Mom ROSS & HARRIS, Jttorntpis at f aiu, (IJornpU IGaui ^rlynnl ICtbraty Cornell University Library KF 5305.B36 V.I Commentaries on the law of public corpor 3 1924 019 959 497 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924019959497 COMPAlSrY LAW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OP PUBLIC CORPORATIONS INCLUDINa MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS AUD POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL CORPORATIONS OF EVERY CLASS. BY CHARLES FISK BEACH, Jr., OF XUE NKW YORK B.AB, ATITHOB op "PRIVATB COEPOBAnONS," "MODEKK EQTinT JlIBISPin)DENCE," " CONTHIBBTOBY NkQLIOENOE," "THB MODEBN LAW OP RAILWATS," "Eboeivbrs," "Wilis," etc.; Editob of "Thb Amebicah FBOBATE BEFOBTS," and 80HETIHE EDITOB OP " THX Railway abd Cobfobation Law Jodbmal." DT TWO VOLUMES. VOL. I. INDIANAPOLIS: THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY. 1893. COFTBIGHT, 1893, BY THE BOWEN-MEREILL COMPANY. STATE JOURNAL PEINTmO COMPANY, PRmTBRS AND STBRBOTYPERB, lUDISON, WIS. TO THE HON. THOMAS M. COOLEY. LL.D. IN TOKEN OF S ESTEEM AND THESE VOLUMES ABE OOSDIALLT AND BESFEOTFaLLT DEDICATED. PREFACE. In these volumes I have attempted to consider all the law of public corporations, including municipal corporations, and governmental or political corporations of every class. The scope of the work is, therefore, somewhat wider than that of ' any other with which I am acquainted. I have proposed to myself the task of making a treatise which shall cover the entire field of public company law in all its details, using the term "public companies" in its widest modern sense, and I have studiously undertaken in the volumes in hand not to omit the law, as declared in the decided cases or defined by statute, of any sort of a public corporation. This work, therefore, and my " Private Corporations " (Chicago, 1891) complement each other, and, taken together, are intended to constitute a complete treatise, in four uniform volumes, on Company Law; in all its phases, from the federal government at the one extreme — which, in this country at least, is the first of public corporations (United States v. Mau- rice, 2 Bro43k. 96, 109 {per Marshall, C. J.); Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506), possessing defined and limited corporate powers, with the capacity to contract and bs contracted with, to sue in its corporate name (" The Government of the United States," Cohens v. Yirginia, 6 "Wheat. 264) and to be sued by consent, and which, having been duly created as a corporation by the people of the several original States, acquired a true cor- porate entity, and went into operation, or commenced tiie transaction of its business, on Wednesday, March 4, 1789 (Owings V. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420) — to the most insignificant Joint-stock association or local incorporation, at the other extreme. Within this wide range should seem to be included every sort of an association among men which' passes for a corporation or a company, aside from partnerships on the one hand, and political S'overeignties on the other. VI PEEFAOB. The subject of Public or Municipal Corporations, as com- pared with that of Private Corporations, is, both in this coun- try and in England, largely statutory, and the intelligent reader will, therefore, perhaps not be surprised at the space given in the text to the consideration of many local statutes and ordinances. Sometimes these statutes are types of classes of statutes found in many States, but perhaps more frequently are distinct and sui generis, and must, therefore, in a treatise designed to be general, be separately considered. In collecting and arranging the matter for so large and comprehensive a work as this, I have, of necessity and as of course, relied very much upon the intelligent and faithful labor of several young men in my oflSce upon whose assistance I have come very much to depend in work of this character, and without which, in view of my other engagements, it would have been altogether impossible for me to prepare the work in its present shape, I trust that iwhat has been here collected, collated and di- gested upon this important title may be accorded the same generous and indulgent reception which my other works have had at the hands of my professional brethren. Chablks F. Beaoh, Jb. The MiiiLS BinLDiNO, 35 Wall Street, New York, February 4 189a TABLE OF CONTENTS. VOLUME I. CHAPTER L niTEODtrCIOEY— HISTOEICAL VIEW. ^ - . § 1. The genus corporation defined 1 2. Species of corporations 4 3. Subdivisions of public corporations 6 4. Subdivisions of strictly public corporations ... 8 6. Definition of the municipal corporation .... 10 6. Definition of the public guasi-corporation .... 13 7. Examples of municipal and public guasi-corporations . 13 8. Counties 14 9. The New England towns 16 10. The same subject continued 17 11. The State 19 12. Long Island towns 20 13. The development of the municipal corporation — (a) In gen- eral 21 14. (b) Greece and Rome 22 15. (c) Italy and France — The mediaeval cities ... 24 16. Conclusion 25 CHAPTER II. OF THE CEEATION OP THE COEPOEATIOII. ' Page. g 17. The Teutonic town 28 18. The old English town SO 19. The same subject continued 31 20. Guilds 33 21. The English boroughs 84 22. The same subject continued 36 23. Creation of modern English municipal corporations . . 38 24. Municipal corporations created by charter from the crown 39 25. Municipal corporaitions created by act of parliament . . 40 26. Municipal corporations at common law aiid by prescription in England 41 27. Municipal corporations by implication in England . . 42 28. The Municipal Corporations Reform Act of 1835 . . 43 VIU TABLE OF CONTENTS — TOLUME I. Page. § 29. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1883 « . . ^0 30. The American town ^1 31. The power to create municipal corporations in the United States— Where vested— (a) In the State ... 49 33. (b) In the federal government ^ 38. Municipal corporations created by the federal government — (a) Territories 53 34. (b) The District of Columbia B3 35. Municipal corporations by prescripyon in the United States 53 36. The same subject continued — Instances of incorporation by prescription in the United States 54 37. Municipal corporations by implication in the United States 65 38. The same subject continued 56 39^ Creation of municipal corporations in the United States — (a) In general 57 40. (b) By special charter 58 41. (c) By general municipal incorporating acts ... 58 42i Constitutional limitations of legislative power to create mu- nicipal corporations 59 43. Construction of such constitutional limitations — (a) Corpo- rations for " municipal purposes" and "bodies politic or corporate" 60 44. (b) "Corporate powers". . . . ' \, • • • ^^ 45. Miscellaneous instances of such constitutional limitations . 61 46. Incorporation by courts 63 47. The same subject continued 64 48. Classes of cities under general incorporating acts . . 65 49. The corporate limits — Territory of the corporation . . 65 50. Acceptance of charters by corporators not necessary . . 66 51. The same subject continued 67 53. Substantial compliance with incorporating acts necessary . 68 53. Instances of irregularities in incorporation- . , . 68 54. Notice of incorporation 69 55. Validity of incorporation — How .tested .... 70 56. The same subject continued 71 57. The charter of a municipal corporation is a law ... 71 58. The American township 73 59. Local self-government a delegation of legislative power . 73 60. The same subject continued . . ' . . . . 74 CHAPTER m, THE CMABTER. Page. g 61. Early charters 75 63. Political element in charters 76 63. Charters at the present day 77 64. Municipal charters not within the rule in the Dartmouth College Case 78 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME I. IX 65. The present English statutes 66. The Municipal Corporations Act and the royal prerogative 67. Contents of charter 68. Prominent features of, special charters 69. What charters cannot confer .... 70. Wherein the constitutional limitation consists . 71. Acceptance — When necessary .... 72. The same subject continued .... 73. Compulsory acceptance ..... 74. Charters, how proved 75. Proof of fact of incorporation .... 76. Proof of corporate existence .... 77. General rules of construction of charters . . 78. Can charters be modified . ' . 79. How far the State can enforce performance of local 80. Change in municipal boundaries 81. EfTects of amendments of charter on city ordinances 82. Reorganization under general law — Effect of . 83. Beorganization must be strictly according to statute 84. The same subject continued 85. New York constitution a general law 86. How far special legislation is permissible 87. Written constitutions — Operation of . 88. Power to make by-laws — How limited 89. Conflict of by-laws and general acts . 90. The ordinance when passed must be reasonable . 91. Reasonableness — How determined . . . duties Page. 79 81 83 83 84 85 86 87 8P 89 91 91 93 03 95 95 96 97 98 98 99 100 100 .103 103 104 106 CHAPTER IV. AHENDMEKT, BEPEAL AND FORFErrOBB OF CHARTER. FagB. § 92. The power of the State to amend, repeal or modify the char- ters of municipal corporations 108 93. The charter of a municipal corporation not within the rule of the Dartmouth College Case ' 110 94 Construction of repealing and amendatpry acts — (a) Gen- eral principles Ill 95. (b) Statutes in pari materia construed together — Repeal by implication 113 96. Municipal charter not repealed by subsequent general law unless intent to repeal is clear 113 97. The same subject continued 114 98. Instances of repeal of charter by general acts . . . 114 99. Repeal and amendment of charter by subsequent amend- ment of State constitution 115 100. Repeal of general laws by enactment of municipal charter 115 101. Repeal of general laws by municipal ordinance . . . 116 X TABLE OF CONTENTS TOLUMB I. Page, § 102. The same subject continued 117 103. Construction of amendatory and repealing acts made appli- cable only to cities of a certain class .... 118 104. Effect of legislation upon the charter of a city organized under special law, and not by its acceptance thereof snb- ' ject to the general law 119 105. Miscellaneous instances of effective repealing and amenda- tory acts 120 106. The same subject continued 131 107. "What is an amendment or repeal of a municipal charter? . 132 108. Acceptance of amendment 133 109. Manner of acceptance 123 110. Constitutional limitations on power of legislature to amend or repeal municipal charters — (a) In general . . . 124 111. (b) Special legislation 125 113. (c) Vested rights — Impairment of obligation of contracts — Recognition by constitution 126 113. (d) Title of amendatory or repealing acts . . . . 126 114. The same subject continued 137 115. Forfeiture of charter in England 138 116. The same subject continued 139 117. Instances of forfeiture of charter under English law . . 139 118. The charter of a municipal corporation in the United States not forfeitable by judicial action ..... 130 119. The same subject continued 131 CHAPTER V. MEMBEKSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — PEKSONAI. UABIUTT OF MBMBEBS OP THE COBPOEATION. § 120. Definitions — Membership — Citizenship .... 133 121. Qualifications for membership in English municipal corpo- rations 133 123, The same subject continued 134 123. Qualifications for membership in American municipal cor- porations 135 124. Citizenship in England 135 125. The same subject continued 136 126. Citizenship in the United States ...... 137 127. Natural citizens 138 128. The same subject continued 138 129. Naturalized citizens ' 139 180. The same subject continued 140 131. Right of naturalized citizens to hold and receive lands . 140 132. The status of Chinese before the law 141 133. The stattis of American Indians before the law . . . 143 ' 134. Privileges and immunities of citizens 143 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME I. XI Page, i 133. The same subject continued ...... 144 136. Rights of citizens 145 137. The same subject continued 147 138. Personal liability of members of the corporation . , 148 139. The same subject continued — Russell t). The Men of Devon 149 140. Personal liability of members of public guasi-corporationa in New England 149 141. The same subject continued 150 143. Beardsley«. Smith — (a) The reason for the New England doctrine of personal liability of members ... 151 143. (b) The doctrine in England 153 144. (c) The doctrine in Massachusetts and Maine . . , 153 145. (d) The doctrine in Connecticut . . ' . . . . 154 146. Limitations upon the personal liability of members of New England public Quasi-corporations .... 156 CHAPTER VI. OFFICERS AND AGENTS. ■~ Page. 147. Legislative power to create officers and agents ... 158 148. Legislative control over officers and agents . . . 159 149. Conduct of elections — Construction of election statutes . 159 150. Miscellaneous instances of the construction of election.stat- utes 160 151. Validity of election — General principles .... 163 153. The same subject continued — Illustrations ... 163 153. English rule as to majority 164 154. Election by ballot 165 155. Election by city council .166 156. Election by definite bodies generally — Majority and plu- rality . 168 157. The same subject continued — Quorum majority . . 168 158. Informal ballot 169 159. Tenure of office 170 160. Tenure of office where city passes from one class to an- other 173 161. Power to hold over — English and American rules . . 173 163. The same subject continued 175 163. Appointment of officers . . . i . . . . 176 164. Validity of appointment 177 165. Appointment b}- de facto officers 178 166. Compensation of officers — In general .... 178 167. The same subject continued — Failure of corporate funds . 180 168. The same subject continued — Illustrations . . . 181 169. Miscellaneous instances 183 170. Extra compensation 184 171. Compensation of attorneys 185 173. The same subject continued 186 B Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS TOLUME I. 173. Compensation ^ Power of legislature to control 174. Qualifications for office-holding . . . 175. Official oath 176. The same subject continued . . . 177. Duties of officers 178. Powers of mayor . . 179. The same subject continued — Statutory provisions . 180. The same subject contiiiued — Miscellaneous powers . 181. Miscellaneous instances of powers or municipal officers 183. Z)e /acio officers — General statement . . 183. The same subject continued — Color of title . . 134. Incumbent of an unconstitutional office ... 185. Possession of office by de facto officer . . . 186. Bights and liabilities of de facto officers . . . 187. Resignation by acceptance of incompatible office . 188. Acceptance and withdrawal of resignation 189. Removal of officers and agents — How effected . . 190. Causes for removal — English and American rules . 191. Power of corporation to remove officers and agents . 193. The same subject continued . . 193. Notice of proceeding to remove . 194. The same subject continued . 195. All persons charged with notice of duties and municipal agents 196. Liability of officers to the corporation 197. Instances of fraudulent acts of municipal agents 198. Liability of corporation to officers . , 199. Indictment of municipal officers . . powers of Page. 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 19 J 197 198 199 199 200 200 201 203 203 201 205 206 207 207 208 209 210 211 CHAPTER Vn. PERSONAI. LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. Page. 200. Liability on contracts — Presumption against liability . 313 201. The same subject continued — Negotiable instruments . 213 203. The same subject continued — Excess of authority, fraud, etc. 214 203. Exemption from liability for legislative acts . . . 215 204. The foregoing rule qualified — Breach of trust . . . 215 205. Liability of judicial' officers considered .... 216 806. Qitasi-judicial officers — Corrupt motives .... 218 207. Liability of ministerial officers 219 208. The same subject continued 2S0 209. No personal liability for strictly public acts . . . 23i 210. Default of subordinates 223 211. Ejection of member of council by order of mayor . . 233 818. Negligence of recorder of deeds 235 -813. The same subject continued 236 814. Liability of assessor of taxes 226 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME t XUl CHAPTER VIII. THE LIABILITY OP THE CORPORATION FOR THE ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS AND AQENTS. Page. S 215. Introductory 229 216. Liability ex contractu 229 217. Contracts within scope of powers of corporation . . 230 218. The same subject continued 231 219. The doctrine of ultra vires applied with greater strictness to public than to private corporations .... 282 220. The reason for the rule 233 231. Municipal bonds void when ultra vires .... 233 222. The same subject continued 234 223. Ultra vires — How modified by estoppel . . . 234 224. The same subject continued — Hitchcock r. Galveston . 235 225. Irregularity in exercise of power 237 226. Ultra vires — How modified by the doctrine of implied con- tract — General principles ...... 237 227. The same subject continued 238 228. Illustrations of the doctrine of implied contracts . . 239 229. The same subject continued 240 2. (iOO 600 801 603 603 604 605 606 CHAPTER XVL ULTRA. VIRES. 592. 593. 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599. 600, 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 610. 611, 612. 613, 614. 615, 616, 617, 618. 619, 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. ruling General statement of the rule . . . Purchase of land for use of a railroad Illusti'ations of the general rule . Grant of power to regulate highways construed Contracts for exclusive privileges in highways Strictly official duties not to be confided to non-ofiScial sons Police ordinances — Wooden buildings The same subject continued — Railroad crossings The same subject continued — Markets, eta Donations The same subject continued . . Subscription to stock of railroads . City council as judge of elections Governing authorities of school districts F The same subject continued Purchase of real estate for school purposes — Texas Condemnation of land outside of territorial limits Diversion of lands dedicated to public uses . Sale of real estate — Prescribed mode controls . Appropriations for highways and school buildings Power to purchase realty does not authorize giving notes Work on public buildings, etc Issuing of bonds The same subject continued — Municipal aid The same subject continued — Public improvements Contracts abrogating control of streets . . General legislation — Offers of rewards . . Contracts for water supply The same subject continued Contracts for lighting streets . Grant of exclusive privileges Curative legislation . . . Ratification Estoppel Purchasers of bonds are bound to take notice per- Page. 607 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 681 633 633 633 634 635 636 637 638 689 6(0 641 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLTJME I. XXIH Page. 637. • Corporations may contest ultra vires contracts ... 643 628. Liability upon ultra vii-es contracts 643 629. Ttie same subject continued 644 630. Ultra vires, when not a defense to actions by the corporation 645 631. Tax-payers' resistance 646 632. Tax-payers' suits 647 633. The same subject continued 648 634. Suits to restrain the enforcement of contracts ... 648 635. Injunction the proper remedy 650 636. The same subject continued 6E0 CHAPTER XVII. IMPLIED POWERS A.ND EMINENT DOMAOT. (a) luPLiED Fgwebs. Page. 637. General statement of tlie rule 653 638. Compromise of claims 654 639. The samesubject continued — Application of the rule in Iowa 654 640. The dissenting opinion in the Iowa case .... 655 641. Compromise of ultra vires claims 656 643. Submission to arbitration . 657 643. Employment of attorneys ....... 658 644. Power to hold property in trust 659 645. Acquisition of property for other than municipal purposes 660 646. The same subject continued — Erecting public buildings . 661 647. Power to indemnify. officers 662 648. The same subject continued 663 649. Offers of rewards 664 650. The same subject continued — The power generally denied , 665 651. The same subject continued — The foregoing rule qualified 666 652. Expenditures in obtaining or opposing legislation . . 667 C6) EmHEHT Domain. 653. Nature and definition 668 654. The same subject continued — Constitutional limitation . 669 655. What property may be taken 670 656. Quantity of estate 671 657. What constitutes a taking 673 658. The same subject continued — The leading case . . . 673 659. The same subject continued — Constitutional amendments 674 6C0. Property already appropriated to public use . . . 675 661. The same subject continued 676 663. Change of grade 677 663. Change of use — Additional use 677 664 The same subject continued — Electric railways . . 679 665. Grant of power to municipal corporations .... 681 666. Public use and necessity of appropriation, by whom deter- mined 682 667. Legislative declaration conclusive 683 668. Public use as respects municipalities — Parks and streets . 684 669. The same subject continued — Water, gas, etc, . . . 685 XXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUSlE I. 670. 671. 673. 673. 674. 675. 676., 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 683. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 683. The same subject continued — Cemeteries, sewers, etc. The same subject continued — Leasing for public use The same subject continued — Ornamental purposes Notice of proceeding — Necessity for Parties entitled to notice Service of notice . Treaty with the owner The application or petition The tribunal Eight to jury trial Right to abandon proceedings Damages upon discontinuance of proceedings Compensation Elements in estimating compensation The same subject continued . . Benefits ...... Payment . . . , . . Review of proceedings -^ Certiorari . The same subject continued — Appeal Page. 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 697 697 699 700 701 703 703 704 706 CHAPTER XVia CONTRACTS. Page. 689. How contracts are made ....... 707 690. The same subject continued 708 691. Authority of agents and formality of execution . . 709 693. Compliance with prescribed formalities .... 710 693. Informal distinguished from ultra vires contracts . . 710 694. Power to relieve a contractor in case of hardship . . 711 695. Ratification of contract 713 696. The same subject continued 713 697. Mandatory provisions 713 698. Contracts let to bidders 714 699. The same subject continued 715 700. Plans and specifications 715 701. The same subject continued 716 703. Forfeiture of contracts 717 703. The same subject continued 717 704. Right of set-off in foreclosure of mechanics' liens . . 718 703, Recovery against the corporation upon a quantum meruit . 718 708. Actions by corporations on contracts — Estoppel to deny validity 719 707. Failure of specified means of payment — Implied contract 720 708. Eights of property owners in respect of contracts for im- provements . . 730 709. Fiduciary position of officers — Improvident contracts . 721 710. Action by assignee of contractor — Pleading . . . 731 711. Miscellaneous rulings 723 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I. XXV CHAPTER XIX. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. ' Page. 712. Legislative control subject to limitations ^ .... 724 713. Powers that the Statu cannot relinquish .... 735 /14. Impairment of legislative grants 726 715. The same subject continued ...... 727 716. Bemission of forfeitures 728 717. Property held for public use 729 718. Tenure of office of municipal officer ..... 729 719. 'Agencies of municipal administration .... 730 720. Diversion of funds 731 731. The same subject continued — Public interest paramount to private right 731 722. Application of revenues 782 723. The same subject continued 782 724. Impairment of obligations to individuals .... 733 725. The same subject continued 784 736. Impairment of remedies against the corporation . . 735 727. The same subject continued — Control of taxing power lim- ited 735 738. Vacating assessment of damages 737 729. The rule summarized . 787 CHAPTER XX. TORTS AND CRIMES. 730. Torts by the sovereign power 731. The State not liable for officers' torts — No respondeat supe- rior 732. Suits against United States — Court of claims 783. Suits against New York — Board of claims 734. Counties, etc. , as divisions of the State . 735. The same subject continued . . . 736. Non-liability of New England towns . 787. Liability of New England towns 738. Liability of towns, etc., as to special duties 739. Non-liability of school districts and drainage districts 740. Non-liability for separate boards and bodies 741. Non-liability for torts of independent officers 743. The same subject continued — Who are independent offi' cers 743. The same subject continued — Applied in New York etc. ... . . 744. Non-liability for firemen 745. Non-liability for police 746. Liability for acts of mobs . 747. Private interests must yield to public city, Page. 740 741 741 743 743 745 746 747 748 750 751 751 753 753 754 755 756 757 XXVI TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME II. etc. — § 748. The same subject continued — Destroying buildings to check fire , 749. Non-liability for negligence in public service 750. Non-liability as to jails 751. Non-liability as to hospitals .... 753. Non-liability as to fire-works .... 753. Liability as to city wells aad water ... 754. Non-liability to trespassers .... 755. Liability for nuisances 756. Municipal liability in general .♦ . . . 757. Chartered cities, etc., distinguished from counties. The conflict 758. Municipal liability in exercise of private powers 759. Liability commensui-ate with duty . . . 760. Municipal liability as to water front . 761. Liability for fright of horse .... 762. Municipal liability for acts of officers and agents 763. Not liable for uHro vires acts of officers 764. Non-liability in the exercise of discretionary powers 765. The same subject continued — New York and Georgia rule 766. The same subject continued — Drainage 767. Non-liability for errors of judgment . 768. Liability for trespass .... 769. Liability for waste .... 770. Liability after notice — Implied notice 771. The same subject continued — Statutory notice . 772. The same subject continued — New York decisions 773. Impeaching legi.slative acts for fraud . . , 774 Indictment for torts . 775. Not indictable for felony Page. 759 759 760 763 763 764 765 766 767 768 770 771 772 773 773 774 774 776 77B 777 778 780 780 783 784 784 785 787 VOLUME IL CHAPTER XXL FISCAL MANAGEMENT,1 (a^ Fowkb to lycuB Incebtednbss. 776. Manner of contracting .... 777. Construction of statutory provisions . , 778. Borrowing money 779. The same subject continued ... 780. Employment of attorneys .... 781. Contracts for construction of county buildings 783. Support of the poor 783. Taxation for school purposes . . . 784. The same subject continued jPage. 790 791 793 795 796 797 798 800 801 TABLE OF 00NTENT8 VOLUME U. XXVU Page. §785, Thesamesubject continued— Validity of resolutions . 802 786. Levy of taxes 803 767. Contracts for water supply and lighting .... 804 788. School boards and directors 805 789. Erection of school-houses 806 790. School district board — Contracts for building ... 808 791. Contracts with teachers , 809 793. Authority of county treasurer, etc. 811 793. Authority of officers in particular instances ... 813 794. The same subject continued 813 795. Powers of a trustee of a school township .... 814 796. Town selectmen, etc 815 797. The same subject continued ...... 816 798. Township boards 818 799. The same subject continued — Michigan decisions . . 818 800. Town trustees — Indiana decisions 820 801. The same subject continued ...... 821 802. Directors of schools — Illinois decisions .... 823 803. Town supervisors — Illinois and Minnesota decisions . . 824 804. Power of towns and town officers in Maine ... 825 805. Powers of towns in Massachusetts 836 806. Michigan decisions . . u . . . . . 837 807. Selectmen in New Hampshire ...... 828 808. Towns and town officers in New York .... 829 809. Towns and town officers in Vermont ..... 830 (h) LlUTTATIOK OF InDBBTEDNESS. 810. Construction of constitutional provisions .... 831 811. Rulings of the United States Supreme Court ... 833 813. Bulings in California 835 813. Rulings in Colorado 836 814. Rulings in Illinois 837 815. Rulings in Indiana . 839 816. Rulings under the Iowa constitution ..... 840 817. The same subject continued 841 818. Rulings under the Oregon and Washington constitutions . 842 819. Rulings under Texas laws 842 820. Rulings in West Virginia . 848 821. Special statutory provisions ...... 844 822. The same subject continued ...••• 845 823. Indebtedness for water and lights . . • • . 846 824. Effect of exceeding the limit .847 825. Remedy of tax-payers against increase of debt . ' . . 848 CHAPTER XXIL MUNICIPAL FUNDS. (a) Cabb and Disbubbeubnt of Fvsna, ' ■ - ■ ■ Paee g 826. Funds appropriated to specific uses 851 827. Custodians of fupds 852 838. Thp same subject continued 854 XXVUl TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 11. 829. 830. 831. 833. 883. 834. 833. 836. 837. 838. 839. 810. 841. 843. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 853. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 863. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 870. 871. 878. Compensation of treasurers The same subject continued . Settlements witli treasurers . Actions to recover county funds Actions on treasurer's bond . Public depositories Examination of county officers' accounts Liability of custodian of funds . Liabilities on bonds of custodians of school funds Investment of school funds . ^ . Loan of school funds .... Liability of officers and agents of towns (b) Affbopbutiohs. Appropriations out of special funds . Appropriations anticipating revenue . Special funds The same subject continued — Construction of statutes Statutory provisions further considered Appropriations for schools . . . The same subject continued . . Budget Annual appropriations Appropriation of taxes to sinking fund (c) Uhl^wfol Ezpenditdses. The New York statute providing for investigatioii . (d) CLims. Presentation of claims The same subject continued The same subject continued — Yerification of claim . Presentation of claims for injuries .... Presentation as a condition precedent to right of action Allowance of claims , The same subject continued — Procedure . The same subject continued — Adjudication by the board Conclusiveness of adjudication Proceedings after disallowance of claim . . Malfeasance in over-allowance Proper and improper charges against a county . . The same subject continued Apportionment of indebtedness upon division of a county Claims of contractors for extra work . ' . Claims for services to indigent persons ... Proceedings to enforce payment of judgments . . Mandamus to county officers (fi) Wabramts. Character of warrants as evidences of indebtedness . How drawn Mandamus to compel the signing of a warrant . TABLE OF OONTEHTS — TOLUMB 11. XXIX ■■ "■ Page. 873. Duty of officers in drawing warrants 906 874. Validity of warrants 907 875. Actions upon warrants . 908 876. Mandamus to compel payment of warrants ... 910 877. Defenses to actions on warrants 913 878. Votes of counties 914 879. Votes of towns 915 880. Township orders 916 881. The same subject continued ••.... 917 882. School board orders , . . 918 883. School warrants • . - 919 CHAPTER XXIII. BONDS AND COUPONS. Page. i 884 Implied power to issue bonds 922 885. The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States . 923 886. The same subject continued 924 887. Brenham v. German-American Bank — The language of the court 924 888. Brenham v. German-American Bank — The dissenting opin- ion 926 889. Implied power to issue negotiable bonds — The general rule 927 890. The corporation must have a legal existence . . . 927, 891. No right of action on void bonds 928 893. Constitutional limitations — Public purpose ... 929 893. Aid to manufacturing enterprises 930 894. Internal improvements 931 895. Municipal aid to railroads — Express legislative authority essential 931 898. Railway aid bonds — Legislature may authorize . . 932 897. The same subject continued — Negotiable bonda . . 934 898. Conditions precedent . 934 899. The same subject continued — Assent of tax-payers . . 935 900. The same subject continued — Election .... 937 901. Conduct of election continued 938 903. Conditional subscriptions 939 903. The same subject continued 940 904. Ratification 940 905. The same subject continued ...... 942 906. Eifect of consolidation of companies on authority to sub- scribe 943 907. Eifect of constitutional prohibitions 943 908. > The same subject continued ■ 944 909. Effect of recitals — Knox County v. Aspinwall . . . 945 910. The same subject continued 946 911. Authority to determine performance of conditions prece- dent 947 XXX TABLB OF CONTENTS VOLUMB Q. 912. The same subject continued — Illustration. ... 918 913. The same subject continued — Illustration .... 948 914 The same subject continued — Illustration. , . . 949 915. The doctrine of the United States Supreme Court sum- marized ... 950 916. The rule in New York 951 917. Signature to bonds 953 918. Sealing 953 919. Date — Ante-dating 953 920. To whom payable . . . ♦ 911: 93J. Place of payment ........ 954 933. Time of maturity . . ■ ^955 933. Delivery 956 924. Quality of municipal bonds as ccimmercial paper . . 956 935. Coupons 957 926. Payment of coupons . 958 927. Interest upon interest 958 928. Refunding, substituted and renewal bonds .... 959 929. The same subject continued 959 930. Estoppel by matter in pais 960 931. Estoppel to set up over-issue in violation of statute . . 961 932. Over-issue in violation of the constitutipn — No estoppel by recitals 963 933. The same subject continued — The rule qualified . . 963 934. Bona fide holders 963 935. The same subject continued ...... 965 936. Defenses available against bona ^de holders ... 965 937. The same subject continued ...... 966 CHAPTER XXIV. CHAEITIES AND COREECTION. 938. General rules governing directors of poor, etc. . . 939. Rulings in Massaohusetts'as to overseers of the poor . 940. Rulings in Maine and New York .... 941. Conti"acts by governing boards for the support of the poor 943. Discretionary powers of governing boards 943. Medical treatment for the poor . 944. The same subject continued 945. Settlement of paupers — Generally 946. The same subject continued 947. The same subject continued — Illegitimate children 948. Massachusetts decisions on settlement of soldiers mustered out of service 949. Settlement of married women 950. Settlement acquired by residence and payment of taxes 951. The same subject continued 953. Constitutionality of laws for the removal of paupers . Page. 967 969 969 970 972 973 974 975 976 977 979 9S0 981 983 983 TABLE OB" CONTENTS — VOLUME U. XXXI 953. Rulings on removal of paupers . . .'.".'". 985 954. Notice in oases for removal of paupers .... 986 955. Notice of charge by one town to another .... 986 956. What corporations are liable for support of paupers . . 988 957. No implied liability 989 958. Special liabilities . 990 959. Various rulings as to the poor 991 960. Support of patients at State lunatic asylums ... 991 961. The same subject continued 993 962. Support of insane poor further considered .... 993 963. Aid to children 994 964. Liability of tlie corporation for support furnished to pau- pers 995 965. The same subject continued 996 966. Duty to furnish immediate relief 997 987. Proceedings to compel relative to support paupers . . 998 968. Liability of a pauper for his support 999 969. Municipality cannot recover for voluntary aid ... 999 970. Actions for support of paupers 1000 971. The same subject continued 1003 973, Statutes prohibiting the bringing of paupers from other States . 1004 973, Liability to pauper for negligence of employees ... 1005 974, Support of the insane ,1006 975, The same subject continued 1'006 976, Soldiers' homes 1008 977, Reformatories 1008 978, Liability of counties for the care of prisoneiB ... 1010 979, Care of prisoners continued ...... 1010 980, Hiring of convicts 1011 981, Liability for personal injuries to prisoners . • . . 1013 983. The same subject continued ...... 1013 CHAPTER XXV. PUBLIC HEALTH — BOABDS OP HEALTH, AND QUAHANTINE. Page, § 983, Municipal regulations for the promotion of public health . 1016 984, Power of the State legislature ...... 1017 985, Declaring nuisances is not an exercise of judicial func- tions 1018 986, Extent of authority illustrated 1018 987, The same subject continued 1019 088. Regulation of occupations 1030 989. Powers conferred on boards of health not exclusive " . 162O 990. Power to control manufactures . . . . . 1031 991. Limitations of police power over occupations ... 1022 992. Establishment of sanitary districts 1033 993. The same subject continued . . . < . . . 1033 ZZXU TABLE OF OONTE] fage. § 1065. Curative legislation • • 1081 1066. Supervisors of a county ordering improvements in a town 1081 1067. Sidewalks 1082 1068. Contracts in restraint of right to control or improve streets 1083 1069. Discretion of municipal authorities 1083 1070. The same subject continued 1084 1071. Streets with railways intersecting them .... 1084 1072. Local assessments 1C85 1073. Special taxation in Illinois 1086 1074. Constitutionality of assessments for sidewalks . . . 1087 1075. Fee in land condemned la part of the cost of an improve- ment .......... 108S 1076. Highways 1088 1077. Opening highways 1089 1078. Repairing highways 1090 1079. Bridges • . 1090 1080. Construction of bridges 1091 1081. Agents of counties in the construction of bridges in New York 1092 1082. Sewers 1093 1083. Construction of sewers ....... 1093 1084. The same subject continued 1094 1085. Contracts for construction of sewers . .... 1094 1086. Power as to drains and sewers discretionary ... 1095 1087. Local assessments for drains and sewers .... 1096 1088. Drainage continued 1097 1089. Liability of the corporation 1098 1090. The same subject continued 1098 1091. The same subject continued — Rights in percolating water 1099 1092. Massachusetts decisions as to assessment for sewers . . 1100 1093. Use of street for private drain 1101 1094. Improvements by street-railway companies ... 1101 1095. The same subject continued 1102 1096. Street-railway company bound to repair .... 1103 1097. The same subject continued 1103 1098. Contracts — Construction of, etc 1105 1099. Decisions on particular contracts 1106 ,1100. The same subject continued — Lowest bidder, etc. . . 1107 1 101. The same subject continued — Advertisement for bids, etc. 1107 1103. Conditions precedent to recovery by contractor, etc. . . 1109 1103. Indiana decisions as to letting contracts .... 1111 1104. The same subject continued ...... 1112 1105. Assignment of contract 1112 1106. The same subject continued ...... 1113 1107. Assignment and. subletting continued .... 1114 1108. Effect of assignment of a contract ..... 1115 1109. When a contract is complete 1116 1110. Letting contract after returning bids .... 1116 TABLE OP CONTENTS VOLUME II. XXXV 1111. Reletting contract 1113. Discretion of municipal authorities . 1113. Power to reject a contract 1114. Repaying — Pennsylvania rule illustrated . 1115. Title to street essential to jurisdiction 1116. Opening and improving streets in one proceeding 1117. Description of work in resolution 1118. Conclusiveness of assessor's action . 1119. Assessments for paving streets and constructing sidewalks 1120. When cost of repairing cannot be charged to abutters 1121. Power of assessment illustrated and limited . . 1135. The same subject continued 1123. Assessments for benefits and damages ... 1134. Notice for bids • ^ 1125. Collateral attack of assessments .... 1126. Decisions as to property benefited .... 1127. Liabilities and rights of abutters .... 1128. Damages for change of grade 1139. Action by abutter to enjoin completion of a contract 1130. Actions to vacate assessments 1131. Actions to restrain collection of assessments 1133. The same subject continued . . . -' . 1133. Actions to recover money paid upon illegal assessments 1134. Power to assess abutting owners .... 1185. The same subject continued 1136. The same subject continued — Homestead subject to sale 1137. Instances of tax-bills adjudged invalid . . . 1138. Liability of the corporation for negligence . . 1139. The same subject continued 1140. Damages for improper construction .... 1141. The same subject continued — Constitutional provisions 1142. The same subject continued — Defective streets 1143. Unauthorized modification of contracts . 1144. Rights of abutters 1145. Rights and remedies of abutters . 1146. The same subject continued 1147. Interest of abutters in streets . . . 1148. Liability of corporation for consequential injuries 1149. The same subject continued 1150. Flowage of surface water from streets 1151. The same subject continued 1153. Flowage of water by construction of a levee 1153. Damages for change of grade . 1154. The same subject continued 1155. The same subject continued — ^^Connecticut rule 1156. The same subject continued — "Damage" clause in coH' stitutions 1157. The same subject continued — Measure of damages Page, 1117 1118 1119 1130 1120 1130 1121 1133 1123 1123 W24 1134 1135 1125 1136 1137 1128 1129 1139 1131 1133 1133 1133 1134 1134 1135 1136 1136 1137 1138 1189 1140 1140 1141 1142 1143 1143 1144 1143 1146 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1151 xxxvi TABLB 07 OONTBNTS — VOLUMB IL 1158. Damages by change of grade further considered 1159. The same subject continued — Common-la'w actions 1160. Bight to damages in Pennsylvania . 1161. Estoppel of land-owner . . . 1163. Estoppel further considered . . 1163. Actions by abutters — Pleading, etc. 1164 Questions for the jury Page. 1153 1153 1153 1154 1154 1155 1156 CHAPTER XXVIIL LOCAI. ASSESSMENTS. 1165. Theory supporting local assessments . 1166. Express legislative authority requisite . 1 167. Tiie same subject continued — Illustrations 1168.' A continuing power 1169. What constitutes a local improvement . 1170. Purposes for assessment illustrated . . 1171. The same subject continued 1173. Assessable property — Statutory exemptions 1173. Statutory exemptions continued 1174. Assessments against railroad companies . 1173. Assessment districts ..... 1176. The same subject continued 1177. Prescribed formalities must be strictly followed 1178. The same subject continued 1179. Ordinance or resolution 1180. Petition . . . 1181. The same subject continued 1183. Description of improvement 1183. Delegation of matters of detail 1184. Necessity of prescribed rule of apportionment 1185. Notice — Stewart i;. Palmer 1186. The same subject continued — ITlman v. Mayor &o. . 1187. The same subject continued — Avery v. City of Keokuk 1188. Notice at some stage of proceedings .... 1189. Personal liability of land-owner .... 1190. Becovery of money paid on illegal assessments . 1191. The same subject continued 1193. The same subject continued — Coercion in law . 1193. Apportionment by superficial area .... 1194. , Apportionment by value — Bnle in Arkansas and Tennessee 1195. The frontage rule 1196. Assessments exceeding value of property ■ . 1197. Assessments according to benefit . . . 1198. Bule in sewer assessments .... 1199. Contractor's default no defense to the lot-owner 1300. Injunction against illegal assessments . 1201. The same subject continued .... Page 1158 1160 1161 1161 1161 1163 1163 1165 1165 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1173 1173 1174 1175 1176 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1183 1183 1184 1185 1185 1186 1187 1187 1188 1188 1189 1190 TABLB OF OOMTENTS — VOLUME 11. XXXVll V CHAPTER XXIX. CONTROIi OF STREETS AND WHAETES. _ - " Page. 1208. Power to vacate streets 1191 1303. Restraining the vacation of a street 1193 1304. Discontinuance of ways 1193 1305. Discretion in improving unused streets .... 1194 1206. Damages for closing a street — Massachusetts decisions ' - 1194 1307. Use of streets for private purposes 1195 1308. Powers not to be surrendered 1196 1309. Liability for defective streets 1196 1310. The same subject continued 1197- 1311. The same subject continued — Defective sidewalks . . 1198 1313. Right of corporation to indemnity for damage paid . . 1199 1313. The same subject continued 1300 1314. Proper evidence in actions for injuries .... 1301 1315. Power of park board over streets ..... 1303 1316. Extent of control of streets 1303 1817. Grant of use of streets to railway companies . . . 1203 1818. The same subject continued 1204 1319. Use of streets by railroad companies .... 1305 1830. Extension of track in streets 1306 1231. Power over streets used by railways . • • . 1807 1333. The same subject continued ...... 1808 1833. Regulating speed of cars 1809 1334. The same subject continued ....... 1310 1385. Regulating trains at crossings ...... 1310 1336. Use of snow-plows regulated 1311 1337. Measureof damages in appropriating a railroad right of way 1313 1838. Danger signals 1813 1339. Contract rights in streets 1813 1330. When obstructions allowable 1314 1331. The same subject continued 1315 1333. Right to build a railroad in street — Particular charter pro- vision .......... 1816 1333. Hay scales in streets 1317 1834. Removal of shade trees . 1317 1835. Summary removal of obstructions ..... 1818 1336. The same subject continued ...... 1319 1337. Awnings 1819 1338. Poles for electric wires < . 1320 1839. The same subject continued ...... 1881 1840. Liability growing out of obstructions .... 1338 1341. Injunction against encroachments 1333 1343. Stock running at large 1383 1843. Music in the streets — Salvation army parades . . . 1384 1344. The same subject continued ....*. 1384 1345. Control of wharves 1835 1346. Restraint of certain uses of wharves .... 1836 1247. Limit of liability growing out of control of docks . . 1336 ZXXVUl TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLTIMB II. CHAPTEE XXX. POLICE POWERS. I Page. § 1248, Nature of the police power ...... 1328 1349. Exercise of police powers by municipal corporations . 1239 1250. Bequiring abutting owners to remove snow from side- walks . ^ . 1330 1351. The same subject continued ...... 1331 1253. Power to license occupations ...... 1331 1353. The same subject continued ...... 1233 1354. The license ordinance ....... 1233 12.^5. License fees 1234 1356. Hawkers and peddlers 1234 1257. The same subject continued — Discrimination against non- residents 1335 1358. Reasonableness of license fees for hawkers and peddlers . 1236 1259. Hackmen, draymen, etc 1236 1260. Auctioneers 1338 1361. The same subject continued 1388 1362. Unreasonable license fees for auctioneers .... 1339 1263. License of book canvassers — Interstate commerce . . 1340 1364. Intoxicating liquors 1340 1265. The same subject continued 1341 1366. Hackmen and hotel runners 1343 1267. Regulation of markets 1243 1368. The same subject continued ...... 1343 1269. Ordinances enforcing observance of Sabbath . . . 1344 1370. Regulating weight of bread 1345 1271. Building permits 1245 1273. Wooden buildings and fire limits 1246 1373. Prohibiting carrying concealed weapons .... 1347 1374. Policy shops 1347 1375. Disorderly houses 1348 1376. Distribution of hand-bills 1249 1377. Ordaining offenses — Criminal intent .... 1349 CHAPTER XXXL JIUNICIPAL COURTS AND RECORDS. (a) MuHicaPAL Codbtb. Page. § 1278. Introductory 1251 1379. The same subject continued — Scope of subject . . 1353 1280. Creation — Abolition — Increase of power . ... 1253 1381. The same subject continued 1254 1283. Jurisdiction — Criminal, civil and special . ... 1354 1883. • The same subject continued ...... 1255 1284. Summary powers 1256 1285. The same subject continued 1257 1286. The same subject continued — Felonies and misdemeanors 1358 1287. Jurisdictional limitation . ^ 1259 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLITME 11. XXXIX 1388, lt!89. 1390. 1391. 1393. 1393. 1394, 1293. 1396. 1297. 1398. 1399. 1300. 1301. 1303, 1303. 1304. 1305. 1306. 1307. 1308. 1309. 1310. 1311. 1313. 1313. 1314. 1315. 1316. 1317. 1318. 1319. 1330. 1331. 1332. 1333. 1334, The same subject continued — Constitutional limitations , Qaalifioations of oflScers — Judges and jurors . . . Appeals Method of procedure ........ The same subject continued ....*• (&) MUKIOIFAL BECORDS. Recording of ordinances ....... Evidential character — Originals The same subject continued — Copies .... Proof of records — By originals The same subject continued — By certified copies . . Parol evidence . The same subject continued . . . . . Amendments The same subject continued ...... Right of abstract makers to take transcript of public rec- ords The same subject continued Remedial rights • . CHAPTER XXXIL FIBEMKN AND FOLICEIIEN. Organization of flre department , . . Liability of corporation for removal of fii-eman Certiorari to review dismissal of fireman . Policemen unlsnovrn to the common law . . Qualification of officers — Non-partisan boaras . Police fund — Legislative control of , Suspension pending trial on charges of misconduct The tribunal to hear charges .... The bearing Counsel and witnesses ..... Examining the accused as a witness ... Neglect and absence from duty ... Violating regulations ..... Evidence of intoxication Conduct unbecoming an officer . .~ . The same subject continued .... Severity of punishment ..... Review of proceedings by certiorari . . . Recovery of salary after restoration upon certiorari City marshals Page. 1360 1261 1268 1263 1364 1265 1266 1267 1268 1368 1369 1270 1371 1373 1373 1273 1274 1270 1277 1377 1278 ' 1271 1279 1280 1281 1283 1283 1384 1385 1286 1287 1289 1290 1290 1391 1293 1393 CHAPTER XXXIIL WATER AND LIGHTS. § 1385. Power of municipality as to water supply 1336, Contracts for water supply . . . 1337. Limitations upon power to contract . . 1394 1395 1296 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II. 1S28. Contracts further illustrated 1329. The same subject continued — Monopolies 1880. Construction of contracts . . . 1331. The same subject continued . . 1833. No ezcluBive right .... 1883. Bent of hydrants .... 1884. Water-works companies under Kew Jersey Btatutes 1335. Infringement of riparian rights . 1886. The right to waters of a stream . 1337. Connecting pipes . . . * . 1388, Liability of water-works companies . 1339. The same subject continued . . 1340. Water-rates' ..... 1841. The same subject continued . . 1343. Collection of water-rents . 1343. Power of municipality to contract for lights 1344. The same subject continued 1845. Authorized contracts illustrated . 1846. Unauthorized contracts . . . 1847. Contract for gas lighting construed . 1848. The same subject continued 1349. Construction of statutory and charter proTisions 1350. The same subject continued .... B»ge. 1397 1398 1299 1300 1301 1301 1303 1803 1304 1306 1307 1307 1308 1809 1310 1311 1813 1813 1314 1314 1815 1816 1316 CHAPTER XXXIV. FUBUO EDUCATION. 1351. Introductory 1353. Constitutional provisions and State statutes 1353. Legal status of school system . 1354. State board and superintendent of education 1855. County superintendents .... 1856. Change of boundaries of school districts . 1357. Presumption of legal organization of district 1358. District school boards .... 1359. Meetings of district school boards 1360. Prescribing test-books — Bescission of resolution 1361. Power of board of school trustees to contract 1363. Power to require parents to sign and return teacher's re- port 1363, Fiduciary capacity .... 1364. Limitation of powers . . . 1865. Personal liability of directors 1366. Meetings of district electors — Elections 1B67. . Term of school oflicer — Holding over 1868. School fund 1369. The same subject continued — Mandamus to State comp- troller Boge. 1818 1319 1320 1331 1331 1323 1324 1325 1327 1827 1329 1331 1333 1333 1883 1334 1337 1337 1338 TABLE OF CONTENTS — TOLUMB U. xU li " ■ ~ Page. § 1S70. School taxes 1339 1871. School lands 1340 1378. School bonds 1341 1873, Schoolteacher — Appointment — Contract — EemoTal . 1343 1374. Pupils 1343 1S7S. Race question in schools 1344 1376. Bible in schools 1345 1377. Actions and defenses 1346 CHAPTER XXXV. TAXATION. PftSe. §1378. Distinction between "tax ''and "assessment" . . . 1349 1379. Situs of taxable property 1349 1380. The same subject continued 1350 1381. The same subject continued — Shares of stock . . . 1351 1383. The same subject continued — Credits and choses in ac- tion — Insurance premiums 1352 1383. The same subject continued — Vessels and ferry-boats . 1353 18S4. Subjects of taxation 1353 1385. The same subject continued 1354 1386. License fees and taxes on business 1355 1387. The same subject continued 1356 1388. The saDie subject continued — The power strictly con- strued . 1357 1389. Local taxation of transportation companies ... 1358 1390. Banks 1358 1391. The same subject continued ...... 1359 1393. Miscellaneous property — Water companies ... 1360 1398. Gas companies 1360 1394. Miscellaneous corporations 1361 1395. Apportionment by benefits 1863 1396. Agricultural lands 1363 1397. The same subject continued 1364 1393. The same subject continued — New Jersey and "Wisconsin decisions 1364 1399. Taxation after changing'the corporate limits . . . 1865 1400. The same subject continued 1366 1401. The same subject continued — Kentucky and Iowa de- cisions 1366 1403. Effect of change of corporate limits 1367 1403. The same subject continued 1868 1404. Equality and uniformity 1368 1405. The same subject continued 1869 1406. The same subject continued — Limitation of the rule . 1870 1407. Taxation to pay debts 1371 1408. The same subject continued 1371 1409. The same subject continued — Implied duties . . . 1373 Xlii TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME H. Page. § 1410. Implied duties further considered 13'''3 1411. Limitation of State control 13'''3 1413. The same subject continued — Rules of construction . 1373 1413. Other limitations of taxing power 1374 1414. The same subject continued ...... 1374 1415. Effect of annulling the municipal charter ... 1375 1416. Mandamus 1376 1417. The same subject continued 1376 1418. The same subject continued — Implied obligation to levy tax . . . • ^ 13''"'' 1419. Mandamus after judgment 1378 1420. Proceedings in equity 1379 1421. When mandamjis is Improper 1379 1433. Execution 1380 1433. Legislative control 1381 1434. Taxing powers . • 1383 1435. The same subject continued — Express authority . . 1383 1426. Grant of power strictly construed . . . . • 1383 1437. The same subject continued 1384 1428. Implied powers 1384 1429. Charter limitations 1385 1430. The same subject continued ...... 1386 1431. Taxation to aid private enterprises 1386 1483. The same subject continued ...... 1387 1433. Discrimination against non-residents . .... 1387 1434. State control 1388 1435. The same subject continued .....; 1389 1436. Execution of charter powers 1389 1437. Voting the tax '.".". . 1390 1438. The same subject continued ...... 1391 1489. Assessment and collection further considered . . . 1891 1440. Purposes for which the tax may be levied ... 1393 1441. Local taxes for schools 1394 1443. Lien of taxes 1895 1443. Exemptions 1395 1444. Tlie same subject continued — Corporations . . . 1396 1445. Exemptions further considered — Whiting V, West Point 1397 14'J6. Remedies 1899 1447. The same subject continued '. . • • . . 1400 CHAPTER VXX VIt EIGHWAYS. Fttge. § 1448. Highway defined — Different kinds 1403 1449. Modes of creating highways ...... 1404 1450. Dedication of highway — Nature and requisites . . 1405 1451. Dedication continued — EvideiLce and presumptions . 1407 1453. Footways — Dedication, etc 1408 TABLE OF CONTENTS ^- VOLUME II. xliii 1463. Conditional or qualified dedication — Revocation 1454. Acceptance of highway — Nature of 1455. Dedication by States, by cities . 1456. The subject of dedication continued . 1457. Immemorial public user of highways 1458. Acquiring streets by prescription 1459. The same subject continued — Prescription in various States 1460. Appropriating land for highway — Damages . 1461. Laying out highway — Compliance with statute 1462. The same subject continued 1463. Laying out — Property exempt from . . . 1464. Laying out — Private owner's rights 1465. Proceedings^^to establish highways — Parties — Notice 1466. Laying out — Petition — Jurisdictional facts . 1467. The same subject continued — Objections to petition 1468. Abandonment of highway by non-user 1469. Discontinuing or vacating highways . . 1470. Bridges — Part of highway, etc. .... 1471. Bridges over navigable rivers and waters . 1473. Bridges between States — Between counties 1473. County bridges 1474. County commissioners' discretion as to erection of bridges 1475. City bridges > . 1476. Bridges in towns and townships and boroughs . 1477. Contribution to cost of bridges 1478. County liability for neglecting to repair bridges 1479. General duty to repair bridges 1480. Latent defects — Duty to inspect bridges . 1481. Rule as to heavy loads on bridges .... 1483. Abutting owners' rights and easements . 1483. The same subject continued 1484. Liability for defective construction .... 1485. Defective highway plan — Liability for . 1486. The same subject continued 1487. Duty to keep streets reasonably safe .... 1488. Highway duty of New York towns and villages 1489. Excuse of want of funds 1490. Primary municipal duty — Abutting owners' liability 1491. Municipal and abutting owners' statutory liability . 1492. Limited liability for acts, etc., of independent contractors 1493. Municipal duty of supervision over others 1494. General municipal liability for neglect of streets 1495. Municipal liability in Michigan .... 1496. The same subject continued — The rule in other States 1497. Exceptions to the general rule 1498. Duty of keeping streets safe to whom due 1499. Liability for ways which public is invited to use 1500. Not liable for whole width of rural highways . 1) 1408 1409 1409 1410 1412 1413 1414 1415 1413 1416 1417 1417 1418 1419 1420 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1436 1426 1428 1429 1430 1430 1431 1431 1433 1433 1434 1435 143^ 1438 1439 1439 1440 1441 1443 1445 1445 1446 1447 1448 1448 1449 145e XliT TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME 11. § 1501. Municipal recourse against third persons . 1503. Transfer of liability 1503. Liability when defects concur with other causes 1504. Plaintiif's concurring act in cases of danger and exigency 1505. Limited liability in grading streets . 1506. Liability in respect of latent defects . 1507. Municipal liability as to snow and ice 1508. The same subject continued 1509. The same subject continued — Notice 1510. Liability for obstructions . .* . 1511. The same subject continued — Obstructions for private convenience 1518. Liability for structures over the street . . 1513. Municipal liability for fright of horses 1514. Duty to light streets — To light excavations, etc. 1515. Crossings — Duty to keep safe 1516. Sidewalk openings and excavations — Coal holes . 1517. Duty as to railings and barriers .... 1518. Founderous highway — Deviation from . 1519. When notice of defect may be imputed to municipality 1530. When notice should not be imputed .... 1521. Notice when a question for the jury .... 1523. Notice from similar accidents 1523. When notice is not necessary ..... 1534. Notice to o£5cers, etc 1535. , Notice of injury . . , 1526. The same subject continued — Beqnisites of notice . 1537. The same subject continued — Illustrations of sufiScient notice 1538. Pleading of notice — Evidence of . 1529. Preliminary presentment of claim . . 1530. Evidence of specific defect 1531. Subsequent repairs as evidence 1532. Evidence of contributory negligence 1333. Instructions to jury — May supplement each other 1584. Correct instructions as to negligence illustrated 1335. . Interest on damages for injuries 1536. . Contributory negligence -^Knowledge of danger 1537. . Negligence in the priesence of danger — Lawful obstruc- tions "... 1538. The same subject continued 1339. . Duty to look and listen 1540. Pedestrians' duty to use d-ossings and sidewalks 1341. The same subject continued — Care required at night 1543. Infirm persons — Duty of caution .... 1543. Intoxication as contributory negligence . 1544. Violation of ordinance, etc., as contributory negligence 1545. Travelers' haste 1546. Pleading and proof as to contributory negligence Page. 1451 1453 1453 1455 1456 1457 1458 1460 1461 1463 1463 1465 1466 1468 1469 1469 1471 1473 1473 1474 1473 1476 1478 1479 1480 1481 1483 1483 1485 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1493 1494 1496 1497 1499 1500 1501 1503 1503 1504 TABLE OP CONTENTS — VOLUME II. xlv CHAPTER XXXVII. MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO, (a) M.iin)A)rD8. 1547. Mandamus to compel restoration of members — To call election 1548. Refusal to grant mandamus illustrated — Issuance discre tionar^ 1549. Denial of writ further illustrated 1550. The same subject continued 1551.- The same subject continued — Reinstatement of o£Scer — Canvass of election 1553, Premature application — Laches 1553. Control of official discretion 1554. The same subject continued 1555. The same subject continued — Board of assessment 1556. The same subject continued — Improvement of highways 1557. The same subject continued — Rebuilding a bridge 1558. Petition for mandamus 1559. Relator's right 1560. The same subject continued .... 1561. Particular instances illustrating use of mandamus 1563. The same subject continued .... 1563. Private parties as relators 1564. The same subject continued .... 1565. Acts in excess of officer's powers 1566. Michigan decisions — Control of official discretion 1567. Restoration to office 1568. To compel performance of judicial functions . 1569. The same subject continued .... 1570. To compel payment of judgment 1571. The same subject continued — Compelling audit of claims 1573. Audit of claims continued .... 1573. Payment of claims and warrants 1574. To compel public boards to reverse their decisions 1575. To compel subordinate officer to recognize board 1576. Removal of obstructions in streets . 1577. The same subject continued .... 1578. The same subject continued — Control of discretion 1579. Discretion to remove obstructions further considered 1580. To appoint school trustees 1581. Apportionment, etc., of school moneys 1583. To restore school funds 1588. To compel signing of teachers' warrants 1584. To dissolve an injunction against a city 1585. To compel approval of official bond , 1586. Approval of bonds continued , . 1587. To restore removed officials . . 1588. To compel execution of tax deed . Pago. 1507 1508 1509 1510 1510 1511 1513 1513 1514 1514 1615 1516 1517 1517 1518 1519 1520 1531 1521 1533 1533 1523 1534 1535 1535 1526 1527 1538 1528 1539 1530 1531 1533 1533 1533 1534 1534 1535 1536 1536 1537 1538 xItL TABLE OF CONTENTS VOUJME II. — To Page. 1539 1539 1540 1541 1543 1543 1543 1544 1545 1546 1546 1547 1548 1549 1549 1550 1551 1551 1553 1553 1554 § 1589. To compel approval of contract , 1590. To a county treasurer to refund taxes 1591. Abatement of public nuisance — Canvass of election police commissioners to enforce law 1593. Obstructions in streets — Contract for improvement 1593. For payment of claim 1594. The same subject continued .... 1595. Title to oflSce and custody of records 1596. License to sell liquors . . . . ■ 1597. The same subject continued — Hearing of complaint 1598. By tax-payer to compel investment of funds 1599. To levy tax to pay a judgment — Previous demand 1600. The same subject continued 1601. Peremptory or alternative 1603. Practice — Parties 1603. Parties further considered 1604. The same subject continued 1605. Pleading .... 1606. ' To compel payment of claims 1607. Enforcement of public duties 1608. To obtain possession of office 1609. InSprovement of highways C6) Quo 'W.iBXANTO. 1610. Scope of proceeding — Title to office — Policeman 1611. Validity of incorporation — Evidence 1613. Against municipal officers under void organization 1613. Usurpation of franchise by a city — Parties 1614. Common council as judge of election 1615. Mandamus and quo warranto distinguished 1616. Florida decisions on quo warranto — Council as judges of election 1617. Practice in Massachusetts — Contest of election 1618. Qiio warranto against municipal corporation , '1619. Jurisdiction of court 1620. Election contests — Rules in Colorado . , 1631. Title to office — Practice in Michigan . , CHAPTER XXXVin. tax-payers' actions. ' ~- Page. § 1623. Introductory 1564 1623. The same subject continued 1565 1634. Remedies for illegal taxation — In general , , . 1566 1625. Injunctions against taxation 1567 1626. The same subject continued — Requisites for injunction . 1568 1627. Requisites for injunction continued 1570 1628. No injunction against irregular taxes .... 1571 1639. Void taxes 1573 1554 1555 1555 1556 1557 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1563 1563 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME 11. Xlvii •**-"? '. Page. § 1630. Injunctions against municipal taxation .... 1573 1631. Taxes on personal property 1573 1633. Taxes on real property 1574 1633. Certiorari 1574 16 i4. The same subject continued 1575 1635. When certiorari does not lie — Effect of issuance . . 1578 1636. Becoveries by tax-payers of taxes paid .... 1576 1637. The same subject continued 1577 1638. Actions against officers • . . 1578 1639. The same subject continued 1579 1640. Misappropriations 1579 1641. The same subject continued — Remedies .... 1580 1643. Injunction further illustrated 1581 1643. The same subject continued 1583 CHAPTER XXXIX. ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. Page. § 1644. Capacity to sue and be sued — Whether a county is subject to suit 1584 1645. The same subject continued ...... 1587 1646. Service of process 1588 1647. Corporate name in suits 1589 1648. Authority to bind town by appearance .... 1590 1649. Pleading in suits upon bonds 1591 1650. The same subject continued ...... 1593 1651. Bill of interpleader by public officer 1593 1653. Writofprohibitioninbehalf of a town — Office of the writ 1593 1653. Execution against municipal corporations . . . 1595 1654. Garnishment of municipal corporations .... 1595 1655. The same subject continued 1596 1656. Presentation of claims — Charter provisions construed . 1697 1657. Action by contractor — Remedy by tax-|;>ill when not ex- clusive ... 1598 1658. Corporate liability to qui tarn action for penalties . . 160O 1659. Statutory liability for injuries to sheep by dogs — Filing of statement . . . . ' . . . . . 1600 1660. The same subject continued — Connecticut decisions . 1603 1661. The same subject continued — Massachusetts decisions . 1603 1663, Liability for acts of officers in killing dogs running at large 1604 TABLE OF CASES. Crhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-78S; Vol. n, pp. 78!>-1605.] Aaron v. Broiles (64 Tex, 316), 1039. Abbett V. Johnson County (114 Ind. 61). 9. 1014. Abbey v. Billups (35 Miss. 618). 261. Abbott V. Board (114 Ind. 61). 1436. Abbott V. Mills (3 Vt. 531). 1406. Abbott V. Town of North Andover (145 Mass. 484; 44 N. E. Rep. 754), 916. Abell I'. Prairie Civil Tp. &c. (Ind.. 31 N. E. Rep. 477), 1601. Abendroth v. Manhattan R. Co. (133 N. Y. 1). 1433. Aberdeen v. Blackmar (6 Hill, 334). 1453. Abernathy v. Phifer (84 N. C. 711), 891. Abington v. North Bridgewater (33 Pick. 177). 976. Achley's Case (4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 35), 288. Ackerman v. HuBF (71 Tex. 317), 692. Ackley v. Town of Vilas (Wis., 48 N. W. Rep. 257), 457. Acklev School District ti. Hall (113 U. S. 139), 957. Adams v. Carlisle '(18 S. C. 243), 337. Adams v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (39 Minn. 286; 39 N. W. Rep. 629), 1144, 1433. Adams v. Chicopee (147 Mass. 440), 1437. 1460, 1475. Adams v. Crowell (40 Vt. 31). 372. Adams v. Fisher (63 Tex. 654; 75 Tex. 657; 6 S. W. Rep. 772), 1135. Adams v. Hyde (27 Vt. 221). 139). Adams v. Mack (8 N. H. 493), 1266. Adams v. Natick (18 Allen, 429), 1473. Adams v. Ohio Falls Car Co. (Ind.. 31 N. E. Rep. 57 », 58.5. 5S6. 1195. Adams v. Oshkosh (71 Wis. 493; 36 N. W. Rep. 614). 784, 1463. 1479. Adams v. Paiae (7 Pick. 542). 209. Adams v. Pratt (109 Mmss. .^9), 372. Adams V. Railroad Co. (U Barb. 453; 10 N. Y. 328), 1333, 1413. Adams v. Richardson (38 N. H. 306), 218. Adams v. Richardson (43 N. H. 212), 339. Adams v. Rome (59 Ga. 765). 937. Adams v. Saratoga (11 Barb. 414), 1143. Adams v. Somerville (3 Head, 363), 1357, 1370. Adams V. Stanyan (24 N. H. 405), 352, 374. Adams v. State (N. H., 18 Atl. Rep. 321). 1335. Adams v. State of Illinois (83 111. 133). 823, 1333. Adams i'. Tator (43 Hun, 384), 200. Adams v. Thomas (Ky., IS S. W. Rep. 940). 1343. Adams v. Wiscasset Bank (1 Greenl. (Mp. ) 3S I !, 8, 1 50, 1 54, 1 56. 365. 746. Adams v. Wiscasset Bank (1 Greenl. (Me.>264), 915. Adams Bank v. Anthony (18 Pick. 238). 323. Adams County v. City of Quincy (130 111. 566; 32 N. E. Rep. 624), 1073. Addis V. Pittsburgh (85 Pa; St. 379). 259. Addison v. Sauliner (19 Cal. 82). 1356. Addison Smith, In re (52 N. Y. 536). 499. Addy V. City of Janesville (70 Wis. 401; 35 N. W. Rep. 931), 1099. Adkins v. Brewer (3 Cow. 203). 339. Adley v. Reeves (2 Maule & Sel. 60). 530, 531, 534. Adrian Water Works v. City of Ad- rian (64 Mich. 584; 31 N. W. Rep. 529). 1300. Adsit V. Brady (4 Hill, 6 0; 38 Am. Dee. 669; 40 Am. Dec. 305), 21'J. 320. 1440. ^tna Ins. Co. v. Mabbett (18 Wis. 6„7), 323. JEitxiA Life Ins. Co. v. Lyon County (44 Fed. Rep. 329), 838. ^tna Mills v. Waltham (126 Mass. 422), 692. TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1603.] Agawam v. Hampden (130 Mass. 5-38). 1434. Agawam Bank v. South Hadley (138 Mass. 503), 230. 234. Agnew V. Brail (124 111. 312; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 134), 197. 654, 657. Agnew u, -Corunna City (55 Mich. 438), 776, 1467. Agricultural Branch E. Co. v. Win- chester (13 Allen, K2), 942. Ahem v. Steele (115 N. Y. 203; 29 N. Y. St. Rep. 295), 1036. Ah Kow V. Nunan (5 Saw. 552). 533. Ah Lit, Ex parte (26 Fed. Rep. 513), • 534. Ahrens v. Fiedler (43 N. J. Law, 400), 905. Ah Toy, In re (45 Fed. Rep. 795), 524. Ah You, Ex parte (88 Cal. 99). 518. Ah You. In re (83 Oal. 339), 1360, 1261. Ah You, In re (Gal., 35 Pao. Rep. «74), 1349. Ah Yup, In re (5 Sawyer C. G. 155), 141. . Aiken County v. Murry (S. C, 14 S. E. fiep. 954), 868. Aikman v. School Dist. (37 Kan. 129), 1335. Aitcheson v. Huebner (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 634). 1538. Akron v. McCorabs (18 Ohio St. 229), 766. Alabama R. Co. v. Kidd (39 Ala. 321), 4,7. Alamango v. Albany County (25 Hun, 551). 761. , Albany v. Abbott (61 N. H. 157), 838. Albany r. Gnnliff(3 N. Y. 165), 331, 253, 642. Albany v. McNamara(117 N. Y. 168; 83 N. E. Rep. 931), 999. Albany v. Savannah &c. R. Co. (71 Ga. 158), 1354. Albany &c. Mining Co. v. Auditor- General (37 Mich. 393), 1190, 1568. Albany &c. R. Co. v. Brownell (34 N. Y. 345). 676. Albany Gitv Nat. Bank v. Albany (93 N. Y. 363), 238, 257, 713. Albany Street, Matter of (11 Wend. 149), 677. Albee v. Ward (8 Mass. 79). 339. Alberger i>. Mayor &c. of Baltimore (64 Md. 1 ; 20 Atl. Rep. 988), 1118, 1179. Alberts on v. Town of Cicero (129 111. 326), 1176. Albrecht v. City of St. Paul (47 Minn. 531 ; 50 N. W. Rep. 608), 1137. Albrittin v. Hnntaville (60 Ala. 486), 90, 265, 1474. Albuquerque v. Zeiger (N. M., 37 Pac. Rep. 315). 1190. Alcorn v. Hamer (38 Miss. 652), 67, 87, 1185. Alcorn v. Philadelphia (113 Pa.. St. 494). 1163. Alden v. Alameda County (48 Cal. %70), 1377. Alden v. City of Minneapolis (34 Minn. 254), 677, 1144, 1145. Alden v. Rounsville (7 Met. 218), 1335. Aldermen r. School Directors (91 111. 179;, 1558. Alderson v. Comm'rs (West Va., 8 S. E. Rep. 274), 389. Alderton v. Binder (81 Mich. 133), 1530. Aldrich«7.Collins(So. Dak., 52 N. W. Rep. 854), 626, 6v;7. Aldrich v. TuscumbiaR. Co. (2 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 199; 23 Am. Dec. .307), 682. Aleppo School District's Appeal (96 Pa. St. 76), 1333. Alexander v. Baltimore (5 Gill, 396), 1166. Alexander v. Bennett (60 N. Y. 204). 1254. Alexander v. Big Rapids (76 Mich. 282), 1437, 1469. Alexander v. City of Vicksburg (68 Miss. 564; 10 So. Rep. 63), 754. Alexander v. Greenville (54 Miss. 659), 1216. Alexander v. Milwaukee (16 Wis. 248), 1146, 11^1. Alexander v. Oneida County (76 Wis. 56; 45 N. W. Rep. 21), 917, Alexander v. People (7 Colo. 155), 383, 555. Alexander v. Town of Newcastle (115 Ind. 51; 17 Atl. Rep. 20t)), 226. Alexander Avenue, In re (N. Y., 31 N. E. Rep. 316, 17 N. Y. Supl. 93.3), 554. Alexandria v. Fairfax (95 U. S. 774), 1588. Alexandria & W. R. Co. v. Alexan- dria & F. E. Co. (75 Va. 780), 681. Alexandria Coal Co. v. Swann (5 How. 83), 658. Alf ord V. Jones (Tex , 9 S. W. Rep. 470), 446. Alger V. Curry (10 Vt. 437), 348, 367. Alger V. Eaton (119 Mass. 77), 1578. TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Alger V. Lowell (3 Allen. 405), 1450, 1473, 1501. Allaire v. Hartshorne f21 N. J. Law, 665), 957. AUec V. Reece (39 Fed. Eep. 341 ; 40 Alb. L. J. 386). 817, 338. Allegheny City i'. McClurkin (14 Pa. St. 81), 836. 645. Allegheny City's Appeal (41 Pa. St. 60). 1395. Allegheny County v. Gibson (90 Pa. St. 3S7), 757. Allegheny County v. Van Campen (3 Wend. 49), 310. Allegheny County v. Watt (3 Pa. St. 462), 1011. Allen V. Archer (49 Me. 846), 351, 1578. Allen V. B. & O. R. Co. (114 U. S. 311), 1568. Allen V. Burlington (45 Vt. 803), 346, 347. 369. 370, 831. Allen V. Chippewa Falls (53 Wis. 430), 1146. Allen V. Commonwealth (83 Va. 94), 819. Allen V. Dallas &c. R. Co. (8 Woods (C. C), 316), 965. Allen V. Bist. Tp. (70 Iowa. 434), 1383. Allen V. Drew (44 Vt. 174), 1164. Allen V. Galveston (51 Tex. 802), 859, 1135, 1170. -Allen V. Gray (11 Conn. 95), 539. Allen V. Grew (44 Vt. 174), 1187. Allen V. Hostetter (16 Ind. 15), 433. Allen V. Intendant (89 Ala. 641 ; 8 So. Rep. 30), 813, 814. Allen V. Jay (60 Me. 184), 559, 930, 1387. Allen V. Jer§ey-City (53 N. J. Law, 528), 1433. Allen V. Jones (47 Ind. 448). 681. Allen V. Louisiana (103 U. S. 80), 93t: Allen V. Metcalf (17 Pick. 208), 1334. Allen V. People (84 III. 502), 131. Allen V. St. Louis (13 Mo. 400). 1364. Allen u State (61 Ind. 268; 88 Am. Rep. 673). 330. Allen V. Taunton (19 Pick. 488), 576, 827. Allen V. Watts (88 Ala. 497; 7 So. Rep. 190), 918. Allen County v. Bacon (98 Ind. 81). 1484. AUentown v. Henry (73 Pa. St. 404), 1160, 1164. AUentown School Dist. v. Derr(115 Pa. St. 439), 9.i6. Alley V. Adams County (76 111. 101), 939. Alley V. Edgcomb (53 Me. 446). 1393. AUine v. Le Mars City (71 Iowa, 654), 1498. Allison V. Railway Co. (9 Bush, 247), 646. Alna V. Clough (8 Me. 834), 835. Altgelti'. City of Antonio (Tex., 17 S. W. Rep. 75), 1898, 1360. Alton V. ..Etna Ins. Co. (82 111. 45), 1393. Alton V. County of Madison (81 III. 115), 634. Alton V. 111. Transp. Co. (12 III. 60), 6 4. Alton V. Kirsch (68 111. 861), 539, 540. Alton V. Mulledy (21 111. 76), 207, 260, 286. 485. 540. Altoona v. Lotz (114 Pa. St. 830; 7 Atl. Rep. 240), 1492. Alves' Ex'r v. Henderson (16 B. Mon. 131), 624. Alvis V. Whitney (43 Ind. 83), 1368. Alvord V. Syracuse (98 N. Y. 599), 961. Amador County v. Kennedy, (70 Cal. 458; 11 Pac. Rep. 758), 600. Ambrose v. State (6 Ind. 851), 604. American Ins. Co. v. Stratton (59 Iowa, 696), 814. American Print Works v. Lawrence (81 N. J. Law, 248), 669, 1047. American Rapid Tel. Co. v. Hess (125 N. Y. 641), 1432. American Union Exp. Co. v. St. Joseph (66 l|Io. 675), 1369. Amerv v. City of Keokuk (72 Iowa, 701). 1180, 1187. Ames V. City and County of San Francisco (76 Cal. 325; 18 Pac. Rep. 397), 884, 890. Ames V. Lake Superior &c. R. Co. (81 Minn. 241), 694, 695. Amesbury v. Bowditch &c. Ins. Co. (6 Gray, 596), 584. Amesbury &c. Co. v. Amesbury (17 Mass, 461), 1577. Amev V. AUeghanv City (84 How. 3"64), 510, 1265, 1385. Amherst v. Hollis (9 N. H. 107), 976. Amherst v. Shelburne (11 Gray, 107), 994. Amherst Bank v. Root (2 Met. 528), 323. Amite City v. Clements (34 La. Ann. 87), 589. Amos V. Fond du Lac (46 Wis. 695), 1448. Amy V. Dubuque (98 U. S. 471), 9i8. Amy V. Selma (77 Ala. 103), 485, 473. 473. Amy V. Smith (1 Litt. 336), 144. Amy V. Supervisors (11 Wall. 186). 319. Anderson, In re (47 Hun, 803), 1105. lii TASLE or CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. !8^1605.] Anderson v. Baker (98 Ind. 587), 1430. Anderson v. Baker (33 Nev. 531), 376. Anderson v. Caldwell (91 Ind. 451), 696. Anderson v. City of May field (Ky., 19 S. W. Kep. 598), 880. Anderson V. City of Wellington (40 Kan. 173), 104, 105, 530, 602. Anderson v. City of Wilmington (Del., 19 Atl. Rep. 509); 1099. Anderson v. Equitable Gas Light Co. (13 Daly, 463), 573. Anderson v. Kerns Drain Co. (14 Ind. 199), 687, 1024. Anderson v. Meeker County (46 Minn. 337), 1433.' Anderson v. Pemberton (89 Mo. 61), 1418. Anderson v. Prairie School Tp. (Ind., 37 N. E. Rep. 439), 1341. Anderson v. Santa Anna (116 U. S. 856), 689. Anderson v. Tuberville (6 Cold. • (Teiln.) 150), 682. Anderson City v. East (117 Ind. 136), 864, 7'! 5. Anderson County v. Beal (113 U. S. 237), 356, 946, 961. Anderson County v. Houston &c. R. Co. (53 Tex. 2S8), 947. . Anderton v. City of Milwaukee (Wis., 53 N. W. Rep. 8(5 1, 557. Andover v. Canton (13 Mass. 547), 976. Andover v. Can- (55 N. H. 453), 1336. Andover v. Grafton (7 N. H. 298), 838, 839. Andress v. School Dist. (45 Minn. 88), 1336. Andrews v. Boylston(110 Mass. 314), 857, 370, 372. Andrews v. Durant (18 N. Y. 496), 1491. Andrews «. Estes (11 Me. 267), 314. Andrews v. Insurance Co. (37 Me. 356), 103, 488, 518. Andrews v. King (77 Me. 324), 1282. Andrews v. Portland (79 Me. 484 ; 10 Am. St. Rep. 284). 180, 210. Andrews v. Pratt (44 Cal. 809), 184, 609. Andrews v. School Dist. (37 Minn. 96; 33 N. W. Rep. 217), 627, 1380, 1333. Andrews v. United States (2 Story C. C. 203), 180. Annapolis v. Jiarwood (33 Md. 471), 1160. Anon. (Free. 474), 315. Answer of Justices (122 Mass. 600), 1365. Anthony v. Adams (1 Met. 284), 251, 636. Anthony v. Jasper County (101 U. S. 698), 642, 946. 954. Anthony v. State (29 Ala. 27), 543. Anthony v. Williams (47 Ind. 565), ■ 1113. Anwin v. Wolseley (1 Term E. 674), 213. Apgar, V. Hayward (110 N. Y. 225), 237. Appeal of Aleppo School Dist. (96 Pa. St. 7fi), 1323, Anpeal of Alleghany City (41 Pa. St. ^60), 1395. Appeal of Ayars (122 Pa. St. 226; 16 Atl. Rep. 356), 173. Appeal of Borough of Chartiers (Pa., 8 Atl. Rep. 181). 1149. Appeal of Borough of Dunmore (53 Pa. St. 374), 1371, 1372. Appeal of Borough of Hanover (Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 669), 583, 584. Appeal of Brinton (142 Pa. St. 511 ; 21 All. Rep. 978), 410. Appeal of Brumm (Pa., 12 Atl. Rep. 855); 1310. Appeal of Burgess &c. of Darby (140 Pa. St. 250; 21 Atl. Rep. 394), 457. Appeal of Butler (73 Pa. St. 448), 1238, 1353, 1856. Appeal of Chaffee (56 Mich. 244), 681. Appeal of City of Erie (91 Pa. St. 398), 832, 839. Appeal of City of Philadelphia (78 Pa. St. 88), 1203. Appeal of Commonwealth (Pa., 9 Atl. Rep. 524). 1192. Appeal of Des Moines Water Co. (48 Iowa, 334), 572, 1360, 1361. Appeal of Devore (56 Pa. St. 168), 1866. Appeal of Durach (63 Pa. St. 491), 1354. Appeal of Earley (103 Pa. St. 273), 231. Appeal of Freeport Water-works Co. (129 Pa. St. 605; 18 Atl. Rep. 560), 1301. Appeal of Geist (104 Pa. St. 351), 1115. Appeal of G'lchrist (109 Pa. St. 600), 1850. Appeal of Gillespie (Pa., 24 AtL R^p. 626). 563. Appeal of Grayson (140 Pa. St. 250; 21 Atl. Rep. 394), 457. Appeal of Gross (18 Atl. Rep. 557), 69. Appeal of Haupt (125 Pa. St. 211), 1304. Appeal of Hewitt (88 Pa. St 55), I 1081, 1365, 1367. . Board of Super- visors (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 483), 431. Auditor-General v. Fisher (84 Mich. 128; 47 N. W. Rep. 574), 10B6. Auditor-General v. Railroad Co. (82 Mich. 436), 195. Auditors v. Benoit (30 Mich. 176), 199. Auer V. City of Dubuque (65 Iowa, 650), USD. Augusta V. Dunbar (50 Ga. 387), 1160, 1350, 1353. Augusta V. Hafers (61 Ga. 48), 1477. Augusta V. Kingsfield (36 Me. 235), 981. Augusta V. Leadbetter (16 Me. 45), 654, 836. Augusta V. National Bank (47 Ga. 562), 1354. Augusta V. North (.57 Me. 392), 479, 1388. Augusta V. Perkins (3 B. Mon. 437), 624. Augusta V. Walton (37 Ga. 630), 1354, 1384. Augusta Bank v. Augusta (49 Me. 507), 933. Augusta City Council v. Hudson (fl8 Ga.399;'l5 S. E. Rep. 678), 1428. Augusta Factory v. City Council of Augusta (83 Ga. 734; 10 S. E. Rep. 359), 618. Aulanier v. Governor (1 Tex. 653), 19S, 1357. Auld V. Walton (12 La. Ann. 129), 377. Aurora v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (119 HI. 846), 1393. Aurora v. Fox (78 Ind. 1), 1869. Aurora v. Hillman (90 111. 61), 1477, 1479, 1495. 1503. Aurora v. Reed (57 111. 30), 677. Aurora v. West (32 Ind. 88, 508), 982, 939, 958, 966. Aurora City v. Cheshire (55 Ind. 484), 1450. Aurora City v. West (7 Wall. 82), 959 Austin "u. Allen (6 Wis. 134), 347, 694. Austin V. Austin Gaslight &c. Co. (09 Tex. 180), 1370, 1898. Austin V. D.St. Tp. of Colony (51 Iowa, 103; 49 N. W. Rep. 1051), 848. Austin V. Gas Co. (69 Tex. 187), 1360. Austin V. Johns (68 Tex. 179). 186. Austin V. Murray (16 Pick. 121), 106, 581, 1037. Austin V. Walton (68 Tex. 507; 5 S. W. Rep. 70), 186, 541. Austin V. York (57 Me. 304), 348, 370. Austin City v. Ritz (73 Tex. 391), 1478, 1489. Austrian v. Guy (31 Fed. Rep. 500), Averingtt Russell (33 Barb. 863), 141. Avery v. Newton (148 Mass. 598), 1499. Avery v. Slack (19 Wend. 50), 196. Avery v. Springport (14 Blatohf . 273), 953. Ivi TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Avery v. Stewart (1 Gush. 496), 368, 370. Avery v. Township Board (73 Mich. 622; 41 N. W. Rep. 818). 916, 917. Avont V, Flynn (So. Dak., 49 N. W. Rep. 17), 593. Axt V. Jackson School Tp. (90 Ind. 101), 208, 643. 832. Ayars' Appeal (123 Pa. St. 226; 16 Atl. Rep. 3.56). 173. Ayer v. Norwich (39 Conn. 376), 14C7. Aver V. St. Paul (27 .Minn. 457), 758. Ayers, Jjire (,133 CJ. S. 443). 20. Ayers v. Commissioners (60 Ga. 404), 112, 128. Ayers v. Lawrence (59 N. Y. 192), 647, 780. Ayers v. Newark (49 N. J. Law, 170), 1292. Ayres v. Hammondsport (7 N. Y. Supl. 174), 1461. Ayres v. Penn. R. Co. (52 N. J. Law, 405; 48 N. J. Law, 44), 1408. B. Babbitt v. Savoy (3 Cush. 530), 664. Babcock v. BuflEalo (56 N. Y. 268), 1084. Babcock v. Granville (44 Vt. 325), 1575. Babcock v. Gifford (29 Hun, 186), 220. Babcock v. Helena (34 Ark. 499), 93. Babcock v. Welsh (71 Cal. 402), 1423. Babington v. St. Charles (27 La. Ann. 331), 647. Babson v. Rockport (101 Mass. 93), 1455. Bach V. Carpenter (29 Kan. 349), 55. Bachelder v. Epping (28 N. H. 354), 668, 838. Bachelor v. New Hampton (60 N. H. 207), 694. 1420. Bachlers' Appeal (90 Pa. St. 307), 671. Back man v. Charleston (42 N. H. 183), 257, Backus V. Lebanon (11 N. H. 19; 35 Am. Dec. 466), 633, 696, 1196. Bacon v. Bacon (Cro. Car. 601), 136. Bacon v. City of Savannah (86 Ga. 301; 12 S. E. Rep. 580), 1073, 1187. Bacon v. Robertson (1'8 How. 480), 464, 465. Badkins v. Robertson (53 Ga. 613), 1244. Bagg V. Detroit (5 Mich. 338), 1163. Bagg's Case (11 Coke, 93 (b); 11 Rep. 99a), 203, 303, 206. Bagott's Case (7 Edw. IV. 29), 43. Bailey v. Lawrence County (S. Dak., 51 N. W. Rep. 331), 1517. Bailey v. Mayor &c. of New York (3 Hill, 531; 2 DeniOi 431), 7, 219, 454, 480, 749, 753, 764, 766, 1397. Bailey v. State (SO Neb. 855 ; 47 N. W. Rep. 208), 643, 1266. Bailey v. Winn (101 Mo. 649), 1856. Bailey v. Woburn (126 Mass. 416), 688. Baileyville v. Lowell. (20 Me. 178), ♦ 654. Baily v. Commonwealth (Pa., 20 W. N, C. 321 ; 9 Atl. Rep. 233), 968. Baily v. Commonwealth (Pa., 10 Atl. Rep. 764), 854. Bainbridge v. Dowine (6 Mass. 353), 813. Baines v. Lacon (84 111. 461), 48. Baird v. Daily (68 N. Y. 547). 1486. Baird v. Todd (37 Neb. 783), 833. Baker v. Board (40 Iowa, 228), 555. Baker v. Boston (13 Pick. 184; 23 Am. Dec. 481), 778. Ip34, 1054. Baker v. Chambles (4 Grreene (Iowa), 428), 214. Baker v. Cihcinnati(ll Ohio St. 534], 1356, 1370. Baker v. City of Seattle (Wash., 27 Pac. Rep. 462), 842, 869. Baker v. City of UticaXl9 N. Y. 326), 181. Baker v. City of Washington (7 D. C. 134), 665. Baker v. Cushman (127 Mass. 105), 303, 304. Baker v. Johnson (41 Me. 15), 910. Baker v. Normal (81 111. 108), 535. Baker v. Portland (58 Me. 199), 1503. Baker v. Preston (1 Gilmer, 335), 209, 336. Baker v. Schofield (58 Ga. 182), 510, 1270. Baker v. Shephard (24 N. H. 208), 350, 368. Baker v. Tobin (40 Ind. 810), 1112. Baker v. Torrey (69 Tenn. i), 1340. Baker v. Windham (13 Me. 74), 664. Balch V. County Comm'rs (103 Mass. 106), 686. BalcOmbe v, Northrup (9 Minn. 173), 314. Baldwin v. Bangor (36 Me. 518), 681. Baldwin v. Carter (15 Johns. 496), 279 Baldwin v. City (68 111. 418). 544. Baldwin v. City Council (53 Ala. 437), 1383. Baldwin v. City of Elizabeth (43 N. J. Eq. 11), 564. Baldwin v. Elv (66 Wis. 188; 28 N. W. Rep. 893), 558. TABLE OF CASES. Ivii [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Baldwin v. Franks (120 U. S. 678), 147. Baldwin v. Green (10 Mo. 410), 103, 488,'S13. , Baldwin v. Marshall (3 Humph. (Tenn.) 116), 225. Baldwin v. Mayor &c. (48 Barb. 549), 1372. Baldwin v. Murphy (83 111. 485), 538. Baldwin v. Nickerson(Wyo., 19Pac. Rep. 439), 1336. Baldwin v. North, Branford (32 Conn. 47), 347, 349, 369. 371. Baldwin v. Smith (82 111. 163), 527. Baldwin v. Tucker (16 Fla. 258), 1573. Bales V. Pidgeon (129 Ind. 548; 20 N. E. Rep. 34), 1413. Balfe V. Lammers (109 Ind. 847), 1190. Ball V. Fagg (67 Mo. 481), 176, 543, 1269. Ball V. Town of Woodbine (61 Iowa, 83; 47 Am. Rep. 805), 764. Ballard v. Davis (31 Miss. 525), 296, 1335. Ballard v. Gray (108 N. C. 544), 1263. Ballard v. Harrison (4 M. & W. 392), 1473. Ballard v. Tomlinson (L. R. 29 Ch. D. 115), 764. Ballerino v. Mason (83 Cal. 447). 327. Ballston Spa v. Markham (11 N. Y. Siipl. 826), 13:j5. Baltimore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (31 Ind. 50), 1574. Baltimore v. BonJdin (23 Md. 328), 690. 1419. Baltimore v. Eschbach (18 Md. 276), 253 259 1173 Baltimore v. Gill" (31 Md. 375), 646, 832, 1583. Baltimore v. Greenmount Cemetery {7Md. 547). 1166. Baltimore v. Hughes (1 Gill & J. 480), 534, 1169. Baltimore v. Musgrave (48 Md. 272), 330, 249. Baltimore v. O'Donnell (53 Md. 110), 1468. Baltimore v. Poultney (35 Md, 18), 280. Baltimore v. Radecke (49 Md. 217), 518, 530. Baltimore v. Railroad Co. (21 Md. 50), 195. Baltimore v. Reynolds (20 Md. 1), 253. Baltimore v. Scharf (54 Md. 499), 283. Baltimore &c. Co. v. Nesbit (10 How. 395). 697. Baltimore &o. R. Co. v. North (103 Ind, 359), 675. Baltimore City v. Marriott (9 Md, 160), 1138. Baltimore Turnpike (5 Binney, 481), 376, 296. Bamber v. City of Rochester (63 How. Pr. 103), 1038. Bambrick v. Campbell (37 Mo. App. 460), 499, 1075. Bancroft v. Cambridge (126 1 Mass. 438), 687. Bancroft v. Lynnfleld (18 Pick. 566.) 663, 664. Bangor [v. Inhabitants &c. (71 Me. 535), 1000. Bangor v. Readfleld (32 Me. 60), 98n. Bangor &c. R. Co. v. McCombs (60 Me. 290). 699. Bangor Savings Bank v. City of Stillwater (49 Fed. Rep. 721), 726, 914. 933. Bank v. Brainard School Dist. (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 814), 750. Bank v. Bridges (30 N. J. Law, ll3>, 131. Bank v. Brown (36 N. Y. 467), -87. Bank v. Charleston (3 Rich. Law, 343). 1361. Bank v. Chester (10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 561), 1359. , Bank v. Chillicothe (7 Ohio (Part II), 31), 93, 794. Bank v. Chillicothe (7 Ohio, 354), 933, Bank v. !Ed wards (5 Ired. Law, 516), 1361. Bank v. Hamlin (14 Mass. 178), 1366, 1269. Bank v. Madison (3 Ind. 43), 1358, 1359. Bank v. Mayor &c. of New York (43 N. Y. 185), 1576. 1579. Bank v. Peel (11 Ark. 750), 385. Bank v. Sarlls (Ind., 28 N. E. Rep. 434), 575. Bank v. Savannah (Dudley, 130), 1359. Bank v. Statesville (84 N. C. 169), 250, 640. Bank of Chenango v. Brown (36 N. Y. 467), 64, 525, 1390. Bank of Columbia v. Patterson (7 Cranch, 299), 338, 257, 260, 263, 708. Bank of Commonwealth v. New York (43 N. Y. 189), 240, 244, 1134. Bank of Hamburg v. Wray (4 Strob. (S. C.)87; 51 Am. Dec. 659), 215. Bank of Louisiana v, Farrar (1 La. Ann. 49). 528. Bank of New Orleans V, New Or- leans (13 La. Ann. 43i), 344. Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome (18 N. Y. 38), 933. Iviii TABLE OF CASES. [Tho references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Bank of Santa Rosa v. Chalfant (52 Cal. 170), 1400. Bank of United States v. Dandridge (13 Wheat. 64), 176, 287, 259, 260, 314, 1366. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank (4 Wheat. 205), 7. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank (9 Wheat. 907), 4, 7. Bank head v. Brown (25 Iowa, 540), 683, 684, 685. Barber v. City of East Dallas (Tex., 18 S. W. Rep. 488), 433. Barber v. Comm'rs (93 N. C. 143), 1349. Barber v. Roxbury (93 Mass. 318), 1466. Barber Asphalt Pavement Co. v. City of New Orleans (41 La. Ann. 1015; 9 So. Rep. 484). 871. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Gog- reve (41 La. Ann. 251), 1173, 1186. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hunt (100 Mo. 22; 13 S. W. Rep. 98). 499. Barber Surgeons v. Pelson (2 Lev. 252), 90. Barbie^ v. Connolly (113 U. S. 27), 511. Barbour v. Camden (51 Me. 608), 370. Barbour v. Ellsworth (07 Me. 294), 775. Barbour County v. Brunson (36 Ala. 362). 744. Barbour County v. Horn (48 ^la. R49i, 744. Barclay i'. Howells' Lessees (6 Pet. 498). 671, 1400. Bard v. Poole (12 N. Y. 495), 1424. Barden v. Citv of Portage (79 Wis. . 126), 1148." Bargatei). Sliortridge (5 Clark (H. L.), 297), 947, 954. Barhvte v. Shepherd (35 N. Y. 255), 1514. Barhyte v. Sheppard (35 N. Y. 338), 1178, 1578. Barker v. Hovev(Kan., 26 Pac. Rep. 585), 1088, 1089, 1155, 1416. Barker v. Omaha (16 Neb. 269), 1190. Barker v. People (3 Cowen, 686 ; 15 Am. Deo. 3a3), 189. 37B. Barker v. Smitli (10 S. C, 236), 528. Barker v. State (48 Ohio, 514), 1365. Barker u. Town of Oswegatchie (10 N. Y. Siipl. 884). 816, 1092. Barker v. Town of Oswefratcbie (16 N. Y, Supl. 737), .^54. Barkley v. Comm'rs (93 U. S. 258), 1379. Barley v. Mayor (3 Hill, 331), 4. Barling u. West (39 Wis. B07),486, 518. Barnard v. Campau (39 Mich. 162), 2i5. Barnard v. Campbell (55 N. Y. 456), ' 940. Barnard v. Knox County (Mo., 16 S. W. Rep. 917), 832. Barnert v. Paterson (48 N. J. Law, 395), 291, 493, 493. Barnes v. Atchison (8 Kan. 454), 1385. Barnes v. Bakersfield (57 Vt. 375), 184. i^arnes v. Barnes (6 Vt. 388), 91, 93, 1334. Barnes v. Brookman (107 111. 317), 313. Barnes v. Chapin (4 Allen, 444), 1467. Barnes v. Chicago (138 Mass. C7)» 1478. Barnes v. Common Council (89 Ala. 602), 1269. Barnes v. County of Marshall (56 Iowa, 23), 1540. Barnes v. District of Columbia (91 U. S. 551). 9, 51, 53, 109, 265, 549, 75:i. 754', 768, 1136, 1445. Barnes v. Dyer (56 Vt. 469), 1176. 1349. Barnes v. Lacon (81 111. 461), 932, 1383. Barnes v. Marshall (56 Iowa, 20), 1575, 15T8. Barnes v. State (19 Conn. 398), 1349. Barnes v. Williams (53 Ark. 205; 13 S. W. Rep. 845). 187. Barnett. Ex parte (51 Ark. 215; 10 S. W. Rep. 492), 1012. Barnett v. Newark (28 111. 62), 503, 1064. Barney v. Dewey (13 Johns. 236), 1453. Barney Dumping Boat Co. v. New York (40 Fed. Rep. 50), 754. Barnum v. Oilman (27 Minn. 466), 386. Barnum v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore (62 Md. 375), 563, 660. Barr v. Atlanta (64 Ga. 3i5), 1388. Barr v. Auburn (89 111. 361), 543, 1369. Barr v. Deniston (19 N. H. 170), 646. Barr t'. Kansas City (105 Mo. 55U), 1451, 1478. 1.503. Barr r. Oskaloosa (45 Iowa, 275), 1195. Barr v. Stevens (1 Bibb. 392), 706. Barre r. Coventry (63 Vt. 95; 20 Atl. Rep. 925). 978. Barre v. Greenwich (1 Pick. 129), 983. Barrel! v. Black (56 Me. 498), 766. Barren's Case (L. E. 10 Ch. App. bU), 717. TABLE OF OASES. lis [The references ore to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Barrett, Ex parte (43 Ala. 498), 1051. Barrett v. Cambridge (10 Allen, 48), 1577. Barrett v. Crane (16 Vt. 246), 344. Barrett v. School Dist. (87 N. H. 445), 1330. Barrett v. Schuyler County Court (44 Mo. 197), 940. Barrett v. Sbaubbut (5 Minn. 823), 225. Barron v. Krebs (41 Kan. 338), 1172. Barrow v. Baltimore (7 Peters, 243), 670. Barrow v. Davis (46 Mo. 394), 1189, 1573. Barry v. GoaJ (89 Cal. 2,15; 26 Pac. ^ep. 785; 24 Pac. Rep. 1033), 810. Bany v. Lowell (3 Alien, 127). 1146. Barry v. Terkildsen (72 Cal. 254; 13 Pac. Rep. 657), 1496. Bany Water Co., In re (Vt., 20 Atl. Rep. 109), 1305. Barter r. Commonwealth (3 Pa. 253), i99, 529, 531, 1303, 1253. Barthet v. City of New Orleans (24 Fed. Rep. 563), 520, 603. Bartholomew v. Harwinton (33 Conn. 410). 817. Bartle v. Des Moines (38 Iowa, 414), 841. Bartlett v. Board of Education (59 111. 304), 313. Bartlett v. Crozier (15 Johns. 250), 219. Bartlett v. Crozifer (17 Johns. 439), 1439. 1445. Bartlett v. Governor (2 Bibb, 586), 320. Bartlett v. King (12 Mass. 537), 538. Bartlett v. Knsley (15 Conn. 337), 836, 367, V63o. Bartlett v. Sayer (12 N. Y. Supl. 170), 1337. Bartlett v. Tucker (104 Mass. 336; 6 Am. Rep. 240), 215. Bartmeyer v. Iowa (18 Wall. 129), 144. Barton v. Gadsden (79 Ala. 495), 526. Barton v, Pittsburgh (4 Brewst. 373), 543, 1173, 1365.,, Barton v. Sweptson (44 Ark, 437), 208. ' Barton v. Syracuse (36 N; Y. 54), 768, 777, 1080, 1137. Barton County v. Walser (47 Mo. 189), 15. Bartram v. City of Bridgeport (55 Conn. 122), 1176. Bass V. Columbus (30 Qa. 845). 941. Bass V. Fort Wavne (121 Ind. 389; 33 N. K Rep. 2o9), 1^17. Bass V. State (84 La. Ann. 494), 669. Bass Foundry & Machine Works v. Board i&o. (115 Ind. 234), 713, 798 893 Bassett't). Denn (17 N. J. Law, 433), 190. Bassett v. Fish (12 Hun. 209), 319. Bassett v. Fish (75 N. Y. 304), 1492. Bassett v. Porter (4 Cush. 487), 54, 91, 93, 1324. Bassett v. St. Joseph (53 Mo. 290), 1430, 1471. Bastrop County v. Hearn (70 Tex. 563; 8 S. W. Rep. 302), 857. Bateman v. Florida Commercial Co. (Fla.. 8 So. Rep. 51), 1400. Bateman v. Mid. Wales R. Co. (L. R. 1 C. P. 499), 933. Bateman Overseer of Poor v. Mather (N. J., 24 Atl. Rep. 444), 980. Bates V. Bassett (60 Vt. 530; 15 Atl. Rep. 300), 661. 831. Bates V. Gregory (Cal., 22 Pac. Rep. 683), 1587. Bates V. Mobile (46 Ala. 158), 1351, 1356, 1859. Bates V. Ovei'seers &c. of Plymouth (14 Gray. 168), 348, 1375. Bates V. Porter (74 Cal. 224 ; 15 Pac. Rep. 732), 851. Bates 0. Village of Rutland (63 Vt. 178; 20 Atl. Rep. 278), 752. 782. Bates County v. Winters (97 U. S. 85). 966. Batesviile &c. Co., Ex parte (39 Ark. 82). 280. , Batesviile Institute v. KauSman (18 Wall. 151), 480. Bath County v. Amy (13 Wall. 344), 1379. Bathurst v. MoPherson (L. R. 4 App. Cas. 256), 768, 7b6. Bathurt v. Course (3 La. Ann. 260), 1273. Baton Rouge v. Bearing (15 La. Ann. 208), 1253. Battle V. Mobile (9 Ala. 234), 1353. Battles V. Laudenslager (84 Pa. St. . 446). 965. Bauer v. Rnchester (35 N. Y. St. Rep. 959), 1463, 1469. Bauman v. Detroit (58 Mich. 441), 264. Baumgartner v. Hastv (100 Ind. ' 575; 50 Am. Rep. 830), 13, 593, 643, 1047, 1346. Baws V. Allentown (34 N. H. 351), 56. Baxter v. City of Seattle (Wash., 38 Pac. Rep. 537), 595. Baxter v. State (9 Wis. 88), 1839. Baxters. Winposki Turnpike (28 Vt. 133), 10, 156, 747, 1536. Ix TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Bay County v. Brock (44 Mich. 45), 11536. • Bay County v. Bullock (51 Mich. 544), 396, 434. Bayard v. Baker (76 Iowa, 330 ; 23 Am.- & Eng. Corp. Cas. 136), 301, 498. 507, 509. Bayard v. Klinge (16 Minn. 349), 381, 1390. Bayley v. Taber (5 Mass. 386), 956. Bayliss v. Pearson (15 Iowa, 379), 313, 314. Baysinger v. People (115 111. 419). 311. Beach v. City of Elmira (11 N. Y. Supl. 913), 1099. Beach v. Leahy (11 Kan. 63), 14, 61, 1320. Beacon Falls v. Seymour (44 Conn. 310), 987. Beal V. Ray (17 Ind. 550), 375. Beale v. Guerneey (8 Johns. 446), 1491. Bealey v. Dickenson (43 Vt. 599), 1336, Beall V. Athens (81 Mich. 536), 1447, 1454, 1467, 1471. Beals V. Amador County (35 Cal. 634), 1371. Beals V. Rubber Co. (11 R. I. 381; 33 Am. Rep. 473), 1166. Beals V. Supervisors Amador County (38 Cal. 449), 453. Beam v. Patterson (47 N. J. Law, 15), 1073. Beaman v. Lake County (43 Miss. 337), 928. Bean v. Board (51 Iowa, 53; 49 N. W. Rep. 1049), 883. Bean v. Concord (48 Vt. 30), 783. Bean v. Jay (33 Me. 117), 657. Bean v. People (7 Colo. 200), 1374. Bean v. Thompson (19 N. H. 390), 853. Bear v. City of AUentown (Pa., 3 Atl. Rep. 1063), 1154. Bearce v. Fossett (34 Me. 575), 351, '373 Beard v. City of Brooklyn (31 Barb. 143), 1600. Beard v. Decatur (64 Tex. 7 ; 63 Am. Rep. 735), 1S3. Bearden v. Madison (73 Ga. 184), 486. Beardsley v. City o^ Hartford (50 Conn. 529), 1150. Beardslev v. Smith (16 Conn. 368), 150, '151, 156, 345, 915, 1376. Bearton v. Farmers' Bank &o. (13 Peters, 134 ),3. ^ Beasley v. Beckley (38 West Va. 81), 546, 1576. Beasley v. United States (31 Ct. CI. 225). 743. Beatty u. Litus (47 N. J. Law, 89), 1407, 1426. Beatty v. Sibley County (33 Minn. 470), 856. Beaufort i\ Ohlandt (34 S. C. 158;, 1357, 1363. Beaumont v. Wilkesbarre (143 Pa. St. 198; 31 Atl. Rep. 888), 119, 510, 1187, 1266. Beaver v. State (124 Ind. 334), 861. Beaver County v. Armstrong (44 Pa. St. 63), 958. Beaver Creek v. Hastings (53 Mich. 528), 277. ' Bilfevers v. Trimmer(3N. J. Law, 97), 1036. Beck V. Carter (68 N. Y. 383), 766. Beck V. Hanscom (29 N. H. 313), 307. Becker v. City of Washington (94 Mo 375; 7 S. W. Rep. 291), 501, 631, 542, 107-3, Becker v. Keokuk Water-works (79 Iowa, 419; 44 N. W. Rep. 694), 1315, 1307, 1893. Beckham v. Nacke (56 Mo. 546), 1349. Beckwith v. Whaleu(65 N. Y. 323), 1323 Beckwith v. Whalen (70 N. Y. 430), 1430. Bedell, £x parte (20 Mo. App, 135), 504, 605. Beecher v. City of Detroit (Mich., 52 N. W. Rep. 731), 586, 1172. Beecher v. Clay County (52 Iowa, 140), 1579. Beeoroft i'. Council Bluffs (63 Iowa, 646;, 1128. Beekman, In re (31 How. Pr. 16), 396. Beekman v. Frost (18 Johns. 544), 225. Beekman v. Saratoga &c. R. Co. 13 Paige Ch. 45; 23 Am. Dec. 679), 669, 683, 695. Beekman Street, Matter of (4 Bradf. 503), 677. Beekman Street (20 Johns. 269), 697. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts (97 U. S. 25), 86, 1032, 1231. Beers n Botsford (3 Day (Conn.). 159), 150, 155. Beers v. Dallas City (16 Oregon, 334 , 18 Pac. Rep. 18.S), 707, 711. Beers v. State (20 How, 527), 740. Beesman v. Peoria (16 111. 484), 1262. Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz (135 III. 691 ; 36 N. E. Rep. 704), 385. Beikman's Case (11 Abb. Pr. 164), 1064. Belcher v. Farrai: (8 Alien, 825), 1029, 1035, Belfast V. Leominster (1 Pick, 123), 826, 969. Belfast &o, R. Co. v. Brooks iCO Me. 568), 348, 367, 937. TABLE OF OASES. Ixi [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Belfast &c. Ry. Co. v. Unity (62 Me. 148), 305, 361. Belisle v. Clark (49 Ala. 98), 315. Belknap v. Reinhait (2 Wend. 375; 20 Am. Dec. 631). 213. Bell V. Boston (101 Mass. 506), 1080. Bell V. City of Americus (79 Ga. 153; 3 S. E. Rep. 613), 938. Bell V. City of Rochester (11 N. Y. Supl. 305), 1036. Bell V. McKiBney (63 Miss. 187), 218. Bell V. Mobile &o. R. Co. (4 Wall. 598), 993. Bell V. Nashville Bank (Peck (Tenn.), 396), 50. Bell V. New York (105 N. Y. 139), 1381. Bell V. Ohio &c. R. Co. (25 Pa. St. 161). 635. Bell V. Platteville (71 Wis. 189; 86 N. W. Rep. 831), 663. Bell County v. Alexander (22 Tex. 350), 563, 660. Belleview v. Hohn (83 Ky. 1), 252. Bellinger v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (23 N. Y. 43), 779, 1447. Bellows V. Courter (6 N. Y. Supl. 7S), 1001. Belmont v. Vinah haven (82 Me. 534 ; 20 Atl. Rep. 89), 977. Belo V. ForsvtKe County (76 N. C. 489), 935," 961. Beloit u. Morgan (7 Wall. 619), 961. Belt V. Abstract Co. (73 Md. 389; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 440), 1273, 1874. Bemis v. Le&nard (118 Mass. 503), 850. Benedict v. Goit (3 Barb., 459), 679. Benjamin v. Webster (100 Ind. 15)y 1390. Benjamin v. Wheeler (15 Gray, 486), 339. Bennet v. People (30 111. 389), 1340. Bennet v. United States (3 Wash. T. 179), 158S. Bennett v. Buffalo (17 N. Y. 373), 1181, 1383. Bennett v. Burch (1 Denio, 141), 344. Bennett v. McKee (6 W. & S. (Pa.) 513), 335. Bennett v. New Bedford (110 Mass. 433), 303. BoLnett v. State (58 Miss. 556), 315. Bennett v. Whitney (94 N. Y. 303), 319, 330. Bennett's Appeal (65 Pa. St. 243), 4, 5. Bennington v. Park (50 Vt. 178), 1390. Benoist v Inhabitants of Carondelet (8 llo. ;;50), 908. Benoist v. St. Louis (19 Mo. 179), 395, 1362, 1385. Benoit v. Wayne County (80 Mich. 176), 210. Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water Co. (13 Cal. 306), 697. Benson v. Monroe (7 Cush. 125), 244, 246. Benson v. Village of Waukesha (74 Wis. 31 ; 41 N. W. Rep. 1017), 1194. Bentley v. Barton (41 Ohio St. 410), 1394. Benton v. Boston (140 Mass. 13), 762. Benton v. Hamilton (110 Ind. 294; 11 N. E. Rep. 238), 633. Benton v. Milwaukee (50 Wis.* 368), 1171. Benton v. Taylor (46 Ala. 388). 1575. Bepler v. Cincinnati (23 Weekly Law Bui. 229), 1182. Bergen v. Clarkson (6 N. J. Law (1 Halst.), 352), 278, 535. Bergen v. State (33 N. J. Law, 490), 489. Bergman v. St. Louis &o. R. Co. (Mo., 1 S. W. Rep. 384). 508. Bergman v. St. Paul &c. R. Co. (31 Minn. 533), 698, 699. Berkely r. Taunton (19 Pick. 480), 983. Berlin v. Bolton (10 Met. 115). 975. Berlin v. Gorham (34 N. H. 366), 67, 74, 86, 87, 95. 109, 415. Berlin Bridge Co. v. Wagner (57 Hun, 346), 1438. Berlin Iron Bridge Co. v. Wagner (10 N. Y. Supl. 840), 1093. Bernard v. Torrance (5 Gill & J. (Md.) 383), 313. Bernards Township v. Morrison (133 U. S. 523), 630, 947. Bernards Township v. Stebbins (109 U. S. 341), 948, 953. Berrenberg v. Boston (137 Mass. 331 ; 50 Am. Rep. 896), 1486. Berry v. Commonwealth (Ky., 14 S. W. Rep. 589), 860. Berry v. McComb City (69 Miss. 882), 1407. Bertholf v. O'Reilly (74 N. Y. 509), 740. Bertonmeau v. Directors (3 Woods, 177), 1345. Bessinger v. Dickerson (20 Iowa, 260), 334. 337, 331. Bethany v. Sperry (10 Conn. 200), 344, 347. Bethlehem v. Alexandria (32 N. J. Law, 66), 446. Bethlehem v. Town of Watertown (51 Conn. 490), 987. Izji TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Betholto V. Conely (9 III. App. 3^9), 648. Bethune v. Hughes (28 Ga. 560), 106, 1344. Betts V. Baglpy (13 Pick. 573), 344. Belts V. Village of Gloversville (8 N. Y. Supl. 795), 1436. Bevans v. United States (13 Wall. 56), 321. Bevai-d v. Hoffman (18 Md. 479; 81 Am. Dec. 61S). 218. Bibel V. People (07 III. 175), 283, 549. Bicljer.'!taff, In re (70 Cal. 35), 1333, 1342. Bickneli v. Widner School Tp. (73 Ind. 501) 8-n. Biddle v. Willavd (10 Ind. 63), 202. Bidelman v. State (110 N. Y. 233), 1428. Bidwell V. Pittsburgh (85 Pa. St. . 413), 758. Bidwell V. Town of Murray (40 Hun, 190), 1439, 1445. Bieling v. City of Brooldvn (120 N. Y. 98; 24 N. E. Rep. 389), 1466. Bigelow V. Bridge (8 Mass. 275), 339. Bigelow V. Chicago (90 111. 49), 1169, 1187. Bigelow Vy Hillman (37 Me. 52), 803, 536, 933. Bigelow V. Perth Amboy (25 N. J. Law, 297). 1161, 1270. Bigelow V. Railroad Co. (27 Wis. 478), 524. Bigelow V. Randblpli (14 Grav, 541), 156, 749, 750, 759, 763, 1015. Bigelow V. Weston (3 Pick. 267), 1-167. Bigelow V. Wilson (1 Pick. 485), 350. Big$;s V. Citv of Huntington (33 West Va.V)), 1498. Biggs V. Mi-Bride' (Oreg., 31 Pac. ■ Rep. 8;S), 158. Bigler v. Mayor (5 Abb. N. C. 51), 845. Bill V. Dow (56 Vt. 5631, 363. Billings V. Kneen (57 Vt. 43-<), 975. Billings V. L:)fferty (31 111. 318), 218. Billings V. Worcester (102 Mass. 329), 1437, 1453, Bills V. City of Goshen (117 Ind. 391 ; 30 N. E. Rep. 115), 484, 501, 504, 530, 521, 602, 1333. Binde v. Klinge (30 Mo. App. 285), 1343. Binghamton v. Binghamton &c. Ry. Co. (16 N. Y. Supl. 225). 1103. Binsse v. Wood (37 N. Y. 530), 1453. Bird V. Merrick (L. & R. 115). 375. Bird V. New York (33 Hun, 396). 196. Bird V. Perkins (33 Mich. 38), 70. Bird V. Wasco County (3 Oreg. 282). 187. Birdsall v. Clark (73 N. Y. 73; 39 Am. Rep. 105), 383, 386, 489, 549, 551, 573. Birge v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co. (16 N. Y. Supl. 596), 367. Birge v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (65 Iowa, 440), 691. Birmingham v. McCary (84 Ala. 469: 4 So. Rep. 630). 1478, 1499. Birmingham v. Rumsey (63 Ala. 352), 1380. Birmingham &c. St. Ry. Co. v. Bir^ « mington St. R. Co. (79 Ala. 465). 568, 1103. Bish V. Johnson (31 Ind. 299), 943. Bishop V. Brainard (28 Conn. 289;. 943. Bishop V. Cone (3 N. H. 515), 374. 1273. Bishop V. Fahey (15 Gray, 61), 1604. Bishop V, Marks (15 La. Ann, 147), 1185, 1369. Bishop V. Moorman (98 Ind. 1), 651. Bishop V. Schneider (46 Mo. 472), 226. Bishop V. Williamson (11 Me. 405), 333. Bissell V. Hopkins (4 Cowen, 53), 1491. Bissell V. Jeffersonville (34 How. 287), 787, 916. Bissell V. Kankakee (64 111. 349), 619, , 930. 1374. Bissell V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (23 N. Y. 63), 1406. Bissell V. Saxton (66 N. Y. 55), 337. Bissell V. Sexton (77 N. Y. 191), 334. Bissell V. Spring Valley Tp. (110 TJ. S. 163), 833, 952. Bittinger u.'Bell (65 Ind. 445), 937. Black V. Cohen (53 Ga. 621), 911. , Black V. Columbia (19 S. C. 412), 364. Black V. Cornell (30 Mo. App. 641), 632, 805, 1330. Black V. Mayor &o. of Baltimore ()0 Md. 335), 697, 69S. Black V. Saunders County (8 Neb. 440; 1 N. W. Rep. 144). 890. Black V. Town of Brinkley (54 Ark. 373; 15 S. W. Rep. 1030), 413, 414. Blackburn v. Walpole (9 Pick. 97), 367, 368. Blackett v. Blizzard (9 Barn. & C. 851), 391, 493. Black man v. Lehman (63 Ala. 545), 957, Blackmore v. Vestry &c. (L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 451), 768, Blackstone v. County Comm'rs (108 ' Mass. 68), 1404. TABLE OF OASES. Ixiii [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 78»-I605.] Blackstone v. White (41 Penn. St. 330), 90. Bladen v. Philadelphia (60 Pa. St. 464), 252. Blain v. Bailey (35 Ind. 165), 113. Blair v. Cuming County (111 XJ. S. 363), 930, 931, 953. Blair v. Forehand (100 Mass. 136), 1604. Blair v. Hanna (87 Ind. 298), 1419. Blair v. Lantry (Neb., 31 N. W. Rep. 790), 853. Blair u Lunnins; (76 Cal. 134), 1175. Blair D. Eidgelv (41 Nfev. 63; 97 Am. Dec. 248). 378. Blair v. West Point (3 McCrary, 459), 57. Blake v. Dubuque (13 Iowa, 66), 704. Blake v. Ferris (5 N. Y. 48), 1315, Blake v. Johnson (1 N. H. 91), 1579. Blake v. Lowell (143 Mass. 296), 1437, 1480. Blake v. Macon (53 Ga. 173), 1583. Blake v. Newfield (68 Me. 365), 1488. Blake v. Orford (64 N. H. 399), y49, 637. Blake v. People (109 111. 504), 1558. Blake v. Railroad Co. (39 N. H. 435), 432. Blake v. Walker (33 S. C. 517), 549. Blake w. Windham (13 Me. 74), 826. Blakely v. Benneke (.'59 Mo. 193), 315. Blakely v. Troy (18 Hun. 167), 1474. Blakely Township v. Devine (36 Minn. 53; 29 N. W. Rep. 342), 1059. Blakeraore v. Dolan (50 Ind. 194), 526. ' Blakie v. Staples (13 Grant (Canada), 67), 647. Blanehard v. Bissell (11 Ohio St. 96), 393, 401. 403, 500, 1064, 1366. Blanehard v. Blackstone (102 Mass. 343), 263. Blanehard v. City of Kansas (16 Fed. Rep. 444), 1139. Blanchford v. Dow (33 Me. 557), 1579. Blandford School District v. Gibbs (3 Cush. 39), 163. B/inding v. Burr (13 Cal. 843), 95, 109. Blank. Matter of (73 N. Y. 388), 573. Blank v. Levonia (79 Mich. 1), 1431. Blanlon v. McDowell Co. (101 N. C. 533), 959. Blashfleld v. Telegraph Co. (18 N. Y. Supl. 250). 1432. Blatchley v. Moser (15 Wend. 315), 515, 103.->. Bledsoe v. Gary (Ala., 10 So. Rep. 503), 1353, 1354, 1355. Blessing v. City of Galveston (43 Tex. 641,659), 110,465, Bleu V. Bear River Co. (20 Cal. 603), 713 941 Blight 'v. Rochester (7 Wheat. 535), 139. Bliss' Petition (63 N. H. 135), 144. Bliss V. Hosmer (15 Ohio, 44), 670. Bliss V. South Hadley (145 Mass. 91), 1448. Blize V. Castlio (8 Mo. App. 390), 706. Block V. Bourbon County Oomm'rs (99 U. S. 686), 9-)6. Block V. Jacksonville (36 111. 301), 508, 543, 1268. Blodgett V. Boston (8 Allen, 237), 1448. Blodgett V. Holbrook (39 Vt. 336), 368, 370, 1391. Bloodgood V. M. & H. R. Co. (18 Wend. 9), 703. Bloom V. Xenia (33 Ohio St. 461), 1064. Bloomer v. StoUoy (5 McLean (U. S.) 158), 73, 535. Bloomfleld v. Charter Oak Bank (121 U. S. 121), 16, 345, 348, 358, 364, 3;3, 374, 816, 915, 960, 1371, 1376. Bloomfleld v. Trimble (54 Iowa, 399), 515, 604. Blooming Valley (56 Pa. St. 66), 13B6. Blooraington v. Bay (43 111. 503), 1308, 1449. Bloomfleld &c. Natural Gas Light Co. V. Richardson (63 Barb. 437), 686. Bloomington v. Brokaw (77 111. 194), 1381. Bloomington v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (134 111. 451 ; 26 N. E. Rep. 366), 1076. Bloomington v. Pollor!k(Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 146), 1152. Bloomington v. Wahl (46 III. 489), 106, 1244. Bloomington Cemetery Ass'n v. Peo- ple (111., 28 N. E. Rep. 1076), 1081, 1165, 1166. Bloomington School Tp. v. Nat. School Furnishing Co.' (107 Ind. 43; 7 N. E. Rep. 760), 208, 815, 821 Bloor V. Delafleld (69 Wis. 378), 1468. Blount V. Janesville (31 Wis. 648), 558. Bluffton V. Mathews (93 Ind. 313), 1484. BluflE Creek v. Hardenbrook (40 Iowa, 130), 1334. . Ixiv TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL H, pp. 789-1605.] Blush V. Colchester (39 Vt. 193), 346. 848, 869. Bly V. HaTerhill (UO Mass. 530), 1467. Bly V. Whitehall Village (120 N. Y. 506), 1493, 1499. Blythe v. Tompkins (3 Abb. Pr. 468), 839. Board &c. v. Arnett (116 Ind. 438), .1430. Board &c. v. Bailey (133 Ind. 46), 1435. Board &o. v. Baker (34 111. App. 331), 1432, 1334. Board &c. v. Baker (34 111. App. 620), 867, 1383. Board &c. v. Beckwith (10 Kan. 603), 671. Board &o. v. Board (58 Miss. 619), 1866. Board &c. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bent County (15 Colo. 330; 25 Pac. Eep. 508), 457. Board &o. v. Board of Ed. (30 West Va. 434), 1334. Board &c. v. Board of Siiperyisors (18 N. Y. Supl. 883), 1011. Board &o. v. Boehr {ri 111. App. 639), 1836. Board &c. v. Boswell (Ind., 30 N. E. Eep. 534), 1014. Board &c. v. Boynton (30 Ind. 859), 798. 973. Board &c. v. Bradford (73 Ind. 455 ; 37 Am. Rep. 174). 666. Board &o. v. Brod (Ind., 29 N. E. Eep. 430), 1431. Board &c. v. Brown (89 Ind. 48), 1432, 1435, 1427, 1484. Board &o. v. Brown (Ind., 80 N. E. Eep. 935), 996. Board &c. v. Brown (33 La. Ann. 333), 329. Board &o. v. Burkey (1 Ind., App. 565; 37 N. E. Rep. 1108), 993. Board &o. v. Byrne (67 Ind. 21), 798. Board (Sfc. v. Casey (18 N. Y. St.- Rep. 251), 1036. Board &c. v. Catlett's Ex'rs (86 Va. 158), 891. Board &c. v. Chipps (Ind., 29 N. E. Rep. 1066), 1431. Board &o. v. Cbitwood (8 Ind. 504), 1330. Board &c. v. Cincinnati Steam Heat- ins Co. (Ind., 37 N. E. Rep. 612), 797. Board &o. v. City of Kingston (DO Hun, 485 ; 3N. Y. Supl. 231), 1003. Board &o. v. Clark (93 N. Y. 391), 184, 330. Board &c. v. Cole (Ind., 28 N. E. Rep. 772), 606. Board &c. v. Comm'rs of Hendricks Co. (33 Ind. 334), 433. Board &c. v. Common Council of Detroit (38 Mich. 437), 15. Board &c. v. Crotty (9 Colo. 318; 13 Pac. Rep. 151), 1537. Board &c. v. Darrow (13 Colo. 460; 23 Pac. Rep. 784; 40 Am. &Eng. Corp. Cas. 342), 207, 388. Board &c, v. Da vies (Wash., 1890; 24 Pac. Rep. 540), 114, 115, 414. Board &o. v. Day (ip Ind. 450), 909, * 933. Board &c. v. Deprez (87 Ind. 509), 1427. Board &c. v. Dombke (94 Ind. 73), 1430. Board &o. v. Edmonds (76 111. 544), 1595. Board &c. v. Emmerson (95 Ind, 579), 1430.- 1484. Board &c. v. Fahlor (114 Ind. 176; 15 N. E. Rep. 880), 898. Board &o. v. Fonda (77 N. Y. 350), 313, 825, 953. Board &c. v. Fullen (111 Ind. 410; 12N. E. Rep. 398), 898, 1161. Board . State of Ohio (45 Ohio St. 555), 1345. Board &c. v. Taylor (123 Ind. 148; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 394), 659, 797. Board &c. v. Templer (84 Ind. 333), 861. Board &c. v. Templeton (116 Ind, 369: 19 N. E. Rep. 183), 184. Board &c. v. Thomas (Ky., 15 S. W. Rep. 670), 1337. Board &c. v. Thompson (106 Ind. 534), 1428. Board &c. v. Valentine (32 N. Y. St. Rep. 919), 1036. Board &c. v. Ward (69 Ind. 441), 666. Board &c. v. Weeks (Ind., 39 N. E. Rep. 776). 812. Board &c. v. Wertz (112 Ind. 268; 13 N. E. Rep. 874), 881. Board &c. v. Wood (136 Ind. 168; 35 N. E. Rep. 190), 861. Board &o. v. Woods (77 Mo. 197), 576. Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Barnett (107 111. 507), 678. Boardman v. Flagg (70 Mich. 373), 819. Boardman v. Ealliday (10 Paige, 238), 199. Boardman v. Supervisors (85 N. Y. 359). 1855, 1575. Bobbett V. State (10 Kan. 9), 343, 1520. Bock V. City of Brooklyn (2 N. Y. Supl. 559). 1190. Bodwio V. Fennell (1 Wils. 833), 530, Boehm v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore (61 Md. 259), 1025. Bogart V. Green (8 Mo. 115), 333. Bogart V. Township of Lamotte (79 Mich. 394; 44 N. W. Rep. 612), 330, 383, 630, 631. Ixvi TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Boge V. Girardey (38 La, Ann. 7L7), 1357. Bogert V. Indianapolis (13 Ind. 134), 1036. Bogert V. Trustees (43 N. J. Law, 358), 343, 347. Bohen v. Waseca (33 Minn. 176), 365, 1466. Bohler v. Schneider (49 Ga. 195), 1356, 1370. Bohlman v. Railway Co. (40 Wis. 157), 190. Bohmy«. State (81 Tex, App. 597), 513. Bohn V. Metrop, EI, R, Co. (129 N, Y. 576), 1433. Boland v. City of Kansas (33 Mo. App, 8), 1495. Bolger V. Foss (65 Cal, 350), 1433. vBollest). Brimfield (130 U*. S, 759; 7 S, Ct. Rep. 736), 63% 941. Bolton V. Good (41 N. J. Law, 296), 375. Bonaparte v. C. &c, R. Co, (1 Bald. • 305), 4, 7. Bond V. Hiestand (20 La, Ann, 139), 113, 113. Bond V. Kenosha (17 Wis, 384), 558, Bond V. Newark (19 N; J. Eq. 376), 1130, Bonesteel v. Mavor (33 N. Y, 163), 253, 634, 1140. iJonham v. Taylor (Tex,, 16 S, W, Rep, 5S5 ; 33 Am, «fc Eng. Corp, Cas, 647), 637, 871, Bonne v. Logan (43 N, J, Law, 421), 641, Bonnell v. Allen (53 Ind, 130), 651, BonnelL v. County of Nuckolls (49 N. W. Rep, 225), 833, Bonner v. McPhail (31 Barb, 106), 1259 Bonner k State (7 Ga, 473), 1558, Bonsall v, Lebanon (19 Ohio, 419), 1123, 1181, Bontong v. City of Brooklyn (15 Barb, 375), 1133. Boody V. United States (1 Woodb, & M, 150), 380, Book V. Earl (87 Mo, 246), 634, 833. Booker v. Young (13Gratt, 303), 169. Boom V. Utica (3 Barb, 104), 350, 252, Boom Co, V. Patterson (98 U. S, 403), 591. B93, 1088, 1151. Boone v. People (4 111, App, 231), 1333, Boone County v. Armstrong (23 Neb, 764; 37 N, W, Rep, 63B), 881. Boone County v. Keck (31 Ark. 387), 1596. Boone County v. Jones (54 Iowa, 699 ; 87 Am, Kep, a6B), 208, 312, 336, Booneville v. Ormrod (36 'Mo, 193), 1419. Booth V. Town of Carthage (67 111. 108), 538. Booth V. Woodbury (33 Conn. 125), 817, BootKbay v. Giles (68 Me. 160), 313, Boots V. Washburn (79 N. Y. 307)» 1093. Bordages v. Higgins (Tex., 19 S. W. Rep. 446), 1135. Bordeaux v. Meridian Land &c, Co. (67 Miss, 304), 1340. Bore V. Bush (6 Mart, N, S, (La.) 1), 339, Boring v. Williams (17 Ala. 510), 328, 1259. Bork V. City of Buffalo (127 N. Y, • 64; 37 N, Y, St, Rep, 333), 845. Borough w. Simmons (113 Pa. St. 384;,5 AlhRep. 434), 1101, Borough of fipthlehem v. Haus (Pa., 26 W, N. C, 348; 19 Atl, Rep, 437), 1096, Borough of Chartiers' Appeal (Pa,, 8 Atl. Rep 181), 1149, Borough of Dunmore's Appeal (53 Pa, St, 374), 458, 1371, 1373. Borough'of Freemansburg v. Rodg-' ers (Pa., 8 Atl, Rep, 873), 1143. Borough of Freeport v. Marks (9 Pa, St, 253), 215, Borough of Greensburg v. Young (53 Pa. St, 280), 1133, Borough of Hanover's Appeal (Pa., 24 Atl, Rep, 669), 583, 584, Borough of Little Meadows (35 Pa, St. 335), 1366, Borough of Milford v. Milford Water Co. (124 Pa, St, 610; 17 Atl, Rep, 185; 23 W, N, C, 413), 1397, . Borough of Millvale v. Railway Co. (131 Pa, St. 1 ; 18 Atl, Rep. 993), 1307. Borough of Mt, Pleasant v. Balti- more &c. R, Co, (Pa„ 30 Atl, Rep. 105i), 1168. Borough of -Norristown v. Fitzpat- riok (94 Pa. St. 121), 755. Borough of Norristown v. Norris- town Pass, Rv. Co. (Pa., 33 Atl, Rep. 1060), 1103, Borough of Sayro v, Phillips (Pa., 1892), 34 Atl, Rep, 76), 520, 1335. Borough of Taylorsport, In re (18 Atl. Rep. 224), 64. Borough of West Philadelphia (5 Watts & Serg, 281), 403, Borough of Yarmouth Case (3 Brownlow & Goldsb. 392), 43. Borough of York v. Forsoht (23 Pa, St. 391), 635, Boss V. Hewett (20 Wis, 460), 957, TABLE OF OASES. Ixvu rrhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Boss V. Litton (5 Car. & P. 407), 1498. Bossy V. Gillmore (3 Me. 191), 1393. Boston V. Baldwin (139 Mass. 315), 1261. Boston u Brazer (11 Mass. 447), 657. Boston t'. Mt. Washington (139 Mass. 15; 29 N. E. Rep. 60), 980. Boston V. Schaffer (9 Pick, 415), 1233. Boston V. Shaw (1 Met 130), 518, S21, 1188. Boston V. Simmons (150 Mass. 461; 15 Am. St. Rep. 330), 209, 216. Boston V. Wells (14 Mass. 884). 982. Boston V. Weymouth (4 Cush. 53S), 1266. Boston Belting Co. v. City of Boston (149 Mass. 44; 20 N. E. Rep. 320), 1099. Boston Mills v. Cambridge (117 Mass. 896), 772. Boston & Albany R. Co., In re (53 N. y. 574), 676. Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Lowell &c. R. Co. (124 Mass. 368), 676. Boston djoc. R. Co. v. Boston (140 Mass. 87), 1404. Boston ate. R. Co. v. Folsom (46 N. H. 64), 705. Boston &c. Society v. Boston (116 Mass. 181; 17 Am. Rep. 15B), llt)6. Bostwick V. Barlow (14 Hun, 177), 221. Bostwick V. Van Voorhis (91 N. Y. 3)3), 323. Boucher v. New Haven (40 Conn. 456), 1445, 1478. Boulden v. Fowler (11 Colo. 396; 18 Pac. Rep. 337), 1096. I Boulder v. Niles (9 Colo. 415), 265, 1417, 1458, 1459. Bouldin v. Baltimore (15 Md. 18), 1171. Boulton V. Crowther (3 Barn. & C. 703J, 757. Bound V. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. (45 Wis. 543). 617, 646, 945, 1583. Bounds V. Kirven (63 Tex. 159), ,674. Bourdeaux v. Meriden Land & In- dustrial Co. (67 Miss. 304), 800. Bourget v. Cambridge (Mass., 31 N. E. Rep. 390), 1448. Bourne v. State (Neb;, 52 N. W. JEJep. 7i0), 1331. Bouton V. Brooklyn (15 Barb. 393), 1574. Bouton V. McDonough Co. (84 III. 384), 614. Bouton V. Neilson (3 Johns. 475), 1189. Bow V. AUenstown (34 N. H. 351), 54, 92, 13:i5. Bowditch V. Boston (101 U. S. 16), 759. Bo wdoinham v. Richmond (6 Greenl. (Me.) 112), 1389. Bowen v. Mayor &o. (79 Ga. 709), 937. Bowen v. Morris (2 Taunt. 374). 262. Bowen v. Newell (16 R. I. 238; 14 Atl. Rep. 87U), 1397. Bowen v. State (108 N. Y. 166), 20. Bowers v. Fleming (67 Ind. 541), 331. Bowler v. Drain Comm'rs (47 Mich. 154), 190. , Bowlin V. Furman (28 Mo. 437). 624. Bowling Green v. Carson (10 Bush, 64). 106, 1243. Bowman v. Tripp (14 R. L 242), 1480. Bowman v. Venice &o. R. Co. (103 111. 459), 691, 693. Boy V. Girardey (38 La. Ann. 717), 1370. Boyce v. Auditor-General (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 4^7), 818. Boyd V. Alabama (91 U. S. 645), 1032. Boyd V. Chambers (78 Ky. 140), 95, 109, 12)3. Bovd I'. City of Selma (Ala., 11 So. ■ Rep. 393), 1355. Boyd V. Insurance Patrol (113 Pa, St. 169), 9, 10. Boyd V. Readsboro (52 Vt. 522), 783. Boyd V. School Tp. (114 Ind. 310; 16 N. E. Rep. 511), 815, 830, 1333. Boyd V. State (88 Ala. lB9j, 1344. Boyden v. BrooUline (8 Vt. 284), 183. Boyden v. United States (13 Wall. 17), 331. Boyer v. Hoboken (44 N. J. Law, 131), 506. Boyland v. Mayor &c. (1 Sandf. 27), 250, 643. Boyle V. Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 495), 1174. Boyle V. City of New Orleans (8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 339), 646. Boyt«. Dougherty Co. (79 Ga. 211; 3 S. E. Rep. 613), ^68. Brabham v. Supervisors of Hurds Co. (54 Miss. 363). 10. Braoeville v. Doherty (30 111. App. 645), 520, 1235. Brackenridge v, Fitchburg (145 Mass. lUO). 1499. Brackeit v. Blake (7 Met. 335), 1115. Braden v. ]p.cNutt (114 Ind. 314: 16 N. E. Rep. 170), 1326, 1,340. Bradford v. Armiston (92 Ala. 349), 1431. Bradford v. Chicago (25 111. 412), 242, 343. Ixviii TABLB OF OASES. [The references are to pages: YoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605J Bradish v. Lucken (88 Minn. 168), 1573. Bradley v. Bander (36 Ohio St. 36), 1351. Bradley v. City of Eau Claire (56 Wis. 168; 14 N. W. Rep. 10), 893. Bradley v. City of Rochester (7 N. Y. Supl. 337). 1334, 1335. Bradley v. Fisher (18 "Wall. 351), 317. Bradley v. Frankfort (99 Ind. 417), 695. Bradley v. Franklin County (65 Mo. 638), 941. . Bradley v. Love (76 Iowa, 397; 41 N. W. Rep. 53). 873. Bradley v. McAtee (7 Bush, 667), 1163, Bradley v. Richmond (6 Vt. 131), 1596. Bradley v. Village of West Duluth (Minn., 47 N. W. Rep. 166), 1078. Bradshaw v. Camden (39 N. J. Law, 416), 1533. Bradshaw v. Omaha (1 Neb. 16), 110, 403, 1367. • Bradshaw v. Rogers (30 Johns. 103), 670. Bradstreet v. Supervisors (13 Wend. 546), 141. Brad well v. State (16 Wall. 130), 144, 147. Brady v. Ellis (59 N. Y. 630), 714. Brady v. Howe (50 Miss. 607), 178. Brady v. King (53 Cal. 44), 1173. Brady v. Lowell (3 Gush, 131), 746, 770, 1448. Brady v. Mavor &e. of Brooklyn (1 Barb. 584), 657. Brady v. Mayor &c. of New York (20 N. Y. 312), 251 ; 256, 257, 259, 639, 640, 643, 713, 714. Brady v. Mayor &o. of New York (N. Y.., 30 N. E. Rep. 757), 716. Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co. (H Mich. 435), 1054, 1346. Brady v. Weeks (3 Barb. 157), 1047. Braidy v. Theritt (17 Kan. 468), 200. Brainard v. New Xondon (33 Conn. 552), 664. Braintree v. Battles (6 Vt. 395), 90, 93. Braley v. Dickinson (48 Vt. 599), 351. Bramah v. Roberta (3 Bing. N. C. 963), 922. Bramwell v. Guheen (Idaho, 29 Fac. Rep. 110), 370, 1394. Branch v. Commissioners (3 Call (Va.), 438). 337. Branch v, Marengo (43 Iowa, 600), 1359. Brandlrff v. Harrisan County (50 Iowa, 164), 648. Brandon, Ex parte (49 Ark. 143; 4 S. W. Rep. 453). 1012. Brandt v. City of Milwaukee (69 Wis. 386; 34 N. W. Rep. 246; 1193. Branham v. San Josd (24 Cal. 585), 624, 643. Brannon v. County Court (33 West Va. 789; 11 S. B. Rep. 34). 843. Braun v. City of Chicago (110 111. % 186), 1339. Braun v. Sauerwein (10 Wall. 318), 475. Bray v. Wallingtord (30 Conn. 416), 156, 1597. Bray ton v. Fall River (113 Mass. 218), 772, 785. Brazil v. McBride (69 Ind. 244), 180. Breaux v. Parish of Iberville (23 La. Ann. 333), 633. Breaux's Bridge, Jn re (30 La. Ann. 1105), 500. Breckner v. Gordon (81 Ky. 665 ; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 395), 95, 109. Breed v. Conley (14 Iowa, 369), 336. Breese ii. Poole (16 111. App. 551), 698. Bregguglia v. Lord (N. J., 30 Atl. Rep. 1083), 603. Brehm v. Mayor &o. (104 N. Y. 186), 1598. Brehm v. Mayor &c. (39 Hun, SSB), 1184. Breichelbeil w. Powlez(15N. Y. Supl. 465), 991. Brenham v. Brenham Water Co. (67 Tex. 543: 4 S. W. Rep. 143), 549, 567, 635, 637, 1398. Brenham u German- American Bank (144 U. S. 173), 561, 796, 934, 926, 937. Breninger v. Belvidere (44 N. J. Law, 350), 104, 519. Brennan v. Bradshaw (53 Tex. 330), 405. Brennan v. St. Louis (92 Mo. 433), 1430, 1486. Bres V. Louviere (37 La. Ann. 736), 1341. Brevoort v. Detroit (24 Mich. 333), 1188. Brewer v. Bowman (9 Ga. 37), 684. Brewer v. Inhabitants of New Glou- cester (14 Mass. 316). 150, 153. Brewer v. Springfield (97 Mass. 153), 1188, 1573. Brewer v. Watson (71 Ala. 299). 1374. Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer (63 Me. 03 ; 16 Am. Rep. aa5), 930, 1354, 1393, 1396. TABLE OF OASES. Ixix (The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Brewis v. Duluth (3 McO. (U. S. C. Ct.) 219), 454. Brewster v. Dennis (31 Pick. 233), 983. Brewster v. Harwich (4 Mass. 278), 451. Brewster v. Hyde (7 N. H. 206), 344, 349. Brewster v. Syracuse (19 N. Y. 118), 1181. Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor &c. of New York (5 Cow. 538), 606, 1026. Brickill v. New York (7 Fed. Eep. 479), 749. Bricklayer v. Plasterers (Palm. 396), 487. Bridge Co. v. Frankfort (18 B. Mon. 41), 645. Bridge Co. v. Hoboken Land & Im- provement Co. (13 N. J. Eq. (2 Beas.) 81). 584, 1216. Bridge Co. v. United States (105 U. S. 470), 1433, 1424. Bridgeport v. Housatonio R. Co. (15 Conn. 475), 208, 2ai, 643, 932, 933, 941. Bridgeport v. Railroad Co. (36 Conn, 255), 591, 1160. Bridgeport Ins. Co. v. Wilson (34 N. Y. 281). 1452. Bridges v. Griffin (33 Ga. 113), 1353. Bridges v. Sballcross (6 West Va. 562), 158. Bridges v. WvokofE (67 N. Y. 130), 1408, 1422. Bridgewater v. Plymouth (97 Mass. 383), 980. Bridgford v. Tuscambia (4 Woods, 611), 1270. Briegel v. City of Philadelphia (26 W. N. C. 853; 19 Atl. Rep. 1038), 1099. Brientnall v. City (103 Pa. St. 156), 592. Brieswick v. Mayor &c. of Bruns- wick (51 Ga. 639), 533. Briggs V. Borden (71 Mich. 87; 38 N. W. Eep. 713), 368, 631, 648, 1336. Briggs V. Coleman (51 Ala. 561), 319 Briggs v. Murdock (13 Pick. 305), 347, 350, 351, 353. Briggs V. Wardwell (10 Mass. 356), 339. Briggs V. Whipple (6 Vt. 94), 664 Brigham v. Edmunds (7 Gray; 359), 778. Bright V. Association (33 La. Ann. 59), 719. Bright V. McCulIough (27 Ind. 223), 441, 1356. Bright V. Supervisors (18 Johns. 242), 184. Brightman v. Bristol (65 Me. 436), 757. Brighton v. Kirner (32 Wis. 54), 1361. Brighton v. Pensacola (93 U. S. 266), 474. Brimmer v. Boston (102 Mass. 19), 633. Brinckerhoff v. Board of Education (6 Abb. Pr. (N.'S.) 428; 37 How. Pr. 499; 2 Daly, 443), 1595. Brinkmeyor v. Citv of Evansville " (39 Ind. 187), 9, 323, 744. Brinton's Appeal (142 Pa. St. 511), 407, 410. Briscoe v. Bank (11 Peters. 357), 20. Bristol V. Johnson (34 Mich. 133), 1572. Bristol V. New Chester (3 N. H. 521), 67, 83, 451, 1368. Biitton V. Fort Worth (78 Tex. 227 ; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas, 411), 317, 318. Britton v. Platte City (2 Dill. 1), 804. Brizzolari v. State (37 Ark. 3ii4), 604. Broad v. City of Paris (66 Tex. 119; 18 S. W. Rep. 342). 318, 327. Broadnac's Case (1 Vent. 196), 90. Broadway &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &o. (1 N. Y. Supl. 646), 1212. Broadway Bapt. Church f, McAtee (8 Bush. 508), 1166, 1182. Broadway Widening, In re (63 Barb. 573), 296. Broberg v. Des Moines (63 Iowa, 523), 1480. Brockmau v. City of Creston (79 Iowa, 587; 44 N. W, Rep. 823; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 69), 104, 577, 61«, 648. Brockton v. Cross (138 Mass. 297), 889. Brockton v. ITxbridge (138 Mass. 292), 980. Brodhead v. Milwaukee (19 Wis. 624), 931. Brodie v. McCabe (33 Ark. 690), 1373. Brokaw v. City of Terre Haute (97 Ind. 451), 697. Brokaw V. Comm'rs&c. (130 III. 482), 1533. Brome v. Cuming Countv (Neb., 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. " Cas. 481), 659. Bronsoo v. Borough of Wallingford (54 Conn. 513 ; 9 Atl. Rep. 393), 1137. * Bronson v. Oberlin (41 Ohio St. 476) 557. ' bcz TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages; Vol. J, pp. 1-788; Vol. IT, pp. 789-1605.] Bronson v. Town of Washington (57 Conn. 346; 18 Atl. Eep. 264), 1593, 1600. Bronson v. Woolsey (17 Johns. 46), 213. Brookfleld v. Eeed (153 Mass. 568), 1080. Brookhaven v. Strong(60 N. Y. 57), 31. Brooklyn v. Breslin (57 N. Y. 591), 489, 519. 521, 549, 551, 1238. Brooklyn v. Brooklyn E. Co. (47 N, Y. 476), 1453. Brooklvn v. Cleves (1 Hill & D. Sup. 231), 581. Brooklyn i). Insurance Co. (99 U. S. 363). 964. Brooklvn v. Meserole (26 Wend. 132), 1573. Brooklyn v. Railroad Co. (47 N. Y. 486), 1200. Brooklyn Central R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. Co. (32 Barb. 358), 103, 488. Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm- strong (45 N. Y. 234), 94, 624, 671, 683. Brooklyn Street, In re (118 Pa. St. 640), 1407. Brooklvn Trust Co. v. Hebron (51 Conn. 33), 350, 851, 3B4, 372. Brooks v.. Fischer (79 Cal. 173; 21 Pac. Rep. 652), 63, 69, 96. Brooks V. Mangan (Mich., 49 N. W. Rep. 633). 1335, 1236. Brooks V. Mitchell (9 M. & W. 15), 957. Brooks V. Polk County (53 Iowa, 460), 1364. Brooks V. Riding (46 Ind. 15), 1144. Brooks V. Shelton (47 Miss. 343), 1568. Brooks V. SomerviJle (106 Mass. 371), 1478. Brookville v. Gagle (73 Ind. 117), 530, 589. Brophy r. Hyatt (10 Colo. 333; 15 Pac. Rep. 399), 177, 301, 1025. Brophy- v. Landman (28 Ohio St. 543). 1170. Brophy v. Perth Amboy (44 N. J. Lrtw, 217). 539. Brothers V. Comm'rs (70 N. C, 726) 832. Broughton v. Manchester Water- works (3 Barn. & Aid. 1), 933. Broughton v. Pensacola (93 U. S. 266), 97, 417, 421, 423. - Brouwtr v. Appleby (1 Sandf. 158), 87. Brown's Case (153 Mass. 1). 1355. Brown v. Austin (1 Mass. 208; 3 Am. Deo. 211), 213. Brown v. Beatty (34 M:8^. 327), 669, 704. Brown V. Big Rapids (83 Mich. 101), 758. Brown v. Board of Infirmary Di- rectors (Ohio, 81 N. E. Rep. 744), 1007. Brown v. Bon Homme County (86. Dak.. 46 N. W. Rep, 173), 630, 911, 948. Brown v. City of Atchison (39 Kan. 37), 338, 719. Brown v. City of Cape Girardeau (90 Mo. 377). 1391. Btown V. City of Denver (7 Colo. 305), 1178. Brown v. City ot oiibLd Rapids (81 Mich."]Ol; 47 N. W. Rep. 117), 1125. Brown v. County Comm'rs (3 Mc- Crary, 469), 792. Brown v. County Comm'rs (21 Pfl. St. 37), 528. Brown v. Crego (33 Iowa, 438), 1378. Brown v. Denver (3 Colo. 169), 1169. Brown v. Duplassis (14 La. Ann. 842), 590. Brown v. Finiey (3 MacArthur, 77), 1596. Brown v. Gates (15 West Va. 131), 12, 1380. Brown v. Glasgow (57 Mo. 156), 1430. Brown v. Green (46 How, Pr. 306), 1535. Brown v. Hicks (1 Pike (Ark.), 332), 1367. Brown v. Hummel (6 Pa. St. 86); 5. Brown v. Illius (37 Conn. 84), 765. Brown v. Inhabitants of Melrose (Mass., 30 N. E. Rep. 87), 818. Brown v. Inhabitants of Vinal Haven (65 Me. 40?), 1037. Brown v. Insurance Co. (3 La. Ann. 177.), 465. . Brown v. Jerome (103 111. 871), 1355. Brown v. Lowell (8 Met. 172), 677. Brown v. Lunt (37 Me. 423). 198. Brown v. Mayor &c. of New York (63 N. Y. 239), 259, 639. Brown v. Merrick County (18 Neb. 355), 1434. Brown V. Moseley (11 Sm. & Marsh. (Miss. 354), 835. Brown v. Powell (35 Iowa, 329), 1419. Brown v. Rome &o. R. Co. (86 Ala. 306), 694. 3rown v. Ruse (69 Tex. 589; 7 S. W. Rep. 489), 906. Brown v. Rush County (Kan., 17 Pac. Rep. 304), 389. Brown u.. School Dlst. (64 N. H. 303; 10 Atl. Rep. 119), 627. Brown v. Smith (24 Barb. 419), 1578. Brown v. Southbury (53 Conn. 313), 1483. TABLE 07 OASES. Izzi [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.] Brown i). State (82 Ga. 224; 7 S. E. Rep. 915), 1544. Brown v. Town Board &c. (77 Wis. 27; 45 N. W. Rep. 67B), 830, 909, 917, 919. 1347. Brown v. Town of Canton (4 Lans. (N. Y.)409), 830. Brown v. Utica (2 Barb. 104), 643. Brown v. Winterport (79 Me. 305 ; 9 All. Rep. 844), 257, 304, 352, 358, 862, 3U6, 363, 811. Brownell v. Palmer (32 Conn. 107), 860, 374. Brownell v. Town of Greenwich (114 N.Y. 51^), 956. Browning v. Board (44 Ind. 11), 1124. Browning v. City of Springfield (17 111. 143), 267. ■ Brownlee v. Board (81 Ind. 186), 815. Brownlee v. Union (53 Iowa, 489), 1400. Brownsville Comm'rs v. Loague (139 U. S. 493), 1375. Brownville v. Cook (4 Neb. 102), 589, 604. Bruce v. Dickey (116 111, 537),>658, 713, 824. Bruck V. Broesigks (18 Iowa, 393), 5li5. Brucker v. Covington (69 Ind. 33), 1500. Bruecher v. Village of Portchester (101 N. Y. 240), 113.3, 1184. Brus;geraian v. True (25 Minn, 133), .696. Brumm's Appeal (Pa., 12 Atl. Rep. 855), 1310. Brunswick v. Brunswick (51 Ga. 639), 128. Brunswick v. Dunning (7 Mass. 445), 451. Brunswick v. Finney (54 Ga. 317), 64. > Bi'unswick v. Litchfield (3 Greenl. (Me ) 38), 1389. Brunswick v. McKean (4 Me. 508), 373. Brush V. City of Carbondale (78 III. 74) 591 1194. Brusso' V. Buffalo (90 N. Y. 679), 1444, 1469, 1478, 1491, 1497. Bryan v. Cattell (15 Iowa, 538), 187, 1293. , Bryan v. Page (51 Tex, 533; 33 Am. Rep. ^7), a38, 259, 485, 639, 659. Bryan v, Uuited States (1 Black, 140), 325 Bryan v. Wsar (4 Mo. 106), 1268. Bryant v. City of St. Paul (33 Minn. 289 ; 8 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas. 201), 744, 851, 1037. Bryant v. Robbins (70 Wis. 258 ; 85 N. W. Rep. 545), 1097. Bryant v. Town of Randolph (14 N. Y. Supl. 844), 767, 773. Bryant v. Town of Randolph (133 N. Y. 70), 748, 1471. Bryant i;. Wood (11 Lea (Tenn.), 337), 314. Brydon v. Campbell (40 Md. 381), 225. Bryson v. Johnson County (100 Mo. 76; 13 S. W. Rep. 239), 793, 1091. Buchanan v. City of Duluth (45 Minn. 403; 43 N. W. Rep. 204), 1098. Buchanan v. Curtis (35 Wis. 99), 1406. Buchanan v. Litchfield (102 U. S. 278), 633, 834, 936, 946, 963. Buchanan v. School Dist. (35 Mo. App. 85), 613. 633. Buchanon v. Satlein (9 Mo. App. 564), 709. Buck V. Colbath (3 Wall. 341), 333, 334. Buck V. Collins (51 Ga. 391), 1373. Buck V. Lockport (6 Lansing (N. Y.), 351), 1376. Buckinghouse v. Gregg (19 Ind, 401), 433.^ Buckland v. Conway (16 Mass. 396), 657. Buckley v. Briggs (30 Mo. 453), 260. Buckley v. Drake (41 Hun, 384), 704. Bucknall v. Story (36 Cal. 67), 1160, 1574. Bucknall v. Story (46- Cal. 589), 344, 247. Buckner. Ex parte (4£ing. (Ark.) 73), 1.576. Buckner v. Augusta (1 A. K. Marsh. 9), 634. Buckner v. Gordon (81 Ky. 665), 377. Bucksport V. Spofford (i3 Me. 487), 347, 351, 353. Bucroft V. City of Council Bluffs (63 Iowa, 646), 644. Buell V. Ball (20 Iowa, 283), 522, 785, 13t)4, 1366, Buell V. Buckingham (16 Iowa, 284). 492. Buell V. State (45 Art. 336), 1348. Buffalo, In re (78 N. Y. 363), 1265 Buffalo V. Chadcayne (N. Y., 31 N. E. Rep. 443), 595. Buffalo V. Schliefer (25 Hun, 275), 539. Buffalo V. Webster (10 Wend. 99), 106, 521, 580, 1243. Buford 13. State (73 Tex. 182; 10 S. W. Rep. 401), 121, 130, 413. 419, 465. ' ' Building Inspectors, 7b re (R. X, 21 Atl. Rep. 913), 177. Bull V. Bull (43 Conn. 469), 1389. %, Ixzli TABLE 07 OASES. (The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Bull V. Conroe (13 "Wis. 333), 557. Bull V. Read {]3Gratt. 73), 68, 67. Bullitt V. Clement (16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193), 2ia. Bullitt County v. Washer (130 U. S. 142), 286. Bullock V. Curry (2 Met. (Ky.) 171), 1386, 1390. Bullock V. Geomble (45 111. 218), 5S6. Bullock V. New York (99 N. T. 634), 1438. Bullock V. Spence (91 N. Y. 303), 1491. Bullock V. Town of Durham (19 N. Y. Supl. 635), 1431. Bulow V. Charleston (1 Nott & McC. 527), 1359. Bump V. Smith (11 N. H. 48), 1323. Bunch V. Edenton (90 N. C. 431), 1493. Bunn V. People (45 111. 397), 183. Bunner v. Downs (17 N. Y. St. Eep. 633), 594. Bunting v. Willis (27 Gratt. (Va,) 144), 202. Burch V. Hardwicke (30 Gratt. 24), 755 1277 Buroheil v. City of New York (6 N. Y. Supl. 196), 1185. Burchfield v. New Orleans (41 La. Ann. 75), 230. Burchfield v. City of New Orleans (43 La. Ann. 235; 7 So. Rep. 448), 233, 709. Burden v. Stein (27 Ala. 104), 686. Burdette v. Allen (West Va., 13 S. E. Rep. 1012), 605. Burdick v. Richmond (16 E. L 503), 886. Burford v. Grand Rapids (53 Mich. 98), 264. Burgess v. Pue (2 Gill, 11), 64, 1382. Burgess v. Pue (3 Gill (Md.), 354), 376. Burgess &c. of Darby's Appeal (140 Pa. St. 350; 21 Atl. Rep. 394), 457. Burgess &c. v. Citizens' Pass. Ry. Co. (Pa., 1892; 23 Atl. Rep. 1062), 489. Burhans v. Village of Norwood Park (111., 37 N. E. Eep. 1088), 1093. Burk V. Ayers (19 Hun, 17), 686. Burk V. State (5 Lea (Tenn.), 349), 98, 420. Burke v. Galveston County (76 Tex. 267), 1341, 1347. Burke v. Jeffries (20 Iowa, 145), 59'. Burke v. Supervisors (4 West Va. 371), 389. Burke v. United States (31 Ct. CI, 317), 741. Burke County Comm'rs v. Bun- combe Co. Conam'rs (101 N. C, 520; 8S. E Rep. .176), 977. Burleigh v. Town of Rochester (5 Fed. Rep. 667), 952, 956. Burley v. Bethune (1 Marsh. 120). 218. Burlington v. Baumgardner (42 Iowa, 673), 1357, 1383. Burlington v. Beasley (94 IT. S. 310), 931. Burlington V. Burlington &c. E. Co. (41 Iowa, 134), 1383. Buijington v. Burlington St. E. Co. (49 Iowa, 144 ; 31 Am. Rep. 145), 527. Burlington v. Dankwardt (73 Iowa, 170; 84 N. W. Eep. 801), 615, 1343, 1344. Burlington v. Dennison (43 N. J. Law, 165), 385,484. Burlington v. Estlow (43 N. J. Law, 13), 528. Burlington v. Gilbert (31 Iowa, 356), 645, 1175. Burlington v. Insurance Co. (31 Iowa, 102), 485, 1234, 1356. Burlington v. Kellar (18 Iowa, 59), 103, 488, 530, 583. Burlington v. Palmer (43 Iowa, 681), 118. Burlington v. Quick (47 Iowa, 246), 1182. Burlington &c. E. Co. v. Clay County (13 Neb. 367), 1386. Burlington &c. R. Co. v. Spearman (12 Iowa, 113), 393. Burlington Water-Works Co. v. City of Burlington (43 Kan. 735 ; 38 Pac. Rep. 1068), 573, 1301, 1303. Burtington Water Co. v. Woodward (49 Iowa, 58), 841. Burnes v. Atchison (3 Kan. 454), 52, 933. Burnett, Ex parte (30 Ala. 461), 106, 534, 1260. Burnett v. Sacramento (12 Cal. 76), 1169, 1174. Burnham v. Brown (33 Me. 100), 957. Burnham v. Chicago (24 111. 496), 1120. Burnham v. Fond du Lac (15 Wis. 193), 1596. , Burns v. Bender (36 Mich. 195), 820. Burns v. City of Bradford (Pa., 20 Atl. Rep. 997), 1199. Burns v. Clarion County (62 Pa. St. 422), 1371. Burns v. Le Grange (17 Tex. 415), 1257. Burns v. Norton (59 Hun, 616), 218. Burnside v. Lincoln County Court (86 Ky. 423), 1544. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxiii PChe referenoea are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. IT, pp. 789-1605.] Burr V. Atlanta (64 Ga. 235), 1285. Burr V. CharitOD County (3 McCrary, 604), 941. Burr V. City of Carbondale (76 111. 455), 803. Burr V. Leicester (121 Mass. 241), 677. Burr V. Pinnev (13 Wend. 309), 1458. Burrill v. Boston (3 Cliff. 590), 643, 713. Burroughs v. Comm'rs(39 Kan. 196), 893. Burroughs v. Lowder (8 Mass. 373), 313. Burt V. Boston (123 Mass. 333), 1449. Burt V. Brigham (117 Mass. 307), 699. Burt V. Winona &o. R. Co. (31 Minn. 472), 199, 290. Burton v. Burton (1 Keyes (N. Y.), 559), 138. Burton v. Norwich (34 Vt. 345), 831. Burton v. Tuite (78 Mich. 363), 1273. Burton v. Wakefield (4 N. H. 47), . 982. Bur well v. Comm'rs 'of Vance County (93 N. C. 73), 672. Busbee v. Comm'rs (93 N. C. 148), 1159. Bush V. Geisey (16 Oregon, 355; 49 Pac. Rep. 133), 911. Bush V. Seabury (8 Johns. 419), 106, 580, 1343. Bush V. Wolf (Ark., 17 S. W. Rep. 709), 900. Bushnel r. Whitlook (77 Iowa, 285 ; 43 N. W. Rep. 186), 1038. Bushnell v. Com. Ins. Co. (15 Serg. & R. 186), 5. Buskirk v. Strickland (47 Mich. 889), 673. Butchers' Ass'n v. Boston (139 Mass. 390), 1404. Butchers' Co. v. Bullock (2 Bos. & Pul. 434), 537. Butchers' Co. v. Morey (1 Bla. 370), 1323. Butchers' Union &o. Co. v. Crescent City &c. Co. (Ill U. S. 746), 1344. Butler's Appeal -(73 Pa. St. 448), 1233, 1353, 1856. Butler V. Oomm'rs (15 Kan. 178), 719. , Butler V. Counly of McLean (32 111. App. 397), 667. Butler V. Bangor (67 Me. 385), 1468. Butler V. Board &c. (46 Iowa, 326), 1540. Butler V. Charlestown (7 Gray, 12), 253, 281, 659, 709, 1141. Butler V. Dunham (37 111. 474), 933, 961. Butler V. Kent (19 Jolins. 233), 233. Butler V. Milwaukee (15 Wis. 493), 664. Butler V. Muscatine (11 Iowa, 433), 1364. Butler V. Neosho County (15 Kan. 178), 186. Butler V. Nevin (88 111. 575). 1171. Butler V. Passaic (44 N. J. Law, 171), 1033. Butler V. Pennsylvania (10 How. 403). 86, 187. Butler V. Regents &c. (33 Wis. 124), 183. Butler V. Sullivan County (Mo., 18 S. W. Rep. 1142), 813. Butler V. Supervisors (46 Iowa, 326), 1578. Butler V. Supervisors &c. (26 Mich. 22), 1178, 1179. Butler V. United States (21 Wall. 273), 311. Butler V. United States (88 U. S. 273), 314. Butler V. Village of Edgewater (6 N. Y. Supl. 174), 1099. Butler V. Worcester (113 Mass. 541), 1096. Butte V. Cohen (Mont., 34 Pac. Rep. 306), 316, 317, Butte County v. Boydstun (68 Cal. 189: 11 Pac. Rep. 781). 556. Butte County v. Morgan (76 Cal. 1 ; 18 Pac. Rep. 115), 331, 858. Butterfield v. Inhabitants of Melrose (6 Allen, 187), 353. Butterfoss v. State (40 N. J. Eq. 335), 1058. Butternut v. O'Malley (50 Wis. 333), 422, 470. Butterworth's Case (1 Woodb. & M. O. C. 333). 140. Buttrick v. Lowell (1 Allen, 172), 755, 1014, 1278. Butz V. Citv of Muscatine (8 Wall. 575), 94,' 473, 1377, 1381, 1385. Butz V. Kerr (133 111. 659), 1024. Butzraan v. Whit beck (42 Ohio St. 223), 1357. Buxton V. Chesterfield (60 N. H. 357), 989. Byerly v. City of Anamosa (79 Iowa, 204; 44 N. W. Rep. 359), 1471, 1492. Byers iJ.. Commonwealth (43 Pa. St. 89), 544. 1257. Byler v. Asher (47 111. 101). 377. Byles V. Golden (53 Mich. 612), 827. Byram t>.- Detroit (50 Mich. 56), 1190. Byrd, Ex parte (84 Ala. 17 ; 5 Am. St. Rep. 328), 1243, 1344. Byrnes v. Cohoes (67 N. Y. 204), 767, 1147. Byron v. Low (109 N. Y. 291; 16 N. E. Rep. 45), 720. Ixxiv TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: VoL Byron v. State (35 Wis. 313). 786. Byrum v. Peterson (Net., 51 N. W. Eep. 839), 1519. c. Cabot V. Britt (86 Vt. 349). 1269. Cadmus v. Farr (47 N. J. Law, 395), 391. i Cadmus v. Farr (47 N. J. Law, 208), 297. Cadwallader v. Durham (46 N. J. Law, 53), 993. Cagwin i». Town of Hancock (84 N. Y. 533), 951. Cahill, In re (110 Pa. St. 167), 1253, 1354, Cahokia v. Rautenberg (88 111. 219), 213 ^ Cahoon u. Coe (58 N. H. 518), 350. Cain V. Comm'rs (86 N. C. 8). 1159. Cain V. Syracuse (95 N. Y. 83), 263, 7:6. Cairo v. Allen (8 111. App. 398), 1381. Cairo v. Bross(101 111. 475), 5«1. Cairo &c. E. Co. v. Sparta (77 III. 505), 48, 93.5, 955, 1383. Cairo &c. R. Co. v. Turner (31 Ark. 494), 670. 704. Calder'v. Police Jury (La., 10 So, Rep. 786). 1030. Caldwell v. Alton (33 111. 416), 520, 1243, 1244. Caldwell V. Harrison (11 Ala. 755), 396. , Caldwell V. Justices (4 Jones (N. Q.) Eq. 323). 48, 1382. Caldwell v. Rupert (10 Bush (Ky.), 182). 1160. Caldwell v. State (55 Ala. 133), 533. Caldwell County v. Harbert (68 Tex. 381 ; 4 S. W. Rep. 607), 813, 1343, 1371. Caldwell County v. Texas (68 Tex. 331), 1346, 1347. Calhoun, Ex parte (87 Ga. 359), 1371. Calhoun County v. Galbraith (99 U. S. 314), 943." 947, 955, 956. California v. Pacific R. Co. (127 U. S. 39), 51. California &c. R. Co. v. Butte County Supervisors (18 Cal. 671), 939, 1576. Calking v. Baldwin (4 Wend. 667), 704. Calkins v. Hartford (33 Conn. 67), 1477. Call' v. Chadbourne (46 Me. 206), 64, 67, 87. Callahan v. Mayor (66 N. Y. 656), 1255. Callahan v. Morris (30 N. J. Law, 161), 769. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Callan v. Wilson (127 U. S, 540), 545, 546, 1357. Callanan v. Gilman (107 N. Y. 360), 1434, 1468, 1464. Callanan v. Madison (45 Iowa, 561), 1400. Callaway County v. Foster (93 U. S. 567), 943, 947. Callender v. Marsh (1 Pick. 418), 757. Calwell V. Boone (51 Iowa. 6^7), 264. Cambria Street, In re (75 Pa. St. % 357). 190. Cambridge v. Chandler (6 N. H 'HtX), 350. Cambridge v. Railroad Comm'rs (158 Mass. 161), 1427. Camden v. Allen (36 N. J. Law, 398), 472 538 Camden v. Bloch (65 Ala. 336), 546, 1363. Camden v. Mulford (36 N. J. Law, 49), 546, 1174. Camden i'. Village Corporation (77 Me. 530), 661. Cameron v. Cappeller (41 Ohio St. 533), 13.55. Cameron v. School Dist. (43 Vt. 507), 373. Camp V, Minneapolis (38 Minn. 461 ; 83 N. W. Rep. 461), 406. Camp V. State (37 Ala. 53), 1340. Campau v. Langley (39 Mich. 451), . 537. 10.'5i Campbell. In re (1 Wash. 287; 24 Pac. Rep. 624). 98. Campbell v. City of Cincinnati (Ohio, 1893; 31 N. E. Rep. 600), 498, 1064. Campbell v. Citv of Kenosha (5 Wall. 194), 6iS8, 941. Campbell v. City of Montgomery (53 Ala. 62T). 756. Campbell v. Dwiggins (83 Ind. 473), 690, 1178. Campbell V. Evans (45 N. Y. 356), 1025. Camrbell v. Kennedy (34 Iowa, 494), 1417. Campbell v. Morris (3 Har. & MoH. • 551), 144. 145. • Campbell v. Race (7 Cush. 408), 1473. Carapb^ll V. Seaman (63 N. Y. 568), 1052. Campbell v. Taylor (8 Bush, 206), 1393i Campbell v. Thompson (16 Me. 117), 539. Campbell County v. Knoxville R. Co, (6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 598), 932, 934. Camphor v. People (12 111. 290), 330. Canaan v. Derush (47 N. H. 218), £88. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxv (The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. l-788j Vol, tf, pp. 789-1605.5 Canal Co. v. Conirn'rs of Drainage (26 La. Ann. 740), 6T1. ■ Canal Co. v. Garrity (1 15 111. IfjS ; 3 N. E. Rep. 448), 5'S7. Canal Co. v. Outagamie County (76 Wis. 588 ; 45 N. W. Rep. 536), 598. Canal St., 7w re (11 Wend. 155), 698. Canepa v. Birtninghani CQS Ala. 358), 1246. Canfield v. Bayfield County (74 Wis. 64; 41 N. W. Rep. 437; 43 N. W. Rep. 100), 598. Canniffi v. Mayor (4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 430), 190. Cannon v. New Orleans (20 Wall. 577), 580, 1043, 1388. Canova v. Comm'rs.&c. (18 Fla. 512), 449, 450, 906. Canterbury v. Boston (141 Mass. 215), 1483. Canto, Ex parte (31 Tex. App. 61 ; 17 S. W. Rep. 155; 57 Am. Rep. 609), 582, 1244. Canton v. Nist (9 Ohio St. 489), 103, 488, 513, 1245. Canton v. Smith (65 Me. 303), 349, 358, 360, 364, 367. Cantrell v. Clark County (47 Ark. 239), 988. Cantril v. Sainer (59 Iowa, 36), 524. Cantwell v. City of Appleton (71 Wis. 463), 1480, 1496.^ Canyonville Road Co. v. County of Douglass (5 Oregon, 380). 706. ■ Gape Girardeau v. Fougeau (80 Mo. App. 551), 484. Cape Girardeau v. Riler (52 Mo. 534), 504. Cape Girardeau v. Riley (73 Mo. 320), 513, 518. Cape Girardeaa &o. Road v. Dennis (67 Mo. 438), 683. ' Cape Girardeau County Court v. Hill (118U. S. 68), 111. Cape Girardeau Road v. Renfroe (58 Mo. 365), 679. Cape May &c. R. Co. v. Cape Mav (35 N. J. Eq. 419), 537. Capen v. Foster (13 Pick. 485; 33 Am. Dec. 633), 377. Capital Bank v. School Dist. (6 Dak. 348; 48 N. W. Rep. 863), 808, 809, 920, 1336, l;^95. Capital Gas Light Co. v. Charter Oak Co. (51 Iowa, 34), 1361. Capps V. Railroad Co. (67 111. 607), 1456. Card V. Ellsworth City (65 Me. 547), 1467. Cardigan v. Page (6 N. H. 183), 350, 1272. 1891. Cardwell v. American Bridge Co. (113 U. S. 305), 1423. F Carey v. Board &o. (N. J., 31 Atl. Rep. 492), 1281. Carey v. City of Duluth (Minn., 36 N. W. Rep. 459). 423. Cai'ey v. City of East Saginaw (79 Mich. 73: 44 N. W. Rep. 168), 1110. Carey v. State (34 Ind. 105), 835, 337. Carev v. Water-works Co. (41 La. Ann. 910). 633. Carland v. Commissioners (5 Mont. 579)i 890. Carleton v. Franconia &o. Steel Co. (99 Mass. 316). 766. Carleton v. People (lb Mich. 350), / 198, 390, 398. Carlin v. Cavender (56 Mo. 388), ^1175. Carlton v. Newman (77 Me. 408), 1383. Carlton v. Redington (31 N. H. 391), 1036. Carlton Street, In re (16 Hun, 497), 301, 498. Carlyle v. Clinton County (111., 30 N. E. Rep. 782), 812. Carlyle Water, Light & Power Co. V. City of Carlyle (31 111. App. 325), 6"35, 839. Carney v. Marseilles (136 III. 401; 26 N. E. Rep. 491), 1374, 1430,> 1440. Carpenter v. Aldrich (3 Met. .58), 1591. Carpenter v. City of St. Paul (38 Mihn. 332). 1071. Carpenter i;. Cohoes (81 N.-Y. 81), 1428, 1450, 1473. Carpenter v. Gwynn (35 Barb. 895), 1405. Carpenter v. Lathrop (51 Mo. 483), 947. Carpenter x\ People (8 Colo. 116; 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 110), 95; 109, 120. Carr v. Ashland (63 N. H. 665), 783. Carr v. City of Easton (Pa., 21 Atl. Rep. 832), 1493. Carr v. McCampbell (61 Ind. 97), 1374. Carr u Northern Liberties (35 Pa. St. 330). 364, 775, 785. Carr v. St. Louis (9 Mo. 191), 103, 488, 513. Carr v. State (103 Ind. 548). 694, 1430. Carr v. United States (98 TJ. S. 438), 740. Carricou. People (123 HI. 198; 14 N. E. Rep. 66), 1323, 1835. Carrier v. Shawangunk (10 Fed. Rep. 330), 947. Carroll v. Langan (63 Hun, 380), 1256. Carroll v. Mayor (13 Ala. 173), 1576. Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 78^1603.] Carroll v. St. Louis (13 Mo. 444), J86, 659. Carroll v. Siebenthaler (37 Cal. 193), SIO. Carroll v. Wall (35 Kan, 36), 298, 299, 495. Carroll County v. Graham (98 Ind. ' a79), 1399. Carroll County v. Smith (111 TJ. S. 556), 208, 381, 964. Carrolton v. Clark (21 111. App. 74), 298. Garron «. Martin (26 N. J. Law, 594), 1174. Carson v. Hartford (48 Conn. 68), 697, 698. . Carson v. McPhetridge (15 Ind. 327), 375. Carter v. Citv of Augusta (Me., 24 Atl. Eep."892), 990. Carter u. Clark (89 Ind. 238), 679. Carter v. Dow (16 Wis. 298), 1370, 1604. Carter v. McFarland (75 Iowa, 196 ; 39 N. W. Eep. 268). 275. Carter v. Monticello (68^ Iowa, 178), 1477, 1479. Carter v. Ottawa (24 Fed. Rep. 546), 964. Cartersville v. Lyon (69 Ga. 577), 1261. Carthage v. Frederick (132 N. Y. 268), 1229, 1331. C^rthan ■». Lang (69 Iowa, 384), 648. Cartright f. Beimont (58 Wis. 373), 1451. Carv V. City of North Plainfield (N. J., 7 Atl. Rep. 42), 1238. Cary v. Ottawa (8 Fed. Rep. 199), 947. Cary v. Pekin (88 111. 154), 1364, 1365. Carver v. Taunton (152 Mass. 484; 25 N. E, Rep. 963), 985. Case of Spain (47-J'ed. Rep. 208), 1240. Case V. Blood (71 Iowa, 633), 1338. Case u. Favier(12 Minn. 89), 571. (.ase V. Johnson (91 Ind. 477), 1126. Case V. Mobile (30 Ala. 538), 90, 541. Casey v. Rae (58 Cal. 163), 1473. Caskey v. Greensborbugh (78 Ind. 233), 314. Casparv V. City of Portland (19 Ore- gon, 496; 24 Pac. Rep. 1036), 774. Cass V. Bellows (31 N. H. 501), 1266, 12T3. Cass V. Dillon (.! Ohio St. 6071, 112, 933, 944. Cass V. Dillon (16 Ohio St. 38), 1379. Cass County v. Gillett (100 U. S. 585),. 943, 944, 964. Cass County v. Green (66 Mo. 498), 964, Cass County v. Johnston (95 V. S. 360), 380. 381. 947. Cassedy v. Stockbridge (21 Vt. 391), 1502. Cassidy v. Bangor (61 Me. 434), 275, 303. Cassidy r. City of Covington (Ky., 168. W. Rep. 93), 1078. Cassin v. Zavalla County (70 Tex. 419). 37«. C*t Plate Mfrs. v. Meredith (4 T. R. 794), 757. Castle V. Berkshire (11 Gray, 26), 1194. Cathcart v. Comstock (56 Wis. 590), 439, 448. Catron v. La Fayette County (106 Mo. 659; 17 S. W. Rep. 577), 847, 848, 947, 1592. Cavan v. Citv of Brooklyn (5 N. Y. Supl. 758), 1598. Cavanagh v. Boston (139 Mass. 436), 778. Cavanagh v. Brooklyn (38 Barb. 233),, 775, 1438. Cavanaugh v. Smith (84 Ind. 380), 1419. Caviel I). Coleman (73 Tex, 550), 1343. Cavis V. Robertson (9 N. H. 534). 374. Cawley v. People (95 111. 249), 209, 314. Cedar Rapids &c. Ry. Co. v. Cowan (77 Iowa, 535). 1540. Cemetery Ass'n v. Meniuger (14 Kan. 312), 571. Cemetery Co. v. Buffalo (46 N. Y. , 503). 1133. Centerville v. Miller (57 Iowa, 56), 529. Central v. Sears (2 Colo. 588), 183, 485, 486; Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell (15 Gray, 106), 380, 490, Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell (4 Gray, 474), 670. Central City Horse Ry. Co. v. Fort Clark, Horse Ry. Co. (87 III. 533), 671. Central Park Extension, In re (16 Abb. Pr. 56), 685. Central Ry. Co. v. State (33 N. J. Law, 320), 591. Centre Street, In re Vacation of (115 Pa. St. 247; 8 Atl. Rep. 56), 1134, 1125. Cerf V. Pfleging (94 Cal. 131), 1407. Cervo Gordo v. Rawlings (111., 25 N. E. Rep. 1006), 1335. Chaddook v. Day (75 Mich. 527), 1244, 1356. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxvii [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Chadwiok v. Colfax (51 Iowa, 70), 1381. Chadwick v. McCausland (47 Me. . 342). 1408. Chaffee's Appeal (56 Mich. 244), 6S1. Chaffee v. Middlesex R. Co. (146 Mass. 224), 958. Chaffe« County v. Potter (142 U. S. 355). 962. Chafln V. Waukesha County (62 Wis. 463), 539. Chahoon's Case (21 Gratt. 822), 1254. Chalk V. White (Wash., 29 Pac. Rep. I 979j, lo08. Challis V. Atchison (16 Kan. 117), 682. Challis V. Parker (11 Kan. 394), 1169. Cballiss V. Comui'rs (IS Kan. S3), 1.568. Chamberlain v. Bell (7 Cal. 292), 225. Chamberlain v. Cleveland (34 Ohio St. 55), 1173. Chamberlain v. Dover (13 Me. 460), 355, 357, 360, 364. 1273. Chamberlain v. Elizabeth Steam Cordage Co. (41 N. J. Eq. 43), 68). Chamberlain v. Enfield (43 N. H. 197),. I -168. Chamberlain v. Evansville (77 Ind. 54S), 519, 528. Chamberlain of London v. Compton (7 D. & R. 597), 106, 518. Chamberlin «. Morgan (68 Pa. St. 168), 686. Chambers v. Bridge Mfg. Co. (16 Kan. 270), 1588. Chambers v. City of St. Joseph (33 , Mo. App. 536), 1599. Chambers v. Farrv (1 Yeates, 167), 678. Chambers V. Lewis (9 Iowa, 533), 70.1. Chambers v. St. Louis (29 Mo. 543), 663. 660. Chambers v. Satterlee (40 Cal. 497), 669, 1163. Chambers v. Territory of Washing- ton (H Wash. T. 280), 1543. Chambers County v. Clews (21 Wall. 317), 935. Champaign v.- Forrester (29 III. App. 117), 1096. Champaign v. Harmon (98 III. 491), 565. Champaign v. Jones (132 111. 304), 1463. Champaign'City v, Patterson (50 111. • 61), 1449. Champlin v. Penn Yan (84 Hun, 33), 1466. Chandler v. Boston (112 Mass. 200), 393, 1866. Chandler t>. Bradish(23 Vt. 416), 175, 244, 367. Chandler t). Comm'rs(141 Mass. 208), 1.594. Chandler v. Hanna (73 Ala. 891), 555. Chandler v. Reynolds (19 Kan. 249), 442, 1368. Chapin v. School Dist. (80 N. H. 25), 349, 350, 1336. Chapin v. School Dist. (85 N. H. 445), 660. Chapin v. Waukesha County (63 Wis. 463). 544. Chapin x\ Worcester (124 Mass. 464), 1097. Chaplain v. Brown (15 R. L 579; 10 Atl. Rep. 639). 1144. Chaplin v. Hill (24 Vt. 628), 640. Chapman v. Clark (49 Mich. 305), 190. Chapman v. Commonwealth (35 Gratt. 721), 328. Chapman v. County Comm'rs (79 Me. 267), 288. Chapman v. Douglas County (107 U. S. 348), 2a7, 240, 628. Chapman v. Ferguson (1 Barb. 267), 385. Chapman v. Gates (54 N. Y. 140), 703. ChapmaTi v. Nobleboro (76 Me. 427), ■ 1481. Chapman v. Oshkosh &c. R. Co. (33 Wis. 629), 699. Chapman v. Swan (65 Barb. 310), 1409, 1414, 1415. Chapman v. -Town of Milton (31 West Va. 384; 7 S. E. Rep. 23), 1450, 1479. Chariton v. Holliday (60 Iowa, 391), 299. Charles v. Haskins (11 Iowa, 339), 336. Charles v. Hinckley Local Board (53 L. J. (N. S.),554), 764. Charles v. Hoboken (37 N. J. Law, 203), 296. Charles v. O'Mailley (18 111. 407), 1266. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (11 Pet. 420), 566, 584, 1196, 1318. Charleston v. Ashley Phosphate Co. (34 S. C. 541), 1264, 1368, 1369. Charleston v. Chur (3 Bailey (S. C,)i 164), .541. Charleston v. Lunenburgh (31 Vt, 488), 1588. Charleston v. Oliver (16 S. C. 47), 531, 1233, 1356, 1357. Charleston v. Reed (37 West Va. 681), 693, 1346. IXXVIU TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789- ■'^605.] Charlestown v. County Comm'rs (3 Met. 203), 639. Charlestown v. County Comm'rs fl09 Mass> 270). 705. 1576. Chailotte &o. Co. v. Gow (59 Ga. 685). 333. Charlton v. Barker (54 Iowa, 360) 603. Chartiers Tp. v. Langdon (131 Pa. St. 77: 18 Atl. Eep. 930; 25 W. N. C. 203). 191. Chartiers Tp. v. Philips (122 Pa. St. 601), 1454. Chase v. Chase (95 ]Sr. Y. 373), 1134. Chase v. City of Oshkosh (Wis., 51 N. W. Rep. 560), 582.-1194, 1318. Chase v. County of Saratoga (33 Barb. 603), 1526. Chase u Merrimack Bank (19 Pick. I 564), 150, 153, 345, 915, 1376. Chase v. RaiJioad (97 N. Y. 389), 710. Chase v. Rutland (47 Vt. 393), 695. Chase v. Stevenson (71 lU. 385), 1327, 1345. Chase v. Worcester (108 Mass. 601, 1101. Chattanooga v. Geiler (13 Loa, 611), 1139. Chatterton v. Parrott (46 Mich. 433), 1417. Cheaney v. Hooser (9 B. Mon. (Ky.) • - 330), 74, 393, 403, 1364, 1366. Cheatham v. United States (93 U. S. 85), 1569. / Chedsey v. Canton (17 Conn. 475), 747. Cheeney v. Brookfleld (60 Mo. 53), 643, 910. Cheetham v. Hampson (4 T. R. 318), 1036. Cheezen v. State (3 Ind. 149), 529. Chegaray v. Jenkins (5 N. Y. 876), . 837. Chelmsford v. Demerest (7 Gray, 1), 329. Chemung Bank v. Supervisors (5 Denio, 517), 253. Chenery v. Holden (16 Gray, 135), 1602, 1603, 1604. Cheney, Ex parte (90 Cal. 617), 1347. Cheney v. Brookfield (60 Mo. 53), 231. Cherokee , v. Fox (34 Kan. 16), 639, 123(5. Cherokee &c. Co. v. Whitfield (38 Ga. 121), 1339. Cberokees v. Georgia (5 Peters, 1), — 142. Cherry v. Board of Comm'rs (N. J., ' 30 Atl. Rep. 970), 1077. Cherry v. Keyport (58 N. J. Law, 544), 1077. Chesapeake &c. Cai al Co., The (1 Md. Oh. 248), 67(j Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Chi* R. Co. i.* Gill &J. 122), 129. Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Bradfcfrd (6 West Va. 620). 697. Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Hoard (16 WestVa. 270). 113. Cheshire Prov. Inst. v. Stone (52 N. H. 365), 993. Chess V. Manown (3 Watts, 319). 678. ' Chegfehii-e v. People (116 111. 493; 6 N. E. Rep. 4861. 1556. Chester &c. R. Co. v. Caldwell County (72 N. C. 480), 381, 935. Chester City v. Black (132 Pa. St. 570; 19 Atl. Eep. 3761), 593, 1081, 1169. Chester Couutv V. Barber (97 Pa. St. 455), 629, 659. Chester Couijty v. Brower (117 Pa. St. 647). 674. Chestnutwood v. Hood (98 III. 133), 1384. Chicago V. Babcock (111., 32 N. E. Eep. 371). 1469, 1496. Chicago i;. Baer (41 III. 306), 1167, 1188. Chicago V. Barbian (80 111. 483), 704. Chicago V. Bartee (100 III. 61), 1235. Chicago V. Brophy (79 111. 277), 1479. Chicago V. Dalle (115 111. 886), 781, 1474. Chicago V. Edwards (58 111. 252), 205. Chicago V. Fidelity Bank (11 Bradw. 165), 1.577, 1578. Chicago V. Gage (95 111. 593; 3S Am. ' Rep. 182). 209, 311, 314. Chicago V. Gallagher (44 111. 395), 1436. Chicago V. Halsey (35 111. 595), 1381, 1395. Chicago V. Hay (75 111. 580), 1467. Chicago V. Johnson (58 111. 91), 1479. Chicago V. Keefe (114 111. 233), 1449. Chicago V. Laflin (49 111. 173). 1034. Chicago V. Langlass (66 111. 361), 1431, 1436. Chicago V. Larned (34 111. 203), 1363. Chicago V. McCarty (75 111. 603), 1474. Chicago V. McCoy (111., 26 N. E. Rep. 363), 505. Chicago ij. McLean (133 111. 148), 1497. Chicago V. Powers (43 111. 169), 1427, 1477. Chicago V. Quimby (38 111. 274), 538. Chicago V. Robbins (3 Black, 418), 9,* 1200, 1452. Chicago V. RumpflE (45 111. 90), 568, 608, 688, 1210. Chicago V. Sheldon (9 WaU. 50), 1108. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxix [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] Chicae:o v. Shober &c. Co. (6 Bradw. (111.) 560), 307. Chicago V. Taylor (135 U. S. 161), 674. Chicago V. Trotter (111., 26 N. E. Rep. 359), 518, 602. Chicago V. Union BId'g Ass'n (]'03 III. 379). 674, 1195. Chicago V. Wright (69 111. 318), 571, 1170, 1383. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. City of Chi- cago (111., 29 N. E. Rep. 1109), 590, 1168. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of JoHet (79 111. 25). 1050. Chicago &c. R, Co. v. City of Quincy (111., 37 N. E. Rep. 192). 1208. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of Quinby (III., 38 M. E. Rep. 1069), 107(5, 1083. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Cole (75 111. 591), 1571. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Engle (76 111. 317), .54H, 12(i8. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Haggai-ty (67 111. 113), 191)9. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Harris (Kan., 30 Pac, Rep. 456), 910. Chicago &r. Ry. Co. v. Hock (118 111. 587), 696. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Iowa (94 U. S. 155), 6. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Jacobs (110 111. 414), 699. 700. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Lake (71 111. 333),. 682. Chicago &c, Ry. Co. v. Langlade County (56 Wis. 614), 199, 439, ■ 448. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Makepeace (44 Kan. 676; 24 Pac. Rep. 1104), 940. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Minnesota Cent. R. Co. (14 Fed. Rep. 525), 527. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Osage County (33 Kan. 597), 945. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. People (120 III. 104). 1168. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Pinckney (74 III. 377), 934, 937, 944. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Siders (88 III. 320), 1189, l.i68. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Smith (63 111. 268), 933. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. South Park Comm'rs (11 III. App. 5K2), 1108. Chicago &c. Rv. Co. v. Sutton (Ind., 30 N. E. Rep. 29i;, 1417. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Swinney (97 Ind. 586), 697. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Town of Oconto (50 Wis. 190), 427. Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity (115 Bl. 155), 93. Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago (88 111. 381), 515, 1832. Chickasaw County Supervisors v. Clay County Supervisors (62 Miss. 325). 459. Chickering v. Robinson (3 Cush. 643), 338. Chioopee Bank v. Chapin (8 Met. 40), 957. Chicora v. Crews (6 S. C (N. S.)243), 50. Chicot County v. Kruse (47 Ark. 80; 14 S. W. Rep. -469), 1374, 1509. Child V. City of Boston (4 Allen (86 Mass.). 41), 7r7, 1436. Child V. Chappel (9 N. Y. 346), 1411. Child V. Colburn (54 N. H. 71), 348, 364, 367, 369. Child V. Hudson's Bay Co. (3 P. Wms. 207), 530. Childrey v. Radv (77 Va. 518), 315. Childs V. Nelson (69 Wis. 125; 33 N, W. Rep. 587), 1194, 1318. Childs V. West Troy (33 Hun, 68), 1485. Chillieothe i). Brown (38 Mo. App. 609), 601, 1243. Chin Yan, Ex parte (60 Cal. 78), 518, 1234. Chiniquy v. People (78 111, 570), 940. Chinn v. Trustees (33 Ohio St. 338), 1189. Chirac v. Chirac (3 Wheat. 1), 139. Chisholm v. Montgomery (3 Woods, 594), 794. Chisholm v. State of Georgia (2 Dallas, 419). 19, 51, 740, Chittenden v. Town of Barnard (61 Vt. 145), 976. Choate v. Rochester (13 Gray, 92), 982, 983. . Choteau v. Rowse (56 Mo. 6.'i). 219. Chouteau v. Allen (70 Mo. 390), 257. Chrisman v. Brace (1 Duv. (Ky.) 63), 218. Christensen, Ex parte (85 Cal. 208), 524. Christensen, In re (43 Fed. Rep. 243), J241. Christian Church i?. Johnson (53 Ind. 273), 360. Christian County v. Rockwell (35 111. App. 20), 974. Christman v. Phillips (58 Hun. 383; 12 N. Y. Supl. 338), 799, 973. Christopher v. Van Liew (57 Barb. 17), 339. Christy v. Ashtabula County (41 Ohio St. 511), 660. Christy v. Newton (60 Barb. 332), 1430. Ixxx TABLE OF CASES. [The reterenoea jfre to pages: Vol..!, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Christy v. Whitmoro (67 Iowa, 60), 1028. Christ's Church v. Woodward (26 Me. 172), 350, 351. Chumasero v. Gilbert (26 III. 39), 385. Church V. CasetS Roht. (N. Y.) 649), 291 Church' V. Detroit (64 Mich. 571), 1446. Church V. Stack (7 Cush. 226). 1375. Churchman v. Indianapolis (110 Ind. 359), 244, 1171. Cicero v. Williamson (91 Ind. 541), 1419. Cihak V. Klekr (17 111. App. 124), 1411. Cincinnati v. Bryson (15 Ohio, 625), 1160, 1237. Cincinnati v. Buckingham (10 Ohio, 257), 535, 537, 1^43. Cincinnati v. Cameron (33 Ohio St. 336), '108, 711. Cincinnati v. Gwynne (10 Ohio, 192), 539, 1255, Cincinnati v. Kasselman (Ohio, 33 Weekly Law Bui. 332 1. 1163. Cincinnati v. Morgan (3 Wall. 275), 947. Cincinnati v. Penny (31 Ohio St. 499), 1100, 1456. Cincinnati v. Eice (15 Ohio, 2S5), 1244, Cincinnati v. White's Lessees (6 Pet. 4:^1), 571. 1406. Cincinnati &c. Assurance Co. v. Rosenthal (55 111. 85), 3.'i4. Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Belle Centre (Ohio, 27 N. B. Rep. 464), 675. Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Clinton County (1 Ohio St. 77), 933. Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. C.umniins;s- ville (14 Ohio St. 523). 590, 678. Cincinnati College v. State (19 Ohio, 110). 1166. Cincinnati Gas Light Co. v. Avon- dale (43 Ohio St. 257), 600. Ciucinnati Health Association v. Rosenthal (55 111. 85), 144. Citizens' &c. Ins. Co. v. Sortwell (8 Allen, 219), 374. Citizens' Gas & Mining Co. v. T&wn of Elwood (114 Ind. 332; 16 N. E. Rep. 624), 486, 51)8. 608. Citizens' Loan Ass'n v. Lyon (29 N. J. Eq. 110), 647. Citizens' Ry. Co. v. Jones (34 Fed. Rep. 679), 1103. City V. Alexander (23 Mo. 483), 933. City V. Fox (78 Ind. 1), 1172. City V. Gardner (97 Ind. 1 ; 49 Am. Rep. 416), 643. City V. Hannibal &o. R. Co. (39 Mo. 476), 1361. City V. Hays (93 Pa. St. 72). 713. City V. Kern (Mont., 29 Pac. Rep. 720), 1264. City V. Kingsbury (101 Ind. 290), 691. , City V. Lamson (9 Wall. 477). 638. City V. McQuillikin (9 Dana, 513), 1186. City r. Murphy (79 Ga. 101), 1160. CititejW. Nichols (28 Pac. Rep. 679), 1265. City V. Southgate(]5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 491). 403. City V. Trvon (35 Pa. St. 401), 593. City V. Wistar (35 Pa. St,. 427), 593. City & County of St. Louis v. Alex- ander (23 Mo. 488), 9.i2. City & Countv of San Francisco r. Itsell (80"Cal. 57; 22 Pac. Rep. ' 74), 625. • City & Suburban Ry. Co. v. City, of Savannah (77 Ga. 731 ), 594, 1211. City Bank v. Bogel (51 Tex. 354), 1354, 1359. City Council v. Ashley Phosphate Co. (S, C. 1891 ; 13 S. E. Rep. 845), 530, 540. ' City Council v. Baptist Church (4 Stroljh. 306). ,525, 5?7, 594, 1026. Citv Council v. Benjamin (3 Strobh. (S. C.) Law, 508), 1244. City Council v. Capital City Water Co. (Ala., 9 So. Rep. 339). 635. City Council i'. Dunn (1 McCord (S. C), 3;i3), 543, 1268. City Council d. King (4 McCord (S. C ), 487), 1363. City Council v. Marks (50 Ga. 612), 702. City Council v. Murphey (79 Ga. 101 ; 3S. E. Eep. 326), I'Si. City Council v. Pepper (1 Rich. (S. C.) 364), 1255, 12ii2. City Council v. Seeba (4 Strobh. Law (S. C), 319), 541. City Council v. Walton (77 Ga. 517), 564. City Council v. Yeomans (85 Ga. 708). 378. City Council . Pierce (124 111. 140; 16 N. E. Rep. 218), 393, 406. DonahoetJ. Richards (38 Me. 379; 61 Am. Dec. 856). 318, 319, 1346. Donahue v. Graham (61 Cal. 876), 1 15. Donaldson v. Boston (83 Mass. 508), 1446. Donaldson v. County of Butler (98 Mo. 163), 1591, Donnelly v. City of Brooklyn (7 N. Y. Supl. 49), 883. Donnelly v. City of Pittsburgh (Pa. , 23 Atl. Rep. 394), 1031. Donnelly v. Decker (58 Wis. 461), 1024. Donnelly v. Town of Ossining (18 Hun; 352), 830. Donnelly v. Tripp (13 R. I. 97), 773, Donnersberger v. Prendergast (128 111. 32U ; 31 N. E. Rep. 1), 406. Donougb V. Dewey (83 Mich. 309), ' 199, 274, 277, 1333. Donovan v. McAlpin (85 N. Y. 185 ; 35 Am. Rep. 649), 323. Donovan v. Mayor &c. of New York (44 Barb. 180), 844. Donovan v. Mayoi' &c. of New York (33 N. Y. 391), 208, 280, 35.', 640. Donovan v. Vioksbiirg (89 Miss. 247), 535. Doolan v. Manitowoc (48 Wis. 312), 180. Dooley v. Muse (Neb., 48 N. W. Rep. 143), 1323. Dooley v. Town of Sullivan (112 Ind. 451), 775, 1111. Doolittle V. County Court (28 West Va. 258), 1516. Doolittle V. Selectmen &c. (59 Conn. • 402), 1549. ' Dorchester v. Youngman (60 N. H. 385), 493. Dore V. City of Milwaukee (42 Wis. 108), 1151, 1153. Dorey v. Boston (146 Mass. 336), 287. TABLE OF CASES. CV rrhe references are to pages: Vol, Dorgan v. Boston (13 Allen (94 Mass.), 233), 684, 1096. Dorgan v. Mobile (31 Ala. 469), 1013. Dorman v. Jacksonville (13 Fla. 588), 677. Dorman v. Lswiston (81 Me. 4111, 693, 1419. Dorn V. Backer (61 N. Y. 261; 61 Barb. 597), 326. Dorsey v. Eacine (60 Wis. 292), 1481. Dorsey v. Smyth (38 Cal. 21), 310, ia93. Dorsey County v. Whitehead (47 Ark. 305; 1 S. W. Rep. 97), 308, 907. Doster v. Atlanta (72 Ga. 833), 761. Doster v. Howe (38 Kan. 353), 659. Dotterer v. Bo we (84 Gal 769; 11 S. E. Rep. 896), 1596. Doty V. Elsbree (11 Kan. 309), 927. Dougan v. Cham plain Trans. Co. (56 N. y. 1), 1486. Dougherty v. Brown (91 Mo. 86 ; 3 S. W. Rep. 810), 1155. Doughertys. Hitchcock (35 Cal. 513), ,1171. Dougherty v. Hope (3 Denio, 598), 352, 1383. Dougherty v. Miller (36 Cal. 83), 706. Douglas i;. Chatham (41' Conn. 811), 933. Douglas V. Downing (Miss., 9 So. Rep. 297). 930. Douglas V. Jones (62 Ga. 433), 243. Douglas V. Town of Harrisville (9 West Va. 162), 1189, 1369. Douglas County v. Bardon (79 Wis. 641 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 969), 817. Douglas County v. Walbridge (38 Wi?. 179), 940. Douglass V. Commonwealth (2 Rawle, 883), 1^46. Douglass V. County of Baker (23 Fla. 419; 2 So. Rep. 776), 374. Douglass V. Pike County (101 U. S. 677), 946. 1373. Douglass V. Placerville (18 Cal, 643), 570. 646. Douglass V. State (31 Ind. 439), 1893. Douglass V. Wickwire (19 Conn. 489), ' 198. Douglass County v. Timme (Neb., 49 N. W. Rep. 366), 179. Douglass County Comm'rs v. Bolles (94 U. S. 104), 947, 960. Douglasville v. Jones (63 Ga. 433), 241. Dousman v. Pres't &o. of Town of Milwaukee (1 Pin. (Wis.) 81), 434. Dousman v. St. Paul (33 Minn. 387), . 1127. Dovaston v. Payne (3 Sm. L. Cas. 143), 1406. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Dove' V. Ind. School Dist. (41 Iowa, 689), 1345. Dover v. MoClintock (6 Watts & S. 80), 1368. Dover v. Murphy (4 N. H. 16l), 995. Dover v. Twombly (43 N. H. 59), 329. Dow V. Backer (61 Barb. 597), 1578. Dow V. Bullock 113 Gray, 136), 175. Dow V. Chicago (11 Wall. 108), 1568, 1569, 1573, 1574. Dow V. Norris (4 N. H. 17), 524. Dowlan r. Sibley County, In re (36 Minn. 430; 31 N. W. Rep. 517), 15, 1125. Do.wner v. Boston (7 Cush. 377), 1188. Downer v. Lent (6 Cal. 94), 1031. Downing v. Herriok (47 Me. 463), 218. Downing v. Mason Co. (87 Ky. 208; 12 Am. St Rpp, 473), 10. Downing v. Miltonvale (36 Kan. 740), 507, 541, 543. Downing v. Rugar (21 Wend. 178), 276, 296, 297, 1335. 1390. Downs V. Board &c. (Wash., 30 Pac. Rep. 147), 1589 Dows V. Town of Elmwood (34 Fed, Eep. 114), 941. Doxey v. Inspectors (67 Mich. 601 ; 35 N. W. Rep. 170), 621, Doyle V. Austin (47 Cal. 360), 1393. Doyle V. Falconer (1 Privy Council Appeals, 329), 305. Drainage Co. Cases (11 La. Ann. 3S8), 1034. Drake v. Lowell (13 Met. 293), ]44.'i. Drake v. Lowell (110 Mass. 514), 1466. Drake v. New York (3 Johns. Cas. 79), 1533. Drake v. Phillips (40 111. 388), 646, 1160, Drake v. Railroad Co. (7 Barb. 737). 484. Drake v. Stoughton (6 Cush. 893), 657. Draper v. Cambridge (30 Ind. 368), 1345. Draper v. Springport (104 U. S. 501), 260, 953. Drath v. B. & M. E. Co. (15 Neb. 365), 697. Drefenthaler v. New York (111 N. Y. 331), 842. Dr. Gaskin's Case (8 T. E. 209), 202. Drew V. Morrill (63 N. H. 23), 194, 314. Drexel v. Town of Lake (127 111. 54; 20 N. E Rep. 38), 591. Driftwood &c. Turnpike Co. v. Bar- tholomew County Comm'rs (72 Ind. 226), 231, 2|60, 643. OVl TABLE OF CASES. [The reterpnoes axe to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] Drlggs V. Phillips (103 N. Y. 77; 3 N. Y. St. Rep. 69), 1223, 1405, 1421. Drisko v. Columbia (75 Me. 73), 368. Dritt V. Snodgrass (66 Mo. 286; 27 Am. Rep. 343), 218, 219. Dronberger v. Reed (11 Ind. 420), 696. Drott V. Riverside (4 Ohio C. 0. 312), 181. Drucker v. Manhattan R. Co. (103 N. . Y. 157), 1433. Druiffi V. Parker (L. R. 5 Eq. 131), P53 Druliner v. State (20 Ind. 308), 166. Drummond i\ City of Eau Claire (Wis.. 48 N. "W. Rep. 244), 1171. Drury v. Foster (2 Wall. 24), 311. Drydenty. Swinburne (20 West Va. 89), 386. Duanesburgh v. Jenkins (57 N. Y. 177), 932, 941, 1382, 1889, 1390. Duanesville v. Jenkins (57 N. Y. 186), 952. ' Dubach v. Hannibal &a R. Co. (89 Mo 483; 1 S. W. Rep. 86), 587, 1206. Dubois i;. Augusta (Dudley (Ga.), 30), . 513. Du Bois V. Decker (130 N. Y. 325; 29 N. E. Rep. 313; 4 N. Y. Supl. 768),, 1006. Dubuque v. Chicago &o. R. Co. (47 Iowa, 207), 1384. Dubuque v. III. Cent. R. Co. (39 Iowa, 56), 1358, 1383. Dubuque v. Insurance Co. (29 Iowa, 9), 1352, 1357. 1362. Dubuque v. Rebman (1 Iowa, 444\ 1257, 1262. Dubuque &c. College v, Dubuque (13 Iowa, 555), 257, 713, 1330, 1331. Dudley v. Grayson (6 T. B. Mon. (Kv.) 251). 1368. Dudley v. Mayhew (3 N. Y. 15), 555. Duel V. Lamb (1 Thomp. & C. 66), 998. Duer V. Small (4 Blatchf. 263), 1359. DuflEy V. Dubuque (63 Iowa, 171; 18 *r. W. Rep. 900), 1448, 1466. Dugan V. Farrier (47 N. J. Law, 383), 290, 297. Dugan V. United States (3 Wheat. 172), 214. Duggen V. MoGruder (Walk. (Miss.) 112), 1576. Duke V. Brown (96 N. O. 137; 1 S. E. Rep. 937), 377, 643. Duke V. Rome (30 Ga. 635), 776, 778. Dullan>\ Wellaon (53 Mich. 393; 51 Am. Rep. 128), 207. Dullanty v. Vaughn (77 Wis. 38), 618. Duluth V. Krupp (Minn., 49 N. W. Rep. 335), 1236. Duluth V. Mallet (43 Minn. 204; 45 N. W. Rep. 154), 589, 1211. Dumas v. Patterson (9 Ala. 484), 326 330 Dun V. Howard (6 Ark, 461), 1355. Dunavan v. Board of Education (47 Hun, 13), 1343. Duncan v. Buffalo (3 N. Y. Supl. 503), 1460. Duncan v. Findlates (6 CI, & F. 894), * 332. Duncan v. Lawrence County Comm'rs (101 Ind. 403), 286, 971. Duncan v. State (7 La. Ann. 377), 329 Duncan v. Terre Haute (85 Ind. 104), 691, 1418, 1419. Duncombe's Case (Cro. Car. 366), 1473. Duncombe v. Fort Dodge (38 Iowa, 281), 361. Duncombe v. Prindle (13 Iowa, 1), 465. Dundas v. Lansing City (75 Mich. 499), 1477, 1479, 14«6, 1493, 1503. Dundy v. Richardson Co. (8 Neb. ■ 508), 60, 61. Dunham v. People (96 111. 331), 1024. Dunham v. Rochester (5 Cowen, 462), 106, 518, 521, 535, 1232. Dunham v. Village of Hyde Park (75 111. 371), 681. Dunham v. Williams (37 N. Y. 251), 1412. Dunleith v. Reynolds (53 111. 45), 1350. Dunleith &o. Bridge Co. v. Dubuque (32 Iowa. 427), 1361. Dunlop V. Keith (I Leigh. 430), 533. Dunlop V. Munroe (7 Cranch, 242), 222. Dunman v. St. Paul R. Co. (36 Minn. 357), 1503. Dunovan v. Green (57 111. 63). 1371. Duntley v. Davis (43 Hun, 239), 814. Dunwiddie v. Town of Rushville (37 Ind. 66), 1190. Du Page V. Jenks (65 111. 272), 1189. Du Page Co. v. People (65 111. 360), 160. Duperier v. Viator (35 La. Ann. 957), 1390. Duraoh's Appeal (63 Pa, St. 491), 1354. Durand v. Borough of Ansonia (57 Conn. 70). 1070. Durango v. Pennington (8 Colo. 257), 258, 713, 1116. Durango v. Remsberg (16 Colo. 327), 12B4. Durant v. Eaton (98 Mass. 469), 1573. TABLE OF OASES. CVII prhe references are to pages; Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Durant v. Iowa County (1 Woolw, 69), 882. 964. Durant v. EauSman (34 Iowa, 194), 1364, 136i Durant v. Palmer (39 N. J. Law, 544). 1451. Durfey v. Town of Worcester (63 Vt. 418; 32 Atl. Rep. 609), 987. Durham v. City of New Britain (55 Conn. 378; 11 Atl. Rep. 354), 1049. Durham v. Hyde Park (75 Ul. 371), 591. Durkee v. Janeeville (38 Wis. 464), 557, 558. Durkin, In re (10 Hun, 269), 505. Duryea v. Smith (16 N. Y. Supl. 688), 1155. Durvee v. Mayor &c. (96 N. Y. 477). 1491. Dusenbury v. Mutual Tel. Co. (11 Abb. N. C. 440). 678. 1433. Dutten V. Hanover (43 Ohio St. 215), 343, 467. Dutton V. Aurora (114 111. 138). 805. Dwight V. Mayor (12 Allen, •622), 1351. Dwyer v. Hackworth (57 Tex. 245), 563, 934. Dyar v. Corporation (70 Me. 515), 1097. DyckmHn v. Mayor &o. (5 N. Y. 484), 681. Dyer v. Boogan (70 Cal. 136), 1271. Dyer v. Chase (53 Cal. 440), 1161. Dyer v. City of St. Paul (37 Minn. 457; 8 N. W. Rep. 373), 1144. Dyer v. Heydenfeldt (Cal., 4 West Coast Eep. 585), 1173. Dyer v. Smith (13 Conn. 384), 217, E. Eadle v. Slimmon (86 N. Y. 9), 1183. Eagle v.. Beard (33 Ark. 497), 450. Eagle V. Kohn (84 111. 293), 940. Eames v. Savage (77 Me. 312), 1376. Earl of Exeter v. Smith ^2 Keb. 367 ; Can. 177), 487. Earley's Appeal (103 Pa. St. 273), 231. Early v. Hamilton {75 Ind. 376). 694. East Dallas v. State (73 Tex. 370; 11 S. W. Rep. 1030), 400, 413. East Lincoln v. Davenport (94 U, S. 801), 943. 947, 961. East Oakland v. Skinner (94 U. S. 255), 230, 633, 936. East River Gas Light Co. v. Don- nelly (93 N. Y. 557), 331. East St. Louis v. Amy (120 U. S. 600), 115, 1374, 1375. East St. Louis v. Board of Trustees (6 111. App. 76), 849. East St. Louis v. East St. Louis &c, Co. (98 111. 415), 237, 635, 645, 805, 887, 839. East St. Louis v. Flannigan (26 III. App. 449), 80."), 837. East St. Louis v. Flannigan (84 111. App. 596), 855. East St. Louis v. Maxwell (99 111. 439), 113, 113. East St. Louis v. O'Flynn 119 111. 200; ION. E. Rep. 39.1), 1193, 1195. East St. Louis v. People (6 111. App. 130), 849. East St. Louis v. People (124 111. 655; 33 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 408), 843. East St. Louis v. Rhein (111., 38 N. E. Rep. 1089), 406. East St. Louis v. St. John (47 III. 463). 6S1. East St. Louis v. Thomas (11 Dl. App. 283), 283. East St. Lnuis v. Trustees (6 111. App. 130), 1380. East St. Louis v. Trustees (103 111. 489), 1357. East St, Louis v. United States (110 U. S. 331), 1374. East St. Louis v. Wehrung (50 111. 28), 283. 550, 1390. East St. Louis v. Zebley (110 TJ. S. 331), 1379, 1380. East Sudbury v. Sudbury (12 Pick. 1), 983. East Syracuse, In re (20 Abb. N. C. 131), 879, 880. 1124. East Tennessee University v. Knox- ville (6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 166), 11. Eastern &c. Pass. Ry. Co. v. City of Easton (133 Pa. St. 505; 19 Am. St. Rep, 658), 1055. Easthampton v. County Comra'rs (154 Mass. 424), 676. East Hampton v. Kirb (68 N. Y. 459), 21. Eastman v. City of Concord (64 N. H. 263; 8 Atl. Rep. 822), 883. Eastman v. Company (44 N. H. 146), 1036. Eastman v. Meredith (36 N. H. 284 ; 73 Am. Dec. 303), 10, 17, 39, 94, 156, 759, 763, 766, 775, 785. 1015. Easton v. Chanfiler (11 Wend. 90), 1578. Easton v. Neff (103 Pa. St. 474), 775. Eastport v. Lubec ((i4 Me. 246), 995. Eaton V. Berlin ,(49 N. H. 219), 838. Eaton V. Boston &c. R. Co. (51 N. H. 504, 673, 674. Eaton V. Chesebrough (83 Mich. 214), 1395. cvui TABLE OF 0ASE8. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL II, pp. 789-1605.] Eaton V. Eeegan (114 Mass. 433), 1245. Eaton V. Miner (5 N. H. 543). 349. Eaton V. Supervisors &c. (44 Wis. 489), 14, 15. Eatontown v. Shrewsbury (49 N. J. Law, 188; 6 Atl. Rep. 319), 976. Eberhardt v. Wood (6 Lea(Tenn.), 467; 2 Tenn. Ch. 490), 314. Eberhart v. Railroad Co. CJO III. 347), 1456. Eohsbaoh v. Pitts (6 Md. 71), 1181. Ecliert V. Long Island K. Co. (43 N. Y. 502), 1493. Eckman v. Township of Brady (81 Mich. 70), 995. Ecorse Township v. Board &c. (75 Mich. 270), 1429. Eddy V. Board of Health (10 Phila. ;94), 105U Eddy V. Wilson (43 Vt. 363), 361, 366, 373, 663. Edenton,i>. Wool (63 N. C. 379), 1255. Edgecumbe v. Burlington (46 Vt. 218), 686. Edgerly v. Concord (6? N. H. 8), 759, 775. Edgerton v. HufE (36 Ind. 35), 672. Edgerton v. New Orleans (1 La. Ann. 485), 1595. Edin burg -American Land Co. v. City of Mitchell (So. Dak., 48 N. W. Rep. 131), 807, 9S0. Edmands v. Boston (108 Mass. 535), 699. 701, 1101. Edmands v. Banbury (28 Iowa, 367; 4 Am. Rep. 177), 377. Edmunds v. Gookins (34 Ind. 169), 393, 401, 1366. Edwards v. City of Chicago (111., 30 N. E. Rep. 350), 1170. Edwards v. Davis (16 Johns. 283), lOOG. Edwards v. Ferguson (73 Mo. 686J, 318. Edwards v. Kearzey (96 U. S. 595). 435. Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas (47 Fed. Rep. 368). 763, 768. Edwards v. Trustees &o. (30 111. App. 538), 1338. Edwards v. United States (13 Otjo, 471), 301, 203. ■ Edwards v. Watertown (34 Hun, 436), 386. Edwards v. Williamson (70 Ala. 145), 435. Eels V. American &c. Tel. Co. (30 N. Y. Supl. 600), 1433. Effingham v. Hamilton (68 Miss, 633; ,10 So. Rep. iJ9), 1509. Egan V. Chicago (5 111. App. 70), 485. Ege V. Koontz (8 Pa. St. 109), 241. Eggleston v. Columbia Turnpike Co. (18 Hun, 146), 1466. Eglestoh V. City Council (1 Mills, Const. (S. C.) 45), 1354. Egremont v. Benjamin (135 Mass. 15), -338. Egypt Street, In re (3 (Grant (Pa.) Cas. 455), 113. Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin (27 Mo. 495), 1185, 1356, 1370. Ehrgott V. New York (96 N. Y, 364), * 265, 753. 1445. Eichels v. Evansville St. Rv. Co. (73 Ind. 261 ; 41 Am. Rep. 861), 109, 114, 590. Eifert v. Central Covington (Ky., 15 S. W. Rep. 180), 13i)9. Eilert v. Cshkosh (14Wis. S87), 1171. Ela V. Smith (5 Gray, 131), 193, 195, 1603. Elbin V. Wilson (33 Md. 135), ,318. Elder v. Bemis (3 Met. 599), 339. Elder v. Dwight Mfg. Co. (4 Gray, 201), 1356. Elder v. Territory (3 Wash. T. 438), 1336. Eldora v. Burlingame (63 Iowa, 23, 33), 534. 644. Eldred v. B^rnadotte (53 111. 368), 1381. Elgin V. Eaton (83 111. 535), 1153, 1456. Elgin V. Hoag f23 111. App. 650), 1096. Elizabeth v. Force (39 N. J. Law, 587), 965. Elizabeth v. Westfield (7 N. J. Law, 439), 978. Elizabeth Citv v. N. J. Cent. R. Co. (53 N. J. Law, 491), 1413. Ellzabethtown v. Lefler (28 111. 90), 641. 543, 1064. Elk V. Wilkihs (113 U. S. 94), 143. Elkhart v. Ritcer (66 Ind. 136), 1430, 1484. Elkhart v. Simonton (71 Ind. 7), 697. Elkhart t!. Wickwire (131 lad. 331; 23 N. E. Eep. 344), 1126. Elk Point V. Vaughn (1 Dak.M13; 46 N. W. Rep. 577), 117, 514, 515, 1343. Elliott V. City of Oil City (Pa., 18 Atl. Rep. 553), 1099. Elliott V. Fair Haven &c. R. Co. (33 Conn. 579), 590.. Elliott V. Palmer (10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 437), 131)3. Elliott V. Philadelphia (75 Pa. St. 347), 755. Elliott V. Sackett (108 U. S. 133), 953. Elliott V. Swartwout (10 Pet. 137), 1577. Elliott V. Supervisors (58 Mich. 452 ; 35 N, W. Rep. 461), 817, 1029. TABLE OF CASES. CIX rrhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1805.] Elliott V. Williamson (10 Lea (Tenn.), 38^, 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 603), 1893. Elliott V. Willis (1 Allen, 461), 198. Ellis V. Am. Acad. (120 Pa. St. 608), 1412. Ellis V. Bristol (2 Gray, 370), 1533. Ellis V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (77 Wis. 114; 4.5 N. W. Rep. 811), 617. Ellis V. Page (1 Pick. 43), 528. Ellis V. Peru City (23 111. App. 35), 1492. Ellis V. Washoe County (7 Nev. 291), 658, 659. Ellison V. Lindford (Utah, 25 Pac. Rep. 744), 1363. Ellison V. Raleigh (89 N. C. 125), 204. Ellsberry v. Seary (83 Ala. 614), 1345, 1347. Ellsworth V. Rossiter (46 Kan. 237 ; 26 Pac. Rep, 674), 183, 719. Elmenriorf v. Board of Finance (41 N. J. Law, ia5), 658. Elmendorf- v. Mayor &c. of New York (25 Wend. 693), 174, 301, 497, 500. 1265. Elmore v. Drainage Comm'ra (13.'5 III. 269; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 491), 268, 750. Elmore v. Overton (104 Ind. 348 ; 54 Am. Rep. 343; 4N. E. Rep. 197), 217, 219. Elmore County v. Long (52 Ala. 277), 1377. Elmwood V. Marcy (92 IT. S. 289), 911, 947. Elson V. O'Dowd (40 Ind. 300), 651. Elster V. City of Springfield (Ohio, 30 N. E. Rep. 274), 582, 765. 1100, 1101. Elston V. Crawfordsville (SO Ind. 272), 392, 1366. Elwood V. Bullock (6 Q. B. 383), 519, 1233 Ely V. Board &c. (87 Cal. 166 ; 25 Pac. Rep. 240), 1550. Ely V. Campbell (59 How. Pr. 333), 615. 1464. Ely V. Des Moines (Iowa, 53 N. W. Rep. 475), 1498. Ely V. Niagara County (36 N. Y. 297), 757. Ely V. Parsons (55 Conn. 83; 10 Atl. Rep. 499), 222. 223. Ely V. Rochester (36 Barb. 138), 662. Ely V. St. Louis R. Co. (77 Mo. 34), 1486. Ely ton Land Co. v. Ayres (62 Ala. 413). 646, 1189. Embden v. Lehigh Coal Co. (47 Pa. St. 76), 959. Embler v. Walkill (132 N. Y. 222), 1453, 1493. Embury v. Conner (3 N. Y. 511), 671. Emerich v. City of Indianapolis (1 18 Ind. 279), 1544. Emerie v. Gilman (10 Cal. 404). 1595. Emerson v. Babcbck (66 Iowa, 258 ; 23 N. W. Rep. 656), 1217. Emerson v. Newberry (13 Pick. 377), 713. Emery v. Bradford (29 Cal. 75). 706. Emery v. Gas Co. (28 Cal. 345), 1166, 1172, 1188. Emery v. Hapgood (7 Gray, 55 ; 66 Am. Dec. 459). 209. Emery v. Lowell (137 Mass. 138), 2i4: Emmitt v. City of New York (13 N. Y. Supl. 887), 184, 188. Emmons v. City of Lewiston (135 III. 36: 24 N. E. Rep. 1006), 1235. Emory v- Lowell (104 Mass. 13). 773. Empire v. Darlington (101 U, S. 87), 943, 964. Emporia v. Gilchrist (37 Kan. 532; 15 Pac. Rep. 533), 1083. Emporia v. Loden (85 Kan. 588), 686, Emporia v. Norton (16 Kan, 336), 504. Emporia v. Schmidling (33 Kan. 485), 1484. 1486. Emporia v. Smith (42 Kan. 433 ; 32 Pac. Rep. 616), 393. Emporia v. Volmer (12 Kan. 623)i 539 Empire City Bank, In re (18 N. Y, 199), 690. Enfield v. Jordan (119 U. S. 6S0), 964. Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford &c. R, Co. (17 Conn. 40), 1196. Engle V. New York (40 Fed, Rep. 51), 754. English V. Chicot County (36 Ark. 454), 932. English V. People (96 111. 566), 929. English V. Smock (34 Ind. 113 ; 7 Am. Rep. 215), 651. Enos V. Springfield (113 111. 65), 1074, 1078, 1086. 1187. Enright v. Falvey (4 L. R. Ir. 397), 333. Enterprise v. Fowler (38 Kan. 415; ' 16 Pac. Rep. 703). 884. Episcopal Church, Matter of (75 N. Y. 324), 1071. Episcopal Society v. Dedham Epis- copal Church (1 Pick. 878), 257. Erie v. Bootz (72 Pa. St. 196), 112. Erie v. Erie Canal Co. (59 Pa. St. 174), 86. Erie v. Knapp (29 Pa. St. 173), 159fi. Erie Academy v. Erie (31 Pa, St. 515), 1365. ex TABLE OF CASES. / [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. U, pp. 789-1605.] Erie City v. McGill (101 Pa. St. 616), 1500. Erie City v. Schwingle (33 Pa. St. 384), 385, 1440. Erie County v. Erie (113 Pa. St. 360), 1397. Erlinger v: Boreau (5l III. 94), 64. Ernst V. Kunkle (5 Ohio St. 530), 1115. Erskine v. Van Arsdale (15 Wall.^ 77), 1577. Escanaba Company v. Chicago (107 U. S. 678), 758. Eschbach v. Pitts (6 Md. 71). 1395. Eslava v. Jones (83 Ala. 139). 219.' Espy V Fort Madison (14 Iowa, 236), 1577. Essex Turnpike Corporation v. Col- lins (8 Mass. 393). 305. Estep V. Keokuk County (18 Iowa, 199i, 351, 642. Estes t). Owen (90 Mo. 113; 3 S. "W. Rep. 133). 589, 1161. Estey V. Starr (56 Vt. 690), 303, 363. Estopinal v. Peyroux (37 La. Ann. 477), 3.'{8. Euf ala' V. McNab (67 Ala. 588), 330, 549. Eufeka Basin &c. Co., In re (96 N. Y.48; 3 Dill. 37R), 931. Eureka Springs v. O'Neil (Ark., 1893; 19 S. W. Rep. 969), 525. > Eustace v. Johns (38 Cal. 3), 1301. 1441. Evans v. Council Bluffs (65 Iowa, 238). 435, 1363. Evans v. Etheridge (96 N, C. 43). 230. Evans v. Hughes County (6 Dak. 102; 50 N. W. Eep. 720). 596. Evans V. Savage (77 Me. 213), 150. Evans v. Sharp (29 Wis. 564), 558. Evans v. Town of Stanton (33 Minn. 368), 835. Evans v. Utica (69 N. Y. 166), 1438, 1492. Evanston v. Gunn (99 U. S. 660), 9, 365. Evansville v. Blend (118 Ind. 436), 1377. 1379. Evansville v. Decker (84 Ind. 335; 43 Am. Eep. 86), 1096, 1098. 1099. Evansville v. Hall (14 Ind. 37), 13.59. Evansville v. Martin (41' Ind. 145)? 520. Evansville v. Page (33 Ind. 535). 401. Evansville v. Plisterer (34 Ind. 36), 1574. Evansville v. State (1 18 Ind. 436), 1279, 1383. Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Evansville (15 Ind. 895), 283. Evansville Co. v. State (73 Ind. 319), 1419. Evartu. Pastal (86 Mich. 325; 49 N. W. Rep. 53), 316. Eve V. Simon (78 Ga. 120), 1.545. Eveleigh v. Hounsfleld (34 Hun, 140), 1439, 1440. Everett v. Council Bluffs (40 Iowa, 66), 1050. Everett v. Smith (23 Minn. 53), 381, 494. Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. Beecher (53 Conn. 551), 686. Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. City of TIew Haven (43 Conn, 334i, 677. Everaon v. Syracuse (100 N. Y. 577), 773, Everton v. Sutton (5 Wend. 280), 339. Everts- v. Rose Grove Dist. Tp. (77 Iowa, 37; 41 N. W. Rep. 478), 613, 1331. 1333. Evertson v. First National Bank (66 N. Y. 14), 958. Ewbanks v. Ashley (36 III. 177), 530, 1064, 1264. Ewing V. State (81 Tex. 173), 1556, 1557. Exchange Bank v. Hines (3 Ohio St. 591), 1573. Exchange Bank v. Lewis County (38 West Va. 373), 313. 314. Exeter v. Glyde (4 Mod. 37), 306. Exeter and Northmoreland Town- ship Line (8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 534), 430: Exeter v. Starre (2 Show. 158), £40. Ex parte Ah Lit (26 Fed. Rep. 513), 534. Ex parte Ah Yon (83 Cal. 339), 1261, Exparte Ah You (88 Cal. 99), 518. Ex parte Andrews (18 Cal. 678), 1018.. Ex parte Baltimore Turnpike Co. (5 Binn. 481), 1390. Ex parte Harnett (51 Ark. 215; 10 '8. W. Rep. 493), 1013. Ex parte Batesville &o. R. Co. (39 Ark. 82). 220. Ex parte Bedell (30 Mo. App. 135), 504, 505. Exparte Brandon (49 Ark. 143; 4 S. W. Rep. 453),- 1012. Exparte Burnett (30 Ala. 461), 106, 534, 1051, 1260. Ex parte Byrd (84 Ala. 17 ; 5 Am. St. Rep. 328), 1243, 1344. Exparte Calhoun (87 Ga. 359), 1371. Exparte Campbell (74 Cal. 30; 15 Pac. Rep. 318), 1240. Exparte Canto (31 Tex, App. 61; 17 S. W. Rep. 155), 582, 1344. Ex parte Cassinello (63 Cal. 538), 1020. Exparte Cheney (90 Cal. 617), 1347. Ex parte Chin Yan (60 Cal. 78), 518, 1334. TABLE OF CASES. CXI [The references are to pages: Vol. Ex parte ClnistenBeji (85 Cal. S08), 524. Ex parte City Council of Montgom- ery (64 Ala. 463), 533. Ex parte Gregg (2 Curtis C. C. 98), 140. Ex parte Grouse (4 Wheat. 9), 1008. Ex parte Delaney (43 Gal. 478), 598. Ex parte Firemen's Ins. Go. (6 Hill, 243), 1589. Ex parte Fiske (73 Gal. 135; 13 Pac. Rep. 810), 507, 1246. Ex parte Frank (53 Cal. 606), 518, 531, 608. Ex parte Garza (28 Tex. App. 381 ; 19 Am. St. Rep. 845), llB, 117, 118, 1233. Ex parte Green (Cal., 29 Pac. Rep. 783), 583. Ex parte Gregory (20 Tex. App. 210), 1234, 1337. Ex parte Halstead (97 Gal, 471), 1256. Ex parte Hanson (38 Fed. Rep. 127), 1235. Ex parte Harris (52 Ala. 87 ; 23 Am. Eep. 559), 1536. Ex parte Heath (3 Hill, 42), 190, 389, 1559. Ex parte Heilbron (65 Gal. 609), 1018. Ex parte Heyleman (93 Gal. 493; 28 Pac. Rep. 675), 1336. Ex parte Hitz (111 U. S. 766), 705. Ex parte HoUwedell (74 Mo. 395), 539, 544. 604. £« parte Humphrey (10 Wend. 612), 307. . Ex parte Jackson (45 Ark. 158), 1012. Ex parte Kiburg (10 Mo. App. 442), 539, 544. Ex parte Lane (76 Gal. 587), 541, 1264.. Ex parte Lawhorne (18 Gratt. 85), 175. Ex parte Lynch (2 Hill, 45), 830, 1589. Ex parte McGollum (1 Cowen, 550), 443. Ex parte Mayor (23 Wend. 277), 1169. Elf parte Mirande (73 Gal. 365; 14 Pac. Rep. 888), 274, 358, 1355. Ex parte Murphy (7 Gowen, 153), 163. Ex parte Norris (8 S. G. 408), 200. Ex parte O'Donovan (24 Fla. 881), 1042. Ex parte O'Leary (65 Miss. 80; 3 So. Rep. 144), 1053. Ex parte Parsons (1 Hughes, 282), 804. Ex parte Reed (4 Granch, 583), 533. I, pp. 1-T88; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Ev parte Reed (4 Hill, 572). 335. Ex parte Reily (85 Gal. 632), 199, 1258. Ex parte Reynolds (87 Ala. 138 ; 6 So. Rep. 335; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 1), 617. Ex parte Robinson (13 Neb. 383), 1356, 1370. Ex parte Robinson (3 Pugsley, 389), 378. Ex parte Robinson (Tex., 17 S. W, Rep. 1057), 600. Ex parte Rogers (7 Cowen, 526, n.), 276. Ex parte Samuel J. Peacock (35 Fla. 478), 1261. Ex parte Schmidt (24 S. C. 368), 118, 1257. Ex parte Schneider (11 Oregon, 288), 1233. Ex parte Selma &c. R. Go. (45 Ala. 696), 16, 933. Ex parte Shrader (33 Gal. 279), 1018, 1020. Ex parte Slattery (8 Ark. 484), 1355, 12.^8. Ex parte Smith (38 Cal. 702), 1018, 1240. Ex parte Smith (8 S. C. 495), 200. Ex parte Snyder (64 Mo. 58). 199. Ex parte Solomon (Cal., 27 Pac. Rep. 757), 518. Ex parte State (52 Ala. 231). 740. Ex parte Stockton (33 Fed. Rep. 95), 1840. Ex parte Strang (21 Ohio St. 610), ■ 199. Ex parte Taylor (58 Miss. 478), 1335. Ex parte Thomas (71 Cal. 804), 1388. Ex parte Trask (1 Pug. & Bur. 377), 533. Ex parte Tuttle (91 Cal. 589 ; 37 Pac. Rep. 933), 597, 1348. .Ea; i)ar. Pierce (141 Mass. 203; 6 N. E. Rep. 830), 1008. Farris worth v. Pawtuoket (13 R. I. 8,3), 529. Farnsworth v. Rock Island (83 Me. . 508), 1434. Farnum v. Concord (3 N. H. 898), 156, 747. Farquar v. Roseburg (3 Pac. Rep. 1103), 265. Farr v. Brackett (30 Vt. 344). 528. Farr v. Hollis (9 Barn. & C. 333). 320. Farrar v. City of St. Louis (80 Mo. 379), 1103, 113.5. 1161, 1173. Farrel v. City of New York (5 N. Y. , 673), 1230. Farrel v. London (13 Upper Can. »Q. B. 343), 540. Farrel v. Town of Derby (58 Conn. 234; 84 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas, 391), 667, 815. Farrell v. Bridgeport (45 Conn. 191), 1277. Farrell v. Mayor &c. (20 N. Y. St. Rep. 13; 5 N. Y. Supl. 673). 614. Farren «. King (41 Conn. 448), 1272. Farrington v. Investment Co. (N. Dak., 45 N. W. Rep. 194), 593. Farrington v. Turner (53 Mich. 27), 379 Fass V. Seehawer (60 Wis. 525), 558, 706, 1083. Fath V. Koeppel (73 Wis. 389; 39 N. W. Rep. 539), 1031. Fatout V. School Comm'rs (102 Ind. ■ 323), 1336. Faulk V. McCartney (43 Kan. 695; 23 Pac. Rep. 713), 806. Faulk », Strother (84 Cal. 544; 34 Pac. Rep. Il6), 1553. Faulkner v. City of Aurora (85 Ind. 130), 744. 775. Faulkner v. Hunt (16 Cal. 170). 1577. Faulks V. People (39 Mich. 300), 1249. Faviell v. Railway Co. (2 Exch. 344), 658. Favrot v. East Baton Rouge (34 La. Ann. 491), 1380. Fay V. Town of Lindley (11 N. Y. Supl. 855), 1439. Fayette v. Shafroth (25 Mo. 445), 1256. Fayetteville v. Carter (53 Ark. 301), 1284. Fayssoux v. De Chaurand (36 La. Ann. 547), 1171. Fearing v. Irwin (55 N. Y. 486), 1195. Fecheimer v. Louisville (84 Ky. 306), 1888. Federgreen v. Town of Fallsburgh (25 Hun, 153), 830. Felch V. Gilman (33 Vt. 38), 1417. Feldman v. Charleston (23 S. C. 57), 930 1393 Fell V. State "(43 Md. 71). 487. Fellowes v. New Haven (44 Conn, . 240 ; 26 Am. Rep. 447). 677, Fellows V. Gilman (4 Wend. 414), 310, 313. TABLE OV OASES. cxia [The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] Fellows V. Walker (39 Fed. Rep. 651), 931. Felton V. Milwaukee (47 Wis. 494), 698, 699. Felton V. Short Route Oo. (85 Kv. 640), 1423. Fender n. Neosho Falls (33 Kan. 305), 1368. Fenelon's Petition (7 Pa. St. 173), 1188. Fensier v. Lammon (6 Nev. 109). 334. Fenton v. Salt Lake County (4 Utah, 466; 11 Pac. Rep. 611). 883. Fenwick v. East London Co. (L. R. 20 Eq. 544), 1295. Ferdinand v. Mayor &c. of New York (13 N. Y. Supl. 226), 1117. Ferguson v Bqroush of Stamford (60 Conn. 432), 1177. Ferguson v. Chittenden Co: (6 Ark. 479), 392. Ferguson v. City of Selma (43 Ala. 398), 1048, 1051. Ferguson v. Kinnoull (9 CI. & F. 351), 219. Ferguson v. Landram (5 Bush, 230), 645. Fernald v. Lewis (6 Greenl. (Me.) 264), 150, 345. 915. Fernbach v. Waterloo (Iowa, 34 N. W. Kep. 610), 1488, 1503, 1503, 1504. Fernbach v. Waterloo (76 Iowa, 598 ; 41 N. W, Rep. 370j, 1487, 1488, 1503. Ferrari v. Board of Health (24 Fla. 390; 5 So. Rep. 1), 1043. Ferree v. School Dist. (76 Pa. St. 376), .671. Ferrier, In re (103 III. 367), 1008. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (97 U. S. 659), 1046, 1054, 1312. Field V. Commonwealth (33 Pa. St. 478), 203, 210. Field V. Des Moines (39 Iowa, 575 ; 18 Am. Rep. 46), 669, 759, 1055. Field V. Field (9 Wend. 394), 380. Field V. Girard College (54 Pa. St. 233), 202. Field V. New York (6 N. Y. 179), 1115. Field V. People (3 III. 79), 159. ¥veld V. Stokeley (99 Pa. St. 306; 44 Am. Rep. 109). 759. 1054. Field V. West Orange (36 N. J. Eq. 118; 37 N. J. Eq. 600). 1145. Fifleld V. Marinette County (63 Wis. 533; 23 N. W. Rep. 705), 593, - 1133. Finch V. Board of Education (30 Ohio St. 37; 27 Aiu. Rep. 414), 10. 323, 750. Flndlay v. McAllister (113 U. S. 104), 1375. Findley v. Salem (137 Mass. 171), 760, 1037. Fink V. Milwaukee (17 Wis. 26), 539, 1364. Fink V. St. Louis (71 Mo. 52). 1163. FinleyuDietrick(12 lowa,516), 1366. Finley v. Philadelphia (32 Pa. St. 381), 1350. Finn v. Adrian City (Mich., 53 N. W. Rep. 614). 1469. 1499. Finney v. Oshkosh (18 Wis. 220), 1171. Finney v. State (126 Ind. 577; 26 N. E. Rep. 150), 865, 1334. Fire Department v. Helfenstein (16 Wis. 136), 144. Fire Department' v. Kip (10 Wend. 267), 67, 87. Fire District v. Comm'rs (108 Mass. 142), 1390. Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd (120 Pa. St. 624). 754. Firemen's Ins. Co., Ex parte (6 Hill, 45). 1539. First Municipality v, Blineau (8 La, Ann. 689), 1054. First Municipality v. Comm'rs of Sinking Fund (1 Rob. 279), 9S. First Municipality v. Cutting (4 La. Ann. 335), 580, 1343. First Nat. Bank v. Americus (68 Ga. 119). 1400. First Nat. Bank v. Arlington (16 Blatchf. 57), 953. First Nat. Bank v. Cook (77 111. 632), 1568. First Nat. Bank v. Countv of Sara- •toga (lOe N. Y. 488"; 13 N. E. Rep. 439), 914. First Nat. Bank v. Meredith (44 Mo. 500), 13.=)9. First Nat. Bank v. Ottawa (43 Kan. 295), 1596, 1597. First Nat. Bank v. Peck (43 Kan. 643; 33 Pac. Rep. 1077). 8Q3. First Nat. Bank v. Rush School Dist. (81 Pa. St. 307), 833. First Nat. Bank v. Sarlls (139 Ind. 301), 1246. First Nat. Bank v. Scott (14 Minn. 77), 965. First Nat. Bank v. Town of Concord (1)0 Vt. 357), 936. First Nat. Bank v. Town of Dorset (16 Blatchf. 63), 936. First Nat. Bank v. Union School Tp. (75 Ind.. 3,61), 821. First Nat. Bank v. Yankton County (101 U. S. 129), 941. First Parish &o. v. Cole (3 Pick. 232), 660. First Parish in Sudbury w. Stearns (31 Pick. 148), 162, 391. toxiv TABLE OF CASES. rrhe references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-16(B.] First Presbvterian Church v. Fort Wayne "(Se Ind. 338), 1160, 1166. Fish V. Branin (33 N. J. Law, 484), 1351. Fish V. Dodge (38 Barb. 163). 219. Fish V. Perkins (53 Conn. 200), 090. Fisher v. Board of Directors (La., 10 So. Rep. 494). 808. Fisher v. Bo9ton (104 Mass. 87), 264, 754, 760, 7(i.S, 775, 1037. Fisher v. Cambridge Village (133 N. Y. 527), 1430, ir)03. Fisher v. Deans (107 Mass. 118), 338. 380. Fisher v. Harrisburg (Pa., 2 Grrant's Cas. 291), 518, 531, 539, 1034, 1234. Fisher v. McGirr (1 Gray, 1), 534. Fisher v. People (84 III. 491). 1384. Fisher v. Prowse (3 Best & S. 7T0), 1408. Fisher v. School Dist. (4 Cush. 494), 640. Fisher v. Vaughan (10 Upper Can. Q. B. 493), 1172. Fisk V. Hazard (7 R. I. 438). 664. Fisk V. Jefferson &c. Jury (116 U. S. 131), 1375. Fisk V. Kenosha (26 Wis. 23). P2. Fiske, Ex parte (73 Cal. 125; 13 Pac. Rep. 310). 507. 1346. Fister v. La Rue (15 Barb. 833), 708, 711. Fitch V. McDiarmid (26 Ark. 482), 1517. Fitch V. New York (40 Hun. 512), 192. Fitch V. Pinckard (5 111. 78), 91, 92, 543, 1171, 1268. Fitchburg v. Lunenburg (103 Mass. 358), 978. . Fitchburg R. Co. v. Grand Junction &c. R. Co. (1 Allen, 552|, 198. Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth (5 Al- len, 509), 1009. FitzgferaJd v. City of Troy (7 N. Y. Supl. 103), 1476. Fitzgerald v. Walker (Ark., 17 S. W. Rep. 703), 813. Fitzgerald «. Woburn (1Q9 Mass. 204), 1437, 1460. 1486. Fitzpatrick v. Board &c. (87 Ky. 133 ; 7 S. W. Rep. 896), 1336. Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn (103 N. Y. 536), 210, 1292. Flack V. Green Island Village (123 N. Y. 107), 1405, 1406. Flack V. Harrington (1 III. 313), 339. Flagg V. Hudson (143 Mass. 280;, 1455. Flagg V. Palmyra (33 Mo. 440), ^54, 1378. Flagg V. St. Charles (37 La, Ann. 319), 647. Flagg V. Worcester ,(13 Gray, 601), 1146. Flatan v. State (56 Tex. 93), 315. Flatcher v. Boodle (18 C. B. (N. S.) 152), 134. Flater v. Detroit (70 Mich. 644), 1468. Fleckner v. Bank of U. S. (8 Wheat. 3:^8), 360, 361. Fleming v. City of Appleton (S5 Wis. 90; 13 N. W. Rep. 463), 892. Fleming v. Springfield (154 Mass. 530), 1475, 1480. Ftemming v. Clark (£0 N. J. Law, ' 280), 1273. Fletcher v. Auburn R. Co. (35 Wend. 463), 1457. Fletcher u Inhabitants of Belfast (77 Me. 3^4), 975. Fletcher v. Lincolnville (30 Me. 439), 343, 344, 350, 1335. Fletcher v. Lowell (15 Gray, 103), 192. Fletcher v. Oshkosh (18 Wis. 229), 1171. Fletcher v. Peck (9 Cranch, 87). 741. Flewellen v. Proetzel (Tex., 15 S. W. Rep. 1043), 1160, 1170, 117!. Flint V. Webb (25 Minn. 93), 1164. Flint &c; R. Co. v. Detroit &c. R. Co. (64 Mich. 350), 1213. Flint River Dist. v. Kelley (55 Iowa, 568), 1330. Flood V. State (19 Tex. App. 584), 513, 1245. Flora V. Lee (5 111. App. 629), 543. Flora V. ^fifaney (111., 26 N. E. Rep. 645), 1595. Flora v., Sachs (64 Ind. 155), 532. Floral Springs W. Co. v. Rives (14 Nev. 434), 1587. Flori V. St. Louis (69 Mo. 341), 10, 149. Flournoy v. City (17 Ind. 109), 320, 695. Floyd Acceptances (7 Wall. 666), 207, 214, 966. Floyd V. Barker (13 Coke, 26), 216. Floyd V. Commissioners (14 Ga. 356), 548, 1258. ' Floyd V. Eatonton (14 Ga. 854), 539. Floyd V. Gilbreath (37 Ark. 675), 1568. 1576. Fluty V. School Dist. (49 Ark. 94 ; 4 S. W. Rep. 278), 612. Flynn r. Canton Company (40 Md. 813), 1201, 1441. . Flynn v. City of Boston (153 Mass. 373; 36 N. E. Rep. 868), 480. Flynn v. Hurd (118 N. Y. 19), 1438. Flynn v. Taylor (137 N. Y. 596), 1434. Fobes V. Rome &c. R. Co. (131 N. Y. 505), 1433. TABLE OP OASES. CXV [Tha references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1603.] Fogg V. Dummer (58 N. H. 505). 829. FosK V. Nahant (98 Mass. 578), 773. Foley V. City of Haverhill (144 Mass. 353), 1183. Foley V. Troy (45 Hun, 396), 1458, 1461. Folnier v. Curtis (86 Alfl,. 354; 5 So. Rep. 688). 1223. Folsom V. School Directors (91 111. 403). 833. Foltz V. Kerlin(105 Ind. 821), 189, 200. Fones Bros. Hardware Co. v. Erb (Ark., 17 S. W. Rep. 7). 878. Foot V. Howard County (1 McCrary, 218), 1373. Foot V. Prowse (1 Str. 635; 3 Bro. 169), 174. Foot V. Stiles (57 N. Y. 399). 695. Foote V. Board &o. (67 Miss. 156), 1510. Foote V. Brown (60 Miss. 155), 800. Foote V. Cincinnati (11 Ohio, 408), 67, 86, 133. Foote V. Hancock (15 Blatchf. 373), 985. Poote V. Howard County Court (4 McCrary, 218), 1K75. Foote V. Linck (5 McLean, 616), 1573. Foote V. Pike County (101 U. S. 688), 946. Popper V. Town of Wheatland (59 Wis. 623), 1483. Forbes v. Appletoa (5 Cush, 115), 1188. 1577. Force v. Batavia (61 111. 99), 375, 935. Forcey v. Caldwell (Pa., 9 Atl. Rep. 466), 214. Ford V. Booker (53 Ind. 39.5), 526. Ford V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (14 Wis. 609), 682. Ford V. Clough (8 Me. 334), 351, 353, 867. Ford V. McGregor (80 Nev. 446), 226, 227. Ford V. North Des Moines (80 Iowa, 626; 45 N. W. Eep. 1031). 63, 401, 407. 411, 1367. Ford V. School Dist. (Pa., 15 Atl. Rep. 818), 1324. Ford V. ThrailkiU (84 Ga. 169; 10 S. E. Rep. 600), ."593, 605, 1846. Ford V. Umatilla County (15 Oregon, 313), 1503. Foreman v. MEU-ianna (43 Ark. 384), 411. Forest County v. Langlade County (76 Wis. 605; 45 N. W. Eep. 598j, 437, 439. 453, 468. Forkes v. Borough of Sandy Lake (130 Pa. St. 133; 18 Atl. Rep. 609). 1500. 1503. Forks Township v. King (84 Pa. St. 230), 1494. Forman v. Town of Ellington (46 Hun, 40), 1445. Forshay v. Ferguson (5 Hill, 154), 1183. Forsyth v. Atlanta (45 Ga. 153), 776. Forsyth v. Dunnagan (94 Cal. 438), 1403. Forsyth v. Kreuter (100 Ind. 27), 1174, Forsythe v. Ellis (4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 398). 336. Fort V. Stiles (57 N. Y. 399), 312, Fort Dodge v. More (37 Iowa, 388), 1397. Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith (30 N. Y. 44). 568. Fort Scott V. Brothers (20 Kan, 455), 1198. Fort Smith v. Ayers (43 Ark. 88), 1030 Fort Smith v. Davis (57 Tex. 225), 1171. Fort Smith v. Dodson (46 Ark. 296), 536. Fort Wavne v. Breese (Ind., 33 N. E. Rop, 1038), 1491. Fort Wavne v. De Witt (47 Ind. 391), 1484." Fort Wayne v. Lehr (88 Ind. 68 ; 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 600), 230, 1398. Fort Wayne v. Shoa£E (106 Ind. 66), 1134. Fort Worth v. Crawford (64 Tex. 303 ; 53 Am. Rep. 753), 364, 760. Fortin v. Eastbarapton (145 Mass. 196; 13 N. E. Rep. 599). i476. Fortman v. State (Ind., JON. E. Rep. 94), 1340. Fortune v. St. Louis (33 Mo. 239), 1596. Fosdick V. Perrysburg (14 Ohio St. 473), 112, 468. 944, 1385. Foshay v. Glen Haven (85 Wis. 288), 1469. Foss V. City of Chicago (56 111. 354), 1074. Foss V. Crisp (80 Pick. 131), 141. Fossett V. Bearce (89 Me. 583), 353. Foster v. Clinton County (51 Iowa, 541), 745. Foster v. Coleman (10 Cal. 379), 634. Foster v. Fowler (60 Pa. St. 37), 4, 5, 1381. Foster v. Lane (30 N. H. 305), 13. Foster v. ScarflE (15 Ohio St. 533), 353 375 Foulk V. McCartney (48 Kan. 695), 1348. Fountain County v. Warren County (Ind., 87 N. E. Rep. 133), 1434. . Fowle V. Alexandria (3 Peters, 398), 10, 97, 777, 1282, 1468. cxvx TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-78S; Vol. n, pp. ?89-1605.] Fowler v. Atkinson (6 Minn. 579), 213. Fowler v. Beebe (9 Mass. 231), 200, 1265. Fowler v. Pirkins. 77 111. 271), 1532. Foxworthy v. Citv of Hastings (35 V Neb. 133; 41 N. W. Rep. 132), 1450, 1462. Fox V. Drake (8 Cowen, 191), 212. Fox V. Ellison (43 Minn. 41 ; 44 N. W. Rep. 671). 1261. Fox V. Fort Edward (48 Hurd, 363), 93. Fox V. New Orleans (12 La. Ann. 154), 253. Fox V. Shipman (19 Mich. 218), 819. Fox V. Sloo(10 La.' Ann. 11). 353,709. Fox V, State (3 Tex. App. 329), 1250. Fox V. State of Ohio (5 How. 433), 604. Fractional School Dist. v. Boards of Inspectors (63 Mich. 611), 1336. Fractional School Dist. v. Mallory (23 Mich. Ill), 819. Francis v. Howard County (50 Fed. Rep. 44). 796, 843. Francis v. Railroad Co. (70 111. 238), 1456. Frank, Ex parte (52 Cal. 606), 518, 530, 531, 608. Frank «. San Francisco (21 Cal. 668), 97. Fraiike v. Paducah &c. Co. (88 Ky. 467), 383. 130S. Frankel v. City of New York (2 N. Y. Supl. 294), 1462. Frankfort v. Aughe (114 Ind. 77), 516. Frankfort v. Winterport (54 Me. 250), 668, 825. Franklin v. Cromwell (Dal. 95), 487. Franklin v. Harter (1:27 Ind. 446; 26 N. E. Rep. 882), 1470. Franklin v. Mayberry (6 Humph. 368), 1123, 1135. Franklin v. Westfall (27 Kan. 614), 528. Franklin's Estate, In re (Pa., 1892; 24 Atl. Rep. 626), 563. Franklin Bank v. Cooper (36 Me. 179). 323. Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood (14 Ga. 80). 50. Franklin County v. County of Henry (36 111. App. 193), 976, 988. Franklin County v. Laymiin (34 111. App. 606), 797. Franklin County Comra'ra v. La- throp (9 Kan. 453), 634. Franklin Co. Court v. Bank (87 Ky. 370), 1396. Franklin Tp. v. Lebanon Tp. -(51 N. J. Law, 93; 16 Atl. Rep. 184), 981. Franklin Wharf Co. v. Portland (67 Me. 46), 7T2. Frantz v. Jacob (Ky., 11 S, W. Rep. 654), 796. Frazee's Case (63 Mich. 396; 30 N. W. Rep. 72), 105, 107, 489, 518, 530, 1334, 1349. Frazer v. Lewiston (76 Me. 531), 156. Frederick v. Augusta (5 Ga. 561), 941, 1393. Frederick v. Groshen (30 Md. 486),'i 1583. FrI&holders &c; v. State (24 N. J. Law, 718), 274, 277. Freeholders &c. ■;;, Strader (18 N. J. Law, 108), 9. Freeman v. Davis (7 Mass. 200), 313. Freeman v. Howe (34 How. 450), 334. Freeman v. Otis (9 Mass. 272 ; 6 Am. Dec. 66), 213, 215. Freemansburg v. Rodgers (Pa., 8 Atl. Rep. 873), 1143. Freemont Bldg. Ass'n v. Sherwin (6 Neb. 48), 931. Freeport v. Board of Supervisors (41 111. 495), 976. Freeport v. Isbell (83 111. 440), 232, 364, 1468, 1471. Freeport v. Marks (59 Pa. St. 253), 215. 533, 940. Freeport Water-works Co.'s Appeal (129 Pa. St. 605; 18 Atl. Rep. 560), 1301. Freese v. Woodruff (37 N. J. Law, . 139), 1385. Freetown v. Comm'rs (9 Pick. 46), 705. 1591. Fremont v. Boling (11 Cal. 380), 1190. Fremont &c. R. Co. v. Brown Countv (18 Neb. 516 ; 26 N. W. Rep. 194), 445, French v. Benton (44 N. H. 28), 989. French v. Boston (129 Mass. 593), 264, 769. French v. Burlington (42 Iowa, 614), 832. , French v. Common Council &c. (Mich., 48 N. W. Rep. 174), 1511, 1541. French v. Quincy (3 Allen, 9), 663. French v. Spalding (61 N. H. 395), 350. French v. Teschemaker (24 Cal. 518), 933. Frenchtown Township v. Monroo County (89 Mich. 204). 1429. Frey v. Michie (68 Mich, 323), 1563. Friday v. Floyd (63 III. 50), J 223. Friend v. Hamill (34 Md. 298), 218. Fries V. Brier (111 Ind. 65), 1178. Friesner v. Common Council &G. (Mich., 52 N. W, Rep. 19), 554. TABLE OF OASES. CXVll PThe references are to pages: Vol. !Frith t>. Dubuque (45 Iowa, 403), 264. Fritsch v, Allegheny (91 Pa. St. 236), 1468. Frommer v. Richmond (31 Gratt. 646), 1370. Frosh V. Galveston (Tex., 11 S. W. Rep. 403), 1173. Frost V. Beekman (1 Johns. Ch. 288), 225. Frost V. Belmont (6 Allen, 153), 647. Frost V. Cherry (Pa., 15 Atl. Rep. 782), 561. Frost V. Flick (1 Dak. 131). 1568. Frost V. Inhabitants of Belfast (6 Al- len, 152), 668. Frost V. Leatherman (55 Hich. 38), 1171. Frost V. Mayor of Chester (5 El. & B. 531), 1523. • Frostburg v. Duflfy (70 Md. 47; 16 Atl. Rep. 643), 1096, 1099. Fry V. Albemarln County (86 Va, 1951, 744, 745. Fry V. Lexington (3 Met. 314), 943. Fuhrman v. Huntsville (54 Ala. 363), 539 FuUam' v. Brookfleld (9 Allen, 1), 363. Fuller V. Atlanta (66 Ga. 80). 677. Fuller V. Colfax County (Neb., 50 N. W. Ren. 1044), 883. Fuller V. Groton (11 Gray, 340), 368, 663, 664. Fuller V. Hampton (5 Conn. 417), 150 155 Fuller V. Heath (89 111. 296), 801, 849, 1064. Fuller V. Mayor &c. (83 Mich. 480; 46 N. W. Rep. 731). 1198. Fuller V. Morrison County (36 Minn. 309), 1371, 1383. Fuller V. Mower (81 Me, 380; 17 Atl. Rep. 313), 917. FuUerton v. Spring (3 Wis. 667), 539. Fulliam v. Muscatine City (70 Iowa, 436), 1495. Fulton V Cummins (Ind., 30 N. E. Rep. 949), 554. Fultan V. Davenport (17 Iowa, 404), 1366. Fulton V. Lincoln (9 Neb. 358), 360, 1171. Fulton County v. Lucas County (3 Ohio St. 508), 453. Fulton Street, In re (29 How. Pr. 439), 1079. Fulweiler v. St. Louis (fil Mo. 479), 13U1. Furman v. Nichol (8 Wall. 44), 94. Furman Street, In re (17 Wend. 649), 699, 701, 1151. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-160S.] G. Gabel v. Houston (39 Tex. 336), 1244. Gaddis v. Richland County (92 111, 119), 982, 935. Gage V. Currier (4 Pick. 399), 237. Gage V. Dudlev (64 N. H. 437), 1393. Gage V. Evans (90 III. 509), 1189. Gage V. Graham (57 111. 144), 1383, 1572. Gage V. Hornellsville (106 N. Y. 667; 13 N. E. Rep. 817), 8S5. 1598. Gage County v. Fulton (16 Neb. 5), 974. Gainesville v. Caldwell (81 Ga. 76), 1589. Galatian v. Gardner (7 Johns.' 106): 1414. Oalbraith v. Littiech (73 111. 209), 1269. Galbreath v. Newton (30 Mo. App. 380), 1175. Gale V. Village of Kalamazoo (23 Mich. 344; 9 Am. Rep. 80), 283, 568, 613, 683, 638, 665, 1332, 1244. Galena v. Amy (5 Wall. 705), 1372, 1373. Galena v. Corwith (48 III. 433; 95 Am. Dec. 557), 937, 959. Galesburg v. Hawkinson (75 111. 156), 13, 96, 393, 1368. Galesburg v. Searles (114 111. 317; 29 N. E. Rep. 686), 1086, 1087, 1187, 1363. Galesburg Ed. Board v. Arnold (113 III. 11), 1343. Gall V. Cincinnati (18 Ohio St. 563), 1344. Gallagher v. St. Paul (38 Fed. Rep. 305), 1463. Galline v. Lowell (144 Mass. 491), 1449. Galloway v. Corbitt (53 Mich. 460), 1576. Gallup V. Tracy (25 Conn. 10), 396. Gallup V. Woodstock (29 Vt, 347), 681. Galveston r. Devlin (Tex., 19 S. W. Rep. 395), 716. Galveston v. Hemmis (73 Tex. 558), 1499. Galveston v. Morton (53 Tex. 409), 71 3. Galveston v. Posnainsky (63 Tex. 118; 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 484), 9, 10*13, 265, 366, 768. Galveston &c. Ry. Co. v. G. 0. S. Ry. Co. (63 Tex. 539), 1205. Galveston City Co. v, Galveston (56 ' Tex. 486). 844. Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston (63 Tex. 14), 1897, cxvm TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-160!!.] Galveston Wharf Co. v. Gulf &o. Rv. Co. (Tex., 17 S. W. Eep. 57), 1216. Galway v. Metropolitan El. R. Co. (128 N. Y. 133), 1433. Gamble v. Marion County (Iowa, 52 .N. W. Rep. 556), 894. Game well Fire Alarm Tel. Co. v. Mayor &c. (31 Fed. Rep. 313i, 887. Gans V. The City (102 Pa. St. 97), 1057. Garden City v. Abbott (34 Kan. 283), 1332. Gardiner v. Gardiner (5 Me. 133), 1351, 1359. Gardner, Matter of (68 N. Y. 467), 1533. Gardner v. City of Newbern (N. C, 3 S. E. Rep. 500), 853. Gardner v. Haney (86 Ind. 17), 941, 1379. Gardner v. People (20 111. 430), 1241. Gardner v. State (21 N. J. Law, 557), 185S. Gardner v. Village of Newburgh (2 Johns. Ch. 161), 686, 688, 670. Garfield v. Douglass (23 111. 100), 218. Gargan v. Louisville &c. R. Co. (89 Ky. 312), 1141, 1143, 1423. Garland v. Denver (11 Colo. 534; 19 Pac. Eep. 960), 541. Garland v. Dover (19 Me. 441), 983. Garland v. Jackson (7 La. Ann. 68), 1330. Garlinghouse v. Jacobs (29 N. Y. 297), 231. Garrand County Court v. Bayle County Court (10 Bush (Ky.), 208), 1434. Garrard v. Davis (53 Mo. 332), 335. Garrett v. City of St. Louis (25 Mo. 505), 1135. Garside v. City of Cohoes (13 N. Y. Supl. 192; 58 Hun. 605)> 167. Garty v. Deeming (61 Conn. 423), 1263. Garvie v. City of Hartford (54 Conn. 440; 7 Atl. Rep. 723). 185. Garvin v. Daussman (114 Ind. 429), 1178, 1180. Garvin v. Wells (8 Iowa, 286), 90, 541. Garza, Ex parte (28 Tex. App. 381 ; 19 Am. St. Rep. 845), -116, 117, 118, 1233. Gfas 'Co. V. City of Des Moines (44 Iowa, 505), 1336. Gas Co. V. Parkersburg (30 West Va. 435 ; 4 S. E. Rep. 650), 568. Gas Co. V. San Francisco (6 Cal. 190),- 484,485. Gas Co. V. San Franciscq (9 Cal. 469), 711. Gaskill V. Dudley (6 Met. 346), 150, 345. 915, 1376. Gaskins v. Atlanta (73 Ga. 746), 1468. Gas Light Co. v. City of Saginaw (38 Fed. Rep. 539), 567. Gas Light Co. v. Donnelly (93 N. Y. 557), 714. Gas Light Co. v. Middletown (59 N. Y. 838), 566, 1318. Gas Light Co. v. New Orleans (41 La. Ann. 91), 633. Gaston v. Babcook (9 Wis. 503), 437. GSstwiler v. Willis (33 Cal. 11), 1141. Gatch V. City of Des Moines (63 Iowa. 718), 1180. Gate.i V. Delaware County (18 Iowa, 405), 203. Gates V. Hancock (45 N. H. 588), 360. Gates V. School Dist. (58 -'Vrk. 468 ; 14 S. W. Rep. 656), 811. Gatlin v. Tarboro(78N. O. 119), 1356, 1370. Gaughaa v. Philadelphia (119 Pa. St. 503; 13 Atl. Rep. 300), 1449. Gause v. Clarksville (5 Dill. 165), 631, 633, 795, 923, 960. Gaussen v. United States (97 U. S. 584), 320, 321. Gay V. Bradstreet (49 Me. 580), 1193. Gay V. Cambridge (128 Mass. 387), 1481. Gaylord v. City of New Britain (Conn., 20 Atl. Rep. 365), 1199. Gear v. Dubuque &o. R. Co. (20 Iowa, 523). 698. Gearhart v. Dixon (1 Pa. St. 824), 1171, 1368, 1370, 1391. Geist's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 351), 1115. Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1 Wall. 175), 927, 933, 947, 955. 956, 958, 959, 1373. Gemmil v. Arthur (125 Ind. 858< 25 N. E. Rep. 358), 895. Genesee &c. Bank v. Livingston (53 Barb. 233), 1575. G«nesee School Dist. v. McDonald (98 Pa. St. 444), 1330. Genesee Township v. McDonald (98 Pa. St. 441), 878. Genet v. Brooklvn (99 N. Y 396), 1124. Geneva u Cole (61 111. 397), 70, 1558; Genois, Mayor &o. v. Lockett (13 La. 545). 195. Genovese v. Mavor (55 N. Y. Super. Ct. 397), 1141. Gentle v. Board «&c. (73 Mich. 40; 40 N. W. Rep. 928), 277, 1336. George v. Dean (47 Tex. 73). 1571. George v. Mendon (6 Met. 497). 1335. George v. Oxford Township (16 Kan. 72), 937, 966. TABLE OF CASES. OXIX [The references are to pages: Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] George v. School Dlst. (6 Met. 497), 348, 349, 361, 3H6. George's Creek Coal Co, v. New Central (40 Md. 425), 690. Georgetown College v. District of Columbia(4MacArthur, 43), 1577. Georgia v. Atkins (35 Ga. 815), 19. 740. Georgia v. Savannah (Dud. 132), 1359. Georgia «. Stanton (6 Wall. 65), 19. Georgia State Building & Loan Ass'n V. Owens (88 Ga. 224 ; 14 S. E. Rep. 210), 1260. Gerald v. Boston (108 Mass. 580), 1498. Gerber v. Ackley (33 Wis. 233), 335. Gerberling v. Winnenberg (51 Iowa, 125), 1407. Gere v. Supervisors of Cayuga (7 How. Pr. 255), 991. Gerhard v. Comm'rs (15 R. I. 334; 5 Atl. Rep. 199), 1195. Gerken v. County of Sibley (39 Minn. 433; 40 N. W. Rep. 508), 855. German- American Bank v. Brenham (35 Fed. Rep. 185), 924. German Sav. Bank v. Franklin County (138 U. S. 526), 939. Gerrard v. Omaha &c. R. Co. (14 Neb. 370), 690. Gerrish v. Brown (51 Me. 256). 773. Getchell v. Benton (Neb., 47 N. W. Rep. 468), 931. Getchell v. Wells (55 Me. 434), 361. Gibbons v. Railroad Co. (36 Ala. 410), 933. Gibbons v. iTnited States (8 Wall. 269). 741. Gibbs V. Comm'ra (19 Pick. 298), 1576. Gibbs V. School Dist. (Mich., 50 N. W. Rep. 294). 949. Giboney v. Cape Girardeau (58 Mo. 141), 1365, 1367.. Gibson V. Bailey (9 N. H. 168), 350, 353, 374, 1272. Gibson v. District of Columbia (116 U. S. 404), 1353. Gibson v. Keyser (16 Mo. App. 404), 1161. Gibson v. Mason (5 Nev. 283). 159. Giekey v. Merrill f67 Wis. 459), 647. Gifford V. Railroad Co. (10 N. J. Eq. 171), 046. Gififord V. Town of White Plains (25 Hun, 606), 829. Gilbert v. Board of Education (45 Kan. 31; 35 Pac. Rep. 236; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 399), 318, 865. Gilbert v. Hebard (8 Met. 129). 1594. Gilbert v. Luce (11 Barb. 91), 303. Gilchrist's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 600), 1350. Gilchrist v. Little Rock (1 Dill. 261), 956. Gilchrist v. Schmidling (13 Kan. 263), 536, 1323. Gildersleeve v. Board of Education (17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 201), 273, 307. Giles V. School Dist. (31 N. H. 304), 13, ^44, 1336. Gilhara v. Bank (3 Scam. 245), 385. Gilham v. Wells (64 Ga. 192), 518, 597 Gill V. Brown (13 Johns. 385), 313. Gillan v. Hutchinson (10 Cal. 153), 704. Gillespie v. Brooks (3 Redf. Sur. 363), 1066. Gillespie v. McGowan (100 Pa. St. 144), 765. Gillett V. Logan County (67 111. 256), 286. Gillett V. McGonigal (80 Wis. 158), 1416. Gillette ix Denver (31 Fed. Rep. 822), 1180, 1185. Gillette v. Hartford (31 Conn. 351), 395, 1363, 1365. Gilliam County v. Wasco County (14 Or. 535; 13 Pac. Rep. 324), 462. Gillmore v. Lewis (12 Ohio, 281), 667. Gilluly V. Madisou (63 Wis. 518), 365, 534, 767. Oilman v. Contra Costa County (8 Cai. 52), 1595. ' Oilman v. Deerfield (15 Gray, 577), 1495. Oilman v. Hoyt (4 Pick. 358), 353. Oilman v. Milwaukee (61 Wis. 588), 549. Oilman v. Philadelphia (3 Wall. 713), 758, 1433. Oilman v. School Diat. (18 N. H. 315), 908. Oilman v. Sheboygan (2 Black, 510), 1369, 1381, 1399. Gilmanton v. Sanbornton (56 N. H. 336), 994. Gilmer v. Laconia (55 N. H. 130), 9, 265. Gilmer v. Lime Point (19 Cal. 47), 692. Gilmore v. City of Utica (131 N. Y. 26; 29 N. E. Rep. 841), 378, 286, 1125, 1126, 1174,1176. Gilmore v. Hentig (33 Kan. 156), 1073. Gilmore v. Holt (4 Pick. 358), 353. Gilmore v. Norton (10 Kan. 491), 61. Gilroy v. School Dist. (17 Oregon, 533), 1343. Gilson V. Board &c. (138 Ind. 65; 27 N. E. Rep. 335), 1534. cxx TABLE OF OASES. [Tbo references are to pages: Tol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Gimbel v. Stolte (59 Ind. 446), 691, 1419. Glrard v. Philadelphia (7 Wall. 1), 94, 97, 109. 391, 893, 406, 480, 563, 1366. Girard's Will, In re (3 La. Ann. 898), .563. Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch Brew- ing Ass'n (11 Mo. 508; 13 S. W. Eep. 7071, 589. Glasgov7 V. Rowse (43 Mo. 479), 1356, 1369, 1870. Glasgow V. St. Louis (107 Mo. 198; 17 S. W. Rep. 743), 757, 784, 1193, 1195, 1433. Glasier v. Town of Hebron (131 N. Y. 450). 771, 1438, 1473. Glass V. Ashbury (49 Cal. 571), 553. Gleason v. City of Boston (144 Mass. 38; ION. K. Rep. 476), 995. Gleason v. Soper (24 Pick. 181), 705. Glencoe v. People i78 III. 883), 1538. Glidden v. Reading (38 Vt. 58), 1500. Globe &c. Mills v. Bilbrough (19 N. Y. Supl. 176), 1253, 1355. Gloucester v, 0.sborn (1 H. L. Cas. 385), 563. Gloucester County* v. Middlesex County (Va., 14 S. E. Rep. 660), 1430. Glover v. City of Terre Haute (Ind., 39 N. E. Rep. 413), 401, 405. Goddard, In re Petition of (16 Pick. 504). 117, 513, 539, 1096, 1138, 1301, 1311, 1830. Goddard v. Boston (20 Pick. 407), 118. Goddin v. Crump (8 Leigh (Va.), ISO), 933. Goeltz V. Town of Ashland (75 Wis. 642), 1451. Goetchens v. Matthewson (61 N. Y. 480), 318. Goetler v. State (45 Ark. 454), 1333. Goettman v. Mayor &c. (6 Hun, 132), 201. Goetzman v. Whitaker (Iowa, 46 N. W. Rep. 1058), 895. Goff V. Frederick (44 Md. 67), 110. Goforth V. Construction Co. (96 N. C. 535). 938. Going V. Dunwiddie (86 Cal. 633), 218. Goldman v. Conway County (10 Fed. Rep. 888), 908. Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Comm'rs (L. R. 1 Eq. 161), 765. Goldwaite v. City Council &o, (50 Ala. 486). 541. Gonzales u. City of Galveston (Tex., 19 S. W. Rep. 284), 1323. Gooch V. Association &,c. (109 Mass. 558), 768, 1380, 1381. Goodale v. Brocknbr (61 How. Pr. 451). 1004. Goodale v. Fennel! (27 Ohio St. 426), 1378 1381 Goodale v. Lawrence (88 N. Y. 513), 1000. Goodel V. Baker (8 Cowen, 286), 357. Goodenough v. Buttrick (7 Mass. 140), 5881. Goodfellow V. New York (100 N. Y. 15), 781. X Goodhue v. Beloit (31 Wis. 636), 433. GSodin v. Canal Co. (18 Ohio St. 169), 1151. Goodin v. City of Des Moines (55 Mich. 67; 7 N. W. Rep. 411), 1313. Goodman V. Simonds (30 How. 343), 957. Good now V. Ramsey County (11 Minn. 31), 891. Goodrich v. Brown (30 Iowa, 291), 90, 541, 1255. Goodtitle v. Alker (1 Burr. 183), 673. Goodwin v. C. & W. Canal Co. (18 Ohio St. 169). 701. Goodwin v. Roberts (L. R. 1 App. Cas. 476), 957. Goodyear v. School Dist. (17 Oregon, 517), 1342. Goose River Bank v. Willow Lake School Tp. (No. Dak., 44 N. W. Rep. 1003), 643, 919, 1338, 1343. Gordon v. Baltimore (5 Gill (Md.), 831), 1359. Gordon i'. Cornes (47 N. Y. 608), 1169, 1363, 1389. Gordon v. City of Richmond (83 Va. 486: 2 S. E. Rep. 737), 1447, 1491, 1493, 1496. Gordon v. Clifford (28 N. H. 403), 854. Gordon v. Court (3 How. 133), 1359. Gorgier v. Millville (3 Barn. & C. 45), 957. Gorham v. Gross (135 Mass. 333), 767. Gorham v, Springfield (21 Me. 59), 63, 67, 88. 393, 1366. Goring v. McTaggart (93 Ind. 200), on, 1190, 1574. Gorman v. Sinking Fund Comm'rs (25 Fed. Rep. 647), 958. Gormley v. Day .(114 111. 185; 28 N. E. Rep. 693), 527, 1511. Gorton v. Erie R. Co. (45 N. Y. 660), 1502. Goshen v. Croxton (34 Ind. 389), 539 Goshen v. England (119 Jnd. 868), 1486. Goshen v. Hillsborough (46 N. H. 189), 1005. TABLE OF CASES. CXZl [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Goshen v. Kern (63 Ind. 468), 541. Goshen v. Myers (119 Ind. 196; 31 N. E. Rep. 657), 1427. Goshen Township v. Shoemaker (18 Ohio St. 624), 981. Gosling u Veley (4 H. L. Cas. 679; 12 Q. B. 328; 19 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 135), 106, 169, 294, 380, 386, 483, 518. GoEselink v. Campbell (4 Iowa, 296), 536. 1025, 1§23, 1224. Goasigi v. New Orleans (41 La. Ann. 522), 1244. Goszler v. Georgetown (6 Wheat. 595), 579, 779. Gottsch'alk v. Becher(Neb.i 49 N. W. Rep. 71.5), 403, 404, 407. Gough V. Dorsey (37 Wis. 119), 437. Gould V. City of Rochester (105 N. T. 46; 12 N. E. Rep. 375). 1086. Gould V. Glass (19 Barb. 179). 200. Gould V. Mayor &c. (59 Md. 378), 1066. Gculd V. Paris (68 Tex. 511: 17 Am. & Eng Corp. Oas. 340). 843. Gould V. Sterling (23 N. Y. 456), 937, 933, 935, 952, 1390. Gould V. Topeka (32 Kan. 485 ; 4 Pao. Rep. 833), 1198, 1436. Gove V. Epping (41 N. H. 539). 664. Governors. Allen (8 Humph. (Tenn.) 176), 313. Governor v. Dodd (81 111. 162), 219. Governor v. Gibson (14 Ala. 326), S24. Governor v. Hancock (2 Ala. 728), 335. Governor v. Humphreys (7 Jones (N. C), 258), 313. Governor v. McEwen (5 Humph. (Tenn.) 241), 477. Governor v. Perrine (23 Ala. 807), 331, 337. Governor v. Ridgeway (3 111. 14), 320. Governor v. Robbins (7 Ala. 79), 336, 330. Gowen v. Philadelphia Exchange Co. (5 Watts & S. 141), 1408. Goyne v. Ashley County (31 Ark. 552), 895. Gozzler v. Georgetown (6 Wheat. 597), 1219. Grable v. Roderick (28 Neb. 50.5), 1534. Graf V. City of St. Louis (8 Mo. App. 562), 692. Graflf V. Mayor &o. of Baltimore (10 Md. 544), 697, 693, 11:20. Graffty v. City of Rushville (107 Ind. 502), 608, 1235. Grafton Bank v. Kimball (20 N. H. 107), 373. Graham v. City of Greenville (67 Tex. 63; a S. W. Rep. 742), 64, 405, 408, 1366. Graham v. flartnell (10 Neb. 518), 1413. Graham v. State (1 Pike (Ark.), 171), 1253. Graham v. Washington County (9 DanafKy.), 184). 320. Gram v. Village of Greenbush (3 N. Y. Supl. 76), 1458. Granby v. Thurston (38 Conn. 416), 109, 915. Grand Chute v. Winegar (15 Wall. 371), 947.. Grand Gulf &o. R. Co. v. Buck (53 Mis-i. 246), 1361. Grand Island Gas Co. v. West (28 Neb. 853: 45 N. W. Rep. 243), 1316. Grand Rapids v. Blakely (40 Mich. 367). 341, 343, 15B7. Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. (58 Mich. 641), 693. 1196, 1313. Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. (66 Mich. 43; 33 N. W. Rep. 15), 1196, 1313, 1399. Grand Rapids v. Hughes (15 Mich, 54). 530. Grand Rapids v. Widdicorab (Mich., 53 N. VV. Rep. 635), 1077. Grand Rapids v. Wyman (46 Mich. 5:6), 1474, 1480. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. v. Alley (34 Mich. 16). 691. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co, v. Gray (38 Mich. 461), 1255, 1359, 1361. Grand Rapids &o. R. Co. v. Sanders (54 How. Pr. 314), 957. Grand Rapids E. L. & P. Co. v. Grand Rapids E. E. L. & F. Gas Co. (33 Fed. Rep. 659), 615. Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jar- vis (SO Mich. 320), 674. Grand Rapids St. Ry. Co. v. West Side St. Ry. Co. (48 Mich; 433), fi80. Grandville v. Jenison (84 Mich. 54), 1413. Granger v. Pulaski County (26 Ark. 37). 15. Grant v. Common Council (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 997), 1119. 1539. Grant v. Davenport (36 Iowa, 396), 646, 839, 870. 1360. Grant v. Erie (69 Pa. St. 420), 264, 775. Grant County v. Lake County (17 Oregon, 453; 31 Pac. Rep. 447), 833. Grantlaud v. Memphis (12 Fed. Rep. 387), 435. cxxu TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Granville v. Southampton (138 Mass. 356), 985. Grave v. Fort Wayne (45 Ind. 439), ' 1466. Gravel Hill School Dist. v. Old Farms School Dist. (55 Conn. 344), 1333. Graves v. Citv of Bloomington (17 111. App. 4' 1), 1036. Graves v. Ctolby (9 Ad. & El. 356\ 531. Graves v. Cole (3 Dak. 301), 348. •Graves v. Jasper School Tp. (So. Dak.. 50 N. W. Eep. 904), 13BR. Graves v. Lebanon Nat. Bank (10 Bush (Ky.), 33; 19 Am. Eep. 50), 323. Gray v. Baynard (5 Del. Cb. 499), 618. Gray v. Board of Aldermen (Mass., 31 N. E. Rep. 784), 1101. Grav V. Brooklvn (3 Abb. App. Dee. 367), 95, 109. • Gray v. Brooklyn (10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 186), 784. Gray i'. Granger (R. I., 21 Atl. Rep. 343^, 176. Gray v. State (2 Harr. (Del.) 376), 1260. Grayson's Appeal (140 Pa. St. 250; 21 Atl. Rep. 3!)4), 457. Grayson v. Latham (84 Ala. 546; 4 So. Rep. 300), 907, 909, 913. Great Barrington v. Comra'rs (16 I Pick. 572), 1351. Great Barrington v, Lancaster (14 Mass. 253), 446. Great Falls Mfg. Co. v, Worster (45 N. H. 110), 993. Great Western Ry. Co. v. North Cavuga, In re (23 Upper Can. C. P. 28), 525, 527. Greeley v. Ham man (13 Colo. 94), 544, 545, 1266, 1267. Greeley v. Jacksonville (17 FJa. 174), 113, 525. Greeley v. Passaic (43 N. J. Law, \ 87), 538. Greeley v. People (60 111. 19), 662, 1034. Green, Eoe parte (Cal., 39 Pac. Eep. 783), 533. Green v. Buckfield (8 Greenl. (Me.) 136), 983. Green v. Burke (23 Wend. 490). 200. Green v. Cape May (41 N. J. Law, 45). 485, 640, 1032. Green v. City of Springfield (180 III. 515), 1170. • Green u. County of Richland (27 S. C. 9; 3 S. E. Rep. 618). 889, 898. Green v. Durham (1 Burr. 131), 290, 298. Green v. Dyersburg (2 Flip. (U. S.) 477), 934, 906. Green v. Harrison County (61 Iowa, 311; 16 N. W. Rep. 136). 1015. Green V. Hotaling (44 N. J. Law, 347), 1161, 1397. Green v. Indianapolis (22 Ind. 193), 541. Green v. Indianapolis (25 Ind. 490), 1268. Green v. Miller (6 Johns. 39), 296. Giieen v. Morris &c. R. Co. (1 Beas. (N. J ) 165), 953. Green v. Muraford (5 R. L 472), 1568, 1509, 1573. Green v. Rutherford (1 Ves. 462), 563. Green v. Savannah (R. M, Charlt. (Ga.) 368). 1351, 1356. Green v. Spencer (67 Iowa, 410), I 1485. Green v. State (73 Cal. 29), 20. Green v. Tacoma City (51 Fed. Rep. 622), 779. Green v. Ward (83 Va. 334), 1160, 1161, 1181, 1183. Green v. Wardwell (17 111. 278), 810. Green Bay v. Brauns (50 Wis. 204), 301. 497. Green Bav Canal Co. v. Water-Power Co. (70 Wis. 635; 35 N. W. Rep. 529), 663. Green Township. In re (9 Watts & .S. (Pa.) 22). 415. Greenbanks v. Boutwell (48 Vt. 207), 351, 358, 365, 663. Greenburg v. Corwin (58 Ind. 518), 539. Greenburg Borough v. Laii-d (138 Pa. St. 533; 21 Atl. Rep. 96), 1120. Greencastle Township v. Black (5 Ind. 557), 412. Greene v. Town of Canaan (29 Conn. 157), 1406. Greene Countv v. Boswell (Ind., 30 N. E. Rep." 534). 761. Greene Countv v. Eubanks (80 Ala. 204), 15, 16. Greenfield v. Cushraan (16 Mass. 393), 1005. Greepfleld d. Wilson (18 Gray, 384), 335. Greensburg v. Young (53 Pa. St. 219), 1166. Greenville County v. Runion (9 S. C. 1), 868. Greenville Water-works Co. v. City of Greenville (Miss., 7 So, Rep. 409), 572, 635, 1397. Greenwood v. Freight Co. (105 IT. S. 13), 1103, 1130. Greenwood v. Louisville (13 Bush, 326), 264. TABLt; OF OASES. cxxni [Tbe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Greenwood v. State (6 Bax. 567), 604. Greer v. Rowley (1 Pittsb. Bep. 1), 1596. Gregg V. Jamison (55 Pa. St. 468), 198. Gregory, Ex parie (20 Tex. App. 210), 1234. Gregory v. Adams (14 Gray, 242), 1432. Gregory v. Bridgeport (41 Conn. 76 ; 19 Am. Rep. 485), 283, 286, 664. Gregory v. Brooks (37 Conn. S), '-'19. Gregory v. Brown (4 Bibb (Ky.), 28), 218. Gregory v. Burk (35 Alb. L. J. 278), 1096. Gregory v. Mavor &c. of New York (113 N. Y."416 ; 23 N. Y. St. Rep. 703), 183, 620. Gregory v. Small (39 Ohio St. 846), 218, 219. Grenada County v. Brogden (112 U. S. 261), 638, 639, 941. Greyatoc^, In re 02 Upper Can. Q. B. 458), 533. Gribble v. Sioux City (38 Iowa, 390), 1495. Grider v. Tally (77 Ala. 423; 54 Am. Rep. 65), 219, 320. Gi-idley v. Bloomington (68 111. 47), 1449. Gridley v. Bloomington (88 III. 554), 1160, 1199, 1441. Grier v. Shackelford (3 Brevard (S. C). 190), 164. Griffin v. Mayor of New York (9 N. Y. 456), 263, 785, 1080.' Griffin V. Rising (11 Met. 339), 237. Griffith V. Carter (8 Kan. 565), 1351. Griffith V. Cochran (5 Binn. 87), 1530. Griffith V. County of Sebastian (49 Ark. 24; 3 S. W. Rep. 896), 1587. Griffith V. Crawford County (20 Ohio, 609), 933. Griffith V. Watson (19 Kan. £6), 1351. Griggs V. St. Croix Co. (.27 Fed. Rep. 333),- 1340. Grimes v. Hamilton County (37 Iowa, 290). 654. 656. Grimmell v. Des Moines (57 Iowa, 144), 1185. Grimmet v. Askew (48 Ark. 151 ; 2 S. W. Rep. 707), 274. Grimsleyu. State (119 Ind. 130; 17 N. E. Rep. 928), 864. Grindley v. Barker (I Bos. & Pull. 229), 296. Groflf V. City of Philadelphia (Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 1048), 1148. Grogan v. San Francisco (18 Cal. 590), 48, 239, 625, '626. Gro?an v. Town of Hay ward (4 Fed. Rep. 161), 1143. Grogan v. Worcester (140 Mass. 227), 1482. Grondin v. Logan (Mich., 50 N. W. Rep. 130). 1512. Gross' Appeal (18 Atl. Rep. 557), 69. Gross V. City of Lampasas (Tex,, 11 S. W. Rep. 1086), 1098. Grove v. City of Fort Wayne (45 Ind. 439; 15 Am. Rep. 263). 1048. Grove Street. In re (61 Cal. 438), 694. Giover v. Huokins (26 Mich. 476), 529, 537, 1035. Gi'over V. Pembroke (11 Allen, 89), 848, 368. Groves v. Lebanon Nat. Bank (10 Bus^h (Ky.), 23), 323. Grumon v. Raymond (1 Conn. 40), 339. Grundv V. Hughes (8 111. App. 41), 1003. Grusenmeyer v. Citv of Logansport (76 Iiid. 549), 1038, 1524. Gubasko v. New York (1 N.,Y. Supl. 215), 147"). Guenther i>. Whiteacre (24 Mich. 504), 339. Guernsey v. Burlington Township (4 Dillon, 372), 931. Guerrero, In re (69 Cal. 88), 505, 1390. Guest V. City of Brooklyn (69 N. Y. 506). 1)31, 1571. Guild V. Chicago (83 111. 472), 95, 109. Guilford v.. Supervisors (13 N. Y. 143), 1371. Guilford v. Supervisors &c. (18 Barb. 61.i), 1371. Guillotte V. New Orleans (12 La. Ann. 433). 537. Guldin V. Schuylkill County (Pa. C. P., 48 Phila. Leg. Int. 197), 179. Gulf &c. R. Co. V. Gasscamp (69 Tex. 545), 1493. Gulf &c. R. Co. V. Miami County (12 Kan. 230), 936. Gulf City St. Ry. Co. v. Galveston City Ry. Co. (65 Tex. 502), 1216. Gulf R. Co. V. Black (32 Ind. 468), 1571. Gulick V. New (14 Ind. 93), 192, 262, 387, 1536. Gunn V. Barry (15 Wall. 610), 944. Guhn V. City of Macon (84 Ga. S65i 1232. Gunn's Adm'r v. Pulaski County (3 Ark. 427), 1376. Gunter v. City ofFfiyetteville (Ark., 19 S. W. Rep. 577), 409, 411. Gurley v. New Orleans (41 La, Ann. 75; 5 So. Rep. 659), 230, 33;?, 618. OXXIV TABLE OF QiSES, [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. IT, pp. 789-1605.] Gurnee »; Brunswick County (1 Hughes, 370), 891. Gurnee v. Chicago (45 Mich. 431), 1161. Gustin V. School Dist. (10 Gray, 85), 1384. I Guthrie v. Armstrong (5 Barn. & Aid. 638), 296. Gwynn v. Turner (18 Iowa, 1), 226. Qwynne v. Burnell (7 Clark & F. 5". 3; SBing. N. C..7). 328. Gvvynne v. Pool (Lutw. 290), 317. Hackensack Water Co. v. City of Hoboken (51 N. J. Law, 220), 1296. Hackett v. Ottawa (99 U. 8. 86), 929, 931. 946: Hackettstown v. Swackhamer (37 N. J. Law, 191), 923. HackfoW •". N. Y. Cent. B. Co. (53 N. Y. 654), 15U4. Haddock's Case (Sir T. Raymond, 439; 1 Vent. 355), 406, 1351. Haddox v. Clarke County (79 Va. 677), 375. Hadley v. Citizens' Sav. Inst. (123 Mass. 301), 1430. Hadlev v. State (66 Ind. 271), 1334. Hadsell v. Hancock (3 Gray, 536), 868, 663. Hafford v. New Bedford (16 Gray, 297), 264, 754, 760, 763. 775, 1038. Hagan v. Brooklyn (136 N. Y. 643), 180. Hagaru. Brainard (44 Vt. 294), 1418. Hagar v. Reclamation District (111 U. S. 701), 558, 690, 693, 1168, 1179, 1180, 1565. Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo (47 Oal 238), 1565. Hager v. Burlington (42 Iowa, 681). 1174. Hagerstown v. Dechert (33 Md. 369), 79, 115, 1353. Hagerstown v. Schuer (37 Md. 180), lie. Haggard v. Hawkins (14 Ind. 299), 483.. Hagner v. Heyberger (7 Watts & Serg. 104), 398. Hagood V. Southern (117 U. S. 52), 20. Hague V. City of Philadelphia (48 Pa. St. 52r), 333, 253, 356, 358, 639, 640. Haight V. Keokuk (4 Iowa, 199), 678. Haight V. New York (24 Fed. Rep. 93), 751. Haile v. Palmer (5 Mo^ 403), 1367. Haines v. Campion (3 Harr. 49), 641 . Haines v. School I)istrict (41 Me. 346), 241, 1328. Halbeck v. Mayor &c. (10 Abb. Pr, (N. Y.)439), 190. Halbert v. State (33 Ind. 125), 321. Haldeman v. Penn. R. Co. (130 Pa. St. 435), 671. Hale V. Burnett (15 Cal. 580), 624. Hale V. Kenosha (29 Wis. 599), 1166, 1369. Hale V. Smith (78 N. Y. 480), 1504. Hatey v. Whitney (53 Hun, 119), 237. Hall. In re (36 Kan. 670; 17 Pac. Rep. 649), 445. > Hall V. Baker (74 Wis. 118; 42 N. W, Rep. 104; 27 Am. & Enig. Corp. Gas. 20S), 439, 463, 6.)4. , Hall V. Buffalo (1 Keyes, 193), 1115. Hall V. Chippewa Falls (47 Wis. 267), 1171. Hall V. Cockrell (38 Ala. 507), 313. Hall V. Corporation of Washington (4 Crancih. 583), 533. Hall 1-. De Cuir (95 U. S. 485), 145, 1344. Hall V. Holden(n6 Mass. 172), 362. Hall V. People (57 III. 307), 343, 692. Hall V. Railroad Co. (90 111. 43). 1456. Hall V. School Dist. (46 Vt. 19), 368. Hall V. Smith (2 Bing. 156), 223. Hall V. Westfield (133 Mass. 433), 780. Hallecki). Boylston (117 Mass. 469), 373 1 369 Hallenbeck k Hahn (3 Neb. 377), 933 Haller v. Railroad Co. (83 111. 308), 1456. Hallock V. Franklin County (3 Met. 558), 704. Halloran v. Carter (13 N. Y. Supl. 214), 1510. Hallo well v. Gardner (1 Me. 93), 981. Hallowell v. Harwich (14 Mass. 186)i 1002. Hallowell V. Saco (5 Me. 143). 983, 995. Hall's Free School Trustees i'. Home (80 Va. 470), 1345. Halsey v. People (84 III. 89), 1169. Halsey v. Rapid Transit Street Rv. CJo. (47 N. J. Eq. 380 ; 20 Atl. Rep. 8.59), 280, 553, 679. Halstead, Ex parte (97 Cal. 471), 1356. Halstead v. Mayor &c. of New York (3 N. Y. 430), 331, 250, 352, 643, 659, 664. Ham 17. Grove (34 Ind. 18), 333. Ham V. Mayor &c. of New York (70 N. Y. 459), 751, 1038. Ham V. Salem (10 Mass. 350), 686. TABLE OF OASES. cxxv [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1005.] Hamar v. Covington (3 Met. (Ky.) 4941, 786. Hambletnn v. Dexter (89 Mo. 188),, 467, 1551. Hamden v. Bethany (43 Conn. 312), 987. Hamilton v. Columbus (53 Ga. 4851, 265. Hamilton v. Masaachusetts (6 Wall. • 6331, 1361. Hamilton v. Newcastle &o. R. Co. (9 I'nd. 359). £60. Hamilton v. Phflipsburg (55 Me. 193), 35-3. 364. Hamilton v. President &c. of CaTth- age (34 III. 83), 70. Hamilton r. State (4 Ind. 458), 343. Hamilton v. State (3 Tex. App. 643), 604. Hamilton v. Viclcsburg R. Co. (119 U. S. 280), 1433. Hamilton County v. Mighels (7 Ohio St. 109). 8. 15, 759. 76S,.1585. Hamlin v. Dlns;man (5 Lans. (N. T.) 61). 200. 290. Hamlin v. Kassafer (15 Oreson, 456 ; 3 Am. St. Rep. 176j. 198, 399. Hammel, In re (9 R. I. 248), 300. , HammPtt v. City of Philadelphia (65 Pa St. 1461. 593, 1077. 1163, • 1163, 1164, 1.B87. Hammond v. Commissioners (1.54 Mass. 509; 33 N. E. Rep. 902), 1195. Hammond «. Haines (25 Md. 541), 113. Hammonds v. Richmond County (73 Ga. 188). 761. Hampshire v. Franklin (16 Mass. 76), , 451, 1368, 1389. Hampson v. Taylor (R. I., 8 Atl. Rep. 231), 1413, 1493. Hampton v. Coffin (4 N. H. 517), 704. Hampton v. Conroy (56 Iowa, 498), 535. Hancock v. Boston (1 Met. 128), 1591. Hancock v. District Tp. (78 Iowa, 550), 1333. Hancock v. Hazzard (13 Cush. 112), 208. 321. Hancock Street Extension (18 Pa. St. 26), 1163. Hand v. Brookline (126 Mass. 324), 779. Hand v. Fellows (Pa., 23 Atl. Rep. 1186), 583. Hand v. Newton (93 N. Y. 88), 21. Handy v. City ot New Orleans (39 La. Ann. 107; 1 So. Rep. 593), 646. Hanev v. City of Kansas (94 Mo. 334; 7 S. W. Rep. 417), 1099. ■Haney v. Marshall, (9 Md. 194), 144. Hanger v. Abbott (6 Wall. 533), 475. Hanger v. City of Des Moines (53 Iowa, 193; 35 Am. Rep. 266), 666. Hankins v. People (106 111. 638), 515. Hannah V. Cincinnati (30 Ind. 30), 943. Hannewinkip v. Georgetown (15 Wall. 548), 1569, 1.569, 1570, 1574. Hannibal iJ. Missouri & Kansas Tele- phone Cq. (31 Mo. 23), 1330. Hannon v. Agnew (96 N. Y. 439), 283. Hannon v. Grizzard {89- N. C. 115), 188. Hannon v. Grizzard (96 N. C. 293), 318. Hannon v. St. Louis County (63 Mo. 313), 748. Hanover v. Lowell (5 Met. 35), 368. Hanover School &c. v. Gant (125 Ind. 5571, 1326. Hanscom v. Bpston (141 Mass. 242), 1470, 1474. Hanscom v. Citv of Omaha (11 Neb. 37), 1170, 13"49. Hanson, Ex parte (28 Fed. Rep. 127), 1235. Hanson v. Borough of Warren (Pa., 14 Atl. Rep. 405), 1459. Hanson v. Eichstaedt (69 Wis. 538; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 137), 1273. Hanson v. Electric Light Co. (Iowa, 48 N. W. Rep. 1U05), 1316. Hanson v. Suuth Scituate (115 Mass. 336), 978, 980. Hanson u. Vernon (27 Iowa, 38), 934, 1387, 1393. Hapgood V. Doherty (8 Gray, 373), 696. Harbaugh v. Monmouth (74 111. 367), 535. Harbeck v. Toledo (11 Ohio St. 219), 690. Harbor Comm'rs v. State (45 Ala. 399), 13!)2. Harcourt v. Good (39 Tex. 456), 933. Hardcastle v. State (37 N. J. Law, 553)* 353. Harden berg v. Van Keuren (4 Abb. N. C. 43). 943. Hardenbrook v. Town of Ligonier (95 Ind. 70), 513, 533, 542. Harder v. City of Minneapolis (40 Minn. 446; 42 N. W. Rep. 350), 783, 1483. Hardin v. Carrico (3 Meto..(Ky.) 289), 337. Hardin v. Governor (63 Ga. 688), 1562. OXXVl TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Hardin County v. Louisville &o. R. Co. (Kv., 17 S. W. Rep. 860), 283, ' 620. Hardin ■ Countv v. McFarlin (83 111. l.SSi, 791. " Hardin County v. Wright County (67 Iowa, 137), 1001. Hardins; v. Bader (73 Mich. 316), 277. Harding r. Goodlet (3 Yerg. 40; 24 Am. Deo. .546), 683. Harding v. Rockford &c. R. Co. (65 HI. 90), 937. ^ Hai-ding v. Vandewater (40 Cal. 77), 276. Harding v. Woodcock (137 U. S. 43). 220. Hardmann v. Bowen (39 N. Y. 196), 313 Hard wick v. Pawlet (3S Vt. 320), 994. Hardy v. Keene (53 N. H. 370), 775. Hardy v. Keene (54 N. H. 449), 1420. Hardy v. McKinney (107 Ind. 364), 706. Hardy v. Merriwether (14 Ind. 203), 93'' ' Hardy^w. Waltham (3 Met 163), 576, 827. ■ Hargreav^s v. Deacon (25 Mich. 1), 765. Hargreaves v. Hopper (1 C. P. D. 195), 133. Hargro v. Hodgdon (89 Cal. 623; 26 Pao. Rep. 1106), 1411. Hargroves v. Cooke (15 Ga, 331), 1339. Hark v. Gladwell (49 Wis. 172; 5 N. W. Rep. 323), 302, 366. Harker v. Mayor (17 Wend. 199), 90, 541. Harlem. Gas Light Co. v. Mavor &c. (3 Robt. 124; 33 N. Y. 809), 845. Harman v. Harwood (58 ,Md. 1), 158. Harman v. Tappenden (1 East, 563), 307. Hariiion v. Chicago (110 111. 400; 51 Am. Rep. 698), 4S6, .511, 616, 1053. Harmon v. Marlborough (9 Cush. > 525), 1368. Harmon v. Omaha (17 Neb. 648 ; 23 N. W. Rep. 503), 1139, 1139. Harmony v. Bingham (13 N. Y. 99), 1183. Harness v. State (76 Tex. 566; 13 S. W. Rep. 535; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 50), 98, 173. Harney v. Heller (47 Cal. 17), 1173. Harper v. City of Milwaukee (30 Wis. ; 372), 767, 1137. Harper v. Comm'rs (S3 Ga. 566), 1565. 'Harper v. Lexington &c. R. Co. (3 Dana(Ky.), 227). 691. Harper County Comm'rs v. Rose (140 TJ. S. 71; 11 S. W. Rep. 710), 928. Harrigan v. City of Brooklyn (119 N. Y. 156). 1597, 1598. Harrigan v. Village of Hoosic Falls (IN. Y. Supl. 57), 1458. Harrinian v. Boston (114 Mass. 241),' 1474. Harrington v. Buffalo (2 N. Y. Supl. ^338), 1453, 1460. Harrington v. City of Wilmington (Del., 12 Atl. Rep. 779). 1099. Harrington v. Comm'rs &c. (2 Mc- Cord (S. C), 400). 339. Harrington v. County Comm'rs f22 Pick. 263), 704. Harrington v. Plainview (27 Minn. 224), 1-390, 1580. Harrington v. Wafford (46 Wis. 31), 691. Harris, Ex parte (52 Ala.' 87 ; 33 Am. Rep. 559). 1536. Harris v. Atlanta (62 Ga. 290), 755, 101 3'. Harris v. Baker (4 M. & S. 27), 322. Harris v. Board &c. (105 111. 145), 1024. Harris v. Board &o. (121 Ind. 299)* 1430. Harris v. Chickasaw County (77 Iowa, 345 ; 42 N. W. Rep. 313), 894. Harris v. Hanson (3 Fairf. (Me.) 341), 333 335 ' Harris v. Nesbit (24 Ala. 498), 130. Harris v. Pepperell (L. R. 5 Eq. 1), 953. Harris v. School District (8 Foster (28 N. H.), 58), 13, 353, 373, 1330, ' 1336. Harris v. Springfield (107 Mass. 533), 1080.. Harris v. Thompson (9 Barb. 350), 683. Harris v, Wakeman (Say. 254), 487, 540. Harris v. Webelhoer (75 N. Y. 169), 1500. Harris v. Whitcomb (4 Gray, 433), 377, 1368. , Harris v. Wood (6 T. B. Mon. 641), 1565. Harrisburg v. Crangle (3 Watts & S. 460), 690. Harrisburg v. Legelbaum (Pa., 34 Atl. Rep. 1070), 1120. Harrisburg v. McCormick (129 Pa. St. 213; 18 Atl. Rep. 136), 592, 1081. Harrisburg v, Scheck (104 Pa. St. 53), 1X3. TABLE OF OASES. CXXVll [TheTererenoes are to pages: Vol.. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Harrisburg City Pass. Ry. Co. v. City of Harrisburg (Pa., 34 Atl. Eep. 56), 1207. • Harrison v. Augusta Factory (73 Ga. 447), 1144. Harrison v. Bridgton (16 Mass. 16), 451. 1368, 1388. Harrison i\ City of New Orleans (40 La. Ann. SOS; 4 So. Rep. 133), 812. Harrison v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore (1 Gill, 264), 594, 1019, 1041, 1043, 1346. Harrison v. Milwauliee (49 Wis. 247), 244, 1577, 1578. Harrison v. Milwaukee County (51 Wis. 663), 1146. Harrison v. Williams (3 Barn. & Cress. 162), 12. Harsbman v. Bates County (93 U. S. 5fi9), SO", 948, 943. Harsbman v. Knox Conntv Ci urt (123 U. S. 306). 1375. Hart V. Brooklyn (36 Barb. 22i>), 1133. Hart V. Burnett (15 Cal. 580), 625, ' 1593. Hart V. Lancashire R. Co. (31 L. T. (N. S.)361), 1487. Hart V. Mayof &c. (3 Paige, 213), 1031, 1034. Hart V. Mavor &c. (9 Wend. 571), 530, 535. 538, 614, 1025, 1048. Hart '■. New Orleans (13 Fed. Rep. 292), 1380. ' Hart V. Oceana (44 Mich. 417). 828. Hart V. Poor Guardians (81 Pa. St. 466), 323. Hai-t V. United States (118 U. S. 63), 742. Harter v. Kernochan (103 U. S. 562), 943. Hartford v. Bennett(10 Ohio St. 441), 201. Hartford v. Talcott (48 Conn. 535), 1301. 1331, 1441. Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hart- ford (16 Conn. 149), 451. 1368. Hartington v. Lui;e (Neb., 50 N. W. Rep. 957), 403, 409. Hartnian v. City of Muscatine (70 Iowa, 511), 1495. Hartnall v. Ryde Comm'rs (4 B. & S. 361^ 7ii8, 786. Hartshorn v. Sohoflf (58 N. H. 197), 388. Hartwell v. Armstrong (19 Barb. 166) 686, 1024. Hartwell v. Littleton (13 Pick. 229), 13(2. Harvard College v. Boston (104 Mass. 470), 1167. Harvey v. De Woody (18 Ark. 353), • 1043. Harvey v, Helena (6 Mont. 114), 694. Harvey v. Indianapolis (33 Ind. 244), 646. 1583. Harvey v. Rush County (32 Kan. 159), 179. Harvev v. Thomas (10 Watts, 63), 669, 670. Harvey v. Tyler (3 Wall. 325), 692. Uarward v. St. Clajr &c. Drainage Co. (51 111. 130), 619. Harwinton v. Catlin (19 Conn. 520), 681. Harwood v. Huntoon (51 Mich. 639), 1399. Harwood r. Lowell (4 Cush. 310), 770, 1448. Harwood v. Marshall (9 Md. 83), 190. Hasbrouck v. Milwauloee (13 Wis. 37), 1373, 1385, 1389. Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee (25 Wis. 122), 1384. Haskell v. Bartlett (34 Cal. 281). 506. Haskell v. New Bedford (108 Mass. 208), 773. Haskellu. Penn Yan Village (5 Lans. 4(f), 1.504. \ Hassell v. Long (2 Moore & S.,363), 329. Hassen v. City of Rochester (65 N. Y. 516), 1190. Hastings v. Bolton (1 Allen, 529), 1591. Hastin^rs i\ Columbus (43 Ohio St. 585), 507. Hastings v. Farmer (4 N. Y. 293), 143. Hastings v. San Francisco (18 Cal. 57). 1585. Hatch V. Buffalo (38 N. Y. 376), 1575. Hatch V. Hawkes (136 Mass. 177), 339. 1417. Hatch V. Inhabitantsof Attleborough (97 Mass. 5H3), 320. Hatcheson v. Tilden (4 Harr. & McH. (Md.) 379), 887. Hathaway v. Addison (48 Me. 440), 357, 358. Hathaway v. Saokett (33 Mich. 97), 660. Hathaway v. Town of Homer (5 Lans. (N. Y.) 307), 830. Haupt's Appeal (125 Pa. St. 311), 1304. Havemeyer v. Iowa County (3 Wall. 294), 423. Haven v. Asylum (13 N. H. 632), 1271. Haven V. Grand Junction & D. Co. (109 Mass. 88), 958. Haven v. Lowell (3 Met. 35), 281, Havens v. Latheue (73 N. C. 505), 322. , , cxxvm TABLE 07 OASES. IThe references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v. Comm'rs (^03 Mass. 120; 9 Am. Rep. 518), 6S3. Hawes v. Fox Lake (33 Wis. 443), 1451. Hawk V. Marion County (48 Iowa, 472), 663, 666, 667. Hawkes v. Kennebec (7 Mass. 461), 1376. Hawkins v. Calloway (88 111. 155), 190. Hawkins r. Comm'rs (2 Allen, 351), 691, 1418. Hawkins v. Dougherty (Del., 18 Atl. Rep. 951), 1551. Hawkins County i). Carroll County (nO Miss. 735), 983, 935. Hawks V. Charlemont (107 Mass. 414), lOSO. Hawley v. Fairbanks (108 TJ. S. 543), 1379. Hawley v. Fayetteville Comni'rs (82 N. y. 33), 1376. Hawthorn v. St. Louis (11 Mo. 59), 1596. I Hawthorne v. East Portland (13 Oregon, 371), 1171. Hay V. Cohoes Co. (3 N. Y. 159), 778, 779. Hayden v. Attleborough (7 Gray, 1338), 1450. Harden v.Nayes (5 Conn. 391), 103, ■ 346, 369. Hayden v. Tucker (37 Mo. 314), 1053. Hayes v. City of West Bay Citv (Mich.. 51 N. W. Rep., 1067), 1201. Hayes v. Covington (31 Miss. 408), 613. Hayes v. Hanson (13 N. H. 390), 1416. Haves V. Holly Springs (1 14 U. S. " 120). 230, ()33. 926, 936. 942. Hayes v. Hyde Park (153 Mass. 514), 1455. Hayes v. Missouri (130 U. S. 68). 147. Hayes v. Oshkosh (33 Wis. 314), 752, 754, 1037. Hayes v. Pacific &c. Co. (17 How. 596), 1353. Hayes v. Simonds (9 Barb. 360), 991. HayforJ v. County Comm'rs (78 Me. 158). 694. Haygood v. Justice (20 Ga. 48"i), 9. Haynes v. Bridge (1 Coldw. (Tenn.) ' 3-'), 832. Haynes v. Cape May (40 N. J. Law. 55), 519. Haynes v. Cape May (53 N. J. Law, 180; 19 Atl. Ri-p. 176). 601, 1237. Haynes v. County of Washington (19,111. 66), 447. Hays V. Cambridge (136 Mass. 403), 1435. Hays V. City of Oil City (Pa., 11 AtL Rep. 63), 185. Hays V. Commonwealth (82 Pa. St. 518)..'), 384. Hays V. Hogan (5 Cal. 343), 1577. Hays V. Porter -(22 Me. 371), 219. Hayward's Case (10 Pick. 358), 705. Hay ward v. Mayor &c. of New York (8 Barb. 48K), 686. Hayward v. School Dist. (3 Cush. * 419), 344, 1335. Haywood v. Charlestown (34 N. H. 23), 1419. Haywood v. Savannah (13 Ga. 404), 113,511.488. * Hazard v. Wason (152 Mass. 370), 1591. Hazen v. Lerche (47 Mich. 626), 1330, 1335. Hazzard v. City of Council Bluffs (79 Iowa, i06; 44 N. W. Rep. 319), 1098. Hazzard v. Heacock (30 Ind. 173), 1181. Head v. Providence Ins. Co. (3 Cranch, 127). 252. 634. Headrick v. Whittemore (105 Mass. 23), 691. Healey v. City of New Haven (49 Conn. 394), 1153. Healy v. New York (3 Hun, 708), 1501. Heard v. Brooklvn (60 N. Y. 342), 671. Heard v. Harris (6b Ala. 43), 338. Heath, jBaj parte (3 Hill, 43), 190, 389, 1263. 15.59. Heath v. Barmoip 50 ■T. Y. 302), 671. Heath v. Railroad O/. (61 Iowa, 11; 15 N. W. Rep, 573). 1-217. Hebard v. Ashland County (55 Wis. 145), 832. Hebert v. De Valle (37 111. 448). 635. Hebron G, R. Co. v. Harvey (90 Ind. 192; 46 Am. Rep. 199), 1096. Hecht V. Boughtou (3 Wyo. 368), 1391.' Heckel v. Sandford (40 N. J. Law, 1(50), 473. Heckscher v. City of Philadelphia (Pa., 9 Atl. Rep. 281). 1589. Hedges ]>. Madison County (I Gilm. V 567), 267. 745. Heeney v. Sprasrne (11 R. I. 456), 530, 1201, U4l. Heenev v. Trustees &c. (33 Barb. 360), 140. Heffleman v. Pennington County (So. Dak., 52 N. W. Rep. 851), ^ 908. 909. Heffner v. Commonwealth (28 Pa. St. 108), 843, 1530, 1549. TABLE OF CASES. cxxix [The references are to pages; Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Heick V. Voight (110 Ind. 279), 1420. Heidelberg v. San Francisco Countv (100 Mo. 69), 360, 1091. Heidelberg School District v. Horst (62 Pa. St. 301), 263. Heidler, In re (133 Pa. St. 653; 16 Atl. Rep. 97), 402, 410. Heigel v. Wichita County (Tex., 19 S. W. Rep. 562), 1430." Heine v. Levee Comm'rs (1 Woods, 247), 479), 1379. Heine v. Levee Comm'rs (19 Wall. 655), 479, 1376, 1379. 1395, 1570. Heinemann v. Heard (63 N. Y. 448), 1133. Heiple v. Clackamer County (20 Ore- gon, 147; 25 Pac. Rep. 391), 1089. Heise v. Columbia (6 Ridh. 404), 535, 537 Heiser v. Hatch (86 N. T. 614), 1453. Heiser v. Mayor &c. of New York (104 N. Y. 72; 9 N. E. Rep. 866), 555, 751. 1143, 1457. Heiskell v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore (65 Md. 135), 291, 393, 493. Heland v. Lowell (3 Allen, 407). 551. Held V. Bagwell (58 Iowa, 139), 321, 323. Helena v. Gray (Mont., 17 Pac. Rep. 564), 521. Helena v. Turner (36 Ark. 577), 646. Helleu V. Noe (3 Ired. Law, 493), 536, 1034. Hellenkamp v. City of La Fayette (30 Ind. 193), 897. 1154. Heller v. Sedalia (53 Mo. 159). 364. Heller v. Streoimel (52 Mo. 309), 11, 13. Helms V. Chadbou^ne (45 Wis. 60), 1588. Heman v. Wolf (33 Mo. App. 300;, 1163. Hembling v. Big Rapids (89 Mich. 1), 757, 758. Hemingway v. Machias (33 Me. 4451, 1578. Hemphill v. Boston (8 Cush. 195), 1408. Hempstead v. Des Moines (52 Iowa, 303; 3N. W. Rep. 123), 1153. Hempstead County v. Howard County (51 Ark. 344 ; 11 S. W. Rep. 478), 458, 896. Hendershott v. Ottumwa (46 Iowa, 658), 677. Henderson's Tobacco (11 Wall. 652), 113. Henderson v. Baltimore (8 Md. 352), 1065. 1171, 1383. Henderson v. City of Minneapolis (33 Minn. 319; 30 N. W. Rep. 31,2). 586, 75f, 1144, 1145. Henderson v. Covington (14 Bush (Ky.;, 312), 93, 668. Henderson v. Davis (106 N. C. 88), 70, 1260. Henderson v. Lambert (8 Bush, 607), 395, 1362. Henderson v. Lambert (14 Bush, 24), 1189. Henderson v. Mayor (3 La. 563), 1 95 Henderson v. Nashville R. Co, (17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 173), 096. Henderson v. Smith (26 West Va. 829; 55 Am. Rep. 138), 31«. Henilersonville v. Price (96 N. C. 42:{), 645. Hendricks' Appeal (103 Pa. St. 858), 674. Hendricks v. Board of Comm'is (35 Kan. 483; 11 Pac. Rep. 450), 1010. Hendricks v. Chautauqua County (35 Kan. 483; 11 Pac. Rep. 450), 888. Hendricks v. Johnson (45 Miss. 644), 910. Hendrickson v. Decan (1 Saxt. 577), 495. Heney v. Pima County (Ariz., 17 Pac. Rep. 263), 894. Henkeu. McCord (55 Iowa, 378), 535, 549. Henker v. Fond du Lac (7-1 Wis. 616), 1442. Henley v. Major &c. (5 Bing. 91), 219. Henline v. People (81 111. 269). 694. Hennen, In re (13 Pet. 230), 203. Henniker v. Weave (7 N. H. 57a), 982. Henniker v. Wyman (58 N. H. 528), 829. Henry v. Camden (42 N. J. Law, 835), 1523. Henry v. Dubuque (10 Iowa, 540), 703. Henry v. Gregory (29 Mich. 68), 1573. Henry v. Lansdowne (42 Mo. App. 431), 1263. Henrv v. State (98 Ind. 381), 864. Henry v. Taylor (57 Iowa, 73), 428. Henry v. Thomas (119 Mass. 583), 1174. Henry County v. Nicolay (95 U. 8. 619), 943. Henrv Street, In re (123 Pa. St. 346), 67, 99, 112,. 119, 133. Henshaw v. Cotton (127 Mass. 50), 1594. Henshaw v. Foster (9 Pick. 312), 165. Hepburn v. City of Philadelphia (Pa., 34 Atl. Rep. 27H), 106 1. Hequenibourg v. City of Dunkirk (2 N. Y. Supl. 447), 847. cxxx TABLE OF CASES. tThe references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp^ 789-1605.] Herholdu. Chicago(]08Ill. 467), 1413. Heriot's Hospital v. Eoss (13 CI. & F. 507), 763. Herman v. Crete (9 Neb. 350), 338. Herr v. Lebanon (Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 207), 1454. Herriok v. Carpenter (54 Iowa, 340; 6 N. W. Rep. 874), 555. Herrick v'. Stover (5 Wend. 581), 1415. Herring v. Wilmington R. Co. (10 Ired. 403), 1503. Harrington v. District Tp. of Liston (47 Iowa, 11), 1038. Hernngton v. Lansingburgh (110 N. Y. 145). 1444. Hersohbei-ger v. Pittsburgh (115 Pa. St. 78), 1395. Hersev v. Supervisors &c. (16 Wis. 198). 1190. Hersev v. Supervisors &c. (37 Wis. 75), 1571. HershoS v. Beverly (45 N. J. Law, 288), 534, 540, 1259. Herzo v. San Francisco (33 Cal. 134), 636, 1064. Hesketh v. Braddook (3 Burr. 1847); 531, 532. Hessu PeKg(7Nev. 23), 110. Hesser v. Gral'toh (33 West Va. 548 ; US. E. Rep. 211), 1500. Hessler v. Drainage Comm'rs (53 III. lOo), 695. Hester's Lessee v. Fortner (2 Binn. (Pa.) 40), 225. Hetli V. Fond du Lao (63 Wis. 338 ; 53 Am. Rep. 379), 1146. Heth Tp. V. Lewis (114 Ind. 508), 820. Hewes V. Reis (40 Cal. 255), 570, 1064, 1171. Hewett V. Miller (31 Vt. 402). 1323. Hewison v. New Haven (34 Conn. 1), 265. Hewison v. New Haven (37 Conn. 475), 9, 770, 1453. 1466. Hewitt's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 60), 1081. Hewitt's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 155), 1365, 1367. Hewitt u. State (6 Har. & J. 95; 14 Am. Deo. 259), 324. 335. Hewitt V. Wiiite (Mich., 43 N. W. Rep. 1043), 603. Hexamer v. Webb (101 N. Y. 377), 1444. Heyfron v. Mahoney (9 Mont. 497), 378. Heymann v. Cunningliam (51 Wis. 506). 158S. Heyneiiian v. Blake (19 Cal. S^O), 69(i. H-ywai-d v. Mayor &c. (7 N. Y. 325), 671, 68-,'. Heywood v. City of Buffalo (14 N. Y. 531), 1131, 1189, 1574, 1575. Hibbard v. Clark (56 N. H. 155), 533. Hickey v. Board of Supervisors (63 Mich. .94; 38 N. W. Rep. 771), ■ 888, 1543. Hickey v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (6 IH. App. 173), 283. Hickok V. Hine (33 Ohio St. 523), 629.. Hickok «.*Platt8burgh (15 Barb. 427), 219. Hickok V. Shelburne (41 Vt. 409), 356. 360, 368, 13t)8. Hicks V. Dorn (43 N. Y.. 47), 219. Hicks V. Ward (69 Me. 441). 1194. Hicks V. Westport (130 Mass. 480), 1399 Hiesu Erie City (135 Pa. St. 144), 754. . Higby V. Peed (98 Ind. 430), 1430. Higert V. Greencastle City (43 Ind.' 574), 1484. Higgins V. Ansmuss (77 Mo. 351), 1183. Higgins V. Chicago (18 111. 276), 704. Higgins V. City of Boston (I48 Mass. 485; 20 N. E. Rep. 105), 1473. Higgins V. City of New York (N. Y., 30 N. E. Rep. 44), 179. Higgins V. Curtis (39 Kan. 383; 18 Pac. Rep. 307), 308. Higgins V. Salamanca , Village (6 N. Y. St. Rep., 119), 781. Higginson v. Nahant (11 Allen, 530), 685, 689. Highland Turnpike Co. v. McKean (10 Johns. 159). 91, 93. Hight V. Comm'rs (68 Ind. 575), 659, 666. Hightown v. Staton (54 Ga. 108), 1596. Highway Comm'rs v. Ely (54 Mich. 173), 330, 339. Highway Comm'rs i'. Van Dusan (40 Mich. 429). 630. Higley v. Bunce (10 Conn. 435; 10 Conn. 567), 50 i, 504. Hiland V. Lowell (3 Allen, 407), 486. Hilbish V. Catherman (64 Pa. St. 159), 939. Hildreth v. Lowell (11 Gray. 345), 686. Hildreth v. Mclntyre (1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.)S06), 291, 398. Hill v. Boston (132 Mass. 351; 33 Am. Rep. 333), 10, 17, 135, 150, 156, 489, 746, 747. 75§, 759, 765, 770, 775, 1005, 1376, 1436, 1448. Hill V. Charlotte (73 N. C^ 55; 21 Ain.^Rep. 451), 233, 264, 763, 785. Hill V. City of Fond du Lac (56 Wis. 243; 14 N. W. Rep. 35), 1301, 1441. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXl pThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol, II, pp. 789-160S.] Hill V. City of Kahoka(35 Fed. Eep. 33), 474. Hill V. Dalton (72 Ga. 814). 1257. Hill V. Decatur (23 Ga. 203), 487. Hill V. Easthampton (140 Mass. 881), 605. Hill V. Fitzpatrick (6 Ala. 314), 326. Hill V. Forsyth (67 N. C. 368). 933. Hill V. Higdon (5 Ohio St. 243), 1169, 1353. Hill V. Indppendipnt Dist. &o. (Iowa, 46 N. W. Rep. i043), 282. Hill V. Keiiible(9 Cal. 71), 331. Hill V. Mayor (72 Ga. 314), 544. Hill V. Memphis (134 U. S. 198: 10 S. Ct. Rep. 562; 7 R. R. Corp. L. J. 470; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 135). 5fi2, 681, 633, 933, 925, 938, 933, 9.34. Hill V. Ogden (5 Ohio St. 346), 1370. Hill V. Peekekill Sav. Bank (101 N. Y. 490), 960. Hill V. Portland &o. E. Co. (55 Me. ' 438). W77. Hill V. Railroad Co. (5 Denio, 206), 693. Hill V. Railroad Co. (11 La. Ann. 293), 719. Hill V. School Dist. (17 Me. 316), 1330. Hill V. State (4 Sneed (Tenn.), 443), 211, 78B. Hill V. Tionesta Township (146 Pa. St. 11). 1495. Hill V. Warrell (Mich., 49 N. W. Rep. 479). 1164. Hill V. Winsor(118 Mass. 251), 1449. Hiller v. Sliarou Springs {i^ Hun, 344), 1478. Hillesum v. City of New York (56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 596; 4 N. Y. Supl. 806), 1485. Hillsborough v. Derring (4 N. H. 86), 995. Hilton V. F.nda (86 N. Y. 339). 227. Hilyard v. Harrison (37 N. J. Law, 170). 950. Himmelmann v. Satterlee (50 Cal. 68), 1161. Hinchman V. Railroad Co. (17 N. J. Eq. 80), 1331. Hincks l'. Milwaukee (46 Wis. 5C9 ; 1 N. W. Kep. 230), 557, 1442, Hine v. New Haven (40 Conn. 478), 669, 1246. Hiner v. City of Fond du Lao (71 Wis. 74: 36 N. W. Rap. 622), 1443, 1489. Hines v. Charlotte City (73 Mich. 378; 40 N. W. Rep, 333), 776. 785. Hines v. Lsaven worth (3 Kan. 186), 1169. Hines u. Lookport (50 N. Y. 236), 321, 748. 768, 776. 1440. Hingham &c. Co. v. County of Norfolk (6 Allen, 353), 683, 1069, 1096. Hinkle, In re (81 Kan. 712), 95, 110, 199, 465. Hinkle v. Commonwealth' (4 Dana (Ky.), 518). 543. Hintrager r. Richter (Iowa, 53 N. W. Rep. 188), 841, 909. 910. Him V. State (1 Oiiio St. 30), 113. Hirschman v. Paterson Horse R. Co. (17 N. J. Eq. 75), 590. Hirschoff v. Beverly (45 N. J. Law, 288).' 581. Hiss V. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (53 Md. 342; 36 Am. Rep. .371), 590. Hitch f. Lambright (66 Ga. 228), 2 IS. Hitchcock V. Daubury R. Co. (25 Conn. 516), 1417. HitchcoQki). Galveston (96 TJ. S. 341), 236, 237, 286^, 550, 628, 644, 645, 720. 793, 938, 1160, 1176. Hitchcock V. Galveston (48 Fed. Rep. 640), 1531. Hitchcock V. Galvestoa (4 Woods, 308), 1380. Hitchcock «. St. Louis (49 Mo. 484), 1582. . Hitchins v. Frostburg (68 Md. 100), 776, 1137. Hite V. Whitley County Court (Ky., 15 S. W. Rep. 57), 761. Hixon V. Lowell (13 Gray, 59), 770, * 1448, 1466. Hoadley v. City of San Francisco' (30 Cal. 265), 1143. Hoag V. Durfey (1 Aik. (Vt.) 286), 1269, 1273. Hoagland v. Culvert (20 N. J. Law, 387), 190. Hobart v. Milwaukee City E. Co. (37 Wis. 194 ; 9 Am. Rep. 461), 590. Hobart v. Supervisors (17 Cal. 33), 64, 87. Hobbs V. Board &c. (116 Ind. 876; 19 N. E. Rep. 186), 1136. Hobbs «;. Lowell (19 Pick. 405), 571, 1406. Hobbs u. Yonkers (108 N. Y. 13), 180. Hoblvn V. Regem (3 Bro. P. C. 339), 39p. Hoboken v. Gear (37 N. J. Law, 265), 506. 1533. Hoboken v. North Bergen (43 N. J. Law, 146), 1166. Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (184 , U. S. 6.56), 1410. Hoboken Land Co. v. Hoboken (36 N. J. Law, 540), 1410. Hockady v. County Comra'rs (Colo., 29 Pac. Rep. 287), 869. cxxxu TABLB OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Hookett V. State (105 Ind, 250; 5 N. E. Rep. 178), 6, 573. HodKes V. BuflEalo (2 Denio. 110; 5 Denio, 567), 207, 250, 251, 253, 639, 713, 652, 664, 713. Hodges V. Percival (132 111. 53), 1486. Hodges V. Eunyan (30 Mo. 491), 214. Hodgman v. St. Paul &o, R. Co. (20 Minn, 48), 940, 1391. Hodgson V. Dexter (1 Ci'anch, 345), 212,213. Hodman v. Chicago &c. E. Co. (20 Minn. 48), 989. Hoev V. Gilroy (89 N. Y. 132; 14 N. Y. Supl. 159; 37 N. Y. St. Rep. 754), 585, 614, (540, 1820. Hoff V. City of Philadelphia (93 Pa. Su. 272), 1154. Hoff r. Lafayette (108 Ind. 14), 1366. Hoffeld V. City of Bgfralo(N. Y., 29 N. E. Rep. 747), 1138, 1189. HofEman v. Greenwood County (23 Kan. 307), 186. Hoffman v. San Joaquin County (31 Cal. 426), 769. Hogenson xi. St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. (31 Minn. 336; 17 N. W. Rep. 374), 1145. Hoglan II. Carpenter (4 Bush, 89), 189. Hoitt V. Burnham (61 N. H. 620), 350. Hoke V. Henderson (4 Dev. (N. C.) 1), 187, 203. Hoke V. Perdue (62 Cal. 545), 1189. ' Holbrook v. Faulkner (55 N. H. 311), 303, 365, 627, 1335. "Holcomb V. Danby (51 Vt. 428), 783. Holcombe v. Comm'rs (89 N. C. 346), 1393. Holdane v. Cold Spring (23 Barb. 103; 21 N. Y. 474), 1403, 1405, 1406, 1409. HoUaday v. Frisbie (15 Cal. 630), 624, 1380, 1595. Holland a Baltimore (11 Md. 186), 93, 114, 1173, 1384, 1574. Holland v. Davies (36 Ark. 446), 380, 1335. Holland v. San Francisco (7 Cal. 361), 553. Holland v. State (23 Fla. 123; 1 So. Rep. 521), 285. HoUenbeck v. Winnebago County (95 111. 151), 745, 1014. HoUiday v. St. Leonards (11 C. B. (N. S.), 193), 232. 763. Hollingswnrth v. State of Virginia (3 Dallas, 378), 51, 740. HoUmon v. Carroll (27 Tex. 23), 336. Holloway v. Delano (64 Hun, 27), 1412. Holloway v. Ogden School Dist. (62 Mich. 153), 1343. Hollwedell. Ex parte (74 Mo. 395), 539, 544, 604. Holly V. Bennett (46 Minn. 386), 1269. Holman v. School Trustees (77 Mich. 605), 1331, 1344. Holman v. Townsend (13 Met. 300), 746. Holmes v. Baker (16 Gray, 259), 1384. Holmes v. Jersey City (12 N. J. Eq. _^ 299), 1163. Hblmes V. Seeley (19 Wend. 510), 1473. Holmes v. Village of Hyde Park (121 111. 129; 13 N. E. Rep. 540), 571, 1093. Holt's Appeal (5 R. I. 603), 1336. Holt V. Antrim (64 N. H. 284), 1394. Holt V. City Council of Somerville (137 Mass. 408, 411), 302, 671, 1096, 1173. Holt V. Denny (118 Ind. 449), 1382. Holton V. Board of Comm'rs (55 Ind. 194), 660. Holton V. Milwaukee (31 Wis. 27), 1163. Home ,of Refuge v. Ryan (37 Ohio St. 197), 1008. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta (50 Ga. 530), 1356, 1370. Home Ins. Co. v. Holway (55 Iowa, 571), 333. Home Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (11 Hun, 182), 1491. Hommert v. Gleason (38 N. Y. St. Rep. 348; 14 N. Y. Supl. 5B8), 192, 217. . Honey Creek School Township v. Barnes (119 Ind. 213; 21 N. E. ReJD. 747), 621, 1333. Hood V. Finch. (8 Wis. 381), 696. Hood V. Mayor &c. of Lynn (1 Allen, 103), 633, 664. Hood V. Trustees of Lebanon (Ky. , 15 S. W. Rep. 516), 1076. Hoodley u San Francisco (124 U. S. 646), 625. Hooksett V.' Amoskeag &c. Co. (44 N. H. 105), 529. Hooper V. Emery (14 Me. 375), 747, 835, 1387. Hooper v. Goodwin (48 Me. 79), 198. Hopeu Dead wick (8 Humph. (Tenn.) 1 ; 47 Am. Dec. 597), 50. Hopkins v. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (6 Mackey, 311), 1306. y Hopkins v. Elmore (49 Vt. 176), 345, 915. Hopkins v. Mayor of Swansea (4 M. & W. 6a 1). 486. Hopkins v. Railroad Co. (79 Mo. 98), 1551. TABLE OF OASES. OXXXUl [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Hopkins v. Rush River (70 Wis. 10), 1493. Hopper V. Covington (8 Fed. Rep. 777), 947. Hopper V. Covington (118 TJ. S. 148), «32, 926. Hopple V. Brown Township (13 Ohio St. 311), 933. Hoquerabourff v. City of Dunkirk (3 N. Y. Supl. 447), 163. Horan v. Lane -(53 N. J. Law, 275 ; 21 Atl. Rep. 3021, 166, 177. Horn V. Mayor &e. (30 Md. 218), 643. Horn V. Town of New Lots (83 N. Y. 101), 1133. 1183. Horn V. "Whittier (6 N. H. 88), 313, 829. Hornblower v. Duden (35 Cal. 664), 186, 658. 659. Horner v. Wood (33 N. Y. 850). 1115. Hornung n. State (II 6 Ind. 458; 19 N. E. Rep. ir)l), 299. Horsley v. Bell (1 Bro. C. C. 101), 213. Horton v. Harrison (33 Barb. 176), 296. Horton v. Mobile School Commis- sioners (43 Ala. 59S). 61. Horton i\ Newell (R. L, 33 Atl. Rep. 910), 773. Horton v. Parsons (37 Hun, 42), 190, 200. Horton v. Taunton (97 Mass. 366), 773. Horton v. Town of Thompson (71 N. Y. 513), 640, 960. Hosier v. Higgins Township Board (45 Mich. 340), 827. Hoskins v. Brantley (57 Miss. 814), 386. Hospers v. Wyatt (63 Iowa, 265), 647. Hospital V. Philadelphia (34 Pa. St. 229), 1577. Hot Springs R. Co. v. Williamson (45 Ark. 429), 674. Hotchkiss V. Borough of Phillipsburg (Pa.. 8 Atl. Rep. 434), 1493. Hotehkiss v. Plunkett (60 Conn. 230), 663, 664. Hotz V. School Dist. (1 Colo. App. 40), 1343. Houfe V. Town of Fulton (34 Wis. 608), 1450. Hough I'. Bridgeport (57 Conn. 290; 18 Atl. Rep. W>), 303. Houghton's Appeal (42 Cal. 3.5), 706. Houghton V. Davenport (33 Pick. 235). 353. Houghton V. Huron Copper Min. Co. (57 Mich. 547; 24 N. W. Rep. 820), 623, 13«6. Houghton V. Swarthout (1 Denio, 589), 339. Houghton Overseers v. Jay Over- seers (9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 412), 985. House V. Board (60 Ind. 580), 1430. House V. Metcalf (27 Conn. 631),' 1477. House V. State (41 Miss. 737), 1333, 1241. House Bill No. 331, In re (9 Colo. 624; 21 Pac. Rep. 472); 3;6, 896. House Resolutions &c., In re (13 Colo. 3-*9; 31 Pac. Kep. 484), 120. Householder v. Kansas City (83 Mo. 488), 1139, 1456. Houston V. Emery (76 Tex. 283), 1590. Houston V. Houston (67 Ind. 376), 1419. Houston V. Isaacs (68 Tex. 116), 1478, 1496. Houstou V. Moore (5 Wheat. 1), 139. Houston V. Voorhies (Tex., 8 S. W. Rep. 109). 900. Houston &c. Ry. Co. v. Carson (66 Tex. 345; 18 S. W. Rep. 107), 1205. Hover v. Barkhoof (44 N. Y. 113), 319, 330. 339, 748. Hovey V. Haverstraw (124 N. Y. 273), 1420. Hovey v. Mayo (43 Me. 322;, 677, 1189. Hovey «. State (119 Ind. 386; 31 N. E. Rep. 890), 158. Howard's Case (Hutton, 87), 464. Howard v. Augusta (74 Me. 79), 1400. Howard v. Brogan (31 Me. 358), 313. Howard v. Carnett (Ky., 1 S. W. Rep. 1), 1337, Howard v. Francis County (50 Fed. Rep. 44), 924. Howard v. McDiarmid (26 Ark. 100), .110. Howard v. Proctor (7 Gray, 138), 1390. Howard v. Providence (6 R. I. 514), 699. Howard v. San Francisco (51 Cal. 53), 264. Howard v. Shaw (136 III. 53), 706. Howard v. Shields (16 Ohio St. 25), 1«0. Howard v. Shoemaker (35 Ind. Ill), 189, 192, 195, 1262. Howard t. The Church (18 Md. 457), 1188. Howard v. Trustees (10 Ohio, 365), 1000. Howard v. Worcester (153 Mass. 436), 759, 760, 766. Howard County Comm'rs v. Jen- nings (104 Ind. 108), 191. CXXXIV TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol.' I, pp. 1-78S; Vol. n. pp. 18ft-1605J Howard Street, In re Vacation of (Pa., 21 Atl. Rep. 974). 1193. Howe V. Cambridge (114 Mass. 388), 1097, 1565. ,Howe V. Castleton (25 Vt. 163), 1433. Howe V. Keeler (27 Conn. 538), 713, 941. Howe V. Mason (14 Iowa, 510), 218. Howe V. Treasurer of Plainfield (37 N. J. Law, 145), 548, 604, 1356, 1258. Howell v. Bristol (8 Basil, 493), 1188, 1389. Howell V. Buffalo (15 N, Y. 512), 1160, 1383, 1578, 1598. Howell V. Peoria (90 III. 104), 848. Howell V. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St. 471), 479. 1395. Howell V. State (3 Gill (Md.), 14), 1353. Howes V. Grush (131 Mass. 207), 1490. Howes V. Oakland (104 11. S. 450), 1130. Howland v. City of Chicago (108 III. 500), 1839. Howland v. County Comm'rs (49 Me. 143), 1194. Howland .1% Eldredge (46 N. Y. 457), 1514. Howland v. School Dist. (15 R. I. 184), 352, 371, 1336. 1340. Howland v. Wright County (Iowa, 47 N. W. Rep. 1086), 183. Hoyt V. Gity of Des Moines (76 Iowa, 430: 41 N. W. Rep. 63), 1485, 1486, 1487. Hoyt V. Comm'rs (23 Barb. 238), \ 1350. Hoyt V. East Saginaw (19 Mich. 39), 571, 1065J 1126, 1165, 1169, 1172, 1188. , Hoyt u. Hudson (37 Wis. 656), 1146. Hoyt V. Thompson (19 N. Y. 207), 713. Hubbard v. Elden (43 Ohio St. 380), 336. Hubbard v. Newton (53 Vt. 346), 348, 366, 368. Hubbard v. Russell (34 Barb. 404), 1036. Hubbard v. Taunton (140 Mass. 467), (i05. Hubbard v. Town of Medford (30 Oregon, 315 ; 25 Pac. Rep. 610), 594, 1246. Hubbard v. Williamstown (61 Wis. 397). 350, 375. Hubbard v. Winsor (15 Mioh. 146), Hubbel'l V. Viroqua City (67 Wis. 343), 776. Hubbell V. Yonkers (104 N. Y. 434), 771, 773, 1438, 1471. Huber v. Reily (53 Pa. St, 122), 376. Hudson V. Cuero Land & Emigrgr tion Co. (47 Tex. 561, 678. Hudson V. Geary (4 R. L 485). 1244. Hudson v. Marietta (64 Ga. g8S), 260, 846. Hudson V. Marlborough (154 Mass. , 318), 1473. Hudson V. Thorne (7 Paige Ch. 261). 531. Hudson ,1136, Johnston v. District of Columbia (118 U. S. 19), 263. Johnston v. Macon (62 Ga. 645), 1370. Johnston v. Moorman (80 Va. 131), 218, 338. Johnston v. People's Natural Gas Co. (Pa., 5 Cent. Rep. 564), 6W6j Johnston v. Railroad Co. (10 R. I. 365), 591. Johnston v. Wilson & N. H. 202), 200. Joint Free High School Dist. t». Town of Green Grove (77 Wis. 532 ; 46 N. W. Rep. 895), 801. Joliet V. Verby (35 111. 58), 1449. Jonas V. Cincinnati (18 Ohio St. 318), 1164, 1384. Jones V. Andorer (9 Pick. 146), 296. Jones V. BaHgor Bm'otigh (144 Pa. St. 638), 758, 1149, 1457. Jones V. Blanton (6 Ired. E(J. 120), 330. Jones V. Board of Education (88 Mich. 371), 1329. Jones V. Boston (104 Mass. 461), 1163, 1188, 1466. Jones V. Carmarthen (8 M. & W. 605), 180. Jones V. City of Albany (17 N. Y. Supl. 332), 886. Jones V. Davis (35 Wis. 376), 1413'. Jones V. Gridley (2 Kan. 584), ^5. Jones V. Hays (3 Ired. Eq. 5021 380. Jones V. Housatonic B. Co. (107 Mass. 261), 1467. Jones V. Insurance Co. (2 Daly (N. Y.), 307). 488. Jones V. Kolb (56 Wis. 863), 1383. Jones V. Le Tombe (3 Dallas, 384), 812. Jones V. Loving (55 Miss. 109), 215. Jones t>. McAlpine |64 Ala. 511), 526. Jones V. Mayor &c. (25 Ga. 610), 933. Jones v. New Haven (34 Conn. 1), 7-70, 1448. Jones Vi New Orleans &c. R. Co. (70 Ala. 227), 699. Jones V. New York (37 Hun, 513), 1184. Jones V. New York (9 N. Y. St. Rep. 247), 751. Jones V. Pendleton County Court (Ky., 19 S. W. Rep. 740), 799, Jones V. People (19 111. App. 300), 336. Jones V. Sanford (66 Me. 585), 347; Jones V. Sherwood (37 X!onn. 466), 1602. Jones V. Town of Lind (79 Wis. 64; 48 N. W. Rep 247), 975. Jones V. Troy (4 N. Y. Supl. 733), 1461. Jones V. Williams (11 M. & W. 176), 1048. Jonesboro v. Cairo 9ll V. Merchants' &c. Go. (89 111. 611), 1573. Kimlfail v. Rpsendale (42 Wis. 407 ; 24 Am, Rep. 421), 60, 941. Kimball v. School Dist. (28 Vt. 8), 1330. Kimble v. City of Peoria (111.. 29 N. E. Rep. 733), 502, 1074, 1175. Kimmisl) v. Ball (129 U. S. 217), 144. Kincaid's Appeal (66 Pa. St. 411 ; 5 Am, Rep. 377), 1026. Kincaid v. Hardin County (53 Iowa, 430; 3B Am. Hep. 836), 10, 149, 745, 746, 1015. Kiiadinger v. Saginaw (59 Mich. 855), 1261. King V. Beeston (3 Term R. 593), 396. TABLE OF OASES, cxlvii [Tlie references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1t788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1603.] King V. Belkinger (4 Term R. 810), 494. King V. Buller (8 East, 889), 307. King V. City of Buffalo (10 N. Y. Supl. 564), 177. King V. City of Chicago (111 111. 63), B77. Kingu. Comtn'rs (8 Barn. & C. 355), 757. King V. Davenport (98 111. 305), 669, 1846. King V. Dixon (3 M. & S. 11), 1349. King V. Duryea (45 N. J. Liw, 258), 1167. King V. Hardwick (11 East, 577), 153. King V. Hawkins (10 East, 211), 386. King V. Inhabitants of Bilton (1 East, 13). 349. King V. Inhabitants of Essex (4 Term R. 591), 603. King V. Ireland (68 Tex. 682), 313. King V. Jacksonville (3 111. 306), 530. King V. Leake (i B. & Ad. 469), 1406. King I). Lizzard (9 Barn. & C. 418), 189. King V. McDrew (31 111. 418), 1596. King V. Madison (17 Ind. 48), 1359. King V. Mahaska County (75 Iowa, 339, 629, 643. King V. Market St. Comm'rs(4 Barn. & Ad, 335), 697. King V. Mayor of Colchester (2 Durnf. & East. 259), 155S. King ti. Miller (6 Term R. 278). 307. King V. Minneapolis Stc. R. Co. (32 Minn. 334), 699, 700, 701. King V. Nichols (16 Ohio St 80), 320. King V. Oshkosh (75 Wis. 517), 781, 1463. King V. Parry (14 East, 540), 886. King V. Portland (2 Or. 14fi). 1187. King V. Railway Co. (38 Minn. 224; 20 N. W. Rep. 135). 1151. King v. Richardson (1 Burr. 517), 204. King V. Russell (6 East, 427), 1464. King V. Theodorick (8 East, 543), 348. King V. Utah See. R. Co. (Utah, 22 Pac. Rep. 158), 1395. King V. Warley (6 Term R. 534), 349. King V. Williams (2 Maule & Sel. 141), 306'. King V. Wilson (11 Dill. C. C. 555), 1508. King V. Woburn (10 East, 395), 1.53. £ing County v. Collins (1 Wash. m% 988. Kinghorn v. Kingston (25 Up. Can. Q. B. 130), 548. Kingman &c.. Petitioner (153 Mass. 566; 27 N. E. Kep. 778), 1169. Kingman v. City of Brockton (153 Mass. 355; 26 N. E. Rep. 998), 559, 869. Kingman v. School Dist. (3 Cush. 425), 640, 1330. Kings Go. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens (101 N. Y. 411), 624. Kingsbury r. Dedham (13 Allen (95 Mass.), 186), 1467, 1471. Kingsbury v. School Dist. (13 Met. , 99), 296, 347, 368, 1335. Kingsland v. Mayor &c. (5 Daly, 448), 844. Kingsland v. Mayor (1 10 N, Y. 569 ; 18 N. Y. St. Rep, 701), 614. Kingsley v. Norris(60 N. H. 131), 713. Kingsloi V. Towle (48 N, H. 57). 1418. Kingston &c. Ins. Co. v. Clark (33 Barb. 196), 329. Kinmundy v. Mahan (72 111. 462), 283, 530, .550, 1390. ' Kinneen v. Wells (144 Mass. 497; 59 Am. Rep. 105). 376, 377. 378. Kinney v. City of Tekamah (Neb., 46 N. W. Rep. 83,5), 1199. Kinney v. City of Troy (108 N. Y. 567), 1458. Kinsella v. City of Auburn (7 N. Y. Supl. 317), 1108, 1164. Kinsey v. Pulaski County (3 Dill. 353), 793. Kinsley v. City of Chicago (134 111. 359 , 599, 1240. Kip V. City of Buffalo a N. Y. Supl. 685), 181, 193. Kip V. Patterson (26 N. J. Law. 298), 106, 518, 539, 540, 1355. 1357. Kirby v. Association (14 Gray, 249), 1201. Kirby v. Boyleston (14 Gray, 352), 1231. 5irby v. Shaw (19 Pa. St. 258), 1362, 1366, 1869. Kirchenor v. George C. Flint & Co. (11 N. Y. Supl. 741), 1261. Kirk V. Brazos Countv(73 Tex. 56; 11 S. W. Rep. 143)," 1003. Kirk V. NoweU (1 Term Rep. 134), 534. Kirkham v. Russell (73 Va. 956), 518. Kirkpatrick v. Conim'rs (13 Vt. 310), 1123, Kirkpatrick v. Taylor (118 Ind. 329), 706. Kirkwood v. Newburg (45 Hun, 333), 1092. Kirkwood v. Newburg (133 N. Y. 571), 1428. Kirkwood v. Soto (Cal., 25 Pac. Rep. 48M), 179. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss (100 U. S. 4'Jl), 145, 1351. 1358. cxlviii TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Kisler v. Cameron (39 Ind. 488), 389. Kissell V.' Anderson (73 Ind, 485), 1037. Kistner v. Indianapolis (100 Ind. 210), 264. Kitchell V. Board of Comm'rs (Ind., 84 Ni E. Rep. 366), 555. Kitson V. Ann Arbor (36 Mich. 335), 1356. Kittingpr v. Monroe School Tp. (Ind., 29 N. E. Rep. 931), 808, 1830. Kittle V. Fremont (1 Neb. 338), 14S3. Kittle V. Sherwin (11 Neb. 65), 1370. Kittredge v. North- Brookfield (138 Mass. 286), 348, 367. Kittredge v. Walden (40 Vt. 211), 368. Klatt V. Milwaukee (53 Wis. 196), 746. 1474. Klauder v. McGrath (35 Pa. St. 128; 78 Am. Dec. 329), ^09. Klein v. City of Dallas (71 Tex. 380 ; 8 S. W. Rep. 90), 1478, 1489. Klein v. New Orleans (99 U. S. 149). 1381. / Klein v. St. Paul &o. Ry. Co. (30 Minn. 451), 706. Klein v. Smith Supervisors (54 Miss. 354). 1376. Klein v. Warren Supervisors (51 Miss. 878), 1376. Klinsler v. Bickel (117 Pa. St. 336), 1055, 1346. Klosterman v. Loos (58 Mo. 290), 314. Knabe v. Seville (N. Y., N. Y. Law Jour., Jan. 14. 1893), 1411. Knapn v. Grant (37 Wis. 147), 941, 1389. Knapp V. Hoboken (38 N. J. Law, 371), 1376. Kneedler v. NorristOwn (100 Pa. St. 368), 518, 531, 535, 595, 1303, 1347. Kneeland v. Water Co. (15 Wis. 454). 1353. , Knell V. City of Buffalo (7 N. Y. Supl. 233), 1106, 1173, 1173. Knight V. Ashland (61 Wis. 383), 423, 434, 439. Knight V. Clark (48 N. J. Law, 23; 57 Am.iRep. 534), 213, 313, 314. Knight V. Fairfield (70 Me. 500). 990. Knight V, Kansas City &c. R. Co. (70 Mo. 331), 543, 1266. Knight V. Philadelphia (15 W. N. C. 307), 754. Knight V. Woods (Ind., 28 N. E. Rep. BOG), 1333. Kniper v. Louisville (7 Bush, 599), 1356, 1357. Knobloch v. Chicago &c^ St. Ry. Co. (31 Minn. 403; 18 N. W. Rep. 106), 1311. Knoop's Estate, In re (11 N. Y. Supl. 773), 13B0. Knottman v. Ayer (3 Strob. (S. C.) 93), 315. Knowles v. Davis (2 Allen, 61), 339 Knowles v. Seale (64 Cal. 377), 1138. Knowles v. Yates (31 Cal. 93). 878. Knowlton v. SupervisorB(9 Wis. 410), 1363, 13B9, 1572. Knox V. Board &c. (45 Kan. 156), 1345. Knox v: Peterson (31 Wis. 347), 565, 1171. Knox Comm'rs v. Aspinwall (34 How. 384), 1878. Knox County v. Ai-ms (33 111. 175), 1595. Knox County v. Aspinwall (31 How. .539), 945. Knox County v. Davis (63 lU. 405), 380. Knox County v. Johnson (Ind., 36 N. E. Rep. 148). 1323. Knox County v. McCombs (19 Ohio St. 330), 634. Knox County Court v. United States (109 U. S. 239), 1374, 1375. Knoxville v. Bird (13 Lea (Tenn.), 131). 1055, 1346. Knoxville i). Chicago &c. R. Co. (Iowa, 50 N. W, Rep. 61), 530, 605. Knupfie V, Knickerbocker Ice Co. (84 N. Y. 488), 1301, 1441. Kobs V. City of Minneapolis (33 Minn. 159), 1145. Koehler v. Hill.(60 Iowa, 617), 159. Koestenbader v. Price (41 Iowa, 204), 702. Koester v, Ottumwa (34 Iowa, 43), 746. Koetke v. Ringer (46 Minn. 259), 1363. Kokorao V. Mahan (100 Ind. 343), 1095, 1111, 1129, 1153. Kolb V. O'Bfien (86 111. 310), 319. Konrad v. Rogers (70 Wis. 493; 36 N. W. Rep. 261», 663. Koonce v. Comm'rs &c. (106 N. C. 192; 10 S. E. Rep. 1038). 1543. Koontz V. Burgess &c. of Hancock (64 Md. 134; 20 Atl. Rep. 1039), 390, 1391. KoppikusD. Capitol Comm'rs (16 Cal. • 258), 870. Korah v. Ottawa (33 111. 139; 83 Am. Deo. 355), 539. Kornburg v. Board of Comm'rs (10 Mont. 325; 35 Pao. Rep. 1041), 890. Koshkonong v. Burton (104 U. S. 668), 958. TABLE OF OASES. cxlix [The references are to pages: Vol. Kosmak v. City of New York (53 Hun, 329; 6 N. Y. Supl. 453),, 1099. Eountze v. Oraaha (5 Dill. 443), 1364. Kraft V. Keokuk (14 Iowa, 86), 1577. Kramer v. Cleveland &c. R. Co. (5 Ohio St. 140), 690, 696. . Kranirath v. Albany (53 Hun, 206), 285. Kramrath v. City of Albany (127 N. Y. 575), 845. Kranz V. Baltimore (64 Md. 491), 777, 1137. Kreidler v. State (24 Ohio St. 22)^ 175. Kreigh v. City of Chicago (86 111. 407), 1208. Kress v. State (65 Ind. 106), 217, 338. Krickle v. Commonwealth (1 B. Mod. (Ky.) 261), 533. Krippendorf v. Hyde (110 U. S. 276). 334. Kroeger v. Pitoairn (101 Pa. St. 311; 47 Am. Eep. 718), 315. Kroop V. Forman (:il Mich. 144), 683. Kucheman v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (46 Iowa, 360), 679. Kuhn V. Board of Education (4 West Va. 99), 110. Kundingert). Saginaw (59 Mich. 355), 692. Knnkle v. Town of Franklin (13 Minn. 127), 941. Kunz V. Tracy (16 N. Y. St. Rep. 459), 781. Kuhz V. Troy (104 N. Y. 344), 1444, 1463, 1474, 1475. Kurtz V. Boylston Market Ass'n (14 Gray, 252). 1441. • Kuschke v. City of St. Paul (Minn., 47 N. W. Rep. 786). 1140. Kyle V. Kyle (55 Ind. 387). 1420. Kyle V. Malin (8 Ind. 34), 93, 1160, 1174, 1383. Kynaston v. Shrewsbury (2 Str. 1051), 370. L. JJa Crosse City v. Town of Melrose (22 Wis. 459), 1483. Ladd V. City of 'East Portland (18 Oregon, 87; 23 Pao. Rep. 538), 500, 510. Ladd V. Clements (4 Cush. 477), 343, 344. Ladd V. Franklin (37 Conn. 62), 817. Lade v. Shepherd (2 Str. 1004), 140B. Ladue, In re (118 N. Y. 213), 1412. Lafayette v. Cox (5 Ind. 38), 92, 932. Lafayette v. Cummins (3 La. Ann. 673), 1369. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n. pp. 789-1605.] , La Fayette v. Fowler (34 Ind. 140), 1163, 1188, 1399. Lafayette v. James (92 Ind. 240 ; 42 Am. Rep. 140), 321. Lafayette v. Jenners (10 Ind. 70), 60. La Fayette v. Larson (73 Ind. 367), 1222. Lafayette v. Male Orphan Asylum (4 La. Ann. 1), 1166. Lafayette v. Schultz (44 Ind. 97), 703. Lafayette v. State (29 Ind. 218), 375. Lafayette v. Timberlake (S8 Ind. .S30), 264, 744. 775. : La Fayette v. Wortman (107 Ind. ' 404; 8N. E. Rep. 277), 1153. Lafayette &c. R. Co. v. Geiger (34 Ind. 185). 64, 67, 87, 932. Lafayette &c. Ry. Co. v. Winslow (66 111. 219), 699. Lafayette City v. Blood (40 Ind. 62), 1484. Lafon V. Dufroy (9 La. Ann. 350), 1263. Lagare v. City of Chicago (111., 28 N. E. Rep. 934), 606. Lahr v. Railroad Co. (104 N. Y. 268), 615. Laird v. De Soto (33 Fed. Rep. 431), 419, 431, 474. Lake v. City of Decatur (91 111. 600), 1074. Lake v. Florida (18 Fla. 501), 60. Lake v. Williamsburg (4 Denio, 520), 1160. Lake &c. Water Co. v. Contra Costa Co. (67 Cal. 659), 686. Lake County v. Graham (130 TJ. S. 674), 835, 963. Lake Countv v. Rollins (130 U. S. 663; 9 S."Ct. Rep. 651), 835, Lake County Comm'rs v. State (34 Fla. 363; 4 So. Rep. 995), 440. Lake Shore &c. Rv. Co v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (97 111. 506), 591. Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co. (116 Ind. 578), 675, 690, 1420. Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. City of Chicago (56 111. 454), 1074. Lake View v. Letz (44 III. 81), 520. Lake View u. Tate (130 111. 247; 22 N. E. Rep. 791), 1210. Laker v. Bi-ookline (13 Pick. 343), 330. Lally V. Holland (1 Swan (Tenn.), 396), 22.'». Lamar v. Board of Com m' is (Ind,, 30N. E. Rep. 912), IQll. Lamb v. Burlington &c. R. Ca (39 Iowa, 333), 428, 1368. Lamb v. Lane (6 Ohio St. 167), 696. Lambar v. City of St. Louis (15 Mo. 610), 1436. d TABLE OF OASES. pEhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. l-WSj Vol. U, pp. 789-1605.] Lambert v. People (76 N. Y. 320)^ 199. Lambert v. Thornton (1 Ld. Ray In. 91), 487. Lamborn v. Coram'rs of Dickinson County (97 U. S, l&l). 241, 244, 245, 246. Lament v. Hajght (44 How. Ft. 1), 381. Lamm v. Chicago R. Co. (45 Minn. 71), 1422, 1433. Lamm v. Port Deposit &e. Associa- tion (49 Md. 283), 257. Laramert v. Ledwell (62 Mo. 18S), 64. Lammon v. Fenster (111 TJ. S, 17), 333. La Moille Valley &c. R. Co. v. Fair- field (51 Vt. 357), 932, 906. Lamson v. Newburyport (14 Allen, 30), 990. Lamcaater v. ClavtoH (86 Ky. 373), 1397. Lancaster v. Fulton (J28 Pa. St. 481 ; 18 Atl. Rep. 384; 24 W. N. C. 401). 629. Lancaster County Poor Directors v. Hartman (9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 177), 994, 999. Land v. Allen (65 Miss. 455; 4 So. Rep. 117). 907. Land Co. v. Buffalo County (15 Neb. 605; 19 N. W. Rep. 711), 403. Land Grant &c. Co. v. Coffey County >(6Ean. 8«), 1434. Land, Log; & Lumber Co. v. Brown (73 Wis. 894; 40 N. W. Kep.482), 60, 560. 561, 1364. 1365. Landers v. Staten Island R. Co. (53 N. Y. 450), 1254. Landis v. Borough of Vineland (N. J., 1893; 30 N. E. Rep. 357), 525. Landgrove v. Plymouth (52 Vt. 503), 994. Lands v. Richmond (31 Gratt, 571; 31 Am. Rep. 742), 1123. Lane, Ex parte (76 Cal. 587), 541, 1264. Lane v. Baker (13 Ohio, 237), 1845. Lane v. Commonwealth (103 Pa. St. 481), 158. Lane v. Cotton (1 Salk. 17), 219. Lane v. ^mbden (73 Me. 354), 371, 947, 958. Lane v. Oregon (7 Wall. 71), 532. Lane v. Saginaw^ (53 Mich. 542), 693. Lane v. Schomp (30 N. J. Eq. 82), 961. Lane v. School Dist. (10 Met. 462), 259, 640. Lane V. Woodbury Tp. (58 Iowa, 463), 14S5. Lanfear v. Mayor (4 La. 97; 28 Am. Dec 477), 587, 1048. Langan v. Atchison (35 Kan. 318), 149S. Langdon v. Castleton (30 Vt. 285), 183, 185, 711. Lange v. Benedict (73 N. Y. 12), 318. Langford v. Coram'rs (16 Minn. 875), 690. Langford V. United States (101 U. S. 341), 740, 741. Laoghorne v. Robinson (20 Gratt. * 661), 933, 1109. 1383, 1399. Lansfltois v. City of Oohoes (11 N. Y. S^pl. 908; 58 Hun, 226)^ 1076, 1487. Langsdale v. Bouton (12 Ind. 467),- 1370. Langstafl v. Dalv(49 N. J. Law, 356), 906. Langstpn V. South Carolina R. Co. (3 S. C. 348), 9p9. Lang.worthy v. Dubuque (16 Iowa, 271), 110, 1366, 1367. Lanier v. Mayor (o9 Ga. 187), 1357. Lanier v. Padgett (18 Fla. 848), 816. Lanigan v. N. Y. Gas Light Co. (71 U. Y. 29), 1493. Lanman v. Des Moines (29 Iowa, 310), 1578. Lanning v. Carpenter (30 N, Y. 474), 70. Lanpher v. Dewell (56 Iowa, 153), Lansing v. Carroll (4 Cowen, 190), 1417. Lansing v. Toolan (37 Mich. 152; 33 MieJh. 315), 1437. Lansing v. Treasurer (1 Dill. 522), 1S6I. Lansing v. Van Gorder (34 Mich. 456). 1600. Lapham v. Rice ((55 N. Y. 472), 1438. La Pointe v. O'Malley (47 Wis^ 333), 432. Laramie County v. Albany County (93 U. S. 807), 15, 109, 451, 1366, 138::?. Lareau v. Davigfidn (5 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 367), 141. Laredo v. Maedonell (62 Tex. 511). 640. Laredo v. Nail© (65 Tex. 359), 1.597. La»gen v. State (76 Tex. 333; 13 S. W. Rep. 161), 99, 133, 471. Larkin v.. Bostoa (138 Mass. 531), 1481. Larkin v. Burlington &c. Ry. Co. (Iowa. 1892; 53 N. W. Rep. 480), 526, 1266. Larned v. AH«n (13 Mass. 395), 826. Lamed v. Briscoe (62 Mich. 393), 339. TABLE OF OASES. cli [The references are te pages: Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] LaTned v. Burlington (4 Wall. 276), 794. Larney v. Cleveland (34 Ohio St. 599), 539. •Larsh u. Des Moines (74 Iowa, 513; 38 N. W. Eep. 884), 1490, 1494. Lassen County v. Shinn (88 Cal. 510; 26 Pac. Eep. 365). 796. Latham's Appeal (80 Pa. St. 465), 844. Lathrop «. Bowen (121 Mass. 107), 1591. Lathrop v. State (6 Blackf. (Ind.) 503), 1334. Luthrop i>. Town of Sunderland (Vt., 23 Atl. Rep. 619). 132:i. Latta V. Williams (87 N. C. 126), 1357. Lauenstein v. Fond du Lac (28 Wis. 3:^6), 283. Launder v. City of Chicago (111 111. 291). 601. Laundry License Case (13 Fed. Eep. 239), 1241. Laundry License Cases (33 Fed.- Eep. 701), 1234. Launtz v. People (113 111. 137; 55 Am. Eep. 405), 169, 294, 898, 299, 493. Laurel v. Blue (1 Ind. App. 128 ; 27 N. E. Rep. 301), 1014. Lavalle v. Song (96 111. 467). 1544. Lavery v. Hannigan (30 J. & Sp. 463). 1464. Law V. Fairfield (46 Vt. 435), 783. Law V. Johnston (114 Ind. 439), 1180. Law V. Lewis (46 Cal. 549), 1397. Law V. People (87 111. 385). 790, 870. Lawber v. Mayor &b. of N. Y. (5 Abb. Pr. 325). 13. Lawhorne, Ex parte (18 Gratt. 85), 175. Lawrence v. Bassett (5 Allen, 140), 1591. Lawrence v. Boston (119 Mass. 136), 699. Lawrence v. Fairhaven (5 Gray, 110), 7B0. Lawrence v. Hanley (Mich., 47 N. W. Eep. 753), 1532, 1523. Lawrence v. Ingersoll (88 Tenn. 53; 12 S. W. Eep. 422; 6 L. R. A. 308; 17 Am. St. Eep. 870), 166, 168, 169, 175, 395, 299, 381, 494. Lawrence v. Mt. Vernon (35 Me. 100), 1467. Lawrence v. Trainer (136 111. 474; 87 N. E. Eep. 197), 277, 282, 800, 802, 1327, 1340. Lawrence County v. Hudson (41 Ark. 494), 856. Lawrence County v, Eailroad Co. (81 Ky. 225), 15. Lawson v. Milwaukee &c. E. Co. (30 Wis. 597), 937. Lawton v. Commissioners (2 Caines (N. Y.). 179). 1S68. Lawton v. Erwin (9 Wend. 233), 310. Lay V. Wissman (36 Iowa, 305), 957. Laycock v. Baton Eouge (35 La. Ann. 475), 330, 643, 845. Layton v. New Orleans (12 La. Ann. 515), 392, 404, 13«6, 1371, 1372. Ld. Cromwell's Case (Dver, 383), 487. Lea V. Hernandez (10 Tex. 137). 465. Leach v. Cargill (60 Mo. 316), 1171. Leach v. County of Wilson (('8 Tex. 353: 4S. W. Rep. 613), 918. Leach v. People (12 J 111. 420), 199. Lead villa u. Matthews (10 Colo. 135; 14 Pac. Rep. 112), 179. Learned v. Burlington (3 Am. Law Eeg. (N. S.)394), 15185. Learoyd v. Godfrey (138 Mass. 315), 1500. Leasure v. Mahoning Township (8 West. Eep. 551), 618. Leath v. Summers (3 Ired. Law, 108), 694. Leavenworth v. Casey (MoCahon's Eep. 123), 1198. Leavenworth v. Mills (6 Kan. 388), 1600. Leavenworth v. Norton (1 Ean. 433), 1385. Leavenworth v. Rankin (8 Ean. 357), 330, 254, 642. Leavenworth &o. R. Co. v. Platte County Court (43 Mo. 171), 936, 937. Leaven worth. County v. Barnes (94 U. S. 70), 947. Leavenworth County v. Brewer (9 Kan. 307), 186. Leavenworth County v. Miller (7 Kan. 479), 933. Leavenworth County Comm'rs v. Sellew (99 U. S. 634), 881. Leavitt v. Eastman (77 Me. 117), 1336. Lebcher v. Comm'rs' of Custer County (9 Mont. 315; 33 Pac. Eep. 713), 634. Le Claire v. Davenport (13 Iowa, 210), 106, 1244. Le Clerq v. GallipoliS (7 Ohio, 354), 634. Lecoul V. Police Jury (20 La. Ann. 308), 683, 1295. Le Cooteulx v. City of Buffalo (33 N. Y. 333), 654. Le Duo I'. Hastings {39 Minn. 110), 1353. Ledvard v. Ten Eyck (36 Barb. 102), 1404. clii TABLE OF CASES. prhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Lee V. Minneapolis (23 Minn, 13), 677. 758, 1145. Lee V. Munroe (7 Cranch. 366), 314. Lee V. School Dist. (71 Mich. 371), 1348. Lee V. Terapleton (13 Gray, 476), 245, 1577. Lee V. Thomas (49 Mo. 112), 1363, 1364. Lee V. Troy &c. Co. (98 N. Y. 115), 1504. Lee V. Trustees &o. (7 Dana (Ky,), 28), 666. Lee V. Trustees &c. (36 N. J. Eq. 581 ; 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 560), 1394. Lee V. Village of Sandy Hill (40 N. Y. 443), 774. Lee V. Wallis (1 Kenyon, 295), 534, 535. Lee V. Waring (3 Desauss. (S. C.) 57), 312. Lee County v. Graham. (130 U. S. 674), 962. Lee County v. Lackie (30 Ark. 764), 988. Leech v. State (78 Ind. 570), 202. Leeds v. City of Richmond (103 Ind. 372), 681, 708. 777, 1095. Leeper v. South Bend (106 Ind. 375), 1365. Lees V. Child (17 Mass. 351), 705. Lees V. City of Richmond (31 Barb. 142), 1600. Lefevre v. Detroit (2 Mich. 586), 1166. Lehew v. Brummel (103 Mo. 546), 1845. Lehigh Co. v. Hoffort (116 Pa. St. ' 119), 264, 775, 785.' Lehigh County v. Kleckner (5 Watts & a 181), 1589. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Chicago (38 Fed. Rep. 415), 1128. Lehigh Valley Ins. Co. v. Fuller (81 Pa. St. 396), 1588. Lehigh Water Company's Appeal (102 Pa. St. 515), 587, 1301. Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton (121 tJ. S. 391), 567, 568. Lehn v. City of San Francisco (66 Cal. 76), 1136. Leigh V. State (69 Ala. 261). 389. Leisse v. St. Louis &c. R. Co. (8 Mo. App. 105; 5 Mo. App. 185; 72 Mo. 501), 698. Leitch V. Wells (48 N. Y. 586), 964. Leland v. Long Branch Coram'rs (42 N. J. Law, 875), 1064. Leloup V. Port of Mobile (127 U. S. 640), 1240. Lemmon v. People (20 N. Y. 562), 144. Lemon v. Newton (184 Mass. 476), 778. Lemont v. Singer &c. Co. (98 111. 94), 1568, 1571. Le Neve v. Mile End (8 El. & Bl. 1054), 1403. Lennington v. 31odg«tt (37 Vt. 310), , 238, 349. Lennon v. New York (55 N. Y. 361), 489. Lenon v. Mayor (55 N. Y. 363), 1189. Lent V. Tillson (72 Cal. 404). 1067. Lent V. Tillson (140 U. S. 316; 11 S. Ct. Eep. 835), 558. Lenz V. Sherrott (36 Mich. 139), 528. Leonard v. Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 498), 1381. Leonard v. City of Canton (35 Miss. 189), 93, 244, 651, 1233. Leonard v. Commonwealth (112 Pa. St. 607), 376. Leonard i;. Holyoke (138 Mass. 78), 1483. Leonard v. Peacock (8 Nev. 157), 1576. Le Roy v. New York (4 Johns. Ch. 352), 1571, 1572. Lerov v. New York (20 Johns. 430), 1576. Lescouzeve v. Ducatel (18 La. Ann. 470), 331. Lester v. Baltimore (29 Md. 415), 1577. Lethbridge v. Mayor &c. (15 N. Y. Supl. 563), 183. Levee Co. v. Hardin (37 Mo. 496), 1134, 1135. Lever v. McGlachlin (38 Wis. 364), 390. Levery v. Nickerson (130 Mass. 306), 765. Levy V. Salt Lake City (Utah, 16 Pac. Rep. 598; 1 Pac. Rep. 160), 1099. Levy «. State (6 Ind. 281), 1035. Lewey's Islapd R. Co. v. Bolton (48 Me. 451), 350. Lewis v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 756), 1468. Lewis V. Bourbon County (12 Kan. 186), 936, 966. Lewis V, Brown Township (109 U. S. 162),, 964. Lewis V. City of New Britain (53 Con^. 568). 1070. Lewis V. Comm'rs (16 Kan. 102). 389. Lewis V. Jersey City (51 N. J. Law, 240), 1533. Lewis V. Mayor &c. (9 C. B. (N. S.) 401), 658, 663. Lewis V. N. Y. &c. R. Co. (133 N. Y. 496), 1414. Lewis V. St. Lpuis (4 Mo. App. 563), ' 1061. TABLE OF OASES. cliii [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Lewis V. Sherman County (3 Mc- Crary, 464), 931. Lewis V. Sherman County Comm'rs (5 F^d. Rep. 269), 931. Lewis V. Shreveport (3 Woods (C. C), 205), 941. Lewis V. Shreveport (108 U. S. 283), 308, 230, 256, 563, 639, 933. Lewis V. Spencer (7 West Va. 689j, 1571. Lewis V. State (31 Ark. 209), 1255. Lewis V. State of New Yorli (96 N. Y. 71), 740, 741, 743. Lewiston v. Fairfield (47 Me. 481), 541. Lewiston v. Proctor (23 111. 533), 539. Lexington v. Butler (14 Wall. 282), 909, 947, 955, 957. Lexington v. Headley (5 Bush, 508), 543, 1171, 1174, 1266. 1269. Lexington v. Long (31 Mo. 369), 703, 1263. Lexington v. Lull (30 Mo. 480), 1361. Lexington v. Mulliken (7 Gray, 280). 1376. Lexington &c. R. Co. v. Applegate (8 Dana, 289), 1143. Libby v. County of Anoka (38 Minn. 448; 38 N. W. Rep. 205), 856. Libby v. West St. Paul (14 Minn. 278), 1576. Liberty v. Hurd (74 Me. 101), 15T8. Liberty i>. Palermo (79 Me. 473; 10 Atl. Rep. 455), 994. Liberty Bell. The (23 Fed. Rep. 843), 1568, 1580, Lieb V. Wheeling (7 West Va. 501), 1374. Liebman v. City and County of San Francisco (11 Sawyer, 147), 1067. Liebstein v. Newark (34 N. J. Eq. 203), 1130. Li£Bu V. Town of Beverly (145 Mass. 549; 14 N B. Rep. 787), 1483. Ligare v. City of Chicago (111., 28 N. E. Rep. 934), 587. Light V. State (14 Kan. 489), 375. Lightborne v. Taxing District (4 Lea (Tenn.), 219), 13.55. Lilly V. Taylor (88 N. C. 489), 1371. Lima v. Cemeterv Ass'n (43 Ohio St. 158), 1165. Lincoln v. Beckman (33 Neb. 677; 37 N. W. Rep. 593), 1470. Lincoln v. Boston (148 Mass. 578), 364, 756, 760. Lincoln v. Cambria Iron Co. (103 U. S. 513), 946. Lincoln v. Chapin (133 Mass. 470), 208. Lincoln v. Stockton (75 Me. 141), 331, 643, 713. Lincoln v. Woodward (19 Neb. 359; 37 N. W. Rep. 110). 1174. Lincoln v. Worcester (8 Cush. 51), 1576. Lincoln City v. Smith (28 Neb. 763; 45 N. W. Rep. 41), 1451. Lincoln County v. Oneida County (Wis., 50 N. W, Rep. 344), 887. Linden v. Supervisors &c. of Ala- meda County (45 Cal. 6), 343, 1549, 1550. Lindley I'. Polk County (Iowa, 50 N. W. Rep. 975), 760, 1014. Lindsay v. Chicago (115 111. 13Q), 513, 1369. Lindsay v. Des Moines (68 Iowa, 368), 1451, 1488, 14S9. Linehan v. Cambridge (109 Mass. 212), 657. Linford v. Fitzrov (13 Q. B. 240), 218. Lingo V. Burford (Mo., 18 S. W. Rep. 1081), 1155. Lingo V. Burford (Mo.,30S. W. Rep. 459), 1415. Lining u Bentham (2 Bay(S. C), 1), 338. Linnehan v. Lampson (126 Mass. 506), 1493. Linneus v. Duskey (19 Mo. App. 30), 604. Linneus v. Sidney (70 Me. 114), 990. Linton v. Athens (53 Ga. 588), 1365. Lionberger v. Rowse (43 Mo. 67), 13.59. Lipes V. Hand (104 Ind. 503), 696, 703, 1066, 1098. Lippelman v. Cincinnati (4 OhioCir. Ct. 337), 1083. Lippincott v. Pana (93 111. 24), 935, 944. Lippman v. South Bend (84 Ind. 276), 541. Lipps V. City (38 Pa. St. 503). 592. Lisbon v. Clark (18 N. H. 234), 529. Lisso V. Red River (89 La. Ann. 492), 610. List V. Wheeling (7 West Va. 501), 832, 843. Litchfield v. Ballou (114 U. S 190), 834. Litchfield v. Londonderry (39 N. H. 247), 995. Litchfield V. McComber (43 Barb. 288). 1181. Litchfield v. Parker (64 N. H. 443; 14 Ath Rep. 735), 611. Litchfield v. Polk County (18 Iowa, 70'. 648. Litchfield v. Vernon (41 N. Y. 133), 1163, 1169, 1383. Littpn V. School Tp. (127 Ind. 82; 26 N. E. Rep. 567), 815, 1330. Little ?'. City of Madison (49 Wis. 605), 764. cliv TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Little V. Merrill (10 Pick. 543), 227, 344, 1335. Little V. Moore (4 N. J. Law. 74). 217. Little Falls v. Bernards (44 N. J. Law, 621), 978, 981. Littlefield v. City of Norwich (40 Conn. 406), 1150. Little Eock v. Board of Improve- ments (42 Ark. 152), 281, 1124. Little Bock v. Katzenstein (Ark., 12 S. W. Rep. 198), 1134. Little Rock v. Merchants' Nat. Bank (98 U. S. 3081, 928, 959. Little Rock v. Parish (36 Ark. 166), 94. 110. Little Rock v. Willis (37 Ark. 572), 9. Littlewort v. Davis (50 Miss. 403), 1321. Livermore v. Camden (31 N. J. Law, 508), 769, 787, 1435. Liverpool Water- works v, Atkinson (6 East, 507), 329. Livingston v. Lynch (4 Johns. Ch. 696), 1028. Livingston v. Mayor &c. of New , York (8 Wend. 85), 1163. 1411. Livingston v. Paducah (80 Ky. 656), 13T0. Livingston v. Pippin (31 Ala. 542), 208. ■ Livingston v. Wilder (53 111. 203), 1389 Livingston v. Wolf (136 Pa. St. 519), 1303. Livingston County v, Darlington (101 U. S. 407), 1362. , Livingston County v. Portsmouth Bank (138 U. S. 102), 943. Lloyd V. New York (5 N. Y. 369), 749. League v. Taxing Dist. of B;:owns- ville (35 Fed. Rep. 742), 475. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka (20 Wall. 655), 559, 619, 840, 929, 930, 933, 1372, 1884, 1387, 1393. Locke V. Central City (4 Colo. 65), 180, 183. Locke V. Davison (111 III. 19), 791. Locke V. Rochester (5 Lans. (N. Y.) 11), 303. Locke V. United States (3 Mason, 446), 333. Lockhart v. Railway Co. (139 Pa. St. 419), 678, 679. 680. Lockhart v. Troy (48 Ala. 579), 290. Lock wood V. St. Louis (34 Mo. 20), 1135, 1159, 1166, 1167, 1573. Lodie V. Arnold (3 Salk. 458), 1048. Loeb V. Attica (82 Ind. 175), 1241; Loeb V. Railroad Co. (118 111. 208), 1456. Loesnitz v. Seelinger (137 Ind. 432; 25 N. E. Rep. 1037), 1089, 1189. Loewer v. Sedalia City (77 Mo. 431), 1502, Loftin V. Citizens'- Bank (85 Ind. 346), 1369. Logan . V. Pyne (43 Iowa, 524 ; 23 Am. Rep. 261), 568, 612, 637. Logan County v, Lincoln (81 111. 156), 1024, 1394. " Logansport v. Blakemore (17 Ind. 318), 945. Logansport v. Crockett (64 Ind. 319), 301, 489, 711, 1269. 1272. Ld|ansport v. Dick (70 Ind. 65), 1444. Logansport D. Dvkeman (116 Ind. 15; 17 N. E. Rep. 587), 301, 708, 840, 971, 1126. Logansport v. Humphrey (84 Ind. 467), 360, 565. Logansport v. Justice (74 Ind. 378), 1479. Logansport v. La Rose (99 Ind. 117; 8 Am. &i Eng. Corp. Cas. 512), 1400, 1524. Logansport v. Legg (20 Ind. 315), 292, 294, 1173. Logansport v. Pollard (50 Ind. 151), 1153. Logansport v. Seybold (59 Ind. 235), 405, 1365. Logansport v. Shirk (88 Ind. 563), 673. Logansport v. Wright (25 Ind. 512), 1099, 1137. Lohr V. Metropolitan R. Co. (104 N. Y. 368), 1433. "' Loker v. Brookline (13 Pick. 343), 634, 642. Lombar v. East Tawas (86 Mich. 14), 1486. Lombard v. Stearns (4 Cush. 60), 686. London v. Wilmington (78 N. C. 109), 1370. Londonderry v. Andover (28 Vt. 416), 91, 93. Londoner v. People (15 Colo. 557; 26 Pac. R6p. 135), 173. Long V. Boone County (36 Iowa, 60), 644. Long V. Charleston (103 Mass. 378), 1350. Long V. City of Duluth (Minn., 51 N. W, Rep. 913), 565. 566. Long V. Fuller (68 Pa. St. 170), 686. Long V. Long (57 Iowa, 497), 219. Long I'. Mayor &c. (81 N. Y. 425). 199. Long V. Strauss (107 Ind. 94; 6 N. E. Rep. 133; 7 N. E. Rep. 763), 815. Long V. Taxing District (7 Lea, 134), 518. Longan i'. Taylor (31 111. App. 363 ; 130 111. 413; 33 N. E. Rep. 745), 866, 1333. TABLE OF CASKS. clv [The rrfereBoes«i« to pages: Vd. I, pp. 1-788^ Vol. D, pp. 789-1605.] Longworthy v. City of Dubuque (13 Iowa, 86), 412. liook V. Industry (51 Me. 37S), 1578. Look Tin Sins, In re (31 Fed. Rep. 905; 17 Chicago Leg. News, 57), 137, 138, 141, 148. Loorais V. Spence (1 Ohio St. 153), 933. Loomis V. Wadhams (8 Gray, 538), 1591. Leper V. State (Kan., S9 Pac. Rep. 687). 853. Lopp V. Woodward (Ind., 37 N. E. Rep. 575), 866. Lord V. Anoka (36 Minn. 176; 30 N. W. Rep. 550), 377. Lord V. Meadville Water Co. (Pa., 19 Atl. Rep. 1007; 36 W. N. C. 110). 1304. Lord V. Oconto (47 Wis. 386), 283. 634. Lord V. The Governor &c. (3 Phill. 740). 398. Lord Bruce's Case (2 Str. 819), 203, 204. Lorillard v. Monroe (13 Barb. 161), 1578. Lorillard v. Town of Monroe (11 N. Y. 393), 785, 1038. Los Angeles v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (R7 Cal. 433), 1358. Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Toberman (61 Cal. 199), 259. Loser v. Board of Managers (Mich., 52 N. W. Rep. 956), 1008. Lott V. City of Waycross (84 Ga. 681; 11 S. E. Rep. 558), 847. Lott V. Morgan (41 Ala. 246), 1388. Lott V. Ross (38 Ala. 156), 1160, 1171. Lott V. Swezey (29 Barb. 87), 1185. Lottman v. San Francisco (20 Cal. 96), 254, 63C. , Loud V. Charleston (99 Mass. 208), 1573. Loughbridge v. Harris (43 Ga. 500), 682. Loughran v. Citv of Des Moines (73 Iowa, 383; 34 N. W. Rep. 172), 1099. Loughridge v. Huntington (66 Ind. 252), 506. Louisiana v. Jumel (107 U. S. 711), 20. Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans (109 U. S. 285), 425. 756, 1374. Louisiana v. Pilsbury (105 U. S. 291), 425, 1369. Louisiana v. Taylor (105 U. S, 454), 943. Louisiana v. Wood (103 U. S. 294), 237, 628, 954. Louisiana Ice Mfg. Co. v. City of New Orleans (La., 9 So. Rep. 31), 1084. K Louisville «. Anderson <79 Ey. 831; 3 Am, & Eng. Corp. Cas. 685), 1899. Louisville v. Commonwealth (1 Duv. 295), 572, 1380, lS97. Louisville v. Henning (1 Bush (Ky.), 381). 348, 1352, 1354. Louisville v. Hyatt (2 B. Mon. 177), 1174. Louisville v. Kean (18 Binn. 9), 1549. Louisville v. McKegney (7 Bush (Ky.), 651), 1368. Louisville v. Murphy (Ky., 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 431), 659. Louisville v. Nevin (10 Bush, 549; 19 Am. Rep. 78), 1165. Louisville v. Pillsbury (105 U. S. 378), 537. Louisville v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank (104 U. S. 469), 944. Louisville v. Webster (108 111. 414), 1247. Louisville &c. R. Co, v. City of East St. Louis (134 111. 656; 35 N. E. Rep. 962), 1083, 1168. Louisville , 1345. McMillen v. Anderson (95 17. S. 37), 692, 1179, 1180, 1387. McNair v. Ostrander (Wash., 23 Pac. Rep. 414), 1161. MoN^Uy V. Cohoes (53 Hun, 202 ; 6 N.Y. Supl.,842), 784, 1474. McNamara v. Estes (22 Iowa, 246), 1160, 1161. MoNeal v. Gloucester City (N. J., 18 Atl. Rep. 112), 1589. McNutt V. Livingston (7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 641), 223. McOsker v. Burrell (55 Ind. 435), 218. McPheetersD. Wright (110 Ind. 519), 1340. McPherson V. Chebanse (114 111 46), 513, 1244. McPherson v. Foster (43 Iowa. 48), 840, 842, 901, 1215, 130/', 1374. McPherson v. Nichols (Kan., 29 Pac, Rep. 679), 708), 1268. McPike V. Pen (51 Mo. 63). 375. McPike V. Pew (48 Mo. 585). 1573, McQuillen v. Hatton (42 Ohio St. 202), 683. McRea v. Americus (59 Ga. 168), 515. McSherry if. Canandaigua Village (129 N. Y. 612), 1439. McSpedon v. Mayor &c. (15 How. 428), 252. McTeer v. Lebow (85 Tenn. 121). 218. McVeany v. Mayor &c. of New York (eO N. Y. 185), 388. MoVerry v. Boyd (89 Cal, 304; 26 Pac. Rep. 885), 1163. MoVichie v. Town of Knight (Wis., 51 N. W. Rep. 1094), 343, 347, 350, 351. Mabon v. Halsted (30 N. J. Law, 640), 697, 698. Macauley v. New York (67 N. Y. 602). 772, 1403. MacDonald v. New York (68 N. Y. 23), 230. Mace V. Nottingham West (1 N. H. 52), 989. Mack V. Jones (21 N. H. 393>, 618, 1396. Mackey v. Columbus Townshi;] (71 Mich. 227; 38 N. W. Rep. 899), 1092. MacLean v. Circuit Judge (53 Mich. 257), 1536, Macklin v. Trustees (88 Ky. 592), 11 S. W. Rep. 657), 801, 1340. Macklot V. Davenport (17 Iowa, 379), 218, 1576. Macomber v. Nichols (34 Mich. 212), 1403. Macomber v, Taunton 000 Mass. 255). 1468. Macon v. Bank (60 Ga. 133), 1359. Macon v. Jones (67 Ga. 489),' 1350. Macon v. Patty (57 Miss. 378: 34 Am. Rep. 451), 1123, 1163, 1169, 1182. Macon County Case (99 U. S. 582), 1373. Macon County v. Shores (97 U. S. 272), 944, 947, 956. Macy V. Citv of Indianapolis (17 Ind. 367), 1095. Madden v. Smeltz (2 C. C. Rep. (Ohio), 168). 547. Maddox v. Graham (2 Met. (Ky.) 56), 281, 93l\ 1378, 1549. Maddox: v. Neal (45 Ark. 121), 1345. Maddux v. City of Newport (Ky., 14 S. W. Rep. 957), 1078. Madison v. Baker (103 Ind. 41), 1484. Madison v. Korbly (32 Ind. 74), 176, 303, 207. TABLE OF CASES. clxi [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Madison v. Smith (83 Ind. 503), 1128. Madison v. "Whitney (31 Ind. 261), 1359. Madison County v. People (58 111. 456), 619. Madison Overseers v. Poor Directors (9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 435). 985. Madison Tp. v. Dun]£le(114 Ind. 262), 820, 854. Madry i). Cox (73 Tex. 538; 11 S. W. Rep. 541), 404. 416, 1367. Maers V. Reading (21 Pa. St. 188), 125. Magee v. City of Troy (1 N. Y. Supl. 24), 884, 1463, 1476. Magee v. Commonwealth (46 Pa. St. 358), 592, 1186. Magee v. Supervisors (10 Cal. 376), 389. Magie v. Stoddard (25 Conn. 065), 200. Magill V. Kauffman (4 Serg. & R. 317), 238. Magneau v. Citv of Fremont (30 Neb. 843; 47 N. W. Rep. 280), 275, 277, 278, 356. Maguire v. City of Cootersville (76 Ga, «4), 1096. Maguire t>. Middlesex R, Co. (115 Mass. 239), 1477. Maguire v. Smock (42 Ind. 1), 1174. Maguire v. State Saving Institution (63 Mo. 344), 1577. Mahady v. Bush wick R. Co. (91 N. Y. 149 1, 1433. Mahaska County v. Ingalls (16 Iowa, 81), 337. , Maher v. Chicago (38 111. 266), 236, 237, 645. Maher v. Railroad Co. (91 111. 312), 1456. Mahony v. Bank (4 Ark. 630), 56. Main v. Ft. Smith (49 Ark. 480), 287, 1175. Mairs v. Manhattan &c. Ass'n (89 N. Y. 503), 1452, 1491. Makemson v. Eauffman (35 Ohio St. 444), 1190. Malchus V. Highlands (4 Bush, 547), 1169. Mallett V. Uncle Sam &c. Co. (1 Nev. 188), 178. I Mallorv v. Griffey (86 Pa. St. 275), 1468. Mallory v. Supervisors (2 Cowen, 531), 184. Malloy V. Walker Township (77 Mich. 448). 1471. Malone, Be (31 S. C. 435), 1345. Malone v. Murphy (2 Kan. 350), 1256. Malone v. Toledo (38 Ohio St. 643), 671. Manchester v. Hartford (30 Conn. 118), 1445, 1478. Manchester v. Reserve Tp. (4 Pa. St. 85), 1323. Maneval v. Township of Jackson (9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 28; 28 W. N. C. ISO; 21 Atl. Rep. 672), 791, 817. Manga m v. Brooklvn (98 N. Y. 585; 5 Am. Kep. 705), 187. Manice v. Mayor &c. (8 N. Y. 120), 1160, 1383. Mankato v. Arnold (36 Minn. 62; 30 N. W. Rep. 305), 1009. 1253. Mankato v. Fowler (33 Minn. 364), 1239. Manker». Faulhaber (94 Mo. 430; 6 S. W: Rep. 872), 97. 205, 206. Manley V. Emlen (46 Kan. 665; 27 Pac, Rep. 844), 1297. Mann v. Yazoo City (31 Miss. 574), 327. Manning v. Den (90 Cal. 610), 1183. Manning v. Fifth Parish (6 Pick. 6), 373, 1269. Mannix v. Stat« (115 Ind. 245). 1548. Manor v. McCall (5 Ga. 522), 1552. Mansfield w. Fuller (50 Mo. 338). 1376. Mansfield Village v. Moore (124 III. 133; 1« N. E. Rep. 246), 1449, 1488, 1490. Manuel u. Comm'rs (98 N. C. 9; 3 S. E. Rep. 829), 1014. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Dick- erson (41 N. J. Law, 448; 32 Am. Rep. 237). 333. Manufacturing Co. v. Rasey (69 Wis. 246 : 34 N. W. Rep. 85), 893. Manufacturing Co. v. Schell City (21 Mo. App. 175), 484. Marbec v. State (28 Ind. 86\ 321. Marble v. McKenney (60 Me. 332), 353, 373. Marble v. Whitney (28 N. Y. 297), 1406. Marble v. Worcester (4 Gray, 395), 1453. Marblehead v. County Comm'rs (5 Gray, 451), 705. Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch, 137), 314. March v. Commonwealth (12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 2.5), 103, 488, 528. March v. Scituate (153 Mass. 34). 361. Marchand v. Town of Maple Grove (Minn., 51 N. W. Rep. 606), 1418. Marchant v. Langworthy (6 Hill, 646; .3 Denio, 536). 346, 353. 1336. Marcy v. Taylot (19 111. 634), 1406. Marcy v. Townsliip of Oswego i93 U. S. 637), 834. 047, 951, 960, 961. Marden v. City of Boston (Mass., 29 N. E. Rep. 588), 881. Marietta v. Fearing (4 Ohio, 427), 9£L 109, 527. cisii TABLE OT 0A9ESt. pTIie references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 78*-1605J Marion v. . Epler (5 Ohio St. 250), 1188. Marion &o. R. Co. v. Cliamplin (37 Kan. 683). 1370. Marion County v. Clark (94 U. S. 278), 953, 956. Marion County, i). Harvey County (26 Kan. 181). 1368. Mark v. State (97 N. Y. 672), 117, 513. Market St. Ry. Co, v. Central Ry. Co. (51 Cal, 586), 1205. Markey v. City of Milwaukee (76 Wis. 849; 45 N. W. Rep. 28), 1095. Markle v. Akron (14 Ohio, 586), 487, 539, 1258. Marklee v. Wright (13 Ind. 548). 298. Marks v. Trustees (37 Ind. 155), 1166. Marlboro Tp. v. Freehold (50 N. J. Law, 509; 14 All. Rep. 595), 446, 981. Maruey v. State (18 Mo. 7), 820. Marquette County v. Ward (50 Mich, 174), 331. Marseilles v. Howland (124 111. 547), 1440. Marsh v. City of Brooklyn (59 N. Y. 280), 1134. Marsh v. Fulton Co. (10 Wall. 676), 280, 253, 256, 358, 628, 633, 640, 810, 936, 933, 934, 942, 946, 961, 966, 1374. Marsh v. Supervisors &c. (43 Wis. 502), 1571. Marsh v. Town of Little Valley (64 N. Y, 112; IHun, 554), 830. Marshall v. Comm'rs of Allegheny City (59 Pa. St. 455), 713, 1365. Marshall v. Donovan (10 Bush, 681), 1363. Marshall v. Harwood (5 Md. 438), 175, Marshall v. Silliman (61 111. 218), 937, 1383. Marshall v. Smith (L. R. 8 C. P. 416), 53S Marshall v. State (1 Ind. 72). 1524. Marshall v. Vicksburg (15 Wall. 146), 1388 Marshall County v. Cook (36 111. 44), 937, 961. Marshall County v. Johnson (137 Ind. 238; 26 N. E, Rep. 831), 184. Marshall County v. Schenck (5 Wall. 773), 257, 940. 947, 956. 961. Marshalltown v. Blum(58Iowa, 184), 1388. Marshalsea Case (10 Coke, 68), 217. Martin v. Brooklyn (1 Hill, 545), 6*3. Maiiin v. Brown (63 Tex. 48i), 1341. Martin v. Charleston (13 Rich. Eq. ■ 50), 1861. Martin v. T>\x (53 Miss. 53), 416, 670, 1365, 1367. Martin v. Gleason (139 Mass. 183; 29 N. E. Rep. 664), 670, 686. Martin v. Hilb (53 Ark, 300; 14 S. W, Rep. 94), 1094. Martin v. Lenion (26 Conn. 193), 296. Martin v. Mayor &c. (1 Hill, 545), 223, 250, 352, 6«4, 698, 699. Martin u Neal (125 Ind. 547; 35 N. E. Rep. 813). 898. Martin v. Stanabach (N. J., 23 Atl. ♦ Rep. 58), 978. Martin v. State (33 Neb. 371 ; 36 N. W. Rep. 554), 1544. Martin v. Towle (58 N. H. 31), 1487. Martin ?;. Town of Rosedale (Ind., 39 N. E. Rep. 410), 596, 1335. Martindale v. Martindale (10 Ind. 566), 539. Martindale v. Palmer (52 Ind. 411), 198, 373. 501. 533, 1075. Martinsville v. Frieze (38 Ind. 507), 542. Martz V. Long {In re Martz's Elec- tion) (110 Pa. St. 502; 1 Atl. Rep. 419), 161. Marvin v, McCullom (20 Johns. 288), 956. Marvin v. Town of Jacobs (77 Wis. 31; 45 N. W. Rep. 679), 918. Marvin v. United States (44 Fed. Rep. 405), 185. Marzpt V. Pittsburgh (137 Pa. St. 548: 20 Atl. Rep. 693; 37 W. N. C. 73). 649. Mass. Cent. R. Co. v. Boston &c. R. Co. (131 Mass. 124). 1213. Mason, In re (43 Fed. Rep. 510), 300. Mason v. Bristol fclO N. H. 36), 9f9. Mason v. City of Sioux Falls (So. Dak., 51 N. W. Rep. 770), 570, 571, 1065, 1163. Mason v. Tearson (9 How. 248), 1126. Mason v. Kennedy (Mo., 14 S. W. Rep. 514), 368. Mason v. Lancaster (4 Bush, 406), 1856. Mason v. Mayor &o. (35 N. J. Law, 190), 1533. Mason v. Messenger (17 Iowa, 261), 690. Mason v. School Dist. (20 Vt. 487), 344, 347, 3,50, 1386. Mason v. Shawneetown (77 III. 533), 539, 9.37. Mason v. Trustees (4 Bush, 406), 1240. Massing V. Ames (37 Wis. 645), 1171. Masters V. Troy (50 Hun, 485; 3 N. Y, Supl. 450), 1476, 1477, 1482, 1485. Mather w. City of Ottawa (114 111. 659; 3 N. E. Rep. 816; 2 West. Rep. 46), 559, 618, 931. TABLE OF OASES. clxiii ' [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Mather v. Crawford (36 Barb. 564), 1093, 1428. Matheson v. Mazomanie (20 Wis. 191). 1578. Matter of Albany Street (11 Wend. 149), 677. Matter of Appeal of Des Moines Water Co. (48 Iowa, 824), 572. Matter of Application of Cooper (28 Hun, 515), 686. Matter of Beekman Street (4 Bradf. 503). 677. Matter of Blank (73 N. Y. 388), 573. Matter of Burke (63 N. Y. 224), 1161, 1163. Matter of Churcli (93 N. Y. 1). 704. Matter of Clark v. Sheldon (106 N. Y. 104), 879. Matter of College Street (8 R. I. 476), 1166. Matter of Comm'rs of Public Parks (47 Hun, 302). 1167. Matter of Comm'rs of Washington Park (53 N. Y. 131). 694, 1419. Matter of Deansville Cemetery Ass'n (66 N. Y. 569), 686. Matter of De Graw Street (18 Wend. 568). 1163. Matter of Delancey (52 N, Y. 80), 1134. Matter of Eleventh Ave. (81 N. Y. 436), 1411. Matter of Episcopal Church (75 N. Y. 324). 1071. Matter of Evans (9 Ad. & El. 679), 134. Matter of Ford (6 Lans. (N. Y.) 92), 1178. Matter of Frazee (63 Mich. 396), 602. Matter of Gardner (68 N. Y. 467). 1523. Matter of Gorham (43 How. Pr. 263), 937. Matter of Hamilton Ave. (14 Barb. 405), 673. Matter of Ingraham (4 Hun, 495), 1141. Matter of Lawrence Street (4 E. I. 230), 669. Matter of Llvington (121 N. Y. 94), 1190. Matter of Lnckport &c. E. Co. (77 N. Y. 557), 693. Matter of Marsh (71 N. Y. 315), 692, 693. Matter of Mayor of New York (99 N. Y. 569), 685. Matter of the Metropolitan Gas Light Co. (85 N. Y. 526), 1173. Matter of New Eochelle Water Co. (46 Hu'n, 525), 686. Matter of N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (66 N. Y. 407), 1420. Matter of N. Y. Cent. E. Co. (77 N. Y. 248), 1403. Matter of Opening House Ave. (67 Barb. 350), 692. Matter of Opening of First Street (66 Mich. 42; 33 N. W. Eep. 15), 633. Matter of Orphan Home (92 N. Y. 116), 1189. Matter of Petition of De Peyster (80 N. Y. 565), 690. Matter of Petition of United States (98 N. Y. 227), 703. Matter of Rinebeck &c. E. Co. (67 N. Y. 243), 697. Matter of Ryers (73 N, Y. 1), 686, 687. Matter of State Reservation (103 N. Y. 734), 706. Matter of Taxpayers of Greene (38 How. Pr. 515), 936. Matter of Torrance Street (4 E. 1. 230), 1188. Matter of Trustees &o. (31 N. Y. 574), 1178. Matter of Twenty-sixth Street (12 AVend. 203), 1163. Matter of Union Ferry (98 N. Y. 139), 670. Matter of Village of Middletown (82 N. Y. 196), 690, 693. Matter of Waverly Water-works (85 N. Y. 478), 697. Matter of Wortman (22 Abb. N. C. 137), 1513. Matter of Yick Wb (68 Cal. 294), 599. Matthews v. Alexandria (68 Mo. 115), 282, 624. Matthews v. Baraboo (39 Wis. 677), 1451. Matthews V. Westborough (131 Mass. 521), 657. Matthews v. Westborough (134 Mass. 555), 368, 373, 657. Mattingly v. City of Plymouth (100 Ind.-545), 1153, 1173. Mauch Chunk v. Shortz (61 Pa. St. 399), 1163. Mauldin v. City Council &c. (33 S. C. 1; 11 S. E. Eep. 434), 573, 1314. Maupin v. Franklin County (67 Mo. 327), 231, 643, 1091. Maurin v. Smith (25 La. Ann. 445), 1385. Maury Countv v. Lewis County (1 Swan(Teun.), 236), 15. Maus V. Springfield (101 Mo. 613), 1493. May V. Boston (150 MSss. 516; 33 N. E. Eep. 320), 1481. May V. County of Juneau (30 Fed. Eep. 341), '750. May V. Holdridge (23 Wis. 93), 558. clxiv TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] May V. Logan County (30 Fed. Eep. 250), 749. May V. Mercer County (30 Fed. Eep. 246), 749. Mav V. People (Colo., 27 Pao. Eep. " 1010), 530. May V. Eailroad Company (113 Mass. 161), 799. Mayall &a v. Citv of St. Paul (30 Minn. 294; 15 "N. W. Eep. 170), 1073, 1127. Mayfield v. Moore (53 III. 428), 200. Mayhew v. Gay Head (13 Allen, 129), 301, 373. Malone v. St. Paul (40 Minn. 406), 783. Maynard v. Board of Canvassers (84 Mich. 338), 384. Maynard v. City of Northampton (Mass., 31 N. E. Eep. 1063), 1101. Maynard v. Woodward (36 Mich. 433), 660. Mayor, In re (99 N. Y. 569), 1386. Mayor of Durham's Case (1 Sid. 33), 174. Mayor &c. v. Allaire (14 Ala. 400), 104, 514, 515, 604. Mayor &o. v. Bailey (3 Hill, 538; 2 Denio, 433), 754, 1138. 1393. Mayor &c. v. Baldwin (57 Ala. 61), 1573. Mayor &c. v. Baltimore &o. E, Co. (6 Gill, 388), 1396, Mayor &c. v. Beasley (1 Humph. (Tenn.) 332), 518. Mayor &c. v. Blache (6 La. 500), 339. Mayor &c. v. Board of Police (15 Md. 376), 1877. Mayor &c. v. Bolt (5 Ves. 129), 1059. Mayor &c. v. Boyd (64 Md. 10; 30 Atl. Eep. 1038), 1065. Mayor &c. v. Broadway &c. E. Co. , (97 N. Y. 37.5), 536. Mayor &c. v. Brpwn (9 Heisk. 6), 1013. Mayor &c. v. Cabot (28 Ga. 50), 572. Mayor &c. v, Conner (5 Ind. 171), 298. Mayor &c. v. Crowell (40 N. J. Law, 207; 29 Am. Eep. 224), 329. Mayor &c v. Cunlilf (3 N. Y. 165), S50, 1450. Mayor &o. v. Diokerson (45 N. J. Law, 38), 316. Mayor &o. v. Elliott (3 Eawle, 170), 563, 660. Mayor &o. v. Esohbach (18 Md. 276), 214, 643, Mayor &c. v. Fahm (60 Ga. 109), 1281. Mayor &c. v. Finney (54 Ga. 317), 67, 99, 123, 124. Mayor &c. v. Furze (3 Hill, 613), 1080. Mayor &c. v. Gerspach (33 La. Ann. 1011), 1021, 1054. Mayor &c. v. Gill (31 Md. 395), 650. 859. Mayor &c. v. Gilmore (21 Fed. Eep. 870), 932, 934. Mavor &c. v. Hardwioke (L. E, 9 Ex. 13), 261. Mayor &c. ii. Harrison (30 N. J. Law, 73), 645. Mavor &c. v. Harwood (32 Md. 471); " 1043. M^or &c. V. Hays (25 Ga. 590). 1293. Mayor &c. v. Henley (2 CI. & F. 331), 139. Mayor &c. v. Hoffman (29 La. Ann, 651), 593, 1054. Mayor &o. v. Hook (62 Md. 371), 1120, Mayor &o. v. Hyatt (3 E. D. Smith, 156), 515, 537. . Mayor &c. v. Inman (57 Ga. 370), 113, 937. Mayor &e. v. Insurance Co. X15 Daly, 215), 1363. Mavor &c. v. Johns Hopkins Hospi- tal (50 Md. 1), 1179, 1180. Mayor &c. v. Johnson (63 Md. 235), 1190. Mayor &o. v. Kelly (98 N. Y. 467), 184.. Mayor &c. v. Keyser (72 Md. 106), 650. Mayor &c. u. King (7 Lea, 442), 1025. Mayor &c. v. Kirkley (29 Md. 85), 642. Mayor &c. v. Lanham (67 Ga. 753), 537, 1025. Mayor &c. v. Lasser (9 Humph. (Tenn.) 757), 9, 1013. Mayor &,Ci v. Lombard (51 Miss, 125), 927. Mayor &c. v. Long (31 Mo. 369), 695. Mayor &c. v. Lord (9 Wall. 409), 1379. Mayor &e. v. McWilliams (67 Ga. 106), 1312. Mayor &o. v. Marriott (9 Md. 160), 1059. Mayor &c. v. Meserole (20 Wend. 132), 1189. Mayor &c. v. Mitchell (79 Ga. 807; 5 S. E. Eep. 301), 1050. Mayor &c. v. Murphy (40 N. J. Law, 145), 530. Mayor &c; v. Musgrave (48 Md. 273), 642, 697. Mayor &c. v. Nichols (4 Hill, 209), 103j 488. 51.S. Mayor &c. v. 0'Donneli(53 Md. 110), 14B2. Mayor &o. v. Ohio- &o. E. Co. (26 Pa. St. 355), 1103. TABLE OV OASES. clxv [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1805.] Mayor &o. v. O'Neil (63 Md. 336), 1277. Mayor &c. v. Ordrenan (18 Johns. 123), 535. Mayor &c. v. Park Comm'rs (44 Mich. 602), 685. Mayor &c. v. Phelps (27 Ala. 55), 106, 523. Mayor &c. v. Porter (18 Md. 289 ; 79 Am. Deo. Q86), 283. Mayor &c. v. Proprietors &c. (7 Md. 517), 1066. Mayor &c. v. Eadecke (49 Md. 217), 602. Mayor &c. v. Bailroad Comm'rs (113 Mass. 161), 970. Mayor &o. v. Railroad Co. (26 Pa. St. 355), 1205. Mayor &c. v. Ray (19 Wall. 468), 203, 238, 23(5, 237. 638, 640, 793, 794, 883, 891, 983. 928. Mayor &c. v. Reilly (59 Hun, 501; ' 13 N. Y. Supl. 581), 717. Mayor &c. v. Reynolds (20 Md. 1; 83 Am. Dec. 535). 314, 643. Mayor &c. v. Root (8 Md. 95 ; 63 Am. Dec. 692), 1596. Mayor &c. i\ Scharf (54 Md. 499), 1079, 1179. Mayor . Seaton (133 Ind. 53 1 ; 24 N. E. Rep. 313), 798, 974. Morgan Park v. Gahan (33 111. App. 646; 36 N. E. Rep. 1085), 717, 1105. Moi-gan Steamship Co. v. La. Board of Health (118 U. S. iSn), 1043. Morley v. City of New York (13 N. Y. Supl. 609), 183, 204. Morley V. Town of Metamora (78 111. 394; 30 Am. Rep. 266), 309, 325, 326. Morrell v. Sylvester (1 Greenl. (Me.) 348), 310. Morrill v. State (38 Wis. 428). 1388. Morrill v. Thurston (46 Vt. 733), 339. Morrill v. T. M. &c. Co. (10 Nev. 137), 1588, Morris v. Baltimore (5 Gill (Md.), 344), 246. Morris v. 6oard of Comni'rs (Ind., 31 N. E. Rep, 77), 1014. Morris D. Kasling (Tex., 15 S. W. Rep. 2'.'6), 607. Morris v. Mason#(43 La. Ann. .590), 1271. Morris v. Mayor (3 La. 317), 1344. Morris t>. Powell (125 Ind. 281; 25 N. E. Rep. 221), 378. Morris v. Sea Girt Imp. Co. (38 N. J. Eq. 301), 685. Morris v. State (63 Tex. 728), 136. Morris v. State (65 Tex. 53), 466. MoiTis County v. Hinchman (31 Kan. 729), 713. Morrison v. Fayette County (127 Pa. St. 110: 17Atl. Rep. 755), 890. Morrison v. Hershire (33 Iowa, 271), 1163, 1186. Morrison v. Hinkson (87 111. 587), 1381, 159.5. Morrison v. Howe (120 Mass. 565), 339. Morrison v. Lawrence (98 Mass. 219), 301, 774, 126S. Morrison v. McDonald (31 Me. 650), 193, 195. TABLE OF OASES. clxxi FThe references are to pages: VoL 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] Morrison v. McFarland (51 Ind. 206), 218, 319. Morrison v. Wasson (79 Ind. 477), 1572. Morristown v. Fitzpatriok (94 Pa. St. 121), 75K. Morrow v. Weed (4 Iowa, 77), 691. Morrow County v. HenJrvx (14 Or. 397), 450. Morse v. City of West port (Mo., 19 S. W. Rep. 831), 583. Morse v. Hitchcock County (19 Neb. 566), 445. Morse v. Minneapolis R. Co. (30 Minn. 465), 1486. Moi-se V. Richmond (41 Vt. 435), 1467. Morse v. Stooker (I Allen, 150), 1096. Morse v. Williamson (35 Barb. 473), 339. Morse v. Worcester (139 Mass. 389), 767. Morseman v. Ionia (33 Micfa. 283), 693. Mortgage Co. v. City of Mitchell (So. Dak., 48 N. W. Rep. 131), 909. Morton v. CoirptroUer-General (4 S. C. 430). 220. Morton v. Peck (3 Wis. 714). 14. Morton u. Youngerman (89 Kv. 505), 169. Morville v. American Tract Society (123 Mass. 139). 238, 628. Moser v. Shamlefler (39 Kan. 635; 18 Pac. Rep. 956). 173, 175. Moser v. White (39 Mich. 49), 1391. Moses V. Railroad Co. (31 111. 516), 587. Moses V. St. Louis Sectional Dock Co. (84 Mo. 243; 9 Mo. App. 571). 692. Mosher V. School Dist. (44 Iowa, 132), 840. Mosier v. Des Moines (31 Iowa, 174), 437. Mosley v. Walker (7 Barn. & C. 55), 1243. Moss V. Cummings (44 Mich. 359), 1579. Moss V. Harpeth Academy (7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 383), 933. Moss V. Oakland (88 111. 109), 508. Moss V. Overseers of Litchfield (7 Man. &G. 72), 134. Moss V. Shear (25 Cal. 38), 1368. Moss V. State (10 Mo. 338; 74. Am. Dec. 116), 329. Mossman v. Forrest (37 Ind. 333), 694. Mott V. Hicks (1 Cowen, 513 ; 13 Am. Dec. 5r)0), 213. Mott V. Reynolds (37 Vt. 206), 1272. Mott V. United States Trust Co. (19 Barb. 569), 955. L Motz V. Detroit (18 Mich. 495), 1154, 1169, 1187, 1574. Moulton V. Evansville (25 Fed. Rep. 382), 961. Moulton V. Sanford(51 Me. 127), l453, 1454. Moultrie v. Rockingham &c. Sav. Bank (93 U. S. 631), 947. Moultrie County v. Fairfield (105 U. S. 370), 944, 945. Moultrie Co. v. Rockingham &c. Bank (93 U. S. 631), 960. Moundsville v. Fountain (27 West Va. 182), 1240, 1369, 1262. Moundsville v. Velton (35 West Va. 679), 1364. Mount Adams &c. Inclined Ry. Co. V. City of Cincinnati (35 Wkly. Law Bull. 91). 610. Mount Morris Square, In re (3 Hill, 14), 301, 497, 554, 1575, 1576. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith (100 tJ. S. 514), 78, 94, 391, 421, 434, 439, 464. 1379, 1394. Mount Pleasant v. Breeze (11 Iowa, 399), 529, 603. Mount Vernon v. Dusouchett (3 Ind. 586), 1500. Mount Vernon v. Hovey (56 Ind. 563). 933. Mount Vernon v. Patton (94 111. 65), 658, 824. Mount Zion v. Gillman (14 Fed. Rep. 123), 1571. Mountain v. Multnomah County (16 Or. 379; 18 Pac. Rep. 464), 634. Mower v. Leicester (9 Mass. 347; 6 Am. Dee. 63), 8, 9, 153, 156, 746, 749, 1603. Mozley v. Alston (1 Phill. 790), 398. Mugler V. Kansas (133 U. S. 623), 1544. Muhler v. Hedekin (119 Ind. 481 ; 20 N. E. Rep. 700), 204. Mulcairns v. Janesville (67 Wis. 34), 773. MulhoUand v. Bryant (39 Ind. 163), 166. ■ MulhoUand v. City of New York (113 N. Y. 631 ; 20 N. E. Rep. 856). 1109. MulhoUand v. Mayor (113 N. Y. 631 ; 30 N. E. Rep. 856). 71'6. MuUarky v. Cedar Falls (19 Iowa, 21), 283. MuUpn V. Mayor &c. of New York (12 N. Y. Sup!. 269), 182. 188. MuUer v. Dows (94 U. S. 444), 3. Muller V. English (21 N. J. Law, 317), 378. Mulligan v. Smith (59 Cal. 306), 693, 1067, 1068, 1174. Mullikin V. State (7 Blackf. 77), 1334. clxxii TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n. pp. '(89-1605.] Mulvane v. City of South Topeka (45 Kan. 45; 25 Pao. Rep. 317), 1313. Mumford v. Memphis &o. R. Co. (3 Lea(Tenn. ), 393 ; 1 Am. Rep. 616), 321 Mumma's Appeal (127 Pa. St. 474), 999 Muncey v. Joest (74 Ind. 409), 691, 1419. Munday v. Rahway (48 N. J. Law, 338), 1371. Mundell v. City of Pasadena (87 Gal. 520; 25 Pac. Rep. 1061), 188. Mupger V. City of Waterloo (Iowa, 49 N. W. Rep. 1028), 1201. Municipality v. Biineau (3 La. Ann. 688), 520. Municipality v. Cutting (4 La. Ann. 3'35), 484, 533. 1243. Municipality v. Duncan (3 La. Ann. '183), 1369. Municipality v, Dunn (10 La. Ann. 57), 1159, 1161, 1163, 1363. Municipality v. Morgan (1 La. Ann. Ill), 535. Municinality v. Michaud (6 La. Ann. 605), 1864. Municipality v. Millaudon (13 La. Ann. 769), 1383. Municipality v. Orleans Theatre Co. (3 Rob. (La.) 209), 941. Municipality v. State Bank (5 La. Ann. 394), 1358. Municipality v. White (9 La. Ann, 446), 1363. Munn V. Illinois (94 U. S. 113), 6, 573, 574. Munro v. Merchant (28 N. T. 9), 141. Munroe v. Jackson (55 Me. 59), 995. Munson v. Minor (23 111. 595), 1573. Munson v. New York (3 Fed. Rep. 339), 749. Murdock v. Academv (13 Pick. 344), 206, 207. Murdock v. District of Columbia (23 Ct. CI. 464), 1105. Murphey v. People (3 Cowen, 815), 1357. Murphy, Ex parte (7 Cowen, 158), 163. Murphy v. Bank (30 Pa. St. 417), 1561. Murphy v. Brooklyn (98 N. Y. 648), 1404. Murphy v. Buffalo (38 Hun, 49), 1485. Mutphy V. City of Albina (Oregon, 39 Pao. Rep. 353), 1140, 1141. Murphy v. City of Peoria (119 111. 509; 9N. E. Rep. 895), 1094. Murphy v. Conim'rs (14 Minn. 69), 1003. Murphy v. East Portland (43 Fed. Rep. 308), 843. Murphy v. Gloucester (105 Mass. 4f0), 1471, 1473. Murphv V. Hall (68 Wis. 210; 31 N. W." Rep. 754), 558. Murphy v. Indianapolis (83 Ind. 76), 1493. Murphy *. Jacksonville (18 Fla. 818), 666, 816. Murphy v. Louisville (9 Bush, 189), 643, 1170. Murphy u. Ramsey (114 U. S. 15), 53. Murphy v. Wilmington (6 Houston, * 108), ]lii77. 1579. Murray v. Hoboken Land &c. Co. (it How. 272), 984, 1178. Murray v. Lardher (3 Wall. 110), 957, 958. Murray v. Railroad Co. (93 N. C. 93), 1493. Murray v. Tucker (10 Bush, 240), 706, 1189. Muscatine v. Keokuk &c. Packing Co. (45 Iowa, 185). 244. Muscatine v. Steck (7 Iowa, 505), 1262, 1264. Muscatine &c. R. Co. v. Harton (33 Iowa, 33), 318. Muscatine Turnverein v. Funok (18 Iowa, 469). 465. Musgrave v. St. Louis Church (10 La. Ann. 431), 1036. Musgrove i'. Nevinson (1 Str. 584 ; 3 Ld.Raym. 1359), 371. Muskegis V. Drainage Comm'rs (Wis., 47 N. W. Rep. 11). 1097. Mussel V. Tama County (73 Iowa, 101 ; 34 N. W. Rep. 762), 988.- Musselman v. Manly (43 Ind. 463), 301. Musser v. Johnson (43 Mo. 74; 97 Am. Dec. 316), 314. Mulchler v. Easton City (9 Pa. Co. Ct. 613). 717. Mutual &o. Co. V. Wilcox (8 Biss. C. C. 197), 313. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth (43 N. J. Law, 335), 641, 948, 950. Mutual L. & B. Ass'n v. Price (IB Fla. 304; 36 Am. Rep. 703), 329. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Easton &o. R. Co. (38 N. J. Eq. 133), 691. Mutual Union Telegraph Co. v. Chi- cago (16 Fed. Rep. S09), 1319. Muzzy V. Shattuck (1 Denio, 233), 831. Mvers v. Indianapolis &c. R. Co. (113 111. 386), 1497. Myers v. Irwin (3 Serg. & R. 368), 56. Myers v. People (36 III. 173), 1356. Myers v. School Trustees (21 111. App. 323), 1341. Myers v. United States (32 Ct. 01. 80), 742. TABLE OF OASES. elxxiii pThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Myers v. United States (1 McLean, 493), 334. Myrick v. City of La Crosse (17 Wis. 442). 1126. Mygatt V. Green Bay (1 Bias. (C. C.) 392), 947, 955. Mygatt V. Washburn (15 N. Y. 316), 327. N. Nagel V. Buffalo (34 Hun, 1), 1485. Nail & Iron Co. v. Furnace Co. (46 Ohio St. 644), 1431. Nally V. Carpet Co. (51 Conn. 524), 1486. Nance v. Johnson (Tex., 19 S. W. Rep. 5'59), 651. Napa V. Easterby (61 Gal. 509), 503. Napa V. Easterby (76 Cal. 223; 18 Pac. Rep. 353), 501, 506, 508. Napa &c. R. Co. v. Napa County (30 Cal. 437). 683. N'apnian v. People (19 Mich. 353), 488, 543. Nash 7!. City of St. Paul (8 Minn. 173), 332, 640, 641. Nash V. Lowry (37 Minn. 261; 33 N. W. Rep. 787), 566. Nash V. St. Paul (11 Minn. 174), 639. Nashville v. Altlirop (5 Cold. (Tenn.) 554), 1370. Nashville v. Smith (86 Tenn. 213), 1397. Nashville v. Thomas (5 CoW. (Tenn.) 600), 1359, 1383. Nashville v. Toney (10 Lea, 643), 485. Nashville &c. E. Co. v. Wiison (Tenn.. 15 S. W. Rep. 446). 1397. Nason i;. Directors of Poor (136 Pa. St. 445; 17 Atl. Rep. 616; 24 W. N. C. 60). 333, 854, 968. Natal V. State of Louisiana (139 TT. S. 621; 11 8. Ct. Rep. 635; 43 La. Ann. 613; 1 So. Rep. 933), 544, 580, 1343. National Bank v. Comm'rs (9 Wall. 353), 1352. National Bank v. Kirby (108 Mass. 497), 957. National Bank v. Matthews (98 IT. S. 621), 646. National Bank v. Town of Grenada (41 Fed. Rep. 87), 510, 937. National Bank v. Yankton (101 U. S. 129), 53. National Bank &c. v. Lowell (109 Mass. 314), 234. National Bank of Chemung v. El- mira (33 N. Y. 49: 6 Lans. (N, Y.) 116;, 336. 240, 1576. National Bank of Commerce v. Town of Grenada (44 Fed. Rep. 363), 484, 503, 503. National Bank of the Republic v. City of St. Joseph (31 Fed. Rep. 316), 641, 966. National D. & C. Ry. Co. v. State (N. J., 21 Atl. Rep. .570), 591. National D. R. Co. v. Central R. Co. (33 N. J. Bq. 755), 591. National Lumber Co. v. City of Wy- more(30 Neb. 3S6;46N. W. Rep. 6S3-), 891. National State Bank v. Independent Dist. (39 Iowa, 490), 841. National Water-works Co, v. School Dist. (48 Fed. Rep. 538). 1299. Nations v. Johnson (34 How. 195), 690. Naumann v. Board of City Canvass- ers (73 Mich. 353; 41 N. W. Rep. 367), 161. Nauvoo V. Ritter (97 U. S. 389), 947. Navasota v. Pearce (46 Tex. 535), 9. Naylor v. Field (39 N. J. Law, 287), 113. Naylor v. Galesburg(56 111. 385), 536. Nayior v. Sharpless (3 Mod. 23). 297. Neal V. Comm'rs of Burke (83 N. C. 420), 977. Neal V. Delaware (103 U. S. 370), 147, 148. Neals V. State (10 Mo. 498), 1259. Neary v. Robinson (98 N. Y. 81 ; 27 mm, 14,5), S99. Nebraska City v. Campbell (3 Black, 590), 9, 769. Nebraska City v. Lampkiu (6 Neb. 27), 677. Needham v. Morton (146 Mass. 476), 1393. Needham v. School Dist. (Vt., S Atl. Rep. 198), 1333. Needham v. Wellesley (139 Mass. 372). 1343. Neely v. Yorkville (10 S. C. 141), 208, 642. Neenan v. Smith (50 Mo. 525), 1182, 1187. Neff V. Wellesley (148 Mass. 487 ; 20 N. E, Rep. Ill), 969, 1005. Neier v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Mo., 1 S. W. Rep. 386), 1209. Neitzel v. Concordia (14 Kan. 446), 539. Neitzey v. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (5 Mackev, 34), 1206. Nelson v. Canisteo (100 N. Y. 89), 2b5. Nelson v. La Porte (33 Ind. 268), H€0, 1394. Nelson v. McArthur (38 Mich. 304), 50. olxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I; pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp."789-1605.] Nelson v. Mayor &c. (63 N. Y. 53S 5 Hun, 190), 340, 845. Nelson v. Mayor of New Tork (5 N./Y. Supl. 689). 715. Nelson V. Milford (7 Pick. 18), 363, 663, 661. 664, 1384. Nelson v. Pierce (6 N. H. 194), 851. Nelson V. St. Martin's Parish (111 N. Y. 716), 526. 1372, 1379. ' Nelson v.- United States (32 Ct. CI. 1591, 742. Nesbit V. Independent Dist. of River- side (U. S., 13 S. Ct. itep. 746), 841, 9B3. Nesbit V. Matthews (16 N. Y. Supl. 303), 1356. Nesbit V. Riverside School Dist. (35 Fed. Rep. 1)35). 966. Nesbit V. Trumbo (39 III. 110), 684. .Neugassu. City of New Orleans (43 La. Ann. 163; 7 So. Rep. 565), 796. Nevada Bank v. Sedgwick (104 U. S. 111). 13.59. Nevada Bank v. Steinmitz (64 Cal. 301), 940. N. Stout (52 N. J. Law, 35; . 18 Atl. Rep. 943), 171, 316. N«'wark Aqueduct foard v. City of Passaic (45 N. J. Eq. 393; 18 Atl. Rep. 106), 1033. Newark Aqueduct Board v. Lowe (46 N. J. Bq. 593; 30 Atl. Rep. 54 ; 23 Atl. Rep. 55). 1083. Newaygo Cbunty Mfg. Co. v, Echtinau (81 Mich. 41^, 377, 389. Newberry v. Fox (87 Minn. 141; 33 N. W. Rep. 333), 330, 233, 249, 640. Newbury v. Brunswick (3 Vt. 151), S94. Newburvport v. Cbunty Comra'rs (13 Met. 211), 1575, 1576. Newburyport v. Creedon (148 Mass. 158; 19 N. E. Rep. 341), 1006. Newburyport v. Waltham (150 Mass. 311; 23 N. E. jtep. 46), 978, 980. Newby v. Free (72 Iowa, 379) 1347. Newcastle R. Co. v. Peru &c. B. Co. (3 Ind. 464). OaS. Newell V. Cincinnati (Ohio, 15 N. E. Rep. 196), 1171. KJBwgass V. City of New Orleans (42 La. Ann. 169), 632. 933. Newlan v. Aurora (14 111. 3ti4), 544. Newland v. Marsh, (19 HI. 376), 524. Newland Ave., In re (38 N. Y. St. Rep. 796: 15 N. Y. Supl. 63), 373. Niewling v. Franojs ;;! L. R. 189), 189. Newman v. Arcbe (9 Baxt. 380), 1386. N«wtnan v. City of Emporia (32 Kan. 456), 259, 1171. Newman v. Justices (5 Sneed (Tenn,), 695), 1378. Newman v. Metropolitan &c. By. Co. (118 N. Y. eiS), 70a Newman v. Scott &Ci (1 Heisk, 787), 1376. Newman v. Sylvester (43 lad. 112), 214. Newman v. tTdited States (31 Ct, CI. 205), 743. Newman v. Wait (46 Vt. 689), 1359. Newmeyer v. Railroad Go. (62 Mo, . 83), 613, 646. Newport v. Newport & Cin. Bridge Co. (Ky., 8 L R, An. 484; 29 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas. 491; 13 8. W. Rep. 730), 617. Newport v. Newport Gas Light Co. (84 Ky. 166), 631, 1315. Newpwt V. Ringo's Ex'r (87 Ky. 635), 1355, Newsom v. G-eorgia R. Co. (62 Ga. 339), 1468. NewsoB V. Galveston (76 Tex. 559), 1344. Newton V. Belger (143 Mass. 598; 10 N. E. Rep. 464), .580, 616. Newton v. Ellis (85 Eng. C, L. 133), 1452. Newton V. 7be Commissioners (100 U. S, 528), 86. Ney u Swinney (36 Ind. 454), 698. Ney V. Troy (3 N. Y. Supl. 679), 1461. Niagara &c. Bridge Co. v. Bachman • (66N. Y.361), 1406, 1411. Niagara Falls v. Salt (45 Hun, ,41), 1343. Niagara Falls &c. Ry. Co., In ve (108 ». Y. 375), 682. Nichol V. Mayor &c. (9 Humph. 253), 93; 933. Nichols, In re f6 Abb. N. C. 474; 57 How. Pr. 895), 306. Nichols, In re (48 Fed. Rep. 169), 1240. Nichols V. Athens (66 Me. 403), 1468. Nichols V. Boston (98 Mass, 39), 193, 767. Nichols V. City of Bridgeport (33 Conn. 189), 669, 690, 702, 1163, 1188, 1419. Nichols V. City of St. Paul (44 Minn. 494; 47 N. W. Rep. 168), 1140. Nichols V. Duluth (40 Minn. 389), 758. Nichols V. MacLean (101 N. Y. 536), 200. Nichols V. Minneapolis (30 Minn. 545), 783, 1488. Nichols V. Walter (37 Minn. 364; 33 N. W. Rep. 800), 557. Nickman v. O'Neil (10 Cal. 294), 1254. Nicolay v. St. Clair County (3 Dill. (C. C.)168), 947, 961. Niconlin v. Lowery (49 N. J. Law, 891), 518. Nightingale's Case (11 Pick. 168), 551, 580, 705, 124*}. Niklaus v. CoBkliDg(118'Ind. 289; 30 N. E. Rep. 7^7), 1126. Niles V. Patch (IS Gray, 354), 866. Niles, Mavor &c. v, Mbzzv(83 Mich. 1; 30 'Am. Rep. 670), 186. Niles Water-works v. Niles (59 Mich. 311; 11 Am. & Eng. Corp* Cas. 299), 360, 80.5. Nims V. Mavor (59 N. Y. 508), 1137. Niven v. Rochester (76 N. Y. 619), 1492. Nixon V. Newport (13 R. I. 454), 759 Nixon V. School Dist. (83 Kan. 510), 1395. Nixon V. State (96 Ind. Ill), 854. Noble V. Vinceanes (42 Ind. 135), 936. TABLE OF OASES. clxxvii [The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL n. pp. 789-1605.] Noble Scbocl Furniture Co. v. Wash- ington School Tp. (Ind., 39 N. E. Rep. 935), 814, 815. Noeckeru People (91 111. 494), 1249. Nolan V. King (97 N. Y. 565), 1494. Nolan V. Reese (S3 Cal, 484), 1189. Nolan County v. Simpson (74 Tex. 218: 11 S. W. Rep. 1098), 854. Nolan County u. State (17 S. W. Rep. 823). 576, 796, 843. Noll V. Bubuque &c. R. Co. (33 Iowa, 66), 669. Noonan v. City of Albanv (79 N. Y. 470; 35 Am. Eep. BiiO), 9, 263, 767, 1147. Noonan v. City of Stillwater (33 Minn. 198). 1086. NorfleetiJ. Cromwell (70 N. G. 634; 16 Am. Rep. 787), 686. Normand v. Otoe Co. (8 Neb. 18), 646, Norris, Ex parte (8 S. O. 408), 200. Norris v. Eaton (7 N. H. 281), 349. Norris v. Mayor (1 Swan (Tenn.), 167), 392. 418, 467, 1366. Norris v. Mayor &c. (7 Md. 515), 1120. Norris v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore (44 Md. 5a8), 698. Norris v. Nashville (6 Lea (Tenn.), 337), 1366. Norris v. School Dist. (12 Me. 293), 1330 Norris u Staps (Hob. 211), 90. Norris v. Waco (57 Tex. 635), 416, 1362, 1367. Norristown v. Fitspatripk (94 Pa. St. 121), 755. 763: " Norristown v. Moyer (67 Pa. St. 355), 1198, 1446. North V. Cincinnati &c. R. Co. (10 Ohio St. 548), 1588. North Beach &c. E. Co.'a Appeal (32 Cal. 499), 1358. North Carolina Endowment Fund v. Satchwell (71 N. C. Ill), 50. North Carolina R. Co. v, Alamance (77 N. C. 4), 1577. North Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Town of Lake View (105 111. 207 ; 44 Am. Rep. 788), 1053, 1054. North Hempstead v. Hempstead (Hopk. 288), 1386. North Hempstead v. Hempstead (2 Wend. 109), 8, 56, 451, 464, 1368. North Lebanon v. Arnold (47 Pa. St. 488), 149. North Manheim ',.v. Arnold (119 Pa. St. S80), 1467. North Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Lack- land (35 Mo. 515), 698. North Pac.'Lumbering & Manuf. Co. V. City of East Portland (14 Ore- gon, 3; 13 Pac. Rep. 4), 1110. , North Pa. R. Co. v. Adams (54 Pa, St. 94). 958. North Springfield v. City of Spring- field (111., 39 N. E. Rep. 849), 408. North Vernon v. Voegler (103 Ind. 814), 1099. North Yarmouth v. Skillings (45 Me. 133), 95, 391, 451, 1388. Northampton v. Itiuea (26 Pa. St. 156), 1011. Northampton Bridge Case (116 Mass. - 442), 670. Northern Bank of Toledo v. Porter Township (110 U. S. 608), 256, 640, 642, 834, 946, 963. Northern Cent. R. Co. v. Baltimore (31 Ind. 93), 383. Northern Ind. R. Co. v. Connelly (10 Ohio St. 159). 1166. 1108. Northern Liberties v. Gas Co. (13 Pa. •St. 318), 1207. Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church (13 Pa. St. 104), 593, 1166. Northern Liberties v. Swain (13 Pa. St. 113), 1164. Northfield v. Merrimack County (43 N, H. 165), 976. Northfield v. Taunton (4 Met. 433), 985. Northrop v. Burrows (10 Abb. Pr. 365), 1048. Northrup v. Town of Pittsfield (2 N. Y. Super. Ct. (T. & S.) 108), 830. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Over- holt (4 Dill. 287), 955. Northwestern Packet Co. v. St. Paul (3. Dill. 454). 580. Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. City of Louisiana (4 Dill. 17, n.), 580. North wood v. Barrington (9 N. H. 369), 375. ' Norton, In re (Q. B., June 8, 1872), 203. Norton v. Brownsville (129 U. S. 479), 944. Norton v. City of East St. Louis (36 111. App. 171), 838. Norton v. Dyersburg (127 U. S. 160; 8 S. Ct. Rep. 1111), 563, 925, 931, 1372, 1378. Norton v. Peck (^ Wis. 714), 703. Norton v. Petrie (59 Conn. 200), 1363. Norton v. St. Louis (97 Mo. 537), 1443. Norton v. Shelby County (118 U. S. .435), 199, 391, 840,. 927. Norton v. Walkill R. Co. (63 Barb. 77), 1419. Norwich v. County Comm'rs (13 Pick. 60), 1096. olxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Norwich v. Saybrook (5 Conn. 384), 98». Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co. (25 Conn. 19), 568, 613. Norwich Overseers &c. v. New Ber- lin &c. (18 Johns. 383), 648. Norwood V. Gonzales County (79 Tex. 318), 1416. Note's Case (11 Me. 308). 1259. Nottingham v. Amwell (31 N. J. Law, 37), 978. Nowell V. WriRht (3 Allen, 166). 319. Noxon V. Hill (3 Allen. 315), 338. Noyes v. Haverhill (11 Gush. 388), 1578. Noyes v. Mason City (53 Iowa, 418; 5 N. W. Rep. 593), 1153. Noyes v. Spaulding: (37 Vt. 420), 943. Noyes v. Stillman (34 Ctmn. 15). 1036. Nudd V. Hobbs (17 N. H. 534^ 1408. Nugent V. State a8 Ala. 521). 1355. Nugent V. Supervisors of Putnam County (19 Wall. 241), 943, 943, 945. Nugent V. Wrinn (44 Conn. 378), 979. Nuneaton Local Board v. Sewage Co. (L. R. 20 Eq. 127), 1059. o. Oakes v. Hill (10 Pick, 333), 135. Cakes v. Hill (14 Pick. 442), 1367. Oakham v. Sutton (13 Met. 193), 983. Oakland v. Carpenter (13 Cal. 540), 283, 293, 550, 1389. O'Brien v. City of St. Paul (18 Minn. 163), 1145. O'Brien v. City of St. Paul (35 Minn. 331), 586, 673, 1144, 1145. O'Brien v. Mayor &c. of New York (19 N. Y. Supl. 793), 720. O'Brien i'. Pennsylvania &c. R. Co. (llOta. St. 184), 674. O'Brien v. Philadelphia (150 Pa. St. 689), 1457. Oceana v. Hart (48 Mich. 319), 838. O'Connor v. Memphis (6 La. 730), 97. O'Connor v. Pittsburg (18 Pa, St, 187), 779, 1149. Oconto County v. Hall (47 Wis. 308), 292, O'Dea V. City of Winona (41 Minn, 424; 43 N, W. Rep. 97), 1108, 1109. Odiorne v. Rand (59 N. H. 504), 326. O'Donnell v. Bailey (34 Miss. 386), 1359, 1383. O'Donovan v. Wilkins (Fla., 4 So. Rep, 789), 1043. O'Dowd V. City of Boston (149 Mass. 4i3; 31 N. E. Rep. 949j, 305. O'Ferrall v. Colby (2 Minn. 180), 389. Ogden V. City of Philadelphia (143 Pa. St. 430; 33 Atl. Rep. 694), 1149, 1157. Dgden v. Daviess County (103 U. 8. 634), 619, 643, 933, 934. Ogden V. Ravmond (33 Conn. 379; 58 Am. Dee. 429), 313. Ogdsn V. Town of Lake View (121 111. 433), 1175. Ogden City v. McLaughlin (Utah, 16 Pac. Rep. 781), 1348. Ogg V. Lansing (35 Iowa, 4915), 333, »735, 778, 1037. Ohio V. Comm'rs &c. (14 Ohio St. 569), 933. Ohio V. Covipgton (89 Ohio St. 103). 50. O'Hare v. Town of Park River (N. Dak., i891; 47 N. W. Rep. 380), 180, ,503^;V Ohio V. Treasurer (23 Ohio St. 144), 1330. Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Lawrence (37 111. 50), 1576. Ohio Val. I. Works v. Moundsville (11 West Va. 1), 619. Oil City V. McAboy (74 Pa. St, 849), 1589. Oil City Bridge v. Jackson (114 Pa. St. 331), 1449. Oil Co. V. Palmer (20 Minn. 468), 1127. O'Keefe, In re (19 N. Y. Supl. 676), 534. O'Keefe v. Northampton (145 Mass. 115; 13 N. E. Rep. 383), 899. Olathe City v. Mizee (48 Kan. 435), 1468. O'Laughlin v. Dubuque (43 Iowa, •539), 1498. Olcott V. Supervisors (16 Wall. 678), 61, 933. 964, 1373. Old Colony &c. R. Co. v. Fall River (147 Mass; 455), 1189. Oldis V. Donmille (Show. Pari. Cas. 63), 1594. Oldknow V. Wainwright (3 Burr. 1017; 1 W. Bl. 339), 164, 169, 494. Oldtown V. Bangor (58 Jle. 353), 138. O'Leary v. How (7 La. Ann. 25), 1163. O'Leary t'. Mankato City (23 Minn. 276), 1486, Olin V. Meyers (55 Iowa, 209), 1265. Oliphant v. Comm'rs of Atchison County (18 Kan, 386), 693, 694, 1416. Olive Cemetery Co. v. Philadelphia (93 Pa. St. 129), 1166. Oliver v. Keightley (34 Ind. 514), 646. TABLE or OASES. clxxix pThe references are to pages: Vol. Oliver v. Memphis &c. R. Coi (30 Ark. 128), 1571. Oliver v.. Omaha (3 Dill. 360), 1364, 1365. Oliver v. Washington Mills (11 Allen, 268), 144. 1351. Oliver v. Worcester (103 Mass. 489), 480, 760, 768, 769, 770, 1006, 1226, 1448. Oliver v. Worthington (11 Allen, 268), 1388. Olmstead v. Board (24 lovira, 33), 648. Olmstead v. Camp (33 Conn. 551), 682. Olmstead v. Dennis (77 N. Y. 378), 200, 202, 319, 390. Olmsted v. Proprietors &c. (46 N. J. Law, 495), 683. Olney V. Harvey (50 111. 453), 97, 458, 1368, 1381. Olney v. Wharf (115 111. 528; 5 N. E. Rep. 866), 587, 674. Olph V. Leddick (59 Hun, 637; 14 N. Y. Supl. 41), 814. Olsen V. City of Chippewa Falls (71 Wis. .'558; 37 N. W. Rep. 575), 1473. Olson V. Worcester (142 Mass. 536), 1478. Olyinpia v. Mann (1 Wash. St. 389 ; 25 Pac. Rep. 337), 594, 1346. Omaha v. Kramer (25 Neb. 489; 41 N. W. Rep. 295), 1149, 1151. Omaha v. Olmstead (5 Neb. 446), 1263, Omaha v. South Omaha (Neb., 47 N. W. Rep. 1118), 400. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Omaha (15 Nev. 333), 939. O'Maley v. Freeport (96 Pa. St. 24), 518. O'Malia v. Wentwprth (65 Me. 129), 541. O'Mally V. McGuin (53 Wis. 353), 1267. O'Marrow v. Port Huron (47 Mich. 585), 312. O'Meara v. Green (16 Mo. App. 118), 1123. O'Meara v. Green (25 Mo. App. 199), 1161. O'Meara v. Mayor &c. (1 Daly, 425), 1038. Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank (31 N. Y. 490), 236, 645. O'Neil V. Battle (15 N. Y. Supl. 818), 13B0. O'Neil V. Deerfleld (86 Mich. 610). 1431. O'Neil V. Freeholders (41 N, J. Law, 161), 697. O'Neil V. New Orleans (30 La. Ann. 320), 9, 265. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] O'Neil V. West Branch (81 Mich. 344), 1447, 1450. O'Neill V. Register (Md., 23 Atl. Rep. 960), 1878. Ontario v. Hill (99 N. Y. 324), 952. Ontario &c. R. Co. v. Taylor (6 Ont. Rep. Q. B. Div. 338), 699. Ontario Bank v. Bonnell (10 Wend, 186), 1860. Opdike V. Daniel (59 Ala. 311), 983. Opelousas v. Andrus (87 La. Ann. 699), 500. Opinion of Judges (33 Me. 587), 396. Opinion of Judges (38 Me. 597), 885. Opinion of Judges (58 Me. 590), 559, 1393. Opinion of Judges (64 Me. 596), 385. Opinion of Judges (41 N. H. 551; 11 Am. Law Reg. 743), 384. Opinion of Judges (58 N. H, 631), 389. Opinion of Judges (58 N. H. 623), 1373. Opinion of Justices (6 Cush. 580), 393. Opinion of Justices (117 Mass. 603), 158. Opinion of Justices (150 Mass. 592; 24 N. E. Rep. 1084), 559, 560. Opinion of Justices, In re House Bill No. 519 (Mass., 30 N. E. Rep. 1142), 559. Opinion of Supreme Court &c. (9 Colo. 689; 31 Pac. Rep. 478), 458. Orange &o. R. Co. v. Alexandria (17 Gratt. 176), 1166, 1301, 1385, 1396. Orchard v. School Dist. (14 Neb, 878), 987. Ordinary v. Retailers (42 Ga. 335), 1333. O'Reiley v. Kankakee County (32 Ind. 169). 684, 1024. O'Reilley v. Kingston (1 14 N. Y. 439 ; 21 N. E. Rep. 1004), 1123, 1174, 1186. O'Reilly v. Holt (4 Woods, 645), 1185. O'Reilly v. Sing Sing (15 N. Y. St. Rep. 905: 1 N. Y. Supl. 582), 781, 1501. Oregon «.' Jennings (119 U. S. 74), 255. 946. Oregon v. Pyle (1 Oreg. 149), 187. Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Railroad (10 Saw. 464), 645. Orford v. Benton (36 N, H, 395), 872. Orleans v. Perry (34 Neb, 831 ; 40 N. W. Rep. 417), 1499. Orleans v. Piatt (99 U. S. 676), 964. Orleans <&c. R. Co. v. Dunn (51 Ala; 128), 933. \ f I'^'X A TABLE OF OASES. CThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Orman v. Cheworth (6 Mad. 163>, 1404. Orfne'v. Richmond (79 Va. 86), 1471. OrovilJe &c. E. Co. v. Plumas County (37 Cal. 362). 1547. Orphan Asylum's Appeal (111 Pa. St. 133), 1163, 1949. Orr V.' Hodgson (4 Whe^t. 453], 139. Orr V. Quimby (54 N. Hi .M6), 704. Orser v. Hoag (8 Hill, 79), 138. Orton V. State (IS Wis. 509), 186. Osage City v. L^rkins (40 Kan, 203 ; 19 Pac. Rep. 6.58), 1463. Osborn v. Bank of the United States (9 Wheat. 738), 4, 51. Osborn v. Bank of the United States (9 Wheat. 61), 51. Osborn v. People (103 111. 334), 1558. Osborn v. Selectmen of Lenox (2 Allen, 207), 1604. Osborn v. United States (86 U. S. 577), 839. Osborne, In re (101 Pa. St. 334), 68. Osborne v. Adams County (106 U. S. 181 ; 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 284), 931. Osborne v. Detroit (33 Fed. Rep. 36), 1446, 1476, 1477, 1493. Osborne v. Ke'rr (13 Wend. 179), 313. Osborne v. Hamilton (39 Kan. 1), 1480. Osgood V. Blake (31 N. H. 551). 350, 373. Oshkosh V. Milwaukee &c. Ry. Co. (74 Wis. 534 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 489), 1530, 1531. Oshkosh V. Schwartz (55 Wis. 483), 539, 541, 544. Osterhoudt v. Rigney (98 N. Y. 322), 210, 780, 990. Oswald II. Mayor of Berwick (5 H. of L. Cas. 856), 331, Oswego V. Collins (38 Hun, 171), 1242. Oswego V. Oswego Canal Co. (6 N. Y. 237), 140(5, 1409, 1414. Oswego Falls Bridge Co. v. Fish (1 Barb. Ch. 547), 568. Otis V. De Boer (116 Ind. 531 ; 19 N. E. Rep. 141), 1126. Otis V. Stockton (76 Me. 506). 941. Otis V. Strafford (10 N. S. 352), 989. Otoe County v. Baldwin (111 U. S. 1), 639, 941. Otsego Lake Township v. Kireten (Mich., 40 N. W. Rep. 36), 916. Ottawa V. Carev (108 U. S. 110; 3 S. Ct. Rep., 361), 559, 619, 6i;9, 931, 933, 934. ' Ottawa V. National Bank (105 U. S. ■ 342), 931, 946, 956. Ottawa V. People (48 111, 233), 1553. Ottawa V. Spencer (40 III. 211), 1863. Ottaiwa V. Washabaugh (11 Kan, 12% 1198, Ottawa Comrn'rs v. Nelson (19 Kan. 234), 1369. Ottawa Gas Co. n. McCaleb (81 111. 556), 1363, 1399. " ' Ottawa Gas Light Co. v. People (111., 37 N. E. Rep. 934), 796. Ottendorfer v. Fortunato (56 N. Y. Super. Ot. 495; 4 'K Y. Supl. 639), 1106, Ottoman Calivey Co, v. Philadel- - pjiia (Pa., 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. ' Cas. 534), 308. Ottumwa V. C3iinn (75- Iowa, 405), 1060. Ottumwa V. Schaub (52 Iowa, 515), 548, 1366, 1367, 1269. Ould V. Richmond (33 Gratt. 464), 1355, 1369. Outagamie County v. Town of Greenville (77 Wi^. 165 ; 45 N. W. Rep. 1090), 888, 891, 892. Over V. Greenfield (107 Ind. 231), 261. Overing v. Foote(65 N. Y. 363), 1178, 1179. Overseer of Franklin Township v, t)verseer of Clinton Township (51 N. J. Law, 93 ; 16 Atl. Rep. 184), 446. Overseer of Franklin Township v. Overseer of Lebanon Township (51 N. J. Law, 93; 16 Atl. Rep. 184|, 446. Overseers v. McCoy (3 P. & W. (Pa.) 342), 977. Overseers v. Overseers (18 Johns. 407). 195. Overseers v. Overseers of Pharsalia (15N. Y. 341), 252. ' Overseers of Gilpin Tp. v. Overseer of Polk Tp.(118 fa. St. 84 -^'il Atl. Rep. 791), 977, Overseers of Lewisbutg «. Overseers of Milton (P^., 18 W. N. C."l41X 982. Overseers of Manchester v. Guard- ians &o. (16 Q. B. 72'§), 977. Overseers of Norwich v. Overseers of Berlin (18 Johns. 383), 208',' Overseers of Pittsburg v. Oversegrs of Plattsburg (15 Johns. 436), 196. Overseers of Poor &c. v. Sears (33 Pick. 123). 135. Overseers of Poor of Cascade Tp. v. Overseers of Poor of Lewis Tp. (Pa., 33 Atl. Rep. 1003), 978.985. Overseers of Poor of Lawrence Tp. v. Overseers of Poor (Pa., 38 Atl. Rep. 1134), 982. Overseers of Poor of Walker Tp. v. Overseers of Poor (Pa., 23 Atl. Rep. 1C02), 978. TABLE OF OASES. clxxxi [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1606.] OTe^aeem oS- Taylor v. Overseers of Shenango (114 Pa. St. SJ94; 6 Atl, iRep. 47^. 9i?T. Overseers of WashingtoQ Tp. v. Overseers of SSast %unswieb Tp. (3 Penny. (Pa.) 108), 983. Oveiwhiner v. Jones (66 Ind. 452), 1113. Ovitt w. Chase (37 Vt. 196). 348, 368, 1836. Owen V. Hill (61 Mich. 48), 1385. Owens V. MUvv>aukee (4f-WJa. 461), 1577. Owens V. O'Brien (78 Va'. 116), 315. Owens V. State (64 Tex. 500), 166. Owensboro v. Hickman (Ey., 14 S. W. Bep. 698), 378. Owings V. Jones (9 Md. 108), 1036. O wings V. Speed (5 Wheat- 430), 91, 93, 1266. Owners &o. v. Albany (15 Wend. 374), 685, 690. Owners of Lands v. People (113 111. 304), 1024. Oxford &c. Society v. Society (55 N. H. 463), 503. Ozier i>. Hinesburgh (44 Vt. 220), 1451. Pace V. Ortiz (73 Tex. 437; 10 S. W. Eep. 541), 1538. Pace V. People (50 III. 432), 203. Pacific V. Seifert (79 Mo. 210), 523. Pacific Bridge Co. v. Clackamas County (45 Fed. Rep, 217), 790. Pacific Hotel v. Lieb (83 111. 602), 1363. Pacific B. Co. V. Cass (53 Mo. 17), 1361. Pa0ifi& R. Co. V. Bensbaw (18 Mo. 310), 943. Pack V. Mayor &c. (8 N. Y. 232), 1444. Pack V. Supervisors (36 Mich. 377), 1317, Packard v. Jefferson County (2 Colo. 938), 935, 939. Packard v. Mendegbftll (42 Ind. 598), 1419. Packard v. Railway Co. (48 N. J. Eq. ,281 ; 22 Atl. Rep. 227), 593, 1077. Packet Cq. v. Keokuk (95 V. 8. 80), 579 Packet Co. v. St. Louis (KM U. S. •428), 1388. Packet Co. v. Sorrels (50 Ark. 466), 624. Padelford v. Savannah (14 Ga. 438), 1351, 1356. Padgett V. State (98 Ind. 396), 1534. Paduoah v. Cully (9 Bush, 323), 324. Paducah v. Memphis &c. Co. (13 Heisk. (Tenn.) 1), 702. Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co. (Ey., 13 8. W. Rep, 554), 1308. Page V. Allen (58 Pa. St. 338), 377, 646. Page V. Hardin (8B. Mon. (Ey.) 648), 303, 207, 376. 1529. Pagew. 0'To6le(144 Mass.. 303), .j673. Paine v. Spratley (5 Kan. 523), 1166. : Painter v. Township of Blairstown " (N. J., 1^ Atl. Rep. 1S7), 1392. Palmer v. Bearing (93 N. Y. 7), 1491, 1492. Palmer v. Doney (2 Johns. Cas. 346), 1391. Palmer v. Fitz (51 Ala. 489), 1388. Palmer v. Highway Comm'rs (49 Mich. 45). 1420. Palmer v. McMahon (133 U. S. 668 ; 10 S. Ct. Rep. 324), 558. Palmer v. Mayor &c. of New York (3 Sandf. 318), 184. Palmer v. Stumph (29 Ind. 329), 1154, 1166, 11&7. Palmer v. Vandenburgh (3 Wend. 193), 196, 991. Palmer v. Way (6 Colo. 106), 1123, 1160, 1331. Palmyra v. Morton (35 Mo. 593), 690, 1134. 1349. Pana v. Bowler (107 U. S. 529), 958, 964. Pana v. Lippincott (3 111. App. 466), 938, 941, 966. Pandeman v. St. Charles County (Mo., 19 S. W. Rep. 733), 1480. Paola &c. Ry. Co. v. (/omm'rs (16 Kan. 302), 376, 377, 881. Fappen v. Holmes (44 111. 360), 536. Papworth v. Milwaukee (64 Wis. 390), 1443. Paralee v. State (Ark., 4 S. W. Rep. 634), 1248. Pardridge v. Village of Hyde Park (131 III. 537). 526. Paret v. Bayonne (89 N. J. Law, 559), 657, 658. Paris V. Farmers' Bank (30 Mo. 575); 1361. Paris V. People (37 111. 74). 311. Parish v. Eden (62 Wis. 272), 1480. Parish v. Golden (35 N. Y. 464), 1171. Parish v. Stearns (21 Pick. 148), 1375. Parish v. Wheeler (32 N. Y. 494). 646. Parish in Sherburne t>. Fiske (8 Cush. 264), 208. Parish of Ouichita v. Monroe (43 La. Ann. 782), 549. clzxxii TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n. pp. 7S9-1605.] Parish School Board v. Packwood (43 La. Ann. 468; 7 So. Eep. 537), 806, 1334. Park V. Board (3 Ind. App. 536; 30 N. E. Eep. 147), 1014, 1430. Park V. Seattle (Wash., 31 Pao. Rep. 310). 1456. Park County v. Jefferson County (13 Colo. 585; 31 Pac. Rep. 913), ' looi: Parke Comm'rs *. O'Conner (86 Ind. 531), 1114. Parker's Case (36 N. H. 84), 690. Parker v. Buckner (67 Tex. 20), 1346. Parker v. Challis (9 TLaa. 155), 1169, 1186. Parker v. City of Springfield (147 Mass. 391). 1490. 1494, 1497. Parker V. Commonwealth (6 Pa. St. 507), 74. . Parker u. County of Saratoga (106 N. Y. 39-2; 13 N. E. Rep. 308), 811, 881, 914, 915. Parker v. Portland. (54 Mich. 808), 1540. Parker v. St. Paul (47 Minn. 317), 1406, 1431. Parker v. Smith (3 111. App. 356), 939. Parker v. Syracuse (31 N. Y. 376). 1115. Parker v. Titcomb (83 Me. 180; 19 Atl. Rep. 162), 349, 361, 363, 633, 1333. Parkersburg' v, Byown (106 IT. S. 487 ; a Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 263). 649, 939, 930, 1885, 1387. Parkersburg Co. v. Parkersburg (107 - V. S: 691), 1423. Parkersburg Gas Qo.v. Parkersburg (30 West Va. 435), 549, 1313. Parkhill v. Brighton (61 Iowa, 103), 1495. Parkinson v. Parker (48 Iowa, 667), 327 Parkland v. Gains (Ky., 11 S. W. Eep. 649), 1186. Parks V. Boston (8 Pick. 318), 685, 1193, 1576. Parks V. City of Boston (15 Pick. 193), 690, 1418, 1419, Parks r. Newburyport (10 Gray, 38), 1146. Parks V. Pleasant Grove School Dist. (65 Iowa, 209). 1347. , I'arksham v. Justices (9 Ga. 841), U83. Parmerlee v. Chicago (60 111. 367), 1167. Parnell v. Comm'rs (34 Ala. 378), 705. Parr v. Village of Greenbush (73 N. Y. 463), 262, 511, 034, 809. Parrott v. Ice Co. (46 N. Y. 369), 1491. Parry v. Berry (Comyns, 269), 290, 298. Parsons, Ex parte (1 Hughes, 282), 804, Parsons v. Brainard (17 Wend. 522), 335. Parsons, v. City of Charleston (1 Hughes, 383), 1384. Parsons v. Goshen (11 Pick. 396), 351, 643, 826, 1.398. P^sons V. Jackson (99 TJ. S. .434), 965. Parsons v. McGavock (3 Tenn. Ch. 581), 1596. Parsons v. Monmouth (70 Me. 262), 356, 933. Parsons ». Trustees (44 Ga. 529), 510. Passage v. School Insp. (19 Mich. 330), 1336. Patrick v. Robinson (83 Ala. 575; 3 So. Eep. 694), 1593. Paterson i-. Barnet (46 N. J. Law, I 62), 485. Paterson v. Byram (23 N. J. Law, 394), 978. Paterson v. Sobietv &c. (34 N. J. Law, 385). 39, 40, 63, 67, 74, 86, 87, 109. 473, 1166. Patten v. Green (13 Cal. 325), 1178, 1179. Patterson v. Barlow (60 Pa. St. 54), 377. Patterson v. Baumer (43 Iowa, 477), 686, 687, 1399. Patterson v. City of Butler (83 Ga. 606), 1342. Patterson v. Inhabitants S7. People V. McLean (14 N. Y. Supl. 77), 1291. ■ People V. MacLean (17 N. Y. Supl. 475), 1388. People V. McRoberts(03 111. 40), 1139, 1153, People V. Madison (51 N. Y. 442), 1576. People V. Mahaney (13 Mich. 481), • 187, 18'. 8. People V. Maher (56 Hun, 81). 1171. People V. Mallory (40 How. 281), 614. People V. Maniiattan Ry. Co. (20 Abb. N. C. 39.3J, 1533. People V. Marigold (71 Mich. 335), 1261. People V. Martin (12 Cal. 409), 375. People V. Martin (8 N. Y. Supl. 516, 1284. People V. Martin (10 N. Y. Supl. 511), 1291. People V. Wartl-i (5 N. Y, (1 Seld.) 22), 27.5. 357, 358. 339, 360. People V. Martin (131 N. Y. 196; 30 N. E. Rep. 60), 1280, 1513. People V. Mattimore (45 Hun, 448), 1231. People V. Maxton (111., 28 N. E. Rep. 1074), 1260. People V. May (27 Barb. 238), 706. People V. May (9 Colo. 80; 10 Pac. Rep. 641), 836. People V. May (9 Colo. 404; 12 Pac. Rep. 838), 836, 837, 908. People V. May (9 Colo. 414; 15 Pac. Eep. 36), 837. People V. May (Colo., 15 Pac. Rep. 86), 900. People V. May (17 111. App. 361), 1343. People V. Maynard (15 Mich. 463), 70, 434, 158SJ. People V. Mayor (18 Abb. N. 0. 123), 015. People V. Mayor (9 Hill, 9) 554, 1263. People t'. Mayor &c. (1 N. Y. Supl. 9.')). 1219. People I". Mavor &c. (59 How. Pr. 277). 615, 1464. People r. Mavor &c. of Brooklyn (4 N. Y. 419). 669, 1085, 1371. People V. Mayor &e. of Chicago (51 III. 17: 2 Am. Rep. 278), 48, 1382. People r. Mayor &c, of New York (5 Barb. 43). 176. People V. Mayor &o. of New York (33 Barb. 103), 669. People V. Mayor &c. of New York (7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 81), 90. 541. People V. Meach (14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 429)-, 1092. 1093. People V. Mead (24 N. Y. 114), 952, 953 People V. Meakim (56 Hun. 626; 24 Abb. N. C. 477; 10 N. Y. Supl. 161). 1545. People V. Meakim (183 N. Y. 214), 771, 787. People V. Mellen f32 111. 181), 127. People V. Merrick (16 N. Y. Supl. 246), 176. , People V. Mersereau (74 Mich. 687; 43 N. W. Rep. 153), 336. People V. Metropolitan Police (19 N. Y. 188; 20 N. Y. 316), 1093. People V. Metzker (47 Cal. 594), 388. People V. Meyers (95 N. Y. 223), 597. People V. Miller (38 Hun, 82), 1248. People V. Miller (16 Mich. 205), 1563. People V. Mills (33 Hun, 459), 303, ^104. People V. Minck (31 N. Y. 539), 1268. People J'. Mitchell (35 N. Y. 551), 932 933 People 1'. Molitor (23 Mich. 341), 386, 1563. People V. Montgomery County Su- pervisors (34 Hun, 599), 894. People V. Morgan (55 N. Y. 587). 939. People r. Morrell (81 Wend. 563; 2 Denio. 372), 187, 437, 443. People V. Morris (13 Wend. 325), 4, 5, 10, 67, 85, 87, 89, 95, 109, 473, 477. People V. Mott (64 N. Y. 600), 910, People V. Murray (57 Mich, 896), 543, 1866. People V. Murray (73 N. Y. 585), 178, 474^ cxc TABLE OF CASES. prhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] People V. Nearing (37 N. Y. 308), 686, 1181. People V. Negus (90 N. Y. 403), 780. People V. New Lots Auditors (34 Hun, 336), 1037. People v.- 'New York (5 Barb. 43), 1576. People V. New York (83 N. Y. 491), 203. People V. New York &c. E. Co. (84 N. Y. r,(\r,). 21. People V. New York Board &c. (64 N. Y. 627). 1376. Peoplp V. New Y6rk Cent. &c. R. Co. (74 N. Y. 30'i), 501. People V. New York Police Cotnm'rs (98 N. Y. 333), 1383. People V. Newell (13 Barb. 86; 7 N. Y. 9), 297, People V. Newton (126 N. Y. 656: 27 N. K. Rep. 870; 11 N. Y. Supl. 783), 1513. People V. Nichols (79 N. Y. 583), 203, ?06. People V. Niles (35 Cal. 283), -1350. People V. Nostrand (46 N. Y. 375), 188, SOO, 290, 396. People V. O'Brien (111 N. Y. 1 ; 7 ' Am. St. Rep. 684), 78, 536, 595, 1214. People V. OgdensburKh (48 N. Y. 390), 1350, 1853, 1575. People V. Olmsted (45 Barb. 644), 1514. People I'. O'Neil (109 N. Y. 251), 131. People V. Omaha (2 Neb. 106), 1596. People V. Oregon (37 111. 29), 311. Peoples. Osborn (20 Wend. 186), 706. People V. Osborne (7 Colo. 605), 158. People V. Otis (90 N. Y. 48), SO."?. People V. Ottawa (88 111. 203), 937. Peoples. Pacheco (7 Colo. 175), 870. People V. Page (Utah, 33 Pac. Rep. 791), 65, 119, 131. People V. Palmer (52 N. Y. 84). 396. People V. Parka (58 Cal. 634), 931. People V. Peabody (6 Abb. Pr. 228 ; 15 How. Pr. 470), 198. People V. Pennook (60 N. Y. 421), ■321, 331. People V. Perkins (85 Cal. 509), 190, 315. People V. Peters (4 Neb. 354), 1336. People V. Phillips (1 Denio, 388), 189. People V. Phippin (Mich., .37 N. W. Rep. 888), 144. People V. Phoenix Bank (24 Wend. 131), S58. People v: Pinckney (33 N. Y. 877), 109, 1038. People V. Police Comm'rs (9 Hun, 323), 1390. People V. Police Comm'rs (11 Hun, 403), 1290. People V. Police Comm'rs (77 N. Y. 153), 1290. People V. Police Comm^rs (8 Wkly. Dig. 466), 1290. People V. Police Comm'rs (15 Wkly. Dig. 278), 1390. People n. Police Justices (7 Mich. 456), 1363. People V. Pope (53 Cal. 437), 1143. Pe»ple v; Porter (6 Cal. 36), 203, 375. People V. Potter (63 Cal. 137), 190, 310, 139a. People V. Power (25 111. 187), 109, 1371, 1.373. People V. Pratt (N. Y., 29 N. E. Rep. 7), 6l)6. People V. President &c. (33 Wend. 254), 1437. People V. Pres't Manhattan Co. (9 Wend. 351), 67, 87, 129, 415. People V. Provines (34 Cal. 530), 320. People V. Queens Co. (1 Hill, 193), 1575. People V. Quigg (59 N. Y. 83)j 113. People V. Railwav.Co. (41 Mich. 413; 3 N. W. Rep.' 188), 1079. People V. Raymond (37 N. Y. 428), 158, 1023. People V. Reardon (49 Hun, 430), 1514. People V. Reed (81 Cal. 70), 1407, 1409. People V. Regents &c. (4 Mich. 98), 343, 1530. People V. Reid (10 Colo. 138), 175. People, w. Rensselaer County Super- visors (34 Hun, 366), 889. People V. Reynolds (10 111. 1), 67, 87. People V. Riordan (73 Mich. 508; 41 N. W. Rep. 482), 1556, 1557. People V. Riverside (70 Cal. 463), 49. People V. Robb (55 Hun, 435 ; 8N. Y. Supl. 502), 1397. People V. Robb (5 N. Y. Supl. 869), 1291. People V. Robb (9 N. Y. Supl. 831), 1284, 1388. People V. Robb (16 N. Y. Supl. 134), 1386. Peoples. Roby (53 Mich. 577), 1349, People V. Roche (134 111. 9). 1340. People r. Rochester (31 Barb. 656), 1174. People V. Rochesler (44 Hun, 166), 518. • , People V. Rochester (5 hunk (N. Y.) 142), 273. People V. Romero (18 Cal. 93), 1547. People V. Rosborough (39 Cal. 415), 375. People V. Roseborough (14 Cal. 180), 375. TABLE OF CASES. CXQl (The references are to pages: Vol People V. Runkel (9 Johns. 147),' 174, Z90. People V. Russell (4 Wend. 570), 741. Paople V. Sacramento (6 Cal. 422), 529. , ^ People V. St. Lawrence County (25 Hun, 131). 1525. People V. Salem (20 Mich. 452 ; 4 Am. Rep. 400), 934. People V. Sanderson (30 Cal. 160), 189. People V. San Francisco (37 Cal. 655). 634. People V. Saratoga Springs (54 Hun, 16), 1513., People V. Sawyer (52 N. Y. 296), 986. People V. School Trustees (78 III. 136), 1320. People V. Schuyler (5 Barb. 166), 355. People u Schuyler (4 N. Y. 173), 335. People V. Scrughara (20 Barb. 202), 1523, 1558. People V. Seaman (5 Denio, 409), P85. People V. Searle (52 Cal. 620), 1333. People V. Sheffield (47 Hun, 481), 1553. People V. Shepard (36 N. Y. 285), 755, 1377, 1278. People V. Sisson (98 III. 385), 368, 1323. People V. Smith (21 N. Y. 595), 681, 683, 690, 696. People V. Smith (45 N. Y. 781), 953. People V. Solomon (51 111, 37), 61, 67, 86, 87, 1024, 1397. People V. Son (19 N. Y. Supl. 309), S53. People V. Soucey (26 III. App. 505), 1542t People V. Spencer (55 N. Y. 1), 937. People V. Squire (107 N. Y. 593; 14 N. E. Rep. 820). 1212. People V. State Auditor (43 Mich. 432), 1520. People I'. State Treasurer (33 Mich. 499), 931. People V. State Treasurer (34 Mich. 46S), 934. People ». Staton (73 N. C. 546), 178, People 'v. Stephens (71 N. Y. 527), 715, 741. Pertple V. Stevens (5 Hill, 616), 178, 290. Peoplev. Stevens (13 Wend. 341), 515. People r. Stewart (6 111. App. 63), 331. People V. Stocking (50 Barb. 573), 829, 1525. People V. Stone (78 Mich. 635; 44 . N. W. Rep. 333), 1336, 1337. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 780-1605.] People V. Stott (Mich., 51 N, W. Eep. 509). 1260. People V. Stout (23 Barb. 849), 67, 74, 87. People V. Stowell (9 Abb. N. C. 456), 190, 281. People V. Stupp (2 N. Y. Supl. 537), 8T2. People «. Sturtevant (9 N. Y. 263; 5;) Am. Dec. 536), 1214. People V. Summers (30 N. Y. St. Rep. 614). 1513. People V. Supervisors &o. (11 Abb. 14), 1S71." People u. Supervisors &c. (15 Barb. 607), 1532. People V. Supervisors &c. (48 Barb. 232 ; 34 N. Y. 516). 554. People V. Supervisors &c. (11 Cal. 206). 1371. People V. Supervisors &c. (1 Hill, 3021, 180, 184. Peoi>le V. Supervisors &o. (4 Hill, 20), 1514. People j;. Supervisors &o. (7 Hill, 171), 993. People t'. Supervisors &c. (3 How. Pr. (N. S.) 243), 1526. People V. Supervisors &c. (21 How. Pr. 322), 1525. People V. Supervisors &c. (33 Hun, 305), 1526. People V. Supervisors &c. (100 111. 332), 1549. People V. Supervisors &c. (110 111. 511). 1024. People V. Supervisors &o. (3 Mich. 475), 1528. People V. Supervisors &c. (38 Mich. 421), 1520. People V. Supervisors &c. (12 Johns. 414), 1532. People V. Supervisors &o. (U N. Y. 563). 1517, 1533. People V. Supervisors &c. (20 N. Y. 252), 11B9. People V, Supervisors &o. (51 N. Y. 401), 1379. People V. Supervisors &o. (51 N. Y. 442), 1.525. People V. Supervisors &c. (10 Wend. 363), 1379. People V. Supervisors &c. (12 Wend. 257). 184. People V. Swift (31 Cal. 26), 257, 259, 636, 713. People V. Syracuse (63 N. Y. 84), 296. People V. Taylor (57 Cal. 620), 315. People V. Tazewell County (83 UL 147), 955. People V. Ten Eyck (13 Wend. 448), 825. oxcu TABLR OF OASES. [The references oreto pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1601] People V. Thompson (99 N. Y. 611 ; 1 N. E. Rep. 543), 1541. People V. Thurber (13 111. 544), 144. People V. Tisdale (1 DoukL 59), 385. People V. Toal (85 Cal. 383; 23 Pac. ' Rep. 203), 199. People V. Tompkins (74 111. 482). 330. People V. Town Auditora (74 N. Y. 310), 220, 748. People V. Town Auditors (75 N, Y. 316), 2-20,339. People V. Town of Mt. Morris (111., 27N. E. Rep. 757). l.-,17. People V. Town of Oian (121 111. 650; 13 N. E. Rep. 73u). 460. People V. Township Board (20 Mich. 452), 1387. People V. Tracy (1 Denio, 617), 1549. People V. Treasurer (S4 Mich. 468), 1374. People V. Tremain (17 How., Pr, 142), 1537. People y. Troop (12 Wend. 183), 518. People V. Trustees (78 III. 136). 1388. People V. Tweed (63 N. Y. 202). 109. People V. Utica Ins. Co, (15 Johns. 358), 298, 13.")9. People V. Van Cleve (I Mich. 362; 53 Am. Dec. 69), 389. People V. Vanderbilt (28 N. Y. 396), 1048. People V. Van Slyck (4 Cowen, 297), 389. People V. Van Tassel (19 N. Y. Supl. 643; 17 N. Y. Supl. 938), 300. People V. Vilas (36 N. Y. 459; 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 358),, 184, 309, 320. People V. Village oif Highland Park , (Mich., ."iO N. W. Rep. 660). 163. People V. Village of Little Falls (29 N. Y. St. Rep. 723), 1513. People V. Village of Saratoga Springs (54 Hun, 16; 26 N. Y. St. Rep. 54; 7N. Y. Supl. 125), 1513. People V. Wagner (7 Lans. (N. Y.) 467), 936. People V. Wagner (Mich., 49 N. W. Rep. 609), 1245. People V. Waldrogel (49 Mich. 337), 1350. People V. Walker (23 Barb. 304), 277. People V. Walker (9 Mich. 338), 1275. People V. Walter (68 N. Y. 403), 554. People V. Warfleld (20 III. 159), 381. People V. Warren (14 111. App. 296), 659. People V. Waynesville (88 111. 469), 936, 940. People V. Weber (86 111. 283), 200, 1532. People V. Webber (89 111. 347), 177, 200, 259. People V. Weldon (14 N. Y. Supl. 447), 970. People V. Weller (6 Cal. 49). 375. People V. Weller (11 Cal. 49; 70 Am. Dec. 754), 375. Peoples Wendell (57 Hun, 363; 88 N. Y. St. Rep. 129; ION. Y. SupL 587), 1513, 1.550. People V. Wendell (71 N. Y. 171), 910. People V, Whalen (5 Weekly Dig. 410). 829. People V. Whittomb (55 111. 172), 412. People V. White (24 Wend. 520), 200, %290, 298. People V. Whitman (10 Cal. 38), 189. 'People i;. Whitney's Point (33 Hun, 503), 538. People V. Wiant (48 111. 263). 381. People I'. Wilson (62 Hun. 618). 1265. People V. Wilson (15 111. 389). 1253. Peofile V. WiUon (3 N. Y. Supl. 326), 1174. People V. Wilson (63 N. Y. 186), 377. Peoples. Wilson (119 N. Y. 315; 30 N. Y. St. Rep. 79; 7 N. Y. Supl. 637). 1514. People V. Wong Wang (97 Cal. 277), 1355. Peoples. Woods (7 Cal. 579), 1381. People V. Wren (5 III. (4 Scam,) 269), ■ 67, 88, 4li5. 466, 1024. People V. Wright (31 Mich. 871), 1334. People V. Yeazel (84 111. 539), 1833. Peoples' Board of Supervisors of Queens County. In re (133 N. Y. 468; 30 N. E. Rep. 488; 16 N. Y. Supl. 705), 553. Peoples' R. Co. v. Memphis R. Co, (10 Wall. 38), 6H3, 1196.. Peoples' R. Co. v. Memphis R. Co. (10 Wall. 501). 549. Peoria v. Calhoun (29 111. 317), 519. Peoria v. Crawl (38 111. App. 154), 1099. Peoria v. Kidder (36 111. 351), 1166, 1189, 1399. Peoria v. Johnston (56 111. 52), 412. Peoria &o. R. Co. v. Peoria &c. R. Co. (66111. 174), 1196. Peoria &c. ^t. Co. v. Scott (116 III. 401), 1384. Pepper v. City of Philadelphia (114 Pa. St. 96), 730. Pepper v. Smith (15 Lea (Tenn.), 551), 419. Peppin V. Cooper (3 Barn. & Aid. 431). 329. Perdue v. Ellis (18 Ga. 586), 487. Perin v. Carey (24 How. 465), 563, 660, Perkin v. Proetor (3 Wils. 382), 317. Perkins v. Burlington (77 Iowa, 553), 1363, 1367, TAHOr OF OASES. cxcin [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1603.] Perkins v. Corbin (43 Ala. 103), 1353. Perkins v. Crocker (109 Mass. 128), 1335. Perkins v. Fayette (68 Me. 152), 1488, 1451. Perkins v. Lawrence (136 Mass. 305), 779. Perkins v. Ledbetter (68 Miss. 827; 8 So. Eep. 507). 1342. Perkins v. New Haven (53 Conn. 214), 755 Perkins' v. School Dist. (56 Iowa, 476), 1331, Perkins v. Slack (86 Pa. St. 270), 844. Perkins v. Watertown (5 Biss. 320j, 1588. Perkins v. Weston (3 Cush. 549), 1275. Perkinson v. St. Louis (4 Mo. App. 333). 207. Perley v. Georgetown (7 Gray, 464), 1578. Perley v. Muskegon County (33 Mich. 132), 323. Perrin v. Lyman (33 Ind. 16), 313. Perrine v. Farr (23 N. J. Law, 356), 68.), Perry v. Cheboygan (55 Mich. 350), i83. Perry v, Cumberson (39 Hun, 436), i411. Perry v. Dover (13 Pick. 206), 252, 1335. Perry v. Keene (56 N. H, 514), 929, 933. Perrv v. Putney (53 Vt. 538), 783. Perry v. Rockdale (63 Tex. 457), 1383 Perry v. Salt Lake City (Utah, 35 Pac. Eep. 739), 1342. Perry v. State (9 Wis. 19), 438. Perry v. Tossever (8 Ohio, 531). 1353. Perry v. Tynen (82 Barb. 137), 298, 297. Perry v. Washburn (20 Cal. 318), 479. Perry County v. City of Du Quoin (99 111. 479), 974. Perry County v. Conway County (53 Ark. 430; 12 S. W. .Rep. 877), 883. Perryman v. Bethune (89 Mo. 158), 1336. Perryman v. City of Greenville (51 Ala. 507), 90. Peruvian &c. R. Co. v. Thames &c. Ins. Co. (L. R. 2 Ch. 617), 922. Pesterfleld v. Vickers (3 Cold. 205). 103, 488, 1013. Peterborough v. Lancaster (14 N. H. 383), 352. 874. 1400. Peters v. Litchfield (34 Conn. 364), »»6. Peters v. Lvnchburgh (76 Va. 927), 1369. Peters v. Town of Fergus Falls (35 Minn. 549), 1059. Petersburg v. Applegarth (38 Gratt. 831). 9. Petersburg v. Mappin (14 111. 193), 657. Petersburg v. Metzker (31 111. 205). 103. 488, 513, Petersilea v. Stone (119 Mass. 465), 198. Peterson v. Mayor &c. (17 N. Y. 449), 308, 338, 351, 260, 639, 640, 710, 845. Petition of Brady (85 N. Y. 268), 1169. Petition of Cleveland. In re (51 N. J. Law, 319: 58 N. J. Law, 188: 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 330), 375 Petition of De Pierris (83 N. Y. 343), 1173. Petition of Garvey (77 N. Y. 633), 1163. Petition of LandafI (34 N. H. 163), 705. Petition of Merriam (84 N. Y. 596), 1390. Petition of Mt. Washington Road Co. (35 N. H. 135), 685. Petrie v. Doe (30 Miss. 698), 396. Pettengill v. City of Yonkera (116 N. Y. 558). 1469. Pettibone v. Beardslee (1 Luzerne Leg. Rep. 180), 1596. Pettigrew v. Bell (34 S. O. 104), 1337. Pettiarew v. Village of Evansville (35 Wis. 323), 1096. Pettingill v. Town of Glean (48 N. Y. St. Rep. 96), 1458. Pettis V. Johnson (56 Ind. 139), 585, 1193. Petty V. Looker (21 N. Y. 267), 189. Petty V. Myers (49 Ind. 1). 933. Peyser v. Mayor &c. of New York (70 N. Y. 497), 242, 1182, 1184, 1185. Peyser v. The Mayor (79 N. Y. 621), 1134. Pfefferle v. Comm'rs (89 Kan. 432 ; 1 8 Pac. Rep. 506), 1014. Phelan v. City of New York (14 N. Y. Supl. 785). 182. Phelan v. Granville (140 Mass. 386), 181. Phelan v. Mayor (119 N. Y. 86; 83 N. E. Rep. 175), 720, 1110. Phelps V. City of New York (113 N. Y. 316; 19 N. E. Rep. 408), 342, 244,282. 1106, 1183. Phelps V. Lewiston (15 Blatcbf, 131), 947. CXOIV TABJ.E OF CASES. [The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Phelps V. Mankato City (23 Minn, 376). 145 . 1488. / Phelps' v.n (60 N. Y. 10). 1331. PMladelphia ., Appeal (86 Pa. St. 179), 1115. Philadelphia v. Comm'rs (53 Pa. St. 451), 16. Philadelphia v. Dibeler (Pa., S3 Atl. Rep. 567), 1077: Philadelphia v. Dickson (38 Pa. St. 347), 703, Philadelphia v. Duncan (4 Phila, 145), 533. Philadelphia v. Dungan (134 Pa. St. 52; 16 Atl. Rep, 524; 23 W, N. C. 243), 1057. Philadelphia v. Dyer (41 Pa. St. 463), 703. Philadelphia v. Evans (Pa., 31 Atl. Rep. 200), 1078. Philadelphia v. Ferry Ry. Co. (53 , Pa. St. 177), 13S4. Philadelphia v. Field (58 Pa. St, 320), 1169. Philadelphia v. Fianigan (47 Pa, St. 27), 634, 642. Philadelphia v. Fox (64 Pa. St. 169). 11, 74, 94, 109, 436, 480, ,163. Philadelphia v. Germantown Pass. R, Co. (10 Pliila. (Pa.) 165), 683. Philadelphia v. Given (60 Pa. St, 136); 200, 1392. Philadelphia, v. Greble (38 Pa, St, 339). 479, 1395, Philadelphia v. Jewell (135 Pa, St. 339), 712. Philadelphia v. Luckhardt (73 Pa. St. 311), 1115, 1116. Philadelphia v. MuUer (49 Pa, 440), ■ 1178, . Philadelphia v. Phila. &o, R, Co. (58 Pa, St. 353), 624. Philadelphia v. Phila. &c. R, Co. (88 Pa. St. 314), 712. Philadelphia v. Providence Trust Co. (133 Pa. St. 334; 18 Atl. Rep. 1114), 1049. Philadelphia v. Railroad Co, (33 Pa. St. 41), 1168. Philadelphia V, Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry, Co. (143 Pa, St. 444; 22 Atl, Rep. 695), 1104. Philadelphia v. Rink (Pa„ 2 Atl, Rep. 515), 1293. Philadelphia v. Rule (93 Pa. St. 15), 1186. Philadelphia v. Scott (81 Pa. St. 80), ■ 669. Philadelphia v. Smith (Pa., 16 Atl. Rep. 493: 33 W. N. C. 343), 1441, UU, 1474, 1497. Philadelphia v. Tryon (35 Pa. St. 401). 1163. Philadelphia v. Verner (8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 97), 1164. Philadelphia v. Wistar (93 Pa. St. 404), 1120. Philadelphia v. Wright (100 Pa. St. 235), 1149. Philadelphia &c. R. Co. «. Williams (54 Pa. St. 103), 690. Philadelphia & Trenton R, Co,, In re (6 Whart, 26), 635. Philips V. Jefferson (5 Kan. 412), ^1577, Philips V. New York (113 N. Y. 216), '241. Philips V. Wickham (1 Paige Ch. 590), 465. Phillips, In re (60 N. Y, 16), 499, Phillips V. Albany (38 Wis, 340), 349, 617, 934, Phillips V. Allen (41 Pa. St, 481), 5S5. Phillips ■«, Ash's Heirs (63 Ala, 418), 555. Phillips V. Commonwealth (44 Pa, St, 197), 311, Phillips V. County Court (31 West Va. 477), 1493. Phillips V. Foxhall (L. R. 7 Q. B. 666), 323. Phillips V. Mayor &c, of N. Y, (1 Hilt. (N. Y. Com. PI.) 483), 187. Phillips V. School Dist. (79 Mich. 170; 44 N. W. Rep. 439)i 806, Phillips V. Stevens Point (35 Wis. 594), 1576, 1578. Phillips V. Tecumseh (5 Neb. 312), 1340. Phillips County v, Lee County (34 Ark. 340), 438. Pickering v. De Roohemont (N. H., 23 Atl. Rep. 88). 345. 347, 1336. Pickering v. Pickering (11 N. H. 141), 373. Pickering v. Shotwell (10 Barr, 27), 663. Pickering v. State (106 Ind. 228; 5 N. E. Rep. 611), 1127). Pickett V. Adams (Ky., 15 S. W. Rep. 805), 1.333. Pickett I'. Harrod (86 Kv. 485). 1323. Pickett V. Hastings (47 Cal. 369), 624. Pickett V. School District (35 Wis. 551), 393. Pickford v. Mayor &c. of Lynn (98 Mass. 491), 705. Pickles V. Dry Dock Co. (38 La. Ann. 413), 573. Pidgpnn V. McCarthy (82 Ind. 321), 55. Pierce v. Benjamin (14 Pick. 856), 1579. Pierce v. Drew (136 Mass, 75', 678, Pieice V. Emery (33 N, H. 507), 1556. TABLE OF OASES. CXCV [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Pierce v. New Bedford (139 Mass. 534), 264. Pierce v. Richardson (37 N. H. 306), 1373. Pierce v. Whitcomb (48 Vt. 137). 766. Pierce Mfp;. Co. v. Bleckwenn (16 N. Y. Supl. 768). 876. Piercy v. Averill (37 Hun, 360), 319, 331. Fieri v. Sbieldsboro (43 Miss. 493), 1034. Pierie v. Philadelphisv (139 Pa. St. 573: 31 Atl. Eep. 90), 184. Pierrepoint v. Loveless (73 N. Y. 311), 1444. Pierson v. Glean (14 N. J. Law, 37), 1036. Pike V. Megoun (44 Mo. 391), 218. Pike County v. State (11 111. 303), 11)53. Pillsbury v. City of Augusta (79 Me. 71; 8 Atl. Rep. 150), 1193. Pillsbury Vi Moore (44 Me. 154), 1036. Piinental v. San Francisco (31 Cal. 351), 339. 393, 293, 636, 649. Pine Bluff Water & Light Co. v. Sewer District (Aik., 19 S. W. Rep. 576), 1094. Pine City v. Munch (43 Minn. 343), 1058, 1059, 1588. Pine Civil Township v. Huber Mfg. Co. (83 Ind. 131), 307, 643, 815, 820. Pine Countv v. WiUard (39 Minn. 125: 39 "N. W. Rep. 71), 323. Pine Grove Township v. Talcott (19 Wall. 6B6), 933. 934, 1383. Pinkerton v. Bailey (8 Wend. 600), 1339. Pinkhara v. Topsfleld (104 Mass. 78), 1437, 1460. Pinney r. Brown (60 Conn. 164), 353. PioUet V. Simmers (106 Pa. St. 95), 1467, 1468. Piper V. Chappell (14 M. & W. 634), 533. Piper V. Pearson (3 Gray. 130), 339. Piper V. Singer (4 Serg. & R. 354), 1397. Piqua V. Zimmerlin (35 Ohio St. 507), 535. Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop (16 How. 369), 94. 109. Piscatauqua Bridge v. New Hamp- shire Bridge <7 N. H. 35), 671. PIscataway v. Perth Amboy (4 Harr. 173). 993. PIscataway Townships, Jn re (N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 759). 1416. Pitts V. Opelika (79 Ala. 537). 502. Piusburg V. ClarksvUle (58 N. H. 2J ), 1439. Pittsburg V. Cluley (74 Pa. St. 362), 1269. Pittsburgh. Danforth (56 N. H. 371), 346, 369. Pittsburg V. Grier (33 Pa. St. 54), 767, '773. Pittsburg V. Reynolds (Kan., 29 Pac. Rep, 757), 503. Pittsburgh's Appeal (Pa., 16 Atl. Rep. 92), 1354. Pittsburgh's Appeal (138 Pa. St. 401 ; 31 Atl. Rep. 757), 174. Pittsburgh v. Scott (1 Pa. St. 309), 683. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Rose (74 Pa. St. 363), 609. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Swinney (97 Ind. 5861, 698. Pittsburgh E. Co. 'j, Taylor (104 Pa. St. 306), 1494. Pittston Borough v. Hart (85 Pa. St. m% 1471. Pitzman v. Freeburg (93 III. HI), 932. Pixley V. Clark (35 N. Y. 520), 779. Pixley V. Western Pac. R. Co. (33 Cal. 183), 703. Place V. Providence (12 E. I. 1), n4fi. Place V. Taylor (23 Ohio St. 317). 337. Placer County v. Campbell (Cal., 11 Pac. Rep. 603). 887. Planters' Ass'n v. Avigno (38 La. Ann. 553). 965. Plaquemines Police Jury v. Mitchell (37 La. Ann. 44i, 1395. Platenius v. State (17 Ark. 518). 740. Piatt V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (Iowa, 31 N. W. Rep. 883). 1193. Piatt V. People (65 III. 360), 160. Platte County v. Gerard (13 Neb. 844), 659. Platter v. County of Elkhart (103 Ind. 360; 3 N. E. Rep. 544; 1 West. Rep. 335), 308, 643, 971, 1111, 1534. Platteville v. Bell (43 Wis. 488), 539, 544. Platteville v. Galena &o. R. Co. (43 Wis. 493), 1391. , Platteville v. Hooper (63 Wis. 381), 313, 317. Platteville v. McKernan (54 Wis. 487). 539. Plattsburg v. Riley (43 Mo. App. 18), 405. Plattsmoiith v. Boeck (Neb. , 49 N. W. Rep. 895), 1139, 1149. Plattsinouth v. Fitzgerald (10 Neb. 401). 960. Pleasant v. Kost (89 111. 490), 1166. Pleuler v. State (11 Neb. 547), 1356. Plimpton V. Summerset (33 Vt. 383), 1357. cxevi TABtB OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Plumer p. Harper (3 N. H. 8S), 1036. Pluminer v. Sheldon (94 Cal. 533), 1407, 1432. Plymouth v. County Comm'rs (16 Gray, 341). 706. Plymouth v. Graver (135 Pa. St. 24), 771. Plymouth v. Painter (17 Conn. 585), 198. Plympton v. Boston Dispensary (106 Mass. 544). 1066. Pocontico Water-works Co. v. Bird (4 N. Y. Supl. 317), 1303. Poe V. Machine Works (34 West Va. 517), 546. Poillon V. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 132), 663. Poindexter v. Greenhow (114 IT. S. 270), ao. Point Pleasant Bridge Co. v. Tovrri of Point Pleasant (3 West Va. 328; 9 S. E. Rep. 231), 68. Point Pleasant Land Co. v. Trustees (47 N. J. Law, 23.')), 383, 803, 1336. Polack V. Orphan Asylum (48 Cal. 490), 1195. Police Comm'rs v. City of Louisville (3 Bush. 597). 1278. Police Jury v. Britton (15 Wall. 566), 5fi2, 631, 633, 833, 932, 935, 933. Police Jury v. McCormack (33 La. Ann. 624), 624. Police Jury u. Michel (4 La. Ann. 84', 1595. Police Jury v, Shreveport (5 La. Ann. 661), 110. Police Jury v. Succession of McDon- ough (8 La. Ann. 341), 933. Police Jury of Ouachita v. Monroe (38 La." Ann. 680), 14. Polinsky v. People (3 Hun, 390), 515. Polk V. Cosgrove (4 Biss. 437), 325. Polk V. Plummer (3 Humph. (Tenn.) 500), 313. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan (3 How. 312), 669. Polling Lists, In re (13 R. L 729), 377. Pollock V. Lawrence County (3 Pittsb. R. 137). 903. Pollock V. Louisville (13 Bush, 221 ; 26 Am. Rep. 260). 1013, 1038. Polly V. Saratoga (9 Barb. 449), 690. Pomeroy v. Westfield (154 Mass. 462), 1455, 1456, 1493, 1499. Pomeroy Co. v. Davis (81 Ohio St. 555), 1350. Pomfrey v. Village of Saratoga Springs (104 N. Y. 459; 11 N. E. Rep. 43), 831, 339, 780, 885, 1393, 1409, 1440, 1458, 1474, 1477, 1491. Pompton V. Cooper Union (101 U. S. 196), 946. Ponca V. Crawford (33 Neb. 662; 37 N. W. Rep. 609), 1499. Pond V. Chippewa County (43 Wis. 63), 1171. Pond V. Medway (Quincy (Mass.), 193), 705. Pond V. Negus (3 Mass. 230), 303, 526, 1416. Pontiac v. Carter (33 Mich. 164), 233, 757, 1194. Po(Jk i\ Lafayette Building Ass'n (71 Ind. 357), 646. Pool V. Boston (5 Cush. 219), 667. Pool V. Trexler (76 N. C. 297), 687. Pooler V. Reed (73 Me. 139), 200. Pooley V. City of Buffalo (133 N. Y. 592; 124 N. Y. 306), 1183. Poor District v. Byers (Pa., 11 Atl. Rep. 242), 898. Poor Dist. of Lock Haven v. Poor Dist. (Pa., 13 Atl. Rep. 742), 983. Pope V. Phifer (3 Heisk. 683). 1389. Poplin V. Hawke (8 N. H. 305), 995, 1001. Poquet V. North Hero (44 Vt. 91), 975. Port Hudson v. Chad wick (53 Mich. 320), 1144. Port Huron v. McCall (46 Mich. 565), 93, 93. Port Jevvis v. First Nat. Bank (98 N. Y. 550), 1300, 1453. Port Royal v. Graham (84 Pa. St 436), 90S. Portage Co. v. Wisconsin R. ~&c. Co. (121 Mass. 460), 9S9. Porter v. Attica (33 Hun, 605), 1409. Porter v. Railroad Co. (33 Mo. 138), 1306. Porter v. Rockford (76 111. 561), 1363. Porter v. Stanley (47 Me. 515), 338. Porter v. State (78 Tex. 591 ; 14 S. W. Rep. 794), 1338, 1533. Portland v. Bangor (43 Me. 403), 1259. Portland v. Bangor (65 Me. 130), 1259. Portland v. Schmidt (13 Oregon, 17), 549. • Portland v. Water Co. (67 Me. 135). 1353, 1360. Portland &c. R. Co. v. City of Port- land (14 Or. 188; 12 Pao. Rep. 265), 578. Portland &c. R. Co. v. Hartford (58 Me. 33), 361, 935, 939. 960. Portland &c. K. Co. v. Standish (65 Me. 63), 370, 936. Portland Sav. Bank v. Evansville (25 Fed. Rep. 389), 959. Portland Stone- ware Co. v. Tavlor (R. I., 19 Atl. Rep. 1086), 1550, 1552. TA&I.E OF O&SES. CXCVU [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1603.] Portsmouth Sav. Bank v. Spriug- fleld (4 Fed. Rep. 376), 9fil. Portsmouth Sav. Bank v. Village of Ashley (Mich., 52 N. W. Rep. 74), 630. Portwood 1'. Montgomery (52 Miss. 533). 1S6S, 1373. Post V. Boston (141 Mass. 189), 1437, 1475. Post V. County of Pulaski (47 Fed. Rep. 283), 9.38. Post V. Kendall Co. (105 U. & 667), 208. Post V. Pearsall (22 Wend. 425), 1410. Post V. Sparta (63 Mich. 333; 2» N. W. Rep. 731), 1537. 1540. Postmaster-General v. Munger (2 Paine, 189). 3^0, 330. Postmaster-General v. Rice (Gilpin, 554), 645. Potter V. Canaan (37 Conn. 224), 817. Potter V. Castleton (53 Vt. 435). 1451. Potter V. Douglass Countv (87 Mo. 239; 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 656), 832. Potter V. Town of Greenwich (26 Hun, 326). 955. Potter V. Village of Homer (59 Mich. 8). 1540. Pottier & S. Man. Co. v. Taylor (3 MacArtlnir, 4), 1596. Pottner v. City of Minneapolis (41 Minn. 73; 43 N. W. Eep. 784), 1099. Potts V. City of Pittsburgh (14 W. N. C. 38). 1589. Potts 7!. State (75 Ind. 33i), 910. Poughkeepsie v. Wilisie (36 Hun, 270). 183. Poulters' Co. v. Phillips (6 Bing. N. C. 314), 523. Pound V. Chippewa County (43 Wis. 63). 571, 1063. Pound V. Turck (95 U. S. 459), 1433. Powell V. Boraston (18 C. B. (N. S.) 175), 134, Powell V. Commonwealth (127 U. S. 67^). 599. Powell V. Farmer (18 C. B. (N. S,) 168), 133. Powell V. Heisler (45 Minn. .549; 48 N. W. Rep. 411), 8B8. Powell V. Parkersburg (28 West Va. 698), 114, 1,574. Powell V. Tuttle (3 N. Y, 396), 297, 1390. Power V. Village of Athens (99 N. Y. 592), 568. Powers' Appeal (29 Mich. 504), 623, 671, 13M1. Powers, In re (25 Vt. 261), 1357.' Powers V. Bears (13 Wis. 214), 695. Powers V. City of Council Blufifs (50 Iowa, 197), 1138. Powers I'. City of Yonkers (114 N. Y. 145; 21 N. E. Rep. 132), 713. Powers V. Comm'rs (8 Ohio St. 285), 393. Powers V. Decatur (54 Ala. 214), 531, 1333. Powers V. Railroad Co. (33 Ohio St. 439), 692. Powers V. St. Paul (36 Minn. 87), 783. Powers V. Superior Court (23 Ga. 65), 933. Powers V. Wood County (8 Ohio St. 285). 1306. Powers V. Woodstock (38 Vt. 44), 1433, 1429. Poweshiek County v. Cass County (63 Iowa, 244), 988. Poyer v. Village of Desplaines (23 111. App. 576). 1053, 1334. Prairie v. Lloyd (97 III. 179). 9.56. Pratt V. Baupre (13 Minn. 187), 314. Pratt V. Gardner (3 Gush. 63), 317. Pratt V. Law (9 Cranch, 456). 1144. Pratt V. Lincoln County (61 Wis. 63 ; 20 N. V/. Rep. 726), 593, 1132. Pratt V. Short (53 How. Pr. .506 1, 651. Pratt V. Swanton (15 Vt. 147), 350, 640, 1141. Pray v. Jersey City (32 N. J. Law, "394). 9, 10, 769, 1448. Pray v. Northern Liberties (31 Pa. St. 69), 1166. Preble v. Portland (45 Me. 241), 286. Pre'lt V. McDonald (7 Kan. 426), 193, 19.1, 508. 539. 513, 1269. Prescott V. Hays (42 N. H. 66), 200. Prescott V. State (19 Ohio St. 184), 1008. President v. Coal Co. (50 N. Y. 266), 730. President &c. v. City of Indianapolis (13 Ind. 630), 478. President &c. v, Diffebach (1 Yeates, 367), 692. President &c. v. Schroeder (58 111. 353), 1014. President &c. v. State (45 Ala. 399), 1389. President &c. v. Thompson (20 111. 1U7). 465; 1558. President &c. of Ottawa v. County of La Salle (12 III. 339), 113. , Pressel v. Bice (142 Pa. St. 263), 1*^55 Prestley v. Foulds (3 Scott, N. R. 205, 2251, 129. Preston v. Boston (13 Pick. 7), 244, 247, 1399. Preston v. Culbertson (58 Gal. 209), 379. OXCVIU TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pagpa; YoL I, pp. 1-788; Yom^ pp.789-1605.] V. Roberts (13 Bush. 570), Prosnect Park &c. R. Co. v. Preston v. Roberts (13 Bush, 570), 1170. Preston v. Rudd (84 Ky. 161), 1187. Prettyman v. Tazewell County (19 111. 406), 955. Prewett v. Mississippi County (38 Ark. 313). 988. Prezinger v. Harness (114 Ind. 491 ; 16 N. E. Rep. 495), 277, 1075, 1136. Price V. Bartram (Cowp. 69), 1223. Price V. Grant (7 N. Y. Supl. 904), 1360. Price V. Methodist Church (4 Ohio, 513), 1166. Price V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co. (37 Wis. 9S), 700, 1148. Price V. Railroad Co. (13 Ind, 58), 393, 1173. Price V. Thompson (48 Mo. 363), 624. Price V. Town of Breckenridge (93 Mo. 379), 1406. Prideaux v. Mineral Point (43 Wis. 533). 1436, 1451. Priest *. Cummings (16 Wend. 617), 140. Priet V. De La Montanyo (§5 .Cal. 148; S4Pac. Rep. 613), 316. Priet V. Reis (93 Cal. 85 ; 38 Pao. Rep. 798). 851; Prince v. City of Fresno (88 Cal. 407; 36 Pac. Rep. 60fi), 183. Prince v. City of Lynn (149 Mass. 193; 21 N. E. Rep. 296), 171. Prince v. Lewis (5 Barn. & C. 363), 1343. Prince v. Quincy (105 111. 138; 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 66), 330, 805, 845. Prince v. Quincy (138 III. 443; 31 N. E..Rep. 768), 837, 844. Princeton v. Vierling (40 Md. 340), 341, 344. Prindle v. Fletcher (39 Vt. 355), 1475. Pringle and McDonald, In re (Upper Can. Q. B. 356), 180. Pritchard v. Atkinson (3 N. H. 335), 1419. Pritchett «. People (6 III. 535), 290, 313. Pritchett v. Stanislaus Co. (73 Cal. 310; 14 Pac. Rep. 795), 188. Privett V. Bicktord (26 Kan. 53), 386. Procter v. Andover (43 N. H. 348), 635. Proctor V. Lewiston (35 111. 153), 1143. Proprietors of Cambridge v. Chand- ler (6 N. H. 271), 350. Proprietors of Cardigan v. Page (8 N. H. 183), 350, 353, 388. Proprietors of Southhold v, Horton (6 Hill, 501), 67, 87. Prospect Park &c. R. Co. v. William- son (91 N. Y. 553), 676. Prosser v. Davis (18 Iowa, 367), 678. Prosser D. Secor (5 Barb. 607). 227. Protestant Home ' v. Mayor (35 N. J. , Law, 157). 1361, 1396. Protestant Orphan Asvlum's Ap- peal (111 Pa St. 135); 1164. Prout V. Pittsfield Fire Dist, (154 Mass. 450), 657. Providence v. Clapp(t7 How. 161), 9. Providenre v. Miller (11 R. L 273; 23 ♦Am. Rep. 4.53), 313, 263. Providence v. Union R. Co. (13 R. I. 473), 538. Providence &o. R. Co. v. Wright (2 R. L 459), 1358. Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber (3 R. L 15), 686), 1361. Providence InsHtution v. Gardiner (4 R. I. 484), 1359. Pi'ovident Inst. v. Jersey City (113 U. S. 506), 1164, 1395. Provincetown v. Smith (120 Mass. 96), 1042. Provost V. New York (3 N. Y. SupL 631), M61. Prowse V. Foot (3 Bro. P. C. 289), 315. Pruden i;.. Grant County (13 Oregon, 308), i586. Pruden t\ Love (67 Ga. 190). 218. Public School Trustees v. Taylor (30 N. J. Eq. 61b), 115. Public Schools V. Risley (10 Wall. 91), 579. Pueblo V. Robinson (Colo., 31 Pac. Rep. 899), 1134. Puffer V. Orange (133 Mass. 389), 1472. Pugh V. Little Rock (36 Ark. 75), 543, 1368. Puitt V. Comm'rs (94 N. C. 709). 1345. Pulaski V. Gilmore (31 Fed. Rep. 870), 944. Pulaski County v. Judge of Saline County (37 Ark. 339). 450. Pulaski County t;. Reeve (43 Ark. 55), 8, 15. Pulaski County v, Vaughn (83 6a. 370), 863. Pulliam t'. Runnels County (Tex., 15 S. W. Rep. 377), 1341. Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Penn (141 U. S. 18), 1340. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. (13 Wall. 166), 670. 1466. Purcell V. Booth (6 Dak. 17), 1363. Purcell V. Town of Bear Creek (111., 38 N. E. Rep. 1085), 860. Purdy V. Lansing (138 U. S. 557), 939 Purdy v. People (4 Hill, 384), 61, 12a. Purrington v. Warren (49 Vt. 19), 783. TABLE or OASES. CXCIX [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1805.] Purssell V. Mayor &c. (85 N. Y. 330), 1138, 1184, Pusey V. City of Allegheny (98 Pa. fat. 522), 677, 1149. Putnam v. Douglas County (6 Ore- gon, 328; 25 Am. Rep. 527), 702. Putnam v. Langley (133 Mass. 204), 304, 1529, 1560. Putnam County v. Auditor of Allen County (10 Ohio St. 322), 451. Pybus V. Gibb (6 EI. & B. 902), 321 Pye uMankato (38 Minn. 536; 31 N. W. Rep. 863), 782. 1144. Pye V. Peterson m Tex. 312; 23 Am. Rep. 608), 593, 1247. Q. Quaid V. Trustees (49 N. J. Law, 607). 882. Queeii v. Aberdare (14 Q. B. 854), 351. Queen v. Abingdon (5 Q. B. 406), 977. Queen v. Birmingham &c. lEy. Co. (6 Ry. Cas. 628; 4 Eng. L. &. Eq. 276), 697. Queen v. Bishop (5 Q. B. Div. 259), 1249. Queen «.' Gilbert (3 Pug. & Bur. 619), 533 Queen v. Glossop (1 Q. B. 227), 977. Queen v. Governors &c. (8 Ad. & El. 632), 202, 210. Queen v. Justices (4 Q. B. D. 532), 533. Queen v. Local Government Board (L. R. 8 Q. B. 237), 41, 1366. Queen v. Milledge (4 Q. B. D. 333), 533. Queen v. Poole (L. R. 19 Q. B. D. 602). 787. Queen v. Prince (L. R. 2 Cr. Cas. 154), 1250. Queen v. Saddlers' Co. (10 H. L Cas. 404), 206. Queen v. St. Ives (L. R. 7 Q. B. 467), 977. Queen v. St. Leonard (1 Q. B. 21), 977. Queen v. Saintifl (6 Mod. 255), 1408. Queen v. Worcester (9 Q. B. 340), 977. Queensbury v. Culver (19 Wall. 83), 1379. Quick V. Village of River Forest (130 111. 323; 23 N. E. Rep. 816), 1094. Quigley v. Aurora (50 Ind. 28), 539. Quigiey v. Vaughn (17 III. App, 347), 1348. Quill V. City of ■ Indianapolis (124 Ind. 293 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 788), 627, 889. Quimby v. Vermont Cent. R. Co. (23 Vt. 387),671. Quinoy v. Ballance (30 111. 185). 539. Quincy v. Bull (106 111. 337), 525, 527. Quincy v. Cook (107 U. S. 549), 941. Quincv V. Jackson (113 U. S. 332), 1385. Quincy v. Jones (76 III. 231), 1207. Quincy v. O'Brien (24 111. App. 591). 604. Quincy V. Railroad Co. (93 111. 21), 484. Quincy v. Steel (120 U. S. 341; 7 S. Ct. Rep. 520), 1180. Quincy &e. R. Co. v. Morris (84 111. 410), 933. Quinetteu. St. Louis (76 Mo. 402), 523, 528. Quinlan v. Utica (11 Hun, 317; 74 N. Y. 603), 1477, 1485. Quinn v. State (35 Ind. 485; 9 Am. Rep. 754), 376, Quintinii;. Board &c. (64 Miss. 483; 1 So. Rep. 635), 1052. Quong Woo, In re (13 Fed. Rep. 229), 1390, 1233. R. Racho V. Detroit (90 Mich. 93), 1447. Radcliffi V. Brooklyn (4 N. Y. 195), 775 779 1457 Radeck's Case (49* Md. 228), 1246. Rader v. Southeasterly Road District (38 N. J. Law, 273). 473. Radway v. Briggs (b7 N. Y, 356), 1403. Rae V. Flint (51 Mich. 526; 16 N. W, Rep. 8S7), 817, 1029. Ragan v. Railroad Co. (Mo., 20 S. W. Rep. 234J, 1415, Rahway v. Rahway (49 N. J. Law, 884), 1378. Rahway Sav, Inst. v. Mayor &c. (N. J., 20 Atl. Rep. 756), 1593. Rail V. Potts (8 Humph. (Tenn.) 225', 218. Railroad Commission Cases (116 U. S..,307), 6, Railroad Co. v. Alabama (101 TJ. S. 833), 30. Railroad Co. v, Bentley (64 111. 4S8), 391. Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago (UO III. 267), 1167. Railroad Co. v. Conn«illy (10 Ohio St. 159), llti7. Railroad Co. v. Connolly (7 Ind. 33), 704. CO TABLE OF CASES. p3ie refereoces are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 78a-l(S03.] Railroad Co. v. Dayton (23 Ohio St. 510), 591, 675. Railroad Co. v. Evansville (15 Ind. 895). 927. Railroad Co. v. Gaines (97 U. S. 697), 1374. Railroad Co. v. Houston (95 U. S. 697). 1493. Railroad Co. v. Howard (13 How. 307J, 1600. Railroad Co. v. Lawrence (27 111. 50), 1576. Railroad Co. v. Lincoln County (67 Wis. 478 ; 30 N. W. Rep. 619), 593: Railroad Co. v. Marion County (36 Mo. 294), 286. 1390. Railroad Co. v. Moffltt (75 111. 524), 591 Railroad Co. v. Odum (53 Tex. 343), 510. Railroad Co. v, Otoe County (1 Dill. 338), 1592. Railroad Co. v. Otoe County (16 Wall. 667), 933. Railroad Co. r. Richmond (96 U. S. 521), .':90, 1211. .Railroad Co. v. Smith (6 Ind. 249), 704. Railroad Co. v. Spearman (18 Iowa, 112), 1366. Railroad Co. v. Tennessee (101 U. S. 337). 20. Railroad Co. v. Town of Lake (71 III. 333), 591, 681. Railroad Co. v. Wakefield (103 Mass. 361), 1208. Railroad Co. v. Whalen (11 Neb. 58n). 699. Railroad Co. v. Wilt6e(116 111. 449 j 6 N. E. Rep. 49), 591. Railroad Co. v. Wright (5 R. L 459), 1167. Railroad Co. v. Ziemer (124 Pa. St. 560), 1491. Railway Co. v. Circuit Judge (44 Mich. 479), 1S36. Railway Co. v. City of Faribault (23 Minn. 167), 591. Railway Co. v. City of Louisville (4 Bush (Ky.), 478), 1358. Railway Co. v. Citv of Louisyille (8 Bush (Ky.), 419), 587. Railway Co. «>. City of Philadelphia (58 Pa. St. 119). 1207. Railway Co. i: City of Philadelphia (124 Pa. St. 319; 16 Atl. Rep. 741), 1079. Railway Co. v. City of Philadelphia (10 Phila. 70). 1307. Railway Co. v. Easton (133 Pa. St. 505 ; 19 Atl, Rep. 486), 1207. Railway Co. v. Hoboken (41 N, J. Law, 71), 1232. Railway Co. v, Iowa (94 U. S. 155), 574. Railway Co. v. Oakrs (20 Ind. 9), 704, Railway Co. v. Williarasport (120 Pa. St. I; 13 Atl. Rep. 496), 1207. Raines v. Simpson (50 Tex. 995; 32 Am. Rep. 609). 320. Raina v. Oslikosh (14 Wis. 372), 71. Raisler v. Athens (i6 Ala. 191), 314, 1400. Raker v. Magnon (9 III. App. 155), 544. Raleish v. Peace (110 N. C. 33; 14 S. E. Rep. 5-.'l), .')70. 1177. Raleigh v. Sorrell (1 Jones (N. C), Law. 49). 287. 3U0. Raleigh &c. R. C^o. r. Davis (3 Dev. & Bat. Law (N. C). 451). 669. Ralls County v. Douglass (lOOTJ. S. 58.5), 943, 941. Ralls County Court v. United States (105 U.S. 733), 42"), 1373, 1380, 1384, 138."). Ramsay v. Hneger (70 111. 432), 1573. Ramsey v. Ramsey (121 Ind. 215;, 1000. Ramsey v. Riley (13 Ohio, 157), 318. Ramshay. In re (83 Eng. Com. Law, 174), 203, 210. Ramson v. Mayor &c. (34 Barb. 226), 659. Ramthun v. Halfman (58 Tex. 551), 140.^. Ranch v. City (33 Kan. 456), 1171. Rand v. Wilder (11 Cush. 294), 348, 353. Randall i'. Christiansen (76 Iowa, 169), 141S. Randall v. Conway (63 N. H. 513), 1416. Randall v. Eastern R. Co. (108 Mass. 376). 264. 1468. Randall v. Van Vechten (19 Johns. 60), 363, 2ii:i. Randolph v. Biainlree (4 Mass. Slo), 451. Randolph v. Good (3 West Va. 551), 376. Randolph v. United States (31 Ct. CI. 283). 743. Randolph County v. Post (93 U. S. 502), 940, 914, 947. Rang I'. Governor (4 Blackf. 2), 329. Ranney v. Bader (67 Mo. 476), 613, 634. Ransom v. Boal (39 Iowa, 68), 634. Rapelye v. School Tru.itees (1 Edm. (N. Y.) Sch. Cas. 175), 1321. Rapho Tp. V. Moore (68 Pa. St. 401), 1198. 1433. Ratcliffe v. County Court (West Va., 14 S. E. Rep. 1004), 854. TABLE OF OASES. CCl pTbe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 78M603.] Rathbon v. Budlong (15 Johns. 1), ai3. Eathbun v. Acker (18 Barb. 8«3), 1171. Rau V. Little Rook (34 Ark. 303), 525. Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co. (45. Ohio St. 118; 12 N. E. Rep. 445), 615. Rawlings v. Beggs (85 Ky. 351), 706. Rawson v. School Dist. (100 Mass. 134), 1384. Rawson v. Spencer (113 Mass. 40), 1388. Ray V. Bank (3 B. Mon. 510). 1577. Ray V. City (90 Ind. 5fi7), 1 176. Rayw. City of St. Paul (40 Minn. 458; 42 N. W. Rep. 297), 1450. Ray V. Citv of St. Paul (44 Minn. 340; 46 N. W. Rep. 675), 783, 1199. Ray V. Manchester (46 N. H. 59), 364, 775. Ray V. Wilson (Fla., 10 So. Rep. 618), 910. Ray County v. Bentley (49 Mo. 336), 746. Ray County v. Vansycle (96 U. S. 675), 944, 961. Raymond v. City of Sheboygan (70 Wis. 318; 35 N. W. Rep. 540), 1442. Raymond v. Fish (51 Conn. 80), 1019, 1031, 1040. 1046. Raymond v. Harrison (11 Me. 190), 995. Raymond v. Iiowell (6 Cush. 534). 1469, 1498. Raynsford v. Phelps (43 Mich, 343 ; 38 Am. Rep. 189). 318, 319. Re Corliss (11 R. I. 638), 189. He Creek (3 B. & S. 459), 134. Re Malone (31 S. C.'435), 1345. Re Norton (Q. B., June 8, 1872), 203. Re Pearl Street (11 Pa. St. 565), 1143. Re Tie Loy (26 Fed. Rep. 611). 1033. Re Wan Yin (23 Fed. Eep. 701), 1233. Read v. Calais (48 Vt. 7), 783. Read V. City of Buffalo (74 N. Y. 463), 913. Read v. City of Camden (N. J., 31 Atl. Rep. 565), 1084. Read v. City of Camden (N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 549), 547, 593, 1084. Read v. Plaltsmouth (107 U. S. 568 ; 2 Am. & Eng, Corp. Cas. 300), 941, 1371, 1394. Readdy v. Borough of Shamokin (Pa., 20 Atl. Rep. 396), 1199. Reading v. Commonwealth (11 Pa. St. 196), 1319. Reading v. Keppleman (61 Pa. St. 233), 94, 109. Reading v. Savage (120 Pa. St. 108), 47. Reading v. Wesiport (19 Conn. 561), 976. Readington v. Dilley (24 N. J. Law, 209), 695. Reardon v. St, Louis County (36 Mo. 555), 746. Reardon v. San Francisco (66 Cal. 493), 674. Reckner v. Warner (23 Ohio St. 275). 696. Reclamation Dist. v. Goldman (61 Cal. 205), 1166. Recorder v. Brooks (Colo., 29 Pac. Rep. 746), 1375. Rector v. State (6 Ark. 187), 1255. Red V. Augusta (35 Ga. 386), 302. 936." Red Rock v. Henry (106 U. S. 596), 944. Redd V. Henry County (31 Gratt. 695), 936, 961. Reddall v. Bryan (14 Md, 444), 686. Reddick v. Amelia (1 Mo. 5i, 53. Kedraond v. state (36 Ark. 58), 1350. Redmond v. Town (106 N. G 133; 10 S. E. Rep. 845), 1355. Redwood County u Tower (38 Minn. 45), 331. Reed, Ex parte (4 Cranch, 582), 533. Reed, Ex parte (4 Hill, 573). 335. Reed v. Acton (117 Mass. 384), 359, 360, 36S. Reed v. Belfast (20 Me. 248), 747. Reed v. City of Birmingham (Ala., 9 So. Rep. 161). 1418. Reed V. Conway (-'0 Mo. 22), 318. Reed v. Home Savings Bank (130 Mass. 443), 767. Reed v. Lancaster (152 Mass. 500; 25 N. E. Eep. 974), 381, 799, 970. Reed v. Madison (53 N. W. Rep. 547), 1449. Reed v. Toledo (18 Ohio, 161), 1160. Reed v. Town of Orleans (Ind., 27 N. E. Rep. 109). 815, 1593. Reeder v. Harlan (98 Ind. 114), 326. Reedv v. School Dist. (30 Mo. App. ri3), 1343. Reeniilin v. Mosby (47 Ohio St. 570; 36 N. E. Rep. 717), 176. Rees V. Watertown (19 Wall. 107), 148, 149, 479, 1373, 1373, 1376, 1379, 1588. Reeve School Tp. v. Dodson (98 Ind. 497), 208, 643, 832. Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood County (8 Ohio St. 338). 687, 1024. Reeves County v. Pecos Countv (69 Tex. 177; 7 S. W. Rep. 54),"463. Regents &o. v. Detroit (13 Mich. 138), 263. .ecu TABLE OF CASES. [Xhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Regents &o. v. Williams (9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365), 493. Regina t'.> Bailiffs (3 Ld. Eaym. 1233), 387. Eegina v. Bewdley (1 P. Wms. 307), 97, 464. Regina v. Bowers (1 Denlson, 23), 543. Regina v. Bradley (3 El. & El. 634), 385. Regina v. Bridsevrater (10 Ad. & El. 281), 13, 663. Regina v. Coaks (3 El. & Bl. 249), 386. Regina v. Councillors of Derby (7 Ad. & El. 419), 163. Regina v. Cumberlego (36 L. T. (N. S.)700), 180. Regina v. franklin (6 Ir. R. C. L. 239), 386. Regina v. Orimshaw (10 Q. B. 747), 276. Regina v. Hiarns (7 Ad. & El. 960), 163. Regina v. Howard (4 Ont. 377; 4 Am. . & Eng. Corp. Cas. 377), 1247. Regina v. Ipswich (2 Ld. Raym. 1340), 206. 207. Regina v. Justices of Shropshire (8 Ad. & El. .173), 850. Regina v. Lander (1 Ir. R. C. L. 225), 350. Regina v. Ledyard (8 Ad. & El. 535), 163. Regina v. Litchfield (4 Q. B. 893), 663, 933. Regina v. Mayor of Aberavon (11 L. ■ T. (N. S.) 417; 11 W. E. 90), 81, 83. Regina v. Mayor of Chipping Wy- combe (44 L. J. Q. B. 82), 134. Regina v. Mayor of Exeter (L. R. 4 Q. B. 114), 133. Regina v. Mayor of Ryde (28 L. T. (N. S.) 639), 203. Regina v. Mayor of Tewksbury (Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 639), 163. Regina v. Mayor &c. of Bridgnorth (10 Ad. & El. 66), 134. Regina v. Mayor &c. of Eye (9 Ad. & El. 670). 134. Regina v. Mavor &o. of Kiddermins- ter (30 L.'J. Q. B. 281), 134. EegiTia v. Mayor &c. of Leeds (7 Ad. & El. 963), IGo. Regina v. Mayor &c. of Leeds (4 Q. B. 796; Dav. & M. 143), 13. Regina V. Mayor &o. of New Windsor (7 Q. B. 908), 134. Regina v. Mayor &c, of Silverpool (41 L. J. Q. B. 145), 12. Regina v. Paramore (10 Ad. & El. 286), 12. Regina v. Petrie (30 Eng. L. & Eq. 207). 1406. Regina v. Rippon (1 Q. B. Div, 217), 165. Regina v. Rowley (3 Q. B. 143; 6 . Q. B. 668). 165. Regina v. Stamford (4 Q. B. 900, n. a), 663. Regina v. Staples (9 Best & S. 928, n.). 1561. Regina v. Tavlor (11 A. & E. 949), 139. Regina v. Tewkesbury (3 L. R. Q. B. 629), 386. Regina v. Thomas (8 Ad. & El. 183), 276, Regina v. Thompsoa (5 Q. B. 477; Dav. & M. 497). 13. Regina v. Whip (4 Q. B. 141), 276. Regina v. York (3 Q. B. 847; 3 G. & D. 105), 18. Rehberg v. New York (91 N. Y. 137), 781. 1446, 1448, 1480. Rehmke v. Goodwin (Wash., 27 Pac. Rep. 473), 843. Reid V. Board of Supervisors (128 N. Y. 364), 1134. Reid V. Town of Eatonton (80 Ga. 755), 1345. Reiflf V. Conner (10 Ark. 241), 303, 537. Reilly, Ex parte (85 Cal. 633), 199, 1353. Reilly V. City of Albanv (112 N. Y. 30; 19 N. E. Rep. 508), llOH. Reilly v. City of New York (51 N. Y, Super. Ct. 463), H07. Reillv V. City of Racine (51 Wis. 536; , 8 N. W. Rep. 417), 1194, 1410. Reimer's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 183),. 1203. Reinbolt v. Pittsburgh (41 Pa. St. 278), 927. Reioeman v. Covington &c. R. Co. (7 Neb. 310), 933. Reinhard v. Mayor &c. (3 Daly (N. Y.), 243), 529, 1449. Reining v. City of Buffalo (102 N. Y. 309), 784, 1598. Reining v. New York &c. R. Co. (128 N. Y. 157; 28 N. E. Rep. 640), 587, 1433. Reinken v. Fuehring (Ind., 30 N. E. Rep. 414), 1163. 1231. Remington v. Harrison County Court (12 Bush (Ky.), 148). 657. Remington v. Ward (78 Wis. 539 ; 47 N. W. Rep. 659), 816. Rens V. City of Grand Rapids (73 Mich. 237; 41 N. W. Rep. 263), 230, 233, nil, 1140. Rensselaer v. Davis (43 N. Y. 187), 671, 683. TABLE OF OASES. CCUI [The references are to pages: Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. -789-1606.] Rensselaer ti. Leopold (106 Ind. 39). 685, 1128. Rentz V. Detroit (48 Mioh. 544; 13 N. W. Rep. 694), 1135. Ren wick v. Hall (84 111. 163), 1556. Report of Commissioners of Adjust- ment, In re (49 N. J. Law, aSS ; 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 484), 5fi3. Republic &c. v. Pollak (75 111. 292), 1362, 1399. Requa v. Rochester (45 N. Y. 130), 771, 781, 1445, 1500. Response to House Resolution (55 Mo. 295), 64. Respublica v. Duquet (3 Yeates, 493), 629, 1054. V4L Reubelt v. School Town of Nobles- ville (106 Ind. 478; 7 N. E. Rep. 206), 971.973. Reusch V. Chicago &c R. Co. (57 Iowa, 687), 670. Revell V. Pettit (3 Met. (Ky.) 314), 339. Rex V. Araery (3 Terra Rep. 515), 464. Rex V. Andover (1 Ld. Raym. 710), 202. Rex V. Ashwell (13 East, 32), 535, 526. Rex V. Atkins (3 Mod. 13; 3 Show. 238), 174. 271, 278. Rex V. Axraouth (8 East, 383), 134. Rex V. Bailey (1 Mood. C. C. 33), 134. Rex V. Bankes (3 Burr. 145S), 1523. Rex V. Bellringer (4 T. R. 810), 164, 370 291 Rex V. Bird (13 East, 867), R35, 526. Rex V. Blizzard (L. R. 2 Q. B. 55), 202. Rex V. Bower (1 Barn. & C. 493), 164, 270 291. Rex V. Bridge (1 M. & S. 76), 386. Rexu Bridgewater (3 T. R. 550), 134. Rex V. Buller (8 East, 892; 1 Rol. Ahr. 514), 273. Eex V. Bumstead (3 B. & Ad. 699), 189. Rex V. Burgess (2 Burr. 908), 1404, 1408. Rex V. Carlisle (Fortesc. 200; 11 Mod. 379), 203. Rex V. Carroll (1 Leach. 237). 134. Rex V. Carter (Cow p. 59), 270. Rexv. Chalke (1 Ld. Raym. 225; 1 Roll. Rep. 409; 3 Bulst. 189), 304. 206. Rex V. Chitty (5 Ad. & El. 609), 189. Rex V. City of London (Mich,, 33 Car. 2; 2 Show. 263), 130. Rex V. Corry (5 East, 381 ; 1 Smith, 243), 273. Rex V. Coventry (1 Ld. Raym. 891), 303. Rex V. Croke (Cowp. 26), 298. Rex V. Cross (3 Camp. 384), 1464. Rex V. Dawes (4 Burr. 3:79), 870. Rex V. Derby (Cas. Temp. Hardw. 154). 207. Rex V. Devonshire (1 Barn, & C. 609)j,lH4, 370, 291. Rexv. Djncaster (2 Burr. 738), 204, 206, 270. Rex V. Eaton (Litt. 23), 136. Rex V. Ellis (9 East, 252; 2 Str. 994), 190. Rex V. Faversham (8 Term R. 856), 207. 271, 52.5. Rexv. Foxcroft (Burr. 1017), 386. Rexv. Gaborian (11 East, 86, n, ; 2 Show. 238). 271, 372. Rex V. Greet (8 Barn. & C. 363), 164. Rex V. Grosvenor (7 Mod. 199), 139, 464. Rex V. Grunes (5 Burr. 3599), 178, ^7i Rex V. Harris (1 Barn. & Ad. 936), 275 276. Rex V. Harris (3 Burr. 1423), 1529. Rex V. Hastings (1 Barn. & Aid. 148), 1258. Rex V. Havering-Atte-Bowers (5 Barn. & Aid. 391), 1253. Rex V. Hawkins (10 East, 211), 386. Rex V. Head (4 Burr. 2515), 290, 298. Rex V. Hadley (7 Barn. & C. 496), 164, 291. Rex V. Hearle (1 Str. 627), 174, Rex V. Hebden (Andr. 389), 178, 270, 273. Rex V. Hertford (1 Ld. Raym. 426), 298. Rex V. Hill (4 Barn. & C. 441), 370, 271. Rex V. Holmes (H. 9), 1523. Rex V. Home (Cowp. 672), 542. Rex V. Hoyte (6 T. R. 430), 164. Rex V. Jones (1 Barn. & Ad. 677), 201. Rex V. Jones (3 Camp. 230), 1464. Rex V. Kent (13 East, 220), 129. 464. Rex V. Lane (2 Ld. Raymond, 1304), 203. Rex V. Lathrop (1 Wm. B. 471), 270. Rex V. Lisle (Andr. 163; 3 Str. 1090;, 178, 198, 270. 272, 1523. Rex V. Liverpool (2 Burr. 723), 204, 206. 207, 270, 278. Rex V. Lyme Regis (Doug. 153), 803, 204, 80B. Rex V. Mason (2 D. & E. 686). 543. Rex V. May (4 Barn. & Ad. 843), 164. Rexv. May (5 Burr. 2682), 270, 271. Rex V. Mayor &o. (8 Mod. Ill), 290. Rex V. Mayor &c. (5 T. R. 66), 178. cciv TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. TL pp. 789-1605.] Rex V. Mayor &c. (1 Lev. 291), 203. Rex V. Mayor ot Cambridge (4 Burr. 2008), 1523. Rex V. Mavor of Colchester (2 Term R. 259). 1523. Rex V. Mayor of Oxford (6 Ad. & El. 349), 1523. Rex V. Mayor of York (4 Term R. Rex V. Medley (6 Car. & P. 292), 764. Rex V. Miller (6 T. R. 268), 164, 270, 464, Rex V. Monday (2 Cowp. 580), 164, 270, 294, 386. Rex V. Morris (3 East, 21.5). 464. Rex V; Morris (4 East. 26), 270. Rex V. Okehampton (Burr. S. C. 5), 134. Rex V. Oabourne (4 East, 326), 464. Rex V. Overseers of Christ Church (7 E. &B. 409), 164. Rex V. Oxford (3 Salk. 428), 202. Rex V. Oxfordshire (30 Eng. C. L, 289), 1425. Rex V. Parry (6 A. & E. 810), 129. Rex V. Passmore (3 Term Rep. 241), 464. Rex V. Paasmore (.Sa T. R. 119), 97. Rex V. Phillips (1 Str. 394), 174. Rex V. Ponsonby (1 Ves. Jr. 1), 204. Rexv. Richardson (1 Burr. 517), 203, 204, 206, 207. Rex V. St. Luke's Hospital (3 Burr. 1063), 134. Rex V. Sainthill (2 Ld. Eaym. 1174), 1432. Rex V. Saunders (3 East, 119), 129, 464. Rex V. Sefton (Russ. & Ry. 203), 134. Rex V. Shrewsbury (Cas. Temp. Hardw. 151). 270, 271. Rex V. Spencer (if Burr. 1827), 189. Rex V. StadiriK (1 Str. 497). 543. Rex V. Stewart (4 East, 17), 464. Rex V. Taylor (3 Salk. 231), 203, 204. Rex V. Theodorick (8 East, 543), 270, 271, 273. Rex V. Thornton (4 East, 308), 174, 270. Rex V. Tidderley (1 Sid. 14), 204. Rex V. Tizzard (9 Barn. & C. 418), 201. Rex V. Trapshaw (1 Leach. 427), 134. Rex V. Tregony (8 Mod. 129), 464. Rex V. Trew (8 Barnard, 370j, 272. Rex V. Tripp (M. T. 1836), 134. Rex V. Tucker (1 Barnard, 27), 871. Rex V. Varlo (Cowp. 250), 270, 380. Rex V. Wake (1 Barnard, 80), 271. Rex V. Warrington (1 Salk. 152), 897. Rex V. Wells (4 D. P. C. 563), 125i. Rex V. Westwood (4 Barn. & C, 799), 390, 298. Rex V. Weymouth (7 Mod. 371), 189. Rex V. White (5 A. & E. 613). 129, Rex V. Williams (3 Maule & Sel. 141, 144), 273. Rex V. Wilton (5 Mod. 259), 206. Rex V. York (5 Term R-. 72), 270. Rexford v. Knight (11 N. Y. 308), 70-3. Reynolds, Ex parte (87 Ala. 138; 6 So. Rep. 335; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 1), 617. RernoMs v. Baldwin (1 La. Ann. *162). 192, 288, 898. Reynolds v. Mayor (8 Barb. 597), 663. Reynolds v. New Salem (6 Met. 340). 347, 915. * Reynolds v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (58 N. Y. 848), 1504. Reynolds v. Reynolds (15 Conn. 83), 684. Reynolds v. Stark County (5 Ohio, 204), 624. Reynolds v. United States (98 U. S. 145), 1285. Reynolds Land & Cattle Co. v, Mc- Cabe (78 Tex. 57), 368, 1383. Rhea v. Umatilla County (3 Oregon, 300), 1189. Rhine v. City of Sheboygan (Wis., 52 N. W. Rep. 444), 996. Rhine v. McKinney (53 Tex. 354), 696. Rhoda V. Alameda County (69 Cal. 533; 11 Pac. Rep. 57). 883. Rhodes v. Cleveland (10 Ohio, 159), 677, 766. Rice V. City of Evansville (108 Ind. 7; 58 Am. Rep. 28), 109S. Rice V. City of Flint (67 Mieh. 401 ; 34 N. W. Rep. 719), 1147. Rice V. Des Moines (40 Iowa, 638), 841. Rice V. Foster (4 Harr. (Del.) 479), 74, 525 Rice V. Montpelier (19 Vt. 470), 1451. Rice V. Plymouth County (48 Iowa, 1361, 614, 1028. Rice V. Smith (9 Iowa, 570), 555, 646. Rice V. State (3 Kan. 141), 1356. Rice V. Wood (113 Mass. 113; 18 Am. Rep. 459), 309. Rich V. Chicago (59 111. 286), 301. 497, 498, 1865. Rich V. Errol (51 N. H. 350). 888. Rich V, Player (2 Show. 286), 297. Rich V. Township of Mentz (19 Fed. Rep. 725), 939. Rich V. Township of Mentz (134 U. S. 622), 936. Richards v. Bria (15 Daly, 144), 1263. Richards D. Cincinnati (31 Ohio St. 506), 1163. TABLE 07 CASES. OCT [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Richards v. Enfield (13 Gray, 344), 1455. Richards v. Independent School Dist. (46 Fed. Rep. 460), 920. Richards v. Mayor &c. (16 J. & Sp. 315), 754. Richards v. Osceola Bank (79 Iowa, 707), 862. Richards v. Supervisors (69 Iowa, 613), 848. Richards v. Town of Clarksburg (30 West Va. 491 ; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. Ill); 204, 280, 287, 549. Richardson v. Boston (24 Hun, 188), 576. Richardson v. Central R. Co. (65 Vt. 465), 672. Richardson v. Morgan (16 La. Ann.. 429), 1185. Richardson v. Royalton &c. Co. (6 Vt. 496), 1432. Richardson v. Smith (59 N. H. 517), 705. Richardson v. Truenbach (24 Neb. 596). 1006. Richardson &c. Co. v. Barstow (26 Abb. N. (). 150), 1434. Richardson County ^y. Smith (25 Neb. 767; 41 N. W. Rep. 774), lOOS. Riche V. Bar Harbor Water Co. (75 Me. 91), 686. Richeson v. People (115 111. 450), 940. Richland County v. Lawrence County (13 111. 1), 94, 109, 1388, 1389. Richland County v. Richland (59 Wis. 511: 18 N. W. Rep. 497), 1857. Riohlicke v. City of St. LoUis (98 Mo. 437; 11 S. W. Rep. 1001), 1099. Richmond v. Crenshaw (76 Va. 936), 1568, 1580. Richmond v. Daniel (14 Gratt. 385), 1352, 1354. Richmond v. Dudley (129 Ind. 112: 26 N. E. Rep. 184), 602. Richmond v. Dudley (Ind., 28 N. E. Rep. 312), 520. Richmond v. Johnson (53 Me. 437), 825. Richmond v. Judah (5 Leigh (Va.), 305), 244. Richmond v. Lisbon (15 Me. 434), 981. Richmond v. Long (17 Gratt. 375), 762, 1013. Richmond v. McGirr (78 Ind. 192), 549, 794. Richmond v. Mulholland (116 Ind. 173; 18 N. E. Rep. 832), 1496. Richmond v. Richmond &o. R. Ca C-'l Gratt. 604), 1361, 1383, 1396, 1399. Richmond v. Scott (48 Ind. (868), 1369. Richmond v. State (5 Ind. 334), 660. Richmond &c. v. Bridge Co. (11 Leigh, 521; 13 How. 71), 1812. Richmond &c. R. Co. «. Louisa R. Co. (13 How. 71), 1198. Richmond County GaBlig;ht Co. v. Middletown (59 N. Y. 228), 612, 638. Richmond Mayoralty Case (19 Gratt. 673), 1254.' Rickert v. Drainage Dist. (111., 37 N. E. Rep. 86), 1395. Ricketts v. Spraker (77 Ind. 371), 1127, 1189. Ricketts v. Village of Hyde Park (85 III. 110). 706. Riddell v. School Dist. (15 Kan. 168), 329 Riddle v. Bedford County (7 Serg. & R. 386), 300. 290. Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals (7 Mass. 169), 8, 150, 153, 746. Riddle v. Westfleld Village "(65 Hun, 432), 1484 Rideout v. School Dist. (1 Allen, 332), 368. 1335. Rider Life Raft Co. v. Roach (97 N. Y. 378r, 719. Ridgeway v. West (60 Ind. 371), 535. Ridley v. Doughty (Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 350), 305. Ridley v. Sherbrook (3 Cold. (Tenn.) 509), 376. Riest V. Goshen City (48 Ind. 339), 150.0. Riggs V. Boylan (4 Biss. 445), 225. Riggs V. Johnson County (6 Wall. 166), 1373, 1373, 1378, 1379. Righter v. Newark (45 N. J. Law, 104), 1125. Rigler v. Railroad Co. (94 N. C. 604). 1493. Rigney v. Chicago (102 111. 64), 674. Riker I'. Jersey City (38 N. J. Law, 225), 341. Riley v. Kansas City (31 Mo. App. 439), 1277. Riley v. Rochester (9 N. Y. 64), 1386. Riley v. Trenton (51 N. J. Law, 49t), 550. Ring V. Cohoes (77 N. Y. 83), 1453. Ring V. Grout (7 Wend. 341), 1336. Ring V. Johnson (6 Iowa, 265), 953. Ripley v. Freeholders (40 N. J. Law, 45), 1425. Ripley v. Hebron (60 Me. 379), 978. CCVl TABLE 07 OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Eipley v. Warren (2 Pick. 593), 1591. Rlson V. Farr (24 Ark. 161 ; 87 Am. Dec, 53), 376. Bitchie v. Franklin (22 Wall. 67), 638. . Ritchie v. Soutli Topeka (38 Kan. 8fi8; 16 Pac. Rep. 333), 173, UBO, 13&5. Kitten house's Estate (140 Penn. St. 173; 21 Atl. Rep. 224), 281. Ritter v. Patch (12 Cal. 298), 1571, l.'J73. Rivers v. Augusta (65 Ga. 876), 776, 7S5. Rivet V. City (35 La. Ann. 134), 647. Road Case, In re (17 Pa. St. 71), 302, 936. Road in Augusta Township (17 Pa. St. 71). 527. Road in Milton (40 Pa. St. 300), 1499. Road in Roaring Brook, Jrere(Pa., 21 Atl. Rep. 411), 1090. Road in Sterrett Tp. (114 Pa. St. 627), 694. ^ Road in Upper Hanover (44 Pa. St. 277). 608. Roads in Sadsbury Tp., In re (Pa., •23 Atl. Rep. 773), 1000. Roanoke Gas Co. v. City of Roanoke (88 Va. 810; 14 S. E. Rep. 665), 1083. Roanoke R. Co. v. Davis (3 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.)45), 4, 7. Robb V. Carter (65 Md. 331), 175, 187. Robb V. Mavsville &c. R. Co. (3 Met. 117), 700. Robbing v. Board &c. (91 Ind. 537), 798, 974. Robbins v. Chicasfo (4 Wall. 057), 1199, 1441, 1444,1452. Robbins v. Milwaukee &c. Co. (6 Wis. 636), 702, Robbins v. Taxing Districts (120 U. S. 489), 1240. Robbins v. Townsend (20 Pick. 349), 975. Roberson v. Lambertville (38 N. J. Law, 69), 540. Robert v. Sadler (104 N. Y. 229; 10 N. E. Rep. 438), 1143. Roberts' Case (51 Mich. 548), 95, 109. 5S,c)berts v. Bolles (101 U. S. 119), 946. Roberts v. Boston (5Cu8h. 198), 1345. Roberts v. City of Louisville (Ky., , 17 S. W. Rep. 316), 1336. Roberts v. Conim'rs (10 Kan. 29), 1010. Roberts v. Douglas (140 Mass. 129), 1483. Roberts v. Ogle (30 111. 460), 604, 1025. Roberts v. People (9 Colo. 458; 13 Pac. Rep. 630), 881. Roberts «. Williams (15 Ark. 43), 684. Robertson v. Breedlove (61 Tex. 816), 6^3, 794, 796, 1580. Robertson v. Frank Bros. Co. (132 U. S. 17), 1183. Robertson v. Rockford (21 111. 451), 109. Robertson v. Sichel (137 U. S. 507), 232. Robey v. Turney (8 Gill & J. 125), 336. Bobie V. Sedgwick (35 Barb. 319), 53, QQ Robins v. Ackerly (91 N. Y. 98), 21. Robins v. New Brunswick (15 Vt. 116), 1133. Robinson, Ex parte (11 Nev. 263), 1356. 1370. Robinson, Ex parte (3 Pugsley, 389), 378. Robinson, Ex parte ij^e^s.., 17 S. W. Rep. 1057). 600. Robinson u. Bidwell (33 Cal. 379), 933. Robinson v. Burlington (50 Iowa, 240). 346. Robinson v. Butte County Super- visors (43 Cal. 353), 1373, 1375, 1378, 1379. Robinson v. Chamberlain (34 N. Y. 38d; 90 Am. Dec. 713), 319, 330. Robinson v. Charleston (3 Rich. (S. C.) 317), 244, 1370. Robinson v. City of Evansville (87 Ind. 334), 264, 744. Robinson v. County of Benton (49 Ark, 49; 4 S. W. Rep. 193), 192, 1256. Robinson v. Fitcbburg &c. R. Co. (7 Gray, 93), 1477. Robinson v. Franklin (1 Humph. 1.56), 1357. Robinson v. Greenville (43 Ohio St. 625), 756, 764, 776. Robinson v. Hague (63 Iowa, 273), 1341. Robinson v. Hamilton (60 Iowa, 134), 1018. Robinson v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (66 N. Y. 11), 1504. Robinson v. Oceanic S. N, Co. (112 N, Y. 315), 144. Robinson v. Pioche (5 Cal. 460), 1501. Robinson v. Rippey (HI Ind. 112; 12 N. E. Rep. 141), 694, 1136. Robinson v. Rockford (31 111. 451), 933. Robinson v. Rohr (73 Wis. 436; 9 Am. Rep. 810; 40 N, W. Rep. 668), 231. Robinson v. Rowland (26 Hun, 501), 226, 337. TABLE OTF OASES. ccvii [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Robinson v. St. Louis (38 Mo. 488), 362. Robinson v. Swope (13 Bush, 31), 684. Roche V. Jones |87 Va. 484 ; 13 S. E. Rep. 965), 161, 176, 189, 196, 390. Roche V. Mayor &c. (40 N. J. Law, 257; 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 20), 133. Rochefort v. Attleborough(154 Mass. 142). 1437, 1475. Rochester v. Campbell (123 N. Y. 405; 25 N. E, Rep. 937), 1200, 1441, 1453. Rochester v. Close (35 Hun, 308), 1238. Rochester v. Erickson (46 Barb. 93), 1059. Rochester v. Montgomery (72 N. Y. 65), 1199, 1453. Rochester v. Randall (105 Mass. 295; 8 Am. Rep. 519), 334. Rochester v. Town of Rush (80 N. Y. 303), 573, 1386, 1397. Rochester v. Upman (19 Minn. 108), 541, 1355. Rochester &o. R. Co. v. Clarke Nat. Bank (PO Barb. 234), 198. Rochester Electric R. Co., In re (133 N, Y. 351), 1453. Rochester Water Comm'rs, In re (66 N. Y. 413), 6S6. Rochester White Lead Co. v. Roch- ester (3 N. Y. 463). 1137. Rock V. Stinger (36 Ind. 346), 331. Rock Creek Township v. Strong (96 U. 8. 271), 954. 955. Rock Island v. Vanlandschoot (78 111. 485). 1503. Rock Island County v. Sage (88 111. 682), 1024. Rock Island Supervisors v. United States (4 Wall; 435), 1378. Rockingham Savings Bank v. Ports- mouth (52 N. H. 17), 1573. Rocsell V. Lowell (7 Grav, 100), 1455. Roderick v. Whitson (5"l Hun, 620; 4 N. Y. Supl. 112), la24. Rodman v. Harcourt (4 B. Hon, 224), 1H9. 200. Rodman v. Justices (3 Bush, 144), 1379. • Roe V. Lincoln County (56 Wis. 66), 647. Roeller v. Ames (83 Minn. 132), 1596. Rogan V. Watertown (30 Wis. 260), 617. Rogers, In re (7 Co wen, 636), 276, 296. Rogers v. Brunton (10 Q. B. 26), 487. Rogers v. Burlington (3 Wall. 654), 561, 63Q, 925, 926, 927, 933. 947, Rogers v. Jones (1 Wend. 237), 21, 103, 514, 515, 535. Rogers v. People (68 111. 154\ 13. Rogers v. Randall (29 Mich. 41), 1083. Rogers v. St. Charles (3 Mo, App. 41), 699. Rogers v. St. Paul (33 Minn. 494), 1071, 1169. Rogers v. Slonaker (32 Kan. 191), 203, 276. Rogers v. Trustees Graded Schools (Ky., 18 S. W. Rep. 587). 1343. Rogers v. Voorhees (134 Ind. 469; 84 N. E. Rep. 374). 898. Rohde V. Seavey (Wash., 29 Pao. Rep. 768), 420. Rohland v. St. Louis &o. Ry. Co. (89 Mo. 80), 1260. Rolfs, In re (30 Kan. 758), 1258. Rollins V. Chester (46 N. H. 411), 864, 370. Rollins V. Lake County (34 Fed. Rep. 845), 836. 837. Rollstone Nat. Bank v. Carleton (136 Mass. 226;, 333. Rome V. Cabot (38 Ga. 5C), 1019. Rome V. McWilliams (67 Ga. 106), 846. Ronkendorfif v. Taylor (4 Peters, 349), 1266. Roodhouse v. Jennings (39 111, App. 50), 606. Rooney v. Brown (21 La. Ann. 51), 1166. Rooney v. Randolph (128 Mass. 580), 1435. Roosevelt v. Draper (23 N. Y. 818), 1583. \ Roosevelt v. Godard (62 Barb. 533), 524. Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor (84 N. Y. 108), 1166. Root's Case (77 Pa. St. 276), 703. Root V. Alexander (18 N. Y. Supl. 633), 1003. Roper V. Laurienburg (90 N. C. 427 ; 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 130), 186, 658, 659. Roper V. Livermore (28 Me. 193), 843, 3i7. Roper V. McWhorter (77 Va. 214; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 260), 624, 647. Roper V. Sangamon Lodge (91 111. 518; 33 Am. Rep. 60). 209. 326. Roper V. Trustees &o. (91 III. 518V 323 Rose w.'st. Charles (49 Mo. 509), 1385. Rose V. Turnpike Co. (3 Watts (Pa.), 46), 46.5. Rosebaugb v. Saffln (10 Ohio, 31>, 535. Roseboom v. JeflFerson School Tp, (129 Ind. 377; 23 N. E. Rep. 796), 631. 1339. covin TABLE OV OASES. [T^e references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.1 Rosetibauin, In re (6 N. Y. Su|d. 18«, 1106. EoaeEfthal v. Taylor R. Ob, (79 Hex. 335), 1434. Ecwewell v. Prior (2 Salk. 460; 1 Ld. Raym. 713), 1036. Boss IV. Brown (74 He. S5&), 21S, 214. Hess V. City of Madison (1 Ind. 381 ; 48 Am. Dec. 361), 361. 711, 1270. Ross V. City of Philadelphia (115 Fa. St. 332; 8 Atl. Bep. 398), 709. Ross V. Clinton (46 lon^a, 606), 1147. Bess V. Stackboiise (114 iBd. 300; 1« N. E. Rep. 501), 897, 1111, 1112, 1136, 1173. Roas V; Wiltliiamson (44 Ga. 501), 314. RoBsire v. Boston (4, Alien, 57), 2^. Rossiter v. Peck (3 Gray, 539), 344. Roteniberry v. Bd. 'of Supervisors (67 Miss. 470; 7 So. Rep. 211), 556. Roth V. Honje of Refuge (31 Md. 839), 1008. Rothrock v. School District (133 Pa. iSt. 487: 19 Atl. Rep. 483; 25 W. N. C. 510), 179. Roude V. Jersey City (18 Fed. Rep. 719), 965. Rounds V. Mansfield (38 Me. 586), 219, 313. Bosmds V. Mumford (2 R. I. 154), 623. Rounds V. Wayuaait (81 Pa. St. 895), 112. Stramdteee v. Galveston (51 Tex. 302), 1135. ^Quse V. 'Moore (18 Johns. 407), 8, Rovpe V. Portsmouth (56 N. H. 391), 1137. Rovrell V. Horton (58 Vt. 1), 309. . Rowell V. Town of Versihire (62 Vt, 405). 994. Ronrell V. Tunbrid$:e School Dist. r59 Vt. 658; 10 Atl. Rep. 754), 1330, 1381. Rowlett V. Eubank (1 Bush (Ky.), ' m.), 813. Rowley v. Gibbs (14 Johns. 385), 1491. Blowiting«. Goodehild (3 W. BL 906), 219. ^^ytster v. CoiU'm'FB of GranviUe Co. (98 N. C. 148; 3 S. E. Rep. 739), 808, 912. Roz^l vD. Andrews (103 N. T. 150), 1414. ]ie)a?i9r «. St. Fsamcois (34 Mo. 395), 931. Raan.Street, In re (182 Pa. St. 257 ; 19 Atl. Rep. 219), 1303. Ruby V. Shain (54 Mo. 207), 613. Rtugt^CharitT v. Merryweail^er (11 East, 375. 'n.), 1403, 1406. Rage:l«s v. 'Board of XiHstees of Wioodland (CaL, 26 fac. Rep. 520), 174. Ruggles V. City of Fond du Las tS3 Wis. 436; 10 N. W. Rep. 565), 246, 893. Rna^les v. OolUer (43 Mo. 859), 283, 1390. Ru^le^u Nantucket (11 Gush. 438), 2!sa. R^^les V. Town of Nevada (63 Iowa, 185), 1477, 1486. Ruhland v. Supervisors (55 Wis. 664; 13 N. W. Rep. 877), 348. Rumford School Dist. v. Wood (13 Mass. 1S3). &57. Rummel v. Railroad Co. (30 N. Y. St. Rep. 235; 9 N. Y. Supl. 404), 1411. Rumsey v. People (19 N. Y. 41), 70. Rumsey Manuf. Co. v. Inhabitants of Schell City (21 Mo, App. 175), 708. Rundle v. Baltimore (28 Md. 356), 1576. Rundle v. Delaware &c. Canal Co. (1 Wall. Jr. 273), 4, 7. Runion v. Latimer (6 S. C. 136), 300. Runkle v. Commonwealth (97 Pa. St. 328), 1530. Runyan v. Coster (14 Pet. 182), 1434. Ruohs n. Town of Athens (Tenia,, 18 S. W. Bep. 400), 420, 937. Rusher r. Ci^ of Dallas (Tex., 18 S. W. Bep. 333), 756. Rushville v. Adams (107 Ind. 475), 1469. Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co. and., «8 N. E. Rm. 849), 653,566,573,594. RushiviUe Qas Co. v. Rushville (121 Ind. 306; 23 N. E. Rep. 72; 6 L. R. An. 315), 169, 394, 295, 299, 493, 495. Russell V. Cage (66 Tesx. 428; 1 S. W. Rep. 370), 551, 798, 843. Russell V. Canastota ^ JH. Y. 496), 1199, 1441. Russell V. Chicago (36 111. 285), 176. Russell V. Columbia <74 Mo. 480), 783, 1462, 1478. • Russell V. %er .(40 N. Q. 173; 48 N. H. 396), .858. Russell V. Lowell (7 Gray, 100), 1456. Russell V. Mayor (8S Hun, 848), 1183. Russell V. Mayor &c. of New York (3 Denio, 461), 669. 759, 1047. Russell V. Nfiw B^ven (51 Conn. 259), 1577. Russell V. St. Louis (9 Mo. C07), 1364. TABLE OF OASSS. CCIX [The r^erences are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1606.] Russell V. Town of Steuben (57 111. SS), 745. Eussell V. Tate (53 Ark. 54t; 13 S. W. Eep. 130; 7 L. E. An. 180), 209, 316, 618, 647, 873. EuBsell V. The Men of Devon (2T. R. 667), 149, 152, 746. 1585. Russell V. Turner (63 He. 496), 694. Russell V. Wellington (Mass., 1893; 31 N. E. Rep. 630), 491. Russell V. Wiliiamsport (9 Pa. Co. Ct. 139). 179.- Russellville v. White (41 Ark. 485), 1233. Ruston V. Grimwood (30 Ind. 364), 1417. Rutherford v. Davis (95 Ind. 245), l4l7. Rutherford v. Hamilton (97 Mo. 548), 374, 377. Rutherford i'. Swink (90 Tenn. 153), 1266, 1368. Rutherford v. Taylor (38 Mo. 315), 624. Rutherford v. Village of Holly (105 N. Y. 633; U it. E. Eep. 818; 37 Hun, 639). 1 147. Rutland v. County Comm'rs (30 Pick. 71). 705, l.'i9I. 1594. Rutland v. Paig,e (24 Vt. 181), 953. Eutter V. Chapman (8 M. & W. 1), 38, 80, 81. Ruttles V. City of Covington (Ky., 10 S. W. Rep. 644). 1203. Rutz V. Kehr (111., 29 N. E. Eep. 553), 576. Ryan, In re {45 Mich. 173), 113. Ryan v- County of Dakota (33 Minn. ■ 138), 305. ' Eyan V. Martin j(91 N. C. 464), 645. Eyan v. United Slates (86 U. S. 514), 339 Eyder v. Eailroad Co. (13 HI. 533), 91. Eyeg^te v. Wardsboro (30 Vt. 746), 994. ■ Ryers, Matter of Appeal of (7? N. Y. 1), 606, 686, 687. Ryerson v. Brown (35 Mich. 333; 24 Am. Rep. 564), 682. Ryerson v. Iiaketon (52 Micli. 509), 1383. '^ • s. St. Charles v. O'Mailly (18 111. 408), 1272. St. Clair v. Board of Appeals (7i Pa. St. 252), 1572. St. Francis Society v. Cummings (Ark., 18 S. W. Eep. 461). 101 1. St. Helena Water-works v. Forbes (^ Cal. 182), 686. St. Helen's Mill Co., In re (3 Sawy. 88), 1141. St. Jojin Village v- McFarlan (33 Mich. 72), 785. ' St. Johns Cemetery, In re (N. Y., 81 N. E. Rep. 102; 16 N. Y. Supl. 894), 582. St. Johnsbury ». Thompson (5S Vt 300), 116,486, 513. St. Joseph V. Anthony (30 Mo. 537), * 1 383. St. Joseph V. Buck^nan (57 Ind. 96), 1400T St. Joseph V. Owen . Cadwallader (36 Pa. St. 126), 478. Schaller v. City of Omaha C^ ^eb. 335; 36 K W. Rep. 533), eH 1151. Scheerer v. Edgar (16 Cal. 569; 18 Pac. Rep. 681), 904. Scheftels v. Tahert (46 Wis. 438), 539. Schell V. Stein (76 Pa. St. 398), 336, Schell City v. Bums^y Manuf. Co. (39 Mo. App. 264), 708. " Schenck v. Peay (1 Dill, 367), 1390. Schenck v. Peay (1 Woolw. 175), 288, 396. . Schenectady &o. Plank Road Co. v. Thatcher (11 N. Y. 103), 943. Schenley v. Commonwealth (36 Pa. St. 29), 1081, 1161, 1163. Schenley v. Commonwealth (35 Pa. St. 62), 283, 550. 1390. Schermerhorn v. City of Schenec- l;ady (3 N. Y. Supl. .435; 50 Hun, 331 1 182 Scbloss v. White (16 Cal. 65), 337. Schmidt, Ex parte (34 S, C. 368), 112. 1257. Schmidt v. County of Stearns (34 Minn. 112), 713. Schneider, Ex parte (11 Oregon, 288), J333. - Sohoff V. Bloomfield (8 Vt. 473), 353, Schoff V. Gould (53 N. H. 512), 351, 353, 374. Schqff V. Improvement Co. (57 N. H. 110). 1419. Schofleld V. School Qist. (27 Ck>nn. 499), 158g. School Commissioners v. Dean (3 Stew. &P. (Ala.) J90), 56. School Directors v. ScbooL Directors (105 111. 653), 460. School Directors v. Ewington (36 111. App. 379), 1343. School Directors v. Pogleman (76 111. 189), 834. School Directors v. Uppy (54 111. 287), 823. School Directors v. McBride (32 Fa. St. 215), 1330. TABLE OF OASES. CCZIU prho references are to pages: Vol. School Direetors it School Direetors (111., 28 N. E. Rep. 49), 1323. School Dist. V. Atherton (13 Met. lOi), 175, 378. 127Q, 1372, 1335. School Dist. V. Bailey (12 Me. 254), 1330. . School Dist. V. Bennett (53 Ark. 511), 1335, 1339, 1330, 1335. School Dist. V. Blakeslee (13 Cona. 237), lasS, 1335. School Dist. V. Board (37 Mich. 1), 1576. School Dist. V. Board (73 Mo. 627), 1368. School Dist. V. Bodenhauer (43 Ark. 140), 1380. School Dist. V. Buagdon (33 N. H. 507), 353, 374. School Dist. V. Carr (63 N. H. 201), 196. School Dist. V. Clark (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 539). 807, 1370. School Dist. V, Crews (23 111. App. 367). 1342. School Dist. V. Deshon (51 Me. 454), 1334. School Dist. V. Driver (Ark., 7 S. W. Rep. 387), 1340. School Dist. V. Fuess (98 Pa. St. 600), 968. School Dist. V. Gage (39 Mich. 484), 1596. School Dist. V. Garvey (80 Ky, 159), 1891. School Dist. V. Insurance Co. (103 TJ. S. 707), 61. School Dist. V. Jennings (10 111. App. 643). 1335. School Dist. V. Lombard (2 Dill. 493), 891 903 School Dist! V. Lord (44 Me. 374), 343, 373, 1274, 1335. School Dist. V. McDonald (39 Iowa, 464), 327. School Dist. V. Macloon (4 Wis. 79), 453, 1331. School Dist. V. Mawry (Ark., 14 S. W. Rep. 669), 1343. School Dist. V. Mercer (Pa., 9 Atl. Rep. 64), 1848. School Dist. V. Oxford (63 N. H. 277), 1347. School Dist. V. Prentiss (N. H., 19 Atl. Rep. 1090), 1338. School Dist. V. Randall (7 Cush. 478). 1334. School Dist. «. Roach (41 Kan. 531 ; 21 Pac. Rep. 597), 1322. School Dist. V. Roach (43 Minn. 495 ; 45 N. W. Rep. 1097), 1333. School Dist. V. St. Joseph &c. Ins. .Co. (101 U. S. 472). 60. School Dist. .i". Saline County (9 Neb. 405), 1534. I, pp. 1-788; VoL H, pp. 789-1605.] School Dist. V. School Dist. (20 Kan. 76), 1323. School Dist. V. School Dist. (E^n., 26 Pac. Rep. 43), 1395. School Dist. V. School Dist. (63 Mich. 61; 29 N. W. Rep. 489), 653, 1320, 1323. School Dist. V. School Dist. (81 Mich. 330), 1333. School Dist. V. School Dist. (18 Mo. App. 266), 1346. School Dist. V. School D|st. (94 Mo. 612: 7S. W. Rep. 385). 133'5. - School Dist. V. Stone (106 U. S. 183), ' 832. School Dist. V. Sullivan (Kan., 29 Pac. Rep. 1141). 613. School Dist. V. Tebbetts (67 Me. 239), 1334. School Dist. V. Thelander (31 Minn. 333). 1334. School Dist. V. Thompson (5 Minn, 280), 1331. School Dist. V. Town (Vt., 33 Atl. Rep. 570), 1325. School Dist. V. Town of Bridport (Vt.. 23 Atl. Rep. 570), 1338. School Dist. V. Town of Greenfield (64 N. H. 84), 1333. School Dist. V. Town Treasurers (61 Mich. 673), 1337. School Dist. V. Township of River- side (67 Mich. 401 ; 34 N. W. Rep. 886). 1333. School Dist. V. Twitchell (68 N. H. 11), 1338. School Dist. V. Webber (75 Mo. 558), 1895. School Dist. V. Wickersham (84 Mo. App. 337). 1340. School Dist. V, Williams (38 Ark. 454), 14. School Dist. V. Wood (13 Mass. 193), 8. 18, 153, 1376. School Dist. V. Xenia Bank (19 Neb. 89) 958 938 School Fund, In re (15 Neb. 684; 50 N. W. Rep. 272), 866. School Town &c. v. Powner (126 Ind. 528; 26 N. E. Rep. 484), 1342. School Town of Milford v. Zeigler (Ind., 27 N. E. Rep. 303), 810, 811, 1348. School Town of Monticello v. Ken- dall (72 Ind. 91; 37 Am. Rep. 139), 214. School Town of Princeton v. Geb- hart (61 Ind. 187), 711. School Tp. of Allen v. School Town of Macy (109 Ind. 559), 464. School Tp. V. Barnes (119 Ind. 213; 21 N. E. Rep. 747), 815. CCXIV TABLE OF CASES. IThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Sohoolbred v. Charieston (3 Bay, 63), 1379. Sohoolfleld's Ex'r v. Lynchburg (78 Va. 366). 1369. Schools V. Eisley (10 Wall. 91), 679. Schott V. People (89 111. 195), 543. Schriber v. Langlade (66 Wis. 616), 439, 465. Schroeder v. City Council (3 Treadw. Const. 726), 1241. Schroth V. Prescott (68 Wis. 378; 33 . N. W. Rep. 621), 1476. Sohroyer v. Lynch (8 Watts (Pa.), 453), 333. Schultz V. Cambridge (38 Ohio St. 659), 534. Schultz V. Milwaukee (49 Wis. 354), 264. Schumni v. Seymour (34 N, J. Eq. 143), 207, 280, 640, 730, 1130. Schuyler County v. Mercer County (4 Gilm. 20), 1532. Schuyler County v. Thomas (98 XT. S. 169), 943, 947. Schwartz v. Barry (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 379), 863. Schwartz v. Flatboats (14 La. Ann. 243), 1390. Schwartz v. Oshkosh (55 Wis. 490), 503, 514, 1265. Schwartz v. Wilson (75 Cal. 502 ; 17 Pac. Rep. 449), 835, 874. Schwiiohow V. Chicago (68 111. 444), 597. Scituate v. Weymouth (108 Mass. 128), 1424. Scofield V. City of Council Bluffs (68 Iowa, 695), 644. Scofield V. Lansing (17 Mich. 437), 283. Scoles V. Wilsey (11 Iowa, 261), 336. Scotland County v. Hill (133 U. S. 107)', 913, 944, 964. Scotland County v. Thomas (94 U. S. 682), 943, 947. Scotland County Court v. United States (140 U. S. 41), 1385. Scott V. Chickasaw (53 Iowa, 47; 3 N. W. Rep. 835), 1400, 1579. Scott V. City of Toledo (36 Fed. Rep. 385), 558, 670. Scott V. Davenport (34 Iowa, 208), 840, 843. Scott V. Paulen (15 Kan. 162). 377. Scott V. Shreveport (20 Fed. Rep. 714). 640. Scott V. State (46 Iowa. 303). 331. Scott V. Union County (63 Iowa, 583), 377. Scott County v. Hinds (Minn., 52 N. W. Rep. 523), 569, 1186. eoovill 1'. Cleveland (1 Ohio St. 136), 95, lOa, 390, lHiO, 1169. Scoville V, Mattoon (55 CSonn. 144), 1333. Soranton v. Catteson (94 Pa. St. 202), 1463, 1480. Scranton v. Gore (134 Pa. St. 595; 33 W. N. C. 419), 1497. Scranton v. Hyde Park Gas Co. (103 Pa. St. 383), 909. Scranton v. Pennsylvania Coal Co. (105 Pa. St. 445). 1134. Scranton City v. Hill (103 Pa. St. 378). 1498. Scrip;ure v. Burns (59 Iowa, 70), 1530. Soudder v. Trenton &0..C0. (1 N. J. Eq. (Saxt.) 694; 33 Am. Dec. 756), 683. 696. Scully V. O'Seary (11 Chicago Legal News, 37), 1257. Seabury v. Howland (15 R. I. 446), 350, 368, 371, 1337, 1336, 1395. Seagraves v. Citv of Alton (13 111. 366), 339, 974, 1034. Seaman v. . Baughman (Iowa, 47 N. W. Rep. 1091), 370, 807, 1395. Seaman r. Hicks (8 Paige, 65). 684. Seaman v. Mayor &o. (80 N. Y. 339), 1227, 1403. Seaman v. Patten (3 Caines, 313), 1031. Searcy v. Tarnell (47 Ark. 369). 70, 634. Searing v. Heavysides (106 III. 85), 1573. Searle v. Abraham (73 Iowa, 507), 848, 1311. Searlf 8 v. Manhattan R. Co. (101 N. Y. 661), 1454. Sears v. Dennis (105 Mass. 31 0\ 1455. Searsmart v. Lincolnville (83 Me. 75; 31 Atl.. Rep. 747), 978. Seattle v. Tyler (Wash. Ty., 1877), 53. Seattle v. Yesler (1 Wash. T. 577), 1182, 1188. Sebastian v. Bryan (31 Ark. 647), 334, 330. Secombe v. Railroad Co. (33 Wall. 108), 693. Second Congregational Church Soc. V. City of Omaha (Neb., 53 N. W. Rep. 839), 586. Second Univ. Soc. v. Providence (6 R. L335), 1166. Secrist v, Delaware Comm'rs (100 Ind. 59). 1114. Seebold v. People (86 III. 33). 116. Seebold v. Shitler (34 Pa. St. 133), 624. Seeger v. Mueller (133 111. 86; 24 N. E. Rep. 513), 623, 643. Speley v. Peters (5 Gilm. 130), 604. Seelev v. Westport (47 Conn. 394), 1183. TABLB 07 OASES. CCXV [The references are to pages: VoL 1, pp. 1-V88; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] Seely v. Pittsbursh (83 Pa. St. 360), 1170, 1186, 1349. Seely v. Sebastian (4 Oregon, 25), 687. Seibert v. Botts (57 Me. 430), 633. Seibrecht v. New Orleana (13 La. Ann. 496). 259, 643. Seifert v. Brooklyn (15 Abb. N. C. 97), 777. Seifert v. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 186), 363. Seitzinger v. Steinberger (13 Pa. St. 379), 1361. Selby V. City of Portland (14 Ore- gon, 243; 12 Pac. Rep. 377), 1378, 1293. Selby V. Comm'rs (14 La. Ann. 434), 1369. Selma v. Mullen (46 Ala. 411). 260. Selma v. Rome &c. Co. (45 Ga. 180), 703. Selma &c. R. Co., Ex parte (iS Ala. 69ii), 16, 93g. Seneca County Supervisors v. Allen (99 N. Y. 532), 856. Seneca Falls v. Zalinski (8 Hun, 571), 1453. Serrill v. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St. 355), 1363. Sessions v. Crunkilton (30 Ohio St. 349), 686, 1024. Severin v. Cole (38 Iowa, 463), 690. Seward v. Conrov (Neb. , 50 N. W. Rep. 339), 409. Seward v. Rising Sun City (79 Ind. 853), 1351. Sewall V. Brainard (38 Vt. 364), 958. Sewall V. St. Paul (20 Minn. 511), 1127, 1171. Sewell V. Cohoes (75 N, Y. 4.5), 1450, 1486. Sewer in ThirtyeFourth St. (31 How. Pr. 42), 296. Sewer Street, In re (8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 2i6), 1404. Sexton V. County of Cook (114 111. 174; 28 N. E. Rep. 608). 613. Seymer v. Lake (66 Wis. 651), 1502. Seymour v. Carter (2 Met. 520), 1080. Seymour t). Comm'rs (119 Ind. 148; 21 N. E. Rep. 549), 1098. Seymour v. Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. (126 Ind. 466; 26 N. E. Rep. 128), 675. Seymour v. School Dist. (53 Conn. 502), 1597, Seyniour v. Van Slyke (8 Wend. 403), 741. Shafer v. Mumma (17 Md. 331), 193, 195, 544, 548, 604, 1035, 1258. Shaffer v. Weech (34 Kan. 595), 1174. Shakespear v. Smith (77 Cal. 638; 20 Pac. Rep. 294), 919, 1333. Shankland v. Phillips (3 Tenn. Ch. 556), 1330. Shanks v. Dupont (3 Peters, 242), 13S. Shannon v. O'Bozle (51 Ind. 565), 624. Shannon v. Portsmouth (54 N, H, 183), 621. Shannon v. Reynolds (78 Ga. 760; 3 S. E. Rep. 653), 901. Shannon v. Town of Tama City (74 Iowa, 23), 1450. Sharp V. Apgar (31 N. J. Law, 858), 1576. Sharp V. Contra Cnsta County (34 Cal. 284), 744, 1371, 159.5. Sharp V. Johnson (4 Hill, 92), 1181, ■I OQQ Sharp v'. Mayor &c. (40 Barb. 364), 830. Sharp V. Smith (32 111. App. 336), 868. Sharp V. Spier (4 Hill, 76), 565, 1160, 1383. Sharp's Executor v. Dunavan (17 B. Mon. 223), 1364, 136H. Sharps v. Robertson (5 Gralt. (Va.) 518), 187. Sharpless v. Mayor &c. of Philadel- phia (21 Pa. St. 147; 59 Am. Dec. 759), 86, 929, 933, 1331, 1387, 1389. Shaver v. Starrett (4 Ohio St. 494), 685. Shaw V. Crocker (42 Cal. 435), 677. Shaw V. Dennis (10 Hi. (5 Gilm.) 405), 933, 1024, 1169. 1363. Shaw V. Kennedy (Term Rep. (N. C.) 158), 536. Shaw II. Mayor &o. (19 Ga. 468), 210. Shaw V. Norfolk R. Co. (5 Gray, 180), 941. Shaw V. Reed (16 Mass. 450), 339. Shaw V. Statler (74 Cal. 258; 15 Pac. Rep. 833), 835, 874, Shaw V. Village of Snn Prairie (74 Wis. 105; 42 N. W. Rep. 271), 1477. Shawnee County v. Carter (3 Kan. 11,5), 1389. Shawneetown v. Baker (85 111. 563), 356, 257, 657. Shawneetown v. Mason (82 HI. 337), 703. Shay, In re (15 N. Y. Supl. 488), 1548. Shea V. Milford (145 Mass. 525), 281, 799, 970. Shebovgan v. Railroad (21 Wis. 675), 1090. Sheehan's Case (128 Mass. 445), 1265. Sheehan v. Martin (10 Mo. App. 285), 1124. Sheehan v. Owen (82 Mo. 458), 1136. CCXVl TABLE 07 OASES. [The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.] Sheehan v. Samaritan's Hospital (50" Mo. 155; U Am. Rep. 412), 1134, 1135, 1166, 1361. Sheehan v. Sturgis (53 Conn. 481), 1344. Sheehy v. Kansas City Cahle Ey. Co. (94 Mo. 575), 674, 1456. Sheel V. City of Appleton (49 Wis. 125; 5 N. W. Rep. 37), 783, 893, 1474. ■ Sheeley v. Detroit (45 Mich. 425), 1163. Sheets v. Selden's Lessee (3 Wall. 190), 350. Sheffield i'. Otis (107 Mass. 282), 980. Sheffield v. Watson (3 Uaines (N. Y.), 69), 213. Sheffield School Tp. v. Andress (56 Ind. 157), 260, 823, 922. Shehan v. Gleeson (46 Mo. 100), 283. Sheidley v. Lynch (95 Mo. 487; 8 . S. W. Rep. 434), 869. Shelby v. Alcorn (36 Miss. 373; 72 Am. Dec. 169), 198. Shelbv V. Clagett (Ohio, 33 N. E. Rep. 407), 1440, 1478. Shelby County Court v. Cumberland &c. R. Co. (8 Bush, 209), 945. Sheldon v. Kalamazoo (21 Mich. 383), 1578. Sheldon v. Litchfield County (1 Root, 158), 1586. Shellabarger v. Binns (18 Kan. 345), 318. Shelley v. St. Charles County (30 Fed. Rep. 603), 1371. Shellhouse v. State (110 Ind. 509), 1413. Shelton v. Derby (27 Conn. 414), 690, 1418. Shelton v. Mayor of Mobile (30 Ala. 540), 535. Shelton County v. Borough of Birm- ingham (Conn., 24 Atl. Rep. 978), 1150. Shely V. Detroit (45 Mich. 431), 1187. Sheni^ndoah Borough v. Erdman (Pa., 12 Atl. Rep. 814), 1499. Shepard v. Pulaski County (Ky., 18 S. W. Rep. 15), 760. Shepardson v, Milwaukee &c. R. Co, (6 Wis. 605), 703. Shepherd v. Burkhalter (13 Ga. 444), 225. Shepherd v. District Tp. (23 Iowa, 595), 904. Shepherd v. Lincoln (17 Wend. 350), 219, 323. Shepherd v. Staten (5 Heisk, (Tenn.) 79), 200. Shepley v. Detroit (45 Mich. 531), 1161. Sheppard's Election Case (77 Pa. St. 295), 160. Sherbourne t" . Guba County (21 Cal. 613; 81 Am. Dec. 151), 9. Sheridan v. Colvin (78 111. 337), 591, 803. Sheridan v. Hibbard (111., 9 N. E. Rep. 901), 1488. Sheridan v. Salem (14 Oregon. 328; 13 Pac. Rep. 985), 93, 138, 885, 1098, 1447. Sherman v. Board (84 Mich. 108; 47 N. W. Rep. 513), 1510. Sherman v. Buick (33 Cal. 341), 684, Sherftlan v. Oarr (8 R. L 431), 658, 663. Sherman v. Highway Comm'rs (Mich,, 51 N. W. Rep. 1123), 1416. Sherman v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co. (40 Wis. 645), 679. Sherman v. Torrey (99 Mass. 473), ,368. Sherman City v. Nairey (77 Tex. 291), 1431. Sherman County v. Simons (109 U. S. 735). 15, 9C3. Sherry v. Gilmore (58 Wis. 324), 55. Sherwin v. Bugbee (17 Vt. 337; 16 Vt. 439), 91. 93, 347, 348, 354, 358, 361, 1324, 1336. Sherwin v. Wigglesworth (129 Mass. 64), 1399. Sherwood v. Lafayette City (109 Ind. 411), 690, 1418. Sherwood v. St, Paul R. Co. (21 Minn. 137), 1418. Shields v. Chase (33 La. Ann. 409), 1380. Shields v. McGregor (91 Mo. 534), 163. Shlnbone v. Randolph County (56 Ala. 183), 1377, 1378. Shinners v. Proprietors &c. (154 Mass. 168), 1486. Shipley v. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (34 Md. 336). 702, 70:i. Shipley v. Mi chanics' Bank (10 J. R, 484), 1539. Shipman v. State (43 Wis. 381), 230. Shippey v. Au Sable (65 Mich. 494), 1433. Shippy V. Wilson (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 853), 900. Shirley v. Watertown (3 Mass. 323), 981. Shoemaker v. Grant (36 Ind. 175), 1400. Shell V. German Coal Co. (118 DL 427), 682. Shontz V. Evans (40 Iowa, 139), 1391. Shook V. City of Cohoes (108 N. Y. 648 ; 15 N. E. Rep. 531), 1463, 1492. Short V. Spier (4 Hill, 76), 344. TABLE OT CASES. CCXVU prhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. '!SS-1WS.1 Short V. Symmes (159 Mass. aOS), 200. snorter v. Rome (53 Ga. 621), 947. Shreve v. Town of Cicero (129 111. 226 ; 21 N. E. Rep. 815), 1093. Shreveport v. Levy (36 La. Ann. 671), 613, 1345. Shreveport v. Eoos (85 La. Ann. 1010), 529. Shrewsbury v. Salem (19 Pick. 389), 975. Shriver v. Pittsburgh (66 Pa. St. 466), 1351, 1356. Shue V. Comm'rs (41 Mich. 638), 695. Shuetze v. Bailey (40 Mo. 69), 214. Shuford V. Comm'rs (86 N. C. 562), 1177. Shuman v. City of Fort Wayne (187 Ind. 109; 26 N. E. Rep. 560), 601. Shutesburg v. Oxford (16 Mass. 102), 988. Sibley v. Mobile (3 Woods, 535), 1372, 1373, 1380. Sic, Jn re (Cal., 14 Pac. Rep. 405), 518. Sidener v. Essex (22 Ind. 301), 699. Siiles V. Portsmouth (09 N. H. 24), 1463. Sidner v. Alexander (31 Ohio St. 378), 326. Siebrecht v. New Orleans (13 La." Ann. 496), 230. Siedler v. Chosen Freeholders (39 N. J. Law, 633), 1^94. Siefert w. Citv of Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 136; 4 N. E. Rep. 321), 1099. Sights V. Yarnalls (13 Gratt. 292), 135.5. Sikes V. Hatfield (13 Gray, 347). 281. Sikes V. Manchester (59 Iowa, 65; 13 N. W. Rep. 755). 1474. Sill w. Village of Corning (15 N. Y. 297), 458. SUliman v. Fredericksburg &c. E. Co. (37 Gratt. 119), 214. Silly V. Taylor (88 N. C. 489), 1373, 1384. Silsbee v. Stockle (44 Mich, 561), 1387. Silver v. Cummings (7 Wend. 181), 196. Silver v. People (45 111. 334). 1548. Silver Lake Bank v. North (4 Johns. Ch. 370), 336, 645. Simmes v. Chicot County (50 Ark. 5C6; 9S. W. Rep. 308), 894. Simmes v. St. Paul (33 Minn. 408), 9. Simmons v. Camden (36 Ark. 276; 7 Am. Rep. 620), 677. Simmons v. Citv of Toledo (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 184), 649. Simmons w State (18 Mo. 268), 1356. Simms v. Citv of Paris (Ky., 1 S. W. Rep. 543). 1305. Sihiondst). Heard (33 Pick. 120; 34 Am. Dec. 41), 813. Simonds v. Parker (1 Met. 508), 1591. Simons v. Kern (93 Pa. St. 455), 1057. Sims V. Board (39 Ind. 40). 1036. Sims V. City of Frankfort (79 Ind. 446), 585, 1195. Sims V. Hines (181 Ind. 534; 33 N. E. Rep. 515). 706, 897. Sinclair v. Baltimore (59 Md. 593), 1469. Singer's Appeal (131 Pa. St. 365; 18 Atl. Rep. 931), 66. Singt-r Mfg;. Co. v. Elizabeth (43 N. J. Law, 849), 955. Single V. Marathon County (38 Mo. 364), 943. Siniar v. Canaday (53 N. Y. 298), 691. Sinnett V. Moles (38 Iowa, 35). 555. Sinnottu. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (Wis., 50 N. W. Rep. 10971, 588. Sinton v. Ashbury (41 Cal. 525), 1371. Sioux City i\ School Dist. (55 Iowa, 150), 1166, 1353. Sioux City v. Weare (59 lowa^ 95), 987. Sipe V. Murphy (Ohio, 31 N. E. Rep. 884), 1239. Skinner v. Bateman (96 N. C. 5), 1342. Skinner v. Henderson (10 Mo. 305), 709. Slack V. Blackburn (64 Iowa, 373), 937 Slack v. Mavsville &c. R. Co. (13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 1), 933. Slack V. Norwich (38 Vt. 818), 1578. Slater v. Wood (9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 15), 198, 195. Slattery, Ex parte (3 Ark. 484), 1355, 1858. Slaughter v. Commonwealth (13 Gratt. 767). 144, 1357, 1370. Slaughter v. Mobile County (73 Ala. 134), 435. Slaughter v. People (2 Doug. (Mich.) 334), 517, 1858. Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wall. 36), 144, 145, 1244. Slee V. Bloom (5 Johns. Ch. 366), 174. Sleeper r. Bullen (6 Kan. 300), 1574. Sleeper v. Landown (53 N. H. 244), 1500. Sleight V. People (74 111. 47), 1389. Slessman v. Crozier (80 Ind. 487), 535. Sloan V. Beebe (84 Kan. 343), 1164. Sloan V. State (8 Blaokf. (Ind.) 361), 79, 109. Small V. Inhabitants of Danville (51 Me. 359), 480. COXVIU TABLK OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.] Small V. Orne (79 Me, 78; 8 Atl.Rep. 153), 167, 399. . Smalley v. Appleton (75 Wis. 18), 1441, 1470, 1481. Smartwood v. Walbridge (10 N. Y. Supl. 863), 1343. Smead v. Indianapolis &c. B. Co, (11 Ind. 104), 251. Smedley v. Irwin (51 Pa. St. 445), C83. Smeltzer v. White (93 U. S. 390), 909. Smith, Ex parte {38 Cal. 708), 1810. Smith, Ex parte {8 S. C. 495), 200. Smith. In re (99 N. Y. 324), 1078. Smith's Case (4 Mod. 55), 139, 464. Smith V. Aberdeen (35 Miss. 458), 1185. Smith V. Adrian (1 Mich. 495), 95, 109. Smith V. Appleton (19 Wis. 468), 1381. Smith V, Aston (Freem, Ch. 388), 953. Smith V. Banss (15 111. 399), 412. Smith V. Board County Comm'rs (45 Fed. Rep. 735), 91, 98, 99, 160, 1G4. 347, 875. Smith V. Board County Comm'rs (46 Fed. Eep. 340), 744. Smith V. Boston (7 Cush. 254), 1194, 1195, 1423. Smith V. Bradley (20 N. H. 117), inc. Smith V. Buffalo (1 Sheld. (N, Y.) 493), 1064. Smith V. Chicago (38 Fed. Rep, 388), 1458. Smith V. City of Des Moines (Iowa, 51 N. W. Eep. 77), 1201. Smith V. City of Eau Claire (Wis., 47 N. W. Rep. 830), 1151. Smith V. Citv of Leavenworth (15 Kan. 81),' 1198. Smith V. City of Louisville (Ky., 6 S. W. Rep. 911), 1238. Smith V. City of Rochester (76 N. Y. 506), 754, 770, 774, 1038. Smith I'. City of Pochester (92 N. Y. 463), 672. Smil h V, City of Saginaw (81 Mich, 123; 45 N, W. Rep. 964), 395. Smith V. City of Toledo (34 Ohio St, 126), 1171. Smith V. City of Waterbury (54 Conn. 174; 7 Atl. Rep. 17). 186, 187. Smith V. City of Wilmington (98 N. C. 343), 377, 378. Smith V. Clark County (54 Mo. 58), 935, 944, 947, 954. Smith V. Cofran (34 Cal. 310), 1383. Smith V. Comm'rs (31 Kan. 669). 968. Smith V. Commonwealth (35 (iratt. 780). 319. Smith V. Commonwealth (41 Fa. St. 335). 181. Smith V. County of Jefferson (10 Colo. 17), 1332. Smith V. Cronkjte (8 Ind. 134), 314. Smith V. Crutcher (Ky., 18 S. W. Eep. 521), 375. Smith V. Davis (30 Cal. 536), 1383. Smith V. Dedham (144 Mass. 177; 10 N. E. Eep. 783), 805, 847. Smith V. Engle (44 Iowa, 365), 1120. Smith V. Ferri^ (6 Hun, 553), 1418. biuith V. Gould (61 Wis. 31), 21u 1146. Smith V. Holmes (54 Mich. 104), 228. Smith V. Hubbard (1 Pickle, 306; ;; S. W. Eep. 569), 1093. Smith V. Kernochen (7 How, 198), 114. Smith V. Law (31 N. Y. 296), 275. Smith V. McCarthy (56 Pa. St. 359), 64, 67, 86, 87, 398, 1366. Smith V. Madison (7 Ind. 86), 93, 118. Smitli V. Masourick (44 Ga. 163), 646. Smith V. Marston (5 Tex. 426), 540. Smith V. Mayor &o. (13 Cal. 531), 658, 659. Smith V. Mayor &o. (81 Mich, 123), 1520. Smith V. Mayor &c. (10 N. Y. 504), 253. Smith V. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 63), 1171. Smith V. Morse (2 Cal. 524), 383, 5,50, 1389. Smith V. Nashville (4 Lea (Tenn.), 69), 659, 664. Smith V. Nashville (88 Tenn. 464; 13 S. W. Rep. 934), 573. Smith V. Newbern (70 N. C. 14), 549. Smith V. Newburgh (77 N. Y. 130), 256, 639, 845. Smith V. New York (37 N. Y, 518), ■ 187. Smith V. Peoria County (59 111. 412), 320. Smith V. Philadelphia (13 Phila. (Pa.) 177), 658, Smith V. Proctor (6 N. Y, Supl. 212 ; 53 Hun, 143), 1336. Smlthr. Proctor (130 N. Y. 319; 29 N. E. Rep. 313), 93S. Smith V. Eeadfield (27 Me. 145), 1577. Smith V. Saginaw (81 Minh. 123). 1367. Smith V. San Antonio (17 Tex. 643), 1257, 1265. Smith V. School Dist. (40 Iowa, 210), 1345. Smith V. School Dist. (69 Mich. 589), 809, 1342, Smith V. Schroeder (15 Minn. 86), I 1577. TABLE OF OASES. CCXIX (The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] Smith V. Sherry (50 Wis. 210), 1365. »1367. Smith V. Sherwood Township (62 Mich. 159), 1471. Smith V. Smith (3 Dessaus. (S. C.) 557), 464. Smith V. Titcomb (81 Me. 272), 64. Smith V. Tobener (32 Mo. App. 601), 491. Smith V. Vicksburg (54 Miss. 61.5), 1354. Smith V. Washington (20 How. 135), 757, 779. Smith V. Weldon (7.S Ind. 454)^694. Smith V. Wildes (143 Mass. 556), 1499. S nith V. Wright (24 Barb. 170). 219. Smith V. Wright (27 Barb. 621), 1439, 1445. Smith V. Zaner (4 Ala. 99), 141. . Smithfield v. Waterville (64 Me. 412), 990. Smoot V. The Mayor (24 Ala, 112), 90. Smout V. Ilberry (10 M. & W, 1), 215 Rnedicor v. Davis (17 Ala. 472), 223. Snell, In re (58 Vt. 207), 117, 513. Snell V. Belleville (30 U. C. Q. B. 81), 1244. Snell V. Bridgewater &c. Co. (24 Pick. 296), 112. Snell V. Campbell (24 Fed. Rep. 880), 1399. Snell V. Hope (3 Denio, 594), 1390. Snelling v. Joflfrion (43 La. Ann. 886; 8 So. Rep. 609), 632, 791, Snelson v. State (16 Ind. 29), 709. Snodgrass v. Morris (Ind., 24 K. E. Rep. 151), 1338. Snow V. Fitchburg (136 Mass. 183), 1183. Snow V. Provincetown (109 Mass. 123). 677. Snyder, Ex parte (64 Mo. 58), 199. Snyder v. Foster (77 Iowa, 638 ; 42 N. W. Rep. 506), 629, 647. Snyder v. North Lawrence (8 Kan. 82), 524. Snyder v. Plass (28 N. Y. 465), 1417. Snyder v. Trumpbour (38 N. Y. 355), 1417. Snyder Township v. Bovaird (122 Pa. St. 442; 15 Atl. Rep. 910; 23 W. N. C. 563), 618, 917. Society &c. v. New London (29 Conn. 174), 933, 936. Society &c. v. Pawlet (4 Peters, 480), 56, 70, 88. Society &c. v. Vandyke (3 Whart. (Pa.) 309), 206. Society of Scriveners v. Brooking (3 Q. B. 95). 518. Socns V. Racine (10 Wis. 871), 558. Solomon, Ex parte (Cal., 27 Pac. Rep. 757), 518. Solomon v. City of Kingston (24 Hun, 5B3), 757. Solomon v. Hughes (24 Kan. 211), 643, 1366. Solon V, Williamsburg Sav. Bank (85 Hun, 1), 937. 953, 965. Solon V. Williamsburgh (.114 N. Y. 123), 960. Soloy V. City of New Orleans (33 Lh. Ann. 79), 647. Somerset v. Parson (105 Pa. St. 360). 296. Somerville V. Boston (120 Mass. 574>, 981. Somerville v. Dickerman (137 Mass. 273). 549. Soon Hing v. Crowley (113 U. S. 703), 511. Soper V. Henry County (26 Iowa, 264), 15. 746. Soper V. Livermore School Dist. (88 Me. 193), 350. 370, 1335. Soule V. City of Passaic (N. J. Eq., 20 Atl. Rep. 346), 1145. Soule V. Thelander (81 Minn. 337), 1334. South V. Maryland (18 How. 393), 333. South Bend v. Paxon (67 Ind. 238), 1484. . South Berwick v. Huntress (53 Me. 89), 311. South Brunswick v. Township of " Cranberry (53 N. J. Law, 126; 20 Atl. Rep. 1084), 978. South Carolina v. Georgia (93 U. S. 4), 1423. South Covington &c. Ry. Co. v. Berrv (Ky., 18 S. W. Rep. 1026), 59-"), 596. South Hampton v. Hampton Falls (UN. H. 134), 983. South Omaha w. Cunningham (Neb., 47 N. W. Rep. 930), 1140. South Ottawa v. Foster (20 111. 396), 745. South Ottawa v. Perkins (94 U. S. 260), 208, 932. South Park Comm'rsw. Railroad Co, (107 111'. 105), 1168. South Park Comm'rs v. Williams (51 ill. 57). 685. South Platte Land Co. v. Crete (11 Neb. 347), 15i)8. South School Dist. v. Blakeslee (13 Conn. 227), 348, 354, 368. Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co. (116 N. Y. 1), 20. Southard v. Bradford (53 Me. 389), 344, 364. Southborough v. Marlborough (24 Pick, 168), 975, 983. ccxx TABLE 01" CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. It, pp. 789-1C05.] Southerland v. Goldsboro (96 N. C. 49). 381. Southern Pao. R. Co. v. Hixon (5 Ind. 16S), 306. Southern Pao. R. Co. v. Reed (41 Cal. 256), 679. Southern R. Co. v. Ely (95 N. C. 77), 706. Soutliport V. Ogden (S3 Conn. 128), 103. 488, 513, 528. Southwell V. Detroit (74 Mich. 438; 43 N. W. Rep. 118), 1201. Soutter V. Madison (15 Wis. 30), 423, 1376. Sower V. Philadelphia (35 Pa. St. 231), 48t, 485. Spain's Case (47 Fed. Rep. 208), 1240. Spalding v. Kelly (66 Mich. 693), 435. Spangler v. City &o. of San Fran- cisco (84 Cal. IS; 33 Pac. Rep. 1091), 1099. Spangler v. Jacobv (14 111. 397), 801, 1365. Spangler v. York County (13 Pa. St. 337), 1066. Spann v. Webster Co. Comm'rs (64 Ga. 498), 846. Sparland v. Barnes (98 111. 595), 1380. Sparrow v. Evansville &c. R. Co. (7 Porter (Ind.), 369), 943. Spaulding v. Arnold (125 N. Y. 194; 36 N. B. Rep. 295; 34 N. Y. St. Rep. 980), 879, 1546. Spaulding v. City of Saginaw (84 Mich. 134; 47 N. W., Rep. 444), 290. Spaulding v. Inhabitants of Peabody (163 Mass. 129; 10 L. R. An. 397; 36 N." E. Rep. 421; 33 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 638), 636. Spaulding v. Lowell (83 Pick. 71), 208, 330, S51, 642. 663, 837, 1343. Spaulding V. North San Francisco &c. Ass'n (87 Cal. 40; 25 Pac. Rep. S48), 1068, 1118. Spaulding v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co. (57 Wis. mi), 706. Speaker v. Glass (3 Privy Council Appeals, 560), 205. Spearbracker v. Larrabee (64 Wis. 573), 1477, 1481. 1492. Specht V. Commonwealth (8 Pa. St. 312), 1344. Spectit V. Dc-troit (20 Mich. 168), 633. Speedlingr. Worth County (68 Iowa, 153J, 1006. Speer i). City of Athens (85 Ga. 49 ; 11 S. E. Rep. 803), 1170. Speith V. People (87 111. 600), 801. Spellman v. Chicopee (131 Mass. 443), 1483. Spellman v. New Orleans (45 Fed Rep. 3), 1240. Spencer v. County of Sully (Dak., 3 1 N. W. Rep. 97), 889. Spencer v. Merchant (135 TT. S. 84'i : 8 S. Ct. Rep. 9S1), 558, 1168. 1178, 1179, 1180. Spencer v. Perry (17 Me. 413), 339. Spencer v. Pierce (5 R. I. 63), 959. Spencer Tp. v. Riverton Tp. (56 Iowa, 85). 1485. Spengler v. Trowbridge (63 Miss. 46), moe. Spioeland v. Alier (98 Ind. 467), 1484. Spicer v. Elkhart County (126 Ind. 552), 1435, 1427. Spicer v. Hoop (51 Ind. 365), 651. Spidell V. Johnson (138 Ind. 235; 23 N. E. Rep. 889), 898. Spier V. New Utrecht (131 N. Y. 430), 1414. Spies V. Brooklyn (18 N. Y. Supl. 170), 763. Spiller V. Woburn (IS Allen, 137), 1346. Spilnian v. City of Parkersburg (35 West Va. 605; 14 S. E. Rep. 379), 843, 844. Spitler V. Young (63 Mo. 42), 1233. Spitzer v. Village of Blanchard (83 Mich. 334; 46 N. W^ Rep. 400), ^ 630, 948, 949. Spitjsnogle v. Ward (64 Ind. 30), S18. rSpooner v. Freetown (139 Moiss. 335), 1483. Sprague w. Brown (40 Wis. 6K),158. Sprague v. Coenen (30 Wis. 209), 564. Sprague v, Norway (81 Cal. 173), 160. Spring V. Hyde Park (137 Mass. 554). 778. Spring Valley Water-works v. San Francisco (83 Cal. 386), 130S, 1309. Spring Valley Water-works v. San Mateo Water-works (64 Cal. 123), 683. Spring Valley Water-works v, Schot- tler (62 Cal. 100), 1556. Spring Valley Water- works v. Sohot- tler (110 U. S. 347), 6. Springer v. Chicago (135 111. 552), 1456. Springer v. City of Philadelphia (Pa., 12 Atl. Rep. 490), 1459. Springer v. Clay County (35 Iowa, 241), 909. Springfield v. Connecticut River Co. (4 Cnsh. 63), 676. Springfield v. Doyle (76 111. 202), 1473. TABLE OF OASES. CCXXl [The references are to pages: Vol. Sprinsrfield v. Edwards (84111. 626), S43, 848, 870. 1583. Springfield v. Le Claire (49 111. 476), 1478. 1479. SpringfielJ u. Mather (184 111. 88; 16 N. E. Kep. 92), 1073. Springfield v. Power (25. 111. 187), 1034. • . SprinKfield v. Schmook (68 Mo. 394), •tOi. Springfield v. Teutonic Sav. Bank (84 N. Y. 403). 936. Springfield v. Walker (42 Ohio St. 843), 658. Springfield R. Co. v. Springfield (85 Mo. C76). 1423. Springwell v. County Treasurer (56 Mich. 240). 431. Sprowl V. Lawrence (33 Ala. 674). 314, 31.i. Spurrier v. Wirtner (18 Iowa, 480), 706. Staats V. Washington (44 K. J. Law, 610), 53.5, Staats V. Washington (45 N. J. Law, 318; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 38). 275. 277, 535, .'iSl, 537, 1294. Staats V. Washington (46 N. J. Law, 209), 625. Stack V. City of East St. Louis. (85 III. 377), 587. Stackhouse v. City of La Fayette (26 Ind. 17; 89 Am. Deo. 450), 1099. Stackhou.se v. Clark (S2 N. J. Law, 291). 301. Staokpole v. Healy (16 Mass. 33), 1417. Stadler v. Detroit (13 Mich. 340), 203, 210. Stadler v. Roth (59 Mo. .400), 1273. Stafford v. Albany (7 Johns. 541), 699. Stafford v, Oskaloosa (57 Iowa, 748), 1451. Stafford v. Oskaloosa (64 Iowa, 251), 1463. Stamford v. Fischer (17 NI Y. Supl. 609), 1835. Stamford v. Eeadsboro (46 Vt. 61 1), 976. . Stamford Water Co. v. Stanlev (39 Hun, 424), 686. Stamp V. Cass County (47 Mich. 330), 666. Stamper v. Temple (6 Humph. (Tenn.) 113), 667. StandardjOil Co. v. Bachelor (89 Ind. 1), 1355. Standart v. Burtis (46 Hun, 82), 210. Standish v. Washburn (21 Pick. 287), 1477. Stanhart v. Sittey (N. J., 19 Atl. Rep. 464), 1259. 1. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol n, pp. 789-1605.] Stanleyr. City of Davenport (54 lowHi 4m: 37 Am. Rep. 816), 590, 1469. Stanton v. Camp (4 Bai'b. 274), 263. Stanton v. City of Salem (145 Mass. 476), 1459. Stanton v. Springfield (13 Allen, 568), 14H7, 14(10, 1466. Stan wood v. City of Maiden (Mass., 31 N. E. Rep. 702), 1194. Staples V. Town of Canton (69 Mo. 592), 14a0. Staibiid V.Falmouth (51 Me. 101), 344. Starbuck v. Murray (5 Wend. 148; 21 Am. Deo. 17i), 090. ' Starin v. Town of Genoa (23 N. Y. 439). 631, 933. 953. Stark V. Lancaster (57 N. H. 88), 1450. Starkey v, Minneapolis (19 Minn. i:03). 200, 708. Starkwell v. State (101 Itid. 1). 1358. Starr v. Burlington (45 Iowa, 87), 486, 1171. Starr v. Rochester (6 Wend. 564V 1570. Starr v. Trustees (6 Wend. 564), 1263. State V. Adams (65 Ind. 393), 1562. State V. Adams.(58 Yt. 694). 363. State V. Allen (7 Jones Law (N) C), 584), 337. State V. Allen (2 McCord, 55), 984. State V. Allen (23 Neb. 451; SON. W. Rep. 756), 856. State V. Ailing (12 Ohio, 16), 178. State V. Ames (20 Mo. 314). 1344. State V. Anderson (36 Fla. 240; 8 So. Rep. 1), 1559. State V. Anderson (44 Ohio St. 247), 119, 126. State V. Anderson (2 S. C. 499>, 1396. State v: Anderson County (8 Bazt. (Tenn.) 349), 1378. State V. Andrews (11 Neb. 533), 1240i State V. Andrews (1-5 R. I. 394; 6 Atl. Rep. 596).. 163. State V. Appleby (35 S. C. lOO), 881, 1543. State r. Applegate (N. J., 8 Atl. Rep. 505), 803. State V. Armstrong (73 Mich. 288), 611. State V. Armstrong (30 Neb. 493; 46 N. W, Rep. 618), 439. State V. Assessors of Taxes (51 N. J. Law. 279; 17 Atl. Rep. 132), 1391, 1543. State V. Atlantic (84 N. J. Law, 99), 1163. State V. Atlantic City (49 N. J. Law, 558 ; 17 Am. & En^. Corp. Cas. 342; 9 Atl. Rep. 759), 841, 805, 848, 1396. ccxxu TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL H, pp. 789-1605.] State V. Atlantic City (53 N. J. Law, 333; 19 Atl. Rep. 780), 1533, 1539, 1550. State V. Atlantic Highlands (50 N. J. Law, 457), 1560. State V. Atter (5 Ohio C. C. 253), 171. State V. Babcock (19 Neb. 330), 931, 1387. State V. Babcock (20 Neb. 528), 1171. State t!. Babcock (21 Neb. 599), 9;!5. State V. Babcock (33 Neb. 614). 923. State V. Babcock (23 Neb. 179; 36 N. W. Rep. 474). 981. State V. Babcock (25 Neb. 278). 933. State V. Babcock (35 Neb. 709; 41 N. W. Rep. 654), 65, 67, 87. State V. Bacon (S. C, 9 S. E. Rep. 76r)), .903. State V. Baker (La., 10 So. Rep. 405), ' 540, 1249, 1264. State V. Baker (38 Wis. 71), 376, 377. State V. Baldwin (45 Gonn. 134), 529. State V. Ball (59 Mo. 321). 1053. State V. Bank (45 Mo. 538), 314. State V. Bank of Smyrna (8 Houst. 99), 1359. State V. Barbour (53 Conn. 76 ; 55 Am. Rep. 65; 23 Atl. Rep. 686), 166, 167, 170, 302, 304. State V. Barnes (33 Fla. 8), 875. State V. Barnet (46 N. J. Law, 63), 484. State V. Bartlett (30 Miss. 624), 313, 313. State V. Bartlett (35 Wis. 387). 540. State V. Baxter (50 Ark. 447 ; 8 S. W. Rep. 188), 608. State V. Bayonne (85 N. J. Law, 335), 484. State V. Bayonne (49 N. J. Law, 311), 1171. State V. Bays (Neb., 48 N. W. Rep. 270), 1519. State V, Bean (76 N. C. 78), 331. State V. Bean (91 N. 0. 554), 1244. State V. Beattie (16 Mo. App. 143), 604.' State V. Beeman (35 He. 343), 350, 368. State V. Beirce (37 Conn. 319), 542. State V. Bell (34 Ohio St. 194), 282, 550, 1064. ' State V. Beloit Supervisors (20 Wis. 79). 1377. State V. Beners (86 N. C. 588), 230. State V. Bently (83 N. J. Law, 533), 1351. State V. Benton (39 Neb. 460; 45 N. W. Rep. 794), 1340. 1341. State V. Berdetta (73 Ind. 185), 585, 1111, 1195. State V. Bergen (38 N. J. Law, 89), 486, 496. State V. Bergman (6 Or. 341), 604. State V. Berry (12 Iowa, 58), 112, 693. State V. Berry (14 Ohio St. 315), 383. State V. Berry (47 Ohio St. 233), 388, 1557. State V. Bieler (87 Ind. 330), 1543. State V. Bill (13 Ired.'Law (N. C), 373). 546. State V. Binder (38 Mo. 450), 118, 291, 381 State V. Bishop (39 N. J. Law, 326), 68 1. State V. Blackstone (63 Wis. 862), 937. State V. Blair (33 Ind. 313), 310, State V. Blake (35 N. J. Law, SOS), 641. State V. Blake (36 N. J. Law, 44S), 669. State V. Blend (121 Ind. 514), 1277, 1279. State V. Blohn (26 La. Ann. 538), 339. State V. Bloom (17 Wis. 521), 199, 1338. State V. Blossom (19 Nev. 312), 199. State V. Bloxham (26 Fla. 407; 7 So. Rep. 873), 179. State V. Boal (46 Mo. 528), 386, 887. State V. Board &c. (Fla., 8 So. Rep. 749), 1548. State V. Board &o. (Ind., 20 N. E. Rep. 892), 1524. State V. Board &c. (45 Ind. 601), 1534. State V. Board &c. (63 Ind. 497), 1534. State V. Board &o. (80 Ind. 478), 1426. State V. Board &c. (113 Ind. 170), 1426. State V. Board &o. (119 Ind. 444), 1426. State V. Board &c. (135 Ind. 247), 1426. State V. Board of Conim'rs (39 Kan. 657), 965. State V. Boneil (42 La. Ann. 1110), 529. State V. Board &o. (37 Minn. 443 ; 8 N. W. Rep. 161), 1071, 1137. State V. Board &c. (N. J., 8 Atl. Rep. 509). 193. State V. Board &c. (N. J., 14 Atl. Rep. 560), 1556. ' State V. Board &c. (16 N. J. Law, 504), l'-181. State V. Board &c. (N. J., 33 Atl. Rep. 343), 813. State V. Board &c. (N. J., 23 Atl. Rep. 949), 1033, 1033. State V. Board &c. (46 N. J. Law, 170j 6 Atl. Rep. 659), 1283. State V. Board &c. (49 N. J. Law, 170), 1393. TABLE OF CASES. CCXXllI [The reterenoesare to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] State V. Board &c. (.53 N. J. Law, 69), 1534. State «. Board &c. (18Nev. 173), 1328. State V. Board &c. (17 Nev. 96), 1338. State V. Board &b. (27 Ohio St. 96), 1379. State V. Board &c. (85 Ohio St. 368), 1838. State V. Board &c. (24 Wis. 683), 1509, 1539. State ?'. Board &c. (63 Wis. 234), 1331. State V. Bodeii (N. J., 16 Atl. Rep. 50). 305. State V. Boeker (56 Mo. 17), 203. State V. Bolche (1 S. W. Rep. 234), 1551. State V. Bonnell (119 Ind. 494; 21 N. E. Rep. 1101), 1544, 1545. State 11. Borough (N. J., 10 Atl. Rep. 377), 1556. State V. Bradford (33 Vt. 50), 1556, 1560. Slate V. Bradley (54 Conn. 74X 1324. State V. Bradley (3 New Eng. Rep. 713). 54. State V. Brainerd (23 N. J. Law, 484). 94. St.ite V. Branin (23 N. J. Law, 484), 109. 113, 473, 1361. State V. Brennan's Liquors (35 Conn. 478), 198. . State V. Brewer'(64 Ala. 287), 1383. State V. Brigantine Borough (N. J., 24 Atl. Rep. 481), 814. State V. BrinkerhofiE (66 Tex. 45), 189, 201. State V. Brittafn (89 N. C. 574), 513. State V. BrodboU (Neb., 44 N. W. Rep. 186), 87.5. State V. Brossiieid (67 Mo. 331), 634. State V. Brown (20 Atl. Rep. 773), 1363, 1364. State V. BroA-n (112 Ind. 600; 14 N. E. Rep. 487), 864. State V. Brown (11 Ired. Law (N. C), 141), 335. State V. Brown (54 Md. 318), 835. State V. Brown (Minn., 53 N. W. Rep.,935), 1098, 1009. State V. Browning (28 N. J. Law, 550), 1336. State V. Brunswick (33 N. J. Law, 548), 1163. State V. Bryce (7 Ohio, part II (82), 414), 206. State V. Burbridge (24 Fla. 112), 373. btate V. Burlington (36 Vt. 531), 78S. State V. Burton (45 Wis. 150), 1331. State V. Button (35 Wis. 109), 447. State V. Butts (31 Kan. 537), 377, 378. State V. Buttz (9 S. C. 158), 201. State a. Cain (4 West Va. 559), 1350. State V. Cainaii (94 N. C. 8»3), 533, 524, 541, (J03. State V. Calhoun (61 Miss. 556), 379. State V. Camden (5 N. J. Law, 87; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 638), 125. State V. Camden (47 N. J. Law, 64; 54 Am. Rep. 117). 161, 1503. State V. Campbell (13 Atl. Rep. 585), 599. State V. Campton (3 N. H. 513), 786. btate V. Canterbury (28 N. H. 218), 67, 88. State V. Cantieny (34 Minn. 1), 535, 532 State V.' Canvassers (17 Fla. 39), 389. State V. Carletou (1 Gill, 249), 319. State V. Carpenter (60 Conn. 27; 22 Atl. Rep. 497), 519, 541, 1248, 1264. State V. Carr (Ind., 38 N. E. Rep. 88), 180. State V. Carr (5 N. H. 367). 70. State V. Carrick (70 Md. 586), 339. State V. Carroll (33 Conn. '449), 197, 198, 199. 291. State V. father ■(22 Neb. 793; 36 N. W. Rep. 157). 903. State V. Cavers (23 Iowa, 343), 389. State V. Chamber of Commerce (20 Wis. 63), 631. State V. Chamberlin (37 N. J. Law, 388), 535. State V. Chapman (44 Conn. 595), 302, 303. State V. Charleston (10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 204), 1388. State V. Charleston (5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 843), 1359. State V. Charleston (3 Speer's L. (S. C.)719), 1351, 1356. State V. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (80 Iowa, 586), 690. State V. Christopher (13 Wis. 637), 1163. State V. Churchill (41 Mo. 41), 314. State V. Cincinnati Gas Co. (18 Ohio St. 262), 523. State V. Circuit Court (N. J., 15 Atl.' Rep. 272), 561. State V. City Clerk &c. (7 Ohio St. 835), 527. State V. City Council (13 Rich. 703), 1123. State V. City of Bayonne (N. J., 8 Atl. Rep. 114), U2I. State t). City of Bayonne (N. J., 20 Atl. Rep. 69), 1075. State V. City of Bayonne (N. J., 23 Atl. Rep. 648), 587. State V. City of Bayonne (35 N. J. Law, 335), 485, COXXIV TABLS 07 OASBS. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1606.] State V. City of Camden (N. J., 11 Atl. Rep. 137). 103, 114, 518. State V. City of Cliarleston (10 Rich. B03), 594. State V. Citv of Cincinnati (19 Obio, 178), 1345. State V. Cincinnati (20 Ohio St. 18), 60, 61, 135. State V. Citv of Crete (Neb., 49 N. W. Rep. 273), 1.5-10. State 11. City of Elizabeth (N. J., 24 Atl. Rep. 495), Wl. State V. City of Hobolcen (N. J., 18 Atl. Rep. 085). 495. State V. City of Kearney (25 Neb. 262), 1518. Stater. City of Millville (N. J., 21 Atl. Rep. 568), 1393. State V. City of New Albany (127 Ind. 221; 26 N. E. Rep. 791). 1530, 1511. State V. City of New Orlean's (40 La. Ann. 399; 3 S. E. Rep. .582), 877. State V. Citv of New Orleans (41 La. Ann. 9i), 424. State V. City of New Wliatcora (Wash., 27 Pac. Rep. 1030^ 398. State V. City of Newarls (N. J., 8 Atl. Rep. 128), 1831. State V. City of Newark (N.' J., 12 Atl. Rep. 770), U70. State V. City of Newark (N. J., 23 Atl. Rep. 281), 585. State V. Citv of Orange (13 Atl. Rep. 240), 1235. State V. City of Orange (N. J., 32 Atl. Rep. 1004). 505, 1076. State V. City of Passaic (N. J., 23 Atl. Rep. 945), 1167. State V. City of Plainfield (N. J., 24 Atl. Rep. 493), 584. State V. City of Portage (13 Wis. 662), 693. State V, City of Toledo (48 Ohio St. 112; 26 N. E. Rep. 1061), 1394. State V. City of Topeka (36 Kan. 76), 548. State V. City of Trenton (51 N. J. 1 Law, 498; 18 Atl. Rep. 110), 515, 616. State V. City of Waxahacliie (Tex , 17 S. W. Rep. 348), 399, 400, 408, 414. State V. Clark (4 Ind. 315), 971. State V. Clark (43 Mo. 533), 1592 State V. Clark (N. J., 19 Atl. Rep. 4621, 1330, 1336, 1340. State ti. Clark (52 N. J. Law, 391), 803, 803. State V. Clarke (54 Mo. 17), 116, 117, 118, 513, 519. 5'35, 1422. State V. Clarke (3 Nev. 566), 189, 302. State V. Clarke (25 N. J. Law (1 Dutch.). 54), 117. 518. State V. Clarke (73.N. C. 255), 321. State V. Clary (23 Neb. 403; 41 N. W. Rep. 356). 1«33. State V. Claly County (46 Mo. 231), 1376. State v: Clayton (37 Kan. 443), 202. State V. Clevenger (37 Neb. 433), 1368. State V. ,Clinton (N. J., 21 Atl. Rep. 304), 533. Stalte V. Clinton (53 N. J. Law, 329), 530. State V. Clinton (6 Ohio St. 380), 1378. State V. Clothier (30 N. J. Law, 351), 157.5. State V. Cleveland (SO Mo. 108), 310. State V. Cobb (H4 Ala. 137). 965. State V. Cockrell (3 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 6J. 164. State V. Coke Company (18 Oljio St. 263), 56S. State V. Cole County Court (80 Mo. 80), 992. State V. Clin (37 Vt. 318), 1358. State V. Columbia (27 S. C. 137), 1350. Stat^ V. Colvig (15 Oreg. 67). 314. State V. Commercial Bank (13 Sra. & M. 539; 53 Am. Dec. 106), 139. State V. Comm'rs &o. (4 Dev. (N. C.)' 345), 211. State V. Comm'rs &c. (39 Kan. 700), 1564. State V. Comm'rs &c. (41 Kan. 630), 1367. State V. Comm'rs &c. (14 Neb. 32), 138K. State V. Comm'rs (17 Nev. 96 ; 28 Pac. Rep. 133), 876. State V. .Comm'rs &c. (3 N. C. Law, 617), 811. State V. Comm'rs '&o. (6 Ohio St. 380), 1378. State V. Comm'rs &c. (Ohio, 30 N. E; Rep. 785), 1513. State V. Common Council &c. (15 Wis. 30), 30, 1549. State V. Compton (38 Neb. 485; 44 N. W. Rep. 660), 632, 1333, 1335. State V. Conlin (37 Vt. 318), 544. State V. Conner (83 Neb. 265; 3 Am. St. Rep. 367; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453). 3T6, 377. State V. Conover (4 Dutch. 224), 33.5. State V. Constaiitine (43 Ohio St. 437; 51 Am. Rep. 813), S76, 884. State V. Consumers' Water Co. (51 N. J. Law, 420), 1303. State V. Cooper (20 Fla. 547), 908: TABI-E OF CASKS. CCXXV [The references are to pages: Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] State V. Corning (44 Kan. 443; 24 Pac. Rep. 966). 893. State V. Cornish (N. H., 21 Atl. Rep. 180), 1005. State V. Corrigan &o. Street Ry. Co. (8.) Mo. 363), 590, 1103. State V. Council (2 Speer's L. (S. C.) 623), 1851. State V. County Comm'rs (21 Fla. 1), 403. State V. County Comm'rs (23 Fla. 29), 1553. State V. County Comm'rs (23 Kan. 264), 389. State V. County Comm'rs (Neb., 48 N. W. Rep. 146), 1341. State V. County Comm'rs (38 S. C. 258), 1542. State V. Countv Court (19 Ark. 3601, 1353. State V. Countv Court (Mo., 8 S. W. Rep. 844), 900. State V. County Court (44 Mo. 230), 314. State V. County Court (44 Mo. 504), 933. State V. Countv Court (83 West Va. 589; 11 S. E. Rep. 73). 1516. State V. County Judge (5 Iowa, 380), 1377. State V. County Judge (7 Iowa, 186), 343, 389. State V. County of Fillmore (82 Neb. 870; 49 N. W. Rep. 769), 1508. State V. Covington (29 Ohio St. 103), 15H. 1278. State V. Cowan (39 Mo. 330), 110, 617. State V. Cozzens (42 La. Ann. 1069 ; 8 So. Rep. 268), 1211. State V. Cram (16 Wis. 343), 439. State V. Crane (84 Me. 271 ; 24 Atl. Rep. 853), 1254, 1355, 1260. State V. Crane (36 N. J. Law, 394), 695. State V. Crawford (36 N. J. Law, 394), 1171, State V. Crenshaw (94 N. C. 877), 521, 532. State V. Crites (48 Ohio St. 142; 26 N. E. Rep. 1052), 1516, 1548. State V. Croolts (7 Ohio, part 2, 221), 329. State V. Crosby (86 N. J. Law, 428), 302. State V. Cross (Ark., 18 S. W. Rep. 170), 1013. State V. Crummey (17 Minn. 73), 515. State V. Curran (10 Ark. 142), 200. State V. Curran (13 Ark. 321), 67, 88. State V. Culver (27 .Am. Ri-p. 295), 1421. State V. Custer (11 Ind. 210), 1331. State V. Dahl (65 Wis. 510; 27 N. W. Rep. 843), 853, State V. Dallas County Court (73 Mo. 339), 944. State V. Daly (50 N. J. Law, 356; 13 Atl. Rep. 6), 884, 906. State V. Damares (80 Ind. 619), 1436. State V. Davenport (13 Iowa, 335), 1376, 1377, 1878, 1383. State V. Daviess County Court (64 Mo. 80), 940, 1391. State V. Davidson (33 Wis. 114), 316, 365. State V. Davis (17 Minn. 439), 1647. State V. Davis (44 Mo. 139), 187. State V. Dean (23 N. J. Eq. 335), 1163. State V. Deane (23 Fla. 121), 1540. State V. De Bar (58 Mo. 395), 116, 118. State V. De Gress (58 Tex. 387), 189. State r, Deliesseliue (1 McCord (S. C), 52), 1(». State u. Dennv (118 Ind. 449; 21 N. E. Rep. 274), 1014, 1277, 1279, 1382. State V. Deshler (25 N. J. Law, 177), 1825. State V. Dillon (135 Ind. 65), 169. State V. District Board (76 Wis. 177), 1345, 1346. State V. JJistrict Court (41 Minn. 518; 43 N. W. Rep. 389). 500. State V. District Court (Minn., 60 N. W. Rep. 476), 1189. State V. District Court of Hennepin County (33 Minn. 235; 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 206), 308. State :;. District Court of Ramsey County (33 Minn. 295), 1071, 1072, 1127. State V. District of Narragansett (R. I., 16 Atl. Rep. 901), 62. State V. Dodge County (20 Neb. 595; 31 N. W. Rep. 117), 632. State t!. Doherty (35 La. Ann. 119; — Am. Rep. 131), 203. State V. Donahay (30 N. J. Law, . 404), 353. State V. Douglass (33 N. J. Law, 363), 1354. State V. Dousman (28 Wis. 541), 60. State V. Dowling (50 Mo. 134), 1859, 1576. State V. Drake (33 N. J. Law, 194), 1179. State V. Druly (3 Ind. 431), 385. State V. Dunbar (43 La. Ann. 836), 540, 1264. State V. Dunn (11 La. Ann. 549), 329. State V. Dunnington (12 Md. 340), 1536. CCXXVl TABLE 07 CASKS. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] State v. Dunson (71 Tex. 65; 9 S. W. Rep. 103), 98, 413. 419, 420, 465. State V. Duval County (33 Fla. 488), 137. State V, Dwyer (SI Minn. 512), 513. State V. Earnhardt (107 N. 0. 789; 12 S. E. Rep. 426), 603. State V. Eastman (109 N. 0. 785), 1403. State V. Easton E. Co. (36 N. J. Law, 181), 676. State V. Eau Claire (40 Wis. 533), 559, 686. State V. Eberhardt (14 Neb. 201), 1520. State V. Eberly (12 Neb. 616). 1596. State V. Echols (41 Kan. 1), 1386. State V. Eidson (76 Tex. 303), 1323. State V. Elizabeth (30 N. J. Law, 365), 1186. State V. Elizabeth (37 N. J. Law, 432), 485, 1174. State V. Elvins (32 N. J. Law, 363), 440, 458. State V. Elwood (11 Wis. 17), 438, 439. State V. Ely (4 Oregon, 277), 5t4. State V. Engelmann (106 Mo. 628), 1415. State V. Everett (53 Mo. 89), 1551. State V. Fagan (42 Conn. 33), 299, 381. State V. Falconer (44 Ala. 696), 314. State V. Falkenburgh (15 N. J. Law, 320). 1576. State V. Fan- (47 N. J. Law, 208), 493. Stale V. Farrier (47 N. J. Law, 3b3), 199. State V. Fenton (Neb., 45 N. W. Rep. 464), 874, State V. Ferguson (33 N. H. 424), 530, 681. State V. Ferguson (31 N. J. Law, 107), 301, 203. State V. Pindley (10 Ohio, 51), 314. State V. Fishblate (83 N. C. 654), 311. State V. Fiske (9 R. L 94), 283, 550, 1390. State V. Fltts (49 Ala. 402), ^02, State V. Fitzgerald (44 Mo. 425). 1559. State V. Fitzpatrick (64 Mo. 185), 336. State V. Flannagan (67 Ind. 140), 1048. State V. J'leetward (16 Miss. 448), 542. State V. Floyd County Judge (5 Iowa. 380), 1376. State V. Foley (30 Minn. 350), 1371. State V. Follet (6 N. H. 53), 542. States. Folwell (N. J., 20 Atl. Rep. 1079), 1263. State V. Fond du Lao (12 Wis. 287). 6D2. State V. Forest County (74 Wis. 610; 43 N. W. Eep. 551), 60, 63, 438, 439. State V. Forney (21 Neb. 233; 31 N. W. Eep. 802), 444. State V. Fosdick (21 La. Ann. 434), 144. State V. Foster (17 N, J. Law, 101), 303. State V. Francis (88 Mo. 557), 1562. State V. Francis (95 Mo. 44; 14 West. Rep. 353), 74. Stattr. Franklin (40 Kan. 410; 19 Pac. Rep. 801), 1050. State V. Franklin County (21 Ohio St. 648), 659. State V. Frazier (48 Ga. 137), 1561, 15t5. State V. Freeholders &o. (37 N. J. Law. 254^, 663. State V. Freeman (38 N. H. 436), 100. 518, 599. State V. Fuller (96 Mo. 165). 70. State V. Fuller (34 N. J. Law, 237). 1164,1186,1188. State V. Fyler (48 Conn. 159), 817. State V. Gallagher (42 Minn. 41), 127. State V. Gandy(12 Neb, 232; 11 N. W. Rep. 39B). 910. ' State V. Garibaldi (La., 11 So, Rep. 36), 1244. State V. Garroutte (67 Mo. 445), 944. State V. Gas Co. (18 Ohio St. 363), 1312. State V. Gastineau (20 La. Ann. 114), 386. State V. Gates (48 Conn. 533), 38.5. State V. Gates (35 Minn. 385), 388. State V. Gayhart (Neb., 51 N. W. Eep. 746), 1538. State V. George (23 Fla. 585; 3 So. Rep. 81), 175, 189. State V. Georgia Medical Society (38 Ga. 608), 103, 488, 513. State V. Gilman (10 S. E. Eep. 283), 144. State V. Gisch (31 La, Ann. 544), 1244. State V. Glasgow (N. C. Conf. 186), 311. State V. Gleason (12 Fla. 190), 1559. State V. Glenn (54 Md. 572), 548, 1357. State V. Goetz (23 Wis. 363), 353, 375. State V. Goflf (15 E. L 505), 200. State V. Goldstucker (40 Wis. 134), MS. State r. Goodwin (69 Tex. 55 ; 5 S. W. Rep. 678), 64, 98, 166, 290. State V. Gordon (60 Mo. 383), 515. State V. Gorham (37 Me. 451), 786, 1199,1425, 1441. TABLE OF OASES. CCXXVU [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. It, pp. 780-1605.] State V. Gorton (33 Minn. 345), 1343. State V. Gouldey (N. J., 18 Atl. Rep, 695), 170. State V. Goulding (44 N. H. 284), 642. State V. Governor (89 Mo. 388), 1551. State V. Grace (Oregon, 25 Pac. Rep. 38S), 1530, 1548, 1550. State V. Gracey (11 Nev. 223), 1396. State V. GrafEmuUer (26 Minn. 6), 540. State V. Graham (31 Neb. 329), 1341. ■ State 1). Grammier (29 Ind. 551), 2U8, 326. State V. Graves (19 Md. 370), 527, 698, 1120. State V. Gray (93 Ind. 303), 1345. State V. Gray (23 Neb. 365; 36 N. W. Rep. 577), 172, 298. 495. State V. Green (15 N. J. Law, 88), 190. State V. Green (37 Ohio St. 227), 169. 294, 381. 493. State V. Green County (54 Mo. 540), 93.^. State V. Greene Co. Board (119 Ind. 444). 1426. State V. Grimes (Minn. , 1892; 52 N. W. Rep. 42), 529, 604. State V. Grimshaw (Mo., 1 S. W. Rep. 3fi3J, 1323. State V. Grosvenor (19 Neb. 494), , 1343. State V. Grubb (85 Ind. 213), 1345. State V. Guiney (26 Minn. 313), 296. State V. Guraber («7 Wis. 298), 529. State V. Gutierrez (15 La. Ann. 190), 1257. State V. Guttenberg (38 N. J. Law, 419), 1373. State V. Guttenberg (39 N. J. Law, 660), 1374, 1377. State V. Haben (22»Wis. 660). 1389. State V. Hadley (37 Ind. 496), 315. State V. Hall (97 N. C. 474; 1 S. E. Rep. 683), 211. State V. Hallock (16 Nev. 373), 1346. State V. Hamilton (40 Kan. 3S3; 19 Pac. Rep. 733), 465. State V. Hamilton (Miss., 50 So. Rep. 57), 1343. State V. Hammer (43 N. J. Law, 435), 557. State V. Hammond (40 Minn. 43 ; 41 N. W. Rep. 243), 611. State V. Hammonton (38 N. J. Law, 430; 20 Am, Rep. 404), 662. State r. Hand (31 N. J. Law, 547), 1174. State V. Haney (2 Dev. & Bat. 390), 543. State V. Hanna (97 Ind. 469), 704. State V. Hannibal &c. R. Co. (.75 Mo. 208), 618, 1369, 139o, 1398. State V. Hanson (20 Nev. 401), 1336. State V. Hardy (7 Neb. 377), 506, 525. State V. Harney (57 Miss. 863), 313. State V. Harper (42 La. Ann. 312), 1240. State V. Harper (6 Ohio St. 607), 821. State V. Harris (Minn., 53 N. W. Rep. 387), 600. State V. Harris (90 Mo. 29), 618. State V. Harris (19 Nev. 222), 1337. States. Harris (17 Ohio St. 608). 1379. State V. Harris (53 Vt. 216), 356, 382, 383. State V. Harrison (67 Ind. 71), 275. State u. Harrison (113 Ind. 434; 3 Am. St. Rep. 663), 175, 20T. State V. Harrison (38 Mo. 540), 389. State V. Harrison (4^ N. J. Law, 79), 1294. State u. Harshaw (73 Wis. 211; 40 N. W. Rep. 641), 452, 896. State V. Hartfield (24 Wis. 60), 1249. State V. Harwi (36 Kan. 588 ; 14 Pac. Rep. 158), 413. State V. Haskell (20 Iowa, 276), 642. State V. Hastings (10 Wis. 518), 214, 1588. State V. Hauser (63 Ind. 155), 282, 286, 711. State V. Hauss (48 Ind. 105), 202. State V. Hawes (113 Ind. 323; 14 N. E. Rep. 87), 815, 822, 839, 864. State V. Hayes (7 La. Ann. 118), 328, 329. State v'. Hayes (61 N. H. 264). 488. States. Haynes (72 Mo. 877). 280, 576. State V. Haynes (50 N. J. Law, 97), 170, 905. State V. Hays (52 Mo. 578), 314. State V. Heath (20 La. Ann. 173 ; 96 Am. Dee. 390), 658. State V. Heidenbain (43 La. Ann. 483; 7 So. Rep. 631), 605, 1034. State V. Heidorn (74 Mo. 410), 504. State V. Heisey (56 Iowa, 404), 313. State u. Helf rid (3 Nott & McCord (S. C), 833), 1354. State V. Henderson (38 Ohio St. 644), 501. State V. Henshaw (76 Cal. 436), 1253. State V. Herdt (40 N. J. Law, 264), 532. State V. Hermann (75 Mo. 340), 119. State i>. Herod (29 Iowa, 123), 135S. State V. Hill (54 Ala. 67), 743. State V. Hill (10 Ind. 219), 1406. State V. Hill (10 Neb. 58), 389. State V. Hinkle (37 Ark. 540), 89."). State V. Hipp (38 Ohio St. 129), i:'oT. State V. Hohoken (33 N. J. Law, 2Su>, 1232, 1355. CCXXVlU TABLE 07 CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] State V. Hoboken (38 N. J. Law, 110), 499, 1294. State V. Holcomb (68 Iowa, 107), 1025. State V. Holden (19 Neb. 249; 27 N. W.Rep. 120), 415. State V. Holmes (La., 10 So. Rep. 173), 180. State V. Horn (94 Mo. 163), 313. State V. Horton (19 Nev. 199), 1337. State V. Houston (78 Ala. 576), 323. State V. Houston (83 Ala. 361), 323. State V. Hoyt (i ©regon, 246), 303, 936. State V. Hudson (39 N. J. Law, 104), 1171, 1576. State V. Hudson (39 N. J. Law (5 Dutch.), 475), 501, 641. State V. Hudson County (30 N. J. Law, 137), 1435. State V. Hudson County Comm'rs (37 N. J. Law. 12), 74. State V. Hudson Tunnel E. Co. (38 N. J. Law, 548), 633. State V. Huggins (Harper, Law, 94), 163. State V. Humphreys (35 Ohio St. 530J, 1386. State V. Hunter (38 Kan. 578), 1278. State V. Hunter (106 N. C. 796), 530. State V. HurfiE (38 N. J. Law, 310), 1336. State V. Hutchins (Neb., 60 N. W. Rep. 165), 1835, State V. Hutchinson (60 Iowa, 478), 336. State V. Hutchinson (39 N. J. Eq. 218), 1033. State V. Hutt (3 Ark. 382), 188. ' State V. Independent School Dist. (43 Minn. 357; 44 N. W. Rep. 120), 1331^ State V. Inhabitants of Summit (53' N. J. Law, 483; 19 All. Rep. 966), 197. State V. Inliabitants of Trenton (36 N. J. Law, 29), 613. State V. Innis (33 N. J. Law, 516), 1359. State V. Ironton Gas Co. (37 Ohio St. 45). 6, 1234. Statute V. Isabel (40 La. Ann. 34.0), 1544. State V. Jack (Tenn., 18 S. W. Rep. 257), 1013. State V. Jackson (8 Mich. 110), 1263. State V. Jacksonville St. R. Co. (Fla., 10 So. Rep. 590). 1519. State V. Jacobs (17 Ohio, 143), 178, 290, 444. State V. Jennings (37 Ark. 419), 64, 94, no. State V. Jersey City (N. J., 18 All, Rep. 586), 1304. State V. Jersey City (N. J., 23 Atl. Eep. 123), 1383. State V. Jersey City (N. J., 23 Atl. Eep. 666), 1377. State V. Jersey City (35 N. J. Law, 309), 373, 875, 277, 286, 1390. State V. Jersey City (25 N. J. Law (1 Dutch.), 636), 203, 205, 20^ 631. State V. Jersey City (26 N. J. Law, 444), 283, 1383. State V. Jersey City (37 N. J. Law, *441), 1189, State V. Jersey City (37 N, J. Law, 493), 48'). State V. Jersey City (39 N. J. Law, 170), 106, 113, 546, 1034, 1050. State V. Jersey City (30 N. J. Law, 93), 501. State V. Jersey City (34 N. J, Law, 390), 1223. State V. Jersey City (35 N, J. Law, 381), 1576. State V. Jinks (42 Ohio St. 345), 1857. State V. Johnson (100 Ind. 489), 815. State V. Johnson (41 Minn. Ill; 43 N. W. Rep. 786), 611, State V. Johnson (4 Wall. 475), 220. State V. Jones (19 Ind. 356). 353, 1356. State V. Jones (19 Ind. 431; 81 Am. Dec. 408), 37.'). State V. Jones (18 Tex. 874), 1416. State V. Judge (13 Ala. 80.5), 385. State V. Judges (35 La. Ann. 1075), 204. State V. Julian (93 Ind. 292), 1334. State V. Justice (24 N. J. Law, 413), 302. State V. .Justices &c. (4 Hawks (N. C), 194). 211. State V. Kantler (33 Minn. 69), 373, 5^5 536 1334 State V. KaVanagh (34 Neb. 506; 39 N. W. Rep. 431), 1517. State V. Kearns (47 Ohio St. 566; 35 N. E. Rep. 1027), 160, 170, 178. 301, 306. State V. Keith (94 N. C. 933), 517. State V. Keith County (16 Neb. 608). 931. State V. Kempf (69 Wis. 470; 3 Am. St. Rep. 763; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 390). 388, 1559, 1563. State V. Kilroy (86 Ind. 118), 1543. State V. King (Neb., 51 N. W. Rep. 754). 540, 543. 1369, 1519. State V. Kirk (46 Conn. 395), 276, 299. State V. Kirk (44 Ind. 401),.189. State V. Kirkley (29 Md. 86), 533. State V. Knight (31 S. C. 81; 9 S. E. Rep. 693). 1513. State V. Knight (Wis., 51 N. W.Rep. 1137), 853. TABLE OF CASES. CCXXIX [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1603.] State V. Kraft (IS OreKon, 550;,23 Pao. Ken, 663; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 842). 163, 388. State r. Labatut (39 La. Ann. 516; 2 So. Eep. 5.')0). 528. State t!. Laml^ertville (45 N. J. Law, 379), 593. State t). Lancaster (3 N. H. 267). 144. State V. Lane (.13 N. J. Law, 375; 21 Atl. Rep. 302), 166, 177. State V. Lane (16 R. I. 620; 18 Atl. Rep. 10:55). 1387, 1.555. State v. Lanier (31 La. Ann. 423), 322 State v. Larrabee (t Wis. 200). 438. State V. Laughton (Nev., 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 79). 315. State V. Lavanac (34 N. J. Law, 201), 678. State V. Leatberman (38 Ark. 81), 54, 64, 70. Stater. Leaver (63 Wie. 387; 29 N. W. Rep. .570), 583, 1194. 1218. State V. Lee (29 Minn. 153), 544. State V. Lee (29 Minn. 445), 539, 604, 1356. State V. Leffingwell (54 Mo. 458), 14, 15. 60. State V. Leverton (.'>3 Iowa, 483), 1333 State V. Levi (90 Ind. 77), 1338. State V. Lewis (35 N. J. Law, 877), 803. State I'. Lingo (26 Mo. 496). 631. State V. Little Valley (64 N. Y. 112), 1376. State V. Lockwood (43 Wis. 403), 1358. State V. Long (8 Ired. (N. C.) 415), 331. 335. State V. Long (94 N. C. 89fi). 1403. State V. Longstreet (38 N. J. Law, 812), 704. State V. Lovey (39 N. J. Law, 135), 323. State V. Lowery (49 N. J. Law, 391), 1031. State V. Ludwig (31 Minn. 202), 1025. State V. Lufy (19 Nesr. 391), 159. State V. McAuley (15 Cal. 45.5), 870. State V. McCann (21 Ohio St. 198), 1345. State V. McClarv (27 N. J. Law, 253), 15^6. State V. McCormack (50 Mo. 568), 326. State V. McCullough (30 Neb. 158), 1561. State V. McFadden (23 Minn. 40), 450. State V. McKee (Oregon, 35 Pac. Rep. 293), 299, 366. State V. McMillan (Mo., 18 S. W. Rep. 784). 384. State V. McNincb (87 N. C. 567), 603. State V. McReynolds (61 Mo. 303), 1366. State V. Maedonald (26 Minn. 445), CO"). State V. Macon County (68 Mo. 29), 1374. State V. Macon County Court (41 Mo. 453). 944, 1393, 1509. State V. Madison (7 Wis. 688), 794, 922, 933. State V. Madison Council (15 Wis. 30), 281, 1377. State V. Mahner (La., 9 So. Rep. 480), 603. State 1'. Maloy (20 Kan. 619). 61. State V. Mansfield (41 Mo. 470), 1259. Slate V. Marlow (15 Ohio St. 114), 388. State r. Martin (27 Neb. 441; 43 N. W. Rep. 244), 194, 654, 874, 878. State V. Matheny (7 Kan. 327), 190, 815. State V. May (22 Ark. 445), 1333. State V. Mayhew (2 Gill (Md.), 487), 395, 156.5. State V. Mavnard (14 111. 419), 1268. State V. Mav.or &c. (22 Fla. 21), 910, 911, 1547. 1548. State V. Mayor &c. (11 Huiuph. (Tenn.) 217), 211. State V. Mayor &c. (23 La. Ann. 358), 870. State V. Mayor &o, (29 Md. 85), 642. State V. Mayor &o. (N. J., 18 Atl. Rep. 586), 611. State V. Mayor &o. (N. J., 31 Atl. Rep. 453), 1170. State V. Mayor &c. (N. J., 23 Atl. Rep. 1004), 608. State V. Mavor &o. (N. J., 23 Atl. Rep. 618), 1075. States. Mayor &o. (N. J., 24 Atl." Rep. 448). 592. State V, Mavor &c. (N. J., 24 Atl. Rep. 481). 592. State V. Mavor &o. (N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 671), (J08. State V. Mayor &o. (25 N. J. Law, 399), 1064. State V. Mayor &o. (29 N. J. Law, 441), 706. State V. Mayor &c. (33 N. J. Law, 49), 1175. State t'. Mayor &c. (37 N. J. Law, 348), 518, 521. State V. Mayor &c. (37 N, J. Law, 41.5), 1123, 1231. State V. Mayor &o. (38 N. J. Law, 110), 534. ccxxx TABLE OF OASES. [The reter e uue s are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.] State V. Mayor &o. (52 N. J. Law, 33), 60. State V. Mayor &o, (R. M. Chailt. (Ga.) 350), 93, 95, 110. State V. Mayor &o. (13 Rich. (S. C.) 480), 1257. State V. Maysville (12 S. O. 76), 1373, 1883. State V. Meadows (1 Kan. 90), 46i. State V. Medberry (7 Ohio St. 532), 870. State V. Medbury (3 R. I. 138), 144, 145. State V. Merrill (37 Me. 339), 487. 599. State V. Merriman (6 Wis. 14), 488. State V. Merritt (83 N. C. 677), 541, 603. State V. Miller (41 La. Ann. 58 ; 7 So. Rep. 673), 589, 1209. Stater. Miller (30 N. J. Law, 368; 86 Am. Dec. 188), 121. State V. Mills (34 N. J. Law, 177), 116. State V. Mills (39 Wis. 333), 697. State V. MUwaukee(30 Wis. 87), 1376, 1877, 1378, 1381. State ». Milwaukee ^20 Wis. 501), 14. State V. Milwaukee (35 Wis. 133), 94. State V. Minneapolis (33 Minn. 501), 939 State v'. Mitchell (58 Iowa. 567). 1413. State V. Mitchell (31 Ohio St. 593), 61. State V. Mobile (30 La. Ann. 325), 544. State V. Mobile (5 Porter (Ala.), 279), 678. State V. Montgomery (74 Ala. 236), 935. 940, 965. State V. Moore (74 Mo. 418), 331, 336, 598, 1303. State V. Morristown (33 N. J. Law, 57), 113, 117. 513. State V. Morristown (34 N. J. Law, 445), 1175. State V. Morse (50 N. H. 9), 693, 1419. State V. Morton (37 Vt. 310), 542. State V. Moss (2 Jones (N. C), 66), 1257, State V. Mott (61 Mo. 297), 530. State V. Moultrieville (Rice {N. C), Law, 158), 538. State V. MuUenhofE (74 Iowa, 271), ■ 1544. State V. Murrav (41 Minn. 133; 43 N. W. Rep."858), 160. State V. Murray (38 Wis. 96), 188. State V. Nashville (15 Lea (Tenn.), 697; 54 Am. Rep. 4,21), 181. State V. Natal (39 La. Ann. 439), 96. State V. Natal (41 La. Ann. 887; 6 So. Rep. 722), 581. State V. Neidt (N. J., 19 Atl. Rep. 318), 1057, 1058. State V. Nelson (Neb., 51 N. W. Rep. 648), 480. State V. Nelson (57 Wis. 147), 1174. ' State V. Nevin (19 Nev. 163). 821. State V. New Orleans (30 La. Ann. 129), 1876, 1878. State V. New Orleans (34 La. Ann. 477), 1379. State V. New Orleans (34 La. Ann. 1149). 1375. State V. Newark (N. J., 12 Atl. Rep. 770), 1163. • St^e V. Newark (27 N. J. Law, 185), 1166. 1167, 1576. State V. Newark (30 N. J. Law, 303), 641, 1173. State V. Newark (34 N. J. Law, 336), 489. State V. Newark (35 N. J. Law, 157), 1166. State V. Newark (37 N. J. Law, 415), 1174. 1186. State V. Newark (40 .N. J. Law, 550), 60, 61. State I'. Newark (47 N. J. Law, 117), 550. State V. Newburg (77 N. Y. 136), 359 State V. Newton (33 Ark. 276). 827. State V. Newton (44 Iowa. 45). 1350. State V. Nolan (57 Minn. 16), 1240. State V. North (42 Conn. 89), 1325. State V. North (27 Mo. 464), 1354, 1388. State V. Noyes (47 Me. 189). 1314. State V. Noyes (30 N. H. (10 Fost.) 379), 67, 87, 88. State V. O'Brien (47 Ohio St. 464 ; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 361 ; 25 N. E. Rep. 131), 388. 1557. State V. O'Connor (Wis., 47 N. W. Rep. 433), 1089. State V. O'Day (69 Iowa, 368), 160. State V. Odom (86 N. C. 43>). 330. State 17. Oleson (36 Minn. 507), 515, 604. State V. Orange (33 N. J. Law, 49), 691, 1174, 1418. State V. Orvis (30 Wis. 235), 853, 375, 1356. State V. Osawkee Township (14 Kan. 418; 19 Am. Rep. 69), 559, 929, 930, 996. State V. Osborne (36 Kan. 530; 13 Pac. Rep. t'SOl. 465. State V. Osborne (33 Mb. App. 536), 1344. State V. Otoe (6 Neb. 139), 693. State V. Pamperin (43 Minn. 330; 44 N. W. Rep. 251), .•597. State V. Parker (35 Minn. 815), 1556. State V. Parker (33 N. J. Law, 31.3), 1353. TABLE OF CASES. CCXXXl [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] State V. Parker (31 N. J. Law, 49), 1576. State V. Passaic (41 N. J. Law, 90), 1171. State V. Passaic (41 N. J. Law, 379). 359. State V. Passaic (43 N. J. Law, 429), 530. State V. Passaic (46 N. J. Law, 124), 1391. Slate V. Paterson (84 N. J. Law, 163). 383, 489, 551, 1333, 1390. State V. Paterson {30 N. J. Law, 159), 641. State V. Paterson (40 N. J. Law, 186). 185, 659. State V. Peck (53 Me. 284), 313. State V. Pender (66 N. C. 313), 1255. State V. Pendergrass (106 N. C. 664), 598, 1244. State V. Penny (10 Ark. 621). 140. State V. Pepper (31 Ind. 76), 312. State V. Perkins (24 N. J. Law, 409), 191, State V. Perth Amboy (38 N. J. Law, 425), 641, 1171. State V. Phillips (79 Me. 506; 11 Atl. Rep. 374). 167, 304. State V. Pierce Countv (71 Wis. 827; 37 N. W. Eep. 233), 793. State V. Plainfield (38 N. J. Law, 95), 489. State V. Pointer (Neb., 51 N. W. Rep. 6.')2), 430. State V. Police Cora m'rs (16 Mo. App. 48), 1281. State V. Police Jury (34 La. Ann. 673), 1372. State V. Portage (12 Wis. 563). 558. State V. Porter (7 Ind. 204), 314. State V. Porter (113 Ind. 79), 291, 294 State v. Portland (74 Me. 268), -786. State V. Powell (40 La. Ann. 234; 8 Am. St. Eep. 523), 329. State V. Powell (67 Mo. 395), 322. ."-later. Powell (97 N. C. 417). 1357. State V. Powers (40 La. Ann. 234; 8 Am. St. Eep. 533), 328. State V. Priester (Minn., 45 N. W. Eep. 712), 497. State V. Prince (26 Iowa. 223), 1420. State V. Proctor (90 Mo. 334). 1415. State V. Pugh (43 Ohio St. 98). 61. State V. Eahway (33 N. J. Law, 110), 343. State V. Eailway Co. (85 Mo. 263), 1079. State V. Randall (35 Ohio St. 64), 389. State V. Eeis (38 Minn. 371 ; 38 N. W. Rep. 97), 1162, 1163, 1187. State V. Eenick (37 Mo. 270), 381, 495. State V, Rhoades (6 Nev. 352), 827. State V. Rice (N. C, 2 8. E. Rep. 180), 522. State V. Richards (31 Minn. 47), 541. State V. Richmond (26 N. H. (6 Fos- ter). 233), 695, 1430. State V. Ricker (33 N. H. 179), 1256. State V. Ring (29 Minn. 78), 314. State V. Riordan (34 Wis. 484), 60. State V. Robb (17 Ind. 536), 218. State V. Roberts (12 N. J. Law, 114), 326. State V. Robinson (43 Minn. 107; 43 N. W. Rep. 833), 601, 1236. State V. Robinson (29 N. H. 274), 542. State V. Rodman (43 Mo. 256), 389. State V. Roggen (32 Neb. 118), 937. State V. Rowe (72 Md. 548; 30 Atl Rep. 179). 104. 616. State V. RuflE (30 La. Ann. 497), 530. State V. St. Anthony (10 Minn. 433), 1336. State V. St. Louis (34 Mo. 546), 1388. State V. St. Louis (47 Mo. 595), 1576. State V. St. Louis (73 Mo. 435), 99, 123. State V. St. Louis (90 Mo. 19), 203. State V. St. Louis Police Comm. (16 Mo. App. 48), 203. State V. St. Paul (86 Minn. 529), 1396. State V. St. Paul &o. Ry. Co. (35 Minn. 131 ; 38 N. W. Eep. 3), 591. State V. Saline County (45 Mo. 342), 952. State V. Saline Countv (48 Mo. 390), 947. State u Sappington (67 Mo. 529; 68 Mo. 454), 330. State V. Sauk County (70 Wis. 485), .')61, 1516. State V. Savannah (1 T. U. P. Charlt. 235; 4 Am. Dec. 708), 517. State V. Saxon (25 Fla. 792), 1508. State V. Soates (43 Kan. 330; 33 Pac. Rep. 479), 883. State V. Schlemmer (42 La. Ann. 1166; 8 So. Rep. 307), 1345. State V. School Dist. (10 Neb. 544). 935. State V. School Dist. (22 Neb. 48), 1332 State V. School Dist. (21 Neb. 725), 1327, 1336. State V. School Dist. (30 Neb. 520: 46 N. W. Rep. 613), 1519. State V. School Dist. (31 Neb. 552), 1332. State V. School Dist. (Neb., 48 N. W. Rep. 393), 13i4, 1534. State V. School Dist. (N. J., 10 Atl. Rep. fOl), 1836. State V. School Trustee (43 N. J. Law, 358), 1336. coxxxu TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] State' V. School Trustees (46 N. J.< Law, 76), 1345. State V. Schuchardt (48 La. Ann. 49; 7 So. Rep. 67), 593, 594, 614, 1247. State V. Scott (17 Mo. 521). 64, 67. State u. Spavey (23 Neb. 4.")4), 1378. State V. Seavy iNeb., 35 N. W. Rep. 235), 1379. State u Severance (49 Mo. 401), 524, State V. Severance (55 Mo. 378), 121. State V. Shakspeare (43 La. Ann. 93; 8 So. Rep. 8ii3). 1507, 1538. State V. Shay (101 Ind. 36). 1563. Hi ate v. Shelby (16 Lea, 240), 604. State V. Shelby ville (4 Sneed, 176), 786. State v. Sheriff of Ramsey Countv (Minn , 51 N. W. Rnp. 113). 557. State u. Shropshire (4 Neb. 411), 1517. State V. Sickles(24 N. J. Law, 125), 1391. State V. Simon (47 Minn. 315). 1433. State V. Simon (20 Oregon, 305 ; 26 Pac. Rep. 170), 17-i. State V. Simons (32 Minn. 540), 64. State V. Sims (16 S. C. 486), 1379. State V. SUirving (19 Neb. 497), 353, 375 State V. Slocum (Neb., 51 N. W. Rep. 969), 890, 1524. State V. Smith (23 Minn. 218), 273, 274, 276, 277, 499, State V. Smith (Mo,, 15 S. W. Rep. 614), 1511, • State V. Smith (96 Mo. 326 ; 72 Am. Dec. 204). 338. State V. Smith (38 Mo, 524), 328. State V. Smith (46 Mo. 60), 413. State V. Smith |87 Mo. 158), 895. State ti. Smith (89 Mo. 408; 14 S.W. Rep. fJ57), 881. State V. Smith (Neb., 48 N. W. Rep. 468), 190!). State V. Smith (100 N. C. 550), 1403. State i\ Smith (Oregon, 25 Pac. Rep. 389), 356. , State V. Smith (10 R, L 258), 1249. Slate V. Smith (11 Wis. 65), 386, 137». Rtiite V. Smith (.52 "Wis. 134), 544. State V. Snodgrass (I Wash. 305; 25 Pac. Rep. 1014). 381, 938. State u, Soniers (96 N. C. 467), 301. State V. South Orange (49 N. J. Law, 104),1171. Stale V. Savereisn (17 Neb. 17*), 864. State V. Spaude (37 Minn. 322; 84 N. W. Rep. 164). 94, 114. 115. State V. Spidle ('f4 Kan. 439; 24 Pac. Rep. 965), 893. State V. Stanley (66 N. C. 50), 190. State t). Stark (18 Fla. 255), 60, 468. State V. Starkey (Minn., 1893; 62 N. W. Rep. 241, 489. State V. Staten (6 Cold. (JTeiin.) 233), 376. State V. Staiib (Conn., 23 Atl. Rep. 924), lrt39. State V. Steamboat Co. (13 Md. 181), 1249. State V. Stearns (1 1 Neb. 104), 1517. State V. Stearns (31 N. H. lOS), 539. State V. Steers (44 Mo. 234), 389. State V. Sterling (20 MH. 503), 395. Start «, Stevens (21 Kan. 210; 18 Am. L. Rep. (N. S.) 48i, 130. State V. Stewirt (74 Wis. 620), 1024, 1097. State V. Stoutmeyer (7 Nev. 342), 1345. State V. Stovall (103 N. C. 416), 598. State V. Strader (25 Ohio St. 527), 1386. State V. Stnmpf (31 Wis. 579), 160. State V. Sullivan County Court (51 Mo. 523), 944. Stat^• )•. Suiiimerfi6ld'(107 N; C. 895; 12 S. E. Rep. 114), rm. State t'. Siipervisors--(58 Wis. 291), 343. State V. Supervisors (61 Wis. 278), 431. State V. Sutterfield (.'54 Mo. 3911, 381. State V. Swift (11 Neb. 128), 549. State V. Svmonds (57 Me. 148), 376. State V. Taft <37 Conn. 92), 374. State V. Tappan T, Clerk (29 Wis. 664), 929. State V. Taylor (Neb., 42 N. W. Rep. 729), 162. , State I'. Ta-vlor (108 N. C. 196; 12 L. R. A. 202; 12 S. E. Rep, 100.5), 198 State v. Telegraph Co. (73 Me. 518), 1096. State V. Tenant (N. C, 14 S, E. Rep. 387), 530, 521. State V. Thayer (74 Wis. 48). 1343. State V. Tliompson (49 Mo. 188), 313. State V. Tiediuan (69 Mo. 515), 1330. Slate V. Timme (54 Wis. 318), 432. State V. Tool (4 Ohio St. 5.53), 314. State V. Toomer (7 Rich. (Law), 316), 315. State V. Topeka (36 Kan. 76). 1259. State V. Town Board(Wis., 51 N, W. Rep. «53). 1415. State V. Town of Baird (Tex., 15 S. W. Rep. 98), 0(i. State V. Town of Lime (28 Minn. 521). 343. 344, 349. State V. Town of Somerset (44 Minn. 549; 47 N. W. Rep. 103), 1515. State V. Town of Tipton (Ind., 9 N. E. Rep. 704), 71. TABLE OF OASES. CCXXXlll [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Stats V. Town of West Hoboken (.53 N. J. Law, 64; 20 Atl. Rep. 737), 1073. State V. Town of Winter Park (29 Fla. 371), 69. State 1'. Township of East Orange (N. J., 8 Atl. Rep. 107), 1188. State V. Traeej' (Minn., 51 N. W. Rep. 613), 1560. 1561, State V. Track (6Vt. 355), 1406. State V. Tracv (94 Mo. 217), 1395. State V, Treasurer (43 Mo. 228), 910. State V. Trenton (N. J., 20 Atl. Rep. 1076), 520, 598. State V. Trenton (N. J.. 23 Atl. Rep. 281), 585. 1221, 1222. State V. Trenton (35 N. J. Law, 485), 190. State V. Trenton (36 N. J. Law, 198), 113 1222 State V. Trenton (36 N. J. Law, 499), 641, 693. State V. Trenton (42 N. J. Law, 74), 550. State V. Trenton (42 N. J. Law, 395), 283. State V. Trenton (51 N. J. Law, 498; 28 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 161), 283 State V. Troth (24 N. J. Law, 879), 94, 109. State V. Trustees &c. (5 Ind. 77), 464. State V. Tryon (39 Conn. 183), 486. State V. Turnpike Co. (31 N. J. Law, 12), 1561. State V. Tuttle (53 Wis. 45), 376. State V. Union (32 N. J. Law, 343), 1265. State V. Union (33 N. J. Law, 350), 441, 489. State V. Vail (53 MTo. 97), 386. State V. Valle (41 Mo. 29), 752. State V. Vanosdal (Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 78). 275. 292. State V. Van Pelt (1 Ind. 304), 325. State V. Van Winkle (25 N. J. Law, 73), 1266, 1268. State V. Varnum (Wis., 51 N. W. Rep. 958), 1533. State V. Vershire (52 Vt. 41), 356. State V. Vickers (51 N. J. Law, 180; 17 Atl. Rep. 153), 1561. State V. Votaw (8 Blaokf. (Ind.) 2), 433. State V. Vreeland (79 Iowa, 466), 1336, State V. Waddell (Minn., 52 N. W. Rep. 213). 578, 1203. State V. Waggoner (88 Tenn. 293; 12 S. W. Rep. 721). 4fi4. State V. Wakely (3 Nott & McC. (S. G.) 410), 1576. State V. Waldron (17 N. J. Law, 369),. 698. State V. Walker (Mo., 7 Cent, L J. 890), 1509. State V. Walker (85 Mo. 41), 634. State V. Walker (17 Ohio, 135). 443. State V. Wall (Ohio, 24 N. E. Rep. 897), 119. State V. Walsh (7 Mo. App. 142), 386. State V. Wapello County (18 Iowa, 388), 929, 934. State V. Ware (13 Oregon, 880), 343. State V. Water Comm'rs (30 N. J. Law, 247), 641. State V. Watts (23 Ark. 304), 325. 330. States. Webber (107 N. C. 983; 12 S. E. Rep. 59H), 520, 525, 603. State V. Weir (33 Iowa, 134). 74. State V. Welch (36 Conn. 215), 517, 599, 1244. State V. Wells (46 Iowa, 663), 1259, 1262. State V. Wells (8 Nev. 105), 175. State V. West (33 La. Ann. 1261), 200. State V. Wheeler (27 Minn. 76), 1240. State u White (29 Neb. 288: 45 N. W. Rep. 631), 874, 1533, 1543. State V. White (64 N. H. 48), 1225. State ti. Whittemore (50 N. H. 245), 140. State V. Whittingham (7 Vt. 390), 786. State V. Wilcox (42 Conn. 364; 19 Am. Rep. 538), 88. State «. Wilcox (45 Mo. 458), 64, 67. State V. Wilcox (17 Neb. 219), 1534. State V. WilkesviUe(20 Ohio St. 288), 292. State V. Wilkinson (2 Vt. 480), 140.3. State i\ Williams (25 Me. 561), 352, 373 State v. Williams (11 S. C. 288), 599, 604. State V, Williams (5 Wis. 308). 376. State V. Wilmington (3 Harr. (Del.) 294). 193, 381. State V. Wilson (13 Lea (Tenn.), 257, 464. State V. Wilson (Neh, 38 N. W. Rep. 31), 389. State V. Wilson (29 Ohio St. 349), 183. State V. Wish (15 Neb. 448), 529. State V. Witherford (54 Wis. 150), 1331. State v. Witter (107 N. C. 792), 1241. State V. Wolever (127 Ind. .306; 25 N. E. Rep. 762), 192, 217. State V. Womack (Wash., 29 Pac. Rep. 939), 303. State V. Woodbury (76 Me. 457), 66. CCXXXIV TABLE OF CASES. \- [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] State V. Woodward (89 Ind. 110), 1545. State V. Wordin (56 Conn. 216; 14 Atl. Eep. 801). 1017. State V. Wright (8 Blackf . (Ind.) 65), 1325! State V. Wright (N. J., 23 Atl. Rep. 116), .583. State V. Young (8 Kan. 445), 52, 71, 93. 1253. State V. Young (17 Kan. 414), 116. State V. Zeigler (32 N. J. Law, 262), 522, 530, 540. State &o. V. Court of Conunon Pleas (36 N. J. Law, 72; 13 Am. Eep. 422), 88. State Bank v. Charleston (3 Rich, Law, 342), 1396. State Bank v. Gibbs (3 McC. (S. C.) 377), 7. State Bank v. Knoop (16 How. 380), 79. State Board v. Aberdeen (56 Miss. 518), 1394. State Board of Agriculture v. Citi- zens' Street Ry. Co. (47 Ind. 407), 644. State' Board of Education v. Aber- deen (56 Miss. 518), 238. State Center v. Barenstein (66 Iowa, 249), 518, 521, 1233, 1234, 1236. State Cent. R. Co. v. Mutchler (41 N. J. Law, 96). 1568. 1571. State R. Co. r. Easton E. Co. (36 N. J. Law, 181), 1418. State Railroad Tax Cases (92 U. S. 575), 1568, 1570, 1571, 1573. State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds (15 Wall. 300), 1566. State Tonnage Cases (12 Wall. 204), 1043. Steamship Co, v. Port Wardens (6 Wall. 81), 580. Stearns v. Richmond (88 Va. 993), 1456. Stebbins v. Kay (4 N. Y. Supl. 566), 1171. Stebbins v. Kay (51 Hun, 589), 1187. Stebbins V. Jennings (19 Pick. 172), 56, 57, 657. Stebbins u. Mayer (38 Kan. 578; 16 Pac. Rep. 74,5), 1293. Stebbins v. Mayes (Kan., 16 Pac. Rep. 745), 509. Stebbins v. Merritt (10 Cush. 27), 1366. Stebbins v. Oneida Village (5 N. Y. Supl. 483), 1475, 1484. Stebbins v. Oneida Village (23 N. Y. St. Rep. 703), 781. Steokert v. East Saginaw (23 Mich. 104), 293. 300, 301, 497, 1265. Steel's Petition (44 N. H. 220), 1420. Steel Co. V. Martin (115 111. 358), 1490. Steele v. Boston (128 Mass. 588), 264, 760. Steele v. Calhoun (61 Miss. 556), 166. StefCan v. Buffalo (21 N. Y. W, Dig. 389), 781. Stein V. Citv of Council Bluffs (73 Iowa, 18"0). 1478. Stein V. Mobile (17 Ala. 284), 1360. Stein ul Mobile (24 Ala. 591), 983, 1360, 1397. Stein V. Mobile (49 Ala. 862; 30 Am. «ep. 388), 1360. Stein V. Railroad Co. (75 III. 41), 1457. Stein V. Water Supply Co. (34 Fed. Rep. 145), 567. Steines r. Franklin County (48 Mo. 167), 936, 947. Steinmeyer v. City of St. Louis (8 Mo. App. 256), 1436. Stephens v. Mayor (84 Ga. 630; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 383), 377, 878 Sterling v. Gait (117 111. 11; 7 N. E. Rep. 471), 1074, 1175. Sterling v. Merrill (134 111. 533), 1474, 1489. Sterling v. Parish of West Feliciana (26 La. Ann. 59), 682. Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby (134 111. 557; 25 N. E. Rep. 660), 796. Stern v. People (96 111. 475), 324. Stetson V. Kempton (13 Mass. 373; 7 Am. Dec. 145), 17, 350, 642, 664, 826, 1383. 1893. Steuart v. Mayor &o. (7 Md. 516), 704. Steubenville v. Gulp (38 Ohio St. 18), 210. Steven v. Insurance Co. (39 Neb. 187), 1363. Stevens v. Commonwealth (6 Met, 243), 543. Stevens v. Danbury (53 Conn. 9), 697. Stevens v. Dudley (50 Vt. 158), 319. Stevens v. Railroad Co. (39 Vt. 546), 646. Stevens v. Society (12 Vt. 688), 1269. Stevens Point &c. Co. v. ReiUy (44 Wis. 295), 60. Stevenson v. Bay City (26 Mich. 44), 510, 1365. Stevenson v. Lexington (69 Mo. 157), 364. Stevenson v. Summit (85 Iowa, 462), 1378. Stevenson V. Weber (29 La. Ann. 105), 647. Steward v. Jefferson (8 Harr. S35), 64. Steward v. Kalamazoo (30 Mich. 69), 1583. TABLE OF OASES. CCXXiT prhe references are to pages; Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Stewart v. Baltimore (7 Md. 500), 696. Stewart v. Cambridge (135 Mass. 102). goo. Stewart v. Citv of Council Bluffs (58 Iowa, 649); 286. Stewart v. City of Council Bluffs (Iowa, 50 N. W. Rep. 219), 1150. Stewart r. Clinton (79 Mo. 604), 510, 70B, 1271. Stewart v. Hovey (Kan., 26 Pao. Rep. 683), 1155. Stewart v. Lee (3 Cal. 364), 810. Stewart v. Otoe County (2 Neb. 177), 628. Stewart v. Philadelphia (Pa., 7 Atl. Rep. 192). 1186. Stewart v. Polk County (30 Iowa, 1), 934. Stewart i'. Sherman (4 Conn. 553), 996. Stewarts Southard (17 Ohio, 403; 49 Am. Dec. 468), 218. 219. 1845. Stewart v. State (4 InQ. 396), 175. Stickney v. Bangor (30 Me. 404), ■ 1578. Stickney v. Salem (8 Allen, 374), 144H, 1455. Stifel V. Brown (24 Mo. App. 102), 1187. StifBer v. Board of Comm'rs (lud,, 27 N. E.' Rep. 641), 895. Stiger V. Red Oak (64 Iowa, 465), 230. Stiles V. Middlesex (8 Vt. 436), 697. Still V. Lansingburgh (10 Barb. 107), 634. Stillwater v. Green (9 N. J. Law, 59), 446. Stillwater Water Co. v. City of Still- water (Minn., 53 N. W. Rep. 893), 586. Stillwell V. Coons (133 N. Y. 243; 25 N. E. Rep. 316), 9s5. Stillwell V. Coope (4 Denlo, 325), 1339. Stillwell V. Kennedy (51 Hun, 114; 5 N. Y. Supl. 407). 985, 986. Stillwell V. New York (17 Jones & Sp. 360; 96 N. Y. 649), 785. Stilz V. Indianapolis (55 Ind. 515), 393, 1365, 1307. Stilz V. Indianapolis (81 Ind. 582), 1368, 1568. Stinchfleld v. Little (1 Greenl. (Me.) 331; 10 Am. Dec. 65), 313. Stinson v. Gardiner (4a Me. 348), 1448. Slinson v. Smith (8 Minn. 366), 1086. Stitt V. Castelline (88 Mich. 339), 1430. Stock V. City of Boston (149 Mass. 410), 1310. Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge (12 Mass. 400). 54, 90. Stockdale v. School Dist. (47 Mich. . 22H), 305. Stocket V. New Albany (3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 85). 647. Stockton. Ex parte (33 Fed. Rep. 95), 1240. Stockton V. Creanor (45 Cal. 643), 383. Stockton V. Powell (Fla., 10 Bo. Eep. 688), 273, 5T0. 953. Stockton V. Western Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (Cal., 15 Pac. Rep. 314), 120. Stockton &o. R. Co. v. Stockton (41 Cal. 147), 683. 933. Stockton &c. R Co. v. Stockton (51 Cal. 328), 939. Stockwell V. White Lake (22 Mich. 341). 819. Stoddard v. Oilman (33 Vt. 568), 303, 306. 349, 361, 863. Stoddard v. Kimball (6 Cush. 469), 957 Stoddard v. Johnson (75 Ind. 30), 377. Stoddard v. Village of Saratoga Springs (4 N. Y. Supl. 745), 1098. Stoddard v. Winchester (154 Mass. 149), 1437. Stokes V. City of New York (14 Wend. 88). 538. 599, 1231. Stokes V. Early (45 N. J. Law, 478), 705. Stone V. Boston (3 Met. 220), 705. Stone V. Cambridge (6 Cush. 270), 1175. Stone V. Citv of Charlestown (114 Mass. 314"). 396, 1368. Stone V. Commercial Rv. Co. (4 M. 6 C. 182). (;97, V Stone V. Elliott (11 Ohio St. 252), 964. , Stone V. Godfrey (5 De G., M. & G. 76), 248. Stone V. Hubbardston (100 Mass. 49), 1486. Stone V. Mississippi (101 U. S. 814), 1545. Stone V. New York (25 Wend. 157), 759 Stone V. School Dist. (8 Cush. 592), 344, 1835. Stone V. Seymour (15 Wend. 19), 328. Stone V. Small (54 Vt. 498), 360. Stone V. Viele ' (38 Ohio St. 314), 1^76. Stone V. Woodbury (51 Iowa, 523), 1578. Stoneman i\ London &c. Co. (L. R. 7 Q. B. 1). 1418. Stoner v. Flournoy (28 La, Ann. 850), 1365, 1367. COXXXVl TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.] Storrs V. Utica (17 N. Y. 104), 1397, 1444, 146S. Story V. N. Y. El. R. Co. (90 N. Y. 122), 615. 678, 1406, 1410, 1411. Stoughton School Dist. v. Atherton (11 Met. 105), 915. Stout 77. Freeholders (85 N. J. Law, 203), 682. Stout V. Woods (79 Ind. 108), 1420. Stoutenbergh v. Hennlok (129 U. S. 141), 14, 51, 53. 1240. Stow V. Common Council (79 Mich. 595; 44 N. W. Rep. 1047), 171. Stowe V. Wyse (7 Conn. 114), 276. Strader v. Sussex (18 N. J. Law, 108), 769. Strafford v. Sharon (61 Vt. 126), 1429. Strahan v. Town of Malvern (77 Iowa, 454; 43 N. W. Rep. 369), 609. Strahl. In re (16 Iowa, 369), 290, 398. Strand, In re (Cal., 21 Pao, Rep. 654), 62, 69, 96. Strang. Ex parte (21 Ohio St. 610), 199. Strang v. District of Columbia (1 Maokey, 265), 718. Stratman, In re (39 Cal. 517), 1355. Stratton v. Collins (43~ N. J. Law, 563), 1353. Stratton v. Oulton (28' Cal. 44), 175, 310. Sti-auder v. West Virginia (100 U. S. 313), 147. Strauss v. Cincinnati (38 Weekly Law Bui. 359), 1171. Street Case (1 La. Ann. 413), 375. Street v. Comm'rs (70 N. C. 644), 882, Street v. Laurens (5 Rich. Eq. 337), 8-34. ' Street v. Railway Co. (79 N. Y. 293), 1088. Street Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia (51 Pa. St. 465), 1354. Street Ry. Co. v. West Side Ry. Co. (7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 95), 1205. Strenna v. City Council &c. (86 Ala. 340), 1189. Strickler v. City cf Colorado Springs (16 Colo. 61; 26 Pac. Rep. 313), 670, Striebu. Cox (111 Ind. 299; 13 N. E. Rep. 481), 637, «39, 898, 1137. Strike v. Collins (54 L. T. (N. S.) 153), 1344. Strikers. Kelly (7 Hill, 9; 2 Denio, 323), 800, 301, 497. 500, 1365. Striling v. Thomas (60 III. 3ii5). 9. Strom v- Iowa City (47 Iowa, 43), 1583. Strong V. Brooklyn (68 N. Y. 1), 1411. Strong V. Campbell (U Barb. 135), 233. Strong V. District of Columbia (4 Maokey (D. C), 243; 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 568), 381. Strong V. McKeever (103 Ind. 578), 1415. Strong I). N. Y. El. R. Co. (90 N. Y. 123), 1433. Strong V. Stevens Point (63 Wis. 253), 1449. Strong V. United States (6 Wall. 788), 320. Strong, Petitioner (20 Pick. 484), 1555, 1560. Strosser v. City (100 Ind. 443), 413, 643. Stroud V. City of Philadelphia (61 Pa. St. 255), 593. 1163. Strngh V. Supervisors &o. (119 N. Y. 312). 1546. Strunk v. Ochiltree (11 Iowa, 158), 336. Strusburgh v. Mayor (87 N. Y, 453). 1123, 1131, 1133, 1184. Struthers v. Railway Co. (87 Pa. St. 282), 591. Stuart V. Maehiasport (48 Me. 477), 1503. Stuart «. Palmer (74 N. Y. 183), 595, 690. 1177, 1178, 1179. Stuart V. Warren (b7 Conn. 335), 851, 366, 817. Stubbs V. Lee (64 Me. 195). 188, 200. Stuhr V. Hoboken (47 N, J. Law, 148). 503. Sturgeon v. Hampton (88 Mo. 203), 634. Sturm V. School Dist. (45 Minn. 88; 47 N. W. Rep. 462), 347. Stutsman County v. MansSeld (5 Dak. 78; 37 N. W. Rep. 304), 853. Stuyvesart v. Mayor (7 Cowen, 588), 102, 488. 1172. Sublettt). Bed well (47 Miss. 266; 12 Am. Rep. 338), 38fi. Successor of Irwin (38 La. Ann. 68), 614. Sudbury v. Heard (108 Mass. 543), 1579. Sudbury v. Stearns (21 Pick. 148), 344, 1274. Sudbury v. Waltham (13 Mass. 461), 983. Suffolk Siiv. Bank v. Boston (149 Mass. 364), 964. Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co. (82 Mo. 124), 1206. Sullivan v. Board of Supervisors (58 Miss. 790), 670. Sullivan v. Boston (126 Mass. 540), 759. TjLBLia OF OASES.. CCXXXVll [The reterenoes are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. U, pp. 789-1605.] Sullivan v. City of Fall River (144 Mass. 579; 13 N. E. Rep. 553), 1143. Sullivan v. City of Leadville (11 Colo. 483; 18Pac. Rep. 7361,301, 7ia, 877, 1116. Sullivan v. Gilroy (S5 Hun, 285), 1553. Sullivan v. Holyoke (135 Mass. 373), 1080. Sullivan V. Jones (9 Gray, 570), 339. Sullivan v. Pausch (5 OhioC. C. 198), 301. Sullivan v. Phillips (110 Ind. 320), 1095. Sullivan v. School District (39 Kan. 347), 257, 1330. 'Sullivan v. Shanklin (63 Cal. 247), 220. Sullivan i'. State (121 Ind. 343; 23 N. E. Rep. 150), 812. Sullivan v. Walton (20 Fla. 552), 959, 1391. Summers v. Daviess County Comm'rs (103 Ind. 263; 53 Am. Rep. 513), 207. 744, 1014. Summerville v. Pressley (33 S. C. 56 ; 11 S. E. Rep. 545), 593. 594. Summit Borough, In re (Pa., 7 Atl. Rep. 319), 68, 69. Sumner v. Comm'rs (37 Me. 112), 694. Sumnerv. Lebee(3Greenl. (Me.) 223), 374. Sunapee v. Town of Lempster (65 N. H. 655; 3»Atl. Rep. 535), 981. Sunderland v. Martin (113 Ind. 411), 1189^ Superintendents of Poor v. Nelson (75 Mich. 154; 43 N. W. Rep. 797), 1004. Supervisors &c. v: Bates (17 J^. Y. 242), 253. Supervisors &c. v. Birdsall (4 Wend. 453), 657. Supervisors &c. v. Bowen (4 Lans. (N. Y.) 24), 657. Supervisors &c. v. Briggs (2 Denio, 36). 709. Supervisors &c. v. Brush (77 III. 59), 1390. Supervisors &o. v. CoflSnbury (1 Mich. 355), 312, 3W. Supervisors &c. v. Cowan (60 Miss. 876), 1371, 1383. Supervisors &c. v. Dorr (25 Wend. ■ 440; 7 Hill, 583), 333. Supervisors &c. v. Galbraith (99 TJ. S. 214), 9.?4. Supervisors &c. v. Garrejl (20 Gratt. 484). 681. Supervisors &c. v. Horton (75 Iowa, 371), 30 i. Supervisors &o. v. Minturn (4 West Va. 300), 1516. Supervisors &c. v. Morgan (4 Abb. Ct. App. Dee. 339), 993. Supervisors &o. v. O'Malley (47 Wis. 333), 470. Supervisors &c. v. People (25 III. . 181), 301. Supervisors &c. v. People (110 111. 511), 1362. Supervisors &c. v. Stimson (4 Hill, 13&}. 195, 196, 200. Supervisors &o. v. Supervisors of Gogebic County f74 Mich. 721; 42N.,W. Rep. 170), 450. Supervisors &o. v. Supervisors of Gogebic County (Mieh., 46 N. W. Rep. 170), 462. Supervisors &c. v. Supervisors of La Crosse Cotinty (IS Wis. 547). 487. Supervisors &c. v. Supervisors of Sumner County (S8 Miss. 619), 450. Supervisors &c. v. United States (4 Wall. 435), 9, 426, 804. Supervisors &c. v. United States (18 Wall. 71), 803), 1392, 1509. Surgi V. Snetchman (11 La. Ann. 387), 1369. Susquehanna Banku. Brown County Supervisors (25 N. Y. 313), 1189, 1568. Sussex V. Strader (18 N. J. Law, 108). 787. Sutherland v. Godsborough (98 N. C. 49; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 393), 377. SutlifF V. Lake County (47 Fed. Rep. 106), 837. Sutro V. Pettit (74 Cal. 332; 16 Pac. Rep. 7), 208, 230, 231, 233, 233, 234, 249, 836. Sutro V. Rhodes (93 Cal. 117; 28 Pac. Rep. 98), 836. Sutton V. Clarke (6 Taunt. 34), 222. Sutton V. Louisville (5 Dana, 28), 702. Sutton V. McConnell (46 Wis. 269), Sutton V. Orange (6 Met. 484), 446. Sutton V. Spectacle Makers' Co. (i:i L. T. (N. S.)411), 2H1. Swain v. Comstock (18 Wis. 463), 70. Swan V. Grav (44 Miss. 393), 1536. Swan V. Williams (3 Mich. 427), 090. Swann v. Buck (40 Miss. 268)i 112, 187. Swann v. Cumberland (8 Gill, 150), 1576. Swanzey v. Somerset (13? Mass. 313), 1433. Swart V. New York (5 N. Y. Supl. 98), 1496. CCSJ^XVUl TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-IB05.] Swarthu People (109 111. 631), 1233. Swartz V. Large (47 Kan. 304; 27 Pac. Rep. 993), 1558. Sweatt «. Faville (28 Iowa, 326), 556. Sweet V. Gloverville (13 Hun, 302), 1474. Sweet V. Morrison (116 N. Y. 32; 22 N. E. Kep. 276), 720. Sweetser v. Hav (3 Gray, 49), 312. Sweitzer v. Liberty (83 Mo. 309), 5oa. Swepstou V, Barton (39 Ark. 549), 163. Swift V. City of Newport (7 Bush (Ky.). 37), 1364, 1366. Swift v.- City of Poughkeepsie (37 N. Y. 511), 227, 1133. Swift V. City of Topeka (43 Kan. 671). 524. Switzer v. Wellington (40 Kan. 250 ; 10 Am. St. Rep. 196), 1596. Sykes v. Mayor of Columbus (55 Miss, lir)), 639, 942, 1374. Sykes v. Town of Pawlet (43 Vt. 446), 1451. Syme v. Bunting (91 N. C. 48), 330. Symonds v. Clav County (71 111. 355), 9, 149. Syracuse v. Reed (Kan., 26 Pac. Rep. 1043), 855. Syracuse Water Co. v. City of Svra- ouse (116 N. Y. 167; 22 N. E. Rep. 381; 5 L. R. An. 546; 26 N. Y. St. Eep. 364; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 307), 230, 566, 567, 613. T. Taber v. Ferguson (109 Ind. 227), 1075. 1113. Taft V. Gifford (13 Met. 187); 3S3. Taf t V. Montagu (14 Mass. 283),- 640, 1141. Taft V. Pittsford (28 Vt. 286). 359, 643. Taft V. Wood (14 Pick. 363), 237, 1384. Taggart v. Newport Street E. Co. (16 E. I. 668), 678, 679. Tainter v. Lucca (28 Wis. 375), 1571. Tainter v. Worcester (123 Mass. 311), 264. Tait's Ex'r v. Centr. Lunatic Asylum (Va.,4S. E. Rep. 697), 683. Talbot V. Dent (9 B. Mon. 526), 801, 933, 1385, 1387. Talbot V. East Machias (76 Me. 415), 183. Talbot V. Hudson (16 Gray, 417), 683. Talbot «. Queen' Anne's County (50 Md. 245), 8, 15. Talbot Paving Co. v. Common Coun- cil (Mich., 61 N. W. Eep. 933), 1539. Talcott V. Bufifalo (57 Hun, 43). 650. Talcott V. Bufifalo (125 N. Y. 380), 780. Talkington v. Turner (71 111. 234), 385. Tallant v. Burlington (39 Iowa, 543), , 1174. Tall man v. White (3 N. Y. 66). 1383. Tamwortli v. Freedom (17 N. H. 379), 983, 983. Tape V. Hurley (66 Cal. 473), 1345. Tapley V. Martin (116 Mass. 275), 323 ' Tappan'u. Bank (19 Wall. 490), 1351. Tappan v. People (67 III. 339), 1333. Tappan v. Young (9 Daly, 357), 53i; 573 Tarbell's Appeal (129 Pa. St. 146; 18 Atl. Rep. 758), 647. Tarbox v. Sughrue (36 Kan. 225), 163. Tartman v. State (109 Ind. 860), 464. Tash V. Adams (10 Cush. 252), 664, 1399, ln83. Tate V. Railroad Co. (6 Mo. 158), 1206. Tatlock V. Louisa County (46 Iowa, 797. Taunton v. Inhabitants of Wareham (153 Mass. 19i; 26 N. E. Rep. 451), 982, 993, 994. Taunton v. Middleborough (12 Met. 35), 983. Taunton v. Tavlor (116 Mass. 254), 489, 551, 1035, 1059. lOv-0. Taunton v. Westport (12 Mass. 355), 1001. Tawney v. Lynn &e. Ey. Co. (6 L. J. (N. S.) Eq. 283), 697. Tax-payers' Ass'n v. City of New Or- leans (33 La. Ann. 567). 647. Taylor, Ex parte (58 Miss. 478), 1335. Taylor V. Americus (39 Ga. 59), 546. Tavlor v. Board of Health (31 Pa. St. 73), 1577. Taylor v. Boulware (17 Tex. 74). .1366. Taylor v. Carondelet (23 Mo. 105), 523, 534. Taylor v. City of Cohoos (105 N. Y. 54), 1598. • Taylor v. City of Cumberland (64 Md. 68; 20 Atl. Rep. 1037), 771, 1138, 1222. Taylor v. Citv of Lambertville (N. J., ■ 10 Atl. Rep. 809), 1312. Taylor tJ.Clemson (11 Clark & F. 610), 693. Taylor v. Comm'rs (88 111. 526), 1089. Tayloi: v. Commonwealth (3 J. J. Marsh. 401), 158. • TABLE OF CASES. CCXXXIX (The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] Taylor v. Dist. Tp. of Wayne (25 Iowa, 447), 904, 1028. Taylor v. Dunn (Tex., 16 S. W, Eep. 733), 1^15, 1216. Taylor v. Fort Wayne (47 Ind. 274), 393, 1866. Taylor v. Henry (2 Pick. 397), 357, 359, 360, 372, 1275. Taylor «.. Hopper (2 Hun, 646; -62 N. Y. 649), 1410, 1412. Taylor v. Knipe (3 Pearson (Ala.), 151), 1596. Taylor v. Lake Shore R. Co. (45 Mich. 74), 1441. Taylor v. Lambertville (43 N. J. Eq. 107), 238. Taylor v. McFadden (Iowa, 59 N. W. Rep. 1070), 280. 552, 1075, 1384. Taylor v. Morton (37 Iowa, 550), 3^1. Taylor v. New Berne (3 Jones' Eq. (N. C.) 141), 67, 124. Taylor v. Palmer (31 Cal. 240), 501, 507, 1115, 1181, 1183, 1189. Taylor v. People (66 III. 322), 242. Taylor v. Philadelphia Board &c. (31 Pa. St. 73), 344. Taylor v. Phillips (West Va., 14 S. E. Rep. 130), 1421. Taylor v. Pine Bluff (34 Ark. 603), 488. Taylor v. Plymouth (8 Met. 465), 759. Taylor v. Porter (4 Hill, 140; 40 Am. Dec. 274), 684. Tavlor v. Railroad Co. (45 Mich. 74 ; " 7 N. W. Rep. 728), 1201. Taylor v. Salt Lake County (2 Utah, 405), 1587. Taylor v. Sullivan (45 Minn. 309; 11 L. R. A. 373; 47 N. W. Rep. 803), 188. Taylor v. Taylor (10 Minn. 107), 381, 389. Taylor v. Thompson (42 III. 9), 802. Taylor v. Town of Constable (10 N. T. Supl. 607), 1493. Taylor v. Town of Constable (15 N. Y. Supl. 795), 748. Taylor v. Whitehead (Doug. 745), 1473. Taylor v. Williston (62 Vt. 369), 1433. Taylor v. Yonkers (105 N. Y. 203), 14.13, 1459, 1460, 1461. Taylor County v. Standley (79 Iowa, 666; 44 N. W. Eep. 911), 603, 797, 859. Taylors of Ipswich (1 Rol. 5), 129. Tayraouth v. Koehler (35 Mich. 22), 640, 1391. T. B. Scott Lumber Co. v. Oneida Co. (72 Wis. 158), 561. Tearney v. Smith (86 111. 391), 231. Teegarden v. City of Racine (56 Wis. 645; 14 N. W. Rep. 614), 554, 561, 1169. Teft V. Size (10 111. 433). 544. Temple v. Mpad (4 Vt. 535), 165. Ten Evck v. Delaware &o. Canal Co. (18 N. J. Law, 200). 4. 7. Tennant v. Crocker (85 Mjoh. 338; 48 N. W. Rep. 577), 299; 1538. Tensas &c. Jury v. Britton (15 Wall. 670), 236. Terhune v. Mayor &c. of New York (88 N. Y. 247), 179, 210, 755. Terrail v. Tinney (20 La. Ann. 444), 339 Terre Haute v. Beach (96 Ind. 48), 1419. Terre Haute v. Hudnut (113 Ind, 542), 775, 1186. Terre Haute v. Lake (43 Ind. 480), 527. Terre Haute v. Terre Haute Water- works Co. (94 Ind. 303), 711. Terre Haute v. Turner (36 Ind. 522), 677. Terre Haute &c. E. Co. v. Earp (21 111. 293). 943. Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Nelson (Ind., 27 N. E. Rep. 486. 1083. Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Voelker (31 111. 314), 1369. Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Voelker (129 111. 540), 510. Terre Haute R. Ca v. Clem (123 Ind. 15), 1486. ' , Terrell v. Andrew County (44 Mo. 309) 325. Terrell v. Dissaint (Tex., 9 S. W. Rep, 593), 843. Terrell v. Sharon (34 Conn. 105), 646, 1583. Terrill v. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St. 355), 396, 1365. Territory v. Board of Comm'rs (8 Mont. 396; 30 Pac. Rep. 396), 897. Territory of Dakota v. Armstrong (6 Dak. 326 ; 50 N, W. Rep. 833), 1556. Territory of Washington v. Stewart (39 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas, 32)i 63. Terry v. Hartford (39 Conn. 291), 1169. Terry v. Milwaukee (15 Wis. 490), 909. Terry v. Waterbury (35 Conn. 536), 1420. Terry Co. v. East St. Louis (102 111. 560), 1239. Tesh V. Commonwealth (4 Dana (Ky.), 5a3), 1253. Tevis V. Randall (6 Cal. 632), 310. TABLE OF OASES. [The ref erfences are to pagest Vol. ffeje'ai'fe Vtte. %. Co. V. City of Nrnt- QWfeans (40 Fed. Rep. Ill), 1103. Texas Banking Ins. C9. V. SMe (43 Tex. 4S6), 1357, 1370. Thatcher v. CfMc&go &e. Ry. Cb. mo III 660; 11 N. E. Rep. 853), 793 Tfb^chlit V. Cbram'rs (13 Kah. 1'88), „;'iB8S,'«S9. TIraifcher V. Humbte («7 lad. 444), 651. Tb&tcber*. P^Ofde (79 I11.S97), ifi^Tl. •Thaver v. feoston (19 Pick. 511), 766, 774, 'f75. Thayer v. Montgomery CoUHty (3 E»i(U 38'9). ISffl. Thayer v. Stearns (1 Pick. 109), 351, Thayer 'u United States (20 Ct. CI. . 137), 'r#.. The Acorn (3 Abb. (N. S.) 4^), 140, The Borough 6t '^arhlouth Case (2 BrownlOw & Goldsb. 392), 43. The Bricklayei'S v. The Plasterers (Palm. 396). 487. The Chesapeake &c. Canal Co. (1 Md. Ch. 248), 670. The Davis (lO Wall. 15), 740. The Dublin Case (38 N. H. 4S9). 660. The Floyd Acceptances (7 Wall. 666), 307. 214. The 36ing v. The Inhabitants of Hard wick (11 EaSt, 577^). 153. The iKiMg t". Inhabitants of Woburn (10 East. 395), 153. ft* King V. liizzard (9 Barn. & O. 418). 189. The ■fe,ease of the City of London (8 How. State Trials, 1340), 130. The liberty Bell («3 Fed. Rep. 843), 1568; 1580. The f^feofil* i}. Oregon (27 111. 29). 311. The Siren (7 Wall. 153), 740. Theilan v. Porter (14 Lea, 623; 53 Am. Rep. 173), 1047. Thiessen v. City of Belle Plaine tIo\va,-46 N.'W. Rep. 854), 1199. / Third Nat. Bank &c. v. Seneca iFalls i;i5?P8a.'B#t). "^Sg), 947. Third Schpdl Di^. Vi Athertoh (13 Met. 105), 373. Thomas, M!pa>rttl{n Cal. 304), 1388. Thomas v. Ashland (13 Ohio St. 124), S9, 1S53. Thomas v. Brooklyn (58 Iowa, 438), '1403. Thomas v, Burlington (69 loWa, 140), M6<841. Thomas v. Citizens' flotse R. Co. (104)111. 462), 277. Thomas v. Dakin (S3 Wend. 9), 3, 50, I, pp. IJ?®; Vol. n, pp. '?89-l«)5.] ThoiUafe-u. G^in (35 Mi(3l. fSS), 1179, 1185, 1186. Thotoas V. Lelsttia (84 WehA. 6S), 1363, 1383, 1389. Thomas v. Mdrgan CouKty (39 111 496), 956. Themais t. Mount V^ra6h (9 Ohio, 290), 533. 136®. f hoH«te 'V. 0weas A TSfd. f8% 175, 376. Thbrti&s V. Port Httron (27 Mich. 330), 934. ^Hiorlias V. RiblnMOnd (13 Wall. 349), 78, 92, 330, 354, 634. ^raibmas V. weed (14 Johns. SS 1491, Thotaals V. White (13 Mass. 3i Bl3. Thomasbn V. Ashworth (73 Cal. 73) . 93, 114. Thpmasson v. State (13 Iiid. 549), ThomaSton v. St. GteoirgB (17 Me, 117), 981. Thompson v. Abbott (61 Mo. 176), 391, 1333. Thompson v. Andrbscoi^in River Imp. Co. (54 N. H, 8*5), 673, 674. Thompson v. Allen County (115 U. S. 550), 1379. Thompson v. Board of Trusteed (30 111. 99),'^. Thompson v. Bridge-water (7 Pick, 188), 1300. Thompson v. City of JSIil^atfiee (69 Wis. 493; 34 N. W. Rep. 402), 93, 137. Thompson V. Dickefson (3'2 Iowa, 860), 334. Thompson v. Holt (53 Ala. 491), 330. Thompson v. Justices (3 fiamph. (Tenn.) 333), 1536. TbbinpgoHO. Eelly (3 Ohio St. 647), 944. Thornpson v. Lee County (3 Wall. 827), 433, 622, 636, ^33, 955. Thompson v. Mamakaling (37 !Bun, . 400), 966. Thompson v, Milwaukee &e. B. Co. (27 Wis. 93), 1148. Thompson v. New York (52 N. T. Super. Ct. 437). 755. Thompson 'tJ. New York &C. B. Co. (8Bah«t. Ch. 635), 568. Thompson *. Norris- (63 Ga. 638), 15 ?7. Thompson v. Batifie R. Co. (9 Wall. 579), 51. Thompson v. Perri'ne (103 U. S. 806), 688, 830. Thompson «. Perrine (106 U. S. 589), 967. , TABLE OF OASES. ccxli [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Thompaioii V. Scherraerhorn (6 N. Y. (2 Seld.; 92), 282, 549, 573, 1160, 1389. Thompson v. Treasurer of Wood County (U Ohio St. 338), 1034. Thompson v. Village of Quincv (83 Mich. 173; 47 N. W. Eep. 114), 1140. Thompson b. Whipple (54 Ark. 203 ; . 15 S. W. Rep. 604), 223. Thorn pnon-Houston Electric Co. v. City of Newton (43 Fed. Rep. 723), 551, 552, 574, 576. Thomson v. BoonvUle (61 Mo. 282), 283, 677, 1390. Thomson v. Railroad Co. (9 Wall. 579), 7. Thorn v. Sweeney (12 Nev. 251), 686. Thorn V. West Chicago Park Comm'rs (130 111. 594; 23 N. E. Rep. 530), i 1174. Thornton v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (42 i Mo. App. 58), 667. Thorp V. Brookaeld (36 Conn. 320), 1503. Thorp V. Witham (65 Iowa, 566), 696, 704. Thorpe v. Rutland &c. R. Co. (27 Tt. 140). 85, 1212. 1228. Throop II. Forman (31 Mich. 144), 1419. Throop V. Langdon (40 Mich. 686), 1535. Thrower's Case (1 Ventr. 208), 1408. Thrush v. City of Cameron ^1 Mo. App. 391). 709. Thurston v. St. Joseph (51 Mo. 510), 1456. Tice V. Bay City (78 Mich. 209; 44 N. W. Rep. 53), 1222. Tice V. Bay City (84 Mich. 461 ; 47 N. W. Rep. 1062). 1140. Tidd V. Smith (3 N. H. 178). 330. Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer (9 G. & J. 4. Trimmer v. City of Rochester (N. T., 39 N. E. Rep. 746), 1133, 1134, 1183, 1184. Trimmier v. Bomar (20 S. C. 354), 938. Trinity Cbunty v. Polk County (58 Tex. 321), 450. Tripler v. TJew York City (17 N. Y. Supl. 750), 1400, Trippler v. City of New York (125 N. Y. 617; 26 N. E. Rep. 721; 6 N. Y; Supl. 48), 1183. 1185. Tritz V. City of Kansas (84 Mo. 633), 1430. Trott V. Warren (11 Me. 237), 54. Trotter v. City of Chicago. (33 111. App. 206), 603. Trottman v. San Francisco (20 Cal. 96; 81 Am. Dec. 96), 634, 1141. Trowbridge v. Newark (46 N. J. Law;, 140), 176, 524. Trowbridge v. Town of Brookline (144 Mass. 139; 10 N. E. Rep. 7196), 765, 1099. Troxel v. Vinton (77 Iowa, '90 ; 41 N. W. Rep. 580), 1476, l495. Troy V. Atchison &c. R. Co. (11 Kan. 5% 643, ^267, 1268. Troy V. Winters (2 Hun, 68; 4 T. & G. 256), 698, 1246. Truax v. Pool (4B Iowa, 256), 1366. Truchelut v. City Council (1 Nott & McC. (S. C) 227), 489. True V. Davis (133 111. 523: 33 N. E. Rep. 410; 6 L. R. An. 266), 109, 391, 894 406, 838. Truesdell's Appeal (53 Pa, St. 148), 1391. Truesdell v. Combs (83 Ohio St. 186), 338. TABLS OS OASES. ccjdv [The reterenoes are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. EC, pp. 789-1803.] Trumbo ». People (75 III. 563). 1538. Trustees v. Broadhurst (N. C., 13 S. E. Eep. 781), 1395. Trustees v. City of Atlanta {T6 Ga. 181;83Ga. 448), 1166. Trustees v. Cowen (4 Paige, 510), 1233, 1411. Trustees v. DerBott (13 Ohio, 104), 1000. Trustees ti. Erie (31 Pa. St. 515), 527. TrBStees v. Jamison (Ky., 15 S. W. Rep. 1), 807. 1322. Trustees v. Leffens (23 III. 90), 90. Trustees v. Mk;ConaeU (12 111. 138), 1353 1370 Trustees' v. Peaslee (15 N. H. 331), 660. Trustees v. Railway Co. (63 HI. 299), 1888. Trustees v. Rome (29 Hun, 396), 852. Trustees v. Shepherd (111., 28 N. E. Rep. 1073). 1333. Trustees v. Trustees (81 111. 470), 1S31. Trustees v. White (48 Ohio St. 577; 29 N. E. Rep. 47), 887. Trustees v. Winston (5 St. &P. (Ala.) 17), 7. Trustees &c. v. City of Davenport (65 Iowa, 633), 1180. Trustees &c. v. Hill (6 Cowen, 23), S90. Trustees &c. v. King (12 Mass. 546), 563. Trustees &c. v. Moody (62 Ala. 389), 280. Trustees &c. v. Parks (10 Me. 441), 56. Trustees &c. v. Rausch (122 Ind, 167 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 717), 1105. Trustees &c. v. Tatman (13 111. 27), im, 1024, 1368. Trustees of Beltast Academy v. Sal- mond (1 1 Me. 109), 633. Trustees of Belleview v. Hohn (82 Ky. 1), 230, 644. Trustees of Eiie Academy v. Erie (31 Pa. St. 515), 97, 510. Trustees of Public Schools v. Taylor (30 N. J. Eq. 61«), 7a, 8,5. Trustees of Schools v. People (121 111. .553), 1347. Trustees of Schools v. Southaitl (31 lU. App. 359), 867. Tubble V. Everett (51 Miss. 37), 246. Tube Works Co. v. City of Cham- beriain (Dak., 37 N. W. Rep. 763), 643. Tuckahae Canal v. Tuckahoe R. Co. (11 Leigh (Va.), 43), «7B. Tucker v. Aiken (7 N. H. 113), 198, 348, 356, 368, 387. Tucker v. Justice (13 Ired. (N. C.) Law, 434), 303. Tucker v. Justices (34 Ga. 870), 1383 Tucker 'v. Raleigh (75 N. G. 267), 937. Tucker «. Rankin (15 Barb, 471), 1415. Tucker v. Sellers (Ind., 30 N. E. Rep. 531), 1189. Tufts V. Charlestown (4 Gray, 537), 699, TOO. Tufts V. State (119 Ind. 232; 21 N. E. - Rep. 892), 133& Tufts V. Town of Chester (63 Vt. 353), 995. Tugman v. Chicago (78 111. 405), 518, 520, 608, 1310. Tuley «. State (1 Ind. 500). 1.S34. Tunbridge v. Royalton (58 Vt. 213), 1429. Tupelo V. Beard (56 Miss. 632), 1399. Turfler, In re (44 Barb. 46). 1383. Turk V. Commonwealth (129 Pa. St. 151), 189. Turner v. Althous (6 Neb. 54), 1364, 1577. Turner v. Commissioners (10 Kan. 16), 1530. Turner v. Cruzen (70 Iowa, 203), 240, 651. Turner v. Dartmouth (13 Allen, 291), 1146. Turner v. Hadden (62 Barb. 480), 1000. Turner v. Indianapolis (96 Ind. 51), 1484. Turner v. Killian (12 Neb. 580), 336. Turner v. Mayor &c. of Forsyth (78 Ga. 683; 3 S. W. Rep. 649), 615. T.a»ner V. Newbtltgh (109 N. Y. 301; 16 N. E. Rep. 344), 781, 1438, 1444, 1484, 1486. Turner V. SiEson (137 Mass. 191), 336. Turner v. Thomas (10 Mo. App. 342), 214. Turner v. Wilson (49 Ind. 581), 532. Turner v. Woodbury County (57 Iowa, 440), 10, 745. Turaey v. Town of Bridgeport (55 Conn. 412; 13 Atl. Rep. 520), 8ie, 869, 880. Turnpike Co. v. Buffalo (58 N. Y. 639), 1491. Turnpike Co. v. McKean (11 Johns. Wl 1266, 1367. Turnpike Co. v. Pomfret (30 Conn, 899), 1271, 1273. Turnpike Road Co. v. Graver (45 Pa. St, S86), 1141. Turpen v. County Comm'rs (7 Ind. ■ 182). 187. Turrill v. Grattan (53 Cal. 97), 1174. ccxlvi TABLE or CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] /Tuscaloosa v. Wright (3 Port. (Ala.) 3b0), 1367. Tutt V. Hobbs (17 Mo. 486), 313. Tuttle, Ex parte (Cal., 37 Pac. Rep, 933), 597. Tuttle V. Gary (7 Me. 426), 351. Tuttle V. Everett (51 Miss. 27), 241. Tuttle V. Weston (59 Wis. 151), 353. Twenty-second Street, In ro (15 Phila. 409), 670. Twiss V. City of Port Huron (63 Mich. 528; 30 N. W, Rep.. 177), 1066, 1173. Twogood V. New York (102 N. Y. 216), 1480. Tyerman, In re (48 Fed. Rep. 167), 1240. Tyler v. Alford (38 Me. 530), 339. Tyler v. Beacher (44 Vt. 648)', 682, 930. Tyler v. Elizabethtown &c. R. Co. (9 Bush, 510), 97. Tyler v. Henry (2 Pick. 397). 1270. Tyler v. Hudson (147 Mass. 609), 68B. Tyler v. Nelson (14 Gratt. 214), 335. Tyler v. State (63 Vt. 300), 1265. Tyler v. Sturdy (108 Mass. 196), 1404, 1408. Tyler v. Trustees (14 Oregon, 485 ; 13 Pac. Rep. 329), 711. Tyler v. Williston (63 Vt. 269), 1429, 1481. Tyree v. Wilson (9 Gratt. 59), 326. Tyron v. School Directors (51 Pa, St. 9), 1393. Tyson v. Milwaukee (50 Wis, 78), 677. u. Uhl V. Taxing Dist. (6 Lea, 610), 1376, Uhrig V. St. Louis (44 Mo, 458), 1188. Ulam V. Boyd (87 Pa. St, 477), 863, 2ii3. Uline V. New York Cent, R. Co. (101 N. Y, 98), 1457. Ulman v. Mayor of Baltimore (73 Md. 587), 1178, 1179, 1186, Ulrich V, Commonwealth (6 Bush, 400). 1350. Underbill v. Essex (Vt., 23 Atl. Rep. 617), 1429. Underbill v. Gibson (2 N, H. 353), 828. Underbill's Will, In re (3 N, Y. Supl. 2051, 564. Underwood v. Brockman (4 Dana, 309), 1577. Underwood v, Stuyvesant (19 Johns. 181). 1406, Union v. Crawford (19 Cofan. 831), 150, ' Union v. Durkes (38 N. J. Law, 31), 1145. Union v. Rader (41 N. J. Law, 617), 471. Union &c. Ry. Co. v, Philadelphia (101 U, S. 538), 1358, Union Bank v. State (9 Yerg, (Tenn,) 490), 1352. 1383, Union Civil Tp. v. Berrvman (Ind., 28 N. E. Rep, 774), 1014. Union County v. Knox County (90 Tenn. 541; 18 S, W. Rep, 354), 'm.. Union County v. Slocum (16 Oregon, 237; 17 Pac. Rep. 876i, 894. Union County Court v. Robinson (27 Ark, 116), 1391, Union Depot & R. Co. i). Smith (Colo.. 27 Pac. Rep, 329); 195, Union E, R. of Brooklyn, In re (112 N, Y. 61; 19 N. E, Rep, 664), ,595 Union Ferry Co.. In re (98 N, Y. 139), 569, 670, 682. Union Pac. Ry, Co. v. City of Kan- sas City (42 Kan, 497; 22 Pac. Rep, 633), 400, Union Pac, R. Co. v. Colfax County (4 Neb, 450), 931, Union Pac. Ry, Co. v. Comm'rs of Davis County (6 Kan, 256), 443, 945, Union Pac. R. Co, v. Comm'rs of Dgdge County (98 U. S. 541j, 241, 244, 245, 246, 247, 1567, Union Pac. R. Co. ■;;. Lincoln County (3 Dill, 300), 931, 935, 960, 1568. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Merrick County (3 Dill, 359), 960. Union Sav. Ass'n v. Kehlor (7 Mo, App, 165), 709. Union School Tp. v. First Nat, Bank (102 Ind, 4«4; 3 N, E, Rep, 194; 1 West. Rep. 107), 643, 815, 821. Union Township v. Smith (39 Iowa, 9), 331. Union Trust Co. v. Monticello &c, R. Co, (63 N, Y. 814), 958. Union Trust Co. v. Weber (96 111. 346), 1573. United Brethren Church v. Van Dusen (37 Wis. 54), 393. United Hebrew Ass'n v. Benshimol (130 Mass. 325), 529. United States v. Adams (24 Fed, Rep. 348), 331, United States v. American Water- works Co. (37 Fed. Ref). 747), 1311. United States v. Anthony (11 Blatch. (U, S, C. C.) 200), 376. United States v. Arredondo (6 Pet, 729), 609. TABLE OF CASES. ocxlvii, [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] United States v. Austin (2 Cliff. 325), 185. United States v. Boyd (5 How. 39), 337. United States w.-Boyd (15 Pet. 187), 319. 334. United States v. Brown (9 How. 487), 181. United States v. Chassell (6 Blatohf. 431). 18.1. United States v. City of New Or- leans'(31 Fed. Eep. 537), 900. United States v. City of Sterling (3 Biss. 410). 804, 1379. United States r. Clark County (96 U. S. 312), 137.4. United States v. County of Clark (95 U. S. 769), 1375; \rm, 1.547. United States u Cruiksliank (93 U. S. 542), 144, 145. 376. United States t). Dashiel (4 Wall. 182), 331. United States v. Davis (B McLean, 484), \6'i5. Uniteil States v. Gaussfn (3 Woods, 93; 97 U. S. 584). 820. United States v. Giles (9 Cranch, 213), 334. United States v. GirauU (11 How. 28), 337. , United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co. (113 U. S. 645), 741. United States v. Green (19 D. 0. 230). 1257, 12.19. United States v. Harris (1 Sumn. 31), 671, 683. United States v. Harris (106 U. S. 6§9), 147. United States v. Hillogas (8 Wash. C. C. 73), 740. United States v. Hine (8 MacArthur (D. C). 37), 336. United States v. Hodson (10 Wall. i'9.5), 313. United States v. Holly (3 Cr. C. C. 656). 604. United States v. Hoyt (1 Blatchf. 33fi). 330. United States v. Hudson (7 Cranch, 33), 205. United States©. Humason(6 Sawyer, 199). 313. 331. United States v. Insurance Co. (32 Wall. 99), 50. United States v. Irwin (137 U. S. 135), 743. United States v. Jefferson County (1 McCrary, 356), 944, 1373. United States u Jones (109 U. S. 518), 669, 695, 696. United States v. Keehler (9 Wall. 88), 321. United States v. Keokuk (6 Wall. 514), 1379. United States v. Kirkpatrick (9 Wheat. 720), 819, .'520, 831, 329, 741. United States v. Labette County (3 McCrary, 35), 1509. United States v. Le Baron (IS How. 72), 814. United States v. Lee (106 U, S. 196), 30, 740, 741. 1573. United States v. Lincoln County (5 Dill. 184), 1375. United States v. Linn (15 Peters, 290), 313. 953. United States v. McCarney (1 B^ed. Rep. 1041, 330. United States v. McDougall (121 U. S. 89), 743. / United States v. McKelden (MacAr- thur & Mackey, 163), 354, 361, 375. United States v. Macon County (99 U. S. 582), 1373, 1374; 1380, 1384, 1385. United States v. Maurice (3 Brock. C. C. ll-i), 313. United States v. Memphis (97 U. S. 384\ 395, 404, 1365, 1366, 1367, 1368. United States v. Miller County (4 Dill. 233), 804. United States v. Moore (3 Brock. C. C. 317), 334i United States v. Morgan (11 How. 154). 331. United States v. Morgan (3 Wash. C. C. 10), 810. United States v. Nelson (3 Brock. (U. S.)64), 311. United States v. New Orleans. (98 U. S. 38!), 794, 1373,- 1375, 1378, 13til. 1384, 15ii5. . United States v. NichoU (13 Wheat. 505). 319, 741. United States v. Percheman (7 Pet. 51), 1367. United States v. Port of Mdbile (12 Fed. Rep. 768), 434. United States v. Port of Mobile (4 Woods, 536), 1375. United States v. Powell (14 Wall. 493), 330. United States v. Prescott (3 How. 578), 331, 834. United States v. Railroad Bridge Co. (6 McLean, 517). 684. United States v. Reese (93 U. S. 314), 145, 876. United States v. Reynolds (98 U. S. 145), 53. United States v. liogers (38 Fed. Rep. 607), 313. United States v. School Dist. (20 Fed. Rep. 294). 1379. United States v. Silverman (4 Dill. 234), 1379. ccxlviii TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] tTnited States v. Singer (15 Wall. Ul), 320. UnitPd States v. Slater (4 Woods (XJ. 8. C. C), 356), 376. United States v. State Bank (96 U. S. 30), 209. United States v. Swearingen (11 Gill & J. 373), 1585. United States v. Thomas (15 Wall. 337), 321. United States v. Tingey (5 Pet. 343), .313. United States v. Twenty-five Cases of Cloth (Crabbe (U. S.), 356), 111. United States v. Union Pac. E. Co. (91 U. 8. 73), 956. United States v. Van Zandt (11 Wheat. 184), 319, 741. United States v. Villato (3 Dallas, 370). 139. United States v. Watts (1 New Mex. 553), 321. United States v. Wells (3 Cr. C. C. 45), 604. United States v. Wiley (11 Wall. 508), 475. United States v. Williams (5 McLean, 133). 1585. United States v. Wright (1 McL. (U. S.) 509), 203. United States Distilling Co. v. Chi- cago (113 III. 19), 1243. United States Mortgage 'Co. v. Gross (93 111. 483), 639. University v. Indiana (14 How. 368), 4. Universitv v. Skidmore (87 Tenn. 155), 1353. UpdegraflE vl Crans (47 Pa. St. 103), 398. UpdegrafE v. Palmer (107 Ind. 181), 1420. Upham V. Marsh (138 Mass. S46), 339. Uppington v. Oviatt(34 Ohio St. 332), 1385. Upton V. Northbridge (15 Mass. 547), 976. Upton V. Stoddard (47 N. H. 167). 370. Urquhart v. Ogdensburg (91 N. Y, 67), 776, 1080, 1435. Urquhart v. Ogdensburgh (33 Hun, 75), 1504. V. Vacation of Centre Street, In re (115 Pa. St. 247; 8 Atl. Eep. 56), 1124, 1135. Vacation of Henry Street, In re (123 Pa. St. 346; 10 Atl. Rep. 785), 119. Vacation of Howard Street, In re (Pa., 31 Atl. Rep. 974). 1193. ' Vail V. Bentley (23 N. J. Law, 533), 1576. Vail V. Long Island R. Co. (106 N. Y. 283), 1410. Vail V. Morris &c. Coi (31 N, J. Law, 189), 1419. Valentine v. Boston (33 Pick. 75), 1404. Valentine v. St-'Paul (34 Minn. 446), . 343. Vale Mills v. Nashua (63 N. H. 136), 777. Valley County v. Robinson (Neb., 49 N. W. Rep. 356), 860. Valley Iron Works v. Moundsville (11 West Va. 1), 931. Valparaiso v. Gardner (97 Ind. 1 ; 49 Am. Rep. 416), 568, 637, 647, 805. 839, 848, 971, 131H. Van Allen v. Assessors (3 Wall. 583), 1353. Van Alstine v. People (37 Mich. 533), 1064, Van Baalen v. People (40 Mich. 358), 601, 1384. Van Bergen v. Bradley (36 N. Y. 316), 1415. Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush (128 N. Y. 50: 37 N. E. Rep. 973; 13 N. Y. Supl. 545), 1093. Van Buren v. Wells (53 Ark. 368; 14 S. W. Rep. 38), 516, 603. Van Camp v. Board &c. (9 Ohio St. 406), 1345. Vance v. Little Rock (30 Ark. 439), llfiO, 1377, 1383, 1386. Van Cott V. Supervisors (18 Wis. 347), 1573. Van Da Vere v. Kansas City (107 Mo. 83), 1456. Vandemark v. Porter (40 Hun, 397), 1406, 1414. Van Den burgh i;. Greenbush(66N.Y. 1), 536. Vanderbeck v. Inhabitants of Eogle- wood (39 N. J. Law, 845), 450. Vanderbilt v. Adams (7 Cowen, 349), 669, 1018, 1331. Vanderslice v. Philadelphia (103 Pa. St. 103), 1479. Vandertolph v. Highway Comm'rs (50 Mich. 330), 705. Vandine, Petitioner (6 Pick. 187), 531, 550, 596, 1035. Van Doren v. Mayor (9 Paige, 388), 1574. Van Dusen t>. Fridley (6 Dak. 333; 43 N. W. Rep. 703). 436. Vandyke v. State (34 Ala. 81), 740. Van Eppes v. Mobile County (85 Ala. 460), 744. TABLE OF CASES. ocxlix [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. T89-1605.] Van Hastrup. v. Madison City (1 Wall. 291), 946. Van Hook v. Barnett (4 Dev. L. (N. oaes), 313. Van Hook v. Selraa (70 Ala. 361), 520, 1234, 1355. Van Horn v. Des Moines (68 Iowa, 447), 264, 1807. Van Husan v. Heames (Mich., 53 N. W. Rep. 18). 584. Van Norman c. Circuit Judge (45 Mich. 204), 1.536. Van Orsdall v. Hazard (3 Hill, 243), 203. Vanover v. Justices (27 Ga. 354), 802, 1393, 1568. Van Pelt v. City of Davenport (42 Iowa, 308), 1136, 1436. Van Phul v. Hammer (29 Iowa, 232), 60. Van Rensselaer v. Albany (15 Abb. N. C. 457), 777. Van Rensselaer v. Palmatier(2 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 24), 1588. Van Sant v. Harlem Stage Company (59 Md. 334), 617. Van Schaick v. Sigel (60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 122), 333, 22.i. Van Sicklen v. Burlington (27 "Vt. 70), 1394. Van Steenbergh v. Bigelow (3 Wend. 42), 339. Van Swarton v. Commonwealth (34 Pa. St. 131), 1258. Van Val ken burg v. Brown f43 Cal. 43; 13 Am. Rep. 1.36), 376. Van Valkenburg v. Milwaukee (43 Wis. 574), 698, 699. Van Valken burgh v. Earley (1 Lu- zerne Leg. Reg. 257), 1596. Van Valkenburgh v. Patterson (47 N. J. Law, 146). 331. Van West Bd. of Ed. v. Edson (18 Ohio St. 221). 624. Van Wormer v. Mayor &c. of Albany (15 Wend. 263), 1018, 1023. Varden v. Mount (78. Ky. 86), 535, 537 Varick'v. Smith (5 Paige, 137; 28 Am. Deo. 417), 632. Vamey v. Justice (86 Ey. 596), 160. Varney v. Manchester (58 N. H. 430), 1448. Varney v. Stevens (23 Me. 331), 1066. Vason V. Augusta (38 Ga. 543), 517, 1353. Vaughan v. Congdon (56 Vt. Ill), 339 Vaughan v. Johnson (77 Va. 300), 315. Vaughn v. City of Ashland (Wis., 37 N. W. Rep. 809), 1160. Vaughn v. Village of Port Chester (15N. Y. Supl. 474). 1183. V&ught V. Board (101 Ind. 1S3), 1430. Vaux V. Nesbit (1 McCord Ch. (S. C.) 378), 140. 141. Vawter v. Franklin College (53 Ind. 88), 301. Veale v. Boston (135 Mass. 187). 760. Veeder v. Lima (19 Wis. 280), 966. Veeder v. Little Falls (100 N. Y. 343), 1438, 1450, 1473. 1473. Venable v. Curd (3 Head (Tenn.), 583). 300. Veneman v. Jones (llfilnd. 41), 1342. Venice v. Murdock (93 U. S. 494), 834, 947, 953, 1390. Venice v. WoodruflE (63 N. Y. 463), 953 Verheck v. Scott (71 Wis. 59). 3S0. Verderey v. Village (83 Ga. 138), 1370. Vermont &c. R. Co. v. County Comm'rs (10 Cush. 13). 1594. Verona's Appeal (108 Pa. St. 83), 510. Vestal t\ Little Rock (54 Ark. 321 ; 16 S. W. Rep. 891), 401, 403,411. Vestal «. Little Rock (54 Ark. 323; 15 S. W. Rep. 891 ; 16 S. W. Rep. 291), 400, 409, 410. Vioksburg v. Hennessey (54 Miss. 391), 1438. 1494. Vicksburg v. Marshall (59 Miss. 563), 1431. Vicksburg v. Tobin (100 U. S. 430), 1388. Vidal V. Girard's Ex'rs (2 How. 127), . 563, 660. Vida'at v. New Orleans (43 La. Ann. 1181), 757. Vigo Tp. V. Board of Comm'rs (111 Ind. 170; 12 N. E. Rep. 305), 898, 907. Village of Ballston Spa v. Markham (11 N. Y. Supl. 826), 12;S5. Village of Betholto v. Conely (9 111. App. 389), 548. Village of Braceville v. Doherty (30 111. App. 64.5), 530, 1235. Village of Brooklyn v. Smith (104 111. 4391. 673. Village of Buffalo v. Harling(Minn., 53 N. W. Rep. 931), 1588. Village of Cahokia v. Rautenberg (88 III. 319), 213. Village of Carthage v. Frederick (123 N. Y. 36S), 653, 1389, 1331. Village of Cerro Gordo v. Rawlings (111., 25 N. E. Rep. 1006), 1335. Village of Corning u. Rector &c. of Christ Church (33 N. Y. St. Rep. 766; 11 N. Y. Supl. 763). 564. Village of Des Plaines v. Poyer (33 111. App., 574), 1053. Village of Fulton v. Tucker (3 Hun, 529), 1199. ccl TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Village of Glenooe v. People (78 111. 383), 1583. VillaKe of Hartington r. Luge (Neb., 50 N. W. Rep. 957). 403. 409. Village of Hyde Park v. Borden (94 111. SfiV 571, 1093. 1172. Village of Hyde Park v. Carton (133 111. 100). 1175. Village of Hyde Park v. City of Chicago (124 111. 156; 16 N. E. Eep. 333). 406.^413. 418. Village of Jefferson v. Chapman (137 111. 438; 20 N. E. Eep. 33), 1478, 1479. Village of Mansfield v. Moore (111., 16 N. E Rep. 346). 1488, 1490. Village of Morgan Park v. Gahan (Ill.,2fi N.E.Rep. 108.i), 717, 1105. Village of Niagara Falls v. Salt (45 Hun, 41), 1243. Village of North Springfield v. City of Springfield (111., 29 N. E. Eep. 849), 408. Village of Orleans v. Perry (24 Neb. 831 ; 40 N. W. Rep. 417). 1499. Village of Pine City v. Munch (43 Minn. 348), 1058, 1059, 1588. Village of Ponca v. Crawford (23 Neb. 663; 37 N. W. Rep. 609), 1499. Village of St. Johnsbury v. Thomp- son (59 Vt. 301), 486. 513. Village of Shelby v. Clagett (Ohio, 33 N. E. Rep. 407), 1478. Village of Sheridan v. Hibbard (111., 9 N. E. Rep. 901), 1488. Village of Stamford v. Fischer (17 N. y. Supl. 609), 1335. Village of Tarrytown v. Pocontico Water-works Co. (1 N, Y. Supl. 394;. 1295. Village of Winooski v. Gokey (49 Vt. 282), 539. Villivaso v. Barthet (39 La. Ann. 247), 533, 1344. Vinal V. Dorchester (7 Gray, 431), 1466. Vincennes v. Callender (86 Ind. 484), 971. Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light Co. (Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 573), 568. Vincennes University v. Indiana (14 How. 268). 7, 51, 53, 465. Vincent v. County of Lincoln (30 Fed. Rep. 747), 15^7. Vincent v. McCosta County Super- visors (53 Mich. 340), 1540. Vincent v. Nantucket (18 Cush. 103), 308, 350, 642, C64. Vintners' Co. v. Passey (1 Burr. 235), 533 531 Virginia, Ex parte (100 U. S. 339), 147. Virginia v. Hall (96 111. 278), 1182. Virginia v. Rives (100 U. 8. 813), 147. Virginia &o. R. Co. v. Elliott (5 Nev. 358), 696, 699. 700. Virginia &c. R. Co. v. Lyon County (6 Nev. 681, 939. Vivian v. Otis (24 Wis. 518; 1 Am. Eep. 199), 334, 327. Voegtly V. Pittsburgh &c. E. Co. (2 Grant's Cas. (Pa.) 243), 691. Vogel V. Antigo City (Wis., 51 N. ♦W. Rep. 1008). 782. 893. Vogel V. City of Little Eock (Ark.y 19 S. W. Eep. 13). 401, 408. 410. Voght V. City of Buffalo (N. Y., 31 N. E. Eep. 340), 1 122. Volk V. Newark (47 N. J. Law, 117), 513. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy (4 Wall. 585), 94, 435, 473, 1372, 1373, 1S78, 1381. Voorhies v. City of Houston (70 Tex. 331; 7S. W. Rep. 679). 873. Vore V. Willard (47 Barb. SiO), 1399. Vosburg V. McCrary (77 Tex. 568; 14 S. W. Rep. 1W.5). 104. 620. Vose V. Frankfort (64 Me. 229), 825. Vroman v. Dewey (23 Wis. 530), 438. w. Wabash &o. E. Co. v. McCleave (108 111. 368), 1380. Wabash Cityu. Carver (129 Ind. 553), 142.1. 1437. 1481. Wabaunsee County v. Walker (8 Kan. 431), 1577. Waco V. Texas (57 Tex. 635), 1365. Wade V. City of Richmond (18 Gratt. 583), 393, 396, 646, i;i66, 1368. Wade V. Newbern (77 N. C. 460), 360, 261, 263. Wadleigh v. Oilman (13 Me. 403), 59:i, 1054, 1346. Wadraven v. Memphis (4 Coldw. (Tenn.)431), 176. Wadsworth v. Eau Claire County (103 U. S. 584), 944. Wadsworth v. Supervisors (103 U. S. 534), 630. Wadsworth v. Wadsworth (13 N. Y. 376). 141. Wadsworth v. Wendell (5 Johns. Ch. 224), 958. Waffle V. Short (25 Kan. 503), 318. Wager v. Trov Union E. Co. (35 N. Y. 526), 679. Wahlgreen v. Kansas City (43 Kan. 243), 11 7.'). Wahoo V. Dickinson (33 Neb. 426 ; 36 N. W. Eep. 813), 393. TABLE OF OASES. cell [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Wahoo V. Reeder (Neb., 43 N. W. Rep. 1145), 14. Wait V. Ray (67 N. Y. 36), 973. Waitz V. Ormsby County (1 Nev. 370), 1587. Wakefield v. Alton (3 N. H. 378), 983. Wakefield v. Patterson (25 Kan. 709), 355 379 13^3, Wakefield v. Phelps (37 N. H. 295), 528. Wakeham v. St. Clair Township (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 696), 1457, 1493. Walcottv. Walcott (19 Vt. 37), 296. Waldenr. Dudley (49 Mo. 431). 1364. Waldo V. Wallace (13 Ind. 569), 193, 195, 1262. Waldron v. Haverhill (143 Mass. 583; 10 N. E. Rep. 481), 760, lObO. Waldron v. Lee (5 Pick. 333), 1368. Wales V. Muscatine (4 Iowa, 302). 1597. Walker v. British Guardian Ass'n (18 Q. B. 277; 21 L. J. Q, B. 257), 332. Walker v. City of Aurora (III., 39 N. E. Rep. 741), 1094, 1164, 1186, 1366, 1367. Walker v. City of Camden (111., 39 N. E. Rep. 741), 519. Walker v. Chapman (33 Ala. 46), 320. Walker v. Cincinnati (21 Ohio St. 14), 933. Walker v. District of Columbia (6 Mackey, 352). IICO. Walker v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. (6 Harr. 594), 697. Walker v. Evansville (33 Ind. 393), 486. Walker v. Kansas ^ity (99 Mo. 647), 1430, 1451. Walker v. Osgood (98 Mass. 348), 309. Walker v. Eogan (1 Wis. 597), 296. Walker v. St. Louis (15 Mo. 563), 1577. Walker v. Springfield (94 111. 364), 1357, 1370. Walker v. Swartwout (13 Johns. 444 ; 7 Am. Dec. 334), 312, 213. Walker v. Town of Reidsville (96 N. C. 382; 3 S. E. Rep. 74), 1493. Walker v. Wasco County (Oregon, 19 Pac. Rep. 81), 1587. Walkley v. Muscatine (6 Wall. 481), 1376, 1378, 1379. Wall, In re (48 Cal. 279), 487. Wall V. County of Monroe (103 U. S. 74), 823, 903, 938. Wallv. TurnbuU (16 Mich. 228), 819. Wallace v. Fletcher (30 N, H. 434),, 1413. ' ; Wallace v. Karlenoweski (19 Barb. 118), 703. Wallace v. Lawyer (54 Ind. 501), 1114, 1596. Wallace v. Menasha (49 Wis. 79), 752, 773, 1578. Wallace v.' Muscatine (4 Greene (Iowa), 373), 9. Wallace v. San Jose (39 Cal. 180). 208, 234. 643. Wallace v. Shelton (14 La. Ann. 498), 1185. Wallace v. Trustees (84 N. C. 164), 110. Waller 17. Wood (101 .Ind. 138), 1036. Wallich V. Manitowoc (57 Wis. 9; 14 N. W. Rep. 812), 1151. Wallingford v. Southington (16 Conn. 435), 990, 996. Wallis V. Johnson School Township (75 Ind. 3681, 213, 214. 830. Wain V. Philadelphia (99 Pa. St. 330). 501. 503. Walnut Township v. Jordan (38 Kan. 563; 16 Pac. Rep. 813), 444, 463, 466. Walnut Township v. Wade (103 XT. S. 683), 936, 952, 958, 959. Walpole V. Hopkinton (4 Pick. 358), 985, 988. Walrath v. Eedfield (18 N. Y. 457). 1491. Walsh V. City of Union (13 Or. 589; 11 Pac. Rep. 312), 517, 604. Walsh V. Rutland (56 Vt. 228), 752. Walsh V. Trustees &o. (96 N. Y. 427), 1427. Walston V. Nevin (128 U. S. 578), 1179. Walters v. Duke (31 La. Ann. 668), 1356, 1370. Walters v. Shields (3 Met. (Ky.) 553), 1364. Waltham v. Brookline (119 Mass. 479), 993. Waltham v. Kemper (55 111. 346), 265, 267, 745. Waltham v. Newburyport(150 Mass. 569; 33 N. E. Rep. 379), 980. Waltham v. Town of MuUaly (37 Neb. 433), 996. Walther v. Warner (35 Mo. 377). 703. • Waltmeyer v, Wisconsin &c. Ry. Co. (64 Wis. 59), 706. Walton V. Riley (85 Ky. 418; 3 S. W. Rep. 605), 791. Walwoi-th Bank v. Farmers' L. & T. Co. (15 Wis. 639), 293. Wan Yin, In re (23 Fed. Rep. 7011 13.33. Wapella v. Davis (39 111. App. 693), 1267. cclii TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1805.] Wapello V. Bingham {10 Iowa, 39 ; 74 Am. Dec. 370). 339. Ward V. Churn (18 Gratt. 801), 956. Ward t>. Davis (3 Sandf. 503), 1406. Ward V. Farwell (97 III. 593), 548. Ward V. Flood (48 Cal. 36), 1345. Ward V. Hartford County (13 Conn. 404), 745, 1585, 1586, 1596. Ward V. Little Rock (41 Ark. 526), 1034. Ward V. Maryland (31 Md. 379), 1388. Ward V. Maryland (13 Wall. 163), 145. Ward V. Maryland (13 Wall. 418), 144, 1355. Ward V. Stahl (81 N, Y. 406), 331, 337. Ward V. Town of Forest Grove (Ore- gon, 25 Pac. Rep. 120), 710. 711. Ward V. Ward (7 Exch. 838), 1421. Wardens of St. Saviours v. Bostock (2 N. R. 175), 329. Wardsboro v. Jamaica (59 Vt. 514), 1429. Ware v. Peroival (61 Me. 391), 1399, 1400, 1579. Waring v. Mayor &c. of Mobile (24 Ala. 701), 94, 97, 110. 537. Waring v. Savannah (60 Ga, 96), 1396. Warner v. Beers (23 Wend. 103), .50. Warner v. Charlestown (2 Gray, 104), 1366. Wai'ner v. Grace (14 Minn, 487), 667. Warner v. Holyoke (112 Mass. 362), 1472. Warner v. Knox (60 Wis. 434; 7 N. W. Rep. 372), 558. Warner v. Mower (H Vt. 385), 375, 353, 360. Warner ti. Rising Fawn Iron Co. (3 Woods, 514), 958. Warner v. Village of Lawrence (62 Mich. 251 ; 28 N. W. Rep. 844), 1537. Warnock v. Lafayette (4 La. Ann, 419), 293. Warren v. Brown (Neb., 47 N. W. :Pep..633), 1089. Warren v. Bunnell (U Vt. 600), 685. Warren v. Charlestown (2 (Jray, 104), 16, 67, 88, 393, 415, 534. Warren v. City of Chicago (118 111. 329; 9 N. E. Rep. 218), 1165. Warren v. Clement (34 Hun, 473), 230. Warren v. Geer (117 Pa. St. 207), 1388. Warren v. Grand Haven (30 Mich. 24), 1186, 1399. Warren v. Henly (31 Iowa, 31), 1130, 1169. Warren v. Mayor of Lyons (83 Iowa, 351), 634. Warren v. Skinner (30 Conn. 562), 1339. Warren v. Stat^ (11 Mo. 583), 326. Warren v. Town of Wausau (66 Wis. 206), 1192. Warren County v. Marcy (97 U. S. 96), 9i7, 960, 964. Warren County v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank (97 U. S. 110). 964. Warren Countv v. Post (97 U. S. 110), 964. Whrren Countv v. Ward (21 Iowa, 84), 327. Warren County Supervisors v, Pat- terson (56 III. Ill), 624. Warrensburgh v. Miller (77 Mo. 56), 1578. Warrin v. Baldwin (105 N. T. 534; 12 N. E. Rep. 49), 883. Wartman v. City of Philadelphia (33 Pa. St. 203), 599, 1244. Warts V. Hoagland (114 U. 8. 606), 696. Warwick v. Mayo (15 Gratt. 528), 1258. ' Wash V. New York (107 N. Y. 220), 1427. Washburn v. Board of Comm'rs (104 Ind. 321 ; 3 N. E. Rep. 757), 198, 798, 968, 973. 974. Washburn v. 0shkosh(6O Wis. 453; 5 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 517), 109, 1364, 1365, 13G6, 1367, 1400. Washburn v. Phillips (3 Met. 396), 1594. Washer v. Bullitt County (110 U. S. 558), 1424, 1425, 1437. Washington v. Coler (51 Fed. Rep. 363), 965. Washington v. Frank (1 Jones, 436), 543. Washington v. Hammond (76 N. C. 933), 517. " Washington v. Kent (38 Conn. 249), 988. Washington v. Nashville (1 Swan, 177), 1123, 1186. Washington v. Stanford (3 Johns. 193), 446, Washington v. State (13 Ark. 753), 1336, 1370. Washington &c. Church v. New York (20 Hun, 297), 1572. Washington Avenue, I,n re (69 Pa. St. 352), 1186, 1349, 1389. Washington Cemetery v. Prospect Park R. Co. (68 N. Y. 591), 671, 681, 1433. Washington County v. Weld County (13 Colo. 152; 20 Pac. Rep. 373), 463. Washington Gas Co. v. Seminary (53 Mo. 480), 314. TABLE OF CASES. ccliii [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] Washington Ice Co. v. Lay (103 Ind. 48; a K E. Rep. 222), 347, 1415. Washington Supervisors v. Darant (9 Wall. 415), 1378. Water Comra'rs v. East Saginaw (33 Mich. 164), 1373. Water Comm'rs v. GafiEney (34 N. J. Law, 183), 1897. Water Co. v. City of Syracuse (116 N. Y. 167; 22 N. E. Rep. 381), 566, 567. Water Co. v. Ware (16 Wall. 566), 1215, 1444. Waterbury v. Board of Comm'rs (10 Mont. 515; 24 Am. St. Rep. 67), 1597. Waterbury v. Darien (8 Conn. 163; 9 Conn. 256), 1600. Waterbury v. Laredo (60 Tex. 519), 186. Waterbury v. Laredo (68 Tex. 565 ; 5 S. W. Rep. 81), 636. Waterbury v. Lawlor (51 Conn. 171), 1400. Waterloo v. Union Mill Co. (72 Iowa, 487; 34 N. W. Rep. 197), 1218, 1406. Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shan- ahan (128 N. Y. 345), 684. Waters v. Bay View (61 Wis. 642), 1146. Waters v. Carroll (9 Yerg. 102), 330. Waters v. Leech (3 Ark. 110), 106, 518. Watertown v. Cowan (4 Paige, 510), 1403. Watertown v. Mayo (109 Mass. 315), 669, 1059. Watertown v. Robinson (69 Wis. 230), 1588. Watertown F. Ins. Co. v. Simmons (131 Mass. 85; 41 Am. Rep. 196), 323. Waterville v. County Comm'rs (59 Me. 80), 1371. Waterville v. Kennebec Co. (59 Me. 80), 1169. Water-works Co. v. Burkbart (41 Ind. 364), 112, 682. Water-works Co. v. Atlantic City (N. J., 6 Atl. Rep. 24), 1313. Water- works Co. v. Water Co. (N. J., 15 Atl. Rep. 581), 561. Watkins v. County Court (30 West Va. 657; 5 S. E. Rep. 654; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 305), 10, 1014. Watkins v. Walker (17 Tex. 585), 670. Watson V. Bennett (12 Barb. 196), . 260. ' Watson V. Chicago (115 111. 78), 1124, 1187. Watson V. City of Apple ton (63 Wis. 267; 22 N. W. Rep. 475), 893. Watson V. Comm'rs (83 N. C. 1), 1868. Watson V. Corey (Utah, 21 Pac. Rep. 1089), 415. Watson V. Crowsore (93 Ind. 220), 694. Watson V. N. Y. &c. R Co. (47 N. Y. 157), 691. Watson V. South Kingston (5 R. I. 5621, 684. Watson V.' Sutherland (5 Wall. 74), 651. Watson V. Tripp (11 R. L 98), 1308. Watson V. TurnbuU (34 La. Ann. 856), 578. Wattles V. People (13 Mich. 446). 211. Watts V. McLean (38 111. App. 537), 806. Watuppa Reservoir v. Fall River (134 Mass. 367), 765. Wauwatosa v. Gunyon (25 Wis. 271), 1887. Waxahachie t!. Brown (67 Tex. 519; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 348; 4 S. W. Rep. 207), 623. 833. Way V. Center Point (51 Iowa, 708), 428. Waycross City Council v. Youmans (85 Ga. 708). 203. Wavland v: County Comm'rs (4 "Gray, 500), 686, 1397. Waymire v. Powell (105 Ind. 328), 895. Wayne County v. Detroit (17 Mich. 899). 604. Wavne Savings Bank v. Stockwell "(84 Mich. 587), 1431. Wayne Tp. v. Porter Tp. (138 Pa. St. 181 ; 20 Atl. Rep. 989), 979. Weare v. New Boston (8 N. H. 203), Quo Weare i>. Sawyer (44 N. H. 198), 1886. Weaver v. Benjamin (18 N. Y. Supl. 630), 998. Weaver v. Cherry (8 Ohio (N. S.), 564), 1386. Weaver v. Devendorf (3 Denio, 117), 227, 1578. Webb V. Auspach (3 Ohio St. 522), 387. Webb V. Heme Bay Comm'rs (L. R. 5 Q. B. 642), 947. Webb V. La Fayette County (67 Mo. 353), 634. Webb V. Neal (5 Allen, 575), 568. Webber v. Townley (43 Mich. 534), 1273. Weber v. Agricultural Society (44 Iowa, 239), 646. Weber v. County of Santa Clara (59 Cal. 263), 696. coliv TABLE OF CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] Weber v. Creston City (75 Iowa, 16 : 89 N. W. Rep. 136), 1436. Weber v. Hamilton (72 Iowa, 577; 34 N. W. Rep. 424), 193. Weber v, Johnson (37 Mo. App. 601), 508. Weber v. Reintiard (73 Pa. St. 373), 1188. Weber v. San Francisco (1 Cal. 455), 1399. Weber v. Traubel (95 III. 437), 1383. Webster v. Byrnes (34 Cal. 273), 377. Webster v.' Harwinton (33 Conn. 131), 646, 664, 915, 1583. Webster v. Lansing (47 Mich. 193), 540. Webster v. People (98 111. 343). 1382. Webster County v. Hutchinson (60 Iowa, 731), 337. Webster County v. Taylor (19 Iowa, 117). 891. Weckerly v. Geyer (11 S. & R. (Pa.) 85), 218. Weckler v. Chicago (61 III. 143), 681. Wedneri;. State (49 Ark. 172), 1340. Weed V. Ballston Spa Villag;e (76 N. Y. 329), 321, 781, 1438, 1440, 1462. 1492. Week V. McClure (49 Cal. 638), 1577. Weeks v. Batchelder (41 Vt. 317), 368, 1336. Weeks v. City Treasurer (16 N. J. Law, 337), 1353. Weeks v. Dennett (63 N. H. 2), 164, 613. Weeks v. Forman (16 N. J. Law, 237), 530. Weeks v. Milwaukee (10 Wis. 242), 109, 558, 930, 1019, 1354, 1367, 1370, 1384, 1396. . Weet V. Brocfcport (16 N. Y. 161), 769. Wehn V. Com'm'rs of Gage County (5 Neb. 494), 672. Weidman v. Board of Education (7 N. Y. Supl. 309), 1343. Weightman v. City of Washington (1 Black,, 39), 9, 769, 1198. Weightman v. Clark (113 U. S. 256), 938, 1388. Weil V. Greene County (69 Mo. 281), 1588. ■' Weil V. Ricord (24 N. J. Eq. 169), 1039. Weill D. Kenfield(54 Cal. Ill), 1173. Weimer v. Bunbury (30 Mich. 201), 984, 1178. Weinckle v. New York &c. R. Co. (15 N. Y. St. Rep. 689), 588. Weir «. Borough of Plymouth (Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 94), 1146. Weir V. State (93 Ind. 311), 1543. Weirs v. Jones County (80 Iowa, 351), 746. Weis V. City of Madison (75 Ind. 241 ; 59 Am. Rep. 1351, 1095, 1098, 1099. Weisenberg v. Appleton (26 Wis. 56), 1477. Weismer v. Douglas (64 N. Y. 91), 929, 930. 1393. Weitz V. Independent Dist. (79 Iowa, 433), 809, 1330, 1332. W^ch V. Bowen (103 Ind. 253), 525. Welch V. County Court (39 West Va. 63; IS. E. Rep. 337), 449. Welch V. Gardner (133 Mass. 529), 1483. Welch V. Gleason (38 S. C. 247), 339. Welch V. Hotchkiss (39 Conn. 140), 551, 1346. Welch V. Portland (77 Me. 384), 1484. Welch V. Seymour (38 Conn. 387), 339. Welch V. Ste. Genevieve (1 Dillon C. C. 130), 130, 372, 290, 465, 471. Welch w. Strother (74 Cal. 413; 16 Pac. Rep. 23). 836. Weld V. Brooks (152 Mass. 397), 1489. Weidman v. Board (7 N. Y. Supl. 309), 1330. Welker v. Potter (18 Ohio St. 85), 59, 1064, 1171. Welland v. Comstock (58 Wis. 565), 1568. Weller v. Burlington (60 Vt. 28), 364, 753, 782. Weller v. McCormick (47 N. J. Law, 397; 1 Atl. Rep. 516), 1123, 1201, 1441. Welles V. Battelle (11 Mass. 477), 1272. Wellington, In re (16 Pick. 87;. 26 Am. Dec. 631), 682, 1530. Wellman v. Board &c. (84 Mich. 558; 47 N. W. Rep. 1099), 1289. Wells, Ex parte (31 Fla. 280), 469. Wells V. Atlanta (43 Ga. 67), 573, 1393. Wells V. Board of Ed. (78 Mich. 360), 1331. Wells V. Bnrbank (11 N. H. 393), 56, 88, 350. Wells V. Burnham (20 Wis. 113), 1174. Wells V. Company (47 N. H. 235), 350. Wells V, Mayor &c. of Kingston- upon-Hull(L. B. IOC. P. 402). 261. Wells V. Pontotoc County (103 U. S. 635), 933, 934. Wells V. Pressey (Mo., 16 S. W. Rep. 670), 709. Wells V. Rhodes (114 Ind. 467), 694, 1420. TABLK OF CASES. ccIt [The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Wells V. Somerset &c. E. Co. (47 Me, 345), 670. Wells V. Supervisors (103 U. S. 635), 619. 933. Wells V. Town of Salina (119 N. Y. 380; 33 N. E. Rep. 870), 79.1. Wellsborough v. New York &o, R. Co. (76 N. Y. 183), 937. Welsford v. Weidlein (23 Kan. 601), 1174. Welsh V. First Div. R. Co. (35 Minn. 314), 958. Welsh V. St. Louis (73 Mo. 71), 1462. Welsh V. Taylor (31 N. E. Rep. 896), 1412. Welsh V. Village of Rutland (56 Vt. 338). 10S7. Welsh V. Wilson (101 N. Y. 354), 1434. Welton V. Missouri (91 U, S. 375), 1433. Welton V. Townof Woloott(45Conn. 339), 998. Welton Co. v. Borough of Birming- ham (Conn., 24 Atl. Rep. 978), 1070. Wendell v. Brooklyn (39 Barb. 304), 184. Wendell v. Fleming (8 Gray, 613), 310. Wendell v. Troy (4 Abb. App. Dec. 563). 1478. Wendell v. Troy (39 Barb. 829). 1475. Wentworth v. Rochester (63 N. H, 244), 1416. Wentworth v. Smith (44 N, H. 419), 1468. Wentworth v. Summit (60 Wis. 381), 1481. Wenzlich v. McCotter (87 N. Y. 137), 1300, 1441. Werner v. Galveston (72 Tex. 33), 1385. Werth V. City of SpringHeld (78 Mo. 107), 708. Wertz V. Blair County (66 Pa. St. 18), 994, 1000. Wessman v. City of Brooklyn (16 N. Y. Supl. 97), 1080. West V. Ballard (32 Wis. 168), 647. West V. Bancroft (33 Vt. 367). 1393. West V. Brockport Village (16 N. Y. 161), 786, 1198. West V. Columbus (30 Kan. 633), 541. West V. Errol (58 N. H. 233). 838. West v. Lynn (110 Mass. 514), 1466. West V. West &c. R. Co. (61 Miss. 536). 694. West Boston Bridge Co. v. County Comm'rs (10 Pick. 270), 676. West Carroll Parish v. Gaddis (34 La. Ann. 928), 634. West Chester v. Apple (35 Pa. St. 384), 1475. West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester (30 Pa. St. 332), 1861. West Chester R. Co. v. McElwee (67 Pa. St. 311), 1487. West Hampton v. Searle (127 Mass. 502). 1391. West Hartford v. Board of Water Co. (44 Conn. 361). 572. West Newbury v. Bradford (3 Met. 428). 983. West Philadelphia &c. Ry. Co. v. City of Philadelphia (10 Phila. ' 70), 1103. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix (6 How. 507), 633. 670, 689, 1196. Westbrook's Appeal (57 Conn. 95), 278. Westbrook v. Deering (63 Me. 231), 668, 835. Westbrook v. N. Y. &c. R. Co. (57 N. Y. 95: 16 Atl. Rep. 734), 1314. Western &o, E. Co. v. Young (83 Ga. 513), 510. Western &c. Society v. Philadelphia (81 Pa. St. 175)," 1394, 1397. Western College v. Cleveland (13 Ohio St. 375), 322, 351, 264, 756. Western Paving & Supply Co. v. Citizens' Street R. Co. (128 Ind. 525; 26 N. E. Rep. 188; 38 N. E. Rep. 88). 1079, 1103. Western Pub. House v. Blackman (So. Dak., 51 N. W. Rep. 314), 1347. Western R. Co. v. Nolan (48 N. Y. 514), 1575. Western Saving Fund Society v. Citv of Philadelphia (31 Pa. St. 175), 945. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carew (15 Mich. 525). 106. Western Union Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia (Pa., 12 Atl. Rep. 144), 1320. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mayer (28 Ohio St. 537), 1357. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendle- ton (132 U-. S. 359), 1319. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Richmond (36 Gratt. 1), 1363. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State (55 Tex. 314), 1370. Western Union Tfel. Co. v. Thayer (38 Ohio St. 537),. 1370. Westervelt v. Gregg (13 N. Y. 309), 1178. Westfield Borough v. Tioga County (150 Pa. St. 152), 1404, 1433, 1435, 1429. Westhampton v. Searle (137 Mass. 503), '368. oslvi TABLE OF CASES. [rhe references tfra to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.] Westlake v. St. Louis (77 .Mo, 47), 709. Weston, Ex parte (11 Mass. 417), 705. .Weston V. Syracuse (17 N. Y. 110), 1313. Westport V. Kansas City (103 Mo. 141; 15 S. W. Rep, 68), 133, 396. . Wetherell v. Devine (116 III, 631), 1034. Wetmore v. Storv (33 Barb. 414), 275. Weyauwega v. Ayling (99 U. S, 113), 946, 954. Weymire v. Wolfe (53 Iowa, 533), 1508. Weymouth V. City (40 La. Ann. 344), 581. Weymouth v. Comm'rs (108 Mass. 148), 1388. Whalen v. La Crosse (16 Wis. 370), 1171, Whalin v. Macomb (76 111. 49). 1265. Wharton v. School Trustees (43 Pa. St. 358), 1330, 1391, Wharton County v. Ahldag (Tex., 19 S. W. Eep. 391); 856. • Whately v. Comm'rs (1 Met. 336), 1591, 1594. Wheat ■u,,Sn?ith (50 Ark, 366), 188. Wheaton v. Wiant (48 111. 26H), 1075. Whelen's Appeal (108 Pa, St, 168), 331, 647. Wheeler v. Bedford (54 Conn. 344), 1540. Wheeler v. Bowery Sav. Bk, (30 . Abb. N. C. 243), 1260. Wheeler v. Brady (15 Kan. 26), 1325. Wheeler v. Cincinnati (19 Ohio St. 19), 264. Wheeler v. City of Chicago (57 111, 415), 11 36. Wheeler v. Jackson (41 Hun, 410), 784. Wheeler v. Miller (16 Cal. 134), 1595, Wheeler v. Patterson (1 N, H. 88), 318. Wheeler v. Plymouth City (116 Ind. 158; 18 N. E. Eep. 533), 264,775, 785, Wheeler v. Russell (17 Mass. 357), 1245. Wheeler v. Wayne County (81 111. App, 399; 133 111, 599; 34 N, E. Rep. 685), 790. Wheelinp V, Baltimore (1 Hughes, 90), 579. Wheeling v. Black (25 West Va. 366), 175, ,541, 1363, 1865. ' Wlieeling &c. Co. v. Wheeling (99 U. S. 278), 1353. . Wheelock's Election Case (83 Pa. St. 397), 160. Wheelock v. Young (4 Wend. 647), 670. Whidden v. Drake (5 N. H. 13), 1597. Whipple V. Fair Haven (63 Vt. 821), 783. Whitaker v. Benton (48 N. H. 157), 1419. Whitall V. Gloucester (40 N. J. Law, 303), 1423," 1425, 1437. Whitbeck v. Hudson (50 Mich. 86), 1576. Whitcomb's Case (130 Mass. 118), ♦ 399, 300. White, Im re (43 Fed. Rep. 913), 1840. White V. Bayonne (49 N, J. Law, 311), 513. White V. Board (Ind., 28 N, E. Rep. 846), 761, 1014. White V. Bond County (58 111. 397; 11 Am. Rep. 63), 9, 745. White V. Burkett (119 Ind, 431; 31 N. E. Rep. 1087), 1534. White V. Chowan County (90 N. C. 437 : 47 Am. Rep. 534), 10. White V. City of Kansas (33 Mo. App. 49;, 698, White V. Comm'rs (13 Oregon. 317; 54 Am. Rep, 833, n, ; 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 485), 376, 377, 646. White V. Conover (5 Blackf. 462), 695. White V. Corporation of Yazoo City (87 Miss. 357), 1436. White V. Fleming (114 Ind. 560; 16 N, E. Rep. 487), 377, 1089. White V. Fox (33 Me. 341), 330. White V. Hart (13 Wall. 646), 1373. White V. Hiudley Local Board (L. R, 10 Q. B. 319), 768, White?;. Levant (77 Me. 396), 183, White V. Levy (93 Ala. 484), 12H0. Whiter. Marshfield(48 Vt. SO), 232. White V. Morse (139 Mass. 163), 338. White V. New Orleans (15 La. Ann, 667), 353. White V. People (94 lU. 604), 1075, 1086, 1174, 1187, 1349, White V. Phillipson (10 Met. 108), 208. White V. Polk (17 Iowa, 413). 186. White V. School Dist. (Pa,, 8 Atl, Rep. 443), 1330. White V. Stamford (37 Conn. 578), 817, White V. State (69 Ind. 373), 711. White V. Stevens (67 Mich. 33), 571, 1065. 1171, 1173. White V. Tallman (36 N. J. Law, 67), 535 White v. Vermont &c, R, Co, (31 How, 575), 957. TABLE OF OASES. cclvii [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.] White V. Yazoo City (27 Miss. 857), 2ii4. White Deer Tp. Poor Overseers' Ap- peal (95 Pa. St. 191), 999. . White S. M. Co. v. Mullins (41 Mich. 339), 321. Whiteford Tp. v. Probate Judge (53 Mich. 180), 1177, 1178. Whitehall t;. Meaux (8 111. App. 182), 531. Whitehead v. Arkansas &c. R. Co. (26 Ark. 460), 696. Whitely v. Lansing (27 Mich. 131), 1372. Whiteseil v. Northampton (49 Pa. St. 526), 1351. Whiteside v. People (36 Wend. 685), 277, 307. Whiteside v. United States (98 U. S. 247), 208, 214. Whitfield V. Longest (6 Ired. (Law), 268). 586, 1323. Whitfield V. Meridian City (66 Miss. 570), 1440, 1474. Whitford V. Laidler (94 N. Y. 145), 260. Whiting V. Mt. Pleasant (11 Iowa, 4S2), 427, 441. Whiting V. Quackenbush (54 Cal. 306), 1187. Whiting. V. Sheboygan &c. E. Co. (25 Wis. 167), 617, 934. Whiting V. Town of Potter (18 Blatohf. 165), 961. Whiting V. Town of West Point (Va., 14 a E. Eep. 698), 812, 1396, 1397, 1899. Whiting V. Townsend (57 Cal. 515), 1169. Whitlock V. West (26 Conn. 406), 538. Whitmer v. Comm'rs (96 III. 392), 1089. Whitmore v. Village of Tarrytown (16 N. Y. Supl. 740). 1139. Whitney, In re (3 N. Y. Supl. 838), 1541. Whitney v. Boston (106 Mass. 89), 1573. Whitney v. City of New Haven (58 Conn. 450; SO Atl. Rep. 606), 278, 280, 286, 878. Whitney v. City of Pittsburgh (Pa., 23 Atl. Eep. 395), 1174, Whitney v. City of Port Huron (Mich,, 50 N. W. Eep. 316), 500. 882. Whitney v. Essex (43 Vt. 520). 1451. Whitney V. Lynn (122 Mass. 338), 699. Whitnev v. Stow (111 Mass. 368), 368," 1368. Whitney v. Thomas (23 N. Y. 261), 237. Whitney v. Tioonderoga (127 N. Y. 40; 32 N. Y. St. Eep. 135), 1439, 1463. Whitney v. Van Buskirk (40 N. J. Law, 403'. 303, 304. Whitney v. Village of Hudson (69 Mich. 189: 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453), 294, 298, 302, 305, 368, 495. Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow (63 N. Y. 62). 646, 719. Whitsett V. Union Depot & R. Co. (10 Colo. 243), 264, 1193. Whitson V. Franklin (34 Ind. 392), 541, 1209. Whittaker v. Tuolumne County (Cal., 80 Pao. Eep. 1016), 1585. Whyte V. City of Kansas (22 Mo. App. 409), 607. Wliyte V. Mayor &c. of Nashville (3 Swan. 864), 283, 518, 550, 608, 1133. 1389. Whyte V. Mills (64 Miss. 158; 8 So. Eep. 171), 864. Wick ware v. Bryan (il Wend. 545), 218. Widner v. State (49 Ark. 173 ; 4 S. W. Rep. 657), *13. Wier's Appeal (74 Pa. St. 230), 1053. Wier V. Bush (4 Litt. (Ky.) 439), 175. Wiggin t). Freewill Baptist (8 Met. 301), 376. ' Wiggin V. Mayor (9 Paige, 16), 1365. Wiggins V. Chicago (68 ill. 373), 532, 1388. Wiggins V. McCleary (49 N. Y. 846), 1412. Wiggins V. Tallmage(ll Barb. 457), 1213, 1405. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis (103 III. 560), 1358, 1357, 1370. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis (107 U. S. 365). 1353, 1357, 1370. Wight «. Phillips (36 Me. 551), 1417. Wilbur V. City of Springfield (133 III. 395; 14 N. E. Eep. 871), 1073, 1186. Wilbur V. Tobey (16 Pick. 179). 141. Wilcox V. Deer Lodge County (3 Mont. T. 574), 931. Wilcox V. Heiiiming (.'58 Wis. 144; 46 Am. Rep. 63.5), 525, 585. 536. Wilcox V. Rodman (4(i Mo. 3331, 187. Wilcox V. Smit1i(5 Wend. 331). 198. Wilcox V. Township of Eagle (81 Mich. 271), 1340. Wild V. Deig (43 Ind, 455), 685, 1269. Wild V. Paterson (47 N. J. Law, 406), 755. Wilde V. Dunn (11 Johns. 513), 379. Wilder v. Board (41 Fed. Eep. 512), 833. Wilder v. Chicago (26 111. 182), 176. Golviii TABLE OF OASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. Wilder v. Cincinnati (36 Ohio St. 884), 1186. Wilder v. Chicago &c. Ey. Co. (70 Mich. 382; 38 N. W. Eep. a90), 557. Wilder v. East St. Louis (55 III. 138), 1383, 1389. Wilder v. Savannah (TO Ga. 760), 1337. Wiles V. Hoss (114 Ind. 371 ; 16 N. E. Rep. 800), 1111, 1113. Wilev V. Bluffton (lU Ind. 153), 126. Wiley V. Flournoy (30 Ark. 609), 1574. Wiley V. Palmer (14 Ala. 367), 1388. Wiley V. Town of Brim field (59 111. 306). 935. Wilhelm v. Cedar County (50 Iowa, 354), 260, 658. Wilkes V. DinsQian (7 How, 39), 218. Wilkes V. Mayor (79 N. Y. 631), 1134. Wilkesbarre t'. Myers (113 Pa. St. 395), 1393. Wilkey v. Pekin (19 III. 160), 1353. Wilkin V. St. Paul (16 Minn. 271), 690. * Wilkins v. Detroit (5 Mich. 336), 1163. Wilkins v. Detroit (46 Mich. 120), 1161. Wilkins v. Rutland (61 Vt. 336; 17 Atl. Rep. 735), 753, 764, 1462. Wilkinson v. Bixter (88 Ind. 574), 697. Wilkinson v. Cheatham (43 Ga. 258), 930, 1379, 139'3. Wilkinson v. Leland (3 Peters, 637), 941. Wilkinson i>. Peru (61 Ind. 1), 947. Wilkinson v. Township of Long Rapids (74 Miob. 63; 41 N. W. . ' Rep. 861), 817, 918, 1038. Wilkinson v. Van Orman (70 Iowa, 330:), 833, 848. Willamette Bridge Co. v. Hatch (123 U. S. 113), 1433. Willamette Mfg. Co. v. Bank of British Columbia (119 U. S. 191), 1556. Willard's Appeal (4 R. I. 595), 306. WillardJ'. Comstock (58 Wis. 565), 1580. ■ Willard v. Killingworth (8 Conn. 247), 92. 371, 543. Willard v. Newburyport (12 Pick. 337), 826. 837. Willard V. Piko (59 Vt. 302). I33S. Willard v. Presbury (14 Wall. 676), 11-63,1168. Willco'fekB, In re (7 Cowen, 403), 391, 493. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] > Willett V. Young (Iowa, 11 L. R. A. 115; 47 N. W. Rep. 990), 213, 868. Willey V. Greenfield (30 Me. 452), 825. Willey V. Portsmouth (35 N. H. 303), 353, 374, 1451. Williams' Case (3 Bland Cb. 186), 1369. Williams v. Augusta (4 Ga. 509), 539, 548, 593, 599, l'J58. Williams v. Bagot (3 Barn. & C. 786', «t307. Williams v. Brooklyn El. R. Co. (126 N. Y. 96), 143 ». Williams v. Camm'kck (27 Miss. 309), , 1185. Williams v. Citizens' Rv. Co. (Ind. , 39N.-'E. Rep. 408). 1313. Williams v. City of Gloucester (148 Mass. 356; 19 N. E. Rep. 348), 166. Williams v. City of Nashville (Tenn., 15 S. W. Rep. 364), 391, 897, 464. Williams v. Clayton (6 Utah, 86; 21 Pac. Rep. 398), 1529. Williams v. Clinton (28 Conn. 364), 1471. Williams v. Corey (73 Iowa, 194; 34 N. W. Rep. 813), 1193. ; Williams v. Davidson (44 Tex. 1), 935. Williams v. Detroit (3 Mich. 560), 1160, 1163, 1109, 1573. Williams v. Detroit (45 Mich. 431), 1161. Williams v. Directors (33 Vt. 371), 1387. Williams v. Directors &c. (Wright (Ohio), 579), 1345. Williams v. Duanesburg (66 N. Y. 129), 953. Williams v. Ehringhaus (3 Dev. L. (N. C.)297), 313. Williams i). Grand Rapids (59 Mich. 51), 1469. Williams v. Hartford &o. R. Co. (13 Conn. 397), 691. Williams v. Holden (4 Wend. 327), 1189. Williams v. Leyden (119 Mass. 237), 1455. Williams v. Lunenburg (21 Pick. 75), 391. Williams v. New Orleans R. Co. (60 Miss. 689), 697. Williams v. N. Y. &o. E. Co. (16 N. Y. 97), 679, 1433. Williams v. People (133 111. 574), 375. Williams. v. Pittsburgh (83 Pa. St. 7 1),- 696. Williams v. Poor (65 Iowa, 410), 438. TABLi OF CASES. cclix [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Williams v. Powell (101 Mass. 407), 819. Williams v. Bawlinson (10 Moore, 371), 338. Williams v. Rees (9 Biss. 405), 1361. Williams v. Eoberts (88 111. 11), 935, 941. Williams v. Safford (7- Barb. 309), 1473. Williams v. Saginaw (51 Mich. 120), 758, 1125. Williams v. School Dist. (21 Pick. 75), 290, 344, 351, 368, 1189, 1416. Williams v. School Dist. (33 Vt. 271), 686. Williams v. Shelby (2 Oreg;. 144), 313. Williams v. Smith (3 Hill. 301), 957. Williams v. Warsaw (60 Ind. 457). 604. Williams v. Weaver (75 N. Y. 30; 100 U. S. 547), 226, 227. Williams v. Willard (23 Vt. 369), 1064. Williamsburg v. Lord (51 Me. 599), 1390. Williamson v. Commonwealth (4 B. Mon. 146), 530, 531, 540, 1253, 1262. Williamson v. Keokuk (44 Iowa, 88), 128, 932, 1374. Williamson «. Massey (33Gratt. 337), 1399. Williamsport v. Commonwealth (84 Pa. St. 487). 923, 927. Williamsport City v. Beck (138 Pa. St. 147). 1164. Williamstown School Dist. v, Webb (89 Ky. 264; 12 S. W. Rep. 298), 368, 1333. Willington v. Petitioners (16 Pick. 105), 1549. Willis V. Boonville (38 Mo. 543), 1256, 1263. Willis V. Legnis (45 111. 289), 536. Willis V. Sproule (13 Kan. 257), 347, 694. Willis V. Webb (Kan., 37 Pac. Rep. 825), 813. Willman v. Willman (57 Ind. 500), 1419. Wills V. Austin (53Cal. 152), 1183. Willyard v. Hamilton (7 Ohio (Part II), 111; 30 Am. Dec. 195). 695. Wilmington v. Macks (86 N. C. 88), 1355. Wilmington v. Yopp f71 N. C. 76), 1159. Wilmington Cortim'rs v. Roby (8 Ired. L. (N. C.) 250), 13S8. Wilson, In re (33 Minn. 145). 546. Wilson V. Atlanta (60 Ga. 473), 1471. Wilson V. Board of Burr Oak (87 Mich. 240), 1416. Wilson V. Board of Comm'rs (68 Ind. 507), 278. Wilson V. Board of Trustees (133 111. 443; 27 N. E. Rep. 203), 1021, 1034. Wilson V. Burks (71 Ga. 868), 1576. Wilson V. Chilcott (12 Colo. 600), 1160. Wilson V. Clity of Charlotte (108 N. C. 121 ; 12 S. E. Rep. 846), 1398. Wilson i\ City of Macon (Ga., 14 S. E. Rep. 710), 761. Wilson V. Comm'rs (7 Watts & S, 197), 1595. Wilson V. European &c. R. Co. (67 Me. 358), 690. Wilson V. Hardesty (1 Md. Ch. 56), 911. Wilson V. Hathaway (43 Iowa, 173), 690. Wilson V. Hetnming (58 Wis. 144), 1233. Wilson V. Huntington Comm'rs (7 Watts & S. 197), 1377. Wilson V. Jefferson County (13 Iowa, 181), 746. Wilson V. Lewis (10 R. I. 385), 1597. Wilson V. Marsh (34 Vt. 352), 218, 22«. Wilson V. Mayor (1 Denio, 595; 43 Am. Dec. 719). 219, 1080. Wilson V. Mayor &c. (4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 675), 1353. Wilson V. Mayor &c. of Macon (Ga., 14 S. E, Rep. 710), 1013. Wilson V. Neal (23 Fed. Rep. 139), 906. Wilson V. New York (1 Denio, 595), 263, 775, 777, 1438, 1457. Wilson V. Pelton (40 Ohio St. 306), 1182. Wilson V. Peverly (1 Am. L. Cas. 785), 222. Wilson V. Poole (83 Ind. 448), 611, 1190. Wilson V. Roberts (11 C. B. (N. S.) 50; 31 L.J. C. P. 78), 134. Wilson V. Rockford &c. R. Co. (59 111. 273), 703. Wilson V. Salamanca (99 U. S. 499), 834, 943, 946, 961. Wilson V. School Dist. (32 N. H. 118), 13, 259. 640, 1141, i;h30. Wil*)n V. Spoffiord (33 N. Y. St. Rep. 533), 1462. Wilson V. Sutter County Supervis- ors (47 Cal. 91), 1398. Wilson V. Town of (}rantz (47 Conn. 59), 1433. Wilson V. Troy (N. Y., 46 Alb. L. J. 518), 1491. Wilson V. Wall (6 Wall. 83), 143. Wilson V. Waltersville School Dist. (44 Conn. 157), 348, 370, 1335. Gclx table: of oases. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Wilson V. Wheeling (19 West Va. 324), 265. Wilson County v. Third Nat. Bank (103 U. S. 770), 936. Wiltse V. Tilden (77 Wis. 152), 1438. Winans v. Williams (5 Kan. 227), 1325. Winbigler v. Los Angeles (45 Cal. 36), 10, 769, 1448. Winchendenr. Hatfield (4 Mass. 133), 976, 981. Winchester v. Cheshire County (64 N. H. 100; 5 Atl. Eep. 767), 1001. Windham v. Commissioners (36 Me. ,406), 693, 1419. Windham v. Portland (4 Mass. 884), 446, 1368, Windham v. Town of Lebanon (51 Conn. 319), 988. Windsor v. Field (1 Conn. 279), 694, 11S9, 1568. Windsor v. Hallett (97 111. 304), 953. Wing V. Gliok (56 Iowa, 473; 37 Am. Rep. 142, n.), 313. Winn V. Board of Park Comm'rs (Ky., 14 S. W. Rep. 421), 124. Winn V. Macon (21 Ga. 375), 941. Winn V. State (Miss., 7 So. Rep. 353), 1332. Winnsboro v. Smart (11 Rich. 551), 1244. Winona v. Burke (23 Minn. 354), 541. Winona v. School Dist. (40 Minn. 13), 1333. Winona &e. E. Co. v. City of "Water- town (S. Dak., 44 N. W. Eep. 1072), 1187. Winona &c. R. Co. v. Waldron (11 Minn. 515), 670. Winooski v. Gokey (49 Vt. 383), 539, 542, 543. Winpenny v, Philadelphia (65 Pa. St. 135), 773. Winship v. Enfield (43 N. H. 197), , 1454, 1468. Winslow V. Comm'rs (64 N. C. 218), 1381. Winslow V. Perquimans County (64 N. C. 318), 1378. Winspear v. Holman Tp. (37 Iowa, 548), 14, 840. Winston v. Railroad Co. (1 Baxt. 61), 1393. Winston v. Taylor (99 N. C. 310), 1160. Winston v. Tennessee &c. R. Co. (1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 60), 933. Winston v. Westfeldt (23 Ala. 760), 964. Winter v. City Council of Montgom- ery (83 Ala. 589 ; 3 So. Rep. 335), 1319. Winter v. Montgomery (65 Ala. 403), 1400. Winthrop v. Farrar (11 Allen, 398), 1059. Wintz V. Board (28 West Va. 237), 1516. Wirth V. Wilmington (68 N. C. 34), 103, 468. 513. Wisconsin &o. R. Co. v. Taylor (53 Wis. 43), 1353, 1363, 1869. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Ashland County (Wis., 50 N. W. Rep. «37), 303, 380. Wisconsin Cent. E. Co. v. Ashland County (Wis.. 50 N. W. Rep. 939), 302, 593, 1132. Wiser v. Blachly (1 Johns. Ch. 607), 953. Wisner v. Davenport (5 Mich, 501), 819. Wistar v. Philadelphia (80 Pa. St. 505), 1120, 1164. Wistar v. Philadelphia (HI Pa. St. 604), 1120. 1163, 1849. Witherop v. Titusville School Board (7 Pa. Co. Ct. Eep. 45), 1336, 1336. Withers v. Buckley (20 How. 84), 670. Witherspoon v. Meridian (69 Miss. 288), 1407, 1421. Withington v. Harvard (63 Mass. 66), 360, 361, 363, 1580. Witkowski v. Bradley (35 La. Ann. 904), 1386. Witkowski v. Skalowski (46 Ga. 41), 1576. Witner'S Appeal (Pa., 15 Atl. Eep. 438), 1333. Witson V. Mayor &c. of New York (1 Denio. 595), 308. Witter V. Damitz (Wis., 51 N. W. Rep. 57.5). 1407, 1416. Wixon V. Newport (13 R. L 454), 763. Woffenden v. Board &o. (1 Ariz. 237 ; 35 Pac. Rep. 647), 1519. Wolcott V. Lawrence County (36 Mo. 273), 634. 1091. Wolcott V. Wolcott (19 Vt. 37), 385. Wo Lee, In re (36 Fed. Rep. 471), 1841. Wo Lee v. Hopkins (118 U. S. 856), 1341. Wolf, Ex parte {U Neb. 34), 373, 375. Wolf V. Bross (73 Tex. 133), 1406. Wolf V. Keokuk (48 Iowa, 139), 1186. Wolf V. Marshall (52 Mo. 171), 709. Wolf V. Philadelphia (105 Pa, St. 25), 1103, 1181. Wolff V. New Orleans (103 U. S. 358), 334, 435, 1381, 1384. WoUsonv. Rubicon (68 Mich. 49), 1540. TABLB OF 0ASB3. cclxi IThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Wolsey V. Board (33 Iowa, 231), 1420. Wolters, Ex parte (65 Cal. 269), 1340. Wong V. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), 544. Wood V. Bangs (1 Dak. 179; 46 N. W. Eep. 586), 797. Wood V. Bank (9 Cowen, 194), 67, 1266. 1267. Wood V. Bartling (16 Kan. 109), 386. Wood V. Board of Comtn'rs (125 Ind. 370; 25 N. E. Bep. 188), 8B1. Wood V. Brooklyn (14 Barb. 425), 103, 488. 518,"539. Wood V. Cutter (138 Mass. 149), 303. Wood w. Galveston (76 Tex. 126; 13 S. W. Rep. 227). 1135. 1173. Wood V. Louisiana (103 U. S. 294), 234. Wood V. Lynn (1 Allen, 108), 251, 642. Wood V. Mo(5rath (Pa., 24 Atl. Eep. 682), 1101. Wood V. Pres't Jefferson County Bank (9 Cow. 194), 87. Wood t?. Quincy (11 Cuah. 487), 370. Wood V. Simmons (51 Hun, 335; 4 N. Y. Supl. 368), 1003. Wood V. Simons (110 Mass. 116), 372. Wood I'. Stirmon (37 Tex. 584). 1579. Wood V. Strotiier (76 Cal. 545), 1173, 1513. Wood V. Town (106 N. C. 151 ; 10 S. E. Rep. 845). 1355. Wood V. Watertown (58 Hun, 298), 1444. Wood V. Water-works Co. (83 Kan. 590), 572. Woodbridge v. Amboy (1 N. J. Law, 246), 446. Woodbury v. Detroit (8 Mich. 309), 113U. Woodbury v. Hamilton (6 Pick. 101), 826. Woodcock V. Bolster (35 Vt. 632), 1325. Woodcock V. Worcester (138 Mass. 268), 1486. Woodes V. Dennett (9 N. H. 55), 989. Woodger v. Hadden (5 Taunt. 126), 1406. Woodman v. Tufts (9 N. H. 88), 1036. Woodruff V. City of Eureka Springs (Ark., 19 S. W. Rep. 15), 400, 410. Woodruff V. Fisher (17 Barb. 224), 1024. Woodruff V. Neal (38 Conn. 166), 634, 1150. Woodruff V. Okolona (57 Miss. 806), 955. Woodruff V. Paddock (130 N. Y. 618), 1421. Woodruff V. Stewart (63 Ala. 308), 533. Woodruff V. Town of Glendale (23 Minn. 537; 26 Minn. 78), 1059. Woods V. City of Chicago (135 111. 582; 36 N. E. Rep. 608), 1073. Woods V. Colfax County (10 Neb. 552), 10. Woods V. Groton (111 Mass. 357), 1467. Woods V. Henry (55 Mo. 560), 1366. Woodf V. Lawrence County (1 Black, 386), 947. Woods V. Oxford (97 N. C. 227), 377. Woodstock V. Gallup (28 Vt. 587). 689. Woodward v. Town of Rutland (61 Vt. 316; 17 Atl. Rep. 797), 179. Wooley V. Staley (39 Ohio St. 354), 1399 Woolfolk V. Randolph County (83 Mo. 501). 709. Woolley V. Baldwin (101 N. Y. 688), 219. Worcester v. Auburn (4 Allen, 574), 983. Worcester v. Ballard (38 Vt. 60), 996. Worcester v. Eaton (13 Mass. 371), 661. Worcester v. Keith (5 Allen. 17), 694. Worcest3r v. Milford (18 Pick. 379), 993. Worcester v. Town of East Mont- pelier (61 Vt. 139), 976. Worcester County v. Worcester (1 16 Mass. 193), 1165. Worden v. New Bedford (131 Mass. 23), 661, 767, 1006. Work V. State (2 Ohio St. 296), 1258. Worley v. Harris (82 Ind. 493), 70. Wormley v. District Tp. (45 Iowa, 666), 1330. Wormwood v. City of Waltham (144 Mass. 184; 10 N. E. Rep. 800), 886. Worster v. Canal Bridge (16 Pick. 541), 1484. Worth V. Fayetteville Comm'rs (Winst. (N. C.) Eq. 70), 1351, 1356, 1573. Wortlven v. Badgett (33 Ark. 496), 1386. Worthington v. Covington (83 Ky. 365), 259, 1170. Worthington v. Wade (83 Tex. 36), 1408. Worthley v. Steen (43 N. J. Law, 543), 135. Worts V. Watertown (16 Fed. Rep. 534), 1589. Wragg V. Penn Township (94 111. 11), 604. colxii .TABLE OF. CASES. [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-160B.] Wray v. Mayor &o. of Pittsburgh (46 Pa. St. 365). 593. 1163. Wreford v. People (14 Mich. 41), 1084. Wren v. Luzerne' County (9 Pa. Co. Ct, aS; 6Kulp, 37), 179. Wright V. Augusta (78 Ga. 341). 364. Wright V. Bishop (88 111. 303 1. 646. Wright V. Boston (9 Cush. 383), 1163, 1578. Wright V. Carter (37 N. J. Law, 76), 679. Wright V. Chicago (30 111. 253), 1048, 1160. Wright V. Chicago &c. E. Co. (7 111. App. 438). 534. Wright V. Corporation (4 Cranch C. C. 534), 1153. Wright V. Forrestal (65 Wis. 341 ; 37 N. W. Rep. 53), 496, 1194. Wright V. Harris (31 Iowa, 373), 881. Wright V. Linn (9 Pa. St. 438), 660. Wright V. Nagle (101 U. S. 791), 566, 1313. WHght ■». North School Dist. (53 Conn. 576), 364, 309, 370, 1337, 1335. Wright V. People (87 111. 583), 1169, 1391. Wright V. Railroad Co. (64 Ga. 782), 1190. Wright V. Rouss (18 Neb. 334), 338^ Wright V. Simpson (6 Ves. 714 1, 323. Wright V. Tacoma (3 Wash. T. 410), 1174. Wright V. Templeton (183 Mass. 49), 1499. Wright V. Town of Victoria (4 Tex. 375), 633. Wright V. Town Clerk of Stockport (5 Man. & G. 33), 134. Wright V. Wilmington (93 N. C. 156), 777. Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v, Jasper (68 Mich. 441), 837. Wrought Iron Bridge Co. «. Town of Attica (2 N. Y. Supl. 359), 1093. Wulleuwaber v. Dunigan (Neb., 50 N. W. Rep. 438), 937. WuUenwaher v. Dunnigan (Neb., 47 N. W. Rep. 430), 989. Wyandotte v. White (13 Kan. 191), 1198. Wyandotte v. Zeitz (31 Kan. 649), 643. Wyandotte &o. Br. Co. v. Comm'rs (10 Kan. 331), 343. Wyandotte City v. Wood (5 Kan. 603), 60, 61, 125. Wyley v. Wilson (44 Vt. 404), 348, 369. Wynehamer v. People (13 N. Y, 378), 678. Wynn f. State jMiss., 7 So. Eep. 353), 1337. Wynne v. Wright (1 Dev, & Bl. (N. C.) 19), 1388. Wyoming Coal Co. v. Price (81 Pa, St. 156), 671. Wysinger v. Crookshank (83 Cal. 588), 1345. Y. Yaftarv V. District Tp. (80 Iowa, 131), 1338. Yale V. West Middle School Dist. (59 Conn. 489), 1343. Yale College v. City of New Haven (57 Conn. 1), 1070. Yancy v. Harrison (17 Ga. SO), 701. Yanist v. City of St. Paul (Minn., 53 N. W."Rep. 925). 586. Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth (34 Me. 411). 95, 109. Yarnell v. City of Los Angeles (87 Cal. 603; 35 Pac. Rep. 767), 177, 649. Yates V. Lansing (5 Johns. 883), 217. Yates V. Milwaukee (10 Wall. 497), 672, 1050, 1034. Yates V. Town of West Grafton (West Va., 12 S. E. Rep. 1075), 1203. Yates V. Yates (9 Barb. 324), 660. Yavapai County v. O'Neil (Ariz., 29 Pac. Rep. 430). 887. Yeakel u City of La Fayette (48 Ind. 116), 1113. Yeatman v. Crandall (11 La. Ann. 320), 1166, 1185, 1369. Yelton V. Addison (101 Ind. 58), 706. Yesler v. City of Seattle (Wash., 25 Pac. Rep. 1014), 381, 509, 953, 1075. Yick Wo, In re (68 Cal. 394; 58 Am, Rep. 13), 533. Yick Wo «. Hopkins (118 U. S. 356; 6 S. Ct. Rep. 1064), 511, 520, 1033. York County v. Watson (15 S. C. 1), 322. Yorker v. Sandy Lake Borough (130 Pa. St. 123), 1498. Yorty V. Paine (62 Wis. 154), 199, 439. Young V, Blackhawk Countv (66 Iowa, 460), 383. 1028. Young V, Buckingham (5 Ohio, 485), 296. Young V. Charleston (30 S. C. 116; 47 Am. Rep. 827). 9, 769. Young V. City of Kansas (37 Mo. App. 101), 1098, 1099. TABLE OF CASES. cclxiii [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] Young V. Clarendon Township (133 U. S. 340; 10 S. Ct. Rep. 107), 563, 633, 933, 925, 931, 932, 956, 1376. Young V. dommissioners of Boads (3 N. & McC. (S. C.) 537), 9. Young V. District of Columbia (3 MacArthur, 137), 1313. Young V. Henderson (76 N. C. 420), 1356, 1370. Young V. Laconia (59 N. H. 634), 694. Young V. Leedom (67 Pa. St. 351), 767. Young V. McKenzie (3 Ga. 31), 670. Young V. St. Louis (47 Mo. 492), 1134, 1173. Young V. State (7 Gill & J. (Md.) 258), 310, 313. Youngblood V. Sexton (33 Mich. 406), 1357, 1371, 1573. Zabel V, Louisville Baptist Orphans' Home (Ky., 17 S. W. Rep. 212), 1166. Zabriskie v. Railroad Co. (23 How. 381), 67, 253. Zabrisliie v. Trustees (52 N. J. Law, 104), 368. Zanesviile v. Gas Light Crt. (47 Ohio St, 1 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 55). 574. Zanesviile i\ Richards (5 Ohio St. 590), 136-3, 1370, 1384. Zeigler v. Chapin (136 N. Y. 842; 27 N. E. Rep. 471 ; 59 Hun, 314; 13 N. Y. Supl. 783), 196, 635. Zeigler v. Hopkins (117 U. S. 683), 1173, 1174. Zottler V. Atlanta (66 Ga. 195), 1313, 1498. Ziegler v. Flack (54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 69). 1171. Zimmerman v. Canfield (42 Ohio St. 463 ; 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 882). 686. Zimmerman v. Snondeil (88 Mo. 218), 1174. Zorger v. Green sburgh (60 Ind. 1), 523. Zottman v. San Francisco (20 Cal. 98), 5.53, 1171. Zylstra v. Charleston (1 Bay (S. C), 382), 638, 1260. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OP PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. CHAPTEK I. INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW. § 1. The genus corporation defined. 3. Species of corporations. 3. Subdivisions of public corpora- tions. 4. Subdivisions of strictly public corporationa 5. Definition-of the municipal cor- poration. 6. Definition of the public qiuisi- corporation. 7. Examples of municipal and public giWj«i-corporations. § 8. Counties. 9. The New England towna 10. The same subject continued, 11. The State. 18. Long Island towns. 13. The development of the mu- nicipal corporation — (a) In general. 14 (b) Greece and Rome. 15. (c) Italy and France — The mediaeval cities. 16. Conclusion. § 1. The genus corporation defined. — The definition of a corporation most familiar to American jurisprudence is that of Chief Justice Marshall, which declares a corporation to be " an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law." ' This phrase of the chief justice, 1 The full text of the decision from which thf quotation in the text is an extract is as follows : — "A corpora- tion is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con- templation of law. Being the mere creature of law it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either ex- pressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality ; and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality ; properties by which a perpetual succession of many per- sons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity of perpetual conveyances for th6 purpose of transmitting from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men in succes- sion with those qualities and capaci- ties that corporations were invented and are in use. By these means a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promo 2 INTEODirOTDET — HISTOEIOAL VIEW. [§ 1. however, though forcible and suggestive, is, as Judge Dil Ion observes,' rather a description than a definition ; and the same observation may be made of Justice Story's statement in the same case, that a corporation is an artificia,! person existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with certain powers and franchises, which, though they must be exercised through the medium of its natural members,' are yet consid- ered as subisting in the corporation itself as distinctly as if it were a real person.* Chancellor Xent defines a corporation as " a franchise possessed by one or more individuals who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, and are vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of per- petual succession, and of acting in several respects, however numerous the association may be, as a single individual." ' So Lord Coke had defined a corporation to be " a body to take in possession framed as to its capacity by policy, and there- fore called by Littleton (sec. 413) a lody politic; it /is called a ciEJfporation or body corporate because the persons are made into a body, and are of capacity to take, grant, etc., by a par- ticular name." * These definitions, or rather descriptions/are, however, too general to be of practical use, except as sugges- tions ; and they insist too much on the theory that a corpora- tion is strictly a legal or artificial person or individual, ignor- ing the fact that, while a corporation in most of its relations acts as a unit, and may therefore- for the most part be con- veniently regarded as a legal person, it is in many of its rela- tions properly conceived of as composed of an aggregation of persons.' As has been said, the effort of practical jurispru- tidii ot the patticular object like one Corporations, declares that the fiction immortal being. But this being does of the " legal person " has outlived not ehare in the civil government of its usefulness, and is no longer ade- the country, unless that be the pur- quate for the purposes of an accu- pose for which it was created." rate treatment of the legal relations Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 arising through the prosecution of a Wheat 636. corporate enterprise. ' In an article • 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp. 37. in the American Law Review, Pro- 2 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, fessor Pomeroy appi-oves and ampli- 4 Wheat. 518, 667. fies the idea contained in Mr. Tay- - 3 Kent's Commentaries, 267. lor's remark, and calls attention to * 5 Co. Litt 250a. the fact that many modem corpora- s 1 Beach on Private Corp. 8. Mr. tions differ in essentials very little Taylor, in the preface of his work on from partnerships, except that they §1.] INTEODUCTOEY HISTOEICAI, VIEW. dence should be to regard it as a unit or collection of persons according to the relation in which it acts in a given instance.' The most accurate and serviceable definition of a corporation is, perhaps, that of the earliest writer on the subject, who de- fines it to be " a collection of individuals united into one body under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individ- ual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contract- ing obligations, and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a va- riety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its institution or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation or any subsequent period of its existence."* can Rue and be sued, make contracts, acquire rights and incur liabilities in and by their corporate names, and that a change of membership does not work their dissolution. He i-e- marks further that the English courts have always carefully distin- guished between the statutory joint- stock companies with limited liability (which are practically identical with the corporations formed under the statutes of our several States) and common-law corporations. "Legal Idea of a Corporation," 19 Am. Law Rev. 114, 115, 116. So, also, it has been held in the Supreme Court of the United States that a suit by or against a corporation is to be re- garded for juiTsdictional pui^poses as a suit by or against the stockholders of the corporation. Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444. Where the word " per- sons " is used in a statute, " corpora- tions are to be deemed and considered as ' persons ' when the circumstances in which they are placed are identi- cal with those of natural persons ex- pressly included in such statutes." Bearton v. Farmers' Bank &c., 13 Peters, 134, 135 ; Crafford v. Super- visors &c., 87 Va. 110. 1 1 Beach on Private Corp. 4. For explanative discussions of this ques- tion, see the essay of Prof. Pomeroy above cited, '"The Legal Idea of a Corporation," 19 Am. Law Rev. 114, 116, and Lowell on Transfers of Stock, g 2. Mr. Lowell insists on the theory that a corporation is strictly distinct from its members. He says : " A corporation is distinct from its members in the same sense that a State is distinct from its citizens. The parallel, indeed, between a State and a corporation is very close." 2Kyd on Corporations, 13. See, also, for a good definition of a corpo- ration. Thomas v. Dakin, 32 Wend. 9, where it is said that a corporation aggregate is an artificial body of men composed of divers individuals, the ligaments of which body are the franchises and liabilities bestowed upon it, and which bind and unite all into one, and in which consists the whole frame and essence of the corporation. 4 INTE0D0CTOET HI8TOKI0AL V;iEW. [§ 2. § 2. Species of corporations. — For the purposes of this work, corporations may be properly classified into public and private corporations. ->This division is recognized by all writers on the subject, although they differ somewhat in limiting the precise boundary between the two classes. In the Dartmouth College case, Mr. Justice Washington discussed at length the proper method of division of corporations. He said : — " Public corporations are generally esteemed such as exist for political purposes only, suclj as towns, ciftes, parishes and counties; and in many respects they are so, although they involve some pri te interests ; but, strictly speaking, public corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public pur- poses when the whole interests belong also to the government. If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the charter of the government, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and objects of the institu- tion. For instance, a bank created by the government for its own uses, whose stock is exclusively owned by the govern- ment, is in the strictest sense a public corporation. So a hos- pital created and endowed by the government for general charity. But a bank whose stock is owned by private per- sons is a private corporation, although it is erected by the government, and its objects and operations partake of a public nature. The same doctrine may be affirmed of insurance, canal, bridge and turnpike companies. In all these cases the uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but the corpora- tions are private; as much so, indeed, as if the franchises were vested in a single person.^ The division suggested by Mr. ' Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Co., 4 Wheat 518, 668. See, also, on this 13 Allen, 77; McCune v. Norwich subject, Osborn v. United States Gas Co., 30 Conn. 531; New York Bank, 7 Wheat. 738 ; Bank of United &c. E. Co. v. Met Gas Co., 63 N. T. States V. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat 336 ; People v. Morris, 18 Wend. 335, 907 ; University v. Indiana, 14 How. 337 ; Barley v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 381 ; 268; Eundle v. Delaware &c. Canal Ten Eyck v. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 1 Wall. Jr. 390 ; Bonaparte v. C. Co., 18 N. J. Law, 800 ; Tinsman v. &C. R. Co., 1 Bald. 305 ; Roanoke R. Belvidere Delaware E. Co., 36 N. J. Co. V. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat (N. C.) Law, 148 ; Bennett's Appeal, 65 Pa. 45; Ala. E. Co. v. Kidd, 29 Ala. 221 ; St 342; Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa St § 2.] INTEODUOTOET HISTOEIOAL VIEW. 5 Justice "Washington may, however, be properly modified in these modern days of immense private corporations, such as rail- ways, canal companies, telegraph companies and express com- panies, involving public interests and subject to the orders of the public, although maintained generally only for private emolument and of private foundation. The division set forth in a California case seems to conform more nearly to the requirements of modern conditions. In that case, corpora- tions were divided into three classes; the first class being public municipal corporations, the object of which is to pro- mote public interests, and which may be called strictly public corporations ; the second class being quasi-TpnhWo corporations, which are technically private but are of a quasi-Tpuhlic char- acter, having in view some public enterprise in which the public interests are involved and owing certain duties to the public as such, for example, railroad, turnpike and canal companies ; and the third class being strictlj'^ private corporations, of pri- vate foundation, maintained strictly for private emolument and having in view only strictly private enterprises.' The differ- ence between strictly private and strictly public corporations is obvious and radical — the former being formed by the vol- untary action of the corporators, between whom there exists a contract whereby each subjects his interest, with certain re- strictions, to the control of the corporate management for the accomplishment of the ends for which the company was formed,^ and the latter not being in the same sense voluntary associations, and no contract existing between the members.' The distinction, however, between quasi-puhlio and private corporations is much less clearly marked. These g^Mas^-public corporations partake both of the nature of private and of public corporations. They are private corporations in that they are voluntary in their inception ; that they are main- 27 ; Bushell v. Com. Ins. Co., 15 Serg. v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. St 518 ; & R 186; Directors v. Houston, 71 Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St 86; III 318; Miner's Bank v. United Hare's American Constitutional Law, States, 1 Greene (Iowa), 553 ; Sean v. 600. Davis, 51 Cal. 406. '■> Bennett's Appeal, 65 Pa. St 242 ; > Miners' Ditch Co. v. Tellerbach, 37 Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa St 27 ; Bush- Cal. 543. ell v. Com. Ins. Co., 15 Serg. & E. 2 Beach on Private Corp. 42 ; Clear- 186 ; People v, Morris, 13 Wend, water v. Meredeth, 1 WaU. 25; Hays 325, 337; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 40a 6 INTEODtrCTOET HI8TOBI0AL VIEW. [§ 3. tained for private gain ; and that there subsists a contract be- tween their incorporators. They are public in that they have in view a public enterprise in which the pubhc interests are involved ; in that their property is devoted to a use in which the public has an interest, and that they are therefore con- trolled by the public for the common good to the extent of that interest.' Thd old principle of law enunciated by Chief Justice Hale, that when " private property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be jiMds prwaU only," ^ has been greatly extended and amplified in this country by the doc- trine of Munn v. Illinois,' which doctrine was further applied in the line of decisions known as the " Granger Cases " and the " Kailroad Commission Cases." This doctrine is succintly stated and the limits of the power of the government over these quasi-^xib^G corporations is clearly defined in Munn v. Illinois, where it was said : — " When, therefore, one devotes his prop- erty to a use in which the public has an interest, he in efifect grants to the public an interest in that use and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but so long 'as he maintains the use he must submit to the control." * § 3. Subdivisions of public corporations.— It is manifest from the scheme of division indicated in the preceding section that public corporations are naturally divided into the two great classes of strictly public and quasv-^uhWc corporations. The courts of this country, however, although, as shown in the 1 Munn V. Illinois, 94 D. S. 113, 136. water companies. State v. Ironton • 21 Hargrave's Law Tracts, 78. Gas Co., 87 Ohio St. 45 ; Spring Val- 3 94U. S. 113. ley Water-Works v. Schottler, 110 4 Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 118, 126. U. S. 347, 350. See on this subject, 1 The doctrine in that case was ap- Beach on Private Corp. 34r-37, 55-59 ; plied to gi-ain elevators. It has been " The Dartmouth College Case and also applied , to railroads. See the Private Corporations," by William P. "Granger Cases:" Chicago &c. R. Wells, 9 Am. Bar Assoc. Rep. 239; Co. V. Iowa (1876), 94 U. S. 155 ; Peik Address by James A. Gareeld, 5 Leg. u Chicago &c. R. Co. (1876). 164, 178. Gaz. 408; -The Doctrine of Pre- Also the "Railroad Commission sumed Dedication of Private Prop- Cases," 116 U. S. 307. It has been erty to Public Use," by -George Tick- applied to telephones. Hockett v. nor Curtis (John Wiley & Sons, N. Y., State, 1)5 Ind. 350. Also to gas and 1881). § 3.] INTEODUCTOEY HISTOEIOAL VIEW. 7 preceding section, they have gone to great lengths in enforc- ing governmental control over quasi-Tpnhlic corporations, have not generally applied the term "public" or " ^wasi-public " to such corporations, but have with practical unanimity held that if the whole interest does not belong to the government, or if the corporation is not created for the administration of polit- ical or municipal power, it is a private corporation.' In reading the cases on this subject, therefore, public corporations are not generally considered to include what we have denominated jwasi-public corporations. Leaving for a later portion of the work the discussion of these* quas'i^Tpublic corporations, we shall proceed to consider the subdivisions of strictly public corporations, or, as they are generally denominated in the cases, public corporations. Public corporations, then, using the term in the limited sense in which it is used in the text- books and cases, are subdivided into municipal and public 5'«ffi«i-corporations. /Municipal corporations embrace incorpo- rated cities, villages and towns, which are full-fledged corpo- rations, with all the powers, duties and liabilities incident to such a status; while public g-Mflsi-corporations possess only a portion of the powers, duties and liabilities of corporations. As instances of the latter class may be mentioned counties, hundreds, townships, overseers of the poor, town supervisors, 1 Bundle v. Delaware &c. Canal not necessarily a public corporation. Co., 1 WalL Jr. 275, 390 ; Vincennes Cleveland v. Steward, 3 Ga 283. And University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268 ; the fact that a corporation was em- Bank of United States v. Planters' ployed in the service of the govern- Bank, 9 Wheat. 907 ; Bonaparte v. C. ment has been held not to make it a &C. K. Co., 1 Bald. 205 ; Alabama R. public corporation. Thomson v. Bail- Co. V. Kidd, 29 Ala. 221 ; New York road Co., 9 WalL 579. If the State &c. R Co. V. Met Gas Co., 63 N. Y. is a stockholder in a corporation or 326 ; Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 581 ; one of the corpoi-ations, the coi-pora- Directors v. Houston, 71 IlL 318; tion is not a public corporation. Miners' Bank v. United States, 1 Bank of United States v. Planters' Greene (Iowa), 553 ; Ten Eyck v. Del- Bank, 4 Wheat. 205 ; Hutchinson v. aware &c. Canal Co., 18 N. J. L. 300 ; Western &c. B. Co., 6 Heis. (Tenn.) 634. Tinsmau v. Belvidere Delaware E. But see, contra, Trustees v. Winston, Co., 26 N. J. L. 148; McCune v. Nor- 5 St. & P. (Ala.) 17. In South Caro- wich Gas Co., 30 Conn. 521; Boa- lina a corporation owned in ioio by noke B. Co. v. Davis, 3 Dev. & Bat the State was held to be a private (N. C.) 45. It hasbeen held in Georgia corporation. State Bank v, Gibbs, 3 that a corporation deriving part of McC. (S, C.) 377. its support from the government was S INTKODUOTOEY HISTORICAL YIEW. [§ 4. school districts and road districts.* ^t must be borne in mind that public quasi-coripor&tions and qiuisi-pnhlio corporations are entirely distinct classes; the former being represented, as we have said, by townships, counties and such governmental subdivisions of the State, the latter being represented by cor- porations, the property of which is devoted to a use in which the public has an interest, such as railroads, grain elevators, telegraph companies and similar corporations. §4. Subdivisions of strictly public corporations. — The generic difference between these two classes of corporations lies in the fact that municipal corporations are created at the request or with the consent of their members, and for the protaotion of their convenience and welfare, while public quasi- corporations are merely local subdivisions of the State, cre- ated by the State of its own sovereign will, without any par- ti""" lar solicitation or request on the part of the members of the Corporation, and created almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the State at large. The municipal corporation is asked for, or at least assented to, by the people it embraces; the public quasi-corporation is superimposed by a sovereign and a, paramount authority.^ From this fundamental differ- ence in inception flow many minor -and consequential differ- ences between the two classes of corporations under discus- sion. These differences will be more fully considered later herein. The principal differences arise from the fact that pub- lic g"Mas*-corporations are purely auxiliaries to the State, and have no powers, duties or liabilities except as conferred ex- pressly by statute ; and as a result, in many cases municipal corporations are held responsible for damages to persons in- jured through negligence or default of the corporation, where there is no express provision of law to that effect ; ' while • Talbot V. Queen Anne's County, die v. Proprietors, 7 Mass. 169 ; Adams 50 Md. 245 ; Pulaski County v. Eeeve, v. Bank, 1 Me. 363. 43 Ark. 55; Askew v. Hale (1875), 54 2 Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio Ala. 639 ; Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 St 109. This case contains a clear Ohio St 109 ; Bouse v. Moore, 18 discussion of the difference between Johns. 407; North Hempstead w. municipal and. public gwsi-corpora- Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; School tions. See, also, the cases cited in District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 198 ; the preceding section. Mower v. Leicester, 9 Masa 352; 'The rule stated briefly seems- to Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 352 ; Bid- be, that where a municipal corpora- §*.] 1NTEOD0CTOET HI8TOEI0AL VIEW. 9 public 5'«as«*-corporations, being mere subdivisions of the State, and created solely for a public purpose, are not liable in tort in the absence of a statute expressly creating such liability and authorizing an action thereon.* The doctrines just enumer- tion acts for a purpose purely and essentially public, acts as an agent of tlie State, and nothing more, the cor- poration is regarded as a part of the sovereign State, and cannot be sued for a tort, unless express permis- sion by statute to bring such a suit has been given. But where munic- ipal corporations act, as private cor- porations, for the local benefit and advantage of their members, they are liable in tort just as a private cor- poration would ba Mayor &c. of Memphis v. Lasser, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 757 ; O'Neil v. New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 220 ; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 18T, McConneU v. Dewey, 5 Neb. 585 ; Kenworthy v. IrontOn, 41 Wis. 647; Wallace v. Muscatine, 4 Greene (Iowa), 37.3; Simmes v. St. Paul, 23 Minn. 408 ; Young v. Com- missioners of Roads, 2 N. & McC. (S. C.) 537 ; Curran v. Boston, 151 Mass. 505 ; s. C, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 506 ; McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 476 ; Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 ; s. c, 35 Am. Bep. 540 ; Striling v. Thomas, 60 IlL 265 ; Hewison v. New Haven, 87 Conn. 475 ; Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. Law (N. C), 73 ; Gilmer v. La- conia, 55 N. H. 130 ; s. C, 20 Am. Rep. 175; Comm'rs of Baltimore Co. v. Biker, 44 Md. 1 ; Boyd v. Insurance Patrol, 113 Pa. St 169; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. 8. 551 ; Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660; Chi- cago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 418 ; Mayor &c. of N. Y. V. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, . 39 ; Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161 ; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black, 590 ; Supervisors of Rock County v. United States, 4 Wall. 485; Peters- burgh V. Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321 ; Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103; Lit- tle Rock V. Willis, 27 Ark. 573; McKinnon v. Penson, 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 457 ; Mei-sey Docks v. Penhallow, 1 H. L. Cas. (N. S.) 93. In New Jersey, Michigan and South Caro- lina it is held, as an application of this principle, that a municipal cor- poration is not liable in damages at the suit of one who is injured by its failure to perform the statutory duty of keeping highways in repair, no right of action being expressly given by the statute. Freeholders &c. v. Strader, 18 N. J. Law, 108 ; Pray v. Mayor &c., 33 N. J. Law, 394 ; Detroit V. Blakeley, 21 Mich. 84 ; s. C, 4 Am. Rep. 450 ; followed in McCutcheon v. Homer, 43 Mich. 483 ; S. c, 38 Am. Rep. 212; Young v. Charleston, 20 S. C. 116; s. C, 47 Am. Rep. 837. But these cases ai-e opposed to the over- whelming weight of authority. Gal- veston V. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, in which the' -authorities are exhaust- ively cited and discussed, and City of Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Tex. 535, where a contrary rule was applied, is deprived of any value. Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 996 et seq.; Beach on Contributory Negligence, § 244. 'Sherbourne v. Guba County, 21 Cal. 613 ; s. c.,81 Am. Dec. 151 ; Mower V. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 ; s. C, 6 Am. Dec. 63 ; White v. Bond Co., 58 111. 397 ; S. c, 11 Am. Rep. 63 ; Clark v. -Lincoln Co. (Wash. T., 1889), 35 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 311 ; Haygood v. Justice, 20 Ga. 485 ; Symonds v. Clay Co., 71 IlL 355 ; Abbett v. Johnson Co., 114 10 INTEODUCTOET HISTOEICAL VIEW. [§ 5. ated have the support of an overwhelming majority of the cases on the subject. There are, however, authorities holding that municipal corporations are not in any case liable in tort unless such liability is established by express statute.* § 5. Definition of the municipal corporation. — In the English Municipal Corporation Act, 1882, the municipal cor- poration is, defined to be " the body corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitant of a borough ; " ^ and in the same section the borough is defined to be " a city or town to which this act applies." The municipal corporation has also been tersely defined to be " the investing of the people of a place with the local government thereof." ' An old writer has said : — " The essence of a municipal corporation is constituted by uniting the several circumstances between a corporation and other communities." * The meaning of this statement seems to be, that by combining the characteristics of a community, such as a city, with those of a corporation, the idea of a municipal corporation is obtained. Bouvier defines a municipal corpora- tion to be a public corporation created by the government for political purposes and having subordinate and local powers of legislation.' The idea of a municipal corporation has been fre- Ind. 61 ; Galveston v. Posnainsky, Eep. 472 ; Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53 62 Tex. 118 ; Woods v. CoTfax Co., 10 Iowa, 430 ; s. c, 36 Am. Rep. 236 ; De- Neb. 552; Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. troit v. Blakeley, 21 Mich. 84; Turner 639 ; Flori v. St Louis, 69 Mo. 341 ; v. Woodbuiy Co., 57 Iowa, 440 ; Finch Mitchell V. Rockland, 52 Me. 118; v. Board of Education, 30 Ohio St 37 ; Conrad v. Ithaca. 16 N. Y. 158 ; Bax- Pray v. Jersey City, 32 N. J. Law, 394. ter V. Turnpike Co., 22 Vt 123 ; Fowle i Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. V. Common Court of Alexandria, 3 . 139 ; s. C, 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. Peters, 398 ; Boyd v. Insurance Patrol, 347; Winbigler v. Los Angeles, 45 113 Pa. St 169 ; Eastman v. Meredith, Cal. 36. 36 N. H. 284; S. 0., 72 Am. Dec. 302; 2 English Municipal Corporations Dasball v. Olmstead, 80 Minn. 96 ; Act, 1882, § 10. Brabham ?;. Supervisors of Hurds Co., 'Cudden v. Eastwick, Salk. 183. 54 Miss. 363 ; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. This definition has been quoted with 351 ; S. C, 23 Am. Rep. 332; White v. approval in People v. Morris (1835), Chowan Co., 90 N. C. 437 ; S. C. 47 13 Wend. 325, 334,' and in People v. Am. Rep. 534 ; Watkins v. Preston Co. Hurlbut (1871), 24 Mich. 44 Court, 30 West Va. 657 ; s. C, 20 Am. * Glover on Munic. Corp. 6. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 305; Downing v. 5 2Bouvier's Dictionary, tit "Mu- Mason Co., 87 Ky. 208 ; s. c, 12 Am. St nicipal Corporation." § 5.] INTEOD0OTOBT HISTOKICAL VIEW. 11 quently defined and described by the courts of this country. Thus it has been said in Missouri that the definition of a munici- pal corporation would only include organized cities and towns and other like organizations with political and legislative powers for the local civil government and police regulation of the inhabitants of particular districts included in the bound- aries of the corporation.^ In Pennsylvania a municipal corpo- ration has been declared to be a public corporation created by the government for political purposes, and having subordinate and local powers of legislation ; an incorporation of persons,, inhabitants of a particular place or connected with a particular district, enabling them t6 conduct its local civil government, and to be merely an agency instituted by the sovereign for the purpose of carrying out in detail the objects of the gov- ernment.^ In a Tennessee decision it was said that a munici- pal corporation was a body corporate and politic established by law to share in the civil government of the country, but chiefly to regulate the local or internal affairs of the city, town or district incorporated.' These definitions, though use- ful, are too narrow to meet the requirements of a broad and general definition of the idea. The following excellent defini- tion has been given : — "A municipal corporation is a body pol- itic specially chartered by the State or voluntarily organized under a general legislative act, including both territory and inhabitants, for the purpose of local government subsidiary to that of the State ; or (as in England) it may be a similar body which has acquired governmental powers and privileges by prescription." * Judge Dillon's fine definition leaves little if any- thing further to be desired. He says : — " We may therefore define a municipal corporation, in its historical and proper sense, to be the incorporation by the authority of the government of the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authoriz- ing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate 1 Heller v. Stremmel (1873), 53 Mo. in its broader sense is a body politic, 309. such as a State, and each of the gov- 2 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St 180. ernmental subdivisions of the State, 3 East Tennessee University v. such as counties, parishes, townships, Knoxville, 6 Baxt (Tenn.) 166. hundreds. New England towns, and * Am. & Eng. Encyc of Law, tit. school districts, as well as cities and " Municipal Corporations," § 1, p. 952, incorporated towns, villages and - con;inu-iir, "A municipal corporation boroughs." 12 INTEODtrOTOEY — HISTOEICAL VIEW, [§ 6. specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns. This power of local govern- ment is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper." * The definition should, however, be amplified to embrace the weU-settled principle that the term " municipal corporation " embraces both the territory and its inhabitants.'' It follows from this definition that the citizens of the incorporated territory together with that territory form the municipal *corporation.' Neither the municipal government nor the officers of that governmervt are the corporation : they are merely its agents.^ As popularly and loosely used, the term " municipal corporation " frequently includes the public g-wasi-corporations, such as counties, school districts, and like bodies, the nature of which has been dis- cussed in the preceding sections. § 6. Definition of the public quasi-corporation. — The preceding sections indicate the essential differences between the municipal and the public g'was^rcorporation. The latter may be defined to be an involuntary political or civil divis- ion of the State, created by general laws to aid in the admin- istration of government.' An eminent judge has said of this class of corporations : — " They may be considered under our institutions as g't«as*-corporations with limited powers, co- extensive with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage, but restrained by the general use of authority which belongs to these metaphysical persons by the common law." * 1 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 20. iams, 3 Bam. & Cress. 163 ; Reginaw. 2 Kelly V. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78; Paramore, 10 Ad. & Ell. 286; Eegina Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 156 ; v. Mayor &c. of Bridgewater, 10 Ad. People V. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451. & Ell. 281 ; Eegina v. Mayor &c. of 'Lawber v. Mayor &c. of N. Y., 5 Silverpool, 41 L J. Q. B. 145 ; Regina Abb. Pr. 335 ; Clarke v. Bochester v. Mayor &c. of Leeds, 4 Q. B. 796 ; (1857), 24 Bai-b. 446. S. C, Dav. & M. 143 ; Regina v. Thomp- * Baumgartner v. Hasley, 100 Ind. son, 5 Q. B. 477 ; S. C, Dav. & M. 497. 575 ; Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. ' 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp.,' § 25. 1 ; S. C, 49 Am. Rep. 416 ; Brown v. This definition is applied by Judge Gates, 15 West Va. 131; Lawber w Dillon to counties only, but it is suffi- Mayor &c. of N; Y., 5 Abb. Pr. 325 ; ciently general to answer as a deflni- Clarke v. Rochester (1857), 24 Barb, tion of the class. 446; Regina v. York, 2 Q. B. 847; « Opinion of Parker, C. J., in School S. a, 2 G. & D. 105 ; Harrison v. Will- District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 192, 197. ■ § 7.] INTRODDCTOET HISTORICAL VIEW. 13 Counties, townships, school districts, road districts and like public g'waw^corporations do not usually possess corporate powers under special charters ; but they exist under general laws of the State, which apportion the territory of the State into political divisions for convenience of government, and require of the people residing within those divisions the per- formance of certain public duties as a part of the machinery of the State, and, in order that they may be able to perform, these duties, vests them with certain corporate powers.* § 7. Examples of mnnicipal and public quasi-corpora- tions. — As may be gathered from the preceding sections, the distinction between these two classes of corporations is ob- vious. As a result, however, of looseness of nomenclature in the statutes of the various States affecting this subject, it is frequently a matter of doubt to which class a particular cor- poration should be assigned. Thus where the Missouri statute provided that no person should be eligible to a certain office who held office under a municipal corporation, it was held that the incorporated board of public schools w^as not a municipal corporation within the meaning of the act.^ And in general school districts are considered public g'Mas?'-corporations of the most limited powers.' On the other hand, the constitution of 1 Cooley's Const Lim. 294 In City best promote the welfare of all." See, of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. also, the cases cited in the preceding 118, a gunsi-corporation is spoken section. of as "a subdivision of a State, 2 Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309. created solely for a public purpose, ^ Harris v. School District, 8 Foster by a general law applicable to all (N. H.), 58. In this case it was said : — such subdivisions;" and again, as "These little corporations have being "created to caiTy' out a pol- sprung into existence within a. few icy common to the whole State, years, and their corporate powers and and not mainly to advance the in- those of their officers are to" be settled terest of the particular locality, and by the constructions of the court to bring advantage or emolument upon a succession of crude, uncon- to the inhabitants of the munici- nected and often experimental en- pality." Still again, " they are ere- actments. School districts are in ated for a public purpose as an agency New Hampshire gttast-corporations of the State through which it can of the most limited powers known to most conveniently and effectively the law.'' See, also, Foster v. Lane, discharge the duties which the State, 30 N. H. 305 ; Giles v. School District, as an organized government, assumes 81 N. H. 304; Wilson v. School Dis- to every person, and by which it can trict, 33 N, H. 118 ; Rogers v. People, 14 INTEODtrCTOEY — HISTOEICAL VIEW. [§ 8. Iowa prohibited a political or municipal corporation from in- curring indebtedness to an amount exceeding five per cent, on the taxable property of the corporation, and a school district township was considered to come within the prohibition.' The police juries of the Louisiana parishes are considered munici- pal corporations.^ In the constitution of Wisconsin the term " municipal corporation" has been held not to include towns; and consequently, when the same term is used in the statutes of that State, towns are not consicJfered to be within the mean- ing of th^ provisions of the statute unless the legislative in- tent to include them is clear.' The term " city," oT course, applies only to municipal corporations;* as does the word " village." ' The District of Columbia is a municipal corpora- tion.' § 8. Counties. — Counties are, of course, to be classified as public g"Masi-Gorporations under the scheme of division' that has been indicated in this chapter ; as a county is an involun- tary civil division of the State created by statute to aid in the administration of the government. In an Ohio case it is said : — " Counties are at most but local organizations, which, for the purposes of civil administration, are invested with a few func- tions characteristic of a corporate existence. They are local subdivisions of the State, created by the sovereign power of the State, of its own sovereign will, without the particular solicitation, consent or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them. The former organization (referring to municipal corporations) is asked for, or at least assented to, by the people it embraces ; the latter (referring to counties) is superimposed 68 III. 154; Scale v. Chattahooohie Peck, 3 Wis. 714; State v. Milwau- County, 41 Ga. 325 ; Beach v. Leahy, kee, 20 Wis. 87 ; Watertown v. Cady, 11 Kan. S3. 20 Wis. 501 ; Crane v. Fond du Lac, 1 Winspear v. District Township of 16 Wis. 196. As to what constitutes Holnian, 37 Iowa, 642; Curry v. Dis- a corporation created "for municipal trict Township of Sioux City,62 Iowa, purposes," see State v. Le£SngwelI, 54 104 ; Clark v. Thompson, 37 Iowa, Wis. 458. 536. See, also, School District v. * Mitchell v. Treasurer of Franklin Williams, 38 Ark. 454. County, 25 Ohio St 148. 2 Police Jury of Ouachita v. Mon- * City of Wahoo v. Beeder (Neb.), roe, 38 La. Ann. 630. 48 N. W. Rep. 1145. » Eaton V. Supervisors of Manito- * Stoutenburgh v. Eennick, 129 U. woe County, 44 Wis. 489 ; Morton v. 8. 141. §8.] INTEODUCTOKY HISTORICAL VIEW. 15 by a sovereign and paramount authority."* But notwith- standing this radical difference, the county is much more nearly allied to the municipal corporation than are other quasi-corpo- rations, such as school districts, townships and other like bodies, as the county has a much more compact organization than those corporations, and possesses generally much fuller powers. Consequently there is some conflict in th6 decisions as to whether the term "municipal corporation" should be con- strued to include counties. In the large majority of cases the natural division Is followed and counties are not held to be included by that term.^ But both in Iowa and in Minnesota counties have been declared to be municipal corporations within the meaning of statutes affecting such corporations ; ' and a provision in the constitution of Alabama authorizing " municipal corporations " to take property by right of emi- 1 Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St 109 ; Talbot v. Queen Anne's County, 50 Md. 245. 2 Askew V. Hale County, 54 Ala. 639 ; S. C, 25 Am. Rep. 730 ; Hamil- ton County u Mighels. 7 Ohio St. 109 ; Sherman County v. Simons, 109 U. S. 735; Laramie County v. Albany Ciounty, 93 U. S. 807 ; Maury County V. Lewis County, 1 Swan(Tenn.), 236 ; Barton County v. Walser, 47 Mo. 189 ; Granger v. Pulaski County, 2fi Ark. 37: Greene County v. Eubanks, 80 Ala. 204 ; Lawrence County v. Kail- road Co., 81 Ky. 225 ; Talbot tt Queen Anne's County, 50 Mo. 245 ; Pulaski County V, Reeve, 42 Ark. 55 ; Soper V. Henry County, 26 Iowa, 264 ; State V. LefBngwell, 54 Mo. 458 ; Board of Park Commissioners v. Common CouncU of Detroit, 28 Mich. 237. In t le case just cited Judge Cooley eaid : — " It is because, where an urban population is collected, many things are necessary for their comfort and pi-otection which are not needed in ■ Green's Short History of the English People (Harper & Bros., ed. ch. iy, sec. II, pp. m-179. § 22.] OEBATION OF THIS OOEPOEAnON, 37 body, and excluded from their number all who were not bur- gesses by birth, or who failed henceforth to purchase theif right of entrance by a long apprenticeship. In addition to this narrowing of the burgess-body, the internal government of the boroughs had almost universally passed, since the failure of the communal movement in the thirteenth century, from the free gathering of the citizens in borough-mote into the hands of common councils, either seltelected or elected by the wealth- ier burgesses ; and it was to these councils, or to a yet more restricted number of ' select men ' belonging to them, that clauses in the new charters generally confined the right of choosing their representatives in parliament. It was with this restriction that the long process of degradation began which ended in reducing the representation of our boroughs to a mere mockery." ' Thus in the course of time the system of borough representation in England became rotten with abuses. The famous Keform Act of 1832 abolished in great measure the abuses of the system, by placing the government of the ' boroughs in the hands of a larger electorate, and by doing away with many of the " pocket boroughs " which had dwin- dled into petty villages, owned by neighboring land-lords, for whose personal ends the burgesses were elected. In 1835 the Municipal Corporations Keform Act ^ restored to the mem- bers of municipal corporations the rights of local self-govern- ment, of which they had been deprived since the fourteenth century. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 consoli- dated and codified all the previous legislation on the • subject of municipal corporations in England.' 1 Green's Short History of the Eng- chises of the City of London ; 3 Hal- lish People (Harper & Bros., ed, lam's Middle Ages, ch. VIII, part I ; 1889), ch. VI, sec. 1, p. 373. 1 Stephen's English Constitution, 2 5 & 6 WilL IV., ch. 76. ch. Ill ; Hearn's Government of Eng- ' For a full treatment of the inter- land, ch. XV ; Willcook's Municipal esting subject outlined in the preced- Corporations, 513 ; Glover on Coi-p., jng sections, see Dillon on Munic. XXXVIII; Crabbe's History of Eng- Corp., in loco; Green's Short His- lish Law, ch. 8; 1 Blackstone's tory of the English People (Harper & Commentaries, 114 ; 3 Kent's Com- Bros., ed. 1889), pp. 92-95, 139, 156, mentaries, 378; Vaughan's Revolu- 177,194-301,373, 403,663, 843; Nor- tions in English History, book 3, ch.§; ton's Commentary on the History, Frothingham's Rise of the Republic, Coostitutiou and Chartered Fran- 14. 33 OEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. t§ § 33. Creation of modern English municipal corporations. The modern English municipal corporation is created either by charter granted by the king under the general provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 or by act of parlia- ment. The general statute provides that if, on the petition to the queen of the inhabitant householders of any town or towns or district in England, or of any of those inhabitants, praying for the grant of a charter of incorporation, her majesty, by the advice of her privy counci* thinks fit by charter to cre- ate such town, towns or district, or any part thereof spieoi- fied in the charter with or without any adjoining place, a mu- nicipal borough, and to incorporate the inhabitants thereof, it shall be lawful for her majesty by the charter to extend to that municipal borough and the inhabitants thereof so incor- porated the provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act.^ 1 Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, § 310. The crown has always possessed, says an English writer, the power of creating corporations and conferring franchises (see 1 Kyd on Corporations,' 61) ; but where privi- leges and powers are to be conferred Which are not recognized by the com- mon or statute law, an act of parlia- ment is necessary. This act (the Mu- nicipal Corporations Act of 1883), though even without the saving pro- vision contained in section 359 it woijld not at all abridge the common- law prerogative of the crown, never- theless prevents its granting charters of incorporation with the powers con- ferred by this act, save with the, ad- vice of the privy council and on pe- tition by " the inhabitant household- ers." Eawlinson's Municipal Corpo- rations Act (8th ed. by Thomas Geary, 1884), p. 393, nota The saving pro- vision mentioned prescribes that nothing in this act shall prejudicially afEect heir majesty's royal preroga- tive, and the enabling provisions of this act shall be deemed to be in ad- dition to and not in derogation Of the powers exercisable by her majesty by virtue of her royal prerogative. Municipal Corporations Act of 1883, § 359. Of this provision the. same writer from whom we have quoted says: "This seems merely re-affirming the old doctrine that the crown is not affected by any statute unless ex- pressly named therein." Bawlinson'S Municipal Corporations Act (8th ed. by Thomas Geary, 1884), p. 339, note. See on this topic generally, "Munici- pal Corporations — How Organized and Dissolved," a note by H. B. John- son, 18 Am. L. Eeg. (N. 8.) 43. See on the subject of the common-law . prerogative of the crown to grant charters: Butter v. Chapman(in error), in the Exchequer Chamber, 8 M. & W. 1; Eegina v. Mayor of Aber- avon, 11 L. T. (N. S.) 417 ; S. C, 11 W. R. 90. It is further provided that eveiy petition for a chapter under this act shall be referred to a committee of the lords of her majesty's privy council ; and that at least one month before the petition is taken into con- sideration by the committee, notice thereof and of time at which it will be so taken into consideration shall be published in the London Gazette § 24.] OEEATION OF THE OOEtOEATIOlT. 39 The corporation created by charter from the crown under the general statute possesses in general all the common-law pow- ers and qualities of a corporation, except as limited by express provision of the charter,' while parliament has power to con- fer upon the corporations created by its act special and un- usual powers not incident to common-law corporations.^ § 34. Municipal corporations created by charter from the crown. — This class of corporations, as indicated in the pre- ceding section, possesses the powers and attributes of com- mon-law corporations, and no other. These powers and attri- butes are of course subject to the restrictions imposed by the charter. It is a fundamental principle that the crown can impose no charter upon a community without the acceptance and consent of the people of the community. "And as ac- ceptance was necessary to make the king's charter operative, it will be found that the municipal charters which he gave were all given to existing communities, having a recognized and organized existence, and in the habit of acting as one body through elections or agencies and officers. So far as we can judge from history, they were to all intents and purposes already as complete corporations for all practical purposes as are simpler municipal bodies, and accustomed to what was practically corporate action, and known as g'wasi-corporations. But even these could get nothing from the royal grant but liberties or franchises. Any coercive or exclusive power, which by the principles of the common law could not be granted by the king's charter, could only be given by act of parliament." ' A royal charter is a formal authorization, doc- and otherwise as the committee di- ^ Rawlinson's Municipal Corpora- rect, for the purpose of making it tions Act (8th ed. by Thomas Geary, known to all persons interested. Mu- 1884), p, 293, note (d) ; "Willcock on nicipal Corporations Act of 1883, Munic. Coip. 63, 64 ; 1 Kyd. on Cor- § 311. porations, 61 ; Dillon on Hunic. Cori>. 1 See for American cases on the 83 ; Glover on Munic. Corp. 84 powers of corporations created by ^1 Kyd on Corporations, 61. See charter from the crown : People v. Patterson v. Society &c., 34 N. J. L. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 ; s. c, 18 Am. 385 ; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. Rep. 107 ; Paterson v. Society &e., 34 384 ; People v. Bennett, 39 Mich. 451 ; N. J. Law, 385. See, also, 1 Kyd, 61 ; Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, tit " Mu- Willcock on Mun. Corp. 30 ; Angell nicipal Corporations," p. 956, & Ames on Corp., § 69, 40 OKKATION OF THE COEPOEATION. [§ 25. umentary in form, under the great seal, to the persons named therein, to incorporate themselves in a certain place and for certain purposes. It is addressed to all the subjects of the king. The king's charter is wholly inoperative until the per- sons named therein as incorporators accept it. Their assent is essential to give life to the charter, and this assent must be to the very charter proffered them. In case of partial accept- ance the charter avails nothing, unless the modification be approved'by the king. In the cas© of a new corporation, how- ever, a partial acceptance is considered an acceptance of the whole charter. It is said to have been a settled principle at common law that the king had a prerogative right to grant charters — municipal as wefU as private. But this only meant that he had a prerogative to confer privileges. He had no power to impose political obligations on any person or com- munity, unless they were in the form of conditions, nor could he compel the acceptance of any charter.' After the charter has been accepted, the crown cannot withdraw the charter and thereby destroy the life of the corporation^ its creature, without the consent of the members of the corporation.^ § 25. Municipal corporations created by acts of parlia- ment. — In contrasting parliamentary with royal incorpora- tions, it must be borne in mind that the charters granted by the crown were given to existing communities having a rec- ognized organized existence. Inasmuch as their assent was necessary to reinder the charter operative, in no other way could it have been signified except by a body acting through agencies or oflBcers. The powers of parliament regarding the institution of municipal corporations are plenary ; for, as we have seen, there is only one party, the public, concerned in the creation of a municipal corporation, and the persons incor- porated have no contractual rights under their charter. The charter of a corporation created by parliament is the act of parliament. No assent is necessary to render an act of par- liament operative. Not only that, but without assent the in- ' Willcock on Munic. Corp. 30 ; City 34 ; 1 Kyd on Corporations, 61 et seq.; of Patterson v. Society &c., 4 Zab. Willcock on Munic. Corp. 30 ; Angell 385. & Ames on Corp., § 69. * 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., g§ 33, § 26.] CEEATION OF THE OOKPOKATION. 41 oorporated individuals may be deprived of the franchises orig- inally given. Moreover, the powers granted may even be contrary to the usual rules of law ; only, if that be so, there must be no ambiguity in terms, as such grants are not to be implied.^ Parliament can create corporations the privileges of which can never be affected by subsequently-granted royal char- ters, and can at the same time Control and alter any corpora- tion instituted under permission from the crown. While it has been said that no assent is prerequisite in the case of par- liamentary corporations, it must be stated in qualification that an act of parliament usually contains provisions for the condi- tions of incorporation. The English statute for local gov- ernment in " towns and populous districts " ^ provides that this local government is to be adopted by the people who are to exercise the power; for example, in a corporate borough the council adopt the provisions of the act ; and in a place under commissioners the adoption would be by resolution of the commissioners. This adoption of the provisions of the act, and complying with the conditions therein prescribed, is equivalent to an assent of the persons to be incorporated.' Parliamentary corporations at first were usually such as were to Ipe invested with extraordinary privileges or powers. "When the ordinary powers alone were to be given the charter of the king was sufficient. If a royal charter gave too much power, it was to that extent void, and parliament could validate it by enactment. But under the Municipal Corporations Act now in force in Efigland,* nearly all corporations are parliament- ary in their origin. Such laws establish uniform conditions, confer uniform privileges, to all who will meet the prescribed requirements. These general statutes will now be considered. § 26. Municipal corporations at common law and toy pre- scription in England. — Although municipal corporations in England can be created only by one of the two methods pointed out in • the preceding section — by charter from the crown or by act of parliament — still many municipal corpora- 1 Glover on Munio. Corp. 24 ; Will- ' Queen v. Local Government cock on Munic. Corp. 31 et seq.; 1 Board, L. R 8 Q. B. 337. Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 34. * Act of 1882. 2 21 and 23 Vict, oh. 98, § 13. 42 CEEATION OF THE COEFOEATION. [§ 27. tions which owe their origin to neither of these two sources are in existence in that country. These are divided into two classes, known as municipal corporations at common law and municipal corporations by prescription. As the law never presumes the continued existence of anything unlawful, a legal inception for both classes is presumed. Municipal cor- porations at common law are those to which several capacities have been annexed, in virtue of their political character, by the universal assent of the comnwinity, from the most remote period to which their existence can be traced. These corpo- rations have existed, enjoying and exercising corporate rights from time immemorial. This immemorial usage is the basis of their continuing right. The second class — corporations by prescription — are presumed to owe their origin to a char- ter from the crown or an act of parliament, that has been lost or destroyed. Such corporations are of course much more common in England than in the United States, although pub- lic corporations by prescription have been held to exist here.' Prescriptive corporations have a definite legal status. The powers and privileges they have customarily enjoyed are con- ceded to them — the supposition being that the customs and usages regulating them were defined and prescribed in the lost charter. These customs are not always so strictly interpreted as those under a charter of modern origin ; for, as has above appeared, the earliest charters were granted in the days when the power of the king had few if any parliamentary restric- tions, and hence he could confer greater privileges, and create corporations with ampler powers, than the sovereign to-day.' § 37. Municipal corporation by implication in England. — The municipal corporation by implication, as it is styled, does not constitute a class of municipal corporations distinct by origin from the corporations discussed in the preceding sec- tions. Where the royal charter or act of parliament plainly intends to constitute a corporate municipal body, yet fails ex- pressly to confer on that body any attribute or power essen- tial to corporate existence, the law ut res magis valeat qua/m pereat implies from the intention of the charter or act such attribute or power ; and the body so created is considered to 1 See infra, § 36. 2 Co. Litt 250o. § 28.] OEBATION OF THE OOBPOEATION. 43 be validly incorporated. Such a municipal corporation is Called a municipal corporation by implication.' There are many in- stances of these corporations by implication in the early Eng- lish cases. Thus a grant of incorporation to the burgesses of Yarmouth was held by Lord Coke to be good although it failed to expressly confer incorporation upon their successors ;^ and a royal grant to the men of a district authorizing them to elect a mayor, and to plead and be impleaded by the name of the mayor and commonalty, "was considered suflBcient to in- corporate them.'* A grant of land by the king to the inhabit- ants of B., their heirs and successors, rendering rent, was held to constitute them a corporation.^ Also a grant by the crown to the men of a certain locality that they be discharged of tolls was thought to incorporate them for that purpo. at least.' § 3S. The Manicipal Corporations Reform Act of 1835 In the reign of William IV. the question of reforming the municipalities of the realm was agitated in the house of com- mons. An investigating committee, composed of barristers, was finally appointed, and they made a thorough tour of the kingdom. They separated into several subdivisions, and, facil- itated their labor by all the expedients known to the English parliamentary invesjiigating committees. The state of facts disclosed was startling. It was, among many other things, discovered that in nearly all the municipalities the governing bodies were self-constituted and self-electing, and that these governing bodies appointed the municipal officers from their own clique or ring,, thus giving unbounded opportunity for corruption and oppression. The committee reported that no uniform judicial system existed, nor any equable and uniform fiscal policy pursued ; that the magistrates were not often qual- ified by education or birth for the offices they held : the juries 1 1 Kyd on Corporations, 63 ; Grant - The Borough of Yarmouth Case, on Corporations, 43; 10 Co. Litt 27-, 2 Brownlow & Goldsb. 293. The Borough of Yarmouth Case, 2 » 21 Edw. IV., 56. Brownlow & Goldsb. 292 ; Conserva- *2 Jac. Law, tit '"Corporation," tors &c. V. Asli. 10 Barn. & Cress, p. 94. 349; 1 Dillon oh Munic. Corp,, § 42, » Vin. Abr., Ccarp. K, p. 6; Bagott's from whose text the instances given Case, 7 Edw. IV., SO. 3d this section are taken. 4A OEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. [§ 28. were improperly and partially impaneled ; the corporations de- nied accountability ; that responsibility could not be fastenesl anywhere ; and that the constabulary was ill-organized, and the usual duties of a municipality wholly neglected. In short, the absence of system, the non-existence of definitely prescribed regulations of law, was manifest everywhere throughout the two hundred and forty-six municipalities which the report of the commissioners showed to exist. The commission pointed out that the corporations existed independently of the commu- nities in which they had been established, and there was no identity of interest between them, and that in some cases the franchises of corporation had been bestowed not on selected individuals of the community, but sometimes on nonresident freemen. Altogether it was found that among the inhabit- ants of the English municipalities generally dissatisfaction ex- isted with their form of local government The report closed by stating that the commissioners felt it to be their duty to represent to his majesty that the municipal corporations, of England and Wales neither possessed nor deserved the confi- dence and respect of his majesty's subjects; and they sug- gested that a thorough reform be effected, in order that they might become useful and eflicient instruments of local govern- ment.' In consequence of this report, an act was passed the same year, 1835,'' which in its main provisions still obtains, and is at the basis of the municipal system both of England and the United States. It provided that the governing bodies and ex- isting magistrates of every corporation should be removed that year ; that town councils were to be elected trienniaUy by the burgesses; that any one was eligible to be a burgess who had been rated three years to support the poor. It enumerated in schedules all the existing municipalities, and provided for their re-incorporation under the name of the mayor, aldermen and burgesses — or citizens, as the case might be — of so-and-so, and that by such name it should " have perpetual succession, and shall be capable in law, by the council hereinafter men- tioned of such borough, to do and suffer all acts which now lawfully they and their successors respectively may do and 1 Municipal Corporations Rep. 49. porations, by J. A. Roebuck, 30 See, also, Reform of Municipal Cor- Westni. Rev. 48. «5 and 6 Will IV., eh. 78. § 29.] OEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. 45 suffer by any name or title of incorporation." The act fur- ther settled the metes and bounds of the re-organized munici- palities, provided for courts therein, settled the qualifications and mode of election of the city or borough ofiBcers, and or- ganized a constabulary. It authorized the councils to make by-laws, provided for the municipal funds, abolished chartered admiralty jurisdiction, laid down various rules ' of procedure, and finally authorized the crown to grant charters of incor- poration " upon petition " of the inhabitant householders iu any municipality alluded to in the act.^ § 29. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1882. — The pre- amble to this act states clearly the reasons actuating parlia- ment in its passage. " Whereas divers bodies corporate at sundry times have been constituted in the cities, towns and boroughs of England and Wales to the intent that the same might forever be and remain well and quietly governed : Abd whereas, the act of the session of the fifth and sixth years of the reign of King William the Fourth, chapter seventy-six, ' to provide for the regulation of municipal corporations in Eng- land and Wales,' applies to most of those bodies constituted before the passing of that act, and to every of the bodies constituted after the passing of that act ; and that act having been from time to time much altered and added to by other acts, it is expedient that all the acts aforesaid be reduced into one act with some amendments : Be it therefore enacted," etc.^ The act is chiefly a consolidation statute, the alterations being generally merely for the purpose of accommodating its meaning to that of the previous statutes as defined by subse- quent decisions.' The previous legislation affecting municipal corporations was expressly repealed with some qualifications and exceptions by the act.* Under the provisions of the act no one can be enrolled as a burgess or citizen unless he is of 1 The principal municipal corpora- 8 Municipal Corporations Act of tion amendment acts were passed in 1888, 45 and 46 Vict., ch. 50. 1836 and 1837, and are known as The * Eawlinson's Municipal Corpora- Municipal Boundaries Act ; The Mu- tions Act (8th ed. by Thomas Geary, nicipal Funds Act; The Municipal 1884), p. 1. Jurisprudence Act; The Recorders' *See for list of repealed enact- Courte Act ; The Municipal Elections ments Eawlinson's Municipal Corpo- Aot ; The Municipal Bates Act rations Act (8th ed. by Thomas 46 OEEATION OF THE COEPOBATION. [§29. fall age ; lias for twelve months occupied a house, -warehouse, country house, shop or other building in the borough; has during the whole of those twelve months resided in the bor- ough or within seven miles thereof ; has been rated for and paid all poor-rates in respect to the property so occupied for those twelve months ; is not an alien ; has not received for twelve months any union or parochial relief or other alms ; or is not disentitled under the act of parliament.* The council of the borough is composed of the%nayor, alderman and coun- cillors of the borough.' The aldermen are elected by the council out of the number of the councillors or persons quali- fied to be councillors ; and if a councillor is elected to and ac- cepts the office of alderman he thereby vacates his office of councillor.' The councillors are elected by the burgesses. There are numerous qualifications necessary in order to be chosen councillor, chief of which is the requirement that a person must be enrolled or qualified to be enrolled as a bur- gess and must be seised or possessor of property in the bor- ough of one thousand pounds if the borough has four or more wards; and if the borough has a less number of wards, of five hundred pounds.^ ^o one holding any office or place of Geary, 1884), pp. 343-346. It is pro- this act, or.pending at its commence- vided in the saving clauses of the ment; or any established jurisdic- act that nothing therein contained tlon or practice; or the terms on shall prejudicially affect any charter which money has been borrowed be- granted before the commencement fore the commencement of this act of the act; or alter the boundaries under any enactment repealed by of any borough or the number, ap- this act, together with other savings portionment or qualification . of the and exceptions less important And aldermen or councillors thereof or it is further provided that the repeal the division thereof into wards ; or effected by this act shall not extend ' the respective jurisdiction of county to Scotland or Ireland. Municipal and borough justices ; or the effect Corporations Act of 1882, 45 and 46 of any local act of parliament; or Vict, ch. 50, §§250-260. the effect of the Prison Acts ; or the i Municipal Corporations Act of rights, knowledge, duties and lia- 1882, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 9. bilities of the universities of Oxford 2 Municipal Corporations Act of and Cambridge; or the ecclesiasti- 1882, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 10, sub- cal jurisdiction over cathedral pre- div. 2. cincts; or shall prejudicially affect ^ Municipal Corporations Act of her majesty's prerogative; or shall 1883, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 14 affect anything done or suffered be- * Municipal Corporations Act of fore the commencement of this act 1883, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 11. under any enactment repealed by § 30.] OEEATION OF THB COKPOEATION. 47 profit in the gift of the council, except the office of mayor or sheriff, can be elected councillor; nor can a minister of the church of England of a dissenting congregation be elected.' The mayor is elected by the council from among ten alder- men or councillors or persons qualified to be such." It is of course impossible within the scope of this work to give any detailed outline of the general provisions of the act. The es- sential distinction between the system of municipal govern- ment established by the act in England, and the system most general in this country, is that in the English municipalities the entire government is practically confided to^the council, generally consisting of from twelve to sixty-four members, of whom the mayor is one ; while in our system the powers of government are generally divided between the mayor and the common council or board of aldermen. Both systems have their advantages, but on the whole the English plan is simpler and affords less opportunities for evasion or shifting of responsibilities.' § 30. The American town. — As this country was founded by Englishmen and its government established on the lines of the common law of England so modified as to meet the re- quirements of a republic, our municipal corporations were es- tablished in accordance with the English principles of liberty. They generally possess, however, powers of local self-govern- ment far greater than those of the English towns. Thus in Pennsylvania it is provided by the constitution of that State that the general assembly shall not pass any local or special law regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships or like bodies.* Thus it has been said by an eminent writer : " In contradistinction to those governments where power is con- centrated in one man or in one or more bodies of men whose supervision and active control extends to all the objects of gov- ernment within the territorial limits of the State, the Ameri- can system is one of complete decentralization, the primary 1 Municipal Corporations Act of Shaw on Existing Municipal Govem- 1883, 45 and 46 Vict., ch. 50, § 13. ment in Great Britain, Political 2 Municipal Corporations Act of Science Quarterly, voL IV, p. 97. 1883, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 15. < Reading v. Savage (1888), 130 Pa. ' See 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 36, St. 198 ; McCarthys. Commonwealth, citing an excellent article by Mr. 110 Pa. St 343. 48 OEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. [§ 30. and vital idea of which is that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities and general affairs only by the central authorities."^ These municipal corporations are peculiarly the subject of State as distinguished from federal control. They are the creatures of the State legislatures, and must re- main subject to the wise control of their creators within constitutional limitations. It was said by an eminent New York justice: — "When the present constitution was formed, the entire territory of the State was sep^irated and appropri- ated by its civil divisions, its counties, cities and towns. These civil divisions are coeval with the government. The State has never existed a moment without them. All our thoughts and notions of civil government are inseparably associated with counties, cities and towns. They are permajient elements in the frame of government ; they are institutions of the State, durable and indestructible by any power less than that which gave being to the organic law. They are, however, subject to control and regulation by the legislature. It may enlarge or circumscribe their territorial limits, increase or diminish their members, separate them into parts and annex some of the parts to others ; but they must still assume the form and be known and governed only as counties, cities or towns. The State at large is and ever has been an aggregate of these local bodies.'"* In addition to the usual municipal corporations, such as cities, towns and villages, it has been the policy of 1 Cooley's Const Lim. 223 ; People " one of the ablest of American com- V. Detroit (1873), 28 Mich. 228 ; s. c, mon-Iaw judges "), exhaustively dis- 15 Am. Rep. 204. In the famous De- cusses the inherent and hereditary troit Park Case just cited, it was held right of local self-government See, that the legislature could not compel also, Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. a city to issue bonds for the purchase 590 ; People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. of land for a park against the will 128 ; People u Mayor See. of Chicago, of the city council. In his opinion 51 111. 17 ; S. a, 2 Am. Eep. 278 ; Judge Cooley says: — "Itisafunda- 'Baines v. Lacon, 84 111, 461; Cairo mental principle in this State, recog- &a E. E. Co. v. Sparta, 77 HI. 505. nized and perpetuated by express This subject will be more fully provision of the constitution, that the treated infra, in discussing legislative people of every hamlet, town and control of municipal corporations. ■ city of the State are entitled to the 2 People u Draper, 15 N. Y. 561, benefits of local self-government." per Brown, J.; People v. Albertson Caldwell v. Justices, 4 Jones (1858) (1873), 55 N. Y. 50; People u Hurlbut, (N. C), Eq. 323. In the last cited case 24 Mich. 44; & G, 9 Am. Rep. lOa Ruffin, J, (whom Judge Dillon calls § 31.j OEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. 4:9 American legislation to incorporate, at least for some purposes, many minor subdivisions of the State, such as townships, school districts, road districts and similar bodies, thus organ- izing to the highest degree the State government and afford- ing the greatest liberty of action to even the unimportant branches of State administration,* § 31. The power to create municipal corporations in the United States — Where vested — (a) In the State. — Public as well as private corporations must in this country, as a rule, with but irregular and unimportant exceptions, derive their right to corporate existence from the force of legislative au- thority. This authority is exercised by the State, upon which descended this power along with the other prerogatives vested in the crown, upon the emancipation from British dominion. It had been, as we have seen, the peculiar prerogative of the crown to grant charters to municipalities ; and, although par- ' liament has usurped this prerogative along with the other royal powers, the acts of parliament conferring charters upon these bodies to this day direct that it shall be lawful for her majesty, under the circumstances contemplated by the statute, to grant a charter to the inhabitant householders of any dis- trict in England.' As the States upon our separation from Great Britain became sovereign, and succeeded to the powers and prerogatives of the crown, it became the peculiar prerog- ative of the law-giving power of the State to confer the gift of corporate existence upon public as well as private corpora- tions. Consequently the several sovereign States have power to grant charters to municipal and other public corporations, subject only to the prohibitions and limitations imposed by the charters of the respective States;' and subject also to the limitation that this power must be exercised in a manner con- sistent with the powers delegated by the States to the federal government. These principles are established beyond all question.* And this sovereign power of the States has been 1 Cooley's Const Lim. 223, note, preceded the State governmeut. See As an instance of a body possessing Arnold's History, ch. 7. unusually pure and immediate form 2 Municipal Corporations Act of of self-government the New England 1883, § 310. See supra, % town is remarkable. It is curious to » See infra, § note that in Bhode Island the towns * 1 Beach on Priv. Corp., § 3 ; Peo- 4 60 CEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. [§32. so far recognized that the courts have held that it was not withdrawn even though the State exercising it had at the time of such exercise seceded from the Union and was engaged in war with the United States.^ § 32. (b) In the federal government. — To define the power of the federal government to create public corporations it is necessary to consider the general powers possessed by that government, as no express authority to create corpora- tions is granted by the States to that government in the con- stitution.* There being, then, no express delegation of power in the constitution to create corporations, there can be no implied power to do so, except as a means or instrument by which to accomplish the objects for which the federal govern- ment was created.^ The federal government, therefore, has no power to create publicor private corporations except where such a power is necessary in order to carry out some power pie V. Riverside, 70 Cal. 462 ; Hope v. Deadwick, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 1 ; S. 0., 47 Am. Dec. 597 ; New Boston v. Dun- barton, 13 N. H. 409. And for cases aflHrming;, in regard to private as well as public corporations, this funda- mental principle, see Franklin Bridge Co. V. Wood, 14 Ga, 80; Bell v. Nash- ville Bank, Peck (Tenn.), 269; Fal- coner V. Campbell, 2 McLean, C. C, 195- Thomas v. Dakin, 23 "Wend. 9; Warner v. Beers, 33 Wend. 103 ; Nel- son V. McArthur, 38 Mich. 204 ; Ohio V. Covington, 39 Ohio St. 103 ; Cotton V. Mississippi Boom Co., 32 Minn. 873 ; Angell & Ames on Corp. (11th ed.), §71. 1 United States v. Insurance Co., 33 Wall. 99. Bnt it has been considered inexpedient to recognize the exist- ence of a corporation so created by the State, in aid of such a war. 1 Beach on Priv. Corp., g 3 ; North Caro- lina Endowment Fund v. Satohwell, 71 N. C. Ill ; Chieora v. Crews, 6 S. C. (N. S.) 343. 2 1 Beach on Priv. Corp., § 3, where it is said: "In tlie convention of States which framed the constitution an effort was made to invest the con- gress with power to grant acts of in- corporation, but after three days of debate the proposition was voted iown, eight out of the eleven States represented voting in the negative," citing Madison Papers, September 14, 1787, and citing also "Arguments by Simon Sterne in Opposition to the Signature by the President of the United States of Senate Bill No. 1805 (50th Congress, 3d Session), to Incor- porate the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua (Gibson Brothers, Washington, 1889); 4 Jeflferson's Memoirs, Correspondence, etc., 533, 536 (Charlottesville, Va, 1829)." One of the reasons of the rejection urged in debate was that congress would then have power to create a bank, which would render the great cities, where' there were prejudices and jealousies on that subject, averse to the adoption of the constitution. ' 1 Beach on Priv. Corp., § 3, citing McCulIoch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. §32.] CEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. 51 expressly delegated in the constitution to that government.^ The federal government has, consequently, under the power to govern the public domain, the incidental and auxiliary power to create municipal corporations in the Territories and in the District of Columbia, a district ceded by Virginia and Maryland to the United States as a seat of government.^ To recapitulate, the power of the State to create public corpora- tions is incidental to its sovereignty, and may be exercised for any lawful purpose not repugnant to its constitution or to the voluntary limitations imposed upon itself by its ratification of the federal compact ; while the power of the federal govern- ment to create public corporations is an implied power, and exists only in so far as it is necessary for the federal govern- ment to create such corporations in order to carry out powers expressly delegated to that government by the States in the constitution. 11 Beach on Priv. Corp., §§ 3-6; U. S. Const, Amend. X ; McCulIooh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 ; Thompson V. Pacific R R Co., 9 Wall 579 ; Cal- ifornia V. Pacific R R Co., 127 U. S. 39 ; Chisholm v. Georgia, 3 Dall. 419 ; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 ; Osborn v. Bank of the 'Dnited States, 9 Wheat. 738 ; Story on the Constitution, § 1266. See on this topic: "National Corporations," 81 Cent. Law J. 438 ; Hare's American Constitutional Law (Boston, 1889), 98, 105, 111, 249, 1310. For statutes ex- ercising this power see : 19 U. S. Stat at Large, 38 ; 13 D. S. Stat at Large, 665 ; 3 U. S. Stat at Large, 266. 2 Vincennes University v. Indiana (1853), 14 How. 368; Barnes v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540 ; Stqut- enbergh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141. This power of the congress to create municipal corporations stands upon the same basis and is governed by the same principles as its power to create a national bank (McCulloch v. Maiy- land, 4 Wheat 316 ; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat 61) ; or its power to authorize the constrution of railroads through the Territories. California v. Pacific R R Co.,127 U. S. 39. A curious instance of an exten- sion of this implied power is found in the charter granted by the fiftieth congress in its second session to the Maritime Canal Company of Nica- ragua, a company organized for the purpose of constructing, equipping and operating a ship canal from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean through the territory of Nicaragua or Nica- ragua and Costa Rica. To the mind of the writer that extension is un- ' warrantable, as the charter in ques- tion cannot be considered as neces- sary to the exercise of any power expressly delegated to the federal government in the constitution. 1 Beach on Priv. Corp., § 6 ; " Align- ment by Simon Sterne in Opposition to the Signature by the President of the United States of Senate Bill No. 1303 (50th Congress, 2d Session), to Incorporate the Maritime Canal Com- pany of Nicaragua (Gibson Brothers, Washington, 1889)." 52 CpEATION OF THE COKPOBATION. [§ 33. % 33. Municipal corporations created by the federal gov* ernment — (a) Territories. — By virtue of this implied power of the federal government to create corporations where it is necessary to erect such bodies in order to exercise a power expressly delegated in the constitution to that government, the congress of the United States has power to prov ide for the creation of municipal and other public corporations in the Territories, as incidental, and it has been provided by act of congress that the legislative assQjpbUes of the several Terri- tories shall not grant private charters or especial privileges, but may by general incorporation acts permit persons to as sociate themselves together as bodies corporate for mining, manufacturing and other industrial pursuits.^ And this act has been held to prohibit territorial legislatures from incoi*- porating municipal corporations by special act ^ auxiliary to the express power possessed by the federal government to govern the public domain.' This power possessed by the fedefal gov- ernment is delegated to the territorial legislature, generally by a provision in the act creating the Territory that the power of the territorial legislature shall extend to all rightful sub- jects of legislation. The general clause embraces the power to create municipal and other corporations.* « R. S. U. S., g§ 1889, 1890. Clinton v. Englebreot, 13 Wall 434. 2 Seattle v. Tyler (Wash. Territory, For cases showing the complete con- 1877). trol of the congress over the Terri- '^Vinoennes University v. Indiana, tories, see United States v. Beynolils, 14 How. 268 ; People v. City of Butte. 98 U. S. 145 ; National Bank v. Yank- 4 Mont. 174; Burnes v. Mayor &c. ton, 101 U. S. 139; Murphy v. Ram- of Atchison, 2 Kans. 454; Miner's sey, 114 U. S. 15. In the last named Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1; Story on case it was decided that congress had the Constitution, § 1206 ; " National power to exclude polygamists from Corporations," 21 Cent Law J. 428 ; voting. Beach on Priv. Corp., § 3, ad^nejre; ■ on this subject : Commercial National 2 People u Solomon, 51 111. 37. Bank v. City of lola, 2 Dillon C. C. 3 Horton v. Mobile School Commis- 358; s. C, 20 Wall. 665; Olcott v. Bioners, 43 Ala. 598. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 ; Savings * People V. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489 ; Association v. Topeka, 3 Dillon, 376 ; B. C, 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 37. School District v.' Insurance Co., 103 *San Francisco v. Spring Valley U. S. 707. Water-works (1874), 48 Cal 493. » State v. Nevs-ark, 40 N. J. Law, ePurdy v. People, 4 Hill, 384, re- 550. versing 2 Hill, 31. ' Clegg v, Richardson Co., 8 Neb. ' State V. Maloy (1878), 20 Kan. 619 ; 178 ; Dundy v. Richardson Co., 8 Neb. Wyandotte City v. Wood, 5 Kan. 603 ; 508. In Kansas, hovcever, an act for Atchison v. Bartholovc, 4 Kan. 124 ; the same purpose has been upheld aa Gilmore v. Norton, 10 Kan. 491 ; State not unconstitutional. Beach v. Leahy, V. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St 18; State v. 11 Kan. 63. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St 593; State v. 62 OEEATION OF THE OOEPOBATION. [§ 46. when any bill shall be presented to create a corporation for any other than for religious, literary or charitable purposes, or for a military or fire company, it shall be 'continued till an- other election of members of the general asseinbly shall have taken place, and public notice of its pendency shall be given, does not apply to public corporations.' In California there is a constitutional provision that the charters of cities must be consistent with and subject to the constitution of the State. Under this prohibition it has beeft held that charters repug- nant in some of their provisions to the general laws of the State are not entirely valid.* Constitutional limitations on the legislative power to incorporate towns and cities must of course be construed with reference to other portions of the constitutions and the statutes.' § 46. Incorporation by courts.— The legislatures of certain States authorize and empower a court to incorporate a certain district upon the petition of a designated number of the in- habitants of the district. The constitutionality of such acts has been questioned as being an undue delegation of legislative powers. In Iowa such an act has been upheld as not being unconstitutional.* A similar ruling has been made in the 1 State V. District of Narragansett said division," etc., " be submitted to (R I.), 16 At], Eep. 901. a vote of the legal electors of the 2 In re Strand (Gal.), 21 Pac. Eep. town or towns to be affected thereby," 654; Brooks w. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173. on petition of two-fifths of such ' So when the constitution of Wis- legal voters, it was held that such act • cousin provided that " the legislature was not unconstitutional because it may confer on the boards of super- was a discrimination between coun- visors of the several counties, . . . ties, as the legislature has power to such powers, of a local, legislative resume the authority conferred by and administrative character, as they sections 670, 671, upon the county shall from time to time prescribe ; " boards. State v. Forest County and the statutes (E. S., §§ 670, 671) (Wis.), 43 N. W. Eep.' 651; & C, 74 delegated to the county board of the Wis. 610. several counties the power " to set * The code of Iowa provides tha(V off, organize, vacate and change the where the inhabitants of any part of boundaries of the towns In their re- any county not embraced in any in- spectlve counties ; " and a special act corporated city or town shall desire divided Forest county into three to be organized into a city or town, towns, and provided that none of they may apply to the district court said towns should " be divided, va- by petition signed by not less than cated or have the boundaries thereof twenty-flve of the qualified electors changed by the board of supervisors of such territory, and the court shall of said county until the question of appoint commissioners to call an dec- §46.] CREATION OF THE COEPOEATION'. 63 courts of Colorado.' But in "Wisconsin an act authorizing the district judge to declare a town or village incorporated upon the petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants praying for such incorporation was declared unconstitutional as being a delegation of legislative functions to a judicial court.* In tion in the territory ; and, if the elec- tion be in favor of the incorporation, the clerk shall give notice of the re- sult, and copies of all the papers and record entiies shall be filed iu the re- corder's office of the county and in the office of tlie secretary of State ; and when such papers are filed, and officers elected, the incorporation shall be complete. The sections fur- ther provide for the annexation of territory to an incorporated city or town on the filing of a like petition and having like proceedings. It was held that the act is not unconstitu- tional as authorizing the creation of a municipal corporation by judicial act instead of by the legislature, since the only power thereby conferred on the court is the appointment of com- missioners of the election. Ford v. Incorporated Town of North Des Moines(1890), 45 N. W. Rep. 1031. 1 People V. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553. See, also. Mayor pf Norristown v. Sheldon, 1 Head (Tenn.), 24 2 Territory of Washington v. Stew- art, 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 23, where the judge expressly dissented from the doctrine of People v. Flem- ing, 10 CaL 553 ; and quoted Judge Cooley (Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 141), as follows : — « We think the bet- ter doctrine is that laid down by Judge Cooley in his work on Consti- tutional Limitations, which is as fol- lows : — ' The prevailing doctrine in the courts appears to be that except iu those cases where, by the consti- tution, the people have not expressly reserved to themselves a power of de- cision, the function of legislation can- not be exercised by them even to the extent of accepting or neglecting a law which has been framed for their consideration.' " But the same learned author quoted by the judge in the case just cited says elsewhere, after referring to the power of the legislature to create and abolish mu- nicipal corporations without refer- ence to the desires of the incorpo- rators : — " Nevertheless, as the corpo- rators have a special and peculiar interest in the terms and conditions of the charter, in the powers con- ferred and liabilities imposed, as well as in the general question whether they shall originally be or afterwards remain incorporated at all or not, and as the burdens of municipal govern- ment must rest upon their shoulders, and especially as by becoming incor- porated they are held in law to un- dertake to discharge the duties the charter imposes, it seems eminently proper that their voice should be heard on the question of their incor- poration, and that their decisions should be conclusive unless for strong reasons of State policy and local ne- cessity it should seem iinportant for the State to overrule the opinion of the local majority. The right to re- fer any legislation of this character to the people peculiarly interested does not seem to be questioned and the reference is by no means unusual." Cooley's Const Lim. {6th ed.) 139. Citing Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt 78; Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33 ; Mor- f ord V. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82 ; City of Paterson v. Society &c., 24 N. J. Law, 385; Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Me. 64 CEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. [§4T. Arkansas, also, the courts have decided that the legislature cannot delegate to the courts the power to create municipal corporations.^ § 47. The same subject continued. — In order that the courts may' acquire jurisdiction under these acts it is neces- sary for the petition for incorporation to be signed by the proportion of inhabitants required by the statute.' The find- ings of the court in these cases will not in general be disturbed by appellate courts;' and the provisions of the statute are construed with considerable liberality.* 58 ; Commonwealth v. Judges, 8 Pa. St. 391; Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Pa. St 214; Call v. Chadbourne, 46 Me. 206 ; State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 531 ; State V. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458 ; Hobart V. Supervisors &c., 17 Cal. 23; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467 ; Stev^avd v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11 ; Lafayette &c. E. Co. V. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185; Clarke u Rogers, 81 Ky. 43 ; People V. Butte, 4 Mont 174; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St 359; Smith v. Titconib, 31 Me. 272; Erlinger v. Boreau, 51 HI. 94 ; Lammert v. Led- well, 63 Mo. 188 ; Brunswick v. Fin- ney, 54 Ga. 317 ; Response to House Resolution, 55 Mo. 295; People v. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553; Graham v. Greenville, 67 Tex. 72. 1 State V. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81 ; State V. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419. See, also. State v. Simons, 32 'Minn. 540. 2 So under the Pennsylvania stat- ute it has been held that where a court finds that it is doubtful if a petition for the incorporation of a borough is signed by a majority of the freeholders residing within the proposed limits, it loses jurisdiction to entertain the petition or take fur- ther proceedings thereunder. In re Borough of Taylorsport (1888), 18 AtL Rep. 224. And in the same case it was held that the court could not acquire jurisdiction by reducing the territorial limits so that there would be a majority of freeholders left, whose names are on the petition. In re Borough of Taylorsport (1888), 18 AtL Rep. 224 ' As when, upon proceedings by a village under Code Iowa, sections 440-446, to be severed from the limits and control of an incorporated town, the trial court has found in favor of the petitiohers, the Supreme Court will not disturb such finding, unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Ashley v. Town of Cal- liope (Iowa), 32 N. W. Rep. 458. And where the Texas statute required that, before an election to determine if a city should be incorporated shall be ordered by a county judge, proof should be made before him that the territory sought to be incorporated contains the requisite number of in- habitants, the finding of a county judge in such a case was considered conclusive, as no provision was made for revising it State v, Goodwin (1887), 5 S. W. Rep. 678. * In Pennsylvania a proposed bor- ough which contains a small assem- blage of houses, collocated on the plan of streets and lanes, is entitled to in- corporation by the coui-ts, with the concurrence of the grand jury, under act of Pennsylvania of 1834, section 1 §§ 48, 49.] OKBATION OF THE COEPOEATION. 65 § 4:8. Classes of cities under general incorporating acts. — As indicated in the preceding sections, it is customary under the general municipal incorporating acts for the municipal corporations of the State to be divided into classes accord- ing to the number of inhabitants of the incorporated terri- tory. Under these statutes the municipality takes its posi- tion in the class to which it belongs without any acceptance by the incorporators of their allotment to that class. For example, the Utah law divides cities into classes, and provides the way, but not an exclusive one, by which cities should de- termine to which class they belong. Under this provision it was decided that the court would take judicial notice of the class to which a city belongs, and that the city would become a member of its proper class without anything done on its part.* And likewise by the Nebraska statute, which provides that " all cities, towns and villages containing more than fif- teen hundred and less than fifteen thousand inhabitants shall be cities of the second class, and be governed by the provis- ions of this chapter, unless they shall adopt a village gov- ernment, as hereinafter provided." All towns and villages containing more than fifteen hundred and less than fifteen thousand inhabitants are created by the force of act into cities of the second class, without any acceptance or other act of such town or city, or of its inhabitants.* § 49. The corporate limits — Territory of the corpora- tion. — The general incorporating acts make provision for (Brightly, PurdL Dig., p. 196, § 1), porated as a village. Mendenhall v. which provides that "the several Burton (1889), 23 Pac. Eep. 558. courts of quarter sessions within the Where the report of a grand jury, commonwealth shall have power, by on a petition for incorporation of a and with the concurrence of the borough, referred to " the annexe:! grand jury of the county, to incor- petition," and it appeared that the porate any town or village within petition was enfolded with, but not their respective jurisdictions." In re attached to, the report, it was not Incorporation of Village of Edge- error for the court to order the clerk wood (1889), 18 AtL Eep. 646. And to attach it In re Incorporation of under General Statutes Kansas, 1868, Pennsborough (1889), 13 Atl. Eep. 93. chapter 108, § 1, conferring power i People v. Page (Utah, 1890), 23 upon the probate court to declare Pac. Eep. 761. any town or village incorporated 2 State v. Babcock (1889), 25 Neb. upon petition, the probate court has 709 ; 41 N. W. Eep. 654 power to declare a town to be incor- 5 66 OEBATION OF THE OOItPOEATIOII. [§ 60. determining the corporate limits of the municipalities created under those acts, and in the case of incorporation by special act, the limits of the city or town are expressly defined in the act of incorporation. The Pennsj'lvania statute provides that whenever an application shall be made, by the freeholders of any town, for incorporation into a borough, and the bounda- ries embrace lands exclusively used for farming, the courts of quarter sessions of the county where such application is made may, at the request of the pai^y aggrieved, change such boundaries so as to exclude such land. The proposed bounda- ries can be modified, " at the request of the party aggrieved," only at the time the charter is before the court for approval.^ In Texas the fact that the corporate limits include a number of acres of purely agricultural land will not invalidate the corporation.^ The description of the territory to be incorpo- rated should be sufficiently definite to enable identification of the territory. Thus in Maine a description which, in a deed by the State, would be sufficient to describe a plantation, suf- ficiently describes it in the record of a meeting for its organ- ization.' § 50. Acceptance of charter fey corporators not neces- sary. — It is now well settled that the consent of the cor- 1 Appeal of Singer (Borough of of the villages into a borough, it cau- Wilkinsburg), 131 Pa. St. 365 ; 18 not be said that the limits of that AtL Eep. 931. In the same Statfe it village would be unduly extended, or has been held that a village seeking adjacent territory of the neighboring. to incorporate ■with itself adjacent village invaded, by granting the ap- territory, with the consent of its land- plication. In re Incorporation of owners, should not be denied the Village of Edgewood (Pa, 1889), 18 privilege because of objection, made AtL Rep. 646. by persons outside the disputed terri- 2 state v. Town of Baird (Tex., 1891), tory, that taxable property would be 15 S. W. Eep. 98. And under the thereby withdrawn from their con- same Texas statute, where a town has trol. In re Incorporation of Village been incorporated by a legal election, of Edgewood (Pa., 1889), 18 AtL Eep. its incorporation will be declared in- 646. And in the same case it was valid because there is included within decided that the existence of a natu- the corporate limits land not laid off ral boundary line between two vil- into lots or blocks, and the house of lages, such as a deep, wooded ravine, one relator, who, though he does no 13 not such division of territoiy as business in the town, yet attends requires separate corporate exist- church in it, and sends his children ence; and where a majority of the to school there. State v. Town of land-ownei-s on each side of the ra- Baird (Tex., 1891), 15 S. W. Eep. 98. viae demand incorporation wiLh one ' State v. "Woodbury, 76 Me. 457. § 51.J CEEATION OF THE OOEPOKATION. 67 porators is not necessary to the validity of the incorporation of municipalities. The acts, whether general or special, cre- ating municipal corporations are laws, and as such are bind- ing upon all persons subject thereto, whether consenting or unwilling.' Although this power of the legislature to force a municipal corporation upon unwilling corporators is un- doubted, the exercise of such power has been held to be con- trary to the genius of our government." § 51. The same subject continned. — Although the legisla- ture is not bound to consider the wishes of the corporators in creating municipal corporations, it is constitutional for the legislature to submit a proposed charter to the inhabitants of the district to be incorporated, to be adopted or rejected by a vote of those inhabitants.' Thus the question of the consoli- dation of Pittsburg and certain adjacent districts into one cor- poration was submitted to the vote of the persons interested ; and the act submitting the proposed measure was considered constitutional.* On the same principle it has been held in New York that a statute affecting a certain municipality shall ter- minate unless assented to by the voters of the corporation within a fixed time.* 1 People V. City of Butte, 4 Mont ' Mayor &c. of Brunswick v. Fin- 174; Gorhamu. Springfield, 2] Me. 58; ney, 54 Ga. 317; Alcorn «. Hamier, Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266 ; 88 Miss. 653 ; Clarke v. Rogers, 81 Ky. State V. Canterbiyy, 38 N. H. 218; 48; Call w Chadbourne, 16 Me. 307; Bristol V. New Chester, 3 N. H. 534 ; People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489 ; State V. Curran, 13 Ark. 831 ; People People v. Solomon, 51 111. 37 ; People V. Wren, 5 111. 369 ; Coles v. Madison v. Reynolds, 10 111. 1 ; Paterson t'._So^ Co., Breese (111.), 115; Warren- «. ciety &c., 24 N. J. Law, 385 ; Hudson Charlestown, 3 Gray, 104; Peoples. County v. State, 34 N.J. Law, 718; Morris, 13 Wend. 335 ; Fire Depai-t- In re Henry Street, 123 Pa. St. 346 ; ment v. Kip, 10 Wend. 367 ; People v. Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Pa. St. President, 9 Wend. 351 ; People v. 314 ; Commonwealth v. Judges, 8 Pa. Stout, 33 Barb. 349 ; Proprietors &c. St. 395; Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 73; wHorton, 6 Hill, 501; Wood u Bank, State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; Stater. 9 Cow. 194; Morford v, Unger, 8 Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Lafayette &c. Iowa, 82 ; Taylor v. New Berne, 3 R Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185 ; State Jones' Eq. (N. C.) 141 ; State v. Bab- v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 379 ; Foote v. Cin- cock, 25 Neb. 709 ; Zabriskie v. Rail- cinnati, 11 Ohio, 408. road Co., 33 How. 381. . < Smith u McCarthy, 56 Pa. St 359. 2 Paterson v. Society &c., 34 N. J, ' Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33, Law, 385. 68 OEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. [§§ 52, 63. § 52. Substantial compliance with incorporating acts necessary. — If the requirements of the acts authorizing the creation of municipal corporations are substantially followed, the courts will in general uphold the proceedings, and will not declare the incorporation void because unessential formal- ities have been overlooked in whole or in part. So in Nebraska, where it was apparent that a city of the second class had in fact been duly organized in good faith, mere irregularities in some of the proceedings woulft not, it was held, render the organization void.' Following this principle the courts will presume that the necessary formalities were performed in the absence of proof to the contrary." Nor is it always necessary for the records to show on their face that aU the conditions required by the statute were present.' § 53. Instances of irregularities in incorporation. — The Pennsylvania act of 1834, relating to the incorporation of bor- 1 City of Omaha v. City of South Omaha (1891), 47 N. W. Rop. 118. 2 For instance, where a committee was appointed by the court to estab- lish the divisional line between towns in response to a petition in accordance with the Vermont statute, it was pre- sumed, on exceptions to the commit- tee's report, that all the facts alleged in the petition, and which were neces- sary to be established in order to en- title the petitioner to the relief prayed for, were either admitted or proved at the preliminary hearing. Town of Somerset v. Town of Glastenbury (1889), 17 Atl. Rep. 748. And in the same case it was held that it was not necessary that it should appear by the report of the committee that they were sworn as required by law. Town of Somerset v. T6wn of Glas- tenbury (1889), 17 AtL Rep. 748. ' By the code of West Virginia of 1887, chapter 47, section 49, it is pro- vided that the corporate limits of towns containing a population of less than two thousand inhabitants shall be changed by a vote ordered by the council, the result of which vote, if in favor of the change, shall be certified to the circuit court. Section 49 pro- vides that the circuit court shall enter an order approving and con- firming the change, and directing a copy certified to the council, etc. It was held to be n.ot necessary to the validity of the order approving such change that it should show on its face that the town contained less than two thousand inhabitants. Davis V. Town of Point Pleasant (W. Va.), 9 S. E. Rep. 228 ; 32 W. Va. 289; Point Pleasant Bridge Co. v. Town of Point Pleasant, 9 S. K Rep. 231 ; 2 W. Va. 328. See, also, Attorney- General V. Rice, 64 Mich. 385. But where the Pennsylvania statute re- quired that a petition for the incor- poration of a borough should be signed by the petitioners within three months immediately preceding its presentation to the court, that fact need not be stated in the petition, but must appear in the record. In re Summit Borough (Pa., 1887), 7 AtL Rep, 219; In re Osborne, 101 Pa. St 284. § 54.] CREATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. 69 oughs, provided for a reference of an application for incor- poration to the grand jury, and that, if a majority thereof, " after a full investigation of the case, shall find that the con- ditions presented by this act have been complied with, and shall believe that it is expedient to grant the prayer of the petitioners, they shall certify the same to the court." Under this provision an indorsement of " approved " on the petition by the foreman of the grand jury, with his signature, was not considered a sufficient certificate.' But the failure to mark as " filed," a plot of a borough, sought to be incorporated, at the time it was presented, can be cured by an order for it to be so marked nunc pro tunc, according to a decision in the same State.* The constitution of California relating to the adoption of city charters provided that the charter should " be submit- ted to the legislature for its approval or rejection as a whole, without power of alteration or amendment, and if approved by a majority vote of the members elected to each house, it should become the charter of such city." The resolution of approval need not be in the form of a bill passed in the ordi- nary manner, and approved by the governor, as the constitution does not niake the governor a part of the legislature.' § 54. Notice of incorporation. — It is frequently provided in the acts relating to the incorporation of municipalities that notice of the proposed incorporation be published for a pre- scribed period. In Florida it has been held that, where such notice has been given, the proceedings for incorporation may be had on the last day of the notice.'' In that case the statute required the notice to be published " for a period of not less than thirty days." According to the judicial coj;istruction of this requirement, it was complied with if thirty days' notice had been given by excluding the 'first and including the last day; and it was held that the statute did not mean thirty clear days.* The notice must be sufficiently explicit to enable the proposed corporators to vote intelligently upon the ques- 1 JTft re Summit Borough (1887), 7 31 Pac. Eep. 653; In re Strand (CaL; AIL Eep. 319. 1889), 21 Pac. Rep. 654. 2 Appeal of Gross (1889), 18 AtL Eep. < State v. Town of Winter Park 657. ' (1889), 25 Fla. 371. 'BrooksD. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173; S.C., 6 state v. Town of Winter Park (1889), 25 Fla. 371. .70 CREATION OF THE OOBPOEATION. [§ 55. tion of incorporation.* And where all the parties interested in proceedings to incorporate a municipality are in court, they cannot be heard to object that the notice of the proceedings was insufiScient.* § 55. Validity ofincorporation^- How tested. — The State, being the creator of municipal corporations, is the proper party to impeach the validity of their creation ; and conse- quently where the corporation ift acting under color of law and IS recognized by the State as so acting, its corporate ex- istence cannot be collaterally attacked.' This doctrine applies even though the validity of the incorporation may be attacked on constitutional grounds,* In Illinois a town brought an ac- tion against a citizen to recover a tax on property in the town, and it was decided by the court that the validity of the incor- poration of the town could not be impeached in such an action.* If the State acquiesces in the validity of a municipal corpora- tion and recognizes the corporation as val'd for a long period, it will be estopped from denying the validity of the incorpo- ration." In the words of Judge Cooley : — " The State itself may justly be precluded, on the principle of estoppel, from ' A notice by the county supervis- v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463 ; Lanning ore of an election to decide upon the v. Carpenter, 20 N. Y. 474 ; Bumsey incorporation of a California city, on v. People, 19 N. Y. 41 ; Swam v. Com- petition of proper parties, the notice stock, ISWis. 463 ; Jameson v. Peo- stating that the "petition set forth pie, 16111. 257; S. C, 63 Am. Dec. 304 ; the boundaries of the proposed cor- Tisdale v. Minonk, 46 111. 9 ; Ketter- poration, and stated the number of ing v. Jacksonville, 50 HI. 39 ; Searcy inhabitants therein to be about three v. Garnell, 47 Ark. 269 ; Louisville thousand," was decided to be a suffi- &c. B. Co. v. Shires, 108 lU. 617 ; cient notice to enable the voters to Henderson v. Davis, 106 N. C. 88 ; classify the proposed municipal cor- Eayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88 ; State poration under the law in cities of v. Fuller, 96 Mo. 165; State v. Carr, the sixth class, according to the stat- 5 N. H. 367 ; Hamilton v. President ute of that State, and to vote Intel- &c. of Carthage, 24 111. 22; Worley ligently upon the question of incor- v. Harris, 82 Ind. 493 ; Mendenhall V. poration. People v. City of River- Burton, 43 Kan. 570. side, 70 Cal. 461 ; 11 Pao. Rep. 759. 369. Them to Amend Their Own Char- * Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361. ters? " 3 Cent L. J. 83. * See the chapter on LEOlSLATrvE 1 State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. Control, infra. (TT. S.) 380. ' See Bawlinson's Municipal Corpo- 2 Sloan V. State, 8 Blackf. 361. ration Acts, 8th edition; also 45 & » Trustees of Public Schools v. Tay- 46 Vict, ch. 50. See, also, supra, m 28, 29. 80 THE CHAETEE. [§ 65. the MunicipaJl Corporation Acts." "§ 211. (1) Every peti- tion for a charter under this act shall be referred to a commit- tee of the lords of her majesty's privy council " (in this part called the committee of council). " (2) One month at least before the petition is taken into consideration by the commit- tee of council, notice thereof and of the time when it will be so taken into consideration shall be published in the London Gazette, and otherwise in such manner as the committee di- rect, for the purpose of makingtt known to all persons inter- ested." The queen, having received such a petition, and the council having examined and approved thereof, if she deter- mines to grant a charter of incorporation, has certain powers regarding the election and officers in the new boroughs. She can fix the number of councillors, and also the number and boundaries of the borough wards, and assign the councillors among the wards. She may also " fix the years, days and times for the retirement of the first aldermen and council- lors, — thus giving the crown the power of fixing the time of elections." ' The committee of council, before approving a pe- tition to the queen, may settle a scheme for the adjustment of the powers, rights, privileges, franchises, duties, property and liabilities of any then existing local authority whose dis- trict comprises the whole or part of the area of that borough, either with or without any adjoining or other place, and also of any officer of that authority. This scheme is not binding if objected to by the inhabitants or a part of them, unless confirmed by parliament, and it must in any wise be sub- mitted for approval to the secretary of State and the local government board.* Section 216 of this act further provides that " A charter creating a municipal borough which, purports to be granted in pursuance of the royal prerogative and in pursuance of or in accordance with this act, shall after ao- ceptanoe be deemed to be valid and within the powers of this act, and her majesty's prerogative, and shall not be questioned in any legal proceeding whatever." This section was intended to prevent the necessity, which so frequently arose before the 140 & 41 Viot, ch. 69; 46 & 46 245 & 46 Vict, ch. 50, §214 Vict, ch. 50, § 213; Butter v. Chap- man, 8 M. & W. 1. § 66.] THE CHAETEE. 81 passing of these acts, of having acts of parliament to confirm different charters.' § 66. The Municipal Corporation Acts and the royal pre- rogative. — Sir Christopher Eawlinson, whose compilation of the Municipal Corporation Acts is a standard English work, calls attention to the section concerning the queen's power to grant charters : " The crown has always possessed the power of creating corporations and conferring franchises (see 1 Kyd on Corporations, 61) ; but where privileges and powers are to be conferred which are not recognized by the common or statute law an act of parliament is necessary. This act, though it would not at all abridge the common-law preroga- tive of the crown, nevertheless prevents its granting charters of incorporation with the powers conferred by this act, save with the advice of the privy council, and on petition by ' the inhabitant householders.' The petition to the queen must be by the inhabitant householders. It seems a compound house- holdef is included under the term." ^ Notwithstanding the pro- vision of section 216, quoted above, as to the validity of charr ters purporting to be granted in pursuance of this act, there is an interesting case regarding the validity of a borough charter granted under 5 and 6 W. 4, ch. 76, § 141, and 7 W. 4 and 1 Vict., ch. 78, § 49, both of which elections were repealed by 40 and 41 Vict., ch. 69, but substantially reproduced in this act. It was the case of Eutter i?. Chapman,' decided in the court of exchequer chamber, and related to the charter of Manchester. It appears that a petition, which had been agreed upon at a meeting of the rate-payers of the parlia- mentary borough of Manchester, convened by public adver- tisement, and which was in fact attended (and which petition was afterwards signed) by four thousand inhabitant house- holders of the borough, was presented to her majesty, praying for the grant of a charter of incorporation to the inhabitants of such borough under the provision of the act. Afterwards, and before the day appointed for this petition being taken iSee, also, 40 and 41 Viot, ch. 69, 11 L. T. (N. S.) 417; s. C, 11 W. E. 90; § 9 ; 18 and 19 Vict, ch. 31 ; 20 and 21 41 and 43 Vict, ch. 26, § 14 ; 43 and Vict, ch. 10. 43 Vict, ch. 10. 2 See Eeg. v. Mayor of Aberavon, ' 8 M. & W. 1. 6 82 THE CHAETEE. [§ 67. into consideration by the privy council, a counter petition, signed by six thousand of such inhabitant householders, was presented to her majesty, praying her not to grant such char- ter. The whole number of inhabitant householders in Man- chester was at that time forty-eight thousand. The court of exchequer chamber held as follows: — (1) That the second petition did not necessarily, in point of law, deprive her maj- esty of the power to grant such charter upon the first petition ; but that whether the first petition was, under all the circum- stances, the petition of the inhabitant householders of tbe borough, so as to authorize the exercise of the powers con- ferred by the act, was a question of fact for a jury, and that the determination of the privy council to advise the crown to grant the charter upon such petition was not conclusive of its validity. The court further held that the grant of such char- ter of incorporation is an exercise of the common-law prerog- ative of the crown, although it also extends to the new corpo- ration the powers of the municipal act,' which the crown has power to do only by virtue of the sections of this act. More- ' over, the charter may be granted to a part only of the bor- ough, from the whole of which the petition emanated, and is not necessarily to be conferred on the inhabitant householders of the whole borough. The decision went much further into detail than this brief summary. The point first mentioned was upheld by a subsequent decision, to the eflfect that when the first petition had once given the crown power to act under these sections, such power could not be taken away by anything that happened subsequently.^ § 67. Contents of charter.— In the United States, the char- ter being an act of the legislature usually, either specially di- rected to the incorporation of one separate city therein named, or general in its provisions, it is instructive to take up and examine, an illustrative example of a special charter. The general laws of the States have already been discussed. Selec- tion may be made almost at random among special municipal incorporations, for the general features are the same. The city of Auburn was incorporated by the people of the State »5 and 6 W. 4; ch. 76. 2 Reg. v. Mayor of Aberavon, 11 L. T. (N. S.) 417. § 68.] THE OHAETEE. 83 of New York, represented in senate and assembly, by an act passed March "21, 1848. The act sets out the territorial out- line of the proposed municipality, and declares that it " shall hereafter be known by the name of the city of Auburn, and the inhabitants residing therein shall be a corporation under the name and style of the mayor and common council of the city of Auburn, and as such may sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law or equity in this State." The city is then set off into wards. Then follow provisions as to the eleqtion of ward and city officers, and the powers and duties of the " common council " are then enumerated. The powers conferred are the powers of the city relating to its domestic economy, its constabulary and its finances. Sub- ordinate legislative powers are delegated, " such as are neces- sary to carry into full effect the powers given to said council by this act." The duties of the city officers are next defined, after w^hich the subject of municipal taxes is fully treated. The common council are constituted commissioners of high- ways to keep the streets and roads in repair. Additional powers are conferred on them with regard to prevention of fires, to establishing school districts, to caring for the poor, to regulations as to pestilence and disease, and numerous subordi- nate miscellaneous duties. Such in brief is the outline of a special municipal charter. §68. Prominent features of special "charters. — In the charter just examined, it will be seen that the act is more minute and specific regarding the powers and privileges given than in any other part. It would seem as if local self-govern- ment were so great and valuable a right that the people feel that it is to be exercised only upon terms and conditions, and the determination of what these terms and conditions shall in a given instance be is to be left to the wisdom and discretion of the legislature, which bears the relation of mouth and voice to the body of the people. This succinctness in stating what powers are conferred makes it possible to know exactly the limits of the city's jurisdiction, and, in case of the passage of general acts subsequently, the charter is the criterion of inconsistency between the special and the general acts. But under a gen- ( ral law — which may be said to be a species of divisible char- 84 THE CHAETEE. [§ 69. ter, as many municipalities may at the same time point to it as containing the enumeration of their charter rights — the provisions are much the same : only general terms are used, such as " any . . . complying with the provisions of this act . . . shall," etc. A royal charter.ls an instrument in writing setting forth the privileges or an assurance of rights granted by the sovereign to the people.' When it establishes a municipal corporation, it prescribes the territorial limits, the form, methods and franchises o^the proposed municipality, very much as an act of parliament would. It is, however, ad- dressed by the king to all his subjects, and names the persons to be incorporated, and constitutes them and their successors a body corporate.^ "Whether, then, the incorporation be by means of a formal, special document, such as a charter proper, or by means of a particular enactment of the governing body, or whether it be concealed in a general statute, such as the Municipal Corporations Act, it is equally the criterion of every right and privilege enjoyed. It is the constitution of the mu- nicipality. If the power of the common council, or of the city executive, be called in question, the charter, in whatever form it exist, has to be judicially examined and construed. If the right to lease ferry privileges is controverted, the char- ter is the controlling witness to the existence or lack of the right. ■"n § 69. What charters cannot confer. — Judge Hare, in his learndd treatise on American Constitutional Law,' in discuss- ing charters of incorporation, and particularly whether or not charters confer contractual rights which cannot be violated consistently with the constitution, draws a distinction be- tween public and private corporations in this regard, and points out not only that the powers delegated are liable to re- call, but that many powers cannot, by reason of their very nature, be delegated irrevocably. " Many powers," he argues, " and among them the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof, the police power and that of eminent domain, 1 Amer. & Eng. Encyo. of Law, form, appoint the officers and give a voL III, tit Charter. proper name to the municipality. 2 A royal charter may, however, Glover on Munio. Corp. 24. empower another to prescribe the ' Vol. I, p. 608. § 70.] THE OHAETEK. 85 are not only sovereign, but so essential to the care which the State should have for the lives and fortunes of its citizens that they cannot be vested irrevocably in private hands, or exer- cised save for a public purpose ; and any attempt made by the State to alienate its authority in these regards will be merely void, and may be so treated by the courts." ^ The same writer states certain,qualifications of this general proposition as fol- lows : — " A State may forego the power of taxation, but cannot confer it ; or, in other words, may covenant not to tax the cov- enantee, though not that he shall have the right to tax other people.^ So the powers requisite for municipal and local govern- ment may be delegated to a natural or artificial person ap- pointed by the State, or chosen by the inhabitants of a town or district, but cannot be vested irrevocably in the appointee ; and a stipulation to that effect will be nugatory." § 70. Wherein the constitutional limitation consists. — It appears, therefore, from the preceding section that the fed- eral constitution, in providing that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, looks to the pro- tection of property rights and not political rights. The lat- ter are vested in the people at large, but cannot be vested in communities. The constitution is general, and embraces in its scope every citizen. No absolute political rights, then, can vest in any one individual or collection of individuals, as against the legislature, representing the people at large, or as against any other individual or individuals.' If the State, therefore, chooses to organize governmental agencies, — as- all public corporations are shown to be under the rule of the Dartm6uth College Case, — this agency can be modified or re- voked at any time by the State. " This is true of all public corporations," says Judge Hare, in the treatise to which ref- 1 The Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 erty. " Taxation,"' to quote the lan- U. S. 33 ; Thorp v. The Eailroad Co., guage of the master, " is, in its es- 27 Vt. 140 ; Trustees of Public Schools senoe, an exercise of sovereign power V. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618. over an inferior; it is an exaction, ' In Trustees of Public Schools v. payment of which by the inferior is •Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618, 633, the court compelled by the superior." declared it was impossible for the » The People v, Morris, 13 Wend, legislature to clothe a municipality 335, 337. with the power of taxing State pi op- 86 THE CHAETEB. [§ 71. erence has already been made,' " and applies with fuU force to the charters which confer the right of local self-government on towns and boroughs." * " One distinctive feature of such an agency is that the legislature creates the body which it employs and authorizes, another that the corporation con- tracts in its own name, and not on the credit of the citizens individually, or of the State. Hence, when it is dissolved, the entire fabric crumbles, and if another is substituted, it will not necessarily inherit the obligations of its predecessor." ' §71. Acceptance — When necessary. — All private incor- . poration being of the nature of a contract, assent to or ac- ceptance of the contract is essential to its validity. This is not true in the case of municipal corporations. The legislature being supreme, the public interest being that for which the town or city is to be incorporated, the legislature is not in- fringing any right if it impose a charter on a locality and its inhabitants without their consent or even against their will. Nevertheless, the legislature can unquestionably provide that any particular charter shall not talie effect until accepted ; and it can prescribe the way in which the acceptance shall be signified, as that it must be by a majority vote of the inhab- itants. And if such provision is not unconstitutional, as has been repeatedly held,* there is no tenable ground to take against its going further, and prescribing the manner in which such majority vote shall be ascertained. Thus, in the Ohio case just cited, the township and city occupying identical ter- ritorial limits, and the legislature having provided that an amendment to the city charter should be accepted by a ma- jority of the voters of the city, the vote was proceeded to, but 1 Hare's Am. Const Law, § 43. municipal obligations rest upon th* ^ Shaipless v. Philadelphia, 21 Fa. organization that takes the place of St. 149 ; £arb7 v. Shaw,' 19 Fa. 258 ; one that has been dissolved will be City of Erie v. The Erie Canal Co., more fully discussed. 59 Pa. St 174; Pattei-son f. The So- < Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Fa St ciety, 24 N. J. Law, 385; Berlin v. 359; Commonwealth v. Fainter, 10 Gorham. 34 N. H. 266 ; Butler v. Barr (Fa.), 395 ;. County v. Quarter Pennsylvania, 10 Howard, 402 ; New- Sessions, 8 Barr, 214 ; Paterson v. So- ton V. The Commissioners, 100 U. S. ciety &c., 4 Zabr. (N. J.) 385 ; People 528. 548. V. Solomon, 51 111. 53 ; Foote v. Cin- 8 Meriwether v. Garrett 103 U. S. cinnati, 11 Ohio, 408. 472. Further on, the extent to which § 72.] THE OHAKTEE. 87 the council ordered the vote to be taken at the township polls ; and this was held not to be a city vote, and not an acceptance within the provisions of the act, for the voters of the city and township had to possess different qualifications. § 72. The same subject continued. — A royal charter was never operative until the acceptance of those to be incorporated was signified. The proposed body of incorporators were sup- posed to receive and consider the charter, and then to acceipt or reject it. If they accepted it, their acceptance was irrev- ocable, but the acceptance had to be of the whole charter, or it was deemed to be rejected; and if the crown assented to the proposed alterations, then the amended charter was offered again as a new charter. And in the case of the crea- tion of a corporation by the legislature, the acceptance of the charter, or indeed whether there need be any acceptance, is wholly for the legislature to say. It was at first thought un- constitutional for the legislature to provide that a charter shall not take effect until accepted by a majority of the inhabitants, on the ground that it was a delegation of legislative power. The courts have, however, interpreted it otherwise, holding such a provision to be wholly constitutional. It is not a dele- gation of legislative power, but merely the declaration by the legislature of a condition precedent to incorporation, to wit, the vote of a certain proportion of the inhabitants.* By the same reasoning, the legislature can make the right to make certain improvements or incur certain liabilities depend upon a vote of the people interested.^ And the power of police regulation, one of the most essential attributes of sovereignty, 1 Lafayette &c. R Co. v. Geiger, 34 solidated is valid. Smith v. McCarthy, Ind. 185 ; Hobart v. Supervisors, 17 56 Penn. St 359. Cat 33 ; Call v, Chadbourne, 46 Me. 3 For decisions holding acceptance 206 ; Bank v. Brown, 36 N. Y. 467 ; not to be essentia], see People v. Mor- People i>. Solomon, 51 111. 53 ; Alcorn ris, 13 Wend. 325; People v. Pres't- V. Hamer, 38 Mies. 652 ; Patterson v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351 ; Fire Society &c,, 4 Zabr. 385 ; People v. Department of New York v. Kip, 10 Reynolds, 10 III. 1 ; State v. Noyes, 30 Wend. 267 ; Proprietors of Soutli- N. H. 379 : Sedgwick on Construction hold v. Horton,'6 Hill, 501 ; Wood w of Statutory and Constitutional Law, Pres't Jefferson County Bank, 9 Cow.' 1.35, n. A statute submitting to the 194; Brouwer v. Appleby, 1 Sandf. people of several municipalities the 158 ; People v. Stout, 83 Barb, 249 ; question whether they shall be con- State v. Babcock, 35 Neb. 709 ; Berlin 88 THE CHAETEE. [§ 73. may be committed to the majority of the citizens in separate communities.* The right of the legislature to organize munici- palities regardless of the consent of those to be affected rests on the very theory of our government. That theory is that it is a government by the people, who act through their rep- resentatives. They delegate their authority to their agents, who speak and act for them in making laws, and hence they are bound by properly enacted laws promulgated by their agents. They give their consenf to these laws by clothing their agents with power and authority to make them, and there is, therefore, no reserved power in the people to consent to or reject laws properly enacted by their lawfully consti- tuted agents." § 73. Compulsory acceptance. — In no respect is the dis- tinction between private and public corporations more marked than in the fact that np private corporation, or rather body of individuals, can be incorporated compulsorily, while in the case of public corporations the rule is otherwise. The reason IS evident ; for a private corporation by its incorporation en- ters into a contract with the legislative power ; when it accepts its charter the grant is irrevocable, and the contractual rights ft Gorham, 34 N. H. 366 ; State v. 357 ; State v. Noyes, 10 Foster, 279 ; Canterbury, 38 N. H. 195 ; Bristol v. State &c. v. Court of Common Pleas. New Chester, 3 N. H. 534; Gorham w 36 N. J. Law, 73: S. C, 13 Am. Eep. Springfield, 31 Me. 58; State v. Cur- 433. ' ran, 13 Ark. 331 ; People v. Wren, 4 2 Angell & Ames on Corporations, Scam. 369; Coles v. Madison Co., § 79, and cases cited ; People v. Butte, Breese (III.), 115 ; Warren v. Mayor 4 Mont. 174 ; Medical Inst v. Patter- dec, of Charlestown, 3 Gray, 104 ; Mor- son, 1 Denio, 61 ; 5 Den. 681 ; Meyers ford V. Unger, 8 Iowa, 83; People v. v. Irwin, 2 Serg. & E. 868; Wells v. Butte, 4 Mont, 174. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; Society u iThe "local option" liquor laws Town of Pawlet, 4 Pet 480. Under are instances in point These have the classification of cities made by been declared constitutional in many Pennsylvania act of May 23, 1874, a courts. Said the Supreme Court of city having more than ten thoasand Errors of Connecticut : — " The law is population by the last decennial cen- perfect and complete as it comes sus became ipso facto a city of the from the hands of the law-making third class without accepting or adopt- power." State v. Wilcox, 43 Conn, ing the provisions of the act Com. 364 ; S. C, 19 Am. Rep. 536 ; Com- McKenna v. McGroarty (Penn. C. P.), monwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 37 ; 6 Kulp, 195. Commonwealth v. Dean, 110 Mass. § 74. J THE CHAETEE. 89 cannot be impaired or destroyed by any subsequent act of leg- islation.i But when the legislative body determines that the public interest demands that a city or other municipal corpo- ration should be incorporated, it can confer the necessary franchises and impose the necessary duties on the inhabitants of the place, even against their wish. ITor do the franchises that they confer vest any rights in the persons incorporated. This is the learning in the case of People v. Morris,^ where Nelson, J., in writing the opinion, said: — " It is an unsound, and even absurd, proposition, that political power conferred by the legislature can become a vested right as against the government in any individual or body of men." As a matter of fact the prevalence of general laws on the subject of the incorporation of niunicipalities makes this question of accept- ance of less importance, inasmuch as under a general law it is only possible to prescribe under what conditions certain com- munities can avail themselves of the provisions of the act and become municipalities. Acceptance, then, is implied when a particular community avails itself of the said provisions, and is constituted a municipality.' Supposing that the general law provides that whenever the inhabitants, or a majority thereof, of a community containing at least so many inhabit- ants, desire to be incorporated as a municipality, they shall express such desire by a petition to a certain authority, and upon such petition an election shall be held to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants, with similar regulations, after which the community shall be a village or town, or city of the first, second or third class, as the case may be, the incorporation becomes the voluntary act of the incorporators, and is com- pulsory only in cases where there is dissent on the part of a minority, who are bound by the majority's action. § 74. Charters, how proved. — The charter of a municipal- ity incorporated by the legislature is matter of public record and knowledge, like any other act of the legislature ; conse- quently the courts will take judicial notice thereof. This is. as of coursij when the charter is declared to be a public statute, 1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, ner prescribed invalidates the char- 4 Wheat 518. ter. People v. Gunn, 85 CaL 238 ; 2 13 Wend. 325. S. C, 24 Pac Eep. 7ia ' A failure to proceed in the man- 90 THE CHAETEB. [§ 74, but there are a number of cases, e. g., in Alabama,* holding that, even when the act of incorporation is merely public or general in its nature and purposes, and is not expressly de- clared to be a public statute, the courts will judicially notice it. But while the charter is judicially noticed by the courts, the laws or ordinances enacted by the municipality are not so noticed unless by the courts of the municipality. This is true both in England and America.'' Therefore, when any such by-laws or ordinances are to be plfeaded they must be pleaded in substance. If the charter or a statute directs the courts judicially to notice such ordinances, the statute prevails over the general rule and the courts are bound by it. How, then, is this charter brought before a court? How is it proved? Courts will take judicial notice of a charter of a municipality whether it be in the form of a general statute or be declared to be general or public in its character or purposes. It being an expression of the supreme will of the State, the courts will presume it to be a matter of universal knowledge within the State ; therefore it need not be specially pleaded.' But if it prove necessary to establish the fact that a municipality was duly incorporated, the charter itself — that is to say, the act or a true copy thereof, certified or otherwise authenticated — is admissible, and such evidence would be primary. In the absence of primary evidence, it is proper to produce secondary or parol evidence.* 1 Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. ' Smoot v. The Mayor, 34 Ala. 112, 486 ; Ferryman v. Greenville, 51 Ala. 131 ; Case v. The Mayor, 30 Ala. 538 ; 510; Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538; Ferryman v. City of Greenville, 51 Smoot V. Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 121. Ala. 507 ; Albrittin v. The Mayor, 60 2 Norris v. Staps, Hob. 311 ; Willo. Ala. 486. 166, pi. 403 ; Willo. 173, pL 433 ; Willc. * A certified copy from the secre- 173, pi, 425 ; Broadnao's Case, 1 Venti tary of State was admitted when the 196; Barber Surgeons v. Felson, 3 originalcouldnotbefoundinthetown Lev. 253 ; Goodrich v. Brown, 30 clerk's office. Braintree i'. Battles, 6 Iowa, 291 ; Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa, Vt. 395. Blackstone v. White, 41 236; Conboy v. Iowa City, 8 Iowa, Fenn. St 330, where a sworn copy 90 r Cox V. St Louis, 11 Mo. 431; (not official) was held to be proper People V. Mayor &a, 7 How. Pr. 84 ; secondary evidence. Stockbridge v. Harkeru. Mayor, 17 Wend. 199; New West Stockbridge, 18 Mass. 400, a Orleans v. Bonds, 14 La, Ann. 303 ; case of proof by paroL Trustees v. Leffen, 33 IlL 90; Mooney V. Kennett, 19 Mo. 551. §§ 75, 76.] THE CHAETEE. 91 § 75. Proof of fact of incorporation.— Although the char- ter of a city may be judicially noticed, yet it may be the case that the corporate existence of a municipality is alleged, while there is no charter for the courts judicially to notice. This would occur in the case of a corporation by prescription. In such case, proof of user of corporate privileges is admissible, and it is competent to show that the town has for many years exer- cised corporate powers. Or it may be that the legislature has passed an act conferring some additional right or duty on the town, thus giving it, as it were, legislative recognition.' The principle is that the public is the party interested in the incorporation of municipalities, and if the public chooses to consider an existing unincorporated municipality as incor- porate, and waives its right to refuse its recognition, do one else is in a position to assert that it is not a corporate body. Reputation and user are therefore competent to be proven to establish corporate existence.- While there may have been irregularities in the incorporation of a municipality, yet the courts will not favor their interposition long afterward to dis- prove corporate existence.' And in no case can the legal character of a de facto municipal corporation be collaterally impeached by private citizens. It belongs to the State alone, by the proper officers, to institute proceedings in which the regularity of its incorporation may be determined.* § 76. Proof of corporate existence. — A recent writer has said : — " The charter or the act of incorporation of a munici- pality, like records generally, are to be proved by inspection, or by copies properly authenticated ; but if there be suffi- ' " It is universally affirmed that ham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547 ; Ryder v. when a legislature has full power to Railroad Co., 13 111. 533 ; Highland create corporations, its act recogniz- Turnpike v. McKean, 10 Johns. 154; ing as valid a de faato corporation, Owings v. Speed, 5 WheAt 420 ; Lon- whether private or municipal, oper- donderry v. Andover, 28 Vt. 416 ; ates to cure all defects in steps lead- Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt 439. ing up to the organization, and 3 Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 111. 76 ; Jame- makes a dejure out of what before son v. People, 16 IlL 257; Denning v, was only a de facto corporation." Railroad Co., 3 Ind. 437. See, also, Brewer, J., in Comanche v. Lewis, Smith v. Board Com'rs, 45 Fed. Rep. 133 U. 8. 198, 203. 735. 2 Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt 388 ; Bas- * Mendenhall v. Burton, 43 Kail. sett V. Porter, 4 Cush. 487 ; Dilling- 570 ; S. a, 83 Pac. Rep. 588. 92 THE CHABTEE. [§ 77. cient proof of the loss or destruction of the record, much in- ferior evidence of its contents may be admitted.'" When the inquiry into the corporate existence of a municipality is merely collateral, only that the municipality exists de fcbcto need be proved.' The incorporation of a town may be proved by reputation, or by long user of corporate powers, or, as we have previously seen, by grants from the legislature implying a corporate existence.' It is not conclusive proof of no pre- vious corporate existence that a town has been incorporated under act of the legislature, for it may have desired to obtain the rights and privileges given by virtue of some general stat- ute. At the most it would be a question for the jury. So in an action against a village, it was held that a recital in a stat- ute to the effect that the village had been incorporated was proof of such incorporation.* § 77. General rules of construction of charters.— " It is ai well-settled rule, in regard to acts of incorporation, that thfey must be strictly construed, and especially municipal cor- porations, for the reason that as they are invested with a por- tion of the authority which properly appertains to the sover- eign power of the State, they must be confined to those powers which are clearly granted, as it is only by such grants that the government proper can surrender its just authority." ' 1 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, tiit < Fox v. Fort Edward, 48 Hurd, 363. !Municipal Corporations, § 10, p. 965. See as to manner of proving organ- 3 Parol proof of incorporation, ization under a general act, Louis- Robie V. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 319 ; ville &c. R. Co. v. Shires, 108 IlL 617. Highland Turnpike Co. w McKean, ^ Leonard v. City of Canton, 35 10 Johns. 159 ; Dillingham v. Snow, Miss. 189, 190 ; Mintum v. Larue, 23 5 Mass. .547; Bassett v. Porter, 4 How. (U. S.) 435; Lafayette v. Cox, Cush. 487 ; Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 IlL 5 Ind. 38 ; Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio 76 ; Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257 ; (part II), 31 ; Thomas v. Richmond, Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt 388; Brain- 12 Wall. 849; Willard v. Killing- tree V. Battles, 6 Vt 895 ; Sherwin v. worth, 8 Conn. 247 ; Port Huron v. Bugbee, 16 Vt 439 ; Londonderry v. McCall, 46 Mich. 565 ; Nichol v. Andover, 28 Vt 416 ; Dennihg v. Mayor &c., 9 Humph. 252 ; Hender- New Albany' E. Co., 2 Ind. 437; son v. Covington, 14 Bush, 812; Owings V. Speed, 5 Wheat 420. See; Sedgwick on Construction of Statu- also, the preceding section. tory and Constitutional Law, 838 ; 1 3 See Bow v. AUenstown, 34 N. H. Dillon on Municipal Corporations, S51; New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 §91; 15 Am. & Eng. Ency& Law, N. H. 201. 1041. § 78.] THE CHARTER. 93 But where the inquiry is merely as to whether there is a cor- poration the foregoing rule does not apply, and every intend- ment must be taken in favor of the sufficiency of the legisla- tive action.* And where the extent of the powers conferred has been ascertained by the cardinal rule of interpretation, the exercise of authority within the recognized limits is favored by the courts.'. The charter of a city in Michigan empowered the common council to " issue new bonds for the refunding of bonds and evidences of indebtedness already issued," and, in deciding that a judgment against the city was within the lan- guage quoted, Judge Cooley said : — " When a power is con- ferred which in its exercise concerns only the municipality and can wrong or injure no one, there is not the slightest reason for any strict or literal interpretation with a view to narrowing its construction." ' That is good sense, and it is the application of correct principles in municipal affairs. The wholeinstrument, all preceding charters, the general legislation of the State, and the object of the legislature in the erection of municipalities, should be consulted in construing particular provisions of charters.* § 78. Can charters be modified? — All public corporations created for municipal purposes may be controlled, and have their charters amended and altered, at the pleasure of the legislature.' Still, it is conceivable that the legislature may in incorporating a municipality njake a grant, in the nature of a contract with the municipality, which contract it could 1 State n Young, 3 Kan. 445. 73 Cal. 73 ; Chicago Dock Co. v. Gar- 2 Kyle V. Malin, 8 Ind. 34. "The rity, 115 HI. 155; Holland v. Balti- strictness to be observed in giving more, 11 Md. 186; Moran v. Long construction to municipal charter^ Island City, 101 N. Y. 439; Babcock should be such as to cany into effect v. Helena, 34 Ark. 499. every power clearly intended to be ' State v. The Mayor, R. M. Charlt conferred on the municipality and (Ga.) 250. And amendatory acts are every povcer necessarily implied in not local or private within the mean- order to the complete exercise of the ing of constitutional provisions rer powers granted." Smiths. Madison, quiring such laws to embrace only 7 Ind. 86, 87. one subject, and that to be expressed 3 Port Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich, in the title. Thompson v. City of 565, 574. Milwaukee, 69 Wis. 492; s. c, 34 N. <1 Dillon on Municipal Corpora- W. Rep. 402. See, also, Sheridan ■». tions, § 87; Thomason v. Ashworth, Salem, 14 Oregon, 328; s. C, 13 Pac. 94 THE CHAETEE. [§ 78. neither impair nor resume.' And moreover, the power of the legislature to change existing charters at pleasure is modified by the constitution of the United States. For example, no State could so legislate as to prevent an existing municipality from performing any contract it may have entered into, for the reason that no State can pass a law impairing the obliga- tion of contracts.^ Mr. Justice Clifford, in discussing the re- lations of the legislature to municipalities which it has created, said : ' — " Corporations of a municipal character, such as towns, are usually organized in this country by special acts or pursuant to some general State law; and it is clear that their powers and duties differ in some important particulars from the towns w^hich existed in the pajrent country before the Kevolution, when they were created by special charters from the crown, and acquired many of their privileges by prescription, with- out any aid from parliament. Corporate franchises of the kind granted during that period partook much more largely of the nature of private corporations than do the municipali- ties created in this country, and known as towns, cities and villages.* Power exists here in the legislature, not only to fix the boundaries of such a municipality when incorporated, but to enlarge or diminish the same subsequently, without the consent of the residents, by annexation or set-off, unless re- strained by the constitution, even against the remonstrance of every property holder and voter within the limits of the original municipality." ' Eep. 935 ; State v. Spaude, 37 Minn, forth by Chief Justice Perley, in 332 ; s. c, 34 N. W. Rep. 164. Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284. 1 Richland v. Lawrence, 13 111. 1. ' See further as to repeal or change - Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 of charter, Town of East Hartford v. U. S. 514, 532 ; Von Hoffman v. City Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511 ; of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 554. See Piqua Branch of State Bank v. County V. Rogers,. 7 Wall. 181, 184; Knoop, 16 How. 369; Girard v. Phil- Butz V. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall, adelphia, 7 Wall. 1 ; Waring •». Mayor 575, 583 ; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall, of Mobile, 24 Ala. 701 ; Little Rock 44, 63 ; Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 69 ; v. Parish, 36 Ark. 166 ; State v. Jen- State V. Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 123 ; nings, 27 Ark. 419 ; Crook v. People, Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm- 106 III. 237 ; State v. Troth, 34 N. J. strong, 45 N. Y. 234. L. 379 ; State v. Brainerd, 23 N. J. I* 3 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 484 ; Jersey City u J. C, R. Co., 20 U. S. 514, 531. N. J. Eq. 360; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 * The dissimilarities are well set Pa. St 169 ; Reading v. Keppleman, §§ 79, 80.] THE OHAETEE. 95 § 79. How far the State can enforce performance of local duties. — Where the legislative control is confined simply to municipal corporations as agencies of the State in its govern- ment, then this legislative control is ample,^ because in all matters of general concern there is no local right to act inde- pendently of the State. The local authorities of a city have no right, and cannot be permitted, to determine for them- selves whether, for example, they will contribute through tax- ation to the support of the State government, or assist, when called upon by the State, to suppress insurrection, or aid in the enforcement of the police laws. Upon all such subjects the State may exercise compulsory authority and may enforce the performance of local duties.^ But at the same time the fact remains and must not be lost sight of, that municipal corporar tions have objects and purposes peculiarly local, in which the State at large has legally no concern whatever, and in which it is not its function to intermeddle, except in so far as it con- fers the powers and can regulate their exercise.' § 80. Change in mnnicipal boundaries. — The right to in- crease or diminish the area of a municipality must be given by the legislature — the same power which is competent to amend the charter ; for any change in the boundaries of a mu- nicipality — whethftr the territory be enlarged or diminished, or whether a division of territory be made, or any change whatsoever be effected in boundaries or otherwise — must neo- 61 Pa. St. 233 ; Breckner v. Gordon, Burr, 18 Cal. 343 ; San Francisco i'. 81 Ky. 665; Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Canavan, 43 Cal. 541; Marietta v. Ky. 140 ; In re Hinkel, 31 Kan. 712 ; Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427 ; Scovill v. Cleve- Demarest v. New York, 74 N. Y. 161 ; land, 1 Ohio St. 127 ; Lynch v. Laf- Gray v. Brooklyn, 3 Abb. App. Dec. land, 4 Coldw. 96 , Daniel v. Mayor 267 ; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 825 ; of Memphis, 11 Humph. 582 ; Guild v. Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266 ; Cobb Chicago, 82 111. 472 ; Kennedy v. Sac- V. Kingman, 15 Mass. 197; Smith v. ramento, 19 Fed. Rep. 580. Adrian, 1 Mich. 495 ; Kobert's Case, i People v. Hurlbert, 24 Mich. 44. . 61 Mich. 548; Yarmouth v. North ^Comm'rs &c. u Detroit, 28 Mich. Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411 ; North Yar- 286, by Cooley, J., who treats the mouth V. Skillings, 45 Me. 133 ; Car- subject in an exhaustive essay with center v. People, 8 Colo. 116 ; Clinton characteristic clearness and learning. - V. Cedar Bapids &c. R Co., 24 Iowa, ^ cf, " Power of the Legislature to 455 ; State v. Mayor of Savannah, E. Compel Levy of Tax by Municipal M. Charlt 250 ; Mayor v. Steamboat Corporations," a note by T. Eurwell, Co., E. M. Charlt 342; Blanding v. 11 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 80. 96 THE CHAETER. [§ 81. essarily. contract or enlarge the sphere of the municipal juris- diction, and therefore it constitutes ^/-o tanto an amendment of an existing charter. The power is thus clearly legislative, and it is, in general, incapable of being delegated. In that it is legislative it cannot be conferred on the judiciary. The courts cannot then determine to what extent a city can acquire addi- tional territory, or whether it can or cannot acquire it, except in so far as such questions might arise in construing and in- terpreting the city charter. The legislature may, however, delegate to the municipal corporation itself power and author- ity to make changes in its boundaries, because this is not in fact a delegation of legislative power; for it is in legal intent only a provision by the legislature that if certain exigencies arise and certain conditions then exist, then, and in that event, the boundaries may be altered or enlarged. No discretion is given, and if the city proceeds to enlarge its boundaries, sup- posing the conditions to exist when as a matter of fact they do not, the court will pronounce the action invalid and void.' § 81. Effect of amendments of charter on city ordi- nances. — It is often necessary to inquire whether the ordi- nances of a city passed prior to the enactment of certain amendments to the city charter are affected thereby. It is the better view to hold that they are not the less binding on that account. The acquisition of a new charter by a city does not abrogate city ordinances passed under the old charter unless they are clearly inconsistent therewith.^ I^or would the ordinances of a city, or the provisions of its charter,' be affected by a general law, unless they were obviously incon- sistent. Thus, in Missouri the court held, in a case where the city charter authorized the mayor and aldermen to remove for cause any person holding an office created by the charter or by ordinance, that it was not inconsistent with, and there- fore not repealed by, a general act providing for the removal 1 City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, -will mot be declared invalid in toto 75 111. 156. because a few of its provisions may estate V. Natal. 39 La. Ann. 439. conflict with general statutes. Brooks 3 Under a constitutional provision v. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173 ; s. a, 21 Pac that city charters must be ''consist- Eep. 652 ; In re Straud (Cal.), 21 Pac ent with and subject to the constitu- Eep. 654. tion and laws of this State," a charter § 82.] THE CHAETEE. 97 from ofBce of any officer who did not actually spend his time in performing the duties of his office, or of any official guiltjr of wilful violation or neglect of his official duty.' § 82. Reorganization under general law — Elfect of. — :"When a charter is amended, we have elsewhere seen that it has no effect on ordinances passed prior to the amendment which are not inconsistent to the charter as amended. It is usually held that a mere amendment of a charter has no efifect on city offi- cers, so as to determine their tenure of office. But suppose an incorporated municipality reorganizes under: a general in- corporation act, it is clear that the reorganization must have some efifect upon the officers under the old charter. This effect is to abrogate their tenure of office, unless the general law contains some saving clause continuing them in office.'' " Where a new form is given to an old municipal corporation, or such corporation is reorganized under a new charter, taking in its new organization the place of the old one, embracing substantially the same corporators and the same territory, it will be presumed that the legislature intended a continued ex- istence of the same corporation, although different powers are possessed under the new charter, and different officers admin- ister its affairs ; and in the absence of express provision for their payment otherwise, it will be presumed that the legisla- ture intended that the liabilities as well as the rights of prop- erty of the corporation in its old form should accompany the corporation in its reorganization." ' The United States circuit court has held that the organization of tlte city of Pe^nsacola; under a general law of the State of Florida, was merely, in legal effect, an assumption by the city of the new powers and privileges which the act conferred..* 1 Manker v. Faulhaber, 94 Mo. 430. delphia, 7 Wall. 1 ; Frank v. San Fran- 2McGrath v. Chicago, 24 IlL App. cisco, 31 Cal. 668; Olney v. IlarTey, 19. 50 IlL 453; Maysville v. Schultz. 3 3 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Dana, 10 ; Waring v. Mobile, 24 Ala. pp. 973, 973, citingBroughtonv. Pen-, 701; O'Connor v. Memphis, 6 Lfu saoola, 93 U. S. 266 ; Rex t>. Passmore, 730; Hughes w School Dist, 73 Mo. 37 T. E. 119 ; Eegina v. Bewdley, 1 P. 643 ; Tyler v. Elizabethtown &c. R Wms. 207 ; Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. Co., 9 Bush, 510. B. 383 ; Trustees of Erie Academy v. * Milner v. Pensacola, 3 Woods, 633 ; Erie, 31 Pa. St 515 ; Girard v. Phila- Fowle v. Common Council of Alex- 7 98 THE CHAETEE. [§§ 83, 84. § 83. Reorganization must be strictly according to stat- ute. — The statutes often provide, where a city wishes to be incorporated and application is made to a judge of the county to order an election to be held, that proof must be made upon such application that the territory sought- to be incorporated contains the requisite number of inhabitants.' Whatever find- ing the court makes on the proof as presented to him is in such cases conclusive." And when a petition contained the neces- sary statement of the number of inhabitants, w-hich was sup- ported, by an express finding, but the notice, of election was deficient in that particular, the court declined to adjudge the subsequent proceedings invalid on account of the mere irreg- ularity.' The provisions of the statutes are usually held to be mandatory. For example, the town of Nacogdoches, in Texas, kept up its corporate existence until about the year 1882, hav- ing been originally incorporated in 1859. The Eevised Stat- utes of the State prescribe the manner in which an existing municipal corporation may surrender its corporate existence and re-incorporate under the general act. Notwithstanding this, steps were taken in 1887 as for the original incorporation of a city or town. The court held that these proceedings did not operate to create a corporation, nor to dissolve the one existing prior to their institution.* § 84. The same subject continued. — A town in Louisiana was organized under a general law. Subsequently it obtained and reorganized under a special charter. This charter being repealed, it was held to be no longer an incorporated town.* andria, 3 Pet. 398 : First Municipality mains. Harness v. State, 76 Tes. of New Orleans v. Comm'rs of Sink- 566 ; s. C, 13 S. W. Eep. 535 ; 29 Am. ing Fund, 1 Rob. 279. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 50. An act per- 1 E. g.. Rev. Stat Texas, art 508. mitting certain towns to re-incorpo- * State V. Goodwin, 69 Tex. 55. rate that had attempted to incorpo- ' Smith u Board County Com'rs, 45 rate under a previous void act was Fed. Rep. 735; construed not as a validating act, but < State V. Dunson, 71 Tex. 65 ; s. G, as a grant of a new power, under 9 S. W. Rep. 103. Where a municipal which a town might re-incorporate corporation attempts to re-incorpo- with a larger territory than was in- rate under a statute which does not eluded in the first attempt In re authorize such re-incorporation, but Campbell, 1 Wash. 287 ; S. a, 24 Pac. ouly an oi'iginal incorporation, the Rep. 624. proceedings are without effect, and SBurk v. State, 5 Lea 849. the original corporate existence re- § 85.] THE CHAETEE. 99 The legislature, in providing for the amendment of a munici- pal charter or for its reorganization, may expressly provide that it shall take effect only upon the assent of the people of the municipality or a given majority thereof.' But if such an act be adopted or consented to, acts amendatory thereof do not require additional consenting, unless the amendatory act itself calls for such assent.* § 85. New York constitntion a general law. — The consti- tution of 1§46 adopted by the State of ITew York was a con- stitution not framed for a people entering into a political so- ciety for the first time, but for a community already organized, and furnished with legal and political institutions adapted to all or nearly all the purposes of civil government. It was not intended to abolish these institutions, except where they might be repugnant to the new constitution. In its first arti- cle it provides that all the acts of the legislature then in force, and not repugnant to it, should continue to be the law of the State, subject to such alterations as the legislature might see fit to make. "What effect, then, di^ the adoption of this gen- eral law, this new constitution, have upon existing municipali- ties and their officials? By the acts of the legislature, thus continued in force, a great number of offices had been cre- ated, and among them, and constituting numerically far the largest portion of all the functionaries of the State, were the county, city, town and village offices, by which the local gov- ernment was carried on. As to these existing offices and their incumbents, it is clear that neither their functions nor rights changed at all in consequence of this new general act.' What, then, was its effect? It was to set up a criterion, a standard, by which to determine whether the legislature, in creating, amending or repealing municipal franchises, is acting in con- 1 Mayor &c. v. Fiiiney, 54 Ga. 317 ; an injunction restraining the can- In re Henry St, 133 Pa. St. 346; vassing of the returns. Smith v. State V. St Louis, 73 Mo. 435; St Board County Com'rs, 45 Fed. Rep. Louis V. Russell, 9 Mo. 507 ; Largen 725. V. State, 76 Tex. 323. An election '^5 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, held in disregard of the registry laws p. 972. does not effect an incorporation, and ' People v. Draper, 15 N. T, 532, a non-resident owner of property 540. within the proposed limits may have 100 THE CHABTEE, [§§ 86, 87. travention of any vested right. But it affected no office or officer not antagonistic to or inconsistent with the provisions thereof. § 86. How far special legislation is permissible. — It is the business of the legislature to adjust in the interest of the whole people of the State the distribution of the powers of government, taking care that no direct provision of the con- stitution is violated, and that no^arrangement which it has made is incidentally disturbed. Plenary power in the legis- lature for all purposes of civil government is the rule. As a political society, the State has an interest in the repression of disorder and the maintenance of peace and security in every locality within its limits ; and if, from exceptional causes, the public good requires that legislation, either permanent or temporary, be directed toward any particular locality, whether consisting of one county or of several counties, it is within the discretion of the legislature to apply such legisla- tion as in its judgment the exigency of the case may re- quire ; and it is the sole judge of the existence of such con- ditions. The representatives of the whole people, convened in the two branches of the legislature, are subject to con- stitutional limitations, the organs of the public will in every district or locality of the State. It follows, therefore, that to the legislature belongs the arranging and distributing of the administrative functions, committing such portions as it may deem suitable to local jurisdictions, and retaining other portions to be exercised by officers appointed by the central power. As to the constitutional limitations, they are not so much limitations of the legislature as of the power of the peo- ple themselves, self-imposed by the constitutional compact. So when a law is declared unconstitutional, it amounts to say- ing that the sovereign power of the people in that regard has been abdicated by themselves. Otherwise the legislature is untrammeled, and can legislate in cases of local disorder as it wiU.» §87. Written constitutions — Operation of. — Limitation upon legislative power is one of the purposes to be effected 1 People V. Draper, 15 N. T. 533-^37. ' § 87.] THE CHAETEE. 101 by a written constitution. Its necessity lies in the fact that, if no limitations existed, the government could have no ele- ments of permanence and durability; and the distribution of its powers and the vesting their exercise in separate depart- ments would be an idle ceremony. The right of self-govern- ment in the local bodies and the power of the people of those communities to select the local officers and conduct the local administration would utterly disappear, or exist only at the pleasure of the legislature. But the theory of the constitu- tion is that the several counties, cities, towns and villages are of right entitled to choose whom they will have to rule over them ; ' and this right cannot be taken from them, or the elect- ors and inhabitants be disfranchised, by any act of the legis- lature, or of any or all the departments of the state govern- ment combined. Therefore a written constitution must be interpreted, and effect given to it, as the paramount law of the land, equally obligatory upon the legislature as upon other departments of government and individual citizens. Nor must it be literally construed. A written constitution would be of little avail as a practical and useful restraint upon the differ- ent departments of government, if a literal reading only was to be given it, to the exclusion of all necessary implication, and the clear intent ignored. Broad, reasonable interpreta- tions must be placed on its provisions in order that it operate equally and beneficently. The difference between a written and an unwritten constitution, according to Hare,^ is similar to that which " distinguishes the natural integuments, which yield to the motions of the body and expand with the growth of every limb, from an artificial covering that may become' too narrow in the course of time. A country that is bound by fixed rules prescribed by a former generation, which can- not be altered without a long and complicated process, may find itself powerless in the face of some unforeseen exigency, and be obliged to violate its organic law as the price of safety." » 1 The Roman empire tottered into stituent peoples to maintain the ruin because all power was centered status quo. at Rome. This cardinal defect in its ^ i Hare's American Constitutional system of administration removed Law, 214, 215; the strongest inducement for its con- > Daniel Webster, in his speech on 102 THE CHABTEB. [§88. § 88. Power to make fey-laws — How limited. — " The power of municipal corporations to make by-laws," said Judge Gooley,' "is limited in various ways: 1. It is controlled by the constitution of the United States and of the State. The re- strictions imposed by those instruments which directly limit the legislative power of the State rest equally upon all the in- struments of government created by the State. If a State cannot pass an ex post facto law, or law impairing the obliga- tion of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under the State with delegated authority.^ By-laws, therefore, which in their operation would be em post facto, or violate con- tracts, are not within the power of municipal corporations; and whatever the people by the State constitution have pro- hibited the State government from doing, it cannot do indi- rectly through the local governments. 2. Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general laws of the State, and with the provisions of the municipal charter. Whenever the Independence of the Judiciary (Works, vol. Ill), said : — " It cannot be denied that one great object of written constitutions is to keep the departments of government as dis- tinct as possible; and for this pur- pose to impose restraints designed to have that effect. And it is equally true that there is no department ou which it is more necessary to impose restraints than upon the legislature. The tendency of things is almost al- ways to augment the power of that department in its relation to the ju- diciary. The judiciary is composed of few persons, and those not such as mix habitually in the pursuits and objects which most engage public men." Then he comments upon the legislature, and its liability, if in no wise restrained, to encroach upon the judiciary. "The constitution being the supreme law, it follows, of course, that every ^t of the legislature con- trary to that law must be void. But who shall decide this question? Shall the legislature itself decide it? If so, then the constitution ceases to be a legal, and becomes only a moral, re- straint upon the legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be conformable to the constitution, then the constitution is admonitory or advisory only, not le- gally binding; because if the con- struction of it i-ests wholly with them, their discretion in particular cases may be in favor of erroneous and dangerous constructions.' Hence, the courts of law necessarily, when the case arises, must decide on the valid- ity of particular acts.'' "Without this check, no certain limitation could exist on the exercise of legislative power." 1 Cooley's Const Lim., 238 ; " Power of Municipal Corporations to Make By-Laws," 15 Sol. J. & Eep.; 209 and 330 ; "Municipal Ordinances," by Irv- ing Browne, 27 Alb. L. J. 284. 2 Cooley's Const. Lim., 238, citing Stuyvesant v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 588; Brooklyn Central E. R Co. v. Brook- lyn City R. R. Co., 83 Barb. 358; Illi- nois Conference Female College u Cooper, 35 IlL 148. § 89.] THE OHAETEE. 103 I they come in conflict with either the by-law must give way." ' It is often the case, however, that the charter contains a pro- vision that the general laws of the State on some particular subject shall not be operative in that particular city, and that the corporation may pass local laws at discretion. But this exclusive privilege, when granted, can be at any time reoalled.- And this privilege of passing local by-laws, although denied to other cities by a general law, if not inconsistent with the gen- eral law, is not affected by the general law, and can stand to- gether with it. § 89. Conflict of by-laws and general acts. — " It is said that the by-law of a town or corporation is void if the legis- lature have regulated the subject by law. If the legislature have passed a law regulating as to certain things in a city, I apprehend," says Mr. Justice Woodw.orth,' " the corporation are not thereby restricted from making further regulations. Cases of this kind have occurred and never been questioned on that ground ; it is only to notice a case or two out of many. The legislature have imposed a penalty of one dollar for servile labor on Sunday ; the corporation of New York have passed a by-law, imposing the penalty of five dollars for the same offense. As to storing gunpowder in New York, the legisla- ture and corporation have each imposed the same penalty. Suits to recover the penalties have been sustained, under the corporation law. It is believed that the ground has never been taken that there was a conflict with the State law." In a case in Mobile, where the validity of a municipal by-law was questioned, which provided a fine of fifty dollars for assault and battery committed within the city limits, the court held: — "The object of the power conferred by the charter, and the purpose of the ordinance itself, was not to punish iCooley's Const. Lim., 338, (jiting March v. Commonwealth, 13 B. Mon. Wood V. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 435; 25. See, also, Baldwin v. Oreen, 10 Mayor v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 309 ; Peters- Mo. 410 ; Cowen v. West Troy, 43 burg V. Metzker, 21 111. 305 ; South- Barb. 48 ; State v. Georgia Medical port V. Ogden, 33 Conn. 128 ; Andrews Society, 38 Ga. 608 ; Pesterfield v. V. Insurance Co., 37 Me. 356; Canton Yickers, 3 Cold. 305; Wirtb v. Wil- V. Nist, 9 Ohio St. 439 ; Carr v. St mington, 68 N. C. 34. Louis, 9 Mo. 191 ; Commonwealth v. ^ state v. City of Camden (N. J.), 11 Erie & Northeast R E. Co., 37 Pa. St. Atl. Rep. 137. 339 ; Burlmgton v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, ■> Rogers v, Jones, 1 Wend, 261. 59; ConweU u O'Brien, 11 Ind. 419; 104 THE CHABTEE. [§ 90, for an offense against the criminal justice of tlie country, but to provide a mere police regulation, for the enforcement of good order and quiet within the limits of the corporation. It is altogether immaterial whether ihe State tribunal has inter- fered and exercised its powers in bringing the defendant be- fore it to answer for the assault and battery ; for whether he has then been punished or acquitted is alike unimportant. The offense against the corporation and the State are distin- guishable and wholly disconnecte<>, and the prosecution at the suit of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis : the one contemplates the observance of the peace and good order of the city ; the other has a more enlarged object in view, the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State." * The power to pass a city ordinance must be vested in the govern- ing body of the city by the legislature in express terms, or be necessarily or fairly implied in and incident to the powers expressly granted, and must be essential to the declared pur- poses of the corporation, — not simply convenient, but indis- pensable. Any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the pbwer is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.* Powers encroaching upon the rights, of the public or of individuals must be plainly and literally conferred by the charter.' § 90. The ordinance, when passed, must be reasonable. — A city, although fully authorized to enact ordinances, cannot therefore pass unreasonable ones. The ordinance of a city must be reasonable; not inconsistent with the laws of the State; not repugnant to fundamental rights. It must not be oppressive. It must not be partial or unfair. It must not make special or unwarranted discriminations. In short, it must not contravene common right. The Kansas courts held, in a case where an ordinance was passed directed at the street parades of the Salvation Army and interdicting them, that it -Mayor of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 822; State v. Eowe (Md.), 20 Atl. Ala. 400. C/. "Proper Relations of the Eep. 179; Vosburg u McCrary, 77 State to Municipal Institutions," by Tex. 56fi; s. c, 14 S. W. Rep. 195; H. M. White, 5 Tenn. Bar Asso. Rep. Louisville &c. R. Ca v. Shires, 108 159. 111. 617. ' Anderson v. City of Wellington, ' Breningel- v. Belvidere, 44 N. J. L. 40 Kans, 173 ; Brockman v. Crestou, 350 ; Horr & Bemis on Municipal 79 Iowa, 587 ; S. c, 44 N. W. Rep. Police Ordinances, la §90.] THE OHABTEB. 106 was illegal and void, as being partial, unreasonable and in con- travention of common right.' All charters and laws and ordi- nances must be capable of construction, and must be construed in accordance with constitutional principles and in harmony with the general laws of the land ; and anj' ordinance that violates any of the recognized rights and privileges, or the principles of legal and equitable rights, is necessarily void so far forth, and void entirely if it cannot be applied accord- ing to its terms.^ ' Anderson v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 173. The reasoning of the court is interesting : — " The object of this ordinance, and the danger appre- hended and to be avoided by its en- actment, as expressed by its terms, is to prevent the calling together of a large or unusual crowd of people on any of the streets, avenues or alleys of the city of Wellington. Then the question is this: Is a street parade with music or singing legally objec- tionable in itself? or does it threaten the public peace or the good order of the community? This ordinance pre- vents any number of the people of the State attached to one of the sev- eral political parties from marching together with their party banners and inspiring music, up and down the principal streets, without the written consent of some municipal oflBoer. The Masonic and Odd Fellows organ- izations must first obtain consent be- fore their charitable steps desecrate the sacred streets. Even the Sun- day-school children cannot assemble at some central point in the city and keep step to the music of the band as they march to the grove without per- mission first had and obtained. The Grand Army of the Republic must be preceded in its march by the written consent of his honor the mayor, or march without drums or fife, shouts or songs. It prevents a public address upon any subject being made on the streets. It prevents an unusual con- gregation of people on the streets under any circumstances without permission. The ordinance is framed on the theory that an unusual crowd or congregation of people upon one of the public streets of a city is either of itself a disturbance of the public peace, or that it threatens the good order of the community. A ci'owd • of people is one of the most ordinary incidents of every-day life in any city of considerable size in this country. It is not a fair estimate of the char- acter and habits of the American people to assume that the public peace is threatened when numbers of them congregate. We do not believe that the legislative grant of power to the city council can be so construed! as to authorize the city council to take from the people of a city and the sur- rounding country a privilege exer- cised by them in every locality throughout the land, to form their processions and parade the streets with banners, music, songs and shouts. The power to pass such an ordinance should be clear and controlled before it can be upheld. Public parades of this character are not unlawful in their intent, purpose and result ; they are not mala in se. If they are to be mala prqhibita it ought to be by some general law and not by local regulation." ^Frazee's Case, 63 Mich. 396. See. 106 THE CHAETEE. [§ 91. §91. Keasonalbleness — How determined. — How shall it be determined whether or not a by-law of a city is unreason- able? There are various conditions which such a by-law should fulfill. The objects for which a corporation is created, and to aqcomplish which its powers are given, are usually definite and certain. !N"o by-law, therefore, should be passed which does not in some degree look to the accomplishment of these ob- jects. For example, a power to license certain employments is generally granted to cities. TBis does not mean that the Jicense can be so fixed as to prohibit an employment by rea- son of its large amount ; nor that the license shall be imposed solely for the sake of revenue, for that would be an exercise of the power of taxation, which power, to be rightfully exer- cised, must be distinctly enumerated in the charter or incor- porating act. A by-law ought also to be certain.^ It should be in harmony with common sense and common law.^ It should not abridge rights or privileges conferred by the gen- eral laws of the State, unless express authority can be pointed out for it in the charter. It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in the cities than in smaller towns and in rural places. This may jus- tify reasonable precautionary measures, but nothing farther ; and no inference can 'extend beyond the fair scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discre- tion to suppress lawful action altogether can be granted at all. That which is an actual nuisance can be suppressed just so far as it is noxious, and its noxious character is the test of its wrongfulness. There may be substances, like some ex- plosives, which are dangerous in cities under all circumstances, also, Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. • Mayor of Huntsville v. Phelps, 27 587 ; Chamberlain of London v. Comp- Ala. 55 ; Piper v. Chappel, 14 M. & W. , ton, 7 D. & E. 597 ; Clark v. Le Cren, 624. 9 B. & C. 62 ; Gosling v. Veley, 13 2 Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 90 : Q. B. 328 ; Dunham v. Eochester, 5 Bush v. Seabuiy, 8 Johns. 418 ; Bow- Cow. 462 ; Mayor of Memphis v. Win- ling Green v. Carson, 10 Bush, 64 : field, 8 Humph. 707 ; Hayden v. Noyes, Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 310 ; 5 Conn. 391 ; Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547 ; 110 ; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 481 ; Bloomington v. Wahl, 46 IlL 489 ; Austin V. Murray. 16 Pick. 121 ; West Bethune v. Hayes, 28 Ga. 560 ; Kip Union Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 535 ; v. Paterson, 26 N. J. 298. See Cooley, State V. Freeman, 38 N. H. 436 ; State Const Lira., 345, note, and the cases V. Jersey City, 39 N. J. 170, cited. § 91.] THE CHAETEB. 107 and made dangerous by municipal conditions ; but most dan- gerous things are not so different in cities as to require more than increased or quah'fied safeguards ; and to suppress things not absolutely dangerous as an easy way of getting rid of the trouble of regulating them is not a process tolerated under free institutions. Eegulation, and not prohibition, unless under clear authority of the charter, and in cases where it is not op- pressive, is the extent of municipal power.' 1 Fi-azee's Case, 63 Mich. 896. CHAPTEE IV. AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. 92. The power of the State to amend, repeal or modify the charters of municipal cor- porations. 93. The charter of a municipal corporation not within the rule of the Dartmouth Col- 94 Construction of repealing and amendatory acts — (a) Gen- eral principles. 95. (b) Statutes in pari materia construed together — Repeal by implication. 96. Municipal charter not repealed by subsequent general law unless intent to repeal is clear. 97. The same subject continued. 98. Instances of repeal of charter by general acts. 99. Repeal and amendment of charter by subsequent amendment of State consti- tution. 100. Repeal of general laws by en- actment of municipal char- ler. 01. Repeal of general laws by municipal ordinance^ 102, The same subject continued. 103. Construction of amendatory and repealing acts made ap- plicable only to cities of a certain class. § 1^4. Effect of legislation upon the charter of a city organized under special law, and not by its acceptance thereof subject to the general law. 105. Miscellaneous instances of effective repealing and amendatory acts. 106. The same subject continued. 107. What is an amendment or re- peal of a municipal charter? 108. Acceptance of amendment 109. Manner of acceptance. 110. Constitutional limitations on power of legislature to amend or repeal municipal charters — (a) In general 111. (b) Special legislation. 113. (c) Vested rights — Impair- ment of obligation of con- tracts — Recognition by con- stitution. 113. (d5 Title of amendatoiy or re- pealing acts. 114. The same subject continued. 115. Forfeiture of charter in Eng- land. 116. The same subject continued. 117. Instances of forfeiture of char- ter under English law. 118. The charter of a municipal corporation- in the United States not forfeitable by judicial action. 119. The same subject continued. § 92. The power of the State to amende repeal or modify the charters of municipal corporations. — The charter of a strictly public corporation is granted for purposes of the local §92.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHARTEE. 109 government of the district incorporated. The powers con- ferred by this charter are not vested rights as against the State, but, being wholly political, exist only during the will of the legislature ; otherwise, as was declared in an Indiana case, there would be numberless petty governments existing within the State, forming a part of it, but independent of the control of the sovereign power. Such powers may at any time be repealed or abrogated by the legislature, either by general law operating upon the whole State, or by special act altering the powers of the corporation.' For the same reasons the State has power to amend or modify municipal charters at its will ; and it may be stated as a general proposition, that the legislature of the State has full power to amend, repeal or modify the charters of the municipal corporations within the boundaries of the State, subject only to constitutional limita- tions of that power.* As is said by Judge Cooley, restraints 1 Sloan V. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361. 2 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 473 ; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540 ; Kennedy v. Sacramento, 19 Fed. Rep. 580 ; S. C, 5 Am. & Bug. Corp. Cas. 553; Laramie Co. v. Al- bany Co., 92 U. S. 807; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 WaU. 1; Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511 ; Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 ; A spin wall v. Commissioners &c., 23 How. 364 ; Cobb v. Kingman, 15 Mass. 197 ; Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266 ; Granby v. Thurston, 33 Conn. 416; Yarmouth v. Noi-th Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411 ; North Yarmouth v. Sell- ings, 45 Me. 133; Demarest v. New York, 74 N. Y. 161 ; People v. Tweed, 63 N. Y. 203 ; People v. Pinkney, 33 N. Y. 377 ; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532 ; Davidson v. Mayor &c. of New York, 37 How. Pr. 342; Gray v. Brooklyn, 3 Abb. App. Dec. 367; People V. Morris, 13 Wend. 335; Crook V. People, 106 111. 337 ; S. C, 5 Am. &. Eng. Corp. Cas^ 460 ; True v. Davis (111.), 3 N. E. Rep. 410 ; Guild v. Chicago, 83 HL 473 ; People v. Power, 25 111. 187; Robei-tson v. Rockford,31 111. 451 ; Trustees of Schools v. Tat- man, 13 111. 37 ; Richland County v. Lawrence County, 13 111. 1 ; Marietta V. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 136 ; San Fran- cisco V. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 ; Bland- ing V. Burr, 13 Cal. 343 ; Philadelphia V. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Reading v. Keppelman, 61 Pa. St. 233 ; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361 ; Eiohels v. Evansville &c. R. Co., 78 Ind. 261 ; S. C, 41 Am. Rep. 561 ; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis G. L. & C. Co., 66 Ind. 396; Roberts' Case, 51 Mich. 548; Smith V. Adrian, 1 Mich. 495 ; Lynch V. Lafland, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 96 ; Dan- iel V. Mayor &o. of Memphis, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 582; Breckner v. Gordon, 81 Ky. 665 ; s. C, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 395 ; Boyd v. Cham- bers, 78 Ky. 140; State v. Troth, 34 N. J. Law, 379 ; Patterson v. Society &c., 24N. J. Law, 385 ; State v. Branin, 28 N. J. Law, 484; Jersey City v. Jersey City &c. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 360 ; Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 342 ; Carpenter v. People, 8 Col. 116 ; 110 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. [§ 93. on the legislative power of control must be found in the con- stitution of the State, or they must rest alone in the legislative discretion.* § 93. The charter of a municipal corporation not within the rule of the Dartmouth College Case. — Municipal cor- porations do not, of course, come within the rule of the Dartmouth College Case, by which the charters of private corporations were declared to be contracts, and as such pro- tected by the constitutional prohibition of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. This is one of the fundamental dif- ferences between strictly public and other corporations. This difference and the reasons therefor are thus stated by Judge Pearson : — " The substantial distinction is this : Some corpora- tions are created by the mere will of the legislature, there being no other party interested or concerned. To this party a portion of the power of the legislature is delegated, to be exercised for the general good, and subject at all times to be modified, changed or annulled. Other corporations are the result of contract. The legislature is not the only party in- terested ; for, although it has a public purpose to be accom- plished, it chooses to do it by the instrumentality of a third party. ' These two parties make a contract. T\^e legislature for and in consideration of certain labor and outlay of money confers upon the party of the second part the privilege of being a corporation with certain powers and capacities. The expectation of benefit to the public is the moving considera- tion on one side ; that of expected remuneration for the out- lay is the consideration on the other. It is a contract, and S. a, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 110; State v. Cowan, 39 Mo. 330; Wallace Clinton D. Cedar Rapids &a E. Co., v. Trustees, 84 N. C. 164; MUls v, 24 Iowa, 455; Little Rock v. Parish, Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Langworthy 36 Ark. 166; State v. Jennings, 27 «. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; Ho ward «. Ark. 419; State v. Mayor &o. of Sa- McDiamid, 26 Ark. 100; Bradshaw v. vannah, R. M. Charlt (Ga.) 250 ; Po- Omaha, 1 Neb. 16 ; Kuhn v. Board of lice Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La. Ann. Education, 4 W. Va. 99 ; Hess v. 661 ; New Orleans v. Hoyle, 23 La. Pegg. 7 Nev. 23 ; GofiE v. Frederick, Ann. 740 ; In re Hinkel, 31 Kan. 712 ; 44 Md. 67 ; Hagerstown v. Sohuer, 87 S. C, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 369 ; Md. 180 ; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Waring v. Mayor &c. of Mobile, 24 Tex. 641. Ala. 701; St Louis v. Cafferata, 24 'Cooley's Const Lim. 229. See, Mo. 94; St Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. also, §§ 57, 63, 64, 69, 70, 78, 79, SMiwa. 400; St Louis v. Rossell, 9 Mo. 507; §9i.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHAETEE, 111 therefore cannot be modified, changed or annulled without the consent of both parties." ' § 94. Construction of repealing and amendatory acts — (a) General principles. — The great principle controlling the construction of repealing and amendatory acts, as of all other statutes, is that the intention of the legislature must be ascer- tained and carried into effect. In addition to this fundamental principle, it is also to be constantly borne in mind in constru- ing these acts, that the courts require the clearest expression of the intention on the part of the legislature to repealer alter existing laws. "Where the two statutes can be so construed as to allow both to stand, the courts v,nll always adopt such a construction. In order to effect repeal the later statute must either expressly repeal the former, or its provisions must be so entirely repugnant to those of the earlier statute that by no reasonable construction can the two acts stand together, as the law does not favor repeals by implication.'^ 1 Mills V. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Cooley's Const. Lim. 334-337. See the preceding section. It is conceded learning that the charter of a mu- nicipal corporation is not a contract In order to obviate the diflSculties arising from the fact that the char- ters of private corporations are con- tracts, and as such inviolable, many of the States have constitutional pro- visions and general statutes reserv- ing the right of amendment and repeal of such charters. 1 Beach on Priv. Corp., § 36, and cases cited. "In consequence of the decision in that case (Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat 518), a general law was spread upon the statute book of nearly all, if not quite all, the States of the Union, reserving to the legis- lature power to alter or modify all such charters as should be thereafter granted, according to Its will and pleasure." "Legislative Power to Amend Charters," by Wm. L. Eoyall, Esq., 11 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 1, where several phases of the exercise of this power are discussed. Such constitu- tional and statutory reservations are unnecessary in the case of strictly public corporations. As was said by Justice Field in a recent and impor- tant case, considering the effect of legislation by which the municipal government of Memphis was abol- ished : — '■ There is no contract be- tween the State and the public chat the charter of a city shall not at all times be subject to legislative con- trol. All persons who deal with such bodies are conclusively pre- sumed to act upon knowledge of the power of the legislature. There is no such thing as a vested right held by any individual in the grant of leg- islative power to them. Meriwether V. Garrett, 103 U. S. 473. See, also, an article by H. Campbell Black, Esq., on "Legislation Impairing the Obligation of Contracts," lin 35 Ann. L. Reg. (N. S.) 81, 88. 2 Cape Girardeau County Court v. . Hill, 118 U. S. 68; McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459 ; United States v. Twenty- 112 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. [§95. § 95. (b) Statutes in pari materia construed together — Bepeal Iby implication. — An excellent illustration of the rule is found in a Maryland case, where an amendment to the charter of the city of Cumberland prohibited the mayor and common council from pledging the credit of the city for any sum exceeding $10,000 without first submitting the question to the voters after notice, and a subsequent statute author- ized those officers to issue bonds for the purpose of raising money to build a certain bridge.* The courts decided that there was no repugnancy between the amendment and the subsequent act, and that the exercise of the new power must be subject to the proviso previously annexed to the effective part of the charter. It was declared in the opinion that where two laws only so far differ as that by any other construction they may both stand, the rule leges posteriores pnores con- trarias ahrogomt does not apply, and that the later law is no repeal of the earlier act.^ ' As is said by Judge Cooley : — " Ke- ave Cases of Cloth, Crabbe (U. S.), 356 ; Hendei-son's Tobacco, 11 WalL 652 ; Snell u. Bridgewater &c. Co., 34 Pick. 296; Goddard v. Boston, 20 Pick. 407 ; Towle v. Marrett, 3 Me. 33 ; Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 518; Attorney-General v. Kailroad Companies, 35 Wis. 435; Janesville/ V. Markoe, 18 Wis. 350 ; In re Henry Street, 133 Pa. St. 346; McFate's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 333; Kilgore v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa, St. 495; Rounds V. Waymart, 81 Pa. St 395 ; Erie v. Bootz, 72 Pa. St. 196; Mc- Kenna V. Edmunstone, 91 N. Y. 231 ; People V. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83 ; Coving- ton V. East St. Louis, 78 111, 548; East St Louis v. Maxwell, 99111. 439; New Brunswick v. Williamson, 44 N. J. Law, 165 ; Naylor v. Field, 39 N. J. Law, 287 ; Water-works Co. v. Burkhart 41 Ind. 364 ; Blain v. Bai- ley, 25 Ind. 165 ; Him v. State, 1 Ohio St 20; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St 607; Fosdick V. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St 473 ; Dodge w Gridley, 10 Ohio St 20 ; Clark V, Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; State V. Berry, 13 Iowa, 58 ; Chesa- peake &c. R Co. V. Hoard, 16 W. Va. 370 ; Ex parte Schmidt, 34 S. C. 363 ; McGruder v. State (Ga.), 10 S. E. Rep. 381 ; Greeley v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla, 174 ; New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 15 La. Ann. 89 ; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 368; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611 ; Connors v. Carp River Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168; In re Ryan, 45 Mich. 173 ; Ayeridge v. Social Cir- cle Commissioners, 60 Ga. 404 ; Peo- ple V. Londoner, 13 Colo. 803. See, also, cases cited in preceding note. 1 DUlon on Munic. Corp., §§ 86, 87 ; 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 974, 975, tit " Municipal Corporation ; " Annotated Case by M. D. Ewell, Esq., 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 30, 25 (1879), containing a full citation of cases upon the general subjecj; of repeals by implication. 1 Cumberland v. Magruder, 34 Md. 881. Subsequent laws do not repeal former ones by containing different provisions: they must be contrary. Bond V. Hiestand, 30 La. Ann. 139. § 96.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHAKTKE. 113 peals by implication are not favored, and the repugnancy be- tween two statutes should be very clear to warrant a court in holding that the later in time repeals the other when it does not in terms do so. This rule has peculiar force in the case of laws of special and local application, which are never to be deemed repealed by general legislation except upon the most unequivocal manifestation of intent to that effect." ' § 96. Mnnlcipal charter not repealed by subsequent gen- eral law unless Intent to repeal is clear. — As the charter of a municipal corporation is a special act, a general law passed subsequent to the charter will not repeal the provisions of the charter either by implication or by a general clause repealing all acts contrary to its provisions, unless the intent of the legislature to effect such repeal is clear.^ For example, a city in California adopted in its charter the methods of the general revenue act, at that time in force^ for collecting and assessing the municipal taxes, and when that general revenue act was repealed and a general law regulating the creation and gov- ernment of municipal corporations and containing provisions for the assessment and collection of the city taxes was passed, the courts held that the provisions of the charter were not repealed by the passage of the subsequent legislation, and that the municipality should continue to a^ess and collect its taxes according to the methods prescribed in its charter.* 1 Cooley's Const Lim. 183; 18 Am. Cal. 504; Bond v. Hiestand, 20 La. li. Reg. (N. S.) 30, 25 (1879> Ann. 139; Cumberland v. Magruder, 2 State V. Branin, 23 N. J. Law, 484 ; 34 Md. 381 ; Hammond v. Haines, 25 State V. Morristown, 33 N. J. Law, Md. 541. S7 ; State v. Ti-enton, 36 N. J. Law, 3 People v. Clunie, 70 Cal. 504. In 198 ; State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. New Jersey a similar case arose, in 170; Tierney u Dodge, 9 Minn. 166; which the same principle was upheld President &c. of Ottawa v. County of and a provision in a city charter con- La Salle, 13 111. 389 ; East St Louis cerning taxation was declared to re- V. Maxwell, 99 111. 439 ; Haywood v. main in force notwithstanding the Mayor &c. of Savannah, 12 Ga. 404 ; passage of a subsequent general act Mayor v. Inman, 57 Ga. 370 ; McCarty regulating that subject. State v. V. Deming, 51 Conn. 423 ; Harris- Branin, 23 N. J. Law, 484. See, also, 'burgh V. Scheck, 104 Pa, St 53 ; In re last note to preceding section, and Egypt Street, 8 Grant (Pa) Cas. 455 ; § 81, supra, as to effect of amend- JrarJ Commissioners of Central Park, ment of charter upon existing ordi- 50 N. Y. 493; People v. Clunie, 70 nances. 8 114 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEB. [§§ 97, 98. § 97. The same subject continued.— Where the two stat- utes are so inconsistent that they cannot be construed to stand together, the usual principles governing the construction of statutes must be applied in order to ascertain whether it was the intention of the legislature that the charter should be superseded by the general statute, or whether the charter is excepted from the operation of the general law. In order to arrive at the intention of the legislature, the charter and the general act must be considered in Hhe light of the general leg- islation on the subject, and each provision of the charter or the general statute must be read with reference to the other provisions.* § 98. Instances of repeal of charter by geujsral acts.— Thus, an act of the New Jersey legislature which in terms applied to all cities was construed to apply to all, and to re- peal all incoi^sistent charter provisions because the constitu- tion of that State prohibited special legislation, and if any city were excepted from the operation of the act in question, it would be a special law and unconstitutional. Therefore, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the interpretation which vali- dated the law was adopted.* And so where a chapter of a Minnesota statute provided that every village incorporated under the general statutes should thereafter be governed ac- cording to the provisions of that chapter, to the end that uni- formity of village government and equal privileges to all might be secured, it was held that in view of this expresged intention, and the fact that the general statutes contained no 1 state V. City of Camden (N. J.; 540 ; Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 CaL 1887), 11 AtL Eep. 187; New Bedford 73; Eichels v. Evansville &e. E. Co., &c. E. Ca V. Acushnet &c. E. Co., 78 Ind. 261 ; 1 Dillon on Hunic 143 Mass. 200 ; County of Socorro v. Corp., § 87. As an illustration of the Leavitt (N. M., 1887), 18 Pac. Eep. doctrine of the text in a Maryland 759 ; Moran v. Long Island City, 101 case, the definition in a later statute N. Y. 439 ; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 of a term used in an earlier law was How. 198 ; State u Spande, 37 Minn, considered by the courts in constru- 322 ; S. G, 34 N. W. Eep. 164 ; Hoi- ing the prior statute. Holland v. landtt Baltimore (1857), 11 Md. 186; Baltimore (1857), 11 Md. 186. See^ Janesville v. Markoe, 18 Wis. 850 ; also, § 77, supra. Powell V. Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 2 State v. City of Camden (N. J., 698; Board of Commissioners &c. v. 1887), 11 Atl. Eep. 137. Davies (Wash., 1890), 24 Pac. Eep. §§ 99, 100.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHAETEE. 115 provision as to village government, the section applied to all villages incorporated under any general law of the State.' § 99. Eepeal and amendment of charter by subsequent amendment of State constitution. — In this case as in other cases of repeal the intention of the legislature is the point to be considered, but with the qualification that the courts incline strongly to declare the charter provisions vpid if there be any inconsistency, and do not go so far in their efforts to reconcile the two laws. This, of course, is due to the greater weight of the constitution as the organic law of the State. Thus in a California decision the provisions of a city charter referring to streets were considered to have been repealed by the enactment of a new State constitution containing provis- ions thought by the court inconsistent with the charter pro- vision.* And so where the charter of the city of East St. Louis contained a limitation on the power of taxation for the payment of bonded indebtedness, that limitation was held to be abrogated by an inconsistent provision of a State constitu- tion subsequently adopted.' § 100. Repeal of general laws by enactment of municipal charter. — The principles considered in the preceding sections 1 State V. Spaude (1887), 37 Minn, its terms it provides for corporations 333 ; S. a, 34 N. "W. Eep. 164. Laws attempted to be organized under a N. M., 1884, chs. 37, 39, relating to previous void act, and existing coi-- the incorporation, disincorporation porations are authorized to adopt its and re-incorporation of cities, are provisions as to government and in pari materia, and must be read classification. Board of Com'rs u together, and be taken as part of the Davies (Wash., 1890), 34 Pac. Eep. same act ; and their joint effect is to 140. In the last cited case it was continue the existence of municipal declared, in accordance with the doc- corporations created under the act of trine of the text, that where two February 11, 1880, entitled " An act statutes embracing the same subject- for the incorporation of cities,'' and matter are passed at the same ses- to enable them, if they choose, to sion of the legislature, they should either re-incorporate under the pro- bo construed as one act if possible, visions of chapter 39, laws 1884, or to but if in irreconcilable conflict the dissolve their corporation absolutely, later statute should prevail. County of Socorro v. Leavitt (N. M., « Donahue v. Graham, 61 Cal. 276. 1887), 13 Pac. Rep. 759. Act Wash., a East St Louis v. Amy, 130 U. S. March 37, 1890, providing for the or- 600 ; Public School Trustees v. Tay- ganization of municipal corporations, lor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618; Eagerstown v. affects existing corporations, since by Deebert, 33 Md. 369. lis AMENDMENT, ETC., OB OHABTEE. [§ 101. must be applied in coasidering the question whether the en- actment of a municipal chacter repeals the provisions of a prior general law. The intention of the legislature to repeal the general law by the enactment of the charter must be clear and beyond uncertainty. The rule that repeals by im- plication are not favored is strictly applied in this relatibn.^ The ordinances of a municipal corporation, if authorized by its charter, have the same effect within its limits and with re- spect to persons upon whom thejis lawfully operate that an act of the legislature has upon the people at large.^ Consequently, where an ordinance authorized by the charter of the munici- pality is in apparent or real conflict with a general law, the same principles must be applied in deciding whether the gen- eral law and the ordinance can stand together, or whether they are fatally inconsistent, as where the provision of the charter itself is in question. § 101. Repeal of general laws by municipal ordinance. — In a Yermont case there is a strong and interesting presenta- tion of the learning on this point. A general law of the State of Yermont authorized the selectmen of villages to license vic- tualing-houses. "With this law in force the village of St. Johns- bury was incorporated by act of the legislature with a char- ter authorizing the village to pass by-laws regulating the licensing of victualing-houses. Under this charter the village adopted a by-law authorizing its trustees to license viotualing- shops. The validity of the by-law was called into question, and in the opinion of the court it v^as said : — " The by-laws of municipal corporations, when authorized by the charter, have the same effect within its limits, and with respect to per- sons upon whom they lawfully operate, that an act of the legis- lature has upon the people at large.' So if the by-law is author- lEx parte Garza (1890), 28 Tex. « St Johnsburyw Thompson, 59 Vt. App. 381 ; S. C, 19 Am. St Eep. 845 ; 300; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des State V. Clarke (1873), 54 Mo. 17; Moines, 44 Iowa, 508; S. C, 24 Am. State V. De Bar (1874), 58 Mo. 395 ; Eep. 756. This is conceded learning. St Johnsbury v. Tiiompson, 59 Vt The cases supporting the doctrine 300 ; State v. Young (1877), 17 Kan. will be found in the chapter on Bt- 414 ; State v. Mills, 34 N. J. Law, 177 ; laws and Ordinances. Seebold v. People, 86 111. 33. See, 'St Johnsbury v. Thompson, 69 also, g§ 77, 94, supra. Vt 300. § 102.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. IIT ized by the charter, it has the efPect of a special law of the leg- islature within the limits of the village, and supersedes the general law upon the subject of victualing-houses therein ; for the charter giving the village power to pass the by-laW incon- sistent with, and repugnant to, the general law, by necessary implication operated to repeal the general law, within the ter- ritorial limits of the village, on ^the principle that provisions of different statutes which are in conflict with one another cannot stand together, and in the absence of anything showing a different intent on the part of the legislature, general legis- lation upon a particular subject must give way to later incon- sistent special legislation upon the same subject." ' §102. The same subject continned. — An interesting ap- plication of the principles discussed in the last section is to be found in the efforts of various municipalities to license houses of prostitution, where such houses are prohibited by the gen- eral criminal statutes of the State. In a recent Texas case this question arose.^ By its charter the city of San Antonio, which was incorporated by special act of the legislature, was empowered inter alia to suppress and restrain disorderly houses, bawdy-houses and houses of prostitution, to enact or- dinances to restrain and punish prostitutes and to prevent and punish the keeping of houses of prostitution within the city. Under these powers the city council passed an ordinance licens- ing houses of prostitution within the city. At the time of the passage of the ordinance houses of prostitution were prohib- ited by the penal code of the State. It was claimed on the one hand that the ordinance was void as being repugnant to a general law of the State, while on the other hand it was con- tended that by the passage of the charter provisions authoriz- ing the city to restrain, regulate and suppress such establish- • 1 Dillon on Munio. Corp., § 88 ; thorizing it to tax the sale of liquor 4 Kent's Commentaries, 466, noie; may be required to pay an additional In re Snell, 58 Vt. 207 ; State v. Mor- license under a city ordinance author- ristown, 33 N. J. Law, 67 ; State v. ized by a charter granted after the Clarke, 35 N. J. Law, 54 ; Davies v. county license Was issued. City of Fairbarn, 3 How. 636 ; In re Goddard, Elk Point v. Vaughn (Dak.), 46 N. W. 16 Pick. 504 ; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. Eep. 577. See § 88, mpra. 17 ; Mark u State, 97 N. Y. 573. One 2 E'a; parte Garza, 38 Tex. App. 881 ; licensed by a county under a law au- S. C, 19 Am. St Rep. 845. 118 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHABTEB. [§ 103. ments, the general law was, although not expressly, still by necessary implication, repealed. The former view was upheld by the courts, and in the opinion it was said : — " If it was the intention of the legislature to repeal this general law within the corporate limits of said city, it is reasonable to presume that such intention would have been plainly and expressly declared, and not left to be implied merely. It is reasonable to presume that if it had been intended to grant the power to license such houses, the legislature would, as ft did in the charter of the city of "Waco, have expressly granted such power. That' such was not the legislative intent is also, and to otir minds very cogently, shown by the fact that the power to license other occupations was expressly conferred upon the city." ' § 103. Construction of amendatory and repealing acts made applicable only to cities of a certain class. — The provisions of amendatory and repealing statutes are sometimes made ap- plicable in terms only to cities of a certain grade or class. In construing these acts the question often arises as to whether they take effect, ipso facto, upon the city reaching the required population, or whether it is necessary for the city to comply with the statutory formalities required in order to formally raise the city from the lower to the higher grade before the acts take effect. In a recent Utah case where certain sections of a statute amendatory of city charters were by express terms made applicable to cities having a population of over twenty thousand, and pointed out a manner in which the num- ber of inhabitants of a. given city might be determined, the court nevertheless enforced the act by taking judicial 1 Sa;porfe Garza (1890), 28 Tex. App. suppress bawdy-houses, while by an 381 ; S. C., 19 Am. St. Eep. 845. The amendment the city was further em- opinion also refers to tlie Missouri powered to regulate and suppress case on the same subject, where it these resorts. In another Missouri was held that the power to regulate decision it was held that a special act included the power to license. State of the legislature expressly conferring V. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17. See, also, State upon the city of St Louis the power V. De Bar, 58 Mo. 395 ; Smith v. Madi- to permit beer saloons to remain open son, 7 Ind. 86 ; Burlington v. Palmer, on Sunday operated within the city 42 Iowa, 681. But it is to be noted, limits a repeal of the general statute as is remarked in the opinion, that in prohibiting such act. State v. Binder, the Missouri case the original charter 38 Mo. 451. , authorized the city of St. Louis to § 104.J AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHAETEE. 119 notice of the population as shown by the last decennial cen- sus without anything being done on the part of the city.^ On the other hand, under the Ohio statute providing that " existing corporations organized as cities of the second class shall remain such until they become cities of the first class," a mere increase of population has been held not to advance such cities from the second to the first class, but to accom- plish that end the provisions of the statute must be complied with .2 § 104. Effect of legislation upon the charter of a city organized under special law^ and not hy its acceptance thereof subject to. the general law. — Where it is provided, as is frequently the case, that a city organized by special act may elect to become subject to a subsequent general law providing for the creation of municipalities throughout the State, and any city refuses to make such election and remains subject to its original special charter, legislation affecting cities organized under the general law does not effect an ■ amendment or repeal of the provisions of that special charter. So the city of Wilkesbarre, never having accepted the provis- ions of the Pennsylvania statute regulating the government of cities, and making the petition of a majority of the lot- owners a condition precedent to the pavement of a street, was held to be not subject thereto, but to be governed by its own charter, which did not require such petition.' And in Colorado and California a similar ruling was made even in the case of 1 People ex rel. Bynon v. Page struing the same general statute, it (Utah), 23 Pac. Eep. 761 ; s. C, 29 Am. was held accordingly that the stat- & Eng. Corp. Cas. 57. See, also, §48, ute in question, the act of May 23, supra. The courts will in general 1874 (P. L. Pa. 231), and the supple- talre judicial notice of the population mental act of April 11, 1876 (P. L. 21), of a cit^ as ascertained by the fed- establishing a uniform and general eral census. State v. Hermann, 75 system of government for all cities, Mo. 340 ; State v. Anderson, 44 Ohio was not designed to repeal any St 347 ; Topeka v. Gillett, 39 Kan. municipal charter previously created 431. by special enactment, and a city 2 State V. Wall (Ohio), 24 N. E. Eep. which has not accepted the act is 897. not subject to its provisions. In re ' Beaumont v. City of WilkesbaiTe Vacation of Henry St (1889), 123 Pa. (1891), 21 At). Eep. 888. And in con- St 346 ; s. C, 10 Atl. Eep. 785. 120 jMIBNDMENT, ETd., OF OHAETBB. [§ 105. constitutional provisions affecting cities organized under the general law.' § 105. Miscellaneons instances of effective repealing and amendatory acts. — Where a repealing or amendatory act ex- pressly declares that the act shall apply to all" cities and towns of the St^ite, of course those charters of cities and towns within the State which are inconsistent with the provisions of the act are thereby repealed or altered, as the intention of the legislature to effect such repeal or amendment is expressly in- dicated.? Where the earlier and later legislation are obvi- 1 The constitution of Colorado, ar- ticle 14, section 13, authorized the gen- eral assem-bly to provide by general laws for organization and classifica- tion of cities and towns, and to define by genera.1 laws the powers of each class, so that all of the same class shall possess the same powers, etc. Section 14 provided that the general assembly should make provision by general law whereby any city incor- porated by special law might elect to become subject to the general law. The city of Denver never elected to be re-incorporated under the general laws ; but, on the contrary, its charter was often amended. It was decided that Constitution, article 7, section IS, providing that the general assembly shall by general law designate the courts and judges by whom electiqn contests shall be tried, did not in effect repeal an existing provision in the Denver city charter authorizing the city council to determine con- tests as to tjhe electiQn of mayor, nor did it invalidate ^ subsequent amend ment to such provision. People v. Londoner, 13 Col. 303 ; s. a, 23 Pac. Kep. 704 ; Carpenter v. People, 8 Col. 116 ; s. c, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Caa. 110. The cpn^plaint in an action by a California city organized under a special charter was according to the form prescribed by a section of the charter. There was nothing to indi- cate that silch section had been re- pealed or modified prior to the adoption or the constitution of California of 1879, or that the city as a corporation ever re-organized under the act of 1883 (Acts CaL 1883, p. 235), providing for the organiza- tion of cities under general laws. The court held that the complaint was not obnoxious to the constitution of California of 1879,.article 11, section 6, providing that "corporations for municipal purposes shall not be cre- ated by special laws; but the legis- lature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation, organizE^tion and classification in proportion to population of cities, towns," etc. City of Stockton v. Western Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (Cal., 1887X 15 Pac Rep. 3J4. 3 Thus a clause in an act declaring that " this act shall apply to all cities and towns in this State, anything in their charters to the contrary not- withstanding," makes the act opera- tive in those cities whose charters have contrary provisions. In re House Resolutions Relating to House Bill No. 116 (1889), 12 Colo. 289; S. a, 21 Pac. Rep. 484 ; In re Senate Reso- lution Relating to Senate Bill No. 1 (1889), 12 Colo. 290 ; S. c, 21 Pac. Rep. 484. Also it has been decided that § 106.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. 121 ously and fatally inconsistent, the later act repeals the former. Thus, a Texas statute which incorporated the town of Hen- derson, with limits one mile square, the court-house being in the center, was impliedly repealed by a subsequent act in- corporating the same town, with limits extending " one-half mile in every direction from the court-house." ^ In the fa- mous cases in which the members of the board of aldermen of New York, known as the " boodle " aldermen, were in- dicted for receiving bribes in connection with the purchase by Jacob Sharp of the franchise to operate a street railway through Broadway, the charter of the city provided a penalty in the case of municipal ofiBcials for the crime of receiving bribes. A provision of the penal code adopted after the pas- sage of that charter provision imposed a greater penalty upon the same offense. The provision of the penal code was held to supersede and repeal the charter provision.* § 106. The same subject continued In general it may be stated that where a question arises as to whether the provis- ions of a municipal charter are repealed by subsequent legis- lation, the intention of the legislature must be ascertained according to the general rules governing the construction of statutes «ubject to the special limitations indicated in the preceding sections, and where, either expressly or by clear and necessary implication, the intention of the legislature to amend or repeal the provisions of the charter is apparent, such amendment or repeal is effected.' Laws of Utah, 1888, chapter 48, arti- i Buf ord v. State, 73 Tex. 183 ; S. C, cle 30, section 5, providing that the 10 S. W. Rep. 401. sections thereof specifying the num- ^People w O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 351;- ber of wards, and the ofBcers to be People v. Jaehne, 103 N. Y. 183. elected, in cities of certain classes, 'Buford v. State, 73 Tex. 183; shall apply to cities already organ- s. a, 10 S. W. Eep. 401 ; State v. ized, effects an amendment of the Seaverance, 55 Mo. 378 ; State v. Mil- charters of such cities, though the ler, 80 N. J. Law, 368 ; s. a, 86 Am. act contains no repealing clause. Dec. 188 ; Allen v. People, 84 111. 503, People V. Page (Utah), 38 Pac. Rep. and cases already cited. N. Y. Laws 761. See, also, Clintonville v. Keet- 1885, oh. 370, providing for the pres- ing, 4Denio, 841 ; Bank v. Bridges, 30 ervation of the public health, etc., N. J. Law, 113 ; Coe v. Meriden, 45 being general in its application, re- Conn. 155 ; Tiemey v. Dodge, 9 Minn, peals and supersedes the provisions lfl6. of a village charter relating to the 122 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHABTEB. [§ lor. § 107. What is an amendment or repeal of a municipal charter? — The constitution of the State sometimes pre- scribes specific methods according to which the amendment or repeal of municipal charters may be effected. Under these constitutional provisions it is necessary to determine whether legislative or other action is an amendment or a repeal of the charter within the meaning of the statute. In Mis- souri it has been decided that an ordinance extending the limits of a city, the boundaries ef which had been originally defined bv its charter, was an amendment to the charter.' But an act of the (legislature, conferring upon a city powers additional to what it already has under its charter, was re- garded in an Oregon case as supplemental to the charter, and not as an amendment or revision of it, within that provision of the constitution which provides that when an same subject. People v. Daley (1885), 37 Hun, 461. The provision of the city charter of Oakland, granted in 1854, giving the common council ex- clusive jurisdiction to determine an elation contest for the office of coun- cilman, was impliedly repealed by Code Civil Proc. Cal., § 1111 et seq., providing that any elector of a county or city, or any political sub- division of either, may contest for causes therein stated, and that such contest must be determined by a special session of the superior court. McGivney v. Pierce (Cal.), 52Pac. Eep. 369. The construction of municipal ordinances is governed by the same rules that are applied to statutes in similar cases. Eoche v. Mayor &c., 40 N. J. Law, 257; S. C. (annotated), 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 30. 1 The constitution of Missouri, arti- cle 9, section 16, provides that any city having a popufation of one hun- dred thousand may frame a charter for its own government^ which must be approved by four-sevenths of the qualified voters, and which, when "bo adopted, may be amended by a proposal therefor made by the law- making authorities of such city, . . . and accepted by three-fifths of the qualified voters of such city, . . . and not otherwise." Kansas City adopted such a charter, one of vehose provisions defined the territorial lim- its of the city. It was held that an ordinance to extend such limits was an amendment to the charter, and must be accepted by three-fifths of the voters, as required by the consti- tution. And, although the same sec- tion of the constitution further pro- vided that " such charter shall always be , . , subject to the constitu- tion and laws of this state," this was decided to confer no authority on the legislature to authorize amendments to the charter otherwise than as pro- vided by the constitution ; and hence act of Missouri, March 10, 1887, pro- viding that the territorial limits of such a city may be extended by or- dinance, was held to be void so far as it proposes to dispense with the as- sent of three-fifths of the qualified voters of the city to such ordinance. City of Westport v. Kansas City (Mo., 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 68. §§ 108, 109.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. 128 act is revised, or a section amended, the act or section so revised or amended shall be set forth at full length.' The charter of the city of New York originally provided that the aldermen of that city should sit as judges of the court of gen- eral sessions, and it was held that an act depriving the alder- men of that right was an act amending the charter, and, as such, required a vote of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature. Such an act passed without that vote was declared void.* § 108. Acceptance of amendment. — The legislature -has, in the absence of constitutional limitations to the contrary, the power to impose an amendment of the charter without the consent of the inhabitants of the municipality, as it has the power to impose the original charter without such con- sent ; ' but it is frequently provided that an amendment of the charter shall not become a law until the municipal gov- ernment or the inhabitants of the municipality shall, in a man- ner indicated by the statute, signify their acceptance of the amendment.* § 109. Manner of acceptance. — "Where this acceptance is made a condition of the amendment it must be signified ac- cording to the method prescribed by the statute in order to validate the amendment. Thus in Ohio it was provided that an amendment to a city charter should take effect when • Sheridan v. Salem, 14 Oregon, act prescribed the manner of propos- 328 ; s. C, 13 Pac. Eep. 925. ing and voting upon amendments, 2 Purdy V. People, 4 Hill, 384. and further provided that " no ' See §§ 50, 71, 73, 73, supra, amendments shall be proposed or * Attorney-General v. Shepard, 63 submitted by any board of aldermen N. H. 383; In re Henry Street, 123 which shall, contravene, or be repug- Pa. St 346 ; Largen v. State, 76 Tex. nant to, the constitution or statute 323 ; State v. St. Louis, 73 Mo. 435 ; laws of this State." The constitu- Foote V. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, 408 ; tionality of this law is discussed by a Mayor &c. of Brunswick v. Finney, correspojident of the Central Law 54 Ga. 317 ; §§ 51, 72, 73, supra. The Journal, who arrives at the conclu- legislature of Texas passed an act sion that it is not obnoxious to the empowering "any incorporated town maxim which forbids a delegation or city " to amend its own charter, of legislative authority. 2 Cent L. " whenever in the judgment of the Jour. 33. See, also, People v. Bag- board of aldermen " an amendment ley (Cal.), 24 Pac. Rep. 716 ; and became necessary or desirable. The §§ 41, 46, supra. 124 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEB. [§ 110. adopted " by a majority of the voters, of the city," The city and the township were coterminous, but different qualifica- tions for voters were in force in the two corporations. The vote on the acceptance of the amendment was held at the township polls, and the courts declared that the election was void and the amendment ineffectual, on the ground that the statutory provision contemplated a vote at the city polls.* A substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute is, however, suflScient.^ When ncf provision is made by the amending act for the assent of the municipality or its citizens, it Is proper^^r the court to infer that assent from such acts of the citizens as show their willingness to become subject to the amendment.' § 110. Constitutional limitations on power of legislature to amend or repeal municipal charters — (a) In general. — It has been already stated that the sole restrictions on the power of the legislature to amend, repeal or alter the charters of municipal corporations are to be found in the constitutions of the United States and of the several States. These re- strictions are the same that are imposed § 51, where many cases on Ga. 404. See, also, Brunswick w this point are collected. Brunswick, 51 Ga. 639, where a ' Willcock on Corporations, 335. statute entitled "An act to consoli- *For a discussion of this subject §§ 116, 117.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OP CHAETEE. 129 §116. The same subject continued.— The English doc- trine that the charters of municipal as well as of private cor- porations are liable to forfeiture by quo warranto and scire faoias proceedings arises from the fact that there is an im- plied condition upon the grant of any charter, public or pri- vate, that the franchises thereof shall not be neglected or abused.' It is conceded that this doctrine applies to private corporations in this country.* But as will be shown in the succeeding sections, the charters of municipal corporations cannot in the United States be declared forfeited by the courts for any cause. § 117. Instances of forfeiture of charter under English law. — The boroughs and cities of England had always been the centers of intellectual activity, and consequently of rest- iveness, under the attempted tyranny of the Tudors and the Stuarts. "When Charles II. was restored to the throne he took measures to quell the rebellious cities, and notably the great capital of London, by attacking the charters which were the source of their independence. A servile judiciary subserved his aims, and on frivolous grouiids the charter of London was and of the authorities relating not, however, be refused merely be- thereto, with especial reference, how- cause the granting it may or even ever, to piivate corporations, see 1 will dissolve the corporation. Rex v. Beach on Private Ct)rp., § 53. White, 5 A. & E. 613 ; Rex v. Parry, 11 Dillon on Munio. Corp., § 165, 6 A. & E. 810, 830. citing Blackstone's CJoinmentaries, ^ 1 Beach on Private Corp., § 45, 485 ; 2 Kyd on Corporations, 447 ; citing People v. Kingston &o. Koad Willcock on Corporations, 335; Tay- Co., 33 Wend. 193; s. C., 35 Am. Deo. lors of Ipswich, 1 Eol. 5; Rex v. 551 and note; State v. Commercial Grosvenor, 7 Mod. 199 ; Smith's Case, Bank, 13 Sm. & M. 539 ; S. c., 53 Am. 4 Mod. 65, 58 ; Rex v. Saunders, 3 Dec. 106 ; Chesapeake & Ohio Canal East, 119; Mayor &c. of Lyme v. Co. v. Baltimore & Qhio R Co., 4 Henley, 2 CL & F. 331 ; Rex v. Kent, Gill & J. 132 ; People v. President 18 East, 230; Prestley v. Foulds, 2 &c. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351; Scott, N. E. 205, 235 ; Attorney-Gen- Penobscot &o. Co. v. Lawson, 16 Me. eral v. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220. 324; Commonwealth v. Commercial Where it is clear that the object of Bank of Pennsylvania, 28 Pa. St. 388. the quo warranto against an indi- The exercise of this power in this vidual member of the corporation is country is exclusively vested in the to call in question the validity of the courts ; because a legislature caunor, charter granted to it by the crown, as a rule, declare a private ch.arter the court will refuse it Eegina v. forfeited. 1 Beach on Private Corp., Taylor, 11 A. & E. 949. The writ will § 45, and cases cited, 9 130 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. [§ 118. declared forfeited.* The charter was only restored to the city upon conditions which virtually vested in the crown the power of appointing the municipal officers. London was not alone in this predicament. Judge Dillon states that eighty-one quo i^arrcmto informations were brought against English munici- pal corporations by Charles II. and James II. These efforts of tyranny extended to the American colonies, which were at that early time vigorous in their opposition to unconstitu- tional despotism. The charters c^ Massachusetts, of Khode Island and of Connecticut were abrogated. But after the Rev- olution these wrongs were righted, and the charters of all corporations forfeited during the reigns of Charles 11. and James 11. were restored by act of parliament.* § 118. The charter of a municipal corporation in the United States cannot be forfeited by judicial action. — The English law allowing the forfeiture of municipal charters by quo wa/rranto and scire facias proceedings has no place in the American system of jurisprudence. The power to dissolve a municipal corporation is vested wholly and exclusively in the legislative branch of our government.' This distinction seems to arise from the fact that the English municipal corporation was, in the incipienoy of its existence as a corporation, a body of burgesses within the borough — a close Corporation which controlled the town but was not itself the town.* This char- ter of this close corporation, in many respects conducted for private advantage although performing at the same time the function of a governing body over the town or city, was con- sidered to be subject to forfeiture for wilful misuser or non- 1 1 Dillon on Munio. Corp., citing ' Mobile v. "Watson, 116 U. S. 289 ; Rex V. City of London, Mich. 33 Car. 2 ; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 IT. S. 472 ; S. C, 2 Show. 262. See, also. Pulling, Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon Laws &c. of London, 14 ; Norton's C. C. 130 ; Attorney-General v. Bos- Commentaries on History &c. of ton, 123 Mass. 460 ; Attorney-Geherat London, book 1, ch. X The Lease of v. Salem, 103 Mass. 138 ; Buford v. the City of London, 8 How. State State, 72 Tex. 182 ; Harris v. Nesblt, Trials, 1340. 24 Ala. 498. Non-user of corporate 21 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 8; 2 powers is not a forfeiture of corpo- Chandl. Com. Debs. 316 ; 1 Stephen's rate existenca State v. Stevens, 21 English Const, ch. VII, p. 455 ; Ma- Kan. 210 ; S. G (annotated), 18 Am. L. caulay's History of England, vol. Ill, Reg. (N. S.) 43, 46. ch. XV. < See supra, § 22. § 119.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. 131 user in regard to matters which went to the essence of the contract between it and the crown, just as a private corpora- tion is subject to such forfeiture. The same tacit condition was considered to be annexed to the charters of these corpo- rations that is annexed, as is everywhere conceded, to the charters of private corporations; that is, that the corpora- tion shall be subject to dissolution, by forfeiture of its charter effected through regular judicial proceedings, for wilful mis- user or non-user of the franchises of that charter. § 119. The same subject continued. — But in the United States our municipalities are free from any such vestige of an earlier stage of development. The American municipal cor- poration is simply and purely a strictly public corporation. It is a corporation of citizens, for citizens and by citizens. Its sole object is local government. Being maintained, therefore, only for the public' advantage, it is manifestly unjust and even impossible that the charters of our municipal corporations should be forfeited by judicial proceedings. To give such a power to the judiciary would be to make them co-ordinate with the legislature in their control of local government and local legislation. The illegal acts of municipal officials can be avoided and enjoined by vaiious methods of judicial proced- ure, but the charter itself being the creature of the legislature can be destroyed only by the same power that created. We have seen that the power of the legislature over municipal charters is unlimited except by constitutional limitations and by the power of the ballot-box. We may further add that this power of control has no_^rival, and that neither the judi- cial nor the executive departments of our government can create nor destroy a municipality, which is a subdivision of the State government. There are to the knowledge of the writer no cases in which this exclusive control of the legisla- ture has been successfully questioned.^ ' See, upon this point, 1 Dillon on laterally. §§ 55, 75, swpro. The effect Munic. Corp.,§ 168 ; 3 Dillon on Munic. of dissolution of corporations by leg- Corp., § 896 ; Annotated Case, 18 Am. islative action will be fully treated in L. Reg. (N. S.) 43, 46. Regularity of the subsequent chapter on Partition incorporation cannot be attacked col- akd DISSOLUTION. CHAPTEE V. MEMBERSHIP §120. AND CITIZENSHIP — PEESONAL LIABILITY MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION. OF Definitions — Membership — Citizenship. 121. Qualifications for membership in English mimicipal corpo- rations. 123. The same subject continued. 123. Qualifications for membership in American municipal cor- porationa 124 Citizenship in England. 125. The same subject continued. 126. Citizenship in the United States. 127. Natural citizens. 138. The same subject continued. 129. Naturalized citizens. 130. The same subject continued. 181. Right of naturalized citizens to hold and receive lands. 182. The status of Chinese before the law. 183. The status of American In- dians before the law. 134 PrivUeges and immunities of citizens. 139. 140. 141. 143. § ^35. The same subject continued. 136. Rights of citizens. 137. The same subject continued. 138. Personal liability of members of the corporation. The same Subject continued — Russell V. The Men of Devon. Personal liability of members of public g^agi-corporations in New England. The same subject continued. Beardsley v. Smith — (a) The reason for the New England doctrine of personal liability of membera 143. (b) The doctrine in England. 144 (c) The doctrine in Massachu- setts and Maine. 145. (d) The doctrine in Connecti- cut 146. Limitations upon the personal liability of members of New England public guowi-corpo- rations. § 120. Definitions — Membership — Citizenship. — Mem- bership is the state of being a member.^ Citizenship is the state of being vested with the rights and privileges of a cit- izen.^ A member is an individual of a community or society. Every citizen is a member of the State or body politic. So the individuals of a club, a corporation, or confederacy, are called its members.' A citizen is strictly a member of a common- wealth {oimtas), possessing all the rights which can be enjoyed or exercised under its fundamental laws.* A citizen is the 1 Webster's Diet 2 Webster's Diet; » Webster's Diet * Burrill's Law Diet (2d ed.). § 121.] MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. 133 native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and privileges of the city in which he resides ; the freeman of a city, as distinguished from a foreigner, or one not en- titled to its franchises. In the United States, a person, na- tive or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, or the qualifications which enable him to vote for rulers, and to purchase and hold real estate ; ' any person who, under the constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote for public oflScers, and who is qual- ified to fill offices in the gift of the people;* a free inhabit- ant, born within the United States, or naturalized under the laws of congress.' § 131. Qualifications for membership in English munici- pal corporations. — Before the passage of the statute known as the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, the qualifications for members or officers of municipal corporations depended upon the charter, usage or by-laws of the particular corpo- ration, the usual qualifi(8ations being that the person claim- ing to be admitted to the freedom of the corporate town should be the son of a freeman, or should have served an ap- prenticeship to a freeman, or (in some instances) married his daughter, or acquired the privilege by gift or franchise.* But this was changed by the said act of 1882, and under it no person is entitled to be enrolled as a burgess unless he is qual- ified as follows : (a) Is of full age,* and (h) is on the 15th of July in any year, and has been during the whole of the then last preceding twelve months, in occupation, joint or several,' of any house,^ warehouse, counting-house, shop or other building,' in this act referred to as qualifying property' in- the borough. 1 Webster's Diet But see Hargreaves v. Hopper, 1 CL P. 2 3 Story on Const 1 687 (1st b±). D. 195. » 3 Kent's Commentaries, 258, note. * A joint occupation gives the mu- * 1 Dillon on Hunia Corp. (4th ed.), nicipal franchise. Begina v. Mayor § 36, note. of Exeter, L. E. 4 Q. B. 114. sit should seem from these words 'This may include part of a house, that it is suflBcient if the person seek- when separately occupied. Municl- ing to be enrolled were of full age at pal Corporations Act of 1883, § 31. the time of the revision of the lists. ^See Powell v. Farmer, 18 C. B. 9 This property need not be the same Eawlinson's Municipal Corporations during the twelve months. See § 33, Act of 1883 (8th ed.), p. 118. 134 MEMBEE8HIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITT. [§ 122. § 122. The same subject continued. — This statute further provides that no person shall be entitled to be enrolled as a burgess unless he (a) "Has during the whole of those twelve months resided in the borough or within seven miles ' thereof, and (5) Has been rated ' in respect of the qualifying property to all poor rates made during those twelve months for the parish wherein the property is situate ; and (o) Has on before the twentieth of the same July paid' all such or rates,* including borough rates (if tny), as have become pay- able by him in respect of the qualifyijig property ' up to the (N. S.) 168 ; Powell v. Boraston, 18 C. R {N, S.) 175; Ee Creek, 3 B. & a 459 ; Begina v. Mayor &c. of Eye, 9 Ad. & El. 670 ; Rex v. Sef ton, Russ. & Ry. 302 ; In the Matter of Evans, 9 Ad. & El. 679. Where a burgess occupies a " house," and is described as occupying a " counting-house," his name must be expunged from the burgess roll. Reg. v. Mayor of Chip- ping Wycpmbe, 44 L. J. Q. B. 82. In cases where a house is let out to sep- arate tenants, and each tenant has complete control ov^r his portion, see Bex V. Trapshaw, 1 Leach, 427 (4th ed.); Rex v. Bailey, 1 Mood. C. C. 23; Rex V. Carroll, 1 Leach, 237 (4th ed.); Beg. V. Mayor &c. of Eye, 9 Ad. &E1. 6'70; Cook V. Humber, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 83 ; S. C, 31 L. J. C. P. 73 ; Wilson v. Roberts, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 50; S. C, 31 L. J. C. P. 78. >As to the n^ode in which this distance is to be measured, see Raw- linson's " Municipal Corporations Act, 1.883" (8th ed.), §231. 2 It is now established that, in order to constitute a good rating, the name of the party intended to be charged must appear on the rate. Moss, Ap- pellant, V. Overseers of Lichfield, Respondents, 7 Man. & G. 72. See, also, Lord Mansfleld'g reasons in the judgment in Rex v. St. Luke's Hos- pital, 2 Burr. 1063 ; and the oases col- lected, on this subject, in Elliott on Registration (2d ed.), 190 ; and Rex v. Tripp, M. T. 1836 ; Glover on Corp., 693. ' Payment by another person act- ing as a volunteer, and without any authority from the person liable, is not sufficient Reg v. Mayor &o. of Bridgnorth, 10 Ad. & El. 66. But where the payment is made by the landlord in consequence of an agree- ment between him and the tenant, by which the tenant was to pay ad- ditional rent in respect thereof, such payment is sufficient. Wright, Ap- pellant, V. Town Clerk of Stockport, Respondent, 5 Man. & G. 33; Moger V. Escott, L. R. 7 C. P. 158 ; Cook, Appellant, v. Luckett, Respondent, 2 C. E. 168 ; Hughes, Appellant, v. Over- seers of Chatham, Respondents, 5 Man. & G. 54. The decisions on set- tlement cases accord with this view. Rex V. Axmouth, 8 East, 383 ; Rex v. Okehampton, Burr. S. C. 5 ; Rex v. Bridgewater, 3 T. R. 550. * See Rawlinson's " Municipal Cor^ porations Act, 1882" (8th ed.), §§ 144, 197. The non-payment of an illegal rate does not disqualify the party. Reg. V. Mayor &c. of New Windsor, 7 Q. B. 908. As to the payments of compositions for poor-rate under lo- cal acts, see Regina v. Mayor &c. of Kidderminster, 20 L. J. Q. B. 281. sSeeFlatcher v. Boodle, 18 C.B. (N. S.) 152. §§ 123, 124.J MKMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. 13S then last preceding fifth of January." Every person so qual- ified shall be entitled to be enrolled as a burgess, unless he (a) " Is an alien ; or (J) Has within the twelve months afore- said received union or parochial relief or other alms ; or (e) Is disentitled under any act of parliament." ' § 123. Qualifications for membership in American mu- nicipal corporations. — The question whether a person is a member of a public corporation, strict or qitasi, is in this country determined by the residence of the person in ques- tion. If he lives within the limits of the corporation he is considered a member of the corporation ; if he lives without those limits he is not a member. The decision of the question is not affected by the wishes either of the person or of the corporation. In the case of private corporations the question is of course decided in an entirely different manner. One who holds stock in the corporation is considered a member.* § 124. Citizenship in England. — Natural citizenship is cre- ated in England by birth within the allegiance of the king. By a statute of the reign of Edward III.' it was provided that children " which henceforth shall be born out of ligeance of the king, whose fathers and mothers at the time of their birth be and shall be at the faith and ligeance of the king of Eng- land, shall have and enjoy the same benefit and advantage, to have and bear inheritance within the same ligeance as the other inheritors aforesaid in time to come, so also that the mothers of such children passed the sea by the license and will of their husbands." The question whether this statute was 1 Municipal Corporations Act of 346, Judge Morgan says : — " When a 1883, § 9. man moves into a town he becomes 2 0akes v. Hill, 10 Pick. 833,346; a citizen there (if possessed of the Overseers of Poor &c v. Sears, 23 requisite qualifications aa to age, etc.. Pick. 133, 130. "In all guas^-corpo- and if he remains the requisite rations, as cities, towns, parishes, length of time), whatever may be school districts, membership is con- the desire of himself or the town.'' stituted by living within certain See, also, Dillon on Munic. Corp. limits." Per Shaw, C. J., in Over- (4th ed.), chaps. II and III; People U seers of Poor &c. v. Sears, 33 Pick. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; s. a, 21 Am. 133, 130; Hill v. Boston (1877), 133 Eep. 405. Mass. 344, 356; S. C, 23 Am. Eep. 3 25 Edw. IIL, oh. a 333. In Oakes v. Hill, 10 Pick. 333, 1 36 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — LIABILITT. [§ 125. introductory of a new rule or simply declaratory of the previous law was considered in a "New Tork case, and the conclusion was reached " that it is perhaps not easy to determine from the statute itself, taken in connection with its history, whether it was in truth aS enabling or a declaratory act." * Judge Selden, however, continued his consideration of the question by saying : — " Principles, however, have since the statute been thoro,Ughly settled, which is my view and decis- ion of the question. The subject ^f alienage was very elabo- rately examinee! in Calvin's Case (7 Coke, 1; 6 James I.). Aptiong the principles settled in that case and which have re.- maiited unquestioned since tire these : — (1) That natural alle- ^ance does not depend upon locality or place; that it is purely mental in its nature, and cannot, therefore, be confined within any certain boundaries ; or, to use the language of Coke, that ' ligeance, and faith and truth, which are her mem- bers and parts, are qualities of the mind and soul of man, and cannot be circumscribed within the predicament of uhi.' . (Page 76.) (2) That it is not sufficient, in a plea of alienage, to aver that the plaintiff was born out of the kingdom or out of the jurisdic- tion of the king, but every such plea must aver that the plaint- iff is not of the allegiance of the king; and judgment was given for the plaintiff in (!)alvin's Case ' for that the plea in this case doth not refer faith or liegeance to the king indefi- nitely and generally, but limiteth and restraineth' faith and liegeance to the kingdom.' (Id., p. 10a.) (3) That allegiance and protection («'. e., the rights and the duties of citizenship) are reciprocal, the one being the consideration for the other. (Id., p. 6a.) (4) That a British subject, although residing abroad, still owes allegiance to the king of England." * § 125. The same subject continned. — From his considera- tion of the cases and authorities the learned judge finally reaches the conclusion " that the children of English parents, iLudlam v. Ludlam (1863), 36 Law, 4; Halleck on Int. Law, ch. N. Y. 356, 363. 29, § 4, p. 698 ; Ludlam v. Ludlam, 2 Brooke's Afjridgment, title Den- 26 N. Y. 356, 364. The learned judge izen, 21 ; Rex v. Eaton, Litt. 28 ; Col- continued his collation and analogies lingwood V. Pace, 1 Vent. 413, 422 ; of authorities, referring to Cobble- 1 Jenk. Cent, case 2; Bacon v. dike's Case, cited in Calvin's Case, Bacon, Cro. Car. 601 ; 2 Phil, on Int. p. 9&. §126.] MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — -LIABILITY. 137 though born abroad, are nevertheless regarded by the common law as natura,l-born citizens of England." He continues : — " Now upon what ground can allegiance in such cases be claimed? If natural allegiance or allegiance by birth does not depend upon boundaries or place, as Calvin's Case asserts, upon what does it depend? There can be but one answer to the question. It is impossible to suggest any other ground for the obligation than that of parentage. It must, I appre- hend, be transmitted from the parents to the child or it could not exist. This being then the nature of permanent alle- giance, it follows that the king of England may properly claim allegiance from the children of his subjects wherever born. If, then, the child of English parents, though born abroad, is, mibdiinis natus, a born subject of the king, he must also be a born citizen of the kingdom. Allegiance and citizenship are, as we have seen, correlative terms, the one being the consid- eration of the other. So long, therefore, as the parents con- tinue to owe allegiance to the crown of England, so long will their children, by the rules of the common law, whether born within or without the kingdom, owe similar allegiance, and be entitled to the corresponding rights of citizenship." ^ § 126. Citizenship in the United States. — There are in the United States two classes of citizens — natural and naturalized citizens. Citizenship of the former class is created by the birth of the citizen within the jurisdiction of the United States. Citizenship of the latter class is created by the performance of certain requirements defined by statute. The naturalized citizen is from the time of naturalization a full-fledged citizen, entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a natural citizen, saving certain disabilities which relate back to the period during which he was an alien. It is conceded learn- ing that birth within the jurisdiction of the United States creates natural citizenship whether the parents of the citizen are aliens or citizens." To this rule the aboriginal Indians of this country furnish an exception that is, however, only appar- 1 Ludlam v. Ludlam, 36 N. Y. 356, 905. In the latter case a child bom 365. in the United States of alien Chinese 2 Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. Ch. 584 ; parents was declared to be an Ameri- Jn re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. Rep. can citizen. See g 133, infra. 138 MEMBERSHIP AND OITIZBKSHIP LIABILITY. [§§ 127, 128. ent. A child of Indian parents born in. this country is not considered to have been born within the jurisdiction of the United States, and is not therefore a citizen.' § 127. Natural citizens. — Where a person is born within the jurisdiction of the United States he is a natural citizen.' Likewise a person born in a foreign country and out of the jurisdiction of the United States is a citizen of the United States if at the time of his biJth his father was a citizen thereof." § 128. The same subject continued. — "Where a citizen of the United States marries an alien woman who might be nat- uralized, she becomes a citizen ; * and if the husband is nat- uralized after marriage, the wife becomes a citizen.' In cases where a citizen leaves this country and either takes with him a son born in the United States or lias one born abroad, and either the father or son elects to and does become a subject of the country to which they have emigrated, they both be- come aliens, and neither one can inherit real property in the United States." ' See infra, § 133. to indicate an intention of a perma- ^ Fourteenth Amendment to the nent change of domicile, otherwise Federal Constitution ; In re Look Lin than as before stated, his child, born Sing, 21 Fed. Eep. 905 ; S. a, 17 Chi- to him in Peru of a wife a native cago Leg. News, 57 ; Lynch v. Clarke, of that country, is a citizen of the 1 Sandf. Ch. 584, 639. United States. Ludlam «. Ludlam, 3 U. S. Rev. Stat, § 1993; Ludlam 26 N. Y. 356. V. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356 ; Oldtown v. * U. S. Rev. Stat, § 1996. Bangor, 58 Me. 353. In the absence » 10 U. S. Stat at Large, p! 604, § 2 ; of any law of the United States gov- Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496 ; Burton erning the particular case, the ques- v. Burton, 1 Keyes (N. Y.X 559 ; White tion whether one bom out of the v. White, 2 Met (Ky.) 185. United States is a citizen is to be de- * Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Peters, 243 ; termined by the common law' as it Jackson v. White, 20 Johns. 313, existed, irrespective of English stat- Orser v. Hoag, 3 Hill, 79 ; Kilham v. utes, at Jthe adoption of the federal Ward, 2 Mass. 336. The division of constitution. It was accordingly an empire works no forfeiture of pre- held that where a citizen of the viously vested property rights. Kelly United States went to Peru at the v. Harrison, 2 Johns. Cas. 29 ; Jack- age of eighteen years with the inten- son v. Lunn, 3 Johns. Cas. 109. A tion of indefinite continuance there person born in the United States who for the purpose of trading, but took left the country before the deolara- no steps to be naturalized in Peru or tion of independence and never re- § 129.] MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. 139 § 129. Naturalized citizens.— In the United States citizen- ship may be acquired by naturalization.' Under the United States statutes an applicant for admission to citizenship must possess certain qualifications and comply with certain rules before he is entitled to admission to citizenship.* turned became thereby an alien, and incapable of subsequently taking lands by descent Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Peters, 131. See, also, Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cr. 603 ; Jackson V. Burns, 3 Binn. 75 ; Orr v, Hodgson, 4 Wheat 453 ; Blight v. Rochester, 7 Wheat 535. 1 Congress controls exclusively the rules -which , govern naturalization. Houston V. Moore, 5 Wheat 1. As to the time when the power of nat- uralization takes effect, see Chirac v. Chirac, 3 Wheat 1 ; United States v. Villato, 2 Dallas, 370. 3 These requirements are defined by statute as follows: — (1) "Any alien, except Chinese, may be nat- uralized and become a citizen of the United States on the following con- ditions : — The applicant shall de- clare on oath or affirmation before some State court of record, having a seal and clerk, and having com- mon-law jurisdiction, or before a United States district or circuit court, or before a clerk of any of the said courts, two years at least before his admission, that it is his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever his allegiance to his own sovereignty, which must be in peace with the United States at the time. (2) At his final admission to citizenship he shall declare on oath or affirmation before some of the courts aforesaid that h^ will support the United States constitution, and that he renounces all allegiance to any foreign sov- ereign, and especially to his own, whereof he was subject before his application for citizenship. (3) He must prove by at least two witnesses who are citizens that hejias resided within the United States five years ; at least and within the State or Ter- ritory where the court is located at least one year ; that during that time he has been a good moral person, attached to the principles of this government, and is well disposed in this regard. (4) He must renounce all titles to nobility, if he has any. (5) Any alien (except a Chinese) who is a minor, who shall have refolded within the United States three years next preceding his arriving at his majority, and who shall continue to reside therein at the time of making application for citizenship, may, after reaching his majority, and hav- ing resided in the United States at least five years, including the three years of his minority, be given citi- zenship without any preliminary dec- laration. (6) Any alien (except a Chinese) who is twenty-one years of age or over, enlisting in the armies of the United States, either in the regular or volunteer, and who shall be honorably discharged therefrom, can be admitted to citizenship with- out the preliminary declaration of his intentions, but he must prove one year's residence in the United States. (7) The children of parents duly nat- uralized, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of such naturalization, shall, if residing in the United States, be considered as citizens. (8) If an alien who shall have declared his intentions shall die before he is actually naturalized, his 140 MEMBEKSHIP AND OITIZBNSHIP -r- LIABILITT. [§§ 130, 131. § 130. The same subject continued.— Congress has made special provisions by which alien seamen may become natural- ized citizens. Under the act he must first declare his intention of becoming a citizen before the proper court, and then serve three years on a United States merchant vessel.^ A clerk has no power to admit a person to citizenship,, and the admission must be granted by the court, as it is a judicial act.' But the applicant may iriake his declaration of intention to become a citizen before the recording officer of a court of record, and it is properly receivable by the plerk, as he, acts in that capac- ity ministerially and not judiciailly.' § 131. Right of naturalized citizens to hold and receive lands. — Where a person becomes naturalized he has the same right as a natural-born citizen to hold, inherit and receive lands, but the capacity to take by descent must exist at the time the descent happens.* Where an alien, having acquired widow and children shall be consid- ered citizen^ on taking the oath pre- scribed by law. (9) No alien who shall be a citizen, denizen or subject of any country, State or sovereign with whom the United States shall be at war at the time of bis applica- tion shall be then admitted to be a citizen of the United States. U, S. Rev. Stat, tit 30. 1 Act of Congress of 1872, § 29 ; 17 Stat at Large, 268. 2 McCarty v. Marsh, 1 Seld. (5 N. Y.) 263; The Acorn, 2 Abb. (U. S.)434; Caark's Case, 18 Barb. 444. 3 Butterworth's Case, 1 Woodb. & M. C. C. 323 ; State v. Whittemore, 50 N. H. 245 ; Eso parte Cregg, 2 Cur- tis C. C. 98. As to naturalization of a married woman without her hus- band's consent, see Priest v. Cum- mings, 16 Wend. 617. The necessary witnesses must be present in court and examined there openly and pub- licly, and affidavits taken outside of the court as to the applicant's char- acter and residence are not admissi- ble. In re , An Alien, 7 Hill, 137. Where a father becomes naturalized, and at that time has a son residing in the United States, but who is a minor, the son becomes a citizen by reason of his father's naturalization. State V. Penny, 10 Ark. 621. For the privileges and immunities to which a naturalized person is entitled, see 2 Kent's Commentaries, 66. ♦People V. Conklin, 3 Hill, 67; Heeney V. Trustees &c., 33 Barb. 360; Vaux V. Nesbit 1 MoCord Ch. (S. C.) 372. M., an American citizen, died seized of Certain lands' in 1779, leav- ing no lawful issue and no blood rel- atives, save such as were aliens. By his will he devised all his real estate to his wife, also an American citizen, to hold during her life, remainder to his two sisters and seven nephews and nieces, as tenants in common, in fee ; empowering his executors to sell the lands after his wife's death, and divide the proceeds equally among the devisees in remainder. The will further provided that in case any of the devisees in remainder died, before such division, leaving lawful issue. § 132.] MBMBEKSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP UABILITY. 141 lands by purchase, is afterward naturalized before office founds bis title becomes thereby confirmed so that he may hold even Otherwise where his claim is by descent.* as against the State. § 132. The status of Chinese before the law The Chi- nese form an exception to our naturalization la^s. A Chinese person, not born in this country, cannot become a citizen of the United States by naturalization.' A Chinese, however, if born within the limits of this country, even though of alien parents, is a citizen of the TJnited States and of the State wherein he resides. This question was decided by Justice Field in a recent case.' The learned judge held that birth within the jurisdiction of the United States conferred citizen- ship ; that this rule was in force, except as to Africans and the latter should take the share to which the parents, if living, would have been entitled. The devisees in remainder all died aliens prior to September, 1828, one of them (a nephew) leaving a son named E. E., who became naturalized September 3, 1838. The widow died in 1832. In ejectment by the people claiming the lands devised on the ground of their having escheated to the State, it was held that E. E. took no interest in them, either as devisee or heir, which could avail him as against the plaint- iffs, and that the latter were entitled to recover. The fee was not in abey- ance during the life of the widow, but the remainder vested in interest on the death of the testator; and though the devisees in remainder died before they were entitled to the possession, their estate would have descended had they left heirs capable of inheriting. The People v. Conklin, 3 Hill, 66. Judge Bronson in his opin- ion says: — "Although the devisees in remainder were aliens, they could take lands by purchase, which in- cludes a title by devise and any other form of acquiring the land by pur- chase ; " and cites as supporting his view, Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cr. 603, 619 ; Vaux v. Nesbit, 1 McCord, Ch. (S. C.) 352 ; 1 Pow. Dev., 259 (ed. 1838). The learned judge further says: — " The statute of 1830 will not help E. E. because it was passed since the death of M. ; " and cites Jackson v. Green, 7 Wend. 333 ; Jackson v. Fitzsimmons, 10 Wend. 9. And see People v. Irvin, 31 Wend. 128. 1 People V. Conklin, 3 Hill, 66. See. also, Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cr. 603; Bradstreet v. Supervisors, 13 Wend. 546 ; Lareau v. Davignon, 5 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 367; Avering v. Russell, 32 Barb. 263; Munro v. Merchant, 28 N. Y. 9 ; Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 12 N. Y. 376; Scanlan v. Wright, 13 Pick. 528 ; Wilbur v. Tobey, 16 Pick. 179; Foss v. Crisp, 20 Pick. 121; Smith V. Zanor, 4 Ala. 99. The nat- uralization must be complete. Mc- Daniel v. Richards, 1 McCord (S. C), 187. 2 In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawyer C. C. 155. See, also, the United States statutes of 1882 and 1884, restricting Chinese immigration. 8 Jn re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. Rep. 905. 142 MEMBERSHIP i^JSTD CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. [§133. •their descendants, before the passage of the fourteenth amend- ment, which was intended to abolish that exception.^ In this respect the Chinese share that privilege which our laws be- stow on all persons born within our dominion, except in the case of aboriginals of our country. § 133. The statas of American Indians before the law. — The status of American Indians in this country is anomalous. Although born within the limits^of the United States and subject to taxation and the other burdens of citizenship, they are yet debarred from enjoying any of its privileges. They are not considered to be within the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, which provides that " all persons born and naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris- diction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." * The Indian tribes are regarded as alien peoples living within our boundaries, but not of us. And it is also held that the consent of the United States is necessary in order to enable the members of any tribe to be- come citizens of the United States by naturalization. They cannot become naturalized citizens of their own motion with- ilt is to be noted, however, that was not subject to the jurisdiction of the children of Chinese ambassadors the United States within the mean- er persons otherwise employed in ing of the fourteenth amendment, the service of the Chinese govern- and was not therefore a citizen of ment are not citizens, though bom in the United States. It was held that this country. This results from the an Indian is a resident alien in a con- familiar rule that the residence of dition similar to that of the children an ambassador is considered a part of foreign ministers born in this of his own country. In re Look Tin country ; that the Indian owes alle- Sing, 81 Fed. Eep. 905. giance to his tribe and not to our 2 Elk tt, Wilkins, 113 U. S. 94. Here government, and that he can become an Indian claimed the right to vote a citizen only by naturalization or under the clause of the fourteenth by treaty. From this opinion Jus- amendment quoted in the text, and tice Harlan and Justice Woods dis- also under the fifteenth amendment, sented, contending that the Indian that " the right of citizens of the was within the purview of the four- United States to vote shall not be teenth and fifteenth amendments, denied or abridged by the United See, also, Crow Dog's Case, 109 U. S. States or by any State on account of 556 ; Cherokees v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1 ; race, color or previous condition of New York Indians' Case, 5 Wall. 761 ; servitude."* The court denied his Hastings u. Farmer, 4 N. Y. 293 ; fells right to vote on the ground that he v. Webquish, 129 Mass. 469. 134.] MEMBERSHIP AUD CITIZENSHIP LIABIUTT. 143 out such consentj which must be expressed by treaty or stat- ute.* § 134. Privileges and immunities of citizens. — Although a full discussion of the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as secured by the federal consti- tution and the constitutions of the several States, and defined by judicial interpretation of those constitutional provisions, is obviously beyond the scope and plan of this work, it will be well to indicate briefly the fundamental principles upon which these rights, privileges and immunities depend. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immu- nities of citizens of the several States.' "Although the pre- 1 Wilson V. Wall, 6 Wall. 83, and cases cited In preceding note. 2 Const of United States, art 4, §2. Judge Washington discusses this pro- vision as follows: — "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expres- sions to those privileges and immu- nities which are in their nature fundamental, which belong of right to the citizens of all free govern- ments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their be- coming free, independent and sover- eign. What these fundamental prin- ciples are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all compre- hended under the following general heads: — Protection by the govern- ment, the enjoyment of life and lib- erty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to pass through or to re- sale in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pur- suits, or otherwise ; to claim the ben- efit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the State ; to take, hold and dispose of propertj', either real or personal; and an ex- emption from higher taxes or impo- sitions than are paid by the citizens of the other State, — may be men- tioned as some of the particular priv- ileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental ; to which may be added the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State was manifestly calculated (to use the ex- pression of the preamble of the cor- responding provision in the old arti- cles of confederation) ' the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friend- ship and intercourse among the peo- ple of the different States of the Union.' " Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380. The Supreme Court pre- 144 MEMBEKSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP- ■ LIABILITY. [§^135. cise meaning' of ' privileges and immunities ' is not very con- clusively settled as yet, it appears to be conceded that the constitution secures in each State to the citizens of all other States the right to remove to and carry on business therein; the right, by the usual modes, to acquire and hold property, and to protect and defend the same in law ; the right to the usual remedies for the collection of debts and the enforcement of other personal rights ; and the right to be exempt in prop- erty and person from taxes or burdens which the property or persons of citizens of the same State are not subject to." ' § 135. The same subject continued.— No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im- munities of citizens of the United States, or deprive any per- son of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec- tion of the laws.* But it is an undoubted fact that many fers to decide each case as it comes up, and will not define and describe those privileges in a general classifi- cation. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591 ; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 ; Ward v. Maryland, 13 Wall. 418. See, also. United States v. Cruik- shank, 92 U. S. 543 ; Kimmish v. Ball, 139 U. S. 317 ; Lemmon v. People, 30 N. T. 563; People v. Imlay, 30 Barb. 68; Robinson v. Oceanic S. N. Co., 113 N. Y. 315 ; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194 ; Bliss' Petition, 63 N. H. 185 ; State V. Lancaster, 8 N. H. 367 ; State V. Fosdick, 31 La. Ann. 484 ; State v. Oilman, 10 S. E. Rep. 383 ; Crandall V. State, 10 Conn. 340 ; State v. Med- bury, 3 R. L 138 ; People v. Thurber, 13 111. 544 ; Cincinnati Health Asso- ciation V. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85 ; Jef- fersonville &c. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48 ; People v. Phippin (Mich.), 37 N. W. Rep. 888 ; FireDept v. Hel- fenstein, 16 Wis. 136; People v. Cole- man, 4 Cal. 46 ; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; Bartmeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 139 ; Smith v. Wright, 3 E. D. Smith, 441 ; Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. 336; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & McH. 554; Slaughter v. Common- wealth, 13 Gratt 767; Common- wealth V. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36. 1 Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 490, citing Corfleld v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 380 ; Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & MoH. 554 ; Crandall V. State, 10 Conn. 339 ; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 368. 2 Const of United States, 14th Amendment As laid down by Judge Cooley : — " The line of distinction be- tween the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and those of citizens of the several States must be traced along the boundaries of their respective spheres of action, and the two classes must be as differ- ent in their nature as are the func- tions of the respective governments. A citizen of the United States, as such, has the right to participate in foreign and interstate commerce, to have the benefit of the postal laws, to make use in common with others of the navigable waters of the United § 13a.] MEMBEKSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — LIABILITY, 145 rights and privileges depend upon actual residence. And a statute which allows process by attachment against a non- resident debtor, even though such process is not admissible against a resident, does not violate the constitutional provis- ions.' § 136. Bights of citizens. — The fourteenth amendment to the constitution has several objects, and among others it de-- States, and to pass from State to State, and into foreign countries, be- ci^use over all these subjects the ju- risdiction of the United States ex- tends, and they are covered by its laws. Story on Const (4th ed.), § 1937. These, therefore, are among the priv- ileges of citizens of the United States. So every citizen may petition the federal authorities which are set over him in respect to any mattor of pub- lic concern ; may examine the public records of the federal jurisdiction; may visit the seat of government without being subjected to the pay- ment of a tax for the privilege (Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35) ; may be purchaser of the public lands on the same terms with others; may participate in the government if he comes within the condition of suf- frage, and may demand the care and protection of the United States when on the high seas or within the juris- diction of a foreign government. Slaughter-House Cases. 16 Wall. 30. The privileges suggest the immuni- ties. Wherever it is the duty of the United States to give protection to a citizen against any harm, inconven- ience or deprivation, the citizen is entitled to an immunity wliich per- tains to federal citizenship. One very plain and unquestionable immunity is exemption from ary tax, burden or imposition under state laws, as a condition to the enjoyment of any right or privilege under the laws of the United States. A State, there- 10 fore, cannot require one to pay a tax as importer, under the laws of con- gress, of foreign merchandise (Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall. 163) ; nor im- pose a tax upon travelers passing by public conveyances out of the State (Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35) ; nor impose conditions to the right of cit- izens of other States to sue its citi- zens in the federal courts. Insurance Co. V. Morse, 20 Wall. 445. These in- stances sufficiently indicate the gen- eral rule. Whatever one may claim as of right under the constitution and laws of the United States by virtue of its citizenship is a pi'ivilege of a citizen of the United States. Whatever the constitution and laws of the United States entitle him to exemption from, he may claim an immunity in respect to. Slaughter- House Cases, 16 WalL 36. And such a right or privilege is abridged whenever the State law interferes with any legitimate operation of the federal authority which concerns bis interest, whether it be an authority actively exerted, or resting only in the express or implied command or assurance of the federal constitution or laws." Cooley, Principles of Const. Law, 246. See United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; United States v. Cruik- shank, 92 U. S. 542 ; Hall v. D&Cuir, 95 U. S'. 485 ; Kirkland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491. 1 State V. Medbury, 8 E. I. 138; Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 544. 146 MEMBERSHIP AND OTTIZENSHIP — LIABILITV. [§136. Clares the inviolability of the public debt of the United States, and forbids the United States or any other State assnming or paying any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave. It also disqualiiies from holding federal or State offices certain persons who shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States or given aid or comfort to the engmies thereof.^ This amend- ment does not profess to' secure the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies to all persons in the United States. But great diversities may and do exist in these respects in different States. All that a person can demand under the last clause of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment is that he shall have the same protection under the laws as is given « Cpoley's Const Lioi. (6th ed.) 14. fTudge Field says of this amend- ment : — " That amendment was un- doubtedly proposed for the purpose of fully protecting the newly-made citizens of the African race in the enjoyment of their freedom, and to prevent discriminating State legisla- ^tion against them. The generality of the language used necessarily ex- tends its provisions to all persons of eveiy race and color. Previously to its adoption the Civil Rights Act had been passed, which declared that citi- zens of the "United States of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, should have the same rights in every State and Territory to make and enforce con- tracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit^ purchase, lease, sell, own and convey real and per- sonal property, and to full and equal jshenefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and prop- erty, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and should be subject to like punish- -ment, pains and penalties, and to none other. The validity of this act was questioned in many quartera, and complaints were made that, not- withstanding the abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude, the freed- men were in some portions of the country subjected to disabilities from which others were exempt There wers also complaints of the existence in certain sections of the southern States of a feeling of enmity grow- ing out of the collisions of the war towards citizens of the north. Whether these complaints had any just foundation is immaterial ; they were believed by many to be well f Sunded ; and to prevent any possible legislation hostile to any class from the causes mentioned, and to obviate objections to legislation -similar to that embodied in the Civil Rights Act, the fourteenth amendment was adopted. This is manifest from the discussions in congress with refer- ence to it There was no diversity of opinion as to its object between those who favored and those who opposed its adoption." San Mateo County V. Southern Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 732. § 137.] MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. 147 to other classes and persons under like circumstances in the same place.' § 137. The same subject continued.— On this subject Judge Strong says : — " A State acts by its legislative, its exec- utive or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are executed, shall deny Jo any person within its ju- risdiction the equal protection of its laws. Whoever by virtue of public position under a State government deprives aiiother of property, life or liberty without due process of law, or de- nies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition ; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's authority, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning." ^ It is declared by the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States that the rights of citizens of the United States shall not be abridged or denied by any State, or by the United States, on account of previous condition of servitude, color or race.' 1 Hayes v. Missouri, ISO U. S. 68; in the amendment." Civil Rights Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 33. For Cases, 109 U. S. 3. On this see, also, taxation of railroads as a class, see Baldwin v. Franks, 130 U. S. 678 ; Kentucky R R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629. 831. 3 As to these amendments, see 2 Esc parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339. Story on Const (4th ed.), chs. 46, 47, This view was approved in Neal v. 48, and ap}:endix to vol. II. Women Delaware, 103 XT. S. 370, 397. The are not entitled to vote by reason of fourteenth amendment does not, says the new amendments. Minor v. Hap- Judge Bradley, " invest congress with peraett, SI Wall. 163; Brad well v. power to legislate upon subjects State. 16 Wall. 130. See, also, note 1 which are within the domain of State in Cooley's Const Lim, (6th ed.) 15. legislation, but to provide modes of The fourteenth amendment gave col- , relief against State legislation or ored persons the right to be protected State actions of the kind referred to. from unfriendly legislation solely on It does not authorize congress to ere- account of their color, the rights of ate a code of municipal lav/ for the citizenship, and exemption from leg- regulation of private rights ; but to islation which might lessen their provide modes of redress against the rights, tend to reduce them to the operation of State laws and the ac- condition of a subject race, or lower tion of State officers, executive and them in civic society. Ex parte judicial, when theso are subversive Virginia, lOO V. S. 870; Virginia v. of the fundamental rights specified Rives, lOOU. S.313; Strauderu Webt 148 MKMBEESUIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITT. [§ 138. § 13S. Personal liability of members of the corporation. At common law and under the statutes of all our States save those of N^ew England, the members of municipal corpo- rations are not personally liable for the debts of the munici- pality. As is said by Mr. Justice Field in the case in which the creditors of the city of Memphis endeavored to satisfy the debts of the corporation out of the private property of its cit- izens: — "In no State of the Union outside of New England does the doctrine obtain that the private property of individ- uals within the limits of a municipal corporation can be reached by its creditors and subjected to the payment of their demands. In Massachusetts and Connecticut, and perhaps in other States in New England, the individual liability of the inhabitants of towns, parishes and cities for the debts of the latter is maintained, and executions upon judgments issued against them can be enforced against the private property of the inhabitants. But this doctrine is admitted by the courts of those States to be peculiar to their jurisprudence, and an exception to the rule elsewhere prevailing. Elsewhere the private property of the inhabitants of a municipal body can- not be subjected to the payment of its debts except by way of taxation, but taxes, as we have already said, can only be levied by legislative authority. The power of taxation is not one of the functions of the judiciary; and whatever authority the States may, under their constitutions, confer upon special tribunals of their own, the federal courts cannot by reason of it take any additional powers which are not judicial." In Eees V. Watertown,^ from which we have already quoted, the power asserted by the decree was claimed by counsel but was re- jected by the court. "Assume," said the court, " that the plaintiff is entitled to the payment of his judgment and that the defendant neglects its duty in refusing to raise the amount by taxation, it does not follow that the court may order the amount to be made from the private estate of one of its citizens. This summary proceeding would involve a vio- lation of the rights of the latter. He has never been heard in court. He has had no opportunity to establish a defense to the debt itself, or, if the judgment is valid, that such exemp- Virginia, 100 U. a 813 ; Neal v. Dela- » 19 Wall. 116. ware, 103 U. S. 37a §§ 139, 140.] MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — LIABILITY. 149 tions may be perpetual in their duration, and that they are, in some cases, beyond legislative interference. The proceeding supposed would violate the fundamental principle contained in chapter twenty-ninth of Magna Charta, and embodied in the constitution of the United States, that no man shall be de- prived of his property without due process of law ; that is, he must be served with notice of the proceeding and have a day in court to make his defense." ' § 139. The same subject continned — Russell v. The Men of Devon. — This doctrine that the members of a municipal corporation are not personally liable for its debts is of early authority. In the famous English case of Eussell v. The Men of Devon, where the plaintiff brought suit against the inhab- itants of the county of Devon for negligence on the part of the county for allowing a public bridge to remain in a danger- ous condition, through which the plaintiff sustained injury, it was decided that, as the county possessed no public fund out of which the judgment, if recovered, could be satisfied, the ac- tion could not be maintained. The court refused to sanction the doctrine of the personal liability of the inhabitants of the county, on the ground that, if that doctrine were enforced, the jiidgment might be satisfied out of the private property of one or more of the inhabitants, and that the persons whose property had been applied in satisfaction of the judgment would have no Remedy over against the other inhabitants ex- cept by an impracticable multiplicity of actions.^ The doc- trine of this case has been followed in the American cases ; and, as has been said, the members of a municipal corporation are personally liable for its debts nowhere in this country out- side of New England.' § 140. Personal liability of members of public quasi-cor- porations in New England. — By a curious and unique custom • Eees w. Watertown, 19 Wall. 116, Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 116; 133. Symonds v. Clay County, 71 111. 355 ; 2 Russell V. The Men of Devon, 3 North Lebanon v. Arnold, 47 Pa. St. Term Rep. 667. 488; Flori v. St. Louis, 69 Mo. 341 ; ' Cooley's Const Lim. 300 ; 1 Dil- Kincaid v. Hardin County, 53 Iowa, lononMuni(3.Corp.(4thed.),§963,n.; 430; Miller v. Mc Williams, 50 Ala. Merriwether v. Garrett, 103 U. S. 472 ; 427. 150 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. [§ 141. the members of public j^wasi-corporations in New England are held to be personally liable ior the debts of the fcorpora- tion ; and a judgment obtained against the 'public quastAxtt' poration can be satisfied out of the private property of any of its members.' The reason for this peculiar practice seems to have been that judgments against these quasi-oorpotalions could not be satisfied out of any corporate fund, as no such fund existed, and therefore it was necessary to resort to the private property of the members of the corporation. This private property could be reached either by taxation or exe- cution, and in the Kew England States the inconvenient and unjust system of levying execution on private property in order to satisfy judgments against the corporation has been adopted.* § 141i The same>sulbject continued.— In the other States of the Union judgments rendered against public quasi-oorpo- rati^ns which have no corporate fund out of which to satisfy judgments are satisfied by taxation of the members of the corporation instead of by execution. As is said by Judge Cooley : — " So far as this rule (*'. e., that members of a public qtiasi-corpoT&tion are personally liable for its debts) rests upon the reason that these organizations have no common fund, and that no other mode exists by which demands against them can be enforced, it cannot be considered applicable in those States where express provision is made by law for com- pulsory taxation to satisfy any judgment recovered against 1 Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368 ; 19 Conn. 331 ; Cooley's Const Lim. Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 297. In Maine it has been decided 405 ; Kiddle v. The Proprietors &c., that a statute providing that judg- 7 Mass. 187; Brewer v. Ihliabitants ments against the town niaybecpl- of New Gloucester, 14 Mass. 216; lected from the private property of Chase i'. Merrimack Bank, 19 Pick, members of the town is not in con- 564 ; Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Met 546 ; Hill travention of the constitutional pro- v. Boston, 123 Mass. 344 ; s. C, 23 Am. hibition against the taking of private Rep. 332 ; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, property without due process of law. 1 GreenL (Me.) 361 ; Fernald v. Lewis, Evans v. Savage, 77 Me. 212. 6 Me. 264 ; Beers v. Botsford. 3 Day 2 gee infra, g 143, where the rea- (Conn.), 159 ; Fuller v. Hampton, 5 sons for the custom ■ are fully set Conn. 417 ; Atwater v. Woodrich, 6 forth in the opinion in Beardsley V. Conn. 223; McCloud v. Selby, 10 Smith, 16 Conn. 368, 875. Conn, 300; Union v. Crawford, §142.] MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — LIABILITY. 151 the corporate body — the duty of levying the tax being im- posed upon some oflBcer who may be compelled by mandamus to perform it. Nor has any usage, so far as we are aware, grown up in any of the newer States like that which had so early an origin in New England. More just, convenient and inexpensive modes of enforcing such demands have been es- tablished by statute, and the rules concerning them are con- formed more closely to those which are established for other corporations." ^ § 142. Beardsley v. Smith — (a) The reason for the New England doctrine of personal liability of members. — In this leading case ^ the learning relating to this peculiar custom of New England is so clearly stated in the opinion by Judge Church in the Supreme Court of Connecticut that we quote his words at length : — " We know that the relation in which members of municipal corporations in this State have been supposed to stand in respect to the corporation itself as well ^s to its creditors has elsewhere been considered in some respects peculiar. We have treated them for some purposes as parties to corporate proceedings, and their individuality has not been considered as merged in their corplorate connection. Though corporators, they have been holden to be parties to suits by or against the corporation and individually liable for its debts. Heretofore this has not been doubted as to the in- habitants of towns, located ecclesiastical societies and school districts. Frojp a recurrence to the history of the law on this subject, we are persuaded that the principle and usage here recognized and followed in regard to the liability of the in- habitants of towns and other communities were very early adopted by our ancestors; and whether they were considered as a part of the common law of England, or originated here as necessary to our state of society, it is not very material to in- quire. We think, however, that the principle is not of dorties- tic origin, but to some extent was operative and ai>plied in the mother countrj^, especially in cases where a statute fixed a liability upon a municipality which had no corporate funds. The same reason and necessity for the application of such a principle and practice existed in both countries. Such corpo- 1 Cooley's Const Lim. 300, 301. « 6 Conn, 375. 152 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. [§§ 143, 144. rations are of a public and political character ; they exercise a portion of the governing power of the State. Statutes im- pose upon them important public duties. In the performance of these they must contract debts and liabilities which can only be discharged by a resort to individuals, either by taxa- tion or execution. Taxation in most cases can only be the result of the voluntary action of the corporation, dependent upon the contingent will of a majority of the corporators and upon their tardy and uncertain action. It affords no security to creditors, because they have no power over it. Such rea- sons as these probably operated with our ancestors in adopt- ing the more efficient and certain remedy by execution which has been resorted to in the present case, and which they had seen to some extent in operation in the countries whose laws were their inheritance. The plaintiff would apply to these municipal or g^Ma«i-corporations the close principles applicable to private corporations. But inasmuch as they are not, strictly speaking, corporations, but only municipal bodies with- out pecuniary funds, it will not do to apply to them literally and in all cases the law of corporations." ' §143. (b) The doctrine in England.— The individual lia- bility of the members of quasi-corporations, though not ex- pressly adjudged, was very distinctly recognized in the case of Eussell V. The Men of Devon.* It was alluded to as a known principle in the case of The Attorney-General v. The City of Exeter, applicable as well to cities as to hundreds and parishes. That the rated inhabitants of an English parish are consid- ered as the real parties to suits against the parish is now sup- posed to be well settled ; and it was so decided in the cases of The King v. The Inhabitants of Woburn and The King v. The Inhabitants of Hardwick.' And in support of this principle reference was made to the form of the proceedings, as that they were " against the inhabitants," etc. § 144. (c) Doctrine in Massachusetts and Maine. — In the State of Massachusetts, the individual responsibility of the • Citing School District v. Wood, 13 Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667t See supra, Mass. 193. § 1R». 2 Citing Russell v. The Men of >The King v. The Inhabitants of §144] MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. 153 inhabitants of towns for town debts has long been estab- lished. Distinguished counsel in the case of The Merchants' Bank -w. Cook, referring to municipal bodies, says: — "For a century past the practical construction of the bar has been that, in an action by or against a corporation, a member of the corporation is a party to the suit." ' In several other cases in that State the same principle is repeated. In the case of Riddle v. The Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Mer- rimack Eiver,^ Parsons, C. J., in an allusion to this private re- sponsibility of corporators, remarks : — " And the sound reason is that, having no corporate fund and no legal means of ob- taining one, each corporator is liable to satisfy any judgment obtained against the corporation." So in Brewer v. The Inhab- itants of New Gloucester,' the court says : — " As the law pro- vides that, when judgment is recovered against the inhabitants of a town, execution may be levied upon the property of any inhabitant, each inhabitant must be considered as a party." In the case above referred to of The Merchants' Bank v. Cook, Parker, C. J., expresses the opinion of the court upon this point thus : — " Towns, parishes, precincts, etc., are but a col- lection of individuals with certain corporate powers for polit- ical and civil purposes, without any corporate fund from which a judgment can be satisfied ; but each member of the com^ munity is liable in his person and estate to the execution which may issue against the body ; each individual, therefore, may be well thought to be a party to a suit brought against them by their collective name. In regard to banks, turnpike and other corporations the case is different." The counsel con- cerned in the case of Mower v. Leicester,* without contradic- tion speak of the practice of subjecting indviduals as one of daily occurrence. The law on this subject was very much con- sidered in the case of Chase v. The Merrimack Bank,' and was applied and enforced against the members of a territorial par- ish. " The question is," said the court, " whether on an execu- tion against a town or parish the body or estate of any inhab- Wobum, 10 East, 395; The King V. The 3 Brewer v. The Inhabitants of Inhabitants of Hardwick, 1 1 Bast, 577. New Gloucester, 9 Mass. 247. 1 Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. * Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247. 405. 'Chase v. The Merrimack Bank, 2 Riddle v. The Proprietors &&, 7 19 Pick.' 564. Mass. 187. 154 MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITT. [§ 145. itant may be lawfully taken to satisfy it. This question seems to have been settled in the affirmative by a series of decisions, and ought no longer to be considered an open question." The State of Maine when separated from Massachusetts retained most of its laws and usages as they had been recognized in the parent State, and among others the one in question. In Adams V. Wiscasset Bank,* Mellen, 0. J., says : — "It is well known that all judgments against gMffls*-oorporations may be satisfied out of the property of any individlial inhabitant." § 145. (d) The doctrine in Connecticut. — " The courts of this State from a time beyond the memory of any living law- yer have sanctioned and carried out this usage as one of com- mon-law obligation; and it has been applied, not to towns only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical so- cieties and school districts. The forms of our process against these communities have always corresponded with this view of the law. The writs have issued against the inhabitants of towns, societies and districts as parUes. As early in the his- tory of our jurisprudence as 1705, a statute was enacted au- thorizing communities such as towns, societies, etc., to prose- cute and defend suits, and for this purpose to appear either by themsehes, agents or attorneys. If the inhabitants were not then considered as parties individually and liable to the conse- quences of judgments against such communities as parties, there would have been a glaring impropriet}' in permitting them to appear and defend by themselves ; but if parties, such a right was necessary and indispensable. Of course this priv- ilege has been and may be exercised.' Our statute providing for the collection of taxes enacts that the treasurer of the State shall direct his warrant to the collectors of the State tax in the several towns. If neither this nor the further pro- ceedings against the collectors and the selectmen authorized by the statute shall enforce the collection of the tax, the law directs that then the treasurer shall issue his execution against the inhabitants of such town. Such an execution may be levied upon the estate of the inhabitants ; and this provision of the law was not considered as introducing a new principle or enforcing a novel remedy, but as being only in conformity 1 Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 2 1 Swift's System, 337. Greenl. (Me.) 361. § 145.] MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZE^'SHIP LIABILITY. 155 with the well-known usage in other cases. The levy of an execution under this statute produced the case of Beers v. Botsf ord.' There the execution which had been issued against the town of Newton by the treasurer of the State had been levied upon the property of the plaintiff, an inhabitant of that town, and he had thus been compelled to pay the balance of a State tax due from the town. He sued the town of Newton for the recovery of the money so paid by him. The most distinguished prof essional gentlemen in the State were engaged as counsel in that case ; and it did not occur, either to them or to the court, that the plaintiff's property had been taken with- 6at right ; on the contrary, the case proceeded throughout on the conceded principle of our common law that the levy was properly made upon the estate of the plaintiff. And without this the plaintiff could not have recovered of the town, but must have resorted to his action against the officer for his illegal and void levy. In Fuller v. Hampton,* Peters, J., re-marked that if costs are recovered against a town the writ of execu- tion to collect them must have been issued against the property of the inhabitants of the town; and this is the invariable practice. The case of Atwater v. Goodrich' also grew cut of this ancient usage. The ecclesiastical society of Bethany had been taxed by the town of Woodrich for its money at interest, and the warrant for the collection of the tax had been levied upon the property of the plaintiff and the tax had thus been collected of him, who was an inhabitant of the located society of BethanyN Brainerd, J., who drew up the opinion of the court, referring to this proceeding said : — ' This practice with regard to towns has prevailed in New England, so far as I have beei- able to investigate the subject, from an early pe- riod — from, its first settlement ; — a practice brought by our forefathers from England, which had there obtained in corpo- rations similar to the towns incorporated in New England.' It will here be seen that the principle is considered as appli- cable to territorial societies as to towns, because the object to be attained was the same in both — ' that the town or society should be brought to a sense of duty and make provision for payment and indemnity ; ' — a very good, reason and very ap- plicable to the case we are considering. The law on this sub- i Beers v. Botsford, 3 Day (Cionn.), ^ Fuller v. Hampton, 5 Conn. 417. 159, ' Atwater v. Goodrich, 6 Conn. 223. 156 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITT. [§ 146. ject was more distinctly brought out and considered by this court in the late case of McCloud v. Selby,^ in which this well- known practice as it has been applied to towns and ecclesias- tical societies was extended and sanctioned as to school dis- tricts; ' else it would be breaking in upon the analogies of the law.' ' They are communities for different purposes, but es- sentially of the same character.' And no doubt can remain, since the decision of this case, but that the real principle of all the cases on this subject has beerf and is that the inhabit- ants of ywasj-corporations are parties individually as well as in their corporate capacities to all actions in which the corpo- ration is a party. And to the same effect is the language of the elementary writers." * § 146. Limitations to the personal liability of members of New England public quasi-corporations.— It may be noted here, although the subject will be more thoroughly dis- cussed in a subsequent portion of this work, that while the members of these New England public quasi-oorpora,tions are personally liable for the debts of the corporation, still this liability is much curtailed by the doctrine, which is well settled, that these corporations, like counties and other jitasi-corpora- tions, are not liable for torts, unless a statute expressly cre- ates guch liability.' This rule is, however, subject to limita- tion in the case of New England public g'wasi-corporations. It is not applicable in cases where the injury arises from a neg- lect of special duties or the abuse of special authorities, imposed or conferred upon the town with its consent or at its request.* • McCIpud V. Selby,' 10 Conn. 390. v. 'Wliscafiset Bank, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 2Bear()sleyv. Smith, 16 Conn. 375; 361; Mitchell v. Bockland, 53 Me. 2 Kent'^ Commentaries, 231 ; Angell 118; Frazer v. Lewiston, 7ft Me. 531 & Ames on Corp. 374 ; 1 Swift's Di- Farnum v. Concord, 2 N. H. 392 gest, 73, 794; 5 Dane's Ahr. 158; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp., g 963, note ; S. C, 72 Am. Dec. 302 ; Baxter v. Cooley's Const Lim. 297-300. Judge Winoonski Turnpike Co., 33 Vt 133 Cooley cites and approves Beardsley Bray v. Wallingford, 30 Conn. 416 V. Smith, and quotes at length the Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375 opinion of Judge Church. Cooley's Const. Lim. 30 ; 3 Dillon on »See infra, §§ 000, 000; Mower v. Munic. Corp., §§ 963-965. Leicester, 9 Mass. 347 ; s. C., 6 Am. * Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, Dec. 63; Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 541; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. Gray, 541; Hill v. Boston, 133 Mass. 384; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. 351 ; S. a, 23 Am. Rep. 332; Adams CHAPTEE YI. OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 147. Legislative power to create §170. officers and agents. 171. 148, Legislative control over cflS- 172. cers and agents. 173. 149. Conduct of elections — Con- struction of election stat- 174 utes. 150. Miscellaneous instances of the 175. construction of election stat- 176. utes. 177. 151. Validity of election— General 178. principles. 179. 152. The same subject continued — Illustrations. 180. 153. English rule as to majority. 154. Election by ballot. 181. 155. Election by city counciL 156. Election by definite bodies generally — Majority and 183. plurality. 157. The same subject continued — 183. Quorum majority. 158. Informal ballot. 184 159. Tenure of ofiSce. 160. Tenure of office virhere city 185. passes from one class to an- other. 186. 161. Power to hold over -^English and American rules. 187. 163. The same subject continued. 163. Appointment of oflScers. ,18a 164 Validity of appointment. 165. Appointment by de facto oflB- 189. cers. 166. Compensation of officers — In 190. general. 167. The same subject continued — 191. Failure of corporate funds. 168. The same subject continued — 192. Illustrations. 193. 169. Miscellaneous instances. Extra compensation. Compensation of attorneys. The same subject continued. Compensation — Power of leg- islature to control Qualifications for office-hold- ing. Official oath. The same subject continued. Duties of officers. Powers of mayor. The same subject continued — Statutoiy provisions. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous powers. Miscellaneous instances of powers of municipal offi- cers. De facto officers — General statement. The same subject continued — Color of title. Incumbent of an unconstitu- tional office. Possession of office by de facto officer. Rights and liabilities of de facto officers. Resignation by acceptance of incompatible office. Acceptance and withdrawal of resignation. Removal of officers and agents — How effected. Causes for removal — English and American rules. Power of coiporation to re- move officers and agents. The same subject continued. Notice of proceeding to re- movei. 158 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. [§ 147. 194 The same subject continued. 195. All persons charged with no- tice of duties and powers of municipal agents. 196. Liability of officers to the cor- poration. § 197. Instances of fraudulent acts of municipal agents. 198. Liability of corporation to officers. 199. Indictment of municipal offi- cera § 147. Legislative power to create officers and agents. — The authority that makes the laws has a large discretion in determining the means through whif h they shall be executed; and the performance of many duties for which they may pro- videby law may be refefrred either to the chief executive of the State, or, at their option, to any other executive or ministerial officer, or even to a person specially named for the duty.' "Whatever power or. duty is expressly given to, or imposed upon, the executive department, is altogether free from the interference of the other branches of the government. Espe- cially is this the case where the subject is committed to the discretion of the chief executive officer, either by the consti- tution or by the laws. So long as the power is vested in him it is to be by him exercised, and no other branch of the gov- ernment can control its exercise ; and from those duties which the constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law.^ But other powers or duties the executive cannot exercise or 1 Cooley's Const Lim'. (6th ed.), ch. V, 133 ; Bridges v. Shallcross, 6 W. Va. 563 ; People v. Osborne, 7 Colo. 605. 8 Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513. The legislature may ap- point a State board if the constitu- tion does not expressly empower the governor to do so. People v. Free- man (Cal.), 28 Pac. Rep. 173. See, also, State v, Covington, 29 Ohio St 102; Biggs V. McBride (Oreg.), 21 Pac. Rep. 878; Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 886 ; S. C, 21 N. E. Rep. 890. It is not unconstitutional to allow the governor to supply temporary va- cancies in offices which under the constitution are elective. Sprague V. Brown, 40 Wis. 612. If the gov- ernor has the power to appoint with the consent of the senate, and to remove, he may remove without such consent Harman v. Harwood, 58 Md. 1 ; Lane v. Com., 103 Pa. St 481. As to discretionary powers, see Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.), pp. 54, 55. An appointment to office was said, in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 401, to be intrinsically an executive act Where an office is elective, the legislature cannot fill it by appointment or by extending the term of the incumbent People V. McKinney. 52 N. Y. 374; People v. Bull, 46 N. T. 57; Devoy v. New York, 85 Barb. 264 ; 23 How. Pr. 326 ; People V. Blake, 49 Barb. 9 ; People V. Raymond, 87 N. Y. 438 ; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50 ; State v. Gold- stucker, 40 Wis. 134; Opinions of Justices, 117 Mass. 603. §§ 148, 149.] OFFICEES AND AGENTS. 159 assume, except by legislative authority, and the power which in its discretion it confers it may also in its discretion with- hold or confide to other hands.^ § 148. Legislative control over officers and agents. — Al- though, by their constitution, the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the governments they create, and the three departments are responsible to and sub- ject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be exercised in the legiti- mate mode previously agreed upon.^ The maxim which lies at the foundation of our government is that all political power originates with the people. But since the organization of government it cannot be claimed that either the legislative, executive or judicial powers, either wholly or in part, can be exercised by them. By the institution of government the people surrender the exercise of all the sovereign functions of government to agents chosen by themselves, who at least theoretically represent the supreme will of their constituents. Thus all power possessed by the people themselves is given and centered in their chosen representatives.' §149. Condnct of elections — Construction of election statutes. — The statutes of the different States point out spe- cifically the mode in which elections shall be conducted; but, although there are great diversities of detail, the same gen- eral principles govern them all. Election statutes are to be tested like other statutes, but with a leaning to liberality in view of the great public purposes which they accomplish; and except where they specifically provide that a thing shall be done in the manner, indicated and not otherwise, their provis- ions designed merely for the information and guidance of the " Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.), 2 Cooley, Const Lim, (6th ed.), ch. V, p. 134 "In deciding this ch. XVII, 747. question [as to the authority of the ' Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 383, 291. '' governor], recurrence must be had See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 ; to the constitution." Field v. Peo- Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 617 ; State pie, 3 III 79, 80. v. Lufy, 19 Nev. 391. 160 OFFICEES AHD AGENTS. [§ 150. officers must be regarded as directory only, and the election will not be defeated by a failure to comply with them, pro • vided the irregularity has not hindered any who were enti- tled from exercising the right of suffrage, or rendered doubt- ful the evidences from which the result was to be declared.* § 150. Miscellaneous instances of the construction of election statutes. — "Where a city council is the sole judge of the election and qualifications of4ts members, it cannot, after ' Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.), ch. XVII, 776,777; People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 359, and 8 N. Y. 67. See, also, People V. Cook, 7 Ala. 114; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 313; Attorney-Gen- eral V. Ely, 4 Wis. 430 ; People v. 'Higgins, 3 Mich. 333; Piatt i). People, 39 III. 54; Du Page Co. v. People, 65 111. 360; State v. Stumpf, 31 Wis. 579; Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal. 173; Howard v. Shields, 16 Ohio St. 35 ; Sheppard's Election Case. 77 Pa. St. 295; Wheelock's Election Case, 82 Pa. St. 397; State v. O^Day, 69 Iowa, 368. All votes received after the polls should be closed are illegal. Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596. Where a city council passes an ordinance redistricting the city into wards, a special election thereunder is specific- ally prohibited by the Revised Stat- utes of Ohio, and hence, where a spe- cial election is attempted to be held for the selection of members of the council under such ordinance, such special election is inoperative, and persons holding seats in the council by virtue of certificates based upon such special election may be ousted by quo warranto. State v. Kearns, 47 Oliio St 566: S. C, 25 N. B. Rep. 1027. A town was incorporated by a special act, its managers to consist of five trustees, to be elected. It was held that a subsequent general act, repealing all inconsistent provisions in earlier acts, and fixing a day for the election of all town oflBoers, made that day the day on which the five trustees should be elected. Kelly v. Gahn, 113 111. 33. Where a statute providing for an election by the in- habitants ^within the boundaries of a proposed municipal corporation, at which the question of incorporation shall be submitted to the people, fails to provide for any census or enumer- ation of the people preliminary to such proceedings, a failure to make such enumeration will not affect the validity of the election, where the board of county commissioners made a record in their proceedings de- claring the number of inhabitants. Smith V. Board County Comm'rs Skagit County (1891), 45 Fed. Rep. ' 735. Testimony of the village clerk that the names contained in the pe- tition for the election represented a majority of the tax-payers of the village, as contained in the last as- sessment roll, is sufiicient proof that the petitioners represented a major- ity of the tax-payers. People v. Bird, 8 N. Y. Sup]. 801. The laws of Min- nesota of 1885. as amended by laws of 1687, designating the second Tuesday of March as the day upon which the city council of St Paul shall elect a corporation attorney, absolutely pro- hibits an election upon a day ante- cedent to that specified. State v. Murray, 41 Minn. 133 ; S. C, 42 N. W. Rep. 858. § 150.] OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 161 having seated a member on investigation, at a subsequent meeting order a second investigation. OerUorari may issue in such case without waiting for the report and final order.' If there is a tie in the election for mayor between the incumbent and another candidate, and the, city council fails to choose one of them for mayor by lot, as required by the city charter, equity will not interfere to restrain the incumbent from exer- cising the fundtions of the office.^ Once the polls are closed in accordance with the law they cannot be legally re-opened and votes received.' The mere fact that, the number of officers to be elected to fill vacancies was not determined prior to the election does not make the election void.* ' State V. Camden, 47 N. J. Law, 64 ; s. C, 54 Am. Rep. 117. The laws of the State of Michigan, 1887, No. 208, providing for the correction of frauds and mistakes in the cauvass and returns made by inspectors of elections, does not apply in the case of elections for aldermen for the city of Detroit, and an application for an investigation of the returns of such election should be made to the board of aldermen; the city charter as amended in 1887 providing that the board of aldermen shall be the judges of the election and qualifications of its own members, and shall have power to determine contested elec- tions to said board. Naumann v. Board of City Canvassers, 73 Mich. 353; s. a, 41 N. W. Eep. 267. 2Huels V. Hahn, 75 Wis. 468; s. c, 54 N. W. Rep. 507. 8 The Virginia Code of 1887, § 5, Bubd. 16, provides that the word " city " shall be construed to mean a town containing a population of five thousand or more, and having a corporation or hustings court It was held that section 1016, provid-. ing that officers provided for in the "charter of the several cities shall be elected or appointed as the charters may prescribe: provided, that the councilmen ... of 11 each ward of a city shall be chosen by the qualified voters of such ward," does not apply to a town which has less than five thousand population, and no corporation or hustings court. Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484 ; s. C, 13 S. B. Eep. 965. The act of Pennsylvania, passed March 30, 1863, provided for the election of six supervisors by the qualified voters of Hempfleld township at the first succeeding election, and made it the duty of such supervisors to then di- vide the township into six districts, giving each district a supervisor. The court deci.ded that this act re- pealed by implication the act of February 36, 1853, authorizing the election of one supervisor each by two particular districts, and of two by the third ; and that each district of the township was entitled to one supervisor, who was to be elected, however, by the voters of the wliolt^ township. Martz v. Long {In re, Martz's Election), 110 Penn. St. UK ; S. a, 1 Atl. Rep. 419. * An election of five town council- men of North Providence, R. 1, un- der Pub. St. R. 1, ch. 37, § 1, provid- ing that there shall be annually elected in each town not less than three nor more than seven council- men, is not void by reason of the 162 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. [§ 151. § 151. Validity of election — General principles. — In Judge Cooley's L,Jinirable work on constitutional limitations it is said that it is a little difficult at times to adopt the true mean between those things which should, and those which should not, defeat an election ; for while, on the one hand, the laws should seek to secure the due expression of his will by every legal voter, and guard against any irregularities or misconduct that may tend to prevent it, so, on the other hand, it is to be borne in mind that charges of irregularity or misconduct are easily made, and that the danger from throw- ing elections open to be set aside or controlled by oral evi- dence is perhaps as great as any in our system. An election honestly conducted under the forms of law ought generally to stand, notwithstanding the individual electors may have been deprived of their votes, or unqualified voters allowed to participate.' The admission of illegal votes at an election will not -necessarily defeat it ; but to warrant its being set aside on that ground, it should appear that the result would have been different had they been excluded.'^ votera' failing to determine, in ad- "v^ance of the election at the annual meeting, the precise number to be elected, as required by section 6 ; the number of five having been fixed upon in 1874, and that number hav- ing ever since remained unchanged, but no formal vote on the point hav- ing been taken except in 1875, 1878 and 1883, the number being consid- ered as having been fixed by common acquiescence or consent State v. Andrews, 15 R I. 394 ; s. c, 6 Atl. Rep. 596. Where the vacancy in the office of township supervisor, caused by -resignation, has not been filled by appointcnent, as prescribed by Comp. St. Neb., ch. 26, § 103, (1) by the town board; (8) where the offices of the town board are all vacant, by the township clerk ; (3) where there be no township clerk, by the county clerk, — the same may be filled by election fit a special town meeting, when properly convened, under Comp. St. Neb.,ch. 18, providing that electors at special town meetings, when properly convened, shall have power to fill vacancies in. any of the town offices when the same shall not have already been filled by appoint- ment State V. Taylor (Neb.), "43 N. W. Rep. 739. The acts of Virginia, 1883-4, § 12, amending the'charter of the city of Portsmouth, and provid- ing that the city council shall judge by a majority vote of the qualifica- tions of its members, has application only where a seat is contested. Job- son V. Bridges, 84 Va. 398; s. a, 5 S. E. Rep. 529. 1 Cooley's Const Lim. ( 6th ed.), ch. XVII, 785. See also. People v. Vil- lage of Highland Park (Mich.), 50 N. W. Rep. 660. 2 First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148; Blandford School District v. Gibbs, 3 Cush. 39 ; Ex parte Murphy, 7 Cowen, 153; Judkius V. Hill, SO K. H. 140; De- § 152.] OFFICKES AND AGENTS. 163 § 152. The same subject eontinaed — Illustrations. — An erroneous recital in the proclamation of a clause as part of the act, which clause was stricken out before the passage of the act, will not invalidate the election, the date and title of the act being properly given, and it not appearing that the result of the election was in any way affected by the error.' loach V. Rogers, 86 N. C. 857 ; Shields V. McGregor, 91 Mo. 534; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283 ; Tarbox v. Sug- hrue, 36 Kan. 225 ; Swepston v. Bar- ton, 39 Ark. 549. In England candi- dates are nominated and known prior to election day, and the system of Toting was known as open voting, and some cases there favor the prop- osition that votes which were cast for a disqualified person are not good, and the other candidate is elected. Regina v. Ledyard, 8 Ad. & EL 535; Rawlinson on Corporations (5th ed.), 64, note ; Regina v. Council- lors of Derby, 7 Ad. & El. 419 ; Re- gina V. Hiarns, 7 Ad. & El. 960. But if the voter is ignorant of his candi- date's disqualification, the 'vote is counted in determining whether an opposing candidate has a majority. Regina v. Mayor of Tewksbury, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 629. ' In, re Cleveland, 51 N. J. Law, 319; s. c, 18 At). Rep. 67. The New York laws of 1871, creating the board of water commissioners of the village of Dunkirk, and granting them spe- cific powers, creates a new office within the meaning of the constitu- tion of New York, article 10, section 2, which provides that all city, town and village oflScers for whose elec- tion or appointment the constitution makes no provision shall be elected by the city, etc., or some authority thereof, and all other officers for whose election or appointment the constitution makes no provision, and all officers whose offices shall there- after be created by law, slia'.I te elected by the people or appointed in such manner as the legislature may direct, and is not unconstitutional because it names the persons who are to constitute the commission. Ho- quembourg v. City of Dunkirk, 8 N. Y. Supl. 447. Under the laws of Pennsylvania of 1874, section 208, providing that cases of contested elections of the fourth class (embrac- ing municipal council men) shall be tried and determined by the court of quarter sessions, and ,Iaws of Penn- sylvania of 1887, page 204, providing that " each branch of councils shall judge of the qualifications of its mem- bers, and contested elections shall be determined by the courts of law,'' the court of quarter sessions has no jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifi- cation of a councilman, but only upon the regularity of the election. Au- chenbach v. Seibert, 120 Pa. St 159 ; S. c, 13 Atl. Rep. 558. The charter of the city of A., section 22 (Sess. Acts Greg. 1889, p. 240), provides that the council shall be the judge of the qualifications of its members, and, iu case of a contest between two per- sons claiming to have been elected thereto, must determine the same, subject to the review of any court of competent jurisdiction. The court decided that this is not exclusive of the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, under the general statutes of the State, to determine such contests in the first instance. State v. Erafl^ 18 Oregon, 550 ; S. c, 23 Pac. Rep. 66a See, also, State v. Huggins (1824^ Harper, Law, S4; State v. Deliessft- 164 OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§ 153. Although the statute requires that the notice shall state the number of inhabitants within the boundaries of the proposed corporation as ascertained by the board of commissioners, a failure to do so is a mere irregularity, which cannot prejudice a non-resident property owner and will not affect the validity of the election.' § 163. English rule as to majority. — Although it is clear that, in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, the corporate body are bound by the acts not only of the major part of them, but by the niajor part of those who are present at a regularly convened corporate.meeting, yet where the corporate body consists of a definite number, and it is provided that an act shall be done by the body for the time being, or a major part of them, a majority of the whole must meet for the purpose; and if the body be so reduced as that a majority of the whole definite number no longer remains, the act cannot be done unless permitted by the charter or by usage.^ line (1831), 1 McCord (S. C), 53 ; Grier V. Shackelford (1814), 8 Brevard (S. C), 196; State v. Cockrell, 3 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 6. 1 Smith V. Board County Ciomm'rs Skagit County, 45 F.ed. Rep. 735. The laws of New Hampshire provide that "city councils shall have por.er to provide for the appointment or election of all necessary officers for the good government of the city, not otherwise provided for." It was de- cided that a city council has no right to determine when a board of assess- ors shall exercise their power to choose one of their number as clerk of the board. Weeks v. Dennett, 62 N. H. 3. Holding, also, that a notice of an election to determine the ques- tion of incorporation, signed by the county auditor, who is ecu officio clerk of the board of commissioners, and in which it appears that the election was ordered by the board, is a suffi- cient compliance with the provision of the statute that such notice shall be given by the board of commission- ers. 2 Rex V. Hoy te, 6 T. R 430 ; Rex v. Belbringer, 4 T. R. 810, and the cases there cited. But a majority of those present, when legally assembled, will bind the rest. Rex v. Miller, 6 T. R. 368. See, also. Rex v. Monday, Cow- per, 531, 588 ; Rex w Devonshire, 1 Barn. & O. 609 ; Rex v. Bower, 1 Barn. & C. 493. See further as to plurality and majority rule at popular elec- tions, the chapter on Meetings and Elections, infra, and the rules gov- erning elections by definite bodies, §§ 157, 158, infra. Rex v. May, 4 Barn. & Ad. 843; Rex v. Greet, 8 Barn. & C. 368 ; Rex v. Headley, 7 Barn. & C. 496 ; Cotton v. Davies, 1 Str. 59; Oldknow v. Wainwright, 3 Burr. 1017; 1 W. BI. 339; Rex v. Overseers of Christ Church, 7 E. & B. 409. "Where an election of four couucilloTS had taken place on the § 154.J OFFIOEES A.ND AGBNT8. 165 § 154. Election by ballot. — The mode of voting in this country, at all general elections, is almost universally by bal- lot.* " A ballot may be defined to be a piece of paper or other suitable material, with the name written or printed upon it of the person to be voted for ; and where the suffrages are given in this form, each of the electors in person deposits such a vote in the box or other receptacle provided for the pur- pose and kept by the proper officers." * that purpose, called Diribitores, de- livered to each voter as many tahlets as there were candidates, one of whose names was written upon every tablet The voter put into a chest prepared for that purpose which, of these tablets he pleased, and they were afterwards taken out and counted. Cicero defines tablets to be little billets, in which the people brought their suffrages. The clause in the constitution directing the elec- tion of the several State officers was undoubtedly intended to provide that the election should be made by this mode of voting to the exclusion of any other. In this mode the freemen can individually express their choice without being under the necessity of publicly declaring the object of their choice ; their collective voice can be easily ascertained, and the evidence of it transmitted to the place where their votes are to be counted, and the result declared with as little incon- venience as possible." Temple v. Mead, 4 Yt 535, 641. In the case last cited, and in Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 313, it was held that a printed ballot complies with a constitutional provision which requires all ballots for certain .State officers to be " fairly written." Common lines on ruled paper do not render the election void. People V. Kilduff, 15 111. 493. But where the law prohibits "any device or mark" by which a ticket may be distinguished, a dotted line under the title of an office for which uo candi- flrst of November, three of whom were to supply ordinary vacancies, and tlie fourth an extraordinary va- cancy, but no distinction had been made between them, either in the notice of election, the voting papers or in the publishing of the names of the four persons elected, such elec- tion was held to be irregular and void. Begina v. Rowley, 8 Q. B. 143 ; S. G. in the Exchequer Chamber, 6 Q. B. 668. See, also, Begina v. Eip- pon, 1 Q. B. D. 317 ; Begina v. Mayor &c. of Leeds, 7 Ad. & El. 963. ' Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.), ch. XVII, 760. 2 Cush. Leg. Assemb., § 108. " In this country, and indeed in every country where officers are elective, different modes have been adopted for the electors to signify their choic& The most common modes have been either by voting viva voce, — that if, by the elector openly naming the per- son he designates for the office, — or by ballot, which is depositing in a box provided for the purpose a paper on which is the name of the person he intends for the office. The principal object of this last mode is to enable the elector to express his opinion se- cretly, without being subject to being overawed or to any ill-will or prose- cution on account of his vote for either of his candidates who may be before the public. The method of voting by tablets in Rome was an ex- ample of this manner of voting. Tkere certain officers appointed for 166 OFFIOICBS AND AOEITTS. [§ 155. § 155. Election hj city council. — Under the laws or con- stitution of some States the council or city government has the power to elect officers or fill vacancies by vote.' Where city ordinances require that its city solicitor shall be chosen aldermen is composed of nine alder- men. By section 4 the mayor can- not vote, except in case of a tie. Section 5 provides tliat a majority of the%oard shall form a quorum. An ordinance provides that any vacancy on the board of education shall be filled by an election by the mayor and aldermen. At such an election eight of the aldermen and the mayor were present Complainant received four votes, there were three scatter- ing votes and one blank. The mayor did not vote, but declared complain- ant elected. It was held that a ma- jority of the eight aldermen present was necessary to elect complainant, and the blank vote must be counted to show that he did not receive such majority. Nor was the action of the mayor, iii declaring com- plainant elected, equivalent to a vote for him. Lawrence v. Inger- soll, 88 Tenn. 53; s. G, 13 S. W. Rep. 433. See this case cited and com- pared with other authorities in §§ 157, 158, infra. An election ordered by officers de facto is held a good elec- tion. State V. Goowin, 69 Tex. 55 ; S. C, 5 S. W. Rep. 678. A common council, constituted as it will be when a term of oflBce about to expire shall end, and having authority to ap- point the successor of the incumbent, may lawfully make such appoint- ment before the expiration of the current term. Horan v. Lane, 53 N. J. Law, 275 ; s. C (sub nom. State v. Lane), 31 Atl. Rep. 303, where it is also held that when a statute empowers the council to appoint to a certain office, an ordinance of the council which, if enforced against succeed- ing councils, would defeat or ma- date is named is sufficient to con- demn the whole ballot. Steele v. Calhoun, 61 Miss. 556. See, also, Dru- liner v. State, 20 Ind. 308 ; MulhoUand V. Bryant, 39 Ind. 363. A different method from the one usually in force in printing the names of officers will not make the ballot void. Coffey v. Edmonds, 58 Cal. 531 ; Owens v. State, 64 Tex. 500. The board of aldermen having no power to elect except by ballot, no action by them ratifying their previous action can make such election valid. Laiyrence v. Inger- soll, 88 Tenn. 53 ; s. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 422. A provision of the rules of the council, that officers whose salaries are payable from the city treasury shall be electei^ by ballot, applies only to elective officers to be chosen by the council under the charter, and not to subordinate appointees whose compensation is fixed by the mayor and aldermen. Williams v. City of Gloucester, 148 Mass. 356; s. C, 19 N. E. Rep. 848. A city council was empowered to appoint, in joint con- vention, a prosecuting attorney. No mode was prescribed, and there was no power of removal The conven- tion balloted, and A- received a ma- jority of the votes cast It was held that A.'s title to the office was not af- fected by the fact that a resolution declaring him elected was lost, and that a resolution declared the ballot void by reason of errors which did not in fact exist, and that another resolution declared another person elected. [Park, C. J., dissenting.] State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 ; S. c, 55 Am. Rep. 65. 1 Under the charter of the city of Enoxville, the board Of mayor and § 155.] OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 167 by a concurrent vote of both branches of the city council, he cannot be legally chosen unless by a concurrent vote. And the fact that the record untruly states that a vote was in con- currence, when it also states facts showing that it was no^, does not show a valid election.^ "Where, by the city charter, the mayor is allowed a casting vote in the city council, in ac- cordance with the statute of Maine, his act is sufficiently for- mal for that purpose if he determines and declares which of two candidates is elected, although he may not go througli the formality of casting a ballot.^ terially impair their power of ap- pointment, is void. Under the charter of the city of Hartford, providing that the common council should ap- point a prosecuting attorney, but giving no direction as to the mode of appointment, the council met, and a member moved that the convention proceed to ballot for a prosecuting attorney, which motion prevailed. A ballot was taken, giving relator a majority of votes. The result hav- ing been announced, another mem- ber offered a resolution declaring relator elected, which was lost Two resolutions were then offered and passed, one declaring the ballot for relator null and void by reason of errors in the same, and the other de- claring defendant' elected to the office. It was held that relator was elected when the result of the first ballot was announced, there being no error therein, and the convention had no power afterwards to deprive him of the oflSoe. (Pai'k, C. J., dissenting.) State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 ; s. c, 23 AtL Rep. 686. The election of an assessor by the board of aldermen at a legal meeting cannot be reconsid- ered at an adjourned session, and an- other person elected in his place. State V. Phillips, 79 Me. 506 ; s. c. 11, Atl. Rep. 374. 1 Saunders v. Lawrence, 141 Mass, 3»0. Since the Illinois act of 1873, providing a new mode for the assess- ment and collection of taxes, and authorizing the appointment of a city tax commissioner, is unconsti- tutional and void, an ordinance, under which such a city tax commis- sioner was elected, is void, and in- capable of conferring any rights upon him. McGrath v. City of Chi- cago, 34 III. App. 19. A common council, being the sole judges of the election of its members, may, upon a contest respecting the electipn of one of its members, appoint a com- mittee to take testimony, and to re- port the facts and the evidence to the council; Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. Law, 97 : s. c, 11 Atl. Rep. 151. i Small V. Orne, 79 Me. 78 ; a C, 8 Atl. Rep. 153. See the sections on Presiding OfBcers in the chapter on Public Boards, infra. The charter of the city of Cohoes provides that " the mayor and aldermen of the city shall constitute the common council thereof," and that the common coun- cil "shall be judge of the election and qualification of its own mem- bers." It was held that the common council was not the judge of the election of mayor, he not being one of their " own " members within the spirit or intent of the charter. Gar- side V. City of Cohoes, 12 N, Y, Supl. 193; s, c, 58 Hun, 005, 168 OFFICBES AND AGENTS. [§§ 156, 157. § 156. Election by definite bodies generally — Majority and plurality. — When an election is to be made by a definite body of electors, as by a board of aldermen or common coun- cil, the authorities are not in accord as to whether a majority is requisite to elect a candidate or whether a mere plurality is suflScient. On the one hand it is asserted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee to be " well settled " and " not open to controversy "that in such cases a majority is necessary.' On the other hand it was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan in a recent case that " in this country it is generally under- stood that, in the absence of any statutory provision expressly requiring more, a plurality of the votes cast will elect. It is only in cases where the statute so provides that a majority of all the votes cast is necessary to the choice of an officer." ^ This is the only case, so far as the author's examination has enabled him to discover, where it has been distinctly decided that a candidate may ,be chosen by a definite body without receiving more votes than all of his competitors combined. § 157. The same subject continued — Quorum majority. Assuming that a majority is necessary to elect, shall it be a majority (1) of those present (provided they constitute a quorum), (2) a majority of the quorum voting, or (3) simply a majority of those, however few, who vote? According to the Tennessee case cited in the preceding section, a majority of those who are present must concur to do any valid act, including the 1 Lawrence v. IngersoU (1889), 88 the fact that the charter provided for Tenn. 53 : S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 433 ; 6 the transaction of business only by a L. R A. 308 ; 17 Am. St Eep. 870 ; majority of a quorum, and gave the citing Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 283 mayor a right to a vote when a ma- (wherein the author says a majority jority thereof could not decide, must concur to do any valid act), '"thereby conclusively showing," said find 6 Am. & Eng. Enoyo. of Law, the court, "that a majority must i^l. Turney, C. J., dissented. He concur or there is no result." S. G, does not affirm, however, that a p. 63. plurality is sufficient, but dilfers ^Conrad v. Stone (1889), 78 Mich, from the majority of the court on 635, 639. In this case there were three another ground, to be noticed in the candidates, and, of a board of sixteen following section. Although the members present, eight voted for court deemed this to be the settled one, seven for another, and one for common-law rule, the intrinsic value the third. The first was declared of the ease is seriously impaired by elected. § 158.] OFFICEES AND AGENTS. 169 election of of5oers.' In respect to the second and third ques- tions, some of the courts draw a distinction between elections and ordinary business of the board.'' And the rule requiring only a majority of those actually voting for a candidate is de- clared by a decided preponderance of authority.' Those who refrain from voting are conclusively presumed to acquiesce in the action of those who do, and even an express protest on the ground that a quorum has not voted is unavailing.* § 158. Informal ballot. — An interesting point regarding an " informal ballot," so called, was determined in a recent case by the Supreme Court of Michigan. A statute provided for the election by ballot of a school examiner on a certain for a quorum to vote in any case; See, also, cases cited In preceding note, and RushTille Gas Co. v. City of Eushvllle (1889), 121 Ind. 206 ; & c, 6 L. R. A. 315. State v. Dillon (1890), 125 Ind. 65, holds that if a candidate receives a majority of those voting, which is less than a majority of those present, but is a majority of the num- ber necessaiy to constitute a quoi-um, it is saflFioient. It la competent for a council to adopt a rule that a major- ity of those elected, and voting, may choose a candidate. Morton v. Young- erman, 89 Ky. 505. * Gosling V. Veley, 4 H. of Lw Cas. 679 ; Willcook on Munic. boi-p., g 546 ; State V. Green, 37 Ohio St 227. In Conrad v. Stone, 78 Mich. 635, it is stated as a general rule that a plural- ity suffices to elect In the cases cited in the preceding note, a major- ity of those voting, though less than a quorum, satisfies the law. All act- vfdUy voted in the former case, and in none of the latter cases were there more than two candidates competing. Suppose there are three or more candidates — Qucere: May a plurality (i. e., less than a majority) of less than ■ a quorum of votes elect, a quorum being present? 'Lawrence v. Ingersoll (1889), 88 Tenn. 52 ; s. c, 12 S. W. Rep. 423 ; 6 L. R A. 808, where a blank ballot was not counted as a vote, Turney, C. J., dissenting. -Tha court quotes from Dillon en Municipal Corporations, § 217, in support of its conclusion; and the same section is also quoted in Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rush- ville (1889), 131 Ind. 206, 210, to sus- tain exactly the opposite contention. The latter case related to business of the body, not an election, and is cited with other authorities ih the chapter on Public Boards, infra. 2 State V. Green, 37 Ohio St 227; Launtz v. People, 113 IlL 137, 143; Oldknow V. Wainwright (or Rex v. Foxcraft), 2 Burr. 1017; Gosling v. Veley, 4 H. of L. Cas. 679. These cases decide that if a quorum be pres- ent the majority cannot defeat an election by refraining from voting, although they might by such conduct block the business proceedings of a meeting, 3 Launtz v. People, 113 lU. 137 (1885), extending the rule to a vote on the approval of the bond of the oflScer thus elected; Booker v. Young, 13 Gratt 303 (private corporation) ; At- torney-General V. Shepard, 68 N. H. 383, where it was held not necessary 170 OFFIOEBS AND AGENTS. [§ 159. day by the chairmen of the boards of school inspectors. At a meeting convened for that purpose five informal ballots were taken, with the same result, and at a subsequent meeting on the same day a candidate was formally elected. It was de- cided that the person who h^,d a plurality of the informal ballot was duly chosen. The court said : — " When the law requires cer- tain persons to be elected by ballot, there is and can be no such thing as an ' informal ballot.' All ballots cast under statutory requirements are formaf and final if there is an elec- tion, and cannot be repeated. Informal ballots are sometimes taken in a caucus or in a nominating convention ; but they have no place in an election required by law for the election of oflBcers."^ § 159. Tenure of office. — The term of ofBce for which an ofiBcer is elected to serve is, as a general rule, fixed by the or- dinance or law under which he is elected or appointed.' V. Keams, 47 Ohio St. 566 ; s. C, 25 N. E. Eep. 1027. The New Jersey statute of 1886, by which the term of office of the members of the city council, etc., is made three years, does not apply to the alderman of At- lantic City, who is ex officio a mem- ber of the common council, and elected annually. State v. Gouldey (N. J.), 18 Atl. Eep. 695. See, also. State V. Haynes, 50 N. J. Law, 97 ; Jobson V. Bridges, 84 Va. 298. The Michigan statute of 1889, entitled "An act to amend section 4 of Act No. 382 of the Local Acts of 1877, en- titled 'An act to revise the charter of the city of Grand Bapids,' " provides " that the elective officers now hold- ing office within that part of the said city comprised of the Third, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth wards, as created by this act, shall continue to hold the offices for which they were respect- ively elected, and to discharge the duties of said offices for the whole of the territory for which they were elected, -until the officers are duly elected and qualified, as provided by 1 Conrad v. Stone (1889), 78 Mich. 635, holding also that it was not nec- essary for the chairman to declare the candidate elected ; on which point see, also. State v. Barbour, 63 Conn. 76. * The New York City Consolidation Act of 1883 says that clerks of the district courts " shall hold office for the term of six years from the date of appointment." It was held to in- clude the case of a clerk appointed to flu a vacancy caused by the resig- nation of a clerk during his six years. People V. Breen, 53 N. Y. Super. Ct 167 : Truax, J., dissenting. The Ee- vised Statutes of Ohio, relating to nmnicipal corporations, provides that members of the council in office shall, unlesa-a vacancy sooner occurs, serve until the end of their respective terms. Section 8 provides that any person holding an office or public trust shall continue therein until his successor is elected, or appointed, and qualitied. It was decided that mem- bers of the council were entitled to hold over under this section. State § 159.] OFFIOBES AND AGENTS. 171 Where a statute provides that, before the election of town councilmen, the number to be elected shall be determined, an informal acceptance of five as the number to serve, accepted by common consent through several years, will be deemed as valid a determination of the number of councilmen to serve in that capacity as a decision by formal vote of the electors.' the city charter at the annual char- ter election on the first Monday of April, A. D. 1890, and after said date the several aldermen whose terms of office shall not have expired shall onlj represent the territory within the ward in which they shall then re- spectively reside, and at said annual charter election in 1890 aldermen and other ward officers shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of the charter of said city and the re- quirements of this act" It was de- cided that the provision for the alder- men to continue in theofiice to which they were elected, in the wards in which they reside, until such elected term expires, is not an appointment of city officers by the legislature, and that sufficient provision is made for the election of aldermen in the new wards. Stow v. Common Council, 79 Mich. 595 ; s. C, 44 N. W. Rep. 1047. A superintendent is not rendered an agent of the city by an ordinance which provides that " he shall con- tinue in office until removal, or until a successor be chosen." Prince v. City of Lynn, 149 Mass. 193 ; s. C, 21 N. E. Kep. 396. One elected under a stat- ute which fixes the term of office at a longer period than the constitution allows cannot exercise the duties of such office for any period. State v. Atter, 5 Ohio C. C. 353. 1 Metoalf V. Andrews (B. I.), 7 Atl. Rep. 4. In this case a city charter pro- vided that certain officers, including the city treasurer, should be ap- pointed by the common council, to continue in office until the office should be declared vacant, or another person should be appointed to suc- ceed him, and should enter upon the duties of his office ; and that the city treasurer should, before entering on his duties, give bond with sureties for the faithful performance of his duties. S. was appointed treasurer in January, 1867, and continued in office until January, 1875. He gave bonds, with sureties, in conformity with the city charter. In an action on the bond, the sureties pleaded that, by the rules and usages of tlie common council, all the officers appointed by it, including the city treasurer, were appointed for one year, subject to re- moval at pleasure, and, when not re- appointed at the expiration of the term, were suffered to hold over at pleasure ; and that they executed the bond with a knowledge of the said rules and usages of the common council, and on assurances, made by the common council and the plaint- iffs, that they would be bound as such only for the term of one year. The court held that the provisions of the charter as to the mode of appoint- ment and term of office must be strictly followed, and this plea pre- sented no defense. City of Newark V. Stout, 53 N. J. Law, 35 ; S. C, 18 Atl. Rep. 943. Incumbents super- seded by councilmen elected under or by virtue of void proceedings are Entitled to be restored by due process of law ; but the legal organization of the city, and the acts of the council- men de facto, within the purview of the statutes, will be recognized and 172 OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§ 160. The constitution of Colorado provides that every person hold- ing a civil office in a municipality shall, unless removed ac- cording to law, exercise the duties of such office until his suc- cessor is duly qualified. It was held that where a candidate for mayor is by the proper canvassing board declared elected, files his oath and enters upon the discharge of his official duties, the outgoing mayor vacating the office without objec- tion, the court may, on the election being contested and ad- judged illegal, order him to yield the office to the president of the board of supervisors, since a Colorado statute provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of mayor the president of the board of public works shall act.' § 160. Tenure of office where city passes from one class to another. — When under a statute a city is divided into classes, and no provision is made by the statute for the elec- tion of new officers, the officers in office at the time of the upheld. State u Gray, 23 Neb. 365; s. C, 86 N. W. Rep. 577. Persons who are acting as town ofiBcers under an incorporation which is void hecause of a pre-existing valid char- ter will be ousted on proceedings in quo warranto, when the boundaries of the districts from which they were elected are not coterminous with those prescribed in the original char- ter. Harness c. State, 76 Tex. 566; S. a, 13 S.. W. Kep. 535. 1 Londoner v. People, 15 Colo. 557 ; S. C 26 Pac Rep. 135. Brooklyn City Charter 1888, tit 3, § 4, pro- vides that persons appointed to certain city offices "shall severally execute a bond to the corporation in such penaltj' and with such sureties as the common council may require, conditioned for the faithful perform- ance of their respective duties. . , . Such sureties shall qualify in such form as the common council shall prescribe ; and the bonds thereby re- quired, after having been fully ap- proved, shall be filed in the office of the city clerk, . . . before any of the officers required to execute the same shall enter upon the duties of their respective offices." City Or- dinances, tit 9, § 3, provides that "the clerk of the common council shall also indorse and certify on each bond, before the same shall be filed, the resolution of the common coun- cil approving the same, and the time of such approval" 1 Rev. St N. Y. (8th ed.), p. 397, § 9, provides that every officer shall hold over after "his term of office shall have ex- pired, until a successor in such office shall be duly qualffied." It was de- cided that an incumbent of one of the enumerated offices is entitled to hold over after the expiration of his term of office, and to draw the salary therefor, until the bond is approved and filed as required by the city charter and ordinances, and an ap- proval by a justice of the supreme court is not sufficient De Lacey v. City of Brooklyn (1891), 13 N. Y. Supl. 540. § 161.] OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 173 passing of the statute remain in oflSce until new officers are elected and qualified.' § 161. Power to hold over — English and American rules. Formerly in England the law was well settled that the terra ' Under the laws of Kansas, 1885, after a city of the third class is or- ganized into a city of the second , class, the mayor is to be elected on the first Tuesday of April of each odd-numbered year, and a vacancy must be filled at a special election called and held for that purpose, as provided by ordinance; and where no one is elected mayor of such a city, after its organization, on the first Tuesday of April of an odd- numbered year, and no special elec- tion is called by ordinance, the mayor of the city of the third class will hold over. Moser v. Shamlefifer, 39 Kan. 635; s. c, 18 Pac. Eep. 956. When a city of the thii-d class is made a city of the second class, under the Kansas statute, the city ofiBcers continue until new officers are elected and qualified. Ritchie v. City of South Topeka, 38 Kan. 368; s. c, 16 Pac. Eep. 333. The Pennsylvania act of 1889, relating to the division of the cities of the' state into three classes in accordance with their pop- ulation, provides (section 2) that at the election occurring not less than one month after a city has changed classes " the proper officers shall be elected to which the city shall be- come entitled under the change in classification; and upon the first Monday next succeeding thereto the terms of all officers of said city then in office, whose oflSces are superseded by reason thereof, shall cease and de- termine." The court decided that, where a city passed from the third into the second class, it was entitled to such new oflBcers as were pro- vided for in cities of the second class which did not exist in cities of the third class only, and the terms of such of its existing oflBcers only as were abolished in cities of the second class expired; and where the city had twenty-six councilmen under the third class, and was entitled to but thirteen under the second class, and the terms of thirteen of such council- men would expire during the current year, it was not necessary to elect new councilmen, as all the old mem- bers held over for their respective terms. Commonwealth v. Wyman, 137 Penn. St. 508 ; S. C, 31 Atl. Eep. 389. The Pennsylvania act of 1887, dividing the cities of the state into seven classes, and providing that in the fourth to the seventh classes the persons then in office should hold for the terms for which they were elected, except as otherwise provided, the pro- visions of the charter of a city of the fifth class for the election and instal- lation of members of the council apply until the terms of all the mem- bers then in office expire, at which time the provisions of the act of 1887, in relation thereto, will take effect; and the provisions that the councils then in office should hold until their " successors " should be in- stalled, according to the act. and that at the first election under the act the members should be chosen, etc., do not show a contrary intention ; there being a provision that the terms of members in cities of the fourth class should cease at the end of that mu- nicipal year. Appeal of Ayara, 133 Penn. St 336; s. C., 16 AtL Eep. 356.. 174 OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§ 161. of office of the mayor or other head officer was animal and expired at the end of the year, and that he could not hold over until his successor was provided, unless there was a special provision in the statute to that effect.' But the American courts have not adhered to the strict English rule, but have decided that the chief officer, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is apparent, holds over until his successor is ap- pointed.^ The re-organization of a city under the general in- incorporation law is no abrogatilm of its'former charter, and determines the tenure of all officers under it, except such as are within the saving clause of the general law.' See, also, Pittsburgh's Appeal, 338 Penn. St 401 ; s. c, 21 Atl. Rep. 757, 759, 761. 1 Eex V. Hearle, 1 Str. 627 ; Rex v. Thornton, 4 East, 808 : Eex v. Atkins, 3 Mod. 12 ; Mayor of Durham's Case. 1 Sid. 33 ; Foot v. Prowse, 1 Str. 625 ; S. C, 8 Bro. 169; Glover, 173. Some charters provided that the chief of- ficer should hold office until his successor was provided, although his aiig'"nal term of office was only one syear. Rex v. Phillips, 1 Str. 394 For the manner by which this was changed, see 9 Anne, ch. XX, sec. 8. 2 2 Kent's Com. 238; Elmendorf u Mayor &c. of New York, 25 Wend. 693; Slee v. Bloom, 5 Johns, Ch. 866, 378 ; People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. 147. By the general Municipal Incorpora- tion Act of California, 1883, it is pro- vided that officers chosen at a special election to be held within two weeks after the vote in favor of re-organiza- tion shall hold their respective offices only until the next general niunicipal elections. By section 752 it Is pro- vided that all elective officers of cities of the fifth class shall be chosen at a general municipal election to be held therein in each odd-numbered year; the marshal, assessor, etc., to hold office for two years, and the trustees for four years ; but there is, a further proviso that the first board of trustees elected under the provision of this act shall so classify themselves by lot that three of their number shall go out of office at the expiration of two years, and two at the expiration of four years. It was decided that the elective officers, ex- cept members of the board of trust- ees, are to hold office for two years, and they for four years, and that an election must be held every two years. Euggles V. Board of Trustees of Cily of Woodland (Cal., 1891), 26 Pac. Rep. 520. The New York Consolidation Act, 1888, provides that the terms of all officers, whensoever actually ap- pointed, shall cpmmence on the Ist day of May in the year in which the terms of office of their predecessors shall expire; but the commissioner of public works to be appointed on the expiration of the term of the present incumbent in December, 1884, shall hold from the 1st day of May succeeding such month. It was hold that it was clearly the intention that the commissioner's term should begin May 1, 1885, and it was immaterial that the termina- tion of his predecessor's term was erroneously stated to be in December, 1884. People v. Barretfc 8 N. Y. Supl. 677. 'McGrath u City of Chicago, 24 IlL App. 19. Where, upon the re- § 162.] OFFICEES AND AGENTS. .ili § 162. The same subject continued. — In this country it is generally held that an annual officer of whatever grade, espe- cially if his duties consist in the safe-keeping and current man- agement of property committed to his custody, holds over until the appointment and qualification of another in his place. That conclusion was reached upon a review of the authorities by the Supreme Court of California jn 1865, where the doctrine was placed upon considerations of public convenience and ne- cessity.' And the Court of Appeals of Maryland in a compara- tively recent case makes the following comprehensive state- ment: — " Unless there is some clearly expressed and positive prohibition which, by its terras, operates as an ouster, the person filling the office should, continue to discharge those duties until a successor is qualified, no matter whether the office is created by the constitution, by an act of the general assembly, or by a municipal ordinance. Ubi eadem est ratio, eadem est lex." " The same rule obtains in many other juris- dictions.' vision of a city charter, the term and mode of election to a city office are omitted, though the oiBce is con- tinued in existence, the then incum- bent rightfully in possession holds over until superseded by proper legis- lative action. State v. Simon, 20 Oregon, 305 ; S. C, 26 Pac. Eep. 170. A certificate issued by the recorder of the board of aldermen, which is not authorized by law, notifying com- plainant of his election, and signed '■by order of the board," is no evi- dence of ratification of previous in- valid action. Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 53; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 422. See, also, State v. George, 33 Fla. 585. • Stratton v. Oulton, 38 Cal. 44. In that case the office of State librarian was in contention, but the remarks of the court show that the rule would certainly be applied to subordinate officers of a municipal corporation. It is often expressly declared by stat- ute that an incumbent shall hold over. 2 Robb u Carter (1886), 65 Md. 831, 335, where a city solicitor, appointed under ordinance, held over ; Thomas V. Owens, 4 Md. 189; Marshall v. Harwood, 5 Md. 423; Sausbnry v. Middleton, 11 Md. 296. 5 School Dist. V. Atherton, 13 Met 105 ; Dow V. Bullock, 13 Gray, 136 ; Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt 416; Kreidler v. State, 34 Ohio St 23; Stewart v. State, 4 Ind. 396 ; State i'. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434; People v. Fairbury, 51 111. 149; People v. Fer- ris, 16 Hun, 319; Cordrell v. Frizell, 1 Nev. 180 ; State r. Wells, 8 Nev. 105 ; Ex parte Lawhorne, 18 Gratt (Va.) 85; Wheeling v. Black, 35 W. Va. 366; People v. Eeid, 10 Colo. 188; Moser v. Shamlefifer, 89 Kan. 685; Wier V. Bush, 4 Litt (Ky.) 439. For a construction of statutes relating to the holding over of officers, see cases cited in Throop on Public Officers, §§ 335 et seq.; Mechem's Public Of- fices and Officers,' §§ 398 et seq. 176 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. [§ 163. § 163. Appointment of officers. — "Where a city council is authorized to elect officers and no particular mode of election is prescribed, it may appoint them by resolution,^ and has com- plete control over all offices and officers existing under by- laws, unless specially restricted by law.' 1 People V. Bedell, 3 Hill, 196 ; Com- monwealth V. Pittsburg (Police Force, 1850), 14 Pa. St 177; Low v. Com'rs of Pilotage, R M. Cliarlt (1830, Ga.) 302 ; Trowbridge v. Newark, 46 N. J. Law, 140 ; Russell v. Chicago, 26 III. 385 ; Wilder v. Chicago, 36 I'll. 183. 2 People V. Conover, 17 N. Y. 64 ; People V. Mayor &c. of New York, 5 Barb. 43 ; Samis v. Eing, 40 Conn. 298 ; Wadraven v. Memphis, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 431; Madison v. Korbly, 32 Ind. 74, 79; Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo. 481. The acts of artificial persons afford the same presumptions as the acts of natural persons. Chief Justice Story, in Bank of United States v. Dan- dridge, 13 Wheat 64, 70, and cases there cited. The constitution of Vir- ginia providing that all city, village and town ofiBcers whose election or appointment is not provided for by the constitution shall be elected by the electors of such cities, towns and villages, or appointed by such au- thorities as the general assembly shall designate, is merely enabling, and does not prohibit the legislature on incorporating a town from ap- pointing officers until an election is held. Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484; s. c, 13 S. E. Rep. 965. The Public Laws of Rhode Island, 1890, provid- ing for the appointment by the mayor of Providence in February, 1891, and triennially thereafter, of a commissioner of public works, and requiring that the commissioner " now in office and those hereafter to be appointed " should have con- trol of the city engineering depart- ment, and should appoint a city en- gineer on the first Monday in May of each year, abolished the then exist- ing office of city engineer after the fiftt Monday in May, 1890, and did not provide for an additional city engineer to be connected with the board of public work^ Gray v. Granger (B. I), 31 Atl. Rep. 342. Laws of New York, 1888, chapter 314, title 8, section 2, provides for the appointment of city officers, and de- clares that, if the council shall fall to appoint any such officer within three weeks after any vacancy oc- curs, it shall be the duty of the mayor, immediately on the expira- tion of said three weeks, to appoint sueh officer and fill such vacancy. It was held, where the city engineer resigned after the expiration of three weeks, the power of the council to fill such vacancy ceased. People v. Merrick, 16 N. Y. SupL 346. A mu- nicipal board having been abolished by a special act and its duties trans- ferred to a new one, the members of the old board cannot enjoin the ap- pointment of the members of the new board on the groimd that the spe- cial act is unconstitutional Reemi- lin V. Mosby, 47 Ohio St 570 ; s. G, 36 N. E. Rep. 717. The Public Laws of Rhode Island, 1890, which provide that " the town councils of the sev- eral towns throughout the State, and the mayors of the several cities, ex- cept the city of Providence, shall each elect an inspector of buildings, who shall be paid such amount for his services as shall be determined by the town or city council electing him," requires such inspectoiB to be § 164.] OFFIOEKS AND AGENTS. 177 § 164. Validity of appointment. — The appointment of a person to a city office by a mayor under a law which requires confirmation by the council gives the appointee no right to the office without such confirmation by the proper and legal city council.' Where a statute empowers the council of a city to appoint to a certain office, an ordinance providing that the council shall elect, every three years, a fit person to such office, who shall hold his office for the term of three years, and until his successor is elected, is void, as impairing the power of ap- pointment of succeeding councils.* appointed by the mayors, and not by the city councils, of the cities of Paw- tucket, Woonsooket and Newport In re Building Inspectors (1891, R. L), 31 Atl. Eep. 913. The charter of Los Angeles (Act CaL, Jan. 31, 1889), di- recting the city council to appoint as a depositary of the public moneys the bank offering the highest rate of in- terest therefor, and the treasurer to deposit the city funds there daily, is void, being inconsistent with that provision of the constitution of Cali- fornia which provides that the leg- islature shall not delegate to any private corporation, company or in- dividual the right to interfere with or control any county, city or mu- nicipal money, and that the public moneys shall be deposited with the treasurer, and that making any profit out of such moneys shall be a felony ; and also with the Penal Code of Cali- fornia, punishing by imprisonment the misappropriation of public mon- eys by the person charged with keep- ing them. Yamell v. City of Los Angeles, 87 CaL 603; S. O., 25 Pac. Eep. 767. 1 People u Weber, 89 III 347. Under an ordinance providing for the an- nual appointment of a gas inspector by the city council, an appointment to such oflSce, " subject to the further orders of this council," is invalid. 12 Kins' V. City of Buffalo (1890), 10 N. T. Supl. 564. SHoran v. Lane, 53 N. J. Law, 875; s. c, sub nom. State v. Lane, 21 Atl. Eep. 303. Proceedings had under the act of New Jersey, approved April 6, 1889, providing for an election to de- termine whether the mayor of a city shall have the power to appoint cer- tain o£5cers, are not invalidated by a raisrecital of some of the provisions of the act in the proclamation of an election ; the act not requiring their Insertion in the proclamation, and there being nothing to show that the en-or affected the result of the elec- tion. In re Cleveland, 52 N. J. Law, 188 ; s. c, 19 Atl. Rep. 17. The rec- ord of the appointment of a village marshal was read and approved by the board of trustees, as being in accordance with the facts. The va- lidity of his appointment was ques- tioned because the record was inter- lined. It was held that the interline- ation was immaterial. Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo. 223 ; S. a, 15 Pac. Eep. 399. The appointment by a city coun- cil of a member thereof to an office which the statutes of Ohio makes a member of council ineligible to fill, and his acceptance thereof, does not work an abandonment of his office as councilman, for the appointment to the second office is absolutely void. 178 OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. [§§ 165) 166. § 165. Appointments by de facto officers. — Whether an appointment to office by one who is himself only a de facto officer gives a good title to the appointee is not settled. In England, whei-e a town burgess was appointed by a ^ faeto mayor, and the latter was ousted upon a quo wn/rrcmto, the judgment was held conclusive in a like proceeding against the former.* In North Carolina and in Ohio such appointments are brought within the general rule touching the validity of acts of de facto officers in which the public have an interest, and the appointee continues to hold the office after the ouster of his superior.* The Supreme Court of New York, on the other hand, has held that a judgment in an action in the nat- ure of a gv,o warranto, whereby an officer is ousted and his contestant declared entitled, is evidence in favor of an ap- pointee of the latter against one who derives title from the former.' §166. Compensation of officers — In general. — It is a general rule of law that corporations are liable to its officers for their salaries when the work has actually been done ; but it is highly necessary that great care should be exercised in appointing or electing the officers to their positions, as the least omission or technicality may be fatal to their appoint- ment or election, in which event they have no right to com- pensation.* The salary of an official may be reduced during State V. Keams (Ohio, 1889), 25 N. E. that the city comptroller "shall have Bep. 1037. the supervision and control of the iKex V. Lisle^ Andr. 163; s. a, 3 fiscal concerns of all departments, Str. 1090. See, also, Rex v. Mayor &a, bureaus and ofiScers of the city and 5 T. R. 66 ; Rex v. Grunes, 5 Burr, school districts. ... He shall be 2599 ; Rex v. Hebden, Andr. 389. paid a fixed yearly salary." The 2 People V. Staton, 73 N. C. 546; school district of Easton did not ac- State V, Ailing, 12 Ohio, 16; State v. cept this act^ but continued to ac|i Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143. See, also, Mai- under a special law. It had power lett V. Uncle Sam Sec. Co., 1 Nev. 188 ; to appoint an auditor to the school Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607. accounts. The city comptroller au- ' People V. Anthony, 6 Hun, 14S. dited the school accounts, the school' See, also. People v. Murray, 73 N. Y. board having passed a resolution that 585 ; and a dictum, contra, by Bron- it was his duty as city comptroller to son, J., in People v. Stevens, 5 Hill, do so. It was decided that, not hav- 616. ing been appointed auditor by the < An act passed in Pennsylvania school district, he could not recover May 23, 1874 (P. L. 252), provided compensation for. such" services. § 166.] OFFIOBBS AND AGEXTS. 1Y9 his term of office.' But an officer cannot be compelled to take less compensation for his services than that fixed by statute.' Eothrock v. School District, 183 Pa. St 487; S. C., 19 AlL Rep. 483; 25 W. N. C. 510. Under the General Statutes of Colorado, §3326, which provides for annual appropriation bills by the city councils of munici- palities, and that the objects and purposes for which appropriation is made shall be specified, an appro- priation bill by the city of Leadville, which recites a total appropriation of a certain amount, subdivided into appropriations for the following spe- cific objects or purposes, to wit, "sal- ary fund," "streets," "fire," "gas," "interest," and "contingent ex- penses," is a suflScient compliance with the statute to entitle a street commissioner duly elected, whose salary is fixed by ordinance or reso- lution of the city council, to resort to the salary fund for payment of his salary : and it is not necessary that the bill should specify each particu- lar office, and the exact sum to be paid the incumbent thereof. City of Leadville v. Matthews, 10 Colo. 125 ; S. C, 14 Pac. Rep. 112. A laborer in the employ of a city, who was dis- missed, and afterwards reinstated, under Laws of N. T., 1887, ch. 464, providing for preference of honor- ably discharged Union soldiers as employees upon public works, etc., cannot recover from the city wages for the time between his removal and reinstatement, where his posi- tion has been filled by another, who performed the duties thereof, and was paid therefor by the city. Hig- gins V. City of New York (N. Y.), 30 N. E. Rep. 44, reversing s. C, 14 N. Y. Supl. 554, and following Ter- hune V. Mayor, 88 N. Y. 248, and ad- 1 Harvey v. Rush County, 32 Kan. 159 ; Hoboken v. Gear (1859), 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 365. Unless prohibited by the constitution. Douglass County v. Timme (Neb.), 49 N. W. Rep. 266. Municipal oflScers, such as police- men, are not public officers within a constitutional provision that no law shall increase or diminish the salary or emoluments of a public officer after his election or appointment Russell V. Wilhamsport, 9 Pa. Co. Ct 129. See, further, for a construction of such provisions. State v. Bloxham, 26 Fla. 407; S. C, 7 So. Rep. 873; Kirkwood v. Soto (Cal.), 25 Pac. Rep. 488; Wren v. Luzerne County, 9 Pa. Co. Ct 22; S. C, 6 Kulp. 37; Guldin V. Schuylkill County (Pa. C. P.), 48 Phila. Leg. Int 197. 2 People ex rel. Satterlee v. Board of Police, 75 N. Y. 88; People ex rel. Ryan v. French, 91 N. Y. 38; Kehn V. The State, 93 N. Y. 291. Under the Vermont act of 1884, No. 12, § 2, which provides that highway taxes shall be collected by the town col- lector when there are no street com- missioners, the tax bills were not given by the town to plaintiff, who was first constable and ex officio col- lector, but were collected by the town treasurer. It was held that, where the declaration in a suit for the fees for such collection claimed no agreement for fees as collector, as provided by R L. Vt, § 2724, nor alleged any services rendered, the town was not liable therefor, and a subsequent promise to pay such fees would be without consideration. Woodward v. Town of Rutland, 61 Vt 316; s. G, 17 AtL Rep, 797. 180 OFFIOBBS AKD AOXSHa. [§167. § 167. The same subject continued — Failure of corporate funds. — If no salary is attached to an office in a municipal corporation, the corporation is not liable, as the officers are deemed to have been familiar with the law or ordinance cre- ating the office when they accepted the position, and there is no implied contract for compensation.^ Where an officer ac- cepts the amount of compensation, his acceptance of that sum estops him from claiming more.^ If the salary of an official is prescribed by an ordinance or bj»law as being payable in a certain manner or out of certain assessments or taxes, and such assessments or taxes have not been collected, and the corporation is not guilty of negligence in collecting them, the corporation is not liable for the salary until they have been collected.' hering to the general rule that pay- ment to a de facto officer is a defense to an action brought by the de jure officer to recover the same salaiy. See, also, Hagan v. Brooklyn, 136 N. Y. 643, and for a contrary view, State V. Carr (Ind.), 28 N. E. Eep. 88, and a criticism of the prevailing rule by Mr. Freeman in a note to An- drevcs. v. Portland (79 Me. 484), 10 Am. St Rep. 384. Where a contest- ant recovers a public office from the incumbent, he is also entitled to re- cover from the latter the salary re- ceived by him during the term which belonged to the former. Eillion v. ' Van Patten, 42 Kan. 295 ; S. C, 23 Pao. Eep. 383. See, also, State v. Holmes (La.), 10 So. Eep. 173. But it must be shown that the incumbent actually received ihe salary. Mer- rltt V. Hinton (Ark), 17 S. W. Eep. 370. The clerk of the city and county of New York, having been desig- nated by that title for years before the passage of Laws of N. Y., 1857, oh. 628, is the city clerk within the provision of section 33 of that act, that bonds taken pursuant thereto by excise commissioners, from appli- cants for licenses, shall, in cities, be filed " in the city clerk's office ; " and such clerk is therefore entitled, for filing each such bond, to the fee of six cents allowed him by Code Civil Proo. N. Y., § 3304, for filing any paper required by law to be filed in his office other than is expressly pro- vided for, no special fee being pre- scribed therefor by any statute. People V. Giegerich, 14 N. Y. Supl. 263. 1 Locke V. Central City, 4 Cola 65 ; Brazil v. McBride, 69 Ind. 244 ; Doolan U Manitowoc, 48 Wis. 313 ; Jones v. Carmarthen, 8 M. & W. 605 ; Askin V. London, 1 Upper Can., Q. B. 354; Pringle and McDonald, In re, Upper Can., Q. B. 356 ; Eegina v. Cumber- lege, 36 L. T. (N. S.) 700. 2Hobbs V. Yonkers, 103 N. Y. 13; Mclnery v. Galveston, 58 Tex. 334. If an officer renders a bill purporting to cover the whole of his services, but really for less than he is entitled to, and it is allowed and paid, be is debarred from recovering more in the absence of surprise, accident or mistake of fact O'Hare v. Pai'k Eiver (N. D.), 47 N. W. Eep. 380. 3 Andrews v. United States; 2 Story, C. C. 303; People v. Supervisors, 1 § 168.] OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. 181 § 168. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — Where a statute requires the appointment of a town collector fro tempore to be made by writing under tbe hands of the se- lectmen, it is not satisfied by a writing signed with the names of all by one selectman, in une absence of the others, and with no other authority than that which is implied by their having agreed that the party should be appointed ; and a col- lector thus appointed cannot maintain an action against the town for compensation for his services in coUefiting the taxes.' HUl, 362; Baker v. City of Utica, 19 N. Y. 326; Gumming v. Mayor &C. of Brooklyn, 11 Paige, 596 ; Smith v. Commonwealth, 41 Pa. St 335 ; Jer- ' sey City u Quaife, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 203 ; United States v. Brown, 9 How. 487; McClurg v. St; Paul (1869), 14 Minn. 420. The charter of the city of Bufialo provided that the comp- troller should, on or before the 1st day of April in each year, furnish to the council a financial statement for the current year, together with an esti- mate of the current expenses of each department Heads of departments were also required to furnish esti- mates of the amounts required by their respective departments for the current year. The council might amend such estitnates, and were re- quired to pass upon them not later than May 1st The expenditures of each department were required to be kept within the estimates made for it; each oflBce or purpose being debited with the whole sum appro- priated, and credited with the salaries and other fixed sums to be paid there- from, and "the other expenditures" were not to exceed the remainder of the estimate. Contracts for amounts • exceeding such remainder should not bind the city as to the excess. The mayor fixed the salary of the secre- tary of the civil service commission at $600 per annum, payable monthly, but the council only appropriated $60 for the expenses of the commis- sion for the whole year. After pay- ing all the fixed expenses of the mayor's department, a balance re- mained to its credit of less than the amount of salary due the secretary. It was held that the latter could re- cover the $50 appropriated for the expenses of the commission and the unexpended balance to the credit of the mayor's fund, but no more. Kip V. City of Buffalo, 7 N. Y. Supl. 685. But a superintendent employed "by a village for the erection of a public building cannot recover his salary if the statutory certificate that the nfoney necessary was in the villiage treasury was not issued by the village clerk. Drott v. Riverside, 4 Ohio C. C. 313. 1 Phelan v. Granville, 140 Mass. 386. A city charter provided that the mayor's compensation should he $3,400 per annum, and might be changed, but not during his term of offica It was decided that an ordi- nance declaring that, after the expi- ration of the existing term, the mayor should serve without compen- sation, was void, and that a mayor elected with knowledge of the ordi- nance could claim a salary, even though as an inducement to his elec- tion he had said that he would serve without compensation. State v. Nashville, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 697 ; 8. G, 54 Am. Rep. 437. A statute making 182 07FICEB8 AND AOEHTS. [§ 168. "Where the recorder of a city is vested under the code of the State with concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace of all actions, civil and criminal, arising within the corporate limits of the city, and shall receive such fees for his services as may be allowed by law to justices of the peace for like serv- ices, except that for his services in criminal prosecutions for violations of ordinances he shall be entitled to receive only such monthly salary as the board of trustees shall by ordi- nance prescribe, he is vested with a dual jurisdiction as re- corder and justice, and the fines he receives for violations of the penal code are to be paid over to the county treasurer, and he must be paid for his services as in the case of justices.^ If the compensation of an officer is not fixed by the laws of the State, his services, if of a strictly official nature, must be gratuitous.^ It was decided in an Iowa case that where the no provision fox* the payment of a school agent, a promise on the part of the town to pay for his services is not implied from the fact of his elec- tion and ,the rendition of service. Talbot V. East Machias, 76 Me. 415. The aqueduct commissioners of the city of New York have power under the New York statute to employ and dismiss inspectors of the work of con- structing the aqueduct, but have no power to suspend such an inspector without pay, there being no provision in the statute for such suspension; and an inspector may recover pay for the time during which he was so suspended. Mullen v. City of New York, 13 N. Y. Supl. 289, following Gregorys. Mayor, 113 N.Y. 416. And although the New York statute au- thorizes the aqueduct commissioners of New York city to suspend without pay an inspector of the work of con- structing the aqueduct, and also authorizes them to appoint and fix the compensation of inspectors, such an inspector, who was suspended, is estopped from claiming his pay where he signed a writing which re- cited his appointment, and provided that, if he should at any time be sus- pended, his pay should cease. Phelan V. City of New York, 14 N. Y. SupL 785. 1 Prince v. City of Fresno, 88 CaL 407 ; s. C, 26 Pac. Rep. 606. Under the New York act passed February 37, 1883, entitled "An act to supply the city of Schenectady with water," and providing for the appointmejit of three commissioners, who, "for the first year after the commencement of the construction of water-works as hereinafter prescribed, shall each receive such salary as the common council shall fix, . . . which shall not exceed $500," and empowering them to adopt and report any fea- sible plan for the works, " embracing the purchase of any water-works," the commissioners are entitled to compensation for the adoption and the recommendation to the council of a plan for purchasing works and for their control and management of the works after the purchase. Scher- merhorn v. City of Schenectady, 3 N. Y. Supl. 435 ; s. C, 50 Hun, 331. 2 Boyden v. Erookline, 8 Vt. 284 ; Langdon v. Castleton, 30 Vt 285; § 169.] OFFIOEBS AST) AGENTS. 183 mayor of an incorporated town was invested by the code of that State with the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in criminal cases, which did not, however, make any provision for compensation, he was not entitled to recover from the county the reasonable value of his services in the hearing and trial of a criminal case in which the prosecution failed.' § 169. Miscellaneous instances. — One who is appointed a member of a committee to superintend the construction of water-works for a city, because of his knowledge and experi- ence as a civil engineer, is not such a public officer as to pre- clude him from recovering compensation for the services rendered under such appointment, where no compensation therefor has previously been specifically provided.^ If there is an omission in a village charter to make provision for com- pensation to members of a certain board, and it is apparent that such omission was intentional, the members cannot re- cover any compensation.' Where an inspector, under suspen- City of Central v. Sears, 3 Colo. 588; Locke V. Central City, 4 Colo. 65. iHowland v. Wright County (Iowa), 47 N. W. Kep. 1086, two judges dissenting. 2 City" of Ellsworth v. Eossiter, 46 Kan. 237 ; s. C, 26 Pac. Hep. 674. See, also, Bunn v. People, 45 UL 397 ; But- ler V. Regents &o., 33 Wis. 124, 131 ; State V. Wilson, 29 Ohio St 349. In the absence of any statutory author- ity for the suspension of an assistant engineer in the department of public works of the city of New York, ap- poit.t-()d under Laws N. Y. 1883, at a certain salary per year, he may re- cover such salary for the time during which he is so suspended and is not allowed to render service. Morley V. City of New York (1891), 12 N. Y. Supl. 609 ; Lethbridge v. Mayor &c., 15 N. Y. Supl. 563, where a clerk in a city department maintained an ac- tion under similar circumstances. A city having a treasurer duly ap- pointed and qualified under the gen- eral act of incorporation cannot defeat his right to commissions for disbursement of the municipal funds by placi:!g them in the hands of the mayor for disbursement Beard v. Decatur, 84 Tex. 7 ; s. c, 53 Am. Rep. 735. A selectman, overseer of the poor and town agent, secured a pen- sion for one of the town's paupers, and appropriated -the amount re- ceived, in pursuance of a previous agreement with the pauper, to the settlement of the town's claim against the latter for support This amount the pauper subsequently re- covered from the selectman by suit It was held that the selectman was not entitled to compensation from the town for the expenses incurred by him in this suit White v. ISb- vant (1885), 77 Me. 396. ' Perry v. Cheboygan, 55 Mich. 350. Under the Vermont statute which provides that auditors sliall not allow any claim for personal services ex- cept when compensation is fixed by 184 0FFICEE8 AND AGENTS. [§ ITO. sion without pay, exeeates a written agreement, with aqueduct commissioners, which recites his previous appointment, and thereby agrees that if he is suspended or discharged for any cause whatever, while in the employ of such commission, his pay as such inspector shall cease from and after the time of such suspension, subject to the direction of the commissioners, he is estopped from claiming the invalidity of the agreement as to any period of suspension which follows its execution.' § 170. Extra compensation. — It has iong been a fixed rule of law that one who accepts a public office which has a definite salary attached to it must perform all the duties of the office without extra compensation, and. even if after he enters into office his duties are inoreas^ he cannot compel payment of extra compensation.* Where an officer's fees are fixed for an actual day's work, and his duties embrace the work of two or more departments, he cannot recover further com- pensation than the amount fiLjoed by statute.' But where a law or by vote of the town, a tax- lister can recover onty such compen- sation as the town votes him. Barnes V. Bakersfield (1885), 57 Vt. 376. Chapter 52 of New York Laws of 1880, amending the charter of New York City, fixes at $3,000 the salaries of " the clerks of the police courts." This provision has been held not to include the clerk's assistants. C^egier V. New York, 11 Daly (N. Y.), 171. 1 Emmitt v. City of New York, 13 N. Y. Supl. 887. 2 People V. Vilas, 36 N. Y. 459, and cases cited; Mayor &c. of N. Y. v. Kelly, 98 N. Y. 467 ; Board of Super- visors V. Clark, 92 N. Y. 391 ; Board &c. of Auburn v. Quick, 99 N. Y. 138 ; Marshall County v. Johnson, 137 Ind. 238 ; s. C, 26 N. E. Rep. 821 ; Pierie V. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. St 573; S. G, 21 Aa Eep. 90. Right of salaried oflScer of a public corporation to claim extra compensation on the ground that the duties of his office have been increased or new duties added since his salai-y was fixed, see People V. Supervisoi-8, 1 Hill, 362; Wendell v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 204; Palmer v. Mayor &c. of New York, 2 Sindf. 318. See, also, Andrews v., Pratt, 44 CaL 309. Eight of officer to recover when duty performed is outside of his regular official duty, see Bright v. Supervisors, 18 Johns. 242 ; Mallory v. Supervisors, 8 Cowen, 531 ; People v. Supervisors, 12 Wend. 357. ' Under the Indiana statute of 1879, providing that the per diem of town- ship, trustees for each actual day's service shall be $2, to be paid out of the township fund, and that for serv- ices as overseer of the poor he shall be paid out of the county treasury, one who is the duly elected township trustee, and has been paid $2 per day out of the township fund for his serv- ices, cannot claim a further compen- sation out of the county treasury, for the same time, for services as overseer of the poor. Board of Com- missioners V. Templeton, 116 Ind. 369 ; s. c, 19 N. E. Rep. 183. If extra § 171.] OFFICtEES AND AGENTS. 18S constitutional provisaon forbids a raunioipality to pay or grant any extra compensation to a public officer, or to increase his compensation during his continuance in office, it has been de- cided that a city council, the members of which receive no regular pay, has no right to vote compensation to members for special services performed as a committee.' § 171. Compensation of attoriwys. — A public corporation, unless restrained by its charter, has the power to employ at- torneys to conduct and carry on such legal business as comes within its corporate capacity ; * and it is bound to pay for such services.' Likewise a corporation may employ extra counsel to prosecute or defend certain suits or to do certain-legal work either in conjunction with the city solicitor or alone.* Where a charter gives power to a municipal corporation to employ an attorney when necessary, and a subsequent chap- ter provides for a law department, and a chief officer to be called the attorney and counsel, with a salary, the depart- ment to have charge of and conduct all the law business of the corporation, the subsequent chapter is an implied repeal of the power to employ an attorney under the charter.' The services are performed by direction 186 ; Smith v. Sacramento, 13 Cal. of the proper authorities, having no 531. connection -with the duties of the ' Langdon v. Castleton (1858), 30 office, the officer may be allowed Vt 285. compensation therefor. United Estates ■* Hugg v. Camden (1878), 39 N. J. V. Austin, 3 Cliff. 325 ; United States Eq. 6. See, also, Curtis v. Gowan, 34 V. Chassell, 6 Blatchf. 421. HI. App. 516. iGarvie v. City of Hartford, 54 5 Lydfly ,,. Long Island City (1887), Conn. 440 ; & C, 7 Atl. ilep. 7S3. 104 N. Y. 318. Where an action was Where a statute fixes the city treas- brought by a city attorney to i-ecover urer's salary, and says that he shall for services pei'formed for the city, not receive "any other fee or reward it was decided that the preparation whatever," he can claim nothing for of a digest or a codification of the collections of county taxes which it laws applicable to such city was is made his duty to collect as such vdthin the line of his duty as laid officer. Poughkeepsie v. Wiltsie, 36 down by the city charter, which pro- Hun (N. T.), 370. But when the vjded that he "should do all and functions of two appointments or every professional act incident to the offices are separate and distinct, one office which might be required of person may be entitled to recover him" by the officers of said city, compensation for both. Marvin v. Hays v. City of Oil City (Pa.), 11 Atl. United States, 44 Fed. Rep. 405. Rep. 6a 2 State r. Paterson, 40 N. J. Law, 186 OFFIOEES AUD AGBNTS. [§ 172. retaining of extra counsel must be authorized by the corpo- ration,' § 172. The same subject continued. — The duties and com- pensation of attorneys are generally regulated or fixed by statute or ordinance. sAnd a State statute which, without limitation, gave the city attorney of a city fees for the trial of cases, was held in a Connecticut case not to be restricted in its application to cases tried in the city courts.* Where a city has power to allow its attorney "fees," it may also allow him a commission on all sums of money collected for the city ; and under an ordinance authorizing such allowance, no dis- tinction can be taken between collections in civil and in crim- inal cases.' When it is forbidden by statute to increase the 1 Memphis v. Adams (1872), 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 518; S. C, 24 Am. Eep. 331; Clark V. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181 ; Mem- phis r. Brown (1873), 20 Wall. 289, 331. See Eorer v. Laurinburg, 90 N. C. 427 ; Waterbury v. Laredo, 60 Tex. 519. See, also, Hornblower v. Duden, 35 CaL 666 ; Clough v. Hart, 8 Kan. 487. Compensation of city attorney, see Orton v. State, 12 Wis. 509 ; Carroll v. St Louis, 12 Mo. 444; Dillon on Munic. Corp (4th ed.), chap- ter on corporate oflBcere, where the mayor may be employed as attorney and counsel. See Niles, Mayor &o. V. Muzzy (1875), 33 Mich. 61 ; S. a, 20 Am. Eep. 670. If a county attorney goes beyond the limits of his county, with the consent and at the instance of the county board, he may recover reasonable compensation in addition to his salary. Leavenworth Co. v. Brewer, 9 Kan. 307 ; White v. Polk, 17 Iowa, 413 ; Butler v. Neosho Co., 15 Kan. 178 ; Hoffman v. Greenwood Co., 23 Kan. 307. 2 Smith V. City of Waterbury, 54 Conn. 174 ; S. C, 7 Atl. Eep. 17. In the last cited case it was held that the words " continuance in office," in the constitution of Connecticut, amendment 34, prohibiting the leg- islatui'e from increasing the salary of any public officer during his "continuance in office," mean con- tinuing office under one appoint- ment ; and the act of 1881, providing that " the city attorney {of Water- bury) shall be entitled to fees for his services in cases tried for the city," is not unconstitutional, so far' as it af- fects that officer upon hjs re-appoint- ment to that position in 1881, at the expiration of his former term. And also that a statute giving a city at- torney fees for " cases tried for said city " is not restricted in application to technical " cases " in courts of jus- tice, but applies also to a trial of certain matters for the city before a railroad commission. 'Austin V. Johns, 63 Tex. 179. Under an ordinance which gives a city attorney ten per cent on all sums of money collected for the city, such percentage is not restricted to sums which the attorney actually as- sisted to collect City of Austin v. Walton, 68 Tex. 507; S. C, 5 S. W. Eep. 70, where it was also decided an ordinance which gives a city at- torney ten per cent of all sums of § 173.] OFFIOEBS AND AOEKTS. 18T compensation of the attorney for the city during his term of office, the fact that the city advances from the second to the first class during the attorney's term of office doe? not abro- gate the statutory prohibition.' § 173. Compensation — Power of legislature to control.— The State legislature, except as restrained by the constitution, has the power to increase, diminish, or cut off entirely, the sal- ary of an official.^ Likewise the legislature may increase the duties without enhancing the compensation, or may dimin-' ish the compensation without lessening the duties.' money collected for the city is not repugnant to a subsequent ordinance giving him a salary and fees in addi- tion in specified cases, and is not im- pliedly repealed thereby. A city or- dinance, passed in 1880, gave the city attorney a salary in lieu of all other compensation. A subsequent statute gave him fees for the trial of cases. It was held that the compen- sation given by the statute, not being in terms in lieu of all other compensation, was cumulative, and that the city attorney was entitled both to the salary given by the ordi- nance and the trial fees given by the statute. Smith v. Waterbury, 54 Conn. 174; s. c, 7 Atl. Rep. 17. ' Under an Arkansas statute which provided that a city council should not increase the salary of a city offi- cer during his term in office, whea the council of a city of the second class had fixed the salary of the city attorney, it cannot, after becoming a city of the first class, increase his salary during his term in office. Barnes v. Williams, 53 Ark. 305 ; s. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 845. 2Swann v. Buck (1866), 40 Miss. i^68 ; Connor v. Mayor &c. of N. Y. (1851), 1 Seld. (5 N. Y.) 285; affirm- ing s. C, 3 Sandf. 355 ; People v. Mor- rell (1839), 31 Wend. 563; Warner v. People, 7 Hill, 81 ; S. c, 3 Denio, 373 ; Phillips V. Mayor &c. of N. Y., 1 Hilt (N.Y. Com. PL) 483; Smith v. New York (1868), 37 N. Y. 518; Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Cooley, Const Lim. 376 ; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 ; Bird r. Wasco Co. (1871), 3 Oreg. 282 ; Oregon v. Pyle, 1 Oreg. 149 ; Coffin V. State (1855), 7 Ind. 157 ; Tur- pen V. County Comm'rs, 7 Ind. 172 ; Cowdin V. Huff, 10 Ind. 88 ; Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538, 553, per Wright, C. J. ; Cotton v. Ellis, 7 Jones (N. C), Law, 545 ; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 1. Police officers of cities are not within the constitutional provis- ion forbidding legislation to change the compensation of public officers while in office. Mangam v. Brooklyn, 98 N. Y. 585 ; s. c, 5 Am. Rep. 705. An officer who held over, and discharged his official duties until his successor qualified, has been held to be entitled to pay for his services, although there was no such provision of law. Robb V. Carter, 65 Md. 331. ' State V. Davis, 44 Mo. 129 ; Hyde V. State, 53 Miss. 665 ; Wilcox v. Rod- man, 46 Mo. 322 ; Sharpe v. Robert- son, 5 Gratt (Va.) 518. The Califor- nia statute of 1883 provided that mar- shals of cities of the sixth class should receive a compensation to be fixed by ordinance by the board of trustees ; also prescribed the marshal's duties, and provided that he should, for serv- 188 OtnCKSS AND AOEirrs. C§ 174. § 174. Qnalifl«ations for office-holding. — Where neither hy constitution nor by statute are the qualifications for office prescribed, any one is eligible who possesses the elective fran- chise. It may happen, therefore, that one may be an officer who is not a citizen of the United States, for in a number of the States aliens, who have declared their intention to be- come citizens, and have the qualification of residence, are given the franchise.* The State constitution or statutes generally lay down the qualifications of officers.* Eligibility to office ice of any process, receive the same fees as constables. The court decided that the compensXtioi]!! fixed by ttie trustees under the statute was for all duties imposed on the marshal. Mun- dell V. City of Pasadena, 87 Cal. 530; s. c, 25 Pac. Eqp. 1061. Under the New York statute authorizing the aqueduct commissioners of the city of New York to appoint and fix the compensation of inspectors of the work of constructing the aqueduct, the commissioners have no power to suspend such an insjjector without pay, there being no provision in the statute for such suspension ; and an inspector may recover pay for the time during which he was so sus- pended. Emmitt v. City of New York, 13 N. Y. Supl. 887, following Mullen v. Mayor &e., 12 N. Y. Supl. 269 Under the California statute of 1883, munic- ipal corporations are divided into classes, and by the same act the board of trustees of cities of the fifth and sixth classes are authorized to fix by ordinance the compensation of city ijiurshals. In an action by the mar- shal of a city (of the sixth class) to recover for services rendered, the complaint failed to state that the hoard of trustees of such city had passed any ordinance fixing the com- pensation of the marshal, or to state to what class of municipal corpora- tions such city belonged. It was de- cided that the complaint was demur- raHe. Pritchett v. Stanislaus Co., 73 Cal. 310 ; s. C, 14 Pac. Rep. 795. 1 McCarthy v. Froelfce, 63 Ind. 507. 2 State V. Murray, 28 Wis. 96; State V. Smith, 14 "Wis. 497 ; Wheats Smith, 50 Ark. 266 ; Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N. C. 115. A provision that only a qualified elector shall hold office does not prevent making payment of taxes a qualification for election as alder- man. Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417. A statute providing that a person in arrears in payment of taxes should not be eligible as an alderman was held to apply to the office and not to the election, and therefore payment at any time before assuming the of- fice removed the disqualification. People V. Hamilton, 24 111. App. 609, holding also that an arrearage result- ing from the fault of the tax collector in omitting an item from his state- ment was not within the contempla- tion of the statute. Cf. Taylor v. Sul- livan, 45 Minn. 309 ; s. C, 11 L. R. A 272 ; 47 N. W. Rep. 802, where it was held that ineligibility of an alien by reason of his having taken no steps to become naturalized could not be cured a*ter the election. Some quali- fications are required by implication ; for example, a person shall not hold incompatible offices. People v. Car- rigne, 2 Hill, 98 ; People v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375 ; Stubbs v. Lee, 64 Ma 195; State v. Hutt, 2 Ark. 282. If a person already holding an office is § 175.] OFMOEBS AND AGENTS. 189 belongs not exclusively or specially to electors enjoying the right of suffrage. It belongs equally to aU persons whomso- e\rer not excluded by the constitution,^ and cannot be changed by any ordinance or acts of the corporation.* § 175. OfQcial oath. — Public officers are usually required by statute to take an oath before entering upon the duties of the office.' Where the form is prescribed by law it should elected or appointed to another in- compatible with the one which he holds, and he accepts and qualifies to the second, such acceptance and qual- ification operate, ipso facto, as a resig- nation of the former office. State v. Brinkerhofl, 66 Tex. 45. Of. Attorney- General V. Marston (N. H.), 32 Atl. Rep. 560 ; People v. Hanif an, 96 111. 420; The King v. Lizzard. 9 Barn. & C. 418 ; Mil ward v. Thatcher, 3 L. R. 81. See Turk v. Commonwealth, 139 Pa. St. 151 ; Cotton v. Phillips, 56 N. H. 219. Sometimes it is provided that no person shall hold two lucrative offices, or offices in two departments of the government, at the same time. Davenport v. Mayor, 67 N. Y. 456 ; People V. Brooklyn Common Council, 77 N. Y. 503 ; s. c, 33 Am. Rep. 659 ; Be CorUss, 11 R. 1 038 ; Dailey v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 339 ; Rodman v. Har- coui-t, 4 B. Hon. 334, 499 ; State v. De Gress, 53 Tex. 887; State v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566 ; People v. Leonard, 73 Cal. 230 ; Ci-eighton v. Piper, 14 Ind. 183 ; Kerr v. Jones, 19 Ind. 851 ; Howard V. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. 115 ; State v. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401 ; Foltz v. Kerlin, 105 Ind, 231 ; People v. Whitman, 10 Cal. 88 ; People v. Sanderson, 30 Cal. 160 ; Crawford v. Dunbar, 52 Cal. 36 ; Hoglan V. Carpenter, 4 Bush, 89. Women may be school officers in Massachusetts (115 Mass. 602); also in Iowa. Huff v. Cook, 44 Iowa, 639. 1 Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, 703. See State v. George, 23 Fla. 585. 2 People V. Phillips. 1 Dtnio, 388; Petty V. Looker, 31 N. Y. 267; Com- monwealth V. Woelper, 3 Serg. & R 29; Rex v. Spencer, 3 Burr. 1827; Newling v. Francis, 3 L. R. 189 ; Rex V. Bumstead, 3 B. & Ad. 699 ; Rex v. Chitty, 5 Ad. & El. 009 ; Rex v. Wey- mouth, 7 Mod. 371. Where the char- ter of a city provides that the mayor, recorder and aldermen, when assem- bled, shall constitute the common council, and further provides that the common council shall be judge of the election and qualification of its mem- bers, this power extends to the elec- tion and qualification of the mayor ; and being conclusive, the court will not grant a quo warranto after the council has t^ken action. Dafoe v. Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200 ; s. C, 26 N. W. Rep. 879. When the government of a city or town is controlled by the general municipal incorporation act of Florida, neither six months' resi- dence nor registration is requisite to eligibility to office in such city or town, in the absence of any con- stitutional or statutory provision to that effect. State v. Geoirge, 23 Fla. 585 ; s. &, 3 So. Rep. 81. The legisla- ture incorporating a town may ap- point the officers to exercise their functions until a regular election, not- withstanding the constitution pro- vides that town officers shall be elected by the electors of such towns. Roche V. Jones, 87 Va. 484. 'The subject of official bonds is discussed in a special chapter, infra.. 190 OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§ 176. be substantially followed : a literal adherence is not neces- sary ; 1 but a material variation will invalidate the oath.^ It need not been in writing or subscribed unless the statute ex- pressly so provides.' The officer who is required to admin- ister the oath cannot lawfully refuse to do so on account of the ineligibility of the person elected.* § 176. The same subject continued. — According to the weight of authority in this coui$ry, statutory provisions fix- ing the time within which an official oath must be taken are construed to be directory, and a delay does not ipso facto vacate the office, provided the oath is taken before the office is declared vacant by judicial proceedings.* But a contrary doctrine is declared in several oases, holding that such stat- utes are not directory where the delay is caused by neglect or refusal.* A statute requiring an oath to be administered by a particular officer was decided in New York to be direct- ory, and that the oath might be taken before any officer authorized by a general statute.' 1 State V. Trenton, 35 N. J. Law, 485 ; Bassett u Denn, 17 N. J. liaw, 433 ; Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 G. & J. (Md.) 479; Hawkins v. Cal- loway, 88 III. 155. 2 State V. Trenton, 35 N. J. Law, 485; Bowler v. Djiain Comm'rs, 47 Mich. 154; Chapman v. Clark, 49 Mich. 305 ; Bohlman v. Railway Co., 40 Wis. 157. An oath " faithfully to discharge their duties" does not ful- fill a prescribed form to discharge their duties " impartially, and to the best of their judgment" In re Cam- bria Street, 75 Penn. 357. See, for other defects pronounced merely formal, Horton v. Parsons, 37 Hun, 42, a strong case; Colman v. Shat- tuck, 63 N. Y. 348 ; People v. Stowell, 9 Abb. N. C. 456; Hoagland y. Cul- vert, 30 N. J. Law, 387; People v. Perkins, 85 Cal. 509 ; Bassett v. Denn, 17 N. J. Law, 433. And for evidence that the oath has been taken. Hal- beck V. Mayor &c., 10 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 489 : Harwood v. Marshall, 9 Md. 83 ; Soammon v. Soammon, 38 N. H. 419; State V. Green, 15 N. J. Law; 88* ' Davis V. Berger, 54 Mich. 653. < People V. Dean, 3 Wend. 438, case of an infant. See, also. Miller v. Su- pervisors, 35 Cal. 93. »Throop on Public Officers, § 173, and numerous cases there cited. 6 Throop on Public Officers, §§ 173, 174, 175, citing (on p. 188) State v. Matheny, 7 Kan. 837; Courser v. Powers, 34 Vt 517, where a justice Ajf the peace, sued for an arrest, could not justify unless he had taken tho oath of office before the arrest, al- though he took it on the same day. The oath need not be taken while a contest is pending to determine who is legally entitled to the office. Mechem's Public Offices and Officers, § 263, citing People v. Potter, 63 Cal. 137 ; Pearson v. Wilson, 57 Miss. 648. ' Eb parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42 ; Can- nifl V. Mayor, 4 E. D. Smith (N, Y.). 430. See, also, State v. Stanley, 66 N C. 50, and contra, Rex v. Ellis, ii § 177.] OBTIOEES AND AGENTS. 191 § 177. Duties of officers As a rule the duties of ofiBcers are fixed by the ordinance or statute creating them ; but in a "New York case ' it was held that " statutes directing the mode of proceeding by public officers are directory, and are not re- garded as essential to the validity of the proceedings them- selves unless it be so declared in the statute." Where from the nature of the office the officer is called upon to exercise duties involving jadgment and discretion, he cannot delegate his power.* Where all the legitimate lights for ascertaining the meaning of the constitution have been made use of, it may still happen that the construction remains a matter of doubt ; and in such a case every one called upon to act, where, in his opinion, the proposed action would be of doubtful con- stitutionality, is bound upon the doubt alone to abstain from acting.' It is frequently provided by statute that the incum- bents of certain municipal offices shall not be in any manner interested in contracts for which the corporation is liable. These statutes are generally strictly construed.* East, 252, note; S. C., 3 Str. 994 But irregularities of this nature do not prevent the application of the rule validating acts of de facto officers. State V. Perkins, 34 N. J. Law, 409. 1 People V. Cook, 14 Barb. 390 ; S. C., 8 N. Y. 67. 2 The duty to examine and pass upon resolutions and ordinances of the common council,'and determine whether they should be approved, imposed by the city charter on the mayor, is a duty calling for the ex- ercise of his judgment and expe- rience, and cannot be delegated to the mayor's clerk. Lyth v. City of Buffalo, 48 Hun, 175. The mayor of Hudson, not being one of the oflS- cials designated in Laws of New York of 1890, was not obliged to take the test oath required of such offi- cials by section 3 of the same act People V, Gregg, 13 N. Y. Supl 114. 'Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.), ch. IV, 88. The Revised Statutes of Indiana make it the duty of a town- ship trustee to grant temporary relief to one, not an inhabitant of the town- ship, who is sick or in distress, and without money or friends, etc. It was decided that the trustee is not precluded from acting by the fact that such a person has been received into a house from chai-itable mo- tives, and has been and is being cared for. Howard County Comm'rs v. Jennings, 104 Ind. 108. The fact that a supervisor, at the request of citi- zens of the town, built a sidewalk at the expense of the town, did not im- pose on him any duty to repair as an mdividuaL That duty rested upon the persons who directed him to build the walk. Chartiers Tp. v. Langdon, 131 Pa. St 77 ; s. C, 18 AtL Rep. 930 ; 35 W. N. C. 203. * The New York Acts of 1883 de- clare that no clerk in the employ of New York city shall become inter- ested in the performance of any con- tract work or business the price of which is payable by the city. It was 192 OFHOBBS AND AUSTifiak [§ 178. § 178. Powers of mayor, — The mayor is the chief oflBcer or executive magistrate of the corporation, and his powers de- pend entirely upon the provisions of the charter, or constitu- ent act of the corporation and valid by-laws passed in pursu- ance thereof ; ' and although his duties are primarily executive and administrative, judicial duties are often superadded to those which properly appertain to the office of mayor, and he is invested by legislative enactment with the authority to ad- minister not only the ordinancesi of the corporation, but also judicially to administer the laws of the State.* held that a clerk could not become a lecturer in an evening school under an appointment from the board of education. McAdam v. New York, 36 Hun (N. Y.), 340. New York Laws of 1882 prohibit an ofBcer of the cor- poration of New York from being interested in the performance of any work to be paid for from the city treasury. It was held that an exam- iner in lunacy could not be a sani- tary inspector in the vaccinating corps. Fitch v. New York, 40 Hun (N. Y.), 513. 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), 291. 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), 391, 392; Waldo v. Wallace (1859), 13 Ind. 569. See, also, S!ater v. Wood, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 15 ; Morrison v. McDon- ald (1843), 31 Me. 550 ; Commonwealth V. Dallas (1801), 3 Yeates (Pa.), 300; State V. Wilmington (18S9), 3 Harring. (Del.) 394; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 831; Luehrman v. Taxing District ' (Tenn.), 2 Lea, 425; Reynolds v. Bald- win, 1 La, Ann. 162; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. Ill; Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93 ; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426 ; Martindale v. Palmer, 53 Ind. 411. The power to take general affidavits vested in justices of the .peace by the Arkansas statutes (Mansf. Dig., § 2918) may be exercised by the mayors of incorporated towns within the liofits of their corpora- tions, by virtue of the statute (Mansf. Dig., § 797) which confers upon such mayors " all the powers and jurisdic- tion of a justice of the peace m all matters, civil and criminal, arising under the laws of the State, to all intents and purposes." Such mayor may consequently take an affidavit to be used in prosecuting an appeal from a judgment of the county court to ,the circuit court. Robinson v. County of Benton, 49 Ark. 49 ; s. a, 4 S. W. Rep. 195. When the mayor has judicial authority to conduct criminal examinations he is not per- sonally liable in damages for refusal to proceed with an examination until the following day, and to accept bail, and for directing that the accused be locked up until the following day. Hommert v. Gleason, 14 N. Y. SupL 568. If he has acquired complete ju- risdiction he enjoys the same im- munity from personal liability for subsequent excesses of authority that is accorded to the j udges of courts gen- erally. State V. Wolever, 127 Ind. 306 ; S. G, 26 N. E. Eep. 763. For the history and nature of office of mayor, see Dil- lon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), g§ 13, 174, 353, 260, 271, 331, 428; Norton's Com., pp. 90, 402, 403; PuUing's Laws, Cus- toms &C, of London, ch. II, 16 m ; 3 Bouvier's Dictionary, 150 ; 4 Jacobs' Law Dictionary, 264, 265; 3 Toml. Law Dictionary, 540; Fletcher v. § 179.] OFFIOEKS AHD AGENTS. 193 § 179. The same subject continued — Statutory proTis- ions. — It is often provided by statute that the duties of the mayor shall fall, in his absence, upon the president of the council or a similar officer.' The New York statute authoriz- ing the mayor of each city to prescribe civil service rules and to employ suitable persons to make inquiries and examina- tions and prescribe their duties gives the mayor power to des- ignate a secretary for the civil service commission appointed by him under the act and to fix his salary.^ The mayor Lowell, 15 Gray, 103 ; Ela v. Smith, 5 Gray, 131 ; Nichols v. Boston, 98 Mass. 39; Cochran v. McCleary (1867), 23 Iowa, 75, 83. Under the Code of Iowa, section 506, providing that " the mayor of eacli city or incorpo- rated town shall be a magistrate or conservator of the peace, and, within the same, have the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in all matters civil and criminal ; . . . but the criminal jurisdiction shall be co-ex- tensive with the county in which such city or town is situated," it was held that the mayor is given the same jurisdiction in civil cases as a justice of the peace, and, therefore, his jurisdiction extends to a case brought before him by a resident of his incorporated town against a resi- dent of the county, but not of the corporation nor of the township in wliich it is situated, by a notice served on the defendant within his township, but outside the limits of the corpora- tion, and of the township wherein it is situated. Weber v. Hamilton, 73 Iowa, 577 ; S. C., 34 N. W. Eep. 434. 1 Upon an issue as to title to a mu- nicipal office, the power of appoint- ment to which is vested in the mayor, proof of appointment by the presi- dent of the council, who is author- ized to act as mayor in certain cases, is not sufficient without showing the facts upon wliich the right to exer- cise such power depends. State v, 13 Board of Health (N. J.), 8 Atl. Rep. 609. Where the charter provides that in case of the absence of the mayor from the city another pfficer shall act in his place, only such an absence as will render the mayor un- able to perform his duties is intended. Detroit v. Moran, 46 Mich. 213. Un- der a provision in the charter of Jer- sey City authorizing the president of the council to act as mayor in the absence of the latter from the city, except in faking certain appoint- ments, the president may issue a proclamation as mayor pro tempore, submitting the adoption of the act to the voters of the city, that power being vested in the mayor by said actL In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. Law, 319 ; s. C, 18 Atl. Eep. 67. The New Jersey statute, approved 1889, author- izes the mayors of the cities of the State to appoint the principal mu- nicipal officers, in case the actsliould be accepted at a popular election, and authorized the respective mayors of the cities, by proclamation, to call such election. It was decided that in case the mayor was absent, and tlie charter, in such contingency, vested the powers of the mayoralty in a specified officer, such officer could proclaim the election. In re Cleve- land, 63 N. J. Law, 188; S. C, 19 Atl. Rep. 17. See, also. In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. Law, 319. a Kip V. City of Buffalo, 7 N. Y. 194 OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. [§ 180. and city council of a Nebraska city have power to compromise claims against the city arising under a contract to erect asys- tem of water-works for the city.* The mayor may adminis- ter oaths to city oflBcers ; and under the New York statute he may appoint municipal officers independent of the board of aldermen.* § 180. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous powers. — Under authority to preserve the public peace the mayor may resist the lawful police force when they are at- SupL 685. A mayor, supposing that he had power to make an ad interim appointment of a (Aty officer, at- tempted to exercise that power, and that alone. But it was held that, if he did not have the power which he attempted to exercise, the appoint- ment could not be deemed an appoint- ment for a full term, which the mayor had the power, but not the in- tention, to make. People v. Hall, 104 N. Y. 170 ; S. C 10 N. E. Eep. 135. 1 State V. Martin, 27 Neb. 441 ; S. C, 43 N. W. Eep. 244. The mayor of a city of the first class does not have the authority to suspend the city en- gineer under Compiled Laws of Kan- sas, chapter 18, defining the powers of mayors of such cities and vesting such authority in the corporation it- self. Metsker v. Neally, 41 Kaa 122 ; s. c, 21 Paa Eep. 206. Under the General Statutes of New Hampshire, chapter 42, section 3, mayors of cities are authorized to administer oaths to aldermen and common councilmen, and by chapter 40, section 2, all pro- visions of the statutes relating to se- lectmen and town clerks of towns are construed to apply to mayors, aldermen and city clerks of cities; and, the former being authorized by statute to administer oaths to all town oflBcers, the mayor of a city has that authority in relation to city oflBcers. Drew v. Morrill, 62 N. H. 23. 2 The laws of New York of 1884, chapter 43, section 1, entitled "An act to center responsibility in the municipal government of the city of New York," which provides that all the appointments to oflBce in the city of New York previously made by the mayor, and confirmed by the board of aldermen, shall thereafter be made by the mayor without such confirma- tion, applies to excise commissioners in New York, the power to appoint whom was previously vested in the mayor subject to confirmation by the aldermen, although they may be, in a technical sense. State officers. Peo- ple V. Andrews, 104 N. Y. 570 ; S. C., 12 N. E. Eep. 274. The charter of the city of Minneapolis (Sp. L. of Minn. 1881, ch. 76, subch. 4, § 5, subd. 11) authorized the city council by ordinances " to erect lamps, and to provide for lighting of the city," and "to create, alter and extend lamp districts." And it was held that the power so conferred requires the ex- ercise of judgment and discretion, and cannot be delegated to a com- mittee of the council, so that the de- termination of the committee will be final, either as to establishing new lamps or discontinuing those already established. Minneapolis Gas-Light Co. V. City of Minneapolis, 36 Minn. 159; s. c, 30 N. W. Eep. 450. See, further, as to delegation of powers, the chapter on PuBUC Boards, infra. § ISl.j OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. 195 tempting to commit an unlawful act, and may call to his aid a rival body of police.' Where both by charter and ordinance the mayor is vested with certain executive power, it is not abridged by an ordinance confiding authority in the particu- lar case to another ofBcial also ; * and if the law requires that a certain fact " be made to appear to " the mayor as a condi- tion precedent to action by him, his judgment is conclusive and protects him from civil liability.' In Louisiana the Su- preme Court sustained a suit by the mayor in his oifioial ca- pacity to restrain a contemplated violation of the charter by other municipal officers. " We cannot prescribe to him," said the court, " the course which he is to pursue in the discharge of his official duties. The power to see the charter faithfully executed being given to him, the selection of the means nec- essary to its exercise is left to his discretion, and we cannot interfere with them if they violate no law." * Authority con- ferred upon the mayor to punish summarily infractions of po- lice regulations is not an encroachment upon the judicial power vested elsewhere by the constitution." § 181. Xiscellaneons instances of powers of municipal officers. — At the common law, in addition to suits by indi- viduals and corporations, there are some collective bodies, 1 Slater v. Wood, 9 Bo8w. (N. T.) their capacity to sue is commensu- 15. rate with their public trusts and du- 2 Pedrick v. Bailey, 13 Gray, 161. ties, see Auditor-General v. Railroad A city cennot by ordinance confer a Co. (1890), 82 Mich. 426, 429, citing greater power upon its mayor than Supervisor v. Stimson, 4 Hill, 136 ; that given by charter. Union Depot Overseers v. Overseers, 18 Johns. & R Co. V. Smith (Colo.), 27 Pac. Eep^ 407 ; Todd v. Birdsall, 1 Cowen, 260 ; 329. County Treasurer v. Bunbury, 45 SEla V. Smith, 5 Gray, 121. He Mich. 84 The execution of an ap- may order the abatement of a public peal bond by a mayor on behalf of a nuisance (Henderson v. Mayor, 3 La. city is not incidental to the power to 563) ; and notice to him of a nuisance prosecute appeals, and therefore does on city property is notice to the city, not bind the city. Baltimore v. Rail- Nichols V. Boston, 98 Mass. 39. road Co., 21 Md. 50. ting the oflBce, but to the nnconsti- Officers, § 641 ; Mechem on Public tutionality of the act by which the Offices and Offlcei-s, §§ 322, 323 ; officer is appointed." See, also, JEJc Morgan v. Quacken|}ush, 22 Barb. 80 ; parte Reilly, 85 Cal. 632 ; People v. Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Oregon, 456 ; Toal, 85 Cal. 333 ; " Acts of de facto s. c, 3 Am. St. Rep. 176. Councils" in chapter on Public » State v. Blossom, 19 Nev. 313; Boards, infra. Cf. Donough v. Auditors v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176; Dewey (1890), 83 Mich. 309, where it Cronln v. Stoddard, 97 N. Y. 271. was held that if a law providing for * Conover v. Devlin, 15 How. Pr. 200 0FFI0EE8 AND AGENTS. [§§ 186, 187. § 186. Rights and liaMlities of de facto officers.— An oMcer de facto can neither maintain nor defend suits in his official capacity. When he sets up a title by virtue of his office, he must show an unquestionable right.' An infant cannot justify for service of process as a constable.* Actual incumbency merely gives a public officer no right to recover SEdlary of fees either by suit against the municipality or against privkte persofis.' Nor can he bring a suit in his official title for pecuniary penalties.* § 1S7. Resignation by acceptance of incompatible office. Where a person holds an office which he is at liberty to re- linquish at his cwn pleasure, the acceptance of another and incompatible office vacates the first ofiice; ' and it requires no (N. Y.) 470. See, also, Braidy v. Theritt, 17 Kan. 468 ; Runion v. Lati- mer, 6 S. C. 136; Ex parte Norris, 8 S. C. 408; Esis parte Smith, 8 S. C. 495. 1 Adams v. Tator, 43 Hun, 384; Dolan V. Mayor &o., 68 N. T. 374; Venable v. Curd, 3 Head (Tenn.), 583 ; Shepherd v. Staten, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 79 ; Riddle v. Bedford County, 7 Serg. & R 386; People v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 875 ; Dillon v. Myers,^ Bright (Pa.) 436 ; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass. 331; Hamlin v. Dingman, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 61; Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151 ; People v. White, 34 Wend. 630; Patterson w Miller, 3 Met (Ey.) 493 ; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio, 574 ; People V. Weber, 86 111. 388; s. a. 89 III. 347; Nichols v. MacLean, 101 N. Y. 536; Miller v. Callaway, 33 Ark. 666 ; Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 878; Keyser v. McKissan, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 130. But he will be protected in public expenditures for lawful piirpoBes.. McCracken v. Loiioy, 39 IlL App. 619. 2 Green v. Biirke, 33 Wend. 490. See, also, Short v. Symmes, 159 Mass. 398; Colburn v. Ellis, 5 Mass. 437; Cummings v. Clark, 15 Vt 653; Courser v. Powers, 34 Vt 617 ; John- ston V. Wilson, 3 N. H. 303; Pearce V. Hawkins, 3 Swan (Tenn.), 87; Peo- ple V. Weber, 86 111. 383 ; s. C, 89 HL 347; Miller v. Callaway, 33 Ark. 666; Patterson v. Miller, 2 Met (Ky.) 493; Rodman v. Harcourt^ 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 234. 'Dolan V. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 274; S. C, 33 Am. Rep. 168 ; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio, 574; Mayfield v. Moore, 53 111. 438 ; McCue v. Wapello County, 56 Iowa, 698; Prescott v. Hays, 42 N. H. 56 ; Riddle v. Bedford County, 7 Serg. & R. 393 ; Philadel- phia V. Given, 60 Pa. St 136 ; Dolliver «. Parks, 136 Mass. 499. He cannot recover, for instance, if he omitted to take the oath required by statute. Thomas tt Oweiis, 4 Nev. 189 ; Phila- delphia u Given, 60 Pa. St 136. •* Gould V. Glass, 19 Barb. 179; Supervisor v, Stimson, 4 Hill, 136; Horton v. Parsons, 87 Hun, 43 ; Peo- ple V. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375. » People V. Nostratjd, 46 N. Y. 875; People V. Carrique, 2 Hill, 93 ; Magie V. Stoddard, 35 Conn. 565 ; State v. Curran, 10 Ark. 142; Pooler v. Reed, 73 Ma 139; Stubs v. Lee, 64 Me. 195; State n Goflf, 15 R L 505 ; People v. Hanifan, 96 III. 430 ; Foltz v. Kevan, 105 Ind. 221 ; State v. West, 33 La. § 188.] OPFIOEES AND AGENTS. 201 legal proceedings to effect this result,' If a person be elected simultaneoasly to two incompatible offices, by qualifying for either he Signifies his refusal of the other.'* But where the officer is' holding over by law until his successor is chosen, it seeins that he may continue the exercise of the first without prejudice to the second ; ' and where the acceptance of the last office is made compulsory, under a penalty,^ or in case of ineligibility to occupy the same,* there is no implied abandon- ment of office. " "Where one office, is not subordinate to the other," said the Court of Common Pleas of New York, " nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vaca- tion of the other. The force of the word in its application to this matter is that from the nature and relations to each other of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incum- bent of the other." ^ § 188. Acceptance and withdrawal of resignations. — At common law it was an indictable offense for one to refuse an office in a public corporation to which he had been duly elected.' This principle has been applied by the English and several American authorities so as to render a resignation of such an officer after entering upon his office * wholly ineffective Ann. 1261 ; Kenney v. Georgen, 36 * Goettman v. Mayor &c., 6 Hun, Minn. 190; State v. Brinkerhoflf, 66 133. Of. Hartford v. Bennett, 10 Tex. 45. Ohio St 441. 1 State V. Buttz, 9 S. C. 158, and " State v. Keams, 47 Ohio St 566. cases cited in the preceding note. ' People v. Green, 5 Daly, 254 ; s. c, 2 Cotton V. Phillips, 56 N. H. 220. 46 How. Pr. 168. See, also, for a col- Formerly, in England, in the case of lection of English and American rul- incompatible offices, the incumbent ings on incompatibility, Throop on was held to retain the superior, but Public Officers, § 35 et seq. such is not now the rule. Eex v. ' State v. Ferguson, 81 N. J. Law, Jones, 1 Barn. & Ad. 677 ; Milward v. 107 ; Com. Dig., tit Officer, B. 1. See, Thacher, 3 T. R 81 ; Rex v. Tizzard, also, Edwards v. United States, Dillon 9 Barn. & C. 418 ; Com. Dig., tit Offl- on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 223. cer, K 5. ' There can be no resignation by 3 State V. Somers, 96 N. C. 467. one who has not qualified. Miller v. 202 OrFICEBS AND AGENTS. [§189. without the express or implied assent of the appointing power.' But the rule is not settled, many authorities holding that the office becomes ipso facto vacant when a resignation is trans- mitted and received.* "Where such is the law, a resignation is as irrevocable as an appointment, and if it be unconditional it cannot be withdrawn.' But a prospective resignation may be withdrawn with the consent of the authority accepting where no new rights have intervened.* § 189. Removal of oflRcers and agents — How effected. — The power of a corporation to remove its officers depends greatly upon the tenure of office of such officers ; as, where the power of removal is discretionary, they may be removed without notice or hearing ; but if their term of office is dur- ing good behavior, or where' the removal can only be for cer- tain causes, they cannot be removed except after notice and hearing.' The power to remove is incidental to a corporation Supervisors, 25 Cal. 93 ; Rex v. Bliz- ard, L. H. 3 Q. B. 55. See, also. In re Corliss, 11 E. L 638. 1 Rex V. Lane, 2 Ld. Raym. 1804 ; Edwards v. United States, 13 Otto, 471. Cf. United States v. Wright, 1 McL. (U. S.) 509 ; Van Orsdall v. Hazard, 3 Hill, 243, where Cowen, J., said it is en'tirely cfear that the resignation may be either in writing or by parol, express, or even by implication, so that there be an intent to resign on one side and an acceptance on the other. State V. Ferguson, 31 N. J. Law, 107 ; Hoke V. Henderson, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 1, 29 ; State v. Clayton, 37 Kan. 443; Rogers v. Slonaker, 33 Kan. 191; Waycross City Council v. Youmans (1890), 85 Ga. 708; State v. Boeker,56 Mo. 17. 2 Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378, citing Gilbert v. Luce, 11 Barb. 91 ; People V. Porter, 6 CaL 26; State v. Hauss, 43 Ind. 105 ; Leech v. State, 78 Ind. 570 ; Gates v. Delaware County, 13 Iowa, 405 ; State v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566; Conner v. Mayor, 3 Sandf. 355; S. C 5 N. Y. 385, 395. ' State V. Fitts, 49 Ala. 403 ; Gates V. Delaware County, 13 Iowa, 405 Bunting v. Willis, 37 Gratt (Va. 144; State v. Hauss, 43 Ind. 105 Pace V. People, 50 111. 432. ^Biddle v. Willard, 10 Ind. 62, 66 State V. Clayton, 27 Kan, 443 ; S. G, 41 Am. Rep. 418. See, also, Throop on Public Officers, ch. XVIL 8 People V. New York, 83 N. Y. 491 ; Queen v. Governors &c., 8 Ad. & Ell. 633 ; Rex v. Oxford, 3 Salk. 438 ; Bagg's Case, 11 Coke, 93 (b); Ram- shay, In re, 83 Eng. Com. Law, 174, 189 ; Rex u Coventry, 1 Ld. Raym. 391 ; R6x V. Mayor &c., 1 Lev. 391 ; Dr. Gaskin's Case, 8 T. R. 309 ; Will- cock on Munic. Corp. 353, 254 ; 3 Kyd on Corp. 58, 59 ; Rex v, Andover, 1 Ld. Raym. 710; Field v. Common- wealth, 33 Pa. St 478 (1859); Hen- nen. In re, 13 Pet (U. S.) 330. For removal, where duration of term is not fixed, see People v. Comptroller &c., 20 Wend. 595 ; People v. Nich- ols, 79 N. Y. 582; Field v. Girard College, 54 Pa. St 233; Common- wealth V. Sutherland, 3 Serg. & R. § 190.] OFFIOEKS AND AGENTS. 203 at large, and unless delegated to a select body or part, it must be exercised by the whole corporation.^ § 190. Causes for removal — English and American rules. It is said in Kyd on Corporations* that "the offenses for which a corporator may be disfranchised, or a corporate officer removed, have been distributed into three distinct classes : — First, such as relate merely to his corporate or official char- acter and amount to breaches of the condition tacitly or ex-. pressly annexed to his franchise or office.' Seeojidly, such as have no immediate relation to his corporate or official char- acter, but are in themselves of so infamous a nature as to ren- der the offender unfit to enjoy any public franchise; such as perjury, forgery, etc. And thirdly offenses of a mixed nat- ure, being not only against his corporate or oflBciaLduty, but also indictable at common law." * 145; State v. St Louis, 90 Mo. 19; State V. Doherty, 35 La. Ann. 119; 8. a, — Am. Rep. 131 ; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Men. 648 ; Madison v. Korbly, 32 Ind. 74; Stadlerv. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346. The New York statutes of 1887 and 1888 provided that conductors on the Brooklyn bridge, who were soldiers in the war of the Rebellion, and honorably discharged, must be notified of all charges against them before being removed from their po- sitions. It was held, on mandamvs to reinstate such a soldier, who had been removed from such position as conductor without a hearing, that, as he was entitled to a hearing with- out regard to the merits of his case, an order for a bill of particulars was unnecessary, and should be reversed. People V. Howell (1891), 13 N. Y. Supl. 317. The charter of the city of Jacksonville provided that no officer could be removed by the city council without first being heard in his de- fense. It was decided that the hear- ing must be had before the city coun- cil itself, and not before one of its committees. City of Jacksonville v. AUen, 25 111. App. 54 A board of police commissioners is not guilty of an arbitrary and unwarrantable ex- ercise of authority in suspending an o£Scer pending a ti-ial before the board on charges which if true would involve his dismissal State u St Louis Police Ctomm., 16 Mo. App. 48. 1 State V. Jersey City, 25 N. J, Law, 536; Fane's Case, Doug. 153; Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Str. 819 ; Rex v. Rich- ardson, 1 Burr. 517 ; Rex. v. Taylor, 3 Salk. 231 ; Rex v. Lyme Regis, Doug. 153; 2 Kyd on Corp. 56; Grant, 210, 241 ; Glover, 329. 2 2 Kyd on Corp., 63. SBagg's Case, 11 Rep. 98a. < Rex V. Carlisle, Fortesc. 200 ; s. a, 11 Mod. 379. As to whether the power of amotion still exists now that municipal ofiicers are elected under statutory provisions, see JJe Norton, Q. B., June 8, 1872. As to re- scinding an invalid amotion, see Re.- gina V. Mayor of Ryde, 28 L. T. (N. S.) 629. For amotion and disfranchise- ment, see 2 Kent Commentaries, 278, 297 ; and Angell ,& Ames on Corp., 204 OWWICSSS AND AOENTS. [§191. § 191. Power of corpoi'ation to reraore o£Bcers and agents. — One of the common-law incidents of all corpora- tions is the power to remove a corporate officer from his office for just and reasonable cause.' The leading case on this sub- ject is The King v. Richardson,' in which it was decided that a corporation, in the absence of an express grant of authority, had the incidental power to make a by-law to remove offi- cii. XII, where the doctrine of the English decisions is presented, and earlier cases cited. Richards v. Clarksburg (1887), SOW. Va. 491. Dis- franchisement destroys and takes away the franchise or right of being a member of a corporation. Will- cook on Munie. Corp. 245-376; Grant, 2S0, 263; 8 Kyd on Corp. 50-94; Glover, eh. XVI, pp. 327, 328. Under the code of West Virginia, which provides that " all the corpo- . rate powers of the corporation shall be exercised " by the common coun- cils of towns or villages to which said chapter applies, the power of amotion of oflBcers for misconduct, which at common law is vested in the " corpo- ration at large," is conferred on such councils. Bicharda v. Town of Clarksburg, 30 W. Va. 491; S. C, 4 S. E. Rep. 774. The Revised Stat- utes of Indiana confer express au- thority upon the common council Of a city to expel or remove, by a two- thirds vote, any member thereof, or any officer of the corporation, whether elected or appointed, and re- quires the council to make provision as to the mode in which charges shall be preferred and heard. Section 3278 provides that the common council shall be authorized, through a committee, to investigate the books and papers, together with all matters pertaining to the management of the water-works, and, in case of neglect of duty or malfeasance on the part of any officer connected therewith, to remove the offender. 'And it was held that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the council of a city from proceeding to investigate charges preferred against trustees of the water-works in the mode pro- vided by the by-laws and ordinances of the city. Muhler v. Hedekin, 119 Ind. 481; S. C, 20 N. E. Rep. 700. Acts of an officer, after bis suspen- sion, in seeking and accepting other employment, are not admissible against him to show that he under- stood when he received notice of sus- pension that he was discharged. Morley v. City of New York, 12 N. Y. Supl. 609. 1 Dillon on Munic. Coi-p., § 212 (4th ed.) ; Richards v. Clarksburg (1887), 30 W. Va. 491 ; State v. The Judges, 35 La. Ann. 1075 ; Ellison v. Raleigh, 89 N. C. 125 ; Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517 ; Rex V. Doncaster, 2 Burr. 738 ; Rex v, Liverpool, 3 Burr. 723 ; Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Str. 819; Jay's Case, 1 Vent 303 ; Rex v. Lyme Regis, Doug. 153 ; Rex V. Ponsonby, 1 Ves. Jr. 1 ; Rex V. Taylor, 3 Salk. 231 ; Rex v. Tidder- ley, 1 Sid. 14, per Hale, C. B. ; 3 Kyd on Corp. 50-94, where the old cases are digested ; Rex v. Chalke, 1 Lord Raym. 325 : 1 Boll. Rep. 409 ; S. C, 3 Bulst. 189 ; Willcook on Munic. Corp. 246; Grant, 340; 2 Kent's Com. 397. For earlier cases, see Lord Bruce's Case, 3 Str. 819, 820; Tidderley's Case, 1 Sid. 14, per Hale, 0. B. 21 Burr. 517. § 1J)2.] OFFICEES AND AGENTS. 20S ccrs for just cause.' Where the charter of a municipal cor- 1 oration gives to the common council express power to " ex- pel a member for disorderly conduct," the right to expel depends upon the construction of the words disorderly con- duct? % 192. The same subject continued. — The revised statute of Missouri which revised the city charter of Sedalia provided that the mayor should have power, with the consent of the board of aldermen, to remove from office any person holding oflBce, created by charter or ordinance, for cause. It was held that this statute was not repealed by a subsequent statute which provided for the removal from ofiBce of persons who failed to devote their time to their duties, or who were guilty of wilful or fraudulent violation of duty. In an action for wrongful ouster from ofSce, it is not error to permit plaintiff to strike out an allegation as to the power of defendant mayor and aldermen to remove for cause the incumbent of an office created by charter or ordinance, as the state of facts on which the action was based remained unaltered.' 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp^ (4th ed.), of courts in United States to punish § 351. The Massachusetts statutes of for contempt Burr's Trial, 355 ; 1885 provide that subordinates of the Kearney, In re, 7 Wheat 38 ; United various city boards of Boston may be States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 33. removed by the board " for such cause Power of congress. 13 U. S. Stats, at as they may deem sufficient and shall Large, 383 ; 11 U. S. Stats, at Large, assign in their order for removal The 155. See, also, Kilgour v. Thoinp- oourt decided that it does not require son (1 880), 103 U. S. 168. that a subordinate shall be given a ' Manker v. Faulhaber(Mo.), 6 S. W. hearing before the board, on charges Eep. 373. The Missouri constitution preferred against him, before* he can of 1875 provided that all lav?s in force be removed. O'Dovpd v. City of Bos- at the adoption of the constitution, ton (1889), 149 Mass. 443; s. C, 31 and not inconsistent .therewith, N. E. Bep. 949. Charter power of re- should remain in force until altered or moval, at any time, without cause, repealed by the general assembly. It of a police patrol appointed for a was accordingly decided in the ca^e year, see Chicago v. Edwards (1871), lastcitedthattheactof Marchl8,lB73, 58 111. 358. . as amended by an act of 1875 revis- 2 State V. Jersey City (1856), 1 ing the charter of the city of Sedalia, Dutch. (N. J.) 536. For power to and providing for the removal of city punish for contempt in England, see ofiScers by the mayor and board of Doyle V, Falconer, 1 Privy Council aldermen for cause, is not repugnant Appeals, 339 ; Speaker v. Glass, 3 to said constitution of 1875, regarding Privy Council Appeals, 560. Power the duties of persons holding offices 206 OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§ 193. § 193. Notice of proceeding to remoTC Before an offi- cer whose tenure of office is not discretionary can be re- moved, he is entitled to a personal notice of the proceeding against him, which notice must contain the fact that a pro- ceeding to amove is intended and the time when and place where the trial body will meet.^ The charges must be spe- cifically stated, with substantial certainty,^ and the accused must be given time to produce his testimony and present his answer, and is entitled to be represented by counsel and to cross-examine the witnesses against him.' of trust or profit, and the power of the general assembly to provide for their removal for violation or neglect of official duty. Implied power of removal for cause by appointing powei". Willard's Appeal, 4 R I. 595, 597, per Ames, C. J. In an action for damages for wrongful removal from oflSce by the mayor and aldermen of a city, the refusal by the court to permit defendants to read the pro- visions of the city charter giving them authority to remove for cause is erroneous. Manker v. Faulhaber (Mo.), 6 S. W. Rep. 373. The Consol- idation Act of New York provides that the heads of all the departments of New York city may be removed by the mayor, after opportunity to be heard. It was d'ecided that the viola- tion of the provision in the act that no head of the department shall become interested directly or indirectly in the purchase of real estate by the corporation constitutes suflBcient cause for removal by the mayor, and it is immaterial that the act also con- tains a provision for the punishment of such offense. People v. City of New York, 5 N. Y. SupL 538. Where judgment of ouster is pronounced against persons holding seats in a city council, and they are ousted therefrom on the ground that the wards from which they claim to have been elected had. no legal existence, such ouster does not create vacancies in the council which may be filled by a special election. State v. Kearns (1891), 47 Ohio, 566 ; S. a, 25 N. E. Rep. 1027. 1 People V. Benevolent Society, 24 How. Pr. 216; People v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582; Nichols, In re, 6 Abb. New Caa. 474 ; S. c, 57 How. Pr. 395 ; People ex rel. v. Commissioners &a of Brooklyn, 106N. Y.64; Common- wealth V. Pennsylvania Benef. In- stitute, 2 Serg. & R 141 ; Society v. Vandyke, 2 Whart (Pa.) 309; De- lacey v. Neuse &c. Co., 1 Hawks (N. C.), 274; South. P. R Co. v. Hixon, 5 Ind. 165; Innes v. Wylie, 1 C. & K. 257; Queen v. Saddlers' Co., 10 H. of L. Cas. 404; State v. Bryce (1836), 7 Ohio, part II (82), 414, 416; Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 540; Rex v, Liverpool, 2 Burr. 731 ; Rex v. Don- caster, 2 Burr. 738. See 1 B. & Ad. 942; Exeter v. Glyde, 4 Mod. 37; Bagg's Case, 11 Rep. 99a; Rex v. Wilton, 5 Mod. 259; Willc. 264, 265; Reg. V. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym. 1240. When notice may be dispensed with, see Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), §254. 2 Bagg's Case, 11 Co. 99a; S. c, 1 Roll. 225 ; Tompert u Lithgow (1866), 1 Bush (Ky.), 176; Willcock on Munic. Corp. 267; Glover, 334; Rex V. Lyme Regis, Doug. 179. 'Murdock V. Academy, 12 Pick. 244; State v. Bryce (1836), 7 Ohio, part II (82), 414; Rex v. Chalke, 1 §§ 194, 195.] OFFIOEKS AND AGENTS.. 207 R 194. The same subject continued.— 'When the charge is not admitted it must be examined and proved.' Before an officer can be ousted by authority other than the appointing power, he is entitled to a hearing, for the reason that the ques- tion whether he shall be ousted is a judicial one, and a decis- ion given without afifording hira time and opportunity to be heard is ineffectual.'' Where the charge stated does not jus- tify the removal, or where the removal is erroneous, the officer is entitled to be restored by mandamus? % 195. All persons charged with notice of duties and pow- ers of municipal agents. — The statutes prescribe the powers and duties of officers and agents of a public corporation, and all persons dealing with them are charged with the knowledge of the nature of these duties and the extent of these powers.* Ld. Eaym. 326 ; Rex v. Derby, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 154; Eex v. Richard- son, 1 BuiT. 540 ; Rex v. Liverpool, 2 Burr. 734. iMurdock v. Academy, 12 Pick M4; Willcock on Munic. Corp. 267; Glover, 334 ; Harman v. Tappenden, I East, 562; Rex v. Faversham, 8 Term R 356. * Board of Comm'rs of Knox County V. Johnson, 124 Ind. 145; s. a, 19 Am. St. Rep. 88 ; DuUan v. Wellson, 53 Mich. 393 ; S. C, 51 Am. Rep. 128; PeojAe v. Freese, 83 Cal. 453; Williams v. Bagot, 3 Bam. & G. 786; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. 648. The power to oust an officer rightfully in office is essentially a judicial one, except where it is exer- cised by appointing power. State v, Harrison, 113 Ind. 434; S. a, S Am. St Rep. 663. 'State V. Z^rsay City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 536 ; Commonwealth v. Ger- man Society (1850), 15 Pa. St 251 ; Madison v. Korbly (1869), 33 Ind. 74; Reg. V. Ipswich, 3 Ld. Raym. 1340. Equity will not enjoin the corporate authorities from making an unlaw- ful removal or appointing a suc- cessor. Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), ch. XXI and § 847; Delahanty V. "Warner (1874), 75 111. 185 ; s. C., 20 Am. Rep. 237. One who has been duly elected, qualified, and inducted into office as a city alderman cannot be summarily removed, by resolution of the board, upon a charge of dis- qualification, without notice and without hearing or investigation of any kind. Board of Aldermen v. Darrow, 13 Colo. 460 ; S. C, 23 Pac. Rep. 784. < The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 606 ; Merchants' Bank v. Ber- gen Co., 115 U. S. 384; Hodges v. Buffalo. 2 Den. (N. Y.) 110; Cornell v. Guillford, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 510 ; McDon- ald V. Mayor &c. of New York, 68 N. Y. 23; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143 ; Lowell Savings Bank V. Winchester, 8 Allen, 109 ; Perkin- son V. St Louis, 4 Mo. App. 822 ; Cray- craft V. Selvage, 10 Bush (Ky.), 708 ; Cleveland v. State Bank of Ohio, 16 Ohio St 236 ; s. G, 88 Am. Dec. 445 ; Chicago V. Shober &c. Co., 6 Bradw. (III.) 560 ; Alton v. MuUedy, 21 IlL 76 ; Pine Civil Township v. Huber Mfg. Co., 83 Ind. 121 ; Summers v. Daviess 208 OFFIOESS AND AGENTS. [§ 196. § 196. Lial)ility of ofBcers to the corporations. — Public officers elected pursuant to statute by a municipal corporation are not the servants or agents of the corporation in such a sense as will enable the corporation, in the absence of a statute giving the remedy, to maintain actions against such officers for negli- gence in the discharge of their official duty.* When an officer who is about to enter upon the discharge of his duties for a second term makes a report to, or a settlement with, the proper authorities, from which it,appears that he has on hand at the close of his first term a certain sum of money, such set- tlement is, in the opinion of many of the courts, conclusive upon him, if the officers with whom the settlement is made acted in good faith and have no knowledge that the sum of money which he reports is not actually in his hands.' Co., 103 Ind. 263; Axt v. Jackson School Township, 90 Ind. 101 ; Eeeve School Township v. Dodson, 98 Ind. 497; Platter u Elkhart Co., 103 Ind. 360; Bloomington School Township V. National School Furnishing Co., 107 Ind. 48 ; Barton v. Sweptson, 44 Ark. 437 ; Dorsey Co. v. "Whitehead, 47 Ark. 205'; Wallace v. Mayor &c. of San Jose, 29 Cal. 181 ; Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 333 ; S. C, 5 Am. St Rep. 443. See, also, Whiteside v. United States, 93 U. S. 247; Hai-sh- man v. Bates Co., 92 U. S. 569; Mo- Clure V. Oxford Township, 94 U. S. 429; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 TJ. S. 260 ; Lewis v. Shreveport, 108 U. S. 283; Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U.S. 83; Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556; Post v. Kendall Co., 105 U. S. 667 ; Daviess v. Dickenson, 117 U. S. 657;, Mayor &o. of Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 468 ; Vincent v. Nantucket, 13 Cush. (Mass.) 103; Dill V. Wareham, 7 Mete. 438 : Spalding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. Tl ; Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475; Donovan v. Mayor Sec of New York, 33 N. y. 291; McDonald v. Mayor &c. of New York, 68 N. Y. 23; s. c;, 23 Am. Rep. 144 ; Overseers of Nor- wich V. Overseers of Berlin, 18 Johns. 383; Davies v. New York, 48N.Y. Supr. Ct. 194; Appleby v. Mayor &c., 15 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 428 ; Peterson v. Mayor &c of New York, 17 N. Y. 449 ; Ottoman Cahvey Co. v. Phila- delphia (Pa.;, 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 524; Livingston v. Pippin, 31 Ala, 543 ; People v. Baraga Township, 39 Mich. 554; Neely v. Yorkville, 10 S. C. 141. J Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 236 ; Witson v. Mayor &c. of New York, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 595; Minor v. Bank, 1 Pet (U. S.) 46, 69 ; Lincoln V. Chapin, 182 Mass. 470 ; Parish in Sherburne v. Fiske, 8 Cush. 264, 266; Dewey, J., White v. PhiUpson, 10 Met 108; Trafton v. Alfred, 3 ShepL (15 Me.) 258 ; Hancock v. Hazard, 12 Cush. 112; Commonwealth v. Gen- ther (Pa.), 17 Serg. & R. 135. Whether municipal councillors are liable to the corporation for misappropriating its funds, see Municipality of East Missom-i v. Horseman, 16 Upper Can. (Q. B.) 588. For payment of money on Illegal order or resolution, Daniels V. Burford, 10 Upper Can. (Q. B.) 481. 2 Boone County v. Jones, 54 Iowa, 699 ; s. C, 37 Am. Rep. 266 ; State v. § 19T.] OFFICEKS AND AGENTS. 209 § 197. Instances of frandnlent acts of municipal agents. Municipal officers and agents are held to a stri'ct accountability in their dealings with or on behalf of the corporation, and will be held personally liable in case of injury arising either to the corporation or a third party out of any tortious act in their official capacity. If a member of a municipal board authorized to select and purchase a site for public purposes agrees with a third person to inform the latter of the site selected by such board, and that the latter shall thereupon purchase such site, and then sell it to the board at a profitj and the agreement is carried out through the aid of the offi- cer, and the municipality is thereby made to pay a higher price for the property than it could have been purchased for from the original owner, aa action can be sustained against the officer and his confederate for the amount of profit realized by them.i Grammier,29Incl. 551 ; Baker v. Pres- ton, 1 Gilmer, 235 ; Morley v. Town of Metamora, 78 111. 394 ; S. C, 20 Am. Eep. 266 ; Eoper v. Sangamon Lodge, 91 IlL 518; S. G, 33 Am. Eep. 160; Chicago V. Gage, 95 III. 598 ; s. c, 35 Am. Eep. 182 ; Cawley v. People, 95 111. 249. 1 Boston V. Simmons, 150 Mass. 461; s. a, 15 Am. St Eep. 230; 23 N. E. Eep. 210 ; "Walker v. Osgood, 98 Mass. 348; Cutter v. Demmon, 111 Mass. 474; Eice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 135; s. G, 18 Am. Eep. 459; Adams v. Paige, 7 Pick. 542, 550: United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30, 35 ; Emery v. Hapgood, 7 Gray, 55, 58 ; s. G, 66 Am. Dec. 459. All who aid in the commission of a tort are joint tort-feasors, and,"as such, jointly liable for the result of their act Creed v. Hartman, 29 N. Y. 591 ; S. G, 86 Am. Dec. 341 ; Elauder v. McGrath, 35 Pa St 128; s. G, 78 Am. Dec. 329 ; Moir v. Hopkbis, 16 111. 318 ; S. G, 63 Am. Dec. 312. De- fendants, who were members of the town council, with others, entered 14 into a bond in a certain sum for the purpose of building a court-house in the town. Afterwards the town coun- cil, of which defendants were mem- bers, illegally appropriated $1,000 of the town funds to aid in building the court-house, a portion of which sum was immediately paid over. The court held that the defendants were liable for the amount thus paid, in an ac- tion brought by the tax-payers for its recovery. Eussell v. Tate (1890), 52 Ark. 541; s. G, 13 S. W. Eep. 180. The laws of New York, 1881, chapter 531, provides that municipal oflBcers " and other persons acting for or on behalf of any town, county, village . or municipal corporation" may be enjoined, in a suit by tax-payers, from committing any illegal oflScial act. or from committing waste or in- jury to any property, funds or estate of such town, etc. It was held that an action will lie against city oflBcers to prevent them from compromising for a nominal sum a final judgment in favor of the city against persons for violation of the excise law, the 210 0FFICEB8 AND AGENTS. [§ 198. § 198. Liability of corporation to officers. — Corporations are in general liable for their oflBcers' salaries while they con- tinue in office, and if they improperly remove them, they still remain liable.* A highway surveyor, however, cannot recover from the town an amount expended by him in excess of the tax committed to him.^ And it has been decided that a mu- nicipal officer who is kept out of his office and has not per- formed his duties cannot maintain an action against the city to recover the fees accruing fronfthe office.' proceeds of which belong to the poor fund. And in such action the judg- ment debtors, who are alleged to be acting in collusion with the officers, are properly joined as defendants. Standart v. Burtis, 46 Hun, 83. The Missouri statute making town, city, state and county officers liable, etc., for converting public moneys to their own use, embraces township offlcei-s. State V. Cleveland, 80 Mo. 108. Town officers who, in constructing a ditch, act according to their best judgment, refraining from unnecessary injury, are not liable for errors of judgment in choosing the location or method of construction. Smith v. Gould, 61 Wis. 31. Town bonds were delivered by the town to a railroad company in exchange for its stock. A. re- ceived them as president of the com- pany and sold them for the company. A. was also town supervisor. The court held that as he acted for the company, he was not liable to an ac- tion by the town for having sold them to bona fide purchasers, know- ing them to be invalid. Famham v. Benedict, 39 Hun, 33. 1 Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346 ; Shaw V, Mayor &c., 19 Ga. 468. Where overseers of the poor procure supplies on their own credit, instead of following the procedure laid down in the statute, they are not precluded from charging the same to the town, and demanding that the account be audited by the town board of audit Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 N. Y. 333. -Cloud V. Norwich, 57 Vt 448. 8 Dolan V. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 379; Sa- line Co. V. Anderson, 30 Kan. 298. See, also, Terhune v. Mayor &c., 88 N. Y. 347 ; McVeany v. New York, 80 N. Y. 185 ; Steubenville v. Gulp, 38 Ohio St. 18 ; Benoit v. 'Wayne County, 30 Mich. 176. But where an officer's removal was reversed on certiorari, he was entitled to recover for the time during which he was deprived of his office, without deduction for wages earned in another capacity. This is because there is no contract in favor of the officer as there is in the ordinary relation of master and servant He receives his salary aa an incident to his offlca Fitzsim- mons V. Brooklyn, 102 N. Y. 536. An- drews V. Portland, 79 Me. 484. to the same point, although the salary had been paid to a de facto incumbent Such is also the rule in California. Stratton v. Oulton, 38 Cal. 44; People V. Potter, 63 Cal. 137 ; Doraey v. Smith, 28 Cal. 21; Meagher v. County, 5 Nev. 344 ; Can-oil v. Sie- benthaler (1869), 37 Cal. 193. Courts of equity will not as a rule enjoin the payment of the salary to the incum- bent pending a contest Field v. Com- monwealth (1849), 32 Pa. St 478; In re Ramshay, 83 Eng. C. L. 174; Queen v. Governors &c., 8 Ad. & EL 632. Persons who are neither offi- § 199.] OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 211 § 199. Indictment of municipal ofiScers.— Provision is generally made by statute for the indictment of municipal oflBcers for wilful misfeasance or non-feasance in their oflScial capacity. Thus in North Carolina " a public oiBcer intrusted with definite powers to be exercised for the benefit of the community, who wickedly abuses them or fraudulently ex- ceeds them, is punishable by indictment." ' And it has been held in the State of Tennessee that the mayor and aldermen may be indicted for neglecting to keep the streets of a city or town in reasonable repair.* cers de jure nor de facto cannot re- cover the salary of an officer. Samis V. King, 40 Conn. 398. 1 State V. Glasgow, N. C. Conf. 186, 187 ; State v. Justices &c.. 4 Hawks (N. C), 194. See, also, State v. Fish- blate, 83 N. C. 654; State v. Com- missioners of Fayetteville, 2 N. C. Law, 617; Paris v. People, 37 111.' 74. The Illinois statutes make it a crim- inal offense for a town officer to withhold the town records from the county clerk's office, on the discon- tinuance of the township system in the county. But it was held that the indictment need not state the manner in which the town office was abol- ished, and that it was not necessary to a conviction that a demand should have been made on the officer for the records withheld. Baysinger v. People, 115 m. 419. 2 Hill V. State (1857), 4 Sneed, 443. See, also, Phillips v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. St 197. The mayor and alder- men of a city are indictable for any wilful or negliRent failure to dis- charge the duties devolved upon them by the city chai-ter. They can- not with impunity arbitrarily refuse to exercise the powers with which they are invested, nor can they wil- fully prevent them from' being exer- cised. But they constitute a part of a city government distinct from the board of audit and finance of the city, and the two cannot be jointly indicted for refusal or failure to per- form their duties under the charter. State V. Hall, 97 N. C. 474; s. a, 1 S. E. Rep. 683. For requisites of in- dictment for non-performance of official duty see the case last cited; 3 Chitty, Crim. Law, 586, 606; State V. Mayor, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 317; Wattles V. People, 13 Mich. 446; State V. Comm'rs, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 345. One who procures himself to be sworn into a public office to which he knows he has no title is indictable at common law. Scarlet's Case, 12 Coke, 98. CHAPTER VII. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 200. Liability on contracts — Pre- Bumption against liability. 201. The satne subject continued — Negotiable instruments. 203. The same subject continued — Excess of authority, fraud, etc. 803. Exemption from liability for legislative acts. 204. The foregoing rule qualified — Breach of trust 205. Liability of judicial officers considered. 206. @«asi-judicial officers — Cor- ♦ rupt motive. 207. Liability of ministerial offi- cers. 208. The same subject continued. 209. No personal liability for strict- ly public acts, 310. Default of subordinates. 211. Ejection of member of coun- cil by order of mayor. 212. Negligence of recorder of deeds. 213. The same subject continued. 214. Liability of assessor of taxes. § 200. Liability on contracts — Presumption against lia- bility. — Upon considerations of public policy a distinction has been established between the personal liability of public agents on contracts made in behalf of their principal, and that of private agents under like circumstances. It is presumed that persons dealing with public officers do not rely upon their individual credit, and in order to make them personally liable there must be a clear intent to that effect.^ It makes no dif- 1 Willett V. Young (1891, Iowa), L E. A. 115; s. C, 47 N. W. Rep. 990, where trustees of a township were held not liable on an order directed to the town clerk to be paid out of township funds, and signed by them with the word " trustees '' added to their signatures, as it was manifest from the whole instrument that there was no intention to assume liability ; nor would the invalidity of the order given for property purchased for the township affect the case. In Huth- sjng V. Bousquet, 7 Fed. Rep. 833, su- pervisors offered a reward beyond their power ; but as the offer as pub- lished clearly appeared to be intended as official, they were held not liable PS individuals. Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, 345, a leading case by Chief Justice Marshall; Knight v. Clark (1886), 48 N. J. Law, 22 ; S. C, 57 Am. Rep. 534; Cutler v. Ashland, 121 Mass. 588 ; Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 Dal- las, 384 ; Crowell v. Crispin, 4 Daly, 100 ; Fox V. Drake, 8 Cowen, 191 ; Belknap v. Reinhart, 2 "Wend. 375; S. C, 30 Am. Dec. 631; Walker v. Swart won t, 13 Johns. 444; B. C, 7 Am. Dec. 384 ; Osborne v. Kerr, 12 § 201.J PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICBES AND AGENTS. 213 ference whether the contract be written, by parol, or sealed.' But where it is evident that the olflcer intended to pledge his private responsibility he is liable.* ' § 201. The same subject continued — Negotiable instru- ments. — A public agent is not personably liable on negotiable instruments executed by him in his oflBcial capacity, but in the absence of intent to the contrary evident on the face of the instrument the presumption is that the agent acts in his private character, and is therefore individually liable;' that is, the distinction between public and private agents in respect of personal liability on contracts has been said not to. apply to negotiable paper ; and where a note is signed by an agent in his own name, the addition of his official title will not free him from responsibility if the body of the obligation purports to bind him personally.* There are cases, however, which have Wend. 179 ; Eathbon v. Budlong, 15 Johns. 1; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cowen, 513; s. c, 13 Am. Dec. 550; Sheffield V. Watson, 3 Caines (N. Y.), 69 : Bron- son V. Woolsey, 17 Johns. 46 ; Brown V. Austin, 1 Mass. 208 ; s. C, 2 Am. Dec. 11; Tippets v. Walker, 4 Mass. 595, 597; Bainbridge v. Dowine, 6 Mass. 253 ; Dawes v. Jackson, 9 Mass. 490; Freeman v. Otis, 9 Mass. 279; s. c, 6 Am. Dec. 66 ; Comer v. Bank- head, 70 Ala. 498 ; Wallis v. Johnson School Township, 75 Ind. 368 ; Per- rin V. Lyman, 33 Ind. 16; McClen- ticks V. Bryant, 1 Mo. 598 ; s. a, 14 Am. Dec. 310; Tutt v. Hobbs, 17 Mo. 486; Lyon v. Irish, 58 Mich. 518; StinchBeld v. Little, 1 GreenL (Me.) 331 ; S. C, 10 Am. Dec. 65 ; Bernard V. Torrance, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 383. It has been said, however, that this rule in regard to public officers does not apply in favor of the officers of a municipal corporation which is ca- pable of making contracts for itself and is liable t6 be sued thereon. Si- monds v. Heard, 33 Pick. 130 ; Hall v. Cockrell, 38 Ala. 507. And see City of Providence v. Miller (1876), 11 E. 1 372. ' Hodgson V. Dexter. 1 Cranch, 345; Knight v. Clark, 48 N. J. Law, 23 ; s. C, 57 Am. Rep. 534 ; Anwin v. Wolseley, 1 Term R 674; Walker v. Swartwout, 13 Johns. 444; S. c, 7 Am. Dec. 334. 2 Simonds v. Heard, 33 Pick. 120 ; S. c, 34 Am. Dec. 41 ; Ogden v. Ray- mond, 33 Conn. 379 ; s. c, 58 Am. Dec. 439 ; Bayliss t). Pearson, 15 Iowa, 379; Wing u. Glick, 56 Iowa, 473; S. C, 37 Am. Rep. 143, n. ; Cahokin v. Rautenberg, 88 UL 319; Ross v. Brown, 74 Me. 353 ; Fowler v. Atkin- son, 6 Minn. 579 ; Sheffield v. Wat- son, 3 Caines (N. Y.), 69; Gill v. Brown, 13 Johns. 385; Exchange Bank v. Lewis County, 38 West Va. 273 ; City of Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I.. 373; s. C, 33 Am. Rep. 453; Horsley v. Bell, 1 Bro. C. C. 101. > Story on Agency, § 306 ; 1 Daniels' Negotiable Instruments, § 445 ; Tiede- man on Commercial Paper, § 137; Mechem's Public Offices and Officers, § 831 et seq. < Village of Cahokia v. Rautenberg (1878), 88 111. 319 ; Fowler v. Atkinson, 6 Minn. 579; Wing v. Glick, 66 Iowa, 214 PEESONAL LIABILITT OF OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§ 202. taken what is termed by a standard text-writer * " a praise- worthy step " in holding that the official designation is not a mere desoriptio personce, but indicates an intent to charge the corporation.* Whether parol evidence is admissible to show that a note containing a promise, individual in form, but exe- cuted officially, was intended to bind the corporation, is a question not settled. It was held in Iowa that extrinsic evidence could not be resorted to in such a case ; ' but in Minnesota and Missouri the preva%ing rule in cases of private agency is applied, and the ambiguity may be explained.^ § 202. The same subject continued — Excess of author- ity, fraud; etc. — The rule that all persons are bound to know the law precludes them from alleging ignorance of the limits and extent of authority conferred on a public officer ; * which is no more than saying that the latter does not ordinarily warrant the validity of his contracts ; but his express repre- sentations of matter of fact relating to his agency are binding 473; S. C, 37 Am. Kep. 143, note; Exchange Bank v. Lewis County, 28 West Va. 278 ; Eoss v. Brown (1882), 74 Ma 352; Bayliss v. Pearson, 15 Iowa, 279; American Ins. Co. v. Straiten, 59 Iowa, 696; Forcey v. Caldwell (Pa.), 9 Atl. Eep. 466. Cf. Lyon I'. Adamson, 7 Iowa, 509 ; Baker V, Chambles, 4 Greene (Iowa), 428. 1 Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, § 137. * School Town of Monticello v. Ken- dall, 72 Ind. 91 ; s. C, 37 Am. Rep^ 189 ; Moral School Tp. v. Harrison, 74 Ind. 98; Andrews v. Estes, 11 Me. 267; Wallisu. Johnson School Tp., 75 Ind. 368. See, also. Knight v. Clark (1886), 48 N. J. Law, 22 ; s. C, 57 Am. Rep. 534 (case of a sealed note); Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. 126 ; S. C, 77 Am. Dec. 503; Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat 172; Balcombe v. Northrup, 9 Minn. 173; Hodges v. Bunyan, 30 Mo. 491 ; McGee v. Lara- more, 60 Mo. 425. » American Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 59 iDwo, C96. * Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. 136 ; S. C, 77 Am. Dec. 503 ; McClellan v. Rey- nolds, 49 Mo. 313. See, also, Pratt v. Baupre, 13 Minn. 187 ; Musser v. John- son, 43 Mo. 74; S. C, 97 Am. Dec. 316; Shuetze v. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69; Washington Gas Co. v. Seminary, 53 Mo. 480 ; Klosterman v. Loos, 58 Mo. 290 ; Turner v. Thomas, 10 Mo. App. 342. SLee V, Munroe, 7 Cranch, 366; The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 680 ; Whiteside v. United States, 93 U. S. 347; Hull v. Marshall County, 13 Iowa, 133 ; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa," 199; a C, 87 Am. Dec. 433; Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. 112; Mayor &c. v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 388 ; Mayor &c. v, Reynolds, 30 Md. 1; S. a, 88 Am. Dec. 535 ; State v. Hays, 52 Mo. 578; State v. Bank, 45 Ma 528 ; People v. Bank, 34 Wend. 431 ; Delafield v. State, 36 Wend. 193; Sil- liman v. Fredericksburg &c R. Co., 27 Gratt. 119; State u Hastings, 10 Wis. 518. See, also, § 196, supra. §§ 203, 204.] PERSONAL LIABILITY OP OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. 215 upon him ; ^ and he must answer for fraudulent concealments or misstatements of such facts.' So he may, by denying his agency, estop himself from subsequently asserting it to avoid liability ; ' and the obligation may be enforced against him where his principal is a legal myth.* § 203. Exemption from liability for legislative acts. — It is a well-settled and salutary rule that the motives of the in- dividual members of a legislative assembly in voting for a particular law cannot be inquired into and its supporters made personally liable upon an allegation that they acted mali- ciously towards the person aggrieved by the passage of the law. Whenever the officers of a municipal corporation are vested with legislative powers, they hold and exercise them for the public good, and are clothed with all the immunities of government, and are exempt from all liability for their mis- taken use.* Thus where a mayor sought to recover damages from the aldermen of a town by reason of an ordinance by which they " unlawfully and maliciously deprived him of his legal rights, fees, privileges and emoluments, and of his office of mayor," a demurrer was sustained although the defend- ants may have exceeded the measure of their authority in passing the ordinance in question.* § 204. The foregoing rule qnalifled — Breach of trust. — But if the conduct of members of a municipal legislative board 1 Belisle v. Clark, 49 Ala. 98 ; Jef ts Md. 469 ; Borough of Fi-eeport v. V. York, 10 Gush. 393; Bartlett v. Marks, 39 Pa. St 253. See, also, Cooley Tucker, 104 Mass. 336; S. c, 6 Am. on Torte (2d ed.), 443. Rep. 240; Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 "Jones v. Loving (1877), 55 Miss. Pa. St 311; a C, 47 Am. Rep. 718; 109. "If they exceeded their author- Bank of Hamburg v, Wray, 4 Strob. ity," it was a brutum fulmen, and (S. C.) 87 ; S. C, 51 Am. Dec. 659 ; could not for one moment have de- McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197; prived the plaintiff of any privi- S. G, 91 Am. Dec. 468. leges, emoluments or fees of his 2Smout V. Ubery, 10 M. & W. 1; offica If he chose voluntarily to Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, 4 Strob. yield obedience to a void law, it was (S. C.) 87 ; Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 his own folly, .for which the courts Pa. St 311. can afford him no relief by award- > Freeman v. Otis, 9 Mass. 273 ; a C, ing damages against the individuals 6 Am. Dec. 66 ; McClenticks v. Bry- voting for the ordinance. See, also, ant 1 Mo. 598. McCrea v. Chahoon (1889), 54 Hun, «Blakely v. Bennecke, 59 Mo. 193. 577; a C, 8 N. "S. SupL 8a ° County Comm'rs v, Duokett, 20 216 PEESONAL LIABILITY OB OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§205. amounts to a breach of trust, or a conversion of trust money belonging to the municipality, they are personally liable for tort. A declaration in an action by a city against a former chairman of its water board and another person alleged that the board was authorized to buy land for the city for a reser- voir; that the chairman, of whose position, knowledge and authority the other defendant had knowledge, knew and shared in determining the action of the board regarding the purchase ; that both together, taking advantage of this and intending to defraud the city, corruptly agreed that the chairman should impart to the other the doings of the board in selecting the land and the parcel it considered fit for a reservoir site, where- upon such other was to become the purchaser thereof; that the board should afterwards buy it at an advanced price from him and that the profits should be divided between them ; that in pursuance of this agreement the chairman revealed the particular lot thought suitable by the board to the other, who thereupon bought it, and the board, influenced by the chairman, subsequently purchased it from him at an advance ; and that the two divided the profits of the transaction. A demurrer was overruled on the ground that a good cause of action was disclosed against both defendants for the injury sustained by the city.' The aldermen of a town, having executed a bond binding themselves to build within the corporate limits a court-house to be given to the county, illegally voted an ap- propriation of a sum out of the municipal funds to aid in such building, which was immediately paid by the treasurer on the order of the mayor. It was held that the taking of the money by the defendants was the conversion of a trust fund for which they were liable.'' § 205. Liability of judicial officers considered. — As long ago as in the time of Lord Coke it was said : — " Such as are by law made judges of another shall not be criminally accused or made liable to an action for what they do as judges," ' and the principles which should govern such actions have been settled by a vast number of cases, although their application is some- J Boston u Simmons (1890), 150 2 Russell v. Tate (1889), 52 Ark. 541 ; Mass. 461 ; s. C, 23 N. E. Kep. 210. S. c, 13 S. W. Rep. 130. 3 Floyd V. Barker, 13 Coke, 26. § 205.] PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICEES AND AGENTS. 217 times difficult. Where there is no jurisdiction at all there is no judge,' and the protection extends only to judicial decisions or acts of a judicial character and not to mere administrative acts. But where the court, though of limited jurisdiction, has, in a given case, jurisdiction of the subject-matter ^ and of the person interested, a judicial officer is not civilly liable for an erroneous decision, however gross the error may have been or how^ever bad the motive which inspired it.' Thus, where the mayor of a city had the same jurisdiction as justices of the peace, he was held not liable to a civil action for false im- prisonment for "corruptly and maliciously" retaining juris- diction and imposing a fine and imprisonment in default of payment, after the defendant had upon proper affidavit moved for a change of venue, the statute requiring him to grant the motion under such circumstances.* 1 Perkin v. Proctor, 3 Wils. 383 ; Marshalsea Case, 10 Coke, 68-76. 2 By which is not meant simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying the attention of the court, but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the particular case belongs. Jackson v. Smith, 130 Ind. 530, 533 ; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 383. 8 Gwyiine v. Pool, Lutw. 390, 397 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 351; Kress u. State, 65 Ind. 106; Elmore V. Overton, 104 Ind. 348; S. C, 54 Am. Rep. 343; 4 N. E. Rep. 197; Pratt V. Gardner, 3 Cush. 63 ; AUeo V. Reece, 39 Fed. Rep. 341 ; s. C, 40 Alb. L. J. 336 ; Little v; Moore, 4 N. J. Law, 74; Clark v. Holdridge, 58 Barb. 61 ; Dyer v. Smith, 13 Conn. 384 There is an interesting and instructive discussion in Cooley on Torts, ch. XrV ; Throop on Public Officers, in loco; Mechem's Public Offices and Officers, § 619 et seq., and particularly State V. Wolever 'Jnd., 1891), 36 N. E. Rep. 763, where the subject of im- munity of judicial officers from pri- vate suits is fully discussed. "A judi- cial act is one which involves the ex- ercise of a discretion, in which some- thing has to be heard and decided. A ministerial act is one which the law points out as necessary to be done under the circumstances with- out leaving any choice of alternative courses.'' Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 574. The act of a mayor in issuing a warrant of arrest for the violation of an illegal and void ordinance is judicial and gives no cause of action against him, or the officer executing it, or the city itself. Trammell v. Town of EussellviUe (1879), 34 Ark. 105. * " The ruling on such a motion is a judicial act." State v. Wolever (Ind., 1891), 36 N. E. Rep. 763." The reader will find, by consulting the authorities and text-writers cited in this section, that the principles here enunciated are of general application ; and as the proceedings of municipal courts furnish no peculiarities or ex- ceptions, the author does not deem it expedient to enter into a more mi- nute consideration of the topic See also, Hommert v. Gleason, 38 N. Y. St. Rep. 343 ; S. C, 14 N. Y. Sup). 568, which is almost identical with the 218 PEKSOKAL IJABIIiITT OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. [§ 206. § 206. Qnasi-judicial officers, — Corrupt motive. — There are various duties involving the exercise of judgment and dis- cretion which nevertheless are on the border line between those of a strictly judicial and those of a ministerial nature. In such cases the rule is laid down in many decisions that the test of personal liability for error in their performance is that of honest or corrupt motive.^ Thus, a superintendent of schools is not liable for a mere mistake in his decision on the case cited abov^ ; Bell v. McKinney, 63' Miss. 187; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131 ; Merwin v. Rogers, 38 N. Y. St Rep. 404 ; Burns v. Norton, 59 Hun., 616 ; Going v. Dunwiddie (1890), 86 Cal. 633; the leading case of Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 13 ; the title on " False Imprisonment," in 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 661 et seq., and an article by Arthur Biddle, Esq., on " Liability of OflScers Acting in a Judicial Capacity," 15 Am. Law Rev. 427 (July, 1881). >Cobley on Torts (2d ed.), 483; Linford v. Fitzroy, 13 Q. B. 340; Kemp V. Neville, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 523; S. C, 31 L. J. C. P. 158; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 918; 4 L. T. 640; 10 W. R 6; Davis V. Capper, 10 Barn. & C. 28 ; Burley v. Bethune, 1 Marsh. 220; Ashby V. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938; S. C, 6 Mod. 45'; 1 Salk. 19 ; Pruden v. Love, 67 Ga. 190 ; Donahoe v. Rich- ards, 38 Me. 379 ; S. C, 61 Am. Dec, 356 ; Downing v. Herrick, 47 Me. 463 ; Bevard v. HoflEnian, 18 Md. 479 ; S. C, 81 Am. Dec. 618; Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 298 ; Elbin v. Wilson, 33 Md. 135; Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich, 343; S. C, 38 Am. Rep. 189; Mo- Cormick v. Burt, 95 111. 263 ; s. C, 35 Am. Rep. 163; Billings v. LaSerty, 31 111. 318; Garfield v. Douglass, 23 111. 100; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 386; s. c, 27 Am. Rep. 343; Edwards V. Ferguson, 73 Mo. 686 ; Pike v. Me- goun, 44 Mo. 391 ; Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 33; Henderson v. Smith, 26 West Va. 839 ; s. C, 53 Am. Rep. 138 ; Keenan v. Cook, 12 R I. 52 ; Ramsey V. Riley, 13 Ohio, 157 ; Gregory v. Small, 39 Ohio St 346; Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio, 402; Wilson v. Marsh, 34 Vt 352; Hitch v. Lam- bright, 66 Ga. 228; Spitznogle v. Ward, 64 Ind. 30 ; Morrison v. Mc- Farland, 51 Ind. 206; State v. Robb, 17 Ind. 536;McOsker v. Burrell, 55 Ind. 425; Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B. Mon. (Kj-.) 693; Bullitt v. Clement, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193; Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 63; MiUer v. Rucker, 1 Bush (Ky.), 135; Gregory V. Brown, 4 Bibb (Ky.),,38; McCord V. High, 24 Iowa, 336 ; Howe v. Ma- son, 14 Iowa, 510 ; Macklot v. Daven- port, 17 Iowa, 379 ; Muscatine & C. R. Co. V. Harton, 38 Iowa, 33 ; Wheeler V. Patterson, IN. H. 88; Adams v. Richardson, 38 N. H. 306; Hannon V. Grizzard, 96 N, C, 398 ; Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. 39; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114; Millard v. Jenkins, 9 Wend. 298; Wick ware tt Bryan, 11 Wend. 545 ; Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. 463; Goetchens V. Matthewson, 61 N. Y. 420 ; Peavey V. Robbins, 3 Jones (N. C), Law, 339; Moran v. Rennard, 3 Brewst (Pa.) 601 ; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R (Pa.) 35; Rail v. Potts, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 325; McTeer v. Lebow, 85/ Tenn. 121; Throop on Public Offi- cers, § 733 ; Mechem's Public Offices and Officers, § 640 ; Bishop on Non- Contract Law, § 789. § 207.] PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFI0EE8 AND AGENTS. 219 subject of licensing a teacher,* but an action lies if he refuses a license from corrupt or malicious motives,^ and the same rules control liability for dismissing a teacher.' In Connecti- cut it was held that the proof of actual malicious intent would sustain an action against a wharfmaster for ordering the re- moval of a vessel from a dock.* § 207. Liability of ministerial officers. — A ministerial of- ficer is under constant obligation to discharge the duties of his office with reasonable skill and care, and if he fails in these and damage ensues to one specially interested in the discharge of such duties he becomes liable.' Conversely, as it is the 1 Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio, 403 ; S. C., 49 Am. Dec. 463 ; Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376; S. C, 61 Am. Dec. 356. 2 Elmore i'. Overton (1885), 104 Ind. 348; s. C, 54 Am. Bep. 343; Bmton V. Fulton, 49 Pa. St 151. « Gregory v. Small, 39 Ohio St 346 ; Morrison v. McFarland, 51 Ind. 206; McCormick v. Burt 95 111. 263; S. a, 35 Am. Eep. 163 ; Dritt v. Snod- grass, 66 Mo. 286 ; s. C, 27 Am. Rep. 843. * Gregory v. Brooks,. 37 Conn. 3. 5 Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378; Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl. 906 ; Ashby V. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938; Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 17 ; Ferguson V. Kinnoull, 9 CL & F. 251 ; Amy v. Supervisors, 11 WalL 136 ; Henly v. Mayor &c., 5 Bing. 91 ; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt 230; S. c, 94 Am. Dec. 445; Lyon v. Goree, 15 Ala. 360; Briggs v. Coleman, 51 Ala. 561 ; Eslava v. Jones, 83 Ala. 139 ; Bassett V. Fish, 12 Hun, 209 ; Piercy v. Ave- rill, 37 Hun, 360 ; Bartlett v. Crozier, 15 Johna 2.50; Shepherd v. Lincoln, 17 Wend. 250; Jenner v. Jolifife, 9 Johns. 381; Bailey v. Mayor Sec, 8 Hill, 531 ; Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, 630 ; S. a, 38 Am. Dec. 669; Wilson v. Mayor, 1 Denio, 595; s. C, 43 Am. Dec. 719; Hickok v. Pittsburgh, 15 Barb. 427 ; Robinson v. Chamberlain, 34 N. Y. 389; s. C, 90 Am. Deo. 713 ; Smith v. Wright, 24 Barb. 170 ; Fish V. Dodge, 38 Barb. 163 ; Hutson V. Mayor, 9 N. Y. 163 ; Hicks v. Dorn, 42 N. Y. 47; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113; Bennett V. Whitney, 94 N. Y. 302 ; WooUey v. Baldwin, 101 N. Y. 688; Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 528; McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194 ; Keith V. Howard, 24 Pick. 292 ; Con- way V. Russell, 151 Mass. 581 ; Will- iams V. Powell, 101 Mass. 407 ; Now- ell V. Wright, 3 Allen, 166 ; Eayns- ford V. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342; s. a, 38 Am. Rep. 189 ; McGuire v. Galligan, 57 Mich. 38; Grider u Tally, 77 Ala. 422 ; s. C, 54 Am. Rep. 65 ; Choteau V. Rowse, 56 Mo. 65 ; St Joseph &c. Ins. Co. V. Leiand, 90 Mo. 177 ; s. C, 59 Am. Rep. 9 ; Rounds v. Mansfield, 38 Me. 586 ; Stevens v. Dudley, 50 Vt 158 ; County Comm'rs v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468 ; County Comm'is v. Baker, 44 Md. 1 ; Hays v. Porter, 22 Me. 371 ; Long V. Long, 57 Iowa, 497 ; MoCord V. High, 24 Iowa, 336; Kolb v. O'Brien, 86 111. 210 ; Dilcher v. Raap, 73 111. 266; Governor v. Dodd; 81 III. 163; McClure v. Hill, 36 Ark. 268; Collins V. McDaniel, 66 Ga. 203. Allen V. Commonwealth, 83 Va 94, holds that where a duty is of such a char- acter as tu leave no margin whatever 220 PEKSONAL LIABILITY OP OFFICERS AND AGENTS. [§ 208. duty of a purely ministerial officer to do, not reason why,' he incurs no liability for injuries suffered without negligence or corrupt intent on his part.^ A judicial or g'was^-judicial officer may also have ministerial functions to perform; and in re- spect of these, the absolute protection commonly afforded to officers in the' exercise of judicial or legislative functions does not extend.' §208. The same subject centinued. — A ministerial act has been defined to be " official action, the result of perform- ing a certain and specific duty, arising from fixed and desig- nated facts ; " * and again, as '\ one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to, or the ex- ercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done." * Owing to the multitude and complexity of the duties annexed to public offices, the courts in many instances find considerable difficulty in determining whether a particular act is judicial or ministerial. It is held in some States that highway officers charged by statute with the duty of keeping highways in re- pair, and provided with funds for that purpose, act in a min- isterial capacity, and are liable for injuries suffered by their neglect.* The board of street commissioners of a Wisconsin for the exercise of judgment the law v. Streight, 54 Ind. 376 ; Evans v. must he oheyed to the very letter. Etheridge, 96 N. C. 42. And further 1 Mechem's Public OfSces and Offl- definitions in State v. Johnson, 4 cers, § 661. ' Wall. 475, 498; Sullivan v. Shanklin, 2 Sage V. Laurian, 19 Mich. 137; 63 Cal. 247, 351; Morton v. Comp- Highway Comm'rs v. Ely, 54 Mich. troUer-General, 4 S. C. 430, 474 ; Com- 175. In such cases he cannot, under missioner v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471 ; Ar- any principle of law, be made, a tres- berry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 467 ; Raines passer. Harding t;. Woodcock (1890), v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 995; S. C, 33 137U. S. 43. Am. Rep. 609; Clerk & Lindsell on s Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 433 ; s. a, Torts, 574. 54 Am. Rep. 65 ; Thompson v. Holt, 6 Bennett v. Whitney, 94 N. Y. 303 ; 53 Ala. 491; People v. Provines, 34 People w Town Auditors, 75 N.Y. 316; Oal. 530 ; People v. Bush, 40 Cal. 344; People v. Town Auditors, 74 N. Y. Throop on Public Officers, § 539. 310 ; Warren v. Clement, 24 Hun, ^Grideru. TaUy, 77Alav 423; s. C, 473; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 54Am. Rep. 65. 113; Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, 630; 5 Flourney v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. S. C, 40 Am. Dec. 305 ; Robinson v. 169. See, also. Ex parte Batesville Chamberlain, 34 N. Y. 389 ; S. G, &c. R. Co., 39 Ark. 83; Pennington 90 Am. Deo. 713; Babcockv. GiflEord, § 209.] PEH80NAL LIABILITY OF OFFICEES AND AGENTS. 221 city, disregarding the requirement of the charter that all work for the city should be let by contract, resolved that the work of repairing and reconstructing a bridge should be done by themselves under the supervision of their committee and the superintendent appointed by them. The court de- cided that although they were not amenable to any one for their adoption of plans and specifications, yet in the execu- tion of the worli they were mere ministerial ofiicers and not judicial or legislative, and accordingly they were liable to third persons for negligence or misfeasance.^ § 209. No personal liability for strictly public acts. — An officer cannot be subjected to a private action for neglect of a duty to be discharged exclusively for the benefit of the public even by a person specially injured thereby, and though the act was wilful and malicious.'' " He must show the wrong which he specially suffers," said Judge Cooley, " and damage alone does not constitute a wrong." ' Thus in the case last cited, where a county supervisor approved the bond of a treas- urer knowing him to be in default, but not disclosing the fact to the surety, no right of action accrued to the latter.^ And where the charter of a city required that certain work should be awarded by the aldermen to the lowest bidder, but those offi- cers, in violation of their duty, gave the contract to one whose bid was higher than the plaintiff's, the latter being in fact the lowest, it was adjudged that the aldermen were not liable, their duty being of an essentially public nature.' The same is true, also, of the official act of a highway commissioner in 29 Hun, 186 ; Lament v. Haight, 44 " Held v. Bagwell (1883), 58 Iowa, How. Pr. 1 ; Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, 139. 29 N. Y. 297 ; Piercy v., Averill, 37 3 Cooley on Torts (3d ed.), 449. Hun, 360, holding the mayor and * Held v. Bagwell (1883), 58 Iowa, aldermen of a city liable ; Hines v. 139. If a policeman were to neglect Lockport, 50 N. Y. 336; Weed v. his duty to preserve the peace and Ballston Spa, 76 N. Y. 339 ; Pomf rey protect property, whereby some per- V. Saratoga Spr., 104 N. Y. 459 ; Mc- son was injured by violence or his Cord V. High, 24 Iowa, 336 ; Tearney house robbed, it is clear that there is V. Smith, 86 111. 891 ; Bostwiok v. Bar- no private remedy against the officer, low, 14 Hun, 177. Cooley on Torts (3d ed.), 448 ; Shear- 1 Robinson v. Rohr (1889), 73 Wis. man & Eedfleld on Negligence (4th 436 ; S. &, 9 Am. Rep. 810 ; 40 K. W. ed.), § 316. ^ Rep. 668. " East River Gas Light Co. v. Don- 222 PEESONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§ 210. improperly opening or discontinuing a road to the prejudice of an individual,' and the neglect of a quarantine officer to take ordinary precautions to prevent the spread of contagion.' § 210. Default of sulbordinates. — Public officers or agents engaged in the public service, or acting for public objects, whether their appointment emanates from particular public bodies or is derived from general laws, and whether those objects are of a local or generail nature, are not responsible for the misfeasances or positive wrongs, or for the nonfeasance or negligences or omissions of duty, of the sub-agents or serv- ants or other persons properly employed by and under them in the discharge of their official duties.' But the principal is liable if he directs or authorizes the wrong,* or fails to require his deputies to observe statutory regulations," or if he neglects to superintend properly the discharge of their duties,* or neg- ligently employs or retains unfit or improper persons.' There is also an important distinction to the effect that if the inferior or sub-agent holds not an office known to the law, but his ap- pointment is private and discretionary with the officer, the latter is responsible for his acts.' This is illustrated in a re- nelly, 93 N. Y. 557. See, also. Strong 4 M. & S. 27 ; Hall v. Smith, 3 Bing. V. Campbell, 11 Barb. 135 ; Martin v. 156 ; Donovan v. McAlpin, 85 N. Y. Mayor &c., 1 HiU, 545; Butler v. 185; s. C, 39 Am. Rep. 649; Knch u Kent, 19 Johns. 328 ; Ashby v. White, Board of Education, 30 Ohio St 37; 1 Salk. 19. S. C, 37 Am. Rep. 414. ' Sage V. Laurain, 19 Mich. 187. * Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83 ; S. C, sCooley on Torts (3d ed.), 450, 10 Atl. Rep. 499; Tracy v. Cloyd, 10 citing Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 440 ; West Va. 19. White V. Marshfield, 48 Vt. 20 ; Brink- » Bishop v. Williamson, 11 Me. 495, meyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187 ; Ogg where a postmaster was held liable V. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495 ; Western for the default of one whom he al- CoUege &c. v. Cleveland, 13 Ohio St lowed to have the care of the mails 375; Hill v. Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55; without being sworn according to s. c, 31 Am. Rep. 451 ; Pontiao v. Car- law. ter, 33 Mich. 164. « Dunlop v. Mnnroe, 7 Cranch, 242 ; astory on Agency (9th ed.), §319; Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts (Pa.), Story on Bailments (9th ed.), §§ 461, 453; Ford v. Parker, 4 Ohio St 576. 462; Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U. S. 'Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barb. 507. See, also, HoUiday v. St Leon- 632 ; Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts ard, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 192; Duncan u (Pa.), 453. See, also, Throop on Pub- Findlates, 6 CI. & F. 894; Humphreys lie OflSces and Officers, § 593. V. Mears, 1 M. & R. 187; Sutton v. 8 The distinction is more fuUy Clarke, 6 Taunt 84 ; Harris v. Baker, stated in a note to the case of Wilson § 211.] PEESONAL LIABILITY OP OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 223 cent Connecticut case, where a selectman, for the purpose of cleaning a highway obstructed by the growth of trees and shrubbery, directed a laborer employed by him " to cut the brush and the trees and make the road passable." No trees were pointed out and no limits given, nor any expression of judgment by the selectman, but the matter was left to the judgment and discretion of the laborer, who, in good faith, cut down some trees on the land of an adjoining owner, the removal of which was not necessary. The selectman was held liable for the damage.^ So, also, an officer is liable for the defaults of his private servant or agent within the scope of his employment ; ^ and ministerial officers, generally, who are charged with the performance of duties to individuals, as dis- tinguished from purely public duties, are subject to the rule of respondeat superior? % 211. lyection of meml)er of city council by order of mayor. — A statute provided that the mayor should be ex officio president of the council and preside at its meetings, and he was also authorized by an ordinance "to preserve order and decorum and to decide all questions of order, sub- ject to an appeal to the council." An alderman's behavior was insulting and disorderly, but did not threaten personal injury nor arrest the progress of business, and, failing to observe the mayor's admonition, he was conducted out of the council chamber by the chief of police under an order V. Peverly, 1 Am. L. Cas. (5th ed), top Shaick v. Sigel, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) p. 785. In Shepherd v. Lincoln, 17 123. Bee, also, Smith w. Holmes, 54 Wend. 250, it was held, Cowen, J., Mich. 104. Clerks of courts. McNutt delivering the opinion, that a super- v. Livingston, 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) intendent of repaire on the canals of 641 ; Snedicor v. Davis, 17 Ala. 472. the State is personally liable in an Sheriffs. Meohem's Public Offices action on the case for damages sus- and Officers, § 798. A register of tained by an individual through the deeds is liable for the penalty imposed negligence of workmen employed in by statute for the issue of a marriage making repairs. license without reasonable inquiry as > Ely V. Parsons (1887), 55 Conn. 83 ; to the age of the parties, if either is S. C, 10 Atl. "Eep. 499. See, also, under eighteen, where a blank license County Comm'rs v. Duvall, 54, Md. signed by him is filled up by a person 351. specially deputized by him for the ^Mechem's Public Offices and Of- purpose, though the deputy made in- ficers, § 802. quiry. Cole v. Laws, 108 N. C. 185; > Such as recorders of deeds. Van & c, IS S, E. Rep. 985. 224 PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. [§ 211. from the mayor. The court held that the obstreperoiis mem- ber was entitled to an action for damages against both the mayor and chief of police.^ " The ordinance is only declar- atory of the common law," said the court; "it neither in terms nor spirit increases or extends the duties or powers usually pertaining to the position [of the president of the council]. What then are such duties and powers according to the general usages of deliberative bodies? They comprise the duty and power to preserve* order and decorum during the deliberations of the body. It is said to be the privilege of any member, and the special duty of the presiding officer, to take notice of any offense during deliberation, and to call the attention of the assembly to it. In such cases the presi- dent declared to the assemblj'^ that a member named is guilty of irregular or improper conduct, and specifies it. When it has been stated by the president, the member is entitled to be heard in exculpation.^ When the president has called an offending member to order and stated the matter of the of- fense to the house, it seems that he has discharged his duty and exhausted his power in the premises. He thereby trans- mits the further disposition of the matter to the house. The power to punish is not among his prerogatives; that belongs exclusively to the house, and he can never exercise it save as it is expressly ordered by the house. If he has other powers, the fact has escaped the recognition of writers. If noise or tumult in the house, breaches of good order and decorum in the course of proceedings, or an exhibition of disrespect and contempt for the president, would justify a forcible exclusion by him of an offending member, it cannot be that the history of proceedings in deliberative bodies would furnish no in- stance of the assumption of such power." ' 1 Thompson v. Whipple (1890), 54 a matter for the action of the house. Ark. 203 ; S. C, 15 S. W. Eep. 604 If the member disregards its order, 3 " Delicacy and custom requires the president may enforce it Thus that he withdraw in order that the far, and no farther, c^n we find that matter may be fully discussed and the president is authorized to order considered free from any resti-aints that a member be expelled." Thomp- of his presence. If a sense of pro- son v. Whipple, 54 Ark. 203. priety does not constrain him to ' " It is said that the power of the withdraw, the house may order that speaker is well stated by Mr. Speaker he do so ; buthis failure to do it is Lenthall, who, when Charles I came § 212.] PEBSOilA'L LIABILITY OF OFFICBES AND AGENTS. 225 §212. Negligence of recorder of deeds.— Where a re- corder of deeds is employed by tHe owner of land to make a search of title, he is not liable for an error to one who lends money on the faith of it and loses it, at least in the absence of knowledge that it was to be u^ed for procuring a loan.* He -is undoubtedly liable for damage resulting from an erroneous record of a conveyance, although it be the negligence of a deputy;'' but who is entitled to sue, and the measure of dam- ages, are often very nice and difficult questions. The decis- ions are conflicting, and depend more or less on the language of the statutes. While some courts hold that a grantee's title is valid, notwithstanding defective record, if he has filed his deed for record,' others decide that all persons may rely upon the record actually raade, and that the negligence of the recorder is, in effect, imputed to the one who employed him when the rights of third parties are concerned.'' 195, and the dissenting opin- into the House of Commons and asked him whether any of five mem- bers that he came to apprehend were in the house, whether he saw them, and where they were, replied : ' May it please Your Majesty, I have neither eyes to hear nor tongue to speak in this place but as the house is pleased to direct, whose servant I am." s. G, jp. 206. Bat it was conceded that the president might order an arrest to prevent an injury being done to another member without waiting for the action of the house, as that would be no more than any other person would be justified in doing any- where. S. c., p. 307. Parsons ' v. Bralnard, 17 Wend. 523, was con- trolled by a New York statute, and is without force out of that State. It was there held that the presiding oflScer of a town meeting, with stat- ute authority to maintain order, may make a valid order for the removal of a disorderly person, though no vio- lence was threatened. A verdict for fifty cents damages was reversed. iDay V. Reynolds (1880), 33 Hun, 131. C/. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 15 U. S. ion. 'Van Sch^ick v. Sigel, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 133. 'Merrick w. Wallace, 19 111. 486, 497 ; Polk v. Cosgrove, 4 Biss. 437 ; Riggs V. Boylan, 4 Biss. 445; Gai^- rard v, Davis, 53 Mo. 333; Minis v. Minis, 35 Ala. 33. * Frost V. Be'ekman, 1 Johns. Ch. 388, 298; reversed, but not on this ground, Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns. 544; New York Life Ins. Co. v. White, 17 N. Y. 469 ; Chamberlain v. Bell, 7 Cal. 293; Shepherd v. Burk- halter, 13 Ga. 444; Miller u. Brad- ford, 12 Iowa, 14; Brydon v. Camp- bell, 40 Md. 331 ; Barnard v. Campau, 29 Mich. 162 ; Barrett v. Shaubhut, 5 Minn. 823 ; Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309 ; Hester's Lessee v. Fort- ner, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 40 ; Lally v. Hol- land, 1 Swan (Tenn.), 896 ; Jennings' Lessee v. Wood, 30 Ohio, 361 ; Bald- win V. Marshall, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 116 ; Sanger v. Craigue, 10 Vfc 555 ; Cooley on Torts (8d ed.), 454; Throop on Public Officers, § 743. On the question of proximate cause of an in- 226 PERSONAL LIABILITT OP OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§§ 213, 214. § 213. The same subject continued. — Where the error consists in omitting to index or in indexing incorrectly, the decisions are also at variance. In some of them the index is deemed a mere collateral convenience for the benefit of the recorder, an error in which does not prejudice the grantee's title.' But where the statute requires the index to give infor- mation of the contents of the deed, the record is not con- structive notice of anything which is not disclosed by the index.^ • § 214. Liability of assessor of taxes. — Tax assessors are not liable for innocent mistake when acting within the scope of their authority ; ' but they must be careful not to assume a jurisdiction which the law does not confer upon them. If they decide upon the rights of others in cases which the law has not confided to their judgment, they are liable to the same extent as if they possessed no official character whatever. In the leading case in New York it was held that an action could be maintained by a bank to recover a tax levied under an as- sessment upon its capital stock contrary to a statute which provided, instead, for the taxation of the stockholders. " The distinction," said Chief Justice Church, " is between an erro- neous and an illegal assessment. The former is where the officers have power to act, but err in the exercise of the power ; the latter where they have no power to act at all, and it does not aid them to decide that they have." * In assessing jury to a second grantee by reason of ^jjeeder v. Harlan, 98 Ind. 114; the negligence of the recorder com- Gwynn v. Turner, 18 Iowa, 1 ; Breed bined with the fraudulent act of the v. Conley, 14 Iowa, 269 ; Scoles v. grantor (a point which Judge Cooley Wilsey, 11 Iowa, 361. leaves unsolved — Cooley on Torts, ' National Bank of Chemung v. El- 455, 456), cf. Beach on Contributory mira, 53 N. Y. 49, reversing s. c, 6 Negligence (3d ed.), § 33, p. 88, n. 3, Lans. (N. Y.) 116, and reviewing the aiid cases there cited, with Alexander New York cases ; Williams v. Weaver, V. Town of Newcastle, 115 Ind. 51; 75N. Y. 30; a c, affirmed, 100 U. S. S. a. 17 Atl. Rep. 200, cited in Beach 647 ; Robinson v. Rowland, 26 Hun, on Contributory Negligence (3d ed.), 501 ; Ford v. McGregor (1890), 20 Nev. § 345, p. 335. And see Wharton on 446 ; McDaniell v. Tebbetts, 60 N. H. Negligence, § 134. 497; Cooley on Taxation, 553; Wil- iSchell V. Stein, 76 Pa. St 398; son v. Marsh, 34 Vt 352; Odiome v. Bishop V. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472; Rand, 59 N. H. 504. s. c, 3 Am. Rep. 533 ; Comm'rs v. * National Bank of Chemung v, El- Babcock, 5 Oregon, 472 ; Curtis v. mira, 53 N. Y. 49 (cited in preceding Lyman, 24 Vt 33a note); Dom v. Backer, 61 N. Y. 261, § 214.] PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 227 property not taxable, or in deciding erroneously as to a tax- able inhabitant, they act ministerially and not judicially.* On the other hand, if they have jurisdiction both of the per- son taxed and of the subject-matter, there is no individual lia- bility, however erroneous or unequal the tax may be, provided they act in good faith.^ Thus where the statute required an assessment upon the market value of certain shares of stock, and it was made upon the par value, there was .no remedy against the assessors.' It was held in New York that an as- sessor, in determining the value of property, is protected irre- spective of motive;* but it is believed that the prcjvailing rule makes him liable for a malicious overestimate.^ reversing s. C, 61 Barb. 597 ; Hilton V. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339. See, also, Mygatt V. "Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316; Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N. Y. 261 ; Chegaray v. Jenkins, 5 N. Y. 376; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117 ; Prosser v. Secor, 5 Barb. 607 ; Swift V. Poughkeepsie, 37 N. Y. 511 ; Haley V. Whitney, 53 Hun, 119. It was said in Apgar v. Hay ward (1888), 110 N. Y. 225, that if assessors had no jurisdic- tion to make a certain increase which they did make, they would not be liable for property taken to pay the tax, but only for the difference be- tween the correct and erroneous tax. 1 Ford V. McGregor (1890), 20 Nev. 446. 2 Williams u Weaver, 75 N. Y. 30; S. C, aflBrmed, 100 U. S. 547; Bal- lerino v. Mason (1890), 83 Cal. 447, quoting from Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 98; Apgar v. Hayward (1888), 110 N. Y. 225. 3 Williams v. Weaver, cited in pre- ceding note. See, also, an excellent case, Eobinson v. Rowland, 26 Hun, 501. * Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117. But see Apgar v. Hayward (1888), 110 N. Y. 225, at p. 233. " Parkinson v. Parker, 48 Iowa, 667, 669; Ballerino v. Mason (1890), 83 Cal. 447, where, however, the court held that an averment that the de- fendant " wilfully and against law " assessed property too high was not an allegation of malice or of intent to wrong or injure the owner. They are exempt by statute in Massachu- chusetts except for want of integ- rity (Pub. Stat, of Mass., p. 113, § 94); but formerly in -that State the rule was more severe than that adopted elsewhere. Gage v. Currier, 4 Pick. 399 ; Taf t v. Wood, 14 Pick. 362 ; Lit- tle V. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543. Assessors are not liable for an unintentional omission to tax a person, whereby he loses his vote, Grifito v. Rising, 11 Met. 339. CHAPTEE VIII. THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION FOR THE ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 1815. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 331. 333. 834 235. 227. 228. 829. 230. 331. 333. 233. 234 235. 236. 237. Introductory. Liability ex contractu. Contracts -within scope of powers of corporation. The same subject continued. The doctrine of ultra vires applied with greater strict- ness to public than to pri- vate corporations. The reason for the rule. Municipal bonds void when ultra vires. The same subject continued. Ultra vires — How modified by estoppel The same subject continued — Hitchcock V. Galveston. IiTegularity in exercise of power. Ultra vires — How modified by the doctrine of implied contract — General princi- ples. The same subject continued. Illustrations of the doctrine of implied contracts. The same subject continued. Liability of the corporation to repay taxes illegally col- lected. The same subject continued — Restrictions. Illegality of assessment. Actual receipt of taxes by the corporation. Compulsory payment of taxes. The same subject continued. Illustrations of the rule. The same subject continued. The doctrine of the federal Supreme Court considered. The same subject continued. 340. Contracts within the scope of powers of officer or agent. 841. The same subject continued— Clark V. Des Moines. 342. All persons contracting with strictly public corporations charged with knowledge of scope of pow6l:s of officer or agent. 343. The same subject continued. 244 Liability of corporation for act of its officers or agents in violation of law. 245. The same subject continued. 246. Effect of representation of of- ficer or agent as to author- ity. 247. The same subject continued. 248. Ratification of contracts. 249. The same subject continued. 250. Ratification by authorized offi- cers necessary. 351. Manne;r of ratification. 353. Manner of execution of con- tracts by officers and agents. 353. The same subject continued. 354 Contracts by ordinance or res- olution. 355. Signature of contract. 356. The same subject cbntinued. 357. Liability ex delicto — (a) In general 358. (&) Discretionary and legisla- tive acts. 259. (c) The same subject contin- ued. 260. (d) Ministerial acts. 361. (e) Public as contradistin- guished from private duties. 363. The rule applied to public gitasi-corporatioDB. 363. Conclusion. §§ 215, 216.] LIABILITT FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, BTO. 229 § 215. Introductory. — A municipal corporation, like other corporations, can of course act only through its agents. Every liability of such a corporation is in a sense a liability for the acts of its oflBcers or agents. A more detailed statement of the different classes of liabilities incident to municipal corpo- rations will be found in the subsequent chapters of this work. It is the writer's purpose in this chapter to consider the liabil- ity of the corporation for the acts of its oflBlcers and agents with special reference to the powers and authority of those agents, and the extent to which the municipality is bound by those acts. The liability of the corporation is naturally con- sidered under two heads. Every liability is either a liability ex contractu or a liability ex delicto. In other words, the act of the officer or agent by which the municipality is sought to be l)ound is claimed to be either a contract or a tort. The principles governing these two classes of liability, though sim- ilar in many respects, differ materially in others; and in considering any specific question of liability we must first in- quire whether that liability arises from contract or from tort, before we attempt to decide whether the corporation is bound by the acts of its officer or agent. § 216. Liability ex contractu — Requirements for valid contracts. — A municipal corporation is liable, just as is a pri- vate corporation or a natural free person, upon contracts prop- erly assumed by the corporation. There may be said to be three requirements necessary for a valid and enforceable con- tract by a municipal corporation. In the first place the con- tract must be within the scope of the powers of the corporation ; that is to say, the corporation must be authorized, either ex- pressly or impliedly by its charter or other statute by virtue of which it has come into existence, to make such a contract. In the second place the contract must be made by the proper offi- cers or agents. The officers or agents through whom the cor- poration acts in assuming the contract liability must be within the authorized scope of their powers in making the contract on behalf of the municipality. Finally, if the manner in which the municipal corporation must make its contracts is expressly, and imperatively prescribed by mandatory statutes, the con- tract must be made according to the manner prescribed by 230 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. [§ 217. law in order to be valid.^ If these requirements are observed the municipal corporation is liable to private persons upon its contracts to the same extent as a private corporation or a natural person. The constitutional prohibition of laws im- pairing the obligation of contracts applies in favor of private creditdrs of the municipality whether they be corporations or persons, maintaining inviolable the rights of these creditors against any subsequent legislation^ § 217. Contracts within scope of powers of corporation.— The municipal corporation being an artificial person and de- riving its existence and power to act solely from the express or implied provisions of its charter or other creating statute, it cannot make a valid contract which is wholly beyond the scope of its powers. Consequently no officer or agent can make a binding contract on behalf of the municipal corpora- tion, if such contract is wholly beyond the express or im- plied powers of the corporation.' It now seems well estab- 1 See infra, §§ 252-356, where these different requirements are discussed in detail. 2 Wolff V. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. The proposition in the text is of course conceded learning, and it is needless to quote in this connection more of the great number of cases which establish the doctrine. ' Daviess County v. Dickenson, 117 U. S. 657; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 tr. S. 120 ; Lewis v. Shreveport, 108 U. S. 282 ; Town of East Oakland V. Skinner, 94 U. S. 255 ; Marsh v. Ful- ton County, 10 Wall. 676 ; Thomas v. Richmond, 13 Wall. 349; Leaven- worth V. Rankin, 3 Kans. 358; Bo- gart V. Lamotte Township, 79 Mich. . 294 ; Reus v. Grand Rapids, 73 Mich. 337 ; Newberry v. Fox, 37 Minn. 141 ; B. C, 5 Am. St Rep. 830 ; Burchfield v. New Orleans, 43 La, Ann. 235 ; Gurley V. New Orleans, 41 La. Ann. 75 ; Lay- cock V. Baton Rouge, 25 La. Ann. 475 ; Siebrecht v. New Orleans, 12 La, Ann- 496 : Spalding v. Lowell, 33 Pick. 71 ; Laker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343; Bal- timore V. Musgrave, 48 Md. 373 ; Sti- ger V. Red Oak, 64 Iowa, 465 ; State V. Beners, 86 N. C. 588; Fort Wayne V. Lehr, 88 Ind. 62 ; Covington &e. R. Co. V. Athene, 85 Gai 367 ; Citj- of Eufala V. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; New Jersey &c. Telephone Co. v. Fire Commissioners, 84 N. J. Eq. 117; Sutro V. Pettit, 74 Cal. 333; S. c, 5 Am. St Rep. 443; Miners' Ditch Co. V. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 548 ; Agawam Bank v. South Hadley, 138 Mass. 503 ; Atlantic City &c. Water Co. v. Read, 50 N. J. Law, 665 ; Prince v. Quincy, 105 111. 188 ; Trustees of Belleview v. Hohn, 83 Ky. 1 ; Cleveland v. State Bank of Ohio, 16 Ohio St 236; Ship- man V. State, 43 Wis. 381 ; Syracuse W. Co. V. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167; Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218; Moore v. New York, 73 N. Y. 838; MacDonald v. New York, 68 N. Y. 23 ; Buffett v. Troy &c. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 168; Donovan v. New York. f 3T8".] ZZABILTTT FOK AOTS OF OFFTOEES, ETC. 2St Hshed law that where the contract is properly ultra vires, — that is to say, where it is wholly beyond the express or imlied pow- ers of the corporation, — it is absolutely void, and cannot be ratified by performance or by acceptance of benefit thereunder. As is said in a recent California case, neither the doctrine of estoppel or of ratification nor of iona fide holding can be invoked to support such a contract.* § 218. The same subject continued.— There is, however, much conflict in the cases bearing on this point. The great preponderance of authority is undoubtedly in favor of the doctrine of our text, but in many cases the judges seem to have allowed their desire to prevent the defeat of substantial justice by the interposition of the technical defense of uli/ra vires to obscure their judgment in deciding the legal rights of the parties. Thus, in a recent case in which the city of St. Louis sued to recover upon a contract, which the court ac- knowledged to be void, but under which the defendant had enjoyed benefits, it was held that the defendant was estopped from impeaching the validity of the contract. The decision was also placed upon the doubtful ground that a contract made by a municipal corporation, although ultra vires, was yet not illegal if not prohibited by its charter ; and that while the corporation might successfully set up the plea of uli^a vires if sued upon such a contract, still the party contracting with the corporation could not set up that plea against the corporation after receiving and retaining benefits under the contract. The decision may be justified on the ground of estoppel under the particular facts of the case, but the general doctrine laid down 33 N. Y. 291 ; Albany v. Cunliff, 3 are but a few of a great number N. Y. 165 ; Halstead v. Mayor, 3 N. Y. which support the proposition of the 430 ; Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. St text The writer has endeavored to 163 ; Barley's Appeal, 103 Pa. St 373 ; cite the leading and recent cases in Maupin v. Franklin Co., 67 Mo. 837 ; the different States, by consulting Cheney v. Brookfleld, 60 Mo. 53; which other authorities in the reports Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 of that State may be ascertained. Conn. 475 ; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 i Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 333 ; s. c, 5 Iowa, 199 ; Lincoln v. Stockton, 75 Am. St Eep. 443. And this doctrine Me. 141 ; Mitchell v. Eockland, 45 Me. has the high authority of Judge Dil- 496; Driftwood &c. Turnpike Co. v. Ion. 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., §457; Bartholomew County Commission- 3 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 935. See ers, 73 Ind. 336, The cases above cited cases cited in preceding iiote. 332 LIABILITY FOE ACTS 01" OFFIOEES, ETC. [§ 219. that a oity may recover upon an ultra vires contract unless such contract is expressly, prohibited by law, is certainly dangerously broad. The concluding sentence of the decision seems to indicate the real ground of the decision :-r-" In rul- ing thus we give no sanction to a municipal. corporation leav- ing the narrow pathway marked out by its charter, nor do we intimate that we would enforce an ultra vi/rea contract if executory ; we merely hold that good morals and even-handed justice demand that the defendant thould disgorge.'? ^ § 819. The doctrine of ultra vires applied with greater strictness to public than to private corporations.-r-In a-re- cent Minnesota case,^ a contract for grading the streets was made by the officers of a town in the first instance, althoitgh the charter required that the duty to make the improvement should be first imposed upon the adjacent proprietors. In a well-considered opinion the contract was adjudged uUra vires and void. The court said : — " The doctrine of ultra vires has with good reason been applied with greater strictness to mu- nicipal bodies than to private corporations, and in general a municipality is not estopped from denying the validity of a contract made by its officers when there has be no authority for making such a contract." ' A different rule of law would in effect vastly enlarge the powers of public agents to bind a municipality by contracts not only unauthorized but prohibited by the law. It would tend to nullify the limitations and re- strictions imposed with respect to the powers of such agents,. and to a dangerous extent expose the. public to the very evils and abuses which such limitations are designed to prevent.* 1st. Louis v. Davidson, 103 Mo. 149.; trary to public:, policy is void, nofc- s. c, 22 Am. St Rep. 764. withstanding the fact that the, city 'i Newberry v. Fox, 37 Minn. 141 ; has received some benefits there- S. C, 5 Am. St Eep. 830. under. "Citing Mayor v. Ray, 19 WaU. *See to the same effect; .Burch- 468; Brady w Mayor of New York* field v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 335 ;. 30 N. Y. 313; Hague v. City of Phil- Gurley v. New Orleans, 41 La. Ann. adelphia, 48 Pa. St 537; 1 Dillon on 75; Reus v. Grand Rapids, 78 Mich. Munic. Corp., § 457 ; Nash t). City of St. 337 ; Bogart v. Lamotte Township, 79 Paul, 8 Minn. 173, In Covington &c Mich. 394 ; Sutro v. Pettit 74 CaL R. Co. V. Athens, 85 Ga. 367, it is de- 333; s. c, 5 Am. St Rep. 443, and cided that a contract entered into by cases cited in preceding sections, a city outside of its powers a^nd cou.^ §§ 220, 221.] UABIUTT FOB ACTS OF OFFIOBES, ETC. 233 § 220. The reason for the rule.^The reason for the stringent application of the doctrine of ultra vires to strictly public corporations is well stated by Judge, Cooley: — "The powers conferred upon municipalities must be considered with reference to the object of their creation, namely, as agencies of the State in local government. The State can create them for no other purpose, and it can confer powers of government to no other end, without at once coming into conflict with the constitutional maxjm that legislative power cannot be.delegated, or with other maxims designed to confine afl the agencies of government to the exercise of their proper functions ; and wherever the municipality shall attempt to ex^ ercise powers not within the proper province of local self- government, whether the right to do so be claimed under express legislative grant or by implication from the charter, the act must must be considered as altogether ultra vires and therefore void." ' § 221. Municipal bonds void when ultra, vires.— An inter- esting instance of the application of the preceding doctrines is found in a California case already cited.^ The legislature of that State authorized the board of supervisors of the county of San Luis Obispo to issue bonds " not exceeding in the ag- gregate the sum of forty thousand dollars " for the purpose of erecting a court-house. By some means bonds to the amount of forty-two thousand dollars were issued. Under the California statutes such bonds could be legal only by virtue of the express authority of the legislature. The court held that the action of the supervisors in issuing the bonds in excess of forty thousand dollars did not bind the county, as the county had no power to issue bonds without legislative sanction ; that the bonds were absolutely void. " It is quite probable," said the opinion of the court, "that the respond- ents paid full par value for these bonds and that they will lose their money," but " those who contract with a municipal 1 Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 861. the corporate wings clipped, down to And Judge Dillon says :-r" The his- the lawful standard." 1 Dillon on tory of the workings of municipal Munic. Corp, g 457. bodies has demonstrated the salutary 3 Sutro v. Pettit, 74 CaL 333 ; s. a, nature of this principle, and that it 5 Am. St Rep. 442. is the part of true wisdom to keep 25i LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICBKS, ETC. [§§^ 222, 22?, corporation are bound to know the extent of the power of its officers.^ Bespondents would have discovered the worth- lessness of the bonds upon the slightest inquiry. At aU events, hard cases cannot be allowed to make bad law. An over- issue of twenty thousand dollars would have been no less valid than the over-issue of two thousand dollars ; and any other rule would put the people of a county in the complete power of careless or unscrupulous public ofQcers." ^ § 222. The same subject continued. — The Supreme Court of the United States has, however, decided, where municipal bonds are by virtue of misrepresentations contained in the bonds themselves apparently valid, and are sold to lona fide purchasers, and the purchase price received and appropriated by the city, that the city is liable to the purchasers for the price paid for the bonds upon an implied contract to restore money illegally obtained,' But the doctrine of the case cited in the preceding section* has often been sustained ; and under the circumstances of the individual case it has been decided in several instances in Massachusetts that the holders of void municipal bonds were without remedy,* § 223. Ultra vires — How modified by estoppel. — The foregoing principles are to be applied cautiously, however; lating Wallace v. Mayor of San d in the case of strictly public than in private corpora- tions ^ids its application in this class of contracts as well as in those contracts when the question arises whether the contract is ultra vires the corporation. "We have seen that the rule is in force in the case of contracts which are without the scope of the powers of the corporation itself.' In conformity to the principle underlying the rule, the actual powers of public of- ficers or agents are more closely scrutinized than are the pow- ers of agents of private corporations, and acts within the appar- ent scope of the powers of public agents,/but actually without those powers, are frequently held invalid, when in the case of the agents of a private corporation the contrary view would be held by the courts. In general it may be said that the con- tract of a public oflicer or agent, if beyond the actual scope of his powers, will not bind the corporation unless the oflScer is authorized by the corporation to represent himself as duly empowered to make the contract.^ § 241. The same subject continued — Clark v. Des Moines, An excellent illustration of the rule is found in an Iowa case, where action w-as brought upon warrants or orders of the city of Des Moines by an innocent assignee of those warrants or orders It appeared that the charter granted no express or implied power to the officers who undertook to execute the 1 See suryra, § 219 et seq. Eep. 830 ; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. 2 Caark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa. 199 ; Louisville, 8 Bush (Ky.), 415 ; Balti- a G, 87 Am. Dec. 423. and cases there more v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 373. See, cited; Sutro v. Pettit, 74 CaL 832; also, cases cited in succeeding sec- S. C 5 Am. St Kep. 447 ; Newberry tion. V. Fox, 37 Minn. 141 ; s. G, 5 Am. St 250 LIABIUTT yoa AOIB OS OFUCffiBS, KTO. [§ 241. warrants to issa^ nege^iable paper in the name and on behalf of the corporation. It was held that these warrants were negotiable paper, but that they were Toid ab initio from the want of power on the part of the oflScera to issue the paper; that the honafids hdders of the warrants were bound at their peril to aseertain the nature and extent of the powers of the officer and of the eity; and that the fact that these warrants were in the hands of iunoeent Imia Jid^ holders for Yaiue eould not validate them. An opnion is delivered by Judge Dillon, who lays down the fundamental prindples with his usual perspicuity and force: — " The general principle of law is well known and definitely settled that the agents, officers, or even city council, of a munidpal corporation cannot bind the corporation when they transcend their lawful and legiti" mate powers. This doctrine rests upon this reasonable ground ; The body corporate is constituted of all the inhabit- ants within the corporate limits. The inhabitants are the corporators. The officers of the oorporatioB, inelndiag the legislative or governing body, are merely the public agents of the corporators. Their duties and powers are preseribed by statute. Every one, therefore, may know the mature of these duties and the extent of these powers. These considerations, as well as the dangerous nature of the opposite doctrine, dem^ onstrate the reasonableness and necessity of the rule that the corporation is bound only when its agents, by whom from the very necessities of its being it must act, if it acts at all, keep within the limits of their authority. Not only so, but such a corporation may successfully interpose the plea of uUm mretf that is, set up as a defense its own want of power under its charter or constituent statute to enter into a given contract or to do a given act in violation or excess of its corporate power and authority." ' 1 See, also, Hodges v- Buffalo^ 3 jnerouB and aniform, and that some Denio,110; HaJsteadttMayor,3N.Y. o( the mora important opes need 480; Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill, 545; only be cited. Mayor of Albany BooTi nUtica,8 Barb. 104; Cornell v. Cunliflf, 3 N. y. 1(16; Cuyler w. V. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510 ; Boylan Trustees of Boohester, 18 Wend, 165 ; V. Mayor & Aldermen of New York, Dill v. Warehara, 7 Met 438 ; Vincent 1 Sandf. 37. It ia observed by the v. Nantucket, IS Cush. lOS ; Stelsoo distinguished judge that the cases V. Eenipton, 13 Mass. 272 ; s, C, 7 Am. asserting these principles are nu- Pec. 145 ; Parsons V. Inbabitanto (d § 242.]' LIABILITY FOB ACTS OP OFFIOEES, ETC. 251 § 242. All persons contracting with strictly public cor- porations charged with knowledge of scope of powers of officer or agent. — Since the powers of public officers and agents are defined either by the charter or other constituent act, and since these statutes are open to public inspection and *' afford to every person the certgiin means of ascertaining the authority of these officers," ^ " it is fundanaental," says Judge Folger, " that those seeking to deal with a. municipal corpora- tion, through its officials, must take great care to learn the; nature and extent of their power and authority." * Goshen, 11 Pick. 396 ; "Wood v. Inhab- itants of Ljnn, 1 All^i, 108; Spauld- ing V. Lowell, 33 Pick. 71 ; Mitchell V. Rockland, 45 Me. 49&; s. 0., 66 Am. Pea 353 ; Anthony v. Adams, 1 Met 384 ; Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio Sb 375; Commissioners v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403 ; Inhabitants v. Weir, 9 Ind. 334; Smead v. Indianapolis &C. E. Co, 11 Ind. 104; Brady v. Mayor, 20 N. Y. 313; Appleby v. Mayor, 15 How. Pr. 438; Estet v. Eeokuk County, 18 Iowa, 199, and cases cited by Cole, J. ; Clark v. Polk County, 19 Iowa, 347. 'Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; 8. C, 87 Am. Dec. ^3i. 2 McDonald v. The Mayor &c. of New York, 68 N. Y. 33 ; S. a, 33 Am. Kep. 144, citing Hodges v. Buffalo, 3 Denio, 110; Cornell v. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510; Savings Bank v. Win- chester, 8 Allen, 109. In McDonald V. The Mayor &c. of New York the plaintiff sued for the value of mate- rials furnished the city of New York. The defense set up was that plaintiff had failed to comply with statutory regulations providing that the neces- sity for such materials should be certified to by the head of the depart- ment of public works and the ex- penditure therefor authorized by the common council; and further pro- viding that the materials should be furnished upon sealed bids or pro- posals made in compliance with pub- lic notice advertised. The defense was supported by the court under the circumstances of the case. Judge Folger's Ofnoion is valtiable : — " Itis plain," says he, "that if the restric- tions put upon municipaiitiea by the legislature for the purpose of reduc- ing and limiting the incurring of debt and the expenditure of the pub- lic money may be removed upon the doctrine now contended for (i. a, that the defendant, having appropriated the materials of the plaintiff and used them, is bound to deal justly and pay him the value of them), there is no legislative remedy for the evils of m^unicipal government which of late have excited so much attention and painful foreboding. Restrictions and inhibitions by statute are practically of no avail if they can be brought to naught by the unauthorized action of every official of lowest degree, ac- quiesced in or not repudiated by his superiors. Donovan v. The Mayor &c., 33 N. Y. 391. seems to be an au- thority in point, though the exact question now presented was not con- sidered. And incidental remarks of Denio, J., in Peterson v. The Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449, are to the same import And see Peck v. Burr, 10 N. Y. 394 The views here set forth are not to be extended beyond the facts of the case. It may be that where a mu- 252 LIABILITY rOE ACTS OF OFFIOBES, BTO. [§ 243. § 243. The same subject continued. — The rule of the pre- ceding section is conceded learning in its general sense. There is, however, diificnlty in its application to individual oases. This difficulty lies in deciding to what extent the rule is modified by the doctrine of estoppel, of implied contracts, and of ratifi- cation. It may be safely stated, however, that when the aii- thority of the agent is statutory, and therefore a matter of record, the rule is strictly applied.' Now in general the in- tention of the legislature in imposing the statutory restric- tions on the power of the public officer must be considered, and it is a cardinal question whether the abrogation ot .ue restrictions in the particular case under consideration will de- nicipality has come into the posses- sion of the money or the property of a person without his voluntary in- tentional action concurring therein, the law will fix a liability and- imply a promise to repay or return it Thus money paid by mistake, money col- lected for an illegal tax or assess- ment, property taken and used by an official as that of the city when not so, — in such cases it may be that the statute will not act as an inhibition. The statute may not be carried fur- ther than its intention, certainly not further than its letter. Its purpose is to forbid and prevent the making of contracts by unauthorized official agents for supplies for the use of the corporation. This opinion goes no further than to hold that where a person makes a contract with the city of New York for supplies to it without the requirements of the char- ter being observed, he may not re- cover the value thereof upon an im- plied liability." 1 Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199 ; S. C, 87 Am. Deo. 433 ; Delafield v. lUinois, 2 HIU, 159, 174; Bodges to Buffalo, 2Denio, 110; Supervisors v. ^Bates, 17 N. Y. 243; Overseers v. Overseers of Pharsalia, 15 N. Y. 341 ; Butterfleld v. Inhabitants of Melrose, 6 Allen, 187 ; Eossire v. Boston, 4 Al- len, 57 ; Zabriskie w Cleveland &c. R Co., 33 How. 381 ; Chemung Bank v. Supervisore, 5 Denio, 517 ; Baltimore V. Esohbach, 18 Md. 276 ; Baltimore v. Reynolds, SO Md. 1 ; Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676 ; Hague v. Phil- adelphia, 48 Pa. St 527; Head v. In- surance Co., 3 Cranch, 127 ; White v. New Orleans, 15 La. Ann. 667 ; Dey V. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq., 413 ; But- ler V. Charleston, 7 Gray, 12 ; Bladen V. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St 464; Bone- steel V. Mayor &o., 22 N. Y. 162 ; Al- bany V. Cunliff, 3 N. Y. 165 ; Halstead V. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 430; Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill, 545 ; Boom v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104; Cornell v. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510; Appleby v. Mayor &c., 15 How. 438 ; McSpedon v. Mayor &c., 7 Bosw. (N. Y.) 601 ; Donovan v. Mayor &c., 33 N. Y. 291 ; Smith v. Mayor &c'., 10 N. Y. 504 ; Minei-s' Ditch Co. v. Zel- lerbach, 37 Cal. 543; Belleview v. Hohn, 83 Ky. 1. See, also, cases cited in preceding sections. For many of the authorities cited in this note the writer is indebted to the exhaustive brief of D. J, Dean, Esq., assistant counsel to the corporation of the city of New York, in McDonald v. The Mayor &c., C8 N. Y. 23 ; S. C, 23 Am. ■Rep. 144. §•244.] LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 253 feat the general intention of the legislation. In other words, in the opinion of the writer, the question will generally be best determined by ascertaining whether the particular case at bar is of such a nature that a decision in favor of the con- tracting party will invalidate the precautions imposed by the legislature. If so, the restriction should be enforced ; if, on the other hand, the case is such that a decision in favor of the plaintiff will not affect the general policy of the charter or other legislation as evidenced by the restrictions therein de- fined, and will also satisfy the natural laws of justice and equity, then the corporation may be safely held liable.' § 244. Liability of corporation for act of its officers or agents in violation of law. — A contract made by the officers or agents of a public corporation in contravention of express law is of course void and the corporation cannot be held liable therefor.' Thus where a contract was made by individual members of the common council of a municipal corporation in 1 This rule is not, so far as the defeat" Citing Fox v. Sloo, 10 La. writer has ascertained, definitely laid Ann. 11. See, also, Seibrecht v. New down in the cases. It is, however, Orleans, 13 La. Ann. 496, where it is shadowed forth in many of the opin- said in the vernacular of the civil' ions, and it is believed that the best- law : —" Corporations possess only considered decisions fall within its jura minorum. They have not the scope. power of contracting on all subjects 2 Fox v. New Orleans, 13 La. Ann. like persons of full age and sui juris. 154, where the action' was brought Respublica minorum jure solet, idea upon an alleged contract between the que auxilium, restitutionis implorare plaintiff and defendant. This con- potest. Code, Const 4, tit 54, liber tract was for filling in certain city 3; Ibid., Const 3, liber 11, tit 39; lots. The statute providing that all Ibid., Const 4, liber 11, tit 31." "A contracts for public or other work or- contract made by a corporation dered by the municipality should be which is expressly prohibited by let out to the lowest bidder at auc- statute is so far void that the corpora- tion was disregarded, and the court tion cannot maintain an action upon held that the contract was void, say- the contract even though the statute ing: — "No action can be maintained does not in terras declare that such upon a contract made in violation of a contract shall be void, but merely law. If by overriding this statute prescribes a penalty for making it municipal oflBcers could saddle the Whenever the legislature prohibits city with the expenses of the con- an act or declares that it shall be un- tracts they choose to make in deJi- lawful to perform it, every rule of in- ance of its mandates, the tax-payers terpretation must say that the legis- would become an easy prey to the lature intended to interpose its power jobbing contracts which it was the to prevent the act, and as one of the commendable objeci of the statute to means of its prevention that the 254 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICEES, ETC. [§ 246. a manner not authorized by its charter in disregard of the forms therein directed to be observed in the making of its contracts, it was decided that snc3i a contract was not the gtound of any claim agaiost the corporation ; and where the charter required the contract to be made by the common council, a contract made by a special committee of that body was adjudged to be primarily invalid, and it was further de- cided that no subsequent action of the common council could confer validity upon it.* * § 245. The same subject continued. — The doctrine of the preceding section is so clearly and positively established that attempts have been made by the courts to so extend it as to validate contracts which, although beyond the scope of the powers of a public col-poration, are yet not positively prohibited by its charter or other legislation. Thus in a Missoari case already mentioned, a contract was made by the city of St. Louis for the services of prisoners in its work-house to a pri- vate person. The charter of the city provided that all persons in the city work-house should ** woA for the city at such labor as his or her strength will permit, within or without said work-house, or -olh^p place, not exceeding ten hours each work- ing day, and for such work the person so employed shall be allowed, exclusive of his or her board, fifty cents per day for each day's work'' on account of the fine and costs imposed upon the prisoner. This statutory provision clearly did not allow, even if it did not prohibit, the hiring out of the work- house prisoners to private persons. The court held, however, that the contract, thou^ ultra vires, was not absolutely void, and that the city could recover upon a bond given by a con- courts shall hold it void. This is as Bosenthal, 55 III. 85. See, also, to the manifest as if the statute had de- same effect: Morgan v. Menzies, 60 dared that it should be void. That CaL 341 ; Lottman v. San Francisco, the legislature imposes by a subse- 20 Oal. 96; Indianapolis u Indian- quent section of the act a penalty for apolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 896 ; Jackson the violation of the law does not in v. Bowman, 39 Misa 671 ; McDonald the remotest degree legalize or give v. Mayor, 68 N, T. 38 ; S. C, 23 Am. validity to the contract. It but shows Eep. 144 ; Thomas v. Richmond, 13 that the general assembly intended WaU. 349. to adopt such measures as should i Lottman i\ San Francisco, 20 Cal. compel the observance of the law." 96 ; City of Leavenworth v. Hankin, "Cincinnati &c. Assurance Co. v. 2 Kau. 357. § 24:'6.] LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 255 tractor to the city to secure the perfortnance of a contract upon his part, saying in the opinion : — " It will be observed that the charter of the city, while it does not permit, yet does not plPohibit, the makiing of such a contract as the one before us ; so that although the contract is idlff'a vires the corporation, yet it is ftot illegal becaiuse not prohibited by the charter. This is a distinction clearly marked out by the authorities." * § 246, Effect of representation of oificer or agent as to aHthority. — Th« general rule is well settled that since parties dealing with municipal corporations are charged with knowl- edge of the extent of the powers of the officers and agents of these corporations, therefore a contract beyond the scope of the powers of the officer or agent is not to be enforced against the principal corporation.' But to this rule there are excep- tions due to the application of the rules of estoppel. Thus where the public officer or agent is charged with the sole duty of ascertaining whether a condition precedent to the issuing of municipal bonds has been performed, the recital in the bond that such condition precedent has been performed will estop the corporation from setting iap the td«fense -of non-perform- ance of the tjondition precedent against an innocent purchaser for valn-e of the bonds.* 1 Oily of St Louis v. Davidson, 103 upon the authorization of the CEtshier Mo. 149 ; s. a, iS3 Am. St. Rep. 764. of the 'ban'k. It was held that the *See ante, §§ 243, 343, and cases ajct was entirely beyond the scope of there cited. In United States v. City the power of the cashier ; that his B&nk of Oolnmbus, 21 Hoiw. 356, the representation concerning the power tsasbier wtf'the defendant corporation of tte bearer did not bind the bank, wrote a 'tetter stating that the "bearer and thitt ixinsequently the plaintiff was authorized to contract on behalf could not recover. "We think the of the ■bant for the 'transferor money safe rule," said Mr. Justice Wayne, from the east to the south or the "in all instances of acts done by the west for ttie federal government officers of corporate companies or by Acting upon this letter the then sec- those who have the management of retary of the treasury, Hon. Thomas their business from which contracts Corwin, delivered to the bearer a are alleged to have been made, is to draft to be transferred to New Or- test that fact by an inquiry into the leans for $100,000, which the bearer corporate ability that has been given cashed, but the proceeds of which he them and to their subordinate offi- did not transfer or account for. The cera or which the directors of the United States brought action against company can confer upon the latter the City Bank of Columbus to re- to act for them." cover the sum advanced as aforesaid 8 Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. T4 ; 256 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. [§§ 247, 248: § 247. The same subject continned. — The decisions on the rule stated in the last sentence arise chiefly in deciding the validity of municipal or public bonds, and will be fully dis- cussed in a subsequent chapter.* For the present it is suffi- cient to quote the rule as laid down in the Supreme Court of the United States. " When legislative authority has been given to a municipality or to its officers to subscribe for the stock of a railroad company and to issue municipal bonds in payment, but only on some precedent condition, such as a popular vote favoring the subscription, and where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of the municipality were invested with power to decide whether the condition precedent has been complied with, their recital that it has been, made in the bonds issued by them and held by a 'bona fide purchaser, is conclusive of the fact and binding upon the municipality, for the recital is itself a decision of the fact by the appointed tribunal." * § 348. Eatification of contracts. — A most important dis- tinction exists between the two classes of vli/ra vires pubho corporations that we have just considered. The distinction is in respect of the power of the corporation to ratify by subse- quent acquiescence, active or passive, the unauthorized con- tract. If the contract be wholly beyond the scope of the powers of the corporation it is void ah initio, and no subse- quent acquiescence can validate it.' Like a still-born child, it Anderson County v. Beal, 113 U.S. McDonald w, Mayor &c. of New York, 227 ; Northern Bank of Toledo u 68 N. Y. 23 ; Brady v. Mayor &c. of Porter Township, 110 U.S. 608; Town New York, 20 N. Y. 312; Marsh v. of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484. Fulton Co., 10 Wall 676 ; Shawnee- iSee the Chapter on Bonds and town u. Baker, 85"I1L 563; Hague v. Coupons. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 528 ; Parsons 2Townof Coloma «. Eaves, 92 U.S. v. Monmouth, 70 Ma 262; Bank v. 484. In the opinion in that case, Mr. Statesville, 84 N. C. 169. See ante, Justice Strong refers to the state- §§ 217, 218, and cases cited. An ex- ment by Judge Dillon of this rule in amination of the cases will show that [ his work on Municipal Corporations the rule of the text applies both to \ (1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 523), and cases where the act is from its nat- gives the rule in the words quoted in ure entirely beyond the charter the text as a restatement of Judge powers, express or implied, of the Dillon's proposition. corporation, and also to cases where ' Lewis V. Shreveport, 108 U. S. the officer or agent acted wholly be- 288 ; Smith v. Newburg, 77 N. Y. 130 ; yond his statutory authority in mak- §§ 249, 250.] UABILITT FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEKS, ETC. 25T lacks any element of life that may be fostered into active force. This strict rule is based on the general principles which determine the validity or invalidity of ultra vires municipal contracts.' Ratification is a species of estoppel, and as the contracts we are considering are absolutely void, no principles of estoppel will be allowed to control. § 249. The same subject continued. — If, on the other hand, the contract itself be within the scope of the powers of the cor- poration, but be unauthorized only because the officer or agent, while not forbidden by the law to make the contract, was not properly authorized to do so, in that case the contract may be ratified and validiated by subsequent assent of the corpora- tion.* Thus in a Kansas case one member of a school board made a contract for the building of a school-house. This con- tract was a perfectly proper one in its nature, but was unau- thorized because made by only one member of the board. The full school board afterwards accepted the contract, which was thereby ratified and validated.' § 250. Ratification by authorized officers necessary. — It is obvious that the officer or officers who undertake to ratify an unauthorized contract must possess an authority which in the beginning would have enabled them properly to make the original contract in behalf of the corporation.* In a leading iug the contract, so tbat the act of 470 ; Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 390 ; the officer or agent is virtually in Crawshaw v. Roxbury. 7 Gray, 374; contravention of the law. Sullivan v. School District, 39 Kan. 1 See §317. 347; People v. Swift, 31 Cal. 36; 2 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Episcopal Society v. Dedham Episco- Cranch, 399 : Marshall County u pal Church, 1 Pick. 373 ; Topsham v. Schenck, 5 Wall 772 ; Moore v. Al- Eogers, 43 Vt 199. This doctrine bany, 98 N. Y. 396 ; Albany City Nat frequently finds its application in Bank v. Albany, 93 N. Y. 363 ; Brady cases where unauthorized officers V. Mayor &e. of New York, 30 N. Y. have made expenditure of publie 313 ; Backman v. Charlestown, 43 funds. A subsequent assent by the N. H. 135; Shawneetown v. Baker, proper officials to such expenditure 85 IlL 563 ; Brown v. Winterport, 79 will in the absence of express statn- Me. 305 ; People v. Detroit, 38 Mich, tory prohibition ratify the expendi- S38; Dubuque Female College «. Dis- ture. See cases cited. trict Township, 13 Iowa, 555 ; Lamm ^ Sullivan v. School District^ 39 V. Port Deposit &c. Association, 49 Kan. 347. Md. 333: Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. « Delafleld v. lUinois, 3 Hill (N. Y4 17 258 LIABILITY FOB ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. [§ 251. case in ISew York this principle was forcibly enunciated. By a statute of the State of Illinois, certain officers or agents of the State were authorized to borrow money for public use, and for that purpose to sell its bonds or public stocks at not less than their par value. These officers sold the bonds at par, to be paid for in future instalments without interest, while the bonds drew interest from the time of sale. This was held to be a sale below par, and therefore unauthorized and invalid. It was contended by the bondholders that the act of the governor in signing the bonds with knowledge of the terms of sale operated as a ratification of the sale. On this point the court said: — "We are now brought to the inquiry whether the contracts have been ratified so as to be obligatory upon the State of Illinois. I felt some difficulty upon the question upon the argument ; but after reflecting upon it I am unable to say that there has been a ratification. The appel- lant relies on the fact that the governor, after he knew of the first contract, signed the bonds and caused them to be delivered ; and that some of the other public officers of the State acted under the contracts, drawing for money and receiving pay- ments. But the difficulty is that the governor was no more than an agent for the State, and he as well as^the commission- ers acted under a limited authority ; and the same remark is applicable to the auditor and other public officers. None of them had authority to make such contracts as these were ; and if they could not make them originally they could not ratify them. Eatification must come from the principal — the State of Illinois."! § 251. Manner of ratification. — When a certain mode of execution of a contract is prescribed by statute, the act of ratification of an unauthorized contract must comply with the provisions of the statute regulating the manner of entering into the original contract.* This rule is, however, to be taken with the modification that if the statutory method of pro- 159 ; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 2 McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 376; Hague wPhiladelphir,48Pa.St CaL 591; Cross v. Morristown, 18 527. N. J. Eq. 305 ; Town of Durango t'. 1 Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2 Hill Pennington, 8 Colo. 257. (N. Y.), 159, 175, citing People v. Phoenix Bant, 24 Wend. 131. §252.] LIABILITY FOB ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETO. '• 259 cedure be regarded as merely directory and not mandatory^ then a different method of procedure may be allowed in the act of ratification.! Thus, where the council of the corpora- tion is empowered by the charter to make certain contracts by ordinance, and the contract is made by resolution, the subsequent ratification must be by ordinance.'' The mere use by the corporation of unauthorized improvements, such as school buildings, does not amount to ratification, unless the circumstances are such that it would have been natural and proper to have refused such use, or unless it is proven that the use was after knowledge of the unauthorized character of the improvement.' § 252. Manner of execntion of contracts ^}J ofiBcers and agents. — Nothing is more cei'tain, under the modern adjudi- cations, than that the methods prescribed by charter or other statute must be observed by the corporation in entering into contracts, if these statutory provisions are mandatory and in- tended by the legislature to act as wise restrictions upon the power of the corporation to contract. If, then, there are man- datory and restrictive enactments requiring the corporation to contract only under certain formalities and conditions, then contracts made by the officers or agents of the corporation which are not executed according to those statutory require- ments do not bind the municipality.* Eut where the statu- 1 Cory V. Somerset Freeholders, 44 * Bank of United States v. Dan- N. J. Law, 445. dridge, 13 Wheat 64 ; State v. New- 2 Brown v. Mayor &c. of New York, burg, 77 N. T. 136; Brady v. Mayor 63 N. Y. 239 ; People v. Swift, 31 Cal. &o. of New York, 20 N. Y. 313 ; Al- 26 ; Cross v. Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq. len v. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302 ; Bryan 305 ; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. v. Page, 51 Tex. 532 ; McBrien v. 644. It has been held in some cases Grand Rapids, 56 Mich. 95; Argenti that under the circumstances men- v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255 ; Los tioned in the text, the subsequent Angeles Gas Co. v. Toberman, 61 ratification does not operate to vali- Cal. 199 ; Town of Durango v. Pen- date the original contract, even nington, 8 Colo. 357 ; People v. Web- though the ratification be by ordi- bar, 8.9 111. 347 ; Worthington v. Cov- nanca See Newman v. Emporia, 33 ington, 83 Ky. 265 ; Addis v. Pitts- Kan. 456, and cases cited. burgh, 85 Pa. St. 379 ; Keeney v. Jer- ' Wilson V. School District, 33 sey City, 47 N. J. Law, 449 ; State v. N. II. 118 ; Lane v. School District, Passaic, 41 N. J. Law, 379 ; Seibrecht 10 Mete. (Mass.) 463 ; Davis v. School v. New Orleans, 13 La. Ann. 49? ; Bal- Dlsjtrict, 24 Me. 349. timore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 376 ; Taft 260 LIABILITY FOB ACTS OF OFFIOEBS, ETO. [§ 253. tory provisions prescribing the mode of executing contracts are merely directory and are not intended to be restrictive of the powers of the corporation or its oflSccrs to contract, then a failure to comply with those provisions is not necessarily fatal.' § 253. The same subject continued. — It is frequently pro- vided by statute that all public contracts shall be in writing. This being a mandatory provision and restrictive of the power of the corporation to contract it must be complied with, else the contract is invalid.^ And the same rule applies in regard to contracts under seal. " The ancient rule of the common law that corporations could not bind themselves by a contract not under seal is no longer efficacious in this country." ' In this connection it may be noted that by the provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, every English corporation shall continue to have a common seal,* and certain contracts are required to be made under the corporate seal.* V. Pittsford, 28 Vt 286; Fulton v. Lincoln, 9 Neb. 358 ; Hudson v. Mari- etta, 64 Ga. 286; Logansportw. Hum- phrey, 84 Ind. 487 ; Gates v. Hancock, 45 N. H. 528; Heidelberg v. San Francisco County, 100 Mo. 69 ; Niles Water Works v. Niles, 59 Mich. SIX ; Wilhelm v. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa, 254; Driftwood &c. Turnpike Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 72 Ind. 226. The gen- eral principles enunciated in the text will be more fully illustrated in a subsequent portion of the work. See the chapter on Conteacts. 1 Kelley v. Mayor &c. of Brooklyn, 4 Hill, 263 ; 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 449 and cases cited. ^ Starkey v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203 ; McDonald v. Mayor &c. of New York, 68 N. Y. 23 ; Stewart v. Cam- bridge, 125 Mass. 102. '15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 1090, tit "Municipal Corporations," citing Alton v. MuUedy, 21 HI. 76 ; Wade V. Newbern, 77 N. C. 460 ; Selma V. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411 ; New Athens v. Thomas, 83 m 259 ; Watson v. Ben- nett, 13 Barb. 196 ; Bank of Colum- bia V. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299 ; Sav- ings Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191; Hamilton v. Newcastle &c. R Co., 9 Ind. 359; Peterson v. Mayor &c. of New York, 17 N. Y. 449; Missouri Elver &C. R Co. v. Comm'rs of Ma- rion County, 12 Kan. 482 ; Fleckner V. Bank of U. S., 8 Wheat 338 ; Bank of U. S. V. Dandridge, 13 Wheat 64; Christian Church v. Johnson, 53 Ind. 273 ; McCuUough v. Talladega Insur- ance Co., 46 Ala. 376; Buckley v. Briggs, 30 Ma 452; Whitford v. Laidler, 94 N. Y. 145 ; Sheffield School Township v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157; Merrick v. Burlington &a Plank Road Co., 11 Iowa, 75; Trustees &c. V. Moody, 62 Ala. 389. See, also. Draper v. Springport, 104 U. S. 501. * Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, § 250, subd. 1. 5 The appointment by a corpora- tion of an attorney to conduct their suits or manage their affairs must be under the common seal, otherwise he cannot recover against the corpora- § 254.] LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 261 §254. Contracts Iby ordinance or resolution.— The city council being the agents of the corporation, the acts of that body, if intra vires and regular, are of course binding upon the corporation ; and a contract made by ordinance or reso- lution of the council is, so far as regularity of execution is concerned, valid and binding in the absence of express statu- tory provisions regulating the mode of execution of corporate contracts.' Judge Story has said on this subject : — " The acts of such a body or board, evidenced by a written vote, are as completely binding upon the corporation and as complete authority to their agents as the utmost solemn acts done under the corporate seal." ^ On the question whether such a contract is without the statute of frauds, there .is doubt. A New York case approves the doctrine that a contract made by ordinance and duly entered on the official corporate min- utes, which are signed by the clerk, is valid.' The decision in this case is at least tacitly approved by Judge Dillon,* and seems a reasonable adaptation of the law to modern methods of corporate government when the business of the corpora- tion is conducted by a council; but in a North Carolina case a contract made in a similar matter was declared obnoxious tion even though they had by resolu- Kingston-upon-HuU, L. E. 10 C. P. tion expressly directed the business 403. See Eawlinson's Municipal Cor- to be done. Arnold v. Mayor &c. of porations Act (8th edition by Thomas Poole, 4 Man. & Q. 860 ; Sutton v. Geary), p. 100, note. Spectacle Makers' Co., 10 L. T. (N. S.) i Fleckner v. Bank of U. S., 8 411. So an agreement by a corporation Wheat 338; Over v. Greenfield, 107 with one of its officers for an increase Ind. 231 ; Ross v. Madison, 1 Ind. 381 ; of the salary of an office retained People v. Board of Siiftervisors, 37 by him as compensation for the loss Cal. 655; Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 of another office of which he was de- How. 524 ; Detroit v. Jackson, 1 prived under the act of 1835, though Doug. (Mich.) 165 ; Abbey v. Billups, upon an executed consideration, is 35 Miss. 618; Clark v. "Washington, not binding upon the corporation if 12 Wheat 40 ; Wade v. Newbern, 77 not under the common seal. Eegina N. 0. 460; San Antonio v. Lewis, 9 V. Mayor &c. of Stamford, 6 Q. B. Tex. 69. 433. See, also, Cope u Thames Haven 2 Fleckner v. Bank of U. S., 8 Dock & Railway Co., 6 Exch. 849; Wheat 338. Mayor of Kidderminister v. Hard- 'Argus County «. Albany, 55 N.Y. wicke, L. R. 9 Ex. 18. It has, how- 495. See, also, Duncombe v. Fort ever, been held that an agreement Dodge, 38 Iowa, 381. 'for the use of a dock need not be un- < 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 449. der seal. Wells v. Mayor &c. of 262 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICEES. ETC. [§§ 255, 256. to the objection that it did not comply with the statute of frauds.* § 255. Signature of contract.— It frequently happens that the officers or agents of municipal corporations in executing contracts on behalf of the corporation sign their individual names and affix their individual seals instead of using the corporate name and seal. The preponderance of American authorities seems to establish th#rule that such contracts are valid and binding upon the corporation, if made by the proper officers and intra vires the corporation ; but that they are valid and binding only as simple contracts, and that the seal of the individual officer or agent does not supply the place of the corporate seal.^ There is some conflict of opinion, but it is believed that an examination of the cases will show this rule to be sustained in the United States.' , § 256. The same subject continued. — Notwithstanding the fact, however, that the rule of the preceding section pre- vails, it is far safer for municipal contracts to be signed and sealed by the proper officers with the corporate name and seal. Thus in a leading New York case cited by Judge Dil- lon * a contract relating to public matters was made between a committee appointed for that purpose by the city and a natural person. This contract purported to be " between . . . 1 Wade V. Newbern, 77 N. C. 460. within the scope of their authority 2 Parr v. Greenbush, 73 N. Y. 463 j in executing an instrument in belialf Eandall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. 60 ; of the corporation sign their own Stanton v. Camp, 4 Barb. 274 ; Hei- names and affix their own seals, such delberg School District v. Horst, 63 seals are simply nugatory, and the in- Pa. St. 301 ; Blanchard v. Blackstone, strument,. according to the weight of 103 Mass. 343 ; Robinson v. St Louis, modern judicial opinion, is to be re- 28 Mo. 488 ; Eegents &c. v. Detroit, 13 garded as the simple contract of the Mich. 138 ; Bowen v. Morris, 3 Taunt corporation and will bind the cor- 874 But see contra. Bank of Colum- poration, and not the individuals ex- bia V. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299 ; Ful- ecuting it, where the purpose to lam V. Brookfield, 9 Allen, 1 ; Provi- act for the corporation is manifest dence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 273; Ulam «. from the whole paper and where Boyd, 87 Pa. St 477. there are no words evincing an in- 3 See 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 453, tention to assume a personal lia- where the learned author says: — bility." " Where officers or agents of a cor- < 1 Dillon on Munic Corp., § 453. poration duly appointed and acting §§ 257, 258.] LIABILITY FOB ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. 263 a committee appointed by the corporation of the city of Al- bany for that purpose, of the. first part, and . . . of the second part," and was signed and sealed with the individual names and seals of the persons composing the committee. The court decreed the enforcement of the contract against the corpora- tion, as being a public contract.* But in Pennsylvania under very similar circumstances the committeemen were made per- sonally liable.^ § 257. Liability ex delicto — (a) In general. — It is wholly impossible within the limits of this chapter to lay down with any degree of precision or minuteness the rules governing the liability of public corporations for the tortious acts or omissions of their officers and agents. The rules governing ^the decision of these questions will be set forth and discussed in detail in the subsequent chapters. For this chapter the ef- fort of the writer will be to state broadly the general princi- ples according to which the liability of the corporation for the torts of its officers and agents is determined — less with a view to practical utility than to prepare the mind of the reader for an intelligent consideratioji of the particular rules obtaining in the different classes of cases in which this liabil- ity is sought to be enforced. " !No rule on this subject can be so precisely stated as to embrace all the torts for which it has been held by some court or another that a private action will lie against a municipal corporation." ' § 258. (b) Discretionary and legislative acts. — "Where torts are committed by the officers or agents of the public corpo- ration in the exercise of those discretionary and legislative powers which are delegated to them by the legislature.; when those officers or agents in exercising those powers, or by failure to exercise them, incidentally commit torts against natural persons or private corporations, the municipality is wholly free from liability.^ The reason for this rule, with an 1 Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. Fed. Rep. 593 ; Seifert v. Brooklyn, 60. 101 N. Y. 136; Cole v. Medina, 37 2Ulam V. Boyd, 87 Pa. St 477. Barb. 318; Wilson v. New York, 1 3 Conway v. Beaumont, 61 Tex. 10. Denio, 595; Cain u Syracuse, 95 * Johnston v. District of Columbia, N. Y. 83 ; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 118 U. a 19; Trescott v. Waterloo, 26 489; GrifiBn v. New York, 9 N. Y. 264: LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. [§ 259. outline of the classes of acts which are deemed discretionary and legislative within the protection of the doctrine, is clearly and forcibly stated by Judge Oooley in his work on constitu- tional limitations. One passage is quoted from that work in the following section. § 259. (c) The same subject continued. — " As no State," Bays this eminent publicist, "does or can undertake to protect, its people against incidental injuries resulting from its adopt- ing or failing to adopt any proposed, legislative action, so no similar injury resulting from municipal legislative action or non-action can be made the basis of a legal claim against a municipal corporation. The justice or propriety of its open- ing or discontinuing a street, of its paving or refusing to pa-ve a thoroughfare or alleys of its erecting a proposed public building, of its adopting one plan for a public building or work rather than another; or of the exercise of any other dis- cretionary authority committed to it as a part of the govern- mental machinery of the state, is not suffered to be brought 456 ; Whitsett v. Union D. & R. Co., 10 Colo. 243; Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass. 578; French -v. Boston, 139 Mass. 593; Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311: Pierce v. New Bed- ford, 139 Mass. 584 ; Steele v. Boston, 128 Mass. 583 ; Tainter v. "Worcester, 123 Mass. 311 ; Randall v. Eastern &c. R. Co., 106 Mass. 276 ; Fisher v. Bos- ton, 104 Mass. 87; HafEord v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 397; Wright v. Augusta, 78 Ga. 341 ; Weller v. Bur- lington, 60 Vt 38; Hutchinson v. Concord, 41 Vt. 271; Calwell v. Boone, 51 Iowa, 687 ; Schultz v. Mil- waukee, 49 Wis. 354; Anderson v. East, 117 Ind. 126; Wheeler v. Ply- mouth, 116 Ind. 158; Lafayette v. Timberla,ke, 88 Ind. 330; Heller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159 ; McKenna v. St. Louis, 6 Mo. App. 320 ; Robinson v. Evansville, 87 Ind. 334 ; Ray v. Man- chester, 46 N. H. 59: Atwater v. Baltimore, 31 Mo. 462; Bauman v. Detroit, 58 Mich. 444; Burford v. Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98 ; Western College V. Cleveland, 13 Ohio St 375; Frith V. Dubuque, 45 Iowa, 403; Davenport v. Stevenson, 34 Iowa, 235 ; Stevenson v. Lexington, 69 Mo. 157 ; Kistner v. Indianapolis, 100 Ind. 210 ; White v. Yazoo City, 27 Miss. 357; Fort Worth v. Crawford, 64 Tex. 302; Black v. Columbia, 19 S. C. 412; Hill V. Charlott, 73 N. C. 55; Van Horn v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, 447; Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 440; Miller v. St Paul, 38 Minn. 134 ; Men- del V. Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233; Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St 19 ; Greenwood v. Louisville, 13 Bush, 226 ; Jewett v. New Haven, 38 Conn. 368; Torbush v. Norwich, 38 Conn. 235; Howard v. San Francisco, 51 Cal. 52 ; Davis v. Montgomery, 51 Ala. 1S9 ; Lehigh County v. Hoflfort, 116 Pa. St 119; McDade v. Chester, 117 Pa. St 414 ; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St 420 ; Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St 324. See Cooley's Const Lim. 257; 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 950. § 260.] LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 265 in question in an action at law and submitted to the deter- mination of court and jury. If, therefore, a city temporarily suspends useful legislation ; or orders and constructs public works from which incidental injury results to individuals ; or adopts unsuitable or insufficient plans for public bridges, build- ings, sewers, or other public works ; or in any other manner, through the exercise or failure to exercise its political authority, causes incidental injury to individuals, an action will not lie for such injury. The reason is obvious. The maintenance of such an action would transfer to court and jury the discretion which the law vests in the municipality ; but transfer them not to be exercised directly and finally but indirectly and par- tially by the retroactive effect of punitive verdicts upon spe- cial complaints." ^ § 260. (d) Ministerial acts. — The converse of the prop- ositions laid down in the two preceding sections is equally true with those propositions ; that is to say, the municipal corporation is liable for the tortious acts and omissions of its officers or agents when those acts or omissions are violations of absolute and ministerial duties.^ This rule is well established and rests upon the principle that a municipal corporation is, like aU other persons natural or artificial, liable for the proper performance of duties which are not discretionary or legis- lative in their nature, but which are absolute and ministerial. This doctrine is, however, to be modified by the rule that this duty must, even though ministerial, be not for the public but 1 Cooley's Const Lira. 253-5. 111. 346 ; Meares v. Wilmington (N. G), 2 Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660 ; 9 Ired. Law, 73 ; Wilson v. Wheeling, Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 19 W. Va. 334 ; Gilluly v. Madison, 63 U. S. 541 ; Galveston V. Posnainsky, Wis. 518; Boulder u Niles, 9 Colo. 415; 63 Tex. 118; Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 Gilmer v. Laconia, 55 N. H. 130; N. Y. 89; Ehrgott v. New York, 96 Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1 : N. Y. 264 ; Noonan v. Albany, 79 Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103 ; N. Y. 470 ; Hamilton v. Columbus, 53 Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486. Ga. 435 ; Erie City v. Schwingle, 23 Many additional cases could be cited Pa. St 385 ; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt in support of the doctrine of the text, 230 ; Farquar v. Roseburg, 2 Pac. but it is believed to be useless to do Rep. 1103 ; Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn. so. The proposition of the text is in- 176 ; O'Nsil v. New Or' cans, 30 La. deed conceded learning in this coun- Ann. 220; McCombs v. Akron, 13 try. Ohio, 476; Waltham v. Kemper, 55 266 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. [§§ 261, 262. for the private advantage of the corporation, as more fully explained hereafter. § 261. (e) Pulblic as contradistinguished from private du- ties. — The whole doctrine of the liability of public corporations for the torts of their officers or agents is affected and mod- ified by the principle that the tortious act or omission must be in violation not of a public but of a private duty. The reason and the essence of this rule i^clear and easily to be under- stood, but its application to the specific cases is often of great difficalty. The rule is laid down in a recent Texas case, which ' is approved by the editors of the American and English En- cyclopaedia of Law. " So far as public corporations of any class and however incorporated exercise powers conferred on them for purposes essentially public — purposes pertaining to the administration of general laws made to enforce the general policy of the state — they should be deemed agencies of the state, and not subject to be sued for any act or omission occur- ring while in the exercise of such power, unless by statute the action be given. In reference to such matters they should stand as does sovereignty, whose agents they are, subject to be sued only when the State by statute declares they may be. In so far, however, as they exercise powers not of this character, , voluntarily assumed — powers intended for the private advan- tage and benefit of the locality and its inhabitants — there seems to be no sufficient reason why they should be relieved from that liability to suit and measure of actual damage to which an individual or private corporation exercising the same powers for purposes essentially private would be liable." ^ § 262. (f) The rule applied to public quasi-corporations. The rule of non-liability of a public jwasi-corporation is illus- trated in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois. A drainage district enlarged its boundaries, thus discharging more water on the plaintiff's land than it had a right to do, and the work was also performed negligently. In declaring that there was no corporate liability the court said : — " That a private corporation, formed by voluntary agreement for pri- 1 15 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, sky, 63 Tex. 118; s. a, 12 Am. & Eng. 1141 ; City of Galveston v. Posnain- Corp. Cas. 484. § 2 i2.] ' LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. 267 vate purposes, is held to respond in a civil action for its negli- gence or tort, goes without saying; and yet, in deciding the mooted question at issue in this case, it seems convenient to restate that proposition. So, also, it is admitted law that municipal corporations proper, such as villages, towns and cities, which are incorporated by special charter or volunta- rily organized under general laws, are liable to individuals in- jured by their negligent or tortious conduct, or that of their agents and servants in respect to corporate duties. In regard ; to public involuntary j'^as^-corporations the rule is otherwise, and there is no such implied liability imposed upon them. These latter, such as counties, townships, school districts, road districts and other similar quasi-coTiporatloias, exist under gen- eral laws of the State which apportion its territory into local subdivisions for the purposes of civil and governmental admin- istration, and impose upon the people residing in said several subdivisions precise and limited public duties and clothe them with restricted corporate functions co-extensive with the duties devolved upon them. In such organizations the duties and their correlative powers are assumed in invitum, and there is no responsibility to respond in damages in a civil action for neglect in the performance of duties, unless such action is« given by statute.' The grounds upon which the liability of a municipal corporation proper is usually placed are that the duty is voluntarily assumed and is clear, specific and complete, and that the powers and means furnished for its proper per- formance are ample and adequate.^ In such case there is a perfect obligation, and a consequent civil liability, for neglect in all cases of special private damages. The non-liability of the public quasi-corporsition unless liability is expressly de- clared is usually placed upon these grounds. That the corpo- rations are made such nolens volensj that their powers are limited and specific, and that no corporate funds are provided which can, without express provision of law, be appropriated to private indemnification. Consequently in such the liability is one of imperfect obligation, and no civil action lies at the 12 Dillon on Munio. Corp., §§ 761, man (III), 567; Waltham v. Kemper, 763; Cooley's Const Lim. 340, 347; 55 IlL 346. Hedges v. County of Madison, 1 Gil- 2 Browning v. City of Springfieldj 17 111. 14a 268 LIABILITY rOE ACTS OF OFFICEES, ETC. [§ 263. suit of an individual for non-performance of the duty im- posed." ^ § 263. Conclusion. — The writer has endeavored in the pre- ceding sections to give a very general outline of the principles governing the liability of the corporation for the torts of its officers and agents. These rules are necessarily broad and general to a degree which perhaps deprives them of any con- siderable practical value. The^will serve,, however, to show the general trend of the 'adjudications in this country on the subject under consideration. As has been remarked by al- most every writer on this topic, it is impossible to lay down rules of greater definiteness. The particular circumstances of each case must be carefully considered and the decisions re- lating to the class of torts to which belongs that which forms the subject-matter of the action must be examined before the law upon any specific case can be determined. The general results of these rules may be stated to be as follows : — If the tort is one for which the municipality is expressly made liable by statute, that fact of course concludes the liability of the corporation. If such is not the case, then the tort must con- sist (in the case of public corporations other than public g'Wfflsi- corporations) of the violation of a private duty imposed for private corporate advantage ; and not of a public or govern- mental duty imposed for the benefit of the public at large. In the case of public quasi-Gor-porsitions, the general rule is that they are liable only for those torts for which the statute ex- pressly prescribes that they shall be liable. 1 Elmore v. Drainage Com'rs (1890), 135 111. 269; s. C, 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 491. CHAPTER IX. PUBLIC BOARDS. § 264 Corporate assemblies of the § 283. old English corporations. 284. 265. The same subject continued — 285. Notice at common law. 286. 266. The same subject continued — Presence of the mayor. 287. 267. Eegular or stated meetings — Time for holding. 288. 268. Adjournments. 269. Special meetings. 270. Adjourned meetings. 289. 271. Notice of special meetings. 272. The same subject continued — Specifications of object of 290. meeting. 273. Adjourned meetings — Time 291. for holding. 274 Corporation represented by 292. governing boards. 293. 275. The same subject continued — 294 Meeting essential to ofScial action. 295. 276. The same subject continued — 296. Delegation of powers. 297. 277. The same subject continued. 278. Delegation of powers — A 298. Pennsylvania case. 299. 279. The same subject continued — The rule limited. 300. 280. Constitution of council 301. 281. The same subject continued. 282. Conflicting councils — Kerr v. 302. Trega Acts of de facto councila Quorum of definite body. The same subject continued. The same subject continued — An exception to the rule. The same subject continued — Special charter provisions. Quorums and majorities fur- ther considered — The rule in England. The same subject continued — Decisions in the United States. Further application of major- ity principle. Execution of authority vested in two persons. Presiding oflBcer. The same subject continued. Commitment for contempt — Whitcomb's Case. Ayes and nays. Parliamentary law. Keconsideration and rescis- sion — General power. The same subject continued. Power to reconsider and re- scind qualified. The same subject continued. I Reconsideration distinguished from repeal , Joint assemblies of definite bodies. § 364. Corporate assemblies of the old English corpora- tions. — In England to constitute a corporate assembly there must at common law be present the mayor or other head offi- 270 PUBLIC BOARDS. [§ 265. cer,^ a majority of each definite integral part,^ and some mem- bers of the indefinite class usually called the commonalty.' The latter class is generally either by prescription or by char- ter represented by a common council, and when this body ex- ists an assembly of such is deemed a corporate assembly, and the presence of the legal president is necessary although not required by charter.* "Where there is no indefinite class enti- tled to participate in corporate acts, and the governing body consists wholly of a definite or select class, it is necessary to constitute a corporate assembly (sometimes termed in this case a select assembly) that a majority of the select class or classes shall be present. But the attendance of the mayor is not re- quired at a meeting of this kind unless it is expressly so pro- vided.* § 266. The same subject continued — Notice at common law. — Where the days and times for the transaction of par- ticular business are appointed by usage, statute, charter or by-laws, all the members are presumed to have knowledge thereof, and no notice is necessary.* When a meeting is as- sembled for a special purpose, every member who has a right to vote is entitled to notice,' unless he has quit the munioipal- 1 He must be the o&ceidejure and 5 Willcock on Munic. Corp., §§ 92, not merely de/acto (Rex u. Hebden, 106. By the English Municipal Cor- Andr. 391: Eex v. Dawes, 4 Burr, porations Act of 1835 (5 & 6 Wm. IV., 2279 ; Rex v. York, 5 Term R 72), and ch. 76, § 69) one-third of the council by he must attend in that capacity. Rex which body the corporation is repre- V. Carter, Cowp. 59. sented constitutes a quorum. The 2 That is, a majority of that number mayor presides, but if he ift absent a by which each of these parts is con- presiding officer is chosen who has stituted. and not merely a majority a casting vote. of the surviving or existing members. ^ Kex v. Hill, 4 Bam. & C. 441, 443 ; Rex V. Morris, 4 East, 26 ; Rex v. Bell- Willcock on Munic. Coip., § 59. But ringer, 4 Term R. 833 ; Rex v. Thorn- if it is intended to do any other act ton, 4 East, 307 ; Rex v. Miller, 6 Term of importance at such a nieeting, a R. 278 ; Rex v. Devonshire, 1 Barn, notice is necessary. Rex v. Liverpool, & C. 614 ; Rex w Hill, 4 Barn. &C. 441; 2 Burr. 734; Rex v. Doncaster, 2 Rex V. Lathrop, 1 Wm. B. 471. Burr. 744; Rex v. Hill, 4 Barn. & C. 3 Rex V. Varlo, Cowp. 250 ; Rex v. 442 ; Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 545. Monday, Cowp. 539 ; Rex v. Bower, 1 ' Rexu Liverpool, 2 Burr. 731 ; Rex Bam. & C. 498 ; Rex v. Bellringer, 4 v. May, 5 Bun-. 2682 ; Rex v. Shrews- Term R. 833. bury, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 151 ; Rex * Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 126. v. Lisle, Andr. 178 ; Kynaston v. § 265.] PCBLIO BOARDS. 271 ity without retaining a house or leaving his family within its limits.' The notice must be issued by order of some one who has authority to assemble the corporation for that particular purpose.^ It must be personally served upon him, but in case of his temporary absence it maj' be left with his family or at his last place of abode.' It must be given a reasonable time before the hour of meeting, and if the meeting be not at the usual place it should contain an intimation of that circum- stance.* It is not necessary to state what business is to be transacted when it relates onlj'^ to the ordinary aifairs of the corporation, but when it is for the purpose of election, a mo- tion, or making ordinances, the fact should be stated, for some may " feel it their duty to attend upon such occasions, to coun- teract the spirit of party and preserve the firidamental prin- ciples of their constitution."' "If every member of a select body be present either at a meeting on the charter day, or spe- cially convened, or even by accident at a proper place and time, they may by unanimous consent * dispense with notice, and transact any extraordinary business within their peculiar province." ' Their unanimity is only necessary for entering Shrewsbuiy, 2 Str. 1051 ; Rex v. The- ' Hex v. Shrewsbury, Cas. Temp, odorick, S East, 546 ; Rex v. Hill, 4 Hardw. 153 ; Kynaston v. Shrews- Barn. & C. 441 ; including every bury, 2 Str. 1051. It need not be in member of an " indefinite " body, if writing. Rex v. Hill, 4 Barn. & C. the incidental powers of the corpo- 442. ration are still exercised by the body * Rex v. Hill, 4 Barn. & C. 442. The at larga Rex v. Faversham, 8 Term guildhall is the proper place, but if R. 356. there be none some particular place 1 Rex II Grimes, 5 Burr. 2601 ; Rex should be appointed. Musgrove v. V. Shrewsbury, Cas. Temp. Hardw. Nevinson, 1 Str. 584 ; s. c, 2 Ld. 151. It is no sufficient excuse for Raym. 1359; Rex v. May, 5 Burr, omission of notice that the officer 2682. serving it heard and believed he had ^ 'Wiiicock on Munic. Corp., § 74 ; departed, if such was not the fact Rex v. Tucker, 1 Barnard. 27 ; Rex v. Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 68. Shrewsbury, Cas, Temp. Hardw. 151 ; 2 But the want of authority may be Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 546 ; Rex waived by the presence and consent v. Hill, 4 Barn. & C. 441. of all. Rex v. Hill, 4 Bam. & C. 444 ; « It ought to appear plainly by their Rex V. Gaborian, 11 East, 86, n. ; S. C, conduct that they are unanimous. 3 Show. 338 ; Rex v. Atkins, 3 Mod. Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 80. 23. At common law a meeting can ' Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 79 ; be summoned only by the mayor- Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 546 ; Rex Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 94. v. Wake, 1 Barnard. 80. 272 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§§ 266, 267. upon the business, after which it may be transacted in the same manner as if the assembly had met upon proper notice.* § 266. The same subject continned — Presence of the mayor. — It is the common-law privilege attached to the office of mayor that he is an integral part of the corporation, and that no corporate act done in his absence is valid.* He must preside not only at the transaction of those affairs which are merely voluntary or conveni^t, such as the election of new members into the corporation, or an indefinite class, but at those which are of the utmost necessity, as the filling of vacancies or the annual election of the officers.' The mayor must also propose the particular business or acquiesce in the proposal of another,* and he must preside from the beginning to the conclusion of each distinct transaction.* In some in- stances, however, either by immemorial usage or by the terms of the charter, the presence of the head officer was dispensed ,with, and an alternative substituted. In such cases all the requisites of legality must exist in the office of the person substituted, and if he hold by delegation from the head of- ficer, he must not only be the legal deputy, but appointed by the legal principal." § 267. Regular or stated meetings — Time for holding.— The meetings of corporate bodies are either (1) regular or 1 Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 81. depend entirely upon the provisions But if the charter requires a special of the charter, or the act under notice, this cannot be dispensed with, which the corporation is organized, even by unanimous consent. Eex v. and the by-laws passed in pursuance Theodorick, 8 East, 543. of such authority." Martindale v. 2 Eex V. Atkins, 3 Mod. 23; s. C, Palmer, 53 Ind. 411, 413; Welch u 3 Show. 338; Tremaine, 233; Eex v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. 130. Gaborian, 11 East, 87, n. ; 1 Eol. 'Eex v. Lisle, Andr. 174; Eex v. Abr. 514, 30 ; Eex v. Trew, 2 Barnard. Hebden, Andr. 393. 370. " The doctrine of the English * Eex v. Gaborian, 11 East, 86, n., courts as to the old corporations in 87, n. ; Eex v. BuUer, 8 East, 393 ; 1 that country, that the mayor was an Eol. Abr. 514 ; Eex v. Williams, 2 integral part of the corporation, and Maule & SeL 141, 144 that the acts of the corporation in ^ See cases cited in preceding note, his absence were invalid, has, it is * Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 105 ; believed, no application to the office Eex v. Gaborian, 11 East, 86, n. ; Eex of mayor in this country. With us, v. Corry, 5 East, 381 ; S. a, 1 Smith, the powers and duties of the mayor 543, 268.] PDBLIO BOAEDS. 273 stated, (2) special, or (3) adjourned meetings. tTnless the time for the stated meetings of the governing body is fixed by charter or statute, or otherwise provided for by law, the, power of determination resides with the body itself. Where a city charter requires the council to hold " stated meetings," and omits to designate the time, the council may upon simple motion prescribe such time, which may be changed by the council alone ; also upon mere motion, although it has been previously fixed by a formal resolution, approved by the mayor and published.' All the members of the board are pre- sumed to have knowledge of the times for holding the stated meetings, and if any member fails to attend he voluntarily waives his right to participate in the business of the meeting, and is bound by whatever is done within the ordinary range of the duties of the board.' § 268. Adjournments. — At a meeting duly called a major- ity of a quorum have the incidental right to adjourn to an- other time, either on the same or on a future day.' And if an lit requires only such action on their part as expresses the will of the body. State v. Kantter, 33 Minn. 69 ; S. CL, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 169. 2 People V. Batchelor (1860), 22N. Y. 138; Gildersleeve v. Board of Educa- tion (1863), 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 201, 208. As to presiwuptions in favor of the regularity of meetings, see Hud- son County V. State, 24 N. J. Law, 718 ; State V. Smith, 23 Minn. 218 ; Ins. Co. V. Sanders, 36 N. H. 253 ; State v, Jer- sey City, 25 N. J. Law, 309. But in the New York case cited above (23 N. Y. 128), where the board of aldermen at a stated meeting adopted a resolu- tion to meet in convention with the mayor on the same day, for the pur- pose of making certain appointments, it was held that those absent from the stated meeting were entitled to reasonable notice of the time for hold- ing the convention. 9 In re Newland Ave., 38 N. Y. St. Rep. 796; s. c, 15 N. Y. Supl. 63; Ex 18 pai-te Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; S. C, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 153 (citing Dillon on Munic. Corp., 287). The power is incident to special as well as regular meetings. Stockton v. Powell (Fla., 1893), 10 So. Rep. 688. By parUa- mentary law if only a minority have assembled they may adjourn to the next day on which the body can meet for the transaction of business. People V. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 143, 147. Arbitrary adjournment by presiding officer, see § 293, infra. "The rule, as we understand, appli- cable to all deliberate bodies, is that any number have power to adjourn, though they may not be a quorum for the transaction of business." Kim- ball V. Marshall, 44 N. H. 465, 468 (board of aldermen). "It is not at all unusual, and never has been sup- posed to be unlawful, for meetings of corporations to be adjourned for want of a quorum, without transact- ing any other business." This remark 274 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 269. adjournment is irregular because of the want of a quorum, but the adjourned meeting is attended by all the members . who participate without objection in the proceedings, the ir- regularity is cured, and in the absence of any finding the ciourt will presume that all did so attend.' But under an act providing that sessions " shall dontinue six days, if business shall so long require, and no longer," a board has no power to adjourn beyond six days, and pr^eedings at such an adjourned session are corcmh nonjudice and void.^ § 269. Special meetings. — It is competent for a public board, unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute, to call special meetings for the transaction of business proper to come before it ; and where a regular meeting was adjourned to the next regular meeting without taking final action on a certain matter, and at a special meeting called and held dur- ing the interval it was again taken up and disposed of, the validity of the proceedings was sustained.' "Where the char- ter expressly provided that the action of the city assembly at a special session called by the mayor should be confined to the objects specially stated to them when assembled, the language was interpreted to exclude legislation upon matters communi- ■was made in a case where a town Donough v. Dewey (1890), 82 Mich, meeting adjourned to a certain day 809, 313. (not the day of a regular meeting), > State v. Smith, 23 Minn. 818. See, without the choice of a moderator- also, on the last point, Citizens' &c But the learned judge seems not to Ins. Co. v. Sortwell, 8 Allen, 219, 223 ; have confined his statement to ad- Sargent v. Webster, 13 Met 497, 504 ; joumments of popular meetings. Freeholders &c. v. State, 34 N. J. Attorney-General v. Simonds (1873), Law, 718; Rutherford v. Hamilton, 111 Mass. 256, 260. " The law is silent 97 Mo. 543. The use of the word " re- as to the power of the board [of cess" by the clerk instead of "ad- school inspectors] to adjourn. We joum" is immaterial. Ex parte think they have the right to adjourn, Mirande, 73 CaL 365 ; S. C, 14 Pac for any sufficient reason, both as to Rep. 888. time and place ; and unless it be ' Grimmet v. Askew, 48 Ark. 151 ; made to appear that such adjourn- S. a. 2 S. W. Rep. 707. ment was an abuse of the corporate ' Douglass v. County of Baker, 33 functions, and operated to the det- Fla. 419 ; S. C, 2 So. Rep. 776. In this riment of those affected, or to be case, however, no stated time for affected, by the proceedings, such meetings was prescribed by statute, action is not subject to review." See, also. People v. Batchelor, 32 N. Y. isa §§ 270, 271.J PTIBLIO B0AED8. 275 cated to it by the mayor during the session but after the time when it assembled.' § 270. Adjonrned meetings. — An adjourned meeting of either a regular or special meeting, is a continuation of the same meeting, and any business which it would have been proper to consider at the meeting may be acted upon at the adjourned meeting.^ Conversely, an adjourned meeting is limited to those subjects upon which it was competent for the original meeting to take action. Thus, where a charter pro- vided that no ordinance should be passed by the common councQ unless introduced at a previous stated meeting, and the record showed that the ordinance in question was introduced at a previous adjourned meeting, without disclosing whether it was an adjourned meeting of a stated or of a special meet- ing, the defect was held to be fatal.' § 271. Notice of special meetings. — A charter provision requiring a city council to meet " at such time and place as they by resolution may direct " is mandatory but not prohib- 1 St Louis V. Withaus, 90 Mo. 646. = Magneau v. Fremont (1890), 30 Neb. 843 ; Warner v. Mower, 11 Vt 385 ; New Orleans v. Brooks, 36 La. Ann. 641; Street Case, 1 La, Ann. 413 ; Hudson County v. State, 24 N. J. Law, 718 ; People v. Batchelor, 23 N. y. 138; Smith v. Law, 21 N. Y. 296; People v. Martin, 5 N. Y. 23; Rex V. Harris, 1 Barn. & Ad. 936 ; Scadding v. Lorant, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 16. Where the statute requires that a township officer be elected at a regular meeting held on a particular day, such officer may properly be elected at a meeting, held at a later day, which is an adjournment of the regular meeting. Carter v. McFar- land, 75 Iowa, 196; s. a, 39 N. W. Rep. 268; State v. Vanosdal (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 79. See, also, State V. Hanison, 67 Ind. 71 ; Sack- ett V. State, 74 Ind. 486. A statute required supervisors to act at their "session in October." It was held that they might act at an adjourned session. Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich. 146. Where a regular meeting ad- journs for a particular purpose, the adjourned meeting is not confined to that purpose, but may take up other legislative business. Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24. In this country an ad- journed meeting of a special meet- ing is not limited to matters actually begun, but unfinished, at the' first meeting, and may, in Judge Dillon's opinion, consider proper business ab initio. Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 287, n. See, also, Cassidy v. Bangor (1871), 61 Me. 434, 441. 8 State V. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law, 309. See, also, Staats v, Washing- ton, 45 N. J. Law, 318 ; S. C, 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 38. Where the governing body consists of two branches, the unfinished business of either body must be taken up in the next year de novo, Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. 414. 276 PUBUC BOARDS. [§ 271. itory, and a valid meeting may be convened at a time not fixed bj' resolution.^ Every member entitled to be present at a special meeting is entitled to notice of the time and place thereof, which must be served upon him personally, if prac- ticable, or unless some other mode of notice is prescribed by statute or charter.^ "Where a charter provided that the mayor should be ex officio a member of a board of road commission- ers and preside at its meetings when present, but without a vote except in case of a tie, it ^as held that he was entitled to notice of a meeting, although there was not a tie vote in the particular instance.' But the omission of notice is cured » State V. Smith, 23 Minn. 218. Code Iowa, § 303, provides that the board of supervisors, at any regular meeting, shall have power "to pro- vide for the erection of all bridges." The code provides for special meet- ings, but does not prescribe the kind of business that may be transacted. It was held that the statute does not prohibit making provision for the erection of bridges at a special meet- ing, or reconsidering at a special meeting provisions made at a regu- lar meeting. Board of Supervisors v. Horton, 75 Iowa, 271 ; s. c, 39 N. W. Rep. 894. ^ Rogers u Slonaker (1884), 33 Kan. 191 ; People v. Batchelor, 33 N. Y. 138 ; Harding v. Vandewater, 40 CaL 77; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill (Md.), 254; Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. 178; Stowe V. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214 ; Paola &c. Ry. Co. V. Commissioners, 16 Kan. 302, an excellent case, in which Brewer, J., shows that the rule is not arbitrary, but founded upon the clear- est dictates of reason; Wiggin v. Freewill Baptist, 8 Met 301 ; Ex parte Rogers, ' 7 Cowen, 526, note ; Balti- more Turnpike, 5 Binney, 481 ; Cas- sin V. Zavalla County (1888), 70 Tex. 419. See also § 265, supra. And for a construction of provisions relating to notice in> the English Municipal Corporations Act, 5 & 6 Wm. IV., ch. 76, § 69 (Consolidated Act, 1883, § 22), Town Council &c. v. Court, 1 El. & El. 770; Regina v. Whip, 4 Q. B. 141; Regina v. Grimshaw, 10 Q. B. 747, 755 ; Regina v. Thomas, 8 Ad. & El. 183 ; Rex v. Hai-ris, 1 Bam. & Ad. 936. a State v. Kirk, 46 Conn. 395, hold- ing also that a written notice to a member absent from the State, left at the Store of his son, which he was in the habit of visiting daily when in town, was sufficient Code of Iowa, section 301, provides that, on request for a special meeting of the board, the auditor shall fix a day for such meeting, and give notice in writing to each supervisor personally or by leaving a copy thereof at his resi- dence, at least six days before the day appointed, and also give notice by publication in newspapers pub- lished in the county, or, if there be none, by causing notice to be posted at the court-house and at two other places, one week before the time set Held, that the six days' limitation of the notice refers to the copy left at the residence, and not to the personal notice ; and the one-week limitation of the public notice refers to the posted notice, and not to the publica- tion in a newspaper. Board of Su- pervisors V. Horton, 75 Iowa, 271; s. C, 39 N. W. Rep. 394 Charter pro- § 272.] PUBLIC BOARDS. 277 by the presence and consent of all the members,^ "or at least of all who were not properly notified." ^ § 272. The same subject continued — Specification of object of meeting. — It was held in a very early case in New Jersey that if the particular purpose of -a special meeting is visions as to notice must be strictly pursued. Lord w Anoka, 36 Minn. 176 ; s. a, 30 N. W. Rep. 550. See, also, Scott V. Union County, 63 Iowa, 583. The notice may be oral, pro- vided all the membere receive it in time to attend. Scott v. Paulen, 15 Kan. 162; White v. Fleming (1887), 114 Ind. 560 ; S. a, 16 N. E. Eep. 487. Two days' notice for persons all re- siding in the city, and whose duty it is to reside in the city and to be ready to perform the functions of their office, is not so clearly a short no- tice that on a pleading it will be pronounced insufficient People v. Walker, 23 Barb. 304, 305. In White- side V. People, 26 Wend. 635, the no- tice was served at 2 o'clock P. M. for a meeting at 5 P. M. of the same day. Where notice of a meeting of school inspectors was required by law to be given by the township clerk, who was ex officio clerk of the board, it was sufficient though signed by him as " clerk of the board." Donough V. Dewey (1890), 82 Mich. 309. ' Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb. 843 ; People V. Frost (1889), 32 111. App. 242; Thomas v. Citizens' Horse R Co., 104 111. 462 ; Lawrence v. Trainer (ni., 1891), 27 N. E. Rep. 197; Beaver Creek v. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528; State V. Smith, 22 Minn. 218. But if third parties have a right to be heard, e. g., tax-payers, the notice is juris- 'iictional, and cannot be waived by the consent of a majority of those in- terested. Gentle v. Board &c. (1888), 73 Mich. 40; S. C, 40 N. W. Rep. 928. There is a presumption in favor of regularity. Staats v. Washington, 45 N. J. L. 318 ; s. c, 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 39; Freeholders of Hudson County V. State, 34 N. J. Law, 718 Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 543 Torr V. Corcoran (1888), 115 lud. 188 Prezinger v. Harness (1887), 114 Ind, 401, and Indiana cases there cited Stoddard v. Johnson, 75 Ind. 20 Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563 ; s. C. 7 Am. St Rep. 679 ; Scott v. Paulen, 15 Kan. 163. Of. State v. Jersey City, 35 N. J. Law, 309 : Harding u Bader, 75 Mich. 316, 331 ; Newaygo County Mfg. Co. V. Echtinau, 81 Mich. 416. Where the county auditor is empow- ered to call special meetings of the board of commissioners, when the public interests require it, by giving at Ipast six days' notice, unless in his opinion an emergency requires a shorter notice, in which case he may fix it at his discretion, his determina- tion is final and conclusive. Jussen V. Board of Comra'rs, 95 Ind. 567; Prezinger v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491. If want of notice affirmatively ap- pears, it is fatal. Paola &c. Ry. Ca V. Comm'rs, 16 Kan. 302. 2 Lord V. Anoka, 36 Minn. 176; s. a, 30 N. W. Rep. 550, 551. Com- missioners chosen at a regular meet- ing of the board to let a bridge contract and superintend the con- struction, who protested against the legality and the sufficiency of the notice of a subsequent special meet- ing in which the former action was reconsidered, but took no part in the whole of such meeting, and at- tempted by so doing to accomplish their purposes, are estopped to deny the sufficiency of the notice of the 278 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 273. stated in the call, acts of the meeting foreign to the purpose specified are invalid.* But a contrary rule is laid down in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut.. A charter authorized the court of common council to provide hy ordinance for the warning of its meetings, but no provision of charter or ordinance required information to be given of the matters to be considered. It was held that the notice of a special meeting need not specify the object thereof, nor could the scope of authority of tihe council be confined to pur- poses actually specified in such notice. " The familiar rule of notice," said Judge Prentice, " as applicable to meetings of towns and communities is one prescribed by statute. It has no application to meetings of governmental representative bodies like courts of common council. Their status and right to act are more allied to those of the governing bodies of private corporations and of the general assembly, and are governed by the same rules." * Where all the members of the council and the mayor meet and act as a body, they may at such meeting, or any adjourned session, transact any business within the powers conferred by law, notwithstanding no written call for the meeting was made, or in case one was made which failed to indicate the purpose of the meeting.' § 273. Adjourned meetings — Time for holding. — When a meeting is adjourned to a fixed hour, and only a part of the members attend at the precise time and others arrive later, or special meetin;;. Board of Supervis- Township v. McDonald, 98 Pa. St 444, ors V. Horton, 75 Iowa, 271 ; s. e., 39 451. N. W. Eep. 394. « Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb. 843. 1 Bergen v. Clarkson (1796), 1 Halst The court said, however, that the de- (N. J. Law), 353. The court thought cisions of the courts are conflicting the object of a special meeting ought upon the question whether the call always to be mentioned in the notice, must specify the object of the meet- referring to Eex V. Liverpool, 3 Burr, ing when the statute is silent The 735. power of a city clerk to issue a notice 2 Whitney v. City of New Haven for bids for a public improvement, as (1890), 58 Conn. 450, 461, citing directed by the city council, is not Cooley's Const Lim. 155 (4th ed. lost because he made a mistake in his p. 189); Savings Bank V.Davis, 8 Conn, attempt to publish it, where there is 300 ; Westbrook's Appeal &c., 57 no evidence that any one was misled Conn. 95. See, also, Wilson v. Board or harmed thereby. Gilmore v. City ofComm'rs, 68 Ind. 507; Comm'rs of Utica (1892). 131 N. Y. 36 ; S. C, 15 &c. V. Kent, 5 Neb. 137; Genesee N. Y. Supl. 274, affirmed. § 274.] PDBLIO BOAEDS. 279 some depart before any action is taken, it becomes important to determine when the proceedings maj' lawfully begin. Upon ' this question the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said : — " The law has fixed no time at or within which such a meeting must be organized, called to order or proceed to business. It has been held that an appearance within the hour after the time fixed will save the default of a party summoned to ap- pear at court at a particular hour;* and in former times the proceedings of town meetings have been set aside by the leg- islature where a party have been in attendance precisely at the hour, and have at once commenced and dispatched the business of the meeting and adjourned finally before the ar- rival of the members of another party, who relying upon the usual dilatory mode of commencing such meetings had made no haste, and had not arrived. And it seems to have been very properly done. A reasona,ble time should be allowed for pai"ties interested to be present, and an hour may in ordi- nary cases be well regarded as a reasonable time. Special cases must of course rest on their own circumstances where they show cause for greater delay. . . . And we apprehend no more definite rule can be laid down than this : that where parties assemble in pursuance of a notice or appointment, and remain together for the purpose of attending to the business as soon as it is found convenient or practicable, the proceed- ings will be held regular, though the delay may seem unrea- sonable to impatient persons or to those who have engage- ments elsewhere ; and no one of the persons thus assembled would be heard to object to the regularity of the proceedings if he should go away without having made a suitable effort to induce the proper officers or persons to proceed with the busi- ness ; and no third person would be heard to object unless he could show that his rights were affected by the delay." ' § 274. Corporation represented by governing boards.— The corporate body at large of a municipal corporation is usually represented by a common council or other municipal 1 Or even a few minutes over the Johns. 496 ; Atwood v. Austin, 16 hour. Nugent v. Wrinn (1877), 44 Johns. 180. Conn. 373. See, also, Wilde v. Dunn, 2 Kimball v. Marshall (1863), 44 11 Johns. 513; Baldwin v. Carter, 15 . N. H. 465, 467. 280 PUBLIC B0AED8. [§ 2Y5. board.' "Where corporate powers were conferred in general terms upon "townships," it was decided to belong to the board of directors, and not to the citizens en masse, to select and purchase a site for a township hall* So, under a charter which imposes upon the common council the duty " to man- age, regulate and control the property, real and personal, of the city," the expediency of destroying and removing or repairing a city building is to be determined exclusively by the council ; and the fact that a i^ajority of the voters of the city have expressed themselves against the destruction under an order of a prior council submitting the question to them does not affect this power.' The legislative and discretionary powers of the coutlcil can be exercised only by the coming together of the members who compose it, and its purposes or will can be expressed only by a vote embodied in some dis- tinct and definite form.* If no method is prescribed by law, it is left free to act either by resolution or ordinance.® § 275. The same subject continued — Meeting essential .to official action. — As a general rule the individual members of a public body possessing deliberative functions have no au- thority to bind the municipality by unoiRcial statements made at different times and places.* " The public for whom they act," 1 Richards u Town of Clarksburg, den (Iowa), 59 N. W. Eep. 1070, 30 West Va. 491 ; s. C, 20 Am. & where a resolution for the levy of a Eng. Corp. Cas. Ill ; Central Bridge tax was offered at the meeting of a Co. V. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106 ; Dey v. city council and certified to the au- Jersey City, 35 N. J. Law, 404 ; ditor, but the record failed to show Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Law, that it was adopted by the council, 143; Baltimore v. Poultney, 25 Md. and the adoption, notwithstanding 18. this omission, was inferred from the 2 State V. Haynes (1880), 72 Mo. 377. fact that it was offered and ordered ^ Whitney v. City of New Haven, to be so certified. 58 Conn. 450; S. a, 20 Atl. Rep. 666. 'Halsey v. Rapid Transit R. Ca * Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. (N. J. Law), 20 Atl. Rep. 859. Eq. 143. " The mayor and common 6 " it would be of most dangerous, council," said the court in that case, not to say fatal tendency, to sanction " exist only as a board, and they can the notion that parol testimony of do no valid act except as a board, witnesses, were it clear and unquali- and such act must be by ordinance fled, could be admitted at the end of or resolution or something equiva- ten or twelve years to establish a con- lent thereto." Dey v. Jersey City, 19 tract of any kind by a municipal N. J. Eq. 412. Cf. Taylor v. McFad- agency required by law to act within § 275.] PUBLIC BOAEDS. 281 said the Supreme Court of Ohio, "have the right to their best judgment after free and full discussion and consultation among themselves of and upon the public matters intrusted to them in the session provided for by the statute." ^ a very narrow range of power and to keep a record of ita public transac- tions." Strong V. District of Colum- bia (Board of Public Works), 4 Mackey (D. C), 242, 249 ; s. a, 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 568. That the cor- porate body at large is represented by its governing body, acting collect- ively and not as individuals, is illus- trated by decisions in mandamiLS pro- ceedings to compel the performance of a corporate duty. The peremptory writ may be directed to the corpora- tion in its corporate name, or to the proper oflScers in their corporate ca- pacity and official style without naming them, and resignations by officers after service of the alterna- tive writ do not abate the proceed- ings. Leavenworth County Comm'rs V. Sellew, 99 U. S. 624, in which the court said : — " The board is in effect the officer, and the members of the board are but the agents who per- form its duties." Little Eock v. Board of Improvements, 42 Ark. 152 ; Comm'rs v. King, 13 Fla. 451 ; Mad- dox V. Graham, 3 Met (Ky.) 56; State V. Madison Council, 15 Wis. 37 ; Peg- ram V. Cleaveland County Comm'rs, 65 N. C. 114; People v. Collins, 19 Wend. 68. iMcCortle v. Bates, 39 Ohio St 419, where a written contract signed by a majority of the members of a township board of education, which stipulated that the subscribers would formally ratify the same at a legial meeting, was held to be contrary to public policy, and not enforceable against them personally. The decis- ion is recognized as "undoubtedly sound," in People v. Stowell, 9 Abb. N. C. (N, Y.) 456, but not deemed to render invalid a regular resolution of the common council because the ma- jority acted in pursuance of a mutual pledge made before the body met Heed v. Lancaster, 152 Mass. 500. But a committee chosen by a town to erect a building is an agent, not a board of public officei-s, and may act by the agreement of the individual members separately obtained. Shea V. Mulford (1888), 145 Mass. 538; Haven v. Lowell, 5 Met 35. "The vestrymen of a church, as the repre- sentatives of a corporate body, must meet in order to take official action. They cannot act singly, upon the street or wherever they may be found. This is because they are re- quired to deliberate. It is the right ' of the minority to meet the majority and by discussion and deliberation to bring them over if possible to their own views.'' Rittenhouse's Estate (1891), 140 Penn. St 173, 176 ; s. c, 31 Atl Rep. 224 ; Paola &c. Ry. Co. v. Comm'rs, 16 Kan. 803, 309. It was held, obiter, in Butler v. City of Charlestown, 7 Gray, 13, that if the mayor and aldermen had power to retain counsel on behalf of the city it must be exercised by their official act at a lawful meeting of the board, and a contract made by a majority of the board informally would not be binding, nor could a custom of the city to pay bills contracted in that manner create a valid claim. See, also, on the last point, Sikes v. Hat- field, 13 Gi-ay, 347. The fact that the chairman of a town board of super- visors, in the presence of another su- pervisor, told the pathmaster to fix up a town road so that it could be • traveled, and that the board after- 282 . PUBLIC BOAKDS. [§ 276. § 276. The same subject continued — Delegation of powers. It is well settled that the legislative powers of a municipal corporation cannot be delegated to others. Such powers are in the nature of public trusts conferred upon the legislative assembly of the corporation for the public benefit and cannot be vicariously exercised. Thus, where a charter provided that a city council should have power " to restrain, prohibit and sup- press dram-shops," etc., an ordinance of that body prohibiting the sale of liquor without a liceiise, but authorizing the city treasurer to fix the fee for a license, and the term thereof, within certain limits, was held to be void, as an unwarrantable transfer of discretion designed to be exercised ty the council alone.^ So, also, where the charter of a street railway company wards allowed him a portion of his claim for the work done, does not amount to the making of a contract with him by the board so as to en- title him to sue the town for the bal- ance of his claim. "To bind the town the supervi80i;8 must act as a town board." Dieschel v. Town of Maine (Wis., 1892), 51 N. W. Eep. 881 ; Hardin County v. Louisville &c. R Co. (Ky., 1891), 17 S. W. Rep. 860; Independent School Dist. v. Wirtner (Iowa, 1882), 52 N. W. Rep. 243; Commonwealth v. Howard (Pa., 1892), 24 Atl. Rep. 308 ; Jackson v. Colhns (1891), 15 N. Y. Supl. 65. See, how- ever, for modified views, Athearn v. Independent Dist. &c., S3 Iowa, 105 ; Hill V. Independent 'District &c. (Iowa, 1890), 46 N. W. Rep. 1058. A bill to enjoin collection of a school tax alleged that the determination to levy was not made by the school directors at a regular or special meet- ing, nor in their corporate capacity, but as individuals. Held, that such allegations did not charge that the directors acted in the matter with- out meeting togetlier. Lawrence v. Trainer (111.), 37 N. E. Rep. 197. 1 East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 111. 28. See, further, as to the delegation by various municipal bodies of pow- the exercise of which involves que.s- tions of expediency, Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433 ; Coffin v. Nantucket, 5 Cush. 269; Ruggles v. Nantucket, 11 Cush. 433 ; State v Patterson, 34 N. J. Law, 163 ; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo. 359 ; Jackson County v. Brush, 77 HI. 59 ; Baltimore v. Scharf 54 Md. 499 ; Cooley's Const Lim,, § 204 ; Thompson V. Schermerhorn, 6jN. Y. 92. In Mat- thews V. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115, and Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 CaL 540, cities empowered to build and regu- late wharves undertook to confer the right upon lessees or contractors. Of. Gregoly v. City of Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76, where under an express power to " ordain by-laws relating to wharves," and a general authority to appoint necessary officers to carry by- laws into effect, an ordinance ap- pointing a superintendent of wharves with power to order and regulate the mooring of vessels was held to be valid. Birdsall v. Oark, 73 N. Y. 73 ; State V. Bell, 34 Ohio St. 194; North- ern Cent. R. Co. v. Baltimore, 31 Ind. 98 ; Evansville &e. R Co. v. Evans- ville, 15 Ind; 395; State v. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155 ; Phelps v. Mayor &c., 113 N. Y. 216; Young w Blackhawk County, § 277.] PUBLIC BOARDS. 283 ; contained a provision that "said railroad shall be laid out by the mayor and aldermen in like manner as highways are laid out," and a single track railroad was laid out by the mayor and aldermen without any turn-outs, but with a provision in the record of the laying out that " said horse railroad company may construct such suitable turn-outs on either side of said center line as they may find necessary in the prosecution of the business," etc., it was held that the company could not con- struct a turn-out, although necessary for their business and re- quired for public convenience, without a laying out by the mayor and aldermen.^ § 277. The same subject continued. — By statute in Con- necticut it is the duty of the selectmen to, " superintend the concerns of the town." ^ The person first named on a plurality 66 Iowa, 460 : Hannon v. Agnew, 96 N. Y. 439 ; Indianapolis v. Indianap- olis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396 ; Hickey v. Chicago So. R. Co., 6 HI. App. 172; Bibel V. People, 67 111. 175; Davis v. Read, 65 N. Y. 566 ; In re New York &c. Trustees, 57 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 500 ; Kinmundy v. Mayham, 72 111. 462 ; Darling v. St Paul, 19 Minn. 389; Meuser v. Eisdon, 36 Cal. 239 ; State v. Fiske, 9 R I. 94 ; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524 ; White' v. Mayor &c., 2 Swan (Teun.), 364 ; Franke v. Paducah &c. Co., 88 Ky. 467 ; Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; s. C, 9 Am. Rep. 80; Lord V. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386 ; Schenley V. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 62; Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464 ; S. C, 96 Am. Dec. 311 ; State v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. Law, 444 ; State v. Trenton, 42 N. J. Law, 395 ; State v. Trenton, 51 N. J. Law, 498 ; S. C, 28 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 161 ; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat 40 ; Minneapolis Gas Light Co. V. Minneapolis, 36 Minn. 159, hold- ing that power conferred by the city charter on the city council to provide for lighting the city and altering lamp districts cannot be delegated to a committee for final decision. Dill- ard w. Webb, 55 Ala. 468; East St Louis u Thomas, 11 111. App. 283 ; Pin- ney v. Brown (1891), 60 Conn. 164; MuUarky v. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21 ; Milhau V. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435 ; S. C, 27 N. Y. 611; Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend. 485; s. a, "s? Am. Dec. 271; Thomson v. Boonville, 61 Mo. 282; Scofleld V. Lansing, 17 Mich. 437; Lauenstein v. Fond du Lac, 28 Wis. 386 ; Shehan v. Gleeson, 46 Mo. 100 ; Stockton V. Creanor, 45 Cal. 643, hold- ing that a common council cannot confer upon a committee of its own members a power vested in it to ac- cept a bid or award a contract for grading a street 1 Concord v. Concord Horse R. Co. (1888), 65 N. K 30. Where a statute provides that certain powers thereby conferred upon a mayor and council shall be executed by them in a cer- tain manner, the unauthorized doings of an officer who undertakes to act for them cannot be validated by rati- fication. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to such a case. Mayor &o. V. Porter, 18 Md. 289; s. C., 79 Am. Dec. 686. ' Gen. Stats. 1888, § 64 et seg'.,where certain duties are also particularized. 284 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 278. of ballots is first selectman, " and, in the absence of a special appointment, shall be ex officio the agent of such town." ' A board of selectmen appointed a superintendent of highways and a " town agent." The town had previously at a legal meeting designated the first selectman as superintendent of highways, but had made no special appointment of a town agent. It was held that both appointments by the selectmen were void. In respect of the first, Chief Justice Andrews said: — "The selectmen had no Authority to make such an ap- pointment. The selectmen of a town are, to be sure, its gen- eral prudential oflBcers, and are charged with the duty of superintending the concerns of the town, but in so doing they act as the agents of the town and exercise a delegated author- ity. Their powers are for the most part conferred by some statute. In respect to the matters mentioned in these stat- utes they cannot go beyond the special limits of the statute. In other matters long usage has given to the selectmen of towns certain powers. In either case their authority is in the nature of a personal trust to be performed by themselves. They have no power to appoint another to perform the duties that devolve on them." And, touching the appointment of town agent, he continued : — " Undoubtedly a town, like any other corporation, may appoint an agent for any proper pur- pose. Possibly a town may appoint an agent to perform any or all duties usually performed by the selectmen, except such as are specifically imposed on the selectmen by the con- stitution or by some statute. But the selectmen, being them- selves agents, cannot appoint another or one of themselves to be an agent for their own town. That rule of law governs which is found in the maxim delegata potestas non potest dele- gare. Certainly they could not unless specially empowered so to do. They would have no such authority by virtue of their general powers."* This is an application of correct principles to municipal boards. § 278. Delegation of powers — A Pennsylvania case. — A Pennsylvania statute provided that two county commissioners should form a board for the transaction of business, and when 1 Gen. St 1888, § 4& 2 Finney v. Brown (1891), 60 Conn. 164. § 2Y9.] PFBLIC BOAEDS. 285 convened in pursuance of notice or according to adjournment should be competent to perform the duties appertaining to their oflBce. The commissioners contracted with one D. to build a court-house.' D. made a contract with the plaintiff to supply him with brick. After the plaintiff had delivered part of the brick called for by his contract he refused to deliver the rest on the ground that D. had not paid for the bricks al- ready delivered ; whereupon two of the commissioners went to the plaintiff, and with D.'s assent told him to proceed with the delivery of the bricks and that they would pay him. At that time there was more than enough money due to D. from the county to pay the plaintiff for the bricks to be delivered. It did not appear that the other commissioners were informed of or consulted about the matter or that it was discussed at any regular session of the board. The court submitted the question to the jury whether the two commissioners acted in their official capacity or merely as individuals, and a verdict against the county was sustained. The decision may be sup- ported on the ground that the contract of the commissioners was merely an incident to the main contract for the building, regularly made, and that the county could not possibly be sub- jected to any liability under it in excess of the amount pro- vided in the original undertaking with D. But the opinion of the court does not touch these features of the case, and its reasoning is superficial and inadequate of itself to justify the ruling of the court below.^ §279. The same subject continued — The rule limited. But while a council or a similar body cannot delegate all the power conferred upon it by the legislature in a given instance, it may like every other corporation do its ministerial work by agents or committees.' Where a city council was vested with 1 This seems to have been done at a deliberation — between the repairing regular meeting of the board. of an old bridge and the building of 2 Jefferson County u Slagle (1870), a new one. Wolcott u Wolcott, 19 66 Penn. St. 303. See Cooper v. Lam- Vt. 37 ; Throop on Public Officers, peter (1839), 8 Watts (Penn.), 125, §109. making a distinction between acts a Holland v. State (1887), 23 Fla. 133; done by one member in the ordinary S. C., 1 So. Rep. 521 ; Burlington v. routine of his duty and others of a Dennison, 42 N. J. Law, 165 ; Kram- nature demanding consultation and rath v. Albany, 53 Hun, 206 ; Damon 286 PUBLIC BOARDS. [§ 279. power to cause sidewalks in the city to be constructed, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that it might authorize the mayor and the chairmai^ of a committee on streets and alleys to make in its behalf and pursuant to its directions a contract for doing the work, and also give to the owners of abutting lots the privilege of selecting one of several specified materials, reserving to the chairman of the committee authority to select in case the lot-owners failed.' So, also, in the exercise of a like authority, the council may refer £\,pplications for the location or alteration of streets to a conimittee to inquire into the matter and report.^ And where V. Inhabitants of Granby, 3 Pick. 3,45 ; Whitney v. City of New Haven (1890), 58 Conn. 450, where a charter provision that the board of public ■works should execute all orders of the council relating to parks, etc., did not deprive the council of authority to delegate to the city auditor the work of destroying a public building situated in a park ; Gilmore v. City of Utica (1893), 131 N. Y. 36 (15 N. Y. SupL 374, aff'd); S. a, 39 N. E. Eep. 841, where clerk of council di- rected to publish notice of meeting was permitted to fix the day, dis- tinguishing State V. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law, 309; Bullitt County v. Washer (1888), 130 U. S. 143. Under a statute authorizing the county commissioners "to audit the ac- counts of all officers having the care, management, collection or disburse- ment" of county moneys, the com- missioners have power to contract with an expert to examine the county treasurer's accounts. Duncan v. Lawrence County Comm'rs, 101 Ind. 403 ; Milf ord School Town v. Zeigler, 1 Ind. App. (Griffiths), 138; S. C, 37 N. E. Eep. 303; Gillett v. Logan County, 67 IlL 256 ; Alton v. Mulledy, 31 II]. 76; Stewart v. City of Council Bluffs. 58 Iowa, 643 ; State v. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155 ; Edwards v. Watertown. 34 Hun, 436. The English Municipal Corporations Act of 1883, § 33, pro- vides that "the council may appoint out of their body such and so many committees as they think fit, for any purposes which in the opinion of the council would be better regulated and managed by means of such committees; but the acts of every such committee shall be submitted to the council for their approval." See, also, Gregory v. Brldgepoit, 41 Conn. 76, cited. In note to § 876, supra. 1 Hitchcock V. Galveston (1877), 96 U. S. 341. In the same case it was also held that, if the committee were exercising an unlawful delegation of power, it was competent for the council to ratify tlieir acts. See, also, as to ratification, Milford School Town V. Powner, 136 Ind. 538; 8. C, 36 N. E. Rep. 484; Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. Law, 97 ; Eailroad Co. v. Ma- rion County, 36 Mo. 394. But where the common council was required by charter to cause certain work to be done by contract or otherwise, an ordinance directing the superintend- ent of streets to "cause the work to be done" was declared to be unau- thorized. Birdsall v. Clark. 7.? N. Y. 73. 2 Preble v. Portland, 45 Me. 341. It is no objection to a sewer assessment that the mayor and aldermen called in another person to assist them in § 280.] PUBLIC BOAEDS. 287 the council is the sole judge of the election of its members, it may upon a contest appoint a committee to take testimony and to report the facts and evidence to the council.* § 280 Constitution of council. — In the old English mu- nicipal corporations, when the mayor or other chief oflBcer was not present at a corporate assembly, it could transact no business of the corporation, for without his presence at its head no corporate act done was valid.^ City charters in this country do not always agree in the constituents of the coun- cil or governing body. In some cases there is a separate coun- cil which is only one of the parts of the city legislature and requiring the approval of another board or of the mayor act- ing separately, as the governor does, to complete their action. But most of our cities, in their earlier stages, if not perma- nently, have had a council where the mayor sits in person and over whose action he has no veto. In all such corporations he has been deemed a member as clearly as the aldermen.' Where the charter provided "that the intendant of police shall have a seat in the board of commissioners, and when present shall preside therein ; in his absence the board shall appoint a chairman fro tem.pore^^ it was held that the intend- ant was constituted a member of the board.* And when making it Collins v. Holyoke, 146 added, who cannot be lawfully ex- Mass. 298. Council may order a sewer eluded from participation in their to be built by a committee. Dorey u proceedings. Damon v. Granby, 8 Boston, 146 Mass. 336, 339, and cases Pick. 345. cited. Where the members of the * Richards v. Town of Clarksburg, council have personal knowledge of 30 West Va. 491, 497 ; S. O., 20 Am. a fact, they may act without any & Eng. Corp. Cas. Ill; Willcock on further or formal inquiry. Bissell v. Munic. Corp., §§ 94, 102 ; Regina v. Jefifersonville, 24 How. 287, 296 ; Bailiflfs, 2 Ld. Raym. 1233. See § 266, Main v. Ft Smith, 49 Ark. 480 ; Com- supra. monwealth v. Pittsburg, 14 Penn. St. ' People v. Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200, 177. holding that a provision in a charter 1 " This is the well-known course of that " the mayor, recorder and alder- proceeding in every body having men, when assembled together, shall power to judge of the election of its constitute the common council," own members, in case an election is makes the mayor a member of the contested." Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. council. J. Law, 97, 100. The powers of com- * Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (N. C.) mittees may be revoked by the ap- Law, 49. Judge Dillon says that pointing power or new members " whether the mere fact that a single 288 PUBLIC BOARDS. . [§ 281. the language of the organic act is that "the mayor and coun- cilmen shall have power," etc., the co-ordinate action of both is required before their action can have any binding or obli- gatory force.' § 281. The same subject continued. — If, however, by a fair construction of the law the body is composed exclusively of trustees or counoilmen, the mayor is not a member of the council and has no right to prdWde or vote therein.' It was decided by the United States circuit court that under a stat- ute providing for the appointment and qualification of a board of tax commissioners to consist of a definite number, the board was not in existence until all had duly qualified, and the pro- ceedings of a majority were therefore of no validity.' A change in the membership of a board pending proceedings before it does not require that the matters be taken up de novo. Thus, a county commissioner may act with his associates in steps preliminary to laying out a way, and his successor may after- wards act in his place in completing the proceedings, where the acts of the former are separable from those of the latter.'' unauthorized person is by a mistaken But see Hartshorn v. Schofl, 68 N. EL construction of the charter allowed 197. to participate in the transactions of * " The board are a court, and the a meeting of the council would in court is not dissolved by one comrais- .this country be held necessarily to sioner going out and another coming avoid them is a question which per- in. It continues to be the same court haps remains yet to be settled." Dil- though its personality be changed." Ion on Munic. Corp., § 873, n. Chapman v. County Comm'rs (1887), • Saxton V. Beach, 50 Mo. 489 ; Sax- 79 Mo. 267, 209. As to the common ton V. St Joseph, 60 Mo. 153. mode of organizing a municipal body 3 Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75. where part of its members are con- See, also, Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. stantly in oflBce, and some new mem- Ann. 162 ; Commonwealth v. Kepner, bers are annually infused, see Kerr v. 10 Phila. (Penn.) 510 ; Achley's Case- Trego, 47 Penu. St 292. Under Act 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 35. Where a char- Pa. 1887, § 4, providing for certain ter provided that the "common coun- new executive officers in cities, cil shall consist of the mayor and al- " which shall be chosen by city coun- dermen," etc., and that a vote to levy oils," the existing council at the time a certain tax should be passed by two- of change should choose such officers, thirds vote of the " members elect," it Commonwealth v. Wyman (1891), 137 was held that the mayor was not en- Penn. St. 508 ; s. C, 21 Atl. Eep. 889. titled to vote to make up the two- Where two justices of the peace thirds. Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470. " whose terms will soonest expire " ' Schenck v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175, were constituted members of a board, § 282.] PUBLIC BOAEDS. '2f89 § 282. Conflicting councils — Kerr v. Trego.— Where two bodies claim to be regularly organized as the common counciil of a city, and each is proceeding to act as such, to the great detriment of the public interests, may the wrongful body be restrained from acting by means of the equity remedy of in- junction? This was the question which arose and was deter- mined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Kerr v. Trego.* An drdinance of the common council of Philadelphia provided that the clerk and assistant clerk elect should con- tinue in office until the organization of a new council (after an election) and until their successors should be duly elected, and it appeared that on the day and at the hour appointed by law for the organization of the new council there were present twenty-three members whose terms had j'et one year to run, among whom was the president of the preceding year. The clerk and president were in their usual places and proceeded first to call the roll of all the members whose terms of office had not yet expired, and then to call on the new members to present their certificate of election that their names might be enrolled. Further business was interrupted by the disorderly conduct of the new members, who proclaimed one of their number as president, and at a subsequent meeting assumed to act as the lawful common council. The court held, 1. That there was a wrong subject to redress by judicial power. 2. That injunction was the appropriate remedy. 3. That one of the conflicting bodies might maintain the action against the other, the attorney-general not having the sole right to file such a bill. 4. That the maintenance of the regular forms of organization was the test of right. 6. That the mode of or- ganization by the members who continued in office was legiti- mate and according to common usage. 6. That an intention by the complainants to use their power fraudulently did not defeat their right to the injunction. The opinion of the court it is not necessary that the record a common council sit as a court to try- should show affirmatively that the charges against an officer, if one of two justices present fulfilled the re- their number presides over the tribu- quireraent. If they appeared and nal he has a right to vote upon the acted, the presumption is that they questionof guilt in the absence of any were entitled to sit as members. Ne- statute or ordinance to the contrary, waygo County Mfg. Co. v. Echtinau, Asbell v. Brunswick, 80 Va. 503. 81 Mich. 416. Where the members of 1 47 Penn. St 298 (1864). 19 290 PUBLIC BOARDS. [§ 2S3. is interspersed with wise and liberal observations in respect of the proper limits of judicial interference in cases of this kind, and is strongly supported by the temperate judgment of Judge Dillon.' § 283. Acts of de facto councils. — In applying the princi- ple that the acts of de facto officers, properly so called, are valid, no distinction is made, between officers whose duties are executive or administrative and |;hose who compose the coun- cil or other municipal legislative body." But an office which has no de jwre existence cannot have a de facto incumbent.' Accordingly where a town attempted to re-organize under an act which did not. apply to it, a new council differently consti- tuted from that of the old corporation was declared to have • Dillon on Munic Corp., § 375, n. See, however, In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 223, and the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Waite; Demarest v. Wickham, 63 N. Y. 820 ; High on In- junctions, g 1812. 2 Roche V. Jones (1891), 87 Va. 484; s. &, 12 S. K Rep. 965 ; De Grave v. Monmouth, 4 Car. & P. Ill ; State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick. 75 ; Scoville V. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St 126 ; Trustees &c. V. Hill, 6 Cowen, 28; Peoples. Runkle, 9 Johns. 147 ; People v. Bart- lett, 6 Wend. 422; People v. Stevens, 5 Hill, 616; Pritchett v. People, 6 III. 529 ; Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, .75, 84 ; Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 13 ; Cai'land v. Commissioners, 5 Mont 579; St^te v. Goodwin, 69 Tex. 55, where a municipal election ordered by de facto mayor and aldermen was declared valid. In Dugan u Farrier, 47 N. J. Law, 383, a member of the board who was ineligible to the o£Bce of president claimed the right to pre- side and assumed the chair. The board acquiesced ^d proceeded to appoint a county collector. The ac- tion of the board was sustained. Spaulding v. City of Saginaw, 84 Mich. 184; S. G 47 N. W. Rep. 444; In re Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369. See, also, Eoontz V. Hancock, 64 Md. 134 ; Lock- hart V. Ti-oy, 48 Ala, 579 ; De Grave v. Monmouth, 4 Car. & P. Ill ; Rex v. Mayor &c., 8 Mod. Ill; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio, 574 ; People v. Nos- trand, 46 N. T. 375 ; Hamlin v. Ding- man, 6 Lans. (N. T.) 61 ; Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. T. 378; Riddle v. Bed- ford, 7 Serg. & R. 386 ; Lever v. Mc- Glachlin, 28 Wis. 364; Gushing v. Frankfort, 57 Me. 541. As to appoint- ment of an oflScer by less than a quo- rum, § 286, infra. It was held in a well considered case in England that an act done by a definite body was not invalid because officers de jure and ofiScers de facto united in the doing of it. Scadding v. Lorant, 5 Eng. Law & Eq. 16. See and com- pare, Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (N. C.) Law, 49; Willcock on Munic Corp., § 68 ; Parry v. Berry, Comyns, 269 ; Green v. Durham, 1 Burr. 131 ; Rex V. Westwood, 4 Barn. & C. 799, 818 ; Rex v. Head, 4 Burr. 3531 ; Hob- lyn V. Regem, 2 Bro. P. C. 829. »Burt V. Winona &c. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 472; Tinsley v. Kirby, 17 S. C. 1, 8 ; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250 ; People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 540 ; Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dill. § 284.] PUBLIC BOARDS, 291 no power to pass a valid ordinance.' Where a county court was abolished by act of the legislature and its powers trans- ferred to a board of county commissioners, who proceeded to issue bonds under their new authority, and. the statute was subsequently held to be unconstitutional, the bonds were with- out validity even in the hands of lona fide holders.* § 284. Quomm of definite body.— " The quorum of a body may be defined to be that number of the body which when assembled in their proper place will enable them to transact their proper business, or, in other words, that number that makes the lawful body, and gives them the power to pass a law or ordinance.'" When the statute law creating it is silent as to what shall constitute a legal assembly of a definite body, the common law, both in England and in this country, is well settled that the majority of the members elect shall con- stitute a legal body.* This rule of the common law cannot be abrogated hy an act of the municipal body itself, unauthorized by statute or charter.* It can neither enlarge nor diminish the number required to constitute a quorum. Thus, in the case already cited, where one of the co-ordinate branches of a C. C. 130; Hildreth's Heirs v. Mcln- only in case of a tie cannot be counted tire's Devisees, IJ. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 206. in determining whether there is a Cf. State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; quorum present. State v. Porter § 184, supra. (1887). 113 Ind. 79. In the New Eng- 1 Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 12 (by land fotcns where the corporate power C. J. Dillon). is primarily exercised by the citizens 2 Norton v. Shelby Couniy (1885), at large, any number, though less 118 U. S. 425. See § 184, supra. than a majority of the whole, when ' Heiskell v. Mayor &c., 63 Md. 125, assembled at a legal meeting, have 149. the power to act for the whole, unless * Heiskell v. Mayor &c., 65 Md. 125 ; otherwise provided by law. Damon Blackert «. Blizzard, !B,Barn.&C. 851; v. Granby, 3 Pick. 345, 355; Com- Bamett v. Paterson (1886), 48 N. J. monwealth v. Ipswich, 2 Pick. 70 ; Law, 393; Cadmus v. Farr, 47 N. J. States. Binder, 38 Mo. 450; Church w Law, 395 ; McDermott v. Miller, 45 Case, 2 Eobt (N. Y.) 649 ; Williams v. N. J. Law, 251; 5 Dane Abr. 150; Lunenburg, 21 Pick. 75 ; First Parish Dartmouth w. County Comm'rs (1891), v, Stearns, 21 Pick. 148. 153 Mass. 12; In re Willcooka, 7 *"0f the power of the general Cowen, 402, 410 ; Rex v. Devonshire, assembly to fix and determine what 1 Barn. & C. 609 ; Rex v. Headley, 7 should be a quorum there can be no Barn. & C. 496 ; Rex v. Bellringer, 4 possible doubt" Heiskell v. Mayor T. R. 810 ; Rex v. Bower, 1 Barn. & &C., 65 Md. 125, 147. C. 492. One who has a right to vote 292 PUBLIC BOARDS. [§§ 28&, 286. city council adopted a rule prohibiting actiori iiriless two-thirds of its members were present, it was held that an ordinance might be repealed at a meeting consisting of a majority only, and this although the charter contained a provision author- izing those bodies "to settle their rules of procedure."' § 285. The same subject continued. — But it is also essential to the validity of action upon a proposition submitted to the board that a majority of all the^members qualified to vote in the particular instance shall be present, and members having a direct pecuniary interest in the matter adverse to the mu- nicipality which they represent are excluded in counting a quo- rum.' The physical presence of a sufficient number constitutes a legal quorum. Thus, where half of the members of a board in regular session for the purpose of choosing an officer, after several hundred ineffectual ballots, withdrew from the place of balloting and took places among the by-standers, but without leaving the room, it was held that the quorum was not broken, although they refused to vote and protested against further action.' § 286. The same subject continued — An exception to the rale. — The principle that upholds the acts of de facto officers prevails over the rule requiring the presence of a quorum for the transaction of business by public bodies. The charter of the city of Detroit provides for the designation by the com- 1 " It would be an anomaly indeed," set forth by Judge Cooley in Steck- said the court, " if the council itself ert v. East Saginaw, 33 Mich. 104. could deprive itself of the right that As a general rule acts done by less it admittedly had." Heiskell v. Mayor than a quorum are void. State v. &c., 65 Md. 135, 153. Wilkesville, 30 Ohio St S88; Pimen- 2 " Perhaps the only recognized ex- tal v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351 caption to this rule is the case where McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal the body or board is permitted to fix 591 ; Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind. 315 the compensation of its members." Ferguson v. Chittenden Co., 6 Ark. Oconto County v. Hall, 47 Wis. 308; 479; Price v. Railroad Co., 13 Ind. Pickett V. School Dist, 25 Wis. 651 ; 58. As to presumptions in favor of United Brethren Chtirch v. Van Du- a quorum, see Insurance Co. v. Sort- sen, 37 Wis, 54 ; Walworth Bank v. well, 8 Allen, 217 (private corpora^ Farmers' L. & T. Co., 16 Wis. 629; tion). Coles V. Williaiasburgh, 10 Wend. » State v. Vanosdal (Ind., 1893), 81 659. The distinction between a re- N. E. Rep. 78. See Beach on Private mote and direct interest is clearly Corporations, §§ 376, 395. § 287,] PUBLIC BOAEDS. 293 mon cotmcil of the aldermen in each ward to the election districts therein, and also for the appointment of qualified electors in each district, who with the aldermen shall act as chairmen respectively of the board of inspectors and of regis- tration in these districts. These appointments must be made at least two weeks previous to a general election. At the last meeting of the council prior to a general election when these appointments could lawfully be made, the minority faction of the council withdrew, and the majority, though not constitut- ing a quorum, proceeded to make the appointments. The court held that the acts of the ofiicers thus appointed were valid, as they were oflBcers de facto, but that the council would be compelled by mandamus to designate immediately, at a lawful meeting, the chairmen of the different boards of in- spectors to take the place of those illegally appointed at the former meeting.* § 287. The same subject continued — Special charter pro- visions. — Where a charter provides that no ordinance or reso- lution should be passed except by a majority of all the mem- bers elected, and one of the members resigned after election, it was held that a bare majority of those remaining was not empowered to act.' But if the majority is constituted a quorum to do business " at all meetings " of the board, such a number may organize and act at the first meeting, as well as at any subsequent meeting, although it is provided that " the board," etc., shall assemble for the purpose of organization,' The power of removing certain officers was conferred upon a city council, to be exercised " by a vote of two-thirds of that body," and the court inclined to the opinion that (aside from the French text of the charter, which disposed of any doubt) only two-thirds of the body as legally constituted hy the pres- ence of a quorum was required.* But where the language was that " the common council, with the concurrence of two-thirds 1 Dingwall v. Common Council, 83 169 ; MoCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Mich. 568 ; S. C, 46 N. W. Rep. 938. Cal. 591 ; Plmental v. San Francisco, See, also, as to acts of de facto coun- 21 CaL 351. cils, § 283. supra, and of de facto oflS- ' Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540. cers and agents, generally, § 281, * Warnock v. Lafayette, 4 La. Ann. supra, 419. 2 San Francisco v. Hazen, 5 CaL 294 praLio BOAEDS. [§§ 288, 289. of the members thereof," might order, etc., two-thirds of the whole number was declared necessary to make a valid order.^ And where a charter requires a two-thirds vote of the mem- bers of a council on certain measures, and the body is com- posed of a president and six others, five members must concur.^ § 288. Quorums and majorities further considered — The rule in England. — It is not yet settled by the authorities whether the business of a common council or other govern- ing board can be conducted by a bare majority of the number necessa,ry to constitute a quorum, or whether the passage of a measure requires the assent of a majority of those present where more than a quorum are in attendance. Baron Mar- tin, in delivering his opinion in Gosling v. Veley,' adopted and explained a remark by Lord Mansfield * suggesting a dis- tinction between elections and the transaction of other cor- porate business. " It is clear law," said the Baron, "... that for the transaction of business, viz., making a law, im- posing a tax, making a by-law, in fact transacting any business whatever, there must be, first, a lawful meeting, and secondly, a vote of the majority ; and unless the majority votes for the law, tax or by-law, it is not carried." And it was accordingly held that a valid church rate could not be made at a vestry meeting where the majority of those present refrained from voting.' § 289. The same subject continued — Decisions in the United States. — The distinction noticed in the preceding sec- tion has been recognized and applied in election cases by the Supreme Courts of Ohio ' and Ilhnois.'' In a recent case in In- diana ' it appeared that a resolution was introduced at a meet- ing of a common council for the adoption of the report of a iLogansport v. Legg, 30 Ind. 315. « State u Green (1883), 37 Ohio Sfc See, also. State v. Porter, 118 Ind. 79. 327. 2 Whitney v. Village of Hudson 'Launtz v. People (1885), 113 111. (1888), 69 Mich. 189; & a, 30 Am. & 137. Eng. Corp. Cas. 453, n. 8 Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rush- 8 4 H. of L. Cas. 679, 740 (1853). ville (1889), 121 Ind. 206 j s. C, 6 L. E. * In Hex V. Monday, Cowp. 538. A. 315. * Gosling V. Veley, 4 H. of L. Cas. 679. §^0-] PUBLIO BOARDS. 2&5 committee relating to lighting the city. Three of the six mem- bers composing the council, all being present, voted in favor of the resolution, but the other three declined to vote and the mayor declared that it was adopted. The court sustained this view, and said : — " The rule is that where there is a quorum present, and a majority of the quorum vote in favor of a meas^ ure, it will prevail, although an equal number should refrain from voting. It is not the majority of the whole number of members present that is required ; all that is requisite is a nixjority of the number of members required to constitute a quorum."' The same doctrine is affirmed in ITew Hamp- shire,' while in Tennessee ' the opposite extreme is reached in holding that a majority of all present is necessary even to a valid election. § 290. Further application of majority principle. — Where authority to do an act of a public nature is given by law to three or more persons, if the .act is merely ministerial in its character, a majority at least must concur and unite in the performance of it ; but they may act separately and need not be convened in a body or notified so to convene for that pur- pose ; but if the act is one which requires the exercise of dis- cretion and judgment, in which case it is usually termed a iRushville Gas Co. v. City of Rush- position. Their refusal to vote is, in ville, 181 Ind. 306. The court con- effect, a declaration that they con- tinued: — "If there had been four sent that the majority of the quorum members of the common council may act for the body of which they present and three had voted for the are members." Judge Dillon, in re- resolution and one had voted against f erring to this case, says: — "It de- it, or had not voted at all, no one serves further consideration whether would hesitate to afiSrm that the res- this result is consistent with the olution was duly passed ; and it can majority rule applicable to definite make no difference whether four or bodies." Dillon 9n Munic. Corp. (4th six members are present, since it is ed.), § 293, n. The court is silent as always the vote of the majority of to any distinction between elections quorum that is effective. ■ The mere and business proceedings, although presence of inactive members does it cites cases in support of its decis- not impair the right of the majority of ion where the difference was clearly the quorum to proceed with the busi- recognized. ness of the body. If members pres- 2 Attorney-General v. Shepard ent desire to defeat a measure they (1882), 68 N. H. 38a must vote against it, for inaction will « Lawrence v. IngersoU (1889), 88 not accomplish their purpose. Their Tenn. 52 ; S. C, 12 S. W. Rep. 423 ; 6 silence is acquiescence rather than op- L. R. A. 308; 17 Am. St Rep. 870. 296 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 291. judicial act unless special provision is otherwise made, the persons to whom the authority is given must meet and confer together and be present when the act is performed, in which case a majority may perform the act, or, after all have been notified to meet, a majority having met will constitute a quorum or sufficient number to perform the act. As a gen- eral rule, the act may then be legally done by the direction or with the concurrence of a majority of the quorum so as- sembled.^ * § 291. Execution of authority vested in two persons.— Where power is conferred upon two persons, or where a larger number has by death or vacanpy become reduced to two, noth^ 1 Martin v. Lemon, 36 Conn. 192 ; Damon v. Granby, 3 Pick. 345, 354, which makes a distinction between committees appointed; by a public corporation of its own members and committees of persons not members, requiring unanimity in the latter case ; Ballard v. Davis, 31 Miss. 525 ; Petrie v. Doe, 30 Miss. 698 ; Grindley V. Barker, 1 Bos. & Pull. 239; Keeler V. Frost, 33 Barb. 400; Perry v. Tynen, 23 Barb. 137; In re Rogers, 7 Cowen, 526; Astor v. New York, 63 N. Y. 567, 576, 580 ; In re Beekman, 31 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 16 ; In re Sewer in Thirty-fourth St, 31 How. Pr. 42. Upon the death of one, where no provision exists for filling the va- cancy, the power vests in the surviv-. ors. People v. Syracuse, 63 N. Y. 291, citing People v. Palmer, 53 N. Y. 84, and distinguishing People v. Nos- trand, 46 N. Y. 375. The presump- tion is that all were notified and that all met. Astor v. New York, 62 N. Y. 567, 576; Y^oung v. Bucking- ham, 5 Ohio, 485, 489; Chai-les v. Hoboken, 27 N. J. Law, 203. See, also, Jones v. Andover, 9 Pick. 146 ; Inhabitants &c. v. Cole, 8 Pick. 232, 244; Keyes v. Westford, 17 Pick. 273 ; Kingsbuiy v. School District, 13 Met. 99; Crommett v. Pearson, 18 Me. 344; Jenkins v. School. District, 39 Ma 220 ; Green v. Miller, 6 Johns. 39 ; King v. Beeston, 3 Term R 593 ; Guthrie v. Armstrong, 5 Barn, & Aid. 638 ; Eeyser v. School District, 35 N. H. 477; Walcott v. Walcott, 19 Vt 37; Throop on Public Officers, § 106; McCoy v. Curtice, 9 Wend. 17, 19 ; Horton v. Harrison. 23 Barb. 176 ; State v. Guiney, 26 Minn. 313 ; Schenck v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175, 187; People V. Harrington, 63 CaL 257; Walker v. Eogan, 1 Wis. 597; In re Broadway Widening, 63 Barb. 572; Downing v. Rugar, 31 Wend. 178; Somerset v. Parson, 105 Pa. St. 360 ; Cooper V. Lampeter, 8 Watts (Penn.), 128 ; Commonwealth v. Commission- ers, 9 Watts (Penn.), 466, 471 ; Bal- timore Turnpike, 5 Binn. (Penn.) 484; Commissioners v. Leckey, 6 Serg. & R. 170 ; McCready v. Guard- ians, 9 Serg. & R 99; Caldwell v. Harrison, 11 Ala. 755; Crist u Town, Trustees, 10 Ind. 462; Gallup v. Tracy, 25 Conn. 10, holding that a town committee to stake out oystec grounds,' having no fixed place of acting or consultation, no record, no clerk, and no time and mode of pro- ceeding, need not be assembled to act, and may act by majorities of such as are competent. i] PUBLIC BOARDS. 297 ing can be done without the consent of both.' Such is the gen- eral rule; yet there are authorities which hold clearly that to prevent a failure of justice one may act alone without con- sulting the other, as if one be dead or interested or absent when immediate action is necessary.^ Moreover, the common presumption in favor of the performance of oflBlcial duty dis- penses with affirmative proof that the act of one was assented to by the other, and it has been held that this presumption can be rebutted only by the testimony of him whose assent was denied.' So far, also, as their duties are ministerial, it is competent for one to act as the agent or deputy of both with the other's consent, which is only an application of the gen- eral rule that one of a board may be authorized to act in be- half of the whole in the execution of whatever measure they may resolve upon.* §292. Presiding officer. — In England' and generally in the United States it is one of the duties of the mayor to pre- side at corporate meetings. But he has not, in virtue of his office alone, any right to preside, which in all cases depends upon a construction of the charter, organic law or constituent act of the corporation.* When the charter provides that the city council shall elect one of their number to be the president of the board, but does not prescribe the number of votes nec- essary to a choice, the votes of a majority of a quorum duly met are sufficient.'' The presiding officer, although he be the 1 Downing v. Rugar, 31 Wend. 178 ; reversed 7 N. T. 9, but not on this Pell V. Ulmar, 21 Barb. 500 ; New point See § 376 et seq., supra, on York Life Ins. Co. v. Staats, 31 Barb, delegation of powers. 570; Perry «. Tynen, 33 Barb. 137; *" Prior to the Municipal Corpora- Powell V. Tuttle, 3 N. Y. 396. tions Act of 1885 the powers and du- - 6 Vin. Abr., Coroner (H.), pL 7 ; 14 ties of mayors, including the right to 14 Vin. Abr., Joint and Several (B), preside, depended upon charters, re- pl. 1 ; Rex u Warrington, 1 Salk. 153; gal and parliamentary, usages, cub- Naylor v. Sharpless, 3 Mod. 33. And tome, etc." Dillon, J., in Cochran v. see Auditor Curie's Case, 11 Rep. 3; McCleary, 33 Iowa, 75, 83, citing 4 Rich V. Player, 3 Show. 386; Down- Jacob's Law Diet 364, 365; 3 Bouv. ing V. Rugar, 31 Wend. 178. 183. Law Diet 150. » Downing v. Rugar, 31 Wend. 178. « Cochran v. McCleary, 33 Iowa, 75. ♦ Downing u Rugar, 31 Wend. 178; 'Cadmus u Fan- (1885), 47 N.J. People V. Comm'rs, 3 Hill, 599. See, Law, 308. In Dugan v. Farrier, 47 also, People v. Newell, 13 Barb. 86, N. J. Law, 383, the point was raised 298 FXTBEID EOAEDS'. [§ 293. mayor, cannot vote unless he is a member of the body, or is authorized by the charter to give the casting vote in case of a tie.^ A right to preside over the meeting of the council is a " franchise," and if denied a remedy may be had by quo warranto or information in that nature ; but a bill in equity is not a proper proceeding for that purpose unless so provided bv statute.' § 393. The same subject continued. — The functions of the presiding officer are as official as any pa,rt of the meeting of the board and cannot be exercised bv one who is not a mem- that the organization of the board, including the selection of a presiding officer, is essential to the valid exer- cise of its other functions, but the question was left undetermined by the court 1 Carrolton v. CJlark, 31 III. App. 74 ; Launtz v. People, 113 III. 137 ; S. C, 55 Am. Eep. 405 ; Carroll v. Wall, 35 Kan. 36; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 350; Decorah v. BuUis, S5 Iowa, 12; People v. White, 24 Wend. 530 ; State v. Gray, 33 Neb. 365 ; Hil- dreth v. Mclntyre, 1 J. J. Marsh, (Ky.) 206; Eex v. Westwood, 4 Barn. & C. 799 ; Eex v. Head, 4 Burr. 2515 ; Rex V. Croke, Cowp. 26; Green v. Durham, 1 Burr. 131; Parry v. Berry, Comyns, 269. Where the charter makes the president a mem- ber of the council with a right to vote in every case and a casting vote in case of a tie, he may vote on a question and give an additional vote if there is a tia Whitney v. Village of Hudson (1888), 69 Mich. 189; & c, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. . 453, n. 2 Cochran v. McCleary (1867), 22 Iowa, 75, where the question is dis- cussed by Judge Dillon; Common- wealth V. Arrison, 15 Serg. & E. 130 ; In re Sawyer (1887), 124 U. S. 200; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La, Ann. 162, where the Yight of the recorder of a municipality, who was ex officio president of its council, to vote in cases wliere there was not a tie, was tested on quo warranto; Rex v. Hertford, 1 Ld. Raym. 426 ; Com- monwealth V. Kepner, 10 Phila. (Penn.) 510 ; Topping v. Gray, 7 Hill, 359; Commonwealth v. Bank, 28 Pa. St. 389; Mayor v. Conner, 5 Ind. 171 ; Markle v. Wright, 13 Ind. 548; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358; People v. Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371 ; People v. Carpenter, 34 N. Y. 86; People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Peabody tt Flint, 6 Allen, 52 ; Mozley u Alston, 1 Phill. 790 ; Lord v. The Governor &c., 2 PhilL 740 ; Hagner V. Heyberger, 7 Watts & Serg. 104 ; Demarest v. Wickham, Mayor &c., 63 N. Y. 320; Hughes v. Parker, 20 N. R58; In re Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; Updegraff v. Crans, 47 Pa. St 103 ; Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 527. The remedy (by quo warranto) does not exist as a matter of right, and in offices of short duration there is not much to favor interference in ordi- nary cases. People v. Harshaw, 60 Mich. 300, where it was held that a charter providing that the com- mon council should have power to determine contested elections of its members made the decision of that body conclusive and not subject to review. § 294,J PUBLIO BOAEDS. 299 ber.^ It is his duty to announce the result of a vote accord- ing to the fact, and his decision may be attacked collaterally.' He cannot arbitrarily adjourn a meeting in defiance of the majority present.' And mcmdamus will lie to compel him to reverse his decision illegally declaring a resolution carried, and to declare it lost, unless the resolution is itself illegal upon its face.* When the mayor has a right to appoint by and with the consent of the council and also to vote in case of a tie, he may give a casting vote to confirm his own appointment.' And the declaration of a presiding oflBcer that a resolution is adopted has been held to be a casting vote in its favor, if the other votes are equally divid ed ; ^ otherwise where the vote is required to be by ballot.' When the chairman announces the appointment of a secretary in the presence of the meeting and the secretary serves without objection from any one, the act of the chairman is the act of the meeting.* §294. Commitment for contempt — Whitcomb's Case. — By the law of England a town or city council had no power without express act of parliament to commit for contempt of its authority.* The only case directly in point in this coun- try, so far as the author's reading goes, is Whitcomb's Case, decided in 1876 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu- setts.'" A witness having been duly summoned to testify before a special committee of the common council of Boston, > State V. Kirk (1878), 46 Conn. 395, ber of the board, voted for himself, 398. thus making a tie, and the chairman 2 Chariton v. HoUiday, 60 Iowa, erroneously assuming that the vote 891 ; State v. Fagan, 42 Conn. 32. -was valid, declared him elected, and ' Dingwall v. Common Council, 83 there was no dissent. Mich. 568. ' Lawrence v. Ingersoll (1889), 88 «Tennant».Crocker(1891),85Mich. Tenn. 53; S. C, 12 S. W. Eep. 433 ; 6 338; s. C, 48 N. W. Eep. 577. But the L. R. A. 308; 17 Am. St. Rep. 870. remedy by mandamus is discretion- Cf. Small v. Orne, 79 Me. 78, where, ary, and in this case it was denied on under a particular statutory provis- account of the patent illegality of the ion, a declaration by the presiding resolution. ' officer was deemed a casting vote, s Carroll v. Wall, 35 Kan. 36. though the voting was by ballot. SLauntz v. People, 113 HI. 137; « State v. McKee (Oregon, 1890), 35 Rushville Gas Co. u Rushville, 121 Pac. Rep. 293. Ind. 306 ; S. C, 23 N. E. Rep. 73 ; 6 « Grant on Corporations, 84^86 ; L. R. A. 315. Contra, Hornung v. Parke, B., in 4 Moore, P. "C. 89 ; Bar- State, 116 Ind. 458 ; S. C, 19 N. E. Rep. ter v. Commonwealth, 3 Perin. 253. 151, Where a candidate, being a mem- "• 120 Mass. 118. 300 FUBLIO BOARDS. [§ 295. appointed with full powers to investigate and report upon certain charges of corruption against its members, declined to answer a question relating to the matter, and was committed for contempt by a regular order of the council. It was held that the council was neither a legislature nor a court, nor in the accurate use of language was it vested with any judicial functions whatever, although the charter gave it authority to decide upon all questions relative to the qualifications, elec- tion and returns of its members,%,nd that a statute conferring power to imprison and punish without right of appeal or trial by jury was unconstitutional.' § 295. Teas and nays. — A provision in a charter that the yeas and nays "shall" be called and published was held by the Supreme Court of New York to be directory merely and not indispensable to the validity of a vote.^ But the weight of authority and reason is decidedly in favor of the view that such a provision is mandatory, and that proceedings in con- travention thereof are void.' And where the record showed 1 Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118. See, also. In re Mason (1890), 43 Fed. Rep. 510, which holds that the power to punish for contempt is not an inci- dent to the mere exercise of judicial functions. In In re Hammel (1869), 9 R L 348, upon habeas corpus it ap- peared that the petitioner was sum- moned to testify before a town coun- cil on a matter pending before that body, and, refusing to take an oath or aflSrmation, he was ordered to be committed to jail, for contempt of court The proceeding was declared to be illegal for the reason that no deflnite term of punishment was named. The court cited no author- ities and expressly refrained from passing upon " other questions raised." A city charter gave a com- mittee of the common council power to issue a summons to any person to appear and testify in any matter pending before it, and provided a penalty of imprisonment for refusal to obey the summons or to "answer any proper or pertinent question," but contained no express provision au- thorizing the committee to compel the production of books and papers. It was held that there was no power to commit for contempt for refusing to produce them. People v. Van Tas- sel (1893), 19 N. Y. Supl. 643; afllrm- ing s. G, 17 N. Y. Supl. 938. 2 Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill, 9; S. C, afSrmed, 3 Denio, 333. s Steckert v. East Saginaw, 23 Mich. 104, where Judge Cooley said: — " The purpose, among other things, is to make the members of the com- mon council feel the responsibility of their action when these important measures are upon their passage and to compel each member to bear his share in the responsibility by a record of his action which should not afterwards be open to dispute." Town of Olin v. Meyers, 55 Iowa, 309; Cutler v. Russellville, 40 Ark. § 296.] PUBLIC BOARDS. 301 the names of those present at the opening of the meeting, and that a certain resolution was " adopted unanimously on call," it was declared to be an insufficient compliance with a requirement that the votes "shall be entered at large on the minutes." ' But the omission may be supplied by an order nunc pro tunc causing the entry to be made.* If the record fails to disclose that any other members were present than those who voted " yea," it need not state that the nays were called for.' A charter providing that a vote shall " in all cases" be taken by yeas and nays and entered at length upon the journal does not apply to votes taken upon motions to adjourn.* § 296. Parliamentary law. — In speaking of the action of county boards it was said : — " It will not do to apply to the 105 ; s. a, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 414; Tracy v. The People, 6 Colo. 151 ; s. C 4 Am. & Eug. Corp. Ca& 373; Rich v. Chicago. 59 111. 286; Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 319 ; Sullivan v. Leadville, 11 Colo. 483; Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15, where, however, the reason for the rale was held not to apply ; CofSn v. City of Portland, 43 Fed. Eep. 411. See, also, Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 111. 297 ; Sopervisora &c. v. People, 25 111. 181; McCormlck v. Bay City, 28 Mich. 457, holding that a provision requiring ordinances to be passed by "a majority of all the aldermen," i. ft, of all the members elect, would necessitate the recording of the number if not the names of the vo- ters on each side. Delphi v. Evans, 86 Ind. 90. In such cases a single vote by yeas and nays on several or- dinances grouped together is not a passage of any of them. Sullivan v. Pausoh, 5 Ohio C. C. 196. The New York case (Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill, 9) is cited and approved in St. Louis V. Foster, 53 Mo. 518, but here the yeas and nays were not required and the cases are easily distinguishable. Indianola v. Jones, 29 Iowa, 283; In re Carlton Street, 16 Hun, 497 ; In, re Mount Morris Square, 3 Hill, 30; Elmendorf v. Mayor &c., 35 Wend. - 693. ' Non constat that all who met re- mamed through the proceedings. Steckert v. East Saginaw, 32 Mich. 104. A formal call of the roll is not required if the votes are otherwise ascertained and recorded. Brophy v, Hyatt, 10 Cola 238. ' Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 819 ; Vawter v. Franklin College, 53 Ind. 88; Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen, 129; Comm'rs v. Hearne, 59 Ala. 871 ; Musselman v. Manly, 42 Ind. 462; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90. The facts must appear upon the face of the record, and cannot be proved aliunde. In re Carlton Street, 16 Hun, 497. The record is not sup- ported by presumption. Traoey v. People, 6 Colo. 151 ; s. a, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Caa. 873. 'Town of Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220 ; s. C, 23 Am'. & Eng, Corp. Cas. 126. * Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204. 302 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 297. orders and resolutions of such bodies nice verbal criticism and strict parliamentary distinctions, because the business is trans- acted generally by plain men not familiar with parliamentary law. Therefore their proceedings must be liberally construed in order to get at the real intent and meaning of the body." ^ And it was declared in another case that if municipal bodies exercising legislative functions pursue .a method of proceeding understood by themselves which arrives at substantial results, their action should not be overtJ|rown upon any technical rules or strict construction of parliamentary law.' It was held to be no objection to the validity of an assessment that the order did not receive, in either branch of the city council, two sev- eral readings before its passage, as required by the rules. " It is within the power of all deliberative bodies," said the court, "to abolish, modify or waive their own rules, intended as security against hasty or inconsiderate action." ' § 297. Reconsideration and rescission — General power. It is the undoubted right of corporate bodies, unless clearly restrained by legislative enactment, to reconsider a vote as often as they see fit, or to rescind the same, provided vested rights are not disturbed, up to the time when by a conclusive vote, accepted as such by itself, a determination has been reached.* They may adopt rules as to the time when recon- iHark v. Gladwell, 49 Wis. 177; s. a, 55 Am. Eep^ 65; Stater. Chap- S. a, 5 N. W. Rep. 833, quoted and man, 44 Conn. 595 ; Baker v. Cush- approved in Wisconsin Cent R Ca man, 127 Mass. 105 ; State v. Foster, V. Ashland County (Wis., 1891), 50 17 N. J. Law, 101 ; State v. Justice, N. W. Eep. 937. 24 N. J. Law, 413 ; State v. Crosby, 36 2 But the effect of what is done must N.J. Law, 428; Jersey City w State, be gathered from the record and not 30 N. J. Law, 521 ; Bigelow v. Hill- f rom testimony of members as to man, 37 Me. 58 ; Commonwealth v. their understanding of it Whitney Pittsburgh, 14 Penn. St. 177 ; Reiflf v. V. Village of Hudson (1888), 69 Mich. Connor, 10 Ark. 341 ; People u Mills, 189 ; s. G, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 32 Hun, 459 ; State v. Hoyt, 2 Oregon, 453, n. 246; Red v. Augusta, 25 (it 386; »Holt V. City Council (1879), 137 Road Case, 17 Penn. St 71, 75; Mass. 408, 411, citing Bennett v. New New Orleans v. St Louis Church, 11 Bedford, 110 Mass. 43a La. Ann. 244; Dey v. Lee, 4 Jones' * Higgins d Curtis, 39 Kan. 283 ; (N. C.) Law, 238 ; Tucker v. Justices, S. a, 18 Pac. Rep. 207; Whitney «, 13 Ired. (N. C.) Law, 434; Estey v. Van Buskirk (1878), 40 N. J. Law, Starr, 56 Vt 690, where a town meet- 403 ; State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 ; ing rescinded a vote authorizing a §§ 298, 299.] PUBLIC boards. 30o sideration may be moved,' and it is not necessary to the va- lidity of a resolution to reconsider that it should be moved by one who voted originally with the majority ; ^ and a board of aldermen which has indefinitely postponed action on a res- olution of the common council can afterwards rescind that action and pass the resolution.' § 298. The same subject continued. — An order may be i Bscinded by implication, as where a meeting voted to pro- ceed to an election of a city attorney by ballot, and subse- quently made an appointment by resolution vvoa vooe} A committee appointed by a board for the purpose of making a contract on its behalf acquires no vested right and may be deprived of its power by subsequent action of the board ; ' and a town school committee may reconsider its vote electing a superintendent of schools at the same meeting, and before it has been gommunicated to the person so elected.* A resolution adopted at a meeting when such action was illegal may be cured by subsequent valid proceedings in consummation thereof.'' § 299. Power to reconsider and rescind qualified.— As in- timated in the preceding section, when the rights of third subscription in aid of a railroad, no passed a vote which was not within sabscription having actually been the scope of any article except the made ; Stoddard v. Gilman, 33 Vt one rejected. The court held it to be 568 ; Fond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 380. invalid (for another reason also) and 'State V. Womack (Wash., 1892), simply remarked that "no attempt 39 Pao. Rep. 939. appears to have been made to recon- 2 Locke v. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N.Y.) sider the vote dismissing the . . . 11. They may reconsider at an ad- article." These cases may evidently journed meeting a vote taken at a stand together, for the first related to previous meeting. Supervisors &c. the mode of proceeding, the latter to T Horton (1888) 75 Iowa, 371 ; Locke the proceeding itself. Neither case is V. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N, Y.) 11 ; Cas- cited in the opinion in the other, sidy M Bangor (1871), 61 Me. 434. See further, for reconsideration, etc., 'Hough V, Bridgeport (1889), 57 at town meetings, the chapter on Conn. 290; s. a, 18 Atl. Rep. 103. Meetings and Elections, infra. * It would have been more regular * Supervisors &c. v, Horton, 75 to have first formally rescinded the Iowa, 371. previous order. State v. Chapman, eWood v. Cutter (1884), 138 Mass. 44 Conn. 595. In Holbrook v. Faulk- 149. ner (1875), 55 N. H. 311, a school dis- 'State v. Dist Ct of Hennepin trict meeting voted to dismiss an ar- County, 33 Minn. 235 ; & a, 7 Am. & tide in the warrant, and afterwards Eng. Corp. Cas. 206. 304 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 300. parties have accrued under proceedings of a public, body they cannot be affected by a declaration of its change of mind. Thus, a vote ratifying a contract made by town officers with- out due authority cannot be rescinded so as to discharge the town from its obligation.^ The point at which the election of a public officer by a meeting convened for that purpose passes beyond its control and becomes irrevocable has been considered in several cases. "While it is universally admitted that a ballot may be set aside ^or some irregularity or ille- gality before the election is declared,* it was stoutly main- tained by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut that a common council, having appointed an officer by ballot whom it had no power to remove, could not nullify the appoint- ment by a mere declaration that there was error in the ballot when there was none and a subsequent appointment of an- other person.' It was also held, in Maine, that after a city officer has been declared to be chosen by the board of alder- men, and the declaration recorded, the board cannot at an adjourned meeting held the next day, reconsider its action and choose another.* § 300. The same subject continued,— Where an officer's resignation is accepted by the proper board, which then con- firms the mayor's nomination of a successor, the latter action is entirely inconsistent with the idea that the matter of resig- nation remains open for further deliberation ; ' and a board of 1 Brown v. Winterport, 79 Me. 305. was a finality witliout an express See, also in point, Sanborn v. School declaration by him that the relator District, 13 Minn. 17. was thereby elected. 2 State V. PhiUipa, 79 Ma 506 ; Put- * State v. PhUlips, 79 Me. 606. But a nam v, Langley, 133 Mass. 204, where motion to reconsider maybe adopted the result of a recount, differing at a subsequent meeting, where a from the first count, was acquiesced legal rule of the board permits it. in by the meeting; Baker v, Cush- "All contracts implied from a reso- man, 127 Mass. 105, Iution,"said the court, "are subject 3 State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76, to the right to change it by another where the authorities are examined resolution, passed in accordance with and adverse views criticised. There the rules of the board." People v. was a motion to proceed by ballot Mills, 32 Hun, 459. for prosecuting attorney, and the » Whitney v. Van Buskirk, 40 N. J. court held that the announcement of Law, 468. Act N. J. March 20, 1860, tbe result by the presiding officer § 6 (Revision, p. 1201, § 45), providing § 301.] PTJBLIO BOARDS. 305 county commissioners having rejected a claim duly presented to it cannot, at a subsequent meeting, allow any part of it.' Where by statute a vote of two-thirds of the members of a common council is necessary to pass a resolution, a like vote is required to reconsider or rescind it, in the absence of a con- trary rule of the council regulating the practice upon motions for reconsideration.^ But in another case, where subscrip- tions to stock were required to be passed by a two-thirds vote, and a proposal was made by the requisite number, it was held it might be withdrawn before acceptance by less than a majority, and very likely by any number greater than one-third.' § 301. Reconsideration distinguished from repeal. — A limitation of the power of municipal legislative bodies to re- that when two or more candidates for the same ofiBce have I'eceived the same number of votes at the annual meeting, the town committee shall at their next meeting thereafter elect between those having an equal num- ber of votes, unless they shall deem a special meeting advisable, and in that case shall have power to call such special meeting, as now provided by- law, is mandatory, and, the town- ship committee having failed to elect, and ordered a special election, and caused notices to be posted, cannot at a subsequent meeting rescind their action. State v. Boden (N. J.), 16 Atl. Rep. 50. » Ryan v. County of Dakota (1884), 33 Minn. 138. " A vote may be re- considered at an adjourned meeting if it has not been so acted on that it cannot thereby be rendered nuga- tory." Mitchell v.- Brown (1846), 18 N. H. 315 (school district meeting). But in that case such proceedings had been taken in pursuance of the vote that the status quo could not be restored. A resolution once adopted and again read and approved can- not be repealed after the lapse of a 20 year, and when the board has been partly changed by the retiring of members and the election of others, on the ground that it was erroneously entered, upon the mere memory of the members and without notice to the parties affected thereby. Ridley V. Doughty (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 350. And a resolution author- izing the mayor to compromise with the claimants of certain commons by conveying the land claimed at a cer- tain price cannot be repudiated so as to affect the validity of a deed given while it remained unrevoked. Dausch V. Crane (Mo., 1893), 19 N. W. Rep. 61. 2 Whitney v. Village of Hudson (1888), 69 Mich. 189 ; s. c. 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453, n. ; Stockdale v. School Dist, 47 Mich. 836. In the case first cited it was held that a vote is rendered nugatory by the passage of a resolution to reconsider it, although it be not afterwards re- scinded. 8 Belfast &c. Ry. Co. v. Unity (1871), 63 Me. 148, citing Essex Turn- pike Corporation v. Collins, 8 Masa 393. 306 tUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 302. consider their actions, and the distinction between a resolution to reconsider and a vote to repeal, is illustrated in a recent de- cision of the Supreme Court of New Tork. An ordinance passed by the common council was vetoed by the mayor, and passed over his veto. A resolution to reconsider was then adopted, vetoed, and passed over the veto. It was contended that the ordinance was by these proceedings rescinded. The court said: — "The ordinance in question may be repealed but it cannot be reconsidered, for the reason that when it was passed over the mayor's veto it became a law, and thereby passed beyond the power and control of the municipal council to reconsider it. According to the uniform practice of legis- lative bodies, where a motion to reconsider has been passed in the affirmative, the question immediately recurs upon the question reconsidered. The question reconsidered was never acted upon in this case ; therefore, if the common council had the power to reconsider the ordinance, it never rescinded it, because the question reconsidered was never acted upon. There is another fatal point in this case, which is that the ordinance, when passed over the mayor's veto, could not be again reconsidered. It is a rule well settled by parliamentary law that a vote on the reconsideration of a vetoed bill cannot be reconsidered again." ' § 302. Joint assemblies of definite bodies — Constitution and proceedings. — In England it is clearly established that where an act is to be performed by a joint meeting of two or more definite bodies, a majority of each body is essen- tial to constitute a legal assembly, and if, after having met, one of the integral parts withdraws while a proposition is pending, further action thereon by those remaining is in- valid.* But this stringent rule has been materially relaxed 1 Ashton ». City of Rochester (1891), meetings. Thus where a town voted 14 N. Y. Supl. 855, 858, citing to the to raise a tax, but at a subsequent last point, Barclay, Const Man. 197 ; legal meeting, the collector having Fish, Amer. Man. Pari. Law, 90. See, taken no steps in the matter, it was also. Sank v. Philadelphia, 4 Brews, voted to " reconsider " the former (Penn.) 133. But there seems to be vote, the court held that the tax was no technical nor substantial differ- not lawfully levied. Stoddard v. ence between reconsideration, and Gilman (1850), 22 Vt 568. rescission in the proceedings of town ^ King v. Williams, 8 Maule & Sel. § 302.] PUBLIC BOAKDS. 307 by some of the courts in this country. Thus, it is held in !N"ew York that although all the bodies [that is, a majprity of each] must come together for consultation and deliberation, yet, when they do, the vote of the majority of persons pres- ent controls, notwithstanding one of the bodies should leave before the vote is taken.' The Supreme Court of New Hamp- shire has taken a more radical departure from the rule, hold- ing in one case- that a legal vote of one body to meet in con- vention is sufficient without the attendance of a quorum of such body at the joint meeting;^ and in a later decision, that a vote by one body to meet the other, assented to by the latter, who were then in session, but with less than a quorum present, which members alone attended the convention, was equivalent to a vote to meet by both bodies.' 141; King v. Buller, 8 East, 389; That all must meet in the first King V. Miller, 6 Term R 378. instance, see Commmonwealth v. iGiidersleeve v. Board of Educa- Hargest, 7 Penn. Co. Ct. 333. tion (1868), 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 301 ; ^Beck v. Hanscom (1854), 29 N. H. Whiteside v. People (1841), 36 Wend. 218. 634, reversing s. a, 33 Wend. 9; » Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N. H. 465. Ex parte Humphrey, 10 Wend. 612, CHAPTEE X. OFFICIAL BONDS. 303. Official bonds— Definition. 304. What officers must give bonds. ' 305. Form and requisites of bond. 806. Effect of signing official bond in blank. 307. The same subject continued. 308. Construction of courts on bonds improperly approved. 809. Defective bonds valid as com- mon-law obligation. 310. The same subject continued. 311. Time when an official bond takes effect 312. Effect of not filing bonds within the time' prescribed by statute. 818. .The same subject continued. 814. Liability of sureties on a treas- urer's bond. 315. The same subject continued. 316. Mingling of and defalcation out of two funds. 817. Liability of sureties as affected by subsequent legislation. 818. Liability of surety when sub- sequent legislation imposes new duties of the same gen- eral character. 319. The same subject continued. 320. LiabiHty of officer on his bond where the loss is occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy. 321. The same subject continued. 322. Duty of obligee to notify sure- ties of increased risk. 828. Liability of sureties on suc- cessive bonds — (a) Where different sureties are given on each bond. 324. The same subject continued. 825. (b) Where funds received by the officer during his first term remain in bis hands during his second term. 326. (c) When the sureties of the first term are liable for money converted or col- , lected by the officer during his second term. (d) When an officer before en- tering on his second term makes a report to or settle- ment with the proper au- thorities. The same subject continued. (e) Where the officer applies money received in his sec- ond term to pay deficiencies in his first term. (f) Where the bond is given for a term of office or a cer- tain period of time. Laches or negligence of other officers or principal. 332. Liability of sureties where ad- ditional bonds are given. 833. Liability of surety where the official occupies two or more offices. Liability of surety for unoffi- cial acts of officer. The same subject continued. Liability of sureties for acts done under color of office. 887. The same subject continued — Lammon v. Feusier — The doctrine of the federal Su- preme Court 338. The same subject continued. 327. 328. 829. 880. 881. 884. 335. 336. §§ 303, 304.] OFFICIAL BONDS. 309 I 339. The same subject continued — The doctrine of the State courts. 340. The same subject continued. 341. niustrations of the doctrine. § 343. Distinction between judicial and ministei'ial duties. 343. Illustrations of the doctrina 344. The same subject continued. § 303. OfBcial bonds — Definition. — Every bond which is required or authorized by statute to be executed by an officer is an oflBoial bond.^ Accordingly an official bond is a contract with the people for the faithful discharge of the official duties of the officer,^ and such a bond given by a public officer for the faithful performance of his duties is an official bond, although not in the form prescribed by statute.' § 304; What officers must give bonds. — Those officers who receive public moneys as well as those who from the nature of their duties receive money or property for the benefit of private individuals, or whose duties and powers bring them into conflict with the rights of individuals, or involve the seiz- ure and disposal of the property of individuals, are generally required by statute to give bonds with sureties for the faithful performance of their duties.'' The Indiana statute provides that the mayor and other municipal officers therein named, including city clerk, shall, before entering on their duties, ex- ecute a bond, in such penal sum as the council shall direct, " conditioned for the faithful perform-ance of the duties of his office and the payment of all moneys received by hini accord- ing to law and the ordinances of such city." The Supreme Court of that State accordingly held that a bond filed by a city clerk with the statutory conditions was authorized by the statute though there could be, no " money received by him ac- cording to law and the ordinances of such city." * 1 Commonwealth v. Adams, 3 Bush (Ky.), 41, 46. 2 Judge Grover in People v. Villas, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.). 353 ; S. C, 36 N. Y. 439. 3 Lucas V. Shepherd, 16 Ind. 368. * Throop on Public Ofllcers, § 170 ; Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 397 ; Glover on Corp. 305 ; Grant on Corp. 76. sMiddleton v. State, 130 Ind. 166; S. C, 33 N. E. Eep. 133, construing Rev. St Ind. (1881), § 3095. The Ver- mont constitution requires "every officer, whether judicial, executive or military, in authority under this State," to take the oath of office. It was held that municipal officers, list- ers of taxes, for instance, are not in- cluded in this requirement. Kowell V. Horton (1886), 58 Vt 1. A town may lawfully require any of its offi- 310 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§§ 305, 306. § 305. Form and requisites of bond. — Where a statute or charter provides for the filing of an oflBcial bond it almost invariably states the requisites of the bond, but a substantial compliance with the statute or charter is all that is necessary,' unless the statute or charter expressly declares that it shall follow the exact wording of the statute or charter.'^ And it has been repeatedly held that a defect in the acknowledg- ment of the bond, or a failure to approve or acknowledge it, does not release the principal oi^ surety; and where the bond has been approved or acknowledged before an officer having no authority to approve or acknowledge it, the principal or surety is not released by reason of this irregularity from lia- bility on the bond.' § 306. Effect ot signing official bonds in blank. — A party executing a bond knowing that there are blanks in it to be filled up by inserting particular names or other words neces- sary to make it a perfect instrument must be considered as agreeing that the blanks may be thus filled up after he has ex- eoated the bond. If the party signing the paper shall insert in the appropriate places the amount of the penalty, or the names of the sureties, or any other thing he may deem of im- portance as affecting his interest, he may in that way protect himself against being bound otherwise than as he shall thus specify. But if, relying upon the good faith of the principal, the surety shall permit him to have possession of a bond signed in blank, the surety will have clothed the principal with an apparent authority to fill up the blanks at his discretion, in any appropriate manner consistent with the nature of the ob- ligation to be given, so that, as against the obligee receiving cers to furnish bonds with sureties 340 ; Young v. State, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) that he will faithfully perform the 253 ; Wendell v. Fleming, 8 Gray, duties of his office. Morrell v. Sylves- 613 ; Moore v. State, 9 Mo. 330 ; Peo- ter, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 348. pie v. Johr, 33 Mich. 461 ; Green v. 1 Tevis V. Randall, 6 Cal. 683. Wardwell, 17 111. 378 ; State v. Blair, 2 People V. Holmes, 3 Wend. 381 ; 33 Ind. 318 ; People v. Edwards, 9 Allegheny County v. Van Campen CaL 386. The bond must not impose (1839), 3 Wend. 49; Fellows v. Gil- penalties greater than those re- man, 4 Wend. 414; Lawton v. Er- quired by the statute. Stewart v, win, 9 Wend. 233; Cornell v. Barnes, Lee, 3 Cal. 364; United States v. 1 Denio, 35. Morgan, 3 Wash. C. C. 10. 'Musselman v. Com., 7 Pa. St § 307.] OFFICIAL BOHDS. 311 the bond without notice or negligence, and in good faith, the surety will be estopped to allege that he executed the instru- ment with a reservation or upon a condition in respect of the filling of such blanks, and this whether the blanks to be filled have reference to the penalty of the bond, the names of co- sureties or other matter.' § 307. The same subject continued. — An important de- cision on this point was rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1874. This was a suit upon the bond of an internal revenue collector executed by the collector as principal and by several sureties. One of the sureties pleaded that when he signed and sealed the bond it was a printed form, with names, dates and amount of penalty in blank; that he de- livered it to the collector under an express agreement that the latter should fill the blank with a penalty of a certain amount only and procure two other sureties within certain territorial limits each worth a certain amount, otherwise the bond was to be null and void and returned to him, and that the collector fraudulently filled the bond with a greater penalty than that agreed upon and with two additional sureties, neither of whom resided within the agreed territorial limits and both of whom were insolvent. The court decided that the plea was bad and that the sureties were liable.' iCity of Chicago v. Gage (1880), was overruled, or, more correctly 95 111. 593. This is a case where speaking, that the old common-law a printed form of a city treasur- rule upon which the decision in Peo- er's bond was executed by himself pie v. Oregon is based has been over- in blank and sent by him to his sure- borne by the application of the doc- ties, who signed it in blank and re- trine of estoppel in pais. "Where a turned it to the principal, who some- bond has been executed in blank and time afterwards took it to the office delivered to the proper official, he of the corporation counsel, and had may fill in the blank, and the bond the blanks filled in, when the bond is a good and valid one. Hultz v. was retui-ned to the city clerk and Com. (Pa.), 3 Grant's Cas. 61. See presented to and approved by the State v. Pepper, 31 Ind. 76. For con- common council as the official bond trary decision see United States v. of said treasurer. The treasurer de- Nelson, 3 Brock. (U,. S.) 64 faulted, suit was brought on the bond 2 Butler v. United States, 31 Wall, and the sureties entered pleas of non 373. See, also. Dair v. United States, est factum. The court held that the 6 Wall. 1 ; Drury v. Foster, 3 Wall sureties were liable, and that the case 34 ; Inhabitants of South Berwick of The People v. Oregon, 37 111 39, v. Huntress (1865), 53 Ma 89; Stata 312 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§§ 308, 309. - § 308. Construction of courts on bonds improperly ap- proved. — Where a statute does not especially require strict compliance with its provisions as to the acknowledgment and execution of ofHcial bonds to render them valid, courts are very liberal in their construction of the law prescribing the mode of execution.' The omission of an excise commissioner to execute an oflBcial bond approved, by the supervisor of the town does not create a vacancy ; at the utmost, it only fur- nishes causes for a forfeiture of the office ; a vacancy can be effected only by a direct proceeding for that purpose.^ Thus where an excise commissioner failed to procure the approval of the supervisor to the bond presented and filed by him, and at a subsequent town meeting, on the supposition that the failure to have the bond approved \^acated the office, votes were cast electing another excise commissioner "to fill va- cancy, if any exist," it was held that the failure of the first commissioner to have his bond approved did not vacate the office and that there was no vacancy to fill.' § 309. Defective bonds valid as common-law obligations. It is a well settled rule of law where a defective bond is given and the officer enters upon and discharges his duties, that the bond is good as a common-law obligation and the sureties thereon are liable, unless such rule would be contrary to public policy or is expressly forbidden by statute.* Thus where the V. Pepper (1869), 31 Ind. 76, and sCronin u Stoddard, 97 N. Y. 271 ; cases there cited ; McCormick v. Bay following Fort v. Stiles, 57 N. Y. 399. City (1871), 23 Mich. 457; State v. ^ United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. Peck, 53 Me. 284 ; Bartlett v. Board of 348 ; United States v. Linn, 15 Pet Education, 59 IlL 364; Mutual &c. 290; Jessup v. United States, 106 Co. V. Wilcox, 8 Biss. 0. C. 197; S. c., U. S. 147; United States v. Rogers, 4 Myer's Fed. Dec, § 635. 28 Fed. Rep. 607 ; Montville v. Haugh- 1 Young V. State, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) ton, 7 Conn. 543 ; State v. Horn, 94 253 ; Boone Co. v. Jones, 54 Iowa, Mo. 162 ; State v. Bartlett, 30 Miss. 699 ; Mendocino Co. v. Morris, 82 Cal. 624 ; Sweetser v. Hay, 2 Gray, 49, 145. For cases where a bond was and cases there cited ; King v. Ire- held to be vitiated by reason of a de- land, 68 Tex. 682 ; Polk v. Plummer, fective approval, see O'Marrow v. 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 500 ; Lee v. War- Port Huron, 47 Mich. 585 ; Crawford ing, 3 Desauss. (S. C.) 57 ; Supervisors V. Meredith, 6 Ga. 552. v. Cofifenbury, 1 Mich. 355 ; Barnes v. 2 People ex rel. Kelly v. Common Brookman, 107 III. 317; Pritchett v. Council City of Brooklyn, 77 N. Y. People, 6 111. 525. See, also, Mc- 503. Gowen v. Deyo, 8 Barb. 340 ; Classen §§ 310, 3H.J OFFICIAL BONDS. 313 board of education of a union free school, incorporated under a common school act, by mistake and in good faith instead of taking a bond from one elected as its treasurer, as required by- said act, accepted a writing in the form of a bond, but not under seal, the same was held valid and enforcible against the sureties thereto.^ § 310. The same subject continaed. — Where the statute prescribes certain qbligees to whom an official bond is to be made payable, and a bond is given payable to an obligee other than the one prescribed by statute, and the bond in other re- spects complies with the requirements of the statute, it is good as a common-law bond.* And where parties being under no legal disability, and capable of making contracts, enter into a voluntary bond based on a good and valid consideration and for a lawful purpose, the bond is binding on them at common law.' § 311. Time when an official bond takes effect. — An official bond resembles a deed in that it takes effect from the date of V. Shaw, 5 Watte (Pa.), 468; State v. 408; Horn v. Whittier, 6 N. H. 88; Thompson, 49 Mo. 188; Freeman v. Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) Davis, 7 Mass. 200 ; Burroughs v. 176 ; Van Hook v. Barnett, 4 Dev. L. Lowder, 8 Mass. 373 ; Howard v. Bro- (N. C.) 268 ; Justices v. Smith, 2 J. J. gan, 21 Me. 358 ; Rowlett v. Eubank, Marsh. (Ky.) 472. 1 Bush (Ky.), 477 ; Williams v. Shelby, » Archer v. Hart, 5 Fla. 234 It has 2 Oreg. 144. been held that where an officer oc- 1 Board of Education v. Fonda, 77 cupying two oflHcial positions, having N. Y. 350, distinguishing Hardmann filed a bond for his due and faithful V. Bowen, 39 N. Y. 196 ; Rounds v. performance of one of them, volun- Mansfield, 38 Me. 586. See, also, tarily gives a bond for the perform- Boothbay v. Giles, 68 Me. 160; United ance of the duties of the other posi- V. Hodsou, 10 Wall. 395; tion, the latter bond is a valid Thomas v. White, 12 Mass. 369. A common-law obligation, even though bond without any specified obligee he was not required by statute to has been held valid as a common- give such a bond. State v. Harney, law obligation. Fellows v. Gilman, 57 Miss. 863. See, also. Supervisors v. 4 Wend. 414, 419. Coffinbury, 1 Mich. 355 ; People v. 2 United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. Johr (1871), 22 Mich. 461 ; Platteville C. C. 115 ; Iredell v. Barbee, 9 Ired. L. v. Hooper, 63 Wis. 381. For contrary (N. C.) 250 ; Governor v. Humphreys, opinions see State v. Heisey, 56 Iowa, 7 Jones (N. C), 258; Williams v. 404; United States v. Hum'ason, 6 Ehringhaus, 3 Dev. L. (N. C.) 297. Sawyer, 199; State v. Bartlett, 30 See, also, Moore v. Graves, 3 N. H. Miss. 624 314 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 312. delivery thereof.' Thus, it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States, that where a bond has been delivered to the obligee for acceptance and it was accepted afterwards, it took effect from the date of delivery and not from the accept- ance thereof.^ The court said : — " A bond may not be a com- plete contract until accepted by the obligee ; but if it has been delivered to him to be accepted if he should choose to do so, that is not a conditional delivery which will postpone the obli- gor's undertaking to the time q^ its acceptance, but an admis- sion that the bond is then binding upon him and will be so from that time if it should be accepted." ' § 312. Effect of not JSiling bonds within the time pre- scribed by statute. — The weight of the American authorities is decidedly in favor of the doctrine that if a statute fixes the time within which bonds are to be given the provision is di- rectory and not mandatory ; and that unless it expressly de- clares that the failure to give the bond by the time prescribed ipso facto vacates the ofiice, the bond may be given at any time if no vacancy has been declared.^ And it has been held 1 Johnson v. Harney, 84 N. Y. 363; Wend. 481; People v. Ferguson, 20 Eberhardt v. Wood, 6 Lea (Tenn.). Weekly Dig. (N. Y.) 276 ; Duntley v. 467 ; S. C, 3 Tenn. Ch. 490 ; Bryant Davis, 43 Hun, 229 ; Cronin v. Stod- V. Wood, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 337. dard, 97 N. Y. 271 ; People v. Crissey, 2 Butler V. United States, 88 U. S. 91 N. Y. 616 ; Marbury v. Madison, 1 373. Cranch, 137; Kearney v. Andrews, 3 See, also. State v. Tool, 4 Ohio St 10 N. J. Eq. 70; Bank v. Dandridge, 558. Where a collector's bond has 13 Wheat 64 ; State v. Churchill, 41 been filed within the time prescribed Mo. 41 ; State v. County Court, 44 by statute, but is not accepted until Mo. 230; Ross v. Williamson, 44 Ga. the statutory time has elapsed, the 501; Paine on Elections, § 332; acceptance relates back to the time Sprowl v. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674 ; of filing and the bond is valid. Drew State v. Falconer, 44 Ala. 696 ; Smith V. Morrill, 62 N. H. 23. Where a v. Cronkite, 8 Ind. 134; State v. statute requires an official bond to Colvig, 15 Oreg. 57 ; State u. Findley, be given and makes no special pro- 10 Ohio, 51 ; State v. Ring, 29 Minn, vision for the mode of its delivery, it 78 ; Cawley v. People (1880), 95 111. has been held that the filing thereof 249. For the effect of the failure of is a delivery. Sacramento Co. v. a city marshal to give his bond in Bird, 31 Cal. 66. time, see State v. Porter, 7 Ind. 204. * Dillon on Munio. Corp. (4th ed.). For city treasurer's bond, see Chicago § 314; United States v. Le Baron,' v. Gage (1880), 95 IlL 593; Caskey v. 19 How. 72 ; People v. Holley, 12 Greensborough, 78 Ind. 233. §§ 313, 314.] OFFICIAL BONDS. 815 where the statute requires an oflBoer to file a bond every year that his mere failure to do so does not vacate the office.^ §313. The same subject continued. — But the cases are not unanimous on this point, and in some States it has been held that the failure to give the bond within the prescribed time vacates the ofSce, without any proceedings to declare it vacant ; so tha,t it cannot be restored by any subsequent com- pliance with the statute.^ Thus in a Texas case ' it was held , that a statute requiring an officer to qualify within a certain ' time was directory, only where the delay was caused by some- thing over which he had no control, and not in case of his refusal or neglect to qualify. § 314. Liability of sureties on a treasurer's bond.— The sureties on a city treasurer's bond pleaded that by ordinance it was the duty of the mayor to supervise the conduct of the treasurer, and, in case of misconduct of the treasurer, to transmit information to the common council; and that the mayor was invested with full power to examine all books in the custody of the treasurer; and that it was the duty of the common council to examine into the conduct of the treasurer, and to remove him in case of any violation of his duty ; and I Clark V. Ennis, 45 N. J. Law, 69. ^Throop on Public Officers, § 173 ; Where a statute required the master In re Att'y-Gen'l, 14 Fla. 377 : Creigh- in chancei'y within three weeks after ton v. Com., 83 Ky. 148 ; Falconer his election to tender his bond for v. Shores, 37 Ark. 386 ; Vaughan v. approval, and upon its approval to Johnson, 77 Ya. 800 ; Childrey v. deposit it with the treasurer and sue Eady, 77 Va. 518 ; Owens v. O'Brien, out his commission, and that " upon 78 Va. 116; State v. Johnson, 100 his failure to do so within the said Ind. 489 ; State v. Matheny, 7 Kan. time his oflSce shall be deemed ab- 327 ; People v! Perkins, 85 Cal. 509 ; solutely vacant, and shall be filled by People v. Taylor, 57 Cal. 620 ; State election or appointment as hereto- v. Hadley, 27 Ind. 496 ; Kilpatrick v. fore provided," it was held that the Smith, 77 Va, 847 ; Johnson v. Mann, failure tj comply with this require- 77 Va. 265. See, also, Jackson v. ment was only cause of forfeiture, Simonton, 4 Cranch C. C. 355 ; Ben- but not a forfeiture ipso /ac 3 Wall. 341. Brock. C. C. 317. * Citing Fensier v. Lammon, 6 Nev, 2 Citing Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 109, 450; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276. i§ 339, 340.] OFFICIAL BONDS. 335 § 339. The same subject continued — The doctrine of the State courts. — " Upon the analogous question whether the sureties upon the official bond of a sheriff, a coroner or a con- stable are responsible foT his taking upon a writ directing him to take the property of one person the property of another, there has been some difference of opinion in the courts of the several States. The view that the sureties are not liable in such a case has been maintained by the Supreme Courts of l^ew York, New Jersey, North Carolina and Wisconsin, and perhaps receives some support from decisions in Alabama, Mississippi and Indiana." ' § 340. The same subject continued.— Mr, Justice Gray continues : — " And the liability of the sureties in such causes has been affirmed by a great preponderance of authority, in- cluding decisions in the highest courts of Pennsylvania, Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri. Iowa, Ne- braska, Texas and California and in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia." ^ In State v. Jennings ' Chief Jus- 1 Citing Eoc parte Reed, 4 Hill, 573 ; People V. Schuyler, 5 Barb. 166; State V. Conover, 4 Dutch. 224; State v. Long, 8 Ired. Law (N. C), 415; State V. Brown, 11 Ired. Law (N. C), 141 ; Gerber v. Ackley, 32 Wis. 333 ; Gov- ernor V. Hancock, 2 Ala, 738 ; McEl- haney v. Gilleland, 30 Ala. 183; Brown v. Moseley, 11 Sm. & Marsh. (Miss.) 854 ; Jenkins v. Lemonds, 29 Ind. 294; Carey v. State, 34 Ind. 105. "But," continues the opinion, "in People V. Schuyler, 4 N. Y. 178, the judgment in 5 Barb. 166, was re- versed and the case of Ex parte Reed, 4 Hill, 572, overruled by the Biajority of the New York Court of Appeals with the concurrence of Chief Jus- tice Bronson, who had taken part in ■deciding Reed's case. The final de- cision in People v. Schuyler, 4 N. Y. 173, has been since treated by the Court of Appeals as settling the law upon this point Mayor &o. of New York V. Sibberns, 8 Abb. App. Dec. 366 ; s. c, 7 Daly, 436 ; Cummings v. Brown, 43 N. Y. 514; People v. Corn- stock, 93 N. Y. 585." In addition to the State courts mentioned by the learned justice as holding that the sureties are not liable under the cir- cumstances under consideration may be mentioned the Supreme Court of Maryland. State v. Brown, 54 Md. 318. It is also to be noted that State V. Dnily, 3 Ind. 431, is in conflict with Jenkins v. Lemonds, 29i Ind, 394, the former case aflSrming the liabil- ity of the sureties under the circum- stances considered. 2 Citing Cormack v. Common- wealth, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 184 ; Bennett v. McKee, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 513; Archer V. Noble. 3 Greenl. 418; Harris v. Hanson, 3 Fairf. (Me.) 343; Green- field o. Wilson, 13 Gray, 384 ; Tracy »4 0hioSt. 41& 336 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 341. tice Thurman said : — " The authorities seem to lis quite con- clusive that the seizure of the goods of A. under color of process against B. is official misconduct in the official making of the seizure and is a breach of the condition of his official bond where that is that he will faithfully perform the duties of his office. The reason for this is that the trespass is not the act of a mere individual, but is perpetrated colore officii. If an officer under color of &fi.fa. seizes property of the debtor which is exempt from executio^ no one, I imagine, would deny that he had broken the condition of his bond. Why should the law be different if under color of the same process he takes the goods of a third person? If the exemption of the goods from the execution in the one case makes the seizure official misconduct, why should it not have the same effect in the other? True, it may sometimes be more difficult to ascer- tain the ownership of the goods than to know whether a par- ticular piece of property is exempt from execution ; but this is not always the case, and if it were it would not justify us in restricting to litigants the indemnity afforded by the official bond, thus leaving the rest of the community with no other indemnity against official misconduct than the responsibihty of the officer might furnish." § 341. Illustrations of the doctrine. — In some cases where the officer or agent had the legal right and authority to receive the money in respect to which he defaulted, he did not re- ceive the funds according to the manner prescribed b}"^ stat- ute. Thus in North Carolina a judgment debtor paid a sheriff before the issue of execution a sum of money to be applied in V. Goodwin, 5 Allen, 409 ; Sangester Mr. Justice Gray. Jefferson v. Harlr V. Commonwealth, 17 Gratt 134; ley (Ga.). 9 S. E. Rep. 174; Jones w. Commonwealth v. Stockton, 5 T. B. People, 19 IlL App. 300. In addition Mon. (Ky.) 193; Jewell v. Mills, 3 to these cases cited in Lammon v. Bush (Ky.), 78; State v. Moore, 19 Fensier may be mentioned as support- Mo. 369 ; State v. Fitzpatrick, 64 Mo. ins the doctrine of the text, Strunk 185; Charles v. Haskins. 11 Iowa, «. Ochiltree, 11 Iowa, 158; Hubbard 339 ; Turner v. Killian, 13 Neb. 580 ; v. Elden, 43 Ohio St 380 ; Forsythe Hollmon u. Carroll, 27 Tex. 33; Van v. Ellis, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 298; Pelt V. Littler, 14 CaL 194 ; United Turner v. Sisson, 137 Mass. 191 ; Peo- States V. Hine, 3 MacArthur (D. C), pie v. Mersereau, 74 Mich. 687; S. C, 27. The courts of Georgia and Illi- 43 N. W. Rep. 153. nois also concur in the conclusions of § 342.] OFFICIAL BONDS. 337 payment of the judgment. The sheriff defaulted in respect to the money, and his sureties were exonerated from liability on the ground that the receipt of the money by the sheriff before iexecution issued was an unofficial act.' It is not sufficient that there is a custom authorizing the defaulting officer to receive the money in respect to which he has defaulted. It must be his legal right and duty to receive the funds.^ And the gen- eral rule may be stated that the sureties of an officer' incur no liability in respect to money received by him where the stat- ute did not require him to receive the money.' § 343. Distinction between judicial and ministerial duties. The same distinction between, the judicial and the ministerial acts of public officers obtains in this branch of the subject under discussion as where the personal liability of officers and agents and the liability of the corporation for their acts was consid- ered.* As the officer is not in general personally liable for his malfeasance or non-feasance in the discharge of a judicial duty, and as the corporation itself is not liable in such case, so the sureties upon his bond cannot be held for such act or omis- sion.' This general rule is obvious, but there is often great difficulty in determining whether the particular act under consideration is a judicial or a ministerial act. This is espe- cially the case in considering the liability Of the sureties of justices of the peace and of highway commissioners — from ' State V. Allen, 7 Jones' Law (N. C), paid into court, although there was 564. And in several States it has no statutory authority for his doing been held where an officer seized so. His sureties were held not liable property under process, and after- on the gi-ound that the receipt of the wards by agreement of the parties . moneys by him was not an official sold that property in a mar ner differ- act' ent from the mode prescribed by law, 3 Ward v. Stalil, 81 N. Y. 406 ; that the sureties were not liable for Smith v. Stapler, 53 Ga. 300 ; Branch default of the officer In respect to the v. Commissioners, 3 Call (Va.), 438; proceeds of the sale. Webb v. Ans- Saltenberry v. Loucks, 8 La. Ann. 95. pach, 3 Ohio St. 533 ; Governor v. Per- * See § 205 et seq., supra. rine, 23 Ala 807 ; Sohloss v. White, 16 » Place v. Taylor, 33 Ohio St. 317 ; CaL 65. • McGrew v. Governor, 19 Ala. 89. This 2 Carey v. State, 34 Ind. 105 ; Har- is of course a necessary consequence din V. Carrico, 3 Meto. (Ky.) 289. In of the freedom of the officer and the the last cited case it was pleaded corporation from liability for the er- that there was a custom that the rors of the officer in the performance clerk should receive all moneys of a judicial duty. S3 338 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 343. the nature of each office it is evident that it is frequently difficult to dififerentiate these two classes of duties. It is perhaps impossible to lay down any general rule to determine to which class a particular act belongs. The circumstances of each case must be considered before a conclusion can be reached. i , § 343. Illustrations of the doctrine.— The act of a justice of the peace in entering judgment and issuing execution thereon before the time prescribfed by law has been held in South Carolina to be a judicial and not a ministerial act.' And so also the adjournment of a case against the objection of the plaintiff, where the defendant did not appear, was con- sidered in a recent New York case to be an act of a judicial character, although by the provisions of the statute the justice was required to enter judgment upon the failure of the defendant to appear.^ These acts being judicial in character it is not competent for the court to inquire into the motive of the justice ; and neither the justice nor his sureties incur any liability therefor.' 1 Abrams v. Carlisle, 18 S. C. 843. SMerwin v. Rogers, 24 N. Y. St Rep. 496. sThroop on Public Officers, § 733. The learned author collates a number of cases in which the act of the jus- tice was decided to be judicial and not ministerial in its character! Among them may be mentioned the following : — An error of the justice in directing the writ to the sheriff or any constable, where the statute re- quired that the writ should be di- rected to the sheriff. AUec v. Reese, 39 Fed. Rep. 341. The act of a jus- tice in giving judgment for costs where the law gave him no authority to do so. White v. Morse, 139 Mass. 162. Entering judgment for less than the sum proved to be due. Kress v. State, 65 Ind. 106. Accepting an in- formal recognizance; Chickering v. Robinson, 3 Cush. 543. Error in re- fnsins to grant an appeal. Jordan v. Hanson, 49 N. a 199. Error in de- termining the sufficiency of bail Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay (S. C), 1. See, also, on this subject, Fisher v. Deans, 107 Mass. 118; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131 ; Heard v. Har- ris, 68 Ala. 4a The following acts of justices of the peace have been held to be ministerial. For these acts, therefore, their sureties would be bound : — Refusing to issue a writ of execution upon a judgment entered by him. Fairchlld v. Keith, 39 Ohio St 156. Issuing an execution void upon its face. Noxon u Hill, 2 Allen, 215. Rendering a judgment exceed- ing his jurisdiction. Estopinal v. Peyroux, 37 La. Ann. 477. Issuing a warrant of attachment or of arrest in a case where he was not author- ized at law to issue such process. Wright ». Rouss, 18 Neb. 234; Trues- dell V. Combs, 33 Ohio St 186. See, also, for similar instances collated in § 344] OFFICIAL BONDS. 339 §344. The same subject continued. — The same rule ap- plies in considering the liability ol" sureties upon the bonds of highway commissioners. The duties of these ofBoers as of justices of the peace are of a twofold nature. Some of these duties are judicial, others are ministerial. Their judicial du- ties, according to Mr, Throop, include those which are con- nected with the opening, discontinuing, closing and general management of highways, together with the assessment of damages or of benefits thereon. For any act done in the per- formance of these duties they, and consequently their sureties, are not liable so long as the act is within the jurisdiction of the officer as defined by statute.' It is, however, a ministerial duty for these officers to keep the highways in repair if they have sufficient funds to do so; and it is also a ministerial duty for them, if practicable, to obtain the requisite and necessary funds, and for their official default in respect to these duties their sureties are considered to be liable.' Throop on Public Officers, § 734: Inos V. Winspear, 18 Cal. 397 ; Briggs V. Wardwell, 10 Mass. 356 ; Sullivan V. Jones, 3 Gray, 570 ; Fishery Deans, 107 Mass. 118; Albee v. Ward, 8 Mass. 79; State v. Carrick, 70 Md. 586; Spencer v. Perry, 17 Me. 413 ; Grumon V. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40; Tracy v. Williams, 4 Conn. 107 ; Flack v. Har- rington, 1 HL 213 ; Adkins v. Brewer, 3 Cow. 203 ; Clarke v. May, 2 Gray, 410; Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray, 120; Doggett V. Cook, 11 Cusli. 263 ; Shaw V. Reed, 16 Mass. 450 ; Welch v. Glea- Bon, 28 S. C. 247; Kelly v. Moore, 51 Ala. 864 ; Lanpher v. Dewell, 56 Iowa, 153; Eevell v. Pettit, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 314; Bore v. Bush, 6 Mart N. S. (La.) 1 ; Terrail v. Tinney, 30 La. Ann. 444 ; Tyler v. Alford, 38 Me. 530; Kendall V. Powers, 4 Mete. 553; Knowles v. Davis, 2 Allen, 61 ; Guehther v. White- acre, 34 Mich. 504 ; Everton v. Sutton, 5 Wend. 280; Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. 463 ; Cunningham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow, 178: HoiTj;Titon v. Swnrthout, 1 Denici, DSQ; Christopher i: Van Liew, 57 Barb. 17 ; Blythe v. Tomp- kins, 2 Abb. Pr. 468 ; Kerns, v. Schoon- maker, 4 Ohio, 331 ; Miller v. Grice, 2 Rich. Law (S. C), 37; Morrill v. Thurston, 46 Vt. 733; Vaughan v. Congdon, 56 Vt 111. 1 Throop on Public Officers, § 736, citing Elder v. Bemis, 3 Met 599; Benjamin v. Wheeler, 15 Gray, 486 ; Morrison v. Howe, 120 Mass. 565; Denniston v. Clark, 125 Mass. 306; Hatch V. Hawkes, 136 Mass. 177 ; Up- ham V. Marsh, 128 Mass. 546 ; John- son V. Dunn, 134 Mass. 522 ; Sage v. Laurian,"19 Mich. 137; Highway Comm'rs v. Ely, 54 Mich. 178 ; Larned V. Briscoe, 63 Mich. 393; Clark v. Phelps, 4 Cow. 190 ; Van Steenbergh V. Bigelow, 3 Wend. 43; Miller v. Brown, 56 N. Y. 383 ; Morse v. Will- iamson, 85 Barb. 473 ; Harrington v. Comm'rs &c., 2 McCord (S. C), 400. Contra, Adams v. Richardson, 43 N. H. 212. » Throop on Public Officers, § 737, citin;^ Pom fret v. Snratosra. SpringB, 104 N. Y. 459; People v. Town AuJi- tors &c., 75 N. Y.316 ; Hover v. Bark- hoof, 44 N. Y. 113, and other cases. CHAPTEE XI. MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 345. Town meeting in New Eng- § 371. The same subject continued — land and elsewhere. Illustrations. 346. Eight to meeting — Jlfanda- 3'J3. Validity of votes as deter- mus to enforca mined by the warrant— Il- 847. Application for and authority lustrations. to call a meeting. 373. The same subject continued. 848. Secondary authority to call a 374. Invalidity of votes — Illustra- meeting. tions. 849. General purpose of a warn- 375. The same subject continued. ing. 376. Votes of town meetings — Gen- 850. Designation of time and place eral rules of constructioa of meeting. 377. Record of proceedings. 851. General and formal requisites 378. Parol evidence of proceedings. of a warrant. 379. Doings of meetings not le- 853. Th^ same subject continued. gally called. 853. Service of warrant 380. Presumptions in favor of an- 854 Time of service. cient meetings. 855. Return of service. 381. Notice of election. 856. Notice of annual meetings. 383. Qualification of voters — 857. The same subject continued. Power to prescribe. 858. Time of meeting. 383. Registration acts. 359. Place of meeting. 384 Place of election. 360. Organization of meeting — 385. The same subject continued. The moderator. 386. Popular elections — Plurality. 861. The same subject continued — 387. The same subject continued — Clerk and clerk pro tern. Majorities, etc. 363. Adjournpients of meetings. 388. Voting by ballot. 363. The same subject continued. 389. The same subject continued. 864 The power of adjournment 390. The AustraUan ballot and limited. cumulative voting. 365. Adjourned meetings. 391. Absolute accuracy not re- 366. Reconsideration and rescis- quired in a ballot. sion — The general rule. 893. Votes for ineligible candi- 867. The same subject continued — dates. Illustrations. 393. Putting up ofllces at auction- 86& The same subject continued — Tax collector. The rule qualified. 894 City council as judges of elec- 869. Ratification of doings of in- tion and qualification of its valid meetings. members. 870. Parliamentary law in town 395. Canvass and return and con- meetings. test of electiona § 345.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 341 § 345. Town meetings in Ne«r England and elsewhere. — In a preceding chapter we have discussed the rules of law by which the meetings and proceedings of public boards are reg- ulated.' We shall now consider some of the statutory and judicial regulations of "town meetings," a term which we apply generically to all popular meetings of the inhabitants of local communities — whether of strictly municipal corpora- tions or of public g"Ma«z-corporations, such as school districts. The institution of town meetings in this country is coeval with the settlement of New England, and it is in the decisions of the courts of the States composing that section that we find the great body of the law on this subject. These gatherings of the people have been pronounced by students of political science who have closely examined their methods of operation and the influence exerted by them to be the most potent agents in promoting the art of self-government that the world has ever known. " In a New England township the people directly govern themselves ; the government is the people, or, to speak with entire precision, it is all the male inhabitants of one-and-twenty years of age and upwards. The people tax themselves. Once each year, usually in March, but some- times as early as February or as late as April, a 'town meet- ing is held at which all the grown men of the township are expected to be present and to vote, while any one may intro- duce motions or take part in the discussion.' In early times there was a fine for non-attendance, but this is no longer the case; it is supposed that a due regard to his own interests will induce every man to come. The town meeting is held in ■the town house, but at first it used to be held in the church, which was thus a meeting house ' for civil as well as ecclesias- tical purposes.' At the town meeting measures relating to the administration of town affairs are discussed and adopted or rejected ; appropriations are made for the public expenses of the town, or, in other words, the amount of the town taxes for the year is determined and town oflScers are elected for the year." * But the administration of local affairs by means of 1 Public Boabds, oh. IX interesting and eloquent dissertation 2Prof. Fiske's "Civil Government on town meetings, the author says : — in the United States," p. 19. In an- " In the kind of dispussion which it other part of this work, which is an provokes, in the necessity of facing 343 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 346. town meetings is not now confined to the towns of New Eng- land, although these are perhaps invested with more ample powers than are conferred upon them elsewhere. In many of the western States the township system with its town meet- ing for deliberative purposes is steadly supplanting or ceasing to become subordinate to the system of county government, and when tried under favorable conditions is not likely to be abandoned, except when of necessity an increase of population demands a representative borougn or city government.* § 346. Bight to meeting — Mandamus to enforce. — In Connecticut " special town meetings may be convened when the selectmen shall deem it necessary or on application of twenty inhabitants qualified to vote in town meetings." By judicial construction the la^t clause of this provision is manda- tory to the selectmen and the requisite number of voters have a right to demand that a meeting be called for any legitimate and proper purpose.* Although it is not competent for the petitioners to dictate to the selectmen the day and hour for the meeting to be held it is no objection to the petition that it specifies the day and hour, for the selectmen may call a meeting at any reasonable time.' If, however, those oflBcers neglect to perform their duty in the premises the remedy is by ma/ndamus, but all the selectmen must be made parties to the proceeding and the writ can only issue in the name of the State as plaintiff.* argument with argument, and of Phelps, J., in Lyon v. Eice (1874), 41 keeping one's temper under control, Conn. 345, 251. There is no clear the town meeting is the best political legal right to have a meeting called training school in existence. Its ed- "to take action on resolutions to be ucational value is far higher than offered [in the legislature] for the re- that of the newspaper, which in spite peal of the charter of the borough.'" of its many merits as a difluser Williams u School Dist (1838), 21 » Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543; pick. 75. Cf. Little v. MeiriU (1830), Rossiter v. Peck, 3 Gray, 539; Bar- 10 Pick. 543. rett v. Crane, 16 Vt 346 ; Betts v. 2 Hay ward «. School Dist (1848), 8 Bagley, 13 Pick. 573; Bennett v. Cush. 419. The power given by stat- Burch, 1 Denio, 141 ; Short v. Spier, ute to an ecclesiastical body to pre- 4 Hill, 76. scribe the mode of warning its meet- * Brewster v. Hyde (1834). 7 N. H. ings does not enable it to dispense 306 ; Giles v. School Dist, 31 N. H. with a warning by the committee, 304 ; Starbird v. Falmouth (1862), 51 Bethany v. Sperry (1834), 10 Conn. Me. 101. A justice of the peace hav- 200. See, further, for a construction ing authority to call a meeting upon of statutes and by-law conferring au- application after an unreasonable re- thority to call school district meet- fusal of the selectmen is powerless to ings, Stone v. School Dist (1851), 8 act if the majority of the selectmen Cush. 592 (authority to warn not au- have not been requested. Southard thority to caXl); Little v. Merrill u Bradford (1866), 53 Me. 389, citing (1830), 10 Pick. 543 ; Mason v. School Ladd v. Clements, 4 Cush. 477 ; Dist (1848), 20 Vt 487; Corliss v. Fletcher v. Lincolnville, S!0 Ma 439; Corliss, 8 Vt 373. And that an ap- SuUbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 14a plication will Toe presumed, Chandler Cf. State v. Town of Lime (1877), 23 V. Bradish (1851), 23 Yt 416 ; Mason Minn. 521, cited in the second note to V. School Dist (1848), 20 Vt 487. the preceding section. § 349.] MEETINGS AND BLBOTIONS. 345 a meeting.* And the same construction of the statute was adopted in a case where the meeting called upon the original application would have been illegal for want of sufficient notice.* § 349. General purpose of a warning. — The rationale of warnings of New England town meetings is, perhaps, placed upon a firmer foundation by Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court than by any other jurist who has had occasion to discuss the subject. " In Connecticut, as in Massachusetts and Maine," said he, " by common law or immemorial usage the property of any inhabitant may be taken on execution upon a judgment against the town.' A town cannot contract or authorize any officer or agent to make one except by vote in a town meetmg duly notified or warned; and the notice or warning must specify the matter to be acted on in order that all the inhabitants (whose property will be subject to be taken on execution to satisfy the obligation of the town) may know in advance what business is to be transacted 'at the meeting." * This reason has also been adduced : — " If the object of the meeting is specified it will present a motive to the inhabitants to.be present and they will leave business even if it be press- ing, provided they feel an interest in the subject to be deter- mined. On the other hand, if the object is unimportant and any of the inhabitants should feel no concern in the result, they may with safety pursue their ordinary business ; and this cei'- taiiily is matter of convenience. The warning designating the object of the meeting is fair and in prevention of those • Denniston v. School Dist (1845), * Citing Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 17 N. H. 493. If the committee could Conn. 333, 338 ; McLoud u Selby, 10 ignore the petitioner's desire in re- Conn. 390; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 spect of the time, "it is plain," said Conn. 68; 5 Dane Abr., 158 ; Chase u. the court, " that no special meeting Merrimack Bank, 19 Pick. 564, 569 ; could ever be held against their will" Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Met 546 ; Adams In Connecticut the ofiBcers are not in v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. (Me.) default if the day fixed by them is 361 ; Femald v. Lewis, 6 Greenl. (Me.) within a reasonable time. Lyon v. 364; Hopkins v. Elmore, 49 Vt. 176; Eice (1874), 41 Conn. 345. Rev. Stats. N. H. 1878, oh. 339, § 8. 2 Pickering v. De Eoohemont (N. H., See, also, ch. V, supra. 1891), 33 Atl. Rep. 88, where it was « Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank held that the warrant need not recite (1887), 131 U. S. 131. the neglect 346 MEBTnros and elections. [§ BoO. little artifices which sometimes endanger the public peace and throw communities into animosities and- divisions." ' Again, it is to enable the people "to give the subject consideration previous to the meeting," * and " that the will of individuals may not be subjected to the will of a majority any further than it is subjected by law." * 350. Designation of time and place of meeting. — A stat- ute provided that annual town Aeetings should be held at the place where the last meeting was held or at such other place as should have been ordered at a previous meeting. There was also a general provision that the doings of town meetings might be reconsidered upon motion made within a certain time.* It was decided that the mere fact that a ma- jority of the ballots for town officers cast at a regular meeting contained words indicating the will of the voters that the next meeting should be held at a certain place named thereon was not a sufficient designation within the intent of the law. The proposition should have been submitted to the meeting as a deliberative body, and the election of an officer in the following year at the place assigned was declared to be void.' If an annual meeting neglects to appoint a time and place under the f/ower conferred by statute and the latter makes no provision in case of such a failure, the proceedings of a meet- ing duly called by the proper authorities will be upheld.' But a statute providing for such an omission is mandatory.' A by- law prescribing seven days' notice of meetings is reasonable,' 1 Hayden v. Noyes (1824), 5 Conn, city the right to fix by a standing 891, 896. by-law the time and extent of such 2 Blush V, Colchester (1867), 89 Vt pubUcation, and is not controlled by' 198, 196. the general statutes which prescribe 3 Pittsburg V, Danforth (1875), 66 how town meetings shall be warned. N. H. 271. Allen v. Burlington (1873), 45 Vt 202. * The power to reconsider does not > Otherwise no annual meeting depend on statute; See § 866 et seq., could ever afterwards be held. San- infra. born v. School Dist (1866), 12 Minn. 5 State V. Davidson (1878), 82 Wis. 17. 114. A charter provision that all ' Marchant ?;. Langworthy, 6 Hill, warnings of city meetings "shall be 646; s. C, affirmed, 3 Denio, 526. issued by the mayor and published «Rand v. Wilder (1853), 11 Gush, in the manner designated in the by- 294 laws of the city" delegates to the § 351.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 347 but an ordinance requiring a notice of not less than three months is void for unreasonabless.* § 351. General and formal requisites of a warrant. — The statutes, with only slight differences in phraseology, require the time, place and objects of a meeting to be specified in the notice, or warrant, as it is usually termed. It is not essential that it be addressed to the- inhabitants or voters,^ or that the application be recited in it ; ' and, in the absence of statute, no seal is required.* A date is not indispensable," and if a warrant be issued by freeholders under statutory authority their naked signatures suffice.* It is valid if signed by a ma- jority of the board having power to issue it ; ' and a meeting is " called by the . . . committee " when the warrant is signed by the clerk " by order of the . . . committee;"' but it is not " under the hands of the selectmen " where only one of the board signs " by order of the selectmen ; " ' and it is not " issued " by the mayor unless signed by him.'" And a warrant signed by the proper officer, but without any official designation or anything in the document to indicate his offi- cial character, is fatally defective." The year of the meeting 1 Jones V. Sanford (1877), 66 Me. Citing Willis v. Sproule, 13 Kan. 357 ; 585. Austin v. Allen, 6 Wis. 134; Wash- 2 Baldwin v. North Stanford (1864), ington Ice Co. v. Lay, 103 Ind. 48 ; 33 Conn. 47. See, also, Pickering v. s. C, 3 N. E. Rep. 233. De Eochemont (N. a, 1891), 33 Atl. ^ Reynolds v. New Salem (1843), 6 Rep. 88. Met. 340. Cf. Bogert v. Trustees > Roper V. Livermore (1848), 38 Me. (1881), 43 N. J. Law, 358, cited in § 347, 193 ; Sherwin v. Bugbee (1844), 16 Vt »upra. 439. See, also, Pickering v. De Roche- 8 Kingsbury v. School Dist. (1846), mont (N. H., 1891), 33 Atl. Rep. 88 ; 12 Met 99. See, also, Smith v. Board Mason v. School Bist (1848), 20 Vt County Comm'rs (1891). 45 Fed. Rep. 487. 735. Otherwise if there is no pre- * Colman v. Anderson (1813), 10 vious authority or subsequent ratifii- Mass. 105 ; Kingsbury v. School Dist cation. Bethany v. Sperry (1834), 10 (1846), 12 Met 99 ; Inhabitants of Conn. 300. Bucksport V. Spoflford (1835), 13 Me. 9 Reynolds v. New Salem (1843), 6 487. Met 340. And see S. C, p. 344. sDenniston v. School Dist (1845), >» Allen v. Burlington (1873), 45 Vt 17 N. H. 493; Briggs v. Murdock, 13 202. Pick. 305. 11 McVichie v. Town of Knight « Sturm V. School Dist (1890), 45 (Wis., 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 1094. Minn. 88; s. C, 47 N. W. Rep. 463. 348 UEETmOS AND ELEOTIOKS. [§ 352. ought to be specified,' and the hour * and place 'are of vital importance.* § 352. The same subject continued. — Technical accuracy is not required, nor is the warrant to be construed with the same strictness as a power of attorney, or a penal statute,* or a special plea.' The law is satisfied if the propositions to be submitted are indicated with such reasonable certainty that no person interested can be misl^.' Where the design is to raise money the subjects need not be set forth with greater particularity than is expressed in the statute which authorizes the town to vote money for the purposes named in the warrant.' If the application for a meeting contains precise and enumer- ated articles and the warrant is annexed thereto upon the same paper calling a meeting to act on those articles, they are a part of the warrant as effectually as if they were embodied 1 Wilson V. Waltersville School Dist (1876), 44 Conn. 157, which, however, does not decide that it is indispensable. 2 If this is omitted in the record of the warning, parol evidence is inad- missible to show that the original did in fact fix the hour, or that all the legal voters were present and voted. Sherwin v. Bugbee (1845), 17 Vt. 337; S. C, 16 Vt. 439. See, also. King V. Theodorick, 8 East, 543; Moor V. Newfleld (1826), 4 Me 44 8 Sherwin v. Bugbee (1844), 16 Vt. 439. A warrant calling a meeting at a certain hall may imply that it is in the town and known to the voters. George v. School Dist (1843), 6 Met 497. ^The presence and consent of all the inhabitants at a meeting not le- gally wai-ned is not a waiver of the defect Moor v. Newfleld (1836), 4 Me. 44 See, also, Euhland v. Super- visors, 55 Wis. 664; S. C, 13 N. W. Eep. 877. 6 Belfast &c.Ey. Co. v. Brooks (1873), 60 Me. 568 ; Grover v. Pembroke, 11 Allen, 89 ; Kittredge v. North Brook- field (1885), 138 Mass. 386. * South School Dist v, Blakeslee (1839), 13 Conn. 337. 7 Wyley v. Wilson (1873), 44 Vt 404 ; Ovitt V. Chase (1864), 37 Vt 196 ; Moore V. Beattie (1860), 33 Vt 319 ; Austin V. York (1869), 57 Me. 304; Alger v. Curry (1868), 40 Vt 437; Bloomfield V. Charter Oak Bank (1887), 121 U. S. 131. " They are the language of plain men for practical purposes." Per Red- field, J., in Hubbard v. Newton (1880), 62 Vt 346; Blush u Colchester (1867), 39 Vt 193. A statute requiring the subject-matter to be "distinctly stated" adds no force to the intent of a former statute providing that the "mtent and design" should be specified. Child v. Colbum (1873). 54 N. H. 71, 80. See. also, cases cited in the two preceding notes ; and for a more particular examination of the subject, § 373 et seq., infra. 8 Alger V. Curry (1868), 40 Vt 437. See, also, Tucker v. Aiken (1834), 7 N. H. 113, § 353.] MEETINGS AlfTO ELE0TI0K8. 349 in it.* And a meeting is called for each and every article in the warrant, although one article requires a majority vote and another a two-thirds vote." "Where the action of a town was invalid because of want of power and also because there was no notice in the warning of the subject which was considered, an act of the legislature referring to such proceedings as "without authority of law" and confirming them heals all the invalidities.' §353. Service of warrant. — The statutes generally require an attested copy of the warrant to be posted in two or more public places a certain time before the meeting.* The original may be posted, although the letter of the law specifies a copy and the original to be returned with the oflBcer's doing thereon.' The notice must be put up the required length of time,' but not necessarily in the usual place.^ The words "public places," as used in statutes, are construed to mean such places as in comparison with others in the same town are those where the inhabitants and others most frequently meet or resort or have occasion to be, so that a notice there would for that reason be most likely to be seen. The character of the town and the situation and use of the place and the amount of resort to it, if disputed, are niatters of fact for a 1 George v. School Dist (1843), 6 also, Lennirigton v. Blodgett (1864), Met 497. 37 Vt 210. 2 Canton v. Smith (1876), 65 Me. 203. » Brewster v. Hyde (1834), 7 N. H. » Baldwin v. North Branf ord (1864), 206 ; Norris v. Eaton (1834), 7 N. H. 284. 32 Conn. 47. See, also, Eaton v. Miner, 5 N. H. 543 ; * It has been said that this duty is King v. Warley, 6 Term E. 534; personal and cannot be delegated, King v. Inhabitants of Bilton, 1 but the oflScer's return that he East, 13. Copies should include all "caused" the notice to be posted the signatures to the original, implies that it was done under his Chapin v. School Dist (1855), 30 N. H. own eye. Parker v. Titcomb (1889), 25. 82 Me. 180. Cf. Phillips v. Albany 8 And the record may be amended (1871), 28 "Wis. 340, where the ofBcer to record the fact that it was not employed others to do the posting, and thus in-validate the action of the and the court was loath to believe meeting. Blake v. Orf ord (1886), 64 that an objection was seriously N. H. 299. There were no vested taken ; " if it is, it is as seriously over- rights, " if in • a case of this charac- ruled." s. C, p. 35.6. Presumption ter the question is material," said the in favor of regularity. State v. Town court of Lime (1877), 23 Minn. 521. See, ' 'Stoddard v. GUman(1850), 23 Vt 668. 350 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 364. jury. Bat if the facts are apparent it is a question of law what is a public place.' A " conspicuous " place is not syn- onymous with "public;" both words are sometimes used in conjunction to insure the posting of notice in a public place in such a position that it may readily be seen.'' §354. Time of seryice. — It was held in England that where notice was required " at least sixteen days before " a meeting, both the day of the notice and the day of the meet- ing were to be excluded in the computation,' but according to the uniform rule in this couptry wherever the question has arisen only one of these day&is excluded.* It was so decided where the language was " at least twelve days before the time appointed."* A^d "at least five days inclusive before the 'Proprietors of Cambridge v. Chandler, 6 N. H. 371, 279 ; Gibson V. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168, 175, 178; Wells V. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393 ; Pro- prietors of Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 183, 190; Russell v. Dyer, 40 N. H. 173, 186, 187; S. C, 43 N. B. 396, 397, 898; Wells v. Canpany, 47 N. H. 335, 255 ; Gaboon v. Coe, 53 N. H. 518, 522 ; French v. Spalding, 61 N. H. 395, 401. A shoemaker's shop is not a public place. Tidd v. Smith, 3 N. H. 17a Prima facie a blacksmith's shop is. Soper V. Livermore (1848), 28 Me. 193. And an inn and a post-office. Hoitt V. Burnham, 61 N. H. 620. And houses of public worship. Scaramon v. Scammon (1854), 38 N. H. 419. But not the inside of the door if it is kept locked. Osgood v. Blake (1850), 31 N. H. 551, 563. And a'grist-railL Fletcher v. Lincolnville (1841), 20 Me. 439. A stage office may be. Baker v. Shephard (1851), 34 N. H. 208, 312. And a school- house ; a building formerly used as a grain building ; a large board fast- ened on the roadside wall. Seabury V. Howland (1887), 15 E. I. 446. For other cases relating to designated or public places and depending upon spoijiul facts, see Cliapiu c. Si;liool Dist (1855), 80 N. H. 25; Briggs l'. Murdock (1833), 13 Pick. 305 ; Soper V. Livermore (1848), 28 Me. 193 ; State V. Beemau (1853), 35 Me. 343. An allegation in a complaint that the notice was not posted in the most public place is a sufficient averment of fact, and not merely of a legal conclusion, to withstand a demurrer. McVichie v. Town of Knight (Wis., 1892), 51 N. W. Eep. 1094. 2 A neglect to heed this distinction is fatal. Lewey's Island E. Ca v. Bolton (1860), 48 Me. 451; Christ's Church V. Woodward (1846), 26 Me. 173. ' Eegina v. Justices of Shropshire, 8 Ad. & El. 173. See, also, Eegina v. Lander, 1 Ir. R C. L. 225. < Mason v. School Dist (1848), 20 Vt. 487; Hunt v. School Dist. (1842), 14 Vt. 300; Hubbard v. Williams- town (1884), 61 Wis. 397; Brooklyn Trust Co. V. Hebron (1883), 61 Conn. 23, citing Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2 Wall. 190; Bigelow v. Wilson, 1 Pick. 485 ; Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502. See, also, Osgood v. Blake (1850), 21 N. H. 551, 563. 8 Pratt V. Swanton (1843), 15 Vt 147. § 355.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 351 meeting is to be held." > Where notice is published the date of a newspaper is presumed to be the date of its publication,^ although it is printed and many popies sent out on the pre- ceding day.' Statutory provisions relating to the period of notice of public meetings are mandatory and a strict com- pliance therewith is an indispensable prerequisite to valid action,* but a defect in this particular may be cured by act of the legislature.' 355. Beturn of service. — A return of service of a warning Is necessary even if no statute requires it." The return need not be dated,' nor is the date conclusive of the time of service.* If it is signed " B., Constable," without adding " of the town of," etc., it is sufficient.* In Maine, where the statute requires the return to state " the manner of notice and the time it was given," it must show specifically and precisely that the notice was served in exact conformity with the statute.'" ' Brooklyn Trust Co. v, Hebron (1883X 51 Conn. 23. nSchofl V. Gould (1872), 53 N. a 513. » " General publicity cannot fairly be said to be given to anything con- tained in it till the day of its date and general circulation." Queen v. Aberdare Canal Ca (1850), 14 Q. B. 854. United States v. McKelden (1879), objected to the legality of the elec- MacArthur & Mackay, 163. tion of selectmen that the warning * See Sherwin v. Bugbee (1844), IS did not specify the purpose of the Vt 439. meeting, and the case sent up to the ' South School Dist v. Blakesle© Supreme Court did not show afflrma- (1839), 13 Conn. 337. tively that the warrant was perfect, *Sec. 851, supra. yet the court presumed that it was § 360.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 355 essential to the validity of the proceedings that the inhabit- ants assemble at that place.^ But in the absence of fraudulent intent the courts permit a reasonable adaptation to circum- stances, and the doings of a gathering at another placa are not always and as a matter of law illegal. Thus, a meeting was called at a school building in which it was usually held, and the clerk having lost the key stationed a boy at the door to direct persons to a hall where the proceedings were after- wards conducted in due form with an average attendance. An election at this meeting was held to be valid.'' When, however, there is evidence of unfairness or oppression, the acts of parties who deviate a hair's breadth from the strictly legal course will be overthrown. "When, for instance, the place appointed was a school-house, it was taken to mean within its walls ; and a few persons, including the town clerk, who meet in the highway in front of the building and formally adjourn to a distant part of the town, whereby other citizens are designedly prevented from participating in the transac- tion of important business, will have only their trouble for their pains. Such conduct would not be tolerated even if the first meeting were legally held.' § 360. Organization of meeting — The moderator.— The business of a meeting cannot be conducted without a presiding officer, or. " moderator," according to the terminology of New England town meetings.* It is usually made the duty of the town clerk, by statute, to preside until a moderator is chosen, and it has been said that his duty to do so is an incident to his office, without any positive requirement.' It is not neces- sary that a moderator be elected by ballot or be sworn unless the statute prescribes it.* And where he neglects to take an oath as provided by statute, " whether the doings of towns 1 Chamberlain v. Dover (1836), 13 to adjourn before appointing a mod- Me. 466 ; Wakefield v. Patterson erator, see § 363, infra. (1881), 25 Kan. 709. 5Dodds v. Henry (1813), 9 Mass. i Wakefield v. Patterson (1881), 25 262, holding that he is the proper per- Kan. 709. son-to receive and count the votes ' Chamberlain v. Dover (1836), 18 given for moderator. Me. 466. See, also, § 364, infra. « Mitchell v. Brown (1846), 18 N. H. * Attorney-General v. Crocker 315. (1885), 138 Mass. 214. As to the power 356 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 361. can, in any case, be held void on that account, and if in any in what cases, may be questions of no little diflBculty," to quote from the opinion of the court in an early New Hampshire case. It was there held, at any rate, that a tax collector chosen at such a. meeting was a good de facto ofBcer.^ And, likewisej the acts of a moderator appointed in violation of a statute requiring a check list were sustained on the principle which upholds the acts of de facto officers.' And where a moderator elected at- an annual town meeting was called without another election to preside at a meeting held during the year, and there was no objection on the part of any one, a voter who was present was estopped from contesting the va- lidity of the proceedings of the meeting.' § 361. The same subject Continued — Clerk and clerk pro tempore. — The town clerk is the proper officer to record the doings of a meeting, but the fact that the statute provides for the appointment of a clerk when there is a vacancy does not preclude the meeting from appointing a clerk juto tempore in the absence of the regular clerk.* And an appointment by the moderator acquiesced in by the meeting will be an appoint- ment by the meeting.' Where the selectmen without author- ity appointed a clerk pro tempore, who thereupon acted as such with the acquiescence of the meeting, his record of the pro- ceedings was valid as the act of an officer de facto? At a 1 Tucker v. Aiken (1834), 7 N. H. « Hutchinson v. Pratt (1839), 11 Vt 113,140. 403, citing Hawkins, P. C. 18, § 3. 1! Attorney-General u Crocker See, also, Hickok v. Shelburne (1868), (1835), 138 Mass. 314. See, also. Com- 41 Vt 409. There cannot be a record monwealth u Shaw (1843), 7 Met. witliout a clerk. Attorney-General u. 53, 56. Crocker (1885), 138 Mass. 314. 3 State V. Vershire (1879), 52 Vt. 41. s State v: McKee (Oregon), 25 Pac. Cf. State V. Harris (1879), 53 Vt 216. Eep. 293 ; State v. Smith (Oregon), 25 These cases and the cases cited in the Pac. Rep. 389. preceding note seem to dispose of the e Attorney-General «. Crocker(1885), difHculty suggested in Tucker v. 138 Mass. 214. It was held that a pro- Aiken, 7 N. H. 113, 140, quoted in the test made by a voter after the election text As to the efifect of a protest if of town officers at a meeting where it were made when the moderator such a clerk acted " as to the legality firstassumedtoact, qwjere. Attorney- of their election " did not show that General v, Crocker (1883), 138 Mass. he was not reputed to be town clerk. 214, 219. The court refrained from decidin'^ § 362.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 357 meeting of a school society a clerk ^o tem;pore was appointed iu the absence of the regular clerk, but he did not take the oath of office provided by law until some months afterward nor make any record of the business of the meeting before that time, and then only from memoranda and recollection. The record was held to be perfect. The court said : — •" It is suf- ficient if the oath be administered before the official acts re- quired of the clerk are performed so that those acts are done under its influence and sanction. Many acts of public meet- ings must of necessity transpire before the clerk be sworn ; such as the choice of presiding officer and the appointment of clerks themselves. It is not necessary that a clerk be a wit- ness of the proceedings of a meeting under his official oath ; it is sufficient if he record them or sanction the record of them after he has been sworn." ' § 362. Adjournments of meetings. — When a meeting is fairly organized it cannot be doubted that it possesses the in- cidental power of adjournment to another time and place, unless it is prohibited by statute.^ "Where the voters and offi- ■what the effect would have been if a town meeting shall be held open only protest had been distinctly and sea- between sunrise and sunset does not sonably made. S. C, p. 219. require it to be kept open from the ' Bartlettv. Kinsley (1843), 15 Conn, rising until the setting of the sun. 327. A statute requiring a record to It may adjourn from forenoon to be made of the persons swoi-n into afternoon. People v. Martin (1851), oflSce is directory, and it does not pre- 1 Seld. (N. Y.) 34, holding, further, vent the fact from being otherwise that although the statute prescribes proved when there is no such record, the place of meeting it is competent So held where the record of a town for a meeting first convened there to meeting was certified by a clerk pro adjourn to another place. Goodel v. tem. whose oath of office was not on Baker (1828), 8 Cowen, 286. Reason- record. Kellar v. Savage (1840), 17 able presumptions will be made in. Me. 444 favor of regularity and good faith. 2 "Nor is it necessary that the rec- Converse v. Porter (1864), 45 N. H. ord should state any reason for the 385. See, also, McDaniels v. Flower adjournment The voters are the Brook &o. Co., 22 Vt 274. Ad- sole judges of that." Hathaway v. journment to a particular day can- Addison (1860), 48 Me. 440, at p. 444. not be proved by parol. It must It is a measure which can be taken appear of record. Taylor v. Henry only at a regular meeting held at the (1824), 2 Pick.. 397. See, also, An- place appointed in the warning, drews v. Boylston (1872), 110 Mass. Chamberlain v. Dover (1836), 13 Me. 214 And where the record shows 466. A statute providing that a an adjournment to another place 358 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§363. cers by unanimous consent, but without any formal adjourn- ment or vote, go out into the open air in front of the place of meeting for greater convenience, and there vote without ob- jection on the part of any person, and no one is prejudiced in any way, the action is legal.* A town meeting called to vote aid to a railroad under a statute which requires a two-thirds vote may adjourn by a majority vote.^ §363. The same subject continued. — Where the town clerk presides at the opening of a meeting, though it is not competent for the meeting to transact business until the ap- pointment of a moderator, it may nevertheless adjourn, and, aforUori, where a moderator presides who is illegally chosen.' If a meeting legally held is adjourned to another day without specifying the hour, the proceedings of the adjourned meeting are invalid. " Theoretically, it might be well enough to estab- lish it as a general rule that when a meeting called at or ad- journed to a particular hour votes an adjournment without naming any hour, it shall be taken to be the same hour as that fixed in the warning or in the last vote for adjournment in which the hour is named. We are inclined, on the whole, however, to think that the reasons arising from a considera- tion of the practical consequences likely to flow from the one rule and the other weigh most strongly in favor of puttiBg the vote of adjournment upon the same ground and under the same rule as has already been established in the case referred to above * as to the omission in the warning to name any hour for the meeting." ' But where at a March meeting it was and proceedings there had It cannot etc., without stating that any vote be contradicted by parol evidence of was taken, sufficiently shows that it an adjournment without day. Hun- was the act of the meeting. Hatha- neman v. Fire District (1864), 37 Vt way v. Addison (1860), 48 Me. 440, at 40. " Recess " and adjournment are p. 444. synonymous. People v. Martin (1851), 2 Canton v. Smith (1876), 65 Me. 203. 1 Seld. (N. Y.) 34, 27 ; Ex parte Mir- " Attorney-General v. Simonds ande, 73 Cal. 365; & a, 14 Pac. Rep. (1873), 111 Mass. 256. 888. 4Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt 837; 1 Brown v. Winterport (1887). 79 s. c, 16 Vt. 439. Me. 305, citing Dale v. Irwin, 78 IIJ. 6 Green banks v. Boutwell (1870), 43 170 ; People v. Kniffin, 21 How. Pr. Vt 207. If the record of an adjourn- (N. Y.) 43. A record stating that the ment omits the hour, a town clerk meeting " was then adjourned to," chosen at the adjourned meeting § 364.] MEETIKGS AND ELECTIONS. 359 "voted that this meeting stand adjourned to the April meet- ing," and it was shown to have been the uniform custom for fifty years to hold a meeting on the firsi Monday of April, it , was decided that the regular April meeting called by an inde- pendent warrant was also a legal adjourned meeting.^ §384. The pawer of adjournment limited.— A limit to the power of the majority to adjourn a meeting is well illus- trated in a Yermont case where the charter made it impera- tive on a village at every annual meeting to elect its oflScers, and the court held that the majority of the meeting could not adjourn the same without day in fraud of the law and the minority, and if a legal minority immediatel}' following such a fraudulent adjournment reorganizes the meeting and elects officers they will be entitled to hold their offices. " This corporation is governmental in its functions," said the court, " and invested with certain powers, rights and privileges that it may perform the duties cast upon it, and it cannot by re- fusing to perform those duties be permitted to defeat the pro- visions and purposes of the law of its creation. At a meet- ing duly constituted and organized a majority of the voters present, in the absence of any statute or other restraining authority to the contrary, have an implied right to adjourn the meeting to another time and place. But even this we ap- prehend must be fairly done and for no improper purpose. In People v. Martin,* Paige, J., says : — 'I think that the power of adjourning a town meeting to another time and place may under peculiar circumstances be oppressively ex- ercised and lead to a defeat of the public will. This power ought not to be exercised except in a case of extreme -neces- sity.' Chancellor Kent, in speaking of cases where the mem- bers of a corporation are directed to be but are not annually elected, says that the omission to elect does not take away the power incident to the corporation to elect afterwards, when the annual day has passed^ by some means free from design or fraud,. Now, in the case at bar it was by design that the last annual meeting was adjourned without day, and cannot amend it. Taylor v. Henry i Reed v. Acton (1875), 117 Masa (1834), a Pick. 397, 402. 384 2 5N. Y. 27. 360 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 365. such adjournment was a fraud both upon the law and upon the minority who were in favor of abiding by the law." ' § 365. Adjourned meetings. — It is too well settled; to re- quire comment that all corporations, whether municipal or private, may transact any business at an adjourned meeting which they could haye done at the original meeting. It is but a continuation of the same meeting. Whether the meet- ing is continued without interruj)tion for many days, or by adjournment from day to day or from time to time, many days intervening, it is evident it must be considered the same meeting without any loss or diminution of powers.^ If a moderator is chosen at the original meeting in violation of a statute re- quiring a check list, all that is done while he presides is of no binding force, and if town officers are elected at that meeting, the town may, at an adjourned meeting, elect a moderator regularly and different town officers, who will be entitled to their offices as against those claiming under the first elec- tion.' On the other hand, an adjourned meeting has no more authority than the original meeting ; if the latter be void for want of legal notice, or otherwise, no capacity can be 1 Stone v. Small (1882), 54 Vt 498. act business under the original call. Bowells, J., concludes his opinion on Hickok v. Shelburne (1868), 41 Vt, this point by quoting from Kimball 409. See, also. Reed v, Acton (1875), V. Marshall, 44 N. H. 465 (see §273, 117 Mass. 884, 331; Withington v. supra), where Bell, C. J., said in a Harvard, 8 Cush. 66 ; Hunneman v. similar case: — "The majority could Grafton, 10 Met 454 The record of make no legal adjournment to such a vote stating that it was passed " at a time as would defeat the per- a meeting," etc., "legally holden by formanoe of the prescribed duty, adjournment," is sufiScient prima and the minority might keep the facie evidence that it was a legal meeting in existence till the duty meeting. Brownell v. Palmer (1852), was done." See, also, People v. Mar- 22 Conn. 107. See, however, Taylor tin (1851), 1 Seld. (N. Y.) 24, 27; u Henry (1824), 8 Pick. 897, where a Chamberlain v. Dover (1836), 13 Me. record of doings " at an adjourned 466. meeting," without showing of what 2 Warner w Mower (1839), 11 Vt. meeting it was an adjournment, was 385, 391 ; Canton v. Smith (1870), 65 held insufficient. But in that case Me. 203. " A regular and proper ad- the record of the original meeting journment of a town meeting is a did not show an adjournment which continuation of the same meeting." was in fact taken. Attorney-General v. Simonds (1873), ' Attorney - General v. Simonds 111 Mass. 256. An adjourned meet- (1873), 111 Mass. 256. Ing of a special meeting may trans- § 366.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 361 acquired by adjournment.* In other words, there can be no increase of momentum without the application of new force. § 366. Beconsideration and rescission — The general rule. — The general rule is settled beyond dispute that action taken by a town meeting may be reconsidered and rescinded at the same meeting, or at any adjourned or any other subse- quent meeting.^ And a vote not to reconsider a previous vote taken at the same meeting does not abridge the power of fut- ure meetings over that vote.' "Where there is a vote in the negative the voters may nevertheless at the same or any other meeting rescind the vote and pass measures in the aifirma- tive,* or they may take inconsistent action without formally rescinding the vote.' If the votes are repugnant the former is rescinded by implication.* Where the law requires the as- sent of a town to be indicated by a two-thirds vote, a proposal passed by the requisite number may be reconsidered by a bare majority of the voters before it has become binding by the acceptance of the party to whom it is made.' When a motion to " reconsider " a vote is adopted the vote ceases to have any effect, just as if it had never been passed.' I United States n McKelden (1879), 'Hunneman v. Grafton (1845), 10 MaoArthur & Mackay, 163 ; Sherwin Met. 454, at p. 457. V. Bugbee (1844), 16 Vt. 439 ;S. C, 17 ^Stackhouse v. Clark (1890), 53 N. Vt 337. J. Law, 391. « March v. Scituate (1891), 158 Mass. » Eddy v. Wilson (1871), 43 Vt. 363. 84;ParkerwTitc0mb(1889),83Me.l8O; 6 George v. School Dist (1843), 6 Hunneman v. Grafton (1845), 10 Met. Met. 497. 454, 456 : Belfast &c. Ry. Co. v. Unity " Perhaps even a minority consist- (1869), 53 Me. 148 ; Mitchell v. Brown ing of more than one-third might (1846), 18 N. H. 315 ; Getchell v. "Wells do so. Belfast &c. Ey. Co. v. Unity (1867), 55 Me. 484; George v. School (1869), 53 Me. 148. Where a vote to Dist (1843), 6 Met 497 ; Eddy v. Wil- issue bonds to a railroad was passed son (1871), 43 Vt 363 ; Stackhouse v. by the necessary two-thirds, with a Clark (1890), 53 N. J. Law, 391 ; With- condition annexed to it, a subsequent ington V. Harvard (1851), 8 Cush. 66. meeting could not by a mere major- Of course, such action, to be effective, ity vote to waive the condition. Port- must be within the scope of the warn- land &c. R. Co. v. Hartford (1870), 58 ing. See § 373 et seq., infra, and, Me. 33. also, § 397 et seq., supra, relating to ^withington v. Harvard (1851), 8 reconsideration and rescission by Cush. 66 ; Stoddard v. Gilman (1850), public boards. 33 Vt 568. 362 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§§ 367, 368. § 367. The same subject considered — Illustrations.— A town authorized by the legislature to subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad and voting to do so at a lawful meeting may at a subsequent meeting rescind the vote if the rights of third parties have not intervened and nothing has been done under the original vote,^ So, also, where the voters at any legally called meeting were authorized to appropriate a certain sum for building a school-house, which they accordingly did, but at a subsequent meeting thS resolution was rescinded, it was held that they might, at a still later meeting, make the appropriation.^ After a vote to levy a tax has been reconsidered the collector cannot lawfully proceed to collect it.' A town voted to let an inhabitant, who sent his children to school in another town, " draw his proportion of school money," and reconsidered this vote before the money was paid. It was held that assumpsit could not be maintained against the town for the amount of taxes assessed upon and paid by him for the support of schools.'' Under authority to divide, unite and alter school districts from time to time, when deemed neces- sary, a town at an annual meeting set one district over to an- other. It was competent at a subsequent meeting to rescind the vote and reinstate the district." § 368. The same subject continued — The rule qualified. The power to reconsider and rescind is subject to several just and necessary qualifications. If a vote of the town has given a cause of action against it, no subsequent proceedings can impair or destroy this vested right.^ Thus, the appointment of a committee to make a contract on behalf of the town can- i"If, therefore, the town when ^Withington v. Harvard (1851), 8 clothed with au optional power may Cusb. 66. rescind action once taken in its cus- 5 Bill v. Dow (1884), 56 Vt. 563. tomary municipal affairs, no reason ^ jjall v. Holden (1874), 116 Mass. can be assigned why it may not, un- 173 ; Nelson v. Milf ord (1828), 7 Pick, der like circumstances, do the same 18. A vote ratifying the doings of under a grant of power unusual in selectmen in borrowing money and its municipal affairs." Estey v. Starr giving a note therefor in behalf of (1884), 56 Vt 690, 693. the town cannot be rescinded at a 2 Sanford v. Prentice (1871), 28 Wis. subsequent meeting. Brown v, Win- 358. terport (1887), 79 Ma 805. 3 Stoddard v. Gilman (1850), 32 Vt 568. § 369.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 363 not be reconsidered and the authority of the committee with- drawn so as to avoid an intervening contract.' A resolution which constitutes an acknowledgment so as to take a debt out of the statute of limitations cannot be taken back and the claim brought within the bar of the statute.^ And, gen- erally, rights of third parties resting on a vote cannot be di- vested by rescission.' Again, if a vote has accomplished its purpose and worked out the intended result, its force is spent, and an attempt to reconsider it is futile. For instance, a stat- ; ute required each town at its annual meeting to vote on the question of abolishing the school district system and adopt- ing the town system, and that the result of the vote should be certified to the secretary of State. At a town meeting the first vote was a tie, and another was taken at the same meeting resulting in the abolition of the district system. It was held that the vote first taken was final and conclusive, and ex- hausted the authority of the town in the premises, and an election of officers of a town system was illegal.* § 369. Ratification of doings of invalid meetings. — Where the doings of a town meeting are invalid by reason of a de- fective warning, or are lacking in some technical requisite, a subsequent meeting may supersede the vitiating effect of such irregularities by ratification.' A vote at an illegal meeting 1 Not even at an adjourned meeting, duty of the clerk to certify the vote " To have been affected by the ad- to the selectmen, vsrho were thereby journment the subject should have required to assess a tax for the been suspended or the committee di- amount. At a subsequent meeting rected not to proceed till the meeting the selectmen not having assessed the vcas dissolved." Hunneman v. Graf- tax a motion was made to reconsider ton (1845), iO Met. 454, 45H. Cf. Da- which the moderator refused to put mon V. Granby (If 24), 2 Pick. 345. to vote. At a later meeting it was 2 Sanborn v. School Dist. (1866), 12 voted to reconsider, but in the mean- Minn., 17. while the tax had been assessed. ' Where an unauthorized payment Held, that the action of the modera- by a town treasurer was ratified it tor was unwarrantable, but it did not could not be rescinded and the operate to reverse or impair the amount recovered from him. Arling- vote to raise the money, and the ton V. Peirce (1877), 122 Mass. 270. ■ vote to reconsider was of no effect estate I'. Adams (1886), 58 Vt 694. because the assessment had inter- See, also, Parker v. Titcomb (1889), 82 vened. Mitchell v. Brown (1846), 18 Me. 180. A school district voted N. H. 315. to raise money, and it became the * But this cannot be proved by pa- 364 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 309. which has been spread upon the records may be expressly re- ferred to in such a way as to become part of a vote at a sub- sequent valid meeting.* But the courts are altogether averse to an implied ratification ; and a resolution adopting previous defective proceedings will have effect only to the precise ex- tent indicated by its terms.^ Thus, a vote to reconsider certain votes passed at a former meeting does not recognize the valid- ity of other acts of the same meeting ; ' and a vote not to re- scind certain doings does not giv%them any eflBcacy.* "Where a town voted, at a meeting not legally held, to accept the provisions of an act abolishing school districts, and after- wards, at a meeting called under an article "to see if the town will reconsider their action " relating to school districts under the act, specifying it, " and return to the old school district system," it was voted that this article be indefinitely post- poned, it did not legalize the action of the previous meeting.* rol (Jordan u School Dist, 38 Me. 164) ; and the meeting must be duly warned. " The vote of those who at- tend a town meeting being of no va- lidity against the town or its inhab- itants unless the object of the vote is set forth in the notice or warning of the meeting, the town can no more ratify an act afterwards than author- ize it beforehand, except by a vote passed pursuant to a previous notice specifying the object. Without the indispensable prerequisite of such a notice those present at a meeting have no greater power to bind the town indirectly by ratification or es- toppel than they have to bind it directly by an original vote." Per Justice Gray, in Bloomfield v. Char- ter Oak Bank (1887), 121 U. S. 121. This is the same principle that con- trols in the well-settled doctrine that acts absolutely ultra vires cannot be ratified. See chapter on Liability OF THE COEPOEATION FOR ACTS OF ITS Officers and Agents. Ex nihilo nihil fieri potest. 1 Canton, v. Smith (1876), 65 Me. 203, at p. 207. 2 Hamilton v. Philipsburg (1867), 55 Me. 193. In Southard v. Bradford (1866), 53 Me. 389, 891, the court said : — " We cannot presume the town intended to ratify the proceed- ings of a meeting not legally called. If such was the intention of the town, it should have used language so clear and explicit that there could be no doubt of its purpose." ' " It should have been one of the articles in the warrant to see whether the town would ratify those doings and an affirmative vote had thereon before they could be confirmed so as to be binding on the town.'' Cham- berlain V. Dover (1830), 18 Me. 466, 474. <"The immunity of the district was perfect ; no subsequent inaction could aSect it; it could be taken from it only by positive vote upon clear notice that it would pay." Wright V. North School Dist (1885), 58 Conn. 576. See, also, Brooklyn Trust Co. V. Hebron (1888), 51 Conn. 22, a strong case. 6 Child V. Colburn (1873), 54 N. 11. 71. See, also, Rollins v. Chester (1860), §§ 370, 371.J MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 365 § 370. Parliamentary law In town meetings. — " With the exception of the election of those officers which the statute prescribes shall be elected by ballot, all or nearly all of the functions of a town meeting are such as pertain to a deliber- ative body or assembly. The subjects upon which a town meeting may take action are numerous and diversified. The course of procedure which is to be pursued is not fully marked out by statute, and I deem it only safe to say that when the statute does not give direction the general rules of parliament- ary law, so far as they may be applicable, should be observed and enforced in conducting the business of a town meeting. It will necessarily follow that propositions upon which the town meeting may lawfully act may be submitted to it by motion or resolution or in the form of proposed by-laws or or- ders by any elector of the town for the oonsideration of the meeting. It also follows from such application of the rules of parliamentary law that the chairman of the meeting cannot prevent action upon any subject within the power conferred upon the meeting by neglecting or refusing to present the same to the meeting for its action." ' It has also been said, however, that " the technical rules of a legislative body, framed for its own convenient action and government, are not of binding force on towns unless such rules have been so acted upon and enforced by the town in their regular meetings as to create a law for themselves and binding on the inhabit- ants." 2 §371. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — A school district meeting voted to dismiss an article in the war- rant and afterward passed a vote which was not germane to any article except the one dismissed. For that and another reason the court held the vote to be invalid.' A motion was put to vote and rejected. Afterwards an amendment was 46 N, H. 411; and, for a relaxation Met. 454, 457 — not a very perspicu- of the rule where the town has ac- ous statement. See, also, § 296, su- quired property in pursuance of de- pro. f ective votes, Greenbanks v. Bout- ' On this point the court remarked well (1870), 43 Vt 207. that "no attempt appears to have 1 Per Lyon, J., State v. Davidson been made to reconsider the vote dis- (1873), 32 Wis. 114 missing the . . . article," Hol- 2 Hunneman v. Grafton (1845), 10 brook v. Faulkner (1875), 55 N.' H. 366 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 372. passed, but the original resolution was not again submitted to the meeting. It was adjudged that it could not be amended without a reconsideration and therefore there was no .vote.' Although in strict parliamentary law the acceptance of the re- port of a committee will not be an affirmance by the constitu- ent body of the matters contained in it, yet when a matter is referred to a recognized permanent department of a municipal corporation, like selectmen, with authority to take or propose some definite action on the subjegt, and they make a report accordingly without suggesting any separate vote or resolu- tion for more effectually carr^nng the measure into effect, a vote accepting the report has been deemed of itself an adop- tion and execution of the measure proposed.^ "Where there was a spontaneous adjournment of a meeting to the open air, without a vote, the,court in approving the proceeding invoked the maxim of parliamentary law that anything as to the mode of action may be done by unanimous consent.' § 372. Validity of votes as determined Iby the warrant — Illustrations. — The measure of exactness which the law re- quires in specifying the subject-matter in a warrant has already been discussed in general terms,* and is now reverted to for the purpose of showing a few illustrations of the well recognized rules. A liberal construction has always been given to the language of warrants so as to include all that is properly, even if incidentally, embraced in the subject to which they relate, and the articles they contain are mere abstracts or heads of the propositions to be laid before the in- habitants.' The question of granting money need not be dis- tinctly set forth if the subject-matter to be acted on be one 311. Cf. Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt 363, « Commonwealth v. Wentworth and George v. School Dist, 6 Met . (1887), 145 Mass. 50, 52. " These mu- 497, cited in § 366, infra. nicipal divisions of the State [school 1 Stuart V. Warren (1870), 37 Conn, districts] are created to work out 235, beneficial results to the people in ^Niles V. Patch (1859), 13 Gray, 254, education and other vital matters to 261. See, also, Hark v. Gladwell, 49 the well-being of the State, and their Wis. 172. acts should- not be too sharply criti- 3 Brown v. Winterport (1887), 79 cised." Hubbard v. Newton (1880), Me. 305, 311. 52 Vt 846. 4« I 351, 352, supra. § 373.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 367 ■which is likely to require an appropriation.' Thus, a tax may be voted under an article " to see what method the district will take to pay the expense " of a school." And an article " to see what measures the town will take to build " a bridge, " or any matters and things relating thereto," will authorize the raising of money for that purpose.^ A tax may be laid under a warrant " to take into consideration the expediency of rais- ing money for the use of schools." * And a warrant " to see if the town would make an appropriation towards purchasing a fire engine" is sufficient authority for a vote " to raise and appropriate " a sum for that purpose.' Under a warrant to raise money by a tax the town may instruct the collector to pay it to the selectmen although it is the usual course to pay it to the town treasurer.* § 373. The same subject continued. — A public act author- izing town aid to railroads need not be noticed in the war- rant to see if the town will vote such aid.' So, also, "to see if the town will vote to subscribe for and hold shares in the capital stock of" the road; " to see if the town will vote to become an associate for the formation of the" road; and "to see what action the town will take in regard to raising money to aid in building" the road, will support a vote authorizing a committee to borrow money and give notes and bonds there- for.' On the other hand, if a public act conferring authority is referred to by title, page and chapter, its provisions need not be recited.' And a subscription for stock is within the scope of the warrant " to see if the town will loan its credit to aid in the construction of the railroad." '" An agent to build a road may be appointed under a warrant " to choose 1 Blackburn v. "Walpole (1839), 9 not have laid a tax for that purpose. Pick. 97. Torrey v. Millbury (1838), 31 Pick. 64. 2 Chandler v. Bradish (1851), 33 Vt. « Alger v. Curry (1868), 40 Vt. 487. 416. ' Canton v. Smith (1876), 65 Me. 203. ' Ford V. Clough (1833), 8 Me. 834. 8 Kittredge v. North Brookfield * Bartlett v. Kinsley (1843), 15 Conn. (1885), 1 38 Mass. 386. 837. 9 Child u. Colburn (1878), 54 N. H. * But if the warrant had been to 71. See, also, Birge v. Berlin Iron see if the town would appropriate to Bridge Co. (1891), 16 N. Y. Supl. 596. a specific object money already in W Belfast v. Brooks (1873), 60 Me. -the treasury, it seems the town could 568. 368 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 374. all necessary town oiScers." ^ Where a warrant was to see if the town will raise money to pay the bounty " promised " to soldiers, a vote to pay the bounty " offered " to soldiers follows the warning.^ A town may vote to unite two existing districts under an article of the warrant " to see if the town will alter the boundaries of any of the school districts." ' In a warning to act upon the acceptance of a town way a gen- eral description of the way is sufBcient.* A vote to purchase land for a school-house is sustained by an article of the war- rant " to see what measures the district wiU take in relation to building a school-house." ° Many other cases where votes have been tested by the warrant and declared valid are cited in the note.* § 374. Invalidity of votes — Illustrations. — The subject- matter being plainly referred to may properly include author- 1 He is not strictly a town officer. Baker v. Shephard (1851), 24 N. H. 208. 2Blodgett V. Holbrook (1868), 39 Vt 336. 3 Converse v. Porter (1864), 45 N. H. 385. < State V. Beeman (1853), 35 Me. 243. s Dix V. School Dist. (1850), 33 Vt. 309. 6 Brown v. Winterport (1887), 79 Me. 305; Davenport v. Hallowell (1833), 10 Me. 317; Drisko v. Co- lumbia (1883), 75 Me. 73; Sawyer v. Manchester &c. R. Co., 63 N. H. 135 ; Tucker v. Aiken (1834), 7 N. H. 113; Moore v. Beattie (1860), 33 Vt 219 ; Hubbard v. Newton (1880), 53 Vt 346; Weeks v. Batchelder (1868), 41 Vt 317; Ovitt v. Chase (1869), 37 Vt 196; Hickok v. Shelburne (1868), 41 Vt 409 ; Kittredge u Walden (1867), 40 Vt 311 ; Hunneman v. Fire Dis- trict (1864), 37 Vt 40; HaU v. School Dist (1873), 46 Vt 19; Common- wealth V. Wentworth (1887), 145 Mass; 50, 52; Matthews v. West- borough (1881), 131 Mass. 531 ; s. a, 134 Mass. 555; Westhampton v. Searle (1879), 127 Mass. 503; Reed v. Acton (1875), 117 Mass. 384; Whit- ney v. Stow (1873), 111 Mass. 368; Sherman v. Torrey (1868), 99 Mass. 473; Groveru Pembroke (1865), 11 Allen, 88; Kidout v. School Dist (1861), 1 Allen, 233; Fuller v. Groton (1858), 11 Gray, 340; Hadsell v. Han- cock (1855), 3 Gray, 526; Avery w Stewart (1848), 1 Cush. 496; Kings- bury V. School Dist (1846), 13 Met 99; Hanover v. Lowell (1842), 5 Met 35; Williams v. School Dist (1838), 21 Pick. 75 ; Blackburn v. Walpole, 9 Pick. 97; Seabury v. Howland (1887), 15 R. I. 446; South School Dist V. Blakeslee (1839), 13 Conn. 227 ; People 17. Board of Education (1888), 1 N. Y. SupL 593 ; Zabriskie v. Trust- ees (1889), 52 N. J. Law, 104; Briggs V. Borden (1888), 71 Mich. 87; s. C, 38N. W. Rep. 712; Mason v. Ken- nedy (Mo.), 14 S. W. Rep. 514; Will-, iamstown School Dist v. Webb (1889), 89 Ky. 364 ; s. C, 12 S. W. Rep. 298 ; Reynolds Land & Cattle Ca v. Mc- Cabe (1888), 73 Tex. 57; People v. Sisson, 98 111. 335. § 375.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 369 ity to act upon minute specifications and particulars included and necessarily involved in it, which need not be in pairticnlar terms enumerated.' But when the main proposition is nar- row and restrictive it cannot be extended. Thus, where a town meeting voted to dispense with an article in the war- rant providing for bounties to men who were drafted between certain dates and voted a bounty to all, in pursuance of an- other article, it was held that a subsequent meeting called to see if the town would ratify " the vote or article " of the pre- vious meeting to pay a bounty to those described in the re- jected article could not legally appropriate money for any except those persons.^ The method as well as the object of raising money is a matter of substantial interest to the tax- payers, and a vote to borrow money cannot be founded on a proposition to levy a tax.' Sweeping clauses, such as " to do other town business," are entirely nugatory and do not ex- tend the scope of the specifications preceding them.* § 375. The same subject continned. — A meeting warned to consider "the question of raising money," etc., "for school purposes for the ensuing ypar," cannot vote money for the purpose of building a high school building.' An article, " to see if said town will accept and adopt the report of the com- mittee to alter school districts," authorizes such alterations as the committee recommend and no others.* It seems that a meeting called " to take action with regard to rescinding the doings " of a former illegal meeting cannot vote to ratify.' An article in the warrant "to see if the town will vote to pay the same bounty to those who may enlist," etc., " as is now 'Pittsburg V. Danforth (1875), 56 (1864), 33 Conn. 47; Hupt v. School N. H. 271. If the warning has been Dist. (1842), 14 Vt 300 ; Child v. Col- recorded a copy of the record is the burn (1878), 54 N. H. 71. Although usual evidence. The original need a meeting be duly warned for some not be produced. Commonwealth v. purposes, if a vote is had upon some Shaw (1843), 7 Met 53. subject not specified in the warning, 2 Pittsburg V. Danforth, (1875), 56 as to that vote the meeting is void. N. a 371. Pinney v. Brown (1891), 60 Conn. 164. 3 Blush V. Colchester (1867), 39 Vt. » Allen v. Burlington (1873), 45 Vt. 193 ; Atwood v. Lincoln (1872), 44 Vt 203. 833. « Wyley v. Wilson (1873), 44 Vt 404. 4 Hayden w. Noyes (1834), 5 Conn. f Wright v. North School Dist 391 ; Baldwin v. North Branford (1885), 53 Conn. 570. 34 370 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 376. paid to those who enlisted," etc., does not authorize a vote to pay a larger bounty.' A school district meeting Avas called " for thei purpose of obtaining information with regard to the recent assessments upon the property of the district." At the meeting a vote was passed appointing a committee to make the investigation, with power to employ counsel. It was held that the district was not liable for the services of counsel who instituted legal proceedings."'' Q^her cases where the doings of meetings have been pronounced* to be extraneous to the purposes specified in the warrant, and therefore invalid, are cited in the note.' § 376. Totes at town meeting — General rules of con- struction. — Votes upon questions pending in town meetings may be given in any recognized manner in the absence of spe- cific requirements and need not be by ballot.* Nor do the courts expect or demand a scrupulous observance of the most approved formalities. If th? proceedings are in substance what they should be and intelligible it would be mischievous to set them aside for the want of technical precision. A lib- eral and favorable construction prevails, especially when no one is injured by it or deprived of any right.* Thus, instru- ments not under seal executed in pursuance of a vote directing •Austin V. York (1869), 57 Me. 304. town meeting abolish all school dis- 2 Wright V. North School Dist tricts therein, a town divided into (1885), 53 Conn. 576. voting districts cannot legally vote in ' Cornish V. Pease (1841) 19 Me. 184 ; district meetings on the question Allen V. Burlington (1873) 45 Vt 202 ; of abolishing school districta. Com- EoUins V. Chester 1866), 46 N. H. stock v. School Committee (R. I., 411 ; Wood V. Quincy (1853), 11 Gush. 1891), 34 Atl. Rep. 145. 487; Wilson r. Waltersville School 'Soper r. Livermore(1848), 28 Me. Dist, (1876), 44 Conn. 157; Bramwell 193; Kellar v. Savage (1840), 17 Me. V. Guheen (Idaho, 1893), 39 Pao. Rep. .444. "All that is necessary in respect 110. to the manner in which the purpose < Where a constitution required of a town in raisi&g monef shall bo that all elections by the people should expressed in the vflte is that the vote be by ballot it was held that the should indicate in general terms the meetings of district townships were purpose or object for which the- not designed to be elections within money is raised, and if that purpose the meaning of the term, no judges or object is such as comes within the of election being provided for, eta scope of the powers of the town it is Seaman v. Baughman (Iowa, 1891), sufficient" Blodgett v. Holbrpok 47 N. W. Rep. 1091. Under a statute (1866), 39 Vt 336. providing that any town may at a § 377.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 371 an issue of "bonds" were held to be valid obligations,' and- a vote to pay a certain bounty " to each drafted man who may be accepted by the board of enrollment" is not void for uncer- tainty as being applicable to all drafted men wherever they may belong, but only refers to the men drafted to fill the quota of the town.* The same rule that applies in construing a statute under the constitution is applied in construing the votes and acts of towns under a law of the State, and if the valid parts of a vote are separable from those that are void, they will be sustained.' § 377. Record of proceedings. — ^Where the statute requires that a vote shall be passed by two-thirds of the voters pres- ent, a record of a meeting which states that it was " voted," etc., is not sufficient unless it shows that it was carried by two-thirds.* And where a record that a meeting is " duly or legally notified" is raSiAe prima facie sufiBcient by statute, a record simply stating that the meeting was held " according to notice " is defective." A record of a vote passed " in legal meeting assembled " is not proof that the meeting was spe- cially warned for that purpose.' A town was empowered by special act to guaranty a certain amount of the bonds of a railroad company provided the vote should be passed by bal- ' Lane v. Emden (1881), 73 Me. 354 does not cure it If, however, he had 2 Baldwin v. North Branf ord (1864), stated it as a fact, the record could 33 Conn. 47. A description of a school not be contradicted by parol testi- district as "all the territory between" mony, but he might be liable for two given lines is not necessarily de- fraudulent conduct in his office, fectiva Allen v. Archer (1860), 49 Judd v. Thompson (1878), 125 Mass. Me. 346. See, also, Avery v. Stewart 553. (1848), 1 Cush. 496. » Seabnry v. Howland (1887), 15 R. 'Barbour v. Camden (1865), 51 Me. 1 446. It was held that a record is 608 ; Upton v. Stoddard (1866), 47 N. not objectionable because it omits H. 167. to state the hour the meeting was < The maxim omnia prcBSumuntur held when it describes the meeting rite, etc, does not apply. Portland as that which was notified and the &c. R. Co. V. Standish (1875), 65 Me. notice appoints the hour. Howland 63 ; Andrews v. Boylston (1872), 110 v. School Dist, (1885), 15 R. 1 184. Mass. 214. {Of. Attorney-General v. ^WUIard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. Crocker (1885), 138 Mass. 214, 215.) 253. See Isbell v. New York &c. R An amendment by the clerk stating Co. (1857), 25 Conn. 556, for a suflB- that " to the best of my recollection " cient record in such a case, the vote was passed by two-thirds 372 MEE'nNGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 378. lot at a meeting called for that purpose. The record of a meeting showed that it was warned to vote by ballot on the subject and that the vote in question was " passed." The vote was not, in fact, passed by ballot but by a division of the house, and the record was subsequently amended by order of the court. In the meanwhile the company, on the strength of the vote, had expended money and made contracts for the delivery of the bonds. The court held that the town was estopped from insisting on the invalidity of the vote.^ § 378. Parol evidence of proceedings. — The ofiBcial record is the proper evidence of the doings of the meeting, and it is not open to contradiction, enlargement or explanation by parol. This general rule applies to the records of towns, parishes, school districts and all similar organizations.^ But 1 New Hav^n &c. E. Co. v. Chat- ham (1875), 42 Conn. 465. Cf. Brook- lyn Trust Co. V. Hebron (1883), 51 Conn. 22. 'Halleck v. Boylston (1875), 117 Mass. 469; Andrews v. Boylston (1872), 110 Mass. 215; Wood v. Sim- ons, 110 Mass. 116 ; Adams v. Pratt, 109 Mass. 59; Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen, 129; Third School Dist V. Atherton, 12 Met. 105 ; Saxton v. Nimms, 14 Mass. 315; Manning v. Fifth Parish, 6 Pick, fi; Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. 297; Pickering v. Pickering (1840), 11 N. H. 141, 144; Jordan v. School Dist (1854), 38 Ma 164; Moor v. Newfield (1826), 4 Me. 44 Parol evidence cannot be admitted to show that a vote was passed which the record does not show. Orford v. Benton (1858), 36 N. H. 395, 403 ; Harris v. School Dist (1853), 28 N. H. 58, 60. Nor is evi- dence admissible of what the voters intended to do or supposed they had done. Adams v. Crowell (1867), 40 Vt 31, 34; Cameron v. School Dist (1869), 42 Vt 507. The record of a school district showed that "it was voted that the district build a new school-house: 16 for and 11 against it." Evidence that seven who voted in the afSrmative were not legal voters in the district was properly re- jected in replevin for property taken by the tax collector. "The records of the proceedings of municipal pub- lic corporations cannot be collat- erally attacked and overthrown by evidence of this character." Eddy V. Wilson (1871), 43 Vt 362. Cf. Davis V. School Dist (1861), 43 N. H. 381, where counsel claimed to ap- pear for a school district defendant under authority of a vote of the dis- trict The plaintiff offered evidence that at a subsequent meeting the authority was revoked. The court admitted evidence that the vote of revocation was passed by illegal votes. These cases may perhaps be reconciled on the ground that in the former the question arose between strangers to the proceedings, while in the latter the dispute was between the parties. Where, according to the usual course of proceeding, the war- rant is either recorded or preserved in the oflSce of the town clerk, it can- not be proved by parol unless a sufiB- §§ 3Y9, 380.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 373 in an action against a town to recover a sum voted to the plaintiff for injuries received by him while in the employ of the town, parol evidence was admitted to show that the amount voted was a mere gratuity and not supported by any claim of legal liability against the town.' § 379. Doings of meetings not legally called. — Where a meeting is not legally warned, all the officers that are chosen hold their offices without authority of law, and a vote to raise money is not binding upon the inhabitants and cannot be the proper and legal foundation for the assessment of any tax.' A person elected at such a meeting, though sworn into office, can draw from that election no justification for acts done under color of the office.' But his acts would be valid and binding to the extent of the rule which applies to the doings of officers d& facto.* "No one can rely upon a vote of a town as giving him any rights against the town without proving a sufficient notice or warning of the meeting at which it was passed," * and an indictment against a person for illegal voting at a town meetidg cannot be sustained unless the meeting was legally warned.' §380. Presumption in favor of ancient meetings. — No presumption is indulged in favor of the essential regularity of cient reason is shown fornotproduo- < School Dist v. Lord (1857), 44 Me. ing the original or a certified copy. 374. Brunswick v. McKean (1827), 4 Me. » Per Justice Gray In Bloomfleld v. 508. But it is not in the power of Charter Oak Bank (1887), 131 U. S. a clerk to destroy the effect of the 121. A contract made with a school action of a meeting by failing or re- district by a member thereof at a fusing to record the proper papers to meeting not legally warned is bind- show that the meeting was regularly ing upon neither party. School Dist called and notified so long as clear v. Atherton (1846), 12 Met 105. proof of those facts can be made estate v. Williams (1846), 25 Me. aliunde. Marble v. McKenney (1873), 561. But after a decree of foreclos- 60 Me. 333. ure in favor of a town, a vote at a • Matthews v. Westborough, 134 meeting not warned for that pur- Mass. 555. pose extending the period of redemp- 2 Osgood V. Blake (1850), 31 N. H. tion is su£Scient in equity to prevent ' 651, 564 ; Grafton Bank v. Kimball the decree from becoming absolute ■ (1849), 20 N. H. 107. upon the day named. Daggett v. • » Bearce v. Fossett (1852), 34 Me. Mendon (Vt, 1893), 24 Atl. Rep. 243. 575. 374r MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 381. recent proceedings of town meetings.* But it i? otherwise wliere from lapse of time there is a probability that the offi- cers who made the record are no longer living, or have lost a recollection of the facts so that no amendment can be made, or where it is proved that such officers have deceased so that the records cannot be corrected.^ After the lapse of thirty years it was held that a jury might presume that a warrant for a town meeting which was shown to have been properly posted remained posted during the time required by law.' The records of the proprietors of a town purporting to have been made in 1728 contained the proceedings of a meeting held at that time. It did not appear that there was any no- tice for the meeting, nor did the records appear to be attested by any clerk or recording officer, but they were produced by the town clerk, who testified that he received them from his predecessor in office together with the other records of the town. They were held to be competent evidence to be sub- mitted to a jury as to the doings of the meeting.* § 381. Notice of election.— Where both the time and place of a general election are fixed by law the requirement of no- tice is directory, and the election is not vitiated by the failure 1 Bloomfleld v. Charter Oak Bank borough v. Lancaster (1843), 14 N. H. (1887), 131 U. S. 131 ; Cavis v. Robert- 383 (thirty-eight years sufficient), son (1838), 9 N. H. 534, overruling a " It does not appear that the offl- Bishop V. Cone, 3 N. H. 515. cers who made the record are dead, 2 Cavis V. Robertson, 9 N. H. 524 ; but it is a fair presumption that they Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168. It was have loss recollection of the fact," said in those cases that under such etc. Schoflf v. Gould (1872), 53 N. H. circumstances it may be submitted 513, and cases there cited. " It is not to a jury to presume from a defect- to be presumed that the meeting is ive record of the election of a town not both legal and regular because officer and from his having acted there is now no record showing that under the appointment that the meet- it was so." Willey v. Portsmouth ing was duly held, the proceedings (1857), 35 N. H. 303, 309. See, also, of the town regular and the officer School Dist. v. Bragdon (1851), 33 duly sworn ; but this cannot be done N. H. 507, 514 wliere the proceedings are recent and * Adams v. Stanyan (1853), 24 N. H. no reason is shown why the record 405, citing as to want of attestation, cannot be amended if the truth will Sumner v. Lebec, 3 GreenL (Ma) 223. warrant it Brownell v. Palmer, 33 The record of the choice of a person Conn. 107 (twenty -five years suffl- as hog-reeve and field driver and cient) ; State v. Taf t, 37 Conn. 93 proof of his service as such for one , (fifteen years too short a time) ; Peter- year suffices for the presumption in § 381.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 375 of the authorities to make the publication.^ But in the case of special elections when either the time or place is not prescribed by law, the provision for notice is mandatory * when notice is necessary. An election called by an unauthorized person is void. It has no greater validity than the unauthorized action of a mass meeting would have.' But where notice.is to be given by a board, a notice signed by the clerk in which it appears that the election was ordered by the board is suificient.* Where the statute confers upon the mayor of a city the power of pro- claiming an election, it may be exercised in the mayor's ab- sence by one whom the charter vests with the powers of mayoralty in such a contingency," and the service of notice by an officer de facto will not affect the validity of the election.* question. Northwood v. Barrington 1838), 9 N. H. 369 (forty years). 1 Smith V. Crutcher (Ky., 1893), 18 S. W. Eep. 521 ; Paine on Elections, § 384, citing Carson -o. McPhetridge, 15 Ind. 337; Light v. State, 14 Kan. 489; People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350; People V. Porter, 6 Cal. 26 ; People v. Weller, 6 Cal. 49 ;"People v. Brenhanir 3 Cal. 477; Cooley's Const. Lim. 759; Bickey v. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 843 ; State V. Jones, 19 Ind. 421 ; s. C, 81 Am. Dec. 408 ; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; S. G, 86 Am. Dec. 70; City of Lafayette v. State, 29 Ind. 318 ; Dishon V. Smith, 10 Iowa, 313; Jones v. Gridley, 2 Kan. 584 ; State v. Orvis, 30 Wis. 235 ; State v. Goetz, 33 Wis. 368 ; People V. Martin, 12 Cal. 409 ; People V. Boseborough, 1.4 CaL 180. See, also. Commonwealth v. Smith, 132 Mass. 389; State v. Skirving, 19 Neb. 497. As to notice of vacancies to be filled at a regular election, see Peo- ple V. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350 ; People v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; s. C, 70 Am. Dec. 754; People v. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616; Beal V. Ray, 17 Ind. 550 ; Bolton v. Good, 41 N. J. L. 296 ; People v. Eos- borough, 29 Cal. 415 ; People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26 ; People v. Martin, 13 Cal. 409 ; Foster v. Scarfi, 15 Ohio St. 532. a United States v. McKelden (1879), MacArthur & Mackay, 162; Morgan V. Gloucester City, 44 N. J. L. 187; Kenfleld v. Irwin, 52 Cal. 104; Hub- bard V. Williamstown, 61 Wis. 397 ; People V. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616 ; Had- dox 13. Clarke County, 79 Va. 677. Unless an election is fixed by law there must be some notice though none is required by the statute. Mo- Pike u Pen (1872), 51 Mo. 63. 8 Force v. Batavia (1871), 61 111. 99. < Smith V. Board County Comm'rs (1891), 45 Fed. Eep. 725. See, also, Will- iams V. People (1890), 132 111. 574, and §351, supra An error in the procla- mation must, in order to invalidate the election, appear from proofs or by necessary intendment to have so affected the election as to have changed the result On this point the court will not indulge m specula- tion or mere conjecture. In re Peti- tion of Cleveland, 51 N. J. Law, 319 ; S.-C., 52 N. J. Law, 188; 80 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 230. See, also, San Luis County v. White (1890), 91 Cal. 483. where the clerk affixed a scroll to the proclamation instead of a seal required by statute. s/n re Petition of Cleveland, 51 N. J. Law, 819; s. G, 52 N. J. Law, 188; 80 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 280. 6 Bird V. Merrick, L. & E. 115. 376 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 382. § 382. Qualifications of Toters — Power to prescribe.— The qualifications of voters are fixed by the constitutions or stat- utes of the States, and the right of each State to define the qualifications of its voters is complete and perfect, except so far as it is controlled by the fifteenth article of the amend- ments to the constitution of the United States, which provides that " the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, «r previous condition of servi- tude." ' But it is not competent for the legislature to add a substantive qualification to those prescribed by the constitu- tion, unless that instrument confers the power in express terms or by necessary implication.'* Thus, where the consti- tution requires residence in the State for a certain period, a statute which requires residence in the ward, city or town- ship is void.' And a provision in a village charter limiting the right to vote to those who have resided within the village for twenty days immediately preceding the election conflicts with a constitution prescribing residence for no definite period.* J Blair v. Eidgely, 41 Mo. 63 ; S. C, 97 Am. Deo. 248 ; Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 ; United States v. Cruik- shank, 92 U. S. 542 ; Minor v. Hap- perselt, 21 Wall. 162; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497; S. C, 59 Am. Eep. 105 ; Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43 ; s. C, 13 Am. Eep. 136 ; Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St 122 ; Rid- ley V. Sherbrook, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 509 ; United States v. Anthony, 11 Blatch. (U. S. C. C.) 200 ; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 233. The State may also regulate nominating conveintions and caucuses. ; Leonard v. . Common- wealth, 113 Pa. St. 607 ; In re House Bill, 9 Colo. 634. 2 Page V. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 648 ; Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485 ; s. C, 9 Am. Rep. 764; Rison v. Farr, 34 Ark. 161; s. C, 87 Am. Deo. 53; Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189 ; Clay- ton n Harris, 7 Nev. 64; State v. Symouds, 57 He. 148 ; State v. Con- ner, 22 Neb. 265 ; s. C, 3 Am. St Repk 367; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass._ 497; s. c, 59 Am. Rep. 105 ; St Joseph &a R. Co. V, Buchanan County Coiirt, 39 Mo. 485 ; Barker v. People, 3 Cowen, 686 ; s. c, 15 Am. Dec. 322 ; People V. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; 21 Am. Rep. 465 ; White v. Comm'r, 13 Ore- gon, 317; s. c, 57 Am. Rep. 20, note Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St 665 Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St 546 S. C, 54 Am. Rep. 833; State v. Con- Btantine, 43 Ohio St 437; s. c, 51 Am. Rep. 833 ; State v. Tuttle, 53 Wis. 45 ; State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71 ; State V. Williams, 5 Wis. 308 ; Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369 ; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 233; United States v. Slater, 4 Woods (U. S. C. C), 356; Randolph x\ Good, 3 West Va. 551 ; McCaflferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. St 109. ' Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485 ; S. C, 9 Am. Rep. 754. . «State V. Tuttie, 53 Wi8.45. See, § 383.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 377 An act which restricts the right to vote to taxable inhabitants is repugnant to a constitution which is silent respecting prop- erty qualification.^ § 383. Eegistration acts. — It is held by the decided weight of authority that when the constitution is silent on the sub- ject of registration it is competent for the legislature to re- quire voters to be registered a reasonable time before the election, or to be debarred of the right to vote.^ " The true rule is that whenever a registration is ordered it should give the voters an opportunity as near the day of election as prac- ticable for qualifying themselves as electors. All the authori- ties agree in holding that if the length of time between the closing of the registration and the election is unreasonable, the election should be held void." ' Accordingly a law which also, People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 465 ; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497. 1 St. Joseph &c. E. Co. v. Buchanan County Court, 39 Mo. 485. Of. Mc- Mahon v. Mayor &c., 66 Ga. 217 ; S. C, 42 Am. Rep. 65 ; Buckner v. Gordon, 81 Ky. 665. 2Capen v. i'oster, 13 Pick. 485; S. C 23 Am. Dec. 633 ; Hyde v. Brush, 34 Conn. 454 ; People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 343 ; Edmunds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa, 267; S. C, 4 Am. Rep. 177; People V. Laine, 33 Cal. 55 ; Webster V. Byrnes, 34 Cal. 273 ; Byler v. Asher, 47 ni. 101 ; People v. Wilson, 63 N. Y. 188; Davis v. School Dist, 44 N. H. 398 ; Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. St. 54; Auld v. Walton, 12 La. Ann. 129; Harris v. Whitcomb, 4 Gray, 433; Smith n City of Wilmington, 98 N. C. 343 ; Sutherland v. Goldsborough, 98 N. C. 49; S. C, 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 393 ; Duke v. Brown, 98 N. C. 123; McDowell v. Construction Co., 98 N. C. 514; Woods v. Oxford, 97 N. C. 237 ; State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71 ; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St 6d5 ; Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548 ; S. a, 54 Am. Rep. 833; State v. Butts (1884), 31 Kan. 537; In re Polling Lists, 13 R. 1 729; People v. Hoff- man, 116 111. 587 ; S. c, 56 Am. Rep. 793 ; Stephens v. Mayor (1890), 84 Ga, 630 ; s. c, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 383; State v. Conner, 33 Neb. 265; S. C., 3 Am. St Rep. 267 ; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453; McMahon v. Mayor, 66 Ga. 217 ; S. C, 42 Am. Rep. 65; People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; Commonwealth v. McClelland, 83 Ky. 686. See, also, Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497 ; S. c, 59 Am. Rep. 105 ; Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 756 et seq.; McCrary on Elections, § 95 et seq.; Paine on Elections, § 840 et seq.; Mechem on Public OfiSces and Offi- cers, § 149. Contra, Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St 338; Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555 ; White v. Comra'rs, 13 Ore- gon, 817 ; 54 Am. Rep. 832, note ; 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 485. State v. Conner (1887), 33 Neb. 265, holds that the voter cannot be deprived of the right to register at any time before the closing of the polls. » Stephens v. Mayor (1890), 84 Ga. 630 ; s. c, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 282. Laws regulating the exercise of the right of suffrage must be rea- 378 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS, [§ 384. allowed only seven days in the year for voters to register was declared to be subversive of constitutional right and therefore void.' And a statute providing that no person thereafter nat- uralized should be entitled to be registered within thirty days after such naturalization was open to the same objection,* but an act fixing three weeks before the election, for the comple- tion of the registry was sustained.' § 384. Place of election. — "Wibere a statute incorporating a municipality enumerates the ofiicers to be chosen and pre- scribes the qualifications of voters, but does not designate any polling place, the voters have the implied right to supply the oniission.* But if elections are required by law to be held at fixed times and places these cannot be changed except by direct legislative authority.'. Time "and place are of the, substance of every election, and statutory provisions by which they are definitely fixed are mandatory and must be obeyed.* Where the polls were opened a,t a distance of three miles from the place appointed without any just excuse the election was void.' Chief Justice Thompson, of the Supreme Court of Penn- sylvania, expounded the law in point as follows : — " I will not Bouable, uniform and impartial, and has been duly registered he continues must be calculated to facilitate and' to have the right to vote until he loses secure rather than to subvert or im- or is dispossessed of it according to pede the exercise of the right to vote. law. Where the mayor and aldermen Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548 ; without authority ordered a new reg- Monroe v, Collins, 17 Ohio St. 666, istration, the election was void. 687. Smith v. City of Wilmington, 98 N. C. 1 Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St 348. 548 ; S. C, 54 Am. Rep. 832. * State v. Burbridge (1888), 34 Fla. 2Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497; 113. s. c, 59 Am. Rep. 105. This was be- ^Oity Council v. Youmans (1890), cause the regulation was not uniform 85 Ga. 708, 713. and impartial. SMcCrary on Elections (3d ed.), 3 People V. Hoffman, 116 111. 587 ; § 141 ; Paine on Elections, § 337. S. C, 56 Am, Eep. 793. And ten days 'Heyfron v. Mahoney (1890), 9 was held reasonabla State v. Butts, Mont 497 ; Knowles v. Yates, 31 CaL 81 Kan. 537. For unreasonable regis- 93. See, also. Commonwealth v. tration laws, see City of Owensborov. County Conim'i-s, 5 Eawie (Pa.), 75 ; Hickman (Ky.), 14 S. W. Rep. 688 ; Juker v. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. St Morris v. Powell, 135 Ind. 381 ; S. C, 484 ; Miller v. English, 31 N. J. Law, 35 N. E. Rep. 231 : Stephens v. Mayor, 817 ; Ex parte Robinson, 3 Pugsley, 84 Ga. 680. When an eligible person 389. § 385.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 379 say that in case of the destruction of a designated building on th6 eve of an election, the election might not be held on the same or contiguous ground as a matter of necessity — neoes- sitas non hdbet legem. But then the necessity must be abso- lute, discarding all mere ideas of convenience. ... To move the place of an election three miles from that designated by law or to a place more than half a mile distant therefrom without authority or any absolute controlling circumstances must render the election therein void." ' But the circum- stances which do not affect the result when the place desig- nated has been changed are shown in another case where the polls were opened a short distance from and in plain view of the place appointed, the owner of the house selected haying objected to the use of it for that purpose, and no voter being misled or deprived of his vote. The court held that the elec- tion was legal.* § 385. The same subject continned. — A statute provided that " whenever it shall become impossible or inconvenient to hold a town meeting at the place designated therefor, the town board of inspectors, after having assembled at or as near as practicable to such p]ace and opened the meeting and be- fore receiving any votes, may adjourn such meeting to the nearest convenient place for holding the same." They were also required to make proclamation of the adjournment and to station a proper person at the door to notify electors as they arrived. Polls were to be opened at town meetings at 9 o'clock. The record showed that a meeting was legally called, and upon motion it was voted to adjourn to a certain place where the board met pursuant to the adjournment and c ailed the meeting to order at 9 o'clock. The court held that the law would presume the first meeting to have been ppened only a few minutes before 9 ; that whether the place was im- possible or inconvenient and whether the adjourned meeting was held at the nearest and most convenient place were mat- ters solely for the judgment of the board ; and that a failure to make proclamation or to station any one at the door to give notice would not avoid" the election unless there was aflBrma- 1 Melvin's Case, 68 Pa. St. 338. 61 Miss. 556 ; Farrington u Turner, 2 Preston v. Culbertson, .58 Cal. 209 ; 53 Mich. 27 ; Wakefield v, Patterson, in quattuorpedibua, Dale v. Irwin, 78 25 Kan. 709. ID. 180. See, also, State v. Calhoun, 380 MEETINGS AOTJ ELBC3TI0NS. [§§ 386, 387. tive proof that the electors were thereby kept from the meet- ing.* The neglect to close the polls at the prescribed time is not a fatal irregularity if the result of the election is not af- fected.^ And an election was pronounced valid where the closing of the polls was one hour premature, no elector being thereby deprived of his right.' § 386. Popular elections — Plurality. — " It is the theory and general practice of our government that the candidate who has but a minority of the legal votes cast does not be- come a duly elected officer. But it is also the theory and practice of our government that a minority of the whole body of qualified electors may elect to an office, when a majority of that body refuse or decline to vote for any one for that office. Those of them who are absent from the polls in theory and practical result are assumed to assent to the ac- tion of those who go to the polls." * Furthermore, it is not necessary that a candidate for office shall have an absolute majority of all the votes cast at a popular election. " At an ellectiori, by common law, it is only necessary that there should be a majority for one candidate over every other [any other] candidate. There may be as many candidates as there are electors, l6ss one, and the votes of two would carry the election, however numerous the electors, if all the others voted for separate candidates, and the vote of one would be a law- ful election if no other elector voted.* § 387. The same subject continued — Majorities^ etc. — The following expressions in statutory or constitutional provisions as to an election have been held to mean a majority, two-thirds 1 Wisconsin Cent R. Co. v. Ashland pressed will of the majority of those County (Wis., 1891), 50 N. W. Rep. voting, unless the law providing for 937. the election otherwise declares. Any 2 Holland v. Davies, 36 Ark. 446 ; other rule would be pi-oductive of tho Knox County v. Davis, 63 IlL 405 ; greatest inconvenience, and ought Cleland v. Porter, 74 Hi 76. not to be adopted unless the legis- ' People V. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67. lative will to that effect is clearly * Per Folger, J., in People v. Clute, expressed." Cass County v. Johnston, 50 N. Y. 451, 461 ; Verbeck v. Scott, 95 U. S. 360, 369, per Waite, C. J. 71 Wis. 59; Rex v. Varlo, Cowp. 250; « Gosling v. Veley, 4 H. of L. Cas. Field V. Field, 9 Wend. 394. "All 679, 740 (1853), per Martin, Baron; qualified voters who absent them- Throop on Public Agents, § 189, cit- selves from an election duly called -ing Paine on Elections, §§ 173, 174; are presumed to assent to the ex- Naar on Elections, 147 ; • Cooley'a §'387.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 381 etc., as the case may be, of those actually voting, and not a ma- 'jority of all who might have voted: "a majority of such electr ors," ' " two-thirds of such qualified voters," ^ " wishes of a ma- jority of the members . . . expressed at a church election," ' " majority of the legal voters," * " two-thirds of the qualified voters of the township voting at such election," ° "three-fifths of the voters of said city," * " three-firths of the voters therein voting," ' " two-thirds of the qualified voters," ' " majority of the voters," * " majority of the legal voters." "• Const Lim. (Sth ed.) 779. See, also, State V. Green, 37 Ohio St. 237; People V. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451, 461 ; Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52 (1889) ; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 423 ; L. R A. 308. And especially Conrad i'. Stone (1889), 78 Mich. 635, 639, cited in § 156, supra, where the plurality rule was applied to elections by delinite bodies, and a fortiori that doctrine would govern in popular elections. State V. Wilmington (1840), 3 Harr. (Del.) 294, lays down a contraiy rule as the common law, but Harrington, J., dissented, "as it would seem, with reason," says Judge Dillon. Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 377, n. A dictum in State V. Fagau (1875), 43 Conn. 33, 35, is squarely opposed to the text The matter in issue was the validity of a (popular) school district election. The court said : — "Viewing the questions raised in this case to be determined, as we do, entirely by statute, it is quite unnecessary to consider what the rule of the common law may be as to- the effect of a plurality vote, or the necessity for a majority vote to make a valid election. Our govern- ment and our institutions rest on the principle that controlling power is vested in the majority. In the absence of any provision by law to the contrary, the will of any com- munity or association, body politic or corporate, is properly declared only by the voice of the majority. " » Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107 ; Bayard v. Klinge, 16 Minn. 249; Ev- erett V. Smith, 32 Minn. 53. 2 State V. Renick, 37 Mo. 270. See, also. State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450. ' Craig V. First Presbyt'n Church, 88 Penn. St 43. * St Joseph Twp. V. Rogers, 16 Wall 644. "■ Cass County v, Johnston, 95 U. S. 360. 6Yesler v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 308; s. c, 25 Pac Rep. 1014. ' Metcalfe v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 297 ; a C, 25 Pac. Rep. 1010; State v. Snodgrass, 1 Wash. 305 ; s. C 35 Pac. Rep. 1014. 8 Carroll County w Smith (1883), 111 IT. S. 556. Contra, State v. Sutter- field, 54 Mo. 391; Southerland u Goldsboro, 96 N. C. 49. " Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Davidson County Court 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 687 ; People V. Wiant 48 111. 363 ; People v. Warfleld, 20 111. 159; People v. Gar- ner, 47 111. 346, holding that the vote cast at a general election is prima facie evidence of the number of legal voters in the county ; Taylor v. Tay- lor, 10 Minn. 107, to the same point ; State V. Binder, 38 Mo. 450. Contra, People V. Brown, 11 III 478; "a vote of the majority of qualified voters therein," Chester &o. R. Co. v. Cald- well County, 72 N. C. 486. 1' Legal voter means a "qualified elector " who does in fact vote. San- t 382 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§§ 388, 389. § 388. Toting by ballot. — Where a statute provides that the election of certain ofBcers at a town meeting shall be by ballot if called for, this does not necessarily imply that they must be voted for each upon a separate and single ballot and in succession, one after another. It would be competent for the meeting to direct by vote properly taken that all the offi- cers to be elected, or a part of them as might be deemed ex- pedient, be voted for together on Ihe same ballot in a manner similar to that in which State and county officers are voted for. This would give each voter the right and opportunity to cast his vote for the very man of his choice for each office by making up his ballot with the names of such men. But this cannot be done where a ticket is nominated by a com- mittee and the voters are required to accept or reject the whole report. The privilege of voting for some of the nom- inees and against the rest, apd for somebody else in their stead — to scratch the ticket as 'the modern expression is — cannot be lawfully denied to the voter. And although the mode of voting on a ticket as an entirety may have been used without objection in previous meetings, it does not become binding upon any one. It is not a case for the loss of a right by non-user or acquiescence or the gaining of a right by ad- verse use.* § 389. The same subject cootinued. — At a village meet- ing a ballot was taken for moderator. Many were present besides lawful voters, who were mixed indiscriminately in the crowd and were participating in the excitement and uproar that characterized the scene. Tellers with hats made their way through the crowd, and it was impossible to know whether some voters, legal or illegal, did not deposit more ford V. Prentice, S8 Wis. 358. " Pro- the legislature shall have no power vided that a majority of," etc., " shall to remove a county seat, and that no be present . . . and shall vote," county seat shall be removed unless prevents action by less than a major- a majority of the electors vote for its ity of the whola Point Pleasant Land removal, the legislature may pro- Co. V. Trustees, 47 N. J. Law, 235 ; vide that there shall be no removal Quaid V. Trustees, 49 N. J. Law, 607. unless two-thir'ds of the electors vote See, also.an article by Irving Browne, for it Alexander v. People, 7 Cola Esq., on " What Constitutes a Major- 155. ity of Electors? " in 23 Alb. L. J. 44. > State v. Harris (1879), 52 Vt 216, Under a constitutional provision that 326, § 390.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 383 than a single vote, or that a single voter did not put a vote or votes into more than one hat. The court in condemning the proceedings said : — " However proper such a mode of vot- ing may be on some special occasions when the voters are few and are well known and reliable men, and the excitement of hostile interests is not operating to prompt to anything but fair and legal ^voting, and when it would at once be manifest if illegal votes should be cast, nothing that could be said upon the subject could make more palpable the gross impropriety of taking the vote as it was done in this case. It was but a burlesque and a mockery of all sensible and sober ideas of a ballot answerable to the lawful right of the citizen and to the soundness with which the exercise of that right is hallowed in the speech, at least,, of the demagogue, as well as of the in- genuous citizen. It is of no avail to say that it was diflBcult to take the vote in any other way. It would have been in point and cogent to answer that it better not have been taken at all than to be taken as it was. It is at the bottom of all honest and just ideas of a proper vote that some mode should be adopted by which it may be known by persons authorized to determine a questioned right to vote what persons offer to oast votes, or to vote by voice or by count, that the right of any such may be challenged and properly determined, and that in voting by ballot it may, with all practicable certainty, be known whether more votes have been cast than there are legal voters to cast them." ' § 390. The Australian ballot and cumnlative voting. — The Australian ballot system, as it is called, has been adopted by statute in many of the States.^ The main feature of this system is that each voter is provided with an official ballot. • State V. Harris (1879), 52 Vt 316, moderator who is illegally chosen 232. The court held that quo war- presides at a meeting, and a distinct ' ranto lies against a modei-ator elected and contemporaneous protest is made, by the vote of those who had no right' it is at least doubtful if the pro.ceed- to vote, and that where the statute ings are of any validity whatever. requires an election to be by ballot, See on this point, § 361, n. 6, supra. "if called for," it is the right of a ^por an enumeration of the States 'single voter to have a ballot upon and a citation of the legislative acts, his demand when heard and under- see Amer. Dig. Ann. 1891, p. 1417, stood by the presiding officer. If a § 66. 384 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 391. Upon this the names of the candidates are printed, and the use of any other paper as a ballot is forbidden. Bat blank spaces are left for the insertion of any names that may be desired. These statijtes are not in conflict with the constitutional re- quirement that " elections shall be free and equal," althougli the privilege of having ballots printed at the expense of the State is granted only when the number of those who support a particular ticket is equal to a certain percentage of the whole number of votes cast at a previous election.' An attempt has been made in Ohio and Michigan to provide for minority rep- resentation by statute in the absence of express constitutional authority, and in New York there has been legislation sanc- tioning cumulative voting in certain cases. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that every eledtor is entitled to vote for every candidate who is to be elected, and a law which denied the right to vote for more than two of the persons to be chosen was declared to be unconstitutional.' And this rule has been followed in Michigan.' The question has been twice before the Court of Appeals of New York, but that tribunal has found a way of disposing of the cases without passing upon the con- stitutionality of the law.* It is significant, however, that all the other States which have authorized such voting have sub- mitted it to the people for their adoption as part of their fun- damental law, and it is not likely that it can be successfully Introduced in any other way. § 391. Absolnte accuracy not required in a ballot. — Vot- ing is usually required to be by ballot, but that method is not imperative in the absence of such a requirement.* Voting by proxy is not permitted, but a ballot deposited by another in the voter's presence and at his request would not be rejected.* The names of the persons voted for should be expressed with ' be Walt V. Lackawanna County * People v. Crissey, 91 N. T. 616 ; (Pa., 1893), 24 Atl. Rep. 185 ; State v. People v. Kenney, 96 N. Y. 294. McMillan (Mo., 1891), 18 S. W. Rep. sMechem on Public Offices and 784, Officers, § 190. 2 State V. Constantine, 43 Ohio St ^ Opinion of Judges, 41 N. H. B51 ; 437. See, also. Hays v. Common- s. c, 11 Am. Law Reg, 743 ; People wealth, 83 Pa. St 518. v. Blodgett 13 Mich. 137; Clark v. ' Maynard v. Board of Canvassers Robinson, 88 IlL 498. (1889), 84 Mich. 238. § 391.J MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 385 reasonable certainty, but incorrect spelling will not vitiate a ballot if the name is idem sonans. The rule was recently stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois, as follows: — "A bal- lot is indicative of the will of the voter. It is not required that it should be nicely oi^ accurately written, or that the name of the candidate voted for should be correctly spelled. It should be read in the light of all the circumstances sur- rounding the election and the voter, and the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. The bal- lot should be liberally construed, and the intendments should be in favor of a reading and construction which will render the ballot effective rather than in favor of a conclusion which will on some technical ground render it ineffective. At the same time it is not admissible to show that something was •intended which is contradictory of what was done, and if the ballot is so defective as to fail to show any intention what- ever, it must be disregarded." * 1 Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz (1891), 135 111. 591 ; S. C, 26 N. E. Rep. 704. Accordingly, in that case, where the plaintiff was a candidate and his name, though properly pronounced in four syllables, was sometimes syncopate into two, it was held law- ful to count for him ballots on which the name was written re- spectively : Behrenmeyer, Behrs- meyer, Bauersmyer, Bernshmyer, Benshniyer, Benshmyre, Benere, Bensmyer, BemsmerS, Bornsmoer, Berhensmeyer, Berlistmeyer, Ber- ensmyer, Bernmyer, Bernsmier, Behrensmier, Benmyr, Berenmyer, Behmsmeyer, Berntsmire, Behrene, Behrn, Benhmyer. Berhenmeyer and Behrsyer. Considerable deviations and omissions are allowed where there is no other candidate of the same name, such as the omission of a middle letter. People v. Kennedy, 37 Mich. 67 ; State v. Gates, 43 Conn. 533 (a wrong middle letter. Cf. Opinion of Judges, 88 Me. 597); or S5 of a suflSx, People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259 ; S. C, 59 Am. Dec. 451. Initials of the first name are suiScient. At- torney-General V. Ely, 4 Wis. 420; People V. Ferguson, 8 Cowcn, 102; People V. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409; People V. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67 ; Chapman V. Ferguson, 1 Barb. 267. Contra, People V. Tisdale, 1 Dougl. 59; People V. Higgins. 3 Mich. 233 ; S. c, 61 Am. Dec. 491; People v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 288 ; s. c, 97 Am. Dec 141. See, also. Opinion of Judges, 64 Me. 596; Clark v. County Examiners, 126 Mass. 282. Common abbrevia- tions of the first name are not fatal. Regina v. Bradley, 3 El. & El. 684; People V. Ferguson, 8 Cowen, 102; Chumasero v. Gilbert, 26 111. 39; Gil- ham V. Bank, 2 Scam. 245 ; Bank v. Peel, 11 Ark. 750. Nor in one case was its total omission. Talkington V. Turner, 71 111. 284. But if there is a radical departure the ballot must be thrown out People v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283; State v. Judge, 13 Ala. 386 MEETINGS AMD ELECTIONS. [§ 392. § 392. Votes for ineligible candidates. — It is the rule in England that if an ineligible candidate has a majority of valid votes the person having the next highest number is not elected, and there must be a new election. If the voter is ignorant of the fact of disqualification,^ or of disqualification as a conclu- sion of law,^ his vote is valid for the purpose of being counted,' In the United States " the great current of authority sustains the doctrine that the ineligibility of the majority candidate does not elect the minority candijjate, and this without refer- ence to the question as to whether the voters knew of the in- eligibility of the candidate for whom they voted. It is consid- ered that in such a case the votes for the ineligible candidate are not void." * But the authorities are not entirely uniform. Thus, in New York as in England knowledge is an element in the case, but information of both fact and law must be brought directly to the notice of the voter in order to render the vote a nullity ; * while in Indiana it is held that voters are conclu- 805. See, also, on this subject, Faine on Elections, §§ 540 et seq.; Mecbem on Public Offices and Officers, §§ 199 et seq. 1 Gosling V. Veley, 7 AA & EL (N. a) 406 ; s. c, 4 H. of L. Gas. 679 ; Regina V. Tewkesbury, 3 L. R Q. B. 629 ; Re- gina V. Coaks, 3 El. & Bl. 249 ; Cla- ridge v. Evelyn, 5 Bam. & Aid. 81 ; R9X V. Monday, 3 Cowp. 530; Rex V. Hawkins, 10 East, 211; Rez v. Bridge, 1 M. & S. 76. 2 Regina v. Tewkesbury, 3 L. R. Q. B. 629, holding that the maxim igno- rantia legis non exeusat has no ap- plication. 3 See, also, for the rule in Ireland, In re Tipperaiy Eleo., 9 Ir. R. 0. L. 217 ; Regina v. Franklin, 6 Ir. R G L. 333 ; Trench v. Nolan, 6 Ir. R C. L. 464 ; s. a, 27 L. T. R 89. But the next highest candidate is elected if the ineligibility both as to fact and law was known and notorious. King V. Hawkins, 10 East, 211 ; King v. Parry, 14 East, 540 ; Gosling v. Veley, 7 Q. B. 406 ; Rex v. Monday, 2 Cowpt 530; Rex v. Foxcroft, Burr. 1017; Regina v. Coaks, 3 El. & B. 249; Trench v. Nolan, 2 Moak, 711. See, also, Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 780. * Privett V. Bickford, 26 Kan. 52, 57 ; Crawford v. Dunbar, 53 CaL 36 ; Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; In re Corliss, 11 R I 638; State r. Smith, 11 Wis. 65; State v. Smith, 14 Wis. 497 ; People v. Molitor, 23 Mich. 341 ; Hoskins v. Brantley, 57 Miss. 814 ; Sublett V. Bedwell, 47 Miss. 266 ; s. C., 12 Am. Rep. 338; Wood v. Bartling, 16 Kan. 109, 114; Barnum v. Gilman, 37 Minn. 466 ; State v. Gastineau, 20 La. Ann. 114; State v. BoaX, 46 Mo. 528 ; State v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97 ; Dryden V. Swinburne, 20 West Va. 89; Com- monwealth V. Cluley, 56 Pa St 270; State V. Walsh, 7 Ma App. 142, where the death of the majority candidate before the polls were opened, though it was known to the voters, did not result in giving the election to the next highest 6 People V. Qute, 60 N. T. 451. § 393.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 387 sively presumed to know of a candidate's constitutional dis- qualification by reason of holding another office within the election district, and the next highest candidate is elected.* §393. Putting up offices at auction^ — Tax collector. — The office of tax collector was set up at auction in a town meeting and struck oflf to the lowest bidder, and the town afterwards at the same meeting chose the same person col- lector. It was held that the proceeding was illegal. The court said : — " Of the impropriety of putting up any office at auction I can entertain no doubt. . . . The direct tend^- ency of such a practice is to introduce unsuitable persons into public employment — to induce the electors to give their suffrages to him who will work cheapest instead of him who is best qualified. And if an office which is supposed to be onerous and to deserve compensation may be offered to him who is disposed to serve for the lowest wages, it is not appar* ent why those to which some honor is attached may not be offered to him who is willing to give most for the privilege of executing them. The formality of an election may be had afterwards in the one case as well as in the other. In fact, the office of collector has, in one instance at least, been deemed such an object of competition as. to produce an offer of a nom- inal even if it was not an actual consideration duly paid. In a case recently tried in another county the following was among the records produced : — ' Voted, that the coUectorship should be set up to the best bidder. J M agreed to give one and a half mugs of toddy for the privilege of collect- ing.' No evidence of the impropriety of setting up the office at auction more conclusive than this would be desired or farr nished. And there is no necessity for such a practice. The town may fix upon a suitable compensation in the first in- stance; or it may be left for such compensation to be after- wards made as the services rendered shall appear to demand ; and in either case there is no inducement to elect an unsuit- able persan," * 1 Gulick V. New, 14 Ind 93. See, « Per Parker, J., in Tucker v. Aiken also, Hatcheson v. Tilden, 4 Harr. & (1834), 7 N. H. 118, 129, 130. Biit the Mca (Md.) 379; State v. Boal, 46 Mo, court lield that the collector was an 588. oflacer de facto. Bichardaon, 0. J., 388 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 394 § 394. City council as judge of election and qualification of its members. — It is the settled doctrine in some juris- dictions that where provision is made by statute for contest- ing elections, the statutory proceeding is the exclusive rem- edy .^ But the weight of authority is to the contrary, holding that where common councils are made the judges of the elec- tions and qualifications of their members the common-law remedy of guo warranto is not prohibited unless the power of the council is expressly declared^ to be final.^ And where there is no such office as that which a claimant assumes to fill; or there is no authority for his election thereto, the attempt by him to exercise its functions is a mere usurpation. In such a case a proceeding to contest his election is inapplicable and inappropriate, and if the public exigencies demand it he may be ousted by quo warramto; as, for instance, where a person claims to be elected a member of a council from a ward which has no legal existence,' or from a ward which is already fully represented.'* In the latter case the court said : — " The Su- preme Court cannot inquire whether the election was regu- larly conducted, for that duty belongs to the branch of the council in which the seat is claimed ; but they can decide the question whether there was an office or vacancy to be filled." ' in a concurring opinion said: — "A pie v. Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200; Com- coUector thus chosen is not fit to be monwealth v. Leech, 44 Pa. St 333. trusted with the power to seize the Cf. Commonwealth v. Allen, 70 Pa. goods and arrest the bodies of citi- St. 465. zens, especially of citizens who did ^ McVeany v. Mayor &c., 80 N. Y. not concur in the choice. And if an 185; People {;( Hall, 80 N. Y. 117; action of trespass had been brought State v. Kempf, 69 Wis. 470 ; s. C., 17 against (the defendant) for taking Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 388 ; State v. the goods mentioned ... he Gates, 35 Minn. 385 ; Board of Alder- would probably have found it very Topn v. Darrow, 13 Colo. 460 ; s. C., difficult to show a legal defense." 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 343 ; People S. c, p. 140. See, also. Proprietors v. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303; State v. &c. V. Page (1838), 6 N. H. 183. Kraft (Ore.), 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. 1 State V. Marlow, 15 Ohio St 114; Cas. 337. State V. Berry, 14 Ohio St 815 ; State ' State v. O'Brien, 47 Ohio St 464 ; V. Berry, 47 Ohio St 333 ; State v. s. c, 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 361. O'Brien, 47 Ohio St 464 ; s. C, 34 Am. * Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Pa. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 361; People v. St 341. Metzker, 47 Cal. 534 (see, however, * Commonwealth v, Meeser, 44 Pa. People V. Bingham, 83 CaL 338) ; Pec- St 841. § 395.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 389 § 395. Canyass and return and contest of elections. — "It is well settled that the duties of canvassing officers and boards are ministerial merely, and not judicial. Their duty is to count the votes as cast, and they have no authority, unless expressly granted, to hear evidence or to pass upon or correct alleged errors, irregularities or frauds." ' Genuine and reg- ular returns are to be accepted without question by the can- vassers, whose function is simply to declare the apparent result of the voting, and not to investigate or pass upon the legality of the election." They may be compelled to act by mandamus; ' and when they have completed their task their powers are exhausted and they become funati officio.^ The common-law remedy for a defeated candidate who wishes to contest the finding and certificate of election is by an infor- mation in the nature of a qno warranto; but where the stat- ute prescribes the mode of procedure it is generally exclusive.' ' Mechem's Public Offices and Offi- cers, § 208, citing People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 363 ; & a, 53 Am. Dec 69; People u Cicott, 16 Mich. 331; & C, 97 Am. Dec. 141; Morgan v. Quackenbush, 33 Barb. 73 ; Dalton v. State, 43 Ohio St 653 ; s. c, 1 West Kep. 773; Opinions of Judges, 58 N. H. 621 ; State v. Steers, 44 Mo. 223 ; People u Van Slyck, 4 Cowon, 397 ; Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 47 ; Dishon V. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; State v. Cavers, 32 Iowa, 343; Attorney- General V. Barstow, 4 Wis. 749 ; State V. Rodman, 43 Mo. 256 ; State v. Har- rison, 38 Mo. 540 ; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; O'Fenall v. Colby, 3 Minn. 180; Leigh v. State, 69 Ala. 261 ; State v. Wilson (Neb.), 88 N. W. Rep. 31 ; Maxwell v. Tolly, 36 S. C. 77; IS. E. Rep. 160. 2 Paine on Elections, § 603 ; Lewis V. Comm'rs, 16 Kan. 103; State v. Canvassers, 17 Fla. 39; Peebles v. Comm'rs, 83 N. C. 385 ; State v. Steers, 44 Mo. 334, "They have no discre- tion to hear and take proof as to frauds, even if morally certain that monstrous frauds have been perpe^ trated." Attorney-General v. Bar- stow, 4 Wis. 567. 3 Brown v. Rush County (Kan.), 17 Pac. Rep. 304 ; Lewis v. Comm'rs, 16 Kan. 103; s. c., 33 Am. Rep. 375; State V. County Comm'rs, 33 Kan. 364; State v. Wilson (Neb.), 38 N. W, Rep. 31; State v. Hill, 10 Neb. 58; Magee v. Supervisors, 10 Oal. 376; Kisler v. Cameron, 39 Ind. 488 ; State V. County Judge, 7 Iowa, 186 ; Clark V. McKenzie, 7 Bush (Ky.), 533 ; At- torney-General V. Board of Canvass- ers, 64 Mich. 607 ; S. a, 31 N. W. Rep. 539; Commonwealth v. Ensminger, 74 Pa, St 479 ; Burke v. Supervisors, 4 W. Va. 371; Alderson v. Comm'rs (West Va.), 8 S. E. Rep. 374. < State V. Randall, 35 Ohio St 64. 5 See Paine on Elections, § 811; Mechem's Public. Offices and Officers, g 215 et seq. CHAPTEE XII. CONSOLIDATION AND REOECJANIZATION. 396. How effected. 397. Power of legislatura 898. Constitutionality of laws for annexation. 399. Delegation of legislative power. . 400. Illinois decisions. 401. Maryland decisions. 403. Michigan decisions. 403. Missouri and Tennessee decis- ions. 404 Ruling as to Baltimore city. 405. Rule as declared in Washing- ton. 406. Powers of cities under the law. 407. The same subject continued. 408. What may be annexed — Gen- eral rule. 409. The same subject continued — Construction, of statutes. 410. The same subject continued. 411. Right of taxation as to an- nexed lands. 413. Taxation for antecedent debts. 413. Remedy of tax-payer. 414 Effects of consolidation. 415. The same subject continued. § 416. Annexation ♦ Notice. 417. Mode of voting. 418. Jurisdiction and procedure 419. The same subject continued. 430. Reasonableness pf annexation. 431. Validity of annexation. 433. Procedure to test validity. 433. The same subject continued. 434 Special acts as to reorganiza- tion. 435. Nebraska act 436. Effect of reorganization. 437. The same subject continued. 438. The same subject continued — Decisions in California and Tennessee. 439. Validity of reorganization — Special case. 430. Invalid reorganization. 431. Property right passing to new corpora tion._^ 433. For what the reorganized cor- poration becomes liable. 433. Further scope of the forego- ing doctrine. 434 What are such liabilities. 435. Remedy of creditors of the old corporation. § 396. How effected. — Municipal corporations may be con- solidated by act of the legislature, or may extend their bounds aries by annexation of territory adjacent by proper proceed- ings according to the procedure named in the acts of the legislature providing a mode in which this can be accom- plished, and proper tribunals for hearing on the merits and trial of the issues iiivolved between the parties desiring an- nexation and those remonstrating against it. Beorganization is accomplished by a new act of incorporation, in the form of §1 307, S&8i} o€b*80eii«ltkot and keoe&ahizatios. 395^ a new charter from the legislature, or through the forms and modes provided in general laws existent in many of the States for the incorporation, reorganization, etc., of such corporations. § 397. Power of legislature. — The power to divide large municipalities, to annul their old charters and to reorganize them, and to consolidate small ones as well as to detach por- tions of territory from one and annex it to another, to meet the wishes of its residents or to promote the public interests, as understood by it, is conceded to the legislature. This power is full, in the absence of constitutional restriction.' And the legislature by the passage of a general law prescribing modes by which adjacent territory may be annexed to mu- nicipal corporations does not surrender its power and obliga- tion to enlarge or diminish the corporate limits of any town or city whenever the public exigency demands that it should be done.' § 398. Constitutionality of laws fof annexation. — Ques- tions have frequently been made upon the constitutionality of laws providing for the annexation of territory to municipal corporations. Generally the laws have been upheld. The principal cases will be herein referred to. That property 1 Mount Pleasant w. Beck with (1879); § 8, cl. 1, providing that " the legisla- 100 U. S. 514 ; Morgan v. Beloit, 7 ture shall have no power to suspend Wall. 613; Thompson v. Abbott, 61 any general law for the benefit of Mo. 176 ; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr, individuals inconsistent with thegen- 1866 ; North Yarmouth v. Skillings, era! laws of the land." Cantwell, J., 45 Me. 133; Girard v. Philadelphia, said: "... By these [general] 7 Wall. 1 ; S. C, 19 L. Ed. 53 ; Story laws the power to create or abolish, on Constitution, §§1385, 1388; Dillon's enlarge or diminish, municipalities Munic. Corp. 139 ; Cooley's Const, is reposed in the legislature. The Lira. (6th ed.) 328 and cases cited in power of annexation by a prescribed notes; True v. Davis (1889), 133 111. method was conferred on citizens 523 ; s. C, 23 N. E. Rep. 410 ; 6 L. R A. and freeholders concerned ; and at 366 ; Daly v. Morgan (1888), 69 Md. the same time the inherent power of 460 ; s. C, 16 AtL Rep. 387. annexation by special act was left in 2 Williams v. City of Nashville the legislature. The situation was as (Tenn., 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 364, that of two laws, co-existing, by where a legislative act annexing ter- either of which the same result ritory to Nashville was sustained as might be accomplished, and in whic];i not inconsistent with the general laws resort to one will not be inconsistent in respect to annexation, and not in with or a suspension of the other." conflict with Const. Tena, art. 11, 392 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 399. brought by annexation within the corporate lipiits of a mu- nicipal corporation will be subject to taxation to discharge its pre-existing indebtedness is no constitutional objection to the exercise of the power of compulsory annexation, this being a matter, in the absence of special constitutional restrictions, belonging wholly to the legislature to determine.' The Su- preme Court of Ohio has held that proceedings to annex con- tiguous territory to the corporate limits of a town, in pursuance of their statute upon the subject, *kre not in contravention of the provisions of the constitution of the State.^ The statutes of Kansas conferring on cities of the second class power to ex- tend their boundaries so as to include adjacent land that has been subdivided into blocks and lots have been held not to be unconstitutional because of the provision of the Constitution of Kansas which gives the power to the legislature to confer on the tribunals transacting county business such powers of local legislation and administration as it may deem expedient, as such povv'er is not exclusive, but can be conferred on other local agencies.' § 399. Delegation of legislative power.— The laws for en- larging the limits of municipal corporations have been fre- quently assailed upon the ground that they amounted to a delegation of legislative power and wete therefore repugnant to the constitutions of the different States. The Supreme Court of Kansas has held the First Class City Act (1887), which provides that " any city of the first class may enlarge or ex- tend its limits or area by an ordinance specifying with accu- racy the new line or lines to which it is proposed to enlarge or extend such limits or area," not to be such a delegation of 1 Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 WalL 1 ; ler v. Boston, 113 Mass. 200 ; St Louis Elstoni;. CrawfordsvUle, 20Ind. 373; v. Eussell, 9 Mo. 503: St Louis v. Edmunds v. Gookins, 20 Ind. 477; Allen, 13 Mo. 490; Smith v. McCar- Morford u linger, 8 Iowa, 83; Bur- thy, 56 Pa. St 359; Nonis v. Smith- linglon & M. R. Ck). v. Spearman, 13 ville, 1 Swan (Tenn.), 164 ; Wade v. Iowa, 113; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Richmond, 18 Gratt (Va.) 583; 1 Dil- Mon. (Ky.) 830; Lay ton v. New Or- Ion's Munic. Corp., § 348. leans, 13 La. Ann. 515; Arnoult v. 2 powers v. Comm'rs, 8 Ohio St New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 54; Gor- 285. ham V. Springfield, 21 Me. 59 ; Opin- s City of Emporia v. Smith (1889), ion of Justices, 6 Cusli. 580 : Warren 43 Kan. 433 ; s. C, 33 Pac Rep, 616. V. Charlestown, 3 Gray, 104 ; Chand- § 400.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 393 legislative power to thie officers of a municipality as would vitiate the act.' The Missouri act conferring on cities power to extend their limits has been held not to be an unconstitu- tional delegation of power .^ In a similar case in Nebraska it was urged that a statute providing that, after a city council has voted to annex any contiguous territory, the district court shall, on -petition by the city and after notice to the owners of such territory, determine the truth of the allegations of the petition, and whether all or any part of such territory would receive material benefit from annexation to the city, and whether justice and equity require such annexation, and shall enter a decree accordingly, was an attempt to invest the court with extra-judicial powers — a legislative power. The court held that, as a condition of such annexation, the questions re- quired to be determined by the court were entirely of a judi- cial character and it was properly invested with jurisdiction in such matters.' § 400. Illinois decisions. — The act of the legislature of Illinois amendatory of " An act to revise the law in relation to township organization," so far as it attempted to change the boundaries of cities and incorporated villages, has been held to be in violation of the Illinois constitution, as embracing more than one subject.* But the annexation of two or more cities, iHurla V. City of Kansas City 'CityofWahoor. Dickinson (1888), (Kan., 1891), 27 Pac. Rep. 143, an 23 Neb. 426; s. C, 36 N. W. Rep. action to set aside the proceedings 813. The court innot giving assent to by which the boundaries of Kansas Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152, City, Kan , were extended to include relied upon by objectors to the law, the original cities of Kansas City, conceded " that an arbitrary annexa- Armourdale and Wyandotte and tion of territory to a city or town, other contiguous territory, follo>ving where the benefits to be received by CuUen V. City of Junction City, 48 the territory annexed are not con- Kan. 629 ; S. C, 23 Pac. Rep. 652. sidered, can only be accomplished by 2 Kelly T. Meeks (1885), 87 Mo. 396. legislation, either by the legislature See on same point, Stilz v. Indianap- itself or with a tribunal clothed with olis, 55 Ind. 515 ; Taylor v. Fort power for that purpose, and that a Wayne, 47 Ind. 274 ; People &c. v. court under our (Nebraska) constitu- Bennett, 39 Mich. 451 ; Blanchard v. tion could not be clothed with such Bissell, 11 Ohio St 96 ; People v. Car- legislative power." penter. 34 N. Y. 86 ; Devore's Appeal, * Dolese v. Pierce (1888), 124 111. 140 ; 56 Pa. St. 163 ; Dillon's Munic. Corp., S. C, 16 N. E. Rep. 318, the court say- g 183. ing : — " Under the title of the act of 394 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 401. incorporated towns and villages to each other, all of which are indebted, the indebtedness of some being in excess of the limit allowed by the constitution of Illinois, is not prohibited by the section providing that no municipal corporation shall become indebted to an amount " in the aggregate exceeding five per cent, on the taxable property therein ; " and that any such corporation incurring indebtedness " shall provide for the collection of a direct tax " for the payment of the same.^ § 401. Maryland decisions. — It was objected to a legislative act in Maryland, which provided that until the year 1900 the rate of taxation for city purposes on all taxable property within the districts to be annexed to the city of Baltimore should not exceed the existing rate in Baltimore county, that it con- flicted with the article of the Declaration of Eights in the 1887, the legislature had the right to provide, as it did, for the change of township boundaries, but this right did not carry with it, as an incident, the power to change the boundaries of cities and villages, unless the change of the latter was necessar3' to effectuate a change of the former, or at least to promote such object Nothing of this kind is pretended. The only thing claimed — or which can be truthfully claimed — is, that there is some resemblance, or that there are common characteristics, be- tween townships and cities and vil- lages. But this is equally true of all corporate bodies. While townships are regarded as municipal corpora- tions, in the general sense of that term, yet they stand upon a plane altogether different from that occu- pied by cities and villagea The latter are possessed of a much higher order of corporate existence than the for- mer, and differ from them in many essential particulars. They are, in lavr and in fact, as distinct from one another as any two artificial beings could be, whatever their supposed re- semblance may be. This is equally so with respect to their organization and jurisdiction. In the exercise of the powers conferred upon them, they act wholly independent of each other, even where their jurisdiction extends over the same people and territory. . . . Looking at the act as a whole, it is difficult to repel the con- viction that it is nothing more than a method of extending, almost indef- initely, the limits of the great cities of our State without consulting the people living in them, or at least but a small portion of them, and all this without a word in the title of the act to indicate such a purposa" •True V. Davis (1889), 133 III. 533; S. a, 33 N. E. Eep. 410; 6 L. E. A. 266, 367, where the court said : — " If, then, there is no constitutional re- striction upon annexation of munici- palities, and no constitutional right to exempt the property of tax-payers from burdens other than debts con- tracted by the municipality while the property or person was within its jurisdiction, it would seem inevi- tably to follow that there is no con- stitutional ground to object that the burden of some tax-payers will be larger in consequence of annexation than it would otherwise have been." §• 403.] CONSOtmATION AND EBGKSANIZATION. 395 Constitution of Maryland whicli declares that " every person in the State, or person holding property therein, ought tb con- tribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of the government according to his actual worth in real or personal property." The Supreme Court of the State sustained the law over this contention, holding that the principle of equal- ity in taxation is fully gratified by making local taxation equal and uniform as to all property within the limits of the taxing district, and that equality and uniformity, as between differ- ent taxing districts, whether the district be an entire city or parts of a city, is not required in local taxation.' § 402. Michigan decisions.— The Michigan act consolidat- ing the two cities of Saginaw and East Saginaw, which com- prised distinct representative districts, has been held not to contravene that section of the constitution of Michigan which provides for the division of the State into representative dis- tricts and enacts that such division shall remain unaltered until the return of another enumeration, which is to be had every ten years, as the act expressly provides that it shall not change in any respect the boundaries of the existing representative districts, or the manner of electing representatives, and pre- serves the old voting precincts intact.* Also that the fact that • Daly V. Morgau (1888), 69 Md. Gillette v. City of Hartford, 31 Conn. 460, 468 ; a C, 16 Atl. Rep. 287, the 351 ; City of Henderson v. Lambert, court saying:— "The effect of the 8 Bush (Ky.), 607; Benoist v, St. provisions of the nineteenth section Louis, 19 Mo. 179 ; United States v. is to make the territory annexed Memphis, 97 U. S. 393. under it a separate taxing district, ^gmlth v. City of Saginaw (1890), within the limits of the city as thus 81 Mich. 133 ; s. C, 45 N. W. Rep. 964 ; extended, and the legislature itself, LocalActMich.,1889, No. 455. There- exercising its reserved right of tax- lator in this application for a man- ation, fixes for a limited period the damns relied upon People v. Holihan, rate of assessment and taxation for 29 Mich. 116, to sustain his contention local purposes within such district, that the act of consolidation was un- Tbat it may exercise this power in- constitutional. The court thus dis- stead of delegating it to the local tinguished the case cited : — " In Peo- authorities is /well settled in this pie v. Holihan the legislature made State." The court cite State v. May- no provision for preservmg the in- hew, 3 Gill (Md.), 487 ; State v. Ster- tegrity of the representative district ling, 30 Md. 503, and as sustaining from which the territory was de- the same construction refer to Ter- tached, but, by the very terms of the nil V. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 355 ; act, the boundaries of two represent- 396 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 403. the act authorized and made it the lixfty of the council of the consolidated city to issue bonds to raise money to purchase a site for and erect a city hall, and provided that this require- ment should not be abrogated without the assent of a major- ity of the aldermen, and should be construed as in the nature of a contract between the two cities, if unconstitutional, did not afifeot the validity of the rest of the act. And further, that where it appears that the consolidation of two or more cities is for the interest of the inhabitants thereof, an act of consolidation is not contrary to public policy, and does not abridge the rights of citizens. § 403. Missouri and Tennessee decisions. — Kansas City, Missouri, governed by a special charter under the constitutional •provision relating to cities of a population of more than one hun- dred thousand inhabitants, by an ordinance attempted to annex a large adjacent territory including the city of Westport. In a case involving the validity of this annexation ordinance it was held that the ordinance was void ; that it was an amend- ment to the charter, and the constitution of the State denied the city the right thus to extend its limits without first sub- mitting the proposition to and procuring the consent of throe- fifths of its voters, which it had failed to do.^ The placing of property within the corporate limits of a given town is not a taking of private property, as the ownership remains un- changed ; and a Tennessee statute providing for annexation of land to the city of Ifashville was held not in conflict with the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States, ative districts were changed, the tional provisions are fully satisfied electors of one district transferred to when the legislative districts are pre- another and the preservation of the served intact, and the territories district made impossible." Further, united for 'municipal purposes only, Grant, J., said: — "The power of the preserving to the electors the neces- legislature to consolidate two mu- sary provisions for electing their rep- nicipal corporations is not questioned, resentatives." Citing Bay Co. v. Bul- In a new and growing State, cases lock, 51 Mich. 544 ; Stone v. City of must often arise where it is for the Charlestown, 114 Mass. 314 ; Wade v, interest of the people that territory City of Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.) lying in different representative dis- 583 ; Opinion of the Judges, 33 Me. tricts should, for the purpose of local 587. self-government, be comprised in one i City of Westport v. Kansas Oily municipality. . . . The constitu- (1890), 103 Mo. 141. § 404.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOBGANIZATION. 397 which provides that " private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation," nor with the constitu- tion of Tennessee, containing similar provisions.^ l^or was s&,id act repugnant to the provisions of the constitution of Tennessee providing that " no corporation shall be created or its powers increased or diminished by special laws," as this clause applies only to private corporations.^ § 404. Ruling as to Baltimore city. — The act of Maryland extending the limits of Baltimore city by including therein parts of Baltimore county h^s been held not to violate the constitution of Maryland, relating tb the organization of new counties and the location of county seats, which pro- vides that the lines of a county shall not be changed without the consent of a majority of the voters of the territory sought to be taken from one and added to another county.' It was further held that the legislature of the State had the power to extend the limits of a city by including therein parts of the county adjoining, the city itself being a part of the county.* In support of this holding Kobinson, J., said : — " Counties are political divisions of the State, organized with a view to the general policy of the State, and the functions and powers exercised by them have reference mainly to such policy. Besides, their representation in the General Assembly is fixed by the constitution, and we can understand why it was deemed proper to make some provision in regard to the organizsetion of counties, and the annexation of part of one county to another. Towns and cities, however, are or- dinarily chartered at the instance, and mainly with reference to the interest, convenience -and advantage, of persons resid- ing within the particular locality incorporated. They are chartered by the legislature, and their boundaries are fixed by it, and the power to extend them, whenever in its judg- ment the public interests require it, has been exercised by the legislature from the earliest days of the colony, No reason 1 So held in Williams v. City of » Daly v. Morgan (1888), 69 Md 460 ; Nashville (Tenn.), 15 8. W. Eep. 864. s. C, 16 Atl. Eep. 287. 2 Williams v. City of Nashville * Daly «. Morgan (1888), 69 Md. 460 ; (Tenn.), 15 S. W. Eep. 364 s. C. 16 Atl. Bep. 287. 398 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOBGAHIZATION. [§§ 405, 406. has been suggested why the Gonstitution should prohibit the exercise of this power, and it would seem strange that it should provide for the annexation of parts of one county to another, and denj'- to the legislature the power to extend the limits of a city, by including therein parts of an adjoining county, even though such county should be a separate and in- dependent territorial division of the State." §405. Rule as declared in Washington.— The constitu- tion of "Washington declares tlj^t municipal corporations shall not be created by special laws, but the legislature, by general laws, shall provide for their incorporation, organization, etc. This does not prevent two existing municipal corporations, or one existing corporation and an adjacent body whose incor- poration was void, from being consolidated under a law au- thorizing a special election on the question of consolidation.* § 406. Powers of cities nnder the laws.— A Florida statute gave municipal authorities the power to extend their terri- ' State V. City of New Whatcom encourage nniformity it provides that (Wash., 1891), 27 Pac. Rep. 1030, it be- existing cities and towns may, with- ing held that the title, "An act pro- out legislative compulsion, drop their viding for the organization, incorpo- special charters and take up the or- ration and government of municipal ganization of their. respective classes corporations," was sufficiently broad under such genei-al laws as may be to cover provisions authorizing the enacted. To do this," he says, " is in consolidation of two municipal corpo- no sense to destroy or disincorporate rations and the holding of a special a city or town. The territory covered election on the question. Further, that is to be the same. The name is con- act of Washington, March 27, 1890 tinned and the people are identical (Acts, p. 138), providing that "two or But when two existing corporations more contiguous municipal corpora- are to be consolidated the prelimi- tions may become consolidated into nary thing to be accomplished is the one corporation after proceedings disincorporation of the old, and then had as required in this section," and follows the incorporation of a new authorizing a special election to be municipality, in which there must be held on the question of consolidation, new territory, a new name (at least applied to pre-existing corporations as to a part of the new territory) and created by special charter, as well as new people. This operation . . . to those organized under general in- may be accompanied by either a gen- corporation laws. Stiles, J., says of eral or a special election, as the legis- the constitutional provision, that "to lature may direct." § 406.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEORGANIZATION. 389 torial limits, and defined generally the powers and duties of municipalities. Another statute established provisional gov- ernments for cities vrhose charters were repealed for indebt- edness, appointing commissioners with certain general powers, and declared the defunct cities to be provisional municipali- ties, " the boundaries of which shall be co-extensive with the boundaries of such defunct cities and towns," giving to the officers thereof the same powers vested in the officers of such defunct cities under the act of 1869. It has been held that the provisional municipalities had power to extend their territorial limits.' Under the Indiana statutes the common council of a city, while having authority, without the consent of the owner, to annex territory, and extend its boundaries so as to include lots platted adjoining it if the plat has been acknowl- edged and properly recorded, cannot annex land of a married woman, platted by her husband, without her authority and knowledge, even though she may have erroneously supposed it to be included in another plat before made by herself and husband and duly acknowledged and recorded." The limits of a city cannot be extended by vote of the electors thereof, without the consent of the voters of the territory to be an- nexed, under the Texas statutes.' The power to annex territory is not affected by the fact that part of it is occupied as a rural homestead ; nor by the fact of the territory being used for agricultural and grazing purposes.* And it is immaterial that it lies on several sides of a city, if the territory proposed to be annexed by one proceeding comprises but one body of land.® ' Saunders v. Provisional Munici- of a city accepting titles 17 and 18 pality of Pensacola (1888), 24 Fla. shall remain as fixed by the act of 326 ; S. C, 4 So. Rep. 801 ; Act Fla., incorporation, except that they may Feb. 4, 1869 (McClel. Dig. 255, § 44), as be extended by additional territory amended Fla. Laws, 1879, ch. 3161, whenever the majority of the quali- § 2. fled electors of said territory shall 2 City of Indianapolis v. Patterson indicate a desire to be included (1887), 112 Ind. 344 ; S. a, 14 N. E. within the limits of the corporation. Eep. 551 ; E. S. Ind. 1881, § 3195. * State v. City of Waxahachie 3 Lum V. City of Bowie (Tex., 1891), (Tex., 1891), 17 8. W. Rep. 848. 18 S. W. Rep. 142. Sayles' CivU St » State v. City of Waxahachie, cited (Tex.), art 343, enacts that the limits in preceding note. 400 OONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§§ 407, 40S. § 407. The same subject continued. — A city of the first class under the Kansas statute cannot extend its limits so as to include unplatted territory of over five acres against the protest of the owner thereof, unless the same is circumscribed by platted territory that is taken into said city.* Under the Nebraska statute providing that a city of the metropolitan class may include within its corporate limits an area not to exceed twenty-five square miles, including any township or village organization within sucl^ limits, and that such organi- zation shall thereupon cease and terminate, such a city cannot divide the territory of a village and annex a portion thereof, but it must include the entire village.^ Nor can it extend its limits so as to include a city of the second class.' The Ke- vised Statutes of Texas, providing for annexation of adja- cent territory to the limits of a city, has been construed, and it was held that by the words " to the extent of a half mile in width " it was not intended to confine the authority to make an annexation of territory to an area neither more nor less than half a mile wide, but it was intended to limit the area* of territory which might be added to a city to half a mile wide.* And so long as the territories added are only a half mile wide, their outer boundaries may be extended until they intersect, though the corner thus formed is more than a half mile from the original city limits.' § 408. What may he annexed — General rule.^^ If it does ' not appear that the territory as a whole should be annexed, it is error to annex any part of it.' Such land must have great value for urban purposes.' Land which evidence shows rep- 1 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. City of part of thriving and aAibitious cities Kansas City (1889), 43 Kan. 497 ; S. C, to extend the limits of the munici- 33 Pao. Eep. 633. pality beyond the urban population 2 Omaha v. South Omaha (Neb., and to subject to taxation persons 1891), 47 N. W. Rep. 1113 ; Comp. St. and property who neither need nor Neb., ch. 12a, § 3. receive any protection from the city 3 Omalia v. South Omaha, cited in government." preceding note. * State v. City of Waxahachie (Tex., * City of East Dallas v. State (1889), 1891), 17 S. W. Rep. 34& 73 Tex. 370 ; s. C, 11 S. W. Rep. 1030, 6 Vestal v. Little Rock (Ark., 1891), the court deeming it reasonable to 16 S. W. Rep. 391. presume an intention of the legisla- ' WoodruflE v. City of Eureka ture to restrain " a tendency on the Springs (Ark., 1893), 19 S. W. Rep. 15, § 409.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 401 resents a city's growtlji beyond its limits, and that it derives its value from actual or prospective use for town purposes, is a proper subject for annexation though a considerable part thereof may be used for agricultural purposes.' Where sub- urban property is platted into lots, and marked in such way as to impress on it the character of urban property as distin- guished from rural use, the fact that the lots are larger than ordinary city lots will not exclude them from the operation of the laws of Indiana authorizing a city to annex suburban ter- ritory which has been platted into lots.* § 409. The same subject continued — Construction of statutes. — Territory separated from a city by a navigable river is " contiguous " within the meaning of a statute author- izing municipal corporations to annex contiguous territory lying in the same county.' Therefore an unincorporated town on one side of an intervening river may be annexed to a city on the other side, although at the time the only means of com- munication are two toll-bridges and a number of small boats operated by private persons for hire. The annexation of un- platted land which is touched on two sides to its entire extent by platted lands will not be set aside on appeal because it is vacant, low, flat and wet and covered with timber, since itmay have been needed for town purposes, and may have needed organized I009.I government to reclaim it.'' As ordinarily the territory of a municipal corporation is subdivided into lots the court expressing a doubt as to 59 Ind, 396; City of Evansville v. ■whether annexation could be justi- Page, 23 Ind. 535 ; Edmunds v. Gook- fied upon the. ground alone that the ins, S4 Ind. 169. ■city desired to establish, maintain ' Vogel v. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 335 , and preserve water-works upon it S. C., 15 S. W. Bep. 836. 1 Vogel V. City of Little Eock (Ark., * So held in Vestal v. Little Rock 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 13, where an an-' (1891), 54 Ark. 321; S. G, 15 S. W. nexation was held to be right and Rep. 891, a proceeding on the part proper under the rule established in of the city under Mansf. Dig. Ark., Vestal V. City of Little Rock (1891), sec. 923, to annex contiguous terri- ■54 Ark, 321; s. C, 15 S. W. Rep. 891, tory; citing as to where there is aain- and Same v. Same (Ark., 1891), 16 tervening river, Blanchard v. Bissell, S. W. Rep. 391. 11 Ohio St 96, and Ford v. Incorpo- 2 Glover v. City of Terre Haute rated Town &c., 80 Iowa, 636 ; s. o., People ex rel ScrafiFord v. Board in the second preceding nota § 442.] PARTITION, 435 territory taken from two old ones to enact that suits pending on a certain date in any court in either of the old counties shall be prosecuted to final judgment in the county where commenced.^ § 442. Rnles as to severing territory. — An act for the crea- tion of a new county out of portions of two old ones provided " that a portion of E. county and a portioirof S. county, hereby proposed to be segregated, shall not be cut off unless the ques- tion of segregation shall be first submitted to the vote of the people of K. county, and also to the voters of that part of range 69 proposed to be detached from S. county, at a special elec- tion called for that purpose. ... In case a majority of the legal voters of said K. county, and of said range 69, voting shall vote in favor of said segregation, then this act shall be in full force and effect." It was held that a majority of the aggregate vote cast in both counties was insufficient, but a majority of each was necessary to the creation of the proposed county .'■' Lands within the limits of a city, used wholly for agricultural purposes, not benefited by their connection with the city and not needed for city purposes, will be severed on petition of the owners, and if not liable for municipal taxes the severance cannot be conditioned on the payment of any part of the municipal indebtedness.' A Texas act which amends and is a part of a title of the Kevised Statutes provides for elections to withdraw territory from corporate limits, but does not direct the manner thereof. It was held that the act was not, there- fore, invalid, but that the election in question should be held as other elections provided for in the title.* The same act di- rects that, upon a petition by fifty qualified voters of terri- tory within the limits of a municipal corporation, the mayor shall order an election to determine whether such territory shall be allowed to withdraw from the municipality, provided that such municipality be not thereby reduced to an area of ' So held in an ejectment ca33 > Evans v. Council Bluffs, 65 Iowa, brought in the new county. Spalding 238. V. Kelly (1887), 66 Mich. 693. ♦Sansom v. Mercer, 68 Tex. 488; 'Van Dusen v. Fridley (1889), 6 S. a, 5 a W. Rep. 62. Dak. 322 ;. s. G, 43 N. W. Eep. 70a 436 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 443. less than one square mile, or one mile in diameter around the center of the original corporate limits. It .was held that where there was no dispute that the requisite number of qjalified voters had signed, and that the withdrawal in contemplation would leave the requisite area, the act of ordering the election involved no exercise of discretion, and mandamus would lie against the mavor in case of refusal.^ § 443. Pennsylvania rule. — A municipal corporation is merely an agency instituted by the sovereign for the purpose of carrying out in detail the objects of government — essen- tially a revocable agency — having no vested right to any of its powers or franchises, the charter or act of erection being in no sense a contract with the State,: and therefore fully subject to the control of the legislature, who may enlarge or diminish its territorial extent or its functions, may change or modify its internal arrangement, or destrby its very existence with the mere breath of arbitrary discretion. Sio volo, sic jubeo, that is all the sovereign authority need say. This much is undeniable and has not been denied." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the power of an original borough supreme over a portion of its territory which had been detached by proceedings in the court of quarter sessions, and constituted a part of a new borough erected in those proceedings, as there was no power in the court in the manner employed to change the limits of a borough. Under the act governing such changes the procedure is by an application made for the purpose, signed by a majority of the freeholders residing within the limits of the borough; due notice must be given as directed by law,, and it must be approved by the grand jury and confirmed by the court. An omission to take these steps was fatal, and the new borough was not properly formed as to the part it detached from the original borough.' ' Sansom v. Mercer, 68 Tex. 488. vested rights of third parties, either 2 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St enlarge or contract the boundaries of 169. boroughs; may consolidate several 8 Darby u Sharon Hill X18S6), 113 such corporations into one or divide Pa. St 66, the court said : — " The leg- one into several. But it is incompe- islature may by appropriate general tent for the court to dismember a bor- laws to that effect, preserving the ough, except as they may be author- §'i44.] PAKTITION. 437 §444. Constitutionality — Wisconsin. — Apart of a towu had been detached by act of the legislature from one county and annexed to another county. By legislative edict it was restored to the former. In the meantime taxes had been col- lected and paid to the county to which it was annexed. It was contended that an act passed subsequently ordering the treasurer of the latter county to pay over the taxes collected and to assign titles to land bought in for such taxes to the county from which the town was originally detached was un- constitutional because it purported to create an indebtedness from the first county to this second, which the legislature could not do. The court conceded that the legislature was not competent to create such an indebtedness, but overruled the contention. They said : — " But if money had been paid by mis- take, growing out of hasty legislation in annexing a town in one county to another without making any provision as to the efifect of the change, it would be competent for the legislature to provide in what manner this mistake should be corrected." ' An act providing for the appointment of commissioners to ad- just and settle the rights of the old and new counties is not a conferring of judicial powers upon them where an appeal is given from their decisions to the regularly constituted courts of the State, which would make it repugnant to the consti- tution of Wisconsin.- The division of existing towns and the ized by law ; the charter of a munici- of quarter sessions in this respect pal corporation grants privilege? and have just such powers as the legisla- immunicies which are perpetual, and ture has given them." their privileges and immunities are • Supervisors of Jackson Co. v. Su- co-extensive with the corporate lim- pervisors of La Crosse Co. (1861), 13 its. Their responsibility as public Wis. 490, in which it was held that a,?ents exists mainly in the perform- an action for the amount claimed ance of acts for the public benefit, could not be sustained until the but they have also a distinctly plaintiffs had submitted the claim to legal personality ; they may make the defendants and it had been dis- contracts, purchase property, create allowed. This act gave no additional debts, borrow money, and they have remedy, unless perhaps a mandamus a, right, to the extent of the limits to compel the treasurer to comply fixed by their charter, to corporate with its provisions, existence ; their rights and responsi- ^ Forest County v. Langlade County bjlities are in this regard analogousfco (1890), 76 Wis. 605 ; s. C, 45 N. W. Rep. those of private corporations, subject 598. Cf. Gough v. Dorsey, 37 Wis. only to the action of the law-making 119. 131, 138; Gaston v. Babcock, 6 power, as we have stated. The courts Wis. 503, 507. 4:38 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 445. creation of new towns by direct action of the legislature is not the " enacting of any special or private law for incorporating any town," within the meaning of the State constitution.* § Ho. Rnlings as to constitntion of Wisconsin on divis- ion of counties. — The constitution of Wisconsin forbade the division of a county with an area of nine hundred square miles or less without submitting the question to a vote of the people of the county and a majority of all the voters voting on the same. It has been held that bodies of water, such as Lake Michigan or a part thereof, lying within the boundaries of the county, are to be computed. And the act for the formation of a county from Washington county, which with the water area had more than nine hundred square miles, was not repugr hant to this section of the constitution.* The original surveys of the United States government are not to be taken as con- clusive by presumption of law. They may be rebutted and impeached as to their correctness ; but, jprima faeie, they are to be presumed to be correct until their accuracy has been prop- erly impeached.' The accuracy of these surveys may be put in issue by the pleadings, and be determined like other questions of fact,* Where a county from which territory was detached appeared by the United States surveys to contain just nine hundred miles, the act forming a new county of the same was only prima facie unconstitutional; but the burden was upon those who supported the act to show that the county contained more.* The provision to submit to a vote is not merely di- rectory to the legislature; it is inhibitory and imperative." An act which submitted tlie act itsdf to popular vote of the electors of the county, but by its entire scope evidently in- tended only to submit the question of division to popular vote, was held valid notwithstanding the apparently uncon- 1 State V. Forest Couijjty, 74 Wis. * State v. Merriman (1857), 6 Wis. 610; S. a, 43 N. W. Rep. 551. 14 2 State V. Larrabee (1853), 1 Wis. s State v. Merriman, 6 Wis. 14 200. Followed in Perry v. State, 9 Wis. 19. » State V. Merriman (1857), 6 Wis. « State v. Merriman (1857), 6 Wis. 14. See, also, Kane tt Parker, 4 Wis. 14. See, also. State v. Elwood, 11 123, 128; "Vroman v. Dewey, 23 Wis. Wis. 17. 530. § 446.] PARTITION. 4:39 stitutional delegation of legislative power by its, inaccurate language J},nd to have provided constitutionally for a division of the county.^ A county having originally less than nine hundred square miles in area may have attached to it such a part of one which can spare the territory, and if by this ad- dition its area is thus increased to more than the area required in this provision of the constitution, it can be divided to form a part or the whole of a new county without submitting the question to a vote.' § 446. The same subject continued — Uniformity of sys- tem of government. — The creation or division of counties, and the adjustment of the respective rights and liabilities of the new and old counties as to the assets and debts of the lat- ter, are not part of the system of county government which by constitution of Wisconsin is required to be uniform.' To make the town board in such a case also the county board of a new county is no infringement of the rule of unity or the rule of uniformity required by the constitution as to a system of town and county government.^ Nor was an dct for dividing a county into three towns in violation of the same constitu- tional provision.* § 447. Title of act. — An act which expressed its object to be to "incorporate" a certain township, but only mentioned ' State V. Elwood (1860), 11 Wis. 17. sity for a county. But a county ne- 2 State V. Cram (1863), 16 Wis. 343. cessitates a board of supervisors, and ' Forest County 7>. Langlade County if it contains but one town, then (1890), 76 Wis. 605 ; s. C, 45 N. W. there can be but one chairman in Rep. 598. Cf. Crawford Co. v. Iowa such town, and it would hardly be Co., 3 Pin. (Wis.) 368 ; Milwaukee v. claimed that one person should con- Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93 ; Morgan v. Be- stitute such board. [Where there are loit City, 7 Wall. 613 ; Depc re I. Belle- several' towns in a new county the vue, 31 Wis. 130; Mount Pleasant «. law here provided that the chairman Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514 ; Knight v. of the supervisors of the different Ashland, 61 Wis. 233; Schriber v. towns should constitute the county Langlade, 68 Wis. 616, 629, 631 ; Yorty board.] It [the board of the town] V. Paine, 62 Wis. 154, 161 ; Hall v. supplies a necessity, and is as nearly Baker, 74 Wis. 118; State v. Forest uniform as practicable, and preserves Co., 74 Wis. 610, 615. the unity of the system in "that it * Cathcart v. Corastock (1883), 56 constitutes the county board from Wis. 590. The court say : — " There town supervisors." may be necessity for more chan one ^ Chicago &c. Ey. Co. v. Langlade town, and yet there may be neces- County (1883), 56 Wis. 614 The 440 PAETITION AND DISSOLCTIOW. [§447. one of the townships from which it was to be taken, is not repugnant to the' constitution of New Jersey, providing that the object of an act must be expressed in its title, because of its omission of the other township furnishing a portion of its territory .1 As to the objection to the title not embracing all the subject-matter of the bill, it was held that the title, " An act to create and establish the county of Lake from portions of Sumter and Orange counties," was broad enough to cover any provision as to the location of tlffe county site or a change of the same at any period or stage of the existence of the county.* court say : — "It is the one s3-st8m which is to be as nearly uniform as practicable. It is that which is to be protected against legislative en- croachment This system which is to be thus guarded is nothing more nor less than the plan or scheme by which the town and county are to be governed. Within the limits of the constitution this plan or scheme of governing either town or county may be changed by the legislature without any interference with the other. The mere fact that the legis- ' iature, in a given case, prescribes a particular method of organizing new towns and bringing them into the one established system, does not nec- essarily imply that the plan or scheme of governing such new towns, after they are thus brought into the system, is to be any different from that in other towns. The incipient steps leading towards organization should not be mistaken for the more advanced stages. A town implies in- ception and progression as well as completed org;anization. The same is true of a county. Induction into the family of local governments is quite a different thing from exercis- ing the functions of such govern- ment after having been thus in- ducted. The one involves action prior to reaching the system, the other implies action after becoming a con- stituent part of it. The unity and uniformity required apply to the or- ganization when completed rather than the methods to bring about such organization." 1 State V. Elvins (1867), 33 N. J. Law, 363, the court saying : — "Any statement in the title, as to the terri- tory to be taken to fox-m the new town, was unnecessary. Such state- ment goes beyond the mere expres- sion of the object of the statute, and is a particularity which the constitu- tion does not require." 2 County Comm'rs of Lake Co. v. State ex rel. &c. (1888), 34 Fla. 363; S. c, 4 So. Rep. 795, the court say- ing : — " Provisions for such change, whether from a temporary or a per- manent, an original or a subsequent location, are a part of the county government established. Any pro- vision relating to its organization or government, though for use in the future, is as much matter properly connected with the establishment of the county as are those relating to the earliest stages of its existence. The subject of the establishment of a county, within the meaning of the constitutional provision in question, includes not merely what is neces- sary to put it on its feet as a county, but anything that may concern its § 448,] PARTITION. 441 §448. Florida decisions on constitutionality of acts ^A section of the Florida statutes (providing for the incorporation, of cities and towns) authorized the county commissioners to prescribe new boundaries of an incorporated town, when, on the petition of five registered inhabitants of the town setting forth that " the boundaries of the town are of unreasonable and unnecessary extent," it shall be found by the commission- ers that the boundaries of such town " are extended beyond necessary and useful limits, and include an undue amount of vacant farming lands." Another section of the law authorized the county commissioners to enlarge the boundaries of any city or town on the application of the corporate authorities thereof. This act has been held constitutional over an ob- jection that it conferred judicial functions upon the county commissioners.^ I^either was the grant of power to a board of county commissioners of a new county, or a majority of them, to locate the temporary county site a delegation of the law-making pow€r ; nor was it prohibited by the constitution of Florida in legislation organizing a new county." In an- other case there was a contention that the legislature had annulled and abrogated a contract between the county and bondholders, by disrobing the county, without her consent, in future existence or operation. Noth- judgment and discretion, adopting ing is moi'e properly connected with such measures under the law as to the subject of establishing a county them may seem conducive to the than making provision for a change publicconvenienceand public needs." of the county site in the future." At thfe same time the court held that The court cited Cooley, Constitu- the power to sever a part of a town tional Limitations, 144 ; Morford v. solely for the purpose of annexing it Unger, 8 Iowa, 88 ; Whiting v. Mt. to another was not conferred by this Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Bright v. act McCuUough, 27 Ind. 233 ; Mayor &c. 2 County Comm'rs of Lake County V. State, 30 Md. 112 ; SUte v. Union, v. State (1888), 24 Fla. 263 : s. c, 4 So. 33 N. J. Law, 350 ; Humboldt County Rep. 795, the court saying : — "Where V. Churchill County Comm'rs, 6 Nev. the legislature has the power to do a 30. thing by law, and the constitution 1 City of Jacksonville v. L'Engle, has not prescribed the manner of do- 20 Fla 344, the court saying that, ing it, or the nature of the thing is " like the powers to hear and deter- not such as to require that it be done mine applications to lay out, open directly by the legislature, it may, and discontinue roads, locate and through the provisions of its law, use build bridges, and similar powers and any proper instrumentality for effect- duties, they merely exercise such ing the result to be accomplished." 442 PAETITION- AOT> DISSOLUTION. [§ 449. creating new counties from the territory composing the county at the time of issuing the bonds. It was held that severing a portion of the territory of a county by act of the legislature was not a taking of " private property for public use without a just compensation." ' § 449. Kansas decision. — A Kansas statute, which was in- tended in its language to make liable for bonds issued by an original old township for building a bridge the people of a new township which had before the building of the bridge been detached from the old one, was held unconstitutional and void, for that inasmuch as under the facts and circumstances of the case such people were under no moral obligation to assist in paying such bonds.'* A former act containing slightly diflPerent provisions was held valid upon the theory that it simply furnished a remedy for the enforcement of a pre-exist- ing moral obligation.* A vote does not create any liability or 1 County Comm'rs of Columbia existing moral obligation should rest County V. King (1869), 13 Fla. 451, upon such people to discharge such the court not being able to " perceive liability. And in such a case though how the State can be substituted as It is clearly within the province of the the debtor, and liabletopay^the debts legislature, in the first instance, to of the county, by the action of the determine the question whether such legislature in changing her bound- a moral obligation exists or not, yet aries." it is not exclusively within its prov- 2 Craft V. Loflnck (1885), 34 Kan. Ince. The determination of the ques- 305. The people of the old township tion finally devolves upon the court had voted for the building of a The court distinguished cases where bridge. Before it was done the new an act of 1873, chapter 143, had been township was detached from it. interpreted. That act made detached Afterwards the new township built territory liable only for bonds that a bridge which was " an imperative had been "authorized and issued" public necessity." The old township prior to the detachment of the terri- built the one for which the bonds in tory ; while section 2 of the act of this case were issued. It did not ap- 1883 made the detached territoi'y - pear that this one was needed. The liable where only a vote authorizing view of the court was that it is nee- the township to issue its bonds was essary in order to enable the legisla- had prior to the detachment ture by retrospective legislation to ^ Comm'rs of Sedgwick County v. impose a legal liability upon the peo- Bunker, 16 Kan. 498. Cf. Comm'rs of pie owning property in a portion of Ottawa Co. v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234; a township or otlier subdivision of Comm'rs of Marion Co. v. Comm'rs the territory of a State where no such of Harvey Co., 36 Kan. 181 ; Chand- liability existed before, that a pre- ler v. Reynolds, 19 Kan. 249. § 450.] PAETITION. 443 any contract, but merely gives authority to afterward create such liability or contract.' § 450. How partition affects officers. — Where a county is divided and two separate and distinct counties formed out of it by act of the legislature, to one of which a new name is given, whilst the other, it is declared, shall be and remain a separate and distinct county by the nam,e of the county as it existed previous to the division, judges of county courts ap- pointed previous to the division who happen to reside in that portion of the territory distinguished as a county with a new name, under the operation of an act requiring judges of county courts to reside within the counties for which they are ap- pointed, lose their offices, and are no longer competent to act under their commissions; those continuing in the portion which retains the original name continue to the expiration of their term.^ It seems that by express enactment the legisla- ture might have continued these judges in office; but failing to do that the office is gone.' On similar reasoning the Su- preme Court of Ohio have held that the county commission- ers of any of the counties from which a new county is formed whose residences are thrown into the new county lose their offices.* Where a town is divided by the incorporation of a part of it as a new town, such new town remains in the same judicial district as the old one, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the statute incorporating it.* A provision in 1 Union Pac. Ey. Co. v, Comm'rs of county of Orleans from definite sub- Davis Co., 6 Kan. 256. sisting towns of Ontario county, the 2 People V. Morrell (1839), 21 Wend, legislature had no power to abridge 563, the court distinguishing Ex the term of ofiice for which the sev- parte McCoUum, 1 Cowen, 550, and eral justices had been appointed while People V. Garey, 6 Cowen, 642, in the their towns belonged to Ontario. The first of which the court held that a distinction was that in neither case legislative organization of a new was there even a change in the name county by combining several definite or territorial limits of the corpora- subsisting towns of other counties, tions to which- the ofiices in question anddeclaringthatthejusticesalready belonged; much less an actual dis- appointed for those towns respect- solution of those corporations, ively should bold for the residue of ' Cases cited in the preceding note, their terms in the same towns, and * State ex rel. &c. v. Walker (1848), relatively to the new county, was 17 Ohio, 135. constitutional ; and the last holding 5 Commonwealth v. Brennan (1889), lh:it on a similar erection of the 140 Mass. 63; s. a, 22 N. E. Rep. 628, 44i PAETITION AND DISSOLITTION. [§451. an act annexing the larger portion of a village to a city that the taxes in the annexed territory should be collected as if the act had not been passed does not have the effect of re'taining a former treasurer of the village in office for the purpose of col- lecting the taxes.' "Where ja portion of a township is declared by proclamation a city of the second class, the residue retains its organization ; and the members of the township board are still de facto officers at least, al^ough they reside within the limits of the new city.* Under the statutes of Nebraska con- cerning township organization, when, in a new town erected by the county board, in the division of the county into towns or townships, at the first meeting of said board, the offices of the toyvn board as well as the town clerk are all vacant, it is the duty of the county clerk to fill such vacancies as well as all other vacancies in the offices of such town by appointment.' Although commissioners living within the territory taken from their county cease to be commissioners unless they remove to parts of the county remaining unaffected by the division, still, if before removal they appoint a county treasurer, their act will be valid as that of de facto officers.* § 451. Where unorganized territory lias been attached to a county. — The Nebraska statute* which provides for attach- ing unorganized territory to the " nearest organized county di- rectly east for election, judicial and revenue purposes" has been construed, and it has been held that the unorganized county did not thereby become a part of the organized one, but for where it was held that a justice of tion of a new treasurer for the vil- the peace with authority to issue lage had become necessary, warrants in criminal cases anywhere 2 Walnut Township v. Jordan (1888), within the district, whose residence 38 Kan. 563 ; S. cI, 16 Pac, Rep, 812. fell within the new town, might con- * State v. Foraey (1887), 31 Neb. tinue to issue warrants in such cases 233; s. C, 31 N. W. Kep. 802, where as above.therein as well as elsewhere this particular township was formed within the district of territory not theretofore constitut- 1 So held in Eetcham v. Wagner ing a precinct or town, and contain- (March, 1892), 61 N. W. Rep. 281, a ing within its boundaries no person case where the former treasurer re- elected as a town oflBcer at any elec- sided in the portion of the village tion. annexed to the city of Detroit, by * State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143. local act, 1891, Na 214, and an elec- " Compiled Stats, of Nebraska, ch. 18, § 146. § 451.] PAETITION. 4ri5 certain purpos,es therein named was placed under its care, and that, therefore, after the organization of such unorganized ter- ritory as a county and the qualification of its officers, taxes on property in the county were payable to them and not to officers of the county to which it was formerly attached.^ So, also, where after the officers of an organized county have levied taxes on property in an unorganized county attached thereto, and before the taxes become due the unorganized county is organ- ized, the taxes are payable to the treasurer of the new county.^ Garfield county which was created by laws of Kansas, 1887, chapter 81, was by chapter 132 attached with other unorgan- ized counties to Hodgeman county for judicial purposes ; chap- ter 142 provided for district courts in Garfield county. These acts were approved by the governor the same day. Chapter 132 was published March 11th, and repealed conflicting pro- visions, and chapter 142 on March 10th. Upon -the question of the legality of the detention of a prisoner by the sheritf of that county, it was held that the several acts mupt be consid- ered together, and that Garfield county was attached to Hodgeman county for judicial purposes only until organized ; after its organization courts should be held in Garfield county.' By laws of Texas, 1856, page 41, Archer county was attached to Clay county for judicial purposes. By the laws 'of 1866, page 94, it was attached to Jack county " for judicial and other purposes." By the laws of 1870, page 53, it was at- tached to Montague county " for judicial purposes " only. This last act was superseded by laws of 1874, page 53, chang- ing the terms of court, which omitted the clause attaching Archer to Montague. In 1879 (Laws 1879, p. 150) it was at- tached to Clay " for judicial and other purposes." It was held that, under the operation of the foregoing statutes. Archer county was not attached to Clay for any purpose in August, 1 Fremont Sijc. R. Co. v. Brown State, and its oflScera become ame- County (1886), 18 Neb. 516 ; s. C, 26 nable to the law for the faithful per- N. W. Kep. 194 ; the court salying formance of their duty.'' that, " being an organized county, ^ Morse v. Hitchcock County (1886), the ligament that bound it to the for- 19 Neb. 566. msr county is severed by the force » jn re Hall (1888), 36 Kan. 670 ; of the organization and it takes its a a, 17 Pac. Eep. 649. place as one of the counties of the 446 PAETITION Aim DISSOLUTION. [§ 452. 1875, and that the registration in the latter county of a deed of land situate in the former was not constructive notice." § 452. Settlement of inhabitants. — When part of the ter- ritory composing a township is by the act of the legislature formed into a new township, those persons who at the time of separation had a legal settlement in the old township, and resided en the territory so cut oflF, acquire ipso facto a legal settlement in the new township." ♦The court said : — " This doc- trine seems to flow from what may reasonably be presumed to have been the object of the legislature in creating the new township, viz.: that instead of the public relations previously existing between the inhabitants and the old township, there should be substituted similar relations between them and the new township." ' This rule was adopted by statute in Massachusetts as early as 1793, but the courts of that State deemed it a principle of the common law deducible from the nature of corporate rights and duties.* Chief Justice Shaw speaks of the statute as " little more than an authoritative declaration of rules which had been before established as the rules by which persons had been held to acquire settlements." * The New York court was divided on this question, but the principle adopted in Massachusetts was approved by Chief Justice Kent." In New Jersey a residence of ten consecutive years in the same dwelling, begun while the dwelling-place is in one township and ended after it has been comprised by act of the legislature within the limits of another township, will confer a legal settlement in the latter township by force of the statute,^ which has been held to be retrospective.* lAlford V, Jones (Tex.), 9 S. W. » Sutton «. Orange, 6 Met 484, 486. Kep. 470. 'Washington v. Stanford, 3 Johns. 2 Overseer of Franklin Township v. 193. Cf. Stillwater o. Green, 9 N. J. Overseer of Clinton Township (1888), Law, 59 ; Bethlehem v. Alexandria, 51 N. J. Law, 93; S. C, 16 Atl. Rep. 33 N. J. Law, 66. 184. ' Rev. Supp. N. J. 800 ; Overseer of ' Overseer &c. v. Overseer &c., cited Franklin Township v. Overseer of in the preceding note. Lebanon Township, 51 N. J. Law, 93 ; < Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass. 384, S. a, 16 Atl. Rep. 184. 390 ; Salem v. Hamilton, 4 Mass. 676, » Marlborough v. Freehold, 50 N. J. 678; Great Barrington v, Lancaster, Law, 509; Woodbridge v. Amboy, 1 14 Mass. 853, 356. N. J. Law, 246 (313). §a 453, 454.] PAETITION. 447 § 453. Territory severed from an old to form a new corpo- ration is a part of the old until the new is fully organized. Where part of a town is detached from it and incorporated as a city by an act of the legislature, which provides for an elec- tion of city officers by a certain time, and the election is not held, thus leaving the organization of the city in abeyance, it continues to be a part of the town until the organization of the city is completed.' §454. Some Wisconsin acts construed. — An act of the legislature provided for a division of a county by which the territory of one town and fractions of other towns was erected into a new county. The construction placed upon this act by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was that the original county had jurisdiction for governmental purposes over the detached territory only until the organization of the new county was effected,, and that as it embraced but one complete town the supervisors of that town became the board of supervisors of thorizing the inhabitants to form by the means provided a local govern- ment was evidently intended for the benefit of the inhabitants, and is pre- sumed to have been made at their in- stance and not upon the considera- tion that the common good and policy of the State demanded the establish- ment of such local government and the separation of the particular ter- ritory for such purpose from the ju- risdiction of county authority. Until an organization by an election and qualification of the number of per- sons being the several integral parts of the corporation, and forming the political body provided for in the lavFS, there could be in being no mu- nicipal corporation or government; and the condition of the inhabitants within the limits named in the law as to rights and duties would con- tinue unchanged and unaSected by the law authorizing them in a corpo- rate capacity to exercise municipal powera" » State V. Button (1869), 25 Wis. 109, the court holding that the act did not propria vigore sever this part of the town so completely as to make the votes of its inhabitants in the town illegal. The- court cite as sus- taining their view, Haynes v. County of Washington, 19 111. 66, where the court said : — " Grants of corporate powers for purposes of local munici- pal government, such as belong to towns and cities, are a delegation of a portion of the general sovereignty of the State designed to enable the inhabitants of particular localities to establish and maintain police regula- tions and to advance their common prosperity. A charter or act of in- corporation is but evidence of the powers delegated, and which powers remain dormant or in abeyance until in the mode pointed out in the .char- ter the inhabitants for whose benefit those powers are granted bring them into life and exercise by an organiza- tion of the local government Here the law incorporating the town in au- 44:8 PAKTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 455. the new county, and the new county was at once an organized county. Upon the organization of the new county the whole of its territory became for the purposes of town government one town ; and the organized town was in effect enlarged so as to embrace the whole of such territory.^ This act was not repugnant to the constitution, which was intended to prohibit the enactment of any special or probate law for incorporating any town or village ly special charter, or for the amendment of such charts. This has no reference to quasircoripor&tions like the towns which exist as political sub- divisions' in this State.^ A new county having been formed of a part of another, the same act providing for an appoint- ment of officers for the new county by the governor, though the suspension of the power of the people to elect their own oificers might be invalid, the offices were properly cre- ated and existed de jure, and the persons appointed thereto having entered upon the duties of such offices were officers de facto whose official action could not be questioned collater- ally.» § 455. Provisions of act as to county sites. — In Florida an act creating a new county has been held constitutional over an objection that by its provisions it allowed the commissioners of the new county to establish a temporary county seat and af terw'ards order an election for a permanent county seat ; it being urged that this amounted to a removal of the county seat, and the constitution forbade removal of county seats ex- cept by a general law.* The Supreme Court of Michigan has 1 Cathcart v. Comstock (1883), 56 tionment and levy of taxes made by "Wis. 580, which sustained the author- their town Bupervisors so elected act- ity of the supervisors of the town to ing as a county bpard was properly levy and apportion taxes upon such made for the next 3'ear. property as was situated in the origi- ^ Cathcart v, Comstock (1883), 56 nal town, and the sales of such prop- Wis. 590. erty made by the county treasurer of '^ Chicago & N. W. Ey. Co v. Lang- the new county, after he was elected, lade County (1883), 58 Wis. 614, action as tothe period before an election of to set aside an assessment of taxes on the other county officers. The elec- the ground of lack of authority of tion of town officers for the town as the officers of a new county to assess, enlarged by virtue of the statute etc. afterwards was also held to have * County Comm'rs of Lake County been proper, and assessment, appor- r. State (1888), 24 Fla, 263 ; a, c., 4 § 456.] PARTITION. 449 also held that an election of a permanent county seat under the provisions of the laws of Michigan organizing the county of Iron, and naming a temporary county seat until the next general election, when it provided for the election of a perma- nent one, could not be regarded as the removal of a county seat once established, and that the law was not unconstitu- tional for not conforming to the requirements of the constitu- tional provision for such removals.' But the Supreme Court of West Virginia has held that the provisions of the statute law of "West Virginia, prescribing the manner in which the county seat of cmy county may be relocated by a vote of the people at a general election, apply to all the counties in the State, including those whose county seats were declared-per' nianent in the special act of the legislature creating such counties.' § 456. Apportionment of liabilities. — When a county, city or town is divided and its territory reduced or set apart by legislative authority, the legislature may make regulations not only to apportion the property of the corporate body among the new members or communities created, but to throw the obligation to pay the debts of the entire body upon the several parts in proportion to the taxable wealth of each.' The Michigan statute relating to settlements between the re- So. Rep. 795, the court holding that ganizing the county. The court the proviso, " that in the forma- said : — " . . . The power to make tion of new counties the county seat a county . . . necessarily includes may be temporarily established by the power to create and do every-^, law," qualifies CJonstitution, article 8, thing necessary and proper to its section 4, that " the legislature shall perfect organization that is not pro- have no power to remove the county hibited by other portions of the con- seat of any county, but shall provide stitution, and a county site is, to say by general law for such removal," the least, a proper, if not necessary, so far as it was a limitation upon the element of county organization." power of the legislature. By the ' Atfy-Genl v. Board of County proviso there was reserved to the Canvassers (1887), 64 Mich. 607 ; S. c.',' legislature the power to establish for 31 N. W. Rep. 539. the new county a temporary county ^ Welch v. County Court, 39 West seat, which should not be subject to Va. 63 ; s. o., 1 S. K Rep. 337. such limitation, but should be the 'Canova v. Commissioners &c. county seat only until the permanent (1883), 18 Fla. 513. See where this is county seat should be established in well considered. County Commissiori- the manner provided by the act or- ers v. King, 13 Fla. 451, 473. 29 450 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 456. spective boards of supervisors where two counties are formed out of one has been held not to contemplate any other divis- ion tjiSLTi of existing property and liabilities, nor provide for the assumption by one county of the whole burden of State taxation for both counties until the next equalization.^ And a provision requiring State taxes to be levied for five years on the basis of the last equalization, has been held not to mean that when two counties are made out of one the old county must bear the whole burden of S^te tax as before the division, until the next equalization. The proportion which the assess- ment rolls of the year when the last equalization was made, of all the towns in the new county, bear to the aggregate assess- ments of all the towns then in the old (undivided) county, furnishes the rule of apportionment for the two counties until the next equalization.^ The New Jersey act which divided the township of Hackensack into the townships of Eidgefield, of Englewood and of Palisades, and which declared that the in- habitants of said townships should be liable to pay their just proportions of the debts of the inhabitants of the township of Hackensack, did not, propria vigore, make any single township legally responsible for any particular debt, even though the debt had been wholly contracted for work done within its territorial limits.' The legislature has power to divide coun- ties and towns at its pleasure, and to apportion the common property and the common burdens in such manner as to it may seem reasonable and equitable.* Where the General As- 1 Supervisors of Ontonagon County 14 Or. 897. See, also, Canova v. V. SupervisoiB of Gogebic County Comm'rs of Bradford County, 18 Fla. (1889), 74 Mich. 781; & c, 43 N. W. 513; Trinity County v. Polk County, Eep. 170. 68 Tex. 331 ; Pulaski County v. Judge • Supervisors &c,r. Supervisors &c., of Saline County, 37 Ark. 389; Super- cited in the preceding note. visors of Chickasaw County v, 3u- ' So held in Vanderbeok v. Inhabit- pervisors of Sumner County, 58 Miss, ants of Englewood (1877), 39 N. J. 619; Eagle v. Beard, 88 Ark. 497; Law, 345, sustaining a nonsuit which State v. McFadden, 33 Minn. 40 ; had been ordered in an action brought Askew v. Hale County, 54 Ala. by one on a claim against Hacken- 639 ; Comm'rs Currituck County v. sack township for work done on Comm'rs of Dare County, 79 N. C. Engle street which became a part of 565 ; Comm'rs of Sedgwick County Englewood. v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498. Morrow County y. Hendryx (1887), § i57.] PAETITIOIT. 451 sembly created a new county out of territory formerly be- longing to other counties, and to compensate such counties added territory to them from adjoining counties, it was com- petent also to provide that the county receiving the accession should levy an equitable proportion of the indebtedness of the county from which such territory was taken.' § 457. Rules as to property and liabilities.— TTpon the division of a municipal corporation and the organization of a new one out of a portion of the old, in the absence of legis- lative provision to the contrary, the old corporation owns all the public property within its new limits and is responsible for aU the debts of the corporation contracted before the act of separation was passed. The new corporation has no claim to any of the property except what falls within its boundaries and to which the old corporation has no claim.* Where two separate towns are created out of one, each in the absence of any statutory regulation is entitled to hold in severalty the public property of the old corporation which falls within its limits.' If a town is divided and a part of its territory with the inhabitants therein is incorporated into a new town, the old town will retain all the property and be responsible for the existing liabilities, unless there is some legislative provis- ion to the contrary. But upon such division the legislature has constitutional authority to provide that the property owned by the original town shall be apportioned or held for the use and enjoyment of the inhabitants of both towns, and to impose upon each town the payment of a share of the cor- porate debts.* An act creating a new county out of territory formerly embraced in another county failing to provide for a 1 Putnam County v. Auditor of itants of Hampshire County v. In- AUen County, 10 Ohio St 323. habitants of Franklin County, 16 2 Laramie County v. Albany Mass. 86, where the same doctrine is '^Tanty, 92 U. S. 307; Bristol r. New reiterated. In support of second Chesler, 3 N. H. 531. clause, see Brewster v. Harwich, 4 3 North Hempsted v. Hempsted, Mass. 278 ; Randolph v. Braintree, 4 3 Wend. 109 ; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Mass. 315 ; Harrison v. Bridgton, 16 East Hartford, 16 Conn. 149, 171. Mass. 16 ; Windham v. Portland, 4 < North Yarmouth v. Skillings Mass. 384; Minot v. Curtis, 7 Mass. (1858), 45 Me. 133. In support of first 441 ; Brunswick v. Dunning, 7 Mass. clause, see Inhabitants of Windham 445; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. V. Portland, 4 Mass. 384, and Inhab- 86. 452 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 458. division of the school fund, the whole fund belonging to it be- fore the division may be retained by the parent county.* § 458. The same subject continued. — Upon the formation of a new county out of a portion of another, the debt of the latter to the State was apportioned between the two, and each issued certificates for its share. By the acts under which the debt was originally incurred a railroad company for whose benefit it was incurred was requifed to pay certain sums into the State treasury to apply on the debt. It was held that the sums paid by such company should be applied to the certifi- cates of the two counties in proportion to the share of debt as- sumed by each.* A general law providing for the apportion- ment of debts and credits in all cases where new counties are created does not deprive subsequent legislatures of the power to provide otherwise as to counties created by them.' The divided county has the same rights, duties and burdens as be- fore in respect to the remaining territory, except as changed by the legislature.* School districts are corporations for cer- tain specified purposes and neither their rights nor their obli- gations are affected by a change of their names or alteration of their boundaries.' In the change of county lines whereby territory is detached from one county and attached to another, the , county acquiring the additional territory is not .entitled to demand from the other any portion of the funds in its treasury.^ If part of the territory of a town is separated from it by annexation to another, or the creation of a new corpora- tion, without any provision for contribution to the. debts of the old town, and that retains all its property and franchises, • Cook V. School District No. 12 school funds until they are accred- (1889), 13 Colo. 453, the court holding ited to the several school districts, that a making of the estimate of 2 state v. H^rshaw, 73 Wia 211; what proportion of the school fund s. C, 40 N. W. Eep. 641. of a county belongs to the several ' Forest County «. Langlade County school districts by the county super-. (1890), 76 Wis. 605; s. a, 45 N. W. intendent under General Statutes of Eep. 598. Nebraska, section 3067, was not of * Attorney-General v. Fitzpatrick, itself sufficient to vest in the sev- 2 Wis. 542. eral school districts the ownership 6 School District u Macloon, 4 Wis. of their respective shares ; therefore 79. concluding that the counties and not ° Crawford Counter v. Marion the school districts are owners of the County, 16 Ohio, 466. § 459,] PAK'nxiON. 45a such detached portion is not liable therefor.' A county from which territory is detached to form part of a new county is entitled to deduct its existing indebtedness from the bridge fund as well as other moneys previously collected and remain- ing in its treasury at the time of the division, and the balance only, after making the deduction, is required to be divided between the old and new counties." If an equitable claim exists against a new county in favor of an old county growing out of its being erected from the latter, it is competent for the legislature to create by law a board of commissioners to ascertain, settle and report the amount due, and further, to compel the board of supervisors of the county to levy a special tax to pay the amount reported to be due.' It has been held in California that a claim of an old county against k new one formed out of it for the payment of its proportion of the debt of tJie old is of an equitable nature only and it required leg- islation to enable the old county to enforce it.* The act form- ing the new county was held not to require the new county to pay interest on its proportion of the debt of the old.* § 459. A Wisconsin case on property rights. — The towns of Wisconsin by operation of the laws of the Territory became the owners of lands which were held for the benefit of those corporations. When the Territory became a State these rights were preserved by the constitution and laws of the State. The partitipn of a town and the annexation of a portion of its territory to another municipality which was incorporated as a city made no change in these rights. The town continued to hold its title to this real estate. The legislature had an un- doubted right to change the territorial limits of municipal corporations, and to detach this territory from one and annex it to another, and in so doing might provide for an equitable division of the common property. But where this detaching and annexation is done without providing for the disposal 1 Depere v. Bellevue, 31 Wia 120. * Beals v. Supervisors Amador Co., 2 Fulton County V. Lucas County, 28 CaL 449. 2 Ohio St 508. " Beals v. Supervisors, cited in the » People V. Alameda County, 26 preceding nota CaL 641. 454 PAETITIOir AND DISSOETJnOIT. [§ 460. of the land, under sach circumstances that the assent of the town to part with its title cannot be presumed, it continues the owner notwithstanding the separation. The legislature has not the power, either directly or indirectly, to divest a municipality of its private property without the consent of its inhabitants.^ § 460. Rules as to apportionment of liabilities and reme- dies. — A village may be created out of the territory of a city, and as between the city and the village the legislature may apportion the existing indebtedness. But when the cor- poration which created the debt is shorn of its population and taxable property to such an extent that there is no reasonable expectation of its meeting its present indebtedness, and it is unable to do so, the creditors at least can enforce the propor- tionate share of their obligations against the two corporations carved out of one, both being liable to the extent of the prop- erty set off to each respectively." Where a county has been divided by an act of the legislature, one portion thereof re- taining the former name, county seat, county organization, county buildings and all other county property, and the other portion being formed into new counties, the county retaining I Town of Milwaukee v. City of Mil- merely private corporation or person, waukee (1860), 13 Wis. 93. Dixon, Its rights of property once acquired, C J., said : — " The difficulty about though designed and used to aid it in the question is to distinguish between the discharge of its duties as a local the corporation as a civil institution government, are entirely distinct or delegation of merely political and separate from its powers as a power, and as an ideal being en- political or municipal body. It might dowed with the capacity to acquire sell its property, or the same might and hold property for corporate or belostordestroyed, and yet its power other purposes. In its political or of government would remain. In governmental capacity it is liable at' its character of a political power, or any time to be changed, modified or local subdivision of government, it is destroyed by the legislature; but in a public corporation, but in its char- its capacity of owner of property, de- acter of owner of property it is a signed for its own or the exclusive private corporation, possessing the use and benefit of its inhabitants, its same rights, duties and privileges as vested rights of property are no more any other." See, also, Bailey v. the subject of legislative interference Mayor &c. of New York, 3 Hill, 531. or control, without the consent of * Brewis v. Duluth, 3 McC. (U. S. the corporators, than those of a C. Ct.) 319. § 4:61.] PABTITIOK, 455 such name and organization is responsible and liable solely for the entire indebtedness of the county at the time of such divis- ion, and cannot bring an action for contribution against the counties thus set off, unless specially authorized to do so by a legislative provision.' Where a city was created out of a town by an act of the legislature, which made the city and the town liablp proportionately for the indebtedness of the town created before the city and town were dissolved, it was held that the apportionment of this liability between the town and the city depending upon accounts and computations founded upon the proper assessment roll, which could not be made in an action at law, a bill in equity was the proper remedy to apportion such indebtedness between the two municipalities, especially as authority to tax for the payment of municipal liabilities, in cases like this, was in the nature of a trust.* But where it appears that the property left to the old corporation has in- creased rapidly and is sufficient to meet the debt apportioned to it, there is no legal or equitable reason for going behind the legislative apportionment." § 461. Rules In North Carolina as to settlement between new and old counties. — Whore a new county was created providing that " that portion of the citizens and taxable prop- erty taken from '' two other counties " and attached to the " new county " shall not be released from their portion of the outstanding public debts " of the two counties " contracted before the passage of the act ; " and the matter to be adjusted by the county commissioners of the three counties in such manner and mode as might be agreed upon, and one of these counties appointed a commissioner, but the new county took no action whatever, it was held that the county appointing a commissioner could maintain an action against the new county to have an account taken to ascertain the indebtedness at the passage of the act, and obtain judgment for the amount found due as the new county's proportion, and for mcmdamua •County Comm'rs v. County > Morgan v. Beloit, cited in the pre- Comm'rs, 1 Wy. Ty. 140. ceding note. 2 Morgan v. Beloit (1868), 7 Wall. 613. 456 PAKTITION AKD DISSOLUTION. [§ 462. to compel its county authorities to levyupon the -peopie and property detached from the complainant county to pay said judgment.' The interest and claims of the two counties from which territory was detached against the new county being several, it was not necessary to join the other county as a party plaintiff.'' The following rulings were made upon the merits : — The act created no change in the liability of the peo- ple and property taken from the complainant county. It con- tinued their liability just as it stood at the time of the sepa- ration, and as if no separation had taken place. The court established this rule for determination of the indebtedness of the complainant county. Judgments rendered against it be- fore the separation and paid after with money raised before should be deducted. The total indebtedness at the time of separation should be reduced by the balance of taxes collected or collectible in the year before and on hand six months after the separation, since such balance was applicable to the pay- ment of indebtedness outstanding one year before the separa- tion. But such indebtedness should not be reduced by the amount of the taxes collected for the year before separation, and applied to the current expenses for the six months after, since those taxes were expressly designed by law for that pjir- pose. Nor should it be reduced by an amount equal to the Talue of certain lands held at the time of separation, in excess of the needs of the county. The people detached had no right to have such lands sold to pay the county debt, in the absence of an appropriation to that purpose before the separ ration.' § 462. Rules for adjustment of liabilities. — Power being reposed in the commissioners of an old and a new county formed from it to apportion the debt of the old between the two, and to adjust and settle all matters of revenue proper to be done on account of the formation of the new county, the 1 Comm'rs of Granville v, Comm'rs ' Comm'rs of Granville v. Comm'rs of Vance, 107 N. C. 201 ; s. a, 12 S. K of Vance, cited in the preceding not& Eep. 39, ' Comm'rs of Granville v, Comm'rs of Vance, 107 N. C. 391. § 462.] PAETITION. 457 new county is liable for its share of the existing debt, without making any deduction on account of cash in the treasury of the old county, or of unpaid taxes due to it.^ And such new county is liable in prcBsenti to the old county for its share of the debt though part of the debt is not due.^ And claims against the old county which are the subject of pending litigar tion, and the validity of which is denied by that county, cannot be included in the debt to be apportioned.' "Where, upon the formation of a new town out of part of the territory of an old one, a part of the indebtedness of the old town is prorated to the new under Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, section 672, re- quiring the new town to pay its proportion of the indebtedness of the old, but the board divides this indebtedness according to the assessment roll of the old town next preceding the last, instead of according to the last one as required by that stat- ute, whereby the new town is charged with less than it would have been had the apportionment been made as required, the new town cannot resist payment of its proportion on the ground that the apportionment was not in accordance with the statute.* Under the same statute, after an apportionment of the debt, the old town can sue for the amount due from the new town if it refuses to pay.' Where a new county in- cluding a portion of an old one has been created under an act which declared that the detached portion of the old county should remain liable for the payment of certain old bonds of the latter, and after the date of this act the old county had refunded a portion of those bonds and issued new ones, it was held that the new bonds were only evidence of the old debt, 1 Board of County Comm'rs of adjusted under act of Pennsylvania, Cheyenne County v. Board of County June 1, 1887 (P. L. 385), which pro- Comm'rs of Bent County, 15 Colo, vides for adjusting the liabilities for 330; S. C, 25Pac. Eep. 508. "all indebtedness" of a borough 2 Board of Comm'rs &o. v. Board when proceedings are commenced of Comm'rs &c., 15 Colo. 330. for changing its limits. Appeal of 8 Case cited in the preceding note. Burgess &a of Darby, Appeal of On the organization of a new bor- Grayson, 140 Pa. St 250 ; S. C, 31 Atl. ough out of part of an old one which Eep. 394. has a funded debt ander act of * Town of Ackley v. Town of Vilas Pennsylvania, May 39, 1889 (P. L. (Wis.), 48 N. W. Eep. 357. 393), the rights and liabilities of the 'Town of Ackley v. Town of Vilas, old borough and its creditors may be cited in the preceding note. 458 PABTrntarAHD ryiBSOLvrtfiBSfi- [§463. and the detached portion of the old county still remained a part of it for the payment of the bonds.^ § 463. Liabilities which fall upon the portion severed. — In the division of towns the legislature may apportion the burdens between the two, and may determine the proportion to be borne by each.^ A new count}' may be made liable for a ratable proportion of the existing liabilities of the counties out of which it is created under Bie constitution of Nebraska.' Where territory, parts of two townships, was subjected to certain incumbrances in its former relations, justice requires that the same incumbrances should go with the territory when taken for a new town.* A county created from a portion of another has been held in Arkansas, in a proceeding to deter- mine its pro rata indebtedness on account of liabilities of the old county, as provided in the act creating it, to be liable for its jpro rata of such portion of the bonds signed before the division of territory for the purpose of building a court-house and jail, as were absolutely negotiated and sold, as well as in- terest from the date of negotiation. There was a contention that as they had been all signed and placed in the hands of the county commissioners the new county was bound for its share of the whole. This the court overruled for the reason that as long as they were in the hands of the old county's agents unnegotiated they were the property of the county, and there was no debt or liability." Under an act creating a new county, A., out of parts of old counties, among which was B., and pro- viding that the new county " shall pay its portion of the debts of the counties respectively from which said county is formed, J Montgomery County v, Menifee Counties (1886), 9 Colo, 639; a. G, 21 County Court CKy.), 18 S. W. Eep, Paa Rep. 478. 1031. * State v. Elvins (1867), 33 N. J. Law, 3 Sill V. Village of Coming, 15 N. Y. 363, holding an assessment upon the 297 ; Mayor v. State ex rel. the inhabitants of a portion of the new Board of Police of Baltimore, 15 Md. town for a debt of the town from 376 ; City of Olney v. Harvey, 50 IIL which it was formed, of which these 453 ; Borough of Dunsmore's Appeal, prosecutors were not residents, valid. 53 Pa. St, 374. ' Hempstead County Court v. How. ' Opinion of Supreme Court in the ard County (1885), 51 Ark. 344 See, Matter of the Establishment of New also, Phillips County v. Lee County, 34 Ark. 340. § 464.] PAKTmoiT. 459 said proportions to be determined by the assessed value of the . . . property within its limits," the supervisors of the old counties continued to be the auditing boards of the new as to all pre-existing debts. It was also held that where bonds is- sued by the supervisors of B. county for a debt existing at the time of the creation of A. county were voluntarily paid off by the officers of B. county without objection by A. county, the latter was bound to contribute to B. her portion of the debts thus paid.' "Where the only provision in a statute organizing a new county from parts of others in reference to its liabili- ties because of the territory detached is that the property taken from these several counties respectively shall be subject to taxation " for the jpro rata proportion of any debts " due by the several counties, it subjects the county to a propor- tionate liability for debts but not for contingent liabilities arising out of a breach of duty.* § 464. Defenses to claims growing out of partition. — Where a new county has been formed from another by an act providing that it should issue '\\&jgro rata share of bonds for an indebtedness of its parent county to a third from which it was severed, for which it would receive its share of railroad stock issued to the original county in exchange for its bonds under the internal improvement laws of Florida, the deprecia- tion of such railroad stock constitutes no valid reason for the refusal on the part of the new county to pay its proportion of the indebtedness.' Before a county from which a new one is 1 Chickasaw County Supervisors v. suit against it on account of the bonds Clay County Supervisors (1885), 62 is a suit against the parts set off, and Miss. 325. Where Carter county, Ken- a judgment against the county was tucky, had issued bonds, and portions held to be payable out of taxes col- of its territory had been taken to lected within the boundaries of the form other counties by acts which original county. County of Carter provided that the citizens and prop- v. Linton, 120 U S. 517; s. CL, 7 Sup. erty within the old limits should re- Ct Rep. 650. main liable to taxation for the pay- 2 Askew v. Hale County (1875), 54 ment of those bonds as though " this Ala. 639. act had never been passed," the parts » Comm'rs of Baker Co. v. State of the county set off to form other (1882), 18 Fla. 512, the court saying counties which were interested in the that " the act . . . did not create bonds remained for the purposes of an indebtedness and impose it upon the debt a part of Carter county. A [the new] county, but intended that 460 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 464. formed can proceed to compel the latter to issue bonds for its fTO rata share of the bonded indebtedness of the former to the one from which it was formed, it must appear that the plaint- iff county has issued and delivered its bonds for the whole amount to its parent county.' In the same case -the fact that the new county was not a party to mandamus proceedings of the original county against the parent county was held not to afifect its liability; and it was not precluded by a judgment in that case from shewing the^rue amount of its liability in any proceedings of its parent county to compel the payment of its pro rata share of the indebtedness to the original county. The court ruled, however, that a mere answer that a sum stated was not the correct amount was not sufficiently spe- cific ; that a return to an alternative writ of mandamus should, for the purpose of making an issue, set up a positive denial of the facts, or should state other facts sufficient to defeat relator's right. Under the Illinois statutes, providing that, when a por- tion of one town is taken therefrom and added to a second town, the second town shall bear a due proportion of the debts of the first town, to be apportioned by the supervisors and as- sessors of the two towns, a suit was brought for mandamus to compel the supervisors and assessors of the town receiv- ing the addition to comply with the law, but this action was not commenced until more than ten years after the cause accrued. It was held that there was no such trust made out by the case as to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations." This was a case simply involving private rights, a matter of indebtedness between two corporations. No public rights were involved or the rule would have been different.' its due proportion of the debt [due which a proceeding to apportion the from the county of -which it was indebtedness of the old and the new formed to an original county from town formed from it, of the bonded which this last was formed] should indebtedness of the former, was held be paid by it as though there had barred by the statute of limitations, been no division of the parent under which it should have been county." begun within five years fron. the 1 Comm'rs of Baker County v. State time the right accrued. (1883), 18 Fla. 512, reversing an order » People v. Town of Oran (1887), 121 granting a mandamus. 111. 650 ; s. C, 13 N. E. Eep. 726. See, 2 Peoples. Town of Oran (1887), 131 also. County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 EL 650; S. a, 13 N. E. EepL 726, in IlL 84; School Directors v. School § 465.] PARTITION, 461 § 465. Enforcement of obligations of old and new.— The acts severing a part of a county and creating of it new coun- ties with a provision that the new counties should compensate the old county according to the relative and^ro^ato assessed valuation of the property in the territory detached, it was held neither necessary nor practicable to make the new coun- ties parties in a proceeding against the old county to enforce collection of its bonds.' A county had received in exchange for its bonds, under the Internal Improvement Act of Florida, an equivalent in shares of a railroad company. A new county was formed afterwards of a part of its territory. The new county issued its bonds, and upon delivery to the commission- ers of the original county the latter duly assigned over to its commissioners shares of this stock to equal the amount of the new county's bonds. It was held that this assignment transferred to the new county a proprietary interest in that stock, and that the county could enforce its right to have those shares transferred on the books of the railroad company whenever it was desired.* And the proprietary rights of the new county were not affected by the fact that the old county, after the assignment, had voted the whole number of the shares originally given to it for its bonds, which were still stand- ing in its name. It had parted with its right of property and the new county had gained it.' The acceptance by a new county of its share of the railroad stock issued to the old county from which it was severed in exchange for its bonds, and the issuing of the bonds of the new to the old therefor, fixed upon the new county the liability for its bonds, and the Supreme Court of Florida ordered a peremptory mandamus Directors, 105 HI. 653, in the first of corporationa, like private citizens, which the rule is stated as " our [the may plead or have pleaded against court's] understanding of the law is, them the statute of limitations." that as respects all public rights, or ' County Commissioners v. King, as respects property held for pubMc 13 Fla. 451. use upon trusts, municipal corpora- ' State v. County Commissioners of tions are not within the operation of Suwaunee County (1884), 31 Fla. 1. the statute of limitations ; but in re- ' State v. County Commissioners of gard to contracts or mere private Suwaunee County (1884), 31 Fla. 1. rights the rule is different^ and such 462 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 466. to the oflBcers of the new county to levy a tax to pay th6m.* Where by the error of the auditor-general the whole tax, after the division of its territory, has been paid by the old county, its remedy is by an action at law against the new county to recover the latter's proportionate share ; and not by mcmdamus to compel a settlement between the respective boards of supervisors.' The legislature has power, upon the creation of a new county by division of an old one, to make special provisions for adjusting the debts and credits be- tween them, and the enforcement of their respective claims, and they are not obliged to enforce such claims in the manner prescribed in general statutes.' A township cannot divest it- self of its liability to pay its indebtedness by altering its boundaries and changing its name.* The obligation of a new county to issue its bonds or to pay its debts in the manner provided in the act creating the same is not affected or controlled by subsequent constitutional or legislative enact- ment. The obligation of the contract cannot be thus im- paired." § 466. Miscellaneons. — When a new county is created out of a part of an old county, the old county takes the county property and becomes liable for the whole of the county in- debtedness, in the absence of legislative provision to the con- trary, and is therefore liable to pay the whole of the State levy of taxes charged upon the whole county at the time of the division.' An act of Texas authorized the organization ' State V. County Commissioners of * So held in Walnut Township v. Suwannee County (1884), 31 Fla. 1. Jordan (1888), 38 Kan. 563; s. G, 16 The respondent in this case filed sev- Pac. Rep. 813, in which, after a city eral defenses, and asked that the of the second class had heen pro- issues be tried by a jury. The court claimed as to a portion of a township^ denied the motion, holding that the the city thereby detached from it issues in such matters were triable was adjudged to be liable for its pro only by the court rata of warrants issued by the origi- 2 So held in Supervisors of Ontona- nal township, gon County v. Supervisors of Goge- * Commissioners' of Baker Countyv bic County (Mich.), 49 N. W. Rep. V. State (1883), 18 Fla. 513. 170. « Gilliam County v. Wasco County ' Forest County v. Langlade (1887), 14 Or. 535 ; s, G, 18 Paa Repw County, 76 Wis. 605 j s. a, 45 N. W. 334 Rep. 598. § 466.] PAETinoN. 4C3 of Eeeves county out of a portion of the territory of Pecos county, but, owing to the delay of the commissioners and judges of Pecos county, such organization was not perfected until the lapse of several months, and meantime the inhab- itants of that portion included in the new county paid taxes into the treasury of Pecos county. It was held that the delay of the officers of Pecos county to do their duty did not give , Eeeves county the right to recover such taxes from Pecos county.' In Wisconsin the county of M. was organized out of territory theretofore embraced in the county of O., and it was enacted that each county should be the exclusive owner of all real property within its boundaries, and that the treas- urer of O. county should, upon demand by the treasurer of M. county, " assign to the county of M. all tax certifi- cates in his office upon lands situated in the county of M." It was held that the act itself did not pass to M. county the legal title to tax certificates on lands in that county held by O. county, but that the legal title remained in the latter county until the assignment provided for was made.^ The constitution of Colorado requires that each new county, on its establishment, shall be made responsible for a ratable proportion of the " then existing liabilities of the county or counties " from which it is formed. Two counties were carved out of an old one, under acts providing for the en- forcement of this mandate and that " all county records and other property " theretofore belonging to the old county should remain its property. They further provided for a tri- bunal to adjust and settle all matters of revenue proper to be done on account of the formation of the new counties, and to apportion the indebtedness of the old county. It was held that the new counties were not entitled to any part of the surplus funds of the old county.' On the division of a town- ship into two townships, each is entitled to the public prop- erty which falls within its territorial limits ; but, as to money 1 Reeves County v. Pecoa County, 2 Hall v. Baker (1889), 74 Wis. 118; 69 Tex. 177; 8. a, 7 S. W. Rep. 54, S. C. 43 N. W. Rep. 104. upon the principle that a new county s Washington County v. Weld organized out of a portion of the County (1889), IS Colo. 152 ; s. C, 80 territory of an old one is not entitled Pac. Rep. 273, to any funds nor subject to any ob- ligations of the latter. 464 PAETinoN Am) dissolution. [§ 467. and choses in action, the respective claims must be adjusted upon principles of equity, and the. new township is entitled to a proportionate share of the funds realized from taxes, based on the amount of taxable property in the territory taken from the old township and the number of persons therein against whom a poll-tax was assessed, while it should receive a proportionate share of the special school fund, based on the school enumeration of such territory.* % (h) DiSSOLDTIOW. § 467. Dissolution — How effected In general. — In Eng- land a municipal corporation may be dissolved by an act of parliament ; ^ by the loss of an integral part ; * by a surrender of its franchises ; * or by forfeiture of its charter.' In the United States the law is different in some respects. Incorporated towns and cities being but arms and instrumentalities of the State government, creatures of the legislature, and subject to its control and will, it may, as it can establish, also abolish them at its pleasure.' The Supreme Court of California say : — " And as a city may, by legislative enactment, spring from the iTowle V. Brown (1886), 110 Ind. Bewdley, 1 P. "Wms. 207; Banbury 65; s. c, 10 N. E. Rep. 626; follow- Case, 10 Mod. 346; Rex v. Tregony, ing Johnson v. Smith, 64 Ind. 275. 8 Mod. 129 ; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 As to equity jurisdiction and adjust- Burr. 1870 ; Bacon v. Bobertson, 18 ment upon equitable principles, see How. 480; Smith v. Smith, 3 Des- 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., §§ 173, 186, saus. (8. C.) 557. 189 ; Tartman v. State ex rel, 109 * Bex v. Osbourne, 4 East, 326 ; Ind. 360; Mount Pleasant v. Beck- Rex v. Miller, 6 Term Rep. 277; with, 100 U. S. 514. As to rights of Howard's Case, Hutton, 87 ; Grant property in general, see 1 Dillon on on Corp. 306. Munic. Corp., § 188 (3d ed.); North * Rex v. Grosvenor, 7 Mod. 199: Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. Smith's Case, 4 Mod. 55; Bexv. Sand- 109; School Tp. of Allen v. School ers, 3 East, 119; Rex v. Kent, 13 Town of Macy, 109 Ind. 559. East, 220 ; Attorney-General v. 2 2 Kyd on Corp. 447 ; Coke Litt 176, Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220. and note ; Rex v. Amery, 2 Term Rep. ^ Williams v. City of Nashville 515; Glover, 408; Angell & Ames (Tenn., 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 364 See, on Corp., § 767 ; 2 Kent's Com. 305 ; also, Luehrman v. Taxing Dist, 2 County Comm'rs v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403 ; Lea (Tenn.), 433, and authorities there State V. Trustees &c., 5 Ind, 77. cited ; State v. Wilson, 12 Lea (Tenn.), ' Rex V. Morris, 3 East, 215 ; Rex 257 ; State v. Waggoner, 88 Tenn. V. Stewart, 4 East, 17; Rex v. Pass- 393; s. a, 12 S. W. Rep. 731; Cooley's more, 2 Term Bep. 341 ; Begina v. Const Lim. 330, 331. § 468.] DISSOLTTTloa. 4:65 body of the county, being the first subdivision of the territory and political power of the State, there is no reason in law why it may not be resolved back to its original elements, or why the power that has called this political being into exist- ence may not again destroy it. There is no limitation on the power of the legislature in this respect, and economy and convenience may often require that an act incorporating a city should be repealed, and the inhabitants thereof placed in their original situation." ' § 468. The same subject continued. — There is no constitu- tional restriction upon the power of the legislature to abolish municipal and county organizations in Kansas, and the exist- ence of the power is not disputed and cannot be doubted.^ A municipal corporation is not dissolved by the failure to elect oflBcers.' The existence of a corporation does not depend upon the existence of ofiicers. The people have the right to elect them but they are mere agents of the people. The cor- poration might become dormant or be suspended by the re- moval of all the people from it, but the failure to elect oflBcers while the right or capacity to elect them remains will not dis- solve a corporation.* Wilson, Justice, in a dissenting opinion, discussing the power of a legislature to destroy a county, to prevent a misapprehension of the opinion of the Illinois court iPeople V. Hill(1859),7 Cal. 97, 103. expressly overruled in Blessing v. 2 So held in State v. Hamilton (1888), City of Galveston, 42 Tex. 659. 40 Kan. 333 ; s. C, 19 Pac. Rep. 733, " Dillon on Munio. Corp. (4th ed.), approving and following State v. Os- § 166. See, also, Bacon v. Robertson, borne (1887), 36 Kan. 530 ; s. c, 13 18 How. 480 ; Lowber v. Mayor &c., 5 Pac. Rep. 850. See, also. Division of Abb. Pr. 325 ; Clarke v. Rochester, 5 Howard Co., 15 Kan. 194 ; In re Hin- Abb. Pr. 107 ; Welch u. St. Genevieve, kle, 31 Kan. 713 ; State v. Meadows, 1 1 Dill. 130 ; Philips v. Wickham, 1 Kan. 90; Duncombe v. Prindle, 13 Paige Ch. 590; Commonwealth v. Iowa, 1 ; Dillon on Munic. Corp., CuUeiJ, 1 Harris (Pa.), 133 ; President §§ 46, 65. V. Thompson, 20 111. 197 ; Rose v. 3 State V. Dunson (1888), 71 Tex. 65 ; Turnpike Co., 3 Watts (Pa.), 46 ; Peo- f oUowed in Buf ord v. Texas (1888), 73 pie v. Wren, 5 111. 375 ; Brown v. In- Tex. 183, in which case the court de- surance Co., 3 La. Ann. 177 ; Green clined to follow Lea V. Hernandez, 10 Township, 9 Watts & S. (Pa.) 22; Tex. 137, where such facts were held Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 to evidence a civil death — a dissolu- How. 268 ; Muscatine Turnverein v. tion of the corporation — although not Funck, 18 Iowa, 469 ; Schriber v. Langdale, 66 Wis. 616. 30 466 PAKTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 469. in Coles v. County of Madison,* where such a power, by way of- illustration, was conceded, says: — "The only manner that occurs to my mind, by which a legislature can destroy a county, is by annexing it to one or more organized counties. No interregnum would then take place ; the government of the county to which it was annexed would be extended over and embrace it simultaneously with its annexation ; and thus no evil or inconvenience would occur." ^ A municipal corpora- tion is not dissolved by an annendment of its charter which is unconstitutional in whole or in part, as to the election of officers. As the offices previously existed dejure, the persons holding them under the void law are de facto officers and the organization continues.' The effect of a judgment of ouster on an information in the nature of a quo warranto against a municipal corporation and its officers is to immedi- ately dissolve the corporation, whether it existed de jwre or de facto, and work its dissolution, and take away all its rights, liberties, privileges and franchises.* A dissolution in this manner, as in the death of a natural person, operates as an absolute revocation of all power and authority on the part of others to act in its name or in its behalf.' § 469. Surrender of charter. — Judge Dillon thus states the doctrine : — " Since all of our charters of incorporation come from the legislature a municipal corporation cannot dissolve itself by a surrender of its franchise. The State creates such corporations for public ends, and they will and must continue until the legislature annuls or destroys them or authorizes it to be done.* As to the power of a municipal corporation to surrender any of its franchises, for instance, the franchise of collecting tolls on freight passing over a certain channel con- necting another bay with the bay upon which the city was situated, it has been considered an extremely doubtful power, as not only the corporation but a large portion of the State's 1 Breese (IlL), 130. * Dodge u People (1885), 113 IlL 2 People V. Wren, 5 111. 869, 279. 491. Holt, C, in Walnut Township v. Jor- 5 Dodge v. People, cited in the pre- dan, 38 Kan. 563, 565, quotes this and ceding note. highly commends the doctrine. * 1 Dillon on Munic Corp. (4th ed.), 3 Cole t;. President &c. of Village of §167. See, also. Id., §§ 37, 43, 54 Black River Falls (1883), 57 Wis. 110. ^i^OJ] DISSOLUTION, 4«T population residing -without the city's limits as well as of the commercial world were interested.^ Towns incorporated under the 'general law of Missouri can be disincorporated only in the manner therein authorized." A charter granted by the legislature to a municipal corporation must be surrendered to and accepted by the legislature. Where, therefore, a town formerly incorporated was re-incorporated under a general law, this was held not to amount to an effectual surrender of the charter. It should have been accepted and a record made of this fact. The action of the county court extending the limits of the corporation in proceedings to re-incorporate was a mere amendment of the charter.' §470. The same subject continued. — The Ohio Kevised Statutes provide the mode by which municipal corporations may surrender their municipal powers. It has been held that upon the presentation of a petition to the council for an elec- tion upon the question of surrender it was the duty of the council before taking action thereon to satisfy itself that it contained the requisite number of qualified petitioners, and for that purpose they might refer the same to a committee to make the requisite examination. Before an election is ordered petitioners may withdraw their names, and if thereby the num- ber is reduced below the number required, the council should refuse to order an election. Query, if an election had been ordered, whether they could withdraw their names. In a mo/ndamus to compel a council to order an election, whether there has been a petition with the requisite number of sign- ers presents an issue not of right triable by a jury, and an appeal properly lies from the judgment of the common pleas thereon.* In Ohio, an act " to provide for the organization ' Morris v. State (1885), 65 Tex. 53. solve the old corporation ; nor did 2 So held in Hambletnn v. Dexter the law authorize the incorporation (1886), 89 Mo. 188, where the effect of of a new town out of a part of the re-incorporation under this law was inhabitants and territory already in- held not to have disincorporated the corporated. old town, because there was no no- 3 Norris v. Mayor &c. of Smith- tioe given as required by the law ; ville (1851), 1 Swan (Tenn.), 164. neither did the order of the county * Dutten v. Village of Hanover court attempt or undertake to dis- (1884), 42 Ohio St 315. 468 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 471. of cities and incorporated villages," in its first section re- pealing " all laws " then " in force for the organization or government " of municipal corporations, was held not to anni- hilate the old corporations ; it recreated them. It was a re- organization, not a dissolution. Neither their corporate exist- ence nor corporate identity were affected by it. Some of them took, under its operation, a diflferent'legal designation — as incorporated villages instead of towns; the particular mode of their organization was somfewhat changed, and their pow- ers, privileges, rights and duties were restricted, enlarged or modified, but their territorial limits remained the same as before ; legal obligations incurred by or to them remained un- changed.' There is no method provided, under the Idaho statutes defining the power of town trustees, whereby they can dissolve the corporation or effect a disincorporation, and it is not within their power to abandon such incorporation and procure a re-incorporation. Therefore the acts done by a board of trustees of a lawfully incorporated town in an attempt to abandon or disincorporate such municipality, and set up a new goveriiment, were held to be without authority of law, and void.^ § 471. Florida decisions on constitntionality of acts to dissolve. — The Florida statute which provided a mode for dissolution of municipal corporations owing bonded debts was held unconstitutional in that its object was not solely to dissolve, but manifestly to re-incorporate at once, and by this mode of re-incorporation by vote of a certain number of bond- holders and citizens leading up to an appointment of the offi- cers of the municipality by the governor of the State, it departed from, the usual rule as to such bodies, and was in contravention of that provision of the constitution which pro- vides that " the legislature shall establish a uniform system of county, township and municipal government." ' " An act to • Fosdick r. Village of Perrysbiirg the mayor of Fernandina appointed (1863), 14 Ohio St. 473. by the governor under this act, and 2 People V. Bancroft (Idaho), 29 virtually holding that the attempted Pac. Eep. 113. dissolution in the mode provided ' State V. Stark (1881), 18 Fla. 255, therein of the original city v?as void, giving a judgment of ouster against the court especially wishing it under- § 4r72.] DISSOLUTION. 469 dissolve municipal corporations under circumstances therein stated and to provide provisional governments for the same," providing that " whenever any city or town incorporated under the general municipal corporation act . . . is indebted to the amount of $200,000, and has defaulted and still defaults in the payment of its interest account, the charter of such city or town shall be, and is hereby declared to be, repealed and the incorporation thereof dissolved," was held not to be a spe- cial law within the prohibition of the constitution, but a gen- eral law ; the fact that there may have been but one municipal- ity of the class named at the time of the approval of the act not of itself rendering the statute creating this class special and unconstitutional.' • § 472. Tacated towns. — Where a town had recovered a judgment in a suit and was afterwards vacated and abolished, the ordinance providing that the town to which it was to be attached should be the successor to the vacated town in its actions at law, the ownership of such judgment became en- stood that they " do not decide or when so organized to remain such, hold that the legislature can, under but has expressly provided for sur- the constitution, authorize the holders render of its franchises by any city or of one-half of the bonds of an in- town. We are not satisfied that, hav- debted municipal corporation to dis- ing the power to authorize one or solve such corporation ; " nor to say maiiy to surrender its corporate ex- " that the act, stripped of the discre- istence, it cannot for satisfactory tion vested in the bondholders, would cause dissolve any one of them. The be constitutional." legislature, in repealing or modifying 1 Ex parte Wells (1885), 31 Fla. 280, the charter of a municipality, is not the court summmg up its conclusions creating rules for the regulation of as follows : — " Unless there is a limit- future controversies between parties, ation in the constitution restraining it is simply, as it were, shaping its the legislature, it can at will dissolve own instrumentality. . . . Mu- one city or many municipalities and iiicipal corporations can, independent leave others in existence. It could, of constitutional limitations, be dis- moreover, dissolve all existing mu- solved without violating the princi- nicipalities and prevent the same pie suggested for petitioner." 1?he communities from reorganizing, yet principle referred to was that "it provide for others to incorporate, [the statute] does not prescribe a rule . . . The legislature has not pre- of civil conduct," but deals only with tended to either compel communities the past and present, and not with to organize as municipalities, nor the future. 470 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 473. tirely vested in the last town.^ It was contended also that the board of supervisors of the county had no authority to make any distribution of the property of the county, and that so much of the ordinance abolishing this town and making the one of which it was constituted a part of its successor as the owner of this judgment was void. It was held that under the constitution (which empowers the legislature to confer upon boards of county supervisors " powers of a local legisla- tive and administrative charact* "), when any subject of leg- islation is intrusted to county boa.rds by general words in a statute they acquire a right to pass any ordinance necessary or convenient for the purpose of disposing of the whole sub- ject so committed to them, and ijpr that purpose have all the powers of the State legislature over that subject, unless the statute restricts the power or directs its exercise in a certain way.^ And when substituted in such suits the successor is entitled to costs.' § 473. This was no dissolution. — The qualified electors of a corporation in Texas elected a city council known to be in favor of dissolution, which, at a regular meeting in the year of their election, made a full, complete and permanent settlement of all corporate business with a view to its dissolution, when they resigned, after unanimously passing an ordinance declaring the several municipal offices forever thereafter vacant. It was held that the only law relating to the dissolution of mu- nicipal corporations by their own action was the act author- izing cities of a certain population to accept its provisions in lieu of any existing charter by a two-thirds vote of the council, and on compliance with certain requirements ; and that this attempted dissolution by vote of the mayor and aldermen, 1 Supervisors of La Pointe v. O'Mal- rights of the old town in specified ley^ 47 Wis. 333. property — in this case a judgment 2 Supervisors of La Pointe v. O'Mal- against third parties. The appeal in ley, (1879), 47 Wis. 833, holding, also, this case was dismissed because the that under Revised Statutes, section successor (Town of Butternut) had 670, the county board had pov/er to not been substituted and the appeal abolish an existing town; attach dif- taken in its name. ferent parts of its territory to other ^ Town of Butternut v. O'Malley existing towns and provide that one (1880), ,50 Wis. 333. of the latter should succeed to the § 474.] DISSOLUTION. 471 and a subsequent incorporation under laws relating to unin- corporated towns and cities, was void.^ And being void, dis- solution could not be presumed from acquiescence and lapse of time. The court, on the argument that the dissolution of the corporation should be presumed from the period of time which had elapsed since the city had acted under its original charter, said " that presumptions cannot be indulged in oppo- sition to facts which show that the fact sought to be estab- lished by presumption can have no existence." In a similat case it was held that as a municipality could not at will aban- don its special charter and reorganize under general laws, a corporation under a special charter, whose officers had been ousted, was not dissolved by its failure to elect new officers, nor by an attempt to reorganize it under the general laws of the State.2 § 474. Effect of dissolution as to liabilities and fands in hand. — "Where a road district has been incorporated from a portion of a township with power to contract debts for cer- tain purposes, and has done so, and is afterwards dissolved by a repeal of its charter with a provision that the repeal should not in any way impair any legal contracts which its board of commissioners had made and which might remain unexecuted, it has been held that it was the intention of the legislature to impose upon the township committee the liabilities which 'the commissioners had legitimately contracted within the scope of their daties and for the object of their appointment. Such are claims for compensation, etc., of surveyor and his assist- ants, for services of a clerk and for sewer pipe for use in mak- ing improvements.' The repeal of an act incorporating a portion of a township as a polling district dissolves such a government corporation and abolishes its officers. The result is that any funds, raised by taxation for public purposes, in the hands of its treasurer come immediately under the con- trol of the legislature ; and in obedience to its direction by the general laws applicable in such cases, it is the duty of that 1 Largen v. State (1890), 76 Tex. 323 ; » Township of Union «. Rader (1879), S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 161. 41 N. J. ILaw, 617. 2 Welch V. St Genevieve (1871), 1 Dill. 130. 472 PAETITION ASD DISSOLUnON. [§ 475. treasurer to pay over to the proper officer of the township from which this polling district was formed whatever he has in hand.' An act of the legislature of Alabama to vacate and annul the charter of and dissolve a municipal corporation was held to operate a dissolution of the corporation — a withdrawal from it of all governmental power which had been confided to it, except so far as the act authorized the continued exer- cise of such power ; but upon debts and liabilities which had been created or contracted by tljp corporation in the exercise of a power with which it had been clothed by the General As- sembly it was without operation. These debts or liabilities were not lessened in obligation nor extinguished; nor was it within the competency of legislative power to lessen them in obliga- tion or to extinguish them.^ The Supreme Court in Ifew Mexico has construed its disincorporating act, as it may be styled, and held that the effect of its sections providing for a settlement of the debts of a disincorporated city was to make of the county a mere auditing and collecting agent for the creditor of a de- fendant municipal corporation empowered to make by special tax out of the assets of the dead city, in the manner prescribed, a sufficient amount to discharge all claims duly presented and allowed, and not to transfer the liability of the city to the county.' § 475. Effect of dissolution upon liabilities. — The legisla- ture, in the exercise of its supreme power over municipal corporations, may repeal their charters at any time, in its dis- iHeckel v. Sandford (1878), 40 N. NewMexico, 1884, chapter 38, provides J. Law, 180. for disincorporation of cities, and sec- 2 Amy V. Selma (1884), 77 Ala. 103. tion 3 declares that the commission- 3 Board of County Comm'rs of San ers of the county in which such cities Miguel County v. Pierce (New Mex., are situated shall audit claims against 1893), 28 Pao. Rep. 612, where it such cities, and that persons having was held that the plaintiff could not such claihis shall present them within recover of the county because he had six months and not afterwards. See- not followed the provisions of the tion 6 provides for publishing notice disincorporating act in the presenta- to claimants and issuing warrants tion of his claims, etc. ; and that the for amounts allowed. Section 9 pro- claims were barred by reason of not videa that approved accounts shall be having been presented within six presented within four months from months from the time the city of Las the date of notice and not afterwards. Vegas was disincorporated. Laws of § 475.] DISSOLUTION. 473 cretion. The only limitation on the operation of such a re- peal is as to creditors, that it shall not operate to impair the obligation of existing contracts, or deprive them of any rem- edy for enforcing such contracts which existed when they were made.' In a case, therefore, where a part of a township had been incorporated for the purpose of laying out, opening and improving streets, with full power through its commis- sioners to ^borrow money, issue bonds, etc., but owning no property, and debts had been incurred in accordance with the statute incorporating it, and this charter was repealed and the corporation thereby dissolved, the act of repeal was held constitutional, inasmuch as it preserved the debts and im- posed upon the authorities of the township the duties of the commissioners of the dissolved corporation as to assessment, . and other steps for compromise, adjustment and settlement of those claims.'' Upon the contention that the act of the legislature of Alabama dissolving the old corporation of " The City of Selma " and re-incorpprating it as 'SSelma " was in contravention of the constitution of the State, in that it im- paired the obligation of contracts "by destroying or impairing the remedy for their enforcement," the act was sustained, the court stating its conclusion as follows : — An act to dissolve a municipal corporation is not objectionable so far as it author- izes the appointment of commissioners with authority to take charge of, collect and control the assets of the dissolved cor- poration, making of them the application required by law. IN'or is it objectionable so far as it names a court and author- izes the commissioners to apply on the equity side of that court for , instruction, direction and protection in the per- formance and discharge of their duties. ISTor is it objection- able so far as in this respect it may be considered a grant of jurisdiction to said court, nor in the mode of procedure which it prescribes.' A township by act of the legislature was trans- ferred into a city. By subsequent act of repeal the later cor- 1 Eader v. Southeasterly Road Dis- Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 ; Butz v. City of trict (1873), 38 N. J. Law, 378 ; People Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575. V. Morris, IB Wend. 335; State v. 2 Rader w Southeasterly Road Dig- Brannin, 33 N. J. Law, 484; City of trict (1873), 38 N. J. Law, 373. Paterson v. The Society &c., 34 N. J. 3 Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 103. Law, 386 ; Von Hoffman v. City of 474 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 476. poration was dissolved. It was held that the effect of the dissolution of the city, it embracing the same inhabitants and the same boundaries, was to revive the township municipal- ity, to oast upon it the ownership of the municipal property, and to make it liable for the debts of the city, and that the suit was properly brought against the township for a debt in- curred by the city.^ ' § 476. What does not affect*liabilities and remedies.— Even if a municipal corporation can forfeit its franchises by non-user, such forfeiture will not operate to extinguish debts of the corporation contracted before the forfeiture was in- cutred or declared. Furthermore, if 6orporate creditors are not made parties to the proceeding by which the forfeiture is ascertained and declared, they are not bound by the judg- ment of ouster. Municipal corporations cannot extinguish their debts by changing their names or reorganizing under new charters, or by failing to exercise their corporate powers. A debt once contracted by a municipal corporation will sur- vive as a debt against whatever corporate entity is subse- quently created to take its place and exerdise its power of local government over substantially the same people and ter- ritory.^ The legislation of Tennessee, in repealing the charter of cities and subsequently for compromise of their debts by the "taxing districts" formed in their stead, and the attempts (as generally construed) to force this by withholding the 1 Scaine v. Inhabitants of Belleville was the substitution of other instru- (1877), 39 N. J. Law, 536, the court say- mentalities." ing : — " The legal inference must be 2 Hill v. City of Kahoka (1888), 35 that it was the intention of the legisla- Fed. Eep. 33, holding the city of ture,by the repeal of the city charter, Kahoka liable for bonds in aid of not so much to abolish the govern- railroads issued by the town of Ka- ment of the district in question, as to hoka, the charter of which had been alter its form. The charter was re- forfeited for non-user, and the last voked, but there was no interregnum, corporation formed of the same in- fer the township organization in- habitants and territory. Following stantly revived and took its place, the Brighton v. Fensauola, 93 TJ. S. 366 ; repeal arid revival being accom- Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289; pliaheA uno flafu. The object of the S. C, 6 Sup. Ct Eep. 398; Laird w city charter was riot abandoned ; De Soto, 23 Fed. Rep. 431 ; People v. that object was local government ; Murray, 73 N. Y. 535 ; the last as to and to effect this the change made judgment of ouster not binding those not parties. § 477.] DISSOLTJTION. 475 power to tax to meet the obligations of the dissolved corpo- rations, has had much attention in the courts. It has been held that any power of taxation, provided as a means of pay- ing their debts, theretofore granted to the original municipali- ties, devolved as readily as the obligation to pay them, and by operation of the federal constitution, upon those success- ors, notwithstanding the attempted statutory prohibition. As a sequence a mandamus might be issued to the oflBcials appointed for the general purposes of the local government, ; who can exercise the power of taxation which was in the in- habitants of the given territory and which was never taken away, as they do all governmental po'wer of that local char- acter.^ It was also held that where a State, with the delib- erate purpose of obstructing a creditor, repeals a municipal charter, whereby there is no organization to be sued, and the creditor is disabled from proceeding, the time of such ob- struction will be excluded from the limitation of the statute, the legislative intention to suspend it being implied as in case of war. Besides it may be set up as an equitable defense in proceedings by mam.damus? § 477. Repealing charters. — The legislation of Tennessee repealing the charters of municipal corporations and establish- ing taxing districts was the most extensive in this direction that has ever been resorted to in the United States. There has been much litigation growing out of it and important de- cisions made upon the questions raised in the various cases. We will present here some of the most important rulings of the Supreme Court of the State upon the constitutionality of those acts. First on the title of the act. It was held that " An act to repeal the charter of certain municipal corpora- tions and to remand the territory and inhabitants thereof to the government of the State " is not rendered unconstitutional by a provision that the property used by such corporation 1 Devereaux v. City of Brownsville 533 ; United States v. Wiley, 11 Wall, (1887), 39 Fed, Eep. 743; Loague v. 508, 513; Braun v. Sauevwein, 10 Taxing Dist of Brownsville (1887), 29 Wall. 218 ; Montgomery v. Hernan • iFed. Eep. 743. dez, 13 Wheat 139, 134. As to equi- 2 Cases cited in the preceding note, table defense, Angell & Ames on See, also, as to the effect of being dis- Corp. (11th ed.), g§ 715, 731; High, abled to sue. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall Extr. Eera. (3d ed.), g§ 14, 457 et seq. 476 PAETITIOK AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 478. for municipal purposes is transferred to the custody and con- trol of the State to remain public property for the uses to which it has been hitherto applied.^ And " A bill to establish taxing districts in this State and to provide the means of local government for the same," which grants municipal franchises to the communities within the territorial limits of the taxing districts, and gives to the corporation thus created all the nec- essary legislative, judicial and police powers of an incorporated city, and contains specifications df offenses committed against the corporation or by its oflioials with penalties and punish- ments, contains only one subject within the meaning of the constitution.^ An act which provides " that the several com- munities embraced in the territorial limits of all such munici- pal corporations in the State as have had or may have their charters abolished, or as may surrender the same under the provisions of the act, are hereby created taxing districts, in order to provide the means of local government for the peace and safety and general welfare of such district," and further provides for the surrender of all charters of municipal corpo- rations in the State to enable the communities within their limits to be governed by the new act, is in form a general law and cannot be held to be intended as a special law, even if the ' courts can inquire into the intention of the legislature, al- though mainly framed or designed for a particular locality, where the acts of the same session of the legislature show a repeal of the charters of thirty-seven municipal corporations, all of whose communities fall at once within the provisions of the act.' § 478. The same subject continued. — The Supreme Court of Tennessee held an act constitutional which repealed the charter of a single municipal corporation, upon the principle that municipal corporations are within the absolute control of the legislature, and may be abolished at any time in its dis- cretion.* They further held that an act which grants munici- 1 Luehriiian v. Taxing District of * Luehrman v. Taxing District Of Shelby Co. (1879), 2 Lea (Tenn.), 435. Shelby County (1879), 3 Lea (Tenn.), 2 Luehrman v. Taxing District of 425. Cooper. J., gives this as the ob- Shelby Co., 2 Lea (Tenn.), 425. vious reason : — " Being created as in- 'Luehrman v. Taxing District of strumentalities or arms of the gov- Shelby Co. (1879), 3 Lea (Tenn.), 425. ernment, they cannot be continued § 479.] DISSOLUTION. 47 1 pal franchises to the communities within the territorial limits of certain districts in order to provide the means of local gov- ernment, and creates the " agencies and governing instrumen- talities " of a municipal corporation, with the usual legislative, executive and judicial powers, although it may style the crea- tions " taxing districts," in reality organizes the people and territory of the district into municipal corporations.' It was competent for the legislature., in the act creating taxing dis- tricts of these dissolved corporations, to provide for the ap- pointment of provisional officers to hold for a reasonable time, and not have them elected by the people of the district. This was merely to put the new system in motion.^ So also the legislature in this State could reserve to itself the right to impose directly the necessary taxes for the support of mu- nicipal corporations.' § 479. Receiver for a city. — The United States circuit court on a bill filed by the bondholders of the city of Memphis ap- pointed a receiver for the city, and ordered a surrender of the property and assets of the city, and he asked an injunction after- wards against the officer appointed under the laVvs of Tennes- see for the taxing district of Shelby county to receive this In that capacity whenever the public abolishment. And we may conceive exigency, of which the legislature of cases where, by the vicissitudes of alone is judge, demands that they trade, as in the case of old Sarum in should cease to act," See, also, People England, and some of the mining V. Morris, 13 Wend. 331 ; City of Mem- towns of California, the special re- phis V. Memphis Water Works, 5 peal of a particular charter might be Heisk. 495, 537 ; Governor u. McEwen, demanded by public policy when a 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 341 ; McCuUie v. general repeal would be a remedy Mayor of Chattanoga, 3 Head, 817 ; worse than the disease." Lynch v. Lafland, 4 Colo. 96. In an- i Luehrman v. Taxing District of other place he speaks of the power Shelby County (1879), 8 Lea (Tenn.), to repeal charters as follows : — " This 435. is a power so essential to sovereignty ^ Luehrman v. Taxing District of a,nd the preservation by the State of Shelby County (1879), 3 Lea (Tenn.), its control over its instrumentalities 435. The court in the foregoing case of local rale, that it cannot well be rely largely upon Judge Cooley's considered as cut off except by a opinion in People v. Hurlbut, 34 Mich. positive provision to that effect The 44. restriction is against the powers of a ' Luehrman v. Taxing District of corporation being ' diminished ' by Shelby County (1879), 3 Lea (Tenn.), special laws, not against their entire 435, 478 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 479. property and those assets in order that the same might be ad- ministered by the court as a court of equity through its officer. The Supreme Court of the TJnited States on appeal gave the subject full consideraJtion. The court was agreed upon the propositions which follow : — Upon the repeal of the charter of a city, property held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves, landing places, fire-engines, hose and hose-carriages, engine-houses, engineer- ' ing instruments, and generally ^erything held for govern- mental purposes, passes under the immediate control of the State, the power once delegated to the city in that behalf hav- ing been withdrawn.^' Nor could the decree of the court be- low so far as it subjected to the payment of the debts of the city the private property of all persons within its territorial limits be sustained.^ But whatever property a municipal cor- poration holds subject to the payment of its debts will, after its dissolution, be administered for the benefit of the creditors of such a corporation, and applied by a court of equity. Pri- vate property of the corporation such as it holds in its own right for profit or as a source of revenue not charged with any public trust or use, and funds in its posseission unappro- priated to any specific purpose, may be so administered. In this respect the position of the extinct corporation is not dis- similar to that of a deceased individual ; it is only such prop- erty as is possessed free from any trust,' general or special, which can go in liquidation of debts.' The majority of the court re- versed th^ court below, and held that as it involved the power of the court to levy taxes the appointment of the receiver could not be sustained. It was their judgment that taxes levied ac- cording to law before the repeal of a charter of a city other than such as were levied in obedience to the special requirement of contracts entered into under the authority of law, and such as were levied under judicial direction for the payment of judgments recovered against such city, cannot be collected 'Meriwether v. Garrett (1880), 102 President &c. u. City of Indianapo- U. S. 473. See, also, SchafEer v. lis, 13 Ind. 620. Cadwallader, 36 Pa. St. 136 ; City of • Meriwether v. Garrett, cited in Davenport v. Peoria Marine & Fire the preceding note. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 376 ; Askins v. Com- ' Meriwether v. Garrett (1880), 102 monwealth, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 375 ; The U. S. 473. § 480.] DISSOLUTION. 479 through the instrumentality of a court of chancery at th« in- stance of the creditors of the city.* § 480. The same subject continued. — Upon the contention that the creditors of the city of Memphis would be remediless if the federal courts did not come to their relief as to the taxes levied before the repeal of its charter, Field, Justice, says: — " But the conclusion does not follow. The taxes levied pur- suant to writs of mandamus issued by the circuit court are still to be collected, the agency only for their collection being changed. The receiver appointed by the governor has taken the place of the collecting officers of the city. The funds re- ceived by him upon the special taxes thus levied cannot be appropriated to any other uses. The receiver, and any other agent of the State for the collection, can be compelled by the , court, equally as the former collecting officers of the city, to proceed with the collection of such taxes by the sale of prop- erty or by suit, or in any other way authorized by law, and to apply the proceeds upon the judgments." ^ Justices Strong, Swayne and Harlan dissented, holding that the complainants were entitled to some of the relief granted them in the decree. A case was made in their opinion for the appointment of a re- ceiver to take into the possession of the court those taxes which had been levied by judicial direction for the payment of judgments recovered against the city — taxes which had been only partly paid. They placed this upon the principle that a trust ha,d been created with which those taxes had^ been charged ; that the creditors were cestuis que trustent — the city having only the naked title to this fund ; that the city had been, in its neglect to collect and apply these taxes, a faithless trustee, and the court, as in other cases of individual trustees, in this of a municipal corporation as trustee, could and should appoint another.' Further, Justice Strong said, 1 Meriwether tt Garrett (1880), 103 Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. U. S. 473. See, also, as to taxes and 107, 116; Heine v. Levee Cotnm'rs of power of court to collect, City of New Orleans, 1 Woods, 347 ; Same v. Augusta V. North, 57 Me. 393 ; City of Same, 19 Wall. 655. Camden «. Allen, 26 N. J. Law, 398; 2 Meriwether v. Garrett (1880), 103 Perry v. Washburn, 30 CaJ. 318 ; Phil- U. S. 473, 530. adelphia v. Greble, 38 Pa. St 339; SMeriwejiher v. Garrett (1880), 103 Howell V. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 471; U. S. 473, 537. Justice Strong said, 480 PARTITION AND BISSOLtTTION. [§ 481. on page 528 : — If the city, as contended, by the legislative act of repeal of its charter " ceased to have any legal exist- ence, . . . the ,case then became one of a trust without a trustee, pre-eminently fit for equitable interference. A court of equity will not permit a private trust to fail for want of a trustee. And this rule is applicable to cases in which a munici- pal corporation has been nominated the trustee." ' % § 481. Where such a receiver ♦was appointed. — There has been an instance in which a receiver was appointed for a city, a history of which we will give. When the city of Nashville, Tennessee, had been in 1869 brought to the verge if not to a state of bankruptcy by reckless issuing of money obligations and wasteful mismanagement and fraudulent uses of its finances on the part of its regularly elected oflScials, there was an at- tempt to have a receiver appointed through a bill filed by citizens and creditors. The first chancellor dismissed the application. On a second application before another chancellor they were more successful and a receiver was appointed. A third chan- cellor, on application before him to discharge the orders of the second chancellor, approved the action of his predecessor in intervening to annul the operation of the charter of the city. There was extended the old rule that in meeting emergencies for which the law has provided no remedies, equity will interr pose. Judge East, the chancellor, ascribed to the government speaking of the city, "Its character authority. O^er its private obliga- as [a municipal corporation] does not tions it has not." See, also, Bailey v. aflfect the nature of its obligations to Mayor &c. of New York, 3 Hill, 531 ; its creditors or its cestvis que trust. Small v. Inhabitants of Danville, 51 or impair the remedies they would Me. 359 ; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 have if the city was a common Mass. 489. debtor or trustee. While as a mucici- i See, also, Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 pal corporation the city had public Wall. 1 ; Philadelphia «. Fox, 64 Pa. St duties to perform, yet in contracting 169 ; Montpelieru. East Montpelier, 29 debts authorized by the law of its or- Vt. 12 ; Batesville Institute v. Kauff- ganization, or in performing a pri- man, 18 Wall. 151, wherd it is said: — vate trust, it is regarded by the law as " It is, however, within the power of standing on the same footing as a a court of equity to decree and en- private individual, with the same force the execution of the trust rights and duties and with the same through its own officers and agents, liabilities as attend such persons, without the intervention of a new Over its public duties, it may be ad- trustee ; " citing Story's Eq. Jur. 976- mitted, the legislature has plenary 1060. § 481.] DISSOLUTION. 481 of a city a twofold character : first, as an arm of the legislature^ secondly, as a private corporation, the creation of the legisla- ture. Among other things he said : — "The functions of a mu- nicipality are twofold : first, political, discretionary, legisla- tive; secondly, ministerial. While acting within the sphere of the former they are exempt from liability, inasmuch as the corporation is a part of the government to that extent, and its officers to the same extent are public oflBcers, and as such entitled to the protection of this principle ; but within the sphere of the latter (ministerial duties) they drop the badges of governmental officers and become, as it were, the represent- atives of a private corporation in the exercise of privajte functions. The distinction between those legislative powers which it holds for public purposes as a part of the government of the country and those private franchises which belong to it as a. creature of the law is well taken." The receiver ap- pointed administered the affairs of the city, receiving its rev- enues and disbursing the same to whomsoever entitled until there was a change of administration, a restoration of home rule, and the city's representatives by act of the legislature is- sued bonds with which to compromise and settle the fraudulent debt imposed upon it by a band of scheming conspirators J never, however, in any of its actions conceding the justice or propri- ety of paying one dollar of that debt. This ended the receiv- ership of the city of Nashville.' 1 Lucius S. Merriam, Esq., in 25 Am. L Rev. S9& 81 CHAPTEK XIV. ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 483. Introductory. §506. 483. By-laws, ordinances and reso- lution* 507. 484 Distinction between ordinance and resolution. 508. 485. The same subject continued— Illustrations. 509. 486. The province of ordinances. 487. Power to make ordinances. 510. 488. The same subject continued. 489. By whom the power is to be 511. exercised. 490. Validity in respect of form — 513. (a) Meeting of council. 491. (b) The same subject contin- 513. ued. 498. (c) Quorum and votes. 514. 493. (d) The same subject contin- ued. 494. (e) Mode of enactment. 515. 495. (f) The same subject contin- ued. 516. 496. (g) The signing of the ordi- nance. 517. 497, (h) The same subject contin- 5ia ued. 498. (i) Publication of the ordi- 519. nance — When mandatory. 499. The same subject contin- 530. ued — When directory. 531. 500. (k) The same subject contin- 533. ued — Amendments and re- 533. enactments. 601. (1) Manner of publication. 503. (m) The same subject contin- 534. ued. 535. 503. (n) Time and proof of publi- cation. 536, 504. (o) Title of the ordinance. 537. 505. (p) Record of the ordinance. 538. Validity in respect of matter— (a) Constitutionality. (b) The same subject contii»- ued. (c) Consistency with statute and charter. (d) The same subject contin- ued. (e) Consistency with general penal law. (f) The same subject contin- ued. (g) Reasonableness of the or- dinance. (h) The same subject contin- ued — Illustrations. (i).The same subject contin- ued — Reasonableness a question of law, (j) Vagueness of the ordi- nance. Motives of council not to be impeached. Construction of ordinances. The same subject continued — Ordinances void in part Amendment and repeal — By subsequent ordinance. Repeal by act of the legislature. Repeals by implication. Power to impose penalties. Mode of enforcement of ordi- nances — By a purely civil action. Jurisdiction of proceedings. Imprisonment in default of payment of fine. Imprisonment as a penalty. Forfeitures. The same subject continued. §§ 482, 483.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 483 ^ 539. Cumulative fines and fines for continuous and repeated oflense& 530. Enforcement by complaint — Nature of proceeding. '•31. The complaint — General req- uisites. § 533. The same subject continued — Pleading. 533. Pleading further considered. 534. Proof of ordinances. 535. Right to trial by jury. 536. The same subject continued. 587. Certiorari and habeas corpus. § 482. Introductory. — The public corporation in its usual acceptation, excluding the State and the federal government, is for some purpose a miniature State. Its council represents the State legislature and the ordinances of that council repre- sent the statutes of the State. These ordinances, if valid, have, as we shall see, upon those subject to the control of the corporation, the same force and effect that the general stat- utes of the State have upon the people at large. - It is easy to see, therefore, the great importance of the subject which it is proposed to discuss in this chapter. Of the cases concern- ing pubUo corporations it is probable that those which relate to municipal ordinances are more numerous than those which touch upon any other single point.* The validity of the ordi- nance is generally the point in question, and consequently by far the greater portion of the chapter is devoted to the dis- cussion of the various questions which determine the validity of a particular ordinance. These questions are grouped under two heads : — (1) Validity in respect of form, (2) validity in re- spect of matter. It will be found that while an ordinance has, if valid, the force and effect of a general law upon those per- sons who are within the jurisdiction of the council, still the powers of the council are naturally very much more circum- scribed than are those of the legislature, and that an ordi- nance must be most carefully examined both in respect of its form and in respect of its matter before it can be pronounced undoubtedly valid. § 483. By-laws, ordinances and resolations. — The by- laws of a municipal corporation are usually known as ordi- nances, while in the English cases and text-books the former term is generally used.'' There is, therefore, little if any dis- 1 For a further treatment of the § 510 ; Bae. Abr., tit " By-law." See subject see the chapter on The Po- SUmley on By-laws, ch. 1 ; per Parke, LICE Power in Vol. 3, B., Gosling v. Veley, 19 L. J, (N. S.) 2 Beach on Private Corporations, Q. B. li}5. 484 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 484. tinction between the by-laws and the ordinances of a municipal corporation. The terras in their ordinary sense imply one and the same thing.^ A resolution is generally of a more special and temporary character than an ordinance, and re- quires less solemnity of enactment.^ § 484. Distinction between ordinance and resolution.— All legislative and permanent apts regulating the affairs of the corporation should be in the form of ordinances and not in the form of resolutions. Thus, the issuing bonds to aid in constructing a sewer would be a legislative proceeding such as would have to be by ordinance.' But where a corporation only desires to do some ministerial act a resolution is sufiB- cient.* An ordinance may, however, be in the form of a reso- lution, and if enacted with the formalities required by law in the case of an ordinance will generally be valid and binding.' In Louisiana it has been held that where there was a general power to make ordinances and by-laws and no form in which these should be enacted or passed was prescribed, an ordi. nance containing a. prohibition and annexing a penalty was valid, notwithstanding it purported by its terms to be a reso- lution. In substance it was an ordinance and the form in which it was passed did not make it void.* But in Missouri 1 it was decided that in the absence of an aflBrmative showing that a resolution is passed with the same formalities, and noti- fied to the public in the same manner as an ordinance, an act which a municipal charter requires to be done bj-^ ordinance cannot be done by resolution ; nor can a general ordinance au- thorize it so to be done.' 1 Nat Bank of Commerce v. Town A resolution does not require the ap- of Grenada (1800), 44- Fed. Rep. S62 ; proval of the mayor. Burlington v. Bills V. City of Goshen (1890), 117 Ind. Dennison, 42 N. J. Law, 165. 221, 325. » Sower v. Philadelphia (1860), 35 s A resolution is an order of coun- Pa. St 331 ; Gas Co. v. San Francisco, oil of a special and temporary char- 6 Cal. 190 ; Drake v. Railroad Co., 7 aoter ; an ordinance prescribes a Barb. 737 ; Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo. permanent rule of conduct or gov- 880; Manufacturing Co. uSchell City, ernment Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 21 Mo. App. 175. Ohio St 96, 103 ; State v. Bayonne, 6 Municipality v. Cutting (1849), 4 35 N. J. Law, 335. La. Ann. 335. ' State V. Barnet 46 . N. J. Law, 62. ' City of Cape Girardean v. Fougeu, * Quincy v. Railroad Co., 9'J 111. 21. 30 Mo. App. 551. § 485.] ORDINANCES AND BT-LAVTS. 480 § 485. The same subject continued— Illustrations.— When the charter of the municipality expressly requires a certain act to be done by ordinance, it fs safer to use the form of an ordinance rather than of a resolution.' To decide whether a resolution is sufficient for any certain purpose, it is necessary to consider the nature of the act sought to be authorized, the language Qf the general laws and of the charter relating to municipal ordinances, and the question whether the forraali- ,ties required in case of ordinances have been followed in pass- ing and publishing the ordinance. It has been held in Penn- sylvania that a new street could be opened by resolution.' In New Jersey a resolution has been considered sufficient to bind the corporation for the purchase of fire department ap- paratus ;' and for the construction of a sewer;* and for the acceptance of a dedication.' In Iowa the amount of a license previously authorized to be imposed has been allowed to be ' imposed by resolution.' In Indiana a resolution was suffi- cient to authorize street improvements.' Resolutions have been held sufficient by the courts of Illinois to direct munic- ipal agents to make specified contracts and also to appoint municipal agents.' A i-esolution confirming certain acts of the city of San Francisco was held sufficient.* On the other hand in New Jersey an ordinance has been held essential for the following purposes, viz. : — for grading a street ; '" for alter- ing the width of a street sidewalk;" and for appointing a 1 City of Central «., Sears (1875), 3 license fee from time to time as it Colo. 588 ; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. deems proper it may be flxed by res- 90 ; Paterson v. Barnet, 46 N. J. Law, olution. Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. 63 ; Cross v. Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq. City of Arkadelphia (Ark., 1893), 19 305 ; Tfashville v. .Toney, 10 Lea, 643 ; S. W. Rep. 1053. Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 533. 'Commissioners v. Silvers, 33 Ind. 2 Sower V. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. St 491 ; Indianapolis v. Imbery, 17 Ind. 336. 175. ' Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. Law, « Alton v, Mulledy, 31 III. 76 ; Egan 45. V. Chicago, 5 111. Ap. 70. * State V. Jersey City, 37 N. J. Law, » Gas Ca v, San Francisco, 6 Cal. 493. 190. 5 State V. Elizabeth, 37 N. J. Law, lo State v. City of Bayonne, 35 N. J. 433. ' Law, 335. 6 Burlington v. Insurance Co., 31 » Cross v. Mayor of Morristown, 18 Iowa, 103. Under an ordinance au- N. J. Eq. 305. thorizing the city council to fix a 486 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 486. commissioner to assess damages.^ In Colorado the courts have held that an ordinance was necessary in fixing the compen- sation of city officers under the charter of the city.* § 486. The province of ordinances. — The by-laws of a municipal corporation are in the nature of local laws passed by the proper assembly or governing body of the corporation, and thus valid ordinances havg the same effect within the corporate limits and with respect to persons upon whom they lawfully operate that an act of the legislature has upon the people at large.' A municipal ordinance is a "local law pre- scribing a general and permanent rule." * As the State has all power necessarj' for the protection of the property, health and comfort of the public, it can delegate its power in this respect to local municipalities in such manner as may be deemed desirable and the State may resume it when deemed expedient. Therefore, legislation in respect to matters affect- ing only certain localities and not affecting the people at large in any considerable degree will be committed to a local mu- nicipal government.* A municipality may under the authority of its charter, or of the general law, or under its implied right to pass by-laws, establish all suitable ordinances for admin- istering the government of the city, the preservation of the health of the inhabitants and the convenient transaction of business within its limits, and for the performance of the gen- ' State V. Bergen, 33 N. J. Law, have the same eflfects within its lim- 39, 73. its as an act of parliament Hopkins 3 City of Central v. Sears, 3 Colo. v. Mayor of Swansea, 4 M. & W. 631, 588. See, also. Walker v. Evansville, 640. 33 Ind. 398. * Citizens' Gas & M. Co. v. Elwood 8 village of St Johhsbury v. (1887), 114 Ind. 333. Thompson, 69 Vt. 801, 305; Des * Harmon «. City of Chicago, /W Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 111. 400, 408. In this case it was held Iowa, 508 ; Bearden v. Madison, 73 to come within the province of a by- Ga. 184; St Louis v. Bofflnger, 19 law to declare dense smoke from any • Mo. 13 ; State v. Tryon, 89 Conn. 183 Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa. 87 Jones V. Ins. Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.), 307 locomotive or boat to be a nuisance, and to prescribe a penalty thei-efor. This ordinance was held also not to McDermott v. Board of Police, 5 impose such regulation on commerce Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 433; Hiland v. Low- as to interfere with the constitutional ell, 3 Allen, 407. In England a by- prerogative of congress to regulate law lawfully passed has been held to commerca § 487.] ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 487 eral duties required by law of municipal corporations.' The particular instances in which public corporations have seen fit to exercise this power are, of course, innumerable. Many ex- amples will be found under the subsequent discussion of the validity of ordinances.' §487. Power to make ordinances. — It is clearly estab- lished that only the legislature of a State is empowered to make laws; yet this proposition must be taken with the qual- ification that the legislature is empowered to delegate to mu- nicipal corporations the power to make by-laws and ordinances regulating such subjects as fall within the proper province of an ordinance. That such power can be lawfully delegated is un- doubted.' The power of the corporation to pass by-laws is in many English cases said to be derived from custom — ancient and long-continued usage ripening into a prescriptive right on the part of the municipal corporation.* But no such ground can be urged in this country, where the power to pass by-laws and ordinances proceeds entirely from legislation of comparatively recent date.' Consequently there is in our 1 State V. Merrill (1853), 37 Me. 339. Cromwell's Case, Dyer, 322 ; Frank- A city government has the right ud- lin v. Cromwell, Dal. 95 ; The Earl of der the usual grant of power to regu- Exeterv. Smith, 2 Keb. 367 ; Cart. 177 ; late the use and enjoyment of pri- Lambert v. Thornton, 1 Ld. Raym. vate property in the city so as to 91 ; Scarling v. Criett, Moo. 75 ; The prevent its proving pernicious to the Bricklayers v. The Plasterers, Palm, citizens generally, and may, when 396. There were ancient assemblies the use to which the owner devotes in Cornwall, termed stannary con- his property becomes a nuisance, vocations, or parliaments, which compel him to cease so to use it and claimed to make statutes or laws punish him for refusal to obey. Louis- for the rule and government of the ville City Railway Co. v. Louisville, miners in that district " Some of 8 Bush (Ky.), 415. their rules or ordinances were simply 2 See, also, the chapter on THE Po- declarations of the customs prevail- :,ICE Power, infra, vol 2. ing in the district^ but others con- »Hill w. Decatur, 32 Ga 203; Per- tained regulations as to the, modes due V. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586 ; Markle v. of working, and as to the conduct of Akron, 14 Ohio, 586 ; Metcalf v. St the persops engaged therein. They Louis, 11 Mo. 103 ; In re Wall, 48 appear to have depended for valid- Cal. 279 ; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71. ity upon the ancient customs of the * Commonwealth v. Stodder (1848), country." See Rogers v. Brunton, 10 2 Cush, 562, 568. For English cases Q. K 26 ; JIarris v. Wakeman, Say, bearing on these customs the reader 254 is referred to 5 Co. 63; Hob. 213; s Commonwealth v. Stodder, 3 Davenant v. Hurdis, Moo. 584 ; Ld. Cush. 562, 575 ; Barling v. West 488 OBDINAirCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 488, courts no occasion to inquire into these customs, their validity and mode of proof.' § 488. The same subject continued. — This power of the legislature to delegate limited powers of local legislation to municipal corporations is not, however, so extended as to permit the delegation of any power of general State legisla- tion.^ " The power of municipal corporations to make by- laws," says Judge Cooley, " is limited in various ways : — 1. It is controlled by the constitution of the United States and of the State. The restrictions imposed by those instruments which directly limit the legislative power of the State rest equally upon all the instruments of government created by the State. If a State cannot pass an ex post facto law, or law impair- ing the obligation of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under the State with delegated authority. By- laws, therefore, which in their operation would be ex post facto or violate contracts, are not within the power of municipal Corporations ; and w^hatever the people by the State constitu- tion have prohibited the State government from doing, it can- not do indirectly through the local governments. 2. Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general laws of the State and with the provisions of the municipal charter. Whenever they come in conflict with either, the by-law must give way." ' There is, however, no constitutional objection (1869), 39 Wis. 307; Taylor v. Pine 111. 113; Kansas City w Corrigan, 86 BluS, 34 Ark. 603 ; Napman v. Peo- Mo. 67. And citing under the second pie, 19 Mich. 353. limitation, Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 1 Commonwealth v. Stodder, 8 Barb. 435 ; Mayor v. Nichols, 4 Hill, Cush. 563, 568. 309 ; Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 la 2State w Hayes (1881), 61 N.H. 264, 205; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn. 314. 128; Andrews v. Insurance Co., 37 ^Cooley's Const Lim. 338, 339, Me. 256 ; Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St citing under the first limitation, 439 ; Carr v. St Louis, 9 Mo. 191 ; Stuyvesant v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 588; Commonwealth w. Erie &c. North. R. Brooklyn Central R Co. v. Brooklyn Co., 27 Pa St 339 ; Burlington v. City R. Co., 32 Barb. 358; Illinois Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59; Con well w. Conference Female Colleger. Cooper, O'Brien, 11 Ind. 419; March v. Com- 25 IIL 148 ; Davenport &c. Co. v. monwealth, 12 B. Mon. 25 ; Baldwin Davenporl, 13 Iowa, 229 ; Saving So- v. Green, 10 Mo. 410 ; Cowen v. W(est ciety V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St 175; Troy, 43 Barb. 48; State v. Georgia Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga. 404; .Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608; Pester- People u Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 118 field ». Vickers, 8 Cold. 305; Wirth § 489.] ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 489 to state legislation authorizing a city council to empower a particular board of officers who have charge of the whole or a portion of the affairs of a certain department to make reason- able police rules and regulations.' § 489. By whom the power is exercised. — The ordinances which the municipality is thus empowered to make must be adopted by the proper body and in the manner prescribed by law. The legislative assembly of the corporation is usually a select or representative body elected by the quahfied voters of the corporation. This representative body is the agent of the corporation and its authorized acts are the acts of the cor- poration. Its members are not the municipal corporation or a corporation of any kind.^ In many New England towns the legislative body is not representative, but is composed of all the citizens of the town, who meet in person and admin- ister the public affairs of the town.' As the power of a public V. Wilmington. 68 N. C. 21 See, also, on this subject, Burgess &c. of Bor- ough of Non-istown v. Citizens' Pass. By. Co. (Pa. 1893), 33 Atl. Eep. 1063 ; " Power of Municipal Coi'porations to Make By-laws," 15 Sol. J. & Eep. 209 and 230 ; " Municipal Ordinances," by Irving Browne, 27 Alb. L. J. 284. An ordinance which is invalid for want of power of the corporation to enact it is legalized by a statute which expressly recognizes it as valid. State v. Starkey (Minn., 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 24; Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 361; Logansport v, Crockett, 64 Ind. 319; Truchelut v. City Council, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 227; State v. Union, 33 N. J. Law, 350 ; Bergen v. State, 32 N. J. Law, 490 ; State v. Newark, 84 N. J. Law, 236. Cf. State v. Plainfield, 38 N. J. Law, 95. 1 Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, citing Brooklyn v. Bres- lin, 57 N. Y. 591 ; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73 ; State v. Paterson, 34 N. J. Law, 163; Taunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 254; Sawyer v. State Board of Health, 135 Mass. 182; Common- wealth V. Young, 135 Mass. 626. And recognizing as sound but not antag- onistic to the foregoing. Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433; Lowell v. Simp- eon, 10 Allen, 88 ; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396. 2 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp. 270, and cases cited. 3 For the Massachusetts statutes re- lating to these towns see Gon. St 1860, ch. XVIII and oh. XIX For an elabo- rate discussion of the distinctions be- tween towns and cities see the learned opinion of Gray, C. J., in Hill v. Bos- ton, 122 Mass. 344. This for;n of gov- ernment afiEords an example of the pure democracy which the increase of population and the consolidation of nations has made impracticable in modern times. It is identical in prin- ciple with the system of government of Athens where all the free men met in the ''xyoid, of the Teutonic ham- let, where all freemen voted in the folk-mote, and of many mediaeval cities, in which every burgher voted directly in public meeting on all 490 OEDINANCES AHD BY-LAWS. [§ 490. corporation to pass ordinances emanates only from the legis- lature, this power must be exercised strictly within the limits prescribed by the general and special legislation on the sub- ject.i § 490. Validity in respect of form — (a) Meeting of coun- cil. — The ordinance must be passed at a legally convened meeting of the legislative body. The subject of corporate meetings is more fully discussed%elsewhere,'' but a few illus- trations, bearing on the validity of ordinances may be given. The provisions respecting New England town meetings are peculiar and must be especially studied.' The councils of ordinary cities and towns are, as has been stated, represent- ative bodies, elected by the qualified voters of the corpora- tion, and consisting of a number of members fixed by law. It is the legislative agent of the corporation, and through it only can the corporation take legislative action and be bound. The legislative and corporate powers of a munici- pality whose exercise is by the charter or constituent acts committed to the council or governing body can be exercised only at a corporate meeting duly held, and the corporate will must be ascertained by vote and embodied in a, definite form.* The meetings of such legislative municipal assemblies are either (1) stated or regular meetings or (2) special meetings.' The charter or some ordinance generally fixes the time for holding regular or stated meetings, and the members are thus charged with notice ; and no further or special notice is nec- essary unless specially required by law. But notice of a special meeting must, unless express provision to the contrary is made by law, be given to each member entitled to be pres- ent.* There are frequently provisions in charters or in ordi- questioDs of public welfare. The de- ^ See the chapter on Public mocracy of the New England form Boabds, supra. of government is, however, far purer ' See the chapter on MEETINGS akd than those mentioned ; for every ad ult Elections, supra. votes, while in the other instances * Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 15 there was always a large slave popu- Gray, 106, 116. lation which had no voice in the ' See, also, the chapter on Public meeting. Boards, supra. iHorr. & Bemis on Municipal Po- "See chapter on Public Boabds, lice Or'dinances, in loco. supra. The provision of a city char- ter-declaring that the mayor may § i91.J OKDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 491 nances relating to the calling of meetings of councils to the efifect that upon assembly the mayor or other presiding officer shall specially state to them when assembled the objects for which they have been convened, and that their action shall be confined to such object. So under a charter containing such provisions it has been decided that statements in the opening message that the mayor would propose other legislation, and subsequent messages proposing other legislation not specifically alluded to in the first message, would not authorize legislation on such subjects ; ' and that the mayor could not enlarge the scope of legislation by stating in his message calling such session that " he was not averse to submitting any measure " during the session, if deemed of public interest, and that an ordinance passed at the submission of the mayor during th^ session was void.* The charter of Kansas City provides that, " whenever a special session of the common council shall have been called by the mayor, he shall state to them, when assem- bled, the cause for which they have been convened, and their action shall be confined to such cause or causes." It was held that the common council had power, at a special session called for the purpose of acting upon a special ordinance to pave a street, to enact another ordinance for. paving the same street, their action not being limited to the ordinance mentioned in the mayor's message, but extending over the subject-matter of the ordinance.' § 491. (b) The same subject continned. — The ordinance must be passed by a council which has the legal author- ity and right to pass such a by-law. Thus an ordinance passed at a meeting of a county board of supervisors, held pursuant to an act of the legislature which had b6en pre- viously repealed, is void.* The meeting of the council at which the ordinance is passed must be at the time prescribed call special meetings of the council 2 city of St Louis v. Withaus, 16 " by causing notice to be left at the Mo. App. 347. usual residence of each member " of ' Smith v. Tobener, 33 Mo. App. tlie council does not prevent personal 601. notice. Russell v. Wellington (Mass., < County of San Luis Obispo v. 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 630. Hendricks, 71 CaL 343; s. a, 11 Pao. ' St Louis V. Withaus, 16 Mo. App. Rep. 683. 247. 492 OEDINANOES AHD BY-LAWS. [§ 49i!. by law. Consequently under charter of the city of Eochester in New York which provided that, at the next meeting of the council after a disapproval by the mayor, it should pro- ceed to reconsider the resolution disapproved, and, if it should be passed by two-thirds of all the members, it should have full force and effect notwithstanding the disapproval, the courts decided that the council must consider the resolution at the next meeting after the disM)proval comes in, and could not postpone it until a subsequent meeting.^ The formal reg- ularity of the meeting will be generally presumed ; as where in Nebraska, on certificate of the conviction of a person for the sale of liquor on Sunday, a resolution revoking his license di- rected the marshal to notify the licensee of such revocation " by the mayor and council," it was decided it need not other- wise appear that the mayor was present, and that it would not be presumed that he was not, as under the Nebraska stat- , uteHtiis his official duty to preside at all meetings of the council.' The provisions relating to New England town meet- ings are peculiar. Thus it has been held in New Hampshire that defendants in certain suits were not disqualified by inter- est from voting in a town meeting called to take action on said suits.* And that a vote at a meeting of citizens, called under the New Hampshire statute^ authorizing the mayor and aldermen to call a meeting on the written request of one hundred legal voters, was merely advisory and did not control the action of the city council.' § 492. (c) Quorum and votes. — Unless there be some spe- cial provision by charter or law to the contrary, the common- law rule as to quorums and majorities of bodies of definite number obtains with reference to city councils. That is to say, a majority of the whole number must be present to con- stitute a legal quorum; and a majority of that quorum is necessary to do any valid act.' So where a city charter does 1 Peck V. City of Eochester, 3 N. Y. » N. H. Gen. Laws, ch. 46, § la SupL 873. SKelley v. Kennard, 60 N. H. 1. 2 Comp. St Neb., ch, 13, § 20. ' Regents &c. v. WilJiams. 9 Gill & 'Martin u- State (Neb.), 86 N. W. Johns. (Md.) 365; In re Willcocks, 7 Eep. 554, Maxwell, J., dissenting. Cow. (N. Y.) 403 : Buell v. BuckinK- * Dorchester v. Youngman, 60 N. ham (1864), 16 Iowa, 384; Barnert v. H.385. - Paterson, 48 N. J. Law, 395. See, also. § 492.] ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS.. 493 not prescribe the number of votes necessary to an election of a presiding oiScer by the council, the votes of a majority of a quorum elect.^ If the charter or statute contains no pro- vision making a less or greater number than a majority of the members a quorum, then the council has no power to declare by ordinance that a number less or greater than the majority shall constitute a quorum. The common-law rule must hold unless superseded by the express provision of a statute or the charter.^ If more than a quorum be present, and a majority of the quorum vote in favor of a given measure, but not a majority of those present, some members refraining from voting at all, the preponderance of authority seems to be that such vote is sufficient, although there are decisions to the con- trary. So in Indiana it has been held that a resolution may be legally adopted by the vote of three of the six members of a city council, where the other three are present but re- fuse to vote, as the vote of the majority of the quorum present is effective.' In that case it is said : — *' If there is a sufficient quorum present, a majority of those voting is sufficient." * the chapter on Public Boards, supra. 1 State V. Farr. 47 N. J. Law, 308. ^Heiskell v. Mayor &c. of Balti- more, 65 Md. 125. In this case the council declared two-thirds of the members elected to be necessary for a quorum, although there was no provision of statute or charter on the subject. It was decided that the or- dinance was void on the ground stated. See, also, Blackett v. Bliz- zard, 9 Barn. & C. Sol"; Barnert v. Paterson, 48 N. J. Law, 395. s Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Eush- ville, 121 Ind. 206 ; S. C, 23 N. E. Rep. 73. See §g 157, 288, 289, supra. «Willcock remarks to the same effect:— "After an election has been properly proposed, whoever has a majority of those who vote, the as- sembly being suflScient, is elected, although a majority of the entire assembly altogether abstain from voting, because their presence suf- fices to constitute the elective body, and if they neglect to vote it is their own fault, and shall not invalidate the act of the others, but be con- strued as an assent to the determina- tion of the majority of those who do •vote." Willcock, Munic. Corp., part I, § 546. " Those who are present, and who help to make up the quorum, are expected to vote on every question, and their presence alone is enough to make the vote decisive and binding, whether they actually vote or not The objects of legislation cannot be defeated by the refusal of any one to vote when present If eighteen are present and nine vote, all in the affirmative, the measure ia carried, the refusal of the other nine to vote being construed as a vote in tho affil^mative so far as any construction is necessary.'' Horr. & Bemis on Mu- nicipal Police Ordinances, § 48. See, also. State v. Green, 37 Ohio St 227 ; Launtz y. People, 113 111 137 ; County 494 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 493. § 493. (d) The same subject continued. — In a recent Ten- nessee case, however, the contrary doctrine has been sus- tained." In that case the aldermen of the city of Knoxville, nine in number, and the mayor, constituted a board, the ma- ^jority of which had the power to elect a certain city oflBcial. The mayor had no vote except in case of a tie vote among the aldermen, in which case his vote was final. Eight alder- men were present — a quorum undsr the statute — of whom four voted for one Lawrence, three for another candidate, and one cast a blank ballot. The mayor declared Lawrence elected. The court reversed this decision, distinguishing be- tween elections by an indefinite and a definite body of voters, and holding that in the latter case the validity of the act de- pends upon the concurrent votes of a majority of those pres- ent. In the opinion delivered it was said: — "It appears . . . that the rule is settled that a majority of a definite body present and acting must vote for a candidate in order to elect him, and that it is not sufficient that he receive a plurality of votes cast, or a majority if blank ballots are ex- cluded. His claim must not depend upon the negative char- acter of the opposition, but upon the affirmative strength of his own vote; that it is not sufficient that a majority were not cast against him, to be elected. The majority must be cast for him." With reference to the blank vote cast, and the contention that.it should not, count at all, and that therefore only seven ballots were cast, and a majority, four, elected Lawrence, the court said: — "It is true that the blank vote cannot be, in the technical sense, a ballot, but it is nevertheless an act of negation, — affirmative in showing that another voter acted, negative in determining the majority. It was one of eight attempted to be cast with the purpose of not supporting complainant, and is only to be counted in showing that he did not get a majority, just as would have resulted had it been an illegal vote, as being for two candidates or otherwise." '" of Cass V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 369 ; St ' Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. Joseph Tp. V. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644; 58; s. c, 13 S. W. Rep. 422. State V. Remick, 37 Mo. 370 ; Everett ^ Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. V. Smith, 23 Minn. 58; Oldknow v. 53; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 422. From Wainwright, 2 BmT. 1017; King v. this view of the case, however, the Bellringer, 4 Term R 810 ; Inhabit- chief justice dissented, following the ants V. Steams, 21 Pick. 148. rule as stated in the preceding sec- § 493.] OllDINANCES AND BT-LAWS. 495 Where the law expressly requires a certain proportion of votes in order to pass a measure, it cannot be reconsidered by a less proportion.' There are very frequently special provis- ions in the charter or in the statutes prescribing a certain proportion of votes in order to pass any measure. These re- quirements must be strictly observed. So, where the charter of Hoboken provided that if, after the veto of an ordinance by the mayor, two-thirds of the members of the common council elected should pass the same, it should take effect as a law, and under the charter eight members were elected, one of whom died, it was held that it required the votes of six members to pass an ordinance over the mayor's veto.'* Under the Kansas statute giving a casting vote to the mayor when the council is equally divided, and elsewhere saying that he shall appoint by and with the assent of the council, on the question of the confirmation of an appointment he has the casting vote.' And under the IS'ebraska statutes* applying to cities of the second class, of less than five thousand popula- tion, and providing that " to pass or adopt any by-law, ordi- nance, or resolution or order to contract, a concurrence of the majority of the whole number of members elected to the council or trustees shall be required;" and providing that the mayor shall preside at all council meetings and have a casting vote when the council is equally divided, and none other, — an ordinance to redistrict the city, voted for by two members of a council of four and by the mayor, is void.* The tion, and citing Rushville Gas Co. v. if no other candidate is voted for." City of Rushville, 121 Ind. 208. To Citing Hendrickson v. Decan, 1 Saxt this same effect is the language used 577. See, also, §g 156, 157, supra. in the American and English Ency- ' A resolution of a village council, clopsedia of Law, vol. VI, p. 331 : — to adopt ■which the charter requh-es " The only way to defeat the election a two-thirds vote, cannot be recon- of a candidate at an election where sidered by a majority less than two- the number of electors is indefinite, thirds. Whitney v. Village of Hud- , or where the law does not require a son (Mich.), 87 N. W. Rep. 184 See majority of all the members of a § 297 et seq. and § 366 et seq., supra, body having a definite number, as ^ state v. City of Hoboken (N. J.), opposed to a majority of those voting, 18 AtL Rep. 685. is by voting for another candidate ; ' Carroll v. Wall, 35 Kan. 36. and the fact that a majority enters a * Comp. St Neb. 1885, ch. 14, ai-t 1, protest against the minority candi- § 76. date, voted for at a regularly called » State v. Gray (Neb,, 1888), 86 N. W. election, will not defeat the election Rep. 577. 496 OEDINANCKS AND BY-LAW8. [§ 494. Florida Municipal Charter Act provides that a majority of the members of the council shall be required to form a quorum for the transaction of business. A rule of proceeding adopted by a council prescribed that a proposed ordinance might be passed on its first reading by a majority vote of the members- present, and then placed on a second reading by a like vote, and if passed on its second reading might then be read as passed as a whole on such second reading, but no ordinance should be put on its third reading at the same meeting at which it was read the first time except by " unanimous consent of the coun- cil." It was decided that the phrase quoted means all the members who may be present at the time the action as to putting the ordinance on its third reading is taken, whether a bare quorum or more. It does not require that every mem- ber of the council shall be present and consent.' § 494. (e) Mode of enactment. — The mode of enacting the ordinance is generally prescribed in the charter or an ordi- nance, and their requirements should be strictly complied with. So where the charter prescribes that no by-law shall be passed unless introduced at a previous meeting, the provision has been held to be mandatory, and a by-law passed in violation thereof to be void.* Where, however, a city charter requires a resolution to lie over " at least four weeks after its introduc- tion," a resolution introduced on Monday night may be acted on on the fourth Monday thereafter.' The rules relating to the passage of by-laws must be construed with reference to the other provisions on the subject. Thus where a clause in the charter of the city of Minneapolis provided that no or- dinance should be passed at the same session at which it was introduced except by the unanimous consent of all the mem- bers of the council present, it was decided that this provision did not require a unanimous vote upon the final passage of the ordinance, bdt only unanimous consent that it be put to a 1 Atkins V. Philips (Fla., 1891), 8 So. was changed and the ordinance was Bep. 439. passed. The court held that the or- 2 State V. Bergen, 33 N. J. Law, 39, dinance was void, as the name of the in which case an ordinance for open- commissioner who was substituted ing a street was introduced at one should have been laid over to a sub- meeting, and at the next meeting the sequent met'ting. name of one of the comm-ssioners ' Wright v. Forrestal, 65 Wis. 341. § 494.] OKDINAUOES AND BY-LAWS. 497 vote for its passage, since the same section further provided that all ordinances should be passed by an aflBrmative vote of a majority of all the members, etc.* The charter frequently prescribes that the ayes and noes shall be called and published whenever the council votes on an improvement requiring a tax, or on some similar subject. Such a provision has been held in New York to be merely directory.^ And so although the code of Iowa requires the yeas and nays to be taken and recorded on the passage of an ordinance, it has been consid- ered immaterial that the nays do not appear to have been called where only five members of a council composed of eight were shown by. the record to have been present, all of whom voted in the affirmative.' In "Wisconsin it has been held that this requirement has no application to motions to adjourn.' But in many States the provision has been held mandatory, and ordinances passed without due observance of the require- ment are considered void.^ When such a provision is consid- 1 State V. Priester (Minn.), 45 N. W. Rep. 713. 2 Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 9, 24, 29 (1844). It is to be noted that in this case Mr. Justice Bronson dis- sented, and the case was subsequently reversed on other grounds in 3 Denio, 333. Mr. Justice Bronson's argument against the decision of the other judges is as follows : — "It is well known that men acting in a body, es- pecially when under the cover of cor- porate privileges, will often do what no one of them would be willing to do if acting alone and upon his indi- vidual responsibility. And they will sometimes say aye, or permit a matter to pass sub silentio, when they would not venture to record their names in favor of the measure. To guard against such evils and protect the cit- izens against the imposition of un- necessary burdens, it was provided that the ayes and noes should be called and published whenever a vote of the common council should be taken on any proposed improvement involving a tax or assessment upon 32 the citizens. The language is imper- ative — the ayes and noes shall be called when the particular mode in which the corporation is to act is spe- cially declared by its charter. I think it can only act in the prescribed forms. The contrary doctrine wants the sanction of legal authority, and is fraught with the most dangerous consequences. It would place cor- porations above the laws, and there is reason tO fear that they would soon become an intolerable nuisance." See, also, Elmehdorf v. Mayor &c. of New York, 35 Wend. 693 ; In, re Mount Morris, Square, 3 Hill, 20; St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 513 ; Indian- apolis V. Jones, 29 Iowa, 283 ; § 295, supra. 3 Incorporated Town of Bayard v. Baker (Iowa), 40 N. W. Rep. 818. * Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204 6 Cutler V. RussellviUe, 40 Ark. 105 ; Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Tracy v. People, 6 Colo. 151 ; Rich v. Chicago, 59 111. 386. 498 OEDINANOES AND BT-LAWS. [§ 495. eted mandatory the proceeding must be entered on the jour- nal or other record of the meeting, and the regularity of the vote can be evidenced from no other source.^ § 495. (f) The same subject continued. — These rules can generally be suspended by a unanimous vote of the council or by a vote of a large proportion of that body. By such sus- pension the usual formalities of enactments are dispensed with and the ordinance is passed more> speedily than the ordinary procedure would allow. A statutory requirement that all ordinances of a permanent nature shall be fully and distinctly read on three different days unless three-fourths of the mem- bers elected dispense with the rule is mandatory ; and where the rule was dispensed with as to several of such ordinances upon one and the same vote, which were thereupon passed by a single vote, it was held to be a violation of the provision, the latter being construed to require a separate suspension as to each ordinance.'' Such suspension of the rules is sometimes ■presumed jorima facie to be regular from the record showing that the rules were suspended without specifying the pro- cedure of suspension.. So when it was provided by the charter of a city that " no ordinance shall be passed until it shall have been read in such board [of aldermen] at two several meet- ings," etc., " unless this provision be suspended by a vote of all members," etc., and the record showed that certain ordi- nances were introduced " which were read and ordered to be read a second time," etc., " the second reading being dispensed with," etc., it was decided that the second reading was prop- erly shown to be dispensed with, although it was not dis- pensed with at a subsequent meeting, and although the record of the subsequent meeting did not show that the second read- ing had been dispensed with.' Statutory provisions as to pas- 1 Rich V. Chicago, 59 111. 286 ; Tracy ent days unless three-fourths of the V. People, 6 Cola 151 ;■ Inre Carlton council vote to " dispense " with the Street, 16 Hun (N. Y.), 497. See § 295, rules, an ordinatice is valid if passed supra. by a three-fourths vote on a motion 2 Campbell tt City of Cincinnati to " suspend " the rules, there being (Ohio, 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 606. no substantial difference in the terme. 3 Nevin v. Roach (Ky*), 5 S. W. Rep. Incorporated Town of Bayard v. 546. And it is also held in Iowa that Baker (Iowa), 40 N. W. Rep. 818, con- under a statute providing that an or- struing Code of Iowa, § 483. dinance shall be read on three differ- § 496.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 499 sage, where mere fbrmalities, are construed as directory when the language of t^e provision permits.' Provision is often made that no ordinance shall be passed without a certain pub- lication beforehand. This provision has been held in many cases to be mandatory, and an ordinance passed without such prescribed publication is void.* The formalities of the passage of an ordinance must be completed before the ordinance takes effect.' § 496. (g) The signing of the ordinance. — The charter or statute frequently contains provisions that every ordinance must be signed by the mayor or other presiding oflBcer. Whether in such a case the signature of the mayor is essential to the validity of the ordinance or not depends chiefly upon the language of the charter or act. If the charter or act make the signature essential, the ordinance is void if unsigned; if on the other hand the charter does not make the signature of the presiding officer an essential condition precedent to the validity of the ordinance, the provision has frequently been regarded as directory. Thus an ordinance passed by the com- mon council of the city of East Portland could not take effect until approved by the mayor, and all proceedings had under 1 So where both houses adjourn on recammended its passage, instead of the day a bill is presented to the preparing a new ordinance. Bara- mayor, and the bill is signed by the brick v. Campbell (1890), 37 Ma App. mayor, and filed in the city register's 460. oflSce, it becomes a valid ordinance, ^ jjq when a statute prescribes that though it is not returned to the house no assessment resolution shall be in which it originated, as required by passed without previous publication article 3, section 23, of the charter ; as for three days, a resolution passed there is no provision in the charter without such publication is void, which prescribes that no bill shall be- Addison Smith, In re, 52 N. Y. 526 ; come an ordinance which shall not be In re PhiUips, 60 N. Y. 16; State v. returned to the house in which it orig- Hoboken, 38 N. J. Law, 110 ; State v. inated. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. Smith, 22 Minn. 218. V. Hunt, 100 Mo. 22 ; s. c, 13 S. W. 3 if any essential step in the execu- Eep. 98. And an ordinance of the tion of a new ordinance takes place city of St Louis providing for street before it" becomes operative, no improvement is not invalid because charge made in inmtum against a the board of public improvements, property owner by virtue of the pro- after submitting it to the municipal ceeding thereunder acquires any va- assembly, by whom it was returned lidity. Keane v. Gushing, 15 Mo. App. amended, adopted it as amended, and 96. 500 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 497. such ordinance before its approval were held to be nullities.' It has also been decided that under a city charter requiring the mayor to " approve " of every vote, resolution, order, etc., of the common council in order to render it operative, the approval must be in writing, and a resolution will not take effect without the mayor's written approval, although it has never been customary for him to express his approval affirm- atively in writing of any action of the common council ex- cept general ordinances." ♦ § 497. (h) The same subject continued. — There are many cases, however, where such a provision has been held direct- ory only, and an ordinance otherwise legally passed has been sustained although unsigned. An ordinance of a municipal corporation that was actually passed by the council in the ex- ercise of its authority, and in accordance with all legal require- ments, and was duly promulgated and passed into execution, was held in Louisiana not invalid because it was not signed by the mayor or president of the council.' And a legislative provision requiring the presiding officer of a municipal council to sign all ordinances has been considered in the same State directory merely.^ If the ordinance is signed by the proper person, even although not expressly in the proper capacity, 1 Ladd V. City of East Portland appear that they were ever presented (Or.), 33 Pac. Eep. 533. For another to him, instaBce where signature is made es- 2 New York &c. R. Co. v. City of sential by charter, see State v. Dis- Waterbury, 55 Conn. 19; s. C, 10 trict Court, 41 Mina 518; S. C, 43 AtL Rep. 162. To the same point, N. W. Rep. 38.^ The charter of the Whitney v. City of Port Hmon city of South St. Paul, Minn. (Sp. (Mich.), 50 N. W. Rep. 316. See, also. Laws, 1887, ch. 1), provides that all Strikers. Kelly, 7 Hill, 9; Elmendorf ordinances and resolutions shall, be- v. Mayor &o. of N. Y., 35 Wend. 693 ; fore they take effect, be presented to Blanchard v. Bissell (1860), 11 Ohio the mayor, and, if he approves St 96; In re Breaux's Bridge, 30 thereof, he shall sign the same; and La. Ann. 1105. such as he shall not sign he shall re- 3 jicKenzie «. Wooley, 39, La. Ann. turn to the common council. A res- 914 ; S. c,, 3 So. Rep. 138. olution so returned can be passed by * Opelousas v. Andrus, 37 La. Ann. a two-thirds vote of the council. It 699. In accordance with this prin- was decided that resolutions of the ciple an ordinance, published in a council in proceedings to assess real newspaper, which was authenticated estate for street improvements were thus : — " In board of trustees finally of DO effect where not approved and passed this 33d day of January, 1879. signed by the mayor, and it did not J. H., President of the Board of § 498.] 0EDINAN0E8 AND BY-LAWS. 601 the validity of the ordinance will be sustained.' And where a city ordinance authorized a suit for a penalty for carrying concealed weapons on the written report ol the chief of po- lice, a report signed with the chief's name by a subordinate is considered sufficient.* If the signature is made essential, how- ever, the defect is vital and cannot be cured by amendment.' §498. (i) Publication of the ordinance — When mandjt- tory. — An ordinance, bein^ a law, must be published in some way in order to give notice to those affected thereby of its existence. It is generally required by law that the ordinance should be published, and the statutory or charter regulations on this point should be closely followed in order to avoid any question as to the validity of the ordinance. When there was no requirement as to the publication of an ordinance of an Alabama town except a constitutional provision that no person should be punished but by virtue of a law established and promulgated prior to the offense and legally applied, a publication of seven days was held sufficient in the absence of Trustees of the City of N. Attest : J. N. W., Clerk,"— and the copy of which as published contained the fol- lowing addition : — " Published by order of the board. J. N. W., Clerk," was decided in a California case to be sufficiently authenticated. City of Napa V. Easterby, 76 Cal. 322; S. G, 18 Pac. Eep. 253. To this eflEect see, also. State v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St 644 ; Wain v. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St 330; Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. St 124; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 CaL 341; Creighton v. Manson, 37 Cal. 613 ; State v. Jersey City, 30 N. J. Law, 93 ; State v. Hudson, 5 Dutch. (N. J.) 475 ; Day v. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412 ; Martindale v. Palmer (1876), 53 Ind. 411. iThus where Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1879, section 4948, pro- vided that no bill should become an ordinance until signed by the president of the board of aldermen and the mayor, and section 4965 pro- vided that the mayor should preside at all meetings of the board of alder- men, it was decided that an ordi- nance which had been signed by the mayor as such, and not by him as ex officio president of the board of al- dermen, was valid. Becker v. City of Washington, 94 Mo. 375 ; s. C, 7 S. W. Rep. 391. A constitutional provision that certain ordinances shall obtain the concurrent approval of the board of health is satislied by such approval although it was at first refused. Darcantel v. People's S. & R Co. (La., 1892), 11 So. Rep. 839. 2 St Louis V. Vert, 84 Mo. 204. s As where under the Indiana stat- ute requiring ordinances to be signed by the presiding officer, and attested by the clerk, and to be recorded, the defects cannot be remedied by a mo- tion. Bills V. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221 ; S. C, 20 N. E. Rep. 115. 502 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 499. proof of insufficiency of such publication. The court said : — "The matter therefore is vested in the discretion of the municipal governm«nt but not an arbitrary discretion. A reasonable opportunity must be given to the public within the corporate limits to be informed as to the ordinances they are commanded to obey before they can be punished for their violation." ' In general when the charter or general law re- quires publication, it must be made according to the require- ment, else the ordinance will bef void and no penalty can be enforced under it.^ Thus under a provision in the general town incorporation laws of Dakota which provided that " every by-law, ordinance or regulation, unless in case of emergency, shall be published in a newspaper in said town, if one be printed therein, or posted in five public places, at least ten days before the same shall take effect," a by-law passed by the town trustees, but never published or posted, in a case where no emergency is alleged or shown, was considered to be of no force or effect, even as to such persons as had notice of its passage by the trustees.' § 499. (j) The same subject continued — When directory. But under a city charter providing that all ordinances passed by the city council within thirty days after they become laws should be published, but that the failure to publish should not render void or affect the validity of any such ordinance, unless delay raig'ht cause the ordinance to act retrospectively on the rights of individuals, it was held in Missouri that an ordinance went into effect from the date of passage and be- came a law without publication.* And it has been decided in 1 Pitts V. Opelika, 79 Ala. 537. curring a debt for publication does 2 Meyer v. Fromm, 108 Ind. 208; not invalidate the ordinance. Eim- Napa V. Easterby, 61 Cal. 509 ; Wain ble v. City of Peoria (111., 1893), 39 N. «. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St 330 ; Hig- E. Rep. 723. ley V. Bunce, 10 Conn. 667 ; Barnert * Sweitzer v. Liberty, 88 Mo. 309. V. Newark, 28 la 63; Schwartz v. So, also, under St Mass. 1850, ch. 184, Oshkosh, 55 Wis. 490. § 20, an ordinance of the city of Lynn ' CTHare v. Town of Park Eiver need not be published, as a condition (N. D., 1891), 47 N. W. Rep. 8S0; Na- precedent to its validity. It takes tional Bank of Commerce v. Town effect upon its passage, if no time of Orenada, 44 Fed. Rep. 263. The therein is limited or named. Corn- mere factthat the city oflScials may monwealth v. McCafferty, 145 Mass. have exceeded their authority in in- 384; s. a, 14 N. £, Rep. 451. § 500.] OEDINAITOES AND BY-LAWS. 603 Massachusetts that a requirement by ordinance that city or- dinances shall be published two weeks successively in three daily newspapers published in the city was directory; that it contemplated publication after the enactment of the ordinance, and that compliance with it was not a condition precedent to the validity of the ordinance. The ordinance in question prohibited any one from delivering an address on the Boston common without permission of a committee of the common council. The court, however, did not support their decision sustaining the validity of the ordinance on this ground alone, holding that the ordinance was a re-enactment or continuance of an older ordinance, and that in such cases publication was under the Massachusetts laws unnecessary .^ § 500. (k) The same subject continued — Amendments and re-enactments. — In considering the question whether publi- cation is requisite to the validity of an ordinance, the decision must generally be gathered from the language of the legisla- tion relating to that subject.* As the object of publication is of course to give notice of the ordinance to those who must obey it, the importance of publication varies according to the nature of the ordinance. Thus, publication of a police ordi- nance restricting personal liberty should be strictly carried out, while an administrative ordinance, even though directed to be published, has been held valid in 'New Jersey before comple- tion of the publication required by law.' In a recent Louisi- 1 Commonwealth v. Davis (1886), the last provision applied as well to 140 Mass. 485, 487. by-laws and ordinances " of a gen- - So where section 25 of the Colo- eral or permanent nature "as to those rado act concerning towns and cities imposing a fine, etc. National Bank of provides that " all by-laws of a gen- Commerce v. Town of Grenada (1890), eral or permanent nature, and those 44 Fed. Eep. 263, 266. And it was imposing any fine, penalty or forfeit- further stated by Philips, J., quoting nre, shall be published, . . . and from the opinion in Clark v. Janes- it shall b*i deemed a sufficient de- ville, 10 Wis. 178, that " the object of fcnse to any suit or prosecution for such provision for publication was such fine, penalty or foi-feiture to the protection of the people by pre- show that no such publication was venting their rights and interests made," and enacts that "such by- frotti being aifected by laws which laws and ordinances* shall not take they have no means of knowing." effect and be in force until the ex- ' Stuhr v. Hoboken, 47 N. J. Law, piration of five days after they have 148. In this case the city charter been published," it was decided that forbade any change in the salaries of 504 ORDINANCES AND BT-LAWS. [§ 501. ana case it was decided that an ordinance ordering a vote of the tax-payers on the question of a special tax, though supple- mented by an amendment after it is advertised, would not be vitiated thereby, provided the amendment did not materially affect its essential parts.* Where an ordinance is a mere re- enactment or combination of an older ordinance it is not nec- essary, unless expressly required by law, that it should be re- published.^ * § 501. (1) Manner of publication. — In considering the mode of publication requisite in any particular case, reference must be made to the general principles governing the interpretation of statutes, since the manner of publication is almost always regulated by legislation. "When alternative modes of publica- tion are contemplated by the statute, and it is expressly pro- vided that election between these modes must be made by the corporation, an ordinance published by order of the town clerk without election by the council as to the mode of publi- cation is void.' But when the law did not expressly enjoin municipal officers during their terms of office ; and also required all ordi- nances to be published twenty days before taking eflfect An ordinance was passed changing the salary of one of the officers. After its enact- ment but before the expiration of the twenty days of publication a new in- cumbent was elected. It was held that he was entitled to the increased sal- ary provided by the ordinance, and that within the intent of the charter the ordinance took effect as soon as passed. This construction would not perhaps be given in the case of a police ordinance restricting personal rights. • McKenzie v. Wooley (La.), 3 So. Rep. 128. This rule is sometimes ab- rogated by statutory requirements, as where in Indiana the courts declared that if the defects may be supplied by supplemental ordinance, the latter must be published before it can take efEect, the ordinance imposing a pen- alty for its ' violation, and Bevised Statutes of Indiana, 1881, section 3100, requiring such a publication of every penal by-law. Bills v. City of Goshen (1888), 117 Ind. 221, 227; s. a, 20 N. E. Rep. 115. 2 Commonwealth v. Davis (1886), 140 Mass. 485 ; Ex parte Bedell (1886), 20 Mo. App. 125, 130; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483, 509 ; St. Louis V. Foster (1873), 53 Mo. 513; City of Cape Girardeau v. Riler, 52 Mo. 524 ; State V. Heidom, 74 Mo. 410. But see, contra, Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236. 8 Higley v. Bunce (1835), 10 Conn. 485 ; s. c., 10 Conn. 567. This was an ordinance of the town of Canaan. The statute directed that publication should be made in a newspaper printed in the town, or in the town nearest to such town in which a newspaper was printed, or in some other newspaper generally circulated in the town where such by-law was § 502.] OEDINAITCES AND BY-LAWS. 505 upon the council the duty of designating the newspaper but was silent upon that point, it was concluded in New York that the clerk might properly designate the newspaper.' In Cali- fornia the charter of a city required that ordinances be pub- lished. An ordinance containing an order directing that the ordinance be published once in a city newspaper, which publi- cation was duly made, was held to be sufficiently published.^ § 502. (m) The same subject continned. — Under the con- stitution of Illinois, which provides that " all official writings and the executive, legislative and judicial proceedings shall be published in no other than the English language," it was decided that the city of Chicago could not publish its ordi- nances at the public expense in a German newspaper.' And according to a recent decision in New Jersey, under a statu- tory requirement that city ordinances shall be published in a German newspaper, they must, in the absence of legislative direction to the contrary, be printed in the English language, since a statute or ordinance, as there declared, has no legal existence except in the language in which it is passed.^ In Missouri it was held, where the charter provided that all mu- nicipal ordinances should be published in some newspaper pub- lished in the city, that the provision was sufficiently complied with by distributing printed copies of the ordinances with the copies of a newspaper, and this although the copies were not printed in the city.' It is not necessary that the publication should be in a newspaper devoted entirely to current general made, as the town should direct The ments " was held to have no applica- ordinance in question was published tion to city ordinances. City of Pitts- in a newspaper printed in a town burg v. Reynolds (Kan., 1893), 29 Pac. nearest to Canaan, and which cir- Eep. 757. culated generally in Canaan, but ' City of Chicago v. McCoy (IlL), such publication was made by order 26 N. E. Rep. 363, Craig, J., dissent- of the town clerk wholly without di- ing. rection from the council. The court * "The publication of the transla- held that the town council alone tion may be regarded as a proper ex- could elect in what newspaper pub- planatory adjunct of the English lication should be made. copy, but cannot be accepted as a 1 Zn re Durkin, 10 Hun, 269. legal substitute for it." State w City 2 Ik re Guerrero (1886), 69 Cal. 88, of Orange (N. J.), 22 Atl. Rep. 1004. 93. A statute relating to the print- 5 Ex parte Bedell, 20 Mo, App. 125, ing of "legal notices and advertise- 180(1886). §06 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 503. news. Newspapers devoted exclusively to legal news have been held proper vehicles for the publication of ordinances.^ If publication in a newspaper printed and published in the city is required, it is suificient if the newspaper be edited and issued in the city, although its type and press work be done elsewhere." Under a law requiring the publication of the or- dinances of a city as an essential of their validity, maps and books referred to in such ordinances need not be published.' Where it is prescribed that the*publication shall be in a paper of general circulation, it is not considered necessary in Illinois that it be a local paper. Publication in a newspaper issued in a city near at hand, and circulating generally in the corpora- tion, is sufficient.* § 503. (n) Time andproof of publication. — The provisions as to time and proof of publication are generally construed with liberality by the courts. So where publication for one week is required, a single insertion in a weekly newspaper is sufficient." Where the law required that an ordinance be pub- lished for twenty days before taking effect, it was decided in New Jersey that the ordinance would take effect on the twenty-first day after the first publication, and that it was not necessary that twenty days should intervene between the first and last publication.* Where publication for three weeks was required in Indiana, the court considered publication for twenty-one days to be necessary, and that three insertions in a weekly paper, covering a period of fifteen days, did not suf- fice.' In a California case it was decided that an ordinance which provided for its publication for five successive days in a daily newspaper was properly published by publication for 1 Kerr v. Hitt, 75 IlL 51 ; Kellogg if the newspaper had no general cir- V. Corrico, 47 Mo. 157. See these culation in the corporation, such cases for discussion of meaning of publication would be insufficient, the term " newspaper " in this con- Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 Cal. 281. nection. They hold that any period- ' State v. Hardy, 7 Neb. !J77 ; Com- ical purveying news of interest to monwealth v. Mathews, 123 Mass. any considerable class will suffice. 60 ; Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. Law, 2 Boyer v. Hoboken, 44 N. J. Law, 265. 131. 6 Hoboken v. Gtear (1859), 27 N. J. »Napa V. Easterby (Cal.), 18 Pac. Law, 265. Rep. 253. '• Loughridge v. Huiftington (1877), « Tisdale v. Minonk, 46 111. 9. But 66 Ind. 252, 260. § 503.] OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 507 five successive week-days, although a Sunday intervened on which there was no issue of the paper .^ As to the proof of publication of ordinances, the cases hold that where there is prima faoie evidence of such publication the ordinance will be sustained in the absence of rebutting evidence. So where an ordinance was certijBed by the recorder as having been passed by the council on a given day, and he testified that it was published in a certain newspaper on a day named, the publication was considered in an Indiana case sufficiently ; proved, though the newspaper was not shown to be of a gen- eral circulation in the town, as required by statute ; as that fact would, it was said, be presumed, it being the officer's duty to select such a newspaper.^ And likewise when the record of an ordinance had a note appended thereto, stating; among other things, that the ordinance was duly published, and the date of its publication, the ordinance was decided to be valid, unless it was shown that said ordinance was not pub- lished, and the burden of such proof was held to rest on the defendant.' Also where the county government act of Cali- fornia provided that an ordinance of the board of supervisors should be published once a week in some newspaper published in the county, and that an order entered in the minutes should he prima faoie proof that it had been duly published, it was held that the statute did not require that an order for the publication of an ordinance should be made; but if such order was made, and a certain paper designated therein, the fact i£'a;i)arfeFiske(1887), 73Cal. 125; sive days, . . . and shall take s. C, 13 Pac. Eep. 310. So also in effect in ten days after their enact- Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 340. In mept: provided, however, that the Ohio publication in a newspaper common council may iix and pi-e- printed only on Sunday suffices, scribe a different period, and that no Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Ohio St ordinance shall take effect before 585. An ordinance of the city of one publication thereof." It was held Detroit provided that it should take that the ordinance was in force at the immediate effect, and was approved time of the act complained of. Peo- August 2, 1889. The violation thereof pie v. Keir (Mich., 1890), 43 N. W. by defendant occurred August 10, Eep. 1039. 1889. The provisions of the city '^ Incorporated Town of Bayard v. charter relative to the publication of Baker (1889), 40 N. W. Rep. 818. ordinances, and the time of their 3 Downing v. City of Miltonvale taking effect, are that "all ordinances (Kan.), 14 Pac. Kep. 281. shall be published for three sucoes- 508 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 504. that the ordinance was published in another paper in the county did not invalidate it.* § 504. (o) Title of the ordinance.— The charter or the general law often prescribes that an ordinance shall have only one subject and that such subject shall be clearly ox- pressed in the title of the ordinance. Provisions such as these are commonly construed with considerable liberality. So an ordinance which providad both for the grading and paving of an alley was not considered invalid under the pro- vision of the charter of the city of St. Louis, relating to the passage of ordinances, which prohibited a bill from containing more than one subject, which should be clearly expressed in its title.^ And a section providing for the giving of danger signals, and for the equipment of railroad cars, was held in Missouri to be embraced in the title of an ordinance entitled " An ordinance to regulate the speed within the city limits of cars and locomotives propelled by steam." ' And where the board of trustees of a city in California made an order direct- ing certain work to be done on one of the streets, the lan- guage used being, " The board order," etc., it was held, under ■ the charter of the city, which provided that the enacting 6lause of ordinances should be, ," The board of trustees of the city of l^^. do hereby ordain as follows," and a statutory pro- vision that the board might pass " by,-laws, resolutions and ordinances," — the order referred to was valid, not being an ordinance, and the charter provision concerning the enacting clause being merely directory.* Bat on the contrary, under the "Washington statute, which authorized the council of a city, by ordinance, to submit to the voters a plan for the con- struction of water, light and sewerage systems, "either or both," it was decided that an ordinance on these subjects was clearly authorized to be either single, double or triple ; and 1 County of San Luis Obispo v. * Weber v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App. Hendricks, 71 Cal. 343; s. C, 11 Pac. 601. Rep. 683. See, also, as to proof of ' Bergman v. St. Louis && R R. , ordinances, Atchison v. King, 9 Co. (Mo.), 1 S. W. Rep. 384 Kan. 550; Prell v. McDonald (1871), < City of Napa u Easterby (Cal), 7 Kan. 436 ; Moss v. Oakland, 88 111. 18 Pac. Rep. 35a 109 ; Block v. Jacksonville (1865), 36 lU. 801. § 505.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 509 hence it suspended the restriction imposed by the city charter of Seattle, that " no ordinance shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." ^ Also an ordinance, the title of which was to prohibit animals from running at large, but which also provided that no person should keep a dog without paying a tax, and directing the city marshal to kill dogs running at large whose owners had not complied with this regulation and making the owner liable to criminal prosecution for failure to comply therewith, was held to be void under the provisions of the Kansas statutes, that no ordinance should contain more than one subject, which should be clearly expressed in the title.^ And an ordinance of a city of the second class, whose title and body embraced the two distinct subjects of extending the limits of the city, and of appropriating funds to build a bridge, was considered void under the Kansas statute providing that no ordinance of such city should contain more than one subject, which should be clearly expressed in its title ; and this though the latter clause of the ordinance was of no effect because the council had no authority to make the appropriation.' An ordinance entitled " An ordinance controlling the keeping and use of jacks, stallions and bulls," which prohibits the use of such animals in public places, was thought in Iowa not to go beyond the object and scope of its title.* § 605. (p) Record of the ordinance.— The same principles apply in d'isoussing the necessity of recording ordinances that have been set forth in connection with our treatment of their signature by the mayor or other presiding ofHcer. If the charter or other statute makes it essential that the ordinance should be recorded in order to be valid, it is necessary that it should be recorded. If, however, the language of the charter or act, read in connection with the other legislation on the subject, does not appear to make the recording of the ordi- nance an essential prerequisite, the provisions relating thereto 1 Tesler v. City of Seattle (Wash.), 8 Missouri Pao. Ry. Co. v. City of 25 Pac. Eep. 1014. Wyandotte (Kan.), 23 Pac. Rep. 950. 2 Stebbins v. Mayer (Kan.), 16 Pac. * Incoi-porated Town of Bayard v. Rep. 745. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220 ; s. a, 40 N. W. Rep. 818. 510 OEDINANCES AND BT-LAWS. [§ 505. are considered as directory only. Accordingly when a city charter provided that all ordinances should be recorded, within thirty days after their passage, in a book to be provided for the purpose, " and to be kept by the mayor " for inspection, •without charge, of all persons interested, and that they should not be valid or in force until so recorded, it was decided that an ordinance recorded in a book provided for the purpose, and temporarily kept, at the mayor's request, in the city ofiBce of the court-house, at a short dislJance from his office, because he had no safe at his office, was valid.^ And when an incor- porated town was changed into a city, and the statute pre- scribed that the existing town ordinances should continue valid, provided that they should be recorded within four months thereafter, the provision has been considered merely directory, and the town ordinances have been upheld although unrecorded.^ But where a city charter required that all ordi- nances should be recorded, and that no ordinance should be carried into operation in less than two weeks after the same should be so recorded, an unrecorded ordinance has been held to be void.' Apart, however, from the validity of the ordi- nance, the municipal records of the transactions of the munici- pal council are the best evidence of those transactions.* It; is therefore important that accurate and legible record be made of every legislative act of the municipality. The recording of an ordinance is, however, a purely ministerial act. It may be performed by a subordinate or deputy, and a clerical error will not operate so as to invalidate any ordinance properly and legally enacted.' The neglect of a ministerial duty is not deemed fatal to the validity pf municipal proceedings.* What- ever is said as to the necessity of recording ordinances will * Beaumont v. City of Wilkesbarre 44 ; Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa, 90. (Pa.), 21 Atl. Rep. 888. Acts requiring record to be made of 2 Trustees of Academy v. Erie, 31 ordinances will usually be held dl- Pa. St. 515 (1858) ; Ameytt Alleghany rectory, and failure to observe will City, 24 How. 364. not invalidate the ordinance. Na- ' Verona's Appeal, 108 Pa. St 83. tlonal Bank v. Town of Grenada, 41 * Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo. 604 ; Fed. Rep. 87. See, also, Terre Haute Parsonst!. Trustees, 44 Ga. 529; Baker &c. R. Ca v. Voelker, 129 El. 540; V. Schofield, 58 Ga. 182. Ladd v. City of East Portland, 18 Greg. 6 Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11. Vt 402; 87; Western &c. R. Co. v. Young, 83 Railroad Co. v. Odum, 53 Tex. 343. Ga. 512. * Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 Mich. §§ 506, 507.] OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 511 apply equally well to the advisability of recording every reso- lution or regulation which the council may make. But con- tractual relations may be created by the mere passage of a resolution, and will be unaffected by its record or non-record.^ § 506. Validity in respect of matter — (a) Constitutional- ity. — The power of a municipal council to enact by-laws being delegated by the legislature cannot, of course, be more ex- tensive than the power of the delegating body. Consequently the by-laws or ordinances enacted by the council must not be in contravention of the constitution of the United States or of the State. Hence a by-law impairing the obligation of a contract is void as being unconstitutional.^ And if an ordi- nance is accepted, and thereby a contract is created, subse- quent ordinances cannot impair its obligation.' So an ordi- nance by which a license tax was imposed on owners of tug-boats running between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mex- ico was declared void as being a regulation^ of commerce between the States.* But a penal ordinance of Chicago, pro- nouncing steamboats emitting dense smoke to be a nuisance, is reasonable and not unconstitutional as affecting vessels on the Chicago river." §507. (b) The same subject continued. — Likewise ordi- nances giving the municipal authorities undue power in allow- ing or withholding licenses to laundries, by which the Chinese were discriminated against, have been held void as in contra- vention of the fourteenth amendment.* A city ordinance of St. Louis affixing a penalty for carrying concealed weapons was not considered unconstitutional.' And a penalty for vio- lating a town ordinance has been decided not to be a debt 1 Parr v. Village of Greenbush, 72 * Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. 8. N. Y. 463. ' 69. 2 Illinois Conference Female Col- ' Harmon v. Chicago, 110 111. 400 ; lege V. Cooper, 25 111. 148 ; Haywood S. C, 51 Am. Eep. 698. V. Savannah, 12 Ga. 404; Saving So- 6Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. ciety V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St 175 ; 356 ; In re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. Rep. 611. Davenport &c. Co. v. Davenport, 13 Ordinances of similar character, Iowa, 229. where reasonable, have been upheld. 8 People V. Chicago &c Ry. Co., 118 Soon Hing v. Crowley, 118 U. S. 703 ; 111. 113; Kansas City v. Corrigan, 86 Barbier v. Connolly, 118 U. S. 27. Mo. 67. ' St Louis v. Vest, 84 Mo. 304. i>12 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 508. within the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.^ A Minnesota' city ordinance directing a certain ofBcer to arrest and detain until the extinguishment of a fire any person refusing to obey his directions was held unconsti- tutional as depriving the sufferer of his liberty without pro- cess of law or trial by jury.' And an ordinance of the city of Shreveport in Louisiana giving to one sect a privilege which it denied to another was held unconstitutional and void.' But constitutional provisions securing freedom of religious wor- ship were not designed to prevent the adoption of reasonable rules and regulations for the use of streets and public places, and a member of a religious organization while playing on a cornet in a street parade and creating no disturbance is an itinerant musician within the meaning of an ordinance relat- ing to such persons and is not 'protected by the fact that his act was done as a matter of religious worship only.^ §508. (c) Consistency with statute and charter. — As a municipal corporation cannot enact valid laws in contraven- tion of the constitution of the United States or of the State, so it cannot enact laws contrary to the statute of the State. For a legislature to delegate povi^ers which might be used in hostility to the general laws of the State would be SLfelo de se that might render all general legislation inoperative within the limits of the corporation. Thus the ordinances of a city council imposing upon the city solicitor the duties which are required by statute to be performed by the receiver of taxes were held in a recent New Jersey case to be unauthorized and illegal.' In the same State, under a statute authorizing the mayor " in his discretion ... to impose a fine not ex- ceeding twenty dollars " for a certain offense, an ordinance prescribing a fine of not less than three nor more than twenty dollars for the same offense was held to be void, as an addi- tional limitation of the mayor's discretion.' And in general iHardenbrookv. Townof Ligonier, * Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 95 Ind. 70, and cases there cited. Mass. 375. 2 Judson V. Reardon, 16 Minn. 431. 5 state v. City of Camden (N. J.), 11 'Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann. AtL Eep. 137. 671. 6]jaii,jig i,_ Borough of VinelauJ (N. J., 1892), 29 N. E. Eep. 857. § 509.] ORDINANCES AND BY'LAWS. 513 all (Ordinances which irreconcilably conflict either with the charter or with the State statutes are void.' § 509. (d) The same subject continned. — But the by-laws of a municipal corporation, when authorized by its charter, have the effect of a special law of the legislature, and super- sede to a great degree the general law within the territorial limits of suck corporation.^ This question is discussed in an able and thorough opinion in a recent Yermont case where the charter of a village granted to the village certain powers of licensing eating-houses repugnant to the general statute in force at the time of passage of the charter. The court said : — " If the by-law is authorized by the charter it has the eflfect of a special law of the legislature within the limits of the village and supersedes the general law on the subject of victualing' houses therein ; for the charter giving the village power to pass the by-law inconsistent with and repugnant to the gen- eral law operated to repeal the gener&,l law within the terri- torial limits of the village on the principle that provisions of different statutes which are in conflict with one another can- not stand together ; and in the absence of anything showing a different intent on the part of the legislature, general legis- lation upon a particular subject must give way to later incon- sistent special legislation upon the same subject." ' In Louis- 1 State V. Georgia Medical Society, bois v. Augusta, Dudley Rep. (Ga.) 38 Ga. 608 ; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 30. 574; Wirth i;. Wilmington, 68 N. C. ^viHageofSt. JohnsburyuThomp- 24 ; Flood v. State, 19 Tex. App. 584 ; son, 59 Vt 300 ; McPherson v. Che- Bohmy u State, 21 Tex. App. 597; banse, 114111. 46; Covington u East Wood V. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 435 ; St. Louis, 78 111. 548 ; State v. Dwyer, Cowen r. West Troy, 43 Barb. 48; 31 Minn. 513; States. Clarke, 1 Dutch, Mayor &c. of New York v. Nichols, 4 54 ; Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504 ; Hill, 209 ; Mays w Cincinnati, 1 Ohio Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. St 368 ; Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St 439 ; 221. Carr v. St Louis, 9 Mo. 191 ; Baldwin 3 Village of St Johnsbury v. Thomp- V. Green, 10 Mo. 410 ; Petersburg v. son, 59 Vt 300 ; citing 1 Dillon on Metzker, 31 HI. 305; Southport v. Munic. Corp., § 88 ; 4 Kent Com. 466, Ogden, 28 Conn. 138 ; Andrews v. In- note ; In re Snell, 58 Vt 207 ; State v. surance Co., 37 Me. 356 ; White v. Morristown, 33 N. J. Law, 57 ; State Bayonne, 49 N. J. Law, 311; Lozier v. Clarke, 25 N. J. Law, 54; Davies V. Newark, 48 N. J. Law, 452 ; Volk v. Fairbarn, 3 How. 636 ; State v. V. Newark, 47 N. J. Law, 117; Cape Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; Mark v. State, 97 Girardeau v. Eiley, 72 Mo. 330; Du- N. Y. 573. 33 514 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 510. iana, however, it has recently been decided that a grant of power conferred by the legislature in the charter of a munici- pal corporation, to pass and enforce ordinances to suppress and punish the sale of adulterated drinks, was not recalled by a subsequent general statute providing for the prosecution of the same offense throughout the State.^ In many cases it has been held that this power given by charter can be subse- quently revoked by the legislature ; and at any rate both stat- ute and ordinance may stand together if not fatally inconsist^ eht.^ § 610. (e) Consistency with general penal law. — It would seem to flow as a necessary consequence from the principles enunciated in the last section that the corporation cannot pass ordinances imposing further penalties for an act which is already a penal offense under the general laws of the State ; but on this question there is great and serious conflict of opinion in the cases. It is the opinion of Judge Cooley that the clear weight of authority is to the effect that an act may be a penal offense under the laws of the State and that fur- ther penalties, under proper legislative authority, may be imposed for its commission by municipal by-laws, and the enforcement of the one would not preclude the enforcement of the other.' The arguments of those who hold that mu- nicipal ordinances may impose further penalties for the com- mission of acts already penal offenses under the general stat- utes are set forth by Collier, C. J., in an Alabama case cited by Judge Cooley, where a city ordinance imposed a fine foj assault and battery committed within the city limits, and its validity was questioned. He said: — "The object of the power conferred by the charter and the purpose of the ordi- nance itself was not to punish for an offense against the crim- inal justice of the country, but to provide a mere police regu- lation for the enforcement of good order and quiet within the limits of the corporation. So far as an offense has been com- mitted against the public peace and morals, the corporate 1 State V. Labatut (La,), 3 So. Rep. Mo. 94 ; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61 ; 550. Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 261 ; Elk 2 People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. Point v. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113. 611 ; Mayor &c. of Mobile v. Allaire, ' Cooley's Const Lim. 839. 14 Ala. 400 ; St Louis v. Cafiferata, 24 § 510.] OBDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 516 authorities have no power to inflict punishment, and we are not informed that they have attempted to arrogate it. It is altogether immaterial whether the State tribunal has interfered and exercised its powers in bringing the defendant before it to answer for the assault and battery ; for whether he has thus been punished or acquitted is alike unimportant. The offense against the corporation and the State, we have seen, are distinguishable and wholly disconnected, and the prosecu- tion at the suit of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis : the one contemplates the observance of the peace and good order of the city ; the other has a more enlarged object in view — the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State." ' There are many cases upholding the propositions set forth in the last cited authority ; indeed the number of American cases supporting this view far exceeds the number of the cases which hold the contrary. Thus it has recenth^ been decided in New Jersey that certain acts which are in- dictable as offenses against the State may also be by the legis- lature constituted offenses against the police regulations of municipalities so as to subject the offender to the mode of trial incident to proceedings for the violation of ordinances, and that where in such cases the legislature has not njade special provision for a trial by jury it cannot be demanded as matter of right.^ Conformably to these views it was held in Missouri that although by the State statutes it was a misde- meanor to cruelly beat any domestic animal, municipal corpo- rations might prohibit the same act by ordinance and punish offenders.' And in Arkansas, although carrying concealed weapons, disturbing the peace, ansl selling liquor on Sunday 1 Mayor &o. of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94 ; State v. Gordon, Ala. 400. 60 Mo. 383 ; St Louis v. Schoenbusch, estate V. City of Trenton (N. J., 95 Mo. 618; St Louis v. Bentz, 11 18 AtL Rep. 116. See, also, to Mo. 61 ; State v. Crummery, 17 Minn. the same effect^ City of Indianapolis 72 ; State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507 ; V. Huegle, 115 Ind. 581; Rogers w Elk Point t>. Vaughn, 1 Dak. Ter. 113; Jones, 1 Wend. 261 ; Mclnerney v. Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88 City of Denver (Colo., 1892), 29 Pac. 111. 231 ; Hankins v. People, 106 111. Rep. 516 ; Mayor &c. of New York v. 638 ; McRea v. Americus, 59 Ga. 168 ; Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith, 156 ; Polinsky Bloomfield w Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399. V. People, 3 Hun, 390 ; People v. Ste- ^ city of St Louis v. Schoenbusch, vans, 13 Wend. 341 ; Blatohford v. 95 Mo, 6ia Moser, 15 Wend. 21S; St Louis v. 516 OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 511. are each made offenses by statute, the power to prohibit the same acts was considered to be given cities and towns by the statute authorizing the passage of ordinances, not inconsistent with the laws of the State, to suppress disorderly conduct, provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the pros- perity, and improve the morals, order, comfort and conven- ience of the corporation and its inhabitants.* Likewise in Indiana the statute which prohibited towns or cities from making acts punishable by ordinHnce which are made public offenses and punishable by the State did not, it was held, apply to an ordinance making it an offense to sell intoxicating liquors within the limits of the city without first obtaining a city license, on the ground, however, that such act was not an offense against the State law." § 511. (f) The same subject continned, — With due defer- ence to the weighty opinion of Judge Cooley, and to the mass of authorities submitted by him in support of his opinion, to the mind of the writer the cases holding the contrary view though fewer in number are better considered, and more truly founded on principle. In a Missouri case it was decided that one who had been punished under a municipal ordinance could not be afterwards indicted under the State law. The court said: — "The constitution forbids that a person shall be twice punished for the same offense. To hold that a party can be prosecuted for an act under the State laws after he has been punished for the same act by the municipal corporation within whose limits the act was done would be to overthrow the power of the General Assembly to create corporations to aid in the management of the affairs of the State. For a power in the State to punish after a punishment had been in- flicted by the corporate authorities could only find a support in the assumption that all the proceedings on the part of the corporation were null and void. The circumstance that the municipal authorities have not exclusive jurisdiction over the acts which constitute offenses within their limits does not af- iTown o£ Van Buren v. Wells 2 city of Frankfort «. Aughe (1888), (Ark.), 14 S. W. Rep. 38. See, also, 114 Ind. 77. State V. City of Trenton, 51 N. J. Iaw, § 611.] OEDINANCE8 AND BT-LAWS. 517 feet the question. It is enough that their jurisdiction is not excluded. If it exists — although it maybe concurrent — if it is exercised, it is valid and binding as long as it is a consti- tutional principle that no man may be punished twice for the same offense." ' The logic of these considerations seems to show irresistibly that to permit the same act to be punished under the general law and under an ordinance must either lead to a violation of the constitution or must cause an elec- tion to be made between the two, methods of procedure, so that in case the act is punished under one provision the other becomes inoperative and void. This would produce an anom- alous condition of criminal procedure in such cases that could hardly have been contemplated either by the legislature or the city council. In a recent and well considered North Car- olina decision it was held that an ordinance of a city or town which made an act, which was punishable as a criminal offense under the general law of the State, an offense against the town, punishable by fine or imprisonment, was void.^ On the same line authority given to a city in Oregon " to prevent and restrain disturbances " was not thought to include the right to take jurisdiction and punish for the crime of an assault with a dangerous weapon.' It is not uncommonly provided by statute that acts which are public offenses punishable by statute shall not be punishable by city ordinance. In such cases there is no question that such an ordinance is void.' ' state 17. Cowan, 39 Mo. 330. See, any statute, shall not be made pun- also, Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg. ishable by any city ordinance, the 139 ; State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 316 ; wrongful interference with a police- Menken u Atlanta, 78 Ga. 668 ; Jen- man in making an arrest, prohibited kins V. Thomasville, 35 Ga. 145 ; Vason by an ordinance of the city of In- V. Augusta, 38 Ga. 543 ; State v. Sa- dianapolis, is not punishable by that rannah, 1 T. CT. P. Charl. 335 ; s. c, ordinance ; such act being made a 4 Am, Dec. 708 ; Slaughter v. People public offense, and punishable by sec- (Mich.), 3 Doug. 334; State u. Keith, tion 10 of the metropolitan police 94 N. C. 933 ; Washington u Ham- act (Acts 1888, p. 89), providing that mond, 76 N. C. 33, any person who shall, in any man- 2 State V. Keith, 94 N. C. 933. ner, interfere with or interrupt the 8 Walsh V. City of Union (Or., board of metropolitan polic6/ com- 1890), 11 Pac. Eep. 313. missioners in any act of theirs while < So under Revised Statutes of In- in the legal discharge of their duties, diana, 1881, section 1640, providing or of the police force, shall, upon that any act made a public oflfense conviction, be fined, etc. City of In- against the State, and punishable by dianapolis v. Huegle (Ind.), 18 N. K, 518 OEDDTANOES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 512. § 512. (g) Eeasonalbleness of the ordinance. — It is a well- settled principle that a municipal by-law or ordinance must be reasonable. If it be not reasonable, the courts will decline to enforce it, and it will be declared void as matter of law.' Rep. 173. To the same effect is a Califoraia case. Section 3 of ordi- nance No. 192 of the city of Stock- ton, California, malies it unlawful for two or more persons to assemble, be or remain in any room or place for the purpose of smoking opium, or inhaling the fumes thereof. Sec- tion 307 of the State Penal Code de- clares that every person who visits or resorts to any place where opium, or any of its preparations, is sold or given a.way to be smoked at such place, for the purpose of smoking opium, or its said preparations, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and punish- able by fine or imprisonment It was held that the ordinance, in so far as it made criminal precisely the same acts that were declared a crime by the State law, was in conflict there- with; and under Constitution, arti- cle 11, section 11, limiting the power of municipal corporations to the passage of ordinances not in conflict with general laws, was void, and that persons accused of assembling in a room for the purpose of smoking opium therein could not be prose- cuted thei-eunder. In re Sic (Cal.), 14 Pac. Rep. 405; Ex parte Solomon (CaL, 1891), 37 Pac. Rep. 757 ; Exparte Ah You, 88 Cal. 99. •Atkinson v, Goodrich Transpor- tation Co., 00 Wis. 141; Clason v. Milwaukee, 80 Wis. 316 ; Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307 ; People v. Troop, 12 Wend. 183 ; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 463 ; People v. Roches- ter, 44 Hun, 166 ; Mayor &c. of Co- lumbia V. Beasley, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 382 ; Mayor &o. of Memphis v. Win- fl^ld, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 707 ; Long v. Taxing District, 7 Lea, 184; White V. Mayor &c. of Nashville, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 364 ; State v. Mayor &c. of Jersey City, 37 N. J. Law, 348; Nicoulin v. Loweiy, 49 N. J. Law, 391 ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. Law, 286; Delaware &c R. Co. V. East Orange, 41 N. J. Law, 127; Kip v. Mayor &c. of Paterson, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 298 ; Day- ton V. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77; Chi- cago V. Trotter (111.), 26 N. E. Rep. 359; Tugman v. Chicago. 78 111. 405; Clinton v. Phillips, 58 IlL 102 ; In re Frazee (1886), 63 Mich. 306 ; Fisher v. Harrisburg, 3 Grant's Cas. 291 ; Com- missioners V. Gas Co., 12 Pa, St. 318 ; O'Maley v. Freeport, 96 Pa, St 24; Knedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St 203 ; Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 Cush. 438; Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met 130 ; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161 ; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462; Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass. 485 ; Commonwealth v. McCaf- f erty, 145 Mass. 384 ; Commonwealth V. Steffee, 7 Bush (Ky.), 161; Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606; Exparte Chin Yan, 60 Cal. 78; State v. Free- man, 38 N. H. 426; Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va. 956 ; Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. 110; Davis v. Anita (1887), 73 Iowa, 325; State Center v. Baren- stein, 66 Iowa, 349 ; Meyers v. Chi- cago &c R. Co., 57 Iowa, 555 ; Gil- ham V. Wells, 64 Ga. 193; Cape Girardeau v. RUey, 73 Mo. 330. For English cases see 2 Kyd on Corpo- rations, 107; Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587; Chamberlain of London v. Crompton. 7 D. & R. 597; Clark v. Le Gren, 9 B. & C. 53 ; Gosling v. Veley, 13 Q. B. 338; Society of Scriveners v. Brooking, 3 § 512.] OEDnrANOES and bt-laws. &19 But, as was said by Niblack, J., in an able opinion delivered in a recent Indiana case : — " An ordinance cannot be held to be unreasonable which is expressly authorized by the legisla- ture. The power of a court to declare an ordinance unrea- sonable and therefore void is practically restricted to cases in which the legislature has enacted nothing on the subject-mat- ter of the ordinance, and consequently to cases in which the ordinance was passed under the supposed incidental power of the corporation merely." ' So when the legislature expressly authorizes the municipality to pass any certain ordinance, that ordinance will be upheld, regardless of the opinion of the court as to its reasonableness or unreasonableness.^ This prin- ciple was fully discussed in a celebrated and extreme case in Missouri. The charter of the city of St. Louis authorized the city to regulate bawdy-houses. The court construed this pro- vision to allow the passage of an ordinance licensing bawdy- houses, and in discussing the reasonableness of such an ordi- nance it was said : — " It is naked assumption to say that any matter allowed by the legislature is against public policy. The best indications of public policy are to be found in the enactments of the legislature. To say that such a law is of un- usual tendency is disrespectful to the legislature, who, no doubt, designed to promote the morals and health of the citizens., Whether the ordinance in question is calculated to promote the object is a question with which the courts have no concern." » Q. B. 95 ; Elwood v, Bullock, 6 Q. B. Ind. 115 ; Chamberlain v. Evansvillcs 383. Id the last cited case an ordi- 77 Ind. 543 ; Brooklyn v. Breslin nance imposing unreasonable restric- (1874), 57 N. T. 591; Breninger v. tions on the licensing of booths was Belvidere, 44 N. J. Law, 350 ; State v. held invalid. The reasonableness and Clarke (1836), 54 Mo. 17 ; Peoria v. sufl&ciency o£ an ordinance is not to Calhoun (1863), 89 111. 317 ; St. Paul be tested in all cases by its applica- v. Colter (1866), 13 Minn. 41 ; Haynes tion to extreme cases. Coram iin- i: Cape May, 40 N. J. Law, 55 ; Die- wealth V. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 383. trict of Columbia v. Waggaman, 1 Perhaps a proper construction might Mackey, 338. A reasonable penalty not admit of their being included being prescribed in an ordinance, it within it. Commonwealth v. Cutter, is not unconstitutional because the (Mass., 1893), 39 N. E. Rep. 1140. See, statute under which it is enacted alao. Walker v. City of Camden (111., does not limit the penalty the ordi- , 39 N. E. Rep. 741. nance may im^pose. State v. Carpen- 1 Coal Float v. Jeffersonville, 113 ter, 60 Conn. 97. Iiirl. 19. / 3 State t), Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, 36. See •^ Coal Float v. Jeffersonville, 113 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 338. 520 OEDINANOES AMD BY-LAWS. [§ 513. § 513. (h) The same subject continued — Illustrations.— The presumption is always in favor of the reasonableness of the ordinance, and unless it is unreasonable on its face or is proved to be so by proper evidence, the ordinance will be up- held.^ Of course each case in which the reasonableness of an ordinance is questioned must be decided on the facts of that particular case. No general rule can be laid down defining what ordinances are unreasonably and what ordinances are not. But certain broad principles can be followed. Thus an ordinance must not be so vague that its precise meaning can- not be ascertained. This question is discussed in the succeed- ing section. Also the ordinance must not be oppressive.^ It must not be in restraint of trade.' It must not be contrary to common right. Thus an ordinance of a Texas city forbid- ding the renting of private property to lewd women, or to any person for their use, was held to be a prescriptive denial of shelter to that class, and mill and void as in contravention of common rignt.* It must be impartial and general in its oper- ation.' So far as it restricts the absolute dominion of an owner over his property it should furnish a uniform rule of action, and its application cannot be left to the arbitrary will of the governing authorities." An ordinance which provides 1 Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361 ; « State v. Tenant (N. C, 1893), 14 State V. Trenton (N. J.), 20 Atl. Rep. a E. Eep. 387, citing Newton v. Bel- 1076; Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 ger, 143 Mass. 598 ; City of Eichmond Mass. 231. Of. St Louis v. Weber, v. Dudley (Ind.), 38 N. E. Eep, 312; 44 Mo. 547; St. Louis v. Knox, 6 Mo. Tick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; App. 247 ; Clason v. Milwaukee, 30 May v. People (Colo.), 27 Pac. Eep. Wis. 316. 1010 ; Baltimore v. Eedecke, 49 Md. 2 Baltimore v. Eadeoke, 49 Md. 317 ; 217 : Anderson v. City of Wellington, Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 40 Kan. 173 ; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 707 ; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547 ; 396 ; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 111. 405 ; Comm'rs v. Gas Cc^ 13 Pa. St. 318. Village of Braceville v. Doherty, 30 3 Ingman w Chicago, 78 IlL 405 ; In lU. App. 645 ; Barthet v. City of New re Frank, 53 Cal. 606 ; Caldwell w Al- Orleans, 34 Fed. Rep. 564; Bills v. ton, 33 IlL 416; Borough of Sayre v. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 331; Lake Phillips (Pa., 1892), 34 Atl. Eep. 76. View v. Letz, 44 111. 81 ; Evansville v. * Milliken v. City Council &c of Martin, 41 Ind. 145 ; Horr. & Bemis Weatherford, 54 Tex. 388. See, also, on Munic. Police Ordinances, §13. See, State V. Mottt 61 Mo.' 397, and cases also. State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962 ; cited post. State v. Hunter, 106 N. 0. 796. » Municipality v. Blineau (1848), 3 La, Ann. 688. §§ 514, 515.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 621 that no person shall erect, add to, or generally change any building without first obtaining the permission of the board of aldermen, is void for the reason indicated.^ § 614. (i) The same subject continued — Reasonableness a question of law. — It is, of course, a question of law and not of fact, foj* the court and not for the jury, whether any spe- cific ordinance is so unreasonable as to be void.* This is the well established doctrine of the cases in England as well as in America, but the contrary view has been asserted in a Wis- consin case where the validity of an ordinance intended to pro- tect the city from inundation was called into question. The court held that testimony relating to the reasonableness of the ordinance could properly be presented to the jury." This decision is anomalous, however, and is probably entitled to but little weight. § 515. (j) Tagueness of the ordinance. — It is manifest that an ordinance must be certain and definite in order to be rea- sonable. Accordingly the courts have often held ordinances void as being vague and indefinite.* An ordinance providing that for certain oilenses the offender should pay not more than fifty dollars or suffer imprisonment not to exceed one month was held in North Carolina to be void for vagueness and uncertainty .' And in the same State an ordinance pro- viding that for certain disorderly conduct the offender might be fined by the mayor not more than five dollars was also 1 State V. Tenant (N. C, 1893), 14 ware &c. R Co. v. East Orange, 41 S. E. Eep. 387. N. J. Law, 127 ; State v. Mayor &c. z Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591 ; of Jersey City, 37 N. J. Law, 348 ; Hudson V. Thorne, 7 Paige Ch. 361 ; Paxson v. Sweet, 18 N. J. Law, 196. Dunham u Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; aCIason v. Milwaukee (1873), 30 Buffalo V. Webster, 10 Wend. 100 ; Wis. 316. Austin V. Murray, 16 Pick. 121 ; Bos- * Tappan v. Young, 9 Daly (N. Y.). ton V. Shaw, 1 Met 130; Common- 357; San Francisco &o. Factoiy v. wealth V. Worcester, 3 Pick. 463; Brick wedel, 60 CaL 166; Becker v. In re Vandine, 6 Pick. 187; Com- Washington, 94 Mo. 380; Common- monwealth v. Stodder, 3 Cush. 562 ; wealth v. Eay, 140 Mass. 433 ; State Comm'rs of Northern Liberties v. Center v. Barenstein, 66 Iowa, 349 ; Gas Co., 13 Pa. St. 318 ; Kneedler v. Bills v. Goshen (Ind.), 30 N. E. Eep. NorristovCn, 100 Pa. St. 368 ; Fisher v. 115 ; Helena v. Gray (Mont), 17 Pac. Harrisburg (Pa.), 2 Grant's Cas. 291 ; Rep. 564. Ex parte Frank, 53 Cal. 606 ; Dela- » State v. Crenshaw, 94 N. C. 877. 522 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 516. considered void for uncertainty.' But in an Alabama case an ordinance which imposed a penalty not exceeding a fixed sum was upheld as sufficiently certain.' In accordance with these principles the weight of authority is that the amount of the fine imposed by the ordinance must be fixed thereby and cannot be left to the discretion of an officer.' An or- dinance providing that no occupant of land abutting on a private way shall suffer any filth to remain on that part of the way adjoining his land is not open to the objection of in- definiteness because it does not fix a time beyond which it shall not be allowed to remain. The words " sufl'er to remain " imply an opportunity to remove and a failure to do so.* § 616. Motives of council not to Ibe impeached. — A city council being " a minature General Assembly and its author- ized ordinances having the force of laws passed by the legisla- ture of the State," ' it follows that when a municipal corpora- tion passes an ordinance legislative in its character importing no private contract or rights, the members of the corporation enjoy the same prerogatives as members of a State legisla- ture, and their conduct or motives in passing the ordinance cannot be questioned by way of impeaching the validity of the ordinance.* But in Ohio it has been held that this immu- nity from impeachment for fraudulent motives or abuse of 1 State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883. a fine "not exceedinR 5Z." was 8U8- And a town ordinance which pro- tained. Piper v. Chappell, 14 M. & W. vided that "any person whose duty 624. it shall be to make such alterations, ' State v. Zeigler, 32 N. J. Law, 269 ; and who shall refuse to do so after Commissioners v. Harris (N. C), 7 due notice thereof, shall be fined a Jones' L. 281 ; State v. Crenshaw, 94 sum not exceeding five dollars, and N. C. 877 ; State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. one dollar for each and every day he 883 ; State v. Clinton (N. J.), 21 Atl. may neglect to make such repairs,'' Eep. 304. was thought to leave the fine and * Commonwealth v. Cutter (Mass., penalty uncertain in amount and to 1892), 29 N. E. Rep. 1146. be void. State v. Rice, 92 N. C. 421 ; » Taylor f. Carondelet (1855), 22 s. c, 2 S. E. Rep. 180. Mo. 105.' 2 Mayor &c. of Huntsville v. Phelps, * Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 La. Ann. 27 Ala. 55. So, also, under the En- 247, 258 ; s. C, 1 So. Rep. 599 ; Free- glish statute authorizing an ordi- pOrt v. Marks, 59 Pa. St 253 ; Buell v. nance imposing a fine of not more Ball, 20 Iowa, 282. than five pounds, an ordinance fixing § 517.] OEDINANOES AND BT-LAWS. 523 power does not attach to all of the acts of a city council which may assume the form of an ordinance; and that where the city council was empowered to regulate the price of gas, and under the colorable exercise of such power for a fraudulent purpose passed an ordinance fixing the price of gas at a rate at which they well knew that it could not be manufactured and sold without loss, the motives of the council could be prop- erly inquired into.* The officers of a municipal corporation are of course exempt from personal liability for the passage of any ordinance within their authority ; nor are they personally liable for any ordinance not within their authority, for such an ordinance is absolutely void.^ § 517. Construction of ordinances. — The canons of con- struction that are eipployed in the interpretation of statutes are also used to determine the meaning of ordinances.' Pro- visions that are essentially penal are strictly construed,* but ordinary police regulations, even though a penalty be attached, are not subjected to so close a scrutiny.* It is proper to con- sider the title of the ordinance * and the mischief which it Avas designed to remedy,' as also in doubtful cases a contempora- ' State V. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Md. 85 ; Zorger v. Greensburgh, 60 Ohio St. 263, 300, citing Davis v. The Ind. 1 ; Quinette v. St. Louis, 76 Mo. Mayor &c. of New York, 1 Duer, 451. 403. Construction is a question of But in the opinion in the Ohio case law. Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, 13 tliere is a dictum that inquiry into 111. App. 91. the motives of the council in passing * Paciflo v. Seifert, 79 Mo. 310 ; an ordinance for purposes of police Krickle v. Commonwealth, 1 B. Mon. regulation or municipal government (Ky.) 261 ; St Louis v. Goebel, 33 Mo. would perhaps be incompetent; as 395. the courts would have no jurisdiction " A reasonable construction is the to impeach such an ordinance for rule. Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. such a reason. Judge Dillon adds Ann. 335; Rounds D.Mumford, 3 R. L the great weight of his opinion to the 154; Commonwealth u. Robertson, 5 eSeci that the acts of municipal Cush. 488 ; Merriam v. New Orleans, bodies, whether in the form of reso- 14 La. Ann. 318 ; Vintners' Co. v. lutinns or ordinances, may be im- Passey, 1 Bui-r. 335 ; Poulters' Co. v. peached for fraud at the instance of Phillips, 6 Bing. N. C. 314. Liberal persons injured thereby. 1 Dillon on rules are applied to town by-laws. Munic. Corp., § 311. Whitlock v. West, 26 Conn. 406. 2 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 313. « Martindale v. Palmer, 53 Ind. 411, 3 In re Yick Wo, 68 Cal 394 ; S. c, 'Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Saw. 553, 58 Am. Rep. 13; State v. Kirkley, 29 524 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 518. neons construction by the parties interested.' General words and sweeping clauses are controlled by particular descriptions preceding them.^ If an ordinance is susceptible of two con- structions, that one must prevail which will preserve its validity in preference to a construction that will render it invalid ; and this must be done although the construction adopted may not be the most obvious or natural or the literal one.' Thus, an ordinance making it unlawful to ride a bicycle across a public bridge is limited to the footways of the bridge ; otherwise it would be void as against common right.* And an ordinance providing that " no person shall drive or lead any horse or cart or wheel-carriage on the footway or sidewalk of any street " does not prohibit the carting of earth from excava- tions across the sidewalk.' § 518. The same subject continued — Ordinances void in part. — It is well settled that invalid provisions in an ordi- nance do not necessarily render the ordinance totally void. The rule to be applied is that if part of a law be void other essential and connected parts are also void,* but where that 1 Wright V. Chicago &o. R. Co., 7 rng upon his own lot and would deny 111. App. 438 ; State v. Severance, 49 the right of an abutting owner of Mo. 401. driving hia carriage from a stable." 2Sohultz V. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St. In re O'Keefe (1893), 19 N. Y. Supl. 659 ; Snyder v. North Lawrence, 8 676. See, also, Gilluly v. Madison, 63 Kan. 83; Keokuk &c. Ca v. Quinoy, Wis. 518; Ex parte Ah Lit, 26 Fed. 81 111. 433. Cf. IlL Cent E. Co. v. Eep. 513 ; Athens v. Georgia R. Co., Galena, 40 111. 844; St Louis v. 73 Ga. 800. Cf. Commonwealtli v. Herthei, 88 Mo. 138. Curtis, 9 AUeii, 368. 3 Commonwealth v. Dow, 10 Met sjn. re Ah Toy, 45 Fed. Eep. 795; 383 ; Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 Gill & J. Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 33 ; 480; Newland v. Marsh, 19 111. 376; Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Icwa, 36; Her- lowa Co. V. Webster Co., 21 Iowa, shoff v. Beverly, 45 N. J. Law, 388; 381 ; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. Trowbridge v. Newark, 46 N. J. Law, St 445 ; Eoosevelt v. Godar J, 52 140 ; State v. Mayor &o. of Hoboken, Barb. 533; Colwell v. Landing Co., 38 N. J. Law, 1 10 ; Commonwealths. 19 N. J. Eq. 245 ; Bigelow v. Eail- Stodder, 3 Cush. 562 ; Commonwealth road Co., 37 Wis. 478 ; Dow v. Norris, v. Dow, 10 Met 383 ; Fisher v. Mc- 4 N. H. 17 ; Inkster v. Carver, 16 Girr, 1 Gray, 1 ; Amesbury v. Bow- Mich. 484 ; Cooley's Const Lim. 184. ditch &c. Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 596 ; Wai^ 4 Swifts. City of Topeka (1890), 43 ren v. Mayor &c., 3 Gray, 84; Ex Kan. 671. parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208 ; State » " If so construed," said the court v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 888 ; St Louis v. ",it would prevent a party from build- St Louis R Co., 14 Mo. App. 321 ; St § 519.] OEDINANOES AND BT-LAWS. 525 part which is void is independent and no|; essentially connected with the remainder the law will stand.' Thus, it was held that where a statute authorized the mayor to impose a fine of not more than $20 " in his discretion " for certain offenses, an ordinance imposing a fine of not less than three nor more than ten dollars, being void as to the fine, the whole enact- ment was void and could not be treated as ordaining an offenSe.^ But where the charter gave express power to pro- hibit the sale of certain articles except at a public market, an ordinance in pursuance thereof was valid, although it covered some articles not included in the enumeration.' § 619. Amendment and repeal by subsequent ordinance. — The power of a municipal corporation to enact ordinances in- cludes by implication the power to amend or repeal them.* Louis V. St Louis R Co., 89 Mo. 44 ; Piqua V. Zimmerlin, 35 Ohio St 507 ; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. S37 ; Rau v. Little Rock, 34 Ark. 303: Baker v. Normal, 81 111. 108 ; Quincy v. Bull, 106 111. 337 ; Harbaugh v. Monmouth, 74 111. 367; State v. Chamberlin, 37 N. J. Law, 388. 'Staats V. Washington, 45 N. J. Law, 318, 325 ; s. a, 46 N. J. Law, 309; Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144 ; s. C, 46 Am. Rep. 6a5 ; Pennsyl- iVania R Co. v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. Law, 286 ; State v. Hardy, 7 Neb. 377.; State V. Kantler, 33 Minn. 69 ; State V. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1; Cooper v. District of Columbia, 4 MacArthur, 250 ; State v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17. When it prohibits disjunctively two or more acts, the invalidity of one part does not aflfect the validity of the others. Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 111. 39. But the parts must be en- tire and distinct from each other. Municipality v. Morgan, 1 La. Ann. Ill, 116 ; Rex v. Faversham Fisher- men's Co., 8 Term Rep. 356; Will- cook on Munic. Corp. 160, pi. 384. 2Landis v. Borough of Vineland (N. J., 1893), 30 N. E. Rep. 357. The argument was that the maximum limit of ten dollars was opposed to an inference that it was intended to cre- ate an offense which might be pun- ishable by a twenty-dollar fine. One section of an ordinance making it an offense to continue or allow the qontinuance of a house of ill-fame for two days after it shall have been so adjudged under a prior void section, the two are so connected that they must fall together. State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 983 ; s. C, 13 S. E. Rep. 598. 'Shelton v. Mayor of Mobile, 30 Ala. 540. See, also. Eureka Springs V. O'Neil (Ark., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 969. « Welch V. Bowen, 103 Ind. 352; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 86 N. Y. 467; People v. Collins, 8 Mich. 347; Rex V. Baird, 13 East, 367; Rex v. Ashwell, 12 East, 33 ; Great Western Ry. Co. V. North Cayuga, In re, 23 Upper Can. C. P. 28; Greeley v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 174 ; Bloomer v. StoUey, 5 McLean (U. S.), 158 ;' Rice V. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.) 479 ; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165 ; s. c, 63 Am. Dec. 487; In re MoUie Hall, 10 Neb. 537; City Council v. Church, 4 Strobh. (S. C.) 306. But where the record showed that a motion changing cer- 526 OBDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 519. The general rul )s governing the amendment and repeal of statutes are applied to the legislation of municipal corporsr tions. An amendment of a void ordinance is inefifectaal to create a valid and enforceable ordinance,^ but if only a part of the original ordinance is invalid an amendment of that part will stand.* A repealing ordinance may contain a clause ex- cepting from its operation offenses committed and forfeitures incurred previous to the repeal,' but if there be no reservation all violations of the former ordinance are blotted out, as it were, and the courts are also powerless to proceed further in pending prosecutions.* Where a repealing ordinance is itself repealed the original ordinance is restored to full force and efficacy.' The power to amend and repeal is subject to the qualification that it cannot; be exercised in such a way as to impair private rights which have been acquired under a law- ful ordinance.* tain provisions was adopted and that "the mayor was instructed to pre- pare an ordinance covering said changes," it was held not be in it- self a complete legislative act. Jones V. McAlpine, 64 Ala. 511. 1 Cowley V. Town of Eushville, 60 Ind. 327 ; Board of Clay County v. Markle, 46 Ind. 96; Blakemore v, Dolan, 50 Ind. 194; Ford v. Booker, 53 Ind. 395; State v. Kantler, 83 Minn. 69, 77. 2 State V. Kantler, 33 Minn. 69. An amending ordinance which does not attempt to amend the old by adding to or taking from one of its sections, but contains in full the section as it was designed to be when amended, sufficiently complies with a statutory requirement that an amending ordi- nance shall contain the ordinance or part thereof which it attempts to re- view or amend. Larkin v. Burling- ton &o. Ry. Co. (Iowa, 1893), 52 N. W. Rep. 480; Town of Decorah v. Dunstan, 38 Iowa, 96. 3 City of Kansas v. White, 69 Mo. 26. See, also, Pardrige v. Village of Hyde Park, 131 IlL 537. *Day V. Clinton, 6 III App. 476; Barton v. Gadsden, 79 Ala. 495. And no subsequent ordinance or statute can revive the offense by attempting to limit the effect of the repeal. Kan- sas City V. Clark, 68 Mo. 588. The rule is not confined to penal ordi- nances. Kaine v. Harty, 4 Mo. App. 357. A statute abrogating the com- mon-law rule in relation to the repeal of laws does not apply to municipal ordinances. Naylor v. Galesbutg, 56 111. 285. 5 Mayor &c. c. Broadway &a R Co., 97 N. T. 275, citing People v. Davis, 61 Barb. 450 ; Van Denburgh v. Green- bush, 66 N. Y. 1. Day v. Clinton, 6 111. App. 476, cited 'n one text-book to support the contrary proposition, merely decides that the guilt of one whose offense has been wholly ex- purgated by the repeal of the law creating it cannot be revived by a re- peal of the repealing act, 6 Rex V. Baird, 13 East, 879 ; Rex v. Ashwell, 12 East, 23; Bigelow v. Hillman, 87 Me. 53 ; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1 ; Nelson v. St Martin's Parish, 111 N. Y. 716 ; Pond v. Negus, § 520.] ORDINANCES AND BT-LAWS. 527 § 520. Bepeal by act of the legislature. — " The legislature cannot by express intendment repeal ordinandes, though a re- peal may be effected by the passage of a general law that is inconsistent with the ordinance." ' When a city of the second class having lawful authority passed an ordinance to suppress houses of prostitution, and while it was in full force a new law for the government of cities of that class was passed con- taining authority to the city council to " restrain, prohibit and suppress " houses of prostitution, and the former act was repealed without a saving clause, it was held that the new act did not repeal existing ordinances.'' And as a general rule an ordinance will not be deemed to be repealed b^' a stat- ute unless they are irreconcilably inconsistent with each other.' 3 Mass. 230 ; S. C, 3 Am. Dec. 131 ; Cunningham v. Almonte, 21 Upper Can. C. P. 459 ; In re Great Western R Ca, 23 Upper Can. C. P. 28 ; Louis- iana u Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 278; Chi- cago &c. R. Co. V. Minnesota Cent. R Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 525 ; Terre Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind. 480 ; State v. Graves, 19 Md 351; Baldwin v. Smith, 82 m. 162; People v. Chicago &c. R Co., 18 111. App. 125 ; Gormley v. Day, 114 IlL 185; Quinoy v. Bull, 106 111. 337 ; Cape May &c. R Co. v. Cape May, 35 N. J. Eq. 419 ; Reiflf v. Con- ner, 10 Ark. 241 ; State v. City Clerk &c., 7 Ohio St. 355 ; Koad in Augusta Township, 17 Pa. St. 71, 75; Des Moines u Chicago &c. R Co., 41 Iowa, 569 ; Burlington v. Burlington St R Co., 49 Iowa, 144 ; s. C, 81 Am. Eep. 145; City Council of Charleston v. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 306 ; Mayor &c. of Rome v. Lumpkin, 5 Ga. 447. But " no person can claim immunity from proper police regu- lation of his vested interests because they were based upon the privileges or under the protection of a munici- pal ordinance." Horr & Bemis on Munic. Police Ordinances, § 67, and cases cited. 1 Horr & Bemis on Munic. Police Ordinances, §§ 60, 61. A svacute reg- ulating the taking up of stray ani"- mals, and providing that nothing in any municipal charter shall be con- strued to authorize an ordinance dealing with the subject in any other manner, repeals an existing valid or- dinance' of that description. Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 OhiOj 427. 2 "There has been no attempt on the part of the legislature to repeal the law creating cities of the second class and destroy the organization of the same. It is true that a new act has taken the place of the former and continues the organization of such cities with new and modified powers. But this is very different from an entire repeal. The doctrine is well settled that a change in the form of government of a community does not ipso /acto abrogate pre-exist- ing laws." In re Mollie Hall, 10 Neb. 537, citing Trustees v. Erie, 31 Penn. St 515-517. See, also. Waring v. Mayor &c. of Mobile, 24 Ala. 701. 3 Mayor &c. of New York v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 156, holding that a statute by which a violation of the ordinances of New York was declared a misdemeanor and punish- able by fine or imprisonment did not operate as a repeal of the penalty given by those ordinances nor take 528 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 621. But where it is the evident design of the legislature to as- sume the exclusive regulation of a subject which had been be- fore permitted to be regulated by municipal ordinances, the latter must yield, and such legislative intent will more readily be inferred if the ordinance in question would otherwise be unreasonable and oppressive.* § 521. Repeals by implication. — It has been laid down as law that a general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former statute unless the two are plainly inconsistent.^ It is also a doctrine that a sub- sequent statute revising the whole subject-matter of a former one will operate as a repeal of it, though it contains no ex- press words of repeal.' Both these rules are without doubt as applicable to ordinances as to statutes.* Where th^ final chapter of a revising ordinance recited a long list of ordinances which were expressly repealed, the omission of certain ordi- nances from the list was held to preserve them in full force, although the title of the ordinance imported to comprise all former enactments.'' The general ordinances of a city were revised and consolidated for publication and were thus adopted and re-enacted. An ordinance under which a prosecution had , been begun was re-enacted in substantially the same language without any words of repeal or any clause saving pending prosecutions. The effect of the re-enactment was declared to away the right of the corporation to ' Burlington v. Estlow, 43 N. J. prosecute a civil action for the pen- L*w, 13 ; Bartlett v. King, 13 Mass. alty. See, also, March v. Common- 537 ; Deoorah v. Dunstan, 38 Iowa, wealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 35 ; State v. 96 ; Goodenough v. Buttrick, 7 Mass. Lahatut, 39 La. Ann. 516 ; Baldwin 140 ; Booth v. Town of Carthage, 67 V. Murphy, 83 111. 485 ; Quinette v. 111. 103 ; Commonwealth v. Cooley, 10 St Louis, 76 Mo. 403; Franklin v. Pick. 37; Ellis t). Page, 1 Pick. 43, 45 ; Westfall, 37 Kan. 614; Chamberlain Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 395; V. Evansville, 77 Ind. 543. Farr v. Brackett, 30 Vt 344. 1 Southport V. Ogden, 33 Conn. 128. * City of Providence v. Union R 2 Conley v. Supervisors &c., 2 West Co., 12 E. L 473 ; Booth v. Carthage, Va. 416 ; Brown v. County Comm'rs, 67 111. 103. 31 Pa. St. 37 ; Bank of Louisiana v. * The case did not, however, turn Farrar, 1 La. Ann. 49, 54 ; Lenz v. upon this circumstance alone. City Sherrott, 36 Mich. 139 ; Croll v. Vil- of Providence v. Union E. Co., 12 R. L lags of Franklin, 40 Ohio St 340; 473. Barker v. Smith, 10 8. C. 326. § 522.] 0EDINAN0E8 AND BY-LAWS. 529 continue in force the provisions of the original ordinance and not to abate or affect the prosecution.^ §532. Power to impose penalties. — Since an ordinance without a penalty would be nugatory, a corporation that has the power to pass the ordinance has an implied power to pro- vide for its enforcement by proper and reasonable fines against those who break it.* Thus, a power to " open, widen, . . . and keep in repair streets," etc., and to pass ordinances neces- sary to carry into effect the power granted, confers authority to punish by fine any person who may obstruct a public street.' And under a power to suppress bawdy-houses the corporation has by implication and of necessity the power to adopt proper means to accomplish it.* So, also, the power to " restrain and prohibit " an act implies power to punish its commission." But the right to impose fines cannot exist in conflict with a reasonable interpretation of the charter ; and although authority to " prevent " will support an ordinance prohibiting under proper penalties," the general rule that all La. Ann. 1110; Barter v. Common- wealth, 3 Pa. 260 ; Fisher v. Harris- burg, 2 Grant's Cas. (PL) 291 ; Mount Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399; Eeinhard v. Mayor &c. of N. Y., 3 Daly (N. Y.), 243 ; Horr & Bemis on Munic! Ordinances, § 147. Contra, Farnsworth v. Pawtucket, 13 B. L 83. Such Anes must as a general rule be paid into the treasury of the city, town or other municipal corporation, unless the law specifically directs otherwise. People v, Sacramento, 6 CaL 433. 8 Toledo &C. Ry. Ca v. Chenoa, 43 UL 209. * Which included the imposition of a fine. Shreveport v. Boos, 35 La. Ann. 1010. See, also, Amite City v. Clements, 24 La. Ann. 27. estate V. Grimes (Minn., 1892), 62 N. W. Rep. 42. «City of Centerville v. Miller, 57 Iowa, 66; Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates, 493. •Junction City v. Webb (1890), 44 Kan. 71. Citing State v. Guraber, 37 Wis. 298 ; State v. Wish, 15 Neb. 448 ; Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154; Fuller- ton V. Spring, 3 Wis. 667; Scheftels V. Tabert, 46 Wis. 439; Cheezen v. State, 2 Ind. 149; Martindale v. Mar- tindale, 10 Ind. 566 ; Cordell v. State, 22 Ind. 1 ; State v. Baldwin, 46 Conn. 134; Middleton v. Railroad Co., 26 N. J. Eq. 269; United Hebrew Ass'n V. Benshimol, 130 Mass. 325 ; Lisbon V. Clark, 18 N. H. 234 2 Village of Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt 283; Grover v. Huckins. 26 Mich. 476; Mason v. Shawneetown, 77 IlL 533; Korah v. Ottawa, 33 IlL 139; S. C. 83 Am. Dec. 255; Eyer- man v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145 ; Inde- pendence V. Moore, 32 Mo. 392 ; Tip- ton V. Norman. 72 Mo. 380 ; Hooksett v. Amoskeag &c. Co., 44 N. H. 105 ; Mayor &c. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala, 137) Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Coldw. {Tenn.) 382; Shreveport v. Boos, 36 La. Ann. 1010; State v. Boneil, 42 34 530 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 523. doubtful grants must be resolved against the corporation has been held to forbid the extension of the power " to abate " nuisances to the enactment of ordinances prescribing a pun- ishment for the maintenance of a nuisance.^ And where the charter specifically enumerates various powers which the coun- cil may render effectual by means of penal prosecutions, it is an implied exclusion of the right to impose penalties in other cases.* § 623. Mode of enforcement of ordinances — By a purely civil action. — If the manner of enforcing ordinances is pre- scribed by statute or charter it is a cardinal rule that no other method can be resorted to.' In the absence of statutory pro- visions, at common law the recovery of fines and penalties is by an action of debt or assumpsit, and where these forms have been abolished the remedy is by a civil action of the same nat- ure;* and it is competent for the corporation to provide by 1 City of Knoxville v. Chicago &o. R Co. (Iowa, 1891), 50 N. W. Eep. 61. 2 City of Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54, per. Cooley, J., citing Child V. Hudson's E|ay Co., 2 P. Wms. 207; State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424. 3Ewbanlrs v. Ashley, 36 111. 177; King V. Jacksonville, 3 111. 306 ; Israel V. Jacksonville, 2 111. 290 ; Weeks v. Forman, 16 N. J. Law, 237; Will- iamson V. Commonwealth, 4 B. Hon. (Ky.) 146; State v. Zeigler, 33 N. J. Law, 262; Hart v. Mayor &c of Al- bany, 9 Wend. 571; Mayor &a of Newark v. Murphy, 40 N. J. Law, 145. So, too, where a city council invested by statute with authority to require payment of license fees, and to pass such ordinances as are necessary for that purpose, enacts an ordinance prescribing a penalty for failure to pay a license, it is confined to that mode of enforcement and cannot maintain a suit to recover license fees. City Council v. Ashley Phos- phate Co. (S. C, 1891), 13 S. E. Rep. 845. See, also, Santa Cruz u Santa Cruz R Co., 56 Cal. 143. Upon the question, which has not been ex- pressly decided, whether the remedy provided by the English Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, by distress and imprisonment for non-payment of fines, precludes the common-law action of debt or assumpsit, see Grant on Corp. 364; Rawlinson on Corp. (5th ed.) 167; Bodwic v. Fen- nell, 1 Wils. 238 ; Adley v. Reeves, 2 Maule & SeL 61. *Ewbanks v. Ashley, 36 HI. 178 State V. Clinton, 53 N. J. Law, 329 State V. Passaic, 42 N. J. Law, 429 Israel v. Jacksonville, 2 UL 290 Coates V. Mayor &c. of New York, 7 Cowen, 585 ; Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Treadw. Const (S. C.) 215; Heeney V. Sprague, 11 R L 456 ; Brookville V. Gagle, 73 Ind. 117. Where the charter prescribes that it shall be sufficient to declare generally in debt, it is not necessary to file a vrritten declaration in the common-law form. Deitz V. City of Central, 1 Colo. 328, holdmg, also, that in such an action a verdict of guilty is substantially re- sponsive to the issue. § 524:.j OEDIHAHCES AND BT-LAWS. 531 I ordinance for a recovery by an action of debt.^ The suit should be brought in the name conferred upon the corporation by its charter. Thus, if the "mayor and council of the town," etc., constitute the corporate body, the names of the individual officers should not be set out in the declaration.^ Several penalties may be included in the declaration and re- covered in one suit ; ' but it has been held that when ordinances, though relating to the same subject, are entirely different in the specification of offenses and the amounts of the penalties, each presents distinct causes of action, for the enforcement of which separate suits must be brought.* It is not necessary, as in actions on contract, to join all the defendants in interest. The cause of action is assimilated to a case of tort in which one or more of the offending parties may be sued.* § 524. Jurisdiction of proceedings.— If a special tribunal is provided by law for the trial of proceedings based upon municipal ordinances, as is usually the case in this country, that tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction unless the legislature has plainly indicated an intention to the contrary,' and the corpo- ration cannot by ordinance create a court or confer upon it a jurisdiction not expressly authorized by statute or charter.' Of course, the charter itself cannot give power to a judicial officer not recognized by the organic law ; but where the latter 1 Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. essaiy to join them, see Whitehall v. 253; Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Suit. Meaux, 8111. App. 182. 1858. See, also, Staats v. Washing- * Kensington v. Glenat, 1 Phila. 393. ton, 45 N. X Law, 318. Butnotbydis- * Jacksonville v. Holland, 19 111. tress and sale of goods. Willcock on 271. Munic. Corp. 164-181 ; Adley v. * Horr & Bemis on Munic. Police Reeves, 2 Maule & Sel. 60 ; 3 Wheat Ordinances, g 166. In the same sec- Selw. 1178. tion it is said that " remedies under, 2 Powers V. Mayor and Council of ordinances will, however, never be Decatur, 54 Ala. 214. See, also, allowed to fail for want of a tribunal, Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47 ; and if no special tribunal is provided, Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B, actions to enforce penalties may be Mon. 146; HirsohofEv. Beverly, 45 brought in the established courts of N. J. Law, 288 ; Graves v. Colby, 9 the State." Citing Columbia v. Har- Ad. & El. 356 ; Vintners' Co. v. Passey, rison, 2 C. C. (S. C.) 213. 1 Burr. 235. 'Staats v. Washington, 45 N. J. s City of Brooklyn v. Cleves, 1 Hill Law, 318 ; Deel v. Pittsburgh, 3 & D. Sup. 231. But that it is not nee- Watts, 363 ; Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. St 353. 532 OEDINANCES AKD BY-LAWS. [§ 525. vested all judicial authority in certain courts, including justices of the peace, and a charter provided for the election of a jus- tice of the peace, " to be denominated police judge," and de- fined his jurisdiction, it was held that although the title was unwarranted he was lawfully possessed of the powers of a justice of the peace.' The invalidity of an ordinance is not an objection that goes to the jurisdiction of the court.^ And it is also well settled that a magistrate's personal interest in a fine from the fact that he is a citizen of the municipality to which it is payable is too remote to disqualify him to try the action.' An objection to the jurisdiction on account of de- fects in the process should be made at the earliest moment ; it comes too late if made for the first time on appeal.* § 525. Imprisonment in default of payment of fine. — We have seen that the power to impose pecuniary penalties is deemed a necessary adjunct to the power to enact ordinances unless restrained expressly or by fair implication, and that their collection may be enforced by an action of debt or as- sumpsit or an equivalent civil remedy. But as this sanction would be futile against impecunious offenders, it is generally provided that imprisonment may be inflicted in default of payment of the fine and the costs of prosecution.* Only ex- 1 Deitz V. City of Central, 1 -Colo. Herdt, 40 N. J. Law, 264 And the 323. authority to imprison for non-pay- i Woodruff V. Stewart, 63 Ala. 208. ment of fine includes the costs. Horr 'Deitz V. City of Central, 1 Colo. & Bemis on Munic. Ordinances, 323 ; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 § 203. Contra, State v. Cantieny, 34 Pick. 462 ; Jonesborough v. MoKee, Minn. 1. A penalty accruing from a 2 Yerg. 167 ; Thomas v. Mt Vernon, breach of an ordinance of a munici- 9 Ohio, 290 ; Council v. Pepper, 1 pal corporation is not a debt within Rich. 364 ; Queen v. Milledge, 4 Q. B. the meaning of a constitutional pro- Div. 332 ; Queen v. Justices, 4 Q. B. vison which forbids imprisohment Div. 533. It was formerly held other- for debt Hardenbrook v. Town of wise in England. Hesketh v. Brad- Ligonier, 95 Ind. 70. Citing McCool dock, 3 Burr. 1847. v. State, 33 Ind. 127; Lower v. Wal- *Tisdale u Town of Minonk, 46 HI. lick, 25 Ind. 68; Turner v. Wilson, 9. See, also, Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 49 Ind. 581 ; Mollvain v. State, 87 111. 373. Ind. 602 ; Lane v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 ; * The costs are no part of the pen- Dunlop v. Keith, 1 Leigh, 430 ; Cald- alty and are not conjputed in deter- well v. State, 55 Ala. 133 ; Hibbard v. mining whether the jurisdictional Clark, 56 N. H. 155 : City of Camden amount has been exceeded. State v. v. Allen, 26 N. J. Law, 398 ; Flora v. § 526.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 633 press and precise authority will justify such imprisonment.' Payment of fines cannot be coerced in that manner under a, power to fine or imprison; ^ but where a charter conferi*ed the power to enact ordinances with penalties, and provided that upon conviction for a breach thereof and failure to pay the fine the offender might be placed at labor for the city, it was held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license tax on certain occupations might lawfully annex a fine for violation of its pro- visions, which might be enforced in the same manner as any other ordinance.' In all cases the terms of the judgment must be in exact conformity with the language of the statute or charter relating to the penalty. Under authority to com- mit to the county jail a commitment to any other prison is void.* So, where the statute provided that imprisonments should not exceed six months, a judgment that the defendant should be confined in jail until such time as would at a cer- tain rate per day make the amount of the fine and costs was pronounced invalid." § 526. Imprisonment as a penalty. — The right to inflict' imprisonment as a penalty for a violation of an ordinance must be given by charter or statute, otherwise no such pen- Sachs, 64 Ind. 155. Cf. Ex parte " It does not appear from the record Eeed, 4 Cranch, 583 ; Philadelphia v. what amount of costs was taxed in Duncan, 4 Phila. 145 ; Hall v. Corpo- this case, but it is argued by counsel ration of Washington, 4 Cranch, 583. that when the fine and costs are 1 Brieswick v. Mayor &c. of Bruns- added together they could not be wick, 51 Ga. 639 ; Burlington v. Kel- discharged in six months at the rata lar, 18 Iowa, 59 ; City of London's Case, [prescribed by law]. It is enough to 8 Coke, 187 ; Clark's Case, 5 Coke, 64. say that such might be the eflfect, * Brieswick v. Mayor &c. of Bruns- and if so the defendant at the end of wick, 51 Ga. 639. Cf. Ex ■parte Green six months would be driven to an- (Cal., 1893), 39 Pac. Eep. 783, where it other proceeding in order to obtain was held by a divided court that his discharge^ We are of opinion the under a power to impose a fine or judgment should have limited the imprisonment, or both, a fine and imprisonment to six months, so that imprisonment, and imprisonment in when that period should have ar- default of payment of the fine, might rived the keeper of the prison would be imposed in one sentence. have discharged the prisoner at »Ex parte] City Council of Mont- once." See, also. In re Greystook, 13 gomery, 64 Ala, 463. Upper Can. Q. B. 458 ; Queen v. Gil- < Merkee v. Rochester, 13 Hun. 157. bert, 3 Pug. & Bur. 619 ; Ex parte 8Kanouse v. Town of Lexington, Trask, 1 Pug. & Bur. 377. 13 III App. 318. The court said: — 534: OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 527. alty can be legally annexed or enforced. The rule is that they can only be enforced by a pecuniary penalty unless there is some express act giving power to inflict other punishment.* The power to imprison must be strictly construed. In a recent case in Colorado it appeared that a city charter gave the coun- cil power to enforce ordinances " by a proper fine, imprison- ment, or other penalties." The question at issue was whether this provision would sanction a fine and imprisonment. The conclusion that it would not was based on the following argu- ment : — "If the words ' other penalties ' were omitted, a single offense could be punished by either fine or imprison- ment, but not by both fine and imprisonment. Therefore, if the council had power to provide for ' fine or imprisonment,' such power must be conferred by the words ' other penalties.' But this language was in our judgement employed in contra- distinction to ' fines and imprisonments.' The expression is, 'or other penalties,' *. e., penalties other than fines or impris- onments. To say that the phrase ' other penalties ' may in a given case include ' fine and imprisonment,' together, whereas it could not include either fine or imprisonment separately, would be at least paradoxical. . . . The ' other penalties ' referred to are penalties that do not include either of the two previously designated, such as revocation of licenses, forfeit- ares, distress and sale, and the like." ^ Before the power to imprison can be exercised there must be an appropriate by- law and a trial and judicial ascertainment that such by-law has been violated.' § 527. Forfeitures. — A municipal corporation cannot im- pose a forfeiture of property without express authority. Such an extraordinary power cannot be exercised under the gen- eral power to make by-laws.* Where th^ only penalties which 1 City of Burlington v. Kellar, 18 ^ Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461. Iowa, 59; Kinmundy v. Mahan, 78 * Taylor w. City of Carondelet, 33 111, 462; State u EufE, 80 La. Ann. Mo. 105. In Kirk v. Nowell, 1 Term 497. See, also, Clerk v. Tucket, 3 E. 124, Lord Mansfield held that Lev. 281 ; S. c, 2 Vent 183 ; Adley v. such a power must be expressly Beeves, 2 Maule & Sel. 60; Lee v. given, as otherwise it was against ■Wallis, 1 Kenyon, 295. Magna Charta; and Mr. Justice s Mclnerney v. City of Denver BuUer also held the ordinance creat- (Colo., 1893), 29 Pac. Eep. 516, 531. ing a forfeiture to be bad for the ad- § 528.] OBDINANOES ASD BY-LAWS. 635 a town council was authorized to impose for violation of or- dinances were fines not exbeeding $50, an ordinance declaring that any retailer who should sell or give any spirituous liquors to a slave without a written permit should forfeit his license was held to be void. A distinction was urged by counsel be- tween the forfeiture of a license and the forfeiture of goods and chattels, but the court replied that the oppression and aai-dship of a forfeiture does not depend on the nature but the value of the thing forfeited. " It may be better for the retailer," said Frost, J., " to have his stock in trade forfeited than his license to retail. ... If the town council can forfeit it for the offense of selling spirits to a slave, they may declare it forfeited for any other offense ; and thus convert a license to retail into a recognizance of the retailer for the observance of all their by-laws." ' § 528. The same subject continued. — When the power to denounce a forfeiture of property is clear it must not be exer- ditional reason that the act of parlia- ment had prescribed in what manner by-laws should be enforced, namely, by fine or amerciament, and that therefore the corporation was pre- cluded from inflicting any other pun- ishment. This case has been cited by subsequent elementary writers as establishing both these positions. 3 Kyd on Corp. 110; Willcook on Munia Corp., p. 180, pL 449 ; Angell & Ames on Corp., § 860. See, also. Hart V. Mayor i&c of Albany, 9 Wend. 571 ; Clerk v. Tucket, 3 Lev. 381 ; Lee v. Wallis, 1 Kenyon, 293 ; PhUlips V. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 4S1; Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich. 404 ; Rose- baugh V. Saffln, 10 Ohio, 31 ; Cotter V, Doty, 5 Ohio, 394; Kneedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St 368; White V. Talhnan, 26 N. J. Law, 67 ; Ber- gen V. Clarkson, 6 N. J. Law 353 ; Slessman v. Crozier, 80 Ind. 487; Hampton v. Conroy, 56 Iowa, 498; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378; Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86 ; Mayor &C. of New York v. Ordrenan, 13 Johns. 133: Dunham v. Eochester, 5 Cowen, 463 ; Mayor &c. of. Mobile V. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137; Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 357; Wilcox V. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144 ; Donovan V. Vicksburg, 29 Miss. 347. But an ordinance imposing a pecuniary pen- alty and also a forfeiture may be good as to the penalty and void as to the forfeiture. Kneedler v. Korris- town, 100 Pa. St 368. 'Heise v. Town C'ouacil, 6 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 404, 415, 417. See, also, Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371; Staats V. Washington, 44 N. J. Law, 610. An ordinance pi'oviding that upon a second conviction for viola- tion of a Sunday closing of tippling- houses law the defendant's license and the money paid therefor shall be forfeited and remain forfeited, though upon appeal and trial de novo he is, acquitted, is void for un- reasonableness. Mclnerney v. City of Denver (Colo., 1893), 39 Pac. Rept 516. 536 OEDINANOES AND BT-LAWS. [§ 528. oised in contravention of constitutional provisions looking to the security of property from condemnation without " due process of law." Most of the cases in which the validity of ordinances in this particular has been discussed were those enacted for the impounding and sale of animals running at large. " The cases agree," says Judge Dillon, " that when the' power to denounce the forfeiture against such animals is given there should be notice either actual or constructive, or prior legal proceedings." ^ But •this alternative requirement has afforded ground for much contention among the courts. The law was laid down by the Supreme Court of Kansas as follows: — "Where the law or an ordinance provides that the owner of the cattle shall, in addition to the cost of taking them up, impounding and keeping them, pay for the dam- ages that they may do to private individuals while unlawfully running at large, the question pt damages and the amount thereof can be determined only by judicial investigation, and generally in a suit between the parties interested." And it will also be admitted that where fines or forfeitures, or any- thing of a penal or criminal nature or character, is imposed, the question of whether the owner of the stock is liable for the same can only be determined by judicial investigation.* But when nothing is attempted to be imposed upon the owner of the stock as damages or penalty, but only the reasonable cost of taking up, impounding and keeping the same, and sufficient notice is provided for, and the ordinance is authorized by the city charter, it is believed that no court has ever held the law, or the ordinance found-ed thereon, to be unconstitu- tional or invalid, although there may be no provision for a judicial investigation, except the general remedies to deter- mine whether the law or the ordinance has been complied with, and although the notice provided for may not be a per- sonal notice, but only a notice by publication or by posting." * 1 1 Dillon on Munio. Corp., § 348. field v. Longest, 6 Ired. (Law), 268 2 Bullock V. Geomble, 45 111. 318. Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144 s Pappen v. Holmes, 44 111. 360 ; Gosselihk v. Campbell, . 4 Iowa, 296 Willis V. Legnis, 45 111. 289. McKibben v. Fort Scott, 35 Ark. 352 « Gilchrist v. Schmidling (1873), Hellen v. Noe, 3 Ired. (Law), 498 12 Kan. 263, 272, quoted and ap- McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) proved in Fort Smith v. Dodson 483; Shaw v. Kennedy, Term Rep. (1885), 46 Ark. 296. See, also, Whit- (N. C.) 158; Davies v. Morgan, 1 C. & § 529.] 0EDINAN0E8 AHD BY LAW^. 537 But the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declare that a judicial investigation is essential to the validity of such proceedings. " The constitution provides that the citizen shall not be de- prived of his property except by the law of the land. The meaning of the provision has generally been construed a law that hears before condemning and arrives at a judgment for the divestiture of the rights of property through what is ordi- narily understood to be judicial process — general rules that govern society in reference to the rights of property. This is the general rule, and it is only in extreme cases, when the preservation and repose of society or the protection of the property rights of a large class of the community absolutely require a departure, that the courts recognize any exception. When, for instance, it becomes necessary to destroy private property to prevent the spread of fire or pestilence in a city or the advance of an army, the rule is silent, bending to an overwhelming necessity." The court insists that the right to proceed without citation and without hearing should not be extended beyond the impounding of the animals. "When that is done the necessity for summary and precipitate action ceases and judicial proceedings looking to a forfeiture may then properly begin." ^ § 529. Cumulative fines and fines for continuous and re- peated offenses. — A municipal corporation having power to enforce ordinances by fines may distinguish between a first and a second offfense, and mark that distinction by a gradation of the penalty, provided the penalty in no case exceeds that authorized to be imposed.* Where the acts are distinct repe- titions of an offense and not merely a continuation of a mis- conduct which may be treated as an 'enijirety the full penalty may be inflicted in each case. Unlawful sales of liquor on the same day may,' for instance, be punishable separately.' J. B87 ; Grover v. Huckins, 26 Mich, leans, 18 La. Ann. 432) ; Cincinnati 476 ; Campau v. Langley, 39 Mich. v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257. 451; Moore w State, 11 Lea (Tenn.), ^Staats v. Washington (1883), 45 85; Mayor &c. v. Lanham, 67 Ga. N. J. Law, 318, citing Butchers' Co. 753. V. Bullock, 2 Bos. & Pul. 434. iVardentt Mount (1879). 78 Ky. 86, 8 Columbia v. Harrison, 2 C. C. and cases there cited. See, also, in (S. C.) 216 ; Heise v. Columbia, 6 favor of this view, Lanfear v. Mayor, Rich. 404 4 La. 97 icf. Guillotte v. New Or- 538 OBDINAN0E8 AND BY-LAWS. [§ 530. But where a person was charged in one complaint with one hundred violations of an ordinance " prohibiting any person from cutting down and making use of cedar and other trees," it was held to set forth only a single offense.' It was also held that an ordinance imposing a fine of $125 on each hun- dred pounds of gunpowder kept in store, the limit of power to punish being $250, could not be enforced beyond the limit.* So, too, an ordinance prescribing a penalty " of not less than one dollar nor more than fiv6*dollars for every hour'" that a person shall keep his wagon within the limits of a market without the authority of the clerk of the market is in Viola-, tion of a statute conferring power to pass reasonable by-laws with penalties not exceeding $20 for one offense.' § 530. Enforcement by complaint — Nature of the pro- ceeding. — There is great confusion among the authorities as to the rules of procedure and evidence applicable to the prose- cution of offenders against municipal ordinances by complaint. The decisions are influenced in a great measure, but not wholly, by local statutory or constitutional provisions.* But the code of Wyoming civil procedure in all such actions is expressly enjoined.' Substantially the same rule has been judicially adopted in some other States, while in many jurisdictions they are deemed to possess in whole or in part the characteristics 1 State V. Moultrieville, Rice (S. C), single continuous offense, and the Law, 158. ordinance afiSxing a penalty which, 2 New York v. Odrenaux, 13 Johns, computed accoinling to its terms, 123. The court remarked that if a may exceed $30 for a single offense contrary construction were to prevail upon one and the same day is void." a penalty to the full amount might Commonwealth v. Wilkins (1876), 121 be repeated, not upon the offense it- Mass. 356. Cf. Horr & Bemis on self but upon the quantity of the of- Munia Police Ordinances, § 153. f ense, and that with equal propriety * These must be strictly followed so the penalty might be imposed on far as they go. People v. Whitney's every pound or on every grain. See, Point, 33 Hun, 508 ; and generally the also, Chicago v. Qnim'by, 38 111. 374 ; case is controlled by the procedure Hai't V. Mayor &c., 9 Wend. 571 ; which obtains in similar cases before Stokes V. Corporation of New York, the same tribunal. People v. Cox, 14 Wend. 87 ; Marshall v. Smith, L. R. 76 N. Y. 47 ; Greeley v. Passaic, 43 N. 8 C. P. 416 ; Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 J. Law, 87. Bay (S. C), 383 ; Crepps v. Durden, 6 Jenkins v. Cheyenne, 1 Wy. Ter. Coyrp. 640. 387. * " The offense thus punished is a § 531.] OEDINAlfCES AND BY-LAWS. 539 of criminal prosecutions. A summary of the doctrine in va- rious States is given in a recent and much-quoted treatise, and the authorities there cited will be found in the note.* § 531. The complaint — General requisites. — At common law no trial for any offense except contempts could ever bei had without a written complaint.' It is a part of the technical meaning of the term " complaint " that it is verified by the oath or affirmation of the person who informs.' The cora- • Horr & Bemis on Munic. Police Ordinances, § 170. Alabama: Stricter rules than in cifil cases. Mobile v. Jones, 42 Ala. 630; Fuhrman v. Huntsville, 54 Ala. 263. California: Criminal Santa Barbara v. Sher- man, 61 Cal. 57 ; People v. Johnson,- 30 Cal. 98. (For the rule in Colo- rado, see the succeeding section.) Georgia: Not criminal. Williams v. Augusta, 4 Gra. 509 ; Floyd v. Eaton- ton, 14 Ga. 354. Illinois: Not crim- inal Quinoy v. Ballance, 30 111. 185 ; Town of Jacksonville v. Holland, 19 m. 271 ; Lewiston v. Proctor, 33 111. 533. Indiana: Not criminal. Brook- ville V. Gagle, 73 Ind. 117 ; Quigley v. Aurora, 50 Ind. 28; Greenburg v. Corwin, 58 Ind. 518 ; Goshen v. Crox- ton, 34 Ind, 239; Commissioners u Chissom, 7 Ind. 688; Miller v. O'Reilly, 84 Ind. 168. Iowa: Not criminal. Davenport v. Bird, 84 la. 524. Kansas: In some cases civil, in others criminal. Neitzel v. Concor- dia, 14 Kan. 446. Cf. Emporia v. Vol- mer, 13 Kan. 622. Massachusetts: Criminal. Commonwealth v. Wor- cester, 8 Pick. 462 ; In re Goddard, 16 Pick. 504. Michigan: Not criminal. Cooper V. People, 41 Mich. 403 ; Peo- ple V. Detroit, 18 Mich. 445. Minne- sota: Not criminal. State v. Lee, 37 Minn. 445. Missouri: Not criminal. St Louis V. Vert, 84 Mo. 204; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 895; Ex parte Kiburg, 10 Mo. App. 442. Ne- braska: Criminal. Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 103. New Hampshire: Criminal. State v. Stearns, 31 N. H. 106. New Jersey: Not criminal. Bro- phy V. Perth Amboy, 44 N. J. Law, 317 ; Kip V. Patterson, 26 N. J. Law, 298; Keeler v. Milledge, 24 N. J. Law, 143. New York: Not criminal. Wood V. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 431. See, also, Buffalo v. Schliefer, 25 Hun, 275. Ohio: In some cases civil, in others criminal. Cincinnati v. Gwynne, 10 Ohio, 192; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586. See, also, Lar- ney v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio St 599. Wisconsin: The rule is now nearly or quite the same as that in Colo- rado. See the following section. Platteville v. McKernan, 54 Wis. 487 ; Platteville v. Bell, 43 Wis. 488; Fink V. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26 ; Oshkosh V. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 483 ; Sutton v. McConnell, 46 Wis. 269; Chafln v. Waukesha County, 63 Wis. 463. 24 Blackstone's Com. 280; Bar- bour's Cr. Law, 614; 1 Bishop Crim. Proc, § 894; Chitty Cr. Law, 34; Archbold's Cr. Prac & PI., p. 31, n. 1 ; Allen V. Gray, 11 Conn. 95, 102; Tracy v. Williams, 4 Conn. 107; Prell V. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Campbell V. Thompson, 16 Me. 117. On appeal, city ordinances will not be presumed to require a written complaint. Al- ton V. Kirsch, 68 111. 261. 3 Campbell v. Thompson, 16 Me. 117, 120. A slight error in the jurat will not vitiate the affidavit Chero- kee V. Fox, 34 Kan. 16. If the charter 540 OBDINANOES AITS BT-LA.WS. [§ 532. plaint ought regularly to be entitled in behalf of the proper party, which in most cases is the corporation;^ but mere irregularities not affecting any substantial right of the de- fendant, and where the record of the proceedings is sufficiently full and specific to protect him against another prosecution for the same offense, will be disregarded.^ There must be a distinct allegation of the offense,' a reference to the ordinance violated, and a conclusion.* § 532. The same subject continued — Pleading. — The pre- cision required in common-law informations or indictments is not required in affidavits for violation of municipal ordinances. "It is sufficient if they set out with clearness the offense charged, and the substance of that part of the ordinance which has been violated, with a reference to the title, the date and the section." * It is generally held sufficient to set out the substance of the ordinance or the section of it which is ^Ueged to have been violated.^ But a simple charge of violat- Baid: — "This much, however, it requires an information by the city attorney, a complaint made by a deputy, though afterwards adopted by him, is not suSBcient. Kansas City V. Flanagan, 69 Mo. 23. 1 Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 148 ; Smith v. Marston, 6 Tex. 486 ; Webster v. Lansing, 47 Mich. 192. Any form of complaint in this respect which is prescribed by statute must be strictly obeyed. State V. Zeigler, 33 N. J. Law, 262 ; State V. Bartlett, 35 Wis. 287 ; Exeter V. Starre, 3 Show. 158; Harris v. Wakeman, Say, 254 ; Commonwealth ti. Fahey, 5 Cush. 408. 2 State V. GrafiEmuUer, 26 Minn. 6 ; Farrel v. London, 13 Upper Can. Q. B. 343 ; Hershofif v. Beverly, 45 N. J. Law, 288 ; Alton v. Kirsch, 68 111. 261 ; SUte V. King, 37 la. 463. 3 Roberson v. Lambertville, 38 N. J. Law, 69; Horr & Bemis on Munic. Ordinances, § 173. * See the following two sections. ^Keeler v. Milledge, 34 N. J. Law, 143, 145. Continuing, the court ought to contain, for the office of the complaint is not only to give the magistrate jurisdiction, but event- ually to apprise the party of what offense he is charged with, and it an- swers neither of these purposes with certainty unless it contains these particulars. I am inclined to think this complaint is defective, inasmuch as it does not give the date and the section of the ordinance alleged to have been violated ; but as it refers to the ordinance relating to markets, and gives the literal words of the section, and as there is no pretense that the defen'dant was sut^prised, I should have some hesitation in re- versing for this ciiuse alone." See, also, Memphis v. O'Connor, 53 Mo. 468; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 141 Mass. 79; State v. Dunbar, 43 La. Ann. 836; State v. Baker (La., 1892), 10 So. Rep. 405 ; City Council v. Ash- ley Phosphate Co. (S. C, 1891), ,13 S. E. Rep. 845. *Kip V. Patterson, 26 N. J. Law, § 532.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 541 ing an ordinance by a mere recital of the number of the sec- tion is insufficient.' The complaint should state briefly but clearly the acts done or omitted to be done which constitute a violation of the ordinance, together with the time when and place where the offense was committed.^ The general rule undoubtedly is that it is sufficient to describe the offense in the language of the ordinance ; ' but where the words of the ordinance by their generality embrace within their litaral terms cases which are not within their equity and, spirit or 298; Goldwaite v. City Council Sec, 50 Ala. 486 ; Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538; Charleston v. Chur, 2 Bailey (S. C), 164; Clevenger v. Rushville, 90 Ind. 258 ; Janes ville v. Milwaukee &C. R Co., 7 Wis. 484 ; People v. Jus- tices, 12 Hun, 65; City Council v. Seeba, 4 Strobh. Law (S. C), 319; O'Malia v. Wentwortb, 65 Me. 129. In Ex parte Lane (1888), 76 Cal. 587, a description of the oflfense, and a reference to the section of the ordi- nance, was held BuflScient. See, also, to the same point, Faribault v. Wil- son, 34 Minn. 254; Auburn v. Eld- ridge, 77 Ind. 126; Huntington v. Pease, 56 Ind. 305 ; Goshen v. Kern, 63 Ind. 468; Whitson v. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392 ; West v. Columbus, 20 Kan. 633; State v. Merritt, 83 N. C. 677; State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 880. In some cases it has been held unnec- essary to refer to the ordinance. Rochester v. Upraan, 19 Minn. 108; State V. Richards, 21 Minn. 47 ; Osh- kosh V. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 483. See, also, Information of Oliver, 21 S. C. 318, and contra, Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn. 354; Lewistou v. Fairfield, 47 Me. 481. But the prevailing rule is that the courts will take judicial no- tice of the charter, and the power to make by-laws, but not of the by-laws themselves. Case v. Mayor of Mobile, 30 Ala. 538 ; Goodrich v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 391 ; Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa, 386 (c/. Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa, SO); Elizabethtown v. Lefler, 23 111. 90; Harker v. Mayor, 17 Wend. 199; People V. Mayor &c. of N. Y., 7 How. Pr. (N. T.) 81 ; Mooney v. Kennett, 19 Mo. 551 ; Cox v. St Louis, 11 Mo. 431; Austin v. Walton, 68 Tex. 507; New Orleans v. Baudro, 14 La. Ann. 303; City of Miles City v. Kern (Mont, 1892), 29 Pac. Rep. 720 ; Peo- ple V. Buchanan, 1 Idaho, 681 ; Green V. Indianapolis, 22 Ind. 193; Wheel- ing V. Black, 25 West Va. 266 ; Gar- land V. Denver, 11 Colo. 534 ; s. c, 19 Pac. Rep. 960. In Town of Mounds- ville V. Velton, 35 West Va, 217 ; s. C, 13 S. E. Rep. 373, it is said to be " well settled " that the courts of the mu- nicipality will take judicial notice of its ordinances without pleading or proof, — citing Dillon on Munio. Corp., § 413, and Wheeling v. Black, 25 West Va. 266. But c/. Horr & Bemis on Munic Ordinances, § 174, and Bishop on Stat Crimes (2d ed.), § 106, and cases cited; Downing v. Miltonvale, 36 Kan. 740. 'City of Huntington v. Pease, 56 Ind. 305; City of Huntington v. Cheesbro, 57 Ind. 74. 2 City of Huntington v. Pease, 56 Ind. 305; Memphis u O'Connor, 53 Mo. 468 ; Lippman v. South Bend, 84 Ind. 276; St Louis v. Fitz, 63 Mo. 583. 'St Louis V. Knox, 74 Mo. 79; State V. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97; Commonwealth v. Cutter 1893), 39 N. E. Rep. 1146. 542 OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 533. the obvious intention of the framers, the rules of good plead- ing require all the circumstances and ingredients of the offense to be set out.' §533. Pleading further considered. — While some lati- tude must be allowed in the construction of complaints charging violations of ordinances, all the common safeguards and requirements of criminal pleading ought not to be disre- garded. A complaint for wilfMly refusing, as the agent of a water company, to supply the complainant with water, a tender being made in actual money for that purpose, which does not state that the water company was under a legal ob- ligation by ordinance to supply such water, and does not in express words or by fair implication allege that the tender was sufficient or was the amount of the legal or contract price of the water supply desired, is bad. and should be quashed on motion.^ But a general allegation that an ordi- nance has been duly passed is sufficient without alleging that every antecedent act requisite to its legal passage has been done ; ' nor that the officers were duly elected and authorized to pass the ordinance.* As a general rule exceptions need not be negatived." If an offense be cumulative with respect to the acts done, although any one of the acts be sufficient to constitute the offense, the cumulative offense may be charged without making the pleading bad for duplicity.* A complaint for allowing swine to go upon the sidewalk is not objec- 1 State V. Goulding, 44 N. H. 384 ; * Hardenbrook v. Ligonier, 95 Ind. State V. Beirce, 37 Conn. 319 ; Com- 70. See, also, Winooski v. Gokey, 49 monwealth v. Stark, 2 Cush. 556 ; Rex Vt 383 ; Janesville v. Milwaukee &c V. Home, Cowp. 673, 683 ; State v. E. Co., 7 Wis. 484. Cf. Washington Follet, 6 N, a 53; 3 Hawk. P. C, v. Frank, 1 Jones, 436. ch. 35, §§ 111, 115; 3 Bac. Abr. 113; 'McGearu Woodruflf,33N. J. Law, State V. Robinson, 39 N. H. 374 ; Rex 313 ; Lynch v. People, 16 Mich. 473 ; V. Mason, 2 D. & E. 586; Davey v. Martinsville u Frieze, 83 Ind. 507. Baker, 4 Burr. 3461 ; Rex v. Stading, « Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen, 1 Str. 497; Anthony v. State, 39 Ala. 368; State v. Haney, 2 Dev. & Bat 27 ; State v. Fleetward, 16 Miss. 448; 390, 403. See, also, Regina v. Bowers. Horr & Bemis on Munic. Ordinances, 1 Denison, 33 ; Stevens v. Common- § 17b. wealth, 6 Met. 243 ; State v. Morton, ajohnsonuCityof Winfleld(Kan., 27 Vt 310; Hinkle v. Common- 1893), 39 Pac. Rep. 559. wealth, 4 Dana (Ky.), 518. 'Becker v. City of Washington (Mo.), 7 S. W. Rep. 391. § 534.] OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 543 tionable in describing a oontinuous street by the names of its different parts.* Where the complaint is brought in the name of the corporation, it is proper to conclude "contrary to the form of the ordinance," etc. : - but when it is required to be prosecuted in the name of the State, it ought to conclude con- trary to the statute, or to both statute and ordinance.* § 534. Proof of ordinances — The method of proving or- dinances is frequently provided for by statute ; * but where, the matter is not thus regulated, the common-law rule requires the production of the originals or the books in which they are recorded.' If the regular enactment of the ordinance is not questioned, it is not necessary to show that fact in addi- tion to its production to sustain a conviction." But where it becomes necessary to prove a compliance with all formalities, none must be omitted which are requisite to its validity.' 1 Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen, 26a 2 Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt 282. *HoiT & Bemis on Munic. Police Ordinances, § 176. In a prosecution for Tiolation of an ordinance under a statute providing that "it shall be sufficient to set forth the offense fully, plainly, substantially and form- ally, and no part of such ordinance need be set forth," a conclusion "against the revised ordinances of said city in such case made and pro- Tided," is sufficient to embrace an amendment to a section included in a volume entitled, " Revised Ordi- nances." Commonwealth v. Oden- weller (Mass., 1893), 30 N. E. Rep. 1022. *Napman v. People, 19 Mich. 352; St Louis V. St Louis R. Co., 89 Mo. 44 See, also. Downing v. Miltonvale, 36 Ean. 740. 'Chicago &C. R. Co. v. Engle, 76 DL 317; City Council v. Dunn, 1 Mc- Cord (S. C), 333 ; Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 ni. 78 ; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 446 ; State V. King, 37 Iowa, 463 ; Barr v. Auburn, 89 III. 361 ; Lindsay v. Chi- cago, 115 IlL 120; Independence v. Trouvalle, 15 Kan. 70. As to attesta- tion and identification of the book, see Town of Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo. 380 ; Ottum wa v. Schaub, 53 Iowa, 515. Where there is no record the orig- inal or a certified copy is admissible. Pugh V. Little Rock, 35 Ark. 75; Bailey v. State (Neb.), 47 N. W. Rep. 208 ; Kinghorn v. Kingston, 25 Up. Can. Q. B. 180 ; Block v. Jacksonville, 36 111. 301. 6 Town of Flora w Lee, 5 HI. Ap. 629. 7 Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 347; Elizabethtown v. Lefler, 23 111. 90; Schott V. People, 89 111. 195. The record-book is the best evidence of the ordinance and cannot be contra- dicted by parol. People v. Murray, 57 Mich. 396 ; Solomon v. Hughes, 24 Kan. 211 ; Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush, 508 ; Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo. 481 ; Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 395 : St Louis v. Foster, 53 Mo. 513. Cf. Knight V. Railroad Co., 70 Mo. 231 ; Barton v. Pittsburgh, 4 Brewst 373 ; Troy v. Atchison &c. R. Co., 11 Kan. 519. But it is generally held that parol proof of publication is compe- 544 OEDrUANOES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 535. § 535. Bight to trial Iby jury Constitutional provisions relating to trial by jury, being twice put in jeopardy, pro- ceedings by indictment or information and the like, in crim- inal cases, are generally held to have been adopted with refer- ence to the procedure previously existing. If in a given class of offenses trials without a jury were formerly the prevailing rule, this rule is not abrogated by the constitution.^ Both in this country and in England the transgrpssion of municipal regulations enacted under th% police power for the purpose of preserving the health, peace and good order, and otherwise promoting the general welfare within cities and towns, have for considerably more than a century been generally prose- cuted without a jury.* It is certainly true that where the judgment against the defendant entails a fine, even if it^ col- lection may by virtue of the statute and ordinance be enforced by imprisonment, the proceeding remains a civil action so far as a jury trial is concerned, whether it be in the name of the State or not.' And in a number of well-considered decisions the same rule is held to apply where the judgment may in- clude imprisonment in the first instance and not merely as an alternative.* There is excellent authority for the proposition tent Horr & Bemis on Manic. Police Denver (Colo., 1893), 29 Fac. £ep. Ordinances, § 187, and oases there 516. cited; Eldora v. Burlingame, 63 Iowa, * State v. Lee, 39 Minn. 153; City 23 ;Newhanu Aurora, 14 111. 364 ;Teft of Greeley v. Hamman (1888), 13 w. Size, 10 lU. 433. See, also. Raker Colo.94; £'a!jpar Colden v. Botta, 12 Wend. 334 537.] OKDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 647 9t entitled to a review of the proceedings.' It is not the povince of the writ of habeas corpus to retry any questions f fact upon which the findings of the court of original juris- iotion must be presumed to have been based. Unless it ppears as a matter of law that an ordinance is void, the jmedy of review must be had by other appropriate prooeed- 1 People V. Leavitt, 41 Mich. 470. he writ does not lie in favor of the >Tporation after trial and acquittal, ranston u Augusta, 61 Ga. 573. An mtting owner may maintain cer- orari to review an ordinance langing the grade of a street in ont of his property, and if the lange of grade is justified only as part of an entire scheme he may question the legality of the scheme. Read v. Camden (N. J., 1893), 24 Atl. Rep. 549. 2 Question of reasonableness de- pending on facts will not be thus retried. In re Wright, 39 Hun, 357. See, also. Madden v. Smeltz, 3 C. C. Rep. (Ohio), 168. CHAPTER Xy. EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS, § 538. Powers of a municipal corpo- ration generally. B39. Delegation of powers. 840. The same subject continued. 541. Exercise of powers. 543. Mode of exercise. 643. Proceedings not reviewable. 544. The same subject continued. 545. Constitutionality of acts grant- ing powers. 546. The same subject continued. 547. Validity of acts granting pow- ers. 548. Power to " trade " should not be granted. 549. Power of towns as to villages within them. 550. Power to issue commercial paper. 551. As to trusts. 553. Purchase at tax sales. 553. Granting exclusive franchises. 554. The same subject continued. 555. Contracts not exclusive. 556. Improvements generally. 557. Costs of Improvements. 558. Gas and water supply. 659. Natui'al-gas companies. 560. Establishment of electric plant 661. Public property. 563. The same subject continued. 563. Parks. i mi. Wharves. 666. The same subject continued. 566. Markets. 567. The same subject continued. 568. Streets generally. 569. Construction of statutory pro- visions. 570. Protection of streets. 571. Grading of streets. 573. Allowing the use of streets by railroads. 673. The same subject continued. 674. Regulations as to railroads us- ing streets. 675. The same subject continued. 576. Crossings of railways. 677. Sewers. 578. Fire limits. 579. Directions as to buildings. 680. Police power. 581. The same subject continued. 683. To promote health. 583. General welfare, eta 584. Licenses. 585. Occupationa 586. The same subject continued. 587. Public offenses. 588. The same subject continued. 589. Nuisances. 590. Holidays, etc. 691. Miscellaueoua § 538. Powers of a municipal corporation generally. — The powers of a municipal corporation are those granted in ex- press words by its charter or the general statutes under which it is incorporated ; the powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers thus expressly granted, and the pow- ers essential to the declared purposes of the corporation, not § 539.] EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWEES. 649 only convenient but indispensable.' These corporations being mere instrumentalities of the States for the more convenient administration of local government, their powers are such as the legislature may confer, and these may be enlarged, abridged or entirely withdrawn at its pleasure.^ Only silch powers and rights can be exercised under municipal charters as are clearly comprehended within their words, or derived therefrom by necessary implication, regard being had to the object of the grant. Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of the words used by the charter must be resolved in favor of the public' It is very doubtful whether the legislature can delegate to any municipality or other corporate body the power to grant a franchise, as the exercise of that power involves a high trust, created and conferred for the benefit of those who granted it; and as the trust is confided to the legislature it must remain where it is vested until the constitution of the State is changed.* § 539. Delegation of powers. — The legislature having dele- gated some portion of its power to a municipal corporation, the latter must hold those powers in subordination to the general power. Such powers given for local purposes are re- garded as trusts confided to the hands in which they are placed, and are not subject to be delegated by the departments in the control of which they are placed.' The Supreme Court » Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), 67 Tex. 543; State v. Swift, 11 Neb. § 89; Richards v. Town of Clarks- 138. burg, 30 West Va. 491 ; Parkersburg '■* Barnes v. District of Columbia Gas Co. V. Parkersburg, 80 West Va. (1875), 91 XJ. S. 540. 435 ; Kelly v. Town of Milan, 31 Fed. 3 Minturn v. Larue (1859), 38 How. Eep. 843 ; Cook Co. v. McCrea, 93 IlL 435, holding that the legislature may 336 ; Portland v. Schmidt. 13 Or. 17 ; grant exclusive control over ferries Somerville v. Dickerman, 137 Mass. to a municipality, but that the char- 373 ; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378 ; ter of Oakland did not confer such Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind. 193 ; exclusive privileges upon the city. Oilman v. Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 588; * People's R Co. v. Memphis E. Co., Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 335 ; Smith 10 Wall. 50. V. Newbern, 70 N. C. 14 ; Blake v. ^ Thompson v, Schermerhorn, 6 Walker, 33 S. C. 517; St Louis v. N. Y. 93; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. Bell Telephone Co., 96 Mo. 633 ; Eu- 73 ; S. C, 39 Am. Rep. 105 ; Brooklyn faula t;. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; Parish v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591; Lyon v. of Ouiehita v. Monroe, 43 La. Ann. Jerome, 26 Wend. 485 ; s. C, 37 Am. 783 ; Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., Dec. 271 ; Bibel v. People, 67 III. 175 ; 550 EXPEE8S OOKPOEATE P0WEE8. [§ 540. of New Jersey has sustained the power of the legislature to authorize a municipal body to delegate the police powers which it has received from the legislature to another quasi-mximcipal body of its creation.^ § 540. The same subject continued. — The legislature had the constitutional rigjit to authorize the council of a city to empower the board of police to make rules and regulations respecting the use of the streats of Boston.^ The court Kinmundy v. Mahan, 73 111. 462; State V. Fiske, 9 E. I. 94; State v. Trenton, 43 N. J. Law, 74 ; State v. Newark, 47 N. J. Law, 117; Hitch- cock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341 ; Schen- ley ,t>. Com., 36 Pa. St 63 ; SUte v. Bell, 34 Ohio St 194 ; Whyte v. Mayor &c. of Nashville, 2 Swan, 364; Smith V. Morse, 2 Cal. 534 ; Cooley on Const Lim. 304; Sedgvrick on Stat and Const Law, 164 ; Oakland v. Carpen- tier, 13 Cal. 540, declaring an ordi- nance giving the exclusive privilege of laying out, constructing, etc., wharves within the city for thirty- seven years, void as being a transfer of the corporate powers of the board. East St Louis v. Wehrung, 50 111. 38, holding that prosecution could not be maintained for a violation of an or- dinance which attempted to delegate the power of the city council to the city treasurer by authorizing him to grant licenses to retail liquor and to Hx the amount to be paid for it See, also, § 376 et seq., supra. 1 Riley v. Trenton, 51 N. J. Law, 498. which sustained the constitu- tionality of " An act to establish an excise department in cities in this State." Rev. Supp. N. J. 695, 696. The court said : — " The statutes, in ques- tion do not authorize cities possessed of certain police powers to erect excise boards, who, when created, shall, ipso facto, become the trans- ferees of the powers previously pos- sessed by the municipality itself ; still less does it confer powers of this nat- ure upon the municipality in the first instance with permission to pass them over to excise boards when created. . . . The . . . act is a grant of original powers to boards of excise commissioners. Until such boards are created there is no person in whom the power can vest The erection of these boards is intrusted to the governing body of the mu- nicipality which creates, but does not delegate It gives vitality, nothing more. . . . [It] is the simultaneous extinguishment of similar powers pre-existent in the municipality upon the vesting of a more comprehensive system of like powers intended by the legislature to cover the whole territory." See, also, Paul v. Glou- cester County, 50 N. J. Law, 58.5. '■^ Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 383 ; s. C, 19 N. E. Rep. 334, where it was held that under this power, delegated to the police board by the council, the board was empowered to require an itinerant musician to take out a license and pay a small fee therefor. See, also, as to reasonableness of ordinance. Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 463 ; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161 ; Vandine, Petitioner, 6 Pick. 187; Commonwealth v. Bean, 14 Gray, 52 ; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen, 366; Commonwea,lth v. McCafEerty, 145 Mass. 384 As to requiring a license. Commonwealth v. Stodder, 8 541.] EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWERS. 651 lid: — "The several towns and cities are agencies of govern- lent largely under the control of the legislature. The powers nd duties of all the towns and cities, except so far as they re specifically provided for in the constitution, are created ad defined by the legislature, and we have no doubt that it as the right in its discretion to change the powers and duties •eated by itself and to vest such powers and duties in offi- jrs appointed by the governor, if in its judgment the public ood requires this, instead of leaving such oflicers to be elected y the people or appointed by the municipal authorities." ' ounty oflicers authorized by law to contract for the building f a court-house cannot delegate such authority to a private idividual.'' § 541. Exercise of powers. — Where a city council has ower to act in a given case and the mode of action is not rescribed by charter, it may proceed either by resolution or by rdinance.' Where it is intended to pay for an electric plant y the issuance and sale of city bonds, and the statute era- owers the city to erect such a plant upon the approval of a lajority of the voters of the city, it is proper to submit to vote ae entire matter of erecting the plant and issuing the bonds 1 one proposition.* Under that provision of the same act fhich provides that the city council may order the submission f the question of electric lighting to a vote, or that the mayor lay do so upon petition of a certain number of tax-payers, le adopti®n of an ordinance providing for the erection of an lectric plant is not a condition precedent to the submission f the question. Though the issuance of the bonds at the ush. 563, 573; Nightingale, Peti- 135 Mass. 188, 196; Commonwealth oner, 11 Pick. 168 ; Pedrick v. Bai- v. Young, 135 Mass. 536 ; Brooklyn v. ly, 13 Gray, 161 ; Commonwealth v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591 ; Birdsall v. rooks, 109 Mass. 355. As to the fee, Clark, 73 N. Y. 73 ; State v. Paterson, ommonwealth v. Stodder, 3 Cush. 34 N. J. Law, 163. 53; Welch v. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn. i Cominoitwealth v. Plaisted, 148 tO; Cooley's Const Lim. (5th ed.), Mass. 375; s. c, 19 N. E. Eep. 334. 13, n. ; 1 Dillon on Munio. Corp. (4th « Russell v- page, 66 Tex. 438; S. c, }.), § 357. As to the legality and 1 S. W. Hep." 370. ropriety of delegating such powers ' City of Crawfordsville v. Bradeu ) the pohce board or other boards, (Ind., 1891), 28 N. E. Rep. 849. [yland v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 407 ; * Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. aunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 354, City of Newton (1890), 43 Fed. Hep. 30; Sawyer tt State Board of Health, 733. ' 552 EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWEES. [§ 542. time they were authorized by vote would have been in viola- tion of the constitutional limitation as to amount of munici- pal indebtedness allowed, yet, if when they were issued they were not in excess, they are not void, no debt being created until the bonds are issued. That such bonds were sold and delivered before the ordinance providing for issuing them took effect was no ground for enjoining their payment at the suit of a tax-payeri A city, by^ranting the privilege to a private corporation to erect an electric plant for the purpose of lighting the same without any grant of exclusive rights, is not estopped from erecting such a plant itself when power has been granted it by statute to do so.^ That a natural-gas company entered into business under an ordinance of a city having power to regula^te its prices, silent on the subject of rates, does not exempt it from the provisions of a subsequent ordinance with reference thereto.^ The provisions of an ordi- nance denying gas companies the right to carry on their busi- ness unless they execute a bond, and declaring the execution of the bond of itself a full acceptance of the ordinance with all its requirements, is invalid as to a company already in busi- ness under an ordinance requiring no such bond.' The power to erect water-works under a statute which provides for the approval of the voters of the city by a majority vote may be exercised by the council passing an ordinance, in advance of an election, prescribing the character of the water-works and the tax to. be levied to meet its cost, and afterwards submit- ting the question to the electors.* If a charter of a city re- quires any sale or lease of its real estate to be made at public auction to the highest bidder, an ordinance of its council mak- ing a lease of any of such property to a corporation upon the payment of a rent reservedvhas been held to be void and to pass no title to the corporation; 5 1 Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Eep. 849, holding that the enforce- City of Newton (1890), 4'3 Fed. Rep. ment of this void ordinance by prose- 733, for this and the preceding propo- cution of the company's employees sitions. was properly enjoined. 2 City of Eushville v. Eushville * Taylor v. McFadden (lowA, 1S93), Natural Gas Co. (Ind., 1891), 28 N. E. 50 N. W. Rep. 1070. Rep. 849. ^ San Francisco &c. R. Ca t). Oak- 8 City of Rushville V. Rushville land, 43 Cal. 503w Natural Gas Co. (Ind., 1891), 28 N. E. §§ 542, 543.] EXPRESS ooepoeate powees. 553 § 542. Mode of exercise. — The powers of a municipal cor- poration, whether regarded as political or governmefatal, or those of a mere private corporation, can be exercised only in conformity with the provisions of its charter. The legislature can impose such restrictions as it thinks proper, as in the case cited it saw fit to require the formalities of legislation for the disposition of the city property, for the imposition of taxes, the regulation of the fire department and matters con- nected with the general welfare of the city.' All contracts made by a municipal corporation must conform to the mode prescribed in its charter for making contracts.'' The provis- ions of a statute authorizing an act by a municipal corpora- tion must be strictly followed.' Where no method is pre- scribed by law in which a municipality shall exercise its powers, but it is left free to determine the method for itself, it may act either by resolution or ordinance.* Bonds issued by a corporation under the corporate seal, but w^ithout the passage of a resolution authorizing the issue, have been held void where the legislature authorized the issue " at such time or times as the board of trustees may by resolution direct." ' Where t.he power to perform an act is in a municipal corpora- tion, and in the execution thereof the prescribed form is not followed, the corporation has the power to subsequently rat- ify and confirm the informal act, so as to make it as binding as if originally done in the proper manner.* Property of a municipal*corporation can only be conveyed in the mode of conveying its property particularly pointed out in its charter.' § 543. Proceedings not reviewable. — The action of a county board of supervisors in borrowing money, and issuing county bonds therefor, for the purpose of improving highways in a town, is legislative and not judicial, and cannot be re- viewed on certiora/ri? There need be no failure of justice if iMcCracken v. San Francisco, 16 « McCoy v. Briant, 53 Cal. 248. Cal. 591. * Lucas v. San Francisco, 7 Cal. 463. '- Zottman v. San Francisco, 30 ' Holland v. San Francisco, 7 Cal. Cal. 98. • 361. See § 248 et seq., supra. ' Glass V. Ashbury, 49 Cal. 571 ; Mc- 6 People v. Board of Supervisors of Coy tt Briant, 53 Cal. 248. Queens Co. (1893), 133 N. Y. 468; * Halsey v. Rapid Transit Co. (N. J., S. C, 30 N. E. Eep. 488, reversing 16 1890), 20 AtL Rep. 859. N. Y. Supl. 705, construing Laws 554 EXPEE8S OOEPOKATE POWEBS. [§ 543. the power is wrongly used. Any aggrieved tax-payer could arrest all proceedings.' Though the proceedings of county commissioners in establishing highways may be irregular, as the boards are usually composed of men unskilled in the law, such irregularities not affecting the substantial rights of the parties affected will be disregarded.* The New York statute providing for the discontinuance of proceedings to open a street on objection of abutting owners ' has been construed not to apply to the opening of Ibreets of the first class, which by provision of the act is to be whenever the board of street opening shall think the public interest requires it, but only to the opening of streets of the second and third classes, which the act provides shall be on request of a certain proportion of the owners of the frontage. It was held that the power to discontinue was express and complete, and that the decision was final and conclusive, not subject to review.* In determin- ing what property would be benefited by an improvement, and hence should be assessed, the action of the common coun- cil of a city is conclusive.* Under the provision of the consti- tution of 'Michigan* the legislature may confer upon boards of supervisors the power to determine when there exist the prerequisite facts authorizing a special election of the people of the municipal corporation upon any question.^ Where a N. Y., 1869, ch. 855, § 1. See, also, Peo- for in Revised Statutes of Indiana, pie V. Mayor, 2 Hill, 9 ; In re Mount 1881, section 5095. Morris Square, 3 Hill, 14 ; People v. ^ Consolidation Act, Laws of New Board of Health, 33 Barb. 344 ; Peo- York, ch. 410, sec. 990. pie V. Supervisors of Livingston Co., Vn re Alexander Avenue (N. Y., 43 Barb. 233; affirmed. 84 N. Y. 516; 1892), 31 N. E. Eep. 316; dismissing People V. Walter, 68 N. Y. 403; Peo- appeal from 17 N. Y. Supl. 933. pie V. Jones, 112 N, Y. 597; s. C, 20 'Teegarden v. City of Eacine, 56 N. E. Eep. 577. Wis. 544; s. a, 14 N. W. Eep. 614 1 People V. Board of Supervisors of * Constitution of Michigan, article Owens County, 132 N. Y. 468. See, 4, section 38, authorizes the confer- also. Barker v. Town of Oswegatchie, ring upon boards of supervisors of 16 N. Y. Sapl. 727. Eemedies are pro- Buch powers of a local legislative vided in Code of New York, sections and administrative character as the 1935, 1968 et seq., Laws N. Y. 1881, ch. legislature may deem proper. 531, as amended by Laws N. Y. 1887, 'Friesner v. Common Council of ch. 673. • Town of Charlotte (Mich., 1892), 53 2 Fulton V. Cummings (Ind., 1893), N. W. Eep. 19, where it was held 30 N. E. Epp. 949. Proceedings for that a board of county supervisors establishing highways are provided having examined a petition for a § 544.] EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWEES. 655 board of commissioners is required by statute to erect a court-house where the same has not been done, and to keep the county building in repair, and authorized to provide the means to construct, complete or repair the court-house or other public buildings whenever it shall be necessary to do so, it is for them alone to determine whether an old court- house should be replaced by a new one ; and in the absence of an abuse of discretion amounting to fraud, they will not be enjoined from carrying out their plans, though it may seem to tax-payers that the old building is sufficient.' § 544. The same sulbgect continued. — The jurisdiction of boards of supervisors in the exercise of their powers under the provisions of the Iowa Code ^ has been held to be exclusive, and an injunction will not lie to restrict the board in the exercise of its power, even though the petition is an attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the board (it containing in the case cited thousands of names of persons who were not " legal voters " ). The board has no power to investigate the alleged fraud, being bound by the facts as they appear on the face of the proceedings.' The court distinguished and held not applicable to this case sev- eral cases cited in favor of the complainants.* In Mississippi special election on local option and Herrick v. Carpenter, 54 Iowa, 340 ; declared that the election had been s. C, 6 N. W. Eep. 574, as to the power prayed for by the requisite number of the legislature to provide for reloca- of electors, such declaration by them tion of county sites by a general law was final, and that it was not com- and giving exclusive authority to petent afterwards to show that a a special tribunal in such matters, certain number of the petitioners 4 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law, 403; were not qualified voters. Alexander v. People, 7 Colo. 156 ; iKitchell V. Board of Comm'rs s. c, 3 Pac. Eep. 894; Dudley v. and.), 34 N. E. Eep. 866. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 15; Heiser v. 2 Code Iowa, §§ 381, 387, regulate Mayor, 104 N. Y. 73; s. c, 9 N. E. elections for the relocation of county Eep. 866; Phillips w Ash's Heirs, 63 sites and vest in the board of super- Ala, 418 ; Chandler v. Hanna, 73 Ala. visors of counties full power to de- 391 ; Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Pa. termine the sufficiency of the peti- St. 333 ; Sedgwick on Stat, and Const, tion, and to authorize the submission* Law, 94 ; Baker v. Board, 40 Iowa, 338. of the question of relocation to a As to courts of equity interposing to vote. control, see 1 High on Injunctions, 5 Luce V. Fensler (Iowa, 1893), 53 § 50 ; 2 High on Injunctions, § 1311 ; N. W. Eep. 517, the court denying Hyatt v. Bates, 40 N. Y. 165. the right to review a decision of the * Eice v. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570, where bjard upon such matter. See, also, a vote to relocate the county seat 556 EXPEESS COEPOEA.TE POWEES. [§ 645. the power of a board of supervisors over court-houses and sites for court-houses is exclusive, and no court can interfere with the exercise of this power so long as it is exercised only unwisely and without discretion ; and the purchase of a site for a court-house, the county having already a court-house site, is not such a usurpation of power as will warrant the in- terference of courts.^ Where the question of the necessity of taking land for a road was setUed by a board of supervisors it is not a question for the court to pass upon.^ § 545. Constitutionality of acts granting powers. — An Ohio statute providing that in any village in any county con- taining a city of the first grade of the first class, in which no sidewalks have already been constructed, etc., the council of such village may construct, etc.,' was held not to be a suffi- cient classification to satisfy the constitutional requirement that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State.* Upon this subject, Beasley, C. J., of New Jersey, said that a law may be general in its provisions, and may apply to the whole of a group of objects having charac- teristics sufficiently manifest and important to make them a class by themselves, and yet the marks of distinction on which the classification is founded may be such that the law may be in contravention of a constitutional provision prohibiting the enactment of special laws which regulate the internal affairs had been taken and the question in- in that case were in many respects volved was the right of the county so unlike those here that they needed judge to erect an expensive public no consideration, building which was required to be at ' Eotenberry «. Board of Supervis- the county seat, while the matter of ors, 67 Miss. 479 ; s. C, 7 So. Rep. 211. location was in controversy. The 2 Butte County v. Boydstun, 68 question involved in Sweatt v. Fa- Cal. 189 ; s. C, 11 Pac. Rep. 781. ville, 33 Iowa, 336, was whether the '"An act to authorize villages to county seat had been relocated and levy special assessments for the con- made under the revision of 1860 and struction and improvement of side- not under the present law. The walks and to be supplementary to question involved in this case was section 3328 of the Revised Statutes not considered in that The case of and known as section 2328a." 88 Ohio Sinnett v. Males, 38 Iowa, 35, arose Laws, 311. under a statute which provided for * Const. Ohio, art. 3, sec. 36 ; Costello the voting of a tax in aid of the con- v. Village of Wyoming (Ohio, 1893), struction of a railway. The statute, 30 N. E. Rep, 613, the facts and the principles involved § 546.] EXPEESS COEPOEATE P0WEE8. 557 of towns and cities.' The Minnesota court said : — " The true practical limitation of the legislative power to classify is that the classification shall be upon some apparent natural reason — some reason suggested by necessity, by such a difference in the situation and circumstances of the subjects placed in dif- ferent classes as suggests the necessity or propriety of differ- ent legislation with respect to them." ^ The New Jersey chief justice said : — " The marks of distinction, on which the classiii- cation is founded, must be such in the nature of things as will, in some reasonable degree at least, account for or justify the restriction of the legislation." ' The classification must be just and reasonable, and not arbitrary.* § 646. The same subject continued. — It was held in Wis- consin that where a city charter gave to every lot-owner a right to compensation for injury resulting from change of grade of a street, a legislative act which' undertook to suspend and declare that provision * inapplicable to certain streets was repugnant to the constitution of Wisconsin, which entitles every person to a certain remedy in the law for all injuries he may receive in his person, property or character; ^ also to the constitution of the United States, amendment 14, section 1, which declares that no State shall " deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws ; " ' also to the 1 State V. Hammer, 43 N. J. Law, (Wis., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 95. The 435, 440. court considered this act special 2 Nichols V. Walter, 37 Minn. • 364, class legislation, and that such dis- 878 ; S. C, 33 N. W. Rep. 800, 803. criminate exercise of arbitrary legis- ' State u Hammer, 43 N.J. Law, lative power was void. See, also, Bull 435, 440. ■y- Conroe, 13 Wis. 333 ; Durkee v. ^.Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St Janesville, 38 Wis. 464 ; Hincks r. Mil- 476. waukee, 46 Wis. 559 ; S. C, 1 N. W. 5 Laws of Wisconsin of 1891, chap- Rep. 330 ; Culbertson v. Coleman, 47 tei 354, entitled " An act to authorize Wis. 193 ; s. C, 3 N. W. Rep. 134 ; the city of Milwaukee to change the Hughes v. City of Fond du Lac, 73 grade of streets," which amended Wis. 383 ; S. C, 41 N. W. Rep. 407 ; a law providing that the owner of City of Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 any lot affected or injured thereby Wis. 303; s. C, 46 N. W. Rep. 138; should be "entitled to compensation" Wilder v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 70 by authorizing the common council Mich. 383 ; s. C, 38 N. W. Rep. 390 ; of that city to change the grade of State v. Sheriff of Ramsey Co. certain streets in designated wards (Minn.), 51 N. W. Rep. 113. " without paying for any injuiy or ' Anderton v. City of Milwaukee dartiage thereby occasioned." (Wis., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 95. The 8 Anderton v. City of Milwaukee court said:— "It [this act] attempts to 558 EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWERS. [§§ 547, 648. State constitution, on the ground that it was a local act and related to a subject not expressed in its title.' § 547. Validity of acts granting powers. — In exercising the power to levy assessments upon property owners for im- provements the tax proceedings required by the charter must be regarded, when taken together, as " due process of law," within the principles sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States.^ § 548. Power to " trade " should not be granted. — The justices of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts have given an opinion to the General Court that the legislature cannot author- ize a city to buy coal and wood as fuel and sell them to its inhabitants. Parker, J., modified his assent to this so far as to say it might if the necessities of society as now or- ganized could be met only by the adoption of such measures. make an arbitrary classification and distinction in regard to such an estab- lished grade between lots similarly situated and subject to the same or substantially the same conditions," and therefore violates the United States Constitution amendment. Cf. Scott V. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. Rep. 385. lAnderton v. City of Milwaukee (Wis., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 95. See, also, Durkee v. Janesville, 36 Wis. 697; Improvement Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 314 ; S. a, 49 N. W. Rep. 971. ^Meggett V. City of Eau Claire (Wis., 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 566, holding the charter not repugnant to Amend. Const. U. S., art 14, § 1. See, also, as to power of legislature to author- ize, Warner v. Enox, 50 Wis. 484 ; s. a. 7 N. W. Rep. 872 ; Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 243; Soens V. Racine, 10 Wis. 271 ; Lums- den V. Cross, 10 Wis. 383 ; State v. Portage, 13 Wis. 562 ; Bond v. Keno- sha, 17 Wis. 384; Blount v. Janes- ville, 81 Wis. 648 ; May v. Holdridge, 33 Wis. 93; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400 ; Evans v. Sharp, 29 Wis. 564; Dill v. Roberts, 30 Wis. 178; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wia 336, 247 ; Johnson v. Milwaukee, 40 Wis, 315. As to "due process of law," Hagar V. Reclamation Dist, 111 U. S. 701 ; s. a, 4 S. Ct Rep. 668 ; Ken- tucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 331; s. C, 6 S. Ct. Rep. 57; Spencer V. Merchant, 135 U. S. 345 ; s. C, 8 S. Ct Rep. 931; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 0. S. 668; s. c, 10 S. Ct Rep. 334; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; S. 0.; 11 S. Ct Rep. 835 ; Fass v. See- hawer, 60 Wis. 535; 19 N. W. Rep. 533; Baldwin v. Ely, 66 Wis. 188- 191; s. c 28N.W.Rep.393; Murphy V. Hall, 68 Wis. 210; S. C, 31 N. W. Rep. 754 ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104. In Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, the court said : — " But errors in the mere administration of the statute [granting the power to widen a street], not involving juris- diction of the subject and of the parties, could not justify this court, in itB re-examination of the judg- ment of the State court upon writ of error, to hold that the State had de^n-ived or was about to deprive the plaintiffs of their property without ' due process of law.' " § 548.J EXPRESS COEPOEATB POWEES. 559 Holmes, J., dissented tipon the ground that the purpose was no less prblio when the article (proposed to be furnished the public) is wood or coal than when it is water or gas or elec- tricity or education, to say nothing of cases like the support of paupers or the taking of land for railroads or public mar- kets.* The principle which controlled the majority of the court was that if this bill was passed it would authorize a carrying on of business which must be with money raised by taxation, and the legislature could authorize a city or town to tax its inhabitants only for public purposes.^ The court sanction the 1 Opinion of the Justices, In re House Bill No. 519 (Mass., 1893), 30 N. E. Rep. 1142. 2 Kingman v. City of Brockton, 153 Mass. 255; s. C, 26 N. E. Rep. 998; Opinion of the Justices, 150 Mass. 592; s. c, 24 N. E Rep. 1084; Mead V. Acton, 139 Mass. 341 ; S. c, 1 N. E. Rep. 413; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454: State v. Osawkee Tp., 14 Kan. 418 ; Mather v. City of Ottawa, 114 IlL 659 ; S. C, 3 N. E. Rep. 216 ; Loan Ass'n V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 ; Cole V. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1 ; S. C, 5 S. Ct Rep. 416 ; Ottawa v. Corey, 108 U. S. 110 ; s. c, 3 S. Ct Rep. 361 ; Attorney- General V. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 ; State V. Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533; Allen V. Jay, 60 Me. 134 ; Opinion of the Judges, 58 Me. 590. The court said : — " Up to the present time, how- ever, none of the purposes for which cities and towns have been author- ized to raise money hsis included any- thing in the nature of what is com- monly called "trade" or "commer- cial business." Instances can be found of some very curious legisla- tion by towns in the colonial and provincial times, some of which would certainly now be thought to be beyond the powers of towns un- der the constitution. Whatever the theory was, towns, in fact, under the colony charter, and for some time under the province charter, often acted as if their powers were limited only by the opinion of the inhabit- ants as to what was best to be done. This was the result of their peculiar situation and condition, and the pow- ers of towns or of the General Court were not much considered. The ex- ercise of these extraordinary powers, however, gradually died out." The only instance referred to of a town purchasing articles for its inhabitants is that of Boston, in March, 1713-14, voting to lay in a stock of grain to the amount of five thousand bushels of corn, and to store it in some con- venient place, and it was left to the selectmen to dispose of it as they saw fit. This followed the prohibition by the General Court of the exportation of grain on account of its scarcity in the fall of 1713. Of this the court said : — " It is apparent that the origi- nal purpose was to provide against a fa.mine, and that it was not the in- tention of the town to assuTne the business of buying and selling all the grain which the inhabitants needed, but of keeping such an amount in store as was necessary in order that small quantities might be obtained, particularly by the poorer inhabit- ants, at what the selectmen, or a committee of the town, or the town itself, deemed reasonable prices. On May 25, 1795, the town voted to sell the granary. This action of the town of Boston was an exception to the usages- of towns, and it appears from the reports of committees that before the Revolution it had come to be con- M)0 EXPRESS COEPOEATB P0WEE8. [§ 549. rule as expressed in another opinion, that " it must often be a question of kind and degree whether the promotion of the in- terests of many individuals in the same community constitutes a public service or not.^ § 549. Power of towns as to villages within them. — A Wisconsin statute provided that " all powers relating to vil- lages and conferred upon village boards by the provisions of chapter 40 of the Revised Statutes and all acts amendatory thereof, excepting those the exercise of which would conflict with the provisions of law relative to towns and town boards, are hereby conferred upon towns and town boards of towns containing one or more unincorporated villages having each ■a population of not less than one thousand inhabitants, and are made applicable to such unincorporated village or villages, and may be exercised therein when directed by a resolution of the qualified electors of the town at the last preceding an- nual town meeting."^ This act was held not void for uncer- tainty, as the powers granted to the town boards are defined by the act therein referred to as governing villages. ISTor was it void for attempting to incorporate a village or villages by a special act. It did not incorporate a village as a separate mu- nicipality; it simply enlarged the powers of town boards. Nor did it violate the Constitution, article 11, section 3. Even though the legislature may in its discretion enforce the incor- poration of communities as cities or villages, under proper limitations, this power does not deprive the legislature of the power to legislate for the control and government of such communities before it is deemed wise to incorporate them.' Nor did it violate the section of the constitution providing that " the legislature shall establish but one sj'stem of town and county government." * It was held that the exercise of sidered as of doubtful expediency, court said: — [Thislaw]"isanamend- and during the Revolution, or not ment of the laws concerning towns long after, it was discontinued." and the government thereof. Like 1 Opinion of Justices, 150 Mass. 593 ; many other laws of the State, it S. C, 34 N. E. Rep. 1084. provides for the exercise of different 2 Laws Wis. 1888, ch. 393. powers by the boards of different ' Land, Log & Lumber Ca v. towns, when there is anything in a Brown (1889), 73 Wis.' 394; S. C, 40 N. town which calls for the exercise of W. Rep. 483. , such different or additional powers. *Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. The act is as general as any other Brown, cited in preceding note. The general act It provides for the exer- § 550.] EXPRESS COEPOEATE POWERS. 561 the power under this act by the town board in providing for water-works, protection against fire and making police regula- tions for a village within the limits of the town was proper and fuUy authorized. An objection was made to this that the law should be declared void under some supposed rule of public policy forbidding taxation of persons for purposes of expendi- ture which would not benefit their property. The court over- ruled this objection.' § 550. Power as to issue of commercial paper. — Charter power to borrow money " for general purposes " " on the credit" of a city only includes authority to borrow money for ordinary governmental purposes, such as are generally carried out with revenues derived from taxation ; and the presump- tion is that the power was intended to confer the right to borrow money in anticipation of the receipt of taxes.' ]!^either does this charter power include the power to issue and sell negotiable bonds, nor can such power be inferred from the provision that " bonds of the city shall not be sub- ject to tax under this act," ' The court relies mainly for the cise of the additional powers in all toTCns in which villages are situated having a given number of inhabit- ants. It is not subject to the criti- cism that though general in form it is special in fact, as it is a matter of public notoriety that there are and have been several towns in the State to which the act can be applied." ..." Such act is not a violation of the system of town government, but a part of the system, in order to adapt the system to the peculiar wants of certain towns in the State." As to constitutionality of laws ap- plying to cities and towns on the basis of population, situation, etc., as being local and special laws, see State V. Circuit Court (N. J.), 15 Atl. Rep. 373 and note ; Water Works Co. V. Water Co. (N. J.), 15 Atl. Rep. 581 ; Frost V. Cherry (Pa.), 15 Atl. Rep. 782. .'Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. 36 Brown, 73 Wis. 394 These princi- ples controlled the ruling. The vil-- lage was not by the act made a sep- arate village, but remained a part of' the town. The town constituted the- taxing district, and the legislature had full power to establish taxing dis- tricts, and the courts cannot question' the justice or injustice of the limits thereof when fixed by the legisla- ture. See, also, Teegardenv. Racine, 56 Wis. 545 ; Dickson v. Racine, 61 Wia 545, 549; T. B. Scott Lumber Co., v. Oneida Co., 73 Wis. 158; State v. Sauk Co., 70 Wis. 485. ^City of Brenham v. German- American Bank (U. S.. 1893), 13 S. Ct Rep. 559, reversing 35 Fed. Rep. 186. 3 St. Laws Tex. 1873, ch. 3, art 3,, § 3; City of Brenham v. German-' American Bank, 13 S. Ct Rep. 559; overruling Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, and Mitchell v. Burling- ton, 4 WalL 370. 562 EXPEE88 OOBPOEATE POWEES. [§ 550. correotness of its conclusion upon a case in which it was held that the implied power of a municipal corporation to. borrow money to enable it to execute the power expressly conferred upon it by law, if existing at all, did not authorize it to create and issue negotiable securities to be sold in the market and to be taken by the purchaser freed from the equities that might be set up by the maker.^ The provision in the charter of Chattanooga, Tenn., that the corporatioii " shall have full power to borrow money on its bAids," etc., did not authorize it to issue warrants on the treasurer or city scrip for the pur- pose of raising money for the ordinary expenses of the cor- poration.* pose is expressly given or necessarily implied for the execution of other express powers, has been affirmed in repeated decisions of this court." See, also, Concord v. Bobinson, 131 IT. S. 165; S. C 7 a Ct. Rep. 937; Norton i\ Dyersburg, 137 U. S. 160 ; s. G, 8 S. Ct. Rep. 1111. The case of Dwyer v. Hackworth, 57 Tex. 245, was distin- guished by the court's referring to the fact that the Supreme Court of Texas, while reversing the court lie- low, said that it could not enjoin the collection of the taxes on the ground of the invalidity of these same bonds without making the holders of those bonds parties to the suit^ and citing Board v. Railway Co., 46 Tex. 316 ; and then the United States Supreme Court say; — " There was, therefore, no adjudication in that case as to the validity of the bonds, and the remark of the court that the city borrowed money by selling its bonds to the amount of $15,000 is of no force on the question of the validity of the bonds," and cite Lewis v. City of Shreveport, 108 U. S. 283 ; S. C 2 S. Ct Rep. 634. 2 Colbum V. Mayor of Chattanooga (Tenn.), 17 Am. L. Reg. 191, the court ordering perpetual injunction against the officers issuing such paper. The court said : — " If there be not money 1 Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673; S.C., 11 S. Ct, Rep. 441. The court further said :— " It is admitted that the power to borrow money, or to incur indebtedness, carries with it the power to issue the usual evidences of indebtedness by the corporation to the lender or other creditor. Such evidences may be in the form of promissory notes, warrants, and perhaps, most generally, in that of a bond. But there is a marked legal difference between the power to give a note to a lender for the amount of money borrowed, or to a creditor for the amount due, and the power to issue for sale, in open market, a bond, as a commercial security, with im- munity in the hands of a. bona fide holder for value from equitable de- fenses." The court cited and ap- proved Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566; Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400; s. C, 4 S. Ct Rep. 489 ; Kelley v. Milan, 137 U. S. 139 ; s. a, 8 S. Ct Rep. 1101 ; Young V. Clarendon Township, 133 U. S. 340 ; 8. a 10 S. Ct Rep. 107; Hill v. Mem- phis, 134 U S. 198, 203; S. G, 10 S. Ct Rep. 562. In this last case the court said: — "The inability of municipal corporations to issue negotiable paper for their indebtedness, however in- curred, unless authority for that pur- § 551.} EXPEES8 OOEPOEATK POWERS. 563 §551. As to trusts. — In the absence of an express grant of power, a municipal corporation cannot accept and hold property upon a purely private trust.' Under its charter power to "receive in trust and control for the purpose of such trust all money or other property ... bestowed upon such corporation . . . for the general purposes of educa- tion," it has been held that the city of Baltimore could take in trust property given it by will " to establish a chair in the McDonogh Educational Fund and Institute, ... to pro- mulgate such a course of instruction in said institute as will aid in the practical application of the mechanical arts, . . . to give boys in that institution such useful and practical me- chanical education as will enable them to gain a livelihood by skilful manual labor." ' Aside from this provision in its latest charter, the court declared that according to the great weight of authority the corporation would seem to be entirely capa- ble of tiaking property in trust for purposes germane to the objects of the corporation or which would promote, aid or as- sist in carrying out or perfecting those objects.' There is no in the treasury, then the corporation should borrow as provided in the charter or by existing law, or they should levy and collect such tax as is necessary to raise virhatever sum is needed, and if they can neither bor- row nor raise the money by taxation to meet their-expenditures, then they should cease their expenditures until they can thus realize according to law." 1 In re Franklin's Estate, Appeal of Gillespie (Pa., 1893), 34 AtL Rep. 636. T.he court, naifl: — "^ Instances are not wanting in which municipal corpo- rations have executed trusts commit- ted to them by private persons, ger- mane to the objects of the corpora- tion, and they have been upheld for that reason." See, also, Philadel- phia V. Fox, 64 Pa. St 169, comment of Sharswood, J., on Gloucester v. Osborn, 1 H. L. Gas. 385, in which it was said that a municipality may take and hold for purposes alto- gether private. Mayor v. Elliott, 8 Rawle, 170. ^Barnum v. Baltimore (1884), 63 Md. 375. '3 Kent Com. 380; 3 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 716. See, also, Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. 433 Green v. Rutherford, 1 Ves. 463 Trustees &c. v. King, 13 Mass. 546 Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Barr, 37 Chambers v. St Louis, 39 Mo. 543 McDonough Will Case, 15 How. 367 McDonongh's Case, 8 La. Ann. 171 Girard's Will, 3 La. Ann. 898; Vidal V. Girard's Ex'r, 3 How. 137; Gi- rard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1 ; Perin V. Carey, 34 How. 465 ; Bell County V. Alexander, 33 Tex. 850 ; Columbia Bridge v. Kline, Bright, 330 ; Miller V. Lerch, 1 Wall Jr. 310; Webb v. Neal, 5 Allen, 575.; Oxford &c. Society V. Society, 55 N. H, 463 ; Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18 ; Cresson'B Ap- peal, SO Pa. St 437. 664 • BXPEESS OOEPOEATB P0WEE8. [§ 552. statute law of New York which can be construed to give a municipal corporation the right to hold lands in trust for pious uses or for religious purposes,' A municipal corporation can- not, in the absence of statute, accept a testamentary trust to establish and maintain a poor-house for the support of the poor of the county.* § 552. Purchase at tax sales. — A city having power under its charter to purchase property*vithin or without its borders can purchase land for non-payment of taxes levied by the city.' Where a statute gives the power to make such pur- chase, a municipality must strictly pursue its statutory au- thority. It is confined to the express provision of the statute conferring the power ; and where there is no authority for it to purchase jointly with another person, a tax deed, from which it appears that land was sold to the municipality and a private individual, has been held void.* So, where a city charter limits to fiftj' years the terms for which lands should be sold to the city for taxes and the city took such land for nine hundred years, the title was held to be void; but if the tax was lawful, the land-owner must pay the tax with interest as the condition of a decree in his favor in a proceeding to set aside or annul the deed.* Per contra: — It has been said by the Supreme Court of Illinois that since municipal corporations can only exercise such powers as are expressly conferred, or as 1 Village of Coming v. Rector &c. ' Keller v. Wilson (Ky., 1890), 14 of Christ Church, 33 N. Y. St Rep. S. W. Rep. 333. The court said:— •ree; s. c, ll N. Y. Supl. 763. In Be "This [the provision in the charter] tJnderhiU's Will (1888), 3 N. Y". Supl. should be construed to mean for gov- 205 ; s. G, Dem. Sur. 466, it was held ernmental purposes ; but in purchas- that a town cannot receive a bequest ing it for its taxes it was executing to be devoted under certain condi- such a purpose, and, in our opinion, tions to the erection of a town hall, no valid distinction can be drawn inasmuch as section 3 of Revised between a purchase by the city at a Statutes of New York, page 337, pro- sale for taxes under a levy by its vides that no town shall possess or ex- collecting officer and under a de- ercise any corporate powers except cretal sale for a like purpose." as enumerated, and section 1 limits < Sprague v. Coenen, 30 Wis. 309. the power of towns in purchasing ' Baldwin v. City of Elizabeth, 43 and holding lands or personal prop- N. J. Eq. 11. See, also, In re Report erfcy to such as may be necessary to of Com'rs of Adjustment, 49 N. J. the exercise of corporate or adminis- Law, 388 ; s. a, 33 Am. & Eng, Corp. trative powers. Caa 484. * City Council v. Walton, 77 Ga. 517. § 553.] EXPKESS OOKPOEATE POWEES. S6ft arise by implication from general powers granted, the charter power of a corporation to buy and hold real property should be understood to include purchases made in the ordinary way, and not a tax sale.' In Indiana it has also been held that there could be no purchase at a sale for taxes due by the corporation without express power conferred by statute, and that it could not bind itself by an agreement to warrant the title of a pur- chaser at such sale.^ Such a sale -to a corporation had before been held void in Wisconsin.' A power to sell lands for taxes imposed upon such lands does not authorize selling of lands for taxes imposed upon the owners or occupants merely, and not upon their lands.* § 653. Granting exclnsive franchises. — A village has no power to grant an exclusive franchisp so as to disable itself for the period of thirty years from establishing for itself a system of water-works, under a power to provide for and control the erection of water-works, and to grant the right to one or more private companies to erect water-works to sup- ply such village and the inhabitants with water, etc.* The 1 City of Champaign v. Harmon, izing the same. They are interme- 93 m. 491. diate agencies between the State and 2 City of Logansport v. Humphrey, the people, created for civil and po- 84 Ind. 467. litical purposes ; and whilst it would 'Knox V. Peterson, 31 Wis. 247. be competent for counties to buy In Bruck v. Broesigks, 18 Iowa, 893, and hold real estate as a means to Lowe, J., hae given the following an end in effecting or carrying out reason for denying such powers to the objects of their creation, it would counties and municipal corporations not be within the scope of their pow- generally: — "The relations which ers to buy and sell delinquent lands counties or municipal corporations at tax sales as a mere pecuniary sustain to the State and their own operation." inhabitants is of a fiduciary nature. * Sharp v. Speir (1843), 4 Hill, 76. The duties required and the responsi- * Long v. City of Duluth (Minn., I Uities imposed in the matter of as- 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 913. The court sessing and collecting taxes are such said : — "If there is any ambiguity or as to render it inexpedient, not to reasonable doubt, arising from the say unwise, and against the purpose terms used by the legislative or grant- and the policy of the revenue law of ing body, as to whether an exclusive the code of 1851 (under which the lan^ franchise has been conferred or au- in controversy was sold for taxes), thorized to be conferred, the doubt to allow counties to traffic in the is to be resolved against the corpora- purchase and sale of tax titles in the tion or individual claiming such a absence of an express statute author- grant. Public policy does not per- 666 EXPBESS OOBFOI^ATS POWEBS. [§ 553. fact that the law in another section pi'ovides that every grant to a private company of the right to erect water-worfes shall proyide for the sale of such works to the village after fifteen years does not affect this construction of the law, as it merely requires that the right to purchase shall be a condition of the grant, but imposes no requirement or duty to purchase, and does not justify the inference that the village could only provide itself with water«works by purchasing from tho company.' A water company was incorporated in 1860 to supply the borough of Easton with water. In 1867 the borough was authorized to construct water-works and to pur- chase the works of any existing company. This authority became effectual in 1881, being approved bj' a popular vote. The water company in the meanwhile had accepted the bene- fits of an act of 1874: which declared that "the right to have and enjoy the franchises and privileges of such incorporation within the district or locality covered by its charter shall be an exclusive one, and no other company shall be incorporated for that purpose " until the corporation should have realized profits to a specified amount. It was held that the franchise was exclusive only as respects other companies, and that the mit an unnecessary inference of an- chise granted by the city under its thority to make a contract inoon- charter powers. GaS Light Co. v. sistent with the continuance of the Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228, holding sovereign power and duty to make that a legislative act authorizing such laws as the public welfare may a town to cause its streets to be requira" On this point see, also, Nash lighted with gas and to enter into a V, Lowry, 37 Minn. 361, 263; S. C, 33 contract with the gas company for N. W. Rep. 787 ; Charles River Bridge that purpose did not confer power to ttWarren Bridge, 11 Pet 420, 443, 444 ; make an absolute contract for a term Minturn v. Larue, 28 How. 485 ; of years ; that the legislature could Wright V. Nagle, 101 TJ. S. 791, 796 ; not thus be deprived of its p6\^3r to Fanning v. G-regoire, 16 How. 524, subsequently legislate upon the sub- where it was held that the earlier ject, and its repeal of the authority grant of a ferry franchise was not to light with gas was effectual to exclusive, and, although "no court terminate the contract so made, or board of county comralssioners" Water Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116 [they having been prohibited by the N. Y. 167 ; S. C, 23 N. E. Rep. 381. act granting the first] could sul>se- i Long v. City of Duluth (Minn., quently grant another franchise, the 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 913. See, also, legislature could do it, or empower Water Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116 the city of Dubuque to do so, thus N. Y. 167, 187 ; S. c., 32 N. E. Rep. 381. sustaining a subsequent ferry frau- § 554.] EXPRESS COEl'OEATE POWESS. 567 borough was not prohibited from supplying water by works constructed by itself, even though that might impair the value of the franchise of the water company.^ § 554. The same subject continned. — It was held that the granting of the exclusive privilege of supplying a city with water "from the Three-mile Creek" did not prevent a subsequent grant of a right to supply water from an- other source.^ Under authority to a municipal corporation to cause its streets to be lighted and to make reasonable regula- tions with reference thereto, it is empowered to enter into a contract to accomplish that end, but it has no authority to thus confer an exclusive right to furnish gas for a period of thirty years.' A city was empowered by its charter to provide itself with water, and was deemed to be authorized to do so by contract. A water company was expressly au- thorized to contract with the city for that purpose, and a contract was entered into which the court deemed to have been intended tb confer an exclusive Hght upon the company for a period of twenty-five years. It was held that the city had no such power,* The fact that a water company is re- quired, when requested, to furnish water to a city for the extinguishment of fires, etc., and that such request has been made, and contracts entered into for that purpose between the company and a city, do not constitute a contract binding the city perpetually while the company retains its charter and preventing the city from making contracts with others. The city could bind itself by such contracts only as it was authorized by statute to make. It has no power to grant ex- clusive privileges to put mains, pipes and hydrants in its streets, nor can it lawfully, by contract, deny to itself the right to exercise the legislative powers vested in its commpn council.* ' Lehigh Water Conipany'8 Appeal, * Syracuse Water Co. v. City of 102 Pa. St. 515. Syracuse, 116 N. Y., 167; s. C, 23 N. 2 Stein V. Water Supply Co., 34 R Rep. 381, sustaining the power of Fed. Rep. 145. the city to authorize another water ' Gas Light Co. v. City of Saginaw, company to construct, maintain and 28 Fed. Rep. 539. operate water-works in the city, but * City of Brenham v. Water Com- not denying th^ right of the com- pany, 67 Tex 543 ; S. C, 4 S. W. Rep. pany first receiving the contract con- l43. tinning to furnish. See, also, Lehigh 568 EZPBESS OOBFOBATE FOWEBS. [§ § 555. Contracts not exclusire. — A city has poorer to contract for a supply of gas or water for a stated period of time extending beyond the tenure of office of the individual members of the common council making such contract.' A contract' by ordinance to pay for twenty-five years for the gas furnished by the lamps provided for therein and by those afterwards directed was upheld. The ordinance was construed to be a grant so far as it conferred upon the gas company the right to lay its maiits and pipes in the public streets. But it was held that in that far it was in the nature of a license and not exclusive.^ Nor was a monopoly of sup- plying the city with gas for street lighting given by such con- tract, there being nothing in the ordinance preventing the city from taking gas from others.' Had the ordinance con- tained a provision by which the city agreed to take gas from Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 391 ; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica & S. R Co., 6 Paige, 554; Oswego Falls Bridge Co. v. Fish, 1 Barb. Ch. 547 ; Thompson v. N. Y. &c. R Co., 3 Sand. Ch. 625; Auburn &c. Plank Road Co. V. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444, 453 ; Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 30 N. Y. 44, 61 ; Power v. VUlage of Athens, 99 N. Y. 592; Dermott v. State, 99 N. Y. 107; Milhan i;. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611 ; New York v. Second Ave. R Co., 32 N. Y. 261 ; Gale v. Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344 ; S. C, 9 Am. Rep. 80 ; Logan v. Payne, 43 Iowa, 524; S. a, 22 Am. Eep. 261 ; Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Bes Moines, 44 Iowa, 505 ; s. C, 24 Am. Rep. 756 ; Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19; State V. Coke Company, 18 Ohio St 263; Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 West Va. 435; S. C, 4 S. E. Rep. 650. In Birmingham & Pratt Mines St Ry. Co. V. Birmihgton St R Co. (1885), 79 Ala. 465, it was held that neither the charter of the city of Birmingham nor the general stat- utes conferred on that corporation the power to grant, by ordinance in the nature of a contract, the ex- clusive franchise in perpetuity of running a street railway through cer- tain designated streets and avenues ; and further, that if such power were granted to the corporation by its charter or public statute, it would be violative of the constitutional pro- vision (Const Ala., art 1, § 23) against the passage of any law "making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities." City of Chicago v. Rumpflf, 45 111. 90 ; Davis v. Mayor of New York, 14 N. Y. 506. 1 City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light Co. (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 573. See, also. City of Indianapolis r. Indianapolis &c. Co., 66 Ind. 396 ; City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1. 2 City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light Co. (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 573. See, also, Crowder v. Town of Sullivan (Ind.), 28 N. E. Eep. 94; City of Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Ca (Ind.), 38 N. E. Rep. 853. ' City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., cited in the preceding note. Cf. Citizens' Gas &a Co. v. Town of Elwood, 114 Ind. 333; & a, 16 N. E. Rep. 634. § 656.] EXPEBSS OOBPOEATE POWEES. 569 no other company, or prohibiting any other company from en- gaging in the business of making and selling gas, the cases mentioned in the note would be in point.' The arrangement provided by the ordinance being purely a business matter there was no surrender by the council of any legislative power.* The statute which authorized the common councils of cities to contract for light for its streets and alleys for a period not exceeding ten years did not affect this contract. By the same act existing contracts, except such as conferred exclusive privileges, were declared valid. This one was held not to be exclusive.' § 556. Improvements generally. — The charter of a city provided that, if sidewalks are not built within the prescribed period of time after notice, the city council may order the same to be done "at the expense of the lots adjoining." It has been held that a resolution of the council, after the expi- ration of the time fixed by the notice, directing the city recorder to advertise for bids to furnish the material and construct the walk, was a sufficient compliance with the charter provision. It was not necessary that they should have di- rected that the walks be built " at the expense of the lots " adjoining.* A provision in a city charter that the expense of constructing sidewalks in a certain contingency should be assessed against the " lots and parcels of land adjoining said sidewalks " was held to conform to the State constitution, which authorized and provided that such assessments might be made " upon the property fronting upon such improve- ments." • Under the Code of North Carolina, relative to towns and cities, providing that the commissioners or alder- 1 Davenport v, Kleinschmidt, 6 Co. v. City of New Orleans, 43 La. Mont 503 ; S. C, 13 Pac Eep. 249, Ann. 188 ; S. C, 7 So. Eep. 559. and cases collected in In re Union * City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Ferry Co., 98 N. Y. 139, 150. Light Co., cited in preceding note. 2 City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas See, also, cases supra. Louisville Gas Light Co. (Ind., 1892), 31 N. E. Eep. Co. v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 115 573, as to its being purely a business U. S. 683 ; s. C, 6 S. Ct. Eep. 265. power. See, also, in addition to cases * Scott County v. Hinds (Minn., aupra, Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), 1893), 53 N. W. Eep. 523. §§ 608, 609 ; New Orleans Gas Light ' Scott County v. Hinds (Minn:, 1893), 53 N. W. Eep. 533. 570 BXPEBSS COIHPOHA.TE POWEES. [§ 557» men may cause necessary improvements to be raade^ and "apportion them equally among the inhabitants by assess- ments," a city authorized by its charter to charge abutting owners with the cost of improvements may apportion them according to the front-foot rule, though the charter is silent as to the method of apportionment.' An amendment to the charter of a city providing that the common council should not take stock "in any public improvement, or effect a loan for any purpose, without first obtaining 'the consent of the people at an election held for that purpose," cannot be ex- tended to improvements other than municipal in their charac- ter. The legislature did not intend to invest the city with au- thority to embark in speculative enterprises of improvement.^ For like reasons a city charter was construed not to authorize the levying and collection of a tax for making a survey of a railroad route from that city to another.' It has been held that although an act empowering a county to improve the naviga- tion of a navigable stream, and to issue bonds, the proceeds of which were to be applied for such purpose, might not provide any means or method for paying the principal and interest on the bonds, such fact was not a good objection to the valid- ity of the act or to the issue of the bonds thereunder, nor was the fact that such provision might not be otherwise made.* § 657. Cost of improvements. — When municipal corpora- tions seek to impose upon property owners the burden of the cost of street improvements, and to hold the property of abutting owners liable therefor, the statute or charter author- izing such improvements to be made must be strictly pursued.' 1 City of Ealeigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. meet the requirements of thia case. 33 ; s. c, 14 S. B. Eep. 531. It was not a work which the charter , 2 Low V. Marysville, 5 Cal. 314, authorized. where it was held the city under that * Stockton v, Powell (Fla.), 10 So. provision had no power to subscribe Rep. 688. to stock in a steam navigation com- & Mason v. City of Sioux Falls (So. pany. Dak., 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 770 ; 3 Destj-, 'Douglas V. Placerville, 18 Cal. Tax'n, 1341; 3 Dillon on Munic. 643. That a railroad extending from Corp., § 769 ; 1 Blackwell on Tax the city was as much of a means of Titles, § 612 ; Merritt v. Village of municipal benefit as a street in the Port Chester, 71 N. Y. 309 ; Hewes v. city, gas or water-works does not Eeis, 40 CaL 3S5 ; McLauren v. City § 5&8.] EXPRESS OOBPOBATE POWEE8. 57 1 Under the Dakota statute, which grants the powers in this respect to cities, the resolution adopted and published must specifically designate the work declared necessary to be done, and property owners and the property will only be liable for the cost of such improvements as are so specifically designated in the resolution and published in the ofiioial paper.' But owners of property abutting upon a street that has been used by the public as a street for a number of years cannot defeat the city in enforcing the collection of street assessments for the cost of improving such street on the ground that the title to such street or some part of it is not in the city.* §658. Gas and water supply.^ — A charter of an electric light company authorizing it to " furnish any city .... with gas, . . . etc.," and the charter of a city giving it power to control and its board of councilraen power " to con- struct, maintain and operate gas and water-works, and to pass all ordinances necessary to regulate the same, " have been held to authorize a contract between the two as to lighting the city by gas, electricity, or any other mode.' Under the power to make all needful police regulations for the welfare, conven- ience and safety of its citizens, the power to light the streets of a city may be lawfully exercised and the council may pur- of Grand Forks (Dak.), 43 N. W. Bep. Corp., § 638 and cases cited ; 2 Green- 710; White v. Stevens, 67 Mich. 33; leaf on Evidence, § 662. As to estop- a a, 34 N. W. Rep. 255 ; Hoy t u. City pel of owner of land. Holmes v. Vil- of Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; Pound v. lage of Hyde Park, 121 111. 138; s. C., Chippewa County, 43 Wis. 63. 13 N. E. Kep. 540; Village of Hyde I Mason n City of Sioux Falls (So. Park v. Borden, 94 111. 26, laying down Dak, 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 770. this rule as to evidence required on 3 Mason v. City of Sioux Falls (So. the part of the city : — •' It is sufScient Dak., 1892), 51 N. W. Bep. 770. See, for the city to show that the street, also, as to uses of the street by the avenueoralleysoughttobeimproved city, and what amounts to a dedica- is one that has, for a considerable tlon, Elliott on Roads and Streets, 92, length of time, been used as a public 126 ; City of Cincinnati v. White's Les- street and is such property as can be sees, 6 Pet 431 ; Jarvis v. Dean, 3 appropriated by the city, and is, in Bing. 447 ; Case v. Favier, 12 Minn, the language of Chief Justice Shaw 89; Hobbsw Inhabitants of Lowell, 19 in the Massachusetts case supra, a Pick. 400 ; City of Chicago v. Wright, street de facto." 69 111. 318 ; Cemetery Ass'n v. Menin- 3 City of Newport v. Newport ger, 14 Kan. 312; 2 Dillon on Munic. Light Co. (Ky.), 12 S. W. Rep. 1040. 572 BXPEESS OOEPORATB P0WEE8. [§ 558. chase and operate an electric light plant for that purpose.' Authority in a city to make a permanent and exclusive con- tract with a water company to build water-works and supply it with water cannot be implied from the general power con- ferred by its charter to contract for the needs of the munici- pality.^ The city of New Orleans was held to have the power to contract for a water supply under the provisions of its charter ; and having this power to contract, it was held that the price, the kind of water, and the amount, w^e matters of legislative dis- cretion vested in the city council ; and that when the city con- fined itself within the limits of its power to contract, this legal discretion exercised by the city council would not be inquired into by the courts, in the absence of fraud and corrupt and extravagant legislation.' Under the General Statutes of Kan- sas, cities of the second class have the right to provide for supplying themselves and their inhabitants with water by granting the privilege of furnishing water to a person, natural or artificial.* A charter which enumerates among the powers of a city one " to provide the city with water by water-works " authorizes the corporation to furnish the inhabitants of the city with water.* Power conferred by the legislature upon a common council to prescribe regulations for the laying of gas pipes through the streets cannot be delegated ; and a res- olution authorizing all companies to lay pipes upon such con- iMauldin v. City Council of Tenn. 464; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 934 Greenville, 33 S. C. 1 ; S. C., 11 S. K. The court said : — [In exercising its Bep. 434 authority the city could not be held 2 Greenville Water Works Co. v. to be] " engaging in a private enter- City of Greenville (Miss.), 7 So. Rep, prise or performing a municipal 409. function for a private end. It is the ' Conery v. New Orleans Water use of corporate property for corpo- Works Co, (1889), 41 La. Ann. 910 ; rate purposes in the sense ' of the S. c, 7 So. Rep. 8. See, also, Mayor &c, revenue law of 1887," and, therefore, of Rome v. Cabot, 38 Ga. 50 ; Wells it may not be liable for a privilege V. Atlanta, 43 Ga. 76; Watson v. tax. See, also, as to liability for taxes, Turnbull, 34 La. Ann. 856 ; Pickles Town of West Hartford v. Board of V. Dry Dock Co., 38 La. Ann. 413. Water Company of the City of Eart- ^ Burlington Water Works Co. v. ford, 44 Conn. 361; City of Rochester City of Burlington (1890), 43 Kan. v. Town of Rush, 80 N. Y. 303; City 735 ; S. C 33 Pac. Rep. 1068. See, also, of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Wood V. Water Works Co., 33 Kan. Duvall (Ky.), 395 ; In the Matter of 590, 597. the Appeal of Des Moines Water 6 Smith V. Nashville (1889), 88 Company, 48 Iowa, 334 § 559.] EXPKESS COEPOEATE POWERS. 573 ditions as may be prescribed by the mayor, comptroller and commissioner of public works confers no authority on the latter and their permits are void.' §669. Natural-gas companies. — "An act empowering cities and towns within the State ... to regulate the supply, consumption and distribution of natural gas therein, and de- claring an emergency," has been held to authorize, not merely such regulations as conduce to safety, but to confer full power to regulate the supply, distribution and consumption of nat- ural gas, including the power to fix reasonable maximum rates that may be charged to consumers.* Where an owner of prop- erty devotes it to a use in which the public have an interest, he must to the extent of the interest thus acquired by the public submit to the control of such property by the public for the common good.' The Supreme Court of Ohio, apply- ing the doctrine just stated on the subject of regulating prices, said : — " Because prior to any legislation on the subject it (a gaslight company) may have possessed the common-law right of fixing its own prices, it does not place it beyond the reach of any legislative control on the subject whenever in the in- terest of the public good it becomes necessary that such con- 1 Anderson v. Equitable Gas Light may be able to reach and control Co. (1884), 12 Daly, 462 ; S. C, Cin. them in the exercise of their implied Weekly L. Bui. 137. See, also, Thomp- police powers. To give to the stat- Bon V. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 93 ; Tap- ute such construction would be to pan V. Young, 9 Daly, 357 ; Birdsall v. say that after such franchises have Clark, 73 N. Y. 73 ; Matter of Blank, been acquired, no matter what con- 73 N. Y. 388 ; Index, tit Delegation duct their holders may be guilty of of Powers. tending to the discomfort or incon- 2 City of Rushville v. Rushville venience of the citizen, and no mat- Natural Gas Co. (Ind., 1891), 28 N. E. ter how extortionate they may be, Eep. 853. This construction was unless their acts tend to endanger based upon the title and the inten- the safety, or otherwise come within tion of the legislature. The court the purview of the inherent police said : — " We cannot think that it powers of the municipality, there is was the purpose of the legislature to no remedy, as the legislature has left leave municipal corporations abso- them independent of municipal su- lutely without power of control or pervision." regulation over the holders of such ' Munn v. Illinois, 94 IT. ' S. 113 ; franchises (using the streets for the Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250 ; s. C, supply of natural gas), except aa they 5 N. E. Eep. 178. 574 EXFEESS COEPOEATE POWEES. [§ 560. trol should be had." ' The only restriction upon the right to fix maximum prices which follows the right to control, and which is delegated by statute to the municipality, is some provision in the, charter or grant of the license which amounts to a contract.* Where a corporation fails to have a stipnla^ tion from the municipality reserving to itself the right to regulate its charges, or otherwise contracts for a restraint of the powers of the city, it acts in full view of the power of the city to regulate its prices by fixing a maximum and is bound by an ordinance on the subject.' A provision in an or- dinance that natural-gas compaines shall supply all individuals along their lines requiring it, on payment or reasonable secu- rity, is valid, and within the power of a city to impose by or- dinance.* § 560. Establishment of electric plant.— Under a general authority to establish electric light plants a city may erect an eldctric plant for the purpose of furnishing light to its inhab- itants in their stores and houses as well as for lighting the streets and public places of the city.' In upholding a similar power in a city under a statute,* the Supreme Court of In- diana said: — "There can be little or no doubt that the power lCityofZane8villei',GasLightCo., city, but may furnish the same for 47 Ohio St 1 ; S. &, 23 N. R Eep. 55. private use ; and the statutes of Iowa 2Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; now place' electric light plants in the EallvFay Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 ; same category." Peik V. Railway Co., 94 U. S. 164. »Elliott's Supp. Ind., 1889, § 794 'City of Eushville v. Eushville et sequuniur. Section 794 provides Natural Gas Co. (Ind), 38 N. E. Eep. that the common council of a city 849. shall have power to light its streets * City of Eushville v. Eushville arid public places with electric light Natural Gas Co. (Ind.), 28 N. E. Eep. and may contract with individuals 849. or corporations for supplying such 6 So held in Thomson-Houston light Section 795 provides for the Electric Co. v. City of Newton (1890), erection in the streets of necessary 43 Fed. Eep. 733. The court said : — poles and appliances for supplying " It has been the uniform rule that electric light to the inhabitants of a city in erecting gas-works or water- the city. Section 798 provides for works is not limited to furnishing the appropriation of lands and rights gas or water for use only upon the of way by corporations engaged in streets and other public places of the lighting the city or the public ana § 560.] BXPEE88 OOKPOEATE POWEKS. 575 to light the streets and public places of a city is one of its implied and inherent powers, as being necessary to properly protect the lives and property of its inhabitants, and as a check on immorality.'" Incidental to the ordinary powers of a municipal corporation, and necessary to a proper exercise of its functions, is the power of enacting sanitary regulations for the preservation of the lives and health of those residing within its corporate limits.* " It follows " [from this princi- ple], continued the court in the Indiana case, " that to con- cede to municipal corporations the possession of such pow- ers does not involve any extension, either by intendment or implication, of the powers expressly conferred by statute; but that by the act authorizing the organization of the cor- poration, the legislature expressly delegates to the munici- pality the power to take such steps as are necessary to pre- serve the health and safety (and we will add the property) of its inhabitants. The inference of the delegation of such powers follows inevitably and irresistibly, because their exer- cise is necessary to the accomplishment of the objects of the incorporation." ' private places for the inhabitants with electric light Of such power the court, in City of Crawfordsville v. Braden (Ind.), 28 N. E. Rep. 84,9, said : "The so-called inferred or inherent police powers of such corporations are as much {lelegated power as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the corporation, and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such power. Special charters as well as general statutes for the incorporation of cities and tovins usually contain a specific enumeration of powers granted to and which may be exercised by such corporations. In many cases the powers thus enumerated are such as would be implied by the mere fact of the incorporation. Where powers are thus enumerated in a statute which would belong to the corpora- tion without specific enumeration, the specific statute is to be regarded, not as the source of the power, but as merely declaratory of a pre-exist- ing power, or rather of a power which is inherent in the very nature of a municipal corporation, and which is essential to enable it to ac- complish the end for which it was created. And the enumeration of powers, including a portion of those usually implied, does not neoessai'ily operate as a limitation of corporate powers, excluding those not enumer- ated." See, also, Clark v. City of South Bend, 85 Ind. 376; Bank v. Sarlls (Ind.), 28 N. E. Rep. 434. 1 City of Crawfordsville v. Braden (Ind.), 38 N. E. Rep. 849. 2 City of St. Paul v. Laidler, 3 Minn. 190. ' City of Crawfordsville v. Braden (Ind.), 28 N. E Rep. 849. This court 576 BXPBESS OOEPOEATB P0WEE8. [§ 561. § 561. Public property. — A patent was issued by the State of Illinois to the county commissioners conveying all the lots in a certain block known as the " Public Square " at Ottawa, on which a statute had directed the public build- ings should be erected, " to aid in the erection of public build- ings." It was held that the county commissioners, after using as much of such block for public buildings as they deemed necessary, might sell and convey the rest of it for the purpose of raising money to pay for such buildings.' Under an act authorizing a county to issue bonds for a building for a court- house, it has no authority to issue bonds for the erection of a jail and court-house combined which is to be permanently used as a jail and is to be used as a court-house only until a separate court-house should be built.^ A statute authoriziiig the supervisor of a county to cause the commons to be sur- veyed and platted, and to lease the same for ninety-nine years, was held to apply to leases in possession only, and not in reversion or futuro; and a subsequent act giving to the person entitled to any portion of such title by an existing lease the right to acquire the fee by paying a certain sum, vested in the lessee a property right which could not be dis- turbed or abridged by any future lease to another.' Under authority " to prevent and extinguish fires," a town may erect a fire-engine house, and, under its general authority to provide a suitable place for town business, may provide for a public hall over said house.^ referred to the Iowa statute involved Mo. 503, where it was contended that in Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. the municipal corporation should be City of Newton, 42 Fed. Rep. 723, relieved from a condition to erect swpra, and said: — "It will be ob- structures of certain kinds upon served that this [that] statute does realty conveyed to it, and thus avoid not in terms confer any power not, in a restoration of the property to the our opinion, as above stated, included grantor on the ground of lack of among the implied powers of mu- power to perform the condition. See, nicipal corporations." also, as to the power to erect the hall, 1 Lyman v. Gedney, 114 111. 388; State v. Haynes, 72 Mo. 377 ; Ketchum S. C, 29 N. E. Eep. 282. v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356; Allen v. 2 Nolan County v. State (Tex.), 17 Taunton, 19 Pick. 488 ; Hardy v. S. W. Eep. 823. Waltham, 3 Met 163; Richardson v. SRutz V. Kehr (IlL), 29 N. E. Rep. Boston, 24 Hun, 188; Board &c. St 553. Louis Public Schools v. Woods, 77 « Clarke v. Brookfield (1884), 81 Mo. 197. § 562.] EXPRESS OOKPOEATB POWERS. 577 § 562. The same subject continued. — The Code of Iowa authorizes cities and towns to acquire lands for various mu- nicipal purposes, and provides that they shall have power " to dispose of and convey such lands if deemed unsuitable for the purposes for which they were purchased;" and also author- izes the purchase by a city of lands sold under execution, when the city has any interest in the proceeding, and em- empowers the corporation " to dispose of the property," or of any real estate or any interest therein, " in such manner and upon such terms as the city council shall deem just and proper." The provisions have been held not to confer upon a city the authority to donate land and buildings to the county in which they are situate in order to induce a relocation of the county seat in such city. Such authority could only exist by legisla- tive grant.' So a statute declaring that when a piece or parcel of land held for public use shall not be needed for public use the land may be sold by the city, has been construed to refer to such property as is held by a city in full use and ownership, as the commons, in this instance, acquired by confirmation under various acts of congress, and not to apply to property which has been dedicated by the owner to the public use.^ A deed of a homestead to a county is not invalid because the land was not acquired for any public purpose, such as a site for a court- house, jail, etc. This holding was in Texas, where the stat- utes ' recognize the rights of counties to take title to and en- joy real estate without any limitation as to the purpose for which it shall be used.* The legislature may regulate the use of any property dedicated to a public use in a city, or promote its improvement, but cannot divert or subject it to any use clearly inconsistent with the contract of dedication. The property or easement which a city has in its streets or public places is not private property in the sense that it cannot be taken for a public use except upon just compensation ; but it is public, and the power of regulating the use thereof, as such, resides in the legislature. The power is not, however, abso- 1 Brookman v. City of Creston, ' Rev. Stat Tex., arts. 680-682. 79 Iowa, 587 ; s. a, 44 N. W. Rep. 833. * Scalf v. Collin County (Tex.), 16 2 Cummings v. City of St. Louis, 90 S. W. Rep. 314 Mo. 259 ; S. C, 2 8. W. Rep. 130. 37 578 EXPRESS COEPOEATE P0WJSE3. [§§ 563, 664. lute, but is limited as above stated.^ The authority of a munici- pality as such to donate the right of way for a railroad com- pany other than through its streets, and appropriate money to pay for such right of way, does not exist under the consti- tution of Texas.'' § 563. Parks. — An act providing that cities acting under special charters may provide for the election of park commis- sioners who shall have exolasiv#power over public parks, and authorizing the councils of such cities to submit to a vote the question whether there shall be levied a tax for the purpose of purchasing real estate for parks and their improvement, has been held in Iowa not to divest the common council of the cities of power under the code, when such commissioners have not been elected, to " purchase or condemn and pay for out of the general fund lands for the use of public squares, streets and parks," and the necessity therefdr is to be deter- mined solely by the city.' A Minnesota statute providing for a system of public parks and parkways in Minneapolis was construed not to authorize the board created by it to vacate or close or exclude any class of vehicles from any street except such as might run through any tract of lands taken for a park, and it could not acquire that power over a street by merely widening it by acquiring title to a strip on each side.* But authority " to make rules for the use and government " of a park will sustain a rule forbidding all persons " to make ora- tions, harangues or loud outcries " therein.* § 564. Wharves. — A municipal corporation may, unless re- stricted by positive law, dedicate property irrevocably to public 1 Portland &c. B. Co. v. City of 9, and art 11, sec. 3. So held in Portland (1886), 14 Or. 188 ; S. c, 13 City of Cleburne v. Gulf &c. R Co., 66 Pac. Rep. 265, where a license by the Tex. 457 ; s. a, 1 S. W. Rep. 348. legislature to a railroad company to ^Inre City of Cedar Bapids (Iowa, use a levee or public landing for oer- 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 1142. tain property was sustained as being * State v. Waddell (Minn., 1892), 52 in aid of the use to which this prop- N. W. Rep. 213. erty had been dedicated by the ^ Commonwealth v. Abrahams grantor to the city. (Mjass., 1893), 80 N. B. Rep. 79. 2 Const, of Texas, 1875, art 10, sec. § 565.] EXPEESS OOEPOKATE P0WEB8. 579 uses.' It may, under its power to regulate wharves, authorize the erection of a public grain elevator upon a wharf so dedi- cated to public uses.^ But it cannot, without express authority from the legislature, by ordinance surrender lo a private cor- poration its control of a public wharf for a fixed term, ner the right to regulate prices chargeable for such use.' A power to regulate them does not include the power to surrender con- trol of them.* Authority conferred by charter upon a city " to purchase and hold real, personal and mixed property, and to dispose of the same for the benefit of the city," is lim- ited to the purchase of such property as may be necessary for the purposes of the corporation, such as the house for the public offices and furniture to fit them up. It does not em^ brace power to subscribe for railway stocks or to any other work of internal improvement. To do this, special authority from the legislature is required." § 565. The same subject continued. — A municipal corpo- ration having, by its charter, an exclusive right to make wharves on the banks of a navigable river upon which it is situated, collect wharfage and regulate wharfage rates, can, consistently with the constitution of the United States, charge and collect from the owner of enrolled and licensed steam- boats, which move and land at a wharf constructed by it, wharfage proportioned to their tonnage.* ' Illinois &c. Canal Co. v. St Louis cannot abridge its own legislative (1873), 3 Dill. 70 ; Public Schools v. power." Risley, 40 Mo. 356 ; Schools v. Eisley, » City of "Wheeling v. Baltimore, 1 10 Wall. 91. Hughes, 90. * Illinois &c. Canal Co. u. St Louis « Packet Company v. Keokuk (187.7), (1872), 3 Dill. 70. 95 U. S. 80. The court said : — "It 3 Illinois &o. Canal Co. v. St Louis is a tax or duty that is prohibited (1873), 3 Dill. 70. [by the constitution] ; something im- ■• Illinois &e. Canal Co. v. St Louis posed by virtue of sovereignty, not (1873), 3 Dill. 70. See, also, Davis v. claimed in right of proprietorship. Mayor &c. of New York, 14 N. Y. 506, Wharfage is of the latter character; 533; Milhan v. Sharp, 37 N. Y. 611; Providing a wharf to which vessels Goslyn ■!;. Corporation of Georgetown, may make fast, or at which they 6 Wheat 593, 597, where, in the Ian- may conveniently load or unload,'is guage of Chief Justice Marshall, it is rendering them a service. The char' lield that a municipal " corporation acter of the servico is the same 580 BXPEESS COEPOEATE POWEES. [§ 566. § 566. Markets. — An ordinance prohibiting the keeping of a' private market within six blocks of a public market is a valid exercise of the power to " regulate " private markets.* The authority of a city to provide for the inspection and to regulate the sale of meats and other things does not give power to tax for revenue the occupation of selling them, but justifies such fees and charges as will cover the expense of in- spection and police supervision.* And under such authority a city may prohibit the sale of sufth articles except at markets duly established under its power to establish and regulate markets.' whether the wharf is built and of- fered for use by a State, a muniojpal corporatioD or a private individual ; and when compensation is demanded for the use of the wharf, the demand is an assertion, not of sovereignty, but of a right of property." Cf. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 WalL 577, where the court carefully guarded the right to exact wharfage. Any law or ordinance savoring of a tax on ton- nage, though ostensibly passed to col- lect wharfage, has been held prohib- ited. See, also, Northwestern Packet Co. V. St. Paul, 3 Dill. 454, where an ordinance imposing a wharfage tax each trip upon every boat and vessel loading or anchoring, etc., was held in conflict with the constitution and void. Nelson, J., said : — " It is not a charge for the use of a wharf, but for the privilege of arriving at and departing from the port." Steam- ship Company v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31, where the statute imposing a tax upon every ship entering the port was held to be void, as "a regu- lation of commerce and a duty of tonnage," — "a sovereign exaction, not a charge for compensation." Peete u Morgan, 19 Wall. 581. hold- ing a tax of the same character void. Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. City of Louisiana, 4 Dill. 17, n. ; Ken- nedy V. Corporation of Washington, 3 Cr. C. C. 595, where it was held that the making of rules for the reg- ulation of private wharves was dis- cretionary, and that the commission- ers could not be compelled to exercise the power. 1 Natal V. State, 139 U. S. 631 ; s. a, 11 S. Ct. Rep. 636 ; affirming 42 La. Ann. 613 ; s. C. 1 So. Rep. 923. The court said : — " By the law of Louisi- ana, as in States where the common law prevails, the regulation and con- trol of markets for the sale of pro- visions, including the places and the distances from each other at which they may be kept, are matters of mu- nicipal police, and may be intrusted by the legislature to a city council to be exercised as in its discretion the public health and convenience may require." Morans v. Mayor, 3 La. 217 ; First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann. 335 ; New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 La. Ann. 417 ; Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns. 419; Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 99; Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. 168 ; Commonwealth v. Rice, 9 Met. 353. 2 City of Jacksonville v. Ledwitb (Fla.), 7 So. Rep. 885. ' City of Jacksonville v, Ledwith (Fla.), 7 So. Rep. 885. § 567.] .EXPEESS OOEPOKATE P0WBE8. 581 § 567. The same subject continued.— A municipal corpo- ration has the power to contract with an individual, to au- thorize him to build a market-house, rent stalls and collect dues during a specified period, with the consideration that the land, which is his property, and the improvements upon it, shall be conveyed to the city, and that the same, at the ex- piration of the term, shall be turned over absolutely in good order to the corporation.^ An act which gives to cities power " to provide for and regulate the inspection of meats, poul- try," etc., and " to do all acts and make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease," does not confer power to establish a public slaughter-house for the purpose of securing proper in- spection of fresh meats.* Although under the special provis- ions of the statute, incorporated towns have power to prohibit slaughter-houses or any unwholesome business or establish- ment within the incorporation, and the common council by appropriate ordinance may regulate the location of any un- wholesome business, and may cleanse, abate or remove- the same.' The establishment and regulation of markets is the exercise of the police power of a city for the preservation of the health of its citizens.* But the legislature has not given to the city of New Orleans power to establish a market ba- zaar as distinguishable from a market.* Under a charter which confers authority upon a city " to regulate the erec- 1 State V. Natal (1889), 41 La. Ann. health did not enlarge the power 887 ; s. C, 6 So. -Rep. 723. The court conferred by the special provisions based this decision on the city's of the statute which followed it, and charter giving it all the power nee- the special powers conferred alone essary for a proper administration should be exercised. State v. Ferge- of a municipal government, and its son, 33 N. E. 427 ; 1 Dillon on Munic. recognized rights of establishing Corp. (2d ed.), § 250 ; City of Cairo w public markets. Morans v. Mayor, Bross, 101 IlL 475. 2 La. 217 ; Cougot v. New Orleans, 16 > Huesing v. City of Eock Island La. Ann. 21 ; Weymouth v. City, 40 (1889), 128 111. 465; S. C, 21 N. E.Eep; La. Ann. 844. 558. • Huesiilg tt City of Eock Island * New Orleans v. Morris, 3 Woods, (1889), 128 111. 465 ; S. C, 21 N. E. Eep. 103. 558, reversing s. c, 25 111. App. 600,— *New Orleans V. Morris, 3 Woods, the court holding that the general 103. provision as to the promotion of 582 EXPRESS COKPOEATE POWEES. £§ 568. tion, use and cdntinpance of market-houses," the city has power to pass an ordinance prohibiting the sale of fresh meats outside the market-house;' The exclusive police power over ishe whole suhject of slaughtering animsils within its corporate limits is delegated by the constitution of Louisiana ^ to the city of New Orleans, subject to no limitation except that im- posed by the article of the constitution itself.' § 568. Streets generally. — Lan'Hs used as a private cemetery may be seized by a city under authority to enter on and con- demn " any and all lands." * It would not have been author- ized to take lands previously taken and devoted to a public purpose.' The cemeteiy land was devoted to a private and not a public use.' The construction of a sewer in a public street, if done in a lawful manner, is authorized; sewerage being one of the legitimate uses to which public streets may be devoted.' The word " building," used in a statute author- izing cities to improve streets by "macadamizing, building," etc., includes " paving," and such cities are not thereby re- stricted to macadamizing their streets, but may pave them Wiith asphalt." The provisions of a city charter as to the re- moval of obstructions from its streets gave comprehensive powers of quasi-legislative character to the common council, and extended :to the cutting down and removal of shade trees Wihich had been igrowing on the sidewalks.' A city has inherent power to construct or reconstruct sewers of all 1 Ex parte Canto, 21 Tex. App.-61 ; *ln re Deansville Cemetery Ass'n, 8. t&, ■\T.-B. W. Rep. 155. 66 N. Y. 569. i*jGonst. La., art. .SiS, ifelates to '' Elater-u. City of Springfield (Ohio, Te£,u}a,tiog. Leaver, 62 Wis. 393; s. c, 29 N. W. Rep. 576. 1 Com. V. George (Pa., 1893), 34 Atl. Rep. 59. This act was not repealed by (P. L. Pa., 1891, 75) act of May 16, 1891, as there is nothing inconsistent with' the former act in its provisions. In In re Private Road in Borough of Huntingdon, Appeal of Huntingdon & B. T. R Co. (Pa., 1892), 24 Atl. Rep. 189, it was held that the act of April 3, 1851 (Brightly, Purd. Dig. Pa. 203 et seq.), giving boroughs power " to survey, lay out, enact and ordain such roads, streets, lanes, alleys, etc.," " as they may deem necessary," and all "needful jurisdiction over the same, has been held not to repeal, as to boroughs, the act of June, 1836 (Brightly, Purd. Dig. Pa. 1499), which authorizes courts of quarter sessions to lay out, upon the petition of one or more persons, " a road from their respective dwellings or plantations to a highway or place of necessary pub- lic resort, or to any private way lead- ing to a highway." 3 May 16, 1891, P. L. Pa. 75, in rela- tion to laying out, opening, etc., of streets, etc., in the several munici- palities of the commonwealtli. 'Appeal of Borough of Hanover (Pa., 1893), 34 Atl. Rep. 669, holding the act of April 3, 1851 (P. L. 320), which authorizes borough councils of their own motion to pass ordinances for widening streets, to be unrepealed ; following Hand v. Fellows (Pa.), 23 Atl. Rep. 1126 ; McCall v. Coates, (Pa.), 33 Atl. Rep. 1137. The court said : — " In the task of steering through con- stitutional restrictions, well meant, but destructive of necessary govern- mental powers, the legislature had found it difficult to construct statutes conferring powers and modes of pro- cedure suitable to all the diverse needs, situations and wishes of the multitude of municipal organiza- tions in the State. In the efifort some well intended acts had come to naught, and others had been shorn of sections that left inconvenient gaps here and there in the whole system. It was to fill these gaps, to support the casus oniissi, and to sup- plement powers doubtful or defect- ive, that the act of 1891 was passed. It took away no power in any mu- nicipality that existed before nor interfered with any mode of its ex- ercise, except where there is an irre- concilable repugnancy." 584 EXPEESS OOBPOEATE POWERS. [§ 570. under the former statute remained, but the proceedings to carry out the improvement might be under the later stat- ute.* Where a city charter requires the board of public works to preSpare a general plan of laying out into streets and alleys all of the city not already laid out, a provision that " no pri- vate plan shall be allowed . . . which does not conform thereto, and no plat shall hereafter be recorded, or be of any validity, unless before such record the approval of such board shall be duly indorsed thereon," ^idoes not empower the board .to refuse to approve a plat without a dedication by the owner of the land platted of a portion of his land for the extension of certain streets.^ And where the plat does not interfere with the general plan established for streets, a writ of mandamus will be granted on petition of such owner, compelling the board to indorse its approval.' An act providing for the con- sent of the municipal authorities as a condition precedent to the incorporation of a company to supply the city with water was construed to require a consent to the formation of a com- pany by the very persons and in the manner proposed. The consent could be given by ordinance and might be wholly refused, but would be defective if given in general terms,* and permission might be granted to more than one company.* § 670. Protection of streets. — The council of the city of Kingston had the authority, under the provisions of its char- ter giving the council powers of commissioners of highways, " to lay out, make and open streets . . . and cause the same to be repaired ; ... to cause any street ... to 1 Appeal of Borough of Hanover » Atlantic City Water Co. v. Con- (Pa., 1893), 34 AtL Rep. 669. sumers' Water Co., 51 N. J. L. 430; *Van Husan v. Hearaes (Mich., s. C, 17 Atl. Eep. 834 See, also, 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 18. The court Charles River Bridge v. Warren said : — " The power conferred goes Bridge, 11 Pet 430 ; Mohawk Bridge no further than to prevent land-own- Co. v. Utica & Schenectady Bridge ers from laying out streets contrary Co., 6 Paige, 554 ; Bridge Co. v. Ho- to the general plan." hoken Land & Improvement Co., 2 'Van Husan v. Heames (Mich., Beas, 81 ; Delaware & Raritan Canal 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 18. Co. v. Raritan & Delaware Bay R. < State V. City of Plainfield (N. J., Co., 1 G E. Green, 331. 1893), 34 Atl. Rep. 493. § 570.] EXPEESS OOEPOEATB POWEES. 585 be graded, paved or repaired ; " to pi-escribe " of what mate- rials " the same shall consist, and its power to pass ordinances for the purpose of executing the foregoing and other powers conferred upon it, authorize4 an ordinance prohibiting any person from drawing a load weighing from two and one-half to five tons over any paved street of a city.^ Under a power to make ordinances to prevent encroachments on and obstruc- tions to the city streets and to regulate the use of streets and sidewalks for signs, awnings and other purposes, the council may by ordinance authorize the erection and maintenance of awnings over the sidewalks.^ An ordinance which purports to grant permission to erect poles and stretch wires in a public street as a part of a system of electrical railroading is illegal.' The laying out of drives, etc., along any beach within a city's limits, which is flowed by ocean tides, whether a beach of the ocean proper or of an outlet, is authorized by a statute pro- viding that cities located on " or " near the ocean, and em- bracing within their • limits any " beach " or ocean front, to lay out streets, drives or walks " along the beach or ocean front." * A common council has no power or authority to au- thorize the permanent possession of a public highway, street or alley for private purposes.* The court said : — " The erec- tion of a structure of the character and permanency described in the complaint, for purely private purposes, upon or across the public streets, alleys, highways or wharves of a city, is unlawful, and such as the common council cannot authorize and should not tolerate. Where a street or other public way is used for public purposes, such as for street railways or other improved methods of travel, the common councils 1 Peoples tt Wilson, 16 N. Y. Supp. 'State v. Inhabitants of Trenton 683. (N. J.), 23 Atl. Rep. 281 ; State v. City 2 Hoey V. Gilroy, 129 N. T. 132 ; a C, of Newark (N. J.), 23 Atl. Rep. 284. 29 N. E. Rep. 85, reversing 14 N. Y. * State v. Wright (N. J.), 23 Atl. Rep. Supp. 159. It is not authorized by 116. Supp. Rev. N. J. 869, § 30, which em- « Adams v. Ohio Falls Car Ca powers street railways, with the con- (Ind., 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 57. Cf. sect of municipal authorities, to use State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185; Sims electric or chemical motors or grip v. City of Frankfort, 79 Ind. 446 ; EI- cables as the propelling power of its liott, Roads & Streets, 490 ; Pettis v. cars instead of horses. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139, 586 EXPEESS COBPOEATE POWEEB. [§ 571. have authority to permit permanent structures to be placed on the streets, but they have no such power when the pur- pose is strictly private and the public in no manner served." ^ § 571. Grading of streets. — An act authorizing a city council to fix the district benefited by a local improvement and to apportion and assess the benefits is not open to the objection that it confers an arbitrary power on the council.^ This form of taxation has beeft repeatedly held valid and the discretionary power is properly lodged in the council.' Where in the exercise of its power a city has changed the grade in a street to the damage of the property upon which it abuts, on a trial of an appeal by the owner from the assessment of damages the city should not be allowed to plead irregulari- ties in its proceedings to defeat the owner's claim for fair damages.* A city council having general authority to estab- lish the grades of streets may, under peculiar circumstances, fix the grade for one side of a street on a materially different level or plane from that of the other side; and if this ren- ders it incidentally necessary to construct a retaining wall along the center of the street, to support the earth on the higher grade, that may be done. Such an exercise of public rights is not an infringement of the rights of an adjacent proprietor whose property may be injured thereby.' A-right to lay pipes in the streets of a city is subordinate to the power of the city to establish grades and grade the streets.* A statute conferring upon cities the power to change grades of streets, whereby railroads entering said cities may relo- 1 Adams v. Ohio Falls Co. (Ind, Soa&c. v. City of Omaha (Neb., 1892), 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 57. For illustra- 53 N. W. Itep. 829. tion of this distinctioii, see Mikesell ^ Yanist v. City of St Paul (Minn., V. Durkee, 31 Kan. 509; s. C, 9 Pac. 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 925. See, also. Rep. 378. O'Brien v. City of St Paul, 25 Minn. s Beecher v. City of Detroit (Mich., 831, 834 ; Henderson v. City of Min- 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 781. neapoUs, 33 Minn. 319 ; fi. C, 20 N. W. ' Beecher v. City of Detroit (Mich., Rep. 323. 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 731. See, also, » Still skater Water Co. v. City of City of Detroit v. Daly, 68 Mich. Stillwater (Minn., 1892), 532f.W. Rep. 509 ; S. 0., 37 N. W. Rep. 11. 893. * Second Congregational Church § 572.] EXPRESS COBPOEATE POWERS. 687 cate, change or elevate their railroads, has been held not to be limited to railroads in existence at the time of the passage of the act.' But under that act a change of grade must be confined to saoh limits as are necessary for the accomplishment of its purpose.* § 572. Allowing the use of streets by railroads. — A city council has no power to condemn land for a street for the ex- press purpose of giving a railroad company the use of a street ; in such manner as to exclude all other travel therefrom.' The power conferred on the common council by the charter of Buffalo * " to permit the track of a railroad to be laid in, along or across any street or public ground " is subject to the qualification that no property rights of abutting owners are thereby invaded, even incases where the city has acquired the fee of the street in which it authorizes such track to be laid.' The laws of Kentucky allow municipal corporations to grant rights of way over the public streets and alleys only on condi- tion that the use of the easement shall not obstruct or " un- reasonably " impede the passage of persons or vehicles. It has been held that the fact that while cars are passing along a railroad laid in a public alley, four hundred feet long and sixteen feet wide, the passage of vehicles drawn by horses is totally prevented, though for only a few minutes at a time, renders the use of the alley by the railroad company an " un- reasonable " obstruction.' 1 state V. City of Bayonne (N. J.), Co. v. City of Louisville, 8 Bush, 23 Atl. Bep. 648. 4:19. 2 State V. City of Bayonne (N. J.), assing by a way left ! State V. Inhabitants of Trenton open for them by the owner, or might (N. J.), 30 AtL Rep. 1076, See, also, frighten horses attached to vehicles § 580, supra. diven along the streets, would be suf- 3 State V. Moore, 104 N. C. 714 ; ficient to warrant the enactment un- State v: Pendergrass, 106 N. C. 664. der the general authority to prohibit estate V. Summerfleld, 107 N. C. nuisances, protect health and pre- 895 ; S. C, 13 S. E. Eep. 114. The court vent individuals from so using their said : — " The fact that produce, mer- own property as to subject others to cliandise, meats, etc., exposed in serious and unnecessary inconven- front of stores might, in the opinion ience or danger. See, also, State v. of the commissioners, based on rea- Stovall, 103 N. C. 416 ; Intendant t>. sonable grounds, endanger the health Sorrell, 1 Jones, 49 ; Cooley Const, of the citizens of the town or incom- Lim., *58. § 583.] EXPRESS COEPOEATE F0WBE3. 599 government and welfare of the city and its - trade and com- merce " authorizes the enactment of an ordinance regulating the sale of cider by prohibiting such sales in less quantities than a gallon, and forbidding it to be drntik on the premises.' Neither was such ordinance unconstitutional as violating pri- vate rights or unreasonably or improperly restraining trade.' The general welfare clause has been held to confer power uvon a city conncil to prohibit the keeping open of stores, shops and other places of business on Sunday.' Under it an ordinance to prevent the keeping of a, bawdy-house has been held valid ; * also an ordinance prohibiting saloons, restaurants and other places of public fentertainment being kept open after 10 o'clock at night.* So under it a municipality may fix the time or places of holding public markets for the sale of food.* The establishment of a by-law imposing a penalty for mutilat- ing any ornamental tree planted in any of the streets or public places of a city has been held within the authority to pass such ordinances as " shall be needful to the good order of the city." ' Under the power to make regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease an incorporated city has the right to require sellers of meats to take out licenses.^ • Monroe u City of Lawrence (1890), 'City of St Louis v. Cafferata» 24 44 Kan. 607; S. C., 24 PacEep. Mo. 94. 1113. Thecourtsaid:— "Instead of « The State v. Williams, 11 S.G 288. specifically defining every regulation SThe State v. Freeman, 38 N. E. which might be necessary to the 426. health, safety, peace and convenience 'Wartman v. City of Philadelphia, of the public, the legislature enacted 33 Pa. St 202. the general welfare clause; and it 'State «. Merrill, 37 Me. 329. seems to us that it furnishes suflS- * Kinsley v; City of Chicago, 124 IlL cient authority for the council to 359. See, also, Williams v. Augusta, pass an ordinance so clearly in the 4 Ga. 509 ; Matter of Yick Wo, 68 Cal. interest of peace, good order and 294; St Louis v. Schoenbusch, 95 health as the one in question." Mo. 618 ; Mayor v. Williams, 15 N. Y. 3Monroe5ii.Cityof'Lawfence(1890),. 502; State) v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215; 44 Kan. 607; s. a, 24 Pac. Rep. 1113. Commonwealth v. McCafferty, 145 See, also, Powell v. Commonwealth, Mass. 384; s. c, 14 N. E. Hep. 453; 127 U. 8. 678; Stokes v. City of New Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass. York, 14 Wend. 88 ; Mobile v. Yuille, 485 ; s. C., 4 N. E. Rep. 577 ; Dillon on 80 Ala. 137; State v. Campbell, 13 Muniu Corp. (4th ed.), §§ 396-407. AtL Rep. 585 and note. 600 EXPEESS COEPOEATE P0WEE8. [§§ 584r, 585. § 684. To license. — A contract between a council and a corporation for the extension of pipes into the municipal terri- tory from a neighboring city, which leaves for an indefinite period to other parties the regulation of the price to be paid or the quantity or quality of gas to be furnished, and which confers exclusive rights, has been held to be unauthorized, under a statute which prohibits the granting of exclusive privileges.' The general legislation of 1887 in Minnesota, reg- ulating the sale of intoxicating^iquors, although applicable to cities, has been held not to have had the effect of repealing by implication existing municipal ordinances upon the subject, or the charter power to enact ordinances not inconsistent with the general law.* An act giving a city power to assess a license tax upon all persons carrying on " any business, trade or pro- fession " within the city authorizes the assessment of a tax for retailing cigars, although the cigars are sold in connection with a grocery business and the grocer has taken out a general license for such business.' A city ocdinance declaring it a misdemeanor punishable by fine to keep stallions, etc., within the city limits for service has been held invalid.* The board of county supervisors has authority to appoint a license col- lector under a valid ordinance referring to the selling of liq- uor at retail.* § 685. Occupations. — A power to license and regulate hack owners and drivers, and to prohibit unlicensed persons and vehi- I Cincinnati Gas Light Ca». Avon- Minn. 418; S. G, 45 N. W. Eep. dale (1885), 43 Ohio St 257. 719. 2 State V. HarrU (Minn., 1893). 52 'City of Mobile v. Craft (Ala.), 10 N. W. Kep. 387. Thecourt said, in So. Rep. 534. additiop to " repeals by iaiplication '' *Ex parte Robinson (Tex.), 17 S. W. not being " favored : " — "Thisprincl- Rep. 1057, as such keeping was pie has peculiar force from the fact not a nuisance per se and its prohibi- that the laws, the implied repeal of tion not authorized either by Revised which is in question, were principally Statutes of Texas, articles 403, 408, special laws, enacted to meet the empowering cities to abate nuisances, needs of particular localities, while or by article 383, empowering cities the repealing act was general, and to "regulale" occupations and call- not thus particular." See, also, ings. Moore v. City of Minneapolis, 43 > Amador County v. Kennedy, 70 CaL 458; s, c., 11 Pac. Rep. 75a §'586.] BXPEE9S COEPOEATE POWEES. 601 cles from engaging in such capacities warrants the imposition of a reasonable pecuniary penalty for a violation of an ordi- nance requiring such a license.' A similar power in a charter extending to public grounds and spaces has been held to au- thorize the enactment of an ordinance forbidding farmers, hacksters, peddlers, etc., from standiiig with their vehicles and carts on the streets adjacent to the city market, within five hundred feet of such market.^ But provisions conferring pow- «rs to license persons in such lines of business have been held to apply only to those who are engaged in business as carriers of persons or property for hire, and not to those who, not being engaged in such business, merely hire out teams and vehicles to those who have property to transport, the hirer himself using and controlling the team and vehicle.' Under a power granted to a city to regulate hackmen, porters, etc., a city may by ordinance prohibit their soliciting custom at the depot or on the platform of any railroad within its corporate lim- its.* § 586. The same subject continued. — An ordinance re- quiring pawnbrokers to take out licences is not authorized by a statute empowering the council to pass ordinances not inconsistent with the laws of the State and necessary to carry out the objects of the corporation.' But all the authorities agree that the business of the pawnbroker is a proper matter for regulation by the police power." Under it, a city council may forbid the keeping or storing of petroleum, naphtha, ben- zine, gasoline, or any inflammable or explosive oils, within the corporate limits in quantities greater than five barrels at a time, iHaynesu. City of Cape May (1889), exact that they should take out a 53 N. J. Law, 180 ; s. a, 19 Atl. Rep. license must be expressly conferred 176. by statute ; it not being unlawful to 2 People V. Keir, 78 Mich. 98 ; s. C, conduct such business, and there r43.N. W. Rep. 1039. being no power to prohibit it in the ' State V. Robinson (1889), 43 Minn, council, they could not require of 107. him a license as a condition prece- * City of Chillicothe v. Brown dent to carrying on the business. (1889), 38 Mo. App. 609. 6 Shuman v. The City of Fort sShuman v. City of Fort Wayne Wayne (1890), 137 Ind. 109;s. C, 30 (1890), 137 Ind. 109 ; s. c, 36 N. E. N. E. Rep. 5c J. See, also, Van Baalen Bep. 560, the court putting the ruling v. People, 40 Mich. 358 ; Launder v. upon the principle that the right to City of Chicago, 111 UL 391. 602 EXPEESS COEPOEATB POWEES. [§ 687. except by permission as in the ordinance provided.' /. statute empowering city councils to regulate the use of the public streets does not authorize an ordinance that no processions shall be allowed upon the streets until a permit shall be ob- tained from the superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such permits to his discretion, since the power conferred upon the council cfmnot be delegated by them.* Nor was such an ordinance authorized by the grant of power in the general incorporation act " to regulate and prohibit the exhibition or carrying of banners ; ... to declare what shall be a nui- sance and abate the same ; ... to prevent and suppress riots, routs, afErays, noises, disturbance, disorderly assemblies in any public or private place.' An incorporated town has power, under a statute authorizing it "to provide for the measuring or weighing of hay, coal," etc., to grant to indi- vidual dealers the right to set scales in the public streets in front of their places of business in such a way as not to be an obstruction to travel.* In Iowa the board of supervisors may employ counsel to institute an action in behalf of the county, and their right to do so is not dependent on the consent of the county attorney." County supervisors in Michigan have no authority, by resolution, to vote the sheriff a salary in lieu of all statutory fees for services rendered the county, and in- clude such salary in the yearly tax levy.' § 587. Public offenses. — An ordinance imposing a fine of $25 for the use of " any abusive or indecent language, curs- • City of Richmond v. Dudley (1891), State v. Mahner (La.), 9 So. Eep. 480 ; 139 Ind. 112; S. C., 26 N. E. Eep. City of Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. 184 The court said : — " The danger 598. to be apprehended to life and prop- ' Trotter v. City of Chicago, 33 IlL erty from the storing of inflamma- App. 206, affirmed in 26 N. E. Rep. ble or explosive substances in large 359. See, also. Matter of Frazee, 63 quantities within the limits of a city Mich. 396 ; Anderson v. City of Well- is so great as to invite legislative ington, 40 Kan. 173. control of the same by the city gov- * Incorporated Town of Spencer v. ernment." Andrew (Iowa), 47 N. W. Rep. 10D7. 2 City of Chicago v. Trotter (111.), 26 » Taylor County v. Standley (Iowa), N. E. Rep. 359. See, also. Bills v. City 44 N. W. Rep. 911, of Goshen. 117 Ind. 221 ; Mayor v. « Hewitt v. White (Mich.), 43 N. W. Eadeoke, 49 Md. 217 ; Barthet v. City Rep. 1043. of New Orleans, 24 Fed. Rep. 563; § 588,] BXPEESS COEPOBATE FOWEES, 603 ing, swearing, or any loud or boisterous talking, holloaing, or any other disorderly conduct," is reasonable and authorized under a statutory power to abate nuisances.' But the same provision would not authorize an ordinance making it an offense for the occupant or owner of any room to suffer or al- low prostitution therein, or males and females to cohabit therein without being lawfully married.^ Authority to suppress bawdy-houses does not include power to provide by ordinance that " circumstances from which it may reasonably be inferred that any house is frequented by disorderly persons or persons of notoriously bad character shall be sufficient to establish that such house is a disorderly house or house of ill-fame." ' An ordinance making a mere private trespass on land penal is not authorized by a statute which confers on the common council authority to " declare what shall be considered nuisances in the . . . lots and places in said borough and remove all obstructions," etc.* § 688. The same snbject continned. — Ordinances prohit»it- ing the carrying of concealed weapons, disturbing the peace and selling liquor on Sunday are not " inconsistent with the laws of the State," although the prohibited acts are made offenses by general statute.* Authority given to a city " to 1 state V. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. 789 ; cities not inconsistent with the laws a a, 13 S. E. Rep. 426. See, also, of the State, to suppress disorderly State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883 ; State v. conduct, provide for the safety, pre- McNinch. 87 N. C. 567 ; State v. Mer- serve the health, promote the pros- ritt, 83 N. C. 677. perity, and improve the morals, 2 State V. Webber, 107 N. C. 962 ; order, comfort and convenience of a C, 13 S. E. Rep. 598. the corporation and its inhabitants. 'State V. Webber, 107 N. C. 963; Town of Van Buren v. Wells (1890), a a, 13 S. E. Rep. 598. The court 53 Ark. 368; 14 S. W. Rep. 88. The said this would be prescribing new court said: — "The only limitation rules of evidence. See, also, City of upon this power is that the by-laws Charlton v. Barker, 54 Iowa, 360 ; and ordinances must ' not be incon- Dorst V. People. 51 III. 386; City of sistent with the laws of the State.' The Mt Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399 ; ordinances in question do not fall Wood on Nuisances, g§ 740, 741 ; 1 within the limitation, and are whole- Dillon on Munic. Corp., §§ 309, 310. some provisions for the prosecution * Bregguglia v. Lord (N. J.), 80 Atl. [promotion?] and improvement of the Rep. 1082. order and morals of the inhabitants 6 Mansf. Dig. Ark., § 764, which au- for whose benefit they were designed, thorizes the passage of ordinances by and a proper exercise of the power 604 EZPBEBS OOBFOSATE FOWEBS. [§ 589. prevent and restrain disturbances" does not include the right to take jurisdiction and punish for the crime of an assault with a dangerous weapon.^ The power given a city council to re- strain and prohibit all descriptions of gambling and fraudu- lent devices and practices authorizes an ordinance prohibiting the keeping or setting up of any gambling device designed, to be used in gambling, and imposing a penalty for its violation.^ § 589. Nuisances. — Under a power in a charter to define and abate nuisances a city was held authorized to declare by or- dinance the running at large of domestic animals a nuisance;* and this power was not abrogated by a statute providing that it should be lawful for • stock to run at large where the inhabitants of the county adopted the stock law, which was done in the county where the city was situated. Under au- thority to maintain the public health and to suppress all nui- sances the city of New Orleans has been held empowered to 351 ; Williams v. Warsaw, fiO Ind. 457 ; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331 ; Wayne County v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 399; State ■». Oleson, 36 Minn. 507; State V. Lee, 39 Minn. 445 ; Linneus V. Duskey, 19 Mo. App. 20 ; City of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588 ; Ex parte HoUwedell, 74 Mo. 395 ; St. Louis v. Vert, 84 Mo. 304 ; Ho))ve v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 37 N. J. Law. 145 ; State V. Bergman, 6 Or. 341 ; Greenwood v. State, 6 Bax. 567; State v. Shelby, 16 Lea, 340; United States v. Holly, 8 Cr. G. C. 656. On similar principle. Fox V. State of Ohio, 5 How. 432; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 19; Briz- zolari v. State, 37 Ark. 364; Bishop on Statutory Crimes (Ist ed.), § 38. 1 Walsh V. City of Union (1886), 13 Or. 589; S. C, 11 Pae. Rep. 318. estate V. Grimes (Minn., 1893), 52 N. W. Rep. 43, holding a "stock clock" under the evidence to be a gambling device. 8 City of Quincy v. O'Brien (1886), 34 111. App. 591. See, also, Roberts v. Ogle, 30 m. 459; Seely v. Peters, 5 Gilm. 130. conferred." See, also. Mayor v. Al- laire, 14 Ala. 400; Bloomfield v. Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399; St Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61 ; St Louis v. Cafifer- ata, 34 Mo. 94 ; State v. Williams, 11 S. C. 388 ; Hamilton v. State, 3 Tex. App. 643; McLaughlin v. Stephens, 3 Cr. C. C. 148 ; United States v. Wells, 3 Cr. C. C. 43; City of St Louis v. Schoenbush, 95 Mo. 618; s. c, 8 S. W. Rep. 791 ; State v. Beattie, 16 Mo. App. 143 ; Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101. The court further approved the doctrine laid down by Judge Cooley that " an act may be a penal offense under the laws of the State, and further penalties, under proper legislative authority, be imposed for its commission by municipal by- laws, and the enforcement of the one would not preclude the enforcement of the other," of which the author says : — " Such is the clear weight of authority, though the decisions are not uniform." Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.), p. 339 ; Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 536 ; Wragg v. Penn Township, 94 UL 11 ; Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind. § 590.] EXPEESS CORPORATE POWERS. 605 pass an ordinance prohibiting smoking in street cars under penalty of fine and imprisonment.' A provision in the charter of a city empowering the mayor and council to abate nui- sances public and private, and to pass all ordinances they may deem necessary for preserving the good order and good gov- ernment of the city, confers on them by necessary implication authority to establish fire limits.^ But a city has no authority to pass an ordinance imposing a fine for the maintenance of a nuisance under a statute providing that incorporated towns shall have power to prevent injury or annoyance from any- thing dangerous, offensive or unhealthy, and t^ cause any nuisance to be abated.' § 690. Holidays^ etc. — It was held that a statute author- izing a " town " to raise money by taxation " for the purpose of celebrating any centennial anniversary of its incorporation " referred to the act which was the beginning of its corporate existence, whether as a district or as a town.'' A city council may appropriate money for public concerts by a band under a statute authorizing the city council ^of the city in a man- ner specified to appropriate money, not exceeding a certain amount, for armories, for the celebration of holidays, " and for other purposes."* 1 State V. Heidenhain (1890), 42 La. R. Co. (Iowa), 50 N. W. Rep. 61. In Ann. 483; S. C., 7 So. Rep. 631. The Burdette v. Allen (West Va.), 13 S. E. court said : — " The city council of Rep. 1013, it was held that under code New Orleans is to a hmiled extent (W. Va.), ch. 47, § 28, empowering clothed with legislative authority and the council of a city to prevent cattle it is vested with that discretion from going at large in the city, and within its powers common to all leg- section 29, empowering the passage of , ialative bodies. Within the exercise needful ordinances and prescriptions of this legislative discretion it has the of tines and penalties to carry the first authority to determine what is anni- grant of power in to effect, the council sance and to enact the necessary or- could provide for the taking up and dinances to suppress it." See, also, impounding of cattle found running Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. Ann. 337 ; at large in the public streets, and for City of Monroe v. Gerspach, 33 La. selling them to pay charges. Ann. toil. * Hill v. . Easthampton (1886), 140 2 Ford V. Thrailkill (1890), 84 Ga. 69 ; Mass. 381. S. C, 10 S. E. Rep. 600. Under " such ' Hubbard v. Taunton, (1886), 140 general welfare " clauses, said the Mass. 467. The court said :— " The court word " other " implies that the oele- ' City of Knoxville v. Chicago &c. bration of holidays is a public pur- 606 BXPEESS COEPORATE POWEES. [§ 591. § 591. Miscellaneoas. — Under the power to " regulate " a city council may prohibit " the burial of the dead " within the city limits.' A city charter authorizing the city " to erect, repair and regulate public wharves and docks, and fix the rates of wharfage thereat," has been held not to give the city power to create a harbor or to improve one by obtaining an increased supply of water.* The power to fill up slips is not given to cities by an act authorizing cities to construct and keep in repair canals and slips for the accommodation of com- merce.' County commissioners are not empowered to order- the payment of attorney's fees for services rendered to the petitioners for gravel roads under a statute which provided that " the cost and expense of the preliminary survey, pro- ceedings and report of the improvement shall be paid out of the county treasury, and be refunded, as well as all other amounts advanced by the county for the preliminary expense of such improvement." * Although the statute provides for the election of a city attorney, the mayor and council of a municipal corporation may employ counsel to commence and prosecute suits for violations of city ordinances in case of va- cancy in the ofiice of city attorney.* pose within the meaning cf the act, ^ Spenglei- v. Trowbridge (1834), 62 and indicates that purposes which are Miss. 46, where it was held, that the public only in that sense are included payment from the city treasury of within its scope ; although they look money for expenses of persons to go rather more obviously to increasing to Washington city to influence con- the picturesqueness and interest of gressional action to that end should life than to the satisfaction of rudi- have been enjoined, mentary wants, which alone we gen- ' Ligare v. City of Chicago (111.), 28 erdlly recognize as necessaiy." N. E. Rep. 934. I People V. Pratt, 139 N. Y., 68 ; S. C, * Board of Commissioners of Rugh 39 N. K Rep. 7. See, also, Cronin v. Co. v. Cole (Ind.), 38 N. E. Eep. 773. People, 83 N.Y. 318; Brick Presbyte- 'City of Roodhouse v. Jennings rian Church v. Mayor &c., 5 Cow. (1887), 89 lU. App^ 50, 538; Coates v. Mayor &c., 7 Cow. 585 ; In re Ryers, 73 N. Y. 1. CHAPTEE XVl. ULTRA VIREa 693, General statement of the rule. 593. Purchase of land for use of a railroad. 594. Illustrations of the general rule. 595. Grant of power to regulate highways construed. 596. Contracts for exclusive privi- leges in highways. 597. Strictly official duties not to be confided to non-official per- sons. 598. Police ordinances — Wooden buildings. 599. The same subject continued — Railroad crossings. 600. The same subject continued — Markets, etc. 601. Donations. 602. The same subject continued. 603. Subscription to stock of rail- roads. 604 City council as judge of elec- tions. 605. Governing authorities of school districts. 606. The same subject continued. 607. Purchase of real estate for school purposes — Texas rul- ing. 608. Condemnation of land outside of territorial limits. 609. Diversion of lands dedicated to public uses. 610. Sale of real estate — Prescribed mode controls. 611. Appropriations for highways and school buildings. § 613. Power to purchase really doe* not authorize giving notes. 613. Work on public buildings, etc. 614. Issuing of bonda 615. The same subject continued — Municipal aid. 616. The same subject continued — Public improvements. 617. Contracts abrogating control of streets. 618. General legislation — OflEersof rewards, 619. Contracts for water supply. 630. The same subject continued. 631. Contracts for lighting streets. 633. Grant of exclusive privileges. 633. Curative legislation. 634. Ratification. 625. Estoppel. 626. Purchasers of bonds are bound to take notica 627. Corporations may contest ul- tra vires contracts. 628. Liability upon ultra vires con- tracts. 639. The same subject continued. 630. Ultra vires, when not a de- fense to actions by the cor- poration. 631. Tax-payers' resistance, 633. Tax-payers' suits. 633. The same subject continued. 634. Suits to restrain the enforce- ment of contracts. 635. Injunction the proper rem- edy. 636. The same subject continued. § 592. General statement of the rule. — Acts of municipal corporations which are dene without power expressly granted, 608 ULTEA VIEES. [§ 592. or fairly to be implied from the powers granted or incident to the purposes of their creation, are ultra vires. So, also, acts of the officers of such corporations which are done without the prescribed preliminaries to action, which are conditions precedent to their being authorized. So, also, are the acts which are specially prohibited to them by statute, or where for special reasons the power to do such acts in general is withdrawn from them in particular instances. It was held that there was no power in a. city council to authorize one whose term as mayor had expired to sign bonds as of a date durins: his term of office.* 1 Coler V. Cleburne (1889), 131 U. S. 162; s. G, 9 a Ct Rep. 720. The statute provided that the bonds should be signed by the mayor. " This clearly means that they shall be signed by the person who is mayor of the city when they are signed, and not by any other person," said Jus- tice Blatchford. In State v. Mayor &a of Jersey City (N. J.. 1892), 24 Atl. Rep. 571, it was held that a reso- lution of the board of aldermen to publish, under a statute requiring it, the names, residences and places of business of persons applying for li- censes to sell liquors, in a German newspaper, was void. The presump- tions in such a case, where there is no express intimation in the statute as to the language in which the notice is to be given or the newspaper is to be printed, that the legislature de- signed the notice is to be published in the same language as the news- paper itself (see State v. Mayor &c. (N. J.), 22 Atl. Rep. 1004), and that the notice was to be given in the or- dinary language of the State (see Road in Upper Hanover, 44 Pa. Sfe 277), arise and require the notice to be given in English, in a newspaper printed in the same tongue. The court also sustained a tax-payer's right to intervene by certiorari to •prevent this as an illegal expenditure of municipal funds, deflciencies in which must be made up by general taxation. In Citizens' Gas and Min- ing Co. V. Town of Elwood (1887). 114 Ind. 332; a c, 16 N. E. Rep. 624,' it was held that the Indiana act of 1887, page 36, with reference to nat- ural-gas companies, forbade the grant of special privileges by special con- tract or license to any company; and that under the rules of common law as well as under the provisions of the statute, the subject of supply- ing towns and cities with natural gas must be regulated by a general ordi- nance, and that the ordinance must not unfairly discriminate between competing con)panies. The ordi- nance must be general in its nature and impartial in its operation. See, also, Graffty v. City of Rushvllle, 107 Ind. 502; White v. Mayor, 2 Swan. 364 ; City of Chicago v. Rumpfif, 4,1 IlL 90 ; Tugman v. City of Chicago, 78 111. 405; Ex parte Frank, 52 C*l. 606; 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp. 323. In State v. Baxter (1887). 50 Ark. 447 ; S. C, 8 S. W. Rep. 188, it was held that under Mansfield's Digest of Ar- kansas, section 1407, allowing county courts to dispose of real and personal property belonging to the county and appropriate the proceeds to the county's use, such courts are trustees of the county ; and where it appears that land donated by congress tQ a county for public buildings was § 693.] ULTBA TIBE3. 609 § 593. Purchase of land for use of a railroad. — The pur- chase of land by a town for the use of a railroad for right of way, though ostensibly for a public street, is ult/ra vires, and the purchase price cannot be collected by one having knowl- edge of the facts and aiding in the transaction.^ leased by such court for ninety-nine years, without regard to the statute requiring that sales of county lands should be by a commissioner ap- pointed by the county court, and without advertising that the land was to be leased to persons paying an inadequate consideration therefor, such lease may be set aside by the county on the ground of fraud. See, also, Andrews v. Piatt, 44 CaL 317 ; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet 729. iStrahan u Town of Malvern (1889), 77 Iowa, 454; s. C, 43 N. W. Eep. 369. In Huesing v. City of Eock Island (1889), 128 111. 465; S. a, 31 N. E. Eep. 558, It was held that while under paragraphs 83 and 84 of sec- tion 1, article 5, of the general incor- poration law of Illinois, there was conferred upon cities and villages power to prohibit slaughter-houses or any unwholesome business or es- tablishments within the incorpora- tion, and the common council may regulate by appropriate ordinance the loQation of unwholesome busi- ness, and may cleanse, abate or re- move the same, this power did not authorize appropriating public funds for the erection and maintenance of a public slaughter-house. In City of StL Louis V. Bell Telephone Co. (1888), 96 Mo. 623; S. C, 10 S. W. Eep. 197, it was held that the power to regu- late charges for telephone service was neither included in nor inci- dental to the power to regulate the uses of the streets; and that while the city, under that provision of its charter which gave the mayor and assembly power to license, tax and 39 regulate "telegraph companies as corporations, etc and all other business, trades, avocations or professions whatever," had the power to make police regulations as to the mode in which the business of tele- phone companies shall be exercised, it did not derive therefrom any power to pass the ordinance regulat- ing charges for the service; nor could it do the same under the gen- eral welfare clause of its charter as to maintaining peace, good government, health or welfare of the city. See, also, St Louis v. McLaughlin, 49 Mo. 563 ; City of St Louis v. Herthel, 88 Mo. 128. In Tilyon v. Town of Gravesend (1887), 104 N. Y. 356; S. C 10 N. K Eep. 542, 543, it was shown that a resolution was passed at a town meeting providing that the common lands of the town should be let only at public auction after notice, and that no lot should be let at a time more than one year prior to the ex- piration of any existing lease thereon, and provided for compensation to be made by incoming to outgoing ten- ants in case a lot previously under lease should be let to another than the former lessee. A later resolu- tion amended the former one by adding thereto that the commission- ers were " also authorized to renew any existing lease . . . upon terms as they may deem most advanta- geous for said town." It was held that the amendment did not authorize the renewal of a lease before the last year of the unexpired lease. In Mill- saps t>. Monroe (1885), 37 La. Ann. 641, it was held that in the absence of 61 '^ ULTRA VIEE?. [§^94. § 594. Illustrations of the general rule. — In Ohio a mu- nicipal corporation has no power to borrow money except in conformity with the statute which provides that " all bonds issued under authority of this chapter shall express upon their face the purpose for which they were issued and under what ordinance," and that such bonds shall be advertised and sold at auction to the highest bidder. Therefore a contract by a city- to levy an assessment to repay money advanced Toy an in- dividual has been held to be voiA' A municipal corporation organized under the general statutes of Alabama has been held not liable in an action against it for services rendered as cap- tain of a quarantine guard under a contract made with the intendant.' A municipal corporation cannot any more than any other corporation or private person escape the taxes due on its property, whether acquired legally or illegally, and it cannot make its want of legal authority to engage in a par- ticular transaction or business a shelter from the taxation imposed by the government on such business or transaction by whomsoever conducted.' In New Hampshire it has been held that as a town has possession of the volumes of New Hampshire Keports, Statutes, Pamphlet Laws, and other books and documents by law distributed to the several towns for the Bpecial authority given in its charter was It incident to the power granted or by statute a municipal corporation or the objects and purposes of the had no power to lease a ferry. Mu- corporation. Therefore, the contract nicipal corporations cannot legally of employment of a guard was an contract debts for Imaginary neces- act ultra vires, and not binding upon sities or real conveniences. They are the town ; and an attempt to ratify not permitted to exercise powers not the contract of the intendant was specially delegated to them in their also futila charters unless such powers are inci- ' Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 dent to those granted or flow from U. S. 256 ; & c, 6 S. Ct Eep. 1055, them by necessary implication. See, an action instituted by the city to re- also, Lisso v. Red Eiver, 29 La. Ann. cover taxes which it claimed to have 493. p&id under protest to a collector of 1 Mt Adams &o. Inclined Ry. Co. United States internal revenue V. City of Cincinnati, 25 Wkly. Law taxes on account of liquors distilled Bull. 91. by the city ; the city basing its 'New Decatur v. Berry (1890), 90 right to recover upon the- claim that Ala. 433 ; S. G, 7 So. Rep. 838. These as it had no power to engage in this general statutes neither gave the business it was not legally bound to town authorities expressly the power pay the taxes. See, also, McCready to make quarantine regulations, nor v. Guardians &c., 9 Serg. & R. 94. could such power be implied ; neither § 595.] ULTRA. VniBS. 611 use of its inhabitants, and to enable them and its officers to become informed of the laws and official business of the State, it has no power nor can its selectmen lawfully make any dis- position or use of the books inconsistent with that object.' § 595. Grant of power to regulate highways construed. A city has no power through its city council to prohibit circu- lating, distributing or giving away circulars, hand-bills or ad- vertising cards of any description in or upon any of its public streets or alleys, as it is neither expressly conferred nor to be fairly implied from a charter providing for cleaning the high- ways, for the prevention of obstructions thereon, and con- ferring power to regulate their use.'' V. Hammond (1889), 40 Minn. 43; S. C, 41 N. W. Rep. 343, an ordi- nance of a city imposing a penalty upon " any person who commits any act of lewdness or indecency within the limits of said city " was lield to be v Augusta Factory v. City Council of Augusta (1889), 83 Ga. 734; S. c, 10 S. E. Rep. 359. See, also, State v. Han- nibal &C. R. Ca, 75 Mo. 208 ; Mack v. Jones, 21 N. H. 393: Cooley oi) Taxa- tion, 200; Desty on Taxation, 466. In Gray u Baynard (1883), 5 Del. Ch. 499, it was held that while the legis- lature had conferred upon the city council of Wilmington very full powers touching its public streets, it was not competent for the city coun- cil to authorize the erection of a pri- vate building in such a manner as to create a public nuisance. In Town- ship of Snyder v. Bov.iird (1888), 122 Pa. St 442; s. G, 15 AtL Rep. 910; 22 W. N. C. 563, it was held that the supervisors of a township have no power to give to the assignee of a town^ip order a new order in his own name as a substitute for the old one. Leasnre v. Mahoning Town- ship, 8 West Rep. 551. In State v. Har- ris, (1888), 96 Mo. 29, it -was held that a subscription to stock of a railroad company by a county court for the county, where it appeared that two- thirds of the qualified voters of the county, at a regular or special elec- tion, had not assented to such sub- scription, which was required by General Statutes of Missouri, 1865, page 338, section 17, to authorize such subscription, was without au- thority and void. County courts in this State are only the agents of the counties. *Brockman v. City of Creston (1890), 79 Iowa, 587; S. G, 44 N. W. Rep. 822 ; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 69. The rule is thus stated by the Iowa court :— " [Cities] have power to dispose of their real property for pur- poses authorized by law and for no other purpose. The purpose of the disposition of lands determines the question of authority. A city may sell its lands when its interests re- quire that they be sold ; but it pos- sesses no authority to give away, or to convey without consideration, or for a purpose which it has no au- thority to advance, any of its prop- erty." See, also. District Township V. Thomas, 59 Iowa, 50. 5 Mather v. City of Ottawa (IlL, 1885), 2 West Rep. 46, holding that the city had no power to incur a debt § 603.] ULTRA. VIEES. 619 § 603. Subscribing to stock of railroads. — Acts authoriz- ing appropriations by towns and cities as aid to railroad cor- porations in consideration of their constructing the roads through their limits if approved by a majority of the electors of the town or city, but also requiring the authorities of the corporation " to levy and collect a tax and make such provis- ions as may be necessary and proper for the prompt payment of the appropriation," neither expressly nor by implication invest such corporations with the power to issue commercial . paper in payjnent of an appropriation so voted.' The adop- tion of the constitution of 1870 in Illinois, which provides that " no county, city, township or other municipality shall ever become subscriber to the capital stock of any railroad or private corporation, or make donations to or loan its credit in aid of such corporations," withdrew from municipal corpo- and issue bonds, and levy- and collect taxes for the payment of bonds is- sued to raise money to build a dam across a river witliin its limits, for the purpose of introducing the water of such river into the city, with the view of developing the natural advan- tages of the city for manufacturing purposes. See, also, as to such power being confined to corporate purposes, Johnson v. Campbell, 49 111. 316 ; Har- ward V. St Clair &c. Drainage Co., 51 111. 130 ; Madison County v. People, 58 ni. 456 ; People v. Du Puyt, 71 111. 653. In Johnson v. Stark County (1860), 34 111. 75, the court said:— "All will perceive that the building of our court-houses, jails, poor-houses, the opening and keeping in repair of common highways, and the erection and maintenance of bridges, by which they are rendered useful to the people,' are 'county purposes' for whic'h the people of the county may be taxed ; and that the erection of hotels, mercantile, manufacturing, trading and banking hou8es,aItbough of great importance to the prosperity of the community, are not such pur- poses as were contemplated by the constitution. These are properly re- garded as matters of individual en- terprise and cannot, in any reason- able or just sense, be regarded as public or county purposes." Bissell V. Kankakee, 64 111. 249, holding city bonds issued to aid a company so as to enable it to embark in the man- ufacture of linen fabrics in the city to be void. English v. People, 96 Dl. S66, holding that a city tax levied to pay bonds issued in aid of a manu- facturing company could not be en- forced. Ohio VaL L Works v. Moundsville, 11 W, Va. 1 ; Loan Asso. V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. In Ottawa V. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; s. c, 27 L. Ed. 669, the bonds were held to be void. 1 Concord v. Robinson (1886), 121 U. S. 165 ; a a, 7 S. Ct Rep. 987, holding bonds issued by the town invalid. See, also, Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400, 406; Wells v. Supervisors, 103 U. S. 635, 631, 632 ; Ogden V. County of Daviess, 103 U. S. 634, 639. 620 ULTBA VIBES. [§ 604- rations all power to subscribe to stock or make donations ex- cept in cases where they had before its adoption, as the law then existed, been authorized to do so by a vote of the peo- ple of such municipalities. In that case they could complete the matter.^ § 604. City conncil as judge of elections. — A statute de- scribing the duties and powers of a city council, declaring that it shall " be the judge of the elfection and qualification of its own members," does not confer upon such council the power to hear and determine a contest of an election for the city marshalship ; nor does it include the power to enact ordinances for such purpose.* 1 Concord v. Robinson (1886), 131 U. S. 165; S. C, 7 S. Ct Rep. 937. See, also, Middleport v. Mtna Life Ins. Co., 82 111. 563, 568 ; Asplnwall V. County of Daviess, 23 How. 364 ; ■W^adsworth o. Supervisors, 103 U. S. 534. In Hardin County v. Louis- ville & N. E. Co. (Ky., 1891), 17 S. W. Kep. 860, it was held that the presence of one of the sinking fund commissioners of the county at a meeting of the stockholders of the railroad corporation, when a resolu- tion was passed declaring a stock dividend for the purpose of stopping interest on payment of stock sub- scriptions, and his action in voting for the resolution being unauthor- ized either by statute, by the county court or by the county commission- ers, did not estop the county fi»m demanding interest on a stock sub- scription it had made up to the time ' when a cash dividend was declared. 2Vosburg V. McCrary (1890), 77 Tex. 568; s. C, 14 S. W. Rep. 195. This last was claimed under Revised Statutes of Texas, 343, that muni6ipal corporations "may ordain and es- tablish such acts, laws, regulations and ordinances not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of this State as may be needful for the gov- ernment, interest, welfare and good order of said body politic; " and sec- tion 418, that " the city council shall have power to pass, publish, amend or repeal all ordinances, rules and police regulations not contrary to the constitution of this State for the good government, peace and order of the city and the trade and com- merce thereof, that may be necessary or proper to carry into effect the powers vested by this title in the corporation, the city government or in any department or oflScer thereof." To this the court said : — "The power of a municipal corporation or of a city council cannot exceed that con- ferred by the charter and all ordi- nances must be in subordination thereto. Ordinances when author- ized by the charter are but munici- pal laws intended to regulate and provide for the orderly exercise of powers conferred by the charter." In Gregory v. Mayor &c. of New York (1889), 113 >f. Y. 416; s. G, 22 N. Y. St. Rep. 703, it was held that the power of a board of commission- ers to remove emploj^ees did not in- clude the power to suspend indefi- nitely and without pay. The posi- § 605.] ULTBA VIBES. 621 § 605. Governing authorities of school districts. — Town trustees having authority to " build or otherwise provide suit- able houses, furniture, apparatus and other articles and edu- cational appliances necessary for the thorough organization and efficient management " of schools, cannot purchase, at the expense of the township, text-books for the use of the pupils attending the public schools of the township.' tion of the court was, that there is nothing in the power to remove or expel which necessarily and in all cases includes the power to suspend, and the latter power may not be implied from the mere grant of the former. Shannon v. Portsmouth, 54 N. H. 183, distinguished. See, also. State V. Lingo, 26 Mo. 496 ; State v. Chamber of Commerce of Milwau- kee, 20 Wis. 63 ; State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law, 536. ' Honey Creek School Township v. Barnes (1889), 119 Ind. 213; S. C, 21 N. E. Rep. 747, in which Jackson School Township v. Hadley, 59 Ind. 534, where the indebtedness was for Webster's Dictionaries, is distin- guished. In State v. City of Bayonne {N. J., 1887), 8 Ati. Rep. 114, it was held that school-houses were not in- cluded in the expression "public buildings " in section 79 of the char- ter of Bayonne, which authorizes the mayor and council to purchase sites, markets, public buildings and wharves, and to erect suitable build- ings or wharves, or other structures or improvements on said sites and for said purposes, or for the purpose of purchasing sites for school-houses, to issue bonds; therefore, a resolu- tion to issue bonds to enlarge a school- house was illegal. In Roseboom v. JeflEerson School Tp. (1889), 129 Ind. 377; S. a, 23 N. B. Rep. 796, it was held that a contract made by a town- ship trustee for building a school- house beyond the fund in hand, and that to be derived from the tax levy for the year, without an order from the board of county commissioners, was without authority. See, also, Mid- dleton V. Greeson (1885), 106 Ind. 18. In Briggs v. Borden (1888), 71 Mich. 87; s. c, 38 N. W. Rep. 712, the ac- tion of school inspectors in the de- struction by division of a school dis- trict and attaching the parts toother districts, without having obtained the consent of a majority of the resi- dent tax-payers of the district, which was required by Howell's Statutes of Michigan, section 5041, before such division could be made, was decreed to be null and void for lack of au- thority. See, also, Doxey v. Inspect- ors, 67 Mich. 601, 604; s. C, 85 N. W. Rep. 170, 172. In Dartmouth Sav. Bk. V. School Districts (Dak.), 43 N. W. Rep. 832, it was held that a petition by a majority of the districts affected being a condition precedent to the establishment of a new district, the formation of a new district by. the county superintend- ent, under Dakota Police 'Code of 1877, chapter 40, relating to the di- vision of school districts and rear- rangement of their boundaries, with- out such a petition, would be beyond his authority. Also, that districts which are its successors would not be estopped to deny the incorpora- tion of their predecessor by showing a failure to prevent such a petition in an action upon a bond of this predecessor. Farmers' & M. Nat 622 ULTEA VIBES. [§ 606. § 606. The same subject continued. — Under an act con- ferring power on school trustees to lay out roads, streets and alleys, the power of school trustees was confined to cases where they laid out school lands into town or village lots. In other cases they had no power to lay out roads or to appro- priate or dedicate any part of such land for public high- ways.^ Bk. V. School Dist. (Dak), 42 N. W. Rep. 767, where the court held that the power to select a site for a school-house belonged alone to the legal voters of the district, under the Dakota statutes, and until they have selected it by vote the district board has no authority whatever to ac- quire the site or erect a school-house. And in this case the school district was held not to be liable on warrants issued without authority by the board of directors for the purchase of a- school site. iSeeger v. Mueller (1890), 133 111. 86 ; s. C 34 N. E. Rep. 513, affirming 28 111. App. 28, holding that any at- tempt of the school trustees to lay out a road was vJtra vires and void. The court said: — "The power granted by [these] sections [of thfe act] to trustees of schools will not be extended by implication, but in de- termining their extent and scope a strict interpretation will be adopted. The thirtieth section of [the] act de- clares trustees of schools bodies cor- porate and politic, thus constituting them municipal or guast-municipal corporations, and the same rule of in- terpretation should apply to the stat- ute from which they derive their powers which obtains in case of other municipal corporations. Such bodies act wholly under a delegated author- ity, and can exercise no powers which are not in express terms or by fair implication conferred upon them." See, also, Buchanan v. School Dis- tftct, 25 Mo. App. 85; Thompson v. Lee County, 8 Wall. 337 ; Minturn v. Larue, 33 How. 435. Revised Statutes of Maine, chapter 11, section 1, for- bids the alteration of school districts except upon the recommendation of municipal and school officers. In Parker v. Titcomb (1889), 83 Me. 180; S. c, 19 Atl. Rep. 163, it was held that an attempt, in the absence of such rec- ommendation, to alter by uniting or disuniting, Vvas ultra vires. In State v. Compton (Neb., 1890), 44 N. W. Rep. 660, it was held that the presentation of a petition in writing duly signed to a county superintendent of schools being necessary to give him jurisdic- tion to detach a part of the territory of a school district and attach the same to an adjoining district, a change of the boundaries of districts in that respect without such petition was without authority. The court said : — "The duties of superintendents are alone those prescribed in the statute.'' See, also. State v. Dodge County, 30 Neb. 595; S. C., 81 N. "W. Rep. 117. In this last case it was held that the board of equalization of taxes of a county possessed no powers save those conferred by statute, and that the filing of a complaint was neces- sary to give it jurisdiction to increase the valuation of a tax-payer's prop- erty, and unless this appeared upon the face of the proceedings there was DO authority to act. People v. Flint, 39 Cal. 670 ; People v. Goldtree, 44 Cal. 333. In Black v. Cornell (1888), §§ 607, 608.] ULTEA VIEES. 623 §607. Purchase of real estate for school purposes — Texas ruling. — An incorporated town in Texas exceeds its powers by contracting to issue its bonds in the purchase of grounds for public free school purposes. Should such a town afterwards, by adopting the provisions of the statutes, become under general law a city, the purchase of such grounds would not be ratified by this act of adoption of the permission of the statute and becoming a city.' § 608. Condemnation of land outside of territorial limits. Proceedings by a village to condemn land outside of its ju- risdiction are unlawful unless the village charter expressly gives the power to do so. A power cannot be implied where by the proceedings it is proposed to take land against the will of the owners.^ 30 Mo. App. 641, it was held that no power exists in a board of public school directors, without authority from the voters of the district, to rent buildings or, rooms separate from the district school-house, and to employ teachers for a supplemental school therein. Seibert v. Botts, 57 Me. 430. In Board of Education v. Roehr (1887), 33 111. App. 629, it was held that a school district having be- come organized under Revised Stat- utes of Dlinois, chapter 122, section 80, the board of education had no power to enter into a contract for the erection of a school-house without a petition of a majority of the voters of a district iWaxahachie v. Brown (1887), 67 Tex. 519 ; s. c., 4 S. W. Rep. 207. See, also, Robertson v. Breedlove, 61 Tex. 316, where it was held that commis- sioners' courts, though charged with the duty of providing court-houses, could not issue bonds for that purpose in absence of an express legislative grant. In Waxahaohie v. Brown, su- pra, the court said : — " The power to borrow money or to create debt is not a necessary incident of the power to buy grounds and build school-houses, and hence should not be implied against the spirit and pol- icy so clearly manifested by contem- poraneous legislation as well as by the organic law in force at the time this legislation was enacted." It was also held that the city had no power to ratify a purchase involving the is- suance of bonds in contravention of the authority of the town when the contract was -made, and which, if ratified, would involve the issuance of bonds in excess of the amount the city could lawfully issue. SHougton V. Huron Copper Min. Co. (1885), 57 Mich. 547; s. C., 34 N. "W. Rep. 820. See, also, Dillon on Munic, Corp., § 469; Cooley's Const Lim. 528-541 ; Kroop v. Forman, 31 Mich. 144 ; Detroit Sharp Shooters' Ass'n v. Highway Com'rs, 84 Mich. 36 ; Pow- ers' Appeal, 29 Mich. 604; Spechttt Detroit, 20 Mich. 168. In Wright v. Town of Victoria (1849), 4 Tex. 375, it was held that citizens who had purchased of the corporation lots upon the faith of an ordinance pur- porting to make a dedication of the timbered lands to the free and com- 624 ULTEA VIBES. .[§ 609. § 609. Diversion of lands dedicated to public nses. — The authorities of a municipal corporation cannot lawfully appro- priate to other uses land which has been dedicated by the owner as a street ; nor can they divert it to uses and purposes foreign to those for which it was dedicated ; nor is it within the power of the legislature to authorize such a disposal or diversion of it.* mon use of the citizens were not entitled to an injunction to restrain the sale of such timbered lands, which the corporation by act of the legislature had been empowered to sell, and use the proceeds for erection of public buildings, school-houses, etc., for the reason that the corpora- tion had no power tO: dedicate these timbered lands so as to restrain a a future sale under the powers given in the statute. Kings Co. Fire Ins. Co. V. Stevens, 101 N. Y. 411 ; Eoper V. MoWhorter, 77 Va. 314. In Searcy V. Yarnell, 47 Ark. 269, where a con- tract of sale bad been executed, the corporation was held estopped from setting up the plea of ultra vires. As to disposal of property dedicated to public uses in violation of trusts upon which it is held, or without legislative authority, see Reynolds v. Stark Co., 5 Ohio, 204; Meriwether V. Garrett, lOS U. S. 472; Augusta u Perkins, 3 B. Mon. 437 ; Alves' Ex'r V. Henderson, 16 B. Mon. 131, 168; Bowlin V. Furman, 28 Mo. 427 ; Ken- nedy V. Covington, 8 Dana, 50 ; New- ark V. Elliott, 5 Ohio St. 113 ; Ransom V. Boal, 39 Iowa, 68 ; Still v. Lansing- burgh, 16 Barb. 107; Knox, County V. McCombs, 19 Ohio St. 320 ; Phila- delphia V. Phil. &c. R Co., 58 Pa. St. 253 ; Holladay v. Frisbie, 15 Cal. 630 ; Shannon v. O'Boyle, 51 Ind. 565; Matthews u Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Lord V. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386 ; Warren Co Supervisors v, Patterson, 56 111. 111. « Packet Co. v. Sorrels (1887), 50 Ark. 466; In re John and Cherry Streets, 19 Wend. 659; Warren v. Mayor of Lyons, 22 Iowa, 351; Le Clerq v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio, 354 ; Meth. E. Church v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. Law, 13 ; Augusta v. Perkins, 3 B. Mon. 437 ; Buckner v. Augusta, 1 A. K. Marsh. 9; Alves' Ex'r v. Henderson, 16 B. Mon. ISl, 168 ; Police Jury v. McCor- mack, 33 La. Ann. 624 ; Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Kennedy v. Covington, 8 Dana, 50 ; Rutherford V. Taylor, 38 Mo. 315; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 363 ; Alton v. IlL Transp. Co., 13 III. 60 ; San Antonio V. Lewis, 15 Tex. 388 ; New Orleans V. United States, 10 Pet 734 ; Ran- som V. Boal, 29 Iowa, 68 ; Branham V. San Jose, 24 Cal. 585; Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234 ; Jacksonville v. Jackson- ville Ry. Co., 67 111. 540; Cromwell v. Connecticut Brown Stone Q. Co., 50 Conn. 470; West Carroll Parish v. Gaddis, 34 La. Ann. 938 ; CummingS u St. Louis, 90 Mo. 359 ; Hale v. Bur- nett, 15 Cal. 580; San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 CaL 541 ; Pickett v. Has- tings, 47 Cal. 269; Commonwealth V. Rush, 14 Pa. St 186; Common- wealth V. Alburger, 1 Whart 469; Van Wert Bd. of Ed. «. Edson, 18 Ohio St 231 ; Seebold v. Shitler, 34 Pa. St 133; Ind. & B. E. Co. v. In- dianapolis, 13 Ind. 630; Newark v. Stockton, 44 N. J. Eq. 179; New Or- leans &c. R. Co. V. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 478 ; S. C, 36 La. Ann. 517 ; Franklin Co. Comm'rs v. Lathrop, 9 Kan. 453 ; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. § 610.] ULTRA VIRES. 625 § 610. Sale of real estate — Prescribed mode controls.— The cases in California which involved the sale of real estate of the city under an invalid ordinance necessitated rulings upon various points pertinent to the subject we are now considering. The legislature had restricted the governing authorities in the charter to a sale of such property by ordinance or resolution authorizing it, the only mode of city legislation, and prescribed how many votes should be required to pass such ordinance. The power of the legislature to prescribe a mode was sustained by the court, and the ordinance was held void because it was not adopted by a proper vote ; in short there was no power to sell because the necessary steps to give such power had not been taken. The sales were therefore held never prop- erly made and that no title to the purchasers passed from the city. The court held the city, inasmuch as it had through its oflBcers received the money of these purchasers paid upon their contracts of purchase, and used the same for corporate municipal purposes, liable in actions for its recovery to re- turn it. Field, C. J., said : — " [The facts] show an appro- priation of the proceeds, and the liability of the city arises from the use of the moneys or her refusal to refund them after their receipt. The city is not exempted from the common obligation to do justice which binds individuals. Such obligar tion rests upon all persons whether natural or artificial. If the city obtain the money of another by mistake, or without 168. As to power of municipal cor- Hoodley v. San Francisco, 50 Cal. poration to alien public places with 275, where the court said of this the consent of the legislature, see same square : — " It was granted to Hebert v. DeValle, 37 111. 448 ; Bell v. the city for public use and is held Ohio &c. R Co., 25 Pa. St. 161 ; s. c, for that purpose only. It cannot be 1 Grant Cas. 105 ; Phil. & Trenton R. conveyed to private persons, and is Co., In re. 6 Whart 26 ; Hart v. Bur- effectually withdrawn from com- nett, 15 CaL 580 ; Payne v. Treadwell, merce ; and the city having no au- 16 Cal. 332, distinguished in Grogaii thority to convey the title, private V. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, 614 In persons are virtually precluded from City and County of San Francisco v. acquiring it" Approved and fol- Itsell (1889), 80 Cal. 57 ; S. C, 33 Pac. lowed in Sawyer v. San Francisco, 50 Kep. 74, it was held that the city held Cal. 375, and in Hoadley v. San its public squares in trust for the Francisco, 70 Cal. 324, which was af- public, and the municipal authorities firmed on writ of en-or in Hoadley had no authority to dispose of them v. San Francisco (1887), 134 U. 8. by way of compromise or otherwise. 646. 40 ULTEA VIEE8. [§ 611. authority of law, it is her duty to refund it, from this general obligation. If she obtain other property which does not be- long to her, it is her duty to restore it, or if used, to ren- der: an equivalent therefor, from the like obligation.^ The legal liability springs from the moral duty to make restitution. And we do not appreciate the morality which denies in such cases any rights to the individual whose money or other prop- erty has been thus appropriated. The law countenances no such wretched ethics: its comnfand always is to do justice."* It wias also held that where an authority to do any particular act on the part of the corporation could only be conferred by ordinance, a ratification of such an act could only be by ordi- nance. And further, that even if the city would be estopped from denying the sale, and from asserting title to the prop- erty sold, it did not follow that the purchasers would be estopped from claiming a return of the money they paid. The general doctrine of estoppel in pais is not applicable to these purchasers, they not being wrong-doers. The sale of the city's property here being without authority and void, these purchasers were not required to surrender possession of the property before they could maintain an action to recover back the purchase-money. The rule as to rescission does not apply. The contract being void, there was nothing to rescind ; no rights were acquired, and there were in consequence no rights to restore. ' § 611. Appropriations for highways and school buildings. Town supervisors have no authority to appropriate or expend in the construction or repair of highways any funds raised for ordinary town charges.* 'Eov have the electors of a town power to appropriate any sum for such construction or repair 1 Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. < Aldrich v. Collins (So. Dak., 1893), 283. 52 N. W. Rep. 854. As the constitu- 2 Pimental v. San Francisco (1863), tion, article 10, section'3, provides that 21 Cal. 351, 361, 862. funds raised " by taxation, loan or as- 'McCracken v. San Francisco sessment for one purpose shall not be (1860), 16 Cal. 591 ; Grogan v. San diverted to any other," the acts of Francisco (1861), 18 Cal. 590 ; Satter- the board in this case making such lee V. San Francisco, 23 Cal. 214 ; appropriations were held to be illegal Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 184 ; and void. liOttrnan v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 102; People v. Sv^ift, 31 Cal. 28. § 612.] ni.TBA VIEES. 627 of highways, except when they have voted to raise the sum by taxation. The power to appropriate is limited to the sum voted to be raised. They have no control over any other fund for that purpose.' § 612. Power to purchase realty does not authorize giv- ing notes. — While a county in Nebraska is empowered by statute to purchase realty for ^ poor-farm, it is beyond the power of the governing authorities of the corporation to give 1 Aldrich w Collins (So. Dak., 1892), 63 N. W. Eep. 854, holding that a resolution adopted by the electors at their annual town meeting to keep all the funds of the town in one general fund was without authority of law and void. In Brown v. School Dist No. 6 (1886), 64 N. H. 303; s. C, 10 AtL Eep. 119, a vote of a school district to raise money for the erec- tion of a school-house upon a lot other than the one designated by the county commissioners upon a proper appeal from the action of the district was held to be unauthorized and void. The court said : — "If the school district were permitted to ab- rogate or discontinue a location made by the commissioners, which would be a refusal to procure the land designated, and to build a school- house upon it, they could nullify the statutes designed to compel the pur- chase of the land located for a lot by the commissioners and the build- ing upon it of a school-house." See, also, Holbrook v, Faulkner, 65 N. H. 311, 315, 316; Blake v. Orford, 64 N. H. 299, where it was held that such a tax would be abated on petition of the tax-payers of the district. In Andrews v. School Dist. No. 4 fl887). 37 Minn. 96; S. a, 33 N. W. Eep. 217, it was held that where goods were received under a contract made by the trustees in a manner unauthorized and which would not bind the dis- ti-ict, and used for the benefit of the district under such circumstances and for such length of time as to raise the presumption that it was with the common consent of the dis- trict, the law would impose on the district the obligation to pay for them. In Town of Winamao v. Huddleston (Ind., 1892), 81 N. E. Eep. 581, it was held that a town could not issue bonds to procure funds with which to rebuild a school-house, where the bonds, if issued, would create an indebtedness in excess of two per cent of the taxable value of the property within the town limits, to which limit of taxation it is re- stricted by the constitution of In- diana, article 13, section 1. The court said : — " The debt created by a bond executed by a public cor- poration is not an obligation payable out of a specific fund, but is a con- tract to pay money generally." This case is not within the doctrine of Quill V. City of Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292; s. c, 23 N. E. Eep. 788; Strieb V. Cox, 111 Ind. 299; S. C, 12 N. E. Eep. 481 ; Board v. Hill, 115 Ind. 316 ; & C, 16 N. E. Eep. 156. These bonds would create a debt, this case radi- cally differing from City of Valpa- raiso V. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1. That there was a provision or promise to levy taxes to pay these bonds was no reason why the constitutional restric- tion would not apply. 528 UXTEA VIEE3. [§ 613. promissory notes and mortgages of the land to secure their payment.' The United States Supreme Court accepted this as a correct ruling upon the statute as to the purchase of a poor-farm for a county, but held that parties who had sold such to a county for a cash payment and notes with mortgages for the deferred payments, upon th^ failure of the county to meet these notes were entitled to have the contract of pur- chase rescinded and the property reconveyed to them.* § 613. Work on public buildings^etc.— The people of a county voted seventy-five thousand dollars to build a court-house, and a contract was entered into by a contractor to build it by the plans and specifications for that sum. Changes were made in the plans by which the cost was much increased in •Stewart v. Otoe County, 2 Neb. 177. The court said : — " The statutes provide the only security that can be ^iven. The public faith is pledged, and a tax not exceeding one per cent, may be levied upon all the taxable property of the county an- nually, and when collected paid to the person entitled thereto by an or- der upon the treasurer of the county, . payable out of that special fund." , 2 Chapman v. County of Douglas (1883), 107 U. S. 348. The court said : — " The agreement, ... so far as it relates to the time and mode of payment, is void; but the contract for the sale itself has been executed on the part of the vendor by deliveiy of the deed, and his title at law has actually passed to the county. As the agreement between the parties has failed by reason of the legal disabil- ity of the county to perform its part, according to its conditions, the right of the vendor to rescind the contract and to a restitution of his title would seem to be as clear as it would be just, unless some valid reason to the con- trary can be shown." See, also. Marsh V, Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676, 684 ; Louisiana v. Wood, 103 U. S. 394; Miltenberger v. Cooke, 18 Wall. 431. Further on the court said: — "The purchase itself . . . was expressly authorized. The agreement for defi- nite times of payment and for secu- rity alone was not authorized. It was not illegal in the sense of being pro- hibited as an offense ; the power in that form was simply withheld. The policy of the law extends no further than merely to defeat what it does not permit and imposes upon the parties no penalty. It , thus falls within the rule stated in Pollock on Contracts," 264. See, also, as to the application of this principle, Morville v. Amerioap Tract Society, 133 Mass. 139, 137; Hitchcock v. Gal- veston, 96 U. S. 341, 350, which al- lowed a recovery for the value of the benefit conferred upon the munici- pal corporation, notwithstanding the contract to pay in bonds was held to be illegal and void. The court said : — " It matters not that the promise was to pay in a manner not authorized by law. If payment cannot be made in bonds because their issue is ultra vires, it would be sanctioning rank injustice to hold that payment may not be made at alL Such is not the law." § 614.] ULTEA VIBES. 629 some respects, but no corresponding changes were made to decrease the cost in other respects. It was held in such a case that all the agreements whereby the total cost of the work was to exceed the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars were in excess of the authority of the supervisors, and there- fore void, and there could be no recovery upon them ; and that the case was not altered by the fact that the people afterwards voted an additional sum to complete the building which the contractor failed to finish under his contract.' Boards of supervisors have no power to construct bridges over navigable lakes, no such power having been conferred upon them by statute.* § 614. Issuing of bonds. — Where there is a total want of power under the law in the officers or board who issue bonds of a municipal corporation, the bonds will be void in the hands of innocent holders. There is a distinction between irregu- larities in the exercise of the power conferred and the total 'King V. Mahaska County (1888), 75 Iowa, 329. In County of Lancas- ter V. Fulton (1889), 138 Pa. St. 481 ; S. a, 18 Atl. Eep. 384 ; 24 W. N. C. 401, a contract made by the commission- ers of a county, to give to the county solicitor, whose salary is fixed by law, an additional compensation for services to be rendered by him ly- ing within the sphere of his official duties as prescribed by statute, was held to be ultra vires; and that being in its effect evasive and subversive of law, and contrary to public policy, it was void, irrespective of intent, and was, therefore, incapable of being ratified after the expiration of the solicitor's term. Hunter i\ Nolf, 71 Pa, St. 282 ; Chester County v. Bar- ber, 97 Pa. St. 455. 2 Snyder v. Foster (1889), 77 Iowa, 638; S. a, 42 N. "W. Eep. 506. The court said : — " It is true that boards of supervisors have power to provide for the erection of all bridges ' which may be necessar5', and which the public convenience may require, within their respective counties,' but they can provide for the erection of such bridges only in public high- ways. They may establish highways only 'as provided by law.' But the law does not authorize the es- tablishment of a highway until the right to use the land over which it is to pass for that purpose has been obtained. In this case the State holds the title to the bed of the lake for the use and benefit of Its citizens. It has noli by express statute, au- thorized any obstruction of such use." See, also, as to how far powers con- ferred may be extended by implica- tion, Hickok V. Hine, 23 Ohio St 523; Inhabitants of Charlestown v. County Comm'rs, 3 Met 202 ; Com- monwealth V. Coombs, 2 Mass. 492; Inhabitants of Springfield v. Railway Co., 4 Cush. 71; Att'y Gen. v. Ste- vens, 1 Saxt (N. J.) Ch. 869 ; s. C, 8 Am. Dec. 531. 630 ULTKA TIBES. [§ 614. want of power to do the act, the distinction being between questions of fact and questions of law. If it is a question of fact and the board of officers are authorized by law to deter- mine the 'fact, then their determination is final and conclusive. And. although it may be contrary to the fact, yet if recited in the bond that the necessary and proper steps required by law to be taken had been taken, then the municipality is estopped from denying that they were teken.^ But all persons are presumed to know the law, and if the law creates conditions jsrecedent upon which the right to act at all depended, and these conditions were not complied with, and the law ap- pointed no board or officer to determine that fact, then there cannot be an innocent holder of such bonds.^ Where a bond upon its face does not show authority on the part of the town- ship to issue it, the doctrine of honafide holder does not apply, but the holder takes it subject to the defense of entire illegal- ity.' ' iSpitzer v. Village of Blanchard (1890), 82 Mich. 234; S. C, 46 N. W. Rep. 400; Dixon Co. u Field, 111 U. S. 89 ; S. C, 4 S. Ct Rep. 315. 2 Bernard D. Township of Morrison, 133 U. S. 523 ; s. c, 10 S. Ct Rep. 333. ' Bogart V. Township of La Motte (1890), 79 Mich. 394; s. &, 44 N. W. Rep. 612. And a municipal corporation cannot ratify or be es- topped by an act void in its inception and wholly ultra vires. Highway Comm'rs v. Van Dusan, 40 Mich. 429. In Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, the court held that when the power was shown in the municipal corpora- tion to issue the bond, but there were irregularities in its execution, the coi'poration might be estopped to deny that the power was properly executed. In Town of Hackettstown V. Swackhamer (1874), 37 N. J. Law, 191, it was held that municipal cor- porations in the absence of a specific grant of power do not in general possess the capacity to borrow money; and a note given by such corporation for an unauthorized loan cannot be enforced even though the money borrowed has been expended for municipal purposes. In Ports- mouth Savings Bank v. Village of Ashley (Mich., 1893), 52 N. W. Rep. 74, it was held that the village was not bound to pay water-woi-ks bonds, the signing of which by the presi- dent and clerk had been authorized by resolution of the village council, but which were delivered by the president without any authority conferred by resolution. The public can act only through authorized agents, and it is not bound until all who are required to participate in what is to be done have performed their respective duties. Brown v. Bon Homme County (Dak.), 46 N. W. Rep. 173. The Michigan court alsO said : — " The statute of this State in reference to the issuing of the water- works bonds vests that power in the village council, and until that body has met at a legal meeting and voted to issue the bonds or authorized their § 615.J TTETEit VIBES. &31 § 615. The same subject continued — Municipal aid. — A municipal corporation cannot create a debt and issue nego- tiable bonds representing it in order to pay for a subscription to a railway corporation under a power conferred by the leg^ islature upon it to subscribe for stock in that corporation.' Seven-year bonds issued by a township board, bearing inter- est, in lieu of township orders which were payable on pre- sentation, have been held void.* The power of township boards in Michigan to audit and allow claims and issuing obligations ends with issuing orders for what they allow to be signed by the clerk and countersigned by the chairman." issue, one of the essential require- ments of the statute has not been complied with; and these bonds being issued without such direction are not binding against the i^illage." 1 Hill V. Memphis (1889), 134 U. S. 198; S. C 33 L. Ed. 887; 10 S. Ct Rep. 562 ; 7 R. R Corp. L. J. 470 ; 39 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 135. All grants of power of this kind must be construed strictly. Under a grant like this the corporation might give written evidence of the subscriptions, but that only. The rule for munici- pal corporations differs from that of private corporations. Private corpo- rations created for private purposes may contract debts in connection with their business, and issue evidences of them in such form as may best suit their convenience. But municipal corporations, being established for purposes of local government, in the absence of specific delegation of power cannot engage in undertak- ings not directed immediately to the acrumplishment of those purposes. The provisions in the general rail- road law of Missouri, which went into effect January 1, 1866, respecting the loan of nmnicipal credit to a railroad company, and the act of the State of March 24, 1868, respecting the fund- ing of the debts of municipalities, are to be construed in subordination to the provisions of the constitution of the State then in force, prohibit- ing the legislature authorizing any town to loan its credit to any corpo- ration except with the assent of two- thirds of the qualified voters at a regular or special election. 2 Bogart V. Township of La Motte (1890), 79 Mich. 294; S. C, 44 N. W. Eep. 612, for neither townships of this State nor their oflBcers have any power to borrow money or to issue bonds except that power isconfen-ed upon them by act of the legislatura s Comp. L. Mich., § 708. Asto the rule of strictly construing acts grant- ing corporate powers involving the imposing of public burdens, see 1 Dil- lon on Munic. Corp., §§ 507-509; Starin v. Town of Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439 ; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566; Gause v. City of Clarksville, 5 Dill. 165. In Newport v. Newport Gas Light Co., 84 Ky. 166, it was held that when a municipal corporation has the power, express or implied, to contract with others to furnish its inhabitants with the means of ob- taining gas at their own expense, it has the power to make a contract granting to a corporation the exclu- sive rights to the use of its streets for that purpose for a term of years. This opinion rested upon this, among other grounds, that the power given 632 ULTRA VIBES. [§ 616. § 616. The same subject continued — Public improve- mentSt — While police juries may contract for improvements which they are authorized to make to be paid out of the taxes which they are authorized to levy for parochial expenses, and which are set apart Tor this special improvement, they can- not issue any promissory note, draft or warrant in advance to cover this amount which may go into the treasury. It must be there before the warrant issues, unless by legislative authority they are authorized t^ issue the same in advance.' A town in Indiana had issued its negotiable bonds to a certain amount, the proceeds of which were to be used in the construc- tion of a school-house, and sold them in open market. When they matured there was a new issue of similar bonds and they were also sold in open market. The Supreme Court of the TJnitied States held the new issue to be void for want of authority, and that the municipality was not estopped from setting up that defense.^ \ the inuuicipality to provide for light- ing the city included the power to grant that exclusive right 1 Snelling v. Joffrion (1890), 42 La. Ann. 886; s. c, 8 So. Rep. 609, in vrhich the court sustained the rights of tax-payers to maintain the action to annul the contract so far as to pre- vent the issuing of evidences of in- debtedness against a fund not yet in the parish treasury, this being pro- hibited by express legislative author- ity. La. Act 1877, No. 30, § 5 ; Breaux V. Parish of Iberville, 33 La. Ann. 333 ; Sterling v. Parish of West Feli- ciana, 36 La. Ann. 59. See, also, New- gi-ass V. City of New Orleans (1890), 43 La. Ann. 163. The court would not interfere with the discretion of a police jiiry so as to dictate what par- ticular contract should or should not be made. Gas Light Co. v. New Or- leans, 41 La. Ann. 91 ; Carey v. Water- works Co., 41 La. Ann. 910. 2 Merrill v. Monticello (1890), 138 U. S. 673; s. C, 11 S. Ct. Eep. 411. The implied power of a municipal corporation to borrow money to en- able it to execute the powers ex- pressly conferred upon it by law, if it exists at all, does not authorize; it to create and issue negotiable securities to be sold in the market and to be taken by a purchaser freed from equities that might be set up by the maker. To borrow money and to give a bond or obligation therefor which may circulate in the market as a ne- gotiableeecurity freed from any equi- ties that may be set up by the maker of it are essentially different transac- tions in their nature and legal effect. See, also. Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 678 ;^ast Oakland v. Skinner, 94 U. S. 355 ; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 103 U. S. 378; Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83 ; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 130 ; Davies County v. Dick- inson, 117 U. S. 657;.Gause v. Clarks- ville, 5 Dill. 165 ; Hopper v. Coving- ton, 118 U. S. 148, 151 ; McCracken w City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, 619 ; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 506; Mayor v. Bay, 19 Wall. 468; §§ 617, 618.] ULTEA VIEES. 633 § 617. Contracts abrogating control of streets. — The lay- ing out and opening streets by the common council of a city being the exercise of its legitimate functions, any Contract made by the city with an individual or corporation, by which it agrees that it will not in the future open or extend a street in any particular place or part of the city, is an abrogation of its legislative powers and uli/i^a vires} A contract by a city to straighten the course of a large stream running in a zig-zag direction through it has been held not to be ultra vires? § 618. General legislation — OlTers of rewards. — The con- tracts of municipalities obtain validity only by force of the law authorizing their making. There is no authority for contracts Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400, 406, where it was held that the statutes of Tennessee which conferred upon counties in that State power to erect a court-house, jail and other necessary county buildings did not authorize the issue of commercial paper as evidence of or security for a debt contracted for the construction of such a building. Young v. Clar- endon Township, 133 U. S. 340, 347; Kelleyi'. Milan, 127 U. B. 139; Hill v. Memphis, 134 U. S. 198, 203. 1 Matter of Opening of First Street (1887), 66 Mich. 42; s. C, 88 N. W. Rep. 15. See, also, Gale v. Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Toledo &c. Ry. Co. V. Detroit &c. R. Co., 63 Mich. 564; Milhau v. Sharp, 37 N. Y. 611 ; Coleman v. Second Ave. E. Co., 38 N. Y. 201 ; Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103 ; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19 ; State V. Hudson Tunnel R. Co., 88 N. J. Law, 548; Newcastle R. Co. V. Peru &c. R. Co., 3 Ind. 464- Brim- mer V. Boston, 103 Mass. 19 ; Trustees of Belfast Academy v. Salmond, 11 Me. 109 ; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507; Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 567 ; Davis v. Mayor, 14 N. Y. 506, 532; People's R. Co. v. Memphis R Co., 10 Wall. 38. 2McGuire v. City of Rapid City repair and prevent obstructions in its streets. In Benton v. Hamilton (1886), 110 Ind. 294; s. C, 11 N. E. Rep. 338, a contract between a town treasurer and the town for the im- provement by the former of a public street was void under the Revised Statutes of Indiana, 1881, section 2049, which prohibited it ; and it was fur- ther held that contracts by a munici- pal corporation with one of its own oflBcers, by which a burden is imposed on property owners, are opposed to the policy of the law. In Lyddy v. Long Island City (1887), 104 N. Y. 218 ; S. 0., 10 N. E. Rep. 155, a contract with an attorney made with the au- thorities of a city for professional services was void, as the amended charter of the city (N. Y. Laws 1871, ch. 461) placed the common council under an absolute disability to create any debt or liability on the part of the city for legal services ; also, that, having no authority to create a lia- bility against the city by express (1889), 6 Dak. 346, the court holding such power in the city to arise from its power to drain, improve, keep in contract, it could not legalize such a claim by acknowledgment, ratifica- tion or otherwl^j. 634 ULTEA VIEES. [§ 619. that the law does not empower the governing boards to enter into,' In holding that a county court in Oregon had no power to order the offer of a reward for information leading to a con- viction of bribery at a coming election, the court said : — " The county courts, in the management of county affairs, have no power except that which is expressly given them by statute, or which is necessary to carry out those so given them. They have no authority to legislate. Their province is to adminis- ter the law as the legislature has directed.?' '^ § 619. Contracts for water supply. — An act, the material parts of which are quoted in the note,' for the annexation of a town to a city, was held to give to the city a power to pur- chase the property and franchises of the water-works company, but by the terms of the act that right expired with the ex- 1 Therefore a contract let by a board of commissioners of a county, for the care of the " poor," at a cer- tain price per capita, and for the care of the " sick and infirm " at an- other price per capita, was held to be void in Lebcher v. Comm'rs of Custer County (1890), 9 Mont 315; s. c, 33 Pac. Rep. 713, as the law- only authorized a contract for the care of such persons as were poor and therewith sick and infirm. See, also. Parr v. Village of Greenbush, 73 N. Y. 463 ; Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 3 Cranch, 137; Bonestell v. Mayor, 23 N. Y. 163; Foster v. Cole- man, 10 Oal 379; Trottman v. San Francisco, 30 Cal. 96 ; s. c, 81 Am. Dec. 96 ; Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 CaL 256 ; City of Alton v. County of Madison, 31 111. 115 ; Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 381 ; Thomas v. Richmond, 13 Wall. 349 ; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 309; Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 348; Philadelphia u Flanigan, 47 Pa. St. 27 ; Johnson v. Santa Clara County, 28 CaL 545. 2 Mountain v. Multnomah County (1888), 16 Or. 379; s. c, 18 Pac, Rep. 464. They have no powers except those granted and defined by law, and like other agents must pursue their authority and act within the scope of their power. See, also, Wol- cott V. Lawrence County, 26 Mo. 272 ; Book V. Earl, 87 Mo. 246 ; Sturgeon V. Hampton, 88 Mo. 203; State v. Brossfield, 67 Mo. 331 ; Webb v. La Fayette County, 67 Mo. 353; Ranney V. Baden, 67 Mo. 476 ; State v. Walker, 85 Mo. 41. ' ' Laws of New York, 1886, chapter 335, section 5, reads, "The mayor, comptroller and auditor of the city . . . are hereby authorized . . . to purchase the reservoir, , . . and all other property, of [a water- works company] . . , when and at such price as may be agreed upon, . , . and in case said parties shall be unable to agree upon a price for the purchase, . . . then in that case the power to acquire said property and franchises by the right of emi- nent domain is hereby expressly delegated to said city, . . . and the said ofBcers in the name of and for said city within two years there- after may proceed to acquire . . ." § 620.] ULTRA VIEES. 635 piration of the two years.' Any contract by a city council with a private corporation, impairing the exercise of its power and duty to keep the streets in repair, safe and convenient for public use, is void as against public policy .'^ Upon a con- tentiou that a contract by a city with a water company, in extending through a period of twenty-one years and depriving subsequent city councils of legislative control over the matter embraced in it, was ultra vires, it was held that the objection did not require that the contract should be held void, but only voidable so far as it was executory.' § 620. The same subject continued. — Authority to make a permanent and exclusive contract with a water company to build water-works and supply a city with water cannot be implied from the general power conferred by its charter to contract for the needs of a municipality.* J Zeigler v. Chapin (1891), 126 N. Y. 343; s. C, 27 N. E. Eep. 471, af- firming 59 Hun, 214 ; a C, 13 N. Y. Supl. 783, in which case the court lield the action of a tax-payer to annul a contract which had been en- tered into by the city authorities for the purchase of this property, on the ground that thg contract having been made after the two years had expired was illegal and void, there being no power in the city author- ities to make it, was maintainable, and that the injunction restraining the officials from carrying out the contract pending the litigation was properly granted. 2 City Council of Montgomery v. Capital City Water Co. (Ala., 1891), 9 So. Rep. 339. The court said:— "If conceded that the city council has authority to contract for a supply of water for fire and sanitary purposes, yet the city council has no power, in the absence of legislative authority, t3 make contracts or pass ordinances relinquishing or abandoning the leg- islative or governmental powers or divesting the corporation of its legis- lative discretion, or disabling it to perform its public duties." 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 97. ' Carlyle Water, Light & Power Co. V. City of Carlyle (1888), 31 111. App. 325 ; City of East St. Louis v. East St Louis a, L. & C. Co., 98 III 415 ; Decatur Gas Light & Coke Co. u City of Decatur, 24 III. App. 544. * Greenville Water Works Co. v. City of Greenville (Miss., 189U), 7 So. Rep. 409. In City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Company (1887), 67 Tex. 542 ; s. C, 4 S. W. Rep. 143, it was held that the city had no power to grant to this water company an exclusive privilege of supplying it with water for twenty-five years, it not being expressly granted to it, and for the further reason that the power of a city government to make such a contract as would disable it from controlling in future, as it might deem best, municipal aflairs to which it refers, cannot be implied from the express delegation of power to con- tract regarding the particular subject- matter. Ths ruling was based up )n the general principle that poweis 636 TILTEA VIEES. [§ 621. §621. Contracts for lighting streets. — Cities and towns in Massachusetts have been held to have r j authority under the statutes to erect and maintain works for the manufacture and distribution of electric light for lighting the public streets or for this and the additional purpose of furnishing light to their inhabitants.' A city has no power to loan the moneys are conferred on municipal corpora- tions for public purposes, and they can neither be delegated nor bar- tered away. Such corporations have no power either to cede away or em- barrass their legislative or govern- mental powers, either through the agency of by-laws or contracts with others, so as to disable them from the performance of their public du- ties. Applying these principles, the contract here would have the effect not only to embarrass the city gov- ernment in the exercise of the power conferred on it but to withdraw from it the right to provide water in any other authorized way for public purposes and for the inhabitants of the city, which was the sole purpose for which the power to erect, main- tain and regulate water-works was given to it Tliis would result from the exclusive right which, from the terms of the ordinance, it intended to confer. In Waterbury v. City of Laredo (1887), 68 Tex. 565; s. C, 5 S. W. Eep. 81, it was held that a con- tract between the city and an attor- ney, which gave to him annually for twenty years one-third of the rents of the ferry privileges and ferries or of any bridge or bridges built across the Rio Grande river at that point, the contract being declared to be ir- revocable, and which mutually bound the contracting parties to do no act and to enter into no engagement or contract that would interfere with its terms, in connection with certain suits he had conducted pertinent to this ferry, for which he had been reasonably compensated, was in con- IrEivention of public policy and not enforceable. It would, if enforced, place it beyond the power of the city to establish a free ferry or to charge such tolls only as would defray the expenses of operating the franchise if it so desired. In City of Cleburne V. Brown (1889), 73 Tex. 443; s. C, 11 S. W. Eep. 404, it was held that a contract between the city and a water and ice company, which, if carried out, would have amounted to a loan by the city of its credit to a private corporation, was ultra vires. It had not the power to do it under the constitution of Texas, article 11, section 3. 'Spaulding v. Inhabitants of Pea- body (1891), 153 Mass. 129; s. c, 10 L. Rep. Anno. 397 ; 26 N. E. Eep. 431 ; 38 Am. & Eng. Coi-p. Cas. 638. Such a power cannot be implied as an in- cident to power expressly granted them to erect and maintain street lamps — at least where it has been the custom of the legislature to spe- cifically define from time to time the purposes for which towns may raise money by taxation of their inhabit- ants. See, also, as to construing strictly all such statutes, Minot v. West Roxbury, 113 Mass. 1 ; Coolidge V. Brookline, 114 Mass. 592 ; Connolly V. Beverly, 151 Mass. 437 ; Anthony v. Adams, 1 Met 384. The legislature of Massachusetts has since this de- cision enacted "an act to enable cities and towns to manufacture and distribute gas and electricity." Mass. St 1891, ch. 370, approved June 4> 1891. § 622.] ULTEA VIEES. 637 arising from a sale of bonds issued to construct water-works.' The treasurer being by law the proper custodian of such moneys, his bondsmen, in such a case, could maintain a suit to restrain his carrying out the order of the city council, as it would be a misappropriation of the fund.* § 622. Grant of exclusiye privileges The powers of mu- nicipal corporations are limited to the express terms of the grant and will not be extended by inference. A municipal corporation can confer exclusive privileges for the prosecution of business only under an express grant of power from the legislature. Monopolies being prejudicial to the public wel- fare, the courts will not infer grants thereof, but will refuse to presume the existence of legislative intention in conflict with public policy.' 1 City of Bonham v. Taylor (Tex., 1891), 16 S. W. Rep. 555; s. C, 33 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 647. The court said : — " Municipal corpoi-a- tions existing under the general law- have power to raise funds for special purposes, enumerated in the statute, and to use such funds for the' pur- poses for which they were raised, tout we know of no power conferred on them to become money lenders except of a sinking fund raised to meet the payment of a debt" It was contended that Revised Statutes of Texas, article 370, which declares that "the city council shall have the management and control of the finances and other property, real, personal and mixed, belonging to the corporation," conferred on the city the power to lend the special fund raised for constructing the water- vporks. This contention was over- ruled, the court holding that the stat- ute meant a control in accordance with law and not in violation of law, and as to article 430, which gave to the city power to appropriate money raised to enumerated purposes, this was not one of them. Nor would article 424, which relates to the in- vestment of a sinking fund, apply. The money in question was not the sinking fund, which the city would have power to lend, for the entire fund was money borrowed, and not money raised by taxation for a sink- ing fund. 2 City of Bonham v. Taylor (Tex., 1891), 16 S. W. Rep. 555 ; s. c, 33 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 647. 3 liOgan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524 ; S. c, 22 Am. Rep. 261. In Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 543, the court considered a grant to a water company of the right and privilege, for the term of twenty-five years, of furnishing the city with water, and thus summed up their conclu- sion:— "We do not wish to be understood to hold that a municipal corporation has no power in any event to contract for such things as are consumed in their daily' use, for a period longer than the oflflcial term or' the officers who make the con- tract ; Lat we do intend to be under- stood to hold that such corporations have no power to make contracts continuous in character in reference 638 QLTEA VIEES. [§ 623. § 623. Curatire legislation.— The United States Supreme Court have held and adhered to it that where municipal cor- porations have issued evidences of indebtedness, which at the time of issue were unauthorized, it was in the power of the legislature to validate their issue by curative legislation.^ to such things or any others, by which they will be, in effe-ct, pre- cluded from exercising, from time to time, any power, legislative in character, conferred upon them by law." In Gale v. Kalamazoo. 23 Mich. 344; s. c, 9 Am. Rep. 80, in which a contract to build and con- trol a market-house for the period of ten years was held to be void be- cause it created a monopoly, Judge Cooley said : — "It is impossible to predicate reasonableness of any con- tract by which the governing au- thority abdicates any of its legisla- tive powers, and precludes itself from meeting in the proper way the emer- gencies that may arise. Those pow- ers are conferred in order to be exercised again and again, as may be found needful or politic; and those who hold them in trust to-day are vested with no discretion to cir- cumscribe their limits or diminish their efficiency, but must transmit them unimpaired to their successors. This is one of the fundamental max- ims of government, and it is impos- sible that free government with restrictions for the protection of in- dividual or municipal rights could long exist without its recognition." In Davenport v. Eleinschmidt, 6 Mont 503, it was held that a city council has no authority to grant to any person a monopoly even where no express prohibition is found in the charter or other acts of the legis- lature. In Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435, Justice Nelson gives this rule of construction of grants by the legis- lature to corporations : — " that only such powers and rights can be ex- ercised under them as are clearly ^mprehended within the words of me act, or derived therefrom by nec- essary implication, regard being had to the objects of the grant. Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of ttie terms used by the legislature must be resolved in favor of the pub- lic." In Richmond County Gas Light Co; V. Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228, the New York Court of Appeals held that there was uo power conferred upon the town auditors to contract with a gas company to light the streets of the town for five years. In Chicago v. RumpfiF, 45 111. 90, a right to do all slaughtering of ani- mals ip Chicago for a specified period was held to be void, because creating a monopoly. > Bolles V. Brimfield (1886), 120 IT. a 759; s. a, 7 S. Ct Rep. 736; Grenada Co. Supervisors v. Brogden, 1 13 U.'S. 361, 263, the court saying in this case: — "Since what was done in this case by the constitutional major- ity of qualified electors and by the board of supervisors of the county would have been legal and binding upon the county had it been done under legislative authority previously conferred, it is not perceived why subsequent legislative ratification is not, in the absence of constitutional restrictions upon such legislation, equivalent to original authority." Thompson v. Perrine, 103 U. S. 806, 815 ; Ritchie v. Franklin, 23 Wall. 67 ; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 837, 330; City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477, 485; Campbell v. City of Kenosha, 5 § 624.] ULTEA VIEES. 639 § 624. Ratification. — Corporate ratification, without au- thority from the legislature, cannot make a municipal bond valid which was void when issued for want of legislative power to make it." An act performed by a public corporation in Wall. 194; Otoe County «. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1, 15 ; St Joseph Township V. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, 663 ; Ander- son V. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356; U. S. Mortgage Co. v. Gross, 93 III. 483, 494, where the court said: — " Unless there be a constitutional in- hibition, a legislature has power, when it interferes with no vested right, to enact retrospective statutes to validate invalid contracts or to ratify and confirm any act it might lawfully have authorized in the first instance." In Katzenberger v. Aber- deen (1886), 121 U. S. 173; S. C, 7 S. Ct. Eep. 947, it was held that when, by reason of a change in the consti- tution of a State, its legislature had no constitutional authority to au- thorize a municipal corporation to issue negotiable bonds, it could not validate an issue of bonds by such a corporation made before the change in the constitution, and when the legislature had such power. The court was controlled by Sykes v. Mayor of Columbus, 55 Miss. 115, where Chief Justice Sinirall said about this attempted curative act: — "The act of 1872 is not relied on to waive mere Irregularities in the exe- cution of the power, but as confer- ring power by retrospective opera- tion. If the bonds are obligatory on the city of Columbus, they became BO for the first time by virtue of this statute. The legislature of 1873 could not by relation put itself back to 1869 and exercise power not denied or restricted by the constitution of 1833. The measure of its power was the constitution of December, 1869, and it could not ratify an act pre- viously done if at the date it pro- fessed to do so it could not confer power in the first instance. It could authorize a municipal loan condi- tionally. In order to ratify and le- galize a loan previously made, it was bound by the constitutional limita- tion of its power." This doctrine was assented to in Grenada County Su- pervisors V. Brogden, 113 U. S. 371. 1 Lewis V. City of Shreveport (1882), 108 U. S. 282, which held bonds of the city issued to grant pecuniary aid to a railroad without legislative au- thority void as beyond the power of the city to issue, and, as they bore evidence on their face of the purpose for which they were issued, void in the hands of bona fide holders. The holder of the bonds insisted that as the city had employed agents to sell these bonds, and its law officer had given an opinion in favor of their validity, and that they had been rec- ognized in ofiicial statements as binding obligations, and that taxes had been levied to pay principal or in- terest, this amounted to a ratification. The court held that it matters not that such things had been done. Ot- tawa V. Cary, 108 U. S. 110. See,-also, as to the inability of subsequent acts of a corporation to make an ultra vires contract eflfective, Sault Ste. Marie Co. v. Van Dusen, 40 Mich. 429 ; Jefferson County v. Arrighi, 54 Miss. 668; Nash v. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174; Hague V. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 538 ; Brady v. Mayor, 30 N. Y. 312; Bryan V. Page, 51 Tex. 332; Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449 ; Cowen v. West Troy, 43 Barb. 48 ; Brown v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 239 ; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110 ; McDonald y. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23; Smith v. Newburgh, 77 640 ULTEA TIEE8. [§ 625. violation of the terms of a statute cannot be validated by a sub- sequent ratification by the corporation.' An act of a munici- pal corporation, void for want of authority to do it, cannot be validated by an estoppel incurred by the corporation ; other- wise all limitations on the power of such corporation imposed by the legislature for the public good might be evaded at the mere volition of the corporation.^ § 625. Estoppel. — In general, a municipal corporation is not estopped from denying the validity of a contract with its officers, when there has been no authority for making such a contract. The doctrine of ultra vires is applied with greater strictness to municipal bodies than to private corporations.' cannot be evaded by estoppel. North- ern Bank v. Porter, 110 U. S. 608, 619. s Newberry v. Fox (1887), 37 Minn. 141 ; s. C, 33 N. W. Eep. 333, which held a contract for making certain street improvements made by the municipal officers in the first inr stance without haVing called upon the adjacent proprietor to make them, and a default upon his part, which the charter required, to have been unauthorized; also that the contracting party could not recover after he performed the contract, he not having been misled as to any fact. He was legally chargeable with notice of the restricted power of the municipal authorities under the char- ter. See, also, as to being charge- able with notice, McDonald v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 28 ; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143. As to applying the doc- trine of ultra vires, Mayor v. Roy, 19 Wall. 468; Brady v. Mayor of New York, 30 N. Y. 312 ; Hague v. City of Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527 ; 1 Dillon on Munic Corp., § 457 ; Nash v. City of St Paul, 8 Minn. 172; Concord v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165, 170; Crow v. Oxford, 119 U. S. 215 ; Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218 ; S. a, 10 N. E. Rep. 155 ; Donovan v. City of New York, 33 N. Y. 291, 293. N. Y. 130; Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. Law, 45 ; Taymouth v. Koehler, 35 Mich. 22; Marsh u Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676 ; Horton v. Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513 ; Scott v. Shreveport, 20 Fed. Rep. 714 ; San Diego Water Co. V. San Diego, 59 Cal. 517 ; Bank v. Statesville, 84 N. C. 169; City of La- redo V. Macdonell, 52 Tex. 511. As to effect of use of a school-house which has been constructed at an expense beyond the authority reposed in the building committee by the vote of the district, or similar cases as a rat- ification, Wilson V. School District, 32 N. H. 118 ; Kingman v. School Dis- trict, 2 Cush. 425; Davis v. School District, 24 Me. 349 ; Lane v. School District, 10 Met 462; Chaplin v. Hill, 24 Vt 628 ; Fisher v. School District, 4 Cush. 494; Taft v. Montague, 14 Mass. 283 ; Keyser v. School District, 35 N. H. 477 ; Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt 147. 1 Platter v. Elkhart County (Ind., 1885), 1 West Rep. 235. 2Hoey V. Gilroy (1891), 37 N. Y. St Eep. 754 ; s. c., 14 N. Y. SupL 159 ; Pet- erson V. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449, 454, hold- ing that no sort of a ratification can , make good an act without corporate authority. N. Y. &c. R Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N. Y. 473, that a statute § 626.] ULTRA VIEE8. 641 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, with reference to this doc5- trine, said : — "A different rule of law would, in effect, vastly enlarge the power of public agents to bind a municipality by contracts, not only unauthorized but prohibited by the law. It would tend to nullify the limitations and restrictions imposed with respect to the powers of such agents; and to a danger- ous extent expose the public to the very evils and abuses which such limitations are designed to prevent." ^ §626. Purchasers of bonds are bound to take notice. — The power of a municipal corporation to issue coupon bonds is derived from the legislative authority of the State, and the laws conferring such power form a part of the bonds them- selves. Accordingly, every person dealing with such corpo- ration must, at his peril, take notice of the existence and terms of the law by which it is claimed the power to issue such bonds is conferred.^ 1 Nash V. City of St Paul, 8 Minn. 172. In State v. Atlantic City (1887), 49 N. J. Law, 558; S. C, 9 AtL Rep. 759, where the city had entered into a contract with a water-works com- pany for a supply of water, and after some delay an action was brought by the company to enforce its contract, it was held that neither the city nor a tax-payer was estopped from contesting the authority of the city to enter into such contract, and that the writ of certiorari was prop- erly allowed, it having been applied for within a reasonable time after it bad become- apparent that by the proceedings a burden might be im- posed on the tax-payers. See, also. State V. Newark, 80 N. J. Law, 303; State V. Hudson, 39 N. J. Law, 475 ; State V. Hudson, 39 N. J. Law, 115; State V. Water Coram'rs, 30 N. J. Law, 347 ; State v. Paterson, 36 N. J. Law, 159 ; State v. Trenton, 36 N. J. Law, 499 ; State v. Perth Amboy, 38 N. J. Law, 425; Haines v. Campion, 8 Harr. 49; State v. Blake, 35 N. J. 41 Law, 208 ; Bonne v. Logan, 43 N. J. Law, 431. When, however, a munic- ipal corporation had power to bor- row money if certain facts existed, and the legislature had manifested an intention to invest certain offl- , cials or agents with authority to de- termine the existence of such facts, and they have solemnly asserted their existence, the corporation has been held to be estopped f roih con- testing its obligations when in the hands of those who loaned thereon in good faith and without knowl- edge of the lack of power, on the ground that the facts did not exist Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Eliza- beth, 42 N. J. Law, 235. 2 Nat Bank v. City of St Joseph (1887), 31 Fed. Rep. 316. In this case it was a condition of these bonds that interest should cease upon a tender of the principal by the governing au- thorities of the city at any time. And the court held that it was be- yond the power of the mayor and councilmen to curtail or impair the 642 ULTBA VIEES. [§ 627. § 627. Corporations may contest nitra Tires contracts. — "Where contracts are not authorized by the charter or by other legislative act, and are clearly without the scope of the power of the corporation, and therefore void, in actions therein the corporation may interpose the plea of ultra vires, setting up as a defense its own want of power to enter into the con- tract.' The acts of oiBcers cannot bind the local public by estoppel^ where the officers performing these acts cannot bind them by a direct contract.^ A %iunicipal corporation incurs effect of this condition by issuing bonds of a different tenor. See, also, Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S. 693, 697 ; Ogden i). Daviess County, 103 U. S. 634 ; Northern Bank v. Porter Township, 110 U. S. 608, 618; s. G, 4 Sup. Ct Eep. 254. In Duke v. Brown (1887), 96 N. C. 137 ; s. a, 1 S. E. Eep. 937, It was held that where there is an inherent constitutional defect in the statute authorizing the issue of municipal bonds, a purchaser of the bonds takes them with notice of their illegal origin, for purchasers must in- quire into the authority by which the bonds are issued, and are held to no- tice of any defect therein. See, also, as to the duty of persons to take notice of the scope of power of officers in coutractihg for municipalities. Mayor &C. V. Eschbach, 18 Md. 376 ; Mayor &c. u. Reynolds, 30 Md. 1 ; Mayor &c. V. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85 ; Horn v. Mayor &c., 30 Md. 318 ; Mayor &c v. Mus- grave, 48 Md. 373 ; Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357; Wyandotte v. Zeitz, 21 Kan. 649; Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475, 493 ; Hayes v. Covington, 21 Miss. 408; Taft V. Pittsford, 28 Vt 386 ; Mont- gomery City Council v. Mont. & W. Pt R. Co., 31 Ala. 76 ; Hodges v. Buf- falo, 2 Denio, 110; Dill v. Wareham, 7 Met. 438 ; Branham v. San Jose, 34 Cal. 583, 603; McCoy «. Brant. 53 Cal. ^7 ; Wallace v. San Jose, 39 CaL 180; State v. Mayor, 39 Md. 85, 111; State V. Haskell, 20 Iowa, 376 ; Peo- ple V. Baraga, 39 Mich. 554 ; Neely v. Yorkville, 10 S. C. 141 ; C/aycraf t v. Selvage, 10 BUsh, 696 ; Treadway V. Schnauber, 1 Dak. 236 ; Laycock V. Baton Rouge, 35 La. Ann. 475; Keating v. Kansas, 84 Mo. 415. 1 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 457 ; Cheeney v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53; BuiTill V. Boston, 3 Cliff. 590 ; Mar- tin V. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545 ; Norwich Overseers &c. v. New Berlin &c., 18 Johns. 383; Seibrecht v. New Or- leans, 13 La. Ann. 496; Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343, 348 ; Phila- delphia V. Flanigen, 47 Pa. St. 31 ; Cuyler v. Rochester, 13 Wend. 165; Albany v. Cunliff, 3 N. Y. 165; Hal- stead v. New York, 8 N. Y. 430; Brown v. Utica, 3 Barb. 104; Cor- nell «. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510; Boy- land V. Mayor &o., 1 Sandf. 37 ; Vin- cent V. Nantucket, 13 Cush. 103, 105 ; Stetson V. Kempton, 13 Mass. 372; Parson v. Inhabitants of Goshen, 11 Pick. 396; Wood v. Lynn, 1 Allen, 108 ; Spalding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71 ; Mitchell V. Rockland, 45 Me. 496; Tippecanoe Co. Comm'rs v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403 ; Inhabitants v. Weir, 9 Ind. 234 ; Appleby v. New York, 15 How. Pr. 438; Brady v. New York, 30 N. Y. 313 ; Estep v. Keokuk County, 18 Iowa, 199; Maupin v. Franklin County, 67 Mo. 327 ; Lincoln u. Stock- ton, 75 Me. 141. 2 Platter v. Elkhart County (Ind., 1885), 1 West. Rep. 235. A public corporation, such as a county or a § 628.] TJLTEA VIEES. 643 no liability for work done under a void contract, and wiiere there is no guaranty on its part that the forms of law have been complied with, and its officers, without authority, at- tempt to contract, those dealing with it must see to it that its agents have power to act.' § 628. Liability upon ultra vires contracts. — Where a con- tract is void because of the express declaration of a statute, or because prohibited in terms, the retention by a municipal- ity of the fruits of such a contract will not subject it to liabil- ity, .cither under the contract or upon a quantum meruit? 1S.O estoppel can ordinarily arise from the act of a municipal corporation or officer done in violation of or without authority of law. Every person is presumed to know the nature and extent of the powers of municipal officers and therefore can- not be deemed to have been deceived or misled by acts done without legal authority.' city, is composed of the inhabitants of a locality, and the ofScers are not agents in the strict sense of the term, but are persons acting in an official capacity. See, also, Baumgai-tner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575; s. c, 50 Am. Rep. 820 ; Strosser v. City, 100 Ind. 443 ; City v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 ; S. a, 49 Am. Rep. 416. 1 Daly V. San Francisco (1887), 73 Cal. 154 ; s. C, 13 Pac. Rep. 331. The Supreme Court of the United States have thus stated the rule : — " Indi- viduals as well as courts must take notice of the extent of authority con- ferred by law upon a person acting in an official capacity." See, also, Union School Tp. v. First Nat Bank (Ind., 1885), 1 West. Rep. 107; Reeve School Tp. V. Dodson, 98 Ind. 497; Ajct V. Johnson School Tp., 90 Ind. 101 ; Pine Civil Tp. v. Huber Mfg. Co., 83 Ind. 131 ; Cummins v. Seymour, -79 Ind. 491; Driftwood &c. Co. v. Board, 73 Ind. 334 ; Murphy v. City of Louisville, 9 Bush, 189. ' GuOse River Bank v. Willow Lake School Tp. (No. Dak., 1890), 44 N. W. Rep. 1003; Dickinson v. City of Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65 ; McBrien V. City of Grand Rapids, 33 N. W. Rep. 206 ; Tube Works Co. v. City of Chamberlain (Dak.), 37 N. W. Rep. 763. aSeeger v. Mueller (1890), 133 111. 86 ; s. c, 24 N. E. Rep. 513, where the rule was applied in a case in which purchasers of school lands claimed an easement of a right of way, over roads laid out by school ti:ustees, which laying out of roads waS' held to be ultra vires and void. In King V. Mahaska County (1888), 75 Iowa, 329, it was held that, where the work done under additional and void con- tracts in the erection of a court- house had been paid for in the pe- riodical estimates of an architect, and afterwards the. contractor brought an action against the county for a lai'ge sum of money, involving all the transactions between the par- ties, based on the several contracts, the county was not concluded, by such payments, from insisting that the additional contracts were illegal 644 TJLTEA TIKES. [§ 629. § 629. The same subject continued. — In a case where the United States Supreme Court held' that under the charter power of a city it was vested with power to cause sidewalks to be erected, and could delegate its power to the mayor and chairman of the committee on streets and alleys, to make, in its behalf and pursuant to its directions, a contract for doing the work, there was an objection that it had not the power to pay for the work done under this contract in bonds and that there should be no recovery against the city for that reason. The court, as the issue of bonds was not prohibited by any statute, said : — "At most the issue was unauthorized. At most there was a defect of power. The promise to give bonds to the plaintiffs in payment of what they undertook to do was therefore, at farthest, only ultra vvresj and in such a case, though the specific performance of an engagement to do a thing transgressive of its corporate power may not be en- forced, the corporation can be held liable on its contract. Hav- ing received benefits at the expense of the other contracting party, it cannot object that it was not empowered to perform what it promised in return, in the matter in which it promised to perform.^ and that all the money paid should within the letter of their grant" But be regarded as paid on the amount in Scofield v. City of Council Bluffs named in the original contract. Long (1886), 68 Iowa, 695, it was held that V. Boone County, 36 Iowa, 60, dis- where a city, pursuant to a contract, tinguished. In Trustees of Belleview in payment for work in grading V. Hohn (1884), 82 Ky. 1, an action to streets issued certificates of assess- recover for work done on streets ment upon the owners of abutting under a contract in which the con- lots, it impliedly agreed that they tractor bound himself not to look to were valid, and upon it being shown the city for payment, but to the that they were not valid, because the property owners whose lots abutted city had no power to assess the cost upon the street, it was held that the of such grading upon the abutting corporation could not be held liable lot-owners, the contract could not be upon implied promises by reason of set aside, and the city was held liable benefits received. The court said : — for the contract price of the work, " This refusal to hold corporations and not onl3' for the reasonable value liable is done for the protection of thereof. Bucroft v. City of Council the inhabitants of the corporation Bluffs, 63 Iowa, 646. and because the only power the cor- ' Hitchcock v. Galveston (1877), 96 poration has is from the law creating U. S. 341. The court referred with it, and instead of recognizing a more approval to State Board of Agrioult- liberal rule the courts are inclined ui'e v. Citizens' Street Railway Co., to hold corporations and their agents 47 Ind. 407, holding that "although §;630.] ULTB4. VIBES. 645 ,§ 630. Ultra vires^ when not a defense to actions by the corporation. — One who has, made a contract with a city which is ultra vires on its part, as, for instance, for the working of the city's convicts sentenced to the workhouse, and reaped the .benefits of such contract, cannot defend in an action for their work rendered for him under the contract on the ground that the contract was against public policy or that it was not within the power of the city to enter into it.' Where a municipal cor- poration has made a contract with an individual and it has been executed, and nothing remains to be done except for him there may be a defect of power in a corporation to make a contract, yet if a contract made by it is not in vio- lation of its charter, or of any statute prohibiting it, and the corporation has by its promise induced a party relying on the promise and in execu- tion of the contract to expend money and perform his part thereof, the cor- poration is liable on the contract See, also, substantially to the same effect, Allegheny City v. McClurkin, 14 Pa. St 81, and more or less in point, Ma- ker V. Chicago, 38 IlL 366 ; Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 490 ; Argenti v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 256 ; Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370. The court, in Hitchcock V. Galveston, supra, held that the contract remained in force BO far as it was in other respects law- ful, and that the action' for damages for breach of the same was main- tainable. East St. Louis v. East St Louis Gas L. &'C. Co., 98 111. 415; Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 ; 3 Parsons on Contracts, 790 ; Field on Corp., § 278, par. 8; Bridge Co. v. Frankfort 18 B. Mon. 41 ; San Fran- cispo Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 CaL 453. iCity of St Louis v. Davidson (1890), 102 Mo. 149. The city could successfully interpose the plea of ultra vires if sued upon such a con- tract but tl>e other party cannot plead its disability. The charter of this city, while not permitting such a contract does not prohibit it; therefore the contract tliough ultra vires was not unlawful. This dis- tinction is sanctioned by the authori- ties. 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 936 ; McDonald w. Mayor, 68 N. , Y. 23 ; Bigelow on Estoppel (5th ed.), 465, 685 ; Oregonian By. Co. v. Rail- road, 10 Saw. 464 See, also. Mayor v. Harrison, 30 N, J. Law, 73, where a collector of assessments for street; improvements and his sureties sought to defend an action on his bond upon the ground that the act of the council of the municipality in creating the office and his appoint- ment to it was ultra vires and void ; it was held that there was no power ■ in the common council to create the oflSce, but that the appointee was , estopped from denying the validity of the ordinance. Middleton v. City , of Elkhart 130 Ind. 166, was decided on the same principle ; also Hender- sonville v. Price, 96 N. C. 423 ; City of Burlington v. Gilbert 31 Iowa, 356 ; Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 ; Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush, 330 ; Mayor /y. Sonneborn, 113 N. Y. 423 j Commonwealth v. Wolbert 6 Bin- ney, 393 ; Postmaster-General v. Rice, Gilpin, 554 ; Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. 0. 464. 646 ULTRA VIEES. [§031. to pay the last instalment of the price agreed upon for the privilege accorded him, and he has reaped all the benefits he had proposed to himself in making the contract, the doctrine of vMra vires does not apply.' § 631. Tax-payers' resistance. — The courts generally now rebognize the rights of property holders or taxable inhabitants to resort to judicial authority to restrain municipal corpora- tions and their officers from translfiending their lawful powers or violating their legal duties in any unauthorized mode which will increase the burden of taxation, or otherwise injuriously affect tax-payers and their property ; such as an unwarranted appropriation and squandering of corporate funds or unjusti- fiable disposition of corporate property; an illegal levy and collection of taxes not due or exigible, etc' 'Town of Monticello v. Cohn (1886), 48 Ark. 354 ; S. c, 3 S. W. Eep. 130, an action on a bond giiren by defendant to the corporation for a privilege, and it was held he could not plead the want of corporate power to make the contract Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 ; Par- ish V. Wheeler, 23 N. Y. 494; Whit- ney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 63; Pook V. Lafayette Building AsB'n, 71 liid 357 ; Weber «, Agricult- ural Society, 44 Iowa, 239; Helena u Turner, 36 Ark. 577. 2 Handy v. City of New Orleans (1887), 39 La. Ann. 107; s. C, 1. So. Eep. 593, sustaining an action based upon charges that the city had in ex- cess of its powers and in violation of prohibitory provisions in its charter passed an ordinance under which a contract of lease of public wharves was ientered into. Followed and ap- proved in Conery v. New Orleans Water-works Co. (1887), 39 La. Aim. 770 ; s. C, 3 So. Rep. 555. As to the sub- ject-matter and amount involved in giving jurisdiction to the court the tax-payer stands in judgment for the whole community, irrespective of the distributive interest he may have in the matter at issue. Pro hoc vice, he is considered as the payer of all taxes. See, also, Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601 ; Gifford v. Railroad Co., 10 N. J. Eq. 171; Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375 ; Wade v. Eichtnond, 18 Gratfc 563; Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338 New London v. Brainard, 33 Conn. 553 ; Harvey v. Indianapolis, 33 Ind. 344 ; Barr v. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170 Stevens v. Railroad Co., 29 Vt 546 Webster v. Harrington, 33 Conn. 131 ; Terrell v. Sharon, 34 Conn. 105 Merrell v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126 Normand v. Coe, 8 Neb. 18 ; Oliver v. Keightley, 34 Ind. 514; Drake v. Phillips, 40 lUi 388; Grant v. Daven- port, 36 Iowa, 396 ; Douglas v. Placer- ville, 1 8 Cal. 643 ; Smith v. Magourick, 44 Ga. 163; Newmeyer v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 53 Mo. 81 : Wright v. Bishop, 88 111. 303 ; Rice v. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570; Place v. Providence, 12 R. I. 1; Allison v. Railway Co., 9 Bush, 247 ; Bound v. Railroad Co., 45 Wis. 543; ElytOn Land Co. w Ayres, 63 Ala. 413 ; Boyle v. City of New Or- leans, 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 329 ; White V. County Comm'rs, 13 Oregon, §632.] ULTEA VIBES. 647 § 633. Tax-payers' suits.— Tax-payers may maintain suits against towns and their officers to prevent or remedy misap- plication of town funds, their relations to the municipality being analogous to those of stockholders to a private corpora- tion.' And chancery has power in such cases to grant affirm- ative as well as injunctive relief.^ Where nothing has been done further than the adoption by the common council of a city of a resolution that the mayor and city clerk take immediate steps to let a contract for the construction of water-works for the city, a court of equity will not interfere at the suit of tax- payers to enjoin the threatened enforcement of such resolution, even though its adoption by the council was ultra vires and therefore unauthorized.' 317 ; S. C, 13 Am. & Eng. Corpi Cas. 485; Whelen's Case, 108 Pa. St 163; s. G, 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. ITif City of Delphi v. Sturgman, 104 Ind. 343 ; S. C, 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 37 ; City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 ; s. &, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 626; Roper v. McWhorter, 77 Va. 214 ; s. c, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 360 ; Stocket v. New Albany, 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 85 ; Ayer v. Law- rence, 59 N. Y. 192; Flagg v. St Charles, 27 La. Ann. 319 ; Babington V. St Charles, 37 La. Ann. 331 ; Stev- enson V. Weber, 29 La. Ann. 105; Tax-payers' Ass'n v. City of New Or- leans, as La. Ann. 567 ; Saloy v. City of New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 79; Rivet V. City, 35 La. Ann. 134. 1 Russell V. Tate (1889), 53 Ark. 541 ; s. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 160 ; 7 L. R. An. 180 ; Jacksonport v. "Watson, 33 Ark. 704 ; Crampton v. Zabriski, 101 U. S. 601 ; 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. 914, 915 ; Blakie v. Staples, 13 Grant (Canada), 67, cited in note on p. 903, 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. 2 3 Story Eq. Jur. 1253; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152 ; Citizens' Loan Ass'n V. Lyon, 29 N. J. Eq. 110 ; Att'y- Gen. V. Poole, 1 Craig & Ph. 17 ; Peo- ple V. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491 ; Att'y-Gen. V. Boston, 123 Mass. 460 ; Att'y-Gen. V, Dublin, 1 Bligh, 312 ; 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp., 909-912. In Appeal of Tarbell ^1889), 129 Pa. St 146 ; s. c, 18 Atl. Rep. 758, the court held it proper to restrain by injunction a board of school directors from appro- priating money to the erection of a school building upon lands conveyed to a county in trust " to be appropri- ated to the use of the public build- ings of the county, an academy and church or churches," until the title to the ground on which the buildings might lawfully be erected should have been acquired. 3 Pedrick v. City of Rlpon (1889), 73 Wis. 622 ; s. c, 41 N. W. Rep. 705. See, also, Judd V. Fox Lake, 28 Wis. 583 ; West V. Ballard, 32 Wis. 168; Nevil V. Clifford, 55 Wis. 161 ; Roe v. Lin- coln Co., 56 Wis. 66 ; Giekey v. Mer- rill, 67 Wis. 459; Sage v. Fifield, 68 Wis. 546. In Snyder v. Foster (1889), 77 Iowa, 638 ; S. C, 42 N. W. Rep. 506, a tax-payer, it was held, could main- tain an action to prevent the county officers paying out money on a con- tract for the erection of a bridge which the county had no legal au^ thority to erect 2 High on Injunc- tions, § 1560. Hospers v, Wyatt, 63 048 UI-TP4 VIEES. [§§ 633, 634. § 633. The same subject continued. — Where a city is at- tempting to dispose of public property without authority of law, one who has property liable to taxation in the city may maintaiti an action to restrain such disposition, though he be not a resident of the city.^ And the court cannot inquire into the motives of the prosecutor of such a suit, nor deny him re* lief because his interest as a tax^payer is inconsiderable, Nor need he defer his action until a tax has actually been levied upon his property by reason of the wrongful disposition of the property of the city. He may have the preventive rem- edy by injunction as soon as damage is threatened by the un- lawful act.' § 634^. Suits to restrain the enforcement of contracts. — The Supreme Court of New Jersey having decided that the Iowa, 265; Cornell College v. Iowa County, 32 Iowa, 620; Carthan v. Lang, 69 Iowa, 384 In Briggs v. Borden (1888), 71 Mich. 87; a C, 38 N. W. Rep. 712, the right of a resi- dent tax-payer of a school district which the township board of school inspectors, acting without jurisdic- tion, had attempted to divide and par- cel out, to other districts, to file a bill to restrain the sale of the school-house and other property of the original district, was sustained: the court said : — " If the school inspectors are permitted to take this last step in the destruction of the district, the mis- chief and damage to him may be ir- reparable." iBrockman v. City of Creston (1890), 79 Iowa, 587; S. C, 44 N. W. Rep. 822. As to residence or citizen- ship of person whose interests were about to be prejudiced by action of municipal corporation, not being es- sential to authorize an action to re- strain, see, also, Brandirff v. Harrison County, 50 Iowa, 164; Olmstead v. Board, 24 Iowa, 33; Litchfield v. Polk County, 18 Iowa, 70. In Brock- man V. City of Creaton, supra, the court explain their ruling thus : — "It must be remembered that the doctrine we recognize is not based upon the right of the property owner or tax-payer, resident or non-resident, to dictate and control the adminis- tration of the city government and to nullify by proceedings in the court the lawful acts of the city oflScers, legislative or executive, done in the administration of the city's affairs, for the reason that the proposed acts of the city do not promote its interest or are against public policy. The, foundation of the doctrine is the in- terference with the rights of the tax- payer in the increase of the burden of taxation, or the liability thereto, by misappropriating the property of the city, which may demand the levy of taxes to acquire other property in its place ; or the property, having been acquired through taxation, its dis- position would be in effect a misap- propriation of taxes, which may oc- casion levies to take the place of the misapplied tax." 2 Brockman v. City of Creston (1890), 79 Iowa, 589; S. &, 44 N. W. Rep. 822. I 634.] ULTBA VIBES. 649 resolution of a board of freeholders for the purchase of and payment for land on which to erect a court-house by the issue of bonds was illegal for the lack of authority in them, and the vendor having brought suit on the bonds, the United States Supreme Court sustained an action of tax-payers for restraining the prosecution of the action, and^to enjoin the board from pay-- ing the bonds, and to direct a reconveyance of the land and a surrender of the void bonds, holding they were entitled to the relief prayed for.' A tax-payer of a city has sufficient inter- est in the subject-matter to sue to enjoin the consummation of an illegal contract by the city with a bank, by w^hich it is proposed to take the public moneys out of the hands of the legal custodian of them, and deposit them in a bank as a loan at interest.- But it has been held that a person suing under a statute which provided that any tax-payer might institute a suit for an injunction to restrain the execution of a contract by a municipal corporation in contravention of its powers in case of the failure of the public prosecutor to institute such suit could not complain that the owners of a majority of the frontage of lots on the proposed line of a street railroad, the franchise of which, granted by the city, plaintiff attacked as illegal, had not given their written consent thereto, he not being an owner of any such lots.' A contract for paving a street awarded to contractors for a " vulcanite asphalt pave- ment," a kind neither called for in the ordinance of the city council nor even hinted at in the advertisement inviting bids, and where' the parties proposing to bid were instructed to pre- pare their own specifications and submit them with their re- spective bids, has been held illegal, null and void as beyond the power of the council to make, as they did not comply with the statutes for letting such contracts to the lowest bidder.^ 1 Cranopton v. Zabriskie (1879), 101 » Simmons v. City of Toledo (1889), 5 U. 8. 601 ; Clark v. Saline County, Ohio Cir. Ct R. 124. 9 Neb. 516; Pimental v. City of San *Marzet r. Pittsburgh (1890), 137 Francisco, 21 Cal. 362; Argenti v. Pa. St 548; S. a, 20 Atl. Rep. 693; San Francisco, 16 Gal. 282 ; Parkers- 27 W. N. C. 73. And a property burg o. Brown, 106 U. S. 487. owner on the street which was to be ^Yarnell v. City of Los Angeles paved has a right to maintain a suit (1891), 87 Cal. 603; s. C, 25 Pac. Eep. to enjoin the prevention of the work, 767. though it be conceded that the bill 650 ULTBA TIBES. [§§ 635, 636. § 635. Injunction tlie proper remedy. — A contract made in the name of a city not in the mode and manner and upon the conditions prescribed by the ordinance is void, as a com- pliance with those conditions by the governing power of the city is essential to the exercise of the power conferred.* Where city authorities undertake to make a contract without the lawful power to make it, and the contract, if made, will increase the burden of taxation, tax-payers constitute a spe- cial class, having a special interest in the subject-matter dis- tinct from that of the general public. In all such cases in- junction is, upon obvious principles, the most convenient and appropriate remedy.^ § 636. The same subject continued. — But a tax-payer can- not have a contract of purchase of property for the county set aside as being ultra vires, and the treasurer enjoined from paying warrants issued for the residue of the purchase- money, his action being against the county treasurer and affect injuriously the rights and ■was filed by him as a cover for an unsuccessful bidder for such con- tract 1 Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. Key- ser (1890), 73 Md. 106. The court said : — '• They had no power to make a contract without advertising for proposals, nor had they any power to make a contract without opening all the proposals filed within the time designated, nor had they any power to award the contract to any one other than the lowest responsi- ble bidder." 2 Mayor &a of Baltimore v. GUI, 31 Md. 895. In a later case, St Mary's Industrial School v. Brown, '45 Md. 810, 836, an injunction -was held to be the proper remedy when- ever it appears that municipal corporations and their officers are "acting ultra vires or are assum- ing or exercising a power over the property of the citizen, or over cor- porate property or funds, which the law does not confer upon them, and where such unauthorized act may property of the parties complaining." The cases were approved and fol- lowed in Mayor &a of Baltimore v. Keyser (1890), 73 Md. 106, where, after holding that the mayor and aldermeii had no power to make a contract for lighting a portion of the city except in the mode and manner prescribed by law, and sustaining the tax-payers' right to an injunc- tion, the court said that the complain- ants "have a right to require that the- money they have contributed for the public benefit shall be spent only for the purposes and in the manner authorized by law, and that every security designed to protect its proper expenditure shall be faith- fully observed. This right is a vital one to them, and they are required to allege no other injury than that it is about to be violated. They wUl be injured if the violation is per- mitted by the act of violation alone." See, also, Talcott v. City of Buffalo, 57 Hun, 43. § 636.] ULTEA VIKE8. 661 the supervisors and the county not a party, for the reason that such a decree would be inequitable while the county is allowed to retain the property, and its title could not be disturbed in such an action.^ Where the consideration received by a cor- poration under an ultra vires contract can be restored, a court of equity will not relieve the corporation as against the contract, without providing for a restoration of the consid- eration.^ 1 Turner v. Crozen (1866), 70 Iowa, a03. ■J Turner v. Crozen (1886), 70 Iowa, 203, in which case the court held that the county should not be relieved from its contract for the purchase of a poor-farm, which purchase was ul- tra vires, without a reconveyance to the vendor. The court thus distin- guished a class of cases : — " We are aware that there is a class of cases where courts of equity declare a con- tract ultra vires, and grant relief in favor of a corporation, without any decree for the restoration of the con- sideration received by the corpora- tion. This is so where municipal funds have been issued in excess of the constitutional limit of indebted- ness, and the money obtained thereon has been expended. Cou rts of equity decree the cancellation of such bond, or enjoin payment without decree- ing repayment to the bondholders of the money received by the corpora^ tion on the bond. But this results from the necessity of the case. If the courts should decree repayment, the very object of the constitutional provision would be defeated." See, also, Pratt v. Short, 53 How. Pr. 506 ; Leonard u City of Canton, 35 Miss. 189 ; Moore v. Mayor Sec, 73 N. Y. 338; Lucas Co. v. Hunt, 5 Ohio, 488. In Nance v. Johnson (Tex., 1893), 19 S. W. Rep. 559, it was held that tax- ' payera could not maintain a suit to enjoin the payment of the school fund to a teacher under a contract made with him by the school trust- ees, on the ground that the trustees had no authority to make such a con- tract with him, as his school was a sectai'ian one, unless they had ex- hausted the remedies allowed them under the law of appeal from the school trustees to the superintendent of public instruction, and from him to the State board of education, un- der Sayles Civil Statutes of Texas, article 3715. In Town of Winamac V. Huddleston (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 509, a tax-payer's action for in- junction to restrain the issue of bonds of a school district which were about to be issued without authority was sustained, as there was no other remedy of equal power of efficiency, the case coming within the rule in Watson V. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74; Denny v. Denny, llSInd. 33; s. C, 14 N. E. Rep. 593 ; Bishop v. Moorman, 98 Ind. 1 ;. English v. Smock, 34 Ind. 115, 134; S. c, 7 Am. Rep. 215; Elson V. O'Dowd, 40 Ind. 300, 303 ; Clark v. Jeffersonville &c. R. Co., 44 Ind. 248 ; Thatcher v. Humble, 67 Ind. 444; Spicer v. Hoop, 51 Ind. 365, 370 ; Bon- nell V. Allen, 53 Ind. 130. CHAPTER XVII. IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. (o) Implied Powbes. i 637. General statetuent of the rula 638. Compromise of claims. 639. The same subject continued — Application of the rule in Iowa. 640. The dissenting opinion in the Iowa case. 641. Compromise of ultra vires claims. 643. Submission to arbitration. 643. Employment of attorneya 644. Power to hold property in trust. 645. Acquisition of property for other than municipal pur- poses 646. The same subject continued — Erecting public buildings. 647. Power to indemnify ofBcers. 648. The same subject continued, 649. Offers of rewards. 650. The same subject continued — The power generally denied. 651. The same subject continued — The foregoing rule qualified. 652. Expenditures in obtainiug or opposing legislation. (6) Eminent Domain. 653. Nature and definition. 654. The same subject continued — Constitutional limitation. 655. What property may be taken. 656. Quantity of estate. 657. What constitutes a taking. 658. The same subject continued — The leading case. ) 659, The same subject continued — Constitutional amendments. 66,0.. Property already appropriated to public use. 661. The same subject continued. 662. Change of grade. 668. Change of use — Additional use. 664. Thesame subject continued — Electric railways. 665. Grant of power to municipal corporations. 666. Public use and necessity of appropriation, by whom de- termined. 667. Legislatit'e declaration con- clusive; 668. Public use as respects munici- palities — Parks and streets. 669. The same subject continued — Water, gas, eta 670. The same subject continued — Cemeteries, sewers, etc. 671. The same subject continued — Leasing for public use. 672. The same subject continued — Ornamental purposes. 673. Notice of proceeding — Neces- sity for. 674. Parties entitled to notice. 675. Service of notice. 676. Treaty with the owner. 677. The application or petition. 678. The tribunal 679. Eight to jury trial. 680. Eight. to abandon proceedings. 681. Damages upon discontinuance of proceedings. § 637.] IMPLIED POWEES. 653 i 682. Cornpensation, 683. Elements in estimating com- pensation. 684. Tlie same subject continued. 685. Benefits. 686. Payment 687. Review of proceedings — Cter- tiorari. 688. The same subject continued — Appeal. (a) Implied Powees. § 637. General statement of the rule. — The powers of public corporations are either express or implied. " The former are those which the legislative act under which they exist confers in express terms ; the latter are such as are necessary to carry into effect those which are expressly granted and which must therefore be ' presumed to have been within the intention of the legislative grant. . . . But without being ex- pressly empowered so to do they may sue and be sued ; ^ may have a common seal; may purchase and hold lands and other property for corporate purposes and convey the same ; may make by-laws whenever necessary to accomplish the design of the incorporation and enforce the same by penalties; may enter into contracts to effectuate the corporate purposes. Ex- cept as to these incidental powers, which need not be though they usually are mentioned in the charter, the charter itself, or the general law under which they exist, is the measure of the authority, to be exercised. And the general disposition of the courts of this country has been to confine municipali- ties within the limits that a strict construction of the grants of powers in their charters will assign to them ; thus applying substantially the same rule that is applied to charters of pri- vate incorporations." * 1 " I have no doubt of the right of the school district as a body corpo- rate to interfere and ask the aid of equity to prevent the consummation of an illegal and void apportionment and creation of a debt against it by the collection of the same out of the taxable property virithin its limits." Morse, J., in School Dist. v. School Dist, (1886), 63 Mich. 51, 58. Courts take judicial notice of the powers and capacities of public corporations, and in actions by them it is not nec- essary to allege a legal capacity to sue. Janesville v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 7 Wis. 484 2 Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 231. "' A municipal corporation possesses not only the powers specifically con- ferred upon it by its charter, but also such as are necessarily incident to or may fairly be implied from those powers, including all that are essential to the declared object of its existence." Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268, 271, citing 654 IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§§ 638, 639. § 638. Compromise of claims. — It is well settled that mu- nicipal corporations have the power to effect the compromise of claims in favor of or against them. This is a corollary to the right to sue and be sued.^ They may compromise doubt- ful controversies in which the corporation is a party either as plaintiff or defendant. A judgment in favor of a city is not to be regarded as final while the right of appeal exists ; and at any time before the period in which to appeal expires, the city council may lawfully compwemise the case and settle the claim by the acceptance of a less sum than that of the judg- ment.^ A fortiori the proper authorities may settle a suit in which judgment has been rendered in favor of the plaintiff corporation, but from which the defendant has appealed.' §639. The same subject continued — Application of the rule in Iowa. — A more radical doctrine in favor of the power to compromise is declared by the Supreme Court of Iowa. By statute in that State county supervisors are " to represent their respective counties and to have the care and management of and probably no right to discharge a debt without payment which may be held against parties who are solvent and responsible where no controversy exists in regard to the validity and binding effect of the Indebtedness. This point is discussed in the follow- ing two sections. ' Town of Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 111. 193 ; s. C, 56 Am. Dec. 501, where the town accepted payment of the costs in full settlement of the judg- ment Here, also, the court said that public oflScers could not, under the. pretense of satisfaction, discharge a debt due the corporation without payment "The law vests them with a discretion in such matters which they are to exercise .for the best interests of the corpora- tion. Settlement of an existing con- troversy, if made in good faith, binds the corporation, but if collusively made it is not obligatory." S. c., p. 195. Cf. § 703, n. 1, infra. Le Couteulx v. City of Buffalo, 33 N. Y. 333; Ketchum v. City of Buf- falo, 14 N. Y. 356 ; Buffalo &c. R. Co. V. City of Buffalo, 5 Hill, 309; 1 Dil- lon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 89 ; Angell & Ames on Corp. 346, 364 ; a Kyd on Corp. 149. See, also, 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 1040. 1 People V. San Francisco, 27 Cal. 655; People v. Coon, 35 Cal. 648; Bailey ville v. Lowell, 30 Me. 178 ; Au- gusta V. Leadbetter, 16 Me. 45 ; State V. Martin, 37 Neb. 441 ; S. C, 43 N. W. Rep. 344 ; Grimes v. Hamilton County, 37 Iowa, 390 ; Mills County v. Bur- lington- &c. R Co., 47 Iowa, 66; Hall u Baker (Wis., 1889), 37 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 308 ; Artz v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 153. 2 Agnew V. Brail (1888), 134 111. 813 ; S. C, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 134. But the court said that the council had no power to sell or in any man- ner to dispose of the property of the corporation without consideration; § 640.] IMPLIED P0WEE8. 655 the property and business of the county." Upon an applica- tion for a writ of certiorari to test the power of the supervis- ors to settle a judgment in its favor for less than the amount recovered it was alleged and admitted by demurrer that the judgment debtor was perfectly solvent. The court sustained the action of the board. Premising that the power to compro- mise a claim before it has ieen reduced to a judgment is un- questionable and after judgment when the debtor's solvency is doubtful, Adams, 0. J., continued: — "It is true that in the case at bar the plaintiflF avers that the judgment debtor was solvent. But that averment is immaterial. We cannot go into any such question of fact in this action. The question before us is one of jurisdiction. If the board can make a compromise with an insolvent judgment debtor it must be allowed to judge for itself in any given case as to whether the debtor is insolvent or not, and an error made in this respect, however great, would not affect its jurisdiction." ^ § 640. The dissenting opinion in the Iowa case. — But in a dissenting opinion. Beck, J., uses the following vigorous language: — "My brethren insist that the defendants satisfied the judgment in the exercise of their power to compromise an action to which the county is a party. . . . But an in- superable objection to this position is that the defendants did not compromise the action for the very best of reasons — no action in fact was pending. There had been an action, but a judgment had been rendered therein. If there was a ' compro- mise ' it was not of an action, but of a valid undisputed claim 1 Collins V. Welch (1883), 58 Iowa, condition of the judgment debtor is. 73, 73; S. C, 43 Am. Eep. 111. The such that the board is unable to dis- opinion proceeds as follows : — " It is cover any way of collecting any part true that where a claim has been re- of the judgment. The board should duced to judgment all questions per- have the power to accept a part in taining to the rightfulness of the satisfaction of the whole if in its claim have been adjudicated. But judgment the best interests of the questions may arise subsequent to the county would thereby be promoted, rendition of the judgment, and where All rules of business conduct by which they are of such a character as to the prudent person is governed are render a compromise expedient it is applicable to a county in the man- manifest that the board ought to agement of its affairs under similar have the power to make it Sup- circumstances." pose, for instance, that the financial 656 IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 641. upon a judgment. In the case which is cited * there was an action against the county which it resisted and litigation was pending. There could well be a compromise in that case ; in this case there was no pending litigation and no dispute as to the Validity of the county's claim on the judgment. In my judgment the canceling of the judgment upon the payment of a part only cannot be called a compromise. ... It would be just as improper to apply the word to such a trans- action as to say that in a distribution of alms a compromise is made with the mendicant." Further on in combating the posi- tion of the majority of the court that if the board had juris- diction their action could not be reviewed on questions of fact, he continued : — "I have heard much that has been writ- ten upon the subject of the jurisdiction of courts, but this doc- trine is new to me. I have always understood the rule to be that the jurisdiction of courts (I have never understood that the board of supervisors is higher than the courts) may al- ways be inquired into whenever their judgments are brought in question. It is true that their decisions upon questions of process whereby they obtained jurisdiction cannot be collat- erally assailed. But if upon the face of the record of a judg- ment it appears that jurisdiction is wanting the judgment is void and will be so regarded, both collaterally and on direct attacks." " In the author's view the dissenting opinion is the sounder and safer. § 641. Compromise of ultra vires claims. — The right to compromise disputed claims came into conflict with the doc- trine of ultra vires in a recent case in Massachusetts in such a way -as to afford ground for a vigorous contest. The de- fendant, a ^■Mfflsi-corporation called a fire district, was created by the legislature and invested with certain express and ample powers for the extinguishment of fires within its limits. The district established an electric fire-alarm system, one of the wires of which ran into the house where the plaintiff lived, and during a thunder-storm she was injured by electricity conducted into the house by means of the wire. It was not controverted that the! establishment of the fire-alarm system 1 Grimes v. Hamilton County, 37 * Collins v. Welch, 58 Iowa, 73. Iowa, 290. § 6i2.] IMPLIED P0WEE8. 66T was within the defendant's authority. The plaintiff sued the defendant and obtained a verdict with substantial damages in the superior court under instructions from the presiding jus- tice authorizing it to be rendered. Exceptions were taken, and before they were argued in the appellate court the defendant passed a vote appropriating a sum less than the verdict to be paid in compromise of the action and claim, which the plaint- iff accepted and afterward brought suit to recover. The de- fendant contended that it was not liable in the first instance for any negligence of the fire department or of its members, and that it was wholly beyond its power to assume liability therefor by a compromise of the plaintiff's claim. " This latter objection," said the court, " is clearly untenable, and we have therefore no occasion to consider the former P The court also declared that whether the result of a litigation depends chiefly upon the ascertainment of the facts by the verdict of a jury, or upon the determination of the rules of law found applicable by the court, in either case the uncertainty is one upon which compromises rest and are upheld by the law.' § 642. Submission to arbitration. — The authorities fully sustain the proposition that a municipal corporation may, un- less restricted by its charter, submit a disputed claim against it to arbitration.^ The governing body of the corporation is 1 Prout V. Pittsfield Fire District Agnew v. Brail, 134 111. 313 ; Super- (1891), 154 Mass. 450, citing to the visors v. Bowen, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 24, proposition that the power to sue 30, 31 ; Supervisors v. Birdsall, 4 and be sued is inherent, Rumford Wend. 453 ; Dillon on Munic. Corp., School Dist. V. Wood, 13 Mass. 193 Stebbens v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172, 188 Linehan v. Cambridge, 109 Mass. 212 §§ 30, 477, 478. ^ Paret v. Bayonne, 39 N. J. Law, 559 ; Kane v. City of Fond du Lac, 2 Kent's Commentaries, 377, 278, 283, 40 Wis. 495 ; Brady v. Mayor &c. 284 and notes ; Angell & Ames on of Brooklyn, 1 Barb. 584 ; Shawnee- Coiporations, §§ 23, 24, 78 ; Dillon on town v. Bakt^r, 85 111. 563 ; Buck- Munic. Corp., §g 31, 22. And that the land v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396 ; Inhab- power of compromise is incident to itants of Boston v. Brazer, 11 Mass. the liability to be sued, Cushing v. 447 ; Dix v. Town of Dummerstown, Stoughton, 6 Cush. 389 ; Drake v. 19 Vt. 273 ; Remington v. Harrison Stoughton, 6 Cush. 393 ; Matthews w Coimty Court, 13 Bush (Ky.), 148; Westborough, 131 Mass. 521 ; s. C, 134 In re Arbitration between Eldonand Mass. 555 ;Medwayv.Milford, 21 Pick. Ferguson Townships, 6 Upper Can. 349, 359; Bean v. Jay, 23 Me. 117; L. J. 270; District Tp. of Walnut Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 111. 193 ; v. Rankin, 70 Iowa, 65, which was a 43 658 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 643. the proper agent to exercise this power, and it may intrust the city attorney with the selection of the arbitrators.^ It will be assumed that the attorney of the corporation may in virtue of his retainer consent to a reference of a cause, though he had no authority under seal to appear or to consent to a reference, and after award made it will not be set aside on the supposed want of authority in the attorney to consent to a submission.* If a statute shqjild direct an ascertained sura of money to be paid to an ascertained person by the authori- ties of a township or other political precinct, mam,dcmiu8 might be used to coerce such payment in case of default ; but the report of a statutory referee, confirmed by the court, is in no better legal position than an award made by arbitrators, and the remedy must be an ordinary action.* § 643. Employment of attorneys. — A municipal corpora- tion may without express authority, unless especially restricted, employ an attorney to attend to the corporate interests and to prosecute and defend actions brought by or against the municipality.* But it cannot make a valid contract for ,the case of a claim in favor of a town 'Elinendorf v. Board of Finance, against its treasurer, and where the 41 N. J. Law, 135. court said that an arbitration of dif- < Lewis v. Mayor &c., 9 C. B. (N. S.) ferences is just as legitimate a mode 401 ; Sherman v. Carr, 8 R L 431 ; of settlement as by action. "All per- Smith u Mayor &c., 13 Cal. 531; sons " in a statute relating to arbitra- Hornblower u Duden, 35 CaL 664; tion includes municipal corporations, Thatcher t). Comm'rs, 13 Kan. 183; Springfield v. Walker, 43 Ohio St Ellis v. Washoe County, 7 Nev. 291 ; 543. See, also. Smith v. Philadelphia, Clarke v. Lyon County, 8 Nev. 181 ; 13 Phila. (Pa.) 177. Wilhelm v. Cedar County, 50 Iowa, > Kane v. City of Fond du Lao, 40 254 ; Mt Vernon v. Patton, 94 111. 65 ; Wis. 495. It was held in that case Roper v. Laurienburg, 90 N. C. 427 ; that an alderman who had been act- S. C, 7 Am. & Ebg.' Corp. Cas. 130 ; ive in the council in endeavoring to CuUen v. Carthage, 103 Ind. 196 ; s. G, procure payment of plaintiEE's claim 14 Am. .& Eng. Corp. Cas. 256; 53 against the city was not thereby ren- Am. Rep. 504; Bvuce v. Dickey, 116 dered incompetent to act as an ar- 111. 527 ; State v. Heath, 20 La. Ann. bitrator. At any rate the city, hav- 172 ; S. C, 96 Am. Dec. 390. County ing notice of his conduct, could not commissioners acting in behalf of object after award made. the county possess this power. Ellis «Paret v. Bayonne, 39 N. J. Law, v. Washoe County, 7 Nev. 291; Jack 559 ; Faviell v. Railway Co., 3 Exch. v. Moore, 66 Ala. 184 ; Huffman v. 344 ; Alexandria Coal Co. v. Swann, Cohim'rs, 23 Kan. 281. But their ac- 6 How. 83. tion must be taken at a legal session § 644.] IMPLIED POWERS. 659 employment of an attorney to file a bill in which it seeks to destroy its corporate existence.^ And there is no implied power to employ attorneys to conduct or assist in conducting criminal prosecutions.^ And where the law has provided an oflBcer whose duty it is to attend to all the legal business of a county it has been held that the 'county cannot employ coun- sel.' Counsel may be employed not only in suits in which the corporation is a party on the record, but in those in which it may be a party in interest.* § 644. Power to hold property in trust. — Municipal cor- porations may not only take and hold property in their own the fines it may employ an attorney to assist the State's attorney. Peo- ple V. Warren, 14 111. App. 296. ' Brome v. Cuming County (Neb., 1891), 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 481. See, also, Platte County v. Gerard, 13 Neb. 244 ; Cuming County v. Tate, 10 Neb. 193 ; Ramson v. Mayor &c., 34 Barb. 326 ; Clough v. Hart, 8 Kan. 487 ; State v. Paterson, 40 N. J. Law, 186. Cf. Hugg V. Camden, 39 N. J. Eq. 6. * Ellis V. Washoe County, 7 Nev. 291 ; Thatcher v. Comm'rs, 18 Kan. 182 ; Smith v. Mayor &c., 13 Cal. 581 ; Hornblower v. Duden, 85 Cal. 664 ; Jack V. Moore, 66 Ala. 184 ; Curtis v. Gowan, 34 111. App. 516; Doster v. Howe, 28 Kan. 353; Gushing v. Stoughton, 6 Cush. 389. As to what does not constitute a sufficient in- terest, see Halstead v. Mayor &o., 3 N. Y. 480; Smith v. Nashville, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 69. A town has power to employ counsel to defend an action for false imprisonment brought against the town marshal by a per- son arrested by him for violating a town ordinance. CuUen v. Carthage, 103 Ind. 196; S. C., 53 Am. Eep. 504; 14 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 256. See, also, Roper v. Laurienburg, 90 N. C. 437 ; S. C, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 130. of the board. McCabe v. Comm'rs, 46 Ind. 880 ; Comm'rs v. Ross, 46 Ind. 404 ; Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray, 13; Thatcher v. Comm'rs, 13 Kan. 183. See, also, Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 533; S. C, 32 Am. Eep. 637; Carroll v. St Louis, 12 Mo. 444. And they cannot contract for services for a period beyond the time when by operation of law the board will be reorganized. Board &c. v. Taylor (1889), 138 Ind. 148; S. G, 80 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 394» Nor for an un- reasonably large contingent fee. Chester County v. Barber, 97 Pa. St 455. Counsel may be employed to attend to corporate interests outside of the territorial limits of the corpo- ration or in another State. Memphis V. Adams, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 518 ; a C, 24 Am. Eep. 331. Employment by a mayor alone was sustained in an ex- treme case. Louisville v. Murphy (Ky., 1887), 18 Am. «fc Eng. Corp. Caa 421, 1 Daniel v. Mayor, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 583. 2 Hight V. Comm'rs, 68 Ind. 675. Not even against an official indicted for embezzling corporate funds. Comm'rs V, Ward, 69 Ind. 441 ; Montgomery v. Jackson County, 22 Wis. 69 ; State v. Franklin County, 21 Ohio St 648. But where a town has an interest in 660 IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 645. right by direct gift, conveyance or devise,' but they are capa- ble, nnless specially restrained, of taking property, real and personal, in trust for purposes not foreign to their institution, and not incompatible with the objects of their organization.'' Its capacity to take and execute trusts of this kind is not limited to objects technically denominated charities or pious uses, or to religious or educational purposes, and is circum- scribed by no other limitationslhan such as should exclude inconsistent, incompatible and improper objects. Thus, it has been held that a town is capable of holding in trust a snm of money, the income to be invested yearly in the purchase and use for display of United States flags.' § 645. Acquisition of property for other than municipal purposes. — In an action of ejectment by a town it adduced evi- dence of possession for more than twenty years in proof of title. It appeared, however, that the premises were not used for mu- nicipal purposes, but were part of a larger tract which was for 1 Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18 ; McDopough V. Murdoch, lo How. 367; 3 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § CS6, and cases there cited; 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 1060, and cases cited. 2Vidal V. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 137; Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465; Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 331; Chapin v. School District, 35 N. H. 445 ; The Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 459- Education is not an incongruous element in municipal affairs, and be- quests for that purpose are valid so far as the capacity to hold is con- cerned. Maynard v. Woodward, 36 Mich. 433 ; Hathaway v. Sackett, 33 Mich. 97; Yates v. Yates, 9 Barb. 334; Bell County v. Alexander, S3 Tex. 350 ; Richmond v. State, 5 lud. 834; First Parish &c. v. Cole, 3 Pick. 233 ; Christy v. Ashtabula County, 41 Ohio St 511 ; Barnum v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore, 62 Md. 275. Bequest for thii relief of the poor : Board of Comm'rs v. Rogers, 55 Ind. 2C7; Craig V. Secrist, 54 Ind. 419. For a hospital : Mayor &c. v. Elliott, 3 Rawle, 170. For highways and bridges: Town of Hamden v. Rice, 24 Conn. 349. For a town building: Cogge- Bhall V. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch. 292. For purchase of fire-engines: Wright v. Linn, 9 Pa. St 433. 8 Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18. The court there said that it seems to be impossible to prescribe in definite terms the almost innumerable ob- jects of a liberal bounty with which a town might be advantageously and happily endowed, directly or in trust In this case it was held if a city vio- lates or abuses its power to purchase property it is a matter solely between it and the State. Courts will not de- termine the question of misuser by declaring void conveyances made in good faith. Chambers v. City of St Louis, 29 Mo. 543. See, also, Inhab- itants of Worcester v. Eaton, 13 Mass. 371 ; Holt€n v. Board of Comm'rs, 55 Ind. 194 § 64:6.] IMPLIED POWEES. 661 most of the time in the occupation of tenants of the town. The defendants contended that the town could not acquire title by possession for any other than municipal purposes and requested the court so to charge, and the court refusing to do so they excepted. " The cases cited in support of these excep- tions," said Durfee, C. J., "do' not goto the point that a town cannot aoquire land by possession for other than municipal purposes, but only to the point that it is ult/ra vires for a town to purchase land for other than such purposes. We think this quite a different thing; for a town cannot purchase land with- out expending its moneys, and it has no right to expend its moneys, raised by taxation or otherwise for municipal pur- poses, for other purposes. The acquirement of land by pos- session does not involve an expenditure any more than does the acquirement of land by deed of gift or bj'' devise ; and it has been decided that a gift or devise of land to a town is good even though the land be given or devifeed in general terms, and be accepted without any intent to use it strictly for municipal purposes." ' § 646. The same subject continued — Discretion in erect- ing public buildings. — The validity of appropriations for the purpose of erecting or repairing public buildings is sometimes contested in the courts on the ground that the contemplated accommodations exceed the actual needs of the corporation and are to be rented in part to private individuals. The distinc- tion drawn in the authorities is this: — If the primary object of a public expenditure is to subserve a public municipal pur- pose, the expenditure is legal notwithstanding it also involves as an incident an expense which, standing alone, would not be lawful. But if the primary object is to promote some private end, the expenditure is illegal even though it may incidentally serve some public purpose.^ It is proper in constructing build- iNewShoreham v. Ball, 14 R. I. a mere pretense to cooceal a private 566, citing Worcester v. Eaton, 13 purpose, of course the expenditure is Mass. 371 ; Sargent % Cornish, 54 N. H. illegal and fraudulent" A town hall 18; Dillon on Munic. Corp., g 437. was fitted up with theatrical appa- 2 Bates V. Bassett (Vt, 1888), 15 Atl. ratus and part of the building was Rep. 200. " This is the test," said the rented as a postoffice. The court court in that case, " where good faith sustained a tax to defray the expense. is exercised in making the expendi- See, also, Worden v. New Bedford, ture. If a public purpose is set up as 131 Mass. 23 ;. Camden v. Village Cor- 662 IMPLIED POWEBS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 647. ings to make suitable provision for prospective wants.* Pro- ceedings in raising and expending money within the limits of the corporate powers in these particulars will not be collater- ally impeached and held void because in the opinion of a court and jury a less sum would have answered the immediate neces- sities of the corporation or the money might have been more judiciously and economically expended.^ § 647. Power to indemnify officers. — A municipal corpo- ration may legally indemnify an officer acting in good faith for a loss incurred in the discharge of his official duties. Thus, the court refused to enjoin a town from indemnifying one of its officers for his expenses in successfully resisting a suit for damages for malicious prosecution in procuring, by the direc- tion of the town council, the arrest of the plaintiff on a charge of obtaining public moneys by false pretenses, the plaintiff having been acquitted upon the trial.' So, also, where the mayor of a city, in the execution of a law conferring certain poration, 77 Me. 530 ; City of Jackson- ville V. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163 ; s. &, 7 So. Rep. 885 ; Bell v. Platteville, 71 Wis. 139; s. G, 86 N. W.-Rep. 831; Eonrad v. Rogers, 70 Wis. 492 ; s. c., 36 N. W. Rep. 261 ; Ely v. Rochester, 26 Barb. 133; Reynolds v. Mayor, 8 Barb. 597 ; Poillon v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 132. In Attorney-General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400, it was held that the legislature could not authorize the erection of a dam across the river at the expense of the city "for the purpose of leasing water-power for private purposes " merely ; yet, upon subsequent amendment of the act, it was in effect held that as the city bad lawful authority to erect the dam " for tlie purpose of water-works for the city," it might as incident thereto leasa for private purposes any excess of water-power not required. Attor- ney-General V. Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533 ; Green Bay Canal Co. v. Water Power Co., 70 Wis. 635 ; s. C, 35 N. W. Rep. 529, 36 N. W. Rep. 828. 1 Greenbanks v. Boutwell (1870), 43 Vt 207 ; French v. Quincy, 3 Allen, 9. 2 Eddy V. Wilson, 43 Vt 362; Greeley v. People, 60 111. 19 ; Spauld- ing V. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71 ; Torrent v. Muskegon, 47 Mich. 115. 'This was within the power con- ferred by the statute to raise money for " town purposes." State v. Ham- monton (1876), 38 N. J. Law, 430; a C, 20 Am. Bep. 404, citing King v. Inhabitants of Essex, 4 Term R. 591 ; Attorney-General v. Mayor, 2 Mylne & Cr. 406; Regina v. litchfleld, 4 Q. B. 893 ; Regina v. Stamford, 4 Q. B. 900, n. a; Lewis v. Mayor &c., 9 C. B. (N. S.) 401 ; Regina v, Bridgewater, 10 Ad. & El. 281 ; Regina v. Para- more, 10 Ad. & EL 286 ; Nelson v. MU- ford, 7 Pick. 18 ; Bancroft v. Lynn- field, 18 Pick. 566 ; Fuller v. Groton, 11 Gray, 340, where the members of a school committee were sued for libel because of some statements made in their ofBcial report to the town. For their expenses in success- fully defending themselves the town voted an indemnity and the court held that it had a right to do so. Hadsel v. Hancock, 8 Gray, 526; § 648.] IMPLIED powEEa. 663 powers upon him, and in good faith but in excess of his au- thority, trespassed upon the rights of a citizen, who sued for false imprisonment and recovered a verdict, it was pro- nounced to be a " legitimate duty " and a " usual and ordi- nary expense " for the city to reimburse him.' § 648. The same subject continued. — But in order to jus- tify an expenditure of money in indemnifying an officer three things must appear: — First, the officer must have been acting in a matter in which the corporation had an interest ; second, he must have been acting in the discharge of a duty imposed or authorized by law ; and third, he must have acted in good faith.^ In two Connecticut cases the enforcement of this rule resulted in a denial of the right to indemnify. The common council of the city of Bridgeport, under authority of the city charter, enacted a by-law with regard to wharves, and the anchoring, moving and mooring of vessels in the harbor, and appointed an officer called a superintendent of wharves to discharge the duty provided for in the by-law. The perform- ance of his duties was not enforced by a penalty, and he acted only upon application of parties interested and at their ex- pense. While acting in good faith he ordered a vessel lying at a wharf to be hauled astern to make more room for an- other at an adjoining wharf; and was sued for damages by the owner of the wharf. It was decided that the city had no sufficient interest in the matter to sustain a vote of indemnity State V. Freeholders &c., 3'7 N. J. less and overbearing, still it would Law, 254 Cf. Hotchkiss v. Plunkett, seem to be the wisest course to leave 60 Conn. 230, cited in the foUowihg the matter of indemnification to section. the discretion of those who repre- • Sherman v. CaiT (1867), 8 R. 1 431. sent the interests of the city. " We The court said that the opposite rule know of no case," continued the would tend to make an officer too court, "in wnich, while the officer cautious if not too timid in the exer- continues to act in behalf of the cise of his powers — "powers which community and not In his own be- must be frequently exercised for the half, it is held that the community protection of society before and not cannot indemnify, him.'' s. c, p. 434. after a thorough investigation of the See, also. Nelson v. Mllford, 7 Pick, case in which he is called upon to 18, quoted at length in Cooley's Const act ; " and that, although it may be Lim. (6th pd.) 258. urged that if the officer has the right '■' Hotchkiss v. Plunkett (1891), 60 to fall back on the city treasury there Conn. 330. is danger that he will become reck- 664 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 649. for his expenses in defending the suit. " He is not the agent or servant of the city," said the court, "nor subject to its control, and it is not responsible for his oflBcial negligence, misconduct or delinquency, nor benefited by his oificial fidel- ity. With respect to his oflBcial character and obligation the city has no duty to perform, no rights to defend, no interest to protect, and no pecuniary or corporate concern in the sub- ject-matter connected with his oflHcial duty. Want of inter- est involves the wadt of power aftd is necessarily fatal to the claims of the city." ' And where the members of a board of education of a school district were sued for an injury to the business reputation of the plaintiffs by their refusal to enter- tain- a bid ofifered by the plaintiffs for furnishing stationery for the district on the ground that they had sometime before dealt dishonestly with the district, the money of the district could not be used for the defense of the suit.* § 649. Offers of rewards. — The question whether towns, cities or counties have the implied power to bind themselves by offers of reward for the arrest and conviction of criminals has been considered in several cases, and the conclusion sup- , ported by the weight of authority is adverse to the existence of such a power. One of the earliest cases involving this point arose in Massachusetts, and Chief Justice Shaw there held ' Gregory v. Bridgeport (1874), 41 32 Conn. 553 ; Webster v. Harwinton, Conn. 76 ; S. C, 19 Am. Eep. 485, 33 Conn. 131. citing Merrill «. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 2 Andrews, C. J., pointedly re- 136 ; Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H.. 539 ; marked that there was no duty a.u- Halstead v. Mayor &o., 3 Comstock thorized or imposed to make charges (N. Y.), 430 ; Martin v. Mayor &c., 1 of dishonesty and cheating. Hotch- Hill, 545 ; Hodges v. City of Buffalo, kiss v. Plunkett (1891), 60 Conn. 230. 2 Denio, 110 ; Vincent v. Nantucket, See, also, Fuller v. Groton (1858), 11 13 Cush. 105 ; Stetson v, Kempton, Gray, 840. A corporation cannot ap- 13 Mass. 373 ; Nelson v. Milford, 7 propriate money to pay the 30sts of Pick. 18 ; Fuller v. Groton, 11 Gray, an ofHcial who has been prosecuted 340 ; Babbitt v. Savoy, 8 Cush. 580 ; for oflScial misconduct, although he Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 586 ; be acquitted. People v. Lawrence, 6 Tash u Adams, 10 Cush. 353 ; Claflm Hill, 244; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 V. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 503 ; Hood v. N. H. 126 ; Butler v. Milwaukee, 15 Mayor &c., 1 Allen, 108 ; Briggs v. Wis. 493 ; Smith v. Nashville, 4 Lea Whipple, 6 Vt 94; Baker v. Wind- (Tenn.), 69, 73. See, also, Halstead v. ham, 13 Me. 74; Fisk v. Hazard, 7 Mayor &c., 3 N. Y. 430. E. L 438 ; Brainard v. New London, § 650.] IMI'L,1KD P0WEE8. 665 that a statute limiting the power of the mayor and aldermen in offering rewards to a certain amount did not operate to re- strain the city council, as the representatives of the whole body of the people, from offering a greater amount for the appre- hension and conviction of &,ny person who should set fire to a building with felonious intent.' The courts wherein this power has been denied to municipalities do not attempt to cope with this case as a direct opposing authority, nor does it seem to the author that they parry the force of it satisfactorily. Some of them take no notice of it whatever, while it has been 'said not to be applicable because the Massachusetts statute conferred the power to ofifer rewards.^ And again, that as the reward was for the detection of persons who should thereafter be guilty of the crime of arson within the limits of the city, it was " a sim- ple police measure, as legitimate as the employment of police to guard the inhabitants and their property against violators of the law." ' But the learned chief justice did not rest his decision upon either of these grounds or refer to them in any manner. In Pennsylvania it was held to be within the legit- imate province of the burgesses of a town to oCFer rewards for the detection of offenders against the general safety of its in- habitants (incendiaries in that case). The court said : — " The burgesses . . . are a part of the public police. It is therefore the State by one of its departments that offers a re- ward for the detection and conviction of an unknown offender against its laws." * § 6&0. The same subject continued — The power generally denied. — But, with the exceptions noted in the preceding sec- tion, the decisions are unanimous, and the purely implied power to tax the inhabitants for the apprehension of criminals is not only denied,* but charter provisions are strictly con- iCrawshaw v. Eoxbury (1856), 7 equally within the province of the Gray, 374 State in administering its criminal 2 Hawk V. Marion County (1878), 48 laws. Iowa, 473, 474. < Borough of York v. Foraoht (1854), 8 Patton V. Stephens (1878), 14 Bush 23 Pa. St 391, 393. (Ky.), 324. But it is evident that, » Gale v. South Berwick (1863), 51 whether the ofifer is antecedent or Me. 174. "We have been unable to subsequent to the commission of the find any case overturning the case of offense, the service to be paid for is Gale v. South Berwick." Baker v. IMPLIED POWEKS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 651. strued so as to exclude it. Thus, an article in the charter of the city of Covington providing. that " the council shall have power to pass any needful by-laws and ordinances for the due and effectual administration of right and justice They may legislate upon all subjects which the good govern- ment of said city shall require, unless restrained by the terms of the charter or constitution of the State, notwithstanding the legislature may have enacted laws relating to the same," confers no authority to offer a reVard for the arrest of the city treasurer, who had been indicted for forgery and for the em- bezzlement of the funds of the city.* " It is not a matter in which the local: public have an exclusive or peculiar interest," said the court, " as distipguished from the general public. The offender when arrested must be tried under the laws of the State by the judiciary of the State. . . . No power can be implied in favor of a corporation which does not pertain to matters of a local character, matters which peculiarly concern the local public, and without which those local affairs commit- ted by the State to the corporation cannot be properly at- tended to." * § 651. The same subject continued — The foregoing rule qualiQed. — Where it was provided by statute that counties "may acquire and hold property and make all contracts necessary or expedient for the management, control and im- provement of the saiae," it was conceded that the county had no power to offer a reward for the arrest of persons charged with the commission of crime, but held that the City of Washington (1870), 7 D. C. The charter gave the common coun- 134, 140; Hawk v. Marion County oil power by a, two-thirds vote to (1878), 48 Iowa, 472 ; Boai'd of Comm'rs offer rewards. It was held that, even V. Bradford (1880), 73 Ind. 455 ; s. G, assuming that there was an implied 37 Am. Rep. 174 ; Hight v. Board &c., power, it could not oe exercised ex- 68 Ind. 575 ; Board &c. v. Ward, 69 cept in the manner pointed out. Ind. 441. See, also, Lee v. Trustees Loveland v. Detroit (1879), 41 Mich. &c., 7 Dana (Ky.), 28. 837. See, also. Stamp v. Cass County iPattonv.Stephens(1878), 14 Bush (1883), 47 Mich. 330. "Whether a re- (Ky.), 324. ward might not be binding if it re- 2 Pa tton «. Stephens, 14 Bush (Ky.), lated merely to offenses against 334, 328. If the power be doubtful municipal ordinances, gucere. Mur- the court should decide against it phy v. Jacksonville (1881), 18 Fla. Hanger v. City of Des Moines (1876), 318. 52 Iowa, 193 ; S. C, 35 Am. Rep. 266. § 652.] I IMPLIED POWEES. 667 board of supervisors might offer a reward for the recovery of money which had been stolen from the count3\ " Of neces- sity it seems to us that this power must exist," said the court ; " otherwise, when a county treasury is robbed, the county au- thorities must fold their hands and remain passive until the thief repents and voluntarily returns the money, or rely on the exertions of the individual citizen to work and labor for the recovery of the money without hope of pay or pecuniary re- ward. If the latter discovered the money under such circum- stances, the temptation to divide with the thief instead of the county would be great." * § 653. Expenditures in obtaining or opposing legislation. The Supreme Court of Connecticut decided in a recent case that a town has the power to employ and pay counsel to op- pose before the General Assembly a petition to divide its ter- ritory, made by certain individuals seeking to promote their own interests, and not by the State from motives of policy. The chief justice dissented, and the majority opinion concedes that the conclusion of the court is in conflict with the views expressed in Maine and Massachusetts.^ In the latter State it iHawk V. Marion County (1878), Putnam Ins. Co., 16 Minn. 408; 48 Iowa, 472, 475, holding also that if Warner v. Grace, 14 Minn. 487 ; Gill- only a part of the stolen money is re- more v. Lewis, 13 Ohio, 281 ; Means ' covered the party through whose v. Hendershott, 24 Iowa, 78 ; Thorn- agency the recovery has been efiEected ton V. Missouri Pac. R Co., 43 Mo. is entitSed to ajpro rata share of the App. 58. See, also, Morris v. Kasling reward. Under the Revised Statutes (Tex.), 15 S. W. Rep. 336. of Illinois, chapter CO, section 15, pro- 2 Parrel v. Town of Derby, 58 Conu. viding that county boards may offer 234 ; s. C, 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. rewards for the arrest and convic- 391. " Had the State of its own mo- tion of any person guilty of stealing tion, by reasons of public policy, taken " any horse, mare," etc., " or any steps to change the boundaries of the other property exceeding $50 in town or abolish it altogether, the case value," the limitation as to value ap- presented would have been a very- plies only to property other than different one ; but the attack was not that specified. Butler v. County of made by the State from motives of McLean, 33 111. App. 397. When the policy, and in the interest of good offer of a reward is authorized, an government, but was made by cer- officer cannot recover it if his serv- tain parties who sought thereby to ices are only in the line of his duty, promote their own interests. The Pool V. Boston, 5 Cush. 219 ; Stamper attack was not directed alone against V. Temple, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 113 ; other individuals who differed from Kick V. Merry, 23 Mo. 72 ; Day v. them but against the town as welL 668 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 663. was held that a town has no implied authority to incur ex- pense in opposing before the legislature a proposition to annex it to another town.^ The same court had previously denied the validity of a contract to pay for services of " lobby mem- bers " in procuring the passage of a charter of incorporation.'^ In Maine, also, a town cannot legally raise and expend money either for services of members of the " third house " in oppoo- ing a division of the town,' or of attorneys who appear before a committee for the same purpose.* A city has no authority to appropriate money to obtain legislative permission to build a bridge across a navigable river,' or to procure the passage of an unconstitutional act.' (b) Eminent Domain. § 653. Nature and definition. — The right of eminent dor main has been defined to be " that superior right of property pertaining to the sovereignty by which the private property acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or its use controlled for the public benefit without regard to the wishes of its owners. More accurately it is the rightful au- thority which exists in every sovereignty to control and regu- The end sought involved not only a counsel to oppose its division before dismemberment of the town in re- a committee of the legislature. Con- spect to territory and population, but nolly v. Beverly (1890), 151 Mass. 437.- also a division of its corporate prop- ^ Frost v. Inhabitants of Belfast, erty, a reduction of its grand list, an 6 Allen, 152, on the ground that se- apportionment of its debts, liabilities cret attempts to secure votes, etc., are and burdens as to highways, bridges, not a legal consideration, paupers and the like." ' Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me. 1 Coolidge V. Inhabitants of Brook- 350. line, 114 Mass. 593. In Minot v. In- State V. Macdonald, 26 Minn. 445 ; Doctor V. Hartman, 74 Ind. 321; White V. Conover, 5 Blackf. 462; State V. Richmond, 6 Foster (N. H.), 235 ; Shue v. Comm'rs, 41 Mich. 638. < Elliott on Roads and Streets, 218 et seq., where the authorities are ex- amined. " The reason is that the right in such cases did not exist at common law. Beekman v. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45; s. c, 22 Am. Deo. 679; Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 696 IMPLIED P0WEE8 AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 679. constitutions secure tlie right in this class of cases in express terms.* Arid where the word " jury " is used it is construed to denote ex vi termini a body of twelve men acting substan- tially through the accustomed forms by which the powers of a jury are exercised.^ It is generally held in interpreting these provisions that if a jury trial may be had in an appellate, court, it is no objection that the preliminary hearing is before a tribunal without a jury.* And a jury may be waived by agreement of the parties interesfJfed.* Ohio (Part II), 111 ; s. C, 30 Am. Dec. 195 ; Montgomery S. R. Co. v. Sayre, 73 Ala. 443; Heyneman v. Blake. 19 Cal. 579; Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 Saxt. Ch. 694; s. C, 23 Am. Dec. 756 ; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19; S. C, 35 Am. Dec. 466; Bruggerman v. True, 35 Minn. 123 ; Copp V. Henniker, 55 N. H. 189; Hymes v. Aydelott, 20 Ind. 431; Drbnberger v. Reed, 11 Ind. 420; Lipes V. Hand, 104 Ind. 503; City of Kansas v. Hill, 80 Mo. 523 ; Kendall V. Post 8 Ora 161 ; Warts v. Hoag- land, 114 U.S. 606; Missouri Pac. E. Co. V. Hunes, 115 U. S. 512; People V. Smith, 21 N. T. 595; Hood v. Finch, 8 Wis. 381 ; Ligat v. Common- wealth, 19 Pa. St 456 ; Virginia &c. R. Co. V. EUiott, 5 Nev. 358; Ander- son V. Caldwell, 91 Ind. 451; Kim- ball V. Board of Supervisors, 46 Cal. 19. Contra, Kramer v. Cleveland &c. E. Co., 5 Ohio St 140 ; Rhine v. Mc- Kinney, 53 Tex. 354 ; Henderson v. Nashville E. Co., 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 173. See, also, Lewis on Eminent Domain, g 811. " The proceeding for the ascer- tainment of the value of the property and consequent compensation to be made is merely an inquisition to es- tablish a particular fact as a prelim- inary to the actual taking; and it may be prosecuted before commis- sioners or special boards, or the courts, with or without the interven- tion of a jury, as the legislative power may designate. AU that is required is that it shall be conducted in some fair and just manner, with oppor- tunity to the owners of the property to present evidence as to its value, and to be heard thereon." Justice Field in United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 519. 1 WiUiams v. Pittsburgh, 83 Pa. St 71 ; Mitchell v. Illinois &c. R Co., 68 111. 286 ; Weber v. County of Santa Clara, 59 Cal. 265 ; Louisville && R. Co. V. Dryden, 39 Ind. 393; Paul v. Detroit, 32 Mich. 108 ; Ipsom v. Mis- sissippi &c. R Co., 36 Miss. 300. 2 Clark V. City of Utica, 18 Barb. 451. Unanimity is necessary to a legal verdict Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St 167 ; Whitehead v. Arkansas &c. R Co., 28 Ark. 460 ; Des Moines v. Layman, 21 la. 158 ; Mitchell v. Illi- nois &c R Co., 68 Dl. 386 ; Cooley's Const Lim. (4th ed.) 394. Cf. Cruger V. Hudson River R Co., 12 N. Y. 190 ; McManus v. McDonough, 107 Bl. 95. 3 Stewart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500 ; Hapgood V. Doherty, 8 Gray, 373; Thorp ?'. Witham, 65 la. 566 ; Max- well V. Board, 119 Ind. 30; Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St 167; Reckner v. Wai-ner, 33 Ohio St 375 ; Atlanta v. Central R Co., 53 Ga. 130. A bond may be required by statute on ap- peal. Lewis on Eminent Domain, g 312. and cases cited. < Chicago &C. Ry. Co. v. Hock, 118 m. 587. §§ 680, 681.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 697 § 680. Right to abandon proceedings. — In the absence of statutory provisions requiring proceedings once begun to be prosecuted to completion, it is almost universally held that the party instituting them has a right to withdraw at any time before the compensation is determined, that is, before the confirmation of the commissioner's report.' And although it is held in New York that " the order of confirmation oper- ates as a judgment binding both paf ties," ^ the prevailing rule is that the public authorities have a reasonable time to decide whether to accept the land or other property at the price fixed or to discontinue the proceedings.* § 681. Damages upon discontinuance of proceedings. — Upon a discontinuance the land-owner is entitled to recover his legal costs, at any rate, and probably other legitimate ex- 1 Elkhart v. Simonton, 71 Ind. 7 ; Brokaw v. City of Terre Haute, 97 Ind. 451 ; Chicago &c. Co. v. Swinney, 97 Ind. 586; Hunting v. Curtis, 10 Iowa, 152; Corbin v. Cedar Rapids &c Co., 66 Iowa, 73 ; Graflf v. Balti- more, 10 Md. 544; Black v. Mayor, 50 Md. 235; Clarke v. Manchester, 56 N. H. 502 ; Why te v. City of Kan- sas, 22 Mo. App. 409 ; Joseph v. Ham- ilton, 43 Mo. 282; Stiles v. Middle- sex, 8 Vt. 486; HuUin v. Second Municipality, 11 Rob. (La.) 97; Ap- plication for Widening &c., 4 Rob. (La.) 357; Stevens v. Danbury, 58 Conn. 9 ; O'Neil v. Freeholders, 41 N. J. Law, 161 ; Chesapeake &c. R. Co. V. Bradford, 6 West Va. 620. In New York it is held that the court may impose conditions. Matter of Wav- erly Water Works, 85 N. Y. 478. See, also, Beekman Street, 20 Johns. 269 ; Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 655. It would seem to be reasonable to require a party to make his election within the time allowed for filing objections to the report. Crume v. Wilson, 104 Ind. 583; People u. Com- mon Council of Syracuse, 78 N. Y. 56. In England, after notice of in- tention to take, even before the price is ascertained, the proprietor acquires the right to insist upon fulfillment of the award when made. Queen v. Birmingham &c. Ry. Co., 6 Ry. Cas. 628 ; s. C, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 376 ; King V. Market St. Comm'rs, 4 Barn. & Ad. 335; Stone v. Commercial Ry. Co., 4M. & C. 133; Walker u. East- ern Counties Ry. Co., 6 Harr. 594 ; Tawney v. Lynn &c. Ry. Co., 6 L. J. (N. S.) Eq. 382. 2 Matter of Rhinebeck &c. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 243. See, also, Drath v. B. & M. R Co., 15 Neb. 365. 8 O'Neil V. Freeholders &c., 41 N. J. Law, 161 ; Mabon v. Halsted, 39 N. J. Law, 640 ; Merrick v. Baltimore, 43 Md. 219 ; Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Mo. 272; Joseph v. Hamilton, 48 Mo. 282; People v. Hyde Park, 117 111. 462; Wilkinson V. Bixter, 88 Ind. 574; Carson v. Hartford, 48 Conn. 68 ; State v. Mills, 29 Wis. 322. There should be no un- reasonable delay. Baltimore &c. Co. V. Nesbit, 10 How. 395. See, also, Williams v. New Orleans R. Co., 60 Miss. 689. But, in favor of the prop- erty owner, an unreasonable delay may constitute an abandonment by implication. Bensley v. Mountain 698 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 681. penses,' which in one case were held not to include counsel fees.^ " If, pending proceedings, possession has been taken of the property sought to be condemned, the abandonment of such proceedings renders such possession wrongful from the beginning, and a suit will lie for any damages occasioned by the entry and possession." ' In many cases the owner is kept in suspense for a considerable period before the election to discontinue is made, during which time he is unable to dis- pose of his property, deems it injbdicious to improve it, or is otherwise deprived of the beneficial use of it. The Supreme Court of Louisiana declared that the fact of great delay and abandonment of the suit vi as prima facie evidence that it was unnecessary and gave judgment for damages.* The same doc- trine was laid down by the Court of Appeals of Maryland,* and subsequently affirmed with the qualification that the de- lay must be culpable or unreasonable, which is a question of fact for the jury.* Further than this the courts are not dis- posed to go.^ Lake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306. For other cases of constructive abandon- ment, see Mabon v. Halsted, 39 N. J. Law, 640; Breeae v. Poole, 16 IlL App. 551. Costs of discontinuance, 'i North Missouri R Co. v. Lackland, 25 Md. 515. The right to abandon proceedings is frequently regulated by statute, and many cases con- struing these provisions are cited in Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 356. 1 Carson v. City of Hartford, 48 Conn. 68; Graff v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore, 10 Md. 544; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351 ; Gear v. Dubuque & C. R Co., 20 Iowa, 523 ; McLaugh- lin V. Municipality, 5 La. Ann. 504 See, also, Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill, 545; Felton f. Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494 ; Leisse v. St. Louis &c. R Co., 73 Mo. 561 ; North Missouri &c. R Co. V. Lackland, 35 Mo. 515; State v. Waldron, 17 N. J. Law, 369. 2 Bergman v. St Paul &o. R Co., 31 Minn. 583. ' Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 658, citing Pittsburg &c. R Co. v. Swin- ney, 97 Ind. 586 ; Hullin v. Second Municipality of New Orleans, 11 Eob. (La.) 97; Van Valkenburg v. Mil- waukee, 43 Wis. 574 ^McLaughlin v. Municipality, 5 La. Ann. 504 Where the proceed- ings are rightfully discontinued, after award made, the land-owner's remedy, if he has any, is by a special action for damages and not by man- damus or other action to collect the amount State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351 ; Milliard v. Lafayette, 5 La. Ann. 112; In re Canal St, 11 Wend. 155. * Norris v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore, 44 Md. 598, holding that the measure of damages is interest upon tlie mar- ket value of the property for the time the delay was without justifia- ble excuse. 6 Black V. Mayor &a of Baltimore, 50 Md. 335. To the same effect, see Leisse v. St Louis &c R Co., 2 Mo. App. 105 ; s. c, 5 Mo. App. 585 ; 72 Mo. 561. See, also. White v. City of Kansas, 23 Mo. App. 49. 'Carson v. \jity of Hartford, 48 § 682.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 699 § 682. Compensation. — Pecuniary compensation must be paid to the person whose property is taken, the amount of which is fixed by inquest before a jury or before commission- ers. The compensation must be the full reasonable value of the interest appropriated, and the measure of damages is the market value.^ In estimating the market value speculative considerations do not have weight unless, in exceptional cases, the probable increase in value from whatever cause can be very clearly proven. But improvements on the property taken may not be disregarded.^ The market value is usually calculated at what the property would " bring in the hands of a prudent seller at liberty to fix the time and the conditions of the sale." ' And considerations of association or affection are not admitted. In Massachusetts the court held that it Conn. "68; Bergman. u. St. Paul &c. K. Co., 31 Minn. 533; Van Valken- burg V. Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 574 ; Fel- ton V. Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494. Mar- tin V. Mayor &c of Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545, decides that there is no ac- tion even for unreasonable delay. Where the proceedings are aban- doned after award made and subse- quently recommenced, it has been held that the first award is binding and a bar to the new proceedings. Bogers v. St Charles, 3 Mo. App. 41. See, also, Hupert v. Anderson, 35 Iowa, 578. Many statutes now give a right to recover damages upon abandonment The expression, " trouble and expense," is construed in Whitney v. Lynn, 133 Mass. 338. See, also, Stafford v. Albany, 7 Johns. 541. 1 Hill V. Railroad Co., 5 Denio, 306 ; In re Furman St, 17 Wend. 649; Lawrence v. Boston, 119 Mass. 136; BurtuBrigham, 117 Mass. 307; Cobb V. Boston, 113 Mass. 181 ; Fall River Works V. Fall River, 110 Mass. 428; Edmunds v. City of Boston, 108 Mass. E35 ; King v. Minneapolis Union Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 334 : Jones v. New Or- leans &c. R Co., 70 Ala. 337; Cohpn V. St Louis &c. R. Co., 34 Kan. 158; St. Louis &c. R Ca v. Anderson, 39 Ark. 167 ; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Ja- cobs, 110 111. 414 ; Jacksonville &c. R. Co. V. Walsh, 106 111. 353; Sidener v. Essex, 33 Ind. 201 ; Comm'rs v. Rail- road Co., 63 Iowa, 397 ; Bangor &c. i R. Co. V. McComb, 60 Me. 390 ; Rail- road Co. V. Whalen, 11 Neb. 585; Virginia &c. R Co. v. Elliott, 5 Nev. 358 ; Pittsburgh &c. R Co. v. Rose, 74 Pa. St 363 ; Howard v. Providence, 6 R I. 514 ; Chapman v. Oshkosh &c. R Co.. 33 Wis. 639 ; Memphis v. Bol- ton, 9 Heisk. 508 ; Ontario &c. R Co. V. Taylor, 6 Ont Rep. Q. B. Div. 838 ; Penny v. Penny, 37 L. J. Ch. 340. Witnesses acquainted with the mar- ket value may testify to their opin- ion, though it is said to be the pre- vailing rule that a witness cannot be asked how much damages a party has suffered. Elliott on Roads and Streets, 107, and cases cited. 2 Jacksonville &c. Ry. Co. v. Walsh, 106 111. 353 ; Lafayette &c. Ry. Co. v. Winslow, 66 111. 319. '6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 568, citing, among other cases, Law- rence V. Boston, 119 Mass. 136; Mem- phis V. Bolton, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 508 ; Tufts V. Charlestown, 4 Gray, 537; Cobb V. Boston, 113 Mass. 181. 700 IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 683. was not competent to take into account what the owner would give rather than be turned out of his property.' Nor can the fact that the particular lot is absolutely indispensable to the project of the corporation be made an element in its value.'' But of course the purpose to which property has been put and in view of which improvements have been made is very justly a factor in the case.' § 6S3. Elements in estimating compensation. — The state- ment that the indispensability of the property to the taker's purposes is not to afifect the amount of compensation must be taken with the qualification that where property is found in every way suitable and he seeks to condemn it, although other property could be obtained not quite so conveniently situated, the owner is entitled to the benefit of the suitability in esti- mating its value. In the case of Mississippi &o. Boom Co. v. Patterson,* the plaintiff, a boom construction company, en- titled by law to enter upon and occupy lands necessary to properly conduct its business, sought to acquire a chain of islands in the Mississippi river, very well fitted to form, by connecting their shore line, a boom of great dimensions. The result of the original proceedings was an award of $3,000, from which both parties appealed. Upon a second appraise- ment the jury assessed the value of the property at $300, but in view of its adaptability for boom purposes they found a further and additional value of $9,058.33. The company con- tended that the $300 appraisal was all it could be made to pay. Mr. Justice Field, for the court, said : — " In determin- ing the value of land appropriated for public purposes the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property be- tween private parties. The inquiry in such cases must be, what is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted ; that is to say, what is its worth from its availability for valu- iTufts?;. Charlestown, 4Gray,537. R. Co., 37 Wis. 98; Chicago &c. k 2 Virginia &c. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Co. v. Jacobs, 110 III. 414; Robb v. Nev. 358; Penny v. Penny, 37 L. J. Maysville &c. E. Co., 3 Met. 117; Ch. 840. King v. Minneapolis R. Co., 33 Minn. 8 Michigan &c. Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 334. 44 Mich. 233 ; Price v. Milwaukee &c * 98 U. S. 408. §684.] KM INENT DOMAIN. 701 able uses. Property is not to be deemed worthless because the owner allows it to go to waste, or to be regarded as value- less because he is unable to put it to any use. Others may be able to use it, and make it subserve the necessities or conven- iences of life. Its capability of being made thus available gives it a market value which can be readily estimated." . . . The learjied justice goes on to show the adaptability of the islands to the company's purposes, and adds : — " Their adapt- ability for boom purposes was a circumstance, therefore, which the owner had a right to insist upon as an element in estimat- ing the value of his lands." ^ § 684. The same subject continued. — Some oases go even further and hold that the owner is entitled to the highest price the property will bring for the use to which it may most advantageously be applied.- Judge Cooley expresses himself on the subject of compensation as follows : — " The principle upon which the damages are to be assessed is always an im- portant consideration in these cases, and the circumstances of different appropriations are sometimes so peculiar that it has been found somewhat difficult to establish a rule that shall always be just and equitable. If the whole of a man's estate is taken there can generally be little difficulty in fixing upon the measure of compensation ; for it is apparent that in such a case he ought to have the whole market value of his prem- ises, and he cannot reasonably demand more. The question is reduced to one of market value, to be determined upon the testimony of those who have knowledge upon that subject or whose business or experience entitles their opinion to weight. It may be that, in such a case, the market value may not seem to the owner an adequate compensation, for he may have rea- sons peculiar to himself, springing from association or other cause, which make him unwilling to part with the property on the estimate of his neighbors ; hui such reasons a/re inca- pable of hemg taken into account in legal proceedings where the iSee, also, In re Furman St, 17 ^In re Furman Street, 17 Wend. Wend. 669 ; Goodwin v. C, & W. 669 ; King v. Minneapolis &c. E. Co., Canal Co., 18 Ohio St 169 ; Yanoy v. 83 Minn. 324. See, also, as to re- Harrison, 17 Ga. 30. That no allow- covery for incidental injuries to re- ance is to be made for the good-will maining land, Elliott on Eoada and of a business, see Edmunds v. Bos- Streets, 193, 104. ton, 108 Mass, 535. 702 IMPLIED P0WEE8 AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 685. question is one of compensation in money, inasmuch as it is manifestly impossible to measure them by any standard for estimating values which is applied in other cases and which necessarily measures the worth of property by its value as an article of sale, or as a means of producing pecuniary returns." ' § 685. Benefits. — There is a wide difference of opinion among the courts upon the question AV^hether the damages for the land taken may be offset either wholly or partly by the benefits that accrue to the resiaue. It is said in a standard treatise that the authorities range themselves under these heads : — " 1st. Those holding that benefits cannot in any case be set off against the injury sustained by the land-owner.^ 2d. Those holding that special benefits may not be set off against the value of the land actually seized, but may be set off against incidental injuries sustained by the land-owner.' 3d. Those holding that special benefits may be set off against the value of the land as well as against incidental injuries." * In all cases the benefits claimed must be special to the partic- ular parcel affected * and of a kind not common to the public at large.* In several States there are statutory or constitu- tional provisions forbidding a deduction on account of bene- fits. In declaring the construction of such an inhibition the Court of Appeals of New York said : — " Whatever land is taken must be paid for by the railroad company at its full market value, and from such value no deduction can be made, although the remainder of the land-owner's property may be largely 1 Cooley's Consf. Lim. (6th e(J.) 646, v. State, 5 Blackf. 384; Putnam v. 647. Douglas County, 6 Oregon, 338 ; s. a, 2 Elliott on Roads and Streets, 188, 25 Am. Rep. 537 ; Root's Case, 77 Pa. 189, citing, among other cases. New St 376: Nichols v. Bridgeport, 28 Orleans &c. E. Co. v. Mayo, 39 Miss. Conn. 189. See, also, 6 Am. & Eng. 374; Memphis v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. Encyc. of Law, p. 581. (Tenn.) 508 ; Israel v. Jewett, 29 la. ' Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369 ; 475 ; Savannah v. Hartridge, 37 Ga. Paducah v. Memphis &c. Co., 13 113. Heisk. (Tcnn.) 1; Selma v. Rome &c. ' Citing, among other cases, Rob- Co., 45 Ga. 180 ; Koestenbader v. bins V. Milwaukee &c. Co., 6 Wis. Price, 41 Iowa, 204. 636 ; Shipley v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., « Comm'rs of Asheville v. Johnston, 34 Md. 386 : City Council of Augusta 71 N. C. 898 ; Meacham v. Fitchburg V. Marks, 50 Ga. 612 ; Shawneetown R Co., 4 Cush. 291 ; Springfield v. V. Mason, 82 111. 837 ; Sutton v. Louis- Schmook, 68 Mo. 394 ; Lipes v. Hand, ville, 5 Dana, 38. 104 Ind. 503; Penrice v. Wallis, 37 * Citing, with other cases, M'Intyre Miss. 173. § 686.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 703 enhanced in value as a result of the operation of the railroad. But in eonsidermg the question of damages to the remainder of the land not taken, the commissioners must consider the effect of the road upon the whole of that remainder, its advantages and disadvantages, benefits and injuries, and if the result is beneficial there is no damage and nothing can be awarded." ' § 686. Payment. — Where the constitution does not pro- vide that payment must be made before the property is taken, it need not be giveii in all cases concurrently in point of time with the actual exercise of the right of eminent domain. It is enough if an adequate and certain remedy is provided whereby the owner of such property may compel payment of his damages.^ A remedy contingent upon the realization of a fund from taxation for benefits within a limited assessment district does not meet the requirements of the law.' And it is a gross violation of constitutional right to compel the owner of property to resort to -a lawsuit in order to recover.^ Judge Cooley says : — " The land should either be his or he should be paid for it. Whenever, therefore, the necessary steps have been taken on the part of the public to select the property to be taken, locate the public work, and declare the appropriation, the owner becomes absolutely entitled to the compensation, whether the public proceed at once to oc- cupy the property or not. If a Forfeiture of Charter, ch. IV, 'supra. § 713.] LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. 725 no right to interfere and control by compulsory legislation the action of municipal corporations.' I § 713. Powers that the State cannot relinqnjlsh. — Justice Swayne, speaking upon this subject for the United States Supreme Court, said : — " The legislative power of a State, ex- cept so far as restrained by its own constitution, is at all times absolute with respect to all offices within its reach. It may at pleasure create or abolish them or modify their duties. It may also shorten or lengthen the term of service. And it may increase or diminish the salary or change the mode of compensation.* The police power of the States, and that with respect to municipal corporations, and to many other things that might be named, are of the same absolute character.' In all these cases there can be no contract and no irrepealable law, because they are ''governmental subjects," and hence within the category before stated. They inwolYepubUo inter- ests, and legislative acts concerning them are necessarily ^i^&^'o ' People &a v. Common Council of Detroit (1873), 28 Mich. 238; S. C, 15 Am. Rep. 2U3, a well-considered case refusing a mandamus to compel the common council of the city to order the issuing of bonds to purchase lands for a park contracted for by a board of park commissioners under an act of the legislature supposed to have enlarged the powers of this board so far as to authorize them to make a purchase of lands for the city; in other words, to give them a power of taxation ; the court holding that while it was within the legislative power to take away as it did from a citi- zens' meeting, where it was formerly located under a prior act, the right to decide for the city upon the purchase of a public park, and to lodge it with some other proper agent or repre- sentative of the local community, the State had no authority to confer such functions upon its own agents, nor by legislative amendment en- larging their powers upon these park commissioners, who were originally State appointees and had become rep- resentatives of the city only to the ex- tent that their authority was recog- nized under the original statute by the representatives of the city, which conferred upon them no such power. See " Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations," by W. P. Wade, Esq., 8 Cent. L. J. 3 ; and as to compulsoiy legislation. People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 ; Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 303. As to the private rights of corporations as distinguished from public. Small v. Danville, 51 Me. 362 ; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St 180; Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St 375 ; San Francisco Gas Co. V. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453 ; Oliver V. Worcester, 102 Mass. 499. 2 See Butler v.- Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402. 3 See Cooley's Const. Lim., pp. 238, 342; The Regents v. Williams, 4 GiU & J. 321. 726 LEGISLATIVE CONTBOL. [§ T14. laws. Every succeeding legislature possesses the same juris- diction and power with respect to them as its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification which the former had of enactment — neither more nor less. All occupy in this respect a footing of public equality. This must necessarily be so in the nature of things. It is vital to the public welfare that each one should be able at all times to do whatever the varying circumstances and present exigen- cies touching the subject invol^d may require. A different result would be fraught with evil. All these considerations apply with full force to the times and places of holding courts. They are both purely-public things, and the laws concerning them must necessarily be of the same character. If one may be bargained about so may the other. In this respect there is no difference in principle between them."* § 714. Impairment of legislative grants. — A legislative grant is an executed contract, and as such is within the clause of the constitution of the United States which prohibits the States from passing any law impairing the obligation of con- tracts. It cannot, therefore, be destroyed and the estate be divested by any subsequent legislative enactment.* "And though a municipal corporation is the creature of the legisla- ture, yet when the State enters into a contract with it, the subordinate relation ceases, and that equality arises which exists between all contracting parties. And however great 1 Newton v. Commissioners (1879), Trhicbthelndiana court said: — "The 100 n. S. 548, an action to restrain establishment of the time and place the removal of a county seat, in of holding courts is a matter of gen- which case the court applied the eral legislation, respecting which the principles of the text and held that a act of one session of the Greneral As- law establishing a county seat of a sembly cannot be binding on an- county in a town upon condition that other." Adams u County of Logan, 11 the citizens of the town should give IlL 336 ; Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698. a boiid in a fixed sum for building a ^ Grogan v. San Francisco (1861), 18 court-house, the condition precedent CaL 590, holding it not in the power having been complied with, was not a of the legislature to divest property contract which would disable the leg- which is not held in trust for pub- islature subsequently to legislate for lie municipal purposes. See, also, it< lemova to another town. See. also, Benson v. Mayor && of New York, Armstrongs Comm'rs, 4 Biackf. 208 ; 10 Barb. 245. El well V. Tucker, 1 Biackf. 285, in § 715.] LEGISLATIVE OONTEOL. 727 the control of the legislature over the corporation, it can be exercised only in subordination to the principle which secures the inviolability of contracts." ^ § 715. The same subject continue^. — The Supreme Court of the United States sustained a statute of Connecticut which discontinued a ferry in which a town had a half-interest on the ground that there was no contract between the State and the town by which the latter could claim a permanent right to the ferry, the nature of the subject-matter of the grant and the character of the parties to it both showing that it was not such a contract as was beyond the interference of the legis- lature.^ 1 Field, C. J., in Grogan v. San Francisco (1861), 18 Cal. 580, 613. In Spaulding v. Andover (1873), 54 N. H. 38, an act which declared a por- tion, of a fund vchich had been as- signed to a town " to belong to and be the property of " certain individ- uals was held to be invalid as violat- ing a contract between the State and the town which was the effect of a statute under which the State issued bonds and assigned to the town its portion "to be devoted exclusively toward the reimbursement of the expenditures incurred by the town for war purposes during the rebell- ion." The court said : — " [The as- signment of these bonds] was an un- qualified and unincumbered grant [of the same to the town], possessing all the incidents of an executed and iri-evooable contract." 2 Town of East Hartford v. Hart- ford Bridge Co. (1850), 10 How. 611. Woodbury, Justice, said : — " . . . the doings of the legislature must be considered rather as public laws than as contracts. They related to public interests. They changed as those in- terests demanded. The grantees like- wise, the towns being mere organiza- tions for public purposes, were liable to have their public powers, rights and duties modified or abolished at any moment by the legislature. They are incorporated for public and not private objects. They are allowed to hold privileges, or property only for public pui-poses. The members are not shareholders nor joint partners in any corporate estate which they can sell or devise to others, or which can be attached and levied on for their debts. Hence, generally, the doings between them and the legis- lature are in the nature of legislation rather than compact, and subject to all the legislative conditions just named, and therefore to be consid- ered as not violated by subsequent legislative changes. It is hardly pos- sible to conceive the grounds on which a different result could be vin- dicated without destroying all legis- lative sovereignty and checking most legislative improvements and amend- ments, as well as supervision over its subordinate public bodies. Thus to go a little into details, one of tlie highest attributes of a legislature is to regulate public matters with all public bodies, no less than the com- munity, from' time to time, in the manner which the public welfare may appear to demand. It can neither devolve these duties permanently on 728 LEGISIATIVK CONTKOL. [§ 716. § 716. Bemission of forfeitures. — A county does not, nor do any of its citizens or its governing authorities acquire aright of property or any separate or private interest in a forfeiture named in an act of the legislature authorizing a subscription by the State to the stock of a private corpora- tion, if the corporation fails to do a certain thing, though the act declares it for the use of the county. A proviso of that kind in an act of the legislature is a measure of State policy which the State has a right to change if the policy is after- wards discovered to be erroneous.^ other public bodies, nor permanently suspend or abandon them itself, with- out being usually regarded as un- faithful, and, indeed, attempting what is wholly beyond its constitu- tional competency. It is bound, also, to continue to regulate such public matters and bodies, as much as to organize them at first. Where not resti'ained by mei'e constitutional provision, this power is inherent in its nature, design and attitude, and the community possess as deep and permanent interest in such power re- maining in and being exercised by the legislatm-e when the public prog- ress and welfare demand it, as in- dividuals or corporations can in any instance possess in restraining it." See, also, remarks o£ Taney, C. J., in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge. 11 Peters, 420, 547, 548. 1 State V. Baltimore & Ohio R Co. (1845), 3 How. 534, in wliich it was urged that the county had acquired a beneficial right to the $1,000,000 named in the act by reason of the failure of the railroad company to construct their road through the county ; that its right was a vested right; in short, that it was a con- tract, and that the legislature had no power by a subsequent act to re- lease the corporation from its pay- ment and order a discontinuance of the suit which the county had insti- tuted for the amount The Supreme Court of the United States held that it was a penalty inflicted upon the corporation as a punishment for dis- obeying the law, and the assent of the company to it, as a supplemental charter, was not sufficient to de- prive it of the character of a penalty. A clause of forfeiture in a law is to be construed differently from a simi- lar clause in an engagement between individuals. A legislatijre can im- pose it as a punishment, but individ- uals can only make it a matter of contract. The legislature has a right to remit a penalty imposed by law. In HoUiday v. People (1848), 10 111. 214 it was held that the legislature might, after verdict, release a pen- alty in a popular action brought for the benefit of a county, a county be- ing a public corporation subject completely to the control of the leg- islature, and the acts of the executive pursuant to the provisions of the constitution. See, also. Coles v. County of Madison, Breese (111.), tl5 ; Conner v. Bent, 1 Mo. 235. In the latter case it was held that the legis- lature was competent to relieve from a forfeiture, even where, the money was going to a county, and that after judgment; also, tha,t where money accrues to a county (this was an action for money collected as district taxes claimed not to have §§ 717, 718.] LEvJISLATIVE COHTEOL. 729 k § 717. Property held for public uses. — It is within the power of the legislature to relieve a city or other municipal corporation frona the trust to hold real property condemned or purchased for a public use only, and to authorize it to sell and convey the same.' So, also, the legislature may sanction a sale of such property, a change in its character from realty to persopalty, and the devotion of the avails of such a sale to general or special purposes.^ The legislature having declared in a prior act authorizing the purchase of lands for a public use by a municipality that the holders of the bonds issued and sold by it to pay for such lands should have a lien upon the lands to secure the payment of the bonds, it cannot by a sub- sequent act empower the municipality to sell such lands and make a title freed from the lien of such bondholders. The se- curity cannot be taken away without impairing the obligation of the contract, which is not one between the corporation and the State, but between the creditor of the one part^ and the corporation and the State of the other part* § 718. Tenure of office of municipal officials. — It has been held in Kentucky that the provisions of the State constitution as to courts of cities and the election of judges was never in- tended to take from the legislature the power to enlarge the boundaries of towns in existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution, or to alter or abolish the courts therein, when the law-making power should deem it for the benefit of the inhabitants.* been paid over), it cannot be said to McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143 ; Wa- be so vested as to prevent the con- bash &c. Co. v. Beers, 3 Black, 448. tvol of the legislature, as the legisla- * Boyd v. Chambers (1S79), 78 Ky. ture has power over the counties and 140, in which the right to the office of all things that belong to them in a city judge elected in accordance that capacity simply as such. with the terms of a new charter of a 1 Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm- city re-incorporated was sustained strong tl871), 45 N. Y. 234 ; S. C, 6 over the claims of one elected when Am. Rep. 70. See, also, Nioollw. New the provisions of the constitution York & E. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 131. governed in the matter. The Court 2 De Varaigne v. Fox, 3 Blatchf. 95. of Appeals said : — " Cities and-towns , ' Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm- are mere creatures of the legislature, strong (1871). 45 N. Y. 334; S. c, 6 and the power exists in that depart- Am. Rep. 70. See, also, Curran v. ment of the State government not State of Arkansas, 15 How. 304-314 ; only to abolish the courts, but to de- 730 LEGISLATIVE OONTEOL. [§ 719. § 719. Agencies of mnnicipal administration. — Although the power, under its charter and subsequent legislation, has been placed in the governing authorities of a municipal cor- poration to appoint the officers of any department of its gov- ernment, there remains in the legislature the power, to be exercised whenever it deems that the public welfare requires it, to create by legislative enactment a board for the govern- ment of that particular department, to appoint the members of the board, and to define its duties and delegate to it the powers necessary to the administration of that department.* That the constitution of a State mentions and recognizes any yjarticular municipal corporation does not make the charter of that corporation a constitutional charter so as to place it beyond thd reach of legislative power.* The doctrine that there is a fundamental principle, of right and justice, inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact, that rises above Btroy the existence of the corporation by a repeal of its charter. These in- ferior courts not being the creatures of the constitution, it was never in- tended to deprive the legislature of the power to regulate and control by proper legislation all the machinery necessary to the existence of such municipalities." Again they said : — ' " And when its [the city's] charter has been repealed and a new and dis- tinct act of incorporation obtained [which was done here], it is the crea- tion of a new city government, with its civil and police jurisdiction as well as the manner of electing all Its officers controlled by its charter, when not in violation of the consti- tution." In Rutgers v. Mayor &o. of Ne%v Brunswick (1884), 43 N. J. Law, 51, it was held to be in the power of the legislature of New Jersey to enact a law which was supplemental to an act which had established a district court in cities having fifteen thousand inhabitants. The supple- mental act changed the former by substituting twenty thousand inhab- itants. The ground of the ruling was that district courts are inferior courts, which the legislature could establish, alter or abolish at its dis- cretion, as the public good might re- quire; and if in its discretion the court was abolished, the term of serv- ice of its officers was thereby ter- minated. The effect of the supple- mental act, as the city did not have twenty thousand inhabitants, was to abolish the court and terminate the term of office of the relator, who ap- plied for mandamus to compel the payment of his salary as district judge after the passage of the sup- plemental act 1 Mayor &o. of Baltimore v. State (1860), 15 Md. 376. 2 Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. State (1860), 15 Md. 376. This ruling was based upon the doctrine that the power to govern belongs to the peo- ple, and it is their duty to exercise it for the common good, and being un- der that obligation, it is not to be as- sumed that they have impaired the means of performing the duty by parting with the power to any divis- ion of the body politic. g§ 720, 721.] LEGISLATIVE OONTEOL. 731 and restrains the power of legislation, cannot be applied to the legislature when exercising its sovereignty over public charters, granted for the purpose of government.' § 720. Diversion of funds. — It was urged in an Illinois case that money appropriated by an act to establish and main- tain a general system of internal improvements to the differ- ent counties through which no railroad or canal was provided to be made, when received by the county, became its property for the use of the inhabitants thereof and was beyond legisla- tive control. The Supreme Court held that this money Avas subject to legislative control, and until definitely appropriated it might be resumed or diverted at the will of the legislature.' § 721. The same subject continned — Public interest para- mount to private right. — A municipal officer has no vested right of property in any portion of a fund of the corporation which is set apart as a fund for the relief of disabled or retir- ing officers of the class to which he belongs, which results from an authority given to the treasurer of the corporation by statute fixing the compensation of such officers, and to re- tain a certain amount from the compensation for this purpose. The effect of the provisions of such a statute is an appropria- tion by the State each month to the creation of the fund for 1 Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. State grant may be made to a public cor- (1860), 15 MA 376. poration for purposes of private ad- 2 County of Richland v. County of vantage, and although the public Lawrence (1850), 13 111. 1. The court may also derive a common beneBt said : — " There was no contract here therefrom, yet the corporation stands between the State and Lawrence on the same footing as respects such county, either at the time the appro- grants as would any body of persons priation was made or when the uponlwhom like privileges were con- county received the money. The ferred. Public or municipal corpora- county was the mere agent of the tions, however, which exist only for State for the disbursement of a cer- public purposes and possess no power tain amount of the money of the except such as are bestowed upon State as she directed. That the State them for public political purposes, may make a contract with or a grant are subject at all times to the control to a public municipal corporation, of the legislature, which may alter, which it could not subsequently im- modify or abolish them at pleasure." pair or resume, is not denied ; but 3 Kent's Cdm. 305 ; Bailey v. City of in such case the corporation is to be New York, 3 Hill, 531. regarded as a private company. A 732 LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL. [§§ 722, 723. the purposes designated in the statute, and until used for these purposes it can be transferred to other parties and ap- plied to different purposes by the legislature.^ § 722. Application of revenues. — The revenues of a county are not the property of the county in the sense in which the revenue of a private corporation is regarded ; and the power of the legislature to direct its application is plenary. A county being a public corporation, whi«h exists only for public pur- poses, connected with the administration of the State govern- ment, it follows that such a corporation, and of course its revenue, is subject to the control of the legislature, and when the legislature directs the application of its revenue to a par- ticular purpose, or its payment to any party, a duty is im- posed and an obligation created upon the county.* § 723. The same subject continued. — The power of ap- propriation which a legislature can exercise over the reve- iPennie v. Eeis (1888), 133 U. S. 464. Field, Justice, said : — '• The di- rection of the State, that the fund should be one foi- the benefit of the police officer or his representative under certain conditions, was subject to change or revocation at any time at the will of the legislatui-e. There was no contract on the part of the State that its disposition should al- ways continue as originally provided. Until the particular event should happen upon which the money or a part of it was to be paid, there was no vested right in the officer to such payment. His interest in the fund was until then a mere expectancy treated by the law and liable to be revoked or destroyed by the same authority." 2 Boayd of Supervisors of Sangamon County V. City of Springaeld (1872), 63 111. 66. In People &c. v. Power (1860), 25 111. 187, the Supreme Court of Illinois sustained the validity of an act of the legislature which pro- vided that the county in which a city was situated, out of taxes collected as ordered by the act, should pay over to the city certain portions of the revenue realized from the taxea It was especially urged before the court that the legislature could not control the revenue of a county, such revenue being the property of the counties, not to be taken from them without their consent, and to be used and appropriated in such man- ner only as the county courts of the respective counties might direct; that to do so would violate the con- stitutional provisions as to laws im- pairing the obligation of contracts. Upon this point the court said: — " The whole State has an interest in the revenue of a county, and for the public good the legislature must have the power to direct its applica- tion. The power conferred upon a county to raise a revenue by taxation is a political power, and its applica- tion, when collected, must necessa- rily be within the control of the legis- lature for political purposes.'' § 724.] LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL. 733 nues of the State for any purpose, which it may regard as calculated to promote the public good, it can exercise over the revenues of a county, city or town, for any purpose con- nected with the present or past condition except as such reve- nues may, by the law creating them, be devoted to special purposes.' § 724. Impairment of obligations to individuals. — The implied contract which is deemed to arise out of the accept- ance of a charter by a municipal corporation is a contract be- tween the city and the State, and not between the city and individuals, and is not "Impaired" by a statute exempting the corporation from liability for torts.^ An act of the legis- lature establishing a board of public works for a city cannot be held invalid on the ground that it divests old boards, or 1 This mile was declared by Field, J., in Blanding v. Burr (1859), 13 Cal. 343, 351. See, also, Town of Guil- ford V. Board of Supervisors, 13 N. Y. 143 ; People v. Mayor of Brook- lyn, 4 Comst. (N. Y.) 419 ; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65 ; Shaw v. Den- nis, 5 Gil. 415 ; City of Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 492; Inhabitants of Norwich v. County Comm'rs of Hampshire, 18 Pick. 60 ; Truchelut v. City Council of Charles- ton, 1 Nott & McC. 227 ; Wilson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 661, 662 ; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 392; Grant v. Courier, 24 Barb. 237; Benson v. Mayor of Albany, 24 Barb. 248; Clark V. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446; Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila- delphia, 21 Pa. St. 147 ; Moers v. City of Reading. 21 Pa. St. 188; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio, 613 ; Railroad Co. v. Comm'rs of Clinton Co., 1 Ohio St 89; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 337: People V. Mayor of New York, 25 Wend. 681; People v. Draper, 25 Barb. 344 ; State v. Baltimore &c. R Co., 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 436; Crelgh- ton V. San Francisco (1871), 42 Cal. 446, in which it was held that the power of the legislature to appropri- ate the moneys of municipal cor- porations in payment of claims, as- certained by it to be equitably due to individuals, though such claims be not enforceable in the courts, de- pends largely upon the legislative conscience and will not be inter- fered with by the judicial depart- ment, unless in exceptional cases. People V. San Francisco, 11 Cal. 206 ; People V. Haws, 37 Barb. 440; Still- well V. Mayor of New York, 19 Abb. Pr. 376; Hobart v. Supervisors, 17 Cal. 31 ; People v. Pacheco, 27 Cal. 209 ; People v. Stewart, 28 Cal. 395 ; Beals V. Amador County, 35 Cal. 032; Davidson v. Mayor of New York, 27 How. Pr. 342. 2 Gray v. City of Brooklyn (1869), 10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 186. The section of the act, amendatory of the char- ter of the city, under consideration, which exempted the city from lia- bility for non-feasance, etc., of city oflScers, was held constitutional ; and the court further said the section was intended, not to divest persons affected thereby of their rights, but to change and limit their remedies. 734 LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL, [§ 725. the city corporation, or the common council, of the title to property, and transfers it to and vests it in such a board of public works.' § 725. The same subject continued. — If a contract when made is valid under the constitution and laws of a State, as they have been previousl}' expounded by its judicial tribunals, and as they were understood at the time, no subsequent ac- tion by the legislature or the judiciary will be regarded by the United States Supreme Court as establishing its invalid- ity.' 1 People V. Hurlbut (1871), 24 Mich. 44, 73, Christiancy, J., saying : — " All those' previous boards and the city corporation itself held whatever property they did hold in the right, and for the public benefit, of the city, as a public trust for municipal purposes ; and it was clearly compe- tent for the legislature to transfer it to another public board, to be held in the same manner, for the game pub- lic use and benefits." In Western Sav- ing Fund Society v. City of Philadel- phia (1858), 31 Pa. St. 185, the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania affirmed the granting of an injunc- tioQ on complaint of the society to restrain the city from an election of a number of trustees of a loan fund in accordance with an act passed by the legislature, which the court held not to be in the power of the legis- lature, as it impaired a contract made by the city, with reference to the organization of a gas-works com- pany, on the principle that whenever a municipal corporation engages in things not public in their nature it acts as a private individual, — no longer legislates, but contracts, — and is as much bound by its engage- ments as a private person. ZQlcott V. Supervisors (1873), 16 Wall. 678, in which the court applied the principles stated in the text, and held an act of the legislature of Illinois, authorizing a vote of the peo- ple of a particular county upon the questipn whether they would aid the building of a certain railroad, and, if they Voted in favor of aiding, authorizing the issue of county orders for money to aid in the building to have been a proper exercise of legis- lative authority, and the county charged on such orders issued by it and given to the road by way of do- nation. See, also, Chicago v. Shel- don, 9 Wall. 50 ; Louisiana v. Pills- bury, 105 U. S. 278; County of Livingston v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 407 ; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 294 ; Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327 : Gelpcke v. City of Bu- bnque, 1 Wall. 175; Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575; Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270. In Burton V. Town of Koshkonong (1880), 4 Fed. Eep. 373, it was held that if a statute which provided against interest upon interest was intended and did operate so as to affect the rate of interest upon coupons of the bonds of this town, a contract made before its passage, it would be such a change in the remedy as practically to cut off a portion of the cause of action or render the contract of less available worth, and was as much within the constitutional provision inhibiting §^ 726, 727.] LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL. 735 § 726. Impairment of remedies against the corporation. If a municipality enter into a contract under a supposed power to pay for improvements ^y an assessment upon prop- erty owners presumably benefited by such improvements, and upon its afterwards appearing that there was no such power in the corporation, the legislature should pass a statute em- powering the municipality to levy a tax to pay for such im- provements, a contractor who has reduced his claim for such work to judgment against the corporation has a vested right under that statute to a remedy to compel the corporation to levy such a tax that the legislature cannot take away by sub- sequent legislation, under the constitutional provision prohib- iting legislation which would impair contracts.' § 727. The same subject continued — Control of tax- ing power limited. — The Supreme Court of the United States upon this subject has said : — " The argument in support of the act [a statute of Louisiana authorizing the " premium bond " plan for settling the bonded and floating debts of the city of laws impairing the obligation of con- tiacts as if it i affected the contract directly, and judgment was given for the plaintiff. In United States v. Lincoln County (1379), 5 Dill. 184, it was held that an act of the legisla- ture, if it applies to county bonds issued before its passage, and takes away the power from the' county court to levy taxes to pay these bonds, and as a result the right of the holder of a judgment based upon such bonds to compel a levy of a tax by mandamus to the county court, it was in conflict with the constitution as to impairing the obligation of con- tracts. 1 Memphis v. United States (1877), 97 U. S. 393. See, also. Von Hoffman V. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535. In Lansing v. County Treasurer, 1 DilL 628, a statute of Iowa which discrim- inated specially against taxes levied to pay judgments on bonds issued by municipal corporations in aid of rail- roads was, in. view of the laws in force when the bonds were issued, held to be unconstitutional and void as impairing the obligation of con- tracts. In Pereles v. City of Water- town (1874), 6 Biss. 79, a Wisconsin statute of limitations so far as it af- fected municipal bonds issued before its passage was held to be unconsti- tutional and void, Hopkins, J., held that in passing a statute of limita- tions the legislature must allow a reasonable time within which to prosecute existing causes of action ; and as to what constitutes such rea- sonable time the legislature was not the exclusive autliority. The period fixed by the legislature is subject to review by the court, and if they deem it unreasonable they will disi-e- gard it as impairing the obligation of contracts. A limitation to one year in municipal bonds issued for nego- tiation in a foreign market the judg,e regarded as clearly unreasonable and unconstitutiont^l. It amounted to a destruction of the contract 736 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. [§ 727. New Orleans] is substantially this : — That the taxing power be- longs exclusively to the legislative department of the govern- ment, and when delegated to a municipal corporation may, equally with other powers of the, corporation, be revoked or restricted at the pleasure of the legislature. It is true that the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative de- partment, and that the legislature may at any time restrict or revoke at its pleasure any of the powers of a municipal cor- poration, including among othefs that of taxation, subject, however, to this qualification, which attends all State legisla- tion, that its action in that respect shall not conflict with the prohibitions of the constitution of the United States, and, among other things, shall not operate directly upon contracts of the corporation, so as to impair their obligation by abro- gating or lessening the means of their enforcement. Legisla- tion producing this latter result, not indirectly as a conse- quence of legitimate measures taken, as will sometimes hap- pen, but directly by operating upon those means, is prohibited by the constitution, and must be disregarded — treated as if never ena,cted — by all courts recognizing the constitution as the paramount law of the land. This doctrine has been re- peatedly asserted by this court when attempts have been made to limit the power of taxation of a municipal body, upon the faith of which contracts have been made, and by means of which alone they could be performed. So long as the cor- poration continues in existence the court has said that the con- trol of the legislature over the power of taxation delegated to it is restrained to cases where such control does not impair the obligation of contracts made upon a pledge, expressly or impliedly given, that the power should be exercised for their fulfillment. However great the control of the legislature over the corporation while it is in existence, it must be exercised in subordination to the principles which secure the inviolability of contracts." ' I Wolff V. New Orleans (1880), 103 it was held that a statute of Ar- U. S. 358. See, also. Von Hotf man kansas which was passed by the leg- V. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535. In islature after the institution of this -National Bank v. Sebastian County suit in the federal court, declaring (1879), 5 Dill. 414. an action by the counties no longer bodies corporate bank upon county warrants issued and suable upon their contracts, be- by the county in a regular manner, ing evidently intended to deprive §§ 728, 729.] LEGISLATIVE OONTEOL. 737 § 728. Yacating assessments of damages. — The effect of a law which empowers a municipality to condemn property in the broadening of its streets, upon that being done and a com- mission appointed in the law assessing and fixing the compen- sation to the land-owner, is not to divest the owner at once of his property and to vest in him a right to the amount fixed as his compensation, such that the legislature may not provide for a vacating of an order of confirmation of the report of.the commission in the matter, and submit to the court whether or not there had been error, mistake, irregularity and illegal acts in. the proceedings.' § 729. The rule summarized. — A municipal corporation, being a mere agent of the State, stands in its governmental or parties of the right to sue counties in the federal court, impaired the obligation of a contract ; and Parker, Judge, extracted from the case of Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, as to what constitutes the obligation of a contract, as follows : — " The obliga- tion of a contract includes evei-y- thing within its obligatory scope. Among these elements nothing is more important than the means of enforcement. This is the breath of its vital existence. Without it the contract, as such, in the view of the law, ceases to be, and falls into the class of 'those imperfect obliga- tions,' as they are termed, which de- pend for their fulfillment upon the will and conscience of those upon whom they rest. The ideas of right and remedy are inseparable." 1 Garrison v. City of New York (1874), 21 Wall. 190, in which it was held that in the proceeding to con- demn property for public use there is nothing in the nature of a contract between the owner and the State or corporation which the State in virtue of her right of eminent domain au- thorizes to take the property ; all that the constitution of the State or of the 47 United States or justice requires in such cases being that a just compen- sation shall be made to the owner ; hisproperty can then be taken without his assent. The court said : — " The proceeding to ascertain the benefits or losses which will accrue to the owner of the property when taken for public use, and thus the compen- sation to be made to him, is in the nature of an inquest on the part of the State, and is necessarily under her control. It is her duty to see that the estimates made are just, not merely to the individual whose prop- erty is taken but to the public who is to pay for it And she can to that end vacate or authorize the vacation of any inquest taken by her direc- tion to ascertain particular facts for her guidance, where the proceeding has been irregularly or fraudulently conducted or in which error has in- tervened and order a new inquest, provided such methods of procedure be observed as will secure a fair hear- ing from the parties interested in the property." See, also. In the Matter of Widening Broadway, 61 Barb. 483 ; S. a, 49 N. Y. 150. T38 LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL. [§ 729. public character in no contract relation with its sovereign, at whose pleasure its charter may be amended, changed or re- voked without the impairment of any constitutional obliga- tion; but such a corporation in respect of its private or proprietary rights and interests may be entitled to constitu- tional protection.! It was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that a municipal corporation could not claim tha,t a contract between it and a private corporation had been impaired by a subsequent act dt the legislature, where this contract, which was in reality one between the State and the private corporation, . had been adjudged in the State courts to be ultra vires; also, that as the city had repudiated its contract by bringing suit against the private corporation for its taxes, it was estopped from the claim of impairment of the contract by subsequent legislation when such legislation was rendered necessary by or at least was the natural out- growth of its own repudiation of the contract.^ municipal corporation is not private property or a vested rigbt of property in its hands, but the conferring of such power is an exercise by the legislature of a public and govern-- mental power which cannot be im- parted in perpetuity, and is always subject to revocation, modification and control, and is not the subject of contract In Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, it was held that an executive agency created by a State for the purpose of improving public highways, and em- powered to assess the cost of their im- provement upon adjoining lands and to purchase such lands as were delin- quent in the payment of the assess- ment, did not by such purchase ac- quire a contract right in the land so bought which the State could not modify without violating the pro- visions of the constitution of the United States. 2 New Orleans v. New Orleans Water-works Co. and Conery v. New Orleans Water-works Co., 143 U. S. 79 ; s. C, 13 S. Ct Rep. 142. I This doctrine, first declared in Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat 518, 660, 661, restated in East Hart- -ford V. Hartford Bridge Company, 10 How. 511, 533, 584, has been reiter- ated in New Orleans v. New Orleans Water- works Co., and Conery «. New Orleans Water-works Co. (1891), 143 U. S. 79; S. C, 13 S. Ct Rep. 143; in which case the city had under an act of the legislature made a contract for a supply of water with the water- works company, and it was urged by the city that a subsequent act of the legislature which required the city to make a proper compensation to the company for water furnished, or the company should not be compelled to deliver the water to the city, impaired the first contract In Laramie County V. Albany County, 93 U. S. 807, 311, it was held that the legislature had power to diminish or enlarge the area of a county whenever the public convenience or necessity required it In Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189, 199, it was held that the power of taxation on the part of a CHAPTEE XX. TORTS AND CRIMES. 730. Torts by the sovereign power. §753. 731. The State not liable for ofiSoers' torts — No respondeat supe- 753. rior. 754 733. Suita against United States — 755. Court of claims. 756. 783. Suits against New York — Board of claims. 757. 734 Counties, etc as divisions of the State. 758. 735. Tlie same subject continued. 736. Non-liability of New England towns. 759. 737. Liability of New England towns. 760. 738. Liability of towns, etc., as to 761. special dutiea 763. 739. Non-liability of school districts and drainage districts. 763. 740. Non-liability for separate boards and bodies. 764 741. Non-liability for torts of inde- pendent oflBcers. 765. 743. The same subject continued — Who are independent ofiS- 766. oers. 743. The same subject continued — Applied in New York city, eta 767. 744. Non-liability for firemen. 768. 745. Non-liability for police. 769. 746. Liability for acts of mobs. 770. 747. Private interests must yield to public, 771. 748. The same subject continued — Destroying buildings to 773. check fire. 749. Non-liability for negligence in public service. 773. 750. Non-liability as to jails. 774 751. Non-liability as to hospitals. 775. Non-liability as to fire-works. Liability as to city wells and water. Non-liability to trespassers. Liability for nuisances. Municipal liability in general. Chartered cities, etc., distin- guished from counties, etc. — The conflict. Municipal liability in exercise of private powers. Liability commensurate with" duty. Municipal liability as to water front Liability for fright of horse. Municipal liability for acts of ofiScers and agents. Not liable for ultra vires acts of oflBcers. Non-liability in the exercise of discretionary powers. The same subject continued — New York and Georgia rula The same subject continued — Drainaga Non-liability for errors of judgment. Liability for trespass. Liability for waste. Liability after notice — Im- plied notice. The same subject continued — Statutory notice. The same subject continued — New York decisiona Impeaching legislative acta for fraud. Indictment for torts. Not indictable for felony. 740 TOETS AND CEIMES. [§ 730. § 730. Torts Iby the sovereign power. — While the maxim, that the king can do no wrong, is deemed not to apply to the United States or the several States' in their character of public , corporations,^ it is obvious enough on general princi- ples that they should not be subject to prosecution in the courts of their own creation for such wrongs as they may commit,' without their consent to such prosecution duly ex- pressed by statute.^ The liabilities of the State, being created only by its legislature, may be* revoked by the same body Avhenever the public interest requires.* The legislature of a State may keep within the letter of the constitution and bill of rights to which it is subject, and yet with impunity pass laws which are unjust and oppressive to individuals.' In some European countries an innocent man who is punished for crime through judicial errors may have reparation therefor from the State, but not in this country. This seems to be a ..penalty which one has to pay for belonging to civilized so- ciety.' 1 Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341. .. 2 United States v. Hillegas, 3 Wash. C. C. 73. While generally the word corporation as used in statutes does not include a State, yet in its more extensive meaning, both the United States and the several States may be termed corporations. Geor- gia V. Atkins, 35 Ga. 315. 3 "We consider it to be a funda- mental principle that the govern- ment cannot be sued except by its own consent, and certainly no State can pass a law which would have any validity for making the government suable in its courts." Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433; United States V. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 204; The Siren, 7 Wall 153; The Davis, 10 Wall. 15. " The State is not liable for the neg- ligence or misfeasance of its agents unless such liability has been volun- tarily assumed by it by legislative enactment" Lewis v. State of New York, 96 N. Y. 71 ; People v. Denni- son, 84 N. Y. 373. *Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 483, 437. 5 Ex parte State, 53 Ala. 331 ; Van- dyke V. State, 34 Ala. 81 ; Beers v. State, 20 How. (U. S.) 537. See, also, Chisholm v. State, 2 Dallas, 419; Hollingsworth v. State, 3 Dallas, 378 ; Platenius v. State, 17 Ark. 518. 6 In Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, the Civil Damages Act of 1873 was upheld as constitutional in spite of its "sweeping character," and An- drews, J., said : — " We come back to the proposition that no law can be pronounced invalid for the reason simply that it violates our notions of justice, is oppressive and unfair in its operation, or because in the opin- ion of some or all of the citizens of the State, it is not justified by public necessity." See, also. Mobile County V. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691. 704 7 This apparent injustice is consid- ered in 36 Am. L. Rev. 555, and the N. Y. Law Journal of September 81, 1893. §§ 731, 732.] TOETS AND 0EIME8. 7*t §731. The State not liable for offlcersUorts — No re- spondeat superior. — In respect to its contracts the. State is equally liable with individuals ; ' and is restrained by the con- stitution from making laws to impair the obligation of its con-^ tracts.* But governments, federal or State, do not hold them- selves liable to individuals for their officers' misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of power,' for such liability would involve them in endless embarrassments.* The State is not liable for the tortious acts of its agents except by force of statute.* §732. Suits against United States — Court of claims. — The United States has not generally consented to be sued in the federal court of claims in cases sounding in tort or for war claims,* and is not liable for the tort of its officers in forcibly taking private land for public use.' That court is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction in congressioiial cases ' if the claim be for destruction of or damage to property by the army, or if it, be barred by the acts of 1873 or 1879.* Wend. 570; Seymour v. Van Slyke, 8 Wend. 403, overruling People v. Jansen, 7 Johns. 333. 5 Lewis V. State of New York, 96 N. Y. 71 ; Clodfelter v. State, 86 N. a 51, where the court said : — '• That the doctrine of respondeat*superior ap- plicable to the relation of principal and agent does not prevail against the sovereign in the necessary em- ployment of public agents is too well settled upon authority and practice to admit of controversy." « Act of 1887, 24 Stat. , ch. 359. In United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 305, Miller, J., says : — " Congress has created a court in which it has au- thorized suits to be brought against the United States, but has limited such suits to those arising on con- tracts, with a few unimportant ex- ceptions." 7 Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341. See United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645. SActof MarchS, 1883. 'Burke v. United States, 81 Ct 01. iDanoMs v. State, 89 N. Y. 36, 44; People V. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 549. 2 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 137 ; New Jersey v. Wil- son, 7 Cranch, 164 'Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269. * Story on Agency, § 319. In United States V. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat 720, 735, Story, J., said: — "The general principle is that laches is not im- putable to the government ; and this maxim is founded not in the notion of extraordinary prerogative, but upon a great public policy. The gov- ernment can transact its business only through its agents ; and its fiscal opei'ations are so various, and its agencies so numerous and scattered, that the utmost vigilance would not save the public from the most serious losses, if the doctrine of laches can be applied to its transactions.'' See, also. United States v. Van Zandt, 11 Wheat 186 ; United States v. Nichols, 12 Wheat 505 ; People v. Russell, 4 742 TOUTS AND 0EIME8. [§ 732. When congress by special legislation refers a claim of which the court has not jurisdiction it must be held that the first purpose of congress is to confer jurisdiction, and, aJso, that the court is to render substantial justice if upon ordinary principles of law the claimant is entitled to it ; ' but where a private act of congress submits the question whether the gov- ernment is liable for certain alleged acts of its officers, the liability must be deemed to be the legal liability which an ordinary body corporate, such* as a municipal corporation, would be subject to for similar acts of its agents.^ That con- gress has by several special acts provided for payment of sev- eral claims on which claimants could not have recovered in the court of claims in the exercise of its general jurisdiction is no reason why the TTnited States should be held liable in that court on a like claim which congress has not provided for." A .statute authorizing the court of claims to render judgment on claims for property taken in 1857 for the LFnited States by Colonel Johnson, while in command of the Utah ex- pedition, was held not to authorize that court to give judgment for losses caused by the refusal of the colonel to permit claim- ants' trains to proceed without delay.* Though the United States be not responsible for the trespass of ofiicers who illegally seize the property of a citizen, yet if the proceeds pass into the treasury the government will be liable on im- plied contract to account to the owner therefor, and the court of claims has jurisdiction.* In congressional cases the claim- ant in the court of claims must prove his loyalty, and it is not always clear whether it is the personal representative, or the heir, or the creditor of a deceased whose loyalty must be proved.' A claim must be dismissed if the claimant " sus- tained the late rebellion." ' 817; Myers v. United States, 23 Ct 4 United States v. Irwin, 137 U. a CI. 80 ; Nelson v. United States, 33 135. Ct CI. 159. See Beasley V. United 6 Thayer a United States, 30 Ct CI. States, 31 Ct Ci. 335. 137. 1 Cumming v. United States, 33 Ct * Compare Newman v. United CI. 344 ' States, 31 Ct CI. 205, with Randolph scumming v. United States, 23 Ct v. United States, 21 Ct CI. 283. CI. 344 ' Hart v. United States, 118 U. a » United States v. McDougall, 131 63. U. a 89. §§ 733, 734.J TOBTS AND OBIMES. Y43 § 733. Suits against New York— Board of claims. — In Xew York a board of claims has been established to hear and determine "all private claims against the State of New York;"' and the State may become liable for an authorize 1 trespass by its agents and officers on private lands; ^ but un- der the statute establishing the board of claims and the stat- ute of 1876 creating the board of audit,' the State is not generally liable for the negligence or misfeasance of its agents, because the State has not by its legislature assumed such a liability.^ In North Carolina, too, it is held that the State is not rendered liable for the torts of its officers while adminis- tering the functions of government by the constitutional provision which confers jurisdiction on the State Supreme Court "to hear claims against the State."* A similar rule prevails in Alabama.' § 734. Counties, etc., as divisions of the State. — Coun- ties, towns, and, in some States, cities, in the exercise of the governmental functions delegated to them by the State, are 1 L 1884, ch. 85, § 1 ; L. 1883, ch. 205 ; L. 1888, ch. 435. 3 Coleman v. State (1893), 47 N. Y. St Rep. 609, where on appeal from the board of claims it was decided by the Court of Appeals that " for the injury caused by entering upon this strip of land by the State it was liable and the board erred in refusing the claimant any relief. The entry of the State upon the land and its direction to the contractor to excavate and remove the stone there- from being wrongful, a trespass, it became liable for all trespasses com- mitted by the contractor with the knowledge and acquiescence of the agents of the State in executing the contract" 3L.1876, ch. 444. < Lewis V. State of New York, 96 N. Y.-71, where a prisoner in the State reformatory having been in- jured by a defective ladle which the overseer compelled him to use, Dan- forth, J., said ; — " The claimant must fail unless the doctrine of respondeat superior can be applied to the State and the State made liable for the negligence or misfeasance of its agents in like manner as a natural person is responsible for the acts of his servants. We are aware of no principle of law or of any adjudged case which makes that application except where the State by its legisla- ture has voluntarily assumed it" »CIodfelter v. State, 86 N. C. 51, « State V. Hill, 54 Ala. 67, where it was held that section 2534 of the Revised Code was only intended to afford to persons who had claims against the State a mode of ascer- taining whether or not they were well founded, and if they were what sum was due to them; but not to create a liability on the part of the State where it did not exist already under the laws. 744 TOHTS AND CRIMES. [§ 734. not liable for the misfeasance or negligence of their oiEcers ; thus a county is not liable for the negligence of commission- ers in selecting an incompetent physician for the care of the poor.^ In Alabama a county, being deemed an agency of the State, and as exercising a quasi-legislsitive authority over highways, is not liable at common law in damages for any negligence in respect to them,^ but such liability must be spe- cially defined by statute.' In Virginia a county as a political subdivision of the State is not sii|)ject to suit, except as per- mitted by statute, and such permission may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the legislature ; * and the same rule exists in Georgia, though the code makes every county a corporation with the right to sue and be sued. In a particular case, how- ever, the code provides that a county may be sued for neglect 1 In Summers v. Daviess Obunty Comm'rs, 103 Ind. 263 ; s. C, 53 Am. Rep. 513, the court said : — " There is no more reason for holding counties liable for the negligence of the com- missioners in the exercise of the gov- ernmental functions delegated to them than there is for holding cities liable for the acts of their firemen or police officers, or for holding coun- ties and townships liable for the torts of sheriflfs and constables. In pro- viding for the care of the poor, a police povrer virhich resides primar rily in the sovereignty is exercised, and neither the sovereign nor the local governing body to whom such a po. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 319; Lee Holden (1891), 107 Mo. 305. V. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 18. But §§ 748, 749.] TOKTS and crimes. 759 § 748. The same subject continued — Destroying build- ings to check fire. — Unless made so by statute a city is not liable to individuals for the necessary destruction of buildings in order to prevent a conflagration.^ Such a destruction of private property is not a taking for public use entitling the owner to compensation.^ In Pennsylvania the mayor of a city is by virtue of his ofiicial position justified in demolish- ing a wooden building which is dangerous to the public safety.' § 749. Non-liability for negligence in public service. — Where a city, under the authority of a general law, under- takes a work for the sole use and benefit of the public, it is not liable for an injury caused by the negligent or defective performance of such work by its agents or servants, unless some statute either directly or by implication gives a private remedy for such injury.* This rule has been applied against a traveler injured by negligent blasting while excavating the foundation of a public school-house ; ' and against a child in- jured by reason of an unsafe stair-case of a school-house and a dangerous excavation in a school-house yard.* The same rule has been applied in favor of cities in respect to town- houses and court-houses ; ' and in respect to public grounds 1 In Bowditch v. BostoD, 101 U. S. creating the liability, no action can 16, Swayne, J., said : — "In order to be maintained against a municipal charge the city, the remedy ibeing corporation for an injury arising given by statute only, the case must from the neglect of a public oorpo- be clearly within the statute. The rate duty from the performance of city is responsible by force of the which the corporation receives no statute only, and such responsibility special benefit, pecuniai'y or other- is limited to the cases specially con- wise." Allen, J., in Clark v. Man- templated." See, also, Taylor v. Ply- Chester, 63 N. H. 577. See, also, mouth, 8 Met 465 ; Field v. Des Edgerly v. Concord, 63 N. H. 8. Moines, 39 Iowa, 575. As to the 5 Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. statutory liability of the city of New 426. York in such a case, see New York 6 Hill v. Boston, 132 Mass. 344 ; Big- V. Lord, 18 "Wend. 126 ; Russell v. elow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541 ; Sul- New York, 2 Denio, 461. livan v. Boston, 126 Mass. 540. See, 2 Stone V. New York, 35 Wend, also, Nixon v. Newport, 13 R. I. 454. 157, 174; Russell v. New York, 3 'Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. Denio, 461. 384; Hamilton Comm'rs v. Mighels, 7 3 Fields V. Stokley, 99 Penn. St 305. Ohio St 109. A county is not liable * Howard i;. Worcester, 153 Mass. for injuries caused by its neglect to 426. " In the absence of a statute provide a' railing around a veranda 760 TOETS AND CBIMES. ' [§ 750. like Boston Common.' And it makes no material difference in the application of the rale whether the injury is caused by a negligent act done in the direct performance of the public work or is received after the completion of the work.^ As an apparent exception to the foregoing general rule, cities and towns have been held liable for injuries caused by the negligent construction of roads and bridges.' In Texas where a city established a place for the burial of carcasses and garbage in order to improve its sanitary condition, it was held not to be liable to an individual for sickness produced thereby, as the intended improvement was in the interest of the public and the execution of it was not attended with negligence ; but the court added that if the acts done had been for the city's pri- vate advantage it would have been liable for the injury irre- spective of the question of negligence.* Though a municipal work be made and maintained for a time for a public purpose, yet if such purpose be abandoned and it be used for a private purpose, the city becomes liable for negligence in such case as any other private corporation would be.* § 750. Non-lialt)ility as to jails. — A county is not liable to a prisoner for injury to his health caused by failure of the supervisors to keep the county jail in a sanitary condition ; * on the second floor of the court-house, which relate to the construction of ■where no liability is imposed by stat- roads and bridges, it is to be inferred ute. Shepard v. Pulaski County (Ky.), that the legislature intended to recog- 18 S. W. Rep. 15. nize the existence of a liability for 1 Steele v. Boston, 128 Mass. 583 ; the consequences of negligence in Oliver v. Worcester, 103 Mass. 489 ; the performance of the work." Allen, Clark V. Waltham, 138 Mass. 567; J., in Howard u Worcester, 153 Mass. Veale v. Boston, 135 Mass. 187. 436. « Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 'Fort Worth u Crawford, 64 Tex. 436 ; Findley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171 ; 203 ; s. G, 53 Am. Rep. 753. Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass. 578 ; * Clark v. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577. Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87 ; Haf- « A person confined for nearly four ford V. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297. months in a county jail under an in- 8 See Lawrence v. Fairhaven, 5 dictraent for forgery, which was then Gray, 110; Deane v. Randolph, 133 dismissed, cannot recover from the Mass. 475 ; Waldron v. Haverhill, 148 county for injuries to his health, Mass. 583. " These cases, however, caused by the negligent failure of the rest on grounds which take them out board of supervisors to keep the jail of the general rule, and in the last in a healthy condition. Lindley «. resort it must be properly considered Polt County (Iowa), 50 N.W. Rep. 975. that, taking all the statutes together The care and control of prisons being 750.] TOKTS AND OEIMES. 761 nor for assaults upon him by violent and intoxicated fellow- prisoners with whom the police had negligently confined him.' In Kentucky such liability' is imposed upon members of the countj' court instead of upon the county.' In Georgia a county is not responsible for the tort of one of the guards in unlawfully beating a convict, nor for the negligence of the other guards in not protecting him from such beating;' nor is a city liable for a tort committed by one of its convicts on the person of another.* In Virginia chartered towns and cities are not deemed political divisions of the State, as coun- ties aro, and their liability for unhealthy jails is the same in principle as for defective streets and sewers." In Kansas a within the " police power," a county is not liable for the failure of its of- ficers to keep the county jail in a healthy condition. White v. Bpard (Ind.), 28 N. E. Rep. 846, followed ; Greene County v. Boswell (Ind.), 30N.E.Rep.534. A convict in the Al- bany penitentiary alleged that he lost his hand through the negligence of the county in compelling hin:i to ap- proach a circular saw; a demuiTer that the complaint did not state suf- ficient facts was sustained on the ground that the county while en- gaged in the public duty of building and managing the penitentiary was not a corporation but a mere instru- mentality" selected by the State. Ala- mango V. Albany County, 35 Hun, 551. • A city is not liable for personal injuries sustained by one prisoner at the hands of another confined in the same cell of the city prison, though the police officer who arrested the in- jured prisoner, and put him in prison, may have been guilty of negligence in confining him with an intoxicated fellow-prisoner, who was on that ac- count violent and dangerous. Wilson ttCity of Macon (Ga.), 14 S. E. Rep. 710. Where one is confined in a city jail on a criminal charge, and is assaulted by other prisoners confined in the same room, he cannot hold the city liable for such assault, on the ground of the negligence of its officers in not taking proper measures to protect hi.m. Davis i\ City of Knoxville (Tenn.), 18 S. W. Rep. 354 " General Statutes Kentucky, chap- ter 28, article 17, section 4, which provides that the county court shall cause a secui'e county jail to be erected and kept in repair, and upon a failure so to do each member of the court whose name does not ap- pear recorded in favor thereof shall be liable to a fine, and shall be liable in a civil action for all damage sus- tained by any person by reason thereof, does not authorize an action against the county for injuries caused by a defective jail. Hite v. Whitley County Court (Ky.), 15 S. W. Rep. 57. ' Hammonds v. Richmond County, 73 Ga. 188. * Doster v. Atlanta, 73 Ga. 233. 6 Code Virginia, 1887, section 937, provides that every town having no jail of its own may use the county jail. Sections 938-930, applicable only 'to counties and cities, provide that the jailer shall keep the jail al- ways clean, that jails shall be in- spected under direction of the county coui't, and that the jailer may be summarily punished for failure in his T62 TOBTS AND CBIMES. [§751. city is not liable for the bad condition of its prison in the absence of some statutory requirement to keep it in a proper condition.* § 751. Non-liability as to hospitals. — ^Where a city is, under its charter, a municipal government as well as corpora- tion, and receives legislative powers in respect to the public health, it is not liable for the negligence or misconduct of the superintendent, nurses or attendants of its hospitals.'' A cor- poration established for the maintenance of a public charitable hospital, which has exercised due care in the selection of its agents, is not liable for injury to a patient caused by their negligence, nor for the unauthorized assumption of one of the attendants to act as a surgeon, even though the patients be required to pay board.' duty. It was held that a town which used a jail of its own was liable for injuries to the health of a prisoner caused by its filthy condition ; since, under section 937 and a special pro- vision of its charter, it might have used a county jail, subject to inspec- tion and control. Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas, 47 Fed. Eep. 368. 1 Though the General Statutes of Kansas, 1889, paragraph 1013, pro- vides that, in a city of the third class, the chief of police shall have power " to keep all persons arrested in the city in the 6ity prison, county jail, or other proper place," and paragraph 3553, that "all prisoners shall be treated with humanity," the city is not liable for injuries resulting from the confinement of a prisoner with- out bedding in a filthy and unin- habitable city prison. City of New Kiowa V. Craven (Kan.), 36 Pac. Eep. 436. 2 Benton v. Boston, 140 Mstes. 18. In City of Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt 375, the city was held not to be liable for the death of a slave who, after being admitted to the city hos- pital, was negligently allowed to es- cape therefrom and die from expos- ure. After a thorough review of the facts and authorities Rives, J., said : — "If this recovery could be made I do not perceive why by parity of reason the State should not be held liable through its public functionaries in civil actions at the suit of indi- viduals for losses or tofts occurring in the management of its depart- ments and publiC' institutions under its immediate control and super- vision. It cannot be denied that in the municipal government of this city the council occupies towards its hospital relations quite similar to those of the General Assembty to- wairds its asylums for the insane, the blind, and deaf mutes.'' ' McDonald v. Mass. Gen'l Hospital, 130 Mass. 433, where Devens, J., said : — "Where actions have been brought against commissioners of public works, serving gratuitously, for neg- ligence in carrying on the work, by which injury , has occurred, it has been held that they were not liable if proper care had been used by them in selecting those who were actually to perform the work. HoUiday v. St § 752.] TORTS AND OBIMES. 763 § 752. Non-liability as to fire-worts. — The Massach,usetts rule that cities or towns are not liable for negligence in mat- ters of public service,whether the statutes require such service or only permit it, is deemed to exempt a city from liability to persons injured through the negligent discharge of author- ized fire-works.^ In States like New Jersey and New York, where the discharge of fire-works in the streets is deemed a public nuisance,^ the licensing of such a nuisance by the city without the authority of statute I'enders it liable for a conse- . quent injury to individuals;' though merely negatively per- mitting it does not render it so liable, as a city is not responsible for the action or non-action of its police, as shown elsewhere.^ been entered upon, there is no good reason why a liability to a private action should be imposed when a town voluntarily enters upon such a beneficial work, and withheld when it performs the service under the re- quirement of au imperative law. . . . It is well known that many towns in Massachusetts, not bound to do 'so, voluntarily maintain high schools. It is not to be supposed that the legislature have intended to make such towns liable to private ac- tions when towns required to main- tain high schools would be exempt. On the other hand, it has been rec- ognized in numerous cases in this State and elsewhere that the ques- tion of the liability of towns does not rest upon this distinction. Clark v. Waltham, 128 Mass. 567; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87 ; Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541 ; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Wixon v. Newport, 13 R I. 454." See, also. Beach on Contributory Negligence (2d ed.), §§ 259, 413. 2 Jenne v. Sutton, 43 N. J. Law, 257 ; Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218. 3 Spies V. Brooklyn, 18 N. Y. SupL 170, and cases cited. 4 Hill V. Charlotte, 73 N. O. 55 j Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Fenn. Leonards, 11 Q B. (N. S.) 193." See, also, Gooch v. Association &c., 109 Mass. 558 ; Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 13 CI. & F. 507. iTindley v. City of Salem, 137 Mass. 171, where it was held that a city which undertakes the celebra- tion of a holiday (July 4), under the authority of the Public Statutes, chapter 38, section 13 (which pro- vides that the city council may ap- propriate money for such a purpose), exclusively for the gratuitous amuse- ment of the public, is not liable to an action by one who sustains personal injuries through the negligence of city servants in discharging fire- works for the purposes of the cele- bration. After specifying a great number of different cases as to some of which rfties were required by statute, and as to others which were only authorized to do certain things, Allen, J., said : — " In all of these cases the duty is imposed or the au- thority conferred for the. general benefit. The motive and the object are the same, though in some in- stances the legislature determines finally the necessity or expediency, and in others it leaves the necessity or expediency to be determined by the towns themselves. But when de- termined, and when the service has V64 TOETS AND OEIMES. [§ 753. § 753. Liability as to city wells and water. — A municipal corporation is bound to use reasonable diligence to keep its wells for the gratuitous use of the public in repair,' and, on notice that their water is unwholesome, to protect the public health by closing or purifying them ; but it is not an insurer of the quality of their water, or liable to a person injured by using it without proof of wilful misconduct or culpable neg- lect. The city is not bound from time to time to test the purity of such water by a chemical examination.^ As the powers granted by the acts for supplying New York, city with pure water were intended for the private advantage of the city, the city was held liable for the unskilful construction of a Croton river dam by the employees of the water commis- sioners, who, though appointed by the State, were agents of the city.' Doubtless a city may be liable for causing or neg- ligently permitting its sewage and filth to percolate into its wells or other water supply.* A city is not liable in damages St 131 ; Ball v. Town of Woodbine, 61 Iowa, 83 ; s. C, 47 Am. Eep. 805 ; Rob- inson V. Greenville, 43 Ohio St. 635 ; § 745, supra. In Little v. City of sufficient if it be held to the respon- sibility of keeping the wells and pumps in order and clean, and if it be made liable for any injury result- Madison, 49 Wis. 605, it was held ing from the use of impure waters that a city license to exhibit wild animals, specifying no place for such exhibition, is a license to exhibit in some suitable place, and the fact that the licensee makes the exhibition in a public street, and is permitted to do so by the negligence of city officers, does not render the city liable for in- juries resulting therefrom. 1 McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194 2Danaher v. Brooklyn, 119 N. Y. 241, where Earl, J., said : — " The city has its public water supply by run- ning water in addition to these wells. The wells are furnished and kept for public use by the city. It was un- doubtedly the duty of the city to keep the wells and pumps in good order and to keep the wells properly cleaned out so that they would not become contaminated by anything that might be thrown into them. , . . The burden upon the city is from the wells after it has had no- tice of their dangerous qualities and an opportunity to remove the dan- ger. The higher degree of diligence (that is, testing by chemical exami- nation) as to water apparently pui-e and wholesome, agreeable to the taste and in common use by the public without complaint, would be unrea- sonable." 3 Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 531. The village of liutland maintains a water system for the double purpose of furnishing the inhabitants with a supply for private purposes and pro- viding against fire. It was held that as to that portion of the system sup- plying individuals for hire, the vil- lage was liable for any negligence in its construction or maintenance. Wil- kins V. Rutland, 61 Vt. 336.- < Ballard v. Tomlinson, L. R 39 Ch. D. 115: Rex v. Medley, 6 Car. & P. 393; Charles v. Hinckley Local § 754.] TOETS AND OBIMES. 763 for so negligently constructing a sewer as to cut off water from the spring of an abutting land-owner, which otherwise would supply the spring by percolation through the soil of the street, because the owner has no absolute right to such percolating water,^ unless such right has been conferred or damages for interference with it awarded by statute.^ § 754. Non-liability to trespassers. — A municipal corpora- tion is not liable to a trespasser who goes, without license or invitation, upon its land, though unmolested, for mere pleas- ure or to gratify curiosity, and there meets with an injury through the corporation's negligent management of its prop- erty ; and no distinction is made in favor of an infant child so receiving an injury.' In such a case the municipality owes no special duty to a child straying from its parents, and the duty of protecting it is not shifted from its parents to the municipality because it chances to escape from tlieir care.* This is the general rule applicable to those who trespass on Board, 53 L. J. N. S. 554; Brown v. niius, 27 Conn. 84. In Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Comm'ra, L. R 1 Eq. 161, an injunction was granted to restrain commissioners for drain- ing a town from causing the sewage to be discharged into a stream pass- ing through the plaintiff's land, and feeding a lake there, as the pollution of the water perceptibly increased as new houses contributed their sewage to the stream. ' Elster V. City of Springfield (Ohio, 1892), 30 N. B. Rep. 374 2 Trowbridge v. Brookline, 144 Mass. 139, where the court said : — "In exercising its rights the town acta, not under the title of the owner, but by virtue of the authority given by the statute, and under the obligation imposed by the statute to pay all damages occasioned thereby. The petitioner had a right to collect and keep the water in her well, and depriving her of it so as to injure her land was a damage to her. It is no answer that other land-owners had the same right in respect to their lands, and that, if the petitioner's damages had been in consequenofe of the exercise of those rights in his land by a land-owner, she cou'd not have recovered damages from him. The respondent's rights in the land, and its authority to do the act which caused the damage, are given by the same statute which gives a remedy to the petitioner to recover damages." See, also, Watuppa Reservoir v. Fall River, 134 Mass. 267. 3 Clark V. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577, where the court said that "the owner of land, for whatever purpose it may be used, is under no obligation to keep his premises in a sate condition for the prevention of injuiy to tres- passers and persons intruding with- out license or invitation express or implied." See, also, Levery v. Nicker- son, 120 Mass. 306 ; Hargreaves v. Dea- con, 25 Mich. 1 ; Beach on Contrib- utory Negligence (2d ed.), § 50. * Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Penn. St 144. 766 TOETS AND CEIMBS. [§ 755. private lands, and there is no reason why municipal corpora- tions should not have the benefit of it; ^ but of course it has no application to public highways, where all have a right to be, nor can it be invoked by a city which is itself either di- rectly or indirectly a trespasser upon such highways.^ §755. Liability for nnisances. — A municipal corporation must not use its property in such a manner as to injure the property of others, and, unless smthorized by statute, cannot justify a trespass or nuisance on the ground that it is acting for the public benefit,' for in general it has no more right than iBeok V. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283; Pierce v. Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127. See, also, Barrell v. Black, 56 Me. 498; Carleton v. Franconia &c. Steel Co., 99 Mass. 216. 2 Tobin V. Portland &c. R. Co., 59 Me. 183, 188. See, also, Beach on Con- tributory Negligence (2d ed.), § 256. 3 Thus in Miles v. City of Worcester (1891), 154 Mass. 511, which was an action in tort for damages occasioned by the encroachment on plaintiff's land of a wall built by the city in adapting a lot of land to school- house purposes, the continuance of the wall on plaintiff's land was held to be a nuisance for which the city was responsible. Allen, J., said : — "The defendant suggests that it is not liable because the wall was built and maintained solely for the public use and under the requirement of general laws ; and that the case can- not be distinguished in principle from the line of cases beginning with Hill V. Boston, 123 Mass. 344, and ending with Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 436. We are not aware, however, that a private nuisance to propei-ty can be justified or excused on that ground. The verdict shows a continuous occupation of the plaintiff's land by the encroachment of defendant's wall. The question of negligence in the building of the wall is not material. The erection was completed and was accepted by the defendant, and is now in the defend- ant's sole charge, and if it is a nui- sance the defendant is responsible. . . . The public use and the gen- eral benefit will not justify such a nuisance to the property of another." The rule of liability for nuisances and for the invasion of property was thus laid down in Eastman v. Mere- dith, 36 N. H. 385, 395:— "Towns and other municipal corporations, in- cluding counties in this State, have power, for certain purposes, to hold and manage property, real and per- sonal ; and for private injuries caused by the improper management of their property, as such, they have been held to the general liability of private corporations and natural per- sons that own and manage the same kind of property. Bailey v. New York, 8 Hill, 541. . . . So if a town or city maintain an erection or structure which is a private nuisance, and causes a special damage, or in the performance of an authorized act invade any right of property, the corporation has been held liable to a civil action. Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511 ; Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio St. 229 ; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 159." § 756.] TOETS AND CRIMES. 767 a natural person to create or maintain a nuisance.' A city which acquires land on which a nuisance exists becomes liable to others injured by its continuance -if it suffers the nuisance to continue after notice of its existence, and a request to re- move it.' § 756. Municipal liability in general. — Corporations in general are liable to actions for torts as individuals are,' and this rule is applicable to municipal corporations for torts com- mitted under their authority.* A municipal corporation is liable for injuries to individuals resulting from any neglect or omission of duty in keeping its streets in reasonably safe con- 1 Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365 ; Young V. Leedom, 67 Penn. St 851 ; Pittsburg V. Grier, 23 Penn. St 54 ; Delraonico v. New York, 1 Sandf. 223. A city which lets for hire a building erected for municipal pur- poses is liable for an injury caused by a defect or want of repair in the building or for negligence of its agents in the management of the building in the same manner as a private owner would be. Worden v. New Bedford, 181 Mass. 23. In Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470, Andrews, J., said: — "A municipal corporation has no greater right than an individual to collect the surface water from its lands or streets into an artificial channel and discharge it upon the lands of another, nor has any immunity from legal responsi- bility for ei'ecting or maintaining nuisances. See, also, Byrnes v. Co- hoes, 67 N. Y. 304. The negligent construction of a gutter by a munici- pality, or its negligent failure to keep the' same in repair, caused surface- water to flood a lot upon which it would not otherwise have flowed. It was held that the municipality was liable for the consequent damages, al- though such lot was below the grade of the street Gilluly v. Madison, 63 Wis. 518 : S. C, 53 Am. Eep. 299. 2 Nichols V. Boston, 98 Mass. 39; McDonough v. Oilman. 3 Allen, 264. And after acceptance of an unsafe party-wall built by another, a city would probably be liable to the 'ad- joining owner for an injtiry caused by its fall. Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 282. And see Khron v. Brock, 144 Mass. 516; Bryant v. Town of Randolph, 14 N. Y. Supl. 844. A city empowered, for sewerage pur- poses, to change, widen and deepen the channel of a brook, may be liable for so performing the work as to create au unnecessary nuisance. Morse v. Worcester, 139 Mass. 389. 5 In Reed v. Home Savings Bank, 130 Mass. 443, the court s^id : — " It is too late to discuss the question whether a corporation can commit a trespass or is liable to an action on the case or subject generally to ac- tions for torts as individuals are. The reports for a, quarter of a cen- tury show that a large proportion of actions of this nature both for non- feasance and misfeasance are against corporations. By the great weight of modern authority a corporation may be liable, even where a fraudu- lent or malicious intent is necessary to be proved, the fraud or malice df its authorized agents being impu- table to the corporation, as in actions for fraudulent representations, for libel or for malicious pi'osecution." 4 Salt Lake City u Hollister, 118 U. S. 356. 768 TOBTS XSD CBIMES. [§ 757. ditlon for use in the usual mode.' And this is the rule in England, even where the duty is not expressly imposed by statute.* § 757. Chartered cities, etc., distinguished from counties, etc. — The conflict. — In many of the States a distinction is made between the liabilitj'^ of such purely municipal corpora- tions as chartered towns, cities and villages, and the non-liabil- ity of counties and towns as pftlitical divisions of the State, and the former are held quite strictly to the performance of their duties and responsible in damages for neglecting them.' If the charter granted to a city or town at its request enables it to derive benefit in its corporate capacity in the way of rent » Clemence v. Auburn, 66 N. Y. 334 ; Diveny v. Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506 ; Hines V. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236 ; Barton t). Syr- acuse, 86 N. Y. 54 ; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 159 ; Hutson v. New York, 9 N. Y. 168. See the following section. 2 In Bathurst v. MacPlierson, L. E. 4 App. Cas. 256, defendants were held liable for neglect to repair a barrel drain which they had made, and the sole control and manage- ment of which had been vested in them by statute ; following Hartnall 17. Eyde Comm'rs, 4B. & S. 861. "In their lordships' opinion no substan- tial distinction can be taken between that case and the present, in which the duty for the reasons above stated had been found to exist though not expressly imposed by statute." In Blackmore v. Vestry &o., L. E. 9 Q. B. D. 451, the defendants as the body authorized by statute to water the streets were held liable for the slippery condition of an iron flap which they had placed in the street, though they might not have been liable as highway surveyors. See, also. White v. Hindley Local Board, L. R. 10 Q. B. 219. ' Thus in Hamilton County v. Mig- hels, 7 Ohio St, 109, the court says : — " A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for the interest, ad- vantage and convenience of the lo- cality and its people; a county or- ganization is created almost exclu- sively with a view to the policy of the State at large." In Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas, 47 Fed. Eep. 268 : — " The distinction between the liability of a municipal coi'poration called into existence either at the di- rect solicitation or by the free con- sent of the persons composing it for the promotion of their own local and private advantage and convenience, and that of counties or other political divisions of a State, established by general laws, for the negligent con- duct of their oflScers and agents, is clearly defined. The principle upon which the distinction rests is that counties are arbitrary political divis- ions of a State, and the govern- mental powers they exercise are im- posed upon them by general laws, while municipal corporations act vol- untarily in their assumption of a part of the sovereignty of the State in their exercise of self-government," — citing, also, Oooley, Const Lim. {8d ed.) pp. 247, 248. See, also, Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489 ; Galveston V. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, and cases cited. In Barnes v. District of Co- lumbia, 91 U. S. 540, the District was held to be liable to an individual who § 757.] TORTS AND CHIMES. 769 or tolls from the public Works it is required to construct, it is deemed reasonable it should be liable as other corporations are for any injury caused by its negligence.^ But in Arkansas and California this distinction is not observed, and incorpo- rated cities are held to no stricter liability than counties, un- less such liability is imposed by statute.^ Nor is the distinc- tion before adverted to recognized in South Carolina,' nor in Michigan,* nor in New Jersey," nor in Massachusetts, Maine and Connecticut, in respect to highways." Black, 590 ; Weightman v. Washing- ton, 1 Black, 39. 2 Thus in Arkadelphia v. Windham (188fi), 49 Ark. 139, the court said: — "We think the streets of a town or city like all other roads are public highways ; that the duty of keeping them in repair is to the public, not to private individuals ; and that no civil action arises from an injury resulting from a neglect to keep them in re- pair. Ip the absence of a statute there is no difference between the liability of an incorporated town or city and a county in such cases. Such a distinction would be contrary to every principle of fairness, reason and justice.'' In California cities are deemed like counties mere instru- ments of the government and not liable for injuries sustained by indi- viduals through neglect of city offi- cers to keep the streets in repair. Winbigler v. Los Angeles City, 45 Cal. 36, where the decisions in Hoff- man V. San Joaquin County, 31 Cal. 436, and Crowell v. Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 313, were followed. 'Young V. Charleston, 30 S. C. 116. 4 Detroit v. Blakeley, 21 Mich. 84 ; MoCutcheon v. Homer, 43 Mich. 483 ; Detroit v. Putnam, 45 Mich. 265. s Pray v. Jersey City, 33 N. J. Law, 394 ; .Strader v. Sussex, 18 N. J. Law, 108; Callahan v. Morris, 30 N. J. Law, 161 ; Livermore v. Camden, 31 N. J. Law, 508. 6 French v. Boston, 139 Mass. 592; fell into an excavation caused by a change of grade in the city of Wash- ington, which the District permitted a certain railroad to maka The Dis- trict as a chartered municipal corpo- ration had acted by a board of public works appointed under the charter or act of congress by the president and confirmed by the senate. Hunt, J., speaking for the majority of the court, said : — " The powers given to this board are not of a character be- longing to independent oflBcers, but rather those which indicate that it is the representative of the municipal corporation. Notwithstanding these features, and that we find this power given by the act which creates the municipality, and that this is one of the powers ordinarily belonging to a municipal government, and though the manner of its bestowal and the selection of the agents who exercise it are similar to that of the other ap- pointees and agents of the municipal corporation, it is still contended that no liability exists on the part of the corporation to compensate the plaint- iff for his injuries. . . . The au- thorities establishing the contrary doctrine that a city is responsible for its mere negligence are so numer- ous and so well considered that the law must be deemed to be settled in accordance with them.'' • Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 500; Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 49 770 TOBTS AND OEIMES. [§ 758. § 758. Municipal liability in exercise of private powers. In the exercise of its private powers a municipality is liable for torts to the same extent as a private corporation.^ These private powers relate, for example, to the corporate property of a city held and managed by it for its own immediate profit, though ultimately inuring to the public benefit.^ In New Hamp- shire where a city had ceased to use a reservoir for the public purpose of extinguishing fires, and was filling it up in order to use it for a private purpose, it was held to be liable as an in- dividual would be.' Under a charter requiring a city " to pre- serve peace and good order, securing persons and property from violence, danger or destruction," it is not enough to pass an ordinance against " coasting " on the streets, but the city Hill V. Boston, 123 Mass. 344. In the last case Gray, C. J., said : — '* In this commonwealth an act of the legisla- ture changing a town into a city has never been considered as enlarging civil remedies for neglect of corpo- jrate duties; and it has constantly been held that a city like a town is not liable to an action for a defect in a highway, except so far as the right to maintain such an action has been given clearly by statute. Brady v. Lowell, 3 Cush. 121; Harwood v. Lowell, 4 Cush. 310 ; Hixon v. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59 ; Oliver v. Worcester, 103 Mass. 489. The same view has been taken in other New England States and in New Jersey, Michigan and California. Morgan v. Hallowell, 57 Me. 375; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1, 13 ; Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475." 1 Maximilian v. New York, 63 N. Y. 160, 164. " There are two kinds of duties imposed on a municipal corpo- ration: one is of that kind which arises from the grant of a special power in the exercise of which the municipality is as a legal individual ; the other is of that kind which arises or is implied from the use of political rights under the general law, in the exercise of which it is as asovereign. ... In the exercise of the former power, and under the duty to the public which the acceptance and use of the power involves, a municipality is like a private corporation and is liable for a failure to use its power well, or for an injury caused by using it badly." In Smith v. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506, Miller, J., says:— "The docti'ine is well settled that munici- pal corporations are within the oper- ation of the general rule of law that the superior or employer must an- swer civilly for the negligence of an agent or servant in the course of their employment by which another is injured." ^ In OUver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, Gray, J., thus speaks of the pri- vate powers of a city as distinguished from their public duties : — " The dis- tinction is well established between the responsibilities of towns and cit- ies for acts done in their public ca-/ pacity, and for acts done in what may be called their private character in the manajgement of property or rights voluntarily held by them for their own immediate profit or ad- vantage as a corporatiota, althougli inuring of course ultimately to tho benefit of the public." » Clark V. Manchester, 63 N. H. 577. § 759.] TOETS AND 0EIME8. 771 must also use reasonable care and diligence to enforce it ; ^ but in Indiana a city is not liable for failing to enforce its ordi- nances against coasting.* § 759. Liability commensnrafe with duty.— The liability of a city, town or township in respect to public roads or high- ways is commensurate with the duty ep joined by law, and therefore in each case the inquiry is as to the extent of such duty.' Where there is no duty, there is no liability.* The terms duty, diligence, vigilance and negligence are relative. There is no negligence in failing to guard against a very un- likely possibility. Thus a highway running through a sparsely settled town does not require the same attention as a thronged thoroughfare in a populous city ; ' and in a city it is not neg- ligence not to guard against an accident which could not be expected or foreseen.* A power conferred on city authorities to superintend or repair the streets imposes the duty to exer- cise the power when necessary.' Thus a town or township charged with the care of a bridge is liable for injury caused by Ifeaving its abutments unguarded.' The District of Co- lumbia is liable for injuries ai:;ising from neglect of its streets 1 Taylor v. Cumberland, 64 Md. 68. » Glasier v. Town of Hebron, 131 2 City of Lafayette v. Timberlake, N. Y. 447. 88 Ind. 330. •■ A conclusion which 6 Hubbell u Tonkers, 104 N. Y. 434. would make a city liable for the acts ' Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129 ; of coasters can only be reached by Hutson v. New York, 9 N. Y. 163 ; assuming that municipal corpora- New York v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612. As tions are liable for a failure to exe- Earl, C. J., said in People v. Meakim, cute the statutes of the State or the 133 N. Y. 214^ 220:— "It is not ex- ordinances of the corporation, and pressly provided in the statute that this assumption cannot be made un- they shall proceed and make a deter- less settled principjes are disregarded, mination of the matter within any . . . Making and enforcing ordi- particular time ; and indeed there is nances regulating the use of streets no express provision that they shall brings into exercise governmental make any determination whatever, and not corporate powers, and the au- But that they shall is necessai-ily im- thorities are well agreed that for a plied in the statute ; and what is nec- failure to exercise legislative, judi- essarily implied is as much a part of cial or executive powers of govern- the statute as if it were specially , ment there is no liability." written therein." 'Plymouth Township v. Graver, 8 paltonw Upper Tyrone Township, 125 Penn. St 24 137 Penn. St 18 ; Corbalis v. Newberry * Monk V. New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. Township, 132 Penn. St 9 ; Plymouth 553. Township v. Graver, 125 Penn. St 772 TOKTS Am> CEIME8. [§§ 760, 761. in the city of Washington.' In Michigan a city is not liable for failure to keep its sidewalks in repair ; ' but in Ohio a city is so liable, and is not relieved from such liability by giving a pecHUt to individuals to occupy the streets under conditions.' § 760. Mnnicipal liability as to water front.— The State may impose a public duty upon a particular county or city upon the assumption of its being more beneficially interested therein than other portions of tl^ State;* for example, may require it to keep the waters along its front in a naviga- ble condition ; but such a duty does not exist at common law in this country,' except where the city is in control of and receives a revenue from wharves." But a city is liable in damages for obstructing navigable waters by discharging the dirt from its sewers into them, to the individual thereby peculiarly injured.' § 761. Liability for fright of horses. — Where a horse at- tached to a cart was frightened by a hole negligently left by a city in a pier belonging to it and backed against a rotten string-piece which broke and the horse and cart were lost, the city was held to be liable in the absence of proof that the horse was vicious or unusually excitable,* though the result 34. A town is liable for allowing a ' District of Columbian. Woodbury, highway at a railroad crossing to re- 136 U, S. 450. main for years in a dangerous condi- * Detroit v. Osborne, 135 IT. S. 492. tion, though it was at first rendered * Cleveland v. King, 132 U. S. 295. dangerous by the railroad company. * Mobile County v. Eimball, 103 U. Bryant v. Town of Randolph, 14 N. Y. S. 691 ; Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65 Supl. 844. In Plymouth Township Pepn. St 135. tt. Graver, 125 Penn. St 24, it was » Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65 held that •' whether the danger arises Penn. St 135 ; Coonley v. Albany, 133 from an imperfection in the road N. Y. 145. itself, or from an excavatipn In it * Pittsburg v. Grier, 23 Penn. St 54. outside the traveled route, or from 'Bray ton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. the existence of a declivity or stream 218 ; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 of water at the roadside, or from a Mass. 308; Boston Mills ti. Cambridge, railroad upon which locomotives and 117 Mass. 896 ; Franklin Wharf Co. v. trains of cars are accustomed to pass, Portland, 67 Me. 46; Emory v. Low- if there is a concurrence of circum- ell, 104 Mass. 13 ; Gerrish v. Brown, stances which render the road a place 61 Me. 256. of peril to the traveler, the,township * Macauley v. New York, 67 N. Y. is held to do whatever is reasonable 603. and practicable to avert the danger which threatens.'' § 762.] TOETS AND CRIMES. T73 might have been different if the place had not been exposed and dangerous.^ The Massachusetts rule is that if a horse, while uncontrollable by reason of fright, disease or vicious- ness, comes upon a defect in a highway, the town is not liable for the injury unless it would have occurred if the horse had not been uncontrollable ; but a horse which merely shies is not considered uncontrollable.- It is certainly reasonable that a city should be held not liable for an injury caused by a frightened horse on its streets, where the city was not the cause of the fright." § 762. Municipal liability for acts of officers and agents. — A municipal corporation is not liable for the acts of its officers and agents unless previously authorized or subsequently rati- fied by it, or unless done in good faith in pursuance of a gen- eral authority to act for it in the matter to which they relate.* So a city is not liable to an action by one whose property has been wrongfully seized by a tax collector without authority of law, where the city has neither authorized nor ratified the act ; and it is not a ratification to receive the money in igno- rance of the tort, nor is authority conferred by a resolution to hold the collector harmless if he proceeds according to law.' iHubbell V. Yonkers, 104 N. Y. such suit If it was maliciously 434 brought by Newell it was not brought 2 Titu0 V. Northbridge, 97 Mass. in good faith, which is essential to 258 ; Horton v. Taunton, 97 Mass. render the city liable as for an act 266 ; Fogg v. Nahant, 98 Mass. 578. done in pursuance of a general au- See, also, Beach on Contributory thority to act for it under the rule Negligence (4th ed.), § 245, and nu- stated above." See, also, Donnelly v. merous cases there cited. Tripp, 12 E. L 97, where the city coun- 'Cole u Newburyport, 129 Mass. cil of Providence having directed the 691 highway commissioners to cut down * Thus in Horton v. Newell (R L, a certain street, provided the adjoin- 1893), 23 Atl. Rep. 910, which was an ing owners agreed not to make a action of trespass on the case against claim for damages, and by inadver- the city treasurer of the city of Paw- tence the cutting down was done tucket for a malicious suit against the without such agreement by the own- plaintiff brought by the city tax col- ers, it waa held that the city was not lector, the demurrer was sustained liable. See Mulcairns v. Janesville, on the following grounds stated by 67 Wis. 24. the court: — "The declaration does SEverson v. Syracuse, 100 N, Y. not allege that the city of Pawtucket 577. So in Wallace v. Menasha, 48 authorized the suit by Newell in his Wis. 79, the city was held not to be capacity as tax collector, complained liable for the act of its treasurer in of as malicious, or that it has ratified seizing and selling the chattels of 774 TOETS AND CEIMBS. [§§ 763, 764. A complaint in an action of tort against a municipality is de- murrable unless it shows that the wrongful act was not done by an independent officer and was done by an officer while in the performance of some duty of a corporate nature^ § 763. Not liable for ultra Tires acts of officers, etc. — A. muMcipal corporation is not liable for the negligence of its agent or servant in the course of his employment unless the act complained of was within the icope of the corporate pow- ers.* § 764. Non-liaMljty in the exercise of discretionary pow- ers. — A municipal corporation is not liable for the neglect to exercise a power or perform a duty which is discretionary or judicial in its character. This rule has been applied where a one person for the delinquent taxes of another. In Butfalo &c. Turn- pike Co. V. Buffalo, 58 N. Y. 639, the city was held liable because it author- ized the acts complained of through its common council, but that it was immaterial whether the acts of the common council were to be regarded as those of defendant or as those of its agents. It was liable, the tortious acts being, in the course of the agency. - Lee V. Village of Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 443. < lA municipal corporation is not generally liable for the wrongful act of an officer, and in order to hold it liable it must be made to appear that such officer was not an independent public officer, and that the wrong complained lof was done by such offi- cer while in tiie legitimate exercise of some duty of a corporate nature, which, was devolved upon him bylaw or by the direction of the corpora- tion. Caspary v. City of Portland (1890), 19 Oregon, 496; S. C, 24 Pac. Eep. 1036. 2 Smith V. City of Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506, where one of defendant's hose carts while carelessly driven on the street in celebrating the centen- nial anniversary ran over plaintiff ; it was held that as the calling out the hose cart for such a' purpose was not authorized the city was not lia- ible, and that the fact of the city own- ing the cart and horses did not make it responsible for the negligence of its servants having control of them and when using them in a serv- ice not of a public nature and not authorized by law. Miller, J., said: — "If the corporation had power to order the driver of the hose cart, it could only do so in ac- cordance with the statute granting such power, and if it had no such power, the order was clearly void, and the corporation was not liable for the consequences arising from its being carried into effect" See, also, the similar case of Morri- son V. City of Lawrence, 98 Mass> 219, where the city was- held not to be liable for the negligent firing of a rocket by its servant under a defect- ive resolution authorizing the cele- bration of the Fourth of July. See, also, the general rule as expressed by Shaw, C. J., in Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 516, § 76i.J TOBXS AND OBIMES. 775 city failed to provide suiBcient drainage of an individual's premises.^ The sanie rule is applied where the manufacture and sale of fire-works within city limits is left to the legisla- tive authority of the common council.' In Indiana it is held that a municipal corporation is not liable, either for a failure to exercise or a negligent exercise of legislative or judicial pow- ers.' In other words, the general rule is that a municipal cor- > Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489, where Denio, C. J., said : — " It is not the law that a municipal corporation is responsible in a private action for not providing su£9cient sewerage for every or any part of the city or vil- lager The duty of draining the streets is one requiring the exercise of de- liberation, judgment and discretion. ... It admits of a choice of means, and the determining of the order of time in which improvements shall be made. It involves also a variety of prudential considerations relating to the burdens which may be discreetly imposed at a given time and the preference which one local- ity may claim over another." See, also, Wilson v._ New York, 1 Denio, 595; Cole v. Medina, 37 Barb. 318; Cavanagh v. Brooklyn, 33 Barb. 333 ; Radcliflf V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195. In Edgerly v. Concord, 63 N. H. 8, the city was held not liable to a traveler for an injury caused by his horse taking fright at a stream of water thrown from a hydrant by firemen testing its capacity in the presence of the mayor and city council, who are engaged in determining the most suitable location for the erection of an engine-bouse for a steam fire- engine. Allen, J., said : — "As a part of the governmental machinery of the State, municipal corporations legislate and provide for the custom- ary local conveniences of the people, and in exercising these discretionary functions the corporations are not called upon to respond in damages to individuals, either for omissions to act, or for the mode of exercising powers, and to be exercised at discre- tion for the public good. For inju- ries arising from the corporation's failure to exercise its public legisla- tive and police powers and from the manner of executing those powers, there is no remedy against the mu- nicipality; nor can an action be main- tained for damages resulting from the failure of its officers to discharge properly and effectually their offi- cial duties." Citing Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 384; Ray v. Man- chester, 46 N. H. 59, 60; Hardy v. Keeue, 53 N. H. 370, 377; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511 ; HafiFord v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Hill v. Bos- ton, 122 Mass. 344; Barbour v. Ellsworth, 67 Me. 294 ; Judge v. Meriden, 38 Conn. 90 ; Jewett v. New Haven, 38 Conn. 368 ; Hutchinson v- Concord, 41 Vt 271 ; Grant u Erie, 69 Pa. St 420 ; Davis v. Montgomery, 51 Ala. 139. 2McDade v. Chester City, 117 Pa. St. 415. See, also, Lehigh Co. v. Hof- fort, 116 Pa St 119; Carr v. North- ern Liberties, 35 Pa. St 330 ; Easton V. Neff, 103 Pa. St 474. * Anderson City v. East, 117 Ind. 136 ; Wheeler v. Plymouth City, 116 Ind. 158 ; Dooley v. Town of Sullivan, 113 Ind. 451; Terre Haute v. Hud- nut, 113 Ind. 543; Faulkner v. Au- rora City, 85 Ind. 130; Lafayette City V. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330. 176 TOETS AND 0EIME8. [§§ 765, 766. poration is liable only for omission or negligence in respect to its ministerial duties.* § 765. The same subject continued — New Tort and Geor- gia rule. — The rule laid down in the preceding section has been consistently applied in New York, where a power to pass ordinances for the raising or demolishing of public build- ings which by reason of fire might become dangerous, being deemed to be one of local legislation, it was held that the failure to exercise it did not make a city liable for a death caused by the fall of a dangerous wall.' A city is not liable for the failure of its common council, in the exercise of its \discretionary power, to pass and enforce a necessary resolution, though such failure involves an error of judgment.' A city is not liable for its neglect to exercise its quasi-jndicial and dis- cretionary power of improving a sidewalk which is strongly constructed and in good repair but defective in its plan by its slope being too great.* § 766. The same subject continued — Drainage. — The du- ties of municipal authorities in adopting a general plan of drain- age and determining when and where sewers shall be built, of what size and at what level, being of a quasi-jndioial character, as involving the exercise of a large discretion and considera- tions of public health and convenience, are not subject to re- ' Agnew V. Corunna City, 55 Mich, on the ground that the growth of 438 ; MacArthur v. Saginaw, 58 Mich, weeds and grass was too luxuriant 359; Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. for comfort, health and good appear- 103 ; Hubbell v. Viroqua City, 67 ance, one who was gored by a cow Wis. 343 ; Robinson v. Greenville, 43 running at large in the streets was Ohio St 635; Hinesv. Charlotte City, held not to have a cause of action 73 Mich. 378 ; S. C, 40 N. W. Rep. 333 ; against the city. Rivers v. Augusta, Hitchins v. Frostburg, 68 Md. 100. 65 Ga. 876. See, also, Forsyth v. At- 2 Cain V. Syracuse, 95 N. Y. 83. lanta, 45 Ga. 153; Duke V.Rome, 20 In Georgia it is held there is no Ga. 635. sound distinction as to such liability » Cain v. Syracuse, 95 N. T. 83. See, between a failure to pass an ordi- also, Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 161 ; nance in the first instance and its re- McCarthy w Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194 ; peal or suppression. Thus where a Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 37; Peo- oity council passed an ordinance pie v. Albany, 11 Wend. 539. forbidding the running of cattle at * Urquhart v. Ogdensburg, 91 N. Y. large in the streets, but subsequently 67 ; Hines v. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 338. suspended its operation indefinitely § 767.] TOETS AND OEIMES. 777 vision by oourfe and jury in a private action for not sufficiently draining a particular lot of land.* But the construction and repair of sewers, after the adoption of the general plan, are ministerial duties, for the negligent performance of which the municipality which has constructed and owns them may be liable to a person whose property is thereby injured.'' And a city may be liable by virtue of a special contract to pay any damages caused by the construction of a sewer.' A city is liable in case for the damage caused an individual land-owner by discharging a public sewer upon his land and into his mill- pond, where the right to do so has not been acquired in some way known to the law.* A city is not liable for damage in- curred by reason of the gutters being insufScient on an extraordinary occasion." § 767. Non-liability for errors of judgment. — A munici- pal corporation having limited legislative powers delegated by the State is not liable to individuals for losses consequent on its having misconstrued the extent of its powers," or for error of judgment in the exercise of such powers resulting in an 1 Johnson u. District of Columbia, keep the sewer in repair. Kranz i> 118 U. S. 19; Mills v. Brooklyn, 83 Baltimore, 64 Md. 491. N. Y. 489 ; Wilson v. New York, 1 'A city with power to construct a Denio, 595 ; Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, sewer is liable to the owner of prop- 41. erty injured by the negligent man- 2 Barton v. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54. ner in which a contractor conducted While a municipal corporation may the work, where the city contracted not be liable for damage sustained with the owner of the property for a from its neglect to provide a sewer, right of way, and agreed to pay all it is liable if it provides one so inad- damages occasioned by the construc- equate that it overflows and dis- tion. Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind. charges sewerage on the land of an 372. individual. Payment by such per- ■* Vale Mills v. Nashua, 68 N. H. 186. son of an assessmeiit for the con- » Wright v. Wilmington, 92 N. C. struction is not an assent to the dis- 156, charge on his land. Seifert v. Brook- 6 The common council of Alex- lyn, 15 Abb. (N. Y.) N. C. 97 ; Van andria granted a license to carry on Rensselaer v. Albany, 15 Abb. (N. Y.) the business of auctioneer which N. C. 457. Where a city utilized a was ultra vires. The town was held stream as a common sewer for more not responsible for losses sustained than twenty years, repairing it, arch- by individuals from the frauds of the ing it, etc., it was held liable for in- auctioneer. Fowle v. Alexandria, 3 juries sustained from its neglect to Pet 398. ^ 778 TOBTS AND OBIMES. [§ 768. ordinance which is unconstitutional.^ In the case last cited the action of the city in adopting the ordinance in question was a legislative act and the exercise of a right of sover- eignty primarily belonging to the State but delegated to the city, and the United'States circuit court held that for errors of judgment in the exercise of such ppwers cities are not liable in their corporate capacity. ' Where acts done are beyond the authority and power of the city to do, it is not responsible for damages resulting from worl? done negligently or other- wise, under the supposed authority of illegal and void votes of the city council,^ but the liability, if any, rests upon the individuals who performed those acts.' § 768. Liability for trespass. — The State itself cannot in- trude upon private property without the authority of a stat- ute, and a municipal corporation, though acting for and under contract with the State, cannot justify a trespass on private land on the ground that such trespass is necessary to the per- formance of the contract.* Though, if an act be done under 1 One who has served out in prison a fine imposed for the violation of an unconstitutional municipal ordinance has no right of action against the city for false imprisonment Tres- cott V. Waterloo, 26 Fed. Eep. 592. See, also, Buke v. Eome, 20 Ga. 635 ; Ogg V. Lansing, 35 lov^a, 495. ^Cavanagh v. Boston, 139 Mass. 426 ; Spring v. Hyde Park, 137 Mass. 554; Lemon v. Newton, 134 Mass. 476 ; Gushing v. Bedford, 125 Mass. 526. 8 Brigham v. Edmunds, 7 Gray, 359. See, also, Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184, 194. . Buffalo, 103 N. Cooley, Const Lim. (5th ed.) 335. Y. 308; "Wheeler v. Jackson, 41 Hun, § 774.] TOETS AND CEIME8. 785 and on sufficient information,' a city is not liable for its neglect to pass just and reasonable ordinances in respect to matters left to the discretion of, its council ; ^ nor for its. neglect to enforce them if no statutory liability has been im- posed.' Where a subject-matter is intrusted to a town or city for legislative or judicial action, the duty is essentially discretionary, and no person can claim damages for its non- performance.* § 114:. Indictment for torts. — A municipal corporation is» indictable at common law for creating a public nuisance ; * but 1 New York &c. E. Co. v. New York, 1 Hilt 563 ; Millian v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193 ; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 283. 2 In McDade v. Chester City, 117 Penn. St 414, the city council had legislative authority to limit or pro hibit wholly the making and sale of fire-works within the corporate lim- its ; but in an action for damages by one who was injured while aiding to extinguish a fire in a fire-works fac- ^ tory, it was held that the power to prohibit imposed no absolute duty to prohibit fire-works, and that the city was not liable for the failure of the council to exercise its power. See, also, Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Penn. St 330 ; Hill v. Charlotte, 73 N. C. 55 ; Rivers v. Augusta, 65 Ga. 376. » Hines v. Charlotte City, 73 Mich. 378 ; s. C, 40 N. W. Eep. 333, where tlie city having by ordinance established fire limits was held not responsible for loss by fire starting in a wooden building within such limits and in violation of the ordinance, though the city had notice that the building was about to be erected and took no steps to prevent it The court said :— " The rule is well established, however, not only in this State but in most of the States, that simply as municipal cor- porations, apart from any contract theory, no public bodies can be made 60 responsible for ofl^cial neglect in- volving no active misfeasance. It is only where corporations ]iave been guilty of some positive mischief pro- duced by active misconduct that they have been held liable, and not from mere non-feasance, or for errors of judgment Municipal corporations, under their charters and ordinances, do not become insurers of the prop- erty within their, corporate limits from destruction by reason of the neglect or refusal of their officers to enforce their ordinances. St John Village V. McFarlan, 33 Mich. 73." See, also, Stillwell v. New York, 17 Jones & Sp.. 360; affirmed, 96 N. Y. 649; Griffin v. Mayor, 9 N. Y, 466; Lorillard v. Town of Monroe, 11 N. Y. 393; Wheeler v. Plymouth City, 116 Ind. 158; s. C, 18 N. E. Rep. 632. It is also sometimes provided, as in the Albany charter (L. 1883, ch. 298, title 3, § 44), that a city shall not be liable in damages for an omission to pass. or enforce ordinances. See Coon- ley V. Albany, 133 N. Y. 145, 153. < Lehigh County v. Hoffort, 116 Penn. St 119. 6 Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218, 3|7, where the court said:— "If the sewers are so built or managed as to create a public nuisance, the defendants are indictable." See^ also, Eastman v. Meredith, 3G N. H. 28^ 786 TOETS AND CEIME8. [§ 774. perhaps not for not abating a nuisance created by another.' In some States a municipal corporation is indictable at com- mon law for negflecting the public health and public streets," and for misfeasance as well as non-feasance.' Where the duty of keeping in repair the highways and bridges is imposed by statute upon the towns in which they are located, an informa- tion will lie against a town for failing to repair a bridge either built or adopted by it.'' In England the rule has repeatedly been laid down that where an indictment can be maintained against a corporation for a public injury an action on the case can be maintained for a special damage thereby done to an individual ; ' and the ground both of the indictment and of the private action is deemed to be the breach of a covenant en- tered into by the corporation upon a consideration received from the sovereign power." In New Jersey when the neg- 389; People v. Adsit, 3 Hill, 619. In People V. Albany, 11 Wend. 539, the mayor, aldermen, etc., of the city were indicted for not cleansing a foul bam cpnnected with the river and a verdict obtained at general sessions. On appeal to the Supreme doni't. Nelson, J., said : — " It is well settled that when a corporation are bound to repair a highway or nav- igable river they are liable to indict- ment for neglect of their duty. An indictineiit and information are the only remedies to which the public can resort for a redress of their griev- ances in this respect" ' ' State V. Burlington, 36 Vt 531. - Hamar v. Covington, 3 Met (Ky.) 494; Hill v. State, 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 443 ; Crowell v. Bristol, 5 Lea (Tenn.), 685; State v. Shelby ville, 4 Sneed, 176 ; State v. Whittingham, 7 Vt 390. ' In Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339, it was held that a corporation could be indicted for a misfeasance as well ae a non-feasance, and Bigelow, J., sai^ : — " Corporations cannot be in- dicted for offenses which derive their criminality' from evil intention, or which consist in a violation of those, social duties which appertain to men and subjects. But beyond this there is no good reason for their exemption from the consequences of unlawful and wrongful acts committed by their agents in pursuance of author- ity derived from them."