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 Cornell University Library 
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 Psychology of thinking, by Irving Elgar 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 029 196 851 
 
W% Cornell University 
 wE Library 
 
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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING 
 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 MEW YORK • BOSTON - CHICAGO 
 ATLANTA SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO.. Limitto 
 
 - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 
 
 ^\ TORONTO 
 
The Psychology of 
 Thinking 
 
 By 
 IRVING ELGAR MILLER, Ph.D. 
 
 Departments of Psychology and Pedagogy and 
 
 Supervision of Practice Teaching 
 
 State Normal School 
 
 Milwaukee 
 
 Wis. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1909 
 
 All rights rttervtd 
 
<^ }L. 
 
 I 
 
 
 Copyright, 1909 
 By the macmillan company 
 
 Set up and electrolypcd. Published April, 1909 
 
 3' 
 
 -nv 
 
 The mason-henry Press 
 syracuse, n. y, 
 
TO 
 ALBERT C. HILL, Ph.D. 
 
 Department of Public Instruction, Albany, for many 
 Years Principal of Cook Academy 
 
 AND 
 REVEREND SPENCER FISHER 
 
 Montour Falls, N. Y., both Lovers of Boys, Charac- 
 ter Builders, Mm who have Considered it more vporth 
 while to be Makers of Men than Makers of Money. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The theme of this book has its origin in the fact that the 
 writer was once a teacher of mathematics in a New England 
 Academy. In mathematics, perhaps more than in some 
 other subjects, the teacher who would succeed is forced to 
 get into very close touch with the actual mental processes 
 involved in thinking as it goes on in specific concrete cases. 
 It was the clinical interest in the thinking process, sharpened 
 and further developed by the teaching of mathematics, which 
 led the writer ultimately to specialize in the study of Psy- 
 chology and Logic. This original clinical interest in the 
 mental processes, I hope, has not been lost as the result of 
 the greater perfection of theory incident to the university 
 course. 
 
 The reader may find the mathematical interest protruding 
 itself at times, particularly in the choice of illustrative 
 material; but I hope that he will not find the references to 
 mathematics offensively frequent as compared with the 
 references to other subjects. Indeed, many of the illustra- 
 tions have been drawn directly from the most common 
 experiences of life, entirely apart from any reference to the 
 school. 
 
 The dominant point of view for the discussion of thinking 
 within these covers is frankly biological. But it is biological 
 in the broad sense. Life is not thought of as reduced to its 
 lowest physical terms, but as inclusive of everything that 
 makes life worth living. The life process is thought of in 
 terms of the satisfaction of needs in the case of man as we 
 know him at his present level of evolution and civilization. 
 The concrete life of the hidividual includes all that we 
 regard as of value, or worth while, in the complex life of the 
 highly evolved, socialized, and civilized human being. The 
 
 vii 
 
viii Preface 
 
 attempt has been made to show the actual working of the 
 mind as it struggles with problems in the concrete life o 
 the individual, the significance of the mental processes when 
 they are brought to bear upon these problems, and particu- 
 larly the groivth in control over the forces of the ivorld and 
 of life that conies through the development and perfection 
 of the higher psychical processes which zve designate ^ under 
 the head of thinking. In this discussion the emphasis falls 
 upon the psychological rather than the logical aspect, ihe 
 dynamic aspect of the thinking process has been thrown mto 
 as bold relief as possible. Questions of function and sig- 
 nificance are central in the discussion of all the various 
 phases of the thinking process. 
 
 While the movement of thought is dominantly psycholog- 
 ical, the whole book is written from a strong pedagogical 
 bias. The significance for education, and also for the teach- 
 ing process, of the psychological facts and principles is 
 pointed out. This does not mean that educational theory 
 has been worked out in detail, but rather that the educational 
 bearing of the doctrines set forth has been indicated and, in 
 many cases, illustrated to make it more intelligible. The 
 writer has attempted to make the psychological doctrine 
 herein presented stimulating and suggestive both to the 
 parents and the teachers of children. 
 
 The first few chapters may prove to be a little harder 
 reading than the others for those who are not specialists. 
 I advise that they be read rapidly for the general movement 
 of thought, without worrying too much about their perfect 
 understanding. They are sure to clear up as the thought is 
 further developed and applied in the more detailed and con- 
 crete discussions which follow. Afterwards, it may be well 
 to reread the earlier chapters. They are introductory and 
 fundamental in character; and, while they are elaborated 
 rather fully for introductory chapters, yet they are neces- 
 sarily condensed more than would be the case in a book 
 devoted exclusively to general psychology. In other words 
 
Preface ix 
 
 the writer has had to presuppose some familiarity with the 
 simpler facts and principles of psychology. 
 
 References have been given only to a few books, those 
 which are of most immediate value to the reader in ampli- 
 fying, or helping to interpret, certain topics which fall with- 
 in the limits of the discussion. These references are usually 
 quite specific. It has not been my purpose to give a bibli- 
 ography so much as it has been to give a few selections of 
 the best and most relevant material. It has been presup- 
 posed that the general reader will- not care for voluminous 
 references, and that the specialist will easily help himself 
 anyway. The selection of references has been made also 
 with some regard to what is most probably easily accessible. 
 For this reason, I have given no references to James' Prin- 
 ciples of Psychology, but only to his Briefer Course and his 
 Talks to Teachers, which are more widely in use. Like- 
 wise, while I acknowledge personal indebtedness to Dewey's 
 Studies in Logical Theory, to Baldwin's Thought and 
 Things, and to Hall's Adolescence, I give no references to 
 these works. 
 
 The point of view of this discussion of Psychology in 
 general and of Thinking in particular was formulated and 
 the main features of the outline were sketched four or five 
 years ago in connection with the teaching of courses in 
 -Psychology and Pedagogy in the Normal School. Most of 
 the material has been actually used in some form in my own 
 classes. The impetus to elaborate and publish this material 
 was suddenly checked by the appearance in rapid succession 
 of O'Shea's Education as Adjustment, Angell's Psychology, 
 arid Home's Philosophy of Education, all of which are writ- 
 ten from a more or less explicitly biological point of view. 
 My present discussion must, of course, be indebted to these 
 works for much of suggestion and stimulus. Yet it seems 
 as if there is still room for another psychological and educa- 
 tional discussion involving a similar point of view, but 
 independent of these in its sr^cific field. The essential 
 
X Preface 
 
 features of this presentation were given in lectures at the 
 College of Education of the University of Chicago in the 
 summer of 1907. The cordiality with which the class re- 
 ceived these lectures has served as the inspiration and the 
 excuse for putting them into a more permanent form and 
 presenting them to a larger audience. 
 
 I cannot send this little book out without recognizing my 
 obligation to Prof. John Dewey for the large number of 
 "seed" thoughts which have come from his lectures on 
 Logic, Ethics, and Education. But the particular applica- 
 tions, developments, and formulations of these ideas, as well 
 as the underlying movement of thought, are my own ; and I 
 alone must be subject to whatever criticism they may deserve 
 on account of their defects. I am indebted for valuable sug- 
 gestions to my colleagues. President Charles McKenny and 
 Professor Herman C. Henderson, of the Milwaukee State 
 Normal School, and also to Professor W. W. Charters, 
 Ph.D., of the University of Missouri, who were kind enough 
 to read my manuscript before its final revision. 
 
 Irving Elgae Miller. 
 State Normal School 
 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
 January, 1909 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 
 
 PAGE 
 
 General Meaning and Significance of Thinking i 
 
 (i) Thinking an active and constructive aspect of con- 
 sciousness 
 
 (2) Thinking relevant to need 
 
 (3) Thinking has a life function 
 
 (4) Functional and biological interpretations of thinking 
 
 Present Tendency in Psychology 4 
 
 (i) Increasing prominence of the biological point of view 
 (2) Present view compared with Spencer's 
 
 Influence of the Theory of Evolution 5 
 
 (i) Nature of this influence 
 
 (2) Illustration from botany 
 
 (3) Illustrations from other sciences 
 
 (4) Application to psychology 
 
 ■ CHAPTER II 
 THE BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW— Continued 
 
 General Nature of an Organism 11 
 
 Essential Characteristics of an Organism 11 
 
 (i) No part an end in itself 
 
 (2) A self-maintaining system 
 
 (3) Characterized by a law of determination from within 
 
 Adaptation between Organism and Environment 13 
 
 (1) Meaning of adaptation 
 
 a. Activity of external factors 
 
 b. Activity of internal factors 
 
 c. Interaction between external and internal factors 
 
 d. Further interpretation of organism and of adaptation 
 
 (2) Law of reaction 
 
 (3) Function of reactions 
 
 xi 
 
xii Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 
 4. The Biological View of Mind 17 
 
 (i) Consciousness not an end in itself 
 
 (2) Mental processes have adjustment value 
 
 (3) Law of human self-determination psychical as well as 
 
 physical 
 
 5. Conclusion 20 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 THE SENSORI-MOTOR CIRCUIT 
 
 1. Need of more Detailed Study of the Reaction Process. .. 22 
 
 2. The Reaction Process in Terms of the Sensori-Motor 
 
 Circuit 22 
 
 3. Number of Types of Sensori-Motor Circuit 23 
 
 4. The Use of Diagrams 23 
 
 (i) Cautions against their misinterpretation 
 
 (2) The diagrams and their terminology 
 
 5. First Type of Sensori-Motor Circuit 24 
 
 (i) Definition 
 
 (2) Reference to the diagram 
 
 (3) Significance, — mechanism for simple mechanical move- 
 
 ments 
 
 (4) Place of consciousness in this circuit 
 
 6. Second Type of Sensori-Motor Circuit 28 
 
 (i) Definition 
 
 (2) Reference to the diagram 
 
 (3) Significance, — mechanism for complex, organized, me- 
 
 chanical reactions 
 
 (4) Place of consciousness in this circuit 
 
 7. The Third Type of Sensori- Motor Circuit 31 
 
 (1) Definition 
 
 (2) Reference to the diagram 
 
 (3) Significance, — mechanism for variation and reconstruc- 
 
 tion of reactions 
 
 (4) Place of consciousness in this circuit 
 
 8. Recapitulation and Comparison of the Significance of 
 
 the Three Types of Sensori-Motor Circuit 34 
 
 g. Unity and Interdependence of the Three Types of 
 
 Circuit 24 
 
Contents xiii 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE SIGNIFICANCE AND FUNCTION OF 
 CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1. The Functional View of Consciousness 37 
 
 2. Consciousness the Factor of Variation and Reconstruc- 
 
 tion OF Reaction 37 
 
 3. Conditions of Consciousness 38 
 
 4. Special Application to the Human Being 39 
 
 (i) Man's special need of conscious processes 
 (2) Possibility of great delicacy of adjustment 
 
 S- Consciousness the Factor of Individual Control 40 
 
 (i) The idea of control 
 
 a. Adjustment not involving control 
 
 6. Meaning of control 
 (2) Kinds of control 
 
 a. Racial control 
 
 b. Individual control 
 
 6. Summary of the Function of Consciousness 44 
 
 7. Conclusion 45 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 DIFFERENTIATION AND ORGANIZATION OF 
 CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 1. Nature of the First Consciousness 46 
 
 2. General Principle of Mental Development 46 
 
 (i) Statement of the principle 
 
 (2) Illustrations 
 
 (3) Further interpretation 
 
 (4) Analogy of the industrial processes 
 
 3. Doctrine of the Organic Circuit 48 
 
 (i) The reflex arc concept 
 
 (2) The concept of the organic circuit 
 
 a. The idea developed through an illustration 
 
 b. The figure of the spiral 
 
 c. Significance of the organic circuit in the process of 
 
 adjustment 
 
 d. Consciousness a factor in self-determination 
 
xiv Contents 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 ORGANIC UNITY OF MENTAL AND MOTOR LIFE 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1. The Unity and Continuity of Sensory and Motor Pro- 
 
 cesses 54 
 
 2. The Unity and Continuity of Sense-Perception, Intel- 
 
 lect, AND Motor Response 55 
 
 (1) Functional continuity of observation with motor pro- 
 
 cesses 
 
 (2) Functional continuity of observation with higher psy- 
 
 chical processes 
 
 (3) Observation processes absorbed in the higher psychical 
 
 (4) Observation and intellection in continuity with motor 
 
 processes 
 
 3. The Fallacy of Isolating Observation, Intellection, and 
 
 Motor Response in Training 58 
 
 (i) Isolation of observation processes 
 
 (2) Isolation of the intellectual activities 
 
 (3) Isolation of motor activities 
 
 4. The Unity and Continuity of Intellect, Feeling, and 
 
 Will 62 
 
 (i) Their functional distinction 
 (2) Their essential unity 
 
 5. The Fallacy of Isolating Intellect, Feeling, and Will 
 
 IN Training 65 
 
 (i) Isolation ot the intellectual aspect 
 
 (2) Isolation of the feeling aspect 
 
 (3) Isolation of the will aspect 
 
 6. The Unity and Continuity of Child Mind and Adult 
 
 Mind 68 
 
 (1) The prmciple of unity and continuity 
 
 (2) Difference within unity 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 TYPICAL MODES OF ADJUSTMENT 
 
 1. Point of View and Purpose of this Chapter 72 
 
 2. Adjustment without the Intervention of Consciousness 73 
 (i) Automatic action 
 
 (2) Reflex action 
 
Contents xv 
 
 PAGE 
 
 3. Adjustment on the Organic Level of Consciousness.... 74 
 (i) Instinctive action 
 
 a. General nature of instinctive action 
 
 b. Impulse and instinct 
 
 c. Instinct of man and of animals compared 
 
 d. Relation of consciousness to instinctive action 
 
 (a) Feeling involved 
 
 (6) Sense perception involved 
 
 (c) Organic memory involved 
 
 e. Instinctive action and the problem of control 
 
 (2) Non-instinctive adjustments on the organic level of 
 consciousness 
 
 4. Adjustment on the Intellectual Level of Consciousness 83 
 
 (1) Genetic basis 
 
 a. Conditions of intellectual adjustment 
 
 b. Development of the ideal aspect of experience 
 
 (2) Voluntary action of the ideo-motor type 
 
 a. Meaning of voluntary and ideo-motor action 
 
 b. Ideo-motor action on the perceptual level 
 
 c. Ideo-motor action on the level of memory and imag- 
 
 ination 
 
 d. Significance of ideo-motor action for control 
 
 e. Bearing of the discussion on the study of thinking 
 
 (3) Voluntary action of the deliberative type 
 
 a. Conditions of deliberative action 
 
 b. Illustration 
 
 c. Deliberative action the specific field of thinking 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 CONDITIONS AND FUNCTION OF THINKING 
 
 1. Conditions of Thinking 91 
 
 2. Problem in the End 91 
 
 (i) Vagueness of the end 
 
 (2) Conflict of ends 
 
 3. Problem in the Means 93 
 
 4. Problem in Method, or Organization of Means 94 
 
 5. Restatement of the Conditions of Thinking 94 
 
 (i) Distinction between means and end a practical dis- 
 tinction only 
 
 (2) Illustrations 
 
 (3) Summary and formulation 
 
xvi Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 
 6. Relation of Thinking to Other Conscious Processes... 97 
 
 7. General Significance of Thinking from Point of View 
 
 of Control 98 
 
 8. Relation between Functional and Structural Inter- 
 
 pretations of Thinking 100 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE THINKING PROCESS 
 
 1. Unity and Continuity loi 
 
 2. The Principle of Difference loi 
 
 3. Identity of Function, with Difference in Technique... 102 
 (i) Importance of the idea 
 
 (2) Analogy from the industrial process 
 
 (3) Illustrations 
 
 4. Reasoning viewed as involving Higher Technique 104 
 
 5. The Thinking of Children 105 
 
 (i) Fallacy of the doctrine of receptivity 
 
 (2) Origin and nature of the fallacious doctrine 
 
 (3) Reality of the child's thinking 
 
 6. Training in Thinking, — General Principles 107 
 
 (i) Principle of unity and continuity, — identity of function 
 
 a. Unity on the side of motivation, the feeling element 
 
 b. Unity on the side of intellectual activity, or problem 
 
 c. Further applications 
 
 (2) Principle of difiference between thinking of the child 
 and that of the adult, — difference in technique 
 
 a. Application of the principle 
 
 b. Further interpretation through an analogy 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 TRAINING IN THINKING,— USE OF SUBJECT MATTER 
 
 1. Purpose of this Chapter 115 
 
 2. Kindergarten Games and Occupations 116 
 
 (i) Opportunities for thinking 
 
 (2) Simplicity, yet reality, of the child's thinking 
 
 (3) The right kindergarten point of view 
 
Contents xvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 3. Manual Training 117 
 
 (i) Motor training and skill not its chief value 
 
 (2) Vital acquisition of knowledge, discipline, and culture 
 
 (3) Our problem that of discipline of the thinking process 
 
 (4) Opportunity for the natural functioning of thinking 
 
 (5) Appropriateness of manual training for early exercise 
 
 of thinking 
 
 (6) Criticism of dictation ; fallacy of ideal of finished 
 
 product 
 
 (7) Increased motor efficiency from training in vital 
 
 thinking 
 
 4. Mathematics 123 
 
 (i) Recognized value of mathematics 
 
 (2) Danger of formalism and lack of motivation 
 
 (3) Vital training of thinking in mathematics 
 
 5. History 125 
 
 (1) Illustrations of its use 
 
 (2) Value of emphasis on the concrete problem 
 
 6. Geography 128 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 THE ACTIVITY OF IMAGINATION IN THINKING 
 
 1. Thinking in Terms of its Content 130 
 
 (i) Distinction between imagination and thinking 
 
 (2) Constructive imagination and thinking 
 
 2. General Significance of Imagination in the Thinking 
 
 Process 131 
 
 (i) Necessity of imagination in conception of ends 
 
 (2) Necessity of imagination in conscious use of past 
 
 experience 
 
 (3) Necessity of imagination in determining modes of pro- 
 
 cedure 
 
 3. Restatement in Terms of Advantage of Imagination... 133 
 
 4. General Relation between Association and Imagination 
 
 , IN Thinking 134 
 
 (i) Imagination and the laws of association 
 
 (2) Accidental and logical ties of connection 
 
 (3) Superiority of logical ties of connection 
 
 (4) Question of control over the associative mechanism in 
 
 thinking 
 
xviii Contents 
 
 PACE 
 
 5. Illustrations i37 
 
 6. Further Discussion of the Control of Association in 
 
 Thinking 141 
 
 (i) Limitations of control 
 
 (2) Relation of organized system of knowledge to control 
 
 (3) Conclusion as to control 
 
 7. Summary of the Thinking Process in Terms of the 
 
 Imagination i43 
 
 8. Iadequacy for Pedagogy of the Older Accounts of 
 
 Thinking i43 
 
 (i) Psychology of formal thinking not vital 
 
 (2) Logical power not attained through formal training 
 
 alone 
 
 (3) An objection answered 
 
 9. Thinking Power not Separable from Possession of a 
 
 Fund of Knowledge 148 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE IMAGE AS AN ELEMENT OF TECHNIQUE IN 
 THINKING 
 
 1. General Principle 152 
 
 2. Our Use of the Terms Concrete and Abstract Image. . . . 152 
 
 3. Nature and Genesis of Meaning 153 
 
 (i) Genesis of meaning 
 
 (2) Definition of meaning 
 
 (3) Correlativity of meaning and symbol 
 
 (4) The functional nature of meaning 
 
 (5) The abstract image and meaning 
 
 4. Superiority of the Abstract Image as an Element of 
 
 Technique in Thinking 160 
 
 (i) Less irrelevancy of suggestion 
 
 (2) Greater rapidity of movement 
 
 (3) Superiority in making logical connections 
 
 (4) Increase of power 
 
 5. Functional Relation between Concrete and Abstract 
 
 Imagery 162 
 
 (i) Meaning of abstract image dependent upon translation 
 (2) Significance for thinking 
 
Contents xix 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 EDUCATIONAL APPLICATIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1. The Principle of furnishing Adequate Background of 
 
 Concrete Experience 164 
 
 (i) The principle in general 
 
 (2) Concrete experience not to be in terms of one sense only 
 
 2. The Principle of Translation of the Abstract in Terms 
 
 OF THE Concrete 166 
 
 (i) Translation often the determining factor in thinking 
 
 (2) Necessity of practice in translation 
 
 (3) Increased efficiency of abstract images secured 
 
 3. The Principle of Transition from Concrete Images to 
 
 THE Abstract 169 
 
 4. The Principle of testing Meanings 170 
 
 5. Danger of making Education a Process of juggling with 
 
 Symbols 170 
 
 (i) Value of learning dependent on grasp of meaning 
 
 (2) Application to reading 
 
 (3) Danger of loss of interest 
 
 (4) Danger of artificiality 
 
 (5) Extent of this danger 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGINATION IN RELATION 
 TO THINKING 
 
 1. Stages of Development 174 
 
 2. First Period, — Early Infancy 175 
 
 3. Second Period,— Later Infancy I7S 
 
 (i) General characteristics 
 
 (2) Activity of the imagination in play 
 
 (3) Significance of rapid development of imagination 
 
 (4) Enlargement of field of control 
 
 (5) Unification of experience through imagination 
 
 (6) Lack of reflective element 
 
 (7) Distinction between means and ends felt rather than 
 
 conceived 
 
 (8) Thinking not the characteristic type of consciousness 
 
XX Contents 
 
 PACE 
 
 4. Third Period, — Childhood 181 
 
 (i) Development of conscious distinction between means 
 and ends 
 
 (2) Development of symbolism 
 
 (3) Distinction between means and ends practical rather 
 
 than theoretical 
 
 (4) Development of thinking power 
 
 (5) Training in thinking 
 
 S- Fourth Period, — Adolescence 185 
 
 (i) Striking characteristics 
 
 (2) Rapidly developing interest in generalizations 
 
 (3) Thinking becoming reasoning 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE CONCEPT AS AN ELEMENT OF TECHNIQUE IN 
 
 THINKING 
 
 1. Genesis of the Concept 189 
 
 2. The Concept in Teems of Meaning 191 
 
 (i) Meaning and concept 
 
 (2) Definition of concept, — in terms of meaning 
 
 (3) Image and concept 
 
 (4) Meaning and thinking 
 
 3. The Concept as a Tool of Adjustment 194 
 
 (i) The concept and reaction 
 
 (2) The concept and mental construction 
 
 (3) Teleological nature of the concept as a mode of mental 
 
 construction 
 
 (4) Further definitions of the concept 
 
 a. In terms of reaction 
 
 b. In terms of mental construction 
 
 4. Growth of the Concept 199 
 
 (i) Vagueness of the child's first concepts 
 
 (2) General and individual notions 
 
 a. Their functional distinction 
 
 b. The question of their genetic order of precedence 
 
 (3) Development of concepts 
 
 (4) Acquisition of new concepts 
 
 (5) Change and fixity of concepts 
 
Contents xxi 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE CONCEPT AS AN ELEMENT OF TECHNIQUE IN 
 
 THINKING— Continued 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1. Psychological and Logical Concepts 206 
 
 (1) The psychological concept 
 
 (2) The logical concept 
 
 2. Further Comparison of Psychological and Logical Con- 
 
 cepts 208 
 
 (i) As to accuracy 
 
 (2) As to adequacy 
 
 (3) As to relative prevalence 
 
 3. Functional Relation between Psychological and Logical 
 
 Concepts 210 
 
 (1) Psychological concepts the basis of the logical 
 
 (2) Conditions of the logical concept 
 
 a. Unreflective reconstruction, not leading to logical 
 
 concepts 
 
 b. Reflective reconstruction, leading to logical concepts 
 
 4. Process of attaining Logical Concepts 214 
 
 (i) General statement 
 
 (2) Outline of the process 
 
 (3) Criticism of the traditional account 
 
 a. Not a complete psychology of the concept 
 
 b. Ignores dynamic connection of "steps" in the process 
 
 5. The Logical Concept not Final 218 
 
 6. Significance and Function of the Concept in the Think- 
 
 ing Process 220 
 
 (i) The concept central between problematic individuals 
 and individuals brought under control 
 
 (2) Another way of expressing the idea that the concept is 
 
 pivotal in the thinking process 
 
 (3) Increased efficiency of the logical concept 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 THE CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION 
 
 I. The Concept not the Goal of Instruction 224 
 
 (1) The concept a tool, not an end 
 
 (2) Concepts to be acquired for use 
 
xxii Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 
 2. Concepts cannot be given to the Child ready made 225 
 
 3. Concept-Building to culminate in Logical Concepts 226 
 
 4. School to concern itself with Problem of building up 
 
 Background of Psychological Concepts..... 226 
 
 (i) Argument from their basic character 
 
 (2) The doctrine exemplified in school practice 
 
 (3) The doctrine applied to religious instruction 
 
 (4) The doctrine applied to moral instruction 
 
 5. The Test of Possession of Concept that of Function. . 229 
 
 6. Significance of Problems of Action in training to Think 229 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION VIEWED AS TECHNIQUE 
 
 OF THINKING 
 
 1. Purpose of this Chapter 231 
 
 2. Relation of Induction and Deduction to Each Other... 231 
 
 3. Definitions 232 
 
 (i) Their statement 
 
 a. Deduction 
 
 b. Induction 
 (2) Illustrations 
 
 a. Deduction 
 
 b. Induction 
 
 4. The Critical Point of Distinction between Deduction 
 
 AND Induction 236 
 
 (i) Criticism of the formula, "Deduction is a process of 
 going from the general to particulars." 
 
 (2) Criticism of the formula, "Induction is a process of 
 
 going from particulars to the general." 
 
 (3) Deduction and induction to be distinguished in terms 
 
 of locus of problem 
 
 5. Thinking in its Relation to System of Knowledge 239 
 
 (i) General statement 
 
 (2) Relation of deduction to the system 
 
 (3) Relation of induction to the system 
 
Contents xxiii 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION VIEWED AS TECHNIQUE 
 OF THINKING— Continued 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1. Unreflective Induction 243 
 
 2. Reflective Induction 242 
 
 3. Inductive Method, — the Inductive "Steps" 243 
 
 (i) Observation 
 
 (2) Comparison 
 
 (3) Abstraction 
 
 (4) Generalization 
 
 4. Interrelations of the Formal "Steps" 249 
 
 5. Induction of Laws and Principles 231 
 
 6. Unreflective Deduction 251 
 
 7. Reflective Deduction, — Deductive Method 252 
 
 8. Pedagogical Importance of Deductive Method 254 
 
 9. Significance of Inductive and Deductive Method from 
 
 the Point of View of Control 25s 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION VIEWED AS TECHNIQUE 
 OF THINKING— Continued 
 
 1. The Special Device of Deductive Method, — ^the Syllogism 256 
 (i) General relation of the syllogism to deduction 
 
 (2) Illustration 
 
 (3) Function of the syllogism 
 
 (4) Illustrations of functional nature of the syllogism 
 
 (5) Psychology of deduction inadequate in terms of analysis 
 
 of finished product 
 
 2. The Special Device of Inductive Method,— the Hy- 
 
 pothesis 260 
 
 (i) General relation of the hypothesis to induction 
 
 (2) Illustrations 
 
 (3) Function of the hypothesis 
 
 (4) Problem of conceiving h3rpotheses 
 
 (5) Establishment of hypotheses 
 
 3. Complete Induction inclubes Deduction 267 
 
xxiv Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 
 4. Applications to Teaching 267 
 
 (1) Training in thinking must recognize the dynamic aspect 
 
 of inductive and deductive processes 
 
 (2) We must recognize the child's system of already or- 
 
 ganized knowledge as a determining factor in his 
 thinking 
 
 (3) Inductive method is not complete without deduction 
 
 (4) Type studies give the opportunity to provide in school 
 
 work for much of the dynamic aspect of the inductive 
 process 
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 JUDGMENT AS AN ELEMENT OF TECHNIQUE IN 
 THINKING 
 
 1. Definition of Judgment 275 
 
 2. Illustration and Explanation 275 
 
 3. Conditions of Judgment 277 
 
 4. Further Development of the Nature of Judgment 277 
 
 (i) Judgment in the application of accepted concepts 
 
 (2) Judgment in the concept-building process 
 
 5. Judgment and Thinking 278 
 
 6. Judgment Implicit and Explicit 279 
 
 (i) Implicit judgment 
 (2) Explicit judgment 
 
 7. Judgment and Other Mental Functions 281 
 
 8. Judgment and Instruction 282 
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 THINKING AS REASONING 
 
 1. Point of View 284 
 
 2. Elements of Technique involved in Reasoning 285 
 
 3. Dependence of Reasoning upon Laws and Principles, — 
 
 Empirical Thinking and Reasoning Compared 287 
 
 (i) Illustrated in dealing with flickering gas flame 
 
 (2) Illustrated in procedure of medicine 
 
 (3) Illustrated in procedure of agriculture 
 
Contents xxv 
 
 PAGE 
 
 4. Definition of Reasoning 291 
 
 5. Biological Significance of Reasoning 291 
 
 (i) Reasoning the highest factor of control 
 
 (2) Relation between reason and human freedom 
 
 6. The Question of the Reasoning of Animals 293 
 
 7. The Question of the Reasoning of Children 29s 
 
 8. Training in Reasoning 296 
 
 (i) Reasoning the remote goal 
 
 (2) Stages of progress in attainment of the goal 
 
 (3) Relation between function and technique in training 
 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
 THINKING 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW _ 
 I. General Meaning and Significance of Thinking.^ 
 
 (i) Thinking an active and constructive aspect of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 We all know in a general way what we mean by thinking, 
 although we may never have taken the trouble to analyze and 
 formulate that meaning precisely. We know that thinking 
 is the most active and constructive aspect of consciousness. 
 When we think there is more or less concentration of atten- 
 tion, and the attempt is made consciously or unconsciously 
 to exercise some control over the movement of our ideas. 
 In thinking we do not take our ideas merely for granted ; we 
 question them, judge them, and try to determine their value 
 and relevancy with reference to some end. They undergo 
 more or less of a process of construction and reconstruc- \ 
 tion. " Ideas do not merely flow in a thinking process, but ' 
 they are selected, rearranged, and ordered according to'i 
 some purpose. 
 
 We shall not at this time attempt to define thinking. We 
 shall content ourselves for the present with saying that what 
 we mean in general by thinking is this active process, with 
 which we are familiar, of going over our ideas, rearranging 
 
 ' See advice to the reader in the Preface. 
 I I 
 
2 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 them, and ordering them to meet some need that cannot be 
 met by the more spontaneous and undirected flow of ideas. 
 
 (2) Thinking relevant to need. 
 
 We all know, too, in a general way what is the significance 
 of thinking in human life. We find that when we "stop to 
 think" it is in order that we may the better deal with some 
 situation which confronts us. This may be a situation which 
 demands some overt action which cannot be escaped, and we 
 think in order to determine more accurately the nature of 
 the situation and the kind of action which is most appropri- 
 ate. Again, the situation may be one which demands not 
 immediate action, or even any specific act, but rather the 
 formation of some attitude of mind which shall afifect indi- 
 rectly many of our acts thereafter, as for example a principle 
 in politics or in religion. Or the situation may be one which 
 demands the solution of some problem of thought which 
 cannot be left unsolved without making the mind restless 
 and dissatisfied. Such a case would be a theoretical prob- 
 lem in mathematics or a puzzle, the outcome of which is felt 
 by the individual who undertakes its solution to have no 
 practical value, yet he cannot be contented to lay it aside 
 with the thought that it is insoluble or that he has not the 
 power to solve it. 
 
 Now the point which we wish to make clear is that think- 
 ing is not normally a process which finds its justification in 
 itself. On the contrary, it takes place in response to a need 
 of some sort, and it is calculated to meet that need. We 
 stop and reflect, going back over our ideas, reconstructing 
 and rearranging them, and seeking to bring them under 
 control in order to apply more adequately the results of our 
 past experiences to the control of present situations in our 
 lives. 
 
 (3) Thinking has a life function. 
 
 Thinking is not a luxury of the human race merely to be 
 enjoyed or to be admired as a mark of special superiority. 
 It has normally a practical value for life at some point, 
 
The Biological Point of View 3 
 
 securing results that cannot be secured without thinking. 
 It is primarily something which has an important function 
 to perform in furthering the life and interests of those who 
 think. In the struggle for existence and for a life higher 
 than mere existence, a life filled with those values which 
 make existence worth while, thinking is the most central 
 and significant of the conscious processes which contrib- 
 ute to that end. It is the factor to which is due in largest 
 measure the free and flexible control of man over his 
 environment. 
 
 (4) The functional and biological interpretations of 
 thinking. 
 
 The point of view which has just been briefly sketched is 
 both functional and biological. When we interpret the 
 thinking process in terms of what it does, in terms of the 
 precise office which it performs in the whole scheme of con- 
 scious processes, we are taking a functional point of view. 
 When we discuss it from the point of view of its significance 
 to Hfe and try to analyze its place as a factor in the higher 
 evolution of species, we are taking a biological point of view. 
 It can readily be seen that the biological point of view in 
 psychology, if worked out consistently, must include the 
 functional point of view. 
 
 What has just been said must not be thought of as a com- 
 plete, or even a technical, statement of the functional and 
 the biological points of view in psychology. There has been 
 no intention of giving definitions, but only of giving some 
 preliminary idea, vague though it must necessarily be, of the 
 psychological bias of this book. Just what the biological 
 point of view means can best be understood in the light of 
 further discussions, and its significance for psychology and 
 education must be gathered little by little from the book as 
 a whole. In taking the biological point of view for the dis- 
 cussion of the psychology of thinking, we are putting our- 
 selves in line with a very strong present tendency about 
 which something ought to be said. 
 
4 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 2. Present Tendency in Psychology. 
 
 (i) Increasing prominence of the biological point of view. 
 
 Perhaps the most marked present tendency in psychology 
 is to be found in the fact that the biological point of view is 
 coming very rapidly to dominate psychological thought. 
 While this tendency is not in itself new, yet it is so new in 
 its thoroughgoing and systematic application to this field 
 that it hardly seems wise to undertake to discuss the psychol- 
 ogy of thinking from the biologial point of view without 
 first devoting some considerable space to its bearing upon 
 psychology as a whole. It is hoped that the reader will be 
 helped by this in the long run, even though he is to be 
 delayed for quite a long time in the matter of the main dis- 
 cussion, that of the thinking process. 
 
 Present tendency in psychology is the culmination of quite 
 a long period of development. Psychology has for several 
 decades been moving away from its connections with philos- 
 ophy, or metaphysics, and has been trying to ground itself 
 upon the basis of natural science. This tendency has ex- 
 pressed itself very fruitfully in the powerful impulse to con- 
 duct experiments in the realm of physiological psychology, 
 and it has given rise to the psychological laboratory as a 
 permanent feature of all institutions which attempt to engage 
 in psychological research. There has accompanied these 
 two related movements a rapid growth of interest in the 
 genetic and functional aspects of mind. This whole group 
 of tendencies has involved implicitly the standpoint of 
 modern biology. Yet it is not until quite recently that the 
 biological point of view has been put forward definitely and 
 explicitly as a thoroughgoing principle for the correlation, 
 organization, and interpretation of the facts of mind on a 
 natural science basis. 
 
 (2) Present view compared with Spencer's. 
 
 Our statement regarding the recency of the thoroughgoing 
 application of the biological point of view to psychology may 
 seem to the reader unfair to the work of Herbert Spencer. 
 
The Biological Point of View 5 
 
 But, while Spencer's work was of very great significance in 
 reenforcing and giving emphasis to the scientific point of 
 view, his treatment of psychology was vitiated by the doc- 
 trine of associationism which he borrowed from the English 
 philosophy. 
 
 Associationism and the biological point of view in psycho- 
 logy cannot keep house together. Spencer's psychology, 
 vitiated by the doctrine of associationism, could not be truly 
 biological. Associationism represents an atomic view of 
 mind.^ Elements in the form of separate units of sensation 
 are the starting point, and all higher forms of consciousness 
 are but differing combinations, aggregations, or complexes 
 of these elements. The biological conception is one of 
 growth and of development marked by gradual differentia- 
 tions of structure. When the structure has become com- 
 plex, all parts are still functionally and organically related 
 to one another and to the whole. There never were simple 
 units with which to begin. The simple sensations of the 
 associationists are not primary elements of mind at all. 
 They are rather themselves differentiations of structure 
 which have come about in the growth and development of 
 the mind, and they have specific functions to perform in this 
 more complex and more fully developed mind. Spencer's 
 psychology and the more recent formulation in biological 
 terms agree, however, in this respect, namely, that they are 
 both attempts to apply to psychology the evolutionary point 
 of view which has been so fruitful a working hypothesis in 
 other lines of interpretation and investigation. 
 3. Influence of the Theory of Evolution. 
 
 (i) Nature of this influence. 
 
 Whatever one's particular view may be regarding the ori- 
 gin of species, one great fact cannot be escaped, namely, that 
 the theory of evolution has profoundly influenced methods 
 of investigation in almost every field of scientific research. 
 
 'Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 106-116. James, Psychology, 
 Briefer Course, pp. 151, 244. 
 
6 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 A new spirit and a new method have been introduced into 
 all biological and quasi-biological sciences. As a result these 
 sciences have become less classificatory in character and 
 more historic, genetic, and dynamic. There is relatively 
 less stress thrown upon facts of structure and more atten- 
 tion is given to questions of process, of development, and of 
 function. In so far as it is true that facts of structure are 
 studied just as much now as formerly, it is from a different 
 point of view. Both facts to be studied and the method of 
 their organization are determined by reference to their 
 relation to the life process and its clearer and more intel- 
 ligible interpretation and exposition. 
 
 (z) Illustration from botany. 
 
 In the older type of botany, the emphasis fell upon facts 
 of structure and classification according to structure. 
 Specimens were collected, examined, analyzed, and finally 
 classified. The attempt was made to discover the most 
 characteristic features of plants, those features by which any 
 particular kind of plant could be recognized when found 
 again. To this end, various plants which gave suggestion 
 of belonging to the same species were carefully compared 
 with reference to their likenesses and differences. The dis- 
 covery of the most radical and persistent likenesses furnished 
 the standard by which to group plants into classes and sub- 
 classes, so that one's knowledge of plant life could be 
 organized into a comprehensive system, each particular fact 
 having its own place in that system. The same method pre- 
 vailed in zoology. 
 
 The botanist of to-day is no less concerned with the 
 problem of organizing and systematizing his body of knowl- 
 edge concerning plant life than the botanist of a generation 
 ago. Nor do we mean to imply that he does not care at all 
 for the facts of structure. But the chief stress of his inves- 
 tigation falls in a different place, and he employs a different 
 method of organization. He cares less for that group of 
 facts which is the result of observation and analysis of fully 
 
The Biological Point of View 7 
 
 developed forms and more for the whole group of facts con- 
 nected with the growth and development of plants. In other 
 words, he studies living things less in cross section and more 
 in their continuity. He raises questions about the physio- 
 logical processes concerned in the maintenance of the life 
 of the plant. He also wants to know about the functions 
 of its various parts. What special work do the roots per- 
 form? What do the leaves contribute? etc. Every fact of 
 structure is viewed as having some probable significance. 
 Concerning it we must raise the question of why? or what 
 for? and also, how did it come to be? It is not a mere fact, 
 however interesting a fact it may be as such, but it is a fact 
 with a history and with a meaning. What is that history? 
 and what is its meaning in the life of this plant-form ? 
 
 From this point of view, everything that in any way 
 serves as a modifying condition is relevant, and its study in 
 relation to the life of the plant is necessary. The botanist, 
 then, inquires into the conditions favorable and unfavorable 
 to the growth and development of the plant. But he also 
 goes farther than this in his interpretation. He tries to find 
 out about any particular form of plant not only the facts of 
 its present life, but also what is its ancestry. Still further, 
 he seeks to learn under what conditions, by what process, in 
 accordance with what laws, it has evolved from more prim- 
 itive forms. If he finds two plant-forms having a common 
 ancestry, descended from a common stock, even if they dif- 
 fer quite widely in many of their external characteristics, 
 he puts them in the same general class. The method of his 
 investigation and the organization of his material are both 
 dominated by the concept of evolution. 
 
 (2) Illustrations from other sciences. 
 
 Not only the immediately biological sciences of botany 
 and zoology have been determined in their method and in 
 their evaluation of fact by the theory of evolution; but also 
 the indirectly biological sciences of history, political science, 
 economics, and sociology have undergone pretty thorough 
 
8 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 reconstruction under the influence of the same controHing 
 idea. The events of history are not mere events, but they 
 are events to be studied, interpreted, and organized with 
 reference to their relation to human progress. Political and 
 social institutions are viewed as having arisen in the gradual 
 process of attaining better adjustment between social groups 
 and their environments ; and the significance of these insti- 
 tutions is to be determined by the value which they have had 
 and are having in the perfection of such adjustment. The 
 dynamic aspects of these sciences are receiving more and 
 more attention. They are less static and abstract, and are 
 becoming more dj'naraic and concrete. Life, action, pro- 
 cess, movement, function, interconnection, law, wholeness, 
 organic relationship are emphasized. Even theology, which 
 seems most of all to deal with absolutes, is bowing to the 
 demand for reconstruction along lines which make it more 
 in harmony with the other sciences, and religion is being 
 viewed as a phenomenon whose great value consists in its 
 vital relationship to the problem of the most complete adjust- 
 ment in thought and in action to the wealth of social and 
 spiritual values in man's environment. 
 
 (4) Application to psychology. 
 
 Now the point of all this discussion is to make clear and 
 meaningful the statement that psychology is feeling the 
 influence of this same type of thought. Psychology is seek- 
 ing to express itself in biological terms, in terms of the 
 problem of adjustment. This is not at all strange when we 
 think that mind as we know it is a characteristic of living 
 things. Consciousness isolated from the living thing which 
 is conscious is an abstraction. We know of no such thing 
 as consciousness in general ; there are only individual con- 
 sciousnesses belonging to individual living things. The 
 human being is not different in this respect from other liv- 
 ing creatures, even though he is characterized by a higher 
 order of mind. As a living being he is a proper subject of 
 study for the biologist. But he is more than a material 
 
The Biological Point of View 9 
 
 organism; he is an organism with a mind; he is a psycho- 
 physical organism. Here the problems of biology and psy- 
 chology meet and interpenetrate by virtue of the very nature 
 of man. Who then shall separate them without doing vio- 
 lence to the truth? It is certainly more natural and more 
 reasonable to associate psychology with biology than with 
 philosophy. 
 
 The reality of the facts of consciousness can be gotten at 
 only by studying it in its setting of hfe activities. The study f 
 of consciousness in cross-section, the analysis of mental pro- 
 cesses in terms of their structural differentiations, is not 
 adequate. We must raise the further question of the func-' 
 tion and significance of every aspect of consciousness in the 
 life of the whole. That whole is itself not static, but it has 
 come to be what it is as the result of a process. Is con- 
 sciousness in any way subject to the law of that process? 
 Has consciousness any significance in it? Are there con- 
 ditions in the lives of evolving organisms which call for the 
 emergence of the various activities of consciousness in order 
 that the situations which confront these organisms may be 
 satisfactorily met? What are these conditions? Just how 
 do special conscious processes become differentiated and 
 organized into forms of mental action which are adapted to 
 meet them? Such problems as these arise the moment we 
 try to apply the method of evolutionary science to the study 
 of consciousness. Psychology, like the other sciences that 
 we have discussed, then becomes vital, dynamic, and func- 
 tional in character. 
 
 This line of thought will clear up still further as we 
 proceed. We shall now try to get at it and give it further 
 development through the analysis of the conception of an 
 organism. 
 
 Before proceeding to the next chapter, however, it may 
 be well to caution the reader against the common material- 
 istic misinterpretation of present day psychology. The 
 psychologist, in limiting his discussions to those conscious 
 
10 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 powers or processes which he finds, or of which he finds 
 evidence, in the lives of mortal individuals between the 
 limits of birth and death, neither affirms nor denies the 
 existence of any other aspects of mind than these. He 
 purposely limits his field of investigation to the facts of 
 experience here and now. The empirical field is large 
 enough and worthy enough of separate treatment. From 
 this point of view, the problems of the immortality of the 
 soul and their like belong to the field of the psychologist 
 no more than they do to that of the physiologist or the 
 astronomer. The psychologist, however, in excluding these 
 problems from his discussion, does not necessarily do so on 
 the ground that their study would not be of great value or 
 that some solution justifying faith in the unseen is not pos- 
 sible. His legitimate reason for refusing to discuss these 
 problems is that their solution would require a different 
 method of procedure from that employed in dealing with the 
 empirical facts of mind, and he wishes to get together under 
 the control of the principles of one science all the facts the 
 investigation of which falls under a common method. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapters I and II 
 
 Angell, Psychology, Ch. I. 
 
 Angell, "The Province of Functional Psychology," Psy. Rev., 
 March, 1907. 
 
 Bagley, The Educative Process, Ch. I. 
 
 Home, The Philosophy of Education, Ch. II. 
 
 James, Talks to Teachers, Ch. III. 
 
 O'Shea, Education as Adjustment, pp. 44-51, 76-93, 99-104. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, Bk, I, Ch. III. 
 
 Sully, Teacher's Handbook of Psychology, pp. 46-47, 77-85. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 
 (Continued) 
 
 1. General Nature of an Organism. 
 
 An organism is quite commonly thought of as something 
 which is complex in structure and possessed of well-defined 
 and distinct parts or organs. But we call every independent 
 living thing an organism regardless of the degree of its 
 complexity. Bacteria, consisting of single cells microscopic 
 in size, are organisms. The stalk of grass, the flowering 
 plant in the window box, the pumpkin vine, the oak of the 
 forest, these all are organisms. All forms of animal life, 
 too, are organisms. The amoeba, which is only a tiny drop 
 of protoplasm, the minutest insect, the angleworm, the 
 oyster, the bird, the elephant, the human being, these are 
 all organisms. 
 
 From the illustrations given it is evident that some organ- 
 isms are very simple and some are very complex. It is true 
 that most of the organisms to which our attention is com- 
 monly drawn are complex and it is possible to discern in 
 them differentiations of structure for the performance of 
 special functions. But is such differentiation of structure 
 an essential characteristic? or is it the means to a better 
 reahzation of functions? Evidently the latter. While we 
 see that an organism is some sort of a living whole, we must 
 look deeper yet for its absolutely essential characteristics. 
 
 2. Essential Characteristics of an Organism. 
 
 If we keep our illustrations in mind, we can see that the 
 essential characteristics of an organism are as follows : 
 
 (i) When an organism is complex, no one part is an 
 end in itself for the sake of which the other parts exist as 
 mere means to that end. 
 
 II 
 
12 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 Every part of an organism has its function to perform, 
 and the value and significance of that function are to be 
 determined by reference to the part which it plays in the life 
 of the whole. It is not for the sake of the leaves alone that 
 the roots of a plant exist and perform their function, nor 
 for the sake of the stem that the leaves exist. But each 
 one, — leaves, root, and stem, — has its function to perform in 
 the maintenance of the whole plant of which each one is a 
 constituent part. Not even the seed or the fruit is an end 
 in itself, though from man's point of view it may seem to 
 be so. From the biological point of view the function of 
 the seed is merely to perpetuate and propagate this partic- 
 ular kind of plant life. In like manner we may say of 
 every organ or part of the human body, such as heart, 
 lungs, teeth, muscles, nervous system, etc., that no one of 
 these is an end in itself for the sake of which the others 
 exist and perform their function. Each one exists to per- 
 form some function which enables the whole organism to 
 maintain itself upon the earth better than it could without 
 this organ. The relation of parts within an organism is 
 sometimes expressed in this way : Every part of an organism 
 is both means and end to every other part. 
 
 (2) The organism is a self-maintaining system; it pos- 
 sesses all the functions necessary to the maintenance and 
 perpetuation of itself. 
 
 A stone cannot be said to be an organism ; it is not a 
 self-maintaining system. While suffering from the disin- 
 tegrating influences of the environment, it has no specific 
 method determined from within itself of making up its 
 losses. But the plant is constantly taking elements of 
 moisture and nourishment from the soil and carbon dioxide 
 from the air to make up for losses sustained by evaporation 
 and excretion. 
 
 (2) The organism is characterized by a law of deter- 
 mination from within. 
 
 In the case of the stone, its size, shape, etc., are deter- 
 
The Biological Point of View 13 
 
 mined by no specific inner law, but by external forces. But 
 the plant and the animal, while modified in many respects 
 by the influences of the environment, are nevertheless ex- 
 pressions of some more or less specific inner law of develop- 
 ment. Plant a bean and you expect a vine of about a certain 
 height, size, and shape, with leaves and stem marked by 
 well-defined characteristics, and blossoms and seeds which 
 you can describe in advance of their appearance. Plant an 
 acorn and you expect an oak with all that is characteristic 
 of that monarch of the forest. Hatch a hen's tgg and you 
 expect a chicken and not a hawk. In all these cases there 
 is a specific law of development which no amount of ex- 
 ternal force can set aside, however much it may modify the 
 final resultant. 
 3. Adaptation between Organism and Environment. 
 
 (i) Meaning of adaptation. 
 a. Activity of external factors. 
 
 We have spoken of the organism as a self-maintaining 
 system, characterized by a law of determination from with- 
 in. Before we can see clearly the function of consciousness 
 in the life of the organism, we shall need to develop a little 
 more fully the meaning of this statement. In the first place, 
 we must not suppose that any organism is wholly determined 
 from within. There are also significant forces of the 
 environment constantly acting upon it. These may be 
 favorable and necessary to the life of the plant, if plant it 
 be, or they may be unfavorable to its development, and pos- 
 sibly even destructive. The plant requires from the en- 
 vironment light, heat, moisture, elements of nutriment, etc. 
 To be sure, some one of these may be present in such intense 
 form, as is often the case with heat, that the life of the plant 
 is destroyed. But, take any one of them away, and the 
 plant must perish in spite of all its inner tendencies. We 
 see, then, that the life of the plant depends upon the exist- 
 ence of a constant stream of external influences which affect 
 it in various ways. 
 
14 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 b. Activity of internal factors. 
 
 In the second place, when we turn to the other side of the 
 question for a moment, we can see that the law of deter- 
 mination from within is the very real expression of inner 
 forces which have to be taken into account. The rock and 
 the plant may be surrounded by the same external forces, 
 but they are affected differently by them. The plant has a 
 way of responding to certain of them which results in life 
 and growth. Again, two plants grown side by side and sub- 
 ject to the same set of external conditions may differ as 
 widely as the rose and the cabbage. While it is true that 
 the external conditions are necessary, it is evident that the 
 form of the plant is due to something other than these fac- 
 tors. It must be due to the operation of a law of determina- 
 tion from within. 
 
 c. Interaction between external and internal factors. 
 Our analysis has tended to make clear the fact that the 
 
 life process involves two sets of factors, the outer and the 
 inner. Life and growth are dependent neither upon the one 
 set nor upon the other exclusively, but upon the cooper- 
 ation of the two. A bean may be kept away from the mois- 
 ture for a year or more and it will not develop. It needs 
 this influence from the environment in order to "realize" 
 itself. But when it is supplied with the proper external 
 conditions to induce growth, its growth will be in harmony 
 with the inner law of its own development. The materials 
 will be organized into a characteristic form of life the stages 
 of whose development and the leading characteristics of 
 which we can predict. Our illustrations have been drawn 
 from plant life, but the principle is the same for animal 
 organisms. The life, growth, and continued existence of 
 the organism, whether plant or animal, depend upon the 
 proper interaction between internal and external factors. 
 So long as there is preserved the proper equilibrium be- 
 tween these two sets of factors, so long as they cooperate 
 with each other, the life process goes on, and we have a self- 
 
The Biological Point of View 15 
 
 maintaining system, or organism. Destroy this equilibrium 
 and the organism will soon come to an end. 
 
 d. Further interpretation of organism and of adaptation. 
 
 It is, then, a fundamental biological fact that the life 
 process depends upon the proper interaction between inner 
 and outer factors in some center for their coordination. 
 Such a center we call an organism, and the process of right 
 coordination we call adaptation. From the point of view 
 of the biologist, then, an organism is a center for the coor- 
 dination of inner and outer forces in such a way as to 
 further the life process, and, in turn, this furthering of the 
 life process is adjustment, or adaptation. 
 
 (2) Law of reaction. 
 
 If we speak of the interaction between organism and 
 environment primarily from the point of view of the part 
 which the organism as an already organized structure plays 
 in it, we call the process one of reaction. As the psycholo- 
 gist is interested in the organism and its conscious processes 
 directly and only indirectly in the environment and its 
 forces, he uses the term reaction instead of interaction. 
 
 The relation between the inner and the outer forces in 
 the life of the organism may be formulated in simple terms 
 somewhat as follows : The life and development of the 
 organism depend upon the proper reaction of the inner fac- 
 tors upon the outer,^ the outer serving both as stimulant, or 
 excitant, and as means, or material. Thus, food is to the 
 animal both an excitant calling forth some reaction on his 
 part, and it is also material selected from the environment 
 to be used in the maintenance of the life of the organism. 
 
 The law of reaction has been formulated in most general 
 terms applicable to all organic activity as follows : "All 
 stimulations to living matter, — from protoplasm to the high- 
 est vegetable and animal structures, — if they take effect at 
 all tend to bring about movements, or contractions, in the 
 
 ' Sully, Teacher's Handbook of Psychology, pp. 77-85. 
 
1 6 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 mass of the organism."^ Mr. Baldwin calls this the law of 
 dynamogenesis. More briefly stated it is as follows : 
 "Every organic stimulus tends to express itself in move- 
 ment." Thus the tiny amoebae, unicellular organisms in 
 the form of minute droplets of protoplasm, are capable of 
 responding in characteristic ways to the presence of light 
 and food. Even the plant bends toward the light. The lives 
 of the familiar animals furnish illustrations without number 
 of the operation of this general law, which the reader can 
 easily supply. 
 
 (S) Function of reactions. 
 
 The biologist views the organism as a device for the 
 execution of movements in response to stimuli. This 
 capacity of the organism is fundamental to its very nature. 
 It is only through reactions that adaptation, or adjustment, 
 is effected between organism and environment and life is 
 maintained. 
 
 From the biological point of view every form of life that 
 can maintain itself has a right to live. The weed and the 
 snake may not for us, and from our purely human point of 
 view, have any value or subserve any end. But we may 
 not inject our limited point of view into the biological 
 process. Nature is "interested" in every one of her living 
 forms. Hence the primary and fundamental end of every 
 organism is self-preservation and perpetuation of its kind. 
 We have seen that this can be secured only through the 
 proper interaction between the inner forces of the organism 
 and the outer forces of the environment. These must come 
 into some sort of working terms with each other. There 
 must be adaptation of the one to the other; there must be 
 adjustment between them. 
 
 Every organism is, then, "seeking" to realize itself 
 through a process of adjustment between itself and the con- 
 ditions of its environment. This process is effected through 
 reactions. This is as true for the organism with a mind as 
 
 * Baldwin, Mental Development, pp. i66, 170. 
 
The Biological Point of View 17 
 
 for the one without any conscious processes. We can 
 determine whether an organism is high in the scale of 
 development only by a study of its modes of reaction in 
 their relation to the problem of attaining the most advan- 
 tageous forms of adjustment between organism and en- 
 vironment. The mind is a factor in the solution of that 
 problem. 
 4. The Biological View of Mind. 
 
 Our study of the characteristics of an organism and the 
 process of adjustment has prepared us to understand what 
 we mean by a biological view of mind. If we take the 
 biological point of view in psychology, we start with the 
 living whole, with the organism. That living whole is 
 psycho-physical. The human being cannot be described 
 wholly in terms of body, nor can he be described wholly in 
 terms of mind. Both are essential ; he is a mind-body 
 creature. This is a fact which we cannot overlook in our 
 interpretation of the mind. Consciousness and all its pro- 
 cesses must be described in terms of the living whole, — the 
 psycho-physical organism. We can best show what this 
 means by pointing out certain psychological principles, 
 which, from this point of view, follow from our analysis 
 of the organism. 
 
 (i) Consciousness not an end in itself. 
 
 From the biological point of view, consciousness cannot 
 he viewed as an end in itself any more than the hand and 
 the stomach can be viewed as ends in themselves. The 
 psychological aspect of the organism cannot be fully under- 
 stood by studying it in isolation, in terms of itself. 
 Psychology must show the use, or function, of consciousness 
 in the life of the whole psycho-physical organism, — the 
 part that consciousness plays in the concrete life of the 
 individual. Psychology cannot profitably study conscious- 
 ness in the abstract, apart from any relation that it has to 
 the body, or that the body has to it, apart from the complex 
 of activities, or reactions, in which it inheres and which 
 form its natural setting. 
 
i8 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 (2) Mental processes have adjustment value. 
 
 As the organism is a self-maintaining system, the mind 
 and its various forms of activity have some specific relation 
 to the self-maintenance and perfection of the organism. 
 Every mental process has a place and a function within the 
 whole organic system. The biologist believes that every 
 special structure has arisen in the process of adjustment, 
 or that having appeared as a variation it has been preserved 
 and perfected because of the advantage which its possession 
 has given to the organism in the struggle for existence. 
 He has thus come to view every dififerentiation of a struc- 
 ture as having some special adjustment value secured 
 through a useful correlative specialization of function. The 
 mind and its conscious processes are not to be excepted 
 from the general principle. Mind must have some signifi- 
 cance in the process of adjustment. The question then be- 
 comes, What is that significance? Under what conditions 
 of reaction would conscious processes be advantageous? 
 That is, in what sorts of situations would they have selective 
 value and be at a premium in the struggle for existence, 
 or for a more satisfactory existence? Just what is the 
 function and .the adjustment value of each of the various 
 differentiations of consciousness,' — the various attitudes of 
 mind and the various mental activities? Just what part 
 does each play in the process of more perfect adjustment? 
 What in detail is the method by which each of the various 
 conscious processes contributes to the maintenance and wel- 
 fare of the psycho-physical organism ? 
 
 Take the case of memory for example. Psychology will 
 raise such questions as these : Under what conditions will 
 the activity of mind need to assume the form of memory? 
 What will be the use of memory when it does appear? Just 
 what does it contribute under this particular set of condi- 
 tions to the solution of the problem which confronts the 
 organism ? What is the method of its operation in the 
 performance of its function? What are the specific ele- 
 
The Biological Point of View 19 
 
 ments of technique involved in that method? What is its 
 relation to the other conscious processes involved at the 
 same time or in connection with the same situation ? Thus 
 memory will be studied in its whole setting, which includes 
 its relation to bodily activities, or reactions, which are pro- 
 ducing, or are tending to produce, changes in the environ- 
 ment or in the self. Psychology, from the biological point 
 of view, will take the same attitude toward all the other 
 conscious processes, — whether they be classed under the 
 heads of intellect, feeling, or will. They will all be re- 
 garded as functional activities of the mind called forth 
 under conditions which make them necessary in order to 
 meet specific needs of the whole organism. 
 
 (2) Law of human self-determination psychical as well 
 as physical. 
 
 As a law of determination from within is a fundamental 
 characteristic of the organism, it must be that in the case of 
 psycho-physical organisms the law of self-determination is 
 psychical as well as physical. The kind of organism is that 
 which is characterized by both body and mmd in organic 
 relation to each other. When the biological view of mind 
 is urged, its advocate is often thought to be making the 
 body and its physical life the end, viewing mind and all its 
 processes as mere means to that end. But mind, when it 
 appears in the living organism, becomes a part of the whole, 
 an integral aspect of the self. The self is incomplete with- 
 out it. Psychical dispositions and tendencies of every sort, 
 both native and acquired, are inner factors just as really as 
 bodily tendencies. And adjustment to environment in case 
 of psycho-physical organisms must be such as to satisfy 
 needs springing from the mental constitution of the indi- 
 vidual as well as the physical. 
 
 The point which has just been made regarding the mental 
 life also holds true with reference to the social nature. The 
 law of determination from within in the case of human 
 beings includes social tendencies which are inherent. 
 
20 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 Aristotle said that man is a political (social) animal. There 
 have been schools of thought which attempted to explain 
 all social organization from an individualistic and selfish 
 basis. But modern psychology and sociology agree with 
 Aristotle that there is something inherent in man's nature 
 responsible for the evolution of social organizations. There 
 is some sort of a push-from-behind which must be taken 
 into account as well as special conditions of the environ- 
 ment in explaining the varied social institutions of human- 
 ity. The same thing is true in the case of the moral and 
 religious life and their forms of expression. 
 
 In treating, then, of the higher forms of organisms which 
 have found their culmination in the human species, when 
 we speak of adjustment between organism and environ- 
 ment, we shall mean by environment not merely physical 
 nature but every form of influence from without the indi- 
 vidual which comes into interaction with his inner tenden- 
 cies. As inner tendencies are physical, mental, social, 
 ethical, religious, etc., man's adjustment to the world in 
 which he lives is not complete except as it is effected in 
 terms 6f processes which shall meet his various classes of 
 needs, needs that are inherent in the very nature of his law 
 of determination from within. 
 5. Conclusion. 
 
 From the biological point of view, we regard conscious- 
 ness as an essential characteristic of the human organism, 
 which has developed to its present stage of specialization 
 and efficiency in the process of more adequately meeting 
 human needs. As needs have multiplied and have become 
 more definite and highly specialized, consciousness has 
 evolved more fully and has taken on specialized modes of 
 activity relevant to the meeting of these needs. The con- 
 sciousness of the human being is higher than that of the 
 rest of the animal world not so much by virtue of the fact 
 that he has to adjust himself to a more complex environ- 
 ment, as we sometimes hear it stated, as by virtue of the fact 
 
The Biological Point of View 21 
 
 that he has evolved a more complex and varied set of needs, 
 — physical, mental, social, ethical, religious, aesthetic, 
 scientific, etc. To satisfy these needs man is impelled to 
 put himself into more complex relations with his environ- 
 ment. His adjustments in the attempt to meet these needs 
 are more varied and complex. This calls for a higher order 
 of conscious processes. 
 
 Among these higher conscious processes, one of the most 
 significant is thinking, of which we are to make a special 
 study. But before we can enter upon the details of this 
 investigation, we shall have to pause for some length of 
 time to develop more fully our point of view for the inter- 
 pretation of the facts which we shall discuss and for their 
 organization into one consistent whole. This will make 
 necessary some considerable preliminary study of the func- 
 tion of consciousness in general and of the manner in which 
 it becomes differentiated, specialized, and more highly 
 organized for the more efficient performance of its function. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE SENSORI-MOTOR CIRCUIT 
 
 1. Need of more detailed Study of the Reaction 
 
 Process. 
 
 If consciousness is to play any part in the concrete life of 
 the individual, if it is to have anything to do with adjust- 
 ment, then it must have some place within the reaction 
 process. From the biological point of view we must, then, 
 determine just where consciousness comes into the process 
 of reaction ; also under what conditions and with what sort 
 of function. This cannot be done without taking account of 
 some important principles of nervous action. 
 
 2. The Reaction Process in Terms of the Sensori- 
 
 motor Circuit. 
 
 We shall call the course which a nervous impulse takes 
 from the time that it originates in some sort of stimulus 
 affecting a sense organ until it results in some sort of 
 muscular movement, a sensori-motor circuit. The reaction 
 process properly includes the whole set of activities involved 
 in the completion of a sensori-motor circuit. It has its 
 sensory phase, including stimulus and ingoing nervous 
 impulse ; its phase of central redirection in the spinal cord 
 or the brain ; and its motor phase, including outgoing nerv- 
 ous impulse and muscular movement, or response. Con- 
 sciousness, if it comes in at all to modify reaction, functions 
 only in the phase of central redirection, and here only when 
 this redirection takes place in the higher centers of the 
 brain known as the cortex. 
 
The Sensori-Motor Circuit 23 
 
 3. Number of Types of Sensori-Motor Circuit. 
 
 The most casual student of the nervous system must 
 know how exceedingly complex it is and how intricately its 
 minute elementary structures, the neurones, connect with 
 one another. It must be expected, then, that in the varied 
 reactions of the complex human organism innumerable 
 sensori-motor circuits are involved. However, we may 
 roughly reduce them to three general types. These may 
 not be adequate in the explanation of all the details of 
 reaction, but they will help us to reduce to some sort of 
 intelligible system the bewildering complexities and intri- 
 cacies of nervous action. 
 
 4. The Use of Diagrams. 
 
 (i) Cautions against their misinterpretation. 
 
 In explaining the three general types of sensori-motor 
 circuit, we shall be greatly aided by the use of diagrams. 
 But we must keep constantly in mind that the diagrams 
 employed in the explanation of the activities of the nervous 
 system cannot represent facts of detail; they can only 
 schematize the most general principles. The diagrams 
 which follow are highly schematic, and they are drawn 
 purposely in such a way as to leave no room for supposing 
 that they are at all pictorial in character, not even in the 
 matter of conformity to the shape of the brain. No refer- 
 ence is made to the sympathetic system and its relation to 
 the cerebro-spinal system. No attempt is made to represent 
 the shape or the number of the neurones involved in a 
 reaction process, nor the precise manner of their intercon- 
 nection. For these facts, important as they are, the stu- 
 dent should consult some standard text in physiology or 
 neurology rather than expect them to be represented and 
 discussed here. It would take us beyond the compass and 
 purpose of this brief treatise to enter into the minute 
 details of the structure of the nervous system. Yet cer- 
 tain general ideas of its method of action are necessary to 
 
24 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 an understanding of the function of consciousness in the Hfe 
 of the organism. The diagrams given here will be helpful 
 if it is constantly kept in mind that they are not intended 
 to represent details of anatomy, but that they are intended 
 to represent in a schematic way only certain typical path- 
 ways, together with certain critical points of transfer of 
 nervous impulses, in the course of the complete sensori- 
 motor circuit. 
 
 (2) The diagrams and their terminology. 
 Z represents any, or all, of the cortical brain centers. 
 X represents any, or all, of the lower brain centers. 
 Bi, B2, etc., represent different levels of the spinal cord. 
 
 Ai, , An represent stimuli affecting sense organs and 
 
 setting up impulses which reach spinal cord or brain. 
 Ai-Bi represents an afferent impulse traveling to the cord 
 as a center; An-X represents an afferent impulse travel- 
 ing from eye, ear, or other higher sense organ to lower 
 brain center without going by way of the cord. 
 Bi-Ci, B2-C2, etc., represent efferent impulses traveling out 
 
 to muscles. 
 Ci, C2, etc., represent muscular responses. 
 The dotted cross lines are for schematic convenience only. 
 5. First Type of Sensori-Motor Circuit. 
 (See Diagram I). 
 (i) DeHnition. 
 
 In this type of sensori-motor circuit the transition from 
 sensory to motor phase, or the central redirection, is 
 effected in the spinal cord or in the medulla, an enlargement 
 of the spinal cord at its upper extremity. The first type of 
 circuit represents, then, the pathway of a nervous impulse 
 from sensory excitation to motor response by way of the 
 spinal cord or the medulla. The characteristic method of 
 reaction corresponding to this is commonly called reflex. 
 Illustrations of reflex action with the center of redirection 
 
The Sensori-Motor Circuit 
 
 25 
 
 :;^^°'-l 
 
 C2f 
 
26 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 in the cord are to be found in such cases as the sudden with- 
 drawal of the hand from the prick of a pin and the move- 
 ment of the foot of a sleeping person when it is tickled. 
 The medulla is the center of redirection for the so-called 
 "higher" reflexes, such as winking, sneezing, coughing, 
 vomiting, swallowing, etc. These are not to be confused 
 with automatic actions, such as breathing and beating of the 
 heart, which are also controlled by the medulla in large 
 part. 
 
 (2) Reference to the diagram. 
 
 In the diagram we have illustrated only that case of reflex 
 action in which the center of redirection is to be found in 
 the spinal cord. Ai-Bi-Ci represents the sensori-motor 
 circuit ordinarily involved in such a case. We shall sup- 
 pose that it is the response to the tickling of the foot. The 
 motor discharge would normally take place at the same 
 level in the cord as that at which the sensory impulse is 
 received, and it would normally go out on the same side, 
 that is, the foot which has been tickled would be with- 
 drawn. 
 
 It is possible, however, when there is some interference 
 with the more primary method of response, or when it fails, 
 for the nervous impulse to discharge from the spinal center 
 upon the opposite side. In this case, the other foot might 
 be used to rid one's self of the irritant. Or the impulse 
 might even travel up in the cord to a higher level and there 
 be discharged into a motor channel, — reflex act A1-B1-B3- 
 C3. For example, one might with his arm sweep away a 
 fly from his bare foot, if he were in a position such that he 
 could not dislodge the irritant by a movement of the foot 
 itself. In cases so complex as this, however, it is difficult 
 to suppose that the act is wholly reflex, particularly in 
 human beings. 
 
 (3) Significance, — mechanism for simple mechanical 
 movements. 
 
 Whether redirection of the nervous impulse takes place 
 
The Sensori^Motor Circuit 27 
 
 in the cord or in the medulla, the essential nature of the 
 sensori-motor circuit involved is the same. The connection 
 between the sensory neurones which bring the impulse in to 
 the center and the motor neurones which carry the impulse 
 out to the muscles is quite direct, the redirection at the cen- 
 ter is rather immediate, and the mode of reaction is rela- 
 tively simple. It has been proved by experiments upon 
 lower animals, in which the brain has been removed or 
 extirpated, that this lower circuit through the spinal cord 
 provides a mechanism adequate to the performance of all 
 the elementary muscular movements which are involved in 
 all the activities of the animal. But when these acts are 
 not influenced by any discharges of nervous impulse from 
 the brain downward into the cord, in other words when 
 they are purely reflex, they are totally lacking in sponta- 
 neity, or voluntariness, and they are as purely mechanical 
 and necessary in character as the movements of a machine 
 which are released by a spring or which are set free by the 
 pushing of a button. Indeed, the figure of speech, "press 
 the button and the machine will do the rest," would not be 
 inappropriate to apply to acts which involve only the first 
 type of sensori-motor circuit. • 
 
 (^) Place of consciousness in this circuit. 
 
 Properly speaking, consciousness has no place within the 
 first type of sensori-motor circuit. In reflex action, as we 
 might expect from the immediacy of central redirection, 
 consciousness does not intervene between stimulus and 
 response. Hence it cannot modify or control the reaction 
 in any respect. If consciousness does accompany the act 
 at all, it may be explained in either or both of two ways. 
 The nervous impulses set up by the movements of the 
 muscles while the action is taking place may travel to the 
 brain and we may feel the movements. That is, we may be 
 conscious of the fact that we are winking or that we are 
 withdrawing the hand from the prick of a pin, but at the 
 same time consciousness has had nothing to do with the 
 
28 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 production of these movements. Or it may be that some 
 of the original sensory impulse responsible for the reflex 
 act has spread upward to the brain and resulted in aware- 
 •ness of the stimulus, but before this has happened a much 
 larger portion of the current has been redirected from some 
 center in the cord and is already out on its way to produce 
 the muscular contraction. Thus, while we know that we 
 have been pricked by a pin, the consciousness of this fact 
 was not responsible for the movement ; for it did not come 
 soon enough. The central redirection into a motor channel 
 took place before the nervous current reached the centers 
 of consciousness in the brain. 
 
 6. Second Type of Sensori-Motor Circuit. 
 (See Diagram II). 
 
 (i) Definition: 
 
 This circuit is by way of the lower brain centers. At 
 various lower levels of the brain there are masses of gray 
 matter, among which are the optic thalami, the striate 
 bodies, and ganglia in the cerebellum, the pons, and the 
 medulla. These centers lie outside of the first circuit, but 
 through interconnections of neurones they receive impulses 
 from the sensory side of the first circuit and transfer them 
 to its motor side. This longer route for nervous impulses 
 by way of the lower brain centers through a loop, as it 
 were, added to the first circuit, is what we mean by the 
 second type of sensori-motor circuit. 
 
 (2) Reference to the diagram. 
 
 A stimulus originating at Ai may generate an impulse 
 which reaches the cord at the level of Bi. Instead of dis- 
 charging at this level, it may travel upward to the centers 
 at X. Now from X, pathways run down to all the levels 
 of the cord. Hence there is this added possibility not 
 o£fe'red by the first type of circuit, namely, that impulses 
 may discharge from the centers at X simultaneously to 
 touch off the responses Ci, C2, C3 all at the same time, 
 
The S ensori-M otor Circuit 29 
 
 thus combining them into one complex act. Or, the im- 
 pulses may be discharged from the centers at X succes- 
 sively to touch off the responses Ci, C2, C3, etc., one after 
 another in some given order, thus producing a complex 
 reaction process made up of a series of interrelated acts no 
 one of which may necessarily have any significance in itself 
 and yet the whole series be admirably adapted to the attain- 
 ment of some useful end or the performance of some 
 important function. 
 
 (3) Significance, — mechanism for complex, organized, 
 mechanical reactions. 
 
 The lower brain centers, according to prevailing theory, 
 control complex and coordinated activities of various sorts, 
 such as the instinctive and the habitual. For the perform- 
 ance of this function they seem admirably adapted. From 
 the fact that the lower brain centers may discharge into all 
 the dififerent centers of the cord and thus touch off several 
 elementary motor processes at the same time or in succes- 
 sion, the coordination and organization of activity is made 
 possible. But these lower brain centers may also receive 
 sensory impulses from every sensory surface, hence we 
 have the possibility of the most delicate coordination of 
 every sort of sensory impression with every sort of motor 
 response. And muscular activity may be coordinated not 
 alone with the activities of a single sense organ, say the 
 eye, but also with the activities of all the sense organs, — 
 those of touch, hearing, etc., — all at the same time or 
 within the compass of the same situation. All the sensory 
 impressions that are relevant in a given situation, and all 
 the muscular movements that are useful, may work together 
 in one large organization of activity in which they are 
 properly adjusted to one another to make the whole method 
 of reaction one which is very highly adaptive. 
 
 Experiments upon animals, in which the higher brain 
 centers have been removed or extirpated, confirm the view 
 that the control of coordinated and organized motor 
 
30 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 processes is through the activities of the lower brain cen- 
 ters which are brought into play in the second type of 
 sensori-motor circuit. Mr. James cites experiments made 
 upon frogs in which the frog deprived of the use of his 
 higher brain centers could perform every complex act of 
 which the normal frog was capable.^ He could walk, 
 jump, turn over from his back, swim, croak, etc. But the 
 same experiments show that the acts of this frog were 
 perfectly mechanical. They occurred under stimulation 
 and only when the stimulus was given. There was nothing 
 spontaneous or voluntary about them. The frog was noth-" 
 ing but a complex machine. "Touch the right button" and 
 a certain act would occur inevitably. The act might be 
 very complex, but the complexity was one which had been 
 already built up and established ; the organization of the 
 response had been previously perfected and had become 
 a part of the mechanism of the animal. Such acts may be 
 very highly adaptive, but they are nevertheless mechanical. 
 In the lives both of lower animals and of man a very large 
 number of the complex acts of ordinary life which are 
 adapted to ends are of this mechanical sort produced by 
 currents of nervous energy which take the course of the 
 second type of sensori-motor circuit. They are modes of 
 f eaction which are instinctive and determined by heredity ; 
 or which are habitual, having been built up and perfected 
 in their organization in the lifetime of the individual. 
 
 (4) Place of consciousness in this circuit. 
 
 In man, both instinctive and habitual acts, while they 
 are dominantly under the control of the lower brain cen- 
 ters and are thus mechanical in character, are not likely to 
 be entirely free from the determining influence of con- 
 sciousness. But in many cases, as will be shown in detail 
 in a later chapter,^ consciousness enters only to play the 
 part of the most organic and automatic aspects of sense 
 
 'James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 92-96. 
 ' See Chapter VII. 
 
The Sensori-Motor Circuit 31 
 
 perception and associative memory. In a sort of organic 
 fashion, as distinguished from ideational, the sense percep- 
 tion processes are brought into very delicate accord with 
 motor processes in a way that is very significant for the 
 process of adjustment between organism and environment. 
 
 7. The Third Type of Sensori-Motor Circuit. 
 (See Diagram III). 
 
 (i) Deftnition. 
 
 This circuit is by way of the higher, or cortical, brain 
 centers. These are the centers which are known to func- 
 tion in connection with conscious processes and voluntary 
 action. The connection of the cortical centers with the 
 lower brain centers forms an additional "loop." Sensory 
 impulses transferred from centers in the cord to lower 
 brain centers may pass upward from these to the cortex, 
 and motor impulses may travel downward from the cortex 
 either directly to the lower brain centers or directly to 
 centers in the cord. When impulses originating in a 
 stimulus to some sense organ ultimately pass through the 
 cortical centers before they produce their muscular response, 
 no matter how many intervening transfers of nervous 
 energy may have been made, their route is that of the third 
 type of sensori-motor circuit. 
 
 (2) Reference to the diagram. 
 
 In the diagram, to avoid too great complexity in one 
 figure, we have not represented the full "loop" from X to 
 Z and back from Z to X or to some B. We have repre- 
 sented only the downward, or motor, pathways. On the 
 motor side of this circuit, it is very significant that there 
 are two types of connection of the cortical centers with 
 lower centers. The impulse from Z, whether it originates 
 in other brain activities or results from a sensory impulse 
 due to excitation of a sense organ, may discharge directly 
 down into the centers at X, or it may discharge directly 
 down into some center B in the spinal cord without being 
 
32 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 redirected at X. Now, if the centers at Z discharge into 
 those at X, then they touch off the mechanism which con- 
 trols an already existing coordination of activity, — for 
 example, the complex act represented by C1-C2-C3. But 
 the centers at Z may discharge directly into some spinal 
 center, say B5, thus producing the isolated or relatively 
 simple reaction C5. Now it is evident that if Z should dis- 
 charge into both X and B5 at the same time, or in imme- 
 diate succession, there would arise a new complex of 
 activity in which C5 would be combined with C1-C2-C3, 
 making a new organization of activity C1-C2-C3-C5. Or, 
 if an inhibiting impulse should be sent down directly from 
 Z into B2 at the same time that X were touched off, then 
 the muscular process C2 might be withdrawn from the 
 coordination C1-C2-C3, and we would have the modified 
 reaction C1-C3. The centers at Z might also play down 
 upon different centers at X, controlling different coordina- 
 tions of activity, and thus new combinations could be made 
 of already existing complex motor adjustments. 
 
 (3) Significance, — mechanism for variation and recon- 
 struction of reactions. 
 
 The function of the third type of sensori-motor circuit 
 has been seen roughly through symbolic illustrations. Let 
 us now interpret this in the concrete. It may be possible 
 that for certain purposes the movements of the fingers of 
 the hand are well coordinated. The coordination is already 
 established and works smoothly. If so, the impulse from 
 the cortex originating in a single idea may set off the whole 
 complex of activity through discharging into the appro- 
 priate lower brain center which controls that particular 
 coordination of motor processes. The reaction would then 
 take place mechanically upon the mere thought of it. But 
 suppose that there is need for the thumb to be brought into 
 coordination with the fingers. Then additional discharges 
 of nervous energy may be sent down from the cortex 
 directly to the center in the cord which controls the activity 
 
The Sensori-Motor Circuit 33 
 
 of the thumb at the same time that the discharge is sent 
 down from the cortex indirectly to the fingers through the 
 center of control in the lower brain. Thus coordination of 
 the activities of thumb and fingers is brought about. When 
 this coordination is once thoroughly mastered, its control 
 tends to drift downward into the lower brain centers and 
 thus to become mechanical. In like manner, through com- 
 bined action of the cortical and the lower brain centers, the 
 complex activity of walking may be modified so as to serve 
 the purpose of propelling a bicycle. And the person who 
 has learned to play a piano or an organ may learn to coor- 
 dinate with the activity of the hands in this process also the 
 activity of the feet in playing the pipe organ. And the 
 child who can scribble may learn how to control the move- 
 ments in such a way as to write or draw. 
 
 The significance, then, of the fact that currents of nerv- 
 ous energy which originate in any part may pass through 
 the cortical centers before draining out into motor channels 
 is to be found in the possibilities afforded of variation and 
 change. By adding and subtracting muscular elements, or 
 even complexes of elements, reaction processes can be 
 indefinitely reconstructed. New coordinations can be set 
 up and all sorts of variations can be introduced into old 
 cocjrdir itions of activity. Thus we have in our modes of 
 reaction spontaneity, variety, change, as over against 
 mechanical necessity. This, of course, makes for greater 
 delicacy of adjustment as well as for continued growth in 
 control. 
 
 (4) Place of consciousness in this circuit. 
 
 The cortical centers involved in the third type of sensori- 
 motor circuit include those which function in terms of 
 conscious processes and those which function in terms of 
 motor discharge. The significance of this will be worked 
 out in more detail in a later chapter.^ But it is evident 
 from the facts of anatomy and of function stated that con- 
 
 • See Chapter IV. 
 3 
 
34 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 sciousness may enter into this circuit at the point of central 
 redirection in the cortex. It is in the voluntary processes 
 of organizing and controlling reactions that consciousness 
 functions vitally in terms of all its particular forms. 
 
 8. Recapitulation and Comparison of the Significance 
 
 OF THE Three Types of Sensori-Motor Circuit. 
 
 The first type of sensori-motor circuit makes possible all 
 the elementary muscular movements involved in the process 
 of adjustment, but it ties these down to a very close and 
 immediate connection with their stimuli. The centers in 
 the spinal cord are a sort of "keyboard" upon which incom- 
 ing impulses play individually to produce mechanically 
 every distinct kind of simple movement. 
 
 The second type of circuit makes possible organized and 
 coordinated activity of a highly complex and adaptive char- 
 acter. The lower brain centers touch off certain established 
 complexes of motor processes, either hereditary or habitual, 
 but these then occur mechanically with little room for vari- 
 ation and flexibility of response. 
 
 The third type of circuit is the physiological basis of the 
 most important power of the human organism, namely, 
 spontaneity and variation of response. This makes it pos- 
 sible to meet complex and varying needs in the midst of an 
 ever changing environment and to secure a delicacy of indi- 
 vidual adjustment which could not be provided by methods 
 of reaction determined wholly by heredity. 
 
 9. Unity and Interdependence of the Three Types of 
 
 Circuits. 
 
 The three types of sensori-motor circuits which we have 
 been discussing are not to be thought of as acting inde- 
 pendently of one another. The nervous system is one com- 
 plete whole of most delicately related parts. Its action is 
 essentially dynamic. An impulse entering at any point has 
 a tendency to diffuse rapidly through the whole system, 
 
The Sensori-Motor Circuit 35 
 
 though the extent, or degree, of diffusion is limited by the 
 fact that certain easier lines of discharge than others are 
 determined by racial heredity or by habit. 
 
 In complex reactions the most remote parts of the nervous 
 system may function harmoniously in the determination of 
 the response. All three of the sensori-motor circuits may 
 be employed at the same time in the reaction processes 
 involved in what we often consider a single act, — say, for 
 example, in batting the ball in a game of baseball. The 
 successful hit calls for the most delicate coordination of 
 the eye-activities and the muscular processes involved in 
 swinging the club into the right position. Sense judgment 
 and motor reaction are practically instantaneous and auto- 
 matic at the moment that the ball leaves the pitcher's hand. 
 But this same reaction involves cortical activities with their 
 accompanying thought processes in taking account of the 
 position of men on bases in their relation to the kind of 
 thing that the batter ought to do in this particular case. 
 While all this is occurring, reflex activities essential to this 
 whole reaction may be going on. Examples of this are 
 the reflex acts involved in protecting the eyes from the 
 entrance of dust or minute insects and those involved in the 
 right focusing of the eyes with reference to the light. 
 
 The illustration just given shows the most intricate inter- 
 dependence and cooperation of the three types of sensori- 
 motor circuit in the actual process of adjustment. How- 
 ever much, then, we may later make of the significance of 
 conscious processes in the adaptation between organism 
 and environment, we cannot get a true conception of its 
 place and function except as we take account of the con- 
 tributory and related mechanical factors that are involved. 
 In general, we may say that in the learning of new things 
 the higher centers, involving consciousness, would function 
 most actively, with a tendency for control to drift down- 
 ward into the lower centers of the brain when any mode of 
 activity is mastered ; but no control that is attained through 
 
36 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 learning probably ever drifts downward as far as the cen- 
 ters of the cord which are responsible for reflex action. 
 And it is likewise probable that little of the mechanical 
 type of action that is the result of preceding voluntary 
 processes ever gets completely out from under the influence 
 of consciousness as it functions in the third type of circuit. 
 But, with the drifting downward of control from higher to 
 lower brain centers, the higher centers are left free to 
 employ their energy in meeting still further new needs, or, 
 in terms of the accompanying conscious processes, the 
 mind controls the learned activities with a minimum of 
 attention and is left freer to devote itself to that which is 
 still new and problematic. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapter III 
 Angell, Psychology, Ch. II. 
 O'Shea, Education as Adjustment, pp. 78-83. 
 
 Consult chapters on the nervous system in any of the standard 
 texts in Psychology or Physiology. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE SIGNIFICANCE AND FUNCTION OF 
 CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 1. The Functional View of Consciousness. 
 
 It has already been intimated that the conscious processes 
 are intimately bound up with the activities of the cortical 
 centers. We know from abundant evidence, which need 
 not be given here, that this is true. Is it an accidental fact 
 that these are at the same time the centers which function 
 in terms of consciousness and in terms of variation and 
 reconstruction of reaction processes? If we take the 
 biological point of view, we can hardly regard the coin- 
 cidence as one without any functional significance ; for we 
 have come to view all special characteristics of an organism 
 as interrelated and as functioning together within one whole 
 for the furthering and maintaining of the life process. 
 Though we may not be able to explain satisfactorily either 
 to the materialist or to the idealist the ultimate relation be- 
 tween conscious processes and the physiological processes 
 of the brain, yet we may consistently hold that the two 
 sets of activities are functionally related. In the third type 
 of sensori-motor circuit, cortical activities and conscious 
 processes are functionally related as inseparable phases of 
 one whole of adjustment activity the perfection of which 
 demands both. 
 
 2. Consciousness the Factor of Variation and Recon- 
 
 struction OF Reaction. 
 Conscious processes fall within the process of reaction 
 only at the point of central redirection of impulses. We 
 have seen that they come into that particular sensori-motor 
 
 37 
 
38 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 circuit in which the central redirection occurs in the cortex, 
 a mechanism which affords the largest possibility of varia- 
 tion and reconstruction of motor responses. This ought to 
 suggest to us that if we are trying to interpret the special 
 significance and function of consciousness, we should view 
 it as par excellence the factor of variation of reactions 
 whereby reconstructions are efifected and new and more per- 
 fect adjustments between the organism and its environment 
 are attained. 
 
 3. Conditions of Consciousness. 
 
 If consciousness is the factor of variation and reconstruc- 
 tion of reactions, then we should naturally not expect it to 
 appear in the life of an organism except where variation is 
 on the one hand possible and on the other needed or useful. 
 There are classes of organisms of the lower type whose 
 modes of reaction are practically fixed at birth or very soon 
 after birth. They are capable of little or no modification. 
 The methods of activity of these organisms have been 
 organized in advance of their actual experience of needs 
 into modes of procedure, called instinctive, which are 
 adapted to the realization of certain groups of fundamental 
 needs common to the species and which can be met, or sat- 
 isfied, in an environment of a certain kind. In so far as 
 these modes of reaction are fixed, they are under the con- 
 trol of the lower brain centers, and there is no chance for 
 consciousness to function in their reconstruction; in so far 
 as they meet the needs of the organism, mechanically there 
 is no need of consciousness. Organisms in which this sort 
 of predetermined adjustment can be at all adequate are 
 limited to very simple and very general classes of needs. 
 If their fixed modes of reaction fail to meet these needs 
 at any time, they have no remedy, but must inevitably 
 perish. 
 
 We conclude, then, that if already organized and existing 
 modes of reaction, whether reflex, instinctive, or habitual, 
 
Significance and Function of Consciousness 39 
 
 fail to meet the needs of the organism, this is the condition 
 either for the appearance of consciousness,'^ or for the more 
 active functioning of conscious processes, provided always 
 that there is sufficient plasticity of the organism to permit 
 of modification and reconstruction of its motor processes. 
 4. Special Application to the Human Being. 
 
 (i) Man's special need of conscious processes. 
 
 The human being furnishes most fully of all living crea- 
 tures the precise conditions for the appearance and func- 
 tioning of consciousness in a very large degree in his life. 
 He is born exceedingly plastic in structure, and this plasti- 
 city continues through a very long period of infancy and 
 even into maturity. This makes the possibility of variation 
 from predetermined modes of activity very great. Another 
 necessary consequence of this remarkable plasticity is that 
 at the outset the individual cannot have many definitely 
 organized modes of reaction. The chicken can within a 
 day or two pick at a crumb with great accuracy and pre- 
 cision. But the small child cannot at several years of age 
 eat a piece of bread and butter without smearing his face. 
 And the child of kindergarten age has great difficulty in 
 putting on his wraps and in buttoning his clothes. The 
 human being starts out with an exceedingly limited num- 
 ber of things which he can do ; almost everything has to be 
 learned. He has few established motor coordinations in 
 the form of instinctive modes of reaction. He has many 
 tendencies to action, which we may call impulses rather 
 than instincts.^ His needs cannot be met by organized 
 modes of activity determined in advance by heredity. 
 From the very start his natural equipment fails to meet his 
 demands, and in so far as they are not anticipated by 
 parental love, there is the demand for the functioning of 
 consciousness to organize and control his activities in such 
 ways as to satisfy his natural impulses. 
 
 '■ Cf. Angell, Psychology, pp. 63-66. 
 
 ^ See Chapter VII for discussion of impulse and instinct 
 
40 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 (2) Possibility of Great Delicacy of Adjustment. 
 
 The human being starts out more helpless than any other 
 animal, but he has the advantage in the long run. Because 
 he starts out with fewer definitely instinctive modes of be- 
 havior, organized and determined in advance, or in the 
 mere process of physical growth, and consequently expresses 
 his natural tendencies in terms of more elementary muscular 
 processes, aimless, uncoordinated, and unorganized ; he has 
 left to him the possibility of organizing his modes of reac- 
 tion in his own lifet-me in the light of his own specific 
 experiences and in such forms as will meet his particular 
 needs. An analogy may help to make this point clear. 
 When a building comes into your possession as an inher- 
 itance, it may be roughly adapted to your needs, but in so 
 far as it is not so adajDted, it is very difficult to modify it to 
 suit your needs in any very delicate and thoroughgoing 
 fashion. But if you were given the elements of the struc- 
 ture, the bricks and the timbers and the boards, you could 
 combine them in ways to suit yourself and make the rising 
 structure one which should be more specifically adapted to 
 meet your needs. While this analogy is too mechanical to 
 be applied closely, yet it will give an idea of what we mean 
 by saying that the human being, starting with more ele- 
 mentary, uncoordinated, and unorganized reaction processes, 
 can through the function of consciousness ultimately organ- 
 ize his methods of action in such ways as will put him mto 
 more delicate adjustment with his environment than would 
 be possible on the basis of a larger inheritance of already 
 organized reaction processes. 
 
 5. Consciousness the Factor of Individual Control. 
 
 (i) The idea of control. 
 
 What we have already said about the function of con- 
 sciousness has involved implicitly something of the idea of 
 control over the environment. Particularly what has been 
 said about the more delicate individual adjustment effected 
 
Significance and Function of Consciousness 41 
 
 through the conscious processes of the human being has 
 implied the thought of individual control. As the idea of 
 control is essential to the movement of our thought as a 
 whole, it may be well to work it out more explicitly at this 
 point. 
 
 a. Adjustment not involving control. 
 
 Adjustment involves change of some sort. Some adjust- 
 ments are afifected primarily through changes of a physio- 
 logical and structural nature in the organism itself. Such 
 is the case when the animal grows a thicker coat of 
 hair and puts on a heavier layer of fat in the autumn and is 
 thus adjusted to the severer cold of winter. Most of the 
 special adjustments of lower animal life are of this char- 
 acter. Permanent changes have been wrought in structure 
 through a series of generations by the process of natural 
 selection, which have made the animals better adapted to 
 live in their specific environment. Or the modification may 
 be one which is due to temporary causes, as in the case of 
 the hardening of the skin on the hands of the laboring man, 
 which adapts him to the task of handling rough things with- 
 out harm to the delicate structures lying below the outer 
 skin. 
 
 Now change itself is not identical with control, even 
 when adjustment is affected. In these cases of adjust- 
 ment through physiological and structural change in the 
 organism itself we do not have what we are going to call 
 cases of control. If there could properly be said to be 
 control involved, we should have to locate the control 
 primarily in the environment. The environment here is the 
 compelling factor and the organism always yields to some 
 extent whatever be the method of adjustment. 
 
 b. Meaning of control. 
 
 But there are types of adjustment in which the change 
 effected is primarily a change wrought in the environment. 
 The organism is the compelling factor and the environment 
 yields, undergoing such reconstruction as may be necessary 
 
42 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 for the well-being of the organism. In these cases we have 
 what we shall call control over the environment by the 
 organism; the organism is a controlling factor in the process 
 of adjustment. 
 
 (2) Kinds of control. 
 
 a. Racial control. 
 
 The control which the organism exercises may be of 
 either of two typical kinds, — racial control or individual 
 control. The instinctive acts of animals furnish the best 
 illustrations of racial control. The squirrel does not take 
 the winter environment just as it is and adjust himself to it, 
 but he introduces into it certain modifications. In the fall 
 he gathers nuts and stores them away in places which shall 
 be more convenient for him, and is thus supplied with food 
 under different conditions than those of the natural winter 
 environment. The beaver does not take nature as it is, but 
 he introduces extensive changes into his environment. He 
 builds dams, cuts ditches, fells trees, etc. Thus he modifies 
 the conditions of his environment and compels it to meet his 
 needs more adequately. 
 
 While there may be afforded through instinctive action 
 quite a wide sphere of control by the organism over the 
 environment, yet the nature of this control is primarily 
 racial in character. It is nothing that is inherent in the 
 individual as such, representing his personal achievement. 
 It has been acquired by the species in the process of natural 
 evolution, and as it operates in the life of any particular 
 member of the species it is dependent primarily upon the 
 special organization of his nervous system and of his body 
 as a whole. Such control as is exercised is effected through 
 inherited methods of reaction, rather than those which have 
 been determined by the experience of the individual. This 
 is one reason why progress is slow, if not a wholly negligible 
 quantity, in all species below the human. 
 
 b. Individual control. 
 
 The human being exercises control over the environment 
 
Significance and Function of Consciousness 43 
 
 in the process of satisfying his needs not by using methods 
 of reaction which are determined wholly in their organiza- 
 tion by heredity, but which are subject to great modification 
 by consciousness. In so far as consciousness is the dominant 
 factor in the determination of motor responses, the control 
 is individual rather than racial in character. Even where 
 modes of control are the same among human beings, yet 
 they may be highly individual in character. Their form is 
 not determined by heredity but by the solution of the same 
 problem in the same way. And where likeness is due to 
 imitation, this is a social fact rather than a racial one, and 
 it may represent a strong individual element in so far as it 
 involves choice and the consciousness of the relevancy of 
 the particular mode of procedure to the attainment of indi- 
 vidual ends. 
 
 The human race did not come through racial heredity 
 into the use of tools, or of fire, or of steam and electricity 
 in its attempt to control the environment for the satisfaction 
 of its needs. While these achievements may have had in 
 them accidental elements, yet they are due primarily to the 
 functioning of consciousness. And the individuals of one 
 generation may, even within the period of a decade, mod- 
 ify extensively their modes of life, as in the case of the 
 application of electricity to the problems of lighting and 
 transportation. 
 
 But even within the confines of the same social group, 
 individuals may vary widely from one another in their 
 modes of adjustment. Each one may be specifically ad- 
 justed to the world in which he lives in a variety of ways 
 that are peculiar to himself, and which satisfy more fully 
 the peculiar needs or exigencies of his individual life. 
 Racial control brings about adjustments which meet only 
 general classes of needs common to all the members of a 
 certain species; individual control is more varied, bringing 
 about greater delicacy of adjustment to meet the needs 
 which are peculiar to the individual. 
 
44 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 The great problem of the organism is the attainment of 
 control over the environment. The acme of achievement 
 in this direction is individual control. This is of incalcu- 
 lable biological significance. It increases the possibility of 
 self-maintenance immeasurably above that of the lower 
 animals which do not possess it. In the greater delicacy of 
 adjustment which it effects between the individual and his 
 environment, whereby his individual needs are satisfied, it 
 makes life something that is richer in personal values and 
 hence more worth maintaining. It is the most significant 
 function of consciousness to make possible the attainment 
 of individual control. Indeed, the whole history of civiliza- 
 tion may be written in terms of the progressive realization, 
 through the use of his mental powers, of man's increasing 
 control over the forces of his environment and the more 
 perfect adaptation, both social and individual, which has 
 resulted therefrom. 
 
 6. Summary of the Function of Consciousness. 
 
 We have seen that where already organized modes of 
 reaction meet the needs of the organism, consciousness does 
 not intervene. Consciousness is the factor of variation and 
 of change. It reconstructs old modes of action and organ- 
 izes new ones to meet needs that cannot otherwise be met. 
 Consciousness is the pioneer, the scout, always concerning 
 itself with the new and unattained. It is continually con- 
 quering new realms of action and adding them to that which 
 has already been brought under control. 
 
 But not only is consciousness the factor of variation and 
 reconstruction of reactions, it is also the great factor of 
 individual control. Through it we are freed from the 
 tyranny of racial heredity and are able to meet the exigen- 
 cies of the world in which we live in terms of our own ex- 
 perience. Consequently one generation may make progress 
 beyond the achievements of its ancestors, and the individual 
 may establish modes of reaction which adjust him very 
 
Significance and Function of Consciousness 45 
 
 delicately to his environment in ways that satisfy and 
 emphasize that class of needs which are peculiar to himself 
 as an individual. Progress and personality, these are the 
 great fruits of conscious, or individual, control. 
 
 7. Conclusion. 
 
 In closing this chapter, we might point out the difference 
 between the older interpretation of evolution and the line 
 of thought which we have been developing here. The 
 Spencerian formula makes evolution consist in the process 
 of more perfect adaptation of the inner factors to the outer, 
 in other words, of the adaptation of the organism to the 
 environment. There is a newer view, with which our line 
 of thought is in harmony, but which has perhaps not been 
 so strongly stated elsewhere as it is here. We have practi- 
 cally reversed the Spencerian formula and made evolution 
 culminate in the attainment of control of the organism over 
 the environment, in other words, the adaptation of the en- 
 vironment to the organism. This is made possible through 
 the functioning of the conscious processes, which reach 
 their culmination in the thinking of man. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapter IV , 
 
 Angell, Psychology, Ch. III. 
 
 Home, The Philosophy of Education, Ch. II, especially pp. 30 
 34 and 48-54- 
 
 O'Shea, Education as Adjustment, pp. 84-93, 99-104. 
 
 Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, Part II, Chs. XVI, XXI, 
 XXII. 
 
 Mr. Fiske here gives the first modern scientific formulation 
 
 of the meaning and significance of prolonged human infancy. 
 
 The same thought in simpler form may be found in his Excur- 
 sions of an Evolutionist, Ch. XII, pp. 306-19, and also in Butler's 
 
 Meaning of Education, pp. 6-17, 31-2. 
 
 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 4. 193-4 i70-4- 
 
 James, Talks to Teachers, Ch. HI. 
 
 Chamberlain, The Child, Ch. I. 
 
 Kirkpatrick, Fundamentals of Child Study, pp. 3-7- 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 DIFFERENTIATION AND ORGANIZATION OF 
 CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 1. Nature of the First Consciousness. 
 
 The child's first consciousness is a vague, undifferentiated 
 whole, formless and relatively void.^ The human being 
 may come into the world with some quite definite tenden- 
 cies to action ; but he brings with him no inherited knowl- 
 edge. Everything which affects his senses is new and 
 strange. Nothing can be discriminated from anything 
 else. The truth of this can be seen by inference from adult 
 experience. When we adults come into the presence of 
 that which is new and strange, we have no specialized power 
 of apprehending it as such. If we enter a factory, with 
 all its mass of whirring and flying machinery, our minds 
 are dazed and confused. Our first impression, however, is 
 a total one of some sort. We do not get separate impres- 
 sions which are later put together to form the whole. We 
 get a vague total impression first. If the adult's conscious- 
 ness in presence of the new and strange is thus a vague, 
 undifferentiated whole, how much more should we expect 
 this to be true in general of the consciousness of the baby 
 to whom the whole world is new ! 
 
 2. General Principle of Mental Development. 
 (i) Statement of the principle. 
 
 Consciousness becomes differentiated and organised in 
 the process of organising and controlling activities. The 
 specialization of consciousness goes hand in hand with the 
 attitudes which our experiences impel, us to take toward 
 
 'James, Psychology, Briefer Course, p. i6. 
 d6 
 
Organisation of Consciousness 47 
 
 things and the modes of behavior which we employ in 
 meeting our needs more adequately. 
 
 (2) Illustrations. 
 
 The child differentiates his mother's face and his mother's 
 voice out from the vague background of his conscious 
 experience in the process of trying to control his activities 
 with reference to the meeting of his needs of food and 
 creature comfort. His percept ball as something round, 
 or rolling, becomes definite through his actual experiences 
 of trying to control the ball as a plaything. He is burned 
 with the fire, and his memory becomes differentiated as a 
 phase of consciousness which makes use of past experiences 
 in the control of present acts in such a way as to avoid get- 
 ting burned again. He is interested in getting good things 
 to eat. Under the stress of this interest, it is useful to 
 remember where he has found the candy, the cake, etc. 
 In the attempt to so control his activities as to satisfy his 
 needs, memory is differentiated as a special function which 
 meets needs not met by perception. 
 
 Applying the same line of thought to our illustration 
 from adult life, we might say that so long as there is no 
 interest, either theoretical or practical, which impels us to 
 get a more definite impression of the factory, that impres- 
 sion will remain vague. But suppose that we are obliged 
 to take some attitude toward the machinery from the fact 
 that we are to work in the factory. Then the mind begins 
 to observe. Analysis and discrimination take place. We 
 notice belts and wheels and pulleys, etc. And these we 
 see in their relation to one another. Thus we get' a differ- 
 entiated consciousness of the factory. But it is also the 
 consciousness of the whole, — a reconstructed whole which 
 is definite, clear, and well organized as compared with the 
 first impression. 
 
 (^) Further interpretation. 
 
 Without illustrating further, we may say that it is the 
 view of functional psychology that just as in these cases 
 
48 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 so it is with all the specific conscious processes, their dif- 
 ferentiation, organization, and development are necessarily- 
 involved in the process of more adequately controlling expe- 
 riences, j Consciousness, as we have seen, is to be viewed as 
 the factor of variation and control of action. ( It must, then, 
 ■assume forms adapted to the kind of work to be done. 
 The conscious processes which control our actions must be 
 developed with reference to the needs of the organism, and 
 they must be organized into such modes of mental procedure 
 as experience determines worth while in the actual process 
 of making adjustments. This may be made clearer by an 
 analogy. 
 
 (4) Analogy of the industrial processes. 
 
 Just as division of labor and the organization of indus- 
 trial processes are determined inside of the whole industrial 
 situation, the differentiations of structure and the organized 
 modes of procedure being strictly relevant to the needs of 
 that situation ; so with consciousness, its differentiations of 
 structure and its organized modes of activity fall within one 
 whole of adjustment activity in which conscious processes 
 are determined by the needs which have to be met. Or, 
 just as the making of tools falls within an industrial process 
 in which there is a need of them, and hence the form and 
 structure of the tools made are strictly relevant to the kind 
 of work to be done ;| so the differentiation and organization 
 of the various conscious processes falls within an adjust- 
 ment process in which there is a specific need of them, and 
 hence the form and structure of these mental processes are 
 strictly relevant to the kind of work which they are to do. 
 
 3. Doctrine of the Organic Circuit. 
 
 Just how it is that consciousness becomes differentiated 
 and organized in such ways as to give us mental tools 
 exactly suited to the control of our actions is a problem 
 that cannot be solved without getting a more complete view 
 of the reaction process than we have given up to this point. 
 
Organisation of Consciousness 49 
 
 (i) The reflex arc concept. 
 
 We have already analyzed the reaction process into its 
 dominant phases of sensory process, central redirection, and 
 motor process. The view of action as originating in some 
 stimulus and culminating in a corresponding motor re- 
 sponse, whether redirection of the impulse takes place in 
 the cord or in the brain, is sometimes known as the reflex 
 arc concept. It is essentially a view of action in cross- 
 section. Or, if you prefer another figure, it is an analysis 
 of a single pulse, or waye, or unit of action. Starting 
 rather arbitrarily with stimulus we follow the process 
 through to motor response and stop there. While this 
 analysis is useful in locating the place of consciousness 
 within an act that is already organized or that is being 
 modified by conscious processes already developed and 
 connected with it, yet it is a partial and incomplete analysis 
 of the relation between consciousness and action. It is 
 especially inadequate for the purpose of showing how con- 
 sciousness ever comes to intervene between stimulus and 
 response in such a way as to be capable of modifying action 
 in conformity with experience. To make this plain, we 
 need to push the analysis of action further. This we shall 
 do under the head of the concept of the organic circuit. 
 
 (z) The concept of the organic circuit. 
 
 The life process is not an aggregate of units of action. 
 Acts are not independent of one another within the stream 
 of life itself; hence we cannot get a complete account of 
 the process of adjustment in terms of the analysis of the 
 essential elements or phases within a unit of action. In the 
 life process itself motor and conscious processes are inex- 
 tricably interwoven and interdependent. From the study of 
 the reflex arc, it might be thought that the relation between 
 action and consciousness was one in which conscious 
 processes, intervening as they do in this arc between 
 stimulus and response, always preceded and exercised a 
 determining influence upon motor processes. But this is 
 4 
 
50 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 only a half truth. Motor processes may also precede and 
 determine conscious processes. The concept of the organic 
 circuit tries to make clear the mutually determining relation 
 of motor and conscious processes upon each other. This 
 relation can best be elaborated, and the underlying- thought 
 of the organic circuit best be made clear, through an 
 illustration. 
 
 a. The idea developed through an illustration. 
 When the baby's eyes rest upon some bright object, say 
 his red rubber ball, the stimulus sets up a nervous impulse 
 which reaches the visual tract in the cortex and results in 
 a vague consciousness of something present to sense, upon 
 which the impulsive motor response of reaching is likely 
 to follow. But when we have described this in terms of 
 afferent impulse resulting from stimulation of sense organ, 
 central redirection accompanied by vague consciousness, 
 and motor response, zve have not told the whole story. In 
 describing the reaction in terms of the reflex arc concept, 
 we have taken only a cross-section of the whole activity. 
 We have anal3rzed only one pulse of it. There is something 
 more involved which is very important from the organic 
 and dynamic aspect of the whole situation. When the child 
 reaches in response to the stimulus of the ball, he gets new 
 experiences which are registered in his consciousness. 
 There are involved in the reaching process a host of 
 muscular, or kinesthetic, sensations. Still further, if he 
 succeeds in getting the ball, the reaction brings with it as 
 an inseparable aspect the new sensations of touch, and the 
 emotional tone of consciousness is heightened by the plea- 
 sure of achievement. These kinesthetic and touch sensa- 
 tions involved in the successful response become stimuli to 
 further reaction to the ball in the form of playful man- 
 ipulation for the sake of securing again the pleasurable new 
 sensations of touch, movement, and added visual sensations, 
 or for the sake of the satisfaction which comes from the 
 exercise of a new field of control. Or the new experiences 
 
Organisation of Consciousness 51 
 
 registered in consciousness may be remembered and affect 
 reaction at some later time. If, in the process of manipu- 
 lating the ball, the child should accidentally squeeze it and 
 make it whistle, the act of squeezing the ball would not be 
 the end of the activity. It would involve further conse- 
 quences which would mark it as only a phase within a 
 larger whole of activity. A new conscious experience, very 
 highly toned emotionally, namely, that of hearing the 
 whistle, has come to the child. This serves as a stimulus 
 to the repetition of the act at the present time, or, if remem- 
 bered, to the renewal of the act at some other time when 
 the ball is found. 
 
 b. The figure of the spiral. 
 The illustration just worked out makes clear the idea 
 that the life process is not to be conceived in terms of an 
 aggregate of units of action which can be adequately 
 described in terms of stimulus and response. The muscular 
 response does not mark a distinct end of the reaction 
 process, but through its effect upon consciousness it may 
 become the stimulus to a new response. Within the reflex 
 arc, it is true that the stimulus may be followed by con- 
 scious processes which modify the response. But this 
 response may itself be freighted with a rich supply of new 
 sensory and emotional processes which in their return 
 modify consciousness. And when consciousness is thus 
 modified, it may become within another reflex arc a deter- 
 mining factor in further motor responses. Thus, if we take 
 activity in continuity, rather than as a series of reaction 
 units, we shall find the situation somewhat as follows : 
 stimulus — vague consciousness — response — -modified con- 
 sciousness — modified response — consciousness still further 
 modified — response still further modified, etc. This view 
 of action in continuity furnishes us with the conception of 
 an organic circuit in which motor and conscious processes 
 mutually determine each other. The successive circuits of 
 reaction form, as it were, a spiral of development marked 
 
52 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 at each successive turn of the spiral by more definite and 
 more perfect organisation of consciousness on the one hand 
 and of motor responses on the other. 
 
 c. Significance of the organic circuit in the process of 
 
 adjustment. 
 The concept of the reflex arc and that of the organic cir- 
 cuit are not contradictory, but supplementary. The former 
 gives us a useful analysis of reaction in cross-section, or, 
 if you prefer to put it that way, an analysis of a single unit 
 of reaction which reveals the elements in a reaction process. 
 The latter gives us an analysis of reaction in continuity, 
 which reveals the organic and dynamic interrelations of 
 conscious and motor processes. Only through the funda- 
 mental ideas of the organic circuit is it possible to see how 
 consciousness becomes specialized in such a manner as to 
 guide, direct, and control action in specific ways adapted to 
 meet the needs of the individual as they unfold in his expe- 
 rience with his particular environment. 
 
 In the life process, movements of some sort must precede 
 consciousness of these movements and of their results in 
 terms of value to the organism. The movements have been 
 the means of bringing into consciousness certain impressions 
 not otherwise obtainable. These impressions in turn may 
 be utilized in the memory and image processes for the better 
 control of the process of reaction. Further reaction may 
 still further modify consciousness, and so on. In this way 
 particular movements get closely correlated with particu- 
 lar conscious processes, and new impressions are being 
 constantly associated intimately with particular reactions. 
 Thus, the differentiation and organisation of conscioiis 
 processes goes hand in hand with, and is relevant to, the 
 differentiation and organisation of activity. Sensations 
 percepts, and images are made definite and rich through 
 the results of repeated and varied reactions to specific 
 things and specific situations, and they are at the same time 
 becoming better instruments for the manipulation and con- 
 
Organisation of Consciousness 53 
 
 trol of objects, or for the right determination of acts or 
 combinations of acts which shall best meet specific situations. 
 d. Consciousness a factor in self-determination. 
 In passing, it may be interesting to point out a rather 
 striking corollary of the doctrine of the organic circuit. 
 Consciousness comes in not only as the factor of variation 
 of individual responses, but through this power of vary- 
 ing responses, it may in part be determining of its own 
 development. Motor responses bring with them new 
 experiences. In varying responses, consciousness is deter- 
 mining in part what further stimulations are to affect the 
 senses. Through its control over movements, consciousness 
 virtually selects the stimuli which shall determine its own 
 further development. Thus interests, either natural or 
 acquired, may be promoted and developed. If I am inter- 
 ested in music, I do not merely wait for harmonious sounds 
 to occur, but I either go in search of them or I try to produce 
 them. As I control through my conscious processes the 
 movements which shall yield me harmonious sounds, I am 
 also controlling my own development and determining it in 
 that direction. In like manner I may control my own devel- 
 opment within certain l.imits in matters of morals and 
 aesthetics and intellectual power. And, in so far as I con- 
 trol my own development, I become a free being. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapter V 
 
 Angell, Psychology, Ch. Ill, especially pp. 62-69. 
 King, Psychology of Child Development, Chs. III-XI, especially 
 summaries on pp. 71-4, gp-ioo. See also pp. 11-12, 17-18. 
 O'Shea, Education as Adjustment, pp. 156-66. 
 Baldwin, Mental Development, pp. 114, 367-88. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 ORGANIC UNITY OF MENTAL AND MOTOR LIFE 
 
 In the preceding chapter we have seen that conscious 
 processes and motor processes are functionally related 
 within one organic circuit. Through the conception of the 
 organic circuit we are able to see how consciousness and 
 movement come into such relations with each other that 
 each becomes a factor in the differentiation and organization 
 of the other. The psychological and educational implica- 
 tions of such a doctrine are everywhere present. But it 
 may be conducive to clearness, and not irrelevant to our 
 later discussion of thinking, to formulate quite explicidy 
 some of the most important principles which the doctrine of 
 the organic circuit would emphasize. 
 
 I. The Unity and Continuity of Sensory and Motor 
 Processes. 
 
 The sensory and the motor impulse are phases of one con- 
 tinuous movement of nervous energy from a point of origin 
 in excitation to a point of delivery in muscujj^r apparatus. 
 They are aspects of a single reflex arc, or circuit. The fact 
 that the impulse may be delayed at the cortex and modified 
 by the results of past experience does not alter the truth 
 of this statement. Again, motor response is, as we have 
 seen, continuous with new sensation, thus completing an 
 organic circuit. 
 
 From this point of view, the old pedagogical principle, 
 "No impression without expression," needs to have added 
 to it for its completion, "and no expression without further 
 impress'ion." In fact, it is the tacit implication of the added 
 part which has made the old principle vital. Motor expres- 
 sion normally results in new sensory experiences which 
 
 54 
 
Organic Unity of Mental and Motor Life 55 
 
 modify and help to define original impressions. Manual 
 training and all manner of industrial activities in the school 
 bring the children into first-hand relation to hosts of facts 
 and principles which are the immediate outgrowth of the 
 activities themselves or which are involved in, or are neces- 
 sary to, their success. From this point of view manual 
 training and various expressive arts are probably much 
 more significant for education from their possible effects 
 upon the development of the conscious, or mental, processes 
 than from their effects on manual dexterity as such. 
 
 2. The Unity and Continuity of Sense Perception 
 (or Observation), Intellect (or Higher Psychical 
 Processes), and Motor Response. 
 
 (i) Functional continuity of observation with motor 
 processes. 
 
 We do not perceive equally all objects that affect the 
 senses. Perception is a matter of function ; percepts are 
 in response to some need, interest, or problem of the organ- 
 ism. As I come home from school, I can be said to perceive 
 very few of the trees along my route ; but there are two 
 silver birch trees which I always perceive with some degree 
 of distinctness. They are in front of the house in which I 
 live. I need io see them ; they are the sign by which I know 
 that I have arrived at the proper place to turn in from the 
 sidewalk to the house. The perception of these two trees 
 serves a useful function. It is a part of the process of 
 determining a particular motor process and is strictly 
 relevant to that process. So it is, as a rule, with all per- 
 cepts. They satisfy some need or are in response to some 
 interest, native or acquired. They belong in a circuit of 
 adjustment activity which should normally result in some 
 motor change. This change may be either direct or indirect. 
 In the case cited of the perception of the birch trees, the 
 perception process was directly related to the motor process. 
 In other cases it may be only indirectly related to the motor 
 
56 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 process through the modification or development of an 
 attitude of mind which in turn shall be determinative of 
 future acts. For example, my perception of a drunken 
 man may not function directly in the control of any present 
 act of mine ; but it may function in the determination of an 
 attitude of mind which shall make me decline to drink intox- 
 icating liquors when they are offered to me. 
 
 If the need which calls for perception processes is one 
 that has been met frequently in the past by the same mode 
 of reaction, then the connection between percept and 
 response is immediate ; the response is determined by habit 
 without calling forth any higher intellectual processes. 
 Take the ihustration of the two trees again. I have turned 
 in to my house so often upon perceiving these two silver 
 birch trees that now there is a very close association between 
 the perception of the trees and the act of turning in from 
 the street. Moreover, the mode of response has become 
 definite, if it was not so before. The act f olio wr imme- 
 diately upon the proper percept. Casual observation is 
 adequate without the need of any higher psychical processes. 
 
 (2) Functional continuity of observation with higher 
 psychical processes. 
 
 But perception does not always function thus smoothly, 
 and it may need to be supplemented by higher psychical 
 processes. If the situation is problematic, as, for example, 
 when I first moved into the house previously mentioned and 
 did not know its location thoroughly, perception alone was 
 inadequate to meet the needs of the situation confronting me 
 when I wished to find the way home. I had to supplement 
 the perception experience with definite memory processes 
 in which I called up elements of my previous experience to 
 verify my percepts before I dared to turn in with confidence 
 at the gate. In problematic situations, then, higher psychi- 
 cal processes may have to intervene between observation 
 and response to define and solve the problem, after which 
 response occurs in a more satisfactory and efficient manner. 
 
Organic Unity of Mental and Motor Life 57 
 
 (3) Observation processes absorbed in the higher 
 psychical. 
 
 The intellectual processes once called forth to meet the 
 needs of action do not always intervene between observation 
 and response. They may dominate and control observation. 
 Observation then becomes for the time being subservient to 
 intellectual processes of the higher order, or, to put it in 
 other words, observation is taken up into the higher psy- 
 chical processes to form an organic part of them. We may 
 use the illustration of the birch trees here also. If I had 
 difficulty in locating my house, my memory and thought 
 processes might be called very actively into play. Under 
 these conditions I would observe everything relating to the 
 solution of my problem more closely. If the idea of the sil- 
 ver birch trees appeared as the one most relevant to the 
 problem of locating my house, then my observation of silver 
 birch trees all along the street would probably become very 
 acute. Another illustration would be the case of the hunter 
 who has an idea that he is in the vicinity of the lair of a 
 wild animal. He begins, under the domination of that idea, 
 to search for tracks in the snow or for trails in the leaves, 
 and he is alert to catch and interpret every sort of noise 
 that may indicate the presence of the beast. Where there 
 is, as in these cases, a real problem; where higher psychical 
 processes are at work whose completion demands further 
 observation, then observation is most dynamic and vital. 
 What is true of life in this respect is true also of the obser- 
 vation processes of the schoolroom. 
 
 (4) Observation and intellection in continuity with motor 
 processes. 
 
 Thus far we have seen the continuity of perceptual pro- 
 cesses, with movement and also with higher psychical 
 processes, and we have seen the unity of the observation 
 processes with the intellectual in those cases in which the 
 intellectual processes take up the observation processes into 
 themselves as an organic part of the whole. Now, the 
 
58 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 interrelation and interdependence of these processes of 
 observation, intellection, and movement can be gotten at 
 from still another angle. Out of motor responses frequently 
 arise new problems, calling for further observation or for 
 further intellectual activities of the higher type, or for both. 
 The baby, who, in manipulating a box, accidentally pulls off 
 the cover, finds himself face to face with a new problem ; 
 and at once he begins to explore and to investigate and to 
 try to get the cover back on to the box. In the manual 
 training room, the child who has driven a nail into his board 
 in such a way as to split the wood is confronted with a 
 problem demanding investigation. He may now for the 
 first time see that the nail is more wedge shaped one way 
 than the other, and he may also observe that the wood which 
 he is using has such a characteristic as the grain. Whether 
 he has ever seen these things before or not, he now sees 
 them as facts with a significance as relevant to what he is 
 doing. And this mai<es them more vital. 
 
 In all departments of life is it not what we do that deter- 
 mines very largely what we shall see and what we shall 
 think about? If we are farmers, we observe cattle and 
 horses and crops and lands, and what we see suggests to us 
 new problems or variations of old ones. If we are artists, 
 the fact that we have to paint pictures or to carve statues 
 is constantly determining that we shall observe forms of 
 beauty and of harmony and that we Shall be finding in what 
 we do and what we see hosts of new problems for our 
 thoughts. In real life the need of doing things is central, 
 and processes of observation and of thought are organic 
 and dynamic phases of the process of activity. 
 
 3. The Fallacy of Isolating Observation, Intellec- 
 tion, AND Motor Response in Training. 
 
 Our illustrations and discussions have served to make 
 clear the point that in actual experience, viewing activity 
 in all its continuity and fluidity, the processes of observation. 
 
Organic Unity of Mental and Motor Life 59 
 
 intellection, and motor response are not isolable. They are 
 organically and dynamically related to one another, they 
 are inextricably interwoven from every point of view. 
 With whichever you start, you find the other two either 
 genetically or functionally implied and necessarily involved. 
 They are inseparable functional activities within one whole 
 of adjustment activity. If this is true, then it is pedagogi- 
 cally fallacious, because psychologically abnormal, to iso- 
 late any of these processes for separate training. To make 
 this point more specific we shall touch upon some of the 
 fallacious isolations to which school practice is liable. 
 
 (i) The isolation of observation processes. 
 
 The isolation of observation processes for separate train- 
 ing is abnormal ; for observation normally takes place in 
 relation to a problem, a need to be met, a something to be 
 done in a given situation. Observation, including the whole 
 process of getting facts at first hand, is very important, as 
 we shall see later,^ for the building up of right images and 
 the attainment of correct concepts. But observation should 
 proceed under the guidance and direction of some defimte 
 problem to which it is relevant. 
 
 Pestalozzi got hold of a very important principle which 
 needed special emphasis in his day when he insisted on the 
 training of his pupils in observation. But when he set them 
 to observing the cracks in the wall, that kind of observation 
 was lacking in vitality. If there had been some problem, 
 as for example, the question of whether the wall needed to 
 be replastered, or the question of whether the building was 
 settling, then there would have been some point in observ- 
 ing the number and character of the cracks in the wall. 
 Observation under these circumstances would be functional 
 and not merely formal. 
 
 There is not much sense in observing the pores on the 
 under side of a leaf unless the observation is related to the 
 problem of how the function of respiration is carried on. 
 
 ^ See Chapters XIII and XVII. 
 
6o The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 To observe that the north star is stationary or that the 
 magnetic needle always points north is of little significance 
 as a mere fact, unless it leads to the problem of finding 
 one's direction on the sea. It is well that the old-fashioned 
 object lessons which made observation an end in itself are 
 being rapidly relegated to the pedagogical scrap heap. To 
 conduct observation exercises when there is no problem out 
 of which observation springs or to the apprehension of 
 which it leads, violates the functional and dynamic nature of 
 observation processes within the whole mental life. 
 
 (2) The isolation of the intellectual activities. 
 
 The isolation of the intellectual, or higher psychical, pro- 
 cesses for separate training is abnormal. This is the great 
 fallacy of formal discipline. Formal discipline values cer- 
 tain subjects of study and certain modes of procedure for 
 the sake of the training which they are supposed to give to 
 some particular "faculty," such as memory, judgment, 
 reasoning, etc. 
 
 We would not deny that there are certain subjects of 
 study which are more suitable than others to call into play 
 to a large degree certain functional activities of the mmd. 
 There is no doubt that Latin gives a splendid field for the 
 accurate and careful discrimination of the meaning of 
 terms and that mathematics is well adapted to the training 
 of the thinking powers. But to study these subjects merely 
 for the sake of this training without any regard for the 
 social and practical values inherent in them is to isolate the 
 intellectual activities from the larger whole within which 
 they would function normally and to make of them merely 
 formal practice. 
 
 Formal exercises designed primarily for the exercise of 
 this or that particular mental "faculty" ignore the principle 
 of the organic and dynamic continuity of all the mental pro- 
 cesses with one another and with action. Intellectual activ- 
 ities that are to be vital must arise out of some problematic 
 situation in which they function to meet the demands of the 
 
Organic Unity of Mental and Motor Life 6i 
 
 occasion, and they must somehow determine either the 
 present motor response or some attitude for the future. 
 This will be seen more clearly in a later discussion in this 
 same chapter, hence we shall not give it further development 
 at this point. 
 
 (S) The isolation of motor activities. 
 
 The isolation of motor training makes it a mere matter 
 of manual dexterity arbitrarily determined by the instructor. 
 It has nothing but an extrinsic motive back of it, namely, 
 meeting the demands of the teacher. For the pupil himself 
 it has no intrinsic motive or purpose impelling him to its 
 accomplishment, and hence it has no real dynamic character 
 and no intellectual value. Normally the motor process 
 should be relevant to a problem. It may be either the con- 
 crete expression of the solution of some problem, or it may 
 be a stimulus to the conception of a new problem whose 
 solution, in turn, calls for further observation and for 
 further intellectual activities. 
 
 If the child in the manual training room smooths the 
 runner of his sled because he sees that this is a necessity in 
 order to have the sled run easily and rapidly, then the motor 
 process is functioning normally within the larger whole to 
 which it belongs. If the child's drawing tells a story, or 
 conveys a thought of his own, the motor activities involved 
 are relevant and not arbitrary. And, if he finally comes to 
 the point where he sees that his crude drawings are not 
 adequate to the proper expression of his thought, even 
 practice in the technique of drawing may be felt to be rel- 
 evant; for it is seen to be necessary to the accomplishment 
 of his end in the long run. In these illustrations, motor 
 activity is vital through its felt necessity in the concrete 
 realization of the solution of a problem. 
 
 But motor processes, as has already been stated, may also 
 become the stimulus to the conception of new problems. 
 For example, the child who is engaged in the process of 
 weaving with cotton will learn that the seeds have to be 
 
62 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 removed. There then arises the question of how it shall 
 be done. Finding the first solution, that of picking them 
 oiT with the fingers, a very slow process, and knowing that 
 cotton cloth is very cheap, the question arises whether there 
 is not some better way of removing the seeds. The child 
 may be led to conceive this problem for himself, and to 
 undertake its solution. His attempt to solve the problem 
 helps to define the problem more sharply and prepares him 
 for a right understanding of the method and the significance 
 of the invention of the cotton gin. One of the chief values 
 of manual training and of all the forms of laboratory science 
 is to be found in the fact that the pupil can be made, through 
 the results of his own activities, to confront new problems 
 of thought the nature of which he rightly conceives and the 
 solution of which is not formal but inherently necessary for 
 the completion of his concrete work. 
 
 4. The Unity and Continuity of Intellect, Feeling, 
 AND Will. 
 
 Intellect, feeling, and will are not so much structural as 
 functional distinctions. They all have their significance 
 within one whole of activity in which adjustment is being 
 effected to a given situation. 
 
 (i) Their functional distinction. 
 
 The functional distinction between intellect, feeling, and 
 will may be roughly sketched through the use of an illustra- 
 tion. Suppose that I am paddling up a stream with a canoe. 
 At a bend in the stream I suddenly come upon a stretch of 
 very swift rapids. My routine activity is interrupted and 
 now becomes problematic. The situation as a whole is 
 immediately reflected in my consciousness in the form of 
 feeling. I am surprised and probably disappointed. Now 
 this flood of feeling will probably operate to bring sharply 
 into the focus of my consciousness the idea of my purpose 
 or end, which hitherto may have functioned only marginally. 
 I did so want to get a good catch of fish to-day! And the 
 
Organic Unity of Mental and Motor Life 63 
 
 sharpening of the consciousness of my end, an intellectual 
 process, defines more sharply my feeling of disappointment. 
 I cannot be satisfied without having that good catch of fish. 
 If the overcoming of the obstacle appeals to the self thus as 
 vital, as something without which the self cannot be satis- 
 fied, then feeling is the stimulus to the arousal of further 
 cognitive, or intellectual, processes. I must find out some 
 way of overcoming the obstacle, I must get beyond the 
 rapids. Perception, memory, imagination, thinking, one 
 or all, may be called forth to define the situation more per- 
 fectly and to find the proper method of dealing with it. I 
 observe the stream more carefully. Are there too many 
 rocks? Perhaps there is some portion of the stream that 
 is not so swift as the rest. I examine carefully to see. The 
 thought occurs to carry the canoe. I remember that I did 
 this once before and found it very heavy. I discover a foot- 
 path along the stream. The boat is too heavy when I am 
 in it to paddle against the current. But I may walk in the 
 footpath and drag the canoe up the stream. I have thought 
 out a solution of the problem. When a solution of the 
 problem is reached, then the motor tendency which has been 
 held in abeyance in the meantime is released. But it does 
 not operate blindly. It is under the guidance of a definite 
 image of the end to be realized, and it is determined in its 
 course by the idea of the means which have been chosen in 
 solving the problem. This controlling of action by ideas is 
 will. 
 
 While no single illustration can serve adequately to show 
 the precise functions of intellect, feeling, and will, this one 
 may have served the purpose of making clear what we mean 
 by saying that the distinctions are essentially functional 
 ones, each having a specific significance within one whole 
 of adjustment activity. The sketch here given has also 
 indicated roughly the general nature of the functions which 
 are subserved by intellect, feeling, and will. 
 
64 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 (2) Their essential unity. 
 
 The very method which we have employed to show that 
 intellect, feeling, and will are functional distinctions has 
 also emphasized their unity and continuity. This thought 
 will now be developed a little more fully. The mere per- 
 sistence of motor impulse is not will. The rat running 
 around and around in his cage in the vain endeavor to 
 escape is not giving a real manifestation of will. The child 
 who fights and kicks and screams when thwarted is not 
 truly exercising his will. The motor tendencies escaping in 
 these cases are the raw material of will. They are basic 
 only. Without the light of ideas will is blind and indis- 
 tinguishable from pure impulse. Action is accordingly 
 inefiicient. Will is not an independent thing; it is merely 
 the control of action by ideas. 
 
 Without feeling there is no worth-whileness, and on that 
 account nothing gets done, no matter how clear a conception 
 of the end there may be or how definitely the mode of pro- 
 cedure may be worked out. Feeling is the me-side of the 
 whole complex of conscious processes involved in adjust- 
 ment, and it cannot be separated from them without their 
 losing all motivation and dynamic character. 
 
 Without cognition there is no past experience available 
 for use and no possibility of conceiving ends and of making 
 plans to realize them, and hence there is no control of prob- 
 lematic situations. No matter how much energy of motor 
 impulse there may be present, no matter how much dissat- 
 isfaction of the self may be involved in the present situation, 
 without the cognitive processes there can be no secure and 
 satisfactory adjustment, except in cases where there is a 
 solution already determined by some hereditary organiza- 
 tion of activity or by some previously organized habitual 
 mode of action. 
 
 In problematic situations all three phases of consciousness 
 are necessary, and all three are interrelated and mutually 
 interdependent. They are not separate structures; they are 
 
Organic Unity of Mental and Motor Life 65 
 
 rather organizations of consciousness in different ways, each 
 mode of conscious activity being adapted to a particular 
 phase of the work needing to be done in the facihtation of 
 adjustment. They are to be regarded as phases, or atti- 
 tudes, or aspects of the one unitary consciousness which 
 appear within the complete mental act to meet specific needs 
 within the process of adjustment. One or the other of 
 them may be predominant in any given situation and give 
 its name to the whole movement of consciousness according 
 as the stress falls primarily on the problem phase of the act 
 (intellect), or on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the 
 self (feeling), or on the motor aspect of overcoming 
 obstacles or resolving conflicts through activities which 
 takes place under the guidance and direction of ideas (will). 
 
 5. The Fallacy of isolating Intellect, Feeling, and 
 Will in Training. 
 
 From this functional interpretation of intellect, feeling, 
 and will, which is inherent in the concept of the organic 
 circuit, we can see clearly that it is abnormal and formal 
 to isolate any one of these fundamental aspects of con- 
 sciousness for separate and independent training. 
 
 (i) Isolation of the intellectual aspect. 
 
 The isolation of the intellectual phase of consciousness in 
 the process of training is preeminently the fallacy of formal 
 discipline. When the intellect is set apart from its relation 
 to feeling and to action, we make the discipline of memory, 
 imagination, and thinking purely formal. The dynamic 
 aspect is lacking; the worth-whileness that is experienced 
 in the form of feeling, the push-from-behind that comes 
 from the consciousness of value to the self, is not continually 
 stimulating and reenforcing the cognitive activities. Take 
 away the feeling of relevancy to a situation which concerns 
 me, and you take away the very heart of the intellectual 
 process. The feeling element is, then, essential to the train- 
 ing of the intellect. This is usually recognized at the 
 S 
 
66 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 present time in the demand that the child's interest be 
 aroused. Our analysis shows from the scientific point of 
 view why we must secure the interest of the child. 
 
 Neither can the training of the intellect normally be 
 isolated from the motor process. The great function of 
 the higher -psychical processes is to give more adequate con- 
 trol over experience. In other words, their right-to-be con- 
 sists in the fact that they are an integral phase of a more 
 perfect will. The whole intellectual activity is pointless 
 unless it is to eventuate somehow in the modification or 
 control of action, or else in the determination of some 
 attitude which shall make a difference to future actions. 
 Intellectual processes have their significance in the contribu- 
 tion which they make to individual control. If this is true, 
 then cultivation of intellect apart from either healthy interest 
 on the one side or appropriate and controlled motor expres- 
 sion on the other side is abnormal. 
 
 (2) Isolation of the feeling aspect. 
 
 If we accept the functional interpretation of feeling, we 
 cannot expect to train the feelings, or sentiments, of the 
 child properly by devising exercises which are wholly im- 
 aginary for the sake of calling the feelings forth. Fairy 
 stories may serve a useful function in stimulating the back- 
 ward imagination and hastening the process of its develop- 
 ment, but they are; inadequate as means of cultivating the 
 sentiments of the child. They deal in too many unreal sit- 
 uations, which furnish him with no illustrations of how to 
 employ his sentiments, .in the world in which he actually 
 lives. Feel^JIg has no||pially ^function to perform in the 
 whole process of activity. I^fe an important factor in 
 furthering certain acti-\|llles and^fe checking others. Re- 
 spect for the aged, reverence for parents, the love of the 
 beautiful, pride in fair play, righteous indignation over the 
 wrongs of the poor and oppressA^ etc., ^nnot be adequately 
 inculcated through words. Situations whicb arise must be 
 seized upon in which these sentiments are called forth in the 
 
Organic Unity of Mental and Motor Life 67 
 
 process of determining action. Or, if they are situations 
 studied in history, biography, or Hterature, they must be 
 situations into which the pupil is capable of injecting him- 
 self and in which he mentally lives and acts for the time 
 being. 
 
 Feeling should normally grow out of a concrete situation 
 of some sort and return into that situation to inhibit or to 
 reenforce processes which are going on there. In this way 
 sentiment is developed as 'over against mere sentimentality. 
 Mr. James very aptly says : "When a resolve or a fine glow 
 of feeling is allowed to evaporate without bearing practical 
 fruit it is worse than a chance lost; it works so as positively 
 to hinder future resolutions and emotions from taking the 
 normal path of discharge. There is no more contemptible 
 type of human character than that of the nerveless senti- 
 mentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering 
 sea of sensibility and emotion, but who never does a manly 
 concrete deed."^ 
 
 (2) Isolation of the will aspect. 
 
 The functional point of view shows the fallacy of the 
 culture of will as a matter of sheer effort. There is neces- 
 sary an intellectual appreciation of ends, together with feel- 
 ing in the form of interest. It is not necessarily true that 
 the harder anything is to master the better it is for training 
 the will. If the arbitrary element in the task has been prom- 
 inent, the net result of the effort put forth may be the 
 acquisition of hatred for the subject. 
 
 Training of will is concerned with the proper develop- 
 ment of ideals more even than it is with giving formal 
 practice in the putting forth of effort. But these ideals 
 must be so developed that they cannot be held off as cold 
 intellectual propositions recognized as valid by the indi- 
 vidual while at the same time making no vital appeal to him 
 as having value for the self. We must develop ideals under 
 
 'James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 147-148. 
 
68 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 such conditions that they will become warmed through and 
 through with the feeling element. This will make the 
 ideals dynamic, and effort will follow naturally and not as 
 a matter of sheer force. The training of the will is in 
 large part a question of the dynamism of ideals, that is, of a 
 proper union of feeling and intellectual elements, under the 
 impetus and guidance of which acts are controlled with 
 reference to the realization of ends. 
 
 6. The Unity and Continuity of Child Mind and 
 Adult Mind. 
 
 As one result of the child-study movement much has been 
 made of the differences between the child and the adult, 
 both on the physical and on the mental side. Emphasis 
 upon the mental differences between children and adults 
 is of very great service to educational thought, provided 
 it is clearly seen just wherein those differences consist. But 
 there has been some tendency, while recognizing these dif- 
 ferences, to let the fundamental unity and continuity of 
 mind throughout all the stages of its development become 
 obscured. 
 
 (i) The principle of unity and continuity. 
 
 The doctrine of the organic circuit has made clear that 
 the differentiation and organization of consciousness is a 
 phase of an evolving experience of adjustment and control. 
 In this respect the child's mind is in its essential nature the 
 same sort of a mind as that of the adult. His mind, like 
 that of the adult, is functional to the core. The same law 
 applies to both. Conscious processes are called forth under 
 certain conditions, and they function to meet needs. 
 
 While we recognize that the mental activities of the 
 adult are normally called forth only to meet conditions which 
 make their functioning necessary, we sometimes act as if 
 we thought that those of the child responded in any form 
 that we desired merely upon our demand. Or, if not this, 
 we too often assume that if he imitates and repeats the 
 
Organic Unity of Mental and Motor Life 69 
 
 forms in which our mental activities express themselves, 
 he is actually being trained in their use. Educators talk a 
 great deal about the self-activity of the child. The only 
 self-activity that is worth anything is that in which the con- 
 scious processes are called forth in situations in which they 
 are relevant to felt needs of S07ne sort. In this respect, the 
 law of self-activity is the same for child and adtdt. 
 
 (2) Difference within unity. 
 
 We have seen that on the side of function child mind 
 and adult mind are the same, — a device for the variation 
 and reconstruction of reactions to meet more adequately the 
 needs of adjustment. But as the child's experience in 
 organizing and controlling activities is more limited in ex- 
 tent and is simpler in character than that of the adult, we 
 should expect to find corresponding differences in his mental 
 make-up. From the functional point of view there must be 
 a difference in the degree of the development and perfection 
 of the specialized processes, or technique,^ by- means of 
 which the function is exercised in the two cases. The 
 child on the whole deals with simpler problems, which do 
 not demand the more highly specialized technique of con- 
 sciousness for their control. Also, he has had a more 
 limited experience and there has been less opportunity for 
 the differentiation and organization of consciousness in the 
 actual process of controlling action. 
 
 Functional psychology may properly contend that there 
 is essential unity and continuity of child mind and adult 
 mind and at the same time insist that the child's mind be 
 studied and interpreted in terms of itself rather than in 
 terms of the adult mind and what we know of its highly 
 specialized modes of activity. The child's mental processes 
 can be understood only in terms of his stage of develop- 
 ment and in terms of the experiences which lie back of, and 
 are involved in, that stage of development. No amount of 
 
 ' See Chapter IX for further explanation of the use of the term 
 technique. 
 
70 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 study of the adult mind can show us just what are the pre- 
 cise mental processes of the child. For the determination 
 of these we must study the child himself, particularly the 
 nature and degree of control which he has attained over 
 action, control not resulting from the process of mere 
 physical growth and development. Yet the full interpreta- 
 tion of the child cannot be given without reference to the 
 nature of the adult consciousness. This thought must now 
 be developed. 
 
 Qiild psychology reveals the process of growing control ; 
 adult psychology shows that control in its more highly per- 
 fected form. In child psychology we are studying mind in 
 the making; in adult psychology we are taking more the 
 point of view of the finished product. The conscious pro- 
 cesses of the adult represent the normal goal of achieve- 
 ment in the perfection of the machinery of consciousness 
 for exercising control over the world in which we live. A 
 study of them gives an idea of the nature and the value of 
 the various specializations, or elements of technique, which 
 are developing in the mind of the child for effecting varied 
 and efficient adjustment. It is the business of teachers and 
 parents not merely to call forth the conscious processes of 
 the child but to call them forth by supplying the conditions 
 which shall secure their normal functioning and lead to the 
 goal of their normal development. This requires a knowl- 
 edge not alone of child psychology but also of adult 
 psychology. 
 
 Putting this thought in other terms, we may say that the 
 teacher needs to know what are the fundamental impulses 
 developing in the child at any particular period in order to 
 make these the basis of appeal and under normal motivation 
 secure the self-expression on which mental growth and 
 motor control must depend. But he also needs to keep his 
 eye on the remote goal of adult development, or the normal 
 outcome of the educative process, in order to know what 
 impulses and tendencies need checking and what others 
 
Organic Unity of Mental and Motor Life 71 
 
 need stimulating. Thus he will not merely indulge the 
 present impulses of the child but will guide and direct them 
 along the line of development which shall be of greatest 
 value. The present moment of child life, with all its wealth 
 of concrete tendencies, must not be ignored. It is the 
 dynamic center on which all future growth and development 
 depends. But, at the same time, this present moment must 
 be viewed as continuous with a larger whole, of which the 
 remote but more perfectly developed future is a part. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapter VI 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 301-2. 
 
 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 117-18, 370-2, 147-8. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, Ch. II and p. 359. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 56-68. 
 
 Sully, Teacher's Handbook of Psychology, pp. 44-51. 
 
 The references to Dewey, Stout, and Sully just given are 
 especially fine discussions of the distinction of intellect, feeling, 
 and will from one another and their mutual interrelations with 
 one another as phases of a single consciousness. 
 O'Shea, Education as Adjustment, pp. 69-73, 135-7, Chs. 13 and 
 
 14- 
 
 Bagley, The Educative Process, Ch. 14. 
 
 O'Shea and Bagley have given the best recent discussions of 
 the "Doctrine of Formal Discipline" of which I know. They 
 should be supplemented by the papers of Angell, Pillsbury, and 
 Judd in the Educational Review, June, igo8. 
 O'Shea, Dynamiic Factons- in Education, pp. 74-6. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 TYPICAL MODES OF ADJUSTMENT 
 I. Point of View and Purpose of this Chapter. 
 
 We have seen that there is an organic circuit of activities 
 involved in the life process. From the biological point of 
 view, conscious processes are not isolable from the complex 
 of activities which are going on all the time in the attempt 
 of the organism to secure and maintain the proper adjust- 
 ment between itself and the environment. The thinking 
 process is no exception to this rule. We cannot isolate it 
 either from the rest of the conscious processes or from the 
 process of reaction to which it is relevant. We cannot 
 rightly interpret thinking apart from the conditions under 
 which it is called forth, apart from the concrete situations 
 in which it functions. It is intelligible only as a phase 
 within a complete circuit of adjustment activity comprising 
 both mental and motor processes, and the nature of the 
 thinking process is strictly relevant to the conditions which 
 call for its functioning and to the situations which it is its 
 task to control. 
 
 If we wish, then, to locate exactly the place of the think- 
 ing process in the concrete life of the organism, we must 
 study the characteristic modes of adjustment of which 
 organisms are capable, with special reference to the problem 
 of determining whether consciousness functions in them and 
 in what way. This it is our purpose to do in this chapter. 
 Though we shall find that thinking is confined to quite a 
 narrow field of activity, it will more sharply define our con- 
 ception of its significance if we first get clearly in mind, 
 more preciseV than through a mere assertion of the fact, the 
 
 72 
 
Typical Modes of Adjustment 73 
 
 extent and nature of the processes through which the needs 
 of the organism may be satisfied without the function of 
 thinking. 
 
 In the evolution of species, the acquisition of the power 
 to think is undoubtedly a comparatively recent accomplish- 
 ment. And quite likely we must pass quite well up into the 
 scale of the vertebrates before we find consciousness func- 
 tioning at all in definite modes more developed than a vague 
 sentiency, or, at best, in forms of sense perception and of 
 crude memory that must be thought of as more organic than 
 intellectual in character. Even in the case of the human 
 being, there is a large amount of useful activity which goes 
 on smoothly, meeting the needs of the organism, without the 
 intervention of thinking processes. We shall now take up' 
 for study some of the typical modes of adjustment, both 
 animal and human, by means of which needs are met with- 
 out thinking. Thus we shall lead up to those modes of 
 adjustment in which the thinking process functions. 
 
 2. Adjustment without the Intervention" of Con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 (i) Automatic action. 
 
 Automatic action, illustrated by breathing, beating of the 
 heart, the digestive processes, etc., meets the dominantly 
 vegetative needs of the organism and keeps its vital pro- 
 cesses going without the exercise of consciousness. This 
 is important in view of the fundamental character of these 
 processes and the need of continuity in their operation. 
 They are removed by nature from the need of attention. 
 
 (2) Reflex action. 
 
 We have seen that there are also many reflex acts of 
 which the organism is capable, acts which "occur in imme- 
 diate response to sensory stimulation without the interpo- 
 sition of consciousness.^ Such acts are relatively simple, 
 and their function is to produce adjustments which are 
 
 ' Angell, Psychology, p. 337. 
 
74 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 directly for the well-being, often the protection, of a single 
 member, or part, and only indirectly for the well-being of 
 the organism as a whole. For example, the sudden with- 
 drawal of the hand or the foot from an irritant is a rela- 
 tively simple reaction, involving little coordination of 
 activities, and it is dominantly for the good of the member 
 affected. The same principle applies to winking, to the 
 dilation and contraction of the pupil of the eye, to cough- 
 ing, sneezing, etc. The difficulty is primarily local and the 
 remedy is found in a local mechanism. 
 
 In certain acts of the reflex type consciousness is some- 
 times present, as in the case of winking or of sneezing, but 
 it is not the determining factor. Normally the reaction is 
 determined by laws of nervous discharge entirely inde- 
 pendent of the higher centers through which consciousness 
 functions. The conscious processes which appear are not, 
 however, necessarily without any functional significance. 
 They may be important within a larger circuit of activity, 
 an organic circuit of which the reflex is but a part. For 
 example, the consciousness involved in sneezing may deter- 
 mine that I shall get up and close the window, thus ad- 
 justing myself to a situation in which there is danger of 
 catching cold. But the reflex act itself represents a simple, 
 useful adjustment of a purely mechanical type. There is 
 no variation or control by consciousness. 
 
 3. Adjustment on the Organic Level of Consciousness. 
 
 (i) Instinctive action, 
 a. General nature of instinctive action. 
 
 If we examine the conduct of the lower animals, we find 
 certain modes of adjustment characteristic of each species. 
 These modes of adjustment seem not to have been learned 
 as the result of experience, but to be predetermined by 
 heredity, yet they are complex and highly adaptive. Com- 
 mon illustrations of these characteristic modes of adjust- 
 
Typical Modes of Adjustment 75 
 
 ment are the building of nests by the birds, the gathering 
 and storing of honey by bees, etc. These forms of 
 behaviour are commonly called instinctive acts. 
 
 The term instinctive is popularly used to refer to any act 
 which is the expression of some natural tendency. Psycho- 
 logists themselves use the term quite freely in this sense. 
 We shall use it, however, in a more limited sense, a sense 
 which has not very wide usage, but which ought, neverthe- 
 less, to be cultivated. If we are careful to analyze what it 
 is that we have in mind when we use the term instinctive 
 act, we shall find that the dominant thought is some organ- 
 ization of activity which the animal has not had to learn, yet 
 which meets his needs. It is an organised mode of pro- 
 cedure in which the organisation is predetermined, the 
 animal being able to perform the act at birth, or as the result 
 of the purely physical processes of growth and develop- 
 ment. In so far as acts approximate to this type, we may 
 properly call them instinctive. Many of the characteristic 
 activities of animals may depart from the type, but it is not 
 the departure from the type, it is the large degree of con- 
 formity to it, which impels us to call the acts instinctive. 
 b. Impulse and instinct. 
 
 Instinct is the inner aspect of instinctive action. Instinct 
 is the impulse, or specific inner tendency, which is expressed 
 in the form of the instinctive act. Not every impulse, or 
 inner tendency, however, is an instinct. Those only are 
 instincts for which nature has provided in advance, or in the 
 process of physical growth and development itself, a spe- 
 cific and characteristic complex mode of procedure. From 
 this point of view every instinct is an impulse, but not 
 every impulse is an instinct. Impulse may have other modes 
 of expression than in terms of instinctive action. In the 
 broad sense, impulse is the inner aspect of all actions from 
 the simplest to the most complex, from the blindest to the 
 most highly voluntary. In a narrower sense, the term 
 applies only to inner tendencies to action whose pressure, 
 
'j^} The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 or tension, is felt in consciousness, and whose expression 
 cannot be called either an instinctive act or a premeditated 
 one. 
 
 The baby's aimless and random movements of arms and 
 legs are impulsive, and not instinctive. They lack the 
 coordination and organization of the instinctive act. But 
 his clutching of the hand upon the object which happens to 
 touch it may perhaps be called an instinctive act, and cer- 
 tainly his original mode of taking nourishment is instinc- 
 tive ; for here the inner impulse has a specific, organized, 
 and inherited mode of expression.^ Play, imitation, and 
 curiosity are to be classed as impulses rather than as in- 
 stincts because their modes of expression are not specific. 
 The inner tendencies are inherited and natural, but no 
 special modes of expression are provided by nature. Al- 
 most every physical structure may be used in play, and that, 
 too, in a variety of ways. Yet it must be admitted that in 
 the case of the lower animals the activities of play, imita- 
 tion, and curiosity are limited quite closely to hereditary 
 lines and partake largely of the nature of instinctive acts. 
 c. Instinct of man and of animals compared. 
 
 It is evident that instinctive action, in the sense of the 
 term which we employ, is more characteristic of the animals 
 than of man. Man has many impulses, but few instincts. 
 This is an inevitable corollary of his greater plasticity at 
 birth and his longer period of infancy. He cannot start out 
 with so many definitely organized modes of behavior. He 
 may have all the fundamental impulses which lie back of the 
 instinctive acts of animals, and many more ; but their mode 
 of expression on the one side, and their development into 
 clear and specific inner tendencies on the other side, are 
 both problems of his experience. The significance of this 
 fact we have already pointed out. With a richer original 
 
 ' This is the view of Baldwin in the Editor's Preface to Groos's 
 The Play of Animals, p. vii. Groos adopts this view in his later 
 work, The Play of Man, pp. 2, 283-289. 
 
Typical Modes of Adjustment JJ 
 
 endowment of impulses and a meager endowment of 
 instincts, man's conscious processes must be developed more 
 fully, and he ultimately attains a superior adjustment. 
 d. Relation of consciousness to instinctive action. 
 
 Consciousness cannot have much determining or control- 
 ling part in instinctive action. The organization of the 
 motor processes is too fully determined by heredity to leave 
 much room for conscious processes to function. Powerful 
 impulses are stirred up easily by the presence of certain 
 kinds of situations and they drain out into prepared path- 
 ways of nervous discharge, producing reactions characteris- 
 tic of the species. Both the impulses and the modes of 
 reaction adapted to satisfy them have been built up by 
 natural selection in the process of evolution and are now a 
 natural heritage of the species. Hence we cannot expect 
 them to be dependent upon individual experience in any 
 large measure. We should expect the consciousness in- 
 volved in instinctive action, then, to be of a very low and 
 vague order. 
 
 (o) Feeling involved in instinctive action. 
 
 In purely instinctive modes of reaction, neither the end to 
 be realized nor the form of the reaction process by which 
 it is to be realized are determined by consciousness. The 
 inner impulse is blind. Yet it is not necessarily an uncon- 
 scious impulse. It may be, and probably is, in many cases 
 an impulse which makes itself felt in consciousness in the 
 form of a vague feeling. Migrating species of birds, when 
 kept in captivity from their birth, have been known to man- 
 ifest great restlessness when the migrating season came 
 around. If this restlessness was not merely physical but 
 psycho-physical, it must have been reflected in conscious- 
 ness in the form of feehng. There was no basis for an 
 intellectual consciousness of an end to be achieved nor of a 
 method of achieving it. The feeling could get no definition 
 in terms of past experience. The specific reaction which 
 should relieve the tension is determined by laws of nervous 
 
78 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 action which act in correlation with the physiological pro- 
 cesses characteristic of a certain stage of development. 
 Feeling may be a factor in instinctive action in the matter 
 of reenforcing motor tendencies which are present, but it 
 determines not at all what shall be done or how it shall be 
 done, but only that something shall be done. 
 
 If the reader is not satisfied with this illustration, let him 
 apply the same line of thought to the case of the hen sitting 
 upon eggs, the rabbit "freezing," the child fighting in a fit 
 of anger, or the man who has always been peaceful suddenly 
 resenting some insulting remark by a knock-down blow. In 
 the last instance, there is quite likely no one more surprised 
 than the man himself at what he has done. Feeling was a 
 factor in determining that motor discharge should take 
 place, but consciousness cannot be said to have organized 
 the method of reaction nor to have directed and controlled 
 the response. 
 
 {h) Sense perception involved in instinctive action. 
 
 While consciousness does not rise to the level of con- 
 ceiving ends in instinctive action, and hence cannot deter- 
 mine either the what or the how of action, yet it may have 
 something to do with keeping the action going until the 
 instinctive impulse is satisfied. This it seems to do through 
 a process of sense perception which is more organic than 
 ideational in character. 
 
 Instinctive action is made up of a series of acts no one of 
 which would usually have any value in itself. The separate 
 acts are parts of a larger whole of action which is being 
 developed under the stress of a powerful impulse which 
 "seeks" satisfaction. The satisfaction of this impulse is 
 possible only through the right correlation of acts with 
 sensory situations. The sense perception process functions 
 to further the development of the impulse and to give con- 
 tinuity to the series of acts. Let us take the case of nest 
 building as an illustration. The bird is at that stage of 
 development, or at that seasonal period, when the psycho- 
 
Typical Modes of Adjustment 79 
 
 physical impulse to rear young is asserting itself. The nest 
 building impulse is a part of this larger whole, and this 
 instinct begins to assert itself. The seeing of a straw is 
 relevant to this impulse. If it were not, the straw would in 
 all probability not have been noticed. Thus the inner im- 
 pulse operates as a factor in the selection of stimuH to which 
 the organism shall respond. The seeing of the straw is the 
 occasion for an act, — the picking up of the straw. Thus 
 the sense perception process furthers the development of 
 the activity through which the impulse shall be satisfied. 
 In like manner we might follow the process through the 
 acts of flying with the straw in the mouth and of laying it 
 down in the crotch of a limb, and with the repetition of the 
 series until the situation presenting itself to sense percep- 
 tion ultimately satisfies the impulse. Now the point which 
 we wish to make clear as a result of this discussion is that 
 while the chaining together of a series of acts into an 
 instinctive mode of action is in part due to the fact that a 
 fundamental impulse operates in the selection of stimuli, 
 yet the development of the activity is one which involves 
 conscious processes in the form of sense perception. 
 
 We must not, however, read into the sense perception 
 processes which function in the instinctive action of ani- 
 mals the characteristics of our human perceptual processes. 
 The sense perceptions of the animal may be so purely 
 organic in character that we could hardly ascribe any intel- 
 lectual character at all to them. The selective character of 
 the instinctive impulse, of which we have spoken, is to be 
 viewed as organically teleological rather than ideationally 
 purposive. It is due to a strong predisposition of the inher- 
 ited constitution of the nervous system toward certain forms 
 of activity. The satisfaction of the animal's impulses 
 through these forms of activity puts a premium on certain 
 kinds of sensory experience which are relevant to them. 
 Consequently the form of activity and the receptiveness to 
 certain kinds of sense perception have become correlated 
 
8o The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 in the process of evolution. For example, when the kit- 
 ten is under the stress of the instinctive impulse to hunt, 
 theie is a pre-adjustment of the animal's sense organs. The 
 eye is strained to see and the ear to hear. The impulse has 
 drained out from the surcharged centers into predetermined 
 motor channels with the result of giving the characteristic 
 "set" to the organism which we call "watching for prey." 
 When the right sensory impressions are received, then the 
 kitten springs upon the moving object. But it is evident 
 that the perception process did not involve any ideal use of 
 past experience, that is, any image process ; for the kitten 
 had not yet had any opportunity to acquire meanings cor- 
 responding to the motor process. It is doubtful if we even 
 have the right to call the consciousness involved perception 
 at all. 
 
 Even with experience, the sensory processes involved in 
 the instinctive action of animals must be less ideational in 
 character than our human percepts. We manipulate objects 
 more than the animals do, reacting to them in a larger 
 variety of ways, and we also reflect upon our experiences. 
 Hence our percepts are freighted with a richer accumulation 
 of the results of past experiences, and they are shot through 
 and through with the results of higher psychical processes. 
 In perception, all of these experiences, both sensory and 
 ideational, function automatically to determine the nature 
 of the percept. A piece of paper is perceived by me in a 
 very different way from that by which it is perceived by a 
 cat. I have utilized paper in so many different ways as 
 compared with her. I can charge this scrap of paper with 
 meaning which flows over into it from my memory and my 
 imagination. This I usually do not stop to do. My higher 
 psychical processes function automatically to give the object 
 an internally richer character than it can have for the cat. 
 
 (c) Organic memory involved in instinctive action. 
 
 When instinctive actions are repeated in the case of the 
 more intelligent animals, doubtless they are modified as the 
 
Typical Modes of Adjustment 8i 
 
 result of experience. Even if consciousness assumed no 
 higher form than that of organic sense perception this would 
 be true ; for past experiences of the sensory type modify the 
 psycho-physical disposition, and through this modification 
 to some extent they modify action wherever action and sen- 
 sory presentation need to be closely correlated. But some 
 of the animals show evidence of possessing rudimentary 
 memory. Attempts to take advantage of this memory in 
 the training of animals, however, seem to indicate that it is 
 of the organic type sometimes called associative memory. 
 The results of past experience are retained but not imaged. 
 The memory is little more than a complex of associations 
 which have been set up and perfected very slowly and which 
 now operate almost mechanically. 
 
 e. Instinctive action and the problem of control. 
 
 Our discussion of instinctive action has served to make it 
 evident that in this class of acts we have the animals exer- 
 cising considerable control over their environment. But 
 allowing all that we can for the function of consciousness, 
 we see that the sphere of its operations is very limited. 
 Some small modifications of action can be effected, but they 
 fall quite well, as a rule, within the limits of modes of action 
 that are after all predetermined in their essential character. 
 And the conscious processes which function are on a level 
 that is more organic than intellectual. Past experience can 
 be used very little, if at all, in the conscious determination of 
 action. The control which animals exercise is what we have 
 in an earlier place called racial control. It meets the needs 
 of the organism only in so far as those needs are of a gen- 
 eral character common to all the individuals of the species. 
 
 Perhaps the writer ought to apologize for working out in 
 such detail in a book on the psychology of thinking the 
 psychology of instinctive action. He may, perhaps, be 
 pardoned on the ground that so little has been done with 
 instinctive action from this point of view. It will not be 
 necessary in leading up to the specific conditions and func- 
 
82 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 tion of thinking to do more than sketch the other modes of 
 adjustment, the psychology of which is more familiar to all. 
 
 (2) N on-instinctive adjustments on the organic level of 
 consciousness. 
 
 If we stop to analyze human activities, we shall doubtless 
 be surprised to find what a large amount of organization 
 and coordination of action there is that cannot be said to be 
 of voluntary origin so far as the organization is concerned. 
 In walking we go through crowds, turning this way and that 
 without bumping into anybody. We avoid stumbling over 
 rough places, turn aside for trees, for stones, for muddy 
 spots, and spring lightly out of the way of horses and 
 automobiles. We come to a stream in the country and give 
 just the right spring to leap across it. In the house we go 
 through doors without bumping against the doorway. We 
 carry food to our mouths quite precisely, we button our 
 clothes, we touch with the hand any part of the body we 
 choose. We balance on one foot, we shoot a target, we hit 
 or catch a baseball that is thrown, we drive the tennis ball 
 that is coming toward us right back into a corner of the 
 court where it will be most difficult for our opponent to get 
 it. We may, as many boys do, walk on the rail of the rail- 
 way track, or even learn to walk a tight rope. 
 
 Now these forms of activity we say we have learned in 
 our experience. But this is true only in part, if we mean 
 to say that we have learned them voluntarily. The volun- 
 tary part of the procedure in almost every case has con- 
 sisted in little else than fixating attention upon the goal of 
 achievement and repeating the act. So far as the organiza- 
 tion of the activity is concerned, the nervous system seems 
 to have attended to that. This has consisted in a subtle 
 coordination of sense perception and motor processes 
 effected by the delicate nervous mechanism of the subcor- 
 tical centers in the lower ganglia of the brain. The evi- 
 dence of the truth of this is to be found in the futility of 
 trying to learn these activities by attention to their details. 
 
Typical Modes of Adjustment 83 
 
 And even after they are learned, it is usually disastrous to 
 let the mind wander from the end to the process by which 
 the end is being achieved. Many of the motor organizations 
 that are integral parts of larger voluntary activities, as in 
 the case of sewing, skating, dancing, riding a bicycle, run- 
 ning a typewriter, etc., have themselves been effected on 
 the lower level of organic sense perception brought into 
 delicate coordination with motor processes through the 
 Activity of the lower brain centers. 
 
 4. Adjustment on the Intellectual Level of Con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 (i) Genetic basis. 
 
 We have seen that a very large segment of adjustment 
 activity, both animal and human, is carried on upon a very 
 low plane of consciousness. What basis have we for the 
 attainment of adjustment upon any higher level of con- 
 sciousness? We must seek our explanation along two 
 lines. One of these is the conditions which make more 
 intellectual adjustment necessary ; the other is the develop- 
 ment of the ideal, as contrasted with the organic, aspect of 
 experience. 
 
 a. Conditions of intellectual adjustment. 
 
 Man, as we have seen, has relatively few instinctive 
 modes of action. His organized modes of procedure are 
 not largely predetermined. Doubtless he has strong ten- 
 dencies toward action in certain lines rather than others as 
 a matter of inheritance. But the nervous connections for 
 their performance are not made early. He is plastic for a 
 long period. He is in a condition almost from infancy 
 which puts a premium upon the functioning of conscious 
 processes. His impulsive actions have to be organized by 
 himself in order to meet his needs. This makes both ends 
 and processes stand out more vividly in his consciousness. 
 He has to take account of them in order to make his impul- 
 sive actions effective. It is this rich endowment of im- 
 
84 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 pulsive modes of action, unstable, and plastic, and relatively 
 tmorganized, that is both man's handicap in the beginning 
 of the race of life and at the same time the basis of that 
 intellectual development which gives him his ultimate 
 superiority. 
 
 h. Development of the ideal aspect of experience. 
 
 Any control of reaction that is not purely hereditary in- 
 volves profiting by past experience. Even on the low level 
 of organic sense perception, there is something of this. 
 Sensory experiences repeated modify the psycho-physical 
 disposition. That is, inner tendencies to action get "set" 
 in certain directions rather than others as a result of pre- 
 ceding experiences. But this does not necessarily involve 
 any development of the ideal aspect of the experience. And 
 it takes place within narrow limits. 
 
 The first step in the development of the ideal element is 
 the enrichment of sense perception. If we analyze sense 
 perception, we find that it involves two factors, — one that 
 of getting sensory data, the other that of interpretation. 
 When I see a tree, my eye gives me only certain details of 
 color and form. My mind supplies further visual details 
 which I cannot see at this distance, facts of past experience 
 also which came from touch and other special senses. On 
 the basis of the data which vision gives me, then, my mind 
 supplies enough other details from past experience for me 
 to know that the tree is an elm tree. I perceive elm tree. 
 In this perception there have been involved certain imme- 
 diate sensory elements and certain other elements which are 
 ideal. The sensory elements have been the data and the 
 ideal elements have served the function of interpretation of 
 the data. In actual experience we cannot normally have 
 the two aspects separately. If we could isolate the element 
 of sensory data, that is what we would mean by pure sensa- 
 tion, while the whole process would be perception. 
 
 A moment's reflection will show us that pure sensation, 
 if there be such a thing, does not offer us any basis for the 
 
Typical Modes of Adjustment 85 
 
 control of reaction. It may serve to instigate movement, 
 but what movement? There is nothing to determine that, 
 unless it has been predetermined by heredity. If our whole 
 mental life could be reduced to a mere flux of sensations, 
 each absolutely new and unmodified by any previous ex- 
 perience, it is evident that there would be no basis for 
 the conscious determination of one movement rather than 
 another. But when sensations are interpreted, when they 
 are surcharged with meaning derived from past experience, 
 then they may be factors in the determination of action in 
 harmony with experience. In our study of instinctive 
 action, we have already pointed out the fact that through 
 his more varied life of action, the percepts of the human 
 being become much richer than those of the animal in 
 ideal elements. Human percepts may rise above the level 
 of organic sense perception. Many of them, perhaps, do 
 not ; but in so far as they do, they become superior elements 
 of control over action. 
 
 (2) Voluntary action of the ideo-motor type. 
 a. Meaning of voluntary and ideo-motor action. 
 
 In the general sense of the term, any act that takes place 
 under the guidance and direction of an ifuage is a voluntary 
 act. But we must construe image to include the ideal ele- 
 ment in perception as well as in imagination. It is the 
 functioning of the ideal element in experience to control 
 action, even though it may function unreflectively, that 
 makes it voluntary action. When the ideal element, or 
 meaning, has become so thoroughly developed in connec- 
 tion with any mode of reaction that "the act occurs imme- 
 diately and unhesitatingly upon the idea of it,"''- the action 
 belongs to the ideo-motor type. 
 
 h. Ideo-motor action on the perceptual level. 
 
 The mere perception of the water faucet when I am 
 thirsty is sufficient to release the definite mode of reaction 
 which shall meet my need. The perception of the ring of 
 
 'James, Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 423. 
 
86 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 the door bell is followed immediately and unhesitatingly 
 by the appropriate series of acts for that occasion. Here 
 ideal elements of perception are well developed. There 
 are virtually images functioning implicitly in the perception 
 process. The water faucet is not merely a physical thing 
 of a certain size and shape. It has a meaning which oper- 
 ates in consciousness. So with the perception of the ring- 
 ing of the door bell. It is not merely the ringing of a 
 bell, but it is the door bell, and that means that somebody 
 wishes to enter. But the point that is most significant for 
 our discussion is that the situation is met by an appropriate 
 mode of reaction at once on the basis of the meaning of 
 the perceptual activity. A large part of our activity, as 
 we have previously shown, may be accounted for in terms 
 of sense perception processes that are quite largely organic 
 in character. There is still another large segment that may 
 be ideo-motor on the perceptual level. 
 
 c. Ideo-motor action on the level of memory and 
 
 imagination. 
 Even where these highly developed perceptual processes 
 prove inadequate to the needs of the situation, consciousness 
 does not yet necessarily function in the form of thinking. 
 There are still other possibilities. The appropriate mode 
 of reaction may be instantly released in response to some 
 quite definite image process. For example, when I am 
 walking through the woods and come suddenly to a fork 
 in the road, I may see a large tree upon one fork, and the 
 definite recollection may come to me instantly that I passed 
 that tree on a former trip, whereupon I take that branch of 
 the road and arrive safely at my destination. Here we have 
 memory functioning in ideo-motor fashion to determine 
 action without thinking. Upon hearing a shrill cry, the 
 image may come instantly into my mind of a child who has 
 fallen off from the porch. In this case the appropriate 
 mode of reaction follows immediately upon the emergence 
 of that image. Or, to take a more complex case, the idea 
 
Typical Modes of Adjustment 87 
 
 comes into my head to play on the piano. Immediately 
 upon the presentation of this idea I go through the series 
 of acts involved in getting up from my chair, walking to 
 the piano, and playing some familiar tune. In these cases, 
 the idea, or impulse, has been satisfied without any thinking 
 process. 
 
 d. Significance of ideo-motor action for control. 
 
 It is of very great significance from the point of view of 
 control that it is possible for ideas to become so closely con- 
 nected with definite motor processes that the idea can thus 
 touch off an appropriate mode of reaction immediately. A 
 large part of the significance of habit is to be found in 
 the fact that definite and well-organized modes of procedure 
 have been put al'the beck and call of ideas. It is like having 
 a complicated piece of machinery which can be operated by 
 pushing a button here and turning a lever there. Ideo- 
 motor action presents a situation in which, as it were, an 
 idea pushes the button and the organized motor process 
 does the rest. 
 
 This suggests the thought that habits are very useful 
 instruments of the organism in the control of the environ- 
 ment so long as the individual keeps them in their proper 
 place as servants of his ideas. Thus they become valuable 
 elements of technique in voluntary action. Pedagogically 
 this means, if we may be allowed to digress still further 
 from the main line of thought, that motor training in the 
 school should not be given wholly as a series of dictated 
 exercises or drills, but it should be the expression of idea- 
 tional processes, to the end that the pupil may have not 
 merely a set of motor habits but a set of habits under the 
 control of his ideas. The starting point in the training 
 should be with the idea, and the repetition of the motor 
 process, or the drill, should be for the sake of perfecting 
 the physical mechanism by means of which the idea shall 
 operate successfully in life. 
 
 To return to the main line of thought, we may say that 
 
88 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 in the development of ideo-motor action we have control 
 lodged within the individual in a sense which does not apply 
 to instinctive action. In both types of action, there is a 
 complex organized mode of reaction at the service of the 
 organism. In instinctive action, this mechanism is touched 
 off rather mechanically by the nature of the stimulus. In 
 ideo-motor action, the mechanism is at the disposal of the 
 ideas of the individual. These ideas are the fruit of the 
 individual's own experience, they are not merely a racial 
 peculiarity. In putting the mechanism under the control 
 of ideas, the control becomes individual and personal. 
 Through the ideo-motor type of control, freedom, rapidity, 
 and ease of adjustment are provided in so far as the organ- 
 ism is dealing with situations that are familiar and for which 
 an organized mode of reaction has already been worked out. 
 e. Bearing of the discussion on the study of thinking. 
 
 We have only to reflect briefly upon the study which we 
 have been making of the various types of adjustment con- 
 sidered so far to see that we have implicit in them the con- 
 ditions under which the function of thinking is not needed. 
 Certain classes of needs of the organism can be met on the 
 basis of little or no functioning of consciousness. This 
 sphere of adjustment, we have seen, is relatively large, par- 
 ticularly in the lives of the lower animals. In other cases, 
 where consciousness functions, and that, too, even in intel- 
 lectual forms, it does so without involving any thinking 
 process, and yet proves adequate. A study of these cases 
 in particular shows that thinking is not needed in situations 
 in which there is nothing problematic , — where on the one 
 hand, either by reason of the simplicity of the situation or 
 on account of its familiarity, it is immediately evaluated; 
 and, on the other hand, an already established mode of 
 reaction is so closely associated in experience with that type 
 of situation that there is no question of choice, of variation, 
 or of reconstruction. 
 
 Our study of the conditions under which the organism 
 
Typical Modes of Adjustment 89 
 
 has no. need of the thinking process has brought us up 
 sharply, definitely, and clearly to an understanding of the 
 precise conditions under which thinking is necessary. The 
 negative method of approach has served the function of 
 sharply defining, or limiting, the problem of thinking. 
 (2) Voluntary action of the deliberative type. 
 
 a. Conditions of deliberative action. 
 
 Experience furnishes us abundant instances in which 
 adjustment breaks down, or fails, on the basis of ideo-motor 
 action. The first idea fails to suggest an adequate method 
 of reaction, or there is some conflict of ideas which impedes 
 and delays action until it is settled by reflection. The 
 necessity of delay between the having of the idea and 
 response to it is the condition which calls forth the process 
 of thinking. In this interval conscious processes actively 
 function to effect readjustment. This functioning of con- 
 sciousness is deliberation, reflection, or more simply, think- 
 ing; and the type of action is deliberative as contrasted with 
 ideo-motor. 
 
 b. Illustration 
 
 The thought occurs to me to build a fire in the furnace. 
 In harmony with this thought, the reaction process is 
 touched off in the routine channel. But the fire won't 
 burn. The process of adjustment has broken down on the 
 ideo-motor basis. The idea has not yet been realized. Its 
 realization is interrupted and delayed. The interval of de- 
 lay may be utilized in the attempt to effect a readjustment 
 by blind experimentation, or it may be utilized in the at- 
 tempt to solve the problem reflectively. Let us take the 
 latter case. I begin to reflect upon the situation. I men- 
 tally go over what I have been doing to determine whether 
 it was all right, or to locate the point of difficulty. Did I 
 clean out every part of the furnace properly before putting 
 in the fuel? I investigate to find out. Observation, or 
 further perceptual processes, come in here to assist mem- 
 ory. Did I have the chimney cleaned during the summer? 
 
go The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 Active memory functions here. Suppose that I take out 
 all the kindling and the coal, put them all back in a differ- 
 ent order, go and get some kerosene and pdur it over the 
 whole, rearrange all the drafts, and then light the fire. Yes, 
 that will be a good plan ; that is what I shall do, and I shall 
 expect that the fire will burn. Here active imagination 
 has been functioning. As a result of my deliberation in 
 the interval between the original idea and the ultimate 
 reaction process which is to secure adjustment, the whole 
 method of procedure has been mentally reconstructed. 
 c. Deliberative action the specific field of thinking. 
 This mental reconstruction which goes on in the interval 
 of delay between idea and response is a process of thinking. 
 It is in the deliberative type of action that thinking per- 
 forms its normal function. The conditions and function of 
 thinking will be taken up more in detail in the next chapter. 
 We have sought primarily in this chapter to give its setting 
 in the whole series of adaptive activities. We have been 
 leading up to a point of view for its dynamic interpretation. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapter VII 
 
 Xirkpatrick, Fundamentals of Child Study, Ch. 3. 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 242-5, 251-63. 
 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, Ch. 12 and pp. 422-9. 
 Angell, Psychology, Chs. 15, 16, 17 and pp. 397-402. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 CONDITIONS AND FUNCTION OF THINKING 
 
 1. Conditions of Thinking. 
 
 We have located the thinking process in the process of 
 adjustment as a necessity of problematic situations in which 
 adjustment is delayed until some reconstruction can be 
 effected by the ideational use of past experience. The 
 conditions of thinking may be analyzed more closely by 
 considering the different ways in which the process of 
 adjustment may become problematic. For practical dis- 
 cussion' these may be reduced to three general types. The 
 problem may center (i) in the end to be attained, (2) in 
 the appropriate means to be employed, and (3) in the organ- 
 ization of the means into a definite mode of procedvire. 
 
 2. Problem in the End. 
 (i) Vagueness of the end. 
 
 In many situations which confront us we feel impelled 
 to do something, we feel that action of some sort is called 
 for, but the end is too vague to serve as a basis for the 
 determination of a course of procedure. Action is blocked, 
 and deliberation must ensue before anything can be done 
 satisfactorily. The vague end must be developed, cleared 
 up, and made more definite before reaction can take place. 
 
 Many of the most difficult problems in life are of this 
 sort. We do not know exactly what it is that we want to 
 do, what our aim precisely is. Consequently we go blunder- 
 ing along in inefficiency, unless we hold our processes of 
 reaction more or less in abeyance until we can think the 
 whole situation through and clear it up. I may have a 
 vigue idea that I wish to be a reformer, or it may be a 
 m'ssionary. But what is it to be a reformer? Just what 
 
 91 
 
92 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 does it mean to be a missionary? I cannot tell what I must 
 do nor how to do it until I have a clear idea of the end to 
 be attained. Then it will be possible for me to so order 
 my course of action as to prepare myself properly for my 
 chosen calling. If I know exactly what it means to be a 
 missionary, I may choose to study medicine and prepare 
 myself to practise the healing art as one of the means which 
 I shall employ in realizing my end. And of course I shall 
 have to study carefully the religious impulses of those to 
 whom I am to go as well as grounding myself in the 
 essentials of my own religion. 
 
 In school work, we find that the problem of clear think- 
 ing often first centers in the problem of clearly conceiving 
 the end to be attained. Particularly in arithmetic and 
 geometry is this seen. The statement of the problem must 
 be analyzed and carefully interpreted before any other work 
 is begun. In geometric demonstration, failure is very 
 often due to the fact that the student has not clearly 
 defined his end before undertaking his solution. And all 
 of us who have ever been in school, whether as pupils or 
 as teachers, have seen children rush into the solution of 
 problems in arithmetic, beginning at once to add, subtract, 
 multiply, or divide, before they had taken the trouble to 
 ascertain exactly the end to be realized. Certainly one 
 phase of a problematic situation calling for thinking is the 
 end to be attained. The stress of the problem may center 
 in the definition of the end, and all the rest may be easy. 
 It would be as easy to illustrate the same point in laboratory 
 work and manual training as in the case of the more 
 theoretical, or book, subjects. 
 
 (2) Conflict of ends. 
 
 In some cases the problem centers in the end because con- 
 flicting ends present themselves, each competing for motor 
 expression. Such is the classical case of Antigone. Should 
 she obey her sovereign and leave her brother unburied? 
 Or should she obey the religious impulse which made ii a 
 
Conditions and Function of Thinking 93 
 
 sacred duty to give her brother burial? Not only is such 
 a case one which calls forth the feelings in a most intense 
 form, but also it is one in which the thinking process is 
 involved in a very vital fashion. 
 
 This type of situation, in less/intense form, is quite char- 
 acteristic of our complex life. A simpler illustration would 
 be the case of the student who has a lesson to get in the 
 evening-'and is also invited to go to a very attractive con- 
 cert, t' Two ends are presented at the same time to con- 
 sciousness, each with its particular kind of appeal. The 
 movement of thought is somewhat as follows : "It is only 
 a few days before examination. I am none too well pre- 
 pared. Can I afford to lose the time? I should be hor- 
 ribly chagrined if I should fail. On the other hand, this is 
 an exceptionally good concert. The soloist is a prima 
 donna of international reputation. If I do not hear her 
 now, am I likely ever to have the opportunity again?" 
 Thus both aspects of the situation are canvassed. The 
 thinking process is very active. Its function is to find some 
 solution of the conflict. This may be through a careful 
 evaluation of each of the ends and a choice of that one 
 which, taking everything into consideration in the given 
 situation, is esteemed of the greater worth. Or solution 
 may be found in such a rearrangement of one's time as to 
 be able to realize both ends. In either of these cases the 
 conflict ceases, and the appropriate mode of reaction 
 follows. 
 
 3. Problem in the Means. 
 
 One may know quite definitely what he wants to do, but 
 there may still be the problem of what means to employ to 
 reach the end. The poor young man may have definitely 
 conceived of himself as some time in the future an edu- 
 cated man. He is going to college. But what means to 
 choose to get the money with which to accomplish his end 
 is a great problem, and one which requires careful thought. 
 
94 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 Theie are a variety of possible ways of earning money, that 
 is, of means to be employed. He must carefully consider 
 them to determine which are best. If, as soon as this 
 problem is solved, he knows just how to organize his means 
 into a definite mode of procedure, then the reaction is freed 
 and he may immediately enter upon that series of activities 
 which is going to culminate in his finding himself within 
 college walls. 
 
 4. Problem in Method, or Organization of Means. 
 
 If the young man has selected his various means of earn- 
 ing the money with which to go to college, still there may 
 be the problem of how best to organize these means into 
 a definite series of steps, every one of which shall occupy its 
 proper place in the whole in due relation to every other so 
 as to lead most directly and efficiently to the end. 
 
 To take another illustration, in building a house one 
 may have quite a definite conception of the end, he may 
 also have his means in an abundance of building materials 
 and tools and laborers. But there is still the problem, 
 requiring an immense amount of thinking, of how to 
 organize these means into a definite series of steps, a suc- 
 cession of proper reaction processes, which shall realize the 
 end. 
 
 5. Restatement of the Conditions of Thinking. 
 
 (i) Distinction between means and end a practical dis- 
 tinction only. 
 
 The analysis here given must be regarded as only a 
 rough-and-ready one for the sake of attracting attention to 
 the phases within a problematic situation where the diffi- 
 culty or obstacle may lie which impedes reaction and makes 
 thinking necessary. Of course, in any philosophical view 
 of the matter means and end cannot be so sharply diflFer- 
 entiated from each other. Only that is a means which is 
 relevant to an end. The choice of it as a means implies 
 that I see its relevancy, and hence its place in a system of 
 
Conditions and Function of Thinking 95 
 
 processes which shall realize the end. /if I have really 
 determined the means in any philosophical sense of the 
 word, I have also determined their organization.,/ But for 
 practical purposes we must make distinctions which have 
 value in the determination of action. The distinction be- 
 tween cause and effect is different from the philosophical 
 point of view and from the practical. From the philosoph- 
 ical point of view it vanishes in a system of relations ; from 
 the practical point of view the distinction has real value 
 in the determination of action. So it is with the distinction 
 here set up between means, end, and method, or organiza- 
 tion of means with reference to the realization of the end. 
 
 (2) Illustrations. 
 
 Another illustration may serve to bring out more clearly 
 the fact that the distinctions made are in reality only points 
 of stress within a situation which is problematic, points of 
 stress at which more reconstructive activity of mind is 
 demanded than at other points within the whole process of 
 adjustment. I am to entertain a party of friends on an 
 autumn day. The thought comes to me that I will decorate 
 my rooms for the occasion. Now the end thus presented 
 seems to us at first thought quite definite. But is it so in 
 reality ? 
 
 The embodiment of the idea of the end in a specific word, 
 "decoration", misleads us as to the real nature of the end. 
 The end is problematic in the sense that it is vague and 
 formless, unless the whole idea of autumn decoration is 
 so thoroughly familiar that my mind supplies practically 
 automatically the details of material and arrangement. If 
 the situation is problematic because the end is vague, the 
 process of defining the end through thinking involves the 
 selection of the leaves and flowers and their arrangement 
 for most pleasing effect. Only thus does the end get real 
 content. Hence the process of defining the end and that 
 of determining means and their organization go on together 
 and are mutually determining. 
 
96 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 Yet it is true that tlie point of view in the thinking pro- 
 cess involved may shift so that the problematic aspect in 
 the focus of attention is now that of defining the end, now 
 that of determining the means as separate relevant ele- 
 ments, and now that of arrangement, or organization, of 
 means. The problem of decorating my rooms has its 
 different aspects within one whole : there is the question of 
 what is the efifect which I wish to produce, the question of 
 the flowers and leaves available and suitable for the pro- 
 duction of the effect, and the question of their arrangement. 
 While none of these can be determined in isolation, yet, 
 from the practical point of view involved in the necessities 
 of action, any one of these may become the point of special 
 stress where the crux of the problem is to be found; or 
 this point of special stress, requiring the activity of think- 
 ing, may shift to and fro from one to another of these 
 different phases within the whole process of adjustment. 
 
 Another illustration of the point which we are trying to 
 make can be found in the teaching process. In the teach- 
 ing process as a practical matter, we have to make dis- 
 tinctions for the sake of control which are only working 
 distinctions. We know that they are distinctions which 
 from a larger and more inclusive point of view do not hold. 
 We must take account of the aim of the lesson ; we have 
 certain definite subject matter and certain well-recognized 
 general methods which constitute our means ; and then 
 there is the problem of adjustment of this subject matter 
 and these methods to the child in such a way as to realize 
 our aim. In a general sense, this last is inclusive of the 
 other two. But circumstances may be such as to make 
 the stress of the problem fall on the definition of the aim, 
 or again on the nature of the subject matter, or again on 
 the specific adjustment for to-day. 
 
 (3) Summary and formulation. 
 
 There are, then, three possible problematic phases within 
 a process of adjustment, — the phase of end, the phase of 
 
Conditions and Function of Thinking 97 
 
 means, and the phase of organization, or specific method. 
 These three are mutually determining of one another, yet 
 they represent different points of stress at which the prob- 
 lem may center. At whatever one of these points the 
 situation becomes problematic we have the conditions which 
 require the functioning of thinking to solve the problem. 
 Thinking comes in to further the process of adjustment at 
 points in that process where problems arise. 
 
 If we try to gather up the results of our discussion of the 
 conditions of thinking in the form of a general principle, 
 it would run somewhat as follows : Thinking is called forth 
 in situations in which there is something consciously proh-' 
 lematic in some phase of the process of adjustment of 
 means to ends. 
 
 On the basis of the principle just stated, we may give 
 the following brief definition : Thinking is the process of 
 consciously adjusting means to ends in problematic situa- 
 tions. This definition must not be interpreted too mechan- 
 ically. It is merely a brief statement to suggest to us the 
 fuller meaning of the thinking process without having to 
 go through a lot of qualifying phrases. 
 
 6. Relation of Thinking to Other Conscious Pro- 
 cesses. 
 
 If we have in deliberative action the best illustrations of 
 the function of thinking, so also does it give us striking 
 evidence of the fact that the thinking process is not separate 
 and distinct from other conscious processes If we were 
 to go over in detail the illustration of dehberation given in 
 Chapter VII in the case of the troublesome furnace fire and 
 also all the illustrations given in the earlier part of this 
 chapter, supplying the details in what has only been sketched, 
 we should find that the process of deliberation is often 
 a vast complex of conscious processes of every sort, all 
 working upon a given situation from the point of view of a 
 common problem. There are involved processes of obser- 
 7 
 
98 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 vation, or further perception. Past experiences are called 
 up in the form of memory and reproductive imagination. 
 Images appearing in consciousness are judged and evaluated 
 with reference to their relevancy or their irrelevancy, and 
 on the basis of this judging some are selected and others 
 rejected. Processes of constructive imagination are at 
 work in the organization of new modes of procedure. And 
 so we might go on through the whole range of specific con- 
 scious processes. 
 
 Thinking is not so much a distinct conscious process as, 
 it is an organization of all the conscious processes whicU. 
 are relevant in a problematic situation for the performance 
 of the function of consciously adjusting means to end. In 
 the performance of this function it may take up into itself 
 perception, memory, imagination, judgment, etc. These 
 all become phases in the whole process of consciously solv- 
 ing the problem. Their activity is dominated and unified 
 throughout by their relevancy to that problem. Thinking 
 is to be named from the function which is being performed, 
 from the organization of the conscious processes to do a 
 certain kind of work, rather than from the specific ideational 
 elements of structure which are employed. 
 
 7. General Significance of Thinking from the Point 
 OF View of Control. 
 
 If our ideational modes of control were limited to those 
 which have already been reduced to the form of ideo-motor 
 reactions, our growth in individual control would be at an 
 end. Fortunately not all voluntary action is of the ideo- 
 motor type. The idea that comes does not immediately get 
 its appropriate expression mechanically. The reaction is 
 delayed and becomes problematic. In the interval of delay 
 between the original idea, or the original impulse, and the 
 motor response, thinking intervenes to reconstruct the sit- 
 uation with reference to the main point of stress, or ten- 
 sion, on which the right adjustment depends. Thinking 
 
Conditions and Function of Thinking 99 
 
 is the very heart and center of dehberative modes of 
 adjustment. It is the vital phase of all reconstruction 
 that is reflected in consciousness as problematic. It marks 
 the highest point of the functioning of consciousness in vol- 
 untary action. Thinking is always doing reconstructive 
 work rather than routine work. Through thinking we may 
 reconstruct our existing modes of reaction to deal more 
 efficiently with situations already partly under our control, 
 and particularly through thinking we may devise methods 
 of dealing with new situations for which our other con- 
 scious processes furnish us with no method of control. 
 Thus, thinking is continually enlarging the field of con- 
 trol, particularly in those fields where adjustment is neither 
 on the one hand a racial matter nor* on the other a matter 
 of common ideo-motor routine. What thinking achieves 
 may, however, if repeated frequently enough, be reduced to 
 the more automatic ideo-motor form of control, while the 
 thinking process goes on dealing with new needs the sat- 
 isfaction of which is not yet attained. Thinking is, then, 
 preeminently the conscious process which is concerned in 
 the development and attainment of that highest form of 
 adjustment which we have called individual control. 
 
 The conception of thinking which we have developed is 
 thoroughly functional and biological. The thinking pro- 
 cess is viewed from its dynamic aspect as a factor of 
 significance in the concrete life of the individual. It is easy 
 in reading rapidly to suppose that by this concrete life of 
 the individual is meant primarily his physical life. It may 
 be well not to conclude this chapter without warning the 
 reader once more that such an interpretation of the biolog- 
 ical point of view is too narrow to be justified. Problems 
 of the higher life are a part of the concrete life of the indi- 
 vidual as well as those of the physical life. There have to 
 be mental, moral, aesthetic, and spiritual adjustments and 
 readjustments in the process of satisfying the needs of 
 human beings. The life o'f action and physical existence 
 
lOO The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 is, indeed, more immediate and primary, but it is not for 
 that reason of any more value in the whole process of evo- 
 lution. Personality and individuality in the matter of the 
 control which we exercise in the affairs of the higher life 
 is certainly preferable to the dead level of routine inherent 
 in blind custom or blind obedience to authority. Individual 
 control is to be achieved in the realm of social and spiritual 
 values, or any other aspect of the higher life, only by think- 
 ing, just as truly as in the world of physical science or 
 industrial pursuit. 
 
 8. Relation between Functional and Structural 
 Interpretations of Thinking. 
 
 In giving a functional interpretation of thinking, we do 
 not mean to imply that it has no characteristic structural 
 features. The very fact that thinking is an organization 
 of the conscious processes to perform a certain kind of 
 work would imply that the organization must have a char- 
 acter that is relevant to the kind of work to be done. As 
 this work is marked by variations in the nature of the 
 problems to be solved, we should expect variations in the 
 structural aspects, or the technique, of the thinking process 
 to meet differences of need inherent in the differences of 
 problems. These elements of special structure we shall 
 discuss in later chapters. Suffice it for the present to say 
 that functional psychology does not ignore structural dif- 
 ferentiations, but when it discusses them it interprets them 
 as themselves definitely related to the more adequate per- 
 formance of function. So it will be in our discussion of 
 thinking. We must at some time point out the special 
 elements of technique in the thinking process, but we shall 
 do so not for the sake of the analysis itself but for the sake 
 of the light which it will throw upon the performance of 
 the thinking function. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE THINKING 
 PROCESS 
 
 1. Unity and Continuity. 
 
 From the crudest, simplest, and least adequate forms 
 of thinking employed by the small child up to the most com- 
 plex, most highly controlled, and most adequate forms 
 used by the trained scientist or philosopher, the thinking 
 process is from the point of view of function the same. In 
 all the stages of its development it has the same biological 
 significance, it has the same task to perform, namely, that 
 of consciously adjusting means to ends.' The only test that 
 can be applied to determine whether an individual does 
 think, be he animal, child, or scientist, is this common test 
 of function. We must have evidence that he does con- 
 sciously adjust means to ends in situations which are unde- 
 niably too problematic to be controlled by routine or 
 customary modes of action. 
 
 2. The Principle of Difference. 
 
 The difference in the thinking process at its lower and 
 its higher limits is a matter of the difference in the 
 technique of the process. In the higher thinking process, 
 consciousness guides and directs activities to the more ade- 
 quate performance of their function through the use of a 
 larger number and a more powerful kind of mental tools 
 which it has forged in the course of experience. Illus- 
 trations of what we mean by these mental tools are the 
 abstract image, the logical concept, definite modes of reason- 
 ing, etc. In the higher forms of thinking the tools have 
 been perfected more fully, and there has been attained a 
 
102 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 higher degree of control over them and of skill in their use. 
 A more complete statement of just what are the specific 
 elements of technique in the thinking process and what is 
 the function of each in facilitating that process must be 
 postponed for future chapters. Our task for the present 
 will be limited to the attempt to clarify, illustrate, develop, 
 and apply the doctrine of identity of function with differ- 
 ence in technique as a point of view for studying the think- 
 ing process. 
 
 3. Identity of Function with Difference in Tech- 
 nique.^ 
 
 (i) Importance of the idea. 
 
 The idea of identity of function, with difference in 
 technique, is one of the central and dominating thoughts 
 of this book. If the reader wishes to grasp the argument 
 of the succeeding chapters, he must try to get this idea as 
 clearly in mind as possible and hold it there firmly. We 
 shall try to clear the thought up a little more fully at this 
 point, hoping that this will be sufficient for present pur- 
 poses. In applying the doctrine as an interpretative 
 principle in the following chapters, it will become more in- 
 telligible and its significance will be more fully appreciated. 
 
 (2) Analogy from the industrial process. 
 
 What we mean by unity of function, with difference of 
 technique, may be seen in the history of threshing grain. 
 We have various stages of development in the evolution 
 and perfection of this art. There is the rubbing of the 
 grain in the hands and the blowing away of the chaff with 
 the breath ; the pounding of it with a stick and throwing of 
 it up into the air for the wind to carry away the chaff ; the 
 
 ' My formulation here was suggested by a passage in Dewey's 
 Psychology and Social Practice, pp. 9-14. He discusses mistaken 
 identities and differences of child and adult psychology. While the 
 terms function and technique are my own, I have applied freely his 
 seed thought. 
 
Unity and Diversity in the Thinking Process 103 
 
 improvement upon the stick by the use of two sticks 
 fastened by a thong, one stick being used for a pounder 
 and the other for a handle, i.e., the invention of the flail, 
 and finally this supplemented by the fanning mill ; and last 
 of all comes the threshing machine with its high degree of 
 perfection of all the parts necessary to the process, and 
 their organization into the most efficient machine. 
 
 Throughout we have the performance of the same func- 
 tion in all the stages of development from the most primi- 
 tive to the most modern. In this respect they are all alike; 
 there is identity and continuity. But on the side of tech- 
 nique there is wide diversity between primitive threshing 
 and modern. The significance, however, of the elaborate 
 technique is not in itself, but in its relation to the better 
 performance of a function to which it is relevant. Thresh- 
 ing may be done without the modern threshing machine, 
 but not so well ; the function of thinking may be performed 
 zvithoiit the elaborate and highly wrought technique which 
 characterises the thinking of the trained adidt, but such 
 thinking can deal only with simpler situations and is not 
 so efficient. 
 
 (j) Illustrations. 
 
 The primitive shepherd settled the question of whether 
 all of his sheep were in the fold by identifying each one of 
 them personally. His mental tool for solving the problem 
 was a specific, concrete image of every one of the sheep. 
 Observation of oriental shepherds of recent times confirms 
 the literal truth of the Biblical figure, "He calleth his own 
 sheep by name." In some places shepherds of the prim- 
 itive type determine whether they have all their sheep or 
 not by a process of keeping tally. Here the mind has sub- 
 stituted a concrete device for the separate concrete images 
 of the individual sheep. A herder on our western plains 
 would solve the same problem simply by counting. His 
 mental tools are pure abstract symbols. /In all these cases 
 there is the same practical problem to be solved./ The 
 
104 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 mental function to be performed is the same, but the ele- 
 ments of technique, the mental tools, utilized in performing 
 that function are different, frhere is identity of thinking 
 function, with difference of technique./ 
 
 The Egyptians satisfied themselves that the square on 
 the hypothentise of the right triangle is equivalent to the 
 sum of the squares on the other two sides. This truth they 
 gathered from repeated practical experiences. The Greeks 
 proved the same truth by going through a process of 
 demonstration in which the truth of the proposition follows 
 logically from the principle in accordance with which the 
 figure is constructed. In both cases we have illustrations 
 of thinking processes, but that of the Greeks is more highly 
 organized and controlled. There is identity of function, 
 but difference of technique. In logical demonstration there 
 is a specific method of procedure for drawing inferences 
 and checking them up so as to secure accuracy. This 
 established method of procedure is an important element 
 of technique in geometrical thinking, a mental tool, as it 
 were, which the mind uses for the attainment of superior 
 control in dealing with problems of this sort. 
 
 4. Reasoning viewed as involving Higher Technique. 
 
 It is not our purpose in this section to go into the ques- 
 tion of the specific technique of the reasoning process. For 
 that we are not yet prepared. It will be taken up' later. 
 We shall, however, stop a moment to point out the general 
 line of distinction between reasoning and other forms of 
 thinking. This we do at this point not for the sake of dis- 
 cussing reasoning itself, but for the sake of emphasizing 
 again the doctrine of identity of function and difference 
 in technique as it applies to the thinking process. It will 
 also furnish a point of view for the discussion of certain 
 educational ideas. 
 
 As we do not view primitive threshing and modern 
 threshing as functionally distinct processes, no more should 
 
Unity and Diversity in the Thinking Process 105 
 
 we set thinking and reasoning over against each other as 
 separate and distinct. ^Reasoning is thinking, but it is think- 
 ing characterized by a specific technique. / Reasoning is a 
 stage in the development of the thinking process in which 
 the attainment of a specific, highly wrought, and well 
 organized technique has reached its maximum. The rea- 
 soning of the trained scientist is not different in its essential 
 {i.e., its functional) nature from the crude thinking of 
 the child. /The difference centers in the matter of its tech- 
 nique and the added control which it gives to the individual 
 over the whole thinking process. ^Through superiority in 
 technique the scientist can make the thinking process bend 
 more adequately to his own will in the solution of prob- 
 lems. / This more highly controlled type of thinking we call 
 reasoning. / 
 
 5. The Thinking of Children. 
 
 (i) Fallacy of the doctrine of receptivity. 
 
 The question, "Do children think?", would seem absurd 
 to the average parent. He would take it for granted that 
 they do. The only reason for raising the question at this 
 point is that educational theory and practice are sometimes 
 shaped from the point of view that the minds of children 
 are wholly receptive. In emphasizing the difference be- 
 tween children and adults (in itself a very valuable con- 
 tribution of the child-study movement), it has happened 
 that many have differentiated between child mind and 
 adult mind so sharply as to leave the impression that think- 
 ing is a late development. This is an error which, whether 
 it takes conscious form or only operates unconsciously to 
 determine method, needs to be tracked down and clearly 
 exposed. 
 
 We may consistently hold that small children (and pos- 
 sibly lower animals) think, while at the same time we deny 
 that they can reason./ It does not follow that because the 
 small child cannot reason therefore he cannot think any 
 
io6 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 more than it follows that because primitive man did not 
 have our modern threshing machine therefore he could not 
 thresh grain. The trouble in the interpretation of the 
 child's mind which has led to a tendency to minimize his 
 power to think and to overestimate the importance of 
 receptivity is to be traced to a subtle and almost unconscious 
 tendency to use the terms thinking and reasoning as 
 synonyms. 
 
 (2) Origin and nature of the fallacious doctrine. 
 Much that is erroneous and vicious in educational 
 thought and practice has crept in through the failure to see 
 precisely, on the one hand, in what respects ordinary think- 
 ing and reasoning are identical, and, on the other hand, in 
 just what respects they are different. The adult conscious- 
 ness, with its highly specialized forms of thinking, has been 
 analyzed. The results of this analysis have been taken, 
 and rightly so, as the standard of the reasoning process. 
 '^ Then, unconsciously identifying reasoning and thinking, 
 / while ignoring their fundamental difference, the standard 
 J of thinking (which was in reality the standard of reasoning) 
 ^ has been applied to the mind of the child. Failure to find 
 ^ the abstract imagery, the logical concepts, and other highly 
 v^ wrought mental tools, has led to the conclusion that the 
 <jf/ child cannot reason, which is right ; but their conclusion 
 covertly is made to carry with it the implication that he 
 cannot think, which is wrong. With this implication is 
 bound up another, namely, that childhood is a period of 
 receptivity and not of thinking, hence training consists in 
 filling the mind with a host of facts about which he shall 
 think later when his reasoning powers have developed. 
 (s) Reality of the child's thinking. 
 
 It is not to be denied that the period of childhood is one of 
 marked receptivity ; but it is also one of tremendous signifi- 
 cance in the training of thinking. Receptivity and some 
 form of thinking power are related facts, not distinct things. 
 But the thinking of the earlier period is of the simpler sort 
 
Unity and Diversity in the Thinking Process 107 
 
 which we cannot call reasoning. It is not marked by the 
 possession of a highly wrought technique. It is relatively 
 undifferentiated and unspecialized in its form; but it is 
 just as real and just as vital as that of any scientist or 
 philosopher. The problems of adjustment of means to 
 ends that come into the life of the child are just as real to 
 him as any such problems are to the adult, even if they are 
 simpler and his power of dealing with them is less. In 
 so far as he deals with a real problem that cannot be solved 
 by the more automatic processes of consciousness he thinks, 
 even if the solution is very simple; in so far as his solution 
 is lacking in the higher technique of control he does not 
 reason. 
 
 6. Training in Thinking, — General Principles. 
 
 (i) Principle of unity and continuity, — identity of func- 
 tion. 
 
 The functional conception of thinking makes it a process 
 of consciously adjusting means to ends in problematic sit- 
 uations. Such a process presupposes a feeling of need and 
 the recognition of a problem. If there is unity and conti- 
 nuity of function in all stages of the development of the 
 thinking process, there must also be at all levels of its 
 development on the one hand the feeling of need and on 
 the other the consciousness of something problematic. 
 That is, there is both a feeling aspect and an intellectual 
 aspect to the process. From the functional point of view 
 the unity of the thinking process may be discussed both from 
 the side of the feeling element, or motivation, and from the 
 side of consciousness of problem, or intellectual activity. 
 Both are important in their bearing on the question of train- 
 ing in thinking. 
 
 a. Unity on the side of motivation, the feeling element. 
 We have seen that normally the thinking process is cal- 
 culated to meet a need ; it is teleological to the core. This 
 
io8 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 is true whether the thinking be that of the little child or 
 that of the trained adult. This means that thinking is vital 
 only under conditions in which it functions to secure some 
 end which the individual is capable of conceiving and does 
 conceive as worth while. There is not a different law in 
 this respect for the child from that which applies to the 
 adult. Out in life's work men think because they need to 
 think in order to secure results which they wish to attain. 
 Out of school children do the same. Motivation is a law of 
 life, not merely of adult life. 
 
 If training in thinking is to work in harmony with 
 natural laws, and not be a process of lifting a dead weight 
 in opposition to the laws of nature, then it can be most 
 effectual only when it succeeds in calling forth the activities 
 of mind in situations which in their very nature demand the 
 organization of the conscious processes in the form of 
 thinking to meet some need which the individual feels is 
 relevant to him. That kind of training in thinking which 
 is summed up in the putting of the child through a series 
 of exercises whose sole design is to give him practice in 
 the art, is dead at the very heart. /Vital exercise of the 
 thinking power comes only where there is motivation. /The 
 feeling element, the appeal to the me-side of the self, 'can- 
 not be ignored and the process still be dynamic and suffused 
 with a sense of reality and worth-whileness. 1 The problem 
 of motivation is central in all modern pedagogy. But it 
 has been discussed too much under the head of interest, and 
 the real nature of the problem has been obscured. 
 
 b. Unity on the side of intellectual activity, or problem. 
 
 Not only is all thinking normally in response to a felt 
 need of some sort, but also it is a response to such a need 
 in a particular kind of a situation. The situation which 
 demands the organization of consciousness in the form of 
 thinking is one in which there is something consciously 
 problematic. In this respect there is unity and continuity 
 in the thinking process in all stages of its development. 
 
Unity and Diversity in the Thinking Process 109 
 
 In terms of intellect, then, just as we have seen it in terms 
 of feeling, there is not one law for the adult and a different 
 one for the child. A problem of some sort is the essential 
 intellectual condition and the solution of the problem con- 
 stitutes the essential intellectual activity. 
 
 Thinking must be viewed as functional. The repetition 
 of forms of thinking can give training in the forms of 
 thinking only, not in its functional use. fThe function of 
 thinking for the child as well as for the adult is the solu- 
 tion of problems. I This is true no matter how great may 
 be the variety of situations with which the thinking process 
 has to deal or how great a difference there may be in the 
 degree of complexity and specialization of the processes 
 involved in the exercise of the thinking function. /Training 
 in thinking cannot be successful without leading the child 
 up face to face with problems and letting him wrestle with 
 them. / Function must be emphasized first and form and 
 technique afterwards. Let the child have frequent oppor- 
 tunities to work out for himself the method of dealing with 
 problematic situations, however clumsy his solution may be, 
 and after he has performed the function of thinking show 
 him how he might make it easier or smoother by improving 
 on the form. 
 
 c. Further applications. 
 
 We are accustomed to recognize these two principles, 
 that of the consciousness of need, practical or intellectual, 
 and that of consciousness of problem, as vital conditions 
 necessary to adult thinking. Do we always give them 
 their due recognition in the process of training the child to 
 think? Or do we at this point assume in our educational 
 practice a difference? Do we not too often expect the child 
 to think without any motivation? Ends are presented by 
 us, and we expect him to react to them on demand. Do 
 we not also expect him to go through a process rather 
 than to perform a function? And so long as he goes 
 through the process, often dictated by us at every step and 
 
no The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 learned, we are satisfied, even if there is in reality no 
 conscious adjustment of means to ends wrought out by his 
 own mental processes. To illustrate, we sometimes, though 
 fortunately with growing infrequency, require children to 
 go through with elaborate forms of sentence analysis, called 
 parsing, or to learn highly logical modes of analyzing prob- 
 lems in arithmetic, without the child's ever having any 
 sense of their value, and hence without their meeting any 
 sort of need of his, intellectual or otherwise. Often he 
 does not even conceive any real problem other than is in- 
 volved in the mere form, in which he often becomes quite 
 expert, so expert as to give the impression of an intelligence 
 that is almost human ! We substitute the mechanism for 
 the thought function and exalt the finished product which 
 it produces, dead though it be, above the cruder form of the 
 living reality. 
 
 What has just been said must not be construed as whole- 
 sale condemnation of such exercises as parsing in grammar 
 and of logical analysis of problems in arithmetic. It is 
 merely a plea for the full recognition of the fact that on 
 the side of motivation and of function the thinking of the 
 child and that of the adult are to be viewed as identical in 
 nature. Only through recognition of this fact can artifi- 
 ciality and formality of training in the thinking process be 
 avoided. We are already moving in the right direction in 
 the gradual reconstruction of the curriculum along lines 
 which furnish concrete material for the purpose of appeal- 
 ing to the child's natural impulses of curiosity, imitation, 
 construction, etc. Motivation is thus secured from the 
 start. Moreover, the activities into which the child is led 
 serve as the basis for the natural emergence of real, as 
 opposed to formal, problems of a quite concrete character. 
 Out of these will naturally spring, as they become more 
 complex in character, problems still more highly intellectual 
 whose solution is demanded not from without, but because 
 of the recognized relation of these problems to some larger 
 
Unity and Diversity in the Thinking Process iii 
 
 whole within which they fall. Training in thinking, if con- 
 ducted along these lines, would satisfy both the intellectual 
 and the emotional conditions of the normal thinking process 
 as we find it outside of the schoolroom, where it is per- 
 forming its legitimate life function. 
 
 Of course such a view of training in thinking makes it 
 a task that requires constant study and great skill on the 
 part of the teacher. It requires that subject matter, 
 whether knowledge to be acquired or modes of activity to 
 be set up and perfected, be thought of constantly in terms 
 of the possibilities of its use to stimulate new interests and 
 .to arouse the consciousness of new values. It requires also 
 such skilful guidance and direction of the child that he is 
 led to conceive problems for himself and to undertake their 
 solution as a necessary and natural phase of the realization 
 of his ends. Formal exercises, so far as they are intro- 
 duced, come in then only to serve as models and to furnish 
 practice in thinking processes, the nature and value of which 
 are already appreciated. Formal training and drill are not 
 to be condemned, but they are to be given their true 
 psychological place, the place where motivation and function 
 are at the maximum. 
 
 (2) Principle of difference between the thinking of the 
 child and that of the adult, — difference in technique. 
 a. Application of the principle. 
 It has already been pointed out that the thinking of the 
 child and that of the trained adult differ in the matter of 
 the technique of the process. Proper training in thinking 
 must recognize this fundamental difference. It is at this 
 point that we must insist that the child be interpreted in 
 terms of himself and not in terms of the adult. The types 
 of the problematic situations to which we introduce the 
 child must be adapted to his stage of development. They 
 must be simple enough to be met by a less highly specialized 
 thinking process. The relation between end and means 
 must be more obvious in the earlier stages of development 
 
112 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 of thinking. If we try to force the child through thinking 
 processes in terms of our highly specialized technique, we 
 only arrest development. It it more important that he 
 actually make conscious adjustment of means to ends m 
 problematic situations than that he do this in terms of the 
 adult process. 
 
 The analysis of the thinking process of the trained adult 
 reveals to us the goal of our process of training ; but it can- 
 not furnish the method. For this we must turn to the 
 study of the growing, developing mind. We must under- 
 stand that this mind starts out to perform a function in a 
 crude and unspecialized way, and that it is only through a 
 continuous reconstruction of its modes of activity in actual 
 experiences that it develops the special elements of technique 
 necessary to most perfect control. The crude and unspe- 
 cialized processes of conscious adjustment mark the initial 
 point in a process whose final point is determined by the 
 highly specialized and highly controlled thinking process 
 which we call reasoning. But we cannot reach that final 
 point in training by any process of superposition of the fin- 
 ished product upon the plastic mind, or by any process of 
 grafting the higher upon the lower. No drill upon any 
 magic set of exercises fashioned after the workings of the 
 most perfect and most logical mind can bridge the chasm 
 between the untrained and the trained type of thinking. 
 The ideal of the finished product is absolutely vicious, ex- 
 cept as it functions to determine the remote goal. This 
 goal can be reached only by starting with the child where 
 we find him. He must actually make conscious adjust- 
 ments of means to ends at first in his own crude and un- 
 specialized way. The process thus set up may be improved 
 through special attention to its technique. Through grad- 
 ual and continuous reconstructions of the process, it may 
 be made to approach in the course of time nearer and nearer 
 to the final goal of training. But the principle is perform- 
 ance of the function through some mode of expression first 
 
Unity and Diversity in the Thinking Process 113 
 
 and perfection of technique afterwards. To throw the first 
 stress upon the element of technique in training the think- 
 ing process or any other function is to reverse the natural 
 order and to produce artificiality and arrest of development. 
 b. Further interpretation through an analogy. 
 
 If there is any difficulty in understanding the principle 
 here enunciated for the training of the thinking process, it 
 is the same as that actually employed by the best teachers 
 in the subject of drawing and in the subject of language. 
 In drawing, the child is not now expected first to master 
 the elements of technique, — to practise upon straight lines 
 and curves, etc., as separate elements, — before he is allowed 
 to draw anything. But first there is developed some sort 
 of image in his mind, and he is allowed to express that 
 image freely in his own way. The results are the crudest 
 sort of drawings, in many cases scarcely recognizable as 
 signifying anything. Yet the wise teacher sees in them 
 great significance. She studiously cultivates freedom of 
 expression and does not worry about the finished product. 
 Each day through wise suggestion and criticism the child 
 improves in the form side of his work and almost uncon- 
 sciously learns the simpler elements of technique upon 
 which his art of drawing, or art of expressing his own 
 images, depends. This continues until the time comes for 
 making a special study of technique itself. 
 
 So also in language work, we now throw the stress upon 
 expression first. We try to get the children to talk freely 
 about things which interest them, things of everyday con- 
 cern. This we supplement with oral stories for reproduc- 
 tion. We do not worry very much about the finished 
 product. By suggestions here and corrections there, little 
 by little, in so far as they do not interfere too much with the 
 process of expression itself, — thus we familiarize the child 
 gradually with the technique of language in the very pro- 
 cess of its use, and only later do we make a systematic study 
 
114 T^'''^ Psychology of Thinking 
 
 of the technique and throw special stress upon it in formal 
 lessons in grammar. 
 
 The principle which we apply in the teaching of drawing 
 and of language is the true principle to employ in the train- 
 ing of the thinking process. Just as there are elements of 
 technique in drawing and in language, so also are there 
 special elements of technique in the thinking process. And 
 just as it is more important at first that the child actually 
 express himself in drawing and in language of some sort 
 than that he express himself in the best form ; so also in 
 the cultivation of the thinking power of the child it is more 
 important at the beginning that he actually thinks, actually 
 deals with situations which are consciously problematic, 
 than that he should think in the most finished form. The 
 function is more important than the form. We must start 
 with the function. The form will necessarily be crude at 
 first, but we can help the child little by little to realize the 
 inadequacy of his technique and gradually, through an 
 abundance of concrete experiences of thinking, guide him 
 into modes of thinking which are controlled by better ele- 
 ments of technique. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapter IX 
 
 Dewey, Psychology and Social Practice, pp. 9-14. 
 
 Dewey, The School and Society, pp. 28-9, 37, 49, 65, 72, 118. 
 
 Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum, pp. 32-3. 
 
 It is impossible to give good specific references to these books 
 for the purpose for which they should be read in connection 
 with this chapter, namely, for a study of motivation. The whole 
 discussion is relevant in the last two of the books. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 TRAINING IN THINKING— USE OF SUBJECT 
 MATTER 
 
 I. Purpose of this Chapter. 
 
 It is not the purpose of this chapter so much to give 
 specific suggestions for the teaching of certain school sub- 
 jects as it is to give additional illustrative material which 
 shall clarify the fundamental principles which we have 
 enunciated concerning the thinking process of the child. 
 Both the nature and the significance of these principles can 
 be grasped more fully through a study of their application. 
 A few suggestions in several subjects will suffice to make 
 the point of view stand out clearly enough so that the 
 teacher can apply the same principle further in the same 
 subject or in other subjects. 
 
 In discussing subject matter from the point of view of 
 its significance in training the thinking powers, we are not 
 to be interpreted as supposing that such training is the sole 
 object of the study of any or all of the school subjects. 
 But we would like to suggest that the possibilities of train- 
 ing in the power to think do not reside so much in the par- 
 ticular subject taught as in the method of teaching it. As- 
 the idea is still somewhat prevalent that the period of ele- 
 mentary education is one of receptivity rather than of 
 thinking, our discussion will concern itself primarily with 
 the early training of the child. It will have two principal 
 points of contact with preceding chapters, — one with Chap- 
 ter VIII, which emphasizes the functional nature of the 
 thinking process; the other with one of the fundamental 
 thoughts of Chapter IX, namely, that early training should 
 throw the stress upon the activity of thinking first rather 
 
 IIS 
 
Ii6 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 than upon the technique of the process. We would not 
 deny, either, that the education of the child should recog- 
 nize for all it is worth the fact that the period of elementary- 
 school life is one of very great receptivity. This, however, 
 we feel has been overemphasized through a false conception 
 of the real thinking powers of the child. 
 
 2. Kindergarten Games and Occupations. 
 
 (1) Opportunities for thinking. 
 
 It is not commonly thought that the kindergarten does, 
 or can do, anything in the line of training to think. But 
 there are opportunities even in the kindergarten for chil- 
 dren to make adjustments of means to ends in situations in 
 which there is some problematic element. What to do, 
 and how to do it, even in games, may be determined in part 
 by the child, without dictation at every point from the 
 teacher. 
 
 In building with blocks or in making representations of 
 various things in the sand box, the child has the opportun- 
 ity, or may have it, of conceiving ends and of consciously 
 organizing the means in such a way as to realize those ends. 
 At least, some of the suggestions may come from him. In 
 this way, the processes of sense perception, imagination, 
 and attention are organized into a mode of mental action 
 adapted to the performance of a certain kind of work. 
 That kind of work is the adjustment of means to ends in 
 situations which involve elements that are consciously 
 problematic. An organization of the mental processes 
 which does this kind of work, or performs this function, is 
 a thinking process. 
 
 (2) Simplicity, yet reality, of the child's thinking. 
 
 In these kindergarten occupations, thinking is, of course, 
 a very simple and untechnical process. Yet the conditions 
 which make thinking necessary and useful are just as truly 
 satisfied as they are in any of the situations which confront 
 the astronomer or the philosopher. The problems of the 
 latter may be more complex than those -oi the children, but 
 
Training in Thinking 1 17 
 
 their solutions are no more truly cases of conscious adjust- 
 ment of means to ends than the simpler ones which occur in 
 the kindergarten. The difference is not so much on the side 
 of the existence and vital appreciation of the problem as on 
 the side of the development and use of special technique 
 with which to deal with the problem. 
 
 (SJ The right kindergarten point of view. 
 
 There is no doubt that the kindergarten offers a field for 
 some training in thinking. But this training must be func- 
 tional and vital rather than formal. The kindergarten must 
 get away from the ideal of the finished product. This ideal 
 can operate only as suggesting a remote goal. In training 
 the thinking power of the child, the teacher must stand on 
 the solid ground of the conception of the growing mind 
 of the child as functional and dynamic. The imagination of 
 the kindergarten child is rather fluid and unspecialized.^ 
 Hence, after all, the most important aspect of training him 
 to think is the task of enriching and developing his imag- 
 ination, particularly in terms of the symbols of concrete 
 realities. 
 
 3. Manual Training. 
 
 (i) Motor training and skill not its chief value. 
 
 The term manual training is used here to include not only 
 working in wood and metal but also all forms of industrial 
 activity which depend for their motivation upon the con- 
 structive impulse or upon this in combination with the art 
 impujse. This whole field is one which is remarkably sig- 
 nificant in the possibilities which it affords of furnishing a 
 dynamic basis for the acquisition of knowledge, mental dis- 
 ciphne, and culture. Too often manual training is con- 
 ceived in terms of its value in the promotion of manual 
 dexterity and motor skill, or it is recommended because it 
 is interesting and gives the child an opportunity to make 
 use of his natural motor tendencies. All this may be a 
 
 • See Chapter XIV. 
 
ii8 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 reason for the introduction of manual training into the 
 work of the school, but such a view, if it goes no further, 
 absolutely fails to understand the chief significance of 
 manual training as a school subject. 
 
 (z) Vital acquisition of knowledge, discipline, and cul- 
 ture. 
 
 It is not educationally sufficient to give opportunity for 
 the expression of the constructive impulse, nor to develop 
 motor skill and manual dexterity. Rather, in the process 
 of doing these things we should be guiding and directing 
 the normal activities of the child in such a way that he will 
 be getting out of them in a vital fashion, as opposed to the 
 formal method, fundamental elements of knowledge, disci- 
 pline, and culture. 
 
 Out of these manual activities and occupations there 
 should arise the situations which sharpen the sense of need 
 for further knowledge and which make the acquisition of 
 that knowledge necessary, not because it is merely an as- 
 signed lesson but because the manual processes that are 
 being carried on demand it for their completion and perfec- 
 tion. There is something in the situation, if rightly handled, 
 which makes the acquisition of further knowledge dynamic, 
 It is a case in which the getting of knowledge is an integral 
 part of what Mr. Dewey has called "satisfying an impulse" 
 as contrasted with "indulging" it. In thus satisfying the 
 impulse of construction the mental processes have been 
 called forth and exercised in a normal fashion and their dis- 
 cipline has been a part of the whole process, necessarily 
 involved. 
 
 At the same time the child has been getting a view of 
 things in their larger relations ; the occupation in which 
 he is engaged is seen to be related to a larger and more 
 complex whole. While it is perhaps but a single strand, 
 yet it ramifies through the whole industrial and social 
 fabric. The child no longer interprets from a partial and 
 isolated point of view, and he gets a truer and saner appre- 
 
Training in Thinking iig 
 
 ciation of the real values of life. What is this but culture ? 
 Is it not just as much a part of culture to understand the 
 Hfe and activity going on round about us as to understand 
 the life of the Greeks and Romans? Each has its value. 
 The latter without the former is certainly incomplete. 
 
 (S) Our problem that of discipline of the thinking process. 
 
 While manual training may be conducted in such a way 
 as to contribute definitely and vitally to knowledge, culture, 
 and discipline, in our discussion we are concerned primarily 
 with only one phase, — that of discipline, — and this we are 
 to treat more particularly from the point of view of a 
 single aspect, namely, that of training in the power of 
 thinking. Does manual training afford the right conditions 
 for the calling forth and exercise of the thinking function? 
 Does it furnish these conditions in types of situations which 
 involve adequate motivation, so that the thinking process 
 'becomes dynamic and functions to meet a real need? 
 
 (4) Opportunity for the natural functioning of thinking. 
 
 Certainly the manual arts appeal to a fundamental and 
 deep-seated natural impulse, that of construction. They 
 need no justification to the child. The motivation is from 
 within. Any mental process involved in satisfying the 
 constructive impulse in a given situation becomes dynamic. 
 Thinking, if it comes in at all, is felt to be relevant. It is 
 only one aspect of a larger whole. Does not the child think 
 when he is engaged in paper cutting? in moulding clay? 
 in making boxes, sleds, toy houses, kites, etc. ? Does he 
 conceive ends, and does he consciously adjust means to the 
 realization of those ends? If so, he thinks. The function 
 is being performed, however little of the special tech- 
 nique of the thinking process of the adult we may be able 
 to discover. 
 
 These manual occupations fairly bristle with situations 
 in which there are problematic elements. Did you ever try 
 to make a water-tight box for any special use? What a 
 host of real questions arise! "What sort of wood shall I 
 
120 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 choose ? Shall it be hard wood or soft wood ? Which will 
 best stand the changes that are involved in alternate soak- 
 ings and dryings ? Shall I use nails or screws ? Is the 
 wood which I have selected likely to split or crack where I 
 drive in the nails? How shall I give every piece just the 
 right dimensions so that it will fit exactly into its place and 
 leave no chance for the water to get through? What size 
 must the box be in order to contain the requisite amount 
 of water?" etc. The problem of adjusting means to end 
 in such cases may become problematic at a variety of points, 
 according to the extent of one's previous experiences. 
 When the thinking process is involved at any one of these 
 points there is nothing artificial or formal about its use. 
 Yet this process is called forth frequently and gets abun- 
 dant exercise. 
 
 (5) Appropriateness of manual training for early exer- 
 cise of thinking. 
 
 Manual training is especially suited to the task of train- 
 ing the thinking process in the earlier stages of its develop- 
 ment. All our present-day psychology is emphasizing the 
 'fact that motor processes are more primary than thought 
 processes. Thought processes intervene to modify and 
 ■ perfect modes of reaction. The needs of the individual 
 are thus better met. In manual training we are taking our 
 start at the point ' which biology and psychology both em- 
 phasize as the right point of departure. The thought pro- 
 cesses when they appear come in their natural setting. They 
 are strictly relevant to a motor process which is to meet 
 some need or satisfy some impulse. In these motor pro- 
 cesses of manual training, process and product of activity 
 are quite closely related. Means and end can be easily 
 grasped and thought processes involved in making adjust- 
 ment can be very simple. From simpler situations the 
 transition is easily made to more and more complex situa- 
 tions, thus providing for progressive training in thinking 
 up through the various stages of mental development. 
 
Training in Thinking 121 
 
 The value of starting with the simple and concrete prob- 
 lems of manual training will be shown from another angle 
 when we come to the discussion of the development of the 
 imagination in relation to the power of thinking.^ Suffice 
 it to emphasize the thought at this point that the first prob- 
 lems of thought are most naturally those which spring from 
 problems of action of some sort, and that only later does 
 the thought process become so specialized as to grasp and 
 wrestle with intellectual problems in more or less isolation 
 from an immediately practical situation. Manual training, 
 while furnishing an abundance of concrete problems for the 
 exercise of the thinking function in concrete terms, should, 
 however, also serve as the matrix out of which distinctly 
 intellectual problems should later grow. 
 
 (6) Criticism of dictation; fallacy of ideal of finished, 
 product. 
 
 Do we realize fully enough in our schools the value of 
 manual training from the point of view of its use in develop- 
 ing the power to think ? It is sometimes conducted as if its 
 sole value were thought to be in the manual dexterity or 
 the finished products which it yielded. No problems are 
 conceived by the children, and there is no process of con- 
 scious adjustment of means to ends on their part. The 
 teacher dictates both end and process. The process is 
 broken up into a series of steps. One step is dictated. 
 When this step is completed, then another is taken in which 
 the teacher determines just what is to be done and how it 
 is to be done. The child needs to see for himself practically 
 nothing of the relevancy of what he is doing, he needs to 
 make no conscious adjustments. He has only to go through 
 certain definite motor processes. There can be in this no 
 training in thinking. All that the child can get is a certain 
 amount of manual dexterity. Of course, he may secure a 
 better finished product for the time being. 
 
 It is doubtless the fetich of the finished product which 
 
 'See Chapter XIV. 
 
122 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 the teacher has been taught to worship bHndly that has 
 been responsible for her whole abnormal mode of procedure. 
 I say "taught to worship" advisedly ; for when her work is 
 put on exhibition is it not the most finished products which 
 are expected to appear rather than specimens of work repre- 
 senting stages of progress in the actual achievements of the 
 pupils from day to day or week to week? In our anxiety 
 for results which are immediate, tangible, and visible, we 
 bow down to the golden calf of the finished product, sub- 
 stituting an unholy idolatry for the true worship of real 
 training. Of course stimulation, guidance, and direction 
 on the part of the teacher are necessary. Sometimes even 
 more direct help must be given, but surely this need not be 
 carried so far as to amount to practical dictation at every 
 point. 
 
 (y) Increased motor efficiency from training in vital 
 thinking. 
 
 Some scope for the exercise of the thinking powers ac- 
 cording to the stage of their development may be left in 
 every manual training exercise. This should be done not 
 alone for the sake of the training in thinking but also for 
 the increased efficiency which accrues to the manual train- 
 ing activity itself from the cultivation of the thinking pro- 
 cess. A teacher in a prominent school for the professional 
 training of teachers of manual training said in conversation 
 with the author that he received pupils who had been 
 through technical courses in manual training in the uni- 
 versity, who could make every kind of joint that might be 
 involved in any part of their work, but who were lamentably 
 deficient in working out the problems involved in the execu- 
 tion of a rather simple concrete piece of work in which they 
 had to determine for themselves what kind of joint should 
 be used. They had evidently been drilled in technique first 
 instead of starting with concrete situations relatively simple 
 and working out technique in connection with the solution 
 of problems. Their thinking and their technique were out 
 
Training in Thinking 123 
 
 of relation to each other. The training of thinking in the 
 actual manual training activities gives more varied and more 
 perfect control over the manual arts themselves. 
 
 4. Mathematics. 
 
 (i) Recognised value of mathematics. 
 
 The place of mathematics in the process of training to 
 think need not be elaborated very fully. It is an older sub- 
 ject in the history of the curriculum than manual training, 
 and the methods of handling it, have been more definitely 
 worked out and put to the test. It is commonly thought 
 of as par excellence the school subject adapted to the train- 
 ing of thinking processes. There is no question that on 
 the side of conditions the mathematical branches satisfy the 
 demand of furnishing abundant problematic situations. 
 
 (2) Danger of formalism and lack of motivation. 
 
 The possibilities of mathematics in the matter of furnish- 
 ing problems we shall not need to discuss. But there are 
 other phases which need careful consideration. There is 
 the question of adequate motivation. Are we handling the 
 mathematical branches in such a way that the thinking pro- 
 cess is called forth under normal and dynamic conditions, 
 that is, in situations where it comes in to play a real and 
 vital part in a larger whole of activity? Mathematics in- 
 volves a remarkably large amount and variety of technique. 
 Are we making too much of the technique in advance of 
 any felt need for it in the thinking process ? While we are 
 accustomed to think of mathematics as preeminently a 
 thought subject, is there actually any other subject in which 
 it is possible to do so much manipulation of symbols and 
 forms, the elements of technique, without any real thinking? 
 
 (3) Vital training of thinking in mathematics. 
 
 Is there any way of making mathematics, particularly in 
 the earlier stages, more dynamic and real and less a matter 
 of formal drill ? Yes, if it can be made to grow out of cer- 
 tain forms of activity in which the child is already inter- 
 
124 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 ested. All forms of mathematical thought, if they have 
 any function at all, have their justification in the added con- 
 trol which they give us over our activities. Arithmetical, 
 algebraic, and geometrical formulations should, then, have 
 a basis in activities of some sort to which they are imme- 
 diately relevant, and this connection between the mathe- 
 matical mode of thought and the active process to which 
 it is relevant should be maintained until the development 
 of mathematics as a science has impressed the mind as it- 
 self worth while for the sake of the values which inhere in 
 the subject. 
 
 If the boy is already interested in making boxes, sleds, 
 etc., he finds that he has to measure and compute as a part 
 of the constructive process. Inch, foot, yard, and various 
 combinations of these, need to be known. It is a serious 
 matter in the making of his sled if the runners are not equi- 
 distant throughout. And the corners of his box have to be 
 square, and the wheels of his cart or his bicycle have to be 
 perfect circles. Thus we might go on and enuinerate hosts 
 of elementary facts and principles of arithmetic, algebra, 
 and geometry which are bound up with the manual training 
 activity. This fact of their connection with the satisfaction 
 of the constructive impulse makes them relevant and vital. 
 There is motive for learning them, even to getting right 
 down to the task of drilling upon them. 
 
 There are some who assert that no number combination 
 should be taught to the child until he has actually run up 
 against a situation which has made him feel the need of it. 
 This application of the principle seems to be extreme ; but it 
 certainly is feasible to withhold the drill upon number com- 
 binations until the child has had forms of experience in 
 which he has been made to feel the need of these number 
 combinations sufficiently that the teaching of a new com- 
 bination does not become a wholly arbitrary process. So 
 with those processes which belong more particularly to 
 thinking and reasoning in mathematics. Problems in buy- 
 
Training in Thinking 125 
 
 ing and selling, in laying of carpets and floors, in papering, 
 painting, etc., if brought right down to the familiar set- 
 ting of the child's everyday life, furnish situations in which 
 means have to be adjusted to ends under conditions which 
 make the thinking process involved and the elements of 
 technique required seem very vital. Definite and accurate 
 forms of analysis and of demonstration, which follow, in- 
 stead of preceding, actual thinking processes to which they 
 are relevant, are seen to be valuable acquisitions for more 
 perfect control of the thinking process and are studied with 
 greater relish and appreciation. The laboratory method of 
 teaching mathematics, if it could be extended more widely, 
 would do much to bring about more real and vital and intel- 
 ligent thinking in mathematics. 
 
 5. History. 
 
 (i) Illustrations of its use. 
 
 In the study of history it is comparatively easy to develop 
 concrete situations in which problematic elements stand 
 forth clearly and definitely. For example, all the facts of 
 Braddock's campaign in the French and Indian War can be 
 made to center about the problem of the control of the Mis- 
 sissippi valley. Let the children be presented with an 
 abundance of concrete facts relative to the life of the times, 
 so that they can put themselves back in thought right into 
 the midst of the problem. Let them see clearly the colonists 
 pushing westward over the mountains. What would be one 
 of the easiest routes? They will see that it will be by the 
 valleys of the rivers that converge to form the Ohio. Let 
 them see clearly the line of French explorers and traders 
 crowding into the Mississippi valley from the north. In 
 process of time they will completely shut off the American 
 colonists from westward expansion. What will they do 
 about it? Where will the conflict of races be likely first to 
 occur? Why? If you were one of the leaders of the 
 Americans or of the English, what would you regard as 
 
126 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 your strategic point in the campaign? And what would 
 your plan of campaign be? Suppose you were a leader 
 among the French. Think the same thing through from 
 their point of view. Without carrying this illustration out 
 further, we may suggest that if children can get a situation 
 clearly before them, viewing it from the inside, as it were, 
 they need not merely follow the record of events, but they 
 may anticipate them in large part as the outcomes of circum- 
 stances and conditions which are adequate to their explana- 
 tion. Thus there is abundant opportunity for the exercise 
 of the function of thinking. As a consequence of this 
 mode of procedure the facts learned are also fixed more 
 firmly in the mind. 
 
 The work of the great Constitutional Convention may be 
 taken up with older pupils in such a way as to make them 
 conceive the problem and to forecast in some measure 
 fundamental aspects of its solution. This will require the 
 study of an abundance of details as to the difficulties in- 
 volved in the practical independence from one another of the 
 thirteen colonies, now become states. Only through the 
 study of an abundance of details can the problem be made 
 to stand out sharply. Also the pupils must have consider- 
 able familiarity with the chief types of government in the 
 various separate colonies. Knowing what forms of gov- 
 ernmental procedure the members of the Convention were 
 familiar with, it will be possible for the pupils to suggest 
 certain principles that are likely to be embodied in the con- 
 stitution of the closer Union. Familiarity with the excel- 
 lencies and the defects of the Articles of Confederation will 
 furnish additional data relevant to the solution of the prob- 
 lem. Students may judge for themselves what ideas would 
 impress the members of the Convention as of most relevancy 
 and of most worth. Also a detailed knowledge of the 
 variety and nature of the conflicting interests represented 
 would make it possible for the pupils to forecast some of 
 the" compromises which are responsible for certain features 
 
Training in Thinking 127 
 
 of the Constitution, for example, the provision for equal 
 representation of the states in the Senate and proportional 
 representation in the House of Representatives ; or the pro- 
 vision for the abolition of the slave trade in 1808. 
 
 (2) Value of emphasis on the concrete problem. 
 
 In so far as the study of history can be made to center 
 about concrete problems which give meaning to the collec- 
 tion of masses of details and which call for the exercise of 
 the pupil's constructive and interpretative powers in con- 
 struing facts and events in terms of social and political 
 movements, in so far is the child getting splendid training 
 in thinking through his study of history. We are too prone 
 to think of history in terms of record of fact. It is in real- 
 ity not one half so much record of fact as it is interpretation 
 of fact. It is a weighing, judging, and sifting of facts, 
 leading to some reorganization which throws light upon 
 social and political movements and makes them intelligible. 
 In the concrete body of historical facts there lie imbedded 
 social and political laws and principles which have meaning 
 and significance only as they are seen in their setting. 
 
 We might give the pupil outright an organized system of 
 historical facts closely knit and bound together by the sig- 
 nificant laws and principles of the science. But this gives 
 him neither a just appreciation of the facts nor of the prin- 
 ciples involved. He has not thought them through for 
 himself in a way that makes them forever his own, a body 
 of working capital for further study and interpretation of 
 social and political problems in his own time and genera- 
 tion. May not the pupil within certain limits be encour- 
 aged to go through the facts for himself, judging and 
 sifting them from the point of view of some problem, mak- 
 ing his own interpretations and discovering principles for 
 himself, and only later bringing his interpretations and con- 
 clusions to the test of their comparison with the views of 
 the expert historian? This would throw a decided empha- 
 sis upon thinking and would cultivate an independence 
 
128 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 of thought which can never be secured by the process of 
 always following and trying to understand the thoughts of 
 others. We already have too many graduates of our 
 schools, and even of our colleges, of the "It says" type. 
 We ought to be developing more of those who speak with 
 convictions of their own, convictions born of close investi- 
 gation for themselves and of that clear thinking through of 
 problems which enables one to give a reason for the state- 
 ment which he makes. 
 
 6. Geography. 
 
 Geography furnishes hosts of problems that can be treated 
 in such a way as to provide the conditions for vital think- 
 ing. We need suggest only a few by way of illustration, 
 without working out the method of treating them. Why 
 is the climate of England warmer than that of Labrador? 
 Why are the lands just east of the Rocky Mountains arid? 
 Why is the United States cutting a canal through the 
 Isthmus of Panama? What are the conditions that have 
 operated to make New York, Chicago, and St. Louis such 
 large cities ? It is easy to supply the data necessary to the 
 solution of such problems. Why should not the children 
 be left to work out the solutions for themselves so far as 
 possible instead of being told the whole thing? 
 
 Almost all of the vital truths of geography can be brought 
 out through the study of typical problems. The pupil can 
 be trained to think of existing things not merely in terms 
 of themselves, — even mountains, lakes, and valleys he may 
 come to think of in terms of conditions and causes, in terms 
 of processes which are going on all the time, now as well 
 as in the past, in terms of complex relationships between 
 means and ends. Thus he not only gets abundant practice 
 in thinking, but he is also building up the habit of thinking, 
 of looking for principles in accordance with which to ex- 
 plain the simplest phenomena which to another might be 
 taken for granted as mere brute facts. 
 
Training in Thinking 129 
 
 It would be interesting to work out suggestions for the 
 teaching of language, reading, and some of the physical and 
 biological sciences with special reference to the fulfilment of 
 the conditions of thinking. But enough has been done to 
 illustrate the principle which we wish to make clear, and 
 to emphasize the value and the possibility of doing more in 
 the way of training pupils in elementary and high schools 
 to think. It is evident from the preceding discussions that 
 the process of training children to think is not so much 
 dependent upon the selection of a particular body of sub- 
 ject matter as it is upon the attitude taken toward that 
 subject matter. No teacher can be so thoroughly circum- 
 scribed and limited by the nature of the subject matter or 
 by the directions of supervisors as to exclude the possibility 
 within certain limits of leading children to conceive prob- 
 lems and to use their own powers of mind in the struggle 
 for their solution. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE ACTIVITY OF THE IMAGINATION IN 
 THINKING 
 
 I. Thinking in Terms of its Content. 
 
 (i) Distinction between imagination and thinking. 
 
 If we look into our minds when a thinking process is 
 going on we find a stream of imagery. Images are the 
 content, or mental stuff, of the thinking process. But 
 thinking differs from other processes in which past expe- 
 rience functions to determine action not so much in terms 
 of content as it does in terms of the organization of the 
 imagery and its conscious direction toward ends. Imag- 
 ination and thinking are not two separate and distinct pro- 
 cesses. Images are involved in both cases. Our attention 
 may be taken up primarily with the forms in which ideas 
 are embodied, with their explanation in terms of past ex- 
 perience and in the light of present conditions, with the 
 laws of connection and sequence of images, etc. When we 
 are dealing with problems of this sort, we are apt to use 
 the term imagination. But when we think of the stream 
 of images as organized in such a way as to perform the 
 function of consciously adjusting means to ends, then we 
 call the activity of imagination a thinking process. 
 
 (2) Constructive imagination and thinking. 
 
 When it comes to a case of constructive imagination the 
 line between it and a thinking process is very shadowy in- 
 deed. From one point of view they are absolutely identi- 
 cal. In so far as we can distinguish them at all, it is only 
 with reference to the aspect on which attention is fixed, 
 whether that of content or that of function. If we are 
 considering the mental content and the facts and laws of its 
 
 130 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 131 
 
 organization as related to the process of getting new mental 
 forms, we call the process constructive imagination ; if we 
 are considering the function of this reorganization and 
 reconstruction of the elements of past experience and their 
 embodiment in new forms, we call the process thinking. 
 
 2. General Significance of Imagination in the Think- 
 ing Process. 
 
 In thinking, imagination gets its fullest significance and 
 meaning. The power of imaging things or events does not 
 exist for its own sake but to make past experience the more 
 effective in processes of adjustment. In thinking, the image 
 process rises to the level of meeting the needs of the organ- 
 ism in new and problematic situations. 
 
 (i) Necessity of imagination in conception of ends. 
 
 Thinking is teleological. It has at its bottom a practical 
 basis. It is a process that goes on with reference to ends. 
 It always involves some kind of forward reference. It pre- 
 supposes that there is something not in your present expe- 
 rience which you seek to bring into it. There is an end 
 MMrealized, still in the future. As it does not exist now in 
 terms of reality, it exists only as a fact of consciousness. 
 As a psychic reality it is embodied in the form of an image. 
 In no other way can it be presented to consciousness. It 
 would be possible, of course, without imagination to set up 
 motor activities, to make things happen, but we could not 
 determine in advance what should happen. The process 
 would be blind and random experimentation, involving no 
 individual control whatever. The conception of an end 
 toward which activity is directed necessarily involves 
 imagination. 
 
 (2) Necessity of imagination in conscious use of past 
 experience. 
 
 Reference to the future is meaningless except in terms 
 of past experience. All conceptions of ends are projections 
 of some sort out of past experience. They may involve 
 
132 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 reconstruction of past experience to assume new forms that 
 have never been as such any part of past experience. But 
 these forms can have no meaning except in terms of ele- 
 ments of past experience. This bringing of past experience 
 into consciousness is an act of imagination. Without 
 imagination we would be literally tied down to the present 
 moment. The whole span of life would be a continuous 
 present, in which everything would be summed up in the 
 fleeting moment. Neither past nor future could enter into 
 this moment of consciousness. To be sure, past experience 
 might possibly modify present activity, but not with any 
 awareness of the fact or any intention on the part of the 
 individual. It would have to come about through organic 
 modifications which would be completely summed up in 
 automatic sense perception on the one side and reaction pro- 
 cesses on the other absolutely determined by neural habit. 
 Past experience could not function consciously in present 
 experience and be brought to bear upon activity to modify, 
 direct, or control that activity with reference to ends. 
 
 (^) Necessity of imagination in determining modes of 
 procedure. 
 
 But thinking may center not alone in the determination 
 of ends. It is concerned with the process of working out 
 more or less in advance of action the method, or mode of 
 procedure, by which ends are to be realized. This mode 
 of procedure, if it is to be highly controlled, must take the 
 form of a definite series of steps. There must be first this 
 reaction, then that, then another, etc., until, as the result of 
 the series of reactions, the end foreseen is realized. Now, 
 if we could clearly conceive ends which we wish to realize, 
 but if we were at the same time limited to the use of motor 
 processes the results of which we could not foresee or an- 
 ticipate, the whole process of realizing those ends would 
 be blindly experimental. Many of the activities would be 
 absolutely irrelevant, and if any were relevant it would be 
 a matter of pure chance or accident. 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 133 
 
 Both the acts and their results must be clearly imaged in 
 order to determine a series of reactions which shall be highly 
 controlled in the process of realizing ends. In thinking, 
 we anticipate on' the basis of our past experience what 
 would be the results of certain activities, and while they 
 are still held in the imagination we judge of their probable 
 relevancy or irrelevancy to our needs in this process of 
 adjustment. On the basis of these judgments we reject 
 some acts and select others, and then arrange those selected 
 in a definite series of steps. In this way we may in imag- 
 ination work out a definite mode of procedure by which we 
 shall realize our end wholly in advance of the actual under- 
 taking of the motor processes. 
 
 We cannot say, however, that there is no thinking in those 
 cases in which the whole mode of procedure is not worked 
 out in terms of the imagination in advance of its execution. 
 In many cases the thinking and the experimental activity 
 go hand in hand and are continually modifying each other. 
 But this does not give the high degree of control that is 
 realized in the other type of thinking process. 
 
 3. Restatement in Terms of Advantage of Imagina- 
 tion. 
 
 We might restate the discussion just concluded and get 
 the point more definitely before us by pointing out some of 
 the advantages which accrue from the fact that the imag- 
 ination functions as it does in the thinking process. If we 
 could not anticipate what the results of any motor process 
 were going to be before they actually took place, but had 
 to wait and see, then in some cases, at least, the activities 
 by the time they had taken place would have produced 
 results which changed the situation which we were trymg 
 to control and made it forever impossible to realize our 
 ends. We could not go back over our series of acts and 
 alter and reconstruct them ; the activities have already taken 
 place and produced results which are past recall. If, how- 
 
134 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 ever, we work things out in terms of the imagination first, 
 delaying all action in the meantime until we see in anticipa- 
 tion just what the result of each act in the series is going 
 to be, we can avoid undesirable results by discarding those 
 steps which would lead to them, and we can start all over 
 again without any harm having been done. 
 
 The possibility of controlling the mode of reaction at every 
 point and making it move in a straight course toward the 
 realization of our end still remains so long as we keep the 
 whole process in terms of the imagination until it is per- 
 fected. We can work out the steps in the whole process 
 of adjustment over and over again, making as many cor- 
 rections, eliminations, simplifications, or reconstructions as 
 we please. And this can all be done in advance of the 
 motor processes. In so far as our experience is rich and 
 wide enough to enable us to do this successfully, we can 
 get the method of reaction worked out to the finest detail, 
 so that, whtn it is put over into motor terms, our end is 
 attained without friction, loss, or inadequacy, and all with 
 the highest degree of directness, precision, and skill. The 
 experimentation has all been done in terms of the intellectual 
 process of imagination in advance of action, and the process 
 of adjustment is one that is directed and controlled by con- 
 sciousness functioning in the form of thinking. 
 
 4. General Relation between Association and Imag- 
 ination IN Thinking. 
 
 (i) Imagination and the laws of association. 
 
 The stream of images which is constantly flowing in the 
 thinking process moves in accordance with the laws of asso- 
 ciation. But it has been one of the functions of imagination 
 to free the elements of past experience which are brought 
 before the mind from much of their original setting, or con- 
 text, and to make of them movable elements which shall 
 be free to enter into new associative combinations. Thus, 
 one's image tree need not necessarily carry with it the 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 135 
 
 thought of the particular place where the tree grew, the fact 
 that it was in blossom, or that there was a swing under the 
 tree, although all of these may have been parts of one orig- 
 inal perceptual whole. Not only can the image tree be 
 taken out of this setting and given a new context, but even 
 the order and arrangement of its own parts can be changed 
 at will. Constructive activity of the imagination necessary 
 to a real thinking process presupposes fluidity of imagery, or 
 the freedom of elements to be moved to and fro at will 
 and to enter into new combinations. Yet these elements 
 must themselves appear in consciousness for use in harmony 
 with the laws of association. 
 
 (2) Accidental and logical ties of connection. 
 
 If there is any mental activity at all going on, elements 
 of past experience are brought into consciousness through 
 the connections which have previously been established, — 
 connections of time and place which were accidental in their 
 origin or connections of inherent relationship within a sys- 
 tem, which were logical or necessary in character. It may 
 be that my Uncle John was in San Francisco at the time 
 of the earthquake. As a consequence of this, whenever I 
 think of my Uncle John, I think also of earthquake and 
 San Francisco ; and whenever I think of San Francisco, I 
 think also of earthquake and my Uncle John. One element 
 of the whole group suggests all the others. But the addi- 
 tional items which are suggested come as the result of asso- 
 ciations which may be regarded as accidental rather than as 
 necessary. The tie of connection between San Francisco, 
 earthquake, and my Uncle John is not one that is inherent 
 in the nature of these things. It is an accident of time and 
 place that binds together these various elements into one 
 whole such that now any one of them is likely to suggest 
 the others which belong to that whole. 
 
 But when I think of football, then of roundness, and then 
 of moon, the associative process operating in suggesting this 
 series is determined not by accidental but by inherent ties 
 
136 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 of connection. Roundness is an inherent characteristic of 
 both the football and the moon and serves to connect them 
 in thought independently of the accidents of circumstance. 
 In a mathematical thinking process, I may have need of 
 the rule for finding the area of a triangle. I know that a 
 triangle is equivalent to one half of a parallelogram with 
 the same base and altitude. I know that the area of a paral- 
 lelogram is equal to the product of its base and altitude. 
 Then the area of a triangle is found by taking one half the 
 product of its base and altitude. The associative process 
 by means of which I recalled the rule for the area of a 
 triangle depended upon inherent ties of connection, ties of 
 connection which are logical, necessary, and universal. 
 
 (3) Superiority of logical ties of connection. 
 
 In thinking, ties of connection of either sort, the acci- 
 dental or the inherent, may be taken advantage of for the 
 purpose of bringing before the mind the elements of past 
 experience necessary for the solution of the problem. But 
 it is evident that the organization of knowledge, so far as 
 possible, on the basis of inherent, or logical, ties of con- 
 nection makes it more permanently and more universally 
 available for use in a thinking process. The pedagogical 
 implications of this are quite obvious, and we shall leave this 
 point, for the present at least, and develop at greater length 
 an aspect of the relation between association and imagina- 
 tion in the thinking process which is more likely to be over- 
 looked. 
 
 (4) Question of control over the associative mechanism 
 in thinking. 
 
 We talk a great deal about the laws of association, and 
 we often forget how little control, after all, we have over 
 the associative process as it operates in thinking. The 
 suggestions which we need in thinking through a problem 
 cannot be forced. They must ultimately come spon- 
 taneously through ties of connection, accidental or inherent, 
 which already exist between what we have and what we 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 137 
 
 want. A great deal depends upon the existence and the 
 character of those ties of connection. There is no guarantee 
 that the mechanism of association as it operates in recall 
 will bring just exactly the elements that we need and no 
 others, or that it will bring the elements in the order in 
 which we shall want to use them. In fact, we know of no 
 way whereby we can absolutely control the process so as to 
 be certain of securing at all those elements that we need. 
 If we take the simple case of trying to recall a name which 
 we have forgotten, we can see that all we can do is simply 
 to take advantage of all the possible lines of association and 
 follow them up in the hope that what we need may finally 
 be suggested. Out of a superabundance of material we 
 must select that which is relevant and reject that which is 
 irrelevant. 
 
 5. Illustrations. 
 
 An illustration or two at this point may clarify the line of 
 thought which is being developed and also aid in carrying 
 it further. The first illustration will be one given by a 
 pupil in one of the author's classes. It is the result of 
 introspection of an actual case of thinking in the attempt to 
 deal with a concrete practical problem. 
 
 "I am asked to play a piece of music at a recital. Various 
 ends suggest themselves, — training in memorizing the selec- 
 tion, increased knowledge of music, an addition to my 
 repertoire, cultural value, pleasure of my friends, and my 
 own pleasure. 
 
 "I direct my attention to the field of musical thought. 
 Various questions arise in my mind. Must the selection be 
 short or long? Considering the nature of the program 
 and the great expectations ( ?) of the audience a rather 
 long composition must be chosen or else two shorter num- 
 bers, an 'A' and a 'B'. Why not learn something really 
 worth having, even if long? A short number may be 
 learned at odd moments and without so much effort. It is 
 
138 TJie Psychology of Thinking 
 
 to be one long number then. Fortunately, knowing the 
 musical character of the audience as a whole will help me 
 to decide the sort of music most acceptable. 
 
 "The composition must be classical in nature, but not too 
 technical, as the audience is not composed entirely of musi- 
 cal students. The music must be either one of two varieties 
 — either the brilliant, showy style or a more subdued and 
 dreamy sort, but if the latter it must have a clear ringing 
 melody throughout. With this present end in view, I make 
 two selections : Rhapsodic Hongroise, No. 12, by Liszt and 
 a Beethoven Sonata. Which shall it be ? 
 
 "The Liszt number will require a longer time to learn, as 
 it is more difficult; the Sonata is a longer composition. I 
 play them over and time the rendition. Not much differ- 
 ence, the Sonata taking about five minutes longer. Both 
 selections have a variety of movements, from an andante 
 to a vivace. However, the changes of time and movement 
 are more sudden in the Liszt number, keeping one on the 
 alert ; while in the Sonata the slow, measured largo when 
 once started continues for some time. You rather settle 
 yourself and wait some time for any variation, thus taking 
 away some of the surprises of a Liszt number. 
 
 "The Liszt number has a brilliant ending of chromatic 
 octaves, the Sonata ends with big chords. The ending must 
 be striking. A brilliant ending to anything will often 
 cause an audience to be more lenient with a faulty beginning 
 and middle. 
 
 "Then, too, the Liszt Rhapsodie will be a good thing to 
 memorize because it is different from most of the pieces 
 which I have already memorized, while the Sonata is very 
 much like many others which I already know. 
 
 "After many such rejections and selections, a decision is 
 made in favor of the Rhapsodie, with the immediate end of 
 rendering it to suit an immediate occasion and the more 
 remote ends of training, added knowledge, and pleasure." 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 
 
 139 
 
 The second illustration will attempt to reinstate a form 
 of thinking which is quite common in geometry. 
 
 Let us take the familiar proposition : "The angles opposite 
 the equal sides of an isosceles triangle are equal." 
 
 Given the isosceles triangle ABC, in which AB equals 
 AC ; to prove angle x equals angle y. 
 
 Now, if the proposition is attacked as an original exercise, 
 and is not a mere reproduction of something learned from 
 a book, a course of thinking something like the following is 
 often that which takes place : 
 
 "I will draw a line AD perpendicular to BC. Then I 
 have two triangles, I and II. I wonder if I can prove them 
 equal. If I can, then all their homologous parts will be 
 equal, and I can show that angle x equals angle y. 
 
 "I know that AB of I equals AC oi II, by definition of 
 isosceles triangle; and that AD of I equals AD of II, by 
 identity. Now, if I could only show that angle m equals 
 angle n, I would have two sides and the included angle of 
 one triangle equal respectively to two sides and the included 
 angle of the other, and triangle I would be equal to triangle 
 
140 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 II. Is angle m equal to angle w? I don't see any way of 
 showing it. 
 
 "Can I prove the two triangles equal in any other 
 way? Two triangles are equal if they have a side and 
 two adjacent angles of the one equal respectively to a side 
 and two adjacent angles of the other. I look at my 
 figure. Same trouble with angles as before. Two tri- 
 angles are equal if the three sides of the one are equal 
 respectively to the three sides of the other. Now, maybe 
 I can get along without those troublesome angles. Let me 
 see. I had two sides of the one equal respectively to two 
 sides of the other. I must show that DB is equal to DC. 
 Stuck again. They do look equal, but there is nothing in 
 my hypothesis or my construction that makes them so. 
 
 "What shall I do? Could I make them equal? Oh, yes, 
 I might draw AD to the middle point of BC. Why then, 
 it is all done. I will have the three sides of one triangle 
 equal respectively to the three sides of the other. The two 
 triangles will be equal ; and angle x must be equal to angle 
 
 y" 
 
 When the results of the above thinking process are 
 thrown into the form of a logical demonstration, the whole 
 procedure will be condensed into the following brief com- 
 pass : 
 
 Draw AD to the middle point of BC. 
 Now in triangles I and II, 
 
 AB of I equals AC of II, by definition of isosceles 
 triangle. 
 
 AD of I equals AD of II, by identity. 
 DB of I equals DC of II, by construction. 
 Therefore triangle I equals triangle II. 
 
 (Two triangles are equal if the three sides of the 
 one are equal respectively to the three sides of the 
 other.) 
 Therefore angle x equals angle y. 
 
 (Homologous angles of equal triangles are equal.) 
 
 Q. E. D. 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 141 
 
 Our study of the thinking proeesses as they actually take 
 place in attempts to solve vital problems will serve to 
 emphasize several things which are to be stated and devel- 
 oped explicitly in the series of topics which will constitute 
 the remainder of this chapter. The reader is asked to keep 
 these illustrations in mind as he continues. 
 
 6. Further Discussion of the Control of Association 
 IN Thinking. 
 
 (i) Limitations of control. 
 
 Our illustrations have made it evident that there can be, 
 at best, only a limited amount of control over the associa- 
 tive process as it operates in thinking. This is equally true 
 whether the problem which provokes thought be practical 
 or theoretical. Even in mathematics, where the whole field- 
 is definitely limited and circumscribed, we see that the 
 absolutely essential ideas do not come on demand, and when 
 they do come it is not in their perfect order of relationship. 
 There are abundant suggestions thrown up on the basis of 
 past associations. All that the associative mechanism can 
 do is to give forth what has been committed to it in har- 
 mony with the nature of the ties of connection which have 
 been set up. These suggestions have to be judged, eval- 
 uated for present purposes, and selected or rejected. Fin- 
 ally, the results of the whole process may be thrown into 
 the form of a demonstration, in which the essential ele- 
 ments are organized into a definite series of steps in which 
 the relationship of means to end is clearly exhibited and 
 made apparent. 
 
 In practical problems of conduct and in theoretic prob- 
 lems of economics and science, the essential elements of 
 problems are not usually so sharply defined and contained 
 within narrow and closed limits as in mathematics. Con- 
 sequently the control over the associative activity in the 
 attempt to get relevant suggestions is still more limited, and 
 the process of groping for suggestions, feeling for their 
 
142 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 relevancy, starting over again on new lines of attack, etc., 
 is even more active than can possibly be described in detail. 
 
 (2) Relation of organized system of knowledge to control. 
 
 While the control over the associative activity in thinking 
 is limited, yet we do know that elements belonging to the 
 same organized system of knowledge are most likely to be 
 reinstated. When the problem is mathematical in character, 
 the ideas which arise in consciousness are apt to be math- 
 ematical; when the problem is historical, the ideas sug- 
 gested are apt to fall within the field of our knowledge of 
 history; when the problem is one of conduct or practical 
 life, ideas are apt to arise that belong to the particular set- 
 ting of that problem. Taking advantage of this principle, 
 we can focus our attention upon the particular field of 
 relevancy ; and the more we do this the more is the imagery 
 likely to be limited to that field. But even then the stream 
 of imagery in any vital thinking process, dealing with a real 
 problem, is apt to be wider and deeper than that succession 
 of ideas which represents the final solution. More ele- 
 ments of past experience have to be thrown up in the 
 associative process than can actually be used in the final 
 adjustment of means to ends. Many of these elements have, 
 however, had a function to perform, they have served as 
 intermediate points of contact for the unwinding of the 
 skein of connections until we have come ultimately to some 
 idea relevant to our solution ; others seem to be absolutely 
 irrelevant, like so much driftwood thrown upon the shore 
 by the current. 
 
 (s) Conclusion as to control. 
 
 Our control over the material of the thinking process is 
 largely a matter of limitation of the field of association 
 through the activity of attention, of selection and rejection 
 of elements given spontaneously through connections set 
 up in previous experiences, and of organizing and reorgan- 
 izing elements that are felt to be relevant into new wholes 
 or in new orders of arrangement. From this point of view 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 143 
 
 the voluntary element in thinking is identical with the vol- 
 untary element in motor activities. The organization of 
 any new voluntary' act, we know, starts out with an excess 
 of movements already possible. Of these superabundant 
 movetnents some are found to be relevant and others irrele- 
 vant. Gradually the irrelevant are dropped out and the 
 relevant are selected and organized into a definite mode of 
 procedure which realizes our end. Without the excess, or 
 superabundance, of movements, voluntary action would 
 be impossible ; without the superabundance of ideas fur- 
 nished by the mechanism of association, thinking would be 
 impossible. 
 
 7. Summary of the Thinking Process in Terms of the 
 
 Imagination. 
 The activity of thinking seems to consist in doing the 
 following things, though not necessarily separately and in 
 order. When the mind is confronted with a problem, atten- 
 tion is focused upon a certain field of experience relevant 
 to that problem. The associative process works within that 
 field, throwing up spontaneously certain suggestions relevant 
 and irrelevant. There is tentative judgment and evaluation 
 of the elements presented. Those which are felt to be irrel- 
 evant are rejected and those which seem to be relevant are 
 selected. There is further focusing of attention upon the 
 elements selected for consideration, with resulting activity 
 of the associative process in these directions. There is 
 again evaluation and selection, and so' on. There results 
 finally a series of images that are held more or less definitely 
 before the mind, which have been constructed to represent 
 a series of steps, or order of processes, to be gone through 
 with in order to realize our end. 
 
 8. Inadequacy for Pedagogy of the Older Accounts 
 
 OF Thinking. 
 (i) Psychology of formal thinking not vital. 
 Most of the older accounts of the thinking process are 
 
144 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 cast too much in logical terms. They are the result of 
 analysis of adult thinking processes, nay more than that, of 
 the highly wrought thinking processes of the trained 
 reasoner when the results of his thinking process are put 
 into their most finished form. The syllogism is analyzed 
 as a finished product and found to involve a definitely re- 
 lated series of propositions. The proposition is considered 
 identical with a judgment. The judgment is analyzed and 
 found to involve a comparison of two concepts, and so on. 
 Descriptive psychology has paid too much attention to the 
 relations existing between the ideas in that series which 
 represents the solution of a problem and too little attention 
 to the mental processes which led up to the attainment of 
 those ideas and their organization and incorporation into a 
 movement of thought which attained the solution. 
 
 It is evident from the illustrations which we have given, 
 particularly the one from geometry, that a psychology of the 
 thinking process worked out in terms of an analysis of the 
 finished product (for example, in terms of the series of 
 steps involved in the completed demonstration) ignores the 
 dynamic aspect of this process and does violence to the true 
 psychology of vital thinking as it actually occurs in expe- 
 rience. The analysis of the finished product, of the ideal 
 and perfect organization of the thinking process dominated 
 By the use of the most perfect technique of control, — such 
 an analysis reveals none of the groping of the mind for 
 relevant associations, none of the intensity of the process 
 of evaluation, or judgment, of the ideas that arise before 
 the mind in the associative process, none of the elaborate 
 process of selection and rejection, none of the struggle 
 involved in organization and reorganization of material into 
 a definite series of steps which shall represent an organized 
 mode of procedure. And are not these the important char- 
 acteristics which we found in the actual solution of the 
 problem in geometry? If there is this intensity of struggle 
 in the case of mathematical problems, all of whose elements 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 145 
 
 lie within such definite and narrowly confined limits, how 
 much more is this tension of mind characteristic of practical 
 problems of ethics and business and politics ! 
 
 The mind which follows through the series of steps in- 
 volved in the finished product of thinking, as for example, 
 in the formal demonstration in geometry, has its thinking 
 function reduced to a process of mere assent to the connec- 
 tion of ideas worked out by another. The one who made 
 the demonstration did all the vital thinking. The most 
 vital part of all was that which preceded the formal demon- 
 stration. Any one who has worked "originals" in geometry 
 can testify to that. The one who follows the steps of the 
 finished product does not go through the full thinking pro- 
 cess by any manner of means. That would involve making 
 connections for one's self, actually working out the relation 
 between means and end and constructing the series of steps 
 which should realize the end. 
 
 In all this discussion of the associative process in think- 
 ing, this point certainly ought to stand out by this time very 
 vividly and clearly, namely, that the most vital part of 
 ordinary thinking cannot be described in terms of the 
 syllogism nor in terms of any other highly wrought and 
 ideally perfect mode of procedure that can be analyzed out 
 of completed solutions of problems either inductive or deduc- 
 tive. Educational method and educational practice have 
 suffered enough already from the attempt to base methods 
 for growing minds struggling with real problems upon the 
 psychology of the finished product of the thinking process. 
 No analysis of the goal can ever alone supply us with the 
 data for method, but only the analysis of the methods by 
 which minds actually reach that goal is sufficient for this 
 purpose. Thinking as a process controlled and directed 
 by the use of highly wrought elements of technique is an 
 achievement to be attained as the goal of a long process of 
 training. And even when it is attained, it is exceedingly 
 doubtful if there is any one who ever thinks through new 
 
146 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 problems in such a highly technical fashion as the syllogism 
 represents. 
 
 (2) Logical power not attained through formal training 
 alone. 
 
 The illustration given from geometry is only typical of 
 what is equally true in many other school subjects. The 
 logical, highly organized, system of thought is given directly 
 to the pupil. We then wonder why he cannot make use of 
 the facts learned to think out a problem which arises else- 
 where to which this material would be relevant. The truth 
 is that the pupil has not acquired any additional logical 
 power in merely following through and assenting to the 
 logically arranged material. 
 
 It is pedagogically most vicious to suppose that logical 
 power of thinking can be developed except as the mind goes 
 through for itself the whole process of solving problems. 
 This includes the active functioning of the associative pro- 
 cess already described, with all its tension and strain, with 
 all its construction, and reconstruction. Though models of 
 finished thinking of course have their value, the power to 
 think cannot be acquired by any monkey-like process of 
 imitation. Dictation of the order of ideas and of their 
 organization into a system, or a mode of procedure, is just 
 as bad in manual training, in geography, in history, in 
 science, or any other subject as it has proved to be in geom- 
 etry. Some leeway for the more fluid processes of the 
 pupil's mind must be left, if he is to receive any vital train- 
 ing in thinking. Just how much responsibility is to be 
 thrown upon the pupil is a practical question that must be 
 answered according to the exigencies of the particular teach- 
 ing situation. No absolute rule can be laid down in a 
 theoretical treatise. 
 
 (s) An objection answered. 
 
 Some objection may be raised to the preceding argument 
 on the ground that when geometry was taught by the old 
 method of starting with fixed logical concepts and following 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 147 
 
 through demonstrations all worked out in the text-book, 
 many men got splendid training in thinking from the study 
 of this subject. This is true, but it was not due to the 
 method. Simply these minds were not satisfied to be jug- 
 gled with ; they felt when they accepted a proposition stated 
 by another, and he then made another statement to which 
 they were then obliged to assent, until a conclusion was 
 reached in the attainment of which they had no other part 
 than assent, that somehow or other they had been toyed 
 with, that they had been unfairly driven into a corner. 
 Their minds rebelled and they went out on excursions into 
 the field of their own associative processes and worked out 
 things for themselves, often to the great annoyance of their 
 teachers, be it said. 
 
 Here again geometry furnishes a type of what has been 
 true of other subjects in a less marked and apparent way. 
 Students have gone back of the logical formulations of the 
 text-books ; they have rummaged around in the depths of 
 their own experience until they have brought to light facts 
 by means of which they could interpret those which they 
 were studying and bring meaning over into them. They 
 have not merely followed the thoughts of another, but they 
 have gotten hold of problems and struggled over those 
 problems for themselves, if they have really mastered the 
 subject matter. Fortunately, the mind does sometimes 
 •refuse to be wholly tied down to the dictation either of text- 
 book or of teacher. Also fortunately, there have always 
 been some teachers who have never been satisfied with 
 mere reproductions of logical formulations of text-books. 
 
 One of the strong tendencies of modern pedagogy is to 
 emphasize in a variety of ways to all teachers the absolute 
 futility of trying to teach logical organizations of subject 
 matter without first psychologizing them. They must be pre- 
 pared for by taking advantage of the whole apperceptive pos- 
 sibilities of the child. What this book is emphasizing, also 
 in a variety of ways, is the futility for purposes of training 
 
148 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 in thinking of applying bodily to the child's mind the modes 
 of thinking characteristic of the trained man and supposing 
 that the child is getting training in the thinking process. 
 The technique of the highly finished form of thinking must 
 itself be evolved in the struggle to solve problems. The 
 psychology of this struggle is at least equally important 
 with the psychology of the finished product. 
 
 g. Thinking Power not Separable from Possession 
 OF A Fund of Knowledge. 
 
 The power of thinking cannot be trained in the abstract, 
 or in isolation from the process of acquisition of knowledge. 
 In both of the illustrations which we have worked through 
 in detail, it is noticeable that the possession of knowledge 
 within the specific field, — one that of music, the other that 
 of geometry, — was a most inevitable corollary of the part 
 which association plays in vital thinking. Success in find- 
 ing the relevant associates, the elements necessary to the 
 solution of the problem in thought, is contingent upon their 
 number and their organization. Also one's stock of definite 
 and well-organized knowledge within the field of the prob- 
 lem is an essential factor in the judgment of what is relevant 
 and what is irrelevant to the solution. Taking the problem 
 in geometry for example, past knowledge is continually 
 functioning. There is a stock of theorems and of definitions 
 upon which one is constantly drawing. We may go further 
 than this, and say that probably no one fully acquainted 
 with the subject of geometry, say a teacher of mathematics, 
 would be likely to go at the demonstration of the theorem 
 in so indirect and roundabout fashion. He would get at 
 the essential elements of the solution and organize it into 
 its final form with less waste, less irrelevant thinking. He 
 has well-defined modes of attack and a more highly special- 
 ized technique to apply in his methods of investigation in 
 geometry. 
 
 This last point suggests a very important truth in the 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 149 
 
 psychology of thinking. Who is most likely to think most 
 successfully in mathematics? In general, the man who 
 knows the most mathematics and who is trained in its special 
 technique. Who is the most likely to be successful in 
 thinking through problems in economics, in history, in 
 biology, in psychology, in engineering, etc. ? The men who 
 know the most about these subjects and who are trained in 
 the technique characteristic of each. Thinking power is 
 not an abstract and general power of the mind to be applied 
 equally well in all sorts of situations. It is rather a func- 
 tion of some larger whole, varying with the degree of 
 development of that larger whole. That larger whole in- 
 cludes special knowledge of fact and special training in the 
 technique of the subject. The good thinker in mathematics 
 may be a very poor thinker in economics or sociology, and 
 vice versa. The habit of care in the examination of data, 
 in the analysis of a situation, etc., may be carried over from 
 one department to the other, but the special knowledge and 
 the training in the special technique of one may be of little 
 or no use in the other. The thinking process falls within 
 systems of organized fact, as well as being a factor in the 
 organization of material. 
 
 If these things are so, we delude ourselves when we think 
 of such a thing as training children to think apart from the 
 process of building up a body of knowledge. Again, there 
 may be subjects of study which we feel are valuable because 
 of the fact that they are specially adapted to the training 
 of the child to think. But if the stock of ideas in which 
 this subject deals is one which will seldom or never be 
 drawn upon in his thinking in any other connection than as 
 a subject of study, of what value does this training in think- 
 ing become to him ? If we are to train children of any age 
 CO think, one of the factors in this process is the building 
 up of a system of definite and exact knowledge of facts 
 within the sphere in which the problems of thought are to 
 arise. This body of fact must be organized on the basis of 
 
150 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 its inner and inherent ties of connection, so far as this is 
 consistent with the nature of the materials and with the stage 
 of development of the child. 
 
 A large part of what Mr. James has termed "sagacity"^ 
 as a factor in reasoning, though not the whole of it, is reduc- 
 ible to the factor of knowledge which is immediately avail- 
 able. The author had occasion to note in his teaching of 
 geometry that the difference in the ability of certain stu- 
 dents to think through a problem in that subject very fre- 
 quently could not be ascribed to a fundamental difference 
 in mental or thought power so much as it could to the fact 
 that the successful reasoner had thoroughly mastered all 
 the definitions and previously proved theorems, so that they 
 were immediately available for use. He does not in the 
 least doubt that the same principle holds true in every 
 school subject. A great deal of loose teaching which does 
 not show results in the definite knowledge of important 
 facts and truths mastered by the pupils is unjustifiably ex- 
 cused on the ground that the chief stress has been put upon 
 the ability to think. The fact is there is no ability to think 
 in geometry without knowing the facts of geometry, in 
 geography without knowing the facts of geography, etc. 
 
 In pleading for a larger recognition of the vital thought 
 processes of children in the schoolroom, we are not plead- 
 ing for any diminution of interest in the process of acquir- 
 ing facts, but rather for methods which make the acquisition 
 of these facts a more vital process to the child through the 
 demand made upon him for the exercise of his thinking 
 power in their acquisition and organization. If this is done 
 he will become more fluent and facile in the use of them in 
 further situations demanding thinking. The free and 
 flexible use of facts in the thinking process depends largely 
 on the ties of logical connection which have previously been 
 set up, on the inherent relationships that have been dis- 
 covered in the past. Facts which are woven together by 
 the intimate ties of connection involved in thinking during 
 
The Activity of the Imagination 151 
 
 the process of their acquisition are thus more likely to be at 
 any subsequent time many-sided in character and to suggest 
 more of the fundamental relevancies needed in the solution 
 of new thought problems. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapters XI, XII, and XIII 
 
 Angell, Psychology, Ch. 8, and pp. 245-8. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, Bk. 4, Chs. I and II, also pp. 84- 
 89, 255-6. 
 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychology, Ch. 15. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, Ch. 7. 
 
 Titchener, Outline of Psychology, pp. 294-7. 
 
 Bolton, Meaning as Adjustment, Psy. Rev., May, 1908. 
 
 Baldwin, Thought and Things, Vol. I, Chs. 7-9. 
 
 This reference is for advanced students only. I include it 
 
 for the sake of the functional interpretation of meaning given 
 
 there. 
 
 See other psychologies for the discussions of imagination, asso- 
 ciation, and meaning. 
 
 ^ James, Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 362. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE IMAGE AS AN ELEMENT OF TECHNIQUE 
 IN THINKING 
 
 1. General Principle. 
 
 In the earlier stages in tlie development of thinking, the 
 imagery is all concrete ; in the later stages and in its higher 
 forms, a large amount of abstract imagery is used. The 
 substitution of abstract for concrete images in the thinking 
 process is a decided advance in the direction of the develop- 
 ment of a superior technique. 
 
 2. Our Use of the Terms Concrete and Abstract 
 
 Image. 
 
 By concrete images we shall mean those that are quite 
 faithful reproductions of sense-perceptions, whether visual, 
 auditory, motor, or those relevant to any other sense. In 
 the case of visual images, they would doubtless be more or 
 less pictorial in character. 
 
 While all images are more or less symbolic in character, 
 yet there are wider divergencies in their symbolic function 
 from the image which is primarily re-presentative to that 
 which is arbitrarily symbolic. There are correspondingly 
 different degrees of abstractness of images. The term ab- 
 stract is not used to mark off a class of images that are 
 sharply differentiated from the concrete, but rather a depar- 
 ture from the reproductive and re-presentative character of 
 the image in the direction of greater symbolism. The visual 
 image house might be called concrete, if it were a reproduc- 
 tion, a more or less detailed mental picture, of some partic- 
 ular house ; it might be called abstract to a certain degree if 
 
 152 
 
The Image as an Element of Technique 153 
 
 the image were only schematic, like this, — Such { \ 4 
 
 an image is certainly not lacking in concrete 
 
 character, yet it certainly represents a movement of the 
 mind away from reproductive detail toward greater sym- 
 bolism. In so far as this is true the image is abstract. The 
 image house would be still more abstract if it were only 
 the visual image of the printed word or the auditory image 
 of the word spoken. In these cases, the re-presentative 
 character of the image is entirely lacking, and the symbol 
 is arbitrary. Any other word-symbol would do just as well, 
 provided we agreed upon it. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the thinking of trained adults 
 goes on very largely in terms of word-images or some other 
 form of arbitrary symbols. Mathematics affords us a 
 striking illustration of a field in which as you go from the 
 lower to the higher and more advanced lines of investigation 
 you necessarily employ more and more compact arbitrary 
 symbols in order to carry on the thought process effectively. 
 The more precise significance of the use of abstract images 
 can be seen to better advantage if we postpone the discus- 
 sion until we have worked out something on the nature and 
 genesis of meaning. 
 
 3. The Nature and Genesis of Meaning. 
 
 (i) Genesis of meaning. 
 
 For an illustration let us take a case of the development 
 of meaning in perception. Suppose the child has never 
 seen sugar. He now sees it in the form of a little cube. 
 This cube can have no more meaning to him than any other 
 white cube. But the child has a natural impulse to reach 
 for the object which he sees. Vague perception is followed 
 by reaction. As a result of the reaction process he ulti- 
 mately gets hold of the lump of sugar. He gets new sen- 
 sory experiences different from those which come from the 
 smooth cubes of wood with which he has played. Perhaps 
 he likes the new sensations. If so, they make a more vivid 
 
154 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 impression and with repeated experiences get closely asso- 
 ciated with the visual appearance of the cube. According 
 to the laws of association, if either of these associates 
 occurs alone it tends to suggest the other. Consequently, 
 if the child gets the characteristic visual appearance, the 
 mind now supplies, without his going through the reaction 
 process of reaching, the characteristic quality of roughness 
 which would result from reaching and touching. In this 
 case the visual appearance has operated as a symbol to sug- 
 gest something not given. That which is suggested is 
 meaning. 
 
 Or if the touch sensation is that which is given and the 
 mind supplies, without the child's going through the reaction 
 of looking, the characteristic color and form ; then the 
 touch sensation has operated as a symbol and the color and 
 form are elements of meaning. If the child has gone 
 through play reactions with the cube of sugar, its sight or 
 its touch may suggest these play experiences again. If the 
 play experiences are anticipated on the basis of the data 
 given, then they become a part of the meaning for him. 
 
 Through still other reactions having their origin in a 
 deepseated impulse the child will almost inevitably put the 
 piece of sugar in his mouth and thus get a new group of 
 sensations, those of taste, which will become associated 
 with the others. If, when the piece of sugar is seen, the 
 visual qualities suggest the sweet taste, then this anticipa- 
 tion in advance of the reaction which would bring it, is a 
 case of meaning of sugar for the child. 
 
 The genesis of meaning is, then, to be explained in some 
 such way as this : — Reaction to data given to the senses 
 results in further sensory experience in terms of the same 
 and of other senses. In process of time, as experiences of 
 this sort repeat themselves in the activity of the individual, 
 such a firm association of the various related phases of the 
 total experience is set up that when one of them occurs 
 
The Image as an Element of Technique 155 
 
 alone it suggests one or more of the further possible devel- 
 opments of the experience. 
 
 The data given to consciousness on the basis of which the 
 mind responds in terms of meaning may be either sense- 
 perception data or images. If I see a stream of water and 
 this perception suggests to me boating, quenching my 
 thirst, going in bathing, in all of these cases I have mean- 
 ings attached to water. My mind runs on beyond the per- 
 cept water as something which affects my vision in certain 
 characteristic ways to further results which could be 
 secured from reactions to this thing in certain specific ways. 
 These anticipations are meanings. This is equally true in 
 the case that the water is not actually present to sense but 
 is embodied in the form of an image, either concrete or 
 abstract. If these anticipations follow upon the emergence 
 of the image, then they are elements of meaning of which 
 the image is the symbol. 
 
 (2) Definition of meaning. 
 
 From the point of vifew just developed we may formulate 
 in functional terms a definition of meaning somewhat as 
 follows : Meaning is the mental anticipation of the outcome, 
 or result, of reactions not yet made, hut which might be 
 made, in response to data immediately given to sense or to 
 images arising in the mind. 
 
 (s) Correlativity of meaning and symbol. 
 
 We can easily see now that meaning and symbol must 
 be correlative. Each involves the other necessarily. That 
 which is suggested is meaning, and that which suggests it 
 is the symbol, or carrier, of the meaning. In terms of con- 
 tent, that which is meaning at one time may be symbol at 
 another, and vice versa. The color and form of the object 
 may suggest to the child the sweetness of sugar in advance 
 of his putting it to the mouth. Again, if the lump of sugar 
 is not seen, but is tasted only, the sweetness may suggest 
 color and form in advance of turning the eyes upon the 
 object. In the first case, color and form operate as symbol 
 
156 The Psychology of Thinking ' 
 
 to suggest the meaning sweetness ; in the other, sweetness 
 to the taste operates as the symbol to suggest the element 
 of meaning color and form. There is no such thing as 
 absolute symbol and no such thing as absolute meaning. 
 The two, meaning and symbol, are correlative, but not fixed 
 and absolute. 
 
 In every experience which has meaning for us, analysis 
 is always capable of distinguishing between certain ele- 
 ments which may be regarded as given and as having little 
 or no value in themselves, but only for what they signify, 
 and certain other elements which are supplied by the mind 
 and which are significant. Without meaning there is no 
 symbol ; what we call a symbol is not a real symbol, but only 
 an empty form. It is equally true, but more difficult to 
 understand and more easily overlooked, that without sym- 
 bol there is no meaning. If we have any experience which 
 is absolutely contained within itself, suggesting nothing not 
 immediately given, not serving as the basis of any anticipa- 
 tion, — in other words, to which the mind adds or supplies 
 absolutely nothing, — this experience may have some sensa- 
 tional and perhaps some feeling value, but it cannot be said 
 to have any meaning for the person who has the experience. 
 To connect this thought with the familiar doctrine of apper- 
 ception, this is an experience of something totally new and 
 it is not apperceived. 
 
 The element of meaning involved in experiences of 
 recognition seems difficult to bring under our conception 
 and definition. But even here there is undoubtedly some 
 splitting up of the immediate experience into two phases, 
 one of which is symbolic and the other suggested, only here 
 the two phases are so closely related that it is hard to dis- 
 tinguish them from each other. When we have the expe- 
 rience of recognizing our friend Jackson, that is virtually 
 mentally assuming that he is the same person whom we saw 
 yesterday. In this case we at least supply a setting dififer- 
 ent from that of the present by way of a foil to bring out 
 
The Image as an Element of Technique 157 
 
 the idea of sameness. So we may safely assume that mean- 
 ing and symbol are strictly correlative. If this is true 
 psychologically, it has pedagogical implications of consider- 
 able importance. These we shall try to point out in another 
 place. 
 
 (4) The functional nature of meaning. 
 
 Meaning as an aspect of consciousness is functional. 
 Our account of its genesis, as well as our definition, have 
 emphasized this fact. A study of children's definitions, 
 where you see meaning not yet fossilized, furnishes striking 
 evidence of the truth of our position. Chamberlain^ has 
 collated definitions from several sources. A few of the 
 most striking ones follow : 
 
 Kiss is if you hug and kiss somebody. 
 
 Mast is what holds the sail up top of a ship. 
 
 Nail is something to put things together. 
 
 Nut is something with a shell good to eat. 
 
 Quarrel is if you begin a little fight. 
 
 Ring is what you wear on your finger. 
 
 Saw is if you see something, after you see it you 
 
 saw it. 
 Vain is if you always look in the glass. 
 A dog is to have by one. 
 A garden is to walk in. 
 Village means one sees everybody pass. 
 Flame is the power of the candle. 
 
 The truth of the functional view of meaning here pre- 
 sented is still further seen in the fact that meaning is rela- 
 tive to a given situation. When the child is hungry, an 
 apple is something good to eat ; when he is not hungry, but 
 playful, an apple is something to roll or to throw up and 
 down and catch. The meaning is different in the two cases 
 because the individual anticipates from the object the satis- 
 
 ^ Chamberlain, The Child, pp. 146-147. 
 
158 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 faction of a different need through, or as the result of, a 
 different mode of reaction. 
 
 There seems to be a good deal of evidence in support of 
 the view that the earlier and cruder meanings are func- 
 tional, but will it hold true of the technical and scientific 
 meanings of the trained man? To the child a ball is some- 
 thing to roll, the meaning is plainly functional ; but how 
 different the mathematician's conception ! He would think 
 of a ball as a material sphere, every point of whose surface ' 
 is equidistant from a point within called the center. But 
 his problem is very different. Because he is meeting 
 through the ball a different need, his meaning for the ball 
 is different from that of the child. It answers his purpose 
 as a mathematican, it fits in with his mathematical experi- 
 ences more adequately, to attach that meaning to the ball. 
 In both the case of the child and that of the mathematician, 
 what is anticipated is in terms of characteristic experiences 
 that the object has yielded and is capable of yielding again. 
 The same line of thought can be applied to all manner of 
 meanings that get expression in descriptive terms. The 
 writer believes that it holds equally well for the meanings 
 of such abstract terms as justice, honesty, arid patriotism 
 also, but he does not wish to prolong this aspect of the 
 discussion. 
 — (5) The abstract image and meaning. 
 
 In his Outline of Psychology,'^ Mr. Titchener discusses 
 the manner in which the abstract idea originates. By 
 abstract idea he seems to mean practically what is meant 
 in this discussion by abstract image. He describes a 
 prevalent view of the abstract idea as analogous to the 
 composite photograph, the various percepts of a thing cor- 
 responding to the individual pictures which enter into the 
 composite photograph. In the resulting picture the 
 resemblances are emphasized and the differences, not 
 repeating themselves so often on the plate, are blurred and 
 
 ' Pp. 294-297. 
 
The Image as an Element of Technique 159 
 
 fainter. "The abstract idea of cat, on this analogy, is a 
 reproduction -in which all the cat-resemblances are empha- 
 sized, and all the cat-differences left faint and obscure. 
 Now there can be no doubt that the abstract idea might take 
 this form in an 'all-round' mind, a mind which was equally 
 well developed in all its sense departments. But it is not 
 the form which the idea does take, as a matter of fact, in 
 the average consciousness. The photographic plate is 
 impartial; it gives equal attention, so to speak, to every 
 detail of the picture before it. The organism, on the con- 
 trary, is always biased; it gives more attention to some 
 constituents of an idea than to others. My abstract idea 
 of a cat, therefore, is a composite photograph only of those 
 cat-attributes which have caught my attention ; it is more 
 like an impressionist sketch of a cat — the sketch of some 
 particular artist, throwing into relief the particular char- 
 acteristics which have 'struck' him — than like a composite 
 photograph of some hundred cats." 
 
 This long quotation from Mr. Titchener has been intro- 
 duced at this point largely for the sake of the contrast 
 which he points out between the impartial photographic 
 plate and the bias of the organism. This bias of the organ- 
 ism on which Mr. Titchener comments here incidentally is 
 really made central in functional psychology. The organ- 
 ism is always biased in all its conscious processes. That 
 bias comes from the fact that it is continually being con- 
 fronted with new situations, involving new problems. The 
 needs of the organism in its process of adaptation and 
 adjustment to the world in which it lives make it impossible 
 for any "all-round" mind to exist. An "all-round" mind 
 would be hopelessly at sea in a world like ours in which 
 a variety of individual needs have to be met by a variety 
 of modes of individual control. No, the only guarantee 
 that any of our conscious processes shall be of service to 
 us is that they be fashioned with reference to the "bias" of 
 the organism; for the organism can never be otherwise 
 
l6o The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 than biased according to some situation or other. Con- 
 sequently, while abstract images will be based on percep- 
 tion, none of them can be photographic in character. They 
 are rather mental constructs suited to needs. 
 
 It is inconceivable that the number of teeth on the upper 
 jaw of a steer is as important a fact to the farmer as the 
 number of horns on its head or the number of pounds in 
 its weight. When the farmer constructs an image to meet 
 the ordinary purposes of his thought, the number of teeth 
 serves no useful function and of course will not be made 
 use of. Abstract images are tools of the mind constructed 
 for use. How they shall be constructed, just what ele- 
 ments shall enter into them, depends upon the particular 
 needs of the organism, on its particular "bias." Abstract 
 images are symbols for the carrying of meaning. Whether 
 they arise out of the background of concrete experiences 
 or whether they are arbitrary inventions, the only thing 
 that can logically be demanded of them is that they be 
 capable of performing their function. 
 
 4. Superiority of the Abstract Image as an Element 
 OF Technique in Thinking. 
 
 (i) Less irrelevancy of suggestion. 
 
 In a thinking process, concrete images often suggest 
 more than is necessary. They cumber the thinking pro- 
 cess with unnecessary details. Consequently, they ofifer 
 more lines of departure for the thought to run off into 
 irrelevant channels. If, in a thinking process concerned 
 with some problem of lumbering, the image tree arises as 
 a necessity to the movement of thought, and this image 
 comes with all its concrete detail as the particular beech 
 tree at the bottom of a hill, with a cool spring under its 
 shade, my thought may be easily switched off from its 
 proper movement into the by-paths of reminiscences of my 
 boyhood on the farm. But if the image is more schematic, 
 or if it is the still more abstract word-image, the associates 
 
The Image as an Element of Technique i6i 
 
 suggested are more likely to fall within the field of rele- 
 vancy. However, there are conditions, as will soon be 
 pointed out, under which good thinking demands the use 
 of concrete images. Each kind of image has its own pecu- 
 liar value and function in the thought process. One supe- 
 rior value of the abstract image as an element of technique 
 in thinking is certainly to be found in the fact that it 
 affords less irrelevant suggestion for the side-tracking of 
 the movement of thought. 
 
 (2) Greater rapidity of movement. 
 
 This same freedom from a mass of concrete detail brings 
 with it a still further advantage. Abstract imagery flows 
 more easily and rapidly through the mind than concrete 
 imagery. We have only to compare arithmetical and alge- 
 braic methods of solution of the same problem to observe 
 the superior freedom, brevity, and compactness of the 
 thought process the more symbolic it can be made. 
 
 (s) Superiority in making logical connections. 
 
 The chief value of the abstract image, a value not 
 separate from those already stated, is that it carries better 
 than the concrete image those meanings which are most 
 recurrent and general and thus makes possible the con- 
 cept. The abstract image is the more likely to be a center 
 for the correlation of meanings on which depend general 
 and necessary connections of thought rather than those 
 which are accidental and ever-shifting. Such an element 
 of technique as the abstract image thus gives added power 
 in dealing with problems involving complex and far-reach- 
 ing relations. 
 
 (4) Increase of power. 
 
 To many people the term abstract is a synonym for 
 remoteness from reality. It is true that when we get over 
 into the realm of the abstract we are getting away from the 
 immediately real and practical, but this is only for the pur- 
 pose of coming back at the practical and concrete situation 
 with added power. One who has a heavy stone to lift 
 II 
 
i62 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 appears to be getting away from his practical task when 
 he hunts for a long pole, puts one end of the pole under 
 the stone, places a fulcrum under the pole, walks off sev- 
 eral feet from the stone which he is to lift, and pulls down 
 on the pole instead of up on the stone. But as a result of 
 his getting away from the immediacy of his task he has in 
 reality come back to it with a tremendous increment of 
 power. So it is with the abstract element in thought; it is 
 only a tool for the bringing to bear added power upon the 
 problems of life in their various forms. The whole 
 history of science in its relation to the arts and industries 
 of our day is sufficient evidence of the truth of this 
 statement. 
 
 5. Functional Relation between Concrete and 
 Abstract Imagery. 
 
 (i) Meaning of abstract image dependent on translation. 
 
 Concrete images are fundamental; they lie at the basis 
 of abstract images. Historically it is probable that the 
 abstract symbols of written language originated in the con- 
 ventionalizing of picture writing. Those who did the 
 picture writing became accustomed to more and more 
 abbreviated forms, until only the writers themselves, or 
 those who were taught by them, could tell their meaning. 
 From this it is but a short step to the idea of symbols 
 arbitrarily chosen to represent anything we please. But 
 it is evident that no one of these symbols could have any 
 meaning to the person who used it unless he could trans- 
 late it over into terms of that for which it stood. So it is 
 with all the abstract images which we use in our thinking 
 processes. In the first place, they have their origin for 
 us either in the conventionalizing of the concrete images 
 arising from our perception processes, or else they have 
 been taught to us out of the stock of arbitrary symbols, 
 mostly words, which are now the inheritance of the race ; 
 that is, they have their basis in the concrete. In the second 
 
The Image as an Element of Technique 163 
 
 place, no one of these abstract images, whatever its origin 
 may be, can have any meaning for us except as it is 
 capable of being translated into concrete images of some 
 sort, or else into some familiar set of symbols which we 
 know can be so translated into the concrete. 
 
 (2) Significance for thinking. 
 
 It often happens in a thinking process that the abstract 
 image which arises according to the laws of association 
 which are operative fails to suggest a proper connection 
 for the forward movement of thought. Then it becomes 
 necessary to translate this abstract image into terms of 
 the concrete until some meaning is found which is familiar 
 enough to serve as a basis of effecting the necessary transi- 
 tion in thought. In general, the abstract image suffices 
 when it serves the function of making connections. This 
 it does most adequately in the realm of the familiar. 
 
 In dealing with the unfamiliar we are more likely to need 
 to convert the abstract into its concrete equivalents. When 
 one first learns the meaning in geography of isthmus and 
 of strait, he quite likely has to get some sort of a concrete 
 image in order to distinguish the two. The thinking pro- 
 cess is blocked until the proper meanings are cleared up 
 by translating the word images over into more concrete 
 terms. The abstract symbols m this case are not suffi- 
 ciently perfected as elements of technique in thinking. 
 For a while they have to be translated into terms of the 
 concrete every time that they occur. But when these terms 
 become thoroughly familiar, thought glides on without 
 such translation. The principle need not be further elabo- 
 rated here; for it will be made clearer in the pedagogical 
 discussion which is to follow in the next chapter. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 EDUCATIONAL APPLICATIONS AND 
 ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 I. The School must concern itself with the Task 
 
 OF SECURING FOR THE ChILD AN ADEQUATE BACK- 
 GROUND OF Concrete Experience. 
 
 (i) The principle in general. 
 
 Thinking cannot be most effective, as we have already 
 seen, except as the power to use abstract images is devel- 
 oped. But these have no meaning unless they can be 
 translated in terms of the concrete. Furthermore, some 
 sort of thinking must go on in terms of the concrete as the 
 starting point for the development of this superior abstract 
 element of technique. It is, then, very important that 
 the child have an adequate background of experience with 
 the concrete as the first requisite of any serious attempt to 
 train him to think. May we assume that he will get this 
 background of concrete experience outside of the school? 
 If that assumption was ever justifiable in the past, it is no 
 longer so in this age of specialization of industry and of 
 crowding of the population into the cities. 
 
 It is evident that the school has a duty to perform in 
 seeing that the child gets a richer background of first-hand 
 experience with things. Teachers of science have found 
 the laboratory indispensable not alone for the purpose of 
 conducting investigations with proper instruments, but also 
 as a means of bringing their pupils into direct contact with 
 things which give them the concrete images on which to 
 base the generalizations involved in right thinking. The 
 teachers of the grades are learning the same lesson in ele- 
 
Educational Applications and Illustrations 165 
 
 mentary education. Only here the need is even greater. 
 The experience of the child must be enriched through the 
 agencies of manual training in. all its forms, excursions to 
 the fields and the parks, the use of pictures, stories dealing 
 with concrete situations involving principles, etc. Even 
 in history, morals, and religion, the story element should 
 be emphasized more strongly at first. The work of the 
 school cannot be simply that of furnishing ready-made the 
 great tools of further culture and knowledge,— the three 
 "R's." 
 
 (2) Concrete experience must not be in terms of one 
 sense only. 
 
 Psychologists have abundantly proved the variability of 
 people in their use of concrete imagery. We do not all rely 
 equally upon visual images. With some, auditory images 
 are more prominently employed than the visual ; and with 
 others, motor images play a very large part. Still further, 
 different sorts of situations may call for different types of 
 imagery. Hence it is not sufficient in building up the back- 
 ground of concrete imagery on which higher forms of 
 thought depend to employ modes of instruction which call 
 for visual imagery alone. Forms of instruction must be 
 devised which call into play the eye, the ear, and the hand. 
 Oral instruction, manual training, drawing, and other 
 constructive arts must go hand in hand with observation 
 and books, if we are to furnish an adequate basis of con- 
 crete imagery to support the higher psychical processes. 
 We must be fair to the ear-minded and the motor-minded 
 (may I say hand-minded?) types of people. We must also 
 provide the concrete imagery material for the right under- 
 standing of situations for which one kind of imagery is 
 not adequate. Otherwise thought is crippled and goes hob- 
 bling along on one foot. 
 
1 66 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 2. Attention must be given to the Translation of 
 THE Abstract in Terms of the Concrete. 
 
 (i) Such translation is often the determining factor in 
 thinking. 
 
 We have seen that there is a functional relation between 
 the concrete and the abstract. This relation can never be 
 absolutely broken down after abstract images have been 
 developed. The whole meaning of the abstract is depend- 
 ent upon the abihty to translate it in terms of the concrete. 
 This ability is often the determining element in the solu- 
 tion of a problem of thought. While thinking moves more 
 rapidly and also with greater power in terms of the 
 abstract imagery, yet at critical points the whole success 
 of the process depends upon the ability to translate into 
 terms of the concrete. This would be another argument 
 for the point made above, namely, the need of a sufficient 
 background of concrete experience. But, to return to the 
 particular point under discussion, we can easily see how a 
 general, working out a plan of campaign, might be stuck at 
 some point while working in terms of the map ; but if he 
 had some considerable experience with the country in ques- 
 tion, the solution of his problem would be simplified by 
 stopping to recall certain characteristics of strategic points 
 in all the concrete detail of reproductive imagination. 
 
 Children who fail to solve a certain class of practical 
 problems in arithmetic are often unjustly regarded as 
 stupid or incapable of thinking. Frequently the difficulty 
 is not to be traced to any fundamental weakness in thought 
 power as such, but rather to inability, or failure, to trans- 
 late the abstract terms of the problem over into concrete 
 terms. Such is the case with many children who have 
 trouble with problems in papering, plastering, bricklaying, 
 carpeting, etc. The minute that they get a clear idea of 
 how strips of carpet look upon the floor, of how bricks look 
 in a wall, etc., then the problem becomes quite simple. 
 
Educational Applications and Illustrations 167 
 
 The translation of the abstract statement of such problems 
 into terms of the concrete may often be facilitated by 
 requiring the pupil to supplement, or make explicit, his 
 image by means of a drawing. His chief difficulty has 
 been that he actually could not mentally see how carpet 
 looked upon the floor, or paper on the wall, or boards in 
 a fence around a field. From the point of view, however, 
 of training in the power to think through rapidly and skil- 
 fully this class of problems, the permanent necessity of 
 translating the abstract formulation into concrete terms 
 would be far from ideal. Ultimately these problems should 
 be quickly and readily analyzed into their essential ele- 
 ments, their relation to some fundamental principle, or 
 general method, seen, and the work done by the appropriate 
 rule. 
 
 It is not alone in mathematics that thinking power often 
 depends upon the ability to translate quickly from the 
 abstract formulation of the problem over into the concrete. 
 Many a problem of sociology, of economics, or of practical 
 life, notably in matters of conduct, can be adequately 
 grasped only by repeated translations into terms of con- 
 crete and specific situations. The man who can make 
 these translations with the greatest facility is often the man 
 who arrives most quickly and most certainly at the right 
 conclusions. 
 
 (2) Practice in translation must be given. 
 
 In all training to think, the functional relation between 
 concrete and abstract imagery must be kept unbroken. 
 There must be the adequate background of concrete images 
 derived from abundant first-hand experiences of the right 
 sort to serve as the basis of translation of the abstract into 
 the concrete ; and there must be sufficient practice, at the 
 time of training, in the habit of making such translations 
 at critical points in the thought process. This habit is an 
 important asset to thinking power. It often marks the 
 
i68 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 critical diflference in the mode of attack of a new problem 
 by the successful thinker and the unsuccessful. 
 
 (2) Practice in translation makes abstract images more 
 efficient. 
 
 A still further reason for giving practice in the transla- 
 tion of abstract terms over into the concrete is to be found 
 in the fact that it makes the abstract images themselves 
 more fluent and facile as tools of thinking. There is a 
 feeling of warmth and relevancy to the concrete images 
 which gradually gets transferred to the abstract. The 
 meaning of the abstract becomes an indissoluble part of it, 
 immediately felt and appreciated, needing not to be con- 
 sciously and reflectively unfolded in order to perform its 
 function readily, accurately, and adequately. In other 
 words, practice in translation does away with the need of 
 translation through the transformation of the abstract 
 which has been effected by the process. 
 
 It is doubtful if teachers fully appreciate the value and 
 importance, especially in the early stages of the pursuit of 
 a new subject, of abundant drill in the matter of translating 
 the abstract in terms of the concrete, or of the more 
 abstract in terms of the less abstract and more familiar. 
 This applies particularly to mathematics where so many 
 important general principles and rules are expressed in 
 terms of formulae. These formulae cannot become real 
 tools of the mind, fully adapted to the solution of new prob- 
 lems, except as they have been fully appropriated and 
 assimilated and worked over into the very texture of the 
 mind itself. This means that the functional relation be- 
 tween these abstract elements and their concrete equiva- 
 lents has become so very close that it is immediately felt 
 and appreciated rather than being explicitly thought. 
 Now, every branch of study moves in the direction of more 
 or less abstract formulation of thought. Its formulae may 
 not be so compact as those of mathematics, but they are 
 often more complex, as in economics, sociology, psychology, 
 
Educational Applications and Illustrations 169 
 
 ethics, and religion; hence flexibility, freedom, and power 
 in their use demand abundant practice in their translation 
 into concrete terms. 
 
 3. Training in Thinking demands that the Transi- 
 tion BE EFFECTED FROM THE USE OF CONCRETE IMAGES 
 
 TO THE Use of Abstract Images. 
 
 The preceding paragraphs have emphasized the impor- 
 tance of the concrete. But from the point of view of think- 
 ing power the abstract image is the more powerful tool of 
 thought. While it is necessary to emphasize the concrete 
 for the sake of giving fullness and richness of meaning to 
 the abstract, yet it is also necessary to pass on to the free 
 and flexible use of the abstract. Along with the develop- 
 ment of the habit of translating the abstract in terms of the 
 concrete should go the training of the power to translate 
 and sum up the concrete in terms of the abstract. It may 
 be all right for the child of five to count upon his fingers, 
 but it cramps his mental growth for him to be allowed to 
 continue to do so after this practice has performed its 
 function of getting him started. In the case of the prob- 
 lems already mentioned of papering, plastering, carpet lay- 
 ing, etc., the teacher would fail in the performance of his 
 full duty if he did not lead the children on beyond the 
 necessity of working out all the problems in the concrete. 
 
 For the small child it may be all right and even necessary 
 for him to think of law in the concrete terms of the police- 
 man and of God in terms of a big benevolent man; but 
 growth in the power of intelligent thought along these 
 lines demands the development of the power to think in 
 more and more abstract terms. If we fix the child in the 
 habit of thinking in terms of the concrete by giving him 
 practice in the concrete beyond the necessity of furnishing 
 a sufficient background for the attainment of fullness and 
 richness of meaning for his abstract symbols, we are limit- 
 ing his possibilities of becoming strong and powerful in 
 
170 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 his thought processes. Particularly as the period of 
 adolescence draws near should more attention be given to 
 the cultivation of thought in more abstract terms. 
 
 4. The Child's Ability to give Formal Definitions of 
 
 Things is not a Proper Test of his Knowledge of 
 their Meaning. 
 
 We have already seen that meaning is primarily func- 
 tional in nature. The child of the lower grades has not 
 passed over into that stage of development in which mean- 
 ings take the more structural and descriptive forms of 
 science. If we wish to know whether he understands the 
 meanings of words used in his reading lesson or in any 
 other subject, we should be reasonably well satisfied with 
 answers in functional and concrete terms. It is more or 
 less waste of time for the teacher to be too insistent upon 
 definitions in the abstract and descriptive terms which 
 would be required to satisfy the adult mind. 
 
 5. There is a Real Danger that Education may be- 
 
 come A Process of Juggling with Symbols. 
 
 (i) Value of learning dependent on grasp of meaning. 
 
 We have emphasized the fact that symbol and meaning 
 are correlative. When the child is taught in such a way 
 that he gets a symbol without meaning, psychologically it 
 IS no symbol for him, even though it be for us. The value 
 of the symbol for the teacher is not the sole basis for teach- 
 ing it to the child. It is necessary to develop along with 
 it the correlative meaning. If the child is not ready for 
 this, or if it cannot be done, then the symbol should not be 
 taught. The learning of beautiful memory gems, of 
 catechisms, of Biblical verses, etc., is of very doubtful 
 value, unless much attention is given to the problem of 
 developing their meanings in terms comprehensible to the 
 child. The doctrine here laid down is only another phase 
 
Educational Applications and Illustrations 171 
 
 of the discussion centering in the functional relation be- 
 tween abstract and concrete imagery. 
 
 (2) Application to reading. 
 
 Fluency in reading, — the ability to pronounce hard words 
 and to control the other elements of technique involved in 
 the reading process, — is no guarantee of the assimilation 
 of thought by the reader. Some children have a fatal 
 facility in the handling of symbols. This facility must not 
 be taken as a measure of the grasp of the meaning, or con- 
 tent, of what is read. It is not safe to assume that children 
 understand without taking some trouble to test. And the 
 verbal test is not always sufficient. Dramatization, draw- 
 ing, and constructive work are more certain tests where they 
 can be applied. Reading means intellectual death if con- 
 tent is ignored and the process is reduced to one of drill 
 upon the manipulation of technique. The writer has had 
 opportunity to observe quite widely, and he believes that 
 there is a very real danger that reading may become too 
 much a process of juggling with symbols. 
 
 (2) Danger of loss of interest. 
 
 The process of learning symbols without sufficient atten- 
 tion to meaning leads either to loss of interest or to artifi- 
 ciality. A certain child who had natural facility in reading 
 undertook to read Shakespeare at an early age. He found 
 little difficulty in handling the technique of the reading 
 process and took a certain pride in his achievement. But 
 after a time, the whole thing began to pall upon him be- 
 cause it all seemed such senseless stuff. The result was 
 that he studiously ignored Shakespeare until he became a 
 young man and was required to take up the reading in 
 higher English courses. Another young man said that he 
 thought that he might be able to enjoy Tennyson's "The 
 Princess," if he had not been put through such a stiff drill 
 in analysis of the poem. Mastery of technique at the 
 expense of meaning was deadening in both of these cases, 
 
172 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 and these can be duplicated times without number in 
 actual experience. 
 
 (4) Danger of artificiality. 
 
 Learning processes which begin as juggling with symbols 
 we would naturally expect to die out quickly from lack of 
 motivation. On account of their barrenness, they should 
 normally be the cause of their own cessation. But they 
 are often kept up through the pleasure found in the 
 activity itself. When this is the case the outcome is the 
 most pitiful kind of artificiality, judged from any true 
 standard of the real nature of thinking. The classic illus- 
 tration of this is to be found in the arguments of the 
 Sophists as they are represented to us in Plato's Dialogues. 
 
 But we do not have to go so far away from home as 
 ancient Greece to find abundant illustrations of the same 
 thing. For how many students have algebra and geometry 
 been little more than processes of successful juggling with 
 symbols ! They passed in these subjects, yes, but how much 
 of meaning or significance did they have for them? It 
 was rather fun to manipulate the plus and minus signs in 
 algebra, making changes according to the rules, and to 
 come out at the end of long processes of reduction with 
 the answer given in the book. But what of it? What did 
 it all mean? And so in geometry it was rather interesting 
 to find that if you drew a line through a figure in a certam 
 way, a lot of statements could be made which would be 
 true and which would lead to a certain conclusion. But 
 why draw the line? That was arbitrary; the author said 
 to draw it. How deadening to real vital thought processes 
 to deal with a lot of arbitrary elements when every one of 
 them can be made to carry a rich load of meaning ! The 
 teacher should not rest satisfied until meaning is corre- 
 lated with symbol. 
 
 (5) Extent of this danger. 
 
 This danger of making instruction a process of mere 
 manipulation of symbols is not confined alone to reading 
 
Educational Applications and Illustrations 173 
 
 and mathematics. It is just as likely to occur in the teach- 
 ing of geography, of grammar, of physics, of chemistry, 
 etc. Certainly much of the imagery of adults of the present 
 age who studied geography in their childhood is in terms 
 of dots and lines on maps rather than in terms of anything 
 that is concrete and meaningful regarding places and 
 things. We are doing much to remedy this in present-day 
 education. We cannot do too much in the direction of 
 furnishing a basis in concrete studies for the meanings of 
 the symbols of our more abstract sciences. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGINATION IN 
 RELATION TO THINKING 
 
 I. Stages of Development. 
 
 We are familiar with the thought that the Hfe of 
 the child passes through several stages of development 
 the phenomena of which are different enough to attract the 
 attention of the investigator. But the facts of child life 
 are not to be viewed as mere facts, however interesting 
 they may be. If child study is to have any real significance, 
 the body of facts which it studies must receive some con- 
 sistent interpretation. There must be some standard of 
 their evaluation. The standard of evaluation and inter- 
 pretation is furnished in the idea of growing control. The 
 phenomena of child life must be interpreted in terms of 
 their functional significance in the process of growing 
 control. 
 
 For convenience of discussion we may divide the period 
 of prolonged human infancy into the following periods : 
 ( I ) early infancy, from birth to about two years or two 
 and a half years of age; (2) later infancy, from the end 
 of early infancy until six or seven years of age; (3) child- 
 hood, from six or seven until twelve or thirteen; and (4) 
 adolescence, from the end of childhood until maturity. In 
 the discussion of these stages of development we must not 
 think of them as sharply separated from one another, but 
 as continuous and overlapping. That which is stated as 
 significant of a certain stage of development must be 
 thought of as having its beginnings in the preceding stage 
 and as continuing over into the following one. We are 
 
 174 
 
Development of the Imagination 175 
 
 not going into a full discussion of the characteristics of 
 these stages of development, but shall take up some of the 
 things which throw light upon the place and significance 
 of the thinking process in the life of the child. The stress 
 will then fall upon the development of the child's imagina- 
 tion from the point of view of the problem of growing 
 control. 
 
 2. First Period, — Early Infancy. 
 
 This is a period preeminently of beginnings. The child 
 is largely concerned with the mastery of the fundamental 
 physical coordinations. The larger muscular movements 
 are brought under control, including the fundamental 
 coordinations involved in walking and talking. Objects 
 are of interest to the child mainly as centers of reaction. 
 Upon them he can exercise his growing power of manipu- 
 lation and control. They are things to be pushed and 
 thrown. They are the instruments of securing interesting 
 sensations, — tactual, visual, auditory, muscular, etc. They 
 have immediate and direct value. Activity is interesting in 
 and of itself. It has little of definite aim. The child's 
 play is more physical than intellectual. The objects upon 
 which it expends itself have an emotional significance as 
 furnishing a field for the pleasurable exercise of his grow- 
 ing power of physical control. 
 
 In the child's abundant and more or less impulsive and 
 spontaneous activities in this period, he has acquired 
 various experiences which serve as the basis of the dawning 
 imagination. His control over objects and his own acts in 
 relation to these objects has grown in proportion as he has 
 remembered the results of past experiences and utilized 
 them in further manipulation. 
 
 3. Second Period, — Later Infancy. 
 (i) General characteristics. 
 
 In later mfancy imagination comes into full bloom. The 
 efflorescence of the imagination , and its correlative expres- 
 
176 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 sion in spontaneous play is one of the chief characteristics 
 of this period. Both the activity of imagination and the 
 development of play are stimulated by the fact that this is 
 a period of the freer use and control of the larger muscular 
 coordinations effected in the earlier period and also that a 
 begmning is made in the control of finer muscular coordi- 
 nations. Another of the chief characteristics of later in- 
 fancy is that it is the period of making the fundamental 
 social adjustments. The significance of the kindergarten 
 lies in the recognition of these fundamental tendencies of 
 child life in this period and the endeavor to guide and direct 
 them to a richer fruition. But our discussion must revert 
 to the imagination, however interesting it might be to fol- 
 low up other leads. 
 
 (2) Activity of the imagination in play. 
 
 The period of later infancy is the golden era of the 
 imagmation. There are many ways in which this is evi- 
 denced. One of these is in the play activities of the child. 
 Whereas in the earlier period the child's play was a more 
 or less direct response to some object which he playfully 
 manipulated, or it exhausted itself in the exuberance of 
 physical activity itself ; in this period play is more the 
 response to images in the mind, and the object is reduced 
 to a subsidiary position. The chair is not pushed to and 
 fro merely for the sake of the pleasure of the exercise of 
 physical control involved in the manipulation ; but it has 
 now come to be a train of cars, a wagon, an engme, or 
 what not. The thing that is primary is the image in the 
 child's mind ; the chair is reduced to a vehicle for the expres- 
 sion of that image. Image and play are correlative. They 
 are related to each other as stimulus to response, or as 
 inner to outer aspects of the same process. The image 
 without movement would be very fleeting and evanescent ; 
 movement helps to define and build up the image. 
 
 (3) Significance of rapid development of imagination. 
 If we are to employ our category of growing control, 
 
Development of the Imagination 177 
 
 this rapidly developing imagination is significant from sev- 
 eral related points of view. For one thing it marks a 
 movement in the direction of mental as contrasted with 
 purely physical control. However, in this period the image 
 is not felt to be distinct from the act. Image and act are 
 not discriminated, but are aspects of one emotional whole. 
 Again, a part of the wonderful activity of the imagination 
 during this period can be interpreted as the inevitable con- 
 sequence of the exercise of a new power. There is always 
 pleasure in the exercise and control of a new function. 
 The activity of the imagination in its early stages of devel- 
 opment is its own stimulus and its own reward. 
 
 (4) Enlargement of -Held of control. 
 
 The activity of the imagination enlarges the field of con- 
 trol. During this period the child is preeminently seeking 
 to enlarge his experience. The present moment is not an 
 isolated fact. Through memory and imagination it be- 
 comes a part of a larger whole. The absent features of 
 this larger whole may be supplied to the intense emotional 
 satisfaction of the mind. The common objects of play thus 
 become centers for the condensation of limitless possibilities 
 of experience which the child could not realize in any other 
 way than through play. Time and space become soluble 
 and his sphere of control is indefinitely enlarged. The fact 
 that the fire engme passed an hour ago and is now miles 
 away does not remove it from the sphere of the child's 
 activities and the exercise of his control. The chair be- 
 comes the fire engine and the interesting experience is 
 prolonged and repeated in the absence of the particular 
 thing which originated it. In imaginative play everything 
 in heaven above and earth beneath is brought under the 
 control of the child and is manipulated by him. He is 
 monarch of all he surveys, and time and space furnish no 
 limitations to his empire. There is nothing which the child 
 cannot have, if he will, — drums, stores, soldiers, wild ani- 
 mals from the desert and jungle, etc. There is nothing 
 12 
 
178 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 that he may not be from the coal man or baker to the 
 king. Everything yields to his control. The world is free 
 and plastic, to be moulded at his will. In imagination he 
 can satisfy to the full the natural impulse for power and 
 control. 
 
 (5) Unification of experience through imagination. 
 
 The nature myth appeals to the child, as to the primitive 
 man, largely for the reason that the interpretation which it 
 gives of the facts of nature brings them within the world 
 of his experience and makes more intelligible to him the 
 sun, the moon, the stars, wind, thunder, lightning, the echo, 
 etc. In the myth they cease to confront him in all their 
 mysterious isolation and out-there-ness. Through his 
 imagination they have been brought into his experience 
 and have been made emotionally congruent with the other 
 facts of his experience. By means of the myth gaps in 
 the imagination, as it seeks to grasp related facts as one 
 whole, are filled and the tension of the mind due to these 
 gaps is relieved. Take for example the experience of 
 primitive man with the sun. He sees it rise in the east and 
 set in the west. It then vanishes from his view, reappear- 
 ing in the east the following morning. But the imagmation 
 is not satisfied with this break, or gap, in the experience ; 
 the mind seeks to fill it in. The formation of the myth that 
 the sun is carried around the rim of the disk-shaped earth 
 in a boat from the west to the east fills in that gap and 
 gives unity to the otherwise isolated facts of experience. 
 The myth serves the same function for the child as for 
 the primitive man. Through its agency discordant ele- 
 ments of nature are woven together into a system, and a 
 fundamental impulse toward unity is satisfied through the 
 activity of the rapidly developing imagination. This unity 
 may dissolve again at various points and have to be recon- 
 structed, but it is nevertheless significant that a system of 
 relations has been set up at all. The existence of such 
 systems of relationships, crude and even erroneous though 
 
Development of the Imagination 179 
 
 they may be, is a necessary prelude to the emergence and 
 development of the thinking process. Thinking does not 
 in the first place set up relationships, but it works within a 
 system to define and reconstruct and make explicit relation- 
 ships within that system and to take advantage of them in 
 consciously determining modes of action in problematic 
 situations. 
 
 Through play, myth, and fairy story the imagination of 
 the child is called forth and exercised. It is given flexi- 
 bility and power. It receives practice in the organization 
 and use of imagery, which is important for every phase of 
 the higher psychical processes. The first mental wholes 
 are built up which serve as the basis for further analyses 
 and syntheses on which higher development depends. But 
 the characteristic of the imaginative activity of this period 
 is that it is dominantly a process of enlarging and knitting 
 together the child's experience through the building up of 
 mental wholes which are more emotional and personal than 
 intellectual. 
 
 (6) Lack of reflective element. 
 
 That the intellectual or reflective element is not character- 
 istic of this period, at least until toward its close, is seen in 
 several phenomena of child life. One of these is the lack 
 of organization in games. The small child, for example, 
 enjoys playing hide-and-seek, but he is scarcely hid before 
 he comes running out to be found. The pleasure of the 
 game is in large part the activity itself and the excitation 
 of the imagination. Some of the so-called lies of children 
 are undoubtedly to be explained on the basis of the lack 
 of the reflective element and the predominance of the 
 emotional in the imagination. The distinction between that 
 which is in the mind and that which corresponds to external 
 reality has not been fully made. We adults have had so 
 much practice in distinguishing between our percepts and 
 our images that we rarely go wrong in the matter. But 
 when the imagination is developing very rapidly and its 
 
i8o The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 phenomena are more or less new, untrained, and undis- 
 ciplined, this distinction may not be so evident. How 
 should the child know anyway in advance of abundant 
 experience that what his eyes give him is more reliable 
 than what his imagination gives him? As immediate 
 experiences both are equally real, only one stands further 
 tests better than the other. Because of this fact we have 
 become accustomed to note the difference between the two 
 experiences and to distinguish them. And it is all simpler 
 to us than to the child. 
 
 (f) Distinction between means and ends felt rather than 
 conceived. 
 
 In this golden era of the imagination characterized by 
 spontaneous play, the image and its expression are integral 
 parts of a relatively undifferentiated whole. To have the 
 image is practically the same as responding to it. Process 
 and product of activity merge and interpenetrate. There 
 is not a separate value in consciousness for each. The 
 process has not become subordinate and the product pri- 
 mary. That is why we call the activity play. The dis- 
 tinction between means and ends is not intellectual, though 
 ii: may be emotionally felt. Without this distinction there 
 can be no clear recognition of a problem, nor can there be 
 any such thing as conscious adjustment of means to ends. 
 This is not saying that there is no thinking at all in this 
 period of childhood, but merely that the thinking process 
 is not strikingly characteristic. A two-year-oid child lost 
 his ball in the capacious seat of the Morris chair. He tried 
 to reach it from the front of the chair. Then he tried to get 
 it from one side. Failing in both these attempts, he stopped 
 and looked carefully, after which he went directly to the 
 point of nearest approach and seized the ball at once. Was 
 there not a thinking process of some sort involved here? 
 Did not the child consciously adjust means to an end? 
 (8) Thinking not the characteristic type of consciousness. 
 In the abundant play activities of the child there must be 
 
Development of the Imagination i8i 
 
 numerous occasions for the conscious adjustment of means 
 to ends. We are more likely to underestimate than to 
 overestimate the amount of thinking that is done by the 
 small child. Yet thinking is not the characteristic type 
 of consciousness in this period. The distinctive thing is the 
 freer, more spontaneous, and emotionally toned imagina- 
 tion Thinking cannot receive rapid development without 
 being preceded by a sufficient exercise and development 
 of the imagination to make easy and natural the distinc- 
 tion between means and ends. Much can be done in the 
 plays and occupations of the kindergarten to prepare for 
 and to introduce this distinction. The function of thinking 
 has already begun to be performed in a crude way quite 
 early in the life of the child. In this period of rapid devel- 
 opment and efflorescence of the imagination, the forward 
 movement in the development of thinking is in the direction 
 of bringing to consciousness the distinction between means 
 and ends. Yet this should not be unduly hastened. It may 
 be that the stimulation and development of the imagination 
 will be found to be the more important. 
 
 4. Third Period, — Childhood. 
 
 (i) Development of conscious distinction between means 
 and ends. 
 
 In the second period the child has gotten considerable 
 freedom of control over the larger muscular coordinations. 
 The third period is characterized on the physical side as 
 one in which he is getting control of the finer muscular 
 coordinations. At the close of this period the boy is pretty 
 compact and well knit, with excellent control over his 
 physical powers. In running, leaping, wrestling, climbing, 
 etc., he is nimble and skilful and flexible. As the child's 
 power of manipulation and motor control have been in- 
 creased through bringing into subjection the finer muscles, 
 he has been led in the increased variety and complexity of 
 his reaction processes to distinguish more sharply between 
 
i82 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 means and ends. The more complex the reaction processes, 
 the more likely it is that some of them will be seen to be 
 subsidiary and subordinate, and activities will not loom up 
 so large in consciousness for their own sake but for the 
 sake of their results. Thus arises the conscious distinction 
 between means and ends. 
 
 (2) Development of symbolism. 
 
 Another way of expressing this same thought is to say 
 that the image is becoming a symbol. The image which 
 comes into the mind is no longer merely an inseparable 
 phase of an activity. Images are less direct in function, 
 response is less immediate ; and the images serve more of 
 a mediating function. Imagination ceases to be so blindly 
 impulsive, and images serve to guide and direct activity 
 through a series of steps. As a consequence the objects 
 around which the child's activities revolve cease to be 
 mere centers of immediate reaction as in the first period ; 
 nor do they, as in the second period, serve to the same 
 extent as media for the direct expression of the images in 
 the child's mind. Through the growth in the power of 
 symbolism, the steps in a process of complex reaction can 
 be imaged without the images passing over immediately 
 into their corresponding acts. The image is not now an 
 inseparable and indivisible part of the act, but it may stand 
 for an act which may or may not take place. It becomes 
 symbolic of some phase of the process or of the result of 
 that process. The conscious distinction between means 
 and ends involves the symbolic function of the image. On 
 the side of mental development in this period of childhood, 
 the growth of the power to distinguish between means and 
 ends, or the development of the symbolic function of the 
 image is the most significant characteristic. 
 
 (s) Distinction between means and ends practical rather 
 than theoretic. 
 
 It must be remembered, however, that in this period the 
 symbolism of the image works within quite concrete situa- 
 
Development of the Itnagination 183 
 
 tions. The ena to be realized is most appropriately what 
 we might call a result rather than some abstract end; The 
 interest of the child is largely practical. While, of course, 
 we expect to lead the child toward an appreciation of 
 theoretic values, the dominant practical interest makes 
 necessary a point of contact in some concrete situation. 
 The love of tools on the part of the child in this period 
 of development is an expression of two things,- — one the 
 symbolic function of the image, whereby he is able to dis- 
 tinguish between means and ends ; the other his interest in 
 concrete results and the activities which center in them. 
 
 (4) Development of thinking power. 
 
 With the rapid growth in the power to distinguish be- 
 tween means and ends, we should expect a correspondingly 
 rapid expansion in the field of the child's thinking. If we 
 conceive of thinking as the process of conscious adjustment 
 of means to ends, then the thinking process is certainly 
 furthered through growth in the power to distinguish 
 clearly between means and ends. In fact, no thinking is 
 possible without some degree of the development of this 
 power. 
 
 (5) Training in thinking. 
 
 As the period of childhood roughly corresponds to the 
 period of elementary school education, our problem at this 
 point becomes. What can the elementary school do in the 
 matter of training the child to think, and how can it do it? 
 If the child is to be trained to think he must be given op- 
 portunity to consciously adjust means to ends. But the 
 emphasis must fall upon those types of situation in which 
 the ends are results that are quite definitely related to pro- 
 cesses from which they spring. All the manual training 
 and industrial activites are from this point of view espec- 
 ially valuable as furnishing the right sort of problems. In 
 geography there is the opportunity to emphasize valleys, 
 rivers, mountains, cities, etc., as the outgrowths of certain 
 processes. They are results, definite and concrete, of 
 
184 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 activities which are perfectly relevant and comparatively 
 easy of comprehension because of their concreteness. A 
 valley, for example, may quite easily be seen to be the 
 result of certain processes. It has an explanation. The 
 child can see even now that erosion is going on at some 
 points and deposit of soil at others. In the light of certain 
 present concrete causes and conditions he can work out the 
 process by which the valley came to be what it now is. In 
 doing this, he is mentally adjusting means to ends, but this 
 he is doing within a particular concrete whole. But in 
 doing this repeatedly with many concrete wholes, he is 
 forming a habit of looking upon things as explainable by 
 reference to principles. Thus he will ultimately come to 
 the appreciation of principles and laws themselves. In 
 nature study also, it is easy to correlate cause and effect in 
 a multitude of simple situations. In history this is a little 
 more difficult, requiring more effort of the imagination, 
 but here much can certainly be done in the way of cultivat- 
 ing the habit of thinking of the institutions and modes of 
 life with which we are familiar as the outcome of certain 
 preceding processes. The child is more interested in seeing 
 relations within a particular whole than in seeing broad 
 and sweeping generalizations. His training in thinking 
 should begin with a pretty concrete consciousness of resxilts 
 and the means to secure them, from which should be 
 gradually developed a more generalized sense of the relation 
 between means and ends. This would culminate in the 
 formulation of rules rather than principles. The child may 
 reasonably understand the "how" if not the "why." I say 
 understand, not merely know. Understanding the "how" 
 implies a consciousness of the relation between the means 
 and the end within a particular whole, at least; knowing 
 the "how" may be a purely blind process, which is from 
 the child's point of view wholly arbitrary. 
 
 The child in the grades should be so trained that before 
 he leaves he has acquired the habit of not taking things as 
 
Development of the Imagination 185 
 
 mere brute facts, but of thinking of them as having a back- 
 ground, a setting, a context, as being the results of certain 
 conditions and causes, as belonging to some system or 
 other, and as finding their explanation in some set of rela- 
 tionships within a larger whole. Here is abundant scope 
 for the exercise and development of the power of wider 
 generalization and genuine appreciation of abstract prin- 
 ciples and laws which make possible the larger unifications 
 of experience. Give the practical interest of the child full 
 and free satisfaction, and you furnish a dynamic basis for 
 the development and rapid expansion of the reflective 
 interest which is more characteristic of adolescence. 
 
 5. Fourth Period, — Adolescence. 
 
 (i) Striking characteristics. 
 
 The early part of the adolescent period is known as one 
 of rapid growth. Physically it is a period of muscular and 
 functional reconstruction. It is normally a period of 
 abounding energy and exuberant vital spirits. But it is 
 also a period in which the individual is confronted anew 
 with the problem of muscular coordination and the learning 
 over again of forms of control previously perfected and 
 adapted to his earlier size and strength. The suddenness 
 of the new access of bulk accentuates in consciousness his 
 mal-coordinations and may have something to do with mak- 
 ing him more reflective. 
 
 More significant than the growth processes themselves, 
 however, is the coming to consciousness of new instincts. 
 Through the ripening and sudden emergence of the sex 
 instinct, the youth is made conscious that the period of 
 childhood has come to an end. The emergence of the sex 
 factor in consciousness is not merely physical in its signifi- 
 cance, but even more social. It emphasizes two things : 
 (i) that the individual has come to a period of independ- 
 ence and (2) that he is a part of a larger social whole than 
 his own family. As a result of the first emphasis, he is 
 
1 86 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 likely to rely more upon his own judgment; as a result of 
 the second his interest is suddenly aroused in the larger 
 problems of human life. 
 
 The adolescent is looking out upon a new and larger 
 world in which he feels that he is soon to play a part. It 
 has a new interest and significance for him. This broad- 
 ening social interest reflects itself in a new appreciation of 
 literature, science, religion, history, and sociology. It is 
 natural that everything that throws light upon the big out- 
 side world which looms up so near him should make a 
 powerful appeal to his imagination at this time. Adoles- 
 cence is a period in which the individual is seeking to find 
 himself and to get into touch with the larger social whole 
 of which he is becoming conscious that he is a part. He 
 is confronted with the problem of adjustment to life. 
 Consciously or unconsciously he is feeling for his adap- 
 tation. Hence, from the pedagogical point of view, the high 
 school period is preeminently not one of narrow specializa- 
 tion in one field but of the further development of many- 
 sided interest, in order that the individual who has been 
 living the narrow life of home or immediate neighborhood 
 may find out his right adjustment to the larger social and 
 industrial world. 
 
 (2) Rapidly developing interest in generalizations. 
 
 We are not here concerned with working out in detail 
 the psychology of adolescence. But it seemed necessary 
 to sketch a few salient features to give an appropriate 
 setting for our account of the development of thinking in 
 this period. It is inevitable that the rapid emergence and 
 development of new interests and new problems of a wider 
 scope should make the adolescent more reflective than the 
 pre-adolescent. In his new sense of independence and per- 
 sonal responsibility, he is more likely to reconstruct his 
 experiences along every line consciously and reflectively. 
 He must take account of stock and know where he stands. 
 This, together with his broader outlook upon life, makes 
 
Development of the Imagination 187 
 
 more emphatic his consciousness of the need of fundamental 
 principles and laws. Hence there develops a new and 
 keener interest in, and appreciation of, great generaliza- 
 tions. Things which previously appeared to him to be 
 mere dry abstractions may now become of absorbing inter- 
 est because they serve a useful function in organizing and 
 interpreting the larger world in which he is now interested. 
 Specialization and perfection of technique necessary to 
 reach the more abstract and farther reaching generalizations 
 now has a natural motivation in the consciousness of the 
 new needs to which they are relevant. Pedagogically this 
 means that the high school period rather than that of the 
 grades is one for the organization of the various subjects 
 of study in a scientific form, with emphasis upon the gen- 
 eral and abstract principles involved and also upon the 
 logical connections of the subject matter. 
 
 (S) Thinking becoming reasoning. 
 
 All that we have just said may be expressed in terms of 
 the development of the power of thinking by saying that 
 this is the period of more reflective thought and of reason- 
 ing. Without saying that there is no reasoning in the 
 earlier periods, it is true that the thinking of the pre-adoles- 
 cent is more concrete and immediately practical. It is a 
 process of working through the relations of some concrete 
 whole involving within itself a general principle which is 
 grasped and comprehended through its immediate setting. 
 The adolescent develops more power of appreciation and 
 of understanding of abstract laws and principles. Rela- 
 tions within subject matter are traced out by means of these 
 general principles, and hence the organization of knowl- 
 edge becomes logical and the process of thinking becomes 
 reasoning. The change is like that of passing from con- 
 crete geometry to demonstrative and rational geometry; or 
 it is like that involved in passmg from manual training and 
 domestic science to physics and chemistry. In fact, these 
 very transitions made in passing from the graded school to 
 
i88 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 the high school have their psychological justification in the 
 development and crystallization of the child's mode of 
 thinking into the adolescent's wider and more universal 
 type of thought, characterized by an appreciation of the 
 more abstract elements of technique. These elements will 
 be taken up in detail later, hence we may drop the discus- 
 sion of the stages of development at this point. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapter XIV 
 
 King, Psychology of Child Development, Ch. 13 and Ch. 15. 
 Dopp, The Place of Industries in Elementary Education, Ch. 4. 
 Chamberlain, The Child, Ch. 4. 
 
 Kirkpatrick, The Fundamentals of Child Study, Ch. 13. 
 Sully, Studies of Childhood, pp. 3S-52. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE CONCEPT AS AN ELEMENT OF 
 TECHNIQUE IN THINKING 
 
 I. Genesis of the Concept. 
 
 We are emphasizing the functional nature of conscious- 
 ness. From this point of view, specializations of conscious- 
 ness are a phase of the process of attaining a more special- 
 ized and highly controlled mode of activity. And this 
 more highly specialized mode of activity is for the sake of 
 meeting the needs of the organism more adequately. Now 
 the child has very few specialized modes of activity for 
 meeting his needs at the outset. But he has strong and 
 insistent natural impulses which inevitably drain out into 
 action. 
 
 In the process of his activity, the child comes into rela- 
 tions with many things. Some of these satisfy his impulses. 
 He seeks to come again into relations of the same sort with 
 these things. There is a premium, as it were, put upon his 
 noticing and remembering them. With repeated experi- 
 ences, his image of anything that meets his needs is sharp- 
 ened and defined. Certain characteristics stand out as 
 marks of identification. Thus he comes to recognize his 
 mother's face and distinguish it as an important item which 
 stands out from the vaguer background of his consciousness 
 of things. This is one of the things that has come to have 
 meaning for him. On the basis of its appearance, he anti- 
 cipates certain agreeable experiences. When he reacts on 
 the basis of his anticipations, he finds that he is not disap- 
 pointed. His anticipations are realized. Reactions, which 
 were once purely instinctive or impulsive in character, have 
 
 189 
 
1 90 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 yielded results in consciousness which are associated with 
 this one face. The face thus has become a symbol for the 
 suggesting of certain meanings, and the suggesting of these 
 meanings is the basis, in turn, for certain reactions rather 
 than others. The child has begun to have a concept of his 
 mother. 
 
 The child has a natural impulse to play. Among other 
 things, his play activities bring him into contact with what 
 we call a ball. His reaction to the ball causes it to roll, and 
 this interests him. He comes repeatedly into contact with 
 round things, and as a result of reacting toward them, he 
 finds that he gets this agreeable experience of causing them 
 to roll. Round thing comes to symbolize rolling. The 
 child has learned what to anticipate from round thing, and 
 on the basis of this anticipation he has a definite mode of 
 reacting toward it so as to satisfy his play impulse. In 
 other words, the child has formed the concept ball. 
 
 The genesis of the concept, it is evident from the illustra- 
 tions, is a phase of the process of more delicately adjusting 
 action to the satisfaction of our needs, or impulses. In 
 this process of more perfectly controlling our actions to 
 realize ends, even though these ends are themselves first 
 organic rather than ideal, we find that certain classes of 
 experiences can he repeatedly anticipated from the same 
 thing and that in dealing with that thing most advantage- 
 ously we must employ certain methods of reaction. This 
 is the case of the child with his mother. The concept is 
 individual in character. In the matter of realizing certain 
 other needs, or satisfying impulses, we find that among 
 objects having certain characteristics, one is just as good as 
 another. And when we meet with an object having that 
 characteristic we react toward it in a certain way to satisfy 
 our impulse, that way being the same for all the objects 
 having this characteristic. This is the case of the child with 
 the ball. The concept is general in character. 
 
 The illustrations emphasize what we believe to be true of 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 191 
 
 the genesis of all concepts. They normally arise in the 
 process of activity, and they function to more delicately ■ 
 adjust that activity to the meeting of needs. A meaning, 
 or a core of meanings, gets attached to a single thing or 
 to every individual in a whole group. On the basis of 
 some characteristic of the thing, either present or in image 
 form, the meaning recurs to consciousness and action is 
 accordingly determined. Our discussion of the genesis of 
 the concept emphasizes two aspects, — one that of suggesting 
 meaning, the other that of controlling reaction. We shall 
 now take these up separately and try to sharpen our idea 
 of the concept. 
 
 2. The Concept in Terms of Meaning. 
 
 (i) Meaning and concept. 
 
 In the illustrations given, as well as in our previous dis- 
 cussion of meaning, we have seen that there is a natural 
 tendency, or law of mental action, that experiences resulting 
 from the reactions to the same thing should become closely 
 associated with each other and with the object itself. The 
 same is true in the case of different individual objects, pro- 
 vided that we get from them all the same kind of experi- 
 ences. So thoroughly are the special characteristics of the 
 object and the experiences which it has yielded in past ex- 
 perience organized into one system that it is possible for 
 any one element which appears before consciousness to 
 reinstate the others, that is, it becomes the symbol which 
 suggests a body of meanings. An image which thus con- 
 denses experiences, or is the symbol for the carrying of 
 meanings, performs the function of a concept if it attaches 
 these meanings uniformly to a single thing or to every one 
 of the individuals of a class. The image itself may be 
 either concrete or abstract, provided it operates as a symbol 
 to suggest something beyond itself. 
 
 When the meaning is thought of as characteristic of a 
 single individual, as in the case of the child with his mother, 
 
192 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 we call the notion an individual concept, or individual 
 notion. Thus, if I have in my mind an image horse which 
 operates to reinstate in my experience the particular group 
 of characteristics and qualities which go to make up my 
 horse Ben, who is large and gentle and loves to be driven 
 rapidly, then the concept is an individual concept. The 
 proper names which grammar recognizes are the expres- 
 sions of individual concepts. When a meaning, or core of 
 meanmgs, is thought of as equally applicable to every indi- 
 vidual of a group, as in the case of the child's notion ball, 
 the image which carries the meaning is performing the 
 function of a general concept, or general notion. Thus, if 
 the image horse which I have in my mind suggests the core 
 of meanings, — domestic animal, used for driving, etc., — 
 which I am applying equally to all the animals of a species, 
 then my concept is general. The common nouns of gram- 
 mar represent general, or class, concepts as a rule. 
 
 (2) Definition of concept, — in terms of meaning. 
 
 Writers vary considerably in their use of the term con- 
 cept. Some use it wholly in the sense of a general notion ; 
 others speak of both individual and general concepts. But 
 even in the case of the latter writers where the term con- 
 cept is used without any qualifying adjective it will usually 
 be found that they have in mind what they have defined as 
 the general concept, or class notion. When a class notion 
 is not meant, there is a strong tendency to use the qualify- 
 ing adjective and say individual concept to make the mean- 
 ing explicit. We shall follow this usage, meaning, unless 
 otherwise specified, by concept the general notion. 
 
 Our definition of concept as ordinarily understood would 
 then take the following form : The concept is an image func- 
 tioning in such a may as to suggest a definite meaning, or 
 core of meanings, which the mind attaches equally to all the 
 individuals of a group, or species. 
 
 It must be borne in mind that by individual is not meant 
 a person, nor necessarily a concrete thing, but that there 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 193 
 
 may be individual events and individual qualities and indi- 
 vidual truths. 
 
 (S) Image and concept. 
 
 Many students have difficulty in understanding the func- 
 tional view of the concept on account of their identification 
 of image with concept. The image is essential to the con- 
 cept, but it is not itself the concept. The concept is general, 
 the image is always particular. There has been much futile 
 discussion as to whether there is any such thing as a gen- 
 eral image. There are of course abstract images, but there 
 are no general images. The function of an image may be 
 general, however, and that is the case with the image aspect 
 of the concept. Image and meaning are two indissoluble 
 aspects of the concept. Image alone is not a concept, the 
 image must work, it must do something ' and that which it 
 must do is to suggest meanings and apply them to the indi- 
 viduals of a group. The same image might function in 
 some other way and constitute a memory experience and 
 not a concept at all, that is, it might function so as to build 
 up in the mind a particular event of the past with enough 
 of its concrete setting to identify it as real, as belonging 
 somewhere in the stream of my past consciousness. Or it 
 might function as reproductive imagination, reinstating 
 some fact or event free from its settmg in the past. 
 Whether we have a concept or not is to be determined, then, 
 on the basis not of the kind of image that we have in our 
 mind but by what that image does, by what it symbolizes. 
 
 The image which functions in the concept may be either 
 concrete or abstract, but it is pretty likely to have some 
 degree of abstractness. It is evident from our previous 
 discussion of abstract images that they are better suited 
 than concrete images to do the work of the concept. They 
 carry with them less of the irrelevant detail and are more 
 likely to suggest the essential common characteristics of 
 things belonging to the same group. The same law of the 
 economy of consciousness which impels to the formation of 
 13 
 
194 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 concepts would at the same time operate to give greater 
 abstractness to tlie image aspect of the concept. 
 
 (4) Meaning and thinking. 
 
 With the growth of experience, particularly with the 
 development of the power to shape our conduct with refer- 
 ence to more remote and more complex ends, we must often 
 be satisfied temporarily with merely knozving what we can 
 get out of a thing without actually going through any 
 reaction process calculated to get it. It is sufficient for our 
 needs in certain cases to know what would happen if we 
 reacted in a certain way. This is preeminently the case in 
 problematic situations calling for thinking. 
 
 In thinking we are, as has already been explained, con- 
 cerned with mentally working something out, or experi- 
 menting in terms of the imagination, before we go through 
 with the motor process. This we do either in order that 
 we may better determine whether we want a certain thing 
 to happen, to become real, or in order that we may work 
 out the precise series of steps which will most certainly and 
 adequately realize the end which we wish to attain. Now, 
 for the purpose of making connections in thought, right 
 anticipations of the outcomes of reactions, that is, right 
 meanings, are just as adequate as the actual concrete re- 
 sults themselves. In fact, they are a great deal better ; for 
 we are spared the trouble of going through irrelevant motor 
 processes, or of experimenting in terms of action in ways, 
 which, if not successful, defeat forever the achievement of 
 our end. The concept, as the mstrument for easy manipu- 
 lation of meanmgs, is, then, a very important factor in the 
 thinkmg process. 
 
 3. The Concept as a Tool of Adjustment. 
 
 (i) The concept and reaction. 
 
 Specializations of consciousness arise in the process of 
 adjustment as devices for the more specialized control of 
 reaction. The concept is no exception to this rule. In 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 195 
 
 repeated experiences with the objects which the child man- 
 ipulates and tries to control, he finds that objects of a cer- 
 tain shape roll. The meaning of rolling comes to be firmly 
 associated with all the round objects. Here, as a result of 
 reaction processes, the single meaning has come to be uni- 
 formly attached to a whole group of objects. They all 
 have the same meaning; the child has the concept ball. 
 
 But would the image of roundness suggest the common 
 meaning of rolling, if the rolling of the ball had been a 
 matter of indifference to the child? If he had not sought 
 to manipulate and control the ball, it would not have mat- 
 tered to him whether it would roll or not. He would 
 have had no occasion for attaching any significance of this 
 sort to the quality of roundness. But, as the child is a 
 creature who loves to make things move and to see them 
 move, it is of very great significance to him to be able to 
 anticipate from the image roundness the experience rolling. 
 Having attached this meaning of rolling uniformly to round 
 things, his concept ball becomes a mental tool for guidmg 
 and directing his reaction to this whole class of objects. 
 When he sees the round thing, his play impulse is set free 
 in a definite form ; he will push or throw the object. The 
 control of motor reaction is, indeed, the first and most 
 primary function of the concept. 
 
 The concept represents a definite meaning, or core of 
 meanings, which has in the first place been built up in the 
 process of action. But this core of meaning, when once 
 built up, functions to set free a single definite mode of 
 reaction for a whole lot of individual things or individual 
 situations of the same type or class. To take another illus- 
 tration, when we have the concept apple, we do not need to 
 find out and learn a different mode of reaction for every 
 individual apple in the barrel. A single mental image, and 
 that probably only a very schematic and quite abstract one, 
 symbolizes an essential core of meaning which sets free one 
 appropriate mode of reaction equally applicable to all the 
 
196 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 individuals, namely, eating them. So with the concept pen, 
 the concept fear, the concept money, etc., they are all tools 
 for the simplification of reaction processes through the 
 reduction of them to characteristic modes of procedure 
 which may be employed repeatedly in the control of indi- 
 viduals of a class. 
 
 If we had to deal with all the objects and all the situations 
 which enter into our experience, each one by itself as an 
 absolutely independent affair, then our conquest over the 
 world in which we live would be slow indeed. The concept 
 simplifies our lives of action by enabling us to deal with 
 things in groups. On the mental side of control, it has 
 practically the same function as habit on the motor side, 
 namely, the task of reducing to method and system our 
 modes of dealing with things. Because the concept simpli- 
 fies our mental life, in the organization and classification 
 of our world of meanings, it also simplifies our world of 
 action. And conversely, because we find ourselves success- 
 ful in meeting our needs by certain more or less uniform 
 modes of reaction toward all the individuals in a certain 
 group, our concept becomes more and more fixed in its 
 limitation to a certain core of meaning. 
 
 (2) The concept and mental construction. 
 
 The concept serves another function besides that of im- 
 mediate control over action. It is also a tool of mental 
 construction. The concept may function to suggest a 
 method of construction.^ The image may symbolize a prin- 
 ciple, or law, of construction. In thinking, the question is 
 not always one of motor control, but of control over the 
 images and ideas necessary to the proper transitions of 
 thought. The concept stands for and suggests the method, 
 or rule, in accordance with which we can construct the 
 requisite image out of the elements of our past experiences. 
 We do not then have to remember all the individual past 
 experiences in order to find that which is relevant to meet 
 
 'Dewey, Psychology, p. 205. 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 197 
 
 * 
 
 the needs of our present problem of thought. The signifi- 
 cant and vital aspects of these individual experiences have 
 been condensed at certain centers and intimately knit to- 
 gether and organized under a single image which is now 
 uniformly their bearer or symbol. Thus, in the case of the 
 concept triangle, a single image triangle is sufficient to 
 carry in my thought the general method, or rule, in accord- 
 ance with which I can construct thousands of other images 
 corresponding to triangles which I have actually seen, or 
 which I may produce upon paper, or which I may need 
 merely for mental purposes. The image aspect of the con- 
 cept triangle is for the mathematician merely the carrier, 
 or symbol, of the definition or rule of construction. It 
 means the way, or method, rather than the individual thing. 
 The way triangles are constructed is general, or universal, 
 namely, the drawing of three straight lines to inclose a 
 rectilineal figure. 
 
 Incidentally, it may be apropos to remark here that such 
 a view of the concept instantly solves a difficulty which 
 many have experienced in seeing why it is that a demonstra- 
 tion of a proposition with a single figure is satisfactory for 
 all triangles. If we analyze the demonstration of the 
 theorem that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to 
 two right angles, we shall quickly see that the whole proof 
 depends on the way in which the triangle is constructed and 
 that none of the elements of particularity are used in any 
 part of the proof. Now this way, or method, of construc- 
 tion is the same for all triangles. Hence the proof is ade- 
 quate for all triangles. 
 
 The same line of thought which we have applied to the 
 concept triangle holds good for the scientific concept horse 
 as contrasted with the practical. The image itself may be 
 particular, of some particular horse of my experience, but' 
 as concept it functions to suggest the method of construc- 
 tion, all that would be involved in making an mdividual of 
 this species, if that were in my power. Though we may 
 
198 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 not really make an individual of this species, yet we may 
 mentally construct one, and this is just as satisfactory for 
 purposes of thoug-ht. The image horse functioning as con- 
 cept symbolizes the rule, or method, of mental construction. 
 A single method applies to all the individual cases of mental 
 construction of horse, the variations are a matter of indi- 
 vidual detail. So it is with all the concepts of descriptive 
 and explanatory science, used in the organization and clas- 
 sification of knowledge. They suggest methods of mental 
 construction as contrasted with the concepts of ordinary 
 practical life, which are more immediate tools of action. 
 
 (S) Teleological nature of the concept as a mode of men- 
 tal construction. 
 
 At first thought the two views of the concept, — the one 
 as symbolizing and setting free a method of motor control, 
 the other as symbolizing a method of mental construction, — 
 would not seem to be harmonious with each other and 
 functionally identical. But just as truly as the first is 
 teleological the second is also. The first is immediately 
 and directly practical, the second mediately so. 
 
 The difiference in the functioning of the concept horse in 
 the mind of the farmer and in that of the scientist is due to 
 a difiference in the type of control which each seeks. The 
 farmer is dealing with the immediately practical problem of 
 getting work done; the scientist with the problem of 
 organizing and systematizing and controlling knowledge 
 or thought. For the scientist the concept horse as a mode 
 of mental construction meets his need ; for the farmer the 
 concept horse as symbolic of a certain kind of work done, 
 or as suggesting a method of controlling activities, meets 
 his need. In both cases the concept is a tool of the mind 
 in the control of experiences, — in the one, it is the control 
 of thought, or knowledge, experiences; in the other, it is 
 the control of motor experiences. 
 
 But even in the case of the concept as a tool of the mind 
 in the control of thought, from the biological interpretation 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 199 
 
 of thought, we should have to view this use of the concept 
 as fundamentally conditioned by practical situations and 
 designed ultimately to function in their more perfect con- 
 trol. It needs no lengthy discussion of the intimate relation 
 between the theoretical and the practical aspects of science 
 to make this point plain. 
 
 (4) Further definitions of the concept. 
 
 In view of the preceding discussions of the concept as 
 symbolizing modes of reaction and as symbolizing modes 
 of mental construction, two new ways of defining the con- 
 cept suggest themselves. 
 
 a. In terms of reaction. 
 
 The concept is an image functioning in such a way as to 
 suggest, direct, or control a single method of reaction which 
 applies equally to every one of the individuals of a group 
 or species. 
 
 b. In terms of mental construction. 
 
 The concept is an image functioning in such a way as to 
 symbolize the law, principle, or method in accordance with 
 which one would mentally construct every one of the 
 individuals of a whole group or species. 
 
 4. Growth of the Concept. 
 
 (i) Vagueness of the child's first concepts. 
 
 As meaning depends on past experience and this is limited 
 m the case of the child, meanings for things must begin as 
 vague and only gradually grow more definite and precise 
 with the growth of the child's experience. If meanings are 
 undefined and vague, then certainly concepts are in like 
 manner defective. If the child in his play has found some- 
 thing which opens and shuts and he has been told that it is 
 a hinge, he may call all things which open and shut hinges. 
 For example, he may call a pocket knife a hinge, or even a 
 door a hinge, etc. 
 
200 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 (2) General and individual notions. 
 
 a. Their functional distinction. 
 
 The question is sometimes asked whether the child's first 
 notions are general or individual. As we cannot get into 
 the consciousness of the child to find out, we should have 
 to work out some functional basis of distinction before 
 attempting to answer this question. We must ask the 
 question, What use does the child make of his concepts? 
 This use can be discovered only by the study of his reac- 
 tions, that is, those reactions which are evidently not 
 mechanical, but due to some conscious process. 
 
 If the child's reaction to some individual object is 
 special, then it is evident that to this extent his notion is 
 individual, and this too without regard to the question of 
 whether he is right or wr.ong. The problem is one of his 
 consciousness, not ours. A wrong concept is psychologically 
 just as truly a concept as a right one. If his reaction to a 
 whole group of objects, whether from our point of view 
 rightly or wrongly, is the same for all the individuals in the 
 group, it is evident that in that degree his concept is gen- 
 eral. Thus the child may persistently react to only one 
 object as spoon. If so, it is evident that the meaning of 
 something to assist him in eating attaches to this one object, 
 and hence his notion spoon is individual. On the other 
 hand, he may be equally satisfied with any table utensil to 
 perform this function and be satisfied with the name spoon 
 for any one of them. In this case his notion spoon is 
 psychologically a true general notion, even though too gen- 
 eral to be true logically. But either the generality or the 
 individuality of the child's mode of reaction may be due to 
 the indefiniteness and vagueness of his notion rather than 
 to any positive body of meaning. 
 
 b. The question of their genetic order of precedence. 
 The traditional view is that individual notions precede 
 
 general notions. Observation of children from the point 
 of view indicated, however, seems to show that they do 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 201 
 
 have vague general notions very early, if not from the very 
 beginning of conscious experience. But these vague 
 general notions are apt to be negatively rather than posi- 
 tively general.^ It is an inherent and original character- 
 istic of mind v^fhen confronted writh a situation demanding 
 reaction to adapt the reaction to the individual character 
 of the situation. It is equally just as fundamental and 
 original a tendency of the mind (and this is evidenced by 
 the law of apperception) to apply a mode of reaction once 
 effected or a meaning once attained to a new situation or 
 a new object which has not yet been discriminated as dif- 
 ferent. That is, the tendency to generalize is fundamental 
 to mind. Which comes first in actual experience, the 
 individualizing or the generalizing tendency, is a function 
 of the situation which presents itself. In any case the first 
 notions are so vague and formless that from the adult point 
 of view there is little point in applying to them either the 
 term individual or the term general. 
 
 (^) Development of concepts. 
 
 We have seen that the question as to which precedes 
 in point of time, the individual notion or the general, is 
 more or less futile and meaningless. From the genetic 
 and functional point of view, we are not so much con- 
 cerned with the origin of concepts de novo as with their 
 diflferentiation, growth, and development out of the dim 
 background of a vague and undifferentiated conscious ex- 
 perience. Concepts of some sort originate inevitably as a 
 matter of economy of consciousness as it functions in the 
 reactions of the child toward things, and they get their 
 development and sharper definition in the same process of 
 activity as that in which meanings grow. 
 
 Presupposing a vague background of conscious experi- 
 ence, how do individual and general notions emerge differ- 
 entiated from each other sufficiently to have positive rather 
 
 ' Angell, Psychology, p. 261. 
 
202 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 than negative character? Mr. Dewey^ works out quite 
 carefully the psychology of the process as one in which 
 individual and general notions develop together, every mod- 
 ification in the one affecting the other, until finally by 
 mutual interaction both become definite and accurate. Let 
 us take his illustration of the development of the notion 
 papa, working it out, however, in harmony with our dis- 
 cussion of reaction and meaning. 
 
 In the first place the child may react to all men in much 
 the same way. Is this because he has a general notion man? 
 If so, it is negatively general, general merely from the 
 absence of discrimination of the individuals. But when he 
 learns that he can anticipate from only one man a certain 
 set of agreeable experiences, — such as being provided with 
 toys, being tossed up and down and played with, riding on 
 the shoulder, and being carried out into the garden, etc., — 
 then he discriminates this man from the others, he individ- 
 ualizes this man as his papa, and ceases to react to others 
 in the same way as to his papa. In so far as he does this, 
 he may be said to have an individual notion papa ; but who 
 would say that this notion has in it any of the scientific idea 
 of paternity? Yet the child has taken an important step 
 in the development of an individual notion. Now, in the 
 process of his experience he sees other children get the same 
 sort of agreeable experiences, and quite likely certam char- 
 acteristic disagreeable experiences, in their relation to other 
 men. He applies his notion papa to these men also. They 
 are the papas of those children. Thus he generalizes his 
 idea, or rather makes more definite his implicit general 
 notion papa. But he has in the very process of doing this 
 also made more definite his individual notion. These other 
 men are papas, but they are not his papa. That idea is 
 strictly applicable to only one individual. Thus he has more 
 sharply defined both his individual notion and his general 
 
 'Dewey, Psychology, pp. 208-211. 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 203 
 
 notion at the same time, or in the same process. In tiiis 
 manner, by continual reconstructions within the limits of his 
 experience, by a sort of analytic-synthetic process which 
 goes on unreflectively, the child develops together his indi- 
 vidual and his general notions. 
 
 (4) Acquisition of new concepts. 
 
 The same general principle of differentiation from a 
 vaguer background applies here as in the case of the devel- 
 opment of individual and general notions just discussed. 
 Take the case of the child's acquisition of the new concept 
 sheep. He has already had experience with the dog. The 
 process of apperceiving the new works in terms of both 
 analysis and synthesis. 
 
 The analysis of both dog and sheep results in noting 
 points of identity, — same size, same general shape, four 
 legs, tail, hairy body, etc. These are common terms of 
 the new and the old. Through them the new is assimilated 
 to the old, is perceived in terms of the familiar. The 
 animal is some sort of dog. This is an act of synthesis. 
 
 But a further phase of analysis was involved in the fact 
 that differences must have been noticed which made this 
 process of assimilation not so easy after all and not wholly 
 satisfactory. The new animal was discriminated from the 
 familiar dog, it could not be wholly identified with this 
 animal. There were differences in the hair which might 
 make the child call the animal a curly dog, and there were 
 differences in the characteristic cry which might have led 
 the child to call the animal the baa-baa-dog. 
 
 This identifying of the differences analyzed out with the 
 already recognized core of identity between the two ani- 
 mals is a further act of synthesis. When the child's mind 
 has gone thus far, he has virtually acquired a new concept. 
 Incomplete and inaccurate though it may be, it is now the 
 concept sheep, and he needs only the name to fix it as a new 
 concept, though of course subject to further development 
 in the process of experience. 
 
204 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 In this process of acquiring the concept sheep through 
 the concept dog as an apperceiving mass, it is to be noted 
 that the concept dog has also become more definite and 
 precise. The concept dog can no longer include these curly, 
 baa-ing creatures. Certain characteristics of the dog, like 
 the nature of his hair and his characteristic cry, have 
 ceased to have vague significance and have now come to 
 have definite significance. Of course further experience 
 with both dogs and sheep will probably compel the child 
 later on to reconstruct his concept dog again with reference 
 to the significance of woolly hair as an essential difference, 
 and he will seize upon something else. 
 
 While we have consciously analyzed what is involved in 
 the process by which the child might acquire the new con- 
 cept sheep, the child himself would tnost likely be wholly 
 unconscious of these processes that we have so definitely 
 pointed out. The whole procedure with him would be 
 unreflective. 
 
 (fi) Change and -fixity of concepts. 
 
 We are now prepared for the idea that a concept is not 
 a fixed and unchangeable thing. The child's concepts are 
 subject to growth and development. The same is true of 
 those of the adult, though there is a strong tendency toward 
 fixity of concepts with the growth of experience. As mean- 
 ings are an outgrowth of experience, we can see why con- 
 cepts should be subject to change with the growth of expe- 
 rience ; and we can also see why with the repetition of 
 experiences of the same sort in a world, or realm, of limited 
 experience concepts should ultimately become quite fixed in 
 character. 
 
 An analogy will help us at this point. The hammer 
 probably originated in the choice of any stone which would 
 serve better than the fist in breaking open or crushing food 
 materials. Then a stone of a certain convenient size and 
 shape was selected and kept to be used regularly for this 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 205 
 
 purpose. Later a handle was added, and thus we have a 
 fair beginning of our hammer, which has continued to 
 undergo changes down to the present moment to meet new 
 conditions of work to be performed. The hammer has been 
 subject to the law of change throughout the centuries 
 because of its functional nature. It has had work to do, 
 and its form has had to undergo the changes which have 
 made it adapted to the kind of work to be done under 
 changing industrial conditions. Now the concept, as a 
 mental tool, if it is to perform its function, must undergo 
 the changes which better adapt it to the work it has to do 
 as the new demands of mental experience, particularly 
 during the period of development, are put upon it. The 
 hammer, also because of its functional nature, is subject to 
 the law of fixity. Doubtless it did remain fixed in certain 
 stages of its development for many centuries because of its 
 satisfactory adaptation to existing conditions of a static 
 industrial life. In like manner, any concept tends to be- 
 come fixed so long as it meets adequately the needs of 
 existing static thought situations. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapters XV, XVI, and XVII 
 
 Angell, Psychology, Ch. 10. 
 
 O'Shea, Education as Adjustment, pp. 163-178, 210-214. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, Bk. 4, Ch. 4. 
 
 Angell and O'Shea have both given strong functional and bio- 
 logical statements of the concept. Stout's treatment is tinged 
 with the functional point of view. 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 204-13. 
 Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum, pp. 25-40. 
 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, Ch. 14 and pp. 354-7- 
 Bagley, The Educative Process, Ch. 9. 
 McMurry, Elements of General Method, Ch. 6. 
 McMurry, Method of the Recitation, Chs. 4 and 9. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE CONCEPT AS AN ELEMENT OF TECHNIQUE 
 IN THINKING 
 
 (Continued) 
 
 I. Psychological and Logical Concepts. 
 
 Concepts may be distinguished on the basis of the degree 
 of reflection with which they have originated. On this basis 
 there are two classes, — the psychological and the logical 
 types of the concept. These do not differ from each other 
 in kind; but the logical concept represents a higher stage 
 of development of the reflective element. 
 
 (i) The psychological concept. 
 
 Most of our concepts originate unreflectively. The boy 
 in the country has quite correct practical notions of chest- 
 nut tree, walnut tree, butternut tree, and hickory tree. But 
 his concepts of these various classes of trees did not come 
 to him reflectively. In the process of his experience in 
 hunting for nuts, he has had occasion to absorb a large 
 amount of detailed fact as to the characteristic shape of the 
 leaves and the characteristic qualities of the bark and of 
 the general shape of each one of these kinds of nut tree. 
 By a process of unreflective analysis running through a 
 long period of time he has come to distinguish the dififerent 
 kinds of nut trees by certain characteristic external appear- 
 ances, and by a process of unreflective synthesis, also 
 running through a long period of time, he has come to 
 associate together a certain group of qualities by which he 
 identifies each kind of tree. He has a meaning, or core 
 of meanings, which he attaches quite uniformly to the 
 symbol, whether word image or concrete form image, chest- 
 
 206 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 207 
 
 nut tree. The same is true of every one of the other kinds 
 of nut tree. But this meaning is not one which he has 
 arrived at as the result of study or of reflection upon his 
 experiences. It is a good working meaning which has 
 arisen in the process of controlling his actions, and that 
 is all. 
 
 The child in the country sees plants grow from spring 
 until fall. He absorbs a large amount of quite detailed 
 fact in the satisfaction of his natural impulse of curiosity. 
 By a process of unreflective analysis and synthesis, he learns 
 that the plant goes through several stages of development, 
 sending roots downward and seed leaves upward ; shooting 
 upward with stalk, branches and leaves ; putting forth bud, 
 blossom, and seed ; dying down again in the fall. Thus he 
 arrives unreflectively at a general law, or principle, of 
 development. 
 
 The mental life of the child and also of the adult is just 
 full of these unreflective working notions, whether class 
 concepts or general laws and principles, notions which have 
 never been loosened from their setting, but which have, like 
 Topsy, just "growed."' Such notions are called psycholog- 
 ical notions. The psychological concept may hz defined as 
 one which has arisen unreHectively in the give-and-take of 
 experience, and in which the elements of meaning have, 
 consequently, not been brought fully and explicitly to 
 consciousness. 
 
 (2) The logical concept. 
 
 The logical concept is the result of reflective reconstruc- 
 tion of vaguer concepts. The scientist goes over his 
 experiences with nut trees and also supplements them with 
 further specific and careful observations. On the basis of 
 this more reflective study he constructs his concepts of 
 chestnut tree, walnut tree, etc. In these cases the con- 
 cepts are so definite and so carefully limited in the mind of 
 the person who has them that he can give definitions. But 
 ask the average boy what a chestnut tree is, and he will tell 
 
2o8 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 you simply that it is a tree that bears chestnuts. And ask 
 him how he knows that a certain tree is a chestnut tree, and 
 he will probably tell you that he has always known it, or 
 that everybody knows that it is a chestnut tree. But the 
 scientist knows exactly the meaning which is involved in the 
 use of the term ; for it has been carefully and reflectively 
 worked out by specially directed observation and study with 
 a view of determining the essential characteristics of the 
 thing. 
 
 The same general principle holds true of that class of 
 concepts which we more commonly call laws and principles. 
 The child may in a vague way know something of the law 
 of development of plants. But he has never worked out 
 that law reflectively and might have great difficulty in 
 formulating it in any satisfactory terms. But the trained 
 botanist, having gone over the whole ground very carefully 
 with the explicit intention of finding the exact law, would 
 have a clear and definite idea of it which he could formulate 
 in exact terms. 
 
 Whether we, are dealing with class concepts or general 
 notions in the form of laws and principles, it is these reflec- 
 tive notions which we call logical concepts. The logical 
 concept may he defined as one which has arisen as the re- 
 sult of reflective reconstruction, and one in which the ele- 
 ments of meaning have, consequently, been brought fully 
 and explicitly to consciousness and have been formulated in 
 the mind. 
 
 2. Further Comparison of Psychological and Logical 
 Concepts. 
 
 (i) As to accuracy. 
 
 Either type of concept may be accurate, and either may 
 be inaccurate. The psychological concept of engine built 
 up gradually and unreflectively in the daily experience of the 
 engineer may be very accurate indeed ; while we know that 
 many logical concepts of science carefully and reflectively 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 209 
 
 worked out have been, from lack of adequate data, very 
 inaccurate. But, other things being equal, we should ex- 
 pect the logical concept to be the more accurate, because 
 the meanings which have become involved in it have not 
 been left to chance experience, but observations have been 
 carefully controlled, possibly additional experiments have 
 been performed to supplement observation, and the con- 
 cept has been worked out with conscious care and system. 
 
 (2) As to adequacy. 
 
 The simple psychological notions which most of us have 
 of chair, horse, water, etc., may be adequate to the control 
 of our ordinary activities. But when difficulties arise in 
 the application of psychological concepts, then they often 
 prove to be very inadequate. The logical concepts are 
 more adequate for all manner of situations than the psycho- 
 logical concepts. This is because they have been reflectively 
 built up and the individual knows exactly what they include 
 and can hence control them better as tools of action or of 
 thought. They can be wielded, as it were, with greater 
 deftness and precision. For purposes of control there is 
 a vast difference between being right and knowing that you 
 are right. An important aspect of control of a situation is 
 knowing in advance just exactly how it is going to come 
 out. In an emergency involving a very critical surgical 
 operation, we should certainly prefer, of two surgeons hav- 
 ing equal motor skill, the one who had the more consciously 
 precise and exact concepts of the anesthetics used and the 
 more logical concepts of the organs and functions of the 
 various parts of the body. We should expect him to exer- 
 cise a greater refinement and delicacy of control than the 
 so-called self-made surgeon. 
 
 (s) As to relative prevalence. 
 
 The child's concepts are dominantly of the psychological 
 type. Adults use both kinds. Educated people use more 
 logical concepts than the uneducated. Many of our con- 
 cepts always remain psychological, or at least undergo very 
 14 
 
210 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 little logical reconstruction. This is especially true in the 
 case of hosts of familiar things. Evidence for the truth 
 of this statement is seen in the great difficulty which we 
 have in defining many common terms of everyday use. 
 How many can give a logical definition of table, chair, rock, 
 honesty, truth, religion, etc.? 
 
 3. Functional Relation between Psychological and 
 Logical Concepts. 
 
 (i) Psychological concepts the basis of the logical. 
 
 Much current psychology makes percepts the basis of 
 concepts, but, failing to distinguish between psychological 
 and logical concepts, proceeds to formulate the psychology 
 of the logical concept as if percepts were the basis of logical 
 concepts. We have already seen that it is a fundamental 
 and inherent tendency of mind to generalize. Given a cer- 
 tain amount of perceptual experience, using the term per- 
 ception roughly to include all first-hand experiences with 
 things, and the mind of the child will inevitably form some 
 sort of working general notions as the result of its own 
 spontaneous activities and tendencies. The mind is made 
 that way, and nothing could prevent it from a certain 
 amount of generalizing, in spite of insufficiency of data. 
 
 It is simply not true that the child gets only individual 
 notions from his percepts, or concrete experiences. If he 
 did get only a lot of isolated individual facts, which later 
 he had to compare and from which he had to abstract 
 common qualities as the basis of generalization, whence 
 would arise the problems that would impel him to go 
 through with such a process of reconstruction of experience ? 
 No, from the very start he is getting some sort of organiza- 
 tion of his experiences ; in other words, he is getting general 
 notions. These general notions, however, are of the unre- 
 flective, or psychological, type. Unreflective notions are 
 the first fruits of concrete experiences, and these unreflec- 
 tive, or psychological, concepts are the real basis of logical 
 concepts, both individual and general. 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 2II 
 
 The psychology of the logical concept must not, then, be 
 written without explicit recognition of the fact that the 
 mind already has unreflective notions which lie back of and 
 condition the process of attaining logical concepts. The 
 teaching process aims speciiically at logical notions, both 
 individual and general, but much of the method as ex- 
 pounded in books on pedagogy is vitiated by the fact that it 
 is based on a psychology of the concept which recognizes no 
 psychological concepts as intermediary between the child's 
 percepts and his logical concepts. 
 
 (2) Conditions of the logical concept. 
 
 When in the process of experience any unreflective con- 
 cept proves inadequate to the performance of its legitimate 
 and normal function of controlling action or thought, then 
 that concept itself becomes problematic and the subject of 
 investigation. The degree in which it becomes acutely 
 problematic will determine in large part whether the recon- 
 struction shall be unreflective, and hence lead only to a 
 further development of the psychological concept, or 
 whether it shall be reflective and lead to a more logical con- 
 cept. 
 
 a. Unreflective reconstruction, not leading to logical 
 concepts. 
 
 The degree of acuteness of the problem, we have just 
 said, is a factor in determining whether reconstruction shall 
 be unreflective or reflective. Take, for example, once more 
 the case of the sheep which the child first called a dog. The 
 fact that it did not bark, but rather bleated, that it had 
 woolly hair, that it would not come for whistling, that it 
 was not friendly and would not come and play with the 
 child, — any one of these may have operated as a factor of 
 doubt. The concept dog would not work smoothly. It 
 neither controlled adequately the thought process of naming 
 and identifying, nor did it control the process of right 
 reaction to the creature. But in this case the problem was 
 probably not consciously felt as acute enough to call for 
 
212 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 any elaborate investigation and the concept was unreflec- 
 tively reconstructed. The problem was acute enough to 
 cause wonder and surprise, but was probably solved satis- 
 factorily for the child at that time by the father's calling 
 the animal a sheep, and by the recognition on the part of 
 the child of enough that was characteristic of the animal 
 to be able roughly to identify a sheep when seen again. 
 
 When a certain little boy was about two and a half years 
 of age, his parents moved from a flat into a house. The 
 child was sent to a neighbor's home while the moving took 
 place. There he went to sleep and did not awake until he 
 had been brought into the new house and it was morning. 
 In the morning, he ran about the house with great eagerness, 
 noticing things. Some of the furniture had been changed 
 about to be adapted to the new conditions of living in a 
 house. Among other things, the old dining-room rug had 
 been put in the mother's room and a new rug put into the 
 dining room. The child went to his nurse and said that 
 he wanted his breakfast, but that he wanted it in the dining 
 room, "and the dining room is in mamma's room." Here 
 is a good illustration of a vague psychological concept din- 
 ing room. Its identifying characteristic was the rug. But 
 it was also associated with eating. In this change of the 
 rug to another room, while eating would henceforth be done 
 on a different rug, we have the conditions for the recon- 
 struction of the psychological concept in such a way as to 
 emphasize the eating aspect rather than the rug aspect. 
 But in this case, the reconstruction of the concept which 
 adapted the boy to his new surroundings when it did occur 
 was not made reflectively. The concept was only further 
 developed and made a more accurate psychological concept, 
 or the degree of reflective reconstruction was so small that 
 we should not yet want to call the concept a logical one. 
 h. Reflective reconstruction, leading to logical concepts. 
 
 In many cases where the concept breaks down, or fails 
 to work as a tool of control, the problem is felt more acutely 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique ?I3 
 
 than can be expressed in terms of mere wonder or surprise. 
 It sets up a genuine process of reflection and investigation. 
 And the concept is reconstructed as the result of this further 
 intentional study. Take, for example, the chemist's log- 
 ical concept of water as H,0. Why did the concept ever 
 take this highly logical form? In the attempt to control 
 certain chemical processes, perhaps to make some kind of 
 medicine, or some other useful product, he found that his 
 ordinary concept of water as a transparent fluid of a cer- 
 tain density would not work; it would not control this sit- 
 uation. The difficulty compelled him to make a further 
 and more elaborate investigation of water before he could 
 proceed. As a result of his experimentation he found that 
 for certain chemical purposes he must conceive of water as 
 made up of two gases, hydrogen and oxygen, in a certain 
 definite proportion as indicated by the formula HjO. 
 When he did so conceive of water, his difficulties in control- 
 ling his chemical experiences vanished. The concept in 
 this case has been reflectively reconstructed and is now 
 logical and precise. 
 
 The illustration just given suggests a truth often empha- 
 sized in our functional interpretation of psychology. The 
 concept is evidently relevant to a need ; the tool formed for 
 the more adequate control of a certain type of experience 
 is specialized in the form which it assumes with reference 
 to the kind of work to be done. The chemist's logical con- 
 cept water does not always take the form H^O ; sometimes 
 it is more important that those characteristics of the fluid 
 stand out in consciousness which make it an important 
 solvent of certain classes of substances. Again, the 
 physicist may have a logical concept water still different. 
 But in every case the logical concept water has been built up 
 reflectively to meet a need in the control of action or of 
 thought that could not be adequately met through the more 
 unreflective concept. Perhaps one might say that the full 
 logical concept would represent the sum total of all the 
 
214 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 meanings which have been found essential to the control of 
 these various aspects of experience. 
 
 4. Process of Attaining Logical Concepts. 
 
 (i) General statement. 
 
 Logical concepts are attained through a process of reflec- 
 tive reconstruction of already existing concepts of the 
 psychological type. We have seen already that psycholog- 
 ical concepts grow up unreflectively through a sort of 
 analytic-synthetic process of assimilation. Logical con- 
 cepts are built up through the same process organized, 
 systematized, and reflectively controlled. As has been al- 
 ready explained, the condition which calls for this reflective 
 process of reconstruction is doubt of some sort occasioned 
 by failure of the already existing concept to function ade- 
 quately in the control of action or of thought. 
 
 When the psychological concept is one that is already 
 rich in all the essential elements of meaning, the process of 
 reconstruction called forth by a new demand, like that of 
 being asked to give a definition, is often much like a case 
 of sudden crystallization. When the light of reflection is 
 turned on, it seems as if the essential elements of meaning 
 immediately stand forth, and the transformation from 
 psychological to logical concept is so sudden as to defy 
 analysis. But where the process is more complex, it is cus- 
 tomary to analyze it into a series of steps, or phases. 
 
 (2) Outline of the process. 
 
 This is usually described in the books in terms of the fol- 
 lowing series of steps: (a) Observation of individuals; 
 (&) comparison of these individuals with reference to their 
 likenesses and differences; (c) abstraction of the common 
 qualities; {d) generalization, or the massing together of 
 these abstracted common qualities into one idea equally 
 applicable to all of the individuals. 
 
 (s) Criticism of the traditional account. 
 
 The account just given of the process of attaining con- 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 215 
 
 cepts is true only as it applies to the logical concept ; while 
 the traditional account leaves one with the impression that 
 it is the method by which all concepts are attained. But, 
 even if we take it as a fair outline of the process of attain- 
 ing logical concepts, it needs more qualification and explan- 
 ation than is usually given to it. It needs to be rightly 
 interpreted in order to be true. 
 
 To suppose that the process begins with a lot of miscel- 
 laneous percepts is fallacious. Take the concept chair, for 
 example, which the psychologist has so often used for 
 illustrative purposes. The traditional account is somewhat 
 as follows : We observe a lot of individual chairs ; we com- 
 pare them and find that each has a back, four legs, and a 
 seat which is suitable for one person ; these common char- 
 acteristics we now abstract and hold before the mind, ignor- 
 ing all the variations of individual from individual ; then 
 we generalize by saying that a chair is a piece of furniture 
 having a back, four legs, and a seat suitable for one person. 
 
 Now is the process of generalizing and attaining logical 
 concepts quite so simple as all that? We might quite 
 naturally ask. How did it happen that all the individuals 
 selected for observation and comparison were chairs and 
 none of them were beds, lamps, elephants, etc. ? If logical 
 concepts are based on percepts, or individual notions, why 
 was just this particular selection of individuals made which 
 all fall within certain well-defined limits? The answer is 
 quite simple. The process of working out the logical con- 
 cept did not start with individual notions. The only rea- 
 son we can give why the selection of individuals was so 
 limited is that we already knew in some sort of fashion 
 what a chair was, we already had a psychological concept 
 chair. This psychological concept was dynamically related 
 to, and functioning in, the whole process by which the 
 logical concept was built up. Some failure in this unreflec- 
 tive concept to meet the needs of action or of thought set 
 the problem. It furnished the occasion and motive for the 
 
2i6 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 conscious and systematic investigation. But the fact that 
 the already existing concept was inadequate might have 
 led to the selection for investigation of individuals that 
 properly belong under the head of stools or of benches. 
 Nevertheless, the fact that there was a psychological con- 
 cept to begin with limited to some extent the field of investi- 
 gation. 
 
 We might raise the question, in like manner, why certain 
 characteristics are singled out as essential in the process 
 of comparison. There is absolutely nothing to determine 
 this except that our problem is of a certain kind such that 
 the selection of these characteristics is relevant to its solu- 
 tion. It is the problem of more accurately defining a chair, 
 and we already know in some sort of a way what a chair is. 
 This psychological concept chair dominates the process of 
 comparison and that of abstraction. All the time that we 
 are comparing we are looking for common characteristics 
 to abstract which are relevant to the solution of the problem 
 set by the inadequacy of the unreflective concept chair. 
 
 In the psychological concept we have a common core of 
 meaning, which, though of course vague and subject to 
 reconstruction, yet furnishes the dominant point of view 
 for the whole investigation. It serves as the center, or ral- 
 lying point, around which all the mental activities gather. 
 It was the failure of the psychological concept that created 
 the problem in the first place, and the common core of mean- 
 ing involved in that concept gives a definite set to the prob- 
 lem in a certain direction, guiding and controlling the 
 mental activities throughout and determining the order 
 and dynamic relation of the steps of comparison, abstrac- 
 tion, and generalization. All these points will come out 
 more clearly in our restatement of the whole process, which 
 will be taken up later in Chapter XIX under the head of 
 inductive method. 
 
 In summing up this general criticism of the traditional 
 psychology of the logical concept, we may say that neglect 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 217 
 
 to recognize the part that the psychological concept plays 
 in the whole process of acquiring logical concepts is vicious 
 in either or both of two ways : 
 
 a. It leads one to suppose that he is getting a 
 complete psychology of the concept when a very 
 vital part, that of the psychological concept, is left 
 out. As a psychology of the concept it would be, 
 if not false, at least very misleading. Psycholog- 
 ical and logical concepts need to be distinguished 
 and their functional relation to each other clearly 
 kept in mind. Particularly is it necessary to 
 recognize that logical concepts rest back upon 
 psychological concepts and these in turn are an 
 unreflective outgrowth of perceptual experiences, 
 and it must not be supposed that logical concepts 
 are derived directly from a comparison of scat- 
 tered, isolated, and independent individual notions, 
 without any previous generalization having taken 
 place. Whole sections of pedagogical works are 
 vitiated by being based upon this handy but mis- 
 leading psychology of the concept, which has its 
 origin in the analysis of the finished products of 
 mental action. 
 
 b. It gives one no basis for understanding the 
 real nature and dynamic connection of the series 
 of steps involved in the process which we have 
 outlined as that by which logical concepts are 
 
 ' attained. These steps become purely formal. But 
 when we presuppose that the process has its 
 origin in the breakdown of some psychological 
 concept, which sets a definite problem, then the 
 steps of further observation, of comparison, abstrac- 
 tion, and generalization become vital and dynamic, 
 and their relation to one another is that of 
 organic and necessary connection as phases within 
 one continuous process directed steadily toward the 
 solution of a definite problem. 
 
2i8 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 5. The Logical Concept not Final. 
 
 The logical concept, once constructed, becomes a tool of 
 the mind used freely and flexibly and without hesitation, 
 until perchance doubt is thrown upon it again by reason of 
 some failure to meet our needs in the control of action or 
 of thought, when it is again subject to investigation and 
 reconstruction. Thus a logical concept at any given time 
 or point in our experience is not necessarily final. In cer- 
 tain phases of our experience, particularly the mathematical, 
 logical concepts once attained are apt to become fixed. It 
 may be instructive to point out that even in this sphere 
 there are logical concepts that have to be reconstructed. 
 
 The logical concept of exponent attained in the study of 
 arithmetic is adequate to the needs of that subject. There 
 we think of an exponent as a small figure placed to the 
 right and a little above a number to indicate how many 
 times it is taken as a factor. But in algebraic problems 
 there arise situations to which we apply the laws of ex- 
 ponents which satisfied us for arithmetic and we get into 
 trouble with our concept of exponent. Take the follow- 
 ing simple cases : 
 
 6 6 6 
 
 a , a a 
 
 3 3 1 
 
 — — a , -- = a , — = a , or a. 
 
 366 
 a a 
 
 Here the law of exponents demands that in the process of 
 
 division the exponent of the divisor be subtracted from that 
 
 of the dividend to determine the exponent of the quotient. 
 
 The quotient is one that can be easily interpreted under the 
 
 prevailing concept of an exponent as indicating how many 
 
 times a quantity is to be used as a factor. But let us go 
 
 right on consistently applying our law of exponents to the 
 
 following cases : 
 
 6 6 6 
 
 — = a, — — a , — = a , etc. 
 
 6 7 8 
 
 a a a 
 
 Now apply the concept of exponent to the resulting quo- 
 tients. Is it intelligible to say that a is to be used zero 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 219 
 
 times as a factor, or that a is to be used — i or — 2 times as a 
 factor? Our concept of exponent breaks down at this point. 
 We must either refuse to apply any further the law of 
 exponents applicable to division and say that it is not a 
 universal law, or we must reconstruct our concept of ex- 
 ponent. We do the latter and admit zero and negative 
 exponents, giving them an interpretation in harmony 
 with the facts as seen from another principle of divi- 
 
 6 
 
 a 
 sion. Because — = 1, according to this other principle 
 
 e 
 
 a 
 of division, we say that a" must equal i ; and because 
 
 a 1 
 
 — = — , according to this other law of division, we say 
 
 8 3 
 
 a a 
 
 that a-^ must equal — . Thus we reinterpret and recon- 
 a 
 
 struct our concept of exponent to make it harmonize with a 
 new set of facts, to make it a tool which we may employ to 
 control new situations more adequately than they could 
 otherwise be controlled. Mathematics furnishes illustration 
 after illustration of this breaking down of concepts which 
 are adequate at one level and their reconstruction to make 
 them adequate at another and higher level in the attainment 
 of control. 
 
 The progress of all our sciences has involved the recon- 
 struction of many logical concepts. What a tremendous 
 reconstruction of logical concepts in every department of 
 human thought has been provoked by the application of 
 the idea of evolution ! This lack of finality to our logical 
 concepts need not worry us in the least, if we look upon 
 them from the functional point of view as tools of the 
 mind for controlling thought, and through thought ulti- 
 mately action. Why should it not be a source of satisfac- 
 tion that humanity may improve the tools of thought as well 
 as the tools of commerce and industry? In fact, one might 
 say that the only way that we can improve the tools of 
 
220 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 commerce, of industry, of practical benevolence, of religion, 
 and in general of everything on which the progress of 
 humanity depends, is by improving the tools of thought. 
 
 6. Significance and Function of the Concept in the 
 Thinking Process. 
 
 The concept is the most important element of technique 
 in thinking. It is the great simplifier of mental processes. 
 Just as habit reduces the multiplicity of muscular move- 
 ments to a few simple methods of reaction that can be used 
 for a variety of like situations, so the concept reduces to 
 methods that apply to a large number of individual cases 
 the interpretative and guiding function of consciousness. 
 A concept is a sort of mental habit. This is of great sig- 
 nificance for the process of thinking. Concepts furnish 
 certain organized centers for the control of the thinking 
 process. The concept is, as it were, the pivot on which the 
 whole thinking process turns. The pivotal character of the 
 concept may be worked out in two directions. 
 
 (i) The concept central between individuals zvhich are 
 problematic and individuals brought under control. 
 
 In thinking, we are either analyzing and comparing indi- 
 viduals as a phase of the process of perfecting some con- 
 cept, either reflectively or unreflectively ; or we are taking 
 concepts for granted and are using them to interpret and 
 control individuals. The concept thus occupies a central 
 position between individuals which are problematic, and 
 hence cannot be controlled adequately, and individuals 
 which are properly interpreted and hence can be controlled. 
 This thought is sometimes expressed by saying that in 
 thinking we proceed from individuals to individuals by way 
 of the concept. In actual life it is always individual things 
 or situations which we have to control. The problem is 
 always particular. The concept is not, then, the ultimate 
 goal of thinking ; it is rather the tool of thinking in dealing 
 with individuals. 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 221 
 
 The thought just developed can be clarified by the analogy 
 of a machine, say the reaper. In harvesting grain the 
 problem is always one of controlling some particular situa- 
 tion, of reaping some particular field. There is in human 
 experience no such thing as harvesting in general. Yet, 
 it is just as truly a part of the harvesting function to perfect 
 the reaper as to use it. We perfect the reaper, however, 
 not for its own sake ; it is not ultimate, the goal. It is only 
 an instrument for the more adequate control of the individ- 
 ual harvesting situation. But this machine, when it is 
 perfected, has this great signiUcance, that its method of 
 operation is general, and hence this same machine can be 
 used to control other individual harvesting situations, to 
 reap other fields of grain or to reap the same field another 
 year. The movement has been from individual harvesting 
 situations which were problematic to machine and from 
 machine to the control of individual harvesting situations. 
 Now, just as the reaper arises out of the need of individual 
 situations and, when perfected, functions in the more ade- 
 quate control of those individual situations, so it is with 
 the concept. 
 
 The analogy holds true at another point also. The 
 machine is not fixed, but it is subject to modification at 
 such points as inadequacy may be discovered in actual use. 
 So it is with the concept. The concept, then, is to be viewed 
 as a tool of thinking, and its central position in the thinking 
 process is due to the fact that thinking, like industry, is 
 either moving in the direction of perfecting its tools or in 
 that of making use of them. 
 
 (2) Another zvay of expressing the idea that the concept 
 is pivotal in the thinking process. 
 
 The concept represents a certain core of meaning, and 
 that core of meaning, if thought of from different points of 
 view, may be analyzed into the various elements which are 
 bound together in the complex. For example, take the case 
 of orange. If the child is hungry, one meaning in the com- 
 
222 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 plex stands out prominently, — the orange is something to 
 eat. If the child is in a playful mood, another element of 
 meaning relevant to that situation stands out, — the orange 
 is something to roll In the process of experience many 
 meanings get firmly associated together into one system, or 
 concept. Within this system, any one meaning may quickly 
 and more or less automatically suggest others along the 
 line of relevancy to our problem. When, in thinking, a 
 concept is brought before the mind, thought moves rapidly 
 through the complex of meanings bound together in the 
 concept until it comes to the one that is relevant to, or sug- 
 gestive of, the proper reaction or the proper connection of 
 thought. The vital work is all done at one little center, 
 namely, the concept. The gain in efficiency is analogous to 
 that which Ericsson introduced into naval warfare by 
 mounting guns on a revolving turret so that they could 
 swing easily and rapidly about and be fired in any direction 
 without having to turn the whole vessel around. 
 
 (S) The increased efficiency of tlie logical concept. 
 
 It has already been pointed out that the logical concept is 
 superior to the psychological as a tool of thought on ac- 
 count of the fact that the meanings have been made explicit 
 through reflection and are thus more available for rapid 
 and accurate transitions of thought. This point ought to 
 be more clearly seen in the light of the preceding discussion. 
 
 In time of emergency it is not only well to have the 
 appropriate tool to use, but also to know exactly where it is 
 and to be able to lay hands on it at once. A carpenter may 
 have all the tools that are necessary to do a certain piece of 
 work, but it makes a vast difference to his efficiency whether 
 his hammer is in the barn, his chisel in the attic, his plane 
 in the tool shed, his ax out in the woods, etc., and he has 
 to hunt them up when he wants them ; or whether each is 
 in the proper place in a compact tool chest or cabinet. In 
 one's stock of psychological concepts, he may actually have 
 the meanings that are necessary to carry through success- 
 
Concept as an Element of Technique 223 
 
 fully a line of thought which shall solve his problem ; but 
 those meanings are much more available for use and 
 tremendously increase efficiency if they are all closely knit 
 together in a logical concept and he is conscious of the 
 exact place and significance of each one of them. 
 
 Logical concepts resulting from a vital thinking process 
 and representing an actual organization of meanings for 
 one's self cannot fail to increase the flexibility, freedom, 
 and reach of one's thinking power in any field in which 
 they are relevant. It becomes, then, a very important 
 matter educationally both that children acquire logical con- 
 cepts and that they acquire them in such a way that they 
 become dynamic elements in thinking rather than empty 
 or vague symbols merely. The next chapter will discuss 
 in more detail some of the educational principles which 
 follow from our psychology of the concept. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION 
 I. The Concept is not the Goal of Instruction, it is 
 
 TO BE acquired FOR USE. 
 
 (i) The concept a tool, not an end. 
 
 It is sometimes said that the concept is the goal of instruc- 
 tion. Is this view justified by the psychology of the con- 
 cept just worked out? Concepts are necessary elements of 
 technique in the thinking process. If the child is to be 
 skilful in thinking, it is evident that instruction must con- 
 cern itself with the task of building up a rich supply of 
 concepts, and the process must be carried on until logical 
 concepts are attained. But from the point of view of the 
 thinking process, the logical concept, in the development of 
 which so much thinking must be done, is not itself the goal. 
 It is developed for the sake of use in solving further prob- 
 lems or in the control of action more efficiently. Only from 
 the point of view that education is concerned with the task 
 of supplying the child with a stock of tools, which, at a 
 later time, when he goes out into life, he is going to use, 
 could the concept be viewed as the goal of instruction. 
 
 (2) Concepts to he acquired for use. 
 
 A better view of the function of education insists that the 
 child must not only be supplied with a stock of tools, but 
 that he must also be trained to an appreciation and under- 
 standing of their use and that he must have some practice in 
 applying them. Application of the concept is as important 
 a phase of instruction as acquisition. No father would 
 think that he had done his duty by a son whom he expected 
 to train up as a carpenter when he had put into his hands a 
 complete outfit of tools and had explained their precise 
 
 224 
 
The Concept and Instruction 225 
 
 nature. The boy would have to have some practice in their 
 use also. So it is with the concepts of the various school 
 subjects. They are only tools of thought or of action, and 
 instruction must concern itself not alone with their acquisi- 
 tion but also with practice in their application. Modern 
 psychology would teach that even if acquisition of these 
 concepts were the sole aim, yet this acquisition could not be 
 made perfect except through use. 
 
 2. Concepts cannot be given to the Child ready made. 
 Our whole discussion of the concept has tended to 
 emphasize the fact that concepts grow from a vague back- 
 ground of experience into more and more definite form as 
 the result of a process of reconstruction. This process of 
 reconstruction is itself conditioned, being initiated by some 
 feeling of need engendered through the inadequacy of 
 existing concepts. There is then no royal road of impart- 
 ing concepts by short-cut methods that is in harmony with 
 the normal processes of growth. Concepts cannot be 
 handed out as ready-rnade, finished products by the teacher 
 and appropriated by the child. They do not thus become 
 his concepts. He must go through the process of getting 
 vague ideas first and having these vague ideas repeatedly 
 reconstructed. 
 
 This reconstruction becomes dynamic and real only when 
 it is motivated by some feeling of need on his part. Teach- 
 ing is as much concerned with the development of new 
 needs on the part of the child as it is with the imparting of 
 the facts. The process of reconstructing concepts cannot 
 go on in a vital fashion any faster than it is made necessary 
 by the development of new needs which make reconstruc- 
 tions of experience necessary. This development of new 
 needs is in part dependent upon the natural development of 
 the child and in part upon skilful instruction with that end 
 definitely in view. Any process of instruction that does 
 undertake to impart to the child ready-made concepts only 
 builds up the habit on the part of the child of juggling with 
 IS 
 
226 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 symbols, concerning which reference has already been made. 
 
 3. Instruction which aims at the Development of 
 
 Concepts must culminate in Logical Concepts. 
 
 We have seen that thinking is most adequate when it 
 goes on in terms of logical concepts. That aspect of in- 
 struction which concerns itself with the perfection of the 
 tools of thinking must not, then, stop short of the attain- 
 ment of logical concepts. It is essential that the child be 
 confronted with situations which make the reflective recon- 
 struction of his concepts necessary. One of the chief merits 
 of Socrates' method was that he made the subjects of his 
 questioning keenly feel the inadequacy of their own ideas. 
 At the same time they got suggestions as to the lines along 
 which their concepts needed reconstruction, and they be- 
 came receptive to any ideas which might aid them in the 
 solution of their problem. 
 
 Not only to know, but also to know that you know gives 
 vigor and incisiveness to thinking. There is tremendous 
 added power coming from the use of the best tools. Our 
 age differs from the stone age in large part by virtue of the 
 fact that we have superior tools in every department of 
 life's activities. In perfecting the thought process of the 
 child we must not stop short of giving him the most power- 
 ful tools, — logical concepts. 
 
 4. The School must concern itself with the Problem 
 
 OF building up a Rich Background of Psycholog- 
 ical Concepts in the Mind of the Child. 
 
 (i) Argument from their basic character. 
 
 As psychological concepts are the matrix out of which 
 logical concepts will come as the result of reflection and 
 further observation, and as breakdowns in these concepts 
 are going to furnish the problems determinative of the 
 course of reconstruction, it is important that the child have 
 a rich supply of concepts which spring quite directly out of 
 his own experiences. This supply of psychological con- 
 
The Concept and Instruction 227 
 
 cepts furnishes both material and motivation for the recon- 
 stuctions which shall yield more logical notions. 
 
 (2) The doctrine exemplified in school practice. 
 
 The modern school does much to enrich the stock of 
 psychological notions which the child brings to bear upon 
 the more formal aspects of school study. Excursions to 
 fields and parks to see plants, animals, and natural phenom- 
 ena give the child material from which his little mind at 
 once acquires notions both individual and general. Con- 
 structive work of various kinds furnishes still another 
 source for such notions. The child's language notions are 
 developed unreflectively through stories and oral reproduc- 
 tion and simple composition long before he studies gram- 
 mar, which reconstructs these notions reflectively and makes 
 them logical. 
 
 There is a very strong tendency at the present time in 
 the direction of making the work of the first three grades 
 less formal and less specialized, making it, in other words, 
 preeminently the work of building up the background of 
 first-hand experiences with the things which will be more 
 systematically studied later on in the higher grades. Ex- 
 periences with number, language, geography, and nature 
 in the concrete first, technique later on, that is the watch- 
 word. Let the child drink in, under guidance and direction 
 of the teacher, an abundance of concrete impressions, form- 
 ing his own ideas, and later on concern ourselves with the 
 task of more explicitly working them over into a more 
 logical form. The child who comes to the study of chem- 
 istry and physics with a mind full of ideas of his own 
 derived from first-hand experiences in domestic science and 
 manual training is in a position to appreciate quickly the 
 problems of the new sciences and to reconstruct his con- 
 cepts in harmony with the demands of those problems. 
 
 (s) The doctrine applied to religious instruction. , 
 
 There can be no better preparation for the more precise 
 formulations of religious truths than perfect familiarity 
 
228 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 with the concrete story material of the Old and New Testa- 
 ments. Religious teachers are apt to be in too big a hurry 
 to indoctrinate the child in the great fundamental tenets of 
 their faith. These logical concepts are too frequently 
 empty forms both for children and for adults of that class 
 who are still children in type of thought. More work with 
 concrete material calculated to build up psychological 
 notions, while making haste more slowly, would in the long 
 run lead to clearer-cut logical notions through having sup- 
 plied sufficient basis for the process of reconstruction with- 
 out which the logical notions are felt 'to be irrelevant and 
 meaningless. The doctrine "from the concrete to the 
 abstract," or better, from the psychological to the logical, if 
 applied to the work of the Sunday School, would quickly 
 do away with a uniform course of study for all ages from 
 the kindergarten child to the adult of the Bible class. 
 
 (4) The doctrine applied to moral instruction. 
 
 The public school is frequently criticized of late for its 
 failure to teach morals. Every good teacher of right ideals 
 and habits is doing more teaching of morals in the lower 
 grades at the present time than if a text-book were em- 
 ployed for the purpose. Children are taught morals in 
 their concrete relations with one another and with their 
 teacher all day long in the classroom. Every good teacher 
 is constantly insisting upon right conduct and good man- 
 ners. Truthfulness, kindness, cleanliness, promptness, 
 willing obedience, regard for the rights of others, etc., are 
 being learned in the concrete. Children's ideas are being 
 formed along these lines unreflectively. Probably the 
 school ought, in harmony with the idea of passing on from 
 the psychological notion to the logical, at some point in the 
 higher grades to begin to make the principles of morals 
 stand out more reflectively. They ought to be brought 
 more definitely to consciousness. But no amount of teach- 
 ing morals in terms of the logical concepts can ever take the 
 place of the work done at the present time in the lower 
 
The Concept and Instruction 229 
 
 grades along the line of indirect teaching of morals, nor 
 can it be done at this age so effectively in any other way. 
 
 5. The Test of whether a Child has a Concept or 
 
 not is that of function. 
 
 The concept, whether psychological or logical, is normally 
 a tool in the service of action or of thought. Does the child 
 have a particular concept ? We often think we can tell by 
 asking him if he understands. But telling or failing to tell 
 is not a decisive test. Application of some sort is better. 
 It is only a half truth, that favorite dictum of teachers : "If 
 you know, you can tell it." If we have logical notions of 
 things, we can of course tell what we know ; but if we have 
 psychological notions, perhaps we cannot. Yet we may in 
 the latter case know sufficiently well for use at the present 
 time and under the present conditions. The child's notions 
 are dominantly psychological. Telling is consequently no 
 adequate test of his understanding. 
 
 Furthermore, the child may be at such a stage of develop- 
 ment or at such an early stage of advancement in a given 
 subject that he cannot have logical notions anyway. Over- 
 refinement in the matter of exact description or exact defi- 
 nition is a failing characteristic of teachers who do not 
 understand the mental processes of children, and also of 
 many teachers in the first few weeks of a subject perfectly 
 familiar to them but very strange and unfamiliar to the class. 
 This over-refinement, instead of being conducive to clear 
 thinking, may have in the long run just the opposite effect. 
 
 6. Problems of Action are very Significant in the 
 
 Process of Training to Think. 
 The concept, we have emphasized, is a tool of action, as 
 well as of thought. Even psychological concepts are used 
 to control motor processes. In fact, they originate in the 
 attempt to simplify the control of actions by applying to 
 whole groups of situations the same meanings, which de- 
 mand for their realization the same method of reaction. As 
 
230 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 that aspect of the concept which makes of it a tool for the 
 control of action is the first to develop and the more reflec- 
 tive is the later, training in thinking should supply facilities 
 for the use of the concept in dealing with the problems of 
 action before the child is called upon to deal with more 
 abstract and theoretic problems. 
 
 This doctrine would give manual training a fundamental 
 and inner position in the curriculum instead of making it 
 something tacked on from the outside as an extra or as a 
 fad. Its position would be inner also in another respect, 
 namely, that it would be thought of not merely in terms of 
 a subject adapted to give motor skill, but as a subject de- 
 manded by the nature of the child to give appropriate first 
 expression to his thought processes, and to supply the basis 
 for the higher and more reflective processes involved in 
 more specialized study. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION VIEWED AS 
 TECHNIQUE OF THINKING 
 
 1. Purpose of this Chapter. 
 
 It is the purpose of this chapter and of the following two 
 chapters to give the psychology of induction and deduction 
 rather than the logic. No attempt will be made to give an 
 exhaustive treatment of the subject. For more detailed 
 accounts of the inductive and deductive processes, the 
 reader should consult some standard text in logic. There 
 is no occasion for repeating here the admirable work which 
 the logicians have done in the matter of analysis and 
 description of these characteristic phases of the thinking 
 process. We are concerned primarily with the problem of 
 giving them a functional interpretation, with getting at them 
 from their dynamic psychological side rather than the 
 purely structural side. We shall view them as special 
 organizations of the thinking process for the more perfect 
 performance of its function. From this point of view, they 
 are elaborate specializations in the technique of the thinking 
 process. 
 
 2. Relation of Induction and Deduction to Each 
 
 Other. 
 The thinking process is functionally a unity falling within 
 two hmits, — one the conceiving of an end, the other the 
 reaHzation in thought of that end through the perfection in 
 imagination of the proper method of procedure to attain it. 
 But this whole process is greatly facilitated by the perfec- 
 tion and use of the logical concept as a tool. And by logical 
 concept we shall mean to include here every sort of reflective 
 general notion, whether class concept, principle, or law. 
 
 231 
 
232 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 Now, this process of perfecting the tools of thought is not 
 functionally separate from thinking any more than the 
 process of inventing and making reaping machinery is 
 separate from the function of harvesting grain; but it falls 
 within the process somewhere between the two limits al- 
 ready stated. When the movement of thought is in the 
 direction of perfecting its tools, this phase of the thinking 
 process is called induction; when it is concerned primarily 
 with the use of its tools, this phase is called deduction. 
 
 Both the inductive and the deductive phases are essential 
 and are functionally related within the complete movement 
 of the thinking process, though they may be for some par- 
 ticular interval of time separated, attention falling domi- 
 nantly on one phase or the other according to need. Again 
 apply the analogy of harvesting grain. Both the invention 
 of the tools and their use are essential to the complete and 
 adequate harvesting function. But the two phases may be 
 separated by intervals of time. There may even be division 
 of labor in the performance of the complete function, one 
 man inventing and perfecting tools while another applies 
 those tools to the control of action. It is to be noted, how- 
 ever, that the invention of tools for harvesting cannot be 
 carried on apart from the problem of harvesting, nor is 
 their invention complete without any test of their use and 
 their actual fitness to perform the function. The same is 
 true of the inductive process in thinking. The complete 
 working out of the tools of thinking cannot be absolutely 
 separated from their use. From this point of view the 
 complete inductive process involves deduction as the phase 
 of testing. 
 
 3. Definitions. 
 
 (i) Their statement. 
 
 In harmony with the point of view just developed, we 
 may define deduction and induction in functional terms 
 somewhat as follows : 
 
Induction and Deduction 233 
 
 ■a. Deduction is that form of thinking in which an in- 
 dividual which is problematic is interpreted and controlled 
 by referring it to some concept, or law, which is, for the 
 time being at least, unquestioned. 
 
 b. Induction is that form of thinking in which a con- 
 cept or law, which has become problematic, is reconstructed 
 through an investigation and analysis of individuals. 
 (2) Illustrations. 
 
 a. Deduction 
 I find a lump of something hard and rough and glittering. 
 What is it? The individual is problematic. I don't know 
 what it is ; shall I throw it away or put it in my pocket and 
 carry it home ? I cannot tell unless I can properly interpret 
 it. I try to apply some familiar concept. Perhaps it is 
 gold ore. I observe the individual to see if it has the char- 
 acteristic marks of gold ore. No. Perhaps it is the 
 presence of mica ,that makes it glitter. I look for the 
 characteristic marks of mica. Yes, it is mica. The appli- 
 cation of this concept has interpreted the individual. It is 
 no longer problematic for thought. Consequently it is no 
 longer problematic for action. I know exa'ctly what to do ; 
 I throw it away. This is a case of deductive thinking. 
 The concepts that I used were all unquestioned as to their 
 import ; the problem was in the individual. When I ap- 
 plied the right concept the individual ceased to be prob- 
 lematic. The concept mica interpreted it. It brought 
 meaning from itself over into the little piece of rock. There 
 was no question of what gold is or of what mica is, the 
 question was wholly, "What is this individual thing?" 
 And that question was settled by the appHcation of an 
 accepted concept. 
 
 In grammar, I have the sentence : "Hamilton smote the 
 rock of our national resources, and abundant streams of 
 revenue gushed forth." I ask the question, "What part of 
 speech is streams?" Answer: "It is a noun." "Why?" 
 "Because it is the name of something." "What part of 
 
234 'The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 speech is smote?" "A verb." "Why?" "Because it 
 asserts action." Here again we have problematic individ- 
 uals, the words streams and smote, interpreted through the 
 application of the concepts noun and verb regarding which 
 there is no question as to their meaning. This is a deduc- 
 tive movement of thought. 
 
 Sometimes the deductive movement is a case of the un- 
 folding or development of the general notion to see its 
 application. But even in this case the individual to which 
 the concept is sought to be applied is, when selected, momen- 
 tarily problematic until the application is made. General 
 notion : Every adult male citizen has a right to vote. Appli- 
 cation : — John Smith has a right to vote. But has John 
 Smith a right to vote? Does he fulfil the conditions? Is 
 he an adult? Is he a citizen? The individual is problem- 
 atic. We cannot say he has a right to vote until we have 
 settled these two problems. Then the deduction will be 
 evident. Since John Smith is an adult male, and since he 
 is a citizen, he has the right to vote. We have now settled 
 the problem whether John Smith is a voter by applying the 
 general law. 
 
 b. Induction. 
 
 Let us now take a case of induction, such a one as might 
 occur in actual life, not a formal case set for induction. I 
 am a young person, brought up in a limited environment. 
 I go to the city and meet many people. I meet Dr. Harvey. 
 Trying to put myself at ease with him I begin to talk about 
 things pertaining to the medical profession. He replies, 
 "Oh, I am not a physician." I am too embarrassed to talk 
 further. Later, I learn that Dr. Harvey is a school teacher. 
 Well, why do they call him "Doctor"? I always thought 
 that a doctor was a physician. My trouble is still further 
 aggravated by discovering that Dr. Stark is a minister, and 
 that Dr. White is a scientist. By this time I begin to 
 wonder what Doctor means anyway. My concept proves 
 inadequate. It does not meet the demands of the situation. 
 
Induction and Deduction 235 
 
 I have no way of finding out directly the meaning of 
 doctor by going to a dictionary or cyclopedia. I begin to 
 find out all I can about each of the men whom I meet, or 
 about whom I may read, who are called "Doctor." I find 
 one by one that in each case the title originated in some 
 degree conferred by a university upon the completion of a 
 special course of study and research. I reconstruct my 
 concept doctor in harmony with the result of my investi- 
 gation. It now has in it as the dominant meaning that of 
 special learning along some line, whether medicine, history, 
 law, theology, or some particular science, and the recogni- 
 tion of that special learning by some university. My con- 
 cept doctor has been reconstructed through an investigation 
 and analysis of individuals. The motive to reconstruction 
 was the failure of my concept doctor to meet the needs of 
 the situation, which threw doubt upon its validity. 
 
 As we illustrated a deductive process from grammar, so 
 also by way of comparison it might be well to illustrate an 
 inductive mode of procedure in the same subject. Let us 
 suppose that it is the case of developing the idea of pro- 
 noun. We can take a series of sentences in which pro- 
 nouns occur. Start with one of the individuals. Let the 
 child tell what the word means, let him find some word 
 which means the same and could be used in its place. This 
 one experience will possibly give him a vague idea that 
 there are words which can be used for other words. Take 
 another individual pronoun. Let him tell what word this 
 one means. And so on. Let him examine the various 
 words for which these individuals stand. In each case, it 
 will be brought out that they are nouns. The idea is devel- 
 oped that we often use other words in place of repeating 
 nouns. He now has the concept pronoun, and all he needs 
 is the definition to fix it in mind. In this case a vague idea 
 is first attained, and then it is reconstructed through an 
 investigation of more individuals. 
 
236 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 4. The Critical Point of Distinction between Deduc- 
 tion AND Induction. 
 
 (i) Criticism of the formula, "Deduction is a process 
 of going from the general to particulars." 
 
 This well-worn formula is true in only a limited sense. 
 It is one of those half truths which originate in the at- 
 tempt to formulate the thinking process in terms of the 
 results of an analysis of the finished product. The chief 
 merit of the formula is its simplicity, but at the same time 
 it is very misleading, without ■ further qualification and 
 interpretation. 
 
 We have seen in our illustration of the little piece of 
 rock and in the illustration from grammar that deduction 
 may psychologically start with a problematic individual, 
 and the process may consist largely in the search for an 
 accepted general notion capable of interpeting this individ- 
 ual. The general notion is not given to start with. From 
 this point of view, the deductive movement consists in 
 going from the individual to the general, the very opposite 
 of what the customary formula has it. Certainly the selec- 
 tion of the proper general notion mica is a very vital part 
 of the thinking process involved in interpreting the little 
 piece of rock. Indeed, it is the dynamic aspect of that pro- 
 cess. It is where the whole struggle and tension of mind 
 centers. After the appropriate general notion mica has 
 been selected, then, to be sure, it is applied to the individual ; 
 meaning is brought over from the general notion into the 
 individual and that individual ceases to be problematic. 
 This aspect of the deductive thinking process, which really 
 represents the formulation of the finished product, may be 
 described as proceeding from the general to the particular. 
 But it is after all only the formal part of a thinking process 
 the vital part of which is already complete. 
 
 The point which should stand out clearly now is that we 
 do not necessarily, or even frequently, in deduction start 
 out with a general notion which is given, from which point 
 
Induction and Deduction 237 
 
 on the process is merely the appHcation of that general 
 notion. But the active search for the appropriate general 
 notion is a very vital part of the whole process. The 
 significant point in deduction is that, whether it starts with 
 general notions or whether the general notions have to he 
 searched out, in any case it works with general notions 
 which are accepted or unquestioned. The problem is not 
 one of perfecting the tools of thinking, but of using those 
 we already have. 
 
 (2) Criticism of the formula, "Induction is a process of 
 going from particidars to the general." 
 
 The inductive process does not necessarily start, as the 
 catch-phrase would suggest, with a group of given partic- 
 ulars, or individuals. These particulars may have to be 
 sought after very diligently. Psychologically, the process 
 of induction normally starts with something problematic in a 
 concept or law. This general notion had been hitherto taken 
 for granted, it was adequate within the limits of its previous 
 applications. But now it fails at some point, it is unsatis- 
 factory and calls for further investigation. Take for ex- 
 ample the Ptolemaic system. For centuries it seemed ade- 
 quate to the explanation and interpretation of the phenomena 
 of the heavenly bodies. Even eclipses could be accurately 
 predicted on its basis. But, later, facts were discovered 
 which this theory could not adequately control. Doubt was 
 thrown upon its validity. This resulted in further investi- 
 gations of the phenomena of the heavens with this particular 
 point in view. These investigations ultimately culminated 
 in a reconstruction of the concept of the universe. The 
 Copernican system was not entirely new ; it retained much 
 that was characteristic of the older system, but reconstructed 
 it at critical points, noticeably in the position which the sun 
 occupies in the system. 
 
 When a concept becomes problematic, we turn to the 
 investigation of the individuals which fall, or might pos- 
 sibly fall, under this concept. This phase of the inductive 
 
238 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 process might be described as virtually proceeding from the 
 general to the particulars, — just the reverse of what the 
 popular formula has it. But the study of the individuals 
 is taken up for the sake of arriving at a more adequate con- 
 cept. This phase of the process is virtually proceeding in 
 harmony with the popular formula, "from individuals to the 
 general." But the tension of mind due to the breaking 
 down, or failure, of the general notion and the active search 
 for, and selection of, the proper individuals for investiga- 
 tion, is a very vital part of the whole inductive thinking 
 process. This dynamic aspect should not be ignored in a 
 complete psychology of induction. 
 
 The emphatic point of this discussion is that induction 
 • does not start out with individuals, or particulars, which 
 are given, but the critical thing in the whole process is a 
 general notion which is problematic and calls for reconstruc- 
 tion through the search for, and investigation of, individ- 
 uals which are not problematic. 
 
 (s) Deduction and induction to he distinguished in terms 
 of locus of problem. 
 
 In defining deduction and induction we cannot seize 
 upon the movement from general to particular or from 
 particulars to general as the most significant thing. From 
 the functional point of view, it is more significant to get 
 the exact locus of the problem. The deductive movement 
 starts with a problematic individual ; the inductive with a 
 problematic concept or law. The deductive movement is 
 concerned with finding and applying the proper accepted 
 concept to interpret the individual and bring it under con- 
 trol ; the inductive movement is concerned with the perfect- 
 ing of the problematic concept so that it shall adequately 
 control indisputable particulars. 
 
 If we once get the locus of the problem as our starting 
 point, the form of the movement of thought is secondary 
 and dependent. There will, of course, be a characteristic 
 difference in the form of the movement of thought in deduc- 
 
Induction and Deduction 239 
 
 tion and induction because the locus of the problem is dif- 
 ferent. But we should distinguish, as our definitions at- 
 tempt to do, between the two phases of thinking not by the 
 secondary difference in form, but by the primary difference 
 in function. 
 5. Thinking in its Relation to System of Knowledge. 
 
 (i) General statement. 
 
 Thinking presupposes some sort of a system of knowl- 
 edge. Thinking must make use of past experience as well 
 as present, but this past experience cannot be said to have 
 mental existence in the form of isolated chunks. There is 
 always some degree of organization or unity or wholeness 
 to our past experiences. They have some sort of a setting, 
 or context; they represent systems, rather than isolated 
 facts. 
 
 It is a commonplace of modern psychology that con- 
 sciousness always gives some sort of vague 'wholes from the 
 very beginning. To the unreflective activities of appercep- 
 tion and crude imagination we must ascribe the first vague 
 unities, or systems, of knowledge which rise above the 
 purely perceptual level. As we have seen in our earlier 
 discussions, the child's imagination in the period from two 
 and one-half years of age until six or seven is very active 
 and is an important factor in enlarging and giving some- 
 thing of definite form to his experiences. His imagination 
 is a solvent for the holding together in larger wholes, at 
 least in terms of emotional congruency and satisfaction, 
 elements that would otherwise seem discordant. We have 
 seen that the child's experiences tend continually in an 
 unreflective way to develop meanings, and these meanings 
 tend to crystallize about certain symbols, and thus knowl- 
 edge gets some sort of organization in the form of class 
 concepts, laws, and principles. 
 
 Now the point of this discussion is this, that wherever 
 you may conceive that the thinking process starts in the life 
 of the child, there will always be some sort of a system, or 
 
240 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 better, systems of knowledge, within which it works. The 
 thinking process may operate within existing organizations, 
 or systems, of knowledge, utilizing accepted ideas as the 
 basis of adjusting means to ends ; or, finding an existing 
 organization of experience inadequate to perform the func- 
 tion of controlling action, the thinking process may be con- 
 cerned with its reconstruction and perfection as a tool of 
 thought. But in either case, whether the movement of 
 thought be deductive or inductive, the starting point is 
 within some system of knowledge. 
 
 (2) Relation of deduction to the system. 
 
 Deduction presupposes some system of already organised 
 knowledge, which is, for the time being at least, unques- 
 tioned. The mind already has a stock of general notions, — 
 concepts, definitions, laws, and principles, — which are rele- 
 vant to the problem of thought. The individual which is 
 problematic is conceived of as belonging to some particular 
 system, only we do not know at once just how or where. 
 But, as the system is already organized, every part of it has 
 relation to every other part. It is possible, then, to start 
 at any point in the system and to pass through the whole 
 system to any other point by making explicit the series of 
 relationships, or ties of connection, involved. Deduction 
 makes explicit, by a process of analysis, the relation between 
 the problematic individual and other individuals within the 
 same system, and by an act of synthesis this individual :s 
 given its place within that system of relationships. When 
 the place of the individual is definitely recognized, or made 
 explicit, and its function within that system is seen, then 
 the deductive movement is complete, and the individual is 
 interpreted and brought under control. 
 
 In saying that deductive thinking presupposes a system 
 of already organized knowledge which is brought to bear 
 upon the individual to interpret and control it, it is not 
 to be implied that in bringing this individual under the 
 prevailing general notion the system is in no way modi- 
 
Induction and Deduction 241 
 
 fied. In deduction, however, the system of already organ- 
 ized knowledge, in the form of concepts, laws, etc., is the 
 dominating, or controlling factor. But every general no- 
 tion is modified in some respect by bringing under it a new 
 individual. 
 
 (s) Relation of induction to the system. 
 
 Induction presupposes not necessarily the absence of an 
 organized system of knowledge but merely some inadequacy 
 in that system to control certain individuals. Take for 
 illustration the case already cited of Ptolemaic astronomy. 
 Induction operates within a system, but that system is one 
 which is being organized or reconstructed. Its function is 
 to so reconstruct and reorganize a system of relationships 
 that as the outcome the general notion which results shall 
 be adequate to the control of the individuals concerned. 
 But there must be some system of knowledge relevant to 
 the process to give some definite point of view for the pro- 
 cess of investigation and reconstruction. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapters XVIII, XIX and XX 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 279-89. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 220-34. 
 
 James, Psychology, Ch. 22. 
 
 Welton, Logical Bases of Education, pp. 116-22 and Chs. 9, 10, 
 
 13- 
 
 Bagley, The Educative Process, Chs. 19 and 20. 
 McMurry, Elements of General Method, Ch. 5. 
 McMurry, Method of the Recitation, Chs. 8 and 9. 
 
 16 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION VIEWED AS 
 
 TECHNIQUE OF THINKING 
 
 (Continued) 
 
 1. Unreflective Induction. 
 
 The process of building up concepts, — whether class con- 
 cepts, laws, or principles, — may go on unreflectively. 
 There may be no attempt on the part of the individual to 
 control the inductive movement which results in better tools 
 of thought. This has already been illustrated in the case 
 of the child that had the concept dog and acquired the con- 
 cept sheep, in that of the child who got a new concept dining 
 room in which the idea of rug was not essential, in that of 
 the boys who had good working notions of various classes 
 of nut trees, and in that of the child who had acquired a 
 notion of the law of plant growth. Our minds are just 
 full of such psychological general notions, which are the 
 result of unreflective inductive processes. Repeated recon- 
 structions of these concepts from their vaguer to their more 
 adequate form have taken place through implicit processes 
 of induction rather than through any explicit mode of pro- 
 cedure The inductive process has gone on in terms of the 
 assimilative activities involved in the more fundamental 
 metal tendencies of attention, association, and imagination. 
 The method of procedure is unreflective, it has not been 
 brought definitely and explicitly to consciousness. 
 
 2. Reflective Induction. 
 
 Inductive method is not a pure invention of the 
 scientist or of the logician. It merely makes explicit that 
 which is implicit in the process of generalization wherever 
 it occurs. In the reflective reconstruction of our concepts 
 
 242 
 
Induction and Deduction 243 
 
 this process becomes definite and distinct enough for us 
 to analyze it. When we analyze the inductive process we 
 find that it is possessed of certain well-defined character- 
 istics, or phases. These are observation of individuals, or 
 of particular instances, from the point of view of some 
 problem; comparison for the sake of finding essential 
 characteristics relevant to the solution of the problem; 
 abstraction of the common characteristics judged to be 
 essential; and generalization, or the setting up of the com- 
 mon core of abstracted characteristics as a standard by 
 which to judge or interpret all the individuals of a class, or 
 as a rule which applies to all cases of a certain type. When 
 these phases of the inductive movement of thought are 
 explicitly recognized and are organized into a definite mode 
 of procedure Which we purposely employ in the reconstruc- 
 tion of general notions, then induction is of the reflective 
 type. 
 
 In an earlier chapter we gave a criticism of the ordinary 
 account of the inductive "steps." In giving the more de- 
 tailed account of inductive method which is to follow in 
 the next topic, that criticism will be resumed, while at the 
 same time we shall indicate a point of view which gives 
 both unity and dynamic character to the series of "steps" 
 involved in reflective induction. We shall take the case of 
 the logical formation of the class concept as the simplest 
 illustration for the purpose of showing the nature and rela- 
 tion of the distinguishable phases, or "steps," in inductive 
 method, leaving for a later chapter the discussion and inter- 
 pretation of the hypothesis as a characteristic of inductive 
 method. 
 3. Inductive Method, — the Inductive "Steps." 
 
 (i) Observation. 
 
 The term observation is here used to include the whole 
 process of gathering particular facts, whether it be through 
 further perceptual processes, through inquiry, or through 
 reading. As we have already indicated in an earlier chapter, 
 
244 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 in our study of the concept, the ordinary account of obser- 
 vation gives no suggestion of a principle in accordance with 
 which the individuals to be observed are selected. Observa- 
 tion is not a random process, taking account of any and all 
 individuals. As a matter of fact, the individuals are selected 
 from a more or less definite point of view. Whence this 
 point of view? It is furnished by that core of meaning 
 which is embedded in the corresponding psychological 
 concept. That concept has broken down, failed, or become 
 inadequate ; it is problematic at some point. Observation, 
 to be of any value, must be relevant to the particular prob- 
 lem, and the nature of the problem is determined by the 
 psychological concept which is to be reconstructed. Hence 
 the previously existing psychological concept must inevit- 
 ably function in the process of investigation, guiding and 
 directing its course through the whole series of inductive 
 "steps." As applied to observation this means that we 
 select individuals for observation which we have been 
 accustomed unreflectively to bring under the previously 
 existing psychological concept, supplemented now that we 
 are in doubt by such other individuals as we feel might 
 probably be brought into the same group. 
 
 To make our thought more concrete, let us take the illus- 
 tration of attaining the logical concept trade center, which 
 Mr. McMurry so suggestively works out on the pedagog- 
 ical side in his The Method of the Recitation.^ We shall 
 study it more particularly for the sake of making clear the 
 psychology of the process. Mr. McMurry starts out with 
 the detailed study of Minneapolis and its environment. 
 When this study begins has the child no idea at all of trade 
 center? Most likely he has been studying geography for 
 some time, and he has from his home geography, at least, 
 formed some idea of trade and has seen trade centering in 
 certain villages or towns rather than being scattered all 
 over the neighboring region equally. Even such a vague 
 
 'Pp. 16-24. 
 
Induction and Deduction 245 
 
 idea as he might have of trade center would operate to 
 vitaHze his more detailed study of Minneapolis. But 
 whether the child had or had not this psychological notion 
 with which to start, the study of Minneapolis could not give 
 him a logical notion of trade center. Its primary function 
 would be to furnish the rich background of actual concrete 
 detail out of which a reasonably virile psychological con- 
 cept might emerge which should serve as the basis for the 
 process of logical reconstruction. Having this psycholog- 
 ical concept, it would now be possible for the child to sug- 
 gest other individuals for study ; for he now has a point of 
 view for making selections. At least some already existing 
 concept, either in the mind of the child or in that of the 
 teacher, must be brought into use in order to make any 
 selections of individuals for observation that is not purely 
 random. 
 
 We may now ask, "But what motive is -there for this 
 process of further observation of individuals?" The child 
 applies his notion trade center, either of his own accord or 
 under the guidance and direction of the teacher, to other 
 cities such as Chicago, Pittsburg, etc. From his study of 
 Minneapolis he has associated with the meaning of trade 
 center the idea of waterfall, of lumber industry, of flour 
 mills, etc. In applying his psychological notion to these 
 other cities he finds that it does not work in all respects. 
 It is inadequate in its application to Chicago ; for this city 
 has no waterfall. It is inadequate in its application to 
 Pittsburg; for this city has no lumbering industry. These 
 cities, and perhaps many other individuals, must be ob- 
 served, and the idea of trade center reconstructed. The 
 breakdown of the psychological concept trade center is the 
 stimulus to further observation and furnishes the motive 
 both for this observation and for the "step" of comparison. 
 At the same time, there is a core of meaning involved in 
 the original psychological notion which functions to define 
 the problem sufficiently to determine the selection of the 
 
246 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 individuals for more reflective investigation and to give 
 guidance and direction to all the processes involved therein. 
 
 (2) Comparison. 
 
 The ordinary account does not suggest any principle in 
 accordance with which comparison proceeds when the indi- 
 viduals have been selected. When we compare, it is not 
 for the sake of noting all likenesses and all differences. 
 Such uncontrolled comparison would be felt to be absurd 
 and fruitless. Again, here it is the already existing psycho- 
 logical concept which furnishes a point of view for compar- 
 ison. We compare the individuals from the point of view 
 of the central core of meaning, even though it is now felt 
 to be vague and problematic, which is involved in the 
 psychological concept that is undergoing reconstruction. 
 This furnishes some sort of a standard, though itself sub- 
 ject to modification, for testing the relevancy to our prob- 
 lem of certaia likenesses and differences. The process of 
 comparison is, then, not aimless, but falls within the limits 
 of a problem that is at least vaguely defined. 
 
 When Minneapolis and Chicago as trade centers are com- 
 pared, we do not compare them with reference to their 
 school systems or their method of lighting the streets._ The 
 point of view furnished in our psychological concept in- 
 stantly rules out such lines of comparison. It is at least 
 definite enough to focus the problem of comparison some- 
 where within the field of relevancy. We are apt to choose 
 for comparison those points in which there is some sort of 
 a possibility of trade factors being involved, such as the 
 character of the surrounding country, the facilities of com- 
 munication of various sorts which are concretely familiar 
 to us, etc. 
 
 (s) Abstraction. 
 
 Again, abstraction is not merely the selection of common 
 qualities and characteristics. It is rather the selection of 
 essential common qualities. But how shall we have any 
 idea of what are essential common qualities? Only as we 
 
Induction and Deduction 247 
 
 have some point of view for judgment. This is furnished 
 by the underlying psychological concept which functions 
 to give direction to our investigation. Qualities are essen- 
 tial only in so far as they meet the needs of the problem in 
 hand. The logical concept to be attained must have that 
 core of meaning which shall make of it an efficient tool in 
 the control of individuals either in action or in thought. 
 Only qualities or characteristics which are thus regarded 
 as essential are abstracted, no matter how many others are 
 common. 
 
 Minneapolis and Chicago may both have good school 
 systems, they may both be lighted by gas, or both by 
 electricity. Possibly the average height of the inhabitants 
 of both cities may be the same, etc. But we all feel at once 
 the irrelevancy of this set of common qualities. Why? 
 Because we have enough of an idea of trade center em- 
 bodied in our psychological concept to know that these 
 common qualities or characteristics are not within the field 
 of our problem. 
 
 But both cities lie within a region that needs to be fur- 
 nished with supplies and that also needs to get rid of raw 
 materials ; both cities have excellent railway communica- 
 tions with various parts of the surrounding country ; both 
 cities have water-ways suitable for the transport of goods ; 
 both cities are engaged in receiving raw materials, convert- 
 ing them into manufactured articles, and sending them out 
 to other places for consumption ; both places serve as cen- 
 ters for the collection and redistribution of various kinds 
 of products. In the process of comparison, we run across 
 many such common characteristics which we instantly feel 
 are relevant to our problem. We focus our attention upon 
 these and hold them in mind. 
 
 At the same time there is a process of elimination of the 
 apparently relevant that takes place. We find the water- 
 fall at Minneapolis an important factor in making it a 
 trade center, but there is none at Chicago. We find a 
 
248 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 river at Minneapolis, and a great lake at Chicago ; water in 
 some form seems very relevant. Perhaps it is essential. 
 We compare with Birmingham, Alabama, and see that this, 
 is a great trade center of the South, but an inland city, 
 relying wholly upon railways for its commerce. Now if, 
 through our study of Minneapolis first, we had included 
 in our psychological concept trade center waterfalls, river, 
 and lumber industry; in the process of comparison these 
 elements would have been eliminated as elements which 
 belong in the essential core of meaning. This is the nega- 
 tive aspect of abstraction. 
 
 Abstraction proper consists in the selection of those com- 
 mon characteristics and qualities discovered in the process 
 of comparison which are judged to be essential from the 
 point of view of our problem, the withdrawing of these 
 from the tangle of complex details and the holding of them 
 off before the mind for separate consideration. 
 
 (4) Generalisation. 
 
 This does not consist merely in massing together the 
 common, or even the essential common, qualities of all the 
 individuals into one complex, — a sort of composite photo- 
 graph affair. It does consist in setting up under the con- 
 trol of a single image the abstracted essential qualities as a 
 standard, as a central core of meaning, by which to judge 
 and interpret all the individuals of a group. Under one 
 image are organized a system of meanings which serves as 
 a rule for the determination of all the individuals of a class. 
 The outcome is that this image more adequately symbolizes 
 the appropriate reaction, mental or motor, to all the indi- 
 viduals of the group. 
 
 When we have gathered together the characteristics 
 which are essential to a trade center, — that it shall be a place 
 which receives and transmits goods, that it shall have 
 facilities for the conversion of raw inaterials into manu- 
 factured articles, that it shall have suitable means of con- 
 veyance by rail or by water from one place to another, 
 
Induction and Deduction 249 
 
 etc., we set up these abstracted qualities, organized into one 
 whole, as a standard, or rule, which we apply to every city 
 to determine whether it is a trade center or not. The act 
 of mentally asserting that this core of meanings does con- 
 stitute the standard, and that every city that shall be called 
 a trade center must conform to the standard of possessing 
 these characteristics, — this act is generalisation. General- 
 ization is, then, a far more constructive and a far more 
 dynamic and purposive process than any sort of mental 
 composite photography. 
 
 4. Interrelations of the Formal "Steps." 
 
 It should be observed that the "steps" of observation, 
 comparison, abstraction, and generalization are not absolutely 
 separate and distinct. Their arrangement in a definite 
 order is more or less formal, useful for the purpose of 
 description. They overlap and interpenetrate one another 
 in the actual thinking process. But they represent essen- 
 tial movements within the inductive process. The term 
 phases would be a better term to employ than the more 
 popular term "steps.'' To indicate that we are using the 
 term "steps" in a popular and loose sense only, we have 
 employed quotation marks. 
 
 Observation is for the sake of comparison, and compari- 
 son may be simultaneous with observation, each exercising 
 a determining influence upon the other; comparison is for 
 the sake of abstraction, and a certain amount of abstraction 
 may go hand in hand with comparison ; abstraction is for 
 the sake of generalization, and generalization is not all done 
 at one time,- — it weaves to and fro with the process of 
 abstraction. Indeed, the whole series of processes may be 
 gone through repeatedly in whole or in part, resulting in re- 
 peated modifications of the general notion, before the reflec- 
 tive reconstruction of the concept is complete. In this 
 connection, it may be pointed out that application, or test- 
 ing, of the concept by using it to interpret or control indi- 
 
2SO The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 viduals, which is really a deductive procedure, is an integral 
 part of the whole process of generalization, and this too 
 may be repeated many times before the satisfactory logical 
 concept is attained. 
 
 While the idea of inductive method as a series of steps, 
 each one complete in itself before the next is entered upon, 
 breaks down; it still remains true that there are certain 
 characteristic phases, or movements of thought, in the 
 inductive process each one of which is necessary in some 
 degree of its fulfilment to the next. These phases within 
 the inductive movement of thought are bound together, 
 guided, and directed by a common point of view which 
 dominates the investigation throughout. That point of view 
 is furnished by the central core of meaning embodied in 
 the psychological concept which is being reconstructed. 
 For example, the previously existing psychological concept 
 trade center in our illustration functioned to guide and 
 direct the various "steps" of investigation so that one 
 "step" led rationally to the next and the results of one were 
 directly relevant to the one which followed. 
 
 The line of thought which we have just developed is 
 pedagogically significant in suggesting that there can be no 
 true inductive process for the pupil until he has first gained 
 a reasonable background of psychological notions which 
 shall serve as the basis for the emergence of real problems 
 and which shall also furnish guidance and control to the 
 process of investigation. The relevancy of the inductive 
 "steps" to one another cannot be felt by the pupil except 
 as he has been made conscious of the nature of the problem 
 involved. If the problem is given to him outright, it is 
 purely formal, and all the steps in its solution are formal. 
 It can be made real only by first developing something of a 
 psychological notion out of the application of which the 
 problem may naturally spring. If this is done, then the 
 series of "steps" involved in inductive method may become 
 relevant and dynamic. 
 
Induction and Deduction 251 
 
 5. Induction of Laws and Principles. 
 
 The same general point of view which we have developed 
 in our discussion of the inductive process in its application 
 to the class concept applies also to the case of laws and 
 principles. We arrive at many laws and principles unre- 
 flectively, as, for example, the general law of plant growth, 
 the law of the condensation of vapor, the principle that 
 money is a medium of exchange, the principle that repetition 
 fixes habit, etc. In the realm of laws and principles, the 
 process of attaining logical notions is one that is subject to 
 the same conditions as in the case of the class concept, 
 namely, the breakdown, or failure in practice, of some 
 psychological notion. This is the motive for the investi- 
 gation of individual, or particular, cases with reference to 
 the reconstruction of the law or principle. And the series 
 of inductive "steps" is the same as that already described. 
 Sometimes, however, the breakdown of existing unreflec- 
 tive, or even reflective, notions is so complete that the 
 guidance and direction of the inductive process is under 
 the control of an hypothesis. The nature and function of 
 the hypothesis we reserve for treatment in a later chapter. 
 
 6. Unreflective Deduction. 
 
 Deduction, like induction, as a movement of thought may 
 be unreflective in character. Psychological concepts may 
 not only arise unreflectively, but they may also be used 
 unreflectively. In applying them as accepted and unques- 
 tioned to the interpretation and control of individuals we 
 are proceeding deductively. This we are almost certain 
 to do unreflectively in the case of psychological notions. 
 But even if our concepts are logical, we may make an unre- 
 flective use of them. 
 
 A boy comes to a chestnut tree. He sees that the burs 
 are opening, and he expects to find chestnuts on the ground. 
 He has a general idea of the habit of the chestnut tree at 
 this season of the year. In harmony with that accepted 
 
252 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 idea he interprets this particular situation. The movement 
 of his thought is deductive. But it is not reflectively so ; 
 for he does not reflectively utilize the ground of his infer- 
 ence, or bring it forth explicitly from the background of 
 his consciousness. The concept is, however, applied and 
 determines both his thought and his action. The fisherman 
 sees a pool in the stream which has certain well-marked 
 characteristics familiar to him whereby he instantly infers 
 that it is a good place to cast his line for fishing. There is 
 a ground, or reason, for his expectation, but that reason 
 may not operate reflectively. My general notions of 
 courtesy, of business honesty, of reverence in church, etc., 
 may determine my thought and my action in a thousand 
 details. In every one of these cases there is doubtless a 
 reason which could be pointed out, but as a matter of fact 
 that reason operates quite unreflectively. There is the 
 application of the concepts, their use in guiding and con- 
 trolling both thought and action. In other words, there is 
 a deductive process, but that deductive process is unreflec- 
 tive in character. 
 
 7. Reflective Deduction, — Deductive Method. 
 
 We may say of deductive method, as we did of inductive 
 method, that it is not a pure invention of the scientist and 
 the logician. They have merely made explicit what is 
 everywhere implicit in the use of accepted general notions 
 to control thought and action. It is the characteristic of 
 deduction as a method to make explicit the ground of all 
 inferences. The specific device of deductive method for 
 the reflective control of the whole process is the syllogism. 
 The discussion of this is deferred until a later chapter. 
 
 Deduction, we have said in an earlier place, operates within 
 a system of already organized knowledge. This does not 
 mean that every part of that system is perfectly clear and 
 explicit. Deduction operates within the system to clear it 
 up and bring to light many things of which we were not 
 
Induction and Deduction 253 
 
 conscious and which we could not be said to know. There 
 are two characteristic aspects of inductive method : one the 
 explanatory, the other the anticipatory. The explanatory 
 aspect of deductive method takes some fact that belongs to 
 a system and gives a reason for it, or justifies the fact on 
 the basis of what we know about the principle of organiza- 
 tion of the system to which the fact belongs. A few illus- 
 trations will make this plain. Here is a particular region 
 in western Colorado. We find that it is dry and unproduc- 
 tive. Why? Because the moisture-laden winds from the 
 Pacific ocean in crossing the Rocky mountains rise into 
 higher altitudes, cool off, and deposit their moisture before 
 they descend to the eastern side of the mountain chain. 
 Here the isolated fact is explained by reference to a prin- 
 ciple which applies to the whole system of facts to which it 
 belongs. We call Florida a peninsula. Why? Because 
 it is a portion of land nearly surrounded by water, and 
 connected with a larger portion by a neck, or isthmus. The 
 word James is a proper noun. Why? Because it is the 
 name of a person. Six eighths equals three fourths. Why? 
 Because when both terms of a fraction are divided by the 
 same number the value of the fraction is unchanged. Here 
 facts are justified by reference to controlling principles of 
 the organized systems to which they belong. 
 
 Deductive method may be concerned also with the antici- 
 pation, or discovery, of facts which we do not know. I 
 may not know that western Colorado is dry, but I may 
 know that moisture-laden winds which pass over high 
 mountains deposit their moisture on the near slope. Look- 
 ing up western Colorado on the map, I find that it belongs 
 to a system of geographical fact in which the ocean breezes 
 are intercepted by a high range of mountains. I anticipate, 
 then, or infer, that western Colorado will have a dry 
 climate. This anticipation can be verified by actual obser- 
 vation or by consulting an authority of some sort. I have 
 a triangle all of whose sides are of the same length. Here 
 
254 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 a part of a system of fact is given. By the proper use of 
 certain principles which have already been established, from 
 this data I can discover the fact that the angles of this 
 triangle are all equal. The inherent relationships within 
 the system of geometric fact are such that I can pass from 
 one part of the system deductively to another by means of 
 certain general truths already proved or given by definition 
 or construction. Knowing that in the American Revolu- 
 tion at a certain period the British have determined to 
 separate the colonists into two groups which cannot assist 
 each other, and knowing the details of the colonial life at 
 that time, I can anticipate what the British plan of cam- 
 paign will be. Of course they will seize upon the Hudson 
 river valley as the strategic point of their campaign. 
 Reading up on the subject, I find my inference to be cor- 
 rect. In every department of life, whether that of school 
 study or that of practical affairs, organized knowledge may 
 be used to anticipate or discover something more. Deduc- 
 tive method makes explicit the steps of inference throughout 
 the whole process by which these anticipations, or discov- 
 eries, are attained. The grounds of all inferences are 
 brought out, the reasons are stated. 
 
 8. Pedagogical Importance of Deductive Method. 
 
 Inductive method has received relatively more attention 
 from the teaching profession for some time than deductive 
 method. Deductive method has fallen into disgrace because 
 of its abuse on the formal side. But there is a normal and 
 natural place in instruction for deductive method. The 
 goal of instruction is not the attainment of general notions, 
 — of class concepts and laws, — but the power to use them 
 in controlling experience. Deduction is, after all, the prac- 
 tical side of thinking. The child needs training in deduc- 
 tive processes as well as in inductive. There is abundant 
 opportunity without degenerating into formalism to employ 
 the principle of deduction in both its explanatory and in its 
 
Induction and Deduction 255 
 
 anticipatory aspect in every school subject.^ Most inter- 
 esting development lessons involving the anticipatory type 
 of deduction can be worked out, as has been hinted at 
 above, in geography, in history, and in mathematics. In 
 using his organized body of knowledge to control thought 
 processes which shall yield additional knowledge, the 
 organization of fact itself becomes more definite and clear, 
 and the concepts and laws which the pupil has become freer 
 and more flexible tools of the mind in the control of 
 experience. 
 
 9. Significance of Inductive and Deductive Method 
 FROM THE Point of View of Control. 
 
 It is evident that induction and deduction, when the pro- 
 cesses are of the reflective type, represent highly organized 
 and controlled methods of procedure in thinking. As 
 methods which have been worked out and mastered so that 
 they are the permanent property of the individual, they 
 become, as it were, complex and very powerful tools for 
 him, — tools which he may use in guiding and directing his 
 thought processes to make them accomplish his purposes 
 more efficiently. All the organized methods of doing busi- 
 ness which the merchant has mastered are special elements 
 of technique, or tools, which he employs to facilitate his 
 business and give him added control over its problems. In 
 like manner, organized methods of thinking, like induction 
 and deduction, become powerful mental tools which facilitate 
 the business of thinking and make the control of its prob- 
 lems more complete and adequate. From the biological 
 point of view, this added power of the thought process 
 means added power in the control which the individual is 
 capable of exercising over every phase of his environment. 
 
 ' Cf. Bagley, The Educative Process, Chapter XX. 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION VIEWED AS 
 
 TECHNIQUE OF THINKING 
 
 (Continued) 
 
 r. The Special Device of Deductive Method, — the 
 Syllogism. 
 
 (i) General relation of the syllogism to deduction. 
 
 It is usually considered that the syllogism is the specific 
 and characteristic element of technique in deductive think- 
 ing. This is true in so far as deduction is not made fully 
 explicit except as it involves a process of verification, or 
 proof, in which the ground, or reason, for each inference 
 or transition in thought is explicitly pointed out. The 
 syllogism is the special device for making sure that deduc- 
 tion is correct. It is always a phase of fully reflective de- 
 duction. But to describe even reflective deduction wholly 
 in terms of an analysis of the syllogism, important as the 
 device may be, would be to describe it in terms of an 
 analysis of the finished product only and to ignore the 
 dynamic side of the process. There is, as we pointed out 
 in our illustration of geometric demonstration, even in re- 
 flective deductive thinking, a very large amount of tension 
 and strain of the mind in the process of searching for and 
 evaluating facts relevant to the solution of the problem. 
 Connections of thought have to be made at the cost of much 
 struggle and stress of mind. These connections of thought 
 are exhibited in the formal demonstration only after they 
 have been made. 
 
 (2) Illustration. 
 
 Under ordinary conditions, if I were traveling through, 
 the woods, and, while hungry and thirsty, came upon some 
 
 ■pefi 
 
Induction and Deduction 257 
 
 berries, there would be a natural impulse to react in the 
 way of plucking and eating the berries. But if they had 
 in them some elements of unfamiHarity, I should hesitate. 
 The individuals have now become problematic, they need 
 interpretation. Are they edible berries? If, on closer 
 examination, I can identify them as falling under the 
 familiar notion blackberries, then they are interpreted, i.e., 
 their place and function in an already organized system of 
 knowledge has been made explicit. They are no longer 
 problematic individuals, and the appropriate reaction is 
 freed and may take place in the manner which is habitual 
 for such a situation, without any further thought. The 
 thinking involved in meeting this situation is essentially 
 deductive. A problematic situation has been met by the 
 application of a familiar and unquestioned concept. 
 
 But if the question should still further arise as to 
 whether my interpretation were right or not, we would have 
 the condition which calls for syllogistic reasoning. The 
 whole process might then be gone over again and be thrown 
 into the following form, in which the points of connection 
 in the thinking process are all made clea/r and explicit so as 
 to avoid any possibility of error. 
 
 All blackberries are edible. 
 These are blackberries ; 
 Therefore they are edible. 
 
 (2) Function of the syllogism. 
 
 The syllogism just worked out is only one of many possi- 
 ble forms, but it is illustrative of what is essential in every 
 form of the syllogism. If this book were dealing with the 
 logic of thinking rather than with the psychology, it would 
 be interesting to take up the various forms of the syllogism. 
 But for our purpose it is sufficient to say that the primary 
 function is the same in every form of the syllogism, namely, 
 to point out and make explicit the relation between the gen- 
 eral and individual notions employed in making the transi- 
 17 
 
258 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 tions of thought, particularly to make clear the ground 
 of all inferences. In many cases of deductive thinking, 
 especially in those involving great complexity or subtlety 
 of thought, it is very important to verify conclusions by 
 means of the syllogism. 
 
 It is to be noted that the function of the syllogism is to 
 verify thought processes in making transitions from one 
 judgment to another by inference. It does not establish 
 the truth of the original premises. All that the syllogism 
 given above can do is to test the validity of the reasoning, 
 provided the first two propositions are true. If I have been 
 careless in my observation of the berries and have over- 
 looked some of the essential marks of identification of them 
 as blackberries, my syllogism does not help me any in that 
 matter; I may be poisoned by the berries just the same. 
 The fact that the syllogism tests only the reasoning process 
 and not the truth of the premises is made the basis of a 
 specific method of proof in geometry, namely, the method 
 of "Reductio ad Absurdum." Here correct reasoning 
 gives a conclusion which we know to be wrong ; hence we 
 know that one of the premises is false. 
 
 (4) Illustrations of fimctional nature of the syllogism. 
 
 Mr. James has admirably pointed out the fact that deduc- 
 tive reasoning is teleological.^ That is, it is functional. 
 This is seen in the fact that the syllogism takes particular 
 form according to some interest or need of the individual. 
 The idea of the conclusion, — in the syllogism given, the 
 fdea of eating, — dominates the whole process. In another 
 situation the dominant idea might have been something 
 else. Perhaps I am curious to know whether the berries 
 are getting ripe. I notice then that they are turning red. 
 Redness is now the essential mode of conceiving the situa- 
 tion ; for I know that when blackberries turn red they will 
 soon turn black and will then be ripe. My syllogism then 
 becomes : These blackberries are turning red ; when black- 
 
 ' James, Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 358. 
 
Induction and Deduction 259 
 
 berries turn red, they are getting ripe ; therefore these black- 
 berries are getting ripe. In the first situation it was im- 
 portant that I conceive the berries as blackberries. The 
 conceiving of the situation as a blackberry situation was 
 the heart of the whole reasoning process. In the second 
 situation, where the problem centered in the question of 
 ripeness, that mode of conceiving of it which made the 
 solution possible was redness. 
 
 Let us take one more case in which the principle is more 
 strikingly exemplified. WiUiam Adams is a poet. About 
 all that he seems to be interested in is gathering about him 
 the finest library of poetical works that he can collect. He 
 suddenly falls heir to a sugar plantation. What an 
 embarrassing situation ! What can he do with a sugar 
 plantation? To run a sugar plantation will take him away 
 from his dominant interest in poetry and plunge him into a 
 life of disagreeable oversight of negro workmen and subject 
 him to the tedium of days in the southern heat. The solu- 
 tion comes through conceiving of the whole situation in 
 terms of mpney. Money will purchase leisure and libraries 
 of poetical works. Using Mr. James's terminology, 
 
 The concrete datum S is sugar plantation ; 
 Its essential attribute M is money; 
 The attribute's property P is poetry. 
 
 Money serves as the middle term by which poetry can be 
 gotten out of sugar plantation. The fact that poetry was 
 what was desired made it useful to conceive of sugar plan- 
 tation as money, although it might have been conceived in 
 other ways equally good, if the problem had been different. 
 The problem might have been one of health, or of efficient 
 management, etc. Then a different mode of conceiving of 
 the situation would have been necessary. 
 
 To return to our illustration, if this reasoning is thrown 
 into syllogistic form, we have the following sequence of 
 propositions : 
 
26o The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 Sugar plantation is money; (S is M;) 
 
 Money is poetry; (M is P;) 
 
 ,*. Sugar plantation is poetry. (,*. S is P) 
 
 The psychology of deductive reasoning, according to Mr. 
 James, is practically summed up in the sagacity of properly 
 conceiving S as M and the learning, or ability, to recall M's 
 consequences. It is these two things that give the ability 
 to deal with novel data. 
 
 (5) Psychology of deduction inadequate in terms of 
 analysis of -finished product. 
 
 Whatever else we may get out of these illustrations and 
 the discussion of Mr. James regarding the teleological 
 aspect of reasoning, this at least ought to stand out quite 
 clearly, namely, that the syllogism is only a formulation of 
 the results of thinking for the purpose of exhibiting what 
 has been achieved and seeing that all the connections of 
 thought are valid. The real tension of thought, the vital 
 part of it all, is conceiving of the situation in terms of some 
 idea that suggests consequences which are relevant to the 
 solution. No true psychology of the deductive process of 
 thinking can be written wholly in terms of an analysis of 
 the syllogism into a series of judgments and these judg- 
 ments into a comparison of concepts. The analysis of the 
 finished product does not reveal the intensity of the actual 
 mental processes which were most vital to the solution. 
 
 2. The Special Device of Inductive Method, — the 
 Hypothesis. 
 
 (i) General relation of the hypothesis to induction. 
 
 In our discussion of the method whereby logical concepts 
 are attained, which we worked out in detail in the case of 
 the concept trade center, we have already virtually described 
 the method of induction. We noticed that it consists in a 
 highly organized group of processes, — observation, com- 
 parison, abstraction, and generalization, — which are gone 
 through purposely for the sake of reconstructing a general 
 notion. The prinriple is tVip samp vjhpihpr the general 
 
Induction and Deduction 261 
 
 notion is a class concept or a principle or a law. But there 
 is one element of technique in the inductive process which 
 we have not discussed, namely, the hypothesis. This 
 deserves some special attention. We shall try to interpret 
 it from the point of view of functional psychology rather 
 than from the point of view of logic. 
 
 In many cases calling for the inductive movement of 
 thought, the inadequacy of the organized system of knowl- 
 edge is so great that the reconstruction of our concepts 
 amounts practically, and in the popular sense, to the attain- 
 ment of new general notions. But even here the investi- 
 gation of individuals, or of specific particulars, under the 
 heads of .observation, comparison, etc., cannot go on in a 
 random fashion. There must be some point of view for 
 selecting whatever is to be observed, some guiding prin- 
 ciple of comparison, some clue as to what are essentials in 
 the process of abstraction. Any kind of progress demands 
 some principle of control for the movement of thought. As 
 a matter of fact, the problem is always limited to a certain 
 extent by falling within some particular field of investiga- 
 tion. It has some fundamental character as a problem. In 
 other words, the very fact of a problem at all presupposes 
 some particular feeling of need, some idea of the relevancy 
 of certain elements and the irrelevancy of others, some 
 sort of a goal to be attained. All of these things, however, 
 may be very vague and tentative. But they do argue the 
 presence of some sort of a system of knowledge within 
 which the inductive thinking process is at work. There is 
 a movement of the mind toward some more adequate organ- 
 izing principle for this system of knoweldge, and the mind 
 is in a very delicately receptive mood for the welcoming 
 of any idea within a certain field of relevancy . which is 
 capable of serving as such an organizing principle. Now, 
 when the mind does seize upon some idea confessedly as 
 a tentative principle of organization and interpretation of 
 
262 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 the individuals under investigation, we call that idea an 
 hypothesis. 
 
 (2) Illustrations. 
 
 The hypothesis is not a strange device. It is a tool of 
 thinking in ordinary, everyday, practical situations. Here 
 the scientist found it and then specialized in its use and 
 made it a reflective tool of investigation. 
 
 I am nearing the entrance of a strange town. I see 
 crowds of people moving in the same general direction. In 
 the distance I hear considerable noise. Something is going 
 on in town. What is it? I think of possible explanations 
 of the situation. Is it a football game? Is it a circus? 
 Either of these ideas may be used as an hypothesis. Sup- 
 pose we take the first. It is a football game. What is 
 the use or function of such an idea? I don't know any 
 better now than I did in the first place exactly what is going 
 on. What is the use of "guessing"? But this idea serves 
 as a guiding principle in my investigation to find out. I 
 know what to look for. I begin to be on the alert for signs 
 of college pennants in the hands of passersby ; I look for 
 ribbons displaying college colors ; I observe the people to 
 see if there are groups of young people who look like col- 
 lege boys or college girls. As I approach nearer, I listen 
 for the sound of college yells. My investigation of par- 
 ticulars is not a random process. I follow up clues of a 
 certain sort. They may confirm me in my hypothesis. If 
 they do not, I must start over again ; but at any rate, I 
 have disposed of this possibility. And it is quite likely that 
 if my observations have not been confirmatory of the first 
 hypothesis, I have at least gotten some clue as to the 
 direction in which I must reconstruct my hypothesis to 
 make it conform more nearly to a correct principle of 
 interpretation. 
 
 The police, in dealing with the problem of discovering 
 the individual responsible for a crime, must make hypotheses 
 to guide and direct their investigations. They cannot 
 
Induction and Deduction 263 
 
 profitably examine all the individual men and women in the 
 community, nor can they advantageously explore every nook 
 and corner of the city. The firemen working on a burning 
 building judge from certain indications what are the critical 
 points in their attack upon the flames, and they work from 
 that hypothesis until they find that it is not adequate to 
 control their activities effectually. 
 
 (3) Function of the hypothesis. 
 
 The function of an hypothesis is to control investigation. 
 Its value depends upon the number of relevant facts which 
 can be deduced from it. If there were a football game 
 going on, I had a right to infer, or deduce, that there would 
 be pennants on display, that there would be college yells, 
 etc. On the basis of these deductions, I observed, I watched 
 to see if the facts tallied with my deductions. In so far as 
 they did, I felt confirmed in the adequacy of my hypothesis. 
 It might even be that I should be justified in asserting that 
 there was a football game, even if I could not push my 
 observations far enough to see the game itself. The estab- 
 lishment of an hypothesis consists in the agreement between 
 the deductions which it makes possible and the observation 
 of facts. Its acceptance depends on its ability to explain, 
 interpret, and control mdividuals. Its functional significance 
 consists in the fact that it brings into a situation that is 
 problematic a controlling general idea on the basis of which 
 investigation can proceed in a definite and orderly way 
 while we are reconstructing some shattered or inadequate 
 system of knowledge. 
 
 Let us take another illustration. Suppose that I am out 
 walking and come upon a group of boulders. I notice that 
 they are exceptional in character. They do not seem to 
 belong to the strata of rock common to the region. How 
 did they come to be here ? Perhaps they have been brought 
 here for building purposes. But the whole surroundings 
 make this hypothesis seem unlikely. I wonder if they are 
 not glacial rocks. Though I had never supposed that this 
 
264 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 region was glacial in character before, yet this idea is sug- 
 gestive. I follow up the hypothesis. Let us see now how 
 it will function to determine my investigation. If these are 
 glacial rocks, it is quite likely that I shall find them marked 
 by the characteristic striae, or scratches. This deduction I 
 proceed to test. I examine the rocks for evidence of 
 striation I find them quite plainly marked when I have 
 examined them closely. Again, if these are glacial rocks, 
 there ought to be other evidences of glacial action in the 
 vicinity. On the basis of this deduction, I proceed to 
 examine the stratification of the soil in the vicinity. I find 
 that it has the well-defined characteristics of glacial drift. 
 Still further, if these are glacial rocks, they must have come 
 from some definite region where there are rocks of this 
 kind. On the basis of this deduction, I examine the rocks 
 more carefully to see if there is any evidence to be found 
 of the direction from which they have come. On examin- 
 ing the strise quite carefully, I find evidence that the 
 scratches on the bottom of the rocks were made from south 
 to north, that is, they have scraped over fixed rocks in going 
 from north to south. I find also that the scratches on the 
 upper surface of the boulders indicate that smaller rocks 
 have passed over them from north to south. It is evident, 
 then, that these boulders came from some place farther 
 north. Now are there any rock strata of this character 
 farther north? If these are glacial rocks, there must be. 
 I look the matter up in a geological work, and I find that 
 there are such strata of rock farther north and none in this 
 whole region where I find the boulders. I am convinced 
 then that my hypothesis is correct. That these boiilders 
 have been deposited here by a glacier seems certain. 
 
 At this point it ought to stand out clearly that the func- 
 tion of the hypothesis was to give definite guidance and 
 direction to the investigation whereby I was to solve my 
 problem. This guidance came largely through the fact that, 
 on the basis of the hypothesis, there were certain things 
 
Induction and Deduction 265 
 
 which I had a right to infer. Thus my investigations were 
 confined to specific Hnes of observation instead of being 
 rambling and aimless. The hypothesis serves, for the time 
 being, as a tool for the control of action and of thought 
 the same as any general notion. Only, it is held as tentative 
 during the process of investigation. 
 
 (4) Problem of conceiving hypotheses. 
 
 The most vital and crucial part of inductive thinking is 
 that of conceiving fruitful hypotheses. The thinking pro- 
 cess has not yet been brought under such perfect control 
 that we have any sure method for securing the emergence 
 of the right hypothesis when we are in need of one. All 
 that we can do in the way of controlling this part of the 
 thinking process is to familiarize ourselves so thoroughly 
 with all the facts relevant to our problem that we are in the 
 mental mood, or attitude, for the associative mechanism to 
 work freely through all the material and to suggest subtle 
 relationships which we had not hitherto suspected, or to 
 bring out into reflective consciousness connections which 
 had hitherto been vague and unreflective. In the tension 
 of mmd involved in concentration upon the problem, the 
 mind is more likely to catch up and hold to any fertile sug- 
 gestion than it otherwise would be. In such times of 
 tension a mind richly supplied with facts relevant to a prob- 
 lem often seems to work on ball bearings, as it were. 
 
 It is often said that the first hypothesis is a sheer guess. 
 From what has just been said, it can readily be inferred 
 that I do not wholly agree with that idea. Yet it is true 
 that there are some marks of the guess about the hypothesis 
 in that we have no absolute rule that can be applied for the 
 purpose of leading up inevitably to the right hypothesis. 
 But from the whole psychology of thinking as worked out 
 in this book, is the hypothesis aspect of thinking essentially 
 different in this respect from any other aspect of real vital 
 thinking? In those phases of the thinking process which 
 consist wholly in the summing up of results and in throw- 
 
266 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 ing the whole process over into the form of a finished 
 product, it all seems so easy that we are deceived as to the 
 nature and extent of the control which we exercise over 
 the exact movement of thinking and we suppose it to be 
 greater than it really is. 
 
 (5) Establishment of hypotheses. 
 
 If the reader will recall the illustrations of hypothesis 
 already used, he will see that the establishment, or verifica- 
 tion, of the hypothesis involves its use to interpret, explain, 
 or control facts. In the case of the isolated boulders, the 
 hypothesis that they were of glacial origin, so far as this 
 region was concerned, was an hypothesis that zvorked. It 
 could be used as a principle for the interpretation and ex- 
 planation of a whole host of facts relevant to the situation. 
 The consequences deduced from it tallied with the facts of 
 observation and already established knowledge. In the 
 illustration of football, the verification of the hypothesis 
 was of the same sort. 
 
 In most cases of a scientific character, the conception and 
 the verification of an hypothesis are not so simple as our 
 illustrations would seem to indicate. The first hypothesis 
 that is felt to be fruitful in its suggestiveness, when applied 
 to facts which fall legitimately within the compass of the 
 problem, often fails to explain or interpret them. Deduc- 
 tion of consequences from the hypothesis does not agree 
 with known facts of the situation. In this case the hypo- 
 thesis must either be rejected or it must be reconstructed 
 so as to be adequate in its control of this resisting fact or 
 body of facts. This often involves but little modification 
 or limitation of the hypothesis, and again it involves very 
 great modification. Whether the hypothesis is modified, 
 or whether a new one is formulated, in either case it must 
 be applied. And this process must be repeated until an 
 hypothesis is found which will adequately control all the 
 facts relevant to the problem. 
 
 So long as the controlling idea in a process of investiga- 
 
Induction and Deduction 267 
 
 tion is in the experimental and tentative stage of its develop- 
 ment we call it an hypothesis. If it seems to be fruitful of 
 results, yet we do not wish to imply that it is altogether 
 satisfactory or fully tested, we often refer to it as a work- 
 ing hypothesis. If we have reached the point where we no 
 longer regard it as tentative, but satisfactory, we call it a 
 concept, a principle, a law, or a theory, according to the 
 degree of its generality or the width of its application. 
 Thus, we speak of the concept of house, a principle of per- 
 centage, the law of faUing bodies, the theory of evolution. 
 
 3. Complete Induction Includes Deduction. 
 
 There is a sense in which deduction can be isolated from 
 induction. There are certain problems whose solution 
 demands only the application of already established and 
 accepted concepts within a definite organization of knowl- 
 edge. For these deduction may be adequate. But induc- 
 tion cannot be isolated. It is always inclusive of deduction. 
 We have seen that hypotheses are not established, that 
 general notions are not perfected, except as they are deduc- 
 tively applied in some way and found capable of interpreting 
 and controlling particulars. Furthermore, our discussion 
 has made it evident that in many cases the first hypothesis 
 is vague and tentative in the extreme. The process of its 
 development is through application and reconstruction 
 repeatedly. In these cases deductive processes are inextri- 
 cably woven into the very fabric of the inductive process. 
 
 4. Applications to Teaching. 
 
 (i) Training in thinking must recognise the dynamic 
 aspect of inductive and deductive processes. 
 
 Logical power cannot be developed merely by going 
 through the forms of induction and deduction. In our 
 illustration from geometric demonstration (deduction) and 
 in the illustration of the manner in which the logical con- 
 cept trade center was attained (induction), we have seen 
 that the actual movements of thought involved a great deal 
 
268 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 of tension and struggle of mind. The ransacking of one's 
 mental resources and intense processes of judgment are 
 characteristic of real induction and real deduction. The 
 method of instruction employed by the teacher, if it is to 
 yield fruit in training the power to think, must not be so 
 carefully controlled and directed as to leave no room for 
 the child's mind to struggle with the problem on his own 
 account. 
 
 In both forms of thinking, the starting point is something 
 problematic. Neither of them can have any real motivation 
 unless the problem is felt by the child. Unless the nature 
 of the problem is rightly conceived, neither of them can 
 have anything of teleological character, that is, they cannot 
 be truly voluntary. If this is so, they are not processes 
 which move directly toward any goal, and they cannot be 
 in any right sense of the word processes of conscious ad- 
 justment of means to ends, they must be more or less aim- 
 ess, arbitrary, and artificial, if not purely imitative. 
 
 In genuine, full and complete inductive and deductive 
 processes, the conception of the real nature of the problem 
 is more vital than any idea of the formal order of steps in 
 the process. The mind that really grasps the problem will 
 inevitably hit upon the order and nature of the steps in the 
 thinking process relevant to that type of problem. Having 
 hit upon the order and nature of the steps in simple situa- 
 tions, the formal aspect of the process can be brought 
 definitely to consciousness by instruction ; and training can 
 be given in the perfection of the technique of procedure as 
 a tool to more rapid and more effective solution of problems. 
 But, in early training at least, there can be no doubt that 
 more attention should be given to getting at the locus of 
 the problem and less attention given to the question of 
 whether we shall proceed from the general to particulars 
 or from particulars to the general. 
 
 (2) We must recognise the child's system of already 
 
Induction and Deduction 269 
 
 organized knowledge as a determining factor in his think- 
 ing processes. 
 
 Both induction and deduction, as we have seen, work 
 within systems of knowledge. The child's system of 
 knowledge is vaguer and less logical than that of the adult 
 or of the trained thinker. We must not, then, apply the 
 teacher's standard of deduction or of induction to the 
 thinking of the child. A process of thinking that would be 
 very unsatisfactory from the teacher's standard of essentials 
 may yet be very really and genuinely a thinking process 
 from the standpoint of the system of knowledge within 
 which the child is working. 
 
 Every time the child is asked a reason for a statement 
 which he makes, and succeeds in basing it upon something 
 else consonant with his experience, he has been going 
 through a true process of deduction. His reason may be 
 very unsatisfactory in the light of our knowledge ; but if it 
 is a reason which is harmonious with his system of knowl- 
 edge and experience, then the thinking process is good. For 
 example, the child may ask, "Why does the stone sink in 
 the water?" If he is asked to say what he thinks about it 
 himself, and replies, "Because it is heavy," that may be a 
 very good answer for him. If there is a man in his neigh- 
 borhood who is known to steal and to lie, and the child 
 explains the fact on the basis that "the man is bad, that's 
 why he steals," he is thinking deductively just as truly as 
 if his explanation were better. If his thinking in these 
 cases is based on reasons within his own system of experi- 
 ence and knowledge, it will not be a bit better as thinking 
 if we compel him to carry it on a few points furthej in our 
 terms so as to harmonize with scientific or ethical facts and 
 principles which we know, unless these facts and principles 
 are within the grasp of the child and have been taught to 
 him. Here, as elsewhere in the teaching process, we may 
 be altogether too anxious for the finished product and thus 
 violate the fundamental principle of the thinking process 
 
270 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 of the child, namely, that it is not vital and dynamic to him 
 except as it operates within his own system of knowledge. 
 
 In cases where the child's answer is palpably wrong, even 
 where it seems justifiable in the light of his experience and 
 knowledge, we may do either one of two things. First, we 
 may make it the occasion for further observation and reflec- 
 tion on his part and thus lead him to a reconstruction of 
 his experience so that it will be adequate to the right inter- 
 pretation of the case in question. In other words, the 
 weakness in his system of knowledge is the natural occasion 
 for a vital inductive process. Secondly, we may, if we feel 
 that the child cannot be led to see the truth in more scien- 
 tific terms, merely tell him dogmatically that his answer is 
 wrong and give him the right one without explanation. 
 This can do no harm, if we give him to understand that 
 there is a reason and that he will some day be able to under- 
 stand it. For example, if the child has come across the idea 
 in some story that the earth is round, it is not necessary to 
 give him a complete explanation of the grounds upon which 
 we believe this to be true, if he questions it. We might 
 better answer him dogmatically unless we are convinced 
 that he will be able to interpret our explanation in terms of 
 his own experience or knowledge. 
 
 Certainly any explanation that has to go outside of the 
 child's own system of knowledge to get its binding force 
 is valueless to him and may even be harmful. How much 
 more genuine reasoning there would be among people if so 
 many had not been deluded into supposing that they were 
 actually thinking when they are only juggling with formulae 
 which are not an integral part of their system of knowl- 
 edge ! Otherwise intelligent people, by virtue of the fact 
 that they possess and can manipulate a few catchwords of 
 political, social, religious, or moral philosophy, are often 
 actually held in bondage to fixed ideas and prejudices of 
 every sort on the supposition that they have thought the 
 problems through and settled them. 
 
Induction and Deduction 271 
 
 The teacher who follows up the statements of children 
 with demands for their justification, within the limits sug- 
 gested above, the teacher of the everlasting "Why?" is not 
 only giving them constant practice in deductive thinking, 
 but is also putting them in situations in which they feel the 
 inadequacy of their present system of knowledge either in 
 respect to the extent of its materials or in the matter of 
 their organization for use. Thus he is putting the child 
 into the most favorable attitude of mind for the welcoming 
 of further knowledge given either through direct telling or 
 gained through inductive processes. It is fallacious to sup- 
 pose that because we work under limitations in the training 
 of children to think, because we cannot push the inductive 
 and deductive processes through in such a way as to satisfy 
 our ideal of completeness and adequacy, the ideal of the 
 finished product, therefore we cannot give them training 
 at all in thinking, both deductive and inductive. If we do 
 not give children training in thinking at the stage of their 
 development in which the cruder forms only are possible, 
 how can we expect them to grow up to the point of appre- 
 ciation of the more perfect forms or to power in their use ? 
 
 Suggestions previously made in our study of the develop- 
 ment of the child's imagination would be relevant at this 
 point. We must remember that the child's system of 
 knowledge is one that is held together in large part by ties 
 of connection that get their force from his interest in con- 
 crete wholes rather than by ties of connection that spring 
 from the appreciation of far-reaching abstract principles. 
 His training in inductive and deductive processes previous 
 to adolescence, that is, in the period of the graded school, 
 should be largely, then, within systems of knowledge in 
 which cause and effect, conditions and consequences, are 
 quite closely related within more or less concrete wholes. 
 The period of the graded school, or the elementary school 
 as it is now more commonly called, is one for the training 
 in that kind of thinking which builds up the habit of looking 
 
272 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 for principles which explain things. The period of ado- 
 lescence, corresponding to the age of high school and early 
 college education, should be one in which greater stress is 
 laid upon the development of principles in their more 
 abstract and general form. While this is being done, think- 
 ing may be led to assume the form of more consciously 
 recognized inductive and deductive methods, and the 
 technique of these processes may be finally perfected. The 
 more abstract organization of knowledge into systems under 
 the control of abstract principles makes possible and appro- 
 priate the more highly organized, more abstract, and more 
 perfect forms of the thinking process. Here the goal should 
 be more definitely held in mind as that of the finished 
 product. 
 
 (2) Inductive method is not complete without deduction. 
 
 Much stress has been laid in recent years upon inductive 
 methods of teaching. Our discussion of the inductive 
 process has shown that induction is incomplete without 
 deduction. So it must be with an inductive method of teach- 
 ing, it is incomplete without its appropriate phase of appli- 
 cation. From this point of view, the ideal method of 
 teaching is spoken of as the inductive-deductive method. 
 The idea of peninsula, trade center, etc., when once devel- 
 oped, must be applied in as many different kinds of 
 exercises as possible. Only thus can these ideas themselves 
 become perfectly clear. The principle in arithmetic must 
 be applied frequently and in situations that are not identical, 
 if it is to be mastered. So with any principle or law in 
 physics, economics, or any other sphere of thought. This 
 doctrine is doubtless so familiar to the reader that it needs 
 no further emphasis at this point. 
 
 (4) Type studies give the opportunity to provide in 
 school work for much of the dynamic aspect of the induc- 
 tive process. 
 
 We know that most of the generalizations which lie at 
 the basis of our sciences and of the scientific treatment of 
 
Induction and Deduction 273 
 
 all the subjects of the curriculum have been arrived at as 
 the result of long and tedious investigations, in many 
 cases covering years or even centuries. The complete 
 inductive process is one that we can by no means expect 
 to reproduce in the schoolroom. Who would undertake 
 to reestablish the law of gravitation as a problem of orig- 
 inal induction? But if the child does not go through with 
 the stress and strain of struggling with the obdurate facts 
 of the problem, has he not lost the dynamic character of 
 the inductive process? Has it not become artificial and 
 imitative? 
 
 It is evident that for school purposes there must be some 
 compromise between the full inductive process and the 
 mechanical process of teaching mere brute fact. May 
 not the child go through enough of the inductive process 
 to give vitality to his grasp of principles, to give a real 
 appreciation of their value and significance? In the attain- 
 ment of every important principle, there are certain critical 
 points in the inductive process. The chief problems center 
 at these critical points. The teacher, knowing in advance 
 what these critical points are upon which the induction 
 depends, may skilfully lead the child up to the point of 
 facing these critical problems, both negative and positive. 
 Squarely confronted by these critical aspects of the problem, 
 even if he has to be told many of the facts relative to the 
 solution, yet there remains much that is dynamic. 
 
 Mr. McMurry has so fully worked out the doctrine of 
 type study and illustrated it so abundantly in his book. The 
 Method of the Recitation,^ that any extended amplifica- 
 tion of the doctrine here would be repetition of his work. 
 Hence, only enough will be given to suggest to those who 
 are unfamiliar with the doctrine something of what we 
 mean by it. Take the case of developing the idea of trade 
 center_ for example, which Mr. McMurry discusses in 
 detail. Minneapolis, Chicago, Pittsburg, and Birming- 
 
 • Chapters X and XL 
 18 
 
274 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 ham, Alabama, are good types. Minneapolis is studied in 
 detail. But there is danger of some peculiar characteristic 
 which stands out strongly, like the great waterfalls, being 
 seized upon as essential when it is not. In the study of 
 Chicago, which has no waterfall, this characteristic is elim- 
 inated. If commerce in wheat has been seized upon as an 
 essential characteristic of trade center, then in the study of 
 Pittsburg, whose chief industries center in the coal and iron 
 trades, the idea of wheat as an essential drops out. If 
 the idea of waterways has been seized upon as essential, 
 then in the study of Birmingham that idea drops out. At 
 the same time the common core of meanings is being 
 emphasized through repetition in the variety of situations. 
 
 In the concrete and detailed study of a series of cities, 
 like these, the processes of observation, or study of fact, of 
 comparison, abstraction, and generalization have sufficient 
 scope and free play to be genuine and vital, and the process 
 of induction is not reduced to a mere form. By selection 
 of material in which both the positive and the negative 
 aspects of the problem are emphasized and accentuated, 
 the possibility of arriving at the general principle within 
 reasonable limits of time is assured. But at the same time 
 there is left a pretty wide field for the activity of the child's 
 own mind to function in the arriving at conclusions through 
 a proper series of inductive "steps." 
 
 Mr. McMurry illustrates the use of types in the inductive 
 teaching of principles of history, of morals, and of nature 
 study, as well as geography. The principle is the same, 
 but the practice requires more skill in some subjects than 
 in others. The method is certainly very suggestive in rela- 
 tion to the problem of how to shorten inductive procedure 
 and yet retain its dynamic character in the process of 
 instruction. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 JUDGMENT AS AN ELEMENT OF TECHNIQUE 
 IN THINKING 
 
 1. Definition. 
 
 Judgment is that act of the mind by which we interpret 
 some problematic experience by referring it to some idea 
 derived from past experience. (Adapted from Welton.^) 
 
 Judgment brings an idea to bear upon experience. It is 
 an activity, a tnental process. Judgment and proposition 
 are not identical terms ; proposition expresses the result 
 of a judgment. Judgment is sometimes defined as a com- 
 parison between two concepts. Such a definition is the out- 
 come of the analysis of the finished product, — the proposi- 
 tion. An analysis of the proposition shows two concepts 
 related as subject and predicate. On the basis of this 
 analysis, it is supposed that the mind compared these two 
 concepts and then asserted a relation between them. Such 
 a conception of judgment ignores the dynamic aspect of 
 the process. It often happens that what we have to deal 
 with is an experience which is problematic. It can hardly 
 be said that there are two concepts to start with. But 
 when the judging activity has succeeded in evaluating and 
 interpreting this experience by the aid of a concept, the 
 outcome is expressed in a proposition which indicates a 
 relation between two concepts, one of which is subject and 
 the other predicate. 
 
 2. Illustration and Explanation. 
 
 If I am busily at work with tools and suddenly discover 
 that my finger is bleeding and evidently has been bleeding 
 for some time, I am comforted with a problematic expe- 
 
 ' Welton, The Logical Bases of Education, pp. 63, 73. 
 
 275 
 
276 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 rience. How is the bleeding to be explained? I examine 
 the nature of the wound. I look over my tools for indica- 
 tions of the cause of the wound. I find nothing in my 
 examination of the tools that seems to be relative to the 
 nature of the wound. I examine the wound more care- 
 fully, and finally I find in the bottom of it a splinter of 
 wood. At once the situation clears up. I now remember 
 that I experienced a little discomfort in quickly running 
 my finger over a rough edge. Yes, I hurt myself on the 
 rough edge of a board. That is my judgment. Indeed, 
 it is only the culmination of a whole series of judgments. 
 As for example, — I have cut my finger ; I did not cut it 
 with my saw ; I did not cut it with my knife ; perhaps I cut 
 it with the rough edge of a board ; I find a splinter in my 
 finger ; I remember that the rough edge of that board did 
 not feel comfortable ; I hurt myself on the rough edge of 
 the board. 
 
 Now can any one say that judgment in this situation was 
 a comparison of two concepts? That would presuppose 
 two concepts given in the first place. Rather here is a 
 problematic situation to be interpreted, and we must find 
 the concept to apply to it which is capable of interpreting 
 it. The whole process of tension and strain, including all 
 the intensity of thinking, from the time that the situation 
 is felt to be problematic until it is adequately interpreted, 
 is judgment proper. But the judgment as an activity of 
 applying to the problematic situation an idea derived from 
 past experience may involve within itself many processes 
 of judgment which deal with phases of the situation. It 
 may involve within itself also perception, or further obser- 
 vation, memory, imagination, and thinking. 
 
 Judgment is a process of evaluating a problematic situa- 
 tion. It does not necessarily presuppose two concepts as 
 given. A part of the judging process is finding the right 
 concept to apply to interpret the problematic situation. The 
 clarification of the situation brings out two concepts in 
 
Judgment as an Element of Technique 277 
 
 dynamic relations to each other, — one as subject and the 
 other as predicate. Judgment set up the relationship be- 
 tween the two, or at least developed it and made it explicit. 
 After this has been done and the judgment process is 
 expressed in the form of the proposition, then it is possible 
 to compare the two concepts and assert or deny one or the 
 other. But to view this comparison of the two concepts as 
 judgment would be to take the point of view of the finished 
 product and to make the results of its analysis our standard 
 for defining the whole process. This would ignore the 
 most dynamic aspect, the tension and strain of mental 
 activity, in the live judgment as it actually takes place. 
 
 3. Conditions of Judgment. 
 
 The function of judgment is called forth under conditions 
 of doubt or uncertainty of some sort which interferes with 
 reaction, mental or motor. It is then necessary for us to 
 raise the question "What is this?" We have to evaluate 
 the situation, interpret it, judge it with reference to what 
 we shall regard as its essential characteristic for the pur- 
 pose of dealing with it satisfactorily. When the situation 
 is satisfactorily interpreted, then it is possible for the 
 reaction to take place in accordance with the result of our 
 judgment. 
 
 4. Further Development of the Nature of Judgment. 
 
 (i) Judgment in the application of accepted concepts. 
 
 It is not a real live judgment which ordinarily gets ex- 
 pression in the proposition, "This is a book." We do not 
 stop to evaluate the experience. The object is familiar; 
 there is no doubt. We know exactly how to deal with this 
 book experience. We make the appropriate motor reaction 
 or the appropriate transition in thought by habit. But if 
 the question arises, "How shall I catalogue this book?" 
 and we are uncertain whether it should be classed as meta- 
 physics, as logic, or as psychology; then a real process of 
 judgment is called forth. We try to bring the work first 
 
278 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 under one of these concepts, then another, through a 
 definite investigation of its essential characteristics. On 
 the basis of our investigation we definitely evaluate the 
 problematic situation, and we bring the book under the 
 concept metaphysics. The act of judgment is then com- 
 plete, and its result may be expressed in the proposition, 
 "This is a book on metaphysics." It is evident that as soon 
 as our judgment is complete, we know how to catalogue 
 the book, that is, our method of reaction is determined. 
 The illustration given is a case of judgment in which a 
 well-defined concept, namely metaphysics, furnished the idea 
 to which the problematic experience of cataloguing was 
 referred for successful interpretation. 
 
 (2) Judgment in the process of building up concepts. 
 
 We have already noticed that in the process of building 
 up concepts, as for example the concept of trade center, 
 there was a constant process of evaluation, or judgment, 
 going on. What is it that makes Minneapolis a trade 
 center? Is the waterfall a factor? Is the river a factor? 
 Is the abundance of forests along the river a factor? In 
 the process of comparison of Minneapolis with Chicago, 
 the relevancy of each one of these to the problem had to be 
 judged, or evaluated. And in the process of abstraction 
 there was further judgment as to just what characteristics 
 were essential to the idea of trade center. Thus it is evi- 
 dent that not only is judgment a phase of the application 
 of concepts to the interpretation of problematic experiences, 
 but that it is also an important activity in the building up of 
 concepts. In other words, it is the dynamic element in 
 both deduction and induction. 
 
 5. Judgment and Thinking. 
 
 Whether our thinking be the inductive movement from 
 individuals toward a more perfect concept, or whether it be 
 the deductive movement of applying concepts to the inter- 
 pretation of problematic individual experiences, in so far as 
 
Judgment as an Element of Technique 279 
 
 this process is active and dynamic, the vital aspect of the 
 thinking process is judgment. Wherever there is an activ- 
 ity of mental reconstruction going on, there is judgment. 
 This act of judgment does not seem to he describable 
 in terms of a comparison of two concepts and a result- 
 ing affirmation or denial of connection between them. It 
 is rather an analysis and development of some problematic 
 situation with reference to the discovery of connections 
 between elements of that situation and elements of previous 
 experience, connections that we can take advantage of in 
 seeing the situation from some point of view which shall 
 give it meaning and put it under our control. Such pro- 
 cesses of evaluation are certainly a very necessary phase 
 of the ability to deal with novel data, which Mr. James 
 regards as the very essence of the reasoning process. 
 
 6. Judgment Implicit and Explicit. 
 
 Many writers recognize a difference between judgments 
 in terms of their implicit or their expHcit character. This 
 difference is analogous to the distinction between psycholog- 
 ical and logical concepts. Implicit judgment, if we may 
 use the term at aU in speaking of judgment, is, like the 
 psychological concept, unreflective in character ; while ex- 
 pHcit judgment is, like the logical concept, reflective. 
 
 (i) Implicit judgment. 
 
 If I hear the whistle blow and say, "It is noon," this is 
 an implicit judgment. The situation presented by the per- 
 ception of the whistle blowing is almost instantly cleared 
 up by the application of the concept noon hour. Judgment 
 always presupposes some ground for the interpretation 
 given. In this case, the ground of inference is present, but 
 it is used unreflectively and almost automatically. The 
 inference is the outcome of a complex of very closely asso- 
 ciated past experiences, including probably the daily 
 repetition of the same tone quality of the whistle, repeated 
 examinations of my watch on the occasion of the whistle's 
 
28o The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 blowing and finding that it was twelve o'clock, frequent 
 experiences of eating my dinner immediately after the 
 whistle blew, uniformly seeing the workingmen come from 
 the factory at the signal of the whistle, etc. As a result 
 of the close association set up between the various items of 
 this complex of experiences, now, when I hear the whistle 
 blow, this single item of experience may touch off any one 
 or all of the other items of the complex immediately as an 
 interpretation of the auditory experience. This immediate 
 interpretation is likely to take the form, "It is noon." But 
 it might take the form, "The men in the factory will quit 
 work," or "I ought to eat my dinner now," or "If I look 
 at my watch now, I can tell whether I have the right time, 
 or not." These all might be implicit judgments, having a 
 ground in past experience, but that ground being utilized 
 unreflectively. 
 
 (2) Explicit judgment. 
 
 Suppose that I receive a letter. I look at the hand- 
 writing, and see that it is that of Mr. Jones. I notice that 
 the letter is registered. I remember that Mr. Jones owes 
 me some money. I conclude then, that Mr. Jones has sent 
 me a payment on his note. If my judgment that Mr. Jones 
 has sent me a payment on his note is consciously based upon 
 these grounds, then the judgment is explicit. My judg- 
 ment, "It will rain to-morrow," is explicit, if I base it on 
 the recognized ground, "The wind is shifting to the south." 
 All the judgments in a demonstration in geometry are 
 explicit. 
 
 By an explicit judgment, we mean one in which the 
 ground of the judgment has been brought out clearly. Such 
 a case of judgment is called inference. The ground of 
 the inference in reflective judgment operates reflectively 
 in consciousness. Inference is judgment made explicit 
 through pointing out, mentally at least, the ground, or 
 basis, of the judgment. 
 
Judgment as an Element of Technique 281 
 
 7. Judgment and Other Mental Functions. 
 
 Judgment is implicitly involved in the percept, in the 
 psychological concept, and in unreflective forms of thinking. 
 It is explicitly involved in the logical concept and in all 
 forms of reflective thinking. 
 
 If we are on the sea and some dim object looms up on 
 the horizon, our percept of it is apt to be very vague, but 
 the sailor quite likely sees it at once as a lighthouse, or as 
 a vessel. What makes the difference between his percept 
 and ours? Certainly not the sensory data; for we all have 
 the same. But he has had a great deal of experience in 
 judging, or evaluating, such vague experiences, so that now 
 the process of evaluation works practically automatically 
 and is swallowed up in the perception process. Here judg- 
 ment is implicit in the percept. What is true in this case 
 of perception is true in all our definite percepts of things. 
 Judgment is implicit in every developed percept. 
 
 In an earlier chapter we gave the boy's concept of chest- 
 nut tree, of hickory tree, etc., as illustrations of psycholog- 
 ical concepts. These concepts involve implicitly judgment. 
 There is a ground, or reason, for calling one tree a chest- 
 nut tree and another a hickory tree, but in the conceptual 
 process the ground does not operate reflectively. In the 
 case of the logical concept chestnut tree, as we have already 
 explained in our study of the logical concept, the elements 
 of meaning have been brought explicitly to consciousness. 
 What does this mean but that virtually in the formation of 
 the logical concept a series of explicit judgments have been 
 made? The logical concept summarizes, as it were, and 
 condenses, or holds in solution, a whole group of evalua- 
 tions of situations of the same general class or type. 
 
 Reasoning, as we shall see later, differs largely from less 
 highly reflective types of thinking, in that the grounds of 
 all inferences are explicitly pointed out, or that they 
 operate reflectively in consciousness. Judgment, in reason- 
 ing, is explicit. 
 
282 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 From this point of view, we see again the truth often 
 pointed out before that in actual experience the various 
 mental functions are not isolable, but they are inextricably 
 interwoven and mutually involved. There are characteristic 
 mental movements, characteristic organizations of different 
 conscious processes, which are relevant to the perform- 
 ance of different kinds of mental work. These special 
 functions we can study separately, abstracting, or drawing 
 off, from the whole complex of conscious processes those 
 only which enter into the special organization of activities 
 which performs the function under consideration. To this 
 functional organization of activities we can give a name 
 indicative of the special function that is being performed. 
 Thus, we may have attention, memory, judgment, etc. In 
 studying special functions thus we do not necessarily sup- 
 pose that none of the mental processes, or special organiza- 
 tions of mental processes, which enter into the complex for 
 the performance of one function may not also enter into 
 another complex in the performance of another function. 
 The special mental activities involved in judgment, for 
 example, run, either implicitly or explicitly, through the 
 whole length of the intellectual life from its first step above 
 raw sensation up to the most highly controlled processes of 
 reasoning. 
 
 8. Judgment and Instruction. 
 
 We have seen that judgment is the vital aspect of every 
 sort of thinking. Mr. Dewey calls it "the typical act of 
 intelligence."^ Wherever subjective intelligence is at work, 
 there is some sort of evaluation of situations going on, 
 there is judgment making or utilizing connections between 
 the ideal and the real. 
 
 In the study which we made of concrete cases of think- 
 ing, we saw how important to the whole procedure was the 
 process of judging and evaluating problematic elements, we 
 
 ' Dewey, Psychology, p. 215. 
 
Judgment as an Element of Technique 283 
 
 saw how intense was the tension and strain of this process. 
 If pupils are not to miss the vital aspect of the thinking 
 process, it is important that they be left to do for them- 
 selves as much as possible of the interpretation and evalua- 
 tion of problematic situations. In following through an 
 organized thought process, as a formal demonstration in 
 geometry, as contrasted with the task of constructing the 
 same, the most vital part, that of judgment, is omitted. 
 This has been elaborated in an earlier chapter.^ If the 
 reader will turn back to that earlier discussion, he will see 
 the truth of it from a new angle. 
 
 Supplementary Readings for Chapter XVIII 
 
 Welton, Logical Bases of Education, Ch. 5. 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 213-20. 
 Creighton, Logic, Ch. 20. 
 
 ' See Chapter XI. 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 THINKING AS REASONING 
 I. Point of View. 
 
 Reasoning and thinking are not mutually exclusive terms 
 any more than square and rectangle are in geometry. Yet 
 there is a specific difference in the one case as in the other ; 
 the terms are not complete synonyms. We can say that all 
 squares are rectangles, but we cannot say that all rectangles 
 are squares. The square is a particular kind of rectangle, 
 one with its sides all equal. In like manner, we may say 
 that all reasoning is thinking, but we cannot say that all 
 thinking is reasoning. Reasoning is a particular kind of 
 thinking, one in which there is exercised a superior control 
 over the whole process through the use of a more highly 
 perfected technique and more highly organized methods of 
 procedure. 
 
 The analogy which we have just employed for the sake 
 of clearness must not be pushed too far. We can draw a 
 pretty sharp and definite line of distinction between the 
 square and other rectangles. We cannot draw so sharp a 
 distinction between the reasoning process and all other 
 thinking. The distinction is one of the degree of difference 
 in certain characteristics. There are all stages of develop- 
 ment and refinement of the various elements of technique 
 involved in the reasoning process, and there are all stages 
 of development of skill in their use and of control over the 
 process. It is, then, difficult to determine precisely what 
 degree of development and perfection of the elements of 
 technique is necessary and just how much skill in their use 
 is requisite before we shall call the thinking process reason- 
 ing. In a broad sense reasoning is controlled thinking. If 
 
 284 
 
Thinking as Reasoning 285 
 
 we seek the specific differentia of the reasoning process 
 which makes possible this superior control, we shall find 
 two striking characteristics, — the use of more perfect ele- 
 ments of technique and dependence upon laws and prin-, 
 ciples. To the discussion of these two characteristics we 
 must now turn. 
 
 2. Elements of Technique involved in Reasoning. 
 
 A large part of our discussion of the psychology of think- 
 ing has been concerned with the problem of analyzing and 
 interpreting the various elements of technique involved in 
 thinking. We have shown the conditions under which 
 they are needed and their development is stimulated, and 
 we have tried to interpret their function and significance 
 in the life of the human organism. At this point we need, 
 then, merely to summarize the results of previous discus- 
 sions for the sake of emphasizing those elements of tech- 
 nique which are most characteristic of the reasoning process 
 as distinguished from cruder forms of thinking. 
 
 (i) Imagination in general, — reproductive and con- 
 structive. 
 
 The constructive type of imagination is superior, because 
 it uses free images, images not tied down to any particular 
 setting and hence more movable and more capable of being 
 brought together into new combinations. Also in construc- 
 tive imagination elements of old images may be selected and 
 recombined to make a new image symbolic of something 
 which has not yet entered into experience. Thus essentials 
 may be isolated and held before the mind in the attempt to 
 apply the results of past experiences to new situations dif- 
 fering from any with which we have had to deal previously. 
 
 (2) The image, — concrete and abstract. 
 
 The abstract image is superior in its freedom, fluency, 
 and power of symbolism. 
 
 (2) Association, — two types: (a) contiguous, or acci- 
 dental, and (b) inherent, logical', or necessary. 
 
286 The Psychology cf Thinking 
 
 The latter type is superior for the purpose of making sure 
 connections of thought, independent of accidental con- 
 tingencies, general in character, once available always 
 available. 
 
 (4) The concept, — psychological and logical. 
 
 The latter is superior as a tool in the precise, definite, and 
 reflective control of thought. 
 
 (5) Judgment, — implicit and explicit. 
 
 The latter is superior in making sure that connections of 
 thought are right, through bringing out explicitly the 
 grounds of inference. 
 
 (6) Induction and deduction. 
 
 Neither of these is to be regarded as superior for pur- 
 poses of thought to the other. They are special and highly 
 organized methods of controlling the thought process, the 
 first in building up general notions and the second in apply- 
 ing them. They have their special devices, the hypothe- 
 sis and the syllogism, which, in reasoning, contribute to 
 definiteness and precision of control. 
 
 Summing up, we may say that the special elements of 
 technique involved in reasoning are as follows : construc- 
 tive imagination, the abstract image, logical, or inherent, 
 association, the logical concept, explicit judgment, and an 
 organized method of procedure either inductive or deduc- 
 tive, or both. 
 
 We have tried to formulate the psychology of thinking 
 in terms of function rather than in terms of structure or of 
 content. But function cannot be performed adequately to 
 meet a variety of situations without characteristic differences 
 of structure. These differences of structure which char- 
 acterize reasoning as distinct from cruder forms of thinking 
 are not, however, to be viewed as themselves primary. 
 They are developments of form and of content that have 
 come about in the process of gradually perfecting function. 
 
Thinking as Reasoning 287 
 
 3. Dependence of Reasoning upon Laws and Princi- 
 ples, — Empirical Thinking and Reasoning compared. 
 The second characteristic Hne of differentiation between 
 reasoning and ordinary thinking is to be found in the larger 
 amount of analysis involved and the greater dependence of 
 the movement of thought upon the recognition of laws and 
 principles. Perhaps this larger amount of analysis is itself 
 only an aspect of the process of attempting to control the 
 thinking by reference to laws. The situation needs to be 
 analyzed more carefully in order to discover at just what 
 point law is involved. The view of reasoning as thinking 
 controlled by reference to laws and principles may be made 
 clearer by entering upon a discussion of the difference be- 
 tween empirical thinking and reasoning. 
 
 (i) Illustrated in dealing with flickering gas flame. 
 Mr. James cites the case of trying to remedy a flickering 
 gas flame by one who is not familiar with the principle in 
 accordance with which gas burns. ^ Such a person might 
 accidentally discover that by raising the chimney of the 
 lamp a little at the bottom the flame burned more smoothly. 
 Now, when he has difficulty with the flame again his 
 remedy for the situation will be found through going back 
 in memory and taking bodily the method of procedure 
 which worked in the past and applying it to this situation. 
 He will raise the chimney slightly and put something under 
 it to hold it in that position. In so far as he has met the 
 situation by thinking at all, this type of thinking would be 
 called empirical. The situation confronting him has not 
 been analyzed and the method of solution has been presented 
 to consciousness through reproductive imagination. There 
 has been little or no reconstruction. But suppose he had 
 been familiar with some of the simplest laws of combustion. 
 He would not have needed to experiment blindly in the 
 first place to find a remedy. He would have immediately 
 inferred that there was an insufficiency of oxygen, and that 
 ' James, Psycliology, Briefer Course, p. 359. 
 
288 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 something must be done to provide a greater supply. On 
 the basis of this inference, he would have raised the chimney 
 slightly at once or have taken advantage of some device in 
 the burner for supplying more air to the flame. His method 
 of solution of the problem is determined by an analysis of 
 the situation and the application of a law in accordance with 
 which he constructs a method of procedure without experi- 
 mentation or without previous experience in doing this 
 particular thing. 
 
 (2) Illustrated in the procedure of medicine. 
 
 Empirical thinking is well illustrated in the procedure 
 of early medicine. Certain herbs are found as the result 
 of repeated experiences to be beneficial in certain kinds of 
 sickness. When some one is ill, the illness is taken pretty 
 much in the large as presenting a problem of a certain gen- 
 eral type. This problem is solved by going back into past 
 experience for the remedy. The remedy is taken as more 
 or less of a ready-made affair, and it is applied in a series 
 of steps the order of which is practically the same as that 
 used on some previous occasion. There is no minute 
 analysis of the problem nor of the remedy, and there is no 
 careful and reflective adjustment of means to ends through 
 thoroughgoing reconstruction of the mode of procedure to 
 meet the specific conditions of the case in hand. The 
 method of procedure is determined by a rule and not by 
 the application of principles. 
 
 The trained physician of to-day approaches cases of sick- 
 ness in a different way. Let us say that this case of sick- 
 ness shows many superficial evidences of being a fever. 
 But this does not immediately suggest a method of treat- 
 ment taken bodily, or with little modification, from past 
 experience. There are many different sorts of fever. Be- 
 fore prescribing for this case it must be analyzed more 
 fully. It cannot be taken en bloc. Symptoms must be 
 observed more carefully and inferences drawn from them. 
 Furthermore, not all patients are exactly alike. The prob- 
 
Thinking as Reasoning 289 
 
 lem is quite different for people of different bodily condi- 
 tions and of different temperaments. Before the physician 
 can understand the exact nature and the degree of serious- 
 ness of the disease or of the kind and strength of the 
 medicines he may use, he may have to make a thorough 
 investigation of the present physical condition of the patient. 
 Every vital organ may have to be examined. He may even 
 have to go beyond this and seek information concerning his 
 patient's heredity, his habits, and his manner of life in 
 general. Before he can determine a mode of procedure 
 which shall represent an adequate solution of his problem 
 the physician must have a minute and detailed knowledge 
 of his patient, of the chemical constituents of his medicines, 
 of the structure and function of the various organs of the 
 body, and of the specific effects of .the properties of his 
 medicines upon the action of the bodily organs. On the 
 basis of his analysis of the whole given situation, taking 
 account of all the elements of the problem and their rela- 
 tion to one another, he may construct a method of pro- 
 cedure specifically adapted to this particular case, even if 
 he has never had a case just like it before. His method of 
 procedure, his solution of the problem, is largely determined 
 by his knowledge of laws and principles of human physi- 
 ology and of the effects of drugs and other remedies upon 
 the functions of the organs of the body. Of course, the 
 scientific physician can never get completely away from 
 certain empirical elements, nor can he fail to reap great 
 advantages from abundance of experience; yet it is true in 
 a sense that he virtually constructs anew his method of pro- 
 cedure for every case that he treats. He is a reasoner as 
 distinguished from an empirical thinker. 
 
 (3) Illustrated in the procedure of agriculture. 
 
 In agriculture we see this same transition from empirical 
 
 modes of dealing with its problems to scientific methods. 
 
 The change is due to the formulation of laws and principles 
 
 of plant growth, of the reactions of soils, etc. Again, along 
 
 19 
 
290 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 with the formulation of laws and principles, there goes the 
 recognition of the need of getting at the details of a situa- 
 tion. This makes problems specific and individual, while at 
 the same time they fall under general principles. But, 
 while general principles apply, the method of procedure 
 must be worked out to suit the particular case. This pro- 
 cess of attacking problems of agriculture not by rules of 
 procedure determined wholly by past experience, but 
 through the application of laws and principles to situations 
 thoroughly analyzed, involves reasoning as over against 
 empirical thinking. This will be made clearer in the illus- 
 trations which follow. 
 
 Farmers in many parts of the country once maintained 
 the fertility of their soil by the rotation of crops. They 
 plowed up grass land .and planted it to corn or potatoes. 
 The following year it was devoted to oats, and the next 
 year it was sown to wheat. With the wheat, grass seed was 
 sown, so that upon the harvesting of the wheat crop the 
 land reverted to meadow once again. After taking off a 
 few crops of hay, the rotation began once more. It was 
 found that in this way better crops were produced than 
 could be secured by raising the same crop upon the same 
 field continuously. But the reason why the fertility of the 
 soil was better maintained in this way was not known by 
 many of those who followed the practice. The method of 
 procedure was not constructed on the basis of a knowledge 
 of underlying principles which made it valid. The same 
 was true of the custom of plowing under green crops, such 
 as clover and rye, and of the use of manure. The justifica- 
 tion of these modes of procedure lay in their repeated suc- 
 cess in previous experience as methods of maintaining the 
 fertility of the soil. The methods were empirical rather 
 than scientific ; and the thinking involved in their use was 
 empirical rather than reasoning. When the chemical nature 
 of the soil has been accurately determined, the chemical 
 constituents of various plants have been discovered, and 
 
Thinking as Reasoning 291 
 
 we know just what each crop takes from the soil and what 
 it contributes to its enrichment, then it is possible reflectively 
 to devise ways and means of adjusting crops to the soil 
 and to one another in the agricultural process. In other 
 words, the problems can be solved by reasoning; for exact 
 knowledge of the essential factors entering into them can 
 be secured, and laws and principles can be applied in the 
 construction of methods of procedure. 
 
 4. Definition of Reasoning. 
 
 Having pointed out the specific differentia of the reason- 
 ing process, we are now ready to define reasoning from 
 that point of view. Reasoning is controlled thinking, — 
 thinking organized and systematized according to laws and 
 principles and carried on by the use of superior elements 
 of technique. 
 
 5. Biological Significance of Reasoning. 
 (i) Reasoning the highest factor of control. 
 
 The great problem of living creatures in their evolution 
 from lower to higher forms is that of control over their 
 environment. That form of control is most valuable in 
 which the individual is able to manipulate elements of his 
 environment in such a way as to make them serve as means 
 to the realization of his own ends. The conscious processes 
 are significant in the Hfe of the organism on this very 
 account. Reasoning is the culmination and summation of 
 all the conscious processes in so far as they may be con- 
 ceived as control phenomena. All thinking is essentially 
 constructive in its nature. As it approaches that stage of 
 development and organization which we call reasoning, it 
 enables the individual to deal more and more effectively 
 with new situations, thus enlarging and expanding his field 
 of control over the world in which he lives. Furthermore, 
 reasoning simplifies the process of solving the problems 
 which confront the individual. Reasoning moves toward 
 the solution of its problems in the most direct line. The 
 
292 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 thinking process is guided and directed and safeguarded at 
 every point. The process is methodized. There is con- 
 sequently greater accuracy and adequacy in the performance 
 of its function. In reasoning we have consciousness as 
 the factor of variation and control of action realizing its 
 function at the very highest level. 
 
 (2) Relation between reason and human freedom. 
 
 We may get at this same thought from a different angle 
 by trying to state the relation between reasoning and will. 
 Will is sometimes thought of as a separate faculty. In 
 reality, will is only another name for the fact of control of 
 action. This control of action has its basis in the motor, or 
 impulsive, character of all consciousness. Every idea has 
 in it a motor tendency, every thought is fraught with some 
 sort of motor consequence either visible or invisible. In 
 so far as any set of ideas can be brought into the focus of 
 consciousness and held there by virtue of the nature and 
 strength and number of the connections which have been 
 set up between the various elements of the whole system to 
 which it belongs, that set of ideas will determine action 
 rather than some other set of ideas. Will is only the guid- 
 ance and direction of action or of thought by means of 
 ideas. From this point of view, will is not innate ; it is an 
 acquisition, an achievement. The tremendous output and 
 expression of energy in a fit of anger is not will, because 
 it is not free. It controls the individual instead of the 
 individual controlling it. The same expenditure of en- 
 ergy put forth under the guidance^ and direction of ideas 
 would be will. Freedom of the will is at its maximum 
 where action is most fully under the guidance and direction 
 of ideas. As reasoning gives the fullest and freest and 
 most far-reaching kind of control over action, human free- 
 dom, if we do not like the term freedom of the will, is 
 achieved most completely where reason functions most 
 fully. 
 
Thinking as Reasoning 293 
 
 In our last statement we have come out at the same point 
 at which Kant arrived when he made the possibiHty of all 
 morality rest upon human freedom and conceived of human 
 freedom as inherent only in reason. But we have arrived 
 at the same thought as Kant without the necessity of think- 
 ing of reason as something apart from the rest of the con- 
 scious life and likely to be vitiated and contaminated if it 
 had any connection with impulse and feeling. From the 
 biological and functional point of view we cannot conceive 
 of any conscious process which is not dynamically related 
 to all the other conscious processes and to the life of action. 
 It is because of this fact that reason can control impulse, 
 action, and thought and man can be free. It is through 
 the evolution of the power of reasoning that man has risen 
 to his high level of a free moral agent. Through this 
 power he has become not only a creature who exercises 
 more fully than all others the power of controlHng his 
 environment to meet the exigencies of his own individual 
 life, but also he has achieved the power of determining 
 within certain limits his own self, of controUing his own 
 character. To work out the biological significance of this 
 would carry us far over into the fields of ethics and 
 sociology. But it needs no extended argument to enable 
 those who have followed the line of thought which is cen- 
 tral in this book to see that the development of the ethical 
 and social consciousness in its more reflective form, made 
 possible through reasoning, is of immense biological sig- 
 nificance. 
 
 6. The Question of the Reasoning of Animals. 
 
 Now that we have worked out the specific differentia of 
 reasoning, we are able to attack the question so often 
 asked, "Do animals reason?" One class of writers is very 
 strong in the assertion of the negative of this question, and 
 another is just as strong in the assertion of the positive. 
 In both cases there is usually a confusion arising from the 
 
294 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 failure to analyze exactly what is meant by reasoning. If 
 we mean by reasoning the power to think by means of 
 abstract images, logical concepts, and other highly devel- 
 oped elements of technique in the thinking process, and 
 still further if we include the organization of the thinking 
 process into modes of procedure dominated by laws and 
 principles, then we shall have to say that animals do not 
 reason. But this is not saying that they do not think. It 
 still may be that on the basis of crude memory processes 
 and vague imagery animals do actually vary their modes of 
 procedure to better adjust means to ends in situations the 
 nature of which they dimly recognize and appreciate. 
 
 It is very doubtful whether any cases of animal intelli- 
 gence can be found in which the supposition of reasoning is 
 necessary to their explanation ; but in these same cases it 
 might be very difficult to account for the facts without pre- 
 supposing some sort of thinking process. The writer him- 
 self inclines to the view that animals do not reason, but 
 that they may and do think, the extent of their thinking, 
 however, being very much less than the lovers of animal 
 pets or the writers of animal stories usually suppose. Be- 
 fore passing judgment upon any case of animal intelligence, 
 it is necessary to know its complete background and setting. 
 We must take account very carefully of the specific instincts 
 of the species and of the nature and length of any learning 
 process which has been involved. The cleverest perform- 
 ances of animals, often regarded as exhibitions of thinking, 
 may be the result of a very long period of learning or of 
 training during which firm associations have been set up 
 between certain signs and certain acts. The only factor 
 of consciousness necessary to their explanation may be 
 associative memory, a type of memory which is far more 
 organic than intellectual in character. 
 
 We are on pretty safe ground when we are quite 
 skeptical regarding apparent cases of animal thinking, yet 
 from the evolutionary point of view there seems to be no 
 
Thinking as Reasoning 295 
 
 reason why one should be so determined to interpret every 
 act of the lower animals on the basis of automatism as some 
 scientists are. Why not grant that the conscious processes 
 which attain their highest development in the human race 
 have their roots far back in animal life? This seems more 
 consistent than the contrary with the general theory of 
 evolution. Biologically, consciousness is the great factor 
 of variation of responses to meet the needs of individuals 
 as distinct from those of species. We find considerable 
 variation of response in foxes, dogs, horses, monkeys, etc., 
 and in many of the birds. It is entirely problematic how 
 much development of consciousness we need to assume in 
 order to explain the facts. It seems clear that we do not 
 find variations of the sort that make necessary the assump- 
 tion of reasoning; it is not so clear that we do not need to 
 assume some crude form of thinking. 
 
 7. The Question of the Reasoning of Children. 
 
 This topic has been discussed in an earlier chapter. 
 There it was held that we need to distinguish carefully be- 
 tween reasoning and ordinary thinking. The general line 
 of distinction was pointed out. Now that the meaning of 
 reasoning has been cleared up by an elaborate discussion 
 of its specific differentia, the discussion of the thinking of 
 the child ought to be more intelligible. 
 
 It is evident that the child does not very early make use 
 of the elaborate and highly specialized technique of thinking 
 which justifies us in calling it a reasoning process. This 
 technique is developed in the process of experience to meet 
 the needs of the thinking function more adequately, and not 
 until it has been sufficiently developed and brought under 
 control can the child reason. To infer, however, that be- 
 cause the child does not reason therefore he cannot think 
 is not legitimate. He does organize his crude conscious 
 processes in such a way as to deal satisfactorily with cer- 
 tain kinds of problems whose nature demands thinking. 
 
296 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 principally those which are quite concrete and relatively 
 simple. The child is not merely receptive, his mental pro- 
 cesses are constructive to some extent at a very early age. 
 Consequently he ought to be given school exercises which 
 make demands upon his rudimentary thinking power. 
 
 8. Training in Reasoning. 
 
 (i) Reasoning the remote goal. 
 
 The power to reason ought to be regarded as the remote 
 goal in the early stages of education. It is the finished 
 product which should be the outcome of a long period of 
 development and training. In this case, as in many others, 
 the quickest way to reach the goal is not to aim directly at 
 it. Such a course of procedure may only result in arrested 
 development. 
 
 (2) Stages of progress in attainment of the goal. 
 
 The psychology of thinking which we have worked out 
 recognizes the continuity of development of the thinking 
 process from its crudest beginnings in the differentiation of 
 the imagination up to its highest development in the reason- 
 ing process of the most highly trained and educated man. 
 At the same time, we have emphasized certain characteris- 
 tic phases of development. While no exact time can be 
 assigned to them, and while they cannot be sharply 
 separated from one another, yet there is an order of 
 development, and the stress of training should vary with 
 the dominant characteristics of different periods. 
 
 There seem to be about three phases in the development 
 of the thinking process. These three phases we have seen 
 to be (i) the rapid development of the imagination; (2) 
 the conscious distinction within the imagination between 
 means and ends; and (3) the wider appreciation of laws 
 and principles. The first period of development corre- 
 sponds roughly to that of the kindergarten and the first 
 two grades. The training of thinking in this period should 
 concern itself largely with the task of laying the foundation 
 
Thinking as Reasoning 297 
 
 of a rich background of first-hand experiences which shall 
 yield the concrete images on which all interpretation ulti- 
 mately rests. The second period corresponds roughly to 
 that of the elementary school from the third grade to the 
 eighth. With the development of the conscious distinction 
 between means and ends, there should go training in the 
 solving of problems in which the relation of means to ends 
 is worked out within concrete wholes. The child of the 
 grades should not so much study physics as typical problems 
 in physics; history, as specific, typical, concrete problems, 
 etc. The relations between cause and effect, conditions and 
 consequences, means and ends should first be seen frequently 
 within definite concrete wholes. The interest in broad 
 generalizations cannot be genuine and deep until the habit 
 of mind is first developed of looking for the embodiment 
 of principles within narrower compass. The third period 
 corresponds roughly to that of the high school and the 
 college. In the period of adolescence there develops the 
 larger interest in generalizations as such. This then is 
 the time rather than in the grades for the organization of 
 subject matter in the more logical form of distinct sciences. 
 In the matter of training to think, more stress may now be 
 thrown upon the elements of technique and organization 
 that are characteristic of reasoning. 
 
 (j) Relation between function and technique in training. 
 
 If reasoning is a finished product of training, then analy- 
 sis of this finished product cannot determine the standard 
 by which we shall judge the thinking of the child. Neither 
 can it lay down the rules which determine the kind of 
 exercises which are most valuable for him as training in 
 the power to think. Yet a knowledge of the finished prod- 
 uct is necessary to the teacher ; for every exercise, or set of 
 exercises, employed in the training of the child to think 
 must be brought to the test of the question, "Does it 
 further the development of those characteristics which 
 ultimately lead over into the power to reason?" But this 
 
2g8 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 is after all of relatively little importance as compared with 
 the question, "Does this exercise, or course of exercises, give 
 the child practice in a normal fashion in the solution of real 
 problems?" We are less likely to misplace the emphasis 
 in early training if we center attention upon the perform- 
 ance of function rather than upon the question of form and 
 technique. 
 
 The functional point of view rather than the structural is 
 the richer in suggestions for educational theory and prac- 
 tice. It reveals the thinking process to us in its setting and 
 gives us an appreciation of its dynamic nature. From this 
 point of view we can rightly interpret the significance and 
 value of the various elements of structure, or of technique, 
 that are involved. We are not so likely to set them up as 
 ends in the process of training, but we shall conceive them 
 more clearly as valuable tools which are needed for the 
 more adequate performance of a useful function. Training 
 in the elements of technique necessary to the reasoning 
 process will thus not be ignored, but it will be given its 
 proper place. It will conform to the principle, — exercise 
 of the function first, then practice in the perfection of the 
 technique necessary to the more perfect realization of the 
 function. Training in technique is useless unless the time 
 for the use of the technique has come, and that is the time 
 when its need is felt. 
 
 Training in thinking cannot be dominated at every point 
 by methods derived from the analysis of the finished product 
 reasoning, neither can it be regarded as complete unless it 
 arrives at the goal of the finished product. It must cul- 
 minate in the development of the power on the part of 
 pupils in the high school and the college to think in terms 
 of the most efficient tools which the human race has per- 
 fected in its attempt to control the world in which it lives. 
 Only thus can they achieve that freedom which is essential 
 to the fullest realization of the individual self and which 
 makes man the noblest work of God. 
 
SUMMARY OF REFERENCES 
 
 Angell, Psychology. 
 
 Angell, The Province of Functional Psychology, Psy. Rev., 
 March, 1907. 
 
 Bagley, The Educative Process. 
 
 Baldwin, Mental Development. 
 
 Bolton, Meaning as Adjustment, Psy. Rev., May, 1908. 
 
 Butler, Meaning of Education. 
 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychology. 
 
 Chamberlain, The Child. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology. 
 
 Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology and Social Practice. 
 
 Dewey, The School and Society. 
 
 Dopp, The Place of Industries in Elementary Education. 
 
 Fiske, Excursions of an Evolutionist. 
 
 Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy. 
 
 Groos, The Play of Animals. 
 
 Groos, The Play of Man. 
 
 Home, The Philosophy of Education. 
 
 James, Psychology, Briefer Course. 
 
 James, Talks to Teachers. 
 
 King, Psychology of Child Development. 
 
 Kirkpatrick, Fundamentals of Child Study. 
 
 McMurry, Elements of General Method. 
 
 McMurry, Method of the Recitation. 
 
 O'Shea, Education as Adjustment. 
 
 O'Shea, Dynamic Factors in Education. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology. 
 
 Sully, Studies of Childhood. 
 
 Sully, Teacher's Handbook of Psychology. 
 
 Titchener, An Outline of Psychology. 
 
 Welton, Logical Bases of Education. 
 
 299 
 
INDEX 
 
 Note. — Names of authors to whose works specific references have been 
 given are not included in this index. For these, see references at end of 
 chapters. Topics in the index have been analyzed very little where material 
 is more or less continuous, because the subject matter of the text is quite 
 closely analyzed and sub-topics can be traced very easily there or in the table 
 of contents. 
 
 Abstract image, 152-153, 158-163 ; 
 significance for thinking, 163, 
 ch. 13 ; functional relation to 
 concrete image, 164-170; in 
 concept, 193-194. 
 
 Abstraction, 214-217, 246-248, 249- 
 250 
 
 Adaptation, see adjustment. 
 
 Adjustment, 8, 13-17, 40-45 ; typi- 
 cal modes of, ch. 7 ; intellectual 
 levels of, 73-90 ; place of think- 
 ing in, 88-90, ch. 8 ; concept a 
 tool of, 194-199. See biological 
 point of view and control. 
 
 Adolescence, 170, 185-188, 272, 
 297. 
 
 Agriculture, illustrations of think- 
 ing, 289-291. 
 
 Algebra, 218-219. 
 
 Antigone, 92. 
 
 Aristotle, 20. 
 
 Arithmetic, 92, 124-125, 166-167, 
 169, 253, 272. 
 
 Association, 134-143, 285-286. 
 
 Associationism, 5, 46. 
 
 Astronomy, 237. 241. 
 
 Automatic action, 73. 
 
 Biological point of view, vii, ch. i, 
 ch. 2, y2, 99-100, 101, 120; as 
 a present tendency in psychol- 
 ogy, 4 ; biological significance 
 of reasoning, 291-292. 
 
 Botany, 6-7. 
 
 Child mind, relation to adult 
 mind, 68-71, ch. 9, 117; develop- 
 ment of, 46-48, 112, ch. 14, 239; 
 functional interpretation of, 68- 
 71, 117, 229. 
 
 Concept, chs. 15-17, 286. See 
 logical concept and psycho- 
 logical concept. 
 
 Concrete image, 152-153, 160, 
 162-163, 182-183; in education, 
 164 ff. See abstract image. 
 
 Comparison, 214-217, 246, 249-250. 
 
 Consciousness ; biological viev? 
 of, 17-21 ; conditions of, 38 ff., 
 cf. 83 ; man's special need of, 
 39-40 ; and control, viii, 36, 47- 
 48, see control; differentiation 
 and organization of, ch. 5 ; fac- 
 tor of variation, 37-38; factor 
 of individual control, 40-45, see 
 control; factor in self determin- 
 ation, 53 ; function of, ch. 4, 
 69, see functional view of con- 
 sciousness; nature of first con- 
 sciousness, 46 ff., 199 ff. 
 
 Control, viii, 3, 34, 35, 36, 40-45, 
 47-48, 52, S3. 69-70, 74. 78, 84, 85, 
 102, 105, 124, 174, 194, 196, 199, 
 222, 229-230, 255, 263, 265, 284- 
 285, 298; growing control, ch. 
 14; habit and control, 87; im- 
 agination and control, 134; in- 
 dividual control, 34, 40, 42-44, 
 87-88, 98-100, 291 ff., 298; ra- 
 cial control, 42, 43, 76-77, 81 ; 
 reasoning and control, 291-292 ; 
 significance of ideo-motor ac- 
 tion for, 87-88 ; thinking and 
 control, 98-100 ; control over 
 associative mechanism in think- 
 ing, 136-143; logical concept 
 and control, 209. 
 
 Culture, conception of, 1 18-119. 
 
 300 
 
Index 
 
 301 
 
 Deduction and induction, chs. 18- 
 
 20, 286. 
 Deliberative action, 89-90, 97-99 ; 
 
 as field of thinking, 90. 
 Drawing, 113. 
 Drill, psychology of, 87, in, 124- 
 
 125- 
 
 Elementary education and ele- 
 mentary school, 116, 164-165, 
 170, 183, 227, 271, 296-297. 
 
 Empirical thinking, 287 ff. 
 
 English, 171. 
 
 Evolution, 45, 294-295 ; influence 
 of theory of, 8-9, 73, 77, 219. 
 
 Expression, 54, 55, 112-114. 
 
 Fairy stories, 179. 
 
 Feeling, 62 ff. ; functional inter- 
 pretation of, 62-68 ; in instinct- 
 ive action, 77-78 ; in thinking, 
 107-108, 1 80-1 8 1 ; training of, 
 66-67 ; in relation to mental 
 training, 65-66 ; in relation to 
 training of will, 68. 
 
 Finished product, ideal of, no, 
 112-114, 121-122, 144-148, 217, 
 225, 229, 256, 260, 269, 271, 
 272, 275, 277, 296, 297-298. 
 
 Formal discipline, 59, 60, 65, 66, 
 67, 108, 109-111, 143-149, 170, 
 250, 267. 
 
 Freedom, human, 53, 292-293, 298. 
 
 Function and structure, 6-9, 64- 
 65, 98, 100, 286, 297-298. 
 
 Function and technique, relation 
 between, 101-107, 109, 112-113, 
 148, 227, 295, 297-298. 
 
 Functional view of consciousness, 
 3, ch. 4, 47-48, 55-56, 69, 100, 
 loi, 159-160, 189, 194-195, 213, 
 231 S., 258, 263, 282. 
 
 Generalization, 184-188, 200-203, 
 
 210, 214-217, 248-250. 
 Geography, 128, 173, 183-184, 244 
 
 ff., 253, 272, 273-274, 278. 
 Geometry, 92, 104, 136, 139-140, 
 
 144-150, 172, 187, 197, 253-254, 
 
 256, 258, 267, 284. 
 Grammar, 233, 235, 253. 
 
 Habit and habitual action ; ner- 
 vous mechanism for, 28-30, 34- 
 
 36 ; consciousness and, 30-31 ; 
 in relation to control, 87. See 
 drill. 
 
 High school and secondary edu- 
 cation, 186-188, 272, 297. See 
 adolescence. 
 
 History, 7, 8, 125-128, 165, 184, 
 254- 
 
 Hypothesis, 251, 260 ff. 
 
 Ideal aspect of experience, 83 ff. ; 
 development of, 84 ff. 
 
 Ideals, dynamism of, 68. 
 
 Ideo-motor action, 85-89 ; signifi- 
 cance for control, 87-88. 
 
 Image and imagination, 86, 117, 
 ch. 12, 285, 296; activity of, in 
 thinking, ch. 11, 239; concrete 
 and abstract images, 152 ff. ; 
 development of imagination, ch. 
 14; imagination and play, 176; 
 image and concept, 193. 
 
 Impulse, 39, 75-76, 83, 175; sig- 
 nificance to man, 76-77, 83-84. 
 
 Individual control, see control. 
 
 Induction and deduction, chs. 18- 
 20, 286. 
 
 Inductive "steps," 243-251, cf. 
 214-217. 
 
 Infancy, prolonged human, 76, 83- 
 84; stages of, 174-188. 
 
 Instinct and instinctive action ; 
 nervous mechanism for, 28-30, 
 34-36 ; consciousness and, 30-31, 
 38, 39, 42, 77-81 ; general na- 
 ture of, 74-76 ; of man and 
 animals compared, 76-77 ; in 
 relation to control, 42, 43, 76- 
 77, 81, 88. 
 
 Intellect, 55 ff-, 83 ff., 108-109; 
 functional interpretation of, 
 62-68. 
 
 Isolations, fallacious, 8, 17, 58- 
 62, 65-68, 72, 282. 
 
 Judgment, ch. 21, 286. 
 
 Kant, 293. 
 
 Kindergarten, 39, 116, 176, 181, 
 
 296-297. 
 Kinesthetic sensations, 50. 
 
 Language, 11 3-1 14, 227. 
 Lies of children, i7gri8o. 
 
302 
 
 The Psychology of Thinking 
 
 Logic, viii, 146-148, 231, 257, 261, 
 267. 
 
 Logical concept, 206-220, 222, 
 226, 231, 244, 281 ; not final, 
 204, 218-220; function in think- 
 ing, 220 ff. 
 
 Manual training, 55. S8, 62, 117- 
 123, 124, 165, 183, 227, 229-230. 
 
 Mathematics, vii, 2, 92, 104, 123- 
 125, 136, 139-140, 141, 144-150, 
 153, 158, 166-169, 172, 187, 
 197, 218-219, 253-254, 256, 258, 
 267, 272, 284. 
 
 Meaning, 153-160, 170 ff., igi-192, 
 194, 199; nature and genesis 
 of, 153-155 ; definition of, 155 ; 
 meaning and symbol, 155-157 : 
 functional interpretation of, 
 157-158 ; meaning of abstract 
 image, 162-163, 166; meaning 
 in concept, 191 ff. 
 
 ■Means and end, as a category, 
 94-97- 
 
 Medicine, illustrations of think- 
 ing, 288-289. 
 
 Memory, 18-19, 47, 56-57 ; asso- 
 ciative, 31, 81 : organic mem- 
 ory in instinctive action, 80-81 ; 
 in ideo-motor action, 86. 
 
 Mental development, general prin- 
 ciple of, 46-47, 51-52. 
 
 Mental life, unity of, ch. 6 ; rela- 
 tion between mental and motor 
 life, ch. 6. 
 
 Mind, biological view of, 17-21 ; 
 see biological point of view, 
 child mind, consciousness, con- 
 trol, and mental development. 
 
 Moral instruction, 165, 228-229. 
 
 Motivation, 58-62, 66, 107-108, 
 109-110, 118-119, 123-124, 225, 
 
 245, 268. 
 
 Motor processes, in relation to 
 mental, ch. 6, 120-121 ; see 
 manual training; 51-52, 46-47. 
 
 Music, 137-138. 
 
 Myths, 178-179. 
 
 Observation, 55-60, 214-217, 243- 
 
 246, 249-250. See perception. 
 Organic circuit, 48-53, 72 ; appli- 
 cations, ch. 6. 
 
 Organism, 11-17; essential char- 
 acteristics of, 11-13. 
 
 Percept and perception, 31, 47, 55- 
 60, 132, 179-180, 281 ; in in- 
 stinctive action, 78-80 ; in ideo- 
 motor action, 85-86 ; distin- 
 guished from sensation, 84-85 ; 
 as a factor in control, 85 ; see 
 observation. 
 
 Pestalozzi, 59. 
 
 Plasticity, 39-40, 76, 83-84. 
 
 Plato's Dialogues, 172. 
 
 Play, 76, 175-178. 
 
 Psychological concept, 206-214, 
 226-228, 244, 281. 
 
 Psychology, present tendency in, 
 4ff. 
 
 Racial control, see control and 
 instinct. 
 
 Reaction, law of, 15-16, function 
 of, 16-17; process of, ch. 3; 
 consciousness and, chs. 3-4. 
 
 Reading, 171. 
 
 Reasoning, 104-105, 106-107, 187, 
 281, ch. 222; of animals, 293- 
 295 ; of c'hildren, 295-296 ; train- 
 ing in, 296 ff. 
 
 Receptivity, fallacious doctrine of, 
 105-107, 116, 296. 
 
 Reflex action, 24-27, 35-36, 73-74; 
 significance of, 26-27 ; con- 
 sciousness and, 27-28, 74. 
 
 Reflex arc, 49-52, 54. 
 
 Religion and religious instruc- 
 tion, 8, 20, 165, 168-169, 170, 
 227-228. 
 
 Self activity, 69. 
 Sensation, 84-85. 
 Sensori-motor circuit, ch. 3, cf. 
 
 54-55- 
 
 Sensory processes, in relation to 
 motor, 54 ff. 
 
 Socrates, 226. 
 
 Spencer, 4-5, 45-46- 
 
 Stages of development, 174 ff. 
 
 Syllogism, 256 ff- ; functional in- 
 terpretation of, 257-260. 
 
 Symbolism, 152-157; danger of, 
 123, 170-173, 270; development 
 of, 182-183. 
 
Index 
 
 303 
 
 Technique of thinking, 69, 100, 
 loi-ios, 111-114, 117, 122, ch. 
 12, 188, chs. 15-16, chs. 18-21, 
 285-286, 297-298. 
 
 Teleology, see biological point of 
 view; teleological nature of 
 concept, 198; teleological na- 
 ture of syllogism, 258 flf. 
 
 Thinking, general nature of, 1-3 ; 
 teleological nature of, 2, 3, 21, 
 58, see teleology; in relation to 
 control, 3, 98-100, see control; 
 functional interpretation of, 3, 
 56-57. 58. 72, chs. 8-9 ; recent 
 in evolution, 73 ; conditions of, 
 88-90, ch. 8 ; in deliberative 
 action, 90 ; general principle 
 and definition of, 97 ; relation 
 to other conscious processes, 
 56-57, 72, 97-98; unity and 
 difference in, ch. 9 ; of animals, 
 293-295; of children, 105-114, 
 116, 180-185, 271-272, 295 ff. ; 
 training in, 107-114, ch. 10, 143- 
 150, ch. 13, 183-185, 187-188, 
 ch. 17, 254, 267 ff., 282-283, 
 
 296-298 ; activity of imagina- 
 tion in, ch. II, ch. 14; in rela- 
 tion to system of knowledge, 
 148-150, 179, 239-241, 261, 268- 
 272 ; significance of concept in, 
 220-223 ; see technique of think- 
 ing and reasoning. 
 Type study, 272-274. 
 
 Unity of mental and motor life, 
 ch. 6. 
 
 Variation, consciousness factor of, 
 37 ff-, 69. 
 
 Voluntary action, nervous mechan- 
 ism for, 31-33, 34-36, 82-83 ; 
 significance of, 32-34 ; con- 
 sciousness and, 33-34, 82-83 ; 
 definition of, 85 ; of ideo-motor 
 type, 85-89 ; of deliberative 
 type, 89-90. 
 
 Will, 62 ff. ; functional interpre- 
 tation of, 62-68 ; nature of, 63, 
 64, 292 ; training of, 67-68 ; see 
 voluntary action. 
 
By EDWARD B. TITCHENER 
 
 Sage Professor of Psychology in Cornell University 
 
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