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 Memoirs of tlie areat European congresses 
 
 3 1924 027 900 111 
 
MEMOIES 
 
 GREAT EUROPEAN CONGRESSES 
 
 VIEMA-PARIS, 1814-15-AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1818-TROPMU, 1820- 
 ATO-LAYBACH, 1820-21; 
 
 WITH A VIEW OF P[JBLIC AFFAIRS FROM THE ASSEMBLY OF 
 THE STATES-GENERAL IN FRANCE. 
 
 By the EAEL OF WESTMORELAND, G.C. B. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, 
 
 AND OHARINU CROSS. 
 
 1860. 
 
EUEOPEAI^ CONGRESSES. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 The period to which these Memoirs refer is replete 
 with events of so much importance, that it is impossible 
 to enter upon the task of tracing any account of them 
 without being impressed with the great responsibiHty 
 which must attach to such an undertaking. From the 
 commencement of the French Revolution in 1789 to 
 the peace in 1815 the States of Europe had been sub- 
 jected to more changes and to greater disasters than 
 are recorded in the crowded history of preceding cen- 
 turies. During that period the balance which had 
 been maintained between those states was overthrown, 
 the entire subjugation of the Continent to France was 
 nearly effected, and again that power was driven back 
 within its ancient limits. The moral and political 
 opinions and feelings of mankind were shaken, the 
 respect and attachment to the ancient and established 
 forms of government were broken in upon, and the 
 wildest theories were in many instances adopted in 
 their place. 
 
 It is the purpose of the present Memoirs to unfold 
 the history of the reconstruction of the political system 
 of Europe af^r this general convulsion ; and with the 
 view of bringing to the consideration of this subject 
 whatever information may tend to it^ elucidation, it 
 will be advantageous to review the period which imme- 
 
2 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 diately preceded the assembly of the States-General in 
 Prance, and to trace some of the most important trans- 
 actions which, from that moment until the Peace of 
 Paris in 1814, bore influence upon the relative position 
 of the different members of the European Common- 
 wealth. It will also be of considerable interest, and a 
 measure of justice to the statesmen whose deeds and 
 counsels are to be set forth, that some account of the 
 peculiar situations in which they were placed, the 
 difficulties by which they were surrounded, and the 
 principles upon which they were forced to' act, should 
 be given, in order that a fair and unbiassed judgment 
 may be exercised with regard to them. And upon 
 this subject it is undoubtedly true, that in different 
 countries the same transactions will be viewed in lights 
 as various as are the constitutions, habits, and political 
 tendencies of the people. While in Great Britain — a 
 great and powerful nation, uninfluenced, through its 
 insular position, by any desire of immediate territorial 
 aggrandizement — the subtilties of diplomacy which 
 tended to such an object would be looked upon with 
 dissatisfaction, in others, less fortunately situated, they 
 would be required from the statesmen charged with 
 their general interests. If Scotland were still an inde- 
 pendent country, and by its general policy leagued 
 with the enemies of England, and constantly thwarting 
 the objects of its ambition, the nation would resent 
 the neglect of a minister who should reject any oppor- 
 tunity which might offer of reducing that power, and 
 of depriving it of the means of continuing its hostility. 
 Oases of immediate similarity to this are constantly 
 occurring upon the Continent. They have as frequently 
 occurred to ourselves in India. The mafcner in which 
 they are dealt with must be viewed with an impartial 
 consideration of all the circumstances by which they 
 are attended, as also of the passions and even of the 
 
Chap. I. BUEOPEAN CONGRESSES. 3 
 
 prejudices of the people in whose favour the political 
 advantages are sought after or established. In a spirit 
 of candour such as is here described, it is but justice to 
 look at the conduct of the various statesmen who have 
 wielded the powers of the States of Europe during 
 the last century, and more particularly during that 
 period which but a short time preceded the commence- 
 ment of the French Ee volution. 
 
 The seizure of Silesia by Frederic the Grreat, the 
 invasion of Saxony, the attempts of the Austrian 
 Government to obtain possession of Bavaria, of the 
 Russian and Austrian Governments to extend their 
 conquests in Turkey, of the Prussian Government to 
 profit by the war in which these countries were en- 
 gaged to extend its dominions on the side of Poland 
 while that country should be indemnified through the 
 recession of Gallicia by Austria, the project of the 
 French Government to extend its influence over Hol- 
 landT^wEch was counteracted by Eng;land and Prussia, 
 the seizure of Corsica by that Government, and its 
 alliance in unison with Spain, with the North Ame- 
 rican Colonies while in revolt against the mother 
 country, together with the final partition of the king- 
 dom of Poland ... all these events, which mark 
 the unsettled state of Europe during the period in 
 which they took place, were still of such a nature as 
 not materially to disturb the general balance of power 
 first established by the peace~ofWestphalia, and con- 
 firmed by the result of the wars in which the great 
 Duke of Marlborough bore so considerable a part, and 
 maintained until by the convulsion in France it was 
 totally overthrown. It is necessary, however, to recall 
 the recollection of these events in order justly to appre- 
 ciate the measures which were adopted when the great 
 catastrophe of the French Revolution broke forth upon 
 the world, and stamped a new character upon all the 
 
 B 2 
 
4 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 political motives and principles by which it had till 
 then been guided. 
 
 The rise and progress of the desire of reform and 
 amelioration in the institutions of France may be traced 
 from the reign of Louis XIV. to the termination of the 
 American war. A considerable portion of the sensitive 
 and intelligent French people felt themselves as being 
 without the security of civil liberty, without confidence 
 in the administration of the laws, without the means of 
 procuring redress for the grievances they were suffering, 
 injured in their fortunes, and retarded in their general 
 prosperity, by the unequal and partial system of taxa- 
 tion under which the revenue was collected. All these 
 were serious evils, mainly resulting from the decay of 
 some institutions and the perversion of others, and cal- 
 culated to create dissatisfaction and ill-will towards the 
 Grovernment. To remedy this state of things (while 
 the nation was suffering, under great financial embar- 
 rassments) was a task too difiScult to be accomplished 
 by men of ordinary capacity. To alter established 
 forms of government, to adapt new institutions to the 
 wants and exigencies of a great nation, and yet to 
 hold fast the reins of government and to maintain its 
 authority, is an undertaking for which few minds are 
 tempered. It is a task more likely to be seized upon 
 by rash and inconsiderate men, than to be deliberately 
 undertaken by those who, being acquainted with the 
 difiiculties of the government of nations, would be 
 guided, in any such attempts, by the dictates of pru- 
 dence and moderation. Such unfortunately proved to 
 be the case in France ; and when once the fever of inno- 
 vation prevailed amongst the people, the feeble barriers 
 which had been raised by weak and inefficient men, as 
 a protection to the general interests of the State, were 
 overthrown, and universal desolation was brought upon 
 the country. In the progress towards this great cala- 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN COISIGRBSSES. 5 
 
 mity the true principles of free government were con- 
 founded witli the most extravagant theories of the 
 equal rights of men, with the abolition of all orders, 
 privileges, and distinctions, and with the overthrow of 
 all those authorities and that control by which alone 
 civil society can be held together. These wild and 
 pernicious doctrines, clothed in the specious arguments 
 of enthusiastic propagators, were sent forth to the people 
 of every other country, and the general overthrow of 
 all existing institutions seemed to be the object of those 
 who had installed themselves as the Government of 
 France. Under circumstances so appalling, it became 
 the duty of the sovereigns of Europe to prepare the 
 means of protecting themselves and their subjects from 
 the general disorganization which was thus threatened. 
 The whole of France was involved in anarchy and con- 
 fusion ; the lives of the royal family, of the nobility, 
 and of the men of property throughout the kingdom, 
 were either sacrificed or menaced ; and an organised 
 system of spoliation and confiscation was universally 
 established. The Grovernments of other countries were 
 thus placed under the necessity of taking the earliest 
 and most decisive measures to stem the torrent of mis- 
 rule and oppression which the innovators in France 
 had sought, by an appeal to the passions of mankind, 
 to render general throughout the world. The first 
 document which appears to take cognisance of this sub- 
 ject, and to suggest the propriety of an armed inter- 
 ference, is a letter from Frederic William, King of 
 Prussia, addressed to the Marquis Lucchesini, at that 
 time his minister in Poland, but appointed his pleni- 
 potentiary to the Congress of Sistow, which bears date 
 from Breslau the 15th of September, 1790 : — 
 
EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 Translation of the Extract from the Letter of the King of PaussLi to the 
 Maequis Lucchesini. 
 
 " I send you the two chasseurs, whom you may soon want ; 
 I will have the cypher which you want prepared immediately ; 
 and I have desired the Count Hertzberg to send you a copyist 
 as soon as possible, and to make out your instructions: this, 
 however, is only to avoid giving him annoyance ; for it wiU be 
 better for you to make out jovix own iastructions, and send them 
 to me as soon as they are done. The status qioo must always 
 form the basis. If the Turks will agree to any little cession, it 
 would be the moment to ask the Court of Vienna either for the 
 district of the Enclaves in Upper Silesia, or for that of Brannau ; 
 but it would be better to give up one or both of these than to 
 risk the Turks yielding any of their fortresses to Austria. This 
 must positively be avoided. I highly approve of the journey 
 you propose making to Vienna. According to my latest intelli- 
 gence the King (of Hungary) intends to be at Francfort on the 
 17th. You have therefore no time to lose in undertaking this 
 expedition, which will enable you to learn the real sentiments 
 of the King with regard to Prussia, and your former iutimacy 
 with M. de Manfredini wiU greatly assist you in this object. 
 I If you find that you are treated with confidence, I should wish 
 lyou to try the ground, whether, in the event of things being 
 'l settled with the Turks and in Flanders, the King would be 
 willing to send troops into France, joined to a Prussian corps 
 id'armte, to restore order in the French Government. The 
 .; corps d'arm^e sent by Austria into Flanders might be employed 
 for this purpose, with the addition of some Palatine troops. 
 A Spanish army, united with the Piemontese, might act in the 
 southern provinces of France ; and 40,000 or 50,000 Prussians, 
 after securing Metz, might enter into the heart of France. 
 
 " The pretext of avenging the wrongs done to his brother-in- 
 law and to his sister would be more than sufficient to authorise 
 the King of Hungary to act as I propose ; and he might add to 
 these reasons, the desire to support the Princes of the Empire, 
 in the neighbourhood of Alsace, who have suffered considerably 
 by the disorders committed since the revolution. 
 
 " By acting as I propose it will not be difficult to obtain our 
 ends, after having preliminarily arranged that Austria should 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAK CONGRESSES. 7 
 
 have the lid^re of French Flanders, which joins Hainault. The 
 Elector Palatine should receive a part of Alsace, and should 
 cede to me Juliers and Bergue. If Austria should want more, 
 we must directly think of Upper Silesia. You wiU see whether 
 this plan may in time be acted upon ; and I shall be very glad 
 to hear of you soon at Vienna, in order to judge what can be 
 done. 
 
 " Believe me sincerely your affectionate friend, 
 
 « F. G." ■ 
 
 The following is the answer of the Marquis Luc- 
 chesini : — 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 To the King alone. 
 " SiBE " Warsaw, 18 September, 1790, 
 
 " At the moment I was about setting off for Vienna, con- 
 formably to the orders contained in Your Majesty's autograph 
 letter, I learnt that the departure of the King of Hungary, fixed 
 for the 18th instant, precluded the possibility of executing your 
 royal wishes. Sire, and that I must await the end of the Con- 
 gress in order to confer with the Marquis Manfredini. Thus, 
 unless Your Majesty should order otherwise, I shall, on returning 
 from Bucharest, pass through Vienna, and, regulating my pro- 
 ceedings according to circumstances, endeavour then to fulfil 
 your royal intentions. 
 
 " As the plan. Sire, which you have deigned to communicate 
 to me respecting the affairs of France cannot be executed until 
 next spring, and after the termination of the negotiations of the 
 Hague and Bucharest, it might, I think, be also traced out on 
 my return, and on my passage tlirough Vienna, and after having 
 myself ascertained if the King of Hungary is disposed to act 
 with Your Majesty, independently of his ministers and of the 
 ancient prejudices of the House of Austria with respect to 
 Prussia. However, Sire, it must be confessed that the irregular 
 proceedings of the National Assembly of France, the principles 
 of an imaginary equality which that body so ostentatiously pro- 
 fesses for the purpose of obtaining the support of the masses, 
 the standard of emancipation from ancient institutions and the 
 spirit of insubordination it endeavours to sanction by its example 
 and disseminate by its emissaries, the unjust acts of which it is 
 
8 EUROPEAN CONGEESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 guilty towards foreign princes, in contempt of solemn and sacred 
 engagements, stamped with the guarantee of the law of nations, 
 and the epidemical effects of this example which manifest them- 
 selves in other countries, might require from the sovereigns a 
 coalition of forces for the purpose of restoring order ia the 
 Government, and re-establishing over the people who have been 
 misled by the deceptive appearances of democratic independence, 
 the authority of the laws, and of the sovereigns, their depositaries. 
 Called upon by your position and the interests of your station to 
 enter this coalition. Your Majesty might derive therefrom two 
 equally great advantages — the first, that of obtaining some 
 arrondissemens, whether iu Westphalia or in Upper Silesia ; the 
 second, that of replacing France in its rank among the powers, 
 and of thereby securing to yourself either the fidelity of England, 
 or the possibility of substituting for her alliance that of her 
 rival, in the event of a change of policy in the Cabinet of 
 St. James's. 
 
 " For, Sire, it must be acknowledged that the English 
 Ministry has, under present circumstances, too openly manifested 
 its repugnance to co-operate in the abasement of the House of 
 Austria for the Court of BerUn, (while, at the same time, it 
 remains faithfully attached to its present allies,) not to think of 
 emancipating itself, in case of necessity, from the political 
 despotism which the English Ministry finds a satisfaction in 
 exercising over the Courts that are the friends and allies of 
 England. This is an object as important as delicate, one upon 
 which it is essential to preserve the most impenetrable secrecy, 
 and to take the best concerted measures in order that we may 
 not be seen through either in France or in England. 
 
 " As to my instructions, Sire, the viva voce orders which Your 
 Majesty gave me at Schonwalde, those contained in your letters 
 and direct commands, the memoir of His Highness the Duke of 
 Brunswick, a few articles contained in those which are from the 
 pen of Count Hertzberg, and my conversations with Baron de 
 Jacobi at Vienna, will enable me to draw them up and submit 
 them from Vienna to the distinguished approbation of Your 
 Majesty. There is an additional reason for my leaving here on 
 Friday next, which I have not stated in my to-day's report, 
 which will be known to Count Hertzberg, and read by 
 Mr. Ewart. 
 
 " This English Minister has, however, conceived a bright idea 
 by the proposition of inducing the three mediatorial Powers to 
 
Ohav. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 9 
 
 guarantee to the Porte the entire restitution of the conquests 
 made by the Empress of Eussia over the Turks, mthout extend- 
 ing the guarantee to the possessions of Eussia, seeing that this 
 sovereign has the vanity to make a separate peace with the 
 Turks, and refuses to admit the mediation of any one whom- 
 soever. Nothing more now remaios than to pray that this idea 
 may be adopted by the English Ministry, and that it may be 
 made an article in the instructions of the Chevalier Keith and 
 the Sieur de Haesten. 
 
 " The Sieur de Bulgackou has this morning had his first 
 audience of His Polish Majesty. He went to the castle in a 
 brilliant equipage, drawn by six horses, contrary to the custom 
 of Ministers of the second class, who scarcely ever use more 
 than two. 
 
 " A Eussian comrier, coming from St. Petersburg and pro- 
 ceeding in great haste to Vienna, passed by here this afternoon.' 
 
 These letters are at once explanatory of the system 
 which, at the period they were written, directed the 
 policy of the Court of Prussia. This kingdom was 
 then a great power, though of recent creation ; the con- 
 quest of Silesia and the first partition of Poland, in 
 1772, had raised it from a very inferior state to one 
 of the most important of Europe ; but this change was 
 too recent not to have left a desire of still further 
 aggrandisement in its councils, and of revenge and 
 reconquest in the feelings of those who had been 
 despoiled. This sentiment is developed in both the 
 letters above noticed, particularly in that of the Marquis 
 Lucchesini. He is therein anxious to discover whether 
 the King of Hungary (afterwards the Emperor Joseph) 
 will act independently of his ministers, because they 
 were all supposed to be guided by hostile views against 
 Prussia. He wishes his master to be in a situation to 
 oppose France to England, because England had shown 
 a determination to protect Austria from spoliation ; and 
 lastly, he sees in the successful invasion of France an 
 opportunity of securing some aggrandisement to Prussia, 
 while the other states which might take part in that 
 
10 BUBOPEAK CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 operation would also be rewarded by a territorial in- 
 jdemnity. These views were indeed secondary to the 
 I great object of re-establishing order in France and re- 
 j storing the authority of the King ; but in the then un- 
 settled state of Europe such salutary measures were not 
 likely to be undertaken without being connected with 
 the gratification of some separate interests. The views 
 of the Cabinet of Prussia had been directed to interests 
 of this nature during the whole period of the Marquis 
 Lucchesini's mission in Poland. He had been instructed 
 to favour and encourage the independent spirit which 
 had manifested itself in that country, and the desire of 
 emancipating its Government from the influence of 
 Russia, which, in fact, was in great part effected by the 
 changes in the constitution established on the 3rd of 
 May, 1791. These instructions had been given with 
 a view of entering into an alliance offensive and 
 defensive with Poland, the basis of which should be 
 the cession of Thorn and Dantzic to Prussia, upon a 
 guarantee that the two countries (profiting by the war 
 in which Austria and Russia were engaged with the 
 Turks) should oblige the Cabinet of Vienna to cede 
 back to Poland the State of Grallicia, of which she had 
 become possessed. This negotiation was broken off at 
 the moment of which we are now treating, by the 
 refusal of the Diet of Poland to agree to the concession 
 of the terms which Prussia required, and which, how- 
 ever distasteful to the general feeling of the people, 
 yet perhaps was the only remaining chance of their 
 maintaining the independence of Poland, or even its 
 existence as a nation. For in consequence of this deci- 
 sion the interests of Poland were abandoned by Prussia, 
 and the Marquis Lucchesini was sent to the Congress 
 of Sistow, assembled for the conclusion of peace between 
 Austria and the Turks, under the mediation of Prussia 
 and the maritime powers, which object was effected in 
 
Ohap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 11 
 
 the following year. Poland was ttus left without 
 support, and shortly afterwards an end was put to its 
 existence as an independent kingdom by its second 
 partition, when Prussia leagued herself with Austria 
 and Russia. 
 
 The Marquis Lucchesini was proceeding to this con- 
 gress of Sistow at the moment he wrote his letter to 
 the King, and, according to his advice, all mention of 
 an intervention in the affairs of France was delayed 
 until the following year, when the two Grovernments 
 of Prussia and Austria agreed, to the declaration upon 
 this subject which was signed at Pilnitz. This declara- 
 tion went to the extent of conjointly employing their 
 forces in order to put the King of France in a situation 
 to lay the foundation of a monarchical Grovernment, 
 conformable alike to the rights of sovereigns and the 
 well-being of the French nation. They were preparing 
 to follow up this arrangement, when the revolutionary 
 Government of France declared war against Austria, 
 and thus commenced that great struggle which in 
 the course of twenty years involved the whole of 
 Europe, 
 
 It would be foreign to the design of this work to 
 enter into any account of the transactions which imme- 
 diately followed this event. France was invaded by 
 the armies of Austria and Prussia under the Duke of 
 Brunswick, but the jealousy and misunderstanding 
 which existed between these two powers, the intrigues 
 of General Dumourier in holding out false hopes that 
 he would join the allied troops in order to. deliver the 
 King from the thraldom in which he was kept by the 
 Jacobins in Paris, the temporising character of the 
 Duke himself, who had been induced by the Abbe' 
 Si^yes to receive with favour the principles of the con- 
 stitutionalists, and to whom it had been insinuated that 
 he might be called to the Government of the regene- 
 
12 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 rated people of France, and the anxiety of the Prussian 
 Cabinet for the attainment of important acquisitions 
 Hipon the Vistula : all these circumstances combined to 
 arrest the progress of the allies at the commencement 
 of the campaign of 1792, and to sow the seeds of dis- 
 union, so that, even after Grreat Britain and Holland 
 had in 1793 joined in the general coalition, and after 
 the various successes and disasters of the campaigns of 
 that and the following year, Prussia withdrew from 
 it by a separate treaty with France in the month of 
 April 1795, and engaged at the same time in an armed 
 neutrality with the powers of the north of Germany 
 for their mutual protection, by which she abandoned 
 all the objects which had formerly been contemplated 
 by her, and which had been the basis of her engage- 
 ments with her allies. 
 
 As relating to the transactions which led to this 
 treaty, known as the Treaty of Basle, the following 
 correspondence between the Marquis Lucchesini, the 
 ministers Finkenstein, Alvensleben, and Haugwitz, 
 and the King of Prussia, is inserted, which will serve 
 to indicate the policy by which the Prussian Govern- 
 ment was already preparing the way towards a separa- 
 tion from the general alliance of which it had been the 
 original promoter. 
 
 No. 3. 
 
 Translation of a Report made by the Ministers Finkenstein, Alvensleben, 
 and Hauowitz to the King of Prussia, May 5, 1793. 
 
 " The Court of Vienna, in the German despatch of Baron 
 de Thugut, which Prince Eeuss was directed to read to the 
 Marquis Lucchesini, and which this last Minister has com- 
 municated to us, by order of Your Majesty, having reduced to 
 three principal heads its explanations respecting the Convention 
 of St. Petersburg, as weU as the accession which has been pro- 
 posed to that Coui't, namely : — 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. ^13 
 
 " 1st. As regards the proportion (Verhdltniss) which 
 
 it proposes should exist between the respective in^ 
 
 demnities. 
 " 2nd. As regards the fixing {Festsetzung) of these same 
 
 indemnities ; and 
 " 3rd. As regards the security it requires for its own 
 
 indemnification, and which it expects shall be equal to 
 
 that of St. Petersbm-g and Berlin ; 
 
 " With respect to the two first points we beg Your Majesty's 
 permission to refer to the separate report drawn up by me, 
 Haugwltz, which we take the liberty of annexing to the present 
 one, and by which it appears to us to be proved to demonstration 
 agaiQst the gratuitous assertions of the Austrian Ministry, — 
 
 " That the pretended principle of parity of advantages between 
 the two Courts, which has nowhere been either laid down or 
 recognised explicitly, is above all, totally inapplicable to the 
 present case, where the point for Your Majesty's consideration is 
 not that of acquisitions made by agreement, but that of an 
 indemnification which you have a right to demand from Austria 
 herself, on account of an active and very expensive co-operation 
 in a war which concerns that Power as the party attacked and 
 principally interested therein; that Your Majesty has claimed 
 the possession, not eventual, but actual and in full proprietor- 
 ship, of your indemnities, as the sine qua non condition of your 
 assistance in the second campaign of 1793, with the same forces 
 employed in the former one. 
 
 " That the Court of Vienna was previously informed of the 
 extent of your claims in Poland, and 
 
 " That it expressly consented to this actual taking possession 
 of the position in question. 
 
 " There, consequently, remains the third point only, viz., the 
 pretensions of the Court of Yienna with respect to a guarantee 
 similar to those of the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin for 
 its own indemnities, upon the nature of which it has, however, 
 avoided giving any explanation. 
 
 " It results already from the resumS we have given of the 
 contents of the separate report hereunto annexed, that Your 
 Majesty being placed in an entirely different position, the Court 
 of Vienna is very far from having, either for the indemnification 
 itself, or particularly for an actual and complete guarantee, the 
 same titles as are given to you, Sire, by the previous claim of 
 
14 EUROPEAN CONGBESSBS. Chap. I. 
 
 your acquisition in Poland, as an essential con(iition of your 
 ulterior concurrence in the war, by the acceptance of that condi- 
 tion on the part of the Emperor, and by the complete accom- 
 plishment of your promises, by means of your co-operation. 
 
 " But, howeyer this may be, this third object of the Austrian 
 discussions is of less consequence to Your Majesty than it is to 
 the Court of Kussia, the more so as it is the unexpected and 
 very considerable aggrandisement of this latter, and the conse- 
 quent contiguity of frontiers, which have more especially excited 
 the Ul-wiU and jealousy of that of Vienna ; and this incontestably 
 appears from the contents even of the despatch of Baron de 
 Thugut, in which the approximation of the frontiers of Gallicia 
 and of the new acquisitions of Eussia are brought forward as a 
 principal cause of complaint. 
 
 " Hence, we are persuaded that the intention of Your Majesty 
 win be to enter into no explanations with the Imperial Court 
 upon this last and most important article before having pre- 
 viously come to an understanding upon the subject with the 
 Empress of Eussia, and thus to restrict the preliminary answers 
 to be given to the CoiuH; of Vienna, to a just refutation, either 
 of the principles which it so gratuitously asserts upon the 
 necessity of a parity of indemnifications between the two Courts, 
 or of the ignorance it affects to have been in, of the extent of 
 Your Majesty's views, and of the want of consent on your part, 
 of which she endeavours to take advantage ; and as regards the 
 rest, referring that Court to the result of the engagement you 
 are about, Sird, to enter into, upon this subject, with the Cabinet 
 of St. Petersburg. As to the mode to be followed with regard 
 to this preliminary answer, we take the liberty of proposing (as 
 the one most analogous to that just adopted by the Court of 
 Vienna, for the overtures) ; viz., that the Marquis of Lucchesini, 
 after having extracted the principal facts and reasonings given 
 in the annexed report, should cause the exposi resulting there- 
 from to be read to Prince Eeuss, furnishing him, at the same 
 time, with a copy, should he require one ; but some difficulty 
 must be raised in granting it, similar to that made by the 
 Imperial Minister before he would give him the copy of the 
 despatch which he had received from his Court. The com- 
 munications to be made, and the conduct to be prescribed, in 
 this posture of affairs, to Count de Goltz at St. Petersburg being, 
 as Your Majesty yourself has deigned to observe, of the utmost 
 importance, we have not lost a moment in occupying ourselves 
 
Ohap. I. EUROPEAN CONaEESSES. 15 
 
 with the same, and we have the honour of presenting you 
 annexed hereto a copy of the orders which he will receive, by a 
 courier, upon this subject. Your Majesty will be pleased to 
 convince yourself, by a perusal of their contents, that we have, 
 above all, pressed upon the Court of Eussia, the inadmissibility 
 of the Austrian proposition to consider the act of taking pos- 
 session, on the part of Your Majesty and of the Court of Eussia 
 in Poland, as simply temporary and eventual, insisting, on the 
 contrary, upon the necessity that exists for the two Courts, in 
 consequence of their present position as respects Austria, to pro- 
 ceed forward without further delay, and conclude, if necessary, 
 without the concurrence of that Power, their definitive arrange- 
 ment with the EepubKc of Poland. We have also just addressed 
 to the Sieur de Buchholtz at Warsaw a despatch adapted to 
 these circumstances, directing him to act ia concert in this 
 matter with Baron de Sievers, for the purpose of expediting with 
 renewed energy the measures required for perfecting the great 
 work so auspiciously commenced. We have not even awaited 
 the present moment, in order to give both to Count de Goltz 
 and the Sieur Buchholtz such instructions as the present crisis 
 appeared to us to require, and we flatter ourselves that the 
 copies and extracts of our despatches to the former of these 
 Ministers of the 27th and 28th, and of those to the latter of the 
 26th and 28th April, will prove to Your Majesty that we have 
 anticipated your royal intentions in this respect. Lastly, we 
 consider it our duty to observe further, that we have (by means 
 of a courier who has been despatched under the pretext of 
 Baron de Stein's business), conveyed to Major Knobelsdorff 
 detailed instructions relative to present circumstances, enjoining 
 him, above aU, to watch with the closest vigilance the proceed- 
 ings of the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople, and to 
 prevent or calm the apprehensions which will probably be 
 excited in the SubKme Porte relatively to the new acquisitions 
 which Eussia has just made in its neighbourhood. 
 
 (Signed) " Finkenstein. 
 
 " Al,VBNSLEBEN. 
 
 " Haugwitz." 
 
 " Berlin, 5th May, 1703. 
 To the King. " 
 
16 EimOPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. F. 
 
 No. 4. 
 Ebport addressed to the Kino by the Marquis of Lucchbbini, June, 1793. 
 
 " Of the four great Powers who have taken part against 
 France, there is not one whose interests exactly coincide with 
 those of the others. 
 
 " The Empress of Eussia may have considered the commence- 
 ment of the war as a means of succeeding more easily in her 
 plan of subjugating Poland. She was deeply affected at the 
 injury done to thrones in general by the revolutionists who over- 
 turned that of the French monarchy, nor was she, at the same 
 time, insensible to the satisfaction she promised herself from 
 playing the dignified part of directing from the interior of her 
 Cabinet the forces of the other Powers towards the object she 
 aimed at, that of re-establishing, on all points, the ancient 
 monarchical Government in France. Flattered by the praises 
 heaped upon her by the emigrants, and proud of being able to 
 supply with their daily food the children of the great-grandson 
 of that Louis XIV. who_liad made Europe tremble, she was 
 desirous of taking upon herseE the most importanF"part of the 
 enterprise. On the other hand, Eussia has a political interest 
 in the preservation of the French power in Europe in all its 
 integrity, as well as in the undisturbed existence of a Govern- 
 ment which allows her to interfere in the quarrels of the other 
 sovereigns. She knows her interests too well not to apprehend 
 that if France should cease, for any long time, to be an object 
 of fear and rivalry to England, the latter would tyrannise over 
 every sea, and dictate the law to the whole of Europe. She 
 foresees that these views of England must naturally incline her 
 to an intimacy with the Court of Vienna, and that there might 
 result from this coalition a plan . of pacification altogether con- 
 trary to her schemes. The English Government was right in 
 avoiding war, in order not to render the people discontented by 
 increasing the taxes, which is the immediate and inevitable con- 
 sequence of it. But it could not allow the French to take an 
 inch of ground from the Netherlands, and stOl less permit them 
 to overthrow the Stadtholdership in Holland. The motives 
 which determined the conduct of the English plenipotentiaries 
 at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, still exist, and will 
 prescribe to the English Ministry a similar course of proceeding 
 under present circumstances. The Cabinet of St. James, there- 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 17 
 
 fore, has never concealed the principles in accordance with 
 which England would have been disposed to restore peace 
 between the belligerent Powers, and which now oblige it to. 
 make war. She has the greatest interest in replacing the Aus- 
 trian Netherlands in the hands of a Prince who has the means 
 of defending them against the ambition of France, which haal 
 never ceased to covet them since the days of Louis XIV. For 
 the expenses of the war she sees in the islands of Martinique, 
 Guadaloupe, and St. Domingo, indemnities which are quite to 
 the taste of the nation. Besides, it is natural that the Court of 
 London, desiring to weaken in every direction and in every 
 manner her ancient rival, should have proposed to Austria not 
 to seek anywhere else than in France for an increase of power 
 which would indemnify her for what the war had cost her, and 
 counterbalance the acquisitions which the Courts of Berlin and 
 St. Petersburg have just made in Poland. The Cabiaet of 
 Vienna has eagerly embraced these proposals of England, and 
 endeavours to flatter her amour propre by soliciting her to take 
 the principal part in the union to be established between the 
 Allied Powers. It has conceived the grand plan of effecting, on 
 one side, the exchange of Bavaria, and on the other, of extend- 
 ing the power of Austria in Alsace, seeming her new acquisitions 
 by a formidable barrier against France, which she begins to 
 consider as her natural enemy. The Court of Vienna justly 
 reckons upon the acquiescence of England in her project of 
 making acquisitions upon France; it possesses the formal co- 
 operation of the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg for the 
 necessity of the exchange of Bavaria ; and, aware of the repug- 
 nance of the Empress of Eussia to allow it the least extension 
 of frontiers in Poland, it has reason to hope that this Princess 
 would rather consent, in its favour, to some acquisition in France. 
 So brilliant a perspective, which can only be attained by force 
 of arms, must make the Court of Vienna take the greatest 
 interest in the success of the campaign, and, how ever, d ifficult 
 it^ayJ)e^rJh6r^to_fiii4„fe?ds wherewith to prosecuteThe war, 
 Austria wiU not be the one to hasten its termination. The 
 King, our master, having succeeded in securing so fine an acqui- 
 sition in Poland, makes war against France for no other reason 
 than in order to fulfil the duties imposed upon him as a Prince 
 of the Empire, and the ally of the Court of Vienna. He has 
 just bound himself anew to the prosecution of this war by the 
 engagement he has, by the Treaty of the partition of Poland, 
 
]8 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 entered into with the Empress of Eussia not to make peace 
 tinless conjointly with His Majesty the Emperor. These three 
 reasons which oblige His Majesty to continue the war, prescribe 
 to him, at the same time, the duty of endeavouring to bring 
 about the possibility of not prolonging it beyond the present 
 campaign. To enable us to succeed in this, it is, in my humble 
 opinion, necessary to avoid very carefully tying up our hands as 
 regards the conditions of peace. It is easy to see that England, 
 in proposing upon this subject a concerted action to the Allied 
 Powers, has no other object than to possess itself of the future 
 negotiation in order to fix at its pleasure the time and the con- 
 ditions in accordance with its interests. This is the same line of 
 conduct adopted by England in the War of Succession, abandon- 
 ing afterwards by its special peace in 1713 the Powers which 
 she had armed against Louis XIV. It is the same conduct 
 which she pursued during the war of 1743, without being over- 
 anxious to fulfil at Aix-la-Chapelle what she had promised at 
 Worms to the Courts of Vienna and Turin. Lastly, it is the 
 same conduct of which the august predecessor of our master had 
 to complain in 1762, when, in contempt of the most solemn 
 treaties, the EngKsh made hastily a separate peace with France, 
 which was as prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain as it 
 was possible to become to those of Prussia. 
 
 [( " The experience of the past, then, appears to justify the 
 greatest repugnance to treat, in the midst of war, upon the con- 
 ditions of peace, with a Power whom a popular movement, 
 •a momentary triumph of the opposition, or a ministerial revolu- 
 ! tion would enable to break its engagements with perfect im- 
 punity, whilst the slightest deviation in a monarchy from the 
 j^ strict observance of the engagements it may have entered into 
 'with England is strongly condemned. If His Majesty and his 
 Ministry should think proper to adopt this principle, it would 
 not be very difScult to put it in practice without giving too 
 great umbrage to the Court of Vienna, nor to that of London. 
 Fortunately, the Empress of Eussia has ideas altogether peculiar 
 upon the future pacification, and it appears to me that it would 
 be easy to make use of them, without, however, adoptiag them, 
 in creating difficulties to the conclusion of the Convention pro- 
 posed by the English Minister. The resolutions about to be 
 taken by the Court of Vienna, and which it will immediately 
 communicate to us, wiU enable Your Majesty to decide upon the 
 conduct you will prescribe to your Ministers at London or the 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 19 
 
 Hague. My part being that of executing tlie orders which are 
 given me, I shall not go out of it so far as to sketch that deli- 
 cate course upon which may depend either the prolongation or 
 the end of the war. But my attachment to the welfare of the 
 State which has adopted me, and to the glory of the Sovereign 
 whom I have the honour to serve, compels me to speak with 
 frankness when discussing the scheme of acquisition, which the 
 Court of Vienna announces under the title of the exchange of 
 Bavaria, and the establishment of a formidable barrier against 
 France and Europe. No person can doubt that the exchange of 
 Bavaria for the Austrian Netherlands would give to the Court 
 of Vienna a considerable increase of intrinsic power, of military 
 forces, and of political influence in the Empire, and hence over 
 all the intermediary States of Germany. If the Cabinet of 
 Vienna could succeed in adding thereto, by the acquisition of 
 Alsace and Lorraine, that barrier from the Ehine to the Moselle, 
 of which Baron de Spielmann was charged to make the proposi- 
 tion to His Majesty in the Conferences at Luxembourg, the 
 Austrian monarchy would be raised to a degree of grandeur, 
 which no possible acquisition on the part of His Majesty could 
 counterbalance. Mistress of Alsace, and dominant through 
 Bavaria, and its own ancient possessions in the circle of Swabia, 
 the House of Austria would press Switzerland so closely as to 
 have there a preponderating influence. Being safe from any' 
 sudden attack by France, which, by the loss of Alsace and 
 Lorraine would lose all connexion with the southern circles of 
 the Empire, the Emperor would, on the one hand, have more 
 than ever at his command the three Ecclesiastical electors, the 
 Duke of Wurtemburg and the Margrave of Baden, while, on the 
 other, he could (being sure of Holland by its relations with 
 England) concentrate all his forces towards Bohemia, and 
 occupy himseK exclusively with the only powerful enemy which 
 remained for him to combat. Italy dependent upon him, or in 
 fear of his power, the Porte weak and incapacitated from 
 promptly seizing the favourable moment for making a diversion 
 advantageous to its natural Allies ; Saxony subjugated by his 
 intrigues, or threatened by his armies ; lastly, Eussia who has 
 never done much in favour of her AUies — none of these would 
 hold out to Prussia any hope of support and assistance in the 
 case of war between her and the Court of Vienna. To prevent 
 the execution of this vast project is, in my opinion, of an abso- 
 lute necessity for the future security of the Prussian monarchy. 
 
 c 2 
 
20 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 As to the means of accomplisliing this without in the least com- 
 promising the alliance which unites the Courts of Vienna and 
 Berlin, or the engagements which His Majesty has entered into 
 with the Empress of Eussia, by Article IV. of the Treaty of the 
 21st January, 1793, I think I can find them in the repugnance 
 of that same Empress of Eussia to any considerable dismember- 
 ment of the States constituting the French Empire in Europe. 
 In Article VII. of the above-mentioned Treaty, this Princess, 
 after having promised her good offices, and other efficacious 
 means which might be in her power, in order to faciKtate and 
 procure for the Court of Vienna the exchange of the Nether- 
 lands against Bavaria, adds thereto the other advantages which 
 may be compatible with the general convenience. This clause 
 of compatibility with the general convenience, appears to pro- 
 scribe irrevocably the idea of Austria's obtaining acquisitions in 
 LoiTaine. Independently of the iuterest which the Empress of 
 ; Eussia, as well as the King our master, has in preserving in 
 [France a power capable of counterbalancing the natural ties of 
 lAustria with England and Holland, an interest which caused the 
 apprehensions of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, on the occasion 
 of the journey of Baron de Spielmann to Luxembourg, and the 
 plans of dismemberment he was known to be entrusted with, 
 it is easy to foresee that the Court of Eussia would not willingly 
 lend a hand to any project by which, in consequence of the 
 cession of Lorraine, France would have no further communica- 
 tion with the Empire, and would consequently lose for ever the 
 remains of influence she had exercised there, since the peace of 
 Westphalia in 1648, to the conclusion of the alliance with the 
 Court of Vienna in 1756. 
 
 " Arguing from these principles it appears to me very probable 
 that the Court of Eussia might be used so as to cause a part of 
 the plan conceived by that of Vienna to fail, and thus con- 
 ciliating, what His Majesty owes to the future security of the 
 monarchy, with what his engagements require of him, the hope 
 may be indulged of being able to come out from this war with 
 honour and advantage, and to contribute to the conclusion of a 
 peace which shall secure to Europe that leng-thened repose, of 
 which she has so great a need." 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 21 
 
 No. 5. 
 The King to Baeon Jacobi, in London, June 29, 1793. 
 
 " You are already informed that the courier who brings 
 you this is also the bearer of your instructions for the negoeia- 
 tion of the concert which has so frequently been proposed to me 
 at different times by England, relatively to the affairs of France 
 and the war we are waging with the Eeyolutionists of that un- 
 fortunate kingdom. The better to enable you fully to comprehend 
 the subject, and form to yourseK a correct idea of the course I 
 have pursued, I shaU commence by making unreserTedly known 
 to you not only the reasons which have hitherto prevented me 
 from binding myself with Great Britain by a formal Convention, 
 but also that which now determines me so to do. 
 
 " When the Court of London made its first overtures on the 
 subject of the concert she was desirous of establishing between 
 the Allied Powers, we had, no positive idea either of the extent 
 of her participation in the war, or of the real object she proposed 
 to herself in making it ; and upon considering, on the one hand, 
 her extreme disinclination to a rupture, and, on the other, the 
 advantages it was probable she might derive from the continua- 
 tion of the disturbances in Prance, it was natural to suspect 
 her of wishing to take the lead, either to direct as she pleased 
 the negociations for peace, the thread of which she always 
 secretly followed with the National Convention, or to protract 
 the war indefinitely, should she find it her interest so to do. 
 Such were the considerations which at first indisposed me to the 
 proposition of England, considerations which were so much the 
 more powerful because, having obtained in Poland the district 
 destined to indemnify me for the expfenses of the present war, I 
 had an interest in terminating it as soon as possible, and in con- 
 fiining, if I could do so, my co-operation to the campaign of the 
 current year. My principles have not changed, but those of the 
 British Cabinet have begun to be less disquieting, and to offer a 
 perspective more in harmony with my views, since, accordiag to 
 the repeated assertions in your reports, and all the inferences to 
 be drawn either from the financial system, the decKniag state of 
 the home trade and manufactures, or, lastly, from the personal 
 dispositions of the Ministers, it is almost certain that England 
 will not continue the war any longer than is absolutely necessary 
 for putting a stop to the excesses of the dominant faction, and for 
 
22 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 re-establishing in France an order of things that can be tolerated ; 
 that she will, therefore, act with the same views as those of the 
 Allied Powers ; that, in the meantime, she will lose no time in 
 obtaining, at the expense of her rival, those advantages which 
 are the objects of her ambition, and that she will use her best 
 efforts to accomplish the enterprise in a single campaign. 
 
 " Now, supposing all these consequences to be correct, and that 
 such is really the plan of England, I shall no longer risk any- 
 thing by a closer alliance with her the moment she has, ipse fmto, 
 joined the belligerent Powers; and that, after having already 
 concluded treaties with the Courts of St. Petersburg, Madrid, and 
 Turin, she negociates others with those of Vienna, Naples, and 
 Lisbon. It is above all, in imitation of Eussia, she of all the 
 Powers whose alliance, under present circumstances, is of the 
 greatest advantage to me, that I have decided upon taking part 
 in the general concert ; and it is also the Convention signed at 
 London, on the 25th of last March, between Lord Grenville and 
 Count Woronzow which must serve us for our model, and to 
 which I should prefer conforming myself, inasmuch as, with the 
 exception of the obligations resulting from my alliance with 
 Austria, and from my position as a member of the Empire, I 
 have no direct interest in tlie war, and, consequently, find myself 
 in the coalition nearly upon the same footing as Eussia. Tou 
 can, therefore, now take advantage of the continually recurring 
 inuendos of the British Ministry, in order again to introduce this 
 subject, and you will have so much the less difficulty in doing 
 this naturally and without affectation, since, in conformity with 
 the instructions contained in my former Despatches, you will 
 not have failed to smooth the way for an early negociation. 
 According to the treaty of London, of which you have given me 
 the extract in the postscript of your Eeport of the 26th of March, 
 and which has just been communicated to me in extenso by the 
 Court of Eussia, the two contracting parties have first stipidated 
 in the preamble 
 
 " ' to unite their forces in order to oppose a barrier against the 
 proceedings of the present French Grovemment, whose principles 
 tend to the total subversion and destruction of every Q-ovem- 
 ment) and of all social order.' 
 
 " After which they promise: 
 
 " ' l." To concert together subsequently for the purpose of 
 mutually aiding and supporting each other in this war. 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. ' 23 
 
 " ' 2. Never to lay down arms except by common agree- 
 ment, and, after having obtained the restitution of the conquests 
 which may have been made over the States of their Majesties, 
 or over the friendly Powers to whom they would consider it 
 proper to grant their quarantee. 
 
 " ' 3. To prohibit from their respective ports all exportation 
 to France of munitions of war, naval stores, com, salted meats, 
 ^c, §-c., and to injure, as much as possible, the trade of France, 
 in order to compel her to accept reasonable conditions of peace. 
 
 " ' 4. Not to allow other Powers who take no part in this 
 war to protect, either directly or indirectly, in consequence of 
 their neutrality, or for their own advantage, the commerce of 
 France. 
 
 " ' 5. To occupy themselves, without delay, with the means 
 of drawing still closer the ties of friendship by which they 
 are now united, and to conclude, for that purpose, a treaty 
 of commerce and alliance, renewing, in the meantime, by a 
 separate Convention, the Treaty of Commerce of 1766.' 
 
 " In adopting the substance of this document as the basis of 
 our own Treaty it must, however, be observed with respect to the 
 preamble, that although it undoubtedly declares, with as much 
 correctness as precision, the object and aim of the coalition of 
 the beUigerent Courts, the expression ^to unite their forces^ must, 
 nevertheless, be avoided ; an expression which is in its place in 
 the Treaty with Eussia, but which would be improper and pro- 
 ductive of inconvenience in a case where the choice and employ- 
 ment of the means are not exactly the same on both sides. The 
 phrase might easily be turned, and the following substituted: 
 ' That the two ccmtracting parties regard under the same point of 
 view the indispensable necessity of opposing, ^c, ^e.' 
 
 " Apparently there will be nothing to change in Articles 1 and 2, 
 which form the nucleus of the transaction ; but, as the prohibi- 
 tion of exportation, which is the object of the 3rd one, already 
 exists in my States, it must be admitted as such, the 4th Article 
 being, consequently, agreed to as tending to counteract the 
 neutrality of the Powers who take no part ia the war. And as 
 England, moreover, has appeared inclined to maintain her com- 
 mercial relations with Prussia ever since the port of Dantzic has 
 come under my dominion, care wiU, no doubt, be taken to pro- 
 pose a treaty of commerce between the two Courts analogously 
 with Article 5 of the Kussian Convention. It would be desirable 
 
24 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 to evade every engagement, even indirect, relative to this matter ; 
 but should the British Ministry insist upon it, and there be no 
 means of negativing its urgent appeals, endeavours must at least 
 be made to put off the negociations to future contingencies, and 
 to draw up the article in such a manner that the two eontraeting 
 Powers may reserve to themselves the, right of subsequently intro- 
 ducing such negociations as they may agree upon touching the 
 respective interests of their commerce. Yet, since it is impossible 
 to foresee the changes which the English Ministry might be 
 tempted to make in the Convention which is to serve as our 
 model, it will be necessary that you send here the draft of mine 
 as soon as you have drawn it up. It is a delay which you can 
 easily obtain under one excuse or another, and which will be so 
 much the more usefol, seeing that, during the interval, we shall 
 probably acquire some fresh information as to the proceediugs 
 and negociations of the Court of Vienna. In the meantime you 
 will receive annexed the full power which you wiU require in 
 order to enter upon yours ; but I rely upon your prudence that, 
 before contracting any engagement, you wUl again employ every 
 means in your power to obtain exact and authentic information 
 as to the real desig-ns of the Court of London, and upon the extent 
 which it appears desirous of giving to them in the present war. 
 For this purpose be careful to forward to me, in one of your next 
 reports, the result of your enquiries, adding thereto the opinion 
 which you may consider yourself entitled to give, from your 
 knowledge of the subject, either upon the appearances of a 
 speedy pacification or upon the reasons which might incliae 
 England towards the continuation of the war. The necessity of 
 obtaining this information becomes most particularly urgent on 
 account of the embarrassing contradiction, that, on the one hand, 
 I have, strictly speaking, promised my concurrence to the Court 
 of Vienna only to the end of the campaign of 1793, whilst, on 
 the other, my secret Convention concluded with Eussia, rela- 
 tively to the affairs of Poland, obliges me to continue my aid to 
 Austria during the entire continuance of the war with France. 
 The embarrassment becomes still greater from the circumstance 
 that the Emperor, foreseeing the difficulty of effecting the 
 exchange of Bavaria, wiU, probably, determine upon seeking 
 his indemnities in an aggrandisement at the expense of France, 
 and it is to be presumed that, unless events occur which cannot 
 now be anticipated, the remainder of this campaign will barely 
 suffice for the making of conquests proportioned to the claims of 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 25 
 
 the Court of Vienna. This calculation cannot escape the fore- 
 sight of the Cabinet of St. James's, and it would, therefore, be 
 essential to discover what are the consequences it deduces there- 
 from, and what the measures which, in such an event, it itself 
 proposes to take. Should it decide upon finishing the war, cost 
 what it may, in a single campaign, if it feels certain of accom- 
 plishing its objects in that short space of time, and if it hopes to 
 drag all the belligerent Powers into one and the same general 
 pacification, the Convention you are about to negociate wUl be of 
 inestimable value to the Prussian monarchy, whose future pros- 
 perity essentially depends upon the return of peace, after the 
 enormous sacrifices I have been compelled to make in two 
 ruinous campaigns. If, on the contrary, England, waiving all 
 the considerations pressed upon her by her internal condition, 
 should think only of pushing her point, either in order to second 
 the views of Austria or to satisfy her own ambition, the object 
 then would be to find out if the campaign of 1794 would, at 
 least, be the final term of her plan, and if she would be incliaed 
 to fix a real value upon the aid of Prussia during the next year ; 
 for, otherwise, I should consider myself forced to restrict my co- 
 operation within the slenderest conditions of my indispensable 
 obligations. 
 
 " Nothing but the experience I have at all times had of your 
 integrity and ability could have dictated the confidential instruc- 
 tions contained in the present Despatch. They are, as you may 
 well see, of a character which requires them to be covered with 
 an impenetrable secrecy ; and, for that very reason, they also 
 demand, in their execution, the greatest circumspection and 
 address. In the first place you must endeavour to gain the con- 
 fidence of England, by favour of that Convention she proposes to 
 us ; and this must be done without letting her perceive our own 
 embarrassing position : secondly, the object which I have in this 
 transaction must be carefuUy concealed from the Austrian and 
 Eussian Ministers, as the least suspicion of the matter could not 
 fail to awaken mistrust in the Imperial Courts. That of 
 St. Petersburg, however, having been generally informed of my 
 negociation with England, you will not be able to avoid inform- 
 ing Counts Woronzow and Stahremberg of your interviews with 
 Lord GrenviUe ; but, by alleging an insufficiency of instructions 
 for the final conclusion of the affair, you wiU defer your explana- 
 tion with them until the return of the courier whom you will 
 despatch to this place with the draft of the Convention. It is 
 
26 EUEOPBAN OONGBESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 for your delicacy and tact to blend together advantageously aU 
 these nice points ; and I flatter myself that, upon so important 
 an occasion, I may rely upon the successful efforts of an old ser- 
 vant whose zeal and attachment are so weU known to me. 
 
 " Berlin, 29th June, 1793. 
 
 " To Baron de Jacobi, London." 
 
 No. 6. 
 Translation of a Letter from the Mabqum LuccHEsmi to the Kino. 
 " SlEB " Vienna, 3rd July, 1793, 
 
 " Although the inexplicable, and to the Eussian Ambas- 
 sador, most unexpected silence of the Ministry of Vienna renders 
 me unable to inform Your Majesty precisely as to the time when 
 the announced unsigned draft despatches can be completed (the 
 said despatches relating to the accession to the Convention of 
 St. Petersburg, and to the wishes of His Imperial Majesty as 
 concerns his own iademnities, respecting which, however, no de- 
 finite resolution appears to have been taken), I nevertheless hasten 
 to perform what was prescribed to me at the end of the orders 
 of June 10th, and to send back the chasseur Klamman, in order 
 to inform you, Sire, of the manner in which I have acquitted 
 myself of the commission with which Your Majesty deigned to 
 entrust me, by the aforesaid despatch, aad of the explanations I 
 have had upon the subject of its contents. In the first conver- 
 sation I had the honour of having with the Baron Thugut, I 
 entirely passed over the two first points of the overtures made 
 by Prince Eeuss on the subject of the Convention of St. Peters- 
 burg, namely, the proposition and settlement of the respective 
 indemnities, avoiding also, after having read the orders of the 
 10th of June, all ulterior explanation upon those two subjects. 
 I, therefore, apphed myself so much the more to insist (with 
 respect to the 3rd) upon Your Majesty's reHgious fidelity and 
 sincere friendship for your august Ally, which could alone have 
 induced you to give such evident proofs of your attachment for 
 His Imperial Majesty. I made the Austrian Minister sensible 
 that nothing but the most anxious desire to be able, without loss 
 of time, to contribute efficaciously to the interests of Austria, 
 could have determined Your Majesty to accelerate, as far as the 
 intervening distance would permit, the concert which Your Ma- 
 jesty must necessarily establish with the Empress of Eussia 
 
CHAr. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 27 
 
 upon the important article of the indemnities : that after this 
 Your Majesty had hastened even to promote the wishes of His 
 Majesty the Emperor, in the event of the prosecution of the 
 plan for the exchange of Bavaria experiencing too great diffi- 
 culties, notwithstanding the efficacious and favourable effi)rts 
 which Your Majesty never ceased to employ in order to facilitate 
 its execution, and by means of which you had also succeeded in 
 preparing and effecting the glorious recovery of the Belgian 
 provinces, an object so indispensable and essential for the 
 realization of the proposed exchange. Lastly, I drew Baron de 
 Thugut's particular attention to the very expressive terms in 
 which Your Majesty intimated that if His Imperial Majesty con- 
 sidered it more suitable to his interests to indemnify himself 
 preferably at the expense of France, a project of this nature 
 would certainly meet with no opposition on your part ; that, on 
 the contrary, you would heartily concur therein, and that all 
 which now remained was for you to await more precise informa- 
 tion as to the extent which the Emperor was desirous of assigning 
 to his acquisitions in that quarter, in order to enable you, by a 
 vigorous co-operation, to bring about, before the end of the 
 present campaign, a state of things calculated to insure the 
 accomplishment of these designs. 
 
 " Baron de Thugut listened very attentively to aU which I 
 had the honour of telling him ; but in this first conversation he 
 avoided even alluding to the subject of the acquisitions to be 
 made upon France, and was so much the more energetic upon 
 that of the exchange of Bavaria. After remarking how great 
 would be the satisfaction with which His Imperial Majesty would 
 receive, at so critical a conjuncture, the reiterated assurances of 
 Your Majesty that your sentiments for this Court were constantly 
 invariable and persevering, he added that the difficulties which 
 the exchange of Bavaria appeared to meet with, would no doubt 
 be surmounted by the powerful co-operation of Yom: Majesty, 
 more especially as the Count de Cobenzal believed that he had 
 obtained from the two Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg 
 a guarantee of its accomplishment. I thought. Sire, that I 
 should be acting in conformity with your royal intentions, by 
 rectifying in a courteous and becoming manner the erroneous 
 ideas which the Director-General appeared to me to entertain 
 upon this important matter ; and, therefore, availing myself of 
 the instructions Your Majesty's ministry was pleased to forward 
 to me on this subject, and which were dated the 28th of March, 
 
28 EUROPEAN' CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 I once more recapitulated to the Baron de Thugut the very 
 efficacious and happy efforts your Majesty has never ceased 
 making since the transmission of the Note of Sterbe for facili- 
 tating and effecting the re-occupation of the Austrian Nether- 
 lands already entirely in the enemy's power. I represented to 
 this Minister, that but for the taking of Frankfort and the suc- 
 cessive advantages gained by Your Majesty over the French, at 
 the close of the last year, by driving them beyond the Ehine, 
 we should be at the present time very far from the possession of 
 the Belgic provinces, while the enemy on the contrary, would 
 have found themselves in the very heart of Germany; that, 
 besides this. Your Majesty had by repeated and energetic repre- 
 sentations, forced, so to speak. General Clairfait to remain 
 beyond the Ehine, and by that means put a stop to the incursions 
 of the French ; that the Prussians had all alone taken Venloo, 
 without which the deliverance of Maestricht would have been 
 completely impossible ; and this fortress once in the hands of 
 the French, the plan of the present campaign, already so favour- 
 able to the interests of the House of Austria, would have been 
 entirely disarranged ; that lastly, the body of troops under the 
 command of Lieut.-General De Yins-Velsdorff had certainly 
 very efficaciously contributed to the recovery of the Nether- 
 lands, according to the testimony of His Imperial Majesty 
 himself, who had charged me officially to bring it to the know- 
 ledge of Your Majesty. Baron de Thugut giving me to under- 
 stand that it was the Austrian armies which had really effected 
 this fortunate and prompt re-occupation, I repHed, that I was 
 very far from wishing to detract the least in the world from the 
 glory which Prince Cobourg had acquired upon that occasion, 
 or from the exemplary valoui- of the Austrian troops, which was 
 the admiration of all Europe, and to which, as he knew, Your 
 Majesty rendered the fullest justice ; but that no one, however, 
 could deny, that had it not been for the success which attended 
 Your Majesty's arms at the end of the last year, when the 
 Austrian army in the Netherlands had been almost entirely 
 defeated, the glorious recovery of that country would not have 
 been accomplished last spring, and that it was thus clear and 
 evident that you had contributed thereto in the most efficacious 
 manner. That as Your Majesty again offered, at the present 
 moment, your good offices in order to insure the success of the 
 exchange project, I appealed to the Emperor's justice and to 
 the enlightened judgment of the Imperial Ministry itself, whether 
 
CuAP. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 29 
 
 Your Majesty had not religiously fulfilled all %he engagements 
 entered into with his august aUy, for the purpose of facnitating 
 and effecting the exchange in question. 
 
 " Feeling, no doubt, the justice of these representations, the 
 Baron de Thugut assured me that he undoubtedly acknowledged, 
 with the warmest sensibility, the friendly and satisfactory expres- 
 sions contained in the despatch which I had just read to him ; 
 but that the point in question was the guarantee for the execu- 
 tion which he believed had been given by Your Majesty and the 
 Empress of Eussia, and of which the Petersburg Convention 
 itself made mention. In answer to this I confined myself to 
 admitting that I knew nothing whatever about such a guarantee 
 of execution, but only of one of agreement, and confessed that 
 I was yet too young in the career of diplomacy for me to under- 
 stand precisely what could be meant by a guarantee of execution 
 upon an object the realization of which evidently depended j 
 upon future and uncertain events ; that it certainly belonged to 
 the two contracting Sovereigns exclusively to give the authentic 
 explanation of the terms employed in the Convention of St. 
 Petersburg, but that it appeared to me, individually, that the 
 terms therein used were so clear as not to allow of a double 
 interpretation. Upon which Baron de Thugut ended this con- 
 versation by the remark, which I reciprocated, that whatever he 
 had said to me on the subject of Bavaria was in no respect 
 official, but merely a friendly conversation entered into for the 
 purpose of mutual elucidation, and for avoiding as much as pos- 
 sible any difierences of opinion between the two allied Courts. 
 
 " I am, &c., &c., 
 (Signed.) " Cesae." 
 
 No. 7. 
 
 Translation of a Kepokt addressed to tlie King by the Ministers Finkenstein, 
 Alvenslbbbn, and Haugwitz, July 10, 1793. 
 
 " Your Majesty will have been already informed, by the 
 last despatch from St. Petersburg, of the important contents of 
 the answer which the Empress of Eussia has caused to be deli- 
 vered by Count Easoumoffsky to the Court of Vienna with 
 regard to the overtures of the latter on the subject of the 
 St. Petersburg Convention. The Sieur d'Alopeus, more com- 
 municative hereon than was the Count d'Oestermann, has just 
 
30 EUROPEAN OONGE ESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 sent us a copy of the despatch addressed, upon, this matter, to 
 the said Ambassador, and dated the 16th (27th) May, as well as 
 of that he has himself received, and which was sent at the same 
 time as the first. We have consequently the honour of pre- 
 senting both, hereunto annexed, to Your Majesty, observing that 
 in Count Easoumoffsky's we have taken the liberty of under- 
 lining the passages which appeared to us to merit particular 
 attention. We more especially include in this number the 
 phrase wherein it is said that the Convention of St. Petersburg, 
 to which the Empress presses the Court of Vienna to accede, 
 and to which also, according to every appearance, the latter will 
 accede without any hesitation, obliged Your Majesty to co- 
 operate in the expensive war which she is now engaged in 
 prosecuting, so long as it should last. We must own that this 
 Convention expresses itself upon this point with too much pre- 
 cision for it to be possible entirely to elude the engagement it 
 contains ; and if the Emperor accede thereto it will be for the 
 isole purpose of restricting, as much as is in his power, the said 
 obligation, to which our efforts must likewise be confined. On 
 the other hand, however, it wiU not escape the enlightened 
 attention of Your Majesty that the Empress herself appears to 
 favour this restriction, inasmuch as it is said, towards the end 
 of the despatch to Count Easoumoffsky, that it is of importance 
 to the Court of Vienna to bring about a concurrence more or less 
 liberal on the part of Prussia ; an expression which appears to 
 us to indicate that, while representing to the Court of Vienna 
 the proposed accession to the Convention of St. Petersburg as 
 the means of securing Your Majesty's continued co-operation in 
 the war, the Empress has, notwithstanding, been desu-ous of 
 laying upon the Emperor the task of ultimately arranging with 
 her the mode and extent of that concurrence. It has therefore 
 appeared to us of so much the greater importance that Your 
 Majesty should, as much as possible, keep your hands free upon 
 this point, in the final answer which is yet to be given to the 
 Court of Vienna relatively to the indemnities of the latter, and 
 that, with this view, you should confine yourself in that answer, 
 as far as Your Majesty's co-operation in the war is concerned 
 to some what general terms, in order that Your Majesty may 
 not be bound further than circumstances may require. 
 
 " We have occupied ourselves ia drawing up this answer 
 agreeably to the principle we have just indicated, giving it at 
 the same time the form of an ostensible despatch, addressed to 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 31 
 
 the Sieur Cesar ; and persuaded that, with respect to the object 
 itself of the Austrian indemnities, that their acquisition at the 
 expense of France would be infinitely preferable to the exchange 
 of Bavaria, we have thought we should meet the intentions of 
 Your Majesty by evincing, as regards the views which the Em- 
 peror might be desirous of manifesting on that head, a consider- 
 able degree of facility and obligingness ; it being, however, well 
 understood that he should previously make known to Your 
 Majesty in what they consist, in order that you may subse- 
 quently explain yourself on the subject. We submit this here- 
 unto annexed despatch to the examination and approval of Your 
 Majesty, begging that, should it give you satisfaction, Your 
 Majesty would be pleased to affix your signature, and cause it to 
 be despatched immediately from head-quarters. Upon the exact 
 accomplishment of the stipulations contaiaed in the Convention 
 of St. Petersburg for the prosecution of the war, and the acces- 
 sion of the Court of Vienna to that Convention, it also appeared 
 to us as indubitable that the interests of Your Majesty in such 
 complicated circumstances require more than ever that you 
 should no longer decline the alliance so often proposed by the 
 British Court for the purpose of continuing and terminating the 
 war with one accord ; since it is to be hoped that events will 
 produce a contingency which, whUe, determining the Enghsh 
 Minister in favour of the peace which he is certainly desirous of 
 accelerating, would open to Your Majesty the prospect of your- 
 self arriving at this so salutary an end by the re-establishment 
 of the general tranquillity. 
 
 " Therefore, according to the authorization already contained 
 in the orders of Your Majesty of the 22nd May, it shall be our 
 care, as soon as the answer of the Empress upon this matter 
 shall reach us, to send without delay to Baron de Jacobi the 
 ftdl power which Your Majesty has signed, and to furnish him 
 with the necessary instructions. 
 
 " By so doing we hope to conform to the royal will of Your 
 Majesty, and we await, with the profoundest respect, the orders 
 with which you may be pleased to honour us upon the important 
 object of this most humble report. 
 
 (Signed) " Finkenstein. 
 
 " Alvensleben. 
 " Haugwitz." 
 
 " Berlin, Jtme 10, 1793. 
 " To the King." 
 
32 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 No. 8. 
 
 Translation of a Repobt addressed to the Kins by the Ministers 
 Alvbnsleben and Haugwitz, July 13, 1793. 
 
 " The Marquis Lucchesini has just forwarded to us by courier 
 the plan which Lord Beauchamp, now the Earl of Yarmouth, 
 has been charged to propose to Your Majesty to serve as a basis 
 for the Convention to be concluded between you, Sire, and 
 England, relatively to the present war. This transaction having 
 ever appeared to us of a preponderatiug importance, and the 
 consequences which may result therefrom being so closely con- 
 nected with the welfare of the Prussian monarchy, we presume, 
 Sire, to lay before you, most respectfully, the observations which 
 the first overtures of the Plenipotentiary have suggested to us. 
 
 " Although Baron Jacobi is already provided with the in- 
 structions and full powers requisite for the negotiation, we 
 cannot deny that the mission of Lord Yarmouth and the cre- 
 dentials with which he is furnished are entitled to some con- 
 sideration. It strikes us that Your Majesty would fear to dis- 
 oblige the King of England by refusing to enter iuto discussion 
 with the confidential agent whom he has sent to head-quarters ; 
 and this impression has induced us to inform Baron Jacobi, by 
 yesterday's post, that he must suspend for the present his pro- 
 ceedings, and await further orders, which he will receive imme- 
 diately. 
 
 " Upon comparing the plan transmitted through Lord Yar- 
 mouth with the note we have drawn up upon the Convention, 
 signed by Lord Grrenville and Count Woronzow, we confess that 
 the articles are nearly the same, and present no essential differ- 
 ence ; but Your Majesty will be pleased to recollect that, in the 
 despatch addressed to your Minister in London, we have made 
 the final conclusion to depend upon certain previous notions 
 which enabled us to judge of the real intentions of England, 
 and to adopt, ia consequence, the changes and additions of which 
 the Treaty appeared susceptible. This information being stiU a 
 desideratum, the least we can do at present is to consider 
 maturely these same propositions of Lord Yarmouth as far as 
 we are acquainted with them through the summary of his first 
 conference with the Marquis Lucchesini. 
 
 " They indeed confirm the conjectures we have for some time 
 formed of the tendency of England to terminate the war as soon 
 
Chap. I. EUKOPBAN CONGRESSES. 33 
 
 as possible, and to simplify its co-operation either by putting 
 aside the indemnification of the belligerent Powers, or by aToid- 
 ing to take part in the definitiye arrangement of the internal 
 affairs of France. But, on the other hand, we have been struck 
 with surprise at seeing the English negotiation specify in detail 
 the efforts which Your Majesty is considered as bound to impose 
 upon yourself in this war, as a member of the Empire, as the 
 ally of Austria, as the ally of Great Britain, as the ally of Hol- 
 land; an enumeration so much the more remarkable as His 
 Britannic Majesty, in his letter of the 26th June, also makes 
 mention of the aid he would have expected from you, had you 
 not already, by your active intervention, contributed to the com- 
 mon cause. An insinuation so positively made could not but 
 redouble our attention upon the obligations which may result 
 from the Convention ; nor can we conceal from ourselves that ' 
 Articles 1 and 4, although in other respects conceived in very j 
 general terms, decidedly imply an unlimited co-operation as to I 
 time. Thus, notwithstanding the disposition of England to make 
 the war last so long only as is strictly necessary, it may, how- 
 ever, be in the order of possibilities that this Power may find 
 itself compelled still further to continue the war during one or 
 several campaigns ; in the event of which, Sire, you would be 
 irrevocably dragged in also, by virtue of the new Convention ; 
 and the same would be the case with the other co-interested 
 parties, who would all require from Prussia the assistance stipu- 
 lated by the treaties. In this manner Your Majesty would be 
 bound to furnish — 
 
 Men. 
 
 To the Court ofVienna 20,000 
 
 To the Court of London 20,000 
 
 To the Eepublic of the United Provinces .. .. 12,000 
 For the Contingents of the Empire, about .. .. 13,000 
 
 Total .. .. 66,000 
 
 This calculation astounds us, for it offers us the most complete 
 certainty that Your Majesty's finances are not in a condition to 
 support so considerable a force, and that were you to continue 
 it, at your own expense, for the next year only, you would run 
 the risk, Sire, of inflicting a mortal blow upon the political 
 existence of the monarchy and the welfare of your people. This 
 truth is an alarming one, but it is precisely because it is so that 
 we venture to lay it before the eyes of a King who is the friend 
 of truth and the father of his subjects. 
 
 D 
 
34 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 " So intimate an ally as the Court of England is, one which 
 does justice to the prodigious sacrifices Your Majesty has already 
 made, and which is not ignorant that the resources of Prussia 
 are limited, could never take offence at having the prospect of 
 our embarrassments presented to it, or that, in demonstrating to 
 it the impossibility of meeting them, the sole means of remedying 
 them should at the same time be indicated. Those means, Sire, 
 would consist in securing for yourself, should the prosecution 
 of the war become absolutely inevitable, the following very 
 ' express condition : — ' That the Empire and all the co-interested 
 Powers should furnish to Your Majesty the pecuniary resources 
 of which you stand iu need in order to prolong your co- 
 operation.' 
 
 " For this purpose it would be requisite to add a secret article 
 to the Convention to be concluded with the Court of London, to 
 the effect that Your Majesty engages to co-operate until the 
 conclusion of the present campaign, but that for another one it 
 would be actually necessary that the other Powers co-interested 
 with the Court of London should furnish the pecuniary means 
 you might require. Should this stipulation be refused. Your 
 Majesty should then break the ice, and categorically declare 
 that it is utterly impossible for you to continue the war at your 
 own charge, &c. &c. 
 
 " Such, Sire, is the point of view in which we think it behoves 
 us to regard the present state of the negotiation with the Court 
 of London ; and we should consider ourselves fortunate if Your 
 Majesty should deign to authorize the Marquis Lucchesini to 
 insert our suggestions ia the fundamental principles of the 
 Treaty. 
 
 (Signed) " Alvensleben. 
 " Haugwitz." 
 
 " Berlin 13th July, 1793. 
 " To the King." 
 
 No. 9. 
 
 Translation of a Report addressed to the King by the Ministers 
 Alvensleben and Haugwitz. 
 
 " We have just received the du:ect letter Your Majesty has done 
 us the favour of addressing to us, dated the 13th July, and accom- 
 panied by the original Convention which the Marquis Lucchesini 
 has been instructed to sign with Lord Beauchamp relatively to 
 the affairs of France. By our very humble report of the 15th 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 35 
 
 instant, Your Majesty will no doubt, in the iaterval, have been 
 conTinced that, from the very moment we were informed of the 
 overtures of the English plenipotentiary, we recognised the ne- 
 cessity of transferring. Sire, into your camp, and under your own 
 eyes, the seat of the negotiation ; and that, without even awaiting 
 the orders of Your Majesty, we hastened to submit to you the full 
 power required by the Marquis Lucchesini, in order to conclude 
 the transaction, and to suspend, provisionally, the operations of 
 Baron de Jacobi in London. While taking these necessary steps, 
 we also undertook the essential duty of laying before you. Sire, 
 the reflections which appeared to us naturally suggested by the 
 first propositions of Lord Beauchamp. They will not have had 
 the time to reach your Majesty before the accomplishment of the 
 work ; and all that now remains, therefore, is to forward to you 
 the annexed ratification, which you had commanded us to trans- 
 mit to you. But, full of the confidence which we place in your 
 goodness, and listening solely to the ardent zeal with which we 
 are animated for your service, we dare flatter ourselves that you 
 win not have refused to cast a glance upon our respectful repre- 
 sentations, and it is in this hope that we propose resuming the 
 thread- of them. 
 
 " It is out of all doubt. Sire, that the project brought by Lord 
 Beauchamp from London nearly approaches the one which we 
 had ourselves sketched from the tenor of the Convention con- 
 cluded on the 23rd January, between Lord GrenviUe and Count 
 Woronzow ; but Your Majesty's position being so vastly different 
 both from that of Russia, who, in the course of this war, has con- 
 fined herseK to enacting a purely passive part, and from that of 
 all the other coalised Powers, who act either in their own defence 
 or for objects of private interest, we have, in our instructions to 
 Baron de Jacobi, limited ourselves to consulting the previous 
 notions he might have been able to collect ; and this is the reason 
 of our enjoining him very particularly to defer the final conclu- 
 sion until he had put it in our power maturely to weigh circum- 
 stances. We were beforehand imbued with the great truth, that 
 if it was intended to tie Your Majesty's hands by an unlimited 
 co-operation, the safety of your kingdom required an additional 
 stipulation, which might protect you from the ruinous expenses 
 of a third campaign — expenses the burden of which you could 
 no longer bear, and for which Your Majesty is entitled to claim 
 the aid of foreign subventions. So soon as the negociation was 
 no longer to be continued at London, we readily conceived that 
 
 D 2 
 
B6 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 it would be diiScult to stop it until Baron de Jacobi had for- 
 warded to us tlie result of his inquiries ; and even supposing the 
 possibility of admitting so long a delay, we stiU entertained doubts 
 of being able to obtaiu such information through his medium, 
 because it was evident that Lord Grenville would avoid any 
 positive explanation for fear of counteracting Lord Beauchamp's 
 proceedings. It is therefore upon the examination of what passed 
 between the latter and the Marquis Lucchesini in their first con- 
 ference that we must establish our opinion as well as the con- 
 ception of the separate article mentioned in our very humble 
 report, and the necessity of which has appeared, and still does 
 appear, to us so urgent, that unless it be agreed to in one way or 
 another, by the Court of England, and successively by all the co- 
 interested parties, the future co-operation of Your Majesty be- 
 comes absolutely impossible, according to the alarming calcula- 
 tions which we took the liberty of submitting to you, and which 
 now acquire a greater degree of certainty, inasmuch as we learn 
 by the last letter from the Marquis Lucchesini that Lord Beau- 
 champ had already spoken to him somewhat confidentiy of Eng- 
 land's preparations for a second campaign, and gave him an 
 inkling of a plan of indemnities in favour of Austria, the execu- 
 tion of which presaged many years more of war. Persuaded that 
 these important reflections have not, Sire, escaped the penetra- 
 tion of your exalted intelligence, we however confess that when 
 once the Convention is concluded, signed, and ratified, there , 
 remaias scarcely any probability of the additional article being 
 afterwards introduced therein, without which, we think, it must 
 lose aU its real value, the impossibility of fulflUing the stipula- 
 tions of the said Convention beiag clearly proved. But since 
 Your Majesty has just established with the King of Great Britain 
 a more confidential communication upon the present posture of 
 affairs, and are besides connected with that Sovereign by so many 
 intimate relations, would it not be as well to make known to 
 him immediately the difficulties with which Prussia is menaced, 
 and propose to him the only remedy which can be applied to 
 them ? 
 
 " It appears to us that the final clause of Article I. of the new 
 Convention might naturally furnish the opportunity ; the very 
 opportune pivot, ' that the contracting Powers will continue to em- 
 ploy their respective forces, so far as the circumstances in which 
 they shall find themselves will permit,' being susceptible of a very' 
 wide interpretation, a commencement might be made by de- 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 37 
 
 ducing therefrom the subject of a secret declaration, in which 
 Your Majesty should make known, in confidence, to your ancient 
 ally, that having acceded to the alliance which the King of Eng- 
 land had proposed to you relatively to the war, Your Majesty 
 thought it your duty to make to him the frank and confidential 
 avowal, that after the immense sacrifices and efforts which you 
 had undertaken and made during the former campaign, and 
 which you were determined to continue vigorously until the end 
 of the present one, you would no longer be in a condition to pro- 
 secute subsequently, at your own charge, a war into which you 
 had only entered as an auxiliary Power. That if the allied Courts 
 in coalition took an earnest interest in securing the aid of Prussia 
 for the followmg campaigns, all that would be necessary was to 
 pjjpvide her with pecuniary means proportioned to the enterprise, 
 and to come to an understanding thereon with Your Majesty. 
 That Your Majesty would expect the King of England to take 
 the lead in acknowledging the justice of these prmciples ; and 
 that you should reserve it to yourself. Sire, to 'come to an ex- 
 planation with the other belligerent Powers in succession. 
 
 " We entreat your Majesty to regard with a favourable eye 
 the very powerful motives which have induced us to return to 
 the chatge, in order to reproduce before you the indispensable 
 necessity of a measure to which we attach the glory of your 
 reign and the prosperity of the monarchy. It is impossible for 
 us to dissemble, either to ourselves or to you, Sire, the evils and 
 dangers which the continuation of this fatal war would not fail to 
 create, if at least the weight of the expense were not ultimately 
 thrown upon the Powers who, strictly speaking, ought to have 
 borne it from the very commencement. Lord Beauchamp having 
 announced other additional communications which wiU relate to 
 objects of the greatest importance to Prussia, the negociation is 
 always considered as remaining open ; and the Marquis Lucchesini 
 will have no difficulty in insuring, with his usual ability, the en- 
 forcement of the capital point, which still remains to be discussed, 
 for want of its having been inserted in the principal Convention. 
 
 " We shaU esteem ourselves the most fortunate servants of 
 Your Majesty, if the expedient we have just suggested should 
 attain its object ; and if in repeating our respectful admonitions, 
 we should derive the pleasing satisfaction of having deserved 
 your august approbation. 
 
 (Signed) " Alvensleben. 
 
 " Berlin, 19th July, 1793. " HaUGWITZ. 
 
 " To the King." 
 
38 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 It would be extraneous to the views contemplated in 
 this memoir to recapitulate the long and complicated 
 discussion which took place after the date of this corre- 
 spondence, until the object to which it pointed, namely, 
 the separation by Prussia from her connexion with the 
 Allied Powers, was effected. This object she attained 
 by the Treaty of Basle, signed on the 3rd of April, 1795. 
 
 The important negociations by which this Treaty 
 was brought about, are most ably and satisfactorily re- 
 lated in the work, entitled ' The Memoirs d'un Homme 
 d'Etat,' published in Paris, 1831, and in the early 
 chapters of the excellent ' History of the French Ee;gD- 
 lution ' by Sir Archibald Alison, as also in the 3rd vol. 
 of the ' Diaries and Correspondence of the First Earl of 
 Malmesbury,' in which an account is given of the 
 Treaty of Subsidy and Alliance between Grreat Britain 
 and the States-General with Prussia, negociated at 
 Berlin, and signed by Lord Malmesbury and Count 
 Hertsberg at the Hague, 19th April, 1794. Before 
 the end of that year, and after the payment of 600,000/. 
 of the subsidy stipulated by it from Grreat Britain to 
 Prussia, and without the fulfilment of its obligations on 
 the part of the Prussian Government, the rupture of 
 that treaty was announced by a note of Baron Harden- 
 berg, delivered at Frankfort, 25th October, 1794, to 
 Lord Malmesbury, and Baron Kinckel, the Dutch Ple- 
 nipotentiary ; and on the 3rd April, 1795, the Prussian 
 Government concluded with France a Treaty of Amity, 
 by which it ceded to her all the territories on the left 
 bank of the Ehine. By this act Prussia entirely sepa- 
 rated herself from the alHance she had previously pro- 
 posed and contracted with England, Austria, and 
 Russia, and established a most intimate and friendly 
 connexion with the French Government, which lasted 
 till the end of the war. 
 
 The relations of peace having been thus established 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 39 
 
 between these two countries, the Marquis Lucchesini 
 was soon afterwards sent as the Prussian minister to 
 Paris, where he was received in the first instance by 
 Bonaparte, M. de Talleyrand, and the Grovernment, 
 with the greatest confidence and favour. Soon after, 
 however, he was generally understood to be living on 
 terms of great intimacy with the men of letters who 
 at that time were residing in that capital, but who were 
 supposed to be acting in opposition to the measures of 
 the First Consul. It is curious to observe in the fol- 
 lowing documents the jealousy with which this circum- 
 stance was regarded by him. The subjoined letters, of 
 which the first is from the King of Prussia, and the 
 second from his private secretary, are proofs of the 
 anxious desire which at that time existed at Berlin 
 to maintain the best understanding with the French 
 Grovernment : — 
 
 No. 10. 
 Kino of Peussia to Marquis Lucchesini. 
 
 " A few days ago General Bournonville requested an audience 
 of me, in wHch, after having communicated the propositions with 
 which he was charged upon the subject of affairs in general, and 
 given me proofs of the confidence of his Government, he made 
 no secret of your intimacies in Paris being but ill calculated to 
 promote it. Tastes creditable in themselves, when public business 
 is not compromised thereby, are said to exercise too great an in- 
 fluence in the choice of your society, and you are represented as 
 preferring to hve with a class of persons — that of Hterary men — 
 who, so far from making themselves useful, turn their abilities to 
 bad account. If tranquhhty prevailed, doubtless the Govern- 
 ment would pass this over without notice ; but after the pohtical 
 storms which have agitated France, and when either excitement 
 or malevolence menaces its repose, it becomes the duty of the 
 First Consul to exercise the strictest vigilance. Well aware who 
 the persons are that intend mischief, he forms beforehand his 
 opinion of those who take a pleasure in being intimate with them, 
 and upon this principle it is that he regulates his confidence. 
 
40 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 Tour instructions are too exact, and you have evinced in too 
 many missions your respect for them, to allow the idea to exist 
 for one moment, of attributing to you a real error ; but no one 
 knows better than yourself that in political affairs, to avoid doing 
 wrong is not sufBcient. AU those nice gradations which appear 
 of little or no value, but of which confidence or mistrust is in fact 
 made up, are by no means to be neglected when such vital inte- 
 rests are concerned, and mine gain or lose ia proportion as my 
 ministers either succeed in conciliatiug personal esteem or neglect 
 the means of so doing. But the evil is now done, and at this 
 moment it will be impossible for you to serve me at Paris as your 
 zeal would prompt you, or as your talents justified me in hoping ; 
 but I flatter myself at least that the impression will be but 
 transient, and that you will find no difficulty in regaioing confi- 
 dence by proving, even in the most trifling particulars or at 
 another time, that France has acquired my friendship, that my 
 wishes are in favour of the wise Government whose desire is 
 order and peace, and that by obeying my instructions in all that 
 can convince that Government, your zeal for the object is identi- 
 fied with that of your ofiice. Desirous of rendering to your long 
 services all the justice they deserve, I shall learn with real satis- 
 faction that you have overcome the prejudices which cause me so 
 much uneasiness, and that you have regained the confidence of 
 the First Consul. 
 
 " I pray God, &c., 
 
 " FEfiDEBIC GUILLAUME." 
 
 " Charlottenburg, 6tli June, 1801. 
 " Marquis L." 
 
 No. 11. 
 
 From M. de Lombakd to the Mabquib LtrccEESiNi. 
 
 " For reasons which your Excellency wiU understand, I added 
 no observations of my own to the King's letter, on the day it was 
 despatched. Besides, I should have nothing but curiosity to 
 gratify; for there are impressions to which the Marquis Lucchesini 
 is insensible. 
 
 " The French Government has not caused insinuations to be 
 made : but the most formal, the most violent, the most angry 
 declaration — a declaration amounting almost to the demand of a 
 recall. To these complaints the letter which your Excellency has 
 received was to be considered as the ostensible reply. I know 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 41 
 
 not if it be well calculated for its object ; but of this I am posi- 
 tively certain, that the King believes everything to be possible 
 ■with your Excellency ; and that after having, by his despatch, 
 calmed (as he expects) every angry feeling, and satisfied offended 
 seK-love, he does not despair of witnessing an immediate triumph 
 upon your part. I shall not speak to you of the opinion which 
 has been entertained respecting you. Tou were formed to dictate 
 it, not to let it disquiet you ; but at a distance of two hundred 
 leagues the data which are wanting are sometimes taken as 
 granted, and calculations are suspended which ought to have been 
 agreed upon from the first. In one point of view alone, I think 
 you will not be displeased at hearing from the man whose post 
 allows him the best means of observation, that if ever there were 
 a person respecting whom opinion was unardmous, it is yourself. 
 Three months after your dSut in Paris, you created enthusiasm ; 
 and although at present a slight feeling of regret is mixed with 
 it, every one is sensible that you alone could cause such regret, 
 and that there is but one whose loss would admit of no con- 
 solation. 
 
 " I have asked myself what impression His Majesty's letter 
 would make on me, were I in your place ; but I feel that I must 
 be actually in it, in order to answer the question. Every con- 
 dition has an amour propre peculiar to itself; to be superior to 
 petty considerations is yours. A Lucchesini is but a Prussian, 
 he is only great, he revenges himself by compelling esteem; 
 and, certain of one day leaving in the hearts of his countrymen 
 the remembrance of his unequalled services, he cares but little 
 if there should be found among the archives of his master's 
 cabinet, a melancholy and perishable record of passions to which 
 he is a stranger. 
 
 " I have the honour to be, with a respect only equalled by my 
 devotedness, 
 
 (Signed) " Lombaed." 
 
 A few months previous to the date of these letters, 
 the declaration of the British Government against the 
 armed neutrality at sea, which was headed by Russia, 
 had called forth from the Cabinet of Berlin the an- 
 nouncement of a line of policy which would have mili- 
 tated against the views and interests of England. This 
 policy might eventually have been carried to a great 
 
42 EUROPEAN OONGEBSSBS. Chap. I. 
 
 extent, had it not been arrested by the victory of the 
 British fleet at Copenhagen, the death of the Emperor 
 Paul, and the dissolution of the coalition which had 
 been formed ; but the following letter from the first 
 minister of Prussia, Count Haugwitz, explains the 
 general system which, had the war broken out, it was 
 his intention to have recommended to his Court : — 
 
 No. 12. 
 
 Translation of Count Haugwitz's Letter to the Mabquis of Lucchesini, 
 
 1801. 
 
 " I write to you in the gi-eatest haste, my dear Excellency, 
 being desirous to avail myself of the courier General Boumon- 
 ville is just sending off to Paris, in order to give you a preli- 
 minary reply to your last despatches of the 22nd and' 25th uist., 
 and to communicate to you intelligence of the utmost import- 
 ance, and which must serve as your special guide. England has 
 just formally declared war agaiast Eussia, aUegiug, among other 
 reasons for so doing, the Convention for the maritime neutraKty, 
 which she declares to be injurious to and an attack upon her 
 rights and interests. Denmark and Sweden are not yet named 
 in the declaration ; but, considering upon what the above reasons 
 are founded, there is no doubt but that they equally apply to those 
 Powers. Lord Carysfort has officially communicated the circum- 
 stance here, and the King has already decided upon the course 
 to be taken. An immediate answer will be given to the British 
 Minister declaring the formal adhesion of the King to the said 
 maritime Convention, and requiring, without any delay, the 
 Com-t of England to put a stop to its hostile measures against the 
 Northern Powers ; in default of which His Majesty will be com- 
 pelled to adopt such, on Ins part, as are necessary for fulfilling 
 the engagements he has entered into with them. The conse- 
 quences of this reply are to be foreseen, but the King, without 
 awaiting them, is determined upon being in advance of the time 
 when England, as is anticipated, will carry out her measures 
 against the Northern Courts. We shall take possession of the 
 moutha of the Elbe and of the Weser, and even of the country 
 of Hanover, and silent preparations are making at this very 
 moment for that purpose. For the present, and I cannot im- 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 43 
 
 press it upon you too strongly, tte utmost secresy should be 
 observed, a caution the more important as Baron de Jacobi must 
 be previously informed of it without delay, so that he may have 
 time to warn such of our vessels as may be in England to leave 
 as soon as possible. You can, however, without making any 
 official communication, give beforehand the positive assurance 
 that the King, having acceded to the maritime Convention, wiU 
 be faithful to the engagements he has entered into with the 
 Northern Powers, and will act accordingly. I expect to despatch 
 to you, in a few days, a courier who wDl be the bearer of more 
 detailed instructions and of interestiag communications ; amongst 
 the rest a complete copy of the maritime Convention. 
 
 " I embrace you, my dear Excellency, with all my soul, and 
 renew the assurances with, &c. 
 
 (Signed) " Haugwitz." 
 
 " Berlin, February 3, 1801." 
 
 The hostilities whicVi, according to this letter, v^ere 
 upon the point of breaking out betvsreen Prussia and 
 England, were fortunately averted; but the spirit in 
 which the Prussian Cabinet was at that time directed, 
 and the eagerness to seize an opportunity for the in- 
 vasion of Hanover and the neighbouring states, are 
 characteristic of the minister who terminated his 
 political career by bringing upon his country the mis- 
 fortunes which followed the battle of Jena, By siding 
 with or yielding to the grasping ambition of Bonaparte, 
 Count Haugwitz prepared the way for this dreadful 
 calamity, and has afforded a useful lesson to the world 
 of the impolicy of deferring to a system of injustice 
 and of aggression, upon any hope that, should a suitable 
 opportunity arise, the same inflictions would not be 
 visited upon those who from cunning or cowardice have 
 approved of or encouraged it. 
 
 Shortly after the date of this letter the Peace of 
 Amiens was concluded, and tranquillity was established 
 throughout the world ; but the passions of mankind 
 had been too violently agitated, too many interests had 
 
44 EUROPEAN CONGEESSBS. Chap. I. 
 
 been overthrown, and too much food for the ambition 
 of a numerous body of men who had suddenly risen 
 into power and consequence was still abroad, to allow 
 of its long continuance. The aggressions of Prance on 
 every side alarmed the Grovernment of England ; the 
 menace of the First Consul that Great Britain should 
 be excluded from all influence upon the Continent, and 
 that she was unequal to contend with France, roused 
 the spirit of the country ; and the reported armaments 
 in the ports of France and Holland induced the British 
 Grovernment to arm, and to prepare for the contest 
 which, for the maintenance of the power and inde- 
 pendence of the country, it appeared evident it would 
 have to engage in. This determination was publicly 
 announced in the King's speech to the two Houses of 
 Parliament on the 8th of March, 1803. The following 
 letter from the Baron Jacobi Kleist, the Prussian 
 minister then residing in London, and addressed to the 
 Marquis Succesini in Paris, will give a satisfactory 
 view of the state of things at that moment, both in 
 England and on the Continent, as they were observed 
 by so distinguished and able a diplomatist : — 
 
 No. 13. 
 
 Letter of the Bakon Jacobi. 
 
 " MONS. LE MaKQUIS, " London, 29th March, 1803. 
 
 " Yesterday I received the letter which your Excellency 
 did me the honour of writing on the 22nd inst., and I appreciate 
 too highly the expressions of confidence in me contained therein 
 not to take the earKest opportunity of replyiog to it. 
 
 " I shall address myself, first, to that part of your letter which 
 appears to me to hold out the happiest prognostic of the main- 
 tenance of peace between this country and France. You ex- 
 press, Sir, your firm conviction as to the sincere desire of 
 the French Government to preserve peace, and its unreserved 
 vilHngness to calm the distrust of England, so that nothing 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 45 
 
 compatible with the dignity and security of the French Goyern- 
 ment would be rejected at Paris. 
 
 " It affords me the greatest pleasure, to be enabled to 
 assure you, on my part, that the friendly views of the British 
 Grovemment are most decided ; and if, in my position here, I 
 possess not the same facilities as you do in Paris for judging of 
 the pacific system of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, I can, at least, 
 confidently state that, throughout England, there is but one 
 opinion upon the moderate and pacific character of the King and 
 his Ministry, as well as upon their wish, at length, to live with 
 France upon terms of sincere friendship. 
 
 " This is a truth of which no well-informed foreign Power will, 
 I think, entertain the slightest doubt. All the parties iato which 
 the nation and Parliament of England are divided are unanimous 
 upon this point, but they are not equally so as regards the 
 motives of these peaceable dispositions, some attributing them to 
 prudence and sagacity, while others see nothing in them but 
 weakness. In both these cases, and however they may origi- 
 nate, since the French Government is animated with the sincere 
 wish to tranquillise the anxiety of England, let us not admit a 
 doubt of her succeeding. It appears to me that no very great 
 diplomatic skill is required to bring about a sincere reconcilia- 
 tion, provided that, in their salutary labours, the negociators be 
 guided by upright and honourable principles. But, as you 
 remark, my Lord, it is certain that, unless every prepossession 
 against either of the two Powers be excluded, every effort will 
 be fruitless. Menaces especially would be but labour lost. 
 
 " With regard to the inclinations of the European Powers it 
 appears to me that the want of peace is so imperious, after the 
 bloody and disastrous war which has been terminated by the 
 peace of Amiens, that not one could be found blind enough to 
 refuse contributing, in all sincerity, to the maritime peace. 
 Your colleagues in Paris, my Lord, who appear to despair of 
 preserving it on account of the presumed impossibility of the 
 success of a conciliatory negociation, are certainly not the fittest 
 of all persons for undertaking so important a work. They would 
 commence by doubts and discouragement, and success in affairs 
 is very rare when our mind represents it to us as impossible. 
 But upon what foundations do they rest their melancholy con- 
 victions as to the failure of such a negociation ? Their doubts 
 must be supported by such grave considerations that it becomes 
 highly important to know them but, while I am ignorant of 
 
46 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 them, I cannot, indeed, but persuade myself that a negociation, 
 begun under the happy auspices of a mutual and sincere desire 
 for peace, would be crowned with complete success. I would 
 venture to guarantee beforehand that parties here are fully 
 determined to admit every modiiication compatible with the 
 honour and security of the Crown and of the nation. My reasons 
 are these : independently of the circumstance that the pacific 
 inclinations of the Kuig and of the Ministry appear to form the 
 principal traits in their character, they have, moreover, the most 
 powerful motives for wishing to avoid a rupture. 
 
 " They are not ignorant of the fatal consequences which would 
 infallibly result from it to Portugal, Naples, and other secondary 
 Powers. Holland could not fail to suffer by it. The Court of 
 the Tuileries has given it to be pretty well understood here that, 
 as it is impossible for France to contend at sea with the English 
 fleets, it would be on the Continent that the torch of war would 
 be made to blaze, should it, unfortunately, be rekindled by the 
 proceedings of England : nor is it made a matter of concealment 
 that the French armies would easily find, for the third time, 
 their road to Vienna. No doubt even is entertained that the war 
 would soon extend itself to Hanover and Hamburg, and number 
 those countries among its victims. Lastly, experience shows 
 but too plainly that the national prosperity, which gains the 
 most by the blessings of peace, good order, and the extinction of 
 the debt, could not but suffer the severest injuries from the un- 
 foreseen convulsions attendant upon a new war. No one, 
 assuredly, could guarantee that a complete anarchy would not 
 agaia succeed to that order which is only being just resuscitated 
 upon the Continent. 
 
 " All these grave considerations cannot fail to have occu- 
 pied the councils of His Britannic Majesty in the most serious 
 manner; and, although I am certainly less initiated into the 
 mysteries of the two Cabiaets than you, who are accredited 
 to a Government united to Prussia by the ties of a perfect 
 friendship, strengthened, morever, by interests frequently similar, 
 still I venture to assure you that, without having forgotten a 
 single one of those reflections, the apprehensions of the British 
 Government respecting the continually progressive projects of 
 aggrandizement attributed to the First Consul, have been so 
 serious that not one of the above considerations has succeeded in 
 allaying them. For tliis reason they appear to me the sole and 
 exclusive causes of the attitude which the King has thought it 
 
Ohap.I. EUROPEAN CONGEESSES. 47 
 
 his duty ultimately to assume, by means of the message in 
 question. 
 
 " Were your Excellency acquainted with my reports which have 
 preceded and followed that of the 18th of February, of which you 
 speak to me, your Lordship would not have the least doubt as to 
 my firm and constant conviction that peace between the two 
 Governments cannot be maintained unless the sagacity of the 
 First Consul succeed in tranquillising the apprehensions of the 
 British Government upon the subject of the poHcy adopted by 
 France. 
 
 " It is asserted here that the pacific conquests of the First 
 Consul since the preliminaries of the peace of Amiens equal, if 
 they do not surpass, all those which France has acquired by the 
 most brilliant victories ; and the uneasiness of the British Cabinet 
 upon the subject has always been on the increase. The assurances 
 of the French Ministers here as to the friendly dispositions of 
 their Government have never produced the desired effect. The 
 political measures of the Court of the Tuileries have made so 
 striking an impression upon the minds of the British Ministers 
 that, notwithstanding the frank and open character of General 
 Andreossy, his protestations of friendship have always been 
 looked upon as at variance with fact. I will not, my Lord, 
 conceal from you that I have myself been called upon, more 
 than once, to defend the policy of the First Consul by the consi- 
 deration that a Government recently established imder forms 
 absolutely different from that of the one to which it succeeded, 
 must necessarily follow a different course from other Govern- 
 ments established upon the basis of time and of the habit of 
 conforming to what is called the equilibrium of Europe ; that all 
 stUl depended upon the imposing attitude which the French 
 Government might preserve for the purpose of queUing anarch- 
 ists at home, and of securing respect from the other European 
 nations abroad; that, as the consolidation of the actual Govern- 
 ment in France could not but interest all Europe for the purpose 
 of stopping the contagion of the revolutionary spirit, and, as the 
 First Consul must himseK be sensible that confidence is the most 
 solid basis of his immense power, he would not hereafter refuse, 
 at a proper time and place, to enter into the views of the present 
 Ministry, and certainly endeavour gradually to remove all the 
 causes of England's apprehensions with respect to the pre- 
 ponderating power of France upon the Continent. 
 
 " For a moment it appeared to me that my observations had 
 
48 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 produced some effect ; they have, however, been very consider- 
 ably weakened by the precise declarations emanating from the 
 Cabinet of the Tuileries with respect to the incompetency of the 
 British G-ovemment to interfere, in any way, with Continental 
 affairs. It is possible that the Cabinet of St. James's might have 
 determined upon awaiting, in silence, the time when the mea- 
 sures attributed to the First Consul, for the purpose of more and 
 more extending his dictatorial influence over his neighbours, 
 should be determined upon; but the above declaration having been 
 several times repeated, the Treaty of Amiens having been ap- 
 pealed to as the only rule for the relations between the two 
 Powers, and, lastly, other circumstances too long to be here enu- 
 merated, appear, at length, to have electrified the whole of the 
 British Ministry. 
 
 " The G-overnment thought itself insulted by the pretension 
 announced in the face of all Europe to exclude England from 
 Continental affairs. The idea was insupportable of being de- 
 clared cut off from its old political relations of friendship and of 
 commerce with the Continent of Europe. No doubt, you have 
 seen the sarcastic observations upon this subject with which 
 all the newspapers teemed. At length the last exposS made 
 to the legislative body filled the measure to overflowing. That 
 exposi speaks of the weakness of England as compared with 
 France, of the vacillation of the Ministry. The consciousness of 
 its own greatness, the jealousy of the preponderating aggrandize- 
 ment of France, all the passions of mortified self-love, have been 
 more powerfully awakened than ever. I speak not of the jealousy 
 which might have been excited by the renovated prosperity of 
 the Kepublic under the Consular Grovernment, and of the suc- 
 cessful results of the 18th Brumaire. However rapid may be 
 these advances, too much yet remains to be done ere France can 
 become an object of misplaced envy for England ; but the jealousy 
 I mean is that which has been excited here by the language of 
 the French G-ovemment in speaking of the place it had taken 
 among the Powers of Europe, and of that which it pretended to 
 assign to England with respect to them, in order to confine her 
 within her insular position. The phrases and style of this exposS 
 have deeply wounded the national pride. The Ministers have 
 been exposed to abuse in both Houses of Parliament on the score 
 of weakness or of incompetency. 
 
 " When to all this is added the reports, whether true or false, 
 which have been received here of the extraordinary armaments 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 49 
 
 that are being collected ia the ports of France and of Holland, 
 all surprise will cease at the King's message, which has been 
 regarded in France as so unexpected an event. 
 
 " I flatter myself, that my frankness upon this occasion 
 will afford you a fresh proof of the confidence with which I 
 throw myself upon your indulgence by making known to you, 
 without the least reservation, my observations upon the present 
 critical period. 
 
 " Au reste what you say to me on the continually renewed 
 danger of an invasion, the possibility of which during a new war 
 is offered by the extensive maritime coast of France, I would 
 remark that this prospect is, perhaps, one of the reasons which, 
 in conjunction with the others mentioned by me above, has at 
 length determined the British Grovernment upon extricating 
 itself at once from this so critical a position, in order to place 
 itself in safety from such apprehensions. The idea may be, 
 perhaps, to use an ingenious allegory, that a besiege' 1 garrison, 
 which cannot rely upon a moment's security, should at length 
 take the desperate resolution of making a vigorous sortie, in order 
 to free themselves from durance. 
 
 " There exists scarcely any difference in the opinions of people 
 as to the success of an invasion, understanding only thereby 
 the landing of a certain number of French troops upon the 
 coasts of this country. It is believed that a landing might be 
 effected on several points of the coast of England; but the 
 French would be much mistaken if they supposed these landing 
 points very numerous. It is, however, certain that upon several 
 points the same winds which favour the departure of an invading 
 armament from the ports of France would remove the English 
 fleets from before them. But people flatter themselves that 
 the hostile army, having had time to land, must soon become the 
 victims of their enterprise, and that the event itself, by causing 
 a momentary consternation, would only serve to render the 
 whole English nation still more united. 
 
 " Lastly, the resolution taken by France not to increase her 
 military force under these circumstances is, there can be no 
 doubt, a favourable omen for the continuance of the peace. It 
 appears to me impossible but that the wish with which you 
 conclude your letter, viz., that this moderation of the French 
 Government may not be interpreted as weakness, should be 
 accomplished. The Chief Magistrate who has the supreme direc- 
 tion of the affairs of the French Kepublic is too well known 
 
50 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 by the eminent qualities which he has hitherto displayed, and, 
 amongst others, by his indomitable courage, for liim to risk any 
 mistake as to the motives which will inspire him with moderation 
 in the present crisis. May his vast genius suggest to him the 
 means of turning that crisis to the consolidation of his glory as 
 the pacificator of Europe. 
 
 " I purpose writing as soon as possible to the Marchioness, in 
 order to render her an account of a few little commissions with 
 which she honoured me. In the meantime, my Lord, permit me 
 to pay her here my most respectful compliments. 
 
 " I have, &c., 
 (Signed) " Jacobi Kleist." 
 
 A sliort time previous to the date of this letter the 
 First Consul had conceived the idea of attempting to 
 induce Louis XYIII., who was then residing at Warsaw, 
 to renounce all title to the throne of France : and, with 
 this view, Monsieur de Talleyrand was instructed to 
 communicate such a proposal to the Marquis Lucchesini, 
 and to endeavour through him to engage the King of 
 Prussia to transmit it to the King of France. The 
 following correspondence will explain the nature of the 
 propositions made, and the manner in which it was 
 attempted to carry them into effect. The negotiation 
 was terminated by the imequivocal refusal of the King 
 of France and of his family to enter into any com- 
 promise whatsoever upon any question regarding their 
 rights. 
 
 No. 14. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from Maequis Lucchesini to Count Haugwitz. 
 
 " Count, " Paris, 11th January, 1803. 
 
 " I have been charged with an overture which does not 
 admit of being transmitted to your Excellency through the 
 intervention of any other person. A few days ago the Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs informed me that he had something import- 
 ant to communicate to me on the part of the First Consul. 
 Having conversed with him, on Friday last, upon the matters 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 51 
 
 detailed in my despatch of this day, he requested me to retura 
 late in the evening, in order to receive a striking proof of the 
 confidence of the First Consul in my discretion and of the 
 attachment of the King to hun and to the French Government. 
 I kept my appointment punctually. M. de Talleyrand remarked 
 that he was about to speak to me upon a business wliich, for 
 a long time, would be known to three persons only in France, — 
 the First Consul, himself and me, and which General Bonaparte 
 was resolved to communicate to the King oinr master exclusively, 
 who, by his probity, wisdom, and power, has gained the con- 
 fidence, esteem, and respect of the General. I promised him 
 the most impenetrable secrecy on my part, and the greatest 
 discretion on that of the King's Cabinet. After a long preamble 
 upon the consoKdation of the Government which had replaced in 
 France that of the Monarchy under the Bourbons; upon the 
 sanction which in consequence of its victories and treaties of 
 peace had been given on the part of aU the Powers of the two 
 worlds to the removal of the princes of that family from the 
 throne of France ; upon the irreparable wrong which a conduct 
 but little worthy of the descendants of Henry IV., during the 
 whole continuance of the revolutionary war, had done them 
 in the estimation of a proud and warlike nation ; and upon the 
 invincible and almost unanimous repugnance of the French 
 people to be henceforth governed by any one of them, he 
 expatiated upon the advantage which the present Government 
 would derive from securing its rights and its power upon 
 a recognised basis, calming the conscientious scruples of many 
 Catholics, reconciling what some emigrants believe they still 
 owe to their oaths ,and to their honour, with the desire they 
 almost aU indulge of returning to, and serving their country ; 
 and lastly, in depriving malcontents of the pretext, and the 
 Powers who are the rivals of France, of the instruments, of 
 future troubles: such, he said, were the salutary and laudable 
 objects which the First Consul was desirous of attaining. A 
 mingled feeling of compassion and respect for the misfortunes of 
 the princes of the House of Bourbon, united to that of a regard 
 for the dignity of a great people which had, for a long time 
 been governed by that family, had iospired the First Consul with 
 his noble intention. 
 
 " The motive and the condition of this service are, as you will 
 readily imagine. Count, a free, entire and absolute renunciation 
 of all rights and pretensions to the throne of France, as well as 
 
 E 2 
 
52 EUROPBA'N OONCtRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 of the charges, dignities, domains and appendages belonging 
 to that family. After having conceived this plan, the First 
 Consul determined upon imparting it to the King only, and has 
 directed me to request that His Majesty would be pleased to 
 consider the best means of commnnicating it to the Count de 
 Lille at Warsaw, and inducing him to authorize the King 
 our master to undertake and effect a formal and decisive 
 negociation upon this great object. 
 
 "As soon as your Excellency shall forward me satisfactory 
 intelligence respecting the first essays of this negociation, no 
 time will be lost here, in entering upon all the details as to the 
 extent, securities, and times of payment of the different settle- 
 ments which are to be made upon the head of the House of 
 Bourbon and all the individual members of it. 
 
 " The Fii-st Consul is desirous to secure for the King all the 
 honour and satisfaction accruing from so delicate and important 
 an arrangement, and feels the greatest pleasure in enabling His 
 Majesty to acquire fresh claims to the gratitude of the French 
 Government, and in seconding his efforts for the prosperity and 
 grandeur of the House of Brandenburg. One of the principles 
 which the First Consul has determined upon as regards the 
 proposed arrangement, is, that all persons composing the various 
 branches of the Bourbon family must renounce the humiliating 
 situation of receiving alms from the European sovereigns, must 
 all collect together in a more distant place than Warsaw — 
 Moscow, for instance, and there reside with the dignity befitting 
 their name. This choice of the place of their retirement 
 indicates the intention of associating the intervention of Russia 
 with that of Prussia for ratifying the engagement and securing 
 the performance of the stipulations. M. de Talleyrand, at the 
 same time, intimated to me that General Bonaparte was dissa- 
 tisfied with the prolonged stay of the Count de Lille in the 
 King's dominions, and that the wish to spare His Majesty the 
 pain and embarrassment of a discourteous proceeding was the 
 sole cause of his having hitherto refrained from giving instruc- 
 tions, which the one I have just now traced to you may, 
 perhaps, render unnecessary. 
 
 " The whole of this long conversation was redolent only of the 
 utmost confidence and friendship on the part of the First Consul 
 as weU towards the King as towards those of his servants who by 
 their places here or at Berlin are the depositaries and may 
 become the instruments of this negociation, so that, be the issue 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 53 
 
 of it what it may, the personal and political ties at present 
 existing between tlie two Governments may not be deteriorated 
 either as regards their durability or the satisfaction resulting 
 from them. 
 
 (Signed) " LucoHESiNi." 
 
 No. 15. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from Count Haugwitz to Mabquib Lucchbsini, 
 January '.!2, 1803. 
 
 "It must be confessed that although the King has taken 
 an extreme interest in the contents of your letter of the 11th, he 
 has not been surprised at them. From this you will judge in 
 what manner he regards them. 
 
 " First of all, nothing appears to him more worthy of such 
 a nation as France and of a chief so sure of his good fortune 
 and of himself as the First Consd is henceforth, than this 
 generous consideration for the fate of the Bourbons. In the 
 midst of revolutions and of critical events one consideration 
 alone absorbs aU others ; but victory calculates differently, and 
 General Bonaparte has crowned his own with honour, by inter- 
 esting himself with those who have been the victims of them. 
 
 " But independently of the inward satisfaction he is preparing 
 for liimself, should his intentions prove successful, there is 
 a more general point of view, under which they should be 
 applauded by impartial Europe. The sponge has been passed 
 over the events which have successively excited its horror, 
 its astonishment and its admiration. What now remains of that 
 memorable period is a wise and firm Government in France 
 sanctioned by success and by treaties. Its existence is the 
 condition of peace. What enlightened man is there who would 
 hesitate in his wishes? They must, both from interest and 
 gratitude, be the same with those nations whose recollections are 
 still embittered ones, whose wounds are stiU bleeding, and with 
 those whom one common interest have, long since, connected 
 with the new order of things. 
 
 " Thus whatever is calcuif^ted to render that Government firm 
 and immovable enters alike into the calculations and wishes 
 of the King. No doubt the formal renunciation of the ancient 
 and celebrated family which, for so many ages, has governed 
 France, however humiliating its fate may now be, however 
 
54 EUROPEAN CONGEESSBS. Chap. I. 
 
 impotent may be its resentments, could not be without interest, 
 if only from the circumstance of its adding to the realities which 
 go to build up the fortunes of the First Consul, and were it 
 even the least essential of the forms with which he has been 
 under the necessity of successively investing himself. It is 
 impossible for the truth of this to be better developed than you, 
 M. le Marquis, have done in your letter. 
 
 "I must, therefore, first of all, inform you, in the King's name, 
 that His Majesty most heartily applauds the intentions of 
 the First Consul, and, next, that he transmits, through you, to 
 the first magistrate of the Eepublic, the assurance that here 
 the wishes are unanimous for the success of Ids plan. 
 
 "But General Bonaparte, not confining his confidence to 
 the communication of his views, is desirous that our august 
 master should be the interpreter of them. 
 
 "You, M. le Marquis, were sure of the answer that would 
 be given, — the First Consul must have been so before you. I feel 
 that it is, and I dare affirm, because we have had the expe- 
 rimental truth of it, that it is because we have never wavered in 
 our principles, even at a time when wisdom could not always be 
 rewarded by results, that ia one of the most important relations 
 of Prussia, we now find, every moment, that honourable and 
 rare confidence with which Governments are so little acquainted. 
 
 "The King fuUy appreciates that of which you have just 
 transmitted to us the interesting proof. He offers to the First 
 Consul aU the good offices from which the illustrious head of the 
 French Government can expect to derive advantageous results. 
 It must not be supposed, however, that at present His Majesty 
 can promise any thing certain. His Majesty knows too well the 
 manner in which the passions judge, and the illusions which are 
 allied to lofty recollections and great misfortimes, to flatter 
 himself much that, in this case, self-love should, in the choice of 
 compensations, prefer real advantages to fallacious hopes. We 
 possess no recent data as to the expectations entertained at 
 Warsaw. The King, compassionate and generous towards the 
 man and the unfortunate, has always been severe towards the 
 priuce. Expressions which these principles condemn have not 
 been carried to the throne with impunity, and, if it be desired 
 thoroughly to appreciate his character, let not this very im- 
 portant reflection escape at Paris. He has granted an asylum 
 to destitute refugees, but by doing so, he has consulted his 
 principles as much as his hearts and has done as much for 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 55 
 
 France as for the Bourbons. To allow these last to remain 
 in these dominions is to make ourselves the guarantees of their 
 conduct so long as hospitality tolerates them there. Elsewhere 
 they would, if not hatching plots by which France would be 
 disturbed, at least be multiplying indiscretions calculated to feed 
 animosities and prolong delusions. 
 
 " With us they are certain that the law is on the watch, and 
 that, for them, obscurity is the condition of non-interference, 
 and if, in this respect also the good faith of the King should not 
 be understood as it ought, never will his expectations have met 
 with greater disappointment. 
 
 "You may rely upon the most unassailable discretion, up 
 to the very moment when the secret will no longer belong to us, 
 but to the princes. From that time, you must perceive as well 
 as I do, that all wiU depend upon the manner in which their pride 
 or their dejection will receive the first overtures. If they carry 
 their blindness so far as not to appreciate the advantages, they 
 will not consider themselves under the obligation to remain 
 silent. For transmitting to them the seducing offers proposed, 
 the King has selected a person who certainly will not endanger 
 success. The means afforded to His Majesty by the confidence 
 of the First Consul, the situation of the princes and the 
 obligations which the King's acts of kindness impose upon 
 them, will all be brought to bear upon the minds of the 
 Bourbons. 
 
 "I hope that it may not be long before you receive some 
 news, less quickly, however, than I should myself have wished, 
 for the King's agent not being at Berlin, a fortnight is required 
 for summoning him there and giving him his instructions. The 
 person is M. Meier, President of the Chamber of Justice at 
 Warsaw, who being upon the spot, may, in consequence of his 
 position, the more surely commence operations without exciting 
 suspicion ; being moreover known to the princes, speaking their 
 language, and enjoying much consideration both on account 
 of his post and his character, he will obtain a greater facility of 
 access than any other person could expect. 
 
 " I say nothing to you, M. le Marquis, as to what you should 
 add to the communications with which you are now entrusted. 
 The spirit of your instructions has ever been the same. The 
 relation of the two states proves in how very small a degree 
 it has been lost sight of, and with what great intelligence 
 you have conformed thereto. Do everything to convince the 
 
56 BUROPI'^AN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 First Consul of the principles with which he will ever find us 
 
 animated. 
 
 " I am, &c., 
 
 (Signed) " Haugwitz." 
 
 " Berlin, January 22, 1803." 
 
 No. 16. 
 
 Translation of an Extract from a Lbtteb addressed to Maequis Ltjcchesini 
 by M. Lombard. 
 
 " Dear Excellency, " Monday night, 14th February, 1803. 
 
 " It is one o'clock a.m., and I have just made two copies 
 of the instructions for President Meier. 
 
 " I hope, my dear Excellency, that you will be satisfied with 
 the manner in which the Warsaw negociation has been com- 
 menced, but I more especially wish that you may be so with the 
 reasoning and style of the instructions. I do not name their 
 author, for aU that issues from his pen appears to me to bear a 
 stamp which cannot be mistaken. I shall, however, tell you in 
 confidence, that no success is here anticipated for the proceedings 
 about to be taken ; but what is much, if not all, a proof will at 
 least have been given of good intentions. I will tell you further, 
 under the seal of secrecy, that the Emperor of Russia has been 
 taken into the confidence ; for as it was surmised that the Count 
 de Lille would lose not a moment in himself making known to that 
 sovereign the propositions intended to be made to His Imperial 
 Majesty, it was thought better to anticipate him. The copy of 
 the instructions which will be sent you to-morrow by courier is 
 precisely conformable to the original, with the exception of the 
 qualification of the Count de Lille which has been substituted for 
 that of Gomte de Provence. It is expected here that you will com- 
 municate the document in question to the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs ; and so great a curiosity is excited as to the ulterior mea- 
 sures of the First Consul, that this time economy must give way 
 to curiosity : therefore do not spare couriers when you consider 
 them necessary. 
 
 " I can no more, and conclude in order that I may not affect 
 you with the drowsiness it is impossible for me to resist. Adieu, 
 my dear Excellency ; and do not forget him who makes it the 
 glory of his whole life to respect and esteem you. 
 
 (Signed) " Lombard." 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 57 
 
 No. 17. 
 Translation of a Letter from ('oust HAuawiTZ to Marquis Lucohesini. 
 
 " MoNs. LE Marquis, " March, isos. 
 
 " The President de Meier has been here for several days, 
 and is fully instructed on the subject of the mission for which he 
 has been summoned. The King himself has had a long con- 
 versation with him, for His Majesty takes a more than ordinary 
 interest in the discussion, As well on account of the confidence 
 reposed in him, as of the good results to be expected from it. 
 
 " I can assure yon that if the success does not answer the in- 
 tentions of the First Consul it will not be our fault. Completely 
 to convince you of this, and that with respect to this delicate 
 business you may fuUy understand the point of view in which it 
 is looked upon by the King, I send you a copy of the instructions 
 which M. Meier takes with him. They were not drawn up with 
 a view to appearing in Paris, but they are so characteristic of our 
 august master that I thought the shortest and most instructive 
 way would be to enclose them for you. You know better than I 
 do the use to which they can be best applied : at all events you 
 are authorized beforehand. I must, however, make two observa- 
 tions upon this paper, in order that you may more easily enter 
 into the spirit of it. Under the form of instructions addressed to 
 M. Meier, it is intended to be a means of working upon the muids 
 of the Princes ; and as the President of the Eegency of Warsaw is 
 authorized to read it under the seal of confidence, in this manner 
 the King's view of the business, wMch cannot but have its due 
 eflfect in determining the Princes, will be far otherwise enforced 
 than it could have been by mere verbal explanations. But the 
 very moment this document comes under the eyes of the Count 
 de Lille it should have the effect of winning him over. This will 
 explain to you a thousand nice shades which would not have been 
 observed in ordinary instructions. The second observation I have 
 to make to you is, that however general the first overtures of the 
 First Consul may have been, our instructions are still more so. 
 In them you will find neither the condition of removing from 
 Warsaw nor that of renouncing the benevolences of the other 
 Powers. Both these regard more particularly Eussia, since it is 
 to Moscow that it is intended to banish the Princes. To stipulate 
 upon two points of which that Power is to be the judge, before its 
 having been thought proper to invite her to the discussion, would 
 
58 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Ohap. I. 
 
 be to indispose her from the very commencement against an 
 arrangement in which she would be able to effect much. 
 
 " It would besides be advisable not to alarm, at first starting, 
 the imagination of the Count de Lille. My fear is not that the 
 conditions will not be agreed to, if once the discussion of them 
 can be entered upon, but that the discussion itself will not be 
 opened. The great point is, that the Princes should authorize 
 us to proceed further, — that they give their consent : the rest 
 will follow more easily. 
 
 " The President de Meier sets off the day after to-morrow. I 
 calculate therefore that you will scarcely receive any interesting 
 news touching the object of his mission before the lapse of three 
 or four weeks. The difficulty consists in places and things, and 
 not, as you perceive, in a defect of good will in us. The King is 
 very impatient to see the end of this affair, and to be better in- 
 formed as to the intentions of the First Consul. I am fully aware 
 that, through ordinary couriers, the question is not to be touched 
 upon, except by your enveloping it in a style unintelligible for 
 others. Notwithstanding I beg you to seize every opportunity of 
 communicating to us the notions of which the confidence of the 
 First Consul may have made you the depository ; and have the 
 goodness to forward me these ideas precisely as the first ones, 
 by private letters, or if there be reports to be forwarded, by addi- 
 tional P.S. ; but in the latter case, pray, above all, use envelopes, 
 the better to preserve secrecy, and to answer, even in this respect, 
 the confidence with which the First Consul honours me. I have 
 in my turn communicated it to very few persons— not even to my 
 Comeillers rapporteurs. Lombard drew up Meier's instructions. 
 I flatter myself that you wiH approve both of the reasoning and 
 the style. I salute you, my dear friend. 
 
 (Signed) " Haugwitz." 
 
 No. 18. 
 Translation of the King's Instructions to the Pbesident Meiek. 
 
 " Although you are already informed by me and my Ministry 
 of the object which has called you to Berlin, and of the manner 
 in which I view it, I shall here give you, in addition to the fact, 
 some essential observations to serve you as guides. 
 
 " The First Consul of the French Republic has made me an 
 overture as interesting as it is delicate. As long as he had reason 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 59 
 
 to believe that the new authority was still exposed to the caprices 
 of fortune, so long as war kept up recollections and hatreds, he 
 could not, except with great caution, interest himself in the 
 victims of the revolution. It cannot, however, be denied that, 
 even in less tranquil times, he has done for the emigrants and 
 the clergy all that prudence would allow bim to do. But what 
 is the ruin of some private individuals compared with the fate of 
 that illustrious family who for so many years had occupied the 
 throne of France, and whom an unheard-of destiny precipitated 
 therefrom ? Frenchmen ought not entirely to forget what those 
 Princes had once been to them ; and although carried along by 
 one event after another towards a new order of things which 
 cannot be overthrown without bringing back again the same 
 horrors, sooner or later they ought to consider their honour as 
 engaged not to abandon for ever, to the mercy of foreigners, the 
 fate of their ancient rulers. The First Consul has now no 
 greater wish than to discharge the debt of the nation. If it be 
 no longer in his power to recall the past, at least he can oifer 
 the Princes independence and the means of living in splendour ; 
 he can secure to all of them handsome settlements, which, sanc- 
 tioned by treaties and by legal guarantees, will place, to say no 
 more, that unfortunate family beyond the reach of fresh reverses. 
 " Such is the wish of Bonaparte no doubt ; these his intentions, 
 which reflect such honour on his character, woidd not be pardoned 
 him were he gratuitously to indulge them, or if the sacrifices 
 which he is prepared to make had not for their object and their 
 reward to afSx the last seal to the new system. ' 
 
 " The condition then of his offers would be the free, complete, 
 and absolute renunciation of all the Princes of the Bourbon 
 family to their claims to the throne, and to all charges, dignities, 
 domains, and appanages which are established upon this first 
 title. 
 
 " The more delicate the discussion, the more so was the First 
 Consul required to be in the choice of means. Consistency and 
 good faith always end by commanding confidence. 
 
 " He has not been afraid that I should abuse his ; and as it is 
 in my dominions that the head of the House of Bourbon resides; 
 at this moment, he has desired me to transmit his views to that 
 personage. 
 
 " On some points of the question I may give my opinion ; with 
 the rest I have nothing to do. 
 
 " But whatever may be the result, it was not in my power to 
 
CO EUROPEAN CONaRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 refuse making the communication required of me ; for should the 
 Princes think proper to take advantage of the offer made to them, 
 they themselves might reproach me with refusing to become its 
 organ ; and however distant may be the results arrived at for 
 either party, it was not for me to render them stiU more so. 
 
 " In order to perform the duty I had undertaken, it was neces- 
 sary to find a person on the spot, so as to prevent any suspicions 
 from being prematurely raised — a person moreover, who, being 
 already known to the head of the House of Bom-bon, might in- 
 spire confidence both by his situation and his character. I have 
 selected you, being certain that you wiU understand how delicate 
 tliis commission is in itself, and how interesting it is even for 
 me, who am unshaken in my principles, so soon as the force of 
 circumstances and my duties as a Sovereign have determined 
 them. I have always felt for the Bourbons that sympathy which 
 is their due. 
 
 " The first proposal of General Bonaparte is a very general 
 one, and must naturally be so, for he had first to ascertain what 
 kind of reception would be given to more definite ones. AU at 
 present to be done therefore is to discover what the Princes think 
 upon the question itself. If the offers made to them be such as 
 to induce them to sacrifice some of the hopes they still cherish, 
 or even should they not altogether reject the real advantages in- 
 tended to replace those hopes, I would immediately communicate 
 the circumstance to the First Consul, and it would not be long 
 before he gave me further information as to his intentions : this 
 I would transmit to you from time to time, and you in yoiu- turn 
 would pursue the already-commenced communications. 
 
 " On your arrival at Warsaw, you wiU let some days pass before 
 seeing their Eoyal Highnesses or any of their suite ; for, however 
 unlikely it may be that any one in the world would imagine the 
 object of your journey to be at all connected with them, yet you 
 would thereby be more certain of disappointing inquisitive people. 
 You will after this take measures for letting the Count de LiUe 
 receive the important information now entrusted to you. 
 
 " I leave entirely to your tact and discernment the selection 
 of the means to be employed, as well as the choice of the agent 
 whom you may perhaps think fit to confide in ; for under these 
 circumstances the utmost delicacy is due to the Princes. The 
 sensibility of misfortune is easily wounded, and the matter in 
 question is one in which their dearest affections are involved. 
 Perhaps it might bo better to prepare the Count gradually for 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 61 
 
 the communication. You know those who possess his confidence, 
 and it will be for you to judge what is possible to be obtained 
 through them. What indeed I most especially fear is, that it 
 may be difficult, for even the most obvious considerations and 
 the most clearly -proved interests, to find access to a heart already 
 exasperated by misfortunes ; and it is highly important that the 
 first answer should not be of a character to render resentments 
 for ever iaeffaceable and all new attempts impossible. The 
 reasons with which you may support the offers of the First 
 Consul are so evident and so powerful, that it appears to me 
 scarcely necessary to suggest them. The first point must be 
 entirely left to the Prmces. There is a sentiment of honour 
 which under all circumstances still maintains its empire, and 
 which adversity itself does but render more intense ; and this 
 will prove the most difficult of all to overcome. There is one 
 important reflection, however, with which it may be combated. 
 The Government which is willing to treat with the Bourbons is 
 not the one which despoiled them. Bonaparte is the work of 
 the revolution, it is true, but he was its necessary production ; nor 
 is he in the category of its original creators. Far from having 
 overturned the throne, he has avenged it ; and his fortunes have 
 swept away every faction which desolated France. If his greatest 
 enemies, in order to judge him, start from the period when he 
 seized the reius of government, they must own that he was then 
 the benefactor of France. Unless I deceive myself, it woiild be 
 little less than madness to listen only to bhnd resentments when 
 the object of them no longer exists, and to live in the past alone 
 when the question is to settle the future. 
 
 " And what is that future as regards the Princes ? I honour 
 that fidelity which does not compound with its duties ; and if 
 there still remain any Frenchmen who, devoted to their old 
 masters, still contend against cr cumstances, still reject all rea- 
 sonable considerations, and prefer delusions which fiatter them 
 to a resignation which offends them, I judge while I pity them. 
 
 " But the Princes' duties are confined to themselves ; or should 
 they think that they still extend to the French nation, after the 
 latter has broken every tie which formerly united them, an addi- 
 tional reason is thereby furnished for seeing things in their true 
 light. 
 
 " The revolution which excluded them from the throne is, 
 according to all human calculation, permanently established. 
 A firm Government has superseded, in France, those ephemeral 
 
62 EUROPEAN CONCxRESSES. Chap. I, 
 
 factions among 'whom power oscillated to and fro. Peace reigns 
 at home and abroad. AH classes, tired with a ten years' struggle, 
 and made wise by the evils which always accompany revolutions, 
 have no other want than that of repose. All hold fast to the 
 present order of things : some on account of hopes in which they 
 could not formerly indulge, and others from the fear of losing 
 what still remains to them. The whole system of property, as 
 it actually exists, is the successive result of the different epochs 
 of that stormy period ; and the very idea of a fresh convulsion 
 alarms even those who, in their inmost thoughts, may form very 
 different wishes. 
 
 " An able hand holds the reins, an immense armed force sup- 
 ports it ; religion has resumed its position, or having only under- 
 gone, as regards its outward display, a few modifications sanc- 
 tioned by the Holy See, it has tranquillized tender consciences, 
 it has interested even them in the new order of things, and has 
 deprived the enemies of the Government of the last means of 
 secretly plotting against it. But if in the interior nothing an- 
 nounces that there remains to the Bourbons a party and hopes, 
 the voice of the European Powers has expressed itself more 
 loudly. So long as the irresistible power of circumstances did 
 not call them to the performance of other duties, they aU pro- 
 tested in favour of that illustrious family; but they have all 
 now acknowledged the Eepublic. The question therefore is not 
 that of ephemeral relations dictated by the want of the moment. 
 It is no longer hope or fear making terms with ambition or 
 with danger. It is a new system united in aU its parts, based 
 upon the most solemn treaties ; and unless the latter be eternally 
 a mere mockery, the honour of the same Sovereigns who took up 
 arms ten years since in support of the Bourbons, is itself now 
 engaged against them. In this state of things, to flatter them- 
 selves with the occurrence of any event which might recall them 
 to the throne would be for them a fatal delusion. If they still 
 obstinately persist in indulging in it, they for ever deprive them- 
 selves, by their insensate conduct, of the most inestimable ad- 
 vantages. Besides, who can calculate to what such conduct may 
 ultimately lead? Providence has placed upon the throne of 
 Eussia an extraordinary man who, together with the resources 
 supplied to him by an immense empire, possesses the noblest of 
 hearts. But the descendants of Louis may not always find an 
 Alexander ! And ought not this precarious existence to awaken 
 the anxiety of the head of that illustrious House for the future 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 63 
 
 of those who are arovmd him ? Now while as yet his resolutions 
 possess some value in the eyes of the French Government, while 
 as yet time has not struck with proscription the rights of the 
 family, he may obtain great advantages; he may insist upon 
 their being securely guaranteed to him; he can leave to his 
 family another inheritance than that of hopes and persecutions. 
 And does not duty itself appear to agree with interest ? Then 
 only when the Bourbons shall have declared their sentiments 
 respecting the duties of those whose fidelity has been repaid 
 either by exile or by a precarious existence in their native 
 country, the last pretext for troubles will disappear ; those dark 
 intrigiies of a blind zeal — intrigues which, though for ever foiled, 
 are nevertheless fatal to so many individuals — wiU cease ; internal 
 peace will no longer fear their vain assaults ; and, as a compen- 
 sation for the long-continued outrages with which it has been 
 overwhelmed, the Bourbon family will have sacrificed its just 
 resentments to these laudable considerations, and have secured 
 the tranquillity and repose of the fatherland. 
 
 " Such partly are the arguments which you will bring to bear 
 upon the mind of the Count, and I shall wait with impatience to 
 know from you their effect. Should he leave the door open to 
 negociations, you will not be the only one initiated in them, for 
 no doubt the First Consul only waits for this opportunity in order 
 to interest therein the Emperor of Kussia ; while on the other, 
 it would rest with the Count de LiUe to secure the consent of 
 the other Princes. I shall therefore, as circumstances require, 
 send you more detailed instructions, &c., &c. 
 
 (Signed) " Feedekiok William." 
 
 No. 19. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from M. Lombaed to the Marquis Lucchesini. 
 
 " March 16, 1803. 
 
 " M. Cosmar received his letter two minutes after your's reached 
 me : I hope that he will have done justice to my zeal. Your 
 secret despatch and letter have made the author of the instruc- 
 tions extremely happy. Unfortunately disappointed as regards 
 an infinite number of the enjoyments of life, it is only in the 
 esteem and approbation of men of merit that he finds any con- 
 solation,— judge then of the joy which the perusal of your letter 
 afforded him. If the success of the affair in question has not 
 
6i EUROPEAN CONGRESSES, Chap. I. 
 
 responded to the wishes of the King and his Ministers, it is 
 solely attributable to the difficult position of the Princes. 
 
 " There is no doubt, my dear Excellency, that yon will see the 
 King at Vesel ; His Majesty himself desires it, but there is also 
 another person whom this interview will make very happy. 
 
 " I know not if the Count mentions it in his letter to you ; 
 I doubt it, and it is to supply that omission that I speak to you 
 about this journey. The King has not yet thought fit to pro- 
 duce the itinerary of his route, and has a reason for not doing so 
 — a phrase in your former despatches had given him an inkling 
 of a certain project of the First Consul, which has alarmed the 
 monarch. He wishes to know what he has to depend upon 
 before iixing the time of his journey. I cannot enter into 
 further particulars, my dear Excellency, but these few lines ivill, 
 no doubt, suffice to enable you to guess the King's wishes : all 
 that you can possibly do to remove down there the idea of an 
 interview wiU be regarded here as a service deserving of grati- 
 tude ; with any other person, I should never have risked an 
 avowal of this importance, but I confide it to you, being per- 
 suaded you will not misinterpret my intentions. 
 
 (Signed) " Lombaed." 
 
 No. 20. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from M. Lombaed to the Mabquis Lucchbsini. 
 
 " I cannot tell you with what enthusiasm I have read yom- 
 despatches. 
 
 " My opinion was almost fixed from the time of the first insinua- 
 tions forwarded to Wilhelmsbad. It was unalterably so as soon 
 as I knew the great man. 
 
 " Besides your memoirs alone would have sufficed, and your 
 last despatch, that admirable record of the character of Bona- 
 parte, would, to the blindest of men, be the complement of 
 evidence. 
 
 " I had been convinced three months since, but the question 
 was now that of persuasion, and if the advantages be not mis- 
 takable, undoubtedly there are sacrifices to be made which 
 explain and justify the protracted irresolution of the King. 
 I know no man so sure of himself when he has once made up 
 his mind, but I also know no one who, for that very reason, 
 consults himself so much before he determines. His delays are 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 65 
 
 the measure of his constancy, and if he pledges to the French 
 the latter, it will not be for them to haye to reproach him for the 
 former. I dare not yet announce to you the result in a very 
 formal manner, but I am, at this moment, writing to Count 
 Haugwitz to repair to Potsdam, and, in a few days, perhaps, you 
 will be summoned to a work which, of all those in which you 
 have been engaged in your long and interesting career, will not 
 have been the least delicate in its detaUs, nor the least im- 
 portant in its results. 
 
 " However, until the arrival of the courier, it must be under- 
 stood that I have only written for your Excellency. 
 
 " The Queen is quite heart-broken at the information given by 
 your Excellency on the subject of the interests of her grand- 
 mother. The affair having passed from M. Talleyrand's hands 
 into those of the Minister of Finances, could you not do some- 
 thing with the latter ? 
 
 " Lastly, is there any proceeding upon which you would still 
 wish to advise me, and in which the Queen could be of any 
 service ? 
 
 " I have, &c., 
 
 (Signed) " Lombard." 
 
 " Potsdam, Deo. 10, 1803." 
 
 During the time the negotiation, which had its origin 
 in these documents, was carried on at Warsaw, the 
 second war between Great Britain and the French 
 Eepublic was commenced. The whole population of 
 England responded to the call of the Government, and 
 the nation armed itself to repel the invasion with which 
 it was threatened. 
 
 The nations of the Continent abstained from all inter- 
 ference until the continued aggressions of France, the 
 violation of the territory of Germany for the purpose 
 of arresting the Duke d'Enghien, the seizure of Genoa, 
 and the formation of the kingdom of Italy, roused the 
 Russian and Austrian Governments to a sense of the 
 danger with which they were menaced by the ambition 
 of the French ruler. In the early part of the year 
 1805, when it became evident that these countries were 
 
66 EUROPEAN OONGEESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 preparing for a renewal of war with Prance, and when 
 the demands of Russia were transmitted to that Gro- 
 vernment, and when the First Consul (now become the 
 Emperor of the French) had determined not to adhere 
 to them, the following Memoir was presented to the 
 Cabinet of Prussia by Monsieur de la Foret, the French 
 Minister at that Court. This Memoir was the produc- 
 tion of Monsieur de Talleyrand, who therein in the 
 ablest manner endeavoured to induce the Eang of 
 Prussia to ally himself with France by the offer of the 
 State of Hanover. This country had been taken posses- 
 sion of by the French Grovernment upon the breaking 
 out of the war with England, and Prussia had in vain 
 been called upon by the British Grovernment to protect 
 its neutrality. It was now offered to her as a bait by 
 which to engage her sanction to the various aggres- 
 sions and spoliations of the French ruler. The answer 
 of the Prussian Grovernment was cautiously worded, so 
 as to avoid any compromise of its relations with France, 
 while it intimated the hope that the States of Italy (not 
 included in the Kingdom which had been formed there) 
 and the Eepublics of Switzerland and Holland would 
 be restored to independence. These were demands to 
 which the French Emperor would not listen, and the 
 mere mention of them, as they were calculated to curb 
 his ambitious projects, was highly offensive to him ; 
 the negotiation, consequently, was put a stop to, but 
 the offence was secretly treasured up, and the propo- 
 sition was reserved for a future opportunity, when it 
 was made only with the view of either compromising 
 Prussia with Grreat Britain, or of forcing her into a 
 war with France, which it was anticipated would prove 
 most disastrous to her. 
 
'!HAP. T. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 67 
 
 No. 21. 
 
 Minute presented by the Sieur Lafoeebt, the French Envoy at Berlin, to 
 Baron Haedenbeeg, at that time, in 1805, at the head of the Prassian 
 Cabinet ; a Document proceeding from the pen of the Pkikcb db Bbnb- 
 
 VBNTO. 
 
 " The Emperor Napoleon has paid no attention to the various 
 attempts made to draw his Prussian Majesty into a league against 
 France. He always relies, with perfect confidence, upon the 
 King's friendly feeling, upon his word, upon his interests. He 
 has said to himself that the Sovereign who, with the view of 
 more securely curbing turbulent passions, had declared his neu- 
 trahty and his firm resolution not to allow (were it only for the 
 advantage of his own dominions) that any portion of the north 
 of G-ermany should become a battle-field, would know how to 
 frustrate the attempts which are making to surprise his good faith. 
 
 " The Emperor has viewed in a more serious Kght the in- 
 trigues which have been carried on for the purpose of inducing 
 the King to confine his system of neutrality to the Prussian pro- 
 vinces. It is not that he was not very sure that such intrigues 
 would fail, for the Cabinet of Berlin has constantly assured that 
 of Paris that the King desired war neither at home nor in his 
 neighbourhood. But to know what the enemy dares demand, 
 when circumstances are adverse to him, is to know what he will 
 dare to do when he behoves he has the power. 
 
 " What must have been the Emperor's feelings when he learnt 
 that the Cabinet of Berlin had just recently excepted the coasts 
 of Hanover from among the points closed by Prussia against every 
 attack ? 
 
 " He was so much the less able to help being extremely sur- 
 prised, because it has hitherto been asserted, in terms the most 
 clear and the least liable to lead to this exception, that the 
 theatre of the war could not be established in any part of the 
 north of Grermany. The Emperor had promised that his troops 
 should be restricted to a peaceful occupation of Hanover, and 
 the King had promised to cover them from every attack. 
 
 " It was in consequence of his entire confidence in the gua- 
 rantee of Prussia that the Emperor withdrew, a year ago, nearly 
 12,000 men from the Electorate ; and it is evident that liis only 
 motive in so doing was to give the King a pledge of the faith he 
 reposed in him. 
 
 F 2 
 
68 EUROPEAN CONGKESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 " The Emperor does not consider an attack as an object of 
 uneasiness, provided that his foresight he free to act ; on the con- 
 trary, were he to consult the interests of his glory alone, he would 
 wish that 40,000 Eussians, English, or Swedes, might arrive in 
 the Electorate, being certain of giving them a lesson they would 
 not soon forget. 
 
 " But when he unexpectedly learns that Prussia has intended 
 leaving a door open to the Eussians, the Enghsh, and their 
 Allies, he regrets having weakened his army, in the full persua- 
 sion that, as an equivalent for the inactivity in which he kept it, 
 the King would guarantee that inactivity. Wliy did not the 
 army and the coasts of Hanover contribute to the grand expe- 
 dition agaiast England but for the respect due to promises 
 received ? 
 
 " What pains the Emperor is to perceive a change in arrange- 
 ments which he was justified in considering as unalterable ; in a 
 word, to find that Prussia, instead of pursuing, with constant firm- 
 ness, a system which she had adopted in accordance with an 
 accurate and sagacious perception of her own individual position, 
 as well as of the general one of Europe, appears to be awaiting 
 events in order to regulate her policy by them ; that she begins 
 to give way ; that the course she now pm-sues is somewhat reti'o- 
 grade ; that she has arrived at the point of supposing that a 
 demi-guarantee would suffice under present circumstances ; cir- 
 cumstances so grave, which require measures the most complete, 
 and which will not tolerate the employment of half ones. 
 
 " Can the Emperor imagine otherwise than that the inter- 
 pretation which has just been given to the explicit meaning of 
 the assurances, so often reiterated on the part of the King, has 
 been applied to it on the spur of the moment ? Could he foresee 
 it when he withdrew a part of his troops ? 
 
 " If, indeed, it be true that the guarantee of Prussia is but a 
 partial, and, consequently, a delusive one, the Emperor's duty 
 wiU be to guarantee himself; for such is the spirit, and such the 
 right of war. To provide for one's own safety is the first law. 
 
 " Therefore, as, in the event of war being declared by Eussia 
 against France, the army of Hanover would find itself exposed 
 to an attack, for want of that full guarantee on the part of 
 Prussia winch, up to the present time, the Emperor had reckoned 
 upon, all he could do would be to choose one of two alternatives : 
 either to evacuate Hanover, declining to make it his arena of 
 battle, and abandoning it to the English, the Eussians, and the 
 
Chap. I EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 69 
 
 Swedes, or to despatch thither 30,000 men, seizing, in the first 
 instance, Bremen, Hamburg, Lubeck, and Swedish Pomerania, 
 points which the enemy would not fail to make their entrepots. 
 
 " Now, between these two alternatives, of which honour and 
 interest recommend the one and disapprove the other, the 
 Emperor's choice cannot be doubtful. 
 
 " Nor is it a valid objection that, while a part of his forces 
 should be thus resisting at the extremities of dermany, his ene- 
 mies would collect together their own in order to effect a landing 
 in Holland, for such a landing would be madness itself. Even 
 supposing 100,000 Eussians should disembark, they would meet 
 with the same fate which befell their countrymen there five 
 years ago. The amoimt of the French forces on the Texel and 
 the Somme is well known. It is not one single Power that can 
 insult France either upon her frontiers or the countries adjacent 
 to them. 
 
 " GreneraUy speaking Eussia is powerless against France, both 
 on the north and the south, unless, on the former, she have 
 Prussia for an auxiliary, and oil the latter Austria. All their 
 attempts, either with or without the co-operation of the English, 
 would only tend to their confusion and ruin. This is a truth of 
 which they themselves are convinced. Nothing is a stronger 
 proof of it than their endeavours to make the King a participator 
 in their overweening passions ; to induce him, for want of some- 
 thing better, to restrict at least his neutrality, with the option of 
 breaking it when his position has become deteriorated, in order 
 that, as a last resom-ce, they may have at their command an 
 entrance which Prussia would no longer keep closed, knowing 
 that one step necessarily leads to another. 
 
 " The Emperor sees through all the designs of his enemies, 
 and, with a rapid glance, takes in the remotest consequences. 
 It will never happen to him to be surprised a second time, in the 
 midst of peace, as he was by England ; and he showed upon that 
 occasion that, although treaties might be broken with him, the 
 violators of them could not escape the activity of the military 
 combinations which they compelled him to adopt. 
 
 " He calculates for himself and the King the effect of the 
 ideas which England and Eussia have allowed to escape them, 
 as well as of the latitude which Prussia has recently promised to 
 allow^ to their operations. He relies upon the success of his 
 arms, and he asks in what would a war, begun in Hanover, end ? 
 He would most certainly pursue the enemy through the States 
 
70 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 not yet excepted from her neutrality by Prussia. Now, in the 
 confusion inevitable both to the retreating and the advancing 
 party, what becomes of the King's system? Thus it is that one 
 single deviation from the first declarations made by Prussia 
 would bring with it the destniction of her system, without, at 
 the same time, giving her cause for the least reproach against 
 France. 
 
 " But in the double hypothesis, either of a voluntary abandon- 
 ment of the Hanoverian provinces to the Russians, the English, 
 and the Swedes, or of a reverse of fortune which would throw all 
 those possessions into their hands, what would then be Prussia's 
 situation? Hemmed in on all sides by the forces of Russia, 
 which would not act without the co-operation, promised or given, 
 of Austria, Prussia would see her own neutrality contested, and 
 would be reduced, even against her dearest interests, to combat 
 Prance, or else to declare in her favour, with an immense disad- 
 vantage of military position. 
 
 " It therefore behoves the Emperor to have an eye upon the 
 first hostile movements of Russia, and not to allow his enemies 
 an opportunity of executing designs, the facility for wliich has 
 been afforded them by the unexpected curtailment of the King's 
 guarantee, and which would be productive of the most fatal con- 
 sequences even for Prussia herself. 
 
 " Could the King be so unjust as to tax the Emperor with a 
 deviation from bis engagements ? They rested upon a complete 
 guarantee. It is Russia and England who have suggested a 
 sudden distinction, the idea of which was never mooted between 
 France and Prussia, but which has been put forward by their 
 enemies solely from sinister views. 
 
 " The King knows well if it be the cause of the Russians he 
 should embrace. On that side are dangers without even any 
 possible benefit. On the contrary, an intimate union with France 
 offers many present and certain advantages without any possible 
 danger to counterbalance them. But few reflections are neces- 
 sary to prove this. 
 
 " Let Prussia compare her resources of every kiud with those 
 of her two neighbours, Austria and Russia, and let herself decide 
 if she possesses in an equal degree to either the actual elements 
 of grandeur and power, and the future facilities for increasing 
 them. It is evident she has them not. 
 
 " Austria came out of the late war not only without any dimi- 
 nution, but with a very considerable increase of power. She no 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 71 
 
 longer possesses, it is true, the Milanese and Belgium ; but she 
 can scarcely be said to have lost them — for disembarrassed of 
 them would be the more correct expression. Provinces sepa- 
 rated from the body of the monarchy, Belgium especially, the 
 perpetual cause of war for the House of Austria ever since the 
 time of Charles V., and the defence of which has been so difficult 
 for her, were possessions far more onerous than profitable. That 
 they remained in the power of Austria half a century longer than 
 was probable in 1748, was solely owing to the tempting bait 
 which made France contract the alliance of 1756. The moment 
 that alliance was broken they fell. And what ample compensa- 
 tion has not Austria received in the Venetian provinces of the 
 Adige, at the mouths of the Cattaro, not to mention the value 
 or the adjacent position of the indemnities she procured for 
 herself in Germany? Nor is this the whole of her positive 
 gain. Nothing can prevent Austria from acquiring stUl more 
 on the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which, as regards her, is 
 already almost nil. The services she rendered by driving out 
 the Turks have detached from Turkey, and approximated to 
 her, Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the rest of Dalmatia. 
 Covering her frontier they await a more intimate union with 
 Austria, who, relieved from the necessity of employing her 
 forces in that service, is enabled to turn them against other 
 Powers. 
 
 " Where has not Eussia been a gainer, to spealt only of the 
 last fifteen years ? Courland, Poland, Lesser Tartary, the Crimea, 
 the Caucasus, the shores of the Caspian Sea, in every direction 
 she has aggrandized herself Eecently she has formed establish- 
 ments at the mouth of the Phase, she advances towards the 
 heart of Persia, she encircles the Turkish Empire, she dominates 
 in Moldavia and Wallachia ; and, unless we choose to blind oiu-- 
 selves, it is impossible not to see that the possession of the 
 Ionian Isles will enable her to gain advantages in the Morea. 
 
 " If, in the midst of this continued, progressive, and, of late, 
 accelerated movement, by which the greater States cease not to 
 aggrandize themselves more and more, the Prussian Monarchy 
 remain stationary, and, as it were, motionless, her relative power 
 must of necessity become less and less, until at last she will find 
 herself so reduced as to be no longer numbered amongst Powers 
 of the first class. There is nothing around her which can be 
 made a set-off against what Austria and Eussia have already 
 gained, and may gain, from one moment to another. Moreover, 
 
72 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 if the means she must employ to prevent her decline be consi- 
 dered, means which consist in an aggrandizement proportionate 
 to that of her neighbours, it is clear that she cannot succeed by 
 her own unaided efforts. She would be prevented therein by 
 the jealousy of those very neighbours whom she knows full well 
 are her rivals and her natural enemies. This is proved by the 
 difficulties she had to surmount, with the Eussians and the 
 Austrians, before she could obtain for herself an advantageous 
 allotment, at least in a, pecuniary point of view. Still less ought 
 she to expect that they would be induced of themselves, in a 
 spirit of justice, to approximate, by ever so little, her power to 
 their own. Thus she has but one way of increasing it, and that 
 is by a close alliance with France. 
 
 " That which others would not, and even could not do, the 
 Emperor can, and his doing it depends upon Prussia alone. For 
 at this very moment, when the distinction lately made surprises, 
 afflicts, and woidd entitle him to the right of complaint, still 
 faithful to Ms engagements, he has nothing more at heart than to 
 give the King proofs of his friendship, and, especially, of the 
 lively interest he takes in preserving the rank which Prussia 
 holds among the Powers. 
 
 " The opportunity is, indeed, unique ; ages will perhaps glide 
 away before a similar one presents itself. Were it to arise, 
 at a later period, from a combination resulting from war, it is 
 impossible that it could be again found intimately connected 
 with one originating iu peace ; and, therefore, it is particularly 
 at a moment when a rare concurrence of circumstances consti- 
 tutes it the most effective instrument for ensuring the return to 
 the general tranquillity, that Prussia should seize and make it 
 her own. 
 
 " It is now two years since the King desired, and he appears 
 still to desire it, that Hanover should be placed in his hands as 
 a deposit. 
 
 " But such a transfer would not at all have contributed to the 
 pacification. It had, as regarded the Kiug of England person- 
 ally, the inconvenience of relieving him of a subject of uneasi- 
 ness, and of prolongmg his obstiaacy. It would scarcely have 
 given one pretext less to Eussia, who is in the habit of exacting, 
 and who has gradually spoken louder and louder, in proportion 
 as she thought more attention was paid to her. 
 
 " With respect to France it would only serve to make her 
 lose a position wliich, at least, is an imposing one, and to bring 
 
Chap. T. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 73 
 
 still closer to her the weapons she sees preparmg in the distance. 
 It would even be a continual source of complaints as regards 
 English merchandise, enlistments, and the exportation of wea- 
 pons of war. 
 
 " It would not, besides, be laying the axe to the root of an 
 ever renascent evil. The country of Hanover is coveted by 
 every one, and its fate, unless it be otherwise settled, will be a 
 continual cause of war. 
 
 " Had Paul I. lived, and Eussia had had an opportunity, there 
 might have been a suspicion that the branch of Oldenburg had 
 a hankering after this country. The administrating Duke 
 brought forward at Katisbon very immoderate pretensions. 
 
 " It is difficult to believe Prussia to have been ignorant of 
 Austria's having openly demanded this Electorate from France 
 for one of the Archdukes, 
 
 " Every one knows that a project once formed is, of all things, 
 the one least forgotten at Vienna, and that this Court, ever on 
 the watch for events, returns constantly, with the utmost address, 
 to the wishes she has once announced. Can any one say what 
 she would dare to ask of a coalition of which she was a member, 
 if a Russian, English, and Swedish army should succeed in seizing 
 those provinces ? Prussia understands the language which the 
 English at London and the Anglo-Russians at St. Petersburg 
 hold respecting her neutrality, and how anxious they are to find 
 an opportunity of making her repent it, since as they cannot yet 
 compel her to renounce it in their favour. 
 
 " Had Austria obtained her object four years ago, or should 
 she one day attain it, Prussia would be unable to avoid war, for 
 it would be necessary both for her honour and her independence. 
 
 " On the other hand, if, in consequence of occupying the 
 country of Hanover, and of having there contracted long in- 
 dulged and ever recurring habits, it should one day happen 
 that France wished to remain in that Electorate during the 
 peace, war would again be inevitable, for France does not dis-| 
 semble that between Prussia and her there is one point where) 
 the interests of both are incompatible, and that point is Hanover. I 
 ' " The King of England and his Ministry, therefore, have, for 
 the last two years, omitted no opportunity of protesting that 
 Hanover shall never be received as a compensation, and this has 
 been done, doubtless, with the view of inducing France to 
 declare that she would keep it, and by this means compromise 
 her with Prussia. 
 
74 EUROPEAN CONORESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 " And how many more times yet will not France be com- 
 pelled to seek, in the temporary occupation of Hanover, a means 
 of infusing pacific sentiments into the reigning family of England? 
 We must not deceive ourselves ; until the Cabinet of London 
 has had proof upon proof of the impossibility of realising her 
 vast plans of maritime, colonial, and commercial domination, 
 France can never rely upon any peace she may have signed 
 with England. A respectable navy will be her only security. 
 The English policy wiU always profit by continental disturbances 
 to endeavour to destroy this navy, and France will ever have 
 recourse to the same expedients. 
 
 " Thus the destiny of Hanover will, on aU sides, present to 
 Prussia a threatening future. Prussia alone has the greatest of 
 all interests for uniting that country to her monarchy ; and she 
 is seen to place her hopes in projects of barter, and in sudden 
 changes which will be constantly counteracted by neighbours 
 who are for ever watching her movements. She must now play a 
 skilful game, and, while appearing to accept that Electorate, by 
 way of deposit, must make an agreement with France to keep it. 
 
 " The Emperor is ready to transfer it to the King in full pro- 
 prietorship. It is a conquest of which he disposes. He guaran- 
 tees to her the possession of it, and he will make the cession of 
 this Electorate to Prussia, a sine qua non condition of peace with 
 England. Prussia will then approach the position which has 
 been the object of her wishes, but she certainly will not have 
 repaired the relative inequality which the advances of Austria 
 and EuBsia have placed between the three States; she will, 
 however, have accepted all that which fortune and personal 
 friendship can offer her up to this moment, and will also have 
 the means of turning the chances of the future to her advan- 
 tage ; she will have caused additional strength to be given to 
 the provinces, whose future destination may cause her much 
 embarrassment, and plunge her, at least, into costly wars. 
 The English will no longer have upon the Continent a 
 point-cC appui, whence to excite disturbances. The French, who 
 so many times have carried their arms into Hanover, and who 
 have contracted there so many ties, will quit it for ever. All 
 the germs of division between France and Prussia, which might, 
 some day or other, bud forth, will be destroyed, in order to make 
 room for a complete community of interests. Lastly, the peace 
 of the Continent will be the fruit of the measures which France 
 and I'ruBsia will employ in concert. 
 
Chap. 1. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES, 75 
 
 " For this it will be sufficient for Prussia to say that she will 
 make common cause with France in every war which shall have for 
 object to change its present condition in Italy. 
 
 " It would be a grave error to judge of present times by those 
 which preceded them. A general feeling of uneasiness agitates 
 Europe, and it appears that every Power, dissatisfied with its 
 position, is desirous of changing it. A hollow rumbling announces 
 a storm, and England fans the flame. If it bursts, the con- 
 sequences will baffle foresight. 
 
 " It has been already observed that Prussia must not, in that 
 case, hope to remain a passive spectator of events. Drawn into 
 the vortex, compelled to fight upon the ground assigned her by 
 chance, because she will no longer be in time to choose it, she 
 will vainly regret not having foreseen misfortunes it will then be 
 beyond her power to prevent. 
 
 " She may, however, contribute to counteract them in fature, 
 but not by a temporising system, by showing herself always 
 ready to wait, but never to act ; it is by measures worthy of the 
 gravity of circumstances, by opposing to raging passions a mass 
 which may intimidate them, in short an alliance such as is now 
 proposed to her by France, and it is only in such an alliance 
 that a multitude of States can find their safety. 
 
 " On the first symptoms of agitation, which appeared on the 
 Continent in consequence of the intrigues of England, and 
 shortly after the declaration of war against France, the King 
 thought that the example of a strongly declared neutrahty 
 would preserve Russia, and, a fortiori, Austria, in the same line of 
 impartiality, and for a long time he succeeded in preventing an 
 explosion. But the English were not to be discouraged. The 
 question is known to have been debated at London and at St. 
 Petersburg whether they could not do without Prussia, provided 
 she were not secretly bound to France. It was, therefore, upon 
 Austria, who, if her weakness were not strengthened by sub- 
 sidies, and her ambition gi-atified by conquest, desired nothing 
 but breathing time, that every effort was concentrated. Does 
 the King doubt that, the party once formed, advantage wiU not 
 be taken of the very first success, it is hoped fortune may bestow, 
 to maintain their resolutions ? were the success of this coalition 
 within the range of possibility, would not the King be apprehen- 
 sive that even the power of following the torrent may not be left 
 him ? He may read every day in twenty pamphlets, and in the 
 English newspapers, he may learn by reports of the language 
 
76 BUEOPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 now very common at St. Petersburg, that the crippling of a 
 Power so troublesome as his is already spoken of. 
 
 " Everything, then, shews the necessity of a new attitude in 
 order to save Europe from very great misfortunes, upon which 
 England, who only thinks of saving, amid the tumult, the trident 
 of the ocean, seeks to hoodwink Eussia and Austria. And the 
 more the King will collect together into one point of view the 
 preceding ideas, the more he will be convinced that the Emperor 
 is now suggesting to him the only means of peace. 
 
 " A beginning must be made by adopting the principle of the 
 actual cession of the country of Hanover to Prussia in exchange 
 for her pure and simple guarantee of the status prcesens of Italy, 
 in favour of France, that is to say, of the establishm.ent of the 
 kingdom of Italy, as it now is, and of the maintenance of the 
 union of Grenoa, Parma, Placentia, and Piedmont with the 
 French Empire. 
 
 "The Emperor and the King would soon agree about the 
 details. The treaty could, besides, be kept secret as long as 
 might be wished, and every means which should be considered 
 necessary for rendering it palatable to Europe would be 
 employed. 
 
 "A superficial view may induce the fear that a war would 
 result from a pubhc measure directed, generally, against those 
 who might be incHned to disturb the peace of the Continent. 
 Well, even suppose a war should result, where would be the 
 danger for Prussia, when the Emperor would furnish her, 
 if necessary, with 80,000 men against the Eussians, and when she 
 would have for her auxiliaries, Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria, and the 
 Electorate of Baden ? The Emperor would guarantee to these 
 the recez of the Empire, and to the King the possession of the 
 Electorate of Hanover, whilst his allies would only have to 
 guarantee the present status quo of Italy. 
 
 " Besides these are not the times when Frederick the Great, 
 the ally of Louis XV. and afterwards of George II., had reason 
 to complain of the want of energy of the two Courts, and found 
 himself, a hero, aU alone. France governed by the present 
 Emperor offers to the King a more solid support. Why can he 
 not consult his immortal gTeat uncle ? 
 
 "But the importance of the doubt upon the preservation 
 of peace is too great not to deserve a serious examination. It 
 must above all be considered that the continuation of the 
 maritime war is essentially based by England upon the hope of 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 77 
 
 a continental one. This basis once destroyed, the maritime war 
 has no longer any thing to rest upon ; for it is now proved to the 
 Cabinet of London itself, that the attainment of the objects 
 it had in view in renewing hostilities with France, is impossible. 
 And since it is equally clear that Austria would not dare, and 
 consequently, that Russia would not be able, to declare a 
 continental war, from the moment Prussia shall have said, that 
 she would take part in it, in concert with France, the King will 
 then have the glory of arranging, to his own advantage, the 
 peace between France and England. 
 
 " It would argue but a slight knowledge of the character of 
 the English Government to suppose that it would break off the 
 negociations, and make a fresh appeal to the continental passions, 
 as soon as the time was come for notifying to it that Hanover 
 must be ceded to Prussia. 
 
 " 1. Russia and Austria would respect, both before and 
 after the King's declaration, a union of continental forces, 
 wliich it would be rashness itself to attack. 
 
 " 2. The peace between France and England will never 
 be made by His Britannic Majesty, but by the nation, as 
 was that of America. All the predilections of this Sove- 
 reign for Hanover are nothing to the Parliament; every 
 good Englishman will be delighted at being politically sepa- 
 rated from the Continent, and at no longer having to take 
 part in the wars into wliich Great Britain is continually 
 being dragged by the German possessions of its Sovereign. 
 
 " 3. At the worst, there is no political combination at 
 London, which, supported by a very great majority, does 
 not desire to give up a country, of which France would 
 take possession at the very first cannon shot, and which 
 would have, afterwards, to be redeemed by maritime 
 sacrifices. 
 
 " 4. Undoubtedly some compensation must be given by 
 France for the loss of Hanover, and as this can only be 
 done by a greater pliability as regards the arrangements 
 relative to the two Indies, every English ministry would 
 consider the personal loss of the Sovereign as the gain 
 of the nation at large. 
 
 "Thus the difficulty of peace with England in no respect 
 becomes increased: that of the Continent is no longer pro- 
 blematical; England, by being strengthened, sees a necessity 
 
78 EUROPEAN C0NGBE8SBS. Chap. I. 
 
 for replying to the overtures of France ; the Emperor is sure of 
 the assent he will require, and Prussia obtains, at the least 
 possible risk, if, indeed, there be even the shadow of one, all 
 that is necessary for the maintenance of her power. 
 
 " These happy results he whoUy in that singular conjunction 
 of fugitive events of which ability knows how to avail itself. 
 The I2ng will, no doubt, appreciate the disinterestedness of the 
 Emperor, who, upon tliis occasion, is not actuated by any views 
 of personal aggrandizement, or, above all, by any personal 
 apprehensions. For, on the one hand, the Emperor does not 
 think there is any probability of war, for the present. It 
 appears to him that when two countries are so distant from each 
 other as are Russia and France, intrigue, senseless prattle and 
 insult are separated by an immfense interval from actual hostili- 
 ties. Should, however, war break out, he is prepared, he has 
 calculated aU the chances, and entertains not the least doubt, 
 even supposing a union betAveen Austria and Eussia. On the 
 other hand, the Emperor only asks for the guarantee of that 
 which no one can deprive him of, he offers to the King, by right 
 of acquisition, that of which the King has spoken to him merely 
 as a right of deposit ; lastly, it is for France to render an account 
 of this transaction to England. What then can make the King 
 hesitate ? 
 
 " Is it a spirit of moderation ? But the spirit of his ancestors, 
 the glory of his family, the interest of his people, the geo- 
 graphical position of his monarchy, the necessity of maintaining 
 a certain balance of power among his neighbours, the evident 
 danger of falling into a comparatively inferior position, all these 
 considerations should induce him to analyze the nature of a 
 sovereign's moderation. It does not consist in remaining 
 stationary, when all around him is on the increase ; for a prince 
 cannot be said to preserve his dominions, when he neglects the 
 means of keeping them upon a level with others. It has often 
 been remarked, that a State which does not increase, decreases, 
 a maxim which has never been found so strictly true as in 
 the present age. No doubt, moderation proscribes wars ori- 
 ginating in ambition; and forbids that Europe should be con- 
 vulsed that some neighbour may be despoiled. But the question 
 is now to tranquillize Europe, and, after all, it is not upon a 
 neighboiu- that the expenses are made to fall ; the British Emuire 
 will not bo less powerful thereby, and the English are longmg to 
 be rid of Hanover, where their self pride is too often humiliated. 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 79 
 
 " Can it be a land of point of honour attached to the preser- 
 vation of a neutrality the assurance of which the King has 
 recently everywhere renewed ? But when the war commenced 
 between France and England, Russia and Austria declared their 
 neutrality in the same way as Prussia. Judging from the 
 preparations being made by them, it would appear that the one 
 is desirous of making war, while the other defends itself with 
 difficulty against being instigated thereto. What should the 
 King say, but tliis : that lie tvill cease to ie neuter, if others depart 
 from their neutrality. His character would acquire additional 
 lustre by an explanation so natural, so salutary for humanity, so 
 conformable to the sentiments he has manifested since the very 
 beginning of the maritime war. Of what was he then desirous 
 but to expel from the Continent the mania for war ? What is 
 he now desirous of doing, but to show that he is always advancing 
 to the same goal, although by a different road? It is no 
 ordinary glory to be able to address the quos ego to the Powers 
 who might differ from his pacific wishes. 
 
 " Could it be a repugnance to receive a third of the German 
 inheritance of the family of Brunswick Lunebourg, and to 
 nullify the rights of reversion of that of Brunswick Wolfenbuttel? 
 A great many considerations here present themselves. 
 
 "The King may be actuated by the noble emulation of 
 standing forth as an example, and of forgetting that even the 
 most modern histories furnish a thousand such. But would the 
 reigning family in England be in this case despoiled ? has it not 
 one of the splendid diadems of Europe and vast possessions in 
 all parts of the globe? Would it have been unjust to make 
 it contribute to the mass of the Germanic indemnifications for all 
 that its ambition has cost the Continent during the last war ? 
 Is it unjust ia the present day to make it pay for the losses 
 occasioned by the inexcusable blockade of the Elbe and the 
 Weser, and for all the gold of which its monopoKsts have drained 
 the Continent ? It is less a wrong which would be inflicted on 
 the House of Brunswick Lunebourg than a service rendered to 
 an unfortunate portion of Germany, which ought no longer to 
 suffer from a connection condemned by the very nature of 
 things. Lastly, ought not His Britannic Majesty to give a full 
 consent to the King's possession before signiug the peace? 
 .It appears that nothing wiU be wanting to the legitimacy of the 
 title which the King will have received from the conqueror. 
 
 "As to the House of Brunswick Wolfenbuttel, it must be 
 
80 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. 1. 
 
 owned that its eventual right is so remote as to be scarcely 
 appreciable ; so considerable the difference between the great 
 number of the heirs of the line still in possession and the small 
 number of the heirs of the substituted one ; so much uncertainty 
 is there as to the future destiny of Hanover, should the King 
 hesitate to determine it. 
 
 "The arrangement of the indemnities would have been an 
 interminable business but for an unflinching appreciation of 
 rights of this description ; in addition to which the liing, will be 
 fully master to act towards the House of Brunswick Wolfen- 
 buttel, in the way suggested by his sense of what is right and 
 dignified. 
 
 "An opportunity may, perhaps, hereafter present itself of 
 entering mto more ample developments as regards the honour- 
 able colouring which the Cabiuet of Berlin cannot fail to give to 
 the proposition made by the Emperor to the King, as well 
 as upon the manner of making it contribute to the satisfaction of 
 the Electoral Courts ; the facilities which the union of Hanover 
 with Prussia woidd furnish for the settlement of the questions 
 stUl remaining in suspense at the Diet ; and the arrangements, 
 satisfactory even for Austria and Eussia, which would result 
 therefrom. But these are subordinate details. The Emperor 
 offers Hanover purely and simply, and it is for the King 
 himself to determine what would be generous towards his co- 
 Germanic States." 
 
 No. 22. 
 Translation of the Answer of the Pbussian Cabinet to the Minute 
 
 of M. DE LA FOKEST. 
 
 1805. 
 " The more faithful the King is to his engagements, the greater 
 has been the regret with which he has seen that a difference of 
 opinion can exist between himself and His Majesty the Emperor 
 upon the guarantee of the tranquilhty of the north of Germany. 
 The King understood, in all sincerity, that this guarantee could 
 not concern Hanover itself. At the time when the engagements 
 which established it were entered into, that country, belonging 
 to a Power who was the enemy of France, found itself effectively , 
 in a state of war ; it was occupied by the French troops ; and the 
 sole object of the guarantee was the better to secure to Prussia 
 
<'HAP. I. EUKOPEAN CONGRESSES. 81 
 
 and hev allies, on tlie one hand, the state of feace and neutrality ; 
 and, on the other, to France, that she could not be attacked by 
 land throughout the whole extent which sin-rounds tlie country 
 of Hanover. There could not be a question of the peninsula 
 between the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, because the means 
 of Prussia would be insufficient to prevent a landing from being 
 there effected. It is held by the French troops, and they are 
 more than enough to oppose any similar enterprise in a country 
 resembling Holland, presenting even gi-eater difficulties, and 
 offering but very few points where landings are practicable. 
 The guarantee could not have been extended to these countries, 
 except in the case of their having been protected by Prussian 
 troops. 
 
 " The King has most assuredly nothing more at heart than 
 to draw stdl closer and closer those happy relations, founded upon 
 a wise policy, which subsist between Prussia and France. 
 
 " All he wishes is to give to His Majesty the Emperor proofs 
 of his friendship and confidence ; and it is with the liveliest sensi- 
 bility that he received, as a fresh token of these sentiments on 
 the part of His Imperial Majesty, the proposition which His 
 Imperial Majesty has caused to be made to him thi-ough the 
 medium of M. de la Forest. 
 
 " Eendering the fullest justice to the solidity of the arguments 
 with which that proposition has been accompanied. His Majesty 
 will willingly enter into subsequent explanations upon the im- 
 portant object of which it treats. He approves also, with un- 
 feigned satisfaction, of the plan of His Imperial Majesty for 
 making the agreement proposed, upon the cession of Hanover to 
 Prussia, serve as a counterbalance to the guarantee of the status 
 prcesens in Italy, in preventing the war upon the Continent, and 
 in even forwarding the peace with England. 
 
 " But in order to attain this object, it appears to him indis- 
 pensably necessary that the independence of the rest of Italy, 
 not included in the States which Prussia would guarantee, also 
 of the Batavian Kepubhc and of Helvetia, should be equally 
 well secured and guaranteed. 
 
 " The King supposes that this is the intention of the Emperor ; 
 and if His Imperial Majesty would be pleased to give him a posi- 
 tive explanation thereon, His Majesty wi]J with pleasure occupy 
 himself with the details necessary for them to arrive at a de- 
 finitive understanding. 
 
 (Signed) " Hardenbueg." 
 
 G 
 
82 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 In the autumn of this year (1805) the Eussian and 
 Austrian Grovernments declared war against France, 
 and the French Emperor (with the view of turning the 
 position which was occupied by the Austrian army at 
 Ulm) violated the Prussian territory by passing a corps 
 of troops through Anspach. Every exertion was then 
 made to induce the Prussian Grovernment to join the 
 alHes against France. The Emperor Alexander repaired 
 to Berlin, and the Earl of Harrowby was sent there 
 from England, but their exertions were counteracted by 
 the deep-rooted desire of neutrality which had so long 
 been inculcated by Count Haugwitz, and from which 
 he expecteS, amidst the crash of the falling empires 
 which surrounded him, to secure solid advantages for 
 his master. Notwithstanding the personal feeling of 
 the King, and that even the day was named on which 
 Prussia should declare herself against France, Count 
 Haugwitz, who had been sent with the Prussian Ulti- 
 matum to Bonaparte, though he found him at Vienna, 
 consented to allow him to qiiit that capital for his 
 head-quarters in Moldavia before having entered upon 
 the negotiation with which he was charged, so that 
 the fatal battle of Austerlitz was fought before he 
 had executed the purpose of his mission. From that 
 moment the Prussian Grovernment endeavoured to 
 extricate itself from the embarrassment which its 
 apparent hostility had created in its relations with 
 France ; and, although it had committed no act, had 
 made no declaration which could prove the feelings by 
 which it was actuated, yet its general conduct had too 
 clearly demonstrated its secret intentions to leave a 
 hope they could be concealed from the French Grovern- 
 ment. In remodelling the States of Europe which had 
 fallen under the graip of the French Emperor, the con- 
 sent of the King of Prussia to the different arrange- 
 ments was insisted upon, and the cession of Hanover 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 83 
 
 was now again proposed to him as an indemnity for 
 cessions of territory to which he was required to accede. 
 This proposition was reluctantly accepted ; but, previous 
 to its final settlement, Bonaparte had commenced a 
 negotiation for peace with the British Grovernment, the 
 groundwork of which was the restitution of Hanover 
 to the King of England. The Marquis Lucchesini dis- 
 covered and communicated this fact to the Prussian 
 Cabinet, and the discussions which ensued upon this 
 exposure of the duplicity of the French Grovernment 
 brought about the war between France and Prussia, 
 which was immediately followed by the battle of Jena. 
 
 The total overthrow of the Prussian army in this 
 action, which was the result of the inactivity, the irre- 
 solution, and, if it may be so expressed, the inexperience 
 of the superior officers who commanded it, and who 
 had not been engaged in any serious warfare since the 
 Seven Years' War, laid the kingdom at the feet of the 
 French Emperor. By the temporising policy of the 
 first minister of Prussia, this contest had been brought 
 upon his country when she stood alone against the 
 power of Napoleon. Had it been undertaken but a 
 few months before, while Austria and Russia were in 
 unbroken force, the chances would have been more" 
 favourable ; had it been delayed till the Russian, 
 auxiliaries, which were on their march, had joined the 
 Prussian forces, or had been near enough to have 
 afforded them support, the disaster of a defeat could 
 not have been so irreparable ; but weakness and inca- 
 pacity in statesmen are generally accompanied by vanity 
 and self-conceit, and such was essentially the case on the 
 present occasion. When Count Haugwitz discovered 
 that, notwithstanding the obsequious policy he had used 
 towards the French Government, he was betrayed by 
 it, he plunged his country into war, and boasting the 
 traditional renown of the Prussian army under the 
 
 G 2 
 
84 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 great Frederic, relied upon it for the triumph of his 
 cause. When this army was defeated and dispersed, 
 when nearly the whole of its separated corps were cap- 
 tured, and when the fortresses of the kingdom, unpre- 
 pared for defence, surrendered to the victors, he had 
 no resources by which to arrest the progress of the 
 enemy, or to stem the torrent of devastation he had 
 brought upon his country. The correspondence which 
 follows will prove the abject state to which the unfor- 
 tunate Sovereign of Prussia was reduced, and the con- 
 temptuous manner in which he was treated. 
 
 No. 23. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from the Emperor Napoleon to the King of 
 
 Prussia. 
 
 " SlE, MY BeOTHEE, 
 
 " I have received Your Majesty's letter. I much regret 
 that the one which I sent to you by an orderly officer who arrived 
 in your camp on the 13tb, failed to prevent the battle of the 14th. 
 Any suspension of arms by which time would be given for the 
 arrival of the Eussian armies, whom you appear to have invited 
 last winter, would be too contrary to my interests for me to sub- 
 scribe to, however great may be my desire to spare humanity 
 the calamities and victims of war. I do not fear the Eussians ; 
 they are no longer a cloudy vapour for me ; I saw them the last 
 campaign. But Tour Majesty will have to complain of them 
 much more than I : the one-half of your dominions will be the 
 theatre of war, a;hd from that moment will have to endure all 
 the calamities of it ; and the other part wiU be ravaged by your 
 allies, and will have to suffer stiU more. 
 
 " I shall ever regret that two nations, who for so many reasons 
 ought to be united, should be di-awn into a contest for which 
 there is so little cause. The chief instigators of it have become 
 its first victims. I must however once more repeat to Your 
 Majesty that I shall regard with satisfaction the means of re- 
 establishing, if that be possible, the former confidence which 
 reigned between us, and of reconciling the sentiments I entertain 
 for you with my duty and the security of my people, which has 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 85 
 
 again, within the space of fifteen years, been endangered by a 
 fourth coalition. 
 
 " Upon which I pray God, Sir, my brother, to have you in his 
 holy and blessed keeping. 
 
 (Signed) " Napoleon. 
 
 " From my Imperial Camp, 
 Oct. 19, 1806." 
 
 No. 24. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from the King of Prussia to the Marquis 
 
 LUCCHESINI. 
 
 " I forward to you annexed a copy of the letter which the 
 Emperor Napoleon has sent me by my aide-de-camp. Count de 
 Donhoff, and of the answer which I have just returned to His 
 Imperial Majesty. I have not adverted therein to the suspicion 
 which that Sovereign appears to entertain of my having last 
 winter invited Eussia to join her forces to mine, because you wiU 
 no doubt have found an opportunity ere this of convincing His 
 Imperial Majesty how much he wrongs me in this respect, and 
 with what repugnance it was that I decided upon taking this 
 step even then, when events which are yet recent compelled me 
 in fact to consider it as an indispensable one for the safety of my 
 dominions. I understand too well how to appreciate the interests 
 of the latter not to sacrifice, in favour of solid and permanent 
 relations with France, those which I have contracted for no other 
 cause than on account of the dangers with which I had reason 
 to believe I was threatened on the part of His Imperial Majesty. 
 The immediate dismissal of the Eussian armies is a first step for 
 which I am fully prepared, if the overtures with which you are 
 charged be received at all, and that your reports inform me as 
 to what I am to expect ; but the uncertainty I have been in 
 ever since your departure must be no further prolonged. It is 
 highly important that I should know what I have to depend 
 upon, and I therefore beg you most earnestly to put a speedy 
 termination to the state of indecision and doubt in which your 
 silence has kept me up to the present moment. I trust you wUl 
 be able to do so, for the Emperor himself wrote to me that he 
 would regard with satisfaction the means of re-establishing the 
 former confidence which reigned between us. By sending you 
 to him, I have offered him the facility of so doing. On my part 
 no foreign engagement shall oppose any obstacle. Pledge my 
 word, I repeat, to the Emperor, that it shall not. I most sin- 
 
86 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 cerely desire peace with him. I wish to draw still closer my 
 ties with France, and all that is necessary to fulfil this wish is 
 again to find her Sovereign such as he represents himself to be 
 in his letter. Why then do we not come to an understanding 
 without loss of time? And wherefore does the march of the 
 French troops, who are continually advancing, compel me against 
 my will to avail myself of the resources still left me, and of the 
 forces which Russia has ordered to advance in my defence ? 
 
 (Signed) " Feedekick William. 
 
 " Custrin, Oct. 25, 1806. 
 
 " To the- Minister of State the 
 " Marquis Lucchesini." 
 
 No. 25. 
 
 Translation of a Report from the Maequis Lucchesini and Gtbnbbal 
 Zastbow to the Kino of Pbussia. 
 
 " SlEE, " Charlottenburg, Oct. 28, 1806. 
 
 " We consider it our duty to unite together in order to 
 make, by your Majesty's command, a Eeport in common respect- 
 ing the result of the negociation Your Majesty was pleased to 
 entrust us with. 
 
 " I, Zastrow, shall therefore commence by informing you. Sire, 
 that, upon my arriving at Miinchenburg, the officer there in 
 command of the French advanced post caused me to be escorted 
 to Friedrichsfeld, where Marshal Davoust had established his 
 head-quarters. 
 
 " I reached that place on the night of the 16th, at half-past 
 eleven o'clock, but the Marshal absolutely refused to allow me 
 to proceed any further before he received the Emperor's orders, 
 which an aide-de-camp was immediately despatched to obtain. 
 He found the Emperor at Charlottenburg, and returned at seven 
 o'clock in the morning to Friedrichsfeld, with the answer that 
 Prince Berthier, to whom he had spoken, would communicate 
 the Emperor's intentions upon his awaking. 
 
 " On the 27th, at eleven o'clock, a.m., I at last obtained per- 
 mission to depart, and arrived at Charlottenburg at 2 o'clock in 
 the afternoon, at the very moment the Emperor was preparing 
 to mount his horse in order to make his entr(le into Berlin. 
 Notwithstanding this I had the good fortune of being presented 
 lu Ilis Majesty by Marshal Duroc, and of delivering to him my 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 87 
 
 credentials. The Emperor received me with kindness and affa- 
 bility, and I had reason to flatter myself that I was not person- 
 ally disagreeable to him. I informed him of the object of my 
 mission, and expressed to him Your Majesty's anxious solicitude 
 for the cessation of hostilities and the re-estabHshment of peace. 
 
 " The Eiijperor asked me if the Eussians were already on the 
 Prussian territory. I replied, I would not conceal from His 
 Majesty that, according to the latest intelligence received at 
 Custrin, it was possible that the heads of columns might be, at 
 this very moment entering Prussia by the way of Grodno, but I 
 immediately added that you. Sire, were impatiently awaiting a 
 re-assuring word from the Emperor, in order to cause them to 
 march back again. ' Ah !' cried he, sharply, interrupting me, ' if 
 the Eussians make their appearance I shall march against and 
 beat them.' ' That would be,' replied I, ' an additional glory for 
 Your Majesty, and one misfortune more for Prussia, who would 
 see the theatre of the war extended in her provinces.' I repeated 
 the positive assurance that, the very moment the preliminaries 
 of peace should be signed, Your Majesty would hasten to cause 
 those auxiliaries to quit the Prussian territory. The Emperor 
 being on the point of dismissing me without saying anything to 
 me on the subject of my mission, I asked him to whom I was to 
 address myself for that purpose, and, as I expected, he named 
 General Duroc. 
 
 " This General had evinced towards me (Lucchesini) the same 
 hostile feelings which the Emperor entertained against the Prus- 
 sians, feelings revived by a trifling success which General Grouchy, 
 who commanded five regiments of cavah-y under Prince Miirat, 
 must have gained, the preceding evening, over the cavalry of 
 Prince Hohenlohe's advanced guard. I had ascertained, upon 
 this occasion, that the corps-d' armie of this Prince was in danger 
 of being surrounded by several corps-d' armie, who had all 
 marched against him. However, when we both met again, im- 
 mediately after the Emperor's departm-e, for the purpose of 
 asking General Duroc when and where we could conclude with 
 him the Treaty for which we both possessed the full powers, as 
 well as the most ample instructions, he desired us, in conformity 
 with the Emperor's orders, to remain at Charlottenburg, and 
 there draw up the draft of the preliminary articles for the bases 
 of a Treaty of Peace, promising to call upon us the next morn- 
 ing, in order to commence the negociations. He accordingly 
 came about nine o'clock on the morning of the 28th. We laid 
 
88 EUROl'EAN CONGRESSBR. Chap. I. 
 
 before him the draft 'of the preliminary Convention, consisting of 
 seven articles, setting forth the sacriiices Your Majesty was ready 
 to make for the re-establishment of peace, the conditions of the 
 armistice which should immediately follow the signing of this 
 act, the arrangement for the breaking up of the French troops 
 after the exchange of the ratifications, and the engagement for 
 the immediate opening of the conferences for the conclusion of 
 the definitive peace. In his turn General Duroc made us read 
 a draft of articles which the Emperor had dictated to him, and 
 which were to serve as the bases of the peace. 
 
 " It contained the enumeration of all the countries to be ceded 
 by Your Majesty to France. This enumeration included. Sire, 
 all that you possess on the left bank of the Elbe, comprising 
 therein even the Principality of HaUe. The rest of the Duchy 
 of Magdeburg and of the Province of the old March of Branden- 
 burg, which are also situated on the left bank of that river, was 
 all that was reserved for Your Majesty. In naming the Elec- 
 torate of Hanover it was expressly added, and the Duchy of 
 Lauenhurg. 
 
 " The other article concerned the recognition of the Confede- 
 ration of the Ehine, which is extended to Saxony and all the 
 rest of Germany. 
 
 " The article upon the cessions differed from om-s by the 
 claim we put in for the countiy of Halberstadt and that of 
 Halle, with the Countship of Mannsfeld as an equivalent for that 
 of Lauenburg, situated upon the right bank of the Elbe. A 
 detailed discussion ensued between General Duroc and ourselves 
 upon these differences, as well as upon the reasons of our de- 
 mand, and upon the principle continually advanced by the 
 Emperor Napoleon in this painful negociation, viz., that he 
 required the enfeeblement of Prussia as a guarantee for the cer- 
 tainty that she would not attack liim again within two years' 
 time. TMs unfortunate principle, which I, Lucchesini, had 
 hitherto vainly endeavoured to combat in my frequent con- 
 ferences with General Duroc, both at Potsdam and here, is the 
 sole cause of our efforts, whether single or united, to obtain 
 somewhat more tolerable conditions, having constantly failed. 
 Our devotedness, our honour, and the interest of the nation, 
 have made us. Sire, strain every nerve to remove from Napo- 
 leon's mind the idea that, unless he deprive Prussia of the power 
 of action for many years to come, the desire of vengeance will 
 constantly arm her against Frain'o. Unfortunately, Sire, he 
 
Chap. I. BUROPBAiV CONGBBSSRS. 89 
 
 exaggerates the amount of the population of the States which 
 still remain to you, and underrates it in those of which he 
 exacts the cession. BeUeve me, Sire, to have insisted on the 
 line of the Weser was to break off the negociation. The wish to 
 cross the Oder, in order to continue the war with 80,000 men, 
 leaving in the Marches of Brandenburg a corps d'arynde making 
 together from 30,000 to 35,000 men, is a fact generally known 
 and proved. He bears the Eussians a grudge, accusing them 
 of being the cause of the prolongation of the maritime war. 
 Judging from the conversation which he had with me, Zastrow, 
 and from the positive and multipKed facts and information we 
 have made it our business to collect, there can be not the least 
 doubt of Napoleon's extreme desire of avoiding any opportunity 
 of being reconciled to Your Majesty, and thereby of abandoning 
 the vast schemes he has very probably concocted, should the 
 continuation of the war conduct him to the Vistula. 
 
 " It is certain. Sire, that the plan of causing an insurrection in 
 Poland, and of giving the inhabitants of that country a King, is 
 already formed, and that the persons intended to execute it are 
 acquainted with the fact. Circumstances so grave, accompanied 
 by means so considerable as would be able to reduce the mo- 
 narchy to the very verge of ruin, have imposed upon us, Sire, 
 the painful duty of removing the possibility of such an event by 
 accepting the conditions offered to us by the Emperor. 
 
 " On our part we have not forgotten any of the points which 
 Your Majesty deigned to recommend to our zeal. The fate of 
 the unfortunate Duke of Brunswick, and that of the family of 
 the Prince of Orange, have in vain been made the subject of our 
 most earnest appeals, until the most decided refusal deprived us 
 of the hope even of the least success. We then thought it our 
 duty to remain silent, lest we should irritate the Emperor Napo- 
 leon still more against those two Princes. The principal reproach 
 made against the Duke of Bninswick is founded upon the mani- 
 festo he was obliged to sign in 1792, before he entered Cham- 
 pagne. The chief complaints alleged agaiast His Highness the 
 Prince of Orange consist in a pretended animosity of this Prince 
 against France and her present Sovereign, which has induced 
 him to become one of the principal instigators of the present 
 war. It appears that the Emperor even imputes to him certain 
 proceedings which are at variance with the submission due to 
 So\ereigns from those who have the honour of being iu their 
 service. The hope, however, should not be abandoned that, in 
 
90 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 the negociations of the definite Treaty of Peace, the intervention 
 of Tour Majesty may succeed in preserving to these two illuR- 
 trious families some portions of their private estates and pro- 
 perty, nor, in order to accomplish this object, shaU any exertions 
 of ours be wanting. 
 
 " Charlottenburg, 29th Oct. 1806. 
 
 " In the well-founded expectation that, by the return of Mar- 
 shal Duroc with the Emperor's orders and full powers, we should 
 have been able to have completed, in the course of yesterday, 
 the preliminaries of peace, we hastened to draw up our iirst 
 humble Eeport of yesterday's date. Unfortunately last night 
 passed without the G-eneral's returning to Charlottenburg, and 
 we have been equally disappointed of seeing him this morning. 
 Impatient that the end of so urgent an affair should be deferred, 
 at eleven o'clock, a.m., we wrote him a letter, in which we ex- 
 pressed to him our surprise at so prolonged an absence, the more 
 especially as the entire acquiescence of Your Majesty in the con- 
 ditions demanded by the Emperor ought to have ensured the 
 termination of the negociations last night. 
 
 " General Duroc replied by the very humble letter annexed 
 in the original. Surprised at finding therein the assurance that, 
 although the Emperor had been exactly informed of our conver- 
 sation the preceding evening, and had, moreover, been spoken to 
 on the subject in the morning, he had, notwithstanding, left the 
 Imperial head-quarters without giving any subsequent orders in 
 the matter : burning with impatience to forward to Your Majesty 
 the news of the signature of the preHminary Convention ; fearing 
 also that warlike spirit which impels the Emperor to seek for 
 opportunities of prolonging wars, we lost not a moment in draw- 
 ing up the annexed very humble note, a copy of which was for- 
 warded before 5 o'clock in the afternoon to the French negociator. 
 The object of its contents was, in fact, to induce the Emperor to 
 keep his word, and, as he had no longer any pretext for tergi- 
 versation, to urge him to authorise Marshal Duroc to conclude, 
 and to furnish us with the means of executing the suspension of 
 hostUities. In the mean time, the city of Berlin, and all the 
 country occupied by the French troops, are treated with an un- 
 exampled cruelty, and the excessive irritation arising from exor- 
 bitant claims will soon drive the inhabitants to a state of despair. 
 Contributions and requisitions are accumulating every instant, 
 and it is easy to suppose that, being desirous of doubling the 
 
Chap. T. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 91 
 
 impositions upon the Prussian States, the Emperor delays sign- 
 ing a Convention which Your Majesty took the generous and 
 indispensable resolution of charging yourself with. 
 
 " ChailottenbuTg, 30th Oct. 1806. 
 
 " General Duroc has, at last, arrived at Charlottenburg, this 
 day, at eleven o'clock, a.m. : he commenced by confirming the 
 intelligence which had reached us last night, that the whole 
 of Prince Hohenlohe's corps had been made prisoners on the 
 27th, and that those of G-enera:l Blucher and of the Duke de 
 Weimar, followed and sm-round'cd, could not fail falling into the 
 hands of the French corps who are pursuing them. After these 
 disagreeable preambles he declared to us that the Emperor 
 only waited for the acceptance of the three points destined to 
 serve for the basis of the peace, in order that the negociations for 
 the definite Treaty should be immediately commenced, but that 
 he could not consent to the cessation of hostihties by an armistice 
 which would arrest his successes before the Treaty of Peace had 
 put an end to the war. General Duroc gave us to understand 
 that the Emperor, absolutely refusing any diminution whatever 
 of the sacrifices exacted from Prussia, availed himself of our 
 delays in signing to defeat, one after another. Your Majesty's 
 corps d'arm^e. The overtures expressed the most positive refusal 
 to sign a preliminary Convention, by which the French army 
 would be compelled to stop its march at the place wherever it 
 might be when the signature of this act was announced to it. 
 They also left no alternative between the hope of immediately 
 commencing the negociation of the definite Treaty of Peace and 
 the prospect of seeing, on their march hence towards the Oder, 
 seizing every place on the road, and advancing thence to the 
 Vistula, 100,000 Frenchmen, reinforced by the Polish insurgents ; 
 against all which forces 15,000 Prussians, assembled on the right 
 bank of the Vistula, and 50,000 effective combatants, would pro- 
 bably make but an ineffective resistance. We presume to flatter 
 ourselves that Your Majesty will not suspect us of being wanting 
 in zeal, energy, and firmness, when we endeavoured to obtain 
 from General Duroc, in exchange for our acceptance of the pro- 
 posed bases, the engagement that, during the course of the nego- 
 ciations, the French troops should undertake no enterprise either 
 against Magdeburg or Stettin, and that they should remain on 
 the left bank of the Oder. We declared ourselves ready, on our 
 part, to engage that Your Majesty should, in your turn, cause the 
 
92 EUBOPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 auxiliary Eussian troops also to halt in the place wherever they 
 might happen to be. General Duroc protested he could not 
 take upon himself such an engagement, but he promised to pro- 
 pose it to the Emperor ; and, supporting it by all the reasons we 
 had advanced, obtain, without loss of time, his orders respecting 
 it. There now remained the crushing article of the contribu- 
 tion, upon which there are no kind of arguments, no calculations 
 or comparisons with the population of Austria, no protestations, 
 no prayers, but what have been vainly exhausted in order to 
 diminish the exorbitant sum of 100 millions of irancs to a less 
 unreasonable amount. General Duroc declared to us that we 
 could not obtain peace but by burdening ourselves mth this 
 enormous contribution, for the paying which the Emperor pre- 
 tended to assert that more than suiEcient specie was to be found 
 in the Treasury and the Bank. Aware of all the advantages of 
 his present position. Napoleon admits neither arguments nor 
 remonstrances ; and, as the chances which the lapse of time may 
 bring with it cannot but tend to his advantage, we have no other 
 means of preserving the monarchy from a dissolution, urged by 
 more than one ambitious man, than by affixing our signatures to 
 the act very humbly hereunto annexed, and of which the imme- 
 diate effect would be the opening of the overtures for the definite 
 Treaty of Peace. This Treaty, Sire, besides the articles of mere 
 formality, will stipulate the manner and the periods for the 
 respective evacuations of the fortresses and countries occupied or 
 ceded, as well as the conditions of the payments of the contribu- 
 tion. As upon the full execution of this last article wiU depend 
 the entire evacuation of the Prussian States by the French 
 troops, it appears to us very important that we should not be 
 delayed, in the dramng up of the articles, by the want of 
 instructions or of positive information. We, therefore, entreat 
 Your Majesty to take the necessary measures for raisuig the 
 funds, either for the payment in cash of a part of this contribu- 
 tion, or for meeting the engagements entered into by foreign 
 bankers for the other conditions of the said contribution. The 
 person empowered by Your Majesty for this operation will have 
 to treat here with M. Daru, the Emperor's comptroller of finances, 
 and with M. Esteur, his private treasurer. 
 
 " At the close of our long conference with General Duroc we 
 again insisted upon the necessity and the propriety of the sus- 
 pension of hostUe movements in the direction of the Oder. We 
 pressed these new solicitations, presuming that Your Majesty 
 
Ohap. I. EUROPEAN CONaRESSBS. 93 
 
 might be desirous of approaching the seat of the negociations 
 by re-establishing your head-quarters at Custrin. In fact, if 
 that were possible, not only should we possess the incalculable 
 advantage of being nearer to the source of orders and instruc- 
 tions, but we are persuaded that the Emperor Napoleon would 
 consider this return as a fresh proof, Sire, of the more complete 
 separation, on your part, from the hopes, the views, the counsels, 
 and the armies, of the Emperor of Eussia. Under this point of 
 view it might prove of some utility to you, Sire, to receive, on 
 the return of Major De Kauch, some information as to the march 
 of the Russian corps d'armeis destined to serve as your auxiliaries. 
 Their force is already known to Napoleon, but that monarch 
 pretends already to possess the information that the whole Eus- 
 sian army placed upon a war footing menaces the Porte. General 
 Dowbroski is in the suite of the Emperor of the French. All 
 the instructions prepared by me, Zastrow, for announcing the 
 suspension of hostilities can only be forwarded at the moment of 
 the signature of peace. General Duroc has led us to hope that 
 we shall have, this evening, the passport and the necessary 
 orders for the posts for the departure of the couriers. In this 
 expectation we have tlie honour to be, with respect, &c. &c. 
 
 (Signed) " LticcHESiNi. 
 
 " Zasteow." 
 
 No. 26. 
 
 Translation of a Repobt from Marquis Lucohesini and General Zastrow 
 
 to the King. 
 " SlEE " Chailottenburg, Nov. 5, 1806. 
 
 "We resume, with sorrow, the thread of the narratives 
 transmitted to Your Majesty on the 13th ultimo by Major de 
 Kauch. In the evening of the 1st November Prince of Benevente, 
 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived at Berlin. We ad- 
 dressed to him, the same day, a note, a copy of which is very 
 humbly herermto annexed sub litt. A, and, in consequence of 
 the friendly relations existing between that Minister and me, 
 Lucchesini, I added to the ofScial document, a confidential letter 
 for the purpose of interesting his private sympathies in favour of 
 the object of our common request. The next day a carriage 
 was sent from the city by the Prince of Benevente, bringing me 
 a friendly invitation to proceed immediately to the hotel 
 formerly occupied by the Sieur Laforest, where the Minister was 
 
94 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 residing. Eeceiving me in a manner so friendly as to leave me 
 nothing to wish for in this respect, he gave me so much the less 
 cause for satisfaction in his quality of Minister of the Emperor 
 Napoleon. He began by excusing his silence upon the official 
 questions which we had addressed to him the evening before, 
 alleging the want of instructions from the Emperor. He then 
 told me that, as regarded the object I had so much and so justly 
 at heart, he must absolutely confine himself to declaring to me 
 that the Emperor had not yet made up his mind either as to the 
 time or the mode of the pacification with Prussia. He did not 
 conceal from me, as General Duroc had constantly done, that 
 the Emperor was unfortunately resolved to weaken the Prussian 
 monarchy as much as possible, for the purpose of depriving her, 
 for a long time to come, of the power to injure France ; for, he 
 added, that having constantly found the iU effects of treating 
 the Powers whom he had vanquished with generosity, and being 
 imwilluig to expose himself any longer to the necessity of 
 combating, on each return of spring, a new Coalition, Napoleon 
 was considering the means by which he might establish, in the 
 north of Europe, such an order of things as might henceforth 
 guarantee him from similar enterprises. From these avowals, 
 I necessarily inferred that the bases and conditions of the peace 
 proposed and accepted on the 30th of October, woidd not yet 
 lead us to the cessation of hostilities and to the signature of 
 a treaty of peace. If the force of justice and of our arguments 
 could have combated with success the determinations of the 
 Emperor, my zeal and the goodness of our cause would have 
 furnished me with the means of triumphing over the unforeseen 
 opposition which the openiag of the negociations for the con- 
 clusion of the peace met with. The Prince of Benevente, 
 however, assured me that the Emperor was endeavouring 
 to reconcile Your Majesty's wish for peace with his own security 
 and interests, and he protested that if that Sovereign intended 
 to weaken, he was very far from wishing to humiliate you. 
 Then changing his diplomatic discourse into a familiar conversa- 
 tion, this Miaister did not conceal from me his regret at finding 
 the Emperor excessively indisposed towards Prussia, less on 
 account of the war which she had waged against him, with such 
 melancholy results, than from the conviction he had acquired, 
 since he had entered the dominions of Your Majesty, that the 
 enemies of his power and of the grandeur of France had, for 
 a long time since, been planning and organizing the schemes of 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 95 
 
 which, according to Napoleon, the present war is the result. 
 M. de Talleyrand assured me that at Charlottenburg, as well 
 as at Berlin, the royal residences occupied by Your Majesty and 
 your august family had rewarded the search and curiosity of the 
 persons belonging to the Emperor's Court with an immense 
 harvest of correspondence, memoii-s, plans and statements, which, 
 while compromising a great number of persons, appear to have 
 discovered to Napoleon the causes, no doubt only apparent ones, 
 of the change in the system of the Cabinet of Berlia. In the 
 conversation which the Emperor had at Charlottenburg with 
 me, Zastrow, he likewise informed me of these discoveries, whilst 
 General Duroc was directed to shew to me, Lucchesini, a 
 memoir, the object of which was to engage Your Majesty to 
 make common cause with Eussia against a usurper, a memoir 
 the style of which appeared to betray the pen of the Sieur 
 d'Autraignes. These papers, which seem to be very numerous, 
 were divided among the Cabinets of the Emperor, Prince 
 Berthier, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Their contents 
 (our duty obliges us to declare to Your Majesty) appear to have 
 inspired the Emperor with still more unfavourable sentiments 
 and more sinister views as regards the prosperity of the Prussian 
 monarchy. We are compelled to think that the discontent kept 
 up by their daily perusal has had as much influence as the 
 continued successes of the French arms upon the suspension 
 of the opening of negociations for the definite peace. M. de 
 Talleyrand gave me, Lucchesini, to understand that the future 
 fate of Prussia might be less unfortunate, could we succeed in 
 inducing Eussia to make peace speedily with France, which, in 
 his opinion, would be a sort of feeler as to that with England. 
 All that he said to me on this subject confirmed me ia the idea 
 that, after the reduction of Stettin and Ciistrin, and the capitu- 
 lation of the corps commanded by Prince Hohenlohe, Napoleon 
 would not easily allow himself to be diverted from going in 
 quest of the Eussians in Poland. My first conversation, there- 
 fore, with the Prince of Benevente, was not productive of any 
 favourable result for our negociation. The 3rd passed over 
 without our receiving at Charlottenburg any intelligence from 
 Berlin. In the evening, it was agreed that I should send 
 a friendly note to Prince de Benevente requesting him to 
 receive us at his residence, the next day. On the 4th he 
 invited me to pay him a confidential visit. He spoke to me 
 of the discoveries made in the room containing plans of Prussian 
 
96 BUEOPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. T. 
 
 as M'ell as foreign fortresses, of a portion of the public documents 
 belonging to the Aide-de-Camp General and of several acts 
 of the Military College. He listened with some interest to the 
 expressions of surprise and regret manifested by General de 
 Zastrow and myself, at finding that, notwithstanding the full 
 consent of Your Majesty to the conditions exacted by the 
 Emperor for the return of peace, this Sovereign refused to give 
 his assent thereto, and was preparing for fresh enterprises 
 beyond the Oder. But, upon my expressing some doubts as 
 to the sincerity of Napoleon's intention with regard to peace 
 and the preservation of the Prussian monarchy, he repeated to 
 me that this Sovereign \vished to weaken, not humiliate Prussia, 
 and that it would not be long before he came to a decision. In 
 the meantime, we heard on all sides, that General Dabrowski, at 
 the head of the Poles that were at the Emperor's head-quarters, 
 was moving heaven and earth to persuade that Sovereign 
 to despatch a part of his forces into Poland, and that the 
 movement of Marshal Davoust's corps d'armee towards Posen 
 had actually commenced. Not having obtained any conclusive 
 result from the second conversation which the Prince de Bene- 
 vente had with me, Lucchesini, the critical state of circumstances 
 rendered it our duty to repeat to the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, in an official note, a copy of which is hereunto, very 
 humbly annexed, sub litt. B, our urgent request to be admitted 
 to a formal conference with him, and, at the same time, to 
 request of him a courier's passport, in order to communicate 
 to Your Majesty the sudden and unexpected change in the 
 negociation for peace after the departure of Major de Kauch. 
 To this note, dated 5 o'clock a.m., the Prince de Benevente 
 replied, in the evening, by an invitation to a conference and 
 dinner, this day, the 6th instant, and we now interrupt our 
 very humble report in order to join that Minister at Berlin. 
 
 " November 7, 1806. 
 " If the conference which we had yesterday with the Prince 
 de Benevente and the information which we obtained during 
 our visit to Berlin, have neither advanced the negotiation 
 confided to us, nor ameliorated the state of our affairs, we think 
 that we have at least gained a positive knowledge of the causes 
 which have liitherto nullified the effect of the engagements Your 
 Majesty authorized us to enter into, in order to obtain from the 
 Emperor Napoleon the preservation of the rest of the monarchy. 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 97 
 
 When the Prince de Benevente foimd himself hard pressed 
 by the unanswerable arguments brought forward by us for the 
 purpose of proving to him the right acquired by Your Majesty, 
 according to tbe formal engagements of the Emperor Napoleon, 
 to the immediate opening of negotiations for the speedy con- 
 clusion of the definite treaty of peace, the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs did not dissemble the communication made to him by 
 the Emperor that be was endeavouring to discover the means 
 whereby the present state of Prussia might be made subservient 
 to secure the peace he was anxious to obtain, as well as the 
 acceleration of the general pacification. He told us that so long 
 as England did not make peace with France, she would be for 
 ever seeking to form new coalitions, and to agitate the Conti- 
 nent: that the experience of many years had convinced the 
 Emperor that so long as England had not entirely disarmed, 
 there would not be, either for himself or for the other States 
 of Europe, any well founded hope of repose ; that if at the time 
 of the Treaty of Presburg, France had made the paciiication of 
 England one of the articles in the treaty of peace with Austria, 
 the Continent would be in the most perfect tranquillity ; that 
 in the present day, Kussia, forgetting Austerlitz and having 
 refused to sanction an honourable peace, still found herself 
 hostilely disposed towards France, and intimately connected with 
 England : that the Emperor, therefore, was occupied in selecting 
 the means he considered as most efficacious for fixing the 
 irrevocable bases of the general peace : that not having yet been 
 able to decide upon this choice of means, and having to provide 
 for the subsistence of his army, without entirely crushing the 
 provinces in which they were stationed, His Majesty had been 
 under ' the necessity of causing them to advance, in order that 
 they might occupy a wider extent of ground ; but that, notwith- 
 standing this, the Prince de Benevente had not perceived any 
 change in the Emperor's intentions with respect to the sub- 
 sequent re-establishment of peace and good harmony between 
 France and Prussia. This disclosure, which proved that the 
 acceptance of the bases by the act of the 30th of October would 
 not conduct us so soon to peace, and that the successive forward 
 movements of the French arfuies would iudefinitely extend the 
 ravages of war, demolished all our hopes : but, after having 
 vainly tried to dispute the equity of such measures, and even 
 the utility of them for France herself, we desired the Prince 
 de Benevente himself to point out to us the means and the 
 
 H 
 
98 EUROPEAN CONGEESSBS. Chap. L 
 
 conditions by and on which Your Majesty could, at least, 
 interpose with the Emperor Alexander for accelerating the 
 moment of the pacification of Russia, upon which, as it now 
 appeared, that of Prussia must depend. We thought ourselves 
 authorized to assure him. Sire, that you would act in the same 
 way with England, if there were any likelihood that your 
 intervention would have any weight with the Cabinet of St. 
 James's. The Minister replied that he could give us no infor- 
 mation on the subject, but should confine himself to repeating 
 that the Emperor was decided upon finding in the result of the 
 battle of Jena the means of arriving at a general pacification. 
 Despairing of obtaining a syllable more favourable from him, 
 alarmed at the prospect of the misfortunes which a negotiation 
 beset with difficulties would, in the interim, heap upon Prussia, 
 and perceiving traces of a secret disorganization of the present 
 Government wherever the French troops presented themselves. 
 General Zasti'ow and myself used all our efforts to represent, 
 with effect, to the Prince de Benevente, the incontestable justice 
 and urgent necessity for the immediate settlement of an armi- 
 stice which might stop, within certain limits, the march of the 
 French armies for the space of time indisputably required for 
 carrying out the plan for the general pacification. We did not 
 conceal from him even, that, disappointed in the just expectation 
 of concluding peace after the signature of the act of the 30th 
 October, we needed something more positive than mere hopes 
 for us to depend upon the pacific sentiments wliich, according to 
 this Minister, the Emperor would not cease to indulge towards 
 Your Majesty. The inflammatory proclamation hereunto annexed 
 sub litt. C, of General Dabrowski and of Sieur Wiebyski, 
 inserted in the Berlin Gazette, and which appears to be notitiing 
 less than a signal for revolt to all the subjects of the three co- 
 dividing Courts of ancient Poland, furnishes us with a just sub- 
 ject for astonishment and complaint, however ambiguous may be 
 the expressions regarding it which are attributed to the Emperor. 
 " The Minister rephed to us, as usual, that he had no know- 
 ledge of such a document, and that the Emperor had never ex- 
 pressed to him any opinion with regard to it. He therefore re- 
 stricted himself to promising us, — 
 
 " 1. To apply to His Majesty the Emperor to grant the 
 armistice which liad been proposed to him by me, Zastrow. 
 
 " 2. To communicate immediately to us the Em})eror's 
 reply to this proposal. 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGEBSSES. 99 
 
 " 3. To prevail upon Prince Berthier to grant us the pass- 
 port for the courier whom we were so anxious to despatch 
 to Your Majesty this very day. 
 
 " Having been kept to dine with liim, we found among other 
 guests General Duroc, who told us, both separately and together, 
 that it was truly the Emperor's wish to arrive at a general peace 
 by means of the situation in which Prussia is at the present mo- 
 ment placed. This fatal determination exposes the monarchy to 
 certain destruction, unless the well-understood interest of the Ca- 
 binet of St. Petersburg should create a firm and prompt resolution 
 to become reconciled with France, and to employ all its influence 
 in England, in order to induce into a similar line of policy that 
 insular Power, whose gold and whose Continental connections 
 have rendered so colossal the power of Napoleon. The House 
 of Austria, suspected of having only awaited a favourable event, 
 in order to issue hostile instructions to the forces concentrated in 
 Bohemia, with the avowed object of causing her neutrahty to be 
 respected, being compelled perhaps at this moment to disarm, 
 must, it appears to us, participate in the interests and anxieties 
 of Your Majesty for quickly re-establisliing peace in the States 
 bordering upon her own. 
 
 " We are but too well persuaded. Sire, that one moment's 
 irresolution or false calculation, especially on the part of the 
 Cabinet of St. Petersburg, would prepare a sinister future for 
 Prussia and serious embarrassments for Eussia. If, by the most 
 disastrous fatality, the two armies should come to an engage- 
 ment, and victory declare itself in favour of the French, we say, 
 and say it with the greatest horror, such a victoiy would perhaps 
 overturn the throne of Prussia. 
 
 " Au reste, we foresee that the experienced sagacity of Your 
 Majesty, instead of compromising the Prussian troops in an open 
 country, whether with or without auxiliaries, will prefer dividing 
 them among your fortresses of Graudenz, Danzig, Eonigsberg, 
 and Pillau — a purely defensive measure, and one perfectly recon- 
 cileable with your efforts for the general pacification. It appears 
 that Napoleon's departure for Southern Prussia is no longer 
 doubtful. Marshal Davoust, who has preceded him, is already 
 perhaps at Posen. The report at Berlin is that the Guards are 
 on the point of marching there. Troops from Darmstadt are to 
 form the greater part of the garrisons of Stettin and Custrin. It 
 is asserted that the Bavarians who were at Dresden are quitting 
 that city, and extending their lines through Lusace towards the 
 
 H 2 
 
100 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Ohap. I. 
 
 frontiers of Silesia. Magdeburg must be still holding out. 
 Greneral Blucher, who has been joined by General Lecoq from 
 the country of Hanover, is defending himself as far as this place, 
 although hard pressed, but we do not know his exact position. 
 General Savary, with a small number of cavalry, had pushed on 
 to Strelitz, into which Prince Charles of Mecklenburg had re- 
 treated. General Savary, who found the Prince ill, compelled 
 him to declare himself a prisoner of war ; but sent him to the 
 Duke, his father, upon condition of his not serving against 
 France and her allies, and of his not keeping up any corre- 
 spondence with his august family. 
 
 " There is a point, Sire, upon which a very remarkable con- 
 currence of opinions, counsels, and pressing entreaties, both of 
 French officers of distinction and of many of Your Majesty's most 
 faithful subjects, does not allow us to remain silent any longer. In 
 the former a desire for peace and a knowledge of the Emperor's 
 character, in the latter the alarming situation of the State and 
 its august head, have originated, disseminated, and accredited 
 the opinion, that had Your Majesty before requested, or should 
 now request, an interview with Napoleon, this bold and confiding 
 step would arrest the sinister projects which lead him to Posen. 
 The more this departure, so imminent, dissipates the hopes of 
 peace, the more we are called upon, from every quarter, to urge 
 you. Sire, to try this last resource for arresting, above all, the 
 Polish insurrection. Some pretend to say that His Imperial 
 Majesty expected this step, and had even appeared to desire it. 
 Before imparting it to Your Majesty, General Zastrow and myself 
 thought it our duty to speak of it, both separately and together, 
 as well to General Durbc as to the Prince de Benevente. Both 
 absolutely declined giving any opinion upon the propriety or the 
 utility of the interview — both appeared equally to doubt that 
 the Emperor had ever signified his expectation or wish of such 
 a step ; but General Duroc, on the other hand, said nothing that 
 should cause it to be given up. M. de Talleyrand went further. 
 He discussed the object, and reduced the motives of similar in- 
 terviews either to an opportune occurrence produced by chance — 
 as for instance the next day after a battle— or to the movements 
 of a spontaneous sentiment which might suit all circumstances. 
 Thus he rather approved than dissuaded us from inserting this 
 town rumour in our very humble report of this day. We perform. 
 Sire, this task ; but not being able to calculate the consequences 
 wlii(!h such an interview might have, we cannot from this place 
 
Ohap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 101 
 
 hazard a decided opinion thereon. We only venture to suppli- 
 cate Your Majesty, that, if the almost entire absence of any 
 other resource should determine your Majesty to essay this one, 
 Your Majesty would despatch, without delay. Count Donhoff to 
 Posen with a letter to the Emperor, in order to propose a con- 
 ference at Grnesen or any other place His Imperial Majesty should 
 think fit. We suppose Your Majesty would be accompanied by 
 your Cabinet Minister Count de Haugwitz, of whom the Emperor 
 has spoken several times at Berlin with respect and esteem. 
 
 " We were expecting the passport and the answers from the 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs — to whom indeed we had addressed 
 the note, a copy of which is hereunto very humbly annexed, sub 
 litt. D. — when G-eneral Duroc came to propose to us, on the part 
 of the Emperor, a treaty of armistice. He told us that regarding 
 the battle of Jena as now terminated by the successive capture 
 of the Prussian corps d'armSes, which had hitherto escaped the 
 pursuit of his own, the Emperor Napoleon thought seriously of 
 re-establishing peace with Your Majesty. The contents of our 
 very humble report of this day, together with its annexes, are 
 sufficiently explicit to justify our eagerness to accept and sign 
 the treaty which has been proposed to us. General Dm-oc is des- 
 tined to proceed to effect the exchange of the ratifications with 
 Your Majesty, and the Prince de Benevente will lose no time in 
 commencing the negociations of peace. The conditions of this 
 treaty might be a little softened down, if the state of truce in 
 which your Majesty will shortly find yourself appear to aiford 
 you an opportunity of carrying out the project of an interview, 
 concerning which we have taken the liberty of speaking to you 
 previously. The epochs of the payment of the contribution will 
 naturally be one of the difficulties of the conclusion of the treaty. 
 Article 5 of the armistice ought to preserve Southern Prussia 
 from the dangers of an insurrection. The presence of General 
 Duroc at Graudenz will furnish Your Majesty with the facilities 
 which we do not possess, of making pubHc in Silesia the condi- 
 tions of the armistice, which wiU have the effect of preserving 
 the greatest part of that province from the ravages which the 
 presence of the enemy causes elsewhere. 
 
 P.S. — DocnMBNT No. 3. 
 " SlEE " Charlottenburg, Nov. 9, 1806. 
 
 " Marshal Duroc returned this morning at ten o'clock to 
 Charlottenbourg. He was provided with the full power, a copy 
 
102 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chaf, I. 
 
 of which will be annexed to the treaty of armistice, of which 
 likewise we transmit you in copy, sub litt. E 1, a transcript. The 
 desire of saving Magdeburg, had it not fallen in the meantime, 
 prevented our consenting to its evacuation, which was required 
 as an addition to yesterday's conditions. The same difficulty has 
 not prevented us from giving, agreeably to the Emperor's demand 
 of this day, a greater extent to the armistice as regards Silesia. 
 It was yesterday agreed that the line of demarcation, beginning 
 from the mouth of the Bartsh in the Oder, and passing within 
 two leagues of Glogau, should nearly join the Sprotta, and thence 
 follow it as far as its mouth. Some military considerations very 
 favourable to Austria have caused the extent to be given to this 
 article which it has acquired in the treaty. Article 4 has like- 
 v/ise undergone some alteration. In the copy hereunto annexed, 
 sub litt. E 2, of the rejected draft treaty, Your Majesty will find 
 Article 5, of which you will appreciate the intentions. The 
 Emperor refused its admission, saying, that if its object were to 
 arrest the insuiTectionary ilame in Poland, it was both useless 
 and insufficient ; that, once determined to make peace upon the 
 bases and conditions agreed upon, the Emperor could have no 
 interest in causing a few hundred Poles to be shot after the resti- 
 tution of this province to Prussia ; and that the mere report of 
 the armistice would calm there all the excitement which the too 
 famous proclamation had caused. We have proposed a modifi- 
 cation, circumscribing our demand within the limits of a sirnple 
 protection for the civil authorities, and of a guarantee for the 
 property belonging to individuals. Marshal Duroc having gone 
 back to Berlin in order to receive the Emperor's orders upon the 
 two proposed additions, had led us to hope that we should be able 
 to sign the treaty in the evening. We had drawn up our very 
 humble report, when, in reply to the xirgent request I addressed 
 to him in a friendly note, he let me know by a verbal message 
 that he would the next day communicate the last resolves of the 
 Emperor. 
 
 " November 13. 
 " Having in vain waited for General Duroc until four o'clock 
 this day, and anxious respecting a delay which, considering the 
 urgent necessity of the business, alarmed us, we addressed to him 
 the letter veiy humbly annexed sub litt. F. Our letter crossed 
 that of the General, which we annex here, sub litt. G. Its con- 
 tents justified our apprehensions, and again placed the cause 
 confided to us in the midst of hazards from which we hoped we 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 103 
 
 were about to extricate it. The news of the fall of Magdeburg, 
 which had for twenty-four hours been spread about the town, 
 made us even fear that the reduction of that place was only the 
 pretext for the unforeseen refusal to sign the armistice which 
 the Emperor himself had proposed. We replied without delay 
 to the Grand Marshal's letter by that which we submit to you. 
 Sire, sub litt. H. One hour afterwards we received a second 
 letter from General Duroc, which will be found annexed to the 
 others, sub litt. J. Obliged to render an account to Your Majesty 
 of so many variations, we find a difficulty in deciding which of 
 two feelings affects us most — despair at never succeeding in any- 
 thing, or shame at being continually made the victims of deceitful 
 promises. But after the fortunate arrival of Major Eauch with 
 the letter Your Majesty entrusted to him for the Emperor, and 
 after what General Duroc said to us respecting the agreeable 
 impression which this letter had made upon Napoleon, the hope 
 returns to us of at length attaining om: object — the signature of 
 the armistice. However, according to the advice of the Grand 
 Marshal, we have determined to send off the chasseur Harpe 
 with this voluminous draft despatch. We beheve that the know- 
 ledge of the conditions of the armistice which must be imme- 
 diately signed, and of which General Duroc is to carry the 
 Emperor's ratification to Graudenz, will enable Your Majesty to 
 give your commands at Danzic before those for the evacuation 
 of the troops reach there, after the exchange of the ratifications 
 of tliis treaty. We suppose moreover that if any Prussian troops 
 be still to be found in Southern Prussia, you will cause them. 
 Sire, to fall back from the left to the right bank of the Vistula, 
 or, should the proximity of the countries admit, behind the 
 frontiers of Silesia. 
 
 " We now pass on to the contents of the three gracious de- 
 spatches with which Your Majesty honoured us on the 7th October, 
 If, on the one hand, we are fully convinced that the auxihary 
 forces destined by the Emperor Alexander cannot make head 
 against the immense number of troops which Napoleon is ready 
 to oppose to them, we have, on the other, every reason to believe 
 the determination of stopping the former, announced in the letter 
 of your Majesty, will have made a favourable impression upon 
 the French monarch. But the extreme jealousy which he feels 
 respecting the intimate relations existing between Prussia and 
 Eussia will be certain to make him find fresh subjects of irri- 
 tation and animosity against the Prussian Government, if, on the 
 
104 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 return of General Duroc from Graudenz, he could be able to 
 infer, from the presence of Eussian officers at Graudenz, a secret 
 correspondence with Russia for the continuation of the war. 
 These suspicions would cause him to listen to the project of 
 making Poland rise in insurrection ; and having already perhaps 
 prompted him even to deliberate whether or not he should accom- 
 plish the total subversion of the Prussian monarchy, we ought 
 also to fear the erroneous judgment which Napoleon might form 
 upon the motives which may have induced Your Majesty to repair 
 to the Russian army. The dangers to which the State is now 
 exposed make it our duty to be frank, even to boldness. The 
 Emperor Alexander might one day, Sire, restore you your crown ; 
 but under present circumstances its preservation depends solely 
 on the power of Napoleon. We therefore supplicate Your Majesty, 
 in case you shall have gone to Osterode before the arrival of 
 General Duroc at Graudenz, to give him to understand that you 
 had gone there solely with the intention of ascertaining in person 
 if your troops had halted at the place where they had arrived. 
 
 " The crisis is so grave a one that the least incident might pro- 
 duce the most dangerous explosion. 
 
 " In the hope that the signing of the treaty of armistice may 
 soon present us a fresh occasion for addressing to Your Majesty 
 another very humble despatch, we beg your permission to defer 
 until our next report the further answers to the orders in your 
 very gracious despatch which Major Ranch delivered to us this 
 evening. 
 
 " We have the honour to be, &c., &c., 
 
 (Signed) " Maeq. Lucchesini. 
 
 " Zasteow." 
 
 No. 27. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from the King of Prussia to the Empbeob 
 Napoleon. 
 
 " SlE, MY BeOTHER, " Nov. 7, 1806. 
 
 "In asking for peace at Your Majesty's hands, I have not 
 only consulted my reason, but also the feelings of my heart. 
 Notwithstanding, Sire, the dreadful sacrifices which you have 
 just imposed upon me, I do not the less anxiously wish, that this 
 peace, already secured by my formal acceptance of its bases, may 
 soon enable me to renew with Your Imperial Majesty those 
 friendly relations which a moment of war has suspended. 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 105 
 
 "It is highly gratifying for me to shew, from this very 
 instant, my anxious desire to cultivate those ties, by a proof of 
 confidence which I think I shall be giving Your Imperial 
 Majesty in stopping the march of the Eussian troops, even while 
 the Treaty of Peace remains as yet unsigned. 
 
 "I am particularly anxious that Your Imperial Majesty 
 should be received and treated in my palaces in the manner 
 most agreeable to your wishes, for which purpose I have hastened 
 to make all the arrangements which circumstances would permit 
 of, and I hope I may have succeeded. In return permit me to 
 recommend to the magnanimity of Your Imperial Majesty, my 
 capital and the Marches of Brandenburg. Both are but little 
 favoured by nature, being, in some degree, the creation of my 
 immortal uncle. Deign, Sire, to consider them as a monument 
 he has raised to his own memory! The numerous traits of 
 resemblance to be found between Your Imperial Majesty and 
 that illustrious man will, I am convinced, be so many additional 
 motives for yoiu* cherishing a generous regard for his work, 
 as they will also be for my expressing to you. Sire, this my wish. 
 
 " Upon which I pray God to keep you. Sir, my brother, under 
 his holy and blessed protection. 
 
 " Your Imperial Majesty's good brother, 
 
 (Signed) "Fkedeeick William. 
 
 " Graudenz, Nov. 7, 1806. 
 
 " At the same time, I have no hesitation in expressing the 
 wish also that Your Imperial Majesty would, at least, be pleased 
 to except from among the cruel sacrifices you impose upon me, 
 the country of Halberstadt, and the dependencies of Magde- 
 bourg. I shall esteem your acquiescence as a most precious 
 token of your personal sentiments for me, and as one, for which, 
 believe me. Sire, I shall be most desirous of making a just and 
 grateful return," 
 
 No. 28. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from the King of Pbtjssia to Maequis Luochesini 
 and Gbneeal Zasteow, Nov. 7, 1806. 
 
 " I have received, through Major Eauch your Eeport of 
 the 22nd — 30th October. To the misfortunes I have already 
 suffered, has since been added the reduction of the fortresses of 
 Stettia and Ciistrin. This event, so inconceivable that I could 
 
106 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I, 
 
 not possibly foresee it, renders the necessity of peace still more 
 urgent than for me ever. To blind one's self to this fact would 
 be to lose the Monarchy without resource. My own means for 
 continuing the war are now reduced almost to nothing, and it is 
 only on the assistance of Russia that I can rely with any degree 
 of certainty. But the 70,000 men which the Emperor Alex- 
 ander has marched to my assistance, are, under present circum- 
 stances, evidently insufficient. Time would be required for 
 a fresh Russian army to reach my frontiers, and its arrival, even 
 were it much accelerated, would but offer me the temble 
 alternative of either a success bought at the price of the total 
 destruction of my States, in the very heart of which the theatre 
 of war would be established, or else of new reverses. Ruinous, 
 therefore, as may be the terms which the Emperor Napoleon 
 has dictated as the fundamental conditions of the peace, I owe it 
 to my people not to reject them, and consequently, I approve of 
 your having signed the provisional act containing them. 
 
 "But will Napoleon, now, be satisfied with this basis, — and 
 will not the advantages recently gained by the French arms 
 induce him, perhaps, to exact supplementary conditions by 
 which my sacrifices would be increased? Judging from the 
 letter which you, the Marquis Lucchesini, addressed to" Count 
 Haugwitz on the 23rd October, I have to fear this ; at least, I 
 imagine I see the possibility of it. In order, therefore, to 
 prevent the chance of a fatal delay, I think it necessary to 
 inform you, at all events of the last means, which, in a case 
 of extremity, I should resolve upon adopting in order to bring 
 about a speedy conclusion of peace ; but this is supposing that 
 it is not yet signed, and that the delay is caused by fresh 
 demands founded upon the unfortunate maxim adopted by the 
 Emperor of the French — that in order to prevent Prussia from 
 ever again raising the standard against him, he must carry out 
 to the utmost his plan of weakening her. 
 
 " I know that you will have neglected nothing to combat this 
 principle. But there is one argument which ought to have 
 weight. It is but too true. Napoleon has in his hands the means 
 of weakening Prussia so effectually that, for a long time to 
 come, she wiU be unable to take the field even in her own 
 defence, and that it now depends upon liim alone to secure for 
 himself this kind of guarantee. But is it really as solid as he 
 imagines it to be? Must not Prussia, from that moment, 
 depend equally upon Russia and Austria ? Has the recollection 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 107 
 
 of past times no value in the eyes of Napoleon ? Can he have 
 forgotten that not more than a year ago the Prussian troops 
 marched against the Russians in order to prevent them from 
 traversing my dominions in order to fight the French. In my 
 opinion, the recollection of this fact alone suffices to prove how 
 completely illusory is the principle that in order to obtain 
 a guarantee for the maintenance of peace, Prussia must be 
 weakened. 
 
 " But if, in order to put a stop to the calamities of war, an 
 absolute necessity exists for offering an additional guarantee, let 
 it, at least, be of a different description. 
 
 "In this case, but in this case only, propose my accession 
 to the Confederation of the Ehine, under the express condition, 
 however, that the object of this Confederation, now become that 
 of Germany, far from being one of offence against any Power, 
 exclusively confines itself to maintaining peace upon the Con- 
 tinent. In thus resolving to give in my accession, by doing 
 which I should unite, by indissoluble bonds, my interests with 
 France and the ancient Germanic Empire, I consider that 
 I should be giving to the former the surest of all guarantees, 
 and the most convincing proof that I only look for mine in my 
 friendly relations with her. 
 
 " But in order that the two empires may themselves derive 
 from such a political union all the advantages it promises them, 
 it is clearly indispensable that the Emperor of the French 
 should renounce all idea of weakening Prussia stUl further, and 
 that, commenciug by immediately stopping the onward march of 
 his troops, he should spare the resources still left me, evacuate 
 my territory, without loss of time, and diminish generally, 
 as much as it may be now possible, the burden of the enormous 
 exactions imposed upon me. It is to this important end that all 
 your efforts should be directed, and I think your success will not 
 be difficult to achieve, if circumstances permit you to reduce 
 to the form of an article the proposition as regards which I have 
 just given you my eventual authorization. 
 
 " I have too great a reliance upon the personal friendship and 
 enlightened sagacity of the Emperor Alexander, not to be 
 certain that he will be far from being displeased with me, for 
 having taken a resolution dictated to me by the imperious 
 circumstances of the moment. Therefore, never, and under 
 no circumstances, excepting only the case (a very improbable 
 one) of aggression on his part, can I resolve to enter, with 
 
108 BUEOPEAN CONGRESSE'S. Chap. I. 
 
 whomsoever it may be, into any offensive treaty against him. 
 I know nothing of the projects attributed to him, against the 
 Ottoman Porte. In vain, however, would the Emperor Napoleon 
 desire, as you. Marquis Luechesini, appear to suppose he would, 
 that I, in concert with him, should oppose such a scheme by 
 force of arms. The utmost I can do is to promise to employ the 
 most energetic and urgent remonstrances against these projects, 
 the moment they are brought forward ; and this promise you 
 are both of you authorized to give in my name, in a manner the 
 most solemn, whether verbally, or even, if required, by making 
 it the subject of a formal article of the Treaty of Peace. 
 
 "I send to Berlin, the Privy Councillors L'Abbaye and 
 Stegemann in the capacity of Commissioners for regulating 
 all that regards the payment of the contribution. They are 
 instructed to consult with you on the subject. I need not 
 repeat to you how extremely desirous I am that you may agree 
 upon some modifications calculated to render this cruel burden 
 less onerous to the State, and above all, obtain that the payment 
 of the first instalnients be immediately followed by the evacu- 
 ation of the rest of my territory, as, in like maimer, that of 
 my Capital will be effected I hope after the ratification of the 
 Treaty. 
 
 " Agreeing with you upon the utility which might result from 
 another letter to be written by me to the Emperor Napoleon, 
 on the occasion of Major Ranch's return, I have just addressed 
 to him the one, a copy of which is hereunto annexed for your 
 information. You will see that I therein make a fresh attempt 
 to induce the Emperor to except from my sacrifices, at least 
 Halberstadt and the dependencies of the Duchy of Magdeburg. 
 I include in it, as you know from the instructions with which 
 you, General Zastrow, have been provided, the Ooimtship 
 of Hohenstein, and the country of Mansfeld. The preservation 
 of these provinces would be for me of the greatest interest, and 
 I cannot too strongly recommend to you to support, by every 
 means in your power, but without prejudice to the prompt 
 conclusion of the Treaty, the last attempt I have considered 
 it my duty to make in order to obtain the before-mentioned 
 objects. 
 
 (Signed) "Feedekick William. 
 
 "Graudenz, Nov. 7, 1806." 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONttRESSBS. 109 
 
 No. 29. 
 
 Translation of a Letter frqm the Kinq of Prussia to Maequis Lucchesin 
 and General Zastrow, Nov. 23, 1806. 
 
 " The more I have endeavoured to facilitate the attainment of 
 peace the more I must have been painfully affected by the un- 
 expected difficulties which have prevented its conclusion upon 
 the bases proposed and accepted on the 30th of October, how- 
 ever onerous these might be for me. The long silence observed 
 by you since that day had already created doubts in my mind. 
 I was apprehensive lest the Emperor might also have conceived 
 some upon the sincerity of my intentions, and, therefore, to offer 
 to him, together with the last guarantee I had in my power, a 
 convincing proof of the confidence I reposed in him, I commis- 
 sioned you, by my orders of the 7th of November, to give in my 
 accession to the Confederation of the Ehine, while, at the same 
 time, I stopped the march of the Eussian troops. The hopes 
 which so much sincerity and good faith on my part justified me 
 in .entertaining, have, unfortunately, proved but too fallacious. 
 At the moment when the first of your said Eeports reached me 
 at Graudenz, on the 17th inst., the French army, hotly pursuing 
 its successes in spite of the negociations for peace, had already 
 pushed its advanced posts beyond the Vistula. From that instant 
 vanished my every hope of being ultimately able to arrest the 
 march of the Eussians, who, believing that the frontiers of their 
 own empire were menaced, thought only of their duty to protect 
 them, and, consequently, advanced with a celerity and with a 
 mass of forces surpassing all preceding anticipations. 
 
 " On his part the Emperor Napoleon, completely ignoring the 
 first bases solemnly agreed upon for the pacification between 
 Prussia and France, now establishes entirely new ones, insisting, 
 above all, upon the ratification of the armistice, the draft of 
 which you forwarded to me by Major de Eauch. I shall not 
 enlarge upon the hardness of the conditions he would have im- 
 posed upon me, it being no longer in my power to fulfil the first 
 of them, that of compelling the Eussians to quit my dominions. 
 This obstacle alone renders it impossible for me to ratify this 
 document, as I have explained to Marshal Duroc himself, who 
 has this morning returned to the head-quarters of the Emperor, 
 his master. With regard to the new bases proposed for the 
 future peace I shall not now allow myself to form an opinion as 
 
110 BUEOPBAN CONGRBSSES, Chap. I. 
 
 to how far they may be adopted ; but, under all circumstances, 
 they suppose a previous concert with the two Powers who are to 
 take part in it with me, and particularly with Kussia. I shall 
 inform them of the present state of affairs without loss of time. 
 While awaiting the explanations which these bases wiU require, 
 my wish is that you, Major-General Zastrow, return to me. You, 
 Marquis Lucchesini, will alone suffice for carrying on, up till 
 then, the thread of the negociation, and for cultivating the kind 
 intentions of the Prince de Benevente and of the Grand Marshal 
 Duroc, ia order that those able Ministers may avail themselves, 
 in my favour, of any intentions less rigorous for Prussia which 
 their Sovereign may hereafter manifest. Made the confidants of 
 the deep regret I feel at being placed by circumstances in the 
 deplorable impossibility of coming to an understanding with 
 France, either as regards the peace, which I was ready to pur- 
 chase at the price of such great sacrifices, or even for a suspen- 
 sion of arms, I have no doubt but that the Grand Marshal of the 
 Palace will inform the Emperor of aU my sentiments on this 
 matter, and I charge you, Major-General Zastrow, to repeat the 
 same to that Sovereign at the audience which you must apply 
 for before your departure. Eepresent to him how ardently I 
 desire that it may not be long ere my former friendly relations 
 with France be re-established. In the interim the fate of my 
 subjects rests in the hands of that Prince. That, waiving the 
 rights obtained by victory, he may be pleased to inflict upon my 
 subjects, as little as possible, the calamities of war is the dearest 
 wish of my heart, and the magnanimity of Napoleon is a gua- 
 rantee that you will not have made it known to him, in my 
 name, in vain. 
 
 (Signed) " Haugwitz. 
 
 " Osterode, 23rd Nov. 1806. 
 " By the express order of tlie King. 
 
 " To the Minister of State Marquis de Lucchesini, 
 and to Major-Qeneral Zastrow, at Berlin." 
 
 No. 30. 
 
 Translation of a Pbivatb Letter from Count Haugwitz to the Mabquib 
 Lucchesini, Nov. 23, 1806. 
 
 " Although, my dear friend, the annexed despatch will suffi- 
 ciently inform you as to the determination the King has thought 
 fit to adopt under existing circumstances, and respecting which 
 
Chap. I. EUEOPBAN OONGliESSES. Ill 
 
 His Majesty has already explained himself to the Grand Marshal 
 Duroc, I cannot allow your son to depart without saying a word 
 or two to you on my own account. The events of the day have 
 distressed me to a degree I know not how to express. My health 
 has suffered from them. Our never-ending journeys to and fro, 
 and the frightful climate we are in, are, very probably, the cause 
 of the gout, from which I have been suffering for several years, 
 mounting upwards and attacking my eyes. I am almost bhnd, 
 and am incapacitated from continuing to discharge the duties of 
 my post. Maurice will tell you the condition I was in when he 
 left me. I hope he may arrive at Berlin in perfect health. It 
 needed but a closer acquaintance with him for me to love him 
 as my own son, a feeling which the circumstance alone of his 
 being the child of my true friend would have sufficed to produce : 
 and, as to the word friend — it is one which both of us will be 
 equally desirous of claiming at all times, and in all places, where- 
 soever we may be. 
 
 " You tell me, my dear friend, that my house has been 
 searched, and that in one of my bureaux papers have been found 
 which excited some attention. It occurs to me that there were 
 still there some documents belonging to the negociation en- 
 trusted to me in 1794. The results have been printed in Mar- 
 ten's Collections, and appertain to the history of that period. 
 But there is no doubt that a letter from the Queen must also 
 have been found, and the recollection I still retain of it recalls to 
 my memory the most unhappy period of my life, for it was after 
 the death of my son that she gave me the most affecting proofs 
 of her sensibility. That letter, together with several others 
 received by me about the same time, were all locked up in one 
 and the same bureau, and if the parties who had come to open 
 it could have had any idea of what it contained I venture to 
 believe that, overcome by a feeling of reverence and pity, they 
 would have refrained from violating its sanctity. 
 
 " It would have been impossible for me to have sent off Mau- 
 rice alone, or to have confided him to the care of a stranger. I 
 have, therefore, entrusted him to the hands of Kuhnert, and 
 should have done the same for my own son. Kuhnert will 
 return to Krappitz, where he will probably find me. It is you 
 who will judge me ; but, without needing even the judgment of 
 friendship, I can confidently appeal to that of the just, upright, 
 and enlightened man who is accustomed to consider, above all, in 
 the statesman the confidence of the master, swayed to a certain 
 
112 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Ohap. I. 
 
 extent by the mistrust (the most concentrated, perhaps, of which 
 there has ever been an example) on the part of a foreign Court. 
 Of that mistrust I am myself an object, and that is enough for 
 me to say to you about it. The sentiments of personal regard 
 with which the King honours me, and of which he has given me 
 proofs, the recollection of which I shall ever retain, would suffice 
 for my individual tranquillity, did not the idea of quitting His 
 Majesty at the present moment afflict me beyond my power to 
 express. 
 
 " Pray salute for me our friend Zastrow, and never forget, 
 during the remainder of your days, the sentiments with which 
 you have inspired me. 
 
 (Signed) " Haugwitz. 
 
 " Osterode, 23rd Nov. 1806. 
 
 " P.S. — Have the goodness, my dear friend, to remember me 
 to the Prince of Benevente and General Clark." 
 
 No. 31. 
 
 Translation of Memoeandum presented by Makquis Luochesini to 
 Bonaparte, Nov. 13, 1806. 
 
 " This Memorandum, without signature, was presented on the 
 13th Nov. at Berlin, to the Prince de Benevente, and by him to 
 the Emperor Napoleon, who kept it by him for several days. 
 
 " ' Is it advantageous to France to weaken Prussia to such a 
 degree that, ceasing to be able to take pai-t in the quarrels of 
 Germany, she no longer possesses the means of resisting Eussia ? 
 Will the state of vassalage into which Prussia is about to fall, 
 under the Eussian Empire, hasten on the general peace of 
 Europe ? Will this peace be facilitated by the spread of victo- 
 rious armies throughout the Prussian provinces bordering upon 
 the frontiers of Eussia ? And might there not be such a political 
 combination that, by placing Prussia in a constant antagonism of 
 views and interests as regards Eussia, would render her the 
 defender and guarantee of the independence of the Ottoman 
 Empire ? 
 
 " ' Such are the questions which appear to deserve the entire 
 attention of the Sovereign who is now the arbiter of the fate of 
 the Prussian Monarchy. 
 
 " 'That which is in preparation for it will, without doubt, 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN OONGRESSKS. 113 
 
 deprive it of the means of annoying France, but it will also 
 place it in absolute dependence upon Kussia. 
 
 " ' An ambitious Emperor will seize all its provinces one after 
 the other, and will extend his empire as far as the mouth of the 
 Elbe and the mountains which separate Bohemia from Silesia. 
 A prospect such as this could not render the Cabinet of St. 
 Petersburg more inclined now to make peace with that of the 
 TuiUeries. 
 
 " ' The progress of the French armies towards Lithuania at 
 the commencement of the winter may lead them beyond the 
 Dwina ere they encounter the Kussians. Neither the season 
 nor the distances would permit them to reap the fruits of the 
 least disputed success. Should it be wished to demand the 
 cession of some province, what forces will remain at hand to 
 defend that conquest ? 
 
 " ' Russia, however, strong in her remoteness, feels not the 
 want of peace with France, and, perhaps, delays even that of 
 England. The proximity of Moldavia fiu-nishes her with the 
 means 'of keeping the Turks quiet by menaces : she has but to 
 associate, with views of aggrandizement upon the Ottoman 
 Empire, the ancient desires of the Court of Vienna, in order 
 to be certain of the latter's placing no obstacles in the way of her 
 projects. If Prussia, cooped up behind the Elbe, and ceasing to 
 form part of the Germanic Empire, were sufficiently strengthened 
 in Poland to be able to revive the name and the hopes of that 
 nation : if she could extend herself in the Palatinates of Cracow, 
 Scadonia, Lublin, and Chelm, so that a fortress in Scadonia 
 itself enabled it to defend Kotchin and Moldavia against Ka- 
 minie and the enterprises of the Russians in that Principality, 
 then become an intermediary one between the two Imperial 
 Courts, Prussia (the rival of both and the protectress of the 
 Ottoman Porte,) could no longer be in opposition, either as 
 regarded her interests or her ambition, to the French Empire, 
 without whose friendship and assistance she could not hope to 
 support the attacks of her two powerful neighbours. Then the 
 battle of Jena would have a permanent influence upon the 
 destinies of the Empire of the East, and the Prussian Monarchs, 
 annexing to their own Crown that of Great Poland, would, for a 
 long time, be protected from the intrigues which may have con- 
 tributed to kindle the war that now awakens the powerful resent- 
 ment of the Emperor Napoleon against that State. As the 
 employment of the forces of Prussia must henceforth be in oppo- 
 
 i 
 
114 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 sition to the two neighbouring Imperial Courts, her political 
 existence could find no other guarantee than in the grandeur and 
 protection of Prance. The latter has a direct influence upon 
 the destinies of the south and the west of Europe ; but she may 
 stand in need of an intermediary State towards the east of Europe 
 for the purpose of hereafter restraining the enemies of the Otto- 
 man Empire. The frontiers of that Empire, on the side of 
 Kotchin, might then be brought to within the distance of eighty 
 leagues from the new limits of Prussia if, by the exchanges to 
 be effected in Germany at the end of this war, the House of 
 Austria could be induced to renounce the Palatinates of Chelm, 
 Lublin, Scadonia, and Cracow. The revenge of great Sovereigns 
 cannot be personal : if Prussia, vanquished, and ceasing to be a 
 German Power, should at some future time be able to serve 
 those projects for the conservation of the Ottoman Empire which 
 the Emperor Napoleon has in his wisdom formed : if the ten- 
 dency of Eussia gradually to approach the centre of Europe, 
 should be so distinctly pronounced for it to become necessary 
 that all should think of the means of arresting such advance, it 
 must be deduced therefrom that a wise and provident policy 
 would now be, to place Prussia in such a position as for her to 
 answer this double purpose, instead of delivering her up, in con- 
 sequence of her impotency, to the absolute domination of Russia. 
 This latter Power will be better inclined to listen to proposals of 
 peace when the King of Prussia is settled more firmly upon liis 
 throne by the conqueror, than when the future existence of this 
 monarchy is still left an unsolved problem".' 
 
 " Upon reading this poHtical dream the Emperor Napoleon 
 said to the Prince de Benevente, ' These are the only rational 
 ideas which a Prussian Minister has offered to my notice for a 
 long time — let the King ratify the Treaty of Armistice, before 
 I enter Poland, and we shall then see.' The Armistice was not 
 ratified, and Napoleon gave his sanction at Koben and Warsaw 
 to the Polish insurrection. 
 
 " I have, however, heard since (and Baron de Dalberg, Minister 
 of Baden, who had accompanied the Emperor to Poland, confirmed 
 it to me in the month of August in this year (1809), that, when in 
 January, 1807, my arrival at Cracow, on my return to Italy, was 
 known at Warsaw, the Prince de Benevente said officially to 
 some minister in his confidence, ' If the Marquis Lucchesini comes 
 here with full powers he will make peace upon more favourable 
 terms than he expects ; the Emperor is tired of this war, and 
 
CirAP. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 115 
 
 owns that it regards not Poland, bnt the interests of a few 
 Poles.' But the Cabinet of Konigsberg was already in complete 
 tutelage under the dependence of the Eussian Minister. It ^hut 
 its ears to the suggestions of the Prince de Benevente, so that, 
 when the King granted me permission to retire to Italy, he an- 
 nexed thereto the express condition that I should not approach, 
 within several leagues, the posts occupied by the French troops." 
 
 These documents display the history of the negotia- 
 tion which was attempted under the guidance of 
 Count Haugwitz for the re-establishment of peace with 
 France. It failed, as from all the circumstances which 
 attended it, it might have been expected to do. Yet it 
 is a singular fact that the signature of the armistice pro- 
 posed by Marshal Duroc on the 7th of November, and 
 which was to have been signed on the 10th, was pre- 
 vented by the delivery of the despatch announcing the 
 surrender of Magdeburg to Napoleon himself insteati of 
 its passing through the regular channel of the Minister 
 of War, to whom it was directed. The Emperor Napo- 
 leon had authorised Marshal Duroc to propose and con- 
 clude the armistice which has been alluded to, and this 
 officer, together with many of the generals and minis- 
 ters composing the French Court (including M. de Tal- 
 leyrand), was anxious to act accordingly. Having 
 received the necessary orders, had Marshal Duroc been 
 aware of the arrival of intelligence which was likely to 
 have counteracted his views, it is now matter of history 
 that he would immediately have signed the document. 
 His anxiety, as well as that of the persons above 
 referred to, was to prevent the further extension of 
 the war in which the Emperor was engaged. He 
 conceived that the project of advancing into Poland 
 and engaging in a contest with the Eussian empire 
 was too vast and dangerous to be undertaken at that 
 moment ; he was therefore opposed to that party of 
 the French ministers, of which M. Maret was one, 
 
 I 2 
 
116 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. I. 
 
 who, in conjunction with the Pohsh officers about 
 head-quarters, were recommending the advance of the 
 French army. By the immediate delivery of the 
 despatch to the Emperor by the aide-de-camp who was 
 charged with it, he was enabled to retract the orders 
 he had given, at the very moment when the Marquis 
 Lucchesini had arrived, by appointment, at M. de 
 Talleyrand's apartments in Berlin for the purpose of 
 completing the armistice ; and from that moment the 
 determination to carry the French army to the frontiers 
 of Russia was irrevocably fixed.* 
 
 From this time also the ambitious projects of the 
 Emperor Napoleon seem to have taken a wider range, 
 and after the Peace of Tilsit, by which he dismem- 
 bered Prussia and in part re-established the kingdom 
 of Poland, he conceived the vast project of closing the 
 Offtitinent against England ; of employing the fleets of 
 the North Sea, in conjunction with his own, in hostility 
 against her; of extending his power over Spain and 
 Portugal ; and of establishing an uncontrolled dominion 
 in Europe. In the progress towards the completion of 
 this gigantic enterprise he was met by impediments he 
 had never calculated upon, — the seizure of the Danish 
 fleet by the British Grovernment ; the resistance of the 
 people of Spain and Portugal, supported by the armies 
 of England; the war with Austria in 1809, when his 
 principal force was for a moment compromised after 
 the battle of Aspern ; the war which he undertook 
 against Russia in 1812, and which annihilated his 
 immense and magnificent army ; and the great and 
 splendid victories of Lord Wellington — turned against 
 
 * Mons. de Talleyrand recounted thia anecdote to the Author, stating that he 
 had met the aide-de-camp, hearer of this despatch, on the staircase leading to the 
 Emperor's apartment, but that ho (the aide-de-camp") had not mentioned its con- 
 tents ; if he had done so, M. de Talleyrand stated that he should have accom- 
 panied him to the Emperor, and he believed he might have prevented the 
 decision which was taken upon it. 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 117 
 
 him the tide of success and fortune which for so long 
 a period had constantly been with him. 
 
 During the time in which these events took place 
 the British Government had carried on the war from 
 its commencement in 1803, as far as British objects 
 were concerned, with unremitting success ; the fleets 
 of the enemy had been destroyed, the battle of Tra- 
 falgar had triumphantly secured the unrivalled supe- 
 riority of the British navy, the greater part of the 
 enemy's colonies had been captured, and the land- 
 forces had in almost every contest given proofs of their 
 unequalled discipline and valour. But the triumphs of 
 the British army had been obtained in contests of too 
 desultory a nature, undertaken for the attainment of 
 objects too limited and too distant from the immediate 
 seat of war in Europe to have tended to any of those 
 decisive advantages by which that war might be brought 
 to a close, and by which the great question of European 
 independence, for which England was struggling, might 
 be established. The seizure of Alexandria in 1806, of 
 Buenos Ayres and Monte Video, which were afterwards 
 abandoned, the capture of the Cape of Grood Hope and 
 of Madeira, the victory over the French force at Maida, 
 could in no way be instrumental in forcing the enemy to 
 peace or in materially crippling his vast resources upon 
 the Continent. The expedition under Sir A. Wellesley, 
 which was sent in aid of the Peninsular patriots in 1808, 
 and which, after having secured the independence of Por- 
 tugal by the victory of Vimeiro, was reinforced by the 
 troops under Sir John Moore which were withdrawn 
 from Sweden, was the first step towards the establish- 
 ment of a system of operations on the Continent upon 
 a scale more commensurate with the means and power 
 of England. Yet the forces thus brought together 
 were only a small part of the great army which 
 England at that time could dispose of; and in the 
 
J 18 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Ghap. 1, 
 
 following campaign under Sir John Moore in Spain, 
 however brilliant their achievements, they were un- 
 equal to oppose the overwhelming numbers of the 
 French Emperor. With the view of pointing out the 
 impolicy of the divided efforts by which the operations 
 of the British army had been characterised, a memoir, 
 which will be found in the Appendix,* was submitted to 
 the British Cabinet in February, 1809, by the Author. 
 
 , In it he endeavoured to show that England might con- 
 
 I fidently look for the most successful results in the pre- 
 sent contest by a proper concentration of the greater 
 
 1 part of her force (the whole of which then amounted to 
 nearly 250,000 men, including the regular militia) in 
 
 , one operation upon whatever point should be judged 
 most accessible and promising to ourselves, and most 
 vulnerable as against the enemy — whether in Spain 
 and Portugal, where, to a certain extent, we were 
 already engaged ; or in the north of Grermany, where 
 in 1806 we had assembled a considerable army ; or on 
 the soil of France itself,, where our great force might 
 be brought to bear upon the unprotected provinces of 
 
 I that country whilst its army was on the banks of the 
 
 " Danube. 
 
 The views set forth in this memoir were not entirely 
 acted upon. It was resolved to maintain the contest in 
 Portugal and Spain, and at the same time to bring a 
 force of nearly 80,000 men, including both the army 
 and navy, to act on the enemy's territory against 
 Antwerp ; the British force in Sicily was still kept up 
 at its original numbers, and the distant garrisons were 
 maintained upon their accustomed footing to protect 
 the colonies, but this was the last time the forces of 
 England were destined to be employed in the attain- 
 ment of distant and separate objects. The failure of 
 
 * See Appendix, No. 32. 
 
Chap. I. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 119 
 
 the expedition to Walcheren, and the inability of the 
 British army in Spain to contend against the over- 
 whelming forces of the enemy after the brilliant victory 
 of Talavera, were decisive proofs of the inefficiency of 
 divided exertions ; and henceforward the power of 
 England, with trifling exceptions, was brought to bear 
 upon the great contest which was established in the 
 Peninsula, 
 
 The triumphant results of this system, by which the 
 British arms were brought into the heart of France, 
 and the Duke of Wellington became the arbiter of 
 her destinies, have fully proved the wisdom of that 
 decision. By it the G-overnment of England was 
 enabled to combine its exertions in the field with 
 those of its allies, when the great disasters which had 
 annihilated the French armies in the north of Europe 
 called forth the energies of the Continent, and placed 
 them in military array against the fortunes of Na- 
 poleon. 
 
 The political events which marked that period were 
 influenced by England in proportion to the high sta- 
 tion she had thus assumed among the nations of the 
 world. It is a grateful task to assist in handing them 
 down to posterity ; they will redound to her honour, 
 they will mark the moderation and evenhandedness 
 with which she bore her sway at that eventful period, 
 and they will remain an imperishable monument of 
 the worth and talent of the great Greneral and of the 
 Ministers by whom they were directed. 
 
V2i) KUROPKAN CONGRESSES. App. 32. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 No. 32. 
 
 London, February 28, 1809. 
 
 The state of Europe at this moment leads us to expect events of unexampled 
 importance. Great Britain, from her position and the energy of her people, 
 may be considered the most powerful, because the most firmly-established, 
 Power in Europe. Her naval superiority is uncontested, her troops are unri- 
 valled in the brilliancy of their achievements, and her military force is of larger 
 amount than it has ever before attained. 
 
 Spain has revolted from the yoke of France, and, although beaten in some of 
 her provinces, yet holds out a resistance which, supported by the increasing 
 enmity of her people, may be considered as requiring at least a force of 200,000 
 Frenchmen to keep possession of the provinces she now occupies. 
 
 Austria, the only continental Power vehich can at this moment be balanced 
 against France, is in a position which must awaken the anxiety of all those who 
 wish well to the independence of Europe. She has made herself powerful by 
 armaments, but she has drawn upon herself the jealousy of the most tremendous 
 enemy that has existed. She may fight successfully, but to succeed she must 
 struggle against an army which has struck terror into her own, and which for 
 several years past has proved itself so superior as to make the most sanguine 
 admirers of the Austrians tremble for the event of every action. I will not 
 now enter upon the question from whence (whether from superiority of numbers 
 or of skill) the French have gained this ascendency ; but, melancholy as is the 
 fact, it must always be duly weighed in considering the power of the two 
 countries. 
 
 Russia is powerful, and the present appearance of her political transactions 
 would lead a common observer to suppose that, although she is allied to Bona- 
 parte, yet she would be more willing to remain the idle spectator of the contest 
 in Europe, than to become active in the destruction of all balance between its 
 States. The conduct, however, which she may adopt at the present moment 
 it would be difiicult to foretell. Her army, though powerful, is destitute of the 
 means of immediate action ; and, with so much preparation on the part of 
 Austria, one would argue that a want of it in Russia looked like an unwilling- 
 ness on her part to act powerfully in the impending contest. 
 
 France, with all the nations under her command, would appear irresistible. 
 Her means seem always to increase with the difiicultics of her situation ; and 
 the energies her Government puts forth upon every occasion astonish even 
 those who were prepared to expect the most. Against such a Power what 
 prospects of success we may derive from any contest, even from the aUiance 
 of the greatest Powers of Europe against her, it would be a difiicult task to 
 foretell. But as I think that all our expc^ctations of success must rest upon the 
 
^^I'E- 32. EUROPRAN CONGRESSES. 121 
 
 exertions of Great Britain, it is with this view I shall offer a few considerations 
 upon the application of the British army in the contest which appears to be on 
 the point of breaking out upon the Continent. 
 
 In all the wars in which France has been concerned since the reign of Bona- 
 parte, the whole of her military force, however great and powerful, has been 
 actively engaged against the immediate enemy. At the epoch of 1805 the 
 whole of the regular force of France, with but few exceptions, was marched 
 into Germany and the North of Italy, and the provinces of her own country 
 were left unprotected. In 1806 and 1807 the same system was pursued, and 
 the same beneficial effects attended the concentration of force. The conquests 
 of France between the date of the first war of 1 806 and the present time are 
 beyond what any man could have foretold. By some of these conquests her 
 power has been increased ; by some, such as Spain and Italy, which are a 
 constant drain of troops, diminished ; and in point of real strength she has of 
 late perhaps been weakened by the extension of her dominions. 
 
 With respect to Austria, who now seems bravely to have resolved to arm 
 every man she can command, and to make a determined struggle for her exist- 
 ence, whether her army be as considerable as at former periods or not, still she 
 is now, relatively to France, as powerful as she has appeared at any former 
 time, and it is evident that she will require from France to oppose her the same 
 means as were formerly made use of, namely, the march of the whole disposable 
 force of the French Empire into Germany and the States opposite to her frontiers. 
 Supposing, therefore, that this statement is correct, we know already what will 
 be the general system which will be pursued by France in the war we are 
 expecting ; and we may proceed to consider what application will be the most 
 wise for the army Great Britain can bring into the field. 
 
 Without pronouncing that the military system which has generally been 
 adopted for the last fifteen years by the British Government has or has not 
 been a correct one, it cannot but be observed that it has in no instance led to 
 great results ; and although the different expeditions sent out have been com- 
 posed of the best troops the world can boast, yet we at this moment remain 
 almost without one instance of any great and essential benefit derived to England. 
 It can hardly be disputed that if the British Empire is to continue as powerful 
 as it has hitherto maintained itself, it must be by a contest fought in Europe. 
 With the whole Continent under the dominion of Bonaparte, what chance has 
 England in a prolonged struggle of twenty or thirty years ? Sooner or later, if 
 all Europe be against her, her situation must be materially altered. The only 
 line, therefore, of real policy for England, is to support with all her power those 
 States of the Continent that still are able to fight for their independence, to aid 
 them by every active measure she can command, to copy the policy of the man 
 who has conquered Europe, and to bring to bear upon the most vital parts of her 
 enemy the whole force she is able to collect. To continue in the system of striking 
 blows in every comer of the globe, to be able to garrison every post in the West 
 Indies, or in the Mediterranean, and to he hut Eiigland against all the continent 
 of E'urox>e, will prove to be of no real advantage. Great indeed would be the 
 sacrifice of our colonies, and bold the Minister who in England would dare 
 lecommend the measure, but let the system of acquiring power at a distance, 
 and leaving England by itself against the Continent at home, be balanced against 
 
122 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. App. 32. 
 
 it, and surely there can be no doubt on which side the preponderance of advan- 
 tage will be found. It seems evident, therefore, at present that the only policy 
 of England is to concentrate the whole military force she possesses to secure the 
 success of the continental Powers against the overbearing despotism of France. 
 To effect this, it is not the interest of England that Austria should go imme- 
 diately to war. We are not able at this moment to assist her. It will require 
 some time to bring our forces together on any one point, but it is the duty of 
 Government, seeing that the contest is inevitable, to take such measures as will 
 enable us, when that contest begins, to act vrith vigour and effect against 
 France, or such parts of her possessions as may be considered the proper points 
 for an English army to attack. Under these circumstances, the attention of 
 England must naturally be turned to a variety of objects. The Mediterranean, 
 Spain, the Baltic, and France herself, seem equally to hold out objects well 
 worthy her consideration ; but to determine to which the preference should be 
 given, it is necessary to examine what is the amount of force which England is 
 able to employ. The estimates of the present year fix the number of troops in 
 the pay of Great Britain, exclusive of those in India, and including the embo- 
 died militia, at 339,408 men. But as this calculation of necessity allows more 
 than can be called effective, let us take the returns of rank and file from the 
 Adjutant General's Office, and, deducting again even from that statement, let 
 us call the efficient force, exclusive of what is stationed in India, 245,000 men, 
 of which 75,000 are militia. There remains, therefore, at the disposal of Great 
 Britain on the lowest supposition (i. e. 15,604 men below the returns of the 
 Adjutant General's Office) 170,000 effective regular troops. It is evident, 
 from the conduct Bonaparte has always pursued, that in his opinion, if he 
 grasped at maritime and continental conquests at the same time, his force 
 would not be equal to his attempts, and he would necessarily fail. The facts 
 will prove still more, for, as is collected from his different movements, were he 
 to retain trSops in all his conquests, were his forces in every province he has 
 vanquished to be kept equal to the defence of it, were he not even to evacuate 
 some of them entirely, as Hanover, Holland, &c., &c., in 1805, his armies 
 would not be sufficient for the service they would have to perform. 
 
 By defending everything he must necessarily become weak in any particular 
 quarter to which he brings but the surplus of an extensive army ; by the con- 
 trary system he overpowers all that attempts to resist him wherever it is to be 
 found embodied, and then as victor returns into the possession of his former 
 conquests with double security. This line of policy is surely worthy the serious 
 attention of the Government of England. With her superiority at sea, no Power 
 can with more security put in practice the maxims of Bonaparte. The position 
 of England is strong beyond all calculation ; she bids defiance to attack by the 
 superiority of her navy, her distant possessions are still more secured by it, and 
 with all these chances in her fevour, there certainly can be no reason why she 
 should hesitate to leave some of them without all the force which might be 
 required to defend them in presence of an enemy. If there could be any doubt 
 that, if Austria is again beaten, the balance of power in Europe will be totally 
 overthrown, or that, if the Continent is subjected to the will of Bonaparte, all 
 its powers will be directed against England, I would still further push my argu- 
 ments for great and powerful measures on the Continent. But surely nothing 
 more can be wanting to prove that this is the moment which requires the greatest 
 and most powerful efforts of which England is capable. 
 
App. 32. EUROPB^,AN CONGRKSSBS. 123 
 
 Having said so much, I will leave it to others to decide how great a portion 
 of 170,000 regulars and 75,000 militia England can afford to employ effectively 
 and in a body upon the present contest. But what I wish more particularly to 
 inquire into is, in what part of Europe an effective Britbh force of 100,000 men 
 can be employed to the greatest advantage both to England and to the cause of 
 European independence. 
 
 It may be laid down as a principle that, so far as it is possible, every attack 
 that is made by Great Britain should be directed either against France herself, 
 or in direct support of the Powers of the Continent. All operations undertaken 
 against either the allies or the conquests of France are of themselves but of a 
 secondary nature. We know that Bonaparte considers them so, and that he 
 would quietly allow England to possess herself of Hanover, of great part of 
 Italy, and of many other points that could be mentioned, without detaching a 
 single man from his main army, and this upon the broad principle upon which 
 he has always acted, that if he is successful against the heart of his great conti- 
 nental enemy's possessions, which he will effect by leaving his conquests to a 
 certain degree unprotected, he will, as conqueror, re-establish himself in his 
 former dependencies. 
 
 Under this view of the subject, therefore, the British army (destined to the 
 present contest) can only be employed, either in conjunction with the Austrians, 
 to support and strengthen their armies, or in a direct attack upon France and 
 Holland, or in the powerful support of Spain and Portugal, with a view to the 
 invasion of the south of France. By the adoption of the first plan you strengthen 
 the Power on the destruction of which alone Bonaparte hopes to found the 
 subjugation of Europe ; and it is only by adopting one of the two other measures 
 that you can force the Government of France to detach .from her main army to 
 secure herself, and is therefore the only operation, next to direct assistance, 
 which can in any way relieve Austria from being attacked alone by the whole 
 and entire force of France. It has been rumoured that a different system from 
 this has been proposed, namely, that, when France shall have weakened herself 
 in the North and in Spain for the supply of her main army, both these points 
 should engage the attention, and both at the same time receive the assistance of 
 England. Let us consider this proposition. In the first place, by operating 
 upon these two points at the same time, all hope of being of any direct assist- 
 ance to Austria must be given up. In the next place, we must, by adopting 
 these two measures, give up also the hope of being of service to Austria by 
 causing such a diversion in her favour as will reduce the force of the enemy in 
 her front. For as long as the concentrated power of England is not brought to 
 bear upon the present contest, so long will Bonaparte pursue his accustomed 
 policy, and, by pouring everything he can command upon one point, endeavour 
 first to overwhelm his principal opponent. It may therefore be conceded that 
 the proper application of a considerable British force has been reduced to the 
 choice of one of the courses which have been pointed out. To decide the pre- 
 ference due to either of these will require serious discussion. In the first place, 
 it may be laid down as a general maxim in war, that to act but at a small dis- 
 tance from your resources is a most material advantage. Upon this ground, 
 therefore, an attack from England upon France would be much more to be pre- 
 ferred, from the shortness of the communication, than any operation to be car- 
 ried on at a distance in the Mediterranean or in Spain. But in discussing the 
 measures to be pursued at the ])resent moment we must take into consideration 
 
124 EUKOPEAN CONGRESSES. App. 32. 
 
 the actual "emplacement" of the British troops, and endeavour as far as pos- 
 sible to arrange the proposed military undertakings according to the situation in 
 which the army stands. It is argued by those who urge an operation in the 
 Adriatic in direct support of the Austrian army in that quarter, that England 
 has at this moment, by the possession of Sicily, and by the number of men she 
 has now in that country, a great facility of acting (by reinforcing that army 
 from Spain and England) with vigour and rapidity upon Trieste or the Venetian 
 States. It will appear, however, that these reasonings fall to the ground when 
 confronted with those which go to press an operation from England direct upon 
 France. 
 
 In the first place, even if infantry can be carried to a large amount to so 
 great a distance as the Adriatic, how is this to be effected with the cavalry and 
 the necessary equipments to make the army moveable ? The points also from 
 which the troops to form the armament are to be collected, such as the West 
 Indies, America, the Cape of Good Hope, Gibraltar, Spain, and England itself, 
 must be taken into consideration ; and all that are here mentioned are nearer to 
 England than to Sicily. With the exception, therefore, of those troops which 
 must either come from Sicily or go from England, as the place of rendezvous 
 should be fixed, the assembling of the army would be undoubtedly rather expe- 
 dited by making choice of England as their point of meeting. We must also 
 recollect the great disproportion in number of the troops to be sent from the 
 respective countries ; if from Sicily to England, ten or twelve thousand men 
 would be the utmost to be conveyed, but if from England to Sicily, forty or 
 fifty thousand at the least. In regard, therefore, to the facility of bringing an 
 English army into the field, I conceive there cannot be a doubt that the opera- 
 tion should be undertaken from England direct on France. With respect to 
 the danger of withdrawing the British troops from Sicily, it certainly must be 
 allowed to be a critical undertaking, so long as the French continue strong in 
 the kingdom of Naples, yet, with the British superiority at sea, any undertaking 
 against Sicily on the part of the French would be a most hazardous enterprise. 
 It may also be affirmed that while the navy of England is as triumphant as it 
 now is, she may always consider any country unconnected with the Continent 
 as within the reach of her conquest wherever she chooses to sacrifice the means 
 necessary for undertaking it. Upon this view of the subject, of how little 
 import to England is the momentary occupation of Sicily ! Of how little weight 
 in the balance of advantage, when compared with the great object of securing 
 the independence of Europe ! It may therefore be concluded that the partial 
 diminution of the British troops in Sicily, although an inexpedient measure 
 while the French are in force in Naples, would yet become a perfectly wise one, 
 if, as in 1806 and 1807, they reduce their forces in that country. 
 
 With regard to the arguments which press the formation of an army in the 
 Mediterranean, for the purpose of being prepared to make conquests in case 
 Austria should fail, they are quite of a secondary nature. Our object is to 
 break down the colossal power of France. To effect this, or indeed to have 
 even a chance of effecting it, it must be our oidy object. If we succeed in it 
 we shall be powerful in every corner of the globe ; if we fail, not all the con- 
 quests we can make will add one iota to our strength. 
 
 So far, then, there appear no reasons which should determine England to 
 prefer operations in the Mediterranean to a direct attack upon France. Far 
 otherwise. For if we are to be decided by the amount of force we can bring 
 
^^^- '"^2. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 125 
 
 into the field, we must among other things remember, that if to leave 
 Sicily without a garrison would be dangerous, so would it be to abandon 
 England. If the British army were to act in the Adriatic, its distance from 
 Sicily would make a garrison there quite as necessary as if it were acting in any 
 other part of the world. It follows, therefore, that if the British Government 
 decide to act in support of the Austrian army, they 'must deduct from the 
 amount of the army so employed both the garrisons of England and Sicily, and, 
 as the operation would be at such a distance from Great Britain, the garrison to 
 be left in it must be very considerable. On the contrary, if the operation 
 against France should be decided upon, the British army would be so imme- 
 diately in front of England as to make a garrison there, except the dep6ts of 
 formation, quite unnecessary ; and as to Sicily, a small garrison would suffice. 
 But even if the whole force now employed there was to be left in Sicily, still, 
 by choosing a line of operations which would liberate the garrison of England, 
 the active army would be always so much stronger as the excess of force to be 
 retained in Great Britain surpasses that to be left in Sicily. As this must be 
 considerable, so are the advantages of the latter operation. It is evident, there- 
 fore, that, as well from the extent of the army you will be able to employ, as 
 from the equipment you can give it, and from the facility and vigour with 
 which it will act so close to its resources, the operation from England, either 
 direct upon France, or through Portugal and Spain upon that country, is prefer- 
 able to that proposed in the Adriatic. 
 
 But it is argued that France is so strong that she cannot be attacked. This 
 is a proposition totally untenable ; for the force of France consists in the 
 number of troops she can command. With the French army, therefore, at 
 Boulogne, there would be no prospect of attacking her with success. But if 
 her army is away, where is then her strength ? Surely her inhabitants are not 
 more powerful than those of Great Britain, Nor would her defence without an 
 army be more formidable than the resistance of any other people. It is when 
 she is in such a state, when she is left without any other means of defence 
 than what her inhabitants can afford her, that it is proposed she should be 
 attacked. 
 
 Suppose two English armies, forming together a force of 100,000 men, landed 
 in the neighbourhood of Calais and Boulogne, the remainder at Dieppe, their 
 first object being to take the above towns and Havre, and then, with the large 
 force of cavalry England could afford, to advance upon and menace the capital 
 of that country, can any man believe that such a movement would not be a 
 most serious evil to France ? — that it would not call for a most powerful detach- 
 ment from her main army to oppose it ? — or that even if Bonaparte could afford 
 to detach a corps large enough to drive back the invading army (always not a 
 very easy task against 100,000 Englishmen), would not France have received a 
 most severe blow, and Austria a considerable relief? These are positions which 
 cannot be denied. There would be no serious danger to the British army, for, 
 when in possession of the works of Havre, Boulogne, and Calais, the re-embarka- 
 tion would always be secured, and, with a large force of cavalry, the knowledge 
 of the movements of the enemy might always be insured. There is not, there- 
 fore, in this movement anything so alarming as some jiersons are willing to 
 suppose. Whenever an army is to meet an enemy, there is always danger to 
 be apprehended, and particularly from the French, who, next to our own, are 
 the best soldiers in Europe. But is such a consideration to deter the British 
 
126 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. App. 32. 
 
 nation ? Is it not below the character of Englishmen to shrink from such a 
 contest, when at the same moment we are reproaching the Governments of 
 Europe (who have no medium, if they do fight, between victory and aimihila- 
 tion) for not coming forward to fight, with smaller means, the same enemy ? 
 Surely our own doctrine to other nations applies most properly to ourselves : — 
 " To remain inactive is ruin ; not to fight the enemy of Europe will be your 
 destruction ; and not to use every effort and every exertion your country is 
 capable of, is to seal with your own hands the decree of destruction which is 
 already issued against you." Let us, therefore, derive from the very lesson we 
 have dictated to others, a rule to guide ourselves. Let us remember that the 
 last contest we can calculate upon in Europe is fast approaching, and that the 
 last chance of interposing between the independence and the subjugation of 
 Europe will soon be open to us. 
 
 The estimates of the present year, as I have before stated, return as in the 
 pay of Great Britain, excluding the force in India, and including the embodied 
 militia, 339,408 men. Call them only 300,000 ; and is it possible that with 
 such a force England is so positively weakened by her colonies and distant gar- 
 risons as not to be able to afford, by the voluntary aid of her militia battalions 
 and her army of the line together, 100,000 men to fight for that cause on which 
 her existence depends ? It seems impossible ; but if it be the case, surely it is 
 the strongest argument for the pursuit of a new and different system. 
 
 The conclusion which results from all the above reflections is, that the duty 
 of the present Government is to prepare the means of great and unprecedented 
 exertions, to enable them to act, at the moment Austria shall declare herself, 
 with all the force Great Britain can command ; that, to effect this, all objects 
 but one must be abandoned, and to that one all our powers directed ; that 
 the garrisons of some of our colonies must be reduced, and of others almost 
 entirely withdrawn ; that our active army must be increased by every man 
 that can be supplied to it ; that (as, when the British army is in front of 
 England, no garrison is required) the militia should be allowed and encouraged 
 to volunteer their services for offensive operations ; and that all thd force of 
 Britain, thus collected, should be applied in a direct attack upon the most 
 vulnerable points of France, be they her southern provinces, her capital, or her 
 arsenals at Antwerp. The results we are to expect from any of these opera- 
 tions are, first, to strike a severe blow upon France herself; secondly, to force 
 her to reduce the army with which she would fall upon Austria ; and, lastly, 
 by these efforts to render the war between France and that country more 
 equal, and thus to take an active part in seeking to avert the fall of continental 
 Europe. 
 
 With the hope, therefore, that Great Britain will see the necessity of making 
 every exertion of which she is capable in the contest that is approaching, and 
 under the conviction that with a proper application of her concentrated force 
 she will eventually succeed, these suggestions are submitted to the consideration 
 of His Majesty's Government. 
 
 BuBGHBBSH. 
 
Ohap. n EUROPEAN CONGKESSES. 127 
 
 CHAPTEK II. 
 
 PEACE AND SETTLEMENT IN PARIS, 1814. 
 
 After the close of the war between France and 
 Austria in 1809, the Emperor Napoleon appeared to 
 have attained to the utmost limit of conquest or control 
 over the continent of Europe to which the ambition of 
 a sovereign could aspire. There remained no semblance 
 of opposition to his will but in the Peninsula of Spain 
 and Portugal, and to the overthrow of this last resist- 
 ance he now appeared determined to bend his undi- 
 vided exertions. The powerful armies which he marched 
 into these countries extended his conquests in 1809 to 
 the southern extremities of Spain ; and in the year 
 1810 the immense preparations which he directed for 
 the conquest of Portugal seemed to afford him a 
 justifiable expectation of the realisation of his views. 
 The unparalleled exertions and triumphs of the British 
 army under Lord Wellington, the spirit and valour 
 of the troops and people of Portugal, and the uncom- 
 promising hostility of the Spanish nation, drove back 
 this tide of war, and thus secured a spot upon which to 
 plant the fulcrum of a power which, in the end, over- 
 threw the vast dominion which at that moment seemed 
 so firmly established. The Emperor Napoleon through- 
 out the year 1811 continued to pour fresh troops into 
 the Peninsula. He withdrew Marshal Mass^na from the 
 command of the army of Portugal, and replaced him by 
 Marshal Marmont ; but whether he was influenced by 
 the difficulties of the warfare in these countries, and by 
 the obstacles which were opposed to the concentration 
 
128 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. 11. 
 
 for any length of time of a large army in the field, or 
 whether, in his vast projects of future conquests, he 
 considered the war against Spain and Portugal as of 
 minor importance, it does not appear that he ever 
 entertained any serious intention of assuming himself 
 the command of the armies employed in it. Fortune 
 had so long been favourable to him, he had obtained 
 such immense successes, and he was possessed of such 
 powerful means with which to continue to press forward 
 these advantages, that the resistance he met with from 
 England and her allies became at once irritating and 
 hateful to him. He saw with disappointment that the 
 vast project he had conceived of closing the Continent 
 to the commerce and manufactures of Grreat Britain was 
 failing ; and while he was himself obliged to modify 
 his system in France by the special licences which he 
 conferred with no parsimonious hand, he complained 
 loudly of other sovereigns (and particularly of the Em- 
 peror of Russia), who, in consideration of the distresses 
 of their subjects, had adopted a line of policy similar to 
 his own. His power and authority had been esta- 
 blished and nurtured in conquest, and his government 
 was founded upon that basis. The institutions he had 
 established, the immense armies he had raised, the 
 direction he had given to the spirit and enterprise of 
 the French people, all tended to encourage him in the 
 continuance of the same system, A feverish desire of 
 bringing the immense power he was possessed of into 
 action outstripped the formation of any settled plan 
 for the disposal of the conquests which might result 
 from his successes ; and the Emperor Napoleon, when 
 he declared war against Russia in 1812, and passed the 
 frontiers of that country, does not appear to have con- 
 templated a limit to his enterprise, or to have fixed 
 upon any system by which he would bring it to a 
 close. That he undertook this gigantic expedition for 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 129 
 
 the sole purpose of obliging Eussia to close her ports 
 more effectually than they had been against England is 
 not to be believed ; that he contemplated, in addition 
 to this object, the establishment of the kingdom of 
 Poland is contrary to his declarations, and is a scheme 
 of too limited a nature in the advantages which might 
 accrue from it, to justify a belief that this Avas the 
 ultimate object to be attained. Whatever were his real 
 expectations, whether the dismemberment of the Eus- 
 sian Empire, or the future conquest of Turkey, or 
 whether it was in the extent which might be given to 
 the successes he anticipated that his future plans were 
 to be decided, it is now impossible satisfactorily to 
 ascertain. There exists no document, bearing date 
 anterior to the reverses he suffered, in which those 
 plans are set forth, and whatever has since been stated 
 upon the subject is more or less modified by the feel- 
 ings which his reverses engendered. In the two last 
 wars in which he had been engaged, against Prussia 
 and Austria, his astonishing successes had enabled him 
 to dictate terms of accommodation which left these 
 countries more his vassals than independent states. He 
 now marched against Eussia, having at his disposal all 
 their forces, combined with those of the rest of subju- 
 gated Europe ; and it is natural to suppose he looked 
 forward to results as great, if not more extensive, than 
 any he had hitherto obtained. 
 
 Soon after the commencement of the war, however, 
 and particularly after his advance from Smolensko, he 
 seems to have been impressed with the magnitude and 
 risk of the enterprise he had undertaken. He had 
 been accustomed to follow up his enemies with such 
 rapidity and success, and to strike such terror into 
 their armies and their councils, that, before they 
 had had time to reflect upon the dangerous position 
 in which he himself at various times was placed, 
 
 K 
 
130 BUKOPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 they sought for peace at his dictation. This was more 
 particularly the case after the battle of Austerlitz, 
 when the whole Austro-Italian army was ready to 
 fall upon him on one side, and the Prussian army 
 on the other — when the Tyrol was in insurrection, 
 and the British and Eussian forces collected in Han- 
 over were menacing Holland, which at that time was 
 without defence. The terror of his arms and fortune 
 had neutralised the menaced effects of the dangers and 
 difficulties by which he was then surrounded. In the 
 advance, which he determined upon, against Moscow 
 and the centre of the Russian Empire, he trusted to 
 the same results, yet he was no stranger to the greater 
 difficulties and obstacles he was likely to encounter. In 
 the battle of Borodino his refusal to engage his reserves 
 at the close of the action, and thus to hazard his last 
 resources in completing the victory he had obtained, 
 was contrary to the policy he had ever before pursued, 
 and which in any less dangerous situation he un- 
 doubtedly would have adopted. But he was restrained 
 by the consideration of the immense distance he was 
 removed from his resources and supplies, and the un- 
 compromising bravery and hostility of the troops and 
 people by whom he was opposed and surrounded. 
 Upon his arrival at Moscow the destruction of that 
 city by fire, whether by accident or design, was not 
 calculated to diminish the feeling which he entertained 
 of the danger of the position in which he had placed 
 himself. Yet the recollection of the former good 
 fortune which had attended him kept alive the expecta- 
 tion that some negotiation would be entered into — that 
 the terror of his arms would blind his enemies as to the 
 difficulties by which he was surrounded, and would 
 extricate him from the false position in which he was 
 placed. The mode in which his various attempts to 
 open a negotiation with the Emperor Alexander were 
 
CiiAP. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 131 
 
 received by the Russian Generals was not calculated to 
 deprive him of the hope that thev; might be successful ; 
 but if he once gave evidence of his v^eakness by a retreat, 
 all these expectations would vanish. He lingered on, 
 therefore, still clinging to the false but flattering hope 
 which he entertained ; and when at last he gave it up 
 and determined to fall back, it was too late, and his 
 army was crushed in the attempt. From this moment 
 he had to strive against an adverse fortune : he did it 
 with a brave and unbending spirit. He was the idol of 
 that immense portion of the population of France and 
 of Europe who gloried in his triumphs, and whose for- 
 tunes were bound up with his power and dominion. 
 Upon his return to his own country, no discontent was 
 manifested at the immense disasters he had occasioned, 
 and in the course of a few months, notwithstanding the 
 separation of Prussia from his cause, and her declara- 
 tion of war against him, he again appeared in the heart 
 of Germany at the head of a powerful army, and the 
 victories of Liitzen and Bautzen crowned with success 
 the vast exertions he had made, and which had been 
 supported by his subject-people.* 
 
 Immediately after the achievement of the last of these 
 victories, which had been obtained over the combined 
 Russian and Prussian armies, a general armistice was 
 negotiated and established at Plesswiz on the 4th 
 of June. It was brought about by the intervention of 
 Austria, was negotiated on the part of the Allies by the 
 Russian and Prussian commanders, and was consented 
 to by the Crown Prince of Sweden. Up to that period 
 Austria had been seeking to disentangle herself from 
 
 * The account of the defection of the Prussian troops under General Torek, 
 and of the conduct of the Prussian Cabinet till the rupture between that country 
 and France, together with the official documents relating to these events, is given 
 in the first volume of the 'Manuscrit de 1813,' by the Baron Fain, part 1, chap. 9, 
 and in the Supplement. They are here referred to as giving a complete history 
 of this most important event, the consequences of which were the retreat of the 
 French army to the left bank of the Elbe, and the concentration of the forces of 
 Russia, Prussia, and Sweden against the power of France. 
 
 K 2 
 
132 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 the alliance which at the breaking out of the war 
 between France and Russia she had been forced to 
 contract with the former of these powers. She had 
 marched her armies against the Russian Empire, the 
 unwilling auxiliaries in the attempt to break down the 
 last remnant of an independent state upon the Continent ; 
 but when it failed, and the French armies were driven 
 back or destroyed, she availed herself of the altered 
 circumstances in which she was placed, and of the 
 necessity of providing against the danger by which she 
 was menaced by the advance of the Russians upon the 
 frontiers of her empire, to enforce the urgency of new 
 arrangements with France, and to declare the abroga- 
 tion of those treaties which under different circum- 
 stances she had agreed to. Having clearly established 
 her right to this construction of the stipulations she 
 was bound by, and having obtained for it the sanction 
 of the Emperor Napoleon, she offered her mediation 
 between the contending powers, and arming to support 
 it, she called upon them to meet in Congress to settle 
 the general pacification of the world. This offer was 
 readily accepted by the Emperor of Russia and the 
 King of Prussia, but the Emperor Napoleon reluctantly 
 agreed to it, and in the first notification of his accept- 
 ance clogged it with the conditions that plenipoten- 
 tiaries should .be sent either to Prague or Vienna from 
 all the powers at war, among whom even the Americans 
 were included, and that the Congress so assembled 
 should continue its labours although the armistice should 
 be put an end to, and that it should treat under the 
 armed but perfectly disinterested mediation of Austria. 
 These conditions were peremptorily refused, and after 
 some delay the Emperor Napoleon accepted the original 
 proposition ; but it does not appear that he ever seriously 
 contemplated any adherence to it. On the part of 
 England it was declared in a despatch from Lord 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 133 
 
 Castlereagh to Lord Oattcart (who, being the am- 
 bassador to Russia, was instructed to communicate with 
 the Austrian Cabinet) that her acceptation of the prof- 
 fered mediation was placed at the entire disposal and 
 decision of the Emperor of Russia and the King of 
 Prussia. But at the moment when this instruction was 
 received, the delay in the arrival of a French plenipo- 
 tentiary at Prague till the armistice had nearly expired, 
 and the captious discussion then raised by the French 
 plenipotentiaries as to the forms by which the negotia- 
 tion was to be carried on, so entirely precluded all hope 
 of arriving at any favourable result from the labours of 
 the Congress that the adhesion of England was not 
 declared, and Austria, allying herself with the powers 
 in hostility to France, announced the termination of the 
 negotiation which she had in vain attempted to esta- 
 blish.* However — 
 
 " There is a tide in the affairs of men 
 Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune : 
 Omitted, all the voyage of their life 
 Is hound in shallows and in miseries." 
 
 The Emperor Napoleon, by his conduct at this junc- 
 ture, appears to have let go the golden opportunity, 
 which was offered him, of recovering from the disasters 
 which he had suffered, and of remaining the greatest 
 power in Europe, and the eventual arbiter of her 
 destinies. At this time he commanded the resources of 
 France, of Italy, and of Germany, with the exception 
 of the states of Austria and of Prussia ; Spain and Por- 
 tugal had been wrested from him by the great achieve- 
 ment of Yittoria, and the French armies had been 
 driven into their own country ; but as a counterpoise to 
 
 * The history of the transactions and negotiations alluded to in tl^e text, 
 together with the official documents relating to them, are given m the Supple- 
 ment to the 1st part of the 'Manuscrit de 1813,' by Baron Fain ; m the 8th 
 and 9th chapters of the 2nd part and its Supplement ; and m the 2nd, 4th, 7th, 
 and 8th chapters of the 3rd part and its Supplement. 
 
134 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 this disaster, the Danish troops having co-operated with 
 the French under Marshal Davonst in driving the Rus- 
 sians from Plamburg, the Emperor Alexander had 
 withdrawn his minister from Copenhagen, and this 
 country thus became involved as an ally of France in 
 the general war which now raged throughout Europe. 
 
 In such a position, with an army in great part but 
 lately raised to which he might trust his fortunes, with 
 a large proportion of his best and veteran troops shut 
 up in the fortresses in the rear of the allied armies, and 
 therefore affording him no chance of their being made 
 available in the approaching campaign, with a general 
 disinclination to his cause in the Governments and 
 people of Germany, with every reason to distrust the 
 fidelity even of his brother-in-law, the King of Naples, 
 who at the very time was in secret communication with 
 the Court of Austria, and who a few months later, after 
 the battle of Leipsic, separated himself from his alliance, 
 it is difficult to understand upon what grounds he 
 determined to meet again the chance of war, to bring 
 upon himself the combined hostility of all the great 
 powers of Europe, and to risk the fate of his empire, 
 a dominion which it had cost such years of triumphs 
 to establish. It appears not to have been in the cha- 
 racter of the Emperor Napoleon to bend to circum- 
 stances. In the whole of his career his will was law, 
 or he withdrew himself from the scene in which he 
 could no longer dictate to all around him. When such 
 was the case at Fontainebleau in 1814, and at Paris 
 after the battle of Waterloo in 1815, he retired from a 
 position in which he could no longer hope to retain 
 an uncontrolled dominion, abandoning it with a pre- 
 cipitancy which was hardly warranted by the circum- 
 stances in which he was placed, or consonant with the 
 unbending character of his previous conduct. At both 
 these periods he still retained considerable forces at his 
 
Chap. H. E;UR0PEAN CONGRESSES. 135 
 
 disposal, he still might have had a chance of maintain- 
 ing a prolonged and vigorous defence ; but he could no 
 longer hope to be the sole arbiter of the destinies even 
 of his own country; he must have yielded to the 
 feelings and sentiments of those vrho were embarked 
 with him in his arduous undertaking, and in 1815 he 
 must have submitted to the dictation of the Legislative 
 Chambers which he had himself assembled ; but rather 
 than do this he preferred the immediate abandonment 
 of all the apparent chances of future dominion or com- 
 mand ; he withdrew the resources of his own talents 
 and superiority at a moment when they were the most 
 necessary to the brave men who had committed their 
 lives and fortunes to the furtherance of his cause, and 
 he seemed to acknowledge no middle course between 
 dictation or surrender. He stated that he made these 
 sacrifices of his own personal interests to the peace and 
 prosperity of France, not choosing to expose her to civil 
 war ; that he therefore rejected the proposals of some 
 of the partisans by whom he was surrounded at the 
 Palace of the Elys6e Bourbon, and particularly of his 
 brother Lucien, to march a body of troops upon the 
 Legislative Chambers (who were proposing to him to 
 abdicate), to disperse them, and to declare himself Dic- 
 tator. He did as he had done at the rupture of the 
 armistice in 1813, when he faced the dangers by which 
 he was surrounded rather than submit to terms by 
 which the three great continental powers would have 
 been re-established as independent states, and the un- 
 controlled dominion he aspired to limited and circum- 
 scribed. He spurned to calculate the immense resources 
 he would have retained if peace had then been esta- 
 blished. His commanding position he would still have 
 held ; but he must have retrograded from the high 
 estate he once had occupied, he must have bent to cir- 
 cumstances, and must have acknowledged co-equals in 
 
136 EUROPEAN CONGllESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 that dominion which he had aspired to occupy alone. 
 When once the die was cast, although fortune seemed 
 for a moment to smile upon him at the relief of Dresden, 
 yet in every other rencontre she abandoned his cause, 
 and by the great defeat at Leipsic he was driven back 
 upon France, and at once deprived of all the resources 
 of the German Empire ; the second army he had raised 
 within the year was broken and dispirited, and the magic 
 of his name apparently destroyed. During the period 
 in which these events were taking place, his letter to the 
 Emperor of Austria, together with the answer to it, 
 and his conversation with General Meerfelt on the day 
 preceding his overthrow at Leipsic, are the best evi- 
 dences of the feelings and exjjectations he entertained ; 
 and although these documents, as well as the letter of 
 the King of Bavaria upon his ruj)ture with France, 
 and the answer of the Emperor Alexander, have been 
 already placed before the public in the author's work 
 on the Operations of the Allied Armies in 1813 and 
 1814, they are of so much interest to the history of 
 these transactions that they are here inserted : — 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from the Empeeok Napoleon to the 
 Bmpeeok of Austria. 
 
 " SiK MY Beothek and deae Fathee-in-Law, 
 
 " I am desirous of surrendering to you the fortress of 
 Zamose, alid of concluding with you, for this purpose, a little 
 treaty. ^ Your being pleased, therefore, to order Count de Bubna 
 to receive overtures on the subject would afford me great satisfac- 
 tion. As it appears that General Count de Bubna is intended to 
 command a division of observation, I should wish that Your 
 Majesty would have the goodness to authorize him to be the 
 channel of the correspondence which, notwithstanding the pre- 
 sent hostilities. Your Majesty and myself are desii-ous of main- 
 taining with each other. 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 137 
 
 " I informed Count de Bubna, by tlie oiBcer who carried my 
 letter, that I was very pacifically inclined. 
 
 " I cannot bring myself to think that Your Majesty can find 
 your interest in the contmuation of a war, the results of v/liich, 
 should it be prolonged, would be disastrous to France, Germany, 
 and Austria, and advantageous only to England and Eussia. 
 
 " The last communication I had from the Empress is dated 
 the 18th. She had returned to St. Cloud, and was in the enjoy- 
 ment of good health, although, as Your Majesty will readily 
 imagine, much grieved at a contest like the present. 
 
 " From Your Imperial Majesty's good brother and son-in-law, 
 
 (Signed) " Napoleon. 
 
 " Dresden, 25tli September, 1813." 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 Translation of the Answer of the Empbeob of Austria to the 
 Empekor Napoleon. 
 
 " I have received the letter of Your Imperial Majesty dated 
 the 25th September. 
 
 " As the fortress of Zamose is not besieged by my troops, I 
 cannot interfere in its capitulation, which can only be settled by 
 the respective officers in command. 
 
 " Your Imperial Majesty cannot doubt the sincerity of my 
 wishes for peace. Of the twenty-one years I have reigned, ten 
 have been lost, so far as the happiness of my people is concerned. 
 The official document addressed, on the 18th of August last, by 
 the Duke de Bassano to Prince Metternich, seems to prove that 
 Your Majesty shares my conviction, equally with that of my 
 allies, that Europe can no longer be only partially pacified, and 
 that it would be better to exhaust all the chances of a com- 
 menced war than terminate it at the risk of new and inevitable 
 convulsions. 
 
 " At the same time with the Emperor of Russia and the King 
 of Prussia, L forwarded to England Your Majesty's overtures. I 
 expect in a few days the answer of the Prince Eegent, which I 
 shall hasten to communicate to Your Imperial Majesty. 
 
 " Your Imperial Majesty's good brother and father-in-law, 
 
 (Signed) " Fkancis. 
 
 " Toplitz, 29th September, 1813." 
 
138 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 No. 3. 
 
 Translation of a Minute of a Conversation between Genbeal Count db 
 Mberveldt and the Bmpekob Napoleon, at the Camp near Leipsic, 
 October 17, 1813. 
 
 " The Emperor Napoleon sent for me on the 17th at 2 o'clock 
 in the afternoon, and, after paying me a compliment upon the 
 efforts I had made to pass in the rear of his army and attack his 
 communications, told me that, as a mark of his esteem, he would 
 send me back on my parole. After a few questions upon the 
 strength of the allied armies, which he assured me he did not 
 imagine had been so considerable, he asked me if his presence 
 at the army was known to us. I assured him that it was. ' Did 
 youthen intend giving me battle ? ' — 'Yes, Sire.' — 'You are in 
 error as to the forces I have collected here : how many men 
 do you think I may have?' — ' At the most 120,000.' — ' I have 
 more than 200,000. I think I have underrated your numbers : 
 what are they?'—' More than 350,000, Sire.'—' Shall you attack 
 me to-morrow ? ' — ' I have no doubt we shall. Sire : relying upon 
 the superiority of their means, the allied armies will attack 
 Your Majesty day after day, hoping thereby to secure the result 
 of a decisive battle and the retreat of the French army — advan- 
 tages of which Your Majesty's proved talents might disappoint 
 us at iirst.' — 'Must this war last for ever? It is high time to 
 bring it to a termination.' — ■' Sire, it is the general wish, and 
 peace is in Your Majesty's power. Had Your Majesty pleased, 
 you might have concluded it at the Congress of Prague.' — ' But 
 the Allies were not sincere : they finessed. A peremptory term 
 was fixed for me to decide in, as if so important a business could 
 be concluded in ten days. Austria has lost the opportunity of 
 taking the lead in the affairs of Europe. I would have done for 
 her whatever she desired, and we two would have dictated the 
 law to the other Powers.' — ' I cannot conceal from Your Majesty 
 that the opinion in Austria is, that your dictatorship would have 
 ended by dictating the law to Austria herself.' — ' Well, but after 
 all, some one must be spokesman. Let it be Austria then ! If 
 you give ear to Eussia, she is under the influence of England, 
 and England has no wish for peace.' — ' I am ia nowise informed 
 as to the views of my Grovernment, Sire ; and therefore I beg 
 that whatever I may have the honour of saying to Your Majesty 
 may be considered as merely my own private opinion ; but this 
 I know as a certainty, that the Emperor, my master, is deter- 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGllBSSES. 139 
 
 mined never to swerve, in the negociations, from the strictest 
 union with the allied Courts, for he feels convinced that to this 
 union must be attributed the present fortunate position of affairs, 
 and the well-founded hope of a durable peace. Your Majesty 
 knows how greatly desirous all the allied Courts are of bringing 
 about this peace as soon as possible.' — ' Well, then, why are not 
 my proposals for negociating accepted? You see very clearly 
 that England is not inclined for peace.' — ' Sire, I know it for a 
 fact that an answer was daily expected from England, to whom 
 Your Majesty's propositions for commencing negociations had 
 been forwarded, and whose consent thereto was considered as 
 certain.' — ' You will find she will refuse.' — ' England, Sire, is too 
 much in need of peace not to desire it most anxiously ; but what 
 she does desire is a peace, and not an armistice — a peace for the 
 stability of which the guarantee is to be found in its conditions.' — 
 ' And in what, do you suppose, such a guarantee might consist ? ' — 
 ' In a balance of power in Europe which shall set boimds to the 
 preponderance of France.' — ' Well, let England give me back 
 my islands, and I wUl restore Hanover to her ; I wiU re-establish 
 the departments which have been annexed (to the Empire), as 
 well as the Hanse towns.' — ' I believe. Sire, that England wiU 
 insist upon the re-establishment of Holland.' — ' Oh! Holland 
 shall cease to be, for no flags would be respected by her ; besides 
 which, isolated and alone, she would be dependent upon Eng- 
 land.' — ' Sire, I consider the maritime principles established by 
 England as merely provisional, which, as they were caused by 
 the war, so they will cease with it ; in which case the reasons 
 Your Majesty has alleged for wishing to retain Holland will fall 
 to the ground.' — ' Be it so ; but then we must come to some 
 understanding about this same independence, and this the prin- 
 ciples adopted by England wUl render somewhat difficult.' — ' It 
 would be a generous resolve, and a great step towards peace.' — 
 ' I ardently desire it, and will make sacrifices — great sacrifices ; 
 but there are things in which my honour is concerned, and from 
 which, in my present position, I cannot depart — the Protectorate 
 of Germany, for instance.'—' Your Majesty knows too well how 
 much your influence in G-ermany is opposed to the re-establish- 
 ment of the balance of power in Europe, to suppose that it may 
 be still further consolidated by a peace. Our alliance with 
 Bavaria and several other members of the Confederation of the 
 Ehine, and the possession also of Saxony, which we hope to 
 obtain ere long, deprive moreover Your Majesty of one part of 
 
140 EUROPEAN CONGEBSSES. Chap. II. 
 
 your allies ; and, as to the other, we make sure of its soon suc- 
 cumbing, as a consequence of the success promised us by our 
 great superiority.' — ■' Oh ! as for those who are unwilling to have 
 my protection, I give them up. They will repent it, but honour 
 does not allow me to divest myself of the character of Protector 
 for the remaining ones.' — ' I recollect that upon a former occa- 
 sion Your Majesty told me yourself, that it was necessary for 
 the tranquilKty of Europe that France should be separated from 
 the other great European Powers by a cordon of small inde- 
 pendent States. Let Your Majesty be pleased to return to these 
 just principles, which, in the moment of calmness and reflection, 
 your sagacity prompted, and the happiness of Europe will be 
 secured.' The Emperor did not give a negative reply to this 
 observation, and a momentary silence ensued, which he inter- 
 rupted by the exclamation, — ' Well, we shall see ; but all that 
 will not bring about peace. How is it possible to negociate with 
 England, who insists upon binding me down not to build more 
 than thirty sail of the line in my ports ? The English are them- 
 selves so convinced of the utter inadmissibility of this condition 
 that they have not as yet dared to propose it formally, but I 
 knoAv it to be their intention.' — ' Sire, from the very commence- 
 ment of this conversation, I have supposed that the object of 
 this war was, vsdth the Allied Powers, the re-establishment of 
 the balance of Europe. England cannot blind herself to the 
 fact that, possessed as Your Majesty is of such an extent of coast 
 from the Adriatic to the North Sea, you would soon have a navy 
 double and triple that of Great Britain ; and that, considering 
 the talents and activity of Your Majesty, the results would not 
 be difficult to foresee. Now, how can a superiority so near at 
 hand be prevented, but by fixing the number of ships of war 
 which shall henceforth be built in French ports — unless indeed 
 Your Majesty return to the conditions you established when con- 
 stituting yourself the head of the Government of the kingdom of 
 Italy, namely, the intention of restoring independence to that 
 country, upon the establishment of a Continental and general 
 peace. I' am not aware that Your Majesty has ever pubHshed 
 anything in revocation of this law which you so imposed upon 
 yourself It would indeed be a splendid act to do that for the 
 tranquillity of Europe which Europe would regard as a generous 
 sacrifice, instead of incurring the dishonour so justly attached by 
 Your Majesty to the condition wliieh would limit the number of 
 the ships of war of France. Your Majesty would acquire all the 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 141 
 
 credit of this peace ; and after having attained the highest degree 
 of military glory, peace would enable you to complete all the 
 magnificent establishments you have begun in France, and to 
 achieve the happiness of your Empire, which, it must be con- 
 fessed, is made to pay somewhat dearly for your glory.' 
 
 " The Emperor admitted that this condition was more admis- 
 sible. ' At all events,' added he, ' I will never listen to the idea 
 of re-establishing the old order of things in Italy. That country, 
 united under one and the same Sovereign, would accord much 
 better with one general system of policy in Europe.' — ' With 
 regard to the Duchy of Warsaw, Your Majesty, I suppose, re- 
 nounces it?' — ' Oh yes, I offered it, and they have not thought 
 fit to accept it.' — ' Spain might still prove an apple of discord.' — 
 ' No,' replied the Emperor, ' Spain is a mere object of dynasty.' — 
 ' Yes, Sire, but I think that the belligerent Powers have not all 
 the same interest for the same dynasty.' — 'I have been com- 
 pelled to abandon Spain, and this question is thereby settled.' — 
 ' It appears, then,' I rejoined, ' that peace may be possible.' — 
 ' Well, then, send me a person in whom I can have confidence, 
 and we may be able to come to terms. I am accused of always 
 proposing armistices ; I do not propose them now, but you must 
 allow that humanity would be a great gainer by them. If it be 
 required, I will take up a position behind the Saale ; the Eussians 
 and Prussians will be behind the Elbe, you in Bohemia, and poor 
 Saxony, who has suffered so much, will remain neuter.' — ' We 
 could scarcely do without Saxony, were it only on the score of 
 supplies ; but I think that — even supposing we had reason, con- 
 sidering the superiority of our means, to indulge our hopes so far 
 as to contemplate seeing Your Majesty cross the Ehine this very 
 autumn — it could never be compatible witli the interests of the 
 allied armies that Your Majesty should, by means of an armistice, 
 be established on this side of that river.' — ' For this not to be the 
 case, I must lose a battle, which may happen, but it has not 
 happened yet.' " 
 
 No. 4. 
 
 Translation of a Letter from H. M. the King of Bavaria to 
 H. M. the Emperor of Russia. 
 
 " Sir my Beother and Brother-in-law, 
 
 " I have received the letter which Your Imperial Majesty 
 has had the kindness to write to me, and which has afforded mf 
 
142 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 the greater satisfaction, on account of its containing those 
 express assurances of your regard for my person and dominions 
 which you were pleased to repeat to me more than once, and 
 to which I have never ceased to attach the highest value. 
 
 " Inspiring me, as those assurances do, with entire confidence 
 and due gratitude it very naturally follows that I should make 
 no difficulty in relying wholly upon Your Imperial Majesty in 
 all that concerns my own interests, and those of my people. 
 
 " Opposed, in every respect, to a war which, by counteracting 
 my personal inclinations, could only occasion me danger and 
 expense, I have not, on that account, the less fulfilled, with 
 scrupulous fidelity, those engagements which, in concert with 
 almost the whole of Europe, I had, in other times and under 
 other auspices, contracted. Now, when all circumstances combine 
 to release me from those obligations, I cannot but congratulate 
 myself upon being enabled to re-establish relations which I 
 could so sincerely have wished never to see interrupted. I have 
 but one wish, and that is the speedy re-establishment of a sohd 
 and lasting peace, the urgent necessity of which is felt by my 
 subjects, as much, and even more, than by others — and the 
 preservation, in their entirety, of the States which I possess. 
 I shall concur, with zeal and perseverance, and by every means 
 in my power, in aU that can lead to the attainment of this 
 twofold object. I have already sent orders to General Eagla- 
 wich's corps to return to Bavaria. Up to the present time, 
 no hostilities have occurred between my troops and the Austrian 
 army under the command of the Prince de Eeuss : and General 
 Wrede has long had precise orders to abstain from every 
 offensive movement. It would be easy to prolong the state of 
 tranquillity thus naturally established, until a further under- 
 standing be arrived at as regards the subject of those new 
 relations upon which the support and inter veation of Your 
 Imperial Majesty will exercise so powerful an influence. 
 
 "Be pleased. Sir my brother and brother-in-law, to rest 
 assured that I shall anticipate so happy a moment for me with 
 an impatience which is but the very natural result of that sincere 
 attachm,ent and profound respect with which I am, &c., 
 
 (Signed) "Maximilian Joseph." 
 
 " Nymphenbourg, 10th September, 1813. 
 " To Sir my Brother and Brother-in-law 
 
 " H. I. M. the Emperor of All the Kussias." 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 143 
 
 No. 5. 
 < 
 
 Translation of the Answer of the Empbrob of Russia to the 
 
 King of Bavaeia. 
 
 " Sir my Beothee, 
 
 "The reply of Your Majesty has just been delivered 
 to me, aud I am deeply affected by the sentiments it conveys 
 and by the flattering confidence of which it assures me. Your 
 Majesty shall never have cause to regret so impUcit a reliance 
 upon my friendly dispositions towards you. United to the 
 Emperor of Austria by the most indissoluble ties, I hesitate not 
 a moment in acceding to all the proposals he is about to make 
 to Your Majesty and in guaranteeing the transactions resulting 
 therefrom. The object to which all our efforts are directed 
 is the restoration of an order of things which shall secure to 
 Europe a long interval of peace and happiness. I regard the 
 power and independence of the intermediate States as the best 
 means for attaining this desideratum. So important a con- 
 sideration renders it indispensably necessary that the frontiers of 
 Austria should be strengthened in a military point of view, but 
 this cannot be accomplished without making certain arrange- 
 ments with Your Majesty. The point of view from which Your 
 Majesty contemplates the actual state of things, is, doubtless, too 
 elevated for you not to be convinced of this, while, as for 
 myself, I am too candid not to give Your Majesty the most 
 unreserved explanations upon so delicate a subject. The most 
 complete indemnification, however, computed upon the geo- 
 graphical, statistical, and financial proportions of the ceded 
 territory, shall be formally guaranteed to Your Majesty in order 
 that such an exchange cannot but turn to your advantage, since 
 you would only be relinquishing provinces which scarcely 
 amalgamate with the other portions of your dominions, and 
 where the desire of returning beneath the sway of their old 
 masters, is too strongly rooted in the breast of each inhabitant, 
 for the revolutionary spirit not to cause the Government never- 
 ceasing alarm. 
 
 " Ear from wishing that the power of Bavaria should thereby 
 suffer the least diminution, my attachment to Your Majesty wiU, 
 on the contrary, prompt me to find the means of aggrandizing 
 it, in the changes which may be required by circumstances. It 
 would be difficult to give you at the present moment, stronger 
 
144 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 proofs how much I have your interest at heart, and as soon 
 as the preliminary arrangements wdth Austria shall have been 
 signed, I am ready to conclude*with any person Your Majesty 
 may think fit to send to my head-quarters, engagements based 
 upon the principles I have just developed. In return I expect 
 an active and immediate cooperation on the part of Tour 
 Majesty. The moments are precious, but the positive promises 
 you have made me authorize my reliance upon your sincerity. 
 Should the contrary be the case, and the fairest chance for the 
 dehverance of Europe be lost, Your Majesty cannot but perceive 
 that I should no longer have it in my power to realize, on your 
 behalf, the intentions dictated by friendship and confirmed 
 by the liberal policy of all my allies The military arrange- 
 ments about to be proposed to Your Majesty are such as should 
 inspire you with the utmost confidence, affording as they do, 
 an additional proof in favour of the principles by which we are 
 guided. 
 
 " I repeat to Your Majesty the assurances, 
 "&e., &c., 
 
 (Signed) " Alexaxdek. 
 
 " Toplitz, 1/23 September, 1813. 
 " To Sir my Brother, H.M. the King of Bavaria.' 
 
 The position of the Emperor Xapoleon on his return 
 to Paris after the eventful campaign in Germany was 
 far different from that in which he stood before the 
 rupture of the armistice ; the tide of his success, which 
 had hardly ceased to flow exen at the moment of his 
 conversation with General Meerfelt in front of Leipsic, 
 had now gone back for ever. On the arrival of the 
 Allies at Frankfort the whole of the German Confedera- 
 tion quitted his standard, and united with the allied 
 sovereigns ; the states of Europe which were freed 
 from his dominion were at once joined together by one 
 common bond of union ; they raised again the standard 
 of their ancient independence, and proclaimed theu* 
 unmitigated hostility against the power which had for 
 so many years sacrificed and oppressed them. The 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES 145 
 
 Emperor Napoleon, however, still appears to have 
 entertained the hope of being able again to resume 
 oflFensive operations. On his passage through Frankfort, 
 after the success he had obtained over the allied corps 
 commanded by G-eneral Wrede at Hanau, he recom- 
 mended the municipal body of that city to be cautious 
 in their conduct at the arrival of the Allies, and that if 
 it was marked by any imprudence it might hereafter 
 be severely retaliated upon them. The Allies, on the 
 other, hand, were still desirous of peace. The successes 
 which had brought them to the frontiers of France had 
 not eradicated the apprehension which the power, the 
 talents, and fortune of the French Ruler had for so 
 long a time established ; the general armament of the 
 French nation was anticipated, and the recollection of 
 the triumphs of the republican armies when attacked 
 upon their own soil created an anxious and very 
 general desire to avoid the alternative of invasion. 
 The accident of the capture of the Baron de St. Aignan, 
 the French Minister at "Weimar, was converted into a 
 means of opening a negotiation with the French 
 Cabinet. He was charged with the delivery of a note 
 verbale, purporting to be an answer to the propositions 
 made by the Emperor Napoleon to General Meerfeldt, 
 and which declared the terms upon which the allied 
 sovereigns were willing to negotiate for a general 
 peace. The ternas proposed were that France should 
 return to her natural limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and 
 the Pyrenees ; Spain to independence under Ferdinand 
 VII. ; and Italy, Germany, and Holland be re-esta- 
 blished as States independent of France or of any 
 cither preponderating power. The particulars are stated 
 in detail by Baron de St. Aignan, in the following 
 note : — 
 
146 EUEOPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 No. 6. 
 
 Translation of the Copt of Note minuted by Babon db St. Aisnan of the 
 Conversation held by him with Pbince Mbtteenich, Frankfort-on-the- 
 Main, November 10th, 1813. 
 
 " Prince de Mettemich has done me the honour to inform me 
 that the circumstance which brought me to the head-quarters of 
 His Majesty the Emperor of Austria might require me to be the 
 bearer of the answer to the propositions which His Majesty the 
 Emperor of the French had caused to be made through the Count 
 de Meerfeldt. 
 
 " In consequence I have been charged by Prince de Mettemich 
 and the Count de Nessebode to make known to His Majesty, — 
 " That the Allied SoTsreigns were united by indissoluble ties 
 which formed their strength, and from which they would never 
 depart. That the reciprocal engagements they had entered into 
 had caused them to adopt the resolution of making no peace but 
 a general one. That, at the time of the Congress of Prague, a 
 Continental peace had not been thought of, because circumstances 
 would not have allowed the time necessary for coming to a reci- 
 procal understanding on the subject of a general peace ; but that 
 since that time the intentions of all the Powers, as well as those 
 of England, have become known ; that consequently it was use- 
 less to think either of an armistice or of any negociation which 
 had not for its first principle a general peace. That the Allied 
 Powers were unanimously agreed upon the power and the pre- 
 ponderance which France ought to preserve in its integrity, and 
 by confining itself to its natural boundaries, which are the Alps, 
 the Khine, and the Pyrenees. 
 
 " That the principle of the independence of Germany was a 
 sine-qud-non condition ; that France must consequently renounce, 
 not the influence necessarily exercised by every great State over 
 one of less power, but all sovereignty whatsoever over Germany ; 
 that this was besides a principle established by His Majesty him- 
 self, when he said that it was advisable that great Powers should 
 be separated from each other by weaker States. 
 
 " That, as regarded the Pyrenees, the independence of Spain 
 and the re-establishment of the ancient dynasty were equally a 
 sine-qud-non condition. 
 
 " That in Italy, Austria ought to have a frontier, which must 
 be the subject of negociation ; that Piedmont presented several 
 lines open to discussion ; as did also the state of Italy — with the 
 
Chap. II, BUBOPEAN 0ONOHR88E8, 147 
 
 ptoviso, however, that like Gennany it ghonld be governed in a 
 manner independent of France, or of any other preponderating 
 Power, 
 
 " That in the game way the state of Holland should be a sub- 
 ject of n^odation, starting always from the principle that she 
 should be indepemlent. 
 
 " That England was prepared to make the greatest sararificcs 
 in &vour of the peace established upon these ba«es, a» well as io 
 acknowledge the freedom of commerce and navigation which 
 France had a right to claim. 
 
 " That if these principles of a general pacification were agreed 
 to by His Majesty, such place on the right bank of the Ehine an 
 should be coiisidered convenient might bo declared neutral, and 
 thither the Plenipotentiaries of all the belligerent Powers inight 
 immediately repair, without, however, the course of military ope- 
 rations being suspended by the negociations. 
 
 (Signed) " St. Aignan," 
 
 The proposal of these tentut had mainly been brought 
 about hy the Austrian G-ovemment, and had been con- 
 sented to by Russia, Prussia, and by Lord Aberdeen on 
 the part of England. It was conceived by many per- 
 sons of considerable influence at the head-quarters of 
 the Allies to be highly advantageous to France, and 
 therefore objectionable, as being in no way warranted 
 by the general posture of affairs. The Crown Prince of 
 Sweden complained that he had not previously been con- 
 sulted upon it. He appeared to be more influenced by 
 the desire of seeing Napoleon dethroned than France in- 
 va;ded, and accordingly he began to take measures upon 
 his own authority which were not in accordance with 
 the general plans which had been adopted by the other 
 allied G-ovemments. The orders he issued to Count 
 Walmoden, who commanded a corps in observation of 
 Hamburg, and by which he directed him to negotiate 
 a con,vention with Marshal Davoust, allowing that 
 o^cer, with the corps he commanded, to return to 
 Fyanicey were* fetrongly objected to ; the declaration of hm 
 
 !, 2 
 
148 EUKOrEAN CONGRESSES. CiiAr. II. 
 
 intoj^tion to occupy Holstcin and to administer it in 
 tlKi ixame of tho^JCing of Swedon, as well as his attempt 
 to get himself iiamod, protector of the Hans© Towns, 
 wcro ecjually foujid fault with; and tlio measure of 
 sending back to Franco a number of French officers 
 prisoners of war at Stralsund, which he endeavoured to 
 carry into effect, was openly resisted by Q-eneral Borstel, 
 who refused to allow thorn to pass tlu'ough his army. 
 _ , During these transactions a great advantage was 
 gained to the Allies by the general insurrection against 
 tixe French Government in Holland and the Low 
 Countries. It was anxiously desired to aid this move- 
 nient as early as possible by a powerful army; and 
 in addition to the Prussian corps of General Billow, 
 it was hoped the Crown Prince of Sweden might bo 
 persuaded to carry his army to its support. But he 
 again counteracted on this occasion the views of the 
 Allies by concluding an armistice with the Danes, to 
 last till the 6th of January, until which period he stated 
 his inability to break up from the positions he occupied. 
 He employed himself in a negotiation for peace with 
 the Court of Copenhagen under the mediation of Austria, 
 with whose conduct he was dissatisfied, as he conceived 
 she was endeavouring to conclude it upon less favour- 
 able terms (the acquisition, of Drontheim instead of 
 Norway) than he was entitled to by treaty. The 
 Emperor of Russia supported his pretensions^ and ap- 
 proved of his conduct, and on the 14th of January the 
 treaty was brought to a conclusion upon the conditions 
 he required. 
 
 On the 24th of November a letter was received at 
 Frankfort from the Duke of Bassano, cominunicating 
 the Emperor Napoleon's acceptance of the proposals tp 
 treat for a general peace, whicjsh Ba,ron St. Aignan had 
 been charged to communicate to him ; but the language 
 in which this decision was conveyed gave little hope 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 149 
 
 of its sincerity. In the answer of Prince Metternich, 
 dated tlie 25tli of tlie same montti, it was remarked 
 that no mention being made of the bases upon which 
 the AUies had proposed to treat, it was their desire that 
 the Emperor Napoleon would distinctly explain himself 
 with regard to them, which would be the only means 
 of avoiding those insurmountable difficulties which at 
 the commencement of the negotiation might impede its 
 proceeding. At the time this letter reached its desti- 
 nation the news of the general insurrection of the Dutch 
 and of a part of the Belgian people against France 
 had arrived at Paris. This event had very considerably 
 altered the situation of the French Government; the' 
 limits of that empire which had been consented to in 
 the proposals of the Allies were now no longer within 
 the control of that Grovernment ; the whole of the Low 
 Countries was evidently escaping from it. The Em- 
 peror Napoleon therefore decided upon accepting the 
 bases which he had at first evaded, and having re- 
 moved the Duke of Bassano from the direction of 
 foreign aifairs, he entrusted it to the Duke of Vicenza, 
 who addressed a letter to Prince Metternich on the 
 2nd of December, and declared the Emperor's accept- 
 ance of les bases generales et sommaires which had been 
 transmitted by the Baron St. Aignan. This communi- 
 cation was forwarded to England by Count Pozzo di 
 Borgo, and the mission of Lord Castlereagh to the 
 general head-quarters of the allied sovereigns was the 
 consequence of it. During the time which elapsed 
 previous to the arrival of this statesman the prepara- 
 tions for the invasion of France were actively carried 
 on. The plan which was proposed by Austria made 
 it necessary that Switzerland should be occupied by 
 her armies, as it was to serve as a basis for their 
 future operations; but this measure was strongly op- 
 posed by the Emperor of Russia, who was desirous of 
 
150 EUEOPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 seeing the neutrality of that country resjfected. ,,,He 
 feared that by attempting to violate it a war might he 
 the result, and he declared that he would never force 
 any nation to side with him against its will. The 
 Emperor was strongly inclined to favour the demo- 
 cratical party in that state, and as the Austrian Govern^ 
 ment was decidedly hostile to it, there was much diffi- 
 culty in preventing the discussions upon this subject 
 from disturbing the harmony which existed between 
 these Powers. Fortunately the Canton of Berne had 
 declared its intention of not adhering to the neutrality 
 which through French influence had been proclaimed 
 by the central Government at Zurich ; and the persons 
 who were invested with the government of that state 
 being opposed to France and the constitution of 1805, 
 the Austrians upon their invitation entered Switzer- 
 land, and sent Count Senft to that canton as their 
 Minister. This gentleman was accused of having 
 openly excited the aristocratic party to the revolijti®^ 
 which took place shortly after his arrival, by which 
 the settlement of the country, which had been effected 
 under the influence of France, was overthrown, the 
 ancient form of government re-established, and its 
 former possessions, including the Canton de Vaud, 
 declared to be incorporated with it. The deraocratioal 
 party, supported by the Emperor of Eussia, exclaimed 
 against this measure, and Prince Metternich recalled 
 Count Senft, and agreed that the organisation of 
 Switzerland should be deferred till a more convenient 
 opportunity. In the meantime the most positive gua- 
 rantee of the independence of that country was given 
 in the name of the Allied Powers. 
 
 The military occupation of Switzerland was con- 
 sidered by the Austrians as of great importance, as. in 
 case of any reverses in France, it secured the retreat of 
 their army ; and even under such circupastances, it gaje 
 
OuAP. 11. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 151 
 
 them the means of moving a powerful force into the 
 north of Italy, by which their peculiar objects in that 
 country might be promoted. The allied armies having 
 entered France upon various points, the head-quarters 
 of Prince Schwarzenberg were placed at Lorrach on 
 the 20th of December. He soon after moved them 
 to Basle, where he was joined by the Allied Sovereigns, 
 and Lord Oastlereagh reached that place on the 24th 
 of January. At the moment he arrived there, very 
 considerable differences of opinion existed. The Duke 
 of Yicenza had reached Luneville for the purpose of 
 meeting the ministers who were to enter upon the 
 negotiation for the peace which had been offered by 
 the Allies and accepted by France. But as that town 
 was menaced by the advance of the invading armies, 
 he was invited to repair to Ch§,tillon. The Austrians 
 were anxious for immediate negotiations ; and Prince 
 Schwarzenberg had formed his plan for the opening 
 of the campaign upon the hopes of dictating the terms 
 of peace from the position of Langres, to which the 
 march of the different columns of his army was then 
 directed, and where he arrived on the 17th of January. 
 He was unwilling to undertake the task of encountering 
 the immense resources which he conceived the Emperor 
 Napoleon would put forth in case the French nation 
 should be roused and the war become national ; and 
 with the advantages he possessed in the situation he 
 then occupied, he was not willing to risk them by a 
 further advance unless a necessity for doing so was 
 made evident. With this view he was desirous, before 
 undertaking any further operations, that the sentiments 
 of the French Government as to the propositions about 
 to be made to it should be clearly ascertained. The 
 King of Prussia in great part accorded with this opinion, 
 but the Emperor of Eussia, taking a different view of 
 the means which France could oppose^ and of the power 
 
152 EUnOl-'EAN CONGRBSHES. Chap. II. 
 
 of the Allies, was anxious to push the military operations 
 with the utmost vigour. He had a strong conviction 
 that Napoleon would not be able to resist the allied 
 armies, or maintain his power in France ; and he was 
 satisfied that if any chance of his overthrow existed, it 
 was for the interest of the world to make every effort 
 for its attainment. Lord Castlereagh found the Emperor 
 in this disposition, yet while he was already looking for 
 the dethronement of Napoleon, his mind did not appear 
 to be made up as to the person who was to succeed him. 
 He had given hints of his desire to see Bernadotte 
 fixed upon as that person, although he declared he had 
 in no way committed himself upon the subject — yet he 
 did not deny that it was his own opinion that there 
 was no individual of the Bourbon family who was com- 
 petent at that moment to govern France. Lord Castle- 
 reagh, in reply to these observations, endeavoured " to 
 impress upon the Emperor that, if the Bourbons were 
 not re-established, the probability would be that some 
 military adventurer would succeed in placing himself 
 on the throne of France, who might as little suit the 
 rest of Europe as Napoleon ; that it would be difficult 
 for the Allies to decide upon the merits of the different 
 pretenders who would probably start up ; and that the 
 authority of the successful candidate would not for a 
 considerable time be sufficiently established to enable 
 the allied powers to place any reliance upon the engage- 
 ments he might enter into with them. Lord Castle- 
 reagh was decidedly of the Emperor's opinion as to 
 the necessity of pushing with the utmost vigour the 
 military operations, but he recommended that the 
 present opportunities of treating should not be sacri- 
 ficed for a crusade against Paris, and that the allied 
 ministers should enter upon the proposed- negotiation. 
 He declared that he was authorised by the British 
 Government to adopt that measure, and that he could 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 153 
 
 take no engagement whicli would impede it. Prince 
 Metternich coincided with these views, and submitted 
 a memoir to his sovereign, in which they were forcibly 
 put forward. By the answer of the Emperor of 
 Austria to this memoir. Prince Metternich was directed 
 to commence a negotiation with the existing Govern- 
 ment in France, but subject to the treaties by which 
 he was bound to his Allies. The Emperor gave as one 
 of his reasons for this order, that he too much respected 
 the independence of nations to dictate as to the dynasty 
 which was to govern them, or as to the forms of the con- 
 stitution they might chose to adopt. He at the same 
 time directed Prince Schwarzenberg to attend to noth- 
 ing but la raison militaire till the conclusion of peace. 
 The Emperor of Eussia yielded to these opinions, and 
 directed his minister to repair, with those of the Allies, 
 to Ch^tillon. It was at the same time decided, accord- 
 ing to the proposal of Lord Oastlereagh, in considera- 
 tion of the vast successes which had been obtained 
 since the propositions of Frankfort had been transmitted 
 to Paris, that the terms of peace to be required oi 
 France should be her return to the limits of the ancient 
 monarchy. The form of the negotiation was to be 
 between the whole of the allied powers and France, 
 but she was not to be excluded from taking her part 
 in the discussions which might relate to the interests of 
 other states. . It was ■ declared by these Powers, that if 
 the case should arise, there existed no repugnance to 
 the return of the Bourbons to the throne of their 
 ancestors. The Emperor of Austria indeed went 
 further, by declaring that if Napoleon was dethroned, he 
 would recognise no person to succeed him but Louis 
 XVIII. ; and Lord Oastlereagh announced that while he 
 was entering upon a treaty with the Emperor Napoleon, 
 he reserved to himself a power, if any circumstances 
 should tend to weaken the Emperor's authority so 
 
154 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 as not to afford security for the maintenance of the 
 engagements he might enter into, to withdraw himself 
 from the negotiation. With instructions founded upon 
 these views, the allied ministers repaired to Chi,tillon 
 on the 3rd of February. On entering upon the discus- 
 sions which were to occupy the Congress which was 
 thus assembled, the only Power that had any con- 
 quests to give up was Grreat Britain. It became there- 
 fore an object of the first importance that she should 
 explain her views upon this subject. With this inten- 
 tion Lord Castlereagh produced the following state- 
 ment of the situation of the colonies he was authorised 
 to surrender : — 
 
 Population of the captured colonies 434,882 
 
 Cultivated land, acres 2,168,000 
 
 Value in private and public property .. £75,220,000 
 
 In making an offer of these valuable acquisitions. Lord 
 Castlereagh required that the States of Holland and 
 Sicily, for which Great Britain was more particularly 
 anxious, should be re-established, and that the Allies 
 should make such arrangements amongst themselves 
 as should preclude them from pursuing any separate 
 interests, the tendency of which might be to allow 
 France to raise herself into a situation to menace 
 Europe after she had been reduced to a proper standard. 
 The first proceeding of the allied ministers at the 
 Congress of Ch^tillon was to state their ultimatum, 
 namely, the return of France to the limits of the ancient 
 monarchy. M. de Caulaincourt in his answer neither 
 accepted nor refused this proposal, but expressed his 
 belief that some concessions and arrangements would 
 be agreed to, and that he should expect a communica- 
 tion of them from the Allies. All further discussion 
 was, however, put an end to for the moment by the 
 declaration of the Eussian minister. Count Eazoumoffski, 
 
Ohap. n. EUEOPEAN CONGBESSES. 155 
 
 on the 9th of February, that he had received orders 
 not to continue the negotiation. This measure was 
 ^ken by the Emperor of Eussia in consequence of the 
 victory of Brienne, as a result of which he expected to 
 reach Paris, where it was his wish to assemble the 
 representatives of the French nation, whom he would 
 call upon to form a new government, not excluding 
 Bonaparte if their choice should devolve upon him. 
 He had lately been joined by M. de la Harpe, who 
 was supposed to have had some influence in bringing 
 him to this decision ; and the near approach of the 
 Crown Prince of Sweden, who was about to enter 
 Flanders with his army, and with the corps of G-eneral 
 Winzingerode, created some alarm amongst the Allies 
 lest the plan should have been concerted with him. 
 Lord Castlereagh argued with the Emperor against 
 the measure he had thus adopted, and in some degree 
 succeeded in changing his views ; he at the same time 
 declared that if Napoleon was dethroned, no person 
 ought to, be thought of to replace him but the Bourbons. 
 He objected, however, at that moment, to any change 
 in the. objects of the war, from which he conceived the 
 Allies were precluded by their public and avowed 
 declarations. 
 
 The results of the battle of Brienne induced Napoleon 
 to authorise his minister at Chi,tillon to agree to the 
 basis of ancient France, if the Allies would grant an 
 armistice, to obtain which he consented to give up some 
 of the fortresses France was to surrender. The allied 
 ministers required that this should be arranged by the 
 signature of preliminaries, and. that Besan9on, Befort, 
 and Hanningen should be added to the list of fortresses 
 to be immediately given up as a deposit. These terms 
 M. de Caulaincourt refused to agree to, and the advan- 
 ij^ges, I Napoleon obtained over Marshal Bliicher at 
 Montmij;ail, '&e. determined him to withdraw from his 
 
156 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 minister the full powers with which he had entrusted 
 him. By this proceeding, although the Emperor of 
 Eussia had from Chalons-sur-Seine directed his minister 
 to continue the negotiation, yet no progress could 
 be made ; and after several conferences, and the pre- 
 sentation of the French counter-projet on the 15th of 
 March, which was declared to be inadmissible, M. de 
 Caulaincourt not being authorised to accept the basis 
 proposed by the Allies, the Congress was broken up on 
 the 19th.* During the period this Congress had been 
 assembled, a variety of fortune had attended the military 
 operations. Prince Schwarzenberg, who had reached 
 Fontainebleau and Melun when the corps of Marshal 
 Blucher's army were defeated and separated, retired 
 his forces to Troyes, and afterwards to Bar-sur-Aube 
 and Ohaumont. Before he carried this movement into 
 execution, he wrote to Marshal Berthier, on the 17th 
 of February, to propose an armistice, giving as his 
 reason for so doing, that the allied ministers had 
 received orders to sign the treaty which had been pro- 
 posed by M. de Caulaincourt at Ch^tillon. As this 
 measure was taken when the French arms had been 
 triumphant at Nangis and Provins, and the corps ' of 
 Marshal Yictor had driven the Prince Eoyal of 
 Wurtemberg upon Montereau, it was little to be ex- 
 pected that any favourable result should arise from it. 
 It was adopted with the hope of arresting the advance 
 of Napoleon, at a moment when the Allies conceived 
 themselves to be in a situation of considerable em- 
 barrassment ; but its object was too apparent to deceive, 
 and the French armies, with the expectation of bring- 
 ing the Allies to a general action, continued their 
 advance to Troyes. This object having failed, Na- 
 
 • The account of the negotiation of Chatillon, together with the official docu- 
 ments, is given In the ' Manuscrlt de 1814,' by Baron Fain, 3rd vol., 2nd part, and 
 the Supplement. 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 157 
 
 poleon was here induced to accept the proposal to 
 negotiate for a suspension of hostilities, and he sent 
 Count Flahaut to meet the Allied Commissioners 
 appointed for that purpose at Lusigni. This officer 
 proposed as the basis of the negotiation the terms 
 which had been offered by the Allies at Frankfort, but 
 these were peremptorily refused ; and the Commis- 
 sioners separated in consequence of the operations 
 having taken a more favourable turn by the march of 
 Marshal Bliicher towards Trilport and Meaux, whence 
 he moved across the Marne to effect a junction with 
 the reinforcements he was expecting under Generals 
 Winzengerode, Langeron, and Biilow. While these 
 negotiations were going on, considerable despondency 
 prevailed amongst the Allies. The retreat of Prince 
 , Schwarzenberg had induced an erroneous suspicion 
 that he had secret orders not to fight a battle. The 
 disorder which had been occasioned by this movement, 
 and the great uncertainty which appeared to exist as 
 to the operations of the allied armies, brought about a 
 desire of accelerating the conclusion of peace, which 
 was partaken of even by the Emperor of Russia. 
 Lord Castlereagh used his utmost exertions to counter- 
 act this feeling, and by declaring that he would be 
 no party to a peace lowered in tone from what had 
 been decided upon, he prevailed with the different 
 powers to agree to the treaty of Ohaumont, by which 
 the four contracting States bound themselves to prose- 
 cute the war till their objects had been attained, and 
 stipulated for that purpose to bring into the field a 
 force of not less than 600,000 men. 
 
 The contingent for each power was 150,000, and at 
 the moment it was entered upon. Lord Castlereagh 
 produced the following statement as the amount of 
 force Grreat Britain was at that moment maintaining 
 and employing against the enemy :— 
 
158 EUBOPEAN CONGKE88B9. OHAr, H. 
 
 Britigh &>Tce in Spain, Sicily, and Holland .. 90,000 
 
 Subsidized — 
 
 Spanish troops 60,000 
 
 Portugnese 50,000 
 
 Swedish 30,000 
 
 Hanoverians 15,000 
 
 Danish 10,000 
 
 Sicilians 10,000 
 
 Total 265,000 
 
 This treaty produced the most beneficial effects. It 
 put an end to all doubts as to the objectB ft>r which the 
 different Powers were contending', and in a moment of 
 hesitation and alarm it changed the scene and secured 
 their cordial and mutual co-operation. At a later 
 period it became the groundwork of the alliance by 
 which the resumption of power by Napoleon after hfe 
 return from the island of Elba was met and over- 
 thrown, and the reconstruction of the political state of 
 Exu-ope consolidated. 
 
 During the time in which it was n^otiated, the Due 
 de B^ufort and the Marquis Chastelet arrived as 
 deputies from the Xetherlands at the head-quartere of 
 the Allies. The olgect of their miggdon was to ascer- 
 tain the sentiments of the Allied Sovereigns as to the 
 future destiny of their country. The desire they ex- 
 pressed was, that it might return under the dominion 
 of Austria, or that the Belgians might be placed tmder 
 an Austrian prince ; but th^ yielded to the argument, 
 that to be independent they must be strong, and that 
 to effect this olgect ibesy must be united to Holkmd. 
 
 At the moment the Congress of Ch^tillon was 
 dissolved, M. de Titrolles arrived at Bar-sur-Aube, 
 where the Allied Sovereigns were assembled, as an 
 agent from the Koyalists in Paris, and communicated 
 their desire to see the Ck>vemment of the Bourbons 
 re-established, and, if such should be the intention of the 
 Allies, their anxious deare to co-operate with thran for 
 
CttAT. n. BUBOPBAN OONaRBSSES, ■ 169 
 
 that object. To facilitate thig purpose, M. de YitroUes 
 wa» inetmcted by his friends in Paris to require that 
 a declaration should be issued by the Sovereigns, that 
 they would not treat with Napoleon, that the French 
 princes in France might be allowed to declare their 
 objecte, that the provinces which should support them 
 might be relieved from all contributions, and that their 
 taxes might be made over to those princes to be em- 
 pl^e4 as l^bey should think fit; that if any corps of 
 tlfi6 French armies joined their cause, they should be 
 allowed to range themselves under their banners, and 
 that the means of communicating with their partisans 
 should be afforded them. If these measures were agreed 
 to, M. de Vitrolles gave an assurance that a great part 
 of the National Guard of Paris would pronounce in 
 &y<mv of the Eoyal cause, and that five departments 
 of La Vendue were ripe for insurrection. If these mea- 
 sures were not taken, there would be no movement in 
 the country. 
 
 Nearly at the same time Lord Castlereagh received a 
 letter from Lord Liverpool, communicating the declara- 
 tion of the city of Bordeaux in fevour of the Bourbons, 
 and the enthusiastic reception there of the Duke of 
 Angoul&ne, and directing him after the receipt of that 
 letter not to sign any treaty with Napoleon, and, if 
 the negotiations were still pending, to discontinue 
 them. 
 
 The decision which was taken upon the communica- 
 tions of M. de Vitrolles was, that although the moment 
 was fast approaching when an ultimate resolution as to 
 the recognition of a new Government in France would 
 bo forced upon the Allies, yet for the present they 
 would confine themselves to the simple measure of fur- 
 niphing that gentleman with the result of the negotia- 
 tion of Chdtillon, and their consequent proclamation, 
 and with authority to state to his party that the 
 
16Q ETJROPEAIT CONGRESSES. Ghap. W^ 
 
 Count d'Artois had be^n requested, ^.^^Wi^Jims^ 
 
 at mncy, which would become his head-quarters, ;in4^ 
 
 pendent of those of the Allies, and where he would, 
 
 have the means afforded him of paymg any.forc%, 
 
 which might join him, or which might be raised i;^. 
 
 support of his cause; that all persons declaring fpt,;, 
 
 him would be protected, and that the Allies woulcj-j 
 
 engage, under any circumstances, to stipulate > an= amf^;, 
 
 nesty in their favour ; that the taxes in the conquered*, 
 
 provinces which should declare in his favour (thg^, 
 
 amount of which was already calculated at 142,232,8G|a 
 
 francs) would be given up to him, and that the efforts,: 
 
 of the Allies would keep pace with the exertions of the 
 
 Royalists ; but that if this- party did not declare them-;;, 
 
 selves in sufficient force to make it evident that they< 
 
 represented a great national feeling, the Allies wouH\ 
 
 not undertake more efficiently to support their cause. 
 
 M. de Caulaincourt, after quitting Oh^tillon on thds 
 
 24th of March, passed through Paris on his way td joak' 
 
 the Emperor Napoleon, who was a*t that time engagfe^ 
 
 in the operations against Marshal ' Bliicher which ter-' 
 
 minatfed in the defeat of the French army at Laon. In] 
 
 the retreat which followed, the Emperor was fortuna# 
 
 enough to obtain an advantage over the Allies by tlte- 
 
 recapture of Rheims, and the defeat of & Russian divi- ' 
 
 sion under General St. Priest, '^ffcer which he marcfee** 
 
 towards Arcis-sur-Aube, where hfe was opposed fcy the' 
 
 army of Prince Schwarzenberg, and, ■alfter in v$.ift'' 
 
 attempting to force its position, he commenced tlicP 
 
 movement by which he expected to turn the right ^ 
 
 Bank of that army, to fall upon its rear, and cut off its 
 
 communications with the Ehine and Grermany. With^ 
 
 this view he marched upon, Vitrj and iSt. Djzier and' 
 
 from thence pushed forward his 'detachments on Bar"! 
 
 sur-Aube and Ohaumontj 'which "they entered n i-h r 
 
 24th of March '■ 6n which day 'the Emperor of ^" • 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 161 
 
 had quitted those places for Dijon. The Emperor 
 Napoleon whilst engaged in these operations was for 
 some time under the firm persuasion that the allied 
 army was following him; but on the 26th of March he 
 attacked the cavalry under the orders of General Win- 
 zingerode, and ascertained that the whole of the allied 
 forces had marched upon Paris, that they had gained a 
 signal advantage over the two corps of Marshals Mar- 
 mont and Mortier near Fere Champenoise, and that 
 they were already so near Paris that it would be impos- 
 sible for him to reach that capital before they would be 
 in a situation to attack it. 
 
 Under these circumstances he set off for Paris, but 
 before doing so he directed M. de Caulaincourt on the 
 25th of March to address a letter to the Emperor, of 
 Austria, in which that minister stated that, having 
 reached the head-quarters of Napoleon, he had received 
 his orders for the signature of the treaty of peace 
 which had been proposed by the Allies at Ohitillon, 
 and full powers to conclude it, and that he was 
 therefore ready at any moment to proceed to the Em- 
 peror of Austria's head-quarters to fulfil that object. 
 Prince Metternich replied to M. de Caulaincourt on the 
 27th from Dijon, that he would communicate his letter 
 to the other Allied Powers, and he at the same time 
 despatched Count Bombelles, who was then at Dijon, 
 to the Count d'Artois at Nancy, to convey to him the 
 despatches which he had just received from Prince 
 Schwarzenberg, and which had been transmitted to 
 Lord Castlereagh by Lord Burghersh, detailing the suc- 
 cessful entry of the Allies into Paris, and the almost 
 universal adoption of the white cockade, and also to 
 recommend to him to accept immediately the treaty of 
 peace which Napoleon had hitherto rejected, but in 
 which he had now expressed his readiness to concur. 
 
 In the instructions given to Count Bombelles as to 
 
 M 
 
162 EUROPEAN CONGEBSSBS. Chap. II. 
 
 the language lie was to hold to the Count d' Artois, it 
 was stated that the Emperor of Austria connected him- 
 self entirely with the Allies ; — that the marriage of his 
 daughter had never in any way either altered or in- 
 fluenced his views or sentiments as to public affairs ; — 
 and that the moment appeared to him to have arrived 
 when the ancient royal family might be re-established 
 in France. These instructions then went on to say 
 that the Emperor in conjunction with his allies recom- 
 mended the immediate issue of a proclamation by the 
 Count d' Artois, stating the engagements which had 
 already been taken in England by King Louis XVIII. 
 to establish a constitutional Grovernment in France, 
 under which all the present interests of the country 
 would find protection, and by which the sale of the 
 national property, which had been sanctioned by a suc- 
 cession of Grovernments, would be maintained. 
 
 At the time at which these transactions took place 
 Lord Castlereagh received from England intelligence 
 of the successes which had attended our arms under 
 the Duke of Wellington, together with the capture 
 of the city of Bordeaux, and also the despatches of 
 Lord Liverpool, communicating the determination to 
 which the Cabinet had come, that under these circum- 
 stances the terms of peace which had been proposed at 
 Ch^tillon could no longer be accepted, and that he was 
 to take no part in them until the arrival of further 
 instructions. 
 
 The battle of Paris, fought on the 30th March, 
 which had been followed by the capture of that 
 capital, and the enthusiastic reception of the Allied 
 Sovereigns, and the friendly bearing of the inhabitants 
 towards their troops, had decided the great question of 
 the future independence of Europe, and its emancipation 
 from the thraldom under which it had been held by 
 Napoleon. The capitulation of the city was signed 
 
Chap. II. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 163 
 
 during the night, by which it was stipulated that the 
 French troops of the Hne should evacuate Paris on the 
 morning of the 31st with the artillery which belonged 
 to them, that the arsenals and all military magazines 
 and establishments should be given up to the Allies, 
 and that all the French wounded, marauders, &c., found 
 in Paris after nine o'clock were to be considered pri- 
 soners of war. Early on the morning of the 31st the 
 municipality of Paris arrived at the head quarters of 
 the Allies at Bondy, where the Emperor of Russia was 
 established, and upon whom they waited with the view 
 of obtaining whatever alleviation could be granted 
 them, in the future occupation of their capital. 
 
 Amongst the persons present upon this occasion was 
 Monsieur de Caulaincourt, Due de Vicence, who had 
 arrived vsdth Bonaparte at Formenteau, three posts dis- 
 tant from Paris, where the Emperor was informed of - 
 its capitulation, and whence he immediately despatched 
 Monsieur de Caulaincourt to offer to the Emperor of 
 Russia the same terms which had been proposed to 
 Prince Metternich at Dijon, or to accept such other 
 propositions as the exigencies of the moment might 
 seem to require. 
 
 The Emperor of Russia, however, cut short all dis- 
 cussion upon these subjects by the declaration which 
 he made to the municipality — " that he did not make 
 war on France, but against one man, whom he had once 
 admired, but whose ambition and want of faith had 
 obliged him to pursue him even to the heart of France ; 
 that his intentions and those of his Allies would soon 
 be known ; that he meant not to conquer or rule in 
 France, but to learn in Paris (the focus of French 
 feeling) what was the wish of the French nation, and 
 then to give it his support." 
 
 The entry into Paris having taken place on the 31st 
 of March, on the following day the Prince of Benevento 
 
 M 2 
 
164 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. II. 
 
 (Monsieur de Talleyrand) called together the senators 
 at that time residing in Paris, who unanimously came 
 to a vote by which they invited to the throne of France 
 the ancient dynasty of the Bourbons, and established a 
 provisional Government under the presidency of the 
 Prince of Benevento, which was composed of the Abbe 
 Montesquieu, Count Jaucourt, the Duke d'Alberg, and 
 General Burnonville, General Dessolles was appointed 
 by them Governor of Paris, and General Dupont 
 Minister of War. The Corps Legislatif in the. course 
 of the same day adhered to these measures. 
 
 The transactions at Paris from this period to the 
 signature of the peace have been repeatedly described 
 in so many works, that it is needless here to reca- 
 pitulate them. When they terminated a general ex- 
 pectation prevailed that the tranquillity of the world 
 was permanently re-established. That it was not so is 
 well known, and that it was not until after an effort 
 which called forth the resources of nearly every state in 
 Europe that the great conqueror of former years was 
 again vanquished, and that the independence of Europe 
 and its delivery from the dread of that universal sub- 
 jugation with which it had been at one time menaced 
 were finally secured. The object of the following 
 chapters is to show under what circumstances that 
 readjustment of the balance of power amongst the 
 states of Europe was eventually effected, of which the 
 result was an almost uninterrupted continuance of peace 
 for nearly forty years. 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 16.5 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONGRESS OP VIENNA. 
 
 By the peace of Paris the States of Europe were rescued 
 from the general overthrow with which for the last 
 ten years they had constantly been menaced. The 
 power of France and the character of Napoleon had 
 been alike calculated to keep up the fear of such a 
 catastrophe ; and even those States which were the 
 most submissive to the dictation of the Imperial master, 
 had been called upon for sacrifices of money and of 
 soldiers, the demand for which was only limited by his 
 apparently boundless ambition ; while those who sought 
 to maintain their independence, had been, in turn, 
 thrown down and trampled upon, by his superior force, 
 subtilty, and talent. After the battle of Borodino the 
 work of conquest seemed to have reached its utmost 
 limits in Europe, throughout which no real independ- 
 ence could be considered to exist, except in England, 
 and in those States to which she was enabled to afford 
 her immediate protection. 
 
 From this moment, however, the scene was reversed 
 by a change, which, from its rapidity and the extraordi- 
 nary successes with which it was accompanied, was 
 totally unlooked for. The different States of which 
 Europe had formerly been composed, were re-estab- 
 lished in power and independence, and their repre- 
 sentatives were now in the Congress of Vienna about 
 to discuss their general interests, and to reconstruct 
 the then almost forgotten system of a balance of 
 power. 
 
16fi EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. IIL 
 
 Duriug the period iu which these vast disturbances 
 ■ had taken place, the States of the Continent had divided 
 -themselves into two great classes, namely, those which 
 (now that their independence was established) were 
 likely to reap some benefits from those changes, and 
 those which had suffered by them and had opposed 
 them. There was also scattered through those States a 
 numerous class of persons who, wishing to profit by 
 the constitutional principles of government which had 
 been proclaimed at the commencement of the French 
 • Revolution, but which in the sequel had been aban- 
 doned, were now desirous of seeing them established in 
 their respective countries. These persons formed an 
 obstacle, which in the late contest had considerably 
 thwarted the views of the French ruler, and in his 
 decline tended, particularly in the States of Germany, 
 to precipitate his fall. The great exertions which their 
 respective Grovernments were enabled to make, and the 
 spirit with which the call to arms was answered by the 
 people, were chiefly to be attributed to the feelings of 
 patriotism and independence which these persons had 
 kept up and spread among their countrymen. The 
 general prevalence of these sentiments, while they 
 seconded the efforts of the Governments opposed to the 
 French armies, had a still stronger effect upon those 
 Governments which were in alliance with France. For 
 it enabled such of them as were anxious to deliver them- 
 selves from the subjection in which they were held, to 
 effect it with the general approbation of their people, 
 and it forced along with it those Sovereigns who would 
 have maintained a different policy. At the arrival of 
 the allied armies upon the Rhine all Germany was 
 tmited in one mass against the common enemy. 
 
 The interests of all these different Governments, and 
 the objects of those of their subjects who held opinions 
 Kiipposcd to be in opposition to them, were now to be 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 167 
 
 represented and discussed at Vienna. Every State in 
 Europe, and each supporter of every principle that had 
 been put forth, looked to the Congress which was 
 assembled there for the recognition of their objects and 
 the consolidation of their views, and the hopes of all 
 were fixed upon the issue of its deliberations. Under 
 such circumstances the task imposed upon the repre- 
 sentatives of Europe was one of no ordinary diflSculty. 
 The uniting together of those ties which had been so 
 rudely torn asunder, and the moulding into a form of 
 peace those materials which had seemed to build up a 
 system of military dominion, was an herculean labour 
 from which it was difficult to rise with general appro- 
 bation. Impressed with these feelings, the statesmen 
 assembled at Yienna undertook the task imposed upon 
 them, and the best comment upon the result of their 
 labours was the prolonged period of peace and tran- 
 quillity which succeeded. 
 
 The great points to be first discussed at the Congress 
 were the arrangements for Poland, Grermany and Italy. 
 With respect to their discussion it was decided that 
 until the four great Powers were agreed among them- 
 selves upon these questions no other Power should be 
 admitted to the Conferences, although a favourable 
 modification was made for the admission of France and 
 Spain under any particular circumstances that might 
 arise. Upon the question of Poland the Emperor of 
 Russia at once declared his intention of retaining his 
 conquests in that coimtry as far as Kalisch, of incorpo- 
 rating with them the Polish provinces already belong- 
 ing to Russia, and of forming the whole into a kingdom 
 under his government, but with a separate and national 
 administration. This determination created the utmost 
 alarm in the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets, and Lord 
 Castlereagh in the strongest : terms represented to the 
 -Emperor that it would be disapproved of by all Europe ; 
 
1<J8 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 ttat it was odious and alarming in the extreme ; that 
 he opposed it more as a Russian than as a British 
 Minister ; that if he wished to see His Majesty in con- 
 stant troubles he should recommend it to him ; but that 
 the British Government desired to promote peace and 
 the glory of the Emperor ; that the most anxious wish 
 of England would be to see Poland re-established as an 
 independent kingdom, and that Austria and Prussia 
 would be ready to consent to that measure ; but that 
 the proposal His Majesty had made would place him in 
 a menacing attitude towards both these Powers, and 
 would revive the principle of the preponderating mili- 
 tary power which had lately been put down. The 
 Emperor declared in reply, that he could not make the 
 sacrifice of restoring Poland to independence, and that 
 he conceived that raising that country into a kingdom, 
 although under his sceptre, would act as a check even 
 upon Eussia itself; and lastly, as he was in possession, 
 the question could only be decided as he desired. Lord 
 Castlereagh answered to this, that he was entirely un- 
 prepared for such a declaration on the part of His 
 Majesty ; that England had acted upon a very diflferent 
 principle in giving up her conquests ; and that he could 
 in no way give his sanction to it. In opposition to this 
 project Lord Castlereagh endeavoured to bring the 
 Austrian and Prussian Ministers to an understanding 
 as to the arrangements they .were desirous of estab- 
 lishing in Grermany and Italy, that they might after- 
 wards concur with him in his representations to the 
 Emperor Alexander. Prussia desired that the whole of 
 Saxony should be ceded to her, and a line of frontier 
 upon the Rhine, including the fortress of Mayence. In 
 case this should be agreed to, she required that the 
 provisional government of Saxony should be placed 
 in her hands, upon which being done, she would unite 
 with Austria and England against the Russian propo- 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 169 
 
 sition. Prince Metternich yielded generally an acqui- 
 escence in these views, as far as they regarded an 
 arrangement respecting Saxony, but upon the express 
 condition that Prince Hardenberg should at once join 
 him upon the Polish question ; with regard to the 
 fortress of Mayence he could not agree, as he felt that 
 it must belong to the system of defence for the south 
 of Grermany, as it was the only fortress which could 
 oppose the advance of a French army upon the 
 Danube ; that it was not necessary for Prussia, who 
 ought not to come south of the Moselle, and who had a 
 perfect line of defence, protected by Belgium, Holland, 
 the fortresses of Luxemburg, Juliers, Wesel, and Ehren- 
 breitstein, and the line of the Lahn, the Weser, the 
 Elbe, and the Oder. Lord Castlereagh under these 
 circumstances recommended that the two Powers should 
 at once state their views upon the Polish question to 
 the Emperor Alexander, declaring that if the sacrifices 
 they were ready to make were not agreed to, they must 
 bring the question before the general Congress, founded 
 upon existing treaties, by whose decision they were 
 determined to abide. The propositions which Lord 
 Castlereagh recommended, and which were agreed to 
 by Austria and Prussia, were : — 1st. That Poland 
 should be reconstructed as she existed before the first 
 partition ; 2nd. Her re -establishment as she existed in 
 1791 ; 3rd. That Prussia should keep the line of the 
 Vistula, and that she should not object to the formation 
 of the provinces which fell to Eussia into a kingdom 
 under the title of North or East Poland, Austria always 
 reserving the right of forming the provinces which 
 belong to her into a kingdom under the denomination 
 of Southern Poland. Lord Castlereagh was to have 
 been the bearer of these offers, but previous to his see- 
 ing the Emperor, a note was received from Prince 
 Hardenberg by which he withdrew from the concert 
 
170 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. HI. 
 
 which had been established, and advised the giving up the 
 point of Poland to Russia.* He stated that this question 
 was not worth a war, and that Europe was not in a state 
 to undertake one. The consequence of this transaction 
 was, that a new proposition was made to the Emperor 
 of Russia, by Prince Hardenberg, and communicated to 
 Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich, according to 
 which Prussia was to receive Thorn and the line of the 
 Wurtha, and Austria the circle of Zamoze, Cracow, and 
 he line of the Nidda. The Emperor agreed generally 
 to this arrangement, with the exception, however, of 
 Thorn, and with a stipulation that Cracow should 
 become a free town, and upon condition that, as a com- 
 promise for the abandonment of a part of his preten- 
 tions, Saxony should be given in toto to Prussia, and 
 Mayence be made an imperial city. Lord Castlereagh 
 and Prince Metternich, in the embarrasing position in 
 which they were now placed by the concert of the other 
 two Powers, felt themselves compelled to yield their 
 consent to the proposals with regard to Poland, a con- 
 sent they were the less able to withhold, as the frontier 
 of the Vistula which they had wished to establish was 
 more particularly essential to Prussia, who had now 
 abandoned it, but the cession of Saxony they absolutely 
 refused to agree to. Lord Castlereagh pressed upon 
 Prince Hardenberg the arguments which had been 
 suggested to him by the British Cabinet, showing how 
 much more it would be for the advantage of Prussia to 
 abstain from pressing a claim which would be so un- 
 popular, and how much more satisfactory it would be 
 for her to obtain an equal extent of territory under a 
 different arrangement, and which might have the assent 
 of all the Powers assembled in Congress. 
 
 * This abandonment of the policy agreed to by the Prussian Cabinet was the 
 effect of the personal influence of the Emperor with the King, which Lord 
 Ctistlereagh had long been aware of, and the effects of which upon tliis question 
 he Ii'ad always dreaded. 
 
Chap. HI. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 171 
 
 Prince Hardenberg, in the first instance, violently 
 opposed this reasoning, declaring that Prussia onght 
 not to be thwarted in her views, and that he would run 
 all risks rather than agree to it ; but he afterwards was 
 induced to consent that Austria should make a proposal 
 such as she might conceive it would be fitting he should 
 accept. With this view Prince Metternich transmitted 
 a note to Prince Hardenberg, in which, after expressing 
 his desire to see Prussia strengthened as much as pos- 
 sible, in order that (allied with Austria) the two to- 
 gether, using their influence in Grermany, might be a 
 barrier against the power either of France or Russia, 
 he declared that he opposed the cession of the whole of 
 Saxony, as being a barrier to that union between the 
 two Powers which he was desirous of seeing established ; 
 that such a measure would be objected to by all the 
 States of Grermany ; that it would oblige them to look 
 for protection to France, who had declared against it ; 
 and that it would entirely destroy every hope of estab- 
 lishing a permanent settlement of Europe. Prince 
 Metternich yielded upon the point of Mayence, and 
 proposed a territorial arrangement by which the popu- 
 lation of Prussia would be raised to 9,688,890, being an 
 augmentation of 217,200 above what she possessed in 
 1805. 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 Copy of the Confidentjal Letter of Pbinoe Metternich, Minister of State 
 and of Foreign Aflairs, to Prince Hardenberg, Chancellor of State of His 
 Prussian Majesty. Dated Vienna, October 22, 1814. 
 
 " I have received the confidential letter which your Highness 
 did me the honour of addressing to me on the 9th of October ; 
 and having submitted the same to the Emperor, His Imperial 
 Majesty has authorized me to give the Prussian Cabinet the 
 fullest explanation of his views upon the subject in the following 
 answer: — ' 
 
 " No' further assurances are necessary, oh the part of His 
 
17:: EUSOVEAX cvxgkk<$f.s (."kaf. hi. 
 
 Impeml Mjiji siv. t<^ prove the intereist he takes in the jaroj^vrity 
 cfrr.i?^:;i. Kvtv-iSc, livnu the very day wiien His Imperial Jiajesty 
 t v>k ujva himself to ;idvis- the King still to continue to yield to 
 1 1. . noble incc r: i ve whifh. al>ont the olo se of the y oar I S 1 "J. had im- 
 pelled him to prepaie the me;iiisof sevvr.diui: the exertions which 
 the Einjx'K»r of Exissia had deelaieil he ^nnlld make fiw main- 
 tainiiiiT the cause of the iuilejvndence of Eutv'^>e, the deteriiauji- 
 tiou i.>f His Impeiial }[;\i<:^ty not to separate lis iutet\sts frvon 
 those of Prussia could no longer aduiit of a doubt. KesiJved 
 either to save Europe by luiitiug hi.r.seif. both in views and 
 eiferts. with theFewers tvut\\'.erate\l lor that purjvse. or else to 
 sl.;ire. with Prassia. aU the el'.;iuees of dis..sur. the Empeiox lias 
 never for one single moment devijtt^Hi frvm\ the line he had markt d 
 out for himself. The er.rerprise of the Allies having been crowned 
 with ooniplete siitvess. His Imperiid ^laiesty a^"!:uled himself «.>f 
 every opportimitr of proving to all Etiiopo, not only tlie abseuee 
 of every pers-.^ .al consideration on his jxirt. Imt also The cvmfi- 
 denee he reposed i-.; Ids friends the Severeigns, lis r»^\rd for 
 their i'.iterests. and Ids selieitnde for these of TTussi;'.. 
 
 " Convinced that the sole insult wonhy of effi^rts so A^i^st, of 
 sacritices n.^ iiuuiense. wo\dd W the estrtblishment of a sy^^tem of 
 pesiee foimded up«.m tui evjuitable r>^<listributiou of }x^wer among 
 the crowned heads, the Emjvror acoopte*.!. as one of the primary 
 bases of that system, the r^wnstruetion of the Finssian Monarchy 
 U}x>n a seale oonuuensuTtite with its former fullest dimensions, 
 nor de^s he hesiteae to dei-lare, that he sltould view the aggran- 
 dizement of that kingvlora, even were it to exceed thi\Jo limits, 
 without the sligliest degrt.v of jealousv. 
 
 " It was the Austrian Cabinet with which origittatixi the ide*^ 
 of a system of iuter-au\liate jxnwr, his^xl ujvn the closest viuion 
 Wtwtvu Austria and Prussia, and stixmgtheued by that of a 
 Gorman ConlcHlenuion. itst>lf placeii under the oipial influcnw 
 of the above two States, without, however, (.lovmauv ceasiuii- on 
 that acootmt to constitute one entire jx^litical IkhIv. The whole 
 line of jx^liey pursuetl by Austria, and every tivaty coixcludtxl 
 by her. an? stamped with the imjvress of this idea, which, in its 
 development, no less than by the ckv-e \mitm of the Central 
 v'^tates natimJly restdting therefrom, would offer to Cioiinanv a 
 gusirsmttv of tRmqtuUity. and to the whi\le of Etm^jx* a \>U\l>iv 
 of peace. 
 
 •• So s dutary a system has, however, foimd itself ilireotly tra- 
 vei-sed by certain prv^tensious which have latch Ixvu advamtnL 
 
Ohap. hi. EUROPEAN CONCiRESSES. 173 
 
 " Three objects more particularly awaken, at the present 
 moment, the anxious solicitude of the two Cabinets. 
 
 " One of these is how to prescribe bounds to the views which 
 Russia develops in a manner as threatening for the peace of 
 Europe, as they are contrary to the text of the treaty of alliance 
 with Austria and Prussia. The fate of Saxony, and the re- 
 distribution of the territories provisionally occupied by the 
 AUies, form the two others. 
 
 " The Emperor considers the fate of the Duchy of Warsaw as 
 too intimately connected with the direct interests of the two 
 participating Powers of Poland, as weU as with those of entire 
 Europe, for it to be confounded with that of any other. 
 
 " Prussia has motives at least as powerful as those which in- 
 fluence Austria for preventing Eussia from overstepping certain 
 limits, and for not allowing her to take possession of certain 
 points of defence necessary to the two Monarchies. 
 
 " The Emperor is not less desirous than is the King of having 
 it in his power to cement, stiU more and more firmly, the rela- 
 tions most in accordance with his sentiments of attachment and 
 personal gratitude to the Emperor of Russia ; but he cannot 
 persuade himself that such relations can continue to exist, if 
 they be not based upon principles founded upon the maxims of 
 a sound policy. 
 
 " The Emperor entertains not the least doubt that his senti- 
 ments and principles are shared by the King, and he relies upon 
 his aid in support of a cause involving their dearest interests, 
 which is supported by the highest Powers of Europe, and in 
 favour of which the express terms of treaties pronounce, — as 
 well as the principles which have guided the Emperor Alex- 
 ander himself throughout his brilliant career. 
 
 " The Emperor has authorized me to come to an understand- 
 ing with your Highness and Lord Oastlereagh upon the imme- 
 diate effect to be given to the luminous views laid down in the 
 Minute of that Secretary of State. 
 
 " The pretensions of Prussia to an entire incorporation of 
 Saxony in her monarchy have been to the Emperor a real cause 
 of regret. Without entering into any discussion of right with 
 reference to such an act, His Imperial Majesty sees with concern 
 that, under a system professing to be one of reparation, it should 
 be possible for one of the most ancient dynasties of Europe to 
 be threatened with the loss of all its hereditary patrimony. 
 Austria is, for many reasons, directly interested in the preserva- 
 
174 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. HI. 
 
 tion of Saxony, besides ■which, very intimate family ties exist 
 between His Imperial Majesty and the Eoyal Family, On the 
 other hand, the Emperor foresees that veiy angry disputes may 
 arise on the part of many other Powers. He regards the execu- 
 tion of this scheme of total incorporation as a som-ce whence will , 
 infallibly arise, among the other German Powers, a sentiment of 
 direct mistrust towards Prussia and of prejudice against Austria ; 
 and he is convinced that the whole of Germany will censure the 
 concurrence of the two Courts in a question, the very nature of 
 which is so contrary to the general feeling upon that subject. 
 
 " Weighty as these reflections undoubtedly are, the Emperor 
 cannot, however, but regard them as secondarj^ to a consideration 
 of still greater importance ; one, iadeed, so intimately connected 
 vnth the general interests of Europe as is the increase of the 
 power of Prussia upon the scale contemplated by the treaties. 
 
 " The interest taken by Eussia in the total incoi-poration of 
 Saxony by no means diminishes the regret of His Imperial 
 Majesty, and he earnestly desires the King would in his wisdom 
 be pleased to sum up the inconveniences resulting from the total 
 annexation of the Kingdom of Saxony to his Monarchy, and then 
 compare the amount with that of those which both Prussia and 
 Austria would avoid by the preservation of a part of that king- 
 dom adjoining the frontiers of Bohemia. 
 
 " Should, however, the force of cii'cumstances render, in the 
 end, the annexation of Saxony inevitable. His Majesty would, at 
 all events, be compelled to make his consent thereto dependent 
 upon the following express conditions : — 
 
 " 1. That this question be considered, in conjunction with the 
 other territorial arrangements of Germany, under the points of 
 view I am about to explain in detail to your Highness; as 
 well as 
 
 " 2. Under the express reservation of arrangements to be 
 entered into between the two Powers, as regards certain points 
 connected with the frontiers ; the state of fortifications of certain 
 fortresses ; the arrangements respecting commerce ; and lastly, 
 the free navigation of the Elbe. 
 
 " The bases laid down by the Emperor as dne qua rum 
 conditions for any arrangement whatsoever in Germany, are 
 simple ones, and result from the very nature of things ; without 
 them it would be impossible to imagine a state of real tran- 
 quillity, and, inasmuch as Austria has made immense sacrifices ; 
 for the principle of union, she cannot forego the means of 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 175 
 
 making her direct relations with her neighbours rest upon the 
 mutual advantage of the parties interested. 
 
 " I proceed to explain : — 
 
 " The more His Imperial Majesty is averse from ever desiring 
 to see Germany divided into North and South, the greater his 
 wish to preserve, as the fundamental principle of the future 
 federal contract, a perfect unity, and the more he aims at estab- 
 lishing the most complete equilibrium in the influence which 
 Austria and Prussia may be called upon to exercise over Ger- 
 many, the less he is disposed to confound together the defensive 
 systems of Austria and Prussia. 
 
 " To commit such a fault as this, to permit one of these sys- 
 tems to encroach, in a direct manner, upon the other, would be 
 tantamount either to annihilating both, or to making the one so 
 subordinate to the other, that the equality of protection and in- 
 fluence of the two great German Powers would, from that mo- 
 ment, cease to exist. 
 
 " The Emperor considers the line of the Mein, including 
 Mayence, as equally necessary for the defence of the South of 
 Germany and for the security of his own dominions. 
 
 " He therefore insists upon this line remaining to the South. 
 There would be no possibility of completing the allotments of the 
 Princes of the South were Prussia to extend her possessions upon 
 the right bank of the MoseUe. He consequently establishes that 
 river as the line of demarcation. 
 
 " Without entering into any farther details or calculations, it 
 is evident that the security of the Prussian States is free from 
 all risk whatsoever, enjoying as they do the protection of the 
 fortresses of Belgium and HoUand, as well as from their system 
 of defence being strengthened and completed by the citadels 
 of Luxemburg, Juliers, Wesel, and Ehrenbreistein, by the Kne 
 of the Lahn, and by that of the Wesel, the Elbe, and the Oder. 
 The Emperor will never give up reckoning among his means of 
 defence the only important fortress by which the rapidity of an 
 enemy's march upon the Lower Danube could be effectually 
 opposed, and as Kttle can he dispossess himself of the only com- 
 mercial outlet which remains to him in the direction of the 
 Northern seas. 
 
 " In recapitulating the contents of the present overture, I 
 think it my duty to make a summary of it in the following pro- 
 positions,: 
 
 "1. The Emperor , indulges but one ■ political wish, — that 
 
176 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 of the most entire concurrence, both in views and interests, with 
 Prussia. 
 
 " 2. He relies upon the mutual support and the absolute con- 
 formity of action of the two Courts in the Polish question. 
 
 " 3. He makes his Consent to the iacorporation of the King- 
 dom of Saxony to "depend up6n' the above-mentioned reserva- 
 tions. At the! same time he most earnestly requests His Prussian 
 Majesty to consider whether he would not be able to obtain the 
 objept of enlarging his, doijainions, by preserving a, nucleus of 
 that kingdom, a,nd thus rendering it unnecessary to assign an 
 allotment to the King of Saxony by way of indemnity. 
 
 " The Emperor ihsiyt^ upbii the retention of the JVlein in the 
 defensive line of the South, as also that the course of the Moselle 
 shaUi separate the two- portions of territory susceptible' of being 
 made gji]bs|Brvient to the means of arrangements and of indemni- 
 ties for th,^ -.Princes of the North and South of Germany^ 
 
 " The Emperor being more interested than any other Power 
 in placiug the fortress of Mayence in such a state of defence as 
 may defy all surprise, reserves to himself the entering iuto 
 further explanations touching the means of accomplishing that 
 object, such means being compatible with his direct relations 
 with Bavaria, and Kkewise with the possibility of arrangiug the 
 territorial allotments of Germany. As the measures to be 
 adopted with this object are closely connected with the estabhsh- 
 ment of the federative compact, and with the means to be con- 
 certed for the defence of the Confederation, His Imperial Majesty 
 is not of opinion that the discussion of them can be separated 
 from that of these two objects. 
 
 " 5. His Imperial Majesty unites all these questions in one 
 and the same body of negociations ; what he promises he will 
 maintain, connecting, at the same time, his promises with an 
 engagement founded upon the principle of a perfect reciprocity. 
 I have had the honour of explaining myself verbally to your 
 Highness upon the provisional occupation of Saxony by the 
 Pmssian troops. I can only refer you to what I have said to 
 you on the subject, and the Emperor flatters himself that the 
 King will have derived from this proceeding fresh proofs both 
 of his confidence and of his desire to do all in his power to serve 
 those interests which he has accustomed himself not to separate 
 from his own." 
 
 When this note was transmitted to Prince Harden- 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 177 
 
 berg, a communication of all that had taken place upon 
 the Saxon question was .made to Prince Talleyrand, to 
 which he replied, " That justice was the only basis on 
 which the repose of Europe could be established, and 
 that not to depart from this principle was the leading 
 instruction he had received from the King his master. 
 That with this feeling, his great desire would have been 
 to see Poland restored to independence ; that its parti- 
 tion in former times had been the prelude of the system 
 of spoliation which followed ; that the next great ques- 
 tion was Saxony, and that to agree to the propositions 
 now put forward respecting it, was to decide that kings 
 might be judged, and without being heard condemned, 
 they and their people punished, and confiscation rein- 
 troduced into the politics of Europe ; that the people 
 have no longer any rights ; that they are like the 
 beasts of the field, to be disposed of by conquerors ; 
 that the nations of Europe no longer exist in civil 
 society together ; that public rights are at an end ; and 
 that all arrangements among States are legitimate 
 where force commands ; that Europe had suifered too 
 much, not to have a right to repudiate such principles. 
 That as to a balance of power, the occupation of 
 Saxony by Prussia would destroy the influence of 
 Austria, and would dangerously increase the power of 
 Prussia : that France, therefore, would not agree to 
 anything further than what was proposed by Austria, 
 namely, the reconstruction of Prussia by cessions made 
 by the King of Saxony." 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 Translation of the Letter written by Prince TALLEyRAND to 
 Prince Mbtternich. 
 
 " Prince, " Vienna, 19 December, 1814. 
 
 " I lost no time in fulfilling the wishes of His Imperial 
 Royal and ApostoliO' Majesty, conveyed in the letter you did me 
 
 N 
 
178 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 the honour of writing to me ; and I have also brought to the 
 knowledge of His Most Catholic Majesty, the confidential note 
 addressed by you on the 1 0th instant, to the Chancellor of State 
 Prinqe ,Hardenberg, and ;which you communicated to me 
 officially. , 
 
 "To answer for the satisfaction which the resolutions an- 
 nounced in that note will afford the King, I^have only to compare 
 them with the orders given by His Majesty to his ambassadors at 
 the Congress. 
 
 " France had no ambitious views,: no selfish considerations to 
 carry thither. Replaiced within her ancient boundaries, she no 
 longer thought of enlarging them, resembling in this the ocean, 
 which only transgresses its limits after it has been lashed into 
 fury by the tempest. Her armies, covered with glory, no longer 
 aspire ,to fresh conquests. ' Delivered from that tyranny of 
 which she had been less the instrument than the victim, happy 
 in having recovered her legitimate princes, and with them that 
 tranquillity which she had reason to fear she might have lost 
 for ever, she had no claims to assert, no pretensions to raise. 
 She has advanced none, and none wiU she advance. There still, 
 however, remained for her to wish that the work of restitution 
 might be accomplished for the whole of Europe, as well as for 
 herself; that the revolutionary spirit might cease everywhere 
 and for ever ; that every legitimate right might be rendered 
 sacred ; and that every ambitious or unjust enterprise should find 
 its condemnation, as well as a perpetual obstacle, in an explicit 
 recognition and in a formal guarantee of those principles of 
 which the Eevolution has only been one long and fatal act of 
 forgetfulness. This desire of France should also be that of 
 every European State that is not wilfuUy blind. Without such 
 an order of things, no one can for a single moment look with 
 confidence to tbe future. Never was a nobler object proposed 
 to the Governments of Europe : never was a result more neces- 
 sary, and never could there be such hope of obtaining it, as at 
 the period when the whole of Christendom was, for the first time, 
 simimoned to form a Congress. Perhaps this result might have 
 been already completely attained if, as the King had hoped 
 would have been the case, the Congress, upon assembling, had, 
 while laying dovm the principles, defined the object and traced 
 the only road by which it could be arrived at. Then, there is 
 no doubt, certain Powers would not have been seen to make a 
 pretext for destruction, of what could only have conservatism 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGEESSES. 179 
 
 for its end. Certainly, when the treaty of the 30th May de- 
 termiiied that the last result of the operations of the Gongress 
 should be a bond fide and durable balance of power, it did not 
 contemplate confounding together, in one and the same mass, 
 all territories and all peoples, for the purpose of again dividing 
 them according to certain proportions. It intended that every 
 legitimate dynasty should either be preserved or re-established^' 
 that every legitimate right should be respected, and that vacant 
 territories — ^that is to say, territories ^vithout a sovereign — should 
 be distributed conformably to the principles conservatory of the 
 rights of each and of the tranquillity of all. But it would be a 
 very strange error to consider as "the exclusive element of the 
 balance of power, those quantities which are computed by 
 political arithmeticians. 'Athens,' (says Montesquieu) 'pos- 
 sessed the same forces both when she dictated the law with so 
 much glory, and when degraded to a state of slavery : she had 
 20,000 citizens when she defended the Greeks against the 
 Persians, when she disputed empire with Sparta, and when she 
 attacked Sicily. She had 20,000 when dismembered by Deme- 
 trius of Phalerus, and when her citizens were counted like slaves 
 in a market.' 
 
 " The balance of power, then, will be nothing but empty words, 
 if abstraction be made, not of that ephemeral and delusive 
 strength created by the passions, but of that rekl moral power 
 which consists in virtue. Now in the relations that exist be- 
 tween one people and another, the first of all the virtues is 
 justice. 
 
 " Impressed with these sentiments, the King has prescribed it 
 as an invariable rule to his ambassadors, to seek, above all, that 
 which is just, never to swerve therefrom under any circum- 
 stances, nor for any considerations whatsoever, to subscribe to, 
 or acquiesce in, nothing that may be opposed to it, and, as legi- 
 timate combinations arise, to avail themselves of such as may 
 most efficaciously contribute to the establishment and main- 
 tenance of a true equilibrium. 
 
 " Of all the questions to be mooted at the Congress, that of 
 Poland woidd have been regarded by the King as the first, the 
 greatest, the one pre-eminently European, superior beyond all 
 comparison to every other, could His Majesty have hoped as 
 much as he desired that a people so worthy of the sympathies of all 
 other nations; on account of its antiquity, its valour, the services 
 it formerly rendered to Europe, and its misfortunes, could be 
 
 N 2 
 
180 BU.R01'BA.N CONUlllilSSES. Oiiap. HI. 
 
 re^tpr^d to its piiatiuo and compltito indep^ndenci!. 'I'lio i)a)ti- 
 tion -wliiuli orascid its name from tlio cutiilogue of nations, was 
 tho prolude, partly tlic cauHu, and, to a (jcirtaiu d(;}!;roo pi^rbajjs, 
 the pretext for those convulsions of which Europo liaw been tlio 
 victim. But when the force of ciituunHta.nc(!s, prevailing over 
 even the noblest and most generous intentions of the Sovereigns 
 who are in possession of the provinces Ibrmoj-ly belonging to 
 Poland, had reduetsd the I'oliwli question to a mere alfaii' of 
 partition and limits, discussed by the Powers interested amongst 
 themselves, and to which their Hpecial treaties had rendered 
 France a stranger, all that remained to tin; latter, after having 
 offered, as she has done, to support those claims wliich wore tho 
 most equitable, was to wish that you miglit be satisfied, and to 
 be so, herself, if you were. 
 
 "Prom that moment the question of Poland could no longer 
 hold that pre-eminence, not for Franco alone, but e\'eu for 
 Europe itself, which it would Lave had, in the above supposi- 
 tion ; and the question of Saxony then became the most im- 
 portant and the iirst of all, because there is at presciut no other 
 in which the two pi-inciples of legitimacy and balance of power 
 are compromised to so great an extent, as thoy ai-o by the mode 
 in which it is proposed to dispose of that kingdom. 
 
 " To recognise such a disposition as a h^gitijiiato one, it would 
 be necessary to admit as just principles, that kings can be ti-iod 
 by him who has the wish and tho power to possess liims(!]f of 
 their dominions ; that they can be condemned without having 
 been heard, or having had an opportunity of dei'ending tliem- 
 eelves ; that in their condemnation are necessarily involved 
 their families and subjects ; that confiscation, which enlightoncid 
 nations have banished from their code, must, in the iiiiujteeuth 
 century, be sanctioned by the general law of Europe, altlioiigh 
 there is no doubt that the confiscation of an entire kingd(jm is 
 more odious than that of a peasant's hut ; that peoples have no 
 rights distinct and separate from those of their sovereigns, and 
 that they may be assimilated to tho cattle on a farm; that 
 sovereignty is forfeited by the solo fact of (Mjuquest ; that the 
 nations of Europe are united to (;ac,li other by no other moral 
 ties than those which bind thera to tho islanders of tlui South(jm 
 Ocean: that they live among themselvos by tho law of pure 
 nature alone ; and tliat wJiat is callcid tlie public; law of Europe 
 does not in fact exist, seeing, that although civil societios 
 throughout the globe are either wholly or partially governed by 
 
Chap. m. EL'ROPEAX C 'EGRESSES. LSI 
 
 cnstoms which hare for them the force of laws, yet. neverthe- 
 less, the enstoms which are established among the nations of 
 Europe, and which have nniversallT, constantly, and recipro- 
 cally, been observed by them for three centuries, are not a law 
 for them ; in short, that might constitutes right. Btrt Europe, 
 to whom these doctrines have been productive oT so many evils, 
 and have cost it so many tears and so much blOod, Europe has 
 but too dearly purchased the right to detest and execrate them, 
 and they excite everywhere the same horror, whether atTienna, 
 St. Petersburg, London, Paris, iradrid, or Lisbon. 
 
 '■' The disposition intended to be made of the Kngdom of 
 Saxony, however pernicious as an example, would be infinitely 
 more so by its influence upon the general equBibriuni of Europe, 
 an equilibrium which consists in a due relation between the 
 aggressive forces and the reciprocal redsting ones of the various 
 political bodies : for it would wound them in two ways, both 
 very serious ones. 
 
 "1st. By creating a very great aggressive force against 
 Bohemia, and thereby menacing the security of Austria ; for the 
 resisting force proper to Bohemia must be proportionately in- 
 creased, which could only be done at the espen.se of the general 
 resisting force of the Austrian monarchy. Xow the safety of 
 Austria is of too much importance to Europe not to awaken the 
 King's most anxious solicitude. 2nd- By creating in the very 
 heart of the Germanic body, and for one of its members, an 
 aggressive force wholly disproportionate to the resisting force of 
 all the others ; and which, by exposing the latter to a danger 
 always imminent, and by compelling them to seek support from 
 without, would nullify the resisting force, which, in the general 
 system of the European balance of power, the aggregate body 
 should present, but which it cannot possess without the intimate 
 union of its members. 
 
 Trance, like Austria, can truly say that she entertains against 
 Prussia not the slightest feeling of jealousy or animosity'; and 
 it is precisely because she takes a sincere interest in her, that 
 she cannot desire to see her obtain apparent advantages which, 
 acquired by injnstice and being dangerous to Europe,' would, 
 sooner or later, become fatal to herself. The acquisition by 
 Prussia of all those which she may legitimately obtain, so far 
 from meeting with opposition from France, she would be the 
 first to congratiilate her upon them. Let the question then no 
 longer be what portions of Saxony the King of Prussia will cede 
 
182 EUROPEAN OONGHESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 to the King of Saxony, a question by which every idea of justice 
 is overturned ; but if it be asked what part of Saxony its King 
 must cede to the King of Prussia, and if the more completely to 
 confer upon Prussia an existence equal to that it had in 1805, 
 bertain Cessions on the part of the Kiag of Saxony should be 
 necessary, the Kiag of France wiU be the first to persuade that 
 Priace to make such as are compatible with the interests both 
 of Austria and Prussia, which, on this point, CQnstitu.te the 
 general interest of Europe. Your Highness, it appears to me, 
 indicated the just proportion in the table annexed to your note. 
 "His Most Catholic Majesty, unalterably determined not to 
 saiiction, even by his silence, the execution of the scheihes 
 formed against the King and kingdom of Saxony, but wishing 
 to believe that those schemes are the produce of some error or 
 delusion, which a more attentive examination will dissipate, full 
 of confidence in the personal integrity and sentiments of His 
 Majesty the King of Prussia, who has himself also been acquainted 
 with misfortune, knowing all that the influence of His Majesty 
 the Emperor of Russia is capable of effecting, and all that he 
 has a right to expect from the noble qualities which distinguish 
 that monarch, and lastly persuaded that in a just cause one 
 should never despair. His Majesty has not wholly despaired of 
 that of Saxony, and wOl still less do so upon learning that His 
 Majesty the Emperor of Austria, with a determination worthy 
 of him, shall have undertaken its defence upon high grounds, 
 and declared that he will not abandon it. 
 
 (Signed) Peince Talletrabd." 
 
 Prince Hardenberg, in a note of the 16tli December, 
 refused the propositions made in lieu of Saxony, and 
 offered the King of that country an indemnity on the 
 left bank of the Rhine, to consist of the Duchy of 
 Luxemburg, a part of the Archbishopric of Treves, 
 ; ,the southern part of the Duchy of Cologne, and Pruzm, 
 Stavelot, and Malmesy, the whole forming a pppulation 
 of 700,000 souls; Luxemburg, like Mayence, was to 
 become an Imperial City. He declared that Russia 
 and Prussia had desired to treat upon this question 
 conjointement, and that as they were in possession t of 
 Saxony, if it was not ceded to hirn an4 ,:rBCOgnised by 
 
Chap. UI. EUBOPEAX CONGRESSES. 183 
 
 the other Powers, he should consider it fatal to any 
 amicable adjustment. This language was met oti the 
 part of Lord Castlereagh by an explicit statement, that 
 if such terms were persisted in, it would be better to 
 break up the Congress ; that there was no longer the 
 means of deliberatiog, as neither Great Britain, nor 
 France, nor Austria, nor any f)art of Germany would 
 agree to them. That although in consequence of the 
 hostile conduct of the King of Saxony during the war, 
 these Powers might not have held his rights as para- 
 mount to any general political arrangement of Europe 
 — ^yet as a most menacing attitude assumed by Russia 
 (in the case of Poland) had been abandoned, they cer- 
 tainly would not now entertain such a proposition as 
 the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia. It would 
 be most unpopular throughout the world, particularly 
 in England, and it would be the worst policy for 
 Prussia. The strong language of Prince Hardenberg, 
 although it was afterwards softened down, made so 
 serious an impression upon the other Powers, that they 
 determined to unite in resisting anything which might 
 assume the appearance of dictation, A defensive treaty 
 was therefore executed between Great Britain, Austria, 
 and France, confined to this extraordinary case, and it 
 was afterwards acceded to by Holland, Bavaria, and 
 Hanover. It was at the same time agreed that the 
 presence of M. de Talleyrand at all future conferences 
 on the Polish and Saxon question should be insisted 
 upon, in consequence of which Lord Castlereagh and 
 Prince Mettemich, on the 2nd of January, declared in 
 the conference of the Plenipotentiaries, that they would 
 not enter upon the question of Saxony unless the 
 French Plenipotentiary was admitted. 
 
 These measures were crowned with entire success. 
 The Cabinet of Prussia consented t6 accept of the pro- 
 posed modifications, and on the 5th January Prince 
 
184 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. CliAr. 111. 
 
 Hardenberg communicated this determination to Lord 
 Oastlcveagli, and asked for his assistance in bringing 
 about the new plan of arrangements he was willing to 
 adopt. This proposal was readily agreed to, upon con- 
 dition, however, that the attempt, which was stated as 
 about to be made by Prussia, to persuade the King of 
 Saxony to accept of the offer of an indemnity on the 
 left bank of the Ehine should be given up. Such an 
 arrangement it was thought would be most objection- 
 able in every point of view ; it would place this new 
 Power in the hands of France, who (as it was stated by 
 Prince Talleyrand) decidedly refused to agree to it, 
 although, if she were ambitious, she might have desired 
 to see it carried into effect. Lord Castlereagh used the 
 same arguments with the Emperor of Russia, and de- 
 clared he would avail himself of the right, to which he 
 was entitled by the Treaty of Ohaumont, to refuse his 
 consent to it. 
 
 The Emperor, in this conversation, alluded to the 
 treaty he suspected had been made between Great 
 Britain, Frjince, Austria, and Bavaria, which Lord 
 Castlereagh could not avow, but did not choose to deny ; 
 he stated the alarm which had been felt at the language 
 held in these discussions, but added, that if the senti- 
 ments of those from whom it proceeded were as pacific 
 as His Majesty had stated them to be, they had nothing 
 to apprehend from the Powers he alluded to. Lord 
 Castlereagh sliowed the Emperor the plan proposed for 
 the reconstruction of Prussia, accompanied by a de- 
 claration, that if it was agreed to, both himself and 
 Prince Talleyrand would support Prussia in the occu- 
 pation of wliat was thevoin surrendejed to her, not- 
 withstanding the refusal of the King of Saxony to 
 accept the arraiii>ement. 
 
 The Era]K'j<ir stato.d, tliat if Prussia was satisfied, he 
 would agree to tlie modificntions now luought forward. 
 
Chap. III. EUEOPBAN CONGRESSES. 185 
 
 and in the conference of the following day, Prussia 
 declared her consent to them. In this, the fourth, 
 conference, Russia agreed to the counter projects of 
 Austria on the Polish question, and the admission of 
 the French Plenipotentiary to the next conference was 
 decided upon. Lord Castlereagh on this day placed on 
 the protocol of the^ conferences, a protest against the 
 erection of a Polish kingdom under the Crown of 
 Russia, restating in it his former -objections ,to the 
 measure, lamenting that Poland had not been made 
 independent, foreseeing great evils from the course 
 pursued, and strongly recommending that the Poles 
 should henceforward be governed by each Power to 
 whom they might belong, as Poles, and not be treated 
 as under a foreign yoke. Prince Talleyrand declared 
 that he partook in all the feelings announced in this 
 protest, and the Russian Minister also stated that the 
 Emperor his master entirely agreed to them, arguing 
 that • His Majesty's conduct was in conformity with 
 them in seeking to secure^ as far as was in his power, 
 the general happiness of the Poles, by obtaining for 
 them a separate and national government. 
 
 While by the consent of Prussia to the modifications 
 proposed on the Saxon question all further diflSculties 
 upon that subject appeared to be removed, a fresh dis- 
 cussion arose in consequence of the desire of Austria 
 to preserve to the King of Saxony the fortresses of 
 Erfurt and Torgau, Lord Castlereagh made a strong 
 representation against these pretensions, declaring that 
 unless the original plan of arrangements was adhered 
 to with regard i to Saxony, he should withdraw from 
 the engagements into which he had entered. Lord 
 Castlereaghi had an audience of the Emperor of Austria 
 upon this question, and found him strongly impressed 
 with the necessity of adhering to the plan his Ministers 
 had proposed, and ndeeiring i at least that the fortifica- 
 
186 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 tions of Torgau should be destroyed. Prince Talleyrand 
 to a certain extent agreed with these sentiments ; but 
 Prince Metternich, after some hesitation, consented to 
 cede these places, on condition, however, that Leipsic 
 should be preserved to Saxony. Prince Hardenberg 
 strongly objected to giving up this important city, and 
 he was strongly supported by the general feeling of 
 the Prussian Cabinet. 
 
 To get over this difficulty Lord Castlereagh applied 
 to the Emperor of Eussia, who, to make the arrange- 
 ment more palatable to Prussia, placed Thorn at his 
 disposal, by the promise of which Prince Hardenberg 
 was induced to abandon Leipsic, but accompanied by 
 such modifications of the general plan proposed as were 
 thought to be objectionable. Lord Castlereagh then 
 determined to make a sacrifice on the part of the Prince 
 Regent, from the amount of the compensations which 
 he laid claim to in Germany, and of an equal sacrifice on 
 the part of the Prince of Orange. Prince Metternich and 
 Prince Talleyrand consented to this arrangement, arid 
 Lord Castlereagh proposed it to Prince Hardenberg, 
 who at first rejected it ; but after much discussion, 
 seeing that the Prince Regent was thus making a con- 
 siderable sacrifice to obtain a settlement for the King 
 of Saxony, he accepted the proposal, by which Prussia 
 received 850,000 Saxon subjects, and there remained 
 to the King 1,200,000. 
 
 Thus, in the beginning of February, this great; sub- 
 ject of contention was brought to a conclusion, and the 
 Treaties between the three Powers, Austria, Russia, 
 and Prussia, were drawn up, in which the stipulations 
 for the limits of the different States were defined, and 
 in which the city of Cracow, with a territory around 
 it, was declared a free and independent State, and 
 these Treaties were signed at Vienna on the 3rd of 
 May, 1815. The conduct of the King of Saxony in 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 187 
 
 returning from Bohemia after the hattle of Lntzen to 
 join Bonaparte (thereby giving all the aid in his 
 power to the enemy of Europe), was felt to be sufficient 
 ground to refuse his claim to retain the whole of his 
 dominions. He objected, however, at first to accept the 
 portion which was reserved for him, upon which the 
 Allies decided at once to give over to Prussia the 
 districts which had been ceded to her, and to allow her 
 to continue in the provisional government of the part 
 which was to^ belong to Saxony. When at a later 
 period the King of Saxony showed a disposition to 
 accept the offer which had been made to him, the 
 Prussians were unwilling to give up what was only 
 held by them in deposit, stating as a reason, the doubts 
 they entertained, of the King's sincerity as regarded the 
 general alliance against France ; but the Emperor of 
 Russia and the Duke of Wellington (who had replaced 
 Lord Castlereagh at the Congress) declared the stipula- 
 tions must be adhered to, and in the end of March the 
 formal tender of his kingdom according to the new 
 arrangements was made to the King of Saxony, and 
 accepted by him. 
 
 During the time in which the discussions which have 
 been related were carried on, the Congress had been 
 employed in various other arrangements. With regard 
 to Italy, the propositions of Austria as to the terri- 
 tories which were to form part of her empire, and 
 which included the greater part of the Kingdom of 
 Italy as established i by Napoleon,* having been agreed 
 to, the next question. of importance was the settlement 
 of the claims with regard to Naples and Sicily. 
 
 The intimate connexion between these two countries 
 makes it of interest to state here the language which 
 the British Minister was at that time , directed to hold 
 in Sicily. ,By a letter of Lord Castlereagh to Sir W. 
 
 * See the Organisation of the Army of the Kingdoni of Italy in the Appendix 
 (Letter A), No. 3. 
 
188 EUROPEAN OONGEESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 A'Court, dated Vienna, 29th September, 1814, he was 
 authorised to announce to King Ferdinand TV., that 
 Great Britain, in accordance with his desire, would 
 allow the British troops to remain a short time longer 
 in Sicily ; hut that he was to declare that it was the 
 anxious wish of the English Grovernment speedily to 
 withdraw them. With regard to the Sicilian Constitution, 
 although some of its regulations were admitted to have 
 been too restrictive of the authority of the Crown, yet 
 the repeated non-observance of its principles since the 
 return of the King to the administration of his States 
 had been seen with regret. The Prince Regent had 
 hoped that the advantages of a Constitution would have 
 secured the prosperity of Sicily, including the interests 
 both of the Crown and of the people. 
 
 Sir W. A'Court was authorised to present a memorial 
 tending to bring these parties to a compromise, and to 
 secure the advantages of each. He was instructed that 
 the example of the King of France might be cited, and 
 that the King of Sicily should be encouraged to act in 
 a similar way ; that he should be told how fatal the 
 breach of promise to maintain the Constitution would 
 be to his interests in Naples -, and that the British 
 Grovernment' felt how deeply its honour was engaged 
 in supporting the friends of the Constitution, whom it 
 was called upon to protect against the vengeance of 
 those at present in power. Sir W. A'Court, in making 
 this declaration, was ordered to procure, if possible, 
 some mark of favour for these persons, and a formal 
 promise was to be demanded as to their protection, 
 upon the attainment of which was to rest the conti- 
 nuance of British support ; and unless this Was obtained 
 all advances of money were to be suspended, and the 
 British Government would take no step towards the 
 re-establishment of the King in Naples.* 
 
 * Sco in Appendix, Memorandum presented by Sir W. A'Court, 20tli October 
 1814 (No. 4). 
 
Chap. III. EUEOPEAN CONGRESSES. 189 
 
 Witli reference to this mention of the probability of 
 King Ferdinand's return to Naples, it is of interest to 
 state that when Lord Castlereagh passed through Paris 
 on his .way to the Congress of Vienna, and at his au- 
 dience of the King of France, His Majesty represented 
 to him how anxiously he desired to see the Kingdom of 
 Naples restored to its legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand, 
 and he stated that he had instructed his Ministers at 
 the Congress to bring forward the question, and to use 
 every endeavour to induce Prince Metternich to adopt 
 his views upon that subject. The King stated that he 
 felt the attainment of this object to be most important 
 to him both in a dynastic point of view, and politically, 
 as while Murat was at the head of the state of Naples, 
 the aspirations of every revolutionary enthusiast would 
 be to extend his empire and the democratic principle it 
 represented. His Majesty also declared to Lord Cas- 
 tlereagh, the strong conviction which he felt, that, 
 while Napoleon was in the island of Elba and Murat 
 in Naples, there would constantly be communication 
 between them, and that their own intrigues connected 
 with .their numerous partisans throughout Italy who 
 had been displaced from their positions, and disap- 
 pointed in their hopes of power and emolument, by the 
 total overthrow of the French dominion in that country, 
 would be so combined as to maintain a general agita- 
 tion, if not to cause a more serious revolt and convul- 
 sion in that country. 
 
 Lord Castlereagh represented to His Majesty the 
 difficulties and dangers which mjght attend any action 
 undertaken at present in the direction to which His 
 Majesty pointed ; but that it was a question which 
 more directly concerned the Austrian Government, for 
 it was upon .the basis of their treaty with Naples that 
 the Armistice bet\^een Qre&t Britain and that country 
 was established, and that as His Majesty had stated. 
 
190 EUROPEAN CONGEESSEB. Chap. III. 
 
 that his Ambassadors had orders to bring the subject 
 before the Congress, he might rely upon it that the 
 most serious consideration would be given to it; Lord 
 Castlereagh also stated that as His Majesty had alluded 
 to Napoleon's residence in Elba, he would take the 
 opportunity of mentioning that from 3ir N. Campbell- 
 (who, upon the invitation of Napoleon, and the conse- 
 quent orders he had received from his Goveriimeiit, 
 was residing there), he had been informed of Napo- 
 leon's complaint that ihe full amount of the money due 
 to him according to the Treaty of Fontainbleau had not 
 been remitted, and Lord Castlereagh consequently en- 
 treated His Majesty to send a person to the island to 
 settle this account, so that no well-founded complaints ' 
 upon such a subject might be more seriously brought 
 forward. The King gave Lord Castlereagh the assur- 
 ance that he did not believe that any complaint of such 
 a nature could be established, but that he would desire* 
 it to be enquired into and satisfactorily settled. ' ' '" 
 When at the latter end of February this Neapolitan 
 question was brought by Prince Talleyrand before the 
 Congress, Prince Metternich stated, that the Emperor 
 of Austria could not take up the question as on©' of 
 l egitimac y, since Austria had recognised Murat as 
 Kmgof Naples, but that the maintaining the treaty 
 which had been made with him, as well as the con- 
 tinued recognition of his authority, was always made 
 to depend upon the reciprocity of Murat's conduct, who 
 was bound to co-oj>erate cordially with the Allies in the 
 late campaign of Italy ; that it appeared from the reports 
 of Marshal Bellegarde, of Greneral Nugent, and of Lord 
 W. Bentinck that this was not the case, and that, eveii 
 at the present moment, instead of limiting his vievrs to 
 the preservation of his kingdom, he was framing ex- 
 tensive projects for future aggression, and (in opposi- 
 tion to the reclamations of the Pope) was maintaining 
 
CgAP. HI. EUROPEAN CONGBBSSBS. 191 
 
 ppesessipn of the marches, together with the fortress of 
 Ancona ; that all these things being takendnto consi- 
 deration, he, Prince Metternich, would not disguise from 
 Prifice Talleyrand that he was not blind to the incon- 
 venience of leaving an ambitious soldier of Bonaparte's 
 on the throne of that kingdom. The ultimate repose 
 of Italy might be; dependent upon the decision of this 
 question. 
 
 The Emperor certainly saw with alatm the revolu- 
 twnary principle, whichr was evidently re-establishing 
 itself' in that country ; but he knew the difiSculties of 
 the situation, particularly with the 'menacing appear- 
 ance of things in the north of Europe, and he strongly 
 felt the danger of a war in Italy, undertaken upon the 
 plea of national independence. With respect to the 
 attack of Naples by a French army, to what dangers 
 would not this expose bi)th France and Europe ! The 
 Emperor could not allow such an expedition to pass 
 through his states,, and by sea it must take time to 
 prepare , it,: and it, must be protected by England. 
 Prince Metternich, therefore, recommended patience 
 for the moment; the time might come when Murat 
 would not be disinclined to enter into some advan- 
 tageous compromise. ' 
 
 If the Congress , ended without his being recognised 
 either by .England or ,the , Bourbons, and without a 
 peace between Naples and Sicily, Austria would have a 
 favourable opportunity of coming forward and' making 
 such propositions as might be acceptable to all parties. 
 Lord Oastlereagh held generally the same language. 
 England was in no way: bound to Murat, she had only 
 an armistice with, him,, dependent upon his maintenance 
 of the Treaty with Austria. 
 
 He therefore pressed Prince Talleyrand to let the 
 question rest for the moment, and when the other 
 arrangements of the Congress were terminated, Russia 
 
192, EUEQPBAlir CONGRBS^P?., Chap. Ill, 
 
 and England, in conjunqtion with 4-ustria, might make 
 such proposals to Murat as it might be for his inteije^tli; 
 to agree to. , , 
 
 While these questions were agitated in ^ienna, 
 Count Blacas, at Paris, declar^4 there was no.saprifice 
 the King of France would iiot make, to see Murat 
 driven from Naples. While he was there and Bona- 
 parte at Elba, the King could never beseclireon his 
 throne. He announced the deterrninatibh of France to 
 send an expedition against Naples, and requested that 
 Austria .should at le^i^t declare her neutrality, in ,the 
 coptest which might result (frOim, it. The. King of 
 France .was forced., to adopt this measure, first by the 
 representations of his most attached friends ; next by 
 those of Bonaparte's foriher generals, who wfere jealous 
 of Murat' s fortune; , and lastly, by the army, which 
 desired a war. If Austria would not, agree to this, 
 Count Bl^-cas required, that she should make a second 
 Convention, binding herself in conjunction with France 
 to drive Murat from his throne, six months after the 
 close of the Congress. He wished also that the Pow;ers 
 of Europe should declare his decheance. 
 
 During the time these discussions were going on, 
 information was sought for, both by Prince Metternich 
 and Lord CaStlereagh, as to the conduct of Murat 
 during the previous year of 1814, while co-operating 
 with th^ Austrian: armies in Italy, in order that a judg- 
 ment might be fornied from it how far he had fulfilled 
 his engagements with that G-overnraent. , ■ 
 
 With a view of removingi the unfavourable impres- 
 sions which the Duke of Campochiaro was aware 
 existed upon that subject, he laid before Lord Castle- 
 reagh (as stated, in his despatch of the 7th Dec. 
 1814) an historical n;emoir on the political and mili- 
 tary conduct of Murat frpm th^; battle, pf Leipsic .to, 
 the peace of Paps, 30th May, ,1^814. In. this expo- 
 
Chap. IIT. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 193 
 
 sition of facts and circumstances, it was attempted to 
 show : — 
 
 " 1. That Murat broke with France at a time when that 
 Power had still a preponderance in Italy. 
 
 " 2. That he did everything which depended upon him to 
 accede as early as possible to the coalition. 
 
 "3. That he began to act against France before the treaty 
 signed with Austria was ratified by her, and without 
 waiting for the accession of the other Powers. 
 
 " 4. That he conquered the whole of Italy, as far as the Po, 
 from the French army. 
 
 " 5. That his army was several times engaged with the 
 enemy, that he lost considerable numbers of men, and 
 that the King exposed his own person in support of the 
 common cause. 
 
 " 6. That it was not in his power to obtain more decisive 
 success was to be attributed to — First, the unexpected 
 delay in the ratification of his Treaty of Alliance with 
 Austria ; secondly, the extraordinary conduct of Lord 
 William Bentinck ; and, finally, to the dilatory move- 
 ments of Marshal Bellegarde." 
 
 The Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 relate only 
 to the degree of accession given by the other allied 
 Powers to the treaty with Austria ; the 13th states : — 
 
 " That, to sum up the whole, the King, as an ally of 
 Austria, and thus, according to the Treaty of Paris, 
 being at peace with France, and who, before the war, 
 had been acknowledged by all the powers of the Con- 
 tinent, was strengthened by his treaty with Austria, by 
 the accession of the other allied Powers to that treaty, 
 particularly England, by His Majesty's effectual co- 
 operation in the cause of the coalition ; and, in a word, 
 by the Treaty of Peace, signed at Paris, the 30th May, 
 1814." 
 
 In reply to this document, Greneral Nugent, who had 
 commanded the Austrian corps more immediately in 
 conjunction with the Neapolitans in the Italian cam- 
 paign of 1814, transmitted a memoir to the Congress, 
 
194 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 in whicli he denied that Murat had rendered any 
 service whatsoever.! That, on the. contrary, he had 
 thwarted all the movements which hei, Greneral Nugent, 
 had undertaken ; that when he marched upon Pla- 
 centia,i the Neapolitan General at Eeggio refu^6d to 
 let him pass, notwithstanding which he afterwards 
 advanced against , that place, and at the moment he 
 was going to attack it Murat joined him and ordered 
 him to i retire, and thus forced , him to give up .an 
 operation whieh^ promised the most decisive "ad'^an- 
 tages. That it was not true ,that Murat had ordered, 
 as he pretended, the passage of, the Po at Saca, or 
 the attack and capture of Oasal Maggiore, but that it 
 was ' entirely the act of G-eneral Nugent, without any 
 communication with the Neapolitan head-quarters. 
 That at another time, when General Grenier, with a 
 corps of 20,000 French troops, advanced upon the 
 position of the Austrians at Parma, Murat gave 
 General Nugent no assistance, and allowed 3000 men 
 of this force to take Guastalla in his rear, the conse- 
 quence of which was' that he was obliged to fight a 
 ba,ttl'e at Parma to give his detachments oh the Po 
 time to join him, and then retire towards Modena. 
 That after this affair, when the French had sent back 
 the greater part of their force across the Po to join 
 the YicerOy, General Nugent, notwithstanding the 
 orders of Mutat, attacked the remainder of their troops 
 at Heggio, and, having defeated them, he enclosed 
 them in the town; but upon Murat's arrival aftei:: the 
 action he was ordered by him to allow them to eva- 
 cuate it. That for all the above-mentioned reasons, 
 Murat had not fulfilled his engagements, and' conse- 
 quently that the treaty with Austria was as little 
 binding upoii her as upon the other Powers. 
 
 By the communicatiens from Lp^d Willia«i Bentjiick, 
 who was appealed to respecting the conduct which 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES: 196 
 
 Murat had pursued during this campaign, it appeared 
 that, in a despatch to G-eneralfBellegarde as early as 
 the 25th March, 1814, from Verona, he' had stated his 
 conviction that Murat was not' acting honestly with 
 the Allies; and when referred to by Lord Castlereagh 
 upon that subject, he replied from Florence, 7th Jan., 
 1815, that the opportunities he had had of closely 
 observing the whole of Murat's conduct from the 
 period of his return from Leipsic to the end of the war, 
 enabled him to form a tolerably clear conception of his 
 character, his policy, and his good faith, which he 
 expressed in the following words ? 
 
 , " I can state at once; and without ^hgsitation, that his views 
 and principles were totally at variance with those upon which 
 he offered himself and was accepted as the ally of the coalesced 
 Powers ; that he did not perform his engagements ; and that, 
 on the contrary, his conduct, although neutral and negative in 
 its general character, was in its results much more beneficial to 
 the enemy than to the common cause. 
 
 " There i can be no doubt that all'! the advantages' contem- 
 plated from the alliance Tyitb ;Mm-at by Austria and the Allies 
 w^uld have been realized if he had embarked honestly and 
 cordially Jn the cause ; but his policy was to save his crown, 
 arid to do this he must always be on the sid6 of the conqueror. 
 His first agents were sent to me directly after his return from 
 Leipsic. He then: thought Napoleon's fortune desperate ; his 
 lapguage was plain and sincere. , He said, 'Give me an armis- 
 tice, and I will maijch with the whole of the army against the 
 Frenct ; give me the friendship of England, and I care not for 
 Austria or the rest of the world.' 
 
 ' " Subsequently, when Austria came to seek his alliance, he 
 naturally discovered both his own importance and the uncer- 
 tain-issue of the contest. He then began to entertain views of 
 aggrandisement, and by possessing himself of tho whole of the 
 south of Italy he seemed to think he could render himself inde- 
 pendent, whatever might be the event of the war. 
 
 " It may be necessary here to say a word of the counsels by 
 which he was sWi'rounded. Yoiir Lordship already knows that 
 the courage of this officer in the field is no less remarkable than 
 
 n 9 
 
196 EUROPEAN' CONORESSER. Ohap.: III. 
 
 his indecision ^p;d uncertainty in the cabinet. This disposition; 
 unfortunately for him, was actively worked upbn. by two con- 
 tending parties in' his coui't and' army, the one French' and the 
 other Neapolitan. Murat's attachment was to France.- Iti 'aU 
 his abuse of Bonaparte there Was an evident feeMng of feat 
 and' respe;ctifor him. He coveted abo;ve all the /good opinion 
 of the French army. His Freiich advisers played upon these 
 feelings, alwfiys'l magnified the successes: of the French' arms, 
 and endeavoured to keep him in his alliance 'toi their country. 
 He was^ besides most ahsiousinot to lose his French ofiicers, 
 who, he Imew, 'Would' inafc stay with -him from the moment i his 
 conduct became hostile to France. The N6apolitans,_ coun- 
 sellors, army, and Tiation, were all against France, and were 
 extremely desirous that Murat should join heartily in lihi^t 
 cause. His most attached' friends regretted his ind'eeisioii. 
 Living as much with them as I did, declaring always my senti- 
 ments with frankness, never concealing my regret at the neces- 
 sity of the alliance, but, being once made, professing, what J 
 always felt, a sincere desire that it might' be productive of all 
 the advantages to both parties which was expected of it — they 
 seemed to consider me as their friend. They excused their 
 master as well as they could, on the score of his old a-ttachments 
 and connexionsy-from' which it was difficult ;for' him to (Separate. 
 They expressed their hope that I mighti succeed in determining 
 his conduct. Both of these parties agreed in one sentiment, 
 in that of Italian independence andJinthe aggrandisement of 
 their chief.' I have sometimes thoughts when willing -to see Ms 
 conduct in the most favourable ipoint of view, that he himpe^ 
 never knew on which side he was. 
 
 " One of the eonditiojis. of the ,armistiqe. made by i;iip at 
 Naples stipulated that a plan of operations should be arranged 
 between three allied corps. In pursuance of this object, Cdiiut 
 Neipperg presented to me a projet de cavipagne, by iwhich it was 
 proposed that the Anglo-Sicilian troops should lalndat Leghorn 
 and operate ih the rivihte de Genes, drawing its, subsistence from 
 Tuscany. The Neapolitan army was to-iftct, on the- right and 
 the Austritos on theleft bank of the Po, each maintajniiig 
 itself in the countries they respectively occupied. I immediately 
 agreed to it, and despatched Lieut. -Colonel CatineUi,; in com- 
 pany with Count Neippergj,, to. arrange defiiiitively the plan ijn 
 co-operation with Marshal i BeUegarde and Murat. I returned 
 to SicUyj and) in order ^to avoid all loss of time, I. ordered the 
 
OitAP. III. BUKOPEzVN OONGRBSSES. 197 
 
 troops' tO' 'proceed directly tol Leghorn, and I appointed Lieut.- 
 Colonel Oa:tmelli'tO'meet me at Naples, from whiencej upon my 
 retlu-u from' Palermo, I proceeded by land to Leghorn. _.. 
 I" The Neapolitan army had in the meantime occupied the 
 Eoman and Tuscan 'states. Haying followed, the Steps (df this 
 army,, my own observations ' entirely confirm aU that has been 
 said in the 'Paper/'of' Eemarks '. (by General Nugent) Upon 
 the subject of these first- military bperatioiis of the .Neapolitan 
 army, and'upon the misapplication of the tetm. conquest, Ythieh 
 has been/ so triumphantly used upon this; occasion. The truth 
 is, that everywhere there i\^as an apparent! concert between the 
 French' and Neapolitan authorities r these was no act of hos- 
 tility ^ on either side; The French.'^ garrisons were, allowed 
 qviifetljs to evacuate all the fortresses 'and' to reinforce the 
 Viceroy in the nort.k of Italy. I Nobody ^Delieved that Murat 
 was -a^ war with France. Murat could iHotLdo a better service 
 tO' Napoleon than by securing the - quiet reunion of his scattered 
 troops with the main army, or by taking to himself, and from 
 the allied cause,. the benefit of all the resources of the south of 
 Italy, or by weakening by one half the force he stipulated to 
 bring into the field upon the pretended necessity of occupying 
 these: conquereti- countries ; nor is ithis oecupa;tidn less worthy 
 of remarkii Hererthe manner of a conqueror was assumed. 
 The countries were occupied, ds it were, in permanent posses- 
 sion. No allusion ' was made to tke anfcient sovereigns. The 
 Neapolitan agents in the Eoman states discouraged the idea of 
 the Popei's return, and the principle of national union and inde- 
 pendence Hva*' universally proclaimed." ;; 
 
 Lord William Ben tinck also states in 'this despatch 
 tliat lie ""' "''' '"' ' -, _ , '' '" 
 
 " Cettainly did hold to Murat the langufCgb which his conduct, 
 so unjustifiable! and feithless, called for," because he "feltithat 
 the sooner the qtiestion of his ill faith was settled the better. 
 He did' not servd us as a friend — if our fortune should turn 
 he ' would cause our* ruin ^as aneneiuy." . . ■" I presented, 
 in- a note to the Dulvc de GaUo, a written declaration of the 
 verbal assurances given in favour of Murat by Lord Castle- 
 reagh, and accompanied these assurances by a review of the 
 conduct he had pursued ; and I did so with the object of then 
 establishiTig and 'officially recording i the reasons upon which 
 
198 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. CiIap. HI. 
 
 the Allies might ptmish his! infidelity, as well, as in the hopes 
 that such conduct might recall him to his duty." i ' 
 
 Upon the receipt of all this information by Prin6e 
 lletternich, togetH^r; with the reports which came" to 
 him fropa all parts of Italy of the menacing attitucje 
 assumed by Murat, by the CQncsniratiQn of his a,rmy 
 on the frontier of the Papal States, ihe presented i^o 
 the French a& well as to th& Neapolitan representatives 
 in the Congress, the following commiihications, by 
 which he ' ahhounced to both those, G-overnmeDts that 
 His Imperial Majesty his august' Sovereign wduld 
 oppose himself to the passage of the troops of both 
 those countries through the Austrian states in Italy. 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 Translation of Copy of a Note from Peinoe Mettermch to Prince 
 Talletkand. Vienna, 25th February, 1815. 
 
 "The undersigned Minister of State a:nd of Foreign Affairs 
 of His Imperial and Royal Majesty ihas been commanded to 
 make to his Highness Prince Tallejrrand the following . official 
 communication. ;:> ri f 
 
 " In the course of the h«gociations which have taken place at 
 Vienna between the plenipotentiaries of the Powers who signed 
 the Treaty of Paris, the undersigned has never ceased to give, 
 in the name of the EmpOror his august master, p'oofs of His 
 Imperial Majesty's desire to secure to Italy a' definite condition 
 and a tranquillity Which is closely ^onnBoted with that of Europe 
 and of his empire. ■ 
 
 " The state of tension which still continues to exist 'between 
 the Courts of France and Naples has sd much the more engaged 
 the Emperor's 'undiYided attention at a time when large musters 
 of troops are being made on the frontiers of the Kingdom s of 
 Naples, and concentrations of military foJoes are also taking 
 place in the south of France. 
 
 " However averse His Impei:ial Majesty may be from attri- 
 buting to either of the above-named Courts such hostile views 
 as might compromise the tranquillity of Italy, and thereby that 
 of an interesting portion of the Austrian^ monarchy, the 
 
Ghap. III. EUROPEAN OONGEESSES. 199 
 
 E!m|)erGr has, nevertheless^ thougbtifit to renew the declaration 
 which the undCTgigned considered himself called upon to make 
 in one of the first conferences, of the firm determination of His 
 Majesty nbver to permit that by the entrance of foreign troops 
 into Italy the tranquillity of his provinces, or of those governed 
 by the Princes of his family, should be disturbed, as the 
 Emperor, must regard every intention or proceeding contrary' to 
 that detemiination as directed against his interests, and conse- 
 quently against himself. 1 
 
 " The undersigned,' at 'thfel saBiei time that he makes known 
 to Prince Talleyrand thajt he :tra|nsn^i^ a^.siwilair' declaration, 
 directed to the same^pbject, i^pr tlie ^ourt, of Naples, begs his 
 Highness to accept t]iie assurances, &c.,&c.'* \ [ " 
 
 ' ' ' ■ - . •' i ,: ; '"(I i ' ;• • ,-li ,-;;i;r, !i, 
 
 Translation of Copy of a Note from Prince Mbtteenich to the Duke of 
 Oampoghiabo. Vienna, Pebmary 26, 1815. 
 
 " The undersigned Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs 
 of His Imperial and Eoyal Majesty at Vienna has been com- 
 manded to make to his Excellency the Duke of Campochiaro 
 the following official communication. 
 
 '"Ever since, the -establishment of .relations of alliance be- 
 tween the- Courts of Vienna and Naples the Imperial Oourt.has 
 never ceased to give the latter proofs of interest, regard, and 
 confidence! ' The declarations which the Plenipotentiaries of 
 Austria at the Congress had occasion to make at the very first 
 conferehces mustrhavei left no doubt ia the minds of the Powers 
 who have not recognised King Joachim as to the determination 
 of His Imperial and Eoyal Apostolic Majesty not to allow poli- 
 tical discussions to degenerate into a state of war which might 
 disturb the peace of Italy. The explainations which have taken 
 place 'between the undersigned and the Ministers of the King 
 of Naples at the Court of Vienna furnish undeniable proofs; of 
 the solicitude of the Austrian Cabinet to contribute, in every 
 possible manner, to remove the difficulties which ; stiU prevent 
 friendly relations from, being established betweeif: ifche Court of 
 Naples and several other Courts of Europe. His Neapolitan 
 'Majesty,! however, shows thkt he is not 'disposed to listen' to the 
 counsels of Austria, by maintaiaing and reinforcing daily arma- 
 ments which exhaust thpi tesqurces of the kingdom, and which, 
 considering. their! direction, appear nauch more .fitted to keep 
 
200 EDEOPEAN CONGEESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 up a state of suspense and doubt in Italy thaai to secure the 
 frontiers from an invasion, the possibility of which is inad- 
 missible, since His Imperial and Eoyal Apostolic Majesty has 
 decided upon not permitting the passage of foreign troops 
 through his territory. It is with the view of putting a stop 
 to a state of misunderstanding which^ is. prejtidicial to all the 
 Powers of Italy, that the Emperor has just caused to be sent 
 by the undersigned ito the Plenipotentiaries of France, the 
 annexed declaration, which His Imperial and Royal Apostolic 
 Majesty has, at the same tinie, ordered him to briag to the 
 knowledg^iof the Neapolitan Cabinet. ;. s 
 
 " The undersigned must add the positive assurance that, how- 
 ever disinclined His Imperial and Eoyal Apostolic > Majesty may 
 be to admit the possibility of such; an occiUTeiLCfi, he naver- 
 theless cannot but consider any movement made ;by' the Neapo»- 
 litan army beyond the frontifers^ of the kingdom and out of the 
 cantonments it ndw occupies, as. a rupture of the alliance, and as 
 directed against himself. 
 
 " The undersigned has, &c." 
 
 No. 3. 
 
 Translation of Copy of an Official Letter from PrincE'Metternich to tlie 
 DVKB DE Campochiaro. ,Vienna, 26tlj February, 1816. 
 
 " The Emperor has ordered me to communicate with 'your 
 Excellency upon the following subjects, which possess an interest 
 too much in common to both Courts not to be taken by them 
 into their deepest consideration. i (,,,!,;,;, ; 
 
 " The King of Naples continues , his armamejits^ 5 npt^with- 
 standing the relations of alliance which exist bejtwpen him, and 
 us. France, on the other hand, is begitiiiiag to assemble troops 
 in the south. The Emperoi* desires the peace of Italy, aid has 
 continually furnished proofs of his determination to niaintain it, 
 nor can he give stronger ones of this his fixed resolutioh than 
 by addressing to the Courts of Franqe and, Naples the .notes 
 which your Excellency will find annexed. , , , 
 
 "It is not after a twenty years' state of war or of dispute, 
 of which the annals of history cannot produce a like example, 
 it is not at a moment when aU the great interests' Of Em-ope 
 are under discussion, that the Emperor i can capitulate as to the 
 measures which must, at length, secure tho- tri|,nquillity of 
 
Chap. in. EUROPEAN CONGEESSES. 201 
 
 countries so interesting for his empire as. are hia Italian pro- 
 viaees. • . , , .,,.■ iii..;i ^,r. -■'!'■ • 
 
 " The more His Imperial Majesty has shown moderation in 
 his mews^ the more, he has displayed throughout thq.cdurse' of 
 the negociations which now occupy Ua here that : spirit of con- 
 ciliation wliich characterises him, the more' he is entitled to aim 
 at securing to his subjects a state of tranquillity which they so 
 much need, in common with the wJiole- of Europe. In causing 
 the declarations in question ^to Jbe addressed to the French and 
 Neapolitan SoYereigns^ the. Emperor: is as determined to act 
 upon them, as he is continced that the satisfactory relations 
 which exist between his: Court and those of Prance and Naples 
 mil- render unnecessary any extreme measure, which would be 
 as remote from his^wishes/ as ittcwofuldi he contrary to the in- 
 te^^estS of the respective nations. ;; 1.';.^ . ,-.i.>! vk 
 
 "I request your Excellency to ibringLthe' present .oiScial 
 letter and the notes thereunto annexed to the ikhowledge. of 
 your Court, and to receive the assurance's,' &c., &c." ' *^ 
 
 Shortly after the date of these despatches, Count 
 Blacas transmitted to Prince Metternich some addi- 
 tional information as to the conduct of Murat during 
 the years. 1813 and 14, which he had extracted from 
 the archives of Paris, froiii which it appeared that, 
 at the end .pff, 1813, iMurat had proposed to Bona- 
 parte to assist in defending Italy if lall the French- 
 Italian departments south of the Po were ceded to him ; 
 that Napoleon made no reply to this proposition, but 
 M. de Bernadiere gave his opinioii "that, if Italy" was 
 tp b^ divided,^ the northern part ought jto be increased, 
 and ,not the sojithern. Several ■, docunients relating to 
 the conduct ,of Murat; at this period were transmitted 
 by 'the Duke of Blacas^to Lord Castlereagh, iroin which 
 the 'folio wiilg are extracts. 
 
 In .the first of these Eliza Bacchiochi, Grand Duchess 
 of Lucca, writing to Napoleon from Lucca, Feb. 14th, 
 1814, spegjis of Murat as appearing to be in a state 
 of great agita|;ion, and she mentions the astonishment 
 he had expressed -' 
 
202 EUROPEAN CONGBESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 " that she had quitted Tuscany upon the notion that he 'could 
 be the enemy of Your Majesty and of France." ' '' 
 
 She adds — 
 
 " He loudly expresses his devotion and his gratitude to your 
 person, and he even said to the Tuscan Deputies that he would 
 prefer receiving the first Mow, to drawing his sword against a 
 Frenchman. 
 
 " I know not how to reconcile this language, of which I do 
 not suspect the siucerity, with all the arbitrary measures which 
 have endangered my authority, and those which oblige me eiren 
 now to provide for the safety of the French troops assembled at 
 Pisa. 
 
 " Your Majesty will appreciate these contradictions, which 
 seem to me to proceed frora a resolution deemed by the ?ing 
 conformable to his interests, but in wliich he has been dragged 
 contrary to his own affections. I am assured that the language 
 and conduct of the King are similar in his communications with 
 the Viceroy. 
 
 " (Signed) Eliza." 
 
 In a letter to his sister Caroline, Queen of Naples, 
 from Nangis, dated 17th February, 1814, Napoleon 
 says — 
 
 " Your husband is a very brave man in the field of battle, 
 but he is more cowardly than a woman, or a monk, when not in 
 presence of the enemy, He has no moral courage. He has 
 been frightened, and he has not hazarded losing for a moment 
 that which he can only hold by me and with me. Make him 
 fully sensible of his absurdity. When he quitted the army 
 without my order, I foresaw all the evil counsels which would 
 be given to him. I am, however, better satisfied with the mes- 
 sage he has sent me through you. If he be sincerely sorry, let 
 him watch the moment for proving to me that he has not been 
 as ungrateful as he is pusillanimous. I may yet pardon him 
 the injury which he has done me. ■ 
 
 " (Signed) i' Napoleon." 
 
 In a letter from the Duke of Otranto -to Napoleon, 
 dated Lucea, 18th February, 1814, he reports that 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 203 
 
 " The Austrian and English Ministers reproach Murat with 
 being French, and particularly with being too much attached to 
 Your Majesty. The Eevolutionists, who now govern Florence, 
 assert loudly that the King of Naples has an understanding with 
 the French, and that h© deceives the Italians. They attribute 
 to my counsels the iijaction of the Neapolitan troops, which the 
 Allies wislied should march against the Viceroy at the moment 
 when he was about to be attacked by General Bellegarde. The 
 King is in the greatest distress ; he now thoroughly feels in 
 what a situation he is placed:, it is diftcult for me to send him 
 advice. If there was as much firmness in his character ^s there 
 are good qualities in his heart, he wpuld be stronger in, Italy 
 than the coalition. 
 
 .(Signed) " The Duke.of Otkanto." 
 
 Prince Eugene, tlie Viceroy, in a letter to Napoleon, 
 dated Volta, 2 Oth February, 1814, states that 
 
 " The King of Naples, who appeared inclined to march against 
 us, and to yield to the solicitations of the Austrians, changed his 
 project as soon as he became acquainted with Your Majesty's 
 late victories of the 10th, 11th, and 12th, and had not yet 
 received the ratification of his treaty the evening before last. 
 I hope that he :will not a,dd to thp wrongs of which he has been 
 guilty towards Your Majesty, by firing upon your troops. 
 
 (Signed) " Eugene Napoleon." 
 
 A letter also from Napoleon to the King of Naples 
 may be added, dated Braine on the Vesle, March 5th, 
 1814:— 
 
 " SlE, MY BeOTHEE, 
 
 " I have already communicated to you my opinion of 
 your conduct. Your situa.tion has; turned your head. My 
 reverses have deprived you of your senses. You have sur- 
 rounded -yourself withi men who hate France, and who wish to 
 ruin you. I formerly gave you useful warnings. What you 
 write to me is at variance with your actions. I shall, however, 
 see by your manner of acting at Ancona if your heart be still 
 French, and if you yield to necessity alone. 
 
 "I write to the Minister at Wa,r, in order to tranquillize him 
 with respect to your, conduct. KecoUect that your kingdom. 
 
204 EUROPEAN GONOEESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 which has cost so much blood and trouble to Fraojce, is yours 
 only for the benefit of those; who gaye it you. It is, needless, to 
 send me an answer, unless you have something important •to 
 communicate. Eemember that I made you a King solely for 
 the interest of my system. Do not decei've yourself; if yoil 
 should ceaSe to be a Erenchma,n, you would be nothing for me. 
 Contimie to correspond with the Viceroy, taking care that'yotir 
 letters be not intercepted. ,{' , , _■ id 
 
 (Signed) " Napoleon,!' 
 
 These coUimnnications abundantly confirm the ob- 
 servations of Greneral Nugent, and the ojDiniori ' ex- 
 pressed by Lord William Beiltin,cls, concerning the 
 charac'tef, policy, and faith of Murat, as contained ih 
 the documents above referred to, and served to confirm 
 Prince Metternich in the propriety, or rather the neces' 
 sity, of addressing Murat in the' strong ' language h§ 
 had adopted in his despatches above inserted. 
 
 It is now necessary to record the discussions which 
 took place in Congress upon the other various import- 
 ant interests for which it had been assembled, and, irl 
 the first place, with regard ■ to the settlement of the 
 Helvetic Kepublic. The Conferences which Were esta- 
 blished for the negociation of the points affecting this 
 country were carried on by the five Powers,' Fr'ahce 
 being admitted, and, on the part of England, Lord 
 Stewart (afterwards Marquis of Londonderry) being 
 appointed the Commissioner. It was anxiously desired 
 that an exchange might be effected with France of 
 Porentrui for the Pays of Grex, and a negociation was 
 entered into for that purpose. The King of France, 
 however, put an end to it by declaring that he could 
 not cede any portion of 'the French territory— that it 
 was contrary to the public opinion, but he Would rdake 
 suitable arrangements that' the road of Yessoy should 
 be common to both countries. ' 
 
 The Canton of Berne at first claimfed' the whole of 
 its andent possessions, comprifeitig the Pays' de Vaud 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 205 
 
 and'tlie Canton of Argovie, but it afterwards modified 
 its demands Vo the la'tter cotlntry. '' 
 
 Lord 'Stewart, as' the British Commissioner, gave it 
 as his opinion tlxat the Canton of Berne should be 
 sai^isfied/Wfith a rectification of her frontier on the side 
 of Argovie, and agreed; with the 'Austrian, Eussian, 
 and Prussian Ministers, that there was no objection to 
 incorporate with it the Bishopric of Basle. Lord 
 Stew^ft, as well aSj therAustrian and Prussian Ministers, 
 werQiof opinion that thjC. great Powers must become 
 arbiters in the disputes - which, agitated Switzerland, 
 a,nd;,thfit, the recognition of her independence should 
 depend iipon her acceptation of' their decision. M. de la 
 Harpe wrote a strong note against a,ny alteration of the 
 cantons as then existing, and against the pretensions 
 of the aristocratic cantons, which would endanger the 
 liberties of the people, conferred upon them by the Act 
 of Mediation which had been established under the 
 inflineiice: and dictation of Napoleon, and which had 
 ppit with, the entire approbation of M. de la Harpe, 
 who, although attached to the Emperor of ^Russia, to 
 whom he had been tutor, was a violent partisan of the 
 jDrinciples of French democracy. : The deputies of the 
 Y jiltel ir^e expressed a desire that their country should 
 be given to Austria, or be declared an independent 
 canton, ,|*riiice Metternich wished this state might be 
 forn^ed, into, , an independent canton, but the Swiss . 
 deputieiS] ,(|§^W'^4 i^ shpuld, be,, annexed to the G-risons, ^ 
 which was acqordingly decided upon. The repre- 
 fgntatives of Poreptrui, and the , Bishopric of Basle also 
 desired _that . those states should be formed into inde- 
 perid,ent r cantons,. ! or , tba^t the bishopric , should be 
 restored; to its former bishop ; but a different arrange- 
 ment was carried into effect,., and, these discussions were 
 at last ]brought tp, a .plosp: by the depision of the Allied 
 C-Qjn,nii^sioners, according to which ..the Valteline was 
 
206 EUHOPte!AN CONGRESSES. Chap. HI. 
 
 ceded to Austria, and the Bishopric of Basle and 
 Porentrui divided between the Caitons of Berne and 
 Basle. The States'of the Valais, Greneva, and Neufchatel 
 were formed into three new cantons, and added to 
 those already existing, which remained without alter- 
 ation, except that the King of Sardinia ceded a small 
 territory to Greneva in compensation for the Grenovese 
 fiefs. Under these arrangements the declaration of the^' 
 frontiers of the different cantons of the Helvetic Re- 
 public was agreed to on the 4th of March, and finally 
 declared in Congress on the 20th, and accepted' by the 
 Diet' of the Swiss Confederation at* Zurich the 27th 
 of May. 
 
 The arrangement for the annexation of the State of 
 Gl-enoa to Piedmont was negociated between Lord 
 Castlereagh and the Marquis Brignole, and the Con- 
 vention was agreed to and announced to the Congress 
 on the 7th of December, by which the political interest 
 of those united states was secured by their alliance, and 
 in conformity with which they both became connected 
 with the military and defensive system of Italy. They 
 also gained thereby protection against an invasion 
 from France, such as that from which that country had' 
 so much suffered in the year 1796, when Bonaparte, at 
 the head of the French armies, forced a passage into 
 the Piedmontese territory, signally defeated the Aus- 
 trian and Piedmontese armies, and after , dictating a 
 most humiliating peace to the King of Sardinia, occu- 
 pied Milan and almost the whole of Lombardy. This 
 great success could not have been effected without the 
 good understanding which was at that time established 
 between the State of Genoa and the French Revolu- 
 tionary Grovernment, and which the Allied Powers at 
 this time thought it necessary to provide against. The 
 Grenovese Government, how6ver, protested against this 
 measure of annexation, and stated its rights as fotmded 
 
Chap. m. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 207 
 
 upon a long independence, acknowledged; by treaties ; 
 and it expressed a desire, that; if Grenoa as a Republic 
 did not suit the views :of the other .JEuropean Powers, 
 it should be, established under a , Priijpej and made 
 independent, or [be placed under the protection of Eng- 
 land, These feelings are strongly put forward by the 
 Minister of Grenoa, M. Pareto, in his letter dated Paris, 
 the 18th of May, 1814, addressed to Lord Castlereagh, 
 of, whiqh the foUowingris an extract : — 
 
 " Your Excellency seems to have believed that if (according 
 to the Arrangements whicji have .token place under the sanction 
 of the Qrpat^ Powers) i^e. State of ;(jr;enQa.was nnite^ to Pied- 
 mont, it would find in this union advantages which would be a 
 compensatioi^ fqr the loss of its independence. But the real 
 strength of states is found there where iinion, concord, and 
 national feelings' exist. This national feeling wduld certainly 
 not exist in the new amalgamation of these two populations. 
 Divided by their dispositions, by their habits, and by an in- 
 vincible antipathy, the fruit of two centuries of political quarrels, 
 it would be in vain to attempt to unite them into one nation. 
 ~» * • '« * # 
 
 '^ In resuming the "different bbseryatioiis which the under- 
 signed has had the honour to siibmit to his Excellency Lord 
 Castlereagh, he flatters himself that he has proved that the 
 union of Genoa to Piedmont would entail the ruin of that 
 country without any real advantage or assistance to the views 
 of the High Allied Powers :— that those views will be better 
 forwarded by the re-establishment of the Eepublic, and by such 
 arrangements as would ensure, in case of war, to the British 
 GroVemment' the preservation of the ports and gulfs of Liguria : 
 and, finally^ 'that it is impossible to separate Genoa from her 
 territory without destroying hex commerce, and, consequently 
 risking, the consunimation of that ruin which it is sought to 
 avoid. , 
 
 ' ' (Signed) " Paebto." 
 
 Lord Castlereagh regretted that the object of this 
 protest could, not be carried into effect, as it would 
 cause weakness in the Italian; arrangements. He 
 argued that the defence of Italy could only be intrusted 
 
208 EUROPEAN CONGEESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 to a single Power, occupying both Piedmont and Genoa i 
 and lie consideredTtliat the ^disasters which had been 
 brought u23on Italy and Europe by a difffeirent system, 
 and by the divided counsels of the King of Sardinia 
 and the State' of /(jeii'dai^i' 1796, ,wer§ sufficient evi- 
 dence in favour of tKia ,req,soning. , To the conduqtof 
 the G-enovese Governmenti at that time, by their co- 
 operation with the Erenchi-Republici might mainly: be 
 attributed those misfortunes;' he hoped, ho wWfer, that 
 the liberality of the pr0^iit arran^euient would 'suc- 
 ceed in the end in giving satisfactira to, the State ff^ 
 Genoa as well as tOi, the,,]pi;^4'pfiQnti^^j.//,0n thelTth 
 December Lord,,!Gastle|J"eagh,ttiFaiasmitteddthe order to 
 Sir John Dalrymple, then commanding the British 
 troops in the Genovese State, to deliver it up to the 
 King of Sardinija, which he did, as ainpounced by his 
 despatch to Lord Oastlereagh, of the 27th December, in 
 which he enclosed, a 'copy of the protest which' 'Was 
 delivered to him by the President of' the Genovese 
 Government, M. de Serra,. as also the Proclamation of 
 the Provisional Government, the members of which 
 stated that " in retiring from their functions there 
 remained nothing further for them to do but to- fulfil 
 an honourable but melancholy duty — ^that of protesting; 
 that, although the rights of the Genovese to inde- 
 pendence might be unrecognised, they could not be 
 annihilated." edJ yd '^sn^iO 'lo _jniiS[ edi oi l:>aiJiffl 
 edi rio ,9Jj§j;H edi Pkoolamation. xjA dsbhS. odi ,^t'if.o 
 
 8 The Govei-nors and'PiTTCuvatorB of tlie most'S'erene'6e{)ulJlli; ol Genoat.alS 
 
 ' "Having been informed that the Congress at' Vienna has 
 disposed of our country by uniting it to the dominions of His 
 Majesty tlie. King of Sardinia, f^ud being resolved neither, to 
 prejudice its inalienable rights,; uov to, have .rc^cpurse to any, 
 fruitless and ruinous attempts, we divest ourselves of an au- 
 thoriiy wliieh the confidence of the nation, aud^the acquiescence 
 ofntSeeP'incipal Powers of Biuiope, had sanctioned. a™ taoranai 
 
 ^"""Wfiatsoever any G»;ivei-nnieht,unproVicled'vvitli ()tfh,ev 'iiieans 
 
Chap. HI. EUROPEAN CO^G'il'feSSES. 209 
 
 than those fif justice and reason, might 'be capable of eifecting 
 in behalf of ';the .rights, i and! liberties lof its people, we have 
 attempted ,\is^i,1ih(:jTit reser.ve or hesitation. Nothing then remains 
 for us ejpept to reeonimead. to th^, mjinicipal, administrative, 
 arid judicial, authorities the, provisional exepcise of their func- 
 tions, aAd to the GoVernmeiit which may follow them, the care 
 of the troops ^hich'we had begun to raise; as well as the civil 
 ofiicers' who hav6 'faithfully discharged their duties ; ahd to the 
 people of the iQenoveaei territoiy in general that tranquillity 
 whip^ i^ more necessary to nations tlian all other advantages. 
 
 " We carry JD^ck into o.uf ;re|,ire]iie,nt a soothing g,en,t]iment of 
 gratitude to^yarcls the illustrious Britisli General, who knew the 
 limits of victory, and tin unshaken, confidence in the Divine 
 Prdvidence thd,t will never f'drSake the Genoese'. ' 
 
 " Palace of the Government, 26th December, 1814i ' 
 
 " GlROLAMO SeKEA, - 
 
 i I " President of the Government." 
 ■ ' [For conditions' sfee note.*] ' 
 
 The union of the iBelgian Provinces to Hollandj 
 forming an united kingdorti under the sovereignty of 
 the Prince of Orange, had been brought, forward by 
 Lord Castlereaigh, iandiiagreed to by the Allied Powers, 
 including, the French G-overnment, during the dis- 
 cussions which took place amongst the Plenipotentiaries 
 of the Greafc Powers while in Paris in 1814, when the 
 Articles upon which that union was to take place were 
 drawn up and decided upon. These Articles were sub- 
 mitted to the Prince of Orange by the Earl of Clan- 
 carty, the British Ambassador at the Hague, on the 
 21st of July, 1814, in conformity with the directions 
 from Lord Castlereagh, with a view of obtaining their 
 recognitionj.as those Upon-which the union of the two 
 countries was to' take place. The Prince on that day 
 did so recognise them, and the Act by which his con- 
 
 * The conditions' 'upon wliicli tli? State of Genoa was united to that of 
 Piedmont are contained in the 4th Article of the Treaty between the King 
 of Sardpia and the four Powers, d^ted Vipflna, May 20th, 1815, to he found 
 in the Appendix No. 3. 
 
 P 
 
210 EUKOI'EAX if;OX<>RESSEB. Chav. l]l. 
 
 sent was notified was^ signed by A. W. C. de Xagel, 
 the Secr<^tary-rrerieral fpr the Department of Foreign 
 Affairs. Upon ,Ti'hic}i Lord Clancartj, with the aBsent 
 of the MinisterB of. Amtria, of liussia, and of PnaB.sia, 
 at tha^ time inJBolla^d, concerted with Gerjeral Baron; 
 Vincent, Provisional Governor of the Belgian Pro- 
 vinceH, for t?ie reraiBsiori of those provinces to the 
 authority charged to receive them by the Princfi of. 
 Orange. .1 
 
 This united kingdom, as thus constructed, was eirti- 
 rnat^d as containing- 8,000,000 subjects in the firjest 
 part of Envoyt, and its constitution as a, kingdom,, 
 having been finally decided upon by all the Powers at 
 the Congress, was inserted in the General 1'reaty of 
 Vienna on the 28rd March, 1815, together with tJi© 
 recojrriition of kingly authority in the person of the 
 Prince of Orange as the .•Sovereign. In the discussions 
 which ha/1 previously taken place it had been desired 
 by Prussia tliat it should become a part of the Ger- 
 manic body, or, as Lord C'astlereagh recommended, 
 form only a defensive alliance wdth it. Lord C'astle- 
 rc-agh considered that by the fii-st course the Kirig 
 would be too much under the direct influence of Prussia, 
 or, if he sought to protect himself against it by forminjr 
 oonnexioiiii with -some of. the other .States, he would 
 alienate that Government from him which j^ji case of 
 danjrer from foreign invasion would be his Ije-st pro- 
 tector. It would besides be adding a naval Power to 
 Germany, which was foreign from the general consti- 
 tution of her States, and could only be a cause of ern- 
 barrassment. The latter cour.se wa» therefore adopted. 
 Lord Castlereagh con.sented that Great Britain should 
 charge herself with two-thirds of the Russian loan to 
 Holland ; first, becau.-A there had been a sort of promise 
 to Eusisia to do so, and he conceived, upon obtaining 
 her consent to the territorial arrangements, it was good 
 
Chap. HI. KUKOPFAN CO^'ORK^;SKS. 217 
 
 policy,' oven if the prorrjiKo bad hof^n conditional, to 
 adhore to it ; next, h(ica.iaBe ho cjyrK-jiSwcA Kngland'was 
 hcmnA to some pecuniary f-acrifice to Hollar^], afTcorn- 
 pcTjBatiorj for the ceamyn of the West Itidian InlaTidK. 
 Th'; Prince of Orango was entirely f-ati-fied' with this 
 Bcttlement of the qiwHtion. ife felt only' gortio regret 
 at Hcparating hirn^elf from a portion of his hereditary 
 HtatcB which for «0 long a fK^riod liad b<ilonged t/> his 
 family.* '** 
 
 With regard to the rfflnaitiing t^rritoria) arrange- 
 rnentH in which the CongreBB ^b <ing^ged, there wax 
 some diHCflimor) on the fiiihject of I'omeranifi, "w^hicli the 
 
 Holland wc-ru joinod Ui'/^-.tin-.r ar'; riaii-A in the miiii:\iA Articlts oTtlic Tr'/,t.ty 
 botw(;';fi tbft King of tlw; X'41i<;rkri<iH and ttw four Pbwew; lisro';'! »t Vienuai 
 :;lntMay, 1815;- 
 <S''/'>ijl'>vy/•'x; itj t}ui I'ltjht AHkUn oj lli^, 'i'rt'jii.ij h<dij:f^a thy: l'(/u:':r-i. 
 
 IstArt. Thw 7'iiioM K/iiHt t*o (■/>mjA(:t'i and entire, m> tlioi ffx; two eimidrica 
 form one (fingl'j and Kari/o Hfctt*;, si'ivi-Tiind )<y the Coriktitntiori already. 
 i:r,i.i.)i\\ii\i'-A in Ifolliiri'l, ao'l wt//';h v.i)l hn /ooriifio'l by '.-oiriinon ajcrociBiont 
 ac:ordiFi(? t/( tho mjw cirftum-frtaiic/is. ' ' 
 
 2iuJ. I'iUiTb will \i': .no/uiiiiiviiiiiin of Ujo Artii;li;h of tiii/i CooBtitution wbich 
 uKHiir': i/i ii.ll fijniiH 'if ri;(ijrion r;^jnal prot';';(,ioi) &nd favour, and ifWirauU:': 
 tbii luliiiimi'iii of all (;itiz(;/«, wlmtovijr ina,y Ix: tlitir ri.li^i</u» hhViof, to 
 j/uWi*; <i\\\<:i-M and imploymtnts, 
 
 3rd. '11)0 Bfd^ian I'r'rvinca VSll l/o j/ropfrrly ri;pr<:iv;TitiA tit ih<; AnH^imMy of f).'; 
 Bta.f/;« Oi/ooriil, of wllwli.tUc oniifuiry H(;f,aion« in time i>f penJ:': will bfl lj(;J'i 
 ■At/:rtiii.U:\ym!il)iitithiitiill'>i'.)irU,.tit/iwii. 
 
 4tJi. AJJ ti)fe Inlmbitattte of.ttirj K<:ttierlari'lo boin^ tine cormtitoUtmnUy ankirm- 
 hd<:ii uniong tliornw;!*".-.-:, ftio diffcrijut provjjjcfra will '.r/joy i.-'jiiaJly all 
 flio (jornmorc-lal au'I other adviirit<i^;i;rf of th/.-ir ri-wp'soti v<! pi.«)tio()», wi/iKiiit 
 any hir/'lranee or n.nfrJ';tion h';ii)fj \m]fpiftA upon one for tlio advantaf?e 
 ofthc other. 
 
 .^th. IniDOftdiatoly aft./;r t)ie_ Union/ f I/O provincw ;<.ti'l ti/wiiB of Ueljjinin will he 
 lAiiiitUAU) ci/njoji.rw; and th(; (iavi;/;iUon of the ii'A'itiuM on the mme footing; 
 il» the Duteh towmt and province*. 
 
 ';tli. The ebarge» ax well ii* t^ie heii'.fiti* being iri eoinnion, fhf; debts eoo,traet',-<l 
 up to the e))0(;h of (he Union Ijy the thiteli pr'ivlnce," on the Oiie hsiri'l, luxl 
 by the UaWyAh provit/ee->i, on the other !lian'l,_ wild he at ih<:\<e^i)f^ait^.pi 
 tne Pnblif! Treasury of the N'eflierkork. 
 
 7tb.' C(rafonr/ahly to the 'toitrte' prineiph;B, the expenwiw h:i\mr<-A fr/r the <*,tab- 
 Jialmrifmt an'l i7-ew;rvation of tlie fortificationM OD tlie frontier, f/f tlie 
 nr;W 8tite will he borne lA- ti.e f'nldie- 'i'reAifrtry, Hh re-siiltiil:< from dn ohjf ef 
 whieh iutt!re>t» the (f(;eiiri(y, and , ji><ltp'jn/)'>jiee /if^/tll the provineea ,a»id 
 the whole nation. 
 
 8th; The txpHtiii-it tit tho exlahlidhn/ent and kwrpinj,' up of the il^keo *fll 
 
 remain at tUo CJliar^e of tiie diotrietrf wliicb are mor;t dire':tly nitere«ted 
 
 in tliiH hraneh of the niiblii! service, ezce-i/tin;.; the obli}.;atirjti </ the 
 
 Hh'xte iw, general t*j furtii^ih auvoonr iacaife oif any extraordinary diraister, 
 
 ■ irt the liame manner a» Iia« been prae(JH'-'l up to tlie pr'rtfent lime in Hollao'l. 
 
 f 2 
 
212 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. <-'ha^- l^'^" 
 
 Swock'^^o^jecteii ,to, give Up - accordifigf to the Treaty 
 ^itU Denmark, until . tlie, ;expense of the war witii 
 Norway was paid to tbem. Lord Castlereaglr instructed 
 ]^r. . Thprnton, tlie British Minister at , Stockholm, jtct 
 state to the Prince ,R.oyal,,thati until all the stipulation^ 
 of that. Treaty were fulfilled he would not bring before 
 the British Parliament the grant of a million sterling, to 
 Sweden,: which hadibeen agreed upon in Heu of G-ua;dan 
 loppe. The Emperor of Russia, although not inclined 
 to pusli any point against the Prince Royal of. Sweden, 
 yet engaged on this subject to act withi England,, And 
 he^ was called, upon by the,Dul^e of Wellington torsej^ 
 justice done to the Eang of Denmark, consequent upon 
 \vhich;the proposed arrangement was carried intO/ effect. 
 The State of Pomerania^wa^anade over to- Prussia by 
 Sweden, as arranged by. the Treaty between those- twQ: 
 countries under the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, 
 and signed (together with the accompanying declara- 
 tions, both Danish, and. Swedish) at Yienna on the 7th 
 June, 1815.*: , ,., ,,.. . ,,; . i ,],,., j-,J , ..- ' 
 
 * Extmots from the Treaty between Prusaia 'and Sweden coacluded' under the 
 mediation, of. Eussia:— ' - • • ■" .i ' - ■ i, i . . > . ■ ; 
 
 ijl ' ' ' ' . lU'^'^^ y''.j s'^ . 
 
 1. Tlie King of Sweden cind Norway cedes in perpetuity, for Jnajj^elfafigi Ins 
 
 successors to the throne of Swedeij, according to the order of succespjon^ 
 of Sept, 26, 1810, to the King of Prussia and his successors tp the throne, 
 the Duchy of^Pomeraiiia and the Principality of Eiigen, with all its 
 dependencies, islands, fortresses, towns and country. 
 
 2. The King of Sweden, and Norway engages to deliver to the King of Pirjip^ia,^. 
 
 with tlie fortress of Stralsuud and the other fortified places in Pomerauia 
 and the island of Eiigen, the artillery and the military stores helouging 
 to them according to the agreement of His Majesty with the King of 
 Denniark in the 24th Article of the Treaty of Kiel. His Majesty -wiil' 
 also cause to be delivered to iHiS Prussian Majesty 200 pieces of deforikive 
 cannon, and 6 gun boats for the maritiine defence. 
 
 3. The public debt contraifed by the Eoyal Chamber Of Pomerania remains at' 
 ' tlie expense of I the King of Prussia as Sovereign Pri,nce. "' 
 
 i: The donatiohs in domains made by the King of Sweden, which amount to an 
 annual sutu of 43,000 6uiTent Pomeranian rix-dollars, will be returned to the 
 King, of Prussia. ' * 
 
 5. The King of Prussia engages to pay tjhe King of Sweden for the cession of the 
 Duchy of Pomerania and th(^ Principality of Eiigen the sum of 3,500 000 
 cm-rent ris-dollslrS of Prussia. ' ' " ' ' ' ' ' 
 
 G. The Duchy of Pomerania and the Principality of Eiigen will be delivered 
 to the King of PtUsSia'onC month 'after the exchange of the ratifications 
 of the present Treaty. ' ''■"'> i<""' ■■ ' -, ^, 
 
OHAf. in. EUROPEAN CONGMESSBS. 213 
 
 Y,JUpon the arrangements for Bivaria some HifSculties 
 arose with regard to the question of Salzburg/ Vhich 
 both that Power and Austria were desirous of possess- 
 ing ; but it was postponed for the present by the tem- 
 porary abandonment of her claims on the* part of 
 Austria. After the war with France, and after a 
 very lengthened negotiation, Salzburg 'was replaced 
 undern-the authority of Austria, but in the meantime 
 Bavalria obtained the Grand Duchy of Wurtzburg and 
 the Principality of Aschaffenburg. taiocj vnF. ^ 
 ■Amongst the singular ■^ propositions which ^were 
 brought forward at this Congress was one by the King 
 of Bavaria to place the Ionian Islands' under the sove- 
 reignty of the Prince Eugene Beauharnois, 'but the 
 proposal was rejected, and a stipulation in his favoui* of 
 a less important character (as having been distinguished 
 as Viceroy of the King of Italy and "^ the son-in-law of 
 the King of Bavaria) was brought forward and adopted. 
 With regard to the former Electorate of Hanover, 
 the King of Great Britain having assumed the title of 
 
 7^ iWhe King of Prussia and the King of Sweden will name each on his side 
 Commissioners invested with full powers necessary for effecting the remission 
 , of the, Ducljy of Pomerania and the Principality of Ktigen conformably 
 ^"' tB'tJie tehour of thi3 present Treaty. ' ,' 
 
 Sl'rfie'King of Prussia engages iii the most solemn, manner to assure to 
 ' ,. Tne inhabitants of Swedish Pomerania and the island of l^gen, with .tiieir 
 (KjPenttencies, their rights, liberties, and privileges, ai^^py8^,^i,exis^5and 
 were determined in the years 1810 and 1811. , ',.,., ^ "„' ,„, 
 
 9;*'^ie King*, of Prussia engages to maintain the religious establishnients, 
 *''.and, espeWally the Academy of Greiffswalde, in their present etatej^aUowing 
 '"'"tfjfe'inl'to'enjoy all their capital and actual revenues, g^jfi'io^a^' niarlj^'oi 
 
 10. The King of Prussia engages to maiutbdn English conan^g^ m ^^^isid 
 and prerogatives graD,t,i^(l by the Treaty of ^typkliolm, the ^ijdg^feSplte^lS. 
 and confirmed by the 'T^iaty of Kiel of thgjj^jj;)^ Jan. 1814.3 bas .noiniBO 
 
 11, 12, 1?, 14, 15, and 16[jel^te to interior arrangements. j,j(,., ji-taf, ..jHduq erfT .)} 
 17. The high coutractitig®owcrs invito the Emperor ofiAHltlSe ItofiS^Ewflf the 
 
 t',9f,±hp,.tJpit^df,|^pgdom of Groat Britain and Ireland, to give .theirj 
 >4f(^vjjo ,|)jLe,4»ffgIfilit stipuliitiofis contained m the present Trep,ty, as 
 as the reciprofcal' declarations of the Plenipotentiarips of the, JJing 
 of Sweden and o:f the Kijig of Denmark, as annexed to the m-esent ^Treaty. 
 ISI. ,TJmfra^en';^j,Tr^5i.t^ys|^ be ratified, and the ratifica,tioi:^ exph^jigje^ at 
 Befhu m the 'space offeix weeks from this day, oj; sooner if g,03sibie„g^^3 
 
 rMiovilab 3<:f Uiw (ti»ua lo -^^ Bbisoe de Harpenbekg. "Jl. i uiQ wfT :) 
 8noU^»ftiJti( ■all) 111 mnBiCoz'. '.^^ Baron de Humi.oldt. « m!i ,, 
 
 _ LE COMfE CllARLICS AXEL DF, LOWi^NUIELJlI. 
 
 Vienna, 1th June, 1815. 
 
■Hi EUROPEAN OON©BESSES. Chap. HI. 
 
 King^ of Hanover, which' was recognised ibyiiair- the 
 Powers assembled afl Vienna, it was > there decided; to 
 increase the i limits of the new kingdom, and the Kihg 
 of Prussia- agreed to cede tfor this purpose thei Princi- 
 pality of East Friedland, and part of the Principality 
 of Prussian Munster, receiving i in return part of the 
 Duchy of Luneburg, and some of the- adjacent Baili- 
 wicks. This arrangement was 'Confirmed by the .27|;h 
 Article of the Treaty, afterwards signed' .at Vienna lon 
 ■the 29th May; 1815. 'J ■■:--. . ■-;:, .i-:; •• -]..-.; ..i; 
 '-J Inrelation to the iquestion of the Slave Trade, Lprd 
 Oastlereagh proposed :to Prince Talleyrand . that Grreat 
 Britain should cede an is|and in the West Indies,! or 
 ';^ay a sum of money, in, compensation of losses whibh 
 might be incurred by French subjects, if France wouid 
 entirely abolish that traffic. Lord Oastlereagh felt 
 great embarrassment in his negotiation upon this subject, 
 from the strong and general expression of public feeling 
 respecting it in England, which impressed' other coun- 
 tries and Cabinets with anierroneous belief that Great 
 • Britain must have some important Colonial object in 
 the questional He determinedji however, to press the 
 ' subject with all his power, and he proposed a Convention, 
 to be generally agreed to by all the Sovereigns, not to 
 purchase Colonial produce from the States continuing 
 the Slave Trade. He succeeded in, persuading nthe 
 Emperx)r of Russia to agree ito his proposals, comprising 
 the establishment of a Commission composed of the 
 representatives of those States -determined to resist this 
 traffic, which should^ assemble at London or Paris, to 
 watch the means of putting ah end to it, and. it was 
 decided, notwithstanding the opposition of Spain and 
 Portugal, that the subject should be .discussed by the 
 Plenipotentiaries of the eight Powers. The declara- 
 tion of the Gongrefes upon this subject !was agreed to on 
 the 8th of' February.*. ,,.,(•.. 
 
 ' See State Papers for 1815-16, page 971. 
 
CnAP. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 215 
 
 ; Soon after tbej^termmationooftHs negotiation Lord , 
 Castlereagh, having obtained from the Emperor t)f 
 
 ^Russia a declaration of his pacific sentiments with 
 respect I to Turkey, and of 'his desire to settle every 
 question 'linder discussion with that Power under the 
 mediation of Grreat Britain, Austria, and Pi'ance, and 
 having resigned' his commission as first British Pleni- 
 potentiary at the Congress, returned to England, and 
 on his passage through Paris on the 28th of February, 
 he again strongly urged the King: of France to give 
 up the project of 'sending a French army against 
 Naples, and also repeated to hiih- the recommendation 
 that he should depute f^a i |)erson to Napoleon, at the 
 Island of Elba, to settle with him the claims which (he 
 preferred, for money which he stated was due to him, 
 'in virtue of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, 
 
 ' On the 7th of March the- Powers assembled at Vienna 
 were astounded by the news of the departure of Napo- 
 leon from Elba. This intelligence was , contained in a 
 despatch addressed by Lord Burghersh to Lord Oastle- 
 reagh, but transmitted tc the Duke of Wellington at 
 Vienna, and dated Florence, the 1st instant, i It. an- 
 nounced that Bonaparte had taken with him from 
 Elba his guards, amounting to YGO men, a battalion of 
 Corsican Rangers, 300 strong, together With a corps of 
 about 200 Poles, and five field-pieces ; the whole em- 
 barked in five feluccas, and convoyed by a brig-of-war, 
 an armed bomb-boat, and ahalf-decked armed vessel, the 
 
 SI ' Caroline.' ' Napoleon was himself on board his brig- 
 of-wai-', and left the harbour of Porto Ferrajo with the 
 restiof the fleet at 9 o'clock on the evening of the 26th 
 
 ' of February, the whole having been embarked- with 
 great Iseeresy in the course of the previous afternoon. 
 All the general officers -inElba accompanied him, i arid 
 
 "the tnajor of the town, M, de la Piere, was nominated 
 by him a major-general, to whom he entrusted the 
 
216 EUROrEAN CONGEESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 (lefeilc& of the town and island, together witli about 
 150 soldiers and the gendarmerie of the place. - ' 
 
 The event here recorded was the origin .of one of the 
 most siidclen and extensive convulsions with which the 
 civiKsed world has ever been visited. In the midst of 
 profound peace all the States of Europe were called to 
 arm to their utmost, pOwer, and to present themselves 
 on the battle-Md to defend t^e "independence which 
 only so, lately, after years of desolation and warfare, 
 they had believed tliemselves to have secured.* 
 
 * The ' immediate ocoiasion of tbid event was sb entirely aooldental that 
 it deserves to be distinctly detailed. Upon the '^abdication ■ o£j Napoleonvat 
 Fontainebleau in April, 1814, four Commissioners from the Allies -wer* appointed 
 tO' accompany him to i'rdjua, where he was t<J embark for the- island of Elba. 
 These w6re General Baron KoUer from Austria, General Schwivaloff from 
 Russia, Gount Truohs&s from Priissia, and'tlie Author, then LofdlBurghersh, 
 from England. On theimorning of the day on which the Gommiesioners' w6re to 
 set out from' Paris; Lord Burgliersh was obliged, from jSrivate' circumstances, 
 to request Lord Oastlefeagh to allow Colonel Bir Niel Campbell, a- most distin- 
 guished officer, who had been severely wounded at the battle of Perre 
 Champenoise, to replace him in this duty. Napoleon consequently departed 
 from Fontainebleau accompanied by these Commissioners, and when he reached 
 Fr^jus he requested Sir Niel Campbell to embark with him on board 1;he English 
 frigate which he had chosen for his conveyance to Porto Ferrajo ; and when Sir 
 Niel Campbell reported to Lord Castlereagli his arrival there, and the i wish 
 expressed by Napoleon that he should remain' witlr him, he received orde!^^ 
 to conform to that desire. , f , ,• • 
 
 In the montli of November Lord Burghersh wab ajjpoirited His Majesty's 
 Minister in Tuscany, and Sir Niel Campbell, who was residing in the island 
 of Elba, was placed under his orders, and 'this officer repaired to FloroAce 
 to report himself to Lord Burghersh, and to receive his instructions, the 
 only essential part of wliich was, tliat he should' remain in the continuance of the 
 respectful attentions to Napoleon which he had maintained since by his-Tequest 
 ho had 'accoinpanied him, but, at the same time, that he 'should be watchful 
 of any_ circumstances, eitlier' of visits or preparations, whicli miglit be indicative 
 of projects in anyway likely to threaten danger to the' tranquillity of the world'^ 
 Sir Niel immedinteiy' returned to Elba, ' but in the course of a few wfeelts 
 )ie again visited Florence, reporting a certain change of conduct in Napoleori; 
 indicated, by complaints of the want of punctuality in tlie' payment of monies from 
 the French Govcrament, which lie stated to be due to him ''(and whicli 
 were secured by tlie Treaty of Fontainebleau \ and also 'by the visits of persons 
 who were sujiposed to be connected with liis partisans in France 'and' Italy, and 
 more particularly with Marshal Murat, then King of Naples; The armaments 
 of this latter person at the beginning of tlie year 1815 had eSCited considerable 
 attention, -and Lord Burghersh thought it would b6 advisable tosend to Naples 
 an officer of some rank, to inquire wliat were the facts with regard to them. Sir 
 Niel Caihpbell liaving learnt this intention, most earnestly requested Lord 
 Burghersh to make choice of him for this commission, ' as ' it •would relieve 
 liira from attendance on Napoleon, who, since he liad fenced himself so much 
 with tlie etiquette of a Court, was no longer 'as unreserved and familiar with him 
 as lie had previously been. Lord Burghersh replied, that, it wa? impossible 
 for hiril to takb upon himself to 'remove him from the important duty with which 
 tie was charged i tlmt,, considering the unsettled state of tlungs which oxistedf at 
 that poriod, (thq enrl of Jfinuuiy,, 1815),, he thought .Sir Niel ought most strictlv 
 tp perlorm tliu service for wliicih ho had been allowed to remain at Elba. Lord 
 
Chap. ]ir. EUB0PEAN CONGEESSES. 217 
 
 Uponrtke receipt of this lintelligence and of .tkei.laii<i- 
 ing of Napoleon in France near Antibesron,thp'.lst.' of 
 
 Blirghersh begged him immediafely to return there;' but told him that, as 
 he seeiB©4 8<VP»uch to desire to he removed from i^ai duty, he yfould report it to 
 Lord Qastlereagh, and would inform him in Elba of his reply. Sir Kiel Campbell 
 fcon^qtaSnUy.' Returned, aad -Lord Burgbtet madeithe application ,. he j had 
 pi:omised to Lord Oastlereagh. ,,0h the 18th January he received auranswer from 
 hiin, by which he' approved of Lord Burgliersh's intention of stodihg an officer of 
 J5ink to report upon the.,^ipitary preparations in Naples, bu); he ^.i^sired. him on 
 lici account to employ Sir Ni'el Campbell upoh l thai service, as"' it was of the 
 gi;es4e3t consequence that until the close of the Congress «f, Vienna l^e< should 
 rema,in in Elba in order to report anything worthy of remark which might taie 
 place there. Lard Burghersh -waS' preparing to transmit this intelligence to Sir 
 Niel, when,.^to his great astonishment, that officer, walked into his 1*00111, 
 to report his - having returned to Florence, being impatient to - know what 
 had been Lord Castlereagh's decision as to his employment in Naples. Lord 
 Burgliersh' found', great iault with Sir Niel.fbr having thus disobeyed the! Strict 
 Sliders 'he hadi given ■ him to iSmain at his post, and, putting into his hands 
 the. letter he had received from Lord Castlereagh, he, entreated him to return to 
 the ^island,, of-,, Elba without idelayi. Sir Niel expressed . his sorrow for the 
 indiscretion he had committed, and assured Lord Burgher»h he would return 
 immediately, but sta/ted- that the, sloop-of-war "(the, .' Partridge,VCflptain Adye) 
 which was under his orders, and which had brought , him to LeghorB, had 
 returned-to Elba, and would not be baek in Leghorn till Saturday, the 26th. 
 LordBm-ghersh; tol(i him he must exert himself to return immediately; that 
 he might judge from Lord Castlereagh's letter of the importance which was 
 attached to the strict discharge of the duty assigned to him, and that he could 
 only .repeat to him that he ought to return at once. Nothwithstanding this 
 injunction. Sir Niel did not, leave Florence till the Saturday. Upon his arrival 
 at Leghorn he wfrote to Lord Burghersh a despatch and , a private letter, botli 
 dated the 26th of, February, stating that upon his arrival there he received 
 the ,ireps)rt! from , Captain Adye,. as well asi from the Vice-Consul Kicci, that 
 evident preparations were making by Napoleon for leaving the island, and 
 that lie" consequently phould immediately embark, on, board the,' Partridge,'. «ind 
 proceed, there. , m _,,,, : , , ,.. , , 
 
 , J Lord Burghersh heard no more on this ,subjeot -till, the evening of the 1st 
 of' March, when. he. received at. Florenpe ;a 'despatch from Sir Niel Campbell, 
 brought by Mr. ©rattan, an. English gentleman wiio for a short time had been a 
 resident in the island of jElba,. and who was a witness of the departure of 
 Napoleon, and his fleet, on: the night of the 26.th February.. This .. despatch; 
 of which. an extract is given, details this event, -together with the measures whidh 
 Sir. Niel had determined to take upon it.,uThey are of trifling,- importawce, 
 aa they failed in averting the convulsion .Which was, brought upon the world, but 
 they are I confirmatory ("together with the- circumstances which preceded them) of 
 the, fact,, that if Sir Niel Campbell ,had conformed to the [directions be had 
 received, both from his GoverHment and from Lord Burghersh,, or had immediately 
 on Jdsi arrival at 1 Florence, !ou the 19th of February, returned to Elba, he 
 would !. have been in a positdonj-on board the .' Partridge, to have interfered with 
 Napoleon's departure at that, time* 1 and probably to have taken such measures as 
 woijld have prevented, it altogether. It is &ir to state that in, this, transaction no 
 further blame, was attached to SirNiel by Lord: Castlereagh or Lord Burghersh 
 than for his, disbelief in the , urgency of the orders he, had received, and the want 
 of foresight wliich allowed him to suppose that no immediate project of departure 
 froni Elba .Jiad been formed, by Napoleon, while at the same time he had 
 persuaded Ijimself that if he made . any / movement from Elba it would be 
 to combine in, some operation with the troops of Marshal Murat. < 
 
 \|Ei{^-%cf from I)i;3rAiOH,froi}i,.Sii; N",i'el (Jampukli, to Lord IJurqhersh., , 
 "•Mv Lord, ,,: , ,',,iw, -,1 ' .r,,..- Leghorn, 26th Feb:, I8I5, 4 p.m. 
 
 " Captaih^Adye' left this on the' 'afterhfion of the 22nd to visit Elba and 
 Palmayola during "my absence, and to' I'eturn here this day to carry me back. 
 
218 BUEOPBAN OONGEESSBS. Chap. III. 
 
 March, the general impressioii upon' the Sovereigns and 
 the meiflbers of the Congress Was, that, however raSh 
 and startling' this enterprise of Napoleon might aj>i)ear 
 to be, he would, nevertheless, probably succeed in' col- 
 lecting a large army from the officers and liien who had 
 served under him, and had formed a great attachment 
 to him, and that he might thus become a source of 
 serious danger to the Government of tire King of 
 France. Many others, and more particularly M. de 
 Talleyrand and the French plenipotentiaries in Vienna, 
 most conscientiously maintained an opposite opinion, in 
 support of which they cited not only the want of con- 
 sideration or attachment which had been shown to- 
 wards him on his passage through France to feinbark at 
 Frejus, but also what had passed at Orgon, on the 
 road to Lyons, where he had been attacked whilst de- 
 tained at the post-house, and obliged to escape on the 
 horse of his courier ; so that afterwards, when rejoined 
 at the inn in which he had taken^ refuge, by the Allied 
 Commissioners who accompanied him, aind ^vdre present 
 
 From a Memorandum transmitted to me by Mr. Eioui, containing information 
 of what has occurred there since my 'departure upon the 16th^from what 
 Mr. Mariotti, the French Consul here, has heard from his correapQndenJ;s in 
 Elba and Corsica, — from what Captain Adye, this momeM arrived, tells me, and 
 other information which I have obtained here, combined with suspi9tqus 
 Circumstances for a short time' past, I am fully persuaded' that Bonaparte means 
 to quit Elba, and join Murat immediately, or to be in readiness to do so, if there is 
 any decided step taken by the latter. 
 " I mean to sail this night for Elba. 
 
 "I have the honour, &c., , 
 (Signed) "Nibl CAMPsiLL." 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Sin Niel CAMpiSELL to Lord BuRaHERSH. 
 
 '• Mv T nhV, " 0" hoard H.M.S. the ' Partridge,' off Porto Ferrnjo, 
 
 mi uimu. Island of Elba, Mid-day, February 28th. , , 
 
 " This morning being becalmed I landed in a boat at Portoi Ferrajo. 
 Bonaparte left therei upqn ;thei 26th instant at 9 p.m., on board of his i brig 
 ' L'luconstant,', .with the bombard ' L'Btoile,' , the^ half-decked boat 'La 
 Caroline,' iind, four feluccas, yesterday, at 1Q,,a.m. he, was seen from Porto 
 Ferrajo to the; northward .of Oapreizia, and was lost sight :of soon afterwards. 
 Mr. Grattan, an English gentleman, saw the embarkation of the whole, and saw 
 them yesterday in the, §itv?,tion, described. , I am therefore induced to change 
 the opinion I had entertained of .Bopaparte's intentipn .tq go to Na,ples, and 
 think he is destjned for the frontier, of France and Eiedmout. Captain Adye 
 will steer, in that, direction, so, as to endeavour to over,take them before theyland. 
 1 , , ■ , i I- " I have ,the honour, &o., , j ', 
 (Signed) "Niel Campbell." 
 
Chap. III. BUBOPEAN OONGEESSES. 219 
 
 saA the scene -above described, hei decided to continixe 
 ibis journey under tbe disguisei of! an assumed name, 
 and after some discission selected tbat of ;L-Burgbel-sb.* 
 I .T;be opinions, of those who differed from the' French 
 
 fl^Sgation as to the probability of Bonaparte's success 
 
 (gained strength from, day to day, and, on the 19th of 
 
 : March intelligence was received of his successful entry 
 into Paris, together .wiith- an official statement of the 
 
 . .retreat of Louis XYIII. from that capital across the 
 .French frontier into the Netherlands. 
 
 This astonishiug qvent was brought about by the 
 defection of the whole French army from the cause of 
 
 -, the, King, and. its assembly under the. banner of Napo- 
 leon. Officers and soldiers within reach of the influence 
 of his passage through .the' country alike partook of this 
 movement. This transfer of the alliance of a whole 
 army from one Sovereign to another may in part be 
 
 !,accounted for by the fact, that all the corps of that 
 army, being unchanged both as to officers and men, 
 
 ,iil(ewained.the same ^as they had been while serving and 
 gaining laurels under his command. It was therefore 
 
 J too much to ; expect that enthusiastic soldiers, accus- 
 tomed to be led to victory, should resist the call which 
 
 "their leader, almost unattended, had come to make upon 
 them.f 
 
 * This cirpumstftuce is, singular enough to require some explanation, and 
 is ,thus related!' by Count Truchs&s, the commissioner from Pi-ussia, who 
 was' in attendance upon Napoleon and accompanied him to Frejus. 
 
 fit is not improbable th,at this calamity might have been averted, if a 
 
 measure had been carried into ' effect, which had been decided upon by the 
 
 Count D'Artois when heiairived in Paris after the entry of the Aj-lies, 
 
 and received bn'the 14th April from the Provisional Government the sovereign 
 
 authority as Lieutenant-Gdvernor' of the Kingdom, a;nd' as exercising the authority 
 
 of the King in accordance with the powers entrusted to him, which he expected 
 
 to retain for^a considerable time. The Count and the council which he 
 
 ■'had assembled around him, had determined to give to the whole French army, 
 
 as a well-merited reward for their distinguished services and Iblng-protracted 
 
 laboiirs, a general conge' of from four to six: months, during whieheach individual 
 
 soldier ■ was to receive his weekly pay' at his domicile in his commune or 
 
 i'arrondlsaement. During the period i of this cbnge' the wWe of the troops, 
 
 ofScers and men, *ere to be' re-formed, as the Eoyal army, 'into new corps 
 
 ' and regiments. The' prisoners of War retoriiing from foreign' countries, and 
 
 of which thel-e were nearly ' 60,000 in England, were to have been allowed 
 
220 EUROPEAN OONGBESSBS. Chap. HI. 
 
 Upon first receiving information of the landing of 
 Napoleon in France the Powers, assembled in Congress, 
 determined without hesitation to make war against him 
 in defence of Louis XVITI. ; but upon further intelli- 
 gence of the King's departure from France, and of the 
 complete re-establishment of Napoleon's authority 
 throughout the kingdom, this decision was so far 
 changed that the four Powers only bound themselves 
 by the renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont to make war 
 against Napoleon, and all the other Powers of Europe 
 were invited to accede to it, so that the number of 
 troops to be brpught against France was calculated to 
 amount to 840,000 men, 
 
 The Treaty was signed om the 25th of March, but no 
 stipulation wais made as to the subsidy to be given by 
 England, though cA^ery Power applied for some portion 
 of it, without which they stated the difficulty, if not the ' 
 impossibility, of their being able to put their troops int 
 motion. Russia required a sum of 4,000,000/., but the 
 Duke of Wellington declared a grant of such an amount 
 to be totally impossible, and that he was authorised by 
 Lord Castlereagh to offer 7,'000,000Z. as the-suhsidy 
 to all the Powers, and the British army in the field to 
 amount to,75,000„men. 
 
 The first idea as to the general command of the army 
 of Europe was, that the Emperor of Russia should be 
 
 to profit by the same favour as that accorded to tho troops fouiid embodied." 
 The military service of tho State was to liave been entrusted to the Garde 
 Natioualo, wliich upon tlie return of the ancient Koyal Family to the throne 
 of tho country had shown their favourable ,niiiidi( even enthusiastic approval. 
 Wlien tho period for the re-a3sembling of the army after tho expiration of 
 tho cong^ arrived, it was also iilteilded to give a great many entire conge's 
 for long service, or for distinctions gained on tho field of battle; or for well- 
 attested merit. So tliat the number of old soldiers recalled, to the ai-niy would 
 have been greatly diminisliod, and as they would airiiave'becn formed into new 
 corps witli a great number of new oifieers and s(*ildiera, it is not likely tliat they 
 would have retained that enthusiasm for tlie name of Napoleon, which was 
 displayed on the present occasion. It is therefore reasonable to believe, that'the 
 catastrophe of 181.5 wouhl not have occurred, if the intention of the Colint 
 D'A'rtoia had been carried out, which was, however, prevented by the early return 
 of the; King himself from England, and his assumption of the royal authority 
 upon his arrival at Paris on the 3rd of Blsty. 
 
CtlAP.. in.^ EUKOPBAN CONGRESSES. 221 
 
 named Dictator, and'that the Duk^ of Wellington should 
 take the field wilh'hirti ad first of the militarj^" couii^il, 
 but this 'project not mfeeting with general approbation, 
 and the Duke of Wellington' having desired to be with 
 his own armyi or/as' he expressed itj tb be allowed to 
 caKry a musket^ it was given up, and 'aih unaniinous 
 wish was expressed by the Sovereign'^ and PlenipBteh- 
 tiarJes I assembled at the Congress, tha't the 'Dtike of 
 Wellington should' assiime the'fc6m'^^nd 6f the British 
 anfi cdhfederate army aSsembhng'ih' Belgium, 'ahd' thai; 
 he should proceed to assunle that cbhlniand' a^^ soon as 
 the troops composing' it had been brought together. 
 And the Duke being himself convinced that hi^, dqing 
 soiwould meet fee* 'Wishes of the British Gr6vernmeht, 
 and be 'the- wisest course to pursue, he detei^mined to 
 leave Vienna, placing the affairs of the Coigress m the 
 hands of Lord Clancarty, by whom they were brought 
 to a conclusion. Before the Duke's departure he was 
 engaged in Hhe' negotiation of the aff"airs Which had 
 ofccupied J the attention of the Congress, the general 
 character of which 'ib'^pfeported in the following de- 
 spatch: — ' "if 'H|- 
 
 " My LoED, " Vienna, March 4th, 1815. ' 
 
 " ' " Some process lias 'he'eii made In all the affairs in nego- 
 ciatioii' since I last addressed you. '' ' ' i 
 
 " The Emperor of Russia has cojjsented to Austria's retaining 
 possession of the Valteline and the Valley of the Chiavenne and: 
 Botnio ; and that ^J^jfte^, should; hayeitibe Porentrui, on condi- 
 tion that the Powers should propose to Berne, through the 
 deputy of that Canton ;riow here, some alterations in its consti- 
 tution. >iThis! hais been consented to, and as a treaty has been 
 arranged with Mqnsieuii , le Comte de Marceau, by which the 
 King of Sardinia will cede to Geiieya /a' sniall district in the 
 neighbdrirhopfj of that town, including Carouge and a tract of 
 land between the road of the Si'mplon and the lake, on condi- 
 %i6^ of thei cession to IJis Majesty of the Genoese Imperial Fiefs, 
 and of incliiding in the Swiss system the Savoyard districts of 
 
222:- EUKOPEAN OON'G'RESSES. Cha^. III. 
 
 Chablais and Fossigny,!! consider the affairs of Switzerland as 
 settled. The Gommission will meet to-morrow, and I will urge^ ' 
 that its report may be tkken into consideration by the eight 
 Powers without loss of time. ' 
 
 " I enclose a new project given in by Marshal Prince Wrede 
 for thei settlement of tlie questions still depending between 
 Austria and Bavaria. Upon red^iving' it Prince Mettemich sent 
 for the Chancellor Prince Harddnberg, • Coimt Nesselrode, and 
 myseK, and with the exception of Frankfort, which ■ is to' be' 
 made a free imperial town,' and of a cession on the left of the 
 Ehine for Pridice Eugene, and with the addition of the cession' 
 on the part of Bavaria of 'the iown of Salzburg, the principle of'* 
 this project was generally admitted as reasonable and fit to be' 
 adopted; The Chancellor has, I understand, spoken to the Em- 
 peror of Eussia upon the ■ subject, who equally approves of the 
 plan, objecting, however, positively to Bavaria's receiving any- 
 thing more than she has a right to by treaty. 
 
 " Knowing that your Lordship had always intended that Ba- 
 varia should be the German power on the left of the Ehine, ill ' 
 communication with the Sovereign of the Netherlands, I urged 
 this measure upon the consideration of the meeting at Prince 
 Metternicli's ; but the Prince de Wrede had expressed himself 
 so decidedly against the possessions on the left of' the Ehinej'' 
 even with Mayence, since" the' Prussians were placed oh the right 
 of the Moselle, and in any case without having Mayence; that 
 there was no hope of succeeding' in prevailing upon him to take 
 them. The Chancellor and Count Nesselrode were decidedly 
 against alteration ' of the system agreed upoii for Mayence ; and 
 both appeared to tlainlc that it was ihost fortunate that' Bavaria 
 had herself proposed to receive her compensations oil the right 
 instead of the left of the Ehiije. ' : ■ ' 
 
 "There will' be no difficulty respecting the cessions to' be 
 required from Wurtemberg ; and as there appears norie'bn the 
 part of the Emperor of Eussia respecting that' requii-ed from 
 Baden, this power will consequently receive its indemnificfetSoii. 
 It is intended to place Prince 'Eugene in a soveyeigilty de- 
 pendent upon the Kingiof BaVnria, but-where is not settled. 
 
 "The only difficulty in tl)i8 settlement apptors to be Salz- 
 biirg, to which both Austrians niid Bavariansi attach the utmost 
 importance. The former are ' strong in 'treaties. The Beci>et'' 
 Treaty of 'Pairis which contaiys^the' three articles of the Trealty ' 
 of Kiel regarding! cessions, particularly specifies Saltzbuvg' 
 
Chap. III. EUI?OPE^Ni,OONGKESSBS. 223 
 
 among other points to be icecj^d-.to Austria ; in return for wMcli 
 she promises her goo4. offices to obtain for Ba¥«,ria the cession 
 ofMayence, Erankfpirtj and Hauau. The two former pamaot be.; 
 got, and Bavaria will have the last. , : , ^ 
 
 " Th0 line of the InnandiSal^iburg are certainly important to 
 Austria. In, the possession of Bay aria Salzburg is a menacing 
 point upon Vienna, and upon the ■ coBaWunication with Italy, 
 and it breaks in upon the whole system of the Austrian line of ; 
 defence. It is true that Sal^bUrgjin the hands of Austria, is, hke- 
 wisp menacing upon Munich ; irbftt; it M to be, pbseryfld. that 
 Austria does no.ti, require that point for that object. Whereas, 
 though, BaYiaria; should possess Salzburg, ,ai movement from , the 
 Tyrol or from, Bohemia wotild turn her position on the Inn; 
 and the, two Powers are not, nor cannot be so nearly balanced 
 in, strength as, to riq^ixder it desirable to Bavaria to keep Salz-. , 
 bm-g.as,;a< menacing ,point to be used in a counter movenaent for 
 her own defence. 11,1 ^ 
 
 "In every view, then,, of the question, whether of the treaties^ 
 by which; the Powers are bound, or of their military conve- 
 nience or security, I conceive Salzburg ought to belong to 
 Austria. 
 
 ." The jfLustrian Cabinet appear determined to persist in de- 
 manding it, I and the Bavaodans to refuse it. It is unfortunately 
 not only a point of personal convenience to the Prince , Royal, 
 bftthas been made one of vanity to, the. nation ; and I am much 
 afraid that it wiU not be ceded to Austria wit|ioUt creating a 
 good deal of coolness. 
 
 " The Emperor of Eussia was here some nights ago,, and 
 spoke to me, respecting the state of ithei questions between the 
 Kings of Sweden ,andi Denmark, regarding the Treaty of Kiel. 
 His Majesty appeared at first to think that 1 the Prince Eoyal had 
 caflsefor some complaint against the King of Denmark ; and he 
 wisbed,to5i^pW:> what line the Prince Regent intended to take 
 upon this subject. f 
 
 ",I referred His, Majesty, to your Lordship's letter of ithe ,'ii.;,. J 
 to ]|Ir.. Thornton, -vvhifih itiwas::obvious he had not read. I then ■ 
 told hipathat after the, enquiry and reports that had been mkde 
 by ;tMp Commission,ers lOathe ;pai»t' of the Allies, it was impos- 
 sible to allow the Prince Royal to charge the King of Denmark 
 with encouragement , of . the lesistanee of the Niorwegiansi, and; 
 that His Majesty could not. now. be putton hisitrial-on the vague 
 surmisa^i ®f M<aBS.>f|de Lewenhelm ; that the Prince Eoyal, if he 
 
224 EUROPRAN CONGRESSES. Chap. Ill ' 
 
 has any proof, ought to produce it ; and if he had not, he ought 
 to be required to perform his treaty. 
 
 " I then begged His Ma-jesty to reflect upon the unfavourable 
 impression which would be made throughout Europe, if a treaty 
 which had drawn so much attention were not performed in its 
 articles in favour of the King of Denmark, and I told him that 
 I was quite certain that the Prince Eegent would not pay the 
 compensation for Guadeloupe, till the treaty was performed. 
 
 " His Imperial Majesty said he woidd read your Lordship's 
 despatch to Mr. Thornton, and it appeared to me, that what I 
 had said to him had inade some impression upon him. 
 
 " I have since received, yesterday, the duplicates of Mr. 
 Thornton's official and secret answer, Nos. 6 and 7, to your 
 Lordship's despatch. I propose to send the former to be laid 
 before the Emperor, with what observations I shall think useful ; 
 and I will afterwards endeavour to obtain an audience from His 
 Lnperial Majesty, in order if possible to prevail upon him to 
 order his Minister at Stockholm to act in concert with Mr. 
 Thornton on the subject, before he will leave Vienna. 
 
 " His Imperial Majesty's departure is now fixed for the 15th, 
 and I understand ■«'ill probably be delayed till the 20th. I think 
 he will not go till after I have heard from your Lordship from 
 England. 
 
 " Nothing more has happened on the affairs of Italy. Murat 
 has, I understand, in some degree altered his tone, since he has 
 heard of the state of affairs here in the commencement of Fe- 
 bruary. 
 
 (Signed) " Wellington." 
 
 On the 12th March the Duke of Wellington, M. de 
 Talleyrand, and Prince Metternich, waited on the King 
 of Saxony at Presburg, to lay before him, asid to pro- 
 pose for his acceptance, the arrangement which had 
 been come to among the Powers respecting Saxony, 
 begging him to consent to the cession of a part of 
 Saxony, which it had been found necessary to require 
 of him. To these proposals the King of Saxony ab- 
 solutely refused to agree, and the protocol of the Con- 
 gress, dated the 15th of March, declared that the King 
 having refused the portion of his kingdom which had 
 
q«AP, HI. EUROPEAN CONGEEg^ES. 225 
 
 been reserved for Jiim, the, whole country, should be 
 made over for the temporary^ occupation of the Prussian 
 troops. ' ''■ "-"■ •■"-4i ,1 T 
 
 On the 25th March the Duke of Wellington stated 
 that Count .Qampochiar(?^ called upon him to propose 
 C|njthe part of Marshal Murat, that he would join the 
 Allies with his whole army against Napoleon. On the 
 day previous, the i24th inst-^ Lord Oastlereagh writes 
 to the Duke of Wellington, to announce that M. de 
 Pocco, hi^'' Neapolitan agent in London, had waited 
 upon him OjO. that day to ^' make the ,samp proposal, and 
 he jn^triapted him (th^,Duke of Wellington), ijij case he 
 should consider thatjMarshal Murat was ; to; be relied 
 up®n, to carry out tthe negociation. Shortly before this, 
 on the 18th of March, Baron Sebzeltern, the 'Austrian 
 Minister in Rom'Sj announced to Lord Burghersh at 
 Florence, that he had iiitelligence which he could rely 
 upon, I th fit the Neapolitan troops would immediately 
 enter the Roman States, on the eide of Terracina, as 
 they did, in fact, on the 28th March ; this intelligence 
 #as '•frnmediately transmitted to Marshal Bellegarde at 
 Milah! and by him td^ Yienna, where it arrived' at the 
 same time with" the piropositions of alliance which had 
 bee% made to the Duke of : Wellington, and to the 
 Austrian Grovernment, as above stated. It was after- 
 wards known that the Neapolitan army, which already 
 occupied the marches of, Ancona, ^ladib^fjfi reinforced 
 by .thej troops, whipj:;i; passed .t]ie„Tronto on the 28th 
 Il^arch. Lord W. Bentincki, and Marshal J^ellegarde, 
 in^mediately upon receiying this information, wrote to: 
 Vienna to enquire, in case of the invasion, qf the pro- 
 vinces occupied ;Jt)y,ft%, Austrian troops, which ,weJ^e 
 rai^aged, what course they were to pursupi.; The answer 
 of the Austrian Grovernment and of,tliei,Puke of 
 WgUington, qn the 26th March, was, ti^f-t if , Marshal 
 Myrat a,ttacked the Austrian ,fprces in - those provinces 
 
 Q 
 
226 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 he was to be opposed, and that the armistice with 
 England was at an end, as it was only negociated and 
 signed, as being dejoendent upon the peace with 
 Austria. On the day following the date of this letter, 
 the Duke of Wellington announced to Lord Castlereagh, 
 that, on the day on which the proposal of Cariate and 
 Campochiaro was made to the Austrian Government, 
 the Austrians were aware that the Neapolitan troops 
 had invaded the Roman States on the 21st March, and 
 that therefore they could place no reliance on the good 
 faith of that proposal. The Duke also encloses a copy 
 of the despatch that he had consequently written to 
 Lord W. Bentinck, on the 28th, stating that he con- 
 sidered the invasion of the Roman States by Murat as 
 consti tilting an infraction of the armistice. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Lord Wllliam 
 Bentinck, dated Vienna, 28th March, 1815. 
 
 " Prince Metternich has communicated to me a copy of your 
 Lordship's letter to Marshal Bellegarde, of the 20th March, in 
 which your Lordship states your opinion, that in case Murat 
 should make a movement "with his troops, which is considered as 
 an act of hostility and breach of treaty with the Emperor of 
 Austria, your Lordship will consider the armistice existing be- 
 tween His Majesty and Murat at an end. 
 
 " I beg to inform you that I entirely concur with you ia that 
 opinion, which I have reason to believe to be in conformity with 
 that of His Majesty's Government." 
 
 Marshal Bellegarde, on receiving the first notice of 
 the entry of the Neapolitan troops into Terracina, 
 despatched General Stahremberg to Marshal Murat's 
 head-quarters at Ancona, to enquire of him the object 
 of his advance into the Roman States, and of the con- 
 centration of so large a body of his troops in the Marches 
 of Ancona, which appeared to menace the Austrian 
 troops in occupation of the Legations. General Stah- 
 remberg arrived there on the 26th March, and the 
 following is a copy of the letter he addressed to Lord 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 227 
 
 Burghersh, which contains an account of the conversa- 
 tion he had had with Marshal Murat, and of the con- 
 viction which he had received from it that it was the 
 intention of Murat to drive the Austrians out of the 
 Legations. 
 
 Translation of a Letter of General Stahrembbeg to Lord Burghersh. 
 
 " My dear Lord BuEGHEESH, " Bologna, 27tli March, 1815. 
 
 " I hasten to acquaint you with the result of my mission 
 to King Joachim. In an interview which lasted ahove three- 
 quarters of an hour, he demonstrated to me by a verbiage devoid 
 of common sense, the absolute necessity of his movements, that 
 they were provoked by the marching of om- troops into Italy 
 (whereas his troops had quitted Naples much sooner). In order 
 however to keep open the road to Bologna as long as possible, 
 I employed all means to gain time, and after I had used very 
 strong language to him, he assured me he would make no for- 
 ward movement till he had received the courier he expected 
 from Vienna. As I met that courier yesterday at Pesaro, and 
 he will probably bring a reply analogous to the King's views, I 
 do not think I am mistaken in believing that he will commence 
 to-day, or at latest' to-morrow, his movements towards Bologna. 
 He assembled his first division yesterday at Sinigaglia (which I 
 saw), to pass in review, the second division at Ancona, and the 
 third at Macerata and Tolentino, and they are equally ready to 
 march, so that finding little resistance on our side, he might be 
 by the 30th or 31st at Bologna. There is only one- frigate in 
 the port of Ancona ; he sent one away to Leghorn, under pre- 
 text of taking Princess Pauline on board to conduct her to 
 Naples. I found a confidential person in the suite of the Duke 
 de GaRo, who gives me the surest intelligence; I hope to 
 receive some up to-morrow evening, or the day after to-morrow, 
 at Milan, which I will communicate to you, if I know where 
 you are. 
 
 " Your friend, 
 
 (Signed) " Staheembeeg, General." 
 
 This report was not calculated to inspire Marshal 
 Bellegarde with any confidence in the intentions of 
 Marshal Murat ; he therefore hurried forward as much 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 as possible the reinforcements whicli were arriving to 
 his army, and as they were still at some distance in the 
 rear, he determined to evacuate Bologna and the Lega- 
 tions, in case the Neapolitan army should push forward. 
 This advance of the Neapolitan army was not long 
 delayed. For Marshal Murat, on the 30th March, three 
 days after General Stahremberg had left him, issued 
 from Rimini the following proclamation to the Italian 
 people. 
 
 Mdrat's Pkoclamation, 30th March, 1815. 
 
 " Italians ! — The hour is come when the high destinies of 
 Italy must be settled. Providence calls on you at last to be 
 an independentjaation. 
 
 ""^TFfomTlie Alps to the Straits of ScUla a single cry is heard 
 — the independence of Italy. 
 
 " By whaT right do foreigners pretend to deprive you of this 
 ijidependence, which is the first blessing and first right of every 
 people ? By what right do they rule over your finest provinces ? 
 By what right do they appropriate to themselves your riches to 
 transport them to the countries of their birth ? By what right, 
 finally, do they tear your sons from you to serve, to languish, 
 and to die far from the tombs of their ancestors ? Is it, then, 
 in vain that Nature raised for you the barrier of the Alps ? Is 
 it in vain that she provides you with still more insurmoimtable 
 barriers in the difierence of language and of manners, and the 
 invincible antipathy of races ? No, no. Purge the Italian soil 
 of all foreign domination. Once masters of the world, you 
 expiated that dangerous glory by twenty centuries of oppression 
 and of misery. Now, may your glory be to have no masters. 
 Every nation should confine itself within those limits traced by 
 nature. Seas and inaccessible mountains — these are your limits. 
 Never aspire to pass them, but drive back the stranger who has 
 violated them, if he does not hasten to return within liis own. 
 Eighty thousand Italians from the Kingdom of Italy march, 
 commanded by their King, and swear not to seek repose till 
 Italy is liberated. It is already proved that they know how to 
 maintain what they swear. Italians of other provinces, second 
 the magnanimous design. Let those amongst you who are 
 accustomed to the use of arms take them up again, and let the 
 
Chav. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 229 
 
 inexperienced youth hasten to learn to wield them. Let aU 
 who possess generous hearts concur in this noble effort, and call, 
 in the name of the country, on every true Italian to raise the 
 cry of liberty. In short, let all come forward and display, in 
 every form, the national energy. It is now to be decided 
 whether Italy shall be free, or whether she is again for centuiies 
 to bow down her humiliated head to servitude. The struggle 
 must be decisive, and we shall see secured for long the happiness 
 of a country so beautiful that, maimed and bleeding as she is, 
 can stiU excite such passions in the foreigners. The illustrious 
 men of all countries, every nation worthy of a liberal Govern- 
 ment, the Sovereigns who are distiagTiished by greatness of 
 mind, will rejoice at your enterprise and will applaud your 
 triumph! And can England refrain from applauding you — that 
 model of constitutional government, that free people, who 
 reckon it their glory to fight and to spend theii- treasures for 
 the liberty of nations ? 
 
 " Italians, for a long time you have wondered that you called 
 upon us in vain. Perhaps you reproached our inaction, when 
 your aspirations reached us on all sides. But the proper time 
 had not arrived. I had not yet had proof of the perfidy of your 
 enemies, and it was necessary that experience should show the 
 falsity of the lying promises of which your former masters, on 
 returning amongst you, were so prodigal. Experience soon and 
 fatally demonstrated ! I call on you as witnesses, brave and 
 unfortunate Itahans, of Milan, of Bologna, of Turin, of Venice, 
 of Brescia, of Modena, of Eeggio, and of every other illustrious 
 and oppressed region. How many valiant warriors and virtuous 
 patriots are torn from their native lands ! How many groan in 
 irons ! How many victims ! What extortions and unheard-of 
 humiliations ! Italians ! put an end to these miseries. Unite 
 firmly together, and a government of your own choice — a truly 
 national representation, a constitution worthy of the century 
 and of you— will guarantee your liberty, and your internal pro- 
 sperity as soon as your bravery shall have guaranteed your 
 independence. I call around me aU brave men to fight. I call 
 also all who have profoundly meditated upon the interests of 
 their country, that they may prepare the constitution and the 
 laws which will for ever govern the happy Italy — the inde- 
 pendent Italy. 
 
 (Signed) " Joachim Napoleon. 
 
 "Rimini, March 30, 1815." 
 
230 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 It was a singular circumstance that all the privations 
 of the Italian independence, the rule over their finest 
 provinces — the appropriation of their riches, the tearing 
 away their sons to serve, to languish, and to die far 
 from the tombs of their ancestors, had been for the last 
 ten years exclusively the work of the French ruler, who 
 from the frontier of Savoy to the Straits of Messina, 
 had occupied and governed the Italian soil.* Conse- 
 quently this bombastic call by Murat's Proclamation 
 was as little responded to as their aspiring liberators 
 proved themselves equal to the task. 
 
 Marshal Murat not only invaded and occupied the 
 Legations, but also, after writing to assure the Pope that 
 he intended no hostility against him, took possession of 
 the Eoman States, the Pope having escaped from the 
 capital and reached Florence on the 25th March. 
 Again, after addressing a letter to the G-rand Duke of 
 Tuscany on the 27th March, in which he stated that he 
 would not enter his territory, he did directly the re- 
 verse, and sent a corps of 6000 men into Florence. 
 
 No. 6. 
 
 Prom King Joachim Murat to tlie Grand Duke of Tuscany. 
 
 " SiK, MY BkOTHBE, " Anoona, 27tli March, 1815. 
 
 " I am informed that Your Imperial Highness is quitting 
 Tuscany, and the motive assigned to your departure is the 
 movement of my troops, whom I have found it necessary to 
 cause to advance upon the Po. Never having under any cir- 
 cumstances had other than friendly relations with Your Imperial 
 Highness, I cannot conceive that you consider my troops as 
 enemies, and that you have thought it necessary to leave your 
 dominions because they are to approach them. If I could think 
 
 * The state of things in Italy as thus described oorresponda very precisely with 
 the statement made shortly after the battle of Austerlitz in 1805 by Napoleon 
 as to his intentions respecting that counti-y to the Marquis Lucchesini, wlio 
 repeated it to the Autlior. When speaking of the general poUtical aii'airs of the 
 world, he said, "A I'egard d'ltalie, jo la regard© oommo ma maitressc : je veux 
 y couoher seul." 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 231 
 
 that such an idea has entered your mind I should hasten to re- 
 assure Your Imperial Highness, by declaring that I have never 
 had any motive or any project of hostility towards Tuscany, and 
 that it was even my intention not to send my troops into that 
 country if Your Imperial Highness had remained there. Under 
 present circumstances Tuscany cannot without danger remain 
 deprived of the presence of her Sovereign. The country, if 
 abandoned to the intrigues and passions which are in agitation 
 everywhere, might become a theatre of disorder. As I have the 
 greatest interest in preventing at this moment anything likely 
 to disturb the tranquillity of Southern Italy, I venture to request 
 Your Imperial Highness to return to Florence, and I forewarn 
 you that should my invitation remain unattended to, I may find 
 myself under the necessity of occupying Tuscany in order to 
 preserve it from the disturbances which might arise in it. 
 
 " The line Your Imperial Highness has determined to adopt 
 pains me the more as it appears to have been concerted with 
 that taken by the Pope. I cannot conceal from Your Imperial 
 Highness that the absence of the two Soverigns whose terri- 
 tories are composed of the countries which are about to find 
 themselves between my kingdom and my army, may possibly 
 force me to take extraordinary measures which I would fain 
 avoid. 
 
 " I pray God to take you, Sir, my Brother, into his holy 
 keeping, 
 
 " Your good Brother, 
 
 " Joachim Napoleon." 
 
 No. 7. 
 
 The Grand Duke of Tuscany to King Joachim Mubat. 
 
 " Florence, April 2, 1815. 
 " The letter with which Your Majesty has deigned to honour 
 me reached me through the English Minister only this day. It 
 has found me in Florence, and I have never believed that the 
 troops of Your Majesty were about to touch my dominions. I 
 have received with much pleasure the declaration you have the 
 goodness to make to me of the immunity of my territory, which 
 I have no reason to quit at the present moment. This declara- 
 tion may serve to dissipate the alarms wliich might spread 
 amongst my subjects, who take interest in aU that concerns me. 
 I therefore beg to offer you very sincere thanks for it. 
 
 S^c. &c." 
 
232 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chai-. 111. 
 
 No. 8. 
 
 Joachim Mueat to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. 
 
 " Sir, my BkOTHEE and Cousin, " Bologna, April 12, 1815. 
 
 " I have received Your Imperial Highness's letter of the 
 2nd inst. It is with regret that I have been obliged to order 
 my guard, which was to have moved from Foligno by the Furlo 
 to Pesaro, to pass through your States ; but Your Highness is 
 too just not to admit that I could not leave an Austrian corps 
 on my flank, and that I was under the necessity of marching 
 my troops against General Nugent. I had always hoped that, 
 having forbidden them to commence hostilities, the Austrian 
 General would have allowed me to return to my former positions, 
 as I announced that I should only take them to await the deter- 
 mination of the Allies ; I must therefore declare to Your Impe- 
 rial Highness that, retairung for you the same sentiments of 
 friendship, I am ready to evacuate Tuscany, provided you on 
 your side will engage to have it evacuated by all other foreign 
 troops, and to insist upon its neutrality being respected. 
 " I beg Your Imperial Highness to receive the expressions, 
 
 " &c. &c." 
 
 He further carried out these pacific declarations by- 
 occupying Bologna on the 3rd April and attacking the 
 Austrian troops under General Bianchi on the 4th of 
 April, on the Panaro. He made other attacks upon 
 them on the 6th near Cento, at Occhio Bello on the 
 8th, and at Carpi on the 10th, and met with consider- 
 able loss between Ferrara and Ponte Lagoscuro ; being 
 defeated in all his attempts,he evacuatedBologna and the 
 Legations on the 12th of April, and directed his troops 
 at Florence to fall back, they having been, equally 
 with those at Bologna, unsuccessful against the Austrian 
 (xeneral Nugent, who had been joined by a part of the 
 Tuscan forces. Thus he began his retreat unrewarded 
 for his unexampled disregard of all treaties and public 
 engagements, and with the mortification of having 
 witnessed the total failure of the commencement of his 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 233 
 
 ambitious aspirations. This conduct of Murat extorted 
 from Austria a declaration, dated Vienna, 12tli April, 
 1815, wliicli begins by stating that the King had made 
 overtures to the Court of Austria declaring his intention 
 of uniting his policy to that of the said Court, as early 
 as at the end of 1812 ; it recotmts the tergiversation of 
 the King, which caused him to lean to Prance or 
 Austria according to the successes or defeats which 
 seemed to favour the one or other Power during the 
 year7l813 ; the signature of a Treaty of Alliance 
 between Austria and Naples, which was signed on the 
 11th January, 1814, but that, on one pretence or an- 
 other, the Neapolitan army remained passive ; that sub- 
 stantial proofs fell into the hands of the Allies of the 
 treachery of the King, who, while negociating with the 
 Allied Powers, had kept up a constant correspondence 
 with the enemy, and denied to the Emperor Napoleon 
 that such negociations had taken place ; that the vic- 
 tories of the Allies in France and the capture of Paris 
 put an end to the vacillation of Joachim, and the 
 Neapolitan army at length opened the campaign ; but 
 that when the foreign troops left France the Neapolitan 
 army retired into the Papal Marches, to which the 
 King might in consequence of the treaty of the 11th 
 January form some pretensions. That when at the 
 Congress of Vienna the Bourbon Courts protested 
 loudly against the recognition of King Joachim, a wise 
 and prudent policy would have led him to restrict all 
 his views to the preservation of his fine kingdom ; 
 instead of this he secretly meditated immense projects 
 of future aggrandisement, and prepared for their exe- 
 cution by uniting the elements of a political and mili- 
 tary revolution; that Austria saw through all his 
 intentions, and was aware of all his acts ; that when on 
 the 5th of March the news of the evasion of Bonaparte 
 arrived at Naples the King assured the Austrian 
 
234 EUROPEAN OONGBESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 Minister of his fidelity to the Alliance, and made the 
 same declaration to the Cabinets of Vienna and London. 
 At the same moment he sent one of his aides-de-camp, 
 Count Beaufremont, into France to assure Bonaparte of 
 his support ; and that on learning the entry of the 
 latter into Lyons, he declared to him that " he con- 
 sidered the cause of Napoleon as his own, and would 
 prove to him that he had never abandoned it." That at 
 the same time he demanded of the Pope the passage of 
 two of his divisions through the Eoman territory, add- 
 ing that they would not act in a hostile manner, or 
 derange the Holy Father in his capital ; that the Pope 
 protested against this violation of his territory, and 
 when it took place His Holiness left Rome and repaired 
 to Florence. That on the 8th April the Neapolitan 
 Plenipotentiaries at Vienna presented a note to the 
 Cabinet protesting the friendly sentiments of their 
 master, and his determination never to separate from 
 Austria ; but announcing that His Majesty " in conse- 
 quence of the change of events, and the military 
 measures deemed necessary by all the Powers, had 
 thought proper for his own security to extend the 
 position of his forces, and that they would occupy the 
 line of demarcation which the treaty of the year 1813 
 had assigned to the Neapolitan army." Meantime, the 
 Neapolitan army, without any preliminary declaration, 
 had commenced hostilities against the Austrian posts 
 in the Legations on the 30tli of March ; and that His 
 Imperial and Royal Majesty, confiding in the justice of 
 his cause, the valour of his army, and the tried fidelity 
 of his people, and on his intimate relations with all the 
 European Powers, has announced to the Neapolitan 
 Grovernment, by a note "of the 10th of this month, that 
 he considers the state of war established between the 
 two Powers, and that all ulterior decision remains with 
 the force of arms. 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 235 
 
 This declaration was on the part of Austria the 
 formal commencement of the campaign, of which the 
 events are related in the following letters. 
 
 The first of these is from Greneral Stahremherg to 
 Lord Burghersh. 
 
 General Stahbembebg to Lord Burqhebsh. 
 
 " Dear BuEGHBESH, " Bologna, 30th March, 1815. 
 
 " I hasten to inform you that I am arrived here to take 
 the command of the advanced guard. If we are obliged to go 
 back some steps, I promise you that we will soon advance au 
 galop. ... I have done all that was possible with Nugent 
 to make the Marshal move, and I hope that all will go 
 well." . . . 
 
 Same to the Same. 
 
 " DeAE BuEGHEESH, " Bologna, 2nd April, 2 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 " I am in despair at being obliged to cede ground to these 
 aggressors, but I hope that will soon change, and that instead 
 of the rear guard, I shaU soon be commanding the advanced 
 guard. I shall evacuate this town about 4 in the morning; 
 therefore our communication is stopped in this direction, which 
 I much regret, dear Burghersh. According to Colonel Dal- 
 rymple's account the head of the 4th division, with the Guards, 
 wiU be on the 3rd at Florence ; I almost doubt therefore if this 
 win find you there. Dalrymple writes to you at length on 
 military and political matters, so I shall add nothing but a copy 
 of Murat's Proclamation. 
 
 " I do not go far. I shall only pass the Eeno, and I will 
 write again by Pistoja. I hope Nugent will do good service. 
 
 " Your friend, 
 
 " Staheembeeg, General." 
 
 General Nugent to Lord Bdbghbbsh. 
 
 " My DEAE LoED Buegheesh, "^w'h-^S'lt^i^t^^' 
 
 "I am just arrived here, and by to-morrow morning 
 I shall have my troops in this place, about 2000 men. I shall 
 endeavour to make them pass for more, and in every way make 
 as much of ray means as I can. I have so many arrangements 
 
236 EUEOPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 to make that I cannot stir to-night ; but I shall come to-morrow 
 to Florence. I hear, however, the Grand Duke intended to 
 leave that place to-day. Write me word what your movements 
 wdl be. Colonel Dalrymple informs me from Bologna that a 
 strong Neapolitan column is to march through Tuscany. What 
 accounts have you from Florence on this subject ?" 
 
 The Same to the Same. 
 
 " Pistoja, April 7, 1815. 
 " Hitherto nothing important has taken place. The enemy 
 is very slow in his motions and extremely cautious. My ad- 
 vanced guard is at Prato, and my posts halfway between that 
 and Florence. I have no report of the enemy's having entered 
 Florence. I have taken measures to annoy his further move- 
 ment upon Bologna, and the armament in the mountains is 
 extending very rapidly. The Neapolitans begia to believe that 
 England is against them, and deserters are commg here even 
 from Modena and Bologna. The Neapolitans entered Florence 
 this day with great caution." 
 
 The Same to the Same. 
 
 " Pistoja, April 13, 1815. 
 " I just receive the account from General Bianchi, that 
 the Neapolitans were beaten at Occhio Bello on the 8th, and at 
 Carpi on the ]Oth (500 prisoners). Our troops were to enter 
 Modena on the 11th. The same force, two divisions of the 
 Guards, is against me, which makes me presume that Murat is 
 preparing to retreat entirely, otherwise he would not leave aloof 
 so considerable a body of his best troops. Against this force, 
 which is not quite three times mine, I shall be able to ma- 
 noeuvre and cover Leghorn, provided, however, a sufScient naval 
 force remains at that place. Should even Murat retire through 
 Tuscany, I shall, I think, prevent his extending to Leghorn. As 
 this object is not only important for the operations, but likewise 
 for trade, and that I suppose considerable stores are there, you 
 and Captain Campbell wiU find it important to support my 
 operations, which are thus tending to seciu-e the property of 
 British subjects. We have been hitherto attacked every day, 
 though not seriously ; the Neapolitans had always the worst of 
 it. The expedition to Naples is suspended for the moment by 
 the presence of the Neapolitan divisions here ; but ^yhen Murat 
 
Ohap. m. EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. 237 
 
 begins anew to run, then would be the time to embark and get 
 before bim. Endeavour to arrange everything to that effect. 
 It is necessary for the war in France to destroy Murat without 
 loss of time, and this will be the means to do so. 
 
 " P.S. This moment I receive the report that the enemy is 
 falling back upon Florence. 
 
 (Signed) " Nugent." 
 
 Lord BuROHEKsn to General Nugent. 
 
 " My deae Nugent, " Pisa, April 13, 1815. 
 
 " I have received your letter of this morning, and am 
 delighted at the news. I look to Murat being very soon put hors 
 de combat. You have done magnificently with your corps. The 
 retaining the two divisions from joming the Grand Army has 
 done essential service. I have communicated your letter to 
 Captain Campbell ; you may depend upon having every assist- 
 ance from him if you require it. I have directed him to send 
 the intelligence from this part of the world to Sicily, pressing 
 in consequence an expedition from thence to Naples, which if 
 undertaken immediately might meet you when you are enabled 
 to commence your operations in the same direction. If I can 
 come to you the day after to-morrow I shall do so. You know 
 that a column of Neapohtans is reported to be at Segra, on the 
 road from hence to Florence. The Grovernor of this place seems 
 to think it might be coming in this direction. The only chance 
 of its being intended for this part of the world would be the 
 advance of the Neapolitan column, which is near Eome, upon 
 Sienna, from whence it might be intended to join the one from 
 Signa near La Scala, and thence move on Leghorn. 
 
 " I am, &c., &c., 
 (Signed) " Buegheesh." 
 
 From Colonel Wbbklein to Lord Burghersh. 
 
 " My LoBD, " Lucca, April 13, 1815. 
 
 " I hasten to communicate the account of the movements 
 of our troops in Lombardy, which I have just received. Offensive 
 operations commenced on the 10th instant. The corps of General 
 Baron Bianchi arrived that day at Eeggio. A column directed 
 on Carpi found there a considerable corps of the enemy, which 
 was obhged to abandon Carpi, and we took 600 prisoners. 
 
238 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. Chap. III. 
 
 amongst whom many officers. G-eneral Bianclii proposed to 
 march to Modena on the 11th, to attack the enemy, should he 
 maintain himself in that town. The greater part of the Neapo- 
 litan army is directed on Ferrara, and a sharp fight had taken 
 place between that town and Ponte Lagoscuro. The loss of the 
 Neapolitans was considerable, and without attaining their object. 
 The General did not know the details ; but he writes that the 
 enemy's troops are much discouraged, and that the officers 
 themselves advise the soldiers to throw away their arms. We 
 shall shortly see the roads covered with Neapolitan traineurs. 
 " With great respect, 
 
 " Your Excellency's, &c., &c., 
 
 "Weeklein." 
 
 General Stahebmbeeg to Lord Bueqheksh. 
 
 " Dear FeIBND, " FoUgno, 28th April, 1815. 
 
 " I profit by the departure of a courier, who is sent to 
 you from Ancona, to write in haste two words. I arrived here 
 yesterday morning without having been able to catch these 
 fellows, who retire in the greatest haste by the road called the 
 Furlo. My detachments go by G-ubbio as far as Cagli, and by 
 Sterravalle towards Tolentino. I hope to be myseK at Tolen- 
 tino after to-morrow, and to push my detachments on to Loreto 
 and Civita Vecchia. Then their communications will all be 
 intercepted. I believe our troops will be to-day at Bona. The 
 head-quarters of Joachim are at Fano. I cannot .think he will 
 allow himself with his whole army to be shut up in Ancona ; 
 and I believe therefore that in two or three days we shall come 
 to blows with these Neapolitans. How I wish you may be an 
 eye-witness of the mamier in wliich we will settle them ! As 
 soon as any thing of importance takes place I wiU inform you 
 instantly. Try to get a flotilla soon before Ancona ; there are 
 five or six Neapolitan vessels there, which would be a good prize 
 for you. 
 
 " Your friend, 
 
 " Staheembeeg." 
 
 In the last of the above letters from G-eneral Stahrem- 
 berg, it is stated that Murat was moving towards 
 Macerata, and that he himself was marching upon 
 
Chap. III. EUROPEAN CONaEESSES. 239 
 
 Tolentino, where tie hoped to meet Lord Burghersli, 
 who had expressed to him his intention of joining 
 G-eneral Bianchi's army. 
 
 In order to explain the circumstances of the short 
 campaign just described it is necessary to return to the 
 period when Marshal Murat passed the Eoman fron- 
 tiers, and brought his large army up to Ancona. 
 When at that time he was seeking to evade the return 
 of any positive declaration to Greneral Stahremberg 
 (on the 27th of March) of his intentions, his Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, the Duke de Grallo, was employed in 
 drawing up a paper explanatory of the reasons upon 
 which he undertook to drive the Austrians out of the 
 provinces occupied by them according to a Convention 
 with the Pope, and to which he now laid claim, as 
 having held them before the settlement of the Peace of 
 1814 and the return of the Papal Grovernment to their 
 occupation. The manifesto, transmitted by the Duke 
 de Gallo to Marshal Bellegarde, is inserted in the 
 Appendix, but the tone of the argument by which it 
 is attempted to be supported is deprived of all weight, 
 by the language of the Proclamation, which had been 
 issued two days after the letter to the Marshal, namely, 
 on the 30th of March, and been published at Eimini, 
 and by which every engagement and every tie of peace 
 or friendship had been cast to the winds. A similar 
 letter had been addressed to Lord William Bentinck, 
 of his reply to which the following is a copy : — 
 
 Lord William Bentinck to the Duke de Gallo. 
 (Translation.) 
 
 " YouE Excellency, " Turin, Apni 5, 1815. 
 
 " I have received tlie letter that your Excellency has 
 done me the honour to address to me, dated March 28th. 
 Your Excellency declares that the object of the Cabinet of 
 Naples, in advancing so powerful an anny towards the North of 
 
240 EUROPEAN CONGRESSES. . . , Chap. III. 
 
 Italy, and in developing such considerable preparations of 
 war as have been making for some time, has nothing in com- 
 mon with the relations which happily exist between London 
 and Naples, and that those military measures haye no influence 
 on the Armistice. The only relation of wliich I am; aware 
 as subsisting between the two Grovernments is that Armistice. 
 Your Excellency cannot be ignorant of the n^iure of the 
 engagements which exist between the Allied Powers, and must 
 be equally aware that an act of hostility against one of them by 
 any other natipn would be mutually regarded as an insult to the 
 General Alliance ; and your Excellency cannot be ignorant that 
 the coalesced Powers have engaged reciprocally to maintain the 
 tranquilKty of Europe. Up to this moment I have received no 
 advices from the Austrian Conunander-in-Chief in Italy of the 
 commencement of hostilities between the Austrian and Nea- 
 politan troops, but I must announce to you, M. le Due, that 
 I should consider such a notification not only as putting an end 
 to the Armistice, but also as imposing on the English military 
 and naval Commanders of the forces in the Mediterranean, 
 the duty of lending succour, and seconding, with all the means at 
 their disposal, the Austrian armies. I do not disguise from 
 your Excellency that I look upon the Proclamation of the 
 Neapolitan Government, dated 30th of last March, as a most 
 unjust act of aggression, and an attempt to raise up the subjects 
 of the King of Sardinia against their legitimate Sovereign ; one 
 of the most ancient and faithful Allies of His Britannic Majesty, 
 and at the time when part of the English army is in the States 
 of that monarch for the purpose of protecting them. 
 
 " I declare then, in consequence, to Your Excellency, that I 
 consider myself bound by all the ties of friendship, honour, 
 and good faith which unite the two nations to employ all our 
 efforts in concert with those of the King of Sardinia to repel so 
 unworthy an attack against this Sovereign, which was wholly 
 unprovoked. I profit by this occasion to repeat to your 
 Excellency the assurance, &c., &c. 
 
 (Signed) " W. L. Bentinck." 
 
 The Duke of G-allo in his reply, dated Bologna, llth 
 of April, stated that he had not received Lord William 
 Bentinck's despatch of the 5th until the 10th, and that 
 the King of Naples could not perceive without sur- 
 
Ohap. ITT. T3UH0PBAN CONGRESSES. 241 
 
 prise and extreme concern, the dispositions therein 
 manifested, and " which," writes the Duke, 
 
 " are absolutely contrary to the political situation in which the 
 King finds himself with regard to Great Britain. Your Ex- 
 cellency announces to me that engagements exist between the 
 Allied Powers, in virtue of which hostility directed against one 
 among them is to be considered as an attack on the AUiance in 
 general, and that the same Powers haye engaged to maintain 
 the tranquillity of Europe. His Majesty, not having received 
 any communication of the acts relative to these engagements, 
 does not venture to conjecture whether the same acts oblige all 
 the contracting parties equally to acknowledge as Allies who- 
 ever should have contracted an Alliance with one of them to 
 co-operate with the common cause * * * These dififerences 
 can never prevent the King from being the best and most 
 useful friend of England in Italy ; he calls for the testimony of 
 your Excellency, — for that of all the English who have been or 
 who are at Naples, — and of aU the English proprietors and 
 merchants, who will attest how they are treated in the King's 
 States." 
 
 The Duke then adopts a line of reasoning, which it is 
 useless to insert, as being totally destroyed by the 
 terms of the Proclamation of the 30th of March above 
 given, and in direct opposition to the facts which were 
 taking place at that moment, namely, that Murat had 
 attacked the Austrians, and driven them from Bologna 
 to the Po, without giving a single notification of the 
 commencement of hostilities.