r^SSAYS oK 
 
 ',/ 
 
Strata, S^eta foch 
 
 BERNARD ALBERT SINN 
 
 COLLECTION 
 
 NAVAL HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 
 
 THE C5IFTOF 
 
 BERNARD A. SINN, '97 
 
 1919 
 
Comsll Unlvarslty Library 
 VI 69 .C71 1896 
 
 Essays on naval defence / 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 030 752 004 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030752004 
 
ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE 
 
 BY 
 
 VICE-ADMIRAL P H COLOMB 
 
 Author of "Naval Warfare," 
 
 Gold Medallist Royal United Service Institution, and Lecturer on Naval 
 Strategy and Tactics in the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. 
 
 LONDON 
 W H ALLEN & CO LIMITED 
 
 13 WATERLdO PLACE SW 
 '1893 
 
WTMAK ASD SOKS, LIMITED, LOHDOH AMD BEDHIIL. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The Author has been induced to republish this series 
 of Essays, of which the original production dates from 1871 
 to 1889, by two considerations. First, that there is not in 
 existence any single book treating, however generally, the 
 whole field of Naval Defence, where the great principles 
 of strategy and tactics are placed side by side with the 
 material and personal conditions which, either govern or are 
 governed by them. Secondly, that the range of their dates 
 not only forms a record of the progress of Naval ideas, but 
 shows that in a considerable number of cases, it has been 
 possible to specify the causes which were in operation to 
 produce results, and to forecast the results many years 
 before they appeared. 
 
 In general the essays form a series of inductive argu- 
 ments, and will be found, it is apprehended, to show the 
 general trustworthiness of that method when applied to 
 the determination of practical questions of Naval policy. 
 
 If the theory, now between fifteen and sixteen years old, 
 which is given in the second chapter be studied, it will be 
 seen that the principles then laid down, and arrived at by 
 
IV PEEFACE. 
 
 inductive reasoning, either have produced or are producing 
 the effects anticipated for them. Very notably has this 
 been the case with the question of sail-power as applied to 
 men-of-war. Inductive reasoning made it clear fifteen 
 years ago at least, that sail-power, except as a mere 
 auxiliary, must disappear from British men-of-war ; and 
 it was only a want of reliance on the processes of argu- 
 ment capable of being used, that continutd an ex- 
 penditure over masts and sails which might have been 
 saved with advantage. 
 
 At the time of publication the Naval world is busi'^d 
 in denouncing the very heavy gun, its necessarily small 
 number in each ship, and the consequent character of ships 
 which the very heavy gun determines. But this denuncia- 
 tion, it is shown in Chapters II., and VII., written aa far back 
 as 1877 and 1871, was certain to come at some time or 
 other. The causes which would condemn the concentration 
 of artillery power in a very small number of exception- 
 ally powerful houches d, feu on board a warship were open 
 to all from the first, and the inductive process of reason- 
 ing might, had it been used, have pronounced against 
 it more than a score of years ago. 
 
 The importance of a systematic classification of our ships 
 was hardly felt in 1877, when Chapter II. was written, 
 though the reasons demanding it could be set out. 
 
 It is, in fact, only the failure to employ, and wholly rely 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 apou, the iadacfcive method of reasoaing, which leads us 
 from time to time, or keeps us, on paths over which our 
 steps must be retraced. 
 
 It is hoped, therefore, that tho republication of these 
 Essays will not tend to create reactions which throw us 
 back, but rather to encourage us in placing reliance on 
 tentative experiments, and reasoning strictly based on 
 their results. 
 
 If we could say so many years ago that sail-power was a 
 mistake, and that the very heavy gun was a mistake, 
 but that classification was a vital necessity, is there any 
 reason to show that we cannot test every step towards 
 Naval change by the same processes before we em- 
 bark on courses that will only carry us to the wrong 
 goal in the end ? 
 
 Chapters I. to VI., treat of the main principles of Im- 
 perial Defence, and of the sabordinate facts on which they 
 rest. Many of these principles are even now contested, 
 and some of the facts behind them are denied. But to 
 be right upon both is a fundamental necessity for our 
 Empire, and we can only be right if we test every point 
 by experiment or analysis, and then reason carefully from 
 an established basis. 
 
 Chapters VII. and VIII. treat entirely of tactical prob- 
 lems, and their bearing is necessarily most important on 
 all questions relating to the construction and armament of 
 
yi PREFACE. 
 
 our ships. The science of Naval Tactics still remains in an 
 exceedingly vague and unsatisfactory state ; but the Author 
 is now, as ever, persuaded that there are no difficulties in 
 patting it on an absolutely sound basis in peace time. He 
 believes that proper experiments and proper inductions 
 arising thereon, are entirely reliable as the foundation of 
 the science ; and he has always viewed with some alarm 
 the general apathy of British Admirals on the whole sub- 
 ject. He trusts it may never be with any of them, as it 
 was with Villeneuve on a great historical occasion. " No 
 doubt," wrote this unfortunate Admiral in August, 1805 
 " it is thought that sailing hence with twenty-nine ships, I 
 am considered able to fight with vessels of anything like 
 the same number ; 1 am not afraid to confess to you that I 
 should be sorry to meet with twenty. Our Naval Tactics 
 are out of date ; we only know how to range ourselves in 
 line, and that is precisely what the enemy wishes for. / 
 have neither time nor means to agree upon another system with 
 the Commanders of the vessels of the two nations." 
 
 The first Chapter is an essay republished by the kind 
 permission of Lord Brassey, from the Naval Annual of 
 1888-9; the second Chapter was the Naval Prize Essay of 
 the Royal United Service Institution for the year 1878 ; 
 the remaining Chapters are papers read at Meetings of 
 the Institution, and now republished, with the Prize 
 Essay, by kind permission of the Council. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Imperial Defence 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Great Britain's Maritime Power 31 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 The Naval Dhpbnces op the United Kingdom 129 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Relations between Local Fortifications and a 
 
 Moving Navy 160 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Blockade: Under Existing Conditions of Warfare ... 194 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Conyots: Are they any longer possible? 230 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 The Attack and Defence of Fleets 258 
 
 CHAPTER VIU. 
 The Attack and Defence op Fleets 303 
 
ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 IMPERIAL DEFENCE.^ 
 
 Within the last few years tlie minds of both soldiers and 
 sailors have been steadily at work on the study of Imperial 
 Defence, and though it cannot be said that many canons 
 relating to that subject have been universally accepted, it 
 is not to be doubted that all our ideas on the matter are 
 clearer than they were. Not only so, but month by month 
 the points of difference have been defined, have narrowed 
 the issues, and cleared the controversial field. I may be 
 pardoned, perhaps, for assigning to my brother. Sir John 
 Colomb, the leading part in laying down and continually 
 differentiating the governing principles of Imperial Defence. 
 He took up the study more than twenty years ago, at a 
 time when it had not been touched ; and in his first 
 pamphlet " The Protection of our Commerce and, Distribu- 
 tion of our War Forces Considered," which was published 
 in 1867, may be fairly said to have given the key-note to 
 all subsequent discussions. He followed up this paper 
 with a number of others, all clinging closely to the main 
 principles first enunciated, while working out the sub- 
 
 1 Written in 1889. 
 
2 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 ordinate grouping of the details which were necessary to 
 make a complete scheme. Many military writers have 
 contributed to the elucidation of the great subject, but it 
 has been a misfortune that, as a rule, military men have 
 closed their eyes to the long series of principles within 
 which it is necessary to work, and have treated their own 
 proper functions in plans of defence as if there were 
 nothing outside them, nothing limiting or governing the 
 details. 
 
 With many of them this local defence of the land of 
 each locality has been the be-all and end-all of their pur- 
 view ; they have very generally agreed that the communi- 
 cations between localities separated by water has been no 
 part of their business to study or consider, and they have 
 adopted the position that the idea of such existing commu- 
 nications must be ignored. This erroneous method of 
 dealing with the question — for the moment we suppose 
 open communications we alter all the conditions of the 
 problem — seems really to have originated in the Duke of 
 Wellington's famous letter, improperly published in 1847, 
 not so much in the words of the letter itself as in a curious 
 consensus of determination to drop the limiting words 
 used in the letter as if they had never been there. And 
 yet the limiting words on the one side, and the very small 
 addition to our means of military defence against invasion 
 asked for (and long ago doubled) on the other, were of the 
 very essence of the Duke's thought. ' 
 
 This is what the Duke said to Sir John Burgoyne : 
 
 " You are aware that I have for years been sensible of 
 the alterations produced in maritime warfare and opera- 
 tions, by the application of steam to the propelling of ships 
 at sea. This discovery immediately exposed all parts of 
 the coasts of these islands, which a vessel could approach 
 
IMPiiEIAL DEFENCE. 3 
 
 afc all, to be approached at all times of tide, and in all 
 seasons, by vessels so propelled, from all quarters. We 
 are in fact assailable, and at least liable to insult, and to 
 have contributions levied upon us on all parts of our 
 coast ; that is the coast of these, including the Channel, 
 Islands, which to this time, from the period of the Norman 
 
 Conquest, have never been successfully invaded I 
 
 have in the above words represented our danger. We 
 have no defence, or hope of defence, excepting in our fleet. 
 . ... But as we stand now. and if it he true that the 
 exertimis of the fleet alone are not sufficient to provide for 
 our defence, we are not safe for a week after ike declara- 
 tion of war In that space of coast" (that is, 
 
 between the North Foreland and Selsey Bill) " there are 
 not less' than seven small harbours or mouths of rivers, 
 each without defence, of which an enemy, having landed 
 his infantry on the coast, might take possession, and there- 
 in land his cavalry, and artillery of all calibres, and 
 establish himself, and his communication with France.'' 
 
 I have printed what I consider to be the limiting condi- 
 tions of the Duke of Wellington's alarmed views, in italics ; 
 from which it appears that, could he have bsen assured by 
 the naval officers of that day either that the fleet was 
 sufficient to provide for our defence, or that it could pre- 
 vent a French force landed on our coast from maintaining 
 its communications with France, his alarm would have 
 subsided. Bat even when he was far from being assured 
 on these points, he professed that he would be amply 
 satisfied with additions to our military forces which have 
 long been exceeded. Taken apart not only from the 
 limiting expressions, but from the immense changes in all 
 the conditions which have come about since the Duke 
 wrote, we may freely admit that this celebrated document 
 
 B 2 
 
4 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEMNCE. 
 
 formed a sort of military charter for the localisation of the 
 defences of the Empire. For if the British Islands were 
 to be properly and efficiently defended by local works and 
 local military forces, so could every separate part of the 
 Empire be defended by like local means. So also could 
 each town, port, estuary, or coast entrep6t be kept scathless 
 from the enemy's touch by military and local means. 
 
 And the converse of the proposition might, on the same 
 grounds, be defended. If the security of our own communi- 
 cations across the water could not be maintained, if 
 those of the enemy could not be destroyed, the whole value 
 of communications by sea was lowered. It followed that 
 more stress must be laid upon the local powers of resistance 
 of each item of territory composing the British Empire, and 
 less attention should be paid to the defence of the communi- 
 cations between these items. Communications were not 
 of the essence of Imperial Defence ; it was lucky for the 
 Empire that they were not, for they could not be preserved 
 in war.l 
 
 ^ As an instaoce I quote from a paper by Captain Stone, read at 
 the United Service Institation, with Lord Wolseley in the chair, on 
 January 18tb, (1889). " My premiss is that the possession of nasrul 
 arsenals, dockyards, and coaling stations must practically decid'i 
 the question of naval supremacy ; that such supremacy is abso- 
 lutely essential to our existence as a nation, and that the way to 
 secure it is to fortify and arm our own arsenals, dockyards, and 
 coaling stations in such a fashion as to enable them to resist an 
 enemy's attacks, and at the same time to give a free hand to the 
 Navy to attack those of the enemy with such force as may be 
 available, after providing for the patrolling of our principal trade 
 routes." And then the line, or atmosphere, of thought generated by 
 this enunciation oE principles culminates in such an idea aa the 
 following: "The case of Sevastopol is even more instructive, 
 affording as it does an actual parallel to cases with which we may 
 ourselves have to deal in the event of an invasion of our territory." 
 That is to say, that the complete loss of command of the sea and 
 the placing of it absolutely in the hands oE our enemies, is not 
 recognised as a death-blow to the Empire, so long as spots of terri- 
 tory can be kept intact. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 5 
 
 This appears to me to be the kernel of the military 
 thought for many years past. " The absence of the fleet " 
 was the major premiss, not only in military writings on 
 Imperial Defence, from that wonderful and stirring romance 
 — " The Battle of Dorking " — through all its imitations, but 
 through all the serious papers which military men have 
 put forth. Not only so, but it was the same when views 
 passed into acts of expenditure on defensive arrangements. 
 The Navy was at first quite neutral on the subject ; a great 
 portion of the Navy is neutral still. It generally held that 
 it was in no way concerned with military expenditure. It 
 laughed a little at the easy disappearance of the naval 
 forces, either to the bottom by means which were miracu- 
 lous in their efEecta — if that which is contrary to all 
 experience is miraculous — or by decoy and delusion which 
 rested on the slender basis of an argument historically 
 sound so far as it regarded sailing ships only. But when 
 the Navy laughed, it did so in its sleeve, and the military 
 mind was allowed to pursue the train of thought it had 
 fallen into, with very little check indeed from the Naval 
 mind, which ought to have been busy with friendly and 
 useful criticism. The Navy went farther sometimes, and 
 directly countenanced the military theory that it could 
 neglect communications with the vital points of territory 
 if only each point were rendered individually secure. It 
 to a great extent took up the simple idea which has every- 
 thing on the surface to recommend it, and can hardly be 
 shaken by anything but exceedingly close reasoning, that 
 the local security of a mercantile port would always free 
 the ships which would otherwise be necessary for its pro- 
 tection. The idea may have been the outcome of estab- 
 lishing as a fundamental principle the minor value of 
 communications by sea. The Navy itself was becoming 
 
6 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 permeated by the idea that in the next Naval war it would 
 have something to do which was not concerned in main- 
 taining commiiiiioations. What the something else was, 
 has, I believe, to this day been left undefined. The full 
 idea was promulgated by the Royal Commission of 1859-60, 
 where the enormous sums to be spent on the local defences 
 of Portsmouth, Plymouth, the Thames, and tho Medway 
 were recommended and justified on the plea that the 
 country would never stand the expense of maintaining a 
 Channel Fleet sufficiently powerful to cover these ports, 
 and therefore to preserve their water communications. 1 
 
 Yet, had we not allowed ourselves to fall into the 
 strategical errors which we in our mistaken unconcern had 
 permitted to the military mind, we could never hare 
 stopped at that point. It the country would not provide a 
 Channel Fleet, sufficient to cover these parts, what followed ? 
 What was meant by not providing a Channel Fleet suffi- 
 ciently powerful for the purpose? Was it meant that 
 with all our forces assembled in the Channel we should 
 be still too weak, or was it supposed that the something 
 else which was not named would prevent such concentra- 
 tion ? It is, perhaps, indisputable that it was the latter 
 condition which was implied. But if so, then it was 
 assumed that the commnnications over water of Plymouth, 
 Portsmouth, and the Thames were to disappear, and might 
 disappear without great harm, provided these three points 
 were themselves made secure from capture and occupation. 
 Sir John Colomb, for the first time, and, I believe alone, 
 ran a tilt against all these ideas in his pamphlet of 1867, 
 and especially in the following passages : — 
 
 " The distribution of the forces for the protection of our 
 
 1 It is now scarcely conceivable that such an argument cpuld 
 ever have been put forward except Id joke, 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 7 
 
 oommerce is a most imporfcant and, at the same time, & 
 most difficult problem to solve. The magnitude of this 
 national requirement is only equalled by the difficulty of 
 meeting it with the means at our disposal. Like every- 
 thing else upon a gigantic scale, it can only be accom- 
 plished by the proper application of general principles. 
 Now, in all naval and military operations, whether offen- 
 sive or defensive, there is a golden rule, to neglect which 
 is certain ruin ; it is the fundamental law which applies to 
 all warfare, and is simply this — that the success of all 
 operations depends upon the disposition of the forces in 
 such a manner as will best secure the base of operations 
 and ensure safety and freedom of communication. Know- 
 ing this to be true, it remains with us to show how far it 
 can be acted upon and applied to the object in view. 
 
 "To determine the base of operations we look at a 
 commercial chart, which is nothing more or less than a 
 map of the world, showing the tracks of thousands of 
 ships passing and repassing from one part of the globe to 
 another. We know that on the proper distribution of our 
 forces depends the safety of these innumerable vessels, and 
 that this involves the prosperity, nay, the very existence 
 of the British Empire in time of war. It is in reality the 
 income of the nation which is thus scattered broadcast over 
 the ocean. On examining this chart, it appears that all 
 the tracks radiate from one point — the Channel — and that 
 there by far the greatest number of laden ships are 
 collected. One half of all the ships we are to protect are 
 at and round this point. The Channel is the key of the 
 position, the vital spot to secure against surprise, and it 
 must ever be the base of our naval operations throughout 
 the world. 
 
 " JTow, the same law to which we have referred existg 
 
8 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 witli equal force in all commercial enterprises. The base 
 of all mercantile operations is money ; investments may be 
 regarded as the advanced posts of monetary warfare. 
 Upon the freedom of communication depends the safety of 
 the enterprise. 
 
 "Take, for instance, one of the great banks which 
 lately failed. We are told the cause of the disaster was 
 that the capital — i.e.. the money — was locked up ; the 
 power to call in the advanced posts to the relief of the 
 base, or capital, was wanting ; the lines of communication 
 were cut oS by pressure from without, and the whole 
 monetary edifice fell to the ground. 
 
 " We may look upon the Empire as an immense com- 
 mercial speculation. The base of operations is English 
 money, which is laid out in investments in all parts of the, 
 world. Upon the freedom of communication the com- 
 mercial existence of the Empire depends. From this 
 point of view, the greatest calamity which can befall this 
 gigantic enterprise is that pressure from without which 
 would threaten to cut oS the greatest number of its 
 communications. That danger may, any day, assume a 
 very visible form in the shape of a powerful foreign fleet 
 in the Channel. The capital of the greatest commercial 
 enterprise in the world could not be more effectually 
 locked up than by the siispension of ' imports ' and ' ex- 
 ports,' which would, as a consequence, follow such a 
 contingency. 
 
 "For the reasons we have briefly given, it is evident 
 that the safety of the Channel must be maintained ; and 
 that it is worse than useless to distribute the forces for the 
 protection of our commerce over various parts of the 
 world, while the base of our naval operations, the most 
 vital spot in our commercial system, remains insecure. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 9 
 
 As this involves the employment of a large sea-going fleet 
 for Channel service only, it is advisable to ask the question, 
 "Will not a fleet sufficient for this purpose be equal to the 
 task of protecting England from invasion ? " 
 
 The argument in these passages is very clear, and if it is 
 true and complete, it must govern the whole strategy and 
 art of defence of a maritime Empire. 
 
 In such defence there must always be the two opposing 
 ideas — that of the defence of each spot of territory apart 
 from all the rest ; and that of the defence of the water 
 connecting the spots of territory, considered with the spots 
 of territory as a whole. It may easily be held, indeed 
 often is held, that the two ideas are not antagonistic, but 
 can be embodied and acted on side by side. I believe such 
 an argument cannot be sustained. As a fact we know the 
 thing is not so. No agreement has ever been come to in 
 this Empire of ours as to how far the defence of spots of 
 territory shall be carried, or how far their safety shall be 
 left to be determined by the security of their communica- 
 tions. All we recognise in practice is that there is not 
 anywhere in the Empire a spot which has sufficient local 
 defence, and this is equally the case with such great strategic 
 centres as Portsmouth, Plymouth, Gibraltar, and Malta, as 
 with such lesser centres as Albany and Thursday Island. 
 No doubt opinion is not unanimous. There are high 
 authorities who consider Portsmouth and Plymouth over- 
 done with works ; and the great expenditure on Ber- 
 muda and Dover has been condemned. But still, in the 
 result, it is found that the argument of local defence- 
 lessness always prevails, and expenditure everywhere goes 
 on in recognition of it. But never, I believe, is expenditure 
 undertaken except on the basis of the failure of com- 
 paunioationg, That is to say, nev?r are the land defences, 
 
10 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 or even perhaps the strictly local naval defences, intended 
 to combine in any way with the general naval defence. 
 This is invariably supposed to be absent ; that is to say, 
 the communications are, at any rate for the time, supposed 
 to be out. 
 
 The question appears to be whether there is any other 
 way of considering it ? The Royal Commissioners of 
 1859-60 were unable to combine the two ideas of defence, 
 and their justification of the very heavy expenditure on 
 the fortifications of Portsmouth and Plymouth rested on 
 the sole ground that the defence of their sea communica- 
 tions "would involve the necessity of retaining in the 
 Channel, for purely defensive purposes, a fleet equal to any 
 which could be brought against it, not only by one 
 European State, but by any probable combination of mari- 
 time powers, etc." It was not as the complement — as it 
 has been put by distinguished officers — of the defence of 
 the communications that the great defensive works were 
 to be taken in hand, but on the clear understanding that 
 this would be abandoned altogether. The local defence of 
 the spots of territory was the alternative and opposing 
 system of defence, and not the completion or adjunct of 
 the other— the defence of the communications. Sevastopol 
 may possibly afford us an illustration in point. When the 
 British prepared to undertake its capture or destruction, 
 there was attached to the port a very considerable fleet. 
 The port itself was also strongly fortified and heavily 
 garrisoned. The naval defence would have been complete 
 if it had been able to prevent the landing at a distance 
 from the port ; failing to do or attempt this, it collapsed, 
 and the ships became useful for nothing but to be sunk so 
 as to bar the entrance to the harbour. The port finally fell 
 to the possessor of free water communications. But it 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 11 
 
 would not have fallen, for the invading expedition could 
 not have started, had the Russian water communications 
 been complete, and had those of the British been inter- 
 rupted. After the siege was established, there was a 
 certain threatening by the Russian steamships, which 
 remained protected by the fortifications within the harbour, 
 to interfere with the naval operations of the British. But 
 evidently such attempts have either nothing to do with the 
 present argument, or tend to confirm the view that the 
 local defence of the spot of territory, and its defence by 
 the preservation of its communications, are not concomitant. 
 The threats of the Vladimir, such as they were, corre- 
 sponded only to proposed sorties of the garrison, and so far 
 formed a part of, and were subordinate to, the land defences 
 only. 
 
 Sevastopol forms the converse of the lines of Torres 
 Vedras. Sevastopol fell when attacked by sea, and by 
 forces resting on the sea ; Torres Vedras successfully 
 resisted when invested by land, but with its communica- 
 tions by sea intact. In both cases it was the holder of the 
 sea communications who succeeded. But it was the sea 
 communications which formed the complement of the 
 Duke of Wellington's works ; while in the case of Sevas- 
 topol the works stood alone. 
 
 The case of Gibraltar is again analogous to that of Torres 
 Vedras, and the converse of Sevastopol, and of all success- 
 ful attacks from the sea, while it has differentiating features 
 from the defence of the Lisbon territory. In 1780 this 
 fortress was nearly starved out, because the British had 
 allowed its communications by sea to be cut. It must 
 have fallen, had not Rodney, in January, 1780, restored 
 those communications and revictualled the place. But 
 next year it was the same thing again. Gibraltar was on 
 
12 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 the point of being starved out, when Admiral Darby 
 relieved it with a convoy of 100 store ships in 1781. But 
 both these attempts were desultory, and neither resulted, 
 nor were intended to result, in permanently restored com- 
 munications. And this probably for the reason that, except 
 for the protection of Gibraltar, there was no object in 
 keeping command of the adjacent waters. Our commerce 
 thitherwards was insignificant, and so far from Gibraltar 
 forming a base on which the Navy could rest, it was a great 
 tax on the Navy of that day to preserve it. In February, 
 1782, Minorca, fortified and garrisoned, but with its sea 
 communications cut, succumbed to the enemy whose com- 
 munications were open. Gibraltar, however, withstood 
 the tremendous attack by bombardment, chiefly from the 
 sea, of September in that year, but would subsequently 
 have succumbed to starvation had it not been relieved by 
 Lord Howe, with the great force of twenty-six sail of the 
 line. 
 
 The conditions of Torres Vedras and Gibraltar were there- 
 fore alike in so far as they depended upon the sea for 
 supplies ; they were not alike in so far as the sea communica- 
 tions were permanently open in the one case, and intermit- 
 tently open in the other. Minorca, unrelieved from the sea, 
 fell; Gibraltar, relieved from the sea, maintained its defence. 
 But none of these cases could represent Portsmouth and 
 Plymouth, as their supplies would come by land, and they 
 could not be invested from the sea only. Again, neither 
 Lisbon nor Gibraltar were, at the times mentioned, naval 
 strategical points. At the moment it was of no conse- 
 quence to naval operations whether they fell or stood. 
 They were defended not as present bases, but as future 
 possible naval bases, or perhaps, in the case of Gibraltar, 
 only as a portion of territory which honour, and not 
 
Imperial defence. 13 
 
 utility, forbade the British to part with. What appears 
 to be certain is, that had it been necessary to maintain the 
 sea communications ■with Gibraltar for purposes other 
 than the defence of the garrison, not only would the com- 
 mand of the sea round Gibraltar have been preserved, but 
 such preservation would have prevented all attempts to 
 reduce the place either by bombardment or investment. 
 As it was, the British naval force at the bombardment of 
 Gibraltar was so small that it could only co-operate by 
 landing the crews to man the shore batteries. So far, we 
 do not appear to get a connection between the local defence 
 of the spot of territory and the defence of its communica- 
 tions by water. It seems quite impossible to say in what 
 way the local defence by works and garrisons can assist 
 the defence of its communications, though it is clear 
 enough why maritime nations, which have little hope of 
 maintaining sea communications, should fall back on the 
 local defence of the spots of territory. The maintenance 
 of sea communications involves the safety of the place 
 communicated with. 
 
 But we seem from this cursory examination to observe 
 that what local and fixed defence is good for is only as a 
 substitute for naval defence when the sea communications, 
 eicher by accident or design, may be abandoned. There is 
 little sign that the position of a fleet can be strengthened 
 by works for defensive purposes as the position of an 
 army can be. Nor do we easily get, in any form, a defence 
 which combines both descriptions of passive force. 
 
 The questions that occur, and require answering when- 
 ever the amount of local defence to be given to a spot of 
 territory is in debate, appear to be whether, apart from the 
 defence of the place, it is necessary to maintain its sea 
 communications, or whether these may be abandoned 
 
14 ESSAYS Orf NAVAL DEP'ENCJi;. 
 
 without material loss to tlie Empire, provided that the spot 
 of territory can maintain itself apart from them ? If the 
 place to be defended is a mercantile port, a port of call, or 
 in the track of a great stream of commerce, but is not 
 otherwise of importance, the communications of the place 
 by sea are of more importance than the place itself, and it 
 would be almost strangely uneconomical to expend upon 
 the place itself, until every possible effort had been made 
 to ensure the maintenance of the communications with it ; 
 for the place cannot be touched as long as the communica- 
 tions are intact ; and as the place without its communications 
 is of minor value, we should have been sparing where we 
 should have spent, and spending where we should have 
 spared. 
 
 It may be proper to take the opposite view in the case of 
 spots of territory where communications may be inter- 
 mitted without loss at any rate for a time, but which 
 m.ust be preserved for special reasons. Here the non- 
 maintenance of communications invites and allows attack, 
 and it may be more economical to prepare the place 
 itself to sustain it. 
 
 In the days of sailing ships all communications by sea 
 were more uncertain than they are now, and every day 
 the means of maintaining them improve. On the other 
 hand, tliere is little reason to suppose that the time 
 necessary for the reduction of a place, or the cost of the 
 reduction, have materially diminished, if it can be said 
 that they have not increased. 1 
 
 So far the power of local defence is increased ; or to put 
 
 ' The judgment of the American officers who witnessed the 
 bombardment of the forts at Alexandria was, " that vessels are not 
 yet, and never will be, able to fight on even terms with forts " 
 Eeport on the Operations in Egypt : " Information from Abroad," 
 War Series, No. III., p. 74. 
 
IMPEEIAL DEFENCE!. 15 
 
 it the other way, the necessity for heavy expenditure on 
 the local defence which assumes temporary loss of com- 
 munications is lessened by the advent of steam propulsion. 
 Against a given force of attack with a given strength of 
 defence there must be a given time for the place to hold 
 out. If we assume a place prepared to hold out for a 
 month, when both the news of its investment and the 
 force to relieve it are carried by the wayward, uncertain, 
 and moderate power of the wind, it becomes evident that 
 the same place need not be made capable of sustaining a 
 month's siege if the news of the investment can be carried 
 by telegraph, and the succour can be sent by steam. 
 
 Assume Gibraltar to be now as it was in 1780, a place 
 with which communications could be intermitted without 
 loss to the Empire, a place therefore which it is intended 
 in the general scheme of defence should be left open to 
 attack by sea. Then, supposing no telegraph and no steam, 
 we must assume the investment by the enemy to have 
 been established ten days before the Home Government 
 could get news of it ; and suppose that when the news 
 arrived the relieving fleet was ready to sail, we must allow 
 a month to elapse before it could make its appearance at 
 Gibraltar.l 
 
 If then the communications of Gibraltar were not to be 
 kept up, it was strategically necessary that it should be 
 capable of sustaining siege and investment for at least 
 forty days. 
 
 If we bring in steam and telegraph into operation, we 
 have the news of the investment conveyed in a few 
 
 ' llodney's relieving fleet left Portsmouth on December 26, 1779, 
 and arrived at Gibraltar on January 27, 1780. Darby's fleet sailed 
 on March 13, 1781, and arrived April 12. Howe's fleet left on 
 September 11, 1783, and arrived October 11. 
 
16 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 minutes, and the relieving fleet arriving in fonr days. If 
 we omit the telegraph on the assumption that the cables 
 are destroyed, we have eight days between the beginning 
 of the investment and the arrival of relief. From this 
 point of view we can say that if it were necessary for the 
 retention of Gibraltar that it should have been prepared to 
 stand a siege of forty days in the time of sailing fleets, it 
 need only be prepared to hold out for eight days, or one- 
 fifth of the time, now that we are in face of steam pro- 
 pulsion. 
 
 But when it was necessary to prepare Gibraltar to stand 
 for a certain time alone, and with its communications 
 destroyed, imperial necessities did not demand that they 
 should be kept up. The expenditure of money on Gib- 
 raltar as a fortress now depends on whether the old policy 
 can be renewed. In 1779, when we were at war with 
 France and Spain, the whole naval force that we considered 
 necessary to maintain in the Mediterranean amounted to 
 no more than one 60- and one 50-gnn ship, four frigates, 
 and a brig. There was then no great stream of commerce 
 through the Straits of Gibraltar, as to which we had to 
 choose whether to guard it or abandon it. It is probable 
 that no strategist or statesman seriously contemplates 
 now a days a scheme of imperial defence which assumes 
 the destruction or diversion of the flow of British trade 
 between the Pillars of Hercules. It is no doubt the fact 
 that from time to time there springs up a certain advocacy 
 of alternative routes to the East. Such advocacy is rea- 
 sonable if viewed purely as suggesting an outlet in case of 
 failure to preserve the Mediterranean route to the East. 
 But I am not sure that I have met with any proposal to 
 abandon the Mediterranean as a preliminary measure in 
 thp defence of the Empire. If there are such proposals, I 
 
IMPEKIAL DEFENCE. 17 
 
 have not been informed as to how it is intended that 
 Gibraltar and Malta are to be dealt with. In the event of 
 onr failing to maintain our communications with the East 
 via the Mediterranean and the Canal, we ought .to under- 
 stand that we are either to abandon Malta and Gibraltar as 
 we abandoned Minorca in 1782, or we must be prepared 
 with very great naval forces for the purpose of relieving 
 these fortresses from time to time, as we relieved Gibraltar 
 in 1780, 1781, and 1782. We are either to give these 
 strong places up, or we are ultimately to defend thera by 
 the only means possible — that is, by naval means. With- 
 out any question the maintenance of our hold on Gibraltar 
 was, in the years mentioned, a hampering of, and not an 
 assistance to, our Navy ; while the withdrawal of great 
 fleets from the Channel might have left us peculiarly open 
 to attack at home. It has been noticed by a very com- 
 petent and observant oflScer that a connection between the 
 maintenance of Gibraltar and the loss of our American 
 Colonies might be established. Certainly if Howe, in the 
 autumn of 1782, was able to quit the Channel for two 
 months with 34 sail of the line, it would seem to show 
 that but for Gibraltar such a force was available in North 
 America, but it would take me too far from my subject to 
 follow the thought out.l 
 
 What we have to deal with is the illustration given by 
 the case of Gibraltar : that while it would undoubtedly 
 have fallen with less local defensive power than it had, it 
 would equally have fallen had not the whole available 
 Navy been summoned to its support. 
 
 In considering the question, we ought not, I think, to 
 suffer our minds to be involved in estimating the value of 
 
 ^ Howe, leaving Portsmouth on September 11, did not return till 
 November 14. Eight of his ships were detached. 
 
18 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Gibraltar itself. The whole relations between the systems 
 of defence by local strength, available for a time, but after 
 a time certain to fail, and the system of defence by the 
 maintenance of communications, which is not limited in 
 efEeotiveness by the element of time, are only equalled in 
 importance by their complication. The practice we have 
 grown into of assuming two funds, one of which is appli- 
 cable to maintaining communications, and the other appli- 
 cable to separate local defence, founded, as it must be, on 
 the assumption of a failure or interruption of communica- 
 tions, might quite conceivably be pushed to an extent 
 which would weaken the whole Empire. For the fund is 
 originally one found in the hands of the Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, and he does not go into the relative values of 
 different sorts of defence unless called on to do so in 
 Cabinet Council or Committee of Cabinet. So that, con- 
 ceivably, if there should be no Committee of Cabinet on 
 the subject, the reduction of estimate called for by the 
 Chancellor might fall wholly on the defence of communi- 
 cations, and not at all on the local defences of territories, 
 which by themselves are nothing, but, considered as parts 
 of communications, everything. And, indeed, according 
 to Lord Eandolph Churchill's account, something very 
 like this actually happened just before he quitted office. 1 
 Bringing equal pressure to bear on the War Department 
 and on the Admiralty, he got the latter to yield up 
 £700,000, which certainly came out of the defence of the 
 communications, while the former only yielded up £150,000, 
 of which possibly none came ofi the local defences. 
 
 At the bottom' of the whole difficult problem — which is 
 chiefly difficult, be it observed, from the fact that the 
 
 1 In December 1886. 
 
IMPERIAL DEF'ENgE. Id 
 
 administration of the local defences is independent of the 
 administration of the defence of communications — lies the 
 difference of view which may be held regarding the com- 
 mand of the sea. To those who think, as I myself do, that 
 such a command of the sea as in all our wars with France 
 and Spain we have held in the English Channel, is not 
 very difficult for us to hold now all over the world, local 
 defences will assume one aspect. To those who think that 
 not only in distant parts of the world, but in the seas 
 surrounding these islands themselves, we must look in 
 future wars for conditions such as we dealt with when 
 Rodney and De Grasse faced one itnother in the West 
 Indies, or Hughes and Sufeen contended on pretty equal 
 terms in the East Indies, the aspect of local defences must 
 be entirely different. And I think it must be admitted 
 that the latter view prevails, npt only amongst military, 
 but amongst naval men. I am conscious myself that in 
 my general thoughts regarding the relative values of the 
 local defences of spots of territory, and the defences of their 
 communications, I rate the latter higher, and the former 
 lower, than most of my contemporaries. I always feel 
 that in this I may be wrong, and yet every re-examination 
 I make, every fresh illustration that I bring before my 
 mind, with the view of balancing it, tends more and more 
 to raise the value of all that keeps up communication by 
 sea, and to lower the value of all absolutely fixed local 
 defences. That is to say, I get further and further from 
 the contemplation of a disputed command of the sea, 
 believing that, should we negligently suffer it, we shall be 
 taking, not the first retrograde step, but the final step 
 which will complete our ruin as an Empire, and reduce us 
 to a low place in the scale of nations. 
 
 The difference between command of the sea and dis- 
 
 2 
 
20 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCfi. 
 
 puted command of the sea is illustrated commonly to my 
 mind by considering France as maintaining her frontiers 
 intact against the German armies, and thereby keeping 
 her territory free and under her control; and France as 
 invaded by German armies, which she sometimes defeats 
 and sometimes fails to defeat, within her own territory. 
 Supposing in this latter case ttat her towns were so well 
 locally defended that the invaders could only invest them, 
 as Metz and Paris actually were invested, and yet that the 
 French armies should fail, as they did fail, to drive the 
 invaders over the frontier into their own country, reason 
 teaches us, and experience confirms it, that unless the 
 local defences of the towns should either enable the 
 numbers of the defending armies to be increased, or 
 should increase the fighting power of the number other- 
 wise existing, there would be no real strength for France 
 in the locally defended towns. 
 
 This conception follows close on the other conception — 
 universally, I believe, accepted by the Navy from the 
 moment I put it forward — namely, that the frontier of our 
 Empire is the enemy's coast line. It is a very old con- 
 ception, and must have been at the bottom of our ancient 
 claim to the sovereignty of the four seas, or of the British 
 seas, as they were indifferently called. But in the absence 
 of Colonial territory, in the absence, in fact, of an Empire, 
 and the existence only of a kingdom, it did not give the 
 idea of that military force which it now possesses. 
 
 If we are right in considering that to preserve the 
 Empire we must preserve the control of the roads within 
 the Empire, we cannot be right in considering our seaports 
 as frontier towns, and our shores as defensible lines of 
 demarcation between us and foreign forces. The two con- 
 ceptions lie opposed to one another, and their divergence is 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 21 
 
 certainly as old as the days of Pitt, when he turned upon 
 the Addington Ministry and selected the Admiralty, with 
 St. Vincent at its head, as the best point of attack. St. 
 Vincent's attitude then was no new one, and it is the 
 general naval attitude now. It is perfectly true that 
 every now and then we hear in naval companies of ex- 
 pressions and concurrences which admit of a less full and 
 hearty acceptation of the policy laid down by St. Vincent 
 in Council, and by Nelson in action, than we sometimes 
 expect. But this proceeds in part from feelings of tolerance 
 and good nature towards the sister Service, which, truth to 
 tell, were but weak forces in the minds of the two great 
 seamen I have spoken of, and in part from the dormant 
 condition of the critical faculty. Naval officers have ac- 
 cepted pretty generally the term, " First line of defence,'' 
 as applied to the Navy — a term which they never could 
 have invented themselves — because they found it growing 
 into general use, especially amongst military men, and 
 because it seemed to give to the Navy something of the 
 pre-eminently defensive character which they had in- 
 stinctively felt to possess ever since they were children. 
 But their critical faculty not being aroused, they did not 
 perceive all the fallacies and incorrect conceptions which lay 
 under the words. Yet I think the words never were good 
 ones, and never could express a true conception. I recollect 
 the late Admiral Sir William King Hall endeavouring to 
 correct it in a speech at a City dinner by declaring that 
 " the Navy was the first line of defence, the. second line of 
 defence^ and the third line of defence." But though 
 these words might well tpnd to modify a conception 
 originally erroneous, they were not calculated to remove 
 it. It is impossible to use the expression "a line of 
 defence" without conceiving a defensive chain, liable to 
 
22 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 be broken through, and with either something defensive 
 or nothing defensive behind it; but such a conception is 
 quite out of place in considering the functions of the 
 British Navy. It is true that in contemplating Lord St. 
 Vincent's naval preparations /or the defence of the British 
 Islands separately from the rest of the Empire, Sir Edward 
 Pellew spoke of them as a " triple bulwark " ; but then be 
 spoke of a naval force really disposed in three lines : a 
 main outer line of the heaviest character watching the 
 enemy, an inner belt of cruisers, and a third body con- 
 sisting of a concentrated reserve fleet, in case of any 
 partial failure of the first line. But it would hardly have 
 occurred to Sir Edward to include in his lines of defence 
 the squadrons guarding our commerce and possessions in 
 the East and West Indies, or the various ships acting as 
 convoys to our trade in every part of the world. 
 
 And it is apparent that we can — if the enemy's coast is 
 our frontier — no more speak of the Navy as a " Jine of 
 defence " than the French nation can speak of their army 
 as a " line of defence " against the Germans ; or than the 
 Germans can speak of their army as a " line of defence " 
 against possible enemies, north or south. The British 
 Navy, like the French or German armies on the defensive, 
 must in the first instance guard the frontier and keep 
 their territory — in this case water, and not land — free to 
 lawful passage, and barred to the march of enemies. 
 Should they fail to keep the frontier, they must fall back 
 within the water territory, and endeavour to beat the 
 enemies which have invaded it over the frontier again. 
 
 Should they fail in this— as Francefailed in the German war 
 
 the Empire is conquered, even as the French Empire was, 
 notwithstanding that a sea-girt Metz, or a water-surrounded 
 Paris of the British Empire should prove so strono- in 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 23 
 
 lucal defence that investment, aoad not assault, must be the 
 tactic employed to reduce them. 
 
 And the state of a conquered French Empire, through- 
 oat which the communications are by laud, appears to me 
 strictly analogous to the state of a conquered British 
 Empire, throughout which the communications are by 
 sea. I am unable to see any difference in principle, 
 though there may be difference in the degree of its ap- 
 plicability. The enemy gives the law to the territory in 
 both cases. Fortified towns may hold out all over the 
 land Empire, yet if the armies of the enemy hold the 
 roads between the towns, the towns are bound to fall in 
 due course, and perhaps without attack of any kind. 
 Broadly it may be said that in all our naval wars this has 
 been the case. Wherever and whenever we have been 
 able to get the highways into our hands, the territories 
 which they connect — omitting self-supporting continents, of 
 course — have fallen to us. Wherever we have failed to con- 
 trol the sea roads, we have not only made no conquest of 
 territory, but have lost those territories which we possessed. 
 
 Generalising for purposes of illustration, we must say 
 that, without exception, we have controlled the English 
 Channel, considered as a road to the heart of the Empire,- 
 ever since the days of De Ruyter, in 1667. In that year 
 the Dutch had a full command of the Channel, for Charles, 
 listening to the economists, who had behind them the 
 telling claim that his father had lost his head for refusing 
 to be guided by them, had destroyed his naval force. It is 
 illustrative of what has already been advanced as the 
 principle of defence by fixed works, that Portsmouth 
 was on this occasion considered too w^U locally defended 
 to be attacked ; and it would be easy to quote the case to 
 justify a heavy expenditure and a great reliance on such 
 
24 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCK. 
 
 ■works. But he would be a strange advocate who could soberly 
 recommend expenditure which would encourage a return 
 to Charles' disastrous policy. The works of Portsmouth 
 could only have been brought into play when the game 
 was so far given up that the Dutch were free to hold the 
 mouth of the Thames,and therefore to invade at their leisure. 
 
 But since that day we have never lost the control of the 
 Channel, though we once had to fight for it on the spot ; 
 and once we mistakenly fought for it when fighting was 
 imprudent, and a beating might have lost it to us. It is 
 not that hostile fleets have not appeared in the Channel, 
 but it is that, with the exceptions named, such hostile 
 fleets as appeared never felt themselves strong enough to 
 fight for the command of the water, and as a consequence, 
 were never able to attempt territorial attacks. 
 
 In 1690 the French fleet appeared in the easternmost 
 part of the Channel, in such strength that Lord Torrington 
 would never of his own motion have attacked them, and 
 yet was in his own mind quite easy as to the situation. 
 " We were forced to fight,'' he said, " contrary to the 
 opinion of the whole Council of War." Thus wrote the 
 Admiral to Lord Nottingham, when off the Isle of Wight, 
 on the 26th June : " We have now a pretty good view of 
 their " (the French) " fleet, which consists of near, if not quite, 
 eighty men-of-war, fit to lie in a line, and thirty fire ships ; 
 a strength that puts me beside the hopes of success, if we 
 should fight, and really may not only endanger the losing 
 of the fleet, but at least the quiet of our own country too ; 
 for if we are beaten, they, beimj absolutely masters of the sea, 
 will be at great liberty of doing many things tliey dare not 
 attempt while we obsfrve them, and are in a. possibility of find- 
 ing Vice-Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the westward." 1 
 
 ■" Entinck's "Naval History," p. 584. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 25 
 
 Queen Mary's Council, overriding the judgment of the 
 naval men, ordered Torrington to fight ; and then ensued 
 the partial engagement off Beachy Head, made partial, and 
 kept partial specially by the Admiral, in order to avoid the 
 complete defeat which the superiority of the enemy 
 rendered certain ; and to prevent him getting that undiis- 
 puted command of the Channel which might have been 
 fatal to William III. 
 
 The naval history of the next year is a perfect example 
 of the whole policy of naval defence. The French were 
 ready to invade us, as soon as they liad the necessary 
 command of the Channel. England was aware that if the 
 command of the Channel was wrested from her, invasion 
 would follow. Tourville, at the head of an immense naval 
 force, sailed up the Channel to cover the crossing cf a 
 French army, which had orders to embark as soon as he 
 appeared. Kussell was, however, strong enough to offer 
 battle to this covering fleet, and the great fight of LaHogue 
 gave to the English again their undisputed command of 
 the Channel, and stopped all idea of invasion from that 
 moment. The only other serious appearance of the enemy 
 in the Channel was in 1779, when an enormous Franco- 
 Spanish fleet appeared off Plymouth, and yet was entirely 
 held in check by the neighbourhood of a much inferior 
 fleet under Sir Charles Hardy. I can hardly look on the 
 proposed invasion of 1744 from Dunkirk, and the arrival 
 of De Roquefeuille's covering fleet at Dungeness as a really 
 serious attempt, for his French fleet was not originally 
 strong enough to fight for the command of the Channel, 
 and precipitately fled on first sight of the English fleet 
 under Sir John Norris. 
 
 The projected invasion of 1759 was not at all unlike that 
 of 1805, and in both cases the intended covering fleets 
 
26 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 were beaten to pieces — in the first case by Hawke and Bos- 
 oawen, before they could even think of the Channel ; suffer- 
 ing in fact the fate of Villenouve at the hands of Oalder. 
 
 This command of the Channel by our fleet is, then, a 
 supreme element in the defence of the Empire, as Sir John 
 Colomb has placed it. It cannot be omitted, argued away, 
 or spoken of as doubtful in any possible scheme which is 
 founded on reason. " No bulwark, no towers along the 
 steep," can be substituted for it. They do not touch the 
 fringe of the position. If it be argued that while the 
 fleets of Torrington, Russell, Norris, Hawke, Boscawen, 
 Calder, Nelson, and Oornwallis, were always able to prevent 
 every territorial attack of consequence, so were the de- 
 fences of Portsmouth able to prevent De Ruyter from 
 attacking when he had command of the Channel, the 
 answer seems to bo that these latter would neither have 
 prevented invasion nor even attack on themselves had the 
 Dutch been prepared for serious business. Not being so 
 prepared, few games they could play were worth the 
 candle, and the slightest of local defences were suflBcient 
 to prevent an attack which could not be serious, and was 
 in the nature of a raid only. But if the con.mand of the 
 Channel was the only reliable defence of the kingdom 
 when it was self-supporting and there was no Empire, how 
 much more absolute is the necessity when there is no self- 
 support, and there is an Empire with water roads ? If we 
 contemplate the loss of the Channel now, we contemplate 
 imperial ruin as a certain thing, and the conquest of these 
 islands by investment as but a part of the ruin. 
 
 And then every spot of territory we possess, which is 
 not self-supporting, is only a smaller edition of the defen- 
 sible status of the British Islands. If we contemplate our 
 communications by sea with it being cut off, we contem- 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 27 
 
 plate its certain fall. We cannot, in short, admit such a 
 contingency as Gibraltar, Malta, Bermuda, Hong Kong, 
 Aden, or Singapore, being cut ofE from the rest of the 
 Empire, and obliged to defend themselves when sur- 
 rounded by the enemy. We contemplate their certain fall 
 when we do this. We accept a return to the conditions I 
 have spoken of as existing in the East and West Indies at 
 one time, and as existing in the Mediterranean when we 
 allowed Gibraltar to be bombarded, Minorca to fall twice, 
 and Corsica and Elba to pass out of our hands. 
 
 This sort of condition was all very well when, at the end 
 of each year, we were able to balance accounts with the 
 enemy in the matter of ships and territories captured by 
 each nation. There was nothing vital about it, and no 
 ruin involved on either aide. It was all an afEair of 
 pawns, very interesting and exciting, as ultimately pre- 
 paring for the check-mate which might be given by the 
 gainer, but which was not, because of the fulness of the 
 chapter of accidents, at all a certainty. Now, these 
 changes in the possession of territories mean not only 
 losses to the Empire which holds them, but stoppage of 
 circulation and paralysis in the limbs of a delicate and 
 extremely sensitive imperial body. Nothing was certain, 
 nothing absolute, in saiUng naval war. In steam war all 
 is absolute and certain ; time, supply, and force, if care is 
 taken in the comparison. If coal were now as easily 
 procured as water was then, and if the taking of water 
 then meant that someone else was deprived of it, as is the 
 case with coal now, we might be better able to afiord a 
 disputed command of the sea in the vicinity of our ports 
 of supply. Being as we are, dependent generally on coal 
 that has to be carried across the sea, we must not only 
 guard it in store but when, proceeding to stora Rightly 
 
28 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE, 
 
 as we may, and do, regard the defence of the store as an all- 
 important matter, we mast not forget that it is no use 
 defending an empty store, and this we should be constantly 
 doing if we guarded tho place of deposit and then left it. 
 In the days of disputed command of the sea of which I am 
 speaking, our water could be picked up in most places, our 
 victuallers and store-ships were only required at long in- 
 tervals, and the interception of them by the enemy had 
 none of the certainties of time and place which now sur- 
 round their possible capture. 
 
 Let us look for a moment at what happens when disputed 
 command of the sea is allowed. When Rodney got to Bar- 
 badoes in February, 1780, he found De Guiohen blockading 
 a British squadron in St. Lucia, and preparing to attack the 
 island. Rodney's appearance sufficed to relieve it. Then 
 followed an indecisive battle, and the British destroyed 
 Fort St. Juan. Later, Rodney, reinforced, took St. EUstatia, 
 Demerara, and Essequibo. Then the French were rein- 
 forced and British territorial attacks had to be given up. 
 There was another indecisive fleet action, and the French 
 renewed their attempts on St. Lucia, captured Tobago, 
 St. Kitts, Montserrat, and re-captured St. Eustatia, 
 Demerara, and Essequibo, so that the British were left in 
 possession of only Barbadoes, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and 
 Antigua. Bat all this interchange of possession ceased 
 after Rodney's action, which gave to the British the un- 
 disputed command of the sea. 
 
 So in the East Indies. The five battles between 
 Hughes and Suffren were sufficient indication that 
 neither was master, and accordingly each, as opportunity 
 ofiered for a local command due to the wind, made such 
 territorial attacks as time admitted. Hughes co-operated 
 with the army in attacks on Negn.patam and Chinsura, and 
 
Imperial defence. 29 
 
 possessed himself of Trincomalee. SufEren, -watxjliing his 
 chance, captured Cuddalore, and re-took Trincomalee, which 
 he held till the peace. 
 
 Thus we see always the same tale. If communications 
 cannot be cut territories cannot be attacked. If communi- 
 cations are cut and attacks made, territories will always 
 fall if communications are not restored in time. Where 
 ever it is necessary for us to keep up communications, we 
 secure the place by the act. If we abandon the idea of 
 uninterrupted comtaunications, then we embrace the idea 
 of the certain fall of our territories. If we embrace the 
 idea of uninterrupted communications, we dispense with 
 that of assuming the necessity for very great local strength, 
 and fall back on the immediate defence of our stored 
 supplies, which need not include the defence of the sur- 
 rounding localities, because our assumption is that sur- 
 rounding localities cannot be attacked while our communi- 
 cations are complete. 
 
 We must not leave very important posts liable to 
 capture by very inferior forces acting suddenly and by 
 surprise. But we are not to suppose that any spot of our 
 territory can hold out by itself with its sea communica- 
 tions cut. We shall probably go fatally wrong, if we 
 suppose that there is any real substitute for purely naval 
 defence, or providing for the security of ingress to, and 
 egress from, all our ports, whether fortified or not, and 
 whether they be naval bases such as Portsmouth, Ply- 
 mouth, Malta, Simon's Bay, Hong Kong, Bermuda, Halifax 
 and Port Royal; commercial ports such as Liverpool, 
 Newcastle, Cape Town, Durban, Bombay, Colombo, Cal- 
 cutta, Melbourne, Sydney, or Brisbane ; or ports of com- 
 mercial call, such as Gibraltar, Port Said, Suez, Aden, 
 Singapore or Albany. 
 
30 ESSAYS ON Naval dEfencJB. 
 
 So long as we clearly understand that our fixed local 
 defences are subordinate to, and assistant to, maintained 
 lines of conimunication, and that purely naval force is 
 never to be absent long enough to permit communication to 
 be cut, we shall not allow much waste of money on what 
 is not of the essence of imperial defence. But if we 
 suppose that local fixed defences will relieve the Navy of 
 any part of its historically defensive character, and 
 assume that fixed defences are a real substitute for naval 
 defence, and will either strengthen the Navy for purely 
 offensive warfare or enable us to maintain a less complete 
 fleet, then it should seem that we are not reading at all, or 
 not reading aright, the teachings of naval history. 
 
ai 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 GEBAT Britain's maritime power : how best developed as 
 
 REGARDS : (1) riGHIING SHIPS ; (2) PROTECTION OF 
 
 COMMERCE ; (3) NAVAL, VOLUNTEER, OR SUPPLEMENTAL 
 rOECE ; (4) COLONIAL AND HOME DEFENCE : THE CLASSES, 
 ARMAMENT, AND DESCRIPTION OF THE VESSELS NEEDED, AND 
 THE ORGANISATION EEQDIRED TO SECURE A POWERFUL AND 
 ECONOMIC IMPERIAL NAVAL FORCE. 1 
 
 It would be difficult to suggest a uaval subject capable 
 of more comprehensive and exbaustive treatment tban this, 
 which the Council of the Royal United Service Institution 
 have announced for the year 1 877 ; and it may be a 
 matter of regret to many an essayist, that he must com- 
 press into 48 pages his possibly overflowing thoughts on 
 the grand theorem. 
 
 But I conceive that, willingly or unwillingly, any essayist 
 who attempts to deal with the matter presented to him, 
 must do so on the prescribed lines. He must be as full 
 as the limited space at his disposal will admit ; he 
 must be as complete as his knowledge allows ; and he 
 must deal with his subiect according to the classification 
 of its component parts which is furnished for his guidance. 
 I shall therefore endeavour to let these rules govern the 
 observations contained in the following pages. 
 
 1 Written in 1877. 
 
32 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 It is, perhaps, so far fortunate that these limits of classi- 
 fication have been drawn ; for were " the development of 
 the maritime power of Great Britain" left without note 
 or comment, as the subject of the essay, the views of the 
 competitors might turn out so various and so contradictory, 
 that an undue pressure would be placed on the shoulders 
 of the judges, even if any really useful result were 
 achieved. But on the other hand, an essay would never 
 be complete which failed at the outset to grasp its subject 
 as a whole, and to announce with what central figure the 
 subordinate groups were to combine, in order that the 
 picture might charm the eye with its beauty, and the 
 sense with its truth. 
 
 My conviction is that, in considerin<r our naval power 
 and its development as a whole, we too commonly fall into 
 the error which is sometimes apparent in our military 
 designs. We are too apt in both cases to overlook the 
 differences which exist in the circumstances of nations, 
 and to regard our own Empire as liable to the same 
 dangers and amenable to the same military or naval 
 treatment as all others. We thus commit a double mis- 
 take ; we suppose that all other nationalities present 
 similar naval and military features — which they do not — 
 and we fancy that we ourselves exhibit a correspondence 
 in circumstances, temper, and character, with that which 
 we have imagined to be common to all our neighbours. 
 Amongst the nations we are like one of our countrymen 
 who happens to own a foreign ancestry, and to carry a 
 foreign air unconsciously. Such a man will often aim at 
 the uniformity which he thinks he perceives around him, 
 unaware of the peculiarities which others see in him, and 
 which being fundamentally natural, can never be shaken 
 off. If we look for it we can readily detect, in the spoken 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 33 
 
 and written words of our foreign naval critics, their 
 opinion of the singularity of Great Britain's naval position ; 
 and sometimes perhaps we may trace a certain covert 
 surprise on their part, whenever our naval policy appears 
 to follow that of any other country. 
 
 History and tradition — our excellent friends if treated 
 with intelligent confidence, but our mortal enemies if 
 allowed an unrecognised sway — are in some degree to 
 blame for this national failing. Many of our famous 
 naval wars have been carried on with nations whose cir- 
 cumstances were not very dissimilar to our own. When 
 the Hollanders fought with us, we both strove for the same 
 prize, the acknowledged dominion of the Narrow Seas. 
 The south and east coasts of England were matched 
 against the shores of Holland. The conditions were alike ; 
 the field of battle was localised, and close at hand ; so that 
 if the Citizen Navy in its latter days imitated the dash of 
 Prince Rupert, and carried the war into our rivers, the 
 Royal Navy of the second Charies was glad to borrow the 
 fighting formation of the enemy's fleet. Both nations, in 
 short, fought on an equal footing, were liable to the same 
 dangers, and experienced the same chances of success at 
 sea. It was in the nature of things that their naval 
 views should agree, and should produce identical results in 
 policy. In the French wars prior to those of the Revolu- 
 tion and the Empire, the naval circumstances of France 
 and of England did not bo greatly difier. Each had a sea- 
 board trade — vast for that epoch— and while each had 
 growing colonial interests in the West and East, neither 
 nation could be starved into submission by a blockade. 
 When the revolutionary war broke out, the relative situa- 
 tions of the two countries had not materially altered. If 
 Canada had passed to England, England had lost the 
 
34 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 United States, and France still held her magnificent West 
 Indian colony. If French influence in Hindostan was on 
 the wane, Pondicherry was not the unimportant colonial 
 item it has since become ; and a very few years previously, 
 the French had deemed it politic to maintain a fleet, 
 numerically more powerful than our own, in the Eastern 
 Seas. As the war progressed, the fleets, trade, and 
 colonial possessions of Holland, combining with those of 
 France, restored any balance which might have been 
 overthrown by the progress of our Indian Empire. 
 Lastly, to complete the picture ; if at a later period of the 
 war, England trembled under the excitement of a 
 threatened blow from the camp at Boulogne, La 
 Vendue, at an earlier time, might easily have become 
 the stepping stone of England to a new conquest of 
 France. 
 
 Thus the dim recollection of the glories of the past, often 
 disinclines us to take that calm and firm survey of the 
 present, which can alone dictate a policy capable of 
 securing " a powerful and economic imperial naval force." 
 History is often allowed to sway us in one way, when, did 
 we adopt its real teachi'ilgs, it would show that the way 
 was a treacherous byepath. For in what degree, let us 
 ask, does the British Empire of to-day resemble, in its 
 naval aspect, that of any other country ? And how far, 
 with the world against us in arms, could we now adopt 
 the naval policy of the close of last century, or be put to 
 the shifts and expedients of a still earlier naval epoch ? 
 In none of her former naval wars did England begin with 
 any tangible superiority in her favour : still less could she 
 claim a monopoly of power on her side. When she won 
 her higher place at the close of each war, she did it by the 
 stubborn daring of her naval leaders, and by the superior 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER 35 
 
 moral aud physical strength of her seamen. Her forces at 
 any menaced point seldom exceeded the nominal power of 
 those of her enemies, and when she beat them, she did it 
 in spite of the facts. If she now adventares into a naval 
 war — even with the world against her — she does so with 
 one absolnte and one practical monopoly in her favour. In 
 the marvellous constellation of naval stations with which 
 she has spangled the ocean. Great Britain possesses an 
 absolute monopoly of resource. She starts in a war with a 
 connected series of points d'appui, which are of over- 
 whelming value, and which cannot be rivalled by the rest 
 of the world banded together. Formerly, the propulsive 
 force of ships was common to all nations. Now that force 
 is unequally distributed, and England possesses it in larger 
 quantity, and in better quality, not only than any single 
 nation, but than any moderate group of nations. The coal- 
 fields of Wales produce a steaming fuel that has no rival, 
 and, in her great colony at the Antipodes, England holds 
 alike the control of steam power there. In her iron, her 
 inventive power, and her restless industry, she possesses 
 advantages which may easily be added to swell the list of 
 her superiorities at starting ; but these she has always pos- 
 sessed, and has always used in achieving her naval supre- 
 macy, so I do not add them. But in her coal she has far 
 more than the mere superiority which the quantity and 
 quality of her production supplies. Her coal-mines com- 
 bine with her naval stations abroad to give that second 
 "practical" monopoly of which I have spoken. Coal, 
 before it can become a naval force, must find its way into 
 the bowels of the war ship. England alone possesses the 
 appliances for making this transfer in every quarter of the 
 globe. Her enemies must commonly load with coal in 
 neutral ports, in short measure, and in haste and fear. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 England alone stores her war ships everywhere within the 
 security of her own harbours. Steam, which in popular 
 fears " bridged the Channel," in truth and in fact placed in 
 our hands the means of barring every ocean highway to all 
 but British ships. 
 
 But if the progress of time has submitted these vast 
 powers to our control, it has not failed to add corre- 
 sponding weaknesses and dangers to our Empire. The 
 power which closed the naval schemes of Napoleon at 
 Trafalgar was the self-sustaining, self-contained, and self- 
 reliant, eighteen millions of people who lived in the 
 British Islands. However truly the last adjective may 
 apply to the thirty-two millions who have succeeded their 
 ancestors, the two first can no longer do so. In 1813, the 
 British people lived on the produce of their soil. In 1875, 
 that people required side hy side with every pownd's worth 
 of raw cotton for manufacture, one pound's worth of raw 
 corn or flour for their sustenance. In considerations such 
 as the foregoing — which might be multiplied if space 
 permitted — we must recognise one of the great changes in 
 the Empire, since the close of the last naval war. That 
 manufactures and commerce have enormously increased is 
 a well understood fact, but this increase has not so much 
 altered as intensified the conditions which were peculiar to 
 Great Britain in earlier days. The state of the food 
 supply, and the increased population dependent on it, are 
 new elements in the problem, which materially alter the 
 general result. The change is also complete in relation to 
 those outlying colonies of whose enormous value as coal- 
 ing stations I have spoken. In naval war, under the old 
 conditions, a blow aimed at any of our smaller colonies 
 would have been more dangerous to our prestige than 
 vital to our power at sea. The capture or destruction of 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 37 
 
 ■d. coal depot oq British, ground might now inflict a wound 
 which would be well nigh fatal. Deprived of the supply 
 which was absolutely necessary to their ralue as fighting 
 ships, the British men-of-war in the vicinity must either 
 fly from an inferior force or yield to it ; and the com- 
 merce which depended on their protection, must cease 
 to flow. 
 
 What, then, is the British Empire in its maritime aspect? 
 It is a vast, straggling, nervous, arterial, and venous 
 system, having its heart, lungs, and brain in the British 
 Islands, its alimentary bases in the great possessions of 
 India, Australia, and North America, and its ganglia in the 
 Crown Colonies. Through this system pulsates the life- 
 blood of the Empire. Main arteries and corresponding 
 veins lead east through the Mediterranean and the Red 
 Sea to India, China, and Australia ; west to America and 
 the West Indies ; south to Australia, Southern Africa and 
 America, and to the Pacific. Capillaries the most minute, 
 at the extremities of civilisation, gather up the raw pro- 
 duce of the nations, transmit it to the larger channels, 
 which in their turn convey it to the heart. This tremen- 
 dous organ having extracted all that is necessary for its 
 own sustentation, forces the transmitted produce through 
 the great main channels, and finally through millions of 
 branching filaments to sustain and revivify the nations of 
 the earth to their remotest borders. The life of an 
 Empire so highly organised must hang by a thread. 
 It is no mollusc from whose inert substance huge 
 masses may be detached at will without much effect 
 upon its vitality. It is a living organism whose parts 
 are all inter-dependent, and highly sensitive in their 
 relations. A stab at the heart may put it to death 
 more suddenly, but perhaps not more surely, than the 
 
38 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 severing of a remote artery, or the wound of a " nerve 
 centre."! 
 
 Assuming that this picture of the British Empire, its 
 strength, and its weaknesses, is a true one, it is well to put 
 the statement made on page 42 to some closer examina- 
 tion. Do we in fact frame our naval policy in correspondence 
 with the facts of our imperial position ? or, would the 
 course we pursue equally fit Russia, France, Germany, or 
 America ? Are w^e recognising to its full extent our prac- 
 tical monopoly of coal supply? Are we guarding these 
 "nerve centres" — our coaling stations — with a clear notion 
 of the effect of a wound there ? Are the conditions I have 
 sketched familiar to the navaLmind of England ? Do they 
 form the ordinary argument of public writers and speakers 
 on naval policy ? To all these questions, I think we must 
 give such answers as will confirm my statement. From 
 the coniplications of a naval policy which is sadly driven 
 and tossed by the wind of the day, we may occasionally 
 extract a fact, a thought, or a statement, consonant with a 
 general system ; but the rule is the other way. 
 
 Take for instance the invasion sfcares which every now 
 and then set our wits staggering. I hold that it is im- 
 possible for anyone whose habit is to regard our naval 
 Empire as a whole, to share in them. Let us take reason- 
 able precautions by all means against invasion, when, as 
 in the days of Napoleon, the political conditions are such 
 as to render invasion the chief aim of our enemies. But 
 if our precautions are such as will make the invasion of 
 the United Kingdom more difficult, but will render its 
 BLOCKADE by sea more easy, or leave any of these main 
 
 ^ For my conception of the Empire, I am entirely indebted to the 
 writings of Captain J. C. R. Colomb, with whose general principles 
 of imperial defence I cordially cononr. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 39 
 
 arteries or nerve filaments— any of the chief channels of 
 food supply, or trade — liable to bo out or blocked, can it 
 be said that we are recognising our Imperial conditions ? 
 Take again the harbour-defence cry, which at the cost of 
 more than a million, built the " Glatton," " Hotspur," 
 "Cyclops," "Hecate," "Hydra," and "Gorgon;" if it 
 did not go further and share in the designs of the " Devas- 
 tation" and her successors. The building of powerful 
 ships which are not fully sea-going — which are more or less 
 incapable of maintaining the ocean communications of the 
 Empire — can only be justified on the assumption that the 
 chief danger to it lies at the mouth of the Thames, the 
 Mersey, or the Clyde ; at Plymouth Sound, Spithead, and 
 the Medway. But if our enemies are to career at will 
 across our lines of communication, while we guard their 
 terminations at head-quarters, what will be left us to 
 guard ? Take again the exceedingly persistent struggle 
 to produce " Cruisers " which shall be perfect sailing 
 vessels, as well as perfect steamers, but necessarily sacri- 
 ficing coal stowage, steadiness of platform, offensive or 
 defensive power. Is this difficult enterprise embarked in 
 with a clear conviction that these ships can always have a 
 coaling station under their lee, an advantage of which 
 their enemies are deprived ? It is manifest that if the full 
 rig of any ship be reduced to an insignificant auxiliary, she 
 may be made by so much the more powerful a fighting 
 ship. Our enemies' " Cruisers " will be forced to carry a 
 sail power which is not necessary to us. When we siibmit 
 our fighting ships to the inconvenience of full rigs, are we 
 not throwing away one of the advantages of our naval 
 position ? Note again, the energetic development of the 
 torpedo in which we are engaged. Setting aside the 
 argument as to the relative value of particular forms of 
 
40 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFEN'CE. 
 
 this weapon, is its development by us, subordinated to the 
 conditions under which we shall carry on a naval war ? 
 The various forms of towing torpedo, as well as the 
 locomotive weapons, tend to make attack cheap, and there- 
 fore to put into the hands of a weak and struggling naval 
 power, the means of dealing effectual blows to a powerful 
 Navy. Their chief field of usefulness will be from a 
 blockaded port, against the force blockading it. Are we 
 wisely preparing to take the place of the blockaded instead 
 of that of the blockading force ? The fixed torpedo or 
 sub-marine mine is a purely defensive weapon, whose only 
 use is the defence of the land against a superior naval 
 attack ; is that to be the position of our land in any part 
 of the world during the next naval war ? 1 
 
 But some of the most striking facts as bearing on my 
 view of our defective policy are to be found in our ten- 
 dency to imitate what our neighbours do in shipbuilding. 
 We built the " Inconstant " to rival an American design,2 
 and the " Inflexible '' to match an Italian one. 3 We can 
 all remember how pressing our public writers were that 
 we should have a rival to "Peter the Great;" and more 
 recently Mr. Reed has used his powerful pen to urge on us 
 the necessity of building " Popofkas." Why even the 
 well-informed and judicious Council of the Institution 
 could not wholly escape from the prevailing line of 
 thought, and in announcing the subject for the Prize Essay 
 of 1876, they gave war vessels "for coast defence" a 
 prominent place, causing the talented winner of the medal 
 to dash into an astonishing design for a " Popofka," which 
 
 1 There is little to re-model in these words, they remain fairly true 
 at the present day. — Ed. 
 
 ' See Mr. Reed's statement at the " Naval Architects," 6th Anril 
 1876. ^ ' 
 
 ^ Mr. Barnaby, in the Times, 27th April, 1876. 
 
THE DEVELOPMEXT OF NAVAL POWER. 41 
 
 only an immature idea of the circumstances of our Naval 
 Empire could have produced. In the general lesson which 
 our public writers draw from the America War, I think 
 we can detect similar misconceptions of the teachings of 
 history when applied to our naval condition, No commoner 
 warning is held up to ua, than the destruction of American 
 shipping by the acts of the Confederate "Alabama "and 
 her fellows. It is asserted that our carrying trade is liable 
 to be abolished on the outbreak of a naval war, in precisely 
 the same way as the American flag disappeared from the 
 seas. It must of course be granted that like causes will 
 produce like effects, but it can hardly be allowed that if we 
 are alive to our position, either " Alabamas " will be fitted 
 out in neutral ports, or that " Sumters " will escape from 
 enemies' ports, for the purpose of preying on our commerce ; 
 or that if they were so launched, their lives would be so 
 long, or their acts so fatal, as those of their Confederate 
 prototypes. 
 
 The idea of an " Alabama " only arose out of the weakness 
 of the Northern naval force at the outbreak of the war ; 
 and her long life and destructive action were due solely to 
 the facts thac there was originally no force to withstand or 
 check her ; and that when such a force was at last pre- 
 pared, it laboured under precisely the same difficulties as 
 to supplies — especially of coal — as the " Alabama '' herself 
 did. If, however, the conditions of our naval Empire are 
 only intelligently appreciated, and our naval policy framed 
 in accordance with them, there will be so little hopes of a 
 career for a future " Alabama," that she will hardly be 
 equipped, but if equipped and started, her life will be a very 
 short one. The guards of our lines of commerce will be 
 beforehand with her, and will have the tremendous 
 advantage of home supply, whilst she must seek in un- 
 
42 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 willing neutral ports, a scanty subsistence. So that thougli 
 the career of the " Alabama " is really a warning to us, it 
 is not the same kind of warning which it would be to 
 America, Russia, France, Germany, Austria, or Italy. It 
 might be quite right and sound policy in these countries to 
 build " counter- Alabamas," because the conditions under 
 which they must act will be the same as those of the 
 original " Alabamas," which, any one of them might fit out 
 against the other. But it does not follow that a "counter- 
 Alabama" is the true British answer to the possible 
 " Alabamas " of her enemies. On the face of things, it 
 would appear a safer policy to rely on, and fall in with, the 
 great advantages which we stand possessed of in our per- 
 manent naval force, and our chain of naval posts whence 
 our forces may draw their supplies. 
 
 While I thus draw attention to the central figure, 
 round which my subordinate- ones are to be grouped, and 
 while I endeavour to show that this central figure, or 
 idea, is not allowed due prominence in the naval pictures 
 of the day, I must not omit to notice a growing tendency 
 towards a better state of things. I have already in a note 
 spoken of the aid I have derived from Captain J. 0. R. 
 Colomb's excellent writings, in my general conception of 
 our naval Empire. His more recent writings and speeches 
 confirm me. In some of the utterances of Mr. Brassey,! 
 although in points I disagree with him, I think I trace a 
 truer conception of our naval policy than I have commonly 
 observed. In the papers of Captain Scott, on "The 
 Maritime Defence of England," including offensive and 
 "defensive warfare," read at the Institution on the 16th 
 imd .SOfch June, 1876, and in the disous.sions thereon, there 
 
 ' Now Lord Brassey, — Eu. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 43 
 
 is a great deal which is in accordance with a wide and 
 clear view of our naval position. It shall be my endeavour 
 to add, in however small a degree, to the force of the 
 current of opinion which seems turning here and there 
 into a truer direction. 
 
 When, with the conception of our naval Empire 
 sketched on page 37, and of the misapprehension to 
 which we are shown to be liable by the statements 
 in the following pages, I find myself called on to proceed, 
 I am met by a question of tremendous importance, the 
 answer to which must dominate my whole scheme. Ought 
 the British Navy to be regarded as an attacking or 
 defending force? To answer, as is commonly done, that 
 it is a defending force — " Our first line of defence " — and 
 then to complain that it is not developed as an attacking 
 force, that it failed in Russia as the French Navy failed in 
 North Germany, seems to me most dangerous ground to 
 take ap ; illogical to a degree, and the parent of wasteful 
 expenditure. If it is a defending force, let it be so de- 
 veloped, and let some other force take up the attack under 
 its guard. It is almost as weak to answer that it is partly 
 an attacking and partly a defending force ; such a thought 
 if invested with the power of directing a policy, will 
 probably produce a Navy resembling some of those in- 
 genious pieces of furniture, which form sofas, beds, chairs, 
 baths, or writing tables, at convenience, but which 
 generally find their most useful functions in the lumber 
 room. On the other hand, to look upon the Navy as an 
 attacking force is to ignore historical lessons, and few are 
 prepared to support that position. 
 
 For my own part, T am clear that a " powerful and 
 economic," naval force is only to be obtained by regarding 
 it as strictly a defensive one. In saying this, I do not 
 
44 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 mean to deny that there are occasions and localities where 
 isolated naval attacks may be made with advantage, but I 
 contend that such things should not enter into the general 
 scheme, and should invariably be met as the expedience of 
 the moment dictates. In a short phrase, I look on the 
 functions of the English Navy as being confined to pre- 
 venting damage being done to as by the enemy, and to pro- 
 moting and covering attacks. I think, also, that if history 
 shows us that our Navy was rightly used in former ages 
 to fill these offices, the changes of time have confirmed 
 historical lessons, and made them more powerful than ever. 
 
 But let me put forward a few of the arguments 
 which appear to condemn those illogical but common views 
 just mentioned. 
 
 In those general summaries of Admiralty misdoings, 
 with which a free press so often favours us, it has become 
 a supposed platitude to say that that Board was over- 
 taken by the Russian war " without a gun-boat," and 
 would now be overtaken by any other war in the same 
 presumed helpless condition. It is perfectly true that we 
 had no gun-boats at the close of 1853, and that we pro- 
 ceeded to build both gun and mortar-boats almost by the 
 hundred, as soon as war was declared. The charge against 
 the Admiralty is, that the Navy was not in 1854, and is 
 not now, prepared as an attacking force. But in answer, 
 it may be pointed out that 1855-6 saw a large naval force 
 specially prepared to attack the enemy ; so that not a great 
 deal of time was lost, nor did we suffer in any way from 
 the delay j but also that though much of this intended 
 attacking force got on to its ground, it really had no effect 
 on the duration of the war. Its one act was the bombard- 
 ment of Sveaborg, which could not even take rank as a 
 useful diversion of the enemy's force, it is true that work 
 
THE DEVELOPME^fT OF NAVAL POWER. 45 
 
 was afterwards found for the giin-boats in China and else- 
 where, so that the economic failure was not so great as it 
 might have been. But supposing no such use had been 
 made of the force, the loss inflicted on the enemy by purely 
 naval attacks could not have reached the cost of preparing 
 them. 
 
 Sveaborg, in fact, represented the only kind of attacks 
 which the Navy has ever made successfully — the bombard- 
 ment of positions which can be reached from the sea. 
 But we may run through the list of these on our fingers. 
 De Ruyter, on the shores of the Med way, BiOoke at 
 Gibraltar, Nelson at Copenhagen, Exmouth at Algiers, 
 _ Stopford at Acre ; these actions are the only ones of any 
 magnitude which were attended with important conse- 
 quences ; and it is remarkable that they were all fought 
 by ships specially designed to defend themselves against 
 ships, or as I should put it, by specially defensive forces. 
 Another case in point on the other side, is the Spanish 
 attack on Gibraltar. Here the attacking naval force was 
 extemporised, and was certainly as powerful as the concep- 
 tions of the day could design ; but it failed as completely 
 as Nelson's attack on Teneriffe. 
 
 But when we have admitted the policy of looking on the 
 Navy as a defending ferce, we must next point out the 
 lines it should occupy ; and here I may say that I think 
 public writers fall into the gravest errors when they 
 conceive English waters as the outer lines of an entrenched 
 camp, to be occupied by the Navy, while the body of the 
 place is held by a defending army. Such an idea might 
 more reasonably have obtained at the date of the Dutch 
 wars, and might have been forced upon us by the combined 
 fleets of France and Spain at the beginning of this century. 
 But if the unintelligent memory of the Dutch wars laid us 
 
46 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 open to siege or invasion from 1797 to 1805, the intelligent 
 memory of that great peril should guard us from ever 
 repeating the error. Insufficient blookading forces at 
 Toulon, Cadiz, Roohfort, L'Orient, and Brest, permitted in 
 1805 a junction of naval forces against us which our 
 individual superiority at sea alone prevented from being 
 overwhelming. And in what condition, let me ask, should 
 we have found ourselves, had Villeneuve carried out the 
 Emperor's orders, and had he commanded ships individually 
 as powerful as our own ? Sir Robert Oalder's action 
 would have terminated in a loss to us ; the Emperor would 
 not have withdrawn his troops from Boulogne ; and we 
 should have sufidred at least — invasion. Bat these public 
 writers of whom 1 have spoken, wish our naval policy to 
 begin now, where it might have calamitously ended in 
 1805. 1 We are to be prepared, say they, to guard our ports 
 from sudden raids, and our shores from permanent occu- 
 pation. Vast systems of " Harbour Defence," by torpedoes, 
 by rams, circular ironclads, and "Staunch" gunboats, 
 these ought to be the very important, if not the chief 
 objects of a true naval policy. The " protection of our 
 commerce " is to be attained by fast cruisers, who shall 
 meet and destroy the fast cruisers of the enemy, just aa 
 the "Kearsage'' met and destroyed the "Alabama." For 
 fleets ? Well, these writers have a strong notion that 
 their time has gone by, and they say very little for them ; 
 while as to the blockade and the preparation for it — it is 
 an old world notion necessarily to be abandoned in these 
 days of steam and electricity. 
 Summarised, the rather vague policy recommended to us 
 
 ' Information derived from Adcnirality reoordj siooe this was 
 written, tends to show our Naval Reserves at home so large that 
 Napoleon never had any ohanoe of pvibdainjr them.— Ed, 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 47 
 
 may be put thus into four theses. (1) The shores of the 
 British Isles must in the first instance be preserved 
 inviolate by a naval force close to them. (2) The 
 cruisers of the enemy must be met and beaten at sea. (3) 
 The enemy's fleets may be met at sea, and if so, should be 
 beaten. (4) Some kind of naval force especially designed 
 for attacking the territory of the enemy should be always 
 kept in readiness. I am not sure whether those who 
 are in the habit of advancing these theses separately, 
 would admit that I correctly enunciate them now that I 
 have placed them together ; nor, on the other hand, am I 
 sure that some .of those who may read this paper will not 
 commend the summary as the indication of a true policy : 
 but it is in the advancement of such views, either separ- 
 ately, or together, that I see the strongest instances of 
 disinclination to investigate and accept existing facts, and 
 to act in subordination to them. If there are any who 
 altogether deny that I rightly state prevailing opinion, 
 either as a whole, or in its separate branches, I would ask 
 them to turn generally to the writings of the day, and to 
 sse where, and how of to a, the idea of blockade, or of fleets 
 of observation, shows itself present in the minds of the 
 authors. Also, whether the harbour defence ship, and the 
 swift, unarmoured cruiser do not, with the torpedo vessel, 
 almost entirely divide the empire of their opinions on 
 naval construction ? 
 
 Having thus set forth what would, in my view, be the 
 wrong developments of the Navy, considered in its true 
 light as a defending force, let me state what I consider the 
 right development. It appears to me that our Navy has 
 two, and only two great defensive functions to fulfil, 
 namely, (1) to keep the enemy in his own ports, and to 
 stop his supplies thither ; and (2) to keep open the great 
 
48 ESSAYS ON NAVAL nEKENCE. 
 
 sea-routes to and from the beart of the Empire — the 
 Islands of Great Britain. If after these things are fully 
 provided for, anything else remains to be done, certainly 
 let us prepare for it in peace time ; but I cannot imagine 
 that anything else need be done, or in fact, would be done, 
 if these offices of the Navy were completely filled, until 
 we had to deal with an enemy as practically beaten at sea 
 as Russia was when war began in 1854. Then indeed we 
 may expect popular cries for naval attacks on the enemy ; 
 then indeed we may expect to see them made with 
 materials hurriedly designed and brought to bear ; but at 
 least the statesman of such a day will be bound to con- 
 sider these attacks as mere diversions, quite apart from the 
 main purpose of the imperial effort. 
 
 Whatever functions the Navy may be expected, in the 
 minds of those who busy themselves about it, to fulfil, it is 
 certain that one of three views will prevail in dictating the 
 method to be pursued in peace time. Some— chiefly those 
 who are, and expect to remain irresponsible — will be for 
 modelling the whole Navy from first to last on a theory of 
 probable war, and probable requirements then. Others — 
 chiefly those who are so pressed with carrying out detail 
 and the current work of the Navy now, that they have 
 little or no leisure to look into a problematical future — will 
 devote themselves first to the current wants of the day, 
 secondly, to meeting the current opinion of the day. It is 
 exceedingly unlikely that they will, or can go further. 
 But those who have more leisure for thought, and are not 
 so office-driven, will reflect that " a powerful and economi- 
 cal imperial naval force" must grow in a contsitutional 
 soil, and under constitutional skies, which are both in 
 themselves adverse to the production. The soil must be 
 manured and worked, and the weather cheated, or the plant 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWEE. 49 
 
 cannot be developed. In plain words, under the will of a 
 popular assembly, very much driven by the eager but 
 uninstructed opinions of the least informed and most pre- 
 occupied of the people, the greatest caution is necessary 
 not to push a theory of naval force too much into promi- 
 nence ; but having carefully mastered the broad principles 
 of the proposed development, to carry them out in apparent 
 subordination to the requirements of peace. England 
 never has yet, and never will be sufiBciently long under the 
 dominion of a single set of minds to carry out a grand 
 scheme of preparation for war in its entirety. I think it 
 is the duty of an essayist to remember this leading fact, 
 and consequently my next position is that the demands of 
 peace should be in the first instance provided for. But 
 while I lay down this dictum, I couple it with another. 
 Not a single ship should be built which did not designedly 
 occupy her place in the great scheme of preparation for 
 war. It may be said that these things are not compatible, 
 but I hope to show that we should have to submit to very 
 slight inconveniences in peace time after all, while we 
 gained the much greater object of being READY when 
 war came. 
 
 Now let us observe on what clear ground we stand if we 
 follow out the course prescribed up to this point. In the 
 first place, we are taking for our basis only what actually 
 is ; we know for certain the geographical conditions of our 
 naval Empire, and we know exactly our naval wants in 
 peace time. We are to combine these two clear, undoubted 
 facts ; our peace ships are to be built for our peace wants, 
 but we are to see that above and beyond this, they will fall 
 immediately into their places on the declaration of war : 
 but only — and here is an important point — only as defen- 
 sive weapons, and to preserve the naval status of the 
 
50 ESSAYS ON NAVAL nEr'ENCR. 
 
 Empire, while it makes its attacks by other means. 
 Unless we are prepared to say that the peace public ships 
 and the war public ships are essentially different, tlie 
 principle laid down will only call on us to strike out from 
 the design of the peace ship all those elements which mfiy 
 prevent her taking part in the great scheme when the 
 time comes ; and to add such things as are wanting. Next, 
 we banish from our minds all vague and indefinite notioun 
 of naval attacks, and we say in effect, " we maintain a free 
 sea in peace time : nothing whatever is to be thought of 
 the Navy at war but this maintenance, until it is so secure 
 that we have leisure and opportunity for special efforts in 
 other directions." But it is evident that over and above 
 the Navy which is kept up in peace by the direct pressure 
 of a public opinion, largely moulded by the heads of com- 
 mercial houses, whose smaller agencies abroad carry on 
 their business under the active protection of Her Majesty's 
 ships, the country has hardly ever shown itself averse to 
 a moderate expenditure on classes of ships not directly 
 concerned in commerce-protection in peace times ; here our 
 hands are freer, and these ships can be constructed directly 
 and entirely with a view to further defensive war. 
 
 It is on broad and simple bases such as these that I am 
 prepared to rest my scheme for the "development of 
 Great Britain's Maritime Power," and it will be found, as I 
 go on, that I shall advocate what may be thought startling 
 changes : but that such as I do recommend, will be in 
 entire subordination to these great principles, and will be 
 backed by the logic of facts. 1 
 
 Turning now from the statement of general principles, 
 
 1 There is little In the foieRolng pasiaios that requires modlfloa- 
 tlon. The general priaoiplej laid down are more generally aooepted 
 now than they were fifteen years ago, and I trust this essay bad 
 »ome hard in this result,— IOd. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 51 
 
 to their application to the facts, we must look at the actual 
 geographical position of our naval Empire, and note what 
 lines of communication it is imperative to maintain, and on 
 what points d'appui the necessary forces are to rest. This 
 survey will give us some idea of"our probable require- 
 ments in war so far. We must then turn to an examina- 
 tion of our naval force actually in commission, and its 
 geographical distribution. If we draw a comparison 
 between these forces — that probably required in war, and 
 that actually required in peace, we shall readily arrive at 
 some conception of the modifications — if any — proper to 
 be introduced into our peace establishment in order to 
 make it economically valuable for war service. Finally, 
 by assuming a case of war between England and a combi- 
 nation of naval powers as large as may be reasonably 
 expected to appear in arms against us, we shall arrive at 
 some conclasions as to the nature and extent of that force 
 which should undertake the duties of blockade, or of 
 meeting masses of the enemy at sea, in the event of our 
 imprudence in peace time leaving us with incomplete 
 blockading forces on the outbreak of war ; or, which is 
 perhaps as probable, in the event of its being necessary to 
 open the war with a fleet action. In all these estimates 
 of our requirements, we are, it is to be observed, to base 
 our views on a series of facts as follows : — 
 
 (1) The geographical condition of our naval Empire. 
 
 (2) Our actual peace Navy. 
 
 (3) The geographical condition of a possible naval 
 combination against us, and the nature and distribution of 
 neighbouring naval forces. 
 
 It is, I conceive, almost impossible to arrive at very 
 erroneous views if' this method of argument is steadily 
 pursued. The result will be to show us in general terms 
 
 E 2 
 
52 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 the classes of ships, and the relative proportions of the 
 classes necessary at the outbreak of a great war, whence 
 we can deduce rules to be followed in providing our peace 
 Navy. We can afterwards descend to those questions of 
 propulsion, armament, and defensive arrangements, which 
 should rnle the construction of each type, and so conclude 
 our consideration of the two chief heads set forth in the 
 Council's memorandum, namely, our "Fighting Ships, 
 and the Protection of our Commerce;" afterwards we 
 can take the minor points of the "Naval Volunteer, 
 or Supplemental Force," and our "Colonial and Home 
 Defence," — the latter being, as will be observed, really 
 provided for, as far as naval forces go, in my general 
 scheme. 
 
 We may now turn to the chart of our naval Empire 
 which I have prepared. In it I have omitted all refer- 
 ence to the continents enclosing this Empire, because it 
 is sufficiently evident that if we can succeed in preserving 
 the chain of communication between the different naval 
 stations unbroken and free, we by this act preserve our 
 mainland from naval attacks, and need not therefore con- 
 cern ourselves with them. 
 
 As before observed (page 38), the chief arterial and 
 venous trade routes are five in number, and run east 
 through the Mediterranean to India, China, Japan, and 
 Australia ; south to Africa and South America, and round 
 the Cape of Good Hope, or by the Straits of Magellan, and 
 Cape Horn; south-west to the West Indies, and the 
 Isthmus of Panama; west to the United States and 
 Canada; and north-east to the Baltic. The existing 
 nervous system, which in war time must govern and pro- 
 tect the commercial routes, is shown by black lines on the 
 chart. Each line connects two possible naval stations on 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 53 
 
 British territory, which are shown hy the small circles. 
 These circles are not in all case naval stations properly 
 so called, but at least they are, or can be made, coaling 
 stations, if not regular depots. It will be seen that there is 
 another imperfect network of dotted lines connected with 
 small squares. These squares represent ports belonging to 
 the smaller powers, which might, in my opinion, be used 
 in time of war to supplement our existing system of depots 
 where it is defective ; ports belonging to the larger States 
 cannot well be considered in this category, as with any of 
 these -we might be at war, and when at war with any of 
 them, is just the time our naval Empire would be im- 
 perilled. At such a time, however, we are eminently in 
 a position for alliances with the smaller maritime States, as 
 we threaten them all simply by the position we actually 
 hold, and, in consequence of that position, we are more 
 able than any other nation to offer them protection and 
 advantages. These plain lines therefore represent the 
 nerves of the Empire, as it is along them that the force 
 necessary to protect our commerce must flow. The stations 
 at the extremity of the lines are the ganglia, where is 
 stored up and reserved the nerve-force brought into play 
 by the war ships. Whenever these nerves or naval routes, 
 with their corresponding ganglia or naval stations, lie 
 directly side by side with the main commercial streams, 
 and where the stations are sufficiently close to each other, 
 there our naval Empire is in a state of geographical per- 
 fection; where, on the other hand, the naval routes lie 
 apart from the commercial highways, and where the naval 
 stations are few and far between, there the danger is most 
 imminent, and the difficulties of preserving the trade 
 routes intact are greatest. But the importance of these 
 dangers and difficulties does not rest on such geographical 
 
54 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 considerations; it rather depends on the extent and nature 
 of the trade passing over the routes in question. A route 
 over which food for the mother country passes is more 
 important than any other over which no food passes j and of 
 any two routes over which no food passes, that is the most 
 important over which raw materials are conveyed, provided 
 the other does not greatly exceed it in value. According 
 to the "Statesman's Tear Book'' for 1877, and taking the 
 . figures quite roughly, as is proper in an essay of this 
 length, the eastern trade route is as important as any in 
 money value, as the commerce beyond the shores of 
 Egypt alone may be taken at £150,000,000 annually, to 
 which all the Mediterranean and Black Sea commerce 
 must be added. Supposing one-third of this to go round 
 the Cape, the eastern route beyond Egypt would stand 
 at £100,000,000. The southern routes take perhaps 
 £50,000,000 to the Cape of Good Hope and round it; 
 while perhaps £12,000,000 goes round Cape Horn or 
 through the Straits of Magellan. These two routes coin- 
 ciding in the Atlantic, make the southern route in value 
 £62,000,000. But, as much of the import from the Pacific 
 is bread-stufE, and much of that from Australia is raw 
 material, wool, &c., this southern route, with the West 
 African and East American produce and import, will not 
 be less valuable than the eastern route. The south-western 
 route, taking in the Panama trade, may perhaps stand for 
 £20,000,000. The western route to the United States alone 
 is put in the "Year Book" at £91,000,000, or, with Canada 
 added, £110,000,000, but as some of the trade goes over Pan- 
 ama and some round the Horn, the western route may be 
 valuedat perhaps£100,000,000,of which the chief part is food 
 and raw material. The north-eastern route may be worth 
 £80,000,0u0,of which the groii tost partisfoodaiidvawmate rial. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL P01^■ER. 55 
 
 Without attempting to do more than sketch a basis for 
 argument, I should be inclined to place the eastern route 
 first in the scale of importance ; the western next ; and 
 then the southern, north-eastern, and south-western. 
 
 Taking therefore the eastern route first, we observe that 
 everywhere, from England to Hong Kong the naval route 
 coincides with the commercial one, and moreover, the 
 greatest distance between any two naval stations is that 
 between Aden and Gtalle — a little over 2,100 miles — while 
 the central point of that route is but 800 miles from Bombay. 
 But this route is peculiar, inasmuch as it passes through 
 territory not belonging to Great Britain 1; but if the passage is 
 to be made at all, Suez and Port Said must be considered to all 
 intents and purposes as British naval stations. By alliance 
 or otherwise with Egypt, England must have the control of 
 the Canal not as a neutral passage, but as a place where her 
 war ships may replenish as in their own ports. A close 
 alliance with Egypt is therefore, in war time, one of the 
 first and earliest methods of protecting our commerce. 
 But this route is geographically defective, inasmuch as 
 the commercial route is prolonged very much beyond 
 Hong Kong to the north, while the nervous system ends 
 there. China is perhaps not sufficiently advanced to give 
 us trouble by proclamations of neutrality, but Japan would 
 be very likely to do so, and with Russian hostile or neutral 
 ports to the north, our commerce might suffer. It must 
 be understood that we are not only concerned to keep 
 these trade routes safe and free, but the mercantile mind 
 must be assured of both, or commerce will shrink away. 
 It would therefore be very desirable that either from 
 Japan, the Corea, or China, some spot of territory should 
 be obtained which is capable of being converted into a 
 
 ' Egypt has .sicce passed under onr protection. 
 
56 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCIS. 
 
 naval d,ep6t. Places perfectly suitable are Port Hamilton,^ 
 south of the Oorea, and belonging to it, and the Island of 
 Tsu-Sima belonging to Japan. As far as Hong Kong, this 
 eastern route may be said to be geographically perfect, but 
 if its geographical advantages are not taken full advantage 
 of, the commercial stream is liable to menace from three 
 quarters. France at Saigon and Pulo Oondore lies directly 
 upon the route from Singapore to Hong Kong. Spain at 
 Manila, occupies a like position to the eastward; Holland 
 might menace the Straits of Sunda and.of Malacca, those 
 two narrow channels through which, as through great 
 railway junctions, the trains of goods must pass and repass, 
 to and from China and Japan. Were those three countries 
 to become hostile to us, the blockade or destruction of 
 Saigon, Pulo Oondore, Manila, Sourabaya, and Batavia, 
 would probably be found imperative to avert paralysis of 
 the China and Japan trade. When from Point-de-Gallo, 
 the commercial route, instead of going east, or north-east 
 to the Indian ports, passes south-east to Fremantle, King 
 George's Sound, and so to the other Australian and New 
 Zealand ports, we come to a run of 3,000 miles between 
 two naval stations. And this route is capable of being 
 threatened along its northern part by Holland, issuing 
 from her ports from Acheen in Sumatra to Koepang in 
 Timor. Holland would be therefore our greatest danger 
 in the Eastern Seas, did she become hostile ; and in the 
 politics of Europe there seems to me no change more 
 perilous to England than that which would attach Holland 
 to the German Empire in a war between it and the British 
 nation. From the centre of the route from Galle to Fre- 
 mantle or King George's Sound, Singapore lies 1,100 miles. 
 But without the command of Straits of Sunda, Singapore 
 " Port Hamilton was subsequently oooupied for a lime. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 57 
 
 ■would be diffioalt of access. The war ships protecting this 
 route might have to depend for supplies on Galle and on. 
 Premantle or King George's Sound, each not less than 
 1,500 miles from the centre of the route, which might be 
 menaced from points not 600 miles distant. If Holland 
 were inimical, and the blockade of her ports in the Sunda 
 Islands incomplete, it might be advantageous to alter the 
 route to Australia, and to pass by Aden to the Seychelles 
 and the Mauritius. The ouly European power capable of 
 menacing this route with advantages corresponding to our 
 own, is France ; but Bourbon in the immediate neighbour- 
 hood of Mauritius would not be a safe port of issue for 
 ships hostile to England, and the possessions of France in 
 Madagascar and its islands might be kept in check by our 
 ships resting on such bases as Zanzibar and Johanna, or 
 ports in Madagascar itself, for these are just the States to 
 become our natural allies in universal war. After leaving 
 King George's Sound, the eastern commercial route becomes 
 again geographically perfect, until its extremest limits are 
 reached in Fiji, which a far-sighted policy has united to 
 the British Grown. There is but one more commercial 
 route to trace in this part of the world, that namely 
 through Singapore and Torres Straits to our Australian 
 possessions. This route of about 3,600 miles is at present, 
 I believe, destitute of naval stations except at its ex- 
 tremities. In war it could be menaced by Holland with 
 advantages on her side, but on the other hand, naval 
 stations might be established at a point or points along the 
 more eastern part of the route, which would remove our 
 disadvantages. Already in the possession of that superior 
 fleet which we now have, and are bound to keep up along 
 any threatened route, we want no more than smooth water 
 anchorages for our bases of operations, and having them, 
 
58 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFKKCE. 
 
 our local superiority cnn be maintained ; -without them we 
 suffer a theoretical disadyantage -which becomes a very real 
 one if our enemy on the spot is in possession of such 
 bases. 
 
 On the whole it is to be observed of our great t astern 
 lines of commerce, and its protecting nerves, or naval 
 routes, that there is nowhere a distance of more than 
 3,300 miles to be traversed between any two naval 
 stations, or points available as naval stations. If the wind 
 is regarded as a neutral, blowing as hard and as long one 
 way as it does the other — giving a ship all its help one 
 time, and all its resistance at another time— then it follows 
 that such a ship starting with as much coal in her bunkers 
 as will cairy her at a given speed 3,500 miles, will be 
 efficient to guard any " nerve " of the eastern part of our 
 naval Empire. She could steam to the middle point of 
 the " nerve,'' fight an action there, and return either to the 
 naval station she started from, or pass on to the naval 
 station at the other extreme. She could very securely do 
 this if she- made an alliance with the wind, and so arranged 
 matters that when it was foul, it should do her a minimum 
 of harm, and when it was fair, a maximum of benefit. 
 We thus see that the propulsive power of a war ship must 
 be regulated by the geographical conditions of her service ; 
 and if we find that the geographical conditions of the British 
 naval Empire do not, in any part of the world, greatly 
 differ from those just discussed, we shall also find that the 
 propulsive power of our war ships may be governed by a 
 uniform law. If, on the contrary, we find that there are 
 commercial routes requiring protection where it is im- 
 practicable to draw the naval stations within 3,300 miles 
 of each other, we shall have to ascertain whether it is 
 bettt'i' to protect those routes by menns of ships with 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 59 
 
 special arrangements for propulsion ; or whetlier the -wholti 
 standard of propulsive power should be raised. 
 
 We now come to that commercial route which in page 54 
 is roughly estimated as next in importance to the eastern, 
 namely the western. There are no naval stations existent 
 guarding this route and nearer to its middle point than 
 St. John's Newfoundland, Halifax, Bermuda, and Nassau. 
 On the other hand, there is no foreign naval station more 
 ^capable of threatening that route than the Azores. But 
 the Azores, unlike Java, Saigon, and the Philipines, are not 
 to be looked on as a possible inimical naval station. On the 
 contrary, one of our first acts, when the western route is 
 threatened, must be a renewal of our old alliance with 
 Portugal, giving us the command of the Azores as a naval 
 station. Again, St. John's, Halifax, and Bermuda, lie almost 
 on the western trade route, and no foreign territory except 
 the United States themselves would enter on war with more 
 local advantages over the route than our own. In a war 
 with the United States, western trade routes cease south 
 of Nova Scotia, while to interrupt the northern routes to 
 Canada, the United States have not the geographical ad- 
 vantages which we have for their protection. In a Euro- 
 pean combination against us, our enemies have no such 
 grasp of the western routes as we have, and only the posses- 
 sion of the Azores could place them at all on a par with 
 us. But, as I have before said, the Azores can never be 
 regarded as a menace to us so long as Portugal remains in 
 possession of them. The western routes are therefore 
 geographically perfect, and as the longest distance between 
 any two naval stations is 3,200 miles (that between 
 England and Bermuda), the propulsive powers of the war 
 ships guarding the western routes may be identical with 
 those necessary for guarding the eastern. 
 
60 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 We next come to the southern route, a stream of com- 
 merce which, sending branches east and west to Africa and 
 America, parts in the South Atlantic into two great channels 
 of trade — the one going round South Africa to join our 
 eastern network of water carriage, the other passing round 
 South America to dissipate itself along the whole line of 
 American western coast until it reaches its source and ter- 
 minus in British Columbia. Unlike the great eastern and 
 western traffic, which is mainly conducted by steam power, 
 and where the outward and homeward routes in consequence 
 nearly coincide, the southern traffic is mainly conducted in 
 sailing ships, and the routes do not wholly coincide. The 
 outward route keeps to the eastward, north of the Line, and 
 then passes westward, south of it ; that stream which 
 rounds the Cape of Good Hope, not turning east until it 
 has reached a considerable southern latitude. The home- 
 ward route from the east, on the other hand, passes close to 
 the Oape of Good Hope, close past St. Helena and Ascension ; 
 at or near the Line, the western stream from South America 
 and Cape Horn joins it, and the volume of traffic thus in- 
 creased, trends away to the westward, and finally flows home 
 north and west of the Azores. Ships guarding the northern 
 portion of the outward route must at present rest on the 
 home ports, on Gibraltar and Sierra Leone, the two latter 
 lying perhaps 1,000 miles from the main stream. The only 
 foreign territories on which forces hostile to this part of the 
 route could rest, are Madeira, the Azores, and the Oape de 
 Verdes, all belonging to Portugal ; Cadiz and the Canaries, 
 belonging to Spain, and the Gambia, belonging to France. 
 But according to my view, Madeira, the Azores, and the 
 Cape de Verdes, must be regarded as closely allied naval 
 stations, open to our ships to the full extent, but closed to 
 all who had designs on our great southern commercial route. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWEE. 61 
 
 Looked at from this point of view, the route to the Line, out- 
 ward is geographically as defensible as the eastern route ; 
 there would be no spot along the route much more than 
 600 miles from a base, and ships stationed here with 3,500 
 miles in their bunkers would rarely be in alarm as to their 
 coal supply. Deprived of the bases furnished by the Portu- 
 guese Islands, we should be, though still in a bettei; position 
 than any possible enemy not resting on those bases, yet still 
 not so well ofE as might be desirable. Our ships resting on 
 Sierra Leone and Gibraltar must calculate on operating at 
 1,200 miles from either station ; that is, they must be pre- 
 pared to steam to a spot 1,200 miles off, fight there, and 
 return, or steam another 1,200 miles in a difPerent direction. 
 That is, their coal supply must exceed that necessary to 
 to steam 2,400 miles. But in discussing the coal supply 
 necessary for a ship protecting the great eastern routes, we 
 allowed a steaming capacity of 3,500 miles ; therefore any 
 ship whose propulsive power is based on the necessities of 
 the eastern routes, is so far competent to deal with the 
 northern part of the outward southern route, even if she 
 is deprived of her very probable coal dep&ts at Madeira, the 
 Azores, and the Cape de Verdes. The northern part of the 
 homeward southern commercial route is not geographically 
 so convenient for defence as the outward route just treated 
 of. There is a point in that route in latitude 30° north and 
 longitude 35° west, which is nearly equally distant from all 
 the English naval stations surrounding it, or speaking quite 
 roughly, 1,600 miles from St. John's, Bermuda, Barbadoes, 
 Sierra Leone, and Gibraltar. That is, if there were no 
 alliance with Portugal, our ships might have to steam 1,600 
 miles to that spot, fight there, and return 1,600 miles, 
 making in all 6,200 miles. But after al], we are no worse 
 here than we were in the far east, and the propulsive power 
 
62 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 of coal for 3,500 miles found necessary there, would be a 
 snfficient supply even for this extreme case. But including 
 as usual the Portuguese Islands of Cape de Verde and the 
 Azores as our assured friends, there would be a quadri- 
 lateral of coaling stations, none of which were more than 
 1,100 miles from the most distant point within it. So that 
 a ship furnished with 3,500 miles of coal, might go to the 
 centre spot, and cruise, or lie there till she had spent nearly 
 half her remaining coal, before she was called on to return 
 for replenishment. On the other hand, setting Portugal 
 aside, there is no Power in so good a geographical position 
 for attacking this route as we are for defending it. 
 
 South of the Line, no European State is geographically as 
 well prepared to interrupt our lines of traflBo as we are to 
 secure them. Brazil, indeed, and the Southern States of 
 South America, would, if hostile, seriously menace geo- 
 graphically the whole of the route south of the Line, to the 
 Pacific, and the northern portion of that to the Cape, and 
 the Indian Ocean. But I think that these States must be 
 regarded as either neutral or friendly. If allied with us, 
 which would be their natural condition with their commerce 
 at our mercy, all our routes in the South Atlantic would be 
 practically secure. If neutral, our bases of operation must 
 be Ascension, St. Helena, Simon's Bay, and the Falkland 
 Islands. This quadrilateral is so much larger than the 
 northern one spoken of in a previous paragraph, and there 
 is a point within it, perhaps 1,800 miles from any English 
 naval station, and supposing the South American States 
 inimical, there would be some difficulty in protecting from 
 such distant points, the outward traffic to the Oape of Good 
 Hope, and both outward and homeward traffic to the Pacific, 
 seeing that the track lies along the hostile coast. But here 
 it is not impossible that nature has placed at our command 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 63 
 
 the meaas of meeting these difficulties, and of establishing a 
 geographical control over this part of the ocean, sufficient 
 for all practical purposes, even without alliances. A hostile 
 Brazil would place Fernando Noronha at our discretion. 
 Further south is Trinidad, with an anchorage, which though 
 described as " unsafe " in the old days of sailing ships, might 
 not be unavailable to the modern men-of-war as a coal 
 dep6t. South-east again lies Tristan d'Aouna, with its 
 " abundance of vegetables, bread, bacon, eggs, butter, milk, 
 poultry, beef, and mutton." This was a British naval 
 station in 1815, and clearly might, in time of pressure, come 
 under its old rulers. True the anchorage remains marked 
 " unsafe," but steam and chain cables have not been without 
 their influence on the safety of anchorages. Trinidad, 
 Tristan d'Acuna, and the Falkland Islands, form a triangle 
 within which there is no point at a greater distance from 
 one of the three others forming it, than perhaps 1,200 miles, 
 and therefore, with the coal supply premised for ships 
 guarding the Eastern route, the South Atlantic routes might 
 also be guarded, even without alliances ; but much more 
 easily with those which would in all probability be made. The 
 homeward route from the Cape may be dismissed in a 
 sentence. It coincides with the nerve running from 
 Simon's Bay through St. Helena and Ascension, and as 
 these stations are not 1,500 miles apart, the geographical 
 command of the track is complete. 
 
 When we follow the eastern branch of the South Atlantic 
 commercial stream round the Cape, we find a nerve 2,200 
 miles long, running from Simon's Bay to Mauritius, which 
 may be broken at Natal, so that the longest nerve should 
 not exceed 1,500 miles. At Mauritius we connect with 
 the eastern nerve system which has been already discussed. 
 The western branch of the great southern trade route 
 
64 KSSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 passes into the Pacific and follows the coast line to the 
 north. The nerve system here is the most defective of any, 
 and it is evident it cannot be preserved unbroken without 
 alliances, or a class of ship altogether more fully provided 
 than those which are capable of guarding the routes already 
 treated of. There is nowhere in the world so large a space 
 of ocean unstudded by British possessions as the great 
 triangle fotmed by the Falklands, Fiji, and Vancouver's 
 Island. Nor are there within that space many points which 
 are suitable for being converted into naval stations. There 
 may be some spot in the Low Archipelago capable of afford- 
 ing a moderately smooth-water anchorage, and perhaps 
 Easter Island might become a dep&t as a temporary ex- 
 pedient ; but Prance and America already possess the Pacific 
 Islands most eligible for affording support to ships opera- 
 ting within the triangle. On the other hand, the whole of 
 the American Pacific States south of Mexico are so situated 
 that their interest would lie in an alliance with that power 
 which had the chief command of the sea. It appears to me 
 that on such alliances the safety of the eastern Pacific trade 
 route must rest. If these alliances were not contracted by 
 us, inimical European powers would at least meet us in the 
 Pacific on equal terms, a thing which it is of vital import- 
 ance to us to prevent. Neglect on our part to form these 
 alliances, and to place a suitable force in the Pacific to rest 
 upon, and at the same time to sustain them, would indeed 
 leave our trade route open to the attacks of the hostile 
 " Alabamas," and would practically leave us no other re- 
 source but " counter-Alabamas," a state of things which 
 would undoubtedly cause the disappearance of the English 
 flag from those waters. Mexican ports might be less open 
 to us than those more to the south, for if the United States 
 were mixed up in a war, they would be able to bring 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 65 
 
 pressure to bear on Mexico by land, and so force her into 
 neutrality. In a European war, in which the United 
 States were distinctly neutral, Mexican ports would be 
 available to us so long as we held the sea on both herooasts. 
 The Sandwich Islands being quite at the mercy of the power 
 holding the sea, might also be calcu,lated on to sustaiin that 
 power, and so remove some of the defects exhibited by the 
 Pacific as a British nerve-system. But I hold it futile to 
 attempt the defence of the Pacific trade route by any de- 
 scription of vessels which must rest for their supplies on 
 Vancouver, Fiji, and the Falkland Islands. With a friendly 
 coast from the Straits of Magellan to Panama, I do not think 
 it is so difficult to defend the trade routes of the Pacific with 
 ships of the propulsive powers designed for other parts of 
 the world. Were the United States hostile, and did they 
 carry Mexico with them, the Island of Guadalupe, with a 
 moderately sheltered anchorage, lying directly in the track 
 from Panama to Vancouver, might be available as a dep6t, 
 and would reduce the length of the nerve to one quite under 
 control. 
 
 The north-eastern commercial route, and the method of 
 preserving it intact, do not require much discussion. It is 
 liable to interruptions only by the great European powers, 
 and we know by experience that so far as Russia is con- 
 cerned, naval forces resting on temporary bases in the Baltic 
 are quite competent to preserve it. The forces necessary to 
 blockade those ports whence might issue our enemies' 
 " Alabamas," would by the act of blockade preserve the 
 trade route intact. 1 
 
 There remains now only the south-western route, that to 
 
 ^ Heligoland is now withdrawn as a nerve centre from this rente ; 
 but the shortness of the distance makes the change of no Import- 
 aute. — Kd. 
 
66 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 the West Indies, to be dealt with ; but a glance at the chart 
 will show that practically it is provided for. When the 
 means are provided for protecting the southern and the 
 western routes, that which lies between them is already 
 protected. Once past the line joining Bermuda and Bar- 
 badoes, the British traders come into a perfect network 
 of naval stations, all close together, and offering a system 
 of naval bases not equalled in any other part of the 
 world. 
 
 We have now fairly examined the whole of the mar- 
 vellous chain of posts which constitute the strength of the 
 British naval Empire. We have seen that, depending on 
 British territories alone for supplies, ships capable of steam- 
 ing at a given moderate speed for 3,500 miles, may every- 
 where, except in the Pacific, pass from point to point under 
 steam alone. In the Pacific it is seen that, either ships 
 must be independent of coal supply, or they cannot operate 
 when resting alone on British naval stations ; but we also 
 know that to be without coal supply is to lay the whole 
 trade route open to depredators of the " Alabama " class. 
 We see also that everywhere on our trade routes there lie 
 either the territories of small States capable of alliances 
 either offensive or defensive with us, or else those desolate 
 spots which, turned into coal depots, become all that we 
 require. Oiir great conclusion therefore is, that our naval 
 Empire depends upon coal supply ■ that capacity for coal 
 stowage is the first requirement of a British man-of-war. 
 That she must use the wind as an auxiliary only — to be 
 cheated when foul, and to be used when fair. Sach, we see, 
 must be our " propulsive policy," while it can be that of no 
 other nation at war with us. No other nation has these 
 coal dep6ts under her lee, even if she had the coal to place in 
 them, and all other nations must therefore, in attacking 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 67 
 
 our trade routes, reverse our propulsive policy. They must 
 have great sail power, and their steam must bo reserved for 
 fighting purposes. It appears to me impossible for such ships 
 to seriously attack commercial lines guarded by other ships 
 practically independent of the wind ; though they would, of 
 course, meet British ships depending greatly on sail power 
 on an equality. 
 
 The study of our geographical condition, therefore, 
 determines the ratio which steam is to bear to sail power, 
 and determines it altogether in favour of the former. If 
 3,500 miles was an impossible coal supply for a ship, then 
 indeed our geographical studies would not have led to much ; 
 but we know that if all other things give way to this one 
 quality of coal-carrying capacity, there is no difficulty about 
 it, and I should myself put 4,000 miles at five knots as the 
 least amount of coal stowage proper for an English man-of- 
 war. 1 
 
 Hut before leaving finally the geographical part of my 
 essay, it is worth while to note how a sort of destiny has 
 possessed us not only with a command over all the great 
 commercial routes, but with the GATES of these routes. 
 Egypt, it is well understood now, is tied to us by bonds of 
 friendship and interest, and gives us the gate of the Red 
 Sea route to the East ; we already hold the gate of the 
 Mediterranean, and the outer gate of the Red Sea. Galle 
 is the gate leading to the east and south-east trade routes ; 
 Singapore, that of the China and Japan highways. The 
 Cape of Good Hope forms the gate of all eastern trade routes 
 in the southern hemisphere ; while the Falkland Islands 
 command the gate of all western roads by water there. 
 Possessed of these gates, how are enemies to pass them ? 
 
 ' Perhaps we may say that . 4,000 miles at 10 knots is now the 
 minimum — Ed. 
 
 V -2 
 
68 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 If they do pass them, what hopes are there of success 
 against our trade, so long as we hold our chain of posts 
 intact, with sufficient maritime forces resting on them ? 
 The answer is clear — None.l 
 
 But T have set out with a statement, or a promise, that 
 my scheme for war purposes would rest on our peace re- 
 quirements, and that the two things are not so antagonistic 
 as they might be thought. Here I may be asked how I 
 am to reconcile the tremendous expense of a fleet depending 
 almost wholly on steam power with peace estimates ? In 
 answer, I deny the " tremendous expense," and I assert that 
 it is more than probable that a peace fleet formed on the 
 principle that sail power is the merest auxiliary, would be 
 cheaper than the present one is, where in most cases steam 
 and sail fight for the mastery. This is a question of facts, 
 and although I have not space to give all the facts, I can 
 give as many as are necessary to prove my case. In the 
 first place, let it be laid to heart that the estimate for coal 
 to be purchased by the Admiralty was, for 1876, but 
 £113,000; while raw hemp, canvas, and some minor articles 
 of like nature, were expected to cost £123,000. Next, I 
 must> point out that I have made a very close examination 
 of the economical results of sail power, as applied to an iron- 
 clad through two years' service, and to a gun- vessel through 
 some fifteen months. I should state that the ironclad had 
 a sail area equal to four square feet per ton of displacement, 
 while the gun-vessel had sixteen square feet. As to the 
 ironclad, I found, I think beyond the possibility of doubt, 
 that her masts and sails cost the country, partly in coal 
 
 1 It will be clearly seen that up to this point I have done little 
 more than amplify the views of Captain J. C. R. Colomb on " Im- 
 perial Defence," taking — as I am bound to do— the more naval view 
 of the question. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 69 
 
 partly in wear and tear, and partly in interest on capital, 
 not less than £2,000 a-year over and above what the ship 
 would have cost had she been entirely mastless. A.S regards 
 the gun-vessel, I traced her minutely over a voyage of 
 6,100 miles, of which only 1,800 were done under steam, 
 with or without sail, and 4,300 were done under sail alone. 
 The wind was fair and strong for more than seven-tenths 
 of the voyage, and the foul winds never exceeded the force 
 of five. Under such circumstances, the resort to sail only, 
 delayed her voyage by about fourteen per cent. Supposing 
 she had had no masts or sails, that the fair wind would not 
 help her in any way, and that the masts and sails as exist- 
 ing did not in any way retard her when the wind was foul, 
 then it is possible to say that this ship, while reducing 
 her speed as above, did actually save sixty per cent, of her 
 coal on this particular passage, so very favourable to such 
 result. Bttt being here concerned with the money cost, 
 we must ask several questions. Suppose the ship, even as 
 she stood, had steamed at the reduced speed forced on her 
 by the resort to sail, would she not have made a probable 
 saving? Can we truly say that fair winds, even without 
 any sail, do not make an economy on coal ? Is it not true 
 that masts and yards do in fact greatly retard a ship when 
 steaming against foul winds ? What was the cost in wear 
 and tear, and interest, of the sail power ? Lastly, this ship 
 had -3 of light foul winds to -7 of strong fair winds j suppose 
 we allow "1 for the difference of force, and say that she had 
 •2 foul to -8 fair winds ; and suppose we strike a proportion, 
 allowing that a ship must expect as much foul as fair wind, 
 what shall we get as the result? To answer the last 
 question, and the rest with it, we get her average gross 
 saving at no more than thirty seven per cent., from which 
 we must deduct the loss due to foul winds acting on masts 
 
70 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 and yards, and the gain due to fair winds acting on a mast- 
 less hull, as well as the probable saving due to the reduced 
 speed. When I followed this gun-vessel to conditions 
 where fairer averages may be taken, I got a gross saving of 
 coal, without any per contras whatever, such as I have 
 noted above, of five jxr cent. only. In this case the struggle 
 to make a steamer a sailing ship, or a sailing ship a steamer, 
 whichever way it may be looked at, has resulted in a ship 
 very helpless indeed under all circumstances requiring 
 propulsive power. Space does not permit me to go more 
 into this question at present ; I have brought this forward 
 to throw the onus probandi on those who differ from me.l 
 
 So far, I have got at two conclusions ; our war ships must 
 offer defence at sea, and they must Lave each a coal supply 
 equal to 4,000 miles steaming at five knots, while their sail 
 power is to be reduced to a pure auxiliary.- 1 have now to 
 consider how ships may be made most capable of offering 
 this defence at sea, and I shall best do this by considering 
 something of the classification of war ship.s. In the first in- 
 stance, what induces classification at all, and what classification 
 is best suited to British requirements ? There always have 
 been classes of ships, for the simple reason that it would 
 have been uneconomical to have built but a single class. 
 In the great naval epochs of the past, the classification was 
 almost rigid. The line-of-battle ship, the frigate, and the 
 sloop, formed the three great divisions into which all navies 
 were then classed. The more technical " rate " then, as now, 
 sub-divided all classes of ships abo.ve the sloop, but the 
 
 ^ Wbtther these arguments were good or bad, the conclusion has 
 certainly been in accordance with them, sail having disappeared 
 from the Navy. — Ed. 
 
 '-' Speed in comparison to coal consumption has so much increased, 
 that the rate called for is now generally put at ten knots instead of 
 five. But It is obvious that the principle has been accepted and 
 maintain ed. — Ed. 
 
fHE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 7l 
 
 " rate,'' though it meant more than it now does, was not so 
 complete a classifier as the terms used above. To-day the 
 classification has very much broken down. We have the 
 ironclad, the frigate, the corvette, the gun-vessel, and the 
 gun-boat, as the neuclei of a possible classification ; but 
 " classification " as a part of a settled naval policy does not 
 exist. One of the most prominent results of the older 
 classification was an agreement among nations that each class 
 of ship was designed to fight her fellows; one of the 
 results of the present, perhaps unavoidable, want of classi- 
 fication, is that there is an idea that any ship should be 
 ready to attack any other. Purely naval opinion is clear 
 enough, that the old system was right ; but public writers 
 of power and influence are not wanting to say that naval 
 opinion, in this instance, is wrong. Yet nothing has 
 occurred as yet to shake the lesson of history on this point, 
 and naval opinion is so far right to rest upon it. The 
 economical results of a happy classification will be admitted 
 on all hands ; but those who have been in power have 
 feared that with our present knowledge of the new naval 
 forces and weapons daily growing up, any classification is 
 as likely to be unliappy as to be happy. France is quoted 
 against a classification, but I think when she produced 
 many ironclads — or earlier, when she produced many paddle 
 steam-frigates — of a particular type, she got a good econo- 
 mical result for the time, and the ships she built with an 
 eye to classification are not more obsolete than those which 
 we bailt without an eye to classification. Names will help 
 us much on a matter of this kind, and so far as I can see, 
 we should do well to adopt a simple nomenclature which 
 would have the double effect of steadying our view, and of 
 giving us an easy way of speaking of war ships. The term 
 "ironclad " is after all a fallacious one, as there is as yet no 
 
72 ESSAYS OK NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 settled system of placing the armonr, nor any regulated 
 allowance of its thickness or quantity. But all ironclads, 
 whether large or small, whether with much or with little 
 plating, are now expected to fight all other ironclads, 
 whether success be probable or no. Most ironclads will 
 assemble in fleets, as they do at this moment, and I should 
 propose to call that class of ship which represents the old 
 line-of-battle ship in this matter — a " Fleet-ship." Then I 
 see no reason why the next class should not retain the name 
 of " Frigate," the next " Corvette," the next " Sloop," and the 
 last " Gun-boat." " Sloop " is a fine old name, without at 
 present any home ; I do not see why it should not take in 
 all Her Majesty's ships commanded by commanders, and 
 find a home there. I suppose there will still be " Dispatch 
 vessels," "Torpedo-boats," "Rams," &o., but these in my view 
 are temporary and insignificant, and I leave them out of my 
 scheme. Under these five classes I should range, as best I 
 could, the existing Royal Navy, and all future ships should 
 be designed to more and more nearly approach the ideal 
 uniformity typified by the classification adopted. Before I 
 go farther, I should point out that the " gun-boat" will he 
 practically left out of my general scheme. Such vessels are 
 more weapons of attack than of defence, they are quickly 
 built and would always be prepared with reference to 
 special localities and particular duties. The few employed 
 in peace time have fields of operation in guarding those very 
 minute commercial rivulets which flow up shallow waters 
 in various parts of the world; and in war time their defen- 
 sive powers would still be similarly engaged ; they would 
 never be expected to patrol the greater channels of com- 
 mercial intercourse.! 
 
 Taking first therefore the " Fleet-ship," I am prepared 
 * It is a little difficult now to believe that fifteen years ago 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 73 
 
 to say that she should be a broadside ironclad of moderate 
 dimensions, of moderate gun-power, and with a moderate 
 thickness of armour. I say this with a full knowledge of 
 all the shafts levelled at such ships, and in full view of the 
 modern gun, the ram, and the three classes of torpedo ; and 
 I am prepared, I think, to show that " power and economy" 
 to use the excellent words of the Council, are not to be got 
 for the Fleet-ship, but out of this type. The touchstone of 
 the whole matter is to be found in this combination of 
 economy with power ; because, as a moment's reflection 
 shows, uneconomical power is not power in the true sense 
 of the word. In approaching the question, a fixed sum of 
 money m^ust be assumed to be spent in a given time. The 
 most powerful single ship which can be produced for this 
 sum of money is not necessarily the most powerful naval 
 force which the money can command. It is only so if the 
 same money will produce nothing capable of matching her 
 except a sister vessel. Nor would it be economical to pro- 
 duce such a single ship if she were so vastly superior 
 to every other, that nothing could face her singly. The 
 question would arise, whether she could be where she 
 was wanted at the time she was wanted, or whether 
 two or more ships could not be .built which — only 
 costing a like sum — would be as much superior to her 
 when combined as she was to any former single ship. 
 The drift of this argument is in part perceived by those 
 numerous writers who assert the demise of armour-plating 
 and who see in the Chinese " Gamma " and " Delta " the 
 
 there was no classification of our ships. It was first introduced in 
 1887 and now comprises (I) Battle-ship=, three classes; (2)' Cruisers, 
 three classes ; (3) Sloops ; (i) Gun-vessels ; (5) Gun-boats, three 
 classes ; (6) Special vessels. It is a classification which will bear 
 compression, and the mere fact of adopting it tends that way. The 
 gun-vessel appears to be dropping out. — Eb. 
 
74 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFKt^CE. 
 
 answer to the "Inflexible."! They are quite right so 
 far as they go, but they do not carry their argument suffi- 
 ciently far. The "Inflexible" was an answer to the 
 Italian " Dandolo," but was not an economical answer. If 
 the " Inflexible " mounts only four 80-ton guns at a cost 
 of £500,000, and if the "Gamma " mounts a 38-ton gun 
 which she can fight at sea, at a cost of only £25,000, it is 
 pretty certain that so far as gun-power is concerned, the 
 " Inflexible " is neither powerful nor economical. But then 
 if this is admitted, we cannot stop with the writers alluded 
 to, at the " Gamma ; " as the type of future gun-ship. The 
 " Gamma's " fire from her one gun is slow, and not more 
 certain than that of much smaller guns. If all nations now 
 took to building " Gammas," it would very soon be dis- 
 covered that the occupation of the 38-ton gun, as well as 
 of all heavier, and some lighter types, was gone ! No one 
 in his sober senses would build and arm a " Gamma " to 
 fight another "Gamma;" or if he had already committed 
 himself to the ship, he would speedily alter her armament, 
 and substitute several lighter guns for the single heavy 
 one carried by his opponent. Thus the "Dandolo " destroys 
 herself and her guns together, by producing the " Gamma " 
 — a statement which, to many persons, will appear to say 
 that we are in a vicious, circular style of argument in the 
 matter of guns and armour. I, however, am assured that 
 the "Dandolo" with her 100-ton .guns and her heavy 
 plating, forms one extren-.e, and the " Gamma " the other, 
 of a system of experimental argument, which will bring us 
 all to a happy mean between them. When you have a 
 ship which, costing a certain sum, is able to successfully 
 defend herself against two or more ships costing together 
 
 1 Vide Mr. Brassey, in the Times of 30lh May, 1877. 
 
THE DEVELOfMEXT OF JCAVAL POWEH. 7o 
 
 the same sum, all by the use of guns and armour, then, so 
 far as guns and armour alone are concerned, that type is 
 permanent. If the " Inflexible " or " Dandolo " could reply, 
 gun for gun, to the number of " Gammas " which could be 
 built for £500,000, it would not be so easy to condemn her 
 as opposed to a fleet of the latter class. It is because she 
 can only reply to at best a very few of them that she shows 
 as an uneconomical power. 
 
 To regard- this question in its true light, it must be 
 remembered that againsi guns there are two kinds of 
 defence — resistance, ofiered by armour, and avoidance, 
 offered by a small target. The " Inflexible " is the extreme 
 representative of the former ; and the " Gamma " of the 
 latter. If defence by resistance is offered, the attack can 
 only meet it by increasing the weight and space occupied by 
 the guns ; as both of these are limited afloat, the numbers 
 of guns carried by the attack are limited and controlled by 
 the strength of armour offered in defence. Armour- 
 plating has in my opinion no other function than this. 
 Invulnerability can never, I think, be attained. If, how- 
 ever, defence by avoidance is offered, then the attack 
 reduces the size of its guns, in order to increase their num- 
 ber. It would be paradoxical to assert it as a fact, but it 
 is well to contemplate the possibility of very heavy armour, 
 combined with only numerous light guns in a single ship. 
 It is quite true that such a ship would be comparatively in- 
 offensive when attacking an ironclad, but what would the 
 ironclad do with her guns which enly just pierced under 
 very favourable conditions ; and what again would the 
 ideal unarmoured ship with only a few guns do against the 
 other's many ? But passing this by, we see that by carry- 
 ing armour you compel your enemy to take few shots at you 
 in any given time ; while if you carry a greater number of 
 
76 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFJ!;^fCli. 
 
 effective guns than he does, you compel him eitlier to in- 
 crease his armour so as to reduce the number of your 
 guns, or else compel him to abandon armour altogether. 
 He can, as we have seen, only do this by a more or less 
 near approach to the " Gamma " idea, and if it is more costly 
 to put afloat in " Gammas " a number of guns equal to 
 those lighter ones with which you are prepared to meet 
 them, your guns being numerous, then he has no resource 
 except to build, armour, and arm, a ship of the same type 
 as yours, and so fight it out with similar weapons on equal 
 terms. This is the argument as regards guns and armour, 
 and to me it is as clear as daylight that on these grounds 
 the heavy gun will remain, and that the ironclad will re- 
 main, but I doubt about the very heavy gun, and the very 
 heavy armour. I do not think that there is as yet anything in 
 the ram or torpedo to alter this prediction. It is impossible 
 on the data available outside the Admiralty, to say exactly 
 whereabouts this medium between the " Inflexible " and the 
 "Gamma" will lie, but as it is necessary for me to assume a 
 medium in terms of English armour and guns, I take it at 
 the 18 to 25-ton gun, and from 10 to 12 inches of the 
 present armour plating. As to the latter I must express a 
 firm conviction of very old standing, that practically little 
 has been done in the matter of armour for ships. I think 
 that by the use of steel, of chilled iron, or by discoveries in 
 the distribution of armour, or of all combined, its resisting 
 power for a given weight will be probably much increased, 
 whereas I do not see that the effective power of the gun is 
 capable of very material increase irrespective of increased 
 size and weight.l The only point I make in the above 
 selection is a security that my Fleet-ship cannot be success- 
 
 ' I am struck by the ooinoidence that I correct the proof of this 
 page on my return from witnessing the absolute triumph of the 
 Harvey armour-plate over the B-in. gun. — Ed. 
 
THE DE\'ELOPMEXT OF NAVAL POWER. 77 
 
 fully attacked by guns of less power tliaii the English 18- 
 ton gun, and that this gun to be efEective must engage her 
 at less than 800 yards. These are moderate desires, 
 and quite within our compass, and I suspect that such ships 
 cannot be economically and successfully attacked with guns 
 except by ships of like nature ; but this will appear later 
 on. For the Fleet-ship we have thus got four of her chief 
 elements : namely, (1) a coal-carrying capacity equal to 
 4,000 miles at 5 knots ; (3) a rig absolutely auxiliary ; (3) 
 18-ton to 25-ton guns ; and (4) 10-inch to 12-inch armour. 
 If it is at this stage alleged against me that a single 
 "Dandolo '' coming am^ongst my fleet of moderately strong 
 ironclads must put them to flight, as her armour is imper- 
 vious to their guns, then I answer that to float a " Dandolo " 
 my enemies must have long time and preparation ; I will 
 suspend the building of one or more of my Fleet-ships when 
 the time comes, in order to build at a less cost than that 
 of the " Dandolo," and in a much shorter time, a sufficient 
 number of " Gammas " to master her. This is setting aside 
 what I might do with my moderate ironclads themselves 
 in the way of rams and torpedoes.l 
 
 In every class of war ship I think a great principle 
 should, as far as possible, govern construction. This is the 
 principle of dudlUy ; everything should, when possible, be 
 doubled, in order that the disorganisation or destruction of 
 one part should still leave the fellow of it efficient and 
 ready. No single chance shot, chance blow, chance acci- 
 dent, ought to utterly paralyse the ship ; she should, to 
 the fullest possible extent, be provided with a second item 
 
 ' This formed, and still forms, the argnment against the very 
 heavy gan and the very large battle-ships. I see nothing to alter lu 
 it, but believe it will receive more general acceptance now than it 
 did when written. I believe it is generally agreed that it would 
 have betn better had the arguments prevailed. — Ed. 
 
78 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 to fall back upon should the first be destroyed. Thus, for 
 the Fleet-ship, she should be double below water — a ship 
 within a ship — in order to allow her outer skin to be 
 pierced without admitting water to the ship proper. In her 
 compartments they should be so arranged that no two of 
 them would sink her when filled. Her engines should be 
 double, with a double set of boiler? — each engine being 
 capable of connection or disconnection with each set of 
 boilers, or with all or any of them. The two sets of boilers 
 should be in separate compartments, and if possible, one 
 compartment should be before, and one abaft the engines. 
 The engines themselves should be each in a separate com- 
 partment. The screws would of course be twin, and, I 
 think, might well have gearing connecting each with the 
 other when desired, so that one engine could work both in 
 case of the other being disabled. But the greatest applica- 
 tion of the dual principle should be in the gun armament 
 of the Fleet-ship. This should be double : a heavy arma- 
 ment to meet armour, and a light one to meet " Gammas," 
 torpedo vessels, and all other unarmoured ships. The heavy 
 battery should be divided into two, so that a great disaster 
 in one half battery will not affect the other. I should 
 carry this duality to very great lengths in the larger ships. 
 There should be two steam fire engines, each to do the duty 
 of bilge-pumps and capstan engines, and the two capstans 
 should be capable when manned of taking tho place of the 
 steam fire engines. The whole, and half the pumping 
 power should be capable of acting on any single compart- 
 ment, and a double set of pipes would make the danger of 
 accident twice as remote. In the smaller classes of ships 
 the dual principle could not be carried so far, but I suspect 
 it might go farther than we think for.l 
 
 ' I still hold to this principle of duality. — Ed. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER, 79 
 
 When sketching out the great principles which should 
 govern construction in an ideal English Navy as a defensive 
 force, I have to remember that it is to repel the gun, the 
 ram, or the torpedo with success, and it is time that I should 
 write the general principles I propose to adopt for these 
 purposes. I have already mentioned the two species of 
 defence against guns, namely, resistance and avoidance, and 
 these also avail us against rams and torpedoes, though not 
 perhaps to a like extent as against guns. I think each 
 species of defence should be employed in every case. As 
 against the gun, I propose to use armour for resistance, and 
 to reduce the size of the vital target to the smallest limits. 
 I am strongly disposed to think that I would not confine 
 armour to the fleet-ship, but would employ it to a limited 
 extent in the frigate. In the placing of this armour, I 
 should follow a dictum on which we are all pretty well 
 agreed now, although the principle does not appear in all 
 past types of ironclads, namely, that the ship should be pro- 
 tected first, and then the guns— or rather, and then the 
 men. As proper systems of compartments do in fact offer 
 great protection to the ship, it does not necessarily follow 
 that all, or even the greater part of the armour should 
 offer no protection to the guns ; on the contrary, I think it 
 is only where compartments are absent that guns should be 
 without resisting protection, and I can conceive a cellular 
 hull without armour, carrying an armoured battery of guns, 
 with much prospect of success in action. But the Tleet- 
 ship, and perhaps the Frigate, would in my scheme have 
 their water lines and their batteries both protected by 
 armour, but its disposition will differ from any which has 
 to my knowledge been as yet proposed. For the defence 
 against Rams, I offer in the first place the avoidance by 
 manoeuvring, but I am not prepared to incommode my coal 
 
80 ESSAYS 0\ NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 stowage already fixed on, by any shortening of the ship for 
 manoeuvring purposes. I am quite ready to condemn ex- 
 cessive length for the attainment of excessive speed, but I 
 must have my 4,000 miles of steaming power whatever be 
 the consequence in length. I am strongly disposed to 
 think, however, that a ship may often avoid a fatal crushing 
 in her side by opposing resistance to it. With plating 
 arranged as in the " Devastation" target of May, 1871, in 
 two thicknesses, it is possible to back the butts of two plates 
 by the centre of a third ; if this vertical structure is again 
 backed by a horizontal angle-iron or feather such as an iron 
 deck represents, it would have great resisting power, and 
 with an inner skin behind it might be successful against a 
 Bam. But if the great principle of duality, as applied to 
 compartments, be adopted, I do not see how a single Bam is 
 to inflict fatal injury, and I would risk it. For defence 
 against the torpedo, I rely very much on avoidance. The 
 course of investigation into the torpedo question has not 
 been, so far as public knowledge goes, to raise that weapon 
 in naval esteem. As a harbour defence I have for the 
 present nothing to say to it, but as a sea attack, with which 
 I am now alone concerned, the Whitehead is the only 
 species which is seriously feared. Eeasoning from analogy, 
 I should think it fair to suppose that the fear of the weapon 
 will not increase as it becomes familiar to the Navy, and as 
 those weaknesses which exist in every new invention are 
 brought into view. But when all this is said, the weapon 
 cannot be ignored, and the only defence of resistance that I 
 know of is a proper system of compartments. If a ship is 
 prepared to stand one exploding Whitehead without sink- 
 ing, I suppose her to have used her defence by resistance 
 to the utmost, and this she may attain by taking care that 
 no two compartments when filled will sink her. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 81 
 
 Thus far, for the purely defensive arrangements of a 
 purely defensive British Fleet. But a defensive fleet is not 
 necessarily inoffensive ; on the contrary ; much of its defence 
 must rely on. the fear of its enemies to attack. With what 
 weapons is the fear to be established, and how are these 
 weapons to be disposed ? I have already committed myself 
 to the gun, up to the moderate weight of 25 tons, and I 
 have already claimed its disposition on this broadside as the 
 best. To me it is an astonishing question which is com- 
 monly put — " Whether is the bow or the broadside the 
 most important fire ? " because I have never heard a serious 
 argument in favour of the bow fire. I know that an 
 opinion in its favour exists, or is supposed to exist, because 
 in a great many ships the broadside is weakened, and very 
 many terrible inconveniences and dangers submitted to in 
 order to supply bow fire. But I have only heard it asserted 
 in support of this policy, that as a ship must not expose 
 herself to be rammed, she must be prepared to fight an 
 end-on battle. But unless she is pretty close to her enemy, 
 and in a particular relative position, there is no objection 
 in life to her presenting her broadside, and an end-on battle 
 must become a broadside one after the lapse of a very 
 few minutes. But here again, the question is one of fact, 
 not opinion. It is certain, because a ship is longer than 
 she is broad, that the broadside fire can always be made 
 more powerful than the bow fire. It is also certain that 
 the vertical target presented by a ship end-on is less than 
 that presented by a ship broadside-on. I have examined 
 the firing of some of our ships provided with bow fire, and 
 find that bow guns of an average ship throw away 26 per 
 cent, of their fire, under conditions when the broadside 
 guns of the same ship only throw away 16 per cent, of 
 their fire. But the idea of bow and stern fire has not 
 
 a 
 
82 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 grown up, as we generally suppose, on reasoned ground ; 
 wc have been drawn into it by an historical process. Bow 
 and stern chasers were in old days, and may be now, re- 
 garded as useful adjuncts to a ship's armament, and there- 
 fore there was always that idea to rest upon. The 
 paddle-wheel occupying the space required for broadside 
 guns, drove them to the bow and stern. As there was 
 little space there, an increase in the power of the " pivot 
 guns " was sought as a substitute for their necessary 
 reduction in number. Screw ships found the pivot-gun 
 already established, and adopted it as their long-range 
 weapon of attack. The naval mind was thus familiarised 
 with the idea of " all-round fire." The two merits of the 
 turret ship, as originally proposed, were its entirely ar- 
 moured condition and its " all-round fire." There was a 
 tendency to show that other arrangements besides the 
 turret could develop " all round fire,'' — so we got ships with 
 guns placed ill for broadside fire, but well for bow or stern 
 five. And having such guns, controversy arose as to their 
 relative values. It was never seen that to make all-round 
 fire important was the natural aim of those who supported 
 the turret system, but that it was, with the screw ship in 
 motion, and especially with the twin-screw ship, a matter of 
 less vital importance. When it was as easy to turn the 
 ship as the turret, why lay such stress upon the arc of 
 training ? In the result, the great merit of all-round fire 
 was given up, and the supporters of turrets — having already 
 given up complete plating — claimed for turrets — a claim 
 they still support — the power of mounting heavier ord- 
 nance than any other system. But meantime we had got 
 the special end-on, and the special broadside fire into a good 
 many ships — the real history of birth was forgotten — and 
 ancestors were found for each kind of fire in questions of 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 83 
 
 tactics which were practically younger than the ships 
 themselves. Oa such grounds I throw over without fear 
 the " end-on " fire ; I decline to weaken the broadside for 
 an advantage so problematical, and I prefer to be very 
 strong in the directions where my strength would most 
 naturally develop itself, to making myself everywhere 
 weak. I am certain that my enemy must either fly, or let 
 me get my broadside to bear on him, but I do not know 
 any means of making him fight an end-on action if he does 
 not choose to do so. I have, however, no objection to a 
 light end-on fire as an adjunct to the heavy broadside fire ; 
 and I think that if the foremost and after guns of my 
 heavy broadside battery can bear a little more forward and 
 after training than the others, it will not be amiss, pro- 
 vided it does not detract from the ordinary broadside 
 power. Such is my present faith as to guns. As to the 
 ram, I hardly know any class of ship to which I would not 
 fit it. I am not so anxious for a " spur " proper, but I 
 think that every class of ship ought to be able to ram her 
 fellow without too much damage to herself, on any con- 
 venient opportunity. I am not so well disposed towards 
 the torpedo. I think that it is not impossible a tow- 
 ing torpedo may be constructed worthy of a place in the 
 armament of a defensive fleet-ship, but I have no belief 
 whatever in the Harvey as a defensive weapon, and I ex- 
 clude it without hesitation from my scheme. I have much 
 more faith in the " outrigger," but as I hinted in the early ' 
 pages of this paper, it appears to be the proper weapon of a 
 blockaded, not of a blockading or patrolling force. There 
 remains the locomotive torpedo, of which the Whitehead is 
 the most celebrated illustration. If I leave this weapon 
 out of my scheme, I must not be understood as rejecting it, 
 but it is too young, too little known, and too untried 
 
 a 3 
 
84 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 to take a place in a scteme which boasts of being founded 
 on fact.l 
 
 I think that I have thus far marshalled and discussed all 
 the great principles which should govern construction, and 
 it now behoves me to show their practical application to 
 the classes of ships I have suggested as proper for our 
 Navy. I shall here give no more than an outline, because 
 the explanation of several completed designs would be 
 foreign to the purpose I assume to be held in view by the 
 Council of the Institution. I do not suppose that all speci- 
 mens of each class will ever be identical in all respects, but 
 I consider that they should be as nearly so as the gradual 
 development of improvement allows. I think there would 
 probably be two divisions of the Fleet-ship class, the smaller 
 for the more distant services, and the latter for blockade 
 and fleet work nearer home. I should put the displace- 
 ment of these ships at 8,000 and 6,000 tons respectively, 
 and probably the one might be called on to mount 25-ton 
 guns, and the other 18-ton guns. The Frigate would dis- 
 place about 4,000 tons ; the Corvette 2,000 tons ; and the 
 sloop from 600 to 1,000 tons. I shall now proceed to 
 describe a second-class Fleet-ship according to my design, 
 and in doing so will compare her with an existing type of 
 her own displacement. Such a comparison is necessary to 
 fix our ideas and to show the advantages gained by ad- 
 hering to the principles I propose. The first-class Fleet-ship 
 would be of the same type, but larger in every way, while 
 the frigate would in many respects be a smaller Fleet-ship. 
 The Corvette and the Sloop would differ in arrangement, 
 but there would be between them a more complete sym- 
 metry than exists just now. 
 
 ^ This is the argument for holding to the old system of arming the 
 broadside. All subsequent experience confirms me in it, and I thiiik 
 I eee the change coming in accordance with it. — ^Ed. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 85 
 
 The existing type of ship which I hare selected as my 
 exemplar is the " Invincible " class, of which the displace- 
 ment is 6,034 tons; the I.H.P. say, 4,500; the heavy 
 armament ten 12-ton guns ; the light armament insignifi- 
 cant ; the armour 8 inches thick to protect the vital 
 ■ water-line, and not exceeding 6 inches elsewhere. The 
 compartment arrangements are such that the two largest 
 communicate by a supposed watertight door below water, 
 and are together amply sufficient to sink the ship when 
 full. The inner skin does not reach the water-line, nor 
 even the deck below the water-line, so that a leak below 
 the water-line lets the water directly into the body of the 
 ship. The class carries some 460 tons of coal, 160 tons of 
 masts and sails. The weight of the hull, including armour 
 and backing, is 4,000 tons, and of the armour itself 900 tons. 
 The plating extends 5 feet below the water-line, and to 
 about 4 feet above it. It is connected by armour to that 
 of the main battery, which carries six 12-ton guns, mounted 
 as broadside guns, in the usual ports, and above this main 
 battery is a central armoured upper battery, the guns in 
 which are mounted to train from a fore and aft position to 
 one exactly absam. The class is rather deficient in boiler 
 power J and of course very deficient in coal stowage ; at 
 five miles to the ton, which is probably their average 
 steaming power at five knots in smooth water, the class has 
 no more than 2,300 miles in their bunkers. Their area of 
 plain sail is about 24,000 square feet, or about 4 square feet 
 per ton of displacement ; and to enable the " Invincible " to 
 carry this sail, she has 360 tons of ballast, otherwise use- 
 less, and a drag upon her. 
 
 The " Invincible " is thus, to my view, a second-class 
 Fleet-ship. She has been designed to resist the attack of 
 every gun of less power than our own 6J-ton 7-inch gun; 
 
8t) Essays oN jstaval defence. 
 
 which penetrates 6-inch plating at 400 yards. It is part 
 of the design that a fatal wound cannot be given at the 
 water-line by a gun of less power than the 12-ton. Some 
 advantage has, however, been allowed to the compartmental 
 arrangement, as a protection from the fatal effects of shot. 
 As to the attacking powers of the design, immense, and to 
 my view, undue advantage had been credited to fore and 
 aft fire, and very great sacrifices have been made to protect 
 the fore and aft guns by armour. In the first place, the 
 area of side armour covering the main battery is 247 
 square feet per gun ; therefore to mount five guns on the 
 broadside would cost 1,235 feet of armour, or 2,470 feet for 
 the double broadside ; add to this the ends at 1,150 square 
 feet, and we get 3,620 square feet as necessary to mount 
 ten 12-ton guns in a single broadside battery. But to 
 mount these guns as in the " Invincible," six on the broad- 
 side, and four fore and aft, costs 4,445 square feet, or 825 
 feet more : or, taking the armour at 6 inches with 10 
 inches of backing, a weight of 102 tons. Besides the 
 actual weight thus lost, the height of the upper battery 
 induces weight by carrying the gunwale up to it ; and its 
 moment above the centre of gravity has much to say to 
 the necessity of ballast. The question therefore remains 
 for those to answer who advocate the protected fore and 
 aft fire, " Are you prepared to spend 1 00 tons of weight on 
 it, when the whole of your heavy armament costs you but 
 300 tons ? Is it better to increase your heavy armament 
 by one-third, or to spend the weight in placing some of 
 your guns so as to fire in a line with the keel ? " In 
 designing the propulsion of the "Invincible," the con- 
 clusion has been that coal supply is less important than sail 
 power, and practically it is seen that it has been considered 
 wise to spend 526 tons of weight on the development of Bail 
 
The DEMfiLOPMEXT OF XAVAL POAVER. 87 
 
 power. I say nothing of the actual performances of the 
 class under sail, for it may be an accident if they are not 
 proficient in that respect. 
 
 Now, it may be observed that in the case of a second- 
 class Fleet-ship of 6,000 tons, I am prepared to advise a 
 certain trusting to the compartmental system for the pro- 
 tection of the ship ; that I do not think it is wise to spend 
 100 tons of weight on obtaining a protected fore and aft 
 fire ; and that I do not think it is wise to spend anything 
 at all approaching 526 tons on the development of sail 
 power. 
 
 I propose, in placing my views in the concrete, to take 
 the lines of the " Invincible " below water as a fixed 
 standard to work upon, and I propose very little alteration 
 in her outward form above water, and practically none in 
 her construction. In this way every proposed alteration 
 will have a measure, or 'standard of comparison, and the 
 rough outlines of my design may be criticised by an appeal 
 to existing facts. It is necessary for me to state that as I 
 have only collected the main points of the " Invincible's '' 
 design here and there, and by calculation and inference 
 therefrom, my figures must in no case be thought rigidly 
 accurate. In a paper of this kind, I have thought that a 
 reasonable accuracy is all that is required. Turning now 
 to Plate II,, we have before us the profile or elevation of my 
 design for a second-class Fleet-ship to supply the place, say 
 of the lost " Vanguard." In the design, the bow and stern 
 above water are both thrown in a little to make up for the 
 placing of certain weights on the extremes of the upper 
 deck, which are not present in the " Invincible." A light 
 poop coming forward 47 feet is added, as a set-off against 
 the removal of the deck above the " Invincible's " upper 
 battery. The whole of the gunwale fore and aft is lowered 
 
88 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 2 feet, and the removal of this weight may be taken as 
 margin to cover deficiencies ; otherwise the exterior of the 
 " Invincible'B " hull is practically unaltered. In the 
 " Invincible " the lower deck is 2 feet 6 inches below the 
 water-line, and in the " Outrageous " this deck is carried 
 up 3 feet, to 6 inches above the water-line. Below this 
 deck the " Outrageous " is divided into nine main water- 
 tight compartments. The distance from No. 1 to No. 8 
 bulkhead is the same as in the " Invincible," but between 
 these there are in the " Invincible " but four main compart- 
 ments — compartments, that is, with bulkheads carried up to 
 or above the water-line. In the " Outrageous " there are 
 at least seven. In both " Invincible " and " Outrageous " 
 the double bottom extends from No- 1 to No 8 bulkhead ; 
 in " Outrageous " this double bottom is carried up to the 
 lower deck ; in the " Invincible " it stops short 5 feet below 
 the water-line, but in the " Invincible " it is 4 feet 10 inches 
 wide at that point, whereas in the " Outrageous " it nowhere 
 exceeds 3 feet 6 inches, The main deck of the " Out- 
 rageous" is 7 feet 10 inches above the lower deck, which 
 gives a height of 6 feet 6 inches below the beams on the 
 lower deck before and abaft the the battery, and of 5 feet 8 
 inches under the battery itself. The main deck is 7 feet 7 
 inches from deck to upper deck, or 6 feet 6 inches under 
 the beams. 
 
 This may be thought low for the 18-ton guns I propose to 
 put in the battery, but I see no reason why the axes of the 
 guns should not be brought down in mounting, and 6 feet 
 6 inches will allow 10° elevation and 10° depression even to 
 the 35-ton gun. It is most important to reduce the area of 
 plating, and the consequent exposure of the men under iti 
 The upper deck gunwale is 4 feet 6 inches high, repre- 
 senting a parapet to admit of rifle fire over it. As compared 
 
5 
 
 
 E 
 
 3 
 
 
 "T" 
 
 
 =] 
 D 
 
 D 
 
 -rl 
 
 
 ■i^. 
 
 e 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 89 
 
 with the " Invincible," the main deck of " Outrageous " is 
 2 feet 7 inches higher above water than her main battery 
 deck, and the centre of midship port of " Outrageous "is 11 
 feet 2 inches above the water-line, while that of " In- 
 vincible" is 9 feet 10 inches. Tho upper deck of 
 "Outrageous" is thus raised above water 7 inches more 
 than that of " Invincible," and this statement concludes all 
 that is necessary to say of the general structure of the pro- 
 posed ship. I may say here that in proposing these 
 changes, I am not forgetting either weights or moments, 
 but as to the former, the simple raising of the decks does 
 not increase them, and additional bulkheads, &c., are made 
 np for by the removal of others. 
 
 I come now to my arrangements below water, and my 
 explanations will refer to Plate III. as well as to Plate II. 
 The ends before and abaft the main compartments may 
 very well stand as they are ; the usual arrangement of sub- 
 divisional compartments properly tight, and without the 
 treacherous but common sluice valves, ought to make the 
 ends reasonably secure, so far as they go. The first com' 
 partment counting from forward in both ships would con- 
 tain water, hemp cables, &o., and perhaps chain cables ; 
 though in " Outrageous " I might possibly stow them else-- 
 where with advantage. In the second compartment are 
 4 boilers and 20 furnaces, two-thirds of the whole boiler 
 power of the ship. In the " Invincible " the whole boiler 
 power is in this compartment, and this traverses the great 
 "dual principle" to which I have committed myself. 
 This compartment in " Outrageous " likewise contains, in 
 round numbers, 300 tons of coal stowed at the backs and 
 ends of the boilers. The third compartment contains the 
 magazines, which occupy the whole of the compartment in 
 a fore and aft direction, and to within 4 feet of the inner 
 
90 Essays on naval defence. 
 
 skin transversely. The crown is the same distance below 
 water as that of " Invincible." Coal is stowed as a reserve 
 above the crown of the magazines, and in the wing spaces. 
 The magazines are two in number, divided by a fore and 
 aft bulkhead ; each has three passages, which are lighted 
 through No. 4 bulkhead from the engine room. The 
 handing rooms are on the fore side, and each has two 
 supply scuttles, and one return. The supply is prelected 
 from the lower to the main deck by a wrought iron 
 cylinder 3 inches thick, so that bursting shell, or light 
 shot, shall in no way interfere with it ; and as the supply 
 is direct to the battery, much less labour is involved in it. 
 Passing to the fourth compartment, we come to the engines, 
 which I assume would be compound in the new ship. In 
 the " Invincible " the engines are together, but in the 
 " Oatrageous " I propose to separate them by a fore and 
 aft watertight bulkhead — still following out my principles. 
 Abaft the engines is No. 5 compartment, which contains 
 two boilers, each of five furnaces, placed athwartships 
 between the shafts, with 140 tons of coal stowed behind 
 them in each wing. In the " Invincible " this compart- 
 ment takes the engines, but I prefer, as I have said, to liave 
 some boiler power abaft, as well as before the engines, so 
 that there shall be a double system of communication 
 between the engines and their prime mover. But now, 
 as the space at my disposal for engines, magazines, and 
 boilers, from No. 2 to No. 6 bulkheads, is exactly the same 
 in " Invincible " and " Outrageous," it may well be asked 
 how I am able to put into it boiler power to 30 furnaces 
 against the " Invincible's " 26 ; coal to very much over 
 600 tons, against the " Invincible's " 460, and power to 
 the extent of 56 tons, against 30 carried by the " Invin- 
 cible ? " The answer is simple enough. 
 
THE DEVBLOPMEXT OF XAVAL POWER. 91 
 
 I have rid my ship of light rooms, of a wasted passage, 
 and of a shell room, and beside this the compartments are 
 everywhere higher. As to the shell room : so soon as it 
 was admitted that shell may be carried in the open, there 
 was an end to shell rooms, and I have properly left the 
 whole of the shell to be stowed as convenience dictates. 
 The after compartments, as in the-case of those forward 
 already spoken of, might remain as in " Invincible " for 
 the stowage of water and provisions. Ascending now from 
 the holds to the lower deck, the observer would find it 
 clear fore and aft, except as to cabins extending along each 
 side. Unlike the "Invincible," there are no watertight 
 bulkheads with assumed watertight doors, and the deck is 
 comparatively lofty, except under the battery. But 
 though there are no bulkheads, a reserve of buoyancy is 
 got in a much more really secure way. The main bulk- 
 heads are prolonged for 2 feet above the deck, so that water 
 cannot ilow freely beyond them. As to convenience, these 
 are readily stepped over ; and as to safety, no errors or 
 neglect of those on board can mar their good effects in 
 time of trial. I may here observe that I have always 
 thoroughly distrusted appliances such as watertight doors, 
 sluice valves, <fec., which require for their efficiency care 
 and thoughtfulness. When nothing else can be had, then 
 of course we must do the best we can with them, but in 
 my experience I have never seen them absolutely necessary. 
 But there is another novel arrangement about the 
 " Outrageous' " lower deck, which must be mentioned 
 before we go further, and which points the moral to the 
 foregoing observations. Hatchways leading to holds are 
 now left usually open. I propose to fit them with sliding 
 doors, to become airtight by upward pressure, as well as 
 watertight by the usual clamps or screws. I am not 
 
92 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 aware that such a defence against torpedoes has yet been 
 thought of, but it is very certain that if the air cannot 
 escape out of a hold, or compartment, very much water 
 cannot enter below. So, far, I have kept to my principles ; 
 we have here a ship with two seta of engines, two separate 
 sets of boilers, and two magazines. These are all enclosed 
 in separate compartments, and no two of them, if filled, 
 will absolutely sink the ship. In doing this we have not 
 sacrificed much. The engiaeer cannot pass to his boilers 
 without ascending above the water-line, nor can he pass 
 from engine to engine except in the same way, but prac- 
 tically this is the whole of the trouble involved, and we 
 can easily reconcile him to his fate by convenient voice 
 pipes (always carried above and not through the bulkheads). 
 Having thus secured all reasonable protection by means of 
 bulkheads, we have to recollect that unless something is 
 done to prevent it, the lightest shot may enter between 
 wind and water, and may easily fill more than two com- 
 partments in an ordinary action. The armour belt is thus 
 to my mind a necessity of the day ; but whereas the 
 " Invincible " carries a belt extending (I gather) from 5 
 feet below the water-line, to 4 feet above it, I propose to 
 cut ofi the upper 3 feet 6 inches of that belt, and let it 
 extend from 5 feet below the water-line to 6 inches above 
 it. I am going to do this because I intend utilising a fact 
 which there has been great trouble to get at, but which by 
 the researches of Mr. Frond, and the practical experience 
 of Mr. Reed and Mr. Barnaby, has been brought out for 
 use. The " Invincible '' class does not roll. One of these 
 ships may pass through a commission and never heel or 
 roll more than one or two degrees. What does this imply 
 as to the matter in hand ? It tells us that a deck some- 
 where near the water-line cannot be struck by the shot — 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 93 
 
 except the very distant shot — of another ship, at any con- 
 siderable angle. The " Invincible " herself, for instance, 
 with her upper battery guns depressed to even 10°, must 
 get her enemy's water-line deck within 95 feet of her to 
 strike it at that angle. If the deck is below water, of 
 course she has so much the better chance, inasmuch as her 
 shot penetrates above water and goes down afterwards. 
 But what chance is there of getting a shot through even a 
 lightly armoured deck, which cannot be struck at a greater 
 angle than 10°, and that only when within 100 feet of the 
 enemy ? Most shot will in point of fact strike a water- 
 line deck at no greater angle than one or two degrees. 
 Even at 5° a half-inch plate must have nearly the resisting 
 force of a 6-inch plate struck at right angles, and in this 
 view the f-inch iron which now covers the lower deck of 
 the " Invincible " would be to her, if the deck were brought 
 up to the water-line, nearly as complete a protection as her 
 present 6-inch vertical armour. On these grounds, I 
 propose, I think reasonably, to take away a large slice of 
 the vertical armour above water, and to clap it on in extra 
 thickness from 5 feet below the water-line to 6 inches 
 above it, also in horizontal plating, and otherwise as will 
 appear in due course. How much I am going to gain by 
 the process may be briefly stated : taking the armour belt 
 of " Invincible " as 5,292 square feet in area, the new area 
 in " Outrageous" will be only 3,234 square feet, giving me 
 a difFerence of 2,058 feet, which at an average of 5'3 inches 
 of plate, and 10 inches of backing, is perhaps good for 229 
 tons. We may now pass to the main battery, about which 
 little need be said at this moment. It is constructed in 
 the usual way, and of the usual shape, and the only 
 difference in principle between it and the main battery of 
 the " Invincible,'' is the greater size of the foremost ?ind 
 
94 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 after ports on each side. I have already advocated 
 increased arc of fire for the guns in these ports, and I 
 know no simpler way of giving it than by increasing the 
 size of the ports on the fore-side of the foremost guns, and 
 on the after-side of the after guns. I assume in settling 
 the height of this battery deck at 6 feet 6 inches below 
 the beams, that the guns can be so mounted as to fit that 
 height, and the portsills can of course be lowered to suit 
 the axes of the guns, as they are by the hypothesis, 1 ft. 
 4 in. above those of the " Invincible." I do not propose to 
 have any doors in the transverse bulkheads of the battery; 
 it is well to have those bulkheads as secure as may be, and 
 the convenience of an entry to the battery on its own level 
 does not weigh a feather against the extra security of solid 
 bulkheads. In one point I abandon my theory. I propose 
 a single battery in this type, whereas did I carry out my 
 views to their conclusions, I should divide it into two by 
 a transverse bulkhead. The only reason I do not do so 
 here is because it would interfere with my argument and 
 mar its clearness. Were I designing a ship which was to 
 be put afloat, I should make the sacrifices necessary to get 
 this double battery, but it would be more open to argument 
 whether I was right or not than I care to leave the 
 question. On the upper deck rests the light armament to 
 be presently described ; and being on this deck, our atten- 
 tion is at once directed to the rig. I have already stated 
 the reasons which induce me to adopt a pure auxiliary rig, 
 and in this case I propose to reduce the area of sail by 
 about one-half, giving 12,681 square feet. But as area of 
 sail may be expressed in terms of horse-power with a 
 given wind pressure, it is quite certain that in reducing 
 the sail-area by one-half, I am not reducing the assistance 
 to be derived from the sails to anything like that extent, 
 
THE DEVELOP-MEXT OF NAVAL POWER. 95 
 
 and moreover, that if my new sails be made of strong 
 canvas, in fresh breezes I shall still spread as much sail as 
 I did with a full rig. Again, the " Invincible " was crank 
 enough to require 860 tons of ballast, with a moment of 
 (say) 7,000 foot-tons. If I pull down the centre of effort 
 by one-third, and reduce the sail area by one-half, it is 
 pretty certain that I may take away the ballast without 
 any fear of consequences. I want, in point of fact, the 
 righting moment of the I'leet-ship to be small, for in that 
 way alone can I have the steady platform required for her 
 guns, and for the safety of her hull below, and this being 
 so, I am bound to reduce the heeling power which large 
 sail area and a high centre of effort would give. As to the 
 shape of the sails employed, I know of no other so useful 
 as the " leg of mutton " sail. Set upon booms, it gives a 
 fine spread of fore and aft canvas, and is equally efficient 
 as a square sail when the wind draws aft. Moreover, this 
 rig offers the least possible resistance when the sails are 
 not in use, and requires the lightest possible spars. It 
 would be foreign to my purpose to go Hiore into detail 
 on this part of the subject, it is enough to say that I 
 propose this rig for every ship in the Navy without 
 exception. 
 
 Having thus given a general outline of the nature of my 
 Fleet ship, her rig ; how her hull and compartments are 
 arranged ; where armour is placed ; and where and how 
 the armament is distributed ; I must descend to particulars 
 in describing the thicknesses of the armour and the exact 
 nature of the armament ; and as I propose so tremendous 
 additions both to the ofiensive and defensive powers of the 
 ship, as to be startling even to myself, it will be necessary 
 to set out pretty distinctly how these advantages are 
 gained. In effect I am going to substitute twelve IS-tog 
 
96 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 guns in the " Outrageous " for the " Invincible's " ten 12- 
 ton guns. I am going to put this armament under 10- 
 inch and 8-inch plating, where the " Invincible " has but 
 6-inch. Besides, I am going to carry a complete light 
 armament not under armour, consisting of four 90-cwt. 
 7-inoh guns as bow and stern chasers, and sixteen 20- 
 pounders as broadside guns. As to the water-line belt, I 
 intend to put 10 inches along all the vital parts of the 
 ship, where the "Invincible'' now has but 6 or 8 inches ; 
 the ends remaining as I find them in that ship, that is 
 from 6 to 4 inches. In judging of the reasonableness of 
 these proposals, my gains and losses in the matter of 
 weights must be considered. In area of plating I gain 
 very largely, as the " Invincible '' has (say) 9,737 square 
 feet of armour, whereas the " Outrageous " has but 6,098 
 square feet. In this way the armour and backing of the 
 "Invincible" may be taken at 1,090 tons, while that of 
 the "Outrageous " only reaches 917 tons. The armament 
 of the " Invincible " only weighs (including ammunition) 
 370 tons, while that of the " Outrageous " will be 655 tons. 
 On the whole, therefore, this vast change is made at a cost 
 of only 112 tons in weight! It is seen at once that the 
 removal of the 460 tons of masts and ballast not only 
 gives me this weight, but a very wide margin over it. 
 I may now take the ship as a completed design, and 
 then the following table will exhibit the distribution 
 of weight in the "Invincible" and "Outrageous,'' en- 
 abling a complete comparison to be made between the 
 two.l 
 
 ^ I do not yet see mucli ground for altering my view as to dis- 
 tribution of guns and armour in the battle-ship. At present the 
 principle most in favour is that o£ insultation or isolation of guns 
 and their crews ; employing thick arnaour for the heavy guns, and 
 thin arniour for the light guns, thus leaving out of qiiestlpn the 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 
 
 97 
 
 Hull 
 
 BaokliLg 
 
 Armour 
 
 Guns and ammuniiioD 
 
 Engines and stores 
 
 Boilers and water 
 
 Anchors and cables ... 
 Masts, yards, and sails 
 
 Coals 
 
 Stores 
 
 Bailast 
 
 Provisions and water 
 Boats and gear 
 
 Tolal 
 
 6,485 
 
 " Inviccible." 
 
 " Outrageous.'' 
 
 2,945 
 
 2,945 
 
 166 
 
 103 
 
 924 
 
 814 
 
 370 
 
 655 
 
 400 
 
 400 
 
 360 
 
 416 
 
 90 
 
 90 
 
 166 
 
 60 
 
 - 460 
 
 620 
 
 84 
 
 84 
 
 360 
 
 — 
 
 140 
 
 140 
 
 20 
 
 20 
 
 6,347 
 
 On an inspection of this table, it -will be seen tliat after 
 the ship is fitted out ccmpletely, there is a gain on the 
 side of the "Outrageous" over the "Invincible" of 138 
 tons, and I suppose there would actually turn out to be 
 this saving, for though there are some additional bulk- 
 heads which must be added to the weight of hull of the 
 " Outrageous," there is also a good deal of bulkhead work 
 which is omitted, and must therefore be put down in her 
 favour. I also consider that there would be a larger gain 
 on the rig than 100 tons, both from the lesser weight than 
 60 tons of the rig itself, and also from a reduction in the 
 
 equality of the men's lives. I prefer the thicker armour, and 
 should hope to isolate the effect of shells by the use of traverses, 
 compoEed of all the soft material in the ship — hammocks, bags, 
 bedding, clothes, rope, canvas, slops — ^placed in larger canvas bags 
 and built up between the guns. The light guns — very light— in the 
 "Outrageous" were left unprotected by armour, as it was not in- 
 tended that they should be used in ordinary battle, but only as 
 defence against special attacks, where gun-fre would be at a mini- 
 mum. Of coune, in all questions oi vieight of guns and thickness of 
 armour, it is the pritciple only which is conten<?ed for. — Ed. 
 
98 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEKENCE. 
 
 weight of the stores. Carpenters" and boatswains' stores 
 in the " Invincible " stand at 64 tons, and much of this 
 would disappear under the new rig. I want, however, 
 about 120 tons more weight, which this surplus gives me, 
 to be employed as armour on the deck over the vital parts 
 of the ship. Taking the iron of this deck in " Invincible " 
 at half-an-inch, 120 tons will allow me to add 1 inch to it, 
 so covering boilers, engines, and magazines with 1^-inoh 
 horizontal armour. This may be assumed to resist all 
 guns lighter than the 12-ton at 10° impact, if indeed the 
 12-ton itself would actually "penetrate." It may here be 
 observed that the " Invincible's " deck over engine-room, 
 and fore-part of boilers, is now unguarded by vertical 
 armour to shot striking at an angle of 10°, but with only 
 half-inch iron to resist them. I think, however, that a 
 great deal might be done towards protecting the boilers 
 and engines from shot above water, by stowing stores such 
 as chain cables, shot, and hemp cables upon the deck above 
 them ; but these are details to be afterwards considered, 
 as they do not necessarily enter into the design. But 
 before quitting the subject, it may be pointed out that 
 owing to the height of the lower deck of " Outrageous '' 
 above boilers and engine-room, reserve coal may be 
 stowed below it to form a ready support to the iron deck, 
 and to intercept splinters of shell, &o. As to the chance of 
 penetration by shot entering not far above water, and 
 tearing the deck up without actually penetrating it, but 
 so leaving the water to enter in a sea way through the hole 
 in the side, and then through the rent in the deck into the 
 body of the ship, it must be remembered, that in dealing 
 with a leak through the deck, you are outside it, and can 
 readily secure it, unlike a wound in vertical armour 
 directly into the body of the ship, a wound whose great 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWKR. 99 
 
 daasfer lies in. the fact that it must be dealt with from the 
 
 Let me now very briefly compare the fighting and pro- 
 pulsive powers of the " Invincible" and " Outrageous," in 
 order to see whether there is any doubt as to the complete 
 superiority of the latter. In the first place, the " Out- 
 rageoQS " will be able to get to her groand under circum- 
 stances when the " Invincible " could not do so, by reason 
 of her short coal supply. When on the ground, the 
 " Oatrageous " will be able to select and keep her position, 
 having the greater speed. 1 Next, while every heavy shot 
 fairly fired by the " Outrageous," will go clean through 
 the " Iiivincible's " plating, no shot from the latter will 
 peaetrate any of the vital vertical armour of the 
 " Oatrageous." The " Invincible " will receive six heavy 
 shots for every five shots she gives to her opponent. She 
 will get two 7-inch shells for every two 64-pound shell 
 she delivers, and she will get eight 20-pound shells for 
 every one she delivers. If the " Invincible " plants a shell 
 in one of the engines, or one of the boilers of the 
 " Oatrageous," that ship can go on with her other engine 
 and set of boilers ; but if the same accident happens to the 
 " Invincible " she is done. If the " Invincible " is fairly 
 rammed anywhere amidships, she is destroyed as a fighting 
 ship, even if she does not sink. If the " Outrageous " is 
 rammed, even if the inner skin is penetrated, it is very 
 unlikely to destroy her fighting power, and most unlikely 
 to sink her. If a torpedo forces in the double skin of the 
 " Invincible " anywhere amidships, she will either sink, or 
 
 ^ I hare not considered it necessary to put the question oJE speed 
 formally forward in this Essay, as I am very well satisfied with the 
 moderate speed of 12 knots on the mile. It is of far more im- 
 portance to be able to maintain that speed than to exceed it, and 
 tbtn fall short of it. 
 
 H 2 
 
100 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 be forced to abandon the fight ; whereas there is no point 
 at which the explosion of a single torpedo will sink the 
 " Outrageous," and only a small area under the middle 
 line, between the pairs of magazines and engines, which 
 will destroy her efficiency as a fighting ship. On the 
 other hand, it may be argued that owing to the withdrawal 
 of the armour between the belt and the battery of the 
 "Outrageous," she is more vulnerable than the "Invinci- 
 ble " at that point ; and so she is — to the 12-ton or lighter 
 guns— but then the " Invincible,'' in this particular fight, 
 is met by the 18-ton gun, whose shot will go readily 
 through that part of the " Invincible " up to the full dis- 
 tance at which fire could be opened. The question is not 
 whether the " Outrageous " is vulnerable or no : it is 
 whether she may reasonably anticipate victory over any 
 ship or ships of her own displacement. It may also be 
 said that the " Invincible " when disabled in her engine- 
 power may escape under sail, while the "Outrageous" 
 cannot do so under similar circumstances. In answer it 
 can be said that the fact as to the " Invincible " is not true, 
 unless there is a very strong breeze, and then the " Out- 
 rageous '' is as well off ; but it must still be borne in 
 mind that the " Outrageous " is only half as liable to 
 engine derangement as the "Invincible." But if the 
 design of the " Invincible " is to be upheld at all in this 
 case, it must be alleged that she can compel her opponent 
 to fight an end-on action. Then indeed she will have the 
 advantage, for the two 4^-ton guns of the " Outrageous " 
 cannot compare with the two 12-ton guns of the " Invinci- 
 ble." But the question is, How is she going to do it ? The 
 " Invincible " may turn end-on to the " Outrageous " and 
 advance on her. She thereby may compel the " Out- 
 rageous " either to turn towards her, or from her. She 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWEK. 101 
 
 will not tura from ker, because this is to give the " Invin- 
 cible '' the advantages she asks for. If she turns towards 
 her, there must be either a ram, or a broadside fight in 
 passing. 
 
 The " Outrageous " is better able for the ram, and very 
 much better able for the broadside combat in passing ; for 
 as a matter of fact, the " Invincible " having relied on her 
 end-on fire, will only have four 12-ton guns wherewith to 
 reply to her enemy's six 18-ton guns in passing. In a fleet, 
 the case is still worse ; for an " all-round " fire cannot under 
 any circumstances be employed in a fleet. Your friends, 
 and not your enemies, surround you, and compel you to fire 
 only in certain directions. When you are strong in certain 
 arcs of fire, you may abandon the other possible arcs alto- 
 gether, and in your tactical system fill them up with your 
 friends. The ship like the " Invincible,'' which is weak all 
 round, but still has an all-round fire, sacrifices her tactical 
 capacity, and some of her strength is necessarily wasted over 
 arcs where her friends lie. Any attempt to make a hostile 
 fieet fight an end-on battle must result in failure, if the hos- 
 tile fieet can throw its whole force into certain arcs of fire, 
 while the other has surrendered that capacity. When the 
 " Outrageous " is withdrawn from comparison with a ship of 
 her own displacement, and taken on her own merits, it will 
 very possibly be alleged that in giving up the reserve of 
 armoured buoyancy she adopts a fatal error. This, as we 
 have seen, is not capable of assumption in a comparative test 
 as against an " Invincible," but it may be asserted of her as 
 against a ship of the same displacement, armed with nume- 
 rous light guns. Six inches above water, the " Outrageous " 
 is penetrable to the lightest guns ; but this penetration will 
 not let water into the ship : it will at the most let the 
 occasional wash of the sea in upon the lower deck, to wash 
 
102 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 out again by means of the non-return scuppers with which 
 that deck is provided. The vital part of the deck is, as I 
 have shown, not penetrable to light, guns at all, and if the 
 fore and after part is so penetrable, it is, as I have pointed 
 out, eqaally repairable ; and as for the wounds in the verti- 
 cal side above water, they also are under control. But the 
 argument against giving up the reserve of armoured buoy- 
 ancy goes further than this, and urges that the ship may be 
 sunk below her normal draft by the ram or the torpedo 
 acting below the armoured belt. Then a ship without 
 armoured reserve buoyancy is at the mercy of the lightest 
 guns. It is true that if the "Outrageous" sinks by six 
 inches of mean draft, she is then open to wounds from the 
 lightest guns between wind and water, and if she is first 
 sunk to that extent by not less than 180 tons of water being 
 admitted below, she may be altogether sunk by a sufficient 
 number of the lighest shot, provided that no means are taken 
 to avoid that disaster. But these means are existing in the 
 " Outrageous." In the first place she must sink two feet 
 six inches, which represents more water than will fill both 
 engine-room compartments,! before the water admitted by 
 light shot can fiow over the deck at will, or down the hatch- 
 ways. I should decidedly carry up the combings of many 
 hatchways — those from boiler and engine rooms— by iron 
 bulkheads with strong glass panes, to the main deck, and by 
 this means remove the ingress of water below still further, 
 so that it would require a great number of light shot to 
 actually sink the " Outrageous." Thus the armoured reserve 
 of buoyancy is not improperly given up. But I think it is 
 altogether fallacious to argue in this way, on the actual 
 merits or demerits, so considered, of ships of war. All ships 
 of war are, and must ever be, destructible by some processes. 
 ' They hold together to water-line, 684 tons. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 103 
 
 That ship is the better type which, while being less de- 
 structible than the other compared with her — which costs 
 an equal sum — is more destructive. If this method of argu- 
 ment were adopted and firmly adhered to, we should long 
 ago have reached a permanent type of war ship. 
 
 But I have to maintain my structure not only against the 
 "Invincible" type, but against any other ship or combination 
 of ships which can be launched against her for the same 
 amount as she cost. Say the " Outrageous " will cost 
 £250,000. Some other nations may propose to match her 
 by unarmoured " Gammas." These " Gammas " to be effec- 
 tive, must carry the 18-ton gun, and will not, I suppose, cost 
 much less than the others, or say £25,000. Ten of them may 
 therefore' be put afloat for the price of the " Outrageous." 
 But what hopes can ten, or even twelve, " Gammas " have 
 of mastering one " Outrageous ? " She will certainly re- 
 ply to them gun for gua ; for she carries 32 guns, every one 
 of which is effective against the " Gamma," and even her 
 heavy guns alone number as many as are, or can be, floated 
 against her. We have in point of fact got in the " Out- 
 rageous " one form of this ultimate mean, of which I have 
 previously spoken : a ship which cannot be met in an 
 artillery combat with any prospect of equality .except by a 
 sister vessel, or by one or more vessels which in the aggregate 
 cost more than the " Oatrageous." But the ship is liable to 
 be met by weapons supposed to be cheaper than guns : 
 namely ram vessels pure and simple ; and torpedo vessels 
 pure and simple. We have already seen that the "Out- 
 rageous " is by her construction less liable to damage by 
 these weapons than the " Invincible," but it must be shown 
 also that she is less open to their attacks. It is her superior 
 gun-power which effects this object, just as it made her 
 less open to the attacks of " Gammas." Supposing the 
 
104 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 " Oatrageous " to be approached by a light torpedo vessel 
 from ahead or astern, the " Outrageous' " fire is more 
 dangerous to her than that of the " Invincible," for the bow 
 and stern chasers of the " Outrageous " can cross their fire 
 to a very considerable angle, whereas if the approach is 
 made the least on her bow or quarter, the " Invincible's " 
 fire is practically inferior. But if, as would probably be 
 done, the attack be repelled by broadside fire, the advantage 
 is wholly and tremendously on the side of the " Outrage- 
 ous.'' The pure ram will be armour-plated, and cannot be 
 touched by the light guns of either " Outrageous " or " In- 
 vincible." If she therefore approaches either ship end-on, 
 the " Invincible '' has the better chance against her, provided 
 the ram has no more than S-inoh armour. But if the ram 
 carries 10-inch armour, the "Invincible" can do nothing 
 with her either by bow or broadside. But it is pretty cer- 
 tain that the ram approaching on the bow or stern must 
 expose herself to the broadside fire of a properly manoeuvred 
 ship, long before she draws near enough to make it danger- 
 ous to present the broadside to her. A ram, with even 10 
 inches of armour, will have some hesitation in running 
 through the fire of six 18-ton guns, when she knows that her 
 blow, even if delivered, will not be fatal. In any case, it is 
 to b3 noted that the " Invincible " cannot touch her under 
 such circumstances, whereas a single missile from the " Out- 
 rageous " may sink her. 
 
 Here I may leave my leading type of ship, on which I 
 propose that all others,whether Fleet-ships or smaller vessels, 
 should be formed ; but I must not quit her entirely with- 
 out adverting to the question of her stability — a question 
 which the naval architect at least will call upon me to 
 answer. I have had neither the time nor the data necessary 
 for accurate calculation, which indeed would be out of place 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 105 
 
 here, but I have assured myself of the safety of my structure, 
 by very simple and plain considerations. In removing the 
 " Invincible's " masts and yards, I took away from her a 
 moment of 4,000 foot-tons above her centre of gravity, and 
 in removing her ballast I took 7,000 foot-tons below it. I 
 was therefore 3,000 foot-tons worse as regarded moments 
 than before, but still 4,000 tons better than the " In- 
 vincible's " original design. In taking away the " In- 
 vincible's " batteries and armour, I removed 8,800 foot-tons 
 of moment above the centre of gravity, but in placing the 
 battery and armour in "Outrageous," 1 gave her 10,000 
 foot- tons of moment, so that by all the operations to this 
 point I had sacrificed 4,200 foot-tons of moment, but was 
 still 2,800 foot-tons better than the original design of 
 " Invincible." Additional powder in the magazines gave 
 me 340 foot-tons, additional boiler power 560 foot-tons, 
 additional coal 1,000 foot-tons, and so on, so that on the 
 whole I do not calculate on being more than 1,000 or 1,500 
 foot-tons worse than the " Invincible " when ballasted ; 
 then as I had so dealt with the sails as to reduce their heel- 
 ing power by two-thirds, I conceived that I need not, in so 
 rough an outline as this, go further. In any case I have left 
 a very wide margin for possible errors. The raising of the 
 decks will have had some effect to reduce this margin, but 
 on the other hand the lowering of the gunwale and its at- 
 tend ent weights and other things which have not been 
 counted, would tend to restore the balance. If the worst 
 came to the worse the whole battery might come down 
 lower, or even two guns, and the corresponding armour be 
 moved. But I am of opinion that the stability of the struc- 
 ture is not materially compromised as it stands. 
 
 I have been very full, and as accurate as I consider per- 
 missible, in describing the " Outrageous," because she is 
 
106 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 strictly a typical ship for all the most important classes in 
 our Navy. The first class Meet-ship wonld simply be a 
 larger ship of the same type. She should carry 25-ton guns, 
 and 12-inch armour, and as her cubical contents would 
 necessarily only grow below water, I take it that I am safe 
 in assuming that 8,000 tons' displacement would give her 
 twelve 25- tons guns. The upper-deck armament might be 
 increased in numbers, but not necessarily in weight of metal. 
 The object of her design would be, as in the " Outrageous," 
 to meet any force of artillery which conid be floated for her 
 cost, on at least equal terms, and to throw back the chances 
 of successful attack at sea by rams or torpedoes. It would 
 be true that she could not meet an "Inflexible" on equal 
 terms, but that ship would be met at less than her own cost 
 by " Gammas," rams, and torpedoes, which she has not the 
 same power of repelling as the " Blunder," by which name 
 my first-class Fleet-ship may be referred to. A second-class 
 Fleet-ship meeting a first-class Fleet-ship would not neces- 
 sarily fly from her, but it would be no disgrace to do so after 
 a fair fight and a sufficiency of damage ; something must 
 always be allowed for the chapter of accidents, and the shot 
 of even 25-ton guns must strike pretty fair to penetrate 10 
 inches of armour. On the other hand, a shell from an 
 " Outrageous " might enter a " Blunder's " port, or explode 
 down a hatchway, and might make it convenient for her to 
 abandon the fight for the time. It is, however, not to be 
 expected from my point of view that an "Outrageous," 
 costing £250,000, should be asked to meet, in fair fight, 
 a " Blunder " costing £333,000, though it is expected that 
 an " Invincible," costing a like sum to " Outrageous," ought 
 not to fly from her on the open sea ; and it is said that if 
 she must do this, she has failed in design. 
 
 The frigate of 4,000 tons would, on the same lines as the 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 107 
 
 "Outrageous," be 245 feet long, 48 feet broad, with 19 feet 
 8 inches mean draft of water. I gather from the rough 
 calculations I have made, that she might carry 7-inch 
 armour, where the " Outrageous " carries 10-inch, and her 
 heavy armament would consist of twelve 6|-ton guns. Her 
 light armament would consist of one 64-pounder as a bow- 
 chaser, and one 64-pounder as a stern-chaser, with five 20- 
 pounders on a side as broadside guns. The design of this 
 ship would be to compel any intending opponent to carry at 
 least 9-ton guns, and to give " Gammas," rams, and torpedoes 
 as little chance as possible of successful attack. In strict 
 analogy with the " Outrageous " and the " Blunder," the 
 " Ramshackle," as I may call my frigate, ought to carry 9- 
 ton gnnSjibut I suspect I should find a difficulty in getting a 
 4,000-ton ship to carry twelve of them under 7-inoh plating, 
 though if it turned out that she could carry ten of them, it 
 might be well to reduce her to that number. The difficulty in 
 the 4,000-ton ship is height, and the moment due to it. There 
 must be sufficient height to pass fore and aft under the 
 battery in any ship on the design of the " Outrageous," but 
 a proportionate height in a 4,000-ton ship would only give 
 about 4 feet 6 inches between the water-line deck and the 
 beams supporting the battery, which would be too low. The 
 only way I see open is to increase the height to (say) 5 feet 
 6 inches, and to reduce the moment of the battery by a 
 corresponding reduction of its weight, which would only give 
 me twelve G^-ton guns. The place of the " Ramshackle " 
 would be in light squadrons, oi as single ships guarding the 
 main commercial routes, and she would be intended to take 
 the place of the existing nnarmoured frigate. 
 
 I must pass rapidly on with the other classes of ships, 
 for both time and space are beginning to fail me. The 
 Corvette class seems to my mind nearly properly met by 
 
108 ESSAYS Off NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 the " Diamond " class, but the removal of the square rig 
 would probably increase the steaming power and give the 
 necessary coal supply. When we come to the smaller 
 classes of ships we get out of the region of successful attack 
 by Rams, for they themselves would be Rams of a handy 
 size ; and in a ramming combat the ram proper would not 
 have greatly the advantage, hampered as she must be with 
 armour to withstand heavy shot. So that in an encounter with 
 a Ram, which may be supposed to cost the same money as the 
 Corvette, the latter would fight fairly on an equality with 
 the former, and so fulfil the rdle which I assume to be hers. 
 The Corvette — which I might call the " Venture " — would 
 not use her guns against a ram proper, for that would be 
 to throw away fire uselessly, but if anyone argues that she 
 should have plate-piercing guns on purpose to meet such a 
 ram, I ask, cui bono ? Why should the Ram not be met 
 with her own weapons ? Such a suggestion brings forward 
 the wild controversy as to few heavy or many light guns. 
 If the " Venture " were to have two or three heavy guns, 
 say 9 or 12-ton, it is quite true that she might, with an 
 odd shot, damage a " Ramshackle," bat not an " Outrageous " 
 or a " Blunder." But, on the other hand, she must be 
 beaten by a ship of her own class armed with twelve 64- 
 pounders and two 4J-ton guns ; this is a matter not ad- 
 mitting of argument, and quite apparent to those who 
 agree with my preliminary dicta. But besides this capacity 
 to fight her own class, or rather ships of her own value, she 
 must push back the torpedo as far as may be ; and there is 
 nothing but a multitude of penetrating gun.s which will 
 make torpedo attack sufiiciently risky to prevent it. It is 
 the very absence of this preventive which makes the 
 monitor-class so tempting to the sneaking torpedoist. The 
 Corvette is even more open to these attacks than larger 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 109 
 
 ships ; for her lighter draught of water will push her closer 
 in during times of blockade. But let it be known that, as 
 well as a good look out, and giant bull's-eyes to scan sus- 
 picious surroundings, she has a numerous artillery ready for 
 instant service, and the light and cheap torpedo vessel will 
 think once or twice before she hazards an attack. The 
 Corvette shouldalso be armed with at least two mitrailleuses, 
 whose office it would be to represent short-range shrapnel. 
 The Gatling is an admirable weapon of its kind, but it is 
 not so suitable for naval purposes as it might be. I have 
 seen a mitrailleuse by L. Christophe of Brussels, which 
 appeared to me a much more serviceable weapon for ships 
 and boats, inasmuch as it could either be fired in single 
 shots like the Gatling, or in a volley of 31 shots at a time, 
 like the original mitrailleuse. Anyone watching the fire of 
 the Gatling from a ship or boat in motion, must be aware 
 that a very small number of rifles, I think seven, will equal 
 its efEect, as pauses must be made, almost between every 
 shot, to relay. But in the rapid approach of torpedo boats, 
 successive volleys accurately directed, will be much more 
 efEective than the somewhat wild fire of the Gatling under 
 such conditions. In the corvette, and all the smaller classes 
 of ships, where space below water is so important for boiler 
 power and coal stowage, I think I should introduce in their 
 engines an old principle in anew way. When the screw was 
 first introduced, multiplying gearing was employed because it 
 was not known how to get the requisite number of revolu- 
 tions out of the engines. The plan was given up, partly 
 because of the difficulties of multiplying gearing, but chiefly 
 because gearing was no longer necessary. But now, when 
 the number of revolutions of the engine can be so greatly 
 increased, it seems to me that we should utilise that capacity. 
 If the piston of a given engine travels twice as fast as it did 
 
110 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEKENCE. 
 
 before, it is certain that a cylinder of half the size will do 
 the work of the original engine, sabject of course to certain 
 losses. But as weight and space are the two difficulties in 
 the design of a war ship, anything which diminishes them 
 may be freely accepted so long as no more than diminution 
 of weight and space is developed. In another matter con- 
 nected with the smaller class of vessels, the Sloops, I have 
 arrived at very definite conclusions. Without a certain 
 relative draught of water, these smaller vessels would not 
 fulfil their places even in peace time, and for the operations 
 of blockade or attack on enemy's ships in shoal water, 
 woald be more or less inefEective. I think the Sloop 
 class ought not to draw more than ten feet when 
 crossing bars, and operating in shoal water. But on 
 the other hand, I think it is a great mistake to inflict on 
 general service sea-going Sloops, the disabilities which a 
 light draught of water carries with it in the open sea. I 
 think therefore that the shifting of weights for exceptional 
 service sliouldbe distinctly contemplated in the Sloop class, 
 and I shoald fiz on fresh water, shell, and shot, as the 
 weights most capable of being dealt with in this way. The 
 transference of a single ton from 60 feet abaft the longi- 
 tudinal centre of buoyancy to 60 feet before it, representing 
 a moment of 120 foot-tons, would have considerable effect, 
 and I suppose that in ships prepared for it, the weights 
 represented by water, shot, and shell, would effect the object. 
 Supposing the. Sloop to draw 8 feet forward, and 11 feet aft, 
 on an even keel she would draw only 9 feet 6 inches ; but 
 even less than that, as the water would be started overboard. 
 I should not, I think, willingly allow guns to form a part of 
 this shifting weight, for the use of the guns must be con- 
 templated in shoal water. But if the intended variation of 
 draught could not be obtaiaed in any other way , I should 
 
s 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. Ill 
 
 endeavour to move the after broadside gu,ns to ports where 
 they would be equally eflBcient forward. 
 
 I am only now concerned to describe with some more 
 particularity a typical "Sloop" such as I desire to see. Her 
 draught of water and her coal supply are the great limiting 
 .conditions of the Sloop ; armament remaining at first some- 
 what in the background. Speed is mingled with coal 
 supply, but I suppose the Sloop ought to get 11 knots on 
 the measured mile. The coal supply I have already fixed 
 at 4,000 miles for five knots, and the shoal draft of water at 
 not more than ten feet. The Sloop's armament would be 
 somewhat more composite than that of larger ships, for it 
 has to be borne in mind that while she may be met in the 
 open sea by her fellow, and must therefore be armed prin- 
 cipally in view of that contingency, she will also want some- 
 thing of longer range and of heavier shell for reaching into 
 shoaler water than she can advance to, as well as for those 
 land attacks which form the naval basis of our little wars. 
 Hence her armament ought to contain one, or at most, two 
 large guns, pivoting amidships, while she, like the Corvette, 
 Frigate, and Fleet-ship, wants a numerou slight armament 
 for the same purposes. I have, as in the case of the " Out- 
 rageous," taken a type from amongst our own ships, but it 
 is not necessary to name her. She is about 600 tons, 
 steams from 10 to 11 knots under favourable conditions at 
 full speed, and can go about 2,000 miles in smooth water 
 with her coal supply. She measures about 155 feet in 
 length, and 25 feet in breadth, and draws when complete 
 for sea, about 9 feet 6 inches, being a foot by the stern. 
 Her armament consists of one 6^-ton gun, one Gd-pounder, 
 and two 20-pounders, all mounted amidships as pivot-guns, 
 the 20-pounders being at the bow and stern. The type is 
 not unsuccessful, as these figures show, but her difficulties 
 
112 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 are that she is easily stopped in a sea-way, and cannot ensure 
 making a full use of her normal steaming powers. Her 
 spread of canvas (10,134 square feet of plain sail) of course 
 assists her if she can use it, but she is naturally incapable 
 of beating to windward, and her sail power costs her more 
 than 20 tons of weight, that is, nearly one-third of her coal 
 supply, and more than the weight of her guns. She is also 
 short of boiler power, not perhaps for a short run, but shu 
 is short when speed is required for any continuance. 
 Having but four guns in all, she is in a bad position to 
 defend herself from those boat and torpedo attacks which 
 her inshore position in time of war would call out, and 
 lastly, she has, from my point of view, only half the coal 
 that she ought to have. I propose to modify this type to 
 meet all the requirements of my ideal ship, by adding to 
 the size of this ship about 140 tons, making her displace- 
 ment 732 tons; and I propose to do this by adding 15 feet 
 to her length, and a proportionate beam and depth. This 
 will give me space for four boilers similar to the three car- 
 ried by my model; space also for 140 tons of coal, or 
 double the quantity now carried, and a more roomy upper- 
 deck for the armament. As to the draught of water, I 
 propose to bring the " Bantam," as I name the new type, 
 three feet by the stern ; making 8 feet forward, and 11 
 feet aft. Then by stowing water (10 tons) and shot (say 
 5 tons) abaft, I should expect to get movable weights 
 sufficient to bring the ship on an even keel, or 9 feet 6 
 inches mean draught for inshore operations; for the 
 weights moved would not affect her fighting power, and 
 hardly her steaming power in smooth water, while in the 
 open sea her screws would be 1 foot 6 inches deeper than 
 in the present type. As to weights, I should get about 15 
 tons by the modification of the rig, and about 75 tons by 
 the additional buoyancy, after deducting weight of hull. 
 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 113 
 
 This 90 tons will give me the boiler at 17 tons filled, and 
 the coal 70 tons, leaving my weights for armament as at 
 present in the type adverted to, or, with ammunition 
 included, at 31 tons 11 cwt. in all. The armament I 
 propose for this weight would be two 64-pounders at 14 
 tons 12 cwt. together, and six 20-pounders at 14 tons 2 
 cwt. in all, making 28 tons 14 cwt., and leaving three 
 tons for Gatling, or mitrailleuse, to be mounted, one on 
 the poop and one on the forecastle in a nest of hammocks, 
 or a coil of hawsers in action. Those who lay stress on 
 single heavy shells might wish to vary the armament by 
 substituting a single 4^-ton 7-inch gun for the two 64- 
 pounders, but in my mind the other is preferable, and I 
 should think that a " Bantam," armed as I propose, would 
 have no difiBculty in dealing with her older sister, armed 
 as I have described. The exemplar would fire one 7-iiich 
 shell, one 64-pounder shell, and two 20-pound shells, as 
 against the " Bantam's " two 64-pounder shells, three 20- 
 ponnder shells, and two Gfatlings j but the exemplar would 
 be in no condition to reply on her opposite broadside, 
 whereas the " Bantam " would always have at least three 
 20-pounders to use, pending the transport of the others. 
 But in repelling the attack of torpedo-boats, or boats at- 
 tacking with intent to board, the " Bantam " would be 
 immeasurably the superior of her exemplar, and the Sloop 
 should be armed with peculiar reference to attacks to 
 which she is peculiarly liable. Plates IV. and V. give 
 the outline of the " Bantam," on which it is unnecessary 
 to do more than remark that though the sail power is 
 apparently reduced from 10,134 square feet to 4,476 square 
 feet, the reduction is not so great in reality, for circum- 
 stances render it unusual for my exemplar to set more 
 than 7,812 square feet as "plain sail." 
 I must advert for a moment to the Gun-boat and other 
 
114 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 special classes, before quitting this description of my ideal 
 Nary. I do not think that the Gan-boat should be looked 
 on as a sea-going ship. Draught of water is the be-all and 
 end-all of the Gun-boat, and it should not exceed 6 feet. 
 At such a draught, sea-going qualities, coal capacity, &c., 
 must not be looked for, and the attempt to find them is 
 almost sure to terminate in ultimate deep draught, so that 
 in the result we get an inferior Sloop instead of a superior 
 Gun-boat. Gun-boats can be worked as tenders very 
 effectually on most stations, and as their functions lie at 
 the very extremities of oar naval nerve filaments, they 
 must not be expected to take their place elsewhere. 
 Despatch vessels of great speed, and great coal capacity — 
 able to steam their 4,000 miles at a high rate, are acknow- 
 ledged necessities —but they are despatch carriers and 
 nothing more, so must not be looked on or treated as 
 fighting ships. I have already stated that I do not think 
 it is the business of Great Britain to develop the torpedo 
 attack except as a sea expedient, and I am conscious of 
 yielding against my better judgment when I allow that for 
 the satisfaction of home communities money may be spent 
 on outrigger torpedo boats, and on rams — if they can be 
 very cheaply turned out — whose office it shall be to lie at 
 the great commercial ports at home, and in those of India 
 and the larger colonies. 1 grudge every penny withdrawn 
 from the sea-going fleet, for I know in that alone lies' our 
 safety, but I would yield a very small sum to the popular 
 mistake. 
 
 I promised at the outset (page 49), that I should 
 found our war Navy on our peace requirements, and having 
 described a complete Navy such as I think would meet our 
 war purposes, I must now show that such a Navy does not 
 so greatly difier from that now existing, which merely 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 115 
 
 wants the backbone of my central idea, to be broagbt into 
 harmony with it. I have turned to the sea-going Navy 
 abroad on the 1st January, 1877, and I have classified the 
 ships, as though the classes corresponded to those which 1 
 would adopt, looking to their tonnage and draught of water 
 as my principal guides. As we stand at present there is 
 little correspondence between these elements and the power 
 of the ship, but there must be a very considerable corre- 
 spondence between them and the exist of the ship, so that my 
 classification is fair. I find then that we had abroad on 
 the 1st January, 1877, excluding ships on passage out to 
 relieve others : — 13 Pleet-ships, 12 Frigates, 18 Corvettes, 
 38 sloops, 16 gun- boats, and 8 despatch vessels. The 
 Fleet-ship varied in displacement from 10,275 to 6,010 tons ; 
 the frigate ranged from 5,152 to 3,060 tons; the Corvette 
 from 2,431 to 1,542 tons ; the Sloop from 1,108 to 529 
 tons J while the gun-boats varied from 455 to 330 tons. 
 The draught of water of the Fleet-ship varied from 27 feet 
 to 23 feet ; of the Frigate from 24 feet 6 inches to 20 feet 
 2 inches ; of the Sloop from 14 feet to 8 feet 2 inches ; and 
 the Gun-boat from 10 feet 5 inches to 8 feet 2 inches. It 
 may be seen from this statement that not a great deal of 
 change is asked for to complete the Navy in its symmetrical 
 form, and that if a definite classification such as I propose 
 were adopted, we should hardly have the anomalies which 
 are now too often to be found. The variation of from 
 10,000 to 6,000 tons in the Fleet-ship is probably greater 
 than we should find if a definite idea of the duties of 
 Fleet-ships as a class obtained.. The Frigate, again, is some- 
 times a small Fleet-ship, and sometimes a large Corvette. It 
 is STirely a waste somewhere if we find one Sloop of 1,100 
 tons carrying only four guns, and drawing 15 feet 8 inches 
 of water, another of 950 tons and drawing 14 feet, but 
 
 I 2 
 
116 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 still carrying only four guns, while another carries nearly 
 the same armament, displaces only 600 tons, and draws 
 but 9 feet six inches of water. Then if the Sloop of 600 
 tons draws but 9 feet 6 inches, surely the Gun-boat of 450 
 tons should not draw so much as 10 feet 4 inches ? But 
 of all the 38 Sloops scattered over the world, and on whom 
 most of the burden of protecting our commercial routes 
 must fall, I suppose there is hardly one which could steam 
 1,500 miles against a moderate breeze such as a trade wind 
 or a monsoon, while the Corvettes, Frigates, and Fleet-ships 
 are only in rare instances in better case. My aim is that 
 the ships should be more powerful as weapons, and should be 
 able to transport themselves from point to point in a shorter 
 time than at present, and when these two things are 
 accomplished, I conceive it will be time to consider the 
 economical question, which, or I am grossly mistaken, will 
 be found to bear an answer in my favour. 
 
 The peace distribution of our present Navy gives a very 
 perfect foundation for the organisation and distribution of 
 that which I propose in time of war. The Fleet-ships 
 which now form our Channel and Mediterranean squadrons, 
 would, with augmentations, throw themselves upon the 
 coasts of the enemy, and present outside each of his war 
 ports, a force at least equal to his own. The failure of any 
 blockading squadron to shut up its opponent in his own 
 port must be communicated by the despatch vessel and the 
 telegraph to the authority in command. This authority 
 must bring up his supports, and the escaped squadron 
 must be met at sea. So long as it is intact on the high 
 seas, it breaks our communications in that direction, and 
 commerce can only be re-established by its defeat. Lighter 
 ships, Frigates, Corvettes, and Sloops, would guard the 
 inshore passages from war ports, and prevent the exit of 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 117 
 
 the enemy's " cruisers '' to prey on our commerce ; light 
 ships of these classes would also watch the smaller ports 
 where there were no Meet-ships, or, perhaps, any war ships 
 of the enemy, but whence " Alabamas " might otherwise 
 issue. Besting on Gibraltar, Lisbon, Madeira, and the 
 Cape de Verdes, light squadrons and single ships would 
 patrol the great southern trade routes, and keep them free 
 of the enemy's wandering ships or squadrons ; while St. 
 John's, Bermuda, the Azores, and the home ports would 
 equally furnish and sustain single light ships or light 
 squadrons to guard the great western routes. These forces 
 wo aid be under single commanders, who would each be 
 responsible for preserving the routes under his control 
 intact. If any Mediterranean power were at war, or 
 likely to be at war with us, then a proportion of Fleet- 
 ships must observe those ports where Fleet-ships lay ; 
 otherwise, the route through the Mediterranean could be 
 guarded by lighter ships resting on Gibraltar, Malta, and 
 Port Said. Passing to the more distant but smaller com- 
 mercial routes, the West Indies would be guarded by 
 suitable light ships, of which the present West Indian 
 squadron would form the nucleus. The present West 
 Coast squadron would be the foundation of that force of 
 light ships which would patrol between the Cape de 
 Verdes, Sierra Leone, Ascension, St. Helena, the Cape, and 
 Natal. To the East India squadron would be appointed 
 the routes from Aden to Penang in the east, to King 
 George's Sound in the south-east, and to Mauritius in the 
 south. The Red Sea, guarded at each end, would require 
 no English force in it. To the present China squadron 
 would fall the defence of the Straits of Malacca, of Singa- 
 pore, and the routes north-east and south-east therefrom, 
 while the Australian squadron would guard the coasts and 
 
118 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 routes as far east as Fiji. Passing back again, we find the 
 beginning of a squadron in south-east America, which, 
 when strengthened, would rest, in the absence of alliances 
 with Brazil and the Sonth American States, on the Falk- 
 land Islands, Trinidad, and Fernando de Noronha. A 
 strong section of this force wonld carefully watch_the 
 Straits of Magellan, and so guard the Pacific routes from 
 western intruders. The Pacific itself would be guarded by 
 the Pacific squadron, to be increased as much as necessary. 
 Thus we see that really the instinct of the nation has 
 prompted it everywhere to form a basis for the protection 
 of its commercial routes in time of war, and it therefore 
 only remains to continue to develop that instinct in proper 
 directions. 
 
 I may now suppose a strong European coalition against 
 us, and proceed to particularise more distinctly our position 
 at the moment of the outbreak of war, supposing that it 
 came without much warning. I assume that France, 
 Russia, Germany, and Italy are banded together against 
 us, and propose to deal with that hypothetical and very 
 remote contingency. France and Italy are Mediterranean 
 powers, aud the ports of Venice, Ancona, Castellamare, 
 Spezzia, Genoa,and Toulon, would require squadrons of Fleet- 
 ships in observation and blockade. Russia could not enter 
 the Mediterranean except by alliance with Turkey, or by 
 forcing the way through our fleets to the Straits of Gibral- 
 tar. It may be said, perhaps, that Italy would have in her 
 ports three first-class and five second-class ships, while 
 Prance might have four first-class and six or eight second- 
 class Fleet-ships. Remembering that many of the second- 
 class ships, like our own " Warrior " and her contempo- 
 raries, are penetrable by the 6^-ton gun, and that therefore 
 a frigate such as the " Ramshackle " would be an answer 
 
THE DEVEtOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 119 
 
 to them, we see that the force of Fleet-ships in the 
 Mediterranean necessary to confine these enemies in 
 their own ports wonld not be impossible even now to 
 collect. Perhaps sixteen Fleet-ships and a proportion 
 of Frigates would be a sufficient guarantee for the safety 
 of the Mediterranean commercial route ; a force of Corvettes 
 and sloops remaining to patrol between Gibraltar, Malta, 
 and Port Said. Now, in the Mediterranean, at the date I 
 have chosen, we had six powerful Fleet-ships and four 
 Frigates, besides one Corvette, three Sloops, and four gun- 
 boats. If I use the term " ironclad," then I must say 
 there were ten of them, many of whom would match ships 
 of the enemy which I have counted as Fleet-ships. But 
 the displacement of these ten ships came to 62,854 tons, 
 which divided amongst the proposed Fleet-ships at an 
 average of 7,000 tons each, would give nine efficient fleet- 
 ships all practically impervious to anything under the 18. 
 ton gun. An addition of seven Fleet-ships to the existing 
 Mediterranean fleet might therefore be held to secure that 
 sea, were the ships built and classed as I propose. If to 
 this force were added a Corvette, and three Sloops, the 
 highway could be guarded very efficiently, while a few 
 Frigates and Corvettes would watch the ports, such as 
 Venice, capable of fitting out " Alabamas," but incapable 
 of despatching more powerful ships. Altogether, we may 
 say the sixteen Fleet-ships, six Frigates, four Corvettes, six 
 Sloops, four Gun-boats, and two Despatch vessels, would 
 almost guarantee the security of the great eastern route 
 from Gibraltar to Aden ; the addition to our existing force 
 being seven Fleet-ships, five Frigates, and three Sloops. 
 Let us now proceed up the coast of Europe, where, passing 
 by Spain as neutral, and Portugal as friendly, we come to 
 France as an enemy, and to Roohefort as the first war port 
 
120 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 which we meet. Here, however, we cannot meet the 
 Fleet-ship, as there is not water for her, so that no ship 
 larger than a Frigate is needed to blockade the Charente. 
 Lorient is the next war port met with ; but here again a 
 heavy blockading force would not be necessary, as I gather 
 that at high water spring tides there is no more than 29 
 feet water at the entrance. The port could now hardly be 
 used for the collection of first-class Fleet-ships. At Brest, 
 however, we may expect to find at least an equal force to 
 that which we found at Toulon, say twelve Fleet-ships, to 
 which must be opposed in observation twelve of our own. 
 We find our Channel Squadron to consist of four fleet- 
 ships at the date selected. There were besides in the 
 Home ports as a reserve, or otherwise in commission, iron- 
 clads, or their representatives, to the number of ten ; 
 therefore we should be able to deal with the coast of 
 France as far as Brest in the matter of fleet-ahips, and yet 
 have two to spare for Cherbourg, where we might also 
 expect to find twelve fleet-ships. An addition so far of ten 
 fleet-ships to any existing force in commission for the 
 Channel, and of seven for the Mediterranean, would there- 
 fore be a reasonable requirement to protect our southern 
 and eastern commercial routes from absolute breach by 
 hostile fleets under the conditions named. We have next 
 to deal with Wilhelmshaven, where we may assume one- 
 half of the German Fleet to be assembled; say, three 
 first-class, and three second-class Fleet-ships, to be observed 
 by six of our own Fleet-ships. Entering the Baltic, we 
 come to Kiel, where we suppose there are five German 
 fleet-ships, calling for five of our own to observe them. 
 Then we come to the Russian ports of Sveaborg and Cron- 
 stadt, with perhaps a single first-class Fleet-ship, and 
 twelve second-class of very inferior metal and plating. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 121 
 
 Possibly ten o£ our owa Fleet-ships would be sufficient for 
 their observation. Upon the whole, therefore, we see that 
 with a fleet of 62 Fleet-ships, we coald undertake the 
 blockade of all the Italian, French, German, and Russian 
 ports, whence foes worthy of their steel could be expected 
 to issue. That is not so great a number, when we remem- 
 ber that we had at the time chosen for comparison, about 
 48 ironclads, at least as competent as those I have assumed 
 to be arrayed against us. As to the numbers of Frigates, 
 Corvettes, and Sloops which would be required to watch 
 and blockade the smaller ports, I need not enter on, so 
 hopeless an estimate. I assume an imperfect blockade on 
 this head, and suppose that if there were any hopes of a 
 successful attack on our commerce by Frigates or smaller 
 vessels, with reasonable hopes of safe return, such ships 
 would find means to escape our guards. But the very 
 root of my position is that a proper development of our ex- 
 isting resources will make it hopeless for anyone to attempt 
 " Alabama " raid's. So far we have got now as to show the 
 forces necessary to obstruct the issue of hostile fleets 
 against us, and to prevent their junction in so overwhelm- 
 ing a force that our patrols along the lines of commerce 
 must abandon their duties. I have also shown how small 
 a force may guard the Mediterranean route when once 
 the heavy ships are blockaded. If four ships are known 
 to be lying between Gibraltar and Malta, and four more 
 between Malta and Port Said, she would be a sanguine 
 " Alabama " who should hope for a successful career on that 
 line. I may now turn to the more distant commercial 
 routes and their protection. 
 
 I have said that the squadron in the East Indies would 
 be charged with protecting the eastern routes from Aden 
 to Penang, to King George's Sound, and to Mauritius. 
 
122 ESSAYS ON i\AVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Now the forces of Italy, or of Germany, mtist reach this 
 field of operations by running the gauntlet round the Cape 
 of Good Hope, or Cape Horn ; on their route they would 
 meet, even now, the most tremendous diflSculties. There 
 lie in wait for them even in peace time, the West African 
 Squadron of nine sail, and the South American of three sail, 
 while they could not easily obtain coal from neutral ports 
 on a track so watched. Prance, however, has at Bourbon, 
 Pondicherry, and at Saigon, ports of her own which must 
 be watched, while Russia has her ports and existing 
 squadron in the North Pacific. Eiussian Siberia and French 
 Cochin China would be for the observation of the China 
 squadron, of which I shall presently treat. Bourbon and 
 Pondicherry would each require the presence of perhaps a 
 single ship, resting on Mauritius and Trincomalee. Looked 
 at thus, it may be seen that a very small force is necessary 
 in the East Indies to keep our trade routes inviolate ; and 
 the present force of 1 Frigate, 4 Corvettes, and 7 Sloops, 
 might be actually reduced when the graver policy of a 
 European war supplanted those smaller matters which now 
 keep up the East Indian squadron at its high standard. 
 With such ships as I propose, which could throw them- 
 selves at very considerable speed on menaced points, a 
 greater concentration at the Cape of Good Hope would be 
 a reasonable way of protecting the East Indies. Singapore 
 and the Straits of Malacca form so inviting a sluice valve 
 to check the waters of our commerce, that we may almost 
 be sure that a serious attempt to get hold of the handle 
 would be made there, if anywhere in the East, by the 
 powers I have named. It can be approached from so many 
 directions, that the powers in consultation might very 
 readily agree to make a junction of all forces there on a 
 given day, each sending perhaps two or three times as 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWEK. 123 
 
 many ships as are necessary, to make up for certain losses 
 on the way. I think therefore that some concentration of 
 OTir ships should be made there, and this brings me to the 
 consideration of the China squadron and its duties. It con- 
 sisted at the date named of 1 Fleet-ship, 3 Corvettes, 15 
 Sloops, 4 gunboats, and a Despatch vessel. Here is really 
 a very fine force if the Sloops were as efficient in their 
 powers of locomotion as I propose they should be. If a 
 Corvette and 3 Sloops watched the chief Russian port in 
 Siberia ; if the fleet-ship watched an enemy's Fleet-ship say 
 at Saigon ; if she were supported according to the force 
 found there— say with 1 Corvette and 2 Sloops ; and if 4 
 sloops were left along the route from Hong Kong to Japan, 
 we should still have 1 Corvette, 6 Sloops and 4 Gun-boats to 
 protect the route from Singapore to Hong Kong, and to 
 guard Singapore itself. It is not probable — if only the 
 ships were as I wish them — that any addition to the peace 
 establishment in China would be necessary in war time ; 
 for, as in India, the smaller local wants of peace mast 
 immediately give way to the exigencies of an imperial 
 policy in war. In Australia we should probably want an 
 addition to the 3 Corvettes and 1 Sloop which now represent 
 our naval forces there, and I think that if we took that of 
 the 4 Frigates of the detached squadron which existed at 
 the date named by me, and placed them under the command 
 of the Australian Admiral, together with twd or three 
 Sloops, Australia would be left reasonably secure. The 
 Pacific trade route is perhaps the most difficult of all to 
 guard, and I think it very probable that much would have 
 to be done by way of convoy. The route is liable to attack 
 from the basis of Siberia by the Russians, and of Tahiti by 
 the French, and it is difficult to see how the successful raids 
 of sailing "Alabamas" on a sailing trade are to be pre- 
 
124 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 vented, the means of concealment and escape being so com- 
 plex in so great an expanse of ocean. Convoy for the 
 sailing trade would therefore appear to be a necessity, and 
 the probability is that the traffic across the isthmus would 
 be increased, while that round Cape Horn would be 
 diminished. The Siberian fleet being thoroughly blockaded ; 
 and Tahiti, the Marquesas, and New Caledonia thoroughly 
 denuded of possible " Alabamas," the Pacific trade would 
 only be open to the attack of " Alabamas " fitted out in the 
 neutral ports of Pacific America. It would be dangerous 
 for the smaller States to permit such proceedings, while 
 America might be relied on — in view of her own " Alabama 
 Claims" — to take care that nothing touched us from a 
 United States port. But the existing Pacific squadron of 1 
 Fleet ship, 2 Corvettes, and 5 Sloops would be properly aug- 
 mented by at least a corvette and 3 sloops in a war with 
 European powers. Returning home again we pass to the 
 Falkland Islands, on which the present force of 1 Frigate 
 and 2 Sloops would, when augmented, rest in time of war. 
 This force would be in some degree united with that on 
 the West Coast of Africa, now amounting to 1 Frigate, 2 
 Corvettes, 1 Sloop, and 5 Gun-boats ; and I think it would 
 be well, seeing the value of the two great commercial lines 
 which pass there, to unite the two squadrons as a South 
 Atlantic naval station. Even in peace the South Atlantic 
 squadron of 2 Frigates, 3 Corvettes, 3 Sloops, and 5 Gun- 
 boats is respectable, and if called in upon Ascension, St. 
 Helena, and the Cape, would show a very fair guard there. 
 But a concentration would probably be required at Ascen- 
 sion, as at the Cape and the Falkland Islands, as these 
 three points form as it were the necks of the navigation, 
 and if sufficiently guarded, expeditions for more distant 
 parts of our Empire might there receive a check. The 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 125 
 
 West Indian and North American station is now provided 
 with 1 Fleet-ship, 1 Frigate, 3 Corvettes, 4 Sloops, and 3 
 Gun-boats, and these with augmentations would rest upon St. 
 John's, Bermuda, Nassau, and Barbados, to receive the 
 streams of commerce flowing east and west, and to purify 
 those routes from the incumbrance of chance " Alabamas." 
 New squadrons not now in existence would be required to 
 guard the routes nearer home, but it would be found that 
 they would be best disposed in a line running from Cape 
 Finisterre to Cape Clear, and resting chiefly on the home 
 ports. A chain of a dozen Corvettes and Sloops lying along 
 that line would make a very efficient curtain to strain out 
 the gnats which might wish to feed beyond that line on 
 forbidden fruit. 
 
 I think that this cursory survey of our existing position 
 in peace, and of our probable position in a war with four 
 great maritime powers combined against us, is very re- 
 assuring in some respects; in others very much the 
 reverse. If we took our present peace displacement of 
 ships in commission, and their armaments, we should be 
 very well satisfied ; but if we look at their powers of loco- 
 motion we ought to fear. To have a force, and yet to be 
 unable to employ it in the right place, at the right time, is the 
 ultimate blunder of bad generalship. That we should go on 
 deliberately constructing naval forces with this flaw in them 
 would very much surprise the ignorant. It is no surprise 
 to those who recognise the force of the past in influencing 
 the present. It will still be years before the great change 
 I propose is made complete, but there is no year passes 
 which does not more closely approach it, and if war does 
 not come in the meantime, we shalli not so greatly suffer. 
 With ships designed as I propose they should be, oiir peace 
 establishment ought to show such a front as will give 
 
126 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 US a secure basis against any possible combination in 
 war. 
 
 I should add a word or two here on the fourth division 
 of my subject, having treated of the first and second — I 
 mean " Colonial and Home Defence." In the whole of my 
 scheme I have assumed the security of the coaling stations, 
 and I conceive that if a suflGlcient naval force is afloat to 
 protect the line of communication between each pair of 
 coaling stations, that act will protect the stations them- 
 selves. [ find myself unwilling to withdraw from the 
 fixed fund which I assume to be at our disposal, any part 
 for the exclusive use of the coaling station, which might 
 be employed to augment the sea-going fleet. But to be 
 reasonable, I must admit the possibility of attack on a naval 
 station in spite of its sea-going guard. I am only con- 
 cerned then to meet this possibility in the cheapest way 
 possible. And I think this way involves the following 
 principles. (1.) Coal and other stores protected from 
 shell-fire on the sea side. (2.) A garrison of sufficient 
 strength to meet the ordinary landing parties of one or 
 two frigates. (3.) Cover for that garrison. (4.) Stationary 
 torpedoes where capable of application. (5.) Locomotive 
 torpedoes either of the outrigger, or fish description. I 
 should expect to get news beforehand of any serious expe- 
 dition against a naval station, and with ships capable of 
 steaming at a moderate spaed for a long time, I should 
 always calculate on their assembly to defeat such an expe- 
 dition. I should only give such a defence to the naval 
 station itself as would make its attack either useless or 
 hazardous to anything short of a serious expedition. But 
 I put much faith in the sea-going fleet resting on the naval 
 station as a protective force, and little faith on any other 
 appliance. The larger colonies are and must be in the 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL POWER. 127 
 
 hands of armies. The smaller colonies exist as the 
 supports of a Navy as an imperial instrument. The larger 
 ones and India exist as integral parts of the Empire itself 
 The first become parts of the Navy, and should in my 
 opinion be entirely under naval control. The second can 
 be attacked only after the failure of the Navy, and must 
 then be defended by an Army. Colonial and Home ports 
 which are open to attack: as a means of directly damaging 
 the Empire, should be guarded by the Navy in sufficient 
 force, while those naval stations which will be attacked 
 as a means of indirectly damaging the Empire through the 
 Navy, the Navy is doubly bound to protect. But as I 
 have already said, I should allow to all ports open to 
 attack, a certain sum to be expended in the cheapest 
 defences, which appear to be the different classes of 
 torpedo. I wish to condemn again with steady design the 
 idea of the "Harbour Defence Ship." Such vessels are 
 every whit as likely to be withdrawn as the sea-going ship 
 when they are wanted, and the only result is that you build a 
 bad sea-going ship when, had you never heard of harbour de- 
 fence, you would have built a good one. The very extreme 
 to which I would allow myself to go, would be in the ram 
 and the " Gamma ; " but these weapons, if prepared at all, 
 would be, fpr the great Home, or the great Colonial, ports. 
 
 My task, which has been but badly and hurriedly per- 
 formed, will now be done when I have said a word about 
 the Naval Volunteer Force ; but when I have thrown 
 ^ocal Home and Colonial defence entirely on the torpedo, 
 I have already made the supplemental force a corps of 
 Volunteer Torpedo Men. I think it was always difficult 
 to say what the functions of a Naval Volunteer force 
 should be, so long as it was thought that they must serve 
 on board ship. But now, if they are the defenders of 
 
128 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 great ports by torpedoes, we have for them a function such 
 as their educational status will eminently fit them for, and 
 an exercise for their skill and daring in time of war, 
 which might be the envy oE the highest genius. I am 
 strong on spending little on harbour defence, and I there- 
 fore recognise in the Naval Volunteers that very element 
 which I seek, and if the enemy is to be kept at bay by a 
 home defence of any kind, I should think that a cordon of 
 coast torpedoes, fixed and locomotive, in the hands of a 
 British Volunteer force, will do it. 
 
 I have now concluded my essay, and as a final paragraph 
 may summarise my views in a series of theses which may 
 form the bases of discussion should I be so fortunate as to 
 see my essay amongst those selected for publication. The 
 theses are these : — 
 
 (1 ) A frank reliance should be placed on steam 
 
 power ; and coal in naval depots. 
 (2.) A classification of our ships should be adopted, 
 
 and the types should be reduced in number. 
 (3.) It is an error to suppose that the disappearance 
 of armour is approaching, and equally an error 
 to suppose that guns of 80 tons and upwards 
 are the weapons of the future. 
 (4.) No nature of torpedo will greatly alter the 
 
 tactics of a modern sea fight. 
 (5.) It is possible to subordinate the requirements of 
 a peace establishment to those certainly required 
 in war, not only without an increase in the Esti- 
 mates, but with a possible reduction. 
 (6.) Coast and harbour defence should occupy in the 
 British Empire an entirely subordinate position, 
 and the best defence of naval stations is the 
 defence of the routes communicating with them. 
 
129 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE NAVAL DEFENCES OP THE UNITED KINGDOM.' 
 
 I AM desirous of raising a discussion on the purely naval, 
 or active, defences of the United Kingdom, which it seems 
 highly necessary should take place at the present juncture. 
 I think it the more appropriate that we should have a dis- 
 cussion, as looking roughly back over our journals, I easily 
 count up some seventeen papers on the military defences of 
 these islands, but only about four which can be said in any 
 way to touch the naval defences, and I think there is only 
 one — that by Bear-Admiral Scott in 1877 — -professing to 
 deal with them, which has come from the hands of a naval 
 officer. 
 
 But of these four, I do not find one which lays out any 
 principles of naval defence. The paper which goes nearest 
 to principles is that of General Collinson, R.E., which was 
 read in 1874, and produced a very good discussion under 
 the limits set out in the paper. 
 
 I have no intention of writing an elaborate paper now, or 
 of enforcing any plans or dogmas of my own. My position 
 is that, so far as I understand, certain systematic arrange- 
 ments, the results of long experience, were laid down when 
 war broke out again at the beginning of this century 
 which were wholly naval, and which were entirely trusted 
 
 1 Written in 1888. 
 
 K 
 
130 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 to, however it may have suited the party exigencies of the 
 day to force the Cabinet into expenses in the way of extra 
 defences on land on the supposition that the naval arrange- 
 ments would fail. 
 
 In those days there was a certain defined way of looking 
 at the situation of these islands as surrounded by water, at 
 the water surrounding them, and at the possible enemies' 
 coasts which bounded the water. Our islands were strictly 
 regarded as the capital of an Empire, surrounded by a 
 water territory, the frontier of which was the enemy's 
 coast. Prom the very earliest times of regular naval 
 warfare, so soon, that is, as we began to learn, after our 
 great struggles with the Dutch had brought reflection, we 
 began to make disconnected efforts to push out over our 
 water territory and to secure its frontier, knowing that if 
 our territory were to be overrun and left at the mercy of 
 hostile fleets, it would be impossible that the capital should 
 survive. We had seen a contrary course permit an enemy 
 to insult us in the Medwayl and the Thames, and to 
 threaten Portsmouth. 
 
 We had become aware that by efforts to secure our 
 water territory, even though they were incomplete, we had 
 baulked the Dutch plan of blocking the Thames up with 
 sunken ships, and we had learnt as early as 1691 that to 
 blockade Dunkirk was the proper way to prevent the Dun- 
 kirkers from stopping the trade of Newcastle by sinking 
 ships in the Tyne.2 
 
 We had also had experience that the enemy's fleet in 
 possession of the Channel after beating but not destroyinsf 
 or seriously crippling our own, was incapable of executing 
 
 ' Xl,de TJ.S.I. Journal, vol. xxix, p. 936. 
 
 ° Admiral Kussell, afterwards Earl of Orfoid, quoted by Burchett^ 
 p 135. 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 131 
 
 any important service against us — held in check by our still 
 capable ships.l 
 
 And so, as far as our very imperfect appliances allowed 
 us, we asserted territorial command over our home waters, 
 and endeavoured to prevent the enemy from crossing that 
 which we considered our frontier — the exits from the ports. 
 The appliances were very defective — ships that we could 
 only trust at sea between the middle of May and the end 
 of July — provisions and stores of such defective quality 
 and quantity that a week or two at sea always necessitated 
 a return home to replenish. Vessels so incapable of con- 
 tending against the wind that they could not be trusted 
 near the land. But with such appliances we did the best 
 we could, pretty confident that if the enemy, from the 
 uncertainty of our guard over his ports, did evade our fleets, 
 their presence near at home was always a complete check 
 on his ulterior proceedings. 
 
 As time went on and appliances improved, as it became 
 possible to keep up a winter guard, and to push the watch 
 close into the enemy's ports, it was found that a gale of 
 wind was the only thing that should render evasion 
 possible. Apart from gales of wind, Brest itself, 127 
 years ago, could be so closely watched that Hawke 
 declared he could " safely aflSrra that except a few ships 
 that took shelter in Conquet, hardly a vessel of any kind 
 had been able to enter or come out of the port these four 
 months." 
 
 Lord St. Vincent, improving on the work of all who had 
 gone before him, in the first year of this century kept the 
 combined fleets in check at Brest (there were ninety 
 pendants) by anchoring ships of the line in a position which 
 
 ' The condition after the Battle of Beaohy Head. 
 
 E 2 
 
132 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 gave them fall vies? into the harbour. What could be done 
 at Brest could certainly be done generally, and so when 
 the war broke out in 1803, and Iiord St. Vincent was First 
 Lord of the Admiralty, he made the following naval defen- 
 sive dispositions. 
 
 At Toulon and Cadiz there were known to be of French 
 not more than ten sail of the line, four frigates, and two 
 9ma,ller vessels. To look after them there was Nelson with 
 fourteen sail of the line, eleven frigates, and twenty-one 
 smaller vessels. 
 
 At Ferrol were five of the sail line and two frigates, and 
 thither were despatched seven sail of the line, two frigates, 
 and two smaller vessels. 
 
 At Rocheforfc and near were four sail of the line, five 
 frigates, and two smaller vessels of the enemy. To watch 
 them were stationed five sail of the line, one frigate, and 
 one small vessel. 
 
 At Brest the enemy mustered eighteen sail of the line, 
 six frigates, and one smaller vessel. Lord Cornwallis was 
 there with twenty sail of the line, five frigates, and six 
 smaller vessels. 
 
 In dealing with this frontier of the enemy, containing 
 five ports or passes into our territory, we had about twenty- 
 eight per cent, more sail of the line, about thirty per cent, 
 more frigates, but 600 per cent, more of small vessels than 
 he had. These were necessary clearly, if a close watch was 
 to be kept up in all weathers. 
 
 This coast and these ports were furnished with the naval 
 forces of the euemy in the usual character. From St. 
 Malo to the Texel, the ports, besides containing the usual 
 war vessels, were full of the invasion flotilla which ha I 
 now been in preparation for eight years, and was in a pretty 
 forward state. 
 
PLATE VI. 
 
 The ^P^ure* on the water rtprttent British ships, those on the laud the ship a of the 
 enemy. The Jlrtt Jlgnrea repretenl the number of Line-of- Bailie ahipn, thf second, Craiaera, 
 and the third, the apecial vetaelafor the intended invaHon. 
 
 To face page 1-13. 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 133 
 
 In the Texel were four sail of tlie line of the enemy, with 
 a frigate and 120 of the flotilla vessels ; and in the various 
 ports, as far as Dunkirk, there was one lineof-battle ship, 
 four frigates, seven smaller vessels, and 645 of the invasion 
 flotilla. 
 
 To watch these various ports we put nine sail of the line, 
 seven frigates, and fourteen smaller vessels. 
 
 In the more westerly ports, including Boulogne, Havre, 
 Cherbourg, &c., the enemy had two frigates, seven smaller 
 vessels, 120 special gunbrigs, for the service of the invasion, 
 and about 1,450 of the invasion flotilla. 
 
 We placed to watch these, two sail of the line (small 50's), 
 fourteen frigates, and forty smaller vessels. 
 
 Such was the true first line of defence, but as it was evident 
 such a line might be pierced in points both by squadrons 
 under the then conditions of ships, and by small vessels, a 
 second line was provided, consisting of six sail of the line, 
 four frigates, and nineteen smaller vessels. This was the 
 Downs squadron, a squadron which might be doubled in 
 force at short notice did need so require; a squadron which 
 was a permanency in war, and had long been regarded as the 
 second line of naval defence. 
 
 But not yet was the scheme complete. Evasions even of 
 the second line might be possible on a small scale. It was 
 prudent if not necessary to admit the fact, and there was 
 consequently a local guard in Ireland of six frigates and 
 eleven smaller vessels, guarding the St. George's Channel as 
 well. 
 
 At Hollesley Bay, at Yarmouth, the Humber, Leith, and 
 generally along the east coasts of England and Scotland 
 were four line-of- battle ships, two frigates, and twenty 
 smaller vessels. 
 
 Such were the dispositions of force which Lord' St. 
 
134 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Vincent considered made the United Kingdom so absolutely 
 secure that it was only under pressure that he went one 
 step further in the provision of an actual coast defence. 
 Grudgingly he allowed an expenditure of £20,000 for pure 
 coast defence, which afterwards increased to £150,000. For 
 what he considered the wrongful expenditure of this money, 
 Lord St. Vincent always consoled himself by saying " it 
 was the item of his estimates of no other use than to calm 
 the fears of the old ladies both in and out." 
 
 What were the principles of this system of naval defence? 
 They were described by Sir Edward Pelew in the House of 
 Commons in these terms : " I see,'' said he, " a triple naval 
 bulwark, composed of one fleet acting on the enemy's 
 coast ; of another, consisting of heavier ships, stationed in 
 the Downs, ready to act at a moment's notice ; and a third ; 
 close to the beach, capable of destroying any portion of the 
 enemy's flotilla that might escape the vigilance of the other 
 two." Sir Edward was here clearly speaking .only of the 
 special danger of invasion which was threatened. It was 
 not necessary to take account of Brest, Roohefort, Eerrol, 
 and Toulon; the arrangements for watching the enemy 
 there, and the conditions of the enemy himself there, were 
 normal. 
 
 Now on this summary of what was thought secure and 
 sufficient at the beginning of the century to guard us 
 against the great, overwhelming blow which had been in 
 preparation for eight years, a question arises. This system 
 of naval defence was no new thing. The same system, only 
 less developed, because it was impossible to develop it more 
 in the then state of navigation and seamanship, had been 
 in use for 200 years. The port of Dunkirk had been dealt 
 with in 1691 precisely as it was now dealt with in 1804. 
 Doubtless there had been an alternative plan of naval 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 135 
 
 defence contending for favour with that ultimately adopted; 
 and as Hawke was the founder, and St. Vincent the final 
 exponent of the system described, so Lord Howe was the 
 apostle and demonstrator of the competing system. 
 
 Lord Howe was of opinion that the maintenance of a 
 squadron at sea in close touch with an enemy's squadron in 
 port was to place the latter at an unfair advantage. Con- 
 trary to the popular belief of the present day, Lord Howe 
 thought that in a blockading squadron off Brest there was 
 a continual process of deterioration going on, that both 
 men and ships became gradually worn out, and that the 
 force inside became more and more competent to beat the 
 outside force as the time went on. 
 
 While Lord Howe was in power the system of blockade 
 was not approved. His ideal defence was a reserve fleet 
 at St. Helen's and a grand fleet at Torbay. Each of these 
 fleets were to be informed by their frigates of the move- 
 ments of the enemy in his ports, and the grand fleet was 
 to put to sea after, and not before, the enemy himself was 
 out. 
 
 The main difference between the system of Lord Howe 
 and that of St. Vincent was practically that Howe thought 
 the Brest fleet could be more effectually masked from 
 Torbay than from Ushant, but both systems agreed in the 
 necessity for masking the Brest fleet, the only powerful 
 fleet possible, and for providing a reserve home fleet which 
 would be a permanent check on the operations of a fleet 
 which had in any way eluded the vigilance of the grand 
 fleet or its divisions. 
 
 Lord Howe's system was based upon earlier practice, 
 which had been enforced upon us by the inferior character 
 of the ships we had to employ. The best answer to those 
 who might have wished to continue it was perhaps that 
 
136 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 it was not continued. General experience was against it, 
 as it was found impossible to say where the Brest fleet 
 would go to, or where any of its divisions would go to, if 
 it were once let out of sight. 
 
 There was, too, the insuperable objection to the system 
 that it left the enemy free to prey on our commerce. 
 There had been more than one occasion when the whole 
 force of the enemy, being free to put to sea, had massed 
 itself and laid in wait for one of the great convoys which 
 were a necessary part of the arrangement. Squadrons of 
 the enemy also had been nicely calculated to be sufficient 
 to master the smaller convoys which we sent out, and had 
 made, in the great open water, bounded by the coasts of 
 England, France, and Ireland, and a line drawn from Cape 
 Finisterre to Cape Clear, wholesale captures of our mer- 
 cliant ships and the warships which were supposed to 
 guard them When the enemy were free to put to sea 
 ia larger or smaller squadrons, or in single ships at their 
 will and pleasure, it was impossible to provide such 
 convoy as would meet the case, as it was impossible to 
 say what the case would be. And hence the outward 
 bound convoys became very large, and had to be largely 
 guarded — guarded by the whole of our grand fleet to some 
 western point beyond which it was supposed — very often 
 wrongly — that an enemy's squadron would not lie. 
 
 When the system of blockade was adopted, the necessity 
 for large convoys was to a great extent abrogated, and 
 latterly it appears as if only the single privateer, or the 
 very small group of privateers, were able to escape to sea 
 and to attack our commerce, which, to suffer, must have 
 either been very slenderly guarded or not guarded at all. 
 
 Lord Howe's system of leaving the enemy's ports open, 
 pre-supposed an equal commerce on both sides, and then 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 137 
 
 in a calculation — which seldom came out right in practice 
 — the Power which sent most squadrons and cruisers to 
 sea had most chances. Obviously, where the commerce 
 was unequal, the superior commerce suffered most. 
 
 Now there are before us two systems of naval defence, 
 one older than the other and superseded by it. Do we 
 still hold by the system to which experience ultimately 
 led us ? If we do not hold to it, why have we abandoned 
 it ? And what have we substituted for it ? 
 
 One would suppose that as a great nation earnest in 
 preparation for war — or claiming to be so through the 
 eternal panics and alarms which we offer as a testimony 
 to foreign observers— we were ready with an answer to 
 such very simple questions as these. Yet I venture to 
 think there is not a man in the United Kingdom who 
 could give such answers as the next man he meets would 
 agree to. 
 
 But without answering directly, we have answered in- 
 directly and oflBcially, both in words and deeds, and in such 
 a way as to make it difficult to say whether we have ever 
 thought about the matter at all, or ever considered whether 
 any answers were necessary. 
 
 Let us take what the Royal Commissioners said in 1860 
 when advising the expenditure of £12,000,000 on the 
 fortifications of the military ports. This Royal Commis- 
 sion was very badly constituted for pronouncing an opinion 
 on the general principles of defence, but it did pronounce 
 notwithstanding. 
 
 It held as a primary axiom that the fleet could not be 
 relied on at the present day as a defence of the United 
 Kingdom, even if England had no greater interest to pro- 
 tect than the countries which may be opposed to her. It 
 could only be relied on if an undue portion of our fleet 
 
138 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE, 
 
 were tied to the Channel for home defence, setting free a 
 portion of the enemy's fleet. While the Navy in the 
 earlier part of the century was sufficient for the duties 
 imposed on it, it could hardly be made so now. More 
 naval force would be required now for purely defensive 
 purposes than formerly, owing to " the certainty with which 
 the movements of fleets can be combined by the aid of 
 steam, and the rapidity with which a large force can be 
 concentrated at a given time on any point." The expense 
 of providing an efficient Navy would' be greater than the 
 country would bear. Then " the efficient blockade of an 
 enemy's fleet had become well nigh impossible '' in con- 
 sequence of the use of steam. Then it was held that shell 
 had made it likely that even a victorious fleet would be 
 more seriously crippled than in former days, and therefore 
 a longer time uafit for service. Circumstances might 
 occur to prevent our fleet being at the right place at the 
 right time. It might be dispersed in a storm or over- 
 powered. 
 
 Then the Commissioners summarised thus : " Should any 
 such catastrophe occur, or should the fleet, from whatever 
 cause, be unable to keep the command of the Channel, it 
 appears to your Commissioners that the insular position of 
 the kingdom, so far from being an advantage, might prove 
 a disadvantage for defensive purposes, inasmuch as it 
 would enable any superior Naval Power or Powers to con- 
 centrate a larger body of troops on any part of our coasts, 
 and more rapidly and secretly than could be done against 
 any neighbouring country having only a land frontier; 
 and an army so placed could maintain its base, and be 
 reinforced, and supplied with more facility than if de- 
 pendent on land communications." 
 
 Now, however we may differ about the truth and 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 139 
 
 applicability of these pronouncements, I think we must 
 all agree that there is not amongst them the slightest 
 glimmering of an idea that there existed either Lord 
 Howe's or Lord St. Vincent's systems of naval defence, or 
 indeed any other, if any other were possible. But I would 
 ask whether the whole argument does not come simply to 
 this : " We assume it as certain that this country has lost 
 faith in its Navy, and will never put faith in it again. 
 That it will have an insufficient naval force, and that then 
 we shall find, what every other nation has found, that 
 nothing will protect territory from sea attacks if the 
 command of the sea be lost." 
 
 That Report I look upon, in fact, as one of the strangest 
 fian-sequiturs that ever put wrong notions into a nation's 
 head. How the spending of twelve millions in the for- 
 tifications of the military ports was to provide an efficient 
 Ifavy which it was certain the country would not provide, 
 or to prevent a rapid and secret descent on some other part 
 of our coasts, the Commissioners did not say. But their 
 argument assuredly was — we are in a hole, and cannot help 
 ourselves ; let us spend a large sum on an extraneous 
 matter which has nothing to do with the arguments we 
 have been using. 
 
 Let us now turn to the later official utterance which 
 has urged us to spend more money in the same direction. 
 I take what Mr. Stanhope's Committee says, or rather 
 what the " case " given to them came to. " In the case of 
 the principal military ports," says the Committee, "the 
 scheme is framed on the assumption that the command of 
 the Channel has been temporarily lost to us by the fact 
 that the Channel Squadron is absent or disabled, and that 
 these ports and dockyards might have suddenly to rely 
 exclusively on their own resources for defence against 
 
140 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 attack hy a powerful squadroa of ironclads." The Com- 
 mittee thus accepts the couditions accepted by the Royal 
 Commissioners of 1860, but they go further, and give 
 reasons for spending the money. The reasons are that 
 the destruction of our great dockyard at Portsmouth, and 
 in a less degree that of Plymouth, might be decisive of 
 the issue of a great war; and for the Thames and Med way 
 and Harwich, the fortifications are necessary to prevent a 
 sudden attack on London covered by an ironclad fleet. 
 Here, again, is no sign of knowledge of a system of naval 
 defence. A total failure of naval defence is assumed, but not 
 a word is said as to the nature of the defence, not a syllable 
 as to how it will fail. Only it is held that the gain of the 
 command of the Channel by the enemy, which he never 
 gained but once in Charles 11,'s time, will probably be his 
 in the next naval war, and we had better prepare for the 
 inevitable. 
 
 But neither Lord Howe nor Lord St. Vincent would have 
 allowed any of this vague and somewhat wild language for 
 n, moment. To them it would have appeared very like 
 what proposing to provide a substitute for the militia in 
 case it should not be called out, would appear now to 
 .1 military man. Howe placed his reserve fleet at St. 
 Helen's, St. Vincent placed his in the Downs, and both of 
 them thereby made an end of these woes which were to 
 follow the " catastrophe " to the Channel fleet. Moreover, 
 both of them were quite aware that if this miraculous 
 catastrophe was not to take place, but there was to be 
 only an evasion, the Channel fleet itself could have no 
 other post but the Channel, and that the enemy was so 
 psrfectly aware of the fact that his hands were entirely 
 tied. 
 
 Let us now examine a little closely what the Royal 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 141 
 
 Commissioners of 1860 have said, bearing in mind that we 
 have, if they had not, these two systems of defeace before 
 ns, and that Mr. Stanhope's Committee can only get their 
 ironclad fleet to bombard Portsmouth, or force the Thames, 
 by accepting the Royal Commissioners' assertions. 
 
 See what an enigmatical thing it is to talk about, " an 
 undue proportion of the fleet being tied to the Channel. 
 Suppose there were ten ironclads at Brest ready for sea, 
 and, for the sake of argument, none at Cherbourg ; and 
 suppose the force in the Mediterranean were sufBcient to 
 mask the enemy there. Suppose this left us fifteen iron- 
 clads at home. What would, on Lord Howe's principles, 
 be an " undue proportion " to keep in the Channel for 
 purely defensive purposes? Is it not obvious that Lord 
 Howe would have kept the whole fifteen in the Channel, 
 perhaps tea at Torbay and five at St. Helen's ? Where 
 else CO aid they have been but in the Channel on Lord 
 Howe's system of defence ? 
 
 But on Lord St. Vincent's system we may suppose that 
 five would have remained at home and ten have gone off 
 Brest. Would the ten off Brest be an " undue " proportion 
 to keep there for purely defensive purposes ? Could they 
 have been sent anywhere else as long as the ten of the 
 enemy were at Brest, on Lord St. Vincent's principle ? 
 Surely this talk of " undue " proportion is nothing but a 
 mere phrase, embodying the fallacy that our fleets will be 
 wanted somewhere where the enemy is not, and that, 
 therefore, they cannot be kept where he is. 
 
 We are next told that while we could, as we have seen 
 under Lord St. Vincent's arrangements, have a sufficient 
 naval force to keep the enemy everywhere in check, we 
 could not have it now because of the certainty and rapidity 
 of steam communication. 
 
142 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 What is the meaning of this under either of the two 
 schemes of defence? Certainly Lord St. Vincent could 
 make little of it, for he would say, " This certainty and 
 rapidity has got nothing to do with me, for by the 
 hypothesis I have my eye on every portion of the enemy's 
 force in his own ports, and I have such a grip of him 
 that he cannot move. There is nothing in the fact that 
 he can move more certainly and more rapidly to prevent 
 me having as great a superiority off each port in 1860 or 
 1888 as I had in 1803. Of course you may start me with 
 an inferior fleet to that of the enemy, and then certainly 
 1 cannot carry out my plans, but you have shown me 
 nothing yet to prove that you would not give me as 
 great a superiority at either of the latter periods as you 
 did at the earlier. That proportion may be too little for 
 a steam fleet, but not for any reasons you have yet put 
 forward." 
 
 Lord Howe's answer would be equally complete. " Ton 
 give me," he would say, " by hypothesis, the superior fleet 
 at Torbay. You gave it to me just in the same way in 
 1793. I was never attacked there, and the enemy never 
 came near me there, because I had the superior fleet. If 
 you give me the superior steam fleet at Torbay, the fact 
 that the enemy can now move quickly and more certainly, 
 and make his combinations with more accuracy, will not 
 bring himofE the Start in 1860 or 1888 any more willingly 
 than in 1793 ; what kept him away in 1793 was my 
 superiority, and this would keep him away still. 
 
 " But if what you mean is that I, in a steam fleet at 
 Torbay, will find it more difficult to defend the United 
 Kingdom from territorial attacks, invasions, and what not, 
 because the enemy can make combinations with greater 
 certainty and rapidity, then I join issue, and say that is 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 143 
 
 palpable nonsense. As long as my superior steam fleet 
 is at Torbay, it is a full defence against territorial attacks 
 on any part of the coast whatever. Why do I say that ? 
 Simply because the whole course of naval histoiy has told 
 no other story. Nothing can be done in the way of 
 territorial attack with a disputed command of the sea. 
 The greatest seamen have submitted and obeyed the rule, 
 abandoning territorial attack on the mere rumour that the 
 command of the sea would be disputed ; not the greatest 
 seamen have tried to disobey and have suffered for it ; 
 take the Duke of Medina Sidonia and Admiral Persano as 
 examples. How can a steam fleet which dare not face me 
 where 1 wait for it, care to run the risk of being caught 
 by me when entangled with his territorial undertaking ? 
 It is not as if the thing was a novelty. More than once 
 we made territorial attacks on the coast of Prance in later 
 days, but when we did so we took care to mask the only 
 fleet that could interfere with us.'' 
 
 And, Lord Howe would say, "if the enemy has improved in 
 capacity to move and concentrate with certainty and rapidity, 
 I have improved also, and have other advantages which in 
 thB case before us he has not got. I am at the end of the 
 electric telegraph, and there is no part of the coast that he 
 can approach that will not warn me of the fact in a very 
 few minutes. But while I shall know all about his move- 
 ments, he can know nothing of mine until he sees me. If 
 history tells me that an enemy would fear to attack when 
 I had not this advantage, why should I suppose he will 
 cease to fear when I have that tremendous pull over him ? " 
 
 But now comes the strangest statement that could be 
 made without the shadow of a reason or an argument. 
 The efficient blockade of an enemy's fleet, say the Com- 
 missioners, has become " well nigh impossible " in conse- 
 
144 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 quence of the use of steam. Lord Howe considered it 
 well nigh impossible under sail, and if it were so under 
 steam, it would only leave his system of naval defence 
 untouched. Lord St. Vincent had no experience of steam, 
 and could not reply in consequence. Let us, therefore, go 
 to the American Federal Navy, which had a coast of 3,500 
 miles, comprising 189 ports, blockaded by steam for near 
 about four years, and, therefore, had some little experience 
 of the matter. This is how the historian sums up their 
 experience : — 
 
 " As to the legal efficiency of the blockade after the first 
 six months, there can be no question y and by the end of 
 the second year its stringency was such that only specially 
 adapted vessels could safely attempt to run it. If proof 
 of its efficiency was needed, it could be found in the in- 
 creased price of cotton, and in the scarcity of manufactured 
 goods in the South. In the last year it became as nearly 
 perfect as such an operation can be made. Taking its 
 latest development as ' a type, it is probable that no 
 blockade has ever been maintained more effectually by any 
 State ; and it is certain that no State ever had such a 
 blockade to maintain. 
 
 " The success of this undertaking, so un- 
 precedented both in its magnitude and difficulty, can best 
 be judged by the results. The number of prizes brought 
 in during the war was 1,149, of which 210 were steamers. 
 There were also 355 vessels burned, sunk, driven on shore, 
 or otherwise destroyed, of which 85 were steamers naak- 
 ing a total of 1,504 vessels of all classes. The value of 
 these vessels and their cargoes, according to a low estimate, 
 was thirty-one millions of dollars (over £6,000,000). 
 
 Of the property afloat destroyed or captured 
 
 during the Civil War, the larger part suffered in conse- 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KlNGrDOM. ]45 
 
 quence of the blockade In the Civil War, the 
 
 work waa done wholly by the Navy ; and it was done in 
 the face of obstacles of which naval warfare before that 
 time had presented no example or conception." 1 
 
 When the blockade had become so stringent that only 
 special vessels ooald break it, it was estimated at Wilming- 
 ton that one-third of the attempts failed ; and the calcula- 
 tion was that out of sixty-six special blockade runners 
 working that port, forty were ultimately captured or 
 destroyed. Remember, again, that not one of the Con- 
 federate cruisers was able to use a Confederate port as her 
 regular base, while under oar old system of sailing 
 blockade, privateers used all the French ports as their 
 regular bases, and sent our captured ships into them some- 
 times at the rate of two or three a-day. Then let us say, 
 if we can, that there is the slightest justification for accept- 
 ing the dictum of the Boyal Commissioners of 1860. 
 
 On the face of it, things must be the other way 
 altogether with steam. In our wars with France and 
 Spain, there were three things only which allowed their 
 fleets or squadrons to pass to seaj either (1) that we made 
 no effort to stop them, which was Lord Howe's principle ; 
 or (2) that the blockading squadron was blown away ; or 
 (3) that it was away to replenish, to clean bottoms, and to 
 refit. Applying these conditions to steam warfare, it is 
 clear that the first is common to both steam and sail, and 
 is not affected by the change. As to the second condition, 
 its entire disappearance from the Federal experience is a 
 saificient answer. The Federals experienced all the bad 
 weather that any blockaders could expect to be exposed to, 
 but it never caused their squadrons to quit their posts. 
 
 ' " The Blockade and the Cruisers." Soley, p. 43. 
 
 L 
 
146 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 There remains then the third condition, that of replenish- 
 ment, refit, and cleaning bottoms. 
 
 Here it is important to note that this difficulty 
 only exists where the base on which the blockading 
 squadron rests is distant. Even in this case temporary 
 bases can often be found to modify the difficulty. Much 
 was done in former years even in the open sea in the way 
 of supply. Hawke, in the middle of last century, had 
 made arrangements which practically got over the difficulty 
 for Brest and the adjacent ports, when Plymouth was his 
 base. St. Vincent would have laughed to scorn the idea 
 that there was any difficulty in that region at all, and in 
 the latter years of the war, except where there were cases 
 of distinct blundering, I do not gather that the question 
 of replenishment and refit ever allowed the enemy an ad- 
 vantage on the Atlantic coasts of France. 
 
 It was, for some reason, different at Toulon. Villeneuve's 
 escape was due to the necessities of Nelson's supply, and 
 not to the regulation gale of wind. 
 
 Nelson used temporary bases, but they were a long way 
 from his station at Toulon. Our squadrons to the south- 
 ward of Brest made temporary bases of their stations, and 
 territory was several times occupied by our troops, and 
 formed, as a consequence, a naval base. The conduct of 
 the Federal blockade was, as Captain Long well showed in 
 a lecture delivered here in 1881,1 a continued securing of 
 bases nearer and nearer to the station which the blockading 
 squadron must occupy. Steam gave them facilities for this, 
 which wind propulsion would have withheld from them . 
 I think that no one who looks at the geographical situation 
 of the different war ports of the world can doubt that 
 
 > Vide U.S.I. Journal, vol. xxv, p. 316 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 147 
 
 the Federal method will always be an element of steam 
 blockade. 
 
 It may be that the coal question is more insuperable 
 than it appears. But it is evident that if it is, which 
 appears to me in the highest degree unlikely, all that it 
 can possibly do is to throw us back from Lord St. Vincent's 
 system of naval defence upon Lord Howe's system. How 
 can we under either system get an enemy's ironclad fleet 
 into the Channel, and free to bombard Portsmouth or 
 Plymouth Dockyard, or to force the Thames, the Med way, 
 or Harwich ? I think that the country has a right to call 
 on those who are urging expenditure on the hypothesis of an 
 enemy's ironclad fleet in command of the Channel to justify 
 their hypothesis in some way, Nothing can be more un- 
 businesslike than to spend money to meet a very improb- 
 able contingency, and I venture to think that one which 
 has not occurred for centuries is primd /ade improbable, 
 and cannot be assumed. 
 
 I want to put it to those authorities who are for spending 
 this money, whether they accept the basis of naval defence 
 as determined by Lord Howe or Lord St. Vincent, or 
 whether they are prepared with another System, and if 
 so, what it is ? I cannot accept at their hands the pre- 
 liminary hypothesis of an insufficient fleet for any system 
 of naval defence, for neither they, nor anyone else in the 
 country, has formulated such a condition of things for 
 acceptance. But I am willing that they should say we 
 have not, or shall not have force enough to adopt Lord St. 
 Vincent's method. But then I turn round at once and say, 
 that there is nothing else for us to adopt but Lord Howe's 
 method. 
 
 If we cannot defend ourselves by masking the enemy's 
 fleets in his ports, but yet have the superior naval force, 
 
 L 2 
 
148 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 what can we possibly do, being moderately sane, but con- 
 centrate that superior force in a defensive attitude, and 
 wait ? The ironclad squadron which is to bombard Ports- 
 mouth must come out of some port. If we have not the 
 power to prevent it from coming out of that port, and 
 therefore cannot send our fleet there, can we — still being 
 moderately sane — do anything else with our fleet but keep 
 it at home, and ready ? And if the enemy's fleet is 
 inferior, which by the hypothesis it is, how can it come and 
 attack US ? 
 
 The First Lord of the Admiralty uses a curious expres- 
 sion in approval of spending the money in fortifications, 
 which might otherwise come into his hands for the 
 strengthening of the naval defence. He says the fortifying 
 the home ports " must largely increase our ofEensive naval 
 power, for the bases of operation from which our fleet can 
 issue will require little or no naval defence." 
 
 What meaning can we attach to these words in view of 
 either of the systems of defence before us ? Would Lord 
 Howe have agreed that because Portsmouth, Plymouth, 
 and the Thames were strong, therefore he could dispense 
 with his reserve fleet at St. Helen's, or take the grand fleet 
 away to attack Eochefort ? Most assuredly not. What 
 would become of our Channel commerce, what would 
 hinder invasion, were he to leave the Channel open behind 
 him ? How could he attack Rochefort with the Brest 
 fleet free on his flank ? The strength or weakness of 
 Portsmouth or Plymouth could not afEect in the slightest 
 degree the necessities or the conduct of Lord Howe's 
 system of defence. If that system succeeded, the fortifi- 
 cations would not be necessary ; if it failed, the enemy 
 would have an ample choice without thinking of Ports- 
 mouth or Plymouth. 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 149 
 
 In a system of defence conducted on Lord St. Vincent's 
 principles, the status of Portsmouth or Plymouth would 
 be equally powerless to aid or control the action of the 
 fleet. If the blockade succeeded, the fortifications would 
 not be called in question ; if the blockade failed at any 
 point, the evaded squadron must fall back on the Channel. 
 
 In no case could a squadron proceed on an offensive ex- 
 pedition leaving the territorial waters open to the enemy. 
 
 The strategical error which underlies the whole demand 
 for this vast and growing expenditure on fortifications and 
 other fixed defences is of old standing, and I venture to 
 think that we all shared in it — I am sure I did — a few 
 years ago. I shall best bring it out by mentioning two 
 utterances, one quoted by Sir Charles Dilke quite recently, 
 and the other occurring in the discussion on General 
 Oollinson's paper in 1874. The author whom Sir Charles 
 Dilke quotes without disapproval, says that the state of 
 the works at Plymouth and Portsmouth is such that in 
 war we should probably withdraw two considerable por- 
 tions of our fleet from the blockade of the enemy and 
 place them at those two ports to prevent their reduction. 
 The other observation fell from the then Captain, but now 
 Colonel, Ardagh. He said : " It would be perfectly pre- 
 posterous to employ an ironclad to defend a port when you 
 could construct a fort at one-twentieth of the cost of the 
 ironclad, and put one-sixth of the personnel into the fort 
 to defend it." 
 
 Setting aside the obvious slip of the intellect which 
 befell the first writer when he forgot that a blockaded 
 force was blockaded, and therefore could not attack Ports- 
 mouth or Plymouth, and coming to his divided disposition 
 of naval force to defend those ports, we can see how easy 
 it is to go wrong. It is manifest, when we think of it, 
 
150 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 that if there were force enough in ironclads at Plymouth 
 to defend Plymouth, Portsmouth would not want any 
 further defence except on the supposition, hardly capable 
 of being made, that Portsmouth and Plymouth were 
 attacked at the same time ; and that in no case would a 
 naval strategist, having to defend Plymouth and Ports- 
 mouth by ironclads, divide his force. 
 
 And the same error, though it is not so close to the 
 surface, was in Captain Ardagh's mind when he spoke as 
 he did. In no case ought a naval strategist, having to 
 defend the ports and coasts of these islands by naval 
 means, to think of separate naval defence for separate 
 ports when the attack is of a serious character and re- 
 quiring time for its accomplishment. 
 
 We have seen that this was well enough understood by 
 our forefathers, even when the movements of ships were 
 slow and of almost measureless uncertainty. It is ex- 
 ceedingly singular that when we have ships of which the 
 movement is both rapid and certain, we should have so 
 clean forgotten it. And so we have Captain Ardagh 
 stating a thesis which is entirely a wrong one as applied 
 to the defences of these islands, but which we have all of 
 us accepted over and over again as truth. 
 
 Ton can defend a harbour, he says, in these islands, by 
 fortification at one-twentieth of the cost of its defence by 
 ironclads- This is no doubt true if the defence by iron- 
 clads were like the defence by fortification and required 
 separate constructions for each harbour. But it is the 
 reverse of truth as matters stand. 
 
 If on any line of coast of these kingdoms there were 
 twenty ports, each port requiring to be defended by some- 
 thing equal to a single ironclad, which plan would be the 
 cheapest ? To build twenty forts, each equal to an iron- 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OK THE UNITED KINGDOM. 151 
 
 clad in power, or to build one ironclad and station her in 
 tbe middle of the line of coast ? Captain Ardagh might have 
 argued that the construction and arming of the twenty 
 forts would not have cost more than the construction and 
 arming of the ironclad, but he admits that the forts would 
 take three times as many men as the ironclad to man them. 
 And again, when the first rough estimate put forward for 
 defending our mercantile ports, not against ironclads, but 
 only against cruisers, is given at over two millions, we may 
 be confirmed in our doubts as to whether twenty forts, 
 each equal to an ironclad, can be prepared and maintained 
 for the cost of one. 
 
 Into this same strategical error we seem to have fallen in 
 .building the group of coast defence ironclads, and the coast 
 defence gunboats. The idea was, and is, to distribute them 
 at different ports ; and they were intended to be the answer, 
 not to sporadic raiders, but to the ironclad squadron. But 
 five or six ironclads of little locomotive and no sea-keeping 
 power, distributed at different points, can only be a defence 
 against a very limited strength of attack ; and on this point 
 Captain Ardagh was perfectly sound in 1874. A much 
 smaller number of ironclads of good locomotive power and 
 good sea-keeping qualities, is a more powerful form of 
 defence when concentrated at one point on our coast, con- 
 nected up with the electric telegraph, and ready to act on 
 any other point. 
 
 The error we have fallen into arises, I believe, from 
 forgetting that the strategy of the naval Power in 
 command of the sea is necessarily diverse from that of 
 the naval power which cannot hope to have it. 
 France, in building coast defence ironclads and sta- 
 tioning them at her great war ports, is pursuing a 
 policy which can be supported by sound reasoning. Bach 
 
152 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 of these ships is, in her place, the equivalent of a sea-going 
 ironclad, and would compel the enemy, if he determined to 
 blockade, to appear ofE the port with a sea-going ironclad 
 for every coast defence ironclad within it, or to suffer the 
 chances of a reverse. But the superior Navy cannot logic- 
 ally contemplate or prepare for any other position than that 
 of the superior Navy. If she does, every pound she spends 
 on that assumption is so much subtracted from her own 
 power, so much deliberately spent in encouraging inferior 
 naval Powers to hope. 
 
 There is nothing in history to show that there can be in 
 steam naval wars those alternations of success and failure 
 which existed in our sailing naval wars. There are no 
 longer the uncertainties on which those alternations rested. 
 Times and spaces which were then incalculable and might 
 turn to the advantage first of one side and then of the other 
 are now fixed and known. 
 
 We sometimes speak in a vague sort of way, as a justifica- 
 tion for the spending of millions on defences which are not 
 naval, and pre-suppose naval failure, of what we are pleased 
 to call Nelson's being " decoyed " to the West Indies. But 
 if we came to chapter and verse about it, we should see that 
 from no point of view does that action of Nelson's justify 
 the inference drawn from it. In the first place there was 
 no "decoy,"' in the proper sense of the word. If Villeneuve 
 had pretended to go to the West Indies only, and had turned 
 back into the Channel, leaving Nelson to pursue a false 
 scent, there would have been something in the " decoy." 
 But as it was. Nelson simply followed him all the way there 
 and all the way back again, continuing the watch on him 
 which he would have pursued had Villeneuve not quitted 
 the Mediterranean, and masking his force throughout the 
 proceedings. Not only bo, but when Villeneuve, after 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 153 
 
 forming his junction -with the ships at Ferrol, was ready to 
 proceed up Channel, there was in front of him, oiS Brest, a 
 full muster of the whole of our available force, including 
 Nelson's ships. If, therefore, there was any danger to 
 England from invasion at this juncture, it arose, not from 
 any errors, mistakes, decoys, or evasions, but from the 
 prosaic fact that the country had not provided a sufficient 
 naval force for the work it had to do. 
 
 Strategically, there was nothing novel or startling in that 
 episode of naval war. There was a junction between some 
 of the divisions of the enemy's force, which had often been 
 completely carried out before, and was now only partially 
 carried out in consequence of that very " decoy " which is 
 generally supposed to have led up to its completion. Had 
 Nelson never quitted the Mediterranean, then indeed 
 Villeneuve might very possibly have gone on to Brest, for 
 he would have been conscious of having shaken off Nelson's 
 fleet. But as it was, when he sailed from Ferrol for the 
 last time, he was certain that Nelson was near him (he was 
 really two or three days' sail ahead of him), and was con- 
 scious that, strategically, Napoleon's plans were a failure. 
 How far this consciousness influenced his decision to retreat 
 to Cadiz we cannot say, but we can say that it was certainly 
 an element in enforcing that decision. 
 
 So we come back again to the point from which we 
 started, that there are before us two systems of naval defence 
 for these islands, that of St. Vincent, which was also that 
 of the Federals, a systematic and close blockade of the whole 
 of the enemy's ports ; or Lord Howe's system, which assumes 
 blockade to be impracticable, and concentrates the naval 
 force at home in a defensive expectant attitude. Both 
 systems assume a reserve fleet which would not be brought 
 into action but upon the failure of the main fleets to prove 
 
154 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 defensive. Coming back again to them, we have to repeat 
 the request that those who are calling for the expenditure 
 of money on defence which is not naval, and assumes naval 
 failure, should show distinctly how and where the failure is 
 likely to take place. 
 
 I do not mean to deny that generally what has happened 
 before in naval war may happen again, except where the use 
 of steam power distinctly forbids it, as, for instance, the 
 blockading fleet being blown off the coast as it used to be. 
 But if it is once admitted that we can safely refer to history 
 and experience, then I claim that we can rely on naval 
 defence just as we used to do. 
 
 But I think it is imperative on us to prepare to adopt 
 St. Vincent's method, and that solely on account of our 
 commerce. Draw a line in imagination from Cape 
 Finisterre to Cape Clear, and consider that perhaps 9,000 
 British ships cross it either outward or homewardi bound 
 every year, of a value only to be reckoned in hundreds of 
 millions. 
 
 Consider then that in the wars of the past, until the 
 blockade system was in thorough working order, it was 
 about this line that both sides made some of their heaviest 
 captures. Ooasider too that Spain in the days of Queen 
 Elissabeth checked her commerce as a measure of self- 
 preservation ; that Holland stopped hers entirely for two 
 wars with us ; and that Germany in our own time did the 
 like. Consider that for the same reasons any naval 
 opponent of ours would leave us no commerce to prey 
 upon, and we can see that this line from Cape Finisterre to 
 Cape Clear would be the scene of peculiar disasters to us 
 without any compensatory advantages under a revival 
 of Lord Howe's system of defence. When, in our earlier 
 wars with France, the vohime of the commerce of each 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 155 
 
 country was so far equal that the captures were also nearly 
 eqaal, the struggles over this line were pretty nearly 
 equally productive and equally disastrous to each side. 
 Now the disaster could only be on our side, and the pro- 
 duce on the side of the enemy. In order to protect our- 
 selves over this line, I see no means but a revival of convoy 
 — which always was, and always must be of doubtful value 
 alone — or a close blockade of the enemy's ports. It seems 
 impossible to deny, in the face of American experience, 
 that steam blockade, properly undertaken, is exceedingly 
 efEective; perhaps if I mention that the number of steamers 
 captured or destroyed by the Federals amounted to three- 
 fifths of the whole number of steamers of 100 tons and 
 upwards now possessed by France, it will serve to show 
 what a tremendous engine that blockade was. 
 
 There is therefore nothing so likely to protect the line 
 and the free passage of our commerce as close blockade ; 
 and close blockade on St. Vincent's system, with a reserve 
 squadron at home, does away with all this waste in fixed 
 defences. It appears to be clear that logically we have no 
 right to spend the money we propose to spend. For if the 
 blockade be eSective it is certain our coast cannot be 
 insulted. If it be not effective it is incumbent on us to 
 make it so in order to protect our commerce. There is no 
 logical sequence in taking away money from blockade to 
 spend it on forts and submarine mines, because if the 
 blockade be so efiBcient as not to need it, it is certain the 
 ports cannot be attacked ; and if the blockade be inefficient 
 it is imperative to make it so. But if it cannot be made so, 
 commerce must suffer, but the ports are no more open than 
 before to attack, for the fl.eet must be concentrated at home 
 on Lord Howe's system. 
 
 I had intented to have gone pretty fully into the dangers 
 
156 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 to which our shipping near at home, all round our coasts, 
 and ofE our ports would still be liable even after all the 
 greater measures of defence were completed. Time does not 
 permit it, however, and I must only glance for a moment 
 at the question. At times when Lord St. Vincent's method 
 of naval defence was in full force, and when the enemy's 
 war ships were hardly to be met with at sea, the systems on 
 which our commerce was attacked changed, but the attack 
 was still effective. The scene of the attack shifted from 
 that great line we have been speaking of, and centred itself 
 pretty well at Beaohy Head. There never were such 
 swarms of privateers seen as were to be met in and about 
 the Channel in 1810. We captured them by the score 
 annually, but they captured our ships by the hundred. 
 The mischief was no longer done by the great war ships 
 such as the grand corsairs like Jean Bart, Dugnay Trouin, 
 or Thurot, commanded. Such ships could not get through 
 the blockade. Their places were taken by luggers and 
 cutters and snows carrying only six or eight guns, but with 
 plenty of men for boarding and forming prize crews. 
 These " despicable craft," as contemporaries called them, 
 were small enough to slip in and out of the French ports 
 almost without let or hindrance, but they were found 
 competent to face an Indiaman off the Bill of Portland. 
 There was nothing stopped them. The more of them we 
 captured the more they swarmed, and the Admiralty of 
 that day, with more than 600 cruisers at their command, 
 fairly admitted they were beaten. They had reason to 
 confess, seeing that over 600 of our merchant ships were 
 carried into the enemy's ports under our noses in one year. 
 These excessive losses were in part due to a relaxation of 
 St. Vincent's system off the smaller ports, which was 
 deprecated by contemporary observers. But still in 1804, 
 
THE MAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 157 
 
 when this was not the case, the captures of our ships ran 
 up to 387. This is as much as to say that a very good 
 blockade was not a perfect one. From the numerous small 
 ports in France small i-aiders did manage to make exits, 
 and the richness of the prizes justified the risks. 
 
 Admitting, as we must do, that though steam blockade 
 can be very much closer and more stringent than sailing 
 blockade ever was, we cannot expect it to be absolutely 
 perfect, and remembering that the prizes are far richer 
 than they used to be, it is not reasonable to assume that 
 the 900 steamers in France thrown out of ordinary com- 
 mercial work by the war would not be largely employed 
 for raiding purposes. There are 620,000 or 630,000 
 British ships entering or leaving our home ports every year 
 — 1,800 or 1,900 a day — and they cluster like bees off all our 
 great estuaries, the Thames, the Humber, the Tyne, the 
 Clyde, the Mersey, the Severn. A great rich belt of trade 
 eternally girdles our shores, of which the richness may be 
 measured when I tell you that I have had the ships counted 
 from Beachy Head for a period, and that there are always 
 thirty-five ships in sight there, and there is a ship passing 
 every five minutes. 
 
 If the "despicable" privateer, eighty years ago, could 
 make such havoc when shipping was thin and winds un- 
 certain, what grounds have we for supposing that the 
 equally " despicable " raider will not in a future war do 
 much more mischief in the much larger and richer field 
 now open to him ? Plainly, none. That sort of attack on 
 our commerce is as certain as any operation of war that can 
 be reasonably predicted. 
 
 The operations of the raider will be limited by the 
 question of coal supply, and what he does must be done in 
 two or three days. Should no steps be taken to prevent 
 
158 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 him, the raider who is lucky enough to break the blockade 
 will assuredly make for points where the shipping is 
 thickest, and where most w;ork can be done in the shortest 
 time. No doubt he will approach in the guise of the 
 innocent British or neutral merchant steamer. His object 
 will be to run alongside two or three ships and secure 
 them by means of prize crews for capture, or dynamite for 
 destruotionj before his real character has been discovered ; 
 and speed in the transaction will be all-important to him. 
 It seems as if, unless there are armed ships ' on the spot 
 wherever shipping is thickest, a single raider in the short 
 time at his disposal might do enormous damage. 
 
 Our noble Ohairmanl has headed a movement to utilise 
 the great Volunteer forces which are so ready to hand in 
 this country, and to commit to them the charge of defend- 
 ing our home waters against the raiders of the class 
 specified — the only class which can in any properly 
 organised system of naval defence approach our shores. 
 The idea has been to arm local steamers so as to make them 
 the equals of the raiders they are likely to meet, to man 
 them with Volunteer crews, and to station them at all 
 points where shipping is likely to be threatened by the 
 sudden rush of the raider. The Admiralty has given its 
 concurrence and approval of the plan, and we look to see 
 it extend, not only on the ground given, but also from the 
 absolute necessity which is before us of enabling the 
 citizens of a naval nation to throw themselves into the 
 defence of the waters surrounding these islands which 
 certainly ought to be preliminary at least to the defence of 
 the land. 
 
 In this paper I have not estimated whether our present 
 fleet is, either in quantity or quality, sufficient to carry out 
 
 ^ Earl Cowper. 
 
THE NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 159 
 
 Lord St. Vincent's plan of defence. It has seemed to me 
 that such a discussion would properly follow the acceptance 
 of his system. But I am bound to say, in order to avoid 
 misapprehension, that we seem to be little prepared for it, 
 and that in war even with France alone, we should have 
 to fall back on Lord Howe's system, which I understand to 
 mean practically the abandonment of our commerce, though 
 our shores would be perfectly secure. 
 
 Note. 
 
 The Navy in Home Waters, August, 1805. 
 Port and fitting, 
 
 18 line, 9 (50 to 44), 30 frigates, 93 
 
 sloops, &c = 150 
 
 Channel. 
 
 29 line, 26 frigates, 118 sloops, &c. ... = 173 
 Downs and North Sea. 
 
 4 line, -4 (50 to 44), 9 frigates, 144 
 
 sloops, &c = 161 
 
 Spain, Portugal, and Gibraltar. 
 
 12 line, 1 frigate, 6 sloops, &c = 19 
 
 Total 63 line, 13 (50 to 44), 66 frigates. 
 
 August Wth, leaving out Nelson. 
 
 Ganteaune at Brest 21 
 
 Allemand at sea 5 
 
 Villeneuve leaving Ferrol 29 = 55 
 
 Oornwallis off Brest 17 
 
 Calder'g fleet 9 
 
 Stirling's fleet 4 
 
 Home ports, &c 16 = 46 
 
160 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LOCAL FOUTiriCATIONS AND A MOVING 
 
 NAVT.l 
 
 In a lecture delivered in this theatre on the 18th January, 
 Captain Stone of the Royal Artillery made a sort of excursus 
 iato the domain of naval action and policy, when discussing 
 the employment of "Quick-firing Guns for Fortress Defence." 
 In laying down certain propositions with regard to the re- 
 spective functions of a moving Navy and fixed fortifications, 
 and in declaring himself a " looker on " at the game of a 
 combined effort, or of a rival effort, between these two 
 elements of defence, I thought Captain Stone was doing 
 good service in challenging, ab initio, those who supported 
 or denied his positions, to come out, and state their case. 
 As I listened to the lecture and to the discussion, I came to 
 the conclusion that probably neither lecturer nor audience 
 had exerted the critical faculty in sufficient strength to 
 notice how far an acceptance of the propositions put forward 
 might lead us if we followed them up ; and at the same 
 time, I felt that under a paper with a secondary title, it 
 would hardly be convenient to raise a full debate on pri- 
 mary issues. 
 
 But those who listened with me, must, I think, agree 
 that primary issues of great moment were raised in the 
 ' Written in 1889. 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 161 
 
 paper, and pronounced upon with decision in a way which 
 does not wholly accord with some presumably careful ex- 
 aminations that have been recently made. 
 
 The paper on the " Naval Defences of the United King- 
 dom," which I had the honour to read here last year, did 
 undoubtedly tend to raise the value of moving naval 
 defence and to depress that of locally fixed defence. Cap- 
 tain Stone's paper, to which, so far, this is a reply, unques- 
 tionably took the opposite view, and practically claimed? 
 that " Naval Defence " was a contradiction in terms ; the 
 rdle of the Navy not being defence at all, but attack. Here, 
 as the lawyers say, " issue is joined " and most conveniently 
 so for discussion. It is seen that a very wide divergence 
 of opinion is not only possible, but is in flourishing exist- 
 ence, on the subject of the relations between fixed fortifica- 
 tions and a moving Navy, and I hardly think we can better 
 employ a couple of hours than by endeavouring to thrash 
 out some of the truth as to these relations. 
 
 In the Navy I venture to think that we ought to bo a 
 great deal more critical and observant than we are on the 
 subject of our fixed, or localised, defences against naval 
 attack. And though I advert to the matter with the 
 greatest possible diffidence and deference, I sometimes fear 
 that the Army is hurting its efficiency by pressing forward 
 the idea of strong coast works at home and abroad. I sit 
 at the feet of Colonel Maurice so far as I form any notions 
 of military policy, and I fail to see how such views as he 
 expresses stand any chance of being carried out, if we are 
 to greatly shut up the military forces of this country in 
 detached garrisons all over the world. 
 
 With still greater deference, and very humbly indeed, I 
 venture to say that in our military policy, I seem to detect 
 three incompatible lines being pursued. There is the line 
 
 JI 
 
162 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 which steadily regards the invasion of these islands, not as 
 a possible conclusion to a series of disasters such as history 
 furnishes us with no examples of, but as an incident of war 
 at least as prominently near us as a great sea-fight. 
 This line, when pursued, demands the raising, main- 
 taining, and training of a vast body of troops on 
 principles such as we find in continental countries, and 
 it will ask for the fortification of London, at least, if 
 not for converting defensible points surrounding London 
 into a series of first class fortresses. It was this policy 
 that dictated the great land-side works which profess 
 to defend the arsenals of Portsmouth and Plymouth. 
 
 The second line of policy is what I understand to be that 
 of Colonel Maurice, where the Army is to be prepared for 
 embarkation under the convoy of, and disembarkation under 
 cover of, the Fleet, for those sudden military attacks at 
 unprepared points of the enemy's shores, which the rapidity 
 and certainty of transport over a commanded sea, makes 
 easy for this nation. 
 
 The third line of policy is that sketched by Captain Stone, 
 if 1 rightly apprehend him, namely, the dispersal of the 
 Army all over the world in detached garrisons. 
 
 The three lines of policy would seem to me to require three 
 separate armies to carry them out in their entirety ; and if 
 I endeavour in this paper to show cause against the last of 
 them, where my naval knowledge, and some study of the 
 question may justify me in holding an opinion, I trust I 
 shall not have intruded too far on military ground in men- 
 tioning the first and second. 
 
 Nothing could be more satisfactorily clear than Captain 
 Stone's expression of view ; and it is always an advantage 
 to the solution of a controverted question to start with a 
 clear enunciation. 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 163 
 
 " My premiss is," says Captain Stone, " that the posses- 
 sion of naval arsenals, dockyards, and coaling stations must 
 practically decide the question of naval supremacy. That such 
 supremacy isabsolutely essential to our existence as a nation; 
 and that the way to secure it is to fortify and arm our own 
 arsenals, dockyards, and coaling stations in such a fashion 
 as to enable them to resist an enemy's attacks, and at 
 the same time to give a free hand to the Navy to attack 
 those of the enemy with such force as may be available, 
 after providing for the patrolling of our principal trade 
 routes, and the formation of such fleets as may be con- 
 sidered necessary to enable us to force on a naval engage- 
 ment when opportunity offers, with forces adequate to inflict 
 a crushing and decisive blow on the enemy.'' 
 
 The main view here is that the fortiflcation of posts 
 described will enable a given naval force to do things 
 which it could not do were the posts left locally undefended; 
 and a principle underlies it, declaring that naval force is not 
 properly a defensive, but an offensive force ; while military 
 force, concentrated in localities, is truly the defence of, a 
 maritimo, empire. 
 
 Sir John Adye, in a letter to the " Times " last year, on 
 which I had the temerity to offer some criticism, did not 
 quite take up the general relations between fortified har- 
 bours and moving fleets, but he spoke of " adequate land 
 defences of harbours " being the " complement " of their 
 naval defences. He presupposed, however, at least so far 
 as our home porta are concerned, a loss of the command of 
 the sea, and an enemy free to attack without fear of inter- 
 ruption from the sea. He said : " As regards land defences, 
 I would point out, in the first place, that should this country 
 be threatened with attack by an expedition across the sea, 
 it is very important that our enemies should be denied 
 
 M 2 
 
164 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 access to our harbours, and should be compelled, at all 
 events, to make their attempt on the open coast. Their 
 chances of success will be much minimised if they have no 
 secure base of operations." (Sir Edward Hamley used, I 
 think, the same argument in the same way.) 
 
 " That is one point, but there are others. When hostili- 
 ties arise, our vessels, whether of war or of commerce, will 
 often require to return to port to discharge their cargoes or 
 to obtain supplies of coals, munitions, food, &c. They 
 may also have to take refuge in consequence of damages in 
 action, or by stress of weather ; and when necessity thus 
 compels them to seek a harbour of retreat, it is essential 
 that they should be able to refit in security, and be free 
 from molestation." 
 
 At this point I must discriminate a little. We can see 
 that the same view precisely does not animate the minds 
 of two military men, one of whom brings to it the weight 
 of experience in a long and very distinguished career ; while 
 the other must treat it by the light of a less experienced 
 intelligence which even a short career has shown to be of a 
 high class. 
 
 Present to Sir John Adye's mind is a picture of more or 
 less failure of our naval forces, more or less incapacity 
 to protect territory by purely naval means, or more 
 or less defeat at sea. If fortifications are necessary to 
 " deny the enemy access to our harbours,'' if they are 
 required to enable " vessels whether of war or of commerce, 
 . . . to return to port to discharge their cargoes or to 
 obtain supplies of coals, munitions, food, &o.," this must 
 either be because of the inability of a moving Navy to do 
 it ; or because the military defence by fortifications can do 
 it equally well at a much more economical rate. If fortifi- 
 cations are necessary to enable ships to take refuge under 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 165 
 
 them after damages in action, or by stress of weather, the 
 conception must be'that the enemy has beaten them so much 
 as to be able to follow them up, and to be only prevented 
 from annihilating them, or hindering the restoration of their 
 efficiency, by the fortifications within which they have 
 secured themselves. 
 
 These several conditions do not appear to be at first pre- 
 sent to Captain Stone's mind. In his view the Navy is in 
 full competence and efficiency. There is no question of its 
 failure in any way. But fortified arsenals and ports of 
 supply are a convenient method of releasing naval force which 
 must otherwise be detained locally for the defence of the ports. 
 It is, in Captain Stone's conception, a fundamental postulate 
 of naval warfare, that when an Admiral leaves the arsenal 
 from which his fleet emerges complete, for the purpose of 
 an attack on one of those of the enemy, he must be assured 
 that his own port is thoroughly well locally defended. And 
 the inference is that if it is not thoroughly well locally de- 
 fended, he cannot attack, for he must remain there to de- 
 fend it himself. 
 
 Undoubtedly both sets of opinion as to the relations be- 
 tween fortified ports and a moving Navy are largely held ; 
 and the holding of them is not confined to the military 
 service. Being largely held, it almost inevitably follows that 
 there must be, somewhere, a certain amount of truth about 
 them. But, on the other hand, I think it may be safely 
 said that none of them would arise naturally out of the 
 study of naval history. More than that, I think they do 
 not arise directly from the reason of the thing, when we 
 come to face it. 
 
 I rather think such thoughts are not the cause, but the 
 effect, of fortified ports. Having observed fortified ports 
 all over the world, we have imitated, without much 
 
166 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 close examination, that which we have seen, and ap- 
 plied it to our own ports ; having done so, we search 
 for and produce such raisons d'itre as we are able to do, to 
 account for their presence ; and then we call in those raisons 
 d'Stre as an argument for the extension of the system. 
 
 The impoftanoe of the question I raise, and the difficulty 
 in dealing with it, spring from the fact that, primd facie, 
 no one denies the value, if not the necessity, of a certain 
 amount of local defence for the ports of a maritime empire. 
 But then no one knows where to stop. I can never forget 
 that while many military and perhaps more naval men 
 think that the gigantic defensive works of Portsmouth and 
 Plymouth have been over-done. Colonel Schaw demanded, 
 in this theatre, in December, 1886, that £833,000 more 
 should be spent upon those at Plymouth before they could 
 be in any way considered complete. T need hardly advert 
 to the Report of Mr. Stanhope's Committee lest year. It 
 will be fresh in all our minds that the demand for local 
 works, both new and additional to old ones, was very large 
 indeed, and that the actual millions taken up by loan for 
 this service did but partly represent the view which was 
 put forward as to the necessities of the case. 
 
 Who is to fix the degree of fortification at which the 
 local defence of a port should stop ? If an authority de- 
 clares the fortification of any port is insufficient, what argu- 
 ments can we use to prove that it is sufficient ? As a naval, 
 friend of mine, for whose opinion I reasonably have a high 
 respect, has said : " There is nothing between a light bat- ■ 
 tery and a first class fortress." I, myself, have generally 
 felt that the arguments which will call for any fortification 
 of a port against attack from the sea will equally apply to 
 ask for its defence against all the navies of the world. I 
 cannot tell, myself, what the measure of the defence ought 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 167 
 
 to be ; and the only certain check I know, upon expen- 
 diture on local defences when once we begin, is our general 
 way of looking at it. 
 
 It does not appear to me to be of any use saying that 
 defence by the fortification of ports and defence by a 
 moving Navy must go hand in hand. Were they both 
 under the same administrative control — which could only 
 be naval control, with any reason — they might be dealt 
 with side by side, though I do not think that even then they 
 could be said to go " hand in hand." But as we stand, they 
 are rivals for the open palm of the Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, and nothing is to be gained from not recalling 
 the fact and stating it plainly. The reason of the thing, 
 and the history of the thing, come to my mind with a plain 
 conviction that fortification of ports is but an ineflScient 
 substitute for their naval defence, and that as we propose 
 a naval increase we should logically propose a fortification 
 decrease. 
 
 But the reverse is our policy, and the moment the naval 
 experts urge a naval increase, the military experts, and 
 sometimes the naval ones too, are equally, if not more, 
 urgent for local port defences. 
 
 I should like to say here, that for the purposes of my 
 argument, and to keep it clear of side issues, I wish to roll 
 the fortification which is got out of land batteries, coast 
 defence vessels, and submarine mines, all into one. When 
 I speak of fortified ports, I mean ports that are locally 
 protected against attack, whatever the means used may be. 
 But I do not include such local and movable defences — 
 such light vessels — as may be prepared not to defend the 
 port itself from attack, but to warn ofi the roving cruiser 
 which might seek either to blockade the place, or to capture 
 or destroy the unarmed ships frequenting it. 
 
168 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 I draw a distinction, in fact, between the defence of the 
 port against attack, and the defence of the communications 
 of the port. 
 
 As I have said above, I think the best standard we can 
 at present erect as to the share which fortifications should 
 carry away from the till of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
 is one dependent on our general way of looking at the 
 whole question ; and I do not know that there are any 
 proper spectacles through which we can see, except the 
 historical spectacles. 
 
 But let me first follow up the thoughts that have formed 
 themselves in Captain Stone's mind as consequences of the 
 thesis used as a starting point. 
 
 Looking at the functions of the Navy he tells us that, 
 " upon the declaration of war one of the first duties of our 
 Navy will be to attack the enemy's military ports, dock- 
 yards, and coaling stations, and thus secure heavy odds in 
 our favour from the outset. In order to secure the 
 greatest results, the rdle of our Navy miist be essentialli/ 
 offensive, and it is much to be regretted that an unreason- 
 able dread of bombardment should have been aroused 
 recently by the naval manoeuvres, tending to form an un- 
 educated public opinion in favour of keeping our fleets in 
 home waters in any national emergency. Bombardment is 
 an operation which requires a vast expenditure of amuni- 
 tion and a considerable time to be effective, and the 
 material damage inflicted is by no means proportionate to 
 the cost of the undertaking, or to the risk incurred in carry- 
 ing it out." 
 
 We have here the development of the initial idea. Our 
 fleets are absent making attacks on the enemy's ports, 
 which must be, by the hypothesis of possible attacks 
 behind the fleets, well known to be empty of the enemy's 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 169 
 
 warships ; these latter being, as a consequence, free to do 
 what seems good to them. But they are withheld from 
 attacking our arsenals because of the strength of their 
 fortifications, and from bombarding where there are none, 
 because of the cost and tedium of the operation. 
 
 " I will venture," continues the lecturer, " to touch upon 
 one more naval question, and that is the question of 
 blockade. It has been stated that to spend money on land 
 defences, while our Navy is admittedly insufficient in 
 numbers, strength, and speed for the duties it will have to 
 perform, is an altogether mistaken policy; and further, 
 that if our naval strength were increased as it ought to be, 
 there would be little or no necessity for any land defences 
 at all, inasmuch as the enemy's ports could be so efficiently 
 blockaded that our shores, our commerce, our Colonies, 
 and our coaling stations would be as free from hostile 
 enterprises as they are in peace-time. Our recent experi- 
 ences of naval blockade, when the " Warspite," " Severn," 
 and " Iris " escaped from Berehaven, and united at a 
 rendezvous ofE the Hebrides with the "Rodney" from 
 Lough Swilly, would seem to indicate that the game of 
 naval blockade is likely to be a dangerous and unprofitable 
 one for the blookader, and that the blockading squadron 
 might employ its superior strength to better purpose, and 
 more in consonance with the fighting traditions of the 
 British Navy, by attacking and seizing the enemy's ports 
 !ind coaling stations, and thus forcing on a decisive naval 
 engagement.'' 
 
 " It will, I trust, be granted that the Navy has its own 
 sphere of action quite apart from the defence of ports and 
 coaling stations, and that this duty must rest principally 
 with the land forces." 
 
 The " Times " lately remarked that a good deal of the 
 
170 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFKNCE. 
 
 apparent difEerences on defence questions proceeded from 
 want of clear definitions. In these passages there are two 
 words, " offensive '' and " blockade,'' which are ambiguons, 
 and are differently understood. It has come about that a 
 naval meaning has enveloped the word " offensive." It is 
 now common to hear naval officers speak of " ofEensive 
 defence," but they do not thereby mean " attack." They 
 mean advanced defence, and I notice the word applied both 
 to the functions of a squadron watching an enemy in his 
 own port, and " defending '' the sea behind it, by making 
 sure that if he comes out he will be followed and fought ; 
 and to the f auctions of local defence vessels, which operate 
 in waters adjacent to a port and are ready to attack an 
 enemy beyond the reach of the batteries. 
 
 The word " blockade " I endeavoured to show in my 
 paper on the subject, covered three distinct meanings, 
 namely, "sealing up," "masking," and " observing," and 
 possibly, if Captain Stone has founded his opinions as to 
 the results of the experiments of last year, on what naval 
 officers have said about blockade, he may have failed to 
 fully apprehend their meaning on account of the varying 
 value of the term " blockade." It is well known that 
 Nelson repudiated the term " blockade " when applied to 
 his long watch of Villeneuve in Toulon, and, whatever 
 difEerences there may be amongst naval officers as to the 
 capacity of a blockading squadron to seal another up in its 
 port, there is no rift in the general conviction that the 
 enemy must be watched wherever he is, and followed up, 
 for that the disruption of the Empire is certain if force 
 enough, and of the right kind, be not provided for this 
 purpose. 
 
 Probably all that naval Officers are certain about with 
 regard to the escape of the ships named from Bantry and 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 171 
 
 Lough Swilly is, that the blockadors had neither force 
 enough nor of the right kind for the work they had in hand. 
 Judgment is perhaps suspended on the point whether any 
 force would be competent to seal up a determined and enter- 
 prising enemy. 
 
 Captain Stone having, as we see, laid down the functions 
 of fortifications as freeing the Navy, incidentally takes up 
 Sir John Adye's position, and imagines one of our fleets 
 being driven into the shelter of a fortified Plymouth by a 
 superior force of the enemy, " there to refit, coal, and await 
 reinforcements." That means, of course, the loss of the 
 command of the Channel ; and thus having gradually 
 advanced on the original thought of a sea left open to the 
 enemy, while our Navy makes an attack on his land, he 
 passes imperceptibly to the contemplation of our absolute 
 loss of command at sea as something to be looked for in 
 ordinary course, and as something presumably recoverable 
 by military means developed in fortification. 
 
 "The case of Sebastopol," he says, "is even more instruc- 
 tive, afEording as it does an actual parallel to cases with 
 which we may ourselves have to deal in the event of an 
 invasion of our territory." 
 
 Here, we must observe, that never, in any war which 
 might have partaken of the naval character, was there such 
 a collapse as the naval force of Russia exhibited. . Never 
 in any naval war was there such complete and absolute 
 command of the sea as England then enjoyed. We see, 
 then, how imperceptibly by laying down a certain founda- 
 tion and building on it, we come to the calm preparation 
 for a state of things impossible before the entire destruc- 
 tion and conquest of what we call the British Empire. Yet 
 I admit that Captain Stone is consequent in his illustrations. 
 It has long seemed to me that if we start with supposing 
 
172 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 to use Sir John Ayde's forcible and difEerentiating words, 
 that fixed fortifications are a necessary " complement " of 
 naval force, we mast be prepared to adm.it that total loss of 
 command of the sea is to be regarded as but an incident of 
 naval war. 
 
 The conception which Captain Stone has of the Navy 
 carrying the war to the enemy's coast, while leaving an 
 apparently open sea behind it, has so much truth in it that 
 it may be said to be as old as naval war itself. But two 
 corrections appear to be necessary before we can say that it 
 is wholly true. I cannot stop to give instances, but the 
 rule certainly is that a Navy cannot alone make attacks on 
 the enemy's strongholds. Perhaps, if we take out of the 
 list of attacks the bombardments of Algiers, Acre, and 
 Sweaborg, we shall leave nothing behind but such attacks 
 as have been made by the Army under cover of the Navy. 
 I am sure, when I mention it, that the fact will start up in 
 every mind as a familiar one, but 1 ought not to leave it 
 without reminding you that the want of troops was the 
 chief thing that paralysed the French Navy as an attacking 
 force in the Franco- German War. 
 
 The other correction is that the Admirals who 300 years 
 ago recommended the policy of attack, never imagined it 
 required fortified bases behind them. Their view was the 
 opposite. Sir William Monson, Elizabeth's youngster and 
 James I's Admiral, in advocating that policy, wrote, 
 " that whilst the Spaniards were employed at home by our 
 yearly Fleets, they never had an opportunity nor leisure 
 either to make an attempt on us or to divert the wars from 
 themselves ; by which means we were secured from any 
 attempt of theirs." 
 
 The historical case of this active naval policy stands 
 thus : It cannot be undertaken at all until the command of 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 173 
 
 the sea is secured — that is, until it is certain that neither 
 the base nor the communications with the base can be 
 threatened, and thai the operation cannot be interfered 
 with from the sea. It must always be abandoned if there 
 is the least chance of the loss of this command of the sea. 
 
 Let me just recall that so well has this always been 
 understood, that the command of the British seas was the 
 mainspring of all our naval wars, until a time came when 
 it was recognised that we opened the war on the basis that 
 we held the seas. There is positively no explanation of 
 what was done at sea in the Dutch wars but this. It is 
 incomprehensible that the whole naval force of each side 
 should have gathered against the other again and again, 
 and simply fought for the mastery, unless something was 
 to follow when it was gained. And what could follow it but 
 the power of attack on territory as well as the control of 
 the water ? Neither the Dutch nor ourselves ever got so 
 far in mastery at .sea as to contemplate attacks on territory, 
 for we cannot look at De Euyter's raid of 1667, which 
 could not be put in force until we had disbanded our 
 Navy, as an attack. It was an insult, under cover of a not 
 very creditable quibble. Fortification conld not be said to 
 have come into any relations with the moving navies in the 
 Dutch wars. Neither side could attack them for fear of 
 interruption by the other. 
 
 When, later, we fell into war with France, there was at 
 first the same thing over again. In 1690 Lord Torrington 
 had a divided force, and found himself off the Isle of Wight 
 in greatly inferior strength to the French. But he 
 perfectly understood the situation. The mere neighbour- 
 hood of an inferior naval force which was free to attack 
 was an absolute bar to any operations of the enemy against 
 our shores. " A strength," he wrote to the Council, " that 
 
174 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 puts me beside the hopes of success if we should fight, and 
 ^really may not only endanger the losing of the fleet but 
 at least the quiet of our country, too ; for if we are beaten, 
 they being masters of the sea will be at great liberty of 
 doing many things they dare not attempt whilst we observe 
 them, and are in a possibility of joining Vice-Admiral 
 Killigrew and our ships to the westward."! 
 
 Here we have the whole argument " in little." No 
 conceivable arrangement of fortifications could have 
 strengthened Torrington's hands ; there was no question of 
 fortifications relieving his naval force. The French Fleet 
 was there endeavouring to fight the English for the com- 
 mand of those waters, in order subsequently to make 
 territorial attacks ; Torrington could not accept battle be- 
 cause, if he wore badly beaten, he would cease to operate 
 as the defensive force that he was. The very object the 
 French had in view was to drive him off the sea under 
 territorial shelter, and therefore the provision of such 
 shelter was not a thing to be contemplated by the Admiral. 
 The .one great fear, both in the mind ol the Admiral and of 
 the Council, was that he might have to. retire north to the 
 Gun-fleet, where his observation would be weakened ; and 
 the Council forced on the battle of Beachy Head to avoid 
 it.2 Torrington, however, saw more clearly, and he would 
 not allow the battle to proceed as far as to leave him really 
 beaten. By this action he won the campaign, and the 
 French, failing to get the command of the sea, were obliged 
 to abandon their designs. 
 
 The narrow straits in which we found ourselves, had, by 
 the next year, given wisdoin to the Council, and Russell, 
 
 1 Bntinck's " Naval History," p. 548. 
 
 ' Mr. Laughton tells me that this was due to a discreditable 
 intrigue ot Bussell's, 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY 175 
 
 with a large concentrated force in 1692, fought the concen- 
 trated Navy of France at La Hogue exactly on the principles, 
 and with the objects, of our fights with the Dutch. The 
 French were thoroughly beaten, and ever since have com- 
 menced war with us on the understanding that they were 
 to spend most of their time under the shelter of their 
 fortifications leaving the water territory to us. 
 
 Four times since then has France made preparations for 
 an attempt to wrest this command of the sea from us, and 
 to follow it up by territorial attack. In 1744, 1759, 1779, 
 and 180.5, fleets were fitted out to dispossess ours of their 
 water territory, and armies were held in readiness to 
 invade so soon as the Channel was clear. In 1744 and 
 1779 the fleets showed in the Channel, but dared not make 
 good their pretensions. In 1759 the intended Channel 
 commanders were smashed up ofE their own coasts by 
 Hawke and Boscawen ; while in 1805 Villeneuve failed 
 of the nerve which was required to face the enormous 
 risk. 
 
 In no case through all these series of operations can we 
 bring our fortifications into relations with our fleets at all 
 in the home waters. On the other hand, there were 
 always the closest relations between the French fleets and 
 the fortifications under which they sheltered theniselves. 
 Our Admirals never thought about their bases being 
 fortified, being fully persuaded that they were themselves 
 their defence. And the mere fact that the open anchorages 
 of Cawsand Bay, Torbay, St. Helen's and the Downs, were 
 their points d' appui, accounts for the absence of all 
 expressions of doubt as to the support which might be 
 afEorded by the shore. 
 
 But I suppose the answer may be that these were the 
 ' days of sailing ships, and that steam has altered all the 
 
176 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 conditions. It is right to advance the argument, provided 
 it be followed up, but not otherwise. Experience has 
 taught us certain plain principles of naval war, and a new 
 factor has been introduced. We cannot say that this new 
 factor has voided our experience, though it is proper to say 
 that it mmf have done so, and to examine the possibility. 
 
 What is it that steam and electricity have done for 
 naval war ? They have everywhere replaced uncertainty 
 and chance, by certainty : they have immensely shortened 
 times, and distances as measured by times. 
 
 If, in a general way, the balance of power on a water 
 stage of war was liable in the days of sailing ships to dis- 
 turbances through the influence of the chaptei of accidents, 
 it is far less liable to such disturbances since the days of 
 steam. There has been experience enough to confirm the 
 dictum. Perhaps there never was so smooth and un- 
 broken a naval campaign as ours against Eussia. It 
 was steam alone which made it so. It is on clear 
 record that it was steam alone which enabled the Federal 
 States to adopt that " anaconda " policy to which the South 
 ultimately succumbed. It could only be the conviction of 
 the uselessness of all attempts, which caused the Germans 
 to make practically no diversions by sea in the Franco- 
 German War. Certainly in the Chilo-Peruvian War there 
 were cross purposes of the old sort until the " Huascar " 
 was captured. But a naval war between two ships on one 
 side and one ship on the other is hardly of a character to 
 generalise from. 
 
 And so we have it that the feature of steam naval war 
 is certainty. If it be true, as undoubtedly it is, that 
 combinations for attack can be more suddenly and with 
 less warning put into action; it is also true that the time 
 which can be allowed for the attack, before it is inter-' 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 177 
 
 rupted, is very much limited, and the limit is very much 
 more sharply and certainly drawn. With regard to fortified 
 places exposed to attack from the sea, the general efEeot of 
 steam can only have been to add to their strength, not to 
 demand its increase. No one has yet discovered or invented 
 a fortified port capable of maintaining itself for all time 
 against a sea attack. Every such place as yet has fallen 
 when attacked from the seal unless relieved from the sea, 
 provided the attack has been persevered in. And the 
 point is that steam has made relief from the sea more 
 certain and more speedy than it used to be. Relief which 
 was necessary to preserve Gibraltar used to reach that 
 fortress in a month at the earliest. It would now reach it 
 in three or four days. An enemy, with three weeks before 
 him, might very well proceed to the attack of a place, 
 which he could not dream of if he had only three days 
 before him. SufEren, when he dared the attack on 
 Trincomalee, did so because he thought Hughes was a 
 fortnight distant at Madras. A modern Suffren could not 
 now attack Trincomalee unless a modern Hughes was no 
 nearer than Suez. 
 
 But let us construct and follow up such a case, as is 
 suggested by Captain Stone's postulates of the relations 
 between the fortified base and the squadron which is 
 attacking the enemy's arsenals. Let us suppose that an 
 Admiral is bombarding Brest with ten battle-ships, and 
 that he is enabled to do it because his base, Plymouth, is 
 securely fortified. I must assume that, in the view put 
 forward, there is an unmasked force of the enemy within 
 striking distance of Plymouth, for if there be not, the 
 
 ^ Attacked from the sea, that is, as I have said in the earlier part 
 of my paper, by combined naval and military force, the only force 
 capable of making a determined attack. 
 
 N 
 
178 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 fortifications can play no part. The condition of the 
 Admiral off Brest is that he requires constant supplies of 
 all kinds from his base ; there will be a constant going 
 and coming of store-ships and war-ships, and every now 
 and then an injured ship going home for repair. The 
 Admiral is distinctly told that he has his " own sphere of 
 action quite apart from the defence '' of Plymouth as a 
 port, but in the middle of his bombardment he receives 
 intelligfinoe that five of the enemy's battle-ships — a part 
 of his unmasked force — are lying a mile or two off Penlee 
 Point, just.clear of the Plymouth batteries. What is the 
 Admiral going to do ? Can he go on with his bombard- 
 ment, while all his supplies are liable to be cut off, and 
 his ships, in going and coming, to be destroyed in detail ? 
 It may be perfectly true that these enemies cannot long 
 maintain themselves, though why they should not do just 
 as he himself is doing, it is not so easy to see. But I do 
 not think there can be any disagreement amongst us in 
 deciding that our Admiral has no course open to him but 
 to abandon his attack and proceed full speed after the five 
 battle-ships that have been threatening his communica- 
 tions. 
 
 Yet, if this be so, the whole theory of fortifications at 
 the base " relieving '' the naval force falls to the ground. 
 Plymouth, separated from him, is as bad — to him — as 
 Plymouth destroyed ; and the threat of separation governs 
 his conduct in precisely the same way as the threat of 
 destruction does. As far as I can carry my reasoning 
 powers this hypothetical case is conclusive, and it governs 
 the circumstances of every open port which is fortified. 
 There remains no ground for saying that the fortification 
 of a port which it is necessary to keep open will in the 
 slightest degree relieve .the naval force. 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 179 
 
 Bat suppose Plymoath in this case to have no fortifica- 
 tions at all. What then ? I imagine it will be said that 
 five battle-ships would steam up and destroy the dock- 
 yard, and so do a permanent injury instead of a temporary 
 one. If so, the Brest fl.eet must still come home just as 
 before, and, therefore, there is no effect on the fallacy that 
 the fortifications of the base, or open port, will relieve the 
 naval force. But an inner question arises as to whether 
 the five battle-ships would steam up and damage, even if it 
 were entirely unfortified ? Naval history, as far as it goes, 
 is conclusive with a negative answer. It tells us that the 
 neighbourhood of a possibly interfering naval force is a 
 complete bar to any attack on the shore whatever. 
 
 Though time presses me, I cannot forbear to give some 
 illustrations. One of our earliest entries into the Medi- 
 terranean in force was made by Russell in 1694. The 
 French fleet was then parrying on operations against 
 Barcelona, but the arrival of our fleet at Oarthagena was 
 sufficient to cause their entire abandonment, and to force 
 the French to retreat to Toulon. 
 
 Next year Russell, being engaged in an attack on 
 Palamos, 150 miles from Toulon, abandoned it on news 
 reaching him that the French were in a condition to put 
 to sea from that port. This instance is the more interest- 
 ing since, at the very same time, we, being unthreatened 
 by sea in the Channel were at our leisure bombarding, and 
 in great part destroying, St. Malo, Granville, Dunkirk, 
 and Calais. 
 
 The attempts to re-capture Gibraltar, made by the 
 French in 1704-5, were always frustrated by the appear- 
 ance of Sir John Leake's squadron from Lisbon. Twice 
 was the attack proceeded with, and twice was it abandoned 
 in fear of Leake's ships. 
 
 N 2 
 
180 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Thurot's elaborately prepared attack on the east coast 
 of England in 1759 was prevented by the presence of the 
 squadrons of Commodore Boys and Sir Percy Brett. 
 
 In 1782 SufEren was proceeding to the attack on Nega- 
 patam with land forces. The intelligence that Sir E. 
 Hughes was in the vicinity caused the immediate dis- 
 embarkation of the troops, and abandonment of the 
 design. 
 
 Whenever it has been determined to proceed with a 
 territorial attack capable of interruption from the sea, it 
 has been necessary, either to mask the possibly interrupt- 
 ing force, or to employ a fleet of observation as a guard 
 against interference. 
 
 Thus, Sir George Rooke could not have attacked 
 Gibraltar had he not been able to do it with no more than 
 twenty-two ships, while thirty-seven formed a guard ready 
 to engage the French if they had appeared. 
 
 When De Grasse captured the island of Tobago in 1781, 
 almost under the guns of Rodney at Barbados, he took 
 care not only to employ surprise in the operation, but to 
 have such a covering fleet as made it impossible for Rodney 
 to think of attacking him. 
 
 When Suffren captured Trincomalee in 1782, he be- 
 lieved he was taking pains to assure himself that Sir 
 Edward Hughes' fleet was at least a fortnight distant ; but 
 yet the thing was done under guard of a fleet which 
 was capable of fighting a drawn battle with Hughes on 
 the eighth day, the place having fallen on the sixth. 
 
 When it was determined to attack St. Malo and other 
 places on the French coast, in 1745, an essential part of the 
 plan was the masking of the French war-ships in Brest by 
 Rear- Admiral Anson. 
 
 In 1761, when Keppel attacked and captured Belleisle, 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 181 
 
 it was a necessary element of success that a strong squad- 
 ron should mask the ships in Brest. 
 
 All these lessons are found in full force as late as the 
 Franco-German War. Then Bouet-Willaumez was in com- 
 mand of a vastly superior fleet, yet would not risk the 
 simple bombardment of an ill-defended coast town, 
 Kolberg, because of possible interruption at the hands of 
 the inferior German squadron, which was 700 miles dis- 
 tant. 
 
 But to make the reasoning complete, we must not omit 
 to note that two Commanders, and I believe two only, have 
 been found to defy these lessons of experience — the Duke 
 of Medina Sidonia, and Admiral Persano ; the former defied 
 the tlireat of the naval force at Plymouth, the latter of 
 that at Pola. Whether a third Commander will be found 
 to follow in their footsteps is probably questionable. 
 
 The fact that a fortified Brest and a fortified Toulon has 
 always preserved the French fleets from our assaults is, of 
 course, conclusive as an argument that the naval Power 
 which has not the command of the sea, may, by means of 
 fortifications, preserve a fleet for a time at any rate. It is 
 a matter of fair reasoning to say that if your fleet is the 
 most precious thing you have, even when it remains in a 
 state of forced inaction, you can preserve it in your 
 harbours by means of local defences of such strength as 
 will send the enemy anywhere and everywhere before he 
 will be driven to make his attack on the fortified ports. 
 But we cannot forget, at the same time, that a householder 
 can make the fastenings of his hall door so strong that 
 the very last thing the burglar will think of will be the 
 forcing of. them. But I conceive we have established the 
 fact that before a country can employ such fortifications 
 at all, she must have surrendered the command of the sea, 
 
182 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 and if such, command has been necessary to her empire, she 
 must have abandoned empire. 
 
 Let us for one moment push this thought home as in 
 the applied case of one of our fleets being beaten under 
 the shelter of the Plymouth works. When we think of 
 such a thing, we must, in the face of what has been said, 
 suppose that we hare no relieving fleet at hand. Were 
 there such a fleet, it is manifest that the victorious enemy 
 would court destruction in pursuing our beaten fleet up an 
 intricate harbour, where it was liable to be caught by the 
 relieving fleet. We do not, in fact, in our thoughts admit 
 the existence of a relieving fleet. There could not be such 
 a thing at Portsmouth, for instance. Yet the theory must 
 be that in some way this command of the sea, which has 
 been lost, can be regained, and be regained out of Plymouth 
 alone. How is the fleet which has been defeated into Ply- 
 mouth to come victorious out of it ? And supposing such 
 a thing possible, how long will it be before this happens, 
 and what will the enemy be doing meantime ? 
 
 It is a clear historical fact that France never tried to get 
 the command of the Channel unless she had an army 
 ready to make use of that command. Will she not always 
 follow that plan, nay, is this not what we are chiefly told 
 to fear ? Would it, in any of those cases I have men- 
 tioned, have mattered the least to Prance whether she had 
 driven our fleets under fortifications, or only up the har- 
 bour ? Would not either process have equally served her 
 turn ? I think that when we thus press £bings home, we 
 begin to see that there is great reason to doubt the wisdom 
 of spending largely on gigantic defensive works with the 
 idea that our beaten fleets may recover themselves behind 
 them. 
 
 I have been considering the case of great naval bases 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 183 
 
 with which it is of imperial necessity that communications 
 should be open, and where severed communications 
 mean loss of command of the sea, and break up of Empire 
 as a certain consequenco. These great ports do not really 
 differ in character so far as I can see, though they difEer 
 in degree, from what are generally called coaling stations, 
 that fe, ports of supply. If we think of Gibraltar, Malta, 
 Aden, Colombo, Singapore, and Hong Kong, we usually , 
 regard them as ports of supply for our Eastern traders as 
 well as for our war-ships engaged in protecting them, and 
 without going at all beyond that thought — perhaps only in- 
 cluding the latter branch of it — we have spent, and are 
 spending enormous sums on the local defences of each 
 place. What is it exactly that we are aiming at ? What 
 are the conditions we assume to be present when 
 these works shall be brought into play ? There seem to 
 me to be but three possible sets of them. First, that the 
 existence of the local defences shall act as such a scare to 
 the enemy that they will never approach. Second, that 
 we have lost the command of the sea, but could regain it 
 if only these places are preserved to us. Third, that 
 though the places should not fall, enterprising raiders 
 might suddenly cut in and destroy the coal and other 
 stores which would be, without local defences, exposed to 
 assaults lasting too short a time to be interfered with 
 unless every defence were on the spot. 
 
 Two of these places, Malta and -Gibraltar, have had a 
 history, and a third place of like strategical character — 
 Minorca — brings in a history necessary to complete the 
 other two. 
 
 The history of Malta is quite simple. France with a 
 local command of the sea, which could not have existed in. 
 steam warfare, took possession of the place. The French 
 
 I 
 
184 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 losing the command of the sea, simply in consequence of 
 the presence of a superior fleet, held on to Malta from 
 September, 1798, for two years till September, 1800. It has 
 never been threatened since, but we have never since lost 
 the command of the Mediterranean sea. The whole of our 
 operations during our command of the Mediterranean were 
 (unless we except the small use made of Minorca in 1799) 
 conducted with undefended bases, generally open road- 
 steads. 
 
 Minorca, by the joint efEorts of the Army and the 
 Fleet, fell into our hands in 1708. It was then a duly for- 
 tified place, but we were in command of the sea. In re- 
 mained in our possession till 1756. Then, as will be 
 remembered, Minorca fell as a consequence of Byng's 
 failure to wrest the command of the sea from the French. 
 Coming back into our hands in 1763, we held it till 1782. 
 From the outbreak of the war with France, in 1778, we 
 had made no attempt to keep the command of the Mediter- 
 ranean Sea. Our commerce there was of small account, 
 and such as it was, it must have been abandoned, as the 
 full force we maintained, was but one 60-, one 50-gun ship, 
 2 frigates, and a sloop. When Spain declared war in 1779 
 there was nothing to prevent her bending all her energies 
 to the recapture of Gibraltar and Minorca. Neither was 
 there any relief for Minorca from the sea, and it accordingly 
 fell in February, 1782. But again, we had restored com- 
 mand of the sea in 1798, and Minorca became ours once 
 more, as soon as we desired it, without the loss of a man. 
 
 Here then are two places, Malta and Minorca, both ' for 
 their time very strong places, yet both following simply the 
 possession of the sea. That the fortifications prolonged 
 the sieges may be admitted, but what must also be allowed 
 is, that these places could only be attacked by the Power 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 185 
 
 which held the command of the sea. In these instances 
 then, it seems we must narrow the functions of fortifica- 
 tions down to preseifving the places for a limited time after 
 the sea, and with it the communications, have been aban- 
 doned. We" cannot contemplate bringing the fortifications 
 of Malta into actual use until we have abandoned the 
 Mediterranean and our Eastern commercial route. 
 
 I venture to think that when great sums go into the 
 works of Malta there is not a distinct recognition that we 
 are preparing to abandon the Mediterranean route to India 
 and the whole of that line of commerce. 
 
 The case of Gibraltar is full of instruction. I have 
 already mentioned how it fell into our hands, and how it 
 was kept in our hands in its earlier days, not by the 
 strength of its fortifications, but by the relieving fleet of 
 Sir John Leake, who had his base at Lisbon. 
 
 Spain being in 1780, as we have noted, in command of 
 the sea, made a most determined set at Gibraltar as well 
 as at Minorca. I believe we generally consider that the 
 former place was preserved to us by its strength. We are 
 not always reminded that what really preserved it 
 was the employment of the whole available naval power 
 of England in 1780, 1781, and 1782. In each of these 
 years it would have fallen, just as Minorca fell in the last 
 of them, had not immense fleets been dispatched to cover 
 its re-storing and re-victualling. In January, 1780, Sir 
 George Rodney, with fifteen sail of the line, after defeating 
 the Spanish fleet, opened communications with Gibraltar 
 and relieved it. In March, 1781, Admiral Darby sailed for 
 the relief of Gibraltar with no less than twenty-nine sail 
 of the line, near 200 victuallers, store-ships, and others. 
 And connected 'nith this fleet there is the remarkable fact 
 that just about the time that it would have been ofE Brest, 
 
186 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 De Grasse was sailing with a great fleet and army for 
 operations against us in the West Indies. Such a coinci- 
 dence ought to make us extremely cautious in acting on 
 the supposition that fortifications will relieve our fleets. 
 Those of Gibraltar certainly did not in this case. In Sep- 
 tember, 1782, Lord Howe sailed with thirty-four sail of the 
 line and an immense convoy. The fleet, engaging in a 
 partial action with the Spanish fleet, for the third time 
 prevented Gibraltar from falling into Spanish hands. 
 
 We may say, indeed we must say, that but for her 
 fortiflcations, Gibraltar would not now be in our possession. 
 But we must also say that had it been necessary for us to 
 keep up unbroken communications with Gibraltar, as it 
 now would be on account of our trade, the fortifications 
 would never have been called into action ; and had we not 
 for three successive years put out our naval strength to 
 relieve it, the fortifications themselves would not have 
 preserved it to us. 
 
 Again, we seem to be met by the conviction that fortifi- 
 cations can only represent delay. That they are not of 
 themselves of use to a moving Navy, as fortresses on land 
 may strengthen the position of a moving army by cover- 
 ing its flanks, &c., but that wherever communications are 
 given up, they may enable a place to hold out until 
 relieved. 
 
 Some thoughts of a highly paradoxical character will 
 intrude themselves at this point. Gibraltar was a very 
 strong place with a very weak garrison when it fell into 
 the hands of Sir George Rooke. Because it was a strong 
 place it was ever after necessary to put within it a strong 
 garrisoUi At a time when it was not of the slightest use 
 to us, it exhausted our naval strength in its defence ; had 
 it not been a strong place with a great garrison we should 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 187 
 
 simply have evacuated it when it was necessary to abandon 
 the Mediterranean, just as in 1797 we evacuated the island 
 of Elba. We should have done it in the consciousness 
 that it would fall back into our hands as soon as we re- 
 occupied that sea, and the place became of restored value 
 to us. 
 
 Considering it to be merely a dep6t for the supply of our 
 war-ships, we must note it as an exhausted dep&t — the 
 shell of a depot — unless we kept up communication with 
 it. That is to say, it could not in any way have assisted 
 us to regain the command of the sea, for we must have 
 got the command of the sea before we could restore its 
 value as a depot. There is, therefore, a certain danger in 
 making a depot which is necessary to us, too strong locally, 
 as, should it fall — as it must if we abandon the command 
 of the surrounding sea long enough — the fact of its 
 strength may retard and hinder the restoration of our oom- 
 mandof the sea. Had the Spaniards not originally made 
 Gibraltar strong, we could not have held it when we left 
 that sea, and Spain need not have exhausted herself in 
 fruitless efforts to get it back again as a necessary part of 
 her restored command in those waters. 
 
 I am only using Gibraltar as an illustration, not sug- 
 gesting more with regard to that particular fortress than to 
 say that if our communications with it are necessary, the 
 place must be held by means of these communications and 
 not by its isolated strength, and that the illustration 
 governs all naval depots — that is, all naval bases which are 
 not producers of naval strength, but only renewerg of that 
 strength^depots which in these days of steam are chiefly 
 regarded as stores of locomotive force. 
 ., Gibraltar may not be of great importance as a naval 
 dep6t. In the wars of the past it certainly only shared 
 
188 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 the importance which, from the naval point of view, was 
 held by the wholly indefensible bases of Tetuan, Lagos 
 Bay, and Palmas Bay. But were Gibraltar once more in 
 the hands of Spain, the necessities of our case would 
 probably determine that if we were to retain our Mediter- 
 ranean route to India and the East, we should repossess 
 ourselves of it. It may not be of advantage to the Power 
 whose life depends on a free Eastern highway, but it might 
 be impossible to preserve that highway free if the Power 
 determined to bar it were in possession of Gibraltar. 
 
 Reverting now to the three alternative functions which 
 might be assigned to the fortification of Malta, Gibraltar, 
 and other depdts on a line of communication, we do not 
 seem justified by history in assuming that any fortification 
 will act as a scare to prevent the Power controlling the 
 sea from making his attack. Secondly, we are hardly 
 justified in supposing that if we lost the command of the 
 Eastern routes, these dep6ts being still held by us would 
 materially assist us in regaining it, and this for the simple 
 reason that they would be exhausted depots when we 
 restored communication with them, though, after we had 
 regained command, they would be of the same use to us 
 which they are at present. 
 
 There remains the third function of fortification, namely, 
 the protection of the stores — the protection of the dep6t 
 proper, and not the shell of it — from the sudden surprise 
 and destruction which might be effected in a short time by 
 a small force. 
 
 I think that the original claim for the local defence of 
 our coaling stations did not go further than this. I think 
 that if the writings of the earliest advocates of this mea- 
 sure are studied, it will be seen that the last thing they 
 Jiad in their minds was that coaling stations should, or 
 
tOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 189 
 
 could, stand alone. Indeed, I might almost go as far as to 
 say that, in one prominent case, the conception now held 
 by the general body is exactly the reverse of that put for- 
 ward more than twenty years ago, and still held by him.l 
 The idea of prepiration for several communications with 
 coaling stations, which has dominated our actual policy with 
 regard to them, was totally absent then. The defence sug- 
 gested was a local sea defence which would prevent com- 
 munications being out by anything short of a considerable 
 force, for it was plainly felt that a dep6t must cease to be a 
 dep&t, and must lose the whole of its value, if the stream 
 of replenishment ceased to flow into it. 
 
 Think of Singapore for a moment, simply as a naval base. 
 Oar squadron comes in, exhausts the coal supply, and quits. 
 The enemy closes round, seizes the colliers which would 
 have replenished the exhausted stores, fills up his own 
 bunkers from them, and either destroys the rest or dis- 
 patches it to some convenient hiding-place. Our own 
 squadron comes back, drives off the enemy, and finds an 
 empty coal dep&t. So far as our war-ships are concerned, 
 what difEerence does it make whether Singapore has alto- 
 gether fallen or whether only the coal store is empty ? 
 Our squadron there is powerless, while the enemy is left 
 in possession of the sea. The fortifications have abso- 
 lutely failed to hold any relations with the moving Navy. 
 They have not guarded its stores, and they cannot in any 
 way assist it to recover the command of the sea. 
 
 If, on the other hand, a coal store is very much exposed, 
 
 the strongest works may be passed by, and an enterprising 
 
 enemy on a dark night, with good store of dynamite and 
 
 combustibles, but with very little force, might in an hour 
 
 or so destroy all the value which the works had been 
 
 erected to guard. 
 
 ' Sir John Colomb. 
 
190 ESSiYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 I think what took place with regard to Port Hamilton 
 gives us a most usefal measure of the real naval thought 
 with regwd to the fixed defences of a purely naval depftt. 
 Superficially we should read it that the Navy rejected Port 
 Hamilton as a depdt unless it had been heavily fortified 
 and garrisoned, but would have been glad to hold it other- 
 wise. And, still, superficially, it would appear that the 
 sole objection to the unfortified dep&t would have been the 
 necessity of detaching ships, really required elsewhere, for 
 its local guard. 
 
 But the moment we go below the surface we find the 
 governing thought of a different character. Port Hamilton, 
 if valuable as a naval basis at all, would have been chiefly 
 so for operations against the Russian Siberian ports, such 
 as Vladivostock, in the event of war. But the naval 
 instincts, resting on all the broad facts of naval history, 
 declared that such operations required a preliminary com- 
 mand of the sea, also, that if such command existed, unde- 
 fended naval bases would be established as close as possible 
 to the scene of action, and Port Hamilton would, in conse- 
 quence, fail to be of any value. 
 
 The general conclusion arising seems to be that no 
 moving Navy has ever really laid a stress upon fortified 
 bases. When it is in command of the sea it will always 
 seize and hold convenient bases, but it will rarely, if ever, 
 of itself, spend much on the local defence of the bases. 
 Their defence is involved in the command of the sea. A 
 moving Navy must either be in command of the sea, or 
 fighting for it. It holds its command by the same tenure 
 as an army does, and as two armies cannot command the 
 same territory, so neither can two fleets. If in a given 
 territory, the army of one belligerent cannot attack the 
 fortress of the other while the army of the other is 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 191 
 
 besiegiag another fortress of the first ; so neither can these 
 things happen on the water, 
 
 Fortifications will shelter beaten, and, therefore, inactive 
 fleets, just as they will shelter beaten armies. Plymouth 
 and Portsmoath might become to our Empire and our 
 fleets, what Metz and Paris were to the French Empire and 
 armies — ^mere receptacles for shutting up force in, while 
 the Empire was being over-run. I do not think that had 
 we, thirty years ago, regarded them from this point of 
 view, we should have spent as much on their local defences 
 as we have done. 
 
 As regards commercial porta and oat-ports, whether 
 naval bases or not, I take it as plain that every nerve 
 must be strained to secure our communications with them 
 in war, and that it is extremely difficult to defend the ex- 
 penditure of any money on local defence until the commu- 
 nications are absolutely secure. When the communica- 
 tions are secure, the provision of local defence on the 
 supposition that they are not secure, becomes somewhat 
 anomalous. 
 
 But, on the other hand, outlying property of very great 
 value left very much exposed, is a direct temptation to the 
 attack of it. A Malta dockyard without any defence at all, 
 and capable of being got at and destroyed in a few hours 
 by a couple of dashing cruisers, would be such a tempta- 
 tion; as we might presuppose that our communications 
 would not always be so close as to make it absolutely 
 certain that there might not be half-a-dozen hours when no 
 opposing cruiser of ours would be either in port or in 
 sight. 
 
 That is one way of looking at it. But when we are 
 dissatisfied with a Malta dockyard, which we admit is a 
 temptation only to a great battle fleet and a heavy land 
 
192 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 force, and when we propose to spend heavily on the works 
 protecting it, rather than on maintaining communication 
 with it, then we are, I think, looking not at the preserva- 
 tion of our Empire, but at its disruption. We must be 
 contemplating the abandonment of our route to India vid 
 the Mediterranean for some indefinite time, and we must 
 be contemplating either the ultimate loss of Malta, or the 
 exertion of the whole of our naval power at intervals for its 
 relief and retention, all at a time when we cannot make 
 the slightest use of it, and are, by the hypothesis, desperately 
 pressed elsewhere. 
 
 I should observe that all the steam wars confirm the 
 teaching of the sailing wars, respecting fortifications. They 
 have never stood a determined attack from the sea ; they 
 have never given, or restored the command of the sea ; but 
 they have sheltered beaten and inferior fleets, small and 
 large, just as they did in times gone by. 
 
 But, on the other hand, Bouet-Willaumez carried on his 
 naval war in 1870 from the wholly undefended bases of 
 Langeland and Kioje Bay, even as we had, fifteen years 
 before, carried on ours from the undefended dep6t of 
 Nargen, and as Nelson had, seventy years before, carried 
 it on from the anchorage of Madalena. 
 
 As I said at the opening of my paper, I did not think we 
 could do more with so difficult a question as this, than 
 suggest ways of looking at it. It will be apparent that my 
 way of looking at it tends to put very great restrictions on 
 the extension of fixed works and of local defences of any 
 kind. I have endeavoured to look at the matter all round, 
 and wherever I formed an opposite view, to endeavour to 
 press it home to its consequences and see what they came 
 to. I have not adverted much to the local defence of 
 purely commercial ports, because I cannot shake myself 
 
LOCAL FORTIFICATIONS AND A MOVING NAVY. 193 
 
 clear of the conviction that it is the oomnmnications alone 
 of these that are worth defending, and that while the ports 
 are nothing without them, the defence of them includes, 
 inexorably, the defence of the port itself. It is a mere 
 instinct with me which admits light batteries at the 
 entrances of such ports. I cannot, when I face it, reconcile 
 their existence to my reason. 
 
194 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 BLOCKADE : UKDBR EXISTING CONDITIONS OF WARFARE. 1 
 
 Had I recollected when I accepted the invitation of the 
 Council to read this paper, that Captain Long had in. 1881 
 read one here under the title of " The Study of the Tac- 
 tics of Naval Blockade as affected by Modern Weapons," 
 I think I should have asked permission to make some 
 alteration in the present title, for the changes which 
 have taken place in the conditions since then are not such 
 as to suggest any entirely new ground, and I do in fact 
 only hope to approach Captain Long's subject from a 
 possiialy rather different point of view. Indeed the chief 
 change of condition which we may note is perhaps some 
 change of opinion since Captain Long wrote, not of a very 
 solid or reasoned kind, and not founded, so far as I can 
 see, on any definite data. 
 
 It may be well to point out in the first instance that the 
 blockade of which I have to speak to-day is military 
 blockade — the blockade of war-ships by war-ships. Other- 
 wise it might be easily supposed that it would be proper to 
 touch on the law of blockade and the intricatie question of 
 prize for breach of blockade. If we call the blockade of 
 war-ships military blockade, it would no doubt be convenient 
 » Written in 1887. 
 
BLOCKADE. 195 
 
 to call the other civil, or commercial blockade, for although 
 it is a military operation it has behind it the sanction of 
 law, whereas military blockade has only the sanction of 
 force behind it. 
 
 And in considering the subjef.t we shall at once see that 
 whereas we ordinarily speak of military blockade as if it 
 were but one thing, or but of one kind, it is really three 
 things, or three kinds of the same thing. It will be clear 
 to you that this is so when I mention the three words 
 Sealing-up, Masking, and Observing. These words denote 
 three quite- different operations, and yet we know that they 
 have at all times been carried out and spoken of under the 
 same name. I will give you three familiar illustrations 
 which will at once make the distinction clear. Nelson, in 
 March, 1794, speaks of blockade in its first and special 
 sense when he writes, "The blocking up of Corsica he 
 (Lord Hood) left to me : it has been accomplished in the 
 most complete manner ; not a boat got in or a single 
 soldier landed, although 8,000 men were embarked at 
 Nice." Here the object was more to prevent ingress than 
 egress, but it would have been just the same had he claimed 
 that not a boat or a man got out. The ports of Corsica were 
 sealed up. The intention was that nothing floating should 
 either leave or enter them ; that was the ultimate object, 
 and it was attained. When Nelson arrived near Cadiz in 
 October, 1805, with his full force, he was so far from 
 blockading the Franco-Spanish Fleet that he purposely 
 kept his own ships out of view, in order if possible to 
 deceive the enemy into a belief that his numbers were 
 smaller than they actually were ; but he kept close watch 
 on Cadiz by an inshore squadron and repeating ships, so as 
 to have the earliest intelligence of the enemy's movements. 
 If the Franco-Spanish Fleet had not come out this would 
 
 2 
 
196 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 have been called blockade. Similar operations bad often 
 been conducted under that name ; but it was evidently not 
 the sort of blockade which the same officer had carried out 
 at Bastia. The object was the opposite of blockade. It 
 was hoped that the enemy would come out, but every pre- 
 caution was taken that if he came out he should be fought. 
 The operation was not blockade ; it was masTcing. So long 
 as the English Fleet was there the Franco-Spanish Fleet 
 was harmless. It could only become mischievous after 
 fighting and beating the English force. 
 
 Before Nelson arrived off Cadiz the operation was called 
 blockading ; but it was not ; nor was it masking. OoUing- 
 wood took his station off the port with no more than four 
 line-of-battle ships, well knowing that the Franco-Spanish 
 Fleet might any day come out and surround him with 
 thirty-five ships of the line. Oollingwood, therefore, was 
 neither sealing-up nor maslcing ; he was observing. He had 
 no power of keeping the enemy in port, nor of fighting 
 him if he came out; but he had power of watching 
 him, and of reporting his movements. He exercised 
 both. He despatched Blackwood home with news of his 
 arrival ; he remained watching himself ; and had the ships 
 come out he would have hung about them and detached 
 ship after ship until he was left alone to report on their 
 route and probable designs. 
 
 As there are, therefore, these three distinct operations 
 included under the ordinary term blockade, it requires 
 little reflection to see that we must consider them separately 
 before we can come to any conclusions either on the general 
 subject or on particular applications of it. I shall have to 
 form and to express in this paper opinions as to how far 
 " blockade " can be carried out " under existing conditions 
 of warfare." These opinions are now freely expressed on 
 
BLOCKADE. 197 
 
 both sides of the question. Great differences exist ; but I 
 am not sure that the disputants have commonly, or even at 
 any time, drawn the distinctions that I have now done ; 
 and it may be found that some of the difEerences have 
 arisen from the fact that opponents have in their minds 
 different things, though they have both been using the 
 word blockade. We may easily, I think, come to two 
 apparently opposite conclusions, and yet not be open to the 
 charge of inconsistency. " Blockade " may be pronounced 
 impossible in modern warfare, and yet " masking " and 
 " observing " — commonly included under blockade — may 
 be held quite possible. 
 
 A great number of naval ofiBcers hold the opinion that 
 it is worse than useless to go back to naval history for the 
 lessons of modern naval war. I have been for many years 
 past of the contrary opinion — an opinion which grows 
 stronger every day — that it is impossible to form correct 
 views of the present or future of naval warfare unless they 
 are based on a pretty thorough investigation of its history 
 in the past. 
 
 A Royal Commission appointed in 1859, nominally to 
 consider the " defences of the United Kingdom," but 
 really only to consider the fortification of the Royal Naval 
 Ports, reported in 1860 that, " it would be very unsafe to 
 rely on the experience of former wars in judging of " the 
 question of the power of our fleets to mask those of the 
 enemy. No one certainly ought to " rely " on the experi- 
 ence of former naval wars under sail to guide him in fore- 
 casting the future of those under steam, if to " rely " 
 meant to expect the same thing under very different con- 
 ditions. But this sentence was probably meant to go fur- 
 ther, and to say that past experience was no help to the 
 preparation for the future. It was followed up by the 
 
198 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 wide assertion that because of steam " the efficient blockade 
 of an enemy's ports had become well-nigh impossible." 
 
 It was the more remarkable that such a thing should be 
 said at that particular date, seeing that six years earlier 
 we had established and maintained by steam vessels a most 
 rigorous and absolute military blockade of all the ports in 
 the Russian Empire for two years. 
 
 The very next year, too, was to -witness the establish- 
 ment of a blockade of the coast of South America from the 
 Chesapeake to the Rio Grande. And so far from this 
 gigantic operation of war being unsuccessful, it resulted in 
 the destruction of 270 sailing vessels and of 85 steamers, 
 as well as in the capture of 939 sailing vessels and 210 
 steamers. This steam blockade also was undertaken by a 
 nation totally unprepared for it — a nation which had, 
 when the war broke out, only about twenty-four war 
 steamers, all told in commission, of which the most part 
 were on distant stations. 1 
 
 This operation was sealing- up pure and simple. The 
 attempt was to prevent all egress and ingress from and to 
 the enemy's ports — clearly the most difficult form of 
 blockade. The Royal Commissioners were not thinking of 
 this in their modified denial of its possibility. As they 
 were showing that the naval defence of the United 
 Kingdom was not to be depended upon, they must have in- 
 cluded both masking and observing in their use of the 
 word blockade. Blockade in their view had been rendered 
 by steam well-nigh impossible, and so there was the broad 
 chance that the enemy's fleets would evade the masking 
 fleets off their ports and elude the watchfulness of the ob- 
 serving squadrons. 
 
 ' Soley : " The Blockade and the Cruisers." 
 
BLOCKADE. 199 
 
 I believe I shall not be far wrong in assuming that 
 another Royal Commission sitting now, might, if it were to 
 decline to examine and draw the lesson from history, be 
 tempted to say that the torpedo-boat had made blockade 
 " well-nigh impossible." It may not be amiss to notice 
 that hardly anyone would agree that steam alone had made 
 sealing-up, masking, or observing more difficult than they 
 had been in the days of sailing ships. It may quite be 
 that the same change of opinion will follow longer acquaint- 
 ance with the torpedo-boat. 
 
 But my point is that steam, looked at in the light of 
 history, had at least not injured our powers of blockade in 
 any of its three aspects. A contrary opinion could only 
 be arrived at by taking into account all the advantages 
 which steam gave to the enemy for escape from his ports, 
 and neglecting all those which it had given to the blockading 
 force for observing him. 
 
 Such a blockade as the Federal States set up ofE the Con- 
 federate ports could not have been thought of before the 
 days of steam. It was steam which enabled the ships, to 
 close into the mouth of the port. It was steam which, by 
 mitigating, if not removing, the perils of a lee shore, 
 enabled the Federal ships to anchor as close to the water 
 passage they were guarding, as the range of the enemy's 
 guns planted on shore would allow. 
 
 There was not generally any real attempt at anything 
 more than observing and masking during the revolutionary 
 war, and only the inshore squadrons of frigates and light 
 ships kept close off the ports containing the enemy's fleets. 
 The dangers of a lee shore necessarily kept the blockading 
 fleet with a good ofiing when the wind was foul for exit 
 from the port ; when it shifted and made a weather shore, 
 it blew the blockading fleet off, and the blockaded fleet out. 
 
200 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 When Hoche and Morard de Galles had brought the pre- 
 parations of the Irish Expedition to a state of completeness 
 in December, 1796, in the harbour of Brest, Colpoys, with 
 (apparently) fifteen sail of the line, was masking them. In 
 the language of Schomberg he was " cruising off Brest '' 
 (Fig. 1). 
 
 The greater part of the troops were embarked as early 
 as December 1st, and Wolfe Tone, whose journal gives a 
 very fair picture of what was going on inside at Brest, ' 
 embarked on board the " Indomptable " on that day. On 
 the 3rd he could only say it was " pretty certain that the 
 English were in force ofE Ushant to the number of sixteen 
 ships of the line and ten frigates." Colpoys was generally 
 so far off as not to be visible, but the mere idea of his 
 vicinity was sufficient to delay the sailing of the squadron, 
 yet the watch was so loose that Richery with five sail of the 
 line and two frigates got into Brest from Rochefort on the 
 11th December, and this movement followed on the return 
 to England of Sir R. Curtis' squadron, which had been 
 cruising near Belleisle between those two ports. 
 
 On the 15th December there had been for more than 
 three weeks a fair wind out of Brest, and then they conld 
 only see from th& lookout at the point, four sail of the 
 enemy. These were Colpoys' frigates ; but he himself had 
 been blown thirty miles to the westward, so that the 
 Erench expedition was able to sail the next night. Colpoys, 
 having thus missed them, returned to Spithead on the 31st. 
 
 What is the lesson of history here if we choose to read 
 it ? The fair wind out of Brest gave to the French all the 
 advantages which steam could have put at their disposal ; 
 but it took away from the fleet of Colpoys all the advan- 
 tages it gave to the squadron he was watching. If Colpoys 
 had had a steam fleet he would never have been blown 
 
PLATE 711. 
 
BLOCKADE. 201 
 
 thirty miles away. He would have been seen every 
 morning from the Brest signal station, and it is doubtful 
 whether even the idea of the expedition could have 
 matured under such circumstances. As it was, Richery 
 very nearly ran into Oolpoys' jaws on making for Brest. 
 Had the former been able to maintain a position closer in, 
 Richery would never have sailed from Rochefort. 
 
 I think this historical lesson is complebe. The men are 
 men whether the motive power of the ship be steam or wind. 
 The French Expedition sailing in darkness through the Raz 
 du Sein did everything that steam could have permitted. 
 It was the absence of Colpoys which allowed of the escape. 
 Had Oolpoys been independent of wind, he would not have 
 been absent. Hence steam is shown, by the experience of 
 the past, to have made masking a certainty which it never 
 was before. 
 
 We might easily misread another lesson, where the same 
 Wolfe Tone tells us the best of the story. On the 8th of 
 July, 1797, he arrived at the Texel and found De Winter's 
 expedition ready to start ; troops were on board, and every- 
 thing complete. The force consisted of fifteen sail of the 
 line, ten frigates and sloops, and twenty-seven transports. 
 The troops embarked came to abont 13,500 men. Lying 
 in the Texel it is apparent that they looked straight out to 
 sea, but though Duncan's fleet was very usually in sight 
 from the Dutch ships, it was not always so. Wolfe Tone 
 on the 14th of Jane counted from the stern windows of the 
 " Vryheid " " ten sail of English ships of war, little and 
 big, who had presented themselves off the month of the 
 Texel." On another occasion De Winter was dependent on 
 the return of a flag of truce for the numbers and force of 
 the enemy (Pig. 2). 
 
 On the 16 th July, the Dntch officers received their final 
 
202 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 instructions, and only waited for a fair wind to sail, in de- 
 fiance apparently of Dancan's squadron. But the wind 
 was " as foul as the devil." On the 20th the Dutch saw 
 nineteen sail of British ships, but were assured that not 
 more than twelve of them were of the line. De Winter 
 was in fact well aware of every movement of our Navy, and 
 the distribution of our ships. Yet the nearest wind to the 
 N.E. wanted, was N.W. " Damn it to all eternity for me ! " 
 writes Wolfe Tone. On the 20th, Tone had been eighteen 
 days on board, and they " had not had eighteen minutes of 
 fair wind.'' On the 27th and 28th there was a fair wind, 
 but so light that the Dutch could not stir. They could 
 then see Duncan at anchor and counted twenty-two sail. 
 De Winter was in the habit of landing with his glass, and 
 scanning the English fleet from a neighbouring height. 
 Occasionally they were cheered by a whifE of fair wind, 
 but Whenever it came, the tide was foul and they could not 
 move. 
 
 So things continued till the 21st August, when the ex- 
 pedition, as it stood, was finally abandoned. 
 
 These conditions were pretty nearly the reverse of those 
 at Brest. The weather was so fine that it enabled Duncan 
 to anchor off the Texel, and to make absolutely sure that 
 the Dutch Fleet was thoroughly masked. He had all the ad- 
 vantages which steam could have given him. The Dutch, on 
 the other hand, had all the disadvantages which dependence 
 on the wind involved. Could De Winter have been supplied 
 with steam for his motive power, how would history have 
 been affected ? Simply it appears that the Battle of Cam- 
 perdown would have been the Battle of the Texel, and 
 would have been fought by the Dutch when they were 
 loaded with troops. The masking by Duncan would have 
 been effective either way. 
 
BLOCKADE. 203 
 
 Lord Bridport had the reputation of being one of the 
 most persistent and daring of blockaders. An oflScer who 
 had served under him wrote in 1799 that since Lord Brid- 
 port had "held the command of the Channel Fleet, the 
 French have beea blocked up in Brest harbour much 
 closer than they ever were before. No Admiral at any 
 time has kept Ushant so continuously on board as he has 
 done ; not a day passed, when the weather permitted, that 
 Lord Bridport did not stand in ; and when the wind would 
 allow him, he has taken the fleet close in to the Black Rock; 
 his own ship the 'Royal George' has even been within it, which, 
 at the commencement of the war, was rarely done, even by 
 74's." 
 
 When it is pointed out that the Black Rock is thirteen 
 miles from the entrance to the Goulet of Brest, some idea 
 can be formed of what was considered close work in 1799, 
 and true explanation is offered of the escapes, and the 
 evasions of our squadrons which sometimes occurred. 
 
 One of the most remarkable of these took place in this 
 very year 1799, and under the nose of this most dis- 
 tinguished officer. 
 
 In April, Admiral Bruix had at Brest twenty-five sail of 
 the line, five frigatas, and five smaller vessels ready for sea. 
 On the 25th, Bridport, at the head of sixteen sail of the 
 line, but apparently only one frigate — the " Nymphe " — 
 looked into Brest, and saw eighteen sail of the line at 
 anchor in Bertheaume Bay. Five others were under way, 
 and those at anchor were ready for aa immediate start 
 
 (Kg. 1). 
 
 If we had not heard what had just been written, we 
 should have been astonished at Lord Bridport's immediate 
 proceedings, and would have said that he led. up directly 
 to the untoward circumstance which followed. He stood 
 
204 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 away to the W.N.W. at two o'clock in the afternoon, and at 
 four was twelve miles W.S.W. of Ushant, or 30 miles 
 from the French Fleet. 
 
 Only this one frigate, the " Nymphe " was apparently 
 left to watch ; and it may be that the " Dragon," 74, was 
 somewhat detached towards the " Nymphe '' for the pur- 
 pose of repeating her signals to the Admiral. 
 
 The wind was fresh at N.E., and the French were there 
 and then getting under way. The accounts are not clear 
 as to whether the " Nymphe " became aware of the fact or 
 not. There was foggy weather either that evening or next 
 niorning, or both, but the result was that at nine o'clock 
 next morning — the 26th — the " Nymphe " jast caught the 
 last ten or eleven of the French ships rounding the Saintes 
 to the southward. The " Nymphe " made all sail to the 
 N.W. to report, but at noon, when she was fifteen miles 
 W.S.W. of Ushant, she had lost the French Fleet, and had 
 not found her own. At one o'clock she saw the " Dragon," 
 who repeated her signal to Lord Bridport, but it was then 
 clearly too late. The French had six or eight hours' start. 
 Lord Bridport, however, made sail for Brest, not apparently 
 being satisfied with the " Nymphe's " information ; then 
 discovering its truth, but not till the morning of the 27th, 
 he fell back to Bantry Bay, being then and subsequently 
 joined by ships which brought his number up to twenty- 
 six. The French never, however, had any idea of Ireland ; 
 they were oS to the Mediterranean, there to efEect certain 
 combinations, and finally to return to Brest, where they 
 lay in overwhelming strength. 
 
 In this instance, Bridport was either intending to 
 observe or to mask. As forces were on the way to join 
 him, it is possible that he had not the intention of attacking 
 Braix in any case with his sixteen sail. Bat it is clear 
 
BLOCKADE. 205 
 
 that he nevtjr meant to let the French Fleet out to be 
 neither fought nor watched. Naval officers of the day 
 spoke of the escape of the French as " extraordinary." To 
 us, now, it would seem to have followed naturally on 
 Bridport's proceedings. But as Bridport was not at all the 
 man to let slip a chance, we can only assume that the 
 necessities of sail and wind compelled a course which to 
 our modern notions would seem so mistaken. 
 
 But then the question for us here is, could this all have 
 happened with steam fleets ? Bruix again, as De Galles 
 before him, had all the advantages which steam could have 
 given him. He had that fair wind which steam represents, 
 and he used it so that he must have been well on his way 
 at breaking daylight on the 25th of April. Was there 
 anything wanting to success beyond the absence of Lord 
 Bridport ? Would Lord Bridport have been absent if he 
 had had a steam fleet ? I tak§ it that no argument can 
 lie on the other side. Even if we allow that Bridport 
 actually feared a battle when the odds were twenty-five to 
 sixteen, and meant to risk the escape of the fleet rather 
 than the chance of an action — still a withdrawal of thirty 
 miles would never have been a necessity for a steam fleet 
 in like disparity. But knowing what Lord Bridport was, 
 and what his brother was, I can hardly believe that the 
 risk of action would have weighed against the risk of the 
 French escaping. I must, therefore, conclude that it was 
 the dependence on wind which made it unsafe for a 
 fleet to spend the night nearer than thirty miles from 
 Bertheaume Bay. But if this be so, what a disclosure it 
 makes of the real inefficiency of the observation, or the mask- 
 ing, of hostile fleets in their own ports during the last great 
 naval war, and what a curious commentary on the generally 
 received axiom that " Steam has bridged the Channel." 
 
206 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 It is useful here to recall Nelson's proceedings in 
 masking Villeneuve at Toulon, as it may remind us that 
 tremendous as the effort was, it failed in the end, and left 
 Villeneuve master of the situation. 
 
 We have to recollect that this operation difEered in 
 character from those carried on ofE Brest and other 
 Atlantic ports of Trance, inasmuch as the blockade rested 
 on a base 180 miles ofE — the base of the Madalena Islands, 
 at the north point of Sardinia. 
 
 Nelson joined his fleet ofE Monte Ohristo on July 8th, 
 1803, and spent sixteen continuous weeks, till the 31st 
 October, watching Toulon. Then the fleet fell back to 
 Madalena for ten days' rest and refit, frigates remaining on 
 watch. From this date to the 19th January, 1805, there 
 was an average interval of thirty-five days ofE Toulon to 
 eight days at Madalena or Palma In the year 1804 the 
 fleet spent 306 days at sea, and yet Toulon was left 
 practically open for two months out of the twelve. With 
 a sailing fleet, retirement to a base 180 miles ofE must 
 have been accepted as giving the escaping enemy three 
 days' start at the very least, and it must have been known 
 that the masking was thus abandoned. 
 
 It is hardly to be supposed that with a steam fleet 
 resting on the same anchorage, the masking would ever 
 be interrupted for a day. The whole fleet would never 
 abandon the watch. The coaling, provisioning, and re- 
 fitting would have taken place in the ships one by one. 
 Madalena would have become a permanent depot, 'vyhere 
 colliers, store, and ammunition transports, would have 
 assembled in safety. A ship detached from the fleet ofi 
 Toulon in the morning would have been at Madalena for 
 certain next morning, and might very generally have 
 sailed the same night after completion. The work of 
 
BLOCKADE. 207 
 
 watcliing would have been monotonous, but never hard, 
 even in bad weather. In fine weather, when there was no 
 sign of a move — no lighting of fires — on the part of the 
 enemy's ships in port, communication by boat between 
 the ships of the blockading squadron would naturally be 
 free ; and free also would be communication with traders 
 loaded with all kinds of refreshment for the crews. 
 
 Pressed by conditions which the invention of the steam- 
 •engine has removed, Nelson was compelled to trust mainly 
 to chance for masking the French. If he had had more 
 frigates he might have had more warning ; but in no case 
 could the retirement of the squadron 180 miles be con- 
 sidered a maintenance of the masking. And thus it 
 turned out; for though by good fortune the " Active '' and 
 "Sea-horse" were able to report to Nelson at 3 p.m. on 
 the 19th of January the sailing of the French on the day 
 before, yet in that act of reporting, all trace of the enemy 
 was lost. They returned quietly to Toulon, but Nelson 
 knew nothing of it for a month, which he had spent in 
 chasing vaguely to the east end of the Mediterranean. 
 
 Again this arduous, but broken and incomplete, watch 
 was set up ; and again the withdrawal of the whole fleet 
 to Pula Roads in the south of Sardinia left the coast free 
 to Villeneuve. But this time the news of the departure 
 of the French was four or five days' old before it reached 
 Nelson, and it was a fortnight more before the true 
 destination was known. 
 
 We are easily tempted to ask, when the masking of 
 Villeneuve was of such transcendent importance, how it 
 was that' line-of- battle ships were not detached in assisting 
 the chain of look-out frigates. Nelson had certainly the 
 idea in his mind ; and after the first sailing of the French 
 he told off his two fastest line-of -battle ships, the "Spencer" 
 
208 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 and " Leviathan," to act as a detached sqnadron, and to 
 separate from the order of the fleet. But this was going 
 such a very short way towards doing what we should now, 
 with our present knowledge, and want of knowledge, con- 
 sider a very obvious duty that there must have been very 
 strong reasons on the other side. And then, too, ai'ises 
 the question, why did not Nelson detach one ship at a 
 time from Toulon, to Madalena ? The idea is the first 
 which occurs to our mind when we think of blockade 
 resting on a base at the present day ; it is not possible 
 that it should have escaped our forefathers' notice. 
 
 I can only suppose that it was the slow and uncertain 
 powers of locomotion possessed by the line-of-battle ships 
 which made the thing impossible. Nelson took his fleet 
 across the Atlantic in chase of Villeneuve at the average 
 rate of three knots only. The difference between the 
 sailing powers of the frigate and the line-of-battle ship 
 were certainly very marked, and it was perhaps a physical 
 impossibility in most cases for a line-of-battle ship to safely 
 watch an enemy's fleet which had frigates at command. 
 So, too, the idea of detaching single ships to refit could not 
 have been put in force on account of the extreme uncer- 
 tainty of the period of absence. Some such strong reason 
 there must have been ; but no such reason applies to 
 blockade under steam. 
 
 We need not go further into the history of blockade 
 under sail. The teaching is very broad and very plain. 
 It is that a base of some sort was always necessary for a 
 blockading fleet, whether such base was Torbay for 
 Brest, Madalena for Toulon, or Gibraltar and Tetuan for 
 Cadiz. Such base is as necessary, but not more so, with 
 steam ; but then with steam, communication with it has 
 become so rapid, so certain, and so secure cihat none of the 
 
BLOCKADK. 209 
 
 interruptions enforced by dependence on the wind will 
 tell against the closeness of the watch. 
 
 Again, the closeness of the watch under steam will be 
 in marked contrast to its looseness under sail. 
 
 It may be true, and no doubt is so in some cases, that 
 the steam ship requires more frequent communication 
 with the base than the sailing ship, on account of the ex- 
 haustion of her fuel supply. But the modern economies 
 of coal have a tendency the other way, and in any case the 
 consideration does not touch the argument. The experi- 
 ence of the Federals, as well as our own during the 
 Russian War, point to the seizure and maintenance of 
 bases as an essential part of steam blockade. The com- 
 mand of the sea with locomotion independent of wind has 
 — if we are to go by experience — bred an audacity in this 
 kind of thing which far surpasses our seizure of Corsica, 
 Minorca, or Malta. It seems plain that wherever we want 
 the convenience of anchorage and smooth water we shall 
 take it, so long as we can make it safe on the land side. 
 For the blockade of ports near our own shores we shall 
 uBe our own ports, and where those do not sufiBce we shall 
 be found begging, borrowing, or stealing others. 
 
 It is evident that if the masking or observing of the 
 enemy's fleet in the days of sailing ships was necessarily 
 as loose as we have seen it, the actual sealing up was prac- 
 tically abandoned as hopeless. So far as the enemy's 
 cruisers and privateers went, attempts at sealmg up, if 
 made, were singularly inefEeotive. Lloyd's Lists, quoted 
 in the " Naval Chronicle " for 1807, give a loss of 4,314 
 British ships to the enemy by capture in the nine years 
 from 1793 to 1800 inclusive, that is four captures in every 
 three days, and showing a freedom for mischief on the 
 part of the enemy of a remarkable character. 
 
 p 
 
210 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Captures in the Channel and close off all our coasts 
 appear to have been accepted just as wrecks and collisions 
 now are. The " Naval Chronicle " supplied monthly lists 
 of them without remark, and side by side with the 
 wrecks ; and the prizes, if not met by our cruisers in the 
 open sea, which was often the case, seemed to have no 
 difficulty in getting into French and Dutch ports. The 
 mere conception of such a blockade as the Federals in- 
 stantly prepared to set up on the Confederate coasts, does 
 not seem to have reached our ancestors down to the last, 
 and we can only suppose that the presence of steam 
 prompted the suggestion in the one case, as its absence ex- 
 cluded it in the other. 
 
 It appears to me that whatever opinions may be ex- 
 pressed now, if we had a naval war we should follow the 
 example of the Federals exactly, and I suppose we ought 
 to succeed as well as they did, provided always we are 
 wise enough to sacrifice everything for the command of 
 the sea. I cannot contemplate in this paper a policy 
 which should assume our failure in this respect, because 
 to assume it is certainly to draw away the money which is 
 necessary to maintain it. The policy of the fox with his 
 hundred defences against the hounds, never commended 
 itself to me so much as that of the melancholy cat, sadly 
 admitting that it had but the one plan of running up a 
 tree if the cry of the huntsman was heard. The issue of 
 the fable should not, I think, be forgotten, by us when we 
 are tempted to sail near the wind in the matter of naval 
 economies. For the lesson of experience and of history is 
 plain. It was the command of the sea alone which gave 
 the Federals their bases, and thus their powers of blockade. 
 The loss of the command of the Mediterranean Sea com- 
 pelled the abandonment of Elba, in 1797, which had, in 
 
BLOCKADE. 211 
 
 succession to Corsica, become the base for our fleet. In 
 the war between Chili and Peru, the former, though 
 superior at sea, were obliged to abandon the important 
 blockade of Iquique, because of the possible interference of 
 the Peruvian " Huascar." 
 
 The Federals, determined to take and keep the command 
 of the sea, very soon set up a blockade based on it, which 
 it has been rightly said is without a parallel. 
 
 " The old traditional idea of a blockade," says Mr. J. R. 
 Soley, in " The Blockade and the Cruisers,'' " maintained 
 by a few large vessels moving up and down before a post 
 at a distance, gave place to the entirely novel practice of 
 anchoring a large number of small and handy steamers in 
 an exposed position close to the bar at the entrance of the 
 blockaded harbours ; and the boldness with which, after 
 the first six months, men kept their vessels close in with 
 the shore, and manfully rode out the gales at their anchors 
 — a thing which sea-going men, as a rule, had regarded as 
 impossible, and which woald have appalled the stoutest 
 captains of former times — showed as clearly as the actual 
 engagements the real stuff of which the Navy was made. 
 
 " As to the legal efficiency of the blockade after the first 
 six months, there can be no question ; and by the end of 
 the second year its stringency was such that only specially 
 adapted vessels could safely attempt to run it. . . . 
 In the. last year it became as nearly perfect as such an 
 operation can be made. Taking its later development as 
 a type, it is probable that no blockade has ever been main- 
 tained more effectually by any State ; and it is certain 
 that no State ever had such a blockade to maintain." 
 
 Be it recollected then the author is here speaking of 
 sealing up ; of operations which go very far beyond the 
 masking or observing which would alone be vital to us 
 
 p 2 
 
212 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 in a state of naval war, and that everything vital to the 
 safety of their own coasts was included in the sort of 
 blockade which the Northern States undertook. 
 
 That the sealing up was not absolute is sometimes used 
 as an argument that it was inefficient ; and parallels are 
 drawn adverse to our own blockading powers in naval 
 war, which rest on that position. In some minds it would 
 even seem that the escape of vast fleets in the days of sail- 
 ing blockades was a better indication of what we may 
 expect, than the escape or entry of a small proportion of 
 the flying blockade runners specially built for the 
 service. 
 
 But surely it is certain that, setting aside for the pre- 
 sent the effect of torpedo-boats, no squadron, not even a 
 small one, could have evaded blockading squadrons, when 
 the watch was so close that only a proportion of the 
 attempts made by single ships were successful, and that 
 these succeeded, not by escaping notice, but by running 
 the gauntlet. 
 
 The opinion of the Wilmington blockading squadron 
 was that one-third of the attempts to run the blockade 
 out or in failed ; and it was estimated that forty out of the 
 sixty-six special blockade runners were captured or des- 
 troyed ; but of course most of them had had more or less 
 success before they ended their careers. 
 
 Captain Long in his paper has devoted a good deal of 
 space to the attacks which were made on the outlying 
 forts of the blockaded harbours, but although it be true 
 that the possession of these forts was a very important 
 element in absolutely completing the blockade, I do not 
 think that anything of that sort comes within the scope 
 of the present paper. 
 
 It seems to me that I ought to use only the actual 
 
BLOCKADE. 213 
 
 blockading: work of the Federals in order to form an opinion 
 as to what our powers really are in this way ; first con- 
 sidering steam alone, and then observing how far the 
 advent of the torpedo-boat may modify the conclusions. 
 
 I think I may consider it established that the chief, if 
 not the only, element in allowing the escape of our enemies' 
 fleets and squadrons in the last naval war was the adverse 
 action of the wind upon our own. We are now going to 
 examine briefly whether the Federal experience in actual 
 blockading work in 1861 to 1864 at all resembles ours at 
 the close of last century. We are going to ask the Federals 
 in fact, as those most competent to tell us, whether the 
 story we have heard tha,t steam has bridged the Channel 
 is a true one, or whether, so far as their experience is con- 
 cerned, the fact is not just the other way ? 
 
 As I have said, when the Federals pronounced for a 
 blockade of 3,500 miles of coast, embracing 189 harbours 
 and inlets, they had practically no advantages to start with 
 except the initial command of the sea. It is difficult to 
 doubt that the whole conduct and issues of the Civil War 
 would have been entirely different had this command of 
 the sea been seriously disputed. It does not appear im- 
 possible that had the arrival of the " Monitor " in Hamp- 
 ton Roads on the night of the 8th March, 1862, been de- 
 layed sufficiently to have allowed the " Merrimac " to com- 
 plete her victories, the initial command of the sea, on which 
 everything hung, m.ight have been lost. 
 
 But having the initial command, the Federals proclaimed 
 the blockade, and proceeded to the sealing up of every 
 harbour, creek, and inlet leading into the Confederate ter- 
 ritory. At first, as might be supposed, there was no par- 
 ticular plan. Ships were sent as they could be procured 
 off the principal ports — Wilmington, Charleston,. Savannah, 
 
214 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, Sabine Pass, Galveston, 
 &c. The command was originally divided into the Atlantic 
 and the Gulf squadrons, biit latterly, when the blockading 
 forces became numerous, the Atlantic command was divided 
 into two, the North and the South ; and the Gulf command 
 also into two, the East and the West. At first the blockade 
 was a mere hovering off the ports by vessels which did not 
 remain long and passed on elsewhere ; but soon, as ships 
 of all sorts, sizes, and shapes, sailing as well as steam, 
 began to accumulate, regular systems were adopted — 
 systems which appear to me to have rested on the idea 
 of " sealiug up,'' and which would not have been the same 
 had the ideas been of " masking" or " observing," though 
 they obviously included both. 
 
 There was the old system of the in-shore and the off- 
 shore squadron, with the difference that the in-shore 
 squadron was the important one, and was continually 
 pressed closer and closer in, while the outer squadron was 
 spread over large areas as a sort of wide-meshed net to 
 catch the fish which either had escaped or might escape 
 through the other. 
 
 The in-shore squadron was sometimes at anchor and 
 sometimes under way, according to the geographical and 
 other conditions. 
 
 In the approaches to Charleston (Fig. 3) the in-shore 
 squadron was in the first half of the war kept altogether 
 outside the shoals, the off-shore squadron being beyond 
 it. The Beach channel appears to have been the favourite 
 one both for the entrance and the exit of the blockade 
 runners. The attempts were always made at night, and 
 there is no sign of much evasion in the matter. The ships 
 appear to have been always seen, and always attacked both 
 by the in-shore and off-shore squadrons ; but they trusted 
 
BLOCKADE. 215 
 
 to their speed and to tkeir lack, and dashed through the 
 in-shore squadron and out to the off-shore squadron, only 
 being run ashore, rammed, boarded or otherwise captured, 
 in a proportion of cases. 
 
 The in-shore squadron was generally forbidden to chase. 
 If the ships could succeed in barring the progress of the 
 blockade runner outwards, well and good; but if they 
 missed the opportunity, they had to leave it to the off-shore 
 squadron to chase. There was very little warning either 
 way. The entering blockade runner might very often 
 escape notice altogether of the off-shore squadron on dark 
 nights, and if so she was amongst the in-shore squadron 
 without any notice whatever. Issuing from the port, it 
 was certain that very little warning would be given. 
 There was no such complete and accurate system of night 
 signals as the world now possesses, though it had been 
 designed a year before the Civil War broke out. The rough 
 appliances of rockets and blue lights, incompetent to do 
 more than give general warnings, were the signals most in 
 vogue. As the blockade-runner showed no lights, it was 
 only the ships who were close to her that saw her at all, 
 and mere general alarm signals from these ships were not 
 of any use in directing the course of blockading ships at a 
 distance, and there must have been a want of concert 
 which a more accurate and complete system would have 
 removed. 
 
 But, again, we must recall the fact that it was sealing up 
 which was aimed at — actual blockade. It was not the 
 defence of the Federal coasts or the Federal shipping which 
 caused the assemblage of such numerous blockading squad- 
 rons; it was injury to the Confederate territory, the 
 cutting off its supplies, and especially its supplies of con- 
 traband of war, that was the Federal object. It was the 
 
216 ESSAYS ON NAVAL- DEFENCK. 
 
 ingress, as much as, or perhaps more than, the egress which 
 was to be checked. Hence a disposition of the ships 
 blockading which might not have obtained had the object 
 been the masking of war fleets, squadrons, or single ships. 
 The concentration of a large in-shore squadron close to the 
 entrances of harbours would not be the most obvious 
 arrangement for observing or masking. .The strength 
 would be in the wrong place if these were the designs, 
 because the blockade runner, whether ship, squadron, or 
 fleet, had but to make the dash, and, if not stopped, would 
 be free. 
 
 The plan which would suggest itself where egress and 
 not ingress was to be checked, would be but a few of the 
 smallest, lightest, and fastest vessels, with the most perfect 
 signal appliances, close to the entrance to the harbour, and 
 the fighting ships proper in an arc-like chain in the oflBng. 
 It would be the duty of one of the light observing vessels 
 to follow the escaping vessels seawards, continually 
 informing the off-shore squadron of the whereabouts of the 
 chase, in order that a sufiBoient force might be concentrated 
 upon it. 
 
 We must, I think, never forget this double duty of pre- 
 venting equally ingress and egress, which devolved upon 
 the Federals, and we must put the question to ourselves 
 whether, had egress alone been the thing to be stopped, 
 there would have been even the proportion of exits which 
 there were ? Blockade, I may repeat, is a vital operation to 
 us only so far as regards egress. If we can prevent war 
 ships escaping outwards we should be disposed to encourage 
 their escape inwards as so much ofE our hands. 
 
 But, as it was, blockade running at every one of the 
 Confederate ports became gradually impossible, except to 
 specially built and prepared vessels. Some of these 
 
BLOCKADE. 217 
 
 undoubtedly had wonderful success, which may easily 
 support the arguments of those who say that the days of 
 blockade are over. The late Hobert Pacha made six suc- 
 cessful voyage to Wilmington in the " Don," but she was 
 captured directly he left her. The "B.E.Lee," under 
 the command of a Confederate Officer, who had been in the 
 United States Navy, actually ran the blockade twenty-one 
 times in ten months. 
 
 On the other hand, we read of the "Nashville" lying 
 for eight months iu the Ogeechee river blockaded by three 
 gunboats, and utterly unable even to make an attempt to 
 escape. 
 
 As I used the escapes of large ileets and squadrons in 
 
 the days of sailing ships to illustrate the looseness of 
 
 blockades, so I may usefully illustrate the closeness of a 
 
 steam blockade by one or two of the most striking escapes 
 
 - of single ships. 
 
 One of the most daring was that of the " Sumter " from the 
 Mississippi on 30th June, 1861. (Fig. 4.) She was blockaded 
 in Pass a Loutre by the " Brooklyn " and " Powhattan," off 
 its mouth, but owing to the double duty which was thrown 
 on these ships of guarding ingress as well as egress, on this 
 particular day " Powhattan " was absent, and " Brooklyn " 
 was in chase of a sail to seaward. " Sumter " seized his 
 opportunity in broad daylight, and crossed the bar of the 
 pass when the " Brooklyn " was 3J or 4 miles from it. 
 She was reported to have 13 knots speed, while " Sumter " 
 could only get between nine and ten knots. The " Brook- 
 lyn " instantly made for the " Sumter,'' and it very soon 
 became a stern chase, both being under sail and steam ; but 
 the " Sumter " lying closer to the wind was able to compel 
 the " Brooklyn " to furl her squaresails, and so to gain 
 upon her. The " Brooklyn " soon gave up the chase, and 
 
218 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCK. 
 
 was never near enough to open fire on the Confederate 
 ship. 
 
 On another occasion, but this time in darkness, the 
 " Sumter " evaded the blockade of a single ship. She 
 found herself in the open Bay of St. Pierre, with her stern 
 tied up to the shore, and blockaded by the Federal ship 
 " Iroquois.'' St. Pierre being a neutral port, the " Iroquois " 
 could not attempt a really close blockade, but she made 
 arrangements with a merchant schooner to display certain 
 signals to her in the event of the "Sumter" making a 
 move in the night. Captain Semmes thought that those 
 signals would be two only, denoting that the " Sumter " 
 was oE to the northward, or was off to the southward. In 
 this belief the " Sumter " slipped her hawsers and made 
 off to the southward under the land. Those on board her 
 saw the schooner show two red lights, which they took to 
 be a signal that they were off to the southward ; they 
 could also make out the " Iroquois " with their night 
 glasses, but in the shadow of the mountains as they were, 
 they rightly assumed their own invisibility. As soon as 
 they were assured that the " Iroquois '' was off full speed 
 to the south, the " Sumter " turned round and made off 
 full speed to the north, and got away without being chased. 
 
 Ihe " Alabama " performed the same feat under the 
 same commander a-year later. This time it was from Port 
 de Prance, Martinique, the blockading ship was the " San 
 Jacinto," which Semmes contemptuously calls an "old 
 wagon." The night chosen was dark and raining, and the 
 " Alabama " merely trusted to her luck, and ran out under 
 a full head of steam by the most southern route without 
 catching even a glimpse of the " San Jacinto." 
 
 The double achievement of the " Florida " in breaking 
 the blockade inwards and outwards at Mobile has attained 
 
BLOCKADE. 219 
 
 a just celebrity. She was only half fitted and half 
 manned ; it was an absolute necessity that she should get 
 into a Confederate port for completion, and Mobile was 
 ciiosen. This was in September, 1862, and the ship was 
 then at Cardenas in Cuba. The force blockading Mobile 
 consisted of the " Oneida " and five gunboats, but at this 
 particular time all were absent but the " Oneida " and the 
 " Winona " gunboat. One of the gunboats had gone to 
 take post off one of the Mississippi mouths wbich was left 
 unguarded, and three others were away for repairs or coal. 
 The frigate " Susquehanna " had been off the port, but she, 
 too, was away for repairs at Pensacola. 
 
 The " Florida " approached under English colours in 
 daylight, and the " Oneida," not expecting a ruse, and sup- 
 posing her to be an English man-of-war intending to ask 
 permission to enter the port, steamed out to her. The 
 " Florida" simply took no notice ; profited by the momen- 
 tary hesitation of the " Oneida," and passed on at full speed. 
 The " Oneida " was not long in opening fire, and planted 
 several shot and shell in the hull of the " Florida," to 
 which the latter made no reply, and she escaped across 
 the bar, if not in safety, at least without fatal damage. 
 Captain Moffit of the " Florida " was of opinion that had 
 the " Oneida's " guns been better laid she would have 
 ended her career there and then. 
 
 This plucky commander made his escape through a 
 blockading fleet of seven ships four months later, choosing 
 a dark night and a northerly wind; she made out the 
 blockading ships before darkness came on, when she 
 moved down to the bar. They, too, saw her, but seem to 
 have made very incomplete arrangements to intercept her. 
 The " Oneida " remained at anchor and did not even weigh 
 when the flagship, the " Susquehanna," made the signal 
 
220 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 for a blockade ranaer. Another ship, owing to certain 
 formalities enforced on board her, did not slip till half an 
 hour had elapsed. Only one ship, the "Ouyler," really 
 gave chase, which she followed up for the rest of the night 
 and the whole of next day. But the " Florida " evaded 
 her the second night, and was safely engaged in burning 
 Federal vessels the second day. 
 
 The risks that these and other single vessels ran in 
 making these escapes ; the numbers that failed ; the 
 inefficient and temporary character of so many of the 
 blockaders ; all seem to show that it was much easier for 
 whole fleets to escape to sea in the days of sail than for 
 single ships in the days of steam. It may now be held, 
 on the strength of the great American experiment, that it 
 is as difficult, but not more so, to prevent the exit of single 
 ships in the days of steam as it was to prevent the issue of 
 vast fleets in the days of sail. 
 
 I have been anxious to get the question clear for argu- 
 ment as to the influence of steam alone on the question of 
 blockade. Having done so — as far as the limits of time 
 will allow — we must add to the question as it stands the 
 influence of the torpedo-boat. That being, so far as I can 
 see, the only change in the " conditions of warfare " as 
 affecting all natures of blockade since the termination of 
 the American Civil War. 
 
 It is constantly held that owing to the absence of 
 interior naval force in the ports blockaded by the Federals, 
 they were able to take a position and to do things which 
 would have been impossible had there been such force. I 
 can grant that had the Confederates been in any way able 
 to dispute the command of the sea with the Federals, the 
 whole programme of the latter would have been upset, 
 but the facts are against the theory that the Federals were 
 
BLOCKADE. 221 
 
 not liable to attack issuing from the blockaded ports. 
 They were very generally liable ; they were often attacked 
 from within, and sometimes were beaten ofE. Yet the 
 command of the sea made an unfavourable issue of these 
 combats a matter of minor importance. The only one 
 where the issues were really critical was the attack by the 
 " Merrimac," of which I have already spoken. 
 
 In March, 1862, the Elizabeth and the James rivers 
 were blockaded by the following Federal ships lying in 
 Hampton Roads : — The " Congress " and the " Cumber- 
 land," sailing frigates, were lying at anchor at the mouth 
 of the James river; the "Roanoake" and "Minnesota,'' 
 screw frigates, lay further down towards the sea; there, 
 too, was the "St. Lawrence," a sailing frigate like the 
 " Cumberland." The " Roanoake," though a steamer, was 
 disabled in her machinery, and was unable to move except 
 by the assistance of tugs. It was known to all these 
 ships that up the Elizabeth river, at Norfolk, the Con- 
 federates had nearlj completed turning a sister vessel to 
 the " Minnesota " — the " Merrimac " — into a river-service 
 ironclad. They knew also that there were steam gun- 
 boats up the James and Elizabeth rivers, and they ex- 
 pected an attack with the object of raising the blockade of 
 the roads and rivers. 
 
 On the 8th of March the " Merrimac," accompanied by 
 two gunboats, came out of the Elizabeth river and pro- 
 ceeded to the attack of the " Congress " and " Cumber- 
 land " ; three ganboats came out of the James river to 
 assist. The " Minnesota," under her own steam, got 
 under weigh to repel the " Merrimac's " attack, but soon 
 ran ashore in such a position that the " Merrimac " could 
 not get within a mile of her. The "Roanoake" also 
 weighed, and was presently towed ashore by her tugs. 
 
222 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 There she helplessly watched the " Merrimac's " destruc- 
 tive powers, and, being at length got afloat, dropped down 
 to her old position. As she was dropping down, the " St. 
 Lawrence " was being towed up to the attack of the 
 " Merrimac," but she also presently went ashore, and took 
 no efEective part in the day's proceedings. 
 
 The " Merrimac " and her consort gunboats went straight 
 up to the " Cumberland." She fired into her, rammed her, 
 and sank her in a very short time. While she was thus 
 destroying her, the gunboats opened so heavy a fire on the 
 " Congress " that she was fain to make sail and run 
 ashore, where she was afterwards burnt by the " Merri- 
 mac's." shells. On the approach of darkness the "Merri- 
 mac," satisfied with her day's work, withdrew to her own 
 side of the river. She felt herself in command of the sea 
 and of the situation, and designed to complete the work 
 next day at her leisure. 
 
 But froin the sea, at 9 o'clock that night arrived the 
 "Monitor," the Federal answer to the "Merrimac"; and 
 when next morning she got under way to settle the 
 business with the " Minnesota,'' still on shore, she found 
 beside her a little new-fashioned engine of war with scales 
 as hard as her own, and with guns whose shot, though 
 they could not penetrate, were at least able to break up 
 her plating. The " Monitor" was, in fact, able to cover the 
 " Minnesota," owing to the shallow water in which the 
 latter lay, and in the result the " Merrimac " withdrew to 
 Norfolk without having added at all to her victory of the 
 day before. The Confederates had lost the command of 
 the sea and had failed to raise the blockade. 
 
 In April, 1864, the squadron blockading the Roanoake 
 river knew that they might expect an attack from the 
 "Albemarle," an ironclad which the Confederates had 
 
BLOCKADE. 223 
 
 constructed up the river. The Federal force was only two 
 small steamers carrying each a rifled 100-pr. and five or 
 six 9-in. smooth-bores ; and two tugs. On the 18th of 
 April the " Albemarle " came down the river by night, 
 made straight for one of the Federal ships — the "South- 
 field" — rammed her and sank her, the crew escaping to 
 the other which was alongside her. This ship, the 
 '' Miami," and the tugs, then disappeared beaten down the 
 river, but they remained at its mouth, while the " Albe- 
 marle " lay alongside the wharf at Plymouth. 
 
 The squadron off the mouth was reinforced by three 
 more powerful steamers, and, on the 5th of May, the 
 " Albemarle " came down and fought an indecisive action 
 with the whole of them, which, being without distinct 
 advantage to her, left things as they were. As is well 
 known, she was a few months later destroyed by Gushing 
 with a spar torpedo, while she lay alongside the wharf, 
 miles up the river at Plymouth. 
 
 A bold attempt to break up the blockade at Charleston 
 was made in January, 1863. Two ironclad rams which 
 had been prepared inside the harbour — the " Chicora '' and 
 the " Palmetto State '' — taking advantage of a thick haze, 
 crossed the bar, and boldly approached the numerous 
 vessels — ten or more — outside, which were spread over an 
 arc five or six miles in length. In a very short time the 
 Federals, " Mercedita " and " Keystone State," had hauled 
 down their colours. Tlxey were on fire and leaking, while the 
 rams were uninjured; but not being taken possession of, 
 they were recovered by the Federals. The fight lasted from 
 five till half-past seven in the morning, and then the rams 
 returned into port. 
 
 The "Atlanta" was an ironclad converted from her old 
 service of blockade runner by the Confederates at 
 
224 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Wilmington. In June, 1863, the "Monitor," "Wee- 
 hawken," and " Valiant," had knowledge that they would 
 be attacked by the "Atlanta," and .on the 17th they 
 advanced to meet her as she came down the river. The 
 whole thing was over in a few minutes. The " Wee- 
 hawken" fired five shots from her 11-inch and 15-icch 
 guns ; four of them struck the " Atlanta " and did her 
 such damage that she immediately hauled down her 
 colours. 
 
 The blockading squadron at the head of the passes in 
 the Mississippi (Fig. 4), consisting of two sailing sloops, 
 a steam sloop, and a paddle steamer, were driven down the 
 passes on the 12th October, 1861, by the ram " Manassas," 
 escorting fire rafts. Not much damage was done by 
 either, but it was not considered feasible to maintain the 
 position, and the blockade was in consequence partially 
 raised. 
 
 Galveston had been taken possession of by the Federals, 
 and became the base of the blockading squadron. In 
 December, 1862, they were led to expect a combined attack 
 by Confederate ships and troops. The former were two 
 river steamers armoured with cotton bales. They captured 
 the " Harriet Lane," and the "Westfield" was abandoned 
 and blown up. Galveston fell again into the hands of the 
 Confederates, and the blockade was raised. 
 
 From this brief review it appears that the presence of 
 the blockading forces was ilearly everywhere contested 
 from the inside ; and that though it may be true that 
 neither of the combatant forces were on a large or 
 efficient scale, yet proportionately, the Confederate efforts 
 were never to be despised, and often they were critically 
 near success. What they wanted and never had was the 
 power of attack from the sea, and it is obvious that, as I 
 
BLOCKADE. 225 
 
 have already remarked, eyea a temporary power of that 
 sort might ha\e changecl the whole face of the war. 
 
 If the naval forces of England should have to engage in 
 blockading operations against a naval Power, they would 
 in the first instance be liable to attacks similar to those 
 which the Federals experienced. But undoubtedly the 
 particular force which promis:s to interfere most with 
 blockaders is that of torpedo-boats, I must not say torpedo- 
 vessels, for if torpedo- vessels are to take a large place in 
 war, they will take it in the open sea, and as the equals of 
 any other form of open sea naval force. That is to say, 
 they will be the rivals of the battle-ship as at present 
 developed, and aim themselves at becoming the fleet-ships 
 of the future, as claimed by M. Gabriel Charmes. But the 
 torpedo-boat does not in any way claim to take the place of 
 the battle-ship. It tends to operate outwards from the land, 
 and not inwards from the sea. It is more a prospective 
 terror than an open match for the ironclad ; and its cheap- 
 ness combined with its assumed destructive powers makes 
 it especially the weapon proposed for the driving ofi of 
 masking or observing forces in the operations of blockade. 
 
 It is, as I have said, not uncommon to hear naval officers 
 — and some of the best informed— express the opinion that 
 the torpedo-boat has made blockade a thing of the past. I 
 do not think a calm well-reasoned judgment can accept this 
 view. It is almost obvious, however, that if the Gon- 
 f dderate ports had swarmed with torpedo-boats, the in-ahore 
 squadrons could not have been safely so numerous, nor 
 could they have pressed in so closely, nor so perseveringly. 
 
 But I have endeavoured to show that we may be misled 
 by the American experience. To us the sealing up of the 
 enemies' ports can rarely be the object. It was, for America, 
 part of the " Anaconda " policy— a policy resting on the 
 
 Q 
 
226 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 power of almost entirely surrounding the enemy with, an 
 impenetrable wall. We are not in a position to attempt 
 such a thing with any country, and consequently our 
 blockade will seldom extend beyond masking and observing 
 — to measures of defence, not of attack. 
 
 What are the necessities of this policy ? Not surely large 
 in-sliore squadrons ? A single observing ship close in to 
 the port, designed to evade the most modern forms of 
 attack, and with her signalling powers developed to the 
 utmost, is all that is necessary for all purposes of observing, 
 when she is in communication with the real force off-shore. 
 We see the bases of such observing ships in the new 
 " torpedo catchers." They will have a speed which makes 
 the actual attack of torpedo-boats remote ; they will have 
 a draught of water, not only enabling them to press into 
 the shallows about the port, but rendering the chances of 
 a blow from the looomotivp torpedo uncertain. Three or 
 four of such vessels forming an in-shore squadron, always 
 closing in and laying quiet at night, and drawing off as 
 day-light breaks in the morning, would keep quite as close 
 a watch on the egress of the enemy as the numerous 
 vessels of the Federals were able to do. They would 
 naturally be powerless to prevent ingress, but as I have 
 said, that would be immaterial to us. In the case of 
 vessels or squadrons attempting to escape by night, it 
 would be less the duty of these ships to engage them, than 
 to hang on their flanks and continually report their move- 
 ments by signal to the ofi-shore squadron, which would 
 detach and concentrate sufficient force to intercept the 
 runaways. 
 
 If the in-shore observers were attacked either by like 
 forces, or such as might be supposed superior, they would 
 either fight them or draw them off, taking care however 
 
BLOCKADE. 227 
 
 that some of their number should evade action for the 
 purpose of keeping up the watch. No doubt the work of 
 these observers would require all the skill, daring, and 
 perseverance that the Navy has always been accustomed to 
 show, but it would not be of the harassing character which 
 that of the Federal in-shore squadrons was. And this, 
 simply because they would be relieved of the anxieties dee 
 to watching ingress. There would be gallant fights, there 
 would be reputations lost and won, but I am persuaded 
 that the watch would be maintained. The experiments at 
 Bantryand in the North of Ireland were not such as to dis- 
 courage us. Nor is there anything in Federal or Con- 
 federate experience against us. It may be true that dark 
 misty nights will favour the enterprise of escape ; but they 
 will also favour the closer and more intimate watch. The 
 same veil which tends to hide the blockade runner out- 
 wards, tends to hide the observer of his movements. 
 
 But those who think that the torptdo-boat has destroyed 
 the powers of blockade— that is, of masking and observing — 
 think more of the fighting force— of the ofE-shore squadron 
 — ^than of these specially prepared watchers. 
 
 But here we want to recall that all questions of attack 
 and defence are matters, not of dramatic romance, but of 
 common sense and reason. The fleet proper need not ex- 
 pect every kind of attack without notice. If its watchers 
 fail to keep it warned, there is practically only the torpedo- 
 boat attack which can be delivered as a surprise. In this 
 attack, the net defence, though perhaps not a perfect one, 
 is yet a considerable safeguard. I know of no reason why 
 this net defence should not be trusted to at night and in 
 all ordinary moderate weather. I do not know why the 
 ships of the fleet cannot be maintained in such a fair 
 approach to order, with their engines occasionally moving, 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 and their nets down, as may make a surprise by torpedo- 
 boats a thing to be less feared — even if our commanders 
 did not go so far as Hobart Pacha in their contempt for 
 this form of naval warfare. 
 
 A hostile fleet can hardly drop from the clouds on a 
 blockading fleet so situated, but were such a thing to 
 happen, drill should make the passage from the condition 
 of waiting torpedo-boat attack, to bristling with life and 
 movement on the approach of a fleet, a very rapid one. 
 
 Very bad weather, or even bad weather, is of itself a 
 security against torpedo-boat attack. 
 
 And then we have to recollect that for the blockaded 
 enemy all attack is a matter of reflection and reason. He 
 will not deliver it in any form against any part of the 
 blockading forces unless there is at least a chance of 
 success. No doubt his efEorts against the in-shore ob- 
 servers will be more or less incessant — when he can find 
 them. But I take it that the escapes of the " Sumter " 
 and " Alabama," which I have narrated, tend to remind us 
 that small vessels designed to be hidden are not always 
 immediately discoverable. The chances, in fact, are even 
 for both sides. If the weather is clear, the watchers can 
 keep their watch at greater distances. If it is thick, they 
 can close in with the less chance of being discovered. 
 Clear weather and thick weather do not assist or hinder 
 one side more than the other. 
 
 And it is so with the off-shore fleet. A torpedo-boat 
 flotilla will not quit the harbour for the attack unless there 
 be some reasonable hope of finding the off-shore fleet, and 
 this need not disclose itself except in answering the signals 
 of the iu-shore observers. But this disclosure presupposes 
 warning, and is so much against the hopes of the torpedo- 
 boat flotilla. 
 
BLOCKADE. 229 
 
 These are tlie general reflections which my historical 
 examination of this most momentous question has called 
 np in my mind. They are, if -well founded, very encourag- 
 ing, but my whole paper seems but to utter but a single 
 warning. Keep the command of the sea as you value the 
 national life. With it you can do everything. Without 
 it you will speedily be blotted out from the list of great 
 countries. 
 
230 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CONTOTS: ARE THEY ANT LONGER POSSIBLE?! 
 
 In addressing ourselves to answer the que8tion.propounded 
 in the title of this paper, it would appear desirable to 
 ascertain clearly what is meant by the term "Convoy," 
 and what are the limits bounding the action of that which 
 we mean by the term. I think we shall observe that in 
 some senses the meaning of the term is very closely 
 defined and the boundaries of its action very clearly marked 
 out j while in others a considerable amount of generality 
 and even vagueness seems to surround it. 
 
 " Convoy " has three distinct meanings, not only in 
 popular language, but in official and even in legal termin- 
 ology. The word is applied to denote equally the merchant 
 ships guarded by an armed force ; the armed force itself ; 
 and both the armed force and the merchant ships guarded 
 when considered as one body. 
 
 It is, however, a curious thing in law, that though an 
 armed force may be efiectually guarding a fleet of unarmed 
 merchant ships, it is not a " convoy " unless it has been duly 
 appointed to guard the merchant fleet by some authority 
 competent to order it to do so. This competent authority 
 seems always to have been either the Admiralty or the 
 Commander-in-Chief on the station. 2 
 
 > Written in 1887. 
 
 ^ Abbott: "Law relating to Merchant Ships and Seamen." 1802. 
 p. 188. ' 
 
CONVOYS. 231 
 
 Again, a ship may weigli in company withi an armed 
 force properly appointed, and as part of the fleet of merchant 
 ships guarded by sach armed force. She may keep com- 
 pany, and to all outward seeming form ^ part of the convoy, 
 and yet not be a part of it. She would not, in the eye of 
 the law, be under convoy, for instance, unless she had ob- 
 tained, or done her best to obtain, sailing instructions from 
 the offiosr commanding the armed force. She might have 
 obtained them, and yet if she had failed to obtain the 
 necessary appliances — flags, vanes, (fee, for instance — which 
 thjse instructions enjoined she would not be under 
 convoy .1 
 
 These appliances 33em to have been in the discretion of 
 the authority ordering the convoy, as to quantity and 
 quality. Possibly they may have been variable in the dis- 
 cretion of the officer commanding the armed force. 
 
 I have noticed a case where Vice-Admiral Waldegrave, 
 in 1798, laid down stringent regulations, when he was in 
 command of the Newfoundland station, making certain 
 provisions of sails and of anchors and cables compulsory 
 on the ships to whom he granted convoy. He even went 
 so far as to have the merchant ships inspected. Complaints 
 having apparently arisen, he appealed to Lloyd's, and 
 Lloyd's warmly thanked him. There is no hint that he 
 had not the power to enforce his directions on the merchant 
 ships, under penalty that, if captured, the owners could not 
 recover from the underwriters on policies where the warrant 
 was " to sail with convoy." 2 
 
 Five things, in fact, were necessary to make a legal 
 convoy : — 
 
 "■ Abbott, as abo7e ; Marshall on lasarance ; WAtotA's " Insurance 
 Cyclopaeiia," 1873. 
 2 "'^xv. Caron.,"I, p, 81. 
 
232 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 1. It nmst be regular, under an oflBoer properly appointed 
 by Government. 
 
 2. It must be from the rendezvous appointed by Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 3. It must be convoy " for the voyage." 
 
 4. The master must have proper convoy, or sailing, in- 
 structions, and must do and obtain all things that are en- 
 joined to be done and obtained by those instructions. 
 
 5. The ship must be with the convoy till the end of the 
 voyage. 
 
 Gases are given illustrative of this legal interpretation 
 of the term convoy. Thus a ship, after waiting a con- 
 siderable time for convoy to pass a port, joined one off it 
 in a gale of wind, and therefore could not communicate 
 with the war-ship to obtain her instructions. This ship 
 being captured before she had an opportunity of getting in- 
 structions, payment of the insurance was resisted on the 
 plea that she had not fulfilled the warranty of " sailing 
 with convoy." It was held, however, that she had done 
 all that was possible to obtain the instructions and was 
 legally sailing with convoy. 
 
 The foregoing tend to show how narrowly the limits of 
 the term convoy may be drawn. It may now be shown 
 how widely, even how vaguely, the word has been legally 
 defined. 
 
 Thus in reference to the third of the five conditions 
 mentioned above, we are told that " convoy for the voyage " 
 did not necessarily mean for the whole voyage from port 
 to port, but only for such part of it as the Government 
 may determine ought to be prosecuted under escort of an 
 armed force. But this widening of the term is immedi- 
 ately corrected by the well-established dictum that a policy 
 of insurance with warranty to sail with convoy was void 
 
COKVOYS. 233 
 
 by default, whether the default was with the ship or with 
 the Government.! 
 
 It may be gathered, therefore, that Government decided 
 on the amount of protection proper to be given to convoy. 
 That there was still convoy, though there was no protec- 
 tion, in all cases when that protection was authoritatively 
 withdrawn. But then there was no convoy when protec- 
 tion was withdrawn without authority, either by accident 
 or default. Though it does not appear that it was in past 
 naval wars at all usual to leave a convoy wholly without 
 protection at any period of the voyage after weighing from 
 the rendezvous, yet the existence of the legal dictum seems 
 to cover and admit the fact of the practice. 
 
 But again, in a curious way, ships might be legally under 
 convoy though there never had been any intention of pro- 
 viding them with an armed escort. This is shown in cases 
 where the rendezvous appointed by Government was not 
 the port of original departure. The Downs, for instance, 
 was often the rendezvous, and if a ship was captured on 
 her way from a northern port to join convoy at the Downs, 
 she recovered from the underwriters when she was " war- 
 ranted to sail with convoy,'' though she had never seen an 
 armed ship. 
 
 In the year 1747 a convoy was appointed to rendezvous 
 before sailing at St. Helens. A ship departing from the 
 Thames to go to the rendezvous was captured on the way 
 there. Nevertheless, it was held that she was sailing with 
 the convoy in the terms of her policy, because she was 
 doing that which the Government providing convoy had 
 enjoined her to do. Government never proposed to give 
 her armed protection from the Thames to St. Helens, but 
 
 ^ Walford art. " Cotvfy.'' He sa; s the law books "swarm with 
 Cases." 
 
234 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 only on and after leaving St. Helens. She therefore re- 
 covered from the underwriters, because, though she had no 
 armed protection, Government had not proposed that she 
 should have any over that part of her voyage. 
 
 Convoy, oddly enough in its legal sense, does not appear 
 to involve the actual presence of an armed force, but 
 obedience to the injunctions of Government with reference 
 to the protection of commerce by the ships engaged in it. 
 It appears almost as if all the laws of convoy — all the 
 powers of recovery of insurance, and all the forfeitures of 
 the same — might be revived and follow in the next naval 
 war, even though convoy in its narrower sense might never 
 be revived. 
 
 No doubt the whole of the conditions — legal and other — 
 under which the practice and principle of convoy were 
 applied in the past have been seriously modified. It may 
 be difficult to say how seriously the repeal of the Naviga- 
 tion Laws, and the revolution in the commercial ideas of 
 statesmen that this repeal heralded, have affected this 
 question, but there can be no doubt about the magnitude of 
 the change. 
 
 Though the germs of these laws are easily discoverable 
 in earlier legislation, it was not till 1650 thai the Parliament 
 of Cromwell prohibited the traffic of ships built or manned 
 in foreign ports, with the plantations in America, and not 
 till the following year that the famous Act of Navigation 
 was passed. This Act, specially designed to injure the 
 immense carrying trade of the Datoh, provided that all 
 produce of Asia, Africa, and America should be excluded 
 from the British Islands and the Colonies unless it was 
 imported in English-built ships, which were commanded 
 by an English master, and manned by a crew of which the 
 greater part were English. Nor could European produce 
 
CONVOYS. 235 
 
 he imported in foreign ships unless such ships were bond 
 fide belonging to the countries producing the articles 
 imported. This clause specially struck at the Dutch as 
 the carriers of the world. These laws, with occasional 
 modifications, remained in force, or were re-enacted, down 
 to the year 1849, but by the legislation of that year the 
 Privy Council retains discriminating powers in favour of 
 English ships. As is well known, however, the powers 
 are dormant, and the carrying trade in foreign commerce 
 to and from all ports under English jurisdiction is abso- 
 lutely free. 
 
 Thus in former naval wars, British ships were under 
 protective laws, and as a consequence were under more 
 special orders and regulations than would now be con- 
 sidered either proper or politic. Having no rivals who 
 could step iu and take the carrying trade out of their 
 hands, British shipowners were very ready to fall into the 
 wishes of the Government; and British merchants and 
 under ivriters accepted the leisurely and closely ordered 
 methods by which Government thought fit to conduct the 
 carrying trade of the country. Compulsory convoy, under 
 p3ualtie.s not only of forfeiture of insurance claims but of 
 direct fine, was recognised as the concomitant and conse- 
 quence of monopoly in the carrying trade ; and at the 
 outset of every war. Acts, differing little from each other, 
 were passed, compelling all ships not speciilly excepted to 
 sail with convoy if they sailed at all 
 
 The last of these Acts was passed in 180.3, on the re- 
 newal of the war with France, and, like its predecessors, 
 was to be in force only so long as hostilities lasted. The 
 preamble was : — " Whereas it will add to the security of 
 trade to prevent ships sailing without convoy except in 
 certain cases." The first clause enacted that : — " It shall 
 
236 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 not be lawful for any ship or vessel belonging to any of 
 His Majesty's subjects (except as hereinafter provided) to 
 sail or depart from any port or place whatever, unless 
 under the convoy or protection of such ship or ships, 
 vessel or vessels, as shall or may bo appointed for that 
 purpose.'' Then the penalty for sailing without convoy, 
 or wilfully separating or deserting from it, was a fine of 
 £1,000, or £1,500 if the ship were carrying naval or 
 military stores. The penalty might be mitigated, but 
 could in no case be less than £50 ; and it was recoverable 
 from the " person in charge of the ship." Not only was 
 the insurance voided by these statutable offences, but any 
 person settling the insurance claim was liable to a penalty 
 of £200. The masters of ships had to execute a bond not 
 to sail without convoy, and not to separate after sailing, 
 before their ships could be cleared at the Custom- House. 
 The exceptions to the scope of the Act were : — Any ship 
 not required by Act of Parliament to be registered ; any 
 ship licensed to sail without convoy, and I think these 
 were often such as specially armed themselves ; any ship 
 proceeding with due diligence to join the convoy from the 
 port or place at which the same shall be cleared outwards, 
 in case such convoy shall be appointed to sail from some 
 other port or place, except, nevertheless, as to the bond 
 hereby required to be taken upon the clearance outwards ; 
 any ship belonging to the East India or Hudson's Bay 
 Companies. It was further provided that the Act was not 
 to be extended to ships sailing from foreign ports where 
 there was neither convoy nor officer to appoint one. 
 Vessels from Newfoundland with fish might, except in 
 certain cases from the port of St. John's, sail without 
 convoy or licence. 
 
 By the same Act the Admiralty was empowered to give 
 
CONVOYS. 237 
 
 notice to mastars to provide themselves with " flags, vanes, 
 and other materials'' necessary for distinguishing their 
 vessels, and there were the usual provisions as to the 
 SBitting up of actions and the disposition of the penalties 
 recovered. 
 
 Such appear to be the main features of the law of 
 convoy, resting as we have seen upon the Navigation 
 Laws, but how far resting, a layman might find it difficult 
 to determine. 
 
 While this basis of law has disappeared, the vast 
 changes in the mode of propulsion, and in the course of 
 trade which have taken place, form almost as complete a 
 revulsion of conditions as the legal status exhibits. It is 
 impossible now to conceive a set of conditions which, in 
 the middle of last century, gave rise to the following case : 
 A Dutch ship bound from Holland to several Italian ports, 
 during war between France and Holland, received a cargo 
 for those ports and sailed under convoy to Portsmouth. 
 There she waited a year for further convoy. Obtaining it 
 as far as Cadiz, she lay a second year there, and then 
 sailed for Italy and delivered her cargo. The master 
 brought an action against the owners of cargo for the 
 wages and victuals of the crew during the two years, and 
 he gained his cause. No doubt much of the foreign trade 
 in sailing ships is conducted somewhat on the old princi- 
 ples of yearly voyage, but with steam-ships the voyages 
 are as frequent as they can possibly be made, and the only 
 delays allowed between the voyages are due to necessary 
 repairs, to survey, to recoating the bottom, coaling, and 
 obtaining cargo. 
 
 Even did the state of the law now permit such com- 
 plete Governmental supervision as the Convoy Act of 
 1803 reveals, it seems impossible that it could take a 
 
238 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 similar form, but before discussing this point, it may be- 
 wise to glance briefly at what convoy meant and led to in 
 practice about one hundred years ago. 
 
 Most students of naval history will readily recall the 
 fact that the great battle of the 1st June, 1794, arose out 
 of the question of convoy. The French and English 
 fleets fought in the month of June, and on a spot some 
 250 miles west of Ushant, first because there was a French 
 convoy expected from the United States, and, secondly, 
 because of the existing necessity of convoying clear of 
 the Channel, an English merchant fleet. The French war 
 fleet was present to receive and escort home the valuable 
 merchant fleet of 116 sail which arrived safely in France 
 and without any help, a week after the battle. The 
 English fleet was there because it was feared that a large 
 convoy escort might fall into th& hands of the French if 
 not succoured. 
 
 Lord Howe sailed from Spithead in May with some 
 thirty-four sail of the line, beside frigates, guarding 
 ninety-nine sail of merchant ships which formed the East 
 and West India and the Newfoundland convoys. The 
 permanent guard for these ninety-niue merchant ships 
 was two line-of- battle ships and four or five frigates. 0:ffi 
 Falmouth, Howe directed 'the convoy to part company with 
 him and proceed, but he did not trust them to their per- 
 manent convoy only. Six sail of the line and two frigates, 
 beside the permanent convoy, parted from Howe, and saw 
 the East and West India ships to the latitude of Cape 
 Finisterre before returning. Howe himself gave his 
 thoughts to the home-coming French convoy, and after 
 ascertaining _that the grand fleet had not left Brest, 
 cruised for a fortnight to the westward, where it was 
 supposed likely that the French convoy, slenderly pro- 
 
CONVOYS. 239 
 
 tected by two seventy-fours, two frigates, and a brig, 
 might pass. Ratarning to Brest, he found th9,t the grand 
 fleet had put to sea in his absence, and he became aware that 
 Montagu, the oflBcer who had been detached on temporary 
 convoy duty, was very likely, from his position, to meet 
 and be swallowed up by the great French ■ force. He 
 pushed west for the position and the result was the 
 battle. 
 
 Prom this brief historical statement it is very easy 
 to see what were the general features cf the practice 
 of convoy in the last naval war. There was primarily a 
 gathering or assemblage of merchant ships at some 
 appointed rendezvous, but no special protection of war 
 ships was provided between the port of clearance and the 
 rendezvous. The ships so assembled, were, so far as their 
 subsequent movements went, absolutely under the orders 
 of the officer in command of the protecting force. They 
 were compelled to obtain a copy of the sailing orders 
 or regulations for the guidance of the convoy, and to 
 provide themselves with all appliances which might 
 be necessary to the effectual carrying out of those orders. 
 The Government, on its own part, provided an over- 
 whelmingly strong escort for the earlier part of the 
 passage, where an overwhelmingly powerful attack might 
 be expected. As the voyage progressed, the temporary, 
 and mora powerful escort, gradually fell away, until at 
 some selected point, far enough at sea to be presumably 
 beyond the reach of the serious attack by the enemy, the 
 large temporary force bid farewell, the aggregated fleet of 
 merchant ships broke up into its component parts, and 
 each part under its own small guard, made the best of its 
 way separately to its destination. 
 
 Just as the exit of the merchant fleet was thus specially 
 
240 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 and strongly protected, so was its return. The French 
 and American merchant fleet, of which we have spoken, 
 was to hav3 been accompanied by two line-of-battle ships 
 and two frigates across the Atlantic ; and more than a 
 month before it arrived, five sail of the line sailed from 
 Rochefort to join it, and escort it home. 
 
 The same methods were always usual, and concentration 
 of force on both sides was a usual sequence. In August, 
 1793, Lord Howe took his whole fleet from Torbay to 
 escort the Newfoundland ships clear of the Channel 
 dangers, and to meet and escort the West Indian fleet 
 home. Having effected both these objects he returned. 
 Sir John Jervis sailed in November, 1793, with four sail 
 of the line, escorting thirty-nine vessels bound to the 
 West Indies, and thereupon the French detached six fast 
 ships from Brest to intercept him. In April, 1793, 
 Admiral Gell, sailing from Spithead with a squadron, 
 detached a 74 to St. Helena to meet and escort the East 
 Indiamen home. Admiral Cosby earlier in the year 
 •escorted a convoy clear of the Channel with six ILne-of- 
 battle ships, and then quitting it, left one line-of-battle 
 ship to continue the escort to the West Indies. 
 
 Such illustrations show us what convoy meant in prac- 
 tice in the broad acceptation of the term, and our own in- 
 stincts suggest to us that nothing of this nature will take 
 place in the next naval war. But as we have to show that 
 our instincts are not misleading us, it will be well to con- 
 trast some of the practical conditions bearing on convoy 
 about one hundred years ago with those existing now. 
 
 And first as to the question of speed. The French and 
 American merchant fleet, whose expected arrival led to the 
 battle of the 1st June, and the safe arrival of which that 
 battle was in the opinion of some historians the cause, 
 
CONVOYS, 241 
 
 sailed from Norfolk, in Virginia, on the 2nd of April, and 
 did not arrive in France till the 12th of June, making a 
 voyage, therefore, of some 3,000 miles in seventy-one days, 
 or at the rate of about forty-two miles a-day, or less than 
 two knots an hour. Even Nelson, in chase of Villeneuve, 
 could not push his fleet at a greater speed than about 
 three knots per hour. Five, or even six times this latter 
 spaed would not be a remarkable achievement for a modern 
 Atlantic liner. 
 
 Concerning the number of ships requiring convoy about 
 100 years ago and now, the case is not so strong as against 
 the possibility of convoy in the old sense. The increase 
 of tonnage has mastered the increase of numbers to a 
 great extent. 
 
 The average tonnage of ships engaged in the foreign 
 trade in 1792 seems to have been no more than 134 tons, 
 whereas in 1885, the average foreign trade sailing ship 
 was 815 tons, and the average foreign-going steamer, 1,132 
 tons. But the numbers of clearances have not risen pro- 
 portionately with the tonnage. In 1792 the long-voyage 
 trade appears to have reached thirty sailings daily from all 
 ports in the United Kingdom, and for the whole foreign 
 trade the daily sailings appear to have reached thirty- 
 eight.l In 1885 the average clearances of the foreign 
 trade in sailing ships was twenty-two ; and in steam-ships 
 seventy-nine ; the two together reaching one hundred and 
 one daily sailings. 
 
 Apparently every steamer employed in the foreign trade, 
 when freights are good, is cleared, on an average, six times 
 in the year. But the average sailing vessel trading to 
 
 1 The figures for 1885 are indirectly from the statistical abstract 
 by dividiDg the average tonnage into the tons cleared. The figures 
 for 1792 are from a paper by S. Cock, commercial agent to the Cor- 
 poration of Liverpool in 1801. 
 
 E 
 
242 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 foreign ports is only cleared one and a-half times a year. 
 That is, with foreign trade steamers the voyage lasts two 
 months, while, in the sailing vessels, it lasts eight months. 
 A great deal of the sailing trade now follows the old rule 
 of the yearly voyage, including the delay for refit and to 
 collect cargo, and as the sailings of that trade have greatly 
 diminished "itice the days of convoy, it is evident that, so 
 far as sailing ships go, there are no physical disqualifica- 
 tions which would prevent its revival in the next war. 
 
 It is not at all impossible that if convoy could be pro- 
 vided at the beginning of the Revolutionary War with 
 Prance for an outgoing trade of twenty-five or thirty ships 
 daily, or a suflBcient proportion of them, it could also be 
 provided nnder the same system now, for an outgoing trade 
 of one hundred ships daily. Nor would the assemblage of 
 steam fleets or merchant ships at fixed rendezvous, or the 
 conduct of such fleets across the oceans, be one whit more 
 difficult now than they were 100 years ago. On the con- 
 trary, steam is in everyway in favour of a revival of convoy, 
 and if nothing else prevented such revival but the change 
 in the mechanical condition of trading ships, convoy in the 
 next naval war might be expected to revive. 
 
 But as I have said, the repeal of the Navigation Laws 
 has entirely altered the state of the case, and though the 
 Crown has power to re-enforce them to a great extent, it is 
 not thought likely that public opinion would demand its 
 exercise. 
 
 The real reasons why we must suppose convoy on the 
 old system to be dead beyond recall are the changes in the 
 course of trade and in the course of opinion. 
 
 Opinion, thoroughly expressed against the system of 
 convoy, showed itself as early as 1811, and a Mr. Richard 
 Hall Gower, in some "Remarks relative to the Danger 
 
CONVOYS. 243 
 
 attendant on Conroys," puts the whole case for the sailing 
 ships of that year as he might find it for the steam fleet of 
 this year. He says as a preliminary, that security depends 
 on a just application oi force and flight. But flight must be 
 considered prohibited on account of the order for sailing 
 with convoy, and there remains only the force which is re- 
 presented by the men-of-war guarding the merchant ships. 
 Again, convoy is the occasion of loss in the gross. When 
 merchantmen sail singly, they can only be captured singly, 
 but when they sail together, a superior force to the guard 
 may capture it, and the whole convoy with it. 
 
 As illustrations of these positions, we have, at the period 
 of history already referred to, one or two incidents of 
 which we may take note. Thus the squadron of fast ships 
 which had put to sea to intercept Sir John Jervis's convoy 
 to the West Indies, after nearly falling victims to Lord 
 Howe's fleet, which they took for their expected prey, were 
 recompensed for their alarm by meeting our Newfound- 
 land convoy, and capturing no less than seventeen sail. 
 Villaret Joyeuse, issuing from Brest in May, 1794, cap- 
 tured eighteen or twenty ships in one operation. In the 
 same month a squadron of four line-of-battle ships and six 
 frigates and smaller vessels of the enemy fell in with Cap- 
 tain Troubridge in the " Castor," convoying ships from the 
 Channel Islands to Newfoundland, and captured him and 
 fourteen of his charges. These gains to the enemy and 
 losses to us showed the futility of the system of convoy, 
 and made it plain enough to some minds that unless the 
 guard could be so strong as to defy attack, the danger of 
 collecting a mass of ships under such a mockery of pro- 
 tection was much greater than that of leaving the ships 
 free to find their own way, and trust to the chapter of 
 accidents. 
 
 E 2 
 
244 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 And it was not only this, but that the practice of always 
 sailing with the convoy made shipowners and shipbuilders 
 equally careless to protect cargoes by conferring speed on 
 their ships, or by suitably arming them. 
 
 Our author is fully alive to the inconvenience of the 
 system of convoy to trade. Not only must there be delay in 
 collecting a great fleet of merchant ships at the rendezvous, 
 but once started, the whole trade is at the mercy of the 
 slowest sailer, or the most obstinate blunderer. 
 
 Instead of the system of convoy, our author, writing be 
 it remembered in 1811, would, first of all, patrol tho 
 Channel by a chain of cruisers, connected with the land 
 by a chain of signal posts. The cruisers were to ply be- 
 tween the posts, communicating with them and with each 
 other, so that any attempted breach along the line would 
 quickly be met by a concentration from both ends of it, 
 and no part would be unsupported. 
 
 The foreign trade, thus guarded, but not convoyed, clear 
 of the Channel, would then be free to pursue its way, but 
 the recommendation was that the stems of foreign-going 
 ships should always be armed, and the men-of-war, instead 
 of convoying them, should be concentrated at such narrow 
 seas and straits, aad off such headlands as forced the trade 
 to concentrate in passing. 
 
 It must be admitted that this writer was possessed of 
 considerable breadth of view, and there appears to be good 
 reason to believe that even had steam never made its ap- 
 pearance, convoy under the old system might yet have 
 fallen into disuse, as these eminently practical views made 
 tlieir way. 
 
 Our survey, so far, may be said to make opinion rather 
 than fact the author of the old and universal system of 
 convoy. And then we may follow up this thought by re- 
 
CONVOYS. 245 
 
 fleeting that it would be opinion rather than impractic- 
 ability which would forbid the revival of convoy in a 
 modern naval war. It is, indeed, obvious that even as we 
 stand, the Government might, if opinion demanded it, 
 employ numbers of the fast steamers which it is proposed 
 to take up and arm in war, by way of convoy to the un- 
 armed steam trade. There might easily be fortnightly, or 
 monthly, sailing of convoy from the Thames, the Mersey, 
 and the Clyde. The delays would not be so great, the 
 dates of sailing would not be so irregular as they were, 
 now that steam has the mastery of the elements. A steam 
 fleet would be much more easily and safely conducted across 
 the ocean than a fleet of even the most modern type of 
 sailing vessels. Nay, further, a steam fleet of merchant 
 ships is not the helpless flock of sheep that a sailing fleet 
 must show itself on the approach of even an insignificant 
 force of the enemy. "What could a couple of unarmoured 
 cruisers do, if on approaching a fleet of a dozen mej'chant 
 steamers, these apparently weaponless treasuries were to 
 get into line abreast and make for the would be capturer 
 at full speed ? If we can imagine the position for a moment, 
 we shall find ourselves entirely in symp^thy with the war- 
 ships in considering discretion the better part of valour. 
 
 But if it is opinion and not mechanical or physical fact 
 which offers the greatest resistance to the revival of convoy 
 in the old sense, it may be well to examine shortly where 
 the difference is, and on what it rests. 
 
 We have already seien that the Government control of 
 the seaborne trade rested upon the monopoly granted to 
 British shipowners by the Navigation Laws. Bat we have 
 also seen it wisely disputed whether the Government 
 method was the best possible for the security of the trade 
 it assumed to protect from the hazards of war. Few of us 
 
246 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 will now deny that tlie writer of 1811, whom T have quoted, 
 had all the reason on his side. Thus it will follow, that if 
 there be any now desirous of seeing the Crown exercise its 
 powers in a greater or less approach to the protection of 
 Bdtish shipping as against foreign competition, these per- 
 sons may logically decline to advocate the revival of the 
 old system of convoy in war. There is probably at this 
 epoch no second opinion bat that a'steam-ship, with a good 
 pair of heels and one or two quick-firing guns in her stern, 
 runs less risk of capture in war when she proc;eds alone 
 on her voyage than she would when forming part of a fleet 
 of merchant ships trusting to the slender guard of a naval 
 force absolutely iacompetent to meet the concentrated attack 
 of the enemy which such a prize would invite. 
 
 But still, in 1811, it must have been the opinion of "the 
 underwriters which upheld the system of convoy. If the 
 shipowner and merchant found the war risks were taken 
 at a less rate when the warranty was " to sail with convoy," 
 it is presumable that the pressure on the Government was 
 in favour of the enactment of compulsory convoy. If the 
 underwriters had concluded that the risk of sailing with 
 convoy was really greater than that of sailing without it, 
 the pressure on Government would have been against the 
 Act. 
 
 What Government will be asked to do if we are un- 
 happily involved in a naval war will now, as then, depend 
 upon the views of the underwriters. I have made some 
 slight endeavours to ascertain what those views are likely 
 to be, taking it in connection with those of shipowners, 
 and in view of the remarkable proposition lately put for- 
 ward by the President of the Chamber of Shipping — that 
 Government should take the war risks. 
 
 Able men whose business it has been to give some 
 
CONVOYS. 247 
 
 thought to that part of the subject now before us, have 
 divided the carrying trade of the country into three 
 branches, viz. : — 
 
 1. The fast steam trade. 
 
 2. The slow steam trade. 
 
 3. The sailing trade. 
 
 It is the uaiversal opinion that a declaration of naval war 
 would be the signal for the abrupt cessation of the sailing 
 trade all over the world. This opinion is entirely con- 
 firmed by the circumstance that when the Franco-German 
 War broke out almost the whole of the German trade 
 sought the shelter of neutral ports, and remained there till 
 the war was over. There was, I believe, no attempt at 
 convoy, and though the French blockade was anything but 
 complete, commerce shrank from the risks attending 
 attempts to break it. 
 
 The slow steam trade is a very large one, and its usual 
 speed does not exceed nine or ten knots. It is presumable 
 that this trade is not largely engaged with perishable 
 cargoes ; nor would it ssem to rest so much on early 
 markets. If convoy were to revive in any shape, it would 
 probably attend on this trade. 
 
 The fast trade must be a growing one, as by the 
 economies of coal following double, triple, and perhaps 
 quadruple expansion, the cost of speed is continually les- 
 sened, and bulk and weigjit of coal necessary to carry a 
 certain bulk and weight of cargo is continually decreasing. 
 I find that in the opinion of men very competent to judge, 
 and more likely to be right as their own interest rests on 
 the soundness of their judgment, we are close upon a great 
 petroleum revolution. If petroleum is so close at hand 
 as these authorities suppose, tbs stimulus to fast trade 
 will be very great. 
 
248 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 All the arguments used by the writer of 1811 whom I 
 have quoted entirely apply to the steam-ships carrying on 
 this fast trade. As war-ships are now constructed it 
 would be almost hopeless for them to touch a fast trader 
 at 15 to 18 knots. 1 Only accidentally by night or at 
 breaking daylight could the ordinary war-ship hope to get 
 near enough for her operations against the great Atlantic 
 or Australian liner. Practically, if attack were contem- 
 plated they must be made by similar ships, armed for the 
 purpose. But considering the enormous value of the 
 intended prize it is not unlikely that she herself would 
 bear the tax of being well armed. 
 
 Reverting for a moment to the question of the sailing 
 trade, its extinguishment, even in the absence of war, is a 
 thing certain. Though in the ten years ending 1885 the 
 average tonnage of sailing ships engaged in the foreign 
 trade has risen from 586 to 815, yet the numbers have 
 fallen from 5,327 to 3,180.2 The fall has never been less 
 than fifty-seven sail in one year, and in 1880 no less than 
 450 ships ceased to be returned as engaged in the foreign- 
 going sailing trade. Remembering that the average 
 steamer takes twelve freights in the year, while the 
 average sailing ship takes only two and a half, in the 
 foreign trade, it is manifest that the sailing trade will 
 hardly bear the growing economy in working the steamer, 
 and its decline may be even more rapid than it has hitherto 
 been. And this is notwithstanding the fact that in a 
 waiting market trade, freight has even been higher for 
 sailing than for steam-ships now and then. 
 
 ^ The great iaorease of speed given to the later war-ships has 
 somewhat modified this ; but the increased mass of the Merchant 
 steamer must be taken on the other side. — Ed. 
 
 ^ The numbers in 1891 were 2,127 ships, averaging 1,142 tons. — El>. 
 
CONVOYS. 249 
 
 Such being the general conditions, what may be ex- 
 pected from the attitude of the underwriters towards 
 the shipowner and the merchant in war, and how would 
 the interaction of these three great interests tend to 
 sway the Government in the way of protection by 
 convoy ? 
 
 The underwriter on the one hand neither likes loss of 
 business nor a class of business highly speculative. So far 
 as I am able to see he does not dislike but finds his 
 interest in a business which is moderately speculative. 
 When war risks can be fairly well estimated, they will be 
 taken at premiums which fairly measure them. It appears 
 that war risks on German ships were at the outbreak of 
 the Franco-German War pretty freely taken at very low 
 rates — 5s. per cent., I believe, in instances. But a few 
 cases of heavy loss speedily ran the premiums up. I have 
 been told that underwriters who had taken German war 
 risks at 5s. sold them again at £5, incurring thus a certain 
 loss rather than run the risk of enormous uncertain losses. 
 It has been very generally stated to me by prominent 
 underwriters that the rates for American blockade runners 
 were enormous, and that the risks were very commonly 
 declined altogether. Some authorities have told me that, 
 on the outbreak of a naval war with England, war risks on 
 English ships would not be taken at any price likely to be 
 oHered by the merchant or shipowner. The risks on ships 
 jfnd cargoes at sea might be much governed by the 
 proclamation of war. If no time was allowed by the 
 hostile Power before the attack began on ships which had 
 put to sea ere the declaration of war was published, there 
 would be so little measure of the danger of capture to 
 which such ships were exposed that only the more specu- 
 lative underwriters would take them. On the other hand> 
 
250 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 some authorities appear to think that, as in the Frauco- 
 Oerman War, the premiums on war risks might not ba 
 heavy. They would immediately be affected, however, by 
 the earlier reports of captures, and, in my judgment, panic 
 might easily be set up and kept up if the list of captures 
 were early and heavy. 
 
 It will be easily understood that the ground we are now 
 on is the most interesting and the most important of all, 
 for we are dealing with the formation in the City of that 
 opinion which is bound to make itself felt, if not to force 
 the action of the Government. But while it is the most 
 interesting and the most important, it is also the most 
 purely speculative on which the future of convoy rests. 
 My inquiries have been necessarily of a very limited 
 character ; I have to endeavour to express impartially the 
 general sense of the answers to questions put by me in 
 friendly conversation with some of the leading authorities 
 who have most kindly, in all oases, given me the benofit of 
 their experience and opinions. It may be hardly neces- 
 sary to warn my readers that it is very easy for a person 
 like myself to be wholly mistaken on intricate matters 
 of this kind, and even unconsciously to misrepresent the 
 views of those who have kindly expressed them. In 
 some conversations I have had I have' come away with 
 the idea that a declaration of war by England with really 
 naval Powers would at first result in an entire paralysis 
 of trade. It has been said to me that in that case war 
 risks would not be taken at any price which the merchant 
 and shipowner could afford to pay. Neither ships nor 
 cargoes would leave our ports uninsured against war risk 
 under the English flag, and hence stagnation, at least for a 
 time, would follow. 
 But I am bound to say that it does not seem to be the 
 
CONVOYS. 251 
 
 general opinion that our trade in English bottoms could 
 suffer the restrictions that trade in German bottoms 
 suffered in the Franco-German War. 
 
 All the authorities discriminate between different classes 
 of ships as to rates of premium for war risks. It seems 
 certain they would be highest on sailing vessels and lowest 
 on fast steamers. And there seems no doubt that a 
 warrant to sail with convoy would now, just as it did in 
 the last French war, enormously reduce the war risk 
 premium. 
 
 Bearing in mind that current opinion in the City will, in 
 the absence of correcting experience, govern all these 
 questions, I note, not without some surprise, one or two 
 positions which appear to be taken up as axiomatic. War 
 with the United States, in spite of her limited N"avy,l 
 would be regarded as much more threatening to our ocean- 
 caTrying trade than war with France, notwithstanding her 
 relatively enormous naval force. I presume that the naval 
 view would be the exact opposite to this. There appears to 
 €xist a confidence in the security of the steam trader against 
 capture by the steam enemy, which would not be allowed 
 to the sailing trader as against the sailing enemy. Naval 
 opinion might tend a little in this direction from the 
 belief that the average steam merchant ship would generally 
 have the heels of the average man-of-war. In another 
 way the opinion might be supported. Even supposing the 
 war-ships had the heels of the trader, the fall of darkness 
 would tend much more to facilitate the escape of the 
 steamer pursued by a steamer, than of the sailing ship pur- 
 sued by a sailing ship. All points of the compass are open 
 to the escaping steamer to steer upon ; there were always 
 twelve points tabooed to the sailing ship. Then as the 
 1 Now increased, and increasing. — Ed. 
 
252 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 speeds with steam are much greater than they were with 
 sail, it follows that a changed course on the part of th© 
 escaping steamer, not followed, becaase not seen, by the 
 pursuing steamer, will put a greater distance between 
 them in any given time than could be put under similar 
 circumstances between two sailing ships. That is, the two 
 sailing ships might still find themselves near each other at 
 daylight, while the steamers might be hundreds of miles 
 apart. 
 
 Biit if the man-of-war has the heels of the trader with 
 steam, most of these considerations relate to meetings late 
 in the day, and none of them relate to the case of an unfor- 
 tunate trader finding herself within shot of the war-ship 
 when dawn breaks. Apart from these circumstances, I 
 know of nothing which makes a steamer less liable to 
 capture by a steamer, than in the old days, or even the 
 days of the " Alabama," a sailing vessel was by a sailing 
 vessel, for it may be remembered that nearly all the 
 " Alabama's " captures were made while she was under sail 
 alone. If this confidence should underlie the early trans- 
 actions in war risks, and should turn out to be misplaced, 
 the reaction would be correspondingly great. 
 
 If we consider the position of the merchant and the 
 shipowner in time of war, we shall probably find freights 
 rising for the owners of fast steamers, (1) because of the 
 existing opinion that they are less liable to capture, and 
 (2) because of the limited number of fast steamers and the 
 cessation of the sailing trade. A rise in freight would 
 enable the shipowner to pay a higher premium for war 
 risks, but it would impair the merchant's power in that 
 direction. For all the trade now carried on in the slow 
 steamers, and for all the " waiting market " trade now 
 carried on in the large sailing ships, there would be no 
 
CONVOYS. 253 
 
 direct demand for freight in fast steamers. Indirectly the 
 demand might come because of the idea of security from 
 capture, which was shown by the lower rates of premium. 
 If the slow steamer could be secured from capture, 
 or if it were even the opinion that she was so 
 secured, premiums on the slow steamers and. on the cargoes 
 they carry might be expected to fall. It is here that T 
 apprehend the possibility of a revival of something like the 
 old system of convoy. I do not say probability, but possi- 
 bility that Government might be pressed, in the interests 
 of trade generally, to assist in specially securing that part 
 of it which is carried on in slow steamers. If there were 
 such pressure, it might be yielded to by the employment of 
 the armed merchant steamers which the present Govern- 
 ment is using such wise and far-sighted means to secure. 
 
 It will be obvious that the case of the merchant is that 
 which would press, and it would be for him a consideration 
 whether the high war risk premium, or the delays surround- 
 ing convoyed fleets, was the greater evil. If the under- 
 writer were to be of the opinion of Mr. Gower in 1811, he 
 might doubtless not lower his premium for warranty to 
 sail with convoy. But I gather that the idea of safety 
 surrounding the presence of a war-ship would weigh the 
 scale down against the closer reasoning of Mr. Gower, so 
 far as respects the slow steam trade. 
 
 It is germane to my subject, and I cannot therefore 
 avoid pointing out what a remarkable temptation to a 
 wholesale transfer of flag the Declaration of Paris would 
 offer under all these circumstances ; and, on the other 
 hand, whether, in spite of all our present ideas of free 
 trade, the Privy Council might not be pressed in the 
 exercise of some of the powers reserved to it in 1849. A 
 heavy transfer of flag might so alarm the country as tg 
 
254 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 make it demand, reasonably or unreasonably, some protec- 
 tion for the British, flag in order to check the transfer. 1 
 
 In America, the Confederate cruisers appear to have 
 captured or destroyed about 175 vessels; nearly all sailing 
 vessels, and not always very valuable. The result upon 
 Federal shipping generally was a transfer during the four 
 years of the war of 715 American ships to the British flag. 
 And in the first three years of the war about 38 per cent, 
 of the carrying trade of New York disappeared. 
 
 America has never recovered that blow : and though it 
 would bs a mistake to ignore the effect of subsequent pro- 
 tective duties, and of a change in the material used in 
 ship-building, it would be an equal error not to fear that a 
 temporary loss of our carrying trade might be irre- 
 trievable . 
 
 I suppose it is all these considerations which have led 
 some shipowners to think of an arrangement with the 
 Government. They probably argu3 that, first of all, 
 Gorernment would have better knowledge of the probable 
 risk than would be open to the body of underwriters. It 
 would ba further said that if Government took the risk, all 
 its energies would bs turned to minimising it by a proper 
 disposition of its sea forces. The proposal, as I understand, 
 is not that Government should become an underwriter in 
 the ordinary sense of the term, taking war premiums and 
 accepting the war risks. The idea is that shipowners now, 
 in peace-time, would consent to pay a yearly premium or 
 tax to the Government, on condition that if naval war 
 with this country broke out, fixed values should be paid to 
 the owner of the ship if she were captured or destroyed by 
 the enemy. 
 
 ' The legal difficulties of transfer are, however, very great 
 iadeecl. — ^Ed. 
 
CONVOYS. 255 
 
 I am told that shipowners would probably accept reason- 
 able conditions at the hands of Government as to what 
 would, and what would not, forfeit their claim to payment 
 for capture or destruction by the enemy. But the whole 
 matter is necessarily in a very crude state as yet. I have 
 heard nothing as to what shippers might have to say of 
 it, yet it is evident that unless the cargo could be insured 
 as well as the ships, we should not have made much ad- 
 vance. I believe that in one of our recent Russian scares, 
 this revived proposal had some consideration in the minds 
 of the authorities, but it evidently did not lead to anything 
 definite. 
 
 The matter is brought into close connection with our 
 subject in view of a remark I made at the beginning of my 
 paper, namely, that in its widest legal sense, the benefits of 
 convoy fell to the ships which happened to be captured 
 while acting " in obedience to the injunctions of Govern- 
 ment with reference to the protection of commerce." 
 
 If it is to become possible for Government to take a 
 direct pecuniary interest in the security of sea-borne trade 
 when the country is at war, it will certainly control in 
 some way the movements of that trade. This control may, 
 in legal view, replace the Act of 1803. Government will 
 never accept the risks qf heavy payments, and leave the 
 merchant ships absolutely free. Authority will, in consul- 
 tation with trade, settle how its risks may be minimised 
 with least interruption to the trade itself. It would appear 
 that in the old days, ships which dared to be to a certain 
 prescribed extent armed, obtained licence to sail without 
 convoy. Government, in accepting war risks for a peace 
 payment, might not impossibly demand a certain armament 
 of the ships insured in war. It is impossible to say whether 
 it would not enforce modified convoy in some cases. Ac- 
 
256 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 cording to its thouglit-out sclieme of oommeroe guarding, 
 it would demand to control the movement of trade. 
 
 Falling back on our author of 1811, if Government sub- 
 stitute for convoy a system of patrolled routes and strongly 
 guarded centres, it might very reasonably call on the ships 
 for which it was responsible to pursue without deviation 
 the patrolled routes and to pass through the strongly 
 guarded centres. It almost seems possible to me that, 
 without taking any special responsibilities, the Govern- 
 ment, through the law and the underwriters, might press 
 upon shipping to fall in with its scheme for the defence of 
 commerce. 
 
 Thus the points raised by the question given to me as 
 the title of the paper may have a wider significance than 
 appears on the surface. Convoy rested more on the 
 general opinion of the merchant, shipowner, and under- 
 writer, in days gone by, than on the A.ct of Navigation — 
 which again was the embodiment of opinion. Convoy 
 never would be revived without any resuscitation of the 
 Navigation Laws, if, in war, underwriters would accept 
 risks of capture and destruction by the enemy of ships 
 under convoy at a much lower rate than without it. It is 
 true that the course of trade now, in peace-time, is such 
 as to make the idea of convoy abhorrent. But suppose 
 convoy to be the alternative to either a partial cessation of 
 trade, or a transfer of flag? This consideration of the 
 course of trade would fail to affect the question. 
 
 Commerce is timidly sensitive. Were a naval war de- 
 clared to-morrow, and if the capture of a valuable English 
 ship were posted at Lloyd's the next day, what would be 
 the effect of the announcement on the proceedings of ships 
 loaded and about to sail ? If Government thereupon an- 
 nounced that a couple of ironclads would sail from Spit- 
 
CONVOYS. 257 
 
 head to join the Mediterranean Fleet, and would afford the 
 protection of their presence to any ships choosing to sail 
 in company with them, would the merchant or the ship- 
 owner interested in a loaded ship going to the Canal, de- 
 cline the offer because their voyage would be delayed a 
 day, a week, a fortnight ? These are questions City men 
 must answer. No doubt if at a moderate premium the 
 risk of capture was covered, the course of the trade would 
 not be altered. But, as I understand, there is a possibility 
 —though it may not be a probability — of sudden and 
 heavy advances in the rates for war risks, and that these 
 rates would be much lower where the warranty was to 
 sail with convoy, I conceive something at least of the old 
 practice might arise almost before we were aware of it. 
 
 When the Federal war-ship seized Messrs. Slidell and 
 Mason out of an English mail steamer, we despatched, in 
 December, 1863, the " Melbourne " transport under convoy 
 of the '' Orpheus " across the Atlantic. I suspect that at 
 least Government troopers, transports, and store-ships 
 would, in a naval war, be placed under convoy just as in 
 the old days. And it almost seems that whenever the 
 markets allowed of it the merchant and the shipovrner 
 would ask for convoy at the hands of the Government just 
 as in older days, unless they were well assured that the 
 enemy's cruisers were entirely masked by our own fleets 
 and cruisers. 
 
258 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 1 
 
 The subject I have andertaken to illustrate in to-night's 
 paper is one of extreme importance at the present junc- 
 ture. It is not only desirable that we should find our- 
 selves prepared with some defiaite views on naval warfare 
 in the open sea, when carried out with the ships and 
 weapons now at our command, but it must never be for- 
 gotten that the views we may form will, and do, actually 
 govern the nature of the designs produced by our archi- 
 tects, and the disposition of guns and other weapons on 
 their floating carriages. It would therefore be a culpable 
 error for any one treating of the attack and defence of 
 fleets, to confine himself to questions of mancsuvring 
 merely, as though ships were, like men, of an unchange- 
 able type. Writers of the past on the subject of naval 
 tactics, such as Pere Hoste, De Morogues, and Clarke of 
 Eldin, might well be excused if they thus treated their 
 science. But such a method is no longer permissible. 
 Writers of our age, who assume in some sense to lead 
 opinion, must remember that we stand at the cross-roads 
 of naval warfare ; we are no longer edged in by impassable 
 barriers on the smooth highway of progress. Many roads 
 nre open to us, and we have to make a selection, guided 
 ' Written iii 1871. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 259 
 
 by a not much, better trail than the Indian hunter finds 
 in his forests. I am the more anxious to press this point 
 forward, as I believe we are not suifioiently alive to the 
 fact that the current view on the atcaok and defence of 
 fleets is the foundation of all design in naval materiel. I 
 say I think we are not sufficiently alive to this fact, 
 because I cannot believe, were it otherwise, that we 
 should rest content with certain instinctive ideas, on the 
 subject of future naval war, and make almost no attempt 
 to formulate our instincts, and separate where possible the 
 chaff from the wheat. If I were to make the assertion 
 that the designs of our ships arise more out of instinct 
 and tradition than out of any comprehension of how they 
 are liable to attack, and how they are capable of defence, 
 I should at first raise a feeling of incredulous surprise in 
 the minds of my audience. Tet I do make the assertion, 
 and think that a few sentences in explanation will 
 entirely remove the incredulity, while they will strengthen 
 the surprise. Consider for a moment how you could re- 
 but my assertion. What sort of arguments would you 
 use, and what sort of facts would you produce to sustain 
 the counter-proposition that our ships were designed to 
 deliver certain specified and approved attacks, and to offer 
 certain distinct resistances ? You would be constrained 
 to rely on the general proposition that the ships were 
 designed to use their guns, and perhaps their rams for 
 attack; and their armour for defence against guns. 
 Beyond this you could . not go j and you wiU observe that 
 it is a very small step. The gun and the ram are 
 presented to your view as possible weapons, because they 
 are both traditional j you cannot build a war ship except 
 on the supposition that she is to use both or either -of 
 them. Oil the other hand your instinctive desire for 
 
 8 i 
 
260 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 protection from shot has given you armour plating. In 
 what respect you have advanced beyond instinct and tradi- 
 tion can only be proved by ascertaining whether you 
 appreciate the relative values of the two weapons provided, 
 and have designed your ship in agreement with that 
 relation. Take an illustration from the infantry soldier, 
 which is temptingly apposite to the case in hand. He has 
 two weapons, his rifle and his bayonet. Their relative 
 value is established and known, and no projector would be 
 mad enough to sacrifice one iota of the known value of 
 the rifle to the problematical value of the bayonet. But 
 who can say of any ship in our Navy in which the two 
 weapons are combined, that her gun-power is properly 
 sacrificed to assist her ram as the superior weapon, or that 
 her ram-power is judiciously curtailed to admit of in- 
 creased ordnance ? 1 For clearness of expression, I am 
 leaving out of consideration the third weapon — the 
 offensive torpedo — which it will be necessary hereafter to 
 treat distinctly ; but is not my assertion, even in the case 
 of any single ship called upon to attack, or defend herself 
 from any other single ship, quite borne out by the elemen- 
 tary considerations I have adverted to ? 2 
 
 If we go a step beyond the single ship, and glance 
 at the preparation made in our ships for combined attack, 
 or combined defence, we shall light upon a complete abne- 
 gation of any such idea. 
 
 But returning to the single ship, and avoiding the con- 
 fusion of the double weapon in the same ship, think what 
 is ascertained as the best method of carrying ordnance ? 
 Is the " Monarch " or the " Hercules " the more powerful 
 
 1 This language, more than twenty years old, is still applic- 
 able.— Ed. . , 
 
 ' The looomotive torpedo was not considered when this paper 
 was written, but it does not affect the aigument, — Ed, 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 261 
 
 ship ? or would the 5,000 tons of the " Monarch," and her 
 four 2o-ton guns, fall victims to the attack of five lightly 
 clad ships of 1,000 tons, each carrying a single 25-ton gun ? 
 
 Then if the ram be alone considered, what are the rela- 
 tive values of speed and turning powers for attack upon a. 
 willing adversary, or for compulsory defence 1 May speed 
 be judiciously sacrificed to turning powers, and to what 
 extent ? Or must speed be secured at all hazards, and 
 turning powers only considered afterwards ? 
 
 If we are not depending on tradition and instinct, then 
 categorical answers are forthcoming to all these queries. 
 But if no such things are -extant — which is unfortunately 
 true — and if besides, very little efiort is exerted in the 
 attainment of true solutions, then my position remains 
 unassailed and unassailable. 
 
 Now, what I want you to observe in all this is, that 
 while we are very apt to think that the ships and weapons 
 presented to the naval officer for his uses in a complete 
 state, cause him to take particular views of attack and de- 
 fence, and give rise to his speculations on' the subjeob ; 
 yet the converse of this is the case. He first forms views 
 of attack and defence, and these find expression afterwards 
 in material products. It is the abstract gun, ram, and 
 torpedo, which form his original idea of warfare ; the con- 
 crete weapons do no more than modify views already out- 
 lined in his mind. If his original idea is crude, unthought 
 out, above all, if there are diversities of ideal, the results 
 in a material form will give rise to vagiie uncertainties, 
 and endless discussions, such as those by which we find 
 ourselves now surrounded. 
 
 It will be seen, therefore, that from my point of view I 
 could offer you no more important or comprehensive ques- 
 tion than that I have chosen as the title of my paper. 
 
262 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 I had no soDnsr plottsd out what I thought should be 
 said on an occasion like the present, the facts it would be 
 necessary to put forward, the deductions it would be proper 
 to draw, and the general line of treatment it would be 
 desirable to pursue, than I became overwhelmed with the 
 magnitude of the task before me. For just observe for a 
 moment what a paper on " the attack and defence of 
 fleets " might be expected to deal with. Think in what 
 aspects a professional audience might justly call upon me 
 to place the subject before them. 
 
 There would first be the theory of the matter. You 
 would expect me to set out the theoretical relative values 
 of the gun, the ram, and the torpedo, as offensive or defen- 
 sive weapons. Each must, therefore, be carefully and 
 separately considered, and then considered afresh in their 
 relation to each other. 
 
 It would next be proper to look at the state of naval 
 opinion at home and abroad on this question of relative 
 value, and to note how it might coincide or difBer with the 
 conclusions independently arrived at. The ultimate con- 
 clusions, whatever they were, ought then to be applied to 
 the combat between single ships of existing types, and 
 from the whole discussion should be drawn the deduction 
 as to how present ships fulfil the ideal requirements so 
 far. 
 
 I do not think I exaggerate when I say that any discus- 
 sion of the attack and defence of a fleet is absolutely 
 valueless prior to the analysis I have sketched out, but it 
 is apparent that such analysis would fully occupy the limits 
 of a single paper. 
 
 The next step in the enquiry would be the theoretical 
 methods of making a fleet mobile and flexible under the 
 oitrjl of an adaiifil. The state of naval opinion at home 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 263 
 
 and abroad should be applied here, as it was to the values 
 of the weapons, and compared with the facts. 
 
 After this, you might fairly call upon me to consider the 
 ofEensive and defensive features of the various formations 
 proposed or possible, and of the movements by which they 
 are obtained; and here it would be necessary again to 
 glance at the state of naval opinion on this head. Then, 
 and not till then, should we be in a condition to place our- 
 selves in the positio.i of a fleet attacking, or a fleet attacked, 
 and so deduce the rules within which we must act to give 
 the greatest vigour to our attack, and the greatest solidity 
 to our defence. 
 
 In facing these conditions which seemed to me unavoid- 
 able, I had to consider how I should meet them. I might 
 touch very lightly and inefficiently on each branch of the 
 subject, and compress the whole of it so greatly as not to 
 extend the limit of time allowed, but I felt it was not just 
 to so great a subject, so very casually studied, to treat it in 
 that cursory way. If I had had any further doubts about 
 it, they were fully resolved when I found that I had 
 written enough for an hour and a half's reading, and had 
 -not so much as touched the fleet question at all ! 
 
 Therefore, to my great regret, I come before you to- 
 night under the false pretence of a misnomer in title, 
 " The Attack and Defence of Fleets," has dwindled to the 
 attack and defence of single ships, and if I receive your 
 censure at the outset for my acknowledged shortcomings, 
 I shall hope to modify it by showing at the conclusion 
 that I was a helpless instrument in the hands of my 
 facts. 
 
 Without further preface, then, I shall proceed with the 
 examination of guns, rams, and torpedoes, in the order and 
 with the objects I have pointed out. 
 
264 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 In my paper on " Modern Naval TaoHos " read here five 
 years ago, sea-going turret-ships were not, and the discus- 
 sion of the gun-power of a fleet was necessarily confined 
 to broadside ships, whose fire covered an arc of three points 
 before and abaft the beam. 
 
 In my "Lessons from Lissa," also read here in 1867, the 
 " Bellerophon " was our representative ship, and the cal- 
 culations used to illustrate gun-power were drawn from 
 her capabilities. 
 
 The "Monarch" is now our representative sea-going 
 ironclad, and she must do duty as our typical ship. In so 
 using her, I am not prejudging the great cause of turret 
 versus broadside, on the contrary, my opening remarks 
 show that I do not mean to take the " Monarch " as a per- 
 fect ship, and consider how a fleet of such ships can be best 
 employed. I take the " Monarch " as my ideal, in order 
 that I may not find myself dealing with an impossible type, 
 and because the " Monarch " embodies in the highest 
 degree the principle of construction and armament most 
 opposed to that found efficient in former naval wars. 
 
 All round fire is unquestionably the object to which so 
 much is sacrificed in the " Monarch," and if I were to take 
 a ship like the " Hercules " as my representative, I should 
 flnd the struggle after all-round fire just as prominent 
 there, but carried out under a smaller departure from old 
 methods of construction. The " Monarch " has the fewest 
 and heaviest guns of any sea-going ship in the Navy, and 
 she exercises her gun-power over a larger arc than any 
 other. She is the embodiment of the idea that the gnn 
 is the decisive weapon at sea, to which all others must 
 give place, and that this weapon is most powerful when 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 265 
 
 mounted in limited numbers, of the greatest size, and with 
 the largest arc of training. 
 
 The question 1 propounded four years ago in my paper 
 on the battle of Lissa was, " whether the gun was advanc- 
 ing or receding in power as a naval weapon?" The 
 illustration was whether the guns of the " Bellerophon," 
 as against a "Bellerophon," were more or less powerful 
 than the guns of a 90-gun ship against another of her class 
 before the advent of ironclads. The -question to-night is, 
 so far as guus are concerned, the same but carried a stage 
 further. "Has the gun-power of the 'Monarch,' as 
 against a ' Monarch,' advanced or receded from the 
 position held by the guns of the ' Bellerophon ' against a 
 sister ship ? " 
 
 In the discussion of the earlier stage, I endeavoured to 
 show by an analysis of the forces at the battle of Lissa, 
 how enormously the gun was falling back before the 
 increasing work it was called upon to do. My comparison 
 was in the first instance, that under the old sj stem of 
 building and arming ships, each Italian gun would have had 
 only 50 tons of material to destroy in completing the 
 annihilation of the Austrian fleet ; and each Austrian gun 
 would have had only 93 tons of Italian shipping opposed 
 to it. With the new methods of building and armament, 
 however, under which the Fleets actually met, each Italian 
 gun had 260 tons of material to destroy, and each Austrian 
 gun 432 tons : that is to say, unless the guns at the battle 
 of Lissa could give shot for shot of the light guns used in 
 former times, and each shot were about five times as 
 destructive, the gun had receded from its place as a naval 
 weapon. 1 then proceeded to show, that so far from 
 modern guns keeping up shot for shot with their prototypes, 
 their speed of fire was very materially reduced, and that 
 
266 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 one round in two minuteB was as rapid a fire as could be 
 expected. 
 
 A Lissa ship opposed to another, gave an average of 346 
 tons of destructive work. 
 
 A " Bellerophon " opposed to a " Bellerophon " gives 600 
 tons of destructive work to be done by each gun. A 
 " Monarch " opposed to a " Monarch " gives no less than 
 1,275 tons of work. If, therefore, I had reason in pointing 
 to the recession of the gun from its place as a weapon, by 
 the results of the battle of Lissa, what am I to say when I 
 find it has now receded three times as i&v as it had 
 then? 
 
 I imagined that guns, then, supposing them to give shot 
 for shot with the old ones, must be five times as powerful 
 to retain their places. Now, on the same principle, I must 
 imagine the " Monarch's" g^ns to be about twice as power- 
 ful as the "Bellerophon's," or about eighteen times as power- 
 ful as the old smooth bores, in order to keep their place in 
 the race. 
 
 If the " Bellerophon's " plating be considered to have a 
 resisting power of 36, the " Monarch " has a resisting power 
 of 49, which again tells against the g^ns. But, on the 
 other hand, the " Monarch's " guns exert a striking force 
 of 5,000 foot-tons at 1,000 yards, in lieu of 2,400 foot-tons 
 which the " Bellerophon's " guns exert at the same range. 
 Making a proportion, we find that the power of resistance 
 has increased in the ratio of 1 to 1'3, and of attack in the 
 proportion of 1 to 2. The net result in favour of the guns 
 is 0-7, and, consequently, the net recession of the gun-power 
 since the " Bellerophon's " time, is in the proportion of 1 
 to 1-3. 
 
 Now, it seems that a shot from the 25-ton gun, fired at 
 a range of 700 yards, having on impact an energy of 170 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 267 
 
 foot-tons per inch of shof s circumference, fails to penetrate 
 the " Hercules'" tai^et. 
 
 The "Hercules" target is, in resisting force to the 
 "Monarch," as 64 to 49, and the energy of the "Monarch's" 
 shot, at 1,000 yards, is 137 foot-tons per inch of circum- 
 ference. The proportion between the figures show that 
 the resisting powers of the " Monarch's " side against her 
 guns at 1,000 yards are as nearly as possible equal to those 
 shown by the " Hercules " on the occasion referred to ; 
 that is to say, that a '' Monarch " firing at another " Mon- 
 arch," will fail to damage her at 1,000 yards when her 
 shots strike fair. 
 
 But how little can we calculate on this result ? The 
 general idea concludes that a ship will rarely present her 
 broadside to be fired at. To be fair to both sides, suppose 
 the shot strike at an angle of 45°, and the resisting power 
 of the " Monarch " rises from 49 to 98. In other words, it 
 is doubled. What possible prospect has a "Monarch' of 
 deciding an action with another "Monarch" by means of 
 her artillery, under circumstances such as these ? 
 
 But we are only on the borders of the " Monarch's " 
 powerlessness as yet. 
 
 In my paper on Lissa, I endeavoured to show that at the 
 utmost rapidity possible, the " Bellerophon " could not fire 
 more than 4 rounds per gun in 6 minntes, or 28 rounds in 
 all. I am informed that the " Monarch " does not calculate 
 on a greater speed of fire in action than 1 round in 3 
 minutes per gun ; that is to say, the rapidity has fallen 
 from 28 rounds in the " Bellerophon," to 8 rounds in the 
 "Monarch " in 6 minutes ! We have no grounds for sup- 
 posing that more than a trifling increase of accuracy has been 
 gained, and, therefore, I must debit the guns with this 
 further reduction, equal to 3-5 in their power. If my 
 
268 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 figures approach, correotaes^, the reoessioa of the power of 
 the gun since the battle of Lissa, as exeniplified in the 
 "Monarch" and " Bellerophon," is in the proportion of 1 to 
 4'8. The guns are now in point of fact, about five times 
 as weak as they were five years ago. 
 
 This seems to me a very startling conclusion to arrive 
 at, and one which lies at the root of all construction and 
 armament. It is not as though it were certain the gun 
 must meet the gun, and therefore the recession was com- 
 mon to both sides of the equation, but it is that some other 
 weapon or weapons are making tremendous strides, and 
 are beating the gun in competition. It may mean also 
 that the manner of constructing the carriage — that is the 
 ship — is at the bottom of the recession. In any case, 
 1 can conceive no more important subject for inquiry 
 than whether my figures and deductions are correct. 
 If they are, I can only express my belief that we are 
 close upon a very extraordinary re-construction of our 
 Navy. 1 
 
 Thus, far, then, for the relative place of the gun now, 
 compared with that formerly held by it. Let us look at 
 its actual power in view of the future comparison we shall 
 have to make between it and other weapons. 
 
 Uafortunately, precise figures are wanting here, and 
 very little attempt has been made to obtain them, as they 
 can alone bs obtained by experiment. The inquiry takes 
 the form of two questions : How many shot will strike the 
 hull of a " Monarch " in a given time in the open sea, and 
 what amount of damage will they do ? and I must own it 
 has struck me as alarmingly suggestive that I cannot get 
 
 ^ The re-oonstructicn is still going on. Tiiese arguments, in- 
 stiDOtively acting, have prodnoed the subsidiary armament of lighter 
 guns. But the arguments show that this arrangement cannot; be 
 permanent. — Ed. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 269 
 
 an answer oS-hand to either query. Nobody seems to 
 have made the calculation, even with such data as are ob- 
 tainable, and no steps have been taken to improve the data . 
 It is true, I believe, that the materials for determining the 
 number of shot which will strike a given vertical target at 
 a given range, when fired from a steady platform, are ob- 
 tainable, but such a determination must be a very fallacious 
 guide to the results of practice at sea ; nor am I sure that 
 even the materials obtained have been applied to determine 
 the practical question. 
 
 My figures must be, for these reasons, very imperfect ; 
 but I am obliged to use what I can get. 1 
 
 The 12-pounder rifled gnn, at an elevation of 2°, is stated 
 to be capable of placing fourteen shot out of every twenty 
 in a target nine feet square. Speaking roughly, this 
 amounts to saying that two-thirds of the shot fired from a 
 rifled gun are capable of striking a target nine feet square 
 at a distance of 1,000 yards. Actual practice at Shoebury- 
 ness seems to bear out this statement fully ; for on firing 
 twenty rounds from the 12- ton gun, the extreme error of 
 elevation at 1,000 yards was only 13-5 feet, and the mean 
 was only 4'7 feet. In direction, the extreme error was 9-75 
 feet, and the mean error only 4-4 feet. Out of the whole 
 twenty shot, four only would have missed the " Monarch ;■" 
 two would have fallen short, and two would have gone 
 over. It appears safe to conclude from these figures that 
 the " Monarch " is not liable to receive more than four- 
 fifths of the shot fired at her at 1,000 yards ; and if the 
 chances of being hit vary directly as the distance, at 2,000 
 yards the " Monarch " js only liable to receive two-fifths 
 
 1 1 do not know that any much more reliable figures are even 
 now obtainable, but it may be taken that aoonraoy of fire has 
 considerably improved. — Ed. 
 
270 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 of the shoti tired &t her. 1 This is au admission iu favour of 
 the guns ; for the ohaaoes of being hit diminish in a still 
 greater degree ; but as the error given is entirely due to 
 elevatioa, and the " Monaroh" as a target, is very much 
 longer than she is high, the admission may pass. 
 
 Under impossible oircumstaiioes, therefore, if a "Monaroh" 
 opened fire on another " Monaroh " at 2,000 yards, she 
 might hit her eight times in ten minutes, but none of 
 these shot would damage the ship in a vital part, and 
 probably would pass through no part of her plating. I 
 use the expression " impossible oiroumstanoes," because to 
 get that result, a steady platform, a fixed objuot, and per- 
 fect coolness and daliburation are required, uot one of 
 which conditions can be secured at sea in action. 
 
 I have tried to obtain some idea of the deductions neces- 
 sary for each of these conditions ; an unsteady platform, a 
 moving object, and extreme rapidity of fire. But it is not 
 easy. 
 
 Taking the experiments carried out at Vigo between the 
 " Monarch," " Oaptain," and " Hercules " for what they arc 
 worth, it appears that the three ships fired for five minutes 
 each at a rook distant about 1,000 yards, which was esti- 
 mated to be 600 feet long and sixty feet high, or twice as 
 long, and four times as high, as a ship. " Hercules " fired 
 seventeen " shot, of which ten hit ; " Oaptain " fired eleven 
 shot, and made four hits ;. " Monarch " fired twelve shot, 
 and made nine hits. Speaking roughly, as I am bound to 
 do with rough figures, it would appear that a ship such as 
 the "Monaroh" would, under those circumstances, have 
 been hit three times by the "Hercules," once by the 
 " Oaptain," and say three times by the " Monaroh." 
 
 ' Ihe real variation must be, at least, as the square of the 
 distanoe, — Bd. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFiiNCli OF FLEETS. 271 
 
 We have seen that '8 of the shot tired would have hit a 
 " Monarch '' at 1,000 yards, the platform being steady ; we 
 now find from the foregoing experiment that '147 of the 
 " Hercules " shot, .09 of the "Captain's" shot, and -187 of 
 the " Monarch's " shot might be expected to hit her at sea in 
 smooth water, when the distance did not materially vary. 
 
 The question for us is whether these figures may be re- 
 lied on as a guide — whether they fairly represent practice 
 at sea, or either under or over estimate its accuracy. The 
 only other figures at my disposal in order to check the cal- 
 culation are the following. In some recent carefully con- 
 ducted prize firing by one of the ships in the Channel 
 Squadron, it was estimated that at from 800 to 1,200 yards 
 there were only 25 lost shot out of 208 fired. A "lost 
 shot " appears, according to the Admiralty circular, to be 
 one which would miss the " Monarch," passing over her 
 either en ricochet or directly. The firing on this occasion 
 appears to have been exceptionally good, for a triangular 
 target with nine feet sides is represented to have been hit 
 no less than four times. 
 
 If therefore we are to accept these shot not counted as 
 " lost shot " to be a fair representation of the percentage erf 
 hits in a " Monarch " at sea, we shall find it to be '88 of 
 the shots fired. But we have quoted accurate figures 
 showing that at 1,000 yards — a mean of the distances at 
 which the practice under review was carried on — no more 
 than '8 of the shot fired will strike a "Monarch" when 
 the distance is accurately measured from a fixed and steady 
 platform, and the gun is laid with a nicety impossible afloat. 
 This "88 of hits cannot be therefore a true representation 
 of the practice ; and I think naval men generally will 
 admit that observations of the fall of shot taken from the 
 roast-head and extremes of the ship, are, at their very best 
 
272 ESSAYS OM NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 of an extremely rough character. The tendency of ob- 
 servers in such circumstances is almost always to exagger- 
 ate the accuracy of fire, as I am bound to confess appears 
 to be the case in the details of firing under consideration, 
 
 But we have seen that the probable number of hits on a 
 target 9 feet square, at about 1,000 yards, is 14 out of 20. 
 A 9-feet square target gives an area of 81 square feet, 
 while an equilateral triangle with 9-feet sides gives an area 
 of 35 square feet in round numbers. Accepting the 
 assumption that the fall of shot on a given surface varies as 
 its area — which I think will be true enough for our present 
 Durpose — we should find that -3 of the shot should strike 
 the floating target in the case referred to. But as i only 
 out of 208 struck it, the actual hits were -019 of the shot 
 fired. 
 
 Now compare the results of these two investigations. 
 According to the record of " lost shot," this ironclad's prac- 
 tice was really better and closer than that obtained from a 
 steady platform at Shoeburyness ; while, measured 'by the 
 percentage of hits on the target, it was very much worse. 
 
 Looking again at the Vigo practice, the average hits 
 of the three ships upon a " Monarch," at a 1,000 yards, was 
 •141 of the shot fired, in lieu of the '8 of the shot which 
 would have struck had the practice reached its maximum 
 accuracy. If the prize firing practice had been as good as 
 this, '053 of the shot ought to have struck the floating 
 target in lieu of the "019 of the shot which actually did 
 strike it ; in other words, ten hits ought to have been made 
 instead of four. 
 
 Artillerists may very likely smile at the rudeness of 
 these calculations and surmises. No doubt they are very 
 rude, but I am not conscious of the endeavour to establish 
 a foregone conclusion of their means, and, dealing with 
 
THE ATTACK AND DKFENCE OF FLEETS. 273 
 
 them as rudely as they require to be dealt with, they 
 appear to me to establish the probability that a very much 
 smaller proportion of hits by shot will be made in action at 
 sea than any of us have hitherto imagined. 
 
 Is it really then the case that at the moderate range of 
 1,000 yards, under the most favourable circumstances, a 
 " Monarch " can only expect to hit a sister vessel from 
 twice to fifteen times out of every 100 shot? A.nd if she 
 fires so many as 1,000 rounds of shot, will only from 20 to 
 150 take effect? This is a question we should not have 
 left so long unanswered, and it ought to be ascertained with 
 certainty without any delay. 1 
 
 I, however, cannot stop to ascertain how the fact may be ; 
 I must make a reasonable assumption on the facts I am 
 possessed of, and I take a mean position between the result 
 deduced from the Vigo experiments and those taken from 
 prize firing, and I lay it down that 10 per cent, of the 
 " Monarch's '' shot will strike a " Monarch " in action at 
 1,000 yards. 
 
 We have seen that the " Monarch" is, in her vital parts, 
 impenetrable to shot from the 25-ton gun at 1,000 yards 
 when struck fair. Practically, I believe she will be so 
 seldom struck fair, that no part of her plating is vulnerable 
 until within 1,000 yards, and in anything approaching the 
 end-on position I feel bound to extend this invulnerability 
 to within 500 yards of her adversary. However the ques- 
 tion may be argued, it is certain that only a portion of the 
 shot striking the " Monarch " will penetrate, and we cannot 
 suppose this proportion greater than one-half with any cer- 
 tainty. The amount of damage done by the penetration of 
 5 shot out of 100 fired must be small in any case. 
 
 I have now tried to answer the one question as to the pro- 
 
 1 I do not think it is ascertained yet.^-ED. 
 
 T 
 
274 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 portion of shot which might hit a " Monarch " at a moan 
 range, and the other as to the damage likely to be done. 
 
 The next question arises from a combination of the two 
 facts evolved from the argument, and it enquires " How 
 much damage will be effected " upon a ' Monarch ' by 
 another in a given time, say six minutes ? " 
 
 And here I must endeavour to correct the assumed 
 speed of fire by the same data taken to arrive at the per- 
 centage of hits. 
 
 At the rock off Vigo the speed of the " Hercules " was 
 17 shot in five minutes from four guns, being 3-4 shot per 
 minute, or '85 shot per gun per minute. The speed of t'»;e 
 "Captain's" fire was 11 shot in five minutes from four 
 guns, being 2-2 shot per minute, or -55 shot per gun per 
 minute. The speed of the " Monarch's '' firo was 1 2 shot 
 in five minutes, or 2'4 shot per minute, or -6 shot per gun 
 per minute ; the average of the three ships giving "66 shot 
 per minute per gun. The average speed of the prize firing 
 I have used was '7 shot per gun per minute. Wo must 
 take it therefore that this is the maximum speed attain- 
 able under the most favourable circumstances. It amounts 
 to one round from each gun in a minute and forty-two 
 seconds, so that I do not think there need be any fear of 
 adopting the one round per gun in three minutes, which is 
 assumed afloat to be the probable speed of "Monarch's" 
 fire in action, as representing the truth. But for my pur- 
 poses I would rather assume something above the average, 
 and if I allow one round in two minutes, and 10 per cent, 
 of hits, I do not think I place the gun at the range of 
 1,000 yards in action at all in arrear of its actual place. 
 
 Our summary of the actual gun-power of the " Monarch," 
 therefore, amounts to this. 
 
 In six minutes from the opening of her fire on the 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 275 
 
 sister ship at 1,000 yards, she will have fired 12 shot, of 
 which one will have hit and another may have glanced, 
 and it remains an even chance whether the single hit will 
 have penetrated the enemy's armour. 
 
 With this extremely curious conclusion to our investi- 
 gation I shall leave it, and proceed to the newer weapon — 
 the Ram. 
 
 Samg. 
 
 If we are to consider the question of the attack by rams 
 with any hope of a good result, we must begin at the 
 beginning. We must endeavour to treat the question 
 from a purely abstract point of view. We must take two 
 ideal ships of equal speed and turning powers, and 
 condemn them to abstain from many methods of defending 
 themselves which both would use in actual warfare. No 
 disturbing causes must enter into our first analysis, but 
 after we have seen how the case stands, when both ships 
 are limited to strict rules in their behaviour, we can ascer- 
 tain the relative values of those methods which would be 
 used in practice, and we can determine which of them 
 deserve the foremost place. 
 
 While, however, we select two abstract ships for our 
 purpose, we must take care they are not impossible 
 types. The relations of the length to the turning powers 
 must be such as existing types fulfil ; and the speed over 
 arcs must be such as can be realised ; and, as it has been 
 ascertained with regard to existing ships, that at their 
 highest speeds they turn in a circle whose diameter is from 
 four to six times their length, we may take a circle whose 
 diameter is five times the length of our ships as a safe 
 piece of data whereon to found our investigation. The 
 two ships in diagram 1, therefore, are supposed to travel 
 when their helms are hard over, on the arc of a circle 
 
 T 2 
 
276 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 whose radius is two and a half times their length. We 
 must suppose them for the present unable to reduce their 
 speed, and consequently unable to travel on a curve with 
 a smaller radius ;l but we allow them to do anything they 
 wish with their helms ; and we are to suppose each 
 equally anxious to ram his neighbour and to avoid being 
 himself rammed. For convenience we shall assume the 
 speed of each ship to be 9 knots, and their length to be 
 100 yards, or 300 feet. The length of each ship in time, 
 that is, the time it will take each ship to pass over her 
 own length with helm amidships, will be 20 seconds ; 10 
 seconds will therefore represent half each ship's length in 
 time. 
 
 It must be now borne in mind that the fact of putting 
 the helm over reduces the speed over the arc in a degree 
 proportional to the amount of helm given. The "Beller- 
 ophon," for example, when going 12 knots with helm 
 amidships, reduces her speed to 7'8 knots over her arc ; 
 and when going five knots with helm amidships, she 
 reduces her speed to 3 '6 knots over her arc. This 
 peculiarity in the action of the helm deserves more con- 
 sideration than there is now time to give. It is, however, 
 enough for my purposes to state that the fact is so, and 
 that it will affect the question of ramming in the manner 
 to be presently seen. Closer scrutiny of the phenomenon 
 will be found in my former paper on " Modern Naval 
 Tactics." 
 
 If now we take two ideal ships under these conditions, 
 represented in diagram 1 as a? and y, we shall observe that 
 
 ' Thig smaller radius hardly exists for ships with steam steering 
 gear. It was due to the smaller stretching of the tiller ropes and 
 the greater power over the helm by the man at the wheel. But 
 twin screws much increase manoeuvring power for ramming and 
 avoiding the ram. — Ed. 
 
PLATE VIII. 
 
 
 D J agratn I 
 Fii- 3. e 
 
 Diagram II 
 
 Diagram . ni 
 
 "h^ -Si 
 
 To face page ^77. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 277 
 
 SO far as x is concerned, her object is to obtain the 
 position given in Pig. 1 as regards y, and to avoid that 
 given in Fig. 2. y, on the other hand, wishes the 
 opposite. She desires to obtain the position given to her 
 in Fig. 2, and to avoid that given in Fig. 1. 
 
 What is the difference in these two positions ? What 
 constitutes the badness of y's position in Fig. 1, and of ce's 
 position in Fig. 2 ? In both cases these ships are 50 
 yards too far ahead in space ; and ten seconds too far 
 ahead in time. What on the other hand constitutes the 
 goodness of x's position in Fig. 1, and of y'a position in 
 Fig. 2 ? The ships are in both cases 50 yards behind in 
 space, and 10 seconds behind in point of time. It is clear 
 also that if x were anything between her whole length 
 and half her length in space; und between 20 and 10 
 seconds in time behind the position given to her in Fig. 1, 
 she would still strike y a fair ramming blow, for y would 
 not in that time or space be so far ahead as to let x pass 
 astern of her. Again, by as much as x is less than ten 
 seconds in time, or half her length in space, before her 
 position in Fig. 1, by just so much does she run the risk 
 of finding herself in the position given to her in Fig. 2. 
 x'b object is therefore to be between 50 and 100 yards 
 behind in point of space, and between 10 and 20 seconds 
 behind in point of time. Her blow will be just as good if 
 delivered abaft her adversary's beam, as it would be when 
 delivered before it, and if she runs the risk of being too 
 late, she only becomes liable to miss her blow, and does 
 not leave herself open to attack ; whereas, if she runs the 
 risk of being too early, she not only misses her blow, but 
 lays herself open to destruction. Even at this early stage 
 of the enquiry, therefore, it is not unimportant to note 
 that if " excess of speed " be capable of substitution for 
 
278 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 " being too early," and " lack of speed " for " being too 
 late," a ram is not advantaged by the former in the sup- 
 posed case. 
 
 The ship x in Fig. 1, and the ship y in Pig. 2, hati 
 gained her object and her complete victory. But before 
 she could have got to that stage, there must have been a 
 time when neither had any advantage over the other. 
 They must have once been outside ramming distance, and 
 free from attack, and therefore on an equality. And they 
 may have entered upon the ramming distance on an 
 equality, which had been converted into an inequality by 
 the superior skill of .r in Pig. 1, and of y in Fig. 2. But 
 they may have come into ramming distance on an in- 
 equality, and the conqueror may have had it all Iiis own 
 way from the first. Let us, therefore, examine what 
 constitutes ramming distance first,, and then what consti- 
 tutes the inequality. 
 
 Every ship when advancing at speed carries on each 
 side of her two circles of considerable size, within the cir- 
 cumference of which no power on earth can place her. 
 These circles will vary according to the speed at which the 
 ship travels, and according to the power she possesses of 
 stopping herself quickly. Another ship which is any- 
 where inside this circle cannot be rammed so long as she 
 remains there. It is clear from this that it must be from 
 some point within this circle that a ship will find herself 
 able to deliver a blow safe to herself and damaging to her 
 adversary. Outside this circle neither ship can ever get 
 an advantage over the other, both must always be equally 
 free to move. I therefore assume that a ship is within 
 ramming distance of another whenever she is on, or 
 inside, the arc on which the other turns. And, extending 
 this definition to meet oases where neither ship is within 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 279 
 
 the circle of the other, though in close proximity, we may 
 say their ramming distance is twice the radius of the arc 
 described. In diagram 1, Fig. 3, I have represented the 
 ramming distances due to y under the hypothesis we have 
 assumed, and large as these spaces seem, you must re- 
 member they are only the average spaces which existing 
 ships carry about with them when steaming. The mere 
 fact of being within ramming distance of another ship 
 gives no advantage beyond the safety from your opponent's 
 ram. The ship x at p, the centre of i/'s port circle, has no 
 advantage over y, because y is also at the centre of .r's 
 circle. Nor has x at q any advantage ; a; is in precisely 
 the same position as regards y, as y is with respect to 
 X. But suppose X to have come into t/'s circle as in Fig. 
 4:, and we shall see she has a great advantage. In 
 this case x is inside y's circle, and, therefore, safe herself, 
 while y is outside x's circle, and is, therefore, open to 
 attack. It seems to me that the whole art and mystery of 
 ramming will be found to consist in this endeavoar to get 
 your adversary outside your own circle while you remain 
 inside his. 
 
 X has a manifest advantage on the face of matters in 
 this figure. She is excluded from receiving a blow, and is 
 not prevented from giving one. Let us therefore enquire 
 more closely as to the exact chances she has of ramming 
 y under the circumstances postulated. 
 
 In the positions given, x is 40 seconds from the collision 
 point 0, while y is only 25. If therefore both ships pursue 
 their present courses, x will ram y 75 feet from her stern ; 
 y cannot therefore continue her course with safety. Let 
 us suppose she puts her helm hard-a-port, to turn from x 
 along the curve y s. The average time of turning of four 
 ships of the Channel squadron at 12 knots is given as 6 
 
280 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 minutes 2 secondB, and at 5 knots, as 10 minutes 45 
 seconds. We may therefore assume tbat our ideal sliip y 
 will complete her circle in 8 minutes ; it will consequently 
 take her one minute to turn through four points, which 
 will bring her to a. But x is just 55 seconds from the 
 point a ; and she will, if she goes straight on, be herself 
 rammed by y, 75 feet before her starboard beam. She 
 avoids this mishap by porting her own helm, which has the 
 double efiect of delaying her progress, and enabling her to 
 strike y a fair ramming blow before she reaches the point 
 a; y VD. short cannot escape either under steady or port- 
 helm. 
 
 If y puts her helm hard-a-starboard, she has a better 
 chance, for x is only 25 seconds from the point h, while' y 
 is a minute from it, and consequently y may get inside x'a 
 circle and be safe, before x is aware of it. But x can only 
 lose his chance from want of skill. It is his sole business 
 - to keep inside y's circle, whatever happens, and he should 
 put his helm hard-a-port immediately, and turn along the 
 arc X q^. li y now persists in keeping his helm over, x 
 has only to reverse his own at the right moment, and give 
 y a fair ramming blow amidships. 
 
 In the case before us, therefore, y does not appear to be 
 able to avoid the stroke of a;'s ram by any employment of 
 her helm. If 9 knots is her utmost speed, she cannot now 
 increase it, so escape by that means is cut aS. If she had 
 it in her power to reduce her speed instantaneously to 5'6 
 knots, she would only reach the point o at the same time, 
 and therefore on an equality with x. It may be assumed 
 that a ship of any size could not reduce her speed by so 
 much in so short a time ; but let me remark, parenthet- 
 ically, of the difficulty I am placed in for want of data on 
 this subject. It will be clear to you all, that next to a 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 281 
 
 knowledge of the turning powers of ships, and the theory 
 which may be found to lie at the bottom of it, there is no 
 more important consideration for any one proposing to 
 attack by the ram, than the time and space within which the 
 ram can stop herself, or reduce her speed to a given figure. 
 Yet I am not aware that the experiment has been tried 
 with any ship, or that it has beeu so much as noticed as a 
 requirement.! 
 
 HoweTer the actual case may be, we may reasonably 
 assume that y cannot reduce her speed so as to be 20 
 seconds later than x in arriving at the point o. But she 
 may hope to escape by reducing her speed, and putting her 
 helm hard-a-port. Let us suppose that she can and does 
 reduce her speed instantaneously to 5 knots. What is the 
 result ? 
 
 The difference in the diameters of the circles of four 
 ships of the Channel squadron at 12 knots and at 5 knots, 
 was only 53 yards. The radius of y's arc at 5 knots cannot 
 therefore be assumed to differ from that at 9 knots, by 
 more than a quarter of a ship's length. Hence the arc y 
 now describes will not cross a^'s path more than 10 or 12 
 yards to the right of the point a. This is not enough to 
 save her, in fact it bring x's blow still nearer the midship 
 point. But besides making this trifling alteration m the 
 matter of space, y's reduction of speed has made a more 
 considerable one in the matter of time; y will take 20 
 seconds longer to cross x's path under port-helm at the 
 reduced speed than she did under the full speed of 9 knots. 
 We deduce this fact from the knowledge we have that the 
 average time of four ships of the Channel squadron in com- 
 
 1 I believe I myself had made almost the only attempt to get 
 accurate data on this head until 1889, when the present hydro, 
 graher moved in the matter. — Ed, 
 
282 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 plefcing their circles at 5 ktiots, was 10 minutes 45 seconds, 
 in lieu of tlie 8 minutes calculated as the time of turning 
 at 9 knots. 
 
 Supposing cc, therefore, to allow herself to fall into the 
 trap, and to proceed along the line x a at speed, she would 
 cross 2/'s path entirely, just before the latter reached the 
 point a. But before she got so far as this, she would have 
 surrendered her advantage over y, in having got outside 
 her circle, and allowed y to get inside hers. Admitting 
 she was unskilful enough to do this, y can only deliver a 
 5-knot blow upon x, and has surrendered so much of her 
 power by reducing her speed to that figure. But we 
 cannot suppose x would lightly surrender her advantage 
 when she can keep it by the use of a little port helm. In 
 this case it is evident that y'a delay along the curve y a, 
 leaves it open to x to give her a perfectly fair ramming 
 blow almost at her leisure. 
 
 There is still one last course open to y, namely, to 
 reduce speed with the helm h ard-a-star board ; and this 
 seems to me the most judicious thing she can do. She will 
 now take I minute and 20 seconds to reach a point ahead 
 of .1?, somewhat nearer to her than the point b, which latter 
 is, by our hypothesis, 25 seconds only from x. If x 
 {herefore delays an instant in putting her helm hard-a-port, 
 her circle will pass ahead of y, and she may find herself 
 open to the blow of y's ram at the reduced speed, or, if she 
 saves herself from the danger, there may not be room for 
 her to give y a stem blow. The two ships will, in short, 
 most probably rub broadside to broadside in passing, with- 
 out material damage to either. 
 
 But it must not be supposed because y does the Cest 
 thing possible under the circumstances that she. gains any 
 advantage over x ; she may recover the position of equality 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 283 
 
 she originally lost, if ce is unskilful enough to permit it, 
 but that is all which is left open to her, and in any case 
 her reduction of speed is a surrender of her manoeuvring 
 power directly in favour of .r's proceedings. It is open to 
 ,r to reduce her speed at the same time y reduces hers, in 
 which ease she retains all her former advantages, except 
 that her blow, if delivered, will not be so heavy. 
 
 I have not time on the present occasion to pursue the 
 enquiry as to whether the position I have assigned to my 
 two ships in Pig. 4, is really the worst for y and the best 
 for a; ; it is sufficient for my purpose to show that it is a 
 position extremely desirable for ce to seek and for y to 
 avoid, and that if y unhappily allows herself to get into it 
 her fate is very nearly sealed. I think, however, the 
 general principle may be assumed that the grand object of 
 an attack and defence by rams must be to keep your 
 adversary outside your circle, and at the same time to keep 
 within his. 
 
 The next point we have to consider is how should x 
 approach y so as to get into the desirable position ? 
 
 There is a very prevalent idea afloat that the end-on 
 position is the one proper to be assumed. It was one held 
 by myself also, I may say, until I undertook the prepara- 
 tion of this paper, and I can, therefore, the more freely 
 deal with it, and, if necessary, condemn it. 
 
 Let us suppose, then, that x and y, meeting in the open 
 sea, and being each imbued with the necessity of keeping 
 the end-on position, steer for each other. They must 
 either give up their end-on theory, or they will at length 
 reach the position given in Kg. 5. They are now within 
 ramming distance, on an equality certainly, but each pre- 
 cluded from using the weapon that each is endeavouring 
 to use, unless they are willing to try which is the hardest 
 
284 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 at the point o, an extremely improbable conjecture. But 
 observe the position they have placed themselves in. 
 They must either stop where they are, and give up all 
 hopes of ramming, or they must dash at each other on an 
 equality, or one of them must try some other plan. What 
 plan is open to her, let us say, to y ? She may turn along 
 the curve y p, or along the curve y q, or along any curve 
 between those. 
 
 Let us suppose she puts her helm hard-a-port ; in thirty 
 seconds the ships will be in the position given at Fig. 6. 
 In this position y has turned through two points, and is 
 just about surrendering her equality, and allowing x to 
 come within her circle, while she herself is outside x's 
 circle. The danger of her manoeuvre is not so great as 
 it at first appears, but there is no doubt that she has sur- 
 rendered all hopes of using her ram upon x. 
 
 That she is not actually in danger may be noted from 
 considering that she is thirty seconds from the point d, 
 while X is one minute from it ; y, therefore, has a good 
 chance of dragging her whole length across x'a arc before 
 she reaches the point d. But y has a still better chance 
 of escape if she now rights her helm, for she is only 
 twenty seconds from the point 6, while x is fifty-three 
 seconds from it. But, whatever her chances of escape 
 may be, she has no chance of attack, and, as it may be 
 assumed that any movement either ship might make from 
 the position given in Fig. 5, would result in a position 
 similar to that in Fig. 6, we must take it that there is 
 a fundamental error in the end-on approach of two ships 
 intending to ram. 
 
 It may be true thafi the end-on position is proper to 
 avoid being rammed when there is no intention of 
 ramming, but this is not the case wo are now called on to 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 285 
 
 investigate, and is assuredly not the case supposed by 
 those who have abrogated the flank method of evolution 
 in favour of the oblique. 
 
 Let it be noted here that though from a consideration 
 of Figs. 5 and 6, there is great objection to the end-on 
 position when within rwmming distance, there is no objec- 
 tion to it beyond ramming distances ; but then, on the other 
 hand, neither is there any objection to the broadside posi- 
 tion, or, in short, to any other position. The question of 
 the nature of an evolution does not seem, therefore, to be 
 affected at all by the proposal to attack by rams, although 
 the nature of a formation may be. The only movement 
 undertaken when within ramming distance would be the 
 final sweep to ram, or avoid being rammed. Any prepara- 
 tion for this final sw#ep must be made beyond ramming 
 distance, where the ships are free to use what means they 
 please. 
 
 As this end -on approach is not to be sought for in a 
 ramming attaci, because of its liability to result in a posi- 
 tion given at Pig. 5, the question is how should two ships 
 approach each other who are equally ready for the combat ? 
 The answer is to be found by considering that the only 
 difierence between x and y in Fig. 4, is that x is half a 
 ship's length further from the collision point o than y is. 
 We must expect the struggle to be to keep the courses at 
 right angles to each other, but to be rather behind in 
 reaching the point where they cross. The two ships 
 may, therefore, steer for each other in the first instance, 
 but before they close they will each mutually assist to 
 place their courses at right angles, and to keep them so ; 
 or one of them by superior skill will approach on some- 
 thing near the end-on position until he can by a sudden 
 and unexpected movement bring himself within ramming 
 
286 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 distance, at right angles to the other's course, and inside 
 his circle at the same time. 
 
 In the first case, each ship would immediately bring the 
 other, four points on the bow, and so gradually approach 
 each other, and the most skilful of the two would by such 
 means as were open to him take care to be a little behind 
 at the last moment, ultimately taking the place of x in 
 Fig. 4. 
 
 In the other case the ships would steer directly for each 
 other at first, and might be expscted to assume parallel 
 courses, at such distance as would be determined by the 
 most skilful of the two, and we should thus ultimately 
 find them in a position similar to that given in Fig, 7. 
 Here x has determined to get into the position ^j, by a 
 turn of eight points to port, at the* same time as y, by 
 pursuing his course, arrives at the point g. x is two 
 minutes from the point p, consequently his turn must be 
 made when y is two minutes, or 600 yards, from q. The 
 distance between the paths of x and y must be equal to 
 the diameter of the circles, or else x cannot come into posi- 
 tion at p. X will consequently commence proceedings 
 when y is at the great distance of 1,200 yards from him, 
 and nearly 2J points on her bow. 
 
 If all goes well, and y permits herself to fall into the 
 trap, X will certainly gain her wishes and destroy or 
 damage y, being herself in perfect safety; and there is 
 certainly this to be said for such a method of attack, 
 namely, that y will only observe the bearing of x to alter 
 a couple of points, will have little guide as to her intentions, 
 and only two minutes in which to make up her mind. Yet, 
 of course, any movement of y'a helm either way, before she 
 reaches the point q, will overthrow lo'a calculations, and 
 make it necessary to try some other plan, y, however 
 
THK ATTACK AND DEKENGE OF FLEETS. 287 
 
 may divine x'a idea, and may, by slight alterations of course 
 to port, bring herself within x's circle when she gets abreast 
 of the point q. She will thus turn the tables upon x, which 
 is just the risk she runs, and which may arise from- a mis- 
 calculation of the distance or speed of y. The point to 
 notice is, that this method of approach on parallel courses, 
 a diameter apart, is one which may be adopted by two ships 
 equally anxious to try their skill against each other in 
 ramming. 
 
 We should notice that x, in adopting the foregoing methoa 
 of approach, proposes to obtain her object by a double 
 movement : one into the safety position inside y'» circle, 
 and the other the delivery from thence of her final blow, 
 and she leaves it in her power to abandon her intention at 
 any moment prior to reaching the point p. Having once 
 reached it, she places herself in the power of y if she turns 
 out to be a certain distance to the left of q. 
 
 But a; may also decide to deliver her attack from the out- 
 side of y's circle, and only to come within it at the moment 
 of collision. In this case, she will approach on a course 
 parallel to that of y, but only one radius distant from it, as 
 shown in Fig. 8. Here x must put her helm over when 
 2/ is 1| points on the bow, and about 850 yards off, and she 
 will arrive at the point q a little after y reaches it, sup- 
 posing the latter to steer a straight course. But it is most 
 unlikely that y will put herself into the wished-for posi- 
 tion. The change of helm by .v, will be very apparent to 
 y, and her design almost equally so, and the smallest pos- 
 sible movement of helm may not only baulk it, but place .r 
 in a very difficult position, for it is possible that y might 
 meet a; within ramming distance, while the latter had her 
 helm hard over, and the former had hers amidships. In 
 this case, x would clearly have only half the manoeuvring 
 
288 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 power of y, and might suffer for it. x in short cannot make 
 a re-calcnlation of her position and prospects when within 
 ramming distance, should she attack in the method given 
 in Fig. 8, while she can well do so should she attack as in 
 Fig. 7, and should she choose the first method of approach, 
 bringing her enemy rather less than four points on her 
 bow, and forcing her to Teeep so, she is perpetually re-calcu- 
 lating her chances and position. 
 
 We have now discussed roughly the principles of an 
 attack by rams from ahead, when the ships have equal 
 speed and turning powers, and I think it is apparent that 
 the 4-point method of approach is the one we should choose 
 under the circumstances. 
 
 We may now look into the advantage, if any, which x 
 would gain from the possession of superior speed. We may 
 in doing so, leave out of the question those advantages 
 which speed gives in bringing the enemy to action against 
 his will, for we are supposing both ships equalUy anxious to 
 meet. We need not, therefore, trouble ourselves except 
 with the changes which greater speed for x would intro- 
 duce in her position in Figs. 4, 7, and 8. In Fig. 4, if x 
 had a speed of 12 knots in lieu of 9, she would, by pursuing 
 a straight course, strike y nearly amidships at the point o, 
 instead of well abaft her beam, she might therefore begin 
 her attack from a position farther astern, and therefore 
 safer from a miscalculation of the size of j/'s circle. This 
 would be her advantage also in case y put his helm a-port. 
 But on the other hand, if she found herself at the position 
 given, with this extra speed upon her, she may be obliged 
 to forego her attempted attack in order to save herself, for 
 if y puts his helm hard-a-starboard, x is advancing so 
 rapidly that she can hardly avoid allowing y to get inside 
 her circle, and the moment that happens, she is either at 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 289 
 
 j^'s mercy, or she must escape under starboard helm and her 
 superior speed. 
 
 In Figs. 7 and 8, the advantage of superior speed is that 
 x may allow y to approach more closely, and therefore 
 under a better estimate of her distance before she turns : 
 there is no other advantage known to me. 
 
 Eeverting then to Pig. 4, if a; with greater speed than y 
 means to attack her with the same advantages as x is now 
 seen to possess in the diagram, she must either be further 
 from the point o herself, or y must be nearer to it ; but the 
 skill required at the low speed and at the high speed is 
 equal, and the dangers of being rammed instead of ramming, 
 are possibly a little increased. I do not look upon great 
 speed consequently as very important for a ram. 
 
 But if the question is not one of permanent speed, but of 
 the power of incressing or reducing the speed of the ships 
 rapidly, then there can be no question of the advantage. 
 The increased speed will save the ship from being herself 
 rammed, and the power of reducing it will enable her to 
 ram effectively, and hence we may assume that a very 
 heavy ship is an ineflBcient ram, for she cannot have the same 
 powers of varying her speed as a much lighter one would 
 have. 
 
 But now, suppose x with no advantage in speed, is half 
 the length of y with the same proportionate turning powers, 
 and observe the conditions under which she will meet y in 
 Fig. 9. It may be seen at a glance that she has y abso- 
 lutely in her power, for she has all the advantages she 
 before possessed, besides the infinite advantage of manoeuvr- 
 ing freely within y'a circle, and being able to frustrate in 
 the most perfect manner any attempt of y's to escape under 
 starboard helm, which we before saw was really her only 
 chance. 
 
290 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Then again, look at Figs. 7 and 8 as to her facilities for 
 attack under the new conditions. In Fig. 7, if nc had mis- 
 calculated her distance and found that y would be too far 
 ahead to be rammed from the point p, her stroke would 
 have been altogether lost, but under the new conditions 
 she might commence on the curve x p, but end on the 
 curve X t, thereby having it in her power to move the 
 point p to suit the movements of y. While under the old 
 conditions, the boundary of her possible movement under 
 starboard and port helm was x p q, it is now enlarged to 
 xts. So in Fig. 8, x may commence on the curve x p, but 
 has a reserve of manoeuvring power as far as x r. 
 
 If it be said that ij by increased speed can make up for 
 iw's increased turning powers, I think we must deny it, 
 unless y surrenders all idea of ramming, or even of allow- 
 ing her adversary to come within ramming distance. If 
 she allows x to close her, and to get into the position 
 given at Fig. 9 — which she is very likely to do — her speed 
 will hardly save her; for allow her 12 knots to x'b 9 
 in Fig. 9, and she cannot escape under starboard helm, she 
 has not a foot to spare under port helm, and she has not a 
 ship's length to spare under steady helm ; and it is not to 
 be supposed that x in the confidence of her manoeuvring 
 power will not provide against this chance by keeping 
 much closer to the point o. 
 
 There is, however, a method of attack for which 
 superior speed is necessary to success, and that is the 
 attack from the rear, either directly or by an advance past 
 the adversary, and a turn upon her. Of the direct attack 
 I need not speak much ; it would doubtless be possible for 
 a ship with superior speed to chase and to ram a ship of 
 inferior speed, which declined to face her. But the blow 
 so given would be a light one, as its velocity would only 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 291 
 
 be the difEerenoe between the two speeds, and it would 
 undoubtedly be long in coming. The indirect attack is 
 made by the ship with superior speed coming up from the 
 rear on a course parallel to her adversary's, and one radius 
 distant, then drawing sufficiently ahead to strike her at 
 right angles by a turn of 8 points. This case is ably 
 treated by Admiral Boutakov, and I agree with the con- 
 clusion he draws, that the adversary need never allow her- 
 self to be so rammed ; she can see the opponent gaining on 
 her, and must know what the result will be ; she can then 
 either turn from her or towards her in perfect safety, and 
 the result will ultimately be the direct attack I hare noticed. 
 
 Long as we have dwelt upon this question of the ram 
 as a weapon, it must be apparent to all that I have only 
 touched the outskirts of the question, and until Naval 
 Officers will turn their intelligence fully upon it, on the 
 outskirts of the question we shall remain. 
 
 We have, however, I think, shown a probability that 
 the following conclusions approach the truth : — 
 
 1. The end-on position must never be taken up by a 
 ram until the moment her spur strikes the object. 
 
 2. Extreme speed is not so necessary for a ram as 
 extreme powers of turning. 
 
 3. Great length and weight are an inconvenience to a 
 ram. It may be added that they are not necessary for an 
 efEective blow. The work done upon a ship by the 4001b. 
 shot from the 18-ton gun is under 5000 foot-tons. The 
 work done by the stem of a vessel weighing 1,000 tons, 
 propelled at 10 knots, is equal on impact to 4,270 foot- 
 tons, and the work is done below the armour. 
 
 4. So far from ramming being a difficult or impossible 
 task, it is a thing which can be accomplished by superior 
 skill with vessels otherwise equal. But a ram whose 
 
 n 2 
 
292 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 turning powers are much greater than her adversary's 
 may attack her with every confidence of success. 
 
 This seems the place to advert to the ordnance proper to 
 be carried by a ram. 
 
 I must confess myself doubtful about the end-on fire — 
 a result I did not at all expect to arrive at when I planned 
 the paper. I had in my previous papers laid it down that 
 I would in no case use my guns on approaching to ram, 
 but that I should be glad to see my adversary use his, 
 because my movements would be disguised thereby, and I 
 observe a great French authority, Admiral Jurien de la 
 Gravifere, has recently advocated the same view. If this 
 is so, when is a ram to use her artillery ? The answer 
 seems to be, when she has missed her blow, and is passing 
 her adversary broadside to broadside. Except at that 
 moment, " The poor advantage," as Admiral de la Gravifere 
 says, " to be gained by a discharge rendered uncertain by 
 the rapidity with which the distance varies, cannot com- 
 pensate for the cloud of smoke which would envelope the 
 ship at the all-importeint moment, when her safety 
 depends on the precision with which she is handled." 
 
 It may be argued that this is true enough of the case 
 when within ramming distance, but that ships should be 
 armed for end-on fire before coming within it. The 
 answer to this is, that we have seen how a ship may 
 really commence her ramming manoeuvre at the distance 
 of 1,200 yards if she adopts nearly the end-on position, and 
 that if she approaches on a i-point bearing, a very slight 
 alteration of course, will bring her broadside guns to her. 
 
 I thus conclude the rough examination of the ram 
 question as applied to single ships, and as separated from 
 artillery fire and the torpedo. I must now pass to the 
 latter and newer weapon. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 293 
 
 Torpedoes. 1 
 
 In tb.e very admirable paper given to us by Captain 
 Dawson, on OfEensive Torpedo Warfare, he expressed his 
 oonviction that we were neglecting a very powerful and 
 valuable weapon in the outrigger torpedo, which he 
 believed applicable to fleets. Unfortunately experiments 
 on the question are wanting, and it would not be possible, 
 in the absence of them, to make the outrigger torpedo a 
 basis of attack and defence. This mtich may be said for 
 them, however, that if they succeed at all, they will cer- 
 tainly succeed in an attack from the rear. I have shown 
 that a vessel with superior speed may strike another 
 about the stern with an inefficient blow, equal to the 
 difference between their speeds. These are the condi- 
 tions under which the outrigger torpedo would supply the 
 deficiency. The vessel using it consequently wants speed, 
 bat need not be a ram. Captain Dawson thinks they 
 might be employed in outriggers at right angles to the 
 keel, and be so used by a ram which had missed her blow 
 and was passing broadside to broadside of her object. 
 Under such circumstances the torpedo would compete 
 with the broadside gun, and I am rather inclined to think 
 the latter to be the more effective weapon. 
 
 The Harvey torpedo seems to me a weapon by itself, and 
 not an auxiliary, like the outrigger torpedo. I understand 
 that Captain Harvey deprecates its use in ordinary ships, 
 and proposes special ships to employ no other weapons. 
 To me, however, it seams a weapon well adapted as a 
 defence against rams in large and long ships. If the 
 
 ' This section is only useful ai showing; what naval opinion was 
 at the date of publication. It is wholly superseded by the adveut 
 of the locomotive torpedo, which is tactically a gau of immense 
 p )wer, bat with limited range. — Ed. 
 
294 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFKNCE. 
 
 ship (/ in Fig. 9 was known to be towing a torpedo on her 
 port quarter, as in Fig. 10, it enormously increases the 
 hazard of cc'a attack, although it need not deter her alto- 
 gether. Her tactics would be, in the event of missing her 
 blow, to pass close under the stern of y, trusting to run 
 over the torpedo line. The danger, however, would be 
 great, for the line might easily be fouled, and then y's 
 progress might draw it under no's, bottom and explode it 
 there. 
 
 The Harvey torpedo vessel does not require anything but 
 great speed, but this she must have to be eflScient. The 
 tactics she pursues are very much simpler than those of 
 the ram, for she does not want to be in a particular place 
 at a particular time; all she requires is to pass her ad- 
 versary within about 200 yards on any course, and her 
 mission is fulfilled if f3he succeeds in doing so. In the 
 attack by such a vessel on another of her class, skill appears 
 useless as against speed, and it would seem the slowest 
 ship must be destroyed. The object would probably be an 
 endeavour to cross each other's bows, and the fastest ships 
 must ultimately do this. 
 
 These few remarks are all which seem to me necessary 
 on the question of torpedoes as applied to the attack and 
 defence of single ships. They are weapons destined to 
 play an enormous part in the operations of future naval 
 war, and if hereafter I continue this subject, their imme- 
 diate part in fluets must be examined, but as regards the 
 chief of them, the Harvey torpedo, I don't see how it can 
 be discussed by itself. A Harvey torpedo ship meeting 
 another in the 'open sea, and knowing her to be one, cannot 
 run down upon her and trust to chance as to which torpedo 
 takes effect first. She ma,y certainly approach as a ram (x) 
 would in Figs. 7 and 8, with the intention of crossing y's 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 295 
 
 bows at some distance ; yet y can. never be supposed 
 foolish enough to run such a risk. If she thinks she has 
 superior speed, she will carefully abstain from all close 
 quarters except with her head the same way as her enemy, 
 and with helm amidships. It is not as in ramming, where 
 a distance of 50 yards or so makes all the difference be- 
 tween victory and defeat. It is more a question of superior 
 speed, and a knowledge that the superior speed, properly 
 used, must destroy the adversary by torpedo, just as su- 
 perior turning powers must destroy her by ramming. 
 
 The effort of two torpedo ships, it seems to me, will be 
 confined to ascertaining which has superior speed, and the 
 strong probability is that in the ascertainment of that fact 
 one of the two will perish, 
 
 The Attack and Defence of Single Ships. 
 
 Only now, after this separate treatment of the gun, the 
 ram, and the torpedo, are we in a condition to combine 
 them, and to observe the effect under such circumstances. 
 But before proceeding to such combination, it appears to be 
 the proper moment to advert to foreign naval opinion on 
 the status of the weapons. I must leave the torpedo out 
 of this account, for I know not the opinion entertained 
 about it abroad. 
 
 The rise of the ram in foreign estimation is one of the 
 most remarkable features of the age. Dating from the 
 first utterances of our gallant Admiral of the Fleet, Sir 
 George Sartorius, the ram has carried all navies by storm, 
 and, so far as I can gather, except in Russia, without en- 
 quiry. When I read my paper on Modern Naval Tactics 
 here, in the year 1865, and acknowledged myself a com- 
 plete convert to Sir George Sartorius's views, English 
 naval opinion was incredulous. Admiral Boutakov had 
 
296 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 written ably on naval tactics, but had nowhere expressed 
 a conviction that the ram governed the tactics of the future, 
 although au enquirer so acute and unprejudiced could not 
 avoid allasion to its growing importance. In France, a 
 system of tactics based wholly on the supposed unrivalled 
 empire of the gun existed, and there was only the faintest 
 glimmer of an idea that the old line of battle was about to 
 fall from its high estate. 
 
 Now look at the change. Admiral Boutakov has worked 
 at the ram question to an extent unattempted by us ; and 
 Russia has drawn up her scheme of naval evolutions on 
 the avowed principle that the ram is the only weapon 
 of value against a fleet. France has pushed her old system 
 of evolutions into the back ground, in the firm belief that 
 the ram, and the ram only, need be feared at sea. 
 
 The ramming experiments tried by the Russians under 
 Admiral Boutakov, are altogether too interesting to be left 
 without a passing notice. He took two gunboats of 200 
 tons each, and fitted them up as harmless rams. A sort of 
 gabion, or extra large fascine was fitted to the stems of 
 these craft, and a belt of fascine work ran all round their 
 gunwales. Captains of two of the ships present were 
 placed in respective command of the rams ; they were 
 turned broadside to broadside, head and stern, and started 
 to damage each other as much as they could. Cross-bear- 
 inga of the two rams were constantly taken during the 
 continuance of the struggle, and the corresponding tracks 
 mapped out. Two of these encounters have been repro- 
 duced in Diagram II, where the dotted line represents the 
 track of the ram " Priliv," commanded first by Captain 
 Kolon, and secondly by Captain Vogak. It was a rule in 
 these encounters that a Captain lost his command when he 
 was rammed, and consequently some Captains of greater 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 297 
 
 skill slew several foes before they lost their own command. 
 The Straggle represented in the npper fignre lasted 16 
 minutes, and the track of the victorious ram, the " Goul," 
 commanded by Captain Ivanov, is shown in black. Ivanov 
 was again victorious in the struggle shown below, but not 
 till 30 minutes had elapsed. Twenty-one of these en- 
 counters rtre given in the pages of the " Revue Maritime," 
 and the shortest time in which the ramming was effected 
 was 5 minutes ; the longest being 50 minutes ; the average 
 being just 20 minutes. 
 
 No doubt the battle of Lissa has had much to say to the 
 advance of the ram question, but in England we did not 
 lay that lesson to heart as Russia and France have done. 
 The confirmation of my belief in the ram which Lissa gave, 
 and which I very strongly put forward, carried only a small 
 section of the service with me. I was still met as before, 
 by the remark that it was very diflBcult to ram another 
 ship, and I believe that even now only a section of the 
 English. Navy is disposed to forsake the trust in our guns 
 and to put it in our stems. If I am not completely in error 
 on the question, I hope that what I have already said to- 
 night will lead my brother officers to look into the matter 
 more closely than they have yet done, and with minds so 
 much morQ capable than mine, to ascertain what the truth 
 miy be and not to rest satisfied with mere vague phrases 
 and vaguer thoughts. 1 
 
 Let me now briefly endeavour to picture what the 
 nature of a duel in the open sea would be between two 
 " Monarchs," each equally ready for the fray, but one of 
 them determining to use her guns and depending upon 
 
 ^ It will be uuderstoo I that the rise of the locomotive torpedo, 
 by makiog the approach to ram more dingerous, hai pushed than 
 weipon back, and the gun forward. — Ed. 
 
298 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 them, and the other looking at her guns as a secondary 
 weapon. To keep up our terminology, I shall call x the 
 ramming ship and ■;/ the one depending on her guns, it- 
 would, on first sighting her adversary, bring her about 4 
 points on the bow and manceuvre so as to keep her there, 
 while she advanced at speed, y might be expected to steer 
 direct for her enemy, trying perhaps, an occasional long 
 shot and swerving slightly to do it. At about 2,000 yards 
 distance, y would find it convenient, if not forced to do it 
 before, to bring a? about 4-points on her bow so as to keep 
 a steady fire upon her, which we must suppose from that 
 moment to commence. They are each now, in Kg. I, 
 Diagram III, 1,400 yards from the point at which their 
 courses cross; and if they were going 10 knots, — which ,r 
 at least will be certainly doing, as she knows her greatest 
 safety from shot lies in the rapid alteration of elevation of 
 y's guns, — if they were each going 10 knots, they are only 
 4 minutes 12 seconds from collision. What damage can y 
 do with his shot in that time ? She may fire two shots 
 from each gun, or eight in all, of which we have seen none 
 would hit if the ship was steady at 1,000 yards; and the 
 distances at which these shot are fired varies from 2,000 
 yards to nothing. The gauntlet which .r runs is a 
 bagatelle, no ship need fear it, and if y has laid herself 
 open, and permits a; to get into ramming distance, as in 
 Pig. 4, diagram I, it is all over with her, unless she has 
 reserved her fire for the supreme moment. But we may 
 be quite certain that no fire will be reserved. She will 
 have exhausted all her efforts in combined accuracy and 
 rapidity, and x will only run the chance at close quarters 
 of receiving a stray shot badly aimed, as it is sure to be 
 at such a time. If x has passed through 4 shots, a minute 
 before collision, she is safe from any further fire. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 299 
 
 But suppose that y is wise enough to perceive his 
 danger, and to turn towards x, along the curve y r, Pig. 
 2 ; X cannot now ram conveniently, he therefore takes the 
 step he had previously prepared for, and brings his guns 
 into play. His method is to sweep round upon the large 
 circle x q, with his guns trained right abeam on the star- 
 board side. In 30 seconds he discharges them full into 
 the plates of y at pistol range, and passes away unharmed 
 to prepare a renewed encounter. 
 
 I cannot pass a very probable feature of this kind in a 
 naval duel, without remarking on the advantage y would 
 have were she armed as a broadside ship. If y discharges 
 her port broadside at x, two minutes must elapse before 
 she does it again ; more than two minutes must elapse before 
 she can transfer her fire to the opposite broadside; con- 
 sequently X has it all her own way in passing starboard side 
 to starboard side. If y, however, had a second set of guns 
 ready on her starboard side, x might take less from her 
 manoeuvre. 
 
 Time does not permit me to dwell longer on a part of my 
 subject which will bear any amount of the closest study. 
 I have indicated what seemed to me the absolute values of 
 the gun and the ram, and I have endeavoured, by bringing 
 them into opposition in a fight between two ships, which I 
 imagine to be a representative combat of its kind, to get at 
 their relative values. I might infinitely vary the circum- 
 stances of approach and subsequent conduct, but so long as 
 X acts on the assumed superiority of his ram, and y on the 
 assumed superiority of his guns, their combat must par- 
 take of the nature of that I have sketched out. x will 
 again and again make his effort to ram, and will only take 
 to his guns after each failure ; y will persist in believing he 
 is damaging his opponent, which in my view he will not 
 
300 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFKNOE. 
 
 do, aad x'a failures to rum will not prevent him damaging 
 his opponent effectually by his broadside guns. 
 
 There are some points to be noticed in the details of such 
 a combat, as 1 hare sketched, cc cannot be put to a dis- 
 advantage by the direction of the wind, whereas, if y is 
 unhappy enough to engage to windward, the smoke from 
 his own guns will hide as from him, and will, while it 
 interferes with his own fire, effectually shield the oper- 
 ations of X from view, y, however, is not at all hidden 
 from X, who observes her every movement at his leisure. 
 
 The temptation to go at slow speed so as to make better 
 shooting, is very great ; yet nothing could be more danger- 
 ous than to be caught at slow speed within ramming dis- 
 tance by a ram. 
 
 It may be thought that it is improbable that all combats 
 should take the form I have sketched out, but I think it is 
 possible, that if one ship determines to keep her opponent 
 on a 4-point bearing, she compels her to do the same, as 
 being the only way of approaching, so that the ram is 
 still the master, even in directing the method of his 
 enemy's approach. 
 
 Wherever the Harvey torpedo makes its appearance, 
 whether in company with guns and rams, or by itself, it 
 is still speed which must carry the day. Whatever one 
 ship may think of his guns or his ram, he must try his 
 speed and his torpedo, if the other chooses to adopt that 
 mode of attack, y could not, as in Fig. 2, diagram III, if 
 X was towing a torpedo, turn towards him and allow him 
 to cross his bows ; he must turn away from him, and 
 trust to his own torpedo to keep x'a ram clear of him. 
 Hence they come to parallel courses, and artillery fire, 
 broadside to broadside. The struggle will immediately be, 
 which is to head the other, and whichever can Mucceed, 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEET3. 301 
 
 must be victorious. The tendency of the Harvey torpedo 
 seems thus to be, to bring the gun forward again, as the 
 tendency of the ram has been to push it back* While this 
 struggle for precedence continues between two torpedo 
 vessels at short range, much damage must be done by 
 artillery ; and if the. speed of the ships is nearly equal, the 
 combat might be decided by a broadside action of the old 
 type, except that it is carried on at high speed. 
 
 Here then, I close, my examination of the bases on 
 which the attack, and defence of modern fleets must rest, 
 and no one can be more conscious than I of its vagueness 
 and imperfection ; but I hope it will be admitted, that I 
 could not proceed to carry out the examination set forth in 
 my title, until 1 had come to some conclusions, such as I 
 have put forward : and, in any case, I trust to have shown, 
 that with proper experiments and deductions therefrom, 
 the relative importance of the weapons we are dealing with, 
 and their judiciou,s employment, first, in single ships, and 
 finally, in fleets, may be fairly estimated. 
 
 I must not quit the subject without adverting to those 
 principles of construction and armament, which the matters 
 we have been discussing, appear to recommend. 
 
 End-on fire appears less a desideratum than I at first 
 supposed it would turn out. For a ram, it seems quite 
 unnecessary, as the latter seems to combine much more 
 satisfactorily with the old-fashioned broad-side gun. 
 
 The ram, pure and simple, is strongly advocated as a 
 weapon, by Sir George Sartorins ; and I must own that, it 
 seems to me, a gunless ram of equal speed with the " Mon- 
 arch," but about one-fifth her size, would meet her on 
 equal terms in the open sea.l 
 
 ^ Some part of this idea seems to have been at work in producing 
 the Polyphenms.—'EJi. 
 
302 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 If such a ram were to attack, a larger ship could beat 
 defend herself by a large number of light shell guns. 
 Such might be easily employed in a broadside ship, in 
 addition to her plate-piercing armament, but could not be 
 employed in the " Monarch." 1 If, however, it is found that 
 a ram of 1,000 tons can be so plated as to resist all but the 
 heaviest shot when striking at an angle of 45°, then it 
 appears to me, there is no help for the larger and more un- 
 wieldy mass such as the "Monarch," except the towing 
 torpedo. 
 
 If light swift torpedo vessels are designed, a heavier and 
 slower ship must meet their attacks by multiplying the 
 numbers of lighter guns carried. 
 
 On the whole, it does appear to me a matter for very 
 serious consideration, whether this straggle after gans 
 which will pierce the heaviest plates at long range, has not 
 overshot itself — whether the point has not already been 
 passed at which the redaction in the number of shot, which 
 can be fired per minute, is compensated by the increased 
 power of the gun. 
 
 But while it is impossible to dogmatise on these various 
 points, am I wrong in thinking that the service and the 
 country, should seriously undertake to determine the relative 
 values of the gun, the ram, and the torpedo, and not to rest 
 content for one moment longer in an atmosphere of misty 
 ideas on the question ? 
 
 1 This idea has received its development in the secondary arma- 
 ment of battle-ships.— Ed. 
 
303 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. - 
 
 THE ATTACK AND DEFENOB OF FLEETS. 1 
 
 MuoH of the neglect under which my subject undoubtedly 
 lies, may proceed from an idea which impressed me very 
 strongly at one time, namely, that the attack or defence of 
 a modern fleet cannot be profitably stadied prior to the ex- 
 perience of many actual combats. It seems at first sight 
 probable that no such thing as rale or law can be evolved 
 except from the facts of experiment in war. It is there- 
 fore readily assam.ed that naval tactics are not yet in a 
 condition to be made a subject of study. This line of 
 thought would be excusable after many failures to discover 
 the hidden law or laws which may exist, but it does not 
 excuse the neglect to seek for them. We have no business 
 to make the assumption in the first place, for it is founded 
 on no data; and, moreover, I trust to have shown in 
 former papers that so far from being the vague con- 
 glomerate of conflicting opinion generally supposed, a very 
 superficial analysis recovers many points of absolute cer- 
 tainty round which theories may safely revolve ; or, at the 
 very least, gives encouragement to persevere. 
 There are, however, two ways of approaching thestady. 
 
 1 Written in 1872. 
 
304 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 The first is very easy, very common, and very misleading. 
 The second is slow, troublesome, rare, but may lead us to 
 the very centre of the maze. The first is the empirical or 
 ratioeinative method — the second, the inductive. The first 
 assumes some theory of attack and defence, some pet for- 
 mation, or favourite weapon, and argues to the particulars 
 of a combat founded on these assumptions. The latter 
 assumes nothing at the outset. It establishes particulars 
 by observation and experiment, and then collates, or colli- 
 gates, as it has been called, these particulars, until it 
 weaves them into general harmony. The former method 
 may turn out a truth in the same way as you may throw 
 sixes with dice. The latter method may be leas brilliant, 
 but what it establishes is reliable, and in any case such 
 errors as occur, are capable of detection before the general 
 result comes to be applied in war, for they must be 
 caused either by some mistaken particular, or by some 
 wrong application of particulars which are in themselves 
 true. 
 
 I need not say which of the two methods has my 
 approval, or on which of them I intend to base my present 
 enquiry. My former paper sufficiently showed. that I was 
 content to make any sacrifice rather than proceed to' 
 generalise hastily. But in applying such particulars as I 
 assumed to be established when I last addressed you, I 
 must ask yon to bear in mind that they are assumptions 
 still, in a greater or less degree. There is not one of the 
 points then adverted to which will not bear — nay, which 
 does -not imperatively demand — rectification by observa- 
 tion and experiment. I deny absolutely that we can form 
 any correct notion of what a future naval action will be 
 from the colligation of circumstances which we do not 
 know absolutely to be facts. At the same time I hold in 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 305 
 
 good faith to the theory that if we knew accurately all 
 the facts which can be established by experiment and ob- 
 servation in peace time, we should have materials amply 
 sufficient to guide us to complete success on the first 
 occasion of putting our theory into practice against an 
 enemy. 
 
 These remarks are not unnecessary at the outset of my 
 paper. There is not one of us Naval officers who has not 
 either heard or expressed the most decided opinions on the 
 efficiency of certain formations and the inefficiency of 
 others ; yet I venture to say not 10 per cent, of us have 
 ever heard any good reasons as to why one formation is 
 better than another, and not 2 per cent, have ever thought 
 out the matter even superficially for themselves. The dan- 
 ger we run of committing ourselves to some definite theory 
 of attack and defence without any inductive steps leading 
 up to it, is real and tangible ; and if, instead of advocating 
 a particular view, it should come to pass that I show the 
 end father off than ever, and leave your minds open 
 on the questions, I shall not consider I have done bad 
 service. 
 
 I must now advert to an opposite opinion on this matter 
 which is held by men of greater practical experience than 
 my own, and of deservedly greater weight. It is very 
 strongly held by these that it is far more important to have 
 a plan, than to have a good plan, of attack or defence. It is 
 insisted that the Admiralty would be wise now, with our 
 present information, in deciding on a particular formation 
 and mode of attack, and in enforcing its use on our Admirals, 
 so far as excluding all other plans from the Signal Book 
 goes. The issue raised is very distinct, but it is not one I 
 am called on to argue here. For, if I be wrong in suppos- 
 ing a bad compulsory plan to be worse than no plan, still, 
 
306 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 as no plau is yet adopted, such investigations as mine go to 
 establish not only a plan, but, if properly conducted, a good 
 plan, even though, as I before remarked, the attainment 
 of one were so far ofE. 
 
 It is now incumbent on me to state what the aim of my 
 arguments will be. 
 
 I understand the success of a fleet action will depend 
 jointly or severally on four things, namely, material superi- 
 ority, moral superiority, superior mobility, and superior 
 position. 
 
 Material superiority we have nothing to do with. If we 
 have it, and an equality in the other three things, we shall 
 win without a discussion. Moral superiority is often con- 
 founded with strategy, and often spoken of as though it 
 were a possession not only exclusively English, but incom- 
 patible with strategic skill or even strategic plans. I hope 
 I should be the last to despise that fire, dash, and stolid de- 
 termination which hurled a Nelson on the van of the 
 French at the Nile, and on the head of the Mole at Santa 
 Cruz. I trust no English Naval Officer will ever forget 
 that, guns or no guns, rams or no rams, torpedoes or no 
 torpedoes, he who places himself most completely in the 
 spirit of Nelson's orders to his captains is doing the best ser- 
 vice to the State, and runs most chance of winning. If 
 nerve gained naval victories for us a century ago, surely 
 those who have it in superiority possess an increased 
 power now ! But the instances I quoted of Nelson at the 
 Nile, and Nelson at Santa Cruz, are sufficient to indicate that 
 bravery and strategy combined are very much more power- 
 ful than bravery alone. The brave man had better be in- 
 telligently brave while he is about it. It may raise his 
 reputation for pluck to win with great loss, but it will bene- 
 fit the State more that he should win with small loss. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFKNCE OF FLEETS. 307 
 
 Besides, a maa cannot be argued into bravery, and he can be 
 taught strategy. 
 
 Again, mobility in a fleet must be attained before the 
 latter can be strategically employed. I pre-suppose we 
 have it in equality with the other side. Of the four quali- 
 ties set out there remains now only the last — superiority of 
 position. What constitutes it and how to gain it, is the sub- 
 ject I intend to discuss. 
 
 To those, therefore, and they are many, who pin their faith 
 on the moral superiority given by audacity and nerve, and 
 propose without any plan to rush upon an enemy's fleet and 
 frighten him into submission, I have nothing to say of a 
 controversial character. I am not about to argue whether 
 audacity be a greater or a less powerful weapon than 
 skill. But I am about to argue, and do maintain, that 
 audacity supplemented by skill is irresistible, and my object 
 is to arrive at some conclusion as to how your own Meet can 
 be best disposed so as to allow your audacity to produce the 
 greatest possible effect on your enemy with the least harm to 
 yourself. 
 
 I must now set out in order those points which, discussed 
 in my last paper, or generally admitted, have, for the pur- 
 poses of my present argument, all the force of facts, and 
 must be acknowledged as such until they are controverted. 
 
 First comes the possible speed of a fleet in action : we 
 know that this ranges between, say, eight and .thirteen 
 knots, and if I take a mean of ten knots, I shall place my- 
 self in such a position that half my readers will say I put 
 it too high, and the other half too low, a sufficient guarantee 
 for being somewhere near the truth. Assuming such a 
 speed, enables me to deal with the all-important relations 
 of time and space ; will permit me to show what can and 
 what cauDot be done by a fleet in the time allowed ; and 
 
 X 2 
 
308 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 how the skilful commander ma,y. avail himself of the limit 
 which time im.poses on the enemy's movements.! 
 
 Next comes the turning power of ships, which I showed 
 in my last and former papers cannot be taken as to space, 
 at a smaller arc than one with, a radius of two and a half 
 times the ship's length ; and as to time, a reduction in speed 
 over the arc of one-third. It is perhaps necessary to repeat 
 here that this statement does represent in the rough an 
 absolute fact ; and that the figures do give the smallest space 
 combine I with the least time in which average ships can 
 turn. If the space be diminished the time will be increased, 
 and if the space be increased, so also will the tinie.2 
 
 If we now take 300 feet as the length of an ordinary iron- 
 clad, we get an arc of turning for the ships of our fleet of 
 250 yards, and a time of turning through (say) eight points 
 at ten knots, of two minutes. 
 
 I must draw your particular attention to the foregoing 
 figures, because I base my whole view of naval strategy 
 upon them, not indeed on the exact numbers, but upon their 
 relations to each other. These relations are, in my view, the 
 bounds within which the tactician must work, and beyond 
 which he will only fail in attempting to pass. It is no use 
 to call them matters of details or assumptions, they are vital 
 principles ; and the only assumption about them is the 
 exactness of the figures. Ships may not be 300 feet in 
 length, but the shortest turning ironclad which has ever 
 been built, going at her highest speed, takes about a minute 
 to turn through eight points on an arc whose diameter 
 was 5'2 times her length, reducing her speed over the arc 
 by more than one-tenth. 
 
 1 Such a fighting speed must still be considered proper. — Ed. 
 ''■ The twin-screw modifies the space, but not materially the 
 relations between time and space. — ED. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 309 
 
 The next point to be considered is the gun-power of 
 ships. T laid it down last year from the best data obtain- 
 able, that only about 10 per cent, of the shot fired from a 
 sea-going ship would take effect upon another bro.idside- 
 on, and at a fixed distance of 1,000 yards ; and that the 
 highest speed of fire which could be calculated upon, was 
 about one round in three minutes. The damage done by 
 hits at that range was of course not easy to estimate, but 
 except at close quarters, when the shot strike fair on the 
 broadside, all allow it to be small : the effect of hits re- 
 ceived when «nd-on is generally considered to be nil. 
 
 I held the ram to be the effective weapon in a single- 
 ship action, the gun being subordinate, unless the Harvey 
 torpedo should supersede the former ; and while on this 
 subject I must say two words. I have usually in my 
 papers stated that the idea of the ram originated in our 
 Service, with ttte gallant Admiral of the Fleet, Sir George 
 SartoriuS. He will be pleased to know that another officer. 
 Sir James Sulivan, was, contemporaneously with him, 
 pressing the weapon on the notice of the Government, and 
 assisting in that development which we are yet so far from 
 seeing complete. 
 
 Again, I have seen, since I last addressed you, the 
 Harvey torpedo in action, and I have m^odified my views 
 of it. It is not, in my opinion, so powerful a weapon as I 
 formerly believed it to be. To use it effectually, special 
 ships of. high speed must be employed, and even then, 
 much more skill is required than I imagined necessary. It 
 seems to me also, that the mitrailleuse ,or volley -gun will 
 be a very effective defence against this torpedo. It 
 would be used both to sweep the manipulators off the 
 decks, aud also to destroy the torpedo itself. In any case, 
 it must here be said that even when I read my last paper. 
 
310 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFKNCE. 
 
 I could not view the Harvey torpedo as an effective 
 weapon in fleets. It is true tbat one or two special ships 
 towing torpedoes, might, as an avcmt garde, throw a 
 hostile fleet into some confusion ; but, as the enemy 
 might equally well employ the same weapon, we should 
 have a combat of torpedoes vessels between the fleets be- 
 fore they met, which could not lead to decisive results.l 
 If this torpedo is ever rendered powerless against friends, 
 fleets might employ it with greater reliance on its power 
 against enemies. 
 
 I now arrive at a point on which there is not, and 
 cannot be any data, but which universal assent has estab- 
 lished as a fact. I allude to the general understanding 
 that whatever forniations may be in future assumed by 
 two hostile fleets in action, the ships composing them will 
 always be end-on, and never broadside-on to the enemy. 
 Some explanation is required to show how I look on it. 
 
 In my last paper I endeavoured to show that, prevalent 
 as the notion was that the end-on position was that which 
 a ram would assume towards another ship in action, it 
 was in reality a false one. I showed that this was quite 
 a right position for a ship not herself a ram, and desirous 
 to avoid being rammed, but that if a ram were so to range 
 herself she could never strike at an advantage. I find now 
 very many officers hold that I am wrong, not in upholding 
 the advantage of making your stem take your enemy's 
 broadside, but wrong in believing that two ships will 
 seldom, or never, meet stem to stem. It is difficult to 
 argue either side of the question, but I may note that the 
 Russian gunboats never met stem to stem in their experi- 
 ments ; and I may express my firm belief that one or other 
 
 ' It is curious that according to some authorities, the more recent 
 ■■ torpedo-boat " will succeed to this function, in cases. — Bd. 
 
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THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 311 
 
 ship will in such a case swerve at the last moment, and 
 pass broadside to broadside without any result from either 
 ram.l Those who think otherwise must remember that 
 there is no analogy between the old principle of getting 
 broadside-on to your enemy at pistol range, and pounding 
 him till either one or the other struck, and the stem-to- 
 stem encounter between two rams. The superiority of the 
 English seaman in our old wars lay in his muscle and his 
 steadiness. The weakness of our enemies was never in 
 material, but they failed in nerve and stolidity. It was 
 the height of strategy to bring our strong points against 
 his weak ones, and broadside to broadside did this in per- 
 fection. But for one ship to run against another, stem-to- 
 stem, is no strategy, but rather a reckless blind trusting to 
 chance. 
 
 The victory depends upon which ship turns out to be 
 the hardest, and the spinning of a teetotum will represent 
 the chances on either side, The strong probability is that 
 if two ships met at speed, stem-to-stem, the shock would 
 be so terrific that both combatants would instantly dis- 
 appear. 
 
 I am Baying nothing here of the policy of charging 
 straight down upon your enemy in the belief that he will 
 flinch from his end-on position before the last moment, and 
 give you the opportunity you seek. Such a course may be 
 the most excellent strategy, as you are opposing your pre- 
 sumed strength of nerve toyoiir enemy's weakness. I 
 have before said, however, that 1 have nothing to do with 
 strategy of this kind, and if a stem-to-stem encounter is 
 contemplated in any other view, it will, I think, be a very 
 foolish proceeding. 
 
 1 This happened in the case of .the Bovmet ;ancl Meteor, French 
 and German ships in the West Indies.— ED, 
 
312 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 If there is anything to be said on the other side, I am 
 not now aware of it, and 1 therefore base all my ideas on 
 what I have here stated. 
 
 Those, therefore, who think with me, will observe the 
 instinct of the naval world has led it to contemplate the 
 end-on position for hostile fleets, not as the best means of 
 attacking with rams, but as the best means of frustrating 
 an attack of rams. Our opponents will take the opposite 
 view. The latter party will maintain that the ram domi- 
 nates and prescribes the formation, and is itself the chief 
 weapon ; I, on the contrary, conclude that the ram domi- 
 nates and prescribes the formation, which is so good a 
 defence against it, that the ram is not the chief weapon in 
 fleet actions. And the inefficiency of the ram as the chief 
 fleet weapon, once the end-on position is firmly established, 
 seems to me to be argued by other considerations which 
 I have not yet seen treated by any writer on tactics. 
 
 If we examine the ramming tactics for single ships laid 
 out in my last paper, and endeavour to apply them to fleets, 
 we shall soon see, I think, their inapplicability. Take 
 Diagram I, figs. 7 and 8, and Diagram III, fig. 1, of my 
 former paper, and you will at once note that the mode of 
 approach is of small value. If as and y, Figs. 7 and 8, 
 were leaders of single columns in line ahead, as in Diagram 
 IV, fig. 1, it is apparent either thai the leaders alone would 
 encounter, or that the turn of a; to ram, throwing her broad- 
 side open to the next astern of y, would be taken advantage 
 of by that ship, and even if ce succeeded in ramming y, she 
 would herself be rammed in turn. So if x and y were the 
 port wing ships of single lines abreast, as in Diagram IV, 
 fig. 2, their manoeuvres would have no reference to the re- 
 mainder of the fleet. If x and y were not wing ships, but 
 some other ships in the lines abreast, as in Diagram V, fig. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 313 
 
 1, then x must make his turn astern of his left hand neigh- 
 bour; he lays himself open to attack by y's left hand 
 neighbour, and breaks the order of his own line, cutting 
 himself ofE from support at the same time. Should he, 
 however, use the short turn, as in Diagram V, fig. 2, his 
 manoeuvre will be baulked by his own left hand neighbour, 
 to avoid whom he must exercise caution, and who more or 
 less hides the object of his attack, just at the moment when 
 all depends on his getting a clear view. He again lays him- 
 self open to the attack of j/'s left hand neighbour, or, if he 
 misses y, of his right hand neighbour. 
 
 If OS and y, however, being leaders of lines ahead, choose 
 the 4-point method of approach given in Diagram III, fig. 
 1, the rest of the fleet does not partake in any of the ad- 
 vantages of the mode of advance, as may be seen from 
 Diagram V, fig. 3. If, however, they were the leaders of 
 columns in quarter-line, as in Fig. 4, their tactics would 
 equally apply to the ships astern of them. But the difEer- 
 ence is, that x is no longer solely occupied with his attack. 
 If his own next astern by any accident lets y's next astern 
 slip past him, oo has two ships upon him, and fights at a 
 disadvantage. We see running through all these positions 
 a principle by which, in formation, one ship covers or guards 
 another from a ramming attack, and renders useless the 
 methods which are available between single ships. The 
 fleet which rigidly maintains its end-on position, and whose 
 ships only swerve from that to deliver their blow upon the 
 enemy, who presents his broadside while attempting to ram 
 the ships to whom they are guards, goes into action with 
 an advantage, for it runs no such risks of being rammed as 
 its opponents, who seek to attack in that manner, and while 
 it never drops its own guard, it is ready to take advantage 
 of any slip its enemy may make. 
 
314 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Naval tactical strategy, therefore, ■while it dictates an 
 attack by the ram by single ships, as the most effective 
 means of obtaining the victory for him -who is most skilful, 
 does not seem to me to advise that policy in a fleet attack. 
 Yon must beat your enemy in some other way. 
 
 Before leaving this part of my subject, it is necessary to 
 point out that some ships in every formation have no 
 guards, and are open to the same attack as single ships. 
 The rear ships in line ahead are open to the ramming attack 
 on both sides ; and the wing ships in lines abreast and 
 quarter lines are open to attack on their outer sides. 
 Hence, although you cannot, as it seems to me, make your 
 general effort a ramming attack, you will be foolish to 
 avoid' any opportunity which offers of attacking particular 
 parts of your enemy in that manner. 
 
 We are now in a condition to apply the principles we 
 have brought out to the actual business of my paper, the 
 Attack and Defence of Fleets. 
 
 In all sea-fights of former ages, we see either of two con- 
 ditions ; both fleets equally ready for the combat, or one 
 assuming from the outset the attack, and the other the 
 defence ; the former condition is rare. Hitherto, I believe, 
 no case has occurred where — as in so many battles on land 
 — a skilful movement has converted the defence into an 
 attack. The most that could be done in former times was 
 practised by the French, before the revolutionary war, in 
 taking advantage of the weakness of the British attack to 
 damage them seriously while keeping themselves out of 
 harm's way. Clerk of Eldin shows that in the attack from 
 to windward, generally practised by us before Lord Rod- 
 ney's victory changed our views, we really offered a por- 
 tion of our fleets to the whole fire of the enemy, as shown 
 in Diagram V, fig. 5, and our van becoming disabled from 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 315 
 
 this cause, the French were in a position to bear away to 
 leaward to re-form, and to repeat the manoeuvre, which 
 they usually did. 
 
 Sir John Jervis at St. Vincent, and Lord Nelson at the 
 Nile, are brilliant examples of an opposite mode of proceed- 
 ing, and though the approach of Lord Nelson at Trafalgar 
 might seem a recurrence to old methods, it was not really 
 so, as the enemy's fire was divided between two vans, and 
 the approach was direct, and as rapid as it could be, instead 
 of the slow and " lasking " approach, asit was called, shown 
 in Fig. 5, Diagram V. 
 
 In the changed condition of things now, we must be very 
 careful to guard against following history too blindly as our 
 guide ; but, at the same time, we must by no means neglect 
 to avail ourselves of the lessons she really teaches ; though, 
 therefore, the manner has passed away, the inatter remains 
 as worthy of adoption as ever it was. 
 
 I think now that steam has done much to alter the 
 former state of affairs, and that an inferior fleet may, 
 when direct attack is not at first attempted, convert a 
 defence into an attack, and perhaps even gain a victory. 
 
 The principles of a skilful attack or defence must ever 
 remain the same ; they must always be the offering a 
 superior force to an inferior ; and if a part of the enemy's 
 fleet is made to bear the brunt of the whole of your own, 
 the greatest tactician can do no more. 
 
 I am sorry, however, to believe that we are at present 
 drawing more inspiration from the manner of our fore- 
 fathers in naval tactics than from the matter. I do not 
 think we have shaken ourselves sufficiently clear of the 
 traditions of naval sea fights to perceive the laws which 
 underlie them, and become applicable to our own times. 
 In days of yore we had a broadside position ; small sail 
 
316 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 and low speed. Now we have the end-on position, and 
 great speed. I do not think, from all I have seen and 
 heard, that naval minds habitually dwell on the speed at 
 which future actions must be fought. It is known and 
 acknowledged that a ship without speed, if met by a ship 
 with speed, is doomed to certain destruction by ramming, 
 but in spite of this, the picture of a fleet action naval 
 men have before their eyes, is always a confused assem- 
 blage of ships more or less stationary. It is quite common 
 to hear it said that " the best tactics are for every captain 
 to put himself alongside an enemy's ship," as if such a 
 thing were now possible, unless the enemy's ship were a 
 consenting party. The French system of tactics did much, 
 and Lissa did more to confuse the picture of a future sea 
 fight, and to paint it as a meUe of independent attacks. 
 The melee at Lissa was entirely due to the broadside 
 position of the Italian fleet and its want of speed ; two 
 concomitant blunders which no commander will ever be 
 mad enough to bring together again. Had it been other- 
 wise, TegethofE might have had his melee to himself, but 
 the Italians would have been out of it from their own 
 impetus. If two fleets charge one another at ten knots in 
 the end-on position, three minutes will elapse between 
 their being a mile apart and their meeting, and in 
 another three minutes they will again be a mile apart. 
 If the very instant after one fleet had passed through the 
 other, they put their helms hard over, still the other 
 fleet would be three-quarters of a mile away before the 
 first was in pursuit. Under such circumstances the only 
 melee will be amongst the wounded birds, and the type of 
 the battle would be a rash, a contact, a separation, a re- 
 formation, again facing each other, another rush, aud the 
 same thing repeated. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFKNCE OF FLEETS. 317 
 
 The other type of action — still due to speed and the 
 end-on position, would he where one fleet retires before 
 the other uritil, by happy skill, or by happy accident, it is 
 able to face its pursuer with advantage. 
 
 How to face your enemy with this advantage, how to 
 bring your whole fleet on a portion of his when facing him, 
 seems to me the problem before us. 
 
 We shall all be agreed, I think, that anything like 
 elaborate manoeuvring is out of the question, except in 
 the process of retiring. The mere moment of time which 
 elapses between the coming into range of two approaching 
 fleets and their shock, renders either mancBuvring or sig- 
 nalling absolutely out of the question. Nay, even after 
 sighting an enemy's fleet — say ten miles off, he will be a 
 hardy admiral who attempts to do more than throw his 
 fleet into the formation he intends to fight in. In such 
 circumstances, the fewer signals the better, as a mistake 
 might be fatal, and the chances of mistake are trebled 
 when the nerves are tightly strung, as they would be at 
 such a moment of excitement. 
 
 The very numerous, and sometimes eccentric, fighting 
 formations which are proposed for adoption by our own 
 and other Navies may be classified under four heads ; 
 which, on still closer examination, may for the purposes of 
 argument, be resolved into two. These are — 
 
 (1). An extended front, with small depth. 
 
 (2). A narrow front with great depth. 
 
 (3). The mass or square, where depth and front became 
 equalised. 
 
 (4). The system of groups however disposed. The 
 principle doing that the attack or defence is not 
 concentrated, each group making itself felt as 
 occasion ofEers. 
 
318 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 The mass, or square, must possess in a less degree the 
 advantages and disadvantages of the extended and narrow 
 front, and of the small and great depth. 
 
 The groups must be disposed either along an extended 
 front or along an extended depth, and, therefore, must, so 
 long as they remain in formation at all, possess the weak- 
 ness or the strength of those formations. 
 
 If, however, we reflect a moment, we shall see that 
 when an enemy's fleet is approaching in an order of battle, 
 all that can be detected in the few minutes of time 
 allowed, will be either its extended front or its extended 
 depth. Therefore, although if time permitted I might go 
 into greater detail, I think that I shall best argue out the 
 principles I have in view by imagining all formations 
 classed under the two first heads, and considering the 
 relations between an extended front as opposed to an ex- 
 tended front ; a narrow front and great depth as opposed 
 to an extended front and small depth, and a narrow front 
 and extended depth as opposed to the same formation. A 
 few words will then sufiBoe to treat of the mass or square, 
 and of the system of groups. 
 
 It will also, I think, conduce to clearness if I do not go 
 beyond the two representative formations of the extended 
 front and the extended depth, namely, the single column 
 in line abreast and the single column in line ahead. 
 
 The attack I define to be when the ships keep their 
 heads towards the enemy, advancing, or trying to advance 
 on him. The defence is when the fleet retires before the 
 enemy. 
 
 In the attack there is always one enormous advantage 
 on the side of that fleet which takes the initiative. Ships 
 cannot move simultaneously, except by signal. One or 
 two ships may turn so closely after each other, moved by 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 319 
 
 a common impulse, as to be practically simultaneous in 
 their action ; but this cannot be carried throughout a 
 fleet. It follows, then, if there is not time to make a 
 signal after the nature of the attack is disclosed, neither 
 will there be time to manoeuvre so as to counteract it. 
 The Admiral assuming the initiative, or advancing in such 
 a way as enables him to assume it without a signal, may 
 do so with some security against a counteracting move- 
 ment. While he who waits till the attack is developed in 
 the hope of counteracting it, runs the risk of not being 
 allowed time to do so. 
 
 Taking, now. Diagram VI, we have two fleets, 2,000 
 yards apart, approaching at the rate of 20 miles an hour. 
 The fleet A may pass straight on, bearing down upon B, 
 without alteration of course. In the three minutes elapsing 
 between getting into range, and contact, one, or at most two 
 rounds may be exchanged. Supposing both fleets had been 
 stationary at 1,000 yards, and each ship in A fired two 
 guns at B, between one and two shot might strike, with a 
 chance of penetration or damage at its minimum. But the 
 fleet target, so far from being stationary, is altering its 
 range eleven yards in a second. Under such circumstances, 
 to fire is to waste powder. A had better proceed without 
 firing, and with his guns concentrated right abeam and 
 horizontal, ready to discharge point-blank into the enemy 
 in passing, should his ships maintain their end-on position 
 and so elude the ram. B, under present circumstances, 
 ought to reserve his fire, and hence, when the two fleets 
 have passed through one another, they will have fought 
 on an absolute equality, and any less damage done to one 
 or the other must be due to stronger plating, bad practice 
 on the other side, or the chapter of accidents. 
 
 But, consider how very dangerous this method of en- 
 
320 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 gaging -will be to the friends on both, sides. In the con- 
 fusion, excitement, and smoke, how more than likely is it 
 that a friend will receive the broadside intended for an 
 enemy ? True, each fleet runs an equal risk of this, just as 
 each runs an equal risk of being rammed. But to run 
 these risks is not tactics, and it is, I think, plain on these 
 grounds that an attack made direct, by an extended front, 
 ought not to be met by a counter attack of the same 
 nature. 
 
 It will be opan to A, if there is time to make the signal 
 before getting into range, to put in force the application of 
 ramming taetics formerly mentioned, and by altering 
 course together four points either way, to endeavour to 
 force a similar movement on the enemy, and thus to con- 
 vert an artillery combat into a trial of skill in ramming. 
 If this movement were made at the moment of coming into 
 range, the new positions of" the fleets would be at p and rj. 
 It is pretty clear that A's manoeuvre has no forcing effect 
 whatever on B, who, on the contrary, appears to have cer- 
 tain advantages placed in his hands which he had not 
 before. It is true that, for a moment, the artillery of A 
 may be held superior to that of B, inasmuch as he can 
 probably bring more guns to bear. But this advantage 
 passes away as A moves to the right along the front of 
 B ; and besides, A receives the shot of B more directly 
 perpendicular to his broadside than does B those 
 of A. 
 
 But while the port-wing ship of B is guarded from rams 
 by her right-hand neighbour, the port-wing ship of A is 
 not guarded at all, and should be the object of B's attack 
 by ramming. 
 
 Except these '' alterations of course together," which 
 must be ordered by signal before getting into range, there 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 321 
 
 appears little that A caa do so long as he remains in line 
 abreaet ; and if it be as appears, that he gains no advan- 
 tage either in a direct advance or a four-point advance 
 it seems to me he must give up the extended front if he 
 wishes to attack an extended front with an advantage. 
 
 Let us therefore examine the extended and narrow- 
 fronts as opposed to each other. This we have in Diagram 
 VII, fig. 1. We suppose two fleets, A and B, observing 
 one another at sufficient distance to allow of consideration 
 and to the coming to the conclusion to attack : but A de- 
 termines to do so in a formation with a narrow front, and 
 B with an extended front. The headmost ship of A has 
 approached to within 2,000 yards of B's ships. Let us see 
 how matters stand between them. A's leader is opsn to 
 the fire of the whole of B's bow guns, a fire which we have 
 before shown to be ineSective. That is her whole disad- 
 vantage. On the other hand she is within three minutes 
 of contact with B's fleet, and yet has not disclosed the 
 nature of her attack. Supposing the Admiral of A to be 
 leading, his orders would be to the ships astern of him to 
 follow his motions together, as nearly as possible to concen- 
 trate their guns at point blank, right ahead, and to pour in 
 their shot on the instant of passing an enemy's ship. 
 
 A has three attacks open to him : the centre, or either 
 flank, of his enemy ; and leaving him in doubt up to within 
 three minutes of commencing his attack, it is manifestly 
 impossible for B to counteract him, even if there were a 
 movement capable of doing it. Suppose A chooses to pierce 
 the centre, and therefore simply continues his course ; 
 as he passes between two enemy's ships he certainly re- 
 ceives their two broadsides ; but if he be equal in power 
 on both sides he gives them as good as he gets, with this 
 advantage, that his shot which miss one enemy's ship may 
 
322 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 hit another ; while the enemy's shot which miss him may 
 damage their friends. But if A's leader has already been 
 subjected to bow fire from those ships between which he 
 passes, they will hardly be ready in the time to give him 
 broadside fire as well from these guns. But in any case, 
 the moment A's leader has exchanged broadsides with her 
 enemies, and long before they are in a condition to fire 
 again, a succession of fresh ships pass into her place at the 
 rate of one every twenty seconds or thereabouts. The two 
 ships between which A is efEecting his passage will thus 
 receive five broadsides apiece in about a minute and a half, 
 without more than a single reply, and if this is not enough 
 for them, I think it ought to be.l 
 
 Here we have the process of " doubling on the enemy," 
 as I conceive it must in future be practised. The principle 
 remains the same as ever, only the detail has altered with 
 the times. Instead of doubling simultaneously and so 
 placing a ship betwixt two fires, we must now double in 
 succession, serving her with a continued succession of fresh 
 ships. 
 
 The only objection I can see to this centre attack is, that 
 you lay yourself open to the fire of both flanks on your 
 near approach, whereas, by attacking on the flank, you can 
 receive no more than half that amount. 
 
 In this attack, if the Admiral chooses to threaten the 
 centre till close up with the enemy, which I think will be 
 hardly necessary, his ships should turn together towards 
 the intended flank and then turn again into line ahead, 
 as shown in the diagram, pouring successive broadsides 
 into the enemy's wing-ship in passing, A's rear ship 
 
 1 Whether under such circumstances the ships between which 
 A's fleet passes would dare to use their Whitehead torpedoes is an 
 interesting problem. — Ed. 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 323 
 
 should, I think, be directed to attack the wing-ships of the 
 enemy with his ram, and for this purpose should steer 
 further out than the ships ahead, so as to give himself 
 room to turn. His orders should be not to embroil himself 
 by making a second attempt if he misses the first, — indeed, 
 he can hardly obtain a second opportunity, — but to follow 
 the rest of the fleet, which should re-form with their 
 heads towards the enemy, ready to act again as may be 
 necessary. 
 
 There are in this kind of combat a variety of circum- 
 stances to be noted which seem to me to tell in favour of 
 A's attack. If there is no wind, A's ships after the 
 leader, will observe B's wing-ships emerging from the 
 smoke of their own and A's guns, before they themselves 
 have entered it. They will consequently be more m.asters 
 of the situation than B's ships can possibly be. If B's 
 whole line continues to fire from his bow guns, as no doubt 
 he would, there is the greatest danger of his line getting 
 into confusion, and also of some of the shot intended for 
 ail enemy reaching no further than a friend. It is, I 
 believe, a fact that with modern heavy guns the compasses 
 are thrown completely out of gear, so that no formation 
 can be maintained by compass while firing. 1 
 
 In A's advance the compass is not appealed to at all, 
 as each ship simply follows her next ahead in the closest 
 possible order : and although the formation will probably 
 be broken ultimately, this will not happen till its work 
 has been done, and it is clear of smoke in rear of the 
 enemy. 
 
 If the wind were blowing towards the attacked flank 
 across the enemy's front, his view will be interrupted, and 
 
 1 Subsequent experience showed me that Sir Wm. Thomson's 
 (Lord Kelvin's) compass modifies this a good deal.— Ed. 
 
324 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 his fire will slack. But the smoke may also shroud A's 
 ships from one another even before they tire, and their 
 broadsides may be thrown away. 
 
 If the wind is from the attacked flank, A will always be 
 in the clear, while the ships of B's line will be shrouded, 
 each one by the smoke of his neighbour. 
 
 I think, therefore, that A should choose the weather 
 flank for his attack. If the wind be with B's fleet, so 
 much the worse for him, while it will not affect A. While, 
 if the wind be with A's fleet, the conditions will be those 
 of a calm, except that A will be longer in his own smoke 
 after he lia.s passed the enemy. 
 
 But while showing the advantages of thus opposing a 
 narrow to an extended front, we must not omit to ascer- 
 tain what possibilities of defence lie in the extended front. 
 At first sight, many movements will suggest themselves as 
 practicable, but when we apply the rigid standards of time 
 and space, we shall think differently. 
 
 Remember, there are but three minutes in which B 
 must form and execute his plan. On the face of it, there- 
 fore, there can be no combined manoeuvre not previously 
 arranged. No previous arrangement could embrace more 
 than a single movement, yet there is no single movement 
 preserving the line abreast, which can be executed in the 
 time and space except by surrendering the attacking position. 
 
 Suppose B were to hope to swing his line round on his 
 port wing-ship as the pivot? To do this, the port wing- 
 ships, the very object of his solicitude, must reduce their 
 speed, enabling A's rear-ship, already warned, to ram them 
 with ease. But in no case can B's starboard wing-ship 
 come upon A's rear-ship in time. Again, B surrenders his 
 bow -fire in attempting any manoeuvre, for it is admitted 
 by all impossible to manoeuvre in smoke. Besides, any 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 325 
 
 one who has experience of fleet manoeuvring, is aware of 
 the difficulty of preserving the formation when swinging 
 round, even for drill purposes. 
 
 Single ships, it has been said, may pierce A's line or ram 
 him. This is so, but only by passing astern of their 
 friends, and so separating from them and plunging into 
 the midst of their enemies, can they effect their purpose. 
 But then they pass at once into the heaviest of the smoke, 
 and run at least as great a risk of destruction themselves 
 as they bring upon their enemies. 
 
 On the whole, therefore, my view is, that an extended 
 front is an exceedingly weak formation for attack, and 
 ought to saccumb to the narrow front in all cases where 
 things are otherwise equal. 
 
 But the extended front may, when time permits, be 
 changed for the narrow one. If B, surrendering his idea 
 of the line abreast, were, on perceiving A's approach 
 in line ahead, to meet him in the same formation, he 
 would advance his port wing-ship and form astern of 
 him. 
 
 This would give us the narrow front as opposed to the 
 narrow front, shown in Diagram VII., fig. 2, and I think 
 we see the balance is restored, and that if both fleets so 
 advance, they will fight on an equality. 
 
 It is of course useless, and perhaps foolish, for the leaders 
 to open fire till abreast of each other; they will then 
 exchange their broadsides, and if they both pass on, will 
 each receive the broadside of fresh ships before they can 
 reply effectually. Here the same qualities might stand 
 the British seaman gunner in as good stead as formerly 
 provided, that is, that machinery more perfect for working 
 guns is not adopted by other nations, and a rapidity of fire 
 obtained, which we cannot compete with. 
 
326 ESSAYS OK NAVAL DEFENCK. 
 
 But without this, or in spite of this, A may by proper 
 orders to his ships, gain an advantage over B. 
 
 Suppose, for instance, that A's leader, and each ship 
 astern of him, were ordered the moment they had fired 
 their broadsides, to turn sharp off to starboard, B's fresh 
 ships would never get the opportunity of firing at all, and 
 his leader and her next astern, would have received the 
 fire of the whole of A's ships. When the smoke cleared 
 away, A would find himself in quarter line with B in his 
 rear, and might determine on the next stage of his attack. 
 
 I have now discussed as closely as time permits, the 
 principles of Naval Tactics in the attack as they have 
 presented themselves to me after such limited examina- 
 tion as I have been able to give to them. 
 
 It will be seen that I believe the extended front to be a 
 weak formation, and that in no case should it be taken up 
 in an attack. It has appeared also in the course of my 
 enquiry that the bow-fire, or extreme training of guns, ia 
 not of great value, and that more is to be done by broad- 
 side fire in attacking fleets. These conditions appear 
 reversed when one fleet retires before another. Then, 
 uulesB the pursuer can enforce by his speed, or the pursued 
 takes up for himself, the position of attack, the result 
 must depend on the goodness of the gunnery practice. 
 The pursued must spread out an extended rear, and the 
 pursuer an extended front, in order to get the full value of 
 their artillery. Here the distances will be fairly permanent, 
 and the bow and stern fires become effective. I cannot 
 conceive, hoveever, a decisive victory gained on such 
 principles ; and for the defence, I would rather convert it 
 into an audacious attack upon either flank of the pursuer 
 in the manner before described. 
 
 I have already stated that if a formation, such as the 
 
THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 327 
 
 hollow square proposed in Russia, possesses depth and 
 extended front in combination, it possesses also the weak- 
 nesses and strengths of each quality, and therefore', if the 
 better qualities of the line ahead be opposed to the less 
 good ones of the shorter side of a square, there will still be 
 an advantage, though not so great on the part of the former. 
 
 These compromises seem to me to be proper for adoption 
 by such nations as, from their want of naval prestige, may 
 be more solicitous to guard against defeat then to ensure 
 victory. I mast own my sympathies lie in the direction 
 of audacity, and a determination to win or to lose all ; 
 and hence I do not so much concern myself with half 
 measures. 
 
 It will be seen that I lay great stress on compactness 
 and concentration in attack, and I am in consequence 
 opposed to systems of reserves of separate fleets acting 
 conjointly ; or lastly, to the attack or defence by groups. 
 
 I cannot at present see how, when fleets are at speed, a 
 group can act independently without running the great 
 risk of finding itself surrounded by enemies, and beyond 
 the support of its friends. Suppose a group such as Figs. 
 3 and 4, diagram VII., opposed to even the same number 
 of ships only, in close order in line ahead. The broadside 
 fire of one ship in each formation is masked, and in Fig. 3 
 the attacking force of three ships would receive one 
 broadside from the leader at double distance, and one from 
 the wing-ship at close distance. But this wing-ship would 
 get in return three broadsides at close distance. So with 
 four ships in line ahead attacking the group of four. The 
 leader might sustain one broadside at close distance, and 
 two at double distance. But the wing-ship would sustain 
 foar broadsides at close quarters. Then observe the weak- 
 ness of these groups in the matter of ramming. Fig. •!! 
 
328 ESSAYS ON NAVAL DEFENCE. 
 
 has two ships out of three, and Fig. 4 three ships out of 
 four, unguarded. Such an opportunity for the ram-ships 
 of a line ahead is all that can be desired, especially in Fig. 
 4, for the ram which misses the wing-ship, will almost to 
 a certainty catch the rear. 
 
 Such, then, is my slight summary of the line I conceive 
 our study of Naval Tactics should take. I should be 
 very sorry, indeed, to dogmatise on a subject which is to all 
 intents and purposes a new science, but I hope to have 
 shown that there are sound principles to be got at even in 
 peace time, if we will only take suffii3ient trouble to find 
 them. 
 
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