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 Metaphysical basis of Plato's, ejhics, 
 
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THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 OF 
 
 PLATO'S ETHICS 
 
THE 
 
 METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 OF 
 
 PLATO'S ETHICS 
 
 BY 
 
 ARTHUR BERNARD COOK M.A. 
 
 FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE 
 
 "Quis ille primus, cuius ex imagine 
 Natura solars finxit humanum genus, 
 Aeternus, incorruptus, aequaevus polo, 
 Unusque et universus, exemplar Dei?" — 
 
 , MILTON 
 
 Cambri&ge 
 
 DEIGHTON BELL & CO. 
 
 London GEORGE BELL & SONS 
 
 189s 
 
CAMBRIDGE 
 
 PRINTED BY JONATHAN PALMER 
 
 ALEXANDRA STREET 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface ix 
 
 Part I. The Platonic Theory of Mind . . . i 
 
 § I. The Parmenides i 
 
 § 2. The Sophist 17 
 
 § 3. Aristotle's Psychology 23 
 
 Part II. Higher and Lower Mentality . . . 54 
 
 § I. Purpose and Necessity 55 
 
 § 2. Identity and Difference 68 
 
 § 3. Theology 85 
 
 Part III. Metaphysical Descent and Moral Ascent. 113 
 Index Locorum 153 
 
PREFACE 
 
 Tt oZv fi/ieii ipovft.iv eirl ToiToirois Kal roioirois i^TiyiiTais rov 
 Uhdraii/os! Kal tI ■npoaBiiaoiiiv 4k rris ruierepas eirrtas ; 
 
 Proklos in Parm. ed. Cousin vi. 30. 
 
 The following essay is neither a systematic account 
 of Plato's metaphysics, nor an adequate exposition 
 of Plato's ethics. Its scope is a narrower one. It 
 aims at clearing up the connection between the two. 
 And, if the attempt has led me to reinterpret the 
 metaphysical scheme that underlay the ethics of 
 matured Platonism, my purpose throughout has been 
 to show how intimately— and indeed vitally — the 
 latter was connected with the former. Thus far at 
 least I find myself in accordance with the general 
 tendency of modern Platonic criticism. For the sup- 
 posed independence, not to say antagonism, of the 
 several parts of Plato's philosophy, which still mars 
 the work of certain exponents, is nowadays falling 
 into disrepute. We are beginning to look askance on 
 all constructions involving the philosopher in incon- 
 gruous positions. And this is due partly, I think, to 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 a growing appreciation of the artistic side of his 
 thought, partly to special efforts that have been made 
 to determine from theoretical content or linguistic 
 style the true order of the Platonic writings. The 
 former movement postulates that here, if anywhere, a 
 speculative system must mean a harmonious whole ; 
 the latter has shown that sundry seeming inconsis- 
 tencies are but tide-marks of a progressive develop- 
 ment. But, whatever be the precise causes which 
 have of recent times tended to discredit the patch- 
 work Platonism of the past, it will fairly be demanded 
 of any fresh endeavour to articulate the Idealist 
 doctrine that it represent that doctrine as an organic 
 unity. 
 
 This being admitted, the only safe course is to 
 regard the Platonic philosophy from the standpoint of 
 some opo'i 6pi,cr6eh /li'ya'i for which Plato is himself 
 responsible. Now of all such Spot that which is most 
 constantly affirmed and most jealously guarded is 
 the reality of the Ideal world. The late Dr. Maguire 
 has somewhere said that "the objectivity of the Idea 
 is the corner-stone of Platonism." I should prefer to 
 substitute the term "reality" as a translation of oiicrta, 
 because the cardinal dogma of the Timaeiis asserts 
 that the nature of ovaia is to be at once raiiTov and 
 
PREFACE. XI 
 
 Qdrepov, i.e. not only objective but also subjective. 
 And here it may conduce to clearness if, by way of 
 preamble, I sketch the main drift of my essay, in- 
 dicating in the briefest possible manner how this 
 theory of objective and subjective ovcria furnished a 
 satisfactory foundation for the superstructure of 
 morality. 
 
 Plato conceived the universe to be a vo-qrov ^aiov 
 containing within itself a series of vorjTa ^aa. Every 
 such ^a>ov, whether supreme or subordinate, — if it is 
 to make good its claim to real being — must (he says) 
 pass from the objective phase of self-identity into the 
 subjective phase of self-differentiation. The former 
 state consists in the intuitional exercise of pure 
 thought ; the latter comprises the emotive presenta- 
 tions of knowledge, opinion, sensation. But the 
 passage from the one to the other is a necessary 
 feature of each and every votjtov ^wov. As regards 
 nomenclature, — the supreme K,5)ov in its higher con- 
 dition is the sovereign Mind ; in its lower condition 
 it- is the 6eol 6eS>v. The subordinate iJSa in their 
 higher condition are the Ideas ; in their lower con- 
 dition they are particular specimens of the natural 
 kinds. And since the higher mentality must be 
 deemed superhuman, Plato calls the sovereign Mind 
 
xu PREFACE. 
 
 6e6v and the Ideas aiSt'ot deoi, in contradistinction to 
 particulars which are at best only Saifiove<!. 
 
 The significance of these remarks will be at once 
 apparent if we consider the case of a single vot/tov 
 ^&ov — say that of Man. Man being one of the sub- 
 ordinate 5wa expresses one aspect, vis. the humanity, 
 of the supreme t/Ssov. He is endowed with four 
 faculties, named respectively vov^, and eTria-Tij/jLTj, Sofa, 
 ai(T6rjcn,<i. As possessed of vow he is the Idea of 
 Man, an immutable entity correlating with, i.e. think- 
 ing and thought by, all entities of the same order. 
 As possessed of iTrta-Trjfj.r], Ea^a, aicrdr)cn<;, Man lapses 
 from permanent thought into transient knowledge, 
 opinion, sensation, — no longer functioning as a unitary 
 Ideal Mind, but as an indefinite plurality of particular 
 minds. These particulars in their turn correlate with, 
 i.e. apprehend and are apprehended by, particulars of 
 all the voriTo. ^ma : as actively apprehensive we call 
 them ■^v)(ai, as passively apprehensible we call them 
 aM/xaTa. 
 
 Further, the world of absolute being (the sovereign 
 Mind + the Ideal Minds) is termed a TrapaSeiyfia, 
 whose elxcov is the world of relative becoming (the 
 starry gods + all specimens of the natural kinds). 
 And just as metaphysics insists that the former must 
 
PREFACE. xiil 
 
 pass into the latter, so morality demands that the 
 latter — to the best of their ability — must return 
 towards the former. But since the Ideal Minds are 
 partial and serial determinations of the sovereign 
 Mind, this demand of conformity to their appropriate 
 Ideas implies the desirability of attaining, so far as 
 may be, to the condition of the sovereign Mind itself 
 Such attainment in the present life is perforce meagre 
 and limited ; but the theory of transmigration here- 
 after opens up possibilities beyond compute. In fine, 
 the ethical end for particulars as determined by 
 Plato's ontology is to minimise the difference between 
 their own psychosis and that of the supreme ^eo? — 
 a quest which leads them through the successive 
 stages of the Ideal series. 
 
 The discussion of the system here summarised 
 has fallen into three divisions. The first educes the 
 main outlines from a consideration of certain passages 
 of importance in the Dialogues and elsewhere. The 
 second emphasises the distinction between the realm 
 of objective being and the realm of subjective 
 becoming. The third states the metaphysical view 
 of the latter as a copy of the former, and en- 
 deavours to show how that view impliedly incul- 
 cates the rational treatment of individual souls and 
 
XIV PREFACE. 
 
 bodies in accordance witli the ethical end above 
 mentioned. 
 
 It will be seen from this statement that my 
 obligations to Cambridge teaching are not slight. Dr. 
 Jackson's papers in the Journal of Philology (vols. 
 X — xv) have, to my thinking, established beyond 
 reasonable doubt the chronology of the more im- 
 portant Dialogues. Any attempt to reconstruct 
 Plato's mature Idealism must henceforward be based 
 mainly upon the Philebus, the.Parmenides, the T/te- 
 aetetus, the Sophist, the Politicus, the Timaeus, and 
 the Laws. And those who set about it may spare 
 themselves the burden of proving "(i) a revision of 
 the list of Ideas, whereby relations, negations, and 
 artificial products ceased to be regarded as Ideas 
 proper (aura icaff' auTo. 6(877) ; and (2) a modification 
 of the conception of the relation subsisting between 
 the Idea and its particulars, whereby for ' participa- 
 tion ' (fieOe^K) of the latter in the former was sub- 
 stituted 'imitation' {fj,i/j,r](TK)." Again, Mr. Archer- 
 Hind's interpretation of the Timaeus proves to all 
 who have ears to hear that, according to Plato's 
 esoteric meaning, " the one universal Thought evolves 
 itself into a multitude of finite intelligences, which 
 are so constituted as to apprehend not only by pure 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 reason, but also by what we call the senses, with 
 all their attendant subjective phenomena of time and 
 space." 
 
 If in some points of moment I have ventured to 
 dissent from those who propounded these weighty 
 opinions, it is because I cannot but pursue to the end 
 the principle that the Ideal world is composed of 
 ovra, understanding by the word ova-ia in every case 
 a combination of objective with subjective thought. 
 One great outcome of that principle has, I believe, 
 been hitherto overlooked : I mean the fact that for 
 Plato the unit of metaphysical and ethical measure- 
 ment is neither the Idea nor the individual, but the 
 V07ITOV ^S)ov — a personal being whose intellectual 
 activity comprises the two essentials of " reality," 
 namely the unitary ■v6r}ai<; of the Idea and the 
 diffracted 'yvS)<Ti<; of its particulars. To press the 
 consequences of this fundamental doctrine seemed 
 to me not only legitimate, but necessary. 
 
 Trinity College, Cambridge, 
 yuly %th, 1895. 
 
ERRATUM. 
 
 Page 141, line 11, Jor Th Kipros read rb niros. 
 
PART I. 
 
 THE PLATONIC THEORY OF MIND. 
 
 Before the ethical bearings of Plato's Idealism can 
 be appreciated, it is of primary importance to deter- 
 mine the relation in which the Ideas themselves stand 
 towards Mind. This relation — essential as it is to 
 a sound understanding of the Platonic system — is 
 nowhere explicitly set forth in the extant dialogues. 
 Their author has more suo left it to be inferred either 
 from the necessary presuppositions of certain broad 
 tenets, or from a few incidental passages of pregnant 
 meaning. The former, among which may be men- 
 tioned the doctrines of Metempsychosis and Anam- 
 nesis, will be more conveniently dealt with at a later 
 stage of the present argument. The latter call for 
 immediate analysis, as enabling us to formulate 
 simply and directly the connection which we seek 
 to ascertain. 
 
 § I. The Parmenides. 
 
 In Farm. 132 B seq. the Platonic Sokrates, wishing 
 to secure the unity of the Idea against the criticism 
 
THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 of the Platonic Parmenides, suggests that perhaps 
 each Idea is a thought [voTjfia) existent only in souls 
 [ev i/rui^ots). To this suggestion Parmenides retorts : 
 
 (i) That a v6r)/j.a must have a content, an ov ti, ; 
 and that the content which this vornjia voel will be 
 the Idea as previously described and therefore as 
 previously refuted. 
 
 (ii) That if on the one hand each Idea is a voTjfia, 
 and on the other hand particulars are related to Ideas 
 by participation (/te^eft?), then particulars — as aggre- 
 gates of immanent Ideas — may be said to consist 
 6K vorjixcLTiov, vsx fact to be themselves vorifuna, objects 
 of pure thought. Hence follows one of two alterna- 
 tives : either {a) all particulars are voovvra, or (^) some 
 particulars are not voovvra, in spite of their being 
 vorjfiara} 
 
 ' I understand voiifia-ra Svra hv6Tira etvai (Farm. 132 c) as spoken, 
 of particulars ; for, if a thing iK i/oTindTuv ia-riv, it is — to borrow a 
 phrase of Aristotle's — <riv6(aU tii ^{St; votiiidrav &<rirep %v 61/Tav, and 
 may justly be described as itself^a v6riiia. Another logically correct 
 interpretation of the second limb of the dilemma would be : "or there 
 are some Iiieal voiifiara which are not contained in minds.'' But this 
 seems to me inadmissible on two grammatical grounds : (i) It involves 
 a somewhat awkward change of subject from rim a = particulars to 
 vtrtiiiwra = Ideas ; (2) the word kvirrros is elsewhere used in a. passive 
 sense only when passivity is distinctly suggested by the context {e.g. 
 h. horn. Merc. 80 K^poirT' ^S' hii-nra, St4w\eKe Saviiarh epya, Parm. ed. 
 R. and P. v. 73 t^c nhv iav li,ii6rirov, atxivviioy, Plat. Phaedo 80 B t^ 
 ftiv ■ . . voriT^ Koi fwvoei5c7 Kal liSia\iT(f . , . Tip Se . . . avo^T(p koI 
 iroXueiSe? xal SiaXvr^, Dionys. Areop. de dizi. nom, c. I inpoiaios 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 
 
 To put the dilemma in other words. If we choose 
 the first horn {a), we assume that voT^fiara {i.e. par- 
 ticulars, regarded as aggregates of Ideas) must in 
 every case possess the power of thinking ; and 
 thereby we contradict common sense, which affirms 
 that e.g. a palm-tree cannot think. If we choose the 
 second horn ip), we hold that common sense is right 
 in declaring e.g. a. palm-tree to be avorjTov ; and 
 thereby we deny the assumption that would equate 
 all vorifiaTa {i.e. particulars, regarded as aggregates of 
 Ideas) with voovvra. 
 
 Now this argument as a whole turns on the 
 acceptance of , the equation between v6r}fj.a and voovv. 
 For the wording of the first alternative — ^ SoKeiv aou 
 eK vorj/idTcov maxTTOV eivai Koi iravra voeiv — clearly 
 implies that irdma voelv is the natural consequence of 
 6/c vo7)fidT(0v eicaaTov elvai. And the second alterna- 
 tive offers no difficulty at all, unless we are convinced 
 that every vorj/jLa must be a voovv : that it does offer 
 difficulty is shown by Sokrates' answer — 'AXX' oiiBe 
 rovTO, <f>dvai, e^ei Xoyov. Again, it is noteworthy that 
 in Parmenides' first retort the same postulate was 
 
 ouaia Kol vovs ayiniros Koi \6yos &ppriTos), and not always then {e.^. 
 [Alex.] in Arist. Met. ed. Hayduck p. 670, 27 t^i/ yhp voijt^v koI Beiav 
 iroWdi fiii flvai hi/o^Tics iLiti^vavTo). In view of these objections I 
 have followed n. simpler syntax, and given to Aj/iJijtos a meaning that 
 Stephanus calls " frequentissimum et passim obvium" {e.g. Plat. Tim. 
 30 B, where, as in Gorg. 514 c, ia/6iiTos is opposed to vovv exiiv). 
 
THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 tacitly made by the'words — Ov'x^ evo? tm/ov, o eTrl iraaiv 
 €Kelvo TO vorjfjia ivbv voel, fiiav rtva oZaav IBeav ; 
 In short, both the language of the first retort and 
 the fact that the second is couched in the form of 
 a dilemma lead us to suppose that the Platonic 
 Sokrates and his critic were alike prepared to main- 
 tain that everj/ vorjfia must be a voovv. 
 
 Whether this assumption is an axiom or a paradox 
 will depend upon the exact significance that we attri- 
 bute to vorjfia. As with our own word " thought," so in 
 the case of vorifia it is possible to distinguish a variety 
 of allied meanings. Proklos in Parm. ed. Cousin v. 
 147 observes Xiyerai yap vorjfia koi to vorirbv avrb to 
 vorjdh) ical to ivepyr/fia xal to yvaaTiKov rov voovvto^, 
 i.e. the term vdrnia is applied (i) to the actual object 
 of thought, the thing thought of ; (2) to the process 
 of thinking, or more strictly to that process as exem- 
 plified on any definite occasion ; (3) to the cognitive 
 faculty of the thinker. If in the passage with which 
 we are concerned vorifia bears this third sense, then 
 the statement vorjtia voel is self-evident, and further 
 enquiry is futile. But the usage of vo-qixa to denote 
 the "cognitive faculty" is poetical, as may be seen 
 from the lexica^; and at this juncture, where much 
 may hinge on the right selection of a single word, a 
 
 a e.g. Horn. Od. 215, Hes. Op. 129, Theog. 656, Empedocl. ed. 
 Karsten w. 313, 316, 317. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 
 
 poet's licence would be utterly out of place. Had 
 Plato meant " the thinker " or " the thinking faculty," 
 he would assuredly have used to voovv or 6 vovi. Can 
 it be then that v6r)fia here bears its second meaning, 
 and denotes "a process of thinking".'' Two objec- 
 tions at once suggest themselves. In the first place, 
 \i A thinks B, it is fair to describe A or A's mind as 
 thinking ; it may also be fair to presume that B or 
 ^'s mind has a similar faculty for thought; but is it 
 fair to say that A 's thinking thinks .' Has the express- 
 ion vortixa voei thus interpreted any intelligible mean- 
 ing ? And in the second place, if we grant that by 
 a laxity of phraseology such a statement might be 
 made^ it must be admitted that v6r]fj.a thus becomes 
 the equivalent of vorjcri':. But it is difficult to believe 
 that for a common and straightforward term Plato 
 would have substituted a comparatively rare and 
 ambiguous one.* A glance at Ast's Lexicon will 
 
 ' The elasticity of the English language tolerates the following sen- 
 tence : " If the passing thought be the directly verifiable existent, 
 which no school has hitherto doubted it to be, then that thought is itself 
 the thinker, and psychology need not look beyond " (W. James, The 
 Principles of Psychology, i. 401, cp. 369). The nearest approach to this 
 that I know of in Greek is a clause quoted by Stephanus s.v. voep6s : 
 " Mire cum yiiina conjungit Niceph. Callist. H. E. vol. i. p. 8 B, V 5 
 ffoi fiey Koi d vovs . . . a66\wTOS, fipiuv voeph. Koi Beta yoijiiaTa" But 
 Byzantine bombast is foreign to the Parmenides. 
 
 * It might be argued, on the strength of Arist. Psych. A, 3. 13. 
 4070 7 ^ Se v&i\ais Tck Ko^/tara, that nfinara is used as the plural of 
 t>6riiTis. But (i) in that passage "thought is thoughts" means that the 
 
THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 show that, as compared with vortaif, v6r)ij,a occurs but 
 seldom in the -Platonic writings. Discounting Meno 
 95 E, Soph. 22,7 A, 2S8d, as quotations and Symp. 197 E, 
 an avowedly poetical passage in Agathon's speech, 
 we meet with it again only in Politicus 260 D, where 
 heralds as a class are said to issue commands 
 aWoTjOta vorjfiaTa irapaBe'Xp/j^vov. The word is appos- 
 ite there just because it has not a subjective but an 
 objective value — the king entrusts his v6r)fj,a to the 
 herald, as the manufacturer hands over his wares to 
 the retail dealer. It appears to me certain, therefore, 
 that in the present passage also vorj/xa is used in the 
 ^rst of the three senses enumerated by Proklos. It 
 denotes "the actual object of thought, the thing 
 thought of" We may still, however, raise the ques- 
 tion whether vorifia means (a) the object thought of, 
 as it is independently of the thinking subject, or 
 (ii) the object thought of, as represented by the 
 thinking subject to his own mind. The former, to 
 speak with all accuracy, is to votjtov or to voovfievov, 
 "that which can be" or "that which actually is appre- 
 
 mental activity of the thinking subject consists in representations of 
 objects thought, not merely in repeated exhibitions of itself : where the 
 process of thinking is entirely self-contained, iariv ri rdTjo-ij voiicreus 
 v6ii(ris, not yo^^uoToj or votiiiirav v6ritrts ; (2) the plural yoiitreis was 
 available. To Arist. J°reil. IH. ^. 917 a 39 (quoted by L. & S.) and 
 Plut. Mor. 691 C, 1120 A (quoted by Stephanus) add Porphyr. Op. ed. 
 Holsten p. 66 eis 5e iiun^v iXaiovaa irphs rhv vovv iv toij voitafai 
 •yiyverai (sc, ji ifiux^) • • ■ «"' "«' i><yl\(rtis ovk tvev (pavraaias. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 
 
 hended by thought." The latter is to vorifia. Thus 
 Plutarch de placit. phil. iv. 1 1 says eWt Se v6f]iji,a ^dv- 
 racr/j,a^ Siavola<s XoyiKov ^coov — a definition elsewhere 
 used to elucidate the Stoic term \e«Toi', which also 
 was the mental representation of to a-tjuaivofieuov. 
 This distinction between (a) to voovfievov and {b) to 
 poov/jievov y voov/xevov would be important enough if 
 we were dealing with objects sensibly perceived. But 
 in the case of the Platonic Ideas it does not trouble 
 us, because — as Proklos, idid. 140, puts it — o ^foKpdTri<; 
 iv vorjiiaai tutXv ovaiSiadai ras tSea? inreXa^ev.^ The 
 Idea and Mind's thought of the Idea are one. The 
 former has no existence apart from the latter. We 
 have mounted to a level where the word <j)dvTatT(Jui, 
 in so far as it implies the low ground of sense- 
 perception, is not applicable, — a level where less 
 venturesome theorists are not likely to linger : Arist. 
 Psych. T. 3. 8. 432 a 12 tcl Se Ttpina vo7)\xaTa tIvi 
 hioiaei tov ytt^ ipavTuirfiaTa elvai ; fj ovBe ToXXa ^av- 
 Taa-fiara, aW' ovk avev ^avTaafrnTrnv. I conclude, 
 
 * Cp. Alex, de anitn. ed. Bruns p. 85, 20 iyyluerai Sh i) ToiiiSc 
 e^is T^ v^ T^v apxhv Korrh fieriiffaa'tv avb ttjs irepl ret aiffdijr^ ffvpexovs 
 ivfpyeias Stinrtp 6^lv Tivb. air' ahriov \a^0ilpojfros rod Ka66?wv Otapr^- 
 TLK'fiv, h Kar' apx^s. fi^P v6T]fia Kal fvvoia Ka\e7Tai, irXeovfiffav S^ KoX 
 VQiKiXov Koi iroK^rpoTTOv yiv6fievoi/y us 56va<rBai Kal x^P^^ "^^s cutrdTiTiKTJs 
 ^nofidSpas iroieiv rovro, vovs ^St}. 
 
 ^ Cp. Alex, in Arist. Met. ed. Hayduck p. 92, 19, 22, ^i* T^i 
 voelffQai IS fats 7j iv6frTatns and rb flvai ahrwy ev t^ voft(r9ai. 
 
THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 then, that the meaning of vorifjia as it occurs in this 
 section of the Parmenides may be satisfactorily 
 defined as "the object of thought" without further 
 quahfication. And it is of such a v6r)(ia that the 
 interlocutors assume what is by no means a truism, 
 vis. that it possesses the power of thinking. 
 
 We set out, then, impressed with the belief that 
 a v6-r]fjLa has a capacity for vorjtrKi, and furnished with 
 Sokrates' suggestion that each Idea is a v6r)fia. We 
 are, however, hampered by the difficulty which 
 Parmenides urged in the first horn of the dilemma, 
 viz., that if the Idea is a vorj/ia, and if particulars 
 may be said rCav elS&v fierixeiv, particulars too consist 
 e'/c vorjfjbdTav — in fact, are vorj/iara; and therefore 
 particulars ought always to be voovvra — a result 
 which is disproved by experience. This difficulty 
 vanishes with the surrender of the immanence of the 
 Ideas. Sokrates now declares that the fiide^K is ov/c 
 oKXr] Ti? ^ elKaadfjvat avioh (Parm. 132 d). Hence 
 particulars are no longer made up of vorfixaTa in such 
 a way as to be themselves the objects of pure thought ; 
 rather they should be described as ofioico/xara or 
 fiifi^fiaTa of the Ideas. It follows — or would follow, 
 if the conversation did not take another turn — that a 
 particular as such is incapable of vorjaK, and we escape 
 the paradoxical conclusion that e.£: a palm-tree has 
 the faculty of thought ; indeed, we confine these 
 vorjfiaja voovvra to the world of Ideas. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 
 
 Having surmounted this obstacle, we reconnoitre 
 our position. Two principles of importance have been 
 deliberately admitted : — 
 
 Firstly, in every instance of votjo-k the voovfjuevov 
 must be a single real existence, an ov ri. 
 
 Secondly, all voijfiara have a capacity for v67j<ti<s. 
 
 The Idea, then, on this showing (i) is a really 
 existent unit. Consequently it will be possessed of 
 such properties and subject to such conditions as 
 may hereafter be proved essential to oi/a-ia. (ii) It is 
 a thought that thinks. Now to the question, " What 
 does it think ? " we can but reply, " Thoughts." And 
 since every vorj/xa is a voovv, our answer means 
 " Thoughts that think." Moreover, as we have 
 confined "Thoughts that think" to the world of 
 Ideas, we are now asserting that any given Idea 
 thinks Ideas. Thus the Ideal series, as at present 
 conceived, consists in certain voTj/j.ara voovvra which 
 think themselves^ and one another,^ — the range of 
 
 ' Note that, when Sokrates answers in the affirmative the question. 
 Dux ^*'^^ rivos, % iirX nairiv iKftvo rb p67jfia 4trhv voei, ftlav rivh. oZtrav 
 iS4av; (Parm. 132 c), it is not to the conception of the Idea thinking 
 itself that Parmenides demurs, but to the reappearance of the Idea as 
 previously defined with all its former disabilities. 
 
 ' In Phaedrus 247 c, D, soul is described as an ohaia Svras . ■ . 
 n6vif fleoT^) vif. Of this intelligible entity it is said : Ka$op^ fifv o4tV 
 SueatotriyTjy, KaBop^ Se irutppotriyriv, Kadop^ 5e iTri<rT'f]fnjVj ovy( ^ yevetris 
 TtpiaeOTUi , . . a\\& riiv ii> r$ 3 iariv %v Svtus iwiffTii/iriv oiffav Kol 
 T&K\a ixraiTies Tcl ivTa Avras Secura/ievri k.t.K, Mutatis mutandis this 
 passage is applicable to the Idea as it is portrayed in the Parmenides. 
 
10 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 this mental activity being exclusively restricted to 
 the domain of Ideal truth : 
 
 Parm. 134 A Ovkovv koI iirurrrjiir], <f)dvac, ainr) 
 jAev o eoTiv iTriaTtjfir], Trj<; eariv aX'ndeia, airrj<} 
 av eKeivq^ eirj einarriijuri ; Haw ye. 'ExdaTr) Se 
 av tS>v iirio'TrjiJ.mv ^ etrnv, eKatnov tmv ovtcov, o 
 ecTTiv, eir) av eTncTTijfiy i] ov ; Pi at. 
 
 Let us here pause to enquire from what sources 
 these fundamental doctrines derive. The conviction 
 that every vorjua must be a voovv might prima facie 
 be ranged under the general belief that " like is known 
 by like,'' appeal being made to Plato's earlier utter- 
 ance : — Phaedo 80 A, B. raSe Jjfiti/ ^va^aivei, t&J /j,ev 
 Geitp Koi adavdrcj) kol vor)T<p . , . o/MotoraTov elvai -ylrvyijv. 
 For if the soul resembles intelligibles, intelligibles 
 presumably resemble the soul. But it is one thing 
 to assert that the object of thought is incorporeal 
 (even the Stoics went thus far), and another thing 
 to hold that the thoughts of the thinking soul must 
 be themselves capable of thinking. This latter creed 
 was apparently based on the authority of the historical 
 Parmenides, from whose poem two passages may be 
 cited as illustrative of the point. The first of these 
 (ed. R. and P. vv. 39 — 40) is 
 
 ovre yap av yvoir)^ to 76 fir) iov, ov yap avvarov, 
 ovre (ppdaai^' to yap ainb voeiv eanv re koI elvat. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. n 
 
 The general^ sense of the last clause is " We can think 
 only of what exists ; " and the argument shows that, 
 if we can think of nothing but to Sv, to /j-f) 6v will be 
 both unknowable and unspeakable. In fact, Par- 
 menides held that every thought has a truly existent 
 content, inasmuch as to voovfievov must ever be to ov. 
 And this is just what the Platonic Parmenides urges 
 in his first retort to Sokrates' tentative reconstruction : 
 
 Parm. 132 B tI ovv, (j)dvai, ^v eKaarov eari t&v 
 vorj/j,dT(ov, vorjfia Se oiiBevo^ ; '.4^^' dBvvarov, 
 ehrelv. 'AXKa tiv6<s ; NaL "Ovtoi fj ovk ovTO<i / 
 "O7/TOS. 
 
 The second passage to which I allude is (ed. R. 
 and P. vv. 94 — 96) 
 
 rwvTov S' iarl voelv re Kol ovveKev eaTt vorjfia' 
 ov yap avev tov iovro';, ev w Tre^ariafievov eariv, 
 evprjaei^ to voelv. 
 The argument here may be thus .paraphrased, — 
 
 You do not find thought apart^hjm to 01/, wrherein 
 
 thought finds its expression : 
 [You do not find thought's object apart from to 
 ov :J 
 
 ' Literally, the words may be rendered "The same thing exists 
 "both for thinking and for being " (Datival Infinitive) : or possibly, giving 
 to eo-Tiv its technical meaning = " It is," we should translate " Itis the 
 same both for thinking and for being." 
 
12 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Ergo thought and thought's object are co-exten- 
 sive^" — both are to ov. 
 
 It will be observed that the two passages are 
 complementary. The minor premiss, which is wanting 
 in the second, is exactly supplied by the first. The 
 argument as a whole, led to the simple corollary that, 
 if thought coincides with thought's object, that object 
 may be said to think." And this, as we have seen; 
 was the substantial assumption of the Platonic Par- 
 menides in his second retort. 
 
 It is clear therefore, that, when in Farm. 132 B 
 seg. Plato puts into the mouth of the Eleate the two 
 weighty principles enunciated above, he is adducing 
 the actual tenets of the historical Parmenides as 
 
 '" It matters little whether we follow Simplicius {in Phys. A, ed. 
 Diels p. 87, 17) and translate "Thought is coincident with thought's, 
 object," or adopt Mr. Burnet's version {Early Gr. Philos. p. 186) : "It 
 is the same thing that can be thought and for the sake of which the 
 thought exists." In the former case we identify the subject with the 
 object of c(ij)<ri J, in the the latter the object with the subject. Whichever 
 rendering we choose, the argument will be the same, viz, x^z, and j/ ^ z, 
 therefore x^y. 
 
 " I do not mean to imply that Parmenides himself expressly drew 
 this inference, or spoke of ri %v as a vovs. We have no better authority 
 for such an assertion than Plotinus Enn. v. i. 8, and Simplicius in Phys. 
 A. ed. Diels p. 143, 18 S. Moreover, there is the negative evidence 
 of Plato, who, in Soph. 244 B, c, states that the Eleatics called their 
 principle by the two names %v and tv, but makes no mention of vovs 
 as a recognised appellation. My point is merely that the historical 
 Parmenides' identification of vooi/iefov and vooiv paved the way for the 
 Platonic Parmenides' postulate of voi\iuxTa voovvra. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 13 
 
 corrective of his own unrevised Idealism. And we 
 begin to appreciate the dramatic propriety which 
 caused him, at the expense of an obvious anachronism, 
 to choose Parmenides as his critic. 
 
 But the full significance of that choice has not yet 
 been sounded. If Parmenides held that the object 
 thought was also the subject thinking, he did so only 
 because he identified both alike with to 6v. And 
 similarly Plato, who assumes that every vorjfjua voel, 
 must base his assumption on the belief that in any 
 process of voTjai^ the subject and the object are alike 
 referable to a single underlying entity. That entity 
 is described by him elsewhere in terms which corres- 
 pond to the active and passive functions of the Ideal 
 Minds. As they are z/oTj/tara, so It is a votjtov : 
 
 Tim. 37 A '^v'xf}, tS)V votjt&v aei re ovrcov virb rov 
 apitriov apiaTTj yevo/Mevrj tS>v yevvrjffevTeov. 
 As they are voovvra, so It is a vow : 
 
 Phikb. 30 C ea-riv, a TroWa/cts elpi^Ka/iev, aveipov 
 
 re ev rm TTavrl iroXv Kal nripwi iKavbv xai Tts eV 
 
 avToi'; alria ov <j}av\7j Koafiovad re koX avvTCLT- 
 
 Tovaa . . . <TO(f>La jcal vow? \0yofievr] BiKaioTar' av. 
 
 Laws 897 C 17 ^vfiiraaa ovpavov 080? afia Kal ifiopa 
 
 Kal r&v €V avTm ovrcov arrdvrmv vov Kivrjaei Kal 
 
 TTepi^opd Kal Twyia-fioK ofioiav ^vaiv ej(et. , 
 
 This conception of a vor]ro<s row? and of vorjixara 
 
 voovvra may well have been the source of Aristotle's 
 
 statements concerning rh. avev vXrif vorjrd : 
 
14 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Met. A. 7- 1072 b 20 iavTov Se voel 6 vov<s Kara 
 fieraXrjylnv tov vorirov' V07jto<; jbp yiyverai 0iy- 
 rydvcov Kal vo&v, &(TTe ravTov vow Kal votjtov. 
 Ibid. A. 9. 1075 ^ 3 o^X ETe/Dou oi)v 6vro<; rov voov- 
 fiivov Kal TOV vov, oaa fif] v\r]v e%et, to avTo 
 effrai Kal -fj votjctk rw voovfiivcp fiia. 
 Psych. T. 4. 12. 430 « 2 onrep avfi^aiveL eirl rov vov. 
 Kal avTO^ Be voryro's €<ttiv aaTrep to, vorjTa. eirl 
 fiev yap rS>v dvev v\ri<i rb aiiTo eo-Tt to voovv Kal 
 TO voovfievov. 
 Porph. in Categ. ed. Busse p. 91, 14 Xeyw on 
 alriu/jLaL avTov (Aristotle) on Kvpianara Kara 
 avTov Kal pAXiara Kai Trpwrw? Xeyofiivrnv nrpmrmv 
 oven&v t5>v voriT&v otov rov votjtov deov Kal tov 
 vov Kal, eiirep eltrlv ISiai, Kal t&v ISe&v, irapiaTai 
 Tai^Ttt? TrpaTa<; ovaUi<i ecfyrj to? iv rot? aladrjroi^ 
 aTO/iov^. 
 But, be that as it may, unlocked for results have 
 been reached. When Sokrates threw out his sug- 
 gestion that the Idea might be a vorjfia, he probably- 
 meant no more than a human thought or concept. 
 By the aid of Parmenides' questions we have now 
 come to see that the Ideas are beyond the reach of 
 particular cognition : 
 
 Farm. 134 ^ Ou/c apa viro ye rjfi&v yvyvdxTKerai- 
 T&v elS&v ovhev, eireiBr] avrrj^ hnarrjfjLTj'i ov 
 fieTej(piiev. 
 We must in fact conceive them to be a plurality 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. ij 
 
 of Minds into which one supreme Mind has multiplied 
 itself, reproducing in them its own essential features 
 of thinking and being thought. Hence, if they are 
 called vorifiara, it is primarily because they are the 
 thoughts of that Intelligence which is their under- 
 lying cause : 
 
 Plut. de placit. phil. i. lO UXi'itcov j^wpto-Tas tjj? 
 vXtii oiKTia^ Ta<; t'Sea? vTroXafi^dvet ev toj? 
 vorjiiaai koL ev rat? ^avTaaiai'i rov deov, tov- 
 Te<TTL rov vov, v<f)eaTa)<Ta<;. 
 Stob. Eel. I. X. i6a (Aetios), ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 
 127, 19 nxdrtov 'Apia-ravoi . . . ISea Se ovtria 
 da-d)/iaro<} ev rots voijfiaai Koi rat? ^avTaaiai<; 
 Tov deov. 
 Proklos in Parm. ed. Cousin v. 148 a-vve^evKrai, 
 apa aWij\oi<! o re 1/01)9 koi to, eiBrj' koX eh rrjv 
 avyiyeveiav Tavrrjv, m<s ifjLol SoKei, diro^Xetrwv Koi, 
 6 ScoKpdTT]<; TO, eiBr) vorjfiara dcfxopiaaTO. — 
 secondarily because they mentally regard themselves 
 and one another. 
 
 A scrutiny of Parm. 132 B seq. has brought us, 
 then, to the following conclusion. Plato, at the time 
 when he reconstituted his early theory of Ideas, held 
 on the one hand that the object of any process of 
 pure thought must be a single real existence, and on 
 the other that such an object must itself possess the 
 power of pure thinking. These two articles of belief 
 he had adopted from the writings of Parmenides, a 
 
i6 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 philosopher for whom he entertained the deepest 
 reverence.-^^ And further, he had adopted them on 
 the original ground of their validity, namely the 
 recognition of one underlying entity : 
 
 Parm. 128 A Mavdavco, ehrelv tov HcoKparrj, a> 
 UapfieviBr], . . . av fiev <yap iv tow voiijiMunv 
 ev <^]7S elvai to irdv, Koi roxnav reK/jii]pia 7rape;^et 
 KaXw? re kuI ev. 
 As applied to his own Idealism, their immediate 
 result was to warrant him in positing a single really 
 existent Mind as basis and conditioning cause of a 
 series of really existent Minds called the Ideas, — the 
 object of thought for any given Mind being itself or 
 any other Mind. The relation thus formulated may 
 be denoted, at any rate provisionally, by the accom- 
 panying diagram : — 
 
 vorjrbs vovs = The Supreme Mind. 
 
 vo^juLTa voovvTo, = The Series of Ideas. 
 
 '* Cp. Theaet. 183 E TlapiievlSTis Se juot tpalverai, rh rod 'O/x'fipov, 
 alSo76s ri /toi tlvai H/ia Seivis t6 . . . Kal fioi iipdvri $i9os rt fX^^" 
 navT&irairi yevvaiov, Soph. 237 A rbc tow iroTpbs Uap/ifviSou \6yov. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 17 
 
 § II. The Sophist. 
 
 Thus far the components of the Platonic scheme 
 have been characterised as '6ina and as voovvra — 
 voovfji£va. It may now be shown that these charac- 
 teristics involve certain further properties, without 
 which any account of real and phenomenal nature 
 would be altogether inadequate. 
 
 In Sqpk. 248 A the eiS&v <f)l\oi draw a distinction 
 between yevea-K and ovala: the changeable nature of 
 the former we apprehend through our body by means 
 of sense-perception ; the changeless nature of the latter 
 we apprehend through our soul by means of reasoning. 
 Again, in 248 C these same adherents of vorjrh xal 
 dffcofiara eiSrj declare that y€ve(n<} lies within, true 
 cvffia without, the domain of iroieiv koL irda-'xei.v. 
 
 While passing these opinions in review, the Eleate's 
 remarks are supplementary rather than destructive. 
 He points out that, if the Idealists hold, on the one 
 hand that oi<ria yiyvauTKerai, and on the other hand 
 that ovaia is dvadij<s, then — to avoid inconsistency — 
 they must by the process which they describe as to 
 yirfvauTKeiv fj to yv^vaurKecQat, mean something totally 
 different from a iroirjiia fi irddoii. If, however, to 
 yiyvwffKeiv is in point of fact iroieiv n — and the 
 Stranger's words hint that such is the case — then 
 they will allow that its correlative to yiyvmaKeadai 
 must be irdGx^i'V ri, and, still holding to their doctrine 
 
i8 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 that ovaia is '^i/yvuxTKOfievq vtto tij? yvtotreco';, they will 
 admit that Kaff* oaov r^u^vanTKerai,, Kara roaovrov Kivelrai, 
 Sict TO 7rda")(€iv. 
 
 In this paragraph the Eleate's critique of Idealism 
 brings before us two conceptions : 
 
 (i) That oiiffla is aTro^jj?, and — if truly known — 
 must be known in some sense of the word "know- 
 ledge " which transcends the trolrjfia fj irddo<; properly 
 attached to any process of yi/yvcoa-Keiv ^ ycyvma-Keadai. 
 What this higher intellectual state may be we are 
 not yet told, but bearing in mind the ovra of the 
 Parmenides, .which were further determined as voovvra 
 and voovfieva, we shall presume that it is vorja-i'i, pure 
 thought, and our presumption will be justified by the 
 immediate sequel. 
 
 (ii) That ovaia ■trda-'xeL, — so far at least as it 
 provides an object for yv&ai'i, rightly so called, — 
 and that therein it departs from its own ■^pe/j.ia. 
 
 In effect the Stranger rules, and Theaetetus 
 accepts his ruling, that ova-ia is double-faced: 
 
 (i) As the subject and object of vorjai^ it is 
 
 (ii) As the subject and object of yv&a-K it •/rdax^i" 
 
 " Arist. Topka Z. lo. 148 a 20 iirafleis yckp Ka2 oKf«|Toi ioKovaui ax 
 iS4ai to!s \4yovaiv iiias fJvM,Jrag. 1 84, 1510^4 ?ti Sioiperal tiv fUv at 
 iSeat Kal fiepiiTTal, olaat iirofleir, Diog. Laert. III. 12, 13 ^(tti Si rav 
 eiSSi/ iv eKaffTOV a.iSi6v re Kai v6riiia (co! irphs roiroa avaSes. Hence 
 Ideal monads are said to be oirofleis in Met. A. 9. 991 b 26 ovSlv yhtp 
 avTois oUv T6 vrdpxiiv irdSos, ibid. M. 8. 1083 a 9. Compare Aristotle's 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 19 
 
 Can we, however, reconcile these opposing con- 
 ceptions? Can we predicate both aspects alike of 
 the same ovala ? This is the problem to which the 
 Eleate now addresses himself in a passage of unusual 
 lucidity and directness. 
 
 He contends (249 A) that to TravTeXaj? ov cannot 
 be (refivov koX a/yiov, vow ovk expv. And if vow be 
 present, we shall be forced, he says, to admit also 
 5»^, ■'IrvxV] aiid fivrjai'!. At the same time we must 
 be careful to retain that element of aTaa-i'i, without 
 which vov<! could not anywhere exist. 
 
 Oiiaia then, wherever it is found, will be endowed 
 with two qualities which are ivavTidnaTa aWjjXot?, 
 namely : — 
 
 (i) with ffrao-ts, in which case we have vovi ; 
 
 (ii) with Kiv7i(ri<s, in which case we have §0)^ and 
 
 yjrvxv- 
 
 Soph. 249 D TO) hr) ^iXoao^m . . . irdaa dvdr/K7f 
 . , . Kara Trjv r&v TralBeov ev^rjv 6<ra aKuvrfra 
 Kot KeKivrj/jbiva to ov tc Kal to irav ^wafi^orepa^^ 
 Xiyeiv. 
 
 own doctrine : Psych. A. 4. 14. 408 b 2^ hie vovs itras 6etirep6v ri koI 
 hraSis iimv, ibid, r, 5- I. ^ZOa 17 KaX otros i vovs (the vovs ironiTfK(!s) 
 jfupiarbs koI ami^s Kal iirofl^j, rp oiiritf im ivepyelcf. Met. A- 7. 1073 a 
 1 1 which predicates dira0is Kal kvahXaiarov of the ohula. • . . USios Kal 
 iueivriTos Kal kcx"?'"'/'''^ '''"'' oio'fllTSj'. Hermes (quoted by Stob. 
 Eel. I. bti. I, ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 275, 17) has i vovs Airaff^s. 
 
 '* This explains why the definition of Svras 1>v given in Sopk. 247 E, 
 248c was regarded as provisional and not final. "Whatever possesses 
 
20 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Applying this all-important result to the issues 
 of last section, we note that the argument from the 
 Parmenides dealt with only one side of the truth. It 
 regarded ovaLa as the subject and object of vorjaK, 
 without taking into account any lower intellectual 
 faculty, such as that of yvaffii or XoyKTfw's. The 
 Sophist warns us against persisting in such neglect. 
 It bids us to observe that the supreme vov^ of the 
 Philebus is not only a voS?, but also a vonyrov ^u>ov — 
 
 Cp. Tim. 39 E iva toS' co? Ofwiorarov y rm reXeat 
 KOi vorjTw 5»?' "fpof TTiv Ti}? Suntoviav fllfl7]a-lV 
 
 Phileb. 30 D OvKovv iv . . . ry tov Aio<: epet? (fivaet 
 ^aaiXiKrjv (J-ev '^^v^^v, ^curiXtKov Be vow 677171'- 
 eaOab SiA ttjv t^s atrial Bvvafiiv — 
 and that the ideal voijuara of the Parmenides are not 
 only vorifiara, but also vorfrb, tjua — 
 
 Cp. Tim. 30 c TO, yhp Sij vo-qra ^Sia Travra eKelvo 
 
 iv eavrm irepiXa^bv exei. 
 Ibid. 31 A TO 7ap 7repUj(ov iravra, mrbva vorjra 
 fwa. — 
 inasmuch as every vovs, whether supreme or sub- 
 
 the power of doing or suffering " would indeed aptly characterise oliiria 
 qu& subject and object of yvSaais. But qui subject and object of viriaa 
 this same ohala. was admitted to be i.tta9-i\s. Consequently, unless 
 Sivafus can be taken to denote the power of passing from the first or 
 static into the second or kinetic condition, we must substitute the 
 amended definition implied in 249 d. 
 
_ a 
 -o eg 
 
 
or PLATO'S ETHICS. 23 
 
 ordinate, is forced by the necessary nature of its 
 own ovaui to pass out of its tranquil atrddeia into 
 the wonj/jiara and ircBrifjuaTa of animation.'^ Thus 
 by emphasising the fact that, wkerever^^ pure thought 
 is found, there will its shadow the lower mental 
 phase be found also, it enables us to extend our 
 previous scheme as in the diagram. 
 
 § III. Aristotle's Psychology. 
 
 Having learnt in the preceding section that all 
 oiaia deserving of the name must necessarily pass 
 from higher to lower phase, we have yet to enquire 
 
 '^ For Plato's conviction that vovs must be attached to i^uxi see the 
 following passages : Phiieb. 30 c ao^ia /liiy koI koOs &yev 'f'vxvs ouk Hr 
 iroTe ytvoiaSriv, Parm. 132 B /iJ) tuv tiSav %KaaTov ^ roirwv v6iiiia, Kal 
 oiSa/ioO alir^ irpoff^Kj) eyyiyveirBiu i,\\o9i t) iv ifivxt'S, SopA. 249 A dwA 
 toBto fiiv a/KJidrtpa (yoBi and fai^) iviin' airf Ktyojiev, oh fjAtP ii/ ^vxv 
 ye tfytitro/iei' ainh ^X"" ""tA; koI rlv' ttv eVcpoK ?x<" TpcJirov; Tim. 30 B 
 vovy 5* aS x^P^s ij/vxvs hZivmov vapayeveirBai rtp, IHd. 46 D Tutv yh.p 
 &VTUV § vouv iiivip KTuffSat TpoaiiKei, KeKreov rjivx'/iv. Compare Arist. 
 Psych, r. 4. 4. 429a 27 Ka2 cS S^ 01 Xiyovrts t\v ^vy^v eJvai Tiitov eiSwi/, 
 ■n\'t{v 8tj oStc 8\7) 4\\' t\ votfriK'i], oSre 4vT(\exfl^ iWti, Svpifiei rii eWri, 
 Met. A. 3. 10700 26 T] ^vxh . . . fiii iraaa oAX' i vovs, Archytas in 
 frag. phil. Gr. ed. MuUach i, 565 olfcrflao-is jAv iv aduart ylyerai, vAos 
 S' iv i/'ux?. 
 
 " See Soph. 249 B ^vnPalvei S' odv, Si BettlrriTf, aKivhrav re 6vtuv 
 voVv firiSfvl Iff pi /iTiSevhs ftvai /i7)Sajuov, the counterpart of 249 c Ti S' ; 
 &vev ro{iT(ev {sc. tov Karh rayrd k.t.K.) vovv xaBop^s 6vTa ^ yev6^evov 
 tiv Kal dvovovv; "HKiiTTa. 
 
24 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 how this passage may be effected, transporting us as 
 it does from the realm of serene intelligence — 
 
 Tim. 52 A TO Kara ravTO. elSo<; e^ov, dyevrjTov Kai 
 avmkedpov, ovre eh eavro elffSejfpfievov aXKo 
 aWo0ev 0VT6 avTo 6t? aWo iroi lov, doparov Be 
 Koi aWa)<! dvaia-Biyrov, tovto o St) v6i}<n<; el\ri')(ev 
 iirta-KOTreiv — 
 to the world of complex sensitivity — 
 
 Laws 8q6 E ayei /jtev Brj -^vj^rj "Tzavra to, /car' 
 ovpavov Kol yijv km ddXarrav rat? auT^s Kivr^- 
 aeaiv, al^ ovofiard eVrt 0ov\ea-dai, UKoirelffOaif 
 eTn/ieXeiirdai,, ^ovXevea-dai, Bo^d^eiv opdmi;, ii^eva- 
 fjLeva)<;, j^aipovaav, XvTrovfievrjv, Bappovaav, ^ofiov- 
 fj,evr]v, fiiaovaav, arepyovcrav, koX irdaai'; ocrai 
 Tovrmv ^uyyevev! fj Trpcorovpyol icivij<Tet<i ras Sevrep- 
 ovpyovv aZ TrapaKafi^dvovaat Ki,vi]crei<; awfidTcov 
 dyovtrt irdvra el<s av^'qaiv koi ^diaiv Koi hidtcpiaiv 
 KoX avyKpiatv. 
 The method of transition will, I think, be best fol- 
 lowed by the aid of a vexed paragraph in Aristotle's 
 Psychology. I shall first state what I take to be the 
 argument of that paragraph ; and then offer some 
 justification for the meaning which I assign to its 
 several parts. 
 
 Aristotle's thesis is {Psych. A. 2. 6. 404*^ 8) that 
 those thinkers, who find the main characteristic of 
 -^vyj] in TO yivwaKeiv koX to aladdveqdai, identify 
 ylrvxv with their dpxv or dp^ai. Empedokles, for 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 25 
 
 example, constructs the percipient soul out of the 
 sam^ six elements which go to form the percepts of 
 his system. And that Plato acted in a similar way- 
 may be inferred from three considerations^^ : — 
 
 (i) In the Timaeus Plato makes both 17 "^vxh and 
 TO, Ttpaf^yMTa out of the same elements (sc. ravrov and 
 darepov, combining to produce oiaia). 
 
 (ii) In Tcb irepX (fnXoao^lai Xeyo/Jteva he distinguishes 
 four stages in the evolution of the percipient Idea 
 corresponding to four stages in the evolution of the 
 percept Ideas. These four, are r/ tov evo? tSea^ and 
 Trpwrov firJKOi;, irpSiTov TrXaro?, irpwTov ^(Wo<;. 
 
 (iii) The percipient Idea thus evolved apprehends 
 by means of four faculties (namely vow, and iviffrrj/Mri, 
 So^a, aiadrjaKs), which correlate with four ec^ tmv 
 ■n-pay/jMrmv, t.e. with things grouped according to the 
 said four stages in the evolution of the percept Ideas. 
 
 For these reasons Aristotle concludes that Plato, 
 like Empedokles, constructed the subject and the 
 
 " I append the exact words: Psych. A. 2. 7. 404 i 16 -rhv airhv ' 
 5e Tp6vov Koi TlKaruv iv r^ Tifiatep r^i/ ^vx^v iK rwv irrotx^iay iroLet' 
 ytviiffKeffdat yiip r^ d/ioltfi rj Hfioioif, ra 5e irpdyfiara 4k tuv &pxwv eivat, 
 S/ioias Se Kal in rots TtepX <t)t\oiro<plas Keyo/iei/ois Stapl(r8ri, alnh iikv rb 
 i&ov. 4^ airris rrjs tov iyis ISeas Kal rov irpdrov jU^kous koI irAcjToui Kal 
 0<i9ovs, Tcb S" &\\a inotBrp6iras. In Se Kai iWais, vovv fiiv rh eV, 
 ^irwT^/jr/v !^ rii iio — fiOvaxUs yhp 4<t>' ev — ,rhv S\ ToS 4itiireSov ipi9iihy 
 Stilav, atadiiaiv SJ rhv rov areptov- 01 piiv yiip iptSiiol ra etSri aliTo. Kal 
 ipXi'l 4\4yovTO — e'url S' 4k ray arotxfiuv — jKplyerai Sc tA vpiyyiara ra 
 likv y^, t4 S' ^jTiiTT^/iij, Tck Si S6^ri, to S' aiirei)<rei- efSij S" ot dpiSjuol 
 oSrot T&y irpayfiAruV' 
 
26 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 object of cognition out of the same constituents and 
 by parallel processes, thereby preserving the law 7m/{b- 
 (TKeadai ro ofiotov tw ofioito (Psych. A. 2. 20. 405 ^ IS)- 
 
 i. The first of the three clauses here summarised 
 represents Plato as arguing to this effect : — 
 
 (d) Like is known by like. 
 
 (b) TO, irpdyfutTa (i.e. things in general, the objeci 
 of knowledge) are formed e'« t&v afy)(Stv. 
 
 (c) Therefore ^v^^ *°° (*^^^ subject^ of knowledge) 
 must be made ew tS>v aroix^uov. 
 
 This conclusion, says Aristotle, is to be found in 
 the Timaeus. And we can hardly doubt that he refers 
 on the one hand to Tim. 35 A, where the cosmic soul 
 is composed of tuvtov and ddrepov, which coalesce to 
 produce ovcria ; and on the other hand to Tim. 41 D, 
 where the subordinate souls are compounded of the 
 same ingredients, though in a less pure condition. It 
 seems certain, therefore, that by ra iTToixeia Aristotle 
 here denotes the principles of Identity and of Differ- 
 ence, which are represented in the Timaeus by the 
 symbols ravTov and ddrepov. 
 
 Again, the force of the argument depends on the 
 identification of these aroi'xeia with ai dp^aL It has, 
 indeed, been suggested that tcl aroi'xela are rainov, 
 ddrepov and ovaia considered as the elements of the 
 
 -* Cp. Simplic. in Arts/. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 29, 11 hirtynv 
 Toivvv fis rhs ifx^^ '"'^ '"' 7>'«<rTi Tcivra, TouTt'cm rh, Svra, Kal retj 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 27 
 
 material world, whereas at apyal are the same prin- 
 ciples considered as the constituents of the immaterial 
 soul ; but I fail to find adequate support for such a 
 view in either Platonic or Aristotelian diction. If any 
 distinction is to be drawn,^^ I should prefer to say that 
 tavTov and ddrepov regarded by themselves as ulti- 
 mate principles are ap^ai, regarded as the elements 
 of derived existences are <TTov)(ela : cp. 
 
 Arist. Met. W. 4. 1091^ 3 Sta to to h apxw i^^i' 
 ap'X^r)v ca<i a-roi'X^eiov Kal tov api0fi6v ex rov iv6<s. 
 Ibid. N. 4. 1091^ 19 TO /j,£v ^dvai t^v dpjf^rjv 
 TOMVTrjv elvai evSxyyov aKrjdei elvar to fievroi 
 ravrrjv elvai ro «/, rj el fir] tovto, aroi'xeiov re 
 Kal a-roiy(^eiov apiOfiStv, dSwarov. 
 Ibid. N. 4. 1092a! 6 dpy^riv irdaav ffTotj^etov 
 
 TTOlovart. 
 However that may be, both terms are regularly 
 employed by Aristotle to describe the same two bases 
 of Platonism : e.^. 
 
 Met. N. I. loSyb 12 dWa fir)v Kal to? dpxd<; &? 
 arToi)(^6ia KaXovaiv ov koXSi^ diroZiZocunv 01 
 ... TO fieya Kal to fiiKpov XefyovTe<; fierd tow 
 evb<s Tpia ravra o■TO^J^eta rmv dpidfimv. 
 Ibid. M. 9. io86« 26 eVet oZv Xiyoviri Tive<; roiav- 
 Ta? elvai rdi IBia^ Kal tous dpi0fiovi, Kal ra 
 TovToav cTTot^eia r&v ovtwp elvai o-Tot;^eia Kal 
 dpj(^d<!, (TKeirjeov «.t.\. 
 
 " Stob. Eel. 1. X. i6b, ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 128, 14 has 01 itiv olv 
 irtpl 'AptiTToreXriv Kal Il\dTuya ^ta<p4ptti> jiyoSvTiu apx^" ical irroiXE'a. 
 
28 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 And if the substitution of t&v dpx&v for t&v <noix^'iav 
 within the bounds of a single argument seem strange, 
 it is corroborated by the similar case of 
 
 Met. M. 7. 1081^ 31 dpiiyKr) 8', iirelirep earai to 
 ev KoX 7] dopuTTOi; Zvat o-rot^eta. et 8' divvara 
 ra avfiffaivovra, koI Ta<s ap^as ehai ravrat 
 dSvvarov. 
 
 The outcome of this first clause, therefore, is that 
 "irvxv — which is an ovata inasmuch as it is composed 
 of TaiiTou and Bdrepov^—has for the content of its 
 cognitions objects formed of the same constituents as 
 itself, in short other psychic ova-iai. And whereas, 
 when dealing with voTfaK only, we concluded that the 
 object of thought for any given Mind is itself or any 
 other Mind, we have now extended the same con- 
 clusion to the whole '<^vxh whereof vovf is the static 
 phase, and are prepared to affirm that the object of 
 cognition for any such efiyp-vxav is itself or any similar 
 e/jttjrvxpv. 
 
 Moreover in the terms ravrbv and Odrepov we have 
 obtained a convenient notation^" for higher and lower 
 psychosis, which permits us to re-edit our scheme in 
 the appended form. 
 
 ii. The precise import of the second clause is less 
 
 2° Foreshadowed in dialogues earlier than the Timaeus, e.g. Soph. 
 249 B rh Karct Taiirhi xaX Sxrairus Ka\ irfpl rh airS k.t.\. /'arm. 158 c 
 riiv irepav (jiicriv rod ftSovs (= Tim. 35 A t^v Barepov ipiiriy). 
 

OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 31 
 
 easy to determine ; and widely divergent views have 
 been advanced, of which some account must be 
 rendered before further progress is possible. 
 
 Simplicius (in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 28, 
 22 seqq^ takes the whole clause 6iioim<i he km . . . rh 
 S' aXKa 6(iotoTp6va)<; to be descriptive of to. yvmardj 
 the objects known : the next words, ert Se koI aXXo)? 
 .... atadrjcriv Be tov tov arepeov, then denote ra 
 yvtoaTiKa, the subjects knowing : and the concluding 
 lines, ol fiev yap aptfffiol . . . ol apiOfioi oSrot t&v irpay- 
 fiuTav, point the parallelism between object and 
 subject. But, apart from the fact that (a) the words 
 6Tt he KOI aWto? clearly mark a third exposition 
 coordinate with tov avrov he rpoirov k.tX. and ofiolw; 
 he Koi K.T.X. rather than a mere sub-section, this 
 division {b) introduces special difficulties into the 
 passage with which we are immediately concerned. 
 For, granted that by alro ro ^wov is meant the 
 intelligible world ^^ (6 voriToii huiKO(r/j,o<; ev m ra avro- 
 eiSrj), and by to, aWa the knowable opinable and 
 sensible world (to. Xot-Tra Tfj<; t&v yvcoaTwv hiaipicrem^ 
 
 ^' I fail to see any such justification for the term as Mr. Wallace 
 (ed. Arist. Psych, p. 205) finds in Tim. 30 B oStoi; alv Sj) kotoi \liyov 
 rhy eiKSra Set \4yetv rSvBe rhv KSfffiLov ^uoy ^/iij/vxov evvovv re ttj 
 i\ri6eiif 5ii toE fleoO yeveffBai nfivoiav. The cosmos can only be 
 described as a (jaov in so far as its intelligibility implies the evolution 
 of itiwrtyri., io\aaTi, aX&Siyri, — and this is just what Simplicius would 
 exclude ; for these he finds in ret i,Wa.. 
 
32 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 TO. iTTKTTTiTa TO, Bo^affTo, TO, aladT/Ta), it can hardly be 
 said that the latter is constructed ofioioTpoirco? with 
 regard to the former. Simplicius himself acknow- 
 ledges TO. aWa to be e/e r&v apx^ov fiev . . . t&v elB&v, 
 aW omeii iic t&v avToapx&v to? e* o-Tot^e/wv, aSX ef 
 €K€iv(ov fiivj o)s i^rjpTjfiivtov <Be> alritov r&v eKaaroi^ 
 avaToi'xmv. 
 
 Themistius, who (66 B, ed. Spengel p. zoseqq) simi- 
 larly finds in the words 6/ioico<; Be kuI . . . ofioioTpoTTtoi 
 a description of the cosmos as object thought, and in 
 the succeeding clause an account of the soul as sub- 
 ject thinking, is liable to the same objections, vis. 
 (a) that in the words 6fioia<; Be xal . . . ofioiorpoirwi we 
 expect to discover a comparison between ^vwariKov 
 and yvcoa-Tov, not between different kinds of 'yvaard, 
 and (d) that the phrase to, S' dWa o/wioTpoTrux; is an 
 over-statement^^ of the case. 
 
 Nor does Philoponus (C. fol. 2 A) improve upon 
 this by understanding ra d\\a of such ill-assorted 
 elements as rh vorjTo,, tA <f)v<nKd, and ra alcrdrjrd. As 
 Trendelenburg remarks — " Neo-Platonica satis olent." 
 
 Lastly, Sophonias gives, along with much irrelev- 
 ant matter, the view of his predecessors (de Anim. 
 paraph, ed. Hayduck p. 13, 6), making both members 
 
 '* Themistius' explanation is rb fi'kv olii alrro(uov, Tovrtari t6i» 
 Kia-fiOV tiv vmyriv, ix r&y irpinav iitolovv i./x^v, Tti ii M fiipovs ix 
 
 iStas avTuv vphs &\\^Aas ex*"" (^d. Spengel p. 21). 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 33 
 
 of the clause under discussion descriptive of the object 
 of cognition : rerTapa yap avrm . . . arot^eta . . . tow 
 voifrov SutKoafiov ireirbirjVTai, ev a to tS>v ISe&v ttXij- 
 pcofia' TO avroiv, f] ainoh)d<s, ^ avroTpia^ Kal r) avTorer- 
 pd<;, dij) Sivirep Kal 6 aladnjro'i oSto? Koa/ioi; f)pTr)rab tos 
 cm oXtiov tow vorjrov Kal al dpj(al axnov eKelffev. 
 
 Passing from the older commentators to more 
 recent interpreters, we find Trendelenburg — though 
 in several points correcting their extravagance — still 
 misled by them as to the sequence of the main 
 argument : 
 
 " Ita et Plato, quemadmodum pergitur, ut similia 
 similibus cognoscerentur, eosdem numeros 
 avTo^coov fecit, eosdem menti indidit. Sic 
 utraque loci pars artissime coniungenda, neque 
 altera ab altera divellenda, quasi ab illo eVt he. 
 Kal aWaxs novi quid incipiatur."^^ 
 The result of this misconception is that he fails to 
 explain the words rd S' dWa o/jLounpoTTO)'; : 
 
 " Quae fuerint haec reliqua, non definimus, univer- 
 
 sas tantum ideas, ne quid Platoni obtrudatur, 
 
 intellegentes."^* 
 
 He is aware that the explanations propounded by 
 
 Simplicius and Philoponus are unsatisfactory, but 
 
 has little to offer in their stead. 
 
 Arist. deanima, ed. 1877, p. 187, 
 2' Hid. p. 188. 
 
34 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Others have seen that the key to the passage lies in 
 the very " divulsio " which Trendelenburg deprecates. 
 Dr. Jackson, for example, proposes to translate airo 
 TO IjSsov by " the universal Subject "^ and to, aWa by 
 "the universal Object^ This is a distinct move in 
 the right direction : it is, however, open to criticism 
 on the following grounds : — 
 
 (a) An inexact and therefore unsatisfactory mean- 
 ing is attached to the words which describe "the 
 universal Subject : " 
 
 avTo fiev TO ^mov ef avrfji; ttj<; tov ivb<; IBeai xal tov 
 •Trpanov firjKovi Kal irXdrovi Kal ^dOoxK. 
 
 The phrase aur^? t'^? tov evb<s tSea? would thus be 
 loosely used for avrov tov evo?. 
 
 (j8) Elsewhere in Aristotle the term aiiro to ^Stov 
 signifies merely the Idea from which a particular 
 animal derives its animality, the Idea of "animal," 
 e.£^. Met. Z. 14. 1039^ 9 — '^ itoXKk eaTai avTo to 
 ^S>op K.T.X. ibid. M, 9. 1085 a 26 iroTepov to ^&ov 
 avTo iv TO) ^atw 57 erepov avTov ^a>ov,/rag. 184. 1510* 
 14 ^ fiev Kal i,5)6v icfTi, fiere-xpi &v Kal avTov tov ^mov. 
 Plato himself employs the plural of the same' term to 
 describe the Ideas of animals generally : 
 
 ^^ That is, the supreme Nous in its passage into cosmic existence, as 
 opposed to that cosmic existence which originates from the evolution of 
 the supreme NoSy. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 35 
 
 Rep. 532 A TT/Do? avra ^Stj to, foJa eTrt^etpeti/ airo- 
 PXeireiv Kal Trpos avra aarpa k.t.X. 
 I conclude, therefore, that to restrict the phrase to 
 "the universal Subject" is a limitation unwarranted 
 by either Aristotelian or Platonic usage. 
 
 Mr. Wallace, who interprets amo to %mov as " the 
 subject knowing" i.e. the microcosm, and to. aWa as 
 " the objects known " i.e. the macrocosm, escapes the 
 first of these objections — because the particular ^S)ov 
 (the microcosm) is of course the given Idea (^ tov ev6^ 
 ISea) as it appears in three-dimensional space. But 
 he too traverses the terminology of Aristotle, who by 
 avTo TO tpiov elsewhere denotes not a particular^* but 
 an Idea. 
 
 Another suggestion takes both avTo to ^S)ov and 
 TO, oKKa as " subjects " — the contrast between subject 
 and object being not expressed but only implied in 
 the sentence. The former will then mean the supreme 
 fwoK ; the latter the subordinate t,Ssa. This view, apart 
 from its liability to the objections which I have brought 
 against Dr. Jackson's version, seems to me to destroy 
 the balance of Aristotle's triple argument. We should 
 have him adducing three clauses for the express pur- 
 pose of pointing out the similarity between subject 
 
 '^ Plato, according to Mr. Archer-Hind's rendering, uses out^ t^ 
 ^uov of the individual animal in Tim. 89 B : but the passage, as we 
 shall see, may be taken differently. 
 
36 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 and object, and then omitting to make any mention 
 of that object in the central clause of the three.^^ 
 
 It is, I think, possible to rectify all these flaws 
 by understanding avro to ^&ov as " ike absolute 
 animal" that is any given voriTov ^&ov — (whether it 
 be the -n-avTeXk ^wov of Tim. 3 1 B, or one of the iv 
 fiepov; eihei ^ma of Tim. 30 C),— and ra aXKa as "the 
 remaining absolute animals." This somewhat obvious 
 rendering of the words ra aX\a is suggested by Philo- 
 ponus (C. 2 TO, S' aXKa ofioioTpoircoi;, ra aWa, rjTOi, . . . 
 ^ TO, dXKa irapahetr/iMara, olov to avroKaXov, to avTodv- 
 6poyjro<i, KoX iiri r&v \oiir&v 6fioico<;) and strongly 
 supported by the variant readings tos S' aWas 
 o/xotoTpoTTouv (Themist. 66 B) and rav aX\a^ ofioio- 
 TpoTTw? (Philop. c. 2), which refer clearly to the 
 remaining IBeai. That the phrase is a natural one 
 may be gathered from such expressions as the fol- 
 lowing : — 
 
 Tim. 30 C o5 ea-ji rdWa ^aia Kaff' ev icaX koto, yevr] 
 fiopia. 
 
 Ibid. 90 E TO, yap dWa ^<oa y yeyovev av k.t.X. 
 
 Phaedr. 247 E kbli rdWa maavTat rd ovra ovrcot 
 deaxrafievr) k.t.X. 
 
 " This is in a manner the converse of Trendelenburg's error. For 
 he, following the lead of the Greek commentators, held that both parts 
 of the cla^se referred to the objects of cognition ; and the present sugges- 
 tion makes both parts refer to the subjects of cognition. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 37 
 
 Both the given ^S>ov as percipient and the remain- 
 ing ^ma as percepts are constructed ofiocoTpoTreo^, since 
 in every case an absolute animal if subjected to 
 logical analysis will be found to consist of that form 
 of TO ev which is appropriate to itself (hence the 
 article Trj<; tov evo? iSea?) and the successive dimen- 
 sions through which it is evolved. 
 
 This interpretation escapes the two objections 
 urged on p. 34 by admitting the claim of any and 
 every intelligible animal to the title airo to ^&ov, 
 instead of confining the term to the supreme ^&ov.^ 
 It preserves too the symmetry of the argument ; and 
 that, not only by emphasising Aristotle's main con- 
 tention — the similarity between percipient and percept 
 — but also by identifying the subject of the present 
 with that of the preceding sentence : for in the first 
 clause we saw that any given efiyjrvxov — whether it 
 be the whole cosmic ^wov or one of the partial Ideal 
 §wa — is formed out of the same elements as the other 
 efiyfru'^a which constitute the objects of its cognition ; 
 and now in the second clause we see that any given 
 avTo ^Ssov — whether it be the whole cosmic animal or 
 
 '* As a matter of fact — excluding Tim. 89 B, at present subjtidice — 
 the supreme fSoc is not elsewhere, either in Plato or Aristotle, called 
 ouri ri (iaov. It is however spoken of as out!) faoi/ in Tim. 37 c, D iis 
 Se KiiiriSiV avrl} KaX fSc iv6riiTe . . • KaSdwcp oiv ourb Tvyx^vti (aov 
 alSiov iv K.r.K., which is perhaps the passage referred to by Proklos on 
 Tim. 40^ voririi irivrav aWia xal irapaSeiyiiaTiKii rav uiri toD Sifiuovp- 
 yov iroiovfievwu, %v Koi auTo^wov Sti touto KaKeTv A YlKdruv ii^ltoffef. 
 
38 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 one of the partial Ideal animals — is developed through 
 the same four stages as the other fwa which consti- 
 tute the objects of its cognition. The argument, I 
 conceive, is exactly parallel in the first two clauses, 
 and raises a presumption that it will be so in the 
 third also. 
 
 But before passing to the last consideration we 
 must enquire further concerning the nature of the 
 four stages that have hitherto been mentioned without 
 comment. Aristotle alludes to them again in Met. M. 
 2. 1077(2 24 eVi al <^evk<Tei,<i BrfKovaiv. irpmrov fiev jap 
 eVt ixriKOi yiyverai, elra ivl •jr\dro<;, TeXevraiov B' eh 
 ^d6o<;, Koi T6\o9 ecTxev. And his remarks both there 
 and here are best elucidated by a reference to Plato's 
 Laws 894 A — 
 
 r^v^veTai Br) irdvTcov yivetrit, fjviK av ri irddcK § ; 
 
 BrjKov a)s OTrorav dp^V Xa^ovaa av^r]v eh rrjv 
 
 Bevrepav 'e\9rj fieTd^aaiv, Kal diro ravTrj^ eh Tr]v 
 
 TrXricyiov, ical /J'SXpi' rpt&v ikOovaa aiadTjcTiv (ryfl 
 
 Tots aladavofievoii;. /xera^aXKov /lev o5v ovTto 
 
 Kal fiBTaKivovfievov yir/verai irav earc Be owTtus 
 
 ov, oTTorav fievy fMera^aXov Be eh oKXrjv e^iv 
 
 Bte<f)6apTai, Trai/xeXw?. 
 
 From these citations I conclude that tke Platonic 
 
 Idea possesses four phases or conditions, whereof the 
 
 first is opposed to the remaining three as ovrtat ovaia 
 
 to yeveaii. As ovTioi ov Aristotle calls the Idea avrr/ 
 
 fi Tov evo<! iBea ; and Plato adds that it fievei (= the 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 39 
 
 arda-K of Sopk. 249 B, C). As yiyvofievov Aristotle 
 couples it with space of one, two, and three dimen- 
 sions ; and Plato adds that it is developed through 
 these same stages fiera^dWov koi fiSTaKivov/Mevov 
 (= the^ KivrjaK of Sop/t. 249 A, b). 
 
 Thus, on the one hand, the separation between 
 Ideal ovala and phenomenal •yeveai';, enquired after 
 by the Platonic Parmenides — 
 
 Parm. 1 30 B auTO? av ovrco Sir/prjaai, w? 'Keyei's, 
 X^P^'i H'^v eiSrj avra drra, X'^P''^ ^^ ''"* tovtcov 
 av fierexovTa ; — 
 and affirmed by the elSmv ^i\oi — 
 
 Soph. 248 A f^eveaiv, ttjv Se ova'iav x<*'P'''5 "^"^ SteXo- 
 Hevoi Xeyere ; ?i yap ; NaL — 
 is still retained in Plato's mature ontology ; for the 
 Idea 6C7TIV 6vjo}<i ov ovorav /levy fiera^aXov Be el<s 
 aXKTjv e^iv hUi^Oaprat iravreKoi^. While, on the other 
 hand, neither the Ideal nor the phenomenal world is 
 complete apart from its correlative ; for ffTaa-i'^ and 
 KivrjaK, although evavTicoTara aWijXot?, are both 
 essential factors of oiaia, which is in every case 
 evolved from the single state of the former through 
 the threefold condition of the latter. 
 
 There are two further reflections suggested by the 
 passage from the Laws, which may be briefly indi- 
 
 -' [Alexander] in Arist. Met. M. 2. 10770 14 ed. Hayduck p. 731, 
 16 Trp6Tfpou yhp iirt fiiJKos ylverai rj atf^fi<ris ^ SAwj t] kIvthtis, 
 ^v€iTa els irKdras, dlra els fidOos. 
 
40 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 cated here, (a) In the first place, without discussing 
 the details of the context in which that passage is set 
 I may point out that by the dpxv of Laws 894 A Plato 
 means yfrvxv- Thus much is clear from the similarity 
 of the language that follows in 896 A, B — 
 
 S,pa en TroBovfiev /jlt) Uavw SeSelx^ai yjrvxvv tuvtov 
 ov KoX TTjV irpdnriv '^eveaiv teal Kivrjaiv t&v re ovtoov 
 Kol yeyovoTtov Koi iaofieveov kciI Travratv av t&v 
 evavTieov tovtok, eTretSjJ 76 ave<f>dvr] fj.eraffoXij'i re 
 KoX Kivi]aea)<; atrdarfi alrla dtraaiv ; — Ovk, dXKa 
 iKavcoTaTa SeSeiKrat >frvxv f&v irdvriov irpeG- 
 jSvTaTi;, <pav€i(7d ye dp^V icivrjcreto<;. 
 This identification^" supports my contention that 
 aino TO ^mov, the subject of the second clause in the 
 argument from Aristotle's Psychology, is not to be 
 distinguished from ■^v)(r\, the subject of the first 
 clause in the same argument ; inasmuch as the 
 four stages assigned by the Psychology to the a\no 
 ^&ov are by the Laws attributed to ■^vxv- {b) 
 Secondly, the full phrase dpxv tiv^aeax;, which re- 
 calls the language of earlier days (Phaedrus 245 c 
 Tvt\yy] Koi dpxh Kivij(TeQ)<!], may be taken to include 
 both aspects of i/n;;]^?;— the ripep,ia of its higher, and 
 
 3° If it be objected that Aristotle (vid. p. 27) uses the term ofx^ to 
 denote not ^vxh but the elements of which ^vxh is constructed, I answer 
 that the pupil's usage is no voucher for the master's. Indeed Aristotle 
 himself (Psych. A. 2. 7. 404^ 24), as we shall see directly, complains 
 that Plato "calls the apiBnol dSii Ka\ itpx'^ whereas they really are 
 in TWV (TTOtx^luy." 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 41 
 
 the KivrjaiM of its lower intellectuality. The compiler 
 of the Platonic opoi was not far wrong when he 
 defined v6r)cri<; as apj(^r) eiriaT'^fJLTji;, and aiadrja-K as 
 vov Kivr]ai<;. 
 
 But the mention of the diverse faculties of ■^vxv 
 reminds us that we have still to analyse the remainder 
 of Aristotle's argument, which treats of them seriatim. 
 
 iii. The third clause is epitomized by Dr. Jackson 
 as follows — 
 
 We reduce things to api,6p.ol (i.e. Ideal Numbers), 
 and therefore to the elements of these api,6iioi, 
 sc. to 1.2. 3.4. 
 
 Again, Xhe processes of mind are expressed by the 
 same elements, i. 2. 3.4. 
 
 This interpretation, though furnishing the needed 
 parallelism between subject and object, labours under 
 two serious drawbacks : 
 
 (a) The sToiyfia of the Ideal api6fiol are not the 
 numbers 1.2. 3. 4., but the principles of Identity and 
 Difference, which were technically known by this very 
 name ; see, for example. 
 
 Met. N. I. 1087 (J 14 01 TO /Meya koI to p-iKpov 
 XiyovTei} n€Ta rov evo?' rpia ravra o-T0t;^eta 
 T&v dpidfimv. 
 
 {13) Either the words eiBrj S' 01 apid/Mol oinoi irpay- 
 fidrmv, or the words 01 fiev yap dpidfioi .... to 8' 
 aiaO^aei, become superfluous ; the argument is com- 
 plete without them. Nor do we mend matters much 
 
42 TEIE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 if we invert the order of these two sentences. For, 
 that transposition granted, the passage will run : — 
 " And these numbers (sc. i. 2. 3. 4.) are forms of 
 things ; for on the one hand the Numbers were 
 known as the absolute Ideas and first principles, 
 and they are constructed out of their elements {sc. 
 1.2.3.4.) ; while on the other hand things are appre- 
 hended — some by vow, some by iiriarrniri, some by 
 ho^a, some by aia6r]<TK." But that etSi; S' oi dpid/j-ol 
 oiiToi Twv irpa'^ficLTrnv should be followed immediately 
 by 01 fievyap dpidfiol to, eiSr) . . . e\eyovTO,—a. sentence 
 in which both leading words are repeated in a different 
 sense, — is hardly credible. 
 
 In the face of these difficulties I should prefer to 
 retain the text unaltered, remarking that if the words 
 ol fiev ydp' dpi6/j,oi to. eiSrj aiird koX dp')(a\ eke^ovro, elal 
 S' 6K Tmv aroix'^imv had stood alone, they would have 
 been interpreted without fail : " The elSrjTiKol dpiOfiol 
 were spoken of as the absolute Ideas and principles, 
 though in point of fact tliey are compounded of the 
 elements." Moreover, the expression e'/c rmv aToi'x^eimv 
 would have been understood here in 404^ 25 as it was 
 understood a few lines higher up in 404^ 17 — " of the 
 elements TavTov+Odrepov^ovala." Again, it is natural 
 to suppose that the word ovroi, added to oi. dpi0/iol in 
 the last sentence, is intented to connect theni with the 
 faculties just enumerated and to distinguish them from 
 the Ideal dpiOfjuoL Lastly, the statement that these 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 43 
 
 four numbers (i. 2. 3. 4.) represent eiSr] rS>v irpw^iidTav 
 must balance the statement that the percipient has 
 four modes of cognition symbolically denoted by the 
 same numbers (1.2.3.4.); '^^^ since a quasi-spacial 
 account of those modes has been given already (in 
 the words iiria-Trj/irjv Be ra Suo* nova-)(^S}'s yap e^' ev 
 Tov Be Tov iirnreSov apidfiov Bo^av, aLo-Otjcriv Be tov 
 Tov arepeov), it is probable that these e'iBr] t&v 
 Trpayfidrcov are things in general grouped according 
 to the four stages'^ through which, as we learnt from 
 the second clause, percept Ideas pass into the region 
 oi aladr}(Ti,<;: certainly the broad meaning thus assigned 
 to the word etSo? = " class " or "group" is supported 
 by the fact that the article, prefixed to the same word 
 when used above in its technical sense (ra elBrf avra), 
 is here absent. The argument, I take it, may be set 
 out as follows : — 
 
 Again, the one is vow, 
 
 the two is eirLffTrifir), 
 
 the no. of the plane {i.e. three) is 56^, 
 the no. of the solid {i.e. four) is a'ia-dtja-t,^. 
 Now, on the one hand {fiep) the Numbers were 
 called the fundamental Ideas of the Platonic system 
 — though, to speak with all precision, they are con- 
 
 "' Simplic. in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 29, 12 Si^povv Si rd re 
 SvTtt oil KOTcfc ir\dTos, i.\K^ Kwri. 0deos, els t« ret i/07)t& koI iniaTiiTct Kai 
 So^airrlt Kal aiareriTi, koI dfioias rets yviiireis fis vovv Kal iiriirTlinriv Kol 
 Si!|ai' Koi at<rBTi<nv. 
 
44 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 structed out of the a-Toixeia (sc. TavTov+9dTepov=ova-ia) 
 — and they apprehend things by means of the four 
 faculties above mentioned. 
 
 On the other hand (Be) these four numbers (i.e. the 
 numbers 1.2. 3. 4., representing the four faculties) are 
 groups of things. 
 
 In brief, Aristotle's point is that the percipient 
 Ideas evolved as aforesaid apprehend by means of 
 four faculties, and that these faculties correspond to 
 four stages in the spacial evolution of the percept 
 Ideas : what those stages are we already know. 
 
 The recognition of the planes of consciousness 
 symbolised by these numbers i. 2. 3. 4. throws light 
 — where light is much needed — upon the use of the 
 technical term BeKd<;. Aristotle more than once affirms 
 that certain Idealists continued their Ideal Numbers 
 fie')(pi Trji; SeKdSo<i : 
 
 Met. A. 8. 1073^ 20 irepX Se rwv dpid/ji&v ore fiev 
 ft)? irepl dveipcov \eyovaiv, ore S' w? f^^XP'' '''^^ 
 Se/taSo? mptcfievtov. 
 
 Ibid. M.. 8. io84<z 12 et Se ireirepaa-fjievo'i, fiexpt 
 iroaov ; tovto yap Set XeyeaQai ov fj,6vov oti, 
 aXKa KoX Stort. uWa fir^v el fJ^XP'' '''V'' BexaBo^ 
 o apidfio<{, (ocnrep rivet (ftaaiv, irp&Tov fiev Tayv 
 eTTiXel'yjrei to, e'lBr)- olov ei eanv fj rpidf avrodv- 
 6pwTro<i, rif earai dpi6fjLb<; avTolinroi ; airb yap 
 ' eKa<TTo<; dpiOfibi /J-expt BeKd^oi;. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 45 
 
 Ibid. M.. 8. 1084 fl 29 6Tt aTOTTov el 6 apiOfib<; fJ-i'x^pt 
 T^9 BeKd8o<s, fiaXXov ri ov to ev KaX elBo<; avTrj^ 
 T^S SeKaSoi. 
 
 Ibid. N. I. 1088^ 10 olov 7) 8eKa<; iroXv, ei rainTji 
 fiJj e'ffTt vXeiov. 
 
 Phys. T. 6. 206 b 32 /JLexpt yap SeKdBo<! troiel top 
 
 dpidfMOV. 
 
 Now the statement that Ideal Numbers were con- 
 tinued fiexpi Tij? SewciSo? is open to two interpretations. 
 On the one hand, it might mean that there are but 
 ten Ideas in the Ideal series. It was, in fact, obviously 
 so understood, or misunderstood, by certain crude 
 followers of the first Academy. Aristotle's evidence 
 on the point is rendered explicit by 
 
 [Alex.] in Arist. Met. ed. Hayduck p. 700, 27 el 
 yap ai Iheai dpid/Moi, 6 B' apiOfioi a')(fii t'^s 
 BeKaBo^ Xararai, ai IBiai apa BeKa. 
 But to impute such puerility to Plato himself is surely 
 out of the question. Aware that his materials for a 
 comparative study of nature were as yet scanty in the 
 extreme, he probably refrained from delivering any 
 exact dogma with regard to the number of absolute 
 Ideas : 
 
 Met. A. 8. 1073 a 16 irepl ir\i]6ov<s ovBev elprjKaaiv, 
 o Tt Koi ffa4>e<! ehrelv. 
 At most he may have vouchsafed the remark that the 
 Ideas were /ivpia, in order to prevent the supposition 
 
46 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 that they were aireipa. This limitation is possibly 
 alluded to elsewhere by Aristotle : 
 
 Jifei. N. I. 1088^ II olov ri SeKat iroXv, el towti;? 
 fii] eari ifKelov, fj to, fwpia. 
 
 In any case Plato cannot have ignored the palpable 
 absurdity of a system comprising only ten infimae 
 species. On the other hand, the phrase /ie^pt t^? 
 SeKaBoi is susceptible of a different interpretation. It 
 may imply that each individual Idea contains within 
 itself the perfect number ten. And that this was 
 Plato's real meaning appears from an interesting 
 Aristotelian fragment (ed. Rose 1477 d 40) preserved 
 by Philoponus in Arist. Psych. A. 2. 7. 404^ 18 : 
 
 Xeyei oZv (Aristotle) <f)d(rKeiv avTov^ (Plato and the 
 Pythagoreans) ort ra eiStj api6/jLoi elaiv, dpidfiol 
 Be SeKaSiKor eKaa-rov yap t&v eiS&v SexaSa 
 e\eyov. 
 
 Recent exegesis has regarded the testimony of 
 Philoponus either as erroneous and without founda- 
 tion (see Trendelenburg de an. ed. 1877 p. 189), or as 
 reliable and important (see Brandis de perd. Arist. 
 libris p. 49 seqq^. Those who credit the assertion have, 
 however, been put to strange shifts to support their 
 view. Maguire, for example, in The Platonic Idea 
 p. 69 seq., obtains his decad in the following fashion : 
 "The Idea as I is the result of II the combination of 
 III the Indefinite and of IV Unity. . . . The Idea 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 47 
 
 is a Result of a Combination of Two Elements, of 
 which the former indirectly, and the latter directly, 
 rests on an absolute Basis. . . . That is to say, The 
 IV presupposes The III ; The III presupposes The 
 II ; The II presupposes The I; while The I is self- 
 sufficing, and verges on the absolute. But, since 
 
 IV-|-III + II + I = X, 
 we may see how, in Plato's mind. The Ten denoted 
 not only the highest form, but also the living sub- 
 stance of Supreme Reality." I do not think that 
 we need resort to such subtleties for a satisfactory 
 explanation. If every Ideal Number possesses four 
 phases of consciousness denoted respectively by the 
 numbers i. 2. 3. 4., then it is evident that in a sense 
 every Ideal Number is the sum of i -t- 2 -|- 3 -1- 4, or, in 
 other words, is a Se/ea?.^^" In short, the problematic 
 use of the term Sewa? as applied to the Platonic Ideas 
 finds a simple solution in this third clause of the 
 argument from Aristotle's Psychology. 
 
 The general bearing of that clause may be thus 
 illustrated.^^ We particular men, who fancy ourselves 
 
 ''" Philoponus, then, is partially right when he adds {Joe. cit.) 
 cipidfiol filv odv Si& TOVTO' ScKaStKol 8e Sih T7}r reXeidrriTa rai/ 
 elSav. The iravreKas iv of SopA. 248 E was found to involve the 
 development of irovs into ^irtirT^/iri, Si!{o, citaBriais, and the symbols of 
 these four stages produce the decad, which the Pythagoreans named 
 XiavTfXeia (Stob. £cl. I. ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 22, 5). 
 
 3' For the ensuing description cp. Simplic. in Arisi. Psych, ed. 
 Hayduck p. 29, 2 &i>rjyov Se els rhs eiSijTiKeks ipx^^ ""^ Tcks ifivxiicas 
 
48 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 separate entities, are but the Ideal animal Man re- 
 garding itself on the plane of acadrjan: : what we see 
 is therefore a plurality of men moving in three- 
 dimensional space. When we entertain opinions 
 about things, we rise to a higher level and portray 
 them to ourselves by a kind of mental delineation : 
 they still shape themselves as pluralities, but pluralities 
 moving in two dimensions, a flat and it may be 
 delusive picture of surrounding life. As individuals 
 we are capable of a yet higher method of cognition, 
 namely that of eVto-TjjjUTj : when a man knows a thing, 
 he so to speak goes " straight to the point " (fiovaxw 
 yap e^' ev) in his intellectual presentation ; and though 
 
 irda'as yi'^trets, rijv juei/ voepkv &s Ka6* eva&iv afieptffTov ffvvatpov^GV7]v 
 tls r^v juoj/c£8a, t^v Se 4TriffT7jfioi'iK^v us &.ve\L(rffQfi4vrjv Ka\ uis dirh eripov 
 Tov airiov eis rh aiTiarhv irpoayofieyTjVj us Sc Kol SiSt rh airKavfs Koi ael 
 Sict Tuv avTuv Hfvov els T^v dvd^a, t^v 5e i6^av eis t^i/ rpiiiSa Si^ rh rijp 
 Svvafiiv aitTTJs fiij 4vl r'^ aiirh ael, aA\& Torh fieu 4vl rh &\ij0cs TOrk Se 
 iirl rh \fievSos xKiveiv, tis Si t^ji' TetpiSa t^v i£laBi)inP 810 rh au(i.6.Tu\i 
 fivai ami\i\TrTtK'l]v. Themist. in Arist. Psych, ed. Spengel p. 21, 17 
 Tiv juir vovv ex^'" ^^ ^^s toS kvhs iSeas oiT^x [sc. T^Ji' tfii/x^x) Siupi^ovro, 
 riiv Se iiriirTiifaiv iK rrjs wpdrris SvdSos- aip' ivhs "yip iip' %v xaX ri 
 ^iriiTT^/ir)" 4irb yap tuv trporicreuv M xb <ru/xircpa(r/ia, -r^fv S^lac Si ix 
 T^s wptirris rpidSos, iiros fiv xai tou cthtcSou hpiBnis' t^s yhp i6(,yt^ ff'l 
 «ai rh iXriBfS xaX rb ifiEvSos ^k tuv irpoTd(rtav, alffBriiriv Sc arh rr/s 
 irpc^TTjs rerpiSos i^ ?s Kal ri too aTipeov <rd>iiaTOS iSe'o" vepX yiip rh 
 ToiavTov ffa/ia r\ aXaBiiins. Sophonias in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck 
 p. r3, 37 hvhs yap tA itriffTTj fioviKSi rh vod^v tttj upitrfievus ^x*"'''"' rptits 
 fie ff S6^a' rpiTTck yiip Kal t^ Bo^affrh Sih rh afj/pippeves* &.irh 3i ttjs 
 rerpdSos riiv aXattiiriv, in irepX rh irw/ia, 5 rerpiSi avvreSftrai. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 49 
 
 Aristotle^ scofifs at those who are content to regard 
 the soul's knowledge as a series of lines, yet the 
 modern science of psychophysics has certainly tended 
 to confirm Plato's acute conjecture. To rise above 
 iiria-r^fjirj is impossible for us — 
 
 Laws 8q7 D fit] roiwv e'f ivavria^ olov el<t TjXiov 
 
 a7ro/8\67roi'Te?, vvKra iv ixearjfi^pla ivayofievoi, 
 
 •jToiTjacofieda Tr)v airoKpuriv, to? vovv Trore 
 
 OvriToli ofifiaaiv oylrofxevni re Kal yvaco- 
 
 fievob lKav&<} — 
 
 inasmuch as particular thinkers are the Ideal animal 
 
 actively functioning in the mode of ddrepov, and in the 
 
 next stage — v6r]ai<; — particulars coalesce into the Idea. 
 
 It is reserved for the Idea itself to enjoy that direct 
 
 intuition of which the neo-Platonists said^* voel ov ^i}tS)v, 
 
 dXX' extov. 
 
 We are now in a position to combine the results of 
 all three clauses and to indicate the advance made by 
 the passage as a whole. 
 
 From the critique of the Platonic Parmenides, 
 fittingly supplemented by that of the Eleatic stranger, 
 
 '2 Met. M. 2. 10770 29, Psych. A. ^. 17. 409 a 5. It is, however, 
 to be observed that in 407 a 29 Aristotle has himself been guilty of much 
 the same conception as that which he ridicules : ai S' iwaSel^fis Kal 
 air' apxv^, koI ex"""'' "''>" TeAoy, rhv (rvK\oyi<rfihv i) rb trvii.irepa<rfia- et Si 
 ju^ TrepaTovvTai, clW' ouk avaKdfJLVTovtri ye Trii\ty iv apxh^i irpoirKafiPdv- 
 ovtrat 8* ael fieffov Kal lUKpof ciiBviropovo'iv. 
 
 ^ Plotinus Enn. V. i. 4, cp. V. i. 10, V. v. i. 
 
50 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 we had conceived the ground-plan of the universe as 
 a single ovaia multiplying itself into a series of ovaiac. 
 Each ovaia was a voryrov ^&ov, whose nature necessarily- 
 comprised two functions ; on the one hand a power of 
 passionless thought, that might be named v6r)ai<; ; on 
 the other hand a power of active and passive thought, 
 that might be named <yvS)tTi<;. In the case of the 
 universal ovala, vorjffK was represented by the supreme 
 Now ; in the case of the series of ovaiai, vorjaii was 
 represented by the Ideas. 
 
 The argument from Aristotle's Psychology, re- 
 viewed in connection with certain corroborative state- 
 ments, has amplified this theory as follows : — 
 
 (i) Ovaia is now identified with -^vxv^^ — the 
 single all-embracing 6v with the 7ravTe\e<s ^mov, the 
 assemblage of partial or Ideal ovra with the iv nepow; 
 effiet tpia. The higher and lower mentality, which 
 together formed the ovala of a votjtov ^&ov, are thus 
 equated with ravrov and ddiepov, which together form 
 the ovaia of an Ideal e/jLyjrvxov. Further, the objects 
 of cognition for any such efi^lnrxov are declared to be 
 the remaining and similarly constructed e/iijrvxa. 
 
 (2) Every absolute animal, whether it be the whole 
 cosmic animal or one of the partial and subordinate 
 animals, evolves itself thrpugh four phases or con- 
 
 '' Cp. Simplicius in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck, p. 10, 33 01 )ikv 
 

 
 
 5. 
 
 P" V 
 
 
 
 tu 
 
 :i. ^ 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 It 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 ■•: o 
 
 
 
 
 »> 
 
 c9 
 
 
 
 b 
 
 s3i 
 
 
 
 (3 
 
 o 
 
 -^ 
 
 
 1: 
 
 
 b - 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 ■g 
 
 
 
 Ui 
 
 
 
 
 O 
 
 
 
 
 U 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 & 
 ■« 
 
 tfl s- 
 
 
 
 b- 
 
 u e 
 
 
 
 ^1 
 
 2§ 
 
 o 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. S3 
 
 ditions, viz. (a) the immutable being of jj tov Ij/o? Ihia, 
 and (j3) the mutable becoming of the same in space of 
 one, two, and three dimensions. Its objects of cogni- 
 tion are again the remaining and similarly developed 
 animals. 
 
 (3) Each Idea in its perceptive evolution acquires 
 four planes of consciousness : — 
 
 As endowed with wO? it voel ; 
 
 As passing into einarrifjL'q it inioTaTai, 
 
 As passing into Bo^a it So^ofet, 
 
 As passing into aitrdTjaii it aladdvereu. 
 Moreover, the object of its perception throughout 
 these four stages is any other Idea, perceived — 
 
 by vou? as an apidfioi ; 
 
 by iTnajriiit} as a fj.fJKO';, 
 
 by Bo^a as an etriiTeBov, 
 
 by aicrffijcri'} as a arepeov. 
 Thus the passage as a whole enables us to fill up and 
 complete the outlines of the Platonic scheme. 
 
PART II. 
 
 HIGHER AND LOWER MENTALITY. 
 
 At the outset of the present enquiry I proposed 
 to analyse certain incidental passages of pregnant 
 meaning in order to obtain some simple and yet 
 adequate formula for the interrelations of Plato's 
 Idealism. This analysis has established the main 
 fact that Mind is operant in two different ways 
 within the limits of Platonic ontology. For, in the 
 first place, Mind is a Unity self-pluralised into a 
 conclave of Minds, which are objective — i.e. really 
 existent — Ideas. And in the second place, on pain 
 of forfeiting its claim to real existence. Mind passes 
 everywhere out of its own condition of permanent 
 and immutable thought into the transitory and 
 mutable phases of knowledge, opinion, sensation, 
 thereby producing subjective — i.e. phenomenally exist- 
 ent — particulars. In the words of Proklos : traaa i\ 
 T&v yjrvyf&v rd^K eh Bvo Tavrai dv^pTijrai •7rr)yd<;, rijv 
 re SrjfiiovfyyiKTjv Kal ttjv ^moyoviKi]V.^^ 
 
 So far the outlines of the theory. It remains to 
 
 ^ Proklos /« Tim. 3 19 A. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 55 
 
 indicate the ethical colouring of the whole. But 
 before attempting this further task, it will be well 
 to secure due perspective by emphasising afresh the 
 salient points of view. I shall, therefore, in the 
 present chapter endeavour to illustrate from the 
 Platonic dialogues the contrast thus formulated 
 between the objective and subjective aspects of Mind, 
 in the hope that each successive illustration, while 
 exhibiting Plato's technical consistency in the use of 
 non-technical terms, may bring into clearer light the 
 moral significance of his design. 
 
 § I. Purpose and Necessity. 
 
 Timaeus 47 E discriminates (a) to, Bm vov BeSrj- 
 fiiovfyyqfieva from (b) to. Si dvaf/K-rj^ jiyvofieva, and 
 declares that the universe is the combined product 
 of both : fie/itr/fievij yap ovv rj rovBe rov Kocr/iov yeveaK 
 i^ avdr/Kri^ re Kal vov <7UO"Tacr6aj? iyevvrjBr). 
 
 Now {a) the creations of vov<;, as we learnt from 
 the Parmenides, comprise a series of subordinate 
 Minds called the Ideas, which are unified in a single 
 supreme Mind conceived as their basis and ground- 
 work. Again, {b) ra Bi dvdyKrji ytyvofji^va are the 
 results brought about by the necessary passage of 
 the said Minds from the higher mode of " being " into 
 the lower mode of " becoming " ; and this lapse, this 
 
S6 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 deviation, is as such^' referred in the Timaeus to 
 r) irXavtatievr) ahia. It is clear, therefore, that Plato, 
 when he contrasts ra 8io vov BeStjutovpyrj/Meva with to, 
 Si dpdyK7]'i yiyvofieva, is describing just those two 
 aspects of Mind which I have termed "objective" 
 and "subjective." And we are confronted by the 
 question : on what principle of distinction is the 
 latter and not the former assigned to dvayKt] ? 
 
 The reason of the change is not, I think, far to 
 seek. It is uvdyK-rj that the supreme Mind should 
 pass from the ravT6Tr)<; of I'ou? into the erepori;? of 
 itnarriiiri, So^a, aiadr^aif. It is dvdyKt), too, that the 
 subordinate Ideal Minds should similarly pass from 
 perfect to imperfect thought. But it is not dvdyKt) 
 that the supreme Mind should multiply itself into 
 the Ideas. That process of objective pluralisation is 
 never in Plato described as dvar/Koiov. It is on the 
 contrary directly referred to 0ov\r]ai^, the very 
 opposite^^ of dvdyK-q. 
 
 In proof of this contention I may cite first Tim. 
 
 ^ Mr. Archer-Hind seems to me ill-advised in stating (ed. Tim. 
 p. 167 n.) that "Plato calls avdyKij the irAavoi/iEVr) alrla, because, 
 though working strictly in obedience to a certain law, it is for the most 
 part as inscrutable to us as if it acted from arbitrary caprice." The 
 term iT\ava>nevi) surely denotes nothing more than deviation, and is the 
 equivalent of Bdrepov as opposed to rv-hriv. 
 
 ^^ For jSotSATjffis ) ( h.v&yKi] cp. Crat. 420 D where rb Karh. rifir 
 Poi\r\(riv ytyvd/xevov is opposed to rh i,vayKa!ov koX ivrirvTov, irapet 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 57 
 
 29 E — premising that the supreme vov<s, which in 
 Phileb. 28 A — 31 A is the ahla Tr\<i fii^eu)'}, must be 
 identified with the ^eo? to whom in the Timaeus 
 precisely the same function is allotted : — 
 
 (6 TO irav ToSe ^vvi<TTa<i) irdvra oti fidXiara yevia-dai, 
 e^ovXijdT) irapairXriaia eavrS, ravrr/v Srj yevea~ 
 em? Kot Koa/iov fidXia-T dv rt? dpj^rjv KvpiwTaTTjv 
 nrap dvSp&v <^povifimv diroBe)(Ofievo<; opBorara 
 aTToSe^^otr' av. ^ov\rjdel<; yap 6 0eb<; drya0d, 
 ixev Trdvra, <^\avpov Be firjSev elvai kuto, Swa/jnv, 
 ovTco Br) irav otov rjv oparov irapdKa^oiv oii^ 
 'f]av)(^iav dyov dWa kivov/j,€vov TrXTj/t/ueXw? Koi 
 drd/crcoif, et? tu^iv avrb Tfyayev e« tjJ? dra^iav, 
 fiyrjo'dfievo'; meivo tovtov 7rdvT0)<! d/ietvov, 
 (29 E— 30 A). 
 In this paragraph logical analysis lays before us 
 the conception of a supreme Mind brought face to 
 face with a visible chaos. Thus far we are concerned 
 only with avdyKt), which compels vov<{ to degenerate 
 into aiadriai^,^^ but does not determine under what 
 forms such aia0r]aK shall work. At this point, how- 
 ever, a new element is announced : the supreme Mind 
 
 ^^ Laws 81S A %oiKiV 6 rhv Behif irpwrov irapoifiiatriifjLeyos (cp. idid. 
 741 A, Protag. 345 d) 61$ ravta iiroPKexfias e'lTuy as oiSi Beis avdyiqi iii} 
 trore <pav^ fiax^f^^yos, Sffai 9eiai ye, oTjuat, rwr avayK&v cltrip, k,t,\. 
 Similarly the author of the Mpinomis (? Xenokrates) 982 B ^ ^vx^is Se 
 kvdyKTi vovv KeHT7}fi4j/Tjs airaiT&v oivayKuu iroXi* /jLeyitTTTj yiytrotr' &v 
 ipXov(ra ylip 4W' oI/k ipxp/i^vifi vo/ioBere^. 
 
S8 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 is said to reduce the confusion to order ; and this 
 codification of anarchy, this marshalling of motion, is 
 distinctly ascribed to divine ^ovXtjffK. If then it can 
 be shown that ek rd^iv ayeiv to oparov ex tjj? ara^ta? 
 was the recognised function of the Ideal series, it will 
 be justly urged that the existence of this series postu- 
 lates a continued exercise of volition on the part of 
 the supreme Mind. 
 
 Phileb. 16 c — 17 A informs us that confusion is 
 reduced to order by the interposition of a definite 
 number of species between the one genus and the 
 indefinite plurality of particulars. These species are 
 the TroWa which connect the iv with the a-iretpov, and 
 ipso facto distinguish Dialectic from Eristic. We 
 must not be satisfied, says Sokrates, fxk'xpi.'tTep av ro 
 Kar apx^'i ^^ f^V oti ev Koi ttoXXA koI onreipd eart 
 /xnvov lBtj Ti?, aWa Koi oiroaa. 
 
 The method is exemplified by the conduct of the 
 Creator both in Tim. 53 B — 
 
 ore 8' eVe^^etpetTo Koo'/xeladai to ttclv, irvp irp&TOV 
 Kal vSmp ical yrjv Kal dipa, I't^vi? fJ.ev e^ovTa ammv 
 a/na, iravTaTraai je /ir/v SiaKslfieva wcrnep etKO? 
 6;!^6ti' airdv, otuv dv!} tivov Oe6<i, ovto) Stj t6t6 
 irei^vKOTa Tama vpSiTov Biea'^rj/jLaTia-aTO e'lBeai 
 TS Kal dpid/jLol^. — 
 and in Tim. 69 B — 
 
 TavTa ara/CTft)? e)(0VTa 6 6eo'i ev kicdaTW re avTm 
 Trpot avTo Kal tt/jo? aWiyXa avfifJieTpla<; iveiroir)- 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 59 
 
 aev, oaa<! re Kal ottt) Swarov ?iv avaXo'ya jcai 
 
 avjjLfjLeTpa eivai. tots ryap ovre tovtcov octov /jltj 
 
 TVXV ''"'■ M^''"?'^^'') ovre to irapdtrav ovofidcrai, r&v 
 
 vvv ovofia^o/jLevoJv a^ioXoyov rjv ovBev, otov vvp 
 
 Koi iiScop Kal ei rt twv aWmv aXka iravra ravra 
 
 •jrpHarov BteKoa-firjcrev, eireir sk Tovrmv ttuv ToSe 
 
 ^W6(7TJ?o-aTo, ^&ov ev ^&a e^ov to, Travra iv avrS 
 
 dvTjTa aOdvard re. 
 
 But its application to Idealism will be discerned most 
 
 clearly from the latter part of the Parmenides. The 
 
 second hypothesis of that dialectical exercise educes, 
 
 among others, the following results : — 
 
 %v et e<mv, i.e. If ev participates in ovaLa, then — 
 
 (a) ev OP is a Whole comprising Parts, whereof 
 each Part is itself a ev ov comprising lesser parts ; and 
 by continuing this process of subdivision we may show 
 that the original ev ov is arrretpov to ttXjJ^o?. (142 C — 
 143 A). 
 
 (/S) ev (not ev ov, but ^v conceived apart from 
 ovaia) is an undivided unity. The possession of ovaia, 
 however, forces ev into combination with to erepov, 
 and occasions the production of a-v^vyiai, which may 
 be regarded either as couplets or as triplets, according 
 as we fix our attention on any two of their three factors, 
 or add the third which completes the given triunity 
 oiiaia 
 
 ' * nr^ 
 
 ev ereoov 
 
6o THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Further, the interaction of such factors produces 
 every imaginable number ; and we conclude — El apa 
 €<niv ev, avar/Kr) koX - dpidfibv elvai. 'AvdyKi]. AWa 
 firjv dpiOfiov ye oVto? ttoW' civ ew; Koi 7rXi]do<; aveipov 
 T&v ovTwv. (143 A — 144 a). 
 
 (7) Every dpiOfib^ participates in ovala, and has 
 fiopia, viz. units, which likewise participate in ovaia. 
 Thus the original ev ov is not an indivisible Whole, 
 but a Whole that has Parts and is equal to the sum 
 of its Parts, to ev ap' avTo KeKcpfiaTKr/jLevov vtro rij? 
 ovaia<; iroWd re koX direipa to ttXtjOoi itni. (144 A 
 — 144E). 
 
 (8) Lastly, to ev may be called Trepa<s and ireirepaa-- 
 /jiivov in so far as it is a irepiejfpv oKov. Hence to ev 
 apa OV ev t€ ecTTi, irov Kai iroWa, icai oXov /cat fiopia, 
 Kal TTeTrepofffievov Kal direipov irXijdei. (144 E — 
 14s A). 
 
 Again, the fourth hypothesis of the Parmenides 
 
 maintains these propositions : — 
 
 %v el ecTTiv {i.e. If ev participates in ovala), then — 
 (a) On the one hand TaWa, being dWa tov evoi, 
 
 are not ev. On the other hand ToWa /leTexei iry tov 
 
 €vb<; in virtue of possessing fiopia, which are fiopia tov 
 
 o\ov Te Kal ev6<i. ' 
 
 *" Heindorf, Bekker, Schleiermacher, and the Zurich edd. wrongly 
 bracket the word iv : it is just this possession of oiaia which renders 
 possible the subdivision of rb eV, — apart from oiaia it would be 
 indivisible. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 6i 
 
 Thus we posit fiia rt? ISea Kal ev ti, o KaXovfiev 
 oKov, e'f airdviwv ev TeKeiov yeyovoi (157E), E), and 
 affirm that it is composed of •jrdWa fiopia which serve 
 to link ToXXa with the ev o\ov jiXeiov. (157 B — 157 e). 
 
 (/8) Both the oXov and each fiopiov may be said 
 /leri'xeiv tov ev6<;, and therefore to be erepa rov ei/o?. 
 And 17 erepa ^vai'; tov etSov^ will ever be atreipov 
 irXTJOei. (157 E — IS8C). 
 
 (7) Lastly, TO, aXXa rov ev6<!, when combined with 
 TO ev, give rise to a third class of existences, vis. ra 
 fiopia, which rrepav rrdpe<r)(e •jrpb<! dXXTjXaj thereby 
 limiting the drreipia inherent in ret dXXa and establish- 
 ing certain fixed relations with to oXov. (158 c — 
 158 D). 
 
 The argumentation of these two hypotheses re- 
 iterates the lesson of the Fhilebus. Between ev ov and 
 •irX7]6o% waeipov rmv ovrtov must be ranged a series of 
 TToWo ovra related to the former as dpi,6/j,ol to ev or as 
 fiopia to o\oi>, to the latter as irepa^ irapixovra to 
 arreipa. These conditions being granted, knowledge 
 becomes a possibility {Farm. 155 D). We may well 
 follow Dr. Jackson when in this class of intermediates 
 he recognises the Ideas of Plato's own ontology." 
 
 It appears, then, that both in the Philebus and in 
 the Parmenides the Ideas are regarded as a bond 
 between the single objective Mind and the indefinity 
 
 «' The Journal of Philology, yi\,y%. 
 
62 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 of subjective phenomena, their prerogative being to 
 introduce the Trepai of the former into the direipia 
 of the latter. The words of Aetios*^ are strictly- 
 accurate : 
 
 IBea icrrlv ovaia daciofjbaTOi;, ai/ria t&v oia iaTiv airf/ 
 teal irapdSeiy/jLa tt)? rS)v Kara <f>vaiv e')^6vrmv 
 ala-OrjT&v VTro(nd<rea)<s, airrr) fiev v^eaTaxra Kaff 
 iavTJjv [«'], ebKOvitpvcra Be ra? dfiop^ovi vKa<i KaX 
 airia yiyvofiivr) tt)? tovtcov StaTd^eco<}. 
 And since this very introduction of order into disorder 
 is stated in the Timaeus to be the outcome of the 
 divine intent, it results that the objective pluralisation 
 of vov<i which produces the Ideal voriiiaTa is due to 
 deia ^ovXrjai^, and is rightly opposed*^ to the sub- 
 jective action of dvdyicr] or 97 irXavco/jievr) airia. As 
 Tim. 68 E puts it : 
 
 j^jO^ Bv otTt'a? elBrj Biopi^etrOai, to fiev dvayKaloVf rb 
 
 Be delov. 
 And here — lest we should misconstrue Plato's 
 deliberate recognition of ^SouXiyo-ts into an acknowledge- 
 ment of despotic caprice on the part of the Creator — 
 
 *'^ Stob. Eel. I. xii. I a, ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 134, gff. 
 
 " Unless, indeed, we hold that Plato like Aristotle recognised a 
 hypothetical hvAyKi). The latter author sometimes {e.g. Psych. B. 8, 10. 
 420^ 19 seq.) distinguishes kvafxtuov from iviKo, tov eS, but elsewhere 
 [e.g. de fart. an. A. I. 642 a 32 ^ 8" ivdynri 4t4 yuic atmalvei gri ei 
 isfivo iarai t4 oE evexa, ravTu hviyia] iarXv ^x^'") ^''^ '^ k.t.X.) admits 
 a necessity of a conditional or hypothetical sort. In the second sense 
 Plato's Ideal series would be itself hvar/Koiov. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 63 
 
 let US recall the tenor of Tim. 41 B. In that passage 
 6 ToSe TO -irav yevv^ffa^ addressing the 6eol 6e&v assures 
 them of endless life : 
 
 ov n fiev Sr) XvOrjcrea-Oe <ye ovSe rev^eade Bavdrov 
 /wlpav, T^? i/MT)^ iSouXijo-eo)? /jiei^ovixs ert Sea-- 
 fj,ov Kal Kvpicorepov Xaj^oi/re? ixelvcov, oZs ot^ 
 iyiyvea-de ^vveSe2a0e, 
 
 Now the bonds wherewith the 0eol deav had been 
 bound at birth were those of ■^vxv and fa)»j : cp. 
 
 Tim. 38 E Sea-fioh efiy^vj^oi<! am/iara BeOevra ^&a 
 eyew)]6r]. 
 
 Ibid. 40 B ^wa Qeta ovra Kal aiSta koI xaTci ravra 
 iv ravTm arpe^ofieva. 
 
 And it has been shown that ^corj and ■yfrvxv are the 
 predicates of ovaia when it is in a state of motion. I 
 infer that the fiei^cov Sea-fioi will be that which is 
 predicable of oiaia when it is in a state of rest, namely 
 v(yi)<Ti,<;. The inference is supported by Tim. 48 A, 
 which denies the demotic creed ouSet? dvdyicrj<; fiei^ov 
 tayyei v6fio<i,^ affirming that vov<{ is lord even over 
 dvdyKij. 
 
 Thus Tim. 41 B corroborates the coextension of 
 ^ovXrjaK with voT/a-K, — inasmuch as it attributes to 
 
 ** Frag. Trag. adesp. 421 N. cp. Eur. Alk. 965 — 
 r\Zpov. 
 
64 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 the former*^ a supremacy which is elsewhere ascribed 
 to nothing less than the latter, — and by the same 
 means provides the needed assurance that we are 
 dealing with no arbitrary display of divine volition, 
 but with the unvarying purpose of a Being whose 
 eternal aim is the multiplication of his own inherent 
 qualities. Plotinus has read Plato aright : 
 
 T] 8e deXr)ai,<i ovk aXoyo^ ^v, ovBe tov eiiaj, owS' eo? 
 
 eirfjXJdev aina, aW' o)? eSet, ws oiSews ovto^ 
 
 e/cet ecKTJ. 
 These conclusions accord with the wording of 
 41 A, where the supreme Beoi speaks of the handiwork 
 of the 6eol dewv, sc. the rpia OvrjTO, yevr} — 
 
 a St' e/iow yevofieva oKvra ifiov ye fir/ ede\ovTO<!' rb 
 
 fj,ev oHv Bt] Sedev irav \vt6v, to 76 /i^v KaX5)<; 
 
 dp/jLOffdev Kal e'xpv eS Xueiv ideXeiv kukov. 
 That is, the Creator — were he KaKot, not uya66'; — 
 could, by ceasing to will the existence of the Ideas, 
 at a single blow abolish their dependent yevo/ieva.*'' 
 The security that he will not do so lies in the ethical 
 character of his fundamental attributes. 
 
 ^' The correspondence in point of diction with Cratylus 403 c is 
 remarkable: Aeafihs (licf dTifovf, &are /idveiv JTrouoSi', Tr6Tepos 
 iaxvfirep6s iariv, iviyKii f) iiriBvulai llo\ii Sia(p4pei, & S^iepares, 
 
 •5 Snn. VI. viii. 18. 
 
 *' Cp. Tim. 32 C ii^uToi/ 6x6 tow iiA\av Tr\iiv iirh toC ^vvS^cravTos 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 65 
 
 The moral issues of the doctrine thus elicited are 
 of no trivial order. To follow them out to any length 
 would at this stage of my argument be premature. 
 I shall have occasion to revert to them in the sequel. 
 Here it must suffice to say that the equation 
 fiovXr/a-K = v67}(Ti<s confines all true volition to the 
 Ideal world. For if neither knowledge nor opinion 
 nor sensation, but pure thought alone, be designated 
 as the seat of will, it follows that the unit of voluntary 
 action is no longer the particular but the votjtov Jwoc, 
 since nothing short of the vor/Tov ^wov possesses the 
 prerequisite v6rjai,<;. 
 
 Turning next from to, Sia vov BeBrjfjLiovpyrj/j.eva to 
 ra Si avdr/Kr]<s yi^vofji.ei'a (Tim. 47 E), we find that 
 Plato regards the degradation whereby Mind lapses 
 from the mode of Identity into that of Diversity as 
 a necessary transition, taking place perforce. The 
 Creator in Tim. 35 A combines the psychic ingre- 
 dients — Tr/v daripov ^vaiv Bva-fjuicrov oSaav ei? rairov 
 ^vapfioTTav ^ia. The substantive avayicq and the 
 adjective av(VfKcuo<i are applied, primarily to the 
 appearance of Mind in the three lower planes, or in 
 popular parlance to the incarnation of -^vxr), e.g. — 
 Tim. 42 A hirore S^ aatfiaaiv ifitfyvrevdeieu 4^ 
 
 avdr^Kfjis [ai ip'vxai) k.t.X. 
 Ibid. 68 E ravra Si) Trdvra tots Tavrrj •;reij)VK6Ta i^ 
 dvayKiji; 6 rov KoXKurrov re koI dplarov Sjjju- 
 ovpyoi iv TOts yiyvofievoK irapeKdfi^avev k.t.X. — 
 
 5 
 
66 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 and secondarily to the states consequent upon that 
 incarnation, whether they be physical laws, e.g. — 
 Tim. 79 B naTcL ravnjv rfjv avdyKTjv irav irept- 
 
 eXawofievov k.t.X. 
 Ibid. 68 B mv firjre nva dvdyKTjv ixrjre rov elxoTa 
 \6<yov K.T.X. — 
 bodily dispositions, e.g. — 
 
 Tiffl. 75 A jj lyap ef avdyKrj^ yiyvo/Jieini koX fw- 
 Tpe<fiO/j.ev7] ^vai<{ ovhafiy Trpoo-Sep^eTot trvKVOv 
 oarovv k.t.X. 
 Ibid. TJ A T^iv Be ^arjv ev TrvpX KaX iruevfiaTt 
 ^vve^aivev ef dvdyKt}<; e^ew avTw. — 
 sensory impulses, e.g. — 
 
 Tim. 42 A TrpSnov fiev a'iadrjffiv dvayKuiov eitf 
 fiiav TTacriv ek fiiauov iraOri/idTcov ^vfi^vrov 
 ylp/veadai. 
 Ibid. 89 B T&v i^ avdyKT]^ TradTjfidTwv. — 
 emotional concomitants, e.g. — 
 
 Tim. 69 C — D aXXo re eZSo? iv avTm i^v^<i nrpoa- 
 wKoSofiovv TO dvTjTov, Seivo, KOI dvayKata iv iavrci 
 TradripLaTa e^ov, wp&Tov fiev rfiovrjv . . , eveiTa 
 Xinra<; , . . STt 8' at> ddppo<i Kcil (f)6^ov . . . 
 aladrftrei Se aXor^ip koX eTTtj^etpijr^ TravTo? epaiTi 
 ^vyKepaadfievot Tama dvayKai(o<s to OvrfTov 
 761/0? ^vvideaav, koI Sim Taxha St} ae^o/ievoi 
 fiiaiveiv to delov, o ti jirf iraaa rjv dvdyKtf 
 
 K.T.X. — 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 67- 
 
 or the broader conditions of morality in general, e.g. — 
 
 Theaet. 1 76 A dW' ovt' airoXeadai ra Kaifa Bvvarov, 
 
 & ©eoScope' inrevavTiov yap rt tS dyada del elvai- 
 
 dvayKT], OUT iv deok avra iBpvaOai, ttjv Se 
 
 BvijTrjv (pvatv Kal TovSe tov toitov TrepiiroXei i^ 
 
 dvd<yKr}<;. 
 
 This usage of the word and its derivatives is peculiar 
 
 to Plato, though it was seemingly prefigured by 
 
 Empedokles, who held that the essence of ^AvdjKrf 
 
 lay in -the combination of NeiKo<; and ^i\ia — 
 
 Simplic. in Arist. Phys. ed. Diels p. 197, lo 
 '£/i7reSo«\i7? . . avveKopv^aae ttjv tov veiKovf 
 Ka\ T^s <jii\La<! {ivavTicoaiv) . . ew p-ovaSa ttjv 
 Trj<; dvdr/Krji;. 
 Hippolyt. Ref. vii. 29 ^AvdyKriv koK&v ttjv i^ hot 
 eh TToWa Kaja to Net/co? koX e« voXKmv eh ev 
 Kara ttjv ^CKImv /MeTa^oXijv. — 
 and spoke of the punitive incarnation of the heavenly 
 beings as 'AvdyKjj<s ^(^pTJpa. 
 
 To sum up. Plato recognises both an objective 
 and a subjective aspect of Mind. In the former he dis- 
 cerns the purposive pluralisation of unitary thought ; 
 in the latter the decadence necessarily attached to 
 the movement of every real intelligence. As to the 
 relative importance of these two there can be no 
 question : tov Se vov km etnaTrj/jLt]^ epaarrjv dvdyicTt 
 Ta? T9J9 ep-^pova c^vo-etu? alTiai; irpdna'; peTaSimKeiv, 
 6(rai he xm aKKmv p,ev Kivovpevtov, erepa Se e'f dvdyKrjt 
 
68 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Kivovmtov yiyvovTai, Seurepa?** (Tim. 46 e). Hermes 
 puts the matter in a nutshell when he says*' — irpovoia 
 6eia Ta^t?, avayKi) irpovoia inrripeTi'i. 
 
 § II. Identity and Difference. 
 
 An alternative method of notation for the same 
 two aspects of Mind may be found in the quasi- 
 technical terms Tairrbv and darepov. Hitherto I have 
 used these symbols to betoken respectively the one 
 higher and the three lower planes of psychic existence, 
 whether conceived as actively cognising or as passively 
 cognised ; and I have secured provisional consistency 
 by adhering strictly to the statement that every avro 
 ijSiov unites in itself Tavrov the mode of pure thought 
 ■with darepov the mode of knowledge, opinion, sensa- 
 tion. . It seems, however, desirable to justify this 
 procedure by probing the matter somewhat more 
 deeply, in view of a certain not unnatural tendency 
 to confuse the issues of this terminology with the 
 implications of the antithesis ev koX TroWa. 
 
 To begin with, it must be kept steadily in mind 
 that we are employing neither pair of opposites in 
 
 ** Cp. Chalcidius in Plat. Tim. 41 E ed. Wrobel p. 203 "iuxta 
 Platonem praecedit providentia, sequitur fatum," p. 204 "et divina 
 quidem atque intellegibilia quaeque his proxima sunt secundum provid- 
 entiam solam (fiunt), naturalia vero et corporea iuxta -fatum." 
 
 " Stob. Eel. I. xli, I. ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 277, 15. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 69 
 
 its widest acceptation. For the Sophist, raising the 
 question ri irojab vvv ovtw? elpi^Ka/jbev to re ravrov 
 Kal Odrepov ; (254 E), makes answer that these signs 
 denote general relations applicable to all things in 
 heaven and earth. And in like manner the Philebus, 
 declaring the conjunction of unity and multiplicity 
 to be Tmv Xoyoji' avTwv aSdvarov ti /cat dyi^pwv irddo^ 
 (15 D), states that 
 
 tv Kal TToWa xnro Xb'^tov yiyvofieva ireptTpe^etv 
 TrdvTj] Koff eKaajov t&v 7i,eyofievtov del xal vdXat- 
 leal vvv. 
 Our business then is not with the broad logical sense 
 of these words, but rather with their narrower meta- 
 physical meaning. And the restriction thus imported 
 assumes the following specific form : — 
 
 (A) In the Platonic ffrv)(^oyovla the term ravrov is 
 taken to denote that which does not, Odrepov that 
 which does, depart from its own identity. It is true 
 that Parmenidean precision might have desiderated 
 the full phrase ravrov iavrm as opposed to erepov 
 kavrov ; compare e.g. 
 
 Parm. 146 A /cat p,r)v ravrov ye Set elvai aiiro eavr& 
 Kol erepov eavroC K.r.X. 
 
 Ibid. 146 c TO ereptodi 6v avro eavrov ev rm airm 
 
 ovro<s eavra ovk dvdr/Kr) avro eavrov erepov elvatf 
 
 eiTTep Kal erepeodi earai ; "Efiocye BoKei. 
 
 But for technical purposes it was obviously convenient 
 
 to adopt a shortened symbolism, all ambiguity beings 
 
70 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 avoided by the explicit reference of ravTov and ffdrepou 
 to a single oiiaia. Thus the metaphysical limits the 
 logical usage in the following respect. Whereas the 
 logician — appraising words at their current price — 
 predicates both ravrov and ddrepov of any thing or 
 aggregate of things, whether real or phenomenal, on 
 the ground that it is the same as itself and different 
 from all else, the metaphysician — fixing the intrinsic 
 value of the terms by a reference to the unvarying 
 standard of ova'ia — assigns ravTov to oVtw? ovra and 
 ddrepov to yijvofieva as inalienable characteristics, in- 
 asmuch as every ovrax; ov abides in eternal self-same- 
 ness, while every '^i''/v6fievov is the fleeting projection of 
 some permanent being** — tt/so? ToKrjdmov d(j>Q)fjLoicofj,evov 
 €Tepov roiovTov (Soph. 240 A). 
 
 Now if all that lapses not from the identity of 
 ■oWw? ovala be fitly termed tuvtov, the domain of 
 TavTOTi}'; will comprise on the one hand (a) the supreme 
 Mind ; for the ordering of the chaotic universe could 
 not impair the moveless calm of intelligence : 
 
 Tim. 42 E 6 fiev hri [de6<;, i.e. vow) diravTa ravra 
 
 Biard^ai; ep,ev€V ev tc3 eavTOv Kara rpoirov rjdef 
 
 p,ivovTO<; Se voriaavTe<i oi waZSe? k.t.X. — 
 
 and on the other hand (;8) the series of Ideal Minds ; 
 
 for they are as stable as the goodness that gave them 
 
 birth : 
 
 ™ Vid. e-s;. Tim. 520. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 71 
 
 Tim. 52 A 6fio\o<yrjTiov tv /lev elvat to Kara ravrh 
 
 eZSos ej(pv, arfivrfTov Kal avcoiKeOpov, oihe 6t? eavro 
 
 elaBeyfp/iepov aWo dWodev ovre avrb eh dWo 
 
 TToi lov, aoparov he Kal aXKax; dvaicrdrirov, rovro 
 
 o S^ v6i](n<s eiX.Tj'xev iiruTKoireiv. 
 
 The latter as comprehended by the former constitute 
 
 the irapahe'ir/fiaTot eiho's, votjtov koi ael Kara ravTo, ov 
 
 (Tim. 48 e). 
 
 Again, if all that lapses from the identity of ovtioi} 
 ovaia be fitly termed erepov, the domain of eTep6Trj<s 
 will comprise on the one hand (a) the visible mani- 
 festation of the supreme Mind, and on the other hand 
 {^) the visible manifestations of the Ideal Minds. The 
 latter as comprehended by the former constitute the 
 fiifijjfia irapaBeij/uiTOi, yeveaiv e'xpv Kal oparov {Tim, 
 49 A). 
 
 In short, the terms Tavrov and BuTepov in their 
 primary ontological significance serve to discriminate 
 the avTia-Tovxa of Tim. 27 D — 29 D : — 
 
 ovaia, the province of 
 aXrjdeia. 29 C. 
 
 TO ov aei, yivea-iv Se ovk 
 
 exov (27 D) 
 TO Kara ravra e^ov (28 A) 
 TO Kara ravra Kal toffowrw? 
 
 exov (29 A) 
 TO atBiov (29 a) 
 
 yevecri^ the province of 
 "Triarii;. 29 C. 
 
 TO yiyvofievov fiev aei, ov Se 
 
 ovSerrore (27 D) 
 TO yeyovot; (28 B) 
 TO yey ovof (29 A) 
 
 TO yeyov6<s (29 A) 
 
72 
 
 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 TO vorfaei, /j^ra \6<yov irepi- 
 "KrytTTov, ael Kara ravTO, 
 6v (28 A) 
 
 TO Xo^tp ical ^povi^trei irepi- 
 XrjiTTOv Kal Kara ravra 
 e^ov (29 A) 
 
 TO fioptfiov Kal 0iffaiov Kal 
 ^eravovKara^ave'i{2<)'&) 
 
 ro 86^ fier' alad^ffecai 
 oKoyov So^aarov, yiyv- 
 6/ievov Kal aTToWufievov, 
 oi/TO)? Bk ovhkrrore 6v 
 (28 A) 
 
 Sofj; TrepiXriirra fier' ala- 
 0'qffeeix! yiyvo/ieva Kal 
 yevvTjrd (28 B) 
 
 TO rrpcK P'SV eKelvo atreiKacr- 
 0ev, 6v he eUtov (29 C) 
 
 There are, moreover, certain secondary applications 
 of the same terms, of which brief mention may here 
 be made. For since rairov and ddrepov correspond 
 to ovcria and yivetTK, each to each, they may by a 
 slight extension of usage designate also the essential 
 properties of oiiaia and yivea-K. 
 
 Thus (a) TavTw connotes rest, ddrepov motion : 
 
 Tim. 57 E ardaip fiev ev ofiaXoTijri, Kivijaiv Be ek 
 dvtoiMaXorrjTa del riO&fiev atria Be dvttrori]^ ai 
 T^? dva>iJ,dXov ^vo-ews. (That avKTorrif here=:^ 
 Oarepov ^vfn<i is clear from its employment in 
 Arist. Met. B. 4. \QO\b 23, N. i. 1087 (5 4flf., 
 1088 « IS, 2. 1088^ 32, 1089^ 6ff., 5. 1092a: 
 29). 
 
 Arist. Phys. T.2. 201b 19 Brjkov Be aKOVoviriv eo? 
 riOeaaiv avrr)v evioi, ereporrjra Kal dvitTorrjra 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 75 
 
 Koi TO firi ov <})d<TKOVTe<; elvai Tf]v Kivrjo'iv (cp. 
 
 Met. K. g. 1066 a 10).*^ 
 
 So in the disputed passage Tim. 74 A ry Oarepov- 
 
 •7rpoaj(pdifievo^ iv avToU <»? f^^o'V iviaTafievrj- 
 
 Svvdfiei, Kivrjaemi koX Ka/iyjreto^ eve/ca it is not 
 
 the " number of parts " that is insisted on, but 
 
 rather their mobility and flexibility — rw ajO^*? 
 
 €'xeiv Kivr,iTe(o<i otto Ttvo? eV rat? Ka/j.7ral<} as 
 
 Aristotle has it {Met. Z. 16. 1040 /5 12).^^ 
 
 The rationale of this usage may be found in Cratylus 
 
 439 E (ei Se aet axravrco? ej^ei /col to avro euTt, ttw? ^k 
 
 toOto 76 iLera^aXKoi r\ kivoIto, /jLrjSev i^iardfievov t^?- 
 
 ouTou I'Seas ; OvSafim) as contrasted with Arist. Psyche 
 
 A. 3. 8. 406^ 12 (Traffffl KLvrjai'; eKaratrl^ e'cm toO- 
 
 Kivov/jLevov y KivelTai], or in Parm. 145 E — 146A : 
 
 "EffTrjKe fiev iroxJ, eXtrep axno iv eavra eariv. iv yap 
 ivl 6v Kal iK rovTov fir] fiera^alvov iv tw ai/Tw oLv 
 eir), iv eavTw. "Eari yap. To Se ye iv fw avrm 
 del ov effTo? SjJttou dvdr/Kr] del elvai. JJdvv ye. 
 I 06 ; TO ev erepm aei ov ov to evavTiov avay/crj- 
 urjSeTTOT iv t£ avrw ^Ivai, firjheiroTe he ov iv Ta> 
 avTw /iTfhe e(TTdvai, fit) Ioto? Se Kiveladai ; OvTtov. 
 Again {0) tuvtov connotes £ood, ffdrepov evil. 
 
 " These passages probably refer to Plato notwithstanding Philop. 
 in Arist. Phys. ed. Vitelli p. 352, 20 tXeyav Sc 01 Tlvia-^/ifeiai t'i\v 
 Klin\aiv fJvtti «t«(kJtj)To koI imtrSTiiTa Kal rh tiij in. 
 
 ^' Arist. Psych. P. 10. 8. 433 b 24 is parallel only in appearance. 
 
74 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 For this we have Aristotle's express testimony — 
 
 Met. A. 6. 988 a 14 ert Se Trfv tov eZ Koi rod KaKw<s 
 alriav roi? <TTOi')(eioK [sc. to ravTov and ddrepov) 
 dviBcoKev kKwrepoK eKarepav. 
 
 Ibid. A. 10. 1075 ^ 34 airavra rov (jyavXov /j-eOe^ei 
 €^m TOV evo?" TO yap icaKov avro Sa/repov tSiv 
 (TTOfxeiav, 
 
 Ibid. M. 8. 1084 a 34 TO, fiev yap rat? apj^at? aTTO- 
 SiSoaffti/, oloi' Kivqaiv aTaaiv dyadov KaKov, to, S' 
 dWa Tot? dpiO/ioc'!. 
 
 Phys. A. 9. I92ffl 14 )j S' krkpa fiolpa rrj's ivavTidxiewis 
 •jroKKdKt<i av ^avToaOeirj tw irpoii to KaKOiroibp 
 avTi]'} dTevl^ovTi Trjv Bidvoiav ovS' elvai, to 
 Trapdvav. 
 
 Plato, then, would by no means have shrunk from the 
 conclusions of the rednctio ad absurdum in Met. N. 4. 
 X091 b 25 — 1092 a 5. 
 
 It was partly, no doubt, the facility afforded by the 
 terms tuvtov and ddTepov for the expression of such 
 secondary meanings {e.g. the common euphemism of 
 ■eTepo^ = KaK6^), which recommended their adoption as 
 symbols for the primary aspects of Idealism. 
 
 (B) With regard to the antithesis li» xal ttoXKH it 
 may be shown that the limitations imposed by philo- 
 sophic usage differed at, different stages of Plato's 
 development. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 75 
 
 i. During the period to which the Republic and 
 the Phaedo belong, the words are sometimes found in 
 z. broadly physical sense to denote — 
 
 (a) the one particular with its many attributes : 
 
 Phileb. 14 c oTov Tt9 6/xe (^g TIpmTap')(ov, eva yeyov- 
 
 OTa <j>vaei, voWovt elvat -rraXiv tov<s ifie Koi 
 
 evavriovi d\\»j\ot?, jisyav koX crfiiKpov Tidefievo? 
 
 KUL ^apvv Kal Kovipov TOP aiiTov, ical dXKa fivpia. 
 
 Cp. the drift of Rep. 523 A — 524 D, Phaed. 102 B — 
 
 103 A, though the phrase does not actually occur in 
 
 either passage — 
 
 (/S) the one particular with its many parts : 
 Farm. 1 29 C el 8' lyi,k ev rts diroSei^ei ovra koi 
 TToWa, Tt Bavfiaarov, Xeymv, brav fiev 0ov\r)Tai 
 TToXKa d-TTO^aiveiv, tu? erepa fiev to. eirX Be^td 
 fiov ea-Tw, erepa Se to, eV dpi<nepd k.tX. 
 Cp. Rep. 524D — S26b, e.g. 525 A dp,a yap ravTov 
 tos ev re op&ixev Kal w? dveipa to irXrjdo'i, 525 E 
 edv aij KepfiaTi^r]<; avTo (sc. the visible unit), 
 eKetuoi iroWaTr'Kacnova'iv, evXa^ovfievoi ixrj irore 
 ^avfj TO ev fir] ev dWd TroWa p.6pia. 
 But even at this date they were normally confined 
 to a narrower and more directly metaphysical scope, 
 being the ordinary^^ equivalents for — 
 
 (7) the informing Idea and its informed particulars. 
 
 *' An exceptional usage is that ol Farm. 129 B iXA.' ei 4 isTui ev, 
 ^ivrh TovTO TToWa &iroScf|6i Kal aO tA iroWSt S^ eV, tovto ijSri Bavfidffo- 
 (nai (cp. 129 D 06 rb %v iroWck oiS% Tck TroWh eV), where %v and TroXAck 
 represent the Ideas of Unity and Multiplicity. 
 
76 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 So, for example, in the two cardinal rubrics of 
 immature Platonism we read — 
 
 Rep. 5 96 A 6(So¥ 70/3 iron) ri ev eKaarov etdtda/iev 
 TiOeadai, -rrepl eKaara to, iroWd, oh ravTov 
 ovofjia hn^epofiev. 
 
 Ibid. 476 A avTO yikv ev sKaarov Aval, ry Be iStv 
 TTpd^eav Kai aco/idroov Kal dW'^Xtov Koivtovia- 
 travra^ov <pavTa^6/ieva iroWa ^aive(T0ai eKa<T- 
 
 TOV. 
 
 ii. The Philebus marks a transition. All these 
 denotations are passed in review {Phileb. 14 c — 15 c), 
 the first two being summarily dismissed, the last 
 alone retained as suggesting problems worthy of 
 serious discussion. Subsequently, however, an im- 
 portant change of nomenclature is observable. For 
 whereas 15 B drew our attention to the cruces of %v koI 
 iroWd, the Scaipe<Tiv of 16 C — E is fiei^ovo)^ Bir]pr)/jLemi- 
 and embraces the three terms ev, iroXKd, and avetpa. 
 Again, the ev Kal ttoWci of i 5 b were expressly stated 
 to be the one Idea and its many particulars: but 
 in 16 C — E, — though the application is primarily dia- 
 lectical, and the terms signify Genus, Species, and 
 Specimens, — it is evident from the sequel that Plato 
 is also thinking of its metaphysical bearings ; and to 
 the metaphysician ev denotes henceforward tfie single 
 supreme Mind, troWd the subordinate Ideal series, 
 anreipa the indefinite range of particular existence. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 77 
 
 iii. In Plato's later writings the revised termin- 
 ology has become firmly established. It will be 
 remembered, for instance, that the ev, iroWd, and 
 a-rreipa, educed by Parmenides' -rrkdvr) from Platonic 
 data, stood for Mind, the Ideas, and Particulars. 
 And the same phraseology obtains throughout all 
 the works posterior to the Philebus as distinct from 
 those of the preceding period. I do not mean to 
 imply that the doctrine underlying the earlier dia- 
 logues ignores the unity of the supreme Idea and 
 the indefinity of particulars^* ; nor do I hold that 
 the teaching of the later dialogues fails to attain a 
 higher conception of the singleness and indivisibility 
 of each several Idea: I merely contend that to the 
 reader of Plato's less mature discourse the terms %v 
 Km, TToXXa naturally suggest the one Idea and the 
 many particulars, while to the student of his aKpifi- 
 4<rrepoi \6yoi they represent the supreme Mind and 
 the Ideal Minds — a new term dwei.pa being added as 
 a truer description of particulars. 
 
 iv. It may be objected that this contention is to 
 some extent invalidated by Aristotelian evidence, 
 -which shows that the phrase ev eirl voXKeov continued 
 
 ^ In point of fact I cannot find a satisfactory example of iiretpa = 
 particulars, nor even of iv = the supreme Idea, in the earlier dialogues. 
 The nearest approach to the former seems to be Hep. 445 c %y /iiy cItoj 
 «75os TTJs &p(rTJs, iirtipa S^ rrjs lecuetas. The latter is of course deducible 
 from the use of the singular number. 
 
78 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 to be used in the Platonic school as denoting any 
 given Idea. Closer inspection proves that the passages 
 in which that collocation occurs, viz. — 
 
 Met. A. g. 990 (5 7, 13, 991 a 2 {=M. 4. 1079 "^ 2, 9, 
 32) and Z. 16. 1040^ 29,^^ 
 are .directed against certain Idealists — probably 
 followers of Xenokrates o vcadpo^^ — who despite the 
 explicit criticism of the Parmenides adhered to the 
 ontology of the Republic. Further examples of itoKKk 
 in the sense of "particulars" (e.g. Met. A. 6. 987 3 10, 
 988 a 2, etc.) may be due to the same inaccuracy 
 which caused the retention of the term /iide^Ks in the 
 place of the more exact (il/irjaK (Met. A. 6. 987 b 10, 
 M. 4. 107912 25, Pkys. A. 2. 209^ 35). 
 
 On the other hand Aristotle commonly identifies- 
 the Platonic direipov with the material cause, and 
 habitually speaks of the Ideas as dpi9fj,oi, — a word 
 which we have elsewhere seen applied by Plato him- 
 self to their multeity {Farm. l.c. page 61) : so that the 
 regular Aristotelian terminology may be said to agree- 
 with that of the later rather than with that of the 
 earlier dialogues. 
 
 If the foregoing exposition be accepted as sub- 
 stantially correct, it will be seen that, in strict meta- 
 physical parlance, tavrov embraces the %v koI iroWa, 
 
 ^^ The list in the Index Arist. 6l8a 25 is incomplete. 
 ^ Diog. Laert. iv. 2. 6. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 79 
 
 ddrepov the direipa of later Platonism. The supreme 
 Mind and the Ideal Minds, so far as they do not 
 transgress the limits of their own noetic existence, are 
 termed Tav-rov ; so far as they pass beyond those 
 limits into gnostic phase, they are termed daTepov. And 
 since the objective and subjective aspects of Idealism 
 were distinguished by the same criterion, it is evident 
 that TavTov and Bdrepov may be regarded as apt sym- 
 bols for the double operation of Mind. 
 
 I would end by anticipating two misconceptions. 
 In the first place tke irepoTr)'; of the %v does not find 
 expression in the TavT6Tr]<} of the •KoWd. For 
 eTepoTrji; always connotes the motion and imperfection 
 of yir/vofieva, whereas the rairoTij? of the ttoWo — i^. 
 the Ideal series — is endowed with the permanence 
 and perfection of oVtw? ovra. When, therefore, the 
 Greek commentators on Aristotle speak of the Ideas 
 as erepa,^'' it follows that they are using the term in 
 its logical rather than its metaphysical acceptation, 
 and are referring to the fact that the Ideas are a series 
 of different and differently constituted** entities. But 
 
 " E.g: Simplic. in Arist. Phys. ed. Diels p. 143, 26 ff., 147, 21 ff. 
 Plotinus, though right in saying ohx irepa toS i»oC iKiarri Hia, oXX' 
 cKiitTTT] ifovs. Kal S\os fihv d yovs rdi irdvTa eiSrj, cKoffTov Si elSos vovs 
 eKcuTTos (Enn. V. ix. 8), commits a fatal blunder when he severs 6 vovs 
 from ri %v by means of ^ irpdmi iTtp6Tns {Enn. V. i. i). 
 
 *' Ideal Numbers are composed of monads which are at /tiy iv iXKif 
 Siiijmpoi, at 8* ^v t$ aiiT$ aptd/if aSii^opot it,K\i)\ais n6vai (Arist. Met. 
 M.T. loSi^sSfT.) 
 
8o THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 5uch differences do not entitle them to be described 
 as Platonic erepa {i.e. erepa aiira eavrSiv) ; at most they 
 warrant the use of the word aXXa : cp. 
 
 Tim. 52 C, where of the particular phenomenon it 
 
 is said — iripov Si tivoi ael ^iperai ^dvratrfia, 
 
 Bta 7avra iv krept^ Trpoa-^Kei rivl yi'^veaOai, — 
 but of the Ideal kingdom — 
 
 ecu? dv Ti TO fj-ev aWo y, to Se aWo, ovSerepov iv 
 
 ovBeripm irore yevofievov ev a/ia Tavrov xal Svo 
 
 r/evriaeadov. 
 In the second place the erepoTtif of to ev is not to 
 ie confused with the eTep6r7]<! of to. ttoWu. This is 
 at first sight less obvious. It might have been thought 
 that the demands of Necessity would be satisfied and 
 her law fulfilled, if the Ideas alone passed into the 
 sphere of ddrepov, and left the supreme Mind to 
 that voTjaK! vorjaeax; which it enjoys in Aristotle's 
 conception {Met. A. 9. 1074^ 33). But that such is 
 not the case appears to me certain from the following 
 considerations : — 
 
 (i) Plato teaches that ovo-t'a is necessarily an 
 alliance of rainov with ddrepov. If, therefore, to hf 
 acquires the latter element only through the evolution 
 of Tcl TToWo, then Unity owes its existence to the 
 Ideas, not the Ideas to Unity. But we have already 
 ■concluded that the permanence of the Ideal series 
 depends upon the volition of the supreme Mind. 
 Hence, though prepared to allow that. Unity does 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 8i 
 
 not as a matter of fact exist without the Ideas, we 
 must deny that its existence is contingent upon theirs. 
 Rather, the Ideas owe their ovala —its eTepoTt/'i as well 
 as its ravTOTi)^ — to a self-subsisting Unity. 
 
 (2) Again, the Ideas are ovra, ix. they possess 
 both ravTOTrji and erejooT;;?. Their TavTorr]^ they 
 admittedly derive from Unity. Their IrepoT??? either 
 is or is not derived from the same source. If it is, 
 we are justified in discriminating between the eTepoTTji: 
 of TO ^v and the erepoTiji of ra iroWd. If it is not, 
 whence comes it .' Certainly not from the mere fact 
 that the Ideas are a plurality : that, as we have seen, 
 makes them dXKa but not erepa. 
 
 (3) The Ideal Minds stand to the supreme Mind 
 in the relation of iroXKa to ev. It would seem then 
 that they are to be considered multiples of an original 
 Unit. As such, their ravT6Ti]<; presupposes its TairoT?;?, 
 their erepo-rnj^ its eTep6Tij<s. Otherwise they would be 
 neither fractional nor integral powers, but utterly 
 incommensurate quantities. 
 
 (4) Plato's own words suggest a erepouoaKi of the 
 cosmic ^S)ov as distinct from that of the subordinate 
 5wa. In drawing a comparison between the in- 
 telligible and sensible universe he declares that the 
 partial Animals embraced by the entire Animal 
 answer to the particular specimens contained in a 
 visible cosmos : Tim. 30 C rh ycip Sr) vmyra ^&a irdvra 
 
 6 
 
82 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 ixelvo ev eavrm nrepiXa^ov e')(6t, Kaffdirep oBe 6 Koafiof 
 ftlJM<i oaa T6 aK\a dpefifiara ^vviaTijKev opard}^ Parm. 
 158 A makes the same point : Merep^ew 8e ye tov hm 
 dvarfKri t& re o\q> Kal tw (lopl^ . . . Outo)?. Ovkovv 
 ere pa Svra rov evbq fiedi^et ra /jieri'xpvra avrov ; 
 II5>^ 8' ov ; That is to say that to okov [=ro rrav- 
 T6\6S i/Ssov of Tim. 3 1 B) as well as ra p.6pta (= ra ev 
 /iipovi e'lSei §Sa of Tim. 30 c) passes into the sphere of 
 Odrepov. • 
 
 Agreeably to this Phikb. 30 D represents the 
 Creator as having not only vov<i but also "Sfv^ — 
 Ovkovv ev p,ev rfj rov ^io<; epeli (fivaei ^aaiKiidjv p,ev 
 ■\lrvxvv, ^aaiXiKOV he vovv eyyvyveadai, Sid rrjv TJj? atrial 
 8vvafiiv K.r.X. And Phileb. 30 A clearly distinguishes 
 this cosmic soul from the souls of its particular crea- 
 tions — "SiH. To Trap' ij/tti/ a&fia dp' ov "^vxV" ^Jjco/iei/ 
 ex^iv ; TIPfl. ArjXov on ^erop^v. 2/2. Ilodev, & <Jt\e 
 npanapxe, Xafiov, e'lTrep p.f) to 76 toO iravrbi a-&p.a 
 ep,ylrir)(pv ov irvy\ave, ravrd ye e^pv rovrm Kal eri 
 ■irdvrri KaWiova ; UPfl. ArjXov (o? oiBap,69ev dXXoOev, 
 & SdiKparei. 
 
 Finally, we have the problematic assignment of 
 two circles to the mundane soul. Now the circle of 
 the Other (Tim. 36 c, 38 c) cannot represent the part- 
 icular souls of men, horses, etc., since they have 
 
 ™ To the same effect Arius Didymus in Stob. £cl. I. xii, 2a. ed. 
 Wachsmuth i. p. 136, 10. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 83 
 
 special irepioSoi {Tim. 42c, 43D, 8SA, 87 A, 88b, 91E), 
 which are expressly distinguished from those of the 
 universe (Tim. 47 B, 90 D). Nor can it denote the 
 Ideal efiylrvxa : for, so far as these possess viyqaK they 
 do not belong to the realm of ddrepov at all, and so 
 far as they lapse into yv&a-K they are represented by 
 particulars. It must, therefore, stand for the lower 
 phase of the cosmic soul as distinguished on the one 
 hand from the Ideas, and on the other from their 
 particulars. 
 
 (5) If there be no perception of matter "by the 
 cosmic soul apart from the perceptions of finite 
 souls," we are of course driven to say No to the 
 question of the Platonic Parmenides — 
 
 'Ap' ovv oloii re a5 effrai, 6 deb<i ra irap' ^/up yir/vo}- 
 aKeiv ainrjv einarriiJirjv e)(ow ; {Parm. 1 34 C) 
 
 Sokrates' awe-struck comment — 
 
 '.4\\A pjq \Lav, e(fyt}, davfiavTO'i o \670s, et rts rov 
 6eov cmoaTeprjaeie tov elBivai. (Ibid. 1 34 E) — 
 
 prepares us, however, to find that in Plato's maturest 
 judgment this decision is reversed, or at any rate 
 evaded. And Laws 905 D — 
 
 OTt iikv rfap 6eol t' eial xal dvdpdnrwv eTTt/teX- 
 ovvTai, eya^e ov •navrdiraai c^avXcu? av <f>aii^v 
 Tjplv d'jroBeSely(6ai, — 
 repeats the assurance of Phaedo 62 D — 
 
THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 eiiXoyaf e^ei to deov tc eivai tov iiri/ieXovfievoifi" 
 7)/jb&v Kal ■^fidf eKeivov KT'^fiara etvai. 
 
 The moral bearings of this question call for further 
 consideration : for the present I proceed, noting merely 
 that if the supreme ^&ov can pay separate attention 
 to the individual souls of men, it must — unless the 
 argumentation of Parmenides be entirely groundless 
 — pass from the rauTOTijs of pure thought into the 
 crepoTj?? of knowledge, opinion, and even sensation. 
 To challenge that passage is indeed to obscure the 
 connection between Plato's ethical speculations and 
 their ontological basis. 
 
 (6) Mr. Archer-Hind commenting on Tim. 86 E 
 writes : — " Absolute being, absolute thought, and 
 absolute goodness are one and the same. Therefore 
 from the absolute or universal sout can come no evil." 
 Had he in lieu of "soul " repeated the word " thought," 
 no exception could have been taken to the dictum. 
 As it stands, the second clause seems to me a specific 
 denial of the evil world-soul described in the tenth 
 book of the Laws. The description there given 
 cannot be ignored ; — 
 
 •ifvyj) . • • vovv /lev irpoakapovtra ael 6eov deb<i oZa-a, 
 opdb. Kot evSaifiova •/ratBayeoyei •trdvTa, avoia Ze 
 ^irf/evofihnj Travra ai ravavrla tovtok direpy- 
 d^eTai. (897 B) — 
 
 °° Cp. Phaedr. 246E Zths StaKoffftair vdina xai iiTiiie\oiiiti>os. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 85 
 
 and it forces upon us the conclusion that the cosmic 
 soul qud. cosmic functions not only in the mode of 
 tamov as perfect thought, but also in the mode of 
 ddrepov as imperfect thought. 
 
 These are the main arguments which tend to show 
 that ike erepoTi;? 0/ the One must not be confused 
 either with the ravTOTrj^ or with the eTepoTTj^ of 
 the Many. Its more precise determination will be 
 attempted in the succeeding section. 
 
 § III. Theology. 
 
 In discussing the evolution of vow we have more 
 than once had occasion to use the words ^eo? and 
 fieto?. We are not, however, entitled to adapt theo- 
 logical terms to the purposes of philosophy unless we 
 can return an afiSrmative answer to the vexed ques- 
 tion — Did Plato, or did he not, bring his religious 
 convictions into any intimate connection with his 
 metaphysical views.' Dr. Zeller, who here as else- 
 where represents modern orthodoxy at its best, holds 
 that theology does not rank with Dialectics, Physics, 
 and Ethics, as a definite part of the Platonic doctrine ; 
 that it cannot even be classified under any of these 
 sciences" ; that, in short, " the particular notions 
 which bring Plato in contact with positive religion are 
 
 «- Plato and The Older Academy, p. 494. 
 
86 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 for the most part mere outworks of his system, or else 
 an inconsistent relapse into the language of ordinary 
 opinion." ^^ And yet there are certain a priori con- 
 siderations which militate strongly against the ortho- 
 dox position. It is difficult to believe that a speculator 
 so thorough-going and fearless as Plato would have 
 shrunk from the attempt to base his own religion on 
 a sound intellectual foundation. And that foundation 
 lay ready to hand. For it must be observed that, if 
 by a personal being is meant one conscious of uniting 
 in itself a diversity of its own states, then the supreme 
 Mind and the Ideal Minds have substantial claims to 
 personality; and further, that in the said Minds is 
 vested the directorate of the universe. We shall not 
 then be sinning against antecedent likelihood, if we 
 enquire how far Plato provides material for the 
 expression of the Idealist creed in terms of divinity. 
 
 (A) Broadly speaking we may say that, in the 
 Platonic scheme, the objective realm of ravrbv is 
 characterised as divine, and its denizens as deities : 
 
 Polit. 269 D TO KaTk Tama. KoiX mo-owTO)? e)(e.LV ae^ 
 Koi, TavTov elvai rot? irdmmv deioTaTOi^ irpo- 
 ff'^Kei /lovoii}. 
 
 In fact, v67]ai<! and deioTij'; are everywhere mutual 
 implicates : 
 
 ^' F/ato and The Older Academy, p. 505. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 87 
 
 Laws 897 B "^fv^ vovv fiev irpooKa^ovaa a el dtov 
 
 deb<s oZaa k.t.X. 
 Phaedr. 247 D Q^ov Sidvoia v& te Kal ema-Trj/xj) 
 
 aKripdrcp rpe^ofievri. 
 And this applies on the one hand (a) to the 
 supreme Mind, and on the other (d) to the Ideal 
 Minds. 
 
 (a) With regard to the supreme Mind, we have 
 already seen that the functions which the PhUebus 
 assigns to it are in the Timaeus given to 6 0e6s. The 
 phrase tov aKt)dwov afia koI Oelov vovv {Pkileb. 22 c) 
 and the attribution of this i/oO? /SacriXiKoi; to ^eus 
 (Phikb. 30 d) serve to link the two titles together. 
 There is, therefore, no room for doubt that in Plato's 
 teaching — as in that of his immediate successors — 
 absolute Mind and absolute Godhead coincide. 
 Stobaeus, following Aetios, registers the Platonic 
 view correctly in the words d Se 0eos vow eari tow 
 Koafiov.^^ 
 
 (b) With regard to the Ideas we have the evidence 
 of Tim. 37 C — 
 
 d>9 8e KivTjOev avro koI ^&v ivorjae rSsv aiBiav 6eSiv 
 lyer/ovov of/aXfia 6 •yevv^aav iraTijp, rjiycurdr), — 
 
 '' Stob. Eel. I. X. 16 a ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 127, 20. Eel. I. i. 29* 
 (Aetios) ibid. p. 37, 4 nXcErwv Se rh ev, rh fioi/otpves, rh fiovaStK6V) rh 
 &VTUS $v, ThyaB6v, Tl&VTa 8£ Tck TotavTa twv ovofjiArtov els Thv vovv 
 awtiSei. NoCs oiv i 8e6s. Cp. Eel. I. vi. la (Menander) iiiil. p. 83, 
 20, I. i. 24, Hid. p. 31, 5 ri tot' iirrl Beisi vovs. 
 
THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 where they are termed 6eol as being the first plural- 
 isation®* of ^eo?, and atSiot 6eo\ as being the first 
 pluralisation of that which is an aiSiov ^Stov (Tim. 37^). 
 Mr. Archer-Hind well urges®* that Plato "used this 
 strange phrase with some deliberate purpose in view." 
 I cannot however agree with him that " the signific- 
 ance of so calling them is very hard to see." It 
 appears to me a direct indication that the Ideas are 
 the partial Minds into which the universal Mind 
 multiplies itself 
 
 The Politicus perhaps allegorizes the same Unity 
 and Plurality of gods, when it states (271 D seq^ that 
 in the golden age the universe as a whole was managed 
 by a 6eo<i apxav, its separate portions by 0eol afyxpvTe<i.^ 
 These departmental gods are spoken of in terms that 
 certainly suggest Plato's deification of the natural 
 kinds : 
 
 TO, ^&a Kara yevr/ Kal ar/i\a<s olov vofiek Qeloi hiei>- 
 Xijijseaav Saifiovei;, avrdptcrji eh irdvra exaaTo^ 
 eKoarov; wv ol? avro? eve/iev. (271 D) 
 
 (B) But ravrov must of necessity pass into Odrepov. 
 There is need, therefore, to examine the subjective 
 manifestation of these objective deities. And since 
 
 '* irpara SiaKeKpiftdva tt/s aiiepiiTTOv ivdiircus, as Simplicius in Arist, 
 Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 28, 22 calls them. 
 
 " Ed. Ttmamsp. 118 «. 
 
 " Cp. Polif. 272 E at KUTii roils Tifirouj mydpxoiTei r^ ^eyiory 
 iaiiiovt Bfol. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 89 
 
 we have distinguished the erepoieaaK of the cosmic 
 0609 from that of the partial ffeoi, our enquiry sub- 
 divides itself into two questions : (a) What is the 
 minor mode of the supreme 6e6<i ? and (d) What is 
 the minor mode of the Ideal Oeol ? 
 
 (a) It was shown in the course of the last section 
 that the erepoTT?? of to ev is bodied forth as a •rrepiextou 
 KotTnoi, which embraces all particular animals, taking 
 cognisance of their individual conduct, and being in 
 some sort responsible for their special deficiencies. 
 Now the said Koo-fio^, considered as the visible entire 
 of TO ev, is of course a unity. Whether we hail from 
 the Academy or the Lyceum, we are bound to recog- 
 nise eva ovpavov^, because — apart from all question 
 of Idealism — any physical totality may be logically 
 regarded as a single phenomenon.*^ But to infer 
 that "in this case we have an idea with only one 
 particular corresponding" seems to me premature. 
 When Plato mentions the externality of the supreme 
 ^605 in the singular number, it behoves us to ask first 
 whether it is not this collective unity that is intended. 
 In Tim. 34 A — B, for example, — 
 
 o5to? S^ Tra? 6vro<; aet 'Koyi,a-fi6<; 6eov irepX rov it ore 
 iaoiievov Beov XoyiffdeU . . . re\eov iie reXeoov 
 ffoy/idrcov <7&fia hrol/rjae. — 
 
 " Tim. 31 A, cp. Bonitz Ind. Arist. p. 5420 8. 
 *' Cp. Farm. 164 D tyKoi iaovrm, elr cKatrras <l>iuvi/ifvos, t)v Si oi. 
 Soph. 237 D hiiyicfi t6» t« Xiyovra iv yi tj \fyeiv. 
 
90 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 I take it that 6 &v del Seo? is contrasted with 6 irore 
 €(r6fi€vo<s 6e6<i, i.e. God qu^ eternal with God qua 
 temporal. Again, in Tim. 92 c — 
 
 ^Smv opaTov ra opara ireptexpv, etKcav tov irovqrov, 
 Oeo<s alaOrjro'i . . . el? ovpavo<s oSe fiovojevrjv 
 
 COP. 
 
 and in Tim. 68 E — 
 
 ravra S^...o rov KaWitrrov re koL upiarov Srjfuovpy- 
 o? iv Tot? yiyvo/ievoK irapeXd/i^avev, rjVMa rov 
 aiirapKr) re Kal tov TeXemrarov Oeov iyevva. — 
 God qud Creator is opposed to God qud created. But 
 we must not on the strength of such passages argue 
 that the supreme being appears to sense-perception 
 as a unitary god. And this for the excellent reason 
 that such an appearance would impugn the very nature 
 of particular existence. To explain. By a particular 
 is meant a localisation of any given vor/rov fwov by 
 itself or any other votjtov ^uov. The percipient Animal 
 and the percept Animal, both functioning in the fourth 
 plane of consciousness, provide what the Theaetetus 
 calls Kivqatui^ Svo eiSr), irXi^dei /lev aireipov eKarepov, 
 Bvvafiiv Se TO /lev iroielv ej(ov, to Be irdayeLV. (156A). 
 This being so, a unique particular is a contradiction 
 in terms ; inasmuch as the predicate " unique " implies 
 that the object is perceived not in its shifting phase of 
 KlvrjoTK but in its permanent condition of ardai^, that 
 is, not as a particular but as an Idea. Hence in every 
 case particularity connotes numerical indefinity. The 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 91 
 
 denial of a solitary specimen is confirmed alike by 
 the wording of Parmenides' fourth hypothesis — 
 
 Farm. 1588 Th^ erepa rod evo<s nroWd irov av eHrj... 
 
 'Evel Be ye irXeLoi evo'i iari to, re tov evo<; 
 
 fiopiov Koi TO, TOV 6V0? oXov fxerexovTa, ovk 
 
 avdyicri ■^Brj nTKrjOei aireipa elvat avrd ye ixelva rh 
 
 /jberdXafi^duovTa rov ev6<i ; — 
 and by the testimony of Aristotle : 
 
 Met. Z. 1$. 1040 a 25 ea-Tat yap ISia tk fjv aZiivarov 
 
 eVt m-Xeiovrnv Korriyopriaai fj evm. ov SoksI Be, 
 
 d\Xa traaa IBia elvai fieOeKTi^. 
 It would seem, therefore, that the minor mode of the 
 supreme 6eo<; may indeed be regarded as a unity, 
 inasmuch as it is a physical totality** containing 
 within itself all the visible manifestations of the Ideal 
 0eoi, — 
 
 Tim. 30 D ^&ov kv oparov, Travff' oaa avrov icarh 
 
 <f)V(TLV ^vyyevrj fwa ei/To? e'xpv eavTov. — 
 but that nevertheless this irepiexov Kocriwi must in 
 some sense be an indefinite plurality, if it represents 
 theeriE/^oTT;? of to ev. 
 
 And here we should avoid the error of supposing 
 that the particular specimens of the natural kinds 
 
 *' Compare Cicero's description of Xenokrates' theology: "Deos 
 enim octo esse dicit ; quinque eos qui in stellis vagis nominantur, unum 
 qui exemnibus sideribus quae infixa caelo sunt ex dispersis quasi membris 
 simplex sitputandus Deus, septimum solem adiungit, octavamque lunam. " 
 (De Nat. Dear. i. 13. 34). 
 
92 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 supply the needed plurality. That would be to mis- 
 take the irepoTT]!} of to, TroWa for the eTep6rt}<; of to ev. 
 
 The whole visible universe is the full concourse of 
 objective 6eol as viewed subjectively by any one of 
 their company localised on the plane of aMrjati. But 
 what we are seeking is the single sovereign ^eos as 
 viewed by the same spectator on the same plane. 
 
 If, then, the 5eo? Man functioning on the fourth 
 level apprehends the 6eb<; Palm as a multiplicity of 
 palm-trees, there is no reason why he should not 
 similarly apprehend the supreme 0eo<! as a multiplicity 
 of supreme 6eoL Only, whereas particulars are desig- 
 nated by the plural form of the name affixed to their 
 corresponding Idea, and whereas each of the Ideal 
 6eol has some distinguishing name — Man, Horse, or 
 Palm — from which such a plural may be derived, the 
 supreme 0eo<s has no appellation of the sort. He 
 might, however, as a debi supreme over the Ideal 
 0eoi, be fittingly titled 0eo? de&v, the God of gods. 
 Indeed he is so named by Proklos in his account of 
 Platonic Theology : 
 
 The. Plat. ii. ii. p. no (o irp&To^ 6e6^) m? 5e6? 
 e'ffTi deSiv'^ dirdvTmv, koI to? evh<s eud8(ov,...Sfyid^ 
 ep ayioK, toi<s voTjToit ivairoKeKpvfifievoi 0e6i<;. 
 
 ■"• Cp. the fragment from Porphyry irepl i7aA./u£T<iii' cited by Stob. 
 Eel. I. i. 25 ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 31, 8—Zfbs olv i tSs K6<riu>s, (&ov ix 
 (^ui> Kal Behs in Stay, Zehs Sh Kal <i 06(!s>, xaBh vovs lupf oS 
 irpotpspertu vdvra, 0Tt Stj/jnovpyei rots voijficurw. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 93 
 
 When, therefore, we meet the phrase Oeol detov we 
 are tempted to find in it the plural (representing the 
 subjective indefinity) of him who is the 0e6<s 0ea>v. So 
 far as the phrase itself is concerned, this would be a 
 perfectly simple and straightforward solution. But it 
 remains to be seen whether the nature and functions 
 of the 6eol 6e&v, as described in the Timaeus, tally 
 with those of the supreme vmyrhv ^wov conceived as 
 the percept of particular percipients. 
 
 And first as to their nature. Tim. 34 B segg. nar- 
 rates how the original blend of ■^frvx'j was compounded 
 of the three primal elements. It was used for the 
 cosmic soul, being divided into the circles of the Same 
 and the Other. Tim. 41 B tells how the second blend 
 oiy^vxv was compounded of the same elements, though 
 in a less pure condition. It went to form the subord- 
 inate souls, each of which possessed a similar pair of 
 circles. Now in between these two brews we have 
 the planets described as Sea-yiioi? e/ii/ruj^ots awfjuara 
 Se06vra %&a (38 e), and the fixed stars called ^maOela 
 Kol diSca (40 B). Whence — it may be asked — came 
 the animation of these ^aa? It could not be fur- 
 nished by the second mixture of '^v^ri, since that 
 had not yet been compounded. Moreover, the first 
 mixture had been entirely used up (36 b) in the 
 making of the cosmic soul. It is obvious, therefore, 
 that the starry fwa are the externalisation of the cosmic 
 soul as distinguished from the subordinate souls. 
 
94 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 It was natural that their bodies should be placed 
 not only in the circle of the Other to perform the 
 planetary functions, but also in the circle of the Same 
 to be a veritable K6cr/j,o<;. For they are the exponents 
 of the Godhead in the sight of men ; and by setting 
 forth the twofold aspect of " their great original " act 
 as an everlasting witness to an eternal truth. It was 
 no mere access of astronomical ardour which led Plato 
 to write : 
 
 T(bv vvv Xoyav irepl rov Traj/ro? Xeyo/ievtov ovSeh av 
 TTOTe ipp'^drj fiTJre dcrrpa fjurfie rjKmv fi/qre ovpavov 
 ISovTtov (Tim. 47 a). 
 There can, then, be little doubt that the 6eoi deSyp, 
 whom Tim. 41 A identifies with these stars, are simply 
 a subjective pluralisation of the supreme Mind. Were 
 we capable of pure viyqai,^, we should apprehend them 
 as a single deo<i 6e5>v. 
 
 The same lesson may be learnt from the Laws 
 along with sundry practical corollaries. For it is 
 more than probable that the gods, whose care over 
 men is there vindicated by the Athenian, are identical 
 with the 6eo\ 6e&v of the Timaeus. This becomes 
 evident, otoi/ TeKfitjpia \epiaifiev to? elai 6eoi, ravra aiiret 
 irpo^povrei}, ^\i6v re km creK'^vijv xal aarpa koI <yfjv w? 
 Beoiii}''^ Koi 0eia ovra {Laws 886 D). 
 
 '" Cp. Laws 9501) 1iKiov...Kal rohs i,Wovs Btois, 828c tSiv x^ovluv 
 Kttl Sirovs aS Seoiis aipaviovs iitovonuariov, Crat. 397 C ^ivavTQ.1 futi ol 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 95 
 
 And in the conclusion drawn by 899 B I discern a 
 hint that this synod of Xafi-irpoX Bwdarai is but the 
 embodiment of a single Mind : 
 
 do'Tptov Se Bt) trepi irdvrwv Koi aeXTJvTji ivcavT&v re 
 Kal fir)vS>v KoX iraamv mp&v irept Tiva aXKov 
 \6yov ipovfiev fj tov ainov tovtov, <b? iiretSr) 
 ^^XV M^" V •^w^at irdvTwv rovrav atrial e^dv- 
 Tjaap, ciyaOai Se iraaav dpen^v, deov<i avra? 
 elvai ^a-o/iev, eire iv <r<ofjia<riv ivovaai, ^&a 
 ovra, KocTfiovai Trdpra ovpavov eire o'/ry re 
 Kal OTTtB? ; 
 
 It is interesting to note that, as in this passage 
 •^XV ^^^ '•/^WX"' ^""^ "^^'^ alternatively, so in those 
 parts of the Timaeus which deal with the doings of 
 the B^oX 6eS>v there is a constant oscillation between 
 the use of the singular and the plural number. Thus 
 we have deot (44 D) . . . Oeov (44 E) . . . deal (45 A) . . . ^eds (46 C) 
 ...0e6s (47A)...^e6i/ (47B)...06oi) {/^y C) . . .de&v (47c). 
 The alternation may be seen on an extended scale 
 from Tim. 69 C to almost the end of the dialogue. In 
 92 A the grammatical change is not even marked, the 
 subject of ^evvT/aav viz. deal being supplied from the 
 previous 0eov jSao-ei? inroTidevTo<!. A still more striking 
 case occurs in 71 A where an actual anacoluthon is 
 
 trpSoToi tSov itf8p<&nuv rav irepl rijv 'EWdSa Toirovs fi6vovs rohs deabs 
 riyeiirBai, oSanep vvv iroWoX tuv fiapfiipuv, {jXiov Kat a(Ki]vi\v Kal 7^1/ 
 KcCl iarpa xal obpiui6v. 
 
96 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 produced: et'Sore? Be avT6...d6b<s...^vvi(rTr]ae''\ In 
 much the same way 6 Brifiiovpyo<i of Tim. 28 A, 29 A, 
 etc. is pluralised into ol Brjfiiovpyol of 75 B, 6 fuwo-r^? of 
 29 E into ot ^va<nriaavT€<: of 71 D. 
 
 Again, Plato's later writings consistently denote 
 the possession of ravTOTi]!} by the term dddvarov, that 
 of eTeportf^ by the term dvTjrov. If, then, the Oeol de&v 
 were objectively existent as a plurality, they would 
 doubtless be endowed with dOavaaia. But in Tim. 
 41 B we read : 
 
 dQdvarob fiev ovk iare''^ ouS' a'\uTot to Trdfiirav, ov 
 Tt fiev Sr) "KvOrjaeaOe ye ovSe rev^eaOe davdrov 
 IMolpa<;, T^9 efivjf ^ov\r)aew!s fiel^ovo^ en Sea/xov 
 Kal Kvpicorepov \ap^oi/T6? eKelvtov, ol<; ot eyl/yve(T0e 
 ^vveBeurde. — 
 and this agrees with the tenor of Politicus 270 A, 
 where the visible cosmos is spoken of as Xafi^dvovra 
 
 " The converse change from singular to plural occurs in Parm. 
 134 D OiiKovv el wapi t$ Bey aSrri itrrlv ij tiKpifieiTTdrii 4ri<rT'fifi.i], oCt' 
 tiy fi Secnrorela f) iKelvay ijfiav vori ttv 8e<riri<retcv, oSt' &y ti iiriffriiiMi 
 Jl/ias yvolii...oilre yiyviiirKoviri rh hvBp&ittia irpiyiuna fleol Svres. 
 
 " It follows that in Tim. 69 c itav T(iSe luKeiTT^croTo, fSoy li» (ua 
 1X0" tA iriiin'a iy air^ flyrjri aBivari re, and in Tim. 92 C Byrirk yap Kal 
 iBdyara (Ha \a$lbv koX ^vftirKiipuBeU 8Sc i miiryuos k.t.\. the "immortal 
 animals " are not — as has commonly been supposed — the stars. Rather, 
 aSdvara faia = t^e supreme Mind and the Ideal Minds so far as thq/ are 
 TouTifi', Bvirrh, (ua = iAe supreme Mind and the Ideal Minds so far as 
 they become Bdrepoy. Cp. Arist. Top. Z. 10. 148 a 15 aiJ Xi\dTuiv 
 Spl^erat rh Brtirhv trpoadirrav i» roTs ray (liaiy ipiainots- ^ yhp tSc'a oliK 
 iarai Byririi, oToy abrodyBpuwos. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 97 
 
 dOavatriav iiriaKevaaTrfv'^ irapa rov Brjfiiovpyov. 
 These passages confirm us in the belief that the 
 existence of the starry gods as a plurality is merely 
 subjective and phenomenal. 
 
 In brief, the 6eol de&v are related to the supreme 
 Bern as particulars to their corresponding Idea. Aetios' 
 account of that relation in Eel. I. xii. i a ed. Wachs- 
 muth i. p. 134, 9 — 
 
 'JSea eaTiv ovffia daa)fiaro<i . . . Trarpo? eVe^^ovo-a 
 T0t9 ala6ryrol<s rd^iv — 
 is apparently founded on, and certainly justified by, 
 Tim. SOD where the Idea is compared to a "rrarrip, 
 the particular to an eKyovov. Now in 42 E the deal 
 6emv with reference to the supreme Oeo's are called ol 
 iTalBe<i Tov Trarpo?. Similarly in 37 c the latter is 
 o yevvijaa'i irarrip^^ and in 69 c the former are tcl 
 eavTov yevv'qfuiTa.'"^ This coincidence of nomenclature, 
 by establishing the proportion — As particulars : their 
 Ideas : : the 6eol Bemv : the supreme 6e6<s — certainly 
 favours the view I have put forward, that the deol 
 de&v are not an objective but a subjective pluralisation 
 of their Creator^ 
 
 " Cp. Polit. 273 E 0EOS b Koff/iiiiras . . . . aOdnttTov avrhv xal 
 ivy/jpuv anepyd^erat. 
 
 " Cp. J'otit. 273 B. 
 
 ''^ Soph, 266 B has 0caS yevviinara of particular men etc. 
 
 " Chalcidius in Tim. 41 A ed. Wrobel p. 200 well remarks : "IHi 
 enim optimates, id est stellae, non sunt intellegibiles sed sensiles ; at 
 vero febricator eorum intellegibilis adprime." 
 
 7 
 
98 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 To deal next with their functions, (i) In Tim. 
 41—42 the ^eos addresses himself to the Q^oi 6e&v and 
 says : " Three mortal tribes have still to be created 
 that the universe may be complete. So far as their 
 souls are imperishable and divine, they are mine to 
 make : yours be it to fashion their bodies and thereby 
 cause such part of their souls' activity as is necessarily 
 perishable." 
 
 Here Plato distinguishes the direct creations of 
 the ^609 from the indirect creations of the deal 0eaw. 
 To the former belongs the task of providing the 
 immortal and passionless self: 
 
 TtM. 41 C Ka6 oaov . . . aineov aOavdroK ofiatwfjLOV 
 eivai irpoarjKei, deiov Xeyofievov '^e/Mopovv re . . . 
 crireipai; Kai virap^dfievo^. 
 Ibid. 42 E dddvuTOv dp'^rjv Ovtjtov ^ov = 6g C dpvhv 
 '\frvy(fl<! dOdvaTov— 
 to the latter that of adding the mortal body and its 
 attendant passions : 
 
 Tim. 42 D TO Be fierh tov Giropov rots veot? irapeSooKe 
 0eo2'} crcofiaTa irXdrTeiv''^ dvrjTa, to re eirCkonrov, 
 ocrov ert ?iv -yfrvj^fji; avOpmtrivij'i Seov Trpoa-yevia-Oai, 
 rovro Kal Trdvd' oaa dKoXovda eKeivoK direpya- 
 crafiivov's apyeiv. 
 
 '" It may be remarked that the office which Rep. 415 A (dw" i flfbs 
 
 cp. Arist. Pol. B. 5. 1264^ 12 h irapti toS fleoS XP""'^") assigns to the 
 Oehs is in the Tifitaeus assigned to the Beol Beuv. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 99 
 
 Ibid. 69 c TO /^6Ta toOto dvTjrov aaifia ainfi irepi- 
 
 eropvevaav .... aWo re etSo? ev avrm •^u;^?)? 
 
 •TrpoaepKoSo/jLOvv to dvrjTov, Secva /cat avayKaut 
 
 ev iavTm iradi^fiaTa e)(ov. 
 
 This, as I understand it, means : men's very selves 
 
 are due to the evolution of the absolute Mind on the 
 
 first or noetic plane, being brought about by objective 
 
 pluralisation ; men's bodies and bodily affections are 
 
 due to the evolution of the absolute Mind on the 
 
 remaining or gnostic planes, being brought about by 
 
 subjective pluralisation. 
 
 This statement of the case involves one issue of 
 peculiar importance. If the ultimate consciousness 
 of every individual is a direct creation of the Artificer, 
 or — to drop metaphor — an objective multiple of Mind, 
 and if the objective multiples of Mind are none other 
 than the Ideal series, it follows that the souls of par- 
 ticular men, so far as they may be called truly 
 existent, are not to be distinguished from the Idea 
 of Man. The realisation of this truth throws light 
 upon several details of the present passage. We can 
 now see why the aOavaTot ap^i) dvriTov ^wov was called 
 delov rp/e/iovovv Te (Tim. 41 C) : plainly because it is 
 the Idea, and as dwelling within the pale of ravT6T7i<s 
 is entitled not only to ddavaaia but also to deioTT)^. 
 Again, when the Creator urges that, were he to make 
 the perishable part of his creatures, their mortal would 
 put on immortality and take rank with the gods, — 
 
loo THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Tim. 41 C 8i' ifiov Se ravra r^evoiieva koX ^iov 
 
 fieraaj^pvTa deol<; lad^oiT av — 
 
 he virtually declares that the distinction between 
 
 Odrepov and ravTov would be abolished ; transient 
 
 particulars would invade the dominion of Ideal 
 
 But if it be conceded that the immortal part of us 
 all is identical with the Idea of Man, which Idea as it 
 appears in the cosmos becomes subjectively attached 
 to bodies and split into a seeming multitude of souls 
 — irepl ra adtfiaTa yiyvo/Mevq fiepiari] (Tim. 35 A), — 
 there are yet two possible errors which should be 
 signalised. 
 
 On the one hand, it must be observed that this 
 procedure in no wise imperils the unity of the Idea ; 
 since the multiplicity of particular souls belongs only 
 potentially to the realm of Ideal ovaia. As vow?, 
 the Idea is a single eternal Mind. As eTrunruMfi or 
 ho^a or a'ladtiai^, it passes into the manifold activities 
 of human thought. But the latter phase is dynamic- 
 ally latent in the former ; the former is the implicit 
 verity of the latter : 
 
 Soph. 247 D Xe^as Bfj rb koi o-ttouivovv iceKTrifievov 
 Bvvafiiv etV elf to TToieiv . . , etr' et? to irda'xeip 
 . , . irav TovTo oWo)? etvae riOefiat yap opov opi^eiv 
 ra ovra, w? eariv ovk dKKo n irXTjv hvvaii,i<;. 
 
 " This passage then furnishes a parallel to the use of Bioi = "Ideas" 
 in Tim. 37 c : cp. also the terminology of the neo-Platonists (p. 112 n). 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. lor 
 
 On the other hand, the ancient landmark between 
 the soul and the body of any given individual remains 
 unmoved. Sokrates is a special localisation of the 
 Idea of Man functioning in the mode of lower ment- 
 ality. As such he is a double being, comprising both 
 soul and body. His soul is the Ideal Animal con- 
 ceived as actively cognisant on the planes of ffkviaK : 
 his body — or, to speak strictly, his bodily shape — is 
 the same Animal conceived as passively cognised on 
 the same planes.^" The one, inasmuch as its activity 
 is the procession of an Ideal Mind, Plato regards as 
 the handiwork of God q%id. Being, viz. the supreme 
 ^609.*^ The other, inasmuch as its passivity is the 
 result of imperfect apprehension, he refers to the 
 workmanship of God qudL becoming, viz. the Qeoi 6e&v. 
 
 It may here be objected — and the objection is a 
 valid one — that, allowing the body and its accom- 
 panying emotions to be the outcome of imperfect 
 apprehension, we have as yet shown no reason why 
 the 6eoi dewv rather than the lower phase of any other 
 vorjTov ^&ov should be named as the cause of their 
 appearance. The reason, I think, lies in the fact that 
 the Ideal ^a>a are multiples of the supreme fwoj/, whose 
 
 '" This doctrine was a refinement upon the teaching of the earlier 
 dialogues, e.g: Phaedrus 245 E irSv yaf aapta ^ fiiv ^uOev rh KivtiaBai, 
 Ihjiuxov, $ !4 tvioBfV o4t^ i^ aarov, lfi\fivxov, as Tairr)! oUffiis ibiaeus 
 rfnjx^s- 
 
 ^^ Cp. TYfft, 69 C rwv /lev Beiuv ainhs ylyvfrai SrifjLiovpySi, 
 
I02 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 subjectivity therefore takes logical precedence of theirs. 
 Plato in fact goes more to the root of the matter by 
 assigning the causation of the dvrjrbv 'yevo<! to the 
 lower aspect of the supreme de6<;. Elsewhere he 
 penetrates beyond their ulterior to their ultimate 
 source : 
 
 Tim. 41 A Qeol 6e&v, mv iym S7)/j,iovpy6<; irar'^p re 
 epytov. 
 
 Soph. 265 c i,&a Bt) irdvra Ovryra Koi <f)vra...fj.wv 
 aXKov Tip6<; rj deov SrjfiiovpyovvTO'; ^-qaofiev 
 varepov yiyveaOai vporepov ovk ovra ; 
 (2) A second office attributed to the 6eol demv in Tim. 
 41 D — 42 E may be thus expressed. The Artificer 
 begins his task of providing the Oelov ■^yefiovovv re 
 portion of individuals by dividing the whole mass of 
 soul at his disposal into i^u^a? laapldfiovt rot? aarpoK. 
 Bearing in mind what was said concerning ■^v'xr} 
 fiepia-TT) we shall expect Dr. Zeller's view^^ to prove 
 correct, viz. that these yjrvxal are the souls of particular 
 men. But the point may be certified by a considera- 
 tion of the word la^dpidfioi, whose significance has, I 
 believe, been unduly neglected. 
 
 The employment of the terms oXov and fiopia to 
 denote the supreme ^mov and the Ideal ^wa shows that, 
 in Plato's view, the sum total of the latter represents 
 the content of the former. Now this equivalence was 
 
 '^ J'/ato and The Older Academy p. 390, n. 8. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 103 
 
 not confined to the higher phase of Ideal tuvtoti^i; : it 
 applied also to the lower order of particular eTepoTTit. 
 Hence the Platonic Parmenides, after stating {Parm. 
 144 C) that ovaia is Split into ■n-X&lara fiepr), corrects 
 himself and observes : 
 
 OvK aft oKifir^ apri eKeyo/iev, 7UyovTe<s w<; TiXela-Ta 
 jMepT) 17 ovaia veve/iTjTai, aXX icra, a>? eotxe, im 
 hi (144 D — e) 
 
 Kai firjv TO, ye iravra fiepr) ret avrov rb ev ia-Ti, Kal 
 ovTe Ti Trkeov ovre eKarrov ^ iravra. (14S C) 
 
 From these passages I gather that what Aristotle ^ 
 calls TO, TToWa T&v <nnitovvp.eov tok eiSeaiv correspond 
 numerically to the similar phase of to ev, that is, to 
 the 0eol Becov. The meaning of the expression in Tim. 
 41 D will then be as follows. The yfrv^al ladpiOfwi 
 Toli; darpoK are the souls of men which the Creator 
 divides and distributes to the number of the starry 
 gods, that they may severally learn the laws of the 
 universe. Thus the i^w^^al la-dpid/jLoi are particular 
 souls, hut particular souls considered as not yet embodied 
 and therefore as still the direct handiwork of the 
 Creator. Their state of dynamic multiplicity is of 
 course merely a:n analytical abstraction ; for, if the 
 body be but the soul passively apprehended by lower 
 psychosis, actual multiplicity must synchronise with 
 incarnation. The state of potential plurality is, 
 
 " Met. A. 6. 987 6 10. 
 
104 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 however, recognised and described in Parm. 1560 as 
 TO i^ai^viji^^ — a condition intermediate between ovcria 
 and 761/60-4? : 
 
 KuTO, Br) TOP avrbv Xoyov Kal ef ivixs ivl TToXKa lov 
 Kol eK -TToWmv e^' ev oiire ev iariv ovre voWd, 
 oiire StaKplverai ovre avyKpiverai, (157 A). 
 
 It may be added that the sojourn in the ^vwofia 
 o'l/cria-K a<TTpov rationalises the influence over a man's 
 character which ancient astrology universally attri- 
 buted to his birth-star. For the rest, having heard 
 their destiny, these potential particulars are sown into 
 the planets where they are clothed upon with bodies 
 by the subjective action of the late-born gods. 
 
 In fine, this examination of the nature and func- 
 tions of the 6eo\ Oewv enables us to determine their 
 metaphysical value with some assurance. They are 
 not co-ordinate with the rpia Bvtjto. 76^17, except in so 
 far as they constitute the erepoimtrif of a vorfrhv t/Siov, 
 but are related to them as the supreme Nous is to the 
 Ideal voijfiaTa. If the term irapaZei'^fia be understood 
 to denote the cognitions of ■^u^'? functioning in the 
 
 ^ Compai^e the use of i^al(pvi]s in Symp. 210 E ifyii^vits msrlii/erai, 
 Tt QaA)tkaxrT)}V T^if ^vffiv Ka\6v K.TtJi'f Gorg, 523 E ourp rp ipwxp o-vr^v 
 T^v 'f/vxh" Beapovma iial<l>vjis a'iro8av6i'Tos ixdiTTOv. The former passage 
 conceives the individual mind confronting that which is oAt6 KaB" airh 
 linff airov /iovoiiSh i,e\ iv, the latter represents the disembodied soul of 
 the particular man after death. Both depict a juxtaposition of the 
 properties of oitrla and yivtais, which except in a moment of transition 
 is impossible. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 105 
 
 mode of rairov, and the term elimv to denote the 
 cognitions of ifrvxv functioning in the mode of Odrepov, 
 then I conceive that the position assigned by Plato to 
 the ^601 6emv may be fairly represented by the follow- 
 ing diagram : 
 
 irapa^eiyfta elxcov 
 
 deo9 0eol 6eu)v 
 
 {b) Lastly, we approach the question, What of the 
 subjective aspect of the Ideal gods ? There is but 
 one fitting term for a minor order of ot'Stot Oeoi, namely 
 Saifiove<i. And this Plato has used to describe the 
 reasoning powers of particular men : 
 
 Tim. 90 A TO Se irepl tov KvpuoTorov trap rjfuv 
 •^uj^^S eihoxK hiavoeiadai Set r^Se, w? apa avrh 
 Salfiova 6ehi eKo/na SeBcoKe. 
 Ibid. 90 c are Se ael BepairevovTa to delov e)(ovrd 
 TC ai/TOV eS KeKoafiiifiivov tov Salfiova ^vvoiKOV 
 iv avrm Sia^ep6vrw<! evSai/iova elvai. 
 By Baifiwp then Plato means the intelligence^ — 
 
 9* With the Platonic derivation from iaiiitaii in Cral. 398 B L. and S. 
 compare Archil. 3, 4 rairris yhp xftmi Sal/ioves «i<rl iiAxris. 
 
io6 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 that part of us which is the nearest approximation to 
 Ideal ^etoTij?. It is indeed sometimes** called t6 
 6eiov on grounds which we have already examined. 
 But for the most part individuals are relegated to the 
 region of ereporij?, and their highest faculty described 
 as — 
 
 TO deioTUTov rmv map ■qfitv {Tim. 73 A) 
 
 TO ffeiorarov TtSi; eV ■^fuv (Ibid. 88 B) 
 
 o deioTarov r iart Kol t&v iv rfjuv irdvrwv Seairor- 
 ovv {Ibid. 44 D) 
 
 TO iavTov Oeiorarov {Hep. 589 E). 
 
 He who follows its precepts deserves the name of 
 0eio^ {Rep. 500 D, Epist. ?'. 340 C), and the resultant 
 life is iravTav r&v ^itov OeioraTOf {Phileb. 33 B, cp. 
 Laws 766 a). 
 
 Enough has now been said to prove that a theo- 
 logical designation of Plato's Idealism is not chimerical. 
 The objective aspect of Mind is represented on the one 
 hand by the supreme 0e6<;, and on the other by the Ideal 
 deal. The subjective aspect of the former finds expres- 
 sion in the deal 6ewv ; that of the latter in the Saifiove^ 
 of individuals. 
 
 If it be asked — In what relation does this hierarchy 
 stand to the evil World-soul of the Laws ? — I should 
 reply that, since vows is ael ffeoi {Laws 897 B), Necessity 
 or the force which produces the degeneration of i/ofls 
 
 ^ Tim. 41 c, 69 D, 72 D. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 107 
 
 may be justly described not only as dvoia but also 
 as TO dOeov^'', whether in the case of the supreme 
 Mind, — 
 
 Laws 897 B y}rvxri...a,vo[a,^viYyeUo/j,€vrj irdi>Ta av 
 
 Tavavrla tovtok aTrepyd^erai. 
 Theaet. 176 E irapaZeir/fidrav, & ^!Xe, ev r(p ovn 
 earancov, tov fiev delov eiSainoveardTov, rov Se 
 ddeov dBXitoTarov — 
 or in that of the subordinate minds, — 
 
 Tim. 86b voaov fiev Sf) ■^f^^s avoiav ^vyx^mprjTiov. 
 Rep. 589 E el Be to eavTov QeioraTov inrb toJ ddeo)- 
 rdrtp re Kal fiiapcoTaTm Sov\ovrat...ovK apa 
 a6\i6<i eari ; 
 Thus the 6eo\ 0ewv, so far as they represent the 
 6e6<;, are dr/adol Trda-av dpeTrfv (Laws 899 B), so far as 
 they deviate from his perfection, are evil and respon- 
 sible for the defects of their dependent creations. 
 Similarly with particular specimens of the natural 
 kinds : so far as they approximate to their Idea, they 
 are dela and eiiSaifiova ; so far as they recede therefrom, 
 they are ddea and KaKoSaifiova. 
 
 A word or two may be added with regard to 
 subsequent terminologies. Of Speusippos' usage 
 next to nothing is known ; but his severance of vow 
 from ev and rd/yaffov must have produced theological 
 complications of a serious sort. 
 
 *' Cp. Tim. 53 B Stok diirp rwhs 9e6s. 
 
io8 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 With regard to Xenokrates our information is 
 less scanty. Aetios^^ affirms of this philosopher's 
 religious theories that to, irpoTepa irapa rov UXarcovo'i 
 fi€Ta-jre^paKev. And — if we allow for Xenokrates' 
 identification of the Ideas with Mathematical num- 
 bers — the statement may be accepted as in the main 
 correct. At least all the gods of the Platonic theocracy 
 play their part in the comprehensive system of Xeno- 
 krates. Corresponding to the objective deities we find : 
 
 (a) A supreme and unitary Nov<s called Zeii^ or 
 
 TTptBTO? 0e6^. 
 
 (/8) Certain demv Swca/tet? or Oeiai SvvdfieK inherent 
 
 in elemental forms. 
 The place of the subjective deities is filled by — 
 (7) The stars or '0\v/*7rto{ Oeoi, which combine to 
 
 make a collective ovpavo<i also known as a de6<i. 
 
 These stars are the result of a union between 
 
 the One and the indeterminate Dyad or, in 
 
 allegorical phrase, between Zeu? irarifp and the 
 
 fiV'^Vp 6emv. 
 (S) The souls of individual men are called Bai- 
 
 fiov6<s ^'; and even the beasts have some instinct 
 
 of the Divine.*" 
 
 '' Stob. £1:1. I. i. 29 i ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 37, 2. 
 
 " Arist. Top. B.6. 112 a 37. 
 
 "• Clemens Strom. V. xiii. 87 Ktt96\ou 70B1' t^k irtpl toC 6eio\i (mouur 
 Uevi>itpi,Ti)s.. oix iare\iri(ei Kal h- rots &K6yoti fiiJoii (quoted by Zeller 
 op. cit. p. 592«.). 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 109 
 
 Plato's opposition between the power that makes 
 for good and the power that makes for evil reappears 
 perhaps in Xenokrates' broad contrast ®^ between Zev<s 
 vTraTO? and Zeix; i/earos. But the further recognition 
 of inrocreXrjvoi Saifiove<! aopaToi seems a mere concession 
 to popular superstition. On the whole, Xenokrates' 
 theology follows the Platonic outlines, though their 
 author's design is marred and obscured by the attempt- 
 ed innovations of his successor. 
 
 Aristotle likewise held the truth of the maxim *^ — 
 irdvTa <}>vaei e^ei ri delov. But a modified system of 
 metaphysics caused certain changes in his theological 
 vocabulary. The conception of a creative vov<s he 
 appears to have borrowed from Plato's account of the 
 supreme Mind, and, like his master, he describes it by 
 the term Be6<s : 
 
 Met. A. 7. 1072 b 18 — 30. C^.frag. 4,6, 1483 a 27 
 d debt fj vovt itrrlv fj iireKeivd n rov vov, Top. E. 
 6. 1363 7 ^aop vo7jt6v = 6 Qeb<i,Pol.T. 16. 1287a 
 28 d fih) dbv TOP vovv Kekevtov dp')(eiv hoKel KeKeveiv 
 dpxeiv TOP 6e6v, Eth. End. H. 12. 1245 b \6 ov 
 r^ap o6to)i! 6 0e6<i ei exet, dWa ffiXriov ^ &are 
 dXKo TL voelv irap auTO? avTov. 
 Since, however, Aristotle's ontology recognises no 
 
 " Clemens Strom. V. xiv. 116, Plut. Plat. Qu. ix. 1, 2. p. 1007 
 (quoted by R. and P. Hist. Phil. Gr. p. 287). 
 
 " Arist. Eth. Nic. H. 14. 1153* 32. 
 
no THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 ^wpiaTal ISeai,, he is free to transfer the title 6eol from 
 the Ideas to the starry spheres, without the encum- 
 brance of a neologism such as Plato's 6eol detav, or the 
 confusion of equivocal names such as those of Xeno- 
 krates' gods : 
 
 Met. A. 8. 1074^ 8 — 14 6eov<; . . . Tcm ^pd>Ta<i 
 ovala<i ehai, de mund. 2. 391 b 14 — 19 6e&v 
 OiK'qTTJpiov ovpavh<s wvofiaffrai ' K.r.\. Cp. to, 
 Beta Psych. A. 2. 17. 405 a 32, de part. an. A. 5. 
 645 a 4, dvOpanrov ttoKv deioTepa Eth. Nic. Z. 7. 
 1 141 a 34, TCL (fiavepa t&v deimv Met. E. I. 1026 a 
 18, ra deioTara tS>v (frnvepav Phys. JB. 4. 1960: 
 33, ta Oela adofjLara Met. A. 8. 1074a 30, de 
 caelo B. 12. 292 iJ 32, and the more definite 
 expressions of [Alex.] in Met. ed. Hayduck p. 
 709, 28 fif. Q eo\ . . , roaovToi oaai al a^alpai, 
 i^prrjfiivoi, tjj? deioTdTr}<; koX dpia-TT)'; ova-La<s, 
 ibid. p. 709. 33 etf'*' oiv OeoX kcu 0elov wX^^os 
 irepiexpv t^i' oKrjv ^vaiv koX top a-jravra leoff/iov, 
 ibid. p. 721, 31 el? de6<! iaji. rd yap r&v irXava- 
 fiivcov a'cTia 6eol /lev, dWd fieOe^ei koI tw 
 ffovX^fiari rov irponov koX (UbKapiajTaTov i^p- 
 Tijvrai vo6<s. 
 
 Again, Aristotle — who is similarly impressed with 
 the divine nature of thought {Psych. A. 4. 14. 408 b 29, 
 Met. A. 8. 1074^ 16, depart, an. A. 10. 686a 28, de an. 
 gen. B. 3. 736^ 27)— speaks of particular minds in 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 
 
 terms that repeat the language of the Platonic dia- 
 logues : 
 
 Eth. Eud. if. 14. 1248 a 27 opposes to kv fjiilv 
 
 Oelov to eV r& oKtp 0eo?. 
 Etk. Nic. K. 7. 11^^ a 16 twi; iv ■^fuv to deiiOTarov. 
 Probl. AT. 7. 962 a 22 (cp. 9. 962 a: 35) uses to 
 
 BetoTaTov r&v irepl '^fia<; of the human head. 
 It is, therefore, highly probable that Plato's teach- 
 ing was the source of the saying attributed to his 
 pupil : 
 
 Clemens Strom. VI. vi. 53 'ApiaTOTe\^<s Zalfioffi 
 Ke-xprjoQai Trai/ras dvdpanroiK \eyeL crvvofiaprov- 
 (Tiu aiiToli irapa tov j^povov t^s ivatofiaTcocrewi, 
 irpo<j)r]TiKbv tovto fiddTifia Xa^wv Kot Kara6i/ievo<; 
 eis rd, eavTOV ^i^\ia, fir) 6/io\oyri<ra<i odev ixpelX- 
 ero TOV \6<yov tovtov. 
 Cic. defin. ii. 12. 40 "hominem ad duas res, ut ait 
 Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et agendum esse 
 natum quasi mortalem deum." 
 Anst. frag. 187, 15 11 « 43 tou . . . T^a'^iicov ^dov to 
 /Mev ioTt Oeoi, to Se avdptoiroi;, to Be olov TlvOa- 
 yopai. 
 It might be shown that the theology of the neo- 
 Platonists in some measure revived the usage of the 
 Academy. Plotinus, for example, mentions — 
 
 [a] 6 TraTTjp ^eo? ®^ i.e. the supreme Triad of to ev + 
 6 ^ov'i + rj ■^I'X'?- 
 
 »' £nn. V. I. I. 
 
112 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 (/S) The voepai Bwd/ieK, i£. the Platonic Ideas,; 
 which consist in the supreme Nous and, as 
 sharing its animation, are termed ^eoi'®*- 
 
 {7) The opdfievoi deoi ®^ i.c. the stars. 
 
 (S) The Saifjiovei and the 0eol ** of particular men. 
 
 But to pursue the subject would carry us too far 
 afield. It is of more immediate importance to pass 
 from the theological aspect of Plato's philosophy to 
 the moral deductions which he expressly drew there- 
 from, bearing in mind that his ontology was from first 
 to last intended to serve as a sound basis for ethical 
 reflection. 
 
 '* Enn. V. i. 4, cp. iiid. 11. ix. 8 irSi okk Sc t<s HyaXna ivapy^s Kal 
 KoKhp ruv V0T\Tuv Bt&v eliroj; ibid. V. i. 7 irav nhv rh rur ISfuy 
 KiWos, iriCi'Ta; Be Beohs vorirois. lamblichus too calls the Ideas 
 vofpoi {v, I. vorrrol) Btol ap. Prokl. in Tim. 94 c. 
 
 " Enn. V. i. 4, cp. ibid. v. i. 2 iari i\ xa! liKxai Be6s, Sri efiifivxos, 
 Kol Tct &AAa (urrpa. 
 
 '* Enn. V. i. 2, 4. Plotinus was himself guided by a Beds, according 
 to Porphyry, others by their respective Sal/ioves, — Miueipios ft Bfhp Ix"" 
 T^v Sal/ioya Kal ob rou i^eifxevov yivovs -rhv avv6vra ( Vit, Plot, % lo). 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 113 
 
 PART III. 
 
 METAPHYSICAL DESCENT AND MORAL ASCENT. 
 
 In the foregoing chapter I have emphasised the 
 distinction between the objective and the subjective 
 aspects of Plato's ontology. The former was found 
 to be the purposive pluralisation of a supreme Mind, 
 abiding in eternal self-sameness, and invested with all 
 the credentials of divinity. The latter was the necessary 
 €KffTaai<i of every such Mind, whereby it passed out 
 of the sphere of identical being into that of diverse 
 becoming, and stooped from the sovereignty of an 
 Ideal ^60? to the subservience of individual Saifiove<s. 
 This declension is, however, counterbalanced by certain 
 compensatory tendencies which must not be over- 
 looked. Metaphysics indeed compels a oSo? xdroa, 
 but Morality with equal insistence demands a ^Bhi; 
 ava ; and it remains to present the dictates of the one 
 in such a manner as will satisfy the claims of the 
 other. 
 
 Now it will be remembered that we have repeatedly 
 described the objective world as a pattern, the sub- 
 jective world as its copy. And this language 
 applies not only to particulars themselves which, 
 
 8 
 
114 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 whether they be the 6eol Oe&p or the rpia dvrjra yevij, 
 are in any case semblances of higher verities, — 
 
 Tim. 39 E TovTO Bi} to Karakoivov dveipyd^ero avrov 
 
 Trpos Tf]v rov 7rapaSelfyfuiT0<i diroTUTrovfievo<; i^vatv. 
 
 ^irep ovv vovi ivovffai lBea<} rm o eari ^&ov, olai 
 
 re evetai Kol oiraif KaBopa, TOiaina<s KaX TocravTa<; 
 
 BievorjOr) Beiv Kal ToBe ayfiv. elcrX Br} Terrape?, 
 
 /A«t fiev ovpdviov deoiv yivoi;, dWr) Be Trrifvov Kal 
 
 depoTTopov, TpiiTj Be evvBpov etSo?, wefoi/ Be koX 
 
 ')(ep(Tatov rerapTov — 
 
 but also to the conditions of particular existence. For 
 
 Time, according to Plato, is an image of Eternity, and 
 
 Space a simulacrum of Ideal Otherness. 
 
 The former fact is stated in so many words : 
 Tim. 37 D eiKU) S' iirivoei kivtjtov riva alavo^ "Troirjaai, 
 Kal BtaKoafi&v dfia ovpavov iroiei fiivovro^ al&vot 
 ev kv\ KUT dpidfibv iovaav almviov euKova, tovtov 
 ov Bt) ■^povov mvo/idKafjiev. 
 The latter is a legitimate inference from Tim. 52 c, 
 where the thesis that we wrongly import spacial con- 
 ceptions into the world of Ideas is supported by the 
 following argument : — 
 
 " A particular has not an absolute but a relative 
 existence ; it is in fact the mere phantasm of 
 another object : hence it demands a something 
 in which it may appear, unless indeed it is 
 to be reduced to an utter nonentity. [This 
 something is Space.] But in the region of real 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 115 
 
 existence for one thing (sc. Idea) to be formed 
 
 in another thing {sc. Idea ^') would be to make 
 
 that other thing both one and two, which is 
 
 impossible. [Therefore between the Ideas there 
 
 , is no Space, but only Otherness.]" 
 
 This amounts to saying that Space, the medium 
 
 of subjective pluralisation, corresponds to numerical 
 
 Otherness, the medium ,of objective pluralisation. 
 
 Thus the question raised by Aristotle in Pkys. A. 2. 
 
 209^ 33— 
 
 UXdravi fievroi XexTeov . . . Sih rt ovk iv TOTrp ra 
 e'lor} Kal ol dpiBuoL, eiirep to fieOeKTiKov 6 totto?, 
 eij€ Tov /leydKov koI tow fjLiKpov 6vto<; tov 
 fiedeKTiKov ehe rfj^ v\r]<!, &airep ev ra Ti/jtai^ 
 yiypaiftev — 
 will be met by the answer that the term totto? is not 
 rightly used till Ideal alterity has passed into indi- 
 vidual extension. 
 
 It was this doctrine — that particulars and the 
 modes of particular existence bear to ideas and the 
 modes of Ideal existence the relation of an eUwv to 
 
 " Mr. Archer-Hipd (ed. Tim. p. 171) paraphrases: — "For true 
 reason declares that, while the type is one, and the image another, they 
 must be apart ; for they cannot exist one in the other and so be one and 
 two at once." But surely rh /iiv and t^ Si are both Svtus Sfra, i.e. 
 Ideas : this is shown by the whole form of construction i'tKivi. likv 
 K.T.\. . . ,T^ Se uVTus SvTt. It is no question of " the old doctrine of 
 napovirla," but a clear statement of the reason why particulars are 
 extended. Ideas unextended. 
 
il6 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 its irapaSeiy/ia — which determined the whole alle- 
 gorical form of the Timaeus, and so popularised the 
 belief that " This visible World is but a Picture of the 
 invisible, wherein, as in a Pourtraict, things are not 
 truely, but in equivocal shapes, and as they counter- 
 feit some more real substance in that invisible fabrick." 
 The peculiar value of this imagery is that it links the 
 world of relative to the world of absolute being, and 
 thereby expresses just that aspect of Idealism which 
 might best serve as a basis for the structure of 
 morality. In other words, the artistic setting of the 
 Timaeus has a special significance of its own, inasmuch 
 as the raison d'itre of Plato's ethics may be said to lie 
 in the simple reflection that, if the world as we know 
 it is a portrait, it ought to be as exact a portrait as 
 possible. 
 
 Starting from this point of contact between Meta- 
 physics and Morals, I shall attempt to show how the 
 larger lines of matured Platonism mark out the rational 
 end of individual conduct. In so doing we should 
 remember that the true unit of voluntary action is 
 not the particular but the vorjTov ^&ov. Nevertheless 
 av0ptinroi<s SiaXeyoiMsOa, dXV ov deoii, and therefore — 
 
 "We must translate our motives, like our speech. 
 Into the lower phrase that suits the sense 
 O' the limitedly apprehensive. Let 
 Each level have its language ! " 
 
 It will be convenient to begin by resuming the 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 117 
 
 constitution of the moral agent. Every vor^rov ^5>dv 
 possesses four faculties, namely vow, eiri(TTii/ji,r], So^a, 
 a'ia-OrjaK, — the three last being moments in the sub- 
 jective evolution of the first, and opposed to it as 
 yiveaK to ovtw? ovaui. Particulars which, as such, 
 belong to the region of yiyvofneva are consequently 
 debarred from vorjaif. they are, however, endowed 
 with . eTTiaTijfjiij, So^a, and aia6rja-K *^ though in the 
 lower forms of life even these are to a greater or less 
 extent in abeyance. 
 
 This catalogue of the cognitive powers accords 
 well with the usage of the more advanced Platonic 
 writings. In the earlier dialogues pure thought is not 
 unfrequently ascribed to individual thinkers (e.g. Rep: 
 S 1 1 C, D, 5 24 c, Ptiaed. 83 B. alib.}. The Philebus adopts 
 a half-way position ; for it expressly distinguishes the 
 human i/oO? of 21 D, 22 c, 58 D, from the aKt]6iiVo<i koL 
 6ehi fou? of 22 c, 28 c, 30 D. But the Timaeus no- 
 where^ speaks of the particular man as possessing 
 vovf. it describes him as being at most a vov koX 
 ilriaTqfMi<! ipaaTijv (46 d), and his finest faculty as r&v 
 
 "* Cp. Stob. JScl. I. Ixi. I (Hermes) ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 275, 16 
 6 vovs 4v T$ 06^, 6 \oyiTfihf iv r$ avBpdircp. Aristotle after describing^ 
 (Me/. A. 9. Z074 b 35 seqq.) the v6ri(ris voiiirius of the supreme Being 
 continues (patvcTai S' alel JiAAou ii ^irnrr^/ii) xal t) atffBriffis ical v 
 S6^a Kal i) iiivoia, iiunris S' iy vapepyif. 
 
 "' It does indeed use the phrase I'oSi' ^x*"* i^ ^)> ""'''' ^X""' (^9 B)= 
 "sensible, reasonable," and the compounds ivvoiiv (87 d), Karavoeiv 
 (90 D) etc. But to avoid them would have been mere pedantry. 
 
Il8 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 ZiavmffiaTav jj Ik rov vov ^epofiivr} SvvafiK ^* (7 1 ^)- '^^ 
 females and the lower animals it alludes in 91 D — 
 92 B, arranging them in a descending scale according 
 as they approximate to or recede from that higher 
 mentality — vov koI avoiat airo^oXy koX KTtja-ei (92 B) ; 
 while 77 B brings even vegetable life into the same 
 register, — «5 So^rji; /lev Kal Xoyianov { = eiriarr;ii7)<i) 
 re KoX vov fiereari to firjSev, atff0jj<reo)?^*^ Se. In like 
 manner the second hypothesis of the Parmenides 
 enumerates the powers of the human intellect : 
 
 Parm. 155^ *<*^ iirvtm^fir/ Sri ew; av avrov ical 
 
 So^a Koi aiad7j<Ti<!, ewrep Kal vvv ^fiei<; irepl 
 
 avTov Trdvra ravra irpdrrofiev — 
 
 but, as we have seen sometime since, this dialogue 
 
 confines the range of pure thought to the Ideal world. 
 
 Here, however, we encounter a difficulty which 
 has beset the student of the Platonic system ever 
 since Parm. 134B was penned. If the realm of true, 
 existence is iiovm OeuTt) vm {PAaedr. 247 c), and if voO? 
 
 100 This strange expression seems chosen to escape the direct attri- 
 bution of mSs to a particular. Similarly in 51 D, where Plato calls the 
 Ideas ii/alffBrira 6<t>' Ji/iav tUvi vooi/uva ii6yov, the position of the 
 pronoun is instructive. 
 
 "" Simplicius {in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 317, 11) states that 
 plants %x^"' V-^v Tiva cHatriiriv, ItjuiSforcpav Si ^ Kurii rck KWais ^wi^a, 
 Kal &s c^t) XlKirwv oTov KafledSovtrai' aXaB7i<riv, Similarly Empedokles 
 (according to Sextus Math, viii, 286) irivTa ii^iov KoyMh rvyxiveip, Kal 
 ov (ua fUvoy aWi Ka\ <lnni, pifirus ypdipuv • irdyra yip XirBi tpp6niiruf 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 119 
 
 is not allowed to the individual as such, how is it that 
 
 Plato himself feels so secure about his ground-plan of 
 
 a supreme Mind existent both as a unity and as a 
 
 plurality ? The confidence which he displays e.g. in — 
 
 Tim. 29 B ToO iih) oZv /lovlpov koI ffe^aifiv kov fierh 
 
 vov KaTa<l}avov<: fiovifwv} koi dfieTaTTTaiTov}, 
 
 Kaff oaov \oViv\ re aviKA<^KTOVi irpoa^KU \070t? 
 
 ^Lvai, Kal aKtirqToi<!, TovTov Bel fitjSev iWeiireiv — 
 
 could only be justified by the actual intuition of an 
 
 Ideal deo^ : 
 
 Tim. 72 D TO. fiev oiv irepl '^vxfj^ ... to fiev a\r)- 
 6e<s . . . 8eoC ^"^ ^vfi^i^a-avro^, tot' av ovrta fiovatv 
 Suff'xypi^oifieda • ro ye /ir/v etKo? «.t.\., 
 and that intuition is beyond the reach of the indi- 
 vidual, however great his genius and however unceasing 
 his efforts. As Chalcidius ^"^ puts it, " sine divinitatis 
 adminiculo ipsa per se anima nihil valeat spectare 
 atque intellegere divinum." 
 
 The difficulty was a real one, and such as to bring 
 a consistent thinker within sight of scepticism : 
 
 Parm. 135 C ri oiv irot.'qtreiis ^iKo(TO<f)la<; irepi; vol 
 rpey^ei ayvoov/ievav tovtwv ; 
 Plato meets it by two considerations, (i) The highest 
 
 '"^ Cp. Tim. 6Sd 9 (hs liiv rib iraA.\& fls %v ^vyKfpavvivat xai irciXiy 
 i^ ivbs tls troWii Sta\icir iKavas iiritrrdfievos S^a Kai Sucbti!;, avipii- 
 TTwv 5h oiStls ovSfffpa Toiruv tKavhs otire iffTi vvv oiSr* eiffavBls vot' 
 
 CfTTai. 
 
 '<" In Plat. Tim. 41 E, ed. Wrobel p. 202. 
 
I20 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 human iTnazijfir], though it can never attain to divine 
 v6r]<7i<!, may yet be reckoned an approximation 
 thereto i<^: 
 
 Tim. 5 1 E Kai rod /liv {sc. S6^<! aXrjdow) irama 
 dvSpa fi€Te')(€iv <f>aTeov, vov Se deov<;, avdpmirwv 
 fie yivo<! Ppa')(^v ri. 
 The 761*0? in question is no doubt to t&v ^CKotro^ovv- 
 Twv opd&'i ye Kol a\7}d&^ yevof {Epist. f 326 A). 
 Philosophers may in a sense be said vov fierexetv 
 inasmuch as their intelligence leads them to desiderate 
 certain transcendent fixities in nature as a basis for 
 the iinarrifji/t) which they do possess. They apprehend 
 Tav /Mev IBiav vow «ot' eTTiffTd/iav . . . rd S^ diroyewd- 
 /lara alad'^in koX Bo^a (Tim. Locr. 94 B). And it is to 
 this dyad&v dvBp&v ofio^paBfuav voijo'k^'^ that Plato 
 appeals when he wishes to establish any fundamental 
 truth. See, for example, the tenor of^r- 
 
 Phileb. 28 C itdvrei yap avfi^mvovaiv ol ao^ol . . . 
 tt)9 vovv i<TTi fiaaikev'i rfjjZv ovpavov re Kol yrj^. 
 Nevertheless the wisdom of men is at best only 
 earth-born. It cannot by itself provide the needed 
 " divinitatis adminiculum." Hence Plato, half in jest, 
 half seriously, delights to invest his authorities with a 
 supernatural halo, and to speak of their contributions 
 to knowledge as of a divine revelation. In SopA. 2 16 B 
 
 '"* See the admirable remarks of Mr. Archer-Hind ed. Timaeus pp. 
 48—49. 
 
 "" Plat. Epist. i. 3 10 A. 
 

OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 123 
 
 the critic of immature Idealism is 6e6<s tk i\ey- 
 KTucoi; and in Phileb. 16 c the revised ontology is 
 called in so many words "a gift of the gods to man- 
 kind "— 
 
 6em) ix,ev elf dvOpanrqv^ 8o<«?, w? 76 KaTa^iverai 
 €/j,ol, iro6h> €K deSiv ippl<f)ri Bid Tivot TlpoiirjOewf 
 dfia ^avoTOTW tiv\ •Jivpl' koI 01 /lep vaXaioi, 
 KpeiTTovei; ^fji&v Kal ifYurepa deStii olKOvvre^, 
 TavTTjv (jt^fitjv nrapkhoaav, w? ef evo<i fiev Kal eie 
 TToXKuv ovTwv Ta>v del Xeyofievmv elvai,, iripav 8e 
 Kal diretplav iv avTOK ^vfi<}>vTov ij(6vTtov. 
 
 The last phrase of this passage aptly expresses just 
 that scheme which one particular man could not by 
 his unaided reason have descried ; it gives us the 
 appended diagram, in which h denotes the supreme 
 Mind, and iroWa the Ideal series. 
 
 (2) But if any one turns a deaf ear to this theory 
 
 of inspiration, or quotes by way of retort Re/>. 381 E — 
 
 firjS av inro rourmv dvaveidofievai al firjTepei; rii 
 
 iraidia eKSeifiaTovvTcov, Xeyovcrat tou? jxvOow 
 
 KUKW, w dpa 6eol rivei •rrepiep'XpvTai vvKTtop 
 
 TToX^OK ^ivof! Kal iravToSaTroii! IvSaWo/Mevoi, "va 
 
 lii) dfia fiev eli Oeovf ffKatrtfyijii&a-iv, dfia Be rov; 
 
 TratSas wTrepyd^vrai, BetKoTepotK — 
 
 Plato can fall back on a less pregnable position. 
 
 He holds that the souls of individuals have before 
 
 their incarnation stood face to face with the Creator, 
 
124 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 and learnt from his lips rrjv tov ttoi/to? 4>^a-tv {Tim. 
 41 e). This they were enabled to do, because the 
 souls of men conceived as not yet associated with 
 their bodies do not differ from the Idea of Man, under 
 whose intuition all noetic existence would naturally 
 fall.^"^ The doctrine of Anamnesis is in fact the safe- 
 guard of Idealism. It may be denied : but it can 
 hardly be disproved, and — as has before been hinted — 
 it presupposes some such relation of the ideas to Mind 
 as was elicited from the assumptions of the Parmenides. 
 The confinement of pure thought to the world of 
 Ideas cannot, then, invalidate the foundations of the 
 Idealist system, because the individual philosopher 
 not only builds upon the experience of previous 
 thinkers but also possesses an innate criterion of his 
 own structure : 
 
 Phaedrus 249 B, C Sel.yap-dp9p(07rov-^iH€vai Kar^ 
 6(So; Xeyo/ievov, ex TroWav lov aladrjaetov et? ev 
 Xoyta/jiw ^vvaipovfievov. tovto Si i<TTiv dvdfivr)tTK 
 eKeivav, d ttot' elZev rjfiSiv r) "sfrvxi) avfjunopevBelaa 
 deS Koi vtrepiBovaa a vvv elvai <^a/i6i; koI dva- 
 KV-^aaa et? to ov 6vt(o<s. Sto S^ SiKaiav (lovrf 
 inepovTai rj tov 4>i\oa-6(f>ov Sidvota • irpb^ fyap 
 eKeivoi<s del iari fivijfiri Kurd hivafiiv, irpot ottnrep 
 debt mv del6<i earn. 
 
 '"' Diog. Laert. iii. 38 I'Siafrara iiiv <roiptav ^7«toj (k. Plato) thai 
 T^K tSj' v(n)T&p Kol ivTias ivray ^TTiirT^/ini', j}* ^ijirt irepl Behv koX ^ux^v 
 ffiifiaTos Ktxapiafxivriv. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 125 
 
 The removal of this difficulty in epistemology also 
 clears the way for ethical advance. It might have 
 been argued that to make the world as we know it 
 conform to an Ideal pattern is a futile task for those 
 who have no acquaintance with that pattern. But if 
 it be conceded that we can not only approach to such 
 knowledge but also appraise our own progress, the 
 reduction of individual conduct to directive rules 
 demands immediate attention 
 
 The foremost of these rules, as laid down by Plato, 
 is the general obligation of d/ioj'ojo-;,? 6ew. This was 
 indeed a duty inculcated at all stages of his philo- 
 sophic development, with the constant qualification of 
 approximate success : 
 
 Rep. 500 C Beiep Si] koi Koa-filtp ye (j>tK6<To<fi09 ofuXatv 
 Koafiiot; T6 KoX delo<; eh to Svvarov avOpdmat 
 •ylryverai. 
 
 Ibid. 613 B i-mTrjSevmv aper^v eh oaov Svvarbv 
 dp0pdnra) ofioiovcrdai 9ew. 
 
 Phaedrus 253 A einropovcn Sia. to a-vvr6vo)<s ■fivar/- 
 Kaadai Trpo? top 6eov 0\eTrei,v, Kal e^^airjofievoi, 
 aiirov ry fiv^fir), evdovaLSiVTe<s, e^ eKelvov \a/i0- 
 dvovai TO, edrj Kal ra iirnriBevfiara, /caff oaov 
 SuvaTov 9eov dvdpwnra /leTaa^xelv (cp. 249 c). 
 
 Theaet. 1 76 A, B Sto /eat iteipoAjdai j^^ evdevhe eKeure 
 ^vyeip o T4 Toj^MTTa. <l>vyr) Be o/mioxtk 6e& 
 Kara to SvvaTov. 
 
126 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Tim. 29 E irdvra 6 ti fiaXiara r^evevOai i^avKridit 
 irapairK^aia eavT&. 
 
 Laws 716 c Tov oZv T& roiovTfp [sc. 6e&) vpo<T<l>i\i} 
 yevriaofievov el<i Swafiiv o ti fiaXuna Kai avrov 
 ToiovTOV avar/KOMV '^'trfveaBai, 
 But with the modification of the earlier metaphysic it 
 became possible to employ more precise definition. 
 I have said that in Plato's maturer view the individual 
 man consists of soul and body — soul being the active, 
 body the passive function of the same entity. One 
 result of this is that the later dialogues, while deter- 
 mining the human reXo? in a twofold application, 
 emphasise the complementary nature of both its 
 .aspects. The Timaeus, for example, affirms that 
 oiSe/jtla ^v/Jifierpia xal afietpia fiei^cov ^ ■\lrv\fj<} avTrj<; 
 irpb'i a-&fia axnb (87 D), and insists on parallel develop- 
 ment as a mutual security. And the Laws, adopting 
 the customary division of 'irai8eva-i<i into Mu.sic and 
 Gymnastic, interpret the former to mean to, it)? ^wi/tj? 
 fJiej^pi TJj? "^frvxv^ irp6<! apeTrj<; iraiSeiav, the latter tA 
 P'i'Xpi' T^? ToO crrii/iOTO? apeT7J<i (673 A). 
 
 (A) To speak first of ■^vx^. The rational end for 
 individual souls is not — as we might have supposed — 
 the minimising of the diff'erence between their own 
 iiriaT'qfiTj and the vorjaii of their corresponding Idea. 
 For the Ideas themselves are — as Aristotle says 
 {Met. M. 6. 1080 3 12, alid.) — Numbers involving to 
 irpoTepov Kol ixTTepov, that is, a definite succession of 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 127 
 
 Minds, each of which exhibits some part of the entire 
 Mind and takes rank according to its noetic rroa-ov. 
 Hence Plato finds the summum bonum in conformity 
 to the supreme 5eo? rather than in resemblance to any 
 of the Ideal d^oL 
 
 But how is this 6i/,oieoai<i dem to be effected ? Par- 
 ticulars, as such, are debarred from rising to the 
 spaceless and timeless condition of pure thought. 
 Happily for us, the supreme 6eb<! no less than the 
 Ideal deal passes into space and time as a plurality 
 possessed of iTrcan^firj, So^a, aiarOTjaif. The aim and 
 object of particular morality is approximation to the 
 supreme fleo? as revealed to us in the 6eol dewv. Our 
 eTTKTTriiMi), our ho^a, our aiaOrjaK, must be made like 
 to theirs. Otherwise we shall have failed of life's true 
 purpose : 
 
 Tim. 90 D Tw S' iv riiiiv deito ^vyyevei'i elerl Kiv-qaeK 
 al Tov TravTos Btavo^ffeK koi irepitpopai • TavTaii 
 Srj ^werroiievov eKaarov Set ra? irepl Tr)v yeveatv 
 iv T17 ice^aKy Bi€(ji6apfiipa<! rjfjiSsv irepioSow i^op- 
 dovvra Sta to Karafiavddveiv ras rov iravTO'} 
 dpfiovla^ TB Kal irepi^opdii rm KaravoovfJLevp to 
 Karavoavv i^ofwiwaai Kara t^v dp'xaiav ^vaiv, 
 ofwiMxravTa Se Te\os e-)(ei,v tov irporedevTO'; dvOpm- 
 7roi<! viro 6eS)v dpicnov /St'ou Trpos t6 tov irapovTa 
 Kai TOV eireiTa"" 'xpovov. 
 
 "" These last words are noteworthy. Had the bonum been defined 
 as approximation to any single Idea, it might have been inapplicable to 
 
128 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 This Statement supersedes all previous and partial 
 determinations. It is introduced by words which 
 epitomise the teaching of the Republic, the clause — 
 Bepaireia Se Sr) wavri {sc. t^? V^vx^? etSei) ttovtw? 
 
 jj,ia, Ta? ouceicK ktcdar^ rpo^a/i Kal Ki,vi]<Tei<s 
 
 d-TToBiSovai (90 C) — 
 recognising just that apportioned activity which is 
 the mark of genuine justice.^"* Nor do we lose sight 
 of the fiiKTOi ^lo<} advocated in the Philebus, for with 
 this conception of the rational object is closely linked 
 a aKe^jri's dvOpwirlvt}^ ei/Saifioviav xal d&Ki6rr)To<; (Theaet, 
 175 C). As in the Republic evSat/iovia was proportioned 
 to attainment of SiKaioavvr] (Rep. 580 B, C), so in the 
 later dialogues true pleasure depends upon the reali- 
 sation of the human end r^"^ 
 
 Theaet. 1 76 E irapaZevyiidTCitv . . . ivrm Svti, earaTrnVy 
 
 Tov fiev deiov evSaifwveaTarov, rov Se ddeov 
 
 d0\ia}rdTov. 
 Laws 664 B TOV aiirov rfhunov re koI apurrov wro 
 
 6eSsv ^iov Xiyeadai 4>d<TK0VTe<s dXriQeaTora 
 
 ipovfiev. 
 
 the particulars of that Idea in their future life, because such particulars 
 may by metempsychosis change their status in the Ideal order. 
 
 '"" Cp. e.g. Rep. 433 E ^ ToO 01/cefou re Kal lavroS e|is te kh^ 
 ■Kfi\is SiKaiotriyn tly SfioXoyotTO, 441 D Jnvrnutvtvriov Upa iiiuy, Sri 
 Kal fi/iMV HKOirros, Stou &V tA airoS ^KtuTTov tuv 4v air^ npirrri, 
 oSros SlKai6s re iffrai Koi ret aiTov Trpirrav. 
 
 "" Dic^. Laert. iii. 42 irepl Si hyaiuv f) kokuv -roiavra HKeye 
 (sc. Plato)- t4\os iuv eivat r^v i^onoluaiv t# tt^- tV *" apir^iv avrifieti 
 /itp ttvat irphs eiiSaifioylav k.t.\. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 129 
 
 Ibid. T^T.'E, Set 8^ tov KoXKurrov ^iov eiraivelv fii) 
 
 fiovov oTt T«3 a'x^fiari, Kparel Trpo? evSo^iav, aXXa 
 
 Kal w? . . . Kparel Kal rourp b Trdwe? ^tyroviiev, 
 
 Tw 'xplpeiv TrXeMB, eXuTTO) Se \w7ret<r^ai irapa 
 
 Tov 0iov anraina. 
 
 The external manifestation of the supreme Mind 
 
 is called collectively a evSaifiav ^eo? {Tim. 34 B). The 
 
 philosopher who studies truth icTr)<re<o<; evexa evSaifiovo^ 
 
 l3iov, Kaff oaov r/fiStv 17 <j)vaK evSe'xerai, ( Tim. 68 E) may 
 
 win much felicity in the present life — 
 
 Tim. 90 C are Se ael depairevovra to delov e')(pvTa re 
 avTov eS iceKocT-firjfiivov top Balfiova ^vvoucov ev 
 avTw Sia^ep6vTco<s eiiSai/iova elvai — 
 and in the future — 
 
 Idid. 42 B "TToXiv ek rijv tov ^vvvoftov irop€v6el<s 
 oiKrja-iv^^^ affrpov, ^iov evSai/Mova Kal avvrjOri 
 e^oi. 
 For in truth the <njvayvpfj,o<i ^povrjaea^, the conversion 
 of opinion into knowledge, is fivpito tt/so; evSaifioviav 
 hio^epwv {Politic. 272 c). Even on the perceptive 
 plane conformity to nature's design is attended by 
 pleasure. Thus of sensation in general we read : 
 Tim. 64 c TO likv irapa ^v<nv . . . oKr/eivov, to S' 
 ets ^v<nv . . . f)hv. 
 
 ' '" The number of the 9eol Bt&v must balance that of the rpia Bi/ijT«t 
 yhmi (see p. 103). Hence the philosopher is said to travel to the 
 olicriffis of the star, not to become an actual star himself. 
 
 9 
 
I30 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Tim. 8 1 D — E K.aTa t^vffiv fjied' jjSoj^s e^bmaro. 
 Trav yap rb fiev Trapa ^vaiv dXyeivov, rb 8 rj 
 iri<})VKe yiyv6/j,evov ■^Sv. 
 Ibid. 83 A rd^iv r&v Kara ^vaiv ovKer i<rj(pvra 
 irepioBeop, ix^po- fi^v avra avTol<; hth rb /jiijSe- 
 fiiav aTToXavaiv iavrmv ey^etv — 
 and of the single senses : 
 
 Taste. — Tim. 66 b OTrorav 57 ^wffTao-t? . . . olKeia rfj 
 T^s 7X0)7x179 efet 7re(f>vKvia . . . jjSu Kal 7rpoa-<f)i,\e<i 
 TrajJTi Trav to toiovtov. 
 Smell. — Ibid. 67 A to 0* fjhii koI rb XwTjpop ... to 
 fjiev . . . ^la^oftevov . . . to Be . . . rraXiv ^ 7re<f>VKev 
 dr/a'7rr)TW diroBiSov, 
 Hearing. — I3id. 80 B ■fjBovijv fiev tok d(f>pocnv, ev<f)po- 
 ffvvrjv Be Toi<; en^poai Bid rrfv t^9 9eia^ dpfio- 
 vlai; fiifiija-iv ev 0vijTal<s ryevofievr/v (})opaK 
 rrapea-xpv. 
 In the last extract '^Sovrj is the emotion normally 
 accompanying that which conforms to nature ; ei(f)po- 
 avvT) is the higher feeling due to consciousness of that 
 conformity. 
 
 (B) Secondly, we have to consider the character 
 and conditions of tr&na. Here a distinction must be 
 made between matter and shape. The material out 
 of which our limbs are apparently constructed is but 
 a portion of the whole vrroBoyr] yepiaeta'}, borrowed 
 therefrom (Phileb. 29 c) and to be returned thereto 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 131 
 
 {Tim. 43 A). By a law of orderly development, akin 
 to that which fixes the quadruple classification of the 
 natural kinds, this vttoBox^ is figured throughout with 
 the forms of the four elements — forms which repre- 
 sent not indeed any avra kuO' avrd, self-existent 
 Ideas, but still certain avra i(l> Ioutwj;,^" logically 
 distinct types. In this substrate the transient shapes 
 of particulars, the elaiopja Koi i^iovra of Tim. 50 C, 
 are momentarily expressed. They are declared to 
 be T&v ovreov ael fiifiij/iara ; for bodily shape is — as 
 already stated — the individual soul as viewed by our 
 imperfect faculties, and the individual soul is but the 
 Idea as it passes into the triple phase of genetic 
 thought. This holds good, whether percipient and 
 percept belong to different species or to the same, or 
 again coincide in a single personality. So far as 
 method is concerned it matters not whether Sokrates 
 beholds a star, or a friend, or himself In any case a 
 voryrov ^wov is cognised by a votjtov ^S>ov on the plane 
 of sensation, and the result must be a localisation of 
 the former by the latter in the inroSoxv- 
 
 Now it is clear enough that the material content 
 of this localisation is a fractional part of the whole 
 cosmic ffvaraa-K. What is not at once clear is the 
 determination of specific contour and its connection 
 with the shape of the universe. Why, for example, 
 
 '" Tim. 51 B. 
 
132 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 is Sokrates' body unlike that of a star, and by no 
 means hard to distinguish from that of his friend ? 
 And how are all three related to the mundane sphere ? 
 
 The answer to these questions, though implicit 
 rather than explicit in Plato's writings, seems in- 
 evitable. If a particular shape is a particular soul 
 as it appears to particular cognition, it follows that 
 difference of embodiment presupposes difference of 
 soul. In fact we formulate the law : As is the imita- 
 tion of the active ■v/ry^Tj, so will be the imitation of the 
 passive a&fia. Individual souls were grouped under 
 certain definite types, vis. the votjto, ^wa, according to 
 their degree of approximation to the cosmic soul. 
 Therefore individual bodies will be similarly grouped 
 under certain fixed forms, vis. the natural kinds, 
 according to their degree of approximation to the 
 cosmic body. A being endowed with superhuman — 
 say, stellar — thought will be apprehended not as a man 
 but as a star. Again, within the limits of each several 
 species differences of personal shape will be referred 
 to differences of personal attainment, allowance being 
 made for certain retarding tendencies soon to be 
 noticed. 
 
 That in Plato's view physical was thus dependent 
 upon psychical development may be gathered from 
 Aristotle's criticism in Psych. A. 3. 22-23, 4°/^ iS-24: 
 
 awcmtovai 7A/3 km TiBeacriv ehs amfia ttjv '^uj^jJi'j 
 ovdep trpoa^iopiaavTei; Sici riv' alriav ical ttw? 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 133 
 
 ej(pvTov Tov <T&)/iaTO?. Kairoi So^eiev av rovr 
 dvajKalov etvai- Sta yap Tr)v Koivcaviav to /J,ev 
 TToiel TO Se Tracrj^et koI to fiev KiveiTai to 8e 
 Kivei, TOVTOiv S' ovdev virdpj(€t vpoi SWrfKa TOt? 
 Tv^pva-iv. 01 Se jMovov fVtj^etpovo't Xiyeiv 
 irolov Tt fj '^I'X'?) ""C/jt he tov Be^ofievov ffoofiaTO'i 
 oiiOev eri •jrpoaSiopl^ovffiv, wcrirep evSe^ofievov 
 Kara tovi Tlv6ar/opiKov<i /mv0ov<! Tr]v Tvypvaav 
 yjrvxriv eli to Tvxpv ivSveadat a&/ia • BoKei yhp 
 eKaoTov iBtov e-)(eiv elSo<i koX fiop<f)'^v. 
 The objection here brought against the Tzmaeus, 
 which admits the Koivoavia of an active soul with a 
 passive body, is that adherents of this theory are 
 satisfied when they have determined the nature of 
 the former and do not trouble themselves about the 
 fitness of the latter. The objection is a typical one. 
 It amounts to a complaint that the theory is incon- 
 sistent, not with Plato's presuppositions, but with 
 Aristotle's rejection of them : as is said elsewhere of 
 those who posit Ideal Numbers, — 
 
 Trpos fiev TTjv vtroOeatv, 6p0m<! Xiyovaiv, oXws 8' ovk 
 opdoK • TToWA yap dvaipovaiv {Met. M. 7- 
 1082 b 32). 
 From the Platonic standpoint to determine the 
 TTotoTijs of a given soul was also to determine the 
 •TToioTrj^ of its body, inasmuch as that body is the 
 visualisation of that soul. This account of the rela- 
 tion subsisting between the two is confirmed by 
 
'r34 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 Tim. 91 D — 92 B, a passage which implies throughout 
 that the nature of the body depends upon the nature 
 of the soul. It agrees, too, with the priority always 
 assigned by Plato to ■^vyji as analytically contrasted 
 with a&fia, e.g. 
 
 Tim. 34 B, C Tr)v Se 8^ '^v)(r]v ovx «»? vvv varipav 
 
 eiri'xeipovfjbev Xeyeiv, outw? efiTj^^avqaaro koi 6 
 
 deo<i vecorepav • ov yap av dp'xeadai irpecr^vTepov 
 
 VTTO vecorepav ^vvep^a^ eia<rep. 
 
 Laws 896 B opQm apa koI Kvp'm<i aKi]deaTaTa re 
 
 Kah TeXewTara eip^iKoTet civ el/iev '^vmv fiev 
 
 "Trporepav yeyovevai aco/iaTO'; fifuv, a&fia Se Bev- 
 
 •'pepov re koX varepov '^vy(7]<; dpj(ova7i'i dp'j^p/jtevop 
 
 ■Kaja (j)vc7iv. 
 
 Moreover, it justifies certain materialistic descriptions 
 
 of soul 'which occur for the most part in the Timaeus 
 
 and are sometimes almost obtrusively unspiritual. 
 
 In 87 A, for example, it is said of bodily humours 
 
 that, when Ty)v cuj> atn&v arfiiBa ry t^s •^i;;^^? <f)opa, 
 
 ^v/i/il^avTe'i dvcucepaadma-i, iravToZaira voaij/iara '^WY^S 
 
 4/j.-jroiovat. And in 43 D sensations are described as 
 
 o-<^oSpw? aeiovcrai, ras t^s ■^vxfj'i irepioSov}. So too the 
 
 bonds that bind soul to body are mentioned in a 
 
 strangely tangible and visible connection : 
 
 Toi/Tot? ^vfiifaaw dpxv /lev fi tov fii}e\ov yivea-ni- oi 
 yap TOV ^iov Betr/jiol rrjv ijrxjj^rji} t«3 amfiari 
 ^v8ov/ievij<! iv TOUTp SiaSov/ievoi Kareppi^ow to 
 i&vijTov yevo<: (73 B). 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 135 
 
 These and similar examples of verbal license 
 Aristotle is never weary of attacking ; his motive — if 
 we may trust his followers — being the elimination of 
 all metaphor and inexactitude from the domain of 
 rigid science : 
 
 Simplic. in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 28, 11 
 ^ ApiaroreKTj'i . . . ael elo)dai<; . . . ovk . . . dvaipeiv 
 avrrjv rrjv dX'qOeiav, dX\h fj,6vov t^v twv ovofidriov 
 Kard'xprjaiv. 
 
 Still, when in Psych. A. 3. 1 1, 406 b 25 — 23, 407 b 26 
 he refutes at length the manner in which 6 TiiJ,aio<} 
 ^va-io\oyei ttjv i}fV)(T)v Kivelv to aaxfia, it is hard to 
 acquit him of ignoring the real justification for such 
 language, namely Plato's belief that matter is only 
 another aspect of mind — a belief which warranted the 
 extension of physical terminology to psychical pheno- 
 mena, and even palliated the chiasmus of the cosmic 
 soul. 
 
 There is, however, one difficulty besetting this 
 view of the relation between mind and matter which 
 has not yet been examined. If the body is the soul 
 as apprehended by particular cognition, how can there 
 be any such disproportion between soul and body as 
 is contemplated in Tim. 87 D ? — 
 
 "s^D^rjv Urx^P^v **' irdvrri fie^dXrjv daQevkcnepov koX 
 eXMTTov elBov oiav oj^^, ical orav aS roivainiov 
 ^fifiray^ov rovro), ov koKov o\ov to ^&ov. 
 
136 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 At first sight this passage certainly appears to gainsay 
 the rule enunciated above : "As is the imitation of the 
 active ■^XV' so will be the imitation of the passive 
 a-St/ia." But a little reflection will show that the 
 two statements are quite compatible. If a and /r 
 denote the active and passive aspects of the individual 
 Sokrates on the plane of eVto-Tjf/iJ/, a' and /' the same 
 aspects on the plane of So^a, a" and /" on the plane of 
 ai£a-07}(n<i, then the law concerning the parallel develop- 
 ment of -^vxv and aw/ia may be represented by a 
 series of equations : — 
 
 S. 
 a =p 
 
 «*=/' 
 
 Suppose now that Sokrates, though intellectually 
 superior to the average man, suffers from some 
 physical defect, say to e^oo r&v ofifidrav. By the law 
 of correspondence this peculiar conformation of the 
 eyes must accurately express a limitation of the power 
 of sight. But such limitation may well coexist with, 
 or even be brought on by, unusual mental develop- 
 ment. Indeed it is just this sacrifice of one set of 
 faculties to another that Plato here deprecates. Let 
 us, he says, have no ill-conditioned disparity between 
 higher and lower functions. If a be fully developed 
 and a* starved, or if a be starved and a" fully developed, 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. i37 
 
 in either case there is a lack of symmetry about to 
 ^vvafujiorepov, ^aov o KoKovfiev. 
 
 Tim. 88 b fiia hrj aonTqpia vpo<i dfiifxo, firjre t^j* 
 ■^vj(r]V avev <Tmiiaro<i Kiveiv /tj;T6 awfjui dvev 
 ■^vxv^, wa ayMvofikva r^irpniadov hroppoirto KaX 
 vyirj. 
 As a practical precept, both fieKerii Siavoia, the 
 exercise of active thought, and acop-atncia, the cultiva- 
 tion of a healthy frame, are alike enjoined upon one 
 who would imitate the example set by the Universe — 
 the result being a mode of life more harmonious than 
 the high-souled but somewhat ascetic aspirations of 
 the Phaedo: 
 
 Phaed. 6y D to /leXerTjfia air 6 tovto iem rmv 
 i}>i\o^jr6<})03V, XvaK koX ytapiap.o'i '^vxV'i o.iro 
 aa>fiaTO<s. 
 
 Soul and body are indeed distinct, but the distinction 
 is no longer to be an antagonism. Rather it is the 
 contrast between inseparable complements. Active 
 and passive functions are to the particular what voelv 
 and voeia-0ai are to the Idea. 
 
 Granting, then, that physical condition is deter- 
 mined by psychical development, we return to consider 
 the effect produced upon the one by the graduated 
 attainment of the other. 
 
 The nearest approach to the vSrjaK of the supreme 
 0e6<i is, we hold, to be found in the sublime intelligence 
 
138 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 of the deal 6ewv'^^^- Consequently the best imitation 
 of that circularity which symbolises^^* pure thought 
 will be the spherical shapes and revolving orbits of 
 the ovpdviot deol : 
 
 Tim. 40 A Tft) Se iravrX vpocreiKd^wv &jkvkKov 
 eiroiet . . . Kiinj(rei<; Be Svo irpoo'rjyjrev eKaara), rrjv 
 /lev iv raiiTm Kara Tavra Trepl twv avrdov del rtt, 
 aina eavrm Siavoov/JLevp, Tt}v Se eh to irpoadev. 
 Aristophanes' myth turns to similar account the 
 oi\o^vel<i Twroi of the Empedoklean cosmogony. He 
 makes the children of the sun, the earth, and the 
 moon, still bear the impress of their divine origin : 
 Symp. 189E, 190 B oKov ^v eKda-vov toO dvQpamao 
 TO etSo? aTporffwKov, vSarov km ifKevpas KVK\<p 
 eyov . . . irepi^eprj he ^v Koi airrk Kal 17 iropeia 
 avT&v hioL TO Tots yovevcriv o/MOia elvai. 
 As regards the present human frame, the 8eol 6e&v 
 have confined the revolutions of immortal soul in a 
 terrestrial body, whereof the cranium is a copy of the 
 cosmos : 
 
 Tim. 44 D Ta; fiev Si) de'uK irepioSov^ Svo oi/ira; to 
 ToO TTai'To? ayrjixa dirofuiJ,r)a-dfi6voi 7repi<j>6pe9 ov 
 eh <r<j)aipoeiSe<i atofia eveSrfaav, tovto o vvv 
 Ke^aXrjv eTTovofid^ofiev, o deioTurov r earl Kal 
 T&v iv fjfllv TfdvTWV Se<TTroTovv. 
 
 '" They are repeatedly said to follow the example of the supreme 
 ttis,e.g.- Tim. 41 c, 42 E, 69 c. 
 
 "' Tint. 34 A, Laws 898 A. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 139 
 
 Tim. 73 C •tr)v ... TO Qelov (rirepfia otov dpovpav fiek- 
 
 Xovarav e^eiv ev avry irepi^epTJ •travTa'^y rrXdaa's. 
 
 The rest of the body is a mere inrrjpeaia aina {Tim. 
 
 44D) ; yet, inasmuch as it contains to Xoittov koI Ovryrhv 
 
 TTfi yfrv^rj^, it was fashioned of the next best shape : 
 
 afna (7Tpoyyv\a koI TrpoixrjKrj^^^ SiypetTo a)(r)p,aTa (73 D). 
 This difference in dignity is marked by two curious 
 expressions. The head is held in position by sinews 
 which the Creator Trepto-TJ/o-aif kvkX^ irepX rov rpdj^ijXov 
 eKoWTjffev ofioioTriTi, {Tim. 75 D) : whereas in making 
 the vertebral column he acted t^ Sarepov irpoa-xpto- 
 ftevof . . . Svvd/i6i {ibid. 74 A). Apart from one 
 another these expressions are barely intelligible. 
 Viewed together, they recall Tim. 57 E ardcriv fiev ev 
 ofiaXoTTfTi, Kivrjaiv Se eit dvcofiaXuTTjTa del Ti6S>fiev • 
 alria Be dviaorrji; o5 t^? dvmiJidXov ^wcreft)?, where — as I 
 showed from Aristotle — awo-oTijs is equivalent to 17 
 Bwrepov Svva/j.i<i. In short, Plato means that the 
 backbone is flexible, while the head is not. 
 
 So strong is his faith in the microcosmic structure 
 of the human body that in Tim. 81 A he does not 
 scruple to apply the word ovpavo<; to it : 
 
 TO, Be evatfia . . . irepietXrjfifieva &<nrep irrr ovpavov 
 ^vve(rT&TO<s ixdaTov tov ^coov, ttjv tov iravTO^ 
 dvayKd^erai /jbi/Mela-ffai <f)opdv, 
 
 11^ For irpd/iiiKfs as a deterioration of aipaipotiS^s cp, Tim. 91 E 
 irpofi'fiKeis re Kal iravroias eirxov tSis Kopvtpis, Sirp trvveOKltpBTiffav {tnh 
 hpylas ixdarav at irepitjioptti. 
 
140 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 The significance of this phrase will become clearer 
 if we consider that, not only does the vibration of 
 .the inroSoxv correspond to the due motions of the 
 body,— 
 
 Tim. 88 C Kol to, fiepr] depairevreov, to tow TravTo? 
 awofii/MOVfievou elBo<s. 
 
 Ibid. 88 D lav 8e y]v re rpo^hv KaX Tidvvrjv rov iravrot 
 irpofrenrofiev /u/ji^Tai tk, koI to amjMa fidXiaTa 
 /lev fir/Si'iroTe f](TV)(lav ar/eiv ia, Kivy he Ka\ aeia- 
 /jiov<! del Tiva<; ifiiroi&v avTm . . . KaTaKoa/ifj, . . . 
 Kara tov irpoadev Xoyov, ov vepl tov TravTof 
 eXeyofiep, . . . xr/ieiav •jrape^ei — 
 
 but even the concentric spheres of air and fire, which 
 form the mantle of the universe, find their counterpart 
 in the fiery and airy envelopes of the human frame. 
 This, I believe, is the purport of the Platonic theory 
 of respiration, the main points of which may here be 
 summarised. 
 
 The passage in which that theory is set forth {Tim. 
 78 A — 79 E, cp. Tim. Locr. loi D) has a reputation for 
 diflSculty, which it would not, I think, have gained 
 had two facts been borne in mind. To begin with, 
 the whole apparatus of breathing is independent of 
 the animal organism ^^^ ; the §Soj/ was already irKaaOev 
 
 '-* This is not so puerile a notion as it seems at first sight to be. 
 " We can as yet hardly say what are even the local boundaries that 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 141 
 
 when the contrivance was added to it (Tim. 78 c). 
 And secondly, the preliminary remarks in 78 A show 
 that irdina oaa ef iKaTTovwv ^uviTTarai ffreyei ra 
 (jLei^w, TO, S' e'« fiei^ovav to, afiiKporepa ov hivarai : hence 
 the structure of the human body is pervious to both 
 air and fire, but fire which is irdvrtov yevSip a-iiiKpotj,ep- 
 earaTov excludes air. 
 
 According to Plato, the Creator constructed a 
 network or bag {irXeyfia . . . olov 01 Kvproi ^^®), which 
 was apparently formed of two layers — the outer one 
 (to Kvpro^) of air, the inner one of fire. This irXey/jia or 
 KvpTo<s was subdivided into a couple of smaller bags 
 [iyKvpTia] also made of air. The whole, by alternate 
 impletion and depletion, swings to and fro through the 
 
 divide the organism from its environment. When does the air in our 
 lungs begin to belong to us, and when does it cease to be a constituent 
 of the body ? " (Lotze Mkrocosmus i. 136). 
 
 "* By a icipTos is meant a basket of wicker work with a wide mouth 
 but a comparatively narrow neck, used for catching iish : see the illus- 
 trations in Rich Diet. Ant. s.v. ' nassa,' Daremberg & Saglio ZHct. Ant. 
 s.v. 'colum.' Prof. Cook Wilson in his polemic on the Timaeus 
 p. 78 seq. adopts M. Th. H. Martin's view that the mouth of the trap 
 must have the ends of the reeds pointing inwards. But he himself' 
 admits that "there is nothing about such a hindrance in Plato," and it 
 seems more probable that xipros here denotes that form of fish-trap 
 which was closed by a lid j for we should thus obtain a parallel between 
 the lid and the closing of mouth and nostrils. Oppian Hal. iii. 341—370 
 gives a full account of this xipros with a lid : when the trap is full, the 
 fisherman claps to the lid and lifts the whole out of the water — fivlxa 
 yhf) TtoKXoi re Kol fi\nr4fs Te\48u<n, | Si) rdr" ii/^p xipTOio irepl imi/ia 
 Ttaita KoX^irrci | ei &pap6s • rohs S" ^vSov ii> epKe'i ireTrTjjWTaj | i(rTiTioy 
 Kviiaaovras ivtlpvirtv. 
 
142 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 body eh ttiv sk t'^? Koi\La<; eirl ra? <jj\e^a<; vSpeiav. The 
 process may readily be followed by the help of the 
 appended illustration. It comprises two movements, 
 (a) eiarvoi] and {b) avaworj. {a) Expiration. We 
 start with our iyKvpna full of air (fig. i). This air, 
 heated by the fiery envelope, escapes upwards by the 
 nearest way eh tt/v avrov ^tapav efw Trpo? to ^vyyevev. 
 The nearest way is Kara to (tto/iu koI ra? piva^. As 
 it issues thence, it would leave a vacuum behind it, 
 did not the principle of irepiaxTK come into operation. 
 By this principle the whole KvpTO<; is compressed, so 
 that the air at A, which was just outside the body, 
 enters hib, fiav&v tSsv trapK&v and occupies the position 
 B described as to t&v arrjOmv koI rov irXevfiovo';. (b) 
 Inspiration. The air at B (fig. ii) is now in its turn 
 heated by the fiery envelope, and rushing out the 
 nearest way — hih /juav&p t&v a-apK&v — sets up irepitoirK 
 again. The Treptwo-t? forces fresh air kuto, to (rrofia 
 /cat Ta? pivat into the iyxvpTia, and we reach our 
 original position once more. 
 
 This arrangement of air and fire in concentric 
 layers recalls the elemental \?jfet? of Tim. 53 A, 63 B 
 seqg., and the oscillation of the whole is described in 
 terms which tally with the auapa of Phaed. 1 1 1 E : — 
 
 Tim. 78 E BiaKopovftevov . . . Sia ttjs Koi\ia<i. 
 
 Ibid. 80 D rov irvpo^, alwpovjjuevtp . . . cVto? t«5 
 TTvevfiaTi ^vveTTOfiivov, tcI<! <f)\e^a<s re eK t^? 
 KoiKiai} Ty ^vvaicop-^aei TrXripovPTO';, 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 143 
 
 Indeed, Plato himself draws out the comparison : 
 
 Phaed. 1 1 2 B kbIX uairep t&v avatrveovTtov aeX eKirvel 
 re Koi avaTTvet piov to irvevfia, ovtco koX iiceX 
 ^vvauopovfievov too vypm to wvevfia Beivovii rivoM 
 avifiov; Kat afiijj(avov^ irapexerai Kal elaiov Kal 
 
 So far the human form. The shapes of the lower 
 animals are similarly proportioned to their degree of 
 intellectual activity. Flighty conceits beget wings. 
 Indulgence of emotion and appetite distorts the 
 spherical cranium and increases the number of earthly 
 props. Lower passions trail the body in the dust, 
 or — SiKTjv afiadia<i ia'xaT7]<i i<rj(aTa'i olKrjaei<; eiX7}')(p- 
 Tajv— plunge it into the impurities of subaqueous 
 life. 
 
 Moreover, just as the differing grades of soul's 
 intelligence were accompanied by differing grades of 
 eiiSaifiovia, so the approximation to cosmic sphericity 
 entails an approximation to perfect beauty. The 
 evKvKKov ff&fjui of a star is Xafivporarov IBeiv re «a\- 
 \i(TTOv . , . Koafj-oi; aXrjOivo'i {Tim. 40 A). Other 
 particulars reach a positive or comparative degree, 
 according to the rank of their corresponding Idea 
 and their own conformity to it. In fact, all natural 
 products are more or less beautiful since they are 
 more or less accurate copies of Ideal types : 
 
 Tim. 28 A orov ftev o?)v av 6 Sr)/iiovpyb<; Trpos 
 TO KUT^ ravra e)(pp ^Xevcav aei, toiovt^ Ttj/t 
 
144 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 •jrpoo'ypdiiJLevo's irapaSetyfiari, ttjv ISiav xal Svva- 
 fiiv avTov airepyd^TjTai, koXov ef avar/Kri^ ovTWi 
 avoreKeladai irav. 
 Tim. 30 A Xoyiad/ievov oiv evpUTKev ex t&v Kara 
 ^vcTiv opar&v ovSev dvoryrov tov vovv e'XpvTOi 
 oXov oXov KaWiov eaeadai irore epyov. 
 In a word, Plato looks upon beauty as the visible 
 manifestation of that goodness which is the essential 
 attribute of mental activity : 
 
 Tim. 87 C irav Br/ to dr/a06v koKov. 
 Herein he outstrips contemporary art, which, while 
 carrying to completion the principle of unity in variety, 
 omitted that other necessary feature of beauty, viz. 
 expressiveness. We may surely regard Plato's fusion 
 of the two, a fusion ultimately derived from his identi- 
 fication of TO iv with rdyadov, as a distinct anticipation 
 of the modern aesthetic judgment. 
 
 Our examination of the human TeKo'; in its twofold 
 application — to soul and to body — has brought before 
 us in clear relief the conception of the individual as a 
 microcosm, of the universe as a macrocosm. In using 
 these terms I do not necessarily imply that the former 
 resembles the latter in the important respect of being 
 an animal comprising other animals, but merely that 
 the individual is a miniature — a better or worse copy 
 of Mind as it passes into cosmic existence. At the 
 same time I may point out that, just as the opening 
 sections of the Timaeus reassert the valid parts of the 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 145 
 
 Republic, so the triple division of the soul in Tim. 69 C 
 seq. recalls the threefold simile of Rep. 588 B seq. and 
 suggests the image of a man containing diverse animal 
 natures^^' within himself: — 
 
 The Timaeus. The Republic. 
 
 TO Quov =lBia dvOpdirov ($881)). 
 
 ^ dfieivov = IBea XiovTOi; (588D, cp. 
 590 B avrl XiovTOi 
 iriOijKov yiyvea6ai) 
 X^tpov = IBea 0i]piov iroiKiKov koX 
 •iro\vKe<pdKov (588 c). 
 
 6vryrov etSos '^vj(j'i'i 
 
 This may help to explain the " curious quasi-personi- 
 fication of sexual impulse" in Tim. 91 A seq. For if 
 the various mental states of the individual stand to 
 him in somewhat the same relation as the Ideal Jwa 
 to the cosmic fwoi;, it is legitimate to use the phrase 
 fwov efiyfrvxop of such a deiinite state as that indicated 
 by the passage in question. The expression ^wov 
 eTTidv/jLTITiKov ivov T^? TTaiZoTToUa'i {Tim. 91 C) is to my 
 mind a distinct reminiscence of the iroXvKe^Mkov 
 6pe/ifia which in the Republic symbolises to enidv- 
 fiTjTiKov: cp. e.^. the drift of Rep. 5 90 A — 
 
 "'' Cp. also the (v^u^iiTos Sivaius fntmrripov (eiyous re koI tivUxov 
 of Phcudrus 246 A, 
 
 10 
 
146 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 OvKovv KoX TO aieoKao'Talveiv oXei Sia TOiavTU TraXai 
 •ylrejeaOat, on avierai iv ra TOiovrcp to Beivov 
 TO fieya sKelvo Koi, iro\veiSe<s dpenfia irepa tov 
 8eovTO<i / 
 
 with Tim. 91 B — 
 
 aveiOe^ Te Kal avTOKpaTei yeyov6<s, olov ^&ov dwirt^- 
 Koov TOV Xoyov, TrdvTwv St' e'7ri6vfiia<; oiVrpcoSet? 
 i'iri')(ei,pel kpaTelv. 
 
 It remains to investigate one further result trace- 
 able to the law of correspondence between •^^vxh and 
 a-wfia — namely, the belief in Metempsychosis. I do 
 not hold with Mr. Archer-Hind"^ that such a behef 
 "has no essential connexion with the Platonic onto- 
 logy." For if the localised activity of a given votjtov 
 ^a>ov attains that degree of excellence which is the 
 external manifestation of the next higher ^ebov, or 
 sinks to that degree which marks the next lower ^mov, 
 the particular shape under which the said activity 
 was seen must of necessity undergo a corresponding 
 change. To take an example. The Ideal being Man 
 on the plane of sensation perceives himself as a diverse 
 multiplicity of men. One member of this multiplicity 
 — say, Orpheus — is apprehended as possessing poetic 
 genius. When his particular form perishes, a com- 
 pensating form is bound to appear somewhere within 
 
 "8 Ed. Tim. p. 344 k. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 147 
 
 the limits of the cosmic ^wov. And since transmigra- 
 tion is ever towards to ofji,oiov — 
 
 Laws 904 E KaKio) fj,ev ryiyvofievov Trpo? ra? KaKiovi 
 •^v^d's, dfjieivas Se Tr/ao? ras afieivovi iropevo- 
 fievov ^^^ — 
 the new form will appear in the presentations of that 
 Idea which is the paradeigm of the acquired qualities, — 
 say, the Idea of Swan. What has happened is this. 
 The Idea of Man has not become the Idea of Swan ; 
 for every Idea is an eternal being ovre et? iavrb elaSex- 
 Ofievov aXXo dWodev ovre aino et? aXKo iroi lov {Tim. 
 52 a). But one e^iov of Man has vanished and one 
 eltribv of Swan appeared in virtue of the fact that the 
 Ideal series is the unitary Mind existent as a plurality. 
 
 But, it will be asked, if the body is such an 
 infallible index of the soul, why do not acquired 
 characteristics gradually display themselves in form 
 and features .' How comes it that Horace's fancy is 
 not a commonplace fact } — 
 
 " lam iam residunt cruribus asperae 
 pelles, et album mutor in alitem 
 superne, nascunturque leves 
 per digitos humerosque plumae." 
 
 "' Stobaeus Ed. I. xlix. 60 (Porphurios) ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 445, 
 23 observes that, according to Plato, the soul iv rah Xeyo/isvais <p0opa!s^ 
 Kol TEXeuTois iieTa$o\i)i' ttrx^i Kcii /i.eTaK6(riJ.ri<nv els eVepo (Tafidrav elSri, 
 Kad^ TjSov^v Zt^Kovtra rh irpifftpopov Kol oiKeiov 6fiot6T7]Ti Kal trvi/ridel^ 
 0iov StaiTTis. 
 
148 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 It is not a satisfactory answer to this question to reply 
 that the natural kinds are permanent types between 
 which no hybrid means may be inserted, and that the 
 species of the individual is determined by the prepon- 
 derance of his characteristics. For, once allow that 
 the soul as passively apprehended on the level of 
 sense-perception is the body, and it follows that all 
 traits whether they preponderate or not must, so far 
 as they are apprehended, take shape as corporeal 
 deviations. The truer reason is, I take it, that during 
 a man's life-time certain restrictions are laid upon 
 him by the society and influence of his fellowmen, 
 which prevent him from rising or sinking to any very 
 marked extent.^^" But in to i^ai(j)V'ijv, the moment 
 of transition which we call death, the individual 
 soul is not distinguished from the idea^^^ : fiovXria-K 
 therefore comes into play ; and, the limitations of 
 humanity being removed, that particular fraction of 
 the entire Mind leaps into sudden realisation of 
 faculties towards which it had previously felt but 
 an incipient tendency. 
 
 '^o In Tim. 76 E he has the rudiments of a bird's talons, not the 
 feathers and beak. 
 
 "' Cp. Stob. £cl. I. xlix. 6 (Hermes) ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 324, 5 
 ifiuX^ Tofi'i;!' itrrlv ilStos voTiriKJ) obirta . . . iiritWayEiira Si toS ^vo-ikov 
 d/iaTos, avrii naff airiiii /tEvei, oSt^ eavTrjs oitra iy t$ votit^ K6<Tii.tf . . , 
 Kal v Kwr" oiffiair {xivriiris) IittIii aire^oiirios. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 149 
 
 Other questions relative to this transition suggest 
 themselves. It is brought about, according to the 
 Timaeus, by a failure of bodily conditions, a relaxation 
 of the bonds by which we are bound to a certain 
 portion of the xmohoyjl). Accident or disease or mere 
 old age may so disorder or dislocate the complex of 
 elemental triangles, which make up the material of a 
 man's members, that it becomes no longer a fit tene- 
 ment for him. It has sometimes been held that, in 
 Plato's theory, the molecular angles are dulled and 
 blunted by the wear and tear of life till they can no 
 longer retain the soul. This, I think, is an inexact 
 statement of the case. For (i) if triangulation is the 
 expression of a law, we should not expect the triangles 
 ever to be " warped " or malformed. When pressure 
 is applied, no distortion or " shearing " takes place ; 
 they simply crystallise into double the number of 
 sides. The octahedron does not become two four- 
 sided pyramids, as it would if a model were cut with 
 a knife, but two three-sxA^d. pyramids or tetrahedra 
 (Tim. 560). Again, (2) Plato himself explains KMvh, 
 rplr/wva to mean la-')(ypav ttjv ^vyxXeiaiv avrSsv 
 trpot aXKrqXa Kevrrffieva (Tim. 81 B), that is, triangles 
 whose hamation is as yet unimpaired. Hence in 81 c 
 the TToKaiorepa icai aadevicrrepa must be those which 
 are no longer so securely interlocked ; and in 73 B 
 darpa^rj will denote the opposite of (rrpa^o^, "dis- 
 located." Agreeably to this in 81 C we have the 
 
15° THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS 
 
 phrase jjpi'fa t&v Tptydveov 'x^aXa, a double metaphor 
 intended to recall the wording of 73 B : 
 
 TOVToi'} ^VfiTraatv apyr) fiev f) tov /jtveXov 'yeveaK ' 01 
 yap TOV ^iov Becrfiol ttj? '<}''V)(r]<; tw aafiari ^vp- 
 hovfievr)<i iv tovt^ BiaBov/j,6Voi Kareppi^ovv^^ 
 TO Ovryrov 761/0?. 
 Thus 8 1 C declares that, when the triangles of the 
 spinal chord are loosed, ^dtvet irav ^&ov : and 8 1 D 
 adds that, when the same triangles give way alto- 
 gether, then death follows. 
 
 But if death ushers in the sudden transpeciation 
 that I have described, what enables the dead body to 
 retain the lineaments of humanity .-' How is the aw/xa 
 Tapi-xevdev {Phaedo 80 C) explicable on the Idealist 
 hypothesis } Again I would refer to the distinction 
 already drawn between the matter and the shape of 
 our bodies. At the moment of death the soul's 
 activity ceases to impress with its appropriate shape 
 that portion of the vtroBoyi) to which it has hitherto 
 been confined, and begins to imprint another portion 
 of the same susceptible medium with new-born out- 
 lines. Nevertheless the previous portion is left with 
 a certain definite arrangement of triangles, which 
 naturally subsists till it is dissipated by other forces : 
 this arrangement of inanimate matter — the corpse — is 
 neither soul nor body (though it may popularly be 
 
 '^'' Cp. ibid, 73 c (TTTtp/iB . . . &poupav, 84 B tSc ^tCuy, 86 C SivSpov. 
 
OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 15 1 
 
 termed the latter), but a mere congeries of elemental 
 triangles ^^, part and parcel of the cosmic viroBoy^r) to 
 whose store-house it has been returned. Sokrates 
 may say with more truth than ever : 
 
 Phaedo 1 1 5 D ovKeri ifuv TrapafjbevS), aX)C ol'x^o'Ofjun 
 aTTimv el<; fiaKaputv S77 Tiva? eiiSatfiovlai;. 
 For the soul escapes ; and the bodily form — though 
 not the matter which it once impressed — attends its 
 flight.i2* 
 
 Reappearance involves change of place : 
 
 Laws 904 C fieTa^dXKovTa he (piperai Kara ttjv t^9 
 
 elfiapfievr)<! tol^iv km, vofwv. a-fiiKporepa fiev t&v 
 
 7]65)v fiera^dWovTa iXd-TTto Kara to t)js 'xcopa^ 
 
 eiriTreSov fierairopeverai, TrXeiat Be koX dBiKmrepa 
 
 jj.eTaireaovTa eli ^ddoi rd re Kdroo Ti^yofieva tSsv 
 
 Tcmwv. 
 
 In other words, the supreme Mind transforms and 
 
 transports individual souls according to their deserts — 
 
 Laws 903 D eVet Be del '^vxv owTerwyfievrj adjp,aTi 
 
 rare fiev aWa, rare Be dWrn, fiera^dXkei, -jravT- 
 
 olai fieTa^dXdi Be eavrrjv ft hC erepav ■^v^vv, 
 
 ''' The same explanation must be given of all artificial objects — 
 the "house " and " ring "—which are not j/ionf/iara of Ideas but colloc- 
 ations of inert material. 
 
 '" Alexis Olympiod. frag. com. ed. Meineke iii. 455 ira^o )>.\v 
 ifwv t4 Bv/iThv aiou lyivero, \ rh S' iBivarov i^i\pe wphs rhv aepa. | toi/t' 
 
IS2 METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF PLATO'S ETHICS. 
 
 ouSef aWo ep^ov rm irerTevry XetTrerat irKqv 
 lieraTiOevai to /lev aiieivov yvyvofievov ^0o<s eh 
 jSeXr/ft) TOTTOV, yelpov he eh top 'xeipova, Kara to 
 irpeirov axnav exaa-TOV — 
 so that particular life is justly said to depend on the 
 supreme ^mov : 
 
 Tim. 89 B Kar* avro to fwov el/iapfievov sKaa-Tov 
 e)(pv TOP, l3loi/ ^veraif ^wpt? tS>v ef dvwyier)'; 
 •rradriixdrcov. 
 Thus in the last resort we come back to the 6eo<; de&v, 
 and have warrant for describing Plato's ethical theory 
 as the moral synthesis of a metaphysical analysis, the 
 return of Unity towards itself, — a process that is 
 discrete rather than continuous, inasmuch as the aireipa 
 journey towards the ^v through the several stages of 
 the TToWa. 
 
INDEX LOCORUM 
 
 Alex, de anim. ed. Bruns p. 
 
 
 Arist. Met. A. 6. 9880 14 
 
 74 
 
 85,20 
 
 7» 
 
 — 
 
 — 9-990*7 
 
 78 
 
 in Anst. Met. ed. Hay- 
 
 
 — 
 
 — 9- 990* 13 
 
 7| 
 
 duck p. 92, 19, 22 
 
 7« 
 
 — 
 
 — 9. 991 a 2 
 
 o^* 
 
 — p. 670, 27 
 
 3» 
 
 — 
 
 — 9. 991 b 26 
 
 iS« 
 
 — p. 700, 27 
 
 4S 
 
 — 
 
 B. 4. looi b 23 
 
 72 
 
 — p. 709, 28ff 
 
 no 
 
 — 
 
 E. I. 1026a 18 
 
 no 
 
 — P- 709. 33 
 
 no 
 
 — 
 
 Z. 14. 1039* 9—16 
 
 34 
 
 — P- 721. 31 
 
 no 
 
 — 
 
 — 15. 1040025 
 
 91 
 
 — p. 731. 16 
 
 39 » 
 
 — 
 
 — 16. 1040* 12 
 
 73 
 
 Alexis Olympiad, frag. com. 
 
 
 — 
 
 — 16. 1040* 29 
 
 78 
 
 ed. Meineke iii. 455 
 
 151 n 
 
 — 
 
 A'. 9. 1066 fl 10 
 
 73 
 
 Archilochus 3. 4 
 
 105 « 
 
 — 
 
 yl- 3. 1070a 26 
 
 23 « 
 
 Archytas in frag. phU. Gr. 
 
 
 — 
 
 — 7. 1072* 18—30 
 
 109 
 
 ed. Mullach i. 565 
 
 23 « 
 
 — 
 
 — 7. 1072 b 20 
 
 14 
 
 Arist. de an. gen. B. 3. 736 
 
 
 — 
 
 — 7. 1073 a n 
 
 19 » 
 
 *27 
 
 no 
 
 — 
 
 — 8. 1073 a 16 
 
 4S 
 
 de caelo B. 12. 292 b 32 
 
 no 
 
 ' — 
 
 — 8. 1073020 
 
 44 
 
 de mundo 2. 391 * 14 — 1 
 
 9 no 
 
 — 
 
 — 8. 1074 a 30 
 
 no 
 
 depart, an. A. i. 642 a 
 
 
 — 
 
 — 8. 10744 8 — 14 
 
 no 
 
 32 
 
 62 n 
 
 — 
 
 — 8. 1074 b 16 
 
 no 
 
 S. 645a 4 
 
 no 
 
 — 
 
 - 9- 1074*33 
 
 80 
 
 — A. 10. 686 a 28 
 
 no 
 
 — 
 
 — 9- io74*35ff 
 
 ii7« 
 
 Eth. Eud. H. 12. 124S* 
 
 
 — 
 
 — 9- 107503 
 
 14 
 
 16 
 
 109 
 
 — 
 
 — 10. 1075034 
 
 74 
 
 14. 1248a 27 
 
 III 
 
 — 
 
 M. 2. 1077024 
 
 38 
 
 Eth. Nic. Z. 7. 1 141 a 34 
 
 no 
 
 — 
 
 — 2. 1077 29 
 
 49 » 
 
 — H. 14. 1153*32 
 
 109 « 
 
 — 
 
 — 4. 1079 a 2 
 
 78 
 
 — K. 7. 11770 16 
 
 in 
 
 — 
 
 — 4. 107909 
 
 78 
 
 frag. 46. 1483027 
 
 109 
 
 — 
 
 — 4. 1079325 
 
 78 
 
 — 184. isioa 4 
 
 i8» 
 
 — 
 
 — 4- 1079032 
 
 78 
 
 — 184. iSioa 14 
 
 34 
 
 — 
 
 — 6. 1080* 12 
 
 126 
 
 — 187. 1511043 
 
 in 
 
 — 
 
 — 7. 1081*31 
 
 28 
 
 — apud Philoponum 
 
 46 
 
 — 
 
 — 7. 1081* 35ff 
 
 79 « 
 
 Met. A. 6. 987 b 10 
 
 78 
 
 — 
 
 — 7. 1082 * 32 
 
 133 
 
 6. 987 b 10 
 
 78 
 
 — 
 
 — 8. 1083 9 
 
 iSffi 
 
 6. 987* 10 
 
 103 « 
 
 — 
 
 — 8. 10840 12 
 
 44 
 
 6. 9880 2 
 
 78 
 
 — 
 
 — 8. 10840 29 
 
 45 
 
154 
 
 INDEX LOCORUM. 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Arist. Met. M. 8. 1084 a 34 
 
 74 
 
 Arist. /ltyi:-4./'. 4. 12. 43002 14 
 
 9. 1085 a 26 
 
 34 
 
 5. I. 430a 17 
 
 19 « 
 
 9. 1086 a 26 
 
 27 
 
 6. 430a 28 
 
 zn 
 
 — N. I. 1087^ 4 ff 
 
 72 
 
 8. 3. 4320 12 
 
 7 
 
 I. 1087^ 12 
 
 27 
 
 10. 3. 433 b 24 
 
 73 « 
 
 — — I. 1087 ^ 14 
 
 41 
 
 Topka B. 6. 112 a yi 
 
 108 « 
 
 I. 1088 a 15 
 
 72 
 
 — E. 6. 136*7 
 
 109 
 
 I. 1088 15 10 
 
 45 
 
 / — Z. 10. 148 a 15 
 
 96 » 
 
 I. io88^ II 
 
 46 
 
 10. 148 a 20 
 
 18 » 
 
 2. 1088*32 
 
 72 
 
 Chalcidius8« Plat. Tim. ed. 
 
 
 2. 1089* 6 ff 
 
 72 
 
 Wrobel p. 200 
 
 97 « 
 
 4. 1091 6 3 
 
 27 
 
 — p. 202 
 
 ii9« 
 
 4. 1091 15 19 
 
 27 
 
 — p. 203 
 
 68 « 
 
 4. 1091 (5 25 — 
 
 
 — p. 204 
 
 68 » 
 
 1092 a 5 
 
 74 
 
 Ciceto de fin. ii. 12. 40 
 
 III 
 
 4. 10920 6 
 
 27 
 
 — denat. dear. i. 13. 34 
 
 91 « 
 
 S. 1092 a 29 
 
 72 
 
 Clemens Strom. V. xiii. 87 
 
 108 « 
 
 Phys. A. 9. 192 a 14 
 
 74 
 
 xiv. 116 
 
 109 « 
 
 — B. 4. 196 a 33 
 
 no 
 
 — VI. vi. 53 
 
 III 
 
 — r. 2. 201 b 19 
 
 72 
 
 Diog. La.ert. iii. 12, 13 
 
 18 « 
 
 6. 206 b 32 
 
 45 
 
 - 38, 63 
 
 124 « 
 
 — A. 2. 209(5 33 
 
 "5 
 
 — 42, 78 
 
 128 » 
 
 2. 209 * 35 
 
 78 
 
 — iv. 2. I 
 
 78 » 
 
 . Pol. B. s. 1264* 12 
 
 98 « 
 
 Dionys. Areop. de div. »om. 
 
 
 — r. 16. 1287328 
 
 109 
 
 C. I 
 
 2« 
 
 Probl. IH. 7. 917 a 39 
 
 6« 
 
 Empedocl. ed. Karsten vv. 
 
 
 — Ar. 7. 962 a 22 
 
 III 
 
 313, 316, 317 
 
 4» 
 
 9. 962035 
 
 III 
 
 Eur. Alk. 965 
 
 63 « 
 
 Psych. A. 2. 6. 404 b 8 
 
 24 
 
 — Frag, Trag. adesp. 421 N 
 
 63 « 
 
 2. 7. 404 i 16 
 
 25 « 
 
 Hes. Op. 129 
 
 4« 
 
 2. 7. 404* 17 
 
 42 
 
 — Theog. 656 
 
 4« 
 
 2. 7. 404 b 24 
 
 40 « 
 
 Hippolyt. Ref. vii. 29 
 
 67 
 
 2. 7. 404* 25 
 
 42 
 
 Horn. Od. 215 
 
 4« 
 
 2. 17.405032 
 
 no 
 
 — hymn, Merc. 80 
 
 2« 
 
 2. 20. 4051} 15 
 
 26 
 
 Horace Odes 11. xx. 9 ff 
 
 147 
 
 3. 8. 406 * 12 
 
 73 
 
 Niceph. Callist. H.E. vol. i. 
 
 
 3. II. 406* 25 — 
 
 
 p. 8 b. 
 
 s« 
 
 23. 407 b 26 
 
 135 
 
 Oppian Hal. iii. 341 — 370 
 
 141 » 
 
 3. i3-407«7 
 
 s« 
 
 Parmenides ed. R. & P. vv. 
 
 
 3- IS- 407 a 29 
 
 49 K 
 
 39-40 
 
 10 
 
 3. 22—23. 407 >> 
 
 
 — V. 73 
 
 2« 
 
 15—24 
 
 132 
 
 — vv. 94 — 96 
 
 II 
 
 4. 14. 408 b 29 
 
 19 « 
 
 Philoponus in Arist. Phys. 
 
 
 4. 14. 408 b 29 
 
 no 
 
 ed. Vitelli p. 352, 20 
 
 73 « 
 
 4- 17- 409«5 
 
 49 « 
 
 in Arist. Psych. A. 2. 
 
 
 — ^. 8. 10. 420* 19 f 
 
 62 « 
 
 7. 404* 19 
 
 32 
 
 — r. 4. 4. 429027 
 
 23 » 
 
 — 2. 7. 404* 19 
 
 46 
 
INDEX LOCORUM. 
 
 I5S 
 
 Philoponus in Arist. Psych. 
 A. 2. 7. 40415 19 
 
 — 2. 7. 40415 21 
 
 — 2. 7. 404* 21 
 Plato Cratylus 397 c 
 
 — 398 B 
 
 — 403c 
 
 — 420 D 
 
 — 439 E 
 
 Def. citirBnirts, v6ri<ris 
 Epinomis 982 B 
 Epist. a' 3 10 A 
 
 — Cs^fiA 
 
 — r340C 
 Gorg. 514 c 
 
 — 523 E 
 Laws 664 B 
 
 — 673A 
 
 — 716c 
 
 — 732 E 
 
 — 741 A 
 
 — 766 A 
 
 — 8i8a 
 
 — 828 c 
 
 — 886 D 
 
 — 894 A 
 
 — 894 A 
 
 — 896 A, B 
 
 — 896 B 
 
 — 896 E 
 
 — 897 B 
 
 — 897 B 
 
 — 897 B 
 
 — 897B 
 
 — 897 c 
 
 — 897D 
 
 — 898 A 
 
 — 899 B 
 
 — 899 B 
 
 — 903 D 
 
 — 904 c 
 
 — 904 E 
 
 — 9050 
 
 — 9S0D 
 
 Mem 95 E 
 Farm. 128 A 
 
 — 129 B 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 ¥13.10 Farm. 129 c 
 
 75 
 
 47 « 
 
 — 129 D 
 
 75 « 
 
 36 
 
 — 130 B 
 
 39 
 
 36 
 
 — 132 B 
 
 II 
 
 94 » 
 
 — 132 B 
 
 23 » 
 
 105 « 
 
 — I32Bf 
 
 I 
 
 64 » 
 
 — I32Bf 
 
 12 
 
 56 « 
 
 — 132 Bf 
 
 IS 
 
 73 
 
 — 132 c 
 
 2« 
 
 41 
 
 — 132 c 
 
 9» 
 
 57 » 
 
 — 132 D 
 
 8 
 
 120 « 
 
 — I34A 
 
 10 
 
 120 
 
 — 134 B 
 
 14 
 
 106 
 
 — 134 B 
 
 118 
 
 3« 
 
 — 134c 
 
 /3 
 
 104 « 
 
 — 134 D 
 
 96 « 
 
 128 
 
 — 134 E 
 
 83 
 
 126 
 
 — 135 c 
 
 119 
 
 126 
 
 — 142 c— 143 A 
 
 1^ 
 
 129 
 
 — 143 A— 144 A 
 
 60 
 
 57 » 
 
 — 144 A— 144 E 
 
 60 
 
 106 
 
 — 144c 
 
 103 
 
 57 « 
 
 — 144 D — E 
 
 103 
 
 94 « 
 
 — 144 E— 145 A 
 
 60 
 
 94 
 
 — 145 c 
 
 103 
 
 38 
 
 — 145 E — 146 A 
 
 l^ 
 
 40 
 
 — 146 A 
 
 69 
 
 40 
 
 — 146 c 
 
 ^5 
 
 134 
 
 — 155D 
 
 61 
 
 24 
 
 — 155 D 
 
 118 
 
 84 
 
 — 156 D 
 
 104 
 
 87 
 
 — I57A 
 
 104 
 
 106 
 
 — 157 B— 157 E 
 
 61 
 
 107 
 
 — 157 D, E 
 
 61 
 
 13 
 
 — 157 E— 158 C 
 
 61 
 
 49 
 
 — 158 A 
 
 82 
 
 138 « 
 
 — 158 B 
 
 §^ 
 
 95 
 
 — 158 c 
 
 28 « 
 
 107 
 
 — 158 c— 158 D 
 
 61 
 
 151 
 
 — 164 D 
 
 89 « 
 
 151 
 
 Fhaedo 62 D 
 
 83 
 
 147 
 
 — 67D 
 
 137 
 
 83 
 
 — 80 A, B 
 
 10 
 
 94 « 
 
 — 80B 
 
 2« 
 
 6 
 
 — 80c 
 
 150 
 
 16 
 
 — 83B 
 
 117 
 
 75 « 
 
 — 102 B — 103 A 
 
 75 
 
156 
 
 INDEX LOCORUM. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Plato Phaedo 1 1 1 E 142 
 
 — 112 B 143 
 
 — USD 151 
 Phaedrus 245 c 4° 
 
 — 24s E loi n 
 
 — 246 A 145 » 
 
 — 246E 84« 
 
 — 247 c 118 
 
 — 247 c, D 9« 
 
 — 247 D , 87 
 
 — 247 E 36 
 
 — 249 B, C 124 
 
 — 249 c 125 
 
 — 253 A I2S 
 
 PhiUhis 14 c 75 
 
 — 14 c— ISC 76 
 
 — ISB 76 
 
 — ISB 76 
 
 — ISD 09 
 
 — i6c 123 
 
 — 16 C — E 76 
 
 — 16 c— E 76 
 
 — i6c— 17A 58 
 
 — 2ID 117" 
 
 — 22 c 87 
 
 — 22 c 117 
 
 — 22c 117 
 
 — 28 A— 31 A 57 
 
 — 28c 117 
 
 — 28 c 120 
 
 — 29 c 130 
 
 — 30 A 82 
 
 — 30c 13 
 
 — 30c 23 » 
 
 — 30 D 20 
 
 — 30 D 82 
 
 — 30 D 87 
 
 — 30D 117 
 
 — 33B 106 
 
 — s8d H7 
 Politicus 2600 6 
 
 — 269 D 86 
 
 — 270 A 96 
 
 — 271 D 88 
 
 — 27lDf 88 
 
 — 272 c 129 
 
 — 272 E 88 « 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Plato Politicus 273 B 
 
 97 « 
 
 — 273 E 
 
 97 « 
 
 Protag-. 345 D 
 
 57 « 
 
 Xep. 381 E 
 
 123 
 
 — 433 E 
 
 128 « 
 
 _ 441D 
 
 128 « 
 
 — 41SA 
 
 98 « 
 
 — 44SC 
 
 77 « 
 
 — 476A 
 
 76 
 
 — 500c 
 
 '*! 
 
 — 500 D 
 
 106 
 
 — sue, D 
 
 117 
 
 — 523 A— 524 D 
 
 75 
 
 — 524c 
 
 117 
 
 — 524 D— 526 B 
 
 75 
 
 — 525 A 
 
 75 
 
 — 525 E 
 
 75 
 
 — 532 A 
 
 35 
 
 — 580B, C 
 
 I2g 
 
 — 588Bf 
 
 I4S 
 
 — 588 c 
 
 145 
 
 — 588 D 
 
 145 
 
 — 588 D 
 
 145 
 
 - 589 E 
 
 106 
 
 — 589 E 
 
 107 
 
 — 590 A 
 
 14s 
 
 — 590 B 
 
 145 
 
 — 596 A 
 
 76 
 
 — 613 B 
 
 125 
 
 SapA. 216 B 
 
 120 
 
 — 237 A 
 
 6 
 
 — 237 A 
 
 i6» 
 
 — 237 D 
 
 89 « 
 
 — 7,40 A 
 
 70 
 
 — 244B, C 
 
 I2« 
 
 — 247 D 
 
 ICO 
 
 — 247 E 
 
 I9ffi 
 
 — 248 A 
 
 17 
 
 — 248 A 
 
 39 
 
 — 248 c 
 
 17 
 
 — ?,/iSc 
 
 19 » 
 
 — 248 E 
 
 47 « 
 
 — 249 A 
 
 19 
 
 — 249 A 
 
 23 « 
 
 — 249 A, B 
 
 39 
 
 — 249 B 
 
 23 « 
 
 — 249 B 
 
 28 « 
 
INDEX LOCORUM. 
 
 IS7 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 F]a.to SopA. 249 B, c 
 
 39 
 
 Plato Tim. 30 B 
 
 31 « 
 
 — 249 c 
 
 23 « 
 
 — 30 c 
 
 20 
 
 — 249 D 
 
 19 
 
 — 30 c 
 
 36 
 
 — 249D 
 
 20 K 
 
 — 30c 
 
 §^ 
 
 — 254 E 
 
 69 
 
 — 30c 
 
 81 
 
 — 258 D 
 
 6 
 
 — 30c 
 
 82 
 
 — 26s c 
 
 102 
 
 — 30 D 
 
 91 
 
 — 266 B 
 
 97 « 
 
 — 31 A 
 
 20 
 
 Sjftttp. 189 E 
 
 138 
 
 — 3IA 
 
 89 « 
 
 — 190 B 
 
 138 
 
 — 3IB 
 
 36 
 
 — 197 E 
 
 6 
 
 - 3IB 
 
 82 
 
 — 2IOE 
 
 104 « 
 
 — 32 c 
 
 6411 
 
 TAeaef. 156 A 
 
 90 
 
 — 34A 
 
 138 » 
 
 — 17s c 
 
 128 
 
 — 34 A— B 
 
 89 
 
 — 176 A 
 
 67 
 
 — 34" 
 
 129 
 
 — 176 A, B 
 
 125 
 
 — 34B, c 
 
 134 
 
 — 176 E 
 
 107 
 
 — 34Bff 
 
 93 
 
 — 183 E 
 
 i6» 
 
 — 35A 
 
 26 
 
 — 176 E 
 
 128 
 
 — 3SA 
 
 28 « 
 
 Tim. 27 D 
 
 71 
 
 -3SA 
 
 65 
 
 — 27D 
 
 71 
 
 — 3SA 
 
 100 
 
 — 27 D — 29 D 
 
 71 
 
 — 36B 
 
 93 
 
 — 28A 
 
 71 
 
 -36c 
 
 82 
 
 — 28A 
 
 72 
 
 — 37 A 
 
 J3 
 
 — 28A 
 
 72 
 
 — 37c 
 
 87 
 
 — 28A 
 
 96 
 
 — 37c 
 
 97 
 
 — 28A 
 
 143 
 
 — 37c 
 
 I0O» 
 
 — 28 b 
 
 71 
 
 — 37 c, D 
 
 37 » 
 
 — 28 b 
 
 72 
 
 — 37D 
 
 88 
 
 — 29 A 
 
 71 
 
 — 37D 
 
 114 
 
 — 29A 
 
 71 
 
 -38c 
 
 82 
 
 — 29 A 
 
 71 
 
 — 38E 
 
 63 
 
 — 29 A 
 
 71 
 
 — 38E 
 
 93 
 
 — 29 A 
 
 72 
 
 — 39E 
 
 20 
 
 — 29A 
 
 96 
 
 — 39E 
 
 114 
 
 — 29 b 
 
 72 
 
 — 40 A 
 
 138 
 
 — 29 b 
 
 119 
 
 — 4OA 
 
 143 
 
 — 29 c 
 
 71 
 
 — 40 B 
 
 63 
 
 — 29 c 
 
 71 
 
 — 40 B 
 
 ^l 
 
 — 29c 
 
 72 
 
 — 41—42 
 
 98 
 
 — 29E 
 
 S7 
 
 — 41 A 
 
 64 
 
 — 29 E — 30 A 
 
 57 
 
 — 41 A 
 
 94 
 
 — 29 E 
 
 96 
 
 — 41 A 
 
 102 
 
 — 29 E 
 
 126 
 
 — 4IB 
 
 ^3 
 
 — 3OA 
 
 144 
 
 — 4IB 
 
 63 
 
 — 3OB 
 
 3« 
 
 — 41 B 
 
 ^t 
 
 — 3OB 
 
 23 « 
 
 — 4IC 
 
 98 
 
IS8 
 
 INDEX LOCORUM. 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Plato Tim. 41 C 
 
 99 
 
 — 41C 
 
 100 
 
 — 41c 
 
 106 » 
 
 — 41C 
 
 i38« 
 26 
 
 — 41D 
 
 — 41 D 
 
 93 
 
 — 41 D 
 
 103 
 
 — 4ID— 42E 
 
 102 
 
 — 41 E 
 
 124 
 
 — 42 A 
 
 — 42 A 
 
 6S 
 66 
 
 — 42 B 
 
 129 
 
 — 42 c 
 
 83 
 
 — 42 D 
 
 98 
 
 — 42 E 
 
 70 
 
 — 42 E 
 
 97 
 
 — 42E 
 
 98 
 
 — 42 E 
 
 138 » 
 
 — 43 A 
 
 131 
 
 — 43D 
 
 83 
 
 — 43D 
 
 134 
 
 — 44D 
 
 95 
 
 — 44D 
 
 106 
 
 — 44l> 
 
 138 
 
 — 44D 
 
 139 
 
 — 44E 
 
 95 
 
 — 4SA 
 
 95 
 
 — 46 c 
 
 95 
 
 — 46 D 
 
 23 « 
 
 — 46 D 
 
 117 
 
 — 46 E 
 
 68 
 
 — 47 A 
 
 94 
 
 — 47 A 
 
 95 
 
 — 47B 
 
 83 
 
 — 47B 
 
 95 
 
 — 47 c 
 
 95 
 
 — 47 c 
 
 95 
 
 _ 47E 
 
 ^5 
 
 _ 47E 
 
 65 
 
 — 48 A 
 
 63 
 
 — 48E 
 
 71 
 
 — 49A 
 
 71 
 
 — 50 c 
 
 131 
 
 — 50D 
 
 97 
 
 — 5IB 
 
 131 « 
 
 — 5ID 
 
 ii8» 
 
 — 51 E 
 
 120 
 
INDEX LOCORUM. 
 
 IS9 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Plato Tim. 74 A 
 
 139 
 
 Plato Tim. 90 D 
 
 83 
 
 — 7SA 
 
 66 
 
 — 90 D 
 
 ii7» 
 
 — 75E 
 
 96 
 
 — 90 D 
 
 127 
 
 — 75D 
 
 139 
 
 — 90 E 
 
 36 
 
 — 76 E 
 
 148 « 
 
 — 91 A f 
 
 145 
 
 — 77A 
 
 66 
 
 — 91B 
 
 146 
 
 — 77B 
 
 118 
 
 — 91 c 
 
 145 
 
 -78a 
 
 141 
 
 — 91 D — 92 B 
 
 118 
 
 — 78 a— 79 E 
 
 140 
 
 — 91 D — 92 B 
 
 134 
 
 -78c 
 
 141 
 
 - 9IE 
 
 83 
 
 — 78E 
 
 142 
 
 — 9IE 
 
 139 » 
 
 — 79B 
 
 66 
 
 — 92 A 
 
 95 
 
 — 80 B 
 
 130 
 
 — 92 B 
 
 118 
 
 — 80D 
 
 142 
 
 — 92c . 
 
 90 
 
 — 81 A 
 
 139 
 
 — 92 c 
 
 96 » 
 
 — 81B 
 
 149 
 
 Tim. Locr. 94 B 
 
 120 
 
 — Sic 
 
 149 
 
 — — lOI D 
 
 140 
 
 — 81C 
 
 149 
 
 Plotinus Enn. n. ix. 
 
 8 II2» 
 
 — 81C 
 
 ISO 
 
 — V. i. T 
 
 79 » 
 
 — 81D 
 
 ISO 
 
 — V. i. ■ 
 
 III n 
 
 — 81 D — E 
 
 130 
 
 — V. i. 2 
 
 II2» 
 
 -83A 
 
 130 
 
 — V. i. 2, 4 
 
 II2» 
 
 — 84B 
 
 150 « 
 
 — V. i. 4 
 
 49 « 
 
 -85A 
 
 83 
 
 — V. i. 4 
 
 II2» 
 
 — 86b 
 
 107 
 
 — V. i. 4 
 
 II2» 
 
 — 86c 
 
 iSo» 
 
 — V. i. 7 
 
 II2» 
 
 — 86e 
 
 84 
 
 — V. i. 8 
 
 12 » 
 
 — 87 A 
 
 83 
 
 — V. i. 10 
 
 49 « 
 
 — 87A 
 
 134 
 
 — V. V. I 
 
 49 « 
 
 — 87 c 
 
 144 
 
 — V. ix. 8 
 
 79 « 
 
 — 87D 
 
 ii7« 
 
 — VI. viii. 18 
 
 64 » 
 
 — 87D 
 
 126 
 
 Plut. deplacit. phil. i 
 
 . 10 IS 
 
 — 87D 
 
 I3S 
 
 — iv. II 
 
 7 
 
 — 88 b 
 
 83 
 
 Mor. 691 c 
 
 6» 
 
 — 88b 
 
 106 
 
 — 1007 F 
 
 109 « 
 
 — 88b 
 
 137 
 
 — 1 120 A 
 
 6k 
 
 — 88c 
 
 140 
 
 Porpli. in Categ. ed. 
 
 Busse 
 
 — 88d 
 
 140 
 
 p. 91. 14 
 
 14 
 
 — 89B 
 
 35 « 
 
 Op. ed. Holsten p. 
 
 — 89B 
 
 37 » 
 
 66 
 
 6» 
 
 — 89B 
 
 66 
 
 VU. Plot. 10 
 
 II2« 
 
 — 89B 
 
 ii7« 
 
 Proklos in Farm. ed. 
 
 Cousin 
 
 — 89B 
 
 152 
 
 V. 140 
 
 7 
 
 — 90A 
 
 loS 
 
 — V. 147 
 
 4 
 
 — 90 c 
 
 los 
 
 — V. 148 
 
 „ ',5 
 
 — 90c 
 
 128 
 
 — vi. 30 
 
 Pref. 
 
 — 90 c 
 
 129 
 
 The. Plat. ii. II 
 
 .p. no 92 
 
i6o 
 
 INDEX LOCORUM. 
 
 Proklos in Tim. 4 c 
 
 PAGE 
 
 37 » 
 
 — 94c 
 
 II2« 
 
 — 319A 
 
 54 « 
 
 Sextus MatA. viii. 286 
 
 Ii8» 
 
 Simplicius in Phys. A, ed. 
 
 
 Dielsp. 87, 17 
 
 I2« 
 
 — p. 143, 18 ff 
 
 I2« 
 
 — p. 143, 26 ff 
 
 79 » 
 
 — p. 147. 21 ff 
 
 79 » 
 
 — p. 197, 10 
 
 67 
 
 in Psych, ed. Hayduck 
 
 
 P- 10, 33 
 
 50 n 
 
 — p. 28, II 
 
 13s 
 
 — p. 28, 22 
 
 88 « 
 
 — p. 28, 22 ff 
 
 31 
 
 — p. 29. 2 
 
 47 » 
 
 — p. 29, II 
 
 26 » 
 
 — p. 29, 12 
 
 43 » 
 
 — P- 317. II 
 
 ii8» 
 
 Sophonias de anim. paraph. 
 
 
 ed. Hayduck p. 13, 6 
 
 32 
 
 — in Arist. Psych, ed. 
 
 
 Hayduck p. 13, 37 
 
 48 » 
 
 Stob. Eel. I. Pro. 10 (Plu- 
 
 
 tarch) ed. W. i. p. 
 
 
 22, s 
 
 47 « 
 
 — I. i. 24 (Philos. 
 
 
 Incert.) ed. W. i. 
 
 
 p- 31. S 
 
 87 » 
 
 — I. i. 25 (Porphyry) 
 
 
 ed. W. i. p. 31, 8 
 
 92 » 
 
 — I. i. 29A(Aetios)ed. 
 
 
 W. i. p. 37, 2 
 
 108 « 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Stob. Eel. 1. i. 29 b (Aetios) 
 
 ed. W i. p. 37, 4 87 « 
 
 — I. vi. I a (Menander) 
 
 ed. W. i. p. 83, 20 87 n 
 
 — I. X. 160 (Aetios) ed. 
 
 W. i. p. 127, 19 IS 
 
 — I. X. i6a(Aetios)ed. 
 
 W. i. p. 127, 20 87 « 
 
 — I. X. 16* (Aetios) ed. 
 
 W. i. p. 128, 14 27 « 
 
 — I. xii. I a (Aetios) ed. 
 
 W. i. p. 134, 9 97 
 
 — I. xii. I a (Aetios) 
 
 ed. W. i. p. 134, 9 ff 62 » 
 
 — I. xii. 2 a (Arius 
 Didymus) ed. W. i. 
 
 p. 136, 10 82 « 
 
 — I. xii. I (Hermes) ed. 
 
 W. i. p. 277 15 68 n 
 
 — I. xlix. 6 (Hermes) 
 
 ed. W. i. p. 324, S 148 « 
 
 — I. xlix. 60 (Porphy- 
 ry) ed. W. i. p. 445, 
 
 23 147 » 
 
 — I. Ixi. I (Hermes) ed. 
 
 W. i. p. 27s, 16 117 « 
 
 — I. Ixi. I (Hermes) ed. 
 
 W. i. p. 27s, 17 19 » 
 Themistius j» Arist. Psych. 
 
 ed. Spengel p. 20 36 
 
 — p. 20 ff 32 
 
 — p. 21 32 « 
 
 — p. 21, 17 48 « 
 
 1<L, 
 
 J. PALMER, PRINTER, ALEXANDRA STREET, CAMBRIDGE.