3 
 
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 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 Gift in memory of 
 
 MARY STEPHENS SHERMAN, 'U 
 
 from 
 
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Cornell University Library 
 B791 .C15 1917 
 
 Persistent problems of philosophy an in 
 
 olin 
 
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 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
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 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
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THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS 
 OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
-y^^y^ 
 
THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS 
 OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS 
 
 THROUGH THE STUDY OF 
 
 MODERN SYSTEMS 
 
 BY 
 MARY WHITON CALKINS 
 
 PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN WELLESLEY COLLEGE 
 
 AUTHOR OF "AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY," " DER 
 
 DOPPELTE STANDPUNKT IN DER PSYCHOLOGIE" 
 
 "A FIRST BOOK IN PSYCHOLOGY" 
 
 FOURTH REVISED EDITION. 
 
 NeJD gotfe 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 LONDON : MACMILLAN & CO., LTD. 
 192 1 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
Copyright, 1907 and 1917, 
 By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 
 
 Set up and electrotyped. Published March, ^907> 
 
 )^7Tue 
 
 J. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. 
 Norwood, Mass., U,S.A. 
 
PATRI MATRIQUE OMNIUM RERUM QUASCUMQUE 
 PERFECI AUCTORIBUS FItIA AMANTISSIMA HUNC 
 LIBRUM DEDICAVl 
 
PREFACE 
 
 I MUST admit at the outset that this book is not written 
 to lure students, guiltless of metaphysical aspirations, into 
 pleasant paths of philosophical speculation. It is intended 
 rather for students and readers who are seriously concerned 
 with the problems of philosophy and genuinely anxious to 
 study metaphysics under the guidance of the great thinkers. 
 The book is, none the less, designed for beginners in 
 philosophy, as well as for those more advanced, and I 
 have tried to make it clear in statement and logical in 
 order. I have audaciously attempted to combine, also, 
 what seem to me the essential features of a systematic 
 Introduction to Metaphysics with those of a History of 
 Modern Philosophy. This I have done both because I 
 believe that the problems of philosophy are, at the outset, 
 best studied as formulated in the actual systems of great 
 thinkers, and because the historical sequence of philoso- 
 phies, from Descartes's to Hegel's, seems to coincide, 
 roughly, with a logical order. 
 
 I am well aware that in writing a book which seeks to 
 combine two functions, often distinguished, and which 
 attempts to meet the needs of two groups of students, I 
 have run the risk of fulfilUng neither purpose and of help- 
 ing neither set of readers. I hope, however, that certain 
 features of the book may prove useful ; in particular, the 
 plan on which it classifies metaphysical systems, the sum- 
 maries it offers as well of the arguments as of the conclu- 
 sions of modern philosophers, the exact quotations and 
 multiplied text references of its expositions. If I have 
 overloaded the book with quotations and references, it is 
 because I have myself suffered greatly from my inability 
 to find in the writings of the philosophers the doctrines 
 attributed to them by the commentators. I shall be much 
 
viii Preface 
 
 disappointed if these citations do not whet the appetite of 
 the reader and send him directly to the texts of Descartes, 
 Leibniz, Berkeley, and the rest. I cannot, indeed, too 
 emphatically express my sense of the value of a study of 
 texts, and my conviction that this Introduction, and any 
 other, should be used to supplement and not to supplant 
 a reading of the philosophers. The advanced student will, 
 I trust, be aided in such text study by the relative abun- 
 dance of bibliographical and critical material. In the 
 main, this has been relegated, with the biographies, to the 
 Appendix of the book, that the continuity of metaphysical 
 discussion may not be broken. 
 
 It is only fair to point out, finally, that the book, though 
 mainly exposition and criticism, is written from the stand- 
 point of a metaphysical theory fairly well defined. This 
 I have indicated in my last chapter. My philosophical 
 predilections have inevitably colored my criticisms; but I 
 trust that they have not distorted my interpretation of the 
 thought of the philosophers whom I have considered, and 
 that the book may, therefore, be of service to those who 
 do not agree with its estimates or with its conclusions. 
 
 The succeeding chapters disclose the nature and extent 
 of my chief intellectual obligations. But I cannot deny 
 myself the pleasure of acknowledging my personal indebt- 
 edness to my first instructor in philosophy, Professor 
 H. N. Gardiner, to my constant counseller. Professor 
 George H. Palmer, and to the teacher of my more recent 
 student years. Professor Josiah Royce. For generous and 
 invaluable help in the preparation of this book, I am grate- 
 ful, beyond my power of expression, to my colleague, 
 Professor Mary S. Case, who has read the book in manu- 
 script and has criticised it in detail, to its great advantage ; 
 to my father, who has read all the proofs ; and to my 
 friend and pupil, Helen G. Hood, who has verified the 
 citations and references of footnotes and Appendix, and 
 has prepared the Index. 
 
 MARY WHITON CALKINS. 
 January, 1907. 
 
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 
 
 It has been necessary to make ready the second edition of 
 this book at a few days' notice ; but I have tried, in spite of 
 haste, to profit by the counsels of my critics. I am under 
 special obhgation to Professor Ellen B. Talbot of Mount 
 Holyoke College, for supplementing a published review by 
 written suggestions. The greater number of the changes 
 which I have made affect my discussions of Hume's doctrine 
 of causality and of Kant's doctrine of the categories. I have 
 altered my statement of the concept of causality, in conform- 
 ity with Rickert's teaching, by distinguishing (pp. 155, 161, 
 162, et al.; 213 seq.) between causal and natural law; I 
 have explicitly attributed to Kant (p. 225) the conception of 
 epistemological in addition to that of logical necessity ; and 
 I have corrected the passages (pp. 205 seq. and 221) in which 
 I had carelessly identified universality and necessity. There 
 may come a later opportunity for more detailed discussion of 
 this whole subject through a section added to the Appendix. 
 None of these changes involve, in my opinion, a revision of 
 my general estimate and interpretation of Kant's teaching. 
 To this estimate, with all respect to the views of my con- 
 servatively Kantian critics, I still adhere. 
 
 Changes of statement which involve no important alter- 
 ation of doctrine are the attempt (p. 10) to include Kant, 
 Fichte, and Schelling in my Table of Modern Philosophers ; 
 the modified exposition (p. 29) and the reformulated criticism 
 (pp. 48-49) of one of Descartes's arguments ; the reference, 
 on p. Ill, to Spinoza ; the specific assertion (p. 351, footnote) 
 that my interpretation of Schopenhauer diverges from that 
 which is usual; and, finally, the restatement (pp. 408-409) 
 
X Preface 
 
 of the conception of self, and the comparison of this doctrine 
 with that of ' spiritual substance.' I take this opportunity 
 to refer readers, who are interested in the discussion of the 
 nature of the self, to my papers in the Journal of Philosophy 
 for January 30 and for February 27, 1908, and in the Philo- 
 sophical Review for May, 1908. 
 
 The remaining changes in the body of the book are merely 
 verbal corrections. Additions to the BibKography are made 
 on pp. 506, 556, and 558. The paging of the first edition 
 
 is retained. 
 
 M. w. c. 
 
 February, 1908. 
 
 PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION 
 
 The present revision of this book has been undertaken 
 primarily in order to relate its conclusions to the more 
 recent of contemporary philosophical writings and, in par- 
 ticular, to refer to the arguments against idealism so 
 loudly urged by the writers who call themselves 'neo- 
 reahsts.' Advantage has also been taken of the oppor- 
 tunity to amend and to supplement many passages of the 
 book. 
 
 In more detaU, the important additions are the follow- 
 ing : a summary (pp. 42-43) of Descartes's philosophy of 
 nature; a reference (p. 185, note) to modern forms of the 
 Humian doctrine of the self ; a statement (pp. 399-400) of 
 W. P. Montague's conception of consciousness as potential 
 energy; a section (pp. 402-404) on contemporary neo- 
 realism; a brief statement (pp. 409-410) of the bearing of 
 the facts of so-called multiple personality on the doctrine 
 of the unity of the self; a summary (p. 420, note) of 
 Russell's argument in opposition to absolutism ; an indica- 
 tion (p. 441) of the points of contact between Bergson's 
 conception of time and that of absolutistic personaHsm; 
 
Preface xi 
 
 and additions to the BibKography (pp. 557-559 et al., and 
 Supplement, pp. 564-566). The principal changes are cor- 
 rections (pp. 45, 52, 53) of my earlier formulations of 
 Descartes's criterion of certainty and of portions of his 
 arguments for the existence of God ; a correction (pp. 62- 
 63) of my former summary of Hobbes's argument for 
 materialism ; a restatement, without essential change (pp. 
 122, 130), of part of Berkeley's argument ; a more spiritual- 
 istic interpretation (pp. 339-342) of Schelling's identity 
 philosophy; and a re-writing (pp. 429, 449, 451-452) of 
 certain passages in the discussion concerning absolute will 
 and human freedom. Minor changes occur on pages 9, 10, 
 69, 99, 163, 216, 237, 331, 336, 337, 407, 424, 428, 447, 485, 
 492, 494, 500, 515 f-> 523 note, 525 note, 546, 555 note, 
 556. Certain sentences and paragraphs of the earher edi- 
 tions have been omitted, so that the paging is, in the main, 
 undisturbed. 
 
 Especial attention is called, in conclusion, to two points 
 of terminology : (i) to the useful, and neglected, distinction 
 between 'quahtatively' and 'numerically' pluraHstic or 
 monistic systems, and (2) to the use, throughout the 
 book, of the term 'idealism' in the widest possible sense 
 to mean 'the conception of reality as of the nature of 
 consciousness.' The present-day tendency to identify 
 ideahsm either with ideism or with subjective ideahsm 
 is much to be regretted; for there is no other term by 
 which to cover both ideism (the Humian doctrine that 
 reaUty reduces to momentary states of consciousness) and 
 spirituaUsm (or personalism), the doctrine that the universe 
 is throughout personal. In this wider use, the term ideal- 
 ism appHes not only to ideism and to subjective idealism 
 — the form of spiritualism which teaches that the universe 
 narrows to my consciousness — but also to the other forms 
 of spirituaUsm ; to pluraHstic spirituahsm, the doctrine of 
 Leibniz and Berkeley and Ward, and to absolutistic spir- 
 
xii Preface 
 
 itualism, the doctrine of Hegel, of Royce, of Bosanquet, 
 which the last chapter of this book expounds and upholds. 
 
 M. w. c. 
 
 July, 1912. 
 
 PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION 
 
 The issue of a fourth edition of this book gives oppor- 
 tunity for a few changes. The description of the self (p. 
 408) and the discussion of freedom (pp. 451-453) have been 
 re-written. BibHographical references have been added 
 to the footnotes of pages 404, 408, 410, 425, 447. Other 
 changes are made on pages 65, 205, 224, 237, 244, 351, 
 404, Si7> 518, 557. 
 
 M. W. C. 
 
 Dacember, 1916. 
 
CONTENTS 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE NATURE, TYPES, AND VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I. The Nature of Philosophy 
 
 Distinguished from everyday consciousness .... 3 
 
 Distinguished from art . . , 3 
 
 Distinguished from natural science . , . . . . 3 
 II. The Approach to Philosophy 
 
 The scientific point of departure 6 
 
 The study of texts 8 
 
 III. The Types of Philosophy 
 
 Qualitative pluralism or qualitative monism .... 9 
 
 Numerical pluralism or numerical monism .... 9 
 
 Idealism or non-idealism ........ 10 
 
 IV. The Value of Philosophy 12 
 
 SYSTEMS OF NUMERICAL PLURALISM 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 PLURALISTIC DUALISM: THE SYSTEM OF DESCARTES 
 
 I. Introduction: The Beginnings of Modern Philosophy . 17 
 II. The Philosophical System of Descartes 
 
 a. The preparation for philosophy : universal doubt . . 21 
 
 b. The implication of doubt : my own existence ... 23 
 
 c. The inference from my own existence : the existence of God 25 
 
 Ontological arguments for the existence of God : — 
 God must exist, for 
 
 I have a clear and distinct consciousness of him . 26 
 The idea of perfection involves that of existence . 26 
 xiii 
 
xiv Contents 
 
 Causal arguments for the existence of God : — 
 God must exist as cause 
 
 Of the idea of God within me 28 
 
 Of me 30 
 
 d. The inference from the existence of God ; the existence of 
 
 corporeal bodies and of finite selves ... 34 
 
 e. Descartes's summary of his teaching : the substance doctrine 39 
 
 One absolutely independent substance, God ... 4° 
 Created substances of two sorts, minds and bodies, each 
 
 independent of every other created substance . 4° 
 
 III. Critical Estimate of Descartes's System 
 
 a. The adequate basis of Descartes's system : my own existence 43 
 
 b, Descartes's inadequate arguments for God's existence 
 
 Criticism of the ontological arguments : — 
 
 Clear conception is no test of existence ... 44 
 Conceived existence does not necessarily imply actual 
 
 existence 46 
 
 Criticism of the causal arguments : — 
 
 Descartes does not prove that the cause of the idea of 
 
 God must resemble that idea 48 
 
 Descartes confuses the conception of ultimate cause 
 
 with that of first cause 50 
 
 i. Descartes's inadequate arguments to prove the existence of 
 any corporeal reality. Criticism : — 
 
 1. The proof falls with that of God's existence . . 52 
 
 2. The proof from God's veracity is inconsistent . . 53 
 d. Descartes's inadequate dualism : — 
 
 The doctrine of the independence of substances is incon- 
 sistent with that of the influence of spirits and bodies 
 on each other 54 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 PLURALISTIC MATERIALISM: THE SYSTEM OF HOBBES 
 
 [. The Materialistic Doctrine of Hobbes .... 56 
 a. Preliminary outline : The universe is an aggregate of bodies, 
 including : — 
 
 God, the First Mover eg 
 
 Finite spirits ......... eg 
 
 Corporeal bodies recognized as such .... 58 
 
 Note : The commonwealth as civil body • • ■ 59 
 
Contents xv 
 
 b. The doctrine of Hobbes concerning the nature of bodies : 
 
 They are : — 
 Independent of consciousness ..... 60 
 Spatial 60 
 
 c. The argument of Hobbes : — 
 
 Bodies (the non-conscious) are ultimately real, for con- 
 sciousness is fundamentally unreal, since : — 
 Illusions and sense-images are indistinguishable . . 62 
 Ideas vary with the individuals who have them . . 63 
 Precisely similar ideas may arise from different causes 63 
 Consciousness, because caused by motion, is a form of 
 
 motion 63 
 
 II. Critical Estimate of the Doctrine of Hobbes 
 
 The untrustworthiness of consciousness does not prove its 
 
 unreality ........ 65 
 
 The alleged fact that motion is cause of consciousness would not 
 
 prove that consciousness is identical with motion . 65 
 Hobbes's conception of body is inconsistently idealistic . . 66 
 
 Materialists after Hobbes 69 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 PLURALISTIC SPIRITUALISM: THE SYSTEM OF LEIBNIZ 
 
 I. The System of Leibniz 74 
 
 a. The argument for the doctrine that the universe consists of 
 
 immaterial monads 75 
 
 b. The doctrine of the classes of monads and their nature : — 
 
 1. The supreme monad, God . ... . . 79 
 
 2, The finite monads ....... 80 
 
 (a) The characters common to all finite monads : — 
 
 1. Every monad depends on God . . 81 
 
 2. Every monad is active . . . .81 
 
 3. Every monad is absolutely separate from 
 
 every other ..... 82 
 
 4. Every monad is a unity of its own states 84 
 
 5. Every monad mirrors or expresses all 
 
 reality ...... 85 
 
 6. Every monad has been predetermined by 
 
 God to be in harmony with every other 87 
 
xvi Contents 
 
 PAGI 
 
 (i) The classes of finite monads : — 
 
 1. The rational monads: conscious moral 
 
 selves ...,.,, 90 
 
 2. The sentient monads : irrational souls . 92 
 
 3. The simple monads .... 93 
 
 II. Critical Estimate of the System of Leibniz ... 96 
 
 a. Estimate of the doctrine concerning the nature of reality : — 
 
 Leibniz's doctrine of reality as immaterial is sound, but 
 
 is not adequately supported ..... 98 
 
 Leibniz's doctrine of the ultimate multiplicity of reahty 
 
 is without sufficient basis ..... 99 
 
 b. Estimate of the doctrine concerning God : — 
 
 Of Leibniz's arguments for the existence of God, 
 The ontological argument wrongly infers actual neces- 
 sary existence from possible necessary existence . 100 
 The causal argument does not reconcile the teaching 
 that God is outside the series of the finite with the 
 teaching that God is ' sufficient reason ' of the finite 102 
 Leibniz's attempt to reconcile God's goodness with the 
 
 existence of evil is unsuccessful .... 105 
 
 c. Estimate of the doctrine of the finite monads : — 
 
 Those characters of the finite monads which demand the 
 
 existence of God are unproved .... 107 
 
 The activity, internal unity, harmoniousness, and relative 
 isolation of the finite monads are satisfactorily 
 argued 107 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 PLURALISTIC SPIRITUALISM {Continued): THE SYSTEM 
 OF BERKELEY 
 
 Berkeley's Doctrine of the Reality of the Immediately 
 Known: Myself and my Ideas 
 
 "3 
 
 II. Berkeley's Negative Doctrine: The Disproof of the Ex- 
 istence OF Matter (Non-ideal Reality) . 117 
 
 Matter does not exist, whether conceived as 
 
 a. Immediately perceived objects (non-ideal and indepen- 
 dent of consciousness), for these are complexes of 
 ideal qualities 118 
 
Contents xvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 b. Inferred non-ideal and independent reality, for this would 
 be either : — 
 Known to be like sense-ideas, but so ideal; (or). . 126 
 Not known to be like sense-ideas, but, in this case, 
 either 
 Cause of sense-ideas, and so related to the ideal; (or) 1 28 
 Mere unknown reality, and so mere nothing . . 130 
 
 III. Berkeley's Positive Doctrine of Inferred Reality 
 
 a. The creative spirit, God, is known to exist as cause of sen- 
 
 sible ideas ........ 134 
 
 b. Other created spirits are known to exist through the ideas 
 
 by them excited in us 138 
 
 c. The world of nature is a series of sensations imprinted on 
 
 our minds by God . 139 
 
 IV. Critical Estimate of Berkeley's System 
 
 a^ Of Berkeley's doctrine concerning God ; — 
 
 Berkeley proves at most the existence of a greater-than- 
 
 human spirit ........ 141 
 
 Berkeley does not prove the creativeness of God . . 143 
 b. Of Berkeley's doctrine of knowledge : — 
 
 Berkeley's conception of knowledge as copy of reality 
 
 would make knowledge impossible . . . 145 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 PLURALISTIC PHENOMENALISTIC IDEALISM: THE 
 SYSTEM OF HUME 
 
 L The Foundation Principles of Hume's Metaphysics 
 
 a. The derivation of idea from impression .... 150 
 
 (Estimate : The doctrine is untrue to Hume's own analy- 
 sis of consciousness.) 
 
 b. The doctrine of causality 153 
 
 1. The conception of causality as a customary, not a 
 
 necessary, connection ...... 15S 
 
 (Estimate : Hume disproves the necessity of causal se- 
 quence, but not the necessity of temporal sequence.) 
 
 2. The conception of power as a determination of the 
 
 mind 163 
 
 (Estimate : Hume's conclusion is correct, but he does 
 not sufficiently distinguish causality from other rela- 
 tions.) 
 
xviii Contents 
 
 II. Hume's Doctkine of Externai, Objects independent of 
 THE Mind 
 u.. The teaching that external objects cannot be known by the 
 
 senses ......... 17' 
 
 b. The teaching that external objects cannot be known by 
 
 reason ......... I73 
 
 (Estimate of these teachings : Both are justified.) 
 
 c. The inconsistent assumption that external objects exist . 176 
 
 III. Hume's Doctrine of Self 
 
 a. The arguments against the existence of any self: — 
 
 There is no need of a subject in which perceptions may 
 
 inhere . . . . . . . . .179 
 
 There is no consciousness of self . . . . .180 
 
 (Estimate : Both arguments are refuted by introspection, 
 and Hume is himself untrue to them.) 
 
 b. The inconsistent assumption that a self exists . . .186 
 
 IV. Hume's Teaching about God 
 
 Hume cannot prove, but often inconsistently assumes, the exist- 
 ence of God ........ 190 
 
 A CRITICISM OF PRECEDING SYSTEMS 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 AN ATTACK UPON DUALISM AND PHENOMENALISM: 
 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 
 
 A. Kant's Doctrine of the Known Object (^A Refutation of 
 Wolff's Dualism and of Hume's Phenomenalism) 
 
 I. Kant's Doctrine of the Known Object as Spatial and 
 
 Temporal igg 
 
 a. The teaching, in opposition to Hume, that space and time 
 
 are unsensational and a priori .... 200 
 
 i. The teaching, in opposition to Wolff, that space and time 
 
 are subjective ....... 202 
 
 II. Kant's Doctrine of the Categories (the Relations of 
 Known Objects) 
 a. The teaching, in opposition to Hume, that the known object 
 
 includes categories, necessary relations . . . 204 
 I. The category of totality ...... 207 
 
Contents xix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 2. The category of degree (implied in the discussion of 
 
 reality) ......... 208 
 
 3. The category of (phenomenal) causality . . .210 
 
 4. The category of reciprocal connection . . .217 
 
 b, Kant's teaching, in opposition to Wolff, that the categories 
 
 are subjective 218 
 
 c. Criticism of Kant's doctrine of the necessity of the cate- 
 
 gories : — 
 Kant proves no more than logical necessity . . . 220 
 
 B. Kanfs Doctrine of Self and of Objects as related to Self. 
 (^In opposition to Hume) 
 
 I. The Argument for the Existence of Self 
 
 Relations require a self as relater ...... 226 
 
 II. The Doctrine of the Nature of Self 229 
 
 a. Transcendental and empirical self: Conceived as: — 
 
 1. Identical and momentary self ..... 230 
 
 2. Thinking and sensationally conscious self . . . 230 
 
 3. Universal and particular self ..... 231 
 (The universal self is inferred from the existence of 
 
 objects outside me.) 
 
 b. Subject self and object self 234 
 
 C. Kant's Negative Doctrine that Ultimate Reality is Unknown 
 
 I. The Doctrine of Things-in-themselves as Unknown . . 236 
 (Comment : Kant does not prove the existence of things-in- 
 themselves.) 
 II. The Doctrine of the Real Self as Unknown . . .241 
 Arguments : — 
 
 We have no sensational consciousness and, therefore, no 
 
 knowledge of a self. (Criticism) .... 243 
 A self cannot be both subject and object. (Criticism) . . 244 
 III. The Doctrine of God as Unknown 
 Refutation of: — 
 
 The ontological argument 247 
 
 The cosmological argument 248 
 
 The physico-theological argument 250 
 
 D. Kant's Correction of his Negative Doctrine 
 
 I. The Admission that Things-in-themselves might be Known 
 
 (the Hypothesis of the Noumenon) . . 254 
 
XX Contents 
 
 II. The Admission that the Real Self is Known 
 
 a. The teaching that I am conscious of the real (or transcen- 
 
 dental) self ....... 
 
 b. The teaching that I know my moral self as real . 
 
 c. The teaching that the moral self must be member of a 
 
 society of free, blessed, and immortal selves . 
 
 1. The freedom of the selves 
 
 2. The immortality of the selves .... 
 
 3. The blessedness of the selves .... 
 (Criticism of Kant's attempt to prove immortality and blessed 
 
 ness.) 
 III. The Teaching that God must exist to assure the Exist- 
 ence OF the Highest Good 
 (Criticism : Kant has not proved the existence of the highest 
 good.) 
 
 255 
 256 
 
 262 
 265 
 266 
 267 
 
 269 
 
 SYSTEMS OF NUMERICAL MONISM 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 MONISTIC PLURALISM: THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA 
 
 The Doctrine of the One Substance, God 
 a. Exposition : — 
 
 1. Substance as totality of reality 282 
 
 2. Substance as manifested in the modes, not the mere 
 
 sum of the modes ....... 286 
 
 3. Substance as constituted by the attributes : God as 
 
 thinking and extended being ..... 288 
 
 i. Critical estimate of Spinoza's doctrine of substance : — 
 
 I. The inadequacy of Spinoza's argument ft)r the exist- 
 ence of substance (God) conceived as absolute . 293 
 3, The inconsistency of Spinoza's doctrine of the many 
 attributes of substance : — 
 
 The plurality of the attributes is inconsistent with 
 the oneness of God ...... 294 
 
 The infiniteness of the number of attributes is 
 not established ...... 295 
 
 3. The inconsistency of Spinoza's conception of God's 
 consciousness as radically different from the human 
 consciousness ....... 297 
 
Contents xxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 II. The Doctrine of the Modes. (Exposition and Criticism) . 299 
 
 u. The causal relation of God to the modes and of the modes 
 to each other : — 
 The modes as expressions of God, their immanent cause 299 
 The modes as linked to each other by temporal causality 300 
 b. The independence and the parallelism of the two mode 
 
 series ......... 302 
 
 (Criticism : The independence of the modes is incompati- 
 ble with the unity of substance. The parallelism is 
 argued from the independence.) 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE ADVANCE TOWARD MONISTIC SPIRITUALISM: 
 THE SYSTEMS OF FICHTE, SCHELLING, AND 
 SCHOPENHAUER 
 
 (Introduction : The Double Relation of Post -Kantian Philosophy 
 
 to Kant and to Spinoza) 307 
 
 A. THE TEACHING OF FICHTE 
 
 I. Fichte's Popular Philosophy 
 
 a. The first stage of philosophical thought: scientific deter- 
 
 minism . 311 
 
 b. The second stage of philosophical thought : phenomenalistic 
 
 idealism 312 
 
 L. The third and final stage of philosophical thought : ethical 
 
 idealism 314 ' 
 
 II. Fichte's Technical Philosophy 
 
 u. The universe consists of mutually related self and not-self . 318 
 
 b. The relatedness of self and not-self Implies their existence 
 
 as parts of an independent, that is, absolute, reality 320 
 
 c. The nature of the absolute reality : it is : — 
 
 1. Absolute I 321 
 
 2. Impersonal I : a system of finite selves . . . 325 
 
 III. Criticism of Fichte's Conclusion 
 
 The teaching of an impersonal I is a contradiction in terms . 328 
 
 B. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHELLING 
 
 I. SCHELLING'S EARLY DOCTRINE : ThE UNIVERSE AS CONSTITUTED 
 
 BY THE Unconditioned but Impersonal I . 331 
 (Criticism : The conception of an impersonal I is self-contra- 
 dictory.) 
 
xxii Contents 
 
 PAGB 
 
 II. Schelling's Doctrine of the Absolute as Mature . . 336 
 III. Schelling's Doctrine of the Absolute as Identity . . 339 
 (Criticism : Schelling virtually restores the discredited con- 
 ception of the thing-in-itself.) 
 
 C. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOPENHAUER 
 
 I. The Teaching of Schopenhauer 
 
 a. The world of phenomena ; ' the world as idea ' . . . 344 
 
 b. The will as ultimate reality : ' the world as will ' . . . 347 
 
 1. Schopenhauer's argument for the doctrine that ulti- 
 
 mate reality is of the nature of will . . . 348 
 
 2. Schopenhauer's assumption that ultimate reality is a 
 
 single One ........ 349 
 
 3. Schopenhauer's conception of the will as unsatisfied 
 
 desire : the ethics of Schopenhauer ; — 
 
 Schopenhauer's pessimism 352 
 
 Schopenhauer's ethical doctrine of self-renuncia- 
 tion 353 
 
 II. Estimate of Schopenhauer's Teaching 
 
 a. The inadequacy of Schopenhauer's conception of the will 
 
 as mere desire ....... 355 
 
 b. Inadequacy of the conception of the ultimate reality as 
 
 mere will ........ 358 
 
 The adequacy of Schopenhauer's implication that ultimate 
 
 reality is absolute self 359 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 MONISTIC SPIRITUALISM: THE SYSTEM OF HEGEL 
 
 I. Ultimate Reality is neither Undetermined nor Unknow- 
 able 363 
 
 II. Ultimate Reality is Absolute One, for 
 
 a. Ultimate reality is not one single limited reality, for 
 
 1. Every limited reality is at least ' same,' and thus 
 
 implies the existence of other realities . . 369 
 
 2. Every limited reality is dependent on others and thus 
 
 requires their existence ...... 372 
 
 b. Ultimate reality is not a composite of all partial realities : — 
 
 I. Ultimate reality is not an aggregate .... 376 
 
Contents xxiii 
 
 PACE 
 
 2. Ultimate reality is not a complete system of related 
 
 partial realities 377 
 
 III. Ultimate Reality is Self; for 
 
 a. Ultimate reality is not adequately conceived as mere Life . 383 
 
 b. Ultimate reality is not adequately conceived as totality of 
 
 particular selves 385 
 
 Hegel's Applications of his Doctrine .... 389 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS: THE 
 ISSUE BETWEEN PLURALISTIC AND MONISTIC 
 PERSONALISM 
 
 A. CONTEMPORARY NON-IDEALISTIC SYSTEMS 
 I. Materialism. (Qualitatively Monistic) .... 397 
 II. Monistic Realism : The Doctrine of the Unknovi/n Reality 
 
 (Qualitatively Pluralistic) .... 400 
 III. Dualism (Neo-Realism) 402 
 
 B. CONTEMPORAR Y SYSTEMS OF IDEALISM 
 I. Phenomenalism. (Numerically Pluralistic) .... 404 
 
 II. Personal Idealism (Personalism) 406 
 
 (The nature and the consciousness of self.) 
 
 a. Pluralistic personal idealism 411 
 
 Theistic 413 
 
 Anti-theistic 413 
 
 b. Monistic personal idealism 417 
 
 The argument for the existence of the absolute self . 418 
 
 The nature of the absolute self ..... 422 
 
 The absolute self in its relation to the partial selves . 435 
 (a) The relation of the absolute self and of the partial 
 
 selves to time ....... 440 
 
 {f>) The freedom of the partial self as related to the 
 
 absoluteness of the absolute self .... 446 
 
 {,c) Immortal moral selves and nature-selves . . 453 
 
xxiv Contents 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 BIOGRAPHIES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES OF MODERN 
 WRITERS ON PHILOSOPHY, TOGETHER WITH 
 SUMMARIES AND DISCUSSIONS OF CERTAIN TEXTS 
 
 FORERUNNERS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Giordano Bruno 457 
 
 Francis Bacon 458 
 
 CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHERS THROUGH 
 LEIBNIZ 
 RENfi Descartes 
 
 I. Life 459 
 
 II. Bibliography 462 
 
 The Occasionalists : — 
 
 Arnold Geulinx 463 
 
 Nicolas Malebranche 464 
 
 Baruch De Spinoza 
 
 I. life . 464 
 
 II. Bibliography . . 466 
 
 III. Note upon Spinoza's Doctrine of the Infinite Modes . . 468 
 
 IV. Exposition and Estimate of Parts II.-V. of Spinoza's Ethics . 469 
 Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz 
 
 I. Life 483 
 
 II. Bibliography 485 
 
 BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS THROUGH HUME 
 
 I. Materialists and their Opponents 
 Thomas Hobbes 
 
 I. Life 487 
 
 II. Bibliography 490 
 
 Opponents of Materialism: The Cambridge Platonists . .491 
 Later British Materialists (Deists) 4g2 
 
 //. Dualists of the Enlightenment 
 John Locke 
 
 I. Life 492 
 
 II. Bibliography 493 
 
Contents xxv 
 
 PAGB 
 
 The Scottish School of Common-sense Philosophers . . . 494 
 
 ///. Spiritualistic Idealists 
 George Berkeley 
 
 I. Life 495 
 
 II. Bibliography 497 
 
 Arthur Collier 498 
 
 IV. The Phenomenalist 
 David Hume 
 
 I. Life 498 
 
 II. Bibliography 500 
 
 British Writers on Ethics and on Theology 
 
 CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHERS OF THE 
 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 I. Rationalistic Dualists 504 
 
 II. French Materialists and their Contemporaries . . . 504 
 III. Humanists 506 
 
 KANT AND THE KANTIANS 
 Immanuel Kant 
 
 I. Life 507 
 
 II. Bibliography 509 
 
 IIL Outline of the " Kritik of Pure Reason " . . . .513 
 
 IV. Detailed study of certain sections of the " Kritik of Pure 
 Reason " : — 
 (o) The space and time doctrine 
 
 1. The arguments of the Esthetic .... 516 
 
 2. The arguments of Antinomies i and 2 . . 521 
 (J>) The doctrine of the categories 525 
 
 The Kantians 534 
 
 THE POST-KANTIAN MONISTIC IDEALISTS 
 
 JoHANN Gottlieb Fichte 
 
 I. Life 536 
 
 II. Bibliography 538 
 
 FrIEDRICH W. J. SCHELLING 
 
 I. Life 540 
 
 II. Bibliography 54^ 
 
xxvi Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 GeORG WlLHELM FrIEDRICH HeGEL 
 
 I- Life 543 
 
 II. Bibliography 545 
 
 III. Critical Note upon the Order of the Hegelian Categories . 549 
 Arthur Schopenhauer 
 
 I. Life 552 
 
 II. Bibliography 554 
 
 NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS AFTER 
 HEGEL 
 
 PosiTivisTS (Opponents of Metaphysics) 556 
 
 Opponents of Idealism : — 
 
 Materialists 556 
 
 Monistic Realists 557 
 
 Idealists : — 
 
 PhenomenaHsts , . . .557 
 
 Pluralistic Personalists 557 
 
 Note : Pragmatists and Pragmatism 558 
 
 Monistic Personalists 560 
 
 GENERAL WORKS ON PHILOSOPHY 
 
 I. Introductions to Philosophy 562 
 
 II. General Histories of Philosophy 563 
 
 III. Histories of Modern Philosophy 564 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE NATURE, TYPES, AND VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 [^L\oiT6(f>ov^ . . , Toiis S^ dXij^ti/oiJs, e07;, rivai \4yeis j Toi)s TTJi 
 i\ri8da.s, ^k S' iyii, (pi.'KoSediwvas. — PLATO, 
 
 I. The Nature or Philosophy 
 
 When Socrates, in the immortal conversation at the house 
 of Cephalus, defined the philosopher as lover of the vision of 
 the truth, he was describing, not the metaphysician, but the 
 seer. For philosophy, in the more technical sense, differs 
 from the mere love of wisdom ; it is reasoned knowledge, 
 not pure insight, and the philosophic lover of the vision must 
 work out the blessed way to realized truth. With philosophy 
 in this more restricted meaning of the term, a meaning which 
 Plato and Aristotle fixed by adopting it, this chapter and this 
 book will principally deal. 
 
 Philosophy, once conceived as reasoning discipHne, is not, 
 however, completely defined. Thus regarded, philosophy is 
 indeed distinguished, as reflective, from everyday experience 
 which accepts or rejects but does nbt reflect on its object; 
 and is distinguished, as theoretical, from art which creates 
 but does not reason. In both these contrasts, however, 
 philosophy resembles natural science, for that also reflects and 
 reasons. The really important problem of the definition of 
 philosophy is consequently this: to distinguish philosophy 
 from natural science. Evidently, philosophy differs from 
 science negatively in so far as, unHke science, it does not seek 
 and classify facts, but rather takes its materials ready-made 
 from the sciences, simply reasoning about them and from 
 them. But if this constituted the only contrast, then philos- 
 ophy would be a part, merely, of science, not a distinct dis- 
 
 3 
 
4 The Nature of Philosophy 
 
 cipline. For science does not stop at observation, though it 
 begins with it; in truth, science as well as philosophy 
 reasons and explains. Philosophy, therefore, if conceived 
 simply as the process of reasoning about scientific phenom- 
 ena, would be merely the explanatory side of science. There 
 are, however, in the view of most students, two important con- 
 trasts which hold between science and philosophy : philosophy 
 must take as its object the utterly irreducible nature of some 
 reality; and philosophy may take as its object the ultimate 
 nature not only of a single fact or group of facts, but of all- 
 that-there-is, "the ultimate reality into which all else can be 
 resolved and which cannot itself be resolved into anything 
 beyond, that in terms of which all else can be expressed and 
 which cannot itself be expressed in terms of anything outside 
 itseh." ' In both respects a natural science differs from 
 philosophy. To begin with the character last named: 
 philosophy, as has been said, may concern itself with the all-of- 
 reahty — and an adequate philosophy will certainly seek to 
 discover the nature of the all-of-reahty ; a science, on the 
 other hand, studies facts of one order only, that is, it analyzes 
 merely a Umited group of phenomena. Again, philosophy, 
 whatever its scope, always concerns itself with the irreducible 
 nature of some reahty ; whereas a science does not properly 
 raise the question whether these, its phenomena, are in the 
 end reducible to those of another order. 
 
 These distinctions may be readily illustrated. The physi- 
 ologist, for example, does not inquire whether or not the 
 limited object of his study, the living cell, is in its fundamental 
 nature a physical or a psychical phenomenon — whether, in 
 other words, protoplasm reduces, on the one hand, to physical 
 energy, or, on the other hand, to consciousness. On the con- 
 trary the physiologist, properly unconcerned about the com- 
 
 ' R. B. Haldane, " The Pathway to Reality," I., p. 19. Cf. also Hegel, 
 " Encyclopsedia," I., " Logic," Chapters i, 2, 6, for discussion of the nature 
 of philosophy ; and cf. injra. Chapter 11, pp. 369 ieg. for consideration of 
 Hegel's view that no irreducible reality can be limited, and that conse- 
 quently the object of philosophy is, of necessity, the all-of-reality. 
 
The Nature of Philosophy 5 
 
 pleteness or about the utter irreducibleness of his object, 
 confines himself to analysis within arbitrary limits of his 
 living cells, leaving to the philosopher the questions : What 
 is the real nature of these psychical and these physical pro- 
 cesses? Is reality ultimately split up into psychical and 
 physical? Is the division a final one, or is the pyschical 
 reducible to the physical ? Is thought a function of brain 
 activity? Or, finally, is the physical itself reducible to the 
 psychical; that is, is matter a manifestation of conscious 
 spirit ? More than this, the physicist links fact with fact, the 
 rising temperature with the increased friction, the spark with 
 the electric contact. The philosopher, on the other hand, 
 if he take the largest view of his calling, seeks the connection of 
 each fact or group of facts — each limited portion of reality — 
 with the adequate and complete reality. His question is not, 
 how does one fact explain another fact ? but, how does each 
 fact fit into the scheme as a whole ? 
 
 Both characters of the object of philosophy are indicated 
 by the epithet 'ultimate,' of which frequent use is made in 
 this book. Because the object of philosophy is entirely 
 irreducible and because the object of philosophy may be the 
 all-of- reality — for both these reasons, it is often called ultimate 
 and is contrasted with the proximate reah ties of natural science. 
 It is ultimate because it is utterly irreducible and is not a 
 mere manifestation of a deeper reality ; it is ultimate, also, in 
 so far as there is nothing beyond it, in so far, that is, as it in- 
 cludes all that exists. It follows, from the utter irreducible- 
 ness and from the absolute completeness which an adequate 
 philosophy sets before itself, that philosophy is rather a search, 
 a pursuit, an endeavor, than an achievement. This character 
 is widely recognized. Stumpf, for example, conceives philos- 
 ophy as the question-science; James defines metaphysics as 
 the unusually obstinate effort to ask questions; and Paulsen 
 says that philosophy is no 'closed theory' but a 'problem.' 
 All these characters assigned to philosophy may finally be 
 gathered up into one definition : Philosophy is the attempt to 
 
6 The Nature of Philosophy 
 
 discover by reasoning the utterly irreducible nature of any- 
 thing ; and philosophy, in its most adequate form, seeks the 
 ultimate nature of all-that-there-is. 
 
 II. The Approach to Philosophy 
 
 The preceding discussion, brief as it is, of the nature of 
 philosophy, has disclosed certain perils which menace the 
 student of philosophy. Because the systematic observation 
 of phenomena is the peculiar province not of philosophy 
 but of science, the student of philosophy is tempted to deal 
 in vague abstractions, in hfeless generaUties, often, alas, in 
 mere bloodless words and phrases. And because he admits 
 that his own study is, at the beginning, a setting of problems, 
 a questioning, not a dogmatic formulation, he is tempted not 
 to press for a solution of his problems, to cherish his questions 
 for their own sake. 
 
 The only way of avoiding both these pitfalls is to approach 
 the philosophical problems by the avenue of scientific inves- 
 tigation, and from time immemorial, the great philosophers 
 have emphasized this truth. Hegel heaped scorn upon the 
 common view that philosophy consists in the lack of scientific 
 information, and had no condemnation too severe for the 
 ' arm-chair philosophy ' which makes of metaphysic a ' rhetoric 
 of trivial truths'; and, in the same spirit, Paulsen recently 
 writes, "A true philosopher attacks things {ein recht- 
 schaffener Philosoph macht sich an die Dinge selbst)." The 
 philosopher, Paulsen continues, "must at some point, touch 
 bottom with his feet. . . . He may freely choose his sub- 
 ject from the psychological or from the physical sciences ; for 
 as all roads lead to Rome, so among the sciences, all paths 
 lead to philosophy, but there are no paths through the air." 
 
 Paulsen's assertion that philosophy may be reached by way 
 of any one of the sciences is confirmed by the experience of the 
 great philosophers. Descartes and Leibniz and Kant were 
 
The Approach to Philosophy 7 
 
 mathematicians and physical scientists as well as philosophers ; 
 and Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were psychologists. But 
 though metaphysics may be approached from any point on 
 the circumference of the sciences, it is not to be denied that 
 certain inconsistencies and even fallacies have often charac- 
 terized the systems of mathematicians and natural scientists 
 who turn to philosophy.' It is equally certain that these 
 defects have been due to a confusion of scientific with philo- 
 sophical ideals, of scientific with metaphysical standards. 
 Indirectly, these confusions suggest the value of still another 
 entrance to philosophy, the approach by way of what is 
 ordinarily called the history of philosophy. 
 
 Such a study has two definite advantages, and one of these 
 is distinctive. In common with the natural sciences, this 
 study of philosophical texts shares the advantage of being a 
 study of facts. Its facts, to be sure, are second-hand tran- 
 scripts of reality, not direct experiences (and herein lies the 
 disadvantage of the method) ; but nobody who hammers out 
 the meaning of Spinoza, of Kant, or of Aristotle, who compares 
 passages to get at their common significance or divergence, 
 who estimates the different statements of a philosopher with 
 reference to the date of their formulation — no student of 
 texts, in a word, can be accused of floating about vaguely in a 
 sea of abstractions. The more characteristic advantage of 
 this approach to philosophy is the fact that it forces the stu- 
 dent to take different points of view. Spinoza's monism 
 challenges the dualism of Descartes, and Leibniz's emphasis 
 on individuahty throws into relief the problem neglected by 
 Spinoza. The student of pre-Kantian philosophy may turn 
 out dualist or monist or plurahst, but he cannot accept any 
 one hypothesis in a wholly uncritical and dogmatic way, as if 
 no other alternative could be seriously considered. Even the 
 scrupulous and rigorous study of any one great philosophical 
 system must reveal the means for the correction of its own 
 
 ' Cf. Appendix, pp. 518 jeg., and Chapter 11, pp. 398 jeg. 
 
8 The Approach to Philosophy 
 
 inconsistencies. Hume, for example, implies the existence of 
 the self which he denies, for he employs the I to make the 
 denial; and Kant's admissions concerning the moral con- 
 sciousness, if applied as they logically should be to all experi- 
 ence, would solve his paradox of self-consciousness. 
 
 All this suggests the requirements of an adequate study of 
 philosophical texts. It is, first and foremost, the duty of the 
 student to find out what the philosopher whom he studies says 
 and means. This is not always an easy task. If, for example, 
 one is studying Kant or Hegel, one has virtually to learn a new 
 language. It makes no difference how much German one 
 knows, Kant and Hegel do not always speak in German, and 
 Kant does not even always use the same language for two 
 consecutive sections. This bare text criticism, indispensable 
 as it is, is however a mere prehminary to the real expository 
 process, the re-thinking of a philosopher's argument, the sym- 
 pathetic apprehension of his thought. This means, of course, 
 that one reads and re-reads his text, that one outHnes his ar- 
 gument and supplies the links that are evidently implied but 
 verbally lacking, and that one combines the arguments of his 
 different philosophical works. Only when this task of in- 
 terpretation is completed can one fairly enter upon the 
 criticism of a metaphysical system. But the criticism, 
 though chronologically later, is a necessary feature of the 
 study. We do not read philosophy in order to become dis- 
 ciples or to adopt, wholesale, anybody's views. We must, 
 therefore, challenge a philosopher's conclusions and probe his 
 arguments. The only danger in the process is that it will be 
 premature ; in other words, that we oppose what we do not 
 fully understand. Both interpretation and criticism, to be 
 of value, must be primarily first-hand. The curse of the 
 study of literature and of philosophy ahke is the pernicious 
 habit of reading books about books, without reading the books 
 themselves. Interpretation and criticism, finally, have for 
 their main purpose the development of one's own capacity 
 to think constructively, or at any rate, independently. One's 
 
The Types of Philosophy 9 
 
 first objectinreadingphilosophyis, to be sure, the discovery of 
 what philosophers mean, but this is not one's main purpose. 
 For of the great teacher of philosophy that must be true 
 which Herder said of Kant in the early years of his teach- 
 ing, "He obliged me to think for myself; for tyranny was 
 foreign to his soul." Independent thought about the prob- 
 lems of ultimate reality is, thus, the goal of philosophical study. 
 
 III. The Types of Philosophy 
 
 Philosophical systems are best grouped from the stand- 
 point of the object of a complete philosophy. Regarding this 
 object, the irreducible all-of-reality, two questions suggest 
 themselves : First, what exactly is the nature of the universe 
 when it is reduced to the fundamentally real ; to what sort 
 or sorts of reality does it, in other words, reduce? And 
 second, is this ultimate reality one being or many beings ; is 
 it simple or complex ? To the second of these questions one 
 of two answers may obviously be given : the all-of-reality 
 is one, or else it is more-than-one, that is, many. Systems of 
 philosophy which give the first answer may be called numeri- 
 cally monistic; theories which regard the all-of-reality as 
 ultimately a manifold are numerically pluralistic. 
 
 But neither answer gives us information of the nature of 
 the all-of-reality ; that is, neither answers the first of the 
 questions of philosophy. Whether the universe consist of 
 one being, or of many, still the student of philosophy de- 
 mands the nature of this one real, or of these many reals. 
 At first, this problem, also, is a question of one or many. 
 The universe, even if it consist of many beings, may be all 
 of a kind ; and on the other hand, if it be one, that One may 
 conceivably have a plural nature. The first is a qualita- 
 tively monistic, the second a qualitatively -pluralistic, concep- 
 tion. (It thus appears that monism is a doctrine which 
 teaches that ultimate reality has a unity in some sense 
 fxmdamental to its plurality, and that pluralism is a 
 doctrine which denies this fundamental unity.) 
 
lO The Types of Philosophy 
 
 One problem remains : that of describing or naming the 
 ultimate kind, or kinds, of reality. And to facilitate this 
 description we must distinguish two kinds of reality: the 
 universe may be of the same nature as my consciousness of it ; 
 or it may be radically and absolutely unlike my consciousness. 
 Philosophic systems are idealistic or non-idealistic as they 
 give the iirst or the second answer to this question; and 
 idealistic systems are again distinguished according as they 
 regard consciousness as mere succession of ideas (and in this 
 case they are phenomenalistic or ideistic) ; or as they mean by 
 consciousness a self or selves being conscious (and these sys- 
 tems are called spiritualistic or personalistic). The various 
 chapters of this book will explain these terms more fully 
 and win seek to show that all modem systems of philosophy 
 are naturally grouped in harmony with these distinctions. In 
 the following scheme this grouping is indicated : — 
 
 The Representative Modern Philosophess (through Hegel) 
 Numerically 
 
 Pluralistic Monistic 
 
 Qualitatively 
 
 Pluralistic 
 
 (Dualistic) 
 
 QTialftatively Qualitatively Qualitatively 
 Monistic Pluralistic Monistic 
 
 
 Non-ideal- Ideal- 
 istic istic 
 
 Idealistic 
 
 Descartes 
 
 IXKXJL 
 
 Spiri- Phenome- 
 tualistic nalistic 
 HOBBES Leibniz Spinoza 
 Berkeley Htime 
 
 Spiritualistic 
 
 (Dualistic and anti- 
 
 phenomenalistic) 
 
 Kant' 
 
 » It will later appear that the systems of Kant, Fichte, 
 internally inconsistent. 
 
 Fichte' 
 schelling ' 
 
 HFr.ZL 
 
 Schopenhauer 
 , and SchelUng are 
 
The Value of Philosophy 11 
 
 IV. The Value of Philosophy 
 
 The effort has been made to show that there is room for a 
 philosophy fundamental to science, and that it need not be a 
 vague or abstract study. An outline of the main types of 
 philosophic thought has been offered and all seems propitious 
 for our metaphysical venture. And yet we are perhaps reluc- 
 tant to embark. Certain questions about the value of meta- 
 physics press upon us : Is the study of philosophy of supreme 
 importance ? Is it worth while to attempt to know the nature 
 of the irreducible, and of the all-of- reality, while one is still 
 so ignorant of many of the facts of science ? May one not, 
 with greater advantage, devote oneself to the scientific study 
 of certain well-defined groups of phenomena, instead of losing 
 oneself in a nebulous search for ultimate truth — a quest 
 which promises nothing, which sets out from a problem, 
 without assurance of being able to solve it ? 
 
 For some of us, it must be admitted, the time for asking 
 these questions is long gone by. The passion for the highest 
 certainty, the most inclusive and irreducible reality, has taken 
 possession of our souls ; and we could not check ourselves, if 
 we would, in even a hopeless pursuit of ultimate reality. 
 The prophecy of disappointment avails nothing against such 
 a mood. But even the fact that we must be philosophers, 
 whether we will or not, need not deter us from the effort to 
 estimate correctly, to judge dispassionately, the value of 
 philosophical study. It is, above all things, necessary to ad- 
 vance no false claim, and to recognize resolutely that the 
 study of metaphysics holds out no promise of definite results. 
 "Philosophy," said NovaUs, "can bake no bread, but she can 
 give us God, freedom, and immortaUty." But though one 
 agree with Novalis's disclaimer of any narrowly utilitarian 
 end for philosophy, one must oppose with equal vigor his 
 assertion that philosophy gives us God, freedom, or immor- 
 tality. Philosophy, in the first place, gives us nothing; we 
 
12 The Value of Philosophy 
 
 wrest from her all that we gain ; and it is, furthermore, im- 
 possible at the outset to prophesy with certainty what will be 
 the result of our philosophic questioning, our rigorously 
 honest search for the irreducible and complete reality. We 
 may not, therefore, enter on the study of philosophy for any 
 assurance of definite results. 
 
 Let us face the worst. Let us suppose that our meta- 
 physical quest is an endless one, that we never reach a satis- 
 fying conclusion of thought, that no results withstand the 
 blasting force of our own criticism ; even so, the true lover of 
 philosophy will claim that there is at least a satisfaction in 
 the bare pursuit of the ultimate reality, a keen exhilaration in 
 the chase, an exceeding joy in even a fleeting vision of the 
 truth. In less figurative terms: if philosophy is no more 
 than a questioning, at least it formulates our questions, makes 
 them consistent with each other ; in a word, makes us capable 
 of asking intelligent questions. It is good to know ; but even 
 to know why we do not know may be a gain. 
 
 But I cannot honestly leave the subject here. My experi- 
 ence and my observation aUke persuade me that the patient 
 and courageous student gains more from philosophical study 
 than the mere formulation of his problem. It' is indeed true 
 that the finite thinker is incapacitated from the perfect appre- 
 hension of absolutely complete reaUty. But though he may 
 not, in the nature of the case, gain the complete solution of his 
 problem, he can scarcely help answering some questions and 
 discovering that others cannot rationally be asked. More 
 than this, he may well learn the terms in which the solution 
 of his problem is possible, may be assured whether ultimate 
 reality is one or many, spirit or matter. To one who grants 
 this as a probable, or even a possible, outcome of metaphysical 
 investigation, philosophy becomes not merely a privilege but 
 a duty, since the philosophical conclusion has, inevitably, a 
 bearing on the personal life. Artificially, and by an effort, 
 it is true, one may divorce one's life from one's announced 
 philosophy — may hold, for example, to egoistic hedonism as 
 
The Value of Philosophy 13 
 
 the justified philosophical system while one lives a life of 
 self-sacrifice, or may combine the most arrant self-indulgence 
 with a rigorous ethical doctrine. Ideally, however, as we 
 all admit, and actually always to a certain degree, our 
 philosophy "makes a difference";* it affects conduct; it 
 moulds the life of personal relations. Philosophy is, in other 
 words, a phase of life, not an observation of life from the out- 
 side; and the more adequate the philosophy, the more con- 
 sistent the life may become. To provide sound theoretical 
 foundation for noble hving, to shape and to supplement 
 conduct by doctrine, becomes, thus, the complete aim of the 
 philosopher, whose instinct and whose duty alike impel him 
 to the search for ultimate truth. 
 
 ' F. C. S. Schiller, "Humanism," p. 197, 
 
SYSTEMS OF NUMERICAL 
 PLURALISM 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 PLURALISTIC DUALISM:' THE SYSTEM OF DESCARTES 
 
 "II faut . . . admirer toujours Descartes et le suivre quelquefois. " 
 
 — D'Alembert. 
 
 I. The Beginnings of Modern Philosophy 
 
 No one has ever written the history of any period of thought 
 or of life without being greatly puzzled about the point at 
 which to begin it. For whatever event be chosen as the first of 
 the chronicle, this hypothetically first event is conditioned by 
 other events. Every history, therefore, begins at a more or 
 less arbitrary point; and the history of modem philosophy 
 is no exception. The dividing line between the mediaeval 
 and the modem period is one which it is very hard to draw ; 
 in other words, it is impossible to enumerate qualities which 
 mark off absolutely the modem from the mediaeval epoch. 
 
 The mediaeval period seems, however, to be distinguished 
 by these two characters among others: a subordination of 
 thought to revelation, of philosophy to dogma; and a dis- 
 regard for scientific observation. The first of these attributes 
 of mediaeval philosophy is prominent in the works of philoso- 
 phers throughout the period. The medieeval, and especially 
 
 ' The clumsiness of a full description, in technical terms, of the different 
 systems of philosophy has been avoided in these chapter headings. Two 
 terms are employed, here and throughout, of which the first describes the 
 system from the numerical, the second from the qualitative, standpoint. 
 Thus, ' pluralistic dualism ' means, ' (numerically) pluralistic (qualitative) 
 dualism.' (Dualism is a form of pluralism, here a doctrine of two kinds of 
 reality.) Of course this device of order is purely arbitrary; it is equally 
 possible to describe this system, for instance, as dualistic pluralism, under- 
 standing that the first term is used in the qualitative, the second in the 
 numerical, sense. It is important simply to contrast sharply these two points 
 of view. 
 
 c 17 
 
1 8 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 the scholastic, disregard for fact — in particular, for the facts 
 of external nature — is equally apparent. The thinkers of 
 the Middle Ages so immersed themselves in reHgious doctrine 
 and in the impUed problems of ethics, psychology, and 
 demonology, that they could not be affected by the world of 
 nature. Men who speculated with warm concern on the 
 composition of angels' bodies naturally were uninterested 
 in the organs of an animal's body or in the conformation of 
 the physical world. 
 
 One is fairly safe in the assertion that a growing inde- 
 pendence of dogma and a revived interest in natural science 
 mark off the period of modem philosophy from that which 
 precedes it, though even this generahzation is distinctly un- 
 true if too rigidly appUed. There were men in the medi- 
 £eval period imbued with the modem instincts for indepen- 
 dence and for scientific investigation; and there were few 
 philosophers in the seventeenth century who were untouched 
 by mediaevalism. But the teaching of the greater number of 
 philosophical thinkers and, thus, the trend of philosophical 
 thought certainly shows signs of a change toward the end of 
 the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
 We are therefore justified in dating modem philosophy from 
 this time. 
 
 It is a more difficult and a less important task to indicate 
 the very first of modern philosophers. Some historians make 
 the claim for Francis Bacon, but the "Novum Organon"is 
 a doctrine of the methods of science rather than a philosophi- 
 cal system. With far more reason, it is often held that the 
 Italian Giordano Bruno' was the first of modem philosophers. 
 There is, indeed, no question of Brano's independence of ec- 
 clesiastical authority, of his keen interest in the nature world, 
 and of the depth of his philosophic vision; but vision and 
 interest are often those of poet or seer, not those of scientist or 
 philosopher, and Bmno's works, which are without argumen- 
 
 ■ Cf. Appendix, p. 457. 
 
The System of Descartes 19 
 
 tative form, are mystic rhapsody or unargued insight rather 
 than ordered philosophy. By some such process of ehmina- 
 tion many historians of philosophy have dated the modern 
 period from Ren^ Descartes/ It is convenient to follow their 
 lead, for unquestionably Descartes's philosophy is of a 
 relatively common type, probably representing, in a way, the 
 philosophy of most of the readers of this book. 
 
 The revolt of modern philosophy from the influence of the 
 church is curiously illustrated by the outward hf e and station 
 of Descartes. The philosophers of the mediaeval period had 
 been priests or monks, or, at least, university teachers; but 
 Descartes started out as courtier and man of the world, and 
 though he remained throughout his hf e an obedient son of the 
 church, he never occupied an ecclesiastical or an academic 
 office. His immediate preparation for the career of mathe- 
 matician and philosopher consisted of four years of foreign 
 miUtary service, chiefly spent in the Netherlands and in 
 Bohemia, in search, as he says, for "the knowledge which 
 could be found in the great book of the world." ^ At the end 
 of this period, intellectual interests asserted supreme control 
 over Descartes's outward hfe. "I was in Germany," he 
 writes, "and . . . returning from the coronation of the em- 
 peror, the coming of winter detained me in a place where, hav- 
 ing no conversation to divert me, and ... no cares or passions 
 to trouble me, I spent the day, shut up alone in a tent where 
 I had leisure to entertain myself with my thoughts." These 
 thoughts concerned themselves with the deepest problems of 
 reality ; their immediate outcome was the stirring of philo- 
 sophic doubt in the mind of Descartes, his conviction that 
 he had too uncritically adopted the opinions of his teachers, 
 and his resolve to build up for himself an independent philo- 
 
 » Cf., however, N. Smith, "Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy,'' Chap- 
 ter I, note, p. vi., for the assertion that "all that lies outside [Descartes's] 
 philosophy of nature . . . remains in essentials scholastic in conception." 
 
 ' "Discourse on Method," Pt. I., second paragraph from end, Open 
 Court edition, p. 9. 
 
20 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 sophic system. The criterion of truth which he adopted 
 was the following, "never to receive as true anything 
 which I did not evidently know to be true." ^ And he 
 proposed to gain this evident knowledge by a method 
 formulated in the following precepts : "To divide my dif- 
 ficulties," " To conduct my thoughts in order," "To review 
 my conclusions." ^ 
 
 These statements of Descartes's purpose make it evident 
 that he adopts, on the one hand, the three acknowledged 
 methods of scientific thought, analysis, logical reasoning, and 
 verification; and, on the other hand, the philosopher's atti- 
 tude as well, dissatisfaction with conclusions that lack utter 
 certainty. This desire for truth gives way, however, to a posi- 
 tive philosophical doctrine. From a study of this teaching it 
 will appear that Descartes gains, by his philosophic reflection 
 and reasoning, a conception familiar to us all. He regards 
 the universe as made up of spirits, or selves, and of bodies, 
 inorganic and organic. Supreme over all the finite or limited 
 spirits, he teaches, and over all the bodies is an infinite and 
 perfect spirit, God. Descartes's philosophical system is 
 evidently, therefore, pluralistic — both from the qualitative 
 and from the numerical standpoint. It is quahtatively plu- 
 ralistic or, more specifically, dualistic, in that it teaches that 
 there are precisely two kinds of reahty, spiritual and material. 
 It is numerically pluralistic through its teaching that, of each 
 of these classes of reahty, there are innumerable examples or 
 instances ; that each sort of reality is embodied, as it were, in 
 an indefinite number of specific individuals, or things. The 
 effort will be made in this chapter, first, to outline this system 
 and then to estimate it. Criticism will be postponed till the 
 doctrine is fully stated, in the hope that a sympathetic under- 
 
 ' This criterion is embodied in his first 'precept of method.' Cf. "Dis- 
 course on Method," Pt. II., seventh paragraph, Open Court edition, p. 19'. 
 
 ^ Ibid., paragraphs 8-10, p. ig. These precepts clearly state Descartes's 
 method and are therefore to be distinguished from the first precept, quoted 
 above, which states his criterion of truth. 
 
The System of Descartes 2 1 
 
 standing of Descartes's opinions may precede the attempt to 
 estimate their value. 
 
 II. The Philosophical System of Descartes * 
 
 a. The preparation for philosophy : universal doubt 
 
 At the very outset of his philosophical study, Descartes 
 finds his way barred by a formidable difficulty : philosophy 
 is the attempt by reasoning to reach a perfect certainty ; and 
 therefore the student of philosophy must start from some 
 admitted fact, from some perfect certainty, however small. 
 But Descartes discovers, when he searches experience for 
 some truth unambiguously certain and incapable of being 
 doubted, that he can find not one. Of all that he has been 
 taught to believe there is nothing whose reality may not be 
 questioned. His quest for some small certainty leaves him 
 without any certainty on any subject; in other words, he 
 finds it necessary to doubt everything. 
 
 At first sight Descartes's attitude of universal doubt seems 
 absurd. It is possible, we shall most of us admit, to question 
 the existence of the unseen and the unexperienced ; but how 
 can any one in his senses doubt the reality of the things he 
 himself touches, sees, and hears — the existence of objects 
 of the physical world ? Descartes has a ready answer to this 
 question : we cannot be absolutely certain, he teaches, of the 
 existence of the things we perceive, for we know that our senses 
 sometimes mislead us. "All," he says, "that I have up to 
 this moment accepted as possessed of the highest truth and cer- 
 tainty, I have learned either from or through my senses." ^ 
 
 ' This study of Descartes's system is based on the "Meditations" (written 
 1629, published 1641), the "Principles of Philosophy" (1644), and the "Dis- 
 course on Method " (1631). The student of philosophy should read at least 
 the "Meditations" before entering on this chapter; and he may well add 
 "Discourse," I. and V., and "Principles," Pts. I., II., and IV., as abbreviated 
 in the Open Court edition. 
 
 •'■ "Meditations," I., paragraph 2. 
 
22 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 But the senses have " sometimes misled us ; ' . . . I have fre- 
 quently observed that towers, which at a distance seem round, 
 appear square when more closely viewed, and that colossal 
 figures, raised on the summits of these towers, look like small 
 statues when viewed from the bottom of them. . . . Also, I have 
 sometimes been informed by persons whose arms or legs have 
 been amputated that they still occasionally seem to feel pain in 
 that part of the body which they have lost." ^ These examples 
 and innumerable others hke them are sufficient to prove the 
 fallaciousness of the senses. "And," Descartes continues, 
 "it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in 
 that by which we may have even once been deceived." ' 
 There is no escape from this argument of Descartes's. Surely 
 we have all heard footsteps, when, as we have later discov- 
 ered, there was no one near, and we have met in our dreams 
 people as vivid as any in so-called waking Uf e ; and yet these 
 illusory sounds and these dream people are admitted to be 
 unreal. And it is possible, however unUkely, that I am 
 dreaming at this very instant; or that the pen I grasp, the 
 words I hear, are mere illusions. 
 
 So far, Descartes has proved only the uncertainty of objects 
 known through sense-perception. But our doubt, he be- 
 lieves, is of wider extent. It is possible to doubt of every 
 object of knowledge: even mathematical truths concerning 
 "body, figure, extension, motion, and place" may be "merely 
 fictions of my mind." * This follows, he teaches, because 
 every human knower is a finite and a limited being. How 
 then can the human knower be sure that he is not deceived 
 in his most profound conviction ? He does not know every- 
 thing; how can he be certain that he knows anything? = In 
 truth he may be, at every point, in error. 
 
 1 "Meditations," I., paragraph 2. 
 
 ' Ihii., VI., paragraph 6, Open Court edition, p. 89'. 
 
 ' Ihii., I., paragraph 2. 
 
 * Ihid., II., paragraph 2. Cf. "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 5. 
 
 « "Meditations," I., second paragraph from end. The exact form in 
 
 which Descartes conceives this possibility is the following: that God or 
 
 more likely, some 'malignant demon' — has deceived him. ' 
 
The System of Descartes 23 
 
 Descartes does not teach, it will be noticed, that we are in 
 error in all that we believe ; he insists merely that we may be 
 in error. In other words, he does not deny, but he doubts, 
 the reaUty of everything. And in this situation, as he clearly 
 recognizes, philosophy is impossible. 
 
 h. The implication 0} doubt: the existence of myself 
 
 The hopelessness of Descartes's situation is suddenly re- 
 lieved by his discovery of one unquestioned truth: that he 
 himself exists. He cannot doubt this, for doubt itself would 
 be impossible if he did not exist. "I suppose myself to be 
 deceived," he exclaims, "doubtless then I exist, since I am 
 deceived." ' Herewith Descartes reaches the real starting 
 point of his philosophical system, the certainty which is 
 immediately evident to each one of us, namely, the existence of 
 myself. ' ' I had the persuasion ' ' he says, ' ' that there was abso- 
 lutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, 
 neither minds nor bodies. Was I not, then, at the same time 
 persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly 
 existed, since I was persuaded." It is, indeed, impossible 
 "that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am 
 something. . . . This proposition, I am, I exist, is neces- 
 sarily true each time it is expressed by me or conceived in 
 my mind." ^ In other words, Descartes asserts that he is 
 immediately certain of his own existence and that the certainty 
 of a self which doubts is imphed by every doubt, even the most 
 radical. 
 
 This doubting self, Descartes proceeds to describe. It is, 
 first of all, conscious : it is known in doubting, beheving — in 
 a word, in 'thinking,' for Descartes understands by the 
 word "thought (cogitatio), all that which so takes place in us 
 that we of ourselves are immediately conscious of it; and 
 
 * "Meditations," II., paragraph 3. ' Ibid. 
 
24 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 accordingly not only understanding, willing, imagining, but 
 even perceiving."* Furthermore, the self is not identical 
 with any one of its thoughts or doubts, — in other words, with 
 any one of its ideas, — orevenwith thesumof them. Descartes 
 expresses this by the teaching that there is a self, soul, or 
 mind, which has ideas and is conscious. "I am," he says, 
 "precisely speaking, ... a thinking thing, a mind." ^ In 
 the third place, Descartes teaches, the self is free. Of this 
 freedom, he beheves that he is directly conscious. "I ex- 
 perience," he says, "... the freedom of choice ; " ^ " j am 
 conscious of will, so ample and extended as to be superior to all 
 limits." (The conception of the freedom of the self will be 
 considered in more detail in another coimection.*) 
 
 It is most important to reahze the meaning of this doctrine 
 of the self. For if Descartes's prehminary doubt is justified, 
 the certainty of myself is the starting point of every philosophy, 
 and not of Descartes's only. It is true that philosophy was 
 defined as the attempt to discover the irreducible nature of 
 anything; but if I must begin by doubting everything save 
 my own existence, then the truth that I am must be my point 
 of departure in the search for ultimate reaUty. For as Des- 
 cartes and St. Augustine long before him ° pointed out, it is the 
 one certainty immediately evident in the very act of doubting. 
 To be uncertain is to be conscious; and consciousness inev- 
 itably impUes the existence of somebody being conscious. As 
 surely then as doubt or uncertainty exists on any subject, so 
 surely a conscious, doubting self exists. The nature of this 
 
 ' "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 9. Cf. Definition I., from "Reply to the 
 Second Objections to the Meditations," Open Court edition, p. 215. For 
 a view opposed to that here stated, i.e. for the teaching that perception 
 is an "attribute of the soul . . impossible without the body," cf. "Medi- 
 tations," II., paragraph 5, Open Court edition, p. 32. 
 
 ' Ibid., II., paragraph 5, Open Court edition, p. 33'. 
 
 ' Ibid., IV., paragraph 7, Open Court edition, p. 67 seq. 
 
 * Cf. injra, pp. 44, 91 seq., 265 seq. 
 
 ' "De BeataVita," 7; " De Trinitate," X., netal; "De Civitate Dei," 
 XI., c. 26, Eng. trans, (by Dods), pp. 468-469. "If I am deceived, I am. 
 For he who is not, cannot be deceived." 
 
The System of Descartes 25 
 
 knowledge of oneself — the foundation stone of Descartes's 
 system — should be carefully defined. In a sense, of course, 
 it is immediate or unreasoned knowledge, the unreflective 
 sense of one's own existence which is common to us all. Yet, 
 as taken up into philosophy, this knowledge is not instinctive, 
 uncritical self -consciousness. For it has been reasoned about ; 
 though itself immediate, it has been shown to be implied in all 
 doubt. So viewed, it is distinguished from that uncritical 
 consciousness of self which belongs to the everyday life and 
 which often may be in no wise distinguished by its degree 
 of conviction from one's persuasion of the existence of 
 physical objects. 
 
 c. The inference from my own existence: the existence of 
 
 God 
 
 The persistent student of philosophy — the seeker for a 
 knowledge of the irreducible all-of-reahty — may not rest 
 contented when he has established, by reasoning, this one 
 conviction of his own existence. For it is evident that what- 
 ever is required or impUed by this truth — whatever, in other 
 words, may be demonstrated from it — must share in its 
 certainty. Thus, the next question of the philosopher, who 
 starts with Descartes's conviction of his own existence, is 
 the following: may I demonstrate from my own existence 
 the existence of any other reahty ? To this question Descartes 
 worked out a definite answer. As will appear, he concluded 
 that, reasoning from his own existence, he could demonstrate 
 the existence of God ; and that, reasoning from God's exist- 
 ence, he could prove the existence of the physical world. 
 Evidently, then, Descartes's conception of God's nature and 
 his arguments for God's existence are of greatest significance 
 to a student of his system. 
 
 It is enough, for the present, to say that Descartes means by 
 God a perfect (that is, a complete) spirit or self : a being all- 
 powerful, all-wise, all-good. For the existence of God, he 
 
26 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 has four arguments and these are of two main types: two 
 ontological arguments, that is, arguments from the character 
 of the conception of God's nature, and two causal arguments. 
 The statement of these arguments, which follows, has been 
 made as simple and as clear as possible. The arguments are, 
 none the less, full of comphcations and will claim the close 
 attention of the untrained reader. The critical consideration 
 of them is postponed to a later section. The point of depar- 
 ture, it will be remembered, always is the clear and evident 
 knowledge of one's own existence. 
 
 The first of the ontological arguments may be stated thus : 
 That of which I have a consciousness as clear as my conscious- 
 ness of myself, must exist. But I am as clearly conscious of 
 God as of myself; hence God exists. In Descartes's own 
 words, "Whatever mode of probation I adopt, it always re- 
 turns to this, that it is only the things I clearly and distinctly 
 conceive which have the power of completely persuading me. 
 . . . And with respect to God ... I know' nothing sooner 
 . . . than the existence of a Supreme Being, or of God. And 
 although the right conception of this truth has cost me much 
 close thinking, ... I feel as assured of it as of what I deem 
 most certain." ' 
 
 The second of Descartes's ontological arguments is many 
 times restated in his works, but it is not original with him. 
 It was first formulated by the mediaeval philosopher, St. 
 Anselm, and is always known as Anselm's argument for the 
 existence of God.^ In brief, as given by Descartes, it is the 
 following : The idea of God is the idea of an all-perfect Being. 
 But to perfection, or completeness, belong all attributes: 
 power, goodness, knowledge, and also existence. Therefore 
 God, of necessity, exists. "When the mind," says Descar- 
 tes, "... reviews the different ideas that are in it, it dis- 
 covers what is by far the chief among them — that of a Being 
 omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect; and it ob- 
 
 ' "Meditations," V., paragraph 6, Open Court edition, p. 8i'. 
 ' "Proslogium," Chapters II. and III. 
 
The System of Descartes 27 
 
 serves that in this idea there is contained not only possible 
 and contingent existence, as in the ideas of all other things 
 which it clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary 
 and eternal. And just as because, for example, the equality 
 of its three angles to two right angles is necessarily comprised 
 in the idea of a triangle, the mind is firmly persuaded that the 
 three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; so, 
 from its perceiving necessary and eternal existence to be com- 
 prised in the idea which it has of an all-perfect Being, it ought 
 manifestly to conclude that this all-perfect Being exists." ' 
 
 Descartes's causal arguments for God's existence may both 
 be summarized in the following propositions: I know that 
 I exist and that I am a finite, incorporeal being, possessed of 
 the idea of God, an infinite and perfect Being. But both I 
 myself and my idea of God must have been caused by a being 
 capable of creating and preserving me and the idea of God 
 within me. And only an infinite and perfect Being can be 
 the real or ultimate cause of me, and of this idea of God. 
 Therefore such an infinite Being, God, exists.^ 
 
 Before stating these arguments with the care they demand, 
 it is important to analyze the concept of causality on which 
 they are based. Descartes's fundamental principle of cau- 
 sality is the doctrine that every finite reality has some cause. 
 This conviction is implied by almost every statement which 
 he makes about causality. In the second place, Descartes 
 believes that the cause of every finite reality is a 'conserving 
 cause ' — that is to say, that it continues while its effect con- 
 tinues. In other words, he denies the possibility that a cause 
 should cease before its effect ceases. Finally, Descartes holds 
 that each finite reality has a cause which is more than finite — 
 which is, in other words, ' self -existent,' 'ultimate,' 'total,' 
 
 • "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 14. Cf. "Meditations," V., paragraph 3; 
 and "Reply to Second Objections," Axiom X. (quoted Open Court edition, 
 p. 219 seq^. 
 
 ' It may be well for the untrained reader to omit the remainder of this 
 section in the first reading of the chapter. 
 
28 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 and 'efficient.' Such a cause has, he teaches, two essential 
 characters; it has at least as much reahty as its effect; 
 and it is non-ideal, or in Descartes's terminology 'formal,' — 
 that is, it is no mere idea. Both Descartes's causal arguments 
 for the existence of an all-perfect God are based, as will ap- 
 pear, upon the principles just formulated — in other words, 
 upon the necessity of (i) some cause of every finite reality, 
 which is (2) a conserving cause and (3) a more-than-finite, — ■ 
 in fact, an ultimate cause; and, because ultimate, (a) 'formal' 
 or real, and (6) as perfect as its effect.* 
 
 The first of the causal arguments for God's existence, in 
 which Descartes embodies these principles, if not entirely 
 original with Descartes, is so forcibly stated in his discussions 
 of God's existence that it is justly known as the Cartesian 
 argument. In brief, it is this: An all-perfect Being, God, 
 must exist. For I have the idea of such an all-perfect Being ; 
 this idea must have some cause; I, a finite being, could not 
 cause in myself this idea of an infinite God ; and indeed God 
 alone is capable of producing this idea of God which un- 
 questionably I possess. In Descartes's own words the ar- 
 gument is as follows: "There . . . remains . . . the idea 
 of God, in which I must consider whether there is anything 
 which cannot be supposed to originate with myself. By the 
 name God, I understand a Substance infinite, independent, all- 
 knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other 
 thing which exists, if any such there be, were created. But 
 these properties are so great and excellent that ... it is 
 absolutely necessary to conclude . . . that God exists: for 
 I should not . . . have the idea of an infinite substance. 
 
 ' Descartes qualifies this doctrine by the teaching that an effect is " pro- 
 duced by that which contains in itself formally or eminently all that enters 
 into its composition, in other words by that which contains in itself the 
 same . . . properties or others that are superior to them." (" Medita- 
 tions," III., paragraph 11 (French translation), Open Court edition, p. 49^. 
 Italics mine. Cf. "Reply to the Second Objections," Def. IV., and Axiom 
 IV., Open Court edition, pp. 216, 219.) 
 
The System of Descartes 29 
 
 seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some 
 substance in reality infinite." ' 
 
 This argument explicitly involves all the features of Des- 
 cartes's conception of cause, save the doctrine that a cause 
 must conserve its effect. It first of all assumes that my idea 
 of God must have some cause; in the next place, it assumes 
 that the cause must be ultimate, and therefore real being (or 
 in Descartes's term, ' formal ' reality) and not a mere idea (in 
 Descartes's words, it cannot be 'objective' reality).^ "In 
 order," Descartes says, "that an idea may contain this objec- 
 tive [ideal] reality, rather than that, it must doubtless derive it 
 from some cause in which is found at least as much formal 
 [not-ideal] reality as the idea contains of objective [ideal]." ' 
 In other words, every idea is, of necessity, caused by some- 
 thing which is more real than any idea. This argument that 
 God exists as inevitable cause of the idea of God implies, 
 finally, that the ultimate cause cannot be less perfect than 
 its effect. Hence, Descartes argues, I cannot myself be the 
 cause of this idea of God, seeing that I am not infinitely pow- 
 erful and good. It follows from these causal principles, that 
 an infinite God must exist to cause the idea of God. "Be- 
 cause we discover in our mind," Descartes says, "the idea 
 of God, or of an all-perfect Being, we have a right to inquire 
 into the source whence we derive it; and we shall discover 
 that the perfections it represents are so immense as to render 
 it quite certain that we could only derive it from an all-perfect 
 Being ; that is, from a God really existing. For it is not only 
 manifest by the natural light that nothing cannot be the cause 
 
 ' "Meditations," III., paragraph 15, Open Court edition, p. 54. 
 
 ^ This terminology of Descartes must be carefully borne in mind by the 
 reader of his works. For by 'objective' he means what we often express by 
 precisely the opposite term (subjective) ; that is, he means object of conscious- 
 ness, thought, or idea. By ' formal,' on the other hand, he means the oppo- 
 site of ' objective ' — namely, ' real,' in the sense of not-idea. This use of 
 the word 'formal' is foreign to modern usage. It should be contrasted 
 also with Descartes's use of ' formal ' in opposition to ' eminent.' Cf. Note, 
 p. 28 supra, also Open Court edition, p. 244, Note. 
 
 ' "Meditations," III., paragraph 11, Open Court edition, p. 50. 
 
3© Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 of anything whatever, and that the more perfect cannot arise 
 from the less perfect . . . but also that it is impossible we can 
 have the idea or representation of anything whatever, unless 
 there be somewhere ... an original which comprises, in 
 reality, all the perfections that are thus represented to us ; but 
 as we do not in any way find in ourselves those absolute per- 
 fections of which we have the idea, we must conclude that 
 they exist in some nature different from ours, that is, in God." ' 
 
 This argument is of unquestioned validity, if once Des- 
 cartes's conception of cause be accepted, and he, therefore, 
 needs no other causal argument for God's existence. None 
 the less, he formulates another argument, of some complexity, 
 to prove that God must exist — not merely as cause of my 
 idea of God but as cause of me. Descartes's proof of this 
 is by elimination. It is evident that there must be some cause 
 of me, and Descartes seeks to disprove the possibility that any 
 other being, save God, could be the cause of me. 
 
 (i) I am not, in the first place, cause of myself. For, if I 
 were, I must be conscious of this causaHty, whereas "I am 
 conscious of no such power, and thereby I manifestly know 
 that I am dependent on some being different from myself." 
 Moreover, "if I were myself the author of my being I should 
 doubt of nothing, I should desire nothing, and, in fine, no 
 perfection would be wanting to me; for I should have 
 bestowed upon myself every perfection of which I possess 
 the idea, and I should thus be God." ^ Both these arguments 
 are based on my immediate consciousness of my own limited 
 powers and defects ; though the latter may be derived, also, 
 from the principle that the effect may be no more perfect 
 than the cause. 
 
 (2) It is equally certain that no being less perfect than God 
 could have produced me. Descartes argues this mainly on 
 two grounds: No finite being, in the first place, can be the 
 
 ' "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 18. 
 
 ^ "Meditations," III., sixth paragraph from end. Open Court edition 
 pp. 57 and 59. 
 
The System of Descartes 31 
 
 ultimate cause of me, for every finite being has itself to be ex- 
 plained by a cause outside itself. Thus a finite being could 
 only be the proximate or immediate, not the ultimate, cause 
 of me ; and concerning such a proximate, finite, cause, Des- 
 cartes says, we should rightly "demand again . . . whether 
 [it] exists of itself or through some other, until, from stage to 
 stage, we at length arrive at an ultimate cause which will be 
 God." * In the second place, even granting that "some other 
 cause less perfect than God " — that is, some finite cause — 
 were the cause which created me, it could not be the cause 
 which conserves me during every moment of my conscious 
 life. But according to Descartes's conception of causality, 
 every real cause, it will be remembered, must be a conserving 
 cause. For the cessation of a cause would imply, Descartes 
 says, that one moment of time could be dependent on a pre- 
 vious moment of time; and this, he declares, is impossible. 
 "The whole time of my Kfe," he says, "maybe divided into 
 an infinity of parts, each of which is in no way dependent on 
 any other ; and accordingly, because I was in existence a short 
 time ago, it does not follow that I must now exist, unless in 
 this moment some cause create me anew as it were — that is, 
 conserve me." ^ Now no finite cause can be conceived as 
 existing, not merely through my Ufe, but through the life of 
 the succession of finite beings.' Therefore the conserving 
 cause of me must be an infinite, not a finite, cause. 
 
 Evidently these different arguments, against the possibiUty 
 that a being less than God has produced me, have involved 
 not only the principle that every hmited reality has a cause, 
 but also the conviction that this cause is more than finite — in 
 truth that it is ultimate, that it is a conserving cause, and that 
 it is no less perfect than its effect. This last principle is at 
 
 ' "Meditations," III., fifth paragraph from end. 
 
 ^ Ihid., III., sixth paragraph from end, Open Court edition, p. 58. Cf. 
 "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 21; and "Reply to Second Objections," Axiom 
 II., Open Court edition, p. 218. 
 
 ' The part of this argument which is formulated in this sentence is not 
 expressly stated by Descartes. 
 
32 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 the root of Descartes's argument against the hypothesis which 
 remains to be eHminated. It has been shown that neither I 
 myself nor any being less than God can cause me. It is, how- 
 ever, (3) still conceivable that a group of beings, each of them 
 less than God, might produce me. Descartes outhnes this 
 possibility and argues against it in the following way: "Nor 
 can it," he says, "be supposed that several causes concurred 
 in my production, and that from one I received the idea of 
 one of the perfections which I attribute to the Deity, and from 
 another the idea of some other, and thus that all those per- 
 fections are indeed found somewhere in the universe, but do 
 not all exist together in a single being who is God ; for, on 
 the contrary, the unity, the simpUcity or inseparability of all 
 the properties of Deity, is one of the chief perfections I con- 
 ceive him to possess ; and the idea of this unity of all the per- 
 fections of Deity could certainly not be put into my mind 
 by any cause from which I did not likewise receive the ideas 
 of all the other perfections ; for no power could enable me to 
 embrace them in an inseparable unity, without at the same 
 time giving me the knowledge of what they were." ^ Ob- 
 viously the heart of this reasoning is the principle that a 
 cause must be no less perfect than its effect. Fc/r this reason, 
 Descartes teaches, no composite cause could produce in me the 
 idea which I certainly have of an infinite simple being ; and 
 it follows that the cause of me is one ultimate being, resem- 
 bling in its unity, as well as in its other qualities, the idea of 
 itself that it produces in me. This disproof of the possibility 
 that a group of beings produced me of course carries with it 
 the disproof of the doctrine that "my parents" caused me. 
 Descartes, however, adds, in opposition to this doctrine, the 
 statement that one's parents are the causes only of bodily dis- 
 positions, not of mind.^ 
 
 Descartes has, therefore, argued that neither I myself, nor 
 any other being less than God, nor any group of beings, could 
 
 ' "Meditations," III., fourth paragraph from' end. 
 * Ihid., III., paragraph three from end. 
 
The System of Descartes 33 
 
 have caused me. Only one other cause of my existence is 
 possible. I must believe that God exists, for every finite 
 reality must have a cause, and only God could cause that 
 finite reality, myself, of whose existence I am immediately 
 certain.' 
 
 In arguing for God's existence, Descartes has indicated his 
 conception of God's nature. It is summed up in the defini- 
 tion of God as "a Being . . . absolutely perfect." ^ From 
 his absoluteness, follows his entire self-dependence : he is the 
 absolute substance which " stands in need of no other thing 
 in order to its existence." ' From his perfection follow the 
 positive characters: omniscience, omnipotence, and absolute 
 goodness. From his absolute perfection, also, according to 
 Descartes, there result three negative characters. These are 
 the following : In the first place, " God is not corporeal . . . 
 for . . . since extension constitutes the nature of body, and 
 since divisibility is included in local extension, and this indi- 
 cates imperfection, it is certain that God is not body." * Fur- 
 thermore, " God does not perceive by means of senses. . . . 
 Since in every sense there is passivity which indicates depen- 
 dency, we must conclude," Descartes says, "that God is in no 
 manner possessed of senses, and that he only understands and 
 wills ; that he does not, however, like us, understand and will 
 by acts in any way distinct, but that he always by an act that 
 is one, identical, and the simplest possible, understands, wills, 
 and operates all, that is, all things that in reahty exist : for he 
 does not will the evil of sin, seeing this is but the negation of 
 being." ^ From God's perfect goodness it follows, finally, that 
 
 ' For a summary of both causal arguments, cf. " Reply to Second Objec- 
 tions," Prop. 3, Dem., Open Court edition, p. 221. 
 
 ' "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 14. Cf. "Meditations," V., paragraph 3. 
 
 ^ "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 51. 
 
 * Ibid., Pt. I., Prop. 23. The second clause belongs not to the Latin 
 original, but to the French translation. 
 
 ' Ibid. The French translation, in place of the second clause quoted, has 
 the following: "Because our perceptions rise from impressions made upon 
 us from another source " — i.e. than ourselves. 
 
34 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 God does not deceive. "It is impossible," Descartes says, 
 "for liim ever to deceive me, for in all fraud and deceit there 
 is a certain imperfection; and,- although it may seem that the 
 ability to deceive is a mark of subtlety or power, yet the will 
 testiiies without doubt of malice or weakness ; and such ac- 
 cordingly cannot be found in God." ^ 
 
 d. The consequence of God's existence: the existence of cor- 
 poreal things and of finite selves 
 
 Descartes starts out by doubting everything. In the doubt 
 of himself he finds the certainty of his own existence. From 
 the existence of himself he demonstrates, as he believes, the 
 existence of an all-perfect God. From this certainty of the 
 existence of an all-powerful and absolutely good God, he 
 goes on to demonstrate the existence of corporeal (or material) 
 things. He argues mainly from the impossibility that a good 
 God should deceive me. I doubtless possess sense percep- 
 tions, and I have a clear consciousness that these ideas are 
 caused by real objects external to me. And as God "has 
 given me ... a very strong inclination to believe that those 
 ideas arise from corporeal objects, I do not see," Descartes 
 says, "how he could be vindicated from the charge of deceit, 
 if in truth they proceeded from any other source, or were pro- 
 duced by other causes than corporeal things ; and accordingly 
 it must be concluded, that corporeal objects exist." ^ The 
 same argument, it may be observed, would serve to prove 
 the existence of limited, or finite,' spirits other than myself. 
 
 ' "Meditations," IV., paragraph 2. 
 
 ' Ibid., VI., paragraph 9, Open Court edition, p. 93. 
 
 ' This term ' finite ' is commonly applied to realities other than God or 
 the Absolute. The use of the expression 'tinite spirit' is, however, unfor- 
 tunate in that it begs the question of the possible infinitude of the limited, 
 the so-called finite, spirit or self; whereas infinitude, in some sense of the 
 word, has by more than one philosopher been attributed to selves other 
 than the divine self. (Cf. infra, Appendix, p. 523 seq.; Royce, "World 
 and Individual," I., pp. 554 seq.) To discuss the problem is here 
 impossible, for it would involve a consideration of the exact meaning 
 
The System of Descartes 35 
 
 Descartes assumes their existence, but he might have argued 
 it. For I surely conceive the existence of human beings as 
 clearly and distinctly as that of corporeal objects, and the 
 absolutely good God "could not be vindicated from the charge 
 of deceit," if so distinct a consciousness were a mere illusion. 
 Descartes has a second, though subordinate, argument for 
 the existence of corporeal objects. It is the argument, later 
 emphasized by the English philosopher Locke, on which 
 most of us depend when we are challenged to prove the reality 
 of external things — trees or stones, for instance. They must 
 exist, we say, else we should never have these perceptions of 
 them. My imaginations I control as I will ; even my dreams 
 are copies of my previous experience ; but my percepts force 
 themselves upon me, I can neither change nor modify them, 
 they are unavoidable. Evidently then real objects must exist 
 outside me to force on me these impressions of themselves. 
 Descartes makes use of this argument for the reality of physical 
 things. I am directly conscious of "hardness, heat, and the 
 other tactile qualities, . . . light, colors, odors, tastes, and 
 sounds.' And assuredly," he says, "it was not without reason 
 that I thought I perceived certain objects wholly different 
 from my thought, namely, bodies from which those ideas 
 proceeded ; for I was conscious that the ideas were presented 
 to me without my consent being required, so that I could not 
 perceive any object, however desirous I might be, unless it 
 were present to the organ of sense ; and it was wholly out of 
 my power not to perceive it when it was thus present. And 
 because the ideas I perceived by the senses were much more 
 lively and clear, and even, in their own way, more distinct 
 than any of those I could of myself frame by meditation, . . . 
 it seemed that they could not have proceeded from myself, 
 
 of infinity. So far as possible in this book some one of the expressions, 
 'limited,' 'partial,' 'relative,' or 'lesser spirit' will be used in place of the 
 words 'finite spirit,' and the latter expression, when employed, must be under- 
 stood merely to mark out the antithesis between divine (or absolute) and 
 less-than- divine (or less-than-absolute). 
 ' "Meditations," VI., paragraph 5. 
 
36 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 and must therefore have been caused in me by some other 
 objects ; and as of those objects themselves I had no knowrl- 
 edge beyond what the ideas themselves gave me, nothing was 
 so likely to occur to my mind as the supposition that the ob- 
 jects were similar to the ideas which they had caused." This 
 second argument for the existence of material things is based 
 on an undoubted fact: that our sense perception is forced 
 upon us, that we must see and smell and hear what we do. 
 It follows that we do not ourselves voluntarily cause these sense 
 perceptions ; and it is evidently natural for us to refer them to 
 corporeal objects "wholly different from any thought." Of 
 the real existence of these objects, however, we can be assured 
 only if we know that our inferences are to be trusted — in 
 other words, if we are sure that God does not deceive us. So 
 this second argument for the existence of corporeal things 
 presupposes the first argument.' 
 
 Thus Descartes argues for the existence of 'corporeal ob- 
 jects.' But precisely what, it must next be asked, does he 
 mean by the ' corporeal object' ? It is natural to answer that 
 a corporeal object, a material thing, is a real being possessed 
 of qualities corresponding to our sensations : that a corporeal 
 rose, for example, is red and fragrant and smooth and the like. 
 
 ' The second and third sentences of the following passage show that 
 Descartes clearly understood the relation of these two arguments. "It 
 cannot be doubted," he says, "that every perception we have comes to us 
 from some object different from our mind ; for it is not in our power to cause 
 ourselves to experience one perception rather than another, the perception 
 being entirely dependent on the object which affects our senses. It may 
 indeed be matter of inquiry whether that object be God or something differ- 
 ent from God ; but because we perceive, or rather — stimulated by sense — 
 clearly and distinctly apprehend, certain matter extended in length, breadth 
 and thickness, the various parts of which . . give rise to the sensation we 
 have of colors, smells, pain, etc., God would, without question, deserve 
 to be regarded as a deceiver, if he directly and of himself presented to our 
 mind the idea of this extended matter, or merely caused it to be presented to 
 us by some object which possessed neither extension, figure, or motion. For 
 we clearly conceive this matter as entirely distinct from God, and from 
 ourselves, or our mind. . . . But . . . God cannot deceive us, for this is 
 repugnant to his nature. ..." ("Principles," Pt. II., Prop, i.) 
 
The System of Descartes 37 
 
 Descartes, however, teaches that the corporeal objects whose 
 existence he holds so certain are not the colored, fragrant, 
 sounding things which we believe ourselves to perceive. On 
 the contrary, he says, real, material things are simply ex- 
 tended things : they have no color, or fragrance, or texture, 
 or resistance; they have mere shape and figure and extent. 
 The hardness and color and the rest, which we no doubt 
 attribute to things outside us, really are mere sensations in us, 
 due to the 'different figures and motions' ^ of extended bodies. 
 "The nature of body," Descartes says, "consists not in 
 weight, hardness, color, and the like, but in extension alone 
 ... in its being a substance extended in length, breadth, and 
 height. . . ." ^ The real rose, in other words, has no cor- 
 poreal qualities save its shape and size and movement: to 
 our sensations of its redness and fragrance there correspond 
 no similar qualities in the rose itself; these sensations are 
 caused by modifications of the real extension of bodies, that 
 is to say, the sensations are caused by motions of the particles 
 of the real, extended body. 
 
 Thus the world of external things, as conceived by Des- 
 cartes, is a world of extended and moving, but of uncolored, 
 odorless, soundless things. And different as such a world 
 is from the world of objects which we suppose ourselves to see 
 and touch, it is — we must remember — precisely this sort of 
 physical world which the science of our own time assumes. 
 According to the teaching of the physicists, our sensations of 
 light and of color are due to the vibrations of colorless, and 
 indeed of invisible, ether waves, our sound sensations are pro- 
 duced by moving air- vibrations, our tastes and smells are due, 
 finally, to molecular and atomic movements. The natu- 
 ral science of Descartes's day conceived the physical world 
 in a closely allied fashion as a world of extended bodies and 
 of moving particles — therefore, Descartes, in this doctrine of 
 extension as the only quahty of objects, is simply adopting 
 
 ' Motion, Descartes teaches, is a mere modification of extension. 
 ^ "Principles," Pt. II., Prop. 4. 
 
38 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 the widest generalization of the science of his time. But, of 
 course, Descartes does not make, without argument, the as- 
 sumption that external things have only one quahty, exten- 
 sion, and that the other sensible quahties are mere sensations 
 in us produced by the modifications of extended bodies. He 
 offers, in fact, four arguments for this conclusion, and these 
 must now be outHned. 
 
 (1) Descartes urges, first, that extension is the only bodily 
 attribute which is clearly apprehended. By 'clear apprehen- 
 sion' Descartes always means the kind of consciousness which 
 the mathematician has ; and evidently, extension is the only 
 one of the qualities of a body which can be mathematically 
 known. The rest, 'weight, color, and all the other quahties 
 of this sort' are thought with 'obscurity and confusion.' 
 
 (2) It is certain also, Descartes thinks, that the quahties, 
 except extension, of corporeal substances are not necessary to 
 the nature of body. "With respect to hardness," for exam- 
 ple, "we know nothing of it by sense farther than that the 
 parts of hard bodies resist the motion of our hands on com- 
 ing into contact with them; but if every time our hands 
 moved towards any part, all the bodies in that place receded 
 as quickly as our hands approached, we should never feel 
 hardness; and yet we have no reason to beheve that bodies 
 which might thus recede would on this account lose that 
 which makes them bodies. The nature of body does not, 
 therefore, consist in hardness."^ 
 
 (3) In the third place, Descartes points out, this theory 
 that motion may produce in us sensations, of color, odor, and 
 the hke, is in accord with the admitted fact that certain sen- 
 sations — those in particular of pain and of ' titillation ' — 
 are due to moving things. "The motion merely," he says, 
 "of a sword cutting a part of our skin causes pain. And it is 
 certain that this sensation of pain is not less different from the 
 motion that causes it . . . than are the sensations we have 
 
 ' "Principles," Pt. II., Prop. 4. 
 
The System of Descartes 39 
 
 of color, sound, odor, or taste. On this ground we may con- 
 clude that our mind is of such a nature that the motions alone 
 of certain bodies can also easily excite in it all the other sensa- 
 tions, as the motion of a sword excites in it the sensation of 
 pain." ' 
 
 (4) It is probable, Descartes argues finally, that the re- 
 mote, physical causes of sensation are movements of extended 
 things, since it is everywhere admitted that the immediate 
 physiological, or bodily, conditions of all sensations are 'local 
 motions ' of the nerves and brain organs. There is no reason, 
 Descartes believes, to think "that anything at all, reaches the 
 brain besides the local motion of the nerves themselves. And 
 we see that local motion alone causes in us not only the sensa- 
 tion of titillation and of pain, but also of Ught and sounds. 
 For if we receive a blow on the eye of sufficient force to cause 
 the vibration of the stroke to reach the retina, we see numer- 
 ous sparks of fire . . . ; and when we stop our ear with our 
 finger, we hear a humming sound, the cause of which can 
 only proceed from the agitation of the air that is shut up 
 within it." ^ 
 
 e. Descartes' s summary of his positive teaching: the 
 substance doctrine 
 
 This account of Descartes's doctrine has followed mainly 
 his "Meditations." In the end of Part I. of that later work, 
 the "Principles of Philosophy," from which quotation has 
 repeatedly been made, Descartes summarized and supple- 
 mented his metaphysical system, in a terminology resembling 
 that of mediseval philosophy, as a doctrine of substances. 
 This form of his teaching must now be outlined, partly 
 because it forcibly restates the essentials of Descartes's 
 doctrine, as already considered, partly because it brings 
 out more clearly his conception of matter, and finally, 
 
 ' "Principles," Pt. IV., Prop. 197. ' Ibid., Pt. IV., Prop. 198. 
 
40 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 because it is the form in which Descartes's doctrine exerted 
 a strong influence on the course of philosophical thought.' 
 
 By 'substance,' in the strict sense of the term, is meant, 
 Descartes says, "a thing which exists in such a way as to stand 
 in need of no other thing in order to its existence." ^ 
 Evidently, if substance be thus defined, "there can be con- 
 ceived but one substance . . . and that is God." The abso- 
 luteness of God is accordingly taught by Descartes in the 
 doctrine that God is Substance. 
 
 But besides the one absolutely independent Substance, there 
 exist — as Descartes believes that he has found — realities 
 directly dependent on God, and these Descartes calls 'cre- 
 ated substances.' Of these there are two sorts, 'corporeal' 
 and ' thinking ' substances.^ Every thinking substance has " one 
 principal property which constitutes its nature or essence," 
 namely consciousness, or 'thinking.' Every corporeal sub- 
 stance also has a 'principal attribute,' extension. "For 
 every other thing," Descartes says, " which can be attributed 
 to body presupposes extension." Corporeal as well as think- 
 ing things are termed 'substances' because "they stand in 
 need of nothing but the concourse of God." In other words, 
 though dependent on God, they are relatively self-sufficient. 
 The thinking substance, myself, for example, is fundamental 
 to, and in this sense independent of, its own thoughts and 
 ideas; it is also — Descartes teaches — independent of cor- 
 poreal substances. Our mind, he says, is "of a nature en- 
 tirely independent of the body." * It must be noted that 
 Descartes, though he constantly refers to many substances, 
 also speaks of two substances — thought and matter. In these 
 passages, however, he very clearly means by 'substance,' 
 kind or class of substance. Because of a misunderstand- 
 ing of his teaching at this point, Descartes has sometimes 
 
 ' Cf. for less complete treatment of the substance doctrine, "Medita- 
 tions," VI., paragraphs 9-10. 
 
 ' "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 51. « "Discourse," V., last paragraph. 
 
 « lUd., Prop. 52, 53. 
 
The System of Descartes 41 
 
 been unjustly accused of attributing a fictitious reality to a 
 mere general notion.' 
 
 The belief that a created substance is independent save 
 of God leads Descartes, as has appeared, to conclude that 
 every such created substance is independent of every other, 
 and in particular that any extended substance is independent 
 of any thinking substance, and vice versa. One of the 
 corollaries of this doctrine is of especial importance. For 
 from the independence (save on God) of each created sub- 
 stance it follows obviously that a bodily organism is unin- 
 fluenced by what is called its soul. Every body, animal or 
 human, is consequently a mere extended thing, a machine 
 subject only to mechanical — or, more strictly, to mathe- 
 matical — laws. Descartes does not shrink from this con- 
 clusion in its apphcation to animals. An animal, he teaches, 
 is an automaton, a mere body without soul, a machine made 
 by the hands of God. " Were there machines," he says, " ex- 
 actly resembling in organs and outward form an ape and any 
 other irrational animal, we could have no means of knowing 
 that they were in any respect of a different nature from these 
 animals." ^ But Descartes could not bring himself to regard 
 the human body as utterly independent of spirit. Both the 
 logic of his substance doctrine and the analogy with his 
 teaching about animals require this conclusion, yet he 
 teaches that "the reasonable soul ... is joined and 
 united ... to the body, in order to have sensations 
 and appetites." ^ In perception, the soul is affected by the 
 bodily changes due to the stimulus of external objects ; and 
 by voUtion the soul or spirit causes bodily movements. 
 Descartes, however, reduces to its lowest terms this influence 
 of body on soul and of soul on body. He teaches that the 
 soul affects only the direction, never the amount, of bodily 
 
 '■ Cf. "Principles," Pt. I., Prop, g, for Descartes's doctrine of ' uni versals,' 
 or general notions. 
 
 ^ "Discourse," V., second paragraph from end, Open Court edition, p. 60. 
 ' "Discourse," V., last paragraph, Open Court edition, p. 63^. 
 
42 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 movement ; and that the mind immediately influences the 
 body at one small point only, the pineal gland of the 
 brain.^ 
 
 A complete account of Descartes's teaching would in- 
 clude at this point a sketch of his philosophy of nature. 
 Descartes's metaphysics is so deeply spirituahstic that the 
 student is unprepared for his rigidly mechanistic conception 
 of the physical universe. The truth is, however, that the 
 complete quaUtative dualism of Descartes's system (the 
 teaching that spirit is radically different from matter and 
 that a finite spirit is independent of its body) left Descartes 
 free to conceive the physical universe as unhampered by 
 spiritual law. It has already appeared that he everywhere 
 teaches that the human body is no more nor less than a 
 machine.^ And somewhat as the human body is influenced 
 at one point only by its spirit so, Descartes teaches, the 
 world might conceivably have been created, once for all, 
 by God as a chaotic mass and might have attained its pres- 
 ent state by the working out of purely mechanical laws. 
 "If God," he says,' "were now to create . . . enough 
 matter to make the world," in the form of "a confused 
 chaos," and if he were then to "leave this chaos to act 
 according to the laws which he has established," then this 
 chaotic matter would so dispose and order itself as to form 
 planets, sun, fixed stars, and earth. The result, Descartes 
 concludes, would be "a world entirely similar to ours." 
 Not only inorganic bodies and plants but even animal 
 bodies might have come into being through the succession 
 of natural effects upon their causes. It is unnecessary 
 to point out that this conception of the possible continuity 
 of complex with simple organism and of organism with in- 
 organic form, is none other than the theory at the basis 
 
 • "Meditations," VI. ; cf. "Les Passions de I'Ame," Prem. Partie, Art. 31. 
 
 2 Cf. "Discourse," V., paragraph 6: "The movement of the heart fol- 
 lows as necessarily from the disposition of the organs . as that of a 
 cloclc from the force, position, and form of its balances and wheels." 
 
 ' lUd., v., paragraph 2. Cf. "Principles," III, § 45. 
 
The System of Descartes 43 
 
 of modern evolutionary science. And though Descartes, 
 after outlining this daring hypothesis, still asserts, in con- 
 formity with the teaching of the church, that the world was 
 created by God "from the beginning with all its perfections," 
 we are none the less justified in agreeing with Buffon that 
 "it is Descartes who takes the first step" toward that 
 mechanistic conception of the universe which has mainly 
 dominated natural science since his day. 
 
 III. Critical Estimate of Descartes's System 
 
 This study of Descartes has, up to this point, concerned 
 itself to outline clearly his philosophical theory and to make 
 distinct the arguments by which he sought to establish it. 
 But the student of philosophy has not merely the task of 
 understanding a metaphysical system ; it is his duty, also, to 
 estimate it critically, to challenge its assertions, to scrutinize 
 its arguments. And before this critical estimate is under- 
 taken, a warning sounded in the preface of this book must be 
 emphatically repeated. Adequate criticism at this stage of 
 philosophical study is impossible. If it is true, as will be 
 argued, that Descartes did not fully understand, in all their 
 bearings, the problems which he discussed, still more is it 
 true that without a study of other systems no one is fitted 
 to criticise Decartes. 
 
 a. The adequate basis of Descartes's system : my existence 
 
 The writer of this book believes, as firmly as Descartes 
 believed, that I as conscious self exist and that I know my 
 own existence, not only in knowing anytliing whatever, but 
 even in doubting everything. In a later chapter the effort 
 will be made to show that the critics who have questioned the 
 existence of a self really have throughout implied and as- 
 sumed it.^ For the present it will be taken for granted that 
 the reader either admits or grants for argument's sake Des- 
 cartes's foundation teaching : that I myself exist. 
 ' Cf. Chapter 6, on Hume, especially pp. 179 seq^. 
 
44 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 But while insisting on the significance and the truth of Des- 
 cartes's teaching, I doubt and in doubting I exist, it is cer- 
 tainly possible to criticise, at certain points, his conception of 
 the 'I' or 'self.' He is right in insisting that the nature of a 
 self is to be conscious and that any self is more than a 
 mere series of ideas. But he does not adequately conceive 
 the relation of a self, or soul, either to external objects or to 
 God. In particular, Descartes assumes without discussion 
 the freedom of the self, or soul. He never realizes, or at 
 least he never solves, the difficulty involved in conceiving that 
 God is all-powerful and all-good, and yet that finite selves 
 have the freedom to make mistakes and to commit sin.' 
 
 h. Descartes's inadequate arguments for God's existence 
 
 From his own existence Descartes infers that of an all-per- 
 fect God. The arguments on which he bases this conclusion 
 must be scrutinized with special care, for — as has been 
 shown — the existence of a perfect God is to Descartes the 
 warrant for all other reality. The existence of God is thus, 
 as it were, the second foundation stone of Descartes's system. 
 Every other conclusion is derived, not from the certainty 
 imphed in every doubt of his own existence, but from the 
 demonstrated existence of God.^ One by one, therefore, it 
 will be wise to examine Descartes's arguments for God's 
 existence. 
 
 According to the first of the ontological arguments,' God is 
 known to exist because I conceive him as clearly as I con- 
 ceive myself. Obviously the argument involves the follow- 
 
 ' For fuller discussion of the nature of a self, cf. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 
 especially 11, pp. it6 seq., 179 seq., 229 seq., and 407 seq. 
 
 ' The course of the argument may be schematically represented thus : — 
 Myself 
 
 I 
 God— >other beings. 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 26. 
 
The System of Descartes 45 
 
 ing premises : (i) that God is clearly conceived and (2) that 
 clear conception is a guarantee of truth. The argument 
 is sometimes criticised by challenging the assertion that God 
 can be clearly and distinctly conceived. Indeed, Descartes 
 himself admits that he may not comprehend the nature of 
 God, though in the same breath he says that we "know 
 clearly" God's perfections.^ But whatever the outcome of 
 this criticism, it will become evident that the second 
 premise of the argument is of doubtful validity. The best 
 clue to Descartes's meaning is gained by considering his 
 two examples of an object of clear conception' : (i) myself 
 and (2) a mathematical truth, such as 2+3 = 5. Now it 
 has already appeared that I assert my own existence on 
 the ground that it is implied in the doubt or denial of it. 
 Similarly, I am sure of the existence, that is of the actual 
 occurrence in my thought, of a mathematical judgment or of 
 a mathematical idea (for example, the concept of a triangle) 
 or indeed of any idea ; and I have this certainty because the 
 judgment or the idea perforce 'occurs' to me while I am 
 doubting or denying it. There is, it is true, another type 
 of mathematical certainty: I am sure that (2+3) equals 5, 
 not 6 or 7, because I am directly conscious of the identity of 
 (2+3) and 5. But the assertion, that God exists, obviously 
 has not the certainty attaching to an identical proposition, 
 nor is the existence of God directly implied in the denial 
 of it. Therefore, whatever the sense in which Descartes 
 is clearly and distinctly conscious of God, such consciousness 
 is not parallel with the clear conception of myself and of 
 mathematical truths and cannot, on the sole ground of 
 this analogy, be supposed to imply the existence of God.* 
 
 ' "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 19. Cf. "Meditations,"' III., eighth para- 
 graph from end, Open Court edition, p. ss'- 
 
 ^ Cf. " Meditations," III., paragraph 3, end : "Noone will ever yet be able 
 to bring it about that I am not, so long as I shall be conscious that I am, or . . . 
 [to] make two and three more or less than five, in supposing which . . ab- 
 surdities I discover a manifest contradiction." 
 
 ' It is possible that Descartes urged these considerations, not as an argu- 
 
46 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 According to the second ontological argument, God is 
 known to exist because the conception of God is that of an all- 
 perfect being, and because perfection — that is, complete- 
 ness — means the possession of all attributes, therefore of 
 existence.' A strong objection may be brought forward to 
 this teaching. The argument, it may be said, makes too 
 little of the distinction between conception (or idea) and exist- 
 ence. Unquestionably the idea of God includes the idea of 
 really- existing, but the idea of real existence, like any other 
 idea, does not, it is pointed out, carry with it actual existence. 
 I may, for instance, carry out in imagination the demonstra- 
 tion of a geometrical proposition concerning the angles of a 
 triangle. But though I clearly visualize a perfect triangle, 
 this does not prove that the triangle has actual existence. 
 So, though Descartes is right in the teaching that the idea of 
 existence belongs to the idea of God as certainly as the idea of 
 equality to two right angles "is comprised in the idea of a 
 triangle," he may, nevertheless, be unjustified in his con- 
 clusion that the idea of an existing God inevitably implies an 
 existing God. 
 
 It would be unjust to Descartes to suppose that this diffi- 
 culty did not occur to him. "Though," he says, "I cannot 
 conceive a God unless as existing any more than I can a 
 mountain without a valley, yet, just as it does not follow 
 that there is any mountain in the world merely because I con- 
 ceive a mountain with a valley, so Ukewise, though I conceive 
 God as existing, it does not seem to follow on that account 
 that God exists; for my thought imposes no necessity on 
 things. . . ." ^ It will be admitted that the difficulty could 
 not be more adequately stated, but Descartes's answer is not 
 equally satisfactory. It is most clearly formulated in his 
 
 ment for the existence of God, but as a psychological explanation of our 
 conviction of his existence. This view (suggested to me by Professor M. S. 
 Case) is borne out by the fact that Descartes does not employ the argument 
 in his "Reply to the Second Objections." 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 26. * "Meditations," V., paragraph 4. 
 
The System of Descartes 47 
 
 " Reply to the Second Objections to the Meditations." ' Here 
 he says, "In the idea or concept of a thing existence is con- 
 tained because we are unable to conceive anything unless 
 under the form of a thing which exists ; but with this differ- 
 ence that, in the concept of a Umited thing, possible or con- 
 tingent existence is alone contained, and in the concept 
 of a being sovereignly perfect, perfect and necessary existence 
 is included." Thus Descartes argues the existence of God, 
 not on the ground that the idea of mere existence implies 
 actual existence, but on the ground that the idea of necessary 
 existence implies actual existence. Now no finite thing of 
 which I have an idea has more than contingent existence, for 
 I can always imagine that such a finite thing was never 
 created ; for example, I can imagine a demon without know- 
 ing that he exists. But it is impossible to conceive the neces- 
 sarily existing being as perhaps non-existent. In other words, 
 Descartes here teaches that the idea of God-as-existing differs 
 from the idea of a finite-thing-as-existing, — say, the idea of a 
 mountain, — since to the idea of a finite thing belongs merely 
 the idea of contingent, created existence, whereas to the idea of 
 God belongs that of necessary existence. But this argument 
 merely pushes back the difficulty without meeting it. My 
 idea of God does indeed, as Descartes shows, differ from my 
 ideas of finite things herein, that it includes the idea, not of 
 possible, but of necessary, existence. But my idea of God 
 none the less can contain only the idea of necessary existence ; 
 in other words, from my idea, even of the necessarily existing, 
 actual necessary existence cannot be directly inferred.^ 
 
 There remain Descartes's causal arguments for the exist- 
 ence of God. The first of these, it will be remembered, 
 urges that God must exist on the ground that I possess the 
 
 ' Axiom X., Open Court edition, pp. 219-220. 
 
 ^ Descartes does not deny this conclusion with respect to other "true 
 ideas which were born with me." (Cf. "Meditations," V., paragraph 5, 
 near end.) For a fuller statement of this criticism on Descartes, cf. in^ra. 
 Chapter 7, pp. 247 seq. For an outline of a metaphysically valid form of 
 the ontological argument, cf. Chapter 11, pp. 418 seq. 
 
48 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 idea of God and that God only could cause this idea in mj 
 mind.-' This argument, as was shown, involves three as- 
 sumptions. The first of these, that every phenomenon has 
 some cause, may be admitted.^ The second and third as- 
 sumptions are these : that the ultimate cause of every finite 
 reality must be (a) 'formal' — that is, not-idea — and (i) no 
 less perfect than its effect. It should be noted that Des- 
 cartes admits the existence of finite causes which are ' objec- 
 tive ' and are also unlike their effects. And our experience 
 confirms his admission. On the one hand, my fear may be 
 due to my imaged idea of a burglar, and my resolve to walk 
 to the city, to my anticipated need of coal. And on the 
 other hand, observation furnishes us with countless examples 
 of a cause unlike the effect. ° Descartes himself points out, 
 in another connection,* that corporeal motion has effects so 
 unlike itself as sensations of sound, color, and pain. But in 
 spite of the frequent occurrence of finite causes which are 
 mere ideas, Descartes is justified in the teaching that an 
 ultimate, a self-sufficient, cause could not be mere idea, for 
 an idea is, as he might say, a ' mode ' not a ' substance ' ; . 
 that is, the occurrence of an idea implies the existence of 
 some being ' whose ' the idea is. Similarly, in spite of in- 
 stances of causes unUke effects, Descartes is right in holding 
 that an ultimate, or ' total,' cause must be as perfect as its 
 effect.' " An idea," he says, " may give rise to another 
 idea " but " we must in the end reach a . . . cause in 
 which all the reality that is found objectively in these ideas 
 is contained formally." It is however evident, on Descartes's 
 
 ' Cf. pp. 28-30. 
 
 ' For discussion, cf. Chapter 5, "The System of Hume," pp. 153 seq. 
 
 ' Cf . James, " Principles of Psychology," I., pp. 136 scj. Descartes, it 
 is true, admits that a cause (and in particular the ' first and total cause ') 
 may be ' eminently ' as well as ' formally ' like its effect : in other words, 
 that it may possess properties corresponding to those of the effect but supe- 
 rior to them. But this is virtually to yield the principle of the likeness of 
 effect to cause. Cf. supra, p. 28, note. 
 
 * Cf. supra, p. 38. 
 
The System of Descartes 49 
 
 own admission, that before he can prove that God exists 
 actually, and not merely in idea, and that God has attributes 
 corresponding with those of the idea of God, he must prove 
 that an ultimate cause of every finite reality necessarily 
 exists. It will be pointed out, in the following pages, that 
 Descartes does not fully establish this proposition. 
 
 Descartes's last 'proof argues for a God as necessary cause 
 of myself.' To this end Descartes attempts to disprove 
 successively the possibilities that I myself, that any other being 
 less perfect than God, and that any group of beings could have 
 produced me. In the first of the subordinate conclusions of 
 this argument by elimination, Descartes, in the opinion of 
 the writer, is correct. It is indeed impossible to hold in the 
 face of my utter unconsciousness of such a relation, that I 
 cause myself. 
 
 Descartes next argues, it will be remembered, that a being 
 less than God could not have caused me.^ For this conclu- 
 sion, he offers two arguments, of which the less important is 
 the statement that no being, less perfect than God, could be 
 the permanent and preserving — or, in Descartes's terni, the 
 conserving — cause of me. This argument assumes (i) that 
 everything has not merely a cause, but a conserving cause, 
 which exists along with its effect; and (2) that finite causes 
 cannot be conserving causes. But the first of these positions 
 cannot be sustained. It is not clear that every cause must be 
 a conserving cause. The friction of two bits of wood may 
 light a fire which goes on burning long after the sticks have 
 been thrown aside. In fact, the combustion of every mo- 
 ment may be said to have its cause in the conditions of the 
 preceding moment. Observation thus substantiates what 
 Descartes names impossible : the dependence of one moment, 
 and its content, on a previous moment and the contents of 
 the earlier moment. There is no need, then, to examine the 
 assumption that finite causes may not be conserving causes, 
 
 ' Cf. injra, p. 30 seq. ' IhH. 
 
 E 
 
50 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 since Descartes has failed to prove the necessity of the con- 
 serving cause. 
 
 Descartes argues finally that God, and no being less than 
 God, must be cause of me, since — as he teaches — every 
 finite reality must have an ultimate cause and since no finite 
 being can be ultimate. Evidently, this argument is further 
 reaching than the others. For if it be true that there exists an 
 ultimate cause, then from its ultimacy we may argue (what 
 Descartes has not succeeded in proving directly) that it is a 
 conserving cause and an all-perfect being. It is necessary, 
 therefore, to examine the argument with especial care. Des- 
 cartes is, in the first place, unquestionably right in insisting 
 that every finite reality, because finite, has itself a cause, and 
 that it is, therefore, incomplete, dependent — in a word, not 
 ultimate. For, as he recognizes, only a self-sufficient being 
 can be ultimate. The cogency of his argument turns, there- 
 fore, on the validity of its major premise, 'every finite reality 
 must have an ultimate cause.' If this be true, then there must 
 indeed exist an ultimate cause of me, who am a finite being. 
 We turn, therefore, to the reasoning by which Descartes seeks 
 to establish this proposition. We find him arguing for an 
 ultimate cause which is also a first cause. There must be a 
 first cause of me — this is the implication of his argument — 
 for if the cause of me were finite, it also would require a cause, 
 finite or infinite. And if the cause of the cause of me were 
 finite, it too would require a cause, finite or infinite ; and so 
 on ad infinitum. And such an 'infinite regress,' Descartes 
 holds, is impossible ; '■ hence there must be a first cause, that 
 is, an uncaused cause, which is self-caused, self-sufficient, 
 ultimate. The difficulties with this argument are the follow- 
 ing : In the first place, the conception of a first cause involves 
 
 ' Cf. "Meditations," III., paragraphs 5 and 6 from end. Open Court edi- 
 tion, pp. 59-60. The specific reason which Descartes urges against the infi- 
 nite regress is that so there would be no conserving cause. (It has been 
 shown already that he has no right to the argument, since he has not suc- 
 ceeded in proving that the finite reality must have a conserving cause.) 
 
The System of Descartes 51 
 
 a contradiction. For that which is first is, by hypothesis, a 
 temporal reality, and it is the nature of everything temporal 
 to be necessarily connected with a past as with a future ; in 
 other words, when we proceed 'from stage to stage' in a tem- 
 poral series, we must conceive it as extending endlessly and 
 have no reason to assume any first cause. And in the second 
 place, so long as we think of the cause of a finite reality as 
 belonging to a temporal, or indeed to an anywise conditioned 
 series, we have no right to conceive it as ultimate, or self- 
 sufficient, for every term, even the first term, of a series is in 
 some sense conditioned by all the others, whereas an ultimate 
 cause must be unconditioned. Descartes's conception of a 
 first cause which is ultimate is really therefore an attempt to 
 combine the irreconcilable. 
 
 We must conclude that Descartes has not proved, from the 
 alleged impossibility of an endless series, that a finite reality 
 must have an ultimate cause. He has, however, made defi- 
 nite the conception of a self-sufficient, an ultimate cause ; and 
 he has apprehended, more by insight than by reasoning, that 
 the ultimate is implied by the finite, the unlimited by the 
 limited. Later thinkers will estabhsh this insight, will argue 
 cogently for the existence of an ultimate reality, which is not 
 indeed f,rst, or temporal, cause, but which is yet ground or 
 explanation of me.^ 
 
 We have reached, then, the last stage of Descartes's argu- 
 
 1 This criticism of Descartes has revealed the fact that there are two 
 conceptions of cause. According to one of these, a cause (whatever else 
 it is) is the temporally prior; according to the second, a cause (whatever 
 else it is) is the adequate explanation or ground. (A cause in this sense, 
 if ultimate, cannot, as has just been argued, be a temporal event.) In the 
 opinion of the writer it is more convenient to apply the term 'cause' exclu- 
 sively to the temporal event, since there are other terms — as reality and 
 substance — to express what is meant by cause in the other sense. It will 
 later appear that Hume invariably means by ' cause ' a temporal event ; that 
 Berkeley employs the term only in the second sense; and that Kant and 
 Spinoza carefully distinguish the two meanings, but employ the word in both. 
 Cf. injra, pp. 210, 258, 260 seq., and 299 seq. Cf. also A. E. Taylor, "Ele- 
 ments of Metaphysics," pp. 165 seq. 
 
52 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 ment, his attempted disproof of the possibility that "several 
 causes concurred in my production."^ To this, Descartes 
 makes the objection that a combination of causes could not 
 possibly have endowed me with the idea, which I possess, of 
 God's imity. But the assumption made by this argument 
 surely is not beyond challenge. Not only have we instances 
 of a composition of mechanical causes followed by simple 
 effect, but, by Descartes's own admission, I have the con- 
 sciousness of myself as one. Granting then that I had gained 
 from different 'causes' all the other parts of my conception 
 of God I might conceivably add to these the idea of unity 
 gained from self-observation. Descartes does not even 
 consider this possibility. 
 
 All Descartes's arguments, ontological and causal, for the 
 existence of God have thus been reviewed (with the acknowl- 
 edgment that criticism at this early stage of philosophical 
 study is, in the nature of the case, inadequate). If the criti- 
 cisms on these arguments are valid, it results that the argu- 
 ments, as they stand, do not prove the existence of God. Of 
 course it by no means follows that God does not exist, for it 
 is always possible that a correct doctrine is based on an in- 
 valid argument; and it is even possible that Descartes's 
 reasoning was more cogent than his formulation of it. Thus 
 the writer of this book questions the validity and the ade- 
 quacy of Descartes's doctrine as he states it, yet agrees with 
 him, not only in a general way in his conception of God's 
 nature and in the conviction that it is possible to estabUsh 
 the truth of God's existence, but in the conviction that God 
 is necessarily the existing explanation of the universe.^ 
 
 c. Descartes's inadequate arguments for the existence of other 
 finite realities 
 
 The admission of the failure of Descartes's argument to 
 prove the existence of God carries with it consequences of 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 32. ' Cf. especially Chapters 10 and 11. 
 
The System of Descartes 53 
 
 the gravest import to Descartes's system. For on the truth 
 of God's existence depends, for Descartes, the truth that 
 spirits, other than myself, and external objects exist. He ar- 
 gues the existence of spirits and objects alike, on the ground 
 of God's veracity ; and his argument loses all its force if the 
 very existence of a veracious God is uncertain. 
 
 There are other reasons for rejecting Descartes's attempt 
 to prove the existence of material things from the veracity 
 of God. For Descartes himself impugns the veracity of God 
 by admitting that we are deceived in our belief that external 
 objects are not merely extended, but colored, fragrant, and 
 tangible as well. To be sure, he attempts to reconcile the 
 inconsistency by insisting that we are not clearly and dis- 
 tinctly conscious of any quahties save extension ; and by ad- 
 mitting that God allows us to be in error in the case of our 
 obscure and confused consciousness : We are often, Des- 
 cartes admits, at fault in our judgments about the color, 
 the fragrance, or the texture of objects, but we have, he 
 insists, a clear geometrical knowledge of their space rela- 
 tions. We have, for instance, a clear and distinct concep- 
 tion of the cubic contents of an object, whereas we are not 
 certain how to name the color. But this attempted recon- 
 ciliation will not bear analysis. The peculiar certainty of 
 mathematical propositions has already appeared ^ to be of 
 two types : (i) I am certain that a mathematical truth 
 exists in the sense that I am actually conscious of it; 
 and (2) I am certain that one mathematical quantity is 
 identical with another. But both these kinds of 'clear 
 conception' and consequent certainty have to do with ideas, 
 not with corporeal realities. And from the fact that I 
 have a clear idea of a cubic content it no more follows 
 that the cubic content corporeally exists than it follows 
 from my idea (confused or clear) of green color that the 
 color corporeally exists. In the second place, it may be 
 
 1 Cf. page 45, supra. 
 
54 Pluralistic Dualism 
 
 objected that if any of our errors imply God's deceitfulness, 
 then all must imply it. For, according to Descartes, God is 
 our creator and is thus responsible ahke for our indistinct 
 and for our distinct apprehension.^ In truth, Descartes's 
 argument proves too much. He cannot well be right both 
 in the teaching that we cannot be mistaken in supposing that 
 material things exist, and in the doctrine that we must be 
 mistaken in supposing that material things are colored and 
 tangible. 
 
 d. The inadequacy of Descartes's qualitative dualism 
 
 One general difi&culty with Descartes's teaching has already 
 been pointed out: it was the first to trouble his immediate 
 successors ; and indeed it constitutes one of the fundamental 
 issues of philosophy. This is the problem of the relation 
 between "a spirit' and what is called 'its body.' Descartes, 
 it will be remembered, teaches that a spiritual substance and 
 an extended substance are realities utterly independent of each 
 other. And yet he teaches that bodily conditions, for instance 
 the changes of the retina in the light, affect the mind with per- 
 ception; that the mind by wilHng causes conditions in the 
 pineal gland which result in the altered direction of muscular 
 movement; and that God, who is an incorporeal being, pro- 
 duces matter. It is evident that such interaction between 
 minds and bodies is quite incompatible with the asserted 
 independence of the spiritual and the corporeal. Either a 
 spirit and a body do not really affect each other, — but in that 
 case God could not create corporeal objects, and objects 
 could not cause perceptions, and the will could have no effect 
 on bodily movements, — or there are not, after all, two entirely 
 
 ' Descartes's explanation of the occurrence of error, in spite of God's 
 goodness, is, briefly, the following: Finite beings have free will, and when 
 their will occupies itself with subjects beyond the limits of the finite under- 
 standing, "it readily falls into error" ("Meditations," III., paragraphs 7-9, 
 Open Court edition, pp. 67, 69). The main difficulty with this doctrine is 
 the fact that Descartes fails even to recognize the problem of reconciling 
 human freedom with God's infinite power. 
 
The System of Descartes 55 
 
 independent sorts of reality. The attempt to reconcile these 
 concepts forms the starting point of the philosophies im- 
 mediately succeeding on that of Descartes, all of them strongly 
 influenced by his teaching.^ 
 
 Other criticisms, some of them trivial or unjustified, some 
 well founded, have been made on the system of Descartes. 
 It is not, however, necessary to consider these criticisms of 
 detail, seeing that there is, as has been shown, good reason to 
 impugn the completeness or the cogency of the arguments 
 by which Descartes seeks to demonstrate the existence of God, 
 and with it the existence of the world outside me. Such a 
 negative estimate of the decisiveness of Descartes's argument 
 is entirely consistent with a deep conviction of the value of 
 Descartes's contribution to philosophy. His most significant 
 achievement is his vigorous teaching that the existence of a 
 self is immediately certain and implied in every doubt ; and 
 that philosophical inference must start from this certainty. 
 The defects of his system are due to his abandonment of this 
 starting point and to his adoption of other foundation prin- 
 ciples — for example, the alleged criterion of 'clear thought' 
 and the uncritically assumed law of causality. But even Des- 
 cartes's defective arguments have at least the merit of stating 
 clearly inevitable problems of philosophy. He formulates, 
 in enduring outhnes, a quahtatively duahstic, numerically 
 pluralistic, theistic system. He conceives the universe as 
 made up of finite beings, either spiritual or corporeal, in sub- 
 ordination to an Infinite Spirit, God. He holds this doc- 
 trine neither as an unsubstantiated insight, nor as a revealed 
 truth, but as a result of philosophic reasoning. Even when 
 this reasoning proves unsatisfactory, Descartes does good 
 service by so clearly stating the issues involved. Succeeding 
 systems, as will appear, have their starting point in the attack 
 on some one of Descartes's vulnerable positions, or in the 
 development of the truth inherent in some one of his faulty 
 arguments. 
 
 ' Cf, Chapters 3 and 4, especially pp. 56 and 73. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 PLURALISTIC MATERIALISM: THE SYSTEM OF 
 HOBBES 1 
 
 "II fut lou^ et blam^ sans mesure ; la plupart de ceux qui ne peuvent 
 entendre son nom sans fremir, n'ont pas lu et ne sont pas en ^tat de 
 lire une page de ses ouvrages." — Diderot. 
 
 I. The Materialistic Doctrine of Hobbes 
 
 Modern philosophy, as has appeared, starts from the 
 qualitatively duahstic standpoint natural to the stage of Hfe 
 at which reflection begins, but it is almost inevitably led to 
 the correction of this duahsm. The difficulty inherent in 
 qualitatively dualistic systems such as those of Descartes and 
 of Locke is clearly the following : Granted that reality is of 
 two fundamentally unrelated kinds, spiritual and material, 
 how does it happen that an individual of the one sort has an 
 influence on an individual of the other? Why do material 
 things affect a mind so as to produce sensations, and why does 
 a mind induce voluntary movements in a body, if — as 
 Descartes teaches — material substance is independent of 
 any spiritual substance save only God? Must not we even 
 ask how God, a spiritual substance, can create or influence 
 material things, if spirits and material realities are totally 
 unrelated? The difficulty thus involved in asserting on the 
 one hand the unrelatedness, on the other the necessary relation, 
 of minds and bodies, is the problem met by the systems of 
 qualitative monism. These systems remove the source of 
 the difficulty by denying the twofold nature of reality. 
 Bodies and minds, they declare, affect each other simply 
 
 ' Materialism, like idealism, is a form of qualitative monism. The 
 term 'materialism' is used for simplicity in place of the fuller expression, 
 'qualitatively monistic materialism.' 
 
 56 
 
The System of Hobbes 57 
 
 because they are inherently one in nature; the apparent 
 unlikeness is subordinate to a real unity. 
 
 Two main forms of monism are logically possible. The 
 monist may teach that all reaUties are ultimately ideal, that is, 
 of the nature of consciousness ; or he may teach that all reali- 
 ties are fundamentally non-ideal, not of the nature of con- 
 sciousness and existing independently of any selves or any 
 ideas. Of non-idealism also there are two forms. Ultimate 
 and non-ideal reality may be conceived as material, that is, as 
 partaking of a character (or of several characters) of the phys- 
 ical universe — it may be conceived, for example, as motion 
 or as energy; or ultimate reality may be conceived as an 
 unknown reahty, neither ideal nor material, but manifested 
 both in minds and in bodies. The earliest of Enghsh philoso- 
 phers, Thomas Hobbes, better known for his philosophy of 
 government than for his metaphysics, developed a striking 
 system of materialism. In truth, his inimitably vigorous 
 treatises, both philosophical and political, breathed a defiance 
 of traditional beliefs in curious contrast to his personal 
 timidity. The works of Hobbes were later published than 
 those of Descartes, though he was by eight years the older. 
 He conceives of all reality, bodies and so-called spirits, 
 physical processes and ideas, as ultimately corporeal in their 
 nature. 
 
 a. Preliminary sketch of the doctrine 
 
 "The Universe being the Aggregate," Hobbes says, "of all 
 Bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also Body." ' 
 
 ' "Leviathan," Pt. III., Chapter 34, Works, edited by Molesworth, 
 Vol. III., p. 381 ; Open Court edition, p. 1 74. (References to Hobbes, through- 
 out the footnotes of this chapter, are made to the Molesworth edition, and 
 also, wherever it is possible, to the volume of Selections, issued by the Open 
 Court Company. The quotations from the "Leviathan" are, however, 
 made from a copy of the first edition, in the possession of the writer, and follow 
 the orthography of the original text.) The student is counselled to read, be- 
 fore entering upon this chapter, at least the following: "Concerning Body," 
 Chapters i, 6-10, 25 ; "Human Nature," Chapter 2 ; "Leviathan," Chapters 
 iij 31^ 34 COpen Court edition, pp. 5-80, 113-134, 157-180). 
 
58 Pluralistic Materialism 
 
 Bodies, he teaches, are of two sorts, less and more subtle. The 
 less subtle — in other words, the visible and palpable — 
 bodies are commonly known as bodies, or external things. 
 The more subtle bodies, on the other hand, are called spirits 
 and are further distinguished from bodies of the more pal- 
 pable sort, in that they contain within themselves the repre- 
 sentations of other things.' In the words of Hobbes, "some 
 natural bodies have in themselves the patterns almost of all 
 things, and others of none at all."^ Descartes had taught that 
 the universe is made up of God, finite spirits, and bodies. 
 Hobbes accepts the words of this teaching but insists that 
 finite spirits and infinite spirit are alike corporeal in nature. 
 The existence of finite spirits he acknowledges without 
 argument. For the existence of a supreme being, God, he 
 argues much as Descartes had done : " . . . He that from 
 any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next 
 and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause 
 of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit 
 of causes ; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as 
 even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one first Mover; 
 that is, a First and an Eternal cause of all things ; which is that 
 which men mean by the name of God." ' But beyond the 
 certainty that God is really somewhat, since " body is 
 doubtlessly a real substance," * and the reasoned conviction 
 that he is "first cause of all causes," we have, Hobbes teaches, 
 
 ' Cf. "Human Nature," Chapter ii (4), Works, IV., p. 60; "Levia- 
 than," Pt. IV., Chapters 34 and 36, Works, III., pp. 382 and 672^; Open 
 Court edition, p. 175. 
 
 ' "Concerning Body," Pt. IV., Chapter 25 (i), Works, I., p. 389'; 
 Open Court edition, p. 115. 
 
 ' "Leviathan," Pt. I., Chapter 12, Works, III., pp. 95-96; Open Court 
 edition, p. 168. Cf. "Human Nature," Chapter ii. Works, IV., p. 59. 
 Hobbes appeals to Scripture for confirmation of this doctrine that God is 
 corporeal, asserting that "the Scripture favoureth them more that hold 
 angels and spirits corporeal than them that hold the contrary " ("Human 
 Nature," Chapter 11 (5), Works, IV., p. 62; cf. "Leviathan," Pt. III., 
 Chapter 34, and Pt. IV., Chapter 45.) 
 
 * "Answer to Bishop Bramhall," Works, IV., p. 383. 
 
The System, of Hobbes 59 
 
 no knowledge of his nature. We may not attribute to him 
 figure or place, nor ascribe to him sight, or knowledge, or 
 understanding, or passions, for "that were," Hobbes declares, 
 " to circumscribe him within the limits of our fancy." ' Thus, 
 he says, "all that will consider may know that God is, though 
 not what he is." ^ 
 
 Along with natural bodies, thus enumerated, Hobbes also 
 recognizes what he calls the commonwealth. "Two chief 
 kinds of bodies . . . offer themselves," he says, "to such as 
 search after their generation and properties; one whereof 
 being the work of nature, is called a natural body, the other is 
 called a commonwealth, and is made by the wills and agree- 
 ment of men. And from these spring the two parts of philoso- 
 phy, called natural and civil." ^ This is not the place in which 
 to discuss the civil philosophy of Hobbes, though he is best 
 known by his briUiant and paradoxical pohtical theory. As 
 is evident from the preceding summary, his natural philosophy 
 or metaphysics is really a system of physics, a doctrine of 
 body. Accordingly, he names his chief metaphysical work 
 "De Corpore (Concerning Body)," and divides it into three 
 parts: (i) The First Grounds of Philosophy; (2) The 
 Properties of Motions and Magnitudes; (3) Physics or the 
 Phenomena of Nature. Under this last head, Hobbes de- 
 scribes both the world of external nature, of "light, heat and 
 colours, cold, wind, ice, hghtening and thunder" (to quote 
 from his chapter headings), and also the inner world of con- 
 sciousness, of "sight, sound, odour, savour, and touch." His 
 whole philosophy is simply a development of the teaching 
 which he summarizes in these words, "the world (I mean 
 the whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, 
 body; . . . and that which is not body is no part of the 
 universe."* 
 
 » "Leviathan," Pt. II., Chapter 31, Works, III, p. 352; Open Court 
 edition, p. 173. 
 
 ^ "Human Nature," Chapter 11 (2), loc. cit. 
 
 ' "Concerning Body," Pt. I., Chapter i (9), Works, I., p. 11; Open 
 Court edition, p. 14. 
 
 * "Leviathan," Pt. IV., Chapter 46, Works, III., p. 672 ^ 
 
6o Pluralistic Materialism 
 
 b. The doctrine of Hobbes concerning the nature of bodies 
 
 This preliminary sketch of the doctrine of Hobbes must 
 be supplemented by a closer study of his conception of body. 
 He defines body as "that which having no dependance upon 
 our thought is coincident or co-extended with some part of 
 space." ' This definition assigns to body two characteristics : 
 (i) independence of thought, and (2) spatialness or extension. 
 A consideration of the first of these characters reveals a cer- 
 tain ambiguity in Hobbes's expression. As it stands, the 
 statement that body is independent of thought implies the 
 dualistic doctrine that thought as well as body has reality. 
 But the reiterated statements of Hobbes, that spirit is a form 
 of body, forbid this view and justify us in the conclusion that 
 Hobbes means by body that which is ultimately non-con- 
 sciousness, not-ideal. 
 
 The second and more positive character of body is its co- 
 incidence with some part of space. Space, which " is the same 
 thing," Hobbes says, with extension or magnitude, is here to 
 be understood as 'real space.' ^ It does not "depend upon 
 our cogitation"; it is a property or 'accident' or 'faculty' 
 of body.' Here again, Hobbes's doctrine of body is in har- 
 mony with that of Descartes. 
 
 A third and once more a positive character of body is often 
 recognized by Hobbes, though not included in the definition 
 just quoted. This is motion, which he defines as "a contin- 
 ual relinquishing of one place and acquiring of another." * 
 Thus conceived, motion seems to be a complex attribute of 
 
 ' "Concerning Body," Pt. I., Chapter 8 (i), Works, I., p. 102; Open 
 Court edition, p. 53. 
 
 ^ "Concerning Body," Chapter 8 (4), Works, I., p. 105^; Open Court 
 edition, p. 55'- 
 
 ^ Ibid., Pt. II., Chapter 8 (2), Works I., p. 103; Open Court edition, 
 PP- 53~54- Cf. "Leviathan," Pt. III., Chapter 34, paragraph 2, Works, 
 III., p. 38, Open Court edition, p. 174'. 
 
 * Ibid., Chapter 8 (10), Works, I., p. 109; Open Court edition, p. 59. 
 
The System of Hobbes 6 1 
 
 body, consisting of spatial position and temporal succession. 
 Hobbes, however, though he often impUes that motion is 
 subordinate to extension, more often regards it as an attribute 
 of body coordinate with spatialness: "Motion and Magni- 
 tude," he says, "are the most common accidents of bodies."' 
 He is at pains to emphasize also two subsidiary theories con- 
 cerning motion, both following from the doctrine that reality 
 is corporeal. The first is the teaching that all forms of change 
 are motion. "Mutation," he says, "can be nothing else but 
 motion of the parts of that body which is changed." ^ This is 
 obviously true on Hobbes's principles. For if all reality is 
 body, and if body is spatial, then the only change possible 
 certainly is change of place, that is, motion.' The second of 
 the corollaries of his materialistic doctrine concerns the cause 
 of motion. Hobbes teaches that "there can be no cause of 
 motion except in a body contiguous and moved." * The 
 proof which he offers for this teaching that motion must be 
 caused by the impact of a moving body is, in his own words, 
 the following: "a cause is such that being supposed to be 
 present it cannot be conceived but that the effect will follow." 
 But if a body be untouched by any other and "if it be sup- 
 posed to be now at rest, we may conceive it will continue so 
 till it be touched by some other body. . . . And in like 
 manner seeing we may conceive that whatsoever is at rest will 
 still be at rest, though it be touched by some other body, 
 except that other body be moved, therefore in a contiguous 
 body which is at rest there can be no cause of motion." 
 
 • "Concerning Body," Pt. III., Chapter 15 (i), Works, I., p. 203; Open 
 Court edition, p. 95. Cf. the title of Pt. III., "Proportions of Motions 
 and Magnitudes." 
 
 ' Z6j(i., Pt. II., Chapter 9 (9), Works, I., p. 126; Open Court edition, 
 p. 7S'. Cf. Pt. IV., Chapter 25 (2). 
 
 ' Hobbes argues this doctrine from the proposition that motion is the cause 
 of change (cf. below). But this argument involves the improved assump- 
 tion of the necessary likeness of cause and effect (cf. above, Chapter 2, 
 p. 48). 
 
 * Ihid., Pt. II., Chapter 9 (7), Works, I., p. 124; Open Court edition, 
 
62 Pluralistic Materialism 
 
 It is needless to discuss in further detail Hobbes's doctrine 
 of the nature of reality. His philosophy becomes, indeed, a 
 mixture of geometry and mechanics. He discusses " Motion 
 Accelerated and Uniform," "The Figures Deficient," "The 
 Equation of Strait Lines with the Croolced Lines of Parabo- 
 las," "Angles of Incidence and Reflection," "The Dimension 
 of a Circle," "Circular Motion," "The Centre of Equipon- 
 deration," "Refraction and Reflection." ' On most of these 
 subjects his views are — to say the least — now antiquated, 
 and he was never other than an amateur in mathematics ; ' 
 but his introduction of these topics is entirely consistent. For 
 if "every part of the universe is body," the mathematical laws 
 of the physical world are indeed the principles of all reality. 
 
 c. The argument of Hobbes 
 
 From this outline of the system of Hobbes it is necessary 
 now to turn to a consideration of the arguments by which he 
 reaches his conclusions. It is fair to say that he himself lays 
 little stress on these arguments, and that for the most part he 
 asserts and makes plausible, instead of arguing, his material- 
 istic teaching. In the first place Hobbes reduces all quali- 
 ties of the external world to extension and motion. This 
 he achieves by arguing for the 'phantastical' character 
 of the remaining qualities, (i) It is universally agreed, 
 Hobbes first points out, that certain 'images' (by which 
 he means sense-ideas), for example, the percept of an oar as 
 bent in a stream, and the hearing of an echo — are 'merely 
 phantastical,' that is, that no 'real' objects correspond 
 to these images. But this admission throws doubt on the 
 existence of any ' real ' shape, or color, or sound corre- 
 sponding to the consciousness of these qualities. Why 
 should there be a ' real ' oar corresponding to one's per- 
 
 1 These are titles, or part-titles, of chapters in " Concerning Body," Pt. III. 
 ' Cf. G. C. Robertson, " Hobbes," pp. 167 seq.; as also the comment on 
 "Concerning Body," Open Court edition, p. xix. 
 
The System of Hobbes 63 
 
 cept of a straight oar, if there is no ' real ' oar correspond- 
 ing to one's percept of the oar as bent ? Or why shovild 
 there be a ' real ' sound which tallies with the hearing of 
 a shout and no ' real ' sound parallel with the equally 
 clear hearing of the echo?^ (2) It is certain, Hobbes 
 also argues, that the same object produces different ideas 
 in different people. For instance, "it is apparent enough," 
 he says, "that the smell and taste of the same thing are 
 not the same to every man." But the smell and taste 
 which vary with every observer "are not," Hobbes says, 
 "in the thing smelt and tasted but in the men."^ (3) A 
 consciousness of light, Hobbes proceeds, may be produced 
 not by any external object but by direct stimulation of 
 the end-organ.' In this case it is clearly wrong to infer 
 from the "apparition of light' the existence of any external 
 light. All that can rightly be inferred is the occurrence 
 of motion in the organ.* 
 
 For Hobbes, as for Descartes, the implication of all 
 these facts is that "the things that really are in the world 
 without us are . . . motions." But Hobbes goes further 
 than Descartes and argues that consciousness, because 
 caused by motion, is itself a form of motion. Consciousness, 
 Hobbes points out, is the inevitable consequent of brain 
 and nerve excitations; and these in turn follow upon motions 
 in the external object. For example, " it is evident," he says, 
 " that fire worketh by motion. . . . And further, that that 
 motion wherebv the fire worketh, is dilation and contrac- 
 
 1 " Human Nature," Chapter 2 (5), Works, IV., p. 4 ; Open Court edi- 
 tion, p. 158. 
 
 2 "Human Nature," Chapter 2 (9), Works, IV., p. 6 ; Open Court edition, 
 p. 161. Berkeley later turned this doctrine to idealistic use. (Cf. Chap. IV.) 
 
 * " Human Nature," Chapter 2 (7), Works, IV., p. 5 ; Open Court edi- 
 tion, p. 159. 
 
 * In the corresponding paragraph of the earlier editions of this book 
 I treated the three considerations here brought forward as arguments for 
 the untrustworthiness of consciousness, and thus indirect arguments for the 
 ultimate reality of body. I have come to the conclusion that such an inter- 
 pretation is forced. 
 
64 Pluralistic Materialism 
 
 (ion of itself alternately. . . . From such motion in the fire 
 must needs arise a rejection or casting from itself of that part 
 of the medium which is contiguous to it whereby that part also 
 rejecteth the next, and so successively one part beateth back 
 another to the very eye; and in the same manner the exterior 
 part of the eye presseth the interior . . . and therefore the 
 motion is still continued thereby into the hrain. . . . And 
 thus all vision hath its original from such motion as is here 
 described. . . .'" It follows, Hobbes beheves, that opera- 
 tions of the mind, or as he calls them, " conceptions and appari- 
 tions are nothing really but motion in some internal substance 
 of the head; which motion not stopping there but proceeding 
 to the heart must there either help or hinder the motion which 
 is called vital; when it helpeth it is called delight . . . which 
 is nothing really but motion about the heart as conception is 
 nothing but motion in the head . . . ; but when such mo- 
 tion . . . hindereth the vital motion then it is called pain." ^ 
 This is the familiar argument which has given all materialistic 
 theories their force. Consciousness is observed to follow, 
 and, in some sense of the word, to depend, on physical pro- 
 cesses, notably those of the brain, and is, therefore, easily 
 conceived as itself a form of physical process, a function of 
 the brain.' 
 
 II. Critical Estimate of the Doctrine of Hobbes 
 
 The attempt to estimate the system and the arguments of 
 Hobbes, thus outlined, must follow on this exposition. To 
 
 ' Op. cit., Chapter 2 (8), Works, IV., p. 6; Open Court edition, p. 160. 
 
 ' Ibid., Chapter 7 (i), p. 31. Cf. "Concerning Body," Pt. IV., Chapter 
 25 (12), Works, I., p. 406'; Open Court edition, p. 131'; also "Levia- 
 than," Pt. I., Chapter i. Works, III., p. 2 : "All which qualities called Sensible 
 are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the 
 matter, by the which it presseth our organs. . . . Neither in us that are 
 pressed are they anything else but divers motions (for motion produceth 
 nothing but motion)." 
 
 ' Cf., for fuller statement and discussion of this argument, Chapter 5, 
 p. 132 seq. 
 
The System of Hobbes 65 
 
 students of the history of philosophy it is evident that 
 Hobbes reduces consciousness to motion in essentially the 
 fashion in which, in succeeding centuries, Holbach and 
 Vogt and Haeckel have argued that mind is a function of 
 matter. In every form of his argument Hobbes assumes 
 the ultimately material nature of that 'motion' in the ex- 
 ternal object which, when ' continued into the brain ' and 
 'to the heart' becomes the antecedent condition of conscious- 
 ness ; and he assumes also the inevitable likeness of effect 
 to cause. He argues in other words, that because motion 
 causes consciousness, therefore consciousness is motion. To 
 this conclusion several ob j ections may be raised . In the first 
 place, Hobbes does not prove, any more than Descartes had 
 proved,^ that effect and cause must resemble each other. 
 Everyday observation shows us many exceptions to the rule. 
 Even therefore if one grant that consciousness is caused by 
 motion, it does not follow that Hobbes is right in his constant 
 assertions that consciousness is a form of motion.^ 
 
 From this indication that Hobbes does not prove his point 
 we may go a step farther. When he says that a given con- 
 sciousness — conception, or pleasure, or pain — is 'nothing 
 really but motion,' he must mean that this consciousness is 
 a kind of motion. Now the final authority on the nature of 
 consciousness is consciousness itself ; in other words, by in- 
 trospection only may one know what consciousness is.' But 
 introspection of any given consciousness will assure any one 
 that it is not identical with the brain excitation which is its 
 physical correlate. The sensation of red may be caused or 
 accompanied by 'motion and agitation' of the brain, but the 
 sensation of red, as directly known by us, is not identical with 
 the brain excitation which occasions it. One could not, for 
 instance, replace the term 'color sensation' by the term 
 
 ' Cf. supra, pp. 48 seg. 
 
 ^ "Human Nature," Chapter 8 (i), Works, IV., p. 34. 
 ' Cf. Hobbes's virtual admission of this, op. cit., Chapter i (2), Works, 
 IV., p. I. 
 
66 Pluralistic Materialism 
 
 'occipital lobe excitation,' as would be possible if the two 
 terms stood for an identical reality. 
 
 A final objection of an utterly different sort may now be 
 urged against the materialism of Hobbes.' Even if one 
 granted the validity of his arguments, his doctrine would 
 refute itself, for body, conceived as he conceives it as the 
 'space-filUng' or 'moving,' turns out to be a mere nothing or 
 else itself a form of consciousness. This objection must be 
 made good by a careful reexamination of his teaching about 
 body, or matter. 
 
 Body, it will be recalled, is conceived by Hobbes as (i) in- 
 dependent, as (2) spatial, and as (3) possessed of motion. 
 The first of these is obviously a negative character. Spatial- 
 ness, on the other hand, has the appearance of a positive 
 attribute of body. But space (magnitude) is defined by 
 Hobbes as the 'pecuUar accident of every body';^ and ac- 
 cident is defined as 'that faculty of any body by which it 
 works in us a conception of itself ' ; ' so that real space, ac- 
 cording to Hobbes, is no more than this : cause of the concep- 
 tion of space. In other words, space is defined in terms of 
 consciousness. Our only clue to the nature of real space is 
 then our acquaintance with the idea of space. But such a 
 view endows consciousness with a more certain and primary 
 reality than that of body ; and this conception, though plainly 
 implied by the definitions just quoted, is of course at utter 
 variance with the materiahstic doctrine of Hobbes : the con- 
 sciousness or idea of anything is indeed, on his view of it, the 
 mere phantasm or appearance of body — less real, not more 
 real, than body. Combining the conclusions of Hobbes him- 
 self, we have then the following curious result : — 
 
 The peculiar attribute of body is space. 
 
 ' The untrained student is advised to omit the remainder of this section 
 in his first reading of the chapter. 
 
 ' "Concerning Body," Pt. II., Chapter 8 (5), Works, I., p. 105"; Open 
 Court edition, p. 56. 
 
 'Ibid., Chapter 8 (2), Works, I., p. 103; Open Court edition, p. 54. 
 
The System of Hobbes 67 
 
 Space can be defined only as cause of the consciousness of 
 space. 
 
 The consciousness of space is the effect of space, it has only 
 superficial reality of its own. 
 
 In other words : x is the cause of y, and y is the effect of x, 
 and this is all that is true of either of them. 
 
 The statement that Hobbes has no positive conception of 
 body is justified, therefore, so far as the independence and the 
 spatialness of body are concerned. How, then, does it fare 
 with the third attribute, motion? Hobbes's definition of 
 motion has been quoted, 'the continual relinquishing of one 
 place and acquiring of another.' He conceives motion, in 
 other words, as succession of places (that is of spatial modifi- 
 cations). This space-factor of the conception need not be 
 further considered, for it has just been shown that, on the 
 principles of Hobbes himself, space is either mere conscious- 
 ness (a conclusion which Hobbes denies), or that it is the un- 
 known cause of consciousness. The character which, added 
 to spatial position, gives motion is succession. How then 
 does Hobbes define succession ? Has it that positive character 
 which we are seeking, in order to give positive meaning to 
 body ? The words of Hobbes are these : " As a body leaves a 
 phantasm of its magnitude in the mind, so also a moved body 
 leaves a phantasm of its motion namely an idea of that body 
 passing out of one space into another by continual succession. 
 And this idea, or phantasm, is that . . . which I call Time." ' 
 Succession is thus defined by Hobbes as the reality which 
 corresponds to the idea, time. As space was found to be the 
 cause of the idea of space, so succession becomes that-whose- 
 idea-is-time. And in the case of succession, as in that of 
 space, the idea seems to be more important than the real suc- 
 cession, seeing that this latter virtually is defined in terms of 
 the idea. Such a conclusion again runs counter to Hobbes's 
 formal doctrine, and we are forced to decide that his concep- 
 
 '" Concerning Body," Chapter 7 (3), Works, I., p. 94"; Open Court 
 edition, p. 46. 
 
68 Pluralistic Materialism 
 
 tion of succession — that character which, added to spatial- 
 ness (place), gives motion — is entirely vague. The results 
 of the teaching of Hobbes about motion may then be stated 
 somewhat as follows : — 
 
 An essential attribute of body is motion. 
 
 Motion is a complex of spatial positions in a succession. 
 
 Succession can be defined only as ' cause of the idea of suc- 
 cession (time) ' ; and space only as cause of the idea of space. 
 
 Yet ideas of spatial position and of succession have no char- 
 acter except that of being effects of space and of succession. 
 
 There is no escape for Hobbes from the inconsistency of 
 insisting that bodies only, and not ideas, have reality, and at 
 the same time of conceiving body only as it is related to ideas. 
 The difficulty could, to be sure, be avoided by admitting that 
 ideas are realities and not mere appearances of something 
 else. Often, indeed, Hobbes seems almost to embrace this 
 view. He defines time — a most obstinate reahty, it would 
 seem — as an idea ; he makes the 'impossibiUty of conceiving 
 the opposite' a test of causaUty; thus setting up conscious- 
 ness, the so-called phantasm, as test of physical causahty ; he 
 calls place a 'phantasm' which is 'nothing out of the mind'; 
 and he defines not only space, succession, and motion, but 
 infinity, line, surface, and the like, in terms which presuppose 
 the existence of consciousness. "Everything," he says, "is 
 FINITE or INFINITE according as we imagine or do not imagine 
 it limited or terminated every way." ' "If a body which is 
 moved be considered as long, and be supposed to be so 
 moved, as that all the several parts of it be understood to 
 make several hnes, then the way of every part of that body 
 is called breadth." ^ From these definitions, it would appear 
 that our imagining and considering and understanding are 
 essential features of reahty, not mere unreal appearances.' 
 
 ' "Concerning Body," Chapter 7 (11), Works, I., p. 98'; Open Court 
 edition, p. 50'. 
 
 'Ibid., Chapter 8 (12), Works, I., p. iii; Open Court edition, p. 61. 
 ^ The essential idealism of Hobbes's view of body is still further evident 
 
The System of Hobbes 69 
 
 Hobbes never realizes the significance of these idealistic 
 implications of his teaching ; he never yields the view that 
 spirit is a subtle and invisible body and that consciousness 
 is a bodily excitation ; he never fails to conceive the uni- 
 verse as a totality of material things. And in spite of the 
 objections to his system, he has certainly achieved two re- 
 sults : He has formulated, in the first place, a materialism 
 more complete than any since the days of Demokritos — a 
 materialism which embraces man, society, and God. He 
 has suggested, in the second place, the argument which 
 must be squarely met by all opponents of materialistic sys- 
 tems : the argument, still urged by materialists of our own 
 day, that consciousness, because continuous with the un- 
 broken succession of so-called physical and physiological 
 phenomena, is itself a function of the body.^ 
 
 The main influence which Hobbes exerted was not, it must 
 be confessed, upon strictly metaphysical thought. He is 
 best known by the teaching of his ethics and his politics : the 
 doctrine that all men are essentially selfish and that morality 
 and government ahke arise only after experience has shown 
 that ' each man for himseK ' runs greater risks and gains less 
 satisfaction than through cooperation. The ethical systems 
 of Cud worth, Cumberland, and Shaftesbury — to name no 
 others — are reactions against this teaching, and that of 
 Mandeville was a variation upon it. Yet in spite of the pre- 
 dominance of practical philosophy among British thinkers, 
 and in spite of the uncritical condemnation of Hobbes's 
 metaphysics along with his loudly decried ethics and pohtics, 
 his materialistic teaching none the less reappears. John 
 Toland, best known for his 'deistical writings,' — in other 
 
 from the fact that in the earlier paragraphs of Chapter 7 (on "Place and 
 Time ") he uses the expression ' space,' without the limiting prefix, ' imaginary,' 
 to refer to the idea or phantasm. Cf. Chapter 7 (2), Works, p. 94; Open 
 Court edition, p. 45, where he defines 'space' thus: "space is the phantasm 
 of a thing existing without the mind simply." 
 
70 Pluralistic Materialism 
 
 words for his defence of reasoned as contrasted with revealed 
 rehgion, — teaches, as Hobbes had taught, that all reahty is 
 corporeal, "that thought is the function of the brain as taste 
 of the tongue" ; ' and Hke Hobbes he lays stress on the essen- 
 tial activity of matter. To such a materialistic conclusion 
 Harteley tends in his "Observations on Man," arguing that 
 soul no less than Ught may be material and that the traces or 
 vibrations in the brain are our ideas. And later still Joseph 
 Priestley asserts unequivocally the materiaUty of the soul and 
 of God, using the arguments already outhned and insisting 
 also on the difficulties of Cartesian duahsm. All these Brit- 
 ish materialists, including Hobbes himself, are convinced of. 
 the existence of God,^ and are hereby sharply contrasted with 
 the French materiahsts of the eighteenth century ; for these 
 beheve that God is logically ie trop in a world which is purely 
 material. La Mettrie, rejecting all the spiritualistic side of 
 Descartes's doctrine, reasons from the analogy of Descartes's 
 automaton animal body to the conclusion that man also is a 
 mechanism, I'homme machine, as he expresses it in the title 
 of his most important book. And Holbach and Cabanis with 
 equal vigor insist that thought is a function of the brain and 
 that God is superfluous in a world ruled by mechanical 
 law. But even more important than the reassertion of 
 materialism is the reaction upon it; to the consideration of 
 this we must now turn. 
 
 ' "Pantheisticon," p. 15 (1710). 
 
 ^ Hobbes, indeed, and Toland (in his earlier writings) are theists, not mere 
 deists, that is, they admit the authority of revelation, though they insist on 
 interpreting it in accordance with reason. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 PLURALISTIC SPIRITUALISM: THE SYSTEM OF 
 LEIBNIZ ' 
 
 "The great idealist who did not find individuality at all incompatible 
 with universality." — William Wallace. 
 
 The philosophy of Hobbes was a reaction against that 
 duaUstic pluralism of the Middle Ages which assumed the ex- 
 istence of God, finite spirits, and material bodies. Descartes 
 had, it is true, challenged these doctrines, but he had too 
 uncritically reinstated them all, by his teaching that the cer- 
 tain existence of myself implies the existence of a perfect God ; 
 and that God, because perfect, is incapable of deceiving us in 
 our clear conviction that the world outside us exists. In 
 spite of Hobbes, Cartesianism (the philosophy of Descartes) 
 reigned supreme throughout the seventeenth century; even 
 the philosophers who differed from Descartes built up their 
 philosophy on his principles. Most important of these 
 systems, supplementing and correcting that of Descartes, are 
 the teachings of Geulinx and Malebranche. Descartes, it 
 will be remembered, inconsistently asserts both the utter un- 
 relatedness and, on the other hand, the interrelation of a 
 spirit with a body. Geulinx seeks to avoid this inconsistency 
 by his teaching that finite spirit and finite body do not really 
 affect each other, but that God works changes in a given 
 
 ' The full description of this system would be, by the title, numerically 
 pluralistic, qualitatively monistic, and idealistic spiritualism. But spiritual- 
 ism is a form of idealism, as idealism of monism, hence these terms are 
 superfluous; and it has been agreed to imply the terms ' numerical ' and 
 ' qualitative ' by the order of the words which they are meant to qualify. 
 
 It should be noted that the word 'spirit' and its derivative adjectives, 
 especially current in the time of Leibniz and of Berkeley, are used throughout 
 this book as S3Tionyms for the terms ' self,' ' person,' or ' I,' and the corre- 
 sponding adjective, 'personal.' 
 
 7' 
 
72 Pluralistic Spiritualism, 
 
 spirit on the occasion of changes in the corresponding body, 
 and changes in a body to correspond with the changes in a 
 particular spirit. Thus, he teaches, God is the real cause of 
 all changes, spiritual and bodily, and the interaction of 
 finite spirit and finite body is only apparent. Similarly Male- 
 branche denies the activity ahke of finite minds and of finite 
 bodies, teaching that God is the only ground of activity and 
 that we perceive, not things external to us, but the ideas of 
 these same things in the mind of God. Unquestionably both 
 these doctrines meet the particular difficulty in Descartes's 
 teaching which they were framed to correct. They are 
 powerless, however, against at least two other objections to 
 quaUtative dualism. In the first place, both Geulinx and 
 Malebranche admit the existence of corporeal bodies without 
 offering any sufficient reason or argument for their being; 
 whereas it may well be argued that if, as they teach, God 
 alone causes our perceptions, we need infer no objects cor- 
 responding with these perceptions.' And, in the second place, 
 neither doctrine overcomes the difficulty of the relation of 
 God to matter, since, if he be pure spirit, in Descartes's 
 sense, it is difficult to understand how he created matter or 
 how he can even have ideas of matter. 
 
 Hobbes, as we know, has another solution of the difficulty 
 which Geulinx and Malebranche, without full success, have 
 tried to meet. The relation between bodies and spirits is, 
 according to his teaching, readily explained, since spirits are 
 ultimately bodily in nature. But this teaching, though it 
 would indeed meet the difficulty, has been found to be in itself 
 objectionable. For Hobbes not only does not base the doc- 
 trine on valid argument, but when he tries to define body, he 
 conceives it always in terms which apply solely to spirit. His 
 philosophy, therefore, though an uncompromising assertion 
 of materialism, really is an impHcit argument for idealism — ■ 
 the doctrine that there is but one kind of reality, the imma- 
 
 'Cf. Appendix, p. 464. 
 
The System of Leibniz 73 
 
 terial. Such a doctrine, no less than materiahsm, evidently 
 meets the difficulty of the duaUstic, two-substance doctrine. 
 
 Gottfried WiUiehn von Leibniz, first of the great German 
 philosophers, adopts this idealistic solution of the problem 
 involved in Ren6 Descartes's dualism.^ In other words, 
 Leibniz teaches that there is fundamentally but one sort of 
 reality, the spiritual, or, as he would say, the soul-Uke. The 
 purpose of this chapter is, first, to outhne the argument 
 by which Leibniz reaches his conclusion; and second, to 
 summarize his doctrine in its different appHcations. These 
 aims, however, are particularly difficult of attainment. For 
 Leibniz never wrote a complete and systematic treatise on 
 philosophy. In truth, philosophy was but one of his 
 many intellectual interests. He was mathematician, jurist, 
 and historian, as well as metaphysical thinker. More than 
 this, he lived always the active life of the diplomatist and 
 courtier, never the life of the academic or professional 
 philosopher. He spent nearly ten years, after leaving the 
 university, in the service of the elector of Mainz and in dip- 
 lomatic journeys; and in 1676, when he was but thirty years 
 old, he entered on his long service to the House of Hanover. 
 So it came about that he was mainly occupied with practical, 
 rather than with speculative, concerns ; and his philosophical 
 works were not written with the purpose of setting forth con- 
 secutively and logically the principles of his system, but for 
 the most part each with some special purpose: to estimate 
 some recent book, to outhne the system for the use of a friend, 
 to meet some special difficulty, or to answer some definite 
 criticism. Only two of Leibniz's philosophical works — a 
 thesis written during his university days, and the " Theodicy," 
 written for the Princess Sophie-Charlotte, appeared, during 
 his life, in book form. For the most part, therefore, his philo- 
 
 ' It is perhaps best for the beginner in philosophy to omit this chapter on 
 the first reading of the book. The immaterialism of Leibniz is later presented 
 in Berkeley's philosophy, the subject of the next chapter, and Berkeley's 
 writings are simpler and clearer, if less profound, than those of Leibniz. 
 
74 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 sophical writing consisted of his correspondence, still largely 
 unpublished, and of papers contributed to the Acta Erudi- 
 torum and to other learned journals of his day. To derive 
 from these unsystematic, occasional writings a clear, consist- 
 ent, and comprehensive account of Leibniz's philosophy is a 
 task of greatest hazard and difficulty. Only, indeed, by 
 verifying and supplementing one statement by many others, 
 and by allowing for the particular attitude of the person for 
 whom Leibniz was writing, is it possible to frame any such 
 statement at all.' 
 
 I. The System of Leibniz 
 
 The universe, that is, the all-of-reahty, consists, in Leibniz's 
 view, of an indefinite number of 'monads,' or soul-like sub- 
 stances dominated by one supreme monad, God. It willbe 
 convenient to expound this doctrine, at first without any save 
 incidental criticism. This exposition will fall under two 
 main heads: (a) the argument for the doctrine that the 
 universe consists of immaterial and distinct realities, or 
 monads ; (6) the teaching about the nature and the classes of 
 the monads. It will be followed by a critical estimate of the 
 system. 
 
 ' Cf. Appendix, pp. 483-4. The footnotes of this chapter indicate the 
 sources on which it is mainly based. The student is advised to read (i) 
 "The Discourse on Metaphysics," (2) "Letters to Arnaud," especially 
 VI., IX., XI., and XIII. (both works obtainable in translation in a volume 
 published by the Open Court Company), (3) " Monadology, " (4) "The 
 New System." Very useful, also, are (5) " Principles of Nature and Grace " 
 and (6) the Introduction to the " New Essays." The section just cited of the 
 Appendix indicates the different editions and translations in which these 
 works may be found. When the references of the chapter are to numbered 
 sections or paragraphs, e.g. of the "Discourse" or of the "Monadology," 
 the pages of special editions are not given. Otherwise references are regu- 
 larly to the paging of the Gerhardt edition, and occasionally to some one of 
 the translations. 
 
The System of Leibniz 75 
 
 a. The argument for the doctrine that the universe consists 
 of immaterial monads 
 
 Leibniz accepts without question Descartes's doctrine 
 that I myself and other spirits, or souls, exist.' Thus, the 
 fundamental problem of philosophy is for him the follow- 
 ing : is the spiritual the only sort of reality or do ultimately 
 non-spiritual realities also exist? (Such realities, according 
 to Leibniz, would be corporeal or bodily ; he does not take 
 into account the later conception of a kind of reality neither 
 spiritual or corporeal, but fundamental to both.^) Now the 
 attributes, according to Descartes and Hobbes, of corporeal 
 reality are extension, or figure, and motion.' The problem 
 from which Leibniz starts reduces itself therefore to this: 
 are figure and motion ultimately real? This question he 
 answers in the negative. Every extension is, in the first 
 place, he points out, infinitely divisible. There is no surface 
 so small that it is not abstractly possible to break it up, in 
 conception, into smaller surfaces. But endlessness, Leibniz 
 holds,* is an irrational conception, therefore that which is 
 by nature endlessly divisible cannot be an ultimate reality. 
 "It is impossible," he says,^ "to find the principles of a true 
 unity in matter alone . . . since matter is only a collection or 
 mass of parts to infinity." For, as he elsewhere says, "a 
 continuum is not only divisible to infinity, but every particle 
 of matter is actually divided into other parts different among 
 themselves. . . . And since this could always be continued, 
 
 'The terms 'spirit,' 'soul,' 'mind,' 'self,' 'person,' 'I,' — with the ad- 
 jectives corresponding to many of these expressions, — are used by Descartes 
 and by Leibniz, and in general by the writer of this book, as synonyms. 
 
 ' For discussion, cf. infra. Chapter 5, pp. 116 seq.; Chapter 6, pp. 179 
 seq.; Chapter 11, pp. 409 seq. 
 
 ' Of course Descartes regards motion as a form of extension. 
 
 ' "Material atoms are contrary to reason " ("New System," § 11). Cf. 
 discussion of Descartes's arguments for God's existence, supra, pp. 50 seq. 
 
 '' "New System," § 3, cf. § 11; also, "Letters to Arnaud," XVI., Gep- 
 hardt edition, Vol. II., p. 97; XVII., Open Court edition, pp. igi-192. 
 
76 FLuraltstic spiritualism 
 
 we should never reach anything of which we could say, here 
 is a real being." ^ In other words, since by 'ultimate' is 
 meant a further irreducible reality, that which is endlessly 
 divisible cannot be ultimate. 
 
 It is even more obvious that motion is not an ultimate, a 
 self-dependent, sort of reahty. "Motion," Leibniz says, 
 "if we regard only its exact and formal meaning, that is, 
 change of place, is not something entirely real, and when 
 several bodies change their places reciprocally, it is not pos- 
 sible to determine by considering the bodies alone to which 
 among them movement or repose is to be attributed." ^ 
 Evidently, that which is always relative to something else is 
 not ultimately real. 
 
 As merely extended or moving, non-spiritual, or corporeal, 
 things are not, Leibniz teaches, ultimately real. But it is 
 possible, he suggests, to conceive of these non-spiritual things, 
 not as static, but as dynamic reahties, that is, as forces. 
 "Motion," he says, "that is, change of place, is not something 
 entirely real. . . . But the force or the proximate calise of 
 these changes is something more real."^ 
 
 Motion and extension are thus conceived as manifestations 
 or expressions of an underlying force. According to this 
 view, the universe would be made up not of spiritual realities 
 together with non- spiritual, extended, and moving things 
 but of spiritual reahties together with non-spiritual forces. 
 But when he seriously asks himself the question, 'What is 
 force?' Leibniz finds that he has no definite conception of 
 force except as spiritual. The thought of anything as a force 
 is a conception of it as in some sense hke a willing, striving, 
 
 ' Cf. "Entretien de Philarete et d'Ariste," Gerhardt edition, Vol. VI., 
 
 P- 579- 
 
 ' "Discourse on Metaphysics" (Gerhardt edition, Vol. IV., Open Court 
 edition), Prop. XVIII. Cf. ibid., XVII., which by showing that the motion 
 is not always constant makes for the doctrine of the relativity and the ulti- 
 mate unreality of matter. 
 
 ' "Discourse," XVIII'. Here, it should be noted, reality or substance 
 is treated as a cause of phenomena. 
 
The System of Leibniz 77 
 
 working self. Thus, from the conviction that the nature of 
 real unities "consists in force, it follows," Leibniz says, 
 "that it would be necessary to conceive them in imitation of 
 the notion which we have of souls." ^ 
 
 Leibniz's result is the following: He began by assuming 
 the existence of non-spiritual realities — bodies. He dis- 
 covers that these alleged non-spiritual things are in their 
 ultimate nature spiritual. He finds confirmation of this 
 conclusion in Descartes's doctrine about the non-spatial 
 quahties of so-called corporeal things. Descartes had ad- 
 mitted that hardness, color, sound, and the rest are not the 
 qualities of ultimately real and non-spiritual things, but 
 themselves the modifications or experiences of conscious 
 minds; on the other hand, he had insisted that extension is 
 the real attribute of non-spiritual objects. Leibniz argues 
 that extension and motion are on a par with the other quali- 
 ties of supposedly non-spiritual things, and that if color and 
 the rest are modifications of spirit, so, also, are size and mo- 
 tion. "Size and motion," he says, "... are phenomena 
 like colors and sounds . . . although they involve a more 
 distinct knowledge." ^ Leibniz does not elaborate this teach- 
 ing, but his meaning is clear. All that I know about color, 
 sound, and odor, and similarly all that I know of exten- 
 sion and motion, I know through perception. I describe 
 my perception of a supposedly non-spiritual thing in — let 
 us say — the assertion, "I perceive a round, fragrant, red 
 apple." But if the assertion be challenged, — if some one 
 else assert that no round, red, and fragrant object is here, — 
 then I find myself able to say with assurance only this, that 
 I am conscious in definite ways which I describe as color, 
 smell, and form consciousness. In other words, that which 
 is indisputably real in the thing turns out to be a complex 
 
 * "New System," § 3. 
 
 '"Letters to Arnaud," XXII., Gerhardt edition. Vol. II., p. 118 »; 
 XXII., Open Court edition, p. 222. Berkeley later reaches this conclusion, 
 arguing more satisfactorily and in more detail. Cf. injra, pp. 119 seq. 
 
78 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 modification of consciousness. And it is utterly arbitrary 
 to hold with Descartes that, whereas the redness and the fra- 
 grance are modifications of spirit, the roundness is a non- 
 spiritual character. "He who will meditate," Leibniz says, 
 "upon the nature of substance' . . . will find that the whole 
 nature of bodies is not exhausted in their extension, that is 
 to say in their size, figure, and motion, but that we must 
 recognize something which corresponds to soul, something 
 which is commonly called substantial form." ^ "The essence 
 of the body," he writes a little later in a letter to Amaud,' 
 "cannot consist in extension, and we must necessarily con- 
 ceive of something which is called substantial form." How 
 Leibniz conceives this 'substantial form* is clearly shown in 
 another letter. "Substantial unity," he says, "calls for a 
 thoroughly indivisible being, naturally indestructible. . . . 
 This characteristic cannot be found either in forms or mo- 
 tions, both of which involve something imaginary. ... It 
 can be found, however, in a soul or a substantial form, such 
 as is the one called the I. These latter are the only thor- 
 oughly real beings." ^ 
 
 So Leibniz reaches the conclusion that the alleged non- 
 spiritual, or corporeal, realities are in the last analysis 
 spiritual. This he argues on the ground that a corporeal 
 reahty must be conceived either as extended and moving or 
 as a force ; that an extension because endlessly divisible and 
 a motion because always relative are not ultimate; that 
 extensions and motions accordingly are to be conceived as 
 effects or expressions of forces; finally that a force is incon- 
 
 ' Leibniz uses the terms ' substance ' or ' substantial form ' for what I 
 have called the 'fundamental' or the 'ultimate' reality. The expression 
 substantial form is a conscious paraphrase of the Platonic elSos, and refers 
 to the substance realized-as-ideal, that is, to the monad. 
 
 '"Discourse," XII' 
 
 ' Letter IX., Open Court edition, p. 135. Cf. Letter XIII., ihid., p. 154 '. 
 
 •Letter XIV., Open Court edition, p. 161. Cf. "Syst&me Nouveau 
 (New System)," § 11, "II y a une veritable unit^, qui repond Si ce qu'on 
 ippelle mot en nous." 
 
The System of Leibniz 79 
 
 ceivabl» except as spirit. He confirms the doctrine by the 
 observation that our only unchallenged assertions about 
 extensions and motions — as about colors and hardnesses — • 
 concern these qualities conceived as modifications of spirit. 
 The argument to show that ultimate reahty is, all of it, 
 spiritual should be followed by an attempt to prove the second 
 of Leibniz's fundamental doctrines, the manifoldness, or 
 numerical plurality, of the universe. Leibniz, however, 
 never argues, he merely assumes, this fundamental multi- 
 plicity. It seems to him too obvious to need argument. 
 Evidently, he holds, the universe, whatever its constitution, 
 is composed of many realities. 
 
 J. Leibniz's doctrine 0} the classes of monads and of their 
 
 nature 
 
 There are, Leibniz teaches, four main forms of monad, or 
 soul-like reality. These are, the supreme monad, God, and, 
 dependent on him, three types of finite monad : the rational 
 souls ; the sentient but irrational monads ; the bare or simple 
 monads, organic bodies and inorganic masses.* 
 
 I. The supreme monad, God 
 
 By God, the supreme monad, Leibniz means, as Descartes 
 had meant, an infinite, that is, utterly perfect spirit — a 
 Person of absolute power, wisdom, and goodness. This is, 
 of course, the traditional conception of God which Leibniz 
 takes over from his predecessors. His arguments for God's 
 existence closely resemble Descartes's, though Leibniz 
 himself lays undue stress on certain points of difference. 
 These arguments will be later discussed in more detail. 
 
 ' Cf. "Monadology," 19-29; "Letter to R. C. Wagner," Gerhardt 
 edition, Vol. VII., p. 528; "Principles of Nature and Grace," 4. 
 
8o Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 Fundamentally, they are these: (i) From the possibilitj 
 of the conception of an absolutely perfect bemg follows the 
 existence of this being. (2) From the fact that concrete 
 things and abstract truths exist, it follows that there must 
 be a God, a perfect being, as their source ; else there would 
 be no sufficient reason of their existence. 
 
 The supposed demonstration of God's existence has im- 
 portant consequences in Leibniz's system. For from God's 
 perfection it follows both that the world of his creation is the 
 best possible world, and also that all the finite monads must 
 depend utterly on God. Leibniz's view of the nature of 
 God will thus become more evident in the course of the dis- 
 cussion which follows, first of the nature of rational, of merely 
 sentient, and of simple monads ; and second, of their rela- 
 tions to God and to each other. 
 
 2. The finite^ monads 
 
 {a) The characters common to all finite monads 
 
 By monad, Leibniz means, as has appeared, a soul-like 
 reality — that is, a reahty of the nature of the I. In my 
 knowledge of myself, I have therefore, Leibniz teaches, the 
 key to all reality. Accordingly, his method of discovering 
 the characters of monads is mainly that of discovering the 
 characters of the self. " In order to determine the concept of 
 an individual substance,^ it is good," he says, "to consult the 
 concept which I have of myself." ^ The characters which 
 Leibniz attributes to all limited realities — or, in his terms, 
 to 'individual substances,' 'monads,' — are the following: 
 (i) dependence on the supreme monad, God; (2) activity; 
 (3) separateness or isolation; (4) the unification of its own 
 
 ' Cf. supra, note on p. 34. 
 ' Cf. footnote on p. 78. 
 
 ^ "Letters to Arnaud," VIII., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 45 ^j Open 
 Court edition, p. rr6^ 
 
The System of Leibniz 8i 
 
 experiences; (5) the character of expressing the universe; 
 (6) the character of being predetermined by God to harmony 
 with other monads. 
 
 (i) Every monad depends on God 
 
 Every monad is, in the first place, Leibniz teaches, in con- 
 formity with his doctrine of God's perfect power, dependent 
 on God, the supreme monad, as its creator. Creation is 
 expressly Ukened to the production of thought; the finite 
 monad proceeds from God 'by a kind of emanation'; he 
 produces it "just as we produce thoughts." There are many 
 individuals, simply because God "regards all aspects of the 
 universe in all possible manners" . . . and "the result of 
 each view of the universe as seen from a different position is 
 a substance."^ 
 
 (2) Every monad is active 
 
 Leibniz always asserts, and seldom argues, the activity of 
 the monads. "Substance," he says at the very beginning 
 of the "Principles of Nature and Grace," one of the com- 
 pletest summaries of his teaching, "is a being capable of 
 action." But though Leibniz does not supply a definition of 
 activity or an argument for it, most of his readers will agree 
 with him in assigning to the rational monad, the myself, 
 an aspect of spontaneity, independence, or assertiveness 
 which may well be called activity. And empirical observa- 
 tion makes it fairly easy to transfer, in imagination, to corpo- 
 real objects the activity originally realized as characteristic of 
 a self. Leibniz's teaching is thus the common doctrine that 
 our notion of activity is gained wholly by observation of our- 
 selves; that in attributing activity to inanimate objects we 
 
 • "Discourse," XIV.; cf. XXXII. Cf. also, "Ultimate Origination of 
 Things," paragraph 8, Gerhardt edition, Vol. VII., p. 302. 
 
82 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 really endow them with the sort of activity which we perceive 
 in ourselves ; and that, in fact, there is no activity save soul 
 activity.* 
 
 (3) Every monad is absolutely separate from every other 
 
 The doctrine that "every individual substance is ... a 
 world apart, independent of everything else excepting God" ^ 
 is reiterated in each one of Leibniz's formulations of his 
 doctrine: "A particular substance," he says, in that 
 earhest of his mature statements of doctrine, the " Discourse 
 on Metaphysics," "never acts upon another particular sub- 
 stance nor is it acted on by it." ' "It is not possible," he 
 writes, nearly ten years later, "... that any true substance 
 should receive anything from without." ^ " There is no way," 
 he says, in one of the very latest of his philosophical works, 
 "of explaining how a monad may be altered or changed in 
 its inner being by any other created thing ; . . . the monads 
 have no windows by which anything may come in or go out."' 
 
 It will be admitted that introspection seems to testify to the 
 fact that every self is isolated. Our 
 
 ". . . spirits live in awful singleness, 
 Each in its self-formed sphere of light or gloom;" 
 
 I am myself, no one else, a unique self; in being myself I 
 am what nobody else is or can be. I am conscious, indeed, 
 
 ' For criticism, cf. summary of Hume's doctrine; for a contemporary re- 
 statement of the doctrine, cf. Renouvier, "Le personnalisme," Chapter 
 III., p. II. 
 
 ' "Letters to Arnaud," IX., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 57; Open Court 
 edition, p. 133. 
 
 ' "Discourse," XIV^. * "New System" (1695), § 14. 
 
 = "Monadology" (1714), § 7. This last quotation introduces the name 
 by which Leibniz finally characterized his ultimate realities, which he had 
 begun by calling 'substantial forms.' In calling them monads — that is, 
 singles or units — he of course laid special stress on their uniqueness, their 
 separateness, their incapacity of being directly influenced by anything out- 
 side themselves. 
 
The System of Leibniz 83 
 
 of a chasm separating me from all other selves ; and nothing, 
 can affect me except what belongs to me or is a part of me. 
 It appears, in truth, as Leibniz insists, that "jiothing^ can 
 happen to us, e^ccept thoughts and. perceptiarLS,.axid„all.-Our 
 thoughts and percej)tions are but the consequence, contingent 
 it is true, of our precedehr'tEoughts and perceptions,, in. such 
 a way that were I able to consider directly all that happens 
 or appears to me at the present time, I should be able to see 
 all that will happen to me or that will ever appear to me. 
 This future will not fail me, and will surely appear to me even 
 if all that which is outside me were destroyed, save only that 
 God and myself were left."' 
 
 Besides asserting, on the basis of his knowledge of the| 
 'myself,' the separateness and uniqueness of the monads,c 
 Leibniz argues for this character on the ground of the rela- 
 tion of the monads to God. Since each monad is, in truth, 
 one of God's views of the universe, it must reproduce God's 
 characters, including his self-dependence ; it must, therefore, 
 be "independent of everything except God." To this 
 reasoning, Leibniz adds the wholly insuflficient argument, 
 that because a monad cannot have "a physical influence on 
 the inner being of another," therefore the influence of one 
 monad on another requires "the intervention of God."^ 
 Of course, the premise of this argument is true, since so-called 
 physical reality has been proved to be spiritual; but the 
 possibility of a non-physical influence of finite monad on 
 finite monad is not thereby denied. An unexpressed argu- 
 ment at the base of Leibniz's doctrine of the isolation of the 
 monads may, however, readily be discerned. It is this: 
 multiphcity, if fundamental and not superficial, impUes 
 separateness. For things which influence each other are 
 not really many realities, but rather parts of one reality, that 
 is, members of a system or group. But one of Leibniz's 
 
 ' "Discourse," XIV 2. 
 
 ^ "Monadology," 51. Cf. "Principles of Nature and Grace," 2; "Second 
 Explanation of the New System," quoted in^ra, p. 89. 
 
84 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 fundamental doctrines is that of the multiplicity of reality. 
 In so far as he is justified in this teaching, he is correct in the 
 logical inference from it — the doctrine that the fundamen- 
 tally many realities are unique and separate. (It will be 
 shown, however, that Leibniz assumes without proof the 
 ultimate multiphcity.) 
 
 It follows from the isolation of the monad — as Leibniz 
 does not fail to point out — that it is indissoluble and ingen- 
 erable. For if incapable of being affected by anything 
 outside itself, it can neither be ended nor could it ever have 
 been begun. "Only by a miracle," Leibniz says, could "a 
 substance have its beginning or its end." 
 
 (4) Every monad is a unity 0} its own states 
 
 "The individual concept of each person," Leibniz declares, 
 "includes, once for all, everything that can ever happen to 
 him." ' In the end, this assertion, like all others which con- 
 cern the monads, is based on the knowledge which each one 
 of us has of himself : I am, or include within myself, all that I 
 experience ; and I have none the less an identity in spite of 
 change; the present I is, in a sense, identical with the I 
 which endured certain past experiences; and my future ex- 
 periences will be referred to this same I. In Leibniz's own 
 words, therefore, "it must needs be that there should be some 
 reason why we can veritably say that . . . the I which was 
 at Paris is now in Germany." ^ 
 
 But Leibniz is not satisfied with this mere appeal to expe- 
 rience, and proceeds to explain the identity of the monad by 
 a logical analogy. "My inner experience," he says, "con- 
 vinces me a posteriori of this identity, but there must also 
 be some reason a priori. It is not possible to find any other 
 
 ' "Discourse," XIII. 
 
 2 "Letters to Amaud," VIII., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 43'; Open 
 Court edition, p. 112. 
 
The System of Leibniz 85 
 
 reason, excepting that my attributes of the preceding time and 
 state as well as the attributes of the succeeding time and state 
 are predicates of the same subject. . . . Since from the very 
 time that I began to exist it could be said of me truly that this 
 or that would happen to me, we must grant that these predi- 
 cates were principles involved in the subject or in my complete 
 concept, which constitutes the so-called I and which is the 
 basis of the interconnection of all my different states. These 
 God has known perfectly from all eternity." ' The identity 
 of the self is further shown, Leibniz teaches, by an analysis 
 of the concept of change. For, in order that there may be 
 change, not mere succession, there must surely be something 
 which changes ; and this something must be one throughout 
 its succeeding states. 
 
 (5) Every monad mirrors or expresses all reality 
 
 But Leibniz teaches not only that a monad is a unity of all 
 its own experiences; besides these, "in its full concept are 
 included ... all the attendant circumstances and the whole 
 sequence of exterior events." ^ " There was always," Leibniz 
 says, "in the soul of Alexander marks of all that had hap- 
 pened to him and evidences of all that would happen to him 
 . . . for instance that he would conquer Darius and Porus. " * 
 Therefore, "that which happens to each one is only the con- 
 sequence of its complete idea or concept, since this idea already 
 includes all the predicates and expresses the whole universe." * 
 
 '" Letters to Arnaud ; " cf. "Discourse," VIII. Contemporary com- 
 mentators have shown that Leibniz reached this conception of the monad, 
 largely because of his occupation with the logical relation of subject to 
 predicate. Cf. "Discourse," VIII^: "The content of the subject must 
 always include that of the predicate in such a way that if one understands 
 perfectly the nature of the subject, he will know that the predicate apper- 
 tains to it also. This being so, we are able to say that this is the nature 
 of an individual substance." Cf. Russell, "The Philosophy of Leibniz," 
 
 § 17. P- 43- 
 
 2 "Tli,«iouTse." IX. ' Ibid., VIII., end. lUd., XIV. 
 
86 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 Leibniz teaches, it thus appears, not only that in a sense every 
 substance is absolutely complete, but that it expresses all 
 reaUty. 
 
 For this doctrine, Leibniz advances an argument Hke that 
 on which he had based his doctrine of the isolation of the 
 monads. Every monad is the emanation or effective thought 
 of God. But God is absolutely perfect or complete, therefore 
 that which expresses him must share in his completeness. 
 "It is very evident," Leibniz says, in a passage already 
 quoted in part, "that created substances depend upon God 
 who preserves them and can produce them continually by a 
 kind of emanation just as we produce our thoughts, for when 
 God turns, so to say, on all sides and in all fashions, the gen- 
 eral system of phenomena which he finds it good to produce 
 . . . and when he regards all the aspects of the world in all 
 possible manners, . . . the result of each view of the universe 
 as seen from a different position is a substance which expresses 
 the universe conformably to this view, provided God sees fit 
 to render his thought effective and to produce the substance. 
 ... It follows . . . that each substance is a world by it- 
 self." ' In other words, because every monad is one of God's 
 ways of viewing the universe and because God is perfect, or 
 complete, therefore every monad "expresses" — or, as Leib- 
 niz often says "mirrors" — "the whole universe according 
 to its way." ^ By this statement, Leibniz explains, he means 
 that every monad, in that it is an I, is conscious of the whole 
 world — that, to a degree, it laiows the whole universe.^ In 
 my own person, therefore, I reconcile the separateness and 
 the apparent harmony of the individual. I am my separate 
 isolated self, incapable of getting out of myself, or away from 
 
 ' "Discourse," XIV. 
 
 '"Letters to Arnaud," IX., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 57; Open 
 Court edition, p. 133. 
 
 ^lUd., XXII., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 112, XXIII., Open Court 
 edition, p. 212^: "Expression is common to all forms and is a class of 
 which ordinary perception, animal feeling, and intellectual knowledge are 
 species." 
 
The System of Leibniz 87 
 
 my own experience ; and yet I find myself conscious of other 
 selves and things. I mirror and portray the universe, in 
 knowing it — and yet my knowledge never takes me outside 
 my separate and distinct self. 
 
 This theory obviously involves two difficulties. It may be 
 true that I express the universe by being conscious of it, but 
 it is hard to see how an inanimate object — say a rock — 
 expresses the universe in this way.^ But if Leibniz has been 
 successful in the proof that all realities are souls, it must 
 follow that they are conscious.^ A second problem is the 
 following : How can Leibniz teach that a finite monad knows 
 the whole universe? For is it not obvious that no single, 
 finite self, or monad, can know the entire universe ? Leib- 
 niz answers squarely by reaffirming that each soul "knows 
 the infinite, knows all ; " ^ and he seeks to justify the teach- 
 ing by insisting that we have an indistinct and confused con- 
 sciousness of much that we do not clearly know. Of such a 
 character, he holds, is our knowledge of that which we do not 
 immediately experience or logically infer. To the considera- 
 tion of both difficulties we shall later recur. 
 
 (6) Every monad has been predetermined by God to be in 
 harmony with every other 
 
 The preestabHshed harmony of the monads is a theory 
 which Leibniz formulated in the face of the following diffi- 
 culty: His doctrine that each monad expresses the entire 
 universe seems to oppose his equally emphasized doctrine 
 that each monad is separate from every other. He teaches, 
 as has just appeared, that given Adam, all the events of the 
 universe are given, or that given Alexander, the conquest of 
 Darius is therewith assured. But if the existence of Adam is 
 
 ' Cf. "Letters to Arnaud," XIX., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 105, 
 XX., Open Court edition, p. 203' (from Arnaud to Leibniz), to show 
 that this difficulty was felt by Arnaud. 
 
 ^ Cf. infra, p. 95. ' "Principles of Nature and Grace," § 13'. 
 
88 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 implied by my existence, it may well be urged that Adam and 
 I are not absolutely separated and independent of each other. 
 It may be urged, also, that the interrelatedness of minds, or 
 spirits, with things is at least as obvious to ordinary observa- 
 tion as their separateness. I am not merely conscious of my 
 isolation, I am equally conscious of my vital connection with 
 the other spirits of my world. I hve not only in 'awful 
 singleness,' but in close relation to these other spirits; and 
 this must mean, it is urged, that I affect them and am in turn 
 influenced by them. To such mutual influence, not to a per- 
 fect isolation, all the facts of social intercourse — for example, 
 question and answer, and cooperation in labor — seem to bear 
 witness. So-called physical reahties, also, are closely bound 
 together in the relation of cause and effect, so that from the 
 condition of one object we may actually infer that of another. 
 All these commonplaces of observation tell against Leibniz's 
 doctrine of the isolation of reahties; and he himself admits 
 this apparent interconnection, saying that "phenomena 
 maintain a certain order conformably to our nature (from 
 whence it follows that we can . . . make useful observations, 
 which are justified by the outcome of the future phenom- 
 ena)." ' 
 
 Leibniz's way of reconciling these apparently opposed 
 characters of monads, their isolation and their conformity of 
 behavior, is by what is known as his doctrine of preestab- 
 lished harmony: God, from whom each of the created 
 monads emanates, as a thought from its thinker, has so con- 
 ceived, or created, each soul, that each of its thoughts and per- 
 ceptions shall correspond with each of the changes in all the 
 other monads which together constitute the universe as finite. 
 "God," he says, "has first created the soul, or any other real 
 unity, so that everything shall grow out of its own depth, by 
 a perfect spontaneity on its own part and yet with a 
 perfect conformity to outside things. . . . And so it comes 
 
 ' "Discourse," XIV. 
 
The System of Leibniz 89 
 
 about that, though each of these substances exactly repre- 
 sents the universe after its manner and according to a certain 
 point of view, . . . and though the perceptions or expressions 
 of external things arrive in the soul in virtue of its osnvl laws, 
 . . . and as if there existed nothing save God and the soul — ■ 
 still, there will be a perfect accord among all these substances, 
 which produces the same effect as if they communicated with 
 each other. ... It is this mutual relation, regulated in ad- 
 vance, within each substance of the universe, which brings 
 about what we call their communication."' 
 
 In replying to the difficulties found by Foucher^ in this 
 system of preestablished harmony, Leibniz made use of an 
 illustration which at once associated itself with every state- 
 ment of the theory. "Imagine," he says, "two clocks and 
 watches which keep exactly the same time. Now this may 
 come about in three ways. The first is that of mutual in-' 
 fluence ; the second is to put them in charge of a clever work- 
 man who shall keep them in order and together, at every 
 moment ; the third is to make the two timepieces with such 
 art and precision that one assures their keeping time together 
 in the future. Now put the mind and the body in place of 
 these two clocks; their accord may come about in one of 
 these three ways. The theory of influence is that of the every- 
 day philosophy; but since one cannot conceive of material 
 particles which could pass from one of these substances to the 
 other, this conception must be abandoned. The theory of 
 the continual assistance of the Creator is that of the system of 
 occasional causes ; but I hold that this is to make God inter- 
 vene, as a Deus ex machina, in a natural and ordinary situation 
 where, according to reason, he ought to cooperate only as he 
 does in all other natural phenomena. Therefore there re- 
 mains only my hypothesis, that of harmony. From the begin- 
 ning, God has made each of these two substances of such a 
 nature that in following only its own laws, received with its 
 
 ' "New System," 14. ' Journal des Savants, 12 September, 1695. 
 
90 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 being, it none the less is in harmony with the other, just as it 
 would be if they mutually influenced each other." ^ The 
 relatedness of the different monads is thus, fundamentally, 
 an "interconnection among the resolutions of God." ^ 
 
 (&) The classes of created monads 
 (i) The rational monads: conscious, moral selves 
 
 By rational monad, Leibniz means such a self, or spirit, as 
 any human being knows itself to be : Leibniz, Spinoza, or the 
 Electress Sophia. Leibniz does not argue for the existence 
 of the rational self, but asserts it on the unimpeachable tes- 
 timony of consciousness. The existence of many human 
 selves, other than the mere myself, Leibniz usually assumes, 
 for it does not occur to him that this could be questioned. Yet 
 his teaching that a varied, multiple universe follows from the 
 infinite variety of God's perfections offers a general argu- 
 ment for the multipHcity of selves. From all other finite 
 substances, the rational monads are distinguished by the clear- 
 ness and distinctness of their consciousness. This cardinal 
 difference impHes two contrasts. Rational selves alone have 
 reason, in addition to perception and memory; and rational 
 selves alone are morally free and responsible. The char- 
 acter of freedom involves such difficulty that it must be con- 
 sidered at more length. 
 
 Rational monads, Leibniz teaches, incHne to "choices 
 under no compulsion of necessity." So far as this means 
 merely that a rational being is under no compulsion from 
 other finite beings, it is of course entirely consistent with 
 
 ' "Second Explanation of the New System." Note that Leibniz applies 
 the theory explicitly to the relation of a soul to its body. 
 
 ^ " Letters to Amaud," VIII., Gerhardt edition, Vol.11., p. 37; Open Court 
 edition, p. 104. Cf. Letter IX., Gerhardt edition. Vol. II., p. 48; Open Court 
 edition, p. 120. This form of words is a more accurate expression of Leib- 
 niz's apparent meaning than that of the " Monadology," which speaks of the 
 "relationship ... of things to each other." 
 
The System of Leibniz gi 
 
 Leibniz's teaching. But Leibniz seems to mean more than 
 this, namely, that the individual, rational soul, and not God, 
 is author of its own choices.' The proof he offers for the 
 theory is the attempted demonstration that the acts of the 
 finite rational self are contingent acts, therefore not necessary, 
 therefore free. To prove the acts of every rational being 
 contingent, Leibniz makes and emphasizes the contrast be- 
 tween necessary truths, or truths of reason as he calls them, 
 whose opposite is not possible, and contingent truths, whose 
 opposite is possible.^ The truths of geometry — for example, 
 the theorem that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to 
 two right angles or the theorem that alternate internal angles 
 are equal — are examples of necessary truths : their opposite 
 is inconceivable. On the other hand, the fact that Leibniz 
 visited Spinoza in The Hague is a contingent truth ; for Leib- 
 niz might 'possibly' have found Spinoza at Amsterdam, or 
 he might have gone from Paris to Hanover without visiting 
 Spinoza. From this justifiable distinction between necessary 
 and contingent truths, Leibniz then draws the following con- 
 clusion : the acts of a rational being can be imagined as differ- 
 ent from what they actually are, — that is, their opposite is 
 conceivable, or possible ; therefore these acts are contingent, 
 and as contingent they are free, not necessary. But this 
 conclusion is invalidated by the ambiguity of the word 'pos- 
 sible.' Leibniz uses it first as equivalent to 'conceivable,' 
 that is, 'imaginable,' and second as equivalent to 'contingent,' 
 that is, 'not necessary.' Now, in the first sense, the opposite 
 of a given action certainly is 'possible' — that is, one may 
 always imagine a given person as behaving otherwise than in 
 the way in which he actually behaves ; for example, one may 
 imagine Leibniz as going not to The Hague but directly to 
 
 ' "Discourse," XIII., XXX., XXXI.; cf. "Theodicy," e.g. Abr^g^, 
 Objections 4 and 5. 
 
 ^ Cf. "Discourse," XIII., and "Theodicy," cited above. Cf. "New 
 Essays," Bk. I., for a discussion of truths of reason and truths of fact without 
 special reference to this bearing of the doctrine on the freedom conception. 
 
92 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 Hanover. Butit is illogical to argue from the fact that one may 
 imagine Leibniz as going to Hanover on a certain day, to the 
 conclusion that it was really possible for him to go to Hanover 
 on that day. In truth, this conclusion seems wholly incon- 
 sistent with Leibniz's teaching that both Leibniz and Spinoza 
 were created by God, and that it was contained in God's 
 conception of both philosophers that they should meet, in 
 1676, at The Hague.' 
 
 It must be admitted, then, that Leibniz does not prove that 
 the acts of rational beings are contingent, or free. Yet he 
 holds to the doctrine of freedom, doubtless because only so 
 can he reconcile the fact of moral evil with his doctrine of the 
 goodness of God, and because, also, the belief in freedom and 
 responsibility seems to him necessary to the moral life of 
 rational selves.^ In this mainly unargued conviction the 
 force of Leibniz's doctrine of freedom really lies ; and on the 
 facts of the moral consciousness an argument for freedom, 
 far stronger than his, may be based. 
 
 (2) The sentient monads: irrational souls 
 
 Leibniz sharply distinguishes the merely sentient, irrational 
 souls of animals from the rational, self-conscious souls of 
 human beings. Animals' souls, he teaches, have perception 
 and memory, but they have neither exphcit seK-consciousness 
 nor reason nor moral freedom. The difference is, he holds, 
 a difference in clearness of perception : both animal and 
 rational souls perceive, and thus express, the whole universe, 
 but the animal souls only confusedly.' This important 
 distinction of clear from confused consciousness will be con- 
 
 ' Leibniz himself seems to the writer virtually to admit this by his teach- 
 ing that 'contingent' truths are certain. Cf. "Discourse," XIII., XXX., 
 XXXI. 
 
 ' Cf. injra, Chapter 7, pp. 259 seq.; and Chapter 11, pp. 446 seq. On 
 the teaching of Leibniz, cf. Russell, op. cit., § 118. 
 
 ' " Principles of Nature and Grace," 4 and 5. 
 
The System of Leibniz 93 
 
 sidered in discussing Leibniz's doctrine of the third group of 
 created monads. 
 
 (3) The simple monads 
 
 Simple monads, according to Leibniz, constitute the reality, 
 as distinct from the appearance, of what are known as organ- 
 ized bodies and masses of inorganic matter. Corresponding 
 to my idea of my own body or of my hat there is something real 
 — or, more definitely, a collection of reals. These reahties 
 are simple monads, perceptive, soul-Kke substances, each an 
 active, complete, isolated expression of the universe. It is 
 essential to the understanding of Leibniz to reahze that he 
 never teaches that to each animal or inorganic body, as it 
 appears to us, there corresponds but one monad, or soul. 
 Such a view, he holds, is contradicted by the fact that every 
 material body is subject to division and to transformation: 
 a block of marble, for example, may be split into smaller 
 blocks, and animal bodies may be mutilated or even reduced 
 to ashes.* If a body, as it appears to us, were a soul, it would 
 follow then that the soul is divisible and destructible — for 
 Leibniz, an impossible conclusion. Leibniz, in fact, regards 
 every body, organic and inorganic, not as itself a monad, 
 but as an idea in our minds to which corresponds a constantly 
 changing collection of simple monads. These simple monads 
 are in continual flux, forming part now of one body, now of 
 another, and changing place either "little by httle, but con- 
 tinuously," as in nutrition, or "all at one time," as in con- 
 ception or in death.^ 
 
 The only sense in which the particular, animal body, thus 
 conceived, may be said to have unity is because of the subordi- 
 nation of the simple monads, which compose it, to the sentient 
 soul, or dominating monad. With this meaning, Leibniz 
 
 ' Cf. the detailed discussion of this subject in the "Letters to and from 
 Arnaud," XI., XIII., XIV., XVI., XVII., XX., XXIII. 
 ' "Principles of Nature and Grace," 6. 
 
94 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 says, in the"Letters to Amaud" :' "A body is an aggregation 
 of substances, and is not a substance, properly speaking." 
 "Bodies by themselves, without the soul," he says in a 
 slightly earlier letter,^ "have only a unity of aggregation, but 
 the reality which inheres in them comes from the parts which 
 compose them and which retain their substantial unity 
 through the living bodies that are included in them without 
 number."' 
 
 It is not hard to assign a reason for Leibniz's teaching that 
 inorganic and organic bodies represent a distinctive reaUty. 
 There must exist, Leibniz argues, reahties corresponding 
 with our sense ideas or percepts. It is natural to beHeve that 
 these reahties behind sense ideas are things independent 
 of consciousness, but Leibniz has argued that non-spiritual 
 reahties, whether conceived as extensions or as forces, are 
 illusions, and that monads, soul-like substances, are the only 
 reahties. Berkeley, as will later appear, in face of this situa- 
 tion, boldly claims that God is the reality behind the external 
 
 • Letter XXVI., March 23, 1690, Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 135'; 
 Open Court edition, p. 244^. 
 
 ' Letter XVII., April, 1687, Gerhardt edition. Vol. II., p. 100"; Open 
 Court edition, p. 195. 
 
 ° In discussing with Des Bosses the dogma of the 'real presence' in the 
 Eucharist, Leibniz develops another doctrine of the relation of the organic 
 body to the soul. In this view, mind and body form together a substance 
 which has unity. (Cf. "Epistolae ad Des Bosses," Gerhardt edition. Vol. II., 
 pp. 291 jej.) Such a theory appears to the writer, and to many students of 
 Leibniz, to be quite at variance with his fundamental teaching. It is certainly 
 possible to regard it as an unintentional misrepresentation by Leibniz, of his 
 own teaching, a misreading due to his constant impulse toward harmonizing 
 diverse systems and to his special effort to persuade Des Bosses that Leibnizian 
 metaphysics does not oppose Romanist theology. It is only fair to add, how- 
 ever, that two critics, Jacobi and Kuno Fischer, look upon this second theory 
 as representative of Leibniz's real teaching; and that the "Letters to Amaud" 
 contain — side by side with the unequivocal expressions, already quoted, of the 
 body-aggregate theory — certain apparent implications of the view that soul 
 and body together make a unity. (Cf. Letters, Gerhardt edition, pp. 119, 
 75^; Open Court edition, pp. 223', 159'.) The interpretation given in this 
 chapter is that of Erdmann. For a clear statement of the issues of the con- 
 troversy, cf. Russell, op. cit., Chapter 12, § 89 seq. 
 
The System of Leibniz 95 
 
 thing, and regards the thing as God^s idea which he shares 
 with me} But Leibniz, holding closer to the analogy of self- 
 consciousness, preserves for the 'external' object a peculiar 
 reality, a distinct soul of its own. The difference, he teaches, 
 between the simple and the sentient monad, the so-called 
 material thing and the self (animal or human), is simply in 
 the degree of the consciousness possessed by each. The 
 simple monad, like the sentient monad, is 'perceptive' — 
 Leibniz never wavers in this declaration — else it would lose 
 its soul-like character, but its perception is so indistinct, so 
 confused, that the simple monad is fairly called insentient — 
 a 'sleeping' monad, as Leibniz often says.^ 
 
 To show the plausibility of this conception of the so-called 
 inanimate world as peopled with very dimly conscious souls, 
 Leibniz recurs again and again to the difference, observed by 
 each one of us, between the attentive and the inattentive 
 consciousness. "There are a thousand indications," he 
 says, "leading to the conclusion that at every moment there 
 are within us an infinity of perceptions, but without appercep- 
 tion and reflection, that is to say, that there are changes in 
 the soul which we do not apperceive, because the impressions 
 are too small or too numerous or too united, so that nothing 
 distinguishes them. ... So, habit prevents our noticing 
 the movement of a mill or of a waterfall when we have for 
 some time lived beside it. It is not that this movement does 
 not always strike upon our organs and that there does not 
 occur something in the soul corresponding thereto, . . . but 
 these impressions are not strong enough to draw our attention 
 and our memory." ^ The perceptiveness of the simple monad 
 
 ' Cf. infra, p. 139. Leibniz admits the possibility of this conception, in 
 the case of imagination. Cf. "Letters to Arnaud," XII., Gerhardt edition, 
 Vol. II., p. 73'; XIII., Open Court edition, p. 156'. 
 
 ^ It must be observed that modern psychologists would use the terms 
 'sentient' and 'perceptive' in a precisely reversed sense. 
 
 ' "New Essays," Preface, paragraph 6 seq., Langley, p. 47' seq. 
 Leibniz complicates this sound psychological doctrine of the distinction 
 between attentive and inattentive consciousness, by the untenable teaching 
 
96 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 is parallel, therefore, to our own inattentive, sleepy, unre- 
 membered consciousness. In other words, Leibniz teaches 
 that, corresponding with every so-called percept of an object 
 that I have, there exists a confusedly conscious soul, or collec- 
 tion of souls. And, to say the least, he shows the possibility 
 of other-than-human-and-animal souls. 
 
 We may well linger over the completed outhne of Leibniz's 
 picture of the universe. It is a living, spiritual world of ac- 
 tive forces, or souls, each complete in itself and working out 
 its own ends in obedience to its own laws, each distinct from 
 every other, yet harmonized with all the rest in its purpose and 
 in its capacity to mirror all the universe. The creator and 
 harmonizer of all these spiritual forces is the supreme monad, 
 God, a conscious being of absolute power, wisdom, and good- 
 ness. And closest to him in the scale of perfection are the 
 free, self-conscious souls, forming, as Leibniz says, a ' repub- 
 lic of spirits ' of whom, none the less, God is monarch.* 
 
 II. Critical Estimate of the System of Leibniz 
 
 From this summary of the principal teachings of Leibniz, 
 it is evident that Leibniz agrees with Descartes and with 
 Hobbes in conceiving the universe as made up of many in- 
 dividuals. The system of Leibniz is, in other words, numeri- 
 
 that there must be a consciousness, however faint, corresponding with every 
 distinguishable part of a physical stimulus. " To hear the roar of the sea," 
 he continues in the passage quoted above, "I must hear the partial sounds 
 which produce it, that is, the noise of each wave." The tendency of modern 
 psychology is to condemn this doctrine and to teach that a stimulus must 
 attain a given strength before it is accompanied by any consciousness, and 
 that perception due to a composite stimulus is not perception of every con- 
 stituent of that stimulus. (Cf. James, "Principles of Psychology," I., p. 154.) 
 The teaching of Leibniz on this subject has, it must be observed, contributed 
 to the misrepresentation of his doctrine. For the comparison of the simple 
 monad's perceptions with the sentient soul's relations to the indistinguishable 
 parts of a physical stimulus has made it easy to regard the simple monad 
 unconscious — a doctrine quite at variance with the teaching of Leibniz. 
 » "Discourse," XXXVI. 
 
The System of Leibniz 97 
 
 cally pluralistic ; indeed, Leibniz lays far greater stress than 
 Descartes, or even Hobbes, on the multiplicity of the universe 
 and on the consequent uniqueness and separateness of the 
 individuals who constitute it. In contrast with Descartes, 
 and in agreement with Hobbes, Leibniz further teaches that 
 there is but one kind of reahty — in other words, his philoso- 
 phy is qualitatively monistic. But in strong opposition to 
 Hobbes, Leibniz holds that this one kind of reality is imma- 
 terial or ideal. Whereas Hobbes formulates a pluralistic 
 materiahsm, Leibniz teaches a pluralistic idealism — and 
 more definitely, a spiritualism. Both by his monism and 
 by his idealism Leibniz meets real difiiculties in the systems 
 of his predecessors. His monism, that is, his teaching that 
 all real beings are fundamentally of one sort, spiritual, avoids 
 the absurdity of Descartes's doctrine that bodies and spirits, 
 though unUke and utterly independent, none the less affect 
 each other, and avoids as well the difficulty in Descartes's 
 teaching that extension only, of all the quaUties of corporeal 
 bodies, is independent of mind. And Leibniz's idealism 
 meets also the inconsistencies and difficulties of the material- 
 ism of Hobbes. 
 
 But Leibniz's system must be estimated, not only by a 
 valuation of its results, in comparison with the conclusions of 
 his predecessors, but by a scrutiny of the cogency of his argu- 
 ments. Thus estimated, his philosophy is frankly disap- 
 pointing, largely because of the unsystematic development of 
 his thought and expression. Indeed, the value of Leibniz 
 consists rather in the presentation of his own insights than in 
 the organized argument for his conclusions. Here and there, 
 it is true, for specific parts of his doctrine, he attempts detailed 
 proof; but often serious argument fails altogether, often it 
 is barely suggested, not sufficiently developed, often, finally, 
 the vahdity of his argument cannot be admitted. This gen- 
 eral comment must be made good by re-stating, summarizing, 
 and supplementing the criticisms made already on Leib- 
 niz's arguments. It is perhaps unnecessary to remind the 
 
98 
 
 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 reader that criticism at this stage of our study must be pro- 
 visional only, and that it must wait for completion on a wider 
 and deeper acquaintance with philosophical systems. Such 
 criticism may be based on the following brief outHne of the 
 doctrine, which omits entirely the discussion of subordinate 
 questions, even when they are intrinsically important. 
 According to Leibniz, 
 
 A. The ultimately real is 
 
 I. Immaterial 
 II. Multiple 
 
 B. The many, immaterial beings (monads) include 
 
 I. God, the perfect monad 
 
 II. 
 
 III. 
 
 Created spirits 
 (sentient souls) 
 
 Simple monads 
 (insentient but 
 perceptive) 
 
 a. Rational \ 
 and free 
 
 h. Sentient 
 only J 
 
 1 Dependent 
 on God 
 
 ■ Harmonious 
 
 Expressing 
 universe 
 
 Active 
 
 Separate 
 
 One 
 
 a. 'Estimate of Leibniz's doctrine of reality as immaterial 
 and manifold 
 
 The first doctrine to be estimated is, it is evident, the 
 teaching that the ultimately real is immaterial. The signifi- 
 cance of Leibniz's adoption of idealistic doctrine is the greater, 
 because Leibniz was no mere metaphysician. As he him- 
 self says, he "departed very young from the domain of the 
 scholastics," charmed by the "beautiful way" in which the 
 mathematicians and the physicists explained nature.' Both 
 to mathematics and to physics Leibniz made contributions of 
 the highest value ; and to mechanical laws — which he con- 
 ceived as ordered ways, in which ' material ' reality, the 
 mass of simple monads, appears to us' — he always attrib- 
 uted a great, though a subordinate, importance. Thus 
 
 ■'New System,'' 2. 
 
 ' Ibid., 2 and 17. 
 
The System of Leibniz 99 
 
 Leibniz's deliberate conclusion that force, the physical ulti- 
 mate, is spiritual in nature has pecuhar value in that it is the 
 conclusion of a man who is scientist as well as philosopher. 
 
 The writer of this book accepts Leibniz's doctrine, that the 
 real is the immaterial, and accepts the assertions on which it 
 is based : (i) the assertion that extension and motion are not 
 ultimately real but manifestations of a deeper reaUty — either 
 of force or of spirit; (2) the assertion that force can be con- 
 ceived only as spiritual. But Leibniz barely indicates the 
 arguments for these conclusions, leaving to later philosophers 
 the detailed and expHcit demonstration of his results. He 
 might have argued in detail, as Berkeley did, for the doc- 
 trine that extension is on a par with color, sound, and the 
 other non-spatial qualities admitted to be modifications of 
 spirit. He might also have examined the current concep- 
 tions of force, and could then have shown that to the mate- 
 rialist ' force ' really meant no more than either (i) motion, or 
 else (2) the unknown cause of physical phenomena. In the 
 first sense, however (as Leibniz might have proved), force 
 would be, like extension, coordinate with the admittedly ideal 
 qualities of color and the rest. In the second sense, 'force' 
 would mean 'cause of ideas,' and therefore, because related 
 to ideas, force could not be material in the full sense of the 
 term, since it would not be unrelated to consciousness.' To 
 recapitulate: though Leibniz might, in the opinion of the 
 writer, have Justified the ideahstic monism of his system, 
 though he might, in other words, have proved what he 
 taught, that reaUty is through and through immaterial, yet he 
 never carries out this proof with sufficient clearness and detail. 
 
 The second part of Leibniz's teaching is the doctrine that 
 the universe consists, ultimately, of many distinct beings. 
 This doctrine, also, is insufficiently estabhshed. For Leib- 
 niz bases it on superficial observation and on defective argu- 
 ment. He urges in its favor, first, the mere observation that 
 
 ' For development of these arguments, cf. injra, pp. 128 iej., 174 jeg. 
 
lOO Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 there are many different beings in the world ; and second, the 
 argument that every finite being must be ultimately different 
 from every other, since each is a distinct expression of the 
 nature of God." But the undeniable fact that we observe 
 many people, things, and thoughts does not disprove the pos- 
 sibihty that these are ultimately parts of one, including being. 
 And the argument based upon the relation of each finite being 
 to God is invalidated by the inconclusiveness, which will next 
 be set forth, in Leibniz's arguments for God's existence. In 
 technical terms, once more, the numerical plurahsm of Leib- 
 niz, like that of his predecessors, is not satisfactorily demon- 
 strated. He takes for granted and does not prove the exist- 
 ence of an ultimate multipHcity of monads — utterly isolated 
 beings. 
 
 From this comment on the foundation of Leibniz's teaching, 
 it is necessary next to consider his specific doctrines about the 
 multiple, immaterial universe — in a word, to comment on the 
 monad doctrine. 
 
 h. Estimate of Leibniz's doctrine concerning God 
 
 Leibniz's arguments for the existence of God must first be 
 considered, for from the existence of God, the supreme monad, 
 a being infinite, eternal, and perfect — that is, an all-powerful, 
 an all-knowing, and an absolutely good spirit — follow, as 
 has appeared, many of the characters of the other monads. 
 Leibniz's arguments, it will be observed, bear so strong a 
 likeness to those of Descartes that they need not be discussed 
 in detail. Like those, they are of two sorts, ontological and 
 cosmological, or, in Leibniz's terms, 'a priori' and 'c pos- 
 teriori.' 
 
 Leibniz's statement of the ontological argument is the 
 following: "God alone (or the Necessary Being) has this 
 prerogative that if he be possible he must necessarily exist, and 
 
 * Cf. supra, pp. 83 seq. 
 
The System of Leibniz loi 
 
 as nothing is able to prevent the possibility of that which in- 
 volves no bounds, no negation, and consequently no contra- 
 diction, this alone is sufficient to estabhsh a ■priori his 
 existence." ^ This statement of the ontological proof supple- 
 ments that of Descartes by giving reason why the idea of God, 
 alone among other ideas, contains the idea of necessary exist- 
 ence.^ The reason is simply this, that no contradiction is 
 involved in the idea of a perfect being.' Leibniz's meaning is 
 clearly the following: We may rightly question whether 
 there corresponds to our idea of a given limited reaHty any 
 existing thing; for not only are some ideas obviously self- 
 contradictory, — as, for example, the idea of a square circle, — 
 but even such an idea of a particular thing as has seemed 
 to involve no contradiction may prove self-contradictory, 
 since some of its supposed characters may turn out to be in- 
 compatible with others. But I mean by God a perfect being, 
 one possessed of all positive characters, therefore no char- 
 acter asserted of him can contradict another. In other 
 words, the idea of God involves necessary, because uncon- 
 tradictable, existence ; hence — as Descartes had argued — 
 God necessarily exists. 
 
 Leibniz adds nothing to the ontological argument save this 
 reason for asserting that the idea of God includes that of nec- 
 essary existence. There are difficulties in the teaching, but 
 comment upon it is needless, for it after all leaves the onto- 
 logical proof in essentials unchanged : Leibniz still argues 
 from my idea of a necessarily existent, perfect being to the 
 actual existence of that being; and the objection therefore 
 holds against him which was urged against Descartes. What 
 
 ' "Monadology," 45; cf. "Discourse," XXIII. 
 
 * Leibniz, however, is hardly justified in claiming this as an entirely novel 
 teaching. For Descartes had clearly suggested it in his "Reply to the Second 
 Objections to the Meditations." Cf. supra, pp. 47 seq. 
 
 ^ The context makes it clear that Leibniz uses the term ' possible ' in this 
 sense of 'without self-contradiction.' When therefore he goes on to say that 
 God "involves no bounds, no negation," he doubtless means that God 
 includes all qualities or characters. 
 
I02 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 Leibniz claims to prove is that the idea of uncontradictable, 
 and thus of necessary, existence belongs to God. What he 
 does not and cannot prove is that God, though conceived as 
 necessarily existing, does for that reason necessarily exist. 
 
 Besides this a priori, or ontological, argument for God's 
 existence, Leibniz, like Descartes, lays stress on a causal or, 
 as he calls it, an a posteriori argument. The argument is 
 twofold: it is necessary, Leibniz teaches, to infer God's 
 existence as explanation, first of contingent things, and sec- 
 ond, of eternal truths. The assumption on which both these 
 arguments depend is known by Leibniz as the "principle of 
 sufficient reason." He lays great stress upon it throughout 
 his writing, always treating it in connection with the "prin- 
 ciple of contradiction" as a self-evident and unquestionable 
 truth. "Our reasoning," he says, "is based upon two great 
 principles : first that of contradiction, by means of which we 
 decide that to be false which involves contradiction, and that 
 to be true which contradicts or is opposed to the false. And 
 second, the principle of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we 
 believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement 
 true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and 
 not otherwise." ' The principle of sufficient reason is thus 
 identical with Descartes's postulate of an ultimate cause. 
 Like that, it contains two parts : first, the teaching that every 
 finite being has a cause — that no limited being can be con- 
 ceived, except as linked to some cause of itself ; and second, 
 the unproved assumption that there must exist some ultimate, 
 satisfactory — in Leibniz's term, sufficient — cause. 
 
 There are "two kinds of truth," Leibniz teaches,^ which 
 must have a sufficient reason. These are the truths "of 
 reason and those of fact." By truths of fact, he means 
 simply external things and ideas, "bodies and the representa- 
 tions of them in souls." ^ And for the whole "sequence of 
 
 ' " Monadology ," 31-32; cf. "Principles of Nature and Grace," 7. 
 
 ^ "Monadology," 33. 
 
 ' "Principles of Nature and Grace," 8. 
 
The System of Leibniz 103 
 
 the things which extend throughout the universe," ' there 
 must be a sufficient reason; in other words, it would be 
 "possible to one who adequately knew to give a sufficient 
 reason why things are as they are and not otherwise." ^ But 
 no one fact, whether external or internal, can be sufficiently 
 explained by another fact, for the alleged explanation will 
 itself need explanation and will not be ultimate. In the words 
 of Leibniz: "Though the present motion . . . comes from 
 the preceding one, and that from the still preceding one, 
 we gain nothing however far back we go, for there remains 
 always the same question. Thus it is necessary that the suf- 
 ficient reason, which has no more need of another reason, 
 should be found outside the series of contingent things, in a 
 substance, which is cause of the contingent things, — that is, 
 in a necessary being carrying in itself the reason of its exist- 
 ence: otherwise there would still be no sufficient reason at 
 which one could end. Now this last reason of things is called 
 God." ' And God must be existent, Leibniz sometimes adds, 
 since existent things demand an existent cause. (This last 
 stage of the reasoning, from existent things to existent cause, 
 is evidently based on Descartes's principle, already criticised, 
 that the cause must contain at least as much reality as the 
 effects.) 
 
 But God's existence is not merely necessary, Leibniz 
 teaches, to explain the existence of concrete, finite things, 
 'truths of fact' ; it is required, also, to account for the exist- 
 ence of necessary truths, ' truths of reason.' These truths of 
 reason, truths for example of geometry or of arithmetic,* are, 
 he insists, actual facts of our experience; we are as truly 
 
 ' "Monadology," 36. ' "Principles of Nature and Grace," 7. 
 
 ' "Nature and Grace," 8. Cf. "Ultimate Origination of Things," 
 where, as in "Monadology," 39, Leibniz adds to this reasoning an argument, 
 from the fact of the connection among finite beings, to prove that this 'last 
 reason of things' is a single Being («ne seule source). Cf., also, p, 51, foot- 
 note ; and notice that Leibniz, like Descartes, often seems to confuse the con- 
 ception of the temporally first cause and the ultimate cause. 
 
 * Cf. "New Essays," Introduction, paragraph 3. 
 
I04 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 conscious that 3^=27 as that a room is cold. They are 
 distinguished in two ways from contingent facts. The 
 certainty of them is not, in the first place, derived from repe- 
 tition of experience ; the sum of the angles of a triangle is as 
 certainly known to be two right angles in the first apprehen- 
 sion of the theorem as at any later time, whereas one's cer- 
 tainty of any sense-truth, as that the sun will set every twenty- 
 four hours, is dependent on frequent repetition. It follows 
 that one's certainties of fact are not universal: in Nova 
 Zembla, for example, the sun does not set once in twenty- 
 four hours; whereas the truths of reason are everywhere 
 cogent. Truths of reason are distinguished, in the second 
 place, Leibniz teaches, from truths of fact, on the ground that 
 "they are necessary, and their opposite is impossible," 
 whereas truths of fact "are contingent and their opposite is 
 possible." ' Now the peculiar reaUty of these truths of 
 reason can be accounted for, Leibniz teaches, only if they are 
 regarded as dependent in a special way on God. The pe- 
 culiar reality which distinguishes, for example, my conviction 
 that 2x2 = 4, from my behef that it will stop snowing, must 
 lie in the truth that the former idea is a truth of God's mind. 
 In this sense, Leibniz calls the understanding of God "the 
 region of the eternal truths." ^ "It needs must be," he says, 
 "that if there is a reahty ... in the eternal truths, this 
 reality is based upon something existent and actual, and, con- 
 sequently, in the existence of the necessary Being in whom 
 essence includes existence." ' 
 
 The difficulties with these causal arguments for God's 
 existence have really been indicated in the criticism upon 
 
 ' " Monadology ," 33. Cf. "Discourse," XIII. It has been shown 
 already (cf. p. 91) that the opposite of contingent truth is possible only in 
 the sense of being imaginable. 
 
 ' Ihid., 43. 
 
 ' Ihid., 44. In spite of this doctrine that eternal truths depend for their 
 reality on God, Leibniz teaches that the eternal truths are not arbitrary 
 and do not depend on God's will ("Monadology," 46). He never completely 
 coordinates these two views. Cf. Russell, op. cit., pp. 178 seq. 
 
The System of Leibniz 105 
 
 Descartes. The postulate of both arguments, the assumption 
 that things and truths must have not merely a cause, but an 
 ultimate cause, has first to be questioned. For it is not 
 proved by Leibniz, any more than by Descartes, that an 
 ultimate cause, or sufficient reason, for everything must exist. 
 Both Leibniz and Descartes show, it is true, that a reason is 
 always sought, and that a finite reason must be insufl&cient ; 
 but neither proves, though in the view of the writer both 
 might have proved, that a sufficient reason is inevitably to 
 be found. But waiving this objection, and admitting the 
 necessity for an ultimate cause, another difficulty must be 
 pointed out. On Leibniz's principles, such a sufficient cause 
 must be distinct from the finite things — in other words, 
 must be possessed of the monad's distinctness — and must 
 even be outside the series of finite things. This second 
 character follows from the fact that an ultimate, a satisfac- 
 tory, a sufficient, cause must be itself uncaused. But if the 
 sufficient reason be both distinct from the finite things and 
 out of the series of tliem, surely it cannot be related to them 
 as their cause. The dilemma seems a hopeless one : if the 
 ultimate cause be in any sense in the series of the finite things, 
 it is itself in need of a cause, in other words, it is not really 
 ultimate ; if, on the other hand, the supposed cause be outside 
 the series of finite things and distinct from them, it cannot be 
 related to them at all, and evidently therefore cannot be the 
 cause of them.* 
 
 To this estimate of Leibniz's argument for God's existence 
 should be added a criticism of his conception of God's nature. 
 Like Descartes, Leibniz holds that the perfection, or complete- 
 ness, of God involves his goodness. But this conception has 
 peculiar difficulties, because God's perfect goodness, in con- 
 junction with his absolute power, seems incompatible with 
 
 ' The only escape from this dilemma is through the conception of God 
 as the One Reality of which finite things are the partial expression. Cf. 
 Chapters 8, lo, ii, pp. 286 jey., 378 seq., 418 seq. Cf. also Kant's attempt to 
 escape the dilemma by the doctrine of the two causalities. 
 
106 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 the flagrant misery and evil of the world. Leibniz tries in 
 many ways to meet the difficulty. He suggests, for example, 
 that the unhappiness of rational souls may be balanced by the 
 happiness of a greater number of irrational souls, or that the 
 unhappiness of any individual may be overbalanced by the 
 higher quality of his happiness. He urges also that evil may 
 be only partial, in other words, a transcended element in the 
 good.' No one of these assertions, every careful reader of 
 Leibniz will admit, is conclusively proved; and Leibniz in 
 the end always gives up the task of explaining how unhap- 
 piness and sin may be reconciled with the goodness of an all- 
 powerful God, contenting himself with the insistence that 
 God must be good, because he is perfect (complete), and that 
 his created universe, in spite of appearances, must be good 
 at heart.^ 
 
 The result of this criticism is to admit that Leibniz has not 
 proved the existence of God. Yet it must be pointed out that 
 he has at least a greater right than Descartes to the ontologi- 
 cal and to the causal arguments. The 'ontological proof 
 argues from idea to reality ; and for Descartes, who held that 
 a portion of reality is non-spiritual, this inference from idea to 
 reahty is obviously less vahd than for Leibniz, to whom the 
 whole universe is ideal. Again, when the 'causal proof 
 maintains that there is a sufficient reason for each finite fact, 
 Descartes's system leaves a loophole for the fear that this 
 principle of sufficient reason may not apply to that foreign 
 sort of reality, body. Leibniz meets no such difficulty, since 
 it is at least hkely that his spiritual world is a reasonable 
 world. In a word, Leibniz's proofs of God's existence, 
 though as they stand inadequate, are entirely consistent with 
 
 ' Leibniz's discussion of evil is most complete in his "Theodicy." Cf., 
 also, the "Abr^g^" ("Abbreviation of the Theodicy"), Gerhardt edition. 
 Vol. VI., pp. 376 seq. 
 
 ^ Cf. "Abbreviation of Theodicy," Objection VII., Reply: " One 
 judges [the plan of the universe] by the outcome . . . ; since God makes 
 it, it was not possible to make it better." For the fuller discussion of 
 this problem, cf. Chapter ir, pp. 430 seq. 
 
The System of Leibniz 107 
 
 idealistic doctrine. Indeed, it well may be that philosophers 
 after Leibniz will discover God as deepest reaUty and ulti- 
 mate explanation of the universe. 
 
 c. Estimate of Leibniz's doctrine of the finite monads 
 
 The failure of Leibniz to prove the existence of God 
 undermines the rest of his teaching, for to him the universe is 
 a concourse of souls, ranging from rational to insentient, 
 with the supreme soul, God, as its creator, preserver, and 
 monarch. From God emanates each soul, rational or insen- 
 tient; to God is due the completeness and the harmony of 
 the souls, each utterly isolated from all save God; and to 
 God's perfection is due the ultimate goodness of this often so 
 evil-appearing world. In more detail: those characters, 
 attributed by Leibniz to the finite monads, which he 
 argues on the ground of God's existence, must be yielded 
 as unproved. First of these, obviously, is the dependence on 
 God: Leibniz's universe, with God left out, is a world of 
 self-dependent and coordinate spirits. And the other charac- 
 ters which Leibniz attempts to prove, from the relation 
 of the limited monads to God, are their perfect harmonious- 
 ness, their completeness, their capacity to express the entire 
 universe, and even their isolation from each other.^ It 
 follows, if Leibniz has not succeeded in proving God's ex- 
 istence, that he has left these characters of his monads 
 unsupported. 
 
 It must be noted, in the second place, that the doctrine 
 of the activity and of the internal unity of each monad is un- 
 affected by the failure to prove God's existence and the con- 
 sequent relation of the monad to God, for these characters, 
 as has been shown, are established by self-observation: I 
 
 ' For the isolation of the monads he has also the insuflBcient argument 
 which consists in the disproof of physical influence (cf. supra, p. 83) ; and 
 the unexpressed argument from the (unproved) ultimate multiplicity of the 
 monads. 
 
io8 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 know myseK as an active self, a unit of all my own 
 experiences. And so far as Leibniz has established a 
 right to conceive the universe as ultimately spiritual, he 
 is justified in conceiving every real being as active, and 
 as internally a unity. It is possible on Leibniz's principles 
 to rescue two more characters of the monads: their har- 
 moniousness, and their isolation if that is not conceived as 
 absolute. For both characters are established by the 
 certainty I have of my own experience. The facts of my 
 social consciousness — the observed sympathy, imitation, and 
 loyalty, inherent in me — indicate that I am a related self, 
 not a lonely self; and yet my aggressiveness, my inde- 
 pendence, and my sense of responsibility mark the distinct- 
 ness of myself from other selves. A monad, then, if it is 
 a soul-like reality, must possess a relatedness, and a relative 
 distinctness, as well. 
 
 The results of this commentary on Leibniz's doctrine con- 
 cerning the nature of the monads is, then, the following: 
 In the writer's opinion, Leibniz rightly holds, however inef- 
 fectively he argues, that each monad is one and is active ; he 
 rightly holds that it stands in relation to other monads and that 
 it yet is unique among them ; he fails to complete his proof 
 that there exists a God on whom each monad is dependent; 
 nor does he prove that each monad completely includes and 
 expresses the universe, and that it is utterly separate from 
 every other monad and unaffected by it. To have pictured 
 in ineradicable outlines a universe of unique yet related spirits 
 is thus the unassailable value of Leibniz's philosophy. He 
 did not, it is true, complete the building of his city of spirits. 
 It was left to succeeding philosophers to Hft the breastworks 
 of his argument and to bridge the chasms of his doctrine. 
 More hterally: Berkeley first among modem philosophers 
 elaborated and expanded Leibniz's argument against ma- 
 teriahsm ; and the idealists since Kant's day have at least ap- 
 proached more nearly than Leibniz approached both to the 
 reconciliation, within the finite self, of uniqueness with related- 
 
The System of Leibniz 109 
 
 ness, and to a cogent argument for the existence of a complete 
 Self. But we should be untrue to history if we failed to trace 
 to its source in Leibniz's writings one of the most significant 
 tendencies in contemporary philosophy — the emphasis upon 
 the truth of personaUty. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 PLURALISTIC SPIRITUALISM {Continued,): THE SYSTEM 
 OF BERKELEY 
 
 " Berkeley . . . the truest, acutest philosopher that Great Britain has 
 ever known." — G. S. Morris. 
 
 The problems of philosophy which have so far been con- 
 sidered are fundamentally these two: how many kinds are 
 there of ultimate reaUty? and what are these kinds? The 
 earliest answer of modem philosophy to both questions is 
 formulated in the pluraHstic duaUsm of Descartes, which 
 teaches that there are two kinds of reality, spiritual and ma- 
 terial. But the impossibility of accounting for the relation of 
 two ultimately separate kinds of reahty, and the equal im- 
 possibility of regarding them as unrelated, lead Hobbes and 
 Leibniz to answer differently the first of the questions and to 
 acknowledge but one kind of reahty, instead of two. In 
 other words, Hobbes and Leibniz replace Descartes's qualita- 
 tive duahsm by a qualitative monism. To the question, of 
 what nature is this one reality, they offer different answers. 
 The universe consists of corporeal bodies, says Hobbes. The 
 universe is made up of conscious beings, soul-Hke substances, 
 Leibniz answers. 
 
 All these philosophers, Descartes and Hobbes and Leibniz, 
 despite their varying beliefs about the kinds of reality, — one 
 or two, corporeal or spiritual, — none the less agree in the 
 assumption that the universe, the all-of-reality, is, numerically 
 considered, a plurahty. They agree, in other words, that the 
 universe is constituted by a multitude of individuals, spiritual 
 and material, or only spiritual, or only material ; and Leibniz, 
 
The System of Berkeley in 
 
 indeed, lays especial stress on the plurality of the unique 
 individuals. A radically new movement in philosophy might 
 then be initiated by raising the question : is the pluraUty of 
 individuals fundamentally real ? or are they but the manifes- 
 tations of an underlying One, of a single, ultimately real be- 
 ing ? ' But George Berkeley, the philosopher, whose system 
 we are next to study, does not raise this new question. Nor 
 has he any distinctively new answer to the question, how 
 many and what kinds of reality ? He assumes, as his pred- 
 ecessors have assumed, that the all-of-reality consists of a 
 multitude of individuals ; and he teaches that these individ- 
 uals are immaterial. His system is, in other words, like 
 those of all his predecessors, numerically pluralistic. Like 
 that of Leibniz, it is qualitatively monistic and spiritualistic. 
 It has been the fashion of certain critics to undervalue 
 Berkeley's speculative strength, to view his philosophy as 
 the natural attempt of a churchman and bishop to establish 
 the theology of his sect, and to regard his philosophical writ- 
 ings, like his political tracts, as effervescence of the missionary 
 zeal of an orthodox and philanthropic Irishman. A care- 
 ful reading of the works of Berkeley suffices to refute this 
 estimate. His thought is indeed incomplete, but it is inde- 
 pendent and creative. Historically his system is neither a 
 reenforcement of Leibniz's teaching nor a reaction from the 
 materialistic pluralism of Hobbes. It is, rather, a correction 
 of the dualism of Berkeley's predecessor, John Locke. The 
 philosophy of Locke need not be set forth in any detail, for in 
 essentials it repeats Descartes's teaching. Like Descartes, 
 Locke taught that the universe consists of a multitude of 
 finite substances, spiritual and material, subordinated to one 
 infinite spirit, God. Locke reached these conclusions much 
 as Descartes did, though the emphasis of his teaching is 
 sometimes different. The most significant of these differ- 
 ences is his analysis of material substance. Descartes had 
 
 ^ For discussion of the system of Spinoza, who had already considered 
 this problem, cf. Chapter 8. 
 
1 1 2 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 attributed to matter but the one quality, extension ; Locke^ 
 on the contrary, teaches that the essential — or, as he calls 
 them, the ' primary ' — qualities of material substances are 
 extension, with its modifications, and sohdity.' Furthermore, 
 Locke lays more emphasis than Descartes lays on the impor- 
 tant teaching that all other so-called quaUties of bodies — 
 color, sound, odor, and the Hke — do not really belong to 
 material substances. On the contrary they are, so he 
 holds, mere sensations in us produced by the primary 
 quahties of material things, "j'.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, 
 and motion of [their] insensible parts." ^ That is, Locke 
 teaches, as Descartes had taught, that real bodies, or material 
 things, are without color or sound or fragrance: they are 
 mere masses of colorless, extended, sohd, and moving par- 
 ticles, which produce in us (i) ideas resembhng these quah- 
 ties — 'primary' ideas of extension, solidity, and motion; 
 and (2) ideas unhke the qualities themselves, 'secondary" 
 ideas of color, fragrance, and the like. 
 
 Berkeley's point of departure is this distinction between 
 qualities and ideas. He takes issue with Locke mainly by 
 teaching that even the primary qualities are ideal. In other 
 words, Berkeley teaches that extension and solidity, as well 
 as color and sound, are ideas of the mind. Thus, he reduces 
 the material part of Locke's universe to immaterial reaUty, 
 and turns things into thoughts, somewhat as Leibniz had 
 transformed Descartes' s corporeal bodies into simple 
 monads. 
 
 ' Cf. Appendix, p. 493'. 
 
 ^ "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Bk. II., Chapter 8, 
 paragraph 10. 
 
 ' Locke himself does not speak of primary and secondary ideas, but of 
 primary and secondary qualities. He calls the powers of the primary 
 qualities to produce ideas unlike themselves the ' secondary quali- 
 ties' of material things. It is, however, more in accord with his teach- 
 ing to apply the terms 'primary' and 'secondary' (as this text does), not to 
 qualities, but to ideas. (Cf. Locke's admission, "Essay," Bk. II., Chapters, 
 paragraph 8, that he confuses the terms ' quality ' and ' idea. ') 
 
The System of Berkeley 1 1 3 
 
 I. Berkeley's Doctrine of the Reality immediately 
 KNOWN : Myself and My Ideas ' 
 
 "It is evident to any one," Berkeley says, at the beginning 
 of his "Principles of Human Knowledge," "that the objects 
 of human knowledge are ideas. . . . But, besides all that 
 endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is 
 likewise something which knows or perceives them . . . 
 what I call mind, spirit, soul, myself." According to 
 Berkeley, therefore, I know myself in knowing my ideas. 
 He goes on to distinguish the I, or myself, from the mere suc- 
 cession of ideas. "I know or am conscious of my own being ; 
 and that I myself am not my ideas but somewhat else, a think- 
 ing, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates, 
 about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive 
 both colors and sounds: that a color cannot perceive a 
 sound, nor a sound a color: that I am therefore one indi- 
 vidual principle, distinct from color and sound ; and, for 
 the same reason from all other .... ideas." ^ 
 
 It is important to observe that Berkeley does not seek to 
 establish the existence of a self deeper than its own ideas in 
 any other way than by a direct appeal to consciousness. He 
 holds that each man has an immediate, that is, an unreasoned, 
 certainty of his own existence.' And it should be added that 
 whoever denies the existence of himself can go no step further 
 
 ' This study of Berkeley's doctrine is based on his "Principles of Human 
 Knowledge" (1710), and his "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous" 
 (1713). One of these little books, or preferably both, should be read before 
 entering upon this chapter. The relatively disproportionate length of this 
 exposition of Berkeley's teaching is due in part to the peculiar fitness of these 
 texts to introduce students to idealistic doctrine. 
 
 ^ "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," III., Open Court edition, 
 pp. 95-96. 
 
 ' It should be carefully noted that this doctrine does not deny the occur- 
 rence of a mediated, reflected-on, consciousness of myself. Such a reflective 
 consciousness we all gain. The core and centre of it is, however, that imme- 
 diate awareness of self which is the guarantee of its own validity. (On 
 immediacy, cf. A. E. Taylor's "Elements of Metaphysics," pp. 30, 32.) 
 I 
 
114 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 with Berkeley, for every other positive doctrine of his system 
 rests upon the acknowledgment of the existence of this self. 
 The writer of this book beheves, with Descartes and Berkeley, 
 that introspection testifies to the existence of such a self; 
 that in every pulse of consciousness one is certain of a self 
 which 'is conscious' or 'has ideas.' ' 
 
 Before discussing in greater detail the characteristics attrib- 
 uted by Berkeley to 'myself' (the subject of knowledge), 
 it is necessary to consider his analysis of the 'objects of my 
 knowledge,' my ideas. This discussion will involve certain 
 rather barren technicaUties, but these are necessary to a real 
 understanding of Berkeley, and will form but a brief intro- 
 duction to the discussion of more vital subjects. Berkeley 
 seems to group ideas (in the sense of 'objects of knowledge') 
 into two classes : first, ideas (in a narrower sense) ; and, second, 
 notions. He further subdivides ideas, in the narrower sense, 
 into two classes: (i) ideas 'actually imprinted on my senses,' 
 without 'dependence on my will'; and (2) ideas excited by 
 me 'in my mind' at pleasure, that is, ideas of imagination. 
 The 'ideas of sense' he describes as 'more strong, hvely, and 
 distinct than those of the imagination,' adding that "they 
 have Ukewise a steadiness, order, and coherence." ^ Of 
 'notions,' also, Berkeley recognizes two classes: (i) notions 
 "of our jown minds, of spirits, and active beings, whereof in a 
 strict sense we have not ideas,"' and (2) notions "of relations 
 between things and ideas, which relations are distinct from the 
 ideas or things related." * This enumeration of the objects 
 of knowledge may be summarized as follows : — 
 
 ' For discussion of the opposition to thisdoctrine, cf. Chapter 6, pp. 1 79 jej. 
 
 ' "Principles of Human Knowledge," § 30. 
 
 ' IMd., 89. Cf. ihid., 27, and "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," 
 III., Open Court edition, p. 93. 
 
 * Berkeley does not explicitly recognize this distinction, which, however, 
 he everywhere makes between the wide and the narrow sense of the term 
 ' idea.' The distinction, between ideas (in the strict sense) and notions, first 
 appears in the second edition of the "Principles." For a suggestion of it in 
 the first edition, cf. "Principles," 140. In the first edition, Berkeley included 
 
The System of Berkeley 115 
 
 Objects of Knowledge (Ideas, in the wide sense) 
 Ideas (in the strict sense) Notions 
 
 Passively Controlled Of spirits Of rela- 
 
 received by me and their tions 
 
 (Percepts) (Images) operations 
 
 It would not be hard to criticise this summary of the objects 
 of knowledge, for example, on the ground that notions of the 
 first class are not coordinate with the three other groups of 
 'objects of knowledge.' Such criticisms do not, however, 
 affect fundamental philosophical problems and need not be 
 pressed. It is most important, on the other hand, to grasp 
 clearly two of the characters which Berkeley attributes to 
 ideas and to notions. He teaches, in the first place, that ideas 
 and notions are, in a way, the copies of something else. Ideas, 
 he holds, are copies of other ideas ; and notions are, in some 
 sense, 'like' the spirit which is known through them. This 
 doctrine, as will later appear, has an important bearing on 
 Berkeley's system.^ In the second place, Berkeley lays 
 stress on the inactivity of ideas. "All our ideas, sensations, 
 notions, ..." he says, "by whatsoever names they may 
 be distinguished, are visibly inactive — there is nothing of 
 Power or Agency included in them. To be satisfied of the 
 truth of this, there is nothing requisite but a bare observa- 
 tion of our ideas. . . . Whoever shall attend to his ideas, 
 whether of sense or reflection, will not perceive in them any 
 power or activity. . . . The very being of an idea implies 
 passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible 
 
 under the head of ideas both "ideas perceived by attending to the passions 
 and operations of the mind," and "ideas formed by help of memory and 
 imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those 
 originally perceived . . . ("Principles," § i)." Many of the statements 
 of the first edition, like that just quoted, are left by Berkeley, side by side with 
 the altered terminology of the second edition. In the remainder of this 
 chapter the word 'idea' will be used in the narrower sense of 'percept or 
 image,' unless specific mention of the wider use is made. 
 
 ' "Principles," 8, 27, 89. See below, pp. 145 seq. Notions in the sense 
 of 'ideas of relation' seem not to be treated as resemblances. 
 
li6 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 for an idea to do anything . . . : neither can it be the resem- 
 blance or pattern of any active being." ' It will be easier to 
 comprehend what Berkeley means by the passivity of ideas, 
 after considering what he says concerning the correlative 
 activity of spirits. But even at this point of the discussion, 
 most readers will be incUned to agree with Berkeley that intro- 
 spective attention to the train of ideas reveals no 'activity' 
 of any one idea in its relation to another. This is the view 
 already suggested by Bacon and later developed by Hume." 
 It should also be noted that in the section just quoted, the 
 first in which the subject is considered, inactivity is attributed 
 to 'ideas' in the wide sense of the term, including even 
 'notions.' Later, when Berkeley realizes the impossibiHty 
 that a 'passive idea' should resemble an active spirit, we find 
 him limiting the passivity to ideas in the narrow sense. 
 
 From this study of Berkeley's doctrine of the nature of 
 ideas, it is necessary to return to a discussion of the characters 
 which he attributes to 'myself,' that is, soul or spirit. For to 
 these three words he gives, as he explicitly and repeatedly 
 says, precisely the same meaning. "What I am myself — 
 that which I denote by the term I — is the same with what 
 is meant by soul or spiritual substance." ' The most signifi- 
 cant negative characteristic of spirit has already been empha- 
 sized ; the fact that it has a reahty fundamental, and thus in a 
 way superior, to that of ideas. This follows from the charac- 
 teristic doctrine of Berkeley, the teaching that the whole 
 reality of ideas "consists only in being perceived,"^ "whereas," 
 he goes on, "a soul or spirit is an active being whose exist- 
 ence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas 
 and thinking." Positively, therefore, this unlikeness of spirit 
 to idea consists in the activity of spirit. This is the aspect 
 of spirit on which Berkeley lays most stress.^ Spirit is, in- 
 deed, never described, except as an 'active 'being or substance, 
 
 ' "Principles," 25: cf. 27, 139. ' Cf. Chapter 6, pp. 163 seq. 
 
 ' "Principles," 139; cf. 2 and 27. Cf. notes on pp. 70, 406. 
 
 * Ibid., 139; cf. 2, 8, 25, 137. ' Cf. Leibniz's teaching, p. 81. 
 
The System of Berkeley 117 
 
 an'agent,' a 'power' or — moresimply — as "that which acts," 
 " which operates." In the ordinary use of the word, therefore, 
 spirit is called ' active ' just because it is the knower of ideas, 
 whereas ideas are called passive, since their reahty consists 
 in their being known. In a more restricted sense of the word, 
 the 'activity' of spirit is referred to its volitional or creative 
 function. "It is no more than willing, and straightway this 
 or that idea arises in my fancy ; and by the same power it is 
 obhterated and makes way for another. This making and 
 unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind 
 active." ' The mind, or I, is characterized, Berkeley teaches, 
 not merely by activity, but by a certain sort of unity, contrasted 
 with the 'variety' or 'succession' of ideas, and with a per- 
 manence opposed to the fleeting and transitory nature of 
 the ideas. "I know," he says,^ in a passage already quoted, 
 "that I, one and the same self, perceive both colors and 
 sounds." The expression 'substance,' or 'support, of ideas,' 
 which he constantly uses with reference to spirit, lays stress 
 on this permanence of the self; the epithets "simple' and 'in- 
 divisible' imply the unity.' Berkeley further believes that 
 the soul is immortal, but founds the doctrine rather on the 
 traditional opposition between 'immortal' spirit and 'dead' 
 matter than on any adequate discussion.^ 
 
 II. Berkeley's Negative Doctrine: The Disproof of 
 THE Existence of Matter (Non-ideal Reality) 
 
 Up to this point, nothing distinguishes Berkeley in a 
 marked way from his predecessor, Locke, the duahst. For 
 Locke and, in fact, Descartes taught that I may be immedi- 
 ately certain of the existence of myself, an active, unified 
 
 ' "Principles," 28. 
 
 ' "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," III., Open Court edition, 
 P- 9S- 
 
 ' "Principles," 27, 89. Cf. "Dialogues," Open Court edition, p. 92. 
 ♦ " Principles," 141 et al. 
 
ii8 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 spirit, and of the existence of my ideas. But closely inter- 
 woven with his positive doctrine, that I myself and my ideas 
 exist, is Berkeley's negative teaching, the denial of non-ideal 
 or non-spiritual reality. According to his view and that of 
 Leibniz, the universe is, through and through, immaterial, 
 a universe of consciousness, of spirit and idea. Alleged 
 non-ideal reality is reducible, therefore, either to spirit or 
 to idea. 
 
 Before discussing Berkeley's argument it is necessary to 
 define precisely the nature of what he calls 'matter.' 
 According to Berkeley so-called matter has two essential char- 
 acters, both negative : it is in the first place conceived as inde- 
 pendent of consciousness, that is, of mind. By this is meant 
 that 'matter' would exist unchanged though every conscious 
 being and every conscious process were annihilated.^ In the 
 second place, matter is other- than-consciousness, radically and 
 essentially different-from-consciousness. It is thus obvious 
 that Berkeley uses the term in a sense wider than that of the 
 philosophy of our own day, including under it not merely 
 physical phenomena of the world which we directly perceive 
 but also whatever non-ideal reality may be inferred to exist. 
 He argues against both these conceptions: the everyday 
 view of matter as sum of the physical objects which we 
 see, hear, and touch ; and the doctrine of matter as unknown 
 cause or background of our percepts. We must follow both 
 arguments in some detail. 
 
 a. Berkeley's teaching that immediately perceived 'material' 
 things exist only as ideas 
 
 Berkeley's doctrine, that no material reality exists, strikes 
 us at first thought as utterly absurd, for it seems certain that 
 we actually see, hear, taste, or touch material things — trees, 
 thunder, apples, or chairs, for example. But Berkeley never 
 for an instant denies the existence of these directly perceived 
 
 ' Cf. Hume, loc. cit. infra, p. 172; and Royce, "The World and the 
 Individual," First Series, pp. 97 seq. 
 
The System of Berkeley iig 
 
 external objects or things. He believes as firmly as Locke 
 or Descartes or you or I that the trees and chairs which we 
 perceive really exist, but he denies that they exist outside 
 the mind; in a word, he denies that immediately perceived 
 things are realities which would exist though no one were 
 conscious of them. Positively, therefore, Berkeley teaches 
 that things are ideas. "The table I write on," Berkeley 
 says, "exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my 
 study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was 
 in my study I might perceive it or that some other spirit 
 actually does perceive it. There was an odor, that is, it 
 was smelled ; there was a sound, that is, it was heard ; a 
 color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch." ' 
 
 Berkeley has, therefore, to prove that the immediately 
 perceived thing is idea : to do this, it is necessary to analyze 
 it into its parts. A given ' thing ' is, let us say, perceived 
 to be colored, fragrant, soft, and round : in other words, it is 
 known as the sum of its quahties. If, now, it can be shown 
 that each of the perceived qualities has no existence indepen- 
 dent of perception, it will follow, Berkeley holds, that the per- 
 ceived thing is itself a modification of consciousness, in a 
 word, that it is idea, not matter. The question at issue is, 
 therefore, simply this : do we directly perceive colors, odors, 
 and forms as belonging to realities which would exist though 
 there were no perceiver? Berkeley urges that, on the con- 
 trary, color, odor, and form as we directly know them vary 
 with the condition of the perceiver. 
 
 In the "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," 
 he argues this, in detail, for the different sense-qualities. 
 "Suppose," he begins, "one of your hands hot and the other 
 cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel 
 of water in an intermediate state ; will not the water seem cold 
 to one hand and warm to the other ?"^ But if, as the every- 
 
 • "Principles," 3. 
 
 ' "Dialogues," I., Open Court edition, p. 18. Philonous, the settep 
 forth of Berkeley's views, is the speaker. 
 
I20 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 day theory assumes, hot and cold were qualities belonging to 
 an object existing independently of consciousness, then it 
 would be necessary to suppose that a thing has at one and 
 the same time two opposite quahties, heat and cold. This, 
 Berkeley says, is 'to believe an absurdity.' On the other 
 hand, though an object may not be at the same time hot and. 
 cold, a perceiving self may, he holds, at one and the same time 
 have the ideas of hot and cold. Not merely perceived heat 
 or cold, but taste, varies with the perceiver. "That which 
 at other times seems sweet shall to a distempered palate 
 appear bitter. And nothing can be plainer than that divers 
 persons perceive different tastes in the same food, since that 
 which one man delights in, another abhors." And how could 
 this be, Berkeley asks,' "if the taste was really something 
 inherent in the food?" Berkeley's meaning is clear. If in 
 tasting food we directly perceived the quahty of an object 
 existing independently of us, then the same food must taste 
 the same to different people eating it. But it is admitted 
 that a given food 'tastes' differently to different people; it 
 follows that these different tastes are different ideas of dis- 
 tinct people. Similar reasoning is applied by Berkeley to 
 the other sense-qualities. Colored objects change their 
 hue as we approach them; "the beautiful red and purple we 
 see on yonder clouds" are "only apparent colors." They 
 are not really in the clouds, for these "have in themselves 
 [no] other form than that of a dark mist or vapor." ^ And 
 in the same way it may be shown that perceived odors 
 and sounds vary with the perceiver. But all this would be 
 impossible if, in tasting and seeing, hearing and smelling, 
 we directly perceived the qualities of 'material things,' that 
 is, of things existing independently of our consciousness of 
 them. 
 
 So far, Berkeley has considered only what Locke called the 
 
 ' "Dialogues between Hylas and PhUonous," I., Open Court edition, 
 p. 21. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. a6. 
 
The System of Berkeley 121 
 
 secondary qualities. He has merely amplified and empha- 
 sized Descartes's and Locke's arguments to reach this con- 
 clusion, that what we know as heat, cold, odor, taste, sound, 
 and color, are ideas in the mind, not qualities of things inde- 
 pendent of consciousness. And herein, we must remind 
 ourselves, Locke and Berkeley agree exactly with modern 
 science. The physicists teach us that there is nothing in 
 the physical world exactly corresponding to the different 
 colors, sounds, degrees of heat and cold, flavors, and odors of 
 the nature world as we know it. Colors and the rest, they 
 teach, are mere ideas, and the ' real causes ' of these ideas are 
 forms of vibration. Thus the external world of the physicist 
 is essentially the corporeal universe of Descartes and Locke, 
 a silent, colorless world of form and motion. But Berkeley 
 goes on to rob the material world, which we suppose ourselves 
 to perceive directly, of even the so-called primary qualities 
 of form and motion and solidity. For, he argues, the 
 extension, motion, and solidity, which we directly know, 
 vary with the perceiver as truly as heat and taste and color 
 do. It is easy to multiply illustrations of his meaning: 
 The figures which are like moving pigmies as I look down 
 at them from a tower, turn out to be full-sized men ; 
 the nut which resists the pressure of a child's hand is crushed 
 between a blacksmith's fingers ; the trees which glide by me 
 as I am swiftly rowed along the river's bank become immov- 
 able when I check the motion of the boat. Now if, in per- 
 ceiving form, hardness, and motion, I were directly conscious 
 of the quahties in an object existing independently of mind, it 
 would follow that a given figure is both six inches and six feet 
 high, that a nut shell is both hard and soft, that a given tree 
 is in motion and at rest. The absurdity of such results 
 drives Berkeley to the conclusion that the varying figures, 
 hardnesses, and motions, which we directly perceive, are 
 changing ideas in us. From the fact that "as we approach 
 to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, 
 being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than 
 
122 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 at another," it follows, he argues, that extension " is not 
 really inherent in the object." ' 
 
 The doctrine of Descartes and Locke concerning the physi- 
 cal world — which is, as has been shown, the doctrine of 
 modem science — is, thus, in Berkeley's view, utterly incon- 
 sistent. According to this famihar way of thinkiag, colors, 
 sounds, tastes, and odors — the secondary qualities — are 
 ideas in our minds, caused by 'real' material qualities of form 
 and motion. But the argument which convinces Locke 
 that color, taste, and the rest are no real quaUties, inherent in 
 material things, is the fact that they vary with the perceiver; 
 and form, hardness, and weight are variable in precisely the 
 same way: they are, therefore, as truly as color and taste, 
 ideas in the mind. There is, in a word, no reason for dis- 
 tinguishing this one group of thing-qualities — form, motion, 
 and solidity — from the others. 
 
 Against this argument, so long drawn out by Berkeley, 
 it may be urged that though unquestionably it proves that the 
 primary qualities are no more 'real' than the secondary 
 qualities, it nevertheless does not disprove that all qualities, 
 primary as well as secondary, belong to objects independent 
 of mind. There is no need of dwelHng on this point, for 
 Berkeley himself admits the force of the criticism, definitely 
 stating that "this method of arguing does not so much prove 
 that there is no extension or color in an outward object as 
 that we do not know by sense which is the true extension 
 or color of the object." ^ But Berkeley has another and 
 a more fundamental reason for the behef that the things 
 and qualities, which we directly see, touch, and feel, do 
 not exist independently of mind. It is this : When I ask 
 myself what I am directly and immediately sure of, in per- 
 ceiving, it is evident that I am immediately certain only of 
 the fact of my being conscious in this or that way. The very 
 simplicity of this consideration makes it hard to grasp. Let 
 
 • "Dialogues," I., Open Court ed., p. 33; cf. p. 34, end. 
 2 " Principles," 15. 
 
The System of Berkeley 123 
 
 us make it concrete. I say, for example, that I am directly 
 certain of the existence of a red rose. Exactly what is it erf 
 which I am evidently sure ? I am sure that I have sensational 
 experiences of redness, greeimess, fragrance, thorniness, 
 coolness. There is absolutely nothing in the 'thing' of which 
 I am directly certain, save of this complex fact of my experi- 
 ence. I am perhaps certain of more than this, but my other 
 certainties, if they exist, are inferences from this one direct 
 certainty. The material thing then, as directly known, is 
 proved by appeal to the consciousness of every observer to 
 be a fact within consciousness, not independent of it. The 
 'thing' is, therefore, an 'idea.' In Berkeley's own words: — 
 "It is an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that 
 houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, 
 have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being per- 
 ceived by the understanding. But with how great an assur- 
 ance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained 
 . . ., yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, 
 may . . . perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. 
 For what are the f orementioned objects but the things we per- 
 ceive by sense ? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas 
 or sensations ? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of 
 these or any combination of them should exist unperceived ? " ' 
 It should be noticed that Berkeley has so far denied only the 
 existence of those supposedly independent things which we 
 suppose ourselves to perceive directly, to see, hear, and touch. 
 Whether or not there exist, inferred by us but unperceived, 
 things which would exist though no one perceived them and 
 which cause our percepts — this problem Berkeley has not 
 yet considered. He has shown, however, that we have no 
 right to the argument : things exist independent of mind for I 
 see, touch, and hear them ; that, on the contrary, such things as 
 I am immediately and sensationally conscious of are ideas. ^ 
 
 ' "Principles," 4; cf. 22. Cf., also, "Dialogues," I., Open Court edition, 
 
 T). 48'. 
 
 ^ Cf. "Dialogues," I., Open Court edition, p. 12, "Sensible things are 
 Aose only which are immediately perceived by sense." 
 
124 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 Two objections urged against this doctrine of Berkeley's 
 should be considered before passing on to discuss the second 
 of the conceptions of matter against which he argues. It 
 is urged, in the first place, that Berkeley makes concrete, 
 external things unreal. The real and solid world, of moun- 
 tains, rocks, and seas, reduces, we are told, on Berkeley's 
 principles, to a mere illusion, to a series of evanescent and 
 unreal phenomena. Thus, Berkeley's doctrine that the thing 
 is idea destroys the admitted distinction between reality and 
 unreality. There is surely a difference between a real dollar 
 and an imagined dollar,' a real castle and the palace of our 
 dreams. But if, as Berkeley teaches, real dollar and actual 
 palace are themselves ideas, then no room is left for the 
 experienced distinction.^ 
 
 Now, Berkeley clearly realizes the gravity of this charge, of 
 annihilating the reality of the physical world and thereby de- 
 stroying the distinction between real and unreal ; but he very 
 vigorously denies the accusation. He begins by stating the 
 difhculty in terms as forcible as those of his opponents. "It 
 will be objected," he says, "that by the foregoing principles, 
 all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the 
 world : and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes 
 place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind, . . . 
 what, therefore, becomes of the sun, moon, and stars ? What 
 must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, and stones ; nay, 
 even of our own bodies ? Are all these but so many chimeras 
 and illusions of the fancy ? To all which, and whatever else 
 of the same sort may be objected, I answer, . . . Whatever 
 we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, 
 remains as secure as ever and is as real as ever. . . . That 
 the things which I see with mine eyes and touch with 
 
 ' Cf. Kiilpe's "Outline of Psychology," § 28, 2), and the writer's "An 
 Introduction to Psychology," pp. 186 seq., for discussion of the distinction 
 between perception and imagination. 
 
 ' Cf. Locke's argument, "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," 
 Bk. IV., Chapter 11 ; see also Chapter 2, supra, p. 36 
 
The System of Berkeley 125 
 
 mine hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least 
 question." * 
 
 Berkeley then goes on to show wherein consists the reality of 
 these immediately seen and felt things, which — though real 
 
 — are ideas. This reality which distinguishes 'real things' 
 
 — namely, 'ideas imprinted on the senses' — from the 'mere 
 ideas' of imagination, is, in truth, twofold. The "ideas 
 imprinted on the senses ..." have not (i) "a . . . de- 
 pendence on my will," ^ and they are "allowed to have more 
 reahty, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than 
 the creatures of the mind." ' In other words, the reality of 
 perceived things consists, not in the fact that they are inde- 
 pendent of any mind, but in the fact that they are ideas 
 characterized by a superior vividness and regularity, and are 
 independent of my own will. 
 
 In still another way (2) Berkeley teaches that real things — 
 namely, ideas of sense — are distinguished from the ideas of 
 imagination. They are not exclusively or primarily the ideas 
 of a single, finite self, but are ideas of the infinite spirit, God, 
 which may be shared by him with finite selves. In Berkeley's 
 own words : " There are only things perceiving and things per- 
 ceived ; . . . every unthinking being is necessarily, and from 
 the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind ; if not 
 by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of 
 God, in whom 'we live and move and have our being.'"* 
 This aspect of the reahty of things immediately perceived de- 
 pends, however, for its validity on the certainty of God's ex- 
 istence ; and Berkeley has not yet proved the existence of God. 
 But he has shown that, if God exists, real things may plau- 
 sibly be distinguished from images, as existing primarily in 
 God's mind. And, in any case, the involuntariness, the regu- 
 larity, and the order of ideas of sense give to them a pecu- 
 liar reality as compared with ideas of imagination. " Be they 
 never so vivid and distinct," however, Berkeley insists, "they 
 
 ' " Principles, " 34, 35. ' Ihjd., 29. ' Ihid., 33. 
 
 * " Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 98. 
 
126 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind or are 
 perceived by it, as truly as ideas of its own framing." 
 
 h. Berkeley's teaching that inferred material reality does 
 
 not exist 
 
 Berkeley has, so far, shown that we are wrong in the ordi- 
 nary supposition that we immediately see and taste and smell 
 things which exist independently of any mind. On the con- 
 trary, we must admit that the immediate objects of our per- 
 ception are ideas, distinguished by superior coherence and 
 vividness from the ideas of imagination. But this admission 
 does not affect the possibility that non-ideal things do exist in- 
 dependently of consciousness, although we do not perceive 
 them. For it is possible that we ought to injer the existence 
 of things, or matter, independent of our consciousness. This 
 possibility Berkeley, however, denies. He asserts not only 
 that we do not perceive things, independent of consciousness, 
 but also that we have no right to infer the existence of any 
 independent and non-ideal (or, in his words, material) reahty. 
 The arguments for this conclusion must now be considered. 
 Berkeley discusses this hypothesis of inferred matter ^ under 
 many names and forms, as substratum, cause, instrument, 
 occasion, and entity. Several of these forms of the doctrine 
 have lost the significance which they had in the seventeenth 
 century; and all may be grouped under two main heads, of 
 which the second is again subdivided : first, the conception of 
 material (non-ideal) reality as a world of ' real ' things known 
 to be like the percepts of them ; second, the opposite concep- 
 tion of material reality as not known to be like our perceptions. 
 
 The first of these doctrines represents the least possible con- 
 cession to idealism and is a very natural advance upon the 
 theory that material things are immediately known. Granted 
 that things as immediately perceived are ideas, why, it is 
 asked, may there not exist a world of things, existing inde- 
 
 ' This is not Berkeley's expression. 
 
The System of Berkeley 127 
 
 pendently of mind, but yet resembling precisely these per- 
 ceptions of ours ? If this be true, there exists a real world of 
 unperceived yet colored, fragrant, extended things, and our 
 perceptions are copies of these unperceived models of them, 
 these 'real things.' Against such a doctrine, Berkeley urges 
 two objections/ In the first place, he points out, this doctrine 
 that there exist real things like our percepts involves us in a 
 new difficulty. Our ideas of the alleged external things are 
 acknowledged to vary constantly, and it follows that the ' real 
 thing,' if like the ideas of it, must exactly resemble several 
 different ideas. But this is absurd : the real temperature, for 
 example, cannot possibly be both warm and cold ; yet accord- 
 ing to one person's idea the room is warm, whereas according 
 to another person's view it is cold. In the words of Philo- 
 nous, the idealist, to his opponent, Hylas: "How is it pos- 
 sible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our 
 ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and con- 
 stant?"^ Even more fundamental is the objection that 
 reality independent of the mind cannot possibly resemble in 
 any significant sense what is in its inmost nature mental, ideal, 
 of the nature of consciousness. By 'material,' it will be re- 
 membered, is meant, the ' other- than-mental.' No material 
 thing, therefore, can be like an idea.^ The opponent of 
 Berkeley has to face the question, "How can that which is 
 sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a real 
 thing in itself Invisible be like a color; or a real thing which 
 is not audible be like a sound ? In a word, can anything 
 be like a sensation or idea but another sensation or 
 idea?"' 
 
 To the writer, as to Berkeley, it seems clear that a material 
 world which is hke our ideas of it cannot be proved to exist. 
 But it is still possible, Berkeley's opponent will urge, that 
 
 ' "Dialogues," I., last few pages; Open Court edition, pp. 52 seq. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 56^ 
 
 ' Cf. supra, Chapter 3, p. 57. 
 
 ' "Dialogues," I., Open Court edition, pp. 56-57. 
 
128 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 material reality which is not known to be like our percepts 
 none the less exists. There are two important forms of this 
 conception of matter as inferred reaUty, independent of mind 
 and not known to be Uke it : ' matter is regarded either 
 (i) as the cause of our perceptions, or (2) as entirely 
 unlmown. These conceptions must be carefully analyzed 
 and estimated. 
 
 It may be very plausibly argued, in the first place, that ma- 
 terial reality, reahty independent of consciousness, must exist 
 to cause my perceptions. 'Ideas of sensation' — so-called 
 things — are admitted to differ from the mere ideas of the 
 imagination, precisely in that they are not creations of my 
 mind, but 'impressed from without.' Thus, it is urged, there 
 must exist a reaUty independent of consciousness, to cause 
 regular and vivid and inevitable ideas of perception. In the 
 words of Hylas : ^ "I find myself affected with various ideas, 
 whereof I know I am not the cause ; neither are they the cause 
 of themselves, or of one another ... as being altogether 
 inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have, therefore, 
 some cause distinct from me and them, of which I pretend 
 to know no more than that it is the cause of my ideas. And 
 this thing, whatever it be, I call matter." 
 
 Against this doctrine Berkeley argues in the following 
 manner : He admits the necessity of assigning some cause of 
 our ideas of sense. But he points out that matter is not the 
 only possible cause of them. It is at least possible (and he 
 will later argue that it is necessary) to explain these ideas of 
 sense as due to the influence, on the finite mind, of a mind 
 greater and more powerful than itself. In the second place, 
 Berkeley argues, matter cannot, in the very nature of it, be a 
 cause of anything — least of all, of ideas of consciousness. 
 
 ' The conception of 'matter' as substratum is, possibly, a third conception 
 of this sort. As discussed by Berkeley, however, the substratum really turns 
 out to be either the 'extended' or the 'unknown' ; whereas, in its defensible 
 meaning of 'relation of the qualities' the substratum would reduce to an 
 'idea of relation.' 
 
 ^ "Dialogues," II., Open Court edition, p. 70. 
 
The System of Berkeley 129 
 
 For by 'matter' is always meant, Berkeley says/ a 'pas- 
 sive,' 'inert,' 'inactive,' substance. But "how," Berkeley 
 asks, "can that which is inactive be a cause; or that 
 which is unthinking be a cause of thought?'''' By this 
 question Berkeley indicates two reasons for denying that 
 matter, as mere unknown cause of ideas, exists: (i) as in- 
 active it could not be a cause at all ; and (2) even if it were 
 active, and thus a cause, as unthinking it could not be the 
 cause of thought.^ 
 
 Both arguments demand careful scrutiny. To begin with 
 the second: it will be admitted that matter is 'unthinldng,' 
 that is, non-conscious. By definition, 'matter' is precisely 
 that which is other-than-consciousness. But it is not so 
 evident that a non-conscious being could not be cause of a 
 phenomenon of consciousness. We know far too httle of the 
 relation between cause and effect to assert dogmatically that 
 the two must be of the same nature.' In fact, among ob- 
 served cases of causahty the difference between cause and 
 effect is often very striking, as when mechanical causes pro- 
 duce thermal effects, or electrical causes physiological effects. 
 Of course these differences are not so great as distinctions 
 between supposed 'matter' and consciousness, yet Berkeley 
 gives no adequate reason for the assertion that the non-con- 
 scious could not be the cause of consciousness. 
 
 We are thrown back, therefore, to the more general ar- 
 gument that matter, since inactive, cannot be cause of any- 
 thing. Given the inactivity of matter, this will presumably 
 be granted, since causahty in the usual sense does involve 
 activity.* But the student of Berkeley will object, fairly 
 enough, that Berkeley has no right to assume, without argu- 
 
 ' "Principles," g, 67, 6g et al. "Dialogues," II., Open Court edition, 
 p. 71. 
 
 "^ This is a repetition of Locke's doctrine. Cf. "Essay concerning 
 Human Understanding," Bk. IV., Chapter X., paragraphs 14 seq. 
 
 ^ Cf . the criticism of Descartes's conception of causality, supra, Chapter 2-, 
 pp. (jS seq. 
 
 * But cf. Hume's doctrine, as discussed, pp. 163 seq. 
 K 
 
130 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 ment, that matter is ' inactive, ' ' passive, ' or ' inert. ' Modern 
 science expressly challenges this view conceiving of external 
 reality as energy rather than as matter. Yet a study of 
 contemporary scientific conceptions will reveal the fact that 
 'energy' is treated either as motion (kinetic energy) or as 
 'further irreducible cause of motion' or — still more indefi- 
 nitely — as ' that whose form changes while its quantity 
 remains unchanged.' ^ Against any one of these concep- 
 tions Berkeley's arguments might be directed. For energy 
 conceived as motion reduces to sensible quality, and con- 
 ceived as 'cause' or as 'permanent quantity' is an inferred 
 reality of indefinite content. And just as Berkeley showed 
 that we cannot perceive any sensible thing outside our con- 
 sciousness, so, with equal force, he might have argued that 
 the object of our inference is ipso facto an idea, object-of- 
 consciousness, a mental fact. Thus matter, inferred to 
 exist as cause of ideas, whether regarded as active or as 
 inactive, would still be object of our inference and, therefore, 
 in Berkeley's language, an 'idea.'^ The result of our 
 consideration of his doctrine, that matter as cause of percepts 
 does not exist, is then to discredit his express arguments, but 
 to accept his conclusion as a consequence of a truth which 
 he has established. 
 
 But granting that the cause of our percepts cannot be ma- 
 terial, or, in other words, independent of consciousness, there 
 is a final possibility that matter, conceived in a perfectly nega- 
 tive way,exists. It has been shown that color, fragrance, tex- 
 ture, even form and motion, are within the world of conscious- 
 ness, not independent of it ; that even causality is mental, not 
 material. Matter, then, if it exist, has no shape or color, is 
 no form of motion, is not cause of anything. And yet, the 
 opponents of idealism urge, one cannot disprove the existence 
 
 ' Cf. W. Ostwald, "Natural Philosophy," pp. 149 et al. The theory of 
 Boscovitch, that matter is made up of points possessed of inertia and of the 
 powers of attraction and repulsion, was published in the middle of Berkeley's 
 own century. 
 
 ^ For discussion of similar views, cf . later chapters on Hume, Kant, Hegel. 
 
The System of Berkeley 1 3 1 
 
 of some perfectly unloiown reality, which is none the less 
 independent of consciousness.' 
 
 The proof just outUned, that an inferred reality must be 
 mental, would hold against this hypothesis of an unknown 
 reaUty which is "neither substance nor accident, thinking 
 nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, 
 but something entirely unknown." ^ Berkeley does not urge 
 this argument, but offers, in place of it, two other objections. 
 He urges, in the first place, that this conception of matter is 
 not consistently maintained by those who uphold it. The 
 philosophers who allege the existence of an absolutely un- 
 known reality are constantly, he says, assuming to know 
 something, however httle, about it.^ And herein it must be 
 confessed that Berkeley clearly is right. Both the philoso- 
 phers of his time and those of our day, who urge that the 
 ultimate reality must be unknowable, none the less claim it as, 
 in a' certain way, known. Herbert Spencer, to take a mod- 
 em instance, teaches the unknowableness of the ultimate, 
 but at the same time defines the unknowable as an 
 'ultimate cause' and as "that through which all things exist;" 
 and this means that the alleged unknowable may at least be 
 known to be cause.^ If, on the other hand, the hypothesis of 
 matter as 'unknown' be rightly held, if, in other words, it 
 be seriously maintained that matter is that which has abso- 
 lutely no qualities or predicates whatever, then, Berkeley 
 points out, the hypothesis turns into a mere form of words 
 to which no reality corresponds. That which is neither con- 
 scious nor unconscious ; that which is not extended, colored, 
 fragrant, or possessed of any sense-quaHty ; that which is 
 
 ' It should be noted, once more, that the term 'matter' is not nowadays 
 applied to this unknown-reality hypothesis. Modern upholders of this 
 theory spurn the epithet 'materialist.' 
 
 ^ "Dialogues," II., Open Court edition, pp. 78 seg. Cf. "Principles," 80. 
 
 ' This is the probable meaning of Berkeley's objection to the substratum 
 hypothesis, in the non-literal sense of the word 'substratum.' Cf. "Prin- 
 ciples," 16 et al. 
 
 * "First Principles," § 31. 
 
132 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 not active, nor inactive, cause nor effect; that of which no 
 assertion can be made, — is nothing, it does not exist. The 
 hypothesis of matter as unknown is, in other words, self-con- 
 tradictory, for if it really is unknown, it cannot be known to be 
 material, non-ideal. "So," Berkeley concludes, "matter 
 comes to nothing." ^ 
 
 The hypothesis of ultimate reality as unknown yet non- 
 ideal is the last fortress of the opponents of ideahsm. In his 
 argument against them, Berkeley has long since proved beyond 
 a peradventure that the objects immediately perceived are 
 ideas. He has now concluded his examination of the three 
 conceptions of matter, as reality which though unperceived 
 may yet be inferred to exist. And (i) he has shown that 
 material objects Uke our ideas of them may not be inferred to 
 exist; he has (2) asserted, what on his premises he might 
 validly have proved, that matter, conceived as mere inferred 
 cause of sense-idea, does not exist; and finally, (3) he has 
 shown that absolutely unknown material reahty is a mere 
 fiction of the mind. Herewith, the opponents of idealism 
 are, as it seems to him, finally repulsed.^ 
 
 The issue between idealism and non-ideahsm (materialism, 
 as Berkeley calls it) is of such crucial importance that it jus- 
 tifies us in considering, at this point, a form of argument against 
 it which has grown in importance since Berkeley's day. As 
 will, it is hoped, appear, the objection has already been met by 
 Berkeley, but not in the persuasive form in which it has been 
 urged since his day.' In brief it is pointed out that the physi- 
 
 ' "Dialogues," II., Open Court edition, p. 80. Cf. "Principles," 80. 
 This doctrine of unknowable reality is again brought forward by Kant. 
 Cf. Chapter 7, pp. 236 seq. See also Hegel's discussion, Chapter 10, pp. 365 seg. 
 
 ' Not till the student is familiar with post-Kantian philosophy will he 
 fully understand why these three conceptions are exhaustive. Cf. infra, 
 Chapter 11, pp. 398 seq. 
 
 ' Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 63^ seq., for a statement of this argument as it is 
 implied by Hobbes, and Chapter 1 1 , pp. 398 ieg., for a reference to nineteenth- 
 century materialists. 
 
The System of Berkeley 133 
 
 ologists have shown that all phenomena of consciousness 
 depend on nerve-excitation ; and this, it is urged, proves that 
 consciousness, so far from being ultimately real, is itself a func- 
 tion of a material process. In order to present this objection 
 with utmost force a passage may be quoted from a materiahst 
 of relatively recent date. "If," says Karl Vogt, "I cut ofi 
 entirely the flow of blood to the legs of an animal, the func- 
 tion of the muscles is entirely destroyed by the loss of nourish- 
 ment, the animal cannot move its legs, its muscles are lamed. 
 ... If I let the blood back before the decomposition of the 
 muscles has begun, the function is restored ; . . . but if I do not 
 let back any more blood, the muscle dies . . . and there is an 
 end to every exercise of the function. . . . Now suppose that 
 we take as object of our experiment not the legs but the head. 
 We cut off the flow of blood to the brain. Immediately con- 
 sciousness ceases, thought is utterly annihilated, sensation 
 vanishes, motion is checked, every function of the brain has 
 simply stopped. 
 
 " If I promptly enough let back the blood to the brain, mo- 
 tion, sensation, consciousness, and thought return again, 
 the function reinstates itself. But if I wait till the organ can 
 no longer perform its function, sensation, motion, conscious- 
 ness, and thought are forever vanished. ... I reach quite 
 the same conclusion in the case of this experiment as in that 
 of the foregoing : that because of f aihng blood supply the brain 
 could not perform its function, that through continuance of 
 this condition the organ has died, that the function has come 
 to an end with the organ itself . . . ."^ The implication is, of 
 course, that since the brain is material, its function, conscious- 
 ness, must also be material.^ 
 
 Berkeley's reply to this argument for materialism is, in part, 
 suggested in the beginning of the second of the " Dialogues 
 between Hylas and Philonous," and is in part to be suppUed 
 
 ' "Kohlerglaube und Wissenschaft," II., Second Edition, 1855, pp. 
 111-112. 
 
 ^ Cf. Vogt, of. cit., p. 118. 
 
134 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 from the general purport of his teaching. Blood and muscle, 
 nerve and brain, are — he holds — sensible objects; in the 
 last analysis each reduces to a sum of sensible qualities, each 
 is hard or soft, fibrous or cellular, grayish or red. But sense 
 qualities have been abundantly shown to be ideal. Hence 
 brain and nerve are not, as is claimed, 'material substratum' ; 
 and consciousness, if described as function of the brain, is the 
 function of an idea. And if it is claimed that brain and nerve 
 are not mere compounds of sense quaUties, that they are also 
 the necessarily inferred causes of ideas, then Berkeley might 
 answer that the cause of consciousness, as inferred, is itself an 
 object of thought and thus within the domain of consciousness. 
 The force of this objection lies, in truth, first, in the highly 
 probable correspondence of one class of so-called physical 
 phenomena with facts of the human self's consciousness; 
 second, in the unjustified assumption that the physical phe- 
 nomena are ultimately distinct from psychic phenomena, 
 material in the sense of being non-ideal. The grounds for 
 such a prejudice are removed by Berkeley's demonstration 
 that the physical object is itself psychic, and that the distinc- 
 tion between the alleged material reality and the admitted 
 idea must be a distinction between ideas of a less and 
 of a more limited self. To the persuasive form of material- 
 ism founded on physio-psychology, Berkeley's answer is, 
 therefore, the following : brain and nerve process, to which 
 it is proposed to reduce consciousness, are themselves ideal, 
 that is, psychic. 
 
 III. Berkeley's Positive Doctrine of Inferred 
 Reality 
 
 a. The infinite spirit, God 
 
 The conclusion that there is no reality independent of mind 
 seems to leave Berkeley certain only of the existence of him- 
 self and of his own ideas. But the discovery that certain of 
 
The System of Berkeley 135 
 
 his ideas are impressed upon him without his volition, and 
 indeed in opposition to his wishes, has already suggested to 
 Berkeley that some spirit other than himself is the cause of 
 these unwilled ideas of sense. In truth, Berkeley widens 
 his universe to include, besides himself, a creative spirit, 
 God, and other created spirits as well. I am conscious of 
 these other spirits, Berkeley teaches, not as I am conscious of 
 myself with primarily immediate certainty, but because I 
 necessarily infer their existence. "We comprehend," he 
 says, "our own existence by inward feehng or reflection and 
 that of other spirits by reason." ' " My own mind and my own 
 ideas," he elsewhere says, "I have an immediate knowledge 
 of ; and by the help of these do mediately apprehend the pos- 
 sibiUty of the existence of other spirits and ideas." ^ 
 
 This reasoning by which we infer the existence of a spirit, 
 other than my own, which causes my percepts, or ideas of 
 sense, is summarized by Berkeley in an early section of the 
 " Principles": "I find," he says, "I can excite ideas in my 
 mind at pleasure. . . . It is no more than willing and straight- 
 way this or that idea arises. . . . Thus much is certain and 
 grounded on experience. . . . But whatever power I may 
 have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually per- 
 ceived by sense have not a hke dependence on my will. When 
 in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to 
 choose whether I shall see or no ... ; and so likewise as to 
 the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are 
 not creatures of my will. There is, therefore, some other 
 will or spirit that produces them." ° 
 
 This argument for the existence of a spirit, other than 
 myself, as cause of my percepts, presupposes the demonstra- 
 tion, already given, of the truth that spirit alone is a cause. 
 The argument in full may be summarized in the following 
 
 ' "Principles," 89. Cf. the doctrines of Descartes and of Locke, as dis- 
 cussed on pp. 27 seq. 
 
 ' "Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 93. 
 ' " Principles," 28-29. 
 
136 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 manner : (i) I am immediately certain of the existence of my 
 ideas of sense. (2) These ideas must have a cause. (3) There 
 are three, and only three, possible causes for an idea of sense : 
 first, a spirit or spirits ; second, another idea ; third, matter, 
 that is, reaUty independent of and other than spirit and 
 idea. 
 
 (4) (a) But matter, Berkeley beheves, does not exist, hence 
 it is not cause of ideas of sense ; and (h) these ideas caimot 
 cause, or explain, each other, since they are passive — that is, 
 dependent for their existence on being known by a seK;' 
 therefore (c) a spirit, or spirits, must be cause of the ideas of 
 sense. And (5) this conclusion is supported by the imme- 
 diate experience which I, a spirit, have of causing ideas. 
 
 (6) But though (a) it is thus proved that a spirit causes my 
 ideas of sense, I am immediately certain that I am not the 
 cause of them, but that I experience them in spite of myself. 
 Therefore (6) some spirit other than myself must exist as 
 cause of my percepts. 
 
 The existence of the sense ideas 'impressed on the mind' 
 is thus, Berkeley teaches, the guarantee of the existence of a 
 will or spirit other than our own. And the nature of the 
 sense ideas is, he holds, the basis for our reasoning about 
 the nature of this other spirit. The creative spirit must be 
 first of all, Berkeley argues, eternal; for only if it is can we 
 account for the continued existence of sense impressions and 
 their acknowledged independence of any and all individual 
 perceiving selves. "Sensible things," he says, "... have 
 an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experi- 
 ence to be independent of it. There is, therefore, some other 
 mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the 
 times of my perceiving them ; as Hkewise they did before my 
 birth and would do after my supposed annihilation. And as 
 the same is true with regard to all other finite, created spirits 
 it necessarily follows that there is an omnipresent, eternal 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 115. 
 
The System of Berkeley 137 
 
 Mind which knows and comprehends all things and exhibits 
 them to our view.'" 
 
 The character of these ideas of sense seems, furthermore, 
 to Berkeley a sufficient argument for the infinite (or perfect) 
 power, wisdom, and goodness of that eternal spirit which is 
 inferred as their author. For sense experience, the sum of 
 the ideas of sense, thus regarded as independent of my par- 
 ticular mind and more permanent than my special ideas, is 
 what is meant by the world of nature. And nature is char- 
 acterized by phenomena, such as the movements of the stars, 
 or the flow of rivers, so stupendous that only a more than 
 human power could produce them ; by phenomena, such as 
 the growth of plants from the seed or of animals from the em- 
 bryo, so intricate, that only more than human wisdom could 
 produce them ; finally, by a uniformity and regularity so ad- 
 vantageous that only more than human goodness could have 
 caused them. "If," Berkeley says, "we attentively consider 
 the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural 
 things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of 
 the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller, parts, 
 of the creation, together with the exact harmony ... of the 
 whole, but above all, the never enough admired laws of pain 
 and pleasure, and the instincts or natural incHnations, appe- 
 tites, and passions of animals ; I say, if we consider all these 
 things and at the same time attend to the meaning ... of 
 the attributes one, eternal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect, 
 we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid 
 Spirit, who works all in all, and hy whom all things consist." ^ 
 
 Berkeley, it is evident, does not argue God's existence after 
 Descartes's and Leibniz's fashion, from the completeness of 
 the idea which I have of God ; ^ nor as Descartes and Locke 
 had argued, from the necessity that God exists as cause of me;* 
 
 ' "Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 91. 
 
 ' "Principles," 146; cf. 151-153, and "Dialogues," II., Open Court 
 edition, p. 62 seq. 
 
 ' Cf. supra, pp. 46 seq. * Cf. supra, pp. 47 seq. 
 
138 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 nor like Descartes from the necessity that God exists to cause 
 the idea of God within me.^ He argues simply that God 
 must exist as cause of external objects. 
 
 h. Other created spirits 
 
 The existence of created spirits other than myself is also 
 argued from my percepts — ia particular from my percepts 
 of bodily movement. "It is plain," Berkeley says, "that we 
 cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by 
 their operations or the ideas by them excited in us. I per- 
 ceive several . . . combinations of ideas that inform me there 
 are certain particular agents, hke myself, which accompany 
 them and concur in their production. . . . "When, therefore, 
 we see the color, size, figure, and motions of a man, we per- 
 ceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds ; 
 and these being exhibited to our view in sundry, distinct col- 
 lections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and 
 created spirits hke ourselves." ^ The argument is twofold, 
 from cause and from analogy. I have certain ideas, say, of a 
 moving figure, waving hands, and loud sounds; these ideas 
 resemble others which I myself at times produce, yet I am 
 not the cause of these ideas. I infer, therefore, the existence 
 of other finite spirits 'accompanying and represented by' 
 ideas which resemble those produced by my own agency. 
 Berkeley is at pains to add that the existence of finite spirits is 
 inferred with far less certainty than that of God. For, he 
 says, "whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas 
 denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct 
 our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest 
 tokens of the Divinity : everything we see, hear, feel, or any- 
 wise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of 
 God ; as is our perception of those very motions which are 
 produced by men." 
 
 • Cf. supra, p. 49 ' "Principles," 145, 148. 
 
The System of Berkeley 139 
 
 c. The world of nature 
 
 Berkeley conceives God as creator, not only of lesser spirits, 
 but of the world of nature. Nature is thus, he teaches, a sys- 
 tem of ideas — " the visible series of . . . sensations, imprinted 
 on our minds," ' by God, which corresponds to the system of 
 ideas eternally present to God's mind. The laws of nature 
 are God's uniform and regular ways of calling up these sense 
 ideas in our minds. In Berkeley's own words, "The set 
 rules or estabhshed methods wherein the mind we depend on 
 excites in us the ideas of sense are called the laws of nature: 
 and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such 
 and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, 
 in the ordinary course of things."^ 
 
 This conception of nature will become clearer by analysis 
 I may regard the world of nature as composed, roughly speak- 
 ing, of (i) the sense things, trees, sky, and flowers, at which I 
 am at this moment looking ; (2) the sense things, for example, 
 the Mer de Gl^ce and the Pyramids, which either I have seen 
 or have heard described by others ; (3) the nature phenomena, 
 for example, the motions of the stars, whose present reality 
 I infer in order to explain the things I immediately experience ; 
 and (4) the nature events whose past existence I infer to ac- 
 count for phenomena immediately perceived in the present. 
 To this last class belong early stages of the development of 
 the universe, the whirUng of the nebular mass or the glacial 
 epoch, for example. Berkeley regards all four sorts of 
 nature phenomena both as immediate ideas of God, and 
 either as immediate percepts or as ideas of imagination of my 
 own. The first group, that of the things I see, consists of 
 ideas which God shares with me by impressing them on my 
 mind. The second, that of the things I remember seeing or 
 
 ' "Principles," ijo. 
 
 ' Ibid., 30; cf. los; and "Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 108. 
 
140 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 imagine from another's description, have been ideas of sense 
 impressed on me, or on some other finite being, and are 
 now ideas of my imagination. The third is a group 
 of nature phenomena beyond human perception, but inferred 
 as now existing. When we say that the earth moves, Berke 
 ley observes, we mean " that if we were placed in . . . such a 
 position and distance, both from the earth and sun, we should 
 perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets." ' 
 Our assertion that the earth moves is thus our image of the 
 moving earth, and we know this idea of ours to conform to 
 an idea in God's mind, and to be regularly connected with 
 other sense ideas, for instance, with those known as sunrise 
 and sunset. The fourth class of nature phenomena includes 
 the objects which, arguing from nature uniformities, may have 
 existed, we suppose, before the appearance of finite spirits on the 
 earth. These evidently neither are, nor have been, the sense 
 ideas of any finite selves, nor can they even be considered as 
 such. They are ideas of our scientific imagination, and they 
 are the eternally present, direct objects of the consciousness 
 of the eternal spirit. "When things are said to begin or end 
 their existence," Berkeley says, "we do not mean this with 
 regard to God, but his creatures. All objects are eternally 
 known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal 
 existence in his mind : but when things, before imperceptible 
 to creatures, are by a decree of God perceptible to them ; then 
 are they said to begin a relative existence with respect to 
 created minds." ^ In other words, the nature world has a 
 double existence. It is, on the one hand, a closely connected 
 system of ideas eternally present to God, and, on the other 
 hand, a uniform series of ideas in finite minds, corresponding 
 to the system of God's ideas. Of these finite ideas, some are 
 ideas of sense directly impressed by God on a succession of 
 finite minds ; others are necessary inferences, ideas of imagi- 
 
 ' "Principles," 58. 
 
 ^ "Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 121. 
 
The System of Berkeley 141 
 
 nation, corresponding to phenomena existing in God's mind 
 and never directly impressed by him on finite minds. 
 
 It is interesting to contrast this conception of nature with 
 that of Leibniz. Both Berkeley and Leibniz teach that 
 nature has no existence independent of mind — in a word, 
 that it is immaterial. Both teach also that my knowledge of 
 nature is through my acquaintance with my own sense ideas. 
 But whereas Berkeley teaches that nature consists in these 
 sense ideas of mine together with a complete system of cor- 
 responding ideas in the mind of God, Leibniz teaches that my 
 sense ideas indicate, as the reality behind them, monads, 
 soul-like substances, undeveloped spirits. Thus Berkeley 
 argues from his experience of certain sense ideas of motions 
 and bodily features like his own, the existence of created 
 selves. In a parallel fashion, Leibniz argues from all sense 
 ideas the presence of active souls. 
 
 IV. Critical Estimate of Berkeley's System 
 
 It is necessary, in conclusion, to attempt an estimate of the 
 positive results of Berkeley's system. It is evident from the 
 outline that his philosophy is essentially a theology — a doc- 
 trine about God. Naturally, therefore, the criticisms to be 
 made regard in the first instance Berkeley's arguments for 
 God's existence and his conception of God's nature. 
 
 a. Criticism 0} Berkeley's doctrine about God 
 
 Against Berkeley's argument for God's existence, it may 
 be urged that it proves at most merely the existence of a spirit 
 great enough and wise enough to produce nature as we know it. 
 Berkeley's argument, as has been shown, consists simply and 
 solely in the inference that a spirit must exist as cause of 
 those ideas which I myself do not produce. But it is far 
 from evident that a spirit adequate to produce nature should 
 be 'eternal, infinitely wise, good and perfect.' 
 
T42 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 Berkeley argues the eternity of God on the ground that 
 ' sensible things ' ^ exist before the birth and would exist after 
 the annihilation of all 'finite created spirits.' Therefore, 
 Berkeley concludes, in a passage already quoted/ there is an 
 omnipresent, eternal mind which knows and " comprehends 
 all things." It will be observed that, by this argument, 
 the eternity of God is as sure as — but no surer than — 
 the eternity of physical objects. But concerning physical 
 objects I know only that they exist independently of me; I 
 infer with the highest probabiUty, but I do not directly know, 
 that they are more permanent than my ideas. And certainly 
 I do not know that the series of physical phenomena is eter- 
 nal.' Berkeley has thus a right to argue: since things are 
 the ideas of some spirit, therefore as surely as objects exist 
 and have existed, when no human self has perceived them, 
 there exists a spirit greater-than-human, with as great a per- 
 manence as the series of things. But farther than this 
 Berkeley cannot go. He cannot, in other words, prove the 
 eternity of the creative spirit, for he cannot prove that there 
 is an eternity of sensible things. 
 
 (2) Berkeley's proof of the infinite perfection, that is, the 
 utter completeness of this creative spirit, is even more inade- 
 quate. He argues, it will be remembered, from an ' attentive 
 observation' of the 'order,' the 'harmony' and the 'infinite 
 contrivance' of nature that only an absolutely wise and good 
 God could have created them. It is obvious that such a 
 conclusion can be reached only by the most one-sided obser- 
 vation of nature, only in truth by a persistent refusal to regard 
 all that is inexplicable or evil. One may indeed find, in 
 the nature world, 'order' and 'exquisite contrivance'; but 
 besides organs adapted to use there are rudimentary organs 
 which are useless and even harmful to the organism; subor- 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 1 19. 'Eternal,' is here used in the sense 'everlasting.' 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 125. 
 
 ' Cf. Karl Pearson's expression of this doubt, "The Grammar of Sci- 
 ence" (Second Edition), Chapter 4, especially § 7. 
 
The System of Berkeley 143 
 
 dinate to the surviving forms of life are 'smaller parts of 
 creation whose life has no end save destruction' ; side by side 
 with the 'never enough admired laws' of the 'pain and pleas- 
 ure' which make for physical and moral perfection are the 
 suffering and anguish which seem to avail nothing. It is 
 evidently, then, illegitimate in the face of the waste and the 
 destructiveness of nature — the carelessness of type and of 
 individual alike — to argue, as Berkeley does, that the charac- 
 ter of our sense percepts evidently shows the existence of an 
 infinitely wise and good God. It is possible, to be sure, that 
 the wisdom and goodness of God may be otherwise demon- 
 strated ; and if this can be done it is certainly true as Berkeley 
 suggests that the ' mixture of pain and uneasiness which is in 
 the world' may be reconciled with the truth of God's wisdom 
 and goodness.' But it is a different thing to reconcile the 
 apparent defects of nature with the kindly wisdom of its 
 creator, after that has been proved, and to argue, as Berkeley 
 argues, precisely from the character of the nature world to the 
 goodness and wisdom of God. Such an argument is obviously 
 based on defective observation. 
 
 (3) A more fundamental difficulty, and yet one which is more 
 readily avoided, concerns Berkeley's conception of creation. 
 The hypothesis of God as creator is expressly based by him on 
 my alleged immediate knowledge of myself as creating ideas. 
 But my creativeness may well be questioned. In what 
 sense, one may ask, do I create ideas? Is there any trace 
 in my experience of that 'making out of nothing' in which 
 creation is supposed to consist? I call myself creative in 
 certain moments of imagination and thought. But what do 
 I actually experience in thinking out a mathematical demon- 
 stration or in striking out the plot of a story? I turn my 
 mind toward the general topic of my interest; I regard the 
 topic steadfastly from all sides; idea after idea dawns upon 
 me, and — of a sudden — there arrives on the scene that 
 
 • Cf. Chapter ii, p. 430. 
 
144 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 particular idea which I recognize as the solution of my prob- 
 lem or the satisfaction of my esthetic impulse. Berkeley 
 would say that I create the idea, yet it certainly is also true 
 that I did not make it, that it merely appears suddenly here 
 within my consciousness. But if we conceive the greater 
 spirit, as Berkeley (rightly) does, on the analogy of our own 
 spirits, it will be truer to our own experience to speak of it 
 as the 'possessor' or the 'subject' of ideas rather than as 
 their cause. Such a rereading of the Berkeleian conception 
 does not essentially alter it and indeed contributes, as will 
 be shown, to the solution of still other difficulties. 
 
 (4) A similar though greater difficulty is the inadequacy of 
 Berkeley's conception of the relation of the creative spirit 
 to myself. This conception is never clearly outlined, but the 
 impHcation of Berkeley's teaching, that God is inferred from 
 ideas which he gives us, not directly known, is that God is 
 radically distinct from us, a God, as it were, outside us. 
 But if this be true, it may well be urged that it is impossible 
 to understand how God can be conceived as affecting us at 
 all — let alone as 'exciting' ideas in us. We certainly have 
 no direct knowledge of such excitation on the part of God. 
 The sense ideas, like the so-called products of our owH imagi- 
 nation and thought, simply 'are here' and we are conscious 
 of them. The relation between God and the limited spirits 
 is indeed, in the opinion of the writer, comprehensible only 
 on the supposition that the lesser spirits are, in a sense, parts 
 of the greater spirit so that his ideas are at the same time 
 their ideas. This conception contradicts Berkeley's, in so 
 far as it implies, on our part, a direct and no longer a mediate 
 knowledge of God. But there are certain indications that, 
 in an obscure way, inconsistent with his own main teaching, 
 Berkeley did conceive of God as including rather than as 
 creating spirit. In one passage, at least, he speaks of God 
 as "a spirit . . . intimately present to our minds'" — an 
 
 ' "Principles," 149. Cf." Dialogues," III. (passage quoted jw^ra, p. 125'). 
 
The System of Berkeley 145 
 
 expression which implies the futihty of inferring God, by 
 teaching that he is immediately present. More than this, 
 the double definition of external things — on the one hand, as 
 my sense percepts, yet at the same time as God's ideas — 
 is unintelligible unless God's ideas may be mine, unless I 
 possess them in so far as I, the limited self, am included 
 within the unlimited spirit. Such a conception, as will be 
 shown, does away with two of the further objections to 
 Berkeley's system.' 
 
 h. Criticism of Berkeley's theory of knowledge 
 
 It has been shown that Berkeley conceives of knowledge 
 as a copy of something. As has also been indicated, this 
 doctrine leads him to the admission that we have no ideas of 
 spirit. For ideas, he argues, are passive and inert ; and can- 
 not therefore resemble active spirit. He has had recourse, 
 therefore, to the theory that one may have ' notions ' — though 
 not ideas — of spirit. And yet by his teaching about 
 'passivity,' Berkeley tacitly admits that 'notions' no less than 
 ideas are passive. The activity of a spirit, he himself has 
 shown,^ consists simply in being a conscious subject, and the 
 passivity of the ideas is nothing more than 'being perceived.' 
 Now 'notions' as well as ideas are certainly passive in this 
 sense : they are not conscious subjects and they are perceived 
 objects of consciousness. Thus a 'notion of spirit' is as 
 inherently impossible as an idea of spirit. 
 
 This is doubtless the most serious of all the criticisms on 
 Berkeley's teaching; for it shows that, on his own principles, 
 he has no right to that knowledge of his own existence on 
 which his whole system is based. Berkeley's conclusions 
 are, therefore, rescued only by abandoning his theory of 
 
 ' The conception of the finite spirits as included within the Infinite Spirit 
 was held in Berkeley's time by Malebranche and his English disciple, John 
 Norris. (Cf. Appendix, pp. 464, 491.) For a fuller discussion of this 
 difficult subject, cf. infra, Chapter xi, pp. 435 seq. 
 ' Cf. p. 116. 
 
146 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 knowledge and by admitting — as already we have seen 
 reason to admit — that one knows at least one's own spirit 
 directly, without interposition of those abstractions, the ideas. 
 Berkeley himself, as has been shown, impUcitly teaches that 
 we have this direct knowledge. The truth is that to say "a 
 self has successive ideas" is simply another way of saying 
 that a self is conscious. But the idea-conception, even were 
 it adequate to represent the conscious experience of a single 
 self, is distinctly unequal to the representation of the relations 
 of selves, and should not be employed with reference to them. 
 Love and hate, sympathy and contempt, are personal attitudes 
 and caimot be adequately described as series of psychic 
 phenomena.' 
 
 The conception of knowledge as direct and not mere copy 
 encounters, as must frankly be confessed, greater difficulty 
 when applied, not to my knowledge of myself, but to my knowl- 
 edge of other selves — God, and finite spirits. The subject 
 cannot fairly be discussed in any detail at this stage of our 
 advance, but the following preliminary and so far dogmatic 
 statement may be made: In being directly conscious of 
 myself I am conscious of myself as related to other-than- 
 myself . But, as Berkeley and Leibniz have shown, all reality 
 is ultimately spirit, or self. Therefore that other-than- 
 myself, which I know in knowing myself as related to it, 
 must be other self (or selves). The characters and extent 
 of such another self are, of course, matters of inference, not of 
 direct knowledge. The difficulty in this conception is, it is 
 needless to say, the following : how, if a self is other-than-I, 
 can I directly and certainly know it; since that which has 
 given to my consciousness of myself its peculiar certainty is 
 the fact that it is just myself and no other of whom I am 
 conscious ? The solution of the difficulty must consist in the 
 attempt to show that there is a certain sense in which the othei 
 self is ultimately not another. For if all finite selves are 
 
 ' Cf. the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 263 jeg. 
 
The System of Berkeley 147 
 
 expressions of the infinite self, then in one way each is what 
 the other is, so that direct knowledge of one by the other is 
 conceivable.' Thus, Berkeley's 'copy theory' of knowledge, 
 as the mere possession of ideas resembling either spirits or 
 else other ideas, must, it seems, be rejected. For, on this 
 theory, as has appeared, a knowledge of spirit is impossible. 
 But Berkeley has no need of this invalid hypothesis of passive 
 notions which resemble active spirit, since knowledge is no 
 mere possession of mechanical copies, but is, essentially, the 
 immediate presence of spirit to spirit. 
 
 It would not be difficult to add to these criticisms of Berke- 
 ley's system. In particular, it should be noted that the proof 
 just given, that he overemphasizes the idea-as-such, makes it 
 likely that his view of external nature, as a system of ideas, 
 is less probable than Leibniz's conception of nature as an 
 assemblage of spiritual beings. It could also be shown that 
 Berkeley, in spite of his accurate conception of nature uni- 
 formity, undervalues scientific study .^ It is evident, finally, 
 that he does not* critically examine the non-sensuous factors 
 of knowledge. No one of these criticisms, however, affects 
 the fundamental positions of Berkeley's system; therefore, 
 no one of them need, for the present, be emphasized. 
 
 With these criticisms, the consideration of Berkeley's 
 system is completed. It has been shown that Berkeley 
 teaches negatively (i) that so-called 'material' things are 
 really the ideas of some mind, or minds; and (2) that 
 matter, as unknown cause or background of these material 
 things, does not exist. The first of these positions, in the 
 writer's opinion, he makes good ; for the second he does not 
 offer, but he plainly suggests, a proof. Berkeley teaches posi- 
 
 ' For further discussion, cf. Chapter ii, pp. 416 seq. 
 
 ' Cf. the rank scientific heresy of "Principles," 109: "As in reading other 
 books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense . rather than 
 lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language ... so in perusing 
 the volume of nature it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an 
 exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or 
 showing how it follows from them." 
 
148 Pluralistic Spiritualism 
 
 tively (i) that the universe consists of spirits and their ideas 
 (or notions) ; (2) that these spirits include myself, other finite 
 selves, and God — an infinitely wise and good spirit; (3) that 
 finite spirits create certain of their own ideas and notions 
 and receive certain others from God ; (4) that external nature 
 is to be conceived as made up of the ideas of God, often 
 shared by finite selves, and ordered in accordance with the 
 laws of his being — that is, of the laws of nature. The main 
 criticisms on this doctrine have consisted, first, in pointing 
 out that Berkeley's argument for the existence of God cannot 
 prove more than the existence of a greater-than-human spirit, 
 and is utterly inadequate to demonstrate the eternity or the 
 perfect wisdom and goodness of this spirit ; second, in showing 
 the unnecessary flaws in Berkeley's doctrine of knowledge. 
 
 Important contrasts between Berkeley's idealism and that 
 of Leibniz have disclosed themselves in the course of this 
 chapter. The differences in the two arguments for the 
 existence of God and in the two doctrines of nature have 
 already been pointed out. But the fundamental contrast is 
 the following : Leibniz is no less interested in the unique 
 individuality and — as he holds — the consequent ultimate 
 plurality of spirits, than in their common spiritual, non- 
 material character. Berkeley, on the other hand, though he 
 accepts without question the doctrine that ultimate reality 
 consists of a plurahty of distinct spirits, does not emphasize 
 or concern himself greatly with this doctrine and its impli- 
 cations. But Berkeley makes a distinct advance upon Leib- 
 niz in the strength and detail of his argument against 
 materialism. Leibniz asserts the unreality of alleged mat- 
 ter, but he nowhere adequately substantiates his conclu- 
 sions; Berkeley, on the contrary, devotes himself to the 
 painstaking refutation of the claims of materiahsm. Yet the 
 most significant of Berkeley's positive results is, as has been 
 said so often, no other than the most important of Leibniz's 
 conclusions : the conception of the universe as a community 
 of spiritual beings. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 PLURALISTIC PHENOMENALISTIC IDEALISM: THE 
 SYSTEM OF HUME 
 
 " Hume . . . had neither any twist of vice nor any bias for doing good, 
 but was a philosopher because he could not help it." — T. H. Green. 
 
 Close upon the idealistic system of that genial Irish church- 
 man, Bishop Berkeley, follows an idealism of a very different 
 sort — that of the Scotchman, David Hume, who was scep- 
 tic, critic, diplomat, historian, and man of the world, as well 
 as philosopher. Like Leibniz and Berkeley, Hume teaches 
 that reahty is through and through immaterial, but he does 
 not conceive of this immaterial universe after their fashion, as 
 a society of related selves. Rather, he believes the universe 
 to consist of a great complex of ever shifting sensations and 
 images, or, to use his own words, of impressions and ideas. 
 In technical terms, Hume's philosophy, while numerically 
 plurahstic, is qualitatively an ideahstic, but a phenomenal- 
 istic monism. The many individual beings of his universe 
 are not selves or spirits, but psychic phenomena, impressions, 
 and ideas. It is difficult to overemphasize the historical im- 
 portance of this new direction in idealism. Up to Hume's 
 time no modern philosopher had doubted that an immaterial, 
 an ideal, universe must mean a universe composed of spirit- 
 ual beings, of selves. Hume challenges this behef , denies the 
 existence of spirit no less than that of matter, and conceives 
 the universe as immaterial indeed, but as composed not of 
 selves, but of ideas. 
 
 This account of Hume's doctrine is, in a way, misleading, 
 
 149 
 
150 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 in that it lays the emphasis on his positive conception of the 
 universe, whereas Hume's teaching is, above all, negative, 
 and Hume himself was sceptic, not constructive philosopher, 
 was destroyer of traditional beliefs rather than founder of a 
 new system. The truth is, however, that one cannot tear 
 down without at the same time heaping up, and accordingly 
 Hume, in questioning both materialism and idealism, really 
 formulated a new doctrine. 
 
 I. The Foundation Principles of Hume's Metaphysics * 
 
 The positive doctrine to which Hume's scepticism com- 
 mitted him has two foundation principles. One of these is 
 his teaching about impressions ; the other is his causaHty 
 doctrine. Before proceeding to the consideration of Hume's 
 conclusions, it is therefore necessary to understand and to 
 estimate these two underlying conceptions. 
 
 a. The derivation of idea from impression 
 
 "The perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves," 
 Hume says, "into two distinct kinds which I shall call im- 
 pressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these," he 
 continues, "consists in the degrees of force and liveliness 
 with which they strike upon the mind and make their way 
 into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which 
 enter with most force and violence we may name impressions; 
 and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, pas- 
 sions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in 
 the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in think- 
 ing and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the percep- 
 
 ' The outline which follows is based mainly on Bk. I. of Hume's "Treatise 
 of Human Nature" (published 1739), and on the "Inquiry concerning 
 Human Understanding" (1748). The student is urged to read the "In- 
 quiry" entire, and Pt. I. entire, Ft. III., §§ 1-3, and especially 14, and Pt. IV., 
 §§ 5 ^n<i 6, of the "Treatise." Page references in what follows are to the 
 Green and Grose edition of the "Treatise," and to the Open Court edi- 
 tion of the "Inquiry." 
 
The System of Hume 151 
 
 tions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those 
 which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the 
 immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion." ^ 
 
 This introductory statement makes evident that Hume 
 recognizes two groups of sensations : impressions of sensation, 
 as he later names them — of sight, touch, and the rest ; and 
 impressions of reflection, pleasure and uneasiness, the affec- 
 tive experiences, as modem psychologists have called them.' 
 The quoted paragraph further indicates the three main dif- 
 ferences which Hume makes between impressions and ideas. 
 The impressions are (i) liveUer, more forcible, more vivid, 
 than ideas; and (2) in occurrence, prior to ideas. From this 
 last-named character it follows, Hume teaches, (3) that im- 
 pressions are the necessary cause or source of ideas, and 
 conversely that ideas are the mere effects and copies of im- 
 pressions: "All our simple ideas in their first appearance are 
 deriv'd from simple impressions — which they exactly rep- 
 resent. . . . The constant conjunction of our resembhng 
 perceptions is a convincing proof that the one are the cause 
 of the other ; and this priority of the impressions is an equal 
 proof that our impressions are the causes of our ideas." ' 
 
 1 "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. I., § i' ; cf. "Inquiry," § II. (Here, and in what 
 follows, the term "Inquiry" is to be understood as referring to the " Inquiry 
 concerning Human Understanding." "The Inquiry concerning the Prin- 
 ciples of Morals" will be referred to by the last three words of the title.) 
 
 It is imperative to note the distinction between the use which Hume 
 makes and that which Locke and Berkeley make of the word 'idea.' To 
 the latter the word stands for any fact of consciousness or psychic phenome- 
 non as object of knowledge — for percept, image, or emotion. Hume, on 
 the contrary, employs the term 'perception' in this general sense, and uses 
 'idea,' as will be shown, to designate one class of 'perceptions,' the less vivid. 
 Modem usage vibrates between these two extremes. The writer of this 
 book prefers to use the term 'idea' in the more general sense of Locke. 
 
 ' This division is expressly made in the "Treatise" (Bk. I., Pt. I., § 2), 
 and is implied in the "Inquiry" (§ II., paragraph 3). Hume includes 'de- 
 sire and aversion, hope and fear,' among the impressions of reflection, but 
 he later admits that these are not simple reflections. 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. I., § i, paragraphs 7 and 8, end. Htmie qualifies 
 this by the teaching (ibid., paragraph 4) that only simple impressions and 
 ideas, not complex ones, resemble each other. 
 
152 Pluralistic Phenomenalistic Idealism 
 
 It must be noted finally that Hume often supplements his 
 description of impressions as more vivid than ideas by credit- 
 ing them (4) with still another character: their correspond- 
 ence with external objects independent of consciousness. 
 This distinction is suggested in the following passages: 
 "The simple impressions," Hume says, "always take the 
 precedence of their correspondent ideas. ... To give a 
 child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, / 
 present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these 
 impressions." ' This alleged character of the impressions 
 need not, however, be considered, spite of the fact that it 
 lends a certain plausibiUty to Hume's teaching. For Hume 
 later denies the very existence of these 'external objects' 
 and has, therefore, no right to distinguish impression from 
 idea on the ground that the impression corresponds to an 
 object. 
 
 It is evident that the account just given corresponds roughly 
 to an ordinary psychological distinction between 'presenta- 
 tions' and 'representations.'^ But we are mainly concerned 
 with the philosophical use which Hume makes of the doctrine 
 thus outlined. It is the following: We know the real, he 
 teaches, only through impressions or ideas. Indeed, since 
 ideas imply preceding impressions, to know is to have impres- 
 sions. But impressions are either sensations or affections, 
 therefore we know only what we 'sense' or what we 'feel.' ' 
 
 Evidently the vahdity of this important teaching depends 
 not only on the accuracy of Hume's enumeration of impres- 
 
 ' "Treatise," iWd., paragraph 8. (Italics mine.) Cf. "Inquiry," § II., para- 
 graph 7 : " If it happen from a defect of the organ that a man is not susceptible 
 of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of 
 the correspondent ideas. . . The case is the same if the object, proper for 
 exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ." (Italics mine.) 
 
 ' It is, to be sure, admitted even by Hume that his first and fundamental 
 difference between impressions (as lively) and ideas (as faint) does not hold 
 invariably. ("Treatise," loc. cit., end of paragraph i.) 
 
 ' Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. II., § 6; Pt. II., §§ 5 and 6; Pt. IV., §§ 2 
 and 6; and infra, pp. 167 and 180', for Hume's specific applications of this 
 doctrine. 
 
The System of Hume 153 
 
 sions but on the truth of his teaching that ideas, the faint and 
 later appearing perceptions of the mind, are mere copies of 
 these impressions. Now Hume may well be right in the belief 
 that our vivid and our primitive experiences consist exclusively 
 of sensations and affections (impressions), but he is clearly 
 wrong in the opinion that we have no experiences excepting 
 sensations and affections and their copies. There is no guide 
 save that of our own introspection in the enumeration of our 
 different kinds of consciousness, and Hume's own introspec- 
 tion elsewhere testifies that he has distinct experiences which 
 are neither sensational nor affective. Thus, he admits our 
 consciousness of causality, identity, and succession; yet 
 these are neither colors nor sounds nor pleasures nor uneasi- 
 nesses. He is accordingly in face of the following dilemma : 
 he has declared that every experience is impression or copy- 
 of-impression, yet he has admitted the occurrence of experi- 
 ences not included in his list of impressions. Evidently he 
 must either increase the number of impressions, or he must 
 admit the existence of ideas which are not mere copies of 
 sensation or affection. 
 
 h. The doctrine of causality 
 
 From the time of Aristotle, until Hume wrote his " Treatise," 
 no philosopher had offered a close analysis of the conception 
 of causality. Descartes and Leibniz, it will be remembered, 
 had without discussion assumed the necessity of certain causal 
 principles ; ' Berkeley had distinguished between causahty, the 
 creativeness of spirit, and the regular sequence of idea on 
 idea which, incorrectly as it seemed to him, is called causality. 
 But it was left to Hume, among modem philosophers, first 
 to study carefully the causal relation; and his doctrine 
 forms the most permanently valuable part of his philosophy. 
 Hume is chiefly interested in the "relation of cause and effect" 
 
 • Cf. pp. 48 seq., 103 seq. 
 
154 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 because "by means of that relation" we are said to "go 
 beyond the evidence of our memory and senses." ' By 
 reasoning that ideas or objects or events must have a suitable 
 cause, all Hume's predecessors argue for God's exist- 
 ence, and all save Leibniz and Berkeley infer the existence 
 of matter independent of mind. And everyday people as 
 well as philosophers reach conclusions about past and future 
 events by assuming that events must have effects and causes. 
 As Hume says, "it is constantly supposed that there is a con- 
 nection between the present fact and that which is inferred 
 from it." This connection, the causal relation, Hume 
 proceeds to analyze in detail. 
 
 According to the everyday view, there is a power in a 
 moving billiard ball which strikes a second resting ball ; this 
 power forces the second ball to move ; the motion of the second 
 ball follows necessarily on that of the first. Hume's account 
 of this occurrence is the following : There is no power in the 
 moving ball and no necessity in the movement of the second 
 ball. The movement of the second ball has, however, as a 
 matter of fact, followed repeatedly on that of the first; and 
 our minds, therefore, anticipate the movement of the second 
 ball, on seeing the movement of the first ; that is, our minds 
 infer that the movement of the second will follow that of the 
 first. In precise terms, according to the everyday view, the 
 causal relation has two important characters: it is (i) a 
 necessary connection between antecedent cause and follow- 
 ing effect, such that (2) the cause is a power or force. Hume, 
 on the other hand, defines causality as (i) a customary con- 
 junction of events, involving (2) a 'determination of the mind.'^ 
 By the first of these teachings, he denies the necessity ordi- 
 narily attributed to the causal relation, and by the second, he 
 interprets power as a purely mental character. 
 
 ' "Inquiry," § IV., Pt. I., paragraph 4; cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., 
 § 6, paragraph 7. 
 » "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., especiaUy §§ 2, 14. 
 
The System of Hume 155 
 
 I. The conception of causality as a customary, not a 
 
 necessary, connection 
 
 Two kinds of necessity are involved in what is called the 
 causal connection of events. The first of these is the nec- 
 essary or inevitable connection between cause ^ and effect 
 regarded merely as events in time ; it is formulated in the 
 proposition, "Every present has a past and has a future." 
 This sort of necessary connection is common to succession 
 and to causality. The second sort of necessity is expressed 
 in the proposition, " A given event, b, is so connected with 
 a preceding event, a, that no other event could have occurred 
 in the place of b." ^ Hume's main concern is with the strictly 
 causal principle : the effect could not have been other than 
 it is. He denies the truth of this principle, arguing on 
 several grounds that the causal relation is not necessary. 
 
 The first argument by which Hume seeks to show that 
 the causal relation is not necessary is the fact that, given any 
 causal succession, one may always conceive of it as different ; 
 that is, one may imagine the cause to have had a different 
 effect, or the effect to have had a different cause. Only by 
 repeated experience, Hume points out, is it possible to dis- 
 cover what we call the real cause or the real effect. But a nec- 
 essary relation, he urges, is one whose negation is inconceivable 
 and which is known to us at once and without repeated 
 
 ' It should be noted that the term 'cause' is not by all philosophers applied 
 exclusively to an event. By 'cause' has been meant, also, non-temporal 
 'ground' or 'explanation,' and many philosophers have confused the two 
 meanings (cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 51 seq. and Chapter 4, pp. 103 seq.), 
 or else have distinguished these uses, yet retained the word 'cause' for them 
 both (cf. infra, Chapter 7, pp. 210 seq. and 259 seq.). Because other terms 
 may be found to express 'non-temporal causality,' modem writers tend to 
 follow Hume and to ascribe causality to events only. 
 
 ^ It should be noted that the causal principle does not assert that a 
 given event is uniformly preceded by the same cause. A given event may, 
 on the contrary, follow from one of several causes. 
 
156 Pluralistic Phenomenalistic Idealism 
 
 experience.' For example, it is inconceivable that the relation 
 between 3x2 and 3 + 3 should be other than that of equal- 
 ity ; and so soon as I know the meaning of the terms, unaided 
 by repeated experience, I know this equality. On the other 
 hand, I do not know without trial that a drop of acid will turn 
 a blue fabric red : it is conceivable that the acid should turn 
 the cloth black or that it should stiffen the fabric instead of 
 eating it. The causal relation, in other words, is not neces- 
 sary, whereas the mathematical relation is. 
 
 This teaching is of such importance to the development of 
 Hume's system that it must be considered in detail. It will 
 be well to begin with Hume's own illustrations of the doctrine, 
 just stated and briefly illustrated, that the opposite of any 
 cause or of any effect is conceivable, and that consequently 
 only repeated experience enables us to assign an effect or a 
 cause. Hume's first examples are from unfamiliar cases of 
 causality, for, as he truly says, our inability to know effects 
 or causes, without trial, is most readily admitted "with regard 
 to such objects as we remember to have once been altogether 
 unknown to us. . . . Present two smooth pieces of marble," 
 he continues, "to a man who has no tincture of natural philos- 
 ophy ; he will never discover that they will adhere together 
 in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in 
 a direct line, while they make so small a resistance to a lateral 
 pressure." ^ It is equally true, though we seldom realize it, 
 that famiUar effects and causes whose opposite now seems 
 impossible to us had to be learned by repeated experience of 
 them. "We are apt to imagine," Hume says a little later,' 
 "that we could discover ... by the mere operation of our 
 reason, without experience," the famihar effects of well-known 
 causes. "We fancy that were we brought on a sudden into 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § i. Cf. "Inquiry,'- § VII., Pt. I., para- 
 graph 7 (Open Court edition, p. 64'). Cf. Leibniz's doctrine, summarized 
 supra, pp. gi seq. 
 
 ^ "Inquiry," § IV., paragraph 7 (Open Court edition, p. 26'). 
 
 ' Ibid., paragraph 8. 
 
The System of Hume 157 
 
 this world, we could at first have inferred that one billiard 
 ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse ; and 
 that we needed not to have waited for the event in order to 
 pronounce with certainty concerning it." But this convic- 
 tion of the necessary, and therefore immediately realized, 
 connection between cause and effect is an illusion. "When 
 I see ... a bilhard ball moving in a straight line toward 
 another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by 
 accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or 
 impulse ; may I not conceive that a hundred different events 
 might as well follow from that cause ? May not both these 
 balls remain at absolute rest ? May not the first ball return 
 in a straight line or leap off from the second in any line or 
 direction? . . . All our reasonings a priori" Hume con- 
 cludes,' "will never be able to show us any foundation for this 
 preference." In other words, Hume is sure that the connec- 
 tion between a given event — say, the movement of a bilHard 
 ball — and the event which follows it is not a necessary con- 
 nection, precisely because a different succession of events is 
 conceivable. 
 
 This argument for the lack of necessity in the causal con- 
 nection is emphasized by the teaching that only relations 
 whose opposite is inconceivable are necessary. Thus, he 
 would admit that there is a necessary relation, that of unlike- 
 ness, between white and black, because one knows the like- 
 ness "at first sight without any enquiry or reasoning," and 
 because it is inconceivable that white should be like black. 
 His enumeration of necessary relations is the following : rela- 
 tions of "resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and 
 proportions in quantity or number.^ That the square of the 
 hypothenuse," Hume says, "is equal to the squares of the two 
 sides is a proposition which expresses a relation between these 
 figures. . . . Propositions of this kind are discoverable 
 
 ' "Inquiry," § IV., paragraph lo. 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § i, paragraph a. Cf. Pt. II., § 4. 
 
158 Pluralistic Phenomena lis tic Idealism 
 
 by the mere operation of thought. . . . Though there never 
 were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by 
 EucUd would forever retain their certainty and evidence." ^ 
 So, to recapitulate : Hume's first argument against the neces- 
 sity of the causal relation is through the discovery that one 
 cannot, without repeated experience, predict the effect which 
 a given event will have. But a really necessary connection, 
 he teaches, is such that its opposite is inconceivable: it is, 
 therefore, immediately known. The causal relation, accord- 
 ingly, lacks necessity, since its opposite is conceivable and since 
 it is known only through accidental and inadequate expe- 
 rience. Causality, in other words, is customary conjunction, 
 not necessary connection. 
 
 It will be well, before going further, to attempt an estimate 
 of this reiterated argument against the necessity of the causal 
 relation. A careful re-reading of the text can hardly fail to 
 convince one that the argument falls short of its purposed 
 result. It shows that we gain, through accidental experience, 
 not our conviction that a cause must be uniformly followed 
 by a similar effect but merely our knowledge of the precise 
 nature of that effect. The argument has to do, in other words, 
 not with the necessity of the occurrence of a uniform effect, but 
 with the alleged necessity that the effect be of just such or such 
 a nature. (Hume sometimes recognizes this limitation of 
 the argument, though he often loses sight of it.^) In other 
 words, Hume argues (i) that only through repeated expe- 
 rience may one know, for example, that fire will be the result 
 of friction; and argues (2) that because such experience is 
 inevitably incomplete, the connection which it discovers can- 
 not be regarded as absolutely necessary. And up to this 
 
 ' "Inquiry," ibid., paragraph r. In the "Inquiry," Hume teaches that 
 all mathematical relations are necessary. In the "Treatise" (Bk. I., Pt. III., 
 § I, paragraph 4), he questions the necessity of geometrical propositions. 
 (For detailed comparison of the teachings, on this point, of "Treatise" and 
 "Inquiry," cf. Elkin's "Hume's Treatise and Inquiry," pp. m sea.) 
 
 2 Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 2. 
 
The System of Hume 159 
 
 point Hume is unquestionably correct both in his premises 
 and in his conclusion. We do gain our knowledge of the 
 exact nature of the effects of given causes by repeated experi- 
 ence ; and repeated observation, varying with individual and 
 with circumstances, cannot guarantee the universality and 
 the necessity of the causal connection. Hume may be said, 
 then, to have proved that we have only practical persuasion, 
 never absolute certainty, that a given event has precisely such 
 or such an effect. But this result falls far short of Hume's 
 conclusion, (3) that there is no necessary connection between 
 events. Granted that I do not know what, precisely, will be 
 the effect of a given event, I may yet know that it had some 
 cause and that it will have some effect. I may know, in 
 other words, that every cause has an effect and that every 
 effect has a cause. This is the same as saying that my ina- 
 bility to know with certainty the precise nature of cause and 
 effect prevents neither the necessary existence of cause or 
 effect, nor my certainty of that necessary relation. 
 
 A second argument which Hume employs to refute the 
 alleged necessity of the causal relation is the following: 
 Every event, he says, is a fact utterly distinct and therefore 
 separable from every other; evidently there is no necessary 
 connection between events thus inherently separable. In his 
 own words : "All distinct ideas are separable from each other, 
 and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 
 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent 
 this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it 
 the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle.'" "The 
 mind," he says elsewhere, "can never possibly find the effect 
 in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny. . . . 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 3, paragraph 3. Cf. Pt. I., § 7, last two 
 paragraphs, for a correction of the doctrine of the separateness of the dis- 
 tinguishable. Cf. also Pt. IV., § 6 (and injra, p. 180), for a further applica- 
 tion of the doctrine. Note that if Hume were consistent with his teaching 
 about the separateness of ideas, his own effort to derive idea from impression 
 and his constant references to the past would be alike illegitimate. 'Here it 
 is,' would be the utmost to be said of any idea. 
 
i6o Pluralistic Pkenomenalistic Idealism 
 
 For the eifect is totally different from the cause, and conse- 
 quently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second 
 billiard ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first ; 
 nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of 
 the other. ... In a word . . . every effect is a distinct 
 event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered 
 in the cause.'" 
 
 This argument is pecuharly important, for, if it holds, it 
 annihilates not merely the causal necessity of inevitable ef- 
 fects, but the temporal necessity as well, the necessity, in other 
 words, of the connection between past and present, present 
 and future. Present is distinct from past or future in the 
 way in which cause is distinct from effect, and if this distinct- 
 ness is incompatible with necessary connection, then there is 
 neither temporal nor causal necessary connection. But in 
 this conclusion Hume is utterly and obviously in the wrong. 
 It is true that one event, the cause, is distinguishable from 
 another, the effect; but to be distinguishable, by attention, 
 is different from being separable. And it is a matter of im- 
 mediate observation that no effect is separable from its cause ; 
 and that to be an event means precisely: to be a temporal 
 reaHty with a past and a future. Granted that one thinks 
 of an event at all, one must think of it as having some ante- 
 cedent and some consequent. One is not certain that this 
 past or this future is of this or that especial nature, but one 
 is quite certain that every event has necessarily some past and 
 some future. Thus, we know the necessity of the temporal 
 relation just as we know the necessity of mathematical rela- 
 tions, because the contrary is inconceivable. In other words, 
 at least the temporal connection, and for all that has so far 
 appeared, the causal relation, really are what Hume calls 
 relations of ideas, and are therefore necessary. Hume, in- 
 deed, tacitly admits the failure of this argument, for he makes 
 
 ' "Inquiry," § IV., Ft. I., paragraphs 9 and 11 (Open Court edition, 
 pp. 27, 28). 
 
The System of Hume i6i 
 
 constant use of the assumption that past and present are 
 connected with each other. He teaches, as has appeared, 
 that the idea is an effect or copy of the antecedent im- 
 pression, and that cause and effect are themselves ' custom- 
 arily conjoined.' Such relations would be impossible if 
 Hume were justified in the teaching that distinguishable 
 perceptions are separable. 
 
 But Hume has still a third argument directed, like the first, 
 against the purely causal principle : No other than the ac- 
 tual effect could possibly have occurred. He argues that even 
 if the present effect were necessarily connected with the past 
 cause, it would not follow that this cause, if repeated, should 
 in turn be followed by the same old effect. For "past expe- 
 rience," he says, "can be allowed to give direct and certain 
 information of those precise objects only, and that precise 
 period of time, which fell under its cognizance ; but why this 
 experience should be extended to future times, and to other 
 objects . . . this is the main question. . . .' It is impossible 
 that any arguments from experience can prove this resem- 
 blance of the past to the future." ^ Of course Hume does 
 not dream of denying the practical probability that recurring 
 causes should be followed by exactly repeated effects. Indeed, 
 he himself searches for a cause of 'the tendency to pass' 
 from cause to effect, after showing that we have no reason for 
 assigning a necessary cause to anything;' and he perfectly 
 realizes that all scientific theories and all practical reasonings 
 
 ' "Inquiry," § IV., Pt. II., paragraph 3, Open Court edition, pp. 32-33. 
 
 ' Ihid., paragraph 8, op. cit., p. 37. 
 
 ' This is often accounted an inconsistency on the part of Hume. In the 
 opinion of the writer Hume may, however, here be supposed to use the term 
 'cause' in the sense which he has himself given to the word. The real in- 
 consistencies in Hume's causality doctrine are (i) his teaching that past, 
 present, and future are independent of each other; and (2) his teaching that 
 volitions are necessary. He reaches the conclusion last stated on the ground 
 of the uniformity observed as well in the actions of men as in nature changes; 
 and in the course of his argument he implies and occasionally asserts the 
 necessary connection of cause with effect. The entire portion of the "Inquiry" 
 (§ 8) in which he sets forth this doctrine is, indeed, distinctly inconsistent in 
 
 M 
 
1 62 Pluralistic Phenomenalistic Idealism 
 
 about conduct are founded on the expectation of the uniform 
 connection of effect with cause. He denies not the practical 
 certainty but the philosophical necessity of the relation. We 
 cannot, he teaches, know absolutely that the event which, in 
 the past, had one effect will, in the future, have a precisely 
 similar effect. For such an assertion is based solely on our 
 experience of the past ; and the past is no positive guarantee 
 of the future. 
 
 By this argument Hume attempts to disprove causal 
 necessity by disproving the absolute uniformity of it. He 
 rightly assumes that if event h inevitably followed on event 
 a, then, supposing that event a should recur, event h would 
 necessarily recur also. He then denies the necessity of this 
 uniformity, that is, the necessity of the recurrence of h, 
 maintaining that if a should recur, it yet might conceivably 
 be followed by an event other than h. He concludes that 
 therefore h did not in the first place necessarily, that is, in- 
 evitably, follow upon a. It is obvious that this is a valid 
 inference from Hume's premises. But upholders of causal 
 necessity (though not all of them believe that events can 
 recur ^) assert, in opposition to Hume, that if event a should 
 recur then event h would inevitably follow. In the opinion 
 of the writer of this book, Hume is — none the less — justi- 
 fied in this teaching that to-day's event, though ' the same 
 as ' yesterday's does not necessarily have an event ' the same 
 as ' yesterday's as its consequent. And this would prove 
 indirectly that some event other than h might originally have 
 followed on a. 
 
 The results of this discussion may be restated in a shghtly 
 different order. If this exposition is accurate and this criti- 
 cism well founded, it has been shown, first, that Hume un- 
 successfully assails the necessity of that connection between 
 past and present, present and future, which is involved in the 
 
 aim with the remainder of his philosophical writings since it implies that 
 necessity belongs to the will of man. 
 
 '■ Cf . H. Rickert, " Per Gegenstand der Erkenntniss." 2*° Aufl., pp. 212 je{. 
 
The System of Hume 163 
 
 very conception of time; second, that Hume offers an un- 
 successful argument against necessary causal connection 
 when he urges that we are unable to predict the exact nature of 
 effects; but, finally, that Hume is right in his teaching: it 
 is impossible to argue from particular experiences to universal 
 laws, and it is, so far as has yet appeared, unjustifiable to as- 
 sert that a recurring cause must uniformly be followed by the 
 same effect. 
 
 2. The reduction of causal power to a "determination of the 
 
 mind' 
 
 The popular conception of causality not only regards it as 
 a necessary connection of cause and effect, but explains neces- 
 sity as the power of the cause over the effect — a force ex- 
 erted upon the effect. Hume dem'es in toto the existence of 
 power in external causes, but he also identifies power with 
 necessity, and attributes power — not at all, as will appear, in 
 the usual sense of the term 'power' but with a widely altered 
 meaning ^ — to the mind. 
 
 (a) The denial of the alleged power in external objects 
 
 If we really were conscious, Hume argues, as we claim to 
 be, of the power of an object over another, we should have 
 an impression of this power; for "all our ideas are nothing 
 but copies of our impressions, or, in other words ... it is 
 impossible for us to think of anything which we have not 
 antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses." ' 
 But "when we look about us towards external objects . . . 
 we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power. 
 . . . We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow 
 the other. The impulse of one billiard ball," for example, 
 
 ' In this sense, 'power' is, for Hume, perfectly synonymous with 'neces- 
 sity.' 
 
 ^ "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. I., paragraphs 4 and 6 (Open Court edition, 
 pp. 63^ 64'). Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 14. 
 
164 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 "is attended with motion in the second." To disprove the 
 validity of our idea of the 'power' of an external cause, Hume 
 therefore simply denies the possibility of directly observing 
 any such power. Select, he says in effect, any instance you 
 please of external 'power,' and a careful analysis of your 
 experience will convince you that you observe — see, have 
 an impression of — only the sequence of the effect on the 
 cause; you may observe the size and shape and direction 
 and color of the 'cause,' but you will never observe any dis- 
 tinct attribute which you may call its power. In this teach- 
 ing Hume is unquestionably right. We observe, not power, 
 but merely the sequence of external events on each other. We 
 suppose ourselves to be directly conscious of the power of one 
 object over another. We say that we ' see ' that acid has the 
 power to discolor cloth, or that a lighted match has the power 
 to ignite gunpowder. But as a matter of fact we do not see 
 the 'power' of the match at all. We see that one event, the 
 hghting of the match, is followed by another, the explosion of 
 the powder, but we do not perceive any quality in the gun- 
 powder — any characteristic beyond its blackness, powdery 
 texture, and the hke^ — which we can call its 'power.' Hume 
 is perfectly justified in this contention that we are not imme- 
 diately conscious of the power of objects; and since the usual 
 ground for asserting the existence of this power consists in the 
 supposition that we see and feel it, Hume so far proves his 
 point.* 
 
 There remains, it is true, the possibiUty that though we do 
 not directly perceive the power of external objects, we none the 
 less are justified in inferring or reasoning that it exists. This 
 difficulty is impUcitly recognized in an argument already intro- 
 
 ' It will be observed that in this exposition of Hume's argument against 
 the occurrence of what he calls the 'impression of power' stress has not fallen 
 on his use of the word 'impression.' He has been interpreted as saying, 
 not that we have no sensational or afifective consciousness of the power of 
 external things, but that we have no direct consciousness whatever of such 
 power; and he has been justified in this opinion. 
 
The System of Hume 165 
 
 duced by Hume in a slightly different connection. We get 
 the notion of causality, he has argued, solely by observing the 
 regular and repeated sequence of events. '"Tis not," he 
 says, "from any one instance, that we arrive at the idea of 
 cause and effect, of a necessary connexion of power. . . . 
 Did we never see any but particular conjunctions of objects, 
 entirely different from each other, we shou'd never be able to 
 form any such ideas. But . . . 'tis certain," he proceeds, 
 "that this repetition of similar objects in similar situations 
 ■produces nothing new either in these objects, or in any ex- 
 ternal body. For 'twill readily be allowed, that the several 
 instances we have of the conjunction of resembling causes and 
 effects are in themselves entirely independent." ^ Hume's 
 reasoning may then be recapitulated as follows : we cannot 
 infer that power exists in an external cause, for (i) a cause is 
 merely a repeated event ; and (2 ) an event on its first occurrence 
 has no power, for it has been shown that no power is directly 
 observable in it ; and (3) the mere repetition of an event adds 
 nothing to its qualities. In the opinion of the writer this 
 denial that causality is a relation independent of the mind 
 is the most important and the most irrefragable of Hume's 
 negative conclusions. Some of the premises by which he 
 reaches it are, it is true, of questionable cogency — in par- 
 ticular, it might still seem possible, if one questioned Hume's 
 doctrine of impressions, that an external event might possess 
 a power not directly observed. But Hume might have made 
 his point by insisting simply that the causal relation is an object 
 of consciousness, and that it cannot, as such, belong to an 
 alleged world of reality existing independently of conscious- 
 ness.^ Whatever the force of his arguments, Hume does not 
 waver in his declaration that "necessity is something that 
 exists in the mind, not in objects. . • . Either," he adds, 
 
 ' "Treatise," Pt. I., Bk. III., § 14, paragraphs 15, 18, Green and Grose 
 edition, I., pp. 457', 458'. All references are to Vol. I, unless otherwise 
 described. 
 
 ' Cf. supra, Chapter 5, on Berkeley, pp. 130 seq. and infra, Chapter 7, on 
 Kant, pp. 212 seq. 
 
1 66 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 "we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but [a] 
 determination of the thought." ' To the consideration of this 
 positive conception of causaHty as a 'determination of the 
 thought,' we must now turn. 
 
 (J) The conception o] power as a 'determination of the 
 
 mind' 
 
 Granting that there is no discoverable 'power' in an 
 external object, it may be that, as Leibniz and Berkeley 
 teach, we do know a power of the mind. This is, in some 
 sense, Hume's view, for he distinctly says : "Tho' the several 
 resembling instances which give rise to the idea of power . . . 
 can never produce any new quality in the object which can be 
 the model of that idea, yet the observation of this resemblance 
 produces a new impression in the mind. . . . For after we 
 have observ'd the resemblance in a sufficient number of 
 instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind 
 to pass from one object to its usual attendant. . . . This 
 determination is the only effect of the resemblance; and 
 therefore must be the same with power or efficacy. . . ." ^ 
 
 Hume's conception of this 'power,' which he attributes to 
 mind, differs utterly, as must next be observed, fromthe tradi- 
 tional view of 'power.' For Hume denies both the alleged 
 power of mind over body and the alleged power of the mind 
 to create ideas. These negative teachings must be separately 
 considered. 
 
 (i) The common belief that mind exerts a power over body 
 is based, Hume declares, on an inaccurate account of our 
 introspection. It is " said that we are every moment conscious 
 of internal power ; while we feel that by the simple command 
 of our will we can move the organs of our body.'" But 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 14, paragraph 22, Green and Grose edi- 
 tion, I., p. 460'. 
 
 ' "Treatise," ibid., paragraph 20, Green and Grose edition, p. 459'. 
 
 ' "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. I., paragraph g. Open Court edition, p. 65' seq. 
 Cf. "Treatise," ibid., paragraph 12, Green and Grose edition, p. 455'. 
 
The System of Hume 167 
 
 Hume answers that we are directly conscious simply of the 
 sequence of bodily motion on conscious volition : " The mo- 
 tion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of 
 this we are every moment conscious." But of any power or 
 energy in the volition, he adds, "we are far from being im- 
 mediately conscious." He supports this counter appeal to 
 experience by a more questionable argument. If we were 
 conscious, he urges, of the mind's power over body, we ought 
 to be able to explain it ; and, as a matter of fact, we cannot 
 explain it: there is, indeed, "no principle in nature more 
 mysterious than the union of soul with body."' This argu- 
 ment is inconclusive, for the inability to explain 'how' 
 mental power acts cannot be accepted as a disproof of the 
 mere fact 'that' it does act. But the ineffectiveness of the 
 argument does not, in the view of the writer of this book, 
 prejudice Hume's conclusion. For observation here sus- 
 tains Hume's initial assertion that I simply am not conscious 
 of a 'power' in my mind which affects my body. In other 
 words, Hume is right when he teaches that, in my conscious- 
 ness of willing a bodily movement, I do not immediately know 
 the mind as exerting power over the body. I am directly 
 'conscious of a sequence of bodily change upon volition and 
 of a determination of my mind to pass from one to the other ; 
 but I am not directly conscious of my mind as influencing 
 the object.^ 
 
 (2) From the consideration of the alleged power of mind over 
 body, Hume turns to a study of the problem of the power of 
 
 ' In more detail, Hume urges that the power of volition over movement is 
 distinctly circumscribed and that we do not know why the will "has . . . an 
 influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart and liver." Nor, 
 finally, have we even an apparently direct consciousness of a connection be- 
 tween the will and 'the immediate object of its power,' the nervous system 
 ('certain . . . nerves and animal spirits,' to use Hume's expression). 
 
 ' This agreement does not carry with it acquiescence with Hume's posi- 
 tive conception of the will. (Cf. supra, p. i6i, note.) It should be ob- 
 served that Hume's argument leaves open to those who do not accept his 
 impression test of knowledge the possibility of inferring, without directly 
 experiencing, a power of mind over body. 
 
1 68 Pluralistic Phenomenalistic Idealism 
 
 mind over ideas. This had been ordinarily conceived, as by 
 Berkeley, as the mind's power to create ideas. Again, Hume 
 denies the existence of any such power. We are not conscious, 
 he insists, of creating ideas; "we only feel the event, namely, 
 the existence of an idea consequent to a command of the will.' 
 . . . Volition," he adds, "is surely an act of the mind, with 
 which we are sufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it. Con- 
 sider it on all sides. Do you find anything in it," he de- 
 mands, "like this creative power, by which it raises from noth- 
 ing a new idea . . . with a kind of Fiat . . . ?" ^ In this 
 appeal to experience hes the strength of Hume's position. 
 He has other inconclusive arguments from the limitation of 
 the power of mind over ideas, and from our inabihty to explain 
 this power ; but in this challenge to be conscious, if we can, 
 of ourselves as 'creators' of ideas, he certainly scores a point 
 against Berkeley,' since we are rather the recipients and 
 possessors than the creators of our ideas — even the most 
 novel of them. 
 
 In spite of Hume's behef that in our use of the expressions 
 'power' and 'force,' as ordinarily appUed, "we have really 
 no distinct meaning and make use only of common words 
 without any clear and determinate ideas," he none the less 
 insists, as has been shown, that we have an 'impression' of 
 mental 'power.' To make clear this conception of Hume 
 and to estimate it is the main concern of this section. It will 
 be recalled that Hume's argument for the existence of mental 
 power or necessity is, briefly, the following:* Repeated 
 instances of a given cause followed by its effect do produce 
 the 'impression of power'; but the repetition can neither 
 discover nor produce anything new in an external object; 
 
 ' "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. I., ninth paragraph from end. Open Court edi- 
 tion, p. 70'. 
 
 ' Ihid., p. 71', sixth paragraph from end. 
 
 ' Cf. p. 143, above. 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 14, paragraphs T4 seq., pp. 4S7'-46o*. 
 The treatment of this subject in the "Treatise" is fuller and more adequate 
 than that of the "Inquiry." 
 
The System of Hume 169 
 
 therefore the power of which we have the impression must 
 be mental. This reasoning is confirmed by the fact that we 
 "immediately feel a determination of the mind . . . to carry 
 our thoughts from one object to another." ' 
 
 In this 'determination of the mind,' Hume teaches, 'power' 
 consists. It is evidently then of importance to know exactly 
 what he means by the term 'determination.' We are tempted 
 to think that he uses it as we might use the words ' will' and 
 'decision.' If this were true, Hume would be rightly inter- 
 preted as upholding what in the view of the writer is the 
 correct doctrine of will. He would be saying, in effect: 
 Though we caimot know that the mind affects bodily move- 
 ments or that it 'creates' ideas, yet we do know that it is 
 capable of an active and dominating attitude toward external 
 things and toward its own ideas. ^ But such an interpreta- 
 tion is, for several reasons, impossible. In the first place, 
 Hume is here discussing power as it is manifested in the 
 consciousness of all forms of causal relation, so-called external 
 as well as internal causality, and he could never mean that my 
 will affirms, for example, the sequence of sound on vibration. 
 In the second place, the synonyms used by Hume for the 
 expression ' determination of the mind ' show conclusively that 
 he does not refer to the will, however conceived. For in 
 place of the expression 'determination of the mind' he 
 repeatedly uses the terms ' transition of the imagination ' ^ 
 and 'inference.' ^ Thus, in teaching that causality involves 
 mental power and that this power is a 'determination' or 
 ' transition ' of the mind, Hume means simply the following : 
 We are unquestionably conscious of what we call cause and 
 effect, for example, of the motion of a ball as cause of the 
 
 ' "Treatise," ihii., paragraph 19, p. 459' el al. 
 
 ^ Cf. the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 307 seq. 
 
 ^ "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. II., paragraph 3 and last paragraph; "Treatise," 
 ihid., paragraph 6 from end, op. cit., p. 464. 
 
 * "Inquiry," ibid., paragraph 3; "Treatise," ihid., paragraph 7 from 
 end, op. cit., p. 463^. 
 
170 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 motion in another ball. This consciousness first of moving 
 ball a and then of moving ball & is a transition of the mind, 
 and my consciousness of my mind as moving from one to the 
 other is an impression of power. This is the sum and sub- 
 stance of the mental 'power' involved in causality, as it is 
 expressly defined by Hume. It is evident that such a defini- 
 tion of power does not conform to the ordinary usage of the 
 term. But it is equally evident that a mental transition, 
 under whatever name, is involved in tracing cause and effect. 
 This is the important truth of Hume's teaching, later strongly 
 emphasized and amphfied by Kant. The significant defect 
 of the teaching is its failure to distinguish the mental transition 
 in the causal relation from that which is involved in every 
 relation." There may be, for example, as much mental transi- 
 tion in realizing that the uprising in Russia is like the French 
 Revolution as in recognizing that a bell stroke is the cause of 
 a sound. It follows that though Hume's teaching, that 
 mental transition is involved in causality, is correct, it is also 
 inadequate, for it does not suffice to distinguish causality 
 from other relations. 
 
 A brief restatement of Hume's doctrine of causality with 
 the more important of our comments on it will conclude this 
 section. Hume teaches negatively that causahty does not 
 involve the necessary connection of past with present and of 
 present with future; that causality does not involve the 
 uniform relation of cause and efifect; and that causality is 
 not an external relation — that is, a relation existing inde- 
 pendently of consciousness. The first of these assertions 
 Hume cannot make good; the second and third, in the 
 opinion of the writer, are sound doctrine, though Hume's 
 argument is at certain points defective. Positively, Hume 
 teaches that causality is a customary conjunction of 
 events, namely, the mental habit of inferring one event 
 from another. This positive teaching is significant and is 
 
 ^ Cf. Hume's discussion of personal identity, injra, pp. 187' seq. 
 
The System of Hume 171 
 
 true as far as it goes, but it is inadequate in that Hume fails 
 to distinguish causal inference from other forms of mental 
 transition. The doctrine is well summarized in the following 
 passage: "We say that the vibration of this string is the 
 cause of this particular sound. But what do we mean by that 
 affirmation? We . . . mean, that this vibration is followed 
 by this sound, and that all similar vibrations have been followed 
 by similar sounds : [that is, ] that this vibration is followed 
 by this sound, and that upon the appearance of the one, the 
 mind . . . forms immediately an idea of the other." ' 
 
 II. Hume's Doctrine of External Objects, Indepen- 
 dent OF THE Mind 
 
 a. The teaching that external objects cannot be known by 
 
 the senses 
 
 This discussion of Hume's basal theories, the impression 
 test of knowledge and the conception of causality as a mental 
 connection of experienced facts, is an essential prerequisite 
 to the study of his theory of reality. For by these standards 
 Hume measures all metaphysical conceptions. He admits 
 the existence of those realities, and of those only, which meet 
 his impression test of knowledge and which do not seem to 
 him to invalidate his conception of causaHty. Through 
 these tests, then, he proceeds to gauge the reality of bodies, or 
 external objects, and of souls, or selves. With the first of 
 these topics this section is concerned. 
 
 By 'body' Hume understands what we have expressed by 
 the awkward term ' non-ideal reality ' ; a reality which is, in the 
 first place, 'independent' of our perceptions, and, in the 
 second place, 'entirely different from them.' ^ To describe 
 
 ' "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. II., second paragraph from end, Open Court 
 edition, p. 80'. The meaning has been slightly changed, to correspond, 
 however, with Hume's own teaching, by replacing Hume's 'either . . or' 
 with the bracketed words, 'that is.' 
 
 ' Ibid., § XII., paragraphs 9 and 11, Open Court edition, pp. 161', 162'. 
 
172 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 this non-ideal reality, Hume uses the expressions, 'matter,' 
 'body' or 'bodies,' 'external objects,' and 'objects." The 
 character of these objects on which Hume lays most stress 
 is their independence of our perceptions. "An external 
 universe," he says, "depends not on our perceptions, but 
 would exist though we and every sensible creature were 
 absent or annihilated."^ 
 
 Hume's arguments to disprove the existence of such an ex- 
 ternal universe closely resemble, as he does not fail to indi- 
 cate, those of Berkeley.^ He argues, first, that external objects 
 cannot be known by the 'senses' — that they are not, in 
 Berkeley's term, perceived directly. In favor of this conclu- 
 sion, he urges, first, that our senses are known and admitted 
 to be fallacious. Of this 'imperfection and fallaciousness of 
 our organs ' we have, he says, numberless instances : ' the 
 crooked appearance of an oar in water ; the various aspects 
 of objects according to their different distances; the double 
 images which arise from the pressing one eye.' ^ This fact, 
 that some of the objects which seem to us external are mere 
 illusions, makes it impossible to trust to our direct sense- 
 consciousness of externality. Nor may we (after Descartes's 
 fashion) "have recourse to the veracity' of the supreme 
 Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses."^ This, 
 Hume rightly observes, "is making a very unexpected cir- 
 cuit. If his veracity," he continues, "were at all concerned 
 in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible; be- 
 cause it is not possible that he can ever deceive." In other 
 
 ' Cf. especially "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § i!, and "Inquiry," § XII., 
 Pt. I. The terms are enumerated in the order of the frequency with which 
 Hume uses them, beginning with that which Hume least often employs. 
 
 ' "Inquiry," § XII., Pt. I., paragraph 7, Open Court edition, p. 160'. 
 Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, paragraphs 3, 10, and passim. 
 
 ' "Inquiry," ibid., second paragraph from end, Open Court edition, 
 p. 164, note. 
 
 * Ibid., paragraph 6. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, thirteenth 
 paragraph from end. Green and Grose edition, I., p. 498'. 
 
 ' "Inquiry," ibid., paragraph 13, Open Court edition, p. 163'. 
 
The System of Hume 173 
 
 words, Descartes's argument proves too much. Our senses 
 certainly do sometimes ' deceive ' us, and it follows either that 
 the veracity of the supreme Being is no guarantee against such 
 deception, or else that there is no veracious, supreme Being. 
 
 Besides arguing from the experienced fallaciousness of 
 our senses that we have no sense knowledge of objects 
 independent of mind, Hume reaches the same conclusion by 
 considering the nature of the alleged 'external' object of the 
 senses. Such an object, he observes, is beheved to be made 
 up of primary and of secondary quaUties. But, as he points 
 out, "it is universally allowed by modem enquirers, that all 
 the sensible qualities of objects such as hard, soft, hot, cold, 
 white, black, etc., are merely secondary, and exist not in the 
 objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without 
 any external . . . model, which they represent. If this be 
 allowed, with regard to secondary quaUties, it must also fol- 
 low, with regard to the supposed primary quaUties of exten- 
 sion and solidity." ' 
 
 Finally, Hume, like Berkeley, appeals to our introspection 
 to assure us that we really are not directly conscious of things 
 outside us, but that our immediately certain consciousness is 
 of our own experience. "Nothing," he says,^ "can ever 
 be present to the mind but an image or perception . . . ; 
 and no man, who reflects, ever doubted that the existences, 
 which we consider, when we say this house and that tree are 
 nothing but perceptions — in the mind ..." 
 
 h. The teaching that objects external to the mind cannot be 
 known by reason 
 
 In addition to the everyday conviction that objects external 
 to the mind are known to sense or directly perceived, Hume 
 
 • "Inquiry," ibid., second paragraph from end. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., 
 Pt. IV., § 2, paragraphs 12 seq., Green and Grose edition, p. 482*. 
 
 ' "Inquiry," loc. cit., paragraph 9. Cf. "Treatise," loc. cit., paragraph 21, 
 p. 487', et al. 
 
174 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 recognizes the 'philosophical hypothesis* that we must infei 
 the existence of objects distinct from our directly known 
 perceptions.^ The doctrine is familiar to us through Berkeley's 
 arguments against it. Admitting that the colored, extended 
 things which we directly know are merely our own percepts 
 or thoughts, it teaches that there none the less exist real 
 things, very probably unhke these percepts, and in any case 
 independent of them and distinct from them; and that we 
 know the existence of these things by reason or inference. 
 Hume argues, as Berkeley has argued, that we have no right 
 to make this inference, no basis for the conclusion that these 
 'external' objects exist. His argument is worthy of atten- 
 tion. Those philosophers, he points out, who teach that 
 external objects, reahties independent of consciousness, must 
 be inferred to exist, base this inference on the fact that our 
 impressions (or perceptions of things) require a cause; and 
 argue that 'real, distinct existences' must cause these sense 
 impressions. But Hume beheves that he has shown that 
 causality is not a power inherent in an external object, that it 
 is, on the contrary, an experienced connection between suc- 
 cessive facts, — a connection known by the mind. Now if 
 causality be mental, the facts connected by causahty must be 
 mental facts; in other words, the causal relation, being 
 through and through mental, cannot extend beyond the mind. 
 This argument is clearly implied in the following paragraph : 
 " The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one 
 thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause 
 and effect, which shows that there is a connection betwixt 
 them, and that the existence of one is dependent on that of 
 the other. . . . But as no beings are ever present to the 
 mind but perceptions ; it follows that we may observe a con- 
 junction or a relation of cause and effect between different 
 perceptions, but can never observe it between perceptions 
 and objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the 
 
 ' " Treatise," loc. cit., twelfth paragraph from end, p. 498*. 
 
The System of Hume 175 
 
 existence ... of the former, we can ever form any conclu- 
 sion concerning the existence of the latter. . . ."* 
 
 There is no escape from this argument, if Hume's concep- 
 tion of causaUty as a mental relation be admitted. If causality 
 is a purely mental connection, it surely cannot be a bridge 
 between the mental and the non-mental. The only reason to 
 question Hume's use of the argument is the doubt of his 
 having proved satisfactorily this purely mental nature of 
 causaUty. (The position taken in this chapter is that he might 
 fully have proved the point, but has actually left certain parts 
 of his argument unguarded.) 
 
 It must be noticed, however, that Hume impHes, in the pas- 
 sage quoted, a more fundamental argument against the exist- 
 ence of material reahty, as inferred to exist — an argument 
 which does not depend on the validity of his conception of 
 causaUty. Objects inferred to exist are, he says, none the 
 less objects of consciousness, objects 'present to the mind.' 
 But nothing which is present to the mind can possess an 
 existence independent of mind. It is then a contradic- 
 tion in terms to teach that the mind must infer (what- 
 ever be the principle of inference) the existence of external 
 objects ; for it is the nature of such objects to be independent 
 of consciousness. By the use of this reasoning, Hume 
 advances a far stronger argument than Berkeley's in opposi- 
 tion to the doctrine that matter (reaUty independent of mind) 
 must be inferred as cause of perceptions. Berkeley has 
 urged, in objection to this view, that matter is by common 
 consent ' passive or inert ' so that it may not be conceived as 
 cause of anything, still less as cause of active spirit. This 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, eleventh paragraph from end, p. 499. 
 Cf. "Inquiry," ibid., paragraph 12, Open Court edition, p. 162'. The 
 "Treatise" alone discusses this subject in detail, in the section from which 
 quotation is made. The section is long and involved: it discusses both the 
 continuity and the independence of alleged objects external to the mind ; and 
 it introduces many irrelevant, though often significant, considerations. In 
 "Inquiry," loc. cit., paragraph 11 and last paragraph, two subordinate argu- 
 ments against the inferred-matter-conception are suggested. 
 
176 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 objection, it was pointed out/ is ineffective against the dynamic 
 conception of matter as energy or force. Hume's argument 
 does not encounter this difficulty, for he argues against the 
 inferred existence of material reality not on the disputed 
 ground of the passivity of matter but on the ground of its 
 basal character, namely, its existence independent of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 Hume's position, therefore, is one of great strength ; it is, 
 indeed, in the opinion of the writer unassailable. Descartes 
 and the other duahsts had taught that matter, namely, reality 
 independent of consciousness, must exist as cause of our per- 
 ceptions. In reply to this Hume asserts, first, that causaKty 
 is a relation within consciousness and consequently cannot 
 assure us of the reahty of anything outside consciousness; 
 and second, that, whatever the basis of the inference, inferred 
 objects must be known objects, objects present to the mind, 
 and cannot therefore be 'possessed of independent existence.' 
 Hume has thus followed Berkeley in despoihng the universe 
 of material reaUty, reahty independent of mind. He teaches 
 that we neither perceive nor justly infer the existence of 
 ' external objects.' In their place we have simply perceptions 
 which are 'present to the mind.' 
 
 c. The inconsistent assumption that ^external objects' 
 exist 
 
 It is not possible to turn from the contemplation of Hume's 
 disproof of the existence of material reality, without taking 
 account of the extraordinary inconsistency with which he 
 none the less implies in every part of his works the existence of 
 these objects independent of mind. This discovery of in- 
 consistencies in Hume's teaching is not surprising. Already 
 it has been shown that he is untrue to his impression test of 
 knowledge, since he admits the occurrence of relations,^ and 
 
 • Cf. supra, p. 129. ' Cf. supra, pp. 154, 169. 
 
The System of Hume 177 
 
 that, while denying necessity in the scientific experience, he 
 affirms it in the case of so-called voluntary actions.' No- 
 where, however, is Hume's inconsistency more marked in 
 itself and more insidious in its consequences than at just 
 this point. There can be, as has appeared, no remotest doubt 
 that he denies the possibiUty of either perceiving or inferring 
 the existence of objects other than perceptions. Yet the dis- 
 covery of this idealistic doctrine comes as a revelation to one 
 who reads Hume for the first time. For throughout "Trea- 
 tise" and "Inquiry" ahke, Hume has persistently implied 
 the 'real' and 'independent' existence of objects. 
 
 These implications are especially frequent in the exposition 
 of his two basal doctrines : the impression test of knowledge 
 and the theory of causality. For example, he opposes causal- 
 ity to the mathematical relations on the ground that causahty 
 has to do with matters of fact or objects, whereas the mathe- 
 matical principles are 'relations of ideas.' ^ But the dis- 
 tinction evidently has no force if, as Hume believes, the ob- 
 jects are themselves perceptions present to the mind. Again 
 he teaches, as will be remembered, that impressions are dis- 
 tinguished from the corresponding ideas mainly on the 
 ground that these impressions are occasioned by the stimula- 
 tion of the sense organs through external objects.' The dis- 
 tinction certainly loses its intended significance if sense organs 
 and external objects ahke are themselves perceptions of the 
 mind. I say, for example, that my impression of red differs 
 from my idea of red, because a red object stimulated my retina 
 when I received the impression, and was absent when I had 
 the idea. The implication is this: because a real object 
 occasioned the impression, therefore the impression differs 
 from the idea and indeed becomes a criterion of reahty. But 
 if, as Hume teaches, the real red object is itself a perception, 
 it cannot endow the impression with any reality superior to 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 161, note. 
 
 ' "Inquiry," Pt. IV., § i. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § i. 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 152.' 
 
 N 
 
3 
 
 178 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 that of the idea.^ Hume, none the less, wins the assent of 
 many readers to the impression test of knowledge, because 
 his language lends itself to the everyday theory that im- 
 pressions have a superior certainty due to their dependence on 
 supposedly 'real' material objects — sense organs and the 
 physical things which stimulate them. 
 
 In many other passages, more or less significant in relation 
 to his argument, Hume implies or asserts that independent 
 existence of matter which he ends by discrediting. "It is 
 universally allowed," he says (when teaching that voluntary 
 actions are necessary),^ "that matter, in all its operations, is 
 actuated by a necessary force." This sentence is surely mis- 
 leading as used by a writer who a little later argues that the 
 "opinion of external existence . . . [is] contrary to reason." 
 Contradictory statements or impUcations of this sort are found 
 cheek by jowl within a single paragraph or even sentence. 
 The paragraph,* for example, quoted above, in which Hume 
 asserts that "nothing can ever be present to the mind but an 
 image or perception," defines perceptions as "copies or repre- 
 sentations of other existences, which remain uniform and in- 
 dependent." But precisely this independent existence is 
 what Hume later insists that we neither perceive nor rightly 
 infer.' Of course, these inconsistencies in no wise invahdate 
 the force of Hume's argument, if that is cogent, against the 
 existence of realities independent of the mind ; but they rightly 
 shake the reader's confidence in Hume's good faith and lay 
 Hume open to the suspicion of trying to gain, by implication, 
 the benefit of everyday convictions which, by right of logic, 
 would oppose his doctrines. 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 173'; and cf. Green's Introduction to the Green and Grose 
 edition of the "Treatise," Vol. I., paragraphs 195-201, 303 seq. 
 
 ' "Inquiry," § VIII., Pt. I., paragraph 4, p. 84^ 
 
 » Ihid., § XII., Pt. I., p. 165'. 
 
 • IhH., paragraph 9, p. 161'. The definition of the "senses' in this 
 paragraph is similarly inconsistent. 
 
 » Cf. ihid., p. 164; and "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § ■^, quoted on 
 p. 174. 
 
The System of Hume 179 
 
 III. Hume's Doctrine of Self 
 
 Hume's metaphysical doctrine is, up to this point, a mere 
 reassertion of Berkeley's immaterialism, an ideahstic concep- 
 tion of the universe. To Leibniz and to Berkeley, and in- 
 deed to all idealists before Hume, this means simply that the 
 universe is a society of interrelated spirits, or persons. Hume's 
 originality consists in his teaching that the universe, though 
 immaterial, is yet not spiritual, that it is made up of mental 
 facts or ideas — 'perceptions,' as Hume calls them — with 
 no spirits or selves to which the perceptions belong. A cer- 
 tain complex, or group, or series, of these ideas may, indeed, 
 on this principle be called a mind or self; but this self has 
 no identity or permanence or character of its own: it is a 
 mere heap of distinct ideas, each of which exists for itself. 
 Hume's reasons for denying the existence of selves, as dis- 
 tinct from these mere bundles of perceptions, are somewhat 
 arbitrarily divided into arguments against the existence of any 
 'spiritual substance' and arguments against the existence of 
 any self. The division may be disregarded, for spiritual 
 substance really means nothing if not ' self.' ' 
 
 a. Hume's arguments against the existence 0] a self 
 
 By self is meant, Hume rightly supposes, that which is con- 
 scious, which is fundamental to its ideas (its perceptions, as 
 Hume calls them), which is relatively permanent, or better, 
 identical, in the flux of ideas. Hume argues against the exist- 
 ence of a self, so conceived, first on the ground that ideas 
 (perceptions) exist independently and that there is, thus, no 
 need of a self in which the ideas may inhere ; second, on the 
 ground that I am not conscious of myself, whereas if there 
 
 ' The terms have been differently used, but never plausibly or justifiably. 
 Cf. Locke's distinction of spiritual substance, or soul, from person, or self. 
 (" Essay," Bk. II., Chapter 27.) 
 
i8o Pluralistic Phenomenalistic Idealism 
 
 were an I, I must be conscious of it. These considerations 
 must be discussed in order. 
 
 The most important argument, Hume believes, brought 
 forward to prove the existence of a self, is the following: 
 since ideas exist, there exists also a somewhat more per- 
 manent than they in which they inhere or to which they be- 
 long. Now Hume denies this premise. Our perceptions, 
 he says, have no need of anything in which to inhere, because 
 each is independent, each exists for itself, inheres in itself as 
 it were, in fact, fulfils for itself the alleged requirement of a 
 substance. "... All our perceptions," he says, "are 
 different from each other, and from everything else in the 
 universe; they are also distinct and separable, and may be 
 consider'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, 
 and have no need of anything else to support their existence.'" 
 
 But this argument, if it is vahd, proves only this : that from 
 the existence of ideas it is not necessary to infer the existence 
 of any seK. In other words, it proves at most that a self does 
 not necessarily exist, and is far from proving that a self does 
 not exist. Hume's second argument is farther reaching. If, 
 he teaches, there is an I fundamental to my perceptions, then 
 it is self-conscious. In other words, I must be conscious of 
 myself if such a self exist. But, he proceeds, I am not con- 
 scious of myself, therefore no self exists. In two ways Hume 
 seeks to make good the assertion that I am not conscious of 
 myself, (i) He reiterates, in the first place, the statement 
 that one never has an impression of a self. In Part I of the 
 "Treatise" this teaching occurs in its most general form, the 
 assertion that one never has an impression of substance. "I 
 would fain ask . . . philosophers," he says, "... whether 
 the idea of substance be deriv'd from the impressions of sensa- 
 tion or of reflection ? If it be convey'd to us by our senses, I 
 ask, which of them; and after what maimer? If it be per- 
 ceiv'd by the eyes, it must be a color ; if by the ears, a sound ; 
 
 » "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § S, paragraph 5. Cf. § 6, paragraph 3. 
 
The System of Hume i8i 
 
 if by the palate, a taste : and so of the other senses. But I 
 beUeve none will assert, that substance is either a color, or 
 sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must therefore be 
 deriv'd from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But 
 the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our pas- 
 sions and emotions ; none of which can possibly represent a 
 substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct 
 from that of a collection of particular quahties." ^ In Part 
 IV. of the "Treatise," Hume urges the same argument with 
 reference no longer to the existence of ' substance ' in general, 
 but to that of the spiritual substance, or self.^ It is impos- 
 sible, he holds, that a self should exist; for there never 
 can occur an impression of a self, because impressions 
 are, one and all, fleeting and evanescent, perishing with 
 the instant which gives them birth, whereas a self is sup- 
 posed to be identical through succeeding moments. "It 
 must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real 
 idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that 
 to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to 
 have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of 
 self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' 
 the whole course of our Kves ; since self is suppos'd to exist 
 after that manner. But there is no impression constant and 
 invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and 
 sensations, succeed each other, and never all exist at the same 
 time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, 
 or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd ; and con- 
 sequently there is no such idea." ' 
 
 The argument just outhned presupposes the vaUdity of 
 Hume's impression test of knowledge and would fall far short 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. I., § 6. It should be noted that this argument 
 is directed against the existence of substance in general. If it were valid at 
 all, it would therefore tell against the existence of material substance, as well 
 as against that of spirit. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 6. 
 
 » Ihid., paragraph 2. 
 
1 82 Pluralistic P henonienalistic Idealism 
 
 of convincing any one who denied this doctrine of impressions. 
 For the benefit of such a reader, Hume reenforces his position 
 by a direct appeal to introspection. He begins by a clear 
 and forcible statement of his opponents' teaching. "There 
 are," he says, " some philosophers who imagine we are every 
 moment intimately conscious of what we call our self ; that 
 we feel its existence and its continuance in existence. . . . 
 The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, 
 instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more 
 intensely, and make us consider their influence on sel]. . . . 
 To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence ; 
 since no proof can be deriv'd from any fact, of which we are 
 so intimately conscious; nor is there anything of which we 
 can be certain, if we doubt of this." ' This assertion of our 
 consciousness of self Hume flatly denies. "Unluckily," he 
 continues, "all these positive assertions are contrary to that 
 very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any 
 idea of self, after the manner it is here explain'd." In 
 supposed self-consciousness, on the contrary, one is really 
 only conscious of a particular collection of impressions 
 and ideas. "For my part," he asserts,^ "when I enter most 
 intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
 particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
 love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at 
 any time without a perception. . . . When my perceptions 
 are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep ; so long am I 
 insensible of myself and may be truly said not to exist. And 
 were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither 
 think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution 
 of my body, I should be entirely annihilated. ... If any 
 one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection, thinks he has a 
 different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no 
 longer with him. . . . We are essentially different in this 
 particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV-, § 6, paragraph i. ' Ibid., paragraph 3. 
 
The System of Hume 183 
 
 and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain 
 there is no such principle in me." Hume concludes, accord- 
 ingly, that "setting aside some metaphysicians of this 
 kind," he may venture "to affirm of the rest of mankind, 
 that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
 perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
 rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." ' " What 
 we call a mind," he says in another passage, "is nothing but a 
 heap or collection of different perceptions, united together 
 by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be en- 
 dow'd with a perfect simpHcity and identity." ^ 
 
 It is necessary now to estimate with utmost care each of 
 these arguments against the existence of a self. According 
 to the first of them, a self need not be inferred as substratum 
 of ideas, since an idea is self-sufficient, independent, separate 
 from all other reaUty. But this assertion of the self-depend- 
 ence, the isolation, of ideas flatly contradicts the teaching 
 of psychology. It is a commonplace of psychologists, from 
 Plato to St. Augustine, and from Hobbes to Wundt, that 
 ideas are associated and interrelated. There is little need to 
 argue this point, for Hume himself makes the admission, 
 damaging as it is to his system. In the significant Appendix 
 which he added to Volume III. of the original edition of the 
 "Treatise," there occur these memorable paragraphs: — 
 
 "... AH perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, 
 distinguishable, and separable . . . and may exist sepa- 
 rately. . . . 
 
 4: :): 4= * 4= H: 4: 
 
 "But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, 
 when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which 
 binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real 
 simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is 
 very defective. ... 
 
 "In short there are two principles, which I carmot render 
 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 6, paragraph 4. 
 
 ' Ibid., § 2, paragraph 39, Green and Grose edition, p. 495'. 
 
184 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 consistent ; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, 
 viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, 
 and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among 
 distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in 
 something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive 
 some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no diflS- 
 culty in the case." 
 
 It is evident from these paragraphs that Hume himself 
 admits a 'principle of connexion' binding perceptions to- 
 gether; and he certainly, therefore, is not entitled to argue, 
 from the independence of perceptions, that we must not infer 
 a self to exist. 
 
 But the more significant of Hume's arguments remains for 
 consideration. The presupposition of this second argument 
 is unassailable. Certainly, as Hume throughout assumes, 
 if a self exists, then I am conscious of it, for self means 
 self-conscious being. But now, according to Hume, I am 
 as a fact not conscious of a self; therefore no self exists. 
 Hume's denial of self -consciousness is,thus, the significant part 
 of his argument. As has appeared, he makes the denial on two 
 grounds: (i) He urges that I have no impression of myself 
 and that without impression there is no knowledge. Against 
 this argument it may be claimed, in the first place, that Hume 
 is not justified in denying impressions of myself. To be sure, 
 I have no sense impressions of myself, — in other words, I do 
 not see or feel or hear myself, — yet I may be said to have an 
 emotional consciousness of myself ; and emotions, it will be 
 remembered, are included in Hume's class of 'impressions of 
 reflection.' To this an advocate of Hume might answer: 
 Hume's special point is that a 'self' is supposed to have 
 permanence, and that there can be no impression of perma- 
 nence. But precisely this last assertion is incorrect; Hume 
 could not make it save for the inadequacy, already pointed 
 out, in his impression theory of consciousness. Either we 
 are not even conscious of permanence at all, do not know what 
 is meant by the word (but not even Hume asserts this); or 
 
The System of Hume 185 
 
 we have an idea of it without having an impression of it (which 
 is quite contrary to Hume's teaching); or we do have an 
 impression of it. Whichever statement of the case be true, 
 Hume is clearly wrong when he teaches that to know one 
 must have an impression ; that to know the self one must know 
 it as permanent ; that one has no impression of permanence ; 
 and, therefore, finally, that one does not know any self. 
 
 We have so far discredited Hume's attempt to prove from 
 the independence of perceptions that it is needless to infer 
 a self as the substratum in which they inhere. We have 
 seen, furthermore, the weakness of Hume's first reason for 
 denying the direct consciousness of self. There remains 
 his denial of self-consciousness through the mere appeal to 
 introspection. And with this we have reached the crucial 
 point of the discussion. The failure of the preceding reason- 
 ing is unimportant if now Hume can convince me that I am, 
 after all, not directly conscious of a seK — that I am, in 
 fact, conscious only of perceptions, impressions and ideas. 
 Descartes had reasoned : I exist, for to doubt or to deny my 
 existence requires a doubting or denying I. Hume answers : 
 Doubt or denial requires not an I, but an idea, not a doubter, 
 but a doubt ; and, as a matter of experience, I am conscious 
 not of the self or doubter but of the idea, the doubt. ^ 
 
 The first comment to be made upon this teaching is this, 
 that it does not follow from the premise. As has appeared, 
 Hume reaches the conclusion from the observation that he is 
 never conscious of himself except as perceiving. But I may 
 
 1 The best of the contemporary arguments, known to the writer, against 
 the existence of the self are those of G. S. Fullerton ("A System of Meta- 
 physics," Chap. V.) and of C. A. Strong ("Why the Mind has a Body," 
 Chap. IX. Cf. W. K. Clifford's "On the Nature of Things in Themselves," 
 in "Essays," Vol. II., 80 ff.). The essential feature of these arguments is 
 the assumption that the self is an illicitly inferred occult being, separate from 
 experience. The critics of the self-doctrine lay stress on the reality of per- 
 cepts, thoughts, and feelings and argue triumphantly that we have no right 
 to infer a self behind and apart from experience. It is evident that these 
 arguments may be disregarded by all who hold that the self is directly expe- 
 rienced not apart from consciousness but in consciousness. 
 
i86 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 readily grant that I am never conscious of myself except as 
 conscious in some particular way — that is, as having a per- 
 ception of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hate, pain or 
 pleasure — without thereby denying that I am at the same 
 time conscious of a self which perceives. In other words, 
 it is certainly true that a self without perceptions is never 
 experienced, but it does not follow that there is no self; on 
 the other hand, it well may be that the perceptions are those 
 of a self. 
 
 h. The inconsistent assumption that a sel) exists 
 
 In favor of this view that in being conscious of perceptions 
 one is also conscious of a self, it should now be observed that 
 Hume, spite of his denial of a self, constantly presupposes its 
 existence. On every page of "Treatise" and of "Inquiry" 
 alike, he alludes to 'mind or myself' as more than a mere 
 bundle of perceptions, and attributes to it characters — in 
 particular, activity aud continuousness — which cannot pos- 
 sibly belong to mere perceptions. Thus, he speaks of ' the 
 operations of the mind ' ;' he says, in another place, that "im- 
 agination has the command over all its ideas" ;^ and he 
 teaches, even more explicitly, that "the mind has the com- 
 mand over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and 
 vary them, as it pleases."' Hume's assertions of the relative 
 permanence, or continuity, of the mind are equally unambig- 
 uous. "The mind . . . naturally continues," he says.* 
 "The imagination," he has observed, just previously, 
 "when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even 
 when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by 
 
 * "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 8, paragraph 2. Cf. "Inquiry," 
 § v., Pt. I., second paragraph from end, et al. 
 
 * "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 7, second paragraph from end. 
 
 ' Appendix to Vol. III. (original edition) of the "Treatise"; Green and 
 Grose edition, p. 555^. 
 
 * Ibid., Bk. I., Pt. IV., § i!, paragraph 22, Green and Grose edition, 
 p. 488'. 
 
The System of Hume 187 
 
 the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse." 
 But a mere bundle of evanescent perceptions could neither 
 "separate, unite, and mix ideas," nor yet continue in a 
 train of thinking. This inconsistency is made especially evi- 
 dent by the effort to replace Hume's personal pronouns, in his 
 very argument against the self, by some form of his exacter 
 definition of self. The passage quoted on page 182 would 
 read, thus translated, "... when a bundle of perceptions 
 enters most intimately into what it calls this bundle of per- 
 ceptions it always stumbles on some particular perception 
 or other of heat or cold. ..." Thus expressed, without 
 inconsistency with Hume's doctrine, the passage loses all 
 that persuasiveness which it actually possesses because of its 
 virtual imphcation of that self which it ostensibly denies. 
 
 These implications, it must be observed, of the existence 
 of minds or selves, underlying the succession of ideas, are not 
 mere unessential lapses from Hume's central teaching. On 
 the contrary, this conception of a seH is fundamental to no 
 fewer than four of Hume's explicit doctrines or arguments. 
 The first of these is his conception of causality.' It has al- 
 ready been shown that he defines causaHty as 'transition' and 
 'inference' of the mind. But the occurrence of a transition 
 imphes the existence of a permanent being within which the 
 transition occurs ; fleeting perceptions can replace or succeed 
 each other, but there can be no transition in them.^ 
 
 A second teaching of Hume which is based on the assump- 
 tion of the very self which he denies is his doctrine of personal 
 identity, that is, his method of accounting for what he terms 
 the false supposition of personal identity. For, though Hume 
 argues against the fact of personal identity, he none the less 
 has to admit our 'great . . . propension ... to suppose 
 ourselves possesst ' ' of it. He goes on to explain the alleged 
 consciousness of personal identity as the easy 'transition of 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 166 seq. ' Cf. Kant's teaching, injra, p. 227 seq. 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 6, paragraph 5. 
 
1 88 Pluralistic Phenomena lis tic Ideahsm 
 
 the mind from one object to another, the smooth and unin- 
 terrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected 
 ideas." But this 'transition of the mind' involves, as has 
 just appeared, a continuous mind, a self distinct from series 
 of resembling and connected ideas. So, Hume actually 
 opposes what he calls the false conception of personal identity 
 by an explanation which assumes the existence of what is 
 virtually the same — a continuous self. 
 
 The remaining doctrines which require the assumption of 
 a self fundamental to ideas belong to Hume's psychological 
 and ethical teaching, not to the metaphysical system which, 
 in this chapter, is mainly considered. One important form 
 of his doctrine of the passions — that is to say, his psychology 
 of the emotions — is based upon the doctrine of a self in social 
 relation with other selves. Not the impression or idea, but 
 the self, is — Hume teaches — the unit of the affective con- 
 sciousness.^ Thus, pride is defined' as "a certain satisfaction 
 in ourselves" ; love orfriendship is said to be* "a complacency 
 in another " ; "self " is described ^ as " ever intimately present 
 to us." In his moral philosophy, finally, Hume assumes 
 expUcitly the existence of selves in social relations. 'Good' 
 and 'bad' resolve themselves, for him, into 'useful' and 
 'harmful,' or 'pleasant' and 'painful'; but pleasure and 
 pain arise, he teaches, through sympathy with others as well 
 as through personal experience ;° the utiUty which is object of 
 virtue is that of society no less than that of the individual ; ' 
 
 ' " Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 6, paragraphs 6, i6, Green and Grose 
 edition, pp. 535', S4i>. 
 
 ^ This is perfectly evident in the "Dissertation on the Passions." Book 
 II. of the "Treatise," on the other hand, attempts in many passages to re- 
 duce emotions to ideas of pleasure and pain ; but its classification of emotions 
 and its significant discussions are based throughout on the conception of emo- 
 tions as personal relations. 
 
 '"Dissertation," § II. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. II., Pt. I., § 2, Green 
 and Grose edition, Vol. II., p. 77 el al. 
 
 * "Dissertation," § II.; "Treatise," Bk. II., Pt. II., § i. 
 
 ' "Dissertation," § III., 2. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. II., Pt. I., § 2. 
 
 • "Treatise," Bk. III., Pt. II., § 2. Cf. "Principles of Morals." 
 ' "Treatise," Bk. II., Pt. III., § 6'; "Principles," § V., Pt. I. 
 
The System of Hume 189 
 
 indeed, the very "notion of morals implies," Hume says, 
 "some sentiment common to all mankind . . . the senti- 
 ment of humanity.'" But sympathy and society and human- 
 ity imply inevitably actual selves, distinct though inseparable 
 from their ideas, and in vital relation with each other. 
 
 After the outline and the estimate of Hume's doctrine of the 
 seK, it is necessary at the end to review the bearing of the 
 doctrine on the question fundamental to all philosophy: is 
 there a self which underUes evanescent psychic phenomena ? 
 Hume's arguments to prove the self non-existent are funda- 
 mentally two. He argues that a self need not exist, on the 
 ground that our perceptions, independently existing, have no 
 need of a subject in which to inhere ; but he fails to prove 
 even to his own satisfaction that perceptions do exist indepen- 
 dently. Then he argues that a self does not exist, on the 
 ground that our alleged self -consciousness is, after all, a mere 
 consciousness of perceptions ; but his very argument refutes 
 itself and implies the truth that a consciousness of different 
 perceptions is also, inevitably, a consciousness of a perceiving 
 self. It is thus evident that Hume's arguments are incapable 
 of disproving the existence of a self, and it is fair to add that 
 no essentially new arguments have been advanced since the 
 "Treatise" was pubUshed. The case for the self is im- 
 measurably strengthened, also, by the discovery that Hume's 
 own philosophy, from start to finish, impUes the existence 
 of a self. Against the force of these considerations, it may, 
 however, be objected that Hume's inconsistency is not ipso 
 facto an argument for the existence of a self; and that the 
 disproof of Hume's arguments leaves undisturbed the proofs 
 which future philosophers may conceivably bring forward. 
 This abstract possibility is not to be denied, but — in the 
 view of the writer — does not affect one's conviction of an 
 existing self, a unique and identical reality which underlies 
 and unifies distinct perceptions. For this conviction is not, 
 
 ' "Principles of Morals," § IX., Pt. I., paragraph j. 
 
I go Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 primarily, an argued conclusion ; it is a direct and therefore 
 an unproved certainty contained in every conscious experi- 
 ence. Of course this initially immediate assurance is later 
 reflected on; and it is immensely strengthened by the study 
 of Hume and the other philosophers who refuse to recog- 
 nize a self. For such a study shovifs that the arguments are 
 invalid which are urged against the existence of a self; and 
 that the existence of a self is constantly assumed by those 
 who deny it. In the last resort, however, I can only assert, 
 without proving, my direct consciousness of my own existence. 
 
 IV. Hume's Teaching about God 
 
 It has already appeared that Hume argues against the 
 existence of objects independent of the mind, and yet that he 
 tacitly assumes that ideas correspond to external objects ; that 
 he has said "there is no self," and yet that his doctrines of 
 causaHty and identity — to name no others — imply the 
 existence of a self. It will not be surprising, therefore, to 
 discover that Hume everywhere assumes the existence of a 
 'Supreme Being,' or 'Deity,' although it is evident that on 
 Hume's principles we have no right to believe that there is a 
 God. It is true that Hume never argues definitely against the 
 existence of God, for. even the sceptic Philo, in the "Dia- 
 logues concerning Natural Religion," never questions 'the 
 Being but only the Nature of the Deity.' ' But Hume's 
 arguments to disprove the existence of substance, material 
 or spiritual, apply as well to God as to finite reaUties. In 
 the first place, if God is conceived as a causal being, totally 
 distinct from human experience, then the argument by which 
 Hume proves that we may not infer the existence of external 
 
 ' "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," Pt. II., paragraph 3. On 
 this question of Hume's philosophical doctrine about God, and of his personal 
 attitude toward religion, cf. especially the "Dialogues"; but see, also, Elkin, 
 "Hume's Treatise and Inquiry," § 47, pp. 266 seq., and the works there cited, 
 including Huxley, "Hume" (pp. 151 ic?.), and Windelband, "History of 
 Philosophy" (Eng. trans., p. 494). 
 
The System of Hume 191 
 
 objects tells equally against the existence of God. For 
 causality is a relation within experience, and God cannot, 
 therefore, be conceived as infinite cause and at the same 
 time as existing independently of experience. Jf, on the 
 other hand, God be conceived as infinite spirit, or greater 
 self, then Hume's arguments against the existence of selves 
 would also tell — if they were vahd arguments — against 
 God's existence. We have questioned their cogency, but 
 Hume employed them; and it follows that there is no place 
 in his philosophy for God. 
 
 In the eyes of the uncritical reader, Hume's conclusions 
 gain plausibility by his unjustified appropriation of the God, 
 the external objects, and the finite selves whom he has elabo- 
 rately annihilated. In the mind of the rigidly logical thinker, 
 on the other hand, this procedure awakens a suspicion, not 
 indeed of Hume's personal sincerity, but of his intellectual 
 honesty and of the value of his teaching. No one, however, 
 can deny the significance of two portions of Hume's doc- 
 trine, — his conception of causality, and his denial of the 
 existence of a self. Important features of his causal doc- 
 trine had, indeed, been suggested by Berkeley;' but 
 Hume first elaborated and fused the significant teachings 
 that causality is not an immaterial power ; that it is rather a 
 sequence of events or, more clearly scrutinized, a mental 
 continuity or transition. These elements of his doctrine 
 have become inwrought in the fibre of modem philosophical 
 thinking; his equally emphasized denial of the necessity 
 of the causal sequence is, on the other hand, chiefly impor- 
 tant because it initiated Kant's defence of causal necessity.* 
 
 Even more significant among philosophical doctrines is 
 Hume's reduction of all selves to mere 'bundles' of fleeting 
 and unconnected ideas, and his consequent conception of the 
 universe as nothing more than a mass of loosely connected 
 perceptions, momentary sensations, for example, of red, 
 
 • "Principles," 53, 65, 66. ' Cf. injra, p. 211 jeg. 
 
192 Pluralistic P henomenalistic Idealism 
 
 sweet, soft, and fragrant, and equally fleeting emotions of 
 love and hate and avarice and the like. The importance 
 of this conception is not due to its validity ; on the contrary, 
 as it has been the effort of this chapter to show, the doctrine 
 is argued from invahd premises and contradicts our most 
 immediate certainty. Yet Hume has rendered a service to 
 philosophy in setting forth this theory, erroneous as it is. 
 An error never can be refuted till it has been clearly stated ; 
 and an unformulated and unrefuted error may work incalcu- 
 lable injury from the shadowy recesses of the mind which 
 vaguely holds it. Now Hume's annihilation of the self is 
 obviously a doctrine of vital consequences. If the supposed 
 self is a mere parcel of perceptions, replaced a moment hence 
 by another kaleidoscopic complex of sensations, plainly there 
 is no ground for belief in personal immortahty, no philosophic 
 basis for a conviction of personal responsibility. Precisely 
 because of its practical significance, therefore, Hume's denial 
 of the self tends to incite his readers to a closer analysis of 
 the conception of a self, a more careful study of the relations 
 of selves. This effect of Hume's doctrine the succeeding 
 chapters will consider. 
 
A CRITICISM OF PRECEDING 
 SYSTEMS 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 AN ATTACK UPON DUALISM AND PHENOMENALISM: 
 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 
 
 "Das Zuruckgehen auf Kant [kann] fiir uns nur bedeuten: die Fragen, 
 die er gestellt hat, nicht bloss aufs neue zu stellen, sondern sie auch waiter 
 und scliarfer zu fassen, die Antworten die er gegeben hat, aufs neue zu 
 priifen, zu erganzen, zu berichtigen." — Zeller. 
 
 Modern thought had passed, in the early eighteenth 
 century, by way of the duahsm of Descartes and of Locke, 
 through two phases of a quahtative monism. Under the 
 lead of Hobbes, philosophy had meant materiahsm ; in the 
 hands of Leibniz and Berkeley, it had turned ideaUstic and 
 spiritualistic. Hume, finally, though as much an ideaUst as 
 ever Berkeley was, converted the spiritualistic form of ideahsm 
 into phenomenahsm, by conceiving of the universe no longer 
 as a world of spirits but as a world of evanescent psychic 
 phenomena : impressions and ideas. 
 
 Roughly coterminous with Hume's philosophy is the 
 system of the German philosopher. Christian Wolff. Instead 
 of being a modification of idealism. Wolffian doctrine reverts 
 in a curious way to the old dualistic type. Wolff, to be sure, 
 purports to follow Leibniz ; but he ignores all the significant 
 teachings of Leibniz, retaining httle save the terminology and 
 the inconsistencies of the system. Leibniz teaches that the 
 universe is a community of through and through spiritual 
 beings. Wolff, on the contrary, holds that the ultimate all- 
 of-reaHty is a double universe : a world of reality independent 
 of and distinct from any and all consciousness, which would 
 exist if there were no mind or minds to know it; and a 
 parallel world of conscious beings. Thus to every part of the 
 world independent of consciousness, there corresponds, he 
 
 '95 
 
196 Attack ztpon Dtialism and Phenomenalism 
 
 holds, the consciousness of just this particular reality. Wolfl 
 teaches, in other words, as Descartes has taught and as 
 most people uncritically believe, that it is possible to know 
 reaUties which are yet independent of the consciousness of 
 them. 
 
 WolfE's system is, in the second place, rationahstic. His 
 rationahsm follows, as must be admitted, from an inconsistent 
 teaching of Leibniz. For though Leibniz insists on the 
 continuity of consciousness and teaches that sense and 
 thought differ, not in kind, but in degree of consciousness, 
 he none the less exalts reason over sense ; and Wolff em- 
 phasizes and perpetuates the distinction, really subversive 
 of Leibniz's teaching. Thus, Wolff teaches that there are 
 two distinct kinds of consciousness: sense and thought. 
 Sense he conceives as the relatively superficial, which only 
 confusedly corresponds to the reality independent of con- 
 sciousness, and which is unable to fathom the deeper realities 
 of the universe ; thought, on the other hand, he believes, may 
 attain the knowledge of the independent realities, or sub- 
 stances, and of causality, space and time, unity, and the other 
 rational principles. 
 
 It has been necessary to outline Wolff's system, though it is 
 imimportant in itself considered, for the most influential of 
 modem doctrines, that of Immanuel Kant, is directly de- 
 rived from it. Kant's philosophy, in its essential develop- 
 ment, is a progressive exploitation of the world of independent 
 reality in favor of that of consciousness. In other words, he 
 discovers, point by point, that forms of thought have no exact 
 parallels in a world of reality independent of them. Corre- 
 sponding with the sensational consciousness, however, he per- 
 sistently assumes the existence of independent realities — of 
 realities which are, to be sure, despoiled of all describable 
 characters, a ghostlike world of shadowy objects, whose only 
 quality is the negative one of being other than consciousness 
 and independent of it. Kant's relation to Wolff is thus 
 comparable with the relation of Leibniz to Descartes. Yet 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 197 
 
 though, hke Leibniz, Kant modifies duahsm in the direction 
 of ideahsm, unlike Leibniz, he fails to complete his ideahstic 
 reconstruction of the universe. This incompleteness follows, 
 doubtless, from Kant's conservatism. - He was himself a 
 precise little university professor of fixed habits, and his 
 intellect was of the 'slow and sure' order, which turns and 
 twists traditional doctrines in the effort to gain all their 
 meaning, instead of throwing them rashly away at the first 
 suspicion of their inadequacy. In Kant this reluctance to 
 discard old forms was combined with an unsparing criticism 
 of doctrines which had not stood the test of prolonged scru- 
 tiny. The result of this curious combination of the conserva- 
 tive and the critical tendencies is a system marked by great 
 internal inconsistencies. 
 
 Kant's system must not, however, be described solely by 
 its afiEiliation with that of Wolff. For Kant is profoundly 
 influenced also by his study of Hume. From Hume, he 
 derives, in the first place, the suggestion for his criticism of 
 duahsm and of rationahsm; with Hume he emphasizes the 
 perceptual nature of space and time, and the ideal character 
 of the forms of thought. But quite as important as the 
 agreement is the opposition between Kant and Hume. 
 Kant, imperceptibly influenced no doubt by Diderot's and by 
 Rousseau's individuahsm,' reinstates the spirituaUstic — or 
 personahstic — form of idealism. He replaces Hume's view 
 of the universe as mere conglomerate of impressions and 
 ideas, by the older conception of the known universe of 
 conscious selves. Only, as has been pointed out, he 
 retains the dualistic doctrine that there are still reahties 
 beyond these selves. 
 
 But eve^i those who believe, with the writer of this book, 
 that Kant's system includes no teaching new to philosophy, 
 admit its historical importance. It turned back rationaUstic 
 philosophy in Germany from the path of duahsm reentered 
 
 ■ Cf. Appendix, pp. 505, 506. 
 
ig8 Attack upon Dualism and Phe?iomenalism 
 
 by Wolfif ; and it rescued idealism from the sheer phenome- 
 nalism of Hume. The student of philosophy, therefore, 
 reads Kant, not because his works embody teachings which 
 occur nowhere else ; on the other hand, there is httle which 
 he taught that cannot be discovered better stated in the doc- 
 trines of predecessors or of successors. Nor does one study 
 Kant for the intrinsic worth of his system as such ; on the 
 other hand, it must be admitted that his doctrine is incom- 
 plete and inconsistent, that the arguments by which he reaches 
 his conclusions are often invalid and still more often unneces- 
 sary. Yet the student of modem philosophy must study 
 Kant because nineteenth century philosophy of every order 
 has been influenced by Kant's teaching. Post-Kantian 
 idealistic philosophy, both British and continental, is indeed 
 bom of the Kantian system ; the blood of Kant flows in its 
 veins. And the most antagonistic forms of British thought 
 have at least been influenced by Kant in the sense that they 
 have been most vigorous in their onslaughts upon him. 
 Thus the systems of friend and of foe alike presuppose on 
 the student's part an acquaintance with Kant.^ 
 
 A. Kant's Doctrine of the Known Object (A Refu- 
 tation OF Wolff's Dualism and of Hume's Phenom- 
 enalism) 
 
 The dualistic doctrine of Wolff forms the starting-point 
 of Kant's own thought and, for many years, the basis of his 
 
 ' The summary and estimate of Kant's system contained in this chapter 
 are based on the study mainly of his " Kritik of Pure Reason," and the most 
 important of his ethical works, the "Metaphysik of Morality," and the 
 "Kritik of Practical Reason." References are made to the first and second 
 editions (A and B, published respectively in 1781 and 1787) of the "Kritik 
 of Pure Reason," and to the first editions of the other works. The pages 
 of Watson's "Extracts from Kant" (cited as W.) are also referred to. Se- 
 rious students will precede or accompany the reading of this chapter by a 
 study of Kant's text. They will be assisted by the more detailed discussion 
 of many sections of the "Kritik of Pure Reason," in the Appendix of this 
 book (pp. 513 iej.). This chapter departs widely from Kant's order, and 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 199 
 
 teaching at Konigsberg. It may be roughly outlined as 
 follows : — 
 
 World or Consciousness Wortd or Reality Indepen- 
 
 dent or Consciousness 
 
 Sense 
 
 /Sensations of Color ] 
 
 [Sensations of Sound J 
 
 etc. 
 
 I Conception of Substances Real Substances 
 
 Conception of Cause Real Causality 
 
 Conception of Space Real Space 
 
 Conception of Time Real Time 
 etc. etc. 
 
 It will be noticed, from this scheme, that the real world of 
 WolfE resembles that of Descartes: it contains not only 
 substances, but relations : space, time, causality, and the rest. 
 These, Wolff teaches, are independent of consciousness — that 
 is, they would remain real though every conscious being were 
 annihilated. They are known in a twofold way: first, in- 
 accurately and confusedly by the senses; and second, ade- 
 quately and clearly by thought. Thus, sensations of color, 
 sound, and the like are confused and inadequate representa- 
 tions of the world of independent reality, which itself has no 
 color, sound, or odor. On the other hand, the concepts, or 
 thoughts, of substance, space, time, and causahty, are correct 
 representations of real substance, space, causahty, and so on. 
 In opposition to Wolff and in agreement with Hume, Kant 
 teaches that all known objects are phenomena of conscious- 
 ness, ideas, and not realities independent of mind. In oppo- 
 sition to Hume, on the other hand, he teaches that the known 
 object is not a mere complex of sensations, but that it includes 
 unsensational characters, namely, relations. These two fea- 
 tures of Kant's teaching — its divergence from traditional 
 duahsm and its opposition to sensationahsm — -will appear 
 throughout the summary which follows. The first and 
 
 lays Httle stress or none on certain teachings which he emphasizes; but, in 
 the opinion of the writer, it presents every important feature of Kant's doctrine. 
 
200 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 earliest part of the "Kritik of Pure Reason," Kant's most 
 important work, considers the known object as spatial and 
 temporal. 
 
 I. Kant's Doctrine of the Known Object as Spatial 
 AND Temporal ^ 
 
 a. Kanfs teaching in opposition to Hume that space and 
 time are unsensational and a priori. 
 
 Kant sharply distinguishes space and time from mere 
 sensations, those of color, odor, and the like. These mere 
 sensations Kant does not discuss at length, but he attributes 
 to them, exphcitly or imphcitly, four characters. They are 
 (i) many; Kant refers to them as a sense manifold.^ They 
 are (2) un-ordered and chaotic, conglomerate sense material, 
 without form.' They are (3) individual; that is to say, in 
 the same circumstances, one person has one sense experience 
 while a second person has quite a different one.* Finally, 
 (4) the mind in being conscious of sensations is wholly pas- 
 sive ; and sensations are therefore due, in some unexplained 
 way, to the reahty independent of consciousness. This last 
 character attributed to sensations indicates, of course, the 
 unconquered dualism of Kant.^ 
 
 Now, Kant denies that space and time are on a par with 
 these chaotic, individual, sense qualities. There are, he 
 teaches, important differences between the changing color of 
 the sky and the spatial relations of the planets, or between the 
 
 ' Kant's teaching about space and time is contained in two portions of the 
 "Kritik of Pure Reason"' in Pt. I., the "Esthetic"; and in the first and 
 second Antinomies of Pt. III., the "Dialectic." (Cf. Appendix, pp. 516 
 seq., for a more detailed and technical discussion of these sections.) 
 
 '"Kritik of Pure Reason," A, p. 20 et al; B, pp. 34, 68 et al. (The 
 first edition of the "Kritik of Pure Reason" is cited as A, the second edition 
 as B. The references of the early sections of this chapter are almost exclu- 
 sively to this work, and the title will, therefore, ordinarily be omitted.) 
 
 ^ A, 20 et al; 34, 68 et al; W., 22. (The references are to pages.) 
 
 * B, 60 et al. Cf. the discussion, p. 231, injra. 
 
 ' A, 19, 68; B, 33, 93; W., — , 47. Cf. infra, p. 237. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 201 
 
 increasing heat of a star and the times of its successive tem- 
 peratures. These differences reduce to two. Space and 
 time are distinguished, Kant teaches, from the 'sense mani- 
 fold,' in that the mind is active, not passive, in the conscious- 
 ness of them.' Space and time, he holds, are further differen- 
 tiated from sensations, on the ground that both are a priori, 
 whereas sensations are a posteriori. By a priori Kant means 
 universal and necessary.^ An a priori, that is necessary, truth 
 asserts of something that it could not be otherwise; to a 
 universal proposition no exception is possible, — it apphes, 
 in other words, to every member of a given class. In this 
 sense, Kant teaches, space and time are a priori: there is a 
 necessary relation of every moment to its past and to its 
 future as well ; and, similarly, spatial quantities — for ex- 
 ample, the circumference and the radii of a circle — are 
 necessarily related.^ It follows, according to Kant, that space 
 and time are not mere sensations ; and since an object, what- 
 ever else it may be, is always spatial and temporal, it follows 
 also that the known object is no mere sensational complex. 
 It should be added that Kant, even while he asserts the 
 unsensational nature of space and time, none the less regards 
 both space and time as 'forms of perception.' But sensation 
 is admitted to be an essential element of perception, and the 
 wholly unsensational is therefore improperly named percep- 
 tion. It is, however, easy to explain Kant's error in this 
 regard. His account of the space and time consciousness 
 would, indeed, naturally have led him to regard each as a 
 form, not of perception, but of thought — what he later calls 
 a category. But Kant also beheves, for reasons which 
 
 ' Cf. note on p. 205, injra. 
 
 ' " Kritik of Pure Reason," Edition B, Introduction, § II., p. 4 ; W., 9. 
 Kant's frequent definition of 'o priori'' as 'independent of experience' 
 is not quoted because of the ambiguity in Kant's use of the term 
 'experience.' 
 
 ' The argument here summarized is that of the so-called Transcendental 
 Deduction, A, 25, 31, 32; B, 40, 47, 48; W., 26, 30. For more detailed 
 exposition of Kant's doctrine of space and time, cf. Appendix, pp. 516 icj. 
 
202 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 will later appear, that space and time belong to conscious- 
 ness and not to a reality independent of consciousness; and 
 he still believes with Wolff that if they were objects of thought, 
 they must be independently real. In a word, he has a dilemma 
 on his hands : space and time seem to him to be forms of per- 
 ception and not of thought ; and yet they seem to him to be 
 too fixed and too certain to be sensational. He attempts 
 unsuccessfully to solve the problem by creating an imaginary 
 middle state, between perception and thought, distinguishing 
 sharply between sensations, and space and time — the neces- 
 sary forms, as he calls them, of perception. 
 
 h. Kant's teaching in opposition to Wolff that space and 
 time are subjective 
 
 From the a priority, the universality and necessity, of space 
 and time Kant argues their ideal character. He denies, in 
 other words, that they belong to a world independent of 
 consciousness. The self-conscious being, he argues, knows 
 itself only ; and if it makes assertions which have universal 
 validity, in other words, which are a priori, these assertions 
 must be about consciousness, not about any reality inde- 
 pendent of consciousness — divorced from it, unknown by 
 it. But there are, Kant teaches, universal space and time 
 truths, wherefore space and time have to do with conscious- 
 ness, not with the independent reality.' (Conversely, it is 
 simply because mere sensations have, in his opinion, nothing 
 a priori about them, — - because he cannot make imiversal 
 propositions about the sensible qualities of things, — that 
 Kant supposes sensations to be due to an imknown, inde- 
 pendent reality.) 
 
 For a second reason Kant argues that space and time are 
 ideal or subjective. Roughly summarized, his argument is 
 
 • Cf. "Inferences," A, 26 and 31 ; B, 42 and 49; W., 27 and 30. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 203 
 
 the following : The so-called real, or absolute, space and time, 
 belonging according to Wolff to the world of independent real- 
 ity, would be fixed, immutable, and absolute. Space and time, 
 on the other hand, are full of paradoxes. In remembering, 
 for example, one makes the past present ; and in drawing lines 
 through the base of a triangle one discovers that, according 
 to the principles of mathematics, as many lines can con- 
 verge in the apex as can be drawn through the base. And 
 the greatest of these paradoxes is the necessity of conceiving 
 space and time both as complete and as endless: we can 
 always, on the one hand, imagine space beyond space; as 
 mathematicians we must, indeed, regard space as infinite: 
 and every past moment must be conceived to have its past 
 behind it, just as every future must be thought of with a 
 future beyond it. On the other hand, space and time, con- 
 ceived as absolute, must be complete and fixed and immuta- 
 ble. Now such contradictory assertions could not be made, 
 Kant holds, about space and time if they were reaUties inde- 
 pendent of consciousness ; such paradoxes would, indeed, be 
 impossible with reference to a space and a time which are 
 unaffected by our thoughts about them.* On the other 
 hand, consciousness is noted for its contradictions and its 
 paradoxes ; and, thus, all the contradictions involved in space 
 and time are accounted for by regarding both as mere forms 
 of consciousness, ways in which we are conscious. Kant 
 concludes that space and time behave like conscious experi- 
 ences, not like fixed realities, and that they are, in this sense, 
 subjective. "The world," he says (meaning not the uni- 
 verse independent of consciousness but the world of concrete, 
 extended things and successive events) — " the world does 
 not exist in itself independently of the series of my ideas.'" 
 " Space," he says, elsewhere, " is nothing except the form of all 
 
 •Newton's definition of absolute space is the following (" Principles," 
 Bk. I., Definition VIII., Scholium): "Spatium Absolutum, natura sua sine 
 relatione ad externum quodvis, semper manet similare et immobile." 
 
 'A, 505; B. 533; W., 171. 
 
204 Attack upon Dualism, and Phenomenalism 
 
 phenomena of outer sense."' This ideality he adds, is no 
 bar to the reahty of space and time, for both spatial objects 
 and temporal events have ' empirical reahty ' ^ and are 
 'sufficiently distinct' from dream realities. 
 
 It is unnecessary to discuss at length Kant's arguments for 
 the subjectivity of space and time, since Leibniz, Berkeley, and 
 Hume had gone so much farther by their demonstration that 
 all characters of the known object — sensations along with 
 space and time — are ideal. The importance of Kant's teach- 
 ing is in its historical relation to the revived dualism of his 
 immediate predecessor, Wolff. Kant deprives the supposed 
 world of non-conscious reality of that character, spatialness, 
 with which Descartes and Locke had endowed it, of which 
 Leibniz and Berkeley had robbed it, with which Wolff has 
 again enriched it. Kant's other teaching about the known 
 object — that certain of its characters are a priori, or uni- 
 versal — has a less important bearing on the main problem of 
 metaphysics, the nature of the all-of-reahty ; but is of cardinal 
 importance to Kant's method of attack on the metaphysical 
 problem. This will appear more clearly in the next division 
 of this chapter. 
 
 II. Kant's Doctrine or the Categories ' (the Rela- 
 tions OF Known Objects) 
 
 a. Kant's teaching, in opposition to Hume, that the known 
 object includes categories, necessary relations 
 
 Hume has insisted that there is nothing in an object save 
 only that which is perceived, remembered, or imagined; in 
 
 'A, 26; B, 42; W., 27. The argument here outlined, for the sub- 
 jectivity of space and time, is found in the first and second Antinomies 
 (summarized, Appendix, pp. 521 seq.). The first set of illustrations in the 
 text are not those of Kant. 
 
 ^ A, 28, 491 ; B, 44, 520; W., 29. This is substantially Berkeley's teach- 
 ing, though Kant never recognizes the aflBliation. 
 
 ' This teaching is contained in the "Kritik of Pure Reason," in two por- 
 tions of Pt. II., the "Analytic " : first, in the sections numbered g to 14 (with 
 the one immediately preceding § g) ; second, in the division entitled " System 
 of all Principles of the Pure Reason." (Cf. Appendix, pp. 525 seq.) 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 205 
 
 other words, he has taught that an object is a compound of 
 'impressions' ^ only. Yet Hume has virtually admitted the 
 occurrence of experiences which are not impressions ; ^ and 
 Kant is therefore taking the part of Hume against Hume in 
 the teaching that every object contains unsensational as well 
 as sensational elements, that even in perceiving objects we are 
 conscious of them as more than sensational.' The imsen- 
 sational elements of the known objects (not including the 
 spatial and temporal elements) Kant calls categories, and he 
 recognizes twelve of them — four groups of three each — to 
 correspond with the classes of judgments treated in formal 
 logic. 
 
 The categories, Kant teaches, are results of the mind's 
 activity — or better, they are activities of the mind, and are 
 thus distinguished from sensation, for in sense-consciousness 
 the mind is merely passive.* The categories are further- 
 more, like space and time relations, a priori, that is, inde- 
 pendent of sense-experience, universal and necessary. Ac- 
 cording to Kant this seems to mean that one may make uni- 
 versal and unqualified assertions and predictions about them. 
 We do not know what will be the sensible qualities of the 
 
 ' It should be observed that Hume's term 'impressions' and Kant's term 
 'sensations' cover both sensations proper and affections of pleasantness and 
 unpleasantness. 
 
 ^ Cf. supra, pp. 169 seq. 
 
 ' Occasionally Kant is disposed to admit that some objects are merely 
 given — in other words, that uncategorized, purely sensational, objects of 
 experience do occur, though they are not known. (Cf. A, 90; B, 123.) 
 Usually, however, he holds the correct view that every object, even of per- 
 ception, is a related object. 
 
 * Kant lays great stress on this contrast (following Leibniz, through 
 Wolff. Cf. "Esthetic," § i. A, ig; B, },z; "Logic," Introduction, I., A, 50; 
 B, 74;W., 40; A, 67-68, B, 92-93 ; W., 46-47). Kant has been widely fol- 
 lowed in this distinction ; yet, in the opinion of the writer and of many stu- 
 dents of psychology, accurate introspection does not bear out the contrast. 
 The distinction of ' active ' and ' passive ' is not indeed properly made, for, 
 in one sense, all consciousness is activity; and, in another sense, every 
 finite self is passively conscious. The overdrawn distinction of sense from 
 thought is, it should be added, responsible for certain fundamental errors of 
 Kant's philosophy. 
 
2o6 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 physical universe three billion years from now, but we do 
 know that, whatever its constituents, ii must be a totality, 
 that it must be like or unlike the physical universe of this 
 year 1906, and that its present condition is causally, though 
 indirectly, connected with that future condition of it. Or, 
 to take a simpler instance, we cannot predict a priori the 
 sensible character of the event to follow on a present event. 
 A sound or a flash of light may follow on the contact of the 
 wires, but whatever happens will be like or unhke something 
 else, will be the result of what has gone before, and will 
 always be so regarded. In other words, the sensible quali- 
 ties of future things and events cannot with assurance be 
 predicted ; but the unsensational characters of future events 
 and things are predictable, and in that sense universal and 
 necessary. Both because they are predictable and because 
 they imply mental activity, the categories, Kant teaches, are 
 subjective. He argues their occurrence and their unsensa- 
 tional character against Hume, and their subjectivity against 
 Wolff. 
 
 As so far outUned, Kant's analysis of the world of known 
 objects and, in particular, of perceived objects, has consisted in 
 the teaching that an object is made up (i) of sensations — 
 chaotic, individual experiences, passively received by the 
 mind, and due to unknown things-in-themselves ; and (2) of 
 space and time relations, unsensational 'forms,' or construc- 
 tions of the mind itself, corresponding to nothing beyond 
 consciousness, but endowed with a peculiar universality. 
 The chief purpose of his category doctrine — the Transcen- 
 dental Logic, as he calls it — is to discuss the remaining 
 characters of known objects, the categories. Among these, 
 however, he lays especial stress on four, degree, totality, 
 causality, and reciprocal connection, which are relations of a 
 known object within itself or with other objects and, as such, 
 unsensational factors of experience. In the course of his 
 discussion of the categories Kant also restates his doctrine 
 of space and time, so that these sections of the "Kritik" 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 207 
 
 contain Kant's full doctrine of relations. In this chapter, 
 only Kant's conception of the four categories just named is 
 discussed.^ 
 
 Kant's procedure throughout the category discussion is the 
 following : He considers objects as perceived, on the ground 
 that these, if any, might be supposed to be purely sensational. 
 And he points out that, even in perceiving objects, we are 
 conscious of them as involving categories. This general 
 statement must be ampUfied by a consideration of the dif- 
 ferent categories. 
 
 I. The category of totality^ 
 
 In perceiving any object, Kant argues, we are conscious, 
 not merely of its sensational characters, — its color, texture, 
 spatial qualities, and all the rest, — but we are also conscious 
 of these qualities as belonging together, as combined, fused, 
 unified. And this consciousness of totality, or combination, 
 is an essential feature of the consciousness of an object; 
 in Kant's terms, in perceiving an object, we unify the mani- 
 fold of impressions of which it is made up.' This unity, or 
 totaUty, maybe spatial, but it may conceivably be non-spatial ; 
 for example, we are conscious as well of a union of sound, 
 smell, and taste, as of a union of top and bottom, right and 
 left. Kant, however, uses a case of spatial totality to illus- 
 trate this truth that a consciousness of unity is a constituent 
 of every percept. "I cannot," he says, have the conscious- 
 ness of any line, however short, "without drawing it in 
 
 ' For critical summary of Kant's doctrine of the categories (including 
 those which are not considered in this chapter), cf. Appendix, pp. 525 seq. 
 
 ' Kant discusses the categories of quantity, of which totality is most im- 
 portant, in "Analytic," Bk. I., §§ 10-12, and in Bk. II., under the head of 
 "Axioms of Perception," A, Soseq., 161 seq.; B, io6seq., 202 seq.; W., 51 seq., 
 92 seq. 
 
 ' A, 162 ; B, 203 ; W., 93. For a criticism of Kant's statement 'we unify' 
 as compared with the statement 'we are conscious of unity,' cf. James's 
 "Principles of Psychology," II., p. 2, note; and the writer's "An Introduc- 
 tion to Psychology," p. 177. 
 
2o8 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 imagination — that is, without producing it, part by part, 
 from a point." The illustration is unfortunate, for ordinary 
 observation contradicts its statement of fact. We are most 
 often conscious of small figures, not as connected parts but 
 as simple units; though we sometimes construct complex 
 spatial figures in exactly the slow, reflective way which Kant 
 describes, — for example, in imagination we combine geo- 
 metrical figures into a larger whole, or construct, part by 
 part, some complicated design. But though Kant has pitched 
 on a defective example of perceptual complexity, he is none 
 the less correct in his doctrine that perception, the experience 
 of a complex of sense quahties, does include an unsensational 
 consciousness of the holding together, the totality, of these 
 quahties. And he is unquestionably right in the teaching 
 that the relatedness, or totality, of the parts of an object is 
 a priori, necessary, in the sense already indicated : in other 
 words, that without exception and inevitably an object must 
 be conceived as totality of its parts. It should be added 
 that spatial totality is one of the spatial relations already 
 treated in the first division of the "Kritik," and that it is not 
 easy to account for Kant's failure to recognize the present 
 discussion as in part a repetition of what has preceded.^ 
 
 2. The category of degree (implied in the discussion oj the 
 category of reality) ^ 
 
 Every perceived object includes, Kant teaches, besides the 
 relation of totality, some relation of degree, involving, as is 
 evident, comparison. Kant means that every sensation has 
 a degree of intensity ; that is, it is more or less bright or loud 
 or fragrant than other sensations with which it is always 
 
 ' Cf. Appendix, p. 524'. 
 
 ' Kant discusses the ' categories of quality,' among which is his category 
 of 'reality,' in Bk. I., §§ 10-12 of the "Analytic," and in Bk. II., under 
 the head of "Anticipations of Observation." He only incidentally refers 
 to the category of degree. Cf. A, 80 seq., 166 seq.; B, 106 seq., 207 seq.; W., 
 52 seq., 96 seq.; and Appendix, p. 528. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 209 
 
 compared. In Kant's own words: "The real, which is an 
 object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree." * 
 That is to say, an object may always be known as being 
 sensationally 'more' or 'less' intense than other objects. 
 Thus, Kant has again estabhshed the point which he is mak- 
 ing against Hume: the truth that the known object (the 
 phenomenon, as Kant calls it) includes relations, as well 
 as impressions (sensations). For he shows that, in being 
 conscious of the sense qualities of an object, we are conscious 
 always of its degree, that is, of themore-or-less-ness of its color, 
 fragrance, and other sense qualities. He asserts, furthermore, 
 that the degree, the relation of more or less, is a ^rzoH, must in- 
 variably and inevitably be predicated. " There is something 
 which has to do with . . . sensation," Kant says, "which 
 may be known a priori. . . . [The sensation has] intensive 
 magnitude, that is, a degree. . . . Every color, for example, 
 red, has a degree which, however small, is never the smallest 
 possible ; and so it is with warmth, with weight, etc. "' I can- 
 not tell how bright may be the red of this evening's sunset ; 
 but I may know that every red sunset will be more or less 
 bright than other sunsets (if not equally bright) ; in other 
 words, every sensational object involves an a priori relational 
 category of degree. 
 
 It should be added that these categories of degree are one 
 class only of a larger group, the categories of comparison, 
 on which Kant lays little stress. To this group belong also 
 the categories of sameness and likeness and their opposites. 
 All these categories of comparison are necessary and universal ; 
 and, as a class, it must be noted they are different from the 
 connective relations of spatially related objects and tem- 
 porally related events.' 
 
 'These words form the heading of the "Anticipations of Observation," 
 in Edition B, 207; W., 96. 
 
 'A, 169; B, 211; W., 97. 
 
 'Kant refers to the 'sameness' of recognized objects in the so-called 
 "Synthesis of Recognition" (A, 103; W., 60). This consciousness of same- 
 P 
 
2IO Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 3. The category 0} (phenomenal) causality '^ 
 
 Every object is known, Kant teaches, not merely as a 
 totality and as comparable with other objects; it is known, 
 also, as causally related. In opposition to Hume, Kant 
 therefore recognizes as constituent of every known object 
 the a priori, that is, necessary and universal, category of 
 causality. "Experience," he says, "is possible only through 
 the consciousness of a necessary connection of percepts." " 
 The essential features of Kant's conception are clear. We 
 know an ordered world of physical phenomena in relation to 
 each other. The world which we know is not composed of 
 isolated objects or of unconnected events. Just as certainly 
 as we experience the color and sound of it, we know the inter- 
 connectedness of it — the relation of one object, or event, to 
 the others. Moreover, we know this relation as neces- 
 sarily and as universally predicable. We cannot, it is true, 
 Kant seems to say with Hume, assert with absolute certainty 
 that any given event is necessarily the effect of any other 
 particular event,' but we do know that some effect, 
 whether or not we discover the nature of it, follows nec- 
 essarily upon a cause. It could never be admitted, Kant 
 insists, that the causal relation is purely imaginary or that 
 the effect must not be ' everywhere perceived ' as determined 
 by the cause.* On the contrary, the effect follows 'without 
 
 ness is there treated as an argument for the unity of consciousness, but is not 
 explicitly named category. Cf. the discussion of these categories in Chap- 
 ter II, on Hegel, pp. 369 seq. 
 
 ' Kant discusses the relation of phenomenal causality in Bk. I., §§ 10-12, 
 of the "Analytic," and in Bk. II., in the second and third "Analogies 
 of Experience," A, loc. cit., and 189 seq.; B, loc. cit., and 232 seq.; W., loc. 
 cit., and no seq. For Kant's conception of cause, in the other sense of 
 'explanation' or 'ground,' — intelligible cause, as he calls it, — cf. infra, 
 pp. 259' seq. 
 
 ' This is the heading of the " Analogies of Experience, " in Edition B 
 (p. 218; W., loi). Cf. also A, 189; B, 234; W., no. 
 
 'A, 196; B, 241; W., 115'. 
 
 * B, 234. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant i\\ 
 
 exception and necessarily ' ' upon the cause. And from the 
 necessity inherent in the nature of the causal relation Kant 
 argues the subjectivity, or ideal character, of causality. 
 "We are concerned," he says, "only with our own ideas; 
 the being of things-in-themselves [realities independent of 
 consciousness] is entirely outside our sphere of knowledge." ' 
 We cannot possibly predicate of them any universally ad- 
 mitted relation. The circumstance that we find ourselves 
 universally and necessarily asserting the causal relation is a 
 proof that the causahty belongs to the ideal world and not to 
 a world independent of consciousness. 
 
 The full force of Kant's conception of phenomenal cau- 
 sahty is gained only by comparing it with Hume's teaching. 
 It will be remembered that Kant's study of Hume's doctrine 
 of causahty formed, as he himself assures us, the point of 
 departure for his own critical philosophy. Hume, he says, 
 "awaked me from my dogmatic slumber" ; ' and the " Kritik 
 of Pure Reason," he elsewhere says, "was inspired by this 
 Humian doubt." * That is to say, Kant's study of the 
 category of causality led to his discovery of the other cate- 
 gories; and this, as will appear, brought him to the formu- 
 lation of his most important doctrine, that of the transcen- 
 dental self. The gist of Hume's teaching about causahty 
 is, it will be remembered, the following: There is, in the 
 first place, no power or causahty in objects existing inde- 
 pendently of our consciousness. On the contrary, causahty 
 is the anticipated, or inferred, regular sequence of events, 
 or — more precisely — it is a transition or inference of the 
 imagination. There is, in the second place, no necessary 
 relation between cause and effect. Hume argues this 
 {a) because cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, are 
 distinguishable ideas and therefore not necessarily related; 
 
 ' A, 198; B, 244. 
 
 'A, 190; B, 23s; W., III. 
 
 '"Prolegomena," Preface. 
 
 * "Kritik of Practical Reason," p. 56 (Hartenstein Edition, 1867). 
 
212 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 (b) because we gain our knowledge of causes through acci- 
 dental experience and are never able to predict the effect 
 of a given event ; (c) because past experience is no guar- 
 antee of the future.' 
 
 Kant's agreement with Hume is much farther reaching 
 than is ordinarily supposed. He subscribes without reserve 
 to the first stated of Hume's teachings ; and though he denies 
 the second, he admits at least one of its premises. To begin 
 with the most fundamental agreement : Kant is as sure as 
 Hume is, that causality is no character or relation of things 
 independent of consciousness, and that, on the contrary, 
 causaUty is a transition of the mind, a mental connection. 
 What is meant, both philosophers would declare, when it is 
 asserted that the rubbing of sticks together is the cause 
 of a spark, is simply that we, conscious beings, mentally 
 combine the two phenomena in a certain way, that we 
 regard the spark as effect of the friction. The only differ- 
 ence — an important one, to be sure — between Kant and 
 Hume, at this point, is that while Hume describes this 
 mental transition as 'imagination' or 'behef,' Kant calls it 
 'thought.' 
 
 The second of Hume's teachings about causality is the 
 denial of a necessary connection between succeeding events. 
 This doctrine is indeed already impHed by Hume's account 
 of the causal consciousness as imagination; and as Kant 
 has denied the uncertain character of the causal conscious- 
 ness, so he disputes the contingency of the connection between 
 phenomena.^ The causal connection between succeeding 
 events is, he holds, a necessary connection. This important 
 
 ' The order of treatment of the chapter on Hume is here altered. 
 
 ' Whereas Hume argues that causaUty, just because it is mental, is not 
 objective and therefore lacks necessity, Kant teaches that causality is sub- 
 jective because it is necessary. In other words, both teach the subjectivity 
 of causality, but Hume deduces the contingency from the admitted sub- 
 jectivity, while Kant infers the subjectivity from the admitted necessity. 
 With the one, subjectivity is the starting-point; with the other, it hi th« 
 conclusion. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 213 
 
 divergence of Kant from Hume must be discussed at some 
 length. 
 
 Hume argues that events are not causally and necessarily 
 connected on the ground that each event is a separate, self- 
 sufBcient phenomenon and therefore unconnected either 
 temporally or causally with any other. In justified opposi- 
 tion to this Kant points out that "the preceding time neces- 
 sarily determines the following." ^ We may add : an event 
 means precisely a somewhat which is necessarily connected 
 with its past and with its future, and it is a contra- 
 diction in terms to deny the connectedness of one event 
 with another.^ 
 
 Kant thus vindicates the necessity of the purely temporal 
 connection. But though the causal connection implies the 
 temporal, it is, as Hume and Kant both recognize, more- 
 than-temporal. In other words, the doctrine of causal 
 necessity is the teaching that, given a necessary connection 
 between two events, a and h, the second event, h, could not 
 have been replaced by any other. Against this sort of 
 necessary connection Hume, it will be remembered, has two 
 arguments. There is, he urges, no necessary — that is, uni- 
 form — ■ connection between events, for we gain our knowledge 
 of causality through specific experience. So far from deny- 
 ing this, Kant admits that the 'logical clearness' of the causal 
 principle is only then possible when we have made use of it 
 in experience. He does not dispute " the accepted doc- 
 trine" that "we are led to the concept of cause by the 
 harmonious relation of many events." ' But though Kant 
 accepts this, the premise of Hume's argument, he de- 
 nies the validity of the conclusion which Hume draws from 
 it. Kant teaches, in other words, that the impossibility 
 of knowing with certainty just what will be the nature of a 
 given effect does not impair the certainty that there will be 
 
 ' A, 200; B, 246; w., 116. 
 
 ^ Cf. in^ra, pp. 214 seq., to show that Kant means more than this. 
 »A, 19s; B, 241; W., 115. 
 
214 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 some effect.' It is true, he would admit, that the contact of 
 one billiard ball with another may not have as its effect the 
 event which we have foreseen, the motion of the second ball. 
 But it still may be necessarily, that is universally, true — in 
 other words, I may have at any time to admit — that some 
 definite effect follows uniformly on the motion of the first 
 billiard ball. 
 
 Hume has a second argument: Upholders of necessary, 
 connection admit that if a cause recur it must be followed 
 by a recurring effect. Hume denies this uniformity of the 
 causal relation. A past or present experience, he insists, can 
 offer no guarantee for the future : for example, one may not 
 argue from the present relation of spark and flame to the 
 future sequence of one upon the other. Presumably to meet 
 this argument, Kant urges the following consideration: It 
 is admitted, he says, that we know a succession of objects, 
 that is, distinguish an objective from a subjective succession. 
 But objectivity, he holds, is constituted by causaHty, that is, 
 by necessarily uniform succession. Therefore our knowledge 
 of succeeding objects or events is a guarantee of the causal 
 succession of phenomena. Kant has a well-known illustration 
 of our abihty to distinguish objective from subjective suc- 
 cession:^ When I look at a boat drifting down-stream, I 
 must see the boat at the source of the river before I see it at 
 the river's mouth. When, on the contrary, I look at a house, 
 I may successively see the parts in any one of several orders : 
 I may see first the roof and last the cellar, or first the cellar 
 and last the roof. I could not possibly, however, Kant asserts, 
 distinguish the objectivity of the successions of the boat's 
 positions from the subjectivity of the series of ideas of the 
 house, were not the boat's positions linked in a necessary 
 imiform connection which is lacking to the successive ideas. 
 
 ' This doctrine is implied in A, 193-194, B, 238-239, W., 113^114 — a 
 passage written with another purpose, namely, to emphasize the irrevers- 
 ibleness of the causal relation. 
 
 ''A, 191-195; B, 237-240; W., 112-114. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 215 
 
 The fatal flaw in this argument was indicated twenty years 
 later by Schopenhauer.* It is not true that the successive 
 ideas of a 'subjective series' are uncaused. To take Kant's 
 example: there is certainly some cause for that position of 
 my head and eyes which results in my first looking upward 
 to the roof or downward to the cellar of the house, and every 
 successive movement is conditioned by the bodily position 
 or movement which preceded it. Even in the case of a purely 
 imaginary series of ideas, the image of any moment has a cause 
 — physiological or psychical or both — in the preceding mo- 
 ment. But since, thus, subjective as well as objective series 
 are causally bound together, it follows that causality though a 
 character of objective series is not their distinguishing mark.' 
 Kant cannot therefore prove a necessary and uniform 
 connection of events by use of the distinction between ob- 
 jective and subjective succession. But in another section 
 of the " Kritik," ^ he argues in more justifiable fashion for the 
 necessity of causal connection. "If cinnabar," he says, 
 "turned sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, 
 and sometimes heavy ; if a man were transformed now into 
 the shape of this animal and now of that ; if on the longest 
 day the earth were covered now with fruits and again with 
 ice and snow, — then my empirical imagination would never 
 have occasion on observation of the red color to think of the 
 heavy cinnabar. There must therefore be something which, 
 as a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of phenomena, 
 makes this very reproduction of phenomena possible." Kant's 
 
 ' "The Fourfold Root of the Principle of SuiSEicient Reason," § 23 ; ci.infra, 
 
 P- 345- 
 
 ^ It should be added that Kant himself elsewhere formulates another and 
 a justifiable criterion of objectivity. Cf. "Second Analogy," B, 234; also 
 infra, pp. 231 seq. 
 
 'A, 100 seq.; W., 58 seq., "Transcendental Deduction, Synthesis of 
 Reproduction." Cf. Benno Erdmann's use of this argument in a very im- 
 portant paper on "The Content and Vahdity of the Causal Law," in Report 
 of Congress of Science and Arts at St. Louis, Vol. I., also in the Philosophi- 
 cal Review, XIV., 1905. Cf ., also, A. E. Taylor, " Elements of Metaphysics," 
 pp. 165 seq. 
 
2i6 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 meaning is clear. Hume had argued somewhat as follows, 
 the heat of this Jtme is an event distinct from next June's 
 heat; why then must heat be followed by luxuriant vege- 
 tation next June as well as this? Kant raphes: our ex- 
 perience would not be what it is — in other words, we should 
 not know the world as a connected whole of regularly recur- 
 ring phenomena — if the causal uniformity were not absolutely 
 imiversal. The writer of this book, like some other critics of 
 Kant, challenges this conclusion. It is obvious, of course, that 
 we expect such uniformity and that this expectation is imphed 
 in our constant assumption of the regularity of nature. But 
 there seems no cogent reason to doubt that we should assume 
 the uniformity, on the basis of our past experience, even if a 
 future exception to the uniformity were possible — and even 
 if we were sure of such a possibihty. There seems, in other 
 words, no reason to deny that our consciousness of the world 
 as a connected whole might be built up as weU on the basis 
 of an ordinarily uniform experience as on the assumption of 
 an inevitably uniform experience. 
 
 If this criticism of Kant be admitted, it follows that he 
 has not disproved Himie's assertion : the causal and uniform 
 connection of events has not been shown to be absolutely nec- 
 essary. Yet as will appear, the failure to demonstrate this 
 necessity does not invalidate the argument based by Kant on 
 his category doctrine. And more than this, in two features 
 of his causality doctrine, Kant has scored against Hume. 
 He has shown, in the first place, the invalidity of that argu- 
 ment in which Hume denies necessity on the ground that 
 one learns specific causal connections through accidental ex- 
 perience. And he has emphasized, in the second place, the 
 unquestioned necessity, denied by Hume, of the temporal 
 connection of events — the necessity, in other words, of the 
 link between before and after, past, present, and future.* 
 
 ' This is, of course, a virtual repetition of Kant's teaching about time. 
 Incidentally, the inclusion of it with the discussion of causality shows the ar- 
 tificiality of the separation of space and time from the categories. It should 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 217 
 
 4. The category of reciprocal connection * 
 
 At least one other relation is discoverable in the experienced 
 world. Besides knowing every object as a totality and as a 
 comparable thing, and besides knowing temporal events as 
 causally connected, we are aware of a necessary connection 
 between untemporal phenomena. This relation has already 
 been implied by that of totality. The line is the whole of its 
 parts; but the parts are necessarily connected one with the 
 other, indeed, their connection is as necessary as that of a 
 cause with its effect. Similarly, the first term in a binomial 
 series is necessarily connected with the middle term or the 
 last. This form of necessary connection is distinguished, 
 Kant teaches, in the following way from the causal con- 
 nection. The causal and the temporal series are irreversi- 
 ble : the past is inevitably over before the present, the result 
 may not precede the cause. On the other hand, a reciprocal 
 connection is reversible : reciprocally connected phenomena 
 may be apprehended in reversible order. One may look 
 from right to left or from left to right of the line, from west 
 to east or from east to west of the spatially related scene. 
 Right and left, east and west are connected, but their order 
 is, none the less, reversible. In its application to spatial and 
 to other mathematical quantities this is evidently the cate- 
 gory, emphasized in modem mathematics, of order. 
 
 be added that certain paragraphs of the "Second Analogy" consider 
 neither causal nor temporal connection, but rather the reciprocally neces- 
 sary relation of parts within an object (a topic which is elsewhere appro- 
 priately considered; cf. Appendix, p. 527). 
 
 1 This category is only incidentally referred to by Kant in the " Third 
 Analogy" (which is mainly occupied with the consideration of a form of 
 causaUty — mutual causahty — which Kant calls reciprocity). Cf. A, loc. 
 cit., and 211 seq.; B, loc. cit., and 256 seq.; W., 118 seq. Cf, also, Ap- 
 pendix, p. 531. 
 
!i8 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 b. Kant's teaching, in opposition to Wolf, that the 
 categories are subjective 
 
 This discussion of Kant's category doctrine has so far em- 
 phasized mainly his opposition to Hume, that is to say, his 
 teaching that the world of known objects includes not merely 
 sensible qualities but a priori, that is necessary and universally 
 predicable, relations. But Kant opposed with equal vigor 
 Wolff's doctrine that these relations occur outside the mind, 
 as links between realities independent of consciousness. In 
 other words, Kant insisted — in agreement now with Hume 
 and the other idealists — that the categories, no less than the 
 sense forms, space and time, and the sensible qualities, color, 
 hardness, and the rest, are themselves subjective or ideal. 
 But the world of known objects consists, it will be admitted, 
 of sense qualities, of the sense forms, space and time, and of 
 the categories, totality, causality, and the rest. Therefore 
 the known or experienced object is an idea, or, to use 
 Kant's term, a phenomenon; and the known world is a 
 world of ordered phenomena, of subjective realities. 
 
 Kant's main argument for the subjective, or ideal, character 
 of objects as known has been indicated in the discussions of 
 space, of time, and of causality. He has discovered that 
 these relations are a priori, that is, universally predicable. 
 But of reality independent of consciousness no universal 
 predication may, he says, be made. For reahties independent 
 of our consciousness, things-in-themselves, as Kant calls 
 them, could not affect us, or stand in any relation to us, there- 
 fore, they must be, as Kant always teaches, unknown. And 
 obviously, since we do not know them, we can make no 
 universally predicable assertion about them. Whatever is 
 knovra to be universally true must then, as Kant says, be 
 subjective. In his ovm words, "Relation {Verbindung) 
 does not lie in objects and cannot, so to speak, be borrowed 
 from them by sense perception and so first be taken up into 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 2 1 9 
 
 the understanding; on the other hand, connection is ex- 
 clusively an achievement (Verrichtung) of the understand- 
 ing." ' This doctrine of the subjective character of the 
 categories, or relations, is of course in exact opposition to 
 Wolff's teaching. According to Wolff there is a 'real' world 
 independent of consciousness — a world of spatial things 
 and temporal events linked by relations of unity, causality, 
 and the like. We have, Wolff teaches, thoughts about these 
 things and their relations, but things and relations exist 
 unaffected by our thought. Kant has now plundered this 
 supposed world of things-in-themselves, not merely of space 
 and time, but of all the relations as well. We know nothing 
 about unity-in-itself or causality-in-itself, he teaches: unity 
 and causality are mental activities, ways in which we 
 think." 
 
 Kant has thus answered the prehminary questions of his 
 metaphysics, — questions concerning the nature of objects 
 and of our knowledge of them. Known or experienced 
 objects simply are, he says, complexes of related sensations. 
 For example, a grape is a complex of blueness, smoothness, 
 coolness, flavor, resembhng yet differing from other fruits ' 
 and necessarily related to the vine on the one hand and to 
 Rothwein on the other. But sensations and relations are 
 mental experiences. Objects are, therefore, through and 
 through mental, they are ideas ; we know them, as Kant says, 
 because we make them. And yet, though ideal, these known 
 objects are, Kant insists, empirically real ; * they are no 
 
 ' "Analytic," Bk. I.; B, § i6, p. 134; W., p. 66. 
 
 ' This doctrine, it may be noticed, is pretty generally admitted by scien- 
 tific thinkers who, holding to the existence of 'physical forces' independent 
 of our thought, none the less believe that the relations — unity, difference, 
 and the like — are purely mental affairs with nothing corresponding to them 
 in the world of physical energy. . 
 
 ' Resemblance and difference are not numbered by Kant among the 
 explicitly named categories. 
 
 * In the end of the "Esthetic" (A, 28, 36;B, 44, 52; W., 29, 35) Kant con- 
 trasts this 'empirical reality' with 'transcendental ideality.' Both of these 
 terms last mentioned are employed in an unusual sense, to indicate that 
 
220 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 visions and illusions, but real, concrete things, everyday 
 trees and tables and books.* 
 
 In this teaching of the known object as ideal, or phenom- 
 enal, Kant, as has been said so often, merely agreed with 
 Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume. His significance, at this point, 
 was in his opposition to Wolff, who had gone back to the dual- 
 istic standpoint, teaching that there are two kinds of reality, 
 mental and non-mental. Kant himself, as will later appear 
 in more detail, never wholly abandoned Wolff's duahsm. He 
 admitted the existence of realities independent of conscious- 
 ness (things-in-themselves), and in fact he seems to have 
 regarded our sensations as due to them ; but he insisted that 
 these things-in-themselves are unknown and that the char- 
 acters of objects-as-known are, on the contrary, sub- 
 jective. The inconsistency and difficulty of the thing-in- 
 itself doctrine had already been exposed by Hume and by 
 Berkeley, and will, later in this chapter, be discussed. 
 
 c. Criticism of Kant's doctrine of the necessity of the 
 categories ' 
 
 Before proceeding to the exposition of Kant's teaching of 
 the subjectivity of the categories, it is best to review and so far 
 as possible to estimate the main results of the category doc- 
 trine up to this point. As will appear, Kant's most signifi- 
 cant achievement is his emphasis upon the fact that we have 
 not merely sensations but unsensational and, in particular, 
 relational experiences. In the strict sense he does not demon- 
 strate this truth, since it depends for its acceptance on every 
 man's introspection. But he may be said successfully to 
 
 known objects are unreal (ideal) so far as the world transcending conscious- 
 ness is concerned. 
 
 ' Cf. infra, pp. 231 seq., for Kant's distinction between real objects and 
 mere ideas. 
 
 ' The untrained student will perhaps best omit this section on the first 
 reading of the chapter. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 221 
 
 challenge us — Hume included — to deny the occurrence in 
 our experience of the categories. 
 
 Now Kant's main contribution to philosophy — the doc- 
 trine of the transcendental self — depends, as will later be 
 shown, on no wider conclusion about the categories than 
 precisely this : that our experience includes categories as well 
 as sensations. Kant, however, treats the categories in a far 
 more exhaustive fashion, and in particular attempts to explain 
 the distinction between categories and sensations. As has 
 appeared, he finds that the distinction consists in the uni- 
 versality and the necessity of the categories. The writer of 
 this book believes that Kant does not make good this account 
 of the difference, for though there is indeed a universality in 
 the categories, the same universality and necessity may be 
 predicated of sensations. The main purpose of this section 
 is to formulate this criticism. 
 
 By ' the necessary ' Kant of course means ' the inevita- 
 ble,' and he recognizes two sorts of necessity, — 'logical' 
 necessity and necessity of another kind, nowadays called 
 ' epistemological. ' ' Now, there unquestionably is necessity — 
 logical or, in Kant's terms, analytic, necessity — involved in 
 our meanings, conceptions, and definitions. Even Hume 
 admitted the necessity in the case of arithmetical propositions, 
 holding that the square of 3 is necessarily 9, because we mean 
 by the square of 3 what we mean by 9. And similarly, though 
 Hume did not always admit this, the sum of the angles of a 
 triangle is equal to two right angles because we mean by 
 triangle a figure such that the sum of its angles is the sum 
 of two right angles ; and the future is necessarily connected 
 with the present because by future we mean that which 
 is connected with the present. If, then, by necessity 
 
 ' H. Rickert ("Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss," pp. 125 seq., especially 
 p. 129) has slibwn that the fundamental form of epistemological necessity 
 is the necessity that of two contradictory judgments one must be true. 
 This he names Vrteilsnotwendigkeit. Cf . F. C. S. Schiller, " Axioms as 
 Postulates," in "Personal Idealism," p. 70, note (5), 
 
222 
 
 Attack upon Dualism and Phenominalism 
 
 is meant the impossibility of not-meaning-what-we-do- 
 mean, in other words, the impossibihty of self-contradic- 
 tion, Kant is clearly right in asserting the necessity of the 
 categories. But he is as clearly wrong in holding that such 
 necessity distinguishes the categories from sensations. For 
 logically necessary statements may be made as well about 
 sensations as about relations. It is as necessary that what-I- 
 mean-by-white is not-black as it is necessary that what-I- 
 mean-by-two-times-two is four ; and it is as necessary that 
 what-I-mean-by-rose is fragrant as that a triangle is the 
 sum of two right angles. The necessity in both cases is 
 that of my identical meanings.' 
 
 It should be noted that this denial of Kant's distinction 
 between category and sensation does not involve the ad- 
 mission that the two are indistinguishable. On the contrary, 
 sensations are well marked off from the categories. If the 
 passage of this chapter be reread in which the effort is made 
 to give a plausible meaning to Kant's assertion that the 
 categories, as distinguished from sensations, are universal 
 and necessary,^ it will be discovered that all which is shown 
 is (i) the greater observed variety of sensations, and (2) the 
 fact that there are greater observed differences between in- 
 dividuals in their sense experience resulting in an indisposi- 
 tion to make universal judgments about sense facts ; finally, 
 and most important, (3) the fact that while sensations imply 
 relations, relations do not in the same way imply sensations. 
 I cannot, for example, be conscious of ' red' without being 
 conscious of it as less or more bright, but I can well be con- 
 scious of ' more ' without having a consciousness of ' red.' It 
 
 ' This statement about the necessary appears in two forms, one positive 
 and the other negative : the self-contradictory is not true ; and, the true is 
 self-consistent. These are known as the Law of Contradiction and the Law 
 of Identity; are implied in our certainty of the fact of our own conscious- 
 ness ; and are employed by philosophers of every stamp not, as is often erro- 
 neously stated, by rationalists only. Of course, necessity — whether predi- 
 cated of sensation or of category — is itself a category. 
 
 ^ Cf. supra, pp. 205' seq. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 223 
 
 follows that I must predict certain relations in predicting 
 any sensations, whereas I am unlikely to predict these par- 
 ticular sensations in asserting relations. Thus, to summarize 
 Kant's teaching about sensations and categories: he has 
 rightly taught that the categories are necessary, if by neces- 
 sary he means ' inevitably self-consistent ' ; but he has wrongly 
 treated this necessity as a distinction between sensations and 
 relations. In truth, logically necessary statements may be 
 made about sensations ; and their actual distinction from the 
 categories is to be found mainly in what may be named their 
 greater variableness. 
 
 But it must now at once be pointed out that Kant does not 
 mean by the necessity of the categories the merely logical — 
 or, as he calls it, analytical — ■ necessity of which we have so 
 far spoken. In attempting to justify Kant's assertion of the 
 necessity of space, time, and the categories, we have in fact 
 conceived this necessity in an un-Kantian fashion. It is 
 true that Kant recognizes logical necessity, but he expressly 
 teaches that space, time, and the categories have a necessity 
 of another sort. To make clear Kant's meaning it will be 
 necessary, first, to state his distinction between analytic and 
 synthetic judgments. 
 
 "Analytic judgments," Kant teaches, "add nothing 
 through the predicate to the subject, but merely analyze the 
 subject into the partial concepts {Teilhegrifje) which are 
 already thought in it though confusedly. . . . Synthetic 
 judgments add to the conception of the subject a predicate 
 which was not at all contained in it and which could not have 
 been extracted from it by analysis." As example of analytic 
 judgment Kant gives "all bodies are extended," holding that 
 extension is a constituent of my conception of body. The 
 judgment "all bodies are heavy" is, on the contrary, accord- 
 ing to Kant, a synthetic judgment, for heaviness, he says, 
 does not belong to the concept of body.' To this distinction 
 
 » "iEsthetic," Introduction, § 4, A, 7 seg.; B, 11 se<i.; W., 13 je?. It maj 
 
224 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 of the synthetic from the analytic judgment Kant now adds 
 the distinction of the a priori from the a posteriori judgment 
 — the judgment which is universal and necessary from that 
 which is individual and contingent. He attempts, moreover, 
 to coordinate the two sets of distinctions — to decide, in other 
 words, whether analytic and synthetic judgments respec- 
 tively are a priori, a posteriori, or of both kinds. Now, 
 analytic judgments are one and all a priori and, therefore, it 
 is everywhere and without exception true that the characters 
 which a concept includes may be predicated of it. This is 
 the sort of necessity which in this book, and especially in this 
 chapter, has been defended as valid necessity. A more 
 important question in Kant's view is the following: are 
 synthetic judgments, judgments of discovery, ever necessary, 
 a priori? It is evident at first blush that one whole class 
 of synthetic judgments lack this necessity.' These are 
 the judgments which one makes through one's particu- 
 lar experience, which are one and all contingent or a pos- 
 teriori. From the fact that I have, for example, found that 
 metals are heavy I may not rightly infer that without excep- 
 tion all metals are heavy. Kant admits, in other words, that 
 most synthetic judgments are a posteriori, contingent. He 
 insists, however, that besides these contingent synthetic 
 judgments of experience there is another class of synthetic 
 judgments — those which are a priori, or necessary. These, 
 he asserts, are the judgments about space, time, and the 
 categories. In other words, Kant supposes that causaUty 
 and the other relations have a necessity quite different from 
 the logical, or analytic, necessity.^ 
 
 be noted that Locke, who believed that solidity is an essential quality of 
 body, would have named this judgment also analytic. 
 
 Cf. Fichte, "Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre ; " L. Couturat, "Les 
 Principes des Mathematiques," Appendix, pp. 235 seq.; E. Caird, "The 
 Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," I., pp. 267 seq.; and F. Paulsen, 
 "Immanuel Kant," transL, pp. 136 seq., for criticism of Kant's principle 
 of distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. 
 
 'A, 9; B, 13; W., 14. 'A, 10; B, 14; W., 13. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 225 
 
 For a thoroughgoing estimate of this teaching there is not 
 time ; but the following comment may be made : Kant never 
 justifies his assertion that the necessary (o priori) judgments, 
 which may certainly be made about space, time, and the 
 categories, are synthetic as well as necessary. In other 
 words, Kant rightly asserts the necessity of such judgments 
 as " 5 + 7 = 12," "the future follows on the present," but 
 he never proves the truth of his assertion that these a priori 
 judgments are synthetic' It must be confessed that he only 
 once — in the case of causality — even attempts the proof; 
 and the truth is that the causal principle loses necessity 
 whenever it becomes synthetic — whenever, in other words, 
 it seeks to prophesy uniformity. 
 
 And yet it may be pointed out that Kant suggests the 
 occurrence of necessity other than the purely logical neces- 
 sity of analytic judgments. His teaching about the a priori 
 implies the doctrine that, since we undeniably have knowl- 
 edge (or experience) of some sort, therefore the invariable 
 constituents of knowledge are necessary. Now the categories, 
 or relations, are in this sense epistemologically as well as 
 logically necessary, since they belong to experience and thus 
 " make it possible." In precisely similar fashion, however, 
 sensations may be said to be necessary since they, too, are 
 always a constituent of our experience.' 
 
 A brief restatement of this critical section will conclude it. 
 In the view of the writer, Kant has (i) proved that relations 
 are parts of our experience — and this is all which the main 
 argument of the " Kritik " requires of his category doctrine. 
 In the attempt (2) to distinguish categories from sensations 
 he has (a) rightly attributed necessity to space, time, and the 
 categories, but (h) wrongly denied the same sorts of necessity 
 to sensations. He has made this mistake because (3) he 
 
 ' For justification of the statement about the failure of Kant's argument 
 for the a priority of causality, cf . supra, p. 216. For assertion of the analytic 
 character of mathematical judgments, cf . Couturat, op. cit., pp. 262 seq. 
 
 ' Cf. H. Rickert, op. cit., especially pp. 129 seq., 166 seq. 
 
 a 
 
226 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 wrongly regards the necessary judgments about space, time, 
 and the categories as synthetic, that is, as involving a neces- 
 sity other than the logical impossibility of self-contradiction. 
 
 B. Kant's Doctrine of the Self, and of the Object 
 
 AS RELATED TO THE SeLF (IN OPPOSITION TO HuME) 
 
 I. Kant's Argument for the Existence of a Self 
 
 According to Kant the universe of reality includes not 
 merely unknown things in themselves and known objects 
 but includes also a self, or knower. This teaching of Kant 
 is of extreme significance in that it directly opposes Hume's 
 teaching that a self, or knower, does not and cannot exist 
 and that the universe is a mere kaleidoscopic succession of 
 ideas. 
 
 Kant founds his doctrine, — that a self exists, — in the first 
 place, on simple introspection. Hume argues that the 
 succession of ideas makes up the whole of what we know. 
 But these ideas, Kant points out, may at any moment 
 be claimed as 'my' ideas.^ In truth, I am never conscious 
 of ideas which are nobody's ideas: that is to say, in 
 knowing the existence of ideas, I know the existence of a 
 self or of selves. But besides asserting, as a fact of im- 
 mediate experience, the existence of the self, Kant proceeds 
 to argue that certain characters, which we attribute to ideas, 
 really belong to a self and therefore imply its existence. In 
 more detail Kant's argument is as follows: — • 
 
 We are, in the first place, conscious of the identity of cer- 
 tain experiences with others. The consciousness of the 
 identity of the present with the past is, in truth, the essence 
 of recognition. Kant lays stress upon this 'synthesis of 
 recognition,' as he calls it. We have, as he points out, the 
 " consciousness that what we think is the same as that which 
 
 ' "Analytic," Bk. I., \ i6, sentence i: "Das: Ich denke muss alia 
 meine Vorstellungen begleiten konnen." 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 227 
 
 we thought a minute ago." ' Now this identity cannot, 
 Kant insists, belong to the ideas themselves. For, as idea 
 of a particular moment, each idea is distinct from every 
 other, far from being identical with it. If, therefore, as 
 Hume contends, there were no self, — if the word 'self 
 were merely a name for a succession of ideas, — then one 
 idea never could be looked upon as identical with another 
 which had gone before ; and no one even could say, "This is 
 the same view, or bird note, or conclusion." For to-day's 
 landscape, or sound, or reflection is a different idea, a dis- 
 tinct experience, from yesterday's. Yet we do have the 
 experience of identity — in other words, we do recognize ; 
 and the fact that identity may not be attributed to ideas 
 leaves us but the one way to account for the existence of 
 identity. The consciousness of identity is really, thus, the 
 consciousness of the one and identical self.^ 
 
 In the second place, Kant argues the existence of the self 
 from a more general character of the series of ideas. Not 
 merely the one relation of identity, which we attribute to 
 ideas, but all relations of ideas to other ideas, that is, the 
 general fact of the relatedness of ideas imphes, Kant says, 
 the existence of a relating or unifying self. In his own 
 words: "The consciousness of relation can be created only 
 by the subject, for it is an act of its self-activity."^ Kant is 
 content with this assertion that relatedness implies a self as 
 relater. The proposition is, however, so important, that 
 it must be dwelt upon with more than Kant's emphasis on 
 it. Kant has established the fact that the known world is a 
 
 '"Analytic," "Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding," in 
 Edition A (A, p. 103; W., p. 60). Kant shows that the consciousness of 
 identity is involved also in perception. Cf. A, 98. 
 
 ^ Cf. F. C. S. Schiller, on "Axioms as Postulates," in " Personal Idealism," 
 p. 97. "The felt self -identity of consciousness ... is the ultimate psy- 
 chical basis for raising the great postulate of logical identity." Cf. J. S. 
 Mill, note 33 to Vol. II., Chapter XIV., § 7, of his edition of James Mill's 
 "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind." 
 
 5 "Transcendental Deduction" of Edition B, B, p. 130; W., p. 64. 
 
2 28 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 world of related objects, that is, of related ideas. But, as 
 Hume has shown, an idea, in itself considered, is an isolated 
 and self-sufficient fact. The idea of one moment is indeed 
 over before that of another begins, so that there is nothing 
 in one idea which may relate it to a second. It follows 
 that relations do not exist as parts of ideas ; and yet it has 
 been shown already that all relations are subjective, that 
 they exist in the world of consciousness, not in a world 
 independent of reality.' But since ideas are, as a matter 
 of experience, in relations of causality, identity, and the 
 like, to still other ideas,^ these relations, which belong 
 neither to objects independent of consciousness nor to 
 objects as known (ideas) must be characters of a self ; 
 and a self must exist because ideas are related, because 
 they cannot relate themselves, and because no reality inde- 
 pendent of consciousness relates them. 
 
 Kant's argument for the existence of a self has real value. 
 Before Hume's time, philosophers, once they have estab- 
 lished the reahty of consciousness, do not need to argue for 
 the existence of selves ; for consciousness is simply assumed 
 to mean selves who are conscious. Hume, however, chal- 
 lenges this assumption. He teaches, to be sure, that the 
 universe consists, through and through, of consciousness ; but 
 he conceives of consciousness as mere succession of ideas. 
 Kant now restores selves to their rights. A world of con- 
 sciousness must be, he insists, the world of a conscious self 
 which has ideas ; for the ideas, and in particular the identity 
 and the relatedness of the ideas, imply the existence of an 
 identical and unifying self. No self — no ideas ; if ideas — 
 then a self : such, in brief, is Kant's answer to Hume. And 
 the universe of reality, as so far formulated by Kant, con- 
 tains (i) related objects which have turned out to be com- 
 
 ' This argument lays no stress on the relation of the parts within an 
 idea. For consideration of the implication of relation in general, cf. injra. 
 Chapter lo, pp. 369 seq., and Chapter 11, pp. 418 sej. 
 
 ' Cf. quotation on p. 218^ above. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 229 
 
 plexes of sensations and relations; (2) the self which knows 
 them; and (3) unknown things-in-themselves. 
 
 II. Kant's Doctrine of the Nature of the Self 
 
 The existence of known objects, that is, of ideas, has thus 
 been shown by Kant to imply the existence of a conscious 
 self. Kant does not, however, — for a reason which will 
 later appear, — make use of the words 'self or 'spirit.' In 
 their place, he employs such expressions as 'the subject,' 
 'the I think,' and still more often the awkward expression 
 'unity of apperception,' doubtless chosen in order to empha- 
 size the self as contrasted with the evanescent plurahty of the 
 successive, momentary ideas. In this chapter the non-Kan- 
 tian term ' self ' is retained, for the sake of brevity and clear- 
 ness.* No part of Kant's philosophy has more constructive 
 value and none has had more historical significance than his 
 doctrine of the nature of the self. The most characteristic 
 feature of this doctrine is the distinction which he makes 
 between the 'transcendental' self, as he calls it, and the 
 'empirical' self. 
 
 a. The transcendental and the empirical self 
 
 Heretofore, philosophers have distinguished only between 
 finite selves and infinite self. Kant finds the conception 
 'finite self too crude to do justice to the complexity of self- 
 consciousness, but the distinction by which he seeks to 
 enrich it — the distinction between transcendental and 
 empirical self ^ — is, as will appear, vague and indecisive. 
 
 ' The terms ' Gemuth ' and ' innerer Sinn (inner sense) ' as used in the first 
 part of the " Kritik," the early written " Esthetic," probably refer to the self 
 as contrasted with the thing-in-itself. Occasionally these terms creep into 
 the "Analj^ic" — usually as synonyms for 'empirical self,' in some one of 
 its meanings. 
 
 ^ Cf. "Analytic," "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Un- 
 derstanding," of Edition B, §§ 16-19, PP- 13^ *«?•>' W., pp. 65 seq. Even 
 the beginner in philosophy should read these sections, containing, as they do, 
 the core of Kant's teaching. 
 
230 Attack upon Dualism aud Phenomenalism 
 
 (i) He first distinguishes the transcendental self, as identical, 
 from the empirical self, as momentary. Already, in the argu- 
 ment for the existence of a self, Kant has shown how the 
 self, as identical, is contrasted with the idea, as momentary. 
 Now the momentary idea may be idea-of-a-self ; as such, it 
 is empirical self and is distinguished from the transcendental, 
 the identical, self. At any particular instant there are present 
 to my consciousness not only the varying complexes of ordered 
 sensations constituting my percepts of desk and book-shelves 
 and window and road, but a certain complex, chiefly of 
 organic sensations, affectively toned, which makes up my 
 this-moment's-idea-of-myself. This way-that-I-feel-at-this- 
 particular-moment is contrasted both with the percept of 
 outer object and also with the experienced self that can- 
 not be broken up into moments — with the identical, more- 
 than-momentary, one self of which each of us is conscious — 
 the self which remembers and feels and intends instead of 
 consisting of memory image or feeling or purpose. Now 
 the identical self is what Kant means, primarily, by his 
 transcendental unity of apperception ; and his empirical self 
 is, from this point of view, the shifting self which varies with 
 every change of environment, which alters in the process of 
 youth to age and in the progress of disease. The empirical 
 self is, in fact, Kant says, "a many-colored self," or rather, it 
 is a series of selves, each one a distinct idea,^ whereas the tran- 
 scendental self is my own deeper, underlying, identical self. 
 
 (2) The transcendental as contrasted with the empirical self 
 is, in the second place, a thinking, categorizing, active, not a 
 sensationally conscious, passive, self. This is evident from 
 the very name which Kant apphes to it, synthetic unity 
 of apperception, and from the nature of the argument which 
 he advances for the existence of a self. It is the transcen- 
 dental, more-than-momentary, self for which he argues, and 
 he establishes the truth of its existence — it will be remem- 
 
 ' B, § 16, paragraph 2, sentence 5 (p. 134), freely paraphrased. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 231 
 
 bered — solely on the ground that there must be a unifier, 
 a relater of the sense-manifold. Such a unifying, relating 
 self is a thinking self. 
 
 (3) A final important character is attributed by Kant to the 
 transcendental I : it is not merely an identical, and a think- 
 ing, but a universal, self, 'one universal self-consciousness,' 
 as he declares.' We have next, therefore, to discover how 
 he argues that the self is universal and what he means by 
 its universahty. Both problems will be found to involve us 
 in difficulty. In brief, he argues its universality from the 
 discovery that there are ' things outside me,' ^ and our study 
 of his conception of the self leads, therefore, to a discussion 
 of his conception of the ' thing outside me,' and of his argu- 
 ment for its existence. There is a sharp distinction — so Kant 
 teaches, quite in harmony with everyday philosophy — be- 
 tween my private ideas (Vorsiellungen) and the ' things 
 outside me, ' or 'things in space.' It is true that, accord- 
 ing to Kant, these 'things outside me' are known objects, 
 and as such that they are themselves ideas, or related sen- 
 sation-complexes,^ but they differ utterly from the ideas 
 peculiar to a single self — the ideas of a self -as-particular. 
 Between ' an object in space ' and the ideas (percepts or 
 images) called up in different minds by this same object, 
 there is, Kant thus insists, a difference, though the 'thing 
 outside me' is itself idea.^ For example, between my 
 own particular sight or percept of a stone, or your percept 
 of it, and the 'stone outside me' there must be a dis- 
 tinction, else we could not, Kant observes, make general 
 
 '"Analytic," § i6, B, 132; W., 65. 
 
 ^ Kant's reason for believing the existence of a universal self thus re- 
 sembles Berkeley's reason for asserting that there is an infinite self, though, 
 as will appear, Kant is far from meaning by transcendental self what 
 Berkeley means by infinite self. 
 
 ' Conversely it is, as Kant says, true that "every . . . idea may be called 
 an object, so far as one is conscious of it" ("Second Analogy," B, p. 234; 
 W., no). 
 
 ' "Analytic," Bk. I., B, § t8; 139-140; W., 70-71. 
 
232 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 assertions about objects: we could not say "the thing is 
 heavy," but merely "the thing feels heavy to me,"' nor could 
 we distinguish imagination from perception. Thus, generali- 
 zation and perception both imply, Kant teaches, 'a thing 
 outside me and not the mere consciousness of a thing outside 
 me ':^ in other words, "to our percepts (ailsseren Anschau- 
 ungen) there corresponds something real in space." ^ 
 
 This ' thing outside me ' or real ' object in space ' is not, we 
 must once more remind ourselves, an object independent of 
 consciousness, in the sense of the duahsts, Locke and Des- 
 cartes, — in Kant's own terms, it is not a 'thing-in-itself.' 
 Such a view, however tempting, is impossible. For the thing 
 in itself, Kant always teaches, is imknown ; whereas the real 
 'object in space,' though it is not your or my exclusive pos- 
 session, yet is a thing that you and I know, and is therefore 
 an idea. The problem is to reconcile these two conditions: 
 to discover an idea, or phenomenon, which yet is a 'real 
 thing' in a sense in which our percepts, as particular, are not 
 real. Kant's solution of the problem is the following: he 
 conceives of the 'real things in space' as objects of the 
 transcendental self and contrasts them with the mere ideas, 
 the ideas of empirical selves. The real things are, thus, ex- 
 ternal to the empirical self, but they are the ideas, or objects, 
 of the transcendental self. 
 
 The pressing question of Kantian interpretation is then 
 the following : what, concretely, is the self whose object is no 
 mere percept or image, but a real thing, though at the same 
 time an idea? It is very difficult to find Kant's answer to 
 this question. Berkeley has answered it by the doctrine 
 that it is God whose object or idea is the external thing. 
 
 '"Analytic," Bk. I., B, § ig, B, 142; W., 71-72. 
 
 ^ "Refutation of Idealism" of Edition B, B, 275. For outline and criti- 
 cism of the arguments which Kant presents, cf. Appendix, pp. 530, 533. 
 In brief, he argues that consciousness of myself demands a permanent in 
 perception; and that the "perception of this permanent requires a thing 
 outside me." 
 
 ' "Dialectic," Paralagism 4, of Edition A, A, 375, 374 el al. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 233 
 
 Fichte and Hegel are yet to answer it by the teaching that the 
 transcendental self is an absolute, or including, self. The 
 universal self, they hold, whose object is a real thing, must be 
 a self which is greater than the finite selves, and which in 
 some sense includes them. Thus interpreted, the trans- 
 cendental self is a more-than-finite self ; the empirical selves 
 are particular, finite selves, related to the including self as 
 the momentary states to the finite, yet identical, self; and 
 real things, objects of the transcendental or including self, 
 are in one sense external to the finite selves, and yet are known 
 by them in so far as they, the finite selves, share in the con- 
 sciousness of the greater self which includes them.' In the 
 view of the writer, this post-Kantian doctrine truly offers the 
 only answer to the question which Kant himself has raised : 
 how account for the existence of real things distinguished 
 from the ideas of finite selves? But Kant, though he states 
 the problem and, indeed, by the distinction between greater 
 and lesser self, provides terms for this HegeUan solution of it, 
 never himself reaches this result. By transcendental self 
 he seems to mean not an absolute self which includes finite 
 selves but any finite self — you, I, he, or Friedrich der 
 Grosse — in its universalizing consciousness of real things. 
 Thus, besides being a particular self and as such possessed of 
 percepts and imaginations of my own, I am also, Kant seems 
 to teach, a transcendental, universal self which perceives 
 objects realer than those of the particularizing, momentary, 
 empirical self — objects which are in a sense outside that 
 empirical self. Thus, for example, Immanuel Kant, as 
 empirical self, may stand at his window imagining his lec- 
 ture-room and even having his own special percept of the 
 view before him, but Kant as transcendental self is conscious 
 also of 'objects' — of the real Konigsberg street and church 
 and Rathhaus; and these objects might be facts in the ex- 
 perience of all human beings, instead of being, Hke the image 
 
 ■ For more detailed discussion of this doctrine, cf. Chapters 9, 10, 11, 
 pp. 32 r seq., 382 seq., 435 seq. 
 
234 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 of the lecture-room, an idea belonging to one self only. In 
 a word, Kant seems to imply that the different transcenden- 
 tal selves overlap each other — that you and he and I, as 
 conscious of the same object, have somehow a common expe- 
 rience. He seems never to realize that such common experi- 
 ence is impossible if there be not an including self — that, 
 in truth, a universal self is of necessity absolute self. 
 
 h. The subject and the object self 
 
 Besides the distinction between identical and universaliz- 
 ing, or transcendental, self and momentary and particular, or 
 empirical, self Kant recognizes a contrast between subject 
 self and object self, a difference indicated by the words 'I' 
 and 'me.' When I say, "I am conscious of myself," I 
 seem, at least, to make a difference between the self as sub- 
 ject and the self as object. Kant fails to observe that this 
 distinction is not a primary or a fundamental one. It seems 
 to arise through carrying back into the domain of self-con- 
 sciousness the relation which first exists between the self and 
 the thing. "I know the thing" through contrasting it with 
 myself; and so, by a later abstraction, I believe myself to 
 know myself by distinguishing a subject from an object ego. 
 Really, self-consciousness is a single unified experience, and 
 subject self and object self are 'poles within consciousness.' 
 
 The greatest difficulty in Kant's exposition of the self is 
 now the fact that he sometimes treats the distinction between 
 subject self and object self as if it were identical with the 
 contrast between transcendental and empirical ego: that is 
 to say, he sometimes identifies the transcendental with the 
 subject ego, and less constantly the empirical with the object 
 ego.^ He teaches, in other words, that the self is knower 
 only and not itself known ; that, on the other hand, the self 
 as known is the lesser, the empirical, self. 
 
 It wiU be well to summarize the results, already outlined, 
 ' Cf. infra, pp. 244 seq. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 235 
 
 of Kant's positive teaching, before going on, as we must, to the 
 study of his negative doctrine. Kant started, it will be re- 
 membered, from the standpoint of the Wolffian dualism ; he 
 conceived the universe as consisting (i) of things-in-them- 
 selves, reahties independent of consciousness, substances 
 spatially and temporally ordered and causally related, and 
 (2) of conscious minds which know these things. This dual- 
 istic view may be symbolized thus : — 
 The Universe 
 
 Consciousness Things-in-themselves 
 
 But Kant, partly through the influence of Hume, little by little 
 discovered that space, time, substance, and causahty — all 
 the positive characters of the world independent of conscious- 
 ness — really are subjective and ideal. Thus he taught that 
 known objects are simply sensations 'ordered' by certain 
 relations. These relations, he argued further, require and 
 imply the existence of a self. In place, therefore, of the old 
 distinction between consciousness and things, Kant now 
 recognized a double opposition : first, that of 'self to 'object' 
 or 'thing' (each regarded as within the world of conscious- 
 ness) ; and second, that of consciousness, including both self 
 and object, to reality-independent-of-consciousness, that is, 
 to things-in-themselves. The teaching of this stage of 
 Kant 's idealism may be represented, thus : — 
 The Universe 
 
 Consciousness Things-in-themselves 
 
 Selves Things 
 
 Kant's positive philosophy is thus the doctrine of the self 
 and the known thing. But his conception of the self be- 
 comes complex. He contrasts (i) the self as knower, or sub- 
 ject, with the self as known, or object (thus attributing to 
 the self the term, object, heretofore reserved for the thing 
 or the idea). He ;l1so (2) contrasts the self as identical and 
 
236 Attack upon Dualism aud Phenomenalism 
 
 universalizing with the self as momentary and particular; 
 indicating the last two distinctions by one pair of terms, 
 transcendental and empirical. Corresponding with this com- 
 plexity of the self, Kant recognizes a distinction in the class 
 of known objects according as they are ideas of the self as 
 transcendental, or of the self as empirical. These distinctions 
 are included in the following rough summary, but it is not 
 possible to indicate, by the summary, the relations between 
 self and thing, subject and object, namely, that the tran- 
 scendental self is knower both of the empirical, or evanes- 
 cent, self, and of its own categorized sense objects, the 
 'things outside me'; and that the empirical self may be 
 regarded as conscious both of itself and of its ideas : — 
 
 The Universe 
 
 Consciousness Things-in-themselves 
 
 Selves Objects 
 
 Subject-self: Object-selj : 
 
 Transcen- Things outside me 
 
 dental 
 Empirical Empirical Particular ideas 
 
 C. Kant's Negative Teaching That Ultimate 
 Reality is Unknown 
 
 From this summary of Kant's positive teaching, it is 
 necessary now to turn to the negative doctrine on which he 
 seems to lay equal stress. He teaches unambiguously thai 
 not only a world of things independent of consciousness, but 
 also the transcendental self and God are unknown. These 
 teachings must be separately summarized and estimated. 
 
 I. The DocTiaNE of Things-in-themselves as 
 Unknown 
 
 From the earhest years of his teaching to the very end 
 Kant clings to the belief, in which he has been bred, that there 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 237 
 
 exists a world of realities independent of and unaffected by 
 our consciousness of them. He diverges, however, from the 
 traditional doctrine in insisting that we cannot know these 
 objects-as-they-really-are, the things in themselves. "Not 
 the slightest statement," he says, "is to be made a priori 
 concerning the thing in itself which may lie at the basis of 
 . . . phenomena." ^ This doctrine involves a conception of 
 the nature of things-in-themselves, an argument for their 
 existence, and a proof that they are unknown. 
 
 Three essential aspects must be emphasized of the things- 
 in-themselves as Kant conceives them. They are, first, by 
 hypothesis, independent of consciousness, other than con- 
 sciousness, and out of relation with it. This is the force of 
 the predicate 'in themselves' — which indicates the self- 
 sufficiency, the utter independence, of these non-mental 
 realities. The things in themselves are regarded, in the 
 second place, as ultimately real.^ The objects of experience, 
 the objects which turn out to be the ideas of a mind, are 
 called phenomena — that is, appearances — in contrast with 
 them. And because of their supposedly superior reality it 
 seems to Kant a serious loss not to know the things-in- 
 themselves. Finally, the things-in-themselves, as conceived 
 by Kant, lack all characters save that of mere existence. 
 Space and time, substantiality and causality, attributed by 
 Wolff to the reality independent of consciousness, have been 
 regained by Kant for the objects of experience ; the alleged 
 world of things-in-themselves is thus despoiled of all positive 
 characters. 
 
 The discovery that the things-in-themselves are thus empty 
 
 » "General Remarks," A, 49 ; B, 66, § 8, 1., end. 
 
 ' In the sense of ' reality as opposed to appearance ' the term ' thing-in- 
 itself has been retained by philosophers who deny utterly the existence of 
 reality independent of consciousness — by Schopenhauer, who applies it to 
 the Will, by Clifford who applies it to the momentary feeling, and by Strong 
 who differs from Kant mainly in insisting on the mental, though entirely 
 unperceived, nature of the things-in-themselves. (Cf. citations on p. 185, 
 and cf. M. Prince, "The Nature of Mind," Chapters III.-IV.) 
 
238 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 of positive reality raises the question : Why does Kant hold 
 so unswervingly to the bare and useless existence of them? 
 The truth seems to be that, on the basis of the dualism in 
 which he has been bred, he simply takes for granted, without 
 argument, that things-in-themselves exist. The only argu- 
 ments which he suggests are the following : He says, to be- 
 gin with, that in order that there may be appearances, there 
 must be something real of which they are the appearances.' 
 He suggests, in the second place, that sensations, since they 
 are arbitrary, must be caused by things independent of us.^ 
 The truth, however, is, as has been said, that Kant assumes 
 and hardly attempts to argue the existence of these things-in- 
 themselves. 
 
 Kant's teaching that the things-in-themselves, thus con- 
 ceived and argued, are imknown is most vigorously stated in 
 his section on " Phenomena and Noumena."' It begins with 
 a forcible metaphor. "We have now," Kant says, "travelled 
 through the land of pure xmderstanding. But this land is an 
 island and is confined, by nature herself, within unchange- 
 able bounds. It is the land of truth (an alluring name), 
 surrounded by a wide and stormy sea, the very domain of il- 
 lusion, where many a fog-bank and many an iceberg, soon to 
 melt away, falsely suggest new lands. . . . But before we 
 venture out on this sea ... it wiU be wise to cast a glance 
 upon the map of the land which we are ready to abandon, and 
 first to ask whether we might not be content with what it con- 
 tains — whether in fact we must not be content with this land, 
 if there be nowhere else a footing." It at once appears that 
 spite of the existence of the sea of unexperienced reality we 
 must indeed be content with this island of experience, for — 
 dropping his metaphor — Kant argues, as he has so often 
 
 ' A, 250. 
 
 ' It is not certain that this teaching is intended by Kant. It is sug- 
 gested in the " Aesthetic, " Sec. I., A, 19, B, 33, and more definitely in his 
 "Prolegomena." (Cf. note on p. 240, infra.) For refutation of such an 
 argument, cf. especially chap. 4, on Berkeley, pp. 128 seq. 
 
 ' "Analytic," A, 235 seq.; B, 294 seq.; W., 129 seq. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 239 
 
 argued, that our knowledge is by its constitution incapable 
 of apprehending ultimate reaUty. The reason which Kant 
 assigns for this restriction of knowledge to the world of 
 appearance is, briefly, the following: that our knowledge 
 always includes sensation,^ and that sense knowledge can- 
 not reach (what it none the less impUes) ultimate reaUty. 
 This teaching is reiterated throughout the "Kritik." One 
 whole section, ostensibly devoted to the discussion of the 
 categories of modaUty,^ is really given over to the teaching 
 that what is ' actual ' is always, for us, sensational. And the 
 section now under consideration says emphatically: "The 
 understanding can never overstep the limits of sense;"' 
 "only through its sense condition can a category have a 
 definite meaning ... for a category can contain only a 
 logical function . . . through which alone [without sense 
 consciousness] nothing can be known." ^ And because of 
 this inevitable sense factor in' knowledge, the mind, so Kant 
 teaches in the second place, should never "make a tran- 
 scendental use" of any of its concepts, that is, it should 
 never "apply its concepts to things-in-themselves." ° It 
 follows that Kant's gallant rescue of the categories — the 
 unsensational factors of experience — from Hume's attack 
 has not, in his own opinion, any bearing on the problem of 
 the knowableness of reality. According to Wolff relational 
 or thought consciousness guarantees the independent reality 
 of its object, whereas sense consciousness is, in its nature, 
 illusory. But Kant points out that thought is always mixed 
 with sense, that our knowledge always has the sensational 
 taint; and, accepting Wolff's doctrine that the object of 
 sense is mere phenomenon, he concludes that the reality 
 independent of our consciousness is unknown. 
 
 ' Cf. p. 254 for reference to Kant's doctrine that knowledge might be 
 purely intellectual. 
 
 i* A, 218 seq.; B, 265 seq.; W., 122 seq. 'A, 247; B, 303; W., 131. 
 •A, 244-245- Cf. A, 254; B, 309; W., 131-132- 
 'A, 238; B, 297-298; W., 129'. 
 
240 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 This brief exposition of the doctrine of the unknown things 
 in-themselves must be supplemented by an estimate of it. 
 From the start, suspicion has attached to it, for it has been 
 discovered that Kant himself does not consistently hold it. 
 The things-in-themselves belong, by his definition, to reality 
 independent of consciousness; and such reahty cannot be 
 known because the categories cannot be apphed to it. Yet 
 Kant conceives it sometimes as 'things,' sometimes as 'ob- 
 ject ' — thus implying either its plurality or its unity ; and 
 he speaks of it either as actual, or at least as possible, thus 
 applying some one of his categories of modality. More than 
 once also he treats this independent reality as causally re- 
 lated to sense experience : thus he says,^ "The word 'appear- 
 ance' . . . indicates a relation to something . . . which 
 must exist in itself, that is to an object independent of sense." 
 And in another passage he refers to a "transcendental 
 object which is the cause of the phenomenon." ^ Truth to 
 tell, this inconsistency is rooted deep in a fundamental diffi- 
 culty of the thing-in-itself doctrine. Things-in-themselves 
 are, by hypothesis, independent of consciousness, yet they 
 must be talked about and thought about if they are to be 
 inferred as existing. They are drawn, thus, into the domain 
 of the self, they become objects of consciousness, no longer 
 independent reaUties.^ 
 
 The self-contradiction of Kant's teaching that things-in- 
 themselves must exist is thus so evident that the comments on 
 his specific arguments may without harm be abbreviated. 
 
 ' A, 252; cf. 249-250. 
 
 ^ A, 288 ; B, 344 ; cf . for even more explicit statement, Kant's " Prole- 
 gomena," § 13, Remark II.; "I admit . . . that there exist outside us bodies, 
 that is, things which though . . in themselves altogether unknown to us, 
 we know through the ideas which their influence upon our sensibility sup- 
 plies. " (Note, however, that the "Prolegomena" was written in a mood of 
 exaggerated opposition to idealism. Cf. Appendix, p. 510.) 
 
 ' Cf. Berkeley's virtual proof of this in his arguments against the existence 
 of matter conceived as unknown {supra, pp. 131 seq.) and Hegel's discussion 
 of the same hypothesis in his chapters on "Essence" and "Appearance" 
 {infra, pp. 365 seq.). 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 241 
 
 In support of the existence of things-in-themselves, he first 
 argues, it will be remembered, that they must exist to 
 cause sensations. But this implies, what Kant denies, that 
 they are categorized objects. Another argument for the 
 existence of things-in-themselves is by the assertion that 
 mere phenomena, or manifestations, require a something 
 to manifest, a reality of which they are appearance. Upon 
 this reasoning, two criticisms may be made. On the one 
 hand, the argument is illicit, for it applies a category, that of 
 substance, to the things-in-themselves, which, by hypothesis, 
 are uncategorized ; in the second place, the argument is 
 insufficient, for it proves only the existence of some reality 
 more ultimate than phenomena, and leaves open the possi- 
 bility that this more ultimate reality is no thing, but a self. 
 Kant's proof that things are unknown may be even more 
 briefly treated. It rests on the two propositions: that 
 knowledge involves sensation, and that the object of sen- 
 sational consciousness is, ipso facto, unreal. Both proposi- 
 tions are mere assumptions; and for the second, no proof 
 can be found.^ As a whole, then, Kant's thing-in-itself doc- 
 trine breaks under its own weight. He has not proved that 
 things-in-themselves if they exist are unknown; he has not 
 proved that they exist ; and — most important of all — he 
 has not even a right to the bare conception of them, since it 
 involves him in a logical contradiction. 
 
 II. Kant's Doctrine of the Real Self as Unknown 
 
 To the world of ultimate reality which Kant contrasts with 
 that of appearances or phenomena, there may belong, he 
 teaches, not merely things-in-themselves, that is, realities 
 independent of consciousness, but also real, or transcendental, 
 selves.^ These selves, he adds, Hke the things-in-themselves, 
 
 '■ Cf. supra, p. 239. 
 
 ' This conception of the selves as hke the things-in-themselves in being 
 possessed of ultimate reality is an advance on Kant's earlier, Wolffian view 
 (cf. p. 199). 
 
242 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 must be unknown. This assertion that the real or transcen- 
 dental selves are unknown is, it must be observed, more im- 
 portant than the parallel teaching about things-in-themselves. 
 For by the teaching that beyond the domain of self and its 
 object there exist realities which may not be known, ELant 
 simply indicates that the world of selves and their objects is 
 a part only of reahty. But by the doctrine that the tran- 
 scendental ego, the real self, the permanent I, is unknown, 
 Kant narrows the world of the known, subtracting from it 
 the only ultimate reahties which it contains. 
 
 Kant does not, it will be observed, deny the existence of the 
 transcendental selves (or self), nor does he, like Hume, deny 
 the possibility of self-knowledge. But he insists that only 
 the empirical, the lesser and fragmentary self, can be known ; 
 teaching that the true self, though unquestionably existing, 
 cannot constitute an object of knowledge. It is true, he 
 admits, that we infer its existence as the necessary unifier of 
 experience, but the only self which we ever catch, so to 
 speak, the only describable, known self, is just a sum of per- 
 cepts, feelings, and memories — a momentary, particular, 
 empirical ego. In Kant's own words : " I, as intelligence and 
 thinking subject, know myself as thought object, . . . not 
 as I am . . . but as I appear to myself." ' More un- 
 equivocally: "I am conscious of myself ... in the syn- 
 thetic, original unity of apperception, not as I appear to 
 myself, nor as I am in myself : [I am conscious] only that I 
 am." ■" 
 
 This doctrine, it is obvious, is of grave import, for it takes 
 away our knowledge of the only significant self — the only 
 self which has permanence, the only self to which moral 
 worth or immortahty might be attributed.' The known, 
 empirical self reduces, indeed, to an ego closely resembling 
 
 ' B, "Analytic," § 24, 155 end: §§ 24 and 25 taken together contain the 
 most detailed formulation of this argument. 
 ' B, § 25, 137. 
 ' Cf. note on p. 266, injra. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 243 
 
 Hume's mere bundle of perceptions. The heavy conse- 
 quences, thus foreshadowed, of this doctrine, predispose one 
 to a critical examination of Kant's arguments for it. These 
 are two. The first is derived from Kant's conception of 
 knowledge and from his conception of the nature of the 
 transcendental self. On the one hand, he teaches (i) that 
 all knowledge must include sensation; yet (2) that knowl- 
 edge, just because it contains sensation, is incapable of attain- 
 ing unphenomenal reahty. And, on the other hand, he teaches 
 that the transcendental self is a categorizing, imifying self, 
 not a complex of sensations ; and that it is therefore a more- 
 than-phenomenal reahty. It follows that the self, just be- 
 cause it is the deepest kind of reahty, carmot be known, since 
 knowledge includes sensation and since sensation cannot 
 reach the non-phenomenal. This means that all objects of 
 knowledge — including even the self-as-known — must be 
 phenomenal objects, that is, mere appearances, in compari- 
 son with the reahties independent of consciousness. In 
 Kant's own words : "the consciousness of oneself is far from 
 being a knowledge of oneself. . . . Just as I need for the 
 knowledge of an object distinct from me not merely thought 
 . . . but also a perception, ... so also I need for the 
 knowledge of myself . . . besides the fact that I think 
 myself, a perception also of the manifold within me." * 
 
 Before going on to outhne Kant's second argument for 
 the unknowableness of the transcendental ego, it will be well 
 to estimate the value of the first. The impUcit assumptions 
 of this argument have been enumerated; and a brief con- 
 sideration will make clear that, while several of them may be 
 admitted, one at least will be sharply challenged. It may be 
 admitted, in the first place, that the transcendental self is a 
 more-than-fragmentary and an ultimate reahty.^ It is also 
 
 > B, § 25, 158. 
 
 ^ Yet this admission is, on Kant's part, inconsistent with the doctrine that 
 the deepest, the ultimate, reality is independent of consciousness. C£. 
 pp. 236 iej. 
 
244 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 true that we have always found not merely what we call cm 
 knowledge but all our consciousness to contain sensations; 
 in other words, we have never found ourselves conscious 
 without at the same time seeing or hearing, smelling or tast- 
 ing or feeling (singly or together). To be sure, the sen- 
 sational factor of our experience often is unemphasized and 
 unattended to, but — as far as our past and present experi- 
 ence goes — it is always present. But this fact offers no 
 warrant for Kant's conclusion that because our knowledge 
 is, in this meaning, sensational, therefore it may not have as 
 object any ultimate reality. Of course it is true that my 
 consciousness of myself is much more than sensational (and 
 this is doubtless the foundation of Kant's doctrine) ; but this 
 fact does not hinder my being both sensationally conscious 
 and conscious of myself. The two experiences are not irrec- 
 oncilable ; the sensations are either coincident with the self- 
 consciousness or even unemphasized parts of it. When 
 Dante, for example, first saw Beatrice he was conscious of 
 her red robe, but the presence of the sensational conscious- 
 ness did not prevent his soul meeting hers — in a word, did 
 not affect Dante's knowledge of Beatrice. Thus, to reca- 
 pitulate, Kant's first argument to prove the transcendental 
 self unknowable is invalid mainly because it argues, without 
 adequate foundation, that where sensation is there ultimate 
 reality is not. 
 
 Kant's second argument for the doctrine that the tran- 
 scendental self is unknown, is formulated in a later part of the 
 'Kritik.'" In brief, this argument is the following : Knowl- 
 edge involves the distinction between subject and object, that 
 is, between the 'I' and the 'me'; but if the transcendental 
 self were known, it would itself be both subject and object, 
 both ' I ' and ' myself ' ; and this is impossible, for so the neces- 
 sary distinction between subject and object would be lost. 
 
 '"Dialectic," Paralogisms of Edition B (B, 404; W., 148). Here 
 Kant also argues, very successfully, that the soul, if distinguished in Locke's 
 fashion from the self, must be unknown. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 245 
 
 Kant sees in this contradiction a support for his doctrine that 
 the transcendental self is pure subject, or knower, without 
 being object, or known. "Through this I or He or It (the 
 thing) which thinks, nothing except a transcendental subject 
 of thoughts is represented (vorgestellt), = X, ... of which, 
 in abstraction, we can have no slightest idea. (About this / 
 we revolve in an inconvenient circle since we must have a 
 consciousness (Vorstellung) of it to come to any conclusion 
 about it.)" Twenty-five years later, Herbart restated just 
 this difficulty in great detail. "Who, or what," he asks, 
 "is the object of self-consciousness? The answer must be 
 . . . 'The I is conscious of Itself.' This itself is the I itself. 
 One may then substitute this concept of the I, and then the 
 first proposition will be transformed into the following: 
 'The I is conscious of itself as being conscious of itself.' 
 Let the same substitution be ■ repeated, and there results: 
 'The I is conscious of that which is conscious of that which 
 is conscious of itself.' . . . This circle will run on forever 
 . . . and it follows that the question is unanswerable and 
 that the I is a never complete but always to-be-completed 
 problem." ' 
 
 It has already been shown that Kant's solution of the 
 difficulty consists in assuming that the necessary distinc- 
 tion between subject and object self is obtained by regard- 
 ing the subject self as transcendental, or identical and uni- 
 versal, and the object self as empirical, or changing and 
 particularizing. The self which I know is always, in other 
 words, the self of the moment, the way-I-feel or imagine or 
 decide at this particular moment ; and I do not know, I am 
 merely conscious, of the identical, universalizing I, which 
 knows, but is not known, which is subject, not object. It 
 must at once be admitted that this doctrine meets the diffi- 
 culty which was stated. As Kant says, both the suggested 
 conditions of self-knowledge are, in this way, fulfilled : self 
 
 ' "Psychologie als Wissenschaft," § 27. 
 
246 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 knows self and yet there is a distinction between self as 
 knower (the transcendental self) and self as known (the 
 empirical self)/ Yet this conception of the transcendental 
 self as knower and not known has its own insuperable 
 difficulty ; it is clearly self-contradictory. In the very act of 
 saying that the transcendental self is knower, not known, 
 subject, not object, Kant admits the necessary existence 
 of such a self; and anything which must be said to exist is 
 surely known — at least as existing. Kant's doctrine that 
 the transcendental self exists implies, therefore, the admis- 
 sion that it is known. 
 
 So Kant is left with the alleged contradiction of self- 
 consciousness, subject-objectivity, on his hands. He has 
 brought the contradiction forward as proof of his doctrine 
 that the transcendental self is subject only, never object or 
 known ; but it appears that an existent, transcendental, self 
 must be, to some degree, a known self. If then a self is 
 necessarily conceived as known self, and if the conception of 
 a known self involves hopeless contradiction, Kant's whole 
 doctrine of the transcendental self is endangered. In this 
 extremity, the critic of Kant may point out that the diffi- 
 culty which this discredited conception was framed to meet 
 is itself artificial, in other words, that self-consciousness is not 
 in its essential meaning subject-objectivity. Our awareness 
 of self is in truth a fundamental experience, a primarily 
 immediate certainty, and it is but inadequately expressed in 
 terms of the later and more artificial opposition of object and 
 subject — a distinction borrowed from the contrast of self 
 with external things. There is thus no need of proving that 
 I know a transcendental, that is, a universahzing and an 
 
 ' It should be observed that this difficulty would be as well met in the 
 opposite way; that is, if the empirical self were conceived as subject, or 
 knower, and the transcendental self as object. The considerations just 
 summarized in the first argument for the unknowableness of the self (supra, 
 pp. 243 seq.) prevent Kant from reaching this conclusion. Either hypothe- 
 sis, as this page tries to show, is at best an artificial and unnecessary attempt 
 to meet an imaginary difficulty. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 247 
 
 identical self, for I am immediately aware of such a self ; 
 and the opposition of object to subject self is an addition 
 of later reflection. This refutation of the last of Kant's 
 arguments for the unknowableness of the transcendental 
 self sends us back with renewed confidence to his own 
 arguments for the existence of this self, and restores to his 
 universe of reahty the significant figure which he himself 
 has tried to banish. 
 
 III. Kant's Doctrine of God as Unknown 
 
 By his doctrine that only sense objects and empirical (or 
 changing) selves can be known Kant has implicitly taught 
 the impossibihty of knowing God. In the first section of 
 the "Dialectic," however, he argues exphcitly that the 
 existence of God cannot be proved. By God, he says, is 
 meant a being which "includes all reality in itself," a 'su- 
 preme being ' to whom " everything is subject." The imknow- 
 abiUty of God, thus conceived, is argued by Kant through a 
 destructive criticism of the three traditional arguments for the 
 existence of God.' Of these the first is the ontological proof .^ 
 Kant states it in the form in which Anselm held it : "The real- 
 est of all beings contains all reality; and one is justified in 
 assuming that such a being is possible. . . . But existence is 
 included in all reality : therefore existence belongs to the con- 
 cept of a possible being. If, now, this thing does not exist, the 
 iimer possibiUty of it is denied, and this denial is a contradic- 
 tion." ' More simply : The concept of an absolutely real being, 
 
 ' Cf. Chapter 2, pp. 25 seq. and Chapter 4, pp. 100 seq. for discussion of 
 Descartes's and of Leibniz's forms of these proofs. 
 
 * In the chapters to which reference has just been made it has been pointed 
 out that the term ' ontological' may be applied, as by Hegel, to a wider argu- 
 ment for the existence of God. Hegel's objection to Kant's criticism of the 
 ontological argument consists essentially in the contention that the argu- 
 ment should be stated in this larger fashion, hence the objection does not 
 materially affect Kant's criticism of the old form of the argument. 
 
 SA, 596; B, 624; W., 207. 
 
248 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 thatis God, is possible. But absolute reality includes existence. 
 Therefore the absolutely real being must be conceived as 
 existing. Therefore, finally, he does exist. Kant makes 
 short and easy work of this argument. It depends, as he 
 shows, on the false supposition that ' conceived ' existence ' 
 and 'real existence' are synonymous. As a matter of fact, 
 not everything which is conceived is real. To be conscious 
 of one hundred thaler is surely not the same as to possess the 
 hundred thaler : in other words, one may be conscious of the 
 existent, and yet that-which-is-thought-of-as-existing does 
 not necessarily exist. Thus, the fact of our representing to 
 ourselves an all-perfect being is not any guarantee for such a 
 being's existence. 
 
 The cosmological is the causal argument for God's exist- 
 ence.^ Kant states it very clearly, in the passage which 
 follows: "If anything exists," he says, "an absolutely neces- 
 sary Being must exist, . . . [for] every contingent thing 
 must have its cause, and this cause — if contingent — must 
 have its cause till the series of subordinate causes end in an 
 absolutely necessary cause, without which the series would 
 have no completeness. . . . Now, at least I myself exist, 
 therefore an absolutely necessary being exists." ^ 
 
 The argument is familiar, for Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, 
 and even Hobbes have employed it. It is based on two prin- 
 ciples: the first expressed in the proposition, "Every limited 
 or contingent reality must have a cause ;" the second formu- 
 lated in the statement, "Every limited reality must have, not 
 merely a partial, but a completely explanatory, an ultimate 
 
 'Observe that 'conceived' here means merely ' conscious-ed,' 'reflected 
 on.' 
 
 ' The argument is contained in two portions of the last division, the 
 "Dialectic," of the "Kritik": most appropriately in Bk. II., Chapter 3, on 
 the "Transcendental Ideal," but also in Chapter 2, third and fourth An- 
 tinomies. Cf. Adickes, notes to his edition of the "Kritik," pp. 461, 491. 
 
 '"Dialectic, Transcendental Ideal," A, 604 or B, 632, with note; W., 
 211. Cf. the theses of the third and fourth Antinomies, taken together, 
 A, 443 seq., 452 scj.; B, 472 seq., 480 seq.; W., 163-166. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 249 
 
 cause." To the first of these principles Kant, as we know, 
 assents, teaching unequivocally that everything or — to be 
 more exact — every event has a cause/ But the universality 
 of this causal principle does not, Kant insists, imply an 
 ultimate cause. All that it requires is that the causal series 
 of contingent beings never at any particular point came to 
 an end — in other words, that every contingent cause, however 
 far back in the series, should itself have a cause. But Kant 
 is not content with arguing that the first and incontrovertible 
 causal principle does not imply the second — that is to say, 
 that the universality of the causal relation does not imply 
 the existence of an ultimate cause. In addition, he directly 
 opposes the second of the principles, on which the cosmologi- 
 cal or causal argument for God's existence rests, by the teach- 
 ing that a cause must be contingent and that an ultimate, or 
 necessary, being cannot, therefore, be a cause. For cause, he 
 points out, is precisely that which stands in necessary relation 
 both to its effect and to its own cause as well. That is to 
 say, the supposedly ultimate being, if it were a cause, would 
 need to have a cause; and so would cease being ultimate. 
 In Kant's own words: "Every beginning presupposes a 
 state of . . . its cause. But a . . . first beginning would 
 presuppose a state which had no causal relation with a pre- 
 ceding cause." ^ The ordinary way of meeting this difficulty 
 is by the teaching that the supreme being, as necessary, is 
 not subject to the law of contingent causality. But this 
 ejection of the ultimate cause from the series of contingent 
 phenomena destroys the whole cosmological argument, for 
 
 1 Cf. p. 212. 
 
 '"Antinomy III., Antithesis, Proof," paragraph i, A, 445; B, 473; 
 W., 163, a free rendering. It is evident that Kant here uses 'cause' in the 
 Humian sense as belonging to time. The cosmological argument, as has 
 before been observed, really confuses this temporal conception of cause (im- 
 plied in the expression, First Cause) with the other view of cause as explana- 
 tion or ground (implied in the expression. Ultimate or Necessary Cause). 
 Cf. supra, p. 103. Kant uses the term ' cause ' in this second sense, but appKes 
 it only to the moral self. Cf. injra, pp. 259 seq^. 
 
250 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 that infers the existence of God precisely as the highest term 
 of the series of the contingent. "Were the highest being," 
 Kant repeats, "to remain in the chain of conditions," it 
 would itself be a member of the series; and Hke the lower 
 members of which it is the presupposition, there would be 
 need of investigating its higher ground. If, on the other 
 hand, he adds, "the highest being be separated from this 
 chain ; and if — by virtue of being a merely intelligible 
 being — it be not conceived in the series of nature causes: 
 what bridge can reason build in order to reach the nature 
 series \i.e. in order to connect the alleged necessary cause with 
 the contingent things which it is inferred to explain]?" ' 
 
 Besides showing in this fashion that the cosmological 
 argument is invaUd, Kant points out ^ that it is incomplete. 
 It attempts to prove only the existence of an ultimate cause 
 and — in this respect inferior to the ontological argument — 
 "it carmot teach what sort of attributes the necessary being 
 has." The last of the traditional arguments for God's 
 existence arises to supplement the causal argument in this 
 particular. It is known to Kant as the physico-theological 
 argument, but is more commonly known as the teleological 
 argument, or the argument from design. Toward this reason- 
 ing Kant has a temperamental regard, due to his interest 
 in natural science; for the physico-theological argiunent 
 finds in the order and majesty of nature a reason for inferring 
 the existence of an absolutely necessary, an all-perfect 
 creator. Kant states the argument thus : ° "(i) In the world 
 are found everywhere clear tokens of an order which follows 
 a definite purpose; and this purpose is carried out with 
 great wisdom and in a whole of indescribable manifoldness. 
 ... (2) This purposed order is utterly foreign to the things 
 in the world and belongs to them only accidentally, that 
 is to say, . . . different things could not . . . unite to 
 
 * A, 621 ; B, 649. 
 
 'A, 606 seq.; B, 634 seq.; W., 212 seq. 
 
 'A, 625 (cf. 622); B, 653 (cf. 650); W., 219. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 251 
 
 definite ends . . . were they not chosen and disposed 
 through an ordering, reasoning principle. (3) Therefore, 
 there exists a subHme and wise cause (or several of them) — 
 which as intelligence and freedom must be cause of the 
 world." . . . "This proof," Kant says, "deserves ever to 
 be named with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest proof — 
 and most suited to ordinary human reason. It vivifies the 
 study of nature — and itself has its source and the renewal 
 of its strength through nature study. It supplies purposes 
 and aims where our observation had not of itself discovered 
 them and widens our knowledge of nature through the guid- 
 ing thread of a special unity." ' 
 
 Yet though the reasonableness and the utility of the argu- 
 ment appeal to Kant so strongly that they rouse him to one 
 of his rare enthusiasms, he none the less insists that this 
 method of proof carries with it no absolute certainty. For 
 the argument is, after all is said, an argument from the 
 nature of an effect — the well-ordered world — to a cause. 
 In other words, this argument from design is a case under 
 the cosmological argument,^ and since it has been proved 
 unjustifiable to reason from any effect to the existence of a 
 'necessary cause,' any particular case of this reasoning must 
 be discredited. And even if one had already granted the 
 existence of a first cause, this effort to show that the creator 
 is a free intelligence would fail of convincing force, since it 
 is but an argument from "the analogy of certain nature 
 products with that which human art creates." ' Because a 
 human being would need thought and will in order to create 
 objects comparable to the ' wonders of nature and the majesty 
 of the world, ' we have, Kant argues, no right to argue that 
 the unknown cause of nature is intellect and will. 
 
 So Kant concludes his discussion of the three traditional 
 arguments for God's existence. " Outside these three paths," 
 
 'A, 623; B, 6si; W., 218. »A, 629; B, 657; W., 221. 
 
 «A, 626; B, 654. 
 
252 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 he says, "no other lies open to the speculative reason;" and 
 he questions "whether any proof be possible of a proposition 
 so sublimely above all empirical use of the understanding." ' 
 The reader of Kant will echo his doubt, if once he admits 
 that these are the only arguments for God's existence. For 
 Kant's strictures on them surely are justified. From the 
 observation of ordered nature it is, indeed, impossible to argue 
 demonstratively to the existence of an infinite intelHgence 
 as its creator ; no empirical argument can suffice to establish 
 the existence of a logical contradiction, namely, a first cause ; 
 and, finally, the mere consciousness which I possess of a per- 
 fect being, logically possible though it is, cannot guarantee 
 the existence of such a being. If there be, then, no other 
 argument for the existence of God, the conception truly must 
 be viewed after Kant's fashion, as an ideal of the speculative 
 reason. But Kant himself, as will appear elsewhere, sug- 
 gests — what later philosophers amplify — another and, in 
 the opinion of the writer, a valid proof of God's existence. 
 And in this proof, when it shall disclose itself, we shall find 
 no negation, but rather a transformation, of these discredited 
 arguments. My consciousness will be shown to imply the 
 existence of God as its deepest reality (and this is the soul of 
 the ontological argument) ; my consciousness will be shown, 
 furthermore, to imply the existence of God as its explanation 
 (and this it is which the causal argument has tried to express) , 
 finally, even the adaptations of nature may serve to illumi- 
 nate our conception of God (and thus the teleological argu- 
 ment shall find its rightful, though subordinate, place). 
 
 In conclusion certain general comments on Kant's nega- 
 tive teaching must be made. It should be noted, in the first 
 place, that his three negative doctrines have a varied bearing 
 on his positive theory. The first, the doctrine that the things- 
 in-themselves are imknown, makes no inroad whatever on 
 
 'A, 630; B, 658; W., 221-222. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 253 
 
 the world of known reality : its effect, if accepted, would be 
 merely to impress upon us that there exists unknown reality, 
 more ultimate than any which we know. On the other hand, 
 the doctrine that we may not know either permanent selves 
 or God seriously narrows the supposedly known world. 
 
 In the second place, it must be emphasized that Kant 
 asserts the existence of all three of these unknowns : things- 
 in-themselves, selves, and God. With reference to God 
 this statement has later to be proved. But it has already 
 appeared that Kant argues for the existence of the more-than- 
 individual self; and every section of the "Kritik" bears 
 witness to his constant assumption that things-in-them- 
 selves exist. The consequences of these admissions are else- 
 where considered.' 
 
 D. Kant's Correction of his Negative Doctrine 
 
 Kant's negative doctrine of the limits of knowledge, his 
 teaching that the ultimate realities may not be known, is 
 very variously estimated by different critics. To certain 
 students of Kant, for example, to Heine and to Herbert 
 Spencer, the teaching that ultimate reahty — and, in par- 
 ticular, God and immortal selves — are unknown, seems to 
 be the significant and the final result of Kant's teaching. 
 The present writer, however, holds with many other students 
 and commentators that this negative doctrine of the limits 
 of our knowledge is neither an essential nor a permanently 
 significant teaching of Kant. The reasons for this con- 
 clusion have been indicated in the criticism of Kant's teach- 
 ing that the transcendental I is unknown, and that objective 
 reality independent of consciousness exists. But a further 
 reason for rejecting Kant's negative doctrine is found in the 
 fact that he himself corrects and thus virtually retracts it, 
 by his teaching concerning the noumenal object and the 
 moral self. In other words, though unquestionably he 
 
 » Cf. pp. 255, 261. 
 
254 Attack upon Dualism, and P henomenahsnt 
 
 teaches that ultimate realities, whether things or selves, are 
 unknown, he none the less suggests the possibiHty of known 
 things-in-themselves ; and with glorious inconsistency he im- 
 phes and even asserts that the moral self is known. This 
 correction of his metaphysics by his ethics carries with it, 
 as wiU appear, a most significant extension of his positive 
 philosophy. 
 
 I. Kant's Admission that Things-in-themselves might 
 
 BE KNOWN (the HYPOTHESIS OF THE NoUMENA) 
 
 In the very chapter on " Phenomena and Noumena," in 
 which Kant most definitely formulates his teaching that the 
 ultimately real things-in-themselves are unknown, there is 
 contained a curious qualification of this doctrine of the limits 
 of knowledge. This corrective teaching, ignored in the pre- 
 ceding summary of the thing-in-itself doctrine, is as follows : 
 (i) the reason why things-in-themselves are unknown is that 
 all our knowledge includes sense ; and that sense-conscious- 
 ness is incapable of apprehending reality. Were there, then, 
 Kant says, an immediate knowledge untainted by sense — 
 it nught know even ultimate reahties; and these known 
 reaUties, or things-in-themselves, would be noumena (things 
 thought about). ^ Now (2) such unsensuous knowledge is, 
 Kant admits, conceivable. "The concept of a noumenon, 
 that is, of a thing which shall be thought wholly through a 
 pure understanding, not as an object of the senses but as a 
 thing in itself, is not at all contradictory: for one surely 
 cannot assume that sensibiUty is the only possible form of 
 intuition (Anschauung)." But, Kant adds, (3) we do not 
 possess this imsensuous yet immediate knowledge ; our con- 
 
 ' Kant's words are these, " If I assume things which are mere objects 
 of the understanding, and which as such could yet be presented to intuition, 
 though not to sense intuition, such things would be called noumena." (A, 
 249 ; cf . B, 306 seq. The second edition lays more emphasis than the first 
 on the problematic character of this hypothesis.) 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 255 
 
 cepts are mere forms of thought for our sense perceptions, 
 and, therefore, (4) the bare idea of noumena, namely things- 
 in-themselves as objects of thought, is no guarantee of the 
 existence of these knowable things-in-themselves, but is a 
 mere Grenzbegrifj, ^ a ' limitative concept by which to check 
 the presumption of the sense consciousness.' 
 
 So Kant ends by reaffirming the doctrine that the ultimately 
 real things in themselves are unknown. But he has gone so 
 far as to suggest that they might be known — that there is 
 nothing contradictory in conceiving them as known. He 
 has done more than this : he has clearly implied that the ulti- 
 mate realities, if known, would no longer be independent of 
 consciousness. They would be objects of thought, and 
 therefore related to mind ; and yet they would be ultimate. 
 Thus, in two directions, by suggesting that ultimate reality 
 might be known and by implying that, as known, it would 
 no longer be independent of consciousness, Kant has made, 
 by his hypothesis of the noumenon, at least a move toward 
 the correction of the thing-in-itself doctrine. 
 
 II. Kant's Admissions that the Real Self is Known 
 
 a. The teaching that I am "conscious of the real 
 (or transcendental self 
 
 Far more significant than this only half-serious suggestion 
 that things-in-themselves might be known, is Kant's restora- 
 tion of the real self to the domain of the known. It is fair to 
 say that the things-in-themselves, empty of all predicates, 
 would have been no great loss to us ; but the denial of our 
 ability to know selves deprives us of our most valued cer- 
 tainty. With distinct relief, therefore, a reader who takes 
 his Kant seriously finds the real self not only restored to the 
 world of known reality but enriched with new and significant 
 character. 
 
 'A, 255; B, 310-311; W., 132. 
 
256 Attack upon Dualism and P henomenahsm 
 
 It has been shown already, by repeated quotations/ that 
 Kant admits the fact that I am conscious of my real self — 
 not merely of the complex feeUng of the moment, but of my 
 underlying, my permanent, my real self. He has, it is true, 
 withheld the name of ' knowledge ' from this mere conscious- 
 ness of self ; but this doctrine that we do not know a self of 
 which we are and must be conscious is, as has appeared, an 
 absurdity due wholly to Kant's artificial and unjustifiable 
 conception of knowledge. He denies that the consciousness 
 of the transcendental self is a knowledge of it, purely because 
 he holds (i) that knowledge is sensational, and thus of the 
 momentary, and (2) that knowledge involves an actual 
 opposition between subject and object. But it can neither 
 be maintained that sensational knowledge is inherently 
 illusory, nor yet that knowledge requires an absolute subject- 
 object contrast.^ There is consequently no force in Kant's 
 contention that the consciousness of self is not a knowledge 
 of self. It must be true, on the other hand, that the 
 consciousness of the transcendental self is the knowledge of 
 at least one undoubted and more-than-momentary reahty. 
 But besides this unacknowledged implication of the known 
 self, the "Kritik" contains Kant's definite teaching that the 
 moral self is an object of knowledge. The consideration of 
 this teaching follows. 
 
 b. Kant's teaching that I know the moral self as real 
 
 Up to this point we have concerned ourselves exclusively 
 with what Kant calls his theoretical philosophy, and have 
 taken no account of his ethical doctrine. Kant himself in- 
 tends to make a sharp distinction between metaphysics and 
 ethics, theoretical and moral philosophy; but an absolute 
 hne of cleavage is not possible. Ethics, hke metaphysics, 
 involves a doctrine of the human self and — in Kant's view — 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 242. ' Cf. supra, pp. 245 seq. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 257 
 
 a theory, positive or negative, of God. Therefore ethics 
 cannot be divorced from metaphysics; and what Kant and 
 his critics call his moral philosophy is really, in the main, an 
 integral part of his metaphysical system.' 
 
 The core of Kant's ethical system is his doctrine of obh- 
 gation ; and this doctrine involves the teaching that the real 
 self, as a moral self, is known. His teaching may be sum- 
 marized as follows: In the consciousness of obhgation, a 
 man knows himself, not as mere phenomenon, but as a reality, 
 deeper than all phenomena, a self which is more than a mere 
 series of temporally Hnked feelings; in the moral conscious- 
 ness, in a word, a man knows himself as absolute reality. 
 Kant's meaning will become clearer by a closer scrutiny of 
 his doctrine of obligation. It contains four main articles: 
 (i) the consciousness or feeling of obligation is a fact of 
 our experience; (2) the feeling of obligation differs radi- 
 cally from every sensational or affective experience ; (3) the 
 feeling of obligation cannot be accounted for by a preceding 
 succession of phenomena; therefore, (4) the consciousness 
 of obhgation implies the existence of a free, that is, a tran- 
 scendental, an ultimately real, self. These different teachings 
 must now be repeated in Kant's own words. 
 
 (i) The consciousness of obligation exists. I am, Kant 
 says, 'immediately conscious of the moral law.'^ "How this 
 consciousness of moral laws is possible cannot," he says,' 
 
 * This doctrine, here outlined, of the nature of obligation and its implica- 
 tion of the free moral self and of God is found, it should be noticed, not only 
 in Kant's ethical works, but in the third and fourth Antinomies of the 
 "Kritik of Pure Reason." Of the ethical works the more important are 
 the " Kritik of Practical Reason," published in 1788, and the " Metaphysik 
 of Morality (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten)," which appeared three 
 years earlier, and which is sometimes cited as " Metaphysics of Ethics." 
 
 '"Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., Chapter i, § 6, Problem II., 
 Remark, H., 31. (The page references, both to the "Kritik of Practical 
 Reason " and to the " Metaphysik of Morality," are to the Hartenstein edition 
 of 1867); W., p. 268. 
 
 5 Ibid., Bk. I., Chapter i, I. "Deduction of the Principles of Pure Prac- 
 tical Reason," H., 49. 
 s 
 
258 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 "be further explained," for the feeling of obhgation is "an 
 inexplicable fact.'" "The moral law," he says, a little 
 later,^ — meaning by moral law the consciousness of obli- 
 gation — "is given as a fact of pure reason of which we are 
 a priori conscious and which is apodictically certain. . . ." 
 
 (2) The feehng of obligation differs absolutely from the 
 'desire' or the 'impulse.' It is a distinct experience, a con- 
 sciousness sui generis. The 'I ought' feehng, in other 
 words, is not equivalent to the 'I wish' or to the 'it would be 
 pleasanter — more expedient — more advantageous.' Kant 
 makes use of many expressions to sharpen this distinction. 
 He contrasts the feehng of obhgation, under the name ' cate- 
 gorical imperative,' with the desire, as 'hypothetical impera- 
 tive' ; ' and he further distinguishes the 'moral law' from the 
 'subjective maxim'. "Obhgation," Kant says, "expresses 
 a sort of necessity . . . which occurs nowhere else in nature. 
 It is impossible that anything in nature ought to he other than 
 in fact it is. In truth, obligation — if one has before one's 
 eyes only the succession in nature — has simply and solely 
 no meaning. We can as little ask what ought to happen in 
 nature as what attributes a circle ought to have." ^ 
 
 From the assertion of the absolute difference between the 
 feehng of obhgation and empirical desires or wishes, Kant 
 proceeds (3) to the doctrine that the feeling of obhgation can- 
 not be adequately explained as due merely to preceding phe- 
 nomena of the inner life or of the outer world. The preceding 
 facts of our mental condition may serve to explain for us why 
 we wish such and such an end, or act in such and such a way, 
 but they can never explain our sense of duty. "There may 
 be," he says, in the paragraph following that last quoted, 
 "never so many nature causes or sensuous impulses which 
 
 '" Kritik of Practical Reason," H., 46, W., 273'. Cf. H., 32, 45; W., 
 268', 272'. 
 
 'Ibid., p. 50. Cf. "Kritik of Pure Reason," A, 546-547; B, 574-575; 
 W., 186. 
 
 ' "Metaphysik of Morality," H., 263 seq.; "Kritik of Practical Reason," 
 Bk. I., Chapter i. Definition i, Remark, H., 21; W., 259^ 
 
 * "Kritik of Pure Reason," A, 547; B, 575. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 259 
 
 drive me to volition : they cannot create obligation." "The 
 objective reahty of the moral law," he says elsewhere/ "can 
 be proved by no ... a posteriori deduction, and none the 
 less it stands fast on its own merits {jiir sich selbst)." "The 
 moral law," he says again,^ " is a fact absolutely inexplicable 
 by all data of the sense world." 
 
 (4) But just because the feeling of obligation is inexplicable 
 from the standpoint of temporal causality, it is seen inevitably 
 to imply the existence of a self which is deeper, realer, than 
 the phenomena. The feeling of obhgation is, in other words, 
 no mere phenomenon, no purely momentary consciousness. 
 It is rather the expression of a self which is conscious of obli- 
 gation, and which, just because it knows it ought, also knows 
 that it may. Thus the consciousness of obligation is "in- 
 extricably bound up with the consciousness of the freedom" ^ 
 of the wilhng self. One knows "that one can act because 
 one is conscious that one ought, and thus one knows in oneself 
 the freedom which — without the moral law — had remained 
 unknown." * 
 
 From this ethical standpoint, therefore, Kant restates the 
 distinction between the empirical and the transcendental ego, 
 as that between the temporally caused and the free self, or 
 as that between the phenomenally caused and the intelligibly 
 causal self. From the first, the empirical, point of view, I 
 am the complex feeling of this particular moment, and this 
 complex feeling is the result of the inner feeling and of the 
 outer phenomenon of the preceding moment : in a word, I am 
 the product of my experience and of my environment. But, 
 regarding myself — as I may and must — not merely as a 
 series of conscious experiences, but as the self which ought 
 and can, I am 'outside the series'^ of temporal feelings. 
 
 ' "Kritik of Practical Reason," loc. cit., H., 50; W., 275*, 
 'Ibid.,1i., 46; W., 2732. 
 
 s Ibid., H., 45, W., 272*. Cf. below, pp. 265* seq. 
 'Ibid., § 6, Problem II., Remark, H., 32. 
 
 °A, 537; B, 565; W., 184, "Eine solche intelligible Ursache . . . ist, 
 sammt ihrer Kausalitat ausser der Reihe." Cf. A. 493; B, 522. 
 
26o Attack -upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 This means that the self which, superficially regarded, is a 
 series of facts of consciousness is, from a deeper point of 
 view, an active subject (handelndes Subjekt).^ The 'em- 
 pirical character' is, in fact, — Kant says, — 'the mere 
 manifestation (Erscheinung) of the intelligible.' ^ Thus, the 
 same action which "from one point of view is a pure nature 
 result," may "from another standpoint, be regarded as a 
 manifestation of freedom."' For "with reference to the 
 intelligible character . . . there is no 'before' or 'after,' and 
 every act, without regard to its temporal relation to other 
 phenomena, is the immediate working of the intelhgible 
 character . . . which consequently acts freely without being 
 dynamically determined in the chain of nature causes, either 
 through external or internal antecedent grounds." * 
 
 The teaching about the real self of the ethical experience 
 is well summarized in the following statement:^ "Man is 
 one of the phenomena of the sense world, and he, too, is in 
 so far one of the nature causes whose causality must stand 
 under empirical laws. As such, he must have an empirical 
 character. . . . But man, who knows all the rest of nature 
 only through sense, knows (erkennt) himself also through 
 mere apperception ° — and indeed in activities and inner de- 
 terminations which he cannot count among sense impressions. 
 He is certainly, therefore, on the one hand, phenomenon to 
 himself, but on the other hand — in consideration of a certain 
 
 ' A, 539; B, 567. Cf. "Kritik of Practical Reason," loc. cit., II., H., 59; 
 W., 279. 
 
 ' A, 541 ; B, 569. 
 
 »A, 543; B, 571; W., 184. 
 
 'A, 553; B, 581. In the paragraph from which the first quotation of 
 p. 260 is made Kant contradicts himself by saying that the intelligible 
 character "begins" the series of its phenomenal manifestations. This is, 
 of course, to let the intelligible self fall back into the temporal world of the 
 phenomenal self from which it has been rescued. 
 
 'A, 546; B, 574; W., 185-186. 
 
 ' Note that this bare statement is made without specific application to 
 the moral consciousness, though the context certainly refers to the moral 
 experience. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 261 
 
 capacity — he is a purely intelligible object." The last words 
 of the quotation show unequivocally that Kant regards the 
 moral self both as known self and as absolute reality — yes, 
 as 'thing-in-itself.' For this exact expression, heretofore 
 reserved by Kant to describe the ultimate reahty independent 
 of consciousness, is applied in these sections to self in its 
 moral activity. ' Intelligible causaHty ' ' is designated as the 
 activity of a 'thing-in-itself; and later the 'intelligible 
 character,' that is the character of the moral self, is explicitly 
 called 'the character of the thing-in-itself.' 
 
 The comparison of these conclusions with the negative 
 results of Kant's philosophy leads almost inevitably to a 
 reconstruction. Kant has argued, before he comes to the 
 consideration of the moral experience, that the true or tran- 
 scendental self is unknowable, and that beyond the reach of 
 knowledge he certain unattainable reaUties. In the course 
 of his argument he has, it is true, been guilty of extreme in- 
 consistency; he has really impUed that the transcendental 
 self is known and that the ultimate realities are objects 
 within, and not beyond, consciousness. Yet he has clung 
 persistently to the existence of the unknowable world beyond 
 experience. Now, in the study of the moral consciousness, 
 Kant suddenly discovers that here, at least, in the conscious- 
 ness of duty and the knowledge of freedom, the true self comes 
 to know itself. And this true self — no mere series of events 
 dependent one on another — is, Kant sees, an ultimate reahty. 
 But if both assertions be admitted, if the self is an ultimate 
 reality and if this reaht> can be known, then it is no longer 
 possible to hold that ultimate reaUty is, of necessity, beyond 
 our knowledge. On the other hand, it becomes probable that 
 ultimate reahty will turn out to be a self or a related system 
 of selves. Kant himself impUes, though he does not prove, 
 
 • A, 538; B, 566. Here Kant expressly uses the term ' causality' in a non- 
 Humian sense. The intelligible cause is indeed expressly opposed to the 
 phenomenal cause, the temporal event. It is cause in the sense of being ulti- 
 mate reality, or ground. 
 
262 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 the truth of this Berkeley-like hypothesis by the further 
 teachings of his ethics. 
 
 c. Kant's teaching that the free, moral self must be mem- 
 ber of a society of blessed and immortal selves 
 
 Kant's starting-point, as has been shown, is the immediate 
 certainty of a feeling of obUgation distinct from desire. The 
 impossibiUty of deriving this from temporal or empirical 
 causes has led him, in the first place, to insist on the exist- 
 ence of a self deeper than phenomena. In the second place, 
 the fact that no empirical derivation of the feeling of obHga- 
 tion can be found has convinced Kant of its validity. The 
 foundation of the greater part of the positive philosophy, 
 constructed by Kant from the ethical standpoint, is therefore, 
 as should be noted, not the initial assertion of the bare exist- 
 ence of a feeling of obligation, but the later inference of its 
 validity. Or — to state this differently — Kant beheves, not 
 merely in the feeling, but in the fact, of obhgation ; not merely 
 that there is a feeling of obligation, but also that there is 
 obligation, independently of the purely individual admission 
 of it. The existence of the feeling of obligation must imply, 
 Kant teaches, the existence of a more-than-phenomenal self. 
 The validity of the feeling of obligation — the existence, in 
 other words, of obUgation — implies, Kant goes on to show, 
 the freedom, the blessedness, and the immortaUty of selves 
 who are members of a kingdom of related selves. 
 
 This acknowledgment that the wcrld of the moral self is 
 a social world of interrelated individuals is made by reason 
 of Kant's study of what he calls the content of the moral law. 
 A consideration of his specifically ethical doctrine is, therefore, 
 necessary, as a means to the imderstanding of his doctrine 
 of the ultimately real and related selves. After Kant has estab- 
 lished the existence of obUgation, and after he has taught that 
 a self is free to do what it ought, the question arises : what 
 then, ought I, the moral self, to do ? What, definitely, is my 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 263 
 
 duty ? In what terms is the ' categorical imperative ' expressed ? 
 Now Kant adopts, at different times, two attitudes, which he 
 does not clearly differentiate, toward this problem. When he 
 is chiefly concerned to estabhsh the utter distinctness of the 
 ought-feeUng from desire, he defines the object of obUgation 
 in ahnost negative terms. The object of desire is the pleas- 
 urable, but the feeling of obhgation is utterly opposed to 
 desire; hence — Kant teaches — that which one ought to 
 do cannot be pleasurable. "The pure idea of duty" must 
 be " immixed with any foreign ingredient of sensuous desire." ' 
 Furthermore, because the object of desire is always some 
 definite object, and because obligation is opposed to desire, 
 therefore — so Kant teaches, in this phase of his ethical 
 doctrine — obhgation has no definite object. "The single 
 principle of morahty," he says, "consists in independence of 
 all matter of the law — that is, of every object of desire, and 
 in the determination of the Will (Willkuhr), by the mere 
 universal form of law (gesetzgebende Form)." ^ This means 
 that the fundamental principle of duty, the basal formula- 
 tion of the moral law, is simply this : Do whatever you are 
 conscious that you ought to do. Whether or not you can 
 formulate your duty beforehand, whether or not you can 
 a priori define that which is right — so much is certain : you 
 ought at any time to do that which you think that you ought. 
 Empty as it is, this mere 'form of a law' does supply a 
 principle for moral action. Critics of Kant have, however, 
 rightly laid stress on the imsatisfactoriness of this purely 
 formal law, and have claimed, with reason, that a system of 
 'absolute' ethics should define a specific object of obhgation 
 
 "'Metaphysik of Morality," H., 258; W., 233. It should be observed 
 that Kant sometimes recognizes (ibid., 245; W., 227) that the object of 
 acknowledged duty may be coincident with desire — in a word, that one may 
 like to do what one consciously ought to do. 
 
 ' "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., Chapter i, § 8, H. 35; W., 270'. 
 Cf. §§ 3-6. Cf. a statement with a parallel meaning : "The moral law must 
 alone determine the pure will, and its sole object is to produce such a will." 
 {Ibid., Bk. II., Chapter i, H., 114; W., 291'. The translation is Watson's.) 
 
264 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 in order to justify the validity of obligation.' As a matter of 
 fact, Kant does elsewhere suggest a positive content for the 
 moral law, a positive definition of duty. This is the second 
 form of Kant's ethical doctrine. In brief, he teaches that 
 the object of obHgation is the good of humanity ; and by this 
 teaching he, of course, imphes the existence of a society of 
 selves. This positive form of Kant's moral doctrine is well 
 summarized in the "Metaphysik of Morality," by the two 
 successive statements of the moral law, or imperative.^ The 
 first of these is the following : "Act in conformity with that 
 maxim . . . only, which thou canst . . . will to be a univer- 
 sal law." ' And by this Kant means : a right action is an 
 action which every man might repeat without thereby injur- 
 ing society.* The positive content of the moral law, thus 
 formulated, is evidently, then, the preservation of a society 
 of related selves. This is more clearly indicated in the 
 second statement of the 'practical imperative,' which, though 
 it still leaves undefined the nature of the personal end, yet 
 unambiguously conceives of this end as social, never purely 
 individual. This second and more concrete form of the 
 practical imperative is the following: "Act so as to use 
 humanity both in thine own person and in the person of 
 another, always as an end, never merely as a means."* 
 Kant's meaning is that the moral action no longer regards 
 the desires and needs of the individual, except as the indi- 
 vidual belongs to the related whole of selves which he 
 
 •See Kant's express admission of this, "Metaphysik of Morality," H. 
 76; W., 245. 
 
 ' The third formulation of this Maw' is merely a repetition of the first. 
 
 ' "Metaphysik of Morality," H., 269; W., 241. Cf. "Kritik of Practical 
 Reason," loc. cit., § 7, H., 32 ; W., 268. 
 
 * Kant's illustrations make this very clear: My individual wish is to in- 
 crease my fortune in every possible way. A trust fund is left in my hands by 
 a friend who dies without leaving a viall. To appropriate this money may 
 be in accord with my individual advantage, but cannot possibly be in accord 
 with the moral law, for if every one betrayed his trust, there would be no 
 trust funds — in other words, social honor and union would be impaired. 
 
 ' "Metaphysik of Morality," H., 277; W., 246. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 265 
 
 calls 'humanity (Menschheit),' and describes as ' 'a kingdom 
 — the systematic union of different reasoning beings through 
 common laws.' 
 
 It should be added in quahfication of the social nature of 
 this ideal that, in Kant's view, the " universal system of laws," 
 to which each member of society is subject, are "laws which 
 he imposes upon himself and ... he is only imder obUga- 
 tion to act in conformity with his own will." ^ This teach- 
 ing is of great significance. For to say that the common 
 laws of society are laws self-imposed by the individual is 
 simply to say that the individual is of necessity a social self 
 constituted by its relations to others, so that the existence of 
 one individual presupposes the existence of related indi- 
 viduals.' At this second point, therefore, Kant's study of 
 the moral consciousness leads him to widen his conception of 
 reality. He has already seen that the moral consciousness 
 implies the existence of the more-than-phenomenal self; he 
 now discovers that the vahdity of the moral consciousness, 
 the fact of obligation, requires him to conceive of this self 
 as no isolated individual, but as a related self, a member of 
 humanity, a citizen of the kingdom of rational human 
 beings. 
 
 To these interrelated moral selves, Kant attributes three 
 chief characters, freedom, immortality, and blessedness. 
 These must be further discussed. 
 
 (i) It has been shown already (by quotations from both 
 "Kritiks"), that Kant teaches the freedom of the seK; it 
 must now be pointed out that he seems to use this term in 
 at least two ways. On the one hand, he shows that in the 
 consciousness of obhgation one is aware of a self which is 
 deeper than any series of feelings and which is, therefore, 
 ontologically free — in other words, free from, or inde- 
 
 • Ibid., H., 281 ; W., 248. 
 
 ' Ibid., H., 280 ; W., 247. Watson's translation. 
 
 • Cf. the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 152 seq. 
 
266 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 pendent of, the laws of phenomenal relation.' It is a 
 moot point whether Kant believes in 'freedom' in a second, 
 the merely ethical sense, that is to say, whether he teaches 
 that the moral self has the choice between good and ill. In 
 the opinion of the present writer, Kant does, in certain 
 passages, unequivocally teach that the fact of obligation 
 impKes that the moral man 'is free' to do good or ill. This 
 is the most obvious meaning of the passage, already quoted,^ 
 "Man afSrms that he can because he is conscious that he 
 ought;" it is still more plainly impUed in the well-known 
 words "Dm kannst denn du sollst." The implication of these 
 statements certainly seems to be: obligation is impossible 
 unless there be responsibihty — a power to act in one way 
 or in the other. Kant's occasional references to a will 
 which is 'not good' ' — or to a will 'influenced by sensuous 
 desires'* — -imply even more clearly that the real self, the 
 unphenomenal self, has the 'freedom' to be good or bad.^ 
 
 To sum up : Kant teaches that the individual selves in 
 the kingdom of selves are free, in the sense of being selves, 
 not mere complexes of ideas, and that this is implied by the 
 mere consciousness of obligation. At times, also, Kant 
 seems to teach that the fact of obhgation imphes the ethical 
 freedom of these individuals to work good or ill. 
 
 (2) The immortality of human selves, Kant teaches, is a 
 second implication of the fact of obligation. For the very 
 
 '"Kritik of Pure Reason," A, 538 seq.; B, 566 seq.; W., 184 seq.; 
 "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., H., 45 seq.; W., 272 seq.; "Meta- 
 physik of Morality," § III., H., 294 seq.; W., 250. 
 
 ^ Cf. supra, p. 259^. 
 
 ' "Metaphysik of Morality," § I., H., 241; W., 225. 
 
 */6id.. III., H., 302; W., 255. 
 
 ' This doctrine seems to be contradicted by other passages which teach, 
 apparently, that the free self always acts in accordance with the moral law, 
 and that the actions of the evil self belong to the world of phenomena, as 
 distinct from that of the noumenal self. (Cf. "Metaphysik of Morality," 
 III., H., 301 ; W., 254.) Such a view, however, is certainly in opposition to 
 Kant's fundamental doctrine that a given act may be viewed both as phe- 
 nomenal and as expression of a real self. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 267 
 
 first requirement of the moral law is complete conformity 
 with the law, action in accordance with the feeling of obli- 
 gation. Now this "complete conformity ... to the moral 
 law," Kant says, "is holiness, a perfection of which no 
 rational being of the sense world is capable at any 
 point of time of his existence. Since, however, holiness is 
 demanded as practically necessary, it can be found only in 
 an infinite progress toward that full conformity; and . . . 
 it is necessary to assume such practical advance as the 
 real object of our will." ^ Thus Kant teaches the ne- 
 cessity of immortality as requisite to the fulfilment of 
 obligation. 
 
 The conception is certainly invigorating. Is it, however, 
 logically necessary? The question which at once suggests 
 itself is this: Does Kant here contradict his own concep- 
 tion of the moral self as out of the temporal series,^ by 
 the suggestion that it fails of its aim at a particular mo- 
 ment? To this it may be replied that according to Kant, 
 every action is part of a temporal series as well as a mani- 
 festation of the timeless self. Now it is only of the temporal 
 self that one may say : it must be immortal as surely as it 
 has obligation, or duties. For duties must be capable of 
 fulfilment and cannot be fulfilled in a finite time.' Thus 
 the self which, as timeless, is eternal is, as temporal, moral 
 self, immortal. 
 
 (3) Still another implication of duty — or obligation — is 
 named by Kant in a section preceding that just summarized.* 
 Kant calls it the impHcation of a 'highest good.' The 
 
 '"Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chapter 2, IV., H. 128; W., 
 294. Cf. on immortality, Kant's "Traume eines Geisterseher's," s*" Theil, 
 3"' HauptstUck, end; injra, Chapter XI., pp. 453 seq. 
 
 ^ Cf. supra, p. 259'. 
 
 ^ Of course it must on no account be forgotten that Kant teaches that 
 God would see 'in the series' or indefinite progress of the individual, a 
 whole that is in harmony with the moral law. (" Kritik of Practical Reason," 
 Bk. II., Chapter 2, IV., H., 129; W., 295.) 
 
 * Ibid., loc. cit., Chapter 2, and I. and II., H., 116 seq.; W., 291 seq. 
 
268 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 existence of the highest good follows, Kant says, from 
 the fact of obligation, simply and precisely because the 
 'highest good' is the object of obhgation, the content of the 
 moral law. "The highest good," he says, "is necessarily 
 the supreme end of a morally determined will." ' "We ought," 
 he says later, "to seek to further the highest good — and the 
 highest good must certainly, therefore, be possible." ^ 
 
 Kant thus attains a further definition of the object of duty. 
 As conceived in the " Metaphysik of Morahty " the object of 
 the moral law is regarded, first, as conformity with conscious- 
 ness of obligation (whatever its content) — a state to which 
 the argument for irmnortality seems to refer as 'holiness'; 
 and is, second, defined simply and vaguely as the end shared 
 by humanity, the kingdom of selves related by common laws. 
 In the section now considered Kant goes farther and describes 
 duty as the obligation to attain the highest good. Now the 
 highest good, Kant teaches, must be both supreme and com- 
 plete. The supreme good is evidently virtue, or holiness, the 
 conformity with the sense of duty. As complete, however, 
 the highest good must include not merely virtue, but happi- 
 ness also. "Virtue ... is the supreme ^ good. . . . But 
 it is not, for that reason, the whole and complete good, as 
 object of the desire of rational, finite beings. The complete 
 good demands happiness also — and that not only to the 
 prejudiced view of the person who makes an end of himself, 
 but in the judgment of imprejudiced reason which regards 
 happiness in the world as an end in itself. For if we imagine 
 ... a reasonable and at the same time all-powerful being, 
 it cannot accord with the complete will of such a being that 
 there should be those who are in need of happiness and are 
 worthy of it yet who do not possess it." Such happiness, 
 Kant insists, in the effort to coordinate this teaching with the 
 earUer sections of the "Kritik," though it is part of the object 
 
 > " Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chapter 2, IV., H., 121'; W., 294. 
 ■^lUd., Bk. I., Chapter 2, V., H., 131; W., 296^. 
 ' Ihid., Bk. II., Chapter 2, H., 116; W., 291-292. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 269 
 
 of duty, is not its determining motive or Bestimmungsgrund. 
 For only the moral law, the obUgation to be true to one's 
 sense of obligation, can determine the truly moral will.* 
 Reflection upon the tendency of moral actions and upon the 
 explanation of the sense of obligation does, it is true, lead to 
 the conclusion that the object of the moral consciousness, the 
 ideal whose existence it implies, is the 'highest good.' But 
 every single moral act follows upon consciousness of obliga- 
 tion, not upon a calculation of the ' highest good.' 
 
 But this reasoning, spite of its guarded outcome, is even 
 less cogent than the argument for immortality. For Kant 
 urges the existence of the highest good only by an appeal to 
 what he calls unprejudiced reason, and has no weapon with 
 which to meet the opponent who should challenge his con- 
 viction. The failure of this argument, as will appear, in- 
 validates Kant's practical proof of the existence of God. 
 
 III. Kant's Teaching that the Existence of God 
 IS postulated by the Moral Consciousness 
 
 The search for the implication of the moral consciousness 
 not only leads Kant to the doctrine that a society of free and 
 immortal and finally blessed selves exists, but assures him 
 also of the existence of God. Kant argues that God must 
 exist in order that the highest good be possible — that is, in 
 order that happiness should follow upon virtue. A finite 
 moral being cannot order events so as to secure happiness, 
 therefore God must exist to supply that happiness which 
 is a factor in the 'highest good.' All this is very clearly and 
 simply stated by Kant : "It has been admitted that it is our 
 duty to promote the highest good, and hence it is not only 
 allowable, but it is even a necessity demanded by duty, that 
 we should presuppose the possibility of this highest good. 
 And as this possibiHty can be presupposed only on the con- 
 dition that God exists, the presupposition of the highest 
 
 ' " Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chapter i, H., 114, W., 291'. 
 
270 Attack upon Dualism, and Phenomenalism 
 
 good is inseparably bound up with duty, that is, it is morally 
 necessary to hold to the existence of God." ' 
 
 There is certainly nothing more surprising in all that Kant 
 has written, nothing more inconsistent with his rigorous 
 temperament and his severe outlook upon hfe, than this argu- 
 ment for a God who is needed in order to give mere happiness. 
 The argument, as has been shown, depends upon the pre- 
 ceding demonstration that happiness must coexist with 
 virtue. And since this last assertion was unproved, the 'prac- 
 tical argument' for God's existence goes with it. Yet the 
 failure of this argument is no disproof of the wider proposi- 
 tion that the facts of the moral life demand God's existence. 
 Fichte, and especially Hegel, later take up Kant's argument 
 at this point and argue that a moral self and — the more 
 surely — that a kingdom of related moral selves presuppose 
 the existence of an all-including self who is himself the 
 highest good, to share whose reality is immortahty and hfe. 
 
 In conclusion there is need to remind ourselves that Kant 
 makes a curious and — as will be argued — an unwarranted 
 distinction between the assurance based on the facts of moral 
 experience and that which has what he calls a 'theoretical' 
 basis. The latter alone he names 'knowledge,' whereas 
 assurance of the former kind he calls postulate or faith.' 
 For to Kant knowledge always includes sense perception; 
 and, therefore, the awareness of self, of friend, of God, must 
 needs bear another name. "Through practical reason," he 
 says, "we know neither the nature of our soul, nor the in- 
 telhgible world, nor God as they are in themselves. We have 
 only the conceptions of them united in the practical concep- 
 tion of the highest good as the object of our will." It is 
 however of utmost importance to realize that though Kant 
 taught what Tennyson later sung, 
 
 " We have but faith, we cannot know, 
 For knowledge is of things we see," 
 
 ' " Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chapter 2, V., H., 131 ; W., 297. 
 'Ibid., he. cit., VI.*, H., 139-140; W., 299-300. 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 271 
 
 he none the less attributes to the believed or postulated 
 objects of the practical reason all the reality of known ob- 
 jects. Over and over again he says this. "Freedom, Immor- 
 tality, and God," he declares, "... gain objective reahty 
 through an apodictic practical law, as necessary conditions 
 of the possibility of that which the law commands shall be 
 its object." He even adds* that "theoretical knowledge . . . 
 has been extended" by being "forced to admit that there 
 are supersensible objects," though nothing definite is theo- 
 retically known of them. Only, therefore, his arbitrary 
 hmitation of the term 'knowledge' prevents Kant from ap- 
 plying the word to our consciousness of self and of God. The 
 critics who represent Kant as teaching merely that there is a 
 moral 'probability' that God exists, or as teaching that we 
 should act as if we knew that God exists, wholly misrepresent 
 Kant's position. For Kant asserts positively and not doubt- 
 fully that a universe of moral selves and a God exist. 
 
 Thus, to review Kant's ethical doctrine, it is evident that 
 he rightly teaches that the facts of the moral consciousness 
 presuppose the existence of a society of real and interrelated 
 selves. But it is evident, also, that, though his main con- 
 clusions are thus justified, he does not succeed in demon- 
 strating either the immortaUty and the blessedness of the 
 individual, or the existence of God. For his arguments, in all 
 three cases, are of a traditional and empirical nature, and he 
 does not satisfactorily prove that immortality and happiness 
 and God are implications of the moral consciousness. His 
 main defect is, in truth, the failure to see that the argument 
 from obHgation is not the only one : that not merely the will, 
 but the thought, the memory, — yes, even the emotion and the 
 sensation of the conscious experience, — imply a self funda- 
 mental to ideas, which does not merely will, but which thinks, 
 remembers, feels, and perceives. Such a self presupposes — 
 as Kant clearly realized, though he argued it in so ineffective 
 
 ■" Kritik of Practical Reason,' H., 141 ; W , 300'. 
 
272 Attack upon Dualism and Phenomenalism 
 
 a way — a world of things which are mere objects for the 
 self/ a world of related finite selves, and a God who is the 
 sum of all reality, — who is, in truth, intelligence and will. 
 
 These results so closely resemble those of the pre- Kantian 
 ideaHsts, Leibniz and Berkeley, that it is fair to ask ourselves, 
 Does Kant represent any significant advance upon their doc- 
 trine? Has he, in truth, done more than correct Hume's 
 sensationaUstic phenomenalism and Wolff's intellectualistic 
 dualism, so as to swing philosophy back from Hume and 
 Wolff to Berkeley and to Leibniz ? Measured by the stand- 
 ard of its progress toward idealism, is not Kant's system, 
 indeed, a retrogression, since he asserts the existence of 
 things-in-themselves ? Or, if it be assumed that Kant finally 
 interprets the things-in-themselves as free selves, — the pos- 
 tulates of the practical reason, — is not his system less 
 simply self-consistent than Berkeley's? And, if all these 
 questions are affirmatively answered, a practical question 
 will doubtless next be asked : What use is there, it will not 
 unreasonably be urged, in the study of a text so intricate, so 
 difficult, and so contradictory as Kant's? To this question 
 there are, however, three answers, that is, there are three 
 ways of justifying our study of Kant. 
 
 Kant's influence has, in the first place, been far greater than 
 that of Leibniz or of Berkeley. Berkeley had very little 
 effect on continental or even on British philosophy, and 
 Leibniz's doctrine was distorted by Wolff before it was fairly 
 understood; whereas the post-Kantian German schools are 
 built up on Kant's philosophy, and all philosophical works, 
 up to our own day, presuppose an acquaintance with Kant's 
 terms and with his argument. 
 
 There is, in the second place, a certain methodological 
 value in the hard- won character and in the very slowness and 
 incompleteness of Kant's thinking. The idealistic stand- 
 
 ' Cf . the teaching of the " Kritik of Judgment." 
 
The Critical Philosophy of Kant 273 
 
 point is opposed to that of our traditional doctrine, so that 
 there seems to be something almost like sleight-of-hand in 
 Leibniz's and in Berkeley's Ughtning-like transformation of 
 the world of independent things into the world of monads 
 and souls. Kant's more grudging method is, for one type of 
 mind at any rate, more convincing. He does not wish to 
 yield the world of independent reahty and yet — bit by bit — 
 he finds himself compelled to give up space, time, substance, 
 causality; and at the end the very things-in-themselves 
 threaten to turn into real selves. 
 
 But, finally, there is in Kant's teaching a distinct advance, 
 or at the very least the material for a distinct advance, both 
 on Leibniz and on Berkeley. The great defect of each of 
 these systems is, as was shown, its failure to show the rela- 
 tion between infinite and finite monads, or selves. Berkeley, 
 for example, never explains how the Infinite produces ideas 
 in the finite mind, nor how the finite knows either the Infinite 
 or other human selves. But Kant, by his distinction between 
 the empirical and the transcendental self which are yet the 
 same self, by his teaching that the moral consciousness pre- 
 supposes related selves, recognizes the problem and suggests 
 its solution. A completely satisfactory solution, it must be 
 admitted, philosophy has never yet found. 
 
SYSTEMS AND INTIMATIONS OF 
 NUMERICAL MONISM 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 MONISTIC PLURALISM:' THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA 
 
 " Es giebt keine andere Philosophie, als die Philosophie des Spinoza." 
 — Lessing, as quoted by Jacobi. 
 
 We have followed, thus, the history of modem thought on 
 the problem of ultimate reaUty, from its initial duaUstic 
 opposition of spirit to matter, through two forms of quali- 
 tative monism, first, the materiahsm of Hobbes, which re- 
 duces spirit reality to matter, and second, the idealism of 
 Leibniz and of Berkeley, which admits only spiritual reality. 
 We have analyzed also the Humian form of ideahsm, a denial 
 of the existence of self-conscious selves or spirits and a con- 
 sequent reduction of reality to the succession of fleeting and 
 evanescent states of consciousness; finally, we have con- 
 sidered Kant's refutation of this system of phenomenalism — 
 in other words, Kant's restoration of the conscious self to its 
 rightful position as a reality impUed, necessarily, by the 
 fleeting ideas themselves. Kant's successful criticism of 
 Hume's position seems thus to throw us back into the Leib- 
 nizian or Berkeleian imiverse of the many conscious spirits; 
 for Kant's own conviction of an unknown reality, behind the 
 world of the self, has proved to be an inconsistent and im- 
 justified remnant of dualism. 
 
 Yet the study of Kant makes it impossible to accept im- 
 critically the doctrine of Berkeley. For Kant plainly realizes, 
 
 ' This statement of Spinoza's philosophy runs counter to the usual con- 
 ception of it as a purely monistic system. It is indeed true, as will appear, 
 that the most significant teaching of Spinoza is his numerically monistic con- 
 ception of the one substance ; but his doctrine of the many attributes con- 
 stitutes the system qualitatively pluralistic as well. 
 
 277 
 
278 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 though he does not definitely formulate, a difficulty utterly 
 neglected by Berkeley, and realized but inconsistently met 
 by Leibniz : the problem of the relation of the many selves 
 to each other. Both Leibniz and Berkeley, as has appeared, 
 conceive the universe as composed of immaterial, spiritual 
 substances, of which one — the supreme monad or God — 
 is infinitely superior to the others. Neither Berkeley nor 
 Leibniz, however, explains the relation of the spiritual sub- 
 stances to each other ; still less, does either of them reconcile 
 the infiniteness, perfection, absolute completeness of the 
 divine self with the existence of these lesser selves.' Their 
 systems of philosophy, in other words, though quaUtatively 
 monistic, are numerically pluralistic. They teach that there 
 is but one kind of reahty, spiritual, in the universe, but that 
 there are many spirits; and they fail to reconcile the inde- 
 pendence of the spirits with their existence together in the 
 imiverse and with the existence of a supreme spirit. 
 
 It has already been shown that Kant realizes the difficulties 
 inherent in a numerically pluralistic idealism ; and indeed his 
 doctrine of the transcendental self can be interpreted — as 
 has been indicated — in such a way that it becomes a monistic 
 doctrine of one, all-inclusive self, not a pluralistic doctrine 
 of many independent selves. Such a reading, however, 
 probably is not in the spirit of Kant himself. He is rather 
 a critic of plurahstic ideaUsm than the creator of a monistic 
 system. But a century earUer — before the time of the 
 idealists, earlier, therefore, than Berkeley or even Leibniz — 
 there had appeared a constructive critic of numerical plural- 
 ism, a great thinker who conceived of reality as ultimately 
 one being, or substance, and of the so-called many reali- 
 ties — whether things or thoughts, bodies or spirits — as 
 modifications of this one substance. This teacher of numeri- 
 cal monism was Baruch Spinoza, bom in Amsterdam of 
 Jewish parents in 1632, expelled from the synagogue in 1656, 
 
 • For detailed criticisms of Leibniz, cf. supra, pp. 100 seq.; of Berkeley, 
 supra, pp. 144 seq. 
 
The System of Spinoza 279 
 
 dying at The Hague in 1677 after a life of high courage, blame- 
 less honor, tranquil industry, and lofty thought. The com- 
 pletest expression of his metaphysical thought, "The Ethics," 
 was pubhshed in 1677, after his death, but exerted literally 
 no influence on contemporary philosophy, because of 
 the prejudice against Spinoza, aroused in great part by the 
 publication of an earher work, the "Tractatus Theologico- 
 Pohticus," which promulgated unorthodox views of bibUcal 
 criticism and ecclesiastical freedom. Spinoza's philosophy 
 was decried — for the most part, unread — by theologians 
 and philosophers as atheistic, and was attacked, also, on the 
 ground that it undermined morality. The justice of these 
 charges can be fully estimated only by a study of Spinoza's 
 writings. That he was pantheist and necessitarian will 
 become evident, but it will appear that his system presents a 
 foundation for religion and that his ethical teachings inculcate 
 a high and vigorous moraUty. But the contemporary preju- 
 dice, though rooted in misunderstanding and ignorance, 
 effectively isolated Spinoza's teaching. His criticism of the 
 numerical plurahsm of the scholastic and Cartesian doctrines 
 did not influence either Leibniz or Berkeley. Both these 
 philosophers corrected the qualitative pluralism of Descartes 
 and Locke, by substituting one for two kinds of reaUty; but 
 they failed to see the difi&culty inherent in the doctrine of the 
 many substances, and peopled their universe with many 
 spirits, without considering Spinoza's great conception of a 
 single ultimate reality, one substance. But Spinoza's con- 
 ception did not remain forever unfruitful. When idealism, 
 rescued by Kant from Hume's phenomenalistic interpreta- 
 tion, seemed about to reassert itself, — just over a century, 
 therefore, after Spinoza's death, — there occurred a revival 
 of Spinozism which, applied to traditional forms of idealism, 
 transmuted the doctrine of the one substance into the con- 
 ception of the absolute self, manifested in the finite selves, 
 not externally related to them. 
 Lessing, the poet thinker of the later eighteenth century. 
 
28o Monistic Pluralism 
 
 restored Spinoza to his right as master-mind ; and historians, 
 poets, and philosophers alike — Herder and Goethe, no less 
 than Schelling and Hegel — were profoundly impressed and 
 influenced by Spinoza's doctrine of the one substance and 
 of the consequent subordination of lesser realities to the All- 
 including. This influence of Spinoza on the philosophy of 
 the eighteenth and of the early nineteenth century is the 
 more remarkable since, as will be shown, the teaching of 
 Spinoza did not fall in line with the personalistic idealism 
 which characterized most of these post-Kantian systems. Spi- 
 noza's assumption of the equal value of thought and extension 
 had been successfully challenged by Leibniz and by Berkeley. 
 His reaUstic and uncritical assumption of the possibiUty of 
 knowing the ultimate had been opposed by Kant ; and even 
 if, with the writer, one believe that Kant did not prove his 
 point, one must admit that he made impossible an epistemol- 
 ogy so uncritical as that of Spinoza. 
 
 But in spite of these anachronisms and in spite also of the 
 rigid Euclidean form of his "Ethics," strangely contrasting 
 with the inchoate romanticism of most works, philosophical 
 as well as literary, of this period in German literature, Spi- 
 noza's " Ethics" laid its impress on the thought of this period. 
 And this effect it wrought through its central conception, the 
 doctrine of numerical monism, the theory that reality is 
 ultimately one being which underlies the manifold realities 
 of the phenomenal universe. 
 
 Spinoza's "Ethics," his most important work, is divided 
 into these five parts: " Of God," " Of the Nature and Ori- 
 gin of the Mind," " Of the Nature and Origin of the 
 Emotions," "Of Human Bondage," and "Of Human Free- 
 dom." As its title indicates and as Spinoza repeatedly 
 says, the "Ethics" is written with a practical purpose: the 
 whole book and not merely the last division of it " is concerned 
 with the way leading to freedom."* But Spinoza's discovery 
 
 ' Pt. v., Preface, first sentence. (All references are to the "Ethics," 
 unless another title is expressly named.) 
 
The System of Spinoza 281 
 
 of the path to freedom is by way of an investigation of ulti- 
 mate reality ; and this reality turns out to be both the guaran- 
 tee of freedom and the incentive to it. "The results," he 
 says, "which must necessarily follow from the essence of 
 God ... are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the 
 knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness." ' 
 We are chiefly concerned with the fundamental metaphysical 
 teaching of Spinoza.^ 
 
 In each of the divisions of the "Ethics" Spinoza begins, 
 after the fashion of the geometry books, with a series of 
 definitions, supplemented by a set of axioms (in one case, 
 postulates), and then followed by propositions with their 
 proofs, corollaries, and scholia. The explanation of this 
 formal method is not far to seek. Spinoza shared with his 
 contemporaries a profound reverence for mathematics, and 
 with Descartes in particular the hope of lending to meta- 
 physical investigation the certainty possessed by mathe- 
 matics. This seems to have suggested to him that there 
 must be some special virtue in the technical forms in which 
 mathematical demonstrations are made. In this, however, 
 Spinoza — as every modem critic admits — was mistaken.' 
 Mathematics and philosophy are, to be sure, alhed in that 
 both involve, on the one hand, insight, and, on the other hand, 
 reflection. But mathematics with its restricted subject-mat- 
 ter is likely to differ, in method, from philosophy with its 
 unhampered range; and Spinoza's choice, among mathe- 
 matical methods, of the deductive procedure of Euclidean 
 geometry is especially unfortunate, since it obscures the fact 
 that his system rests, after all, on immediate observation. 
 This unfortunate setting of his doctrine is responsible, in- 
 deed, for the most frequent misinterpretation of it: the 
 
 1 Pt. II., Preface. 
 
 ' The metaphysical teaching is developed mainly in Pt. I., in the Defini- 
 tions, Axioms and first thirteen Propositions of Part II., and in Propositions 
 XV. through XXIII. of Pt. V. The student is urged to read at least so 
 much of the "Ethics" ; he will do well to read it entire. 
 
 ' Cf. F. Pollock, "Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy," pp. 147 wg. 
 
282 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 charge that Spinoza's definitions and axioms are far from 
 self-evident, that on the contrary he summarizes his beliefs, 
 without estabUshing them, in his introductory definitions, and 
 that he then, with great show of logic, elaborately proves 
 them by propositions based on these very definitions.' This 
 criticism, as will appear in the following sketch of Spinoza's 
 system, is not justified by his teaching, but it is readily ex- 
 plained by the misleading frame in which his doctrine is set. 
 Even Spinoza must have realized at times that his method 
 hampered him, for he adds to each Part of his "Ethics" a 
 Preface or an Appendix or both, and in most of these, as well 
 as in very many of his letters, he sets forth his meaning in 
 direct and forcible fashion. To the analysis of his teaching 
 it is necessary now to turn. This chapter attempts to give 
 both an exposition of Spinoza's teaching, and a critical 
 consideration of his arguments and their conclusions. No 
 attempt is made in the expository part of the chapter to follow 
 Spinoza's order of propositions, which indeed often obscures 
 his real meaning. 
 
 I. The Doctrine of the One Substance: God 
 
 a. Exposition 
 
 I. Substance as totality 0} reality 
 
 The traditional philosophy, it will be remembered, as 
 formulated just before Spinoza's time by Descartes, conceived 
 of substance as independent reality. Most of the definitions 
 with which Part I of the " Ethics " begins are an amplification 
 of this traditional doctrine, and a statement of its corollaries. 
 'By substance," Spinoza says, "I mean that which is in 
 itself and is conceived through itself : in other words, that of 
 which a conception can be formed independently of any 
 
 ' Cf. Berkeley, "Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher," Dialogue, VII., 
 Clarendon Press edition, Vol. II., p. 334. 
 
The System of Spinoza 283 
 
 other conception;"' and he contrasts substance, thus con- 
 ceived, with the mode, or modification of substance, which 
 "exists in, and is conceived through, something other than 
 itself." ^ This definition of substance clearly suggests 
 Descartes's: "By substance we can conceive nothing else 
 than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need 
 of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence." ' 
 
 But Spinoza advances beyond Descartes in defining sub- 
 stance not only as that which exists in itself (without de- 
 pendence on the external) but as that which is conceived 
 through itself. For substance, if conceived through itself 
 only, is of necessity all-inclusive ; since, if anything existed 
 outside it, substance would have to be conceived as limited- 
 at-least-in-extent by that other existent, and would not there- 
 fore be conceived through itself alone. To be conceived 
 through itself substance must, therefore, be unHmited. The 
 bare existence of anything outside itself would be a limi- 
 tation, a derogation from its completeness, and substance 
 must consequently itself be all that there is. This doc- 
 trine is stated in the early propositions of the "Ethics," in 
 which Spinoza argues, first, that a substance, a reahty in 
 itself and conceived through itself, can neither be pro- 
 duced * nor in any way hmited ^ by another substance ; and, 
 second, that therefore "there can only be one substance."" 
 
 ' Pt. I., Def. 3 (Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se 
 concipitur). 
 
 ' Pt. I., Def. s {Per modum intelligo substantice ajjectionem, sive id quod 
 in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur). 
 
 3 "The Principles of Philosophy," Pt. I., Prop. 51. 
 
 * Pt. I., Props. 2, 3, 6 ("one substance cannot be produced by another"). 
 ' Pt. I., Props. 4, 5, 8 ("every substance is necessarily infinite"). The 
 
 actual argument of Props. 2-8 is unnecessarily intricate, involving both 
 the admitted doctrine of the relation of attributes to substance and the tem- 
 porary supposition (at once shown to be absurd) that there are several 
 substances unrelated to each other. Really, however, as Spinoza recognizes 
 in a parallel case (cf. Prop. 8, Schol. 2, injra, p. 285), the isolation and thus 
 the exclusiveness of substance follows from the definition of it as ' in itself and 
 conceived through itself.' 
 
 • Pt. I., Prop. 8, Proof, first clause. 
 
284 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 The most important difference between Spinoza and the 
 Cartesians is brought out by the words just quoted. Des- 
 cartes sees nothing inconsistent in his assertion of the exist- 
 ence of subordinate reahties, or substances, outside that 
 substance which stands " in need of nothing beyond itself in 
 order to its existence " ; but Spinoza reahzes that only the 
 all-inclusive can be absolutely independent, or self-depen- 
 dent. By insisting not only that substance exists in itself, 
 but that it is conceived through itself, he emphasizes this 
 truth; for no reality existing along with another, however 
 superior to this other, is conceived purely through itself ; on 
 the other hand, it is necessarily conceived as not-that-other, 
 that is, it is in part conceived through the other. Spinoza, 
 therefore, conceives the alleged subordinate reahties as 
 manifestations, or expressions, of the one substance. 
 
 But Spinoza's doctrine, as so far discussed, offers no argu- 
 ment for the existence of substance thus regarded as abso- 
 lute totahty. Granted that substance, if it exist, must be 
 totality, how is it proved that there exists, actually and not 
 merely in conception, any such unhmited, one substance? 
 It is often said that Spinoza merely takes for granted, without 
 any effort to establish his conviction, the existence of the one 
 subtsance. Such a charge is not unnatural, for the very first 
 sentence of Part I,' readily lends itself to this interpretation. 
 "By that which is self-caused," Spinoza says (and this, of 
 course, is substance),^ "I mean that of which the essence in- 
 volves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceiv- 
 able asexistent." This proposition, it will be admitted, asserts 
 and does not justify the doctrine that the existence of sub- 
 stance follows from the conception, and is thus a mere 
 repetition of Descartes's form of the discredited ontological 
 argument. But this criticism overlooks the probability that 
 these introductory definitions claim to be nothing more than 
 
 'Def. I. 
 
 ' Cf. "De Intellectus Emendatione " (Vol. I., p. 28, of Van Vloten and 
 Land edition of Spinoza) : Si res sit in se sive, ut vulgo dicitur, causa sui. 
 
The System of Spinoza 285 
 
 a restatement of traditional doctrine; it further disregards 
 the fact that the early Propositions of Part I. do imply a justi- 
 fication, impossible on Descartes's system, for the doctrine 
 that the existence of substance follows from the conception 
 of it. This justification is found in the teaching, already 
 outlined, that there can be but one substance. For the one 
 substance, so far as we have yet seen, means no more than 
 "all that exists" ; and of the "all that exists," every one must 
 certainly admit that it does exist. The very emptiness and 
 indeterminateness of substance, thus regarded, make it pos- 
 sible to assert its necessary existence. For whereas it might 
 be necessary to establish the existence of this or that par- 
 ticular reality, — of God conceived as one reality among 
 others or of a world of material things, — it is certain that 
 all that there is (it may turn out to be of this or that sort or of 
 many sorts) exists. "If people would consider the nature 
 of substance," Spinoza says, "... this proposition [exist- 
 ence belongs to the nature of substance] would be a universal 
 axiom and accounted a truism." ' The existence of substance, 
 in so far as substance means the all-of-reality, follows, thus, 
 from its utter completeness. In other words the conception 
 carries with it the certainty of the existence of substance, 
 precisely because it is a conception of a so far imdetermined 
 All. Such a guarantee of existence Descartes's conception 
 of infinite substance does not possess, because that is a 
 conception of a particular sort of reaUty — good, wise, power- 
 ful — and because the actual existence of these special char- 
 acters does not immediately follow from the thought of them. 
 The existence of something is, however, immediately certain 
 (the existence, in the last analysis, of this thought about 
 existence) ; ^ and it is equally certain that whatever is, 
 namely all that there is, exists.' 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 8, Schol. II. a. Letter II. (The Letters are cited as num- 
 bered in the translation of Elwes and in the edition of Van Vloten and Land.) 
 ' This statement is not made by Spinoza. 
 • Besides implying this justification of the doctrine that substance exists, 
 
286 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 This one substance, which exists necessarily, Spinoza calls 
 God. "By God," he says, in Definition 6, "I mean a being 
 absolutely infinite." But he proceeds, as we know, to prove 
 that "there can be only one substance," ^ and that "substance 
 is necessarily infinite."^ Evidently, then, 'God' and 'sub- 
 stance ' are for Spinoza synonymous terms ; and the demon- 
 strations, later introduced, of God's existence, are, to say the 
 least, unnecessary,^ since substance, the all, is admitted to 
 exist. 
 
 2. Substance as manifested in the modes, not the mere sum 
 
 of them 
 
 Spinoza does not, however, conceive of substance as the 
 mere aggregate, or sum, of all that exists. So regarded, sub- 
 stance would, be an infinite composite constituted by the bare 
 existence of all the particular finite realities which exist, or 
 have existed, or will exist. But Spinoza, so far from teach- 
 ing that substance is constituted, or made up, of finite realities, 
 insists that the finite phenomena are parts of the one substance, 
 that they are real only as partaking of the nature of this sub- 
 stance. In fact he calls the finite phenomena 'modes' of 
 substance * and says plainly, "By mode I mean the modifi- 
 cation of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived 
 through, something other than itself." Obviously, then, 
 Spinoza holds that substance has a reahty deeper than that 
 
 Spinoza gives evidence of sharing the incorrect Cartesian doctrine, charac- 
 teristic of the seventeenth century, that clear thought impUes the existence 
 of substance as its object. 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 8, Proof. 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 8. 
 
 ' Of Spinoza's proofs, the first is a mere reaffirmation of the existence of 
 substance; the second involves the questionable assumption that anything 
 exists if no reason can be given for its non-existence; and the third carries 
 with it the non-Spinozistic conception of the existence of more than one 
 substance. 
 
 * The term 'phenomena' is not used by Spinoza. For his conception of 
 finite things as related to each other, see this chapter, § II., infra, p. 300. 
 
The System of Spinoza . 287 
 
 of the modes of finite phenomena. Otherwise, he must have 
 said, substance exists as the sum of the modes, instead 
 of saying (as he does repeatedly), the modes exist in 
 substance. 
 
 Throughout the "Ethics," the modes are thus subordinated 
 to substance, or God. "Whatsoever is," Spinoza says dis- 
 tinctly, "is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be 
 conceived. . . . Modes can neither be, nor be conceived, 
 without substance, wherefore they can only be in the divine 
 nature and can only through it be conceived." * This con- 
 ception of finite phenomena as constituted through the fact 
 that they partake of the divine nature underhes all the special 
 doctrines of the " Ethics." Thus Spinoza says of the human 
 mind that it "is part of the infinite intellect of God," that, 
 indeed, "he constitutes the essence of the human mind." ^ 
 Again, he says that "all ideas are in God." ^ In Part 
 III. he argues for the truth that "everything endeavors 
 to persist in its own being," from the admitted propo- 
 sition, "individual things . . . express in a given deter- 
 minate manner the power of God, whereby God is and 
 acts." " 
 
 The last statement is one of those in which Spinoza goes 
 beyond the assertion of the subordinateness of modes to God, 
 and directly asserts the independent reality of God. Similar 
 to the statement that " God is and acts" is the repeated teach- 
 ing that God is the cause of the modes, or finite phenomena. 
 "God . . . is and acts," Spinoza declares, "solely by the ne- 
 cessity of his own nature ; he is the free cause of all things . . . ; 
 ... all things are in God and so depend on him that 
 without him they could neither exist nor be conceived." ^ 
 " God," he says, a Httle earlier, " we have shown to be the first 
 and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 15, and Proof. Cf. Prop. 25, Cor.; Prop. 29, Schol., end; 
 Ft. II., Prop. 45, Proof. 
 
 2 Pt. II., Prop. II, Cor. = Pt. II., Prop. 36, Proof. 
 
 * Pt. III., Prop. 6, and Proof. ' Pt. I., Appendix, first paragraph. 
 
288 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 their existence." ' It is true that Spinoza means by cause 
 something more than that which Descartes meant, an imma- 
 nent as well as an efficient cause ; ^ but whatever his con- 
 ception of cause, Spinoza's God, or substance, which he calls 
 free cause of all existent things, is in some sense more real 
 than the aggregate of finite realities. It is not made up of 
 them, but constitutes them; they are its modifications, its 
 expressions.^ 
 
 But this conclusion leads inevitably to the question : what, 
 then, is the nature of substance — ■ that nature which is ex- 
 pressed in the modes? If substance were the mere sum of 
 the modes, then an exhaustive study of these modes — an 
 investigation of the facts of science — would yield a sufficient 
 account of substance. But since the modes must be con- 
 ceived and explained through substance, an independent 
 investigation of its nature becomes necessary. Spinoza 
 attempts to describe substance by his doctrine of attributes. 
 
 3. Substance as constituted by the attributes: God as think- 
 ing and extended thing 
 
 "By God," Spinoza says, "I mean a being absolutely 
 infinite, that is a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of 
 which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality." * 
 Spinoza has just defined attribute to be "that which the 
 intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance." ° 
 His conception of God is then that of an infinite Being, in- 
 finitely manifold in nature, manifested in the many finite 
 phenomena. 
 
 Spinoza argues for his reiterated doctrine of the infinite 
 number of God's attributes from the absolute infiniteness of 
 God. " The more reahty, or being, a thing has, the greater," 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 33, Schol. II., end. * Pt. I., Def. 6. 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 16, Cor. 1-3, Prop. 18. 'Pt. I., Def. 4. 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 25, Cor. 
 
The System of Spinoza 289 
 
 he says, "the number of its attributes." ' But of these attri- 
 butes he admits that we know only two,^ thought and ex- 
 tension.' Thought must be an attribute of God, for it is 
 certain — from immediate introspection, though Spinoza 
 does not point this out — that particular thoughts exist, and 
 since particular thoughts are modes expressing the nature of 
 God, thought must be a character of God. In Spinoza's 
 words : * "Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a think- 
 ing thing. Particular thoughts, or this or that thought, are 
 modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the 
 nature of God. God, therefore, possesses the attribute of 
 which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which 
 latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of 
 the infinite attributes of God which expresses God's eternal 
 and infinite essence. ... In other words, God is a think- 
 ing being {res)." 
 
 For the parallel assertion that "extension is an attribute of 
 God, or God is an extended thing," Spinoza does not argue." 
 "The proof of this proposition," he says, "is similar to that 
 of the last." It will appear later that Spinoza is mistaken in 
 this implication that extended things, Uke thoughts, are 
 immediately known to exist. He seems to be proceeding in 
 this enumeration of the known attributes of God, in more or 
 less uncritical accord not only with Cartesian philosophizing 
 but with everyday observation. The ordinary observer finds 
 that finite phenomena are of two sorts, thoughts and extended 
 things. And if from the existence of the thoughts it be 
 argued that God must have the attribute of thought (since all 
 phenomena merely express his attributes) it seems to the 
 untrained thinker evident that, from the existence of the 
 things, one must argue to extension as attribute of God. 
 
 • I., Prop. 9. Cf. Prop. 10, Schol. 
 
 ' Cf. Letter 66 (Elwes' translation), 64 (Van Vloten edition). 
 » Pt. I., Prop. 10, Schol. 
 
 • Pt. II., Prop. I and Proof. 
 
 • Pt. II., Prop. 2. 
 
 U 
 
ago Monistic Pluralism 
 
 It would be unjust to Spinoza's teaching to omit, even from 
 so brief an outline of it, a reference to the way in which he 
 guards his assertion that "God is a thinking being," even 
 though this consideration must involve us in a difficulty of 
 interpretation. The problem may be stated in this form: 
 Is Spinoza's God, or substance, self-conscious? Or, in 
 more technically Spinozistic terms, does the attribute of 
 thought, defined as 'expressing the essentiahty' of God, carry 
 with it the conception of God as self-conscious? A decisive 
 answer is probably impossible. Many, perhaps most, care- 
 ful students of Spinoza hold that by his doctrine of the 
 thought-attribute of God, Spinoza means merely that God 
 is the sum or system of the finite consciousnesses.' The 
 upholders of this view support it mainly by reference to 
 Spinoza's repeated assertion that "neither intellect nor will 
 appertain to God's nature"^ and by reference also to cer- 
 tain propositions of Part V., in which Spinoza qualifies the 
 statement "God loves himself,"' by the express assertion 
 that "the intellectual love of the mind [the finite mind] 
 towards God is that very love of God wherewith God loves 
 himself." * This statement, it is argued, regards God's love 
 of himself as the totality of the finite emotions of intellectual 
 love towards God; and in accordance with this teaching, 
 God's consciousness can be no other than the sum or system 
 of finite consciousnesses. 
 
 In opposition to the second of these arguments it may be 
 pointed out that Spinoza's expression is ambiguous. When 
 he says that the love of the finite mind toward God "is the 
 very love" or "is part of the infinite love wherewith God 
 loves himself," he may be supposed to mean, not neces- 
 
 ' Cf. Jacobi, "Briefe an Mendelssohn," 1785, p. 170: "Spinozismus ist 
 Atheismus." 
 
 2 Pt. I., Prop. 17, Schol. Cf. Pt. v., 40, Schol. 
 
 ' Pt. v., Prop. 35 (Deus se ipsum amore irttellectuali inpnito amai). 
 
 * Pt. v., Prop. 36. The end of the proposition makes the conception more 
 explicit by stating that " the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part 
 of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself." 
 
The System of Spinoza 291 
 
 sarily that the love of the finite mind is one of a sum of emo- 
 tions which together make a composite called God's love, 
 but that each finite love is partial expression of the deeper 
 and wider love of God. In other words, the finite love may 
 be part of God's love as well if it is constituted by God's 
 love as if it helps to constitute God's love. Equally am- 
 biguous is Spinoza's refusal to attribute intellect to God. 
 His words must obviously be interpreted in relation to his 
 reference, in the previous proposition,' to 'infinite intellect' 
 within which "all things can fall." Thus interpreted, 
 Spinoza evidently denies to God not intellect, but restricted, 
 or human, intellect.^ In truth, then, neither of the arguments 
 is decisive which is urged against the view that Spinoza's 
 God is self-conscious. 
 
 In support of the view that Spinoza's God is, in some 
 sense, self-conscious, there are, on the other hand, ex- 
 pressions of the most varied sort scattered throughout the 
 "Ethics." The very first proposition, already quoted, of 
 Part II., is the assertion, vitally related to the entire argu- 
 ment, "thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking 
 thing." ^ The third proposition of Part II. makes the con- 
 ception more explicit by the statement, "In God there is 
 necessarily the idea, not only of his essence, but also of all 
 things {omnia) which necessarily follow from his essence;" 
 and Spinoza adds in the schohum to this same Proposition 3, 
 "it follows . . . that God understands himself {ntDeus seip- 
 sum intelligat)." It is difficult to understand by God's idea 
 of his own essence as contrasted with his idea of the omnia 
 which fellow from it, anything less than a self-consciousness 
 which underlies and includes but is more than the sum, or 
 system, of all finite consciousnesses.^ Spinoza's references to 
 
 'Pt. I., Prop. 16. For further references, cf. the passages cited infra, 
 pp. 297 seq. 
 
 ' Cf. loc. cit., Pt. I., Prop. 17, Schol., paragraph 3. 
 
 * Pt. II., Prop, i {Cogitatio attributum Dei ist, sive Deus est res cogitans), 
 
 * Cf. Chapter 10, pp. 378 seq., Chapter 11, pp. 419 seq. 
 
292 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 infinite intellect must be construed in the same way. He 
 constantly teaches that finite phenomena are subordinate 
 to infinite intellect. "From the necessity of the divine 
 nature," he says,' "must follow an infinite number of 
 things in infinite ways, i.e. all things which can fall within 
 the sphere of infinite intellect {omnia, quae sub intellectum 
 infinitum coders possunt)." By these words, Spinoza cer- 
 tainly seems to contrast things, as they appear to the finite 
 mind, with these same things, as they are viewed by the in- 
 finite intellect. That he does not mean by infinite intellect 
 any mere sum, or system, of finite intellects is made evident 
 also by the schohum, already cited, of the following proposi- 
 tion. Spinoza there asserts that "intellect and will, which 
 should constitute the essence of God, must diifer by the 
 width of heaven {toio ccelo) from our intellect and will, and 
 except in name would not resemble them ; any more than the 
 dog, a celestial constellation, and the dog, a barking animal, 
 resemble each other." ^ 
 
 This quotation indicates that Spinoza, however firmly he 
 holds that God is self-conscious being, not a mere sum of 
 conscious beings, nevertheless lays stress on the utter con- 
 trast between human and divine consciousness. The con- 
 sciousness which Spinoza attributes to God is, in truth, 
 intellectual — and intellectual, as has been said, in another 
 than human fashion. Will, in the sense of temporal vohtion, 
 and emotion, in the sense of passive affection, Spinoza denies 
 to God. Purposes for future attainment, that is, 'final 
 causes,' are, he says,' 'mere human figments.' And later he 
 asserts that " God is without passions, neither is he affected 
 by any emotion of joy or sorrow." * With especial emphasis 
 also Spinoza insists that "God does not act according to 
 
 »Pt. I., Prop. 16. 
 
 ' For a criticism of this statement from another point of view, cf. infra, 
 p. 297. For Spinoza's conception of infinite intellect as infinite mode, cf. Let- 
 ter 66, Elwes (Van Vloten, 64). 
 
 " Pt. I., Appendix, Elwes' translation, p. 77'. 
 
 *Pt. v., Prop. 17. 
 
The System of Spinoza 293 
 
 freedom of the will," ' if by freedom be meant arbitrariness and 
 caprice. "It follows," Spinoza consistently teaches, "from 
 [God's] perfection, that things could not have been by him 
 created other than they are." ^ 
 
 h. Critical estimate of Spinoza's doctrine 0} substance 
 
 Spinoza thus conceives of the universe as a necessarily 
 existing,^ unique whole-of-reahty ; which is expressed in 
 partial realities subordinated to the whole ; ' which has, how- 
 ever, a reality deeper than that of the parts ; ^ which is in- 
 deed self-conscious, but with a consciousness widely different 
 from that of the human selves." From this exposition of 
 Spinoza's doctrine, it is necessary now to turn to an esti- 
 mation of it; and a critical estimate must take account 
 both of the internal consistency of the system and of its 
 independent value. The first criticisms which suggest them- 
 selves concern Spinoza's argument for the existence of sub- 
 stance. 
 
 I. The inadequacy oj Spinoza's argument for the existence 
 of substance 
 
 The most significant feature of Spinoza's monism is his 
 insistence, emphasized in the preceding outhne of his doctrine, 
 on the absoluteness and uniqueness of God, or substance; 
 and on the subordination of the finite modes, or phenomena, 
 to the one God. The most fundamental of all the criticisms 
 on Spinoza's doctrine is, therefore, this, that he never es- 
 tabhshes, what he so clearly conceives, this absoluteness of 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 32, Cor. I. 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 33, Schol. 2. Ci. Pt. I., Prop. 17, Schol.; Pt. I., Appendix; 
 and Letter 32, Elwes (Van Vloten, 19). 
 »Pt. I., Def. i; Prop. 11. 
 * Pt. I., Def. 5 ; Prop. 23. 
 5 Pt. I., Def. 3 ; Pt. II., Props, i, 2, etc 
 " Cf. supra, pp. 290 seq. 
 
294 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 God. Spinoza's only argument for the existence of sub- 
 stance is that which is outhned in the first section of this 
 chapter; and this argument, as has been pointed out, de- 
 pends for its cogency on the utter emptiness of the conception 
 of substance as the totahty of all that exists. What this 
 argument estabhshes is simply this: the all-that-there-is 
 exists. From this conclusion it is not justifiable to infer 
 directly: the necessarily existing All is more-than-a-sum, it 
 is a One manifested in its parts. Spinoza, however, makes 
 this direct and invahd inference, and fails, therefore, to es- 
 tabUsh his most characteristic doctrine. Later philosophical 
 systems, the following chapters of this book will try to show, 
 supply the missing demonstration. 
 
 2. The inconsistency of Spinoza's doctrine oj the attributes 
 of substance 
 
 The remaining criticisms of Spinoza's monism concern not 
 its logical basis but its inner consistency. The fundamental 
 difficulty may be stated as follows: the conception of the 
 many attributes of God, or substance, is inconsistent with 
 the teaching that God is fundamentally one.^ The conception 
 of the unity of God is, of course, reconcilable with that of the 
 multiplicity of the modes, or finite reahties, for these are 
 admitted to be merely partial expressions of God. But 
 each of the attributes is defined by Spinoza as ' constituting 
 the essence' or expressing the essentiahty of substance; 
 and surely that which has many essentiahties, or natures, 
 cannot be truly one. If then an attribute does, as Spinoza 
 says, constitute the nature of substance, it also exhausts that 
 nature, so that given, as Spinoza insists, only one substance, 
 there would have to be only one attribute.^ 
 
 ' Cf. Camerer, "Die Lehre Spinozas," p. 9 et al. 
 
 ' This result follows even more unambiguously from a statement made by 
 Spinoza in a letter written, as appears from an expression in it, when he had al- 
 ready completed the first part at least of the " Ethics." In this letter (Letter a), 
 
The System of Spinoza 295 
 
 This conclusion is immensely strengthened by the dis- 
 covery that Spinoza's argument for an infinite number of 
 attributes is faulty, and that he does not, therefore, estab- 
 Ush this teaching, so subversive of his own fundamentally 
 monistic doctrine.' As has appeared, he argues the infinite 
 number of attributes solely on the ground of the absoluteness 
 and completeness of substance. " The more reaUty, or being, 
 a thing has," he says,^ "the greater the number of its attri- 
 butes. . . . Consequently," he adds in the scholium of the 
 next proposition, "an absolutely infinite being must neces- 
 sarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes, each of 
 which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence." But 
 it must be .remembered that Spinoza has proved the existence 
 of infinite substance, or being, only in so far as infinite sub- 
 stance means "all that there is," the totahty of reahty. 
 From this totahty, it certainly follows that no existing attri- 
 bute can be lacking to the infinite substance ; but it does not 
 at all follow that the actually existing attributes are infinite 
 in number.' 
 
 Besides discrediting this a priori argument for the infinite 
 number of the attributes, it is necessary now to challenge 
 Spinoza's assertion, on the basis of alleged experience, that 
 there are two attributes, thought and extension. The diffi- 
 
 which is the reply to one, dated August, 1661, from his correspondent, 
 Oldenburg, he defines the attribute exactly as he later defined substance: 
 " By attribute I mean everything which is conceived through itself and in itself, 
 so that the conception of it does not involve the conception of anything else." 
 Cf. also an expression in Letter 4, "an attribute, that is ... a thing 
 conceived through and in itself." For a recent restatement of Spinoza's 
 position, cf. Ebbinghaus, "Grundzuge der Psychologic," § 27, 3, p. 41 seq. 
 For criticism and discussion of modern parallelism, cf. Taylor, "Elements 
 of Metaphysics," Bk. IV., chapter 2, § 5, pp. 320 seq. 
 
 1 Cf. Letter 65. ^ Pt. I., Prop. 9. 
 
 ^ One of the keenest contemporary critics of Spinoza, Von Tschimhausen, 
 objected that if there are infinite attributes, the two attributes, consciousness 
 and extension, should not be the only ones known to the mind. Cf . Letters 
 65 and 66 (Van Vloten, 63 and 64). In reply Spinoza supposed that there 
 are other-than-human minds to whom the other attributes are known. Cf. 
 Letters 66 and 68 (Van Vloten 64 and 66), and Camerer, op. cit., Chapter 2. 
 
296 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 culty is, of course, with the so-called attribute of extension; 
 lor no one will deny the one truth evident in the very denial 
 of it, that reahty, whatever other character it possesses, has 
 the attribute of thought, that is, consciousness. But Spi- 
 noza's teaching that extension is known in the same way, as 
 a second, independent, character of reahty — this is based 
 on mere assumption, is never argued, and cannot withstand 
 such arguments as Leibniz and Berkeley later brought 
 against it/ Not only, then, has Spinoza failed to prove an 
 infinite number of attributes; he has not demonstrated the 
 existence of any attribute save thought. 
 
 This conclusion is fortified by reference, in the "Ethics" 
 itself, to certain indications of an unavowed idealism. 
 The first of these occurs in the introductory definitions of 
 Part I. Definition 3, for example, defines substance as "that 
 which is in itself and is conceived through itself"; and 
 similarly. Definitions i, 5, and 8 successively define causa sui, 
 mode, and eternity, by two parallel clauses of which the second 
 is in terms of conception. In the definition of 'attribute' the 
 first of the parallel clauses is omitted; and Spinoza says, 
 "By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives as 
 constituting the essence of substance."^ The conceiv- 
 ableness of mode and attribute is thus, for Spinoza, a 
 feature essential to the definition of each. But nothing 
 could be conceivable if there were not a conscious mind to 
 conceive it, and the definitions thus imply the existence, 
 fundamental to mode, attribute, and even to substance, of a 
 
 ' Cf. supra, pp. 75 seq.; 121 seq. 
 
 ' Dei. IV : Per atlributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia per- 
 cipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constUuens. Spinoza does not seem to 
 intend a contrast between the expressions, ' perceive ' and ' conceive.' Erd- 
 mann, followed by other critics — Busolt, for example — interprets Spinoza's 
 'attribute' idealistically, making it closely parallel to Kant's 'category.' (Cf. 
 Erdmann, "History of Philosophy," translated by Hough, II., pp. 6y seq., 
 and Busolt, op. cit., pp. 122 seq., who holds that the conscious intellect implied 
 in these definitions is the divine intellect.) Such an interpretation seems 
 to ignore the realistic aspect of the attribute. Cf . " Ethics," Pt. I., Prop. 9. 
 
The System of Spinoza 297 
 
 conceiving mind. In similar fashion, the conception of the 
 modes (modes of extension and not merely of thought) as 
 'all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intel- 
 lect' clearly suggests that the reahty expressed in the modes 
 is mental.' Spinoza, it is needless to add, did not realize' 
 this idealistic imphcation of his definitions. He is apparently 
 proceeding on the rationahstic assumption, hardly analyzed 
 or criticised till the time of Kant, that the existent must 
 ipso facto be known. 
 
 3. The inconsistency of Spinoza's conception of God's 
 consciousness, as radically different from the human 
 consciousness 
 
 The conclusion of this chapter is that Spinoza taught the 
 self-consciousness of God.^ But it is past dispute that he 
 thought God's consciousness to be utterly different from that 
 of man — as widely different, he says, in a passage already 
 quoted,' as "the dog, a celestial constellation, and the dog, 
 a barking animal." It must now be shown that the radical 
 and qualitative difference between God's consciousness and 
 man's, which is supposed by this illustration, is inconsistent 
 with Spinoza's own conception and with his argument as 
 well. He conceives of the mind of a man as a modification 
 of the divine attribute, thought ; and he justifies the doctrine 
 that thought is an attribute of God, or substance, by the 
 appeal, already quoted, to finite experience: "Particular 
 thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes which . . . 
 express the nature of God. God, therefore, possesses the 
 attribute of which the concept is involved in all particular 
 thoughts, . . . that is to say, God is a thinking being."* But 
 
 • Pt. I., Prop. 16, already cited supra, p. 291. Cf. "Ethics," Pts. II. and 
 III., for cases of an inexact parallelism, in which the physical is really con- 
 ceived in terms of the psychical. 
 
 ' Cf . supra, pp. 29 1 seq. 
 
 'Pt. I., Prop. 17, cf. p. 292 above. 
 
 «Pt. II., Prop. I, Proof. 
 
298 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 that thought of which the finite mind is merely a fixed and 
 definite expression/ which is argued from the existence of 
 finite thoughts, cannot differ in kind from human conscious- 
 ness.^ It must indeed differ as the whole differs from the part, 
 the complete from the incomplete ; and this doubtless is Spi- 
 noza's meaning. His denial of the likeness of the infinite to 
 the human intellect is a reaction from the crude and literal an- 
 thropomorphism of that traditional theology which attributed 
 to God narrow ends, and human passions. Spinoza vividly 
 describes, in the Appendix to Part I, the tendency of 
 such anthropomorphism. Men "beheve," he says, "in some 
 ruler or rulers of the universe, . . . who have arranged and 
 adapted everything for human use. They . . . estimate the 
 nature of such rulers (having no information on the subject) 
 in accordance with their own nature and, therefore, they 
 assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, 
 in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the 
 highest honor. . . . Consider, I pray you, the results. 
 Among the many helps of nature they were bound to find 
 some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, and diseases, 
 so they declared that such things happen, because the gods 
 are angry at some wrong done them by men." It is in his 
 passionate aversion to this unworthy form of anthropomor- 
 phism, that Spinoza denies the hkeness of divine and human 
 intellect. Such denials are inconsistent with Spinoza's own 
 teaching that finite phenomena are expressions of the divine 
 nature. 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 25, Cor. 
 
 * The doctrine that God's intellect is unlike that of man is attacked by 
 Spinoza's keen critic, Von Tschirnhausen, on the basis of Spinoza's own 
 doctrine of causality. In Letter 65 (Van Vloten, 63), Von Tschirn- 
 hausen says: "As the understanding of God differs [on Spinoza's view] 
 from our understanding as much in essence as in existence, it has, therefore, 
 nothing in common with it; therefore (by "Ethics," Pt. I., Prop. 3) God's 
 understanding cannot be the cause of our own." Spinoza seems never to 
 have attempted a reply to this objection. He had, however, in the Scholium 
 of "Ethics," Pt. 1., Prop. 17, departed from the causal theory implied by the 
 axioms of Pt. I. 
 
The System of Spinoza 299 
 
 II. Spinoza's Doctrine or the Modes (Exposition and 
 Criticism) 
 
 The first section of this chapter has offered an outline and 
 a criticism of Spinoza's fundamental teaching that God is 
 the one substance manifested in all finite reahties.' These 
 finite phenomena have been considered only so far as the 
 discussion of them is necessary to an understanding of 
 Spinoza's conception of God, or substance. To complete 
 the view of Spinoza's metaphysics it is therefore necessary 
 to attempt a more detailed discussion of these finite realities. 
 Such a discussion of the modes in its turn will illuminate 
 the doctrine of God, or substance. It has been shown 
 already that Spinoza includes among the 'modes' minds 
 and bodies, ideas and physical phenomena, in a word, all 
 finite phenomena whether psychical or physical. His most 
 fundamental grouping of the modes is into modes of 
 thought (meaning modes of consciousness) and modes of 
 extension. He also distinguishes in Part I.^ between ' infi- 
 nite ' and ' finite ' modes, but of this distinction he virtually 
 makes no further use and it need not here be discussed.' 
 Spinoza's doctrine of the modes as causally related claims 
 our first consideration. 
 
 a. The causal relation of God to the modes, and of the 
 modes to each other 
 
 The relation of the modes to substance has already been 
 discussed in our consideration of the nature of God. Minds 
 and bodies, ideas and physical changes, — all finite phe- 
 nomena or modes, — are manifestations of the one under- 
 
 ' Spinoza usually, it not invariably, contrasts the finite as the 'included' 
 with the Infinite as the ' aU-incIuding.' 
 
 ' Prop. 21 and Prop. 22. 
 
 ' For consideration of the difficult problem here involved, cf. Appendijc, 
 p. 468. 
 
300 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 lying reality. They stand to God in the relation of parts to 
 a whole which is prior to them — which expresses itself in 
 the parts instead of being made up of them. Spinoza some- 
 times describes this as the relation of the modes to an im- 
 manent (not a transient) cause ; and this immanent cause he 
 sometimes calls natura naturans in distinction from natura 
 naturata, or the sum of the modes.' In quite a different 
 sense of the word 'cause,' he conceives each mode as 
 cause of, and in turn as effect of, some other. That is 
 to say, Spinoza, like Kant, recognizes and does not con- 
 fuse two sorts of causahty. The first, the immanent caus- 
 ality of God, or substance, is for Spinoza the relation of 
 organism to member, of constituting whole to part. The 
 second is the temporal relation of mode to mode; and it is 
 this which we have now to consider. Spinoza teaches, in 
 the first place, that the modes of each attribute are causally 
 related to each other, in such wise that each is the temporal, 
 or phenomenal, cause, of one that follows and in the same 
 sense the effect of one that precedes. " Every individual thing 
 (quodcutnque singulare)," he says, "that is, everything which 
 is finite and has a determined existence cannot exist, nor be 
 determined to act (ad operandum) unless it be determined to 
 exist and to act by another cause which is finite and has a 
 determined existence ; and in its turn this cause also cannot 
 exist nor be determined to act imless it is determined to 
 exist and to act by another which also is finite and has a de- 
 termined existence, and so on ad infinitum." He argues this, 
 on the ground that a thing as finite caimot be regarded as 
 if caused by God. "That which is finite and has a con- 
 ditioned existence cannot be produced by the absolute nature 
 of any attribute of God." ^ Therefore, Spinoza concludes (as- 
 suming that for every character, even finiteness, there must 
 be a cause), the modes, as finite, are caused by each other. 
 This argument for phenomenal causahty is not beyond 
 
 ' Pt. I., Prop. 29, Schol. 
 'i Pt. I., Prop. 28, Proof. 
 
The System of Spinoza 301 
 
 criticism — for it might well be objected that it contradicts 
 God's infinity, to admit a character, even finiteness, which 
 does not follow from his nature.* But the truth, that finite 
 things and events are causally connected with each other, 
 will be denied by no one. For, as Kant has shown, causal 
 connectedness is an essential feature of the finite phenom- 
 enon.^ 
 
 One comes almost with surprise, in the very midst of Spi- 
 noza's theology, upon this doctrine of the causal connection 
 of the finite modes, one with another. It marks the greatness 
 of the thinker, Spinoza, that he should thus unite with his 
 rigid doctrine of the dependence of all things on divine 
 necessity, a truly scientific doctrine of the strict dependence 
 of event on event. Every natural event, he teaches, 
 every mechanical change of position, every chemical reaction, 
 and, no less truly, every thought, wish, and intention is 
 determined by some preceding event. Yet Spinoza carefully 
 subordinates the temporal, or finite, relation of the modes with 
 each other to the deeper, the eternally necessary relation to 
 God. Thus, in the scholium to this very proposition which 
 defines phenomenal causaUty, he insists on the truth of 
 the eternal causality, in the words, "All things which are, 
 are in God {omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt) and so depend on 
 God that without him they can neither be nor be conceived 
 (sine ipso nee esse, non concipi possunt). " The causal de- 
 pendence of the modes on each other is in fact, itself, a result 
 of the divine necessity.^ 
 
 ' a. Camerer, Chapter 3, p. 50. 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 210, on Kant's discussion of causaUty. 
 
 ' This truth is often expressed in Part II., by saying, not that one thought 
 or motion depends on another thought or motion, but that it depends on " God 
 not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected 
 by another idea of a particular, actually existing thing" (Pt. II., Prop. 9). 
 When Spinoza speaks of the contingency of finite phenomena he, therefore, 
 refers in the first instance, not to the fact that everything in the universe is 
 conditioned by some other thing, but to the truth "all things are determined 
 by the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain way." 
 (Pt. I., Prop. 29.) 
 
302 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 Setting aside its occasional inconsistencies, we may there- 
 fore formulate Spinoza's doctrine of the two causahties, in- 
 finite and finite, eternal and temporal, as follows: every 
 thing or event in the imiverse may be looked at from two 
 points of view. It may be regarded in relation to similar 
 finite facts, or phenomena, and, as thus regarded, it will be 
 found to be necessarily connected with them, determined 
 by them, and in turn determining them. But the finite thing 
 is also to be regarded in another way, as related to the under- 
 lying one reahty. As thus regarded, in its relation to God, 
 it is an expression, a necessary manifestation, of this divine 
 nature. 
 
 h. The independence and the parallelism oj the two mode 
 
 series 
 
 A second feature of Spinoza's doctrine of the modes is the 
 teaching that the causal relation of the finite modes to each 
 other holds only between the modes which manifest a single 
 attribute of God; in other words, that a thought mode is 
 causally related only to other thought modes, and that an 
 extension mode is causally related only to other modes of 
 extension, whereas thought and extension modes are not 
 interrelated. This doctrine follows logically from Spinoza's 
 teaching that the attributes are independent, one of the other. 
 The first complete statement of it, in the "Ethics," occurs in 
 the sixth proposition of Part II.' " The modes of any attri- 
 bute of God, have God as their cause, in so far as he is re- 
 garded {consideratiir) under that attribute of which they are 
 modes ; and not in so far as he is regarded under any other 
 attribute." Spinoza argues this by reference to that propo- 
 sition of Part I.^ which asserts that "every attribute of the 
 one substance should be conceived by itself." The implied 
 argument for this assertion is presumably to be found in the 
 definitions of attribute and of substance. Attribute is what 
 
 ' Cf. Pt. II., Prop. 5; Pt. III., Prop. a. 'Prop. 10. 
 
The System of Spinoza 303 
 
 is perceived as constituting the essence of substance, and since 
 substance is that which exists through itself, therefore (Spi- 
 noza imphes) the attribute, the essence of substance, must exist 
 through itself.' There is indeed no gainsaying this argument 
 on the basis of these definitions. And granting the existence 
 of a plurality of attributes and of the two known attributes, 
 thought and extension, it follows from the definitions just 
 quoted that each attribute is conceived through itself, and 
 that, therefore, the modes of one attribute are unaffected by 
 the modes of any other : in particular, that ideas follow from 
 ideas only, and that physical phenomena follow from physical 
 phenomena only, so that idea is unaffected by physical change 
 or physical phenomenon by idea. 
 
 The objection which at once suggests itself is that this 
 denial of an interrelation between the modes of the attributes, 
 based as it is on the conception of the self-dependence of each 
 attribute, really militates against the doctrine of the imity of 
 substance. If, on the one hand, the essence of substance is 
 constituted by thought and extension, and necessarily mani- 
 fested in thought modes and extension modes; and if, on 
 the other hand, the attribute, thought, is independent of the 
 attribute, extension, and thought modes independent of 
 extension modes — it seems dif&cult to conceive of the uni- 
 verse as fundamentally one. Spinoza supposes himself to 
 rescue the unity by insisting on the perfect parallehsm of the 
 attributes and of the mode series. Because substance is one 
 and the same, he argues, "the order and connection of ideas 
 is the same as the order and connection of things, . . . that 
 is," ^ he adds in a corollary, "whatsoever follows in extension 
 (formaliter) from God's infinite nature, follows in thought 
 (objective) in the same order and connection, from the idea 
 of God." ' In other words, a thought mode corresponds 
 with every extension mode in such wise that finite minds 
 are paralleled by finite bodies, and thoughts by changes 
 
 ' Once more, cf. Letter 2. ' Pt. II., Prop. 7 and Cor. 
 
 ' For this use of ' formaliter' and ' objective,' cf . Chapter 2, pp. 29 seq. 
 
304 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 in the physical world. It will, however, still be urged that 
 Spinoza has not by this device reconciled the unity of sub- 
 stance v«th the independence of the mode series and of the 
 attributes ; parallelism itself — it will be argued — impHes 
 the separateness of the two parallels. Spinoza never meets 
 this difficulty, but he doggedly asserts the unity of sub- 
 stance. "Conscious substance {substantia cogitans) and 
 extended substance are," he says,* "one and the same sub- 
 stance which is comprehended (comprehenditur) now under 
 the one attribute and now under the other. So also a mode 
 of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the 
 same thing but expressed in two ways." So far as the 
 modes alone are concerned, one might accept this doctrine, 
 and regard the opposition of thought to extension as an 
 illusion of the finite consciousness. But this is not Spi- 
 noza's meaning. For he teaches that thought and exten- 
 sion are attributes and not mere modes; that each "is 
 conceived through itself and in itself" and constitutes the 
 essence of substance. The difference between the attributes 
 is, in other words, ultimate ; and it is utterly unjustifiable in 
 view of it to assert that extended substance and thinking 
 substance are one and the same thing. 
 
 To recapitulate: (i) Spinoza's teaching that ideas and 
 physical changes are not interrelated is based on his conception 
 of the independence of the attributes ; but this latter concep- 
 tion contradicts the fundamental doctrine of the unity of 
 substance. (2) Spinoza's theory that the mode series are 
 parallel presupposes this imdemonstrated independence, each 
 from each, of the attributes, and thus of the mode series, and 
 is therefore an inadequate attempt to reconcile the inde- 
 pendence of the attributes with the unity of substance. From 
 a metaphysical standpoint there is thus no sufficient defence 
 for parallehsm. As a scientific hypothesis, a formulation 
 
 ' Pt. II., Prop. 7, Schol. Cf. Pt. III., Prop. 2, Schol. : "Mens et cor- 
 pus una eademque res. . . ." 
 
The System of Spinoza 305 
 
 of the apparent concomitance of physical with psychical, 
 it is none the less a harmless — possibly even a useful — 
 hypothesis. 
 
 With the account of Spinoza's doctrine of the modes the 
 outline of his metaphysical doctrine is completed. It may 
 be briefly summarized in the following statements: The 
 ultimate reahty is a being, God, or substance, which is mani- 
 fested in, not made up by, all finite realities. God has an 
 infinite number of attributes each expressing his essence, and 
 of these attributes two — consciousness and extension — are 
 known ; in other words, God is infinitely self-conscious ' and 
 infinitely extended. The groups of modes express the 
 different attributes and are independent each of each; but 
 within each group the different modes are related by a tem- 
 poral necessity. The outcome for Spinoza of this meta- 
 physical system is a conception of man's nature culminating 
 in an ethical doctrine of profound practical worth. The ra- 
 tional man, Spinoza teaches, will look on all the course of his- 
 tory, all the events of life, as necessary expressions of God's 
 nature, and he will therefore acquiesce in them. He will 
 know himself also as sharing with all other men the preroga- 
 tive of manifesting God's nature. Freed, by this adequate 
 knowledge of himself and of all nature, from the dominion 
 of regret, of anxiety, and of passion, a man " lives in obedience 
 to reason" and attains to blessedness which is "love towards 
 God." 
 
 The discussion, at this point, of Spinoza's practical philos- 
 ophy would be an unwarranted digression.^ There is need, 
 however, for a recapitulation of the criticisms to be made on 
 his metaphysics. It may be shown that these criticisms 
 reduce to three. The doctrine of the independence of the 
 attributes, one of another, is, in the first place, inconsistent 
 
 ' Cf. p. 291. 
 
 ' For a summary, based on Pts. II .-V., of the "Ethics," cf. Appendix, pp 
 469 sej. 
 
 X 
 
3o6 Monistic Pluralism 
 
 with Spinoza's monism. The doctrine that extension is an 
 attribute of substance is not, in the second place, estabhshed. 
 Purged of this inconsistent pluralism and of the imsupported 
 admission of the ultimate reality of extension, Spinoza's 
 system would obviously reduce to a numerically monistic, 
 qualitatively ideahstic philosophy in which Spinoza's God 
 would become a conscious self inclusive of all lesser realities — 
 of the so-called physical as well as of the psychical. Against 
 this conception may be urged the final and most fundamental 
 criticism on Spinoza's system. Spinoza, as we have seen, 
 does not demonstrate the existence of his absolute substance, 
 God. His basal certainty is that "all that is exists," and he 
 illicitly interprets this truism, significant yet in itself empty, 
 in the sense of his great doctrine : ultimate reahty is a single, 
 self-manifesting being. 
 
 It does not follow from this radical criticism that the phi- 
 losophy of Spinoza is of slight value ; nor even that its value 
 consists in the adequacy of its scientific conceptions, the 
 accuracy of its psychological analysis, and the nobiUty of its 
 ethical teaching. It has all these virtues, but, in addition, 
 great metaphysical significance. For the first time in the 
 history of modem philosophy, Spinoza formulates in definite 
 outlines a strictly numerical monism, the conception of an 
 all-of-reality which is also a One, of a whole of reality which 
 is more-than-a-sum, of a unique being which expresses itself 
 in the many finite phenomena. The mere conception, 
 though insufficiently estabhshed, is of real value. IdeaUs- 
 tically interpreted, it becomes the central truth of the post- 
 Kantian philosophy, for Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and, 
 above all, Hegel attempt the demonstration, lacking in Spi- 
 noza, of the existence of an absolute substance, and con- 
 ceive this substance as absolute self. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE ADVANCE TOWARD MONISTIC SPIRITUALISM: 
 THE SYSTEMS OF FICHTE, SCHELLING, AND SCHO- 
 PENHAUER 
 
 "Wahrend in Frankreich eine Philosophie aufkam die den Geist 
 verkorperte, . . . erliob sich in Deutschland eine Philosophie die . . . 
 nai den Geist als etwas wirkliches annahm." — Heine. 
 
 The philosophical systems of Kant and of Spinoza, widely 
 as they differ in purpose, in teaching, and in emphasis, do 
 yet lead to advance in the same lines. The fundamental 
 errors and inconsistencies in Spinoza's doctrine are, as has 
 just appeared, his failure to argue cogently for the absolute 
 numerical oneness of reality; and his quaHtatively dualistic 
 teaching that the absolute One, or substance, has the two 
 attributes, thought and extension. Kant, on the other hand, 
 supplies the first steps of a vaHd argument for the absolute 
 oneness of ultimate reality, but apparently he does not hold, 
 and certainly he does not systematically formulate, the con- 
 ception. And Kant, as well as Spinoza, is a dualist, though 
 his dualism, following as it does on the ideaUstic teachings 
 of Leibniz and of Berkeley, is not of so crude a sort as 
 Spinoza's. Yet Kant's things-in-themselves, though de- 
 spoiled of all positive characters, are forms of an alleged 
 reaUty independent of consciousness, so that Kant unques- 
 tionably holds a dualistic doctrine.' Advance upon Kant 
 as upon Spinoza is naturally, therefore, in these two direc- 
 
 ' It must be admitted that here and there a critic disputes this assertion, 
 on the ground of Kant's statements (of. supra, pp. 261) that the free moral 
 self is thing-in-itself. In the opinion of the writer, however, Kant's pre- 
 dominant doctrine should be construed from his far more frequent assertions 
 of the distinction between things-in-themselves and consciousness, rather than 
 from this uncharacteristic teaching, significant as it is. Cf., on this subject, 
 
 307 
 
3o8 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 tions : the formulation of a demonstrated numerical monism, 
 and the supplanting of an inconsistent qualitative dualism 
 by a complete, idealistic monism. 
 
 The German philosophers of the waning eighteenth and of 
 the dawning nineteenth century were predominantly influ- 
 enced both by Kant and by Spinoza, though in sHghtly 
 varying proportion. And it is noticeable that their systems 
 correct those of their great predecessors in precisely the two 
 directions already named. Each one of them formulates, 
 and attempts to base on valid argument, the doctrine that 
 the all-of-reality is an absolute One, and that this One is, 
 through and through, a reahty of consciousness. The 
 ideaUsm of these post-Kantian teachers for the most part 
 takes the form of an attack on Kant's things-in-themselves. 
 Their conception of the absolute One of consciousness allies 
 it both with Spinoza's substance (in its thought attribute), 
 and with Kant's transcendental self, in its relation to the 
 empirical selves. Ostensibly, therefore, each of these sys- 
 tems is an ideaUstic monism and teaches that ultimate reahty 
 is constituted by an absolute self. Three of the four systems, 
 however, are marred by a logical contradiction: while in- 
 sisting on the conception of ultimate reahty as absolute self, 
 they virtually yield either the absoluteness or the seKhood 
 — in other words, either the numerical monism or the quali- 
 tative and ideahstic monism of the system. Hegel is the first 
 to formulate a complete and consistent monistic idealism; 
 and the systems of Fichte, SchelUng, and Schopenhauer 
 must be regarded, therefore, as advancing toward a goal of 
 which they just fall short. 
 
 A. The Teaching or Fichte 
 
 The temptation to interest oneself in the personahty of the 
 philosopher as a prehminary to the consideration of his argu- 
 
 Windelband, " Die verschiedenen Phasen der Kantischen Lehre vom Ding- 
 an-sich," Vierteljahrschr. f. wissensch. Philos., 1876. 
 
The Philosophy of Fichte 309 
 
 ment has nowhere greater justification than in the case of 
 Johann Gottheb Fichte. He himself has said that a man's 
 philosophy is the story of his heart, and though this may 
 well be questioned as a statement of universal validity, it is 
 significantly true of Fichte himself. His hfe was one of sharp 
 external contrasts, but these followed and never determined 
 the course of his thought and the direction of his will. The 
 unchildlike concern of his boyish years for moral, not to say 
 for theological, problems was expressed in self-denying 
 actions as well as in the famous sermons to the geese whom 
 he herded. His intellectual divergence, during his university 
 days, from the orthodox doctrine of his time was followed by 
 his abandonment of the preacher's profession, spite of his 
 preparation for it. The conviction, gained at this same pe- 
 riod, that nature determinism is the vahd system of philosophy 
 filled him with despair, but never affected his purpose to 
 square his life with his philosophy ; in the wreck of his ideals 
 he never dreamed of abandoning metaphysics nor of forcing 
 its conclusions to his desires. In the same spirit, ten years 
 after, he lived out his later doctrine of ethical idealism, the 
 doctrine that a man's environment is the object of his obhga- 
 tion, by resigning his professorship at Jena when its freedom 
 of teaching had been challenged. 
 
 Fichte has himself sketched for us the progress of his 
 thought, as it has just been outlined. From his early ac- 
 ceptance of the current form of theism, he had been driven — 
 by the necessity, he believed, of logical reasoning — into a 
 doctrine of physical determinism: the theory that our acts 
 and feelings and volitions are determined by an endless 
 chain of physical causes. Absolutely honest and seeing no 
 escape from this doctrine, Fichte accepted it fully and de- 
 spairingly. The philosophic cloud lifted only when he read 
 Kant's "Kritik of Practical Reason." Then a great light 
 dawned for him. He realized that a conscious self can 
 never be subject to the laws of objects which are, in their 
 real nature, mere phenomena — that is, creations of con- 
 
3IO The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 sciousness. From the exposition of Kant's doctrine, with 
 which his productive work began, he went on to formulate 
 his own system. This consists fundamentally in a develop- 
 ment of Kant's conception of the transcendental I. The 
 thing-in-itself vanishes and the transcendental self becomes 
 for Fichte an absolute though impersonal self, inclusive of 
 finite selves whose deepest reality consists in their moral 
 striving to apprehend and to realize their own infinity. 
 
 I. Fichte's 'Popular Philosophy' 
 
 Fichte's first book of technical significance, published in 
 1794, is the "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschafts- 
 lehre," commonly known as "Wissenschaftslehre," or "Sci- 
 ence of Knowledge," a complete and detailed accoimt of his 
 metaphysical system. It was followed, in 1796, by a work 
 on ethics, the "Gnmdlage des Naturrechts." It is probable 
 that Fichte contemplated a further, regular development of 
 his system, in the form of expositions of the philosophy of 
 nature, of religion, and of art. But his departure from Jena, 
 with the circumstances which embittered it, and — still 
 more — his patriotic absorption in the political problems of 
 those years preceding the war for freedom, broke in upon the 
 plan for a development of his system. From this time on, 
 Fichte's books are either popular expositions and applications 
 of his doctrine, or are restatements of it.' To the first class 
 belongs his "Bestimmung des Menschen (Vocation of 
 Man)," a brilliant, distinctly autobiographical accoimt of the 
 progress of a thinker from a position of physical determinism, 
 through a phase of idealistic phenomenaHsm, into a trium- 
 phant sort of ethical idealism. The Uttle work is written 
 throughout in the first person as befits a philosophical autobiog- 
 raphy ; but it is not purely autobiographical. Rather, Fichte 
 undertakes the story of the thought-progress of a typical and 
 
 ' Cf. Appendix, p. 538. 
 
The Philosophy of Fie hie 311 
 
 logical thinker who begins, as he had begun, at the stand- 
 point of determinism. So he says in the preface that " this I is 
 by no means the author ; he hopes, on the contrary, that his 
 reader may assume the r61e." The style of the book is clear 
 and very direct ; it is eloquent, often by its very simplicity and 
 by the reaction of the thought on the emotion of the imaginary 
 hero. 
 
 a. The first stage of philosophic thought: scientific deter- 
 minism 
 
 In Book I., named "Doubt," I am confronted with the 
 question, "What am I and what is my vocation?"^ To 
 answer the question, I look out upon nature, convinced that 
 I too belong to the world of nature. And I at once discover 
 that every nature object "is throughout determined; it is 
 what it is and is absolutely nothing else." ^ Its qualities are, 
 furthermore, determined by those of all other nature phe- 
 nomena. For, "Nature is a connected whole; in every 
 moment, every single part . . . must be what it is, because 
 all the others are what they are, and you could move no grain 
 of sand from its place without making some change through- 
 out all the parts of the immeasureable whole. But every 
 moment of this duration is determined by all the past mo- 
 ments, and will determine all future moments. You can- 
 not, therefore, in the present moment, imagine any diflference 
 in the position of any grain of sand, without being obliged 
 to think of all the past and all the future as changed." ' And 
 since I myself " am not what I am because I think or will it ;" * 
 since rather I find myself existing and thinking and am 
 obliged to infer some cause of me which is other than myself, 
 
 ' Werke, II., p. 169; translation, by William Smith, Open Court edition, 
 p. I (all the references in the notes to the "Vocation of Man" are to 
 this edition). The student should not fail to read this work. 
 
 ^ Werke, II., p. 172^, translation^ p. 5'. 
 
 'Werke, II., p. 178'; translation, p. ii*. 
 
 * Werke, II., p, 181' | translation, p. 15'. 
 
3 1 2 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 evidently, therefore, I am 'one of the manifestations of the 
 nature force.' ' Yes, "I myself with all that I call mine am 
 a Unk in the chain of this stem nature necessity," "I am 
 a determined being whose beginning was at a definite time. 
 I did not come into being through myself but through another 
 power without me . . . through the universal power of 
 nature." ^ It is true that I seem to myself to have freedom 
 and independence, but this is readily explained as my con- 
 sciousness of the force of nature welling up within me, un- 
 checked by any other manifestations of it in other persons or 
 objects. "Freedom is absolutely impossible. . . . All that 
 I have been, all that I am, and all that I am to be, I have 
 been, am, and shall be, of necessity." ' 
 
 This conception richly satisfies my understanding. It 
 orders and connects all the objects of my knowledge : the 
 facts of my consciousness, of my bodily constitution, of the 
 world without me.* But, alas, it does violence to my ' deepest 
 intuitions and wishes.' My heart is anguished and torn by 
 the doctrine which soothes my understanding. I cannot 
 apply the doctrine to my action, "for I do not act: nature 
 acts in me. To make myself something other than that to 
 which I am destined by nature is impossible, for I do not 
 make myself. Nature makes me and makes all that I am 
 to be. . . . I am under the pitiless power of stem nature 
 necessity." ° 
 
 h. The second stage oj philosophic thought: phenomenalistic 
 
 idealism 
 
 Book I. ends with this despairing acknowledgment of the 
 truth of physical determinism. In Book II., named " Knowl- 
 edge (Wissen)," the fallacy which vinderKes this type of 
 
 ' Werke, II., p. 183^; translation, p. 18' (cf. p. 14'). 
 
 'Werke, II., p. 179^' '; translation, p. 13^. 
 
 ' Werke, II., pp. 184' and 183'; translation, pp. 19' and 17'. 
 
 * Werke, II., pp. 184^ seq.; translation, pp. 19^ seq. 
 
 ^ Werke, II., p. 189' (cf. p. 196' seq.) ; translation, p. 25' (cf. p. 32 jeg.) 
 
The Philosophy of Fichte 313 
 
 determinism is set forth in the form of a dialogue between 
 myself and a keen philosophic reasoner, who is designated as 
 'The Spirit.' He assures me that I am trembling at phan- 
 toms of my own creation. "Take courage," he says, "hear 
 me, answer my questions." Under guidance of his skilful 
 questioning, I then convince myself, step by step, that my 
 early deterministic philosophy was invahdated by my wrong 
 conception of nature and of nature objects. I had started 
 out with the assumption that I belong to the class of nature 
 objects, whereas every nature object is simply the construction 
 of my own consciousness.^ The colors, sounds, and textures 
 of which it is composed are my sensations ; ^ its spatial form 
 is my way of perceiving visual and tactual sensations;^ its 
 relations — of causal connection, for example — are my 
 thoughts about the sensations and the forms.* "And with 
 this insight, O mortal," exclaims the Spirit, whose question- 
 ing has led to this conclusion, "receive thy freedom and thy 
 eternal dehverance from the fear that tormented thee. No 
 longer wilt thou tremble before a necessity which exists only 
 in thy thought ; no longer wilt thou fear to be overborne by 
 things which are made by thyself. ... As long as thou 
 couldst believe that such a system of things existed inde- 
 pendent of thee . . . and that thou mightest thyself be a 
 link in the chain of this system, thy fear was justified. Now 
 that thou hast reaHzed that all this exists only in thee and 
 through thee, thou wilt not fear before that which thou hast 
 known as thine own creation." ^ 
 
 But though I am delivered from the dread of nature neces- 
 sity, I am assailed by a terror still more pitiless. "Wait," I 
 cry, "deceitful Spirit! Dost thou boast of deHvering me? 
 . . . Thou destroyest necessity only by annihilating all 
 
 ' Werke, II., pp. 235^, 239' el al; translation, pp. 77-78; 82-83. 
 ' Werke, II., p. 202 seq.; translation, p. 38 seq. 
 
 'Werke, II., pp. 232 seq.; translation, pp. 74 seq. Notice that Fichte 
 adopts Kant's space theory. Cf. supra, Chapter 7, pp. 200 seq. 
 * Werke, II., pp. 213 et al.; translation, pp. 52 et al. 
 'Werke, II., p. 240'; translation, p. 83*. 
 
314 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 existence. . . . Absolutely nothing exists except ideas, 
 mere shadows of reality. . . . There is nothing permanent 
 without or within me, but mere endless change. I know no 
 being — not even my own. There is no being. I myself 
 know not and exist not. Images exist: they are all that 
 exist. ... I am myself one of those images: no, I am 
 not even that, but the confused image of an image !" ' To this 
 cry of anguish the Spirit repHes : " Thou art right to seek 
 reahty behind the mere appearance. . . . But thou wouldest 
 labor in vain to gain it through and by thy knowledge. If 
 thou hast no other means of seizing on reahty, thou wilt 
 never find it. But thou hast the means. Only use it." 
 
 c. The third and final stage oj philosophic thought: 
 ethical idealism 
 
 So ends Book II., on knowledge. As is evident, it is a 
 summary, in highly dramatic form, and in Kantian phrase- 
 ology, of Hume's idealistic phenomenalism : the doctrine 
 that ideas only — and neither spirit nor matter — have ex- 
 istence. Book III., entitled "Faith," sets forth Fichte's own 
 doctrine of ethical ideahsm. Faith it should be noted, in 
 Fichte's, as in Kant's, use of the term, is not opposed to 
 thought, but only to knowledge, in an unduly narrow use of the 
 latter word. Knowledge means to Fichte the perception of 
 scientific fact, outer and inner, the consciousness of physical 
 phenomena, that is, of things, and of psychical phenomena, 
 that is, of ideas. Faith, on the contrary, is the immediate 
 and certain consciousness of myself,^ in active, moral relations 
 with other finite selves, and thus with the absolute self, or 
 God. 
 
 This result is reached by an analysis of the moral conscious- 
 ness and its presuppositions. In brief, the argument is the 
 following: I am directly conscious of the fact of obligation. 
 
 ' Werke, II., pp. 240, 245; translation, pp. 84''', 89'. 
 ' Werke, II., p. 253* ; translation, pp. 99-100. 
 
The Philosophy of Fichte 315 
 
 There is, indeed, "but one point on which I have to reflect 
 incessantly : what I ought to do ; " ' "I certainly have a duty 
 to perform and truly have these definite duties." ' But in 
 the phenomenal world, it has been shown, there is no obHga- 
 tion, for phenomena, mere successive facts which are links 
 in a chain of necessity, can be bound by no ought. There- 
 fore, this immediate certainty of experience, the fact of my 
 consciousness of duty, can only be explained, Fichte teaches, 
 — as Kant had taught, — by admitting that the world of 
 linked phenomena is not the sole, or even the truest, sphere of 
 reahty. Indeed, the immediate certainty of the consciousness 
 of obligation, and the reahty impHed by the obligation, 
 "absolutely demand,"' Fichte holds, "the existence of 
 another world, an oversensuous * . . . eternal ' world . . . 
 of which" (by virtue of my moral consciousness), "I already 
 am citizen. . . . This which men call heaven does not He," 
 Fichte declares, "beyond the grave: it already encompasses 
 us and its light dawns in every pure heart." ° 
 
 Of this unsensuous reality, presupposed by the fact of 
 obligation, there are three important characteristics. It is, 
 in the first place, a reahty kindred to my own nature. It is 
 "no strange being . . . into which I cannot penetrate. . . . 
 It is framed by the laws of my own thought and must con- 
 form to them. ... It expresses throughout nothing save 
 relations of myself with myself." ' This follows because 
 obhgation to duty imphes the possibihty of its attainment; 
 and only in a world which I can enter can I fulfil obhgation. 
 
 The oversensuous world is, in the second place, a world of 
 free spirits or selves, for only to other selves do I stand in 
 direct relation of obhgation. "The voice of my conscience," 
 
 ' Werke, II., p. 257'; translation, p. 104'. 
 
 ^ Werke, II., p. 261'; translation, p. 109'. 
 
 ' Werke, II., p. 265'; translation, p. 113'. 
 
 * Werke, II., p. 296' (cf. 281', ubeririiscK) ; translation, p. 150. 
 
 ' Werke, II., p. 282' ; translation, p. i-x,-^. 
 
 ' Werke, II., p. 283' ; translation, p. 134'. 
 
 'Werke, II., p. 258' (cf. p. 251'); translation, p. 104'. 
 
3i6 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 Fichte declares, " cries to me, 'Treat . . . these beings as 
 free, independent creatures, . . . existing for themselves. 
 . . . Honor their freedom : embrace their aims with en' 
 thusiasm as if they were your own.' . . . The voice of con- 
 science — the command, 'here limit thy freedom, here 
 assume and honor purposes foreign to thyself — this it is 
 which is first translated into the thought : ' here is surely and 
 certainly a being like unto me.' " ' 
 
 The eternal reahty, finally, is an absolute spirit, or will. 
 This follows, according to Fichte, from two considerations. 
 An absolute will is necessary to explain the unanimity of 
 human experience.^ It is admitted that each conscious self 
 constructs its own world, hence separate spirits could not 
 be aware of each other and could not see the same sense 
 world, were not all human selves parts and manifestations 
 of the absolute self, the eternal and infinite will.^ The 
 existence of the absolute will is demanded also by the 
 more-than-individual authority of the moral law. Though 
 each individual has his own unique ideal, yet the moral 
 law has an authority underivable from individual purpose. 
 "Neither my will nor that of any other finite being, nor that 
 of all finite beings taken together, gives this law, but rather 
 my will and the will of all other finite beings are subordi- 
 nate to it^. . . . This supreme law of the oversensuous 
 world is, then, a will." ^ 
 
 With this discovery of the absolute will, enfolding me and 
 all finite spirits, I "become a new creature. . . . My spirit 
 is forever closed to perplexity and indecision, to uncertainty, 
 doubt, and anxiety; my heart is closed to sorrow, to re- 
 pentance, and to craving." ' Doubt and desire have become 
 impossible to me for I realize my oneness with the eternal 
 
 ' Werke, II., pp. 259*-26o'; translation, pp. io6'-io7'. 
 'Werke, II., p. 299'; translation, p. 153^. 
 ' Werke, II., p. 302'; translation, pp. 155-156. 
 *Werke, II., p. 295"; translation, p. 149'. 
 'Werke, II., p. 297^; translation, p. 151^. 
 
The Philosophy of Fichte 317 
 
 will. "Sublime, living will," I cry out to him, "whom no 
 name names and no thought comprehends, well may I lift 
 my heart to thee, for thou and I are not apart. . . . Thou 
 workest in me the knowledge of my duty, of my vocation in 
 the series of reasonable beings — though how thou workest I 
 do not know. Thou knowest what I think and will — 
 though how thou canst know I do not understand. . . . 
 Thou wiliest . . . that my free obedience should have re- 
 sults in all eternity ; the act of thy will I do not understand 
 and know only that it is not hke my will." ' 
 
 The words just quoted disclose a feature of Fichte's doc- 
 trine of the Absolute which can hardly fail to surprise the 
 reader who has so far followed his argument. In spite of 
 the teaching that this Absolute is Will, Fichte conceives it as 
 impersonal. "In the concept of personality," he says, "is 
 involved that of hmits." ^ To attribute personahty to the 
 absolute will is, then, to attribute limitation. An impersonal, 
 absolute self which yet works, knows, and wills is — it thus 
 appears — Fichte's conception of ultimate reahty. But such 
 a view seems, on the face of it, to involve a self-contradiction. 
 It conceives of the Absolute as impersonal, and yet claims 
 for it all the characters — knowing, willing, working — of 
 personahty. To assure ourselves that this is really Fichte's 
 meaning and that his metaphysical theory has not imcon- 
 sciously been affected by the demands of his moral teaching, 
 it is useful to study some one of the technical expositions of 
 his philosophy. It is convenient to select the earhest and 
 most widely read of these: "Grundlage der Wissenschafts- 
 lehre," or "Science of Knowledge." It has been abundantly 
 proved that the essentials of Fichte's system remained un- 
 altered, in spite of his diverse formulations of it, his varying 
 arguments and emphases, and his changing terminology.' 
 
 ' Werke, II., pp. 303-305; translation, pp. 158', 160'. 
 'Werke, II., p. 305; translation, p. 159^. 
 
 ' Cf. A. B. Thompson, "The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge," 
 p. 3 et al. and Appendix; C. C. Everett, "Fichte," pp. 13, 14. 
 
31 8 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 Hence the outline of the "Wissenschaftslehre" may rightly 
 serve as summary of Fichte's constant teaching. 
 
 II. Fichte's Technical Philosophy 
 
 a. The universe consists oj mutually related self and nop- 
 
 sell 
 
 To the student acquainted only with Fichte's " Vocation of 
 Man,"oreven withhis"Way to a Blessed Life" the "Science 
 of Knowledge" seems, at first, to be the work of an utterly 
 different writer. It consists in a technical, severely abstract, 
 metaphysical argume;nt, seldom Ughted up by illustration, or 
 by practical appUcation. Its chief faults of style are repeti- 
 tion and overelaboration. The joy of discovering signifi- 
 cant truth is fairly worn away by the carefulness with which 
 such a truth is turned and twisted, viewed in this Ught and 
 in that, from every possible standpoint, important and 
 unimportant.' The book has three divisions, General, 
 Theoretical, and Practical; and of these the first two are 
 more closely connected than the second with the third. The 
 book starts with the everyday admission that reahty is made 
 up of self and not-self. The consciousness of the I, the my- 
 self, is particularly vivid, it is pointed out, when I judge or 
 identify, that is, when I say " a is a." ^ For such identification 
 impUes the existence of a relatively permanent self which is 
 conscious of the first a, of the second a, and of their oneness. 
 And since the consciousness of identity is an immediately 
 certain 'fact of empirical consciousness,' ' the I on which its 
 possibiUty depends must exist. 
 
 It is, however, equally certain that I — -the single, finite 
 
 • This sentence is quoted from a paper by the writer, in the Philosophical 
 Review, Vol. III., p. 462. 
 
 ' § I, i), Werke, I., p. 92 ; translation, by A. E. Kroeger, p. 65 (all 
 references to the "Science of Knowledge," in translation, are to this work). 
 
 ' 5 I. 5)> Werke, I., p. 95 ; translation, p. 68'. 
 
The Philosophy of Fichte 319 
 
 I — am not all that exists. I perceive objects which I do 
 not create; my desires are opposed and thwarted: clearly 
 there exists some reahty beyond myself — in other words 
 there is a not-I, or not-self.' 
 
 The self and the not-self may, then, be looked upon as 
 together making up the universe, all that exists. For the 
 term 'not-self is wide enough to include everything besides 
 myself. The nature of the relation between self and not-self 
 has, however, to be taken into account ; and, from this point 
 to the end of Part II., the "Science of Knowledge" consists 
 chiefly in the repeated formulation of this relation between 
 I and not-I. In place of an argument directly advancing 
 from begirming to close of the book one finds, thus, an 
 argument which returns upon itself, going over and over 
 the same ground with unimportant modifications. This 
 argument is, in brief, the following: — 
 
 As together constituting the all-of-reahty, I and not-I seem, 
 in the first place, to be reciprocally or mutually related to 
 each other.^ For, since all reality is made up of self and not- 
 
 ' § 2, Werke, I., p. loi; translation, p. 75. In this section, Fichte at- 
 tempts a deduction, or demonstration, of the existence of the not-self. Really, 
 however, he merely asserts its existence, as a fact of experience. That this 
 is his procedure, Fichte himself elsewhere virtually admits (Werke, I., p. 252). 
 
 ^ This conception of reciprocal relation is discussed in the following por- 
 tions of the "Science of Knowledge" : — 
 
 The self and not-self determine each other (§ 4, B, Werke, I., p. 127; 
 translation, p. 108). 
 
 In reciprocal relation (regarded as causal) matter and form mutually 
 determine each other (Werke, I., pp. 171* seq.; translation, pp. 147* jcj.). 
 
 In reciprocal relation (regarded as that of substantiality) matter and form 
 mutually determine each other (Werke, I., pp. 190* seq.; translation, pp. i6o* 
 seq:). 
 
 The 'independent activity' and the 'form' mutually determine each other 
 (Werke, I., pp. 212 seq.; translation, pp. 176' seq.). 
 
 The last three of the passages of which the headings have been quoted 
 occur in the discussion of the independent activity. 
 
 It may be noted that Fichte describes the three sections, just summarized, 
 of the " Science of Knowledge " — the successive assertions of the existence 
 of I, of not-I, and of the related totality which includes both — as thesis, 
 antithesis, and synthesis, and that he dwells upon the significance of this 
 
320 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 self, it follows that the self is limited by the not-self ; and that, 
 conversely, the not-self is Kmited by the self. Were there noth- 
 ing outside me to thrust itself on my observation or to obstruct 
 my purpose, I should constitute all reahty. And were 
 I not here, the not-I would reign undisputedly. As a matter 
 of fact, we are both here, I and not-I ; reahty is divided be- 
 tween us; we mutually determine each other. 
 
 h. The relatedness of self and not-self implies their exist- 
 ence as parts of an independent, or absolute, reality 
 
 But it is not enough, Fichte continues, to say simply : these 
 opposed reahties, self and not-self, hmit each other. For 
 relation, as Kant has already argued, impKes a reality 
 deeper than that of the terms related. The existence of 
 related terms is, in fact, only possible if they are parts of an 
 underlying, 'independent' reahty which expresses itself in 
 them. In Fichte's words, "To make the reciprocal relation 
 possible, the activity must be taken as absolute," ^ as all- 
 enclosing.^ This conception of the ultimate reahty as One, 
 rather than as coordinated manifold, is emphasized in all 
 Fichte's works. In the "Anweisung zum sehgen Leben," 
 or "Way towards the Blessed Life," for example, he defines 
 the ultimate reality as 'One, not manifold,' as 'self-compre- 
 hensive, self-sufficient, absolute, unchanging unity,' and, 
 finally — in Spinoza's phrase — as ' by itself, for itself, through 
 itself.' But though he constantly asserts, he does not argue 
 at any length for the utter completeness or for the singleness 
 of the reahty fundamental to related self and not-self. The 
 arguments which he neglects to make exphcit are readily 
 supphed. (i) The fundamental reahty must be complete 
 because it consists of I and not-I, and obviously not-I is all 
 
 sort of advance in thought. The procedure recalls Kant's arrangement of 
 the categories in groups of three, and is the germ of that dialectical method 
 which, in Hegel's hands, became so important. 
 
 ' Werke, I., p. 160^; translation, p. 136. 
 
 ^Werke, I., p. 192^; translation, p. 161, end. 
 
The Philosophy of Fichte 32 1 
 
 which I am not, since together they must round out reality. 
 (2) Complete reality is a singular, because I and not-I are 
 related, limited, the one by the other. Now related terms 
 must constitute either a composite made up of parts or a 
 smgular differentiating itself into parts. In the former case 
 the relation which unites the terms would be a third reality 
 in addition to them, that is, would be external to them. But 
 if it were external to the terms it could not unite them, bind 
 them together — in a word, they would not be related. Thus 
 I and not-I can be related only as they are manifestations 
 of a deeper reaUty, an all-embracing One or singular — an 
 'independent activity,' as Fichte calls it — which manifests 
 itself in them and is their relation. In Fichte's own words, 
 "The relation of the reciprocally related terms as such pre- 
 supposes an absolute activity." ^ 
 
 c. The nature of independent, or absolute, reality 
 
 I. Ultimate reality is absolute I 
 
 An important problem remains: the nature of this 'inde- 
 pendent,' all-inclusive One. This, also, hke the problem of 
 relation, is considered by Fichte, not once for all, but at 
 many points of the "Science of Knowledge; " it is not dis- 
 cussed and then dismissed, but is again and again recurred to. 
 The constantly reemerging argument is the following: — 
 
 One of two answers must be given to the question, what is 
 the nature of the ultimate One — the 'independent activity,' 
 to use Fichte's term. Evidently, it must be either of the 
 nature of the self, the I, or of the nature of the not-I, since the 
 two are utterly exclusive and exhaustive. The second of these 
 possibilities is discussed under the rather misleading head- 
 
 * Werke, I., p. 208; translation, p. 174^. The passage is quoted in full, 
 injra, p. 323. (Cf. the expression, Werke, I., p. 205', translation, p. 171', 
 ' the absolute holding together of the opposites'.) 
 
 It should be noted that Fichte, here as elsewhere, assumes, and does 
 not argue, that the all-including One is activity. 
 Y 
 
322 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 ing, causality.' The hypothesis is that of the non-idealists : 
 ultimate reaUty — independent activity, as Fichte in this 
 book calls it — is conceived as non-ideal, that is, as not-self. 
 The argument for the hypothesis is the common one: the 
 existence of an 'external' world, known to us through per- 
 ception. In perception, it is urged, I am conscious of reahty 
 independent of me, external to me. I cannot choose what 
 I shall see or hear ; on the contrary, I passively see and hear 
 what I must. Evidently, then, if this reasoning be correct, 
 the independent reaUty is, in part at least, of the nature of 
 a not-self. But it has been proved already that ultimate 
 reality is niunerically a One — and this requires that it beeither 
 self or not-self, and not a composite of both self and not-self. 
 Now the argument just outlined, from the passivity of percep- 
 tion, results in the conclusion that the not-self is ultimately 
 real. It follows that ultimate reality is not-self, unconscious 
 reality ; and that the supposed I, or conscious self, is a mere 
 mode of the not-self, having, as self, only superficial reahty. 
 
 Fichte hardly does justice to this conception, so clearly does 
 he apprehend the argument which invalidates it. He states 
 the argument somewhat as follows : The existence of a not- 
 self is merely an inference from the experience of perceiving, 
 involving as that does a certain passivity suggesting the 
 existence of reahty independent of it; but perceiving, how- 
 ever passive, is a form of consciousness whose existence is 
 immediately known ; and to infer from consciousness, and as 
 explanation of consciousness, a reahty which denies the 
 fundamental reahty of it is logically impossible. "There is 
 no reahty in the not-I," Fichte says, "except so far as the I 
 is passively conscious. No passivity in the I, no activity 
 [reaUty] in the not-I." In other words, one really knows 
 nothing of a not-self : one knows merely that one is passively 
 
 ' This conception is discussed in the following portions of the " Science of 
 Knowledge" : (i) Werke, I., pp. 131 seq.; translation, pp. 108* seq.; (2) Werke, 
 I., pp. 153 seq.; translation, pp. 129 seq.; (3) Werke, I., pp. 162 seq.; transla- 
 tion, pp. 138 seq.; (4) Werke, I., pp. 171 seq.; translation, pp. 147 seq. 
 
The Philosophy of Fie hie 323 
 
 as well as actively conscious. Thus one knows oneself as 
 limited, but has as yet no conclusive reason to suppose one- 
 self to be Hmited by a not-self. 
 
 Fichte turns, therefore, to the alternative hypothesis : the 
 conception of independent activity (by which, as always, he 
 means ultimate reahty) as I, or self. As has been shown,^ 
 the independent activity is absolute ; hence, on this theory, 
 ultimate reality is an absolute I. The problem which 
 presses for solution is, accordingly: can the existence of an 
 absolute self be reconciled with one's awareness of a Kmited 
 self, an I which finds itself thwarted and opposed? Fichte 
 answers that the absolute self is not only possible in a uni- 
 verse of finite selves, but that it is required for their existence. 
 The relation between absolute and finite selves he defines as 
 that of substantiahty.^ It is the relation of the greater to the 
 less, of the manifesting to the manifested, of the whole to the 
 parts.' Thus the alleged opposition of I to not -I turns out to 
 be the opposition, within the absolute self, of some finite self 
 to the rest of reahty. In other words, not-self means simply 
 not-this-self ; and every finite self is not-self to every other. 
 Only in this restricted sense is there any not-I, for since the 
 ultimate reality, or independent activity, turns out to be 
 that of absolute self, there can be no reahty outside it. But 
 external to finite self, are other finite manifestations of the 
 absolute self ; and this explains the fact that the finite I feels 
 itself passive, opposed and thwarted, even in a world whose 
 ultimate reahty is self.* The very existence of the opposition 
 imphes, however, the reahty of the absolute I : "The coming 
 
 ' Cf. supra, pp. 320 seq. 
 
 ''This conception is discussed in the following portions of the "Science 
 of Knowledge": (i) Werke, I., pp. 136* seq., esp. 139; translation, p. 113'; 
 (2) Werke, I., p. 157; translation, p. 134; (3) Werke, I., p. 163; translation, 
 p. 140; (4) Werke, I., p. igo*; translation, p. 160. 
 
 'Werke, I., pp. 165' and 192''; translation, pp. 141' and 161. Cf. Fichte's 
 words in the "Thatsachen des Bewusstseins " (1810-11), Werke, II., p. 640: 
 " The self-contraction of the One is the original actus individuationis." 
 
 *Ci. Werke, I., p. 287; translation, p. 292. 
 
324 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 together of the reciprocally related members (Wechselglieder) 
 as such is subject to (stekt unter) the condition of an absolute 
 activity of the Self, through which the latter opposes subjec- 
 tive self to objective not-self, and unites both. Only in the 
 Self, and by means of this absolute activity of the Self, are 
 self and not-self related terms: in the self and through its 
 activity they are related." ' 
 
 This distinction between the absolute and the finite I's, sug- 
 gested by Kant, it is true, but first carried out by Fichte in 
 the "Science of Elnowledge," is, far and away, the greatest 
 achievement of the book — and, indeed, of Fichte's entire 
 philosophy. It carries with it a complete disproof of the 
 existence of any thing-in-itself. For if there is no absolute 
 not-I, if — on the contrary — the not-self is opposed simply 
 to a finite self, never to the absolute self, then there is evi- 
 dently no reality utterly independent of consciousness — in 
 other words, there is no thing-in-itself. Fichte's denial of the 
 possibility of a thing-in-itself is very energetic ; and, after his 
 usual fashion, he recurs to it again and again. The main 
 argument, he says, for the existence of a thing-in-itself may 
 be stated thus: Granted that there is an absolute self, 
 manifesting itself in finite selves, what is the reason for this 
 self-differentiation ? Why should an absolute I break itself up 
 into lesser I's ? ^ Must not this ground of the absolute Self's 
 opposition of a finite self to its not-self — this check {Anstoss), 
 as it may be called, to the perfectly undetermined activity of 
 the absolute I — lie outside of the activity of the Absolute ? 
 And in this case, is there not a reahty-independent-of-con- 
 sciousness which, if not a thing-in-itself, is at least a groimd- 
 in-itself ? ' Fichte's negative answer to this question is given 
 
 ' Werke, I., p. 208^; translation, p. 174^. For justification of the use, 
 impossible in German, of capitals to distinguish reference to the absolute 
 Self from reference to the finite selves, cf. Philosophical Review, 1894, 
 Vol. III., p. 459, where a more elaborate symbolism is proposed. 
 
 ' Werke, I., p. 210; translation, p. 175''. 
 
 ' Cf. Berkeley's discussion of this same hypothesis, supra, pp. 128 iej. 
 
The Philosophy of Fie hie 325 
 
 over and over again in Part III., called the Practical Part, of 
 the "Science of Knowledge." He insists on the impossibility 
 of reality-independent-of-consciousness, even in the attenuated 
 form of check to the absolute self's activity. The activity of 
 the finite self must indeed be checked by the reality outside 
 it, but "this not-self must be a product of the absolute I, 
 and the absolute I would thus be affected by itself alone." * 
 
 2. The independent reality is impersonal I : a system of 
 
 finite selves 
 
 But though the ultimate reality, or^ independent activity, 
 is a "self which determines itself absolutely," this absolute I 
 is, none the less, it appears, impersonal. For since it is 
 independent of all other realities, — since it is ultimate or 
 realest reality, — it is evidently, Fichte says, unlimited. But 
 every personal self is conscious of itself, that is to say, it has an 
 object of its own consciousness, and is thus limited by its 
 object. Evidently, therefore (so Fichte teaches, here, as in 
 the "Vocation of Man," and, indeed, in all his works), the 
 absolute self, or I-in-itself, is impersonal, "never comes to 
 consciousness,"^ "is conscious of itself only in individual 
 form." ' Any apparent assertions by Fichte of the personal 
 nature of the absolute reality are mere metaphor ; the ' love 
 of God,' for example, so often referred to in the "Way 
 towards the Blessed Life," is defined as the "act of Being in 
 maintaining itself in existence." ^ 
 
 The further study of the independent reality becomes thus 
 a study of those finite selves in which it comes to conscious- 
 
 ' Werke, I., p. 251'. 
 
 ^ Werke, I., p. 269'; translation, p. 275'. 
 
 ^"Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns, " Werke, II., p. 647. Cf. "Anweisung 
 zum seligen Leben " (" Way towards the Blessed Life "), Werke, V., p. 455 ; 
 translation, II., p. 353^ : " God throws out from himself . . such part of his 
 existence as becomes self-consciousness." 
 
 * Werke, V., p. 541 ; translation, II., p. 473. (References to translations 
 of the "Way towards the Blessed Life" and "Characteristics of the Present 
 Age " are to William Smith's translations in " Fichte's Popular Works," 1848.) 
 
326 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 ness. The last part of the " Science of Knowledge " contains 
 this detailed discussion of the nature of the personal and 
 finite selves. Each finite I has two significant phases, 
 appears, in other words, both as practical and as theoretical. 
 The practical self is the finite self reflecting on the absolute 
 self and on its own oneness with the absolute. The theo- 
 retical self, on the other hand, is the finite self reflecting on its 
 finiteness, realizing itself as limited. The two, theoretical 
 and practical I, are not separable individuals, but merely dis- 
 tinguishable phases of each finite self. They are not separate, 
 because each imphes the other. I, the finite self, could never 
 be reflectively conscious of my finitude, were I not always 
 conscious, however inattentively, of my essential infinity; 
 for a limit, as Fichte says, is not known as a Hmit until, in 
 consciousness, one has gone beyond it.' On the other hand, I, 
 the finite self, could not be conscious of myself as infinite 
 without reahzing that it is precisely this finite seK which 
 manifests and forms a constituent part of the infinite self. 
 This realization of infinity in the form of finitude is empirically, 
 Fichte teaches, a striving {Strehen) after the ideal. No finite 
 end ever satisfies this ideal striving; one purpose after 
 another is set up, attained, and left behind. For the very 
 nature of the finite self's consciousness of itself as part of the 
 Infinite imphes a striving after that which cannot, in the 
 sphere of finite being, ever be apprehended. The following 
 passage condenses this teaching into a statement which the 
 bracketed clauses seek to make clearer. "The I," Fichte 
 says (here meaning the practical, finite self), "demands that 
 it comprehend all reality within itself and that it fulfil in- 
 finity. The necessary presupposition of this demand is the 
 idea of the absolutely posited, infinite I; and this is the 
 Absolute I. (This I is unattainable by our consciousness 
 [. . . that is, by our immediate consciousness].) The I must 
 — by the very conception of it — reflect on itself, consider 
 
 ' Cf. passage quoted below. 
 
The Philosophy of Fichte 327 
 
 whether it really include all reality within itself. ... In so 
 far, it is practical ; neither ' absolute,' because by the tendency 
 to reflection it goes out beyond itself [i.e. realizes itself as 
 limited by something outside itself]; nor yet 'theoretical,' be- 
 cause its reflection has for its ground only the idea proceeding 
 from the I itself and abstracted from the possible check [or 
 thing-in-itself]. If, however, the finite self reflect upon the 
 ' check, ' that is, if it regard its activity as hmited ... it is 
 in so far 'theoretical' self, or inteUigence. If there be no 
 practical phase in the self, no theoretical consciousness is 
 possible : for if the activity of the self reaches only so far as 
 the check, and not beyond it, then, ]or the /,* there exists no 
 check. On the other hand, if the self be not intelhgent, then 
 no consciousness of its practical phase — and, indeed, no 
 self-consciousness of any sort — is possible,"^ for onlythrough 
 the opposition of finite and infinite is the consciousness of 
 either possible. 
 
 Thus, the outcome of the "Science of Knowledge" is that 
 of the "Vocation of Man." In varying terms, but with 
 virtually the same meaning, Fichte's other books outline the 
 same conception of reaUty : an absolute self called Will, and 
 Life, and Being, and God, and by other names as well,' which 
 is spiritual, yet impersonal, and which includes within itself 
 finite reaUties. These realities are single selves, but their 
 common experience constitutes the so-called physical world : 
 in Fichte's words : "the world of purely material objects . . . 
 is the expression of life in its unity. Not the individual as 
 such, but the one hfe, the totaUty of individuals, perceives 
 these objects." * Each of these single selves, in the sec- 
 ond place, is but "a single division {Spaltung) of the 
 one . . . I," yet "each individual has in his own free 
 
 ' Italics mine. ' Werke, I., pp. 277-278. 
 
 ' Cf. A. B. Thompson, op. cit., Appendix, Nomenclature, p. 199. 
 
 ' " Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," Werke, II., pp. 614 seq., 621 seq. Cf. 
 also "Grundziige des gegenwartigen Zeitalters (Characteristics of the 
 Present Age)," IX., Werke, VII., p. 130; translation, p. 133; "A world has 
 no existence except in knowledge, and knowledge is the world." 
 
328 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 choice . . . the possibility of enjoying from any of these 
 , . . standpoints, that peculiar portion of the absolute being 
 which belongs to him." ' In its essence this consciousness of 
 union with the iniinite constitutes the moral consciousness of 
 each one of us ; and all our consciousness is indeed inherently 
 moral. Thus, the physical world is from this truest point of 
 view 'the object and sphere of my duties'; and my fellow 
 human being is known to me in the acknowledged obhgation 
 to respect his freedom.^ Even more obviously, the conscious- 
 ness of obhgation is acknowledgment of the claim of the 
 infinite self ; the growth of the moral ideal is the progressive 
 striving after attainment to imity with the Infinite. 
 
 III. Criticism or Fichte's Conclusion 
 
 The inevitable criticism upon this theory may be simply 
 stated. Fichte's impersonal Absolute is not in any sense a 
 self, or I; it is rather — though this contradicts Fichte's 
 express statement about it — a not-self. For my knowledge 
 of the self is surely rooted in my immediate knowledge of 
 myself; and this myself, whom each of us immediately 
 knows, is a personal self. There is no such thing as imper- 
 sonal consciousness; there never exists feeUng, thought, or 
 will which some person does not feel, think, or will. If, 
 then, Fichte is right both in the doctrine that ultimate reahty 
 is an absolute and singular, not a composite, reahty (an inde- 
 pendent activity, and not a set of reciprocally related terms),' 
 and if he is also justified in arguing that this absolute reahty 
 is self, then this absolute I must be personal. Fichte's teach- 
 ing that reahty is ultimately an absolute and singular I, which 
 is yet impersonal, is, in truth, a contradiction in terms. For 
 ultimate reahty could be both spiritual and impersonal only 
 
 ' " Way towards the Blessed Life," translation, 11., p. 459 ; Werke, V., 
 
 P- 53°- 
 
 ' Cf. supra, pp. 316 seq.; and "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," Werke, II., 
 P- 635.' 
 
 ' Cf. supra, pp. 320 seq. 
 
The Philosophy of Fichte 329 
 
 if it were a composite, a community, of finite selves boimd 
 together by their common perceiving experience and by their 
 mutual moral ideals. This is, in fact, the teaching of Fichte's 
 practical philosophy, but by resolving ultimate reahty into a 
 lot of related individuals, he virtually yields the conception of 
 reality as absolute and singular.' 
 
 It must be added that Fichte often tacitly implies the per- 
 sonahty of the Absolute whose impersonal character he con- 
 stantly asserts. He admits it when, in the " Vocation of Man," 
 he names the ultimate reahty Will ; or when, as in the "Way 
 towards the Blessed Life," he calls it God. For to attribute 
 to the deepest reality knowledge, will, and love is, to all in- 
 tents and purposes, to treat it as personal. That the absolute 
 will is "not like my will," may be admitted, for the Infinite 
 must differ from the finite at least as the whole from the part ; 
 but, as will, it must be personal ; and, for all his doctrine to 
 the contrary, Fichte seems sometimes to have thought of it 
 thus. In the same way, he virtually acknowledges the per- 
 sonahty of the Absolute in his accounts of the religious con- 
 sciousness,^ which gain their force only because they assume 
 a relation of the finite self to a divine person, and which would 
 lose all their meaning if they were interpreted as descriptions 
 of the attitude of the finite self to the community of its fellow- 
 beings. Thus, when Fichte exclaims, "the blessed Life is 
 the apprehension of the One and Eternal with inward love 
 and interest," ^ he gains assent because the 'One and Eter- 
 nal ' is instinctively taken to mean a divine personaUty. If, 
 however, one remember that to Fichte the 'One and Eternal' 
 means either a hidden impersonal reahty or — as is Hkely — 
 a community of human beings, then either it becomes impos- 
 sible to love this hidden being, or else the love is no longer 
 love of the One but of the many. 
 
 ' For fuller discussion, cf . Chapter lo, pp. 378 seq. ; Chapter 11, pp. 418 seq. 
 ^ Cf. "Way towards the Blessed Life," translation, pp. 306, 345, 440, 444, 
 450 (Werke, pp. 418, 448-449. Sii5-Si7. 519-220, 523). 
 
 * "Way towards the Blessed Life," p. 447; translation, II., p. 343. 
 
33° The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 It remains to consider briefly Fichte's reason for holding 
 to this doctrine of an impersonal, absolute self. The concep- 
 tion, there is reason to beUeve, is inherently contradictory, and 
 Fichte does not himself consistently hold to it. Why, then, 
 it may well be asked, does he so persistently assert it ? Evi- 
 dently, for the reason that personahty involves limitations 
 and that he cannot conceive of the ultimate reahty as limited.^ 
 This is, indeed, the only obstacle to the doctrine of an abso- 
 lute, an all-including person. If it can be overcome, there is 
 no barrier to the logical conclusion of Fichte's reasonings: 
 the doctrine that there is an absolute reaUty, and that this 
 Absolute is a personal self. Now Fichte, though he never 
 realized it, had himself surmounted this difficulty by the 
 teaching that the absolute I determines itself. Over and 
 over again, he calls it self-determining, insisting that it 
 'determines' ^ or 'contracts' ^ itself; and he asserts that this 
 determination or contraction of itself into the totaHty of 
 finite selves is through its own activity, not through any 
 external impetus. By this distinction, Fichte formulates the 
 true conception of the Absolute, not as unhmited, but as 
 ' self -limited ' — that is, as limited by nothing external to 
 itself. With this admission, the impossibihty of a personal 
 Absolute vanishes. Personahty, it may be acknowledged, is 
 limitation; finite personahty involves a limitation of myself 
 by the not-myself ; but infinite personahty is self-hmitation, 
 determination of oneself through the laws of one's nature — 
 a necessity which is freedom. 
 
 B. The Philosophy of Schelling 
 
 The systems of Fichte and of Schelling are rightly studied 
 in close connection, both because they are so nearly con- 
 temporaneous, and because they so strongly resemble each 
 
 ' Cf. p. 32s. 
 
 '"Science of Knowledge," Werke, I., pp. 299, 307, 310; translation, 
 pp. 313 el al. 
 
 ' "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," Werke, II., p. 640. 
 
The Philosophy of Schelling 331 
 
 other in their critical reaction on the doctrine of Kant, and 
 in their less direct yet significant relation to Spinoza's teach- 
 ing. Schelling, like Fichte, demonstrates the impossibility 
 of Kant's thing-in-itself, and interprets Kant's transcenden- 
 tal self, as well as Spinoza's substance, as absolute self. But, 
 in spite of these fundamental likenesses, Schelling's doctrine 
 stands in sharp contrast to that of Fichte; somewhat as 
 Schelling himself, with his prosperous youth, his early aca- 
 demic success, his romantic friendships, — in a word, with his 
 Ufe of inward caprice and of outward change, — stands op- 
 posed to the serious Fichte, with his Hfe of poverty, struggle, 
 misunderstanding, and hard-won success. 
 
 I. Schelling's Early Doctrine : the Universe as con- 
 stituted BY AN Unconditioned but Impersonal I 
 
 The important periods of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
 Schelling's philosophic activity are compressed within the 
 short period of fifteen years — roughly speaking, from 
 1795 to 1810.* Like Fichte, he entered on philosophy as 
 expositor and critic of Kant. But, like every independent 
 thinker, he developed a doctrine of his own in the very effort 
 to understand, to expound, and to correct another system. 
 His first work, "Vom Ich (Concerning the I) " was pub- 
 lished in 1795, when its brilliant young author was only twenty 
 years old. Its success led to Schelling's appointment to the 
 chair of philosophy in Jena, which Fichte had left ; and Schel- 
 ling's distinctly technical works were written, all of them, from 
 this academic background. The "Vom Ich" is a clear and 
 
 ' The beginner in philosophy may well postpone the reading of Schelling, 
 for his most significant doctrines are found in the more accessible works of 
 other writers. Schelling is not translated, and the student who does not know 
 German must be referred to Watson's excellent condensation of the "Tran- 
 scendental Idealism" (containing briefer summaries of other works). The 
 German reading student should study the "Vom Ich," selections from the 
 nature philosophy, the " Darstellung " (1801), parts at least of the 
 "System des Transcendentalen Idealismus," and one of the later works, 
 i.g. the "Philosophie und Religion." - 
 
332 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 eloquent exposition of the doctrine, common to Schelling and 
 to Fichte, that ultimate reahty is an absolute, but impersonal 
 self. Schelling argues thus : We are immediately conscious 
 of limited, that is, conditioned, reahties. Each of these con- 
 ditioned facts, or things, seems to depend on some other ; but 
 every limited cause in turn demands a cause, and thus the 
 attempted explanation of one thing by another falls to the 
 groimd.^ But we are not forced to the conclusion that there 
 is no accounting for the universe; on the other hand, the 
 very existence of related things presupposes the existence of 
 unconditioned reality.^ 
 
 Schelling proceeds to consider the nature of this uncondi- 
 tioned reality. The Unconditioned evidently is no object, for 
 every object, or thing, is object of some consciousness, in other 
 words, is the construction of a conscious subject. "What- 
 ever is a thing is . . . object of knowledge, is therefore a 
 link in the chain of our knowledge, falls within the sphere of 
 the knowable, and therefore cannot be the real ground of all 
 knowing." ^ Even the thing-in-itself, the supposed reahty 
 beyond consciousness, is object of our conception and fails, 
 therefore, of being unconditioned.' But though uncon- 
 ditioned reality is not an object, it is not, on the other hand, 
 a subject. For just as an object presupposes, and is therefore 
 conditioned by, a subject, so a subject presupposes and is, 
 then, conditioned by its object. "Precisely because the sub- 
 ject is thinkable only in relation to an object, and the object 
 only in relation to a subject, neither one of the two can con- 
 tain the unconditioned." ^ Now, primarily at least, as the 
 context seems to indicate, ScheUing means, by subject, finite 
 self. This second step in the deduction of the nature of 
 
 ' Cf. " Vom Ich," §§ 2' and 3', Werke, I., 1, pp. 164' and 170'. 
 
 ' Ihid., §§ 1-3, especially 3, Werke, I., 1, pp. 166-170. These passages 
 contain no demonstration of the existence of unconditioned reality. Cf. 
 injra, p. 419, for proof of Schelling's assertion. 
 
 » Ihid., \ 2', Werke, I., i, p. 164'. * lUi., p. 239'. 
 
 'Ibid., § 2', Werke, I., i, p. 165'. Cf. "System des Transcendentalen 
 Idealismus" (1800), Werke, III., i, §§ i, 3, pp. 339 seq., 346 seq. 
 
The Philosophy of Schelling 333 
 
 the ultimate reality simply means, therefore, that every finite 
 self is, by virtue of its finiteness, conditioned, not uncon- 
 ditioned, reality. 
 
 There remains but the one possibihty. Unconditioned 
 reaUty is neither external thing nor finite self : it must, then, 
 be the absolute I, the self which is conditioned, or determined, 
 by nothing outside itself, the self which is realized through 
 itself, the unconditioned " I am because I am." ^ The essence 
 of this I is "freedom, that is to say, it is unthinkable, except 
 as it posits itself — through simple power {Selbstmachf) in 
 itself — not as anything whatever but as mere I." ^ 
 
 The greater part of the "Vom Ich" consists in a detailed 
 and reiterated consideration of the characters, or aspects, of 
 the unconditioned I, from the standpoint of Kant's four 
 groups of categories. The main results of this discussion 
 may, however, be summarized in a few paragraphs. Quan- 
 titatively considered, Schelhng teaches,^ the absolute I "is 
 . . . imity." It is unity, not plurality, for a true plu- 
 rality would contain members endowed with an independent 
 reality, and this has been shown to be impossible.^ In con- 
 trast with the empirical I, this absolute I is, thus, all-inclusive : 
 " it fills all . . .infinity." The ' quality, ' in the second place, of 
 the imconditioned I, is its reality. "The I," Schelhng says,' 
 "includes all . . . reality," else it would be no longer im- 
 conditioned. The only not-self, therefore, is such as derives 
 its reality from the absolute self. In Schelling's words, 
 " The not-self has ... no reahty, so long as it is opposed to 
 the self, so long, that is, as it is pure, absolute, not-self." 
 This means that, though reahties exist doubtless outside any 
 finite self, which are not-selves to this limited I, even these 
 are included within the unconditioned I. Going on to the 
 
 • " Vom Ich," § 3, Werke, I., i, p. 167. Cf. p. 221. 
 
 ' Ibid., § 8, Werke, I., 1, p. 179. Cf. pp. 205, 235, 239, end. 
 ' Ibid., § 9, Werke, I., i, p. 182 seq. Cf. supra, Chapter 7. 
 
 * Cf. supra, p. 332. Cf., also, pp. 349 seq. 
 ' Ibid., § 10', Werke, I., i, p. 186'. 
 
334 ^-^^ Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 relation categories, Schelling points out that by 'substance' 
 is meant 'unconditioned reality.' Hence, he says, "the I is 
 the only substance. ... All that exists is in the I. . . . 
 All that exists is mere accident of the I." ' And because the 
 unconditioned I is absolute power, it is also causality; in 
 other words, it is the presupposition and the explanation of 
 itself and of all subordinate reahties. "Its essence is itself 
 power." ^ There remain only the categories of modahty, and 
 of these Schelling recognizes only one : the absoluteness of 
 the unconditioned I. In truth, the predicate 'absoluteness' 
 merely includes, or reaffirms, the characters already attrib- 
 uted to the unconditioned I, namely, all-including unity, 
 ultimate reality, substance, and power. And, herewith, as 
 Schelling points out, all the categories have been conceived 
 as aspects of the absolute I, instead of being externally de- 
 rived, after Kant's fashion, from distinctions of formal logic' 
 
 Certain comments at once suggest themselves on this 
 category doctrine. It has the merit, which Schelling claims 
 for it, of avoiding the artificiality and the consequent incom- 
 pleteness of Kant's derivation of the categories. But Schel- 
 ling fails to notice that his own point of view is avowedly 
 different from that of Kant, to whom the categories are the 
 relations of known objects or predications about them. 
 And, in the second place, considered in and for them- 
 selves, Schelhng's categories — characters of the uncon- 
 ditioned I — demand the following criticism : every one of 
 them turns out to be a corollary, or else a restatement, of its 
 unconditionedness. But besides these, the imconditioned I 
 has certainly the qualitative character of selfhood, in its 
 various expressions: it is not merely unconditioned, but 7. 
 Schelling should surely have found a place, among the cate- 
 gories of the I, for the characters which belong to it regarded 
 as self. 
 
 The neglect to discuss the quahtative characters of the 
 
 ' " Vom Ich," I 12, Werke, I., i, pp. i92'-i93'. 
 
 'Ibid., § 14, Werke, I., i, p. ig6. 'Ibid., Werke, I., x, p. 154. 
 
The Philosophy of Schelling 335 
 
 unconditioned I is due doubtless to Schelling's denial of its 
 personality. This is based on the theory that the self-con- 
 scious personality of the I would demand that it be object 
 to itself, thus turning the unconditioned into the conditioned 
 self. "Reflect," SchelHng says, "that the I, in so far as it 
 occurs in consciousness, is no more pure, absolute, I ; reflect 
 that there can be for the absolute I no object, and that it can 
 far less become object for itself." ' This is the old argument 
 of Fichte and of Kant : the self of which one is conscious is 
 ipso facio a limited self. The refutation of this argument has 
 been over and over again formulated : ' self-consciousness is 
 self-limitation, and self-limitation does not derogate from 
 absoluteness. It is interesting to notice that in this early 
 stage of his thinking, even SchelUng seems to be only half- 
 hearted in his denial of the absolute I's personality. " The 
 absolute I," he says, " exists (ist) without all reference to objects. 
 That is to say, it exists not in so far as it thinks in general, but 
 in so far as it thinks itself only." ^ Of God, he says, a httle 
 later, that he " perceives . . . nothing, but merely himself."* 
 Still more significant is SchelUng's appeal to self-conscious- 
 ness in the midst of the demonstration, already outlined, of 
 an unconditioned I — an I which exists through itself. " I 
 am because I am,"° SchelUng exclaims, "this thought seizes 
 suddenly upon every man." In these words, Schelling really 
 acknowledges a truth which has no place in his formal system, 
 the truth that consciousness essentially is personaUty, and 
 that an unconditioned I is, of necessity, a personal, though a 
 self-Umiting, self. 
 
 ' "Vom Ich," § 8«, Werke, I., i, p. i8o'. Cf. "System des Transcen- 
 dentalen Idealismus," 2^' Hauptabschnitt Vorerinnerung 3, f, A, Werke, 
 III., I, p. 383*, "Das Ich indem es sich anschaut wird endlich." 
 
 ' Cf . supra, pp. 246 seq. ; 330 seg. 
 
 ' "Vom Ich," § 15, Amnerkung 2, Werke, I., i, p. 204, footnote. (Italics 
 mine.) 
 
 * Ibid., Amnerkung 3, p. 210*. 
 
 ' Ibid., § 3, Werke, I., i, p. 168. The entire passage should be read to 
 gain the full force of the statement. 
 
336 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 Up to this point, no important difference has declared itself 
 between Schelling's doctrine and that of Fichte. Yet even 
 in this early work, so closely following the Hne of Kant's 
 teaching, a contrast appears between Schelling and Fichte 
 in their theories of the moral consciousness. Both teach that 
 the ultimate reahty is an absolute I, manifested in finite con- 
 sciousnesses ; but Fichte lays more stress than Schelling does on 
 the individuaHty impUed by the moral consciousness, and on 
 the essentially moral nature of all self-consciousness. Thus, 
 Fichte, starting from the facts of the moral consciousness, 
 teaches that a man to find out what he is must reiiect on what 
 he ought — must, in other words, study his consciousness of 
 obhgation and its presuppositions. Schelling, on the other 
 hand, leads up to the consciousness of obhgation instead of 
 ■beginning with it, teaching that a man derives his sense of 
 obhgation from his consciousness of unity with the absolute 
 self. What to a finite self is the deepest formulation of the 
 moral law is accordingly embodied by Schelling in the words, 
 "Be absolute, be identical with thyself." ' Thus, for Schel- 
 ling, ethics is a deduction from metaphysics, whereas to 
 Fichte, ethics is a prerequisite to all philosophy. " Give to 
 a man," Schelling says, "the knowledge of what he is; he 
 will soon learn what he ought to be." ^ Fichte would have 
 stated the relation between doctrine and conduct in a differ- 
 ent way. "Let a man but act as he ought," Fichte might 
 have said, " and he will soon learn what he is." 
 
 II. Schelling's Doctrine of the Absolute as 
 
 Nature 
 
 Schelling's ideahsm, hke Fichte's, consists in the doctrine 
 of an imconditioned but impersonal I differentiating itself 
 into Umited selves and not-selves, particular I's and their 
 
 ' " Vom Ich,'' § 13, p. 199'. 
 
 ^ Ihii., Preface to the first edition, Werlie, I., i, p. 157. 
 
The Philosophy of Schelling 337 
 
 objects. But Schelling, as has just been indicated, was, from 
 the first, far less interested than Fichte, in the experiences of 
 the individual selves. It is not, then, unnatural that his 
 early years at Jena should have been largely occupied with 
 the formulation of a philosophy of external nature. There 
 is no need of a special explanation of this tendency, for the 
 later eighteenth century was ahve with a fresh interest in 
 nature. The prevalent Spinozism of the poets took the form 
 of a pantheistic attitude toward nature; and the scientists 
 were making constant discoveries and elaborating new and 
 fascinating theories. In 1777, Lavoisier isolated the element 
 oxygen; in 1790, Galvani discovered animal electricity; Eras- 
 mus Darwin, in his "Zoonomia," pubhshed in 1794, antici- 
 pated the evolution theory of Lamarck. Even the critics, 
 the philosophers, and the poets had their share in scien- 
 tific theorizing and in discovery. Winckelmann and Herder 
 and Lessing applied the development theory in the domains 
 of art, of history, and of Hterature ; Kant anticipated 
 Laplace's formulation of the nebular hypothesis ; and 
 Goethe, the universal genius, proposed his theory that 
 the parts of the flower are metamorphosed leaves. Schel- 
 ling's special interest, evidenced by every one of his writings 
 upon nature-philosophy, in the phenomena of magnetism and 
 of electricity and in the principle of development, has thus 
 its root in the scientific interests and achievements of his 
 age. 
 
 Every nature phenomenon, Schelling teaches, is a com- 
 bination — in other words, a reconciliation — of opposing 
 tendencies. These he names variously : sometimes he calls 
 them the 'unifying' and the 'individualizing' tendencies; 
 again,he names them the 'first,' or ' positive,' and the ' second,' 
 or 'negative,' tendencies.^ The positive, or unifying, ten- 
 dency is, he says, concretely illustrated by gravitation, the 
 force which attracts bodies towards each other ;^ it is 
 
 '"Weltseele," Werke, II., i, pp. 381 seq. ^ Ibid., pp. 364 and 366». 
 z 
 
338 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 abstractly exemplified by time, for the character of succeeding 
 moments, as of events, is to determine each other — they are 
 necessarily connected.' In a similar way, space is a mani- 
 festation of the individuahzing tendency,^ since spaces 
 separate things and each object occupies its own space.^ 
 The complete union of the two tendencies is exemplified by 
 the organism, the spatial body which is yet temporally con- 
 nected with preceding organisms.^ 
 
 It would be unwise to follow, in detail, Schelling's countless 
 variations on this theme. He traces the oppositions and the 
 reconcihations of unifying and individuahzing tendencies 
 within the group of organic,^ as well as within that of inorganic, 
 phenomena." In the group of the organic, sensibility to exter- 
 nal influence is the unifying tendency, iiritabihty is individual- 
 izing, and the reproductive impulse binds both tendencies 
 together. But this and much more like it is, after all, 
 analogy and symboUsm, not reasoning. And one will vainly 
 search the pages of "Weltseele," of "Ideen zur Philosophie 
 der Natur," or of "Erster Entwurf," for any cogent argu- 
 ment. The upshot of Schelhng's play upon scientific analo- 
 gies seems to be this : every nature phenomenon is a one-of- 
 many, a union of opposites. Back of the multipHcity of 
 phenomena, therefore, there doubtless is one power, itself 
 a one-of-many, which manifests itself in these diverse phe- 
 nomena. "Since it is unquestionable," Schelling writes, 
 "that in the living being there is a series (Stujenjolge) of 
 functions, since nature opposed to the animal process irri- 
 tability, to irritabihty sensibility, and so brought about an 
 
 > " Weltseele," Werke, II., 1, p. 368'. ' Ibid., p. 364'. 
 
 ' Schelling suggests light as concrete manifestation of the individualiz- 
 ing tendency {Ibid., p. 368' seq.). He evidently uses the term, not in a 
 literal, but in a vague, symbolic sense. As thus used, it is no real correlate to 
 gravitation, the concrete manifestation of the unifying tendency. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 371'. " Der Lebensquell der allgemeinen . . . Natur ist daher 
 die Copula zwischen der Schwere und dem Lichtwesen . . . Wo auch diese 
 hohere Copula sich selbst bejaht im Einzelnen, da ist . . . Organismus." 
 
 ' Ibid., pp. 493 seq. ' Ibid., pp. 397 seq. 
 
The Philosophy of Schelling 339 
 
 antagonism of forces which mutually balance each other in 
 such wise that when one rises the other falls and vice versa. 
 therefore one is led to the thought that all these functions are 
 merely branches of one and the same power, and that the one 
 nature principle, which we must assume as cause of hfe 
 comes forward [in these lower forms] as its single appear- 
 ances." ' This ultimate One, in his books on nature philos- 
 ophy, Schelling vaguely names 'Nature.' "Nature," he 
 declares, is ". . . not mere appearance or revelation of 
 the Eternal: rather [it is] itself the Eternal." ^ 
 
 III. Schelling's Doctrine of the Absolute as Identity 
 
 The outcome of the phase of Schelling's teaching known as 
 the nature philosophy is, as has just appeared, the doctrine 
 that nature is the absolute reality. But Schelling never 
 conceives of nature, after the manner of Descartes or of 
 Hobbes, as ultimately 'material.' Rather, he regards 
 nature as the progressively developing expression of the 
 Absolute ; and in this third period of his thinking, he argues 
 deductively from the Absolute — now called Identity — to 
 the nature-force or phenomenon, instead of reasoning induc- 
 tively to the existence and character of the Absolute from 
 the existence and character of natural phenomena. There 
 are two accounts of Schelling's identity-philosophy. 
 He is sometimes supposed to coordinate physical reaUty 
 and consciousness as manifestations of a deeper reahty, 
 which is thus the 'identity' or 'indifference' of nature and 
 self. Undoubtedly many passages, especially in the writ- 
 ings of 1795-1800, indicate that SchelUng conceives of an 
 "absolute identity in which there is no duplicity and which 
 
 ' "Weltseele," "Ueber den Ursprung des allgemeinen Organismus," IV., 
 6, Werke, II., i, p. 564. 
 
 'i "Verhaltniss des Realen und Idealen in der Natur," Werke, II., i, 
 P- 2S5- 
 
340 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 . . . can never come to consciousness," ' and of physical 
 phenomena as parallel with consciousness. But it is prob- 
 ably truer to the final form of SchelHng's thought to empha- 
 size his idealistic conception of the Absolute and his subordi- 
 nation of the physical to the conscious, of the object to the 
 subject. "Absolute Identity," he says, "exists only under 
 the form of knowing its identity with itself,"^ and every 
 part or expression of this Absolute Identity must partake 
 of its nature.' Now self-knowing is subject-objectivity. 
 Accordingly, each of the stages — dynamic, organic, and 
 vital — of the developing Absolute is a 'relative totahty' 
 within which less developed stages are distinguished as 
 subjective and objective aspects. 
 
 The essentially idealistic character of this teaching, which 
 differentiates it from Schelling's earlier nature philosophy, 
 is accentuated by the main doctrine of his "System des 
 transcendentalen Idealismus." The problem of this book 
 is the explanation of the correspondence between knowledge 
 and object. Knowledge, it is admitted, seems to imply the 
 existence of reality external to mind : sensation is the con- 
 sciousness of my limitation, and perception is the conscious- 
 ness of nature-objects ; reflection reveals me as causally 
 affected by objects. Even in my willing, I am incited by 
 somewhat more-than-myself , else my will is mere capricious- 
 ness (Willkilhr) .* There is, Schelhng teaches, but one solu- 
 tion to this problem of the relation of intelligence to objects. 
 The object must be the product of a bUnd, unconscious 
 activity, and yet this ' bhnd force ' must be identical in nature 
 with the intelligence which perceives objects and is seem- 
 
 ' "System des transcendentalen Idealismus" (1800), IV., Werke, III., 
 1., p. 600. 
 
 ' "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801)," § 19, Werke, VI. 
 Schelling characterizes this work as the first statement of his system as a 
 whole. C£. Kuno Fischer, op. cit., VI., p. 770 ff. 
 
 'Ibid., §§39>40. 
 
 *" System des transcendentalen Idealismus," III., Hauptabschnitt 
 Epoche I.-III., and Hauptabschnitt IV. 
 
The Philosophy of Schelling 34 1 
 
 ingly limited by them. "How the objective world accom- 
 modates itself to ideas in us, and ideas in us to the objec- 
 tive world, is incomprehensible unless . . . the activity by 
 which the objective world is created is originally iden- 
 tical with that which is manifested in willing ; and mce 
 versa." ^ 
 
 The criticisms upon this identity-doctrine, the most 
 characteristic contribution of Schelling to philosophy, must 
 be summarized very briefly. In the first place, Schelling 
 does not really prove, but rather asserts, the existence of an 
 Absolute. Second, he seldom offers a philosophical demon- 
 stration of development within (or of) the Absolute, usually 
 accepting the ultimate reality of evolution on the basis of 
 empirical observation and of merely scientific inference. 
 Furthermore, his argument for development, when he frames 
 it, is based upon his conception of the Absolute as self- 
 knowing, or subject-objectivity, coupled with his (unar- 
 gued) conviction that each part or stage of reality must be 
 like the whole. But this assumption of the self-knowing, 
 or self-conscious, nature of the Absolute is in flat opposition 
 to Schelling's constant teaching that the Absolute is origi- 
 nally impersonal and comes only gradually to consciousness. 
 For such a conception of the Absolute as impersonal re- 
 duces either to that of an unconscious Absolute — a hy- 
 pothesis forbidden, as has appeared, by Schelling's argument 
 for development — or to the no longer absolutist conception 
 of a mere sum of finite consciousnesses.^ The fundamental 
 criticism of SchelHng's system is, thus, that his conception 
 of the Absolute as originally impersonal really invalidates 
 his own argument, besides bringing back what Schelling 
 as well as Fichte thought he had forever banished from 
 philosophy, a thing-in-itself. 
 
 '"System des transcendentalen Idealismus," Einleitung, § 3, C. Werke, 
 III. 
 
 2 For criticism of this view (which, however, Schelling did not hold), cf. 
 comment on Fichte, p. 329', supra. 
 
342 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritiialism 
 
 With the first decade of the nineteenth century the most 
 important periods of Schelling's philosophy end. From 
 this time onward, his writings are so desultory, often so 
 eclectic in their teaching, and in the end so mystical, that 
 they have been reckoned among the works of German litera- 
 ture rather than as products of strictly metaphysical thought. 
 German philosophy and German Uterature have indeed al- 
 ways stood to each other in a peculiarly direct and vital rela- 
 tion : many of the German poets, notably Lessing and Schil- 
 ler, have been, in a way, philosophers also ; and Schelling, 
 in his later life, is most often looked upon as a philosopher 
 turned poet — a representative rather of romanticism in lit- 
 erature than of idealism in philosophy. The writer of this 
 book more and more inclines to the view that this charge 
 is unjust. Certainly Schelling himself protested vehemently 
 when he was accused by Hegel of Schwdrmerei, and he 
 stoutly defended against Jacobi the advantages of reasoned 
 thought. To be sure, the reader of the "Denkmal gegen 
 Jacobi" feels that Schelling is more concerned to defend 
 reasoning in general than to offer any rigorously reasoned 
 argument for his own conclusions. But these conclusions, 
 different as they seem at first reading from the outcome of 
 the identity philosophy, are at bottom grounded in the same 
 principle. Schelling's later teaching is in brief the following : 
 he conceives what he names the Absolute as personal God ; 
 but he teaches that God has developed, in time, from the pre- 
 personal to the higher, personal phase. In such a doctrine, 
 it is evident, personality is still a subordinate category ; the 
 Absolute, even if it be called God, or Reason, so long as it 
 has not come to self-consciousness is an unknown reality 
 manifested in the personal, but not itself essentially and 
 completely personal.^ 
 
 ' On the interpretation of Schelling, cf. throughout Volume VI. Kuno 
 Fischer's " Geschichte der neueren Philosophie." 
 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 343 
 
 C. The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 
 
 Schopenhauer's philosophy, Hke Fichte's and Schelling's, 
 is closely related to the teachings of Spinoza and of Kant, 
 though it must be added that Schopenhauer does not himself 
 recognize the affiliation to Spinoza. Like Hegel, he con- 
 ceives the ultimate reaUty as an absolute self — though he 
 never uses, and even repudiates, this term.^ His great ad- 
 vance upon Fichte and Schelhng consists in his imphcit 
 recognition of the personaUty of the absolute self. But 
 because he inadequately conceives this personahty, tending 
 constantly, indeed, to identify it with impersonal force, and 
 because he fails to demonstrate its absoluteness, he falls 
 short of an idealistic monism ; the conception of an absolute 
 and personal self, whose conscious activity is self-limitation. 
 Because Schopenhauer does not fully grasp this conception, 
 his philosophy is properly studied before that of Hegel, 
 though Schopenhauer, bom in 1788, is eighteen years Hegel's 
 junior, and though he died in i860, nearly thirty years after 
 Hegel's death. Yet this order of study does Uttle violence to 
 chronology, for Schopenhauer's philosophic genius, like 
 ScheUing's, blossomed early, whereas Hegel's books were 
 published relatively late in his hfe. Schopenhauer's first 
 work, his doctor thesis, the brilliant "Fourfold Root of the 
 Principle of SufiScient Reason," was pubhshed in 1813, only 
 a year after the first volume of Hegel's "Logic" ; yet it con- 
 tains all the essential features of Schopenhauer's system. The 
 complete exposition of the system, the first volume of "The 
 World as Will and Idea," followed in 1818, only a year later 
 than the first edition of Hegel's "Encyclopedia," and two 
 years after the second volume of Hegel's "Logic." 
 
 The pitiful story of Arthur Schopenhauer's Ufe — of the 
 
 ' " Uber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde " — 
 (" On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," dted as 
 " Fourfold Root "), § 20. 
 
344 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 boyhood of travel, the brief period of mercantile pursuits, 
 the petty squabbles with his mother, the envious scorn of 
 academic philosophy, the vain struggle for professional rec- 
 ognition, the long, lonely middle age filled with trivial 
 interests and deep-dyed with lonely cynicism — all this 
 belongs, in its details, to Uterary biography rather than to 
 metaphysical discussion. Yet the combined influences of dis- 
 position and environment are evident in the pessimism of his 
 system; and his cosmopolitan training — in particular, 
 his study of English — had a marked effect on the form of 
 his metaphysical works. The lucidity and brilKancy of Scho- 
 penhauer's style make it utterly unhke that of any other Ger- 
 man philosopher of the period. The reader is, indeed, almost 
 incHned to sympathize with Schopenhauer's fretful remark 
 that he failed of an academic hearing because the German 
 public did not beheve that sound metaphysics could be ex- 
 pressed in unambiguous terms. Oliver Herford's famous 
 rhyme is, therefore, singularly unjust to Schopenhauer. It 
 applies fairly well to other German philosophers, but the 
 metaphysically minded goose-girl could hardly have failed 
 to comprehend "What Schopenhauer's driving at." The 
 succeeding summary of Schopenhauer's teaching mainly 
 follows the order of "The World as Will and Idea," but 
 takes into account also the doctrine of the "Fourfold Root." 
 
 I. The Teaching of Schopenhauer 
 
 a. The world, of phenomena: 'the world as idea' 
 
 "The world," so Schopenhauer begins, "is my idea."* 
 In other words, like Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, Schopen- 
 hauer fully accepts the results of Berkeley's idealism, though, 
 
 ' "Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung." — "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstel- 
 lung," § I. (Cited, after this, by the title of the English translation, "The 
 World as Will and Idea.") Cf. "Fourfold Root," § 21. References in both 
 cases are ordinarily to sections and their paragraphs. The student may well 
 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 345 
 
 unlike them, he exphcitly credits Berkeley with the doctrine. 
 " One knows no sun," Schopenhauer continues, in the passage 
 just cited, "and no earth, but always only an eye which sees a 
 sun, a hand which feels the earth." In other words, "every 
 object is object only in relation to the subject":' so-called 
 external things are, after all, facts of consciousness. With 
 great skill, Schopenhauer next proceeds to analyze these 
 objects of knowledge. Such an object consists, he points out, 
 of sensations, ordered by underived and a priori forms of 
 thought. This, of course, is Kant's doctrine. But Schopen- 
 hauer maintains that these forms are not — as Kant had 
 taught — of four distinct sorts.^ Rather, there is but one 
 form, or principle of unity. This is the "principle of 
 sufficient reason"; it consists in the necessary relation of 
 every imaginable object or event to every other: every 
 object or event, in other words, determines and is also de- 
 termined by every other.' "By virtue of this relation," 
 Schopenhauer says, * "nothing can become object for us 
 which exists for itself and is independent, nothing which is 
 single and detached." 
 
 The relatedness of phenomena is thus, Schopenhauer 
 rightly teaches, the fundamental category. There are, how- 
 ever, several sorts of relatedness : time and space, causality, 
 and two other categories, which — as will immediately appear 
 — Schopenhauer incorrectly includes with these. His dis- 
 cussion of these forms of unity is brilliant and suggestive, 
 especially in its criticism of Kant, yet it is both inadequate 
 and positively defective. It makes only incidental reference 
 to the relations of comparison — identity, difference, and 
 
 read both works entire. He should not fail to read Bk. I., §§ 1-4; Bk. II., 
 §§ 17-23, 27, 29; Bk. IV., §§ 53-54, 56-58, 61, 66-68, 71, of "The World as 
 Will and Idea." 
 
 '"Fourfold Root," § 41. 
 
 ' Cf. Appendix, pp. 527, 554. 
 
 ' "The World as Will and Idea," § 2». 
 
 '"Fourfold Root," § 16'. 
 
346 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 the like; it denies the close likeness of time and causality, 
 it counts motivation as a distinct category, instead of describ- 
 ing it as causal connection of psychic facts ; it denies recipro- 
 cal relation, though definitely recognizing one form of it, 
 the spatial; finally, it includes among these categories the 
 causa cognoscendi, or ground of knowledge, a manifest confu- 
 sion of epistemology with metaphysics.' 
 
 But the object, constituted as it is by our sensations and 
 by our forms of thought, has empirical, but not ultimate, 
 reahty. Rather, as Kant had taught, it is mere appearance, 
 and absolute reality must be elsewhere sought. In the words 
 of Schopenhauer: "The whole objective world is and 
 remains idea ... in fact, a series of ideas whose common 
 bond is the law of sufiicient reason."^ And since ultimate 
 reality is not to be foimd in objects, clearly it must be sought 
 in the subject, or self. It is evident, as Kant had argued, 
 that the forms of knowing, ways of unifying, presuppose and 
 require the existence of a knowing subject, a permanent 
 reality underlying the succession of phenomena. Herein, 
 then, we are likely to find ultimate reality. But a di^iculty 
 at once presents itself. This subject, as knower, is not — 
 so, in common with Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, Schopenhauer 
 teaches — itself known. He defines it as "that which knows 
 all and is known of none," and says distinctly, "We never 
 know it, but it is precisely that which knows. ' ' ' This inability 
 to know the subject follows from the alleged impossibility that 
 the one knower should be both subject and object. " There is 
 no such thing, ' ' he says, " as a knowing of knowing ; for to that 
 end, it would be necessary that the subject should separate 
 itself from knowing, and yet at the same time should know 
 the knowing — which is impossible."* 
 
 ' On all these points, cf. Chapter 7, pp. 204 seq.; Chapter 10, pp. 369 
 seq.; and Appendix, p. 554. 
 
 '"The World as Will and Idea," § 5'; Translation, I., p. 18 (Werke, 
 
 11., p. 17)- 
 
 » Ibid., § 3*. *" Fourfold Root," Chapter 7, § 41'. 
 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 347 
 
 It would seem as if Schopenhauer were irrevocably com- 
 mitted by these words to the doctrine that self-consciousness 
 is impossible and that ultimate reality is, therefore, unap- 
 proachable. But Schopenhauer was a discriminating ob- 
 server of his own experience, and he entertained — along 
 with the reasoned conviction that the knower cannot, in 
 strict logic, be known — the immediate certainty that every 
 self knows itself. "We have," he says, "an inner knowledge 
 of self. But every case of knowledge, by its very nature, 
 presupposes a known and a knower. Hence that which is 
 known in us is, as such, not the knowing but the willing self." ' 
 In truth, Schopenhauer urges, this wilhng self always is the 
 object of our introspection. "The concept, will," he says, 
 "comes from the innermost part, from the most immediate 
 consciousness of every man. Herein a man knows and at 
 the same time is himself, his own individuahty . . . im- 
 mediately, without any form even that of subject, for here the 
 knower and the known merge into each other." ^ In this 
 known self, as will, it is at last, then, possible that we may 
 find ultimate reality. 
 
 h. The will as ultimate reality: 'the world as will" 
 
 Schopenhauer has up to this point argued that there exist 
 (i) external objects which are phenomena, that is, objects of 
 consciousness, and (2) an individual self which knows these 
 objects, and which also knows itself — but knows itself as will, 
 not as knower. He now advances to the Spinozistic position, 
 that the individual is but the manifestation, the partial expres- 
 sion, of an underlying One ; * and he interprets this one reality 
 
 ' " Fourfold Root," § 42. This summary of Schopenhauer's system here 
 follows the order, not of "The World as Will and Idea," but of the "Four- 
 fold Root." 
 
 ' "The World as Will and Idea," Translation, I., p. 145, § 22 (Werke, 
 n., 133). ' Ibid., Bk. II., § 17 seq. 
 
 * Unlike Fichte and Schelling, Schopenhauer is not well acquainted with 
 Spinoza's doctrine; and is out of sympathy with it, as he understands it. 
 
348 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 as will. "The thing-in-itself," he exclaims, "is the will."' 
 And the will, he teaches, is without ground and is "free from 
 plurahty, though its manifestations in space and time are 
 innumerable. " ^ " As a magic lantern shows many and mani- 
 fold pictures," Schopenhauer continues, "but there is only one 
 and the same flame which makes them all visible ; so, in all 
 the manifold phenomena which, side by side, fill the world, 
 or, one after another, as events, crowd each other off the 
 stage, the one will is that which manifests itself. Phenomena 
 and events are the visibleness and objectivity of the one 
 will which remains unmoved in the change: it alone is 
 thing-in-itself; every object is appearance." ^ 
 
 I. Schopenhauer's argument for the doctrine that ultimate 
 reality is of the nature of will 
 
 The argument by which Schopenhauer reaches this sig- 
 nificant result is curiously indirect. I come to the knowledge 
 of my willing self, he teaches, through consciousness of my 
 body. I am no ' winged cherub-face without a body ' ; * and, 
 indeed, each of my vohtions is accompanied by, and, in part, 
 consists, Schopenhauer says, of a movement of my body. 
 This invariable coincidence of volition and bodily movement 
 must indicate, he teaches, that my body is a manifestation of 
 will. But my body is not an isolated phenomenon. As 
 already shown, it is closely interrelated with other objects, 
 it is a part of a continuous organic process ; it is, indeed, more 
 or less closely related with every physical object. If, then, 
 my body is an expression of will, so also must all these re- 
 lated bodies be expressions of will. " The whole body, . . . 
 therefore also the process through and in which it consists 
 is nothing other than phenomenon of the will, the becoming 
 
 Schopenhauer's doctrine of the one, ultimate reality is none the less allied 
 to Spinoza's, and was doubtless indirectly affected by it. 
 
 ' " The Worid as Will and Idea," § 21, Translation, I., p. 142 (Werke, 
 II., p. 131). ^Ibid., § 23'. 
 
 ^Ibid., § 28'. ^Ibid., § 18, Translation, I., p. 129 (Werke, II., p. 118). 
 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 349 
 
 visible, the objectivity of the will." ' And yet these bodies 
 external to mine are surely not expressions of my individual 
 will : there must exist, then, the absolute will, manifesting 
 itself in all nature phenomena and in all finite selves. 
 
 The doctrine for which Schopenhauer presents the argu- 
 ment outhned in the preceding paragraph forms the basis of 
 his system, and the argument, therefore, demands careful 
 criticism. He has to prove (i) that every object is a mani- 
 festation of will, and (2) that the will expressed in external 
 phenomena is absolute. As has just been indicated, he leads 
 to the first of these conclusions by the following steps : (a) the 
 psychologically accurate recognition of the correspondence 
 between volition and bodily movement, and (6) the inference 
 that external objects, because closely related with my body, 
 must, like my body, themselves be forms of will. But (a) 
 the correspondence of voUtion and movement cannot prove 
 that movement is identical with volition. And, similarly, (6) 
 the interconnection of human body and external object can- 
 not demonstrate the identity of their nature : the argument 
 has, at best, but the force of an analogy. It is curious that 
 Schopenhauer should lay such stress on an argument so weak 
 throughout, for he has really no need of it. He has shown 
 that every object is a fact-for-self, an object within experi- 
 ence. If then, as he asserts on the ground of introspection, 
 the self is in its inmost nature will, it follows at once, with- 
 out intermediate proof, that all objects, inorganic and or- 
 ganic, are manifestations of will. 
 
 2. Schopenhauer'' s assumption that ultimate reality is a 
 single One 
 
 There remains the second teaching of Schopenhauer about 
 ultimate reality. He has argued that it is of the nature 
 of will : he has now to show that this will is one and uncon- 
 ditioned, in other words, that one absolute will, not count- 
 
 » " The World as Will and Idea," § 20', Translation, I., p. 140 (Werke, 
 II., p. 129). 
 
350 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 less coordinate wills, forms the reality behind phenomena. 
 But it is fair to say that he never definitely proves the 
 absoluteness of the will; he rather takes it for granted. 
 That it is, however, possible to prove the necessity of 
 a single all-including One, behind all the single in- 
 dividuals, Kant had suggested, Fichte and Schelling had 
 exphcitly taught, and Hegel was yet to demonstrate. But 
 though he did not prove it, Schopenhauer certainly believed 
 that a single, absolute will expresses itself in all phenomena. 
 "The force," he exclaims, "which vegetates in the plant, 
 even the force through which the crystal expands, the force 
 with which the magnet turns to the pole . . . yes, even grav- 
 ity which so powerfully strives in all matter, attracting the 
 stone to the earth and the earth to the sun — these all . . . 
 [are identical with that which] ... is called will. ... It is 
 the innermost nature, the kernel of every individual and of 
 the whole; it appears in every blindly working nature 
 force, it appears, also, in the reflective activity of man, for 
 the great diversity of these two is only in the degree of the 
 manifestation, not in the essential nature of that which 
 manifests itself."* 
 
 All these illustrations of nature forces as expressions of 
 the ultimate reahty must not obscure the fact that Scho- 
 penhauer conceives these forces as forms of conscious will 
 and that, contrariwise, he does not conceive the wUl after 
 Schelling's fashion, as a function of unconscious nature 
 force. "Before this," Schopenhauer says, "people have 
 subsumed the concept of will under the concept of force. I 
 do just the contrary, and would have every force in nature 
 thought as will. This is not to be regarded as an indifferent 
 strife of words: it is rather of the highest worth and signi- 
 ficance. For the concept 'force' is ... in the end based 
 upon and exhausted by the perceptual knowledge of the ob- 
 jective world, that is, by the phenomenal. The concept ' force ' 
 
 ' "The World as WiU and Idea," § 21. 
 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 351 
 
 is abstracted from the domain in which cause and effect rule, 
 and means precisely the causaUty of the cause at the point 
 where it is no longer astiologically explicable. . . . The con- 
 cept 'will' on the other hand, is the only one . . . whose 
 source is not in the phenomenal, in the purely perceptual, but 
 in . . . the most immediate consciousness of every man." * 
 It is true that in discussing detailed topics of his nature phi- 
 losophy, Schopenhauer appears, often, to lose sight of his 
 own warning and to conceive of conscious will as a function 
 of the 'bUnd, inexorable pressure {Hinder, unaufhaltsamer 
 Drang)' of unconscious nature.^ We have a right, however, 
 to hold him to his express assertion arid to state his doctrine 
 as the conception of an absolute, conscious will, manifested 
 in individual human wills and in external nature. 
 
 3. Schopenhauer's conception of the will as unsatisfied 
 desire: the ethics of Schopenhauer 
 
 Schopenhauer's statement that the self is essentially will 
 has, so far, been accepted without close analysis of the con- 
 ception involved. The time has come to inquire more pre- 
 cisely what he means by will. Fichte's doctrine of the vsdll 
 has especially concerned itself with the moral will ; Schopen- 
 hauer, closely following Schelling, interprets the will as an 
 inexplicable, inarticulate activity — a striving, a yearning. 
 Fichte has looked upon the progressive change of ideals, 
 the ceaseless adoption of a fresh end when a primary end has 
 been attained, as a mark of the alliance of the finite with the 
 infinite, an indication that the finite must ever burst the bonds 
 of finitude. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, lays stress 
 on the unattainableness of any completely satisfying aim, 
 and conceives the will as a striving for the unattainable. 
 "The striving," he says, "of all the manifestations of will 
 
 '"The World as Will and Idea," § 22, Translation, I., pp. 144-45; 
 Werke, I., p. 133. Cf. Werke, II., p. 362 and Translation II., p. 403. 
 
 * Ibid., § 54'. This is the conventional interpretation of Schopenhauer. 
 
352 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 . . . must ever be repressed, can never be filled or satisfied. 
 Every goal attained is merely the starting-point of a new race ; 
 and so on to infinity." ^ From the fact of this ceaselessly 
 unsatisfied activity in all the individual manifestations of 
 the infinite will, there follows the struggle which we see in 
 nature all about us. "Everywhere in nature we see com- 
 bat, struggle and varying fortune of war. . . . The uni- 
 versal struggle is most readily seen in the animal world which 
 lives on the vegetable world, and in which every animal be- 
 comes the prey of another. . . . Thus the will to live for- 
 ever devours itself." ^ 
 
 This one-sided conception of the will — interpreted always 
 in terms of the lowest, most primitive, activity of self-con- 
 sciousness — forms the basis of the two main applications 
 made by Schopenhauer of his metaphysical teaching: his 
 pessimism, and his practical ethical doctrine. The pessimism 
 is an obvious corollary of the metaphysics: granted that 
 ultimate reaUty is will, and that will is nothing more nor less 
 than unsatisfied desire, it follows, of necessity, that the world 
 is "the worst possible,"^ and that "all life is misery. . . . 
 The basis of all willing," Schopenhauer says, "is need, lack, 
 therefore pain. . . . Yet if one have no object of will, 
 one is assailed by frightful emptiness. . . . Life, therefore, 
 vibrates between pain and ennui. "^ Thus, philosophical 
 reasoning substantiates the results of empirical observation : 
 "Pleasure is always negative; only pain is immediately 
 given ;"^ and "the life of almost every man is simply a con- 
 stant struggle for fife, with a certainty of losing it in the end."° 
 
 On this pessimistic theory of the universe Schopenhauer 
 builds up his ethics — a system strangely opposed, on its 
 negative side, to the theories of Fichte and of Kant. In sharp 
 
 ' "The World as Wfll and Idea," § 29', Translation, I., p. 214 (Werke, 
 II., p. 19s'). 
 
 'Ibid., § 27, Translation, I., pp. 191-192 (Werke, II., pp. 174-175). 
 'Ibid., Bk. IV., § 56, end. * Ibid., § 57^. » Ibid., § s8». 
 
 'Ibid., § 57', Translation, I., p. 403 (Werke, II., p. 368). 
 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 353 
 
 contrast with their emphasis upon the fact of obligation, 
 Schopenhauer insists that there is no such thing as 'uncon- 
 ditioned obUgation.' To call the will free and none the less 
 to prescribe laws for it is pure contradiction, he asserts. 
 'Ought to will — wooden iron !' he exclaims, contemptuously.' 
 This part of the ethics of Schopenhauer need not, however, 
 detain us, for it is at once evident that his treatment of free- 
 dom and of obligation is too slight to be effective. Thus, 
 he does not attempt to account for the fact that though obliga- 
 tion be illusion, men none the less do sometimes feel that they 
 'ought,' nor does he analyze and discuss the important con- 
 ceptions of freedom.^ But the denial of freedom is merely 
 the introduction to the more important positive teaching of 
 Schopenhauer's ethics. This follows, as has been said, from 
 his pessimism, and comprises first, a doctrine of virtue as 
 self-renunciation and of sin as selfishness, and second, a 
 conception of man's highest aim as denial of the will to live, 
 (i) The world — so Schopenhauer, as we know, teaches 
 — is inevitably wretched. The source of the wretchedness 
 is this : that every individual realizes himself as one with the 
 Infinite, that each therefore asserts himself as 'centre of the 
 world,' and that thus each "wills everything for himself."' 
 Such self-assertion must become denial of the rights of others, 
 and so there results the struggle of humanity. The good 
 man is he who, rightly tracing the world's misery to its source, 
 no longer says, I partake of the Infinite and so all is mine, 
 but rather. These others also are expressions of the Infinite 
 and are thus of one nature with me. Thus, the good man 
 "makes a less than ordinary difference between himself and 
 others . . ., recognizes himself, his very self, his will, 
 in every being . . ., therefore also in him who suffers." * 
 
 ' " The World as Will and Idea," § f,i. Translation, I., p. 351 (Werke, 
 II., p. 321). 
 
 ' In particular, Schopenhauer does not discuss the view that freedom is 
 expression of an individual as opposed, not to the Infinite, but to other human 
 selves. ' Ihid,., § 61'. 
 
 * Ibid., § 66, Translation, I., pp. 480, 482 (Werke, II., pp. 439, 441). 
 2A 
 
354 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 The good man realizes that the happiness or the life of a 
 multitude of human beings overweighs his own individual 
 interest. And he will therefore "sacrifice his own well- 
 being and his life for the good of . . . others. So died 
 Codrus," Schopenhauer exclaims, " so died Leonidas, Regulus, 
 Decius Mus, Arnold von Winkelried — so dies every man 
 who freely and consciously goes to certain death for his friends 
 and for his fatherland." ' 
 
 In its highest form, self-abnegation becomes pure denial 
 of the will to live, the renunciation of one's individuaUty 
 as a thing of unreality. Schopenhauer's words are the best 
 exposition of this culminating doctrine: "As we saw that 
 hate and evil are conditioned by egoism, and that this rests 
 on the capture of knowledge by the principle of individuation, 
 so we discovered as the source and the essence of righteous- 
 ness . . . that penetration of this principle of individuation 
 which annihilates the difference between myself and the for- 
 eign self. ... If now this penetration of the individuality, 
 this immediate knowledge of the identity of will in all its 
 manifestations, is present to a high degree of definiteness, it 
 will . . . show a still wider influence on the will. If ... a 
 man no longer makes the egoistic distinction between his own 
 person and that of another . . . then he knows the whole, 
 comprehends its essential nature, and finds it to consist in 
 constant passing away (Vergehen), in futile striving, in inner 
 contradiction, and in persisting sorrow ; he sees, wherever he 
 looks, suffering humanity, the suffering animal creation, a 
 vanishing world. But all this is as close to him as only his 
 own person is close to the egoist. How should he, then, with 
 such a knowledge of the world affirm such a life as this by 
 repeated acts of will? . . . Rather, this knowledge of the 
 whole, of the essence of reality, becomes the quietus of each 
 and every act of will. The will turns from life. . . . The 
 man attains a condition of freely willed renunciation, of 
 
 » " The World as Will and Idea," § 67'. 
 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 355 
 
 resignation, of true indifference, of entire will-less-ness." ' 
 Asceticism and poverty are the outward marks of this anni- 
 hilation of the will ; the absorption of Christian mystics and 
 of Oriental religionists are its extreme forms; inner peace 
 and true heaven's rest are its accompaniments. In such a 
 state, "there is manifested to us, in place of the constant change 
 from wish to fear and from joy to sorrow, in place of never 
 satisfied and never dying hope, . . . that peace which is 
 higher than all reason — that perfect ocean stillness of the 
 mind. . . . Knowledge alone is left," Schopenhauer con- 
 cludes, "will is vanished. . . . For all those who are still 
 pervaded by will, what remains," he admits in the final 
 sentence of the book, "is Nothing. But ... for those in 
 whom the will has turned upon and negated itself, to them 
 this very real world of ours, with all its suns and milky ways 
 ^is Nothing." 
 
 II. Estimate of Schopenhauer's Teaching 
 
 The preceding summary has briefly outlined Schopen- 
 hauer's metaphysical system and its most important applica- 
 tions, omitting only his curiously parenthetical discussion of 
 aesthetics. This discussion, in itself of the greatest merit, 
 cannot make good its claim to an inherent connection with 
 Schopenhauer's strictly philosophical doctrine.^ The most 
 important difficulties of the system must next be enumerated. 
 They fall into two main groups. 
 
 a. The inadequacy of Schopenhauer's conception 0} the will 
 
 In the first place, as has been suggested, Schopenhauer 
 misconceives the nature of the will. The dissatisfied yearn- 
 ing, unattained striving, to which he constantly gives the name 
 ' will,' is mere wish or desire, not active, self-assertive will. 
 
 ' "The World as Will and Idea," § 68, paragraphs 2-3, Translation, I., 
 pp. 488 seq.; Werke, I., 447 seq. ' Cf. Appendix, p. 554. 
 
356 The Advance toward Monistic Spirittiahsm 
 
 This follows from the testimony of self-consciousness, whose 
 authority Schopenhauer must admit, since upon it he 
 rests his doctrine that ultimate reality is identical with will. 
 "To the reaJity-in-itself," he says, "[underlying] the 
 world of idea, we can attain only by . . . taking into 
 account self-consciousness {mitteUt Hinzuziehung des Selbst- 
 hewusstseins), which testifies to the will as the in-itself of 
 our idea (Erscheinung)." ' But the will to which self-con- 
 sciousness testifies certainly is not identical with bHnd yearn- 
 ing. At most, it only includes this unsatisfied desire as one 
 of its elements ; its essential character is rather the affirming, 
 espousing, domineering assertion of itself. Schopenhauer 
 tacitly admits this in the teaclaing that the highest act of con- 
 sciousness is 'freely willed renunciation (freiwillige Ent- 
 sagung).'' It is true, he calls this freely willed renunciation 
 'will-less-ness' ; but in so doing he obviously implies what 
 he verbally denies. For that which is freely renounced is 
 desire, or yearning, not will ; and the renunciation is the as- 
 sertion of a self deeper than all objects of desire — is, in other 
 words, what Schopenhauer virtually calls it, free will. There 
 is, furthermore, another reason for rejecting Schopenhauer's 
 conception of will, as an account of ultimate reality. Even 
 granting (what has just been shown to be contrary to experi- 
 ence) that the individual will consists of unsatisfied yearning, 
 it is certain that no absolute reaHty can thus be defined. For 
 the Absolute is precisely the complete, the all-including; 
 it cannot then be, in its essence, unfulfilled desire. 
 
 The rejection of Schopenhauer's conception of the wiU 
 overthrows those parts of his system which are built upon it. 
 The first of these is the pessimistic estimate, already sum- 
 marized, of the universe. This is the part of his teaching 
 by which he is best known; but the common estimate of 
 him as mere prophet of pessimism is both unfortunate and 
 
 ' " Critique of the Kantian Philosophy," Translation, II., p. 31 (Werke, 
 II., p. S17). 
 
 ' For the context, cf. supra, p. 354. 
 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 357 
 
 unjust. Brilliant and appealing as his pessimism is, it is after 
 all only an offshoot from his metaphysical doctrine, and is 
 not to be compared, in strength of argument or in keenness 
 of analysis, with the idealistic philosophy on which it is based. 
 Its immediate foundation is, as has been shown, the convic- 
 tion that ultimate reality is ceaseless yearning. From this 
 premise it would certainly follow that all Ufe must be misery. 
 But with the refutation of this doctrine — that absolute 
 reality, or will, is unfulfilled desire — the necessity of uni- 
 versal wretchedness falls away. The actual, empirically 
 observed existence of wretchedness and sorrow is, of course, 
 still to be reckoned with ; and the abiding value of Schopen- 
 hauer's pessimism is the relentlessness with which he insists 
 upon the grim facts of misery and anguish. In these unques- 
 tioned facts, and not in any metaphysical necessity of unhap- 
 piness, the problem of pessimism is to be found. It is 
 Schopenhauer's merit to have forced it upon the attention of 
 idealistic philosophers. 
 
 With the doctrine of the necessity of misery vanishes, also, 
 Schopenhauer's positive ethical theory. For that consists, 
 as has been shown, in the teaching that city is the only duty. 
 With the certainty that the human being is more than a long 
 drawn out desire, comes the need of a wider formulation of 
 one's duty toward him. The groundwork of a doctrine of 
 sin and of virtue has, however, been laid by Schopenhauer, 
 in spite of the defects of his moral system. His diagnosis of 
 sin as narrow and self-centred individualism, his descrip- 
 tion of virtue as the progressive reaHzation of one's unity 
 with the lives of other human beings, form the core of an 
 ideahstic doctrine of the content of the moral consciousness. 
 
 It should be added that the persisting part of Schopen- 
 hauer's doctrine is, to all appearance, its pessimism. In the 
 hands of one of his disciples, von Hartmann, Schopenhauer's 
 teaching of the unappeasable nature-will becomes, indeed, a 
 non-idealistic doctrine,^ and another adherent, Nietsche, 
 
 » Cf. Appendix, p. 557. 
 
358 The Advance toward Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 builds on a pessimism like Schopenhauer's an ethical sys- 
 tem utterly opposed to his — a theory which condemns pity 
 and enjoins egoism/ 
 
 h. The inadequacy of Schopenhauer's conception of the ulti- 
 mate reality as pure will 
 
 A second fundamental objection must now be made to 
 Schopenhauer's metaphysical teaching : not only is his con- 
 ception of will at fault, but his doctrine that one is conscious 
 of oneself as wilhng only, not as knowing, is untrue to intro- 
 spection. That self whom we intimately know is indeed will, 
 but is more than will. The support of this assertion is that 
 appeal on which, as has appeared, Schopenhauer himself 
 bases all his teaching, to the self-consciousness of the indi- 
 vidual. Surely each one of us is conscious of himself, not 
 only in his active attitudes of asserting his own individuality 
 in opposition to other selves or things, or in actively identi- 
 fying himself with the interests of others, or even in impotently 
 yearning and desiring: one is conscious of oneself, also, as 
 thinking and perceiving. The thought and the perception, 
 it is true, ally the one individual with others, but they are none 
 the less integral parts of one's single, individual self. 
 
 The only objection urged by Schopenhauer to this simple 
 deliverance of self-consciousness is the logical contradiction 
 which is, supposedly, involved in the doctrine that a self 
 knows itself.^ This is identified with the doctrine that the 
 subject and the object of knowledge are one — a state- 
 ment which is then branded as a sheer contradiction. To 
 this it may be replied that the very definition of knowledge, 
 as relation of a subject to an object, is an attempt to describe 
 the immediately certain consciousness of self. No argument 
 drawn from the nature of this description can possibly, there- 
 fore, impugn the reahty of the experience which the descrip- 
 tion is to render into words. Moreover, the antithesis between 
 
 ' Cf. Appendix, p. 555, note. 
 
 ' Cf. supra, Chapter 7, pp. 244' seq. ; and this chapter, p. 346. 
 
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer 359 
 
 subject and object (the root of the difficulty in conceiving 
 of the self as knower of the knower) is plainly due to the fact 
 that this definition of knowledge has reference primarily to 
 knowledge of external things, not to knowledge of the self. 
 In being conscious of a phenomenal fact, the subject (or 
 knowing self) certainly does know an object different from 
 a self. This, however, does not argue against the exist- 
 ence of another sort of knowledge, in which there is no 
 recognition either of subject or of object — in which, rather, 
 subject and object coalesce in the experience of my conscious- 
 ness of myself, as knowing and thinking, feeling and willing.* 
 
 To sum up the important points in this estimate of Scho- 
 penhauer : he rightly teaches that ultimate reahty is an ab- 
 solute self, though he does not offer the demonstration ready 
 to his hand, of the absoluteness of this self. He unduly 
 limits this absolute self by affirming that its nature is will 
 without knowledge; and he virtually annihilates the ab- 
 soluteness of the ultimate will by the reiterated teaching that 
 will is mere unattaining struggle. None the less, he distinctly 
 conceives of ultimate reality as absolute person. His doc- 
 trine may therefore be classed as complete, though not as 
 wholly adequate, monistic ideaHsm. At all events, in its 
 essential features, it is close to Hegel's philosophy, though so 
 utterly unHke it in form. Schopenhauer, it must be admitted, 
 would most indignantly have repelled this aspersion, for 
 Hegel's system seemed to him, as to so many others, a mere 
 broth of unintelligible and pretentious terms. Yet the dis- 
 tance from Schopenhauer to Hegel is short and easily bridged. 
 
 ' The doctrine, that the self is fundamentally will, did not die with Fichte 
 and Schopenhauer, but has been more than once revived. A briUiant modem 
 form of the doctrine is held by Professor Miinsterberg. In the opinion of the 
 present writer, Miinsterberg really inflates the conception of will beyond its 
 natural extent, making it virtually synonymous with self, and thus inclusive 
 of perception and thought. A similar comment may be made on modem 
 doctrines of 'voluntarism' in psychology. All these doctrines are based 
 upon the true insight that the will is principle of individuality, uniqueness. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 MONISTIC SPIRITUALISM: THE SYSTEM OF HEGEL 
 
 "... The greatest master of abstract thought that the world has 
 seen since . . . Aristotle died. . No one else has -so much to tell 
 
 the searcher after truth who will make the effort to grasp what he has to 
 say." — R. B. Haldane. 
 
 The writings of Georg WiUielm Friedrich Hegel are 
 curiously parallel, in their unhurried reasoning to great con- 
 clusions, to his own slow progress from obscurity to brill- 
 iant success ; and in their curious union of rationaUsm with 
 mystical insight, to the union, in his o-mi character, of pru- 
 dence with good fellowship. His teaching closely connects 
 itself with that of his contemporaries. With Fichte and 
 Schelling he has much in common — with the former, in 
 particular, his 'dialectic method,' and with the second his 
 Spinozistic monism. The difference between Hegel's system 
 and these others is, however, more significant than the Hkeness. 
 Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer all deny the existence 
 of any reahty save that of self, yet each falls short of the 
 completely monistic and adequate conception of absolute 
 self. Fichte and Schelling assert that the self-conscious 
 being is of necessity Umited, and that the Absolute because 
 imlimited may not be self or spirit ; Schopenhauer admits 
 the self-consciousness of the ultimate reality, but does not 
 adequately conceive this consciousness. The character- 
 istic which distinguishes Hegel from preceding idealists is 
 the uncompromising doctrine that there exists an absolute 
 self, and that every finite reality is an expression of this all- 
 comprehending self. The first section of this chapter is 
 occupied with the attempt to state very clearly the argument 
 by which Hegel seeks to prove the existence of this inclusive 
 
 360 
 
The System of Hegel 361 
 
 self. The clearest and fullest formulation of this argument 
 is found in the most severely reasoned of Hegel's metaphysical 
 works, the "Logik" (1812-1816), and in the first part of the 
 greatly abbreviated restatement of his philosophy which 
 Hegel called the "Encyclopadie." On the larger "Logic," 
 therefore, and on the "Logic of the Encyclopasdia," this 
 chapter is based. The less adequate and less well-propor- 
 tioned argument of the first part of Hegel's earliest book, the 
 " Phanomenologie,"has been mainly disregarded ; and Hegel's 
 other works are referred to chiefly as applications of the doc- 
 trine of the "Logic," and only occasionally for support of 
 its arguments. Hegel's arbitrary use of current philosophical 
 terms, his high-handed appropriation of common words, by 
 a change of their ordinary meaning, to philosophical purposes ; 
 his inordinate love of paradoxical statements, and his over- 
 regard for systematic arrangement and for repeated formulae 
 make his " Logics " harder reading (if that is possible) than 
 Kant's "Kritik" itself. But, however obscured by schematic 
 arrangements or encrusted in words, Hegel's essential argu- 
 ment, expressed and impHed, for monistic spiritualism is 
 profoundly significant and — in the opinion of the writer of 
 this book — convincing.^ 
 
 ' In substance, the remainder of this chapter closely resembles a paper 
 by the writer, on "The Order of the HegeUan Categories in the Hegelian 
 Argument," pubhshed in Mind, XII., N.S., 1903. Certain paragraphs 
 and sentences, p. 384, are, in fact, exact quotations. I have, how- 
 ever, changed my account of the categories of Life and Cognition, largely 
 because of the criticism of my colleague, Professor Mary S. Case; and the 
 chapter is throughout less polemical and less technical than the paper in 
 Mind. It should be added that in both expositions I diverge widely 
 from Hegel's own order of thought. In so doing I doubtless often obscure 
 or even reverse Hegel's characteristic method. I beheve that these hberties 
 with Hegel's text are desirable, in the interest of clearness, for a prehminary 
 outline of his doctrine. But certainly this departure from Hegel's method 
 makes it impossible for the student to regard this chapter as a sub- 
 stitute for the text; especially since the "Logic" undertakes to discuss many 
 subjects which are not here considered. The beginner in philosophy is 
 warned, however, that Hegel's "Logic" and "Phenomenology" demand, 
 if ever works demanded, to be read with a teacher. 
 
362 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 This argument has two main parts, one negative and the 
 other positive. In the first place, Hegel refutes those theories, 
 Kant's and Schelling's, vs^hich would make the search for 
 ultimate reahty futile. In the second place, he argues for his 
 positive conception of the all-of-reality as absolute spirit 
 or self. The outline of his argument will be more readily fol- 
 lowed, if it is preceded by a brief summary of its important 
 steps. This summary will serve, also, by its references to 
 Hegel's text, to indicate his curious fashion of repeating an 
 argvmient already set forth. 
 
 I. (Introduction.) Metaphysics is possible, for 
 
 c. Ultimate Reality is not undetermined. (Bk. L, 
 
 " Being and Naught.") 
 h. Ultimate Reality is not unknowable. (Bk. II., 
 
 "Essence and Appearance," and parallel 
 
 categories.) 
 
 II. Ultimate Reality is Absolute One, for 
 
 a. Ultimate Reality is not a limited, single reality; 
 for every such single reality is 
 (i) (a) Same and other. (Bk. I., "Determined 
 Being;" Bk. II., "Identity and Differ- 
 ence.") 
 (5) Like and unlike. (Bk. II., "Likeness 
 and Unlikeness;" Bk. III., "Notion and 
 Judgment.") 
 (2) Dependent on others. (Bk. II., 
 
 "Causality.") 
 h. Ultimate Reality is not a composite of ultimate 
 parts. (Bk. II., " Finitude and Infinity " 
 and "Being-for-self;" Bk. II., "Action 
 and Reaction;" Bk. III., "Mechanism.") 
 III. Ultimate Reality is Absolute Spirit, for 
 
 a. Ultimate Reality is not mere Life. (Bk. III., 
 
 "Life.") 
 h. Ultimate Reality is not " Finite Consciousness." 
 (Bk. III., "Cognition.") 
 
The System of Hegel 363 
 
 This Hegelian argument must now be considered step bj 
 step.* 
 
 I. Ultimate Reality is neither Undetermined nor 
 Unknowable 
 
 Two forms of the doctrine which makes metaphysics im- 
 possible were well known to Hegel. According to the first 
 of these, reaUty in its 'realest,' its most ultimate, form must 
 be undetermined; that is to say, no predicate may be 
 apphed to it. A partial reality has attributes : it may be 
 round or square, blue or red, soft or hard, pleasant or un- 
 pleasant, famiUar or unfamiliar, psychical or physical. But 
 ultimate reaUty has no one of these predicates, nor indeed, 
 according to this view, any other predicate. For ultimate 
 reality, it is urged, is the all-of-reality, in other words, un- 
 limited reality ; and every predicate applied to reahty must 
 limit it. For example, if a thing is visible, it cannot be in- 
 visible ; if it is square, it cannot be round : in other words 
 every predicate, which anything has, prevents its having the 
 opposite predicate. Evidently, then, since ultimate reahty 
 is — it is held — unhmited, it must be without predicates 
 (determinations); it must be what Schelling called it, an 
 'indifference,' or, as Hegel names it, 'pure being,' not a 
 being of any particular definable sort or kind. And, as such, 
 it is obviously unknowable, since as known it would not be 
 utterly unhmited, but would be limited at least by that one 
 predicate or determination, 'knoAvn.' 
 
 Against the doctrine, just summarized, that ultimate reahty 
 is absolutely undetermined, Hegel offers the following argu- 
 ment: Such 'pure,' that is, entirely undetermined, being is 
 not reality at all: it is nothing. "There is nothing per- 
 ceivable in it ... ; there is nothing thinkable in it. Being, 
 undetermined, unmediated Being, is in fact Nothing, and is" 
 
 ' The headings of this chapter are, in essentials, those of the summary, 
 though not all of the latter are repeated. 
 
364 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 neither more nor less than Nothing." ' This doctrine, that 
 being is as good as nothing, is likely to strike the uncritical 
 reader as inherently absurd. Hegel indeed reaUzes that this 
 is the fate of this teaching. "Being and Non-being the 
 same!" he imagines his reader to exclaim. "Then it is 
 all the same whether I exist or do not exist, whether this 
 house exists or does not exist, whether these hundred dollars 
 are or are not in my possession." ^ But such objections 
 overlook the fact that it is only undetermined, or pure, being 
 which Hegel asserts to be mere nothing. A house, a dollar, 
 a human being — each of these is a determined being, and 
 is distinguished from 'nothing' by the possession of innumer- 
 able positive characters; but pure being is, by hypothesis, 
 without characters : it is in no place, for place would limit 
 it; it is at no time, for a temporal position would be a de- 
 termination; it is neither inorganic nor organic, conscious 
 nor unconscious, matter nor spirit — it is nothing ! ^ But 
 such a conception of ultimate reaUty it is impossible to hold. 
 Whatever it is, it is somewhat, not nothing. For, at the very 
 least, ultimate reality includes, or is identical with, my present 
 moment's thought about it ; and a fact of consciousness — 
 even the fact of saying to oneself "ultimate reality is pure 
 being" — is a determined reahty, since it has at least the 
 attribute of consciousness. In other words, ultimate reality 
 certainly has this attribute : it may be thought about or 
 guessed at ; and the possession of even a single attribute turns 
 
 ' Werke, III., p. 73' ; Stirling, p. 320'. (References to the larger "Logik" 
 are made to the later edition of Hegel's Works, cited as Werke, III., 
 IV., and V. Quotations from Bk. I. (Seyn) are often also referred to 
 James Hutchinson Stirling's translation, contained in his "Secret of Hegel," 
 Vol. I., first edition, 1865.) The names of categories are capitalized in the 
 quotations from Hegel and in the footnotes. 
 
 » Werke, III., p. 77'; Stirling, p. 325^. Cf. " Encycloptedia," | 88('). (Ref- 
 erences to the "Encyclopsedia," are uniformly to the sections of the "En- 
 cyclopaedia," third edition, contained in Werke, Vol. 6; and translated by 
 William Wallace.) 
 
 ' Cf. Berkeley's parallel argument against one conception of matter, 
 supra, pp. 131 jej. 
 
The System of Hegel 365 
 
 ultimate reality into determined being.' Thus, to recapitu- 
 late : Pure, or undetermined being, would be nothing. But 
 the ultimate reahty has, at least, the attribute of being thought 
 about. Therefore ultimate reality is determined ; and meta- 
 physics is justified in its avowed aim, the discovery of the 
 nature of ultimate reahty.^ 
 
 Hegel has thus disposed of one of the theories which would 
 make impossible a true metaphysics — an honest effort to 
 get at the nature of ultimate reaUty. If ultimate reahty were 
 without characters, it would be useless to seek to know it ; 
 but since it is somehow determined, one need not, at the out- 
 set, despair of apprehending it. At this point, however, an- 
 other objection, or another form of the same objection, may 
 be made. Granting that ultimate reahty has positive char- 
 acters, must it not be utterly independent of the objects 
 of human knowledge, entirely cut off from the facts of our 
 experience? Our objects of knowledge are fettered by the 
 forms and the Hmitations of human consciousness: they 
 exist, as Kant has shown, under the subjective forms of space 
 and time, of causahty and the other relations. Must we not 
 suppose that ultimate reahty has characters of its own, that 
 it is free at least from the determinations of our conscious- 
 ness? This is, in truth, the supposition of Kant and of 
 all others who teach the existence of the thing-in-itself, 
 the reality independent of consciousness and of objects of 
 
 'Werke, III., p. 97'; Stirling, p. 348^. "Being . . . belongs to a sub- 
 ject, is expressed [therefore, thought about], has an empirical existence and 
 therefore stands on the plane of the limited. . . . Whatever the expression or 
 periphrases which Understanding employs in opposing the identity of Being 
 and Nothing, it finds in this very experience nothing except determined being." 
 
 'This summary of Bk. I., Section (Abschnitt) I., Chapter i of the 
 larger "Logic," and of §§ 86-8g of the "Logic of the Encyclopaedia," 
 neglects not merely Hegel's historical digressions, but a psychological di- 
 gression as well, on which he lays stress. This is his obscure teaching that 
 Pure Being and Nothing alike are found to be mere Becoming (Werden). 
 By this doctrine, Hegel seems to mean no more than the following: Pure 
 Being and Nothing are found each to be an unsatisfactory expression for 
 ultimate reality, and therefore when reflected on they are replaced by (that 
 is, they 'become') more adequate conceptions of reality. Cf. Appendix, 549. 
 
366 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 consciousness. In particular, this doctrine is espoused by 
 many philosophically inclined scientists and by philosophers 
 who come to metaphysics through natural science. Known 
 reality, they teach, is mere phenomenon or appearance. 
 But back of the appearance there must be a real essence; 
 behind the phenomenal manifestation, there must be an 
 ultimate force; beneath the outer phenomenon must be 
 the inner reahty; and essence, force, inner reality, are 
 not to be known by us, since what we know is always the 
 spatially, temporally, causally limited phenomenon or ap- 
 pearance. 
 
 Against the existence of such independent reahty Hegel 
 urges two considerations. The first of these is found in 
 many sections of Book II. of the "Logic," ^ and in the third 
 chapter, "Kraft und Verstand," of the " Phanomenologie." ' 
 It consists in the proof that Kant and all other philosophers, 
 known to Hegel, who hold to the doctrine of an unknowable 
 reahty independent of objects of consciousness, really 
 teach that this reahty is in relation with facts of human 
 experience. Ka,nt, for example, regards things-in-them- 
 selves as source of sensations, and as plural (things-in- 
 themselves), that is, as thought under the forms of causality 
 and of multiplicity. Still more palpably, those who teach 
 that an unknown force is the reality behind phenomena 
 of magnetism or of growth assume the existence of the 
 force, merely as explanation of the observed phenomena. 
 "We see an electrical phenomenon," Hegel says, "and we ask 
 for its ground . . . : we are told that electricity is the ground 
 of this phenomenon. What is this but the same content 
 which we had immediately before us, only translated into the 
 form of inwardness ? " ' Hegel means that the only argument 
 
 ' It should be stated expressly that the interpretation given by the writer 
 to this part of Bk. II. requires a very wide departure from the actual order of 
 the "Logic." It is for this reason suggested with less confidence than the 
 remainder of this exposition. For justification cf. Mini, loc. cit., N.S., XII,, 
 p. 317 seq.; and Appendix, p. 551. ^ Werke, II., p. 97. 
 
 ' "Encyclopasdia," § 121. Cf. Werke, IV., p. 92'. 
 
The System of Hegel 367 
 
 for the existence of a 'force' is the fact that it is needed to 
 explain such and such phenomena. And attempts, old and 
 new, to define force bear out this contention. Nobody 
 knows what electricity, or mechanical force, or chemical 
 affinity is} Each is regarded as the hypothesized, but 
 unobserved, cause of a certain set of phenomena, objects of 
 our consciousness. Such a force, it is evident, offers no defi- 
 nite explanation of any particular phenomenon ; it is, indeed, 
 as Hegel says, a mere tautology.^ And to claim that force, 
 thus conceived, is independent of phenomena and more real 
 than they, is absurd. For the force can be shown to exist 
 only if the phenomena are knovm to exist, since the argument 
 for its existence is simply this : these actual phenomena must 
 have some ground. Whether conceived as thing-in-itself or 
 as force behind phenomena, the alleged independent reality 
 in truth turns out not to be independent of the fact of ex- 
 perience but to be closely linked with it, related to it. There 
 is, then, no reason to hold that ultimate reahty is outside the 
 pale of possible objects of our knowledge. 
 
 The argument just outlined is based, it will be observed, 
 on Hegel's examination of actual doctrines of ultimate reality 
 independent of consciousness. His procedure amounts to 
 the proof that the advocates of this doctrine have always, as a 
 matter of fact, treated their alleged unrelated reaUty as none 
 the less in relation with the world of experience. But the 
 failure of all historical attempts (since, as well as before, 
 Hegel's time) to hold to a reality independent of experience 
 is not in itself a disproof of the existence of such a reality. 
 Such a disproof is, however, furnished by Hegel's positive 
 doctrine and this must now be discussed. 
 
 A preliminary observation on Hegel's method is, however, 
 important. His constant effort is to show that erroneous 
 conceptions are self-contradictory. The complete analysis 
 
 ' Cf . Benno Erdmann, " The Content and Validity of the Causal Law," 
 Philosophical Review, 1905, Vol. XIV., p. 163. 
 ^ "Encyclopaedia," § 136'. 
 
368 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 of a wrong doctrine serves, he believes, as a refutation which 
 is really a reinterpretation of it. Such an analysis, he points 
 out, begins by substituting for the conception with which one 
 has started the opposite of it, but ends by showing that the 
 truth hes, not in either conception, as opposed to the other, 
 but in a third conception which unites, on a higher plane, the 
 essential features of the initial conception and its opposite. 
 The movement of thought, just described, is known by Hegel 
 as the ' dialectic,' and its three terms are, taken together, named 
 a ' triad.' Thus, we have seen that Pure Being is Nothing, but 
 that both Pure Being and Nothing, because thought about, are 
 found to be really Determined Being. In triad ' form we have, 
 therefore : — 
 
 Pure Being Nothing 
 
 Determined Being. 
 
 Similarly, either Essence or Appearance (in other terms. Force 
 or Manifestation) is believed by Hegel to be an inadequate 
 description of ultimate reahty. For the force, as has been 
 shown, requires its manifestation (because it was hypothe- 
 sized merely to explain the manifestation), and yet the mani- 
 festation, because it is a limited event, demands the existence 
 of a more inclusive reahty. So we have the triad : ' — 
 Force Manifestation 
 
 Actuality (i.e. force in its manifestation). 
 
 Hegel's use of the triad form is not always consistent with 
 itself, and it is often arbitrary and unessential; but funda- 
 mental to the triad method is the truth that the complete 
 criticism of a conception involves an analysis of it, so that one 
 can effectively dispose of a doctrine only by making it refute 
 itself. This principle is sound and helpful; and Hegel's 
 constant use of it is the chief advantage of his method. 
 
 ' Neither of these triads is given by Hegel in precisely this form. 
 
The System of Hegel 369 
 
 Hegel ctarts from the conclusion, just argued, that ultimate 
 reahty is determined, in other words, that it has positive 
 characteristics. In his opinion, these reduce fundamentally 
 to two: ultimate reality is (i) an absolute One, and is (2) 
 spirit. Hegel undertakes to prove both points by the dia- 
 lectic method just described. Assuming the conclusion 
 opposite to that which he holds, he tries to show that it is 
 self-contradictory, and thus that it implies the truth of that 
 which it seems to deny. The following summary of his 
 argument tries to make this clear. 
 
 II. Ultimate Reality is Absolute One 
 
 This doctrine of the absolute and individual unity of 
 leality, receives, for a reason which will later be indicated, 
 far more emphasis than the equally significant teaching that 
 ultimate reality is spirit. It occupies, in fact, all the first 
 two books of the "Logic," except those parts of them already 
 considered, and two divisions of the third book. It has two 
 parts : first, the demonstration that the ultimately real is no 
 single, isolated reahty, one among others, even if preeminent 
 among them; and, second, the proof that the determined, 
 yet ultimate, reahty is not a composite of unrelated single 
 realities. 
 
 a. Ultimate reality is not a single, limited reality 
 
 (i) Every limited reality is at least 'same' {and perhaps 
 'like'), and thus implies other realities 
 
 The hypothesis which Hegel here opposes is the ordinary 
 conception of the nature of philosophy. According to that 
 view, an ultimate or irreducible reality may be very limited ; 
 hence, because philosophy is the study of ultimate reality, 
 any irreducible reality, however limited, is object of philos- 
 ophy. To this conception Hegel opposes the doctrine that 
 
370 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 no strictly limited or isolated reality is irreducible. He does 
 not, however, start out, after the fashion of this paragraph, 
 by a preliminary denial of the doctrine. Here, as elsewhere, 
 be begins by assuming the truth of the doctrine which he op- 
 poses, and by making it disclose its own contradictions and 
 show the insufficiency of its claim to be a final reality. He 
 supposes, therefore, that ultimate reahty is some one reality, 
 among others ; and he asks, what necessary attributes has it ? 
 Evidently, he replies, whatever its positive nature, it is at 
 the very least identical with itself. The assertion is incon- 
 trovertible. A more obvious and certain attribute of any 
 and every reahty cannot be imagined. Whether psychical 
 or physical, permanent or momentary, great or small, every 
 reality must be identical with itself: for example, round is 
 round ; good is good ; matter is matter ; I am I.' 
 
 This self-identity directly and necessarily involves another 
 characteristic. A given reahty, in being the same with itself, 
 is other-than-other-reahties. In being round, round is not- 
 square; in being good, good is not-bad; in being matter, 
 matter is not-spirit; in being myself, I am not some one 
 else. The otherness is, thus, on a par with the self-sameness. 
 The two are correlated aspects of any limited reality, and 
 both seem at first sight to demonstrate its isolation. 
 
 But Hegel goes on to show that both self-sufficiency and 
 distinctness testify to a relation between the supposedly iso- 
 lated reahty and other reahties — a relation so close that the 
 one cannot be thought without the others. To be distinct 
 from others means that there are others from which one is 
 distinguished; and to be identical with oneself imphes, as 
 certainly though less directly, an opposition to others. More 
 than this: the 'same' actually is the 'not-other'; that is to 
 say, relation to others is not a mere external and unessential 
 appendage, but is itself an intimate part, a necessary attri- 
 bute, of every Kmited reality. Roundness actually is not- 
 
 ' In Bk. I., Identity and Otherness are known under the names, Reality 
 (and Somewhat) and Negation, 
 
The System of Hegel 371 
 
 squareness; that is to say, the full conception of a circle 
 includes the characteristic of differing from the rectangle. 
 And similarly the full consciousness of myself includes, and 
 not merely is accompanied by, the consciousness of my dis- 
 tinctness from other selves. Thus the most intimate and 
 apparently isolating attribute of a limited reaUty — its self- 
 identity — imphes the existence of other realities. It follows 
 that this supposedly ultimate hmited reality cannot be essen- 
 tially realer than others, since the very conception of it re- 
 quires the conception of these other reahties, in terms of 
 which it must be defined. In Hegel's ovm words: "The 
 otherness is . . . within it as its own element (Mowew/)." ' 
 Both elemental and complex reahties are self-identical, so 
 that the argument just outUned applies to either. But 
 almost every theory of ultimate reality conceives of it as 
 complex, that is, as consisting of more than one quaUty; 
 and every hmited yet complex reahty has other characters, 
 besides its self-identity and its otherness, which prevent its 
 being ultimate. Among these attributes are its 'hkeness' 
 and its 'unlikeness.'^ Every complex is Mke andunhke (as 
 well as 'same' and 'other'), because it has quaUties; and a 
 quahty can be described only as the way in which one thing 
 resembles one set of things and differs from another set.' 
 Redness is the way in which tomatoes are Hke strawberries 
 and imhke russet apples ; smoothness is the way in which 
 tomatoes are vinhke strawberries and Mke russet apples. 
 There is, in fact, no way of describing a complex thing, except 
 by comparing it, in respect of each of its quahties, with other 
 things. Evidently then its hkeness and unUkeness are essen- 
 tial characters of it. But this hkeness and unhkeness imply 
 
 •Werke, III., p. 136; Stirling, p. 381*. Cf. "Encyclopedia," § gi. 
 
 'Cf. "Logik," II., Abschn. i, Kap. 2, A and B. In III., Abschn. i, 
 K.ap. 1, Likeness and Unlikeness appear again under the names Univer- 
 sality and Particularity. Cf. the summary on p. 362 above, and MitiA, 
 N.S. XII., pp. 322 seq. 
 
 8 Cf. G. E. MuUer, "Zeitschrift fur Psychologie u. Physiologie," Vol. I/, 
 pp. 107 seq., 1898. 
 
372 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 the existence of other reahties than those with which we 
 started, which we have found to be essentially 'like' and 
 'unlike.' Therefore, a single, complex, supposedly unre- 
 lated, reahty, just because it turns out to be inevitably ' like ' 
 and 'unlike' others, cannot, in distinction from these others, 
 be regarded as ultimate reahty. 
 
 The argument just outlined constitutes one of the most 
 characteristic and significant contributions made by Hegel 
 to philosophy. In one or both of its forms it appears in 
 every book of the "Logic" ; it involves categories of the most 
 varying names; it is discussed on different levels of philo- 
 sophic thought ; yet it is always, in the last analysis, the same 
 strong and distinctive argument which it is Hegel's great 
 merit to have expoimded and illustrated, until it has become 
 inwrought with the common fibre of philosophical doctrine. 
 A hmited reahty, he teaches, may not be supposed to exist 
 preeminent among others, yet unrelated to them, for it cannot 
 be conceived except as related to these others. In its aloofness 
 and isolation, therefore, such a single reahty cannot be ultimate 
 reahty — the final goal of the truth-seeker. For it is at least 
 identical with itself; and this identity impUes an otherness 
 which with the identity, the hkeness, and the unlikeness, is 
 an integral part of itself ; and otherness, Hkeness, and unhke- 
 ness require the existence of reahties outside itself. Because, 
 then, its own existence is bound up with that of other realities, 
 no particular hmited reahty can be ultimate. 
 
 In opposition to the doctrine of ultimate reality as limited, 
 Hegel has now a second argument. It may be stated thus : — 
 
 (2) Every limited reality is dependent on others 
 
 In the sections already outlined, Hegel has shown that, 
 because every hmited reahty is itself and not another, and 
 because every complex is hke and unhke others, therefore 
 no such hmited, isolated, unrelated quahty or thing can be 
 
The System of Hegel 373 
 
 looked on as ultimate reality. He now goes on to show that 
 the alleged unrelated reality, besides implying others, is 
 dependent on them, that is, of necessity connected with them. 
 In other words, no supposedly independent reality can make 
 good its claim to independence. Not only does every quality 
 or thing imply the existence of others, but it is conditioned 
 by these others, inextricably bound up with them, influencing 
 them and influenced by them. To be event or thing or self 
 means to be causally or reciprocally related, that is, neces- 
 sarily linked with others. The discussion of Kant's cate- 
 gories has already made this clear. There are relations of 
 influence, or connection, as well as of comparison, and both 
 are necessary and universal. An event is not sometimes part 
 of a causal series and at other times uncaused and uncausal : 
 on the contrary, to be an event means to be Knked with past 
 and with future; a mathematical quantity is not now and 
 again dependent on others, but its being includes its linkages ; 
 a human being is not incidentally dependent on others and 
 in turn an influence upon them, but rather a father's being 
 a father is conditioned on there being a son, and a son is 
 always son of a father, as a husband is husband of a wife, 
 and a friend is friend of a friend. In Hegel's words, " Cause 
 and effect are conceived as separate existences only when 
 we leave the causal relation out of sight." ^ No isolated, 
 unrelated reality, therefore, can be ultimate, because its 
 dependence upon others, hke their dependence upon it, is 
 a part of its own nature ; it cannot, then, be self-sufflcient. 
 For two reasons then the single, exclusive, but hmited, 
 reahty cannot, however significant, be ultimate. It is self- 
 identical, and thus other-than-others, and in this way implies 
 them. It is furthermore necessarily linked to these others 
 in relations of dependence. It is not merely accompanied 
 by the others : rather, it contains the implication of them and 
 the connection with them. A crucially important objection 
 
 • "Encyclopedia," § 153'. Cf. Werke, IV., p. 218'. 
 
374 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 to the argument which this paragraph summarizes must, 
 however, be stated. It is the following : Hegel proves only 
 that along with every hmited reality other hmited reahties 
 must be thought to exist ; he does not prove that these others 
 do actually exist. Hence no conclusion about actual existence 
 may be drawn from this argument, any more than the con- 
 clusion may be reached that there is a God because we have 
 an idea of him. In agreement with this objection it may at 
 once be admitted that Hegel does fail to take the final step 
 in his argument. Yet the step may be suppUed. For, so 
 Hegel might have put the argument : if anything exist besides 
 itself, then any hmited reality is necessarily related to this 
 other reality by relations of comparison and of dependence. 
 And now — he might have added, in entire accordance with 
 his general teaching — my consciousness of my own Umi- 
 tation is a direct witness to the existence of more than one 
 reality. Thus, in knowing the hmited reahty as related to 
 whatever else may exist, I know it as related, not only to an 
 ideal other (or others), but to an actual other.^ 
 
 This result makes a farther-reaching conclusion necessary. 
 What has just been proved of any partial reality, however 
 simple, must hold true of every partial reahty however 
 complex. It must hold true, therefore, of anything short of 
 complete reahty. It follows that ultimate reahty, what- 
 ever else may be said of it, must be conceived as all-that- 
 there-is. For any lesser ultimate reahty would imply the 
 existence of what was left of reahty, and would be ultimate 
 only in connection with that remainder. Thus the signifi- 
 cant conclusion is reached that, as Spinoza had insisted, 
 ultimate reahty is all-of-reahty, and not merely some one 
 reality, realer than the others. In Hegel's own words, "Das 
 Wahre ist das Ganze," the true is the whole. To attain the 
 goal of metaphysics it is necessary, therefore, to get at the 
 nature of this complete reahty. From the discovery that each 
 
 ' Cf., on the direct knowledge of existing plurality, Taylor's criticism of 
 solipsism, o^. cU., pp. 75-76. 
 
The System of Hegel 375 
 
 particular reality implies others, it at first seems to follow 
 that the ultimate reality is a complete composite of these 
 particulars. This is the theory which Hegel next considers 
 in its different forms. His attitude toward it is expressed 
 in the following statement : — 
 
 h. Ultimate reality is not a composite of all particular reali- 
 ties — it is neither an aggregate nor a system 
 
 There are two conceptions of ultimate reality as mere 
 composite. The two agree in the conclusion which is the 
 outcome of the doctrine just outlined, that ultimate or final 
 reality must be absolutely complete : if anything, however 
 trivial or insignificant, exist independently of it, that is, if it 
 fail to include every scrap and shred of reality, then there is 
 something outside and beyond it, it is no longer ultimate. 
 But if ultimate reality, now proved to be all-of-reality, is 
 simply a composite, it must be complete ; it must include, in 
 other words, every single bit of reality which exists now in 
 every cranny of every world; it must, indeed, include every 
 reality which is, or which has been, or which is to come. 
 It follows, in the first place, that ultimate reality is no com- 
 posite of temporal events ; that it cannot consist, for example, 
 in the series of transformations of the physical universe. 
 For, as Kant has shown,' a temporal series is in its essential 
 nature incomplete, since every moment involves, by hypothe- 
 sis, both a preceding and a following moment. There is, 
 therefore, no absolute beginning and no definite end of time ; 
 in other words, a really complete composite cannot conceiv- 
 ably be a temporal series. It is true that, inasmuch as 
 ultimate reality is admittedly complete, the temporal events 
 are not outside it, but in some sense belong to it. Such events 
 must then be regarded as partial and incomplete manifesta- 
 tions of an underlying reality; and such a reality, as com- 
 
 '"Kritik of Pure Reason," first and third Antinomies; Hegel, Werke, 
 III., pp. 140 seq., "Encyclopsedia," §§ 94 seq. CI. also supra, p. 249. 
 
376 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 plete, must in its essence be more-than-temporal.' From this 
 common conviction that ultimate reality is a complete com- 
 posite, and that it therefore does not consist in a temporal 
 series, the two conceptions of this ultimate reaUty now 
 diverge. 
 
 (i) Ultimate reality is not an aggregate 
 
 The first holds that ultimate reality is a mere plurality of 
 entirely distinct and unrelated parts. The reaUty is thus in 
 these isolated particulars, and it is purely the completeness 
 of their number which distinguishes ultimate from incom- 
 plete reality. This explicit plurahty-conception of reaUty 
 Hegel analyzes with his usual tiresome, though skilful, itera- 
 tion. The first result of the analysis is the discovery that a 
 complete plurality of particular unrelated realities must be 
 imknowable and incalculable, since no one of these Hmited 
 real beings can completely know the supposedly complete 
 number of particulars (even though these are not conceived 
 xmder purely temporal forms) .^ To prove a complete plu- 
 rality unknowable is, however, no conclusive argument 
 against this conception of ultimate reality, for Hegel has as 
 yet established only the presumption that ultimate reaHty is 
 completely knowable. Besides being unknowable, however, 
 the complete aggregate shows itself, Hegel teaches, to be 
 impossible. In truth this conclusion has already been impHed 
 in the discovery that every fact, however isolated, consists 
 in its relations to other facts. The existence of an utterly 
 disconnected plurahty of particulars (however complete) 
 thus becomes more obviously impossible than the occur- 
 rence of the single, unrelated reality. For every one of 
 these so-called single and independent reahties is not only 
 self-identical and like others, but is also either cause or 
 effect, or else in reciprocal relation. But if each of its mem- 
 
 ' Cf. Spinoza, "Ethics," Pt. I., Prop. 21; injra, pp. 441 seq. 
 ' Cf. injra, p. 416. 
 
The System of Hegel 2i77 
 
 bers is connected with others, the plurality obviously consists 
 of related individuals. In other words, the supposedly un- 
 connected plurality turns out to be a system of related reals. 
 
 (2) Ultimate reality is not a complete and organically re- 
 lated system of related partial realities 
 
 Hegel is thus led to the discussion of the important plu- 
 ralistic doctrine that ultimate reahty consists in a whole, not 
 in an aggregate — in a complete system or organism of inter- 
 related reahties, not in a mere composite of isolated phe- 
 nomena. This conception has such significance, inherent 
 and historical, that it merits the most careful scrutiny. The 
 absolutely complete system, like the complete aggregate, 
 includes everything which exists, however slight or unim- 
 portant or superficial; and it is, furthermore, made up of 
 reahties which are not, in their innermost nature, temporal. 
 From the complete plurality, however, it differs most sig- 
 nificantly in the fact that the particular realities of which 
 it is made up are completely related with one another. The 
 systematic whole-of-realities is no mere aggregate, but the 
 closest conceivable union of like and unlike, causally and re- 
 ciprocally related part-realities. Now the conception of such 
 a systematic unity of related particulars certainly avoids one 
 of the objections to the conception of ultimate reality as an 
 unrelated aggregate, in that the related system may be re- 
 garded as knowable. For though the complete knowledge 
 of such a system would require acquaintance with every part 
 of it, which is not possible to any finite knower ; yet one may 
 be said to know at least the scheme of reality, in knowing it 
 as the system of Uke and unlike and dependent parts. The 
 conclusive argument against the aggregate-hypothesis is 
 indeed inapplicable to the related- system hypothesis. That 
 argument consisted, it will be remembered, in the analysis 
 of any one of the members of the supposedly unrelated plu- 
 rahty, and in the consequent discovery that each one is made 
 
378 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 up, at least in part, of its relations to other members. But this 
 discovery, though it annihilates the doctrine that ultimate 
 reality is a mere heap of unrelated singles, is the support of 
 the theory that precisely the organic unity of related par- 
 ticulars constitutes ultimate reality. It is not surprising, 
 then, to find that this conception of reahty is widely and 
 tenaciously held in very varying forms. Leibniz's doctrine 
 of the monads is a typical form of such conceptions. Fichte's 
 conception of an absolute I, which turns out to be the com- 
 plete system of all interrelated selves, is the most common 
 idealistic form of the doctrine and is repeated in many con- 
 temporary conceptions, for example, in McTaggart's teach- 
 ing that ultimate reahty is the complete community of spirits,^ 
 and in Howison's conception of the "whole world of Spirits 
 including God," the "many minds in . . . mutual recog- 
 nition of their moral reality." ^ 
 
 But Hegel does not hold this view.' On the contrary, he 
 teaches expUcitly that ultimate reahty is not a mere system, 
 made up of its parts, but an all-including Individual, con- 
 stituting its members. It is highly important to discover 
 the exact meaning of this conception of ultimate reahty as an 
 Individual. The expression will be used in default of any 
 other to refer to a One which is neither a system nor an 
 organism. It is true that 'individual' means primarily 
 'unique,'* and that in this sense a system or an organism 
 may rightly be called individual. There is need, however, 
 of a single term to describe a One which is not a system, and 
 
 ' " Studies in Hegelian Cosmology," passim. 
 * " The Limits of Evolution," pp. xv. and xiii. 
 
 ' This statement is opposed to the conclusion of certain interpreters of 
 Hegel — notably to that of a peculiarly close and careful student, J. McT. 
 E. McTaggart, who attributes to Hegel the doctrine, just quoted, of the com- 
 munity of selves. In the opinion of the writer it is, however, impossible to 
 interpret Hegel's teaching in any other than the general fashion of this chapter. 
 (Cf. a review of McTaggart, by the present writer, in the Philosophical 
 Review, 1903, Vol. XII., pp. 187 seq.; and a discussion of "McTag- 
 gart's Interpretation of Hegel's Category of Cognition," by Louise W. AUen, 
 ibid., pp. 694 seq.) * Cf. injra, pp. 408 seq. 
 
The System of Hegel 2)79 
 
 for this purpose the capitalized word Individual, as qualified 
 by the indefinite article, answers as well as any other known 
 to the writer. It will later appear that only a self can be, in 
 this sense, an Individual ; but this is not yet manifest. Now 
 of a composite, even if it be a composite of related Indi- 
 viduals, the constituent, limited realities are the essential 
 feature. It is correct to say that the composite is made up 
 of them. Without these many realities — atoms or monads 
 or spirits — there would not be any composite ; for example, 
 without soldiers there would be no regiment, without sheep 
 there would be no flock.^ An Individual, on the other hand, 
 has an existence fundamental, logically prior, to that of the 
 parts or of the members. It is not separate from them, but 
 it is distinguishable from them. It is fundamental to the 
 parts, whereas the parts, though they are real, are not abso- 
 lutely essential to it : it expresses itself in the parts, instead of 
 being made up of them. A well-known example of this re- 
 lation of Individual to parts is the relation of a given geo- 
 metrical figure, say a square, to the parts into which it is 
 divided. Such a square is, perhaps, divided into four tri- 
 angles but it is not, strictly speaking, composed of these 
 triangles since, in the first place, it would remain though the 
 boundaries of the triangles were erased, and since, in the sec- 
 ond place, it can be conceived as divided not into triangles 
 but into other figures — rectangles, for example.^ The reality 
 of the square is thus fundamental to that of the triangles; 
 and the triangles are to be conceived as modifications of the 
 square — in Hegel's phrase, as " factors of a higher reaHty." ' 
 Now Hegel teaches in every part of the "Logic," that ulti- 
 mate reaHty is such an Individual and not a mere composite. 
 "The One," he says, "forms the presupposition of the Many; 
 and in the thought of the One is impUed that it explicitly 
 
 ' Cf. McTaggart, op. cit., ii. "The unity which connects individuals 
 . . . has no reaUty distinct from them." 
 
 ' J. E. Erdmann uses this figure in his exposition of Spinoza. 
 'Encyclopaedia, § 156, note. 
 
380 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 makes itself many." ' Such a One is not merely a related 
 system, it is itself an Individual. In Hegel's own words, it 
 is both "a totality of its particular members and . . . sin- 
 gle, particular, or exclusive individuality." ^ 
 
 But though, in the opinion of the writer, Hegel over and 
 over again asserts or implies this doctrine that ultimate 
 reaUty is an Individual, and not merely a system of coordinate 
 parts or an organism, it must be admitted that he nowhere 
 exphcitly outlines the argument for this highly significant 
 conclusion. To the present writer, this neglect seems the 
 greatest and the most inexplicable defect of Hegel's "Logic." 
 There is not lacking, however, an argument, perhaps implied 
 by Hegel, and certainly in accordance with the spirit of Hegel, 
 which, by analysis of the nature of a system, shows that every 
 related system of necessity imphes, that is, requires the ex- 
 istence of, an Individual who relates. The inclusive whole 
 of coordinate, interrelated individuals is thus shown to be 
 but the manifestation or expression of the absolute Indi- 
 vidual. The argument which, logically followed, leads to 
 this conclusion, is virtually Kant's proof of the existence of 
 a transcendental self carried to its inevitable conclusion : ^ — 
 
 It has been seen that single particular realities do form a 
 related system. The question at issue is, then, whether ulti- 
 mate reality consists simply in this interrelated system. To 
 answer this question, it is necessary, after Hegel's method, 
 to analyze closely the conception of a related system or whole. 
 What, it will be asked, is a whole ? It is defined ordinarily 
 in some such fashion : the sum of the relations of distinct 
 
 ' "Encyclopaedia," § 97, note. Cf. ?'W., Werke, III., 182' and 175'. It 
 should be observed that the Notes, or Zusatze, are not parts of the " Encyclo- 
 piedia" as Hegel left it, but additions made by the later editors, Hegel's 
 pupils, from their notes of his lectures. Thus it is evident that they have not 
 the full authority of Hegel's text. 
 
 ' Ibid., § igi. (Italics mine.) For discussion of the sense (not, of 
 course, a literal sense) in which Hegel can call the ultimate reality 'exclusive,' 
 though he has just named it totality, cf. infra, p. 420. 
 
 ' Cf. "Kritik of Pure Reason," Edition B, 129 seq.; and supra, Chapter 7, 
 pp. 229 seq. 
 
The System oj Hegel 381 
 
 yet connected parts. What, then, is a relation? It cannot, 
 in the first place, be external to the parts which it relates, else 
 it would be still another reality and would itself need to 
 be related with all the rest ; and the new relation would again 
 need relating, and so on ad infinitum. A relation external 
 to the terms related would, in a word, be useless to them : 
 it could not be their relation. As Hegel says, in "a unity 
 of differents . . ., a composite, an aggregate . . ., the ob- 
 jects remain independent and . . . external to each other."* 
 And yet, though a relation cannot be external to the terms 
 which it relates, neither can it be a quality inherent in any 
 or in every one of them. For the quality, or attribute, or 
 function, which is in a particular reality, cannot be the bond 
 between that particular and some other. In other words, if 
 ultimate reality were a composite of completely related terms, 
 and if the relations between the terms were qualities of the 
 terms, each for each, then the relations would themselves 
 need relating with each other, for each would belong to some 
 particular reality. There is no escape from this difficulty 
 except by the abandonment of the conception of ultimate 
 reality as a composite, and the alternative conception of it 
 as a whole which is also a singular, an absolute reality whose 
 unique nature is manifested in the particular realities which 
 form its parts. These parts, therefore, need no external 
 relation; they are related in that they are alike expressions 
 of the one reality.^ 
 
 The two first books of Hegel's "Logic" and the greater 
 part of the third and last book are occupied with the portion 
 of his argument already outlined; and Hegel's chief aims 
 in this large part of the "Logic" are, first, opposition to the 
 doctrines which make metaphysics impossible, and, second, 
 
 ' "Encyclopjedia," § 195. Cf. Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," p. 32: 
 "How the relation can stand to the qualities is . . . unintelhgible. If it is 
 nothing to the quaUties, then they are not related at all. . . . But if it is to 
 be something to them, then clearly we now shall require a new connecting 
 relation." 
 
 2 For criticism cf. B. Russell, "The Principles of Mathematics," §§ 54, 99 
 el al. 
 
382 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 the positive teaching that ultimate reahty is an absolute One. 
 But this conception of ultimate reality as numerically one 
 leaves unanswered the even more pressing question: what 
 is the nature of this absolute Individual, this self-determin- 
 ing, self-differentiating One; what is it qualitatively, what 
 is it in its own nature ? Hegel's answer to this question forms 
 the second great teaching of his system, and is contained in 
 the last division of Book III. of his "Logic," on "The Idea." 
 
 III. Ultimate Reality is Spirit, or Person 
 
 Already this question of the nature of ultimate reality has 
 been partially, though only partially, answered. It will be 
 remembered that we have recognized three logically possible 
 conceptions of ultimate reality : it may be of the. nature of 
 consciousness, or of the nature of non-consciousness ; and if 
 the latter, it may either be of the character of the nature- 
 world as we know it, or may be an unknown reality, under- 
 lying both psychical and physical phenomena. But the 
 teaching that ultimate reahty is knowable has annihilated the 
 possibihty last named ; and the conclusion that ultimate real- 
 ity is a complete reahty and yet no composite, or collection of 
 externally united terms, narrows the view that ultimate reality 
 is coincident with the physical world. For the world, con- 
 ceived in terms of inorganic science, is precisely an aggregate 
 of more or less well-adjusted phenomena, a composition of 
 forces, a sum of interacting parts. Such an ultimate reality, 
 obviously, would not conform to the conclusion reached that 
 ultimate reality is a One manifested in its parts, not made up 
 of them, a One which is the relater of the terms because each 
 of them is an essential expression of it. 
 
 It is thus evident that the nature-world, conceived as 
 inorganic, and therefore as composite, would not meet the 
 conditions of ultimate reahty as absolutely one. But there 
 still remains the possibihty of conceiving ultimate reahty 
 no longer as inorganic, but as organic, no longer a:s dead, but 
 
The System of Hegel 383 
 
 as living. This is the theory which Hegel next analyzes in 
 a concluding section of the "Logic." It is summarized in 
 the following statement : — 
 
 a. Ultimate reality is not adequately conceived as mere Lije 
 
 In Hegel's time, Schelling had espoused this hfe-hypothesis 
 of ultimate reahty. In our own day, philosophically inclined 
 biologists — Spencer, for example, and Haeckel — have 
 again made the hypothesis fashionable. At first glance, it 
 has much to commend it. It is superficially possible to 
 regard inorganic phenomena as subordinate to organic, — 
 to hold that inorganic phenomena exist only as nourishment 
 and stimulus to Kving beings, — and, on the other hand, to 
 regard consciousness as a mere function of nerve change, 
 thus making of hf e the central and supreme reahty. The or- 
 ganism, moreover, seems to conform to the conception of the 
 individual (the form, as has been shown, of ultimate reahty) ; 
 for the parts of an organism exist through and for the organ- 
 ism, instead of being added together to make it. Hegel 
 begins his discussion ^ by admitting this analogy between the 
 organism and the absolute One manifested in essential parts. 
 The hving organism, body, he agrees, is not an aggregate of 
 independent parts, but a One, manifesting itself in different 
 members, or organs, related to each other and to the one 
 organism. But there are, he points out, at least two objec- 
 tions to the conclusion that ultimate reahty is rightly con- 
 ceived as identical with organic nature. In the first place, 
 such an answer is certainly insufficient; it does not fully 
 meet the question: what, generically, is ultimate reality? 
 By organic nature, or hfe, we are by hypothesis to mean 
 something more than the inorganic, the not-hving. But the. 
 distinction between hving and not-hving has never been 
 made to the satisfaction of all biologists. Life, it is asserted 
 by many of them, is completely definable in terms of those 
 
 '"Logik," Werke, V., pp. 243 seq.; "EncyclopiEdia," § 216. 
 
384 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 processes which are reducible to physical and chemical 
 changes — contraction, oxidation, loss of heat, and the hke, 
 and by enumeration of its chemical constituents — its peculiar 
 proportion of protein, phosphorus, albumen, and so on. In 
 other words, it has proved impossible — as much, it must be 
 noted, since Hegel's time as before — unambiguously to 
 distinguish life from the not-living. Indeed, modem biolo- 
 gists, Loeb, for example, believe themselves on the verge of 
 the discovery that life may result from inorganic processes. 
 It seems manifestly impossible, then, to conceive of the ulti- 
 mate reahty as hfe, when we cannot distinguish Hfe itself 
 from what is by hypothesis its opposite. 
 
 In the second place, Hegel recalls the result already 
 reached, that ultimate reahty is all-inclusive, utterly com- 
 plete, and he points out that the conception of ultimate real- 
 ity as organism does not meet this second condition. For 
 according to such a view ultimate reahty is either one organ- 
 ism among others, or else it is the totahty — past, present, 
 and future — of such organisms. The first of these hypothe- 
 ses is obviously inconsistent with the conclusion, already 
 justified, that ultimate reahty is no single reality, hmited 
 by the existence of others. The second hypothesis implies 
 the conception of ultimate reahty as identical with the race, 
 or type — or rather, with the totahty of interrelated races. 
 Admitting that the single organism can never be identical 
 with ultimate reahty, this theory thus holds that the life 
 perpetuated through generations — the hfe, not of the indi- 
 vidual, but of organic nature conceived as an organic whole — 
 is the fundamental reahty.' Hegel proceeds, with his cool and 
 penetrating logic, to analyze this conception of organic nature 
 as hfe of the race, which Schelhng, in his ardour, had un- 
 critically assumed to be ultimate. This race, or type, — he 
 asks, — what is it ? Simply, he answers, a plurahty, an 
 indefinitely prolonged procession of hving beings.^ And, 
 
 ' Werke, V., pp. 252 seq.; "EncyclopEedia," § 221. 
 '^ Werke, V., p. 254. 
 
The System of Hegel 385 
 
 since it has been shown already that an organic unity of 
 related individuals is not ultimate reality, the conception of 
 ultimate reahty as Ufe of the race must be abandoned. In a 
 word, the result which is usual with Hegel has followed: 
 the analysis of the concept of hfe, or organic nature, has 
 revealed its own inner inconsistency. In identifying ultimate 
 reahty with life we have supposed ourselves to conceive it as 
 a One expressing itself in parts essential to it : instead, we 
 have found that life, organic nature as conceived by biological 
 science, is, after all, no absolute one, but a composite of dis- 
 tinct, and therefore of externally related, individuals. 
 
 h. Ultimate reality is not adequately conceived as totality of 
 particular selves 
 
 The most promising form of the hypothesis that ultimate 
 reahty is of the character of the physical world has thus dis- 
 closed its weakness. And it, therefore, becomes evident that 
 ultimate reality, since it is proved to be neither imknown 
 reality nor physical nature, must be consciousness.' At this 
 point Hegel might recall the numerical monism of his earher 
 conclusion and might argue thus : the ultimate reality, since 
 it is, on the one hand, conscious and, on the other hand, an 
 absolute Individual, is an absolute self. Instead, he ad- 
 vances on the conclusion that ultimate reality is conscious- 
 ness by the ordinary observation that consciousness, whatever 
 else it is, is the totahty of hmited selves.^ And herein he has 
 
 ' Cf. supra, pp. 57 and 382, to show that these alternative possibilities 
 are exhaustive. Hegel does not, except by implication, enumerate these 
 possibihties, but in the opinion of the writer some such argument has to be 
 supplied in order completely to justify him for stopping where he does, without 
 the effort to discover whether, in technical terms, any categories save those 
 of Cognition and Idea might follow on that of Life. 
 
 ^ Hegel does not use this expression 'totality of selves,' and might some- 
 times seem to be discussing the hypothesis of ultimate reality, conceived as a 
 single, particular self. The whole context, however, justifies the interpre- 
 tation given above, and McTaggart adopts it. 
 
 It is observable that Hegel does not take into account the Humian concep- 
 2 c 
 
386 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 obviously improved on the hypothesis of ultimate reality as 
 totality of organisms. For the organisms, as mere living, 
 non-conscious beings, are distinct from each other, whereas 
 apparently distinct selves are yet connected (as Leibniz long 
 since pointed out) in that they are conscious of each other. 
 Possibly, then, in the fact that each conscious being may be 
 conscious of the rest of the universe, we have the clue to our 
 mystery; perhaps, in other words, in the totahty of human 
 consciousbeings (each consciousofsomeof the others, and even 
 of the scheme of the totality) we have a qualitatively conscious, 
 numerically absolute One, which is yet a One of many. Hegel 
 tests the hypothesis by an analysis of consciousness with 
 intent to discover whether indeed the consciousness of hmited 
 beings can yield this absolute unity. Consciousness, it will 
 be admitted, has two aspects, two fundamental phases, 
 knowing and willing. But an analysis of knowing ' at once 
 discloses that neither a single Imowing self nor the totality of 
 knowing selves can constitute the absolute and all-inclusive 
 reality. For every knowing self is confronted with the 
 opposition of 'the immediate world found ready to hand,' ^ — 
 a world of opinions and purposes contrary to its own and a 
 world of things which it has not made. This is evident in 
 our sense experience, as Descartes and Berkeley and indeed 
 all philosophers teach : we are hot and cold and blinded by 
 the dazzling Hght and deafened by loud sounds and stimg 
 by mosquitoes against our wish and without our initiative. 
 And though in our conceptual dealings with the world, in our 
 analyses and classifications of facts, we are in a way asserting 
 our power over them, still the facts are there to be classified 
 and explained — we do not create them. Our elemental 
 experiences, in a word, come to us without our making them, 
 
 tion of consciousness as impersonal succession of ideas. This omission 
 may be due to the fact that the hypothesis had been so abundantly refuted. 
 
 '"Logik," III., Abschn. 3, Kap. 2, A, Werke, V., pp. 266 seq., "Die 
 Idee des Wahren." Cf. "Encyclopaedia," Third Subdivision, C, (b), (a), 
 § 226 seq., "Cognition proper." 
 
 '"Encyclopaedia," § 224. Cf. Werke, V., p. 265'. 
 
The System of Hegel 387 
 
 often in opposition to our desires. Purely knowing selves 
 cannot, therefore, constitute a self-sufficient, or absolute, 
 Individual. 
 
 It remains to consider ' the possibility that the absolute 
 reality is constituted by the totality of willing selves. At first 
 blush, indeed, there seems a chance that this is true, for selves, 
 when they will, subordinate all apparently external reality to 
 their own ends, regard their ovm interests as supreme and 
 absolute, and "take steps to make the world what it ought to 
 be." ^ Yet even will, so far as it characterizes particular 
 selves, demands the existence of reahty to be opposed, mate- 
 rials to be shaped — in a word, "presupposes . . . the inde- 
 pendence of the object," and is, therefore, limited by reality 
 external to it. As long, therefore, as we define ultimate reahty 
 as consisting of particular selves, we regard it under the dis- 
 credited form of a composite reality. A totality of Hmited 
 selves would, in fact, be a composite, not a unique, singular 
 Individual. In such a composite the oneness would consist 
 in the sum of the consciousnesses which the single selves have 
 of each other. But the consciousness of unity as possessed 
 by any one individual (who is by hypothesis ultimately dis- 
 tinct from the others) is certainly distinct from that conscious- 
 ness of unity which each of the other individuals feels, and 
 thus the supposed absolute unity would remain rather a sum 
 of relations (consciousnesses of imity) which would have need 
 of still further relating. 
 
 The last sections, thus briefly outhned, of the argument of 
 Hegel's "Logic" are marred by needless digression, by over 
 elaboration of details, and by under emphasis, or even omis- 
 sion, of significant steps. None the less in its important 
 features the argument, to the writer of this book, seems to 
 stand out clearly. Absolute reahty, Hegel teaches, though 
 it must of course include all positive characters of inorganic 
 
 '"Logik,"' ibii., Kap. 2, B, Werke, V., pp. 310 seq., "Die Idee des 
 Guten"; "Encyclopaedia," ibii., C. (6) (/8), § 233-235, "Volition." 
 ^"Encyclopaedia," § 234, note. Cf. Werke, V., p. 314. 
 
388 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 nature, is yet not identical with mere inorganic nature, for it 
 is a more-than-mechanical unity. Nor is ultimate reality 
 identical with mere life as totality of organisms, for even here 
 the oneness is not absolute, and each natural organism has a 
 life of its own. In the totality of selves, we have finally a 
 unity of a more essential sort, that of consciousness unifying 
 itself with its object, yet here also the unity is incomplete, 
 for each unifying consciousness is, by hypothesis, distinct 
 from each other. Absolute reality must indeed be conscious- 
 ness, and imifying consciousness, but it can be no composite, 
 no system, of Hmited and distinct selves. It must be, on the 
 other hand, ' subjectivity, . . . self- moving and acti\e,' 
 absolute idea, that is, self — the ' absolute and all truth, 
 the Idea which thinks itself and is completely self-identical 
 in its otherness.' ^ 
 
 We must guard ourselves from over literally interpreting 
 the words of Hegel just quoted. He is popularly held to 
 conceive of the absolute consciousness as abstract thought — 
 thought quite untouched by emotion or by will; and this 
 conception is rightly opposed, as doing violence to salient and 
 vital factors of experience. Such an interpretation is due, 
 however, to an absurd misreading of Hegel. By 'thought,' 
 as predicated of the absolute self, he never means thought in 
 the dry, exclusive sense of a strict psychology, or of an intel- 
 lectualist philosophy, but rather 'consciousness' in all its 
 rich fulness.' The absolute self, differentiated, Hegel teaches, 
 
 ' " Encyclopasdia," § 232, note. 
 
 ^ "Encyclopaedia," §§ 236, 238. Cf. Werke, V., 317'. 
 
 ' It may well be regretted that Hegel uses the word ' thought ' in so many 
 distinct senses, yet it is not diflScult to distinguish them. There are at least 
 three : — 
 
 1. By 'thought' Hegel often means the mediate or reasoning process as 
 contrasted with direct or immediate apprehension. In this sense he contrasts 
 both scientific and philosophic thought with religion. (Cf. injra, p. 392.) 
 
 2. By 'thought' Hegel sometimes means the unifying or relating conscious- 
 ness. In this sense both scientific thought (reflective understanding) and 
 philosophic thought are contrasted with sense consciousness. (Cf. "Logic 
 of the Encyclopaedia," § 80.) 
 
The System of Hegel 389 
 
 into the rich variety of the world of nature and of limited 
 spirit is no lifeless or abstract thought, but concrete self. 
 "The highest, extremest summit," as he says, "is pure Per- 
 sonality, which alone — through that absolute dialectic which 
 is its nature — encloses and holds all within itself."* 
 
 Up to this point this chapter has consisted in an analysis 
 and criticism of the argument by which Hegel seeks to prove 
 that ultimate reahty is absolute spirit, or person. But it 
 would be unfair both to Hegel and to the student of his 
 philosophy to go no further. By far the greater number of 
 the works which bear Hegel's name are characterized, not 
 by metaphysical argument, but by genial appHcation and 
 illustration of the underlying principle of his philosophy: 
 the spiritual and personal ^ nature of the absolutely real 
 being. All save the first section of his earliest work, the 
 "Phanomenologie," the entire "Philosophy of Right," and 
 the collected lectures on the "History of Religion," the "Phi- 
 losophy of History" and the "Esthetics," ^ embody Hegel's 
 applications and illustrations of this underlying doctrine: 
 the existence of an absolute self which differentiates and 
 manifests itself in human beings and in physical nature. The 
 procession of events, Hegel teaches, is the progressive appre- 
 hension of this absolute self under more and more adequate 
 forms; goodness is the adequate relation of human beings 
 to each other as all related to this larger self ; beauty is the 
 absolute self's expression in sense forms ; religion is the per- 
 
 3. By 'thought' in its deepest sense, Hegel means the consciousness which 
 any self has of the infinite self as inclusive of all reality. In this sense, philo- 
 sophic thought is opposed to purely scientific thought and is allied to the 
 highest form of the religious consciousness. 
 
 It may be added that Hegel uses 'sense consciousness' in a narrower and 
 in a wider sense. In the former, the most frequent, meaning it stands for 
 mere sense perception. Occasionally, however, it is used in a general way 
 to indicate the unphilosophic consciousness (perception and understanding). 
 
 ' "Logik," Werke, V., p. 339. 
 
 * The justification for the use of this disputed epithet is given very fully, 
 pp. 380 iej. and 382 seq. ^ Cf . Appendix, pp. 547. 
 
390 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 sonal relation to the absolute self; and philosophy, finally, is 
 the reasoned apprehension of the Absolute. Hegel's influ- 
 ence, through these conceptions, has been truly incalculable, 
 and it is wholly beyond our power to trace it. Doubtless he 
 has won adherents to monistic ideahsm, less by the cogency 
 of his arguments, which few take the trouble to follow, than 
 by the adequacy of the applications of his doctrine to specific 
 spheres of observed reahty. Hegel has, in other words, con- 
 vinced men, not in so far as he has demonstrated the existence 
 of absolute spirit, but in so far as he has shown how religions 
 tend to recognize this absolute spirit, how goodness presup- 
 poses the relation to him, how human history and physical 
 science manifest him. 
 
 It is beyond the purpose of this book to outline and dis- 
 cuss in detail these applications of Hegel's fundamental 
 teaching that ultimate reaUty is an absolute self, a spirit, 
 a person, absolutely one, yet including in its unity — as 
 subordinate and yet essential to it — all the varied reality 
 of the world as we know it. But whatever the limitations of 
 this chapter, brief references to Hegel's conceptions as well of 
 history as of religion are essential to the proper setting of his 
 metaphysics. The essentials of Hegel's treatment of his- 
 tory are the following : His conception is, in the first place, 
 intensely personal; he regards history rather as the pro- 
 gressively closer relating of selves, in ever widening groups, 
 than as development of one mere event from another. 
 From this point of view he is never tired of teaching that the 
 individual and the tribal ideal of duty must be subordinated 
 to that of the larger social organism. Socrates, strong in 
 his conviction of individual duty, and Antigone, in her 
 effort to fulfil the last rites for her brother, both yield in- 
 evitably to the state — the most inclusive unit of social 
 personality. 
 
 Even more significant is Hegel's conception of successive 
 stages in the world's history as in no sense isolated from 
 each other, but as vitally related. In one form or an- 
 
The System of Hegel 39! 
 
 other this conception of history has dominated science since 
 the days of Thucydides. Hegel's interpretation, however, 
 differs from many others in that, in his view, the bond which 
 connects events is no external one. In the place of this 
 conception of mechanical connection Hegel substitutes that 
 of development, always illustrating the relation of phenom- 
 ena from the organic relation of seed to plant.' The present, 
 he teaches, has been developed from the past, of which, 
 potentially, it was already a part. This development he fur- 
 ther conceives as through the progressive reconcihation of 
 opposites : assertion of one aspect of reaUty grows into the 
 expression of its opposite ; and the two opposites are later 
 reconciled in an inclusive unity.^ Unquestionably, there is 
 an apparent difficulty in this Hegehan doctrine of develop- 
 ment. Given Hegel's view of the absolute and essentially 
 timeless self, inclusive of all reality, how can there be develop- 
 ment within it ? how, in truth, does there come to be — as 
 certainly there is — any temporal world? Hegel expUcitly 
 recognizes the problem,' and never attempts to solve it by 
 reUnquishing either of its oppositions. He neither questions 
 the more-than-temporal eternity of the Absolute, nor yet the 
 reahty of temporal development. But he regards the process 
 
 ' "History of Philosophy," A, 2 a, transl., I., p. 22; Werke, 13, p. 343, 
 cited, here and throughout, in latest edition (cf. Appendix, p. 546). 
 
 ' These four stages in development Hegel indicates by the characteristic 
 terms 'the in-itself {an sick),' that is, the undeveloped, primitive stage; 'the 
 for-itself (ftir sich),' namely the stage of self-assertion; 'the for-other (/«r 
 Anderes),' the phase of recognition of others; and finally, 'the in-and-for- 
 itself (an und fur sich),' the fully developed stage in which one's own nature 
 is realized as constituted by its relations to others. (This term — an und fiir 
 sich — inadequately expresses Hegel's meaning, which would be better served 
 by the expression ' for-itself -and-for-other.') A man, for example, is poten- 
 tial, or 'in himself,' in his babyhood; he is 'for himself in his domineering 
 and passionate youth : he is ' for others ' during the period of apprenticeship 
 in trade or in profession; and he is 'in-and-for-himself,' completely realized 
 personality, in his mature life when, on the one hand, he freely chooses a life 
 of service, and, on the other hand, recognizes the rights of others in the very 
 act of imposing commands upon them. 
 
 'Cf. "History of Philosophy," A, transl., p. 7; Werke, 13, p. 19. 
 
392 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 in time as subordinately real. The relative selves — and, 
 indeed, the Absolute as manifested in them — are, so he seems 
 to beheve, temporal though also more-than-temporal ; and 
 every phenomenon is both an event in a temporal series, and 
 an aspect, eternally true, of absolute reality.' 
 
 From this indication of Hegel's doctrine of the relation of 
 time process to the absolute self, and of the consequent con- 
 nection between history and philosophy, we turn finally to 
 his teaching of the relation between philosophy and rehgion. 
 In varying contexts and in different words, he repeats that 
 the object of philosophy is the object of religion "in that 
 supreme sense in which God and God only is the Truth." ^ 
 The whole course of Hegel's metaphysics is, indeed, an 
 argument for the existence of God — an argument, Hegel 
 points out, which is in a sense 'ontological,' since it leads 
 through a study of our conception of being, to the reaUzation 
 that the Absolute Idea (or Self) necessarily exists. In this 
 sense, Hegel says, that "the Notion of God is identical with 
 Being." ' Yet in spite of this fundamental identity of 
 object, Hegel recognizes two frequent differences between 
 philosophy and religion — the first, a contrast in nature and 
 genesis, the second, a difference in object. 
 
 From the first of these points of view, religion is distin- 
 guished from philosophy in that its consciousness of God 
 may be — though it need not be — immediately gained, 
 without a struggle or argument. One may never have 
 
 '"Logic" of the "EncydopEedia," § 212, note, quoted by McTaggart, 
 "Studies in Hegelian Dialectic," p. 171, q.v. 
 
 ' "Logic" of the "Encyclopaedia," § i; "Philosophy of Religion," Intro- 
 duction, paragraphs 2-3. 
 
 ^"Philosophy of Religion," translation, III., p. 355 et al.; Werke, 12, 
 p. 542 el al. Cf. "Logik," Werke, III., Abschn. i, Kap. i, Anmerk 1, C; 
 and "Encyclopasdia," Chapter IV., § 51. Hegel often comments on the 
 ontological argument and objects to Kant's criticism thereof — in particu- 
 lar to the ' hundred dollar illustration ' ; but his objection is mainly to 
 Kant's terminology, and he is not blind to what he calls the 'certainly 
 defective proof (" Philosophy of Religion," translation, p. 357) of the onto- 
 logical argument in its historical form. 
 
The System of Hegel 393 
 
 reasoned about God and one may yet stand to him in the 
 closest of personal relations ; one may have what Hegel calls 
 an 'immediate ' assurance of oneself as related to him. The 
 philosophic consciousness, on the other hand, is never im- 
 mediate. Its endeavor always is to pove the nature of 
 ultimate reahty.^ Its truth is gained, "not by intuition — 
 not even by intellectual intuition, but only by the labor of 
 thought."^ From religion of the unreasoning and immedi- 
 ately gained variety, philosophy is accordingly sharply dis- 
 tinguished. On the other hand, as has been indicated, Hegel 
 holds that the highest form of religious consciousness is reached 
 by the way of thought ; and rehgion, thus conceived, must 
 include, even while it transcends, philosophic thought.^ 
 
 The second of these constant, though not invariable, dif- 
 ferences between philosophy and religion concerns the 
 conception of God. Philosophy (as conceived by Hegel) 
 must realize God as actually one with the human self. Re- 
 ligion, on the other hand, may — though it need not — con- 
 ceive God as external to the human self. This is the view 
 of God which dominates the lowest forms of rehgion — the 
 religion of the child and the savage who picture God as human 
 self and feel toward him the primitive human emotions of 
 friendhness and of fear ; and it is also the conception of the 
 merely scientific thinker, who represents God perhaps as first 
 cause and in any case as a being external to the human self, 
 'a reahty beyond him {ein Jenseits)' either near or far, 
 friendly or hostile.' 
 
 Thus, to sum up Hegel's teaching : rehgion as contrasted 
 
 ' "Logic" of the "Encyclopaidia," § 6^. Cf. §§ 63-75 throughout. 
 
 ^ "History of Philosophy," A, i a, transl., p. is'' ; Werke, 13, p. 27'. 
 
 ^ To this interpretation it may be objected that "Absolutes Wissen," not 
 "Rehgion," is the highest category of the philosophy of spirit. In the opin- 
 ion of the writer, however, "Absolutes Wissen" (the thought which makes, 
 as well as knows, reality, and which is therefore will) is the thought which 
 the Absolute thinks, not the thinking of the limited selves, as such ; and re- 
 ligion is, therefore, for human spirits, the highest of the categories. 
 
 * "History of Philosophy," Introd. B, 2 b, transl., I., p. 62 ; Werke, 13, 
 P- 77'- 
 
394 Monistic Spiritualism 
 
 with philosophy is personal relation, not thought. Religion 
 may be gained immediately or through reasoning; it may 
 or may not include thought ; its object may be falsely con- 
 ceived as external to human selves, though it may also be 
 known as the including self. Philosophy, on the other 
 hand, always is mediate consciousness, and the God, or Ab- 
 solute, who is its object is always known as Absolute Self. 
 In a word, philosophy is thought about reaUty {denkendes 
 Bewusstseyn), whereas reUgion, whether immediate insight 
 or reasoned belief, whether worship of a far-off God or of 
 a God who is one with the human self — religion in its 
 lowest as in its highest form — is experience, never mere 
 thought. Precisely, however, in its highest phase, religion, 
 like philosophy, is ' consciousness of the absolute being, 
 Bewusstseyn des absoluien Wesens.' 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS : THE 
 PRESENT ISSUE BETWEEN PLURALISTIC AND 
 MONISTIC PERSONALISM 
 
 idv ii4v TL vfuv SoKw &\y}6h XdyetVj (Xvvo^\oy^aaTe, el dk tiii, iravrl X67<f) 
 dvTLTeiveTc. — Plato. 
 
 There is reason for concluding, with the outline of Hegel's 
 philosophy, a study of metaphysical systems as exemplified 
 in the works of modern philosophers. For it is fair to say 
 that, in the years since Hegel, no radically new type of meta- 
 physical doctrine has been conceived. Nineteenth-century 
 philosophies have been variations of the forms of pluralism 
 and monism, qualitative and numerical, already outlined; 
 and nineteenth-century philosophers have performed the 
 work of adaptation, elaboration, reconciliation, rather than 
 that of origination. In the opinion, shared by the writer, of 
 many students of philosophy, this dearth of new types is due, 
 indeed, not to a modern lack of spontaneity, but to the fact 
 that with Hegel's system all logically possible ground- 
 forms of metaphysical doctrine have been put forward, so 
 that a system, however spontaneous in inception, must fall 
 within the grooves already worn. A summary of these 
 nineteenth-century systems, and in particular of contempo- 
 rary doctrines, forms the concluding chapter of this book. 
 
 A. Contemporary Non-idealistic Systems 
 
 I. Materialism or Naturalism (Qualitatively 
 Monistic) 
 
 Materialism is, as has been indicated, a form of non- 
 idealism — the conception of the universe, or all-of-reality, 
 as independent of and as other than consciousness, in fact, as 
 
 397 
 
398 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 non-consciousness. In this negative conception all mate- 
 rialistic systems agree.^ In their positive account of ma- 
 terial reality, they differ, however; part of them conceiving 
 ' matter ' in the terms of the physicists and mathematicians 
 as extension or motion, force or energy ; the rest regarding 
 it, in the fashion of the biologists, as life, or organic reality. 
 The latter, the biological form of materialism, appeared first. 
 It was the natural accompaniment of the forward move- 
 ment, during the early nineteenth century, in the sciences of 
 organic life. In its first appearance, modern biological 
 materialism followed closely the lines of the doctrine, out- 
 lined a hundred years before, by the French philosopher, La 
 Mettrie, in his "L'homme machine" which appeared in 
 1748.^ In the middle of the nineteenth century, when 
 Miiller and Schwann were minutely studying the structure 
 of animals, when Ferrier and Munk were showing, in 
 widening detail, the complexity, in developed animal types, 
 of the nervous system, it was not unnatural that Vogt and 
 Biichner and Moleschott should formulate anew the doc- 
 trine that consciousness reduces to a function of nervous 
 matter, that " the brain secretes thought as the liver secrets 
 bile," that ultimate reality is, in a word, nerve activity. 
 The most modern statement of the doctrine is that of 
 Ernst Haeckel, a biologist of the first rank, himself a con- 
 tributor to evolutionary science. His philosophy does not 
 differ fundamentally from that of Biichner, Moleschott, 
 and Vogt. So-called spirit he identifies with ' energy ': as 
 energy is related to mass, so, he teaches, is spirit related to 
 the non-spiritual. Every form of matter, he therefore 
 holds, has spiritual functions: mass and ether alike are 
 possessed of psychic activities, and the very atoms are 
 characterized by feeling and impulse; hut these are uncon- 
 
 ' In our day, these systems discard the epithet 'materialistic,' often in 
 favor of the term 'naturalistic' The rejection of the older terminology 
 obscures the historical affiliation of these systems. 
 
 ' For book references throughout this chapter, cf . Appendix, pp. 556 seq. 
 
Materialism or Naturalism 399 
 
 scious junctions. Consciousness does not differ, in kind, 
 from those unconscious characters; like other forms of 
 energy it has a definite ' material substratum ' ; and this 
 substratum of the energy called consciousness is body — 
 psycho-plasma, Haeckel names it. 
 
 Haeckel's identification of spirit with energy is closely 
 allied with the second, or physical, form of materialism, 
 whose best known expositor is Wilhelm Ostwald. Ostwald, 
 deservedly distinguished in the field of physical chemistry, 
 approaches metaphysics from the side of physics, conceives 
 ultimate reality as energy, and regards heat, as well as 
 chemical, electrical, and nerve energy, as coordinate forms 
 of the ultimate reality, and classifies consciousness as a 
 sub-form of nerve energy.^ Professor W. P. Montague, 
 adopting this view, suggests the identification of conscious- 
 ness with potential energy on the ground, mainly, that both 
 are characterized by 'invisibility or privacy' and that "the 
 conditions under which a stimulus is followed by a sensation 
 happen also to be conditions under which energy passes 
 from a kinetic into an intensive phase." ^ 
 
 When, however, we turn from exposition to argument we 
 find that contemporary materialists have merely refurbished 
 the weapons which were used by Hobbes and by Hol- 
 bach. For the argument underlying all these materialistic 
 systems is the appeal to the observation that consciousness is 
 continuous with physical change, that the conscious organ- 
 ism is connected by imperceptibly progressive stages with 
 apparently inorganic bodies, and that sensation follows on 
 nerve-excitation and nerve-excitation on physical stimulus. 
 But these considerations avail nothing if the idealist is right 
 in his contention that nerve and protoplasm and energy 
 themselves reduce to ideal qualities and relations. And 
 
 > "Vorlesungen (iber Naturphilosophie," p. 381. Cf. "Natural Philoso- 
 phy," pp. 174, 178. 
 
 ^"Consciousness a Form of Energy," in "Essays in Honor of William 
 James," pp. 126, 128. 
 
400 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 modern materialists have for the most part offered no serious 
 criticism of this idealistic position. Haeckel, to be sure, 
 makes a successful, if rather hysterical, polemic against 
 dualism of the spiritualistic type, but he nowhere criticises 
 idealism as such. Ostwald and Montague openly play into 
 the hands of idealism. "To gain an idea," Ostwald says, 
 "of the content of the concept of energy, we will start from 
 the fact that we are able . . . through our will, to call 
 forth occurrences in the external world. This comes to 
 pass in that, in consequence of voluntary activity {Willens- 
 bethdtigung) , definite muscles contract and thus excite move- 
 ments of our limbs, which . . . cause m^ovements in the 
 outer world." This exertion, he continues, "is a magni- 
 tude for it is capable of being added." But "the like 
 effects of motion which are caused by human activity may 
 be caused by machines of all sorts to which one can attribute 
 no exertion. It will, therefore, be more to our purpose to 
 choose a more general name for the magnitude which here 
 makes its appearance: the name 'work.' . . . And we 
 shall in general define energy as work. . . ." > In similar 
 fashion, Montague asserts that "potential energy though 
 not visible or externally perceptible is nevertheless definitely 
 and directly perceivable internally or by participation in it 
 through what is inaptly called the 'muscular sense.'" 
 The idealist rightly claims that this elucidation of the 
 concept of energy by appeal to our sense-consciousness so 
 far from showing consciousness to be a form of energy really 
 tends to reduce energy to consciousness. 
 
 II. Monistic Realism (The Doctrine of the Unknown 
 
 Reality) 
 
 A second form of non-ideahsm is a doctrine numerically 
 
 as well as qualitatively monistic, which maintains that 
 
 ' "Vorlesungen," pp. 153, 154, 158. 
 
 Op. cit., p. 123. Montague, however, vigorously criticises idealism. 
 Cf . p. 402, and bibliography. 
 
Monistic Realism 401 
 
 neither consciousness nor matter (physical process) is the 
 ultimate reality, but that both are forms, or expressions, of 
 an underlying but an utterly unknown reality.^ This is 
 the doctrine, introduced among modern scientists by Her- 
 bert Spencer, which has claimed for itself the name of ' mo- 
 nism,' though it is obviously one form only of the concept of 
 reality as fundamentally ' one ' ; and it is, therefore, better 
 named monistic realism. In order fairly to estimate this 
 doctrine, it must be held firmly in mind that, by its teach- 
 ing, facts of consciousness and physical phenomena, inor- 
 ganic and organic, are alike mere manifestations of a 
 deeper reality ; and that this underlying reality is in itself 
 unknown : it is known only in its expressions, or manifes- 
 tations — that is, in phenomena, psychical and physical. 
 Evidently, such a theory differs utterly from the positive 
 conception of the ultimate reality as itself identical with 
 the physical — whether that be conceived as 'life' or as 
 'energy.' The historic fact that materialists have tended 
 to this form of monism is an indication, therefore, of the 
 logical weakness of materialism.^ 
 
 Against this theory of the unknown reality which is 
 manifested both in mind and in matter one may still urge 
 the arguments which Hegel put forth in opposition to 
 Schelling's conception of the Undetermined Reahty. ' 
 For, in the first place, this hypothesized being, so far from 
 being unknown, is known as being one and as being source 
 or ground, and it thus reveals itself as belonging to the do- 
 main of consciousness, since 'one-ness' and ' f undamental- 
 ness' are both categories or facts of experience. In the 
 second place, this hypothesized unknown reality, if described 
 merely as source of these particular phenomena, mental and 
 
 lit will be remembered that Berkeley used the term 'materialism' to 
 cover this doctrine as well as materialism in the narrower sense. 
 
 2 Cf. Kulpe, "Die Philosophic der Gegenwart in Deutschland," 1904, p. 36, 
 for discussion of the way in which Biichner and Haeckel vibrate between 
 materialism and monistic realism. 
 
 » Cf. pp. 339 seq. 
 
 ZT) 
 
402 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 bodily, really — as Hegel pointed out — has less, not more, 
 reality than they. To hold that a and 6 have no positive 
 nature of their own, but that they are really mere manifes- 
 tations of x; and then to describe x as consisting merely 
 herein that it manifests itself in a and h, is to attribute to x 
 less reality than to a and h, and so to reduce its reality to 
 theirs.' 
 
 III. Dualism (Neo-Realism) 
 
 The first years of the twentieth century are marked by a 
 lively reaction against idealism. Under their common 
 banner, 'neo-realism,' the critics of idealism uphold divers 
 doctrines of their own. The avowed materialism of one 
 among them, Montague, has already been considered ; but 
 most of the neo-realists are dualists and their common 
 contention is that, besides selves and their ideas, or expe- 
 riences, there also exist 'objects,' in some sense external. 
 The main arguments advanced in support of this view take 
 the negative form of criticisms of idealism. Of these, the 
 most important are the following : — 
 
 First (i), the neo-reahst insists that the idealist is guilty 
 of a gross assumption in teaching that because we are con- 
 scious only of ' the ideal, therefore only the ideal exists.^ 
 In reply to this objection, the idealist urges that he dis- 
 covers, and does not assume, the ideal nature of all reality. 
 Step by step, he has found that both sensible qualities and 
 fundamental relations are describable only as ways-of- 
 being-conscious.' Many of the critics, indeed, yield this 
 point but urge that there is no reason for denjdng the exist- 
 ence — along with that of the ideal, known objects — of 
 
 ' Cf. Chapters 3, 5, 7, 10, pp. 66 seq.; 130 seq.; 240 seq.; 366 seq. For 
 illuminating discussion and estimate of modern materialism and realism, 
 cf. James Ward, "Naturalism and Agnosticism." 
 
 ' Cf. especially, "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists," 
 Journal of Philosophy, VII, 1910, pp. 396, 399. 
 
 ' Cf. supra, pp. 118 seq. 
 
Dualism 403 
 
 realities utterly independent of consciousness. To this the 
 idealist replies that, such realities devoid of sensible 
 quality, of permanence, and of causal relation, would 
 be empty nothings, never to be thought about or talked 
 about, and in a word utterly negligible.^ 
 
 The neo-realist, however, next (2) claims that external 
 objects must exist since otherwise no one would make the 
 distinction — which yet, as a matter of fact, we all make — 
 between perceived things and imagined things, between so- 
 called subjective and objective realities.^ The personaHstic 
 idealist answers that the distinction between subjective and 
 objective reality, image and percept, is a contrast be- 
 tween my private experience and that which I share 
 with other selves.' 
 
 In opposition to this teaching, the neo-realist brings 
 forward (3) the subtlest and newest of his arguments 
 against idealism. For up to this point, though it has for 
 the most part escaped his notice, the neo-realist has merely 
 repeated the old arguments with which Berkeley was 
 familiar. This present-day argument runs somewhat as 
 follows : "So far from defining the perceived, or 'objective,' 
 as the experience shared with another self, the idealist has 
 no right to assert the existence of any other self. For he can 
 argue to the other self's existence only by presupposing the 
 existence of external realities, that is, by observation of 
 gesture or articulate sound which he attributes to the other 
 self. But if, as the idealist holds, this movement or soimd 
 is simply an idea in the idealist's mind, then his only legiti- 
 mate inference from it is — not that another self exists but 
 that he himself exists. Idealism is, in other words, neces- 
 sarily solipsistic. In reducing all reality to idea the idealist 
 reduces reality to his own idea, and in denying the existence 
 
 ' C£. supra, pp. 131 scg.; 364 seq. 
 
 2 Cf. especially, Fullerton, "A System of Metaphysics," chapters VI., 
 XXIII. ; G. E. Moore, Mind, 1903, N.S. XII., "The Refutation of Idealism." 
 ' Cf. injra, p. 425. 
 
404 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 of external objects he denies the existence of any other self." ' 
 To this objection a pluralistic idealist of Berkeley's type has, 
 in the opinion of the writer of this book, no conclusive zx\r- 
 swer. On the other hand, the monistic or Hegelian idealist, 
 believing that all finite selves are expressions and parts of 
 the Absolute Self, denies the very premiss of the realist's 
 argument. Not by inference from his own ideas but 
 in a sense directly — so he claims — he knows both himself 
 and other self.^ The main argimients against neo-realism 
 as a positive theory — or rather, group of theories — is 
 the fact that, one and all, neo-reahsts assume their starting- 
 point. Thus, the duaHsts among them assume the exist- 
 ence of 'entities,' physical or logical or both, which 
 they coordinate with mental realities; and monistic neo- 
 realists assume the existence of those 'neutral entities' 
 under which they subsume selves, or minds — thereby 
 describing the immediately known in terms of an artificial 
 construct. 
 
 B. Contemporary Systems of Idealism 
 
 I. Phenomenalism (Numerically Pluralistic) 
 
 Phenomenahstic idealism is the doctrine of Hume: the 
 conception of the universe as a succession of complex psychic 
 
 ' Cf. G. E. Moore, Proceedings oj the Aristotelian Society, 1905-1906, VI., 
 "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception"; H. W. Carr, ibid., 
 1907-1908. ^ Cf. pp. 410^ f. ; also pp. 138, 144 (4). 
 
 ' The doctrine, common to many neo-realists, of the 'externality' of re- 
 lations — and, in particular, of the knowledge-relation — is not a necessarily 
 realistic but rather a numerically pluralistic doctrine. It is virtually held 
 by those pluralistic personalists who conceive of selves as entirely distinct 
 from each other. 
 
 For more extended criticism of neo-realism cf. A. O. Lovejoy, "Error 
 and the New Realism," Philos. Rev., 1913, XXII., pp. 410 flF., J. B. Pratt, 
 "Perry's Proofs of Idealism," Journ. of Philos., 1912, tX., pp. 573 ff., M. 
 W. Calkins, "The Idealist to the Realist," ibid., 191 1, VIII., pp. 449 ff. 
 Criticisms, by Muscio and by Turner, of the paper last cited and replies 
 by the writer appear in the Journ. of Philos., IX., 321 ff. and 603 ff. ; XI., 
 46 ff. and 297 f. For further references to neo-realistic writings, cf. the 
 bibliographies, pp. 557 and 566 infra. 
 
Phenomena lis tic Idealism 405 
 
 phenomena, impressions and ideas. To the phenomenalist, 
 the idea — using the word, in Locke's broad sense, to include 
 every fact of consciousness — is in truth the unit of reality ; 
 and the universe, consisting of the multitude of ideas, is 
 qualitatively one, or homogeneous, though numerically a plu- 
 rality. Hume's phenomenahsm is to-day revived most brill- 
 iantly in the philosophical systems of a group of scientists : 
 notably in those of Ernst Mach, physicist, and of Karl Pear- 
 son, mathematician.^ According to these thinkers, ultimate 
 reality reduces to the complex of sensational experiences — 
 in Hume's terms, to a 'bundle of perceptions.' So Pearson 
 affirms that "the field [of science] is essentially the contents 
 of the mind." ^ A noteworthy feature of this doctrine is its 
 unequivocal idealism. So-called matter, Mach and Pearson 
 teach as emphatically as ever Berkeley taught, is a mere 
 composite of sensational elements, a 'union of immediate 
 sense impressions with associated stored impressions' from 
 which, by association, "we form conceptions and draw in- 
 ferences." Scientific law is no extra-mental force, but — in 
 Pearson's terms — ' a brief description in mental shorthand 
 . . . of the sequences of our sense impressions'; 'necessity 
 in a law of nature' is no non-conscious entity, but 'our ex- 
 perience of a routine.' ' In a word, the imiverse is consti- 
 tuted by consciousness ; it is the composite of experiences. 
 The system thus outlined has been criticised already as it 
 first appeared in the Humian form of it.* Its great merit lies 
 in its determined and successful opposition to materialism, 
 its convicing demonstration that supposedly non-conscious 
 matter is really nothing more than a complex of elements of 
 
 ' Among philosophical writers, C. A. Strong (who follows W. K. Clifford) 
 might be called a phenomenalist but for his curious doctrine of the things-in- 
 themselves. Cf. p. 237, footnote. 
 
 * "The Grammar of Science," second edition, Chapter 2, § 17, p. 75'. 
 
 ^ "The Graromar of Science," second edition, Chapter 2, p. 75^^; chap- 
 ter 3, p. 112^; chapter 4, §3, p. 120I. Cf. Mach, "Die Analyse der Emp- 
 findungen," 4th ed., p. 283^ et al. 
 
 * Chapter 6, especially pp. 171 seq., 179 seq. 
 
4o6 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 consciousness. Of course, this is precisely the position of 
 Berkeley; but it has especial force as put forward, not by 
 avowed metaphysicians, but by natural scientists. This 
 espousal of idealism is in truth a guarantee that keen scien- 
 tific observation, logical scientific reasoning, and bold scien- 
 tific hypothesis are perfectly reconcilable with an idealistic 
 outlook on the universe. The chief objections to this con- 
 temporary form of phenomenalism are precisely the objec- 
 tions already urged against Hume's doctrine. It over- 
 emphasizes the sensational factors of consciousness ; ^ and it 
 is untrue to experience in assuming the independent exist- 
 ence of those abstractions called percepts, feelings and 
 thoughts. It ignores the fact that percept or feehng is 
 always the self perceiving, feeling. Contemporary phe- 
 nomenalists advance no new arguments against this teach- 
 ing of the personal idealists, and there is therefore no need 
 for a fresh criticism of their position. 
 
 A curious result of phenomenalism is that its upholders 
 often deny the metaphysical nature of their teaching. Thus, 
 Mach and Pearson are alike in their opposition to metaphys- 
 ics, a 'supposed branch of human knowledge,' Pearson calls 
 it. Viewed in this way as an 'antimetaphysic,' phenomenal- 
 ism is a form of positivism, the denial of the validity of meta- 
 physics. D'Alembert, in the later eighteenth century, and 
 Auguste Comte, in the first half of the nineteenth, were the 
 leaders of the formal movement bearing this name; but 
 certain thinkers of every period have asserted that one may 
 not know the Ultimate. 
 
 II. Personal Idealism (Personalism) 
 
 Personal, or spiritual, idealism shares with phenomenalism 
 the doctrine that all reality is of the nature of consciousness. 
 
 ' Exception must be made of Mach, who includes among ' sensations ' rela- 
 tional experiences. But Pearson and others treat thought as mere asso- 
 ciated image. 
 
Personal Idealism 407 
 
 From the phenomenalist the personaUst (or spiritualist) 
 differs, however, in his account of what consciousness is. 
 Consciousness, urges the phenomenaUst, is a series or col- 
 lection of momentary ideas ; consciousness, the personal 
 ideaUst insists, is a conscious self or person, that is, a 
 unique ' real ' which is conscious and which may be regarded 
 as including ideas, but which is more permanent than ideas 
 are, and independent of them in a sense in which — on 
 the contrary — they depend on it. This issue between 
 phenomenaUst and personalist is, in the end, not debatable. 
 For each relies and must rely upon direct introspection. With 
 Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, and Kant, Fichte, and 
 Hegel, Lotze and Renouvier, Bergson and Eucken, Howison, 
 Ward, and Royce, and a great company of philosophers, the 
 writer fi,nds that consciousness is not mere idea or series of 
 ideas, but that it is the unique subject of ideas. To one who 
 claims to find momentary ideas only, and no self, in con- 
 sciousness, it is impossible to prove the existence of the self : ^ 
 for proof means bolstering up an assertion by a more fun- 
 damental one, whereas the self, supposing it to exist, is 
 fundamental to ideas. Yet, as was shown in the chapter on 
 Hume's philosophy, the spiritualist is not without argument. 
 Though he must assert, without demonstrating, the existence 
 of a conscious self, he may prove that every extant phe- 
 nomenaHst, so far from disproving, has actually implied the 
 existence of the self to whom he so loudly denies a right to 
 existence. The great problem of the personalis tic philosophy 
 is, therefore, the problem of the nature, the number, and the 
 relation of conscious selves. With regard to the first of these 
 problems personal idealists agree that the nature of the self 
 or selves which constitute ultimate reality must be known 
 primarily by introspective study. It is of course impossible 
 in a strict sense to define this ultimate reality, conscious self, 
 but it is possible to describe it, to distinguish different aspects 
 
 ' C£. the writers cited on p. 185, and G. Kafka, "Uber das Ichproblem," 
 Archil) Jiir die gesamle Psychologie, igio, XIX., pp. 1-241. 
 
4o8 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 of it. The fundamental features of such a description have 
 already been indicated in the exposition of various systems 
 of philosophy. By self is meant a relatively persistent, 
 yet changing, unique, complex, related being.^ The persist- 
 ence of the self has already been considered. Change, as 
 Bergson teaches, is directly experienced by each of us in his 
 growth from childhood. Uniqueness is the character by 
 virtue of which the self is 'this' or 'that' and not any 
 one of a group — a reality which cannot be replaced by 
 another, however Kke it or quaUtatively identical with it. 
 That the self is a complex of many diverse experiences is 
 admitted by everybody. Psychological analysis has dis- 
 tinguished certain fundamental ' personal attitudes ' — 
 assertiveness (which characterizes will and loyalty), 
 receptivity (which distinguishes perception), sympathy, 
 and attention (both egoistic and altruistic) — and has also 
 enumerated the so-called 'elemental' kinds of conscious- 
 ness, notably the sensations and the affections. The self, 
 finally, must be regarded not only as related to any reality 
 in any sense beyond it but also as the relater, or unifier, 
 of the different parts or aspects of itself ^ ! 
 
 ' A comparison of this concept of the self with the traditional notion of 
 'spiritual substance' will disclose, on the one hand, a likeness between the 
 two. Both teach the existence of a reality more permanent than ideas or 
 'mental operations,' and fundamental to them. As actually used, by 
 Berkeley, for example, the concept of 'soul' or 'spirit' seems often to be 
 almost identical with that of 'self.' On the other hand, the soul — or 
 spiritual substance — is sometimes, as by Locke, emptied of all content, and 
 sometimes conceived in the fashion of what might be called materialistic 
 immaterialism. Against this bizarre conception of the soul, not against that 
 of the conscious self, the arguments of Kant's Paralogisms prevail. 
 
 ^ This is not the place to argue for the exact nature and number of these 
 attitudes and elements. Such a task belongs to the psychologist, and the 
 reader is referred to the writer's "A First Book in Psychology," third edi- 
 tion, 1914, chap. I., pp. 3-5 and Appendix, Sect. III., § 34, pp. 330-331, 
 333-3341 for justification of the outline here offered. A different yet closely 
 allied account of the self may be found in A. Pfander's "Einfiihrung in 
 die Psychologic," Leipzig, 1904, II. Teil, Kap. II and III. It should, how- 
 ever, be insisted that this analysis, though primarily the concern of the 
 psychologist, is not on that account outside the domain of philosophy. 
 
Personal Idealism 409 
 
 A word more is necessary with reference to the immediate- 
 ness of our consciousness of self, thus described. Stress has 
 been laid throughout this book on the fact that the immediate- 
 ness of self-consciousness is the starting-point of all philosophy, 
 the guarantee of all truth.' I cannot doubt, I know imme- 
 diately, that I, a conscious self, or person, exist ; and I must 
 beheve whatever is involved in this certainty of my own exist- 
 ence. To this the objection is bound to be made that such 
 a consciousness of self, as has here been described, demands 
 a high stage of development, and that it cannot therefore 
 claim for itself the character of immediateness. Such an 
 objection overlooks the meaning of 'immediate,' which is 
 'unreasoned, and consequently not demanding proof; it 
 overlooks also the fact that a consciousness of oneself as 
 feehng or relating, active or passive, domineering or yield- 
 ing, is far from implying the capacity to distinguish and 
 state these characters. One may be chaotically, confusedly, 
 dimly, conscious of oneself as unique, inclusive, and as 
 sensationally, affectively, and relationally conscious, but — 
 the personalist will insist — consciousness would not be con- 
 sciousness if it were less than this. 
 
 Another common objection to this doctrine that the self 
 is the immediate datum of consciousness is based upon the 
 discovery of so-called alternating personalities and disso- 
 ciated selves. How, it is urged, can one conceive Janet's 
 patient, the peasant Leonie, as a single, unique self when the 
 supposed Leonie has so plainly been shown to be a composite 
 of different selves, not merely a dull paysanne, but also a viva- 
 cious Leonie, and a serious Leonie — these two revealed in 
 different stages of the hypnotic trance and only imperfectly 
 acquainted with each other.^ And how, once more, can one 
 
 For not only is it true that philosophy must have to do with all facts of 
 all sciences, but it is certain that a personalist philosophy must adopt as its 
 unit that I or self which, to the psychologist, is the unit of what he rightly 
 regards as his slice, merely, of a wider reality. 
 
 > Cf. Sturt, "Idola Theatri," p. 92. 
 
 ' Pierre Janet, "L'automatisme psychologique,'' pp. 132 et al. 
 
4IO Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 attribute the immediate consciousness of self to Dr. Prince's 
 Miss Beauchamp with her four to six personalities,' or to 
 Flournoy's Helene Smith suddenly stripped (it seems) of 
 her own identity and apparently reinstating Cagliostro or 
 Marie Antoinette ? ^ This objection confuses the bare, ever- 
 present centre of self-consciousness with the varying cir- 
 cumference and content. The alternations and dissociations 
 are, in truth, the extreme instances of the variations of mood 
 and interest, the temporary changes due to forgetfulness or 
 to novel associations, which characterize every self, however 
 normal. Through all these variations the consciousness of 
 self persists. One does not lose it when one no longer re- 
 members last summer's happenings or when one's customary 
 serenity gives way to restlessness. In similar fashion, the 
 second or 'spHt-off' personality retains a consciousness, 
 however abnormally altered in specific content, of himself. 
 Indeed the frequently recorded lament of the 'second per- 
 sonality,' "I have lost my old self," would be impossible 
 were not the old self really there to mourn the change.^ 
 
 Besides agreeing in a general way on some such account of 
 the nature of a self, all personal idealists known to the writer 
 hold that there are, in some sense, many selves bound or re- 
 lated to each other. The grounds for this belief that I, the 
 narrow myself, am not all-of-reality must be stated here.* 
 In truth, they have repeatedly come to light. Psychologi- 
 cal introspection reveals that, in being conscious of myself, 
 I am directly conscious of myself as limited; and to be 
 conscious of myself as limited is to be conscious of that 
 which Umits me as being, in a certain sense, beyond my- 
 self. But all philosophic thinking, the personal ideahst 
 believes, must culminate in the conclusion that only self is 
 real. I rightly reason, therefore, that in being directly 
 
 ' "The Dissociation of a Personality," 1905. 
 
 ^ "Des Indes k la planlte Mar," Geneva, 3d ed., 1910. 
 
 ' Cf.K.Oesterreich,"DiePhanomenoIogiedesIch," Leipzig, igio, pp. 343ff. 
 
 * Cf. B. Varisco, "The Great Problems," transl. R. C. Lodge, pp. 16 f., 292 f. 
 
Personal Idealism 4 1 1 
 
 conscious of other-than-myself I am conscious of other self, 
 or selves. Thus, my consciousness of friend, of master, 
 or of God, is in its centre a direct consciousness. The rich 
 details, indeed, which make up what I know as another 
 conscious self, and the concrete lines of division between other 
 selves — these are in great part the results of reflecting, com- 
 paring, reasoning, and interpreting ; but of some reality other 
 than my narrow self I am directly conscious; and I am 
 justified in concluding that this other reality is self or selves. 
 So far, then, all personal ideahsts in the main agree. The 
 question which divides them, the most hotly contested of the 
 modem philosophical issues, concerns the ultimate distinct- 
 ness of the selves. No one disputes, as has appeared, the 
 reaUty, in some highly significant sense, of partial and Umited 
 selves (you and I and all the rest), related one with another. 
 The question is : do these selves constitute the fimdamental, 
 the ultimate reahty, the ne plus ultra of being? At this point 
 the spiritualistic systems of plurahsm and of monism sharply 
 divide. The first teaches that the universe consists, in its 
 ultimate nature, of a community of related selves. The 
 second is the theory that ultimate reahty is in its innermost 
 nature a single individual or person, which differentiates 
 itself into the manifold personaUties and objects of the world 
 as empirically observed. The contrast is that, already 
 studied, between the doctrine of Leibniz, of Berkeley, and of 
 Fichte, and the theory first unequivocally formulated by 
 Hegel, later supported by Lotze (unaware of his essential 
 agreement with Hegel), and finally upheld by the neo- 
 HegeUans in England and in America — among others, 
 by T. H. Green, Edward Caird, Bernard Bosanquet, and 
 Josiah Royce. 
 
 a. Pluralistic Personal Idealism (Personalism) 
 
 There is no more vigorous tendency in modem philosophy 
 than the upspringing in the most distinct quarters of the aca- 
 
412 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 demic world of a pluralistic doctrine. As commanding figures 
 among the pluraUsts stand William James, George Howison, 
 John Dewey, Henri Bergson, Charles Renouvier, James Ward. 
 More or less closely organized groups of pluralistic thinkers 
 are found at Oxford and in the University of Chicago. To 
 the former group belong F. C. S. SchiUer, a disciple of James, 
 Henry Sturt, Hastings Rashdall, and others; the Chicago 
 pluralists, Addison Moore, S. F. MacLennan, and the rest, 
 are former colleagues and pupils of Dewey. Distinct from 
 all these is McTaggart, who founds his pluralism on his ia- 
 terpretation — a misinterpretation, it appears to the writer of 
 this book — of Hegel.' Most, though not aU, of these writers ' 
 combine with their plurahsm a protest against rationahsm 
 in metaphysics, and this protest, under the name of prag- 
 matism, looms large in the philosophical discussion of the 
 day. This 'pragmatism' takes the forms mainly of (i) a 
 constant appeal to direct experience ; (2) a reinstatement of 
 emotional and vohtional, alongside intellectual, factors in 
 consciousness; and (3) an insistence on the practical, that 
 is, the more-than-intellectual significance of truth. These 
 teachings are supposed by those who lay stress upon them 
 to be incompatible with monistic personal ideahsm, and they 
 are, therefore, brought forward as an argument for plurahstic 
 personahsm. The writer of this book beheves, on the con- 
 trary, that these teachings of the ' pragmatists ' are well founded 
 and salutary truths, but that they are as compatible with 
 monistic as with plurahstic doctrine. Accordingly, the 
 pragmatist teachings of the pluralists, important as they are 
 in themselves, wiU not be considered in the discussion, which 
 follows, of the issue between plurahstic and monistic personal 
 ideahsm.^ 
 
 Pluralistic personahsm is the doctrine that ultimate reality 
 
 ' Cf. Chapter 10, pp. 378 seq. 
 
 ' McTaggart and Howison and Ladd are important exceptions. 
 ' Cf. Appendix, p. 559, for an outline and criticism of pragmatist doctrine 
 and its bearings. 
 
Pluralistic Personal Idealism 413 
 
 consists in the community, or society, of all related selves 
 or spirits. It is based on two considerations : the conviction 
 that the experience of every I is unsharable, and the 
 firmly held conception that any I's self-consciousness in- 
 volves the recognition of distinct, other selves. "The very 
 quahty of personahty," Howison says, "is that a person is 
 a being who recognizes others as having a reality as unques- 
 tionable as his own." ^ From this conception it must follow, 
 the pluralists argue, that the monistic doctrine of the partial, 
 or limited, selves, as expressions of the absolute self and in- 
 cluded in its ultimate reahty, does violence to the very essence 
 of selfhood, or personahty. Neither the alleged absolute self 
 nor the partial selves, could, they say, on this view, be selves 
 at all ; the personality of absolute and of partial selves ahke 
 would vanish, since personahty consists in relations to other 
 persons or selves. 
 
 Positively, the pluraUsts teach, this analysis of one's own 
 individual self, this discovery that it includes, as essential part 
 of itself, its relations to others, is the guarantee of the ulti- 
 mately real existence of the other selves in relation with each 
 other and with oneself. This argument is of great impor- 
 tance, for upon it rests the case of the pluralists. It demands, 
 therefore, the most careful comment. The comment will, 
 however, be postponed tiU the argument itself is restated in 
 more detailed opposition to monistic doctrine. For the pres- 
 ent, granting temporarily the basal conception, it is necessary 
 to notice the two forms, theistic and antitheistic, of pluraUstic 
 personal idealism. Of these, the first affirms, and the second 
 denies or questions or ignores, the existence of a supreme 
 self, spirit, or person, in close relation with the finite selves. 
 
 The arguments for God's existence, put forward by con- 
 temporary theistic pluralists, reduce to three main types: 
 first, a group of arguments from the nature of the physical 
 universe ; second, the argument from the imperfection of the 
 
 ' "Limits of Evolution," edition of 1901, p. f (d. pp. 49, 52). 
 
414 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 human self ; third, the argument from the nature of a system. 
 The arguments of the first "type need not here be considered, 
 since they are really restatements of older arguments already 
 discussed. They argue God's existence (i) from the inevi- 
 tableness of our sense experience ; ' (2) from the fact that the 
 physical universe existed ages before human consciousness 
 appeared ; ' and finally (3) from the purposiveness of the 
 nature-world.' Of these arguments, however, as has already 
 appeared,* the first two are capable of proving no more than 
 the existence of an other-than-human spirit; and the last 
 shows at best a probabiUty in favor of God's existence.' 
 The next argument of the theistic pluralists is certainly of 
 far greater importance, for it reasons to the existence of God 
 from an essential character of each partial self. Because of 
 the imperfection of the human self it argues that God, the 
 perfect self, must exist. Of contemporary thinkers none 
 has elaborated this argument with greater subtlety than 
 Professor Howison. The self-dependence of the individual, 
 he argues, is his recognition of his own peculiarity, and this 
 involves his recognition of other selves. "The spirit," he 
 says, "is intrinsically individual, it is itsel] and not any other. 
 But such a getting to exact identity can only be by means of 
 difference; and difference again implies contrast and so 
 reference to others. Thus, in thinking itself as eternally real, 
 each spirit inherently thinks the reahty of all other spirits." 
 And this recognition of others, Howison asserts, impHes the 
 real existence of these others. "This universal self-defin- 
 ing," he continues, "imphes and proclaims the universal 
 reahty, the living presence in all . . . the self-conscious 
 intelligence, and this, presented in all really possible forms 
 
 ' Cf. Howison, op. cii., p. 49. 
 
 ' Cf. RashdaU, in "Personal Idealism," VIII., § 9, p. 376". 
 
 ' Cf. Schiller, "Riddles of the Sphinx," pp. 371', 370' et al. 
 
 * Cf. especially on Berkeley's causal argument for God's existence, Chap- 
 ter 5, pp. I4r seq. 
 
 * Cf. especially Chapter 5, pp. 134 se^., 141 seq.; and (on Kant's discus- 
 sion of the physico-theological argument) Chapter 7, pp. 250 seq. 
 
Pluralistic Personal Idealism 415 
 
 or instances 0} its one abiding nature." The forms of self- 
 conscious intelligence thus impUed — that is, the kinds of 
 other self which the individual spirit contrasts with itself — 
 are two: God and finite selves, or minds. "The world of 
 minds," Howison says, "must embrace first the Supreme 
 Instance in which the self-definer defines himself from every 
 other by the peculiarity of perfect self-fulfilment in eternity, 
 so that all ideal possibilities, all rational perfections, are in 
 him eternally actualized, and there is an absolutely perfect 
 mind, or God, whose very perfection lies in his giving com- 
 plete recognition to all other spirits as the complement in 
 terms of which alone his own self-definition is to himself 
 completely thinkable. But secondly, the world of minds 
 must embrace this complemental world, and every member of 
 this complement, though indeed defining himself against each 
 one of his fellows, must define himself primarily against the 
 Supreme Instance, and so in terms of God. Thus each of 
 them in the act of defining his own reality defines and posits 
 God as real — as the one Unchangeable Ideal who is the 
 indispensable standard upon which the reaHty of each is 
 measured. The price at which alone his reality as self- 
 defining can be had is the self-defining reality of God. If 
 he is real, then God is real ; if God is not real, then neither 
 can he be real." ' 
 
 But it is not possible to admit this conclusion. For though 
 God, the perfect self, is, in truth, as he contends, conceived 
 in any imperfect self's adequate definition of himself, yet the 
 fact that each self thus defines "himself primarily against 
 the Supreme Instance," cannot prove that this Supreme 
 Instance has existence other than that of a necessary human 
 ideal — in Kant's terms a 'transcendental Idea.' Howison's 
 argument is, in other words, in its essentials, precisely the 
 old ontological argument of Anselm, Descartes, and Leibniz.* 
 As Descartes, for example, confused the 'idea of existence' 
 
 ' Op. cit., pp. 3S2'-3S3, 355- Cf. Rashdall, op. cit., §§ 9 and 15. 
 
 ' Cf. Howison's admission (pp. 356* and 359') of the epithet 'ontological.' 
 
41 6 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 with 'existence,' so Howison confuses the 'posited real' or 
 the 'defined as real' with the 'real.' To this criticism of 
 Howison the following rejoinder will perhaps be made: 
 such an argument tells equally against the argument, insisted 
 on by the writer of this book, that in being conscious of one- 
 self one is always conscious of other selves. In reply it should 
 be pointed out that what has been taught is the immediate 
 consciousness, not of other-self, but of other-than-self.^ Not 
 immediately, but through reasoning on the nature of reahty, 
 does one reach the philosophical certainty that the other- 
 than-self is other self or selves. Such an immediate certainty 
 of the other-than-self is far from being the certainty of the 
 existence of any particular self — least of all the certainty of 
 a supreme and perfect self. 
 
 There remains a significant argument suggested by at 
 least one of the pluraHstic personal idealists. It is developed 
 in criticism of the non-theistic pluralist doctrine. All plu- 
 raUstic personaUsm, as has appeared, conceives the universe 
 as complete and interrelated totality of selves. The non- 
 theistic pluraHsm, however, regards these selves as co- 
 ordinate, and fails to admit the existence among them of 
 a supreme self, God. In opposition to this omission of God 
 from the totality of selves, a theistic pluraUst, Dr. Rash- 
 dall, calls attention to the fact that on the basis of ideal- 
 ism, an interrelated system can exist only as the object of a 
 self's consciousness, and then urges that only a supra- 
 human mind can conceive the totality of human selves. 
 Dr. Rashdall explicitly adopts this position in his criticism 
 of McTaggart's form of plurahsm.^ "Mr. McTaggart," he 
 says, "feels that the world must be a Unity, that it con- 
 sists, not merely of souls, but of related and interconnected 
 souls which form a system. But a system for whom ? The 
 idea of a system which is not 'for' any mind at all is not open 
 to an IdeaHst ; and the idea of a world each part of which is 
 
 ' Cf. supra, p. 409. ' Op. cit., p. 393, note. 
 
Pluralistic Personal Idealism 417 
 
 knovm to some mind, but is not knovm as a whole to any one 
 mind, is almost equally difficult. Where then, in his view, 
 is the Mind that knows the whole, i.e. the whole system of 
 souls with the content of each? The difficulty could only 
 be met by making out that each soul is omniscient, and per- 
 haps this is really Mr. McTaggart's meaning. If so, the 
 difficulty of making each soul as an extra-temporal reality 
 omniscient, while as occupying a position in the time-series 
 it is all the time ignorant of much, is one which needs no 
 pointing out. In short, I hold that the ordinary idealistical 
 arguments for a Mind which knows and wills the whole are 
 not invalidated by Mr. Mc Taggart's criticism." 
 
 The difficulty with this argument is in its denial of the 
 partial self's knowing the totality of selves. For — it might 
 be urged by the non-theistic pluraUst — though the partial 
 self does not know in detail each of all the selves, yet it 
 does know the existence and the principle of the totality 
 of all the selves, and accordingly there is no necessity 
 of a mind other-than-partial to know the whole. We need 
 not, however, discuss this argument in detail, for there is at 
 least a grave doubt whether a pluralistic theist has a right 
 to it at all. On the contrary, it might be insisted that the 
 only self capable of being conscious of the totality of finite 
 selves would be a self inclusive of them. This objection 
 introduces the monistic form of personal idealism; and to 
 the discussion of it, it is now the time to turn. 
 
 h. Monistic Personal Idealism 
 
 The remainder of this chapter is devoted, for the most part, 
 to a study of the doctrine of monistic personal idealism. Such 
 a study, as will appear, involves a careful estimate of the 
 arguments in favor of the opposing theory of pluralistic per- 
 sonalism. For the two theories have developed in close and 
 parallel contrast to each other. As has been repeatedly indi- 
 cated, the two systems are fundamentally alike. Both are, 
 
4i8 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 indeed, forms of qualitatively monistic, personal idealism; 
 that is, both regard the [universe as inamaterial, conscious, 
 and personal in its ultimate nature. But whereas the plural- 
 istic systems find ultimate reality in the many individual 
 selves, monistic personaHsm conceives it as consisting in one 
 underlying, all-inclusive Self, manifested or expressed in all 
 the many selves. In Royce's words, "there is but one abso- 
 lutely final and integrated Self, that of the Absolute." * 
 The discussion of this monistic hypothesis will include the 
 consideration, first, of the arguments in its favor; second, of 
 the objections urged against it by the pluralists ; and, finally, 
 of the answers given to the pluralistic difficulties by the 
 specific applications of the doctrine. 
 
 The argument for this monistic, or absolutist, form of per- 
 sonal idealism has been often formulated in the preceding 
 chapters,^ yet it must once more be brought forward. It 
 may be briefly stated in the following propositions, which 
 closely repeat the conclusions of the Hegel chapter. The 
 argument will start from the position, already — in the 
 writer's opinion — estabhshed, shared by monistic with 
 pluralistic personalism, the doctrine that the universe is 
 ultimately consciousness, and that consciousness means 
 selves or Self. Monistic personahsm has only, then, to 
 show reason for its divergence from pluralistic personalism 
 in the teaching that ultimate reality is no system, com- 
 munity, or kingdom of selves, but a Self. 
 
 I. Ultimate reality is no absolute plurality; it does not 
 consist in a plurahty of utterly disconnected imits. For we 
 directly experience relations and connections; every one of 
 the supposably discrete, distinct 'units' is both comparable 
 with and dependent on other units : it implies others in being 
 itself distinct, and it is connected with others by virtue of 
 their all existing. 
 
 Stress should be laid, in the foregoing statement, on the 
 assertion that the relations whose reality is asserted are directly 
 
 • "The World and the Individual," II., p. 289. 
 'Cf. supa, pp. 323, 377 iej. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 419 
 
 experienced, not inferred. Monistic doctrine, in its most 
 justifiable form, starts out, in other words, precisely from 
 the radical empiricism which, in the hands of the pluralists, 
 is moulded to such different ends. 
 
 II. But ultimate reahty is, furthermore, no mere manifold 
 of units which are both distinct and yet related. For abso- 
 lute distinctness and relatedness are mutually exclusive 
 predicates. If the units remain entirely distinct, they are 
 then distinct from the relations as well as from each other; 
 in other words, the relations themselves become mere unre- 
 lated units. So long as the units are, by hypothesis, dis- 
 tinct, so long the supposed relations fail to relate. But 
 relation is experienced, it is immediately known to exist. 
 Hence the alternative, entire distinctness, must be aban- 
 doned. There results the conception of ultimate reality, not 
 as mere including system, but as relater of its parts, not as 
 mere one-of-many, but as unique Individual. And if it be 
 objected that this conclusion, reached as it is by logical analy- 
 sis and ehmination, lacks the confirmation of concrete ex- 
 perience, it may at once be repUed that each one of us has in 
 his consciousness of self the example of a unique being which 
 is a one-of-many. For every self is directly known both 
 as particular, single individual (as this one self), and as one- 
 of-many — as the includer of perceiving, thinking, and feel- 
 ing experiences, and yet as diversified in its constantly varying 
 experiences. In a word, every self is immediately known to 
 be a unique, differentiated one. 
 
 III. The conclusion that ultimate reality is an Absolute, 
 not a mere related plurality, combined with the conclusion, 
 already argued, of all personal idealism, pluralistic as well 
 as monistic, that the irreducible nature of the universe is 
 self, gives — as the final outcome of philosophy — the con- 
 ception of ultimate reality as absolute self. The monistic 
 personalist contends that, imderlying and including all the 
 many selves, there is one absolute self which, by its one- 
 ness, constitutes their relatedness; and that these lessei 
 
420 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 selves — accordingly — are only relatively, or partially, 
 distinct.^ 
 
 It is to be noted that this doctrine is, from many points 
 of view, pluralistic as well as monistic. For, first, like 
 all forms of idealism, the doctrine of the absolute self is 
 qualitatively monistic only in the technical sense of viewing 
 all reality as of-the-nature-of-consciousness, whereas, in so 
 far as consciousness is itself complex, the conception of the 
 absolute self may be termed qualitatively pluralistic. And, 
 second, when unity and plurality are themselves regarded 
 as qualities, plurality as well as unity must be attributed 
 to the absolute self as one-of-many. The important 
 reason for describing the conception of the absolute self 
 as monistic is the following: that it asserts the unique 
 selfhood along with the all-inclusiveness, of the Absolute. 
 
 'The second part of the argument here outlined is based on Bradley's 
 denial of the ultimacy of relations regarded as external to the terms related 
 (cf. p. 381 supra). In opposition to absolutism the independence and 
 externality of relations is maintained by contemporary pluralists. The 
 argument of Russell (cited on p. 381) is typical. He recognizes three doc- 
 trines of relation : (i) the 'monadistic,' which regards relations as inherent 
 in each of several terms; (2) the 'monistic,' or absolutist; and (3) the 
 realistic conception of relations as ultimate realities, (i) He rejects the 
 monadistic conception for the reason advanced by Bradley; a. relation 
 inherent in one of several terms would not connect one term with any other. 
 (2) He opposes the absolutist doctrine on the ground that it regards relations 
 merely as predicates of a subject. Now a subject, he says (§ 426) " cannot 
 be qualified by nothing"; and yet if the relations are something, they are 
 no longer mere predicates. There remains (3) the conception of relations as 
 ultimates. But this doctrine, as Russell realizes, has to meet Bradley's 
 objection that a relation needs relating to its terms, and that the new rela- 
 tions need relating ad infinitum. Russell admits the infinite regress (§ 99) 
 but regards it as 'logically . . . harmless' on the curious ground that the 
 relation {R) of one term (a) to another (i) does not "include in its meaning," 
 though it implies, the relation of i? to a and of R to I. This is, surely, a 
 very quibbling defence of the position that relations are ultimately indepen- 
 dent of the terms which supposedly they relate. And Russell's objection to 
 absolutism is met by the appeal to experience. His dilemma (either the 
 relation is independent of the subject, which it qualifies, or it is nothing) 
 vanishes before the discovery that I am a self relating my diGEerent experi- 
 ences (e.g., two conflicting desires). For this 'relating' and the terms 
 which it relates are alike within me — they are 'something' and they qualify 
 me — and yet they are not ' logically prior ' to me. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 421 
 
 To recapitulate : the doctrine, here set forth, of the absolute 
 self, like the so-called pluralistic doctrine of the universe as 
 composed of many selves, is qualitatively monistic, because 
 it views the universe as conscious in its nature. But, unlike 
 pluralistic personal idealism, the doctrine of the absolute self 
 is also a numerically monistic doctrine, not because it 
 denies the existence of many selves (for it affirms their ex- 
 istence), but because it describes the universe, not only as 
 includer of selves but as One Self. 
 
 The conception should be tested by its application to those 
 particular relations which the pluralist theory, spite of its 
 teaching of the fundamental distinctness of the many selves, 
 none the less admits as existing between them. Fundamen- 
 tally, these reduce to three main groups : cognitive, affective, 
 active. It is held by all pluralists ^ that these selves are in 
 their ultimate nature aware of each other, and by most plu- 
 ralists that the selves are emotionally affected by each other 
 and that they actively influence each other. But monistic ' 
 doctrine insists that the consciousness of another self, what- 
 ever its character, requires the ultimate unity of the self 
 which knows, feels, or wills, with that self which is known, 
 felt, or influenced. Absolute distinctness, the monist teaches, 
 would carry with it the impossibility of such relation; the 
 experienced fact of the relation indicates, beyond a per- 
 adventure, the ultimate unity of the related selves. The real 
 uniqueness and the recognized distinctness of each self which 
 the pluraUst emphasizes are, the monist insists, relative to 
 the unique oneness of the absolute self. 
 
 To all this, the pluralist reiterates the objection: this 
 doctrine does rank violence to the experience on which it 
 rests ; it ignores the unambiguous consciousness of each one 
 of us: I exist for myself,^ though in contrast with other 
 selves ; and the independence of these other selves is required 
 
 1 The terms 'pluralist' and 'monist,' as used in this chapter, refer o{ 
 course to numerically pluralistic and monistic thinkers. 
 ^ Cf. Rashdall, op. cit., pp. 383 scq. 
 
422 Coniemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 both by my experienced relations to them, in particular, by 
 my relation of obligation,* and by the experienced un- 
 sharableness of my own consciousness. In reply to these 
 objections, the monistic personalist attempts to show that 
 the ultimate reality of the absolute self leaves room for an 
 independence of the finite selves such as is required by the 
 facts of experience. In replying to the pluralist objection, 
 the monist thus develops his own system. In the following 
 pages the doctrines of the monists will be discussed, with 
 special reference to pluralistic arguments, in the following 
 order: first, the nature of the absolute self; second, the in- 
 dividuality of the human self. 
 
 I. The nature of the absolute self 
 
 Fundamental to the study of other problems of monistic 
 personalism is the analysis of the conception of the absolute 
 self. Here it is of capital importance to remember that the 
 term 'self,' as apphed to the Absolute, must mean, qualita- 
 tively, precisely what it means in its application to human 
 selves. To call the absolute reality self is meaningless, 
 unless there is then attributed to the absolute self a con- 
 sciousness which is hke that of finite selves.^ From finite 
 selves the absolute self must, it is true, differ; but it differs 
 by virtue of its absoluteness, not by virtue of its selfhood.' 
 One may be guided, therefore, in the study of the nature of 
 the absolute self by the following principle : to attribute to 
 the absolute self all experiences and characters of the finite 
 self which are essential to selfhood, but not to attribute to it 
 any quaUties which are inconsistent with absoluteness. If 
 this prove impossible, — if it be shown, in other words, that 
 a self is necessarily characterized by relativity, that is, by limi- 
 
 • Cf. Howison, op. cit., p. 353'. Cf. also Fichte, cited supra, pp. 315 seq. 
 ' Cf., in confirmation, Rashdall's discussion of God's consciousness, op. 
 cit; § 15, PP- 386 seq. 
 
 ' Cf. criticism on Fichte, infra. Chapter 9, p. 358. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 423 
 
 tation from without, or conversely, if it be shown that an 
 absolute reality necessarily lacks some of the essential char- 
 acters of a self, — then the concept of absolute self will 
 perish, as it were, by its own hands in disclosing its inner 
 contradictoriness. It is, however, the belief of the monistic 
 personal idealist that the two characters, selfhood and abso- 
 luteness, are compatible. In what follows the effort will be 
 made to exhibit this compatibiUty. Negatively it will be 
 pointed out that the absoluteness of the Self prevents our 
 conceiving it as primarily or exclusively temporal. This 
 follows from the evident incompleteness and contradiction of 
 time.' An absolute self is at least a complete self, and the 
 very essence of time is its incompleteness. Thus, the Abso- 
 lute must be conceived as supra-temporal, as immediately 
 conscious of what appears to finite selves as present, past, 
 or future. This character of the absolute self will be later 
 considered in the discussion of the relation of absolute to 
 partial self. 
 
 The immediate problem of this study of the absolute self 
 is the discovery of those experiences and characters of the 
 partial self which may be attributed to the absolute. For 
 the purposes of a rough analysis, these may be grouped as, 
 on the one hand, forms of consciousness: (i) perceiving 
 and imagining, (2) thinking, (3) feeling (emotion), (4) affirm- 
 ing (willing and believing) ; and in the second place moral 
 quality (goodness and badness). 
 
 (i) To begin with the form of consciousness first named : 
 perception has four noticeable features. It includes a peculiar 
 group of elemental, conscious experiences — sensations, as 
 they are usually called; it involves the passive accept- 
 ance by the human self of these sensational experiences; 
 it is a direct, an unmediated, consciousness ; and finally, per- 
 ception is an experience regarded as shared: the actual or 
 possible consciousness of oneself as experiencing what one 
 
 ' Cf. pp. 441 f*7. 
 
424 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 feels that any number of other selves do or may experience.' 
 Now it is necessary to attribute to the absolute self the first 
 and third of these factors of experience, sensuousness and 
 immediateness. All the consciousness of the absolute self, 
 in its absoluteness, is immediate, since mediation requires 
 time, whereas the absolute must be supra-temporal.^ It is 
 equally evident that the absolute self must have sensational 
 consciousness, since he must experience every sort and variety 
 of consciousness which is experienced by human selves — 
 otherwise, of course, the absolute self would miss what the 
 finite self possesses. In Royce's words:' "Unless the Abso- 
 lute knows what we know when we endure and wait, when 
 we love and struggle, when we long and suffer, the Absolute 
 in so far is less and not more than we are." The old ration- 
 alistic view which denied sense experience to God, which 
 thought it impious to conceive of God as smelling or tast- 
 ing, really derogates from the infiniteness, the completeness, 
 of God's consciousness.* But though the sensuousness and 
 the immediacy of perception are rightly attributed to the 
 absolute self, he cannot, in the hiaman way, experience its 
 passivity. For passivity in any ultimate sense is evidently 
 a consequence of the hmitation of the human self. To the 
 Absolute, whose being constitutes reality, there can be noth- 
 ing utterly unavoidable. We see and hear what we must see 
 and hear, but the absolute self must be free and uncompelled, 
 in his seeing and hearing, as in all his experiences. There 
 remains the question whether the absolute self may be said 
 to perceive in the sense of sharing his sense consciousness 
 
 ' For justification of these psychological distinctions of this section, cf. 
 the author's "An Introduction to Psychology," Chap. 14, pp. i6g jej./ and 
 "Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie" (Veit u. Cie., 1905), pp. ^oseq. 
 
 ' Cf. pp. 442 seq. below. 
 
 ' "The World and the Individual," II., p. 364. 
 
 ' Doubtless this common, rationalistic doctrine is based on the convic- 
 tion that God, if he had sense consciousness, must possess bodily organs. 
 Yet no theist denies thought and will to God, though they, also, are corre- 
 lated with bodily changes. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 425 
 
 with other selves. An affirmative answer to this question is 
 at least possible. For, as the next section will show in more 
 detail, the existence of the absolute self cannot be taken as 
 denying the existence of the finite and perceiving selves. 
 The perception (if the term be allowed) of the absolute self 
 may well, then, be defined as the sense consciousness which 
 he shares with the finite selves, included within him. 
 
 At this point emerges the following question: does the 
 absolute self not only perceive, but imagine? For imagina- 
 tion, as possessed by human beings, is distinguished from 
 perception precisely herein that imagination is regarded as a 
 primarily private unshared experience, whereas in perception 
 one regards other selves as sharing one's sensational con- 
 sciousness. Now imagination, in at least one allied meaning 
 of the term, may be attributed to the absolute self.' Human 
 selves imagine possibilities contrary to fact. I may, for in- 
 stance, imagine that Columbus did not discover America; 
 but my imagination must be object of the consciousness of 
 the absolute self — else there were, ^er impossibile, conscious 
 experience outside him; and the Absolute's consciousness 
 of this idea of mine as relatively unshared may, not imfairly, 
 be called imagination.^ 
 
 It is necessary, then, to conclude that the absolute self must 
 have, Hke the finite selves, all varieties of elemental sense 
 experience; that he may share it with conscious finite 
 
 ' On two grounds objection is often made to this conception of imagina- 
 tion. It is urged that our habit of describing imagined scenes proves our 
 belief that imaginations may be shared; and that, on the other hand, per- 
 ceptions as truly as imaginations are unshared. In answer to this last 
 objection it should be noted that perception has been defined, not as actually 
 shared experience (for from a psychological standpoint that question is 
 not raised), but as experience regarded as shared; and it is certain that 
 we do habitually believe ourselves to be seeing with others. With refer- 
 ence to the charge that description presupposes the consciousness of 
 imagination as shared, it may be pointed out that the aim of description 
 is to create similar, rather than identical, experience ; in other words, I call 
 on you not to share my imagination, but merely to form an image like mine. 
 
 2 Cf. Lotze, "Metaphysics," Book I., chapter 6, 79, p. 183. 
 
426 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 selves; but that the passivity which belongs to all human 
 perception is incompatible with the experience of the Self 
 who inhabits eternity and beyond whom is no reality. 
 
 (2) The second of the definite questions proposed in this 
 section is the following : may the absolute self be said to think ? 
 Tradition, which has almost uniformly denied the perceptual 
 nature of the supra-human consciousness, has here no objec- 
 tion to offer. Thought, Hke perception, is realized as a shared 
 consciousness; it is contrasted with perception in the fol- 
 lowing ways : it is characterized by relational not by sensa- 
 tional elements ; it is, in general, more complete, less frag- 
 mentary, than perception ; ' it is a more indirect or mediate 
 consciousness ; finally, a certain necessity is attributed to it. 
 In the first of these aspects, thought must evidently be attrib- 
 uted to the absolute self. Absoluteness involves inclusive- 
 ness of experience and the absolute self must be conscious 
 of every shade and variety of likeness, difference, union, and 
 opposition, no less than of every hue, tint, odor, and form. 
 It is equally evident that the absolute self-consciousness must 
 be characterized by a necessity deeper than that of any par- 
 tial self's consciousness, and by a completeness which human 
 experience approximates only in the form of thought. Be- 
 tween our fragmentary, relatively unconnected, perceptions 
 and the systems of thought in which percepts and images 
 are linked in well-ordered dependence, one on the other, 
 there is indeed a marked contrast. The absolute self, also, 
 is conscious of well-ordered wholes ; but his whole is the com- 
 plete sphere of reality, and he has not to attain this complete- 
 ness of insight in a slow and mediated way. Thus, the 
 mediacy and the indirectness of thinking — evidenced es- 
 pecially in the slow process of syllogistic reasoning — must 
 be foreign to the absolute consciousness. The Self, which 
 knows and is all, does not gain truth by degrees, or see it 
 bit by bit. To borrow a term from traditional metaphysics, 
 
 ' Cf. Royce, "The Conception of God," pp. 27 iej. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 427 
 
 the absolute self has intelleUuale Anschauung, thought-in- 
 tuition ; he unites the directness of human perception with 
 more than the completeness of human thought. Thus, to 
 recapitulate and complete this section of the discussion: 
 the absolute self must contain all the characteristic elements 
 of the thought consciousness; his must be indeed the only 
 really necessary and complete consciousness. The absolute 
 self may, furthermore, share his thoughts, no less than his 
 percepts, with finite selves. The mediacy and indirectness 
 of human thought is, however, incompatible with his abso- 
 luteness. 
 
 (3) Emotions constitute the next great group of human 
 experiences, and accordingly the next problem of the present 
 discussion is the question whether emotional consciousness 
 may be attributed to the absolute self. The answer to the 
 question, of course, requires a preliminary analysis. In the 
 opinion of the present writer, emotion is a doubly individual- 
 izing, passive, and affective experience.^ That is to say, in 
 emotion I am profoxmdly conscious of myself as affected, 
 happily or unhappily, by selves or objects which I individu- 
 alize, differentiate from the mass of selves or things, in being 
 emotionally conscious of them. These characters are best 
 considered in reverse order. To begin with, since the 
 absolute self is utterly complete, it must have every sort of 
 experience, and therefore the affective experience in both its 
 phases, pleasure and pain.^ Here, again, we do violence to 
 traditional philosophy. For centuries past, expositors of 
 the nature of the supra-human self, Greek mythologists and 
 Christian theologians ahke, have denied the possibility of 
 his suffering — have represented him as secure from the 
 human lot of misery and sorrow. Philosophical upholders 
 
 '"An Introduction to Psychology," second edition, pp. 264-266; "Der 
 doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie," p. 58. 
 
 ' The word 'pain' is here used, for want of an exact opposite to 'pleasure,' 
 in a psychologically inaccurate sense, not to designate the dermal sense con- 
 sciousness due to laceration, but to mean 'consciousness of the unpleasant.' 
 
428 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 of this doctrine have, it is true, admitted the necessity of 
 reconciUng it with that of the completeness of the divine con- 
 sciousness; and they have attempted this reconcihation by 
 distinguishing divine, or supra-human, knowledge from feel- 
 ing, and by the teaching that the supra-human self knows 
 pain without feeling it.' In the opinion of the present writer, 
 this distinction is psychologically unjustifiable. One can 
 no more know pain without feeling it, than one can know 
 color without seeing it. And, more than this, the doctrine 
 buttressed by this shaky psychology is, after aU, incompatible 
 with the conception of the absolute self's completeness and 
 all-inclusiveness of experience. Pain, as felt, is as distinct 
 and elemental a kind of consciousness as color or form or 
 pleasure; it must, therefore, constitute an element of the 
 absolute experience. 
 
 It is thus evident that the absolute self must be affectively 
 conscious. But affection is one aspect only of emotion. 
 A second aspect, passivity, so far as it belongs to the ab- 
 solute self, is a subordinated factor.^ On this character, 
 not universally attributed to emotion, it is, however, unim- 
 portant to lay much stress. But the final factor of emotion, 
 its doubly individuahzing tendency, is of the greatest signifi- 
 cance. In feehng, my own central personahty is the object 
 of my individuahzing attention, always as related to some 
 special other self, or special object. In perception and in 
 thought also, I am, it is true, conscious of other selves 
 as sharing my experience, but these are 'any' or 'all' selves, 
 whereas in loving or in hating it is a particular self of whom 
 I am conscious. Such an individuahzing consciousness 
 must, now, be attributed to the absolute self if any human 
 individual is in any sense admitted to exist. For the absolute 
 self, with his perfect knowledge, could know such limited 
 individual self only as particular and unique. Now intro- 
 spection testifies that I, at least, exist ; and evidently, there- 
 
 1 Cf. Berkeley, "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," III. 
 ^ Cf. infra, pp. 451-452. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 429 
 
 fore, since the absolute self is affectively conscious, he must 
 be able affectively to individualize me. 
 
 (4) In attributing to the absolute self the active experience 
 of will, we are once more in accord with much of traditional 
 philosophy. By will is meant the active, dominating relation 
 of a self to other selves or to things ; ^ and it is plain that 
 the Self of which all other real beings, selves or not-selves, are 
 the expressions, must be actively, assertively related to them. 
 Activity must be, indeed, the fundamental character of the 
 absolute self ; and will, the supreme, assertive attitude, must 
 be the basal relation of absolute to partial self. The human 
 self is, thus, in the deepest sense, an expression of absolute 
 will, in other words, a particular purpose of the absolute 
 self; and in this sense the Absolute is the creator, or cause, 
 of finite realities, which exist as his purposes. A later 
 section of this chapter will discuss the possibility of the 
 partial freedom of these finite selves. For the present, it 
 will suffice to suggest that, by this conception of the Absolute 
 as essentially a willing, active self, absolutist philosophy, in 
 the form in which this book upholds it, meets a criticism 
 often made by pragmatists and by other anti-rationalists. 
 These critics object to the reduction of the world, so rich in 
 will and in feeling, to the purely logical universe of an abso- 
 lute thinker. It is obvious that the criticism does not apply 
 to the conception of an Absolute who feels and wills. Yet 
 there remains a real opposition between the pragmatist and 
 the absolutist conception of will. In the view of the prag- 
 matist, will has always a reference to the future and he 
 opposes absolutism as denying (so he believes) the reaUty 
 of struggle and of progress. The place of temporal reality, 
 in the world of the Absolute, will be considered later. But it 
 must here be emphasized that will is not always, or even 
 primarily, an attitude toward the future. The human will 
 may indeed be directed toward the future event, but 
 will does not necessarily look toward the future; it is, 
 ^ Cf. "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 307 jej. 
 
430 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 primarily, an active, subordinating attitude of one self to 
 another, in which time may be left out of account. 
 
 This attempted analysis of the absolute self-conscious- 
 ness would be culpably incomplete if it halted here. For, 
 besides the predicates, 'knowing,' 'feeling,' and 'willing,' 
 by which we characterize human selves, there are the so- 
 called moral attributes, 'good' and 'bad.' And one of the 
 peculiarities of these attributes is their opposition : a self is 
 a knowing, feeling, and willing self ; but it is not, either once 
 for all or at one and the same time, both a good and a bad self. 
 The present problem is, therefore, whether either goodness 
 or badness, or both goodness and badness, or neither, should 
 be predicated of the absolute self. It must be remembered 
 that this question is asked of the absolute self, in its absolute- 
 ness. That the absolute self includes what we know as good- 
 ness and badness is as certain as the existence of good and 
 evil finite selves, or even as the existence of a single self, 
 alternately good and bad. But this inquiry concerns the 
 individuality of the Absolute, as absolute, the individuality 
 which is manifested in, and not made up by, that of the human 
 selves. Is the one real Self, the self whose selfhood is un- 
 shared with any partial self, good or bad, both, or neither? 
 
 To one of these questions, a negative answer may at once 
 be given. An absolute self is a complete, a consistent, not 
 a self-contradictory consciousness. Therefore, since 'good' 
 and 'bad' are antithetical, an absolute self-consciousness is 
 not, as absolute, both good and bad. And it will further- 
 more appear, if one follow the clue of human analogy, that 
 an absolute self -consciousness is not itself bad. For observa- 
 tion indicates that moral badness is a function of partialness. 
 It is a commonplace of practical ethics that the more closely 
 self-centred or selfish I — the single self — become, the 
 more morally defective I grow. In other words : the greater 
 my emphasis on myself, as distinguished from other selves, 
 the greater my sin. And the converse is true : the self who 
 sees others as belonging within the confines of his own true 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 431 
 
 self will do justice and love mercy and fulfil all the ideals 
 of moral goodness. It v/ill follow, if this analogy may 
 properly be extended, that the Absolute who recognizes all 
 finite selves as parts of himself, the Self whose selfhood is 
 complete and all-extensive, will rightly be named 'good.' 
 
 A real difficulty is, however, involved in the reconciliation 
 of the possible or probable goodness of the absolute self with 
 the actually experienced evils of the universe. How, if the 
 absolute self be inherently good, can the universe contain 
 the evil which we directly know? Anti-theistic, pluralist 
 idealism does not, of course, encounter this problem, for it 
 finds no difficulty in attributing evil to any limited self. 
 Even theistic personalism may avoid the difficulty if it frankly 
 conceive God, after F. C. S. Schiller's fashion, as a finite, 
 though greater-than-human, self. The prevailing religious 
 consciousness, on the other hand, acutely feels this difficulty 
 of monistic personahsm. For the rehgious consciousness has 
 inherited the conviction of God's power, and believes itself 
 to experience his goodness : it consequently realizes the 
 difficulty of proving this goodness in the face of the shatter- 
 ing and devastating evils of human experience. It is pri- 
 marily of importance not to behttle the problem. A shallow 
 optimism, which neglects the evil either from selfish pre- 
 occupation with personal good fortune, or from an arbitrarily 
 limited observation of nature-adaptations, offers no founda- 
 tion for the doctrine that the absolute self is not merely 
 all-real, all-powerful, and all-knowing, but all-good. The 
 goodness of the absolute self, if it be not compatible with the 
 existence of actual suffering and real sin, is a baseless fic- 
 tion, not a sober metaphysical doctrine. 
 
 The abstract requirements of a conception of the absolute 
 self as good are readily outlined. If the absolute self, in its 
 absoluteness, is to be good, not bad, and if yet the evil must 
 be regarded as actual, then evil must be a subordinate factor, 
 or element, of the good : it must be evil, in isolation, yet 
 capable of forming part of a total good, somewhat as a chord 
 
432 ConteTnporary P hilosophical Systems 
 
 which, taken by itself, is a discord, may yet form a part of a 
 larger harmony. Two considerations ably set forth, years 
 ago, by Professor Royce,^ establish, in the writer's opinion, 
 the possibiUty — nay, the probability — of this view of evil 
 as a transcended factor in the experience of the absolute 
 self. The first of these is an undoubted fact of human con- 
 sciousness: the experience that suffering nobly borne and 
 temptation vanquished enrich the life and strengthen the 
 character — in a word, that they are elements of a wider 
 good. Every human self which knows, however intermit- 
 tently, the strength developed by resistance of moral seduc- 
 tions and the rich fruits of sorrow patiently endured, knows 
 that the "hours of mortal moral strife, alone aright reveal" 
 the deepest goodness of the soul. From this point of view, 
 the evils of our human existence are the elements of an ex- 
 perience which, regarded in its totality, is good, not evil. 
 And the absolute self's consciousness of these evils, as in 
 themselves bad, is such a consciousness as the good man's 
 experience of temptation : he is aware of the luring thought, 
 of the enticing evil, but he is not morally defiled by this 
 awareness of evil, for he is conscious of the bad only to hate 
 it ; he recognizes evil only to vanquish it. So the Absolute, 
 which is the complete self, must indeed be conscious of sor- 
 row and of sin, but is conscious of them only in conquering 
 them, and is not, therefore, evil by the fact of including 
 evil. 
 
 To this conception of the goodness of the absolute self, 
 the following objection may be made : It has indeed — it 
 may be admitted — been shown how evil, granted its exist- 
 ence, may be a subordinate part of the absolute self. But 
 why, it may be urged, does evil exist at all, if all that exists 
 is willed, assented to, or chosen, by an absolute and yet a 
 good self ? It is easy to see how suffering greatly borne and 
 temptation fiercely fought may be the self-assertions of an 
 
 ' "Spirit of Modem Philosophy," Lecture XIII., pp. 440 seq. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 433 
 
 absolutely good self. But there is sin and sorrow which can- 
 not, it is insisted, be regarded as the objects of the will of a 
 good and yet an absolute self — in terms of theology, of a 
 God who permits them. Griefs which narrow and belittle 
 the mind, unresisted temptations which work the ruin of the 
 soul, contaminating vice with its entail of hopeless misery 
 and multiplying sin, — all these, it is urged, are evils of so 
 positive a nature that they must taint the goodness of the 
 self which, by virtue of its absoluteness, actually must have 
 willed them, inasmuch as they exist. 
 
 Only one reply can be made to this objection. The abso- 
 lute self, because complete, includes — it has been shown — 
 all human experience as integral part of himself. It follows 
 that the absolute self has all the experience that the human 
 selves have. In a real sense, therefore, he shares our sor- 
 row, is afflicted in our affliction, knows our grief. No an- 
 guish can wring the human heart but is felt by the absolute 
 self ; no self-contempt can flame up within the human spirit 
 but is experienced by the all-including self. In other words, 
 the absolute self is no God afar off, no supreme Being who 
 decrees misery that he does not share, no divinity who feasts 
 and delights in a distant Olympus, while below him his 
 human subjects toil and sin and suffer. But it is not conceiv- 
 able that a self whose will constitutes reaUty should will his 
 own evil, if that evil be positive and unconquered. The fact 
 that the absolute self shares in human suffering is, thus, 
 a guarantee that the sorrow is neither final nor ultimate, 
 that sin and misery, to human view irreconcilable with good- 
 ness, are none the less the elements — but the transcended 
 elements — of the experience of an absolute and good self. 
 It must be conceded that this reply to the objection of those 
 who hold that the absolute self, because he wills and asserts 
 the evil, cannot be good, offers no explanation of the exist- 
 ence of the deepest human suffering. No finite self, indeed, 
 has ever probed this tragic mystery. What has been insisted 
 on is simply this : that the existence of evil is reconcilable, 
 
434 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 though not by us at this stage of our development, with the 
 goodness of the absolute self. And the grounds of this con- 
 clusion are simply these : the absolute self has willed his own 
 evil, as well as ours; and would not have affirmed it save 
 as subordinated to a wider good. 
 
 This analysis of the consciousness to be attributed to 
 an absolute self gives the following results : it has been 
 found that the absolute self has all the elemental experiences 
 — sensational, affective, relational — of human selves ; that 
 he is conscious of himself as actively related to the finite selves, 
 included within himself ; that his experience is utterly complete. 
 Because of this completeness, however, the absolute experi- 
 ence, as absolute, lacks the essential temporality, the mediacy, 
 and the passivity of the human consciousness. The more 
 general conclusions from the discussion are, first, a convic- 
 tion of the richness of this absolute self-consciousness and of 
 the consequent impossibility of defining it in terms of any one 
 of its aspects — whether Thought, or Will, or Love. Only 
 when thought (for example) is taken, after Hegel's fashion, to 
 mean self-consciousness can it be rightly used as synonym 
 for the absolute, and consequently complete, experience. 
 It is observable, in the second place, that the attempt to clas- 
 sify the absolute self-consciousness has broken certain lines 
 of division necessary to a purely human psychology ; and that 
 it is indeed, therefore, impossible to conceive the absolute 
 self as perceiving, thinking, or feeUng, in the precise sense 
 which psychology gives to these terms. Perception and 
 thought merge the one into the other, when perception has 
 lost its passivity and thought its mediateness. Similarly, 
 emotion approaches will when it is conceived as an active 
 form of consciousness. The main distinction in the absolute 
 self's consciousness really — it appears — lies between his 
 unparticularizing consciousness (roughly coordinate, but not 
 identical, with human perception and thought), and his 
 strongly individualizing consciousness (coordinate with emo- 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 435 
 
 tion and will), the aspects of his experience which demand 
 the existence of sharply differentiated, unique, partial selves. 
 The problems involved in the conception of these partial 
 selves must now be discussed. These problems are the 
 nature of the individuality attributed to these human selves ; 
 the reasons for attributing to human selves, which are 
 expressions of an absolute self, any individuality; and the 
 reconciliation of human with absolute individuahty. 
 
 2. Human individuality * 
 
 The issue between pluralistic personal idealism and the 
 monistic personahsm, which this chapter outlines and de- 
 fends, is simply this : Plurahst and monist alike are imme- 
 diately certain of human individuality, 'the essentially unique 
 being ' ^ of the human self. The monist, however, reasons 
 that ultimate reaUty must consist in absolute self. To this 
 doctrine the pluralist offers two significant objections. He 
 urges, first, that the conception of a self as including selves 
 involves an impossibility, second, that the existence of the 
 human selves merely as manifestations of an including 
 absolute self would make human individuality impossible. 
 The monist has, thus, the alternative of meeting these objec- 
 
 ' In this section, Professor Royce's teaching is substantially followed. 
 In the opinion of the present writer no one has dealt so subtly and so satis- 
 factorily with the problems involved in the reconciliation of the rights of indi- 
 viduality with the impUcations of an absolutist, a numerically monistic, 
 idealism. The present section, then, is based throughout upon the teach- 
 ings of Royce, as formulated in the "Conception of God" and in the "World 
 and the Individual," especially Series II. 
 
 The divergences from Royce's teaching concern chiefly what may be called 
 his psychology and his terminology. These divergences are more apparent 
 in the section which has preceded than in this. They are, in particular, these : 
 (i) The term 'experience' is used in the broad sense 'consciousness,' not as 
 by Royce, for equivalent of 'presentation' or 'brute fact.' (2) Royce's 
 contrast, to the writer inherently vague and unanalyzed, between 'brute fact' 
 and ' idea' is not made. (3) Will is not, as by Royce, identified with attention. 
 (4) Positively, the conception of all forms of consciousness as relations of 
 selves is insisted on. (Cf. also note, injra, p. 438.) 
 
 'Royce, "Conception of God" (1902), p. 241'. 
 
436 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 tions or of abandoning either the immediate certainty that 
 human selves exist or the inferred doctrine that the universe 
 is absolute self. In defence of his first objection, the plurahst 
 insists : The monist conceives what is directly contrary to 
 human experience. Misled by a spatial metaphor, he talks 
 of minds as if they were ' Chinese boxes which can be put inside 
 of each other,' ^ whereas one self simply cannot include 
 another self. Now it is open to the monist to retort : Plu- 
 rahsm involves the reality of an experience at least equally 
 inconceivable, in that it conceives of essentially distinct 
 selves as aware of each other. The reality of my experience 
 of other selves involves, the monist well may insist, the only 
 sort of 'inclusion* of selves within an absolute self which 
 monism claims. But to meet charge with counter charge 
 is an unsatisfying argument, even when, as here, one beheves 
 that one's opponent's inconsistency impHes the truth that he 
 criticises. The monist has, in fact, a reply far better than a 
 tu quoque to the plurahst 's charge. For he can show that 
 the private experience of each one of us furnishes the exam- 
 ple of a self inclusive of selves. How sharply, for example, 
 I distinguish my childhood self, the self of one jubilant year 
 of youth, the self of a period of philosophic vagaries, from what 
 I know as my whole self, myself par excellence. Even with- 
 out the distinction by temporal periods, I am conscious of 
 well-differentiated partial selves within myself — of a radical 
 and a conservative self, a frivolous and a strenuous self, for 
 example. Such self-differentiation of the finite self makes 
 it impossible to deny a priori the inclusion of partial selves 
 within the absolute self. 
 
 At this point the plurahst may suggest the following dif- 
 ficulties. The conception of absolute monism supposes, 
 he will urge, the existence of an Absolute which is not only 
 includer but also self. And this unique personahty must 
 be regarded, the plurahst says, as indivisible. Hence, he 
 
 ' RashdaU, of. cit., VIII., § 15, p. 388'- 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 437 
 
 proceeds, if the absolute self is in any partial self, it must be 
 all in that self. But this is impossible, for it would make such 
 a partial self absolute; and it follows that the absolute self 
 cannot be in any partial self. Otherwise put, the plurahst 
 continues, the aspect or character that constitutes the Ab- 
 solute a person is just the aspect in which he is contrasted 
 with any partial self — with you or me. On this side, he 
 doesn't include us; hence it is not as unique self that 
 he is absolute; hence his personality as such is limited 
 personality — limited by what is not it. Hence as person he 
 is not absolute. The appeal of this objection (which recalls 
 a famous passage of the " Parmenides ") is due partly to the 
 spatial metaphor ilhcitly suggested by the word ' indivisible ' ; 
 and partly to the assumption that personality is a mere aspect 
 of the Absolute. In reply the monist insists that the Absolute, 
 and not a mere character of the Absolute, is personality or 
 self; and he energetically denies that the Absolute is indi- 
 visible in the sense which this argument requires : only a 
 spatial unit, he holds, is in this sense either divisible or indi- 
 visible. Just as I, John Smith, know myself as constituting 
 both my childhood and my adult self, and therefore as op- 
 posed or limited by neither of them, and just as I know my- 
 self, also, as more than any sum of partial selves or experiences 
 so the absolute person includes us, the partial selves, and 
 yet his personality is neither exhausted nor hmited by that of 
 any partial self. 
 
 But the pluralist, it will be remembered, has another ob- 
 jection to the doctrine of an absolute self. Even if finite 
 selves were 'included,' in some sense, within the absolute 
 self, they would lack, the pluralist insists, all that we call in- 
 dividuality; they would be unparticularized selves, each 
 distinguished only by numerical position, from all the others, 
 since each would be merely the expression of the one and 
 same absolute self. In meeting this objection, it is necessary, 
 first, to undertake a close scrutiny of the nature of individu- 
 ality. The results of such a scrutiny have been suggested 
 
438 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 in the preceding section of this chapter. The individual is 
 the unique, and since all reality is conscious self, an indi- 
 vidual is such through and for the individualizing conscious- 
 ness. But, as has appeared, one individualizes when one feels 
 or wills.* There is nothing individualizing in the merely per- 
 ceiving or thinking consciousness. The objects of perception 
 or of thought are members of a group and replaceable one 
 by the other. I see things common to every man's vision, 
 I think thoughts sharable with any minds. But with the 
 objects of my feeling, as with those of my will, it is different. 
 The object of liiy love or of my hate is unique, and not to be 
 replaced by any one, however similar. I envy or pity this 
 man, this child ; I am thrilled with the beauty of this sunset ; 
 I feel myself as individual in relation to this other individual. 
 In a word, no one — however similar — can take the place 
 of the particular and unique object of my emotion or will. 
 The essence of individuahty is evidently, then, uniqueness, 
 the character of being irreplaceable. And the problem of the 
 compatibility of human personaUty with the absoluteness of 
 the One Self reduces to this : does the existence of the ab- 
 solute self permit or preclude the existence of unique partial 
 selves ? 
 
 The monist imdertakes to show that the existence of the 
 absolute self not merely permits, but requires, the existence 
 of unique, included, human selves. The proof is the follow- 
 ing: It has been shown already that the absolute self, if he 
 exist, must be hke human selves. Therefore, the absolute 
 self must possess the individualizing consciousness, and his 
 absoluteness must not thereby be lessened. Now the abso- 
 luteness of the self is not derogated from, the monist insists, 
 by the existence of lesser selves within himself. In fact, 
 
 ' Taylor, and Royce (in certain passages, not in others) , seem to the writer 
 unduly to limit the conception of individuality by identifying it exclusively 
 with will and purpose. (Cf. Taylor, o-p. cit., pp. 57, 98; Royce, "Concep- 
 tion of God," 1902, pp. 222, 268 seq.) The unique, however, is object of 
 emotion as well as of will. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 439 
 
 the absolilte self-consciousness would be less rich and com- 
 plete — which is impossible — than the human conscious- 
 ness, if the absolute self were incapable of individualizing, 
 of distinguishing through personal feeling and will, the 
 mutually exclusive parts of himself. Thus viewed, the exist- 
 ence of distinct individuals, each representing a different 
 emotion or purpose of the absolute self, is not merely recon- 
 cilable with his existence, but essential to the completeness 
 and fulness of his experience. And not only is the multi- 
 plicity of individuals essential to the Absolute, but the exist- 
 ence of the Absolute is necessary to insure to each partial 
 self its individuality. For individuality, on which the plural- 
 ist lays such stress, is a shifting, contradictory affair imless 
 defined from the standpoint of the absolute self. A given 
 human being is this to one of his friends and this to another 
 and still a third this to himself. He would possess no one 
 individuaUty were he not, fundamentally, the expression of the 
 unique individualizing consciousness of the absolute self. 
 Thus, this monistic personalism does not involve, as its op- 
 ponents assert, the loss of human individuality. You and 
 I, so far from being swallowed up in the absolute self, so 
 far from being lost or engulfed in the ultimate I, find the 
 guarantee of our individual reality precisely herein that we are 
 essential and unique expressions of this absolute self. It is 
 idle to raise the question, might the absolute self have existed 
 without me — you — him ? For as a matter of direct ob- 
 servation, I at least exist in relation to other-than-my- 
 self. Hence the absolute self is a self which includes this 
 precise, finite self. But since his reality is absolute, it follows 
 that whatever exists is expression of him. Thus, because the 
 Absolute is as he is, I am what I am. 
 
 In the end, therefore, we reassert the monistic, and yet 
 personalistic, doctrine. Ultimate reality is absolute self, not 
 a totality of related conscious selves, but a Self, inclusive of 
 the many selves, yet characterized by a single personahty. 
 The absolute self is conscious of himself, as I am conscious 
 
440 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 of myself ; but whereas I may distinguish myself from selves 
 in some sense beyond me, he distinguishes himself only from 
 selves in some sense within him. Thus he at once shares in 
 the experience of each of these selves, for it is his experience, 
 and yet transcends this experience, since his consciousness is 
 more than a sum of different consciousnesses — since, in other 
 words, he is conscious of himself as unique, as individual. 
 The lesser selves, of whom I am one, are thus expressions, 
 objects, of the emotion and the will of the absolute self; 
 they exist because he has a nature such that it must express 
 itself in these unique ways. My consciousness is, then, 
 "identically a part" of the experience of the absolute self, 
 "not similar. . . but identically the same as such portion,"' 
 and this explains why I know the objects, though not all the 
 objects, which the absolute self knows. My distinction from 
 the absolute self is, in part, a purely quantitative difference, 
 shown in the fact that I do not know so much as he. In 
 part, however, it is the difference of the Absolute, as self, as 
 utterly unique personahty, from any oneof the totality of in- 
 cluded selves. From this difference, it follows that the lesser 
 self does not, necessarily, feel and will with the Absolute ; 
 whereas the absolute self, besides possessing his own, the ulti- 
 mate, personahty, must feel and will with every partial self. 
 The most insistent of the problems of monistic personalism 
 concern themselves with the relation of the selves — absolute 
 and partial — to time, with the doctrine of human freedom, 
 and with the question of immortality. A brief discussion 
 of these great subjects will conclude this chapter. 
 
 (a) The relation of absolute self and of partial selves to time 
 
 By 'temporal' is meant that which exists at this moment 
 or that. But a moment is precisely that which has both past 
 and future. There is then neither beginning nor end of time ; 
 every moment is what it is by virtue of its relations to the irrevo- 
 
 ' Royce, "Conception of God," p. 292', 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 441 
 
 cable and to the unattained. Thus, the temporal is the essen- 
 tially incomplete ; and because of this incompleteness, the 
 Absolute cannot be conceived in purely temporal terms. On 
 the other hand, the temporal has reality. Temporal dis- 
 tinctions are objects of actual experience. In the words of 
 Bergson who, most vividly among contemporary writers, 
 emphasizes the reality of time, "succession is an incontest- 
 able fact . . . ce n'est plus du pense c'est du vecu." ^ Now 
 the absolutist has no more difficulty than any other thinker 
 in reconciling the alleged contradictions involved in infinite 
 time with the rationality of the universe. For all these con- 
 tradictions arise, as Bergson so brilliantly shows, in the 
 domain of abstract time — of time artificially measured and 
 divided — and not at all with regard to concrete time, time 
 as experienced.^ But the personalistic absolutist seems to 
 face a real obstacle in attempting to reconcile the complete- 
 ness of the absolute self with the reahty of time. Bergson, 
 to whom ultimate reality consists in that which changes, 
 does not feel this difficulty ; but the absolutist cannot avoid 
 the insistent question whether, or in what sense, the absolute 
 consciousness is temporal. To this question he may, how- 
 ever, give the following answer : It follows from the analysis, 
 already made, of the absolute self-consciousness, that the 
 absolute self must experience the elemental sorts of con- 
 sciousness, involved in the time consciousness, since human 
 selves do have the consciousness of time, and since He 
 experiences that which we experience. Human Hfe, as our 
 modern teachers insist, is movement, progress, unending 
 struggle. In Eucken's words, the very "soul of life is self- 
 conquest through struggle {Selbsterrlngen)."^ Butmovement 
 and struggle are temporal processes. The absolute self 
 must therefore be conceived as temporally conscious, that is, 
 as participating in the consciousness of the connection of the 
 
 ' "L'fivolution creatrice," edition of 1908, p. 10. 
 
 ^ Ibid., pp. 10, 49. Cf. "Les donnfies immediates de la conscience," 
 Chapter II. It is doubtful whether Bergson's term 'duration' adequately 
 describes what he means by concrete, or real, time. 
 
 ' "Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung," pp. 128, 132, 169, 210. 
 
442 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 irrevocable with the unattained. More closely analyzed this 
 time-consciousness includes both a relational factor, the con- 
 sciousness of connected terms, and the affective experience, 
 yearning, hope, regret, or rehef, inherent in the consciousness 
 of the unattained or of the irrevocable. Possibly it contains 
 also z.sui generis elemental consciousness. These experiences, 
 as actual, must belong to the absolute reality, the One Self. 
 But the absolute consciousness, though it must indeed in- 
 clude the temporal experience, cannot be merely temporal. 
 The absolute self must, in other words, have both a deeper- 
 than-temporal and a temporal consciousness, since by itself 
 the temporal involves incompleteness. The possibility that 
 one and the same self may possess both sorts of consciousness 
 cannot be denied, for even the human self does not simply 
 experience temporal succession : it has also more-than-tem- 
 poral consciousness. There are at least three readily recog- 
 nized examples of the more-than-temporal experience. Most 
 fundamental of all is the consciousness, especially the emo- 
 tional consciousness, of other selves. In loving and hating, 
 in admiring and despising, we are conscious of ourselves and 
 of other selves, not only, and not primarily, as continuous 
 series of psychic events or even as beings developing in time, 
 but without reference to time as unitary selves. Another 
 example of the more-than-temporal experience of every human 
 self is the consciousness of identity, the oneness which con- 
 tradicts temporal discreteness. Thus, when I say, "This is 
 the same song which I yesterday heard," I surely transcend 
 the temporal difference between to-day's and yesterday's 
 experience. And, finally, there is the more-than-temporal 
 experience which Royce has so subtly and elaborately dis- 
 sected : the consciousness of the sequence, of the melody, or 
 of the sentence, for example, not as a series, but as a complete 
 whole. "A succession," he observes, "... involves a 
 certain . . . relation amongst the events that make up the 
 succession. . . . Each one of them is over and past when 
 the next one comes. . . . But side by side with this aspect 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 443 
 
 of the temporal order, . . . stands still another aspect. . . . 
 When we more directly experience succession, — as for in- 
 stance when we listen ... to a rhythmic series of drum- 
 beats, — we not only observe that any antecedent member 
 of the series is over and past before the next number comes, 
 but also, and without the least contradiction between these 
 two aspects of our total experience, we observe that this whole 
 succession, with both its former and later members, so far 
 as with relative directness we apprehend the series of drum- 
 beats or of other simple events, is present at once to our con- 
 sciousness. ... It is . . . true that for my consciousness h 
 is experienced as following a, and also that a and h are together 
 experienced as this relation of sequence. . . . This essen- 
 tially double aspect of every experience of a present series of 
 events ... is a matter of . . . fundamental importance." * 
 But at this point an objection will be offered to this doc- 
 trine that the absolute, like the human, self is not only supra- 
 temporally, but also temporally, conscious. It will be urged 
 that the Absolute, as absolute, is incapable of sharing human 
 hope, yearning, and regret, since the very core and centre of 
 these experiences is their partialness. Only in so far as a 
 self is limited, relative, partial, can it be in hope or in fear ; 
 for how, it is asked, if it realized all, and itself constituted 
 all reality, could it waver, yearn, or regret? The answer is 
 once more by reference to the everyday experience of each one 
 of us. Who that really loves a child — if only that which 
 Plato calls the child within a man — does not know what it 
 is to share, in a true sense, the bewilderment, the foreboding, 
 the baseless hope due to childish ignorance, while yet one is, 
 as adult self, unperplexed, confident, and courageous ? My 
 heart aches or yearns or beats high with his, and yet I am 
 all the time possessed of a deeper, correcting, supplementing 
 consciousness. Even so, we have the right to suppose, the 
 absolute self may share the experiences, essentially incom- 
 
 ' "The World and the Individual," II., Lecture III.; pp. 114' seq. 
 
444 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 plete, of yearning for the unattained and of contemplating 
 the irrevocable, holding them as real, though subordinated, 
 elements in that ever complete consciousness of the self which 
 is all reality. Such a view, it must carefully be noted, does 
 not invalidate the teaching that the absolute self must feel 
 pain. For the Absolute, as complete consciousness, must 
 indeed share in my pain, since that is an elemental sort of 
 experience. And yet the pain, which for me is an uncontra- 
 dicted element of a doubting or despairing mood, is for him 
 the factor of doubt or despair comprehended, and so trans- 
 muted into assurance or victory. The absolute self is thus 
 conscious of the universe both after the temporal fashion 
 and as a complete, that is, a non-temporal, whole. In Royce's 
 words: "The larger consciousness does not lose the con- 
 scious incompleteness of the lesser, but gives that, just as it 
 is, its place in the completed whole." ' The antithesis be- 
 tween the temporal and the eternal, in the fullest sense of 
 that terai, is thus the contrast between the point of view 
 which divides events into " what now is and what no longer 
 is, — what is to he but is not yet," and the standpoint from 
 which " these same events- ... in so far as they are viewed 
 at once by the Absolute, are for such view all equally present." 
 There is a curious approximation to this doctrine in the 
 teaching, already referred to, of Mr. Schiller. He con- 
 ceives of " a state of perfect adaptation " of the finite con- 
 sciousness in which "there would be no consciousness of 
 change. ... In such a state of perfection," Schiller adds, 
 "Time would be transcended." For eternity, in this positive 
 sense, Schiller, in another book, appropriates a term used 
 by Aristotle in a slightly different connection, Ki'vrjai'; aKivrj- 
 creco';, changeless activity; instancing as 'example' of it 'the 
 state of perfected absorbed attention.' "Could we once 
 attain," he exclaims, "an object of contemplation which 
 was wholly satisfying, should we not seek to retain it in 
 
 • Op. cit., p. 300. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 445 
 
 consciousness forever?"' The likeness of this doctrine to 
 that already outlined need hardly be pointed out ; and the 
 theory of the transcended time-consciousness wins a certain 
 confirmation through the fact that it is espoused by think- 
 ers so antagonistic. Like Royce, the monist, Schiller, the 
 plurahst, teaches that time, spite of its partial reality, is 
 not all-of-reahty ; and that eternity is a transcendence of 
 time. Moreover, the pluralist description of time as perfect 
 adaptation, and still more the conception of this adaptation 
 as absorbed attention, is thoroughly compatible with the 
 doctrine of the eternal as that which is conscious-at-once of 
 the whole.^ In addition, monistic doctrine distinguishes, 
 though it also allies, the absolute and the human conscious- 
 ness of temporal and eternal. " The presence in this 
 sense," Royce says, " of all time at once to the Absolute 
 constitutes the Eternal order of the world — eternal, since 
 it is inclusive of all distinctions of temporal past and tem- 
 poral future, — eternal, since, for this very reason, the 
 totality of temporal events thus present at once to the Abso- 
 lute, has no events that precede or that follow it, but 
 contains all sequences within it, — eternal, finally, be- 
 cause this view of the world does not, like our partial 
 glimpses of this or of that relative whole of sequence, pass 
 away and give place to some other view, but includes an 
 observation of every passing away, of every sequence . . ., 
 and includes all the views that are taken by the various 
 finite Selves." ' And yet, though the eternal order in its 
 fullest sense can be known to the absolute self only, we 
 human selves also share, though partially, in the more-than- 
 temporal consciousness. " To conceive in what sense the 
 temporal order of the world is also an eternal order, we 
 
 ' "Humanism," Chapter XII., p. 217. 
 
 ' After teaching the reality of time, and after insisting that eternity 
 transcends time and forms its ideal, Schiller inconsistently makes eternity 
 part of the temporal order, teaching that time began in eternity and is 
 likely to end there. (" Riddles of the Sphinx," Chapter IX., § ii.) 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. 141. 
 
446 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 have, therefore," Royce declares, " but to remember the 
 sense in which the melody, or other sequence, is known at 
 once to our own consciousness, despite the fact that its 
 elements when viewed merely in their temporal succession are 
 in so far not at once. . . . The brief span of our con- 
 sciousness, the small range of succession, that we can 
 grasp at once, constitutes a perfectly arbitrary Hmitation of 
 our own special type of consciousness. But in principle a 
 time-sequence, however brief, is already viewed in a way 
 that is not merely temporal, when ... it is grasped at 
 once.' ... A consciousness related to the whole of the 
 world's events . . . precisely as our human consciousness 
 is related to a single melody or rhythm," — a consciousness, 
 it might be added, related to all human selves, as our human 
 consciousness is related to any one self, which it regards 
 both as developing Hfe and as unitary being — such a con- 
 sciousness "... is an Eternal Consciousness."^ 
 
 (5) The freedom of the finite self as related to the absolute- 
 ness of the absolute self 
 
 Most difficult of all the problems which, confront monistic 
 personalism is the need of harmonizing with it the insistent 
 claims of human freedom of choice. In calling a self free 
 in this sense, one means that a self is, to some degree, self- 
 directive, that it has real choice ; in other words, that a self 
 may, independently of outside influence, be conscious in 
 this way or in another, — that it may be, at will, happy or un- 
 happy, humble or imperious, good or bad.' 
 
 ' At this point, Royce adds the words : " and is thus grasped not through 
 mere memory but by virtue of actual experience." As I have said, in the 
 footnote on p. 435, the antithesis between memory and actual experience 
 seems to me unfortunate. It is rather true that experience includes mem- 
 ory. Moreover, the argument would be unaffected if it were held that the 
 sequence is grasped by memory, and yet apprehended at once. 
 
 ' Op. cit., pp. 141^-142'. 
 
 ' It is perhaps unnecessary to remind the reader that this is by no man- 
 ner of means the only sense in which a self may be called ' free.' It is free, 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 447 
 
 The pluralistic personalist is wont to assert with great 
 vigor the reahty of human freedom. To do this he has first 
 to rescue the doctrine from the attacks of scientific determin- 
 ism. This form of determinism denies human freedom on 
 the ground that freedom is incompatible with the universality 
 of the causal law. The causal law, as applied by natural 
 science, is the teaching that succeeding events are connected 
 by a uniform necessity ; in other words, that they are connected 
 in a relation such that on the repetition of event a, event h 
 uniformly recurs. And it is urged by scientific determinists 
 that to conceive of several sorts of conscious experience as, 
 at one and the same time, genuinely possible is to annul the 
 principle of uniformity, inherent in the law of causahty. In 
 meeting this objection, personal idealists (monists as well 
 as plurahsts) must, I think, admit that the doctrine of hu- 
 man freedom restricts the appKcation of the causal law, by 
 denying the absolute uniformity of causal connection. But 
 the personalist thinker will rightly refuse to regard this as 
 a decisive objection to the doctrine of freedom. For, as 
 Hume and Kant have shovm, the law of causahty is a form 
 of self-consciousness, its necessity is a necessity of thinking; 
 its reality is, therefore, that of the self or selves whose con- 
 sciousness it helps to constitute. It cannot then be used, hke a 
 boomerang, to weaken our confidence in the existence of any 
 directly known or rightly inferred character of the self/ More 
 than this : in the opinion of the writer, the absolute uniform- 
 ity involved in the causal relation, so far from being demon- 
 strable, is, at best, probable on the ground of repeated ex- 
 perience. There is, for example, no a priori reason why the 
 contact of the charged wires should uniformly be followed 
 by the spark. So conceived, the causal principle has only 
 the force of a very wide generalization,^ apphcable particu- 
 larly to external phenomena, that is, to shared percepts — 
 
 also, in so far as it is self and not mere temporal phenomenon. Cf . supra, 
 Chapter 7, pp. 257 seq. 
 
 1 Cf. Bergson, "L'^volution cr6atrice," pp. 31 seq., 47 seq.; "Les donnfies 
 immediates," Chapter III.; Huxley, "Collected Essays," I. 
 
448 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 a domain of experience into which, it may well be observed, 
 the human will seldom enters as a factor. And the fact that 
 we habitually and reasonably look for uniformity, especially 
 in this sphere of the external, does not prejudice the possi- 
 bihty of freedom of choice — • does not, in other words, for- 
 bid the possibiUty that at a given moment this or that may 
 happen. The principle of uniformity is regarded in this 
 way, by consistent personalists, as an hypothesis either of 
 universal, or else of very wide, application to the facts of the 
 physical world — in a word, as scientific law and as a basis 
 for our expectation of future happenings. But it is freely 
 admitted that the principle of uniformity has the force only 
 of a large and useful empirical generalization. There- 
 fore the opposition between the causal law and the concep- 
 tion of freedom is not sufficient to disprove the reahty of 
 freedom. 
 
 The pluralist, as we have seen, asserts the existence of 
 human freedom, thus defended, and insists that the exist- 
 ence of the absolute self is incompatible with the reality of 
 human freedom. Granting the existence of the absolute self, 
 he urges, no freedom, no alternative, would remain to the 
 finite selves who are but expressions, manifestations, of the 
 Absolutely Real, channels through which its reality flows. 
 No longer, the pluraHst insists, can the monist conceive of a 
 human self as being, at this moment, glad or sorry, good or 
 bad ; the consciousness of this self -direction, possible choice, 
 or freedom, is a pure illusion due to our imperfect recogni- 
 tion of our source. In truth, we must feel and will — no less 
 than perceive — in accordance with the One Will. This, then, 
 is the issue: either the assertion of human freedom or ab- 
 solutist personalism, either the doctrine of human selves pos- 
 sessed of true alternative or the doctrine of selves as deter- 
 mined expressions of the One Self. If the alternative is 
 indeed unavoidable, then either human freedom must be 
 denied, or we must admit an unnoticed flaw in those argu- 
 ments which have led to monistic personalism. These 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 449 
 
 arguments are so recently outlined that they need not here 
 be reviewed. The considerations tending to establish 
 human freedom should, on the other hand, be briefly 
 restated.' They reduce to two: first, that we are often 
 conscious of freedom, that we seem to ourselves free to 
 will thus or thus ; second, the alleged implication of freedom 
 in the moral consciousness. 
 
 The first of these arguments starts from the normal human 
 self's instinctive behef that he is free. Experience of one 
 sort or another may bring me to the point of denying my 
 freedom, but primitively I believe myself to control, to 
 some degree, my own consciousness. It may be questioned, 
 however, whether this is a sufficient ground for regarding 
 freedom after Eucken's and Bergson's fashion as "an unde- 
 niable fact of experience." ^ That a majority of human 
 beings have a feeling of freedom may well be admitted. 
 But a finite being might be dependent without being con- 
 scious of dependence ; it might, in its imperfectness, ascribe 
 to its own narrow self a power greater than it possessed. Its 
 consciousness of freedom, then, though actual, would not be 
 ultimately real — would not conform to the whole constitu- 
 tion of reality. Such a self would err, like the supposed 
 cannon-ball which, coming to consciousness in mid-air, attrib- 
 uted to itself the power which actually originated in the 
 cannon. 
 
 More important is the argument for freedom from the ex- 
 istence of the moral consciousness. I have, so the argument 
 should run, the consciousness of obhgation, the conviction 
 that "I ought." This is a feeling quite distinct from every 
 mere expeditur — every belief that "I would better act thus 
 or thus." Its uniqueness constitutes the very inner core of 
 such characteristic experiences as those of remorse and of 
 self-respect. Now, second, if the feeling of obligation be 
 not also an illusion of consciousness, it implies moral freedom. 
 
 1 Cf. Eucken, " Grundlimen einer neuen Lebensanschauung," p. 147. 
 
 2 G 
 
450 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 It is, then, true that I can if I ought ; it is certain that I may 
 espouse either good or evil, if it is true that I am rightly 
 praised for the one choice and blamed for the other — in a 
 word, if it is true that I ought to choose the good. Once 
 more, then, the decision turns on the question whether an 
 experience be illusory or true. Evidently the answer to 
 this question cannot be given on the basis of direct obser- 
 vation. Nobody, indeed, can feel obligation without feeling 
 it as real; the mere conviction that my feeling adequately 
 represents the real nature of the universe is, as has just been 
 admitted, no demonstration that it is real. But certain con- 
 siderations about the nature of the absolute self tend to con- 
 firm the individual persuasion of freedom. To a complete 
 self-consciousness, it was shown, ^ belong emotional and 
 volitional phases. A complete self loves, pities, wills. But 
 both emotional and voluntary consciousness individualize 
 their objects ; there seems, then, an inherent reason why the 
 absolute self should individualize its own self-expressions. 
 And, in the second place, if the absolute self be conceived as 
 good, it may be urged that it is inconsistent with such good- 
 ness that the finite selves be deceived on precisely this point 
 of their moral obhgation. This is, of course, in principle, 
 Descartes's argument against God's deceitfulness. Ob- 
 viously, it offers tempting openings to unwarranted anthro- 
 pomorphism, and to unduly individual interpretation of the 
 Absolute, yet (though, for these reasons no great stress may 
 be laid on it) as a supplementary consideration it may carry 
 weight. 
 
 So far as has to this point appeared, the doctrine of human 
 freedom of choice has not established itself. In other words, 
 no consideration has compelled the recognition of human 
 freedom in this sense. In the issue between the truth of 
 human freedom and the existence of the absolute self, he who 
 has found reason to accept the reality of the Absolute cannot 
 
 • Cf. supra, pp. 427 Mj. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 451 
 
 yield this conviction in favor of the claims of the freedom 
 of the human self. From this point of view there is, in 
 truth, but one possibility of human freedom. If the free- 
 dom of the lesser self is willed by the Absolute, then — 
 and only then — is the lesser self free. To such a concep- 
 tion there is, however, a ready and serious objection: 
 For how, the objector asks, can the Absolute be supposed 
 to will my freedom to choose what He does not will? The 
 following paragraphs are submitted as a contribution to the 
 discussion of this great problem. 
 
 (i) The purpose of the human self in opposition to the 
 absolute will should, of course, be conceived as opposed 
 to His specific and not to His inclusive purpose. In other 
 words, the human self is partially and not completely free ; 
 his opposition to absolute will is futile; his temporarily 
 rebelKous will is a factor, not in itself but as balanced by 
 other factors, in the full expression of the complex purpose 
 of the absolute self. More concretely stated : I, as unique 
 self, am object of the will of the Absolute. But if He 
 purposes precisely my freedom, then it follows that specific 
 acts and momentary choices may be in opposition to what 
 would have been His purpose if He had willed a world 
 without me in it. We may best understand this by re- 
 course to a human analogy. The wise teacher chooses 
 that his pupil shall become an independent thinker. To 
 this end he wills that the student shall make experiments 
 and sift evidence for himself. But this means that the 
 teacher wills his pupil's very errors, not in themselves but 
 as temporary factors of the capacity for independence. 
 (2) To this attempted reconciliation between absolutism 
 and the doctrine of freedom it will however be objected 
 that the analogy is misleading. For, from the absolutist 
 standpoint, a human purpose, like everything else, is real 
 only by being object of the absolute experience and there- 
 fore, it may be urged, every human purpose is ipso facto 
 a purpose of the Absolute, and there can be no will which 
 
452 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 is, in any sense, opposed to His. This is a very important 
 objection and indeed many writers deny that it can really be 
 met. Let the following consideration^ suggest the possibil- 
 ity, if it does not demonstrate the necessity, of reconciling 
 limited human freedom with absolute will. The absolute 
 self, though He unquestionably experiences all that I experi- 
 ence, none the less opposes some of the objects of my will. 
 All realities, my free choices included, are objects of the 
 Absolute's consciousness — are real, indeed, only as experi- 
 enced by Him. But in so far as He has willed me to be free 
 there must, or may, be partial phases of reaHty which He 
 opposes. If, for example, I choose, in opposition to the 
 absolute will, to commit a theft, this very volition of mine is 
 a part of the absolute experience, else it has no reaUty, yet 
 the absolute self though conscious of it opposes it. 
 
 To this conception it will be objected {a) that by experi- 
 encing what He opposes the absolute self would become 
 passive. In reply it may, with some confidence, be sug- 
 gested that though the Absolute must be fundamentally 
 active. He yet may be conceived as willing his own partial 
 passivity. Such a relation of self-activity to passivity, 
 though it seems paradoxical, is psychologically possible. 
 Thus, suffering is a passivity, but I may cKng to the very 
 agony of my yearning for one who has gone from me. 
 
 But the objector will return (&) with reiterated emphasis 
 to his first position. The absolute self, he will insist, can- 
 not in this fashion be conceived as opposing and still willing 
 the finite self's rebelHous purpose. For, by hypothesis, 
 the finite self's very rebellious purpose exists only as part 
 of the absolute self's consciousness, or — to put this in 
 another way — the finite self exists only by virtue of form- 
 ing an identical part of the Absolute. How then can the 
 finite self be supposed to will anything in opposition to 
 the absolute will? To this question the following reply 
 may be suggested : The finite self, it will be reasserted, 
 does form an identical part of the Absolute Self. The 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 453 
 
 absolute self, therefore, experiences all that the lesser self 
 experiences in its rebellious will — all its sensational and 
 affective consciousness, all its imperious and combative 
 'attitudes.' More than this: the absolute self, in willing 
 the finite self as he actually is, wills precisely this rebellious 
 voKtion. But the Absolute wills the rebellious voHtion 
 not, as the lesser self wills it, in isolation and out of relation 
 to the whole, but as part of a universe which includes, 
 also, such other purposes and fulfilments as balance or (in 
 Royce's fine phrase) ' atone for ' this rebeUious voHtion and 
 its outcome.' Thus, the rebellious purpose of the finite self, 
 though indeed experienced and willed by the Absolute, 
 differs from the Absolute's purpose by the essential differ- 
 ence between part and whole ; and Absolute Will differs 
 from partial will merely, but significantly, by transcending 
 it. The distinction may once more be compared to that 
 between the circle and the sector. The circle unquestion- 
 ably possesses all the qualities of a sector — excepting that 
 of not-being-a-complete-circle. Such a difference, inherent 
 in the very natures of 'part' and 'whole,' certainly cannot 
 invalidate their genuine qualitative identity. Absolute 
 Will differs from human will not in what it lacks but in 
 what it adds. 
 
 (c) Immortal moral selves and nature-selves 
 
 The eager effort to attain a philosophical demonstration 
 of h\mian immortality is neither unnatural nor unjustified. 
 For philosophy, as cannot too often be said, is an aspect or 
 part of Hfe, and it follows that nothing may be hoped which 
 may not also be thought. The problem is, at this stage of 
 our thought, the following : does or does not monistic 
 personal ideahsm require the endless existence of the partial 
 selves — • does this monistic personalism at least guarantee 
 
 1 "The Problem of Christianity," I., Lecture V. 
 
454 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 the existence of the human self after the event which we call 
 death ? 
 
 It is at once evident that our philosophy, in the words — 
 often quoted — of McTaggart, "gives us hope." This it 
 does, in so far as it is a form of immaterialism, by delivering 
 us from the fear of death regarded as the victory of matter 
 over spirit. The proof that matter is phenomenal, that the 
 body to which change comes is but a complex of ideal quali- 
 ties, that the dissolution of the body need therefore mean no 
 more than the loss of a familiar percept common to a group 
 of selves — all these deductions from idealistic doctrine 
 meet the most common objection to the conviction of immor- 
 tality. The personalistic form of idealism adds a positive 
 consideration in favor of the doctrine. The conclusion that 
 ultimate reality is not merely ideal, but personal, cannot fail, 
 by its emphasis on the truth of personality, at the least to 
 quicken the hope of immortality. 
 
 We are, however, immediately concerned with the 
 bearing on the immortality problem of the doctrine of 
 the monistic form of personal idealism — the conception of 
 the human self as expression of the Absolute.' Most plural- 
 istic personalists beUeve it impossible to combine a philosophic 
 conviction of immortality with a doctrine of the absolute self. 
 The conception of the partial selves as included in the Ab- 
 solute, as mere expressions of the One Self — this concep- 
 tion, they urge, deprives the partial selves of individuahty ; it 
 is therefore likely that these mere illusions of personality will 
 succumb to the vicissitude of death. Now it should at once 
 be recognized that it is abstractly possible to conceive an ab- 
 solute self which is expressed in temporally limited forms — 
 in selves which are not endowed with immortality. For the 
 Absolute has been admitted to be temporal as well as supra- 
 temporal, therefore he might conceivably be manifested in 
 
 ' Cf., throughout, Royce, "The Conception of Immortality," and "The 
 World and the Individual," II., pp. 444 iej. 
 
Monistic Personal Idealism 455 
 
 discontinuing temporal forms. On the other hand, it must 
 be insisted that the Absolute might at least as probably ex- 
 press himself not exclusively in temporally limited but also 
 in temporally endless forms. Unless, then, some positive 
 argument inclines us in one way or in another, immortality 
 will remain, from the point of view of this philosophy, an 
 open question. But such a positive consideration is not 
 lacking; it is discovered through a study of the moral con- 
 sciousness. For though a man may not directly realize him- 
 self as immortal, yet every man who knows himself as unique 
 person may discover also that as such he is possessed of 
 a specific duty — a duty which distinguishes him from other 
 selves, a duty which is his own particular way of expressing 
 the Absolute. Now it is of the nature of duty to be endless. 
 There is no such thing as fulfilled obUgation, for every achieve- 
 ment of duty forges a fresh claim, every moral conquest is 
 itself the call to a new battle. Not, therefore, on the ground 
 that the absolute self could express himself only in immortal 
 partial selves, and still less because human beings yearn for 
 immortality, but because there are human beings who know 
 themselves as embodiments of unique duties, and because 
 a duty is inherently endless, therefore the monistic personalist 
 may hold to the immortahty of the moral self. 
 
 This admission that freedom and immortality are not 
 inherent characters of a self, coupled with our previous de- 
 cision that all reahty is personal, leads to the assertion of 
 the probable existence of lesser selves expressing the tem- 
 porary and progressive not the eternal purposes of the 
 Absolute. Such a conception "does away with the distinc- 
 
 ' The conception of ' physical nature ' here suggested (pampsychism) is 
 held by Royce (" The World and the Individual," esp. Lecture V.), and by 
 Ward ("The Realm of Ends," esp. Lecture XII.). The two diflfer in that 
 Royce affirm-; and Ward denies that the finite selves are, one and all, mani- 
 festations of an Absolute. Another idealistic view of Nature, that of Berke- 
 ley, refuses to attribute personality to inorganic nature, regarding it rather 
 as uncentred, as experienced not experiencer, a psychic object common to 
 several subjects. Bosanquet seems to formulate an absolutistic idealism of 
 this type ("The Principle of Individuality and Value," Lecture X.). 
 
456 Contemporary Philosophical Systems 
 
 tion between persons and things altogether." For there 
 well may be many different orders of these selves — selves 
 of merely momentary sensational and affective experience, 
 selves with hmited memory, even perhaps selves with re- 
 stricted foresight and narrow purposes. But so long as 
 such partial selves are devoid, each one, of a Ufe-ideal, a 
 genuinely moral purpose, they have no claim on immortal- 
 ity, are not — in the fullest sense — human selves. What we 
 call physical nature may well be constituted, as Leibniz 
 and Fechner have taught, by these partial selves, in their 
 divers kinds below the level of htunanity. They differ 
 from us so widely that we can not definitely designate 
 them. We can not, for example, speak with assurance of 
 tree-self, stream-self, or rock-seK. For our complex experi- 
 ence — the tree, stream, or rock-experience — may conceiv- 
 ably not be shared with a particular subject-self, but may 
 rather indicate a mere fragment of self or else a multitude 
 of lesser selves. In more concrete terms : Whereas by 
 analogy with our own bodies we can with reasonable assur- 
 ance identify a human body, that is, the complex sense 
 experience which signalizes for us the existence of another 
 human self, we lack exact acquaintance with the bodies of 
 other-than-human selves. And we are not only ignorant 
 of the precise nature and extent of these lesser selves, but 
 are unable to share their experience in any verifiable way. 
 In Royce's telling phrase, physical nature, though not un- 
 conscious, is uncommunicative. 
 
 A discussion of the problems suggested by this view of 
 Nature would lead us much too far afield. We have ended 
 one stage of our philosophic journey, for we have gained a 
 vision of the truth as the monistic personalist sees it: the 
 vision of a One which includes, without annihilating, the 
 many, of an absolute self who guarantees the individuality 
 of the particular selves, of an eternity which transcends yet 
 does not negate time, and of an immortality required by 
 the deathless ideals of every moral seff. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 BIOGRAPHIES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES OF MODERN 
 "WRITERS ON PHILOSOPHY, TOGETHER WITH 
 SUMMARIES AND DISCUSSIONS OF CERTAIN 
 TEXTS 
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 This Appendix contains (i) biographies and bibliographies of 
 those writers whose systems are discussed at length in this book, 
 and (2) briefer notes upon most of the writers to whom the book 
 incidentally refers. It further supplements the book by (3) cer- 
 tain critical notes, excluded for simplicity's sake from the body 
 of the book; and by (4) commentaries on those portions of 
 Kant's "Kritikof Pure Reason" and Spinoza's" Ethics "which are 
 not considered in Chapters 8 and 9. The order followed in the 
 Appendix differs from that of the chapters mainly by grouping the 
 philosophers with greater reference to their nationality and by 
 restoring Spinoza to his proper chronological position. 
 
 In selecting critical works for reference, the standard histories 
 of philosophy have not been repeatedly mentioned by name ; and 
 the lists of commentators have been lengthened or shortened, 
 according to the obscurity or clearness of the different systems. 
 An effort has been made, in most cases, to head the lists by titles 
 of works which seem to the writer of greatest importance to the 
 student. For fuller bibUographies the student is referred to the 
 " BibUography of Philosophy, Psychology, and Cognate Subjects," 
 compiled by Benjamin Rand as Volume III., Part I., of 
 Baldwin's " Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology." 
 
 A. FORERUNNERS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 GIORDANO BRUNO (1548-1600) 
 
 Giordano Bruno, born at Nola near Naples, entered as a youth 
 the Dominican order, but soon abandoned the monastic vocation. 
 After an adventurous life of travel and teaching, in Paris, London, 
 
 457 
 
458 Forerunners of Modern Philosophy 
 
 and Germany, he was arrested in Venice by order of the Inquisi- 
 tion ; was imprisoned for two years ; and was burned at the stake 
 in the Campo dei Fiori at Rome, where his statue now stands as 
 memorial to his daring life of thought and to his martyr death. 
 Bruno accepted unreservedly the Copernican system as metaphys- 
 ical and not merely as astronomical principle. To him the uni- 
 verse is both infinite and alive, and God is its soul. Evidently, 
 therefore, Bruno's writings contain in germ most of the important 
 doctrines of modern philosophy. 
 
 Chief Writings 
 
 1584. " De la causa, principio, et uno," Venice. 
 1584. " Del infinito universo e dei mondi," Venice. 
 1591. "De monade, numero et figura," Frankfort. 
 
 1591. "De immenso et innumerabilibus s. de universo et mundis," Frank- 
 fort. 
 
 "Opera latine conscripta," Naples, 1879-91. 
 
 " Opere (Italian writings)," new edition, Gottingen, 1888-89. 
 
 J. Lewis Mclntyre, Giordano Bruno, 1903. (The most detailed 
 account in English of Bruno's life and works.) 
 
 Cf. Frith, Lutoslawski, Pater, and Tocco — all cited by Rand. 
 
 FRANCIS BACON (1561-1626) 
 
 The brilliant career of Francis Bacon, in the reigns of Elizabeth 
 and the first James, and his tragic fall from the office of Lord High 
 Chancellor are familiar to students of English history. Bacon's 
 contribution to metaphysics is mainly negative ; he opened the way 
 for modern philosophy by his vigorous onslaught on scholasticism 
 and on every sort of formalism. For the rest, the value of his work 
 consists in the impetus which he gave to inductive, to scientific, 
 and — in particular — to experimental, method. 
 
 Chief Writings 
 
 1597. "Essayes." 
 
 1605. "The two Bookes of Francis Bacon: Of the Proficience and Advance- 
 ment of Learning, Divine and Humane." (In Latin, 1623, 
 "De Dignitate et augmentis Scientiaram." Latest edition, with 
 the Essays, Lond., 1874.) 
 
 1620. "Novum organum scientiarum." (First published, 1612, as " Cogi- 
 tata et visa." Latest edition, Camb., 1878.) 
 
Rene Descartes 459 
 
 Cf. the histories of philosophy for accounts of the lives and writings of 
 other writers of the Renaissance, especially for discussion of Boehme, and 
 of Campanella. 
 
 B. CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHERS THROUGH 
 LEIBNIZ 
 
 RENE DESCARTES: THE PLURALISTIC DUALIST 
 I. Life (1596-1650) 
 
 Rene Descartes, born of a noble family in Touraine, was edu- 
 cated in the well-known Jesuit school at La Flfeche, and early 
 showed unusual power of acquisition and initiative. It was char- 
 acteristic of him, that, despite his love of study, he left school when 
 he was only sixteen years old. His earliest pubhshed work, the 
 "Discourse on Method," recalls the period of his early studies, 
 and sets forth the reasons for his temporary abandonment of the 
 life of study. "I knew," he says, "that the languages learned in 
 the schools are necessary for understanding the books of the an- 
 cients, . . . but I thought I had given enough time to the languages 
 and even to the books, histories, and fables of the ancients, for 
 ... if one spend too much time in travelling, one becomes a 
 stranger in one's own land. I especially enjoyed mathematics, 
 . . . but I did not yet realize its true use, thinking that it served 
 only for the mechanic arts. ... I revered theology, but having 
 learned that the way to heaven is no less open to the most 
 ignorant than to the most learned, and that revealed truths . . . 
 are beyond our intelligence, I would not have dared to submit 
 them to the feebleness of my reasoning. As for philosophy, 
 . . . seeing that it had been cultivated by the best minds for 
 several centuries and that none the less there was nothing undis- 
 puted in it, I had not the presumption to hope to succeed better 
 than the others. . . . 
 
 "Therefore, as soon as my age permitted, I utterly abandoned 
 study and resolving to seek no other knowledge than that which 
 could be found within myself or in the great book of the world, 
 I employed the rest of my youth in travelling, in seeing courts and 
 armies, in mingling with people of different dispositions and con- 
 ditions, in gaining all sorts of experience . . . everywhere making 
 
460 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 such reflection as would profit me, on the subjects which pre- 
 sented themselves. For I believed that I should meet much more 
 truth in the reasonings of every man on the matters which con- 
 cerned him, than in the reasonings of a man of letters in his 
 study, on useless speculations. . . . And I was always deeply 
 anxious to learn to distinguish the true from the false, that I might 
 see clearly in my actions and might walk assuredly in this life."^ 
 
 The first two of Descartes's four years of mihtary service were 
 spent in the Netherlands, in the service of Prince Maurice, son of 
 WiUiam of Orange. The position seems a curious one for a 
 pupil of the Jesuits; but France under Louis XIII., with Marie 
 de Medici as virtual sovereign, offered no military career; and the 
 hostility of France toward Spain and Austria had sent many 
 Frenchmen to the army of Maurice. Two years later, when this 
 first service ended, Descartes enrolled himself in the army which 
 Maximihan led to fight for the Emperor Ferdinand II., in his 
 pretensions to the throne of Bohemia, against the Bohemians 
 led by the Protestant king of their choice, the unfortunate 
 Frederick V. 
 
 But neither camps nor courts could divert Descartes from the 
 life of thought to which he was called. He never saw active mili- 
 tary service; and, especially during the years of armed truce in 
 which he served Maurice, he had abundant leisure for the mathe- 
 matical investigation which constitutes his earhest claim to the 
 world's regard. His friendship with the Dutch mathematician, 
 Isaac Beeckman, dates from this period. A little later he took up 
 the tangled thread of philosophical speculation, with the avowed 
 aim of introducing into metaphysics mathematical clearness and 
 precision.^ For a time he lived in Paris; but, though admirably 
 fitted by position, intellect, and training, for a life of social inter- 
 course, he found the cosmopolitan and crowded hfe of the city 
 ill suited for a student's environment. Consequently, he with- 
 drew to the Netherlands, and — the better to avoid distractions 
 — changed his residence from time to time, communicating with 
 the world outside through the medium of trusted friends who kept 
 his secret. 
 
 In this solitude, Descartes composed his works on philosophy 
 
 '"Discourse on Method," Pt. I., paragraphs 7—14. 
 ^ Cf. supra. Chapter 2, pp. 26, 38, 45. 
 
Rene Descartes 461 
 
 and natural science. He was not a student of preceding systems 
 of philosophy, for he reacted strongly from the mediaevalism of his 
 day, and reached metaphysics by the way of mathematics and 
 science." The story goes that he led a visitor, who had asked to 
 see his hbrary, into his dissecting-room and, pointing to the partly 
 dissected body of a calf, said "This is my hbrary." Besides in- 
 venting the fruitful method of analytic geometry, Descartes made 
 contributions of more or less importance to physics — notably to 
 optics — to astronomy, to physiology, and to psychology. The list 
 of his writings, which follows, suggests the scope of his intellectual 
 activity. 
 
 Both the scientific and the philosophical speculations of Des- 
 cartes tended to bring him into conflict with the Romanist church, 
 of which he remained throughout his life a loyal member. That 
 the opposition of the church was never more pronounced is due to 
 Descartes's attitude of at least outward submission. He sup- 
 pressed his earhest work, "Le Monde," when the tidings reached 
 him of the condemnation of Galileo's doctrine; and he says in 
 the last paragraph of his "Principles," "Nevertheless ... I 
 affirm nothing, but submit all this to the authority of the Catholic 
 church and the judgment of the more prudent. ..." His posi- 
 tion seems to savor of unworthy subservience; yet there is little 
 doubt that he was sincere in the belief that his independent scien- 
 tific and metaphysical conclusions were in harmony with the teach- 
 ings of the chvurch. 
 
 The influence of Descartes on philosophy was quickly felt and 
 widely extended. Modern thinkers, scornful of the dogmas of 
 scholasticism, welcomed a metaphysical system which started out 
 from the position of the doubter, and which made clear thinking 
 its criterion. Among the friends whom he made, by his teaching, 
 are two women of remarkable, though diverse, gift. The first is 
 the Princess Elizabeth, daughter of that Bohemian elector, against 
 whom Descartes had served. Elizabeth, to whom Descartes 
 wrote, "I know but one mind and that is your own, to which both 
 geometry and the first philosophy are alike congenial," lived for 
 several years at her mother's court in The Hague ; and in order to 
 be near her Descartes Uved in the neighboring palace of Ende- 
 geest. For her he wrote that brilliant psychological essay, "The 
 
 ' Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 19 seq.; also Chapter i, pp. 6 jcj. 
 
462 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 Passions of the Soul"; and to her he dedicated the summary 
 of his system called "Principles of Philosophy." The correspond- 
 ence between the two (published in full in the new, complete edi- 
 tion of Descartes) reveals, in both master and disciple, the quali- 
 ties of loyal friendship and of vigorous thought. 
 
 The more famous of Descartes's disciples is Queen Christina 
 of Sweden. In 1649 he accepted her invitation to Stockholm, 
 prompted to leave the Netherlands because his doctrine, as taught 
 at the universities, had fallen under the ban of the church. But 
 he was not fitted to endure either the rigorous climate of Sweden 
 or the strenuous life of his royal hostess, who demanded philosophi- 
 cal discourse in the early hours of the cold, northern winter days. 
 He died, deeply and truly mourned, in 1650. 
 
 II. Bibliography 
 
 a. Chief Writings of Descartes 
 
 (Arranged according to dates of publication) 
 
 1637. "Essais philosophiques," including 
 
 "Discours de la m^thode." (For English translation, see below.) 
 "Dioptrique." 
 1641. " Meditationes de prima philosophia." 
 
 Written in 1629. Originally published, with the Objections of 
 various scholars, to whom the work had been submitted in 
 manuscript, and with Descartes's Replies to these Objections. 
 Followed, in 1647, by a translation into French, by the Ducde 
 Luynes, corrected by Descartes. (For translation, see below.) 
 1644. "Principia philosophise." 
 
 A summary, in formal propositions, of Descartes's philosophy, 
 physics, physiology, and psychology. (For translation, see 
 below.) 
 1650. "Traits des passions de I'ame." 
 
 A brilliant little treatise on the psychology of the emotions. 
 1664. "Lemonde ou traits de lalumifere." 
 
 "Traite de I'homme et de la formation du foetus." 
 
 Portions only of the earliest of Descartes's works, finished in 1633, 
 but never published in his lifetime. 
 
 b. Editions and Translations 
 
 "Opera omnia." 8 vols, Amst., 1670-83. 
 
 "CEuvres," 13 vols., Paris, 1724-29. 
 
 "CEuvres,"' ed. V. Cousin, 11 vols., Paris, 1S24-26. 
 
The Occasionalists 463 
 
 "CEuvres," ed. Ch. Adam et P. Tannery, lo vols, (of which 8 have appeared, 
 1906). An edition de luxe, complete, with correspondence. 
 
 "CEuvres de Descartes" ("Discours," "Meditations," "Traits des Pas- 
 sions "), ed. J. Simon, Paris, 1850 and 1865. 
 
 "The Discourse on Method, Meditations, and Selections from the Prin- 
 ciples of Philosophy of Descartes," tr. J. Veitch, Edin. and Lond., 1850- 
 53, nth ed., 1897; N.Y., 1899. 
 
 "The Discourse on Method" (a reprint of Veitch's translation), Open Court 
 Co., 1903. 
 
 "Meditations, and Selections from the Principles of Philosophy" (a reprint 
 of Veitch), Open Court Co., 1903. 
 
 c. Commentary, Criticism, and Biography 
 
 Fischer, K., "Descartes and His School," N.Y., 1887. (A translation of the 
 
 first volume of Fischer's "Geschichte der neueren Philosophie." ) 
 Haldane, E. S., "Descartes: His Life and Times," Lond. and N.Y., 1905. 
 Huxley, T. H., "Lay Sermons," Lond., 1871, pp. 320-344. 
 Mahaffy, J. P., " Descartes " (Philosophical Classics). Edin. and Lond., 
 
 1880. (Mainly biographical.) 
 Smith, N., "Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy," Lond., 1902. 
 
 A study of Descartes's metaphysics and of its influence on succeeding 
 
 Continental and British systems. 
 Bouillier, F. H., "Histoire dela Philosophie Cartesienne," Paris, 1854, 1868. 
 L^vy-Bruhl, L., "History of Modem Philosophy in France," Lond., 1899; 
 
 Open Court Co., 1903. 
 
 THE OCCASIONALISTS' 
 Arnold Geulincx (1625-1669) 
 
 Geulincx was born at Antwerp, taught in the universities of 
 Loewen and of Leyden, and died in Leyden. From his meta- 
 physical doctrine of the entire independence of mind from body, 
 Geulincx deduced an ascetic sort of ethics. Uhi nil vales, ibi nil 
 velis, are the words in which he exhorts the soul to escape the world 
 and its lusts. 
 1662. "Logica." 
 
 1665. "De virtute . . . Tractatus ethicus primus." 
 1688. "Physica vera: opus posthumum." 
 1691. "Metaphysica vera." 
 
 "Opera philosophica," ed. J. P. N. Land, The Hague, 1891-93. 
 
 ' The term applies to Geulincx and his followers rather than to Male- 
 branche. 
 
464 Continenial Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) 
 
 The life of Malebranche was given over to philosophic and 
 religious meditation and retirement. He was a member of the 
 Oratory of Jesus. 
 
 1674-75. "De la recherche de la v6rit^." 
 1680. "Traits de la nature et de la gr^ce." 
 1684. "Traits de morale." 
 i6g8. "Traits de I'amour de Dieu." 
 
 "CEuvres," ed. J. Simon, 2 vols., 1842, 1859; 4 vols. 1871 (lacks the 
 "Traits de morale"). 
 Joly, H., "Malebranche" (Grands Philosophes), Paris, 1901. 
 Caird, E., In "Essays on Literature and Philosophy," N.Y,, 1892. 
 
 BARUCH DE SPINOZA: THE MONISTIC PLURALIST 
 I. Lite (1632-1677) 
 
 Baruch Spinoza was born in November, 1632. His parents 
 belonged to the community of the Portuguese Jews who had taken 
 refuge in Amsterdam from the persecution of the Inquisition. His 
 early environment was therefore that of the Hebrew community 
 in Amsterdam — a society which, despite its political freedom, 
 was yet isolated by its distinct customs and traditions. All that 
 we know of his childhood and youth are certain details of his 
 training at the Jewish schools in Hebrew literature; and later 
 under his well-known tutor, Francis van den Ende, in Latin, in 
 physiology, and perhaps in philosophy. The story of his unsuc- 
 cessful courtship of \'^an den Ende's daughter rests on too slight 
 evidence to be credited. 
 
 The most significant event of Spinoza's outward life was his 
 expulsion, in 1656, from the Jewish S3magogue. We do not know 
 exactly what course of thought or what line of reading disposed 
 Spinoza to question the teachings of the rabbis. Certainly the 
 teaching of Descartes profoundly affected his thinking, and it is 
 very likely that he was influenced by the nature-philosophy of 
 Bruno and of the mediaeval neo-Platonists.' His expulsion from 
 the synagogue followed an unsuccessful attempt of the rabbis to 
 purchase by an annuity of one thousand florins his outward con- 
 formity with Jewish ceremonial and teaching. The sentence 
 
 ' Cf. Pollock (pp. 82 jcj.), and Avenarius, both cited below. 
 
Baruch De Spinoza 465 
 
 which excommunicated him pronounced him "cursed ... by 
 day . . . and by night, ... in sleeping and ... in waking, . . . 
 in going out and in coming in ; " and warned the members of the 
 synagogue "that none may speak with him . . . nor show any 
 favor to him . . . nor come within four cubits of him." ' 
 
 The twenty years which remained of Spinoza's life were spent in 
 the spiritual solitude, enforced by this excommunication, from 
 the association with the friends of his race and of his youth. His 
 doctrines of government, of scripture interpretation, and of the- 
 ology earned for him the distrust and the enmity both of Protestant 
 and of Romanist church, and of the prevalent Cartesian philoso- 
 phy.^ In the years following immediately upon his expulsion, he 
 lived near Amsterdam with a friend who belonged to the small 
 dissenting Christian community of the Remonstrants; later, he 
 spent a few years in the village of Rijnsburg, near Leyden, the 
 headquarters of this same sect ; the last ten or twelve years of his 
 life he spent in or near The Hague. 
 
 In 1670 appeared the only work which Spinoza published dur- 
 ing his lifetime, the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," which in the 
 first place advocated the interpretation of the Scriptures as literary 
 and historical documents and as vehicles of moral truth; in the 
 second place, appealed from church to state authority; and finally, 
 counselled absolute freedom of thought and speech, on the ground 
 that a man may live rightly whatever his theory, or speculative 
 system. A storm of disapproval greeted each one of these teach- 
 ings. The book was prohibited by the Dutch government and 
 was placed on the Index. ^ None the less it gained the attention 
 of thoughtful men, and perhaps procured for Spinoza, in 1672, 
 an invitation, which he decUned, to the chair of philosophy in 
 Heidelberg University. "I reflect," he said, "that I must give up 
 philosophic research if I am to find time for teaching a class. I 
 reflect, moreover, that I cannot tell within what bounds to confine 
 . . . philosophic freedom." 
 
 During all these years Spinoza supported himself by the handi- 
 craft which he had learned as a boy, in accordance with the Jewish 
 custom : the art, in which he acquired both skill and reputation, 
 of making and polishing glasses. His outward life was one of 
 
 ' Freudenthal, pp. 115-116, note, cited below. 
 
 ' Cf. the resolutions of synods, States of Holland, etc., quoted by Freudenthal 
 2H 
 
466 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 almost austere simplicity, of thrift, and of scrupulous honor. Its 
 quiet was, to be sure, well-nigh disturbed when, in 1672, he was 
 barely restrained from exposing himself to personal danger by the 
 public expression of his indignation at the assassination of Jan 
 and Cornelius de Witte. Of the vigorous and daring range of his 
 thought, speculative and practical, during these mainly uneventful 
 years, his works give evidence. For proof of his capacity to give 
 and to gain loyal friendship we must turn to the small collection of 
 his letters and to the indications given by contemporary biographers. 
 Most significant of these is John Colerus, a minister of the Lutheran 
 church at The Hague. For the ' pernicious opinions ' of Spinoza, 
 the philosopher, Colerus entertained only 'aversion and horror,' 
 but he honored the simple, honest, and courageous life of the man, 
 and deprecated the 'many and false reports' about him. In 
 truth, the judgment of Spinoza's contemporaries has long since 
 been reversed. Not only is his philosophy the source of one 
 strong current in modern thought, but many who reject or care 
 not for his metaphysics seek in his ethics and in the example of 
 his life to learn the lesson of renunciation touched with enthu- 
 
 II. Bibliography 
 
 a. Works of Spinoza 
 
 (In the order of publication. For the order of composition, of. Avenarius, 
 
 cited below.) 
 
 1663. "Renati des Cartes principiorum philosophiEe, Pars i. et ii., more geo- 
 metrico," Amst. 
 
 Transl. : "The Principles of Descartes's Philosophy," with Intro- 
 duction, by H. H. Britan, Open Court Co., 1905. 
 (A summary of Descartes's "Principles," I. and II., supple- 
 mented by an Appendix more independently written.) 
 
 1670. "Tractatus theologico-politicus," Hamburg (actually Amst.). Cf. 
 supra, p. 465. 
 
 EngKshbyR. H. M.Elwes, "Chief Works of B. De Spinoza," 
 Lond., 1883-84, Vol. I. 
 
 1677. "Opera posthuma," Amst. 
 
 The title-page contains no indication of editor, publisher, or place 
 of publication. The volume contains, besides a compendium 
 of Hebrew grammar and a, collection of letters, the following 
 works : — 
 
Baruch De Spinoza 467 
 
 "Ethica." 
 
 Engl, by R. H. M. Elwes, op. cit., Vol. II ; by W. H. White, 2d ed., 
 rev. by A. H. Stirling, 1894; by Henry Smith, Cincinnati, 1886. 
 
 "Tractatus politicus." (An unfinished work written just before 
 Spinoza's death, treating of the theory and the forms of govern- 
 ment.) Engl, by Elwes, op. cit., Vol. I. 
 
 "Tractatus de intellectus emendatione." (An anticipation of the 
 epistemological teachings of the "Ethics," probably written about 
 1655.) Engl, by Elwes, op. cit., Vol. II; and W. H. White, 
 Lond., 1895. 
 1687. "SteUtondige reckening van den regenboog (Tractatus de Iride)." 
 1852. "Tractatus de Deo et homine." (This treatise consists chiefly of a 
 sort of first-hand draft of the " Ethics." Incorporated in it are two 
 short dialogues, probably the very earliest of Spinoza's writings.) 
 German translations by C. Schaarschmidt, Berl., 1869, and C. 
 Sigwart, Freiburg, 1870 and 1881. 
 
 "Opera," ed. J. van Vloten et J. P. Land, 1882-83; ^d ed., 3 
 vols., 1895-96. (The only complete and authoritative text.) 
 
 b. Commentary and Criticism 
 
 Pollock, F., " Spinoza, his Life and Philosophy," Lond., 1899 (2d ed.). 
 Ritchie, E., "Notes on Spinoza's Conception of God," and "The Reality of 
 
 the Finite in Spinoza's System," articles in the Philosophical Review, 
 
 XL and XIIL, 1902 and 1904. 
 Avenarius, R., "Ueber die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozischen Pan- 
 
 theismus," Leipzig, 1868. 
 Busolt, G., "Die Grundziige der Erkenntnisstheorie und Metaphysik 
 
 Spinoza's," Berl., 1875. (Commentary from the standpoint of idealism.) 
 Joachim, H., "A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza," Oxf., 1901. 
 Arnold, M., "Essays in Criticism," 3d ed., N.Y., 1876, pp. 237-362. 
 Brunschvicg, L., "Spinoza," Paris, 1894. 
 Caird, J., "Spinoza," Edin. and Lond., 1888. 
 Camerer, T., "Die Lehre Spinoza's," Stuttg., 1877. 
 Froude, J. A., In "Short Studies on Great Subjects," Lond., 1873. 
 FuUerton, G. S., "The Philosophy of Spinoza," pp. 22, 2d ed., N.Y., 1894 
 
 (a translation of parts of the "Ethics"); and "On Spinozistic Im- 
 mortality," Phila., 1899. 
 Renouvier, C, "La philosophic de Spinoza," in La Critique Philosophigue, 
 
 1881-82. 
 Sorley, W. R., "Jewish Mediaeval Philosophy and Spinoza." In Mind, V., 
 
 1880, pp. 362-384. 
 Stein. L., " Leibniz und Spinoza," Berl., 1890. (Stein shows that the influence 
 
 of Spinoza upon Leibniz and the intercourse between them have 
 
 been underestimated). 
 
 (Critics of the late eighteenth century) 
 Hegel, G.W. F.,in"GeschichtederPhilosophie" (Engl, trans.. III., 252-290). 
 
468 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 Herder, J. G., "Einige Gesprache iiber Spinoza's System," Gotha, 1787. 
 Jacobi, F. H., "Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza," Breslau, 1785 (Werke, IV.). 
 Mendelssohn, M., "An die Freunde Lessings," Berl., 1786. 
 Schelling, F. W. J., "Sammtliche Werke," Stuttg., 1861 (X., pp. 33-55). 
 
 Cf. among histories of philosophy, especially Erdmann. Cf. also 
 Joachim, op. oil., for selected bibliography; and Berendt u. Friedlander, 
 Busse, Clarke, Foucher de CareU, Knight, Lowenhardt, and Trendelen- 
 burg, cited by Rand. 
 
 c. Biography 
 
 Colerus, J., "Leven van Spinoza," Amst., 1705. 
 English, Pollock, op. cit. 
 
 Lucas, "La vie de Spinoza," Amst., 1719 (reprinted by Freudenthal, cited 
 below). 
 
 Freudenthal, J., "Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas." 
 
 An invaluable collection of copies and translations into German of original 
 documents: the early biographies, sentence of exconrmunication, pro- 
 hibitions of synods, etc. 
 
 Auerbach, B., "Spinoza: ein historischer Roman," Stuttg., 1837; 2te neu 
 duTchgearbeitete Aufl. : "Spinoza, ein Denkerleben," Mannheim, 1855. 
 
 Renan, E., "Spinoza," Haag, 1887. Engl, in Popidar Science Monthly, 
 XI., 216—230. 
 Cf., also. Pollock, op. cit., and Fischer, Van der Linde, and Meinsma, 
 
 cited by Rand. 
 
 III. Note upon Spinoza's Doctrine of the Infinite 
 Modes 
 
 'Infinite modes* of two sorts ('immediate' and 'mediate' infi- 
 nite modes, as one may designate them, for want of names defi- 
 nitely given by Spinoza) are described in Propositions 21 and 22 
 of Part I. of the " Ethics," but so ambiguously that the student 
 will at once turn to Letter 66 (Van Vloten 64) for the illustrations 
 which Spinoza gives of these infinite modes. " The examples you 
 ask for of the first kind," he says, "are, in thought, absolutely 
 infinite understanding; in extension, motion and rest; an ex- 
 ample of the second kind is the appearance of the whole universe 
 {jades totius universi)." 
 
 By fades totius universi, Spinoza may be supposed to mean 
 the indefinitely great (and thus, in a certain sense, the infinite) 
 sum of all the finite modes — of aU the minds, ideas, bodies, and 
 physical processes. For the other examples of infinite modes, it 
 is harder to find a place in Spinoza's system. In my own hesi- 
 
The Psychology and Epistemology of Spinoza 469 
 
 tating opinion, Spinoza meant to designate by 'infinite intellect' 
 the fundamental aspect of the attribute, thought, and by 'motion 
 and rest' the significant aspects of extension.' Thus conceived, 
 the infinite modes of this group are, as it were, sub-attributes. 
 Such an interpretation, it must be admitted, gives a nevif mean- 
 ing to the term ' mode ' ; but other interpretations (that of Erd- 
 mann and Fischer, for example) are not reconcilable with Propo- 
 sition 21 of Part I. The truth is that Spinoza treats the whole 
 subject so briefly and recurs to it so seldom that we may well 
 question whether we are able to discover his meaning. 
 
 rv. Exposition and Estimate of Parts II.-V. of 
 Spinoza's " Ethics " 
 
 The discussion of Spinoza's psychology, epistemology, and ethics, 
 though it does not fall within the narrow purpose of this book, is 
 here undertaken both because these doctrines are so frequently 
 referred to in the strictly metaphysical portions of the "Ethics," 
 and because they form the consummation of Spinoza's teach- 
 ing. It seems unjust to Spinoza and unfair to his great work, the 
 " Ethics, " to present its metaphysical without its practical doctrine. 
 A further justification of such a summary is the fact that the very 
 wealth of detail in Parts IV. and V. of the " Ethics " often obscures 
 the underlying principles of Spinoza's psychological and ethical 
 teachings. The sections following attempt only to indicate the 
 underlying outlines of his doctrine. For stimulus to psychological 
 analysis, as for the tranquillizing yet invigorating influence of 
 Spinoza's theory of the moral life, the reader must turn to the 
 "Ethics" itself. 
 
 a. The Psychology and Epistemology of Spinoza 
 
 I. The nature of mind 
 
 Spinoza has two ways of describing the mind. The first and 
 most natural of these is found in the third definition of Part II. 
 of the "Ethics, " where Spinoza says of the mind that it is "a con- 
 scious thing" which forms ideas.^ This is a conception of the 
 
 ' Cl. "Tractatus de Deo et homine," Ft. I., 8 and 9. 
 
 ' 'Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum quern mens foimat, propterea quod 
 res est cogitans." 
 
470 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 mind as subject of consciousness. It is restated by Spinoza in 
 many connections; as when he says: "the mind will contem- 
 plate," '"the mind imagines,"^ "the mind perceives . . . through 
 ideas." ' 
 
 Spinoza's second way of describing the mind is as the complex 
 idea of the body.^ According to this view, the mind is no longer a 
 subject of ideas, or a self conscious of ideas, but is the mere sum of 
 ideas. This is the conception whose inadequacy has been revealed 
 by the study of Hume's theory of the self.^ Spinoza seems not to 
 realize its inconsistency with his more usual view of the mind as 
 possessor, not sum, of ideas. He, however, employs this complex- 
 idea-theory of the mind only when he is emphasizing the practi- 
 cally useful conception of the mind as parallel to, coordinate with, 
 the body. This is the meaning of the statement that the mind is 
 constituted by an idea of the body — a teaching about the rela- 
 tion of mind to body which follows necessarily from Spinoza's 
 general doctrine of parallelism. And even if, as suggested in the 
 latter part of the eighth chapter of this book, there is reason to 
 question the metaphysical validity of the concept of parallelism, 
 every one will admit this conception of the mind as a convenient 
 way of ordering psychical and physical phenomena. That is, 
 to put it differently, most psychologists will admit that minds and 
 bodies, as observed, are, to say the least, parallel phenomena even 
 if they are also interrelated, and even if one of the two turns out to 
 be more real than the other.* 
 
 Thus Spinoza's definition of the mind as ' idea of the body,' in 
 the first place, substitutes for the conception of the mind as con- 
 scious thing {res cogitans) the less adequate view of it as a sum 
 of ideas. In the second place, however, it supplements either of 
 the two conceptions of the mind by the accepted teaching that the 
 mind is parallel to the body. Unhappily, however, Spinoza ap- 
 pears to be sometimes himself misled by this ambiguity of the 
 
 ' " Ethics," II., 17, Corol. ' Ibid., Scholium. ' II., 26. Cf. 43, Schol. 
 
 * II., 13 : ''Objectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus." 
 Cf. II and 15. ' Cf . supra, p. 179. 
 
 ' Spinoza himself indicates this double meaning of the tenn 'idea,' in the 
 Scholium to II. 17, where he sets forth the difference between (i) the 'idea' 
 (that is, the psychic phenomenon, parallel to Peter's body), which constitutes the 
 essence of Peter's mind, and (2) the 'idea' (consciousness) of Peter's body which 
 Paul has. The physical parallel to this second idea, Paul's idea, of Peter's body is, 
 as Spinoza does not fail to point out, a modification of Paul's, not of Peter's, body. 
 
The Psychology and Epistemology of Spinoza 471 
 
 term 'idea,' and seems accordingly to regard the mind, defined as 
 idea of the body, as if it were not a parallel, but a consciousness, 
 of the body. This, at least, is the obvious meaning of such a state- 
 ment as the following, "Nothing can happen in the body which 
 is not perceived by the mind." ' Such an assertion flatly contra- 
 dicts our experience. We certainly are not conscious of all the 
 bodily changes which, there is reason to suppose, go on in our 
 bodies. The doctrine is inconsistent with Spinoza's initial con- 
 ception of the mind; and it may well be that his expression, not 
 his thought, is at fault and that he never meant to teach that the 
 mind is conscious of all bodily modifications. His words, however, 
 sometimes lend themselves to this interpretation, and in any case 
 he uses the word ' idea ' with misleading ambiguity.^ 
 
 2. The different sorts oj consciousness and their value 
 
 Spinoza's account of the different types of consciousness, that 
 is, his psychological classification, is preceded and, in part, based 
 on a discussion of the properties of body.' Spinoza justifies this 
 procedure on the ground of his parallelism: if psychic, changes go 
 on, side by side, with physical ones, then for every distinct physical 
 change, a psychical change is to be expected. To this method it 
 may be objected that, considering the assumed independence of 
 psychical and physical, each should be studied for itself and classi- 
 fied by internal likenesses and differences. 
 
 Waiving this objection to the adequacy of Spinoza's method, we 
 may now summarize and classify, as follows, Spinoza's psycho- 
 logical and epistemological doctrine — his classification of con- 
 sciousness according to (i) its value, (2) its object, (3) the 
 accompanying physical phenomena : — 
 
 Stage I. Opinion or Imagination} 
 A. Its Nature : — 
 
 I. Consciousness of the Body. 
 
 a. Cognition (Consciousness primarily of external bodies which 
 affect one's own body) : — 
 I. Primary Cognition (The possession of ideas exactly corre- 
 sponding to external bodies) : — 
 
 » " Ethics," II., 12. ^ Cf. Pollock, " Spinoza," p. 125 
 
 '"Ethics," II., 13, with its Axioms, Lemmas, and Postulates. 
 '"Ethics," II., 40, Schol. 2. Cf. Spinoza's "On the Improvement of the Un- 
 derstanding," Elwes's translation, p. 8. The technical names used by Spinoza 
 himself are italicized. 
 
472 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 (o) Perception, ' when these external bodies are present. 
 (6) Imagination^ when these external bodies are absent. 
 Note. Memory : ' repeated imagination. 
 
 Association:' the relation of images. 
 8. Secondary Cognition (The consciousness, varying with the 
 individual, of common qualities of bodies) : ' — 
 (a) Abstract' (e.g. 'Being,' 'Thing'). 
 (6) Concrete' (e.g. 'Man,' 'Horse'). 
 b. Ajfecl:' (Consciousness primarily of one's own body as 
 affected.) 
 II. The Mind's Consciousness of Itself (Idea idea).'' 
 
 Note. The Mind's illusional consciousness of freedom.' 
 B. The Value of Opinion:' — 
 
 I. Opinion is inadequate, because its parallel (a modification of the 
 human body) is more limited than its object (external 
 thing, human body, or itself).'" 
 II. Opinion is 
 
 a. Untrue so far as its object is external body, himian body, or 
 
 mind ; " yet 
 
 b. True so far as its object is a limited idea." 
 
 Notes, a. Falsity is not a positive quality." 
 
 6. Ideas, even if inadequate and untrue, are 
 necessary." 
 Stage II. Reason. 
 
 A. Its Nature : Consciousness of ideas common to all men." 
 
 I. Ideas of modifications, which are 
 
 a. I. Common to all bodies and parts of bodies.'' 
 2. Common to all ideas. 
 
 b. Common to human body and to all affecting bodies." 
 
 II. Ideas of the eternal and necessary as such (extension, thought, 
 and infinite modes)." 
 
 B. Its Value. 
 
 I. These common ideas are relatively adequate, or complete, because 
 limited in intention." 
 
 '"Ethics," II., 17. ' II., 17, Corel. » II., 18, Schol. * II., 18. 
 
 •II., 40, Schol. I. " III., Def. 3. (Cf. infra, p. 473 Jej.) 'II., 21 and 43. 
 
 ' I., Appendix, and II., 3s, Schol. 
 
 ' Spinoza has two criteria of the value of the different forms of consciousness : 
 their adequacy, which he defines as their completeness (cf. II., Def. IV.,); and 
 their truth, which he defines as the agreements of the idea with its object (idea- 
 turn). Cf. II., Def. 4; Epistle 64 (Van Vloten, 60); "Improvement of the 
 Understanding," Elwes's trans., pp. 12 seq. He teaches, also, that the adequate 
 is the true (II., 34). '» II., 25-28. " II., 41, 35, and Schol. 
 
 '^ II., 33; Epistle 34 (Van Vloten, 21); "Improvement of the Understanding," 
 Elwes's translation, p. 40, VIII. '^ II., 36. 
 
 '* II., 40, Schol. 2; 38, Corol.; "Improvement of the Understanding," Elwes's 
 translation, p. 8. " II., 38. " II., 39. " II., 44, and Corol. 2 with Proof. 
 
 '» II., 38-40. 
 
The Psychology and Epistemology of Spinoza 473 
 
 II. These common ideas are true 
 a. because adequate ; ' 
 
 h. because the object, with which they agree, is limited. ' 
 Stage III. Intuitive Knowledge. 
 
 A. Its Nature : knowledge of real essence of 
 
 I. Attributes of God.' 
 II. Things.' 
 
 B. Its Value. Adequate and necessary.* 
 
 Detailed comment on this doctrine would lead us too far afield. 
 Its obscurest features concern, not the purely psychological classi- 
 fication, but the epistemological valuation. Not only is there a 
 tendency to confuse adequacy with truth; but the definition of 
 truth as agreement of idea with its object (ideatum), inherited as 
 it is from dualistic philosophy, involves great difliculty in the case 
 of self-consciousness (idea idea), where the two are, by hypothesis, 
 the same.' The criterion which Spinoza really employs in his 
 estimate of the grades of consciousness is not the agreement of 
 idea with ideate, but completeness — not alone, as his definitions 
 suggest, in the object of consciousness, but in its subject as well. 
 Thus the second stage of consciousness, reason, is a consciousness 
 (shared with all men) of common qualities, of extension or of 
 thought, either as manifested in bodies ' or in ideas, or as abstractly 
 considered. And the highest consciousness is the explicit, im- 
 mediate consciousness of the one substance in itself and in its 
 manifestations; a consciousness which (if it be right to attribute 
 self -consciousness to Spinoza's God) the finite mind shares not only 
 with all other finite minds, but with God. 
 
 3. The nature and classification of the affective, or non-cog- 
 nitive, consciousness 
 
 Spinoza treats in great detail the psychology of the affects or 
 non-cognitive mental functions. His interest seems to be due 
 
 ' " Ethics," II. 34. 2 iii^_ 
 
 'II., 40, Schol. 2: "Intuition . . . proceeds from the adequate idea of the 
 absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the 
 essence of things." Cf. II., 45; V., 36, Schol.; "Improvement," etc., loc. cit. 
 
 * II., 46-47. ' Cf., throughout, Joachim, op. cit., pp. 152 seq. 
 
 ' With Spinoza's double use of the term 'idea,' there is also the difficulty 
 that an idea has two objects, or ideates : its bodily accompaniment and its 'object.' 
 On all this cf. Joachim, op. cit., pp. 139 seq. 
 
 ' In II., 39, only the ideas of common bodily properties are explicitly recog- 
 nized. Spinoza's general doctrine, however, requires the appUcation to ideas also. 
 
474 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 partly to his dissatisfaction with contemporary writers who, he 
 says, treat the affects rather as 'phenomena outside nature than as 
 facts which follow the common laws of nature' and who "would 
 rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them." 
 But besides the general scientific interest in analyzing the emotions 
 and in reducing them to natural law, Spinoza has also an especial 
 concern with them in their influence upon the Mfe of morality. 
 
 From the standpoint both of psychology and of physiology. 
 Part III. of the "Ethics," which contains these discussions, is of 
 the very greatest value — full of close observation and keen analysis. 
 Spinoza's first definition of the affect makes the term broad enough 
 to cover both the mental process and the accompanying bodily 
 changes. Indeed, he makes the latter primary in his definition. 
 "By affect," he says,^ "I mean the modifications (affections) of the 
 body by which the power to act of the same body is increased or 
 diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of these bodily 
 modifications." Here, on the basis of his fundamental parallelism, 
 Spinoza follows out the method, already criticised, of distinguish- 
 ing mental states according to the distinctions of the parallel, 
 though independent, bodily states. Now it is a common observation 
 that good health attends happiness and that sorrow is accompanied 
 by bodily depression, and it is this fact, widely recognized by 
 modem and evoluntionary theories of emotion, on which Spinoza 
 here lays stress. The bodily phenomena, however, though a 
 constant accompaniment, should not be treated as a cardinal part 
 of the affect — especially on Spinoza's principle of the perfect 
 independence of psychical and physical ; and, as a matter of fact, 
 Spinoza usually means by 'affect,' not the idea-plus-the-bodily- 
 change, but the idea alone. 
 
 A true, though a negative, distinction of the affect is the one 
 already recognized; ^ the cognition has, or may have, as its object, 
 the external thing, while the affect is not, at any rate primarily, 
 a consciousness of external object. But obviously this distinction 
 is sufficient only to mark off the affect from the cognition, and 
 reveals nothing of its actual nature. It is supplemented by 
 Spinoza's distinction between two sorts of affect, on the one hand, 
 what he calls desire (cupiditas) or will (voluntas), on the other hand 
 emotion proper, affect in the narrowest sense. Spinoza does not, 
 
 ' " Ethics," Pt. III., Def. III. * Cf. supra, p. 472. 
 
SpinozcCs Doctrine of the Affects 475 
 
 it must be admitted, say in so many words, "there are two kinds 
 of affect, will and emotion." On the contrary, he often treats 
 desire as coordinate with the basal emotions, joy and sadness. 
 But his definitions justify the distinction, and, as will appear, it 
 is needed to bring consistency into his psychology. He defines 
 will as 'the endeavor (conatus) of the mind ... to persist in its 
 own being.' ^ (It will be observed that endeavor, or conatus, is a 
 broader term than will, in that it may be referred to the body. 
 The term 'appetite' Spinoza reserves for the endeavor of mind 
 and body in conjunction.) The definition in this SchoUum of 
 desire, or cupiditas, as 'appetite with consciousness thereof,' is 
 not very clear; but practically Spinoza uses the term in the sense 
 of will, to mean conscious self-affirmation ; ^ and he defines de- 
 sire, as ' nothing else but the endeavor to act,' ^ 'the actual essence 
 of a man ... as determined to a particular activity. . . .' 
 Now most of the affects which Spinoza treats — for example, 
 fear, indignation, and pity — obviously are not endeavors toward 
 self-persistence, and clearly need to be distinguished from the 
 activities, the strivings of the mind. It is truer to Spinoza's own 
 teaching to make such a contrast. 
 
 (a) From this discussion of Spinoza's definition of emotions, 
 we turn to his classification of them. Of the affects proper, he 
 recognizes joy and sorrow — Imtitia and tristitia — as basal. That 
 they are psychologically elemental and indefinable he tacitly as- 
 sumes, for in his definition of them he goes back to the principle of 
 parallelism, taking for granted that the power of the mind in- 
 creases and decreases as the bodily activity is helped or hindered ; * 
 and accordingly defining Ixtitia and tristitia as passive states (pas- 
 sions) "wherein the mind passes {transit) to a greater" — or lesser 
 — "perfection." In its development, this doctrine of the emotions 
 reveals the subtle analyst and the keen student of the human mind. 
 The emotions are grouped by Spinoza, according to their object, in 
 two main classes, forms of love or hate, that is, of joy or of sorrow 
 
 > " Ethics," III., 9, Schol. Cf. 7, 8. 
 
 ' III., Definitions of the Emotiohs, I., and Explanation. 
 
 ' IV., 59, first Proof, end. 
 
 ^ III., II : "Whatever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, the power of 
 activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, the 
 power of thought in our mind." It should be understood that this section is 
 throughout an attempt to interpret, rather than merely to expound, Spinoza's 
 doctrine of the emotions. 
 
476 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 "with the accompanying idea of an external cause." ' The nature 
 of this cause, or object, of the emotions is virtually the control- 
 ling consideration in the grouping of them ; it may be personal or 
 impersonal, person or thing; but the personal emotions, as Spinoza 
 does not fail to notice, are stronger and more vivid. He assigns 
 as reason the illusion of human freedom. "Love or hatred," he 
 says, "towards a thing which we conceive to be free, must, other 
 conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a 
 thing acting by necessity. . . . Hence it follows," he concludes, 
 "that men, thinking themselves to be free, feel more love or hatred 
 towards one another than towards anything else." ^ 
 
 (i) Among the personal emotions the most important contrast 
 is implied between the egoistic and the sympathetic. In the former 
 group are included simple love and hate, and also those emotions 
 following from the comparison of oneself with others, pride and 
 vainglory, humility and shame. "These emotions, humility and 
 self-abasement (abjectio)," Spinoza shrewdly says, "are of the 
 rarest. For human nature, in itself considered, struggles against 
 them as much as it can ; and thus those who are thought to be most 
 self -abased and humble, are generally most ambitious and envious."^ 
 Repentance, on Spinoza's theory, simply is humility with the il- 
 lusion of free will. "Repentance (Pceniientia)," he says, "is sad- 
 ness, with the accompanying idea of some deed, which we believe 
 we have done by the free decision of the mind." * The basal emo- 
 tions of sympathy are joy in the joy of another or sorrow in his 
 sorrow. "Whosoever," Spinoza says, "imagines that which he 
 loves to be affected with joy or with sorrow will be affected w^ith 
 joy or with sorrow; and each emotion will be the greater or the 
 less in the lover, according as it is greater or less in the thing 
 loved." ' Evidently, the sympathetic emotions, thus conceived, 
 are intensely personal, involving the explicit reahzation of other 
 selves and the sharing of their experience. This is true, also, of 
 the mixed emotions; joy in that "an object of hatred is affected 
 
 ' " Ethics," III., 13, Schol. ' III., 49, and Coral. 
 
 ' III., '• Definitions of the Emotions," XXIX. 
 
 •Def. XXVII. Cf. Prop. 30, Schol; Prop. 51, Schol. 
 
 ' III., 21. Spinoza has an ostensibly supplementary, but really contradictory, 
 account of the sympathetic emotions which is less true to the most trustworthy in- 
 trospection. According to this view, set forth in Prop. 27, after the manner of 
 Hobbes, sympathy is conceived as an involuntary imitation, bodily and mental, 
 of the modifications of the human beings who resemble us. 
 
Spinoza's Doctrine of the Affects 477 
 
 with sorrow" and sorrow in that "the same object is affected with 
 joy." ^ Spinoza indiscriminately calls both these emotions by the 
 same name, envy (invidia). 
 
 (2) Besides the personal emotions, described by Spinoza with 
 peculiar vigor and insight, he discusses also those which are im- 
 personal, — those, in other words, whose cause is not necessarily 
 a person, but a thing or an event. Among the significant emo- 
 tions of this sort are hope and fear, defined as "inconstant joy or 
 sorrow arising from the idea of something past or future about 
 whose issue we are somewhat doubtful;" ^ despair, conceived as 
 "sorrow whose source is the idea of a thing, future or past, where- 
 from the cause of doubt has been taken away ; " ' a group of 
 emotions — consternation, veneration, horror, and devotion * — 
 whose common feature is that they are compounded with wonder 
 (admiratio) , that is, fixed attention — itself incorrectly named by 
 Spinoza among the emotions ; ' and, finally, a group of emotions 
 defined by the precise nature of their object, as avarice, and the 
 love of luxury." 
 
 (b) Parallel with these emotions of joy or sorrow, like or 
 dislike, are the compounds of desire (cupidUas) with emotion 
 proper. Parallel, for example, with love is benevolence, the active 
 impulse to benefit the loved one; ^ parallel with hate is cruelty; ' 
 coordinate with pride is ambition." 
 
 Toward the very end of the discussion'" Spinoza makes one 
 further cardinal distinction — basing it, to be sure, on the early 
 definitions and on Propositions i and 3 of Part III — between 
 those aSects "which are passions" and others, either desires or 
 emotions of joy, not of sorrow, "which are referred to us in so 
 far as we act (agimus)." By activity of the mind, however, 
 Spinoza here means not, as before, will, endeavor, or striving, 
 but the contemplation of adequate ideas." The confusion of the 
 
 ' " Ethics," III., Prop. 23. Cf. " Definitions of the Emotions," XXIII., and 
 Prop. 35. 
 
 = III., Definitions of the Emotions, XII. and XIII. Cf. Prop. 18. 
 
 'III., Definitions, etc., XV. 
 
 •III., Prop. 52, Schol.; Definitions, etc., XLII. 
 
 ' III., Definitions of the Emotions, IV. and Explanation. 
 
 » III., Prop. 56, Schol. ; Definitions, etc., XLV.-XLVIII. 
 
 ' III., Definitions, etc., XXXIV., XXXV. Cf. Prop. 41. 
 
 » Ibid., XXXVIII. » Ibid., XLIV. Cf. Prop. 39, Schol. 
 
 10 III., Props. 58, 59; cf. 53. 
 
 " Cf. III., 1 : " Our mind ... in so far as it has adequate ideas ... is nec- 
 essarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas it is necessarily passive. " 
 
478 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 two conceptions of activity constitutes one of the difficulties of 
 this part of Spinoza's psychology. 
 
 The student of Spinoza will find it a stimulating exercise in psy- 
 chology if he tries, on the basis of these suggestions, to classify 
 the emotions which Spinoza names. No summary, however, and 
 no condensation can reproduce the lifelike accuracy and poignancy 
 of Spinoza's descriptions of the emotions — a portion of his 
 "Ethics " which effectively gives the lie to the conventional con- 
 ception of Spinoza as a logomachist concerned only with verbal 
 distinctions and with abstract definitions. 
 
 h. The Practical Philosophy of Spinoza 
 
 There can be no reasonable doubt that Spinoza's entire system 
 has been formulated as a foundation for the ethical teaching which 
 the fourth and fifth Parts of his "Ethics" set forth. Already 
 the limits of this ethical system have been suggested by the 
 reiterated teaching that human freedom, in the undeterminist 
 sense, is a delusion. For from this it follows that there is no such 
 thing as a moral obligation founded on the freedom of the in- 
 dividual to choose one of two courses of action. On the contrary, 
 the acts of the human being follow with necessity from the nattire of 
 God, or substance, whereof he is simply a modification or expres- 
 sion. In spite of this doctrine of the rigid necessity of human 
 thoughts and actions Spinoza yet insists on the essential freedom 
 of the human being. Under the concept of freedom, indeed, 
 Spinoza, like Kant, summarizes all the characters of the ideal 
 moral life. He thus contrasts what, subjectively regarded, he 
 calls the life of bondage, the irrational, the unvirtuous life, with 
 the life of freedom, the rational, the virtuous life. On the objec- 
 tive side — with reference, in other words, not to the character 
 of the actor, but to the quality of the act or the situation — he con- 
 trasts the bad or irrational with the good or rational.' His ethical 
 doctrine may be summed up in the following statement: The 
 virtuous man is he who lives the life of freedom under the guidance 
 of reason ; in other words, the virtuous man possesses an adequate 
 knowledge of himself in his completeness, as related to the rest of 
 
 ' " Ethics," Pt. IV., purports to treat of the life of bondage and Pt. V. of the 
 life of freedom; but in reality the two are continuous. 
 
The Practical Philosophy of Spinoza 479 
 
 humanity and to God, he lives a life of happy activity for him- 
 self and for others, and he has a joyful knovsfledge of God. The 
 bad man, on the other hand, lives the irrational life of bondage; 
 he has an inadequate knowledge involving an over-estimation of 
 himself, and because he lacks reason he is in bondage to the un- 
 happy passive emotions ; his life is unsocial and therefore self- 
 destructive, and he does not attain to the knovsrledge of God. 
 
 The ethical doctrine of Spinoza, thus briefly formulated, is 
 significant as a vital fusion of certain elements usually treated in 
 isolation and even in opposition, (i) In the first place, Spinoza 
 asserts — though he does not, it must be admitted, cogently prove ' 
 — the reconciliation of intellectual writh emotional and volitional 
 factors. The moral life, as Spinoza views it, is a life of thought, 
 of adequate comprehension of oneself in all one's relations ; but it 
 is no less a life of action and a life of joy: the good man is con- 
 stantly described as one who "lives under the guidance of reason "; 
 and "he who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his 
 affects" is said to "feel joy Qatitia)." ^ (2) Spinoza's "Ethics," 
 in the second place, recognizes the essential motives both of asceti- 
 cism and of hedonism. A large portion of his definite ethical 
 teaching ' consists in directions for holding in check the passive 
 emotions. These directions — based, as they are, on keen psy- 
 chological insight — are of abiding practical value. "An affect," 
 Spinoza teaches, "can neither be controlled nor destroyed except 
 by an opposite affect ; " * and he goes on to point out that, other 
 things being equal, affects whose objects are certain and present 
 and near at hand must be stronger than those whose objects are 
 doubtful, absent, and remote.^ A later counsel to control emotion 
 suggests that "we formaclear and distinct idea of the given affect."' 
 The two directions — first, to control affect by affect; second, to 
 control affect by knowledge — seem at first sight inconsistent and 
 it is possible that Spinoza never reconciled them. On the other 
 hand, we may suppose him to imply that a preceding affect, namely 
 desire, is necessary in order to change emotion into idea. 
 
 This teaching that the affects must be held in check represents 
 the rigoristic side of Spinoza's "Ethics." It never leads him, 
 
 ' Cf. injra, p. 480 *, for Spinoza's argument that the life of freedom is not a life 
 of sorrow. This, however, would not •:irove it a life of positive happiness. 
 * " Ethics," v., IS, Proof. = IV., 1-19, and V., 1-13. * IV., 7. 
 
 » IV., 10-12. 'V., 3. 
 
480 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 however, either to decry all emotion as non-moral or, in a mood 
 of pessimistic asceticism, to glorify emotions of sadness. On the 
 contrary, he estimates the moral value of each emotion for itself; 
 and the most important principle of his estimate is the doctrine 
 that sorrow is in itself evil, since "he who rightly has discovered 
 (novii) that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature 
 and come to pass according to the eternal laws of nature, clearly 
 will find nothing which is worthy of hate, ridicule, or contempt, 
 nor will he pity anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue 
 will strive to do well (bene agere) . . . and to rejoice." ' This 
 lesson not, as Arnold points out, of "mere resigned acquiescence 
 . . . but of joyful activity within the limits of man's true sphere,"' 
 is that by which Spinoza most impressed himself on the moral 
 philosophy of the later eighteenth century. 
 
 The doctrine that all events are expressions of divine necessity, 
 and that consequently all emotions which involve sadness are evil, 
 supplies Spinoza with a fruitful principle of distinction. Thus, 
 hope and fear are evil emotions, sharing, Spinoza says, 'a defect of 
 knowledge and a weakness of mind.' ' Even humility, he teaches, 
 "is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason. Humility," he 
 explains, "is sadness which rises from this, that a man contem- 
 plates his powerlessness. But in so far as a man knows himself 
 by true reason, he is supposed to understand his essence, that is, 
 his power." * Perhaps the most vigorous of Spinoza's specific ap- 
 plications of this general doctrine is found in his teaching of the 
 relation between hatred and love. "All emotions of hatred," he 
 says, "are bad; therefore he who lives under the guidance of 
 reason will try so far as he can not to be assailed by such 
 emotions and ... to prevent his fellow from suffering them. 
 But hatred . . . can be quenched by love and so passes over into 
 love, therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will 
 try to repay hatred with love." Such a man, Spinoza teaches, 
 "fights his battle with confidence." ^ 
 
 Not merely all affects of sadness, but certain pleasant affects 
 are, in Spinoza's opinion, evil. This teaching, it will be observed, 
 more definitely than the exhortation to control desire, distinguishes 
 the system from every form of hedonism. Spinoza, it is true, 
 
 ' "Ethics," IV., 50, Schol. ^"Essays in Criticism." 
 
 ' " Ethics," IV., 47, Schol. * IV., S3, and Proof. ' IV., 46, Proof and Schol 
 
The Practical Philosophy of Spinoza 481 
 
 seems at times to identify the good with the pleasant and the evil with 
 the unpleasant. Thus he says in a Scholium of Proposition 39, 
 Part III., "By good, I here understand every sort of joy . . . 
 and by evil every sort of sorrow;" and he later asserts, in Part 
 IV., "The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emo- 
 tions of joy and sorrow." ^ It is, however, impossible to regard 
 Spinoza as a hedonist. He utterly forbids such a theory by this 
 teaching that the pleasurable emotions may be evil. The expres- 
 sions which suggest hedonism are most simply interpreted as over- 
 emphasis of the optimistic doctrine that joy accompanies goodness. 
 Of the pleasant yet evil emotions the most important are, in the 
 first place, excessive and self-contradictory love and desire ; ' 
 and, in the second place, the emotions, pride and disparagement, 
 which involve an over-estimation of oneself.' 
 
 (3) The last of these teachings suggests the third of the eclectic 
 or harmonizing aspects of Spinoza's "Ethics." It has already 
 appeared that his system, spite of its intellectualism, does justice 
 to the emotional and volitional aspects of human life. It has 
 been evident, also, that his doctrine of sadness as essentially evil 
 is tempered both by the recognition of certain pleasures as evil 
 and by practically effective directions for the control of emo- 
 tion. It remains to show that Spinoza recognizes and unites 
 the principles of individualistic, socialistic, and theistic ethics. 
 Many of the propositions of Part IV., taken by themselves, ex- 
 press a narrow and emphatic individualism. "Since," Spinoza 
 says, "reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands 
 that each love himself, and seek . . . that which is really useful to 
 him." * "No virtue," he asserts, a little later, "can be conceived 
 prior to this: the endeavor to preserve oneself." ° Yet he insists 
 with equal emphasis that "the good which every man who follows 
 after virtue seeks {appetit) for himself, he will desire also for the 
 rest of mankind"; ° and, so far from basing this doctrine on em- 
 pirical observation, he says that "it arises not by accident, but from 
 
 • " Ethics," IV., Prop. 8; cf. Prop, ig for repeated assertion. Cf. also 20, 21, 
 41. The definitions of Part IV. are sometimes, but not necessarily, interpreted 
 in a hedonistic sense. 
 
 2 IV., 44 and 60. (Spinoza refers explicitly only to inconsistent desire.) 
 
 ' IV., 57, Schol. 48. * IV., 18, Schol. ' IV., 22. Cf. 24 and 25. 
 
 'IV., 37, Proof; cf. IV., 18, Schol. "There is nothing . . . more excellent 
 than that the minds and bodies of all should form as it were one mind and one 
 body." 
 
 2 I 
 
482 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 the very nature of reason that man's highest good is common to 
 all." ' For the life of freedom is the life of reason, and reason is, 
 as will be remembered, conceived by Spinoza as a consciousness 
 shared with others. "It follows that men, in so far as they live 
 by the guidance of reason, necessarily do only those things which 
 are necessarily good for human nature and therefore for every 
 man." ^ 
 
 Thus Spinoza harmonizes egoism with altruism by the teaching 
 that the one involves the other. The endeavor to preserve one's 
 own being demands action for the good of other human beings, 
 since one is oneself a part of humanity, or — to put it in the op- 
 posite way — since the other human beings constitute one's own 
 larger self. This consideration leads at once to the crowning 
 doctrine of Spinoza's "Ethics." The close union of human 
 beings is only possible, he teaches, in that they are one and aU 
 expressions of God. Thus, he says, in a passage already quoted 
 in part: "It arises from the very nature of reason that man's 
 highest good is common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the 
 very essence of man, in so far as he is defined by reason. . . . For 
 it pertains to the essence of the human mind to have adequate 
 knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God." These 
 words are profoundly consistent with Spinoza's system of epistemol- 
 ogy and of metaphysics. He has taught that completely adequate 
 knowledge of any object involves a knowledge of God.' Evi- 
 dently, therefore, the complete knowledge of oneself and one's 
 own good demands not merely the recognition of oneself as a 
 member of humanity, but a knowledge of oneself and of all men as 
 expressing God's nature, a knowledge, in other words, "of the 
 eternal and infinite essence of God." Thus Spinoza's consum- 
 mate conception of the good is acquaintance with God. "The 
 mind's highest good," he says, "is the knowledge of God and the 
 mind's highest virtue is to know God." ^ And since adequate knowl- 
 edge is companioned by joy, "he who clearly and distinctly un- 
 derstands himself . . . loves God," and "this love towards God 
 must have the chief place in the mind." ^ Such love toward God, 
 it will be remembered, rises from the perfect knowledge of him; 
 and this knowledge involves the consciousness that he is manifested 
 
 « " Ethics," IV., 36. 2 IV., 35, Proof. ' I., 16 se^.; V., 24-32. * IV., aS. 
 ' v., IS and 16; cf. 32 and zi- 
 
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz 483 
 
 in humanity, consequently " this love toward God cannot be stained 
 by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise it is the more 
 inflamed (joveiur) in proportion as we imagine the more men 
 joined to God by the same bond of love.' ... I have thus 
 completed," Spinoza says, "what I wished to set forth touching 
 . . . the mind's freedom.^ 
 
 GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON LEIBNIZ: THE PLURALISTIC 
 SPIRITUALIST 
 
 I. Life (1646-1716) 
 
 There is no philosopher of modern times whose life so strongly 
 as that of Leibniz confutes the theory that the philosopher is of 
 necessity a dreamy speculator, a man apart from the concerns of 
 active life. To Leibniz, philosophy was the resource of hours 
 snatched from the most strenuous concerns of diplomatic and 
 professional service. He was born in 1646, in Leipzig, the son of 
 a university professor who died in Gottfried's early childhood. 
 From his earliest years he was an omnivorous reader and a preco- 
 cious student; he immersed himself successively in the classics, in 
 mathematics, and in philosophy. He entered, at fifteen, the univer- 
 sity of Leipzig, concerned himself mainly with philosophical study, 
 and two years later published his earhest work, "De principio 
 individui." Turning then from philosophy, he spent one semester 
 in mathematical study at Jena, and thereafter pursued juristic 
 studies, taking his degree in 1666 from the university of Altdorf. 
 
 The youth of twenty then received, but at once refused, the offer 
 of a professorship; and was introduced by a Frankfort friend, 
 Boineburg, to the Elector of Mainz, Johann Philip. In his 
 service Leibniz remained for six years, that is, until 1672. By 
 the elector's authority he drew up — two hundred years ahead of 
 
 > " Ethics," V. 20. 
 
 ' v., 42, Schol. It will be observed that this account of Spinoza's ethical 
 theory disregards a large portion of Ft. V. Some of this has been discussed (cf. 
 supra, Chapters, pp. 2go seq. on Props. 17, 35, 36), in considering Spinoza's doc- 
 trine of the personality of God. The propositions on which no comment is 
 made are those which present an argument, inconsistent with Spinoza's general 
 theory, for the immortality of the soul. There is the more reason for neglecting 
 these since Spinoza himself says (V., 41, 42): "Even if we did not know that our 
 mind is eternal, we should still hold as of primary importance piety and religion. 
 , . . Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself." 
 
484 Continental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 his age — a scheme for attaining the union and security of the 
 German states. One specific means for this end was, in Leibniz's 
 mind, the effort to incite the powerful French king to undertake the 
 conquest of Egypt from the Turks — an enterprise which could not 
 fail to divert his attention from his neighbors, Holland and Ger- 
 many. The scheme was submitted to Louis XIV., and in its 
 interest Leibniz went, in 1672, to Paris. But, by this time, Louis 
 had decided on the war with Holland and an understanding with 
 the Turks; and Leibniz's far-seeing plans had no immediate 
 result. They were carried out independently of each other, long 
 years after his death, by the first Napoleon and by Bismarck. 
 
 Leibniz's patrons, Boineburg and the Elector of Maintz, died 
 in 1672 and in early 1673. He himself spent the three following 
 years in Paris, making a visit to London in the first months of 
 1673. For the most part, these years were given over to a study 
 of mechanics, and especially of physics, which culminated in the 
 discovery, published many years later, of the differential calculus. 
 In 1676, he accepted the invitation of Duke Johann Friedrich to 
 become librarian and counsellor at the court of Hanover. He 
 directed his journey from Paris through The Hague, and visited 
 Spinoza, ostensibly to discuss optics, really — we have reason to 
 think — to confer on philosophical subjects.' 
 
 The history of the remaining forty years of the life of Leibniz 
 is one of undeviating fidelity and of efficient service to the House 
 of Hanover. Leibniz was court librarian, historian, and dip- 
 lomatic adviser, under three successive princes. He directed pro- 
 ductive mining industries, travelled widely to collect materials 
 for his great history of the House of Hanover, interested himself 
 in plans for the union of the Protestant and the Catholic churches, 
 attempted the foundation of academies of science in Berlin, 
 Vienna, and St. Petersburg, and was appointed privy counsellor, 
 by the Electors of Hanover and of Brandenburg and — late in 
 his lifetime — by Peter the Great. Incidentally, he wrote letters, 
 notices, and monographs on philosophical themes. For the last 
 seven years of the life of his warm friend, the Hanoverian princess, 
 Sophie Charlotte first queen of Prussia, Leibniz spent much time 
 at her court in Berlin and in Liitzenburg (now Charlottenburg). 
 Through her, he succeeded in his efforts to found the Berlin 
 
 ' Cf. L. Stein, " Leibniz und Spinoza," cited su^a. 
 
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz 485 
 
 Academy; to meet her difl&culties, he undertook his "The- 
 odicy " ; to her keen mind he furnished impetus and philosophic 
 guidance. 
 
 The last years of the hfe of Leibniz were shadowed by neglect 
 and ingratitude. His patroness, the elder Sophie Charlotte of 
 Hanover, died ; and the Elector of Hanover was crowned George 
 I. of England, but forbade the attendance of Leibniz at the Eng- 
 lish court. Unnoticed and almost unmourned, he died in 1 716. 
 
 n. Bibliography 
 
 a. Chiej Philosophical Writings 
 
 (Most of these works appeared in journals no longer to be obtained, and 
 references are therefore given to the accessible editions. For list of editions, 
 including translations, see below.) 
 
 1663. "De principio individui," Leipz. Hrsg. v. G. E. Guhrauer, Berl., 1837. 
 1684. " Meditationes de cognitione, veritate, et ideis." In Acta Erudi- 
 
 torum. (Gerhardt, IV.; Erdmann; French: Janet; Engl.: 
 
 Duncan.) 
 1686. "Discours de metaphysique." (Ed. C. L. Grotefend, Hannov., 1846. 
 
 Gerh., IV. ; Engl. : Montgomery.) 
 1686-1690. " Correspondance de Leibniz et d'Arnauld" (Ed. Grotefend, 
 
 ibid.; Gerh., II.; French: Janet.; Engl.: Montgomery.) 
 
 1694. "De primae philosophiaj emendatione et de notione substantia." In 
 
 Acta Eruditorum. (Gerh., IV.; Erd.; French: Janet; Engl.: 
 Duncan.) 
 
 1695. " Systfeme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances," 
 
 Journal des savants, 1695. (Gerh., IV. ; Erd.; French: Janet; 
 Engl.: "New System," Duncan, Latta.) 
 
 1696. "Eclaircissements (1-3) du nouveau systeme." Ibid. (Replies to an 
 
 objection of Foucher.) 
 
 1697. "De rerum originatione radicali." (Gerh., VII.; Erdm.; French: 
 
 Janet; Engl.. Duncan.) 
 1705. "Nouveaux essais sur I'entendement," publ. Leipz., 1765. (Gerh., 
 
 v.; Erdm.; Janet; Engl.: "New Essays," Langley.) 
 
 A criticism, chapter by chapter, of Locke's "Essay." 
 1710. "Essais de theodicfe, sur la bonte de Dieu, la liberte de Thomme, et 
 
 I'origine du rnal." Amst. (Gerh., VI. ; Erdm. ; Janet. English 
 
 translation of the Abr^ge, a summary of the Theodic6e, Duncan.) 
 1714. "Principes de la nature et de la grace." In L'Europe savante, 1718. 
 
 (Gerh., VI.; Erdm.; Janet; Engl.: "Principles of Nature. and 
 
 Grace," Duncan, Latta.) 
 (1714.) "La monadologie," publ. Berl., 1840. (Gerh., VI. ; Erdm.; Janet; 
 
 Latin: in Acta Eruditorum, 1721; Engl.: Duncan, Latta, 
 
 Montgomery.) 
 
486 Contitiental Philosophers through Leibniz 
 
 1715-1716. "A Collection of Papers . . . between the Learned Mr. Leibniz 
 and Dr. Clarke . . . relating to the Principles of Natural Phi- 
 losophy and Religion," Lond., 1717. (The original edition con- 
 tains both French and English texts of Leibniz's and of Clarke's 
 letters. Gerh., VII.; Erdm.; Janet.) 
 
 1820. "Lettres au Pfere Malebranche." In MHanges, Soc. des Bibliophiles, 
 1820. (Gerh., L; Erdm.) 
 
 1854. "Refutation de Spinoza." (Lat. and French: in Foucher de Careil's 
 "Letters et opuscules in^dits de Leibniz." Engl.: Duncan.) 
 
 b. Most Accessible Editions and Translations 
 
 Gerhardt, C. J., "Die philosophischen Schriften des Leibniz," 7 vols., Berl., 
 1875-90. (The most nearly complete edition of the philosophical 
 works; preceded by Gerhardt's edition of "Leibnizen mathematischen 
 Schriften," Halle, 1850-63.) 
 
 Erdmann, J. E., "Opera philosophica," Berl., 1839-40; 2 parts. (Excellent 
 edition; lacks "Discourse, Amaud Letters," and other material; out 
 of print.) 
 
 Janet, P., "CEuvres philosophiques," 2 vols., Paris, 1866. (Lacks "Dis- 
 course, Letters to Malebranche," etc.) 
 
 Careil, A. Foucher de, "Lettres et opuscules in^dits," Paris, 1857. 
 
 Duncan, G. M., "Philosophical Works," New Haven, 1890, pp. 392. (In- 
 cludes shorter philosophical works and selections from longer ones. Out 
 of print, 1906.) 
 
 Langley, A. G., "New Essays concerning Human Understanding, with . . . 
 Some of the Shorter Pieces." Lond. and N. Y., 1896. 
 
 Latta, R., "The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings of Leibniz," 
 Oxford, 1898. 
 
 Montgomery, G. R., "Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with 
 Arnauld, and Monadology," Open Court Co., Chicago, 1902. 
 
 c. Commentary and Criticism 
 
 Russell, B., "A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz," Camb., 
 
 1900, pp. 300. 
 Dewey, J., "Leibniz's New Essays concerning the Human Understanding. 
 
 A Critical Exposition," Chicago, 1888, pp. 272. 
 Couturat, L., "La logique de Leibniz," Paris, 1900. 
 
 "Sur la mftaphysique de Leibniz." Revtie de Mltaphysique et 
 de Morale, 1902, X., pp. 1-23. 
 Dillman, E., "Eine neue Darstellung der Leibnizischen Monadenlehre auf 
 
 Grund der Quellen," Leipz., 1891, pp. 525. 
 Eucken, R., "Leibniz und Geulincx," Philos. Monalsheft, XIX., 1883. 
 Lotze, R.,"Metaphysik," Bk. I., Chapters 5-6. (Engl.: Bosanquet, Oxf., 
 
 1887.) 
 Renouvier, C, et Prat, L., "La nouvelle monadologie," Paris, 1899, pp. 546. 
 
British Philosophers through Hume 487 
 
 Selver, D., "Der Entwicklungsgang der Leibnizischen Monadenlehre bis 
 
 1695," Dissertation, Leipz., 1885. 
 Trendelenburg, A., In " Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad. der Wiss.," 1847, 
 
 1852, 1856. 
 
 Among histories of philosophy consult without fail those of Erdmann and 
 of Fischer. Cf. also bibliographies of Descartes and of Spinoza. 
 
 i. Biography 
 
 Guhrauer, G. E., "Leibniz; eine Biographic." 2 vols. Breslau, 1842, 1846. 
 (Cf. Mackie, Pfleiderer, Wolff, cited by Rand.) 
 
 C. BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS THROUGH HUME 
 
 /. MATERIALISTS AND THEIR OPPONENTS 
 
 THOMAS HOBBES: THE PLURALISTIC MATERIALIST 
 
 I. Lite (1588-1679) 
 
 Thomas Hobbes was the son of an unlearned middle-class 
 clergyman who lost his living because he struck down a man at 
 his own church door. He was educated, by his uncle, at Oxford ; 
 but the Oxford of his day was bound down to a classical and 
 mediaeval tradition. It offered, for example, no instruction in 
 mathematics, which it regarded as a black art. Hobbes found 
 nothing to interest or to stimulate him in the university, which later 
 he criticised with great bitterness. He left Oxford, when he was 
 twenty years old, in 1608, and became the travelling tutor and 
 companion of the son of the Earl of Cavendish, soon, through the 
 death of his father, to become head of the family. For twenty 
 years Hobbes occupied this position, enjoying travel and giving 
 himself also to classical study. In 1628 he published the first 
 result of his study — a vigorous and accurate translation of Thu- 
 cydides. 
 
 This year of 1628, in which Hobbes was forty years old, was the 
 time of his philosophical quickening. The Earl of Cavendish 
 died; Hobbes made his third journey to the Continent; and for the 
 first time in his life, he opened a treatise on geometry — Euclid's 
 "Elements"; and at once he set himself with fairly passionate 
 interest upon the study of geometry and mechanics — the inves- 
 tigation of the laws of spatial relation and physical motion, 
 which determined the whole course of his metaphysics. The ten 
 years succeeding this awakening were years of intellectual activity 
 
488 British Philosophers through Hume 
 
 unmarked by any publication. Hobbes concerned himself not 
 only for metaphysics and physics, but for psychological and social 
 theory as well. In 1640 he had formulated and promulgated in 
 manuscript his psychological and poUtical doctrines. In that same 
 year — moved very likely by his natural timidity to withdraw from 
 the possibility of damaging poUtical associations, during the 
 years of civil war — ■ he left England for Paris, where he lived 
 imtil 1651. During part of these years he was tutor to the ban- 
 ished Prince of Wales, later Charles II. ; and during all the time 
 he enjoyed the society of scientists and mathematicians — Gas- 
 sendi, Mersenne, and others. 
 
 The publication, in 1651, of the "Leviathan," the first of his 
 political works to be published in English, won for Hobbes the 
 disfavor both of the ecclesiastical party and of the royahsts, then 
 in exile in Paris. The churchmen resented his theory that the 
 church should be subject to the government, and the royalists 
 objected strenuously to his doctrine that it is lawful to submit to 
 the conquerors of a vanquished monarch. Because of the distrust 
 of both parties, Hobbes returned to England, where he pub- 
 lished, in 1655, the summary of his metaphysical doctrine, called 
 "De Corpore." 
 
 The last twenty-five years of the life of Hobbes were embittered 
 by constant conflicts and disputes. These ranged around three 
 subjects. One quarrel, notably with Ward and vsrith Wallis, 
 professors of mathematics at Oxford, concerned Hobbes's stric- 
 tures on the universities ' — criticisms which applied more fairly 
 to the university of Hobbes's youth than to the greatly reformed 
 Oxford of the middle seventeenth century. The honors of this 
 controversy remained with the philosopher's opponents. They 
 were, of course, more influential than Hobbes, and one of them, 
 John Fell, the dean of Christ Church, expunged a reference to 
 Hobbes from the Latin translation of Wood's "History of Antiq- 
 uities of Oxford," and himself described Hobbes in these uncom- 
 plimentary terms: irritabile illud et vanissimum Malmesburiense 
 animal. A second contest, in which, also, Hobbes was doubtless 
 in the wrong, centred about his mathematical theories, notably 
 his attempt at the quadrature of the circle. Hobbes had entered on 
 mathematical study too late in life to pit himself against well- 
 
 > Cf. "Leviathan," Ft. I., Chapter i, end; Pt. IV., Chapter 46. 
 
Thomas Hobbes 489 
 
 trained scholars; but he maintained his positions with a vigor of 
 invective worthy of a better cause/ 
 
 But the bitterest of all quarrels was that in which Hobbes sought 
 to defend himself against the accusations of atheistic and immoral 
 teaching which haunted him throughout his Ufe and persisted 
 for decades after his death. Writers, theological and philosophical, 
 many of them incapable of understanding Hobbes, united in these 
 clamorous charges against him. The clergyman who wrote the 
 "Dialogue between Philautes and Timothy" (London, 1673) 
 fairly illustrates the critics of Hobbes's own age, who believed that 
 Hobbes had " said more for a bad life and against any other life 
 after this than ever was pleaded by philosopher or divine to the 
 contrary." The allusions of Locke and Berkeley to ' that atheist 
 Hobbes ' reflect the opinions of the generations following. To 
 his contemporary critics, Hobbes replied by publishing vehement 
 Letters and Answers, of which the best known is, perhaps, "An 
 Answer to a Book published by Dr. Bramhall . . . called Catching 
 of ' Leviathan ' " (1682). No one can really read Hobbes's books 
 without agreeing in the main with his protestations. Hobbes 
 certainly teaches that there is a God, and that faith in Jesus 
 Christ is the supreme religious duty. True, he also teaches that 
 God is corporeal, but only in the sense in which, as he believes, 
 men, also, are purely corporeal. However theoretically unjusti- 
 fied the doctrine, it is certainly compatible — as Hobbes holds 
 it — with religious teaching. The ethics of Hobbes, also, inculcates 
 all the practical duties of a Christian morality, though it founds 
 them on a psychologically inadequate basis : the assumption that 
 all men are radically selfish. In a word, Hobbes was unfairly 
 treated ; his reputation suffered unjustly ; and — more unfor- 
 tunate than all — the suspicion of his atheism kept people from the 
 study of his vigorous metaphysics and his acute psychology. 
 
 Truth to tell, the suspicion of immoraUty attached to Hobbes 
 not so much for any teaching of his, as because Charles II., who 
 was kindly disposed to his old tutor, and also highly diverted by 
 the doctrine of Hobbes, had allowed the philosopher a pension. 
 Hence the license of that notorious court of the second Charles 
 was illogicaUy laid at the door of Hobbes's materialism, and 
 
 • Cf. Introduction, p. xix., of the Open Court edition of Hobbes's " Concerning 
 Body." 
 
490 British Philosophers through Hume 
 
 'Hobbist' became a mere S3T3onym for 'free liver.' Hobbes him- 
 self, for all his doughty replies to his adversaries, was apparently 
 terrified by their onslaughts, especially when, in 1666, a parlia- 
 mentary bill ordered a committee to receive information "concern- 
 ing a book, ' Leviathan.' " The bill was dropped, but the transla- 
 tion, in 1668, of the " Leviathan " into Latin, toned down the 
 ecclesiastical portions in a marked degree ; and Hobbes refrained 
 from the publication of any other pohtical works. He lived to 
 be ninety-one years old, vigorous to the end in intellect and in 
 capacity. 
 
 11. Bibliography 
 
 a. Chiej Works of Hobbes, in order of Publication 
 
 (References are to "English Works,'' cited as "E. W." and to "Opera 
 
 Latina," cited as "Op. Lat.," both edited by Molesworth. Ci. infra, p. 491.) 
 
 1628. " Eight Books of the Peloponnesian War, written by Thucydides . . . 
 
 Interpreted with Faith and Diligence immediately out of the 
 
 Greek" ("E. W.," VIII. and IX.). 
 
 1642. " Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia de Give," Paris. 
 
 (The earliest printed form of Hobbes's doctrine of the state. Re- 
 printed as "Elementa Philosophica de Give," Amst. 1647. 
 "Op. Lat.," II.) 
 1650. "De Gorpore Politico, or The Elements of Law, Moral and Politick," 
 Lond. ("E. W.," IV.) 
 
 1650. "Human Nature or the Fundamental Elements of Policie," Lond. 
 
 (Written in 1640, "E. W.," IV.). 
 
 1651. "Leviathan: Or the Matter, Form and Power of a Gommonwealth, 
 
 Ecclesiastical and Givil," Lond. 
 
 (The best known and most vigorous discussion of the political 
 
 theory of Hobbes. "E. W.," III. For later edition, see below.) 
 
 1654. "Of Liberty and Necessity," Lond. 
 
 (Written in 1646 as part of a private discussion with Bishop 
 Bramhall ; published without the consent of Hobbes, " E. W.," IV.) 
 
 1655. "Elementonmi Philosophiae Sectio Prima: De Gorpore," Lond. 
 
 ("Op. Lat.," I.). 
 
 1656. "Concerning Body," Lond. 
 
 (A translation, corrected by Hobbes, of the work just named. 
 The Latin work and its English translation contain the mental, 
 physical, and the mathematical teaching of Hobbes, "E. W.," I. 
 For later edition, see below.) 
 1656. "Six Lessons to the Professors of the Mathematics, ... in the 
 Chairs set up by . . . Sir Henry Savile in the University of Ox- 
 ford." 
 
 (The first of the controversial works on mathematics issued Jt 
 short intervals during the rest of Hobbes'sUfe. "Op.Let.," IV. J 
 
The Cambridge Platonists 491 
 
 1675. "The Iliads and Odysseys of Homer . . . With a large preface con- 
 cerning the Virtues of an Heroic Poem " ("E. W.," X.). 
 
 1679. "Vita Ejus Latino Carmine " ("Op. Lat.," I.). 
 
 1680. "Behemoth: The History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England 
 
 . . . from the Year 1640 to the Year 1660 ("E. W.," VI.). 
 
 For complete and topical annotated list of Hobbes's writings, cf. " The 
 Metaphysical System of Hobbes," ed. Calkins, pp. xviii. fej., cited below. 
 
 6. Editions 
 
 "English Works," in 11 vols., and 
 
 "Opera Latina," in 5 vols., ed. Wm. Molesworth, Lond., 1839-45. 
 
 "Leviathan," ed. T. Thornton, Oxf. 1881. 
 
 "The Metaphysical System of Hobbes, as Contained in Twelve Chapters of 
 
 'Concerning Body' and in Briefer Extracts from his 'Human Nature' 
 
 and 'Leviathan,' " ed. M. W. Calkins, Chicago, 1905. 
 "The Ethics of Hobbes," ed. E. H. Sneath, i8g8. ("Leviathan," Parts I. 
 
 and II.; and "De Corpore Politico," Chapters 6 and 7.) 
 "The Philosophy of Hobbes in Extracts and Notes from his Writings," ed. 
 
 F. J. Woodbridge, 1903. (Part I. of " Concerning Body " and extracts 
 
 from other works, mainly from "Leviathan.") 
 
 c. Commentaries and Criticisms 
 
 Robertson, G. C. : "Hobbes," Edin. and Lond., 1886 (Philosophical Classics). 
 Tonnies, F.: "Hobbes' Leben und Lehre," Stuttgart, 1896, pp. 226. 
 Stephen, L. : "Hobbes," Lond., 1904. (Largely biographical.) 
 Sigwart, H. C. W. von: " Vergleichung der Rechts- und Staats- Theorieen 
 
 des B. Spinoza u. des T. Hobbes," Tiib., 1842. 
 Montuori, R.: "II Principe del Macchiavelli e la Politica di Hobbes," in 
 
 Rivista Filosofica, Jan., Feb., 1905. 
 
 Cf. bibliography of contemporary criticism in "Op. Lat.," I., p. Ixix. 
 seq.; bibliography in Sneath's edition, cited above; and Eachard, Wallis, 
 Ward, Brandt, and Lange, cited by Rand. 
 
 OPPONENTS OF MATERIALISM: THE CAMBRIDGE PLA- 
 TONISTS 
 
 Henry More (1614-87). 
 
 "Opera Omnia," Lond., 1675-79. (Cf. G. N. Dolson, Philos. Rev., 1897.) 
 
 Ralph Ctidworth (1617-S8). 
 
 1678. "The True Intellectual System of the Universe," Lond. (An erudite 
 survey and refutation of the "atomic" and "hylozoic" material- 
 ism ; coupled with an argument for the existence of God.) 
 "Works," 4 vols., Lond., 1829. (Cf. W. R. Scott, "An Introduc- 
 tion to Cudworth's Treatise," Lond., 1891.) 
 
 John NoRRis (1657-1711). 
 
 1701-04. "Essay toward the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World," 
 2 Pts., Lond. (A Platonized restatement of Malebranche's doc- 
 trine of "seeing all things in God.") 
 
492 British Philosophers through Hume 
 
 1724. "Reason and Religion," Lond., yth ed. 
 
 1697. "An Account of Reason and Faith ... in Relation to the Mysteries of 
 Quristianity," Lond., 14th ed., 1790. (A reply to John Toland.) 
 
 RiCHAKD BtJETHOGGE (1638 ?-l694?). 
 
 1677. "Organum vetus et novum." 
 
 1694. "An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits." 
 
 LATER BRITISH MATERIALISTS (DEISTS) ' 
 
 John Toland (1670-1721). 
 
 1696. "Christianity not Mysterious," Lond. 
 
 1704. "Letters to Serena," Lond. 
 
 1720. "Pantheisticon," Lond. 
 
 David Hartley (1705-57). 
 
 1749. "Observations on Man," 2 vols., Lond. 
 
 Joseph Pwestley (i 733-1804). 
 
 1777. "Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit." "Doctrine of Philo- 
 
 sophical Necessity." 
 
 1778. " A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophi- 
 
 cal Necessity," Lond. 
 "Works," 25 vols., Lond., 1817-31. 
 
 //. DUALISTS OF TBE ENLIGHTENMENT 
 
 The Enlightenment is a term applied generally and rather vaguely 
 to most of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, British and Conti- 
 nental. The prominent characters of the period are (i) an opposition 
 to tradition and to system, in particular, to that of the church; and 
 (2) a marked individualism. (Cf. Leslie Stephen, " History of English 
 Thought in the Eighteenth Century," Lond., 1876.) 
 
 JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704) 
 I. Life 
 
 The freedom of the individual is the dominant note in all the 
 works of Locke as it is the keynote of his life. His life falls within 
 the century which fought out for England the battle for the rights 
 of the individual against both monarch and church. In such a 
 time a man must have convictions, and Locke carried into philoso- 
 phy and into religion the principles which he defended in politics. 
 Whether he talked of education, of government, or of theology, 
 always he claimed in the last resort the right and the duty of the 
 individual to free action in accordance with reason. Locke was 
 the son of a genial puritan lawyer of Somerset, a man who fought 
 on the side of ParHament. From Westminster School, the younger 
 Locke went at twenty to Oxford, where, because he would not 
 
 ' Cf. injra, pp. 494, 503- 
 
John Locke 493 
 
 take notes " deferentially," he was regarded as " a man of turbu- 
 lent spirit, clamorous and discontented."^ The philosophy of the 
 schools concerned him little, but Descartes stirred him, and the 
 growing study, in large part unacademic, of natural science claimed 
 his ardent interest. As student, tutor, fellow, he spent fifteen 
 years in Oxford ; leaving the university town in 1667 at the bidding 
 of the first Lord Shaftesbury. In the next sixteen years he served 
 Shaftesbury now as tutor to his son, now as secretary, always as 
 friend. He gained the friendship also of Shaftesbury's intimates 
 and spent four full years in France with Herbert, later Earl of 
 Pembroke. It was inevitable that Locke's fortunes should vacil- 
 late with those of his stout-hearted patron, and in 1683 he followed 
 Shaftesbury in voluntary exile to Holland. He returned to Eng- 
 land in 1689, in the ship which carried the Princess of Orange. 
 In the years which followed , he filled positions of trust and published 
 the books, philosophical and political, which he had written in the 
 time of his seclusion. The last years of his life he spent in the 
 home of Sir Francis Masham, illustrating by his letters and his 
 conversation that gift for friendship which was perhaps his great- 
 est endowment. 
 
 II. Bibliography 
 
 a. Chief Works and Editions 
 
 1690. "An Essay concerning Human Understanding," Lond. (32d ed., 
 i860. Authoritative edition with notes, that of A. C. Fraser, 
 Oxf., 1894. Edition of Books II. and IV. (with omissions) pre- 
 ceded by the English version of Le Clerc's "Eloge historique de 
 feu Mr. Locke, " ed. M. W. Calkins, Open Court Co.,2ded., 1906.) 
 Locke's "Essay," the first widely influential English book on metaphysics 
 and psychology, discusses "the original, certainty and extent of human 
 knowledge." Locke opposes (in Book I.) the doctrine of innate ideas, by 
 which he means ready-made pieces of information; offers (in Book II.) a 
 psychological analysis of the human consciousness ; and restates (in Books II. 
 and IV.), after his own independent and inimitably vigorous fashion, Des- 
 cartes's dualistic philosophy. Book III. is a largely parenthetical discussion 
 of general terms. The main divergences of Locke from Descartes (and addi- 
 tions to Descartes) are (i) Locke's teaching that solidity as well as extension 
 is a quality of matter (II., Chapter 8); (2) his conception of substance as 
 support of qualities (II., Chapter 23) ; (3) his curious distinction of " spiritual 
 substance," or "soul," from "person" (II., Chapter 27); (4) his emphasized 
 argument for the existence of "corporeal bodies," from the occurrence of 
 ideas which "force themselves upon me " (IV., Chapter 11). 
 ' Fraser, " Locke's Essay," I., pp. xix. seq. 
 
494 British Philosophers through Hume 
 
 1689. "Epistola de Tolerantia." Engl.: transl. W. Popple, Lond., 1689. 
 
 1690, 1692. "Second and Third Letter for Toleration." 
 
 1690. "Two Treatises on Government." New edition, with Introduction 
 by H. Morley, 1884. (The doctrine that governments are formed 
 by the consent of the governed for the primary purpose of protect- 
 ing property. A defence, against Hobbes and others, of constitu- 
 tional government, and of the right of revolution.) 
 
 1693. "Some Thoughts concerning Education." New edition by J. S. 
 Blaikie, Lend., 1886. 
 
 1695. "The Reasonableness of Christianity." Edition by J. A. St. John, 
 1836, 1853. (This book maintains the coordinate rights and the 
 essential harmony of reason and revelation. As such, it is really 
 the forerunner of the writings of the English deists, Toland, Col- 
 lins, and others, and of the French deists, Voltaire, Helvetius, 
 and the rest. The teaching of Locke that revelation is reason- 
 able ' gave way soon to the belief, which he would eagerly have 
 repudiated, that revelation is superfluous, and stiU later to a doc- 
 trine positively hostile to revealed religion.) 
 
 "Works." Latest (thirteenth) edition, 9 vols., 1853. 
 
 "The Philosophical Works," ed. J. A. St. John, Bohn Library, 1854, 2 vols. 
 (" Conduct of the Understanding," " Essay concerning Human Under- 
 standing," " Elements of Natural Philosophy.") 
 
 For comment, cf. Eraser, A. C, "Locke" (Philosophical Classics), Edin., 
 Lond., 1890; and "Prolegomena" to the edition of the Essay, cited above. 
 
 Cf . also the following authors cited by Rand and by Calkins : — 
 
 For biographical and historical material : Fox-Bourne , Shaftesbury, Stephen. 
 
 For criticism of Locke by his contemporaries: H. Lee, J. Norris, and 
 J. Proast. 
 
 For recent criticism: Drobisch, B. Erdmann, and A. W. Moore ("The 
 . . . Theory of Knowledge in Locke's Essay," Univ. of Chicago Decennial 
 Publications, Series I., 1892). 
 
 THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL OF "COMMON-SENSE" PHILOSO- 
 PHERS 
 
 These writers founded their system on an acute anti-sensationalistic psy- 
 chology. But they uncritically assvuned the existence of all objects of clear 
 consciousness and the extra-mental existence of objects of perception. 
 Andrew Baxter (i686-r75o). 
 
 1733- " Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul." 
 Thomas Reid (1710-96). (Professor at Glasgow.) 
 
 1764. " Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense." 
 1785. " Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man." 
 1788. " Essays on the Active Powers of Man." 
 
 " Works," ed. Sir Wm. Hamilton, Edin., 1846. 
 
 " Selections " (with bibliography), ed. E. H. Sneath, N.Y., 1892. Cf. 
 A. Seth, cited by Rand. 
 
 1 Cf. pp. 503-505- 
 
George Berkeley 495 
 
 DuGALD Stewart (1753-1828) (Professor at Edinburgh). 
 1792-1827. "Elements of the Phflosophy of the Human Mind," 3 pts 
 "Works," ed. Sir W. Hamilton, 10 vols., Edin., 1854 £E. 
 
 Others of this school are James Oswald and James Seattle. 
 
 III. SPIRITUALISTIC IDEALISTS 
 GEORGE BERKELEY (1685-1753) 
 
 I. Life 
 
 George Berkeley, second of the great trio of British philosophers 
 of the Enlightenment, was born in Kilkenny, Ireland, five years 
 before the publication of Locke's "Essay"; that is, in 1685. At 
 fifteen he entered Trinity College, obtained his bachelor's degree 
 in 1704, and was admitted fellow in 1707. Trinity College was 
 alive with the discussion of Locke's "Essay," and the effect on 
 Berkeley was to stimulate a reaction against the system — or, 
 better, an expansion of the secondary-quality doctrine into a purely 
 idealistic teaching. For Berkeley's philosophic study bore early 
 fruit. He belongs indeed to the group of writers whose thought 
 ripens quickly: in 1709, when he was only twenty-four, he pub- 
 lished his "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," and a year 
 later he brought out his "Principles of Human Knowledge," a 
 little work which yet contains all the essential features of his doc- 
 trine. Three years later appeared a popular presentation of his 
 system, " Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." 
 
 While Berkeley was superintending, in London, the publication 
 of this work, he enjoyed the society and friendship of Sir Richard 
 Steele, Dean Swift, Alexander Pope, and the men to whom these 
 influential friends introduced him. As chaplain to the Earl of 
 Petersham he visited Italy in 1713-1714, and a year later he became 
 the travelling tutor of Mr. Ashe, the son of an Irish bishop. The 
 two spent more than four years on the continent, mainly in Italy, 
 and we are told that in passing through Paris "Mr. Berkeley 
 took care to pay his respects to . . . the illustrious Pfere Male- 
 branche." Soon after his return, in 1721, he became chaplain to 
 the Duke of Grafton. A year later he was greatly surprised to 
 receive a legacy from Mrs. Vanhomrigh (Swift's Vanessa). In 
 1724 he was named Dean of Derry, at a stipend of ;i£iioo a year, 
 and threw himself with zeal into his new work. Already, however, 
 
496 British Philosophers through Hume 
 
 there had dawned on the mind of this vigorously cosmopolitan 
 Christian the ideal of an American colony in which church and 
 college should unite their efforts for the upbuilding'Of an ideal com- 
 munity. His enthusiasm gained adherents to the scheme, Uto- 
 pian as it now seems, and in 1728 he sailed, with the promise, from 
 the government of King George I., of lands in Bermuda and of a 
 grant of ;£2o,ooo. His newly married wife went with him, and a 
 little group of men whom he had inspired with ardor. They were 
 doomed to disappointment: Walpole lost little time in diverting 
 the money to the purposes of a princess's marriage portion; and 
 the colonists never saw the Bermudas, for they had sailed directly 
 to Rhode Island, in the expectation of purchasing lands for the 
 support of the college. The memory of the two years spent by 
 Berkeley in Rhode Island is still preserved by the records of Trinity 
 Church of Newport, where he preached many Sundays; and by 
 the books which he left to the Yale and to the Harvard libraries. 
 His "Alciphron" was written in America, and "Berkeley's Cave" 
 is still pointed out as the reputed scene of the philosopher's study. 
 
 Two years after Berkeley's return to England, in 1734, he was 
 appointed to the bishopric of Cloyne, and he spent the last years 
 of his life in devoted service to this diocese of poor country folk, 
 and in eager thought upon the pressing problems of Irish life. 
 Themainpurposeof" The Querist,'' published in 1733,13 to stimu- 
 late an interest in domestic manufactures. "To feed the hungry 
 and clothe the naked," he says, "will, perhaps, be deemed no im- 
 proper employment for a clergyman who still thinks himself a 
 member of the commonwealth." We are told that Berkeley himself 
 "chose to wear ill clothes, and worse wigs, rather than to suffer the 
 poor of the town to be unemployed." His latest philosophical 
 work, called "Siris," was published in 1744. He died in 1753, 
 at Oxford; and many of us remember the marble tablet, in Christ 
 Church, Oxford, which commemorates his life — a life so full of 
 active service and practical achievement, that it goes far to vindi- 
 cate philosophers from the charge that speculative thinking in- 
 volves ineffective and useless living. 
 
 The inscription ends : — 
 
 "Si christianus fueris 
 Si amans patriae, 
 Utroque nomine gloriari potes, 
 Berkeleium vixisse." 
 
George Berkeley 497 
 
 II. Bibliography 
 a. I. Philosophical and Psychological Writings 
 
 1709. "Theory of Vision," Dublin, 1810. (A development of the thesis that 
 
 distance is not a direct object of vision.) 
 
 1710. "Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge,'' Dublin, Open 
 
 Court Co., Chicago, 1903. 
 
 1713. "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," Open Court Co., 
 Chicago, igor. 
 
 1732. "Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher," Dublin. (Seven Dialogues, 
 directed against scepticism, and developing Berkeley's theological 
 doctrines.) 
 
 1733- "Theory of Visual Language further Vindicated and Explained." 
 
 1744. "Siris. A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concern- 
 ing the Virtue of Tar-water." Lond. (A fantastic compound of 
 amateur medicine and natural science with an idealistic philoso- 
 phy more rationalistic than that of the " Principles.") 
 
 2. Chief Writings on Polilical Subjects 
 
 1712. "Passive Obedience or the Christian Doctrine of not Resisting the 
 Supreme Power." 
 
 The essay inculcates along with its political doctrine a sort of 
 theological utilitarianism — the teaching that God secures the 
 greatest good of the greatest number. 
 
 1721. "An Essay towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain." 
 
 1725. "A Proposal . . for Converting the Savage Americans to Chris- 
 tianity." 
 
 1735-37- "The Querist," 3 pts. 
 
 3. Important Writings on Mathematical Subjects 
 1707. "Arithmetica absque Algebra aut Euclide demonstrata." 
 1721. "DeMotu." 
 
 1734. "The Analyst." (A criticism of higher mathematics as leading to free 
 thinking. The essay involved Berkeley in controversy.) 
 
 "Works," ed. A. C. Eraser, Oxf., r866, 4 vols., 1871, 1891, 1905. 
 "Selections," ed. A. C. Eraser, Oxf., 1866; 5th amended edition, 1899. 
 (Extracts from all the works on philosophy and psychology.) 
 
 b. Criticism and Biography 
 
 Eraser, A. C, "Life and Letters of Berkeley and Dissertation on his Philoso- 
 phy." (This is volume IV. of the "Works," and contains a "Common- 
 place Book" written by Berkeley during his years at Trinity College.) 
 
 Eraser, A. C, "Berkeley" (Philosophical Classics), Edin., Lond., 1881. 
 
 Abbott, T. K., "Sight and Touch," Lond., 1864. (An antagonistic criticism 
 of Berkeley's psychological doctrine.) 
 
498 British Philosophers through Hume 
 
 Friederichs, F., "Uber Berkeley's Idealismus," Berlin, 1870. 
 Mill, J. S., "Dissertations," Vols. II. and IV. 
 
 Cf. Chandler, Loewy, Peirce, Tower, Uberweg, cited by Rand. Berkeley 
 is, however, his own best critic. 
 
 ARTHUR COLLIER (1680-1732) 
 
 " Clavis Universalis or a New Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration 
 
 of the Non-Existence or Impossibility of an External World," Lond., 
 
 1713- 
 
 A vigorously written argument against the possibility of reality independent 
 
 of mind, curiously resembling Berkeley's "Essay" and "Principles" though 
 
 it was planned and probably published before Collier had read Berkeley. 
 
 IV. THE PHENOMENALIST 
 DAVID HUME (1711-1776) 
 I. Lite 
 
 The life of David Hume, in strong contrast to that of Berkeley, 
 was a life preeminently of devotion to purely intellectual ideals. 
 He was no recluse, but his social intercourse and even his years of 
 diplomatic service were mere incidents and interludes in the busi- 
 ness of study and speculation. Hume was born of a good Scottish 
 family in 171 1 — just one year after the publication of Berkeley's 
 "Principles." His youth was a restless one. He was probably little 
 more than fifteen when he finished his university courses at Edin- 
 burgh ; he made an unsuccessful attempt, when he was seventeen, 
 to study law; and he was equally unhappy, at twenty-two, in a 
 half-hearted attempt to enter mercantile life. Thereupon, as he 
 tells us in his story of "My own Life," he "resolved to make a very 
 rigid frugality supply . . . deficiency of fortune, to maintain unim- 
 paired . . . independency, and to regard every object as contempt- 
 ible, except the improvement of [his] talents in literature." 
 
 For three years he worked in "country retreat" in France, 
 chiefly in La Flbche, and there composed his "Treatise of Human 
 Nature." By his own account, this work "fell dead-born from 
 the press " ; but though it unquestionably did not, until years later, 
 excite very wide discussion, there is yet reason to believe that its 
 author's naive self-esteem was needlessly sensitive. Burton tells 
 us, for example, that Hume designated as "somewhat abusive" 
 
David Hume 499 
 
 a review of the "Treatise" which compared it to the juvenile work 
 of a young Milton.^ 
 
 Three years later, in 1742, Hume published the first volume of 
 his "Essays Moral and Political," really a system of political 
 philosophy, though lacking systematic arrangement. Probably 
 because of the reputation gained by this work, Hume was invited 
 in 1745 to become tutor to the young marquis of Annandale, "a 
 harmless literary lunatic," Adamson calls him. This position 
 proved unfortunate; and a year later Hume became secretary to 
 General St. Clair, at first "in an incursion on the coast of France," 
 and a few months later " in his military embassy to the courts of 
 Turin and Vienna." 
 
 During Hume's absence in Turin his "Enquiry concerning Hu- 
 man Understanding," a condensation of his metaphysical doctrine, 
 was published as one of the " Philosophical Essays." According to 
 Hume this, too, was at first "entirely overlooked and neglected.' 
 Not many years later, he was gratified, however, by "answers by 
 Reverends and Right Reverends two or three in a year" and found 
 by this sort of criticism that "the books were beginning to be 
 esteemed in good company." For several years he lived quietly, 
 at first at his brother's country house, later in Edinburgh, con- 
 stantly occupied with his literary work. In 1752 he became Li- 
 brarian of the Faculty of Advocates, receiving the appointment in 
 spite of objections urged on the score of his impiety. He then, as 
 he says, "formed the plan of writing the 'History of England'"; 
 and its successive volumes appeared at irregular intervals from 
 1754 to 1761. From 1763 to 1766 he was secretary of the Earl of 
 Hertford, ambassador to Paris. These were the years of Hume's 
 most brilliant social success; "le gros David," as the Parisians 
 called him, was showered with attention from men and women of 
 all circles, social, academic, and diplomatic. "Do you ask me," 
 he writes from Paris, "about my course of life? I can only say 
 that I eat nothing but ambrosia, drink nothing but nectar, breathe 
 nothing but incense." From 1767 he successfully filled, for two 
 years, the position of under secretary of state in London. With 
 warm content he returned to his Edinburgh home, his friends and 
 his books. "A wife ? " he had written, years before, " That is none 
 
 • Burton, " Life and Correspondence of Hume," I., p. 109, quoted by Huxley in 
 his " Hume," p. 10. 
 
500 British Philosophers through Hume 
 
 of the Indispensable requisites of life. Books? That is one oi 
 them: and I have more than I can use." He died, after seven 
 years of happiness and popularity, in 1776. 
 
 To gain an adequate conception of Hume's character and his 
 personal convictions is a task of acknowledged diflSculty. It is 
 admitted that he was kindly in nature and moderate in temper ; 
 it is not easy to deny in him a naive self-esteem and an over love 
 of popularity. He has, not unnaturally, been esteemed to be per- 
 sonally irreligious; but there is much to indicate that he himself 
 held to an unambiguous, if attenuated and unreasoned religious 
 faith. "Though [my] speculations entertain the learned . . . 
 world," he is reported to have said, after the death of his mother, 
 "yet . . . I do not think so differently from the rest of the world." ' 
 
 II. Bibliography 
 
 o. Works oj Hume 
 
 1739-40. "A Treatise of Human Nature," Lond. Book I. " Of the Under- 
 standing"; Book 11. "Of the Passions"; and Book III. (pub- 
 lished in 1740) "Of Morals"; ed. Green and Grose, 2 vols., last 
 ed., 1889-go; and by L. H. Selby-Bigge, last ed., Oxf., 1896. 
 Book 1. is divided into four parts, of which the first is mainly 
 psychological; the second treats of space and time, with the pur- 
 pose of derogating from their alleged absolute reality; the third 
 includes Hume's doctrine of causality; and the fourth includes 
 his reduction of matter and spirit alike to impressions. 
 
 1741-42. "Essays, Moral and Political," ed. Green and Grose, 1889-90. 
 This book is composed mainly of Hume's graceful and vigorous 
 essays on literary subjects. It was later combined with the two 
 "Enquirys," the "Four Dissertations" (including "Natural His- 
 tory of Religion") and published, 1758, under the title, "Essays 
 and Treatises on Several Subjects." 
 
 1748. "Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding" (later 
 called "An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding"); ed. 
 by Green and Grose, 1889-90; by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 1894; 
 by Open Court Co., 1906. 
 
 This book purports merely to recast in more popular form the 
 teaching of Book I. of the Treatise; but as a matter of fact, 
 it omits the culmination of that work, the doctrine of matter and 
 spirit, as well as the discussion of space and time. It also makes 
 certain additions, notably the section on miracles and most of the 
 teachings about liberty and necessity. 
 
 ' Reported by Hume's friend, Dr. Carlyle, on the authority of Mr. Bayle. Cf. 
 Burton, "Life and Correspondence of David Hume," I., p. 294; and Huxley' 
 "Hume," p. 28. ' 
 
David Hume 501 
 
 1751. "An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," Lond. (Open 
 
 Court Co., igo2.) 
 
 Hume's fresh formulation in abbreviated form, of Book III. of 
 the "Treatise" ; "in my own opinion," he says, " of all my writings, 
 historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best." 
 
 1752. "Political Discourses," Edin.; ed. Green and Grose, 1890. 
 
 "The only work of mine," Hume says, "that was successful on 
 its first publication." A brilliant, though unsystematic, work 
 on political economy — at many points an anticipation of Adam 
 Smith's "Wealth of Nations." 
 
 1754-61. "History of England," in five volumes. 
 
 A brilliant, though untrustworthy history "in which all the lights 
 are Tory and all the shades Whig." 
 
 1757. "Four Dissertations": "The Natural History of Religion," "Of the 
 Passions," "Of Tragedy," "Of the Standard of Taste," Lond. 
 The dissertation first named is the earliest attempt to discuss 
 religion from the psychological and the historical standpoints. 
 It teaches that polytheism is the oldest and most natural form of 
 religion. The "Dissertation on the Passions" is a good restate- 
 ment of Book II. of the "Treatise." 
 
 Foslhumous 
 
 1777. "My own Life," Lond. 
 
 1777. "Two Essays," Lond. ("On Suicide,'' and "On the Immortality of 
 the Soul.") 
 
 1779. "Dialogues on Natural Religion." 
 
 An essay embodying a sort of deistic doctrine. Hume wrote 
 it with great care and left directions that it should be published. 
 
 6. Modern Editions 
 
 "A Treatise of Human Nature and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion," 
 
 2 vols., and 
 "Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary," 2 vols.; all edited with important 
 
 Introductions and Notes by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 
 
 last edition, 1889-90. 
 
 c. Commentaries and Criticism 
 
 Introductions to the volumes of Green and Grose's edition ; especially Green's 
 Introduction to "A Treatise of Human Nature." 
 
 Elkin, W. B. "Hume's Treatise and Enquiry," N.Y., 1904. 
 
 Gizycki, G. v. "Die Ethik David Hume's in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung," 
 Bresl., 1878, pp. 337. 
 
 Huxley, T. H. "Hume," Lond., N.Y., 1879. (A relatively uncritical ex- 
 position.) 
 
 Jacobi, F. H. "David Hume uber den Glauben, Idealismus und Real- 
 ismus," Bresl., 1787. 
 
502 British Philosophers through Hume 
 
 Jodl, F., "Leben und Philosophie David Hume's," Halle, 1872. 
 
 Meinong, A., "Hume-Studien," I., "Zur Geschichte u. Kritik desmodemen 
 
 Nominalismus," II., "Zur Relationstheorie," Vienna, 1877 and 
 
 1882. 
 
 {On the relation between Hume and Kant) 
 
 E. Caird, "The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," Vol. I., Chapter S- 
 B. Erdmann, "Kant's Kriticismus," Chapter I. (cf. "Arch. f. Gesch. d. 
 
 Philos.," I., 1887-88, pp. 62 seq., 216 seq.). 
 J. H. Stirling, "Kant has not answered Hume," in Mind, O. S. Vol. IX., 
 
 pp. 531 seq.; and Vol., X. pp. 45 seq. 
 
 Note: British Writers on Ethics and on Theology 
 
 I. Predominaktly Ethical Writers 
 
 a. Egoistic 
 
 Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733). 
 
 Chief Works: — 
 1705. "The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices Public Benefits," Lond. 
 (A brilliant exposition of Hobbes's doctrine that morality is an 
 expression of self-interest.) 
 1720. "Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and Natural Happiness," 
 Lond. Later editions, 1729, 1731. 
 "A Letter to Dion (Berkeley) occasioned by his Book called 
 Alciphron," 
 
 b. Altruistic 
 
 (Upholding, against Hobbes but with Locke and Berkeley, the doctrine 
 that morality is based preeminently on social not on egoistic feeling.) 
 Richard Cumberland. 
 1672. "De legibus naturae," Lond. (Theistic). 
 
 (i) Intuitionists 
 
 Anthony, Third Earl of SHAFTESBtTRY (1671-1713). 
 
 Chief Work: — 
 1711. "Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times," Lond. 
 
 Shaftesbury conceives of the moral consciousness as feeling or 
 
 instinct, and denies the existence of any conflict between egoism 
 
 and altruism. 
 Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747). (A disciple of Shaftesbury.) 
 
 Chief Works: — 
 1725. "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue," 
 
 Lond. 
 I7SS- "A System of Moral Philosophy," Lond. and Glasgow. 
 Adam Smith (1723-90). (Author of the "Wealth of Nations"). 
 1759. "Theory of Moral Sentiments," Lond. 
 
Writers on Ethics and Theology 503 
 
 (2) Theistic Moralists 
 (The moral consciousness is conceived as submission to the law of God.) 
 Joseph Butler (1692-1752). 
 
 1726. "Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature," Lond. 
 William Paley (1743-1805). 
 1785. "Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," Lond. 
 
 (3) Utilitarian Moralists 
 
 (Cf. E. Albee, "A History of English Utilitarianism," 1902.) 
 
 J. Bentham (1747-1832). 
 
 1789. "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," Lond. 
 Bentham with his basal principle, "the greatest happiness of the 
 greatest number," is the founder of the most significant school of 
 nineteenth-century British ethics, that of the Utilitarians, J. S. Mill, 
 Spencer, Sidgwick, and others. 
 
 IL Predominantly Theological Weiters 
 a. Deists 
 
 (Deism is a reaction against church theology. It rejects or sets little value 
 on revelation, conceiving God mainly as First Cause.) 
 
 John Toland (cf. supra, p. 492). 
 
 i6g6. "Christianity not Mysterious," Lond. 
 
 Anthony Collins (1676-1729). 
 
 r7i3. "A Discourse of Free Thinking," Lond. 
 
 Matthew Tindal (-1733). 
 
 1730. "Christianity as Old as the Creation," Lond. 
 
 b. Theists 
 
 (The theists hold to the possibility of proving a posteriorithe intelligence and 
 the goodness of God. Of the four named below, Clarke and WoUaston also 
 teach that obligation exists independently of the divine law, and that morality 
 is conduct in accordance with true relations.) 
 
 Samuel Clarke (1675-1729). 
 
 1705. "A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," Lond. 
 
 William Wollaston (1660-1724). 
 
 1725. "The Religion of Nature Delineated," Lond. 
 
 Joseph Butler (1692-1752). 
 
 1736. "The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed to the Constitution 
 
 and Course of Nature," Lond. 
 William Paley (1743-1805). 
 1802. "Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of 
 
 the Deity collected from the Appearances of Nature," Lond. 
 
504 Continental Philosophers 
 
 D. CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHERS OF THE 
 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 (Cf. E. Caird, "The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," Vol. I., 
 Introd., Chapter i.) 
 
 /. RATIONALISTIC DUALISTS 
 
 Christian Wolfj (1679-1754). 
 
 Professor in Halle, banished in r723 by Frederick William I. of Prussia 
 through the influence of pietistic opponents, recalled in 1740 by Frederick 
 the Great. (Cf. supra, Chapter 7, p. 195.) 
 
 Important Works : — 
 1712. "Logica, oder Verniinftige Gedanken von den Kraften des Mensch- 
 
 lichen Verstandes," Halle. 
 17x9. "Verniinftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Meu- 
 
 schen, auch alien Dingen tiberhaupt," Frankf. und Leipz. 
 1728. "Philosophia rationalis," Frankf. und Leipz. 
 
 1731. "Cosmologia generalis," Leipz. 
 
 1732. "Psychologia empirica," Leipz. 
 1734. "Psychologia rationalis," Leipz. 
 
 Martin Knutzen (d.) 1751. (The teacher of Kant.) 
 
 1746. "Syetema Causarum EfEcientium." 
 
 A. G. Baumgarten (1714-62). 
 
 1739. "Metaphysica," Halle, 7th ed., 1779. (Often used as text-book by 
 
 Kant.) 
 1750-58. "/Esthetica," Frankf. 
 1751. "Ethica phUosophica," Halle; 2d ed., 1763. 
 F. C. B. Baumeister (1709-1785). 
 
 1733. "Philosophia definitiva," Wittenb., 3d ed., 1771. 
 
 1736. " Institutiones metaphysicae," ibid., 2d ed., 1774. (Occasionally used 
 by Kant as text-book in his early university lectures.) 
 
 II. FRENCH MATERIALISTS AND THEIR CONTEMPO- 
 RARIES 
 
 The Enlightenment in France 
 
 Voltaire (F. M. Arouet) (1694-1778). 
 
 Voltaire was no metaphysician, but he influenced philosophers by his 
 firm opposition, from a deistic standpoint, to a ' prejudiced and privileged 
 orthodoxy.' 
 
 Chief Works on Philosophical Subjects: — 
 1733. "Lettres sur les Anglais." ("An attack on everything established in 
 
 the church and state of France.") Engl., Lond. 
 1738. "Elements de la philosophic de Newton. . . ," Atnst. 
 
The Enlightenment in France 505 
 
 1740. "La m^taphysique de Newton, ou parallfele des sentiments de Newton, 
 
 et de Leibniz," Amst. 
 1759. "Candide, ou I'optimisme," Paris. 
 1764. "Dictionnaire philosophique," Paris; Engl., Lend., 1765 and 1843, 
 
 Boston, 1852. (Mainly a compilation of Voltaire's contributions 
 
 to the " Encyclopedia.") 
 Jean Le Rond D'Alembert (1717-83). 
 
 Mathematician and scientist. For many years co-editor with Diderot, 
 of the Encyclop^die, and writer of the 
 
 "Discours pr^liminaire," in the " Encydop^die." 
 
 {Sensationalist) 
 
 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-80). 
 Important Philosophical Works: — 
 
 1754. "Traits des sensations," Paris and Lond. 
 
 1755. "Traits des animaux," Amst. 
 "(Euvres complfetes," 23 vols., Paris, 1798. 
 
 {Materialists) 
 
 J. O. DE LA METTRIE (1709-51). 
 
 Chief Philosophical Works : — 
 
 1745. "Histoire naturelle de I'ame," The Hague. 
 1748. "L'homme machine," Leyden. 
 
 "CEuvres philosophiques," 2 vols., Lond., 1751. 
 C. A. Helvetius (1715-71). 
 1758. "De I'esprit," Paris; Engl., Lond., 1807. 
 
 1772. "De l'homme, de ses facult^s, et de son Education," 2 vols., Lond. 
 Baron P. H. D. von Holbach (1723-1789). 
 
 Important Works: — 
 1770. " Systfeme de la nature . . . parM. Mirabaud " [really von Holbach], 
 
 Lond., Engl., Lond., 1884. 
 1756. "Le christianisme devoil^." Par feu M. Boulanger [really von 
 
 Holbach], Lond. [really, Nancy], Engl., N.Y., 1819. 
 Denis Diderot (1713-84). 
 
 Diderot is not 'a coherent and systematic materialist,' yet his philosophy 
 becomes in the end distinctly materialistic. He is best known as creator and 
 chief editor of the " Encyclopedic ou dictionnaire raisonn^ des sciences, des 
 arts, et des metiers," 1751-72, 28 vols.; suppls.,7 vols. The"Encyclopedie"is 
 rightly regarded as 'the literary embodiment of the Enlightenment movement 
 in France.' It is 'one unbroken piece of exaltation of scientific knowledge 
 and pacific industry,' never atheistic, but throughout laying stress on 'the 
 justice of religious tolerance and religious freedom.' 
 Chief Philosophical Works: — 
 
 1746. "Pens&s philosophiques," The Hague. 
 
5o6 Continental Philosophers 
 
 1754. "Pensees sur I'interprdtation de la nature," The Hague. 
 
 "Reve d'Alembert" (Posthumous). 
 "CEuvres," ed. Ass^zat et Tourneux, 20 vols., Paris, 1875-77. 
 
 (Cf. J. Morley, " Diderot, and the Encyclopedists," Lond., 1878, 1886.) 
 
 ///. HUMANISTS 
 
 The writers named in this section illustrate a tendency without forming a 
 school. They are representative of a far greater number; and though they 
 are not in a strict sense philosophers, their influence on philosophy is not in- 
 considerable. The common feature of their writings is a reaction from the 
 rationalism of the Enlightenment, and a realization of the significance of 
 personality. 
 
 a. In France 
 
 Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1778. 
 
 1750. " Discours sur les sciences et les arts.'' 
 
 1754. "Discours sur I'origine et les fondemens de I'in^galit^ . . ." 
 
 1761. " La nouvelle Heloise." 
 
 1762. "Emile, ou sur 1' education." 1762. "Du contrat social." 
 
 h. In Germany 
 
 GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LeSSING, 1729-1781. 
 
 Lessing, the creator of German literature, is poet, critic, and apostle of free- 
 dom. Like Herder, he conceives of religion as personal relation between God 
 and man. His most important works, from the standpoint of philosophy, 
 are: — 
 
 1767-69. " Hamburgische Dramaturgic." (A criticism of the principles of 
 dramatic art, essentially Aristotelian in teaching.) 
 
 1777, 1780. "Erziehung des menschlichen Geschlechts." (The concep- 
 
 tion of the history of religions as record of the education of 
 humanity by God.) 
 (For discussion of Lessing as Spinozist, cf. Dilthey and Zirngiebl cited 
 by Rand.) 
 
 JoHANN Gottfried von Herder, i 744-1803. 
 
 Like Rousseau, Herder lays stress on the significance of the primitive 
 consciousness. But he corrects the narrow subjectivity of Rousseau by a 
 doctrine of the development of the human consciousness, of literature, and 
 of art ; and he supplements his collections of early ballads and his literary 
 and philological studies by works of philosophical significance, notably: — 
 
 1778. "Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele." 
 1784-92. " Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit," Engl., 
 
 Lond., 1800. 
 1787. "Gott: einige Gesprache" (3d ed., 1800, entitled, "Gesprache uber 
 
 Spinoza's System"). 
 1799. "Verstand und Erfahrung, Vernunft und Sprache. Eine Metakritik 
 
 zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft." 
 
Immanuel Kant 507 
 
 E. KANT AND THE KANTIANS 
 
 IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804) 
 I. Life 
 
 "The life history of Kant," Heine says, "is hard to write. For 
 he had neither life nor history. He lived a mechanically ordered, 
 very abstract bachelor's life in a quiet little street in Konigsberg. 
 I do not believe that the great clock of the Konigsberg cathedral 
 performed its daily task more tranquilly and regularly than its 
 great fellow-citizen, Immanuel Kant. Getting up, drinking coffee 
 writing, lecturing, dining, going to walk — everything had its 
 appointed time. At half-past four he walked eight times up and 
 down, in every season — and if the weather were bad, one saw his 
 servant, old Lampe, walking behind him, with a great umbrella, 
 like a picture of Providence. A curious contrast between the outer 
 life of the man and his . . . world-destroying thoughts. If the 
 people of Konigsberg had dreamed of the full significance of his 
 thought, they would have felt a dread of him . . . but the good people 
 saw in him ... a professor of philosophy, and when he passed them 
 at the appointed hour, they greeted him cordially and set their 
 watches by him." ' 
 
 Kant was born at Konigsberg, in 1724, the son of a strap-maker. 
 From his parents, pietists of simple and noble character, he early 
 learned lessons of virtue and of reverence. From his school, the 
 well-known Collegium Fredericianum, he received a good classical 
 training. In the university, which he entered at eighteen, he studied 
 philosophy and natural science ; and in 1755, after nine years of the 
 life of private tutor, he habilitated also at Konigsberg as privat- 
 docent. The rest of his life he spent in this same quiet little aca- 
 demic city near the Russian border. He never married, and the 
 records of his life contain no reference to any passionate friendships. 
 Yet the attachment between him and his servant, old Lampe, 
 attests the kindness of his disposition, and his letters to his students, 
 in particular to Marcus Herz, bear witness to the relations of frank 
 friendship which bound them to him. A tribute, written in Kant's 
 later life, by Herder suggests the nature of these early relations 
 with his students. Herder says: "I once had the happiness of 
 
 'Heine, SammtUche Werke, V., "Religion und Philosophie," p. 186. 
 
5o8 Immanuel Kant 
 
 knowing a philosopher; he was my teacher. He had the joyous 
 cheerfulness of youth at that happy time; his open forehead, 
 created expressly for thought, was the seat of imperturbable se- 
 renity; his speech redundant with ideas flowed from his lips. . . . 
 He would constantly bring us back to the simple, unaffected study 
 of nature. He gave us self-confidence and obliged me to think 
 for myself, for tyranny was foreign to his soul." 
 
 As will appear from the list of Kant's writings, his early interests 
 were for mathematics and science, and he retained throughout his 
 life his keen concern for mathematics, physics, geography, and 
 anthropology. His achievements as a scientific theorist are con- 
 siderable. As early as 1755 — that is, forty-one years before the 
 appearance of La Place's "Exposition du Systeme du Monde" 
 — Kant published a "Universal Nature History and Theory of 
 the Heavens," which clearly suggests what La Place later named 
 the nebular hypothesis; and his very latest work, the "Opus 
 Posthumum, " a dissertation on Physics, contains ingenious theo- 
 ries of the constitution of matter. It is perhaps not unnatural 
 that his scientific interest was balanced by a disregard and even 
 a comparative ignorance of technical works of philosophy. His 
 criticisms, for example, of Leibniz and of Berkeley show that he 
 had not thoroughly read either one of them, and even his concep- 
 tion of Hume's teaching is inadequate. His own thinking, as has 
 appeared, was a baflBing combination of conservatism and radical- 
 ism. He united a tenacious fondness for traditional beliefs with 
 the ruthlessness of the reformer. 
 
 Kant was deeply interested also in contemporary affairs and sin- 
 cerely in sympathy with the tendency of the later eighteenth cen- 
 tury toward political emancipation. He was an enthusiastic reader 
 of Rousseau and followed with friendly concern the successive 
 events of the American War for Independence and the French 
 Revolution. His critique of Herder's "Ideas toward the Philoso- 
 phy of the History of Humanity" and his essay on "Perpetual 
 Peace" are the most significant of his own writings on political 
 subjects. 
 
 The breadth of these interests contrasts oddly with the narrow- 
 ness of Kant's personal life. He was never tempted away from 
 Konigsberg. All his journeys were voyages of thought. His inter- 
 course with the great men of his time was mainly by letter. With 
 
Kantian Bibliography 509 
 
 evident satisfaction and with utter acquiescence in the justice of 
 the verdict, but without any corresponding enlargement in his 
 outward circumstances, 4ie gradually found himself the foremost 
 philosophical thinker of his age — the autocrat, or at least the 
 centre, of the world of contemporary thought. He died quietly 
 in 1804, after a few years of literary inactivity. 
 
 The almost exclusive concern with the affairs of thought which 
 characterized all Kant's life is well mirrored in a portrait of the 
 little philosopher, recently discovered in a Dresden antiquary's 
 shop. It represents a man with head somewhat bowed under the 
 weight of the commanding brow, and with tranquil eyes, unmind- 
 ful — so it seems — - of the passion and toil and pettiness of the 
 world of men, but fixed upon the goal of reasoned truth. 
 
 II. Bibliography 
 (Cf. " Gennan Kantian Bibliography," E. Adickes, Boston, 1896, pp. 623.) 
 
 a. Most Important Works of Kant 
 
 (The references are to the volumes of the second Hartenstein edition of 
 Kant's "Werke.") 
 
 I. Early Writings 
 
 (For useful summaries of the works of Kant's early periods, cf. E. Caird, 
 "The Critical Philosophy of Kant," Vol. I., Introd., c. 4.) 
 1755. " Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae : nova dilu- 
 cidatio," H. I., Konigsb. (Delivered when Kant habilitated 
 as privat-docent. Rationalistic, that is, Wolffian, in character.) 
 1755. "AUgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels," H. I., 
 Konigsb. u. Leipz. Transl. by W. Hastie, Lond., 1900. (An- 
 ticipation of the nebular hypothesis.) 
 
 n. Writings Rationalistic, yet Critical of Rationalism 
 
 1762. "Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren," H. II., 
 
 Konigsb. (A criticism of over-pedantic logic.) 
 
 1763. " Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grossen in die Weltweisheit einzu- 
 
 fuhren," H. II., ibid. 
 
 1763. "Der einzigmoglicheBeweisgrund . . des Daseins Gottes," H. II., 
 
 ibid. Transl. in "Essays and Treatises," Lond., 1798. 
 
 1764. "Uber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der naturlichen Theologie 
 
 und Moral" (known as "Evidenz"), H. II. In Mendelssohn's 
 Preisschrift, Berl. 
 1764. "Beobachtungen iiber das Gefiihl des Schonen und Erhabenen," 
 H. II., Konigsb. Transl. in "Essays and Treatises." 
 
5IO Immanuel Kant 
 
 3. Transition to Critical Philosophy 
 
 1766. "Traume eines Geistersehers erlautert durch Traume der Meta- 
 
 physik," H. II., ibid. Transl. by E. F. Goerwitz, Lond., 1900. 
 
 (An unacademic essay, teaching that knowledge is limited and 
 
 that conscience is the basis of true faith.) 
 1768. "Von dem ersten Grund des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume," 
 
 H. II., in "Konigsberg Frage- und-Anzeig-Nachricht." 
 
 (The first published indication of Kant's space doctrine. From 
 
 the phenomena of symmetry, Kant argues the ideality of space.) 
 1770. "De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis disserta- 
 
 tio" (known as " Dissertatio "), H. II., Konigsb. Transl. by 
 
 W. J. Eckoff, N.Y., 1894. 
 
 (Delivered at Kant's inauguration as professor. A complete 
 
 statement of his space and time doctrine.) 
 
 4. The Period, of the Three Kritiks 
 
 (Cf. Kant's correspondence during this period, especially that with Marcus 
 
 Herz.) 
 
 1 781. " Kritik der reinen Vernunft," first edition (A), H. III., Riga (for transl. 
 cf. injra, p. 511). 
 
 1783. "Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen Metaphysik," H. IV., ibid. 
 Ed., with critical notes, by B. Erdmann, Leipz., 1878. Transl. 
 by E. B. Bax, Lond., 1883; by J. H. Bernard, Lond., 1889; by 
 P. Cams, Chicago, 1902. (Written in reply to a review of the 
 " Kritik" by Garve published in the GoUinger Gelehrten Anzeigen. 
 This review accuses Kant of Berkelianism. In his indignant 
 refutation of this charge it is likely that Kant underestimates 
 and misstates his own idealism.) 
 
 1785. "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten," H. IV., ibid. Transl. by 
 T. K. Abbott as "Metaphysics of Ethics" (cited infra, p. 511). 
 
 1787. "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," second edition (B), ibid. 
 
 1788. "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft," H. V., ibid. Ed. by von Kirch- 
 
 mann, and Kehrbach. Transl. by T. K. Abbott, as "Critique 
 of Practical Reason." 
 1790. "Kritik der Urteilskraft," H. V., Beri. u. Libau, ed. by B. Erdmann. 
 Transl. by J. H. Bernard, Lond., 1892, as "Critique of Judg- 
 ment." 
 
 Kant's discussion of 'esthetic' and ' teleological ' judgments. In 
 these, according to his view, we are conscious through feeling 
 of a harmony between subject and object which transcends 
 knowledge. Cf. E. B. Talbot, "The Fundamental Principle 
 of Fichte's Philosophy," pp. 11-15; E. Caird, op. cit. injra, 
 Vol. II., Bk. III. 
 
 5. Later Writings 
 
 1793. "Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blosen Vernunft," H. VI., 
 Konigsb. Transl. in "Essays and Treatises of Kant," II. 1798; 
 (in part) by T. K. Abbott (cited p. 511, infra). 
 
Kantian Bibliography 511 
 
 1795. " Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf," H. VL., ibid. 
 Transl. in " Essays," etc., I. ; and in " Principles of Politics," by 
 W. Hastie, 1891. 
 
 1797. " Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechts und Tugendlehre " 
 
 (known as " Metaphysik der Sitten,") H. VII., ibid. Transl. by 
 J. W. Semple, 1836; 3d ed., 1871. 
 
 1798. "Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht," H. VII., ibid. Transl. 
 
 by A. E. Kroeger in Journ. of Spec. Philos., 1875-1882. (Edited 
 by other hands from Kant's lecture notes and papers.) 
 
 1800. " Logik," H. VIII., ed. G. B. Jasche, ibid. Transl. by T. K. 
 Abbott, 1885. 
 
 1821. " Vorlesungen Uber Metaphysik," ed. K. H. L. Politz, Erf. 
 
 b. Editions 
 I. Of Complete Works, by 
 
 K. Rosenkranz u. F. W. Schubert, 12 vols., Leipz., 1838 ff. 
 
 G. Hartenstein, Leipz., ist ed., 10 vols., 1838; 2d ed., 8 vols., 1867 ff. 
 
 Konigl. Preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaften, Berl. 1900 ff.. Vols. 1-4, and 10-13 
 (Letters) already published. (The authoritative and completest edi- 
 tion.) 
 
 ^. Of the Kritik of Pure Reason 
 
 (o) Edited on the basis of the second edition of the "Kritik," (i) by Benno 
 Erdmann (1877, 3d ed., 1900) and (2) by E. Adickes (1889) (both with 
 useful critical notes); 
 
 (J) Edited on the basis of the first edition of the "Kritik" (i) by J. von 
 Kirchmann (1869, 1891) and (2) by K. Kehrbach (Reclam series), 
 1878; in fine print but containing a very convenient compendium of all 
 texts; 
 
 (c) Translated, entire, by Max Miiller (from the first edition, with the diverg- 
 ing passages of the second edition as supplement) ; in part by J. H. 
 Stirling and J. Watson cited infra. 
 
 3. Compilations 
 
 "The Philosophy of Kant, in Extracts from His Own Writings," transl. by 
 John Watson, N.Y., 18B8; last ed., 1901. (Judicious selections from 
 the three "Kritiks," and the "Metaphysics of Morality," 1785.) 
 
 "The Ethical Writings of Kant," transl. by T. K. Abbott, Glasg., 1879. 
 (Includes "The Critique of Practical Reason," " The Metaphysics of 
 Ethics," and part of the "Religion within the Bounds of Mere Under- 
 standing.") 
 
 c. Manuscript Notes of Kant 
 
 Benno Erdmann, " Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der kritischen Philosophie," 
 Leipz., 1882-1884. 
 
 (A collection of notes made by Kant, through many years, in the mar- 
 gins of his copy of Baumgarten's " Metaphysica " the basis of most of 
 his lectures on metaphysics.) 
 
512 Immanuel Kant 
 
 B. Erdmann, "Nachtrage zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft," Kiel, 1881, 
 pp. 59. (A similar collection of Kant's notes on the margins of his own 
 copy of the "Kritik of Pure Reason," edition A.) 
 
 R. Reicke, "Lose Blatter aus Kant's Nachlass," 2 vols., Konigsb., 1889, 1895. 
 (A collection of manuscript notes.) 
 
 i. Criticism and Commentary 
 {On the Development of Kant's Thought) 
 
 E. Caird, "The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," 2 vols., Glasg., 1889. 
 
 F. Paulsen, " Versuch einer Entwickelungsgeschichte der kantischen Erkennt- 
 
 nisstheorie," Leipz., 1875. (Lays stress on the rationalistic aspect of 
 Kant.) 
 
 B. Erdmann, "Kant's Kriticismus," ibid., 1878. (Lays stress on the scepti- 
 
 cal factor in Kant's development.) 
 W. Windelband, "Die verschiedenen Phasen der kantischen Lehre vom 
 Ding-an-sich," Vierteljahrschr. f. wiss. Philos., 1877. 
 
 (0» the Kritik of Pure Reason) 
 
 G. S. Morris, "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," Chicago, 1882. 
 
 J. H. Stirling, "Text-book to Kant," Edin. and Lond., 1881. (Includes 
 translation in part of iEsthetic, Categories, and Schemata.) 
 
 H. Vaihinger, "Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft," I. and 
 II., Berl. u. Leipz., 1881, 1892. 
 
 This monumental work presents a careful compendium of all criticisms, 
 including those of Kant's contemporaries, which had been made upon 
 the Preface and upon the Esthetic of the "Kritik of Pure Reason." 
 This compilation is supplemented by original and discriminating com- 
 ment. 
 
 {General) 
 
 R. Adamson, "The Philosophy of Kant," Edin., 1879. 
 
 E. Adickes, " Kantstudien," Leipz., 1895. 
 
 C. Cantoni, "E. Kant," 3 vols., Milan, 1879-1883. 
 
 T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant." (In " Works," II., 
 Lond., 1893.) 
 
 F. Paulsen, "Was uns Kant sein kann," Viertelschr. f. wiss. Philos., 1881, 
 
 "Immanuel Kant, sein Leben und Lehre." Transl. by J. E. Creighton, 
 N.Y., 1902. 
 A. Schopenhauer, "Kritik der kantischen Philosophie" (cited infra, p. 554). 
 
 For critics contemporary with Kant, cf. also the writers cited infra, p. 534. 
 For the present-day issue of Kantian criticism, cf . Vaihinger's journal, " Kant- 
 studien." Among the histories of philosophy, cf. especially that of Fischer. 
 Cf. also the following commentators: Cohen, Drobisch, Lasswitz, Simmel, 
 Watson, cited by Rand. 
 
The Kritik of Pure Reason 5 1 3 
 
 III. Outline of the " Kritik of Pure Reason" 
 
 The chapter on Kant's philosophy which this book contains is 
 based mainly on his chief work, the "Kritik of Pure Reason," 
 though departing widely from its order of topics. This divergence 
 is, indeed, necessary, if a reasonably clear and rightly shaded 
 view of Kant's philosophy is to be given, for the "Kritik," as it 
 stands, is an almost inextricably confused tangle of different threads 
 of argument. It is marred by useless reiterations, by subtle self- 
 contradictions, and by misleading symmetries of arrangement. 
 There is a double explanation of the greater number of these glaring 
 faults of style. They bear witness, in the first place, to the oppo- 
 sition, so often noted, between Kant's native conservatism and 
 his revolutionary criticism. They are due, also, to the fact that 
 Kant worked ten years, and over, on the "Kritik." In its present 
 form the book contains, side by side, the formulations of Kant's 
 thought at different times during all these years ; since in the end 
 he very loosely and uncritically put together the various sections 
 which compose the "Kritik." ' 
 
 The "Kritik of Pure Reason" has three main parts: the Ms- 
 thetic, the Analytic, and the Dialectic.^ Esthetic and Analytic are 
 alike in that each aims to study an aspect, or aspects, of the world 
 of experience. The Dialectic, on the other hand, discusses the 
 nature of realities beyond experience. Regarded as doctrine of 
 knowledge, the Esthetic is the study of the perception of objects, 
 the Analytic investigates our thought about objects, and the Dia- 
 lectic is the study of reason — which Kant defines as search for the 
 unknown. As has already appeared, the division lines are not 
 closely drawn; discussions of unknown reality appear in every 
 part of the "Kritik," and, on the other hand, the Dialectic, in 
 spite of its negative purpose, contains an essential part of Kant's 
 
 'For detailed proof of this, cf. E. Adickes, Introduction and Footnotes to his 
 edition of the Kritik, and " Kant's Systematik als systembildender Faktor," 1887. 
 
 For evidence of Kant's long preoccupation with the "Kritik," cf. his corre- 
 spondence with Herz. The following abbreviated extracts suggest its scope: 
 "June, 1771: Busy with a work, ' The Limits of Sense and Reason . . .'" "Feb- 
 ruary, 1772: I am now ready to publish a 'Kritik of Pure Reason,'. . . [a discus- 
 sion] of the nature of theoretical and of practical knowledge — of which the first 
 part will appear within three months. . ." "Nov., 1776: The book is held 
 back by a main objection, as if by a dam. . . .'' "Aug., 1777: I hope to finish the 
 'Kritik' this winter. . . ." "Aug., 1778: I am still working unweariedly. . . ." 
 
 2 The exact division of the Kritik is shown in the reproduced table of contents 
 on pp. 514 -se?. 
 2L 
 
514 Immanuel Kant 
 
 positive doctrine. In view of these defects, the outline of Kant's 
 teaching has been given, in this book, under headings which differ 
 from tiiose of the "Kritik." ' The two schemes of classification 
 correspond, roughly speaking, in the following way: Part of the 
 teaching about the known object (the space and time doctrine) is 
 contained in the jEsthetic, the rest in the Analytic (the category 
 doctrine and the teaching about the "thing outside me"). The 
 general teaching about the transcendental self is contained in the 
 Analytic, but the doctrine of the transcendental self as moral and 
 free forms part of the Dialectic. The doctrine of unknown reali- 
 ties and of the limits of knowledge appears in all parts of the 
 "Kritik." 
 
 AU this is made clearer by the annotations of the greatly abbre- 
 viated Table of Contents which follows. The references are to 
 those pages of this book which discuss the different divisions of 
 the "Kritik." 
 
 Keitik oj Pure Reason 
 Preface. 
 Introduction. 
 
 I. Transcendentax Doctrine of Elements 
 
 Part I. Transcendental ^Esthetic. 
 
 (The space and time elements of the object as known. 200 seq., 
 A priori perception.) 516 seq. 
 
 Part II. Transcendental Logic. 
 
 Division I. Transcendental Analytic. 
 Book I. The Analytic of Concepts. 
 Section I. The Guiding Thread for the Discovery of 
 the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. 
 (Enumeration and first discussion of the 
 
 categories, or relational elements of ob- 204 seq., 
 jects as known.) 526 seq. 
 
 Section II. The Deduction of Pure Concepts of the 
 Understanding. 
 (This section considers : — 
 (i) the argument for the existence of the 
 
 transcendental self (§§15-17). 226 seq. 
 
 (2) the doctrine of the transcendental self 
 
 in relation with itsobject (§§18-19). ^^9 ^^1- 
 
 (3) the doctrine of the limits of knowledge 
 
 (§§22-23), especially the teaching 
 
 about the unknown self (§§24-25).) 241 seq. 
 
 ' ' CI. the sub-heads of Chapter 7, pp. 198 seq^. 
 
The Kritik of Pure Reason 
 
 515 
 
 Book II. Analytic of Principles. 
 
 Section I. Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the 
 Understanding. 
 
 (This section accentuates the distinction 
 between sense and understanding, and 
 suggests that the time consciousness is a 
 link between them. The difficulty is 
 imaginary and the solution unsatisfactory. 
 Cf. Caird, o-p. cit., I., p. 457^; Adickes, 
 edition of the "Kritik," marginal notes, 
 Paulsen, op. cit., Pt. I., Bk. I., §1, 
 I., s, 2.) 
 Section II. System of All Principles of Pure Under- 
 standing. (Doctrine of the categories, 
 continued from Book I., §1.) 
 (i) Axioms of Perception, 
 
 (2) Anticipations of Observation, 
 
 (3) Analogies of Experience. 
 The permanence of substance. 
 The law of causality. 
 The law of reciprocal determination. 
 
 (4) Postulates of Empirical Thought. 
 
 Possibility. 
 Acttuility. 
 
 (Inserted here is the Refutation 
 of Idealism.) 
 Necessity. 
 Section III. The Ground of the Distinction of Objects 
 in general into Phenomena and Nou- 
 mena, 
 
 (The doctrine of the unknown things-in- 
 themselves. A section properly belong- 
 ing in the Dialectic.) 
 Appendix: Amphiboly of Concepts of 
 Reflection. (Chiefly a commentary 
 on Leibniz.) 
 Division II. Transcendental Dialectic. 
 Introduction. 
 Book I. The Concepts of Pure Reason. 
 
 (Introductory and unimportant.) 
 Book II. The Dialectical Conclusions of Pure Reason. 
 (Doctrine of the Unknown.) 
 Section I. The Paralogisms of Pure Reason. 
 
 (Doctrine that the soul, as traditionally 
 conceived, and the transcendental self 
 are unknown.) 
 
 207 seq., 
 527 seq. 
 
 208 seq., 
 
 529 seq. 
 210 seq. 
 217 seq., 
 531 seq. 
 
 532 
 532 
 
 533 
 
 236 seq. 
 254 
 
 244 seq 
 
5i6 Immanuel Kant 
 
 Section II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason. 
 
 (Doctrine of the necessary paradoxes.) 
 Antinomy i. (The endlessness and the 
 
 completeness of space and time.) 521 ^^?-. 
 
 Antinomy 2. (The indivisibility and the 
 
 divisibility of matter.) 524 
 
 Antinomy 3. (Phenomenal and free caus- 
 ality.) 256 seq. 
 Antinomy 4. (A necessary cause and an 
 
 infinite regress of causes.) 248 sej. 
 
 (An anticipation of Section III. below.) 
 Section III. The Ideal of Pure Reason. 
 
 (Discussion of the nature of God, and of 
 
 the arguments for God's existence.) 
 
 The Ontological Argument. 247 seq. 
 
 The Cosmological Argument. 248 scq. 
 
 The Physico-theological Argument. 250 seq. 
 
 II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method 
 (By far the shorter part of the Kritik, and relatively uoimporlant in content.) 
 
 IV. Detailed Study of Certain Sections of the " Kritik 
 OF Pure Reason" 
 
 To assist the serious student of the text of the "Kritik" and to 
 complete, in outline, the discussion of the book, the following brief 
 comments on Kant's teachings about space and time and about the 
 categories are added here. They were excluded from the body 
 of the book where they properly belong, on the ground that the 
 consideration of details would have obscured the general argument. 
 By this method it is beUeved that all essential parts of the " Kritik" 
 are considered, in fairly close relation to the text, either in Chap- 
 ter 7 or in this Appendix. 
 
 a. THE SPACE AND TIME DOCTRINE 
 
 I. The Arguments of the Esthetic 
 
 This portion of the "Kritik" furnishes a good practice ground 
 for the beginner in Kant. It is short and unusually clear; yet 
 representative of some of the more important tendencies of Kant's 
 thought. From the larger standpoint of modern philosophy, 
 this division of Kant's thought has on the other hand merely a 
 
Kant's Doctrine of Space and Time 517 
 
 temporary and individual significance, since his category teaching 
 contains all that is permanent in the space and time doctrine. The 
 following discussion follows the order of the "Kritik," in which 
 Kant argues, first, the a priority, already defined as independence 
 of sense involving universality and necessity, second, the per- 
 ceptual character, and third, the subjectivity of space and time. 
 For the a priority of space and time, Kant has three arguments : ' — 
 
 (i) Space and time — he teaches — unlike color, odor, and the 
 like, are not secondary and derived conceptions, framed by the 
 mind after it has come to know external things (and events) ; for 
 the consciousness of an external thing is already a spatial conscious- 
 ness, and the consciousness of an event is a temporal consciousness. 
 The essential part of this argument, as already paraphrased in 
 the chapter on Kant, is the correct teaching that both the spatial 
 object and the temporal event include relation. There are, how- 
 ever, two difficulties with the argument as stated. As applied to 
 space, it is at fault because of its implication that every external 
 phenomenon is spatial. For it is at least possible — by many 
 psychologists it is confidently thought — that certain external phe- 
 nomena, sounds for example, are not spatial. Evidently, therefore, 
 it is improper to identify 'spatial' and 'external' without further 
 argument. In the second place, Kant seems to confuse a priority 
 with chronological priority.^ In so far as he means by o priori 
 ' earlier in experience ' he is unjustified in his assertion that the 
 relations — spatial, temporal, and the rest — are a priori. For, 
 as Kant himself often acknowledges, it contradicts all recorded 
 experience to assert that our consciousness of a relation is earlier 
 than our consciousness of its terms.^ Neither criticism, how- 
 ever, affects the main contentions of Kant: (i) that space 
 and time include relations; and (2) that relations are neces- 
 sary. 
 
 (2) Space and time, Kant argues in the second place, are a priori 
 because one can never conceive of there being no space and no time, 
 whereas one can well imagine a space with no objects in it and a 
 time empty of events. This statement must, however, be chal- 
 
 ' A, pp. 23 ieg. and 30 iej. B, pp. 38^6?. and 4656?. W., pp. 24icg. and agjeg. 
 (Cf. supra. Chapter 7, pp. 200 seq_.) . . . . , 
 
 2 Cf. the first space-argument and the attempted proof of subjectivity from a 
 priority, pp. 202 and 521. 
 
 2 Cf. for the same criticism, Caird, op. cit., I., pp. 286 seq.; and F. C. S. Schiller, 
 "Axioms as Postulates," §§ 17 and 21, in"Personal Idealism." 
 
5i8 Immanuel Kant 
 
 lenged. Doubtless one is able, as Kant teaches, to 'think awa>"' 
 any given objects and events: one can imagine a room without 
 furniture in it, or a garden without a house in it ; and one can imag- 
 ine that the Greeks did not conquer at Marathon, or that the Alex- 
 andrian library was never burned. But these possibilities do not 
 bear out Kant's contention that utterly empty space and time abso- 
 lutely without events are imaginable. For however rigorous an 
 effort one makes to imagine empty space, one finds oneself 
 always foiled in the attempt. Often, for example, one is conscious 
 of a dim image of one's own body looking at, or groping about in, 
 supposedly empty space ; and even when one succeeds in banishing 
 all images of concrete objects from the image of Space-as-a-whole, 
 that space, if visualized, has of necessity some color however vague, 
 it is, for example, black or dull gray or deep blue. In other words : 
 one never imagines space without at the same time imagining some 
 object or objects, or at any rate some sense quality, which is spatial. 
 And similarly one is never conscious of a time which is not the time 
 of some series of events however slight or unimportant. Kant's 
 second argument for a priority may, thus, be set aside on the ground 
 that it misstates the facts of experience. 
 
 (3) Kant's third argument for the a priority (that is, the in- 
 dependence of sense) of the space consciousness is in truth a 
 corollary from the first. This argument, which he sometimes calls 
 a 'transcendental deduction," runs thus: Geometrical truths are 
 ioth necessary and universally admitted. It is certain that the sum 
 of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles and that the 
 square on the hypothenuse equals the sum of the squares on altitude 
 and base. But geometrical truths have to do with space-relations ; 
 and it follows that the space-consciousness is a priori — necessary 
 and universal. The argument is based on the evident contrast 
 between the propositions of geometry and statements — for exam- 
 ple — about the odor or color of a flower, or the polish of a chair. 
 The necessity of geometry is reasonably attributed, Kant teaches, 
 to the character of its subject-matter, space-relations (Kant 
 names them space-forms) ? And similarly the necessity which we 
 attribute to the succession of nature phenomena argues for the 
 
 ' In edition A, this is the third of the space arguments (p. 25); in edition B, 
 it has a section to itself (§ 3, p. 40). Cf. W., 25, 27. The time argument is 
 similarly ordered except that in edition B the argument appears in both positions. 
 
 ^ For comment, cf. supra, pp. 220^ iej. 
 
Kant's Doctrine of Space and, Time 519 
 
 necessity, and thus for the unsensational character, of our con- 
 sciousness of temporal succession. 
 
 In commenting upon these arguments, it is necessary to dis- 
 tinguish between the teachings about space and about time. 
 So far as time is concerned, Kant is justified in asserting its 
 peculiar necessity, for time is precisely the relation of necessary 
 connection between irreversible phenomena.* But as regards 
 Kant's treatment of space, that comment holds good which has 
 been made on his general conception of relation:^ he rightly 
 teaches the necessity of spatial, as of temporal, relation, but he 
 wrongly regards this necessity as a distinguishing feature of re- 
 lations. On the other hand, as has been pointed out, logically 
 necessary assertions may be made about mere sensations. If this 
 criticism is correct, the permanently valuable part of Kant's space- 
 doctrine is the reiterated teaching that space is, in part at least,' 
 relational. 
 
 Besides arguing thus for the unsensational and a priori nature 
 of the space and time consciousness, Kant has two arguments to 
 prove them perceptual. (It will be remembered that when Kant 
 wrote the /Esthetic, the first division of the "Kritik," he was still 
 in part a Wolffian. At this period, therefore, he wished to prove 
 space and time perceptual, for if they were forms of thought he 
 would be obliged on his persisting Wolffian principles to suppose 
 the existence of an extra-mental space and time exactly correspond- 
 ing with them,* whereas he had already advanced beyond WolflE to 
 the conception of space and time as subjective.) Kant's arguments 
 for the perceptual nature of space and time are in brief as fol- 
 lows : "We can be conscious," ° he says, "only of one single Space 
 [or Time]; and if we speak of many spaces [or times], we mean by 
 these, parts of one and the same all-inclusive space [or time]. 
 These parts, moreover, cannot precede the one all-inclusive space 
 [or time] as the parts of which it is composed, but can only be 
 thought as in it." Now there is no doubt that Kant here suggests 
 a correct criterion of the perception as contrasted with the concrete 
 general notion: the perception is primarily apprehended as one, 
 and only later analyzed, whereas the concrete concept, or class- 
 
 • Cf. supra, p. 213'. ' Cf. supra, pp. 220 seq. 
 
 ' Cf. infra, p. 525^. * Cf. supra, p. 199. 
 
 » On space: ed. A, Arg. 4-S. P; 'S; ed. B, Arg. 3-4, pp. 39-40; W., 25.' On 
 time: ed. A, Arg. 4-5, p. 32; ed. B, Arg. 4-5, pp. 47-48; W., 30. 
 
520 Immanuel Kant 
 
 notion, is built up gradually out of its parts. It is also true that 
 Total Space is imagined by the mathematician, as one whole, funda- 
 mental to its parts. There is none the less a decisive objectionto 
 Kant's conclusion — the fact, namely, that the consciousness of 
 space as one is not a primitive experience, but a consciousness which 
 has been gradually built up, in the largely forgotten past of each 
 individual, by the mental addition of the largest spaces which have 
 been objects of direct experience.' As a matter of fact, therefore, 
 the space-consciousness does not meet the criterion of perception : 
 it is a result of synthesizing, though not of generalizing, conscious- 
 ness, that is to say, it has been made up of parts, before it is analyzed 
 into them. And if this be true of space, it cannot be doubted in 
 the case of time, which consists primarily of its parts; whose 
 oneness is the relation of these parts ; and which is called a One, 
 only when it is metaphorically represented by a spatial image.^ 
 
 Kant's second argument infers the perceptual nature of space 
 and time from their alleged infinitude. He calls space infinite 
 because beyond every spatial boundary — a horizon, for example 
 — one can always imagine the existence of still more space ; and 
 because every moment of time, however indefinitely distant in the 
 past or in the future, must be thought of as having its own past 
 and its own future. The chief difficulty with this argument is 
 Kant's failure to show that infinity is a character of the percept 
 exclusively. Here, as in the preceding argument, his opposition 
 between percept and concept really applies to one class only of 
 concepts — namely, to the concrete general notions, the class no- 
 tions. He is right in the teaching that this sort of concept, built 
 up as it is from experience, lacks an infinity of predicates ; but he 
 does not and cannot show that this is the only type of concept. 
 'Pure concepts' of the infinite may, on the other hand, occur, for all 
 Kant shows to the contrary.' 
 
 It must be borne in mind that the insufficiency of these arguments 
 for the perceptual character of the space and time consciousness 
 does not affect Kant's main purpose — to prove against Hume the 
 unsensational and a priori character of space and time, and then 
 
 ' The discussion of this subject belongs rather to psychology than to philosophy. 
 Cf . Kant's virtual admission, in his discussion of the category of totahty, that the 
 consciousness of space is gradually built up {supra, p. 207). 
 
 ' Cf. Kant's admission of this, B, § 6, 65. 
 
 ' It may be pointed out also that the teaching about the infinitude of percep- 
 tion virtually contradicts the thesis of Kant's second antinomy. 
 
Kant's Doctrine of Space and Time 521 
 
 to prove against Wolff that space and time are subjective — ideal 
 in character. To the consideration of the arguments for subjec- 
 tivity it is now necessary to turn. As contained in the ^Esthetic, 
 Kant's only argument for subjectivity is from the a priority of 
 space and time. "Space," he says, "represents no attribute of 
 things in themselves . . . which would remain if all subjective 
 conditions of perception were abstracted from. For neither abso- 
 lute nor relative conditions of things can be perceived a priori — 
 in other words, before the existence of the things to which they 
 belong."' This argument, as stated, is really based, it will be ob- 
 served, not on the a priority — the necessity and universality — 
 but on the priority, in actual experience, of the space and time 
 consciousness.^ And if we grant its premise, that is, if we grant 
 that we are conscious of space and time before we become con- 
 scious of the existence of extra-mental objects, by receiving sen- 
 sations through their influence, then it is, indeed, evident that 
 space and time are not themselves impressions corresponding with 
 these same objects. But it will be remembered that Kant did not 
 prove that the consciousness of space and time is prior to impres- 
 sions from extra-mental objects; on the other hand, he success- 
 fully proved merely that the consciousness of space and time is 
 not later than the consciousness of objects of our experience. 
 Kant's first and most definite argument for the subjectivity of space 
 and time is therefore based on an invalid premise. This is the 
 more strange, since he might successfully have argued the sub- 
 jectivity of space and time from the a priority strictly conceived, 
 and not from the falsely assumed priority of the space and time 
 consciousness. He might, in other words, have said, as indeed 
 he plainly says in other connections,' that necessary propositions 
 never could be made about reaUties independent of us, whereas we 
 have the right to make them of our own ideas. From the neces- 
 sity of propositions about space and time, there would then have 
 followed their subjectivity. 
 
 2. The Arguments of the First and Second Anttnomies 
 
 Kant argues the subjectivity of space and time not only from 
 their a priority but from their contradictoriness. This argument 
 
 'A, 26, 32; B, 42, 49; W., 37, 31. 
 
 ^ Cf . supra, p. 517. 
 
 sCf. A, 196; B, 241; W., lis- 
 
522 Immanuel Kant 
 
 is contained in a part of the "Kritik " widely removed from the 
 space and time arguments of the Msthetic — namely in the Dia- 
 lectic, the last division of Part I. of the "Kritik." ' Yet the antino- 
 mies, though they appear in so late a part of the " Kritik," are 
 the result of a relatively early phase of Kant's thinking. The 
 gist of the argument contained in them has been stated untech- 
 nically in the text of Chapter 7. For this reason and because the 
 first two antinomies make no important addition to the essential 
 teaching of the "Kritik," the outline which follows is purposely 
 abbreviated. Kant's statement of the first antinomy is as follows : 
 
 1. (Thesis.) The world must have a beginning in time, else 
 at every particular moment of time an infinity of time has elapsed. 
 Thus, there would be a completed infinity, which is impossible. 
 
 The world must be bounded in space, else it would consist of an 
 infinite number of parts. But an infinite time would be requisite 
 in which to apprehend the infinite space, and this has been proved 
 to be impossible. 
 
 2. (Antithesis.) The world cannot have a beginning in time, 
 else an empty time would precede it, and in an empty time there 
 would be no reason for any beginning. 
 
 The world cannot be limited in space, for it would have to be 
 limited by empty space, and empty space — which is nothing — 
 can stand in no relation whatever. 
 
 Kant's conclusion (which applies the antinomy not merely to 
 space and time but to phenomena in general) is best stated in a 
 closing paragraph of what he calls the "Critical Discussion." The 
 antinomy, he says, has brought to light the following dilemma: 
 if the world be a whole-existing-in-itself, it must be either finite 
 or infinite. But the first as well as the second of these alternatives 
 has been proved untrue (by the thesis and antithesis respectively 
 of the first antinomy). Therefore the world cannot be a reality 
 
 ' There are four antinomies of which the theses affirm and the antitheses 
 deny (according to Kant, with equal necessity) the following propositions; — 
 I. The beginning of the world in time and its spatial limitedness. 
 .i. The occurrence of simple, or indivisible, material realities, 
 
 3. Free causes. 
 
 4. A necessary being. 
 
 Kant groups these antinomies together on the ground that each is a necessary 
 illusion of the reason. A study of them shows, however, that the first two connect 
 themselves with the space and time doctrine; the third with the doctrine of the 
 free self; the fourth with Kant's teaching about God. Cf. supra, pp. 257 and 248. 
 
Kant^s Doctrine of Space and Time 523 
 
 existing in itself ; whereas, since observation bears abundant witness 
 to the paradoxes of consciousness, this same contradictory temporal 
 and spatial world well may be a composite of mere phenomena 
 of consciousness or ideas (Vorstellungen). 
 
 Before commenting, even briefly, on this antinomy doctrine, 
 it is essential to observe that it presupposes throughout the older 
 negative conception, not the modern positive view, of the infinite.' 
 That is to say, it conceives of the infinite as in some sense the end- 
 less. But even judged on this basis, the first antinomy does not 
 justify the assertion of Kant that thesis and antithesis are alike 
 valid. The antithesis is indeed an incontrovertible statement of 
 these truths; (i) that time — the related succession of moments 
 — is without beginning, since every alleged first moment al- 
 ways by definition presupposes a still earlier one; and (2) that 
 space must be thought as infinitely extensible since space is, by 
 definition, that whose supposed boundaries must lie between parts 
 of itself. The thesis is, on the other hand, invalid since it 
 makes the false assumption that a series completed at a given 
 moment might be infinite.^ If this criticism be admitted, Kant's 
 solution of the antinomies is discredited, for that assumes that 
 thesis as well as antithesis is proved true. Yet curiously enough 
 the main purpose of Kant's antinomy teaching is not hereby 
 affected. For from the truth of the antithesis, as clearly as from 
 the alleged contradiction between thesis and antithesis, one may 
 infer the probability that time and space, whose boundaries ever 
 elude the seeker, are not characteristics of an immutable reality- 
 independent-of -consciousness. 
 
 ' According to this positive conception the infinite is the self -representative; 
 it is, in other words, that "which can be put into one-to-one correspondence with 
 a part of itself." Its endlessness is a corollary from this positive character. (For 
 statements of this doctrine, cf. E. V. Huntington, The "Continuum as a Type of 
 Order," Reprint by Harvard Publication office from Annals of Mathematics, 
 1905, sees. 7 and 27; Dedekind, "Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen," Engl, 
 transl.in " Essays on Number," 1901, §§ 64.56^.; Royce, "The World and the Indi- 
 vidual," I., "Supplementary Essay," esp. pp. 497 and 507 jegi., with the works 
 there cited, especially those of Bolzano and Cantor. Cf . also, Couturat, ' ' De 
 I'Infini Mathematique." For Bertrand Russell's discussion of the Infinite and his 
 criticism of Kant's first two antinomies, cf. "The Principles of Mathematics," 
 Chapters XIII., XLIII., LIE. Cf . Kant's " Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie 
 des Himmels," III., Hartenstein, I., p. 332, cited by Couturat, for an apparent ap- 
 proach to the positive conception of the infinite. 
 
 ' The argument of the thesis as applied to space need not be separately consid- 
 ered, for it is based directly upon the time-argument. Infinite space is argued impos- 
 sible on the ground that an infinite time would be needed in which to apprehend it. 
 
524 Immanuel Kant 
 
 The second antinomy has to do with space, not with time.' It 
 alleges on the one hand the existence of indivisible units, and on 
 the other hand the necessity of the infinite divisibility of space 
 It is equally necessary, Kant holds, to assert the existence of indi- 
 visible spatial units and to assert the infinite divisibility of space. 
 And he draws, as before, the general conclusion that space, of 
 which such contradictory assertions may be made, must be sub- 
 jective. The decisive objection to this reasoning is that Kant is 
 here using the term space in two different senses, so that the an- 
 tinomy is due to verbal contradiction rather than to the essentially 
 contradictory conception of space. For, on the one hand, the 
 thesis is true of space as perceived, since there certainly are units 
 of space than which no smaller can be perceived, and space is in 
 this sense divisible into simple parts. And, on the other hand, 
 the antithesis is true of space as thought, that is, of space as the 
 object of the mathematical consciousness; for no contradiction 
 is involved in the mathematically fruitful conception of the end- 
 less divisibility of the spatial. Thus regarded, the antinomy 
 vanishes. 
 
 In conclusion, the main difliculties of Kant's space and time 
 doctrine will be summarily restated. In the chapter on Kant the 
 effort was made to state as forcibly as possible what in the writer's 
 view is the permanently valuable part of the teaching. Even in 
 the more critical discussion of the preceding paragraphs stress 
 has been laid wherever possible on correct conclusions, even when, 
 as has been indicated, these are reached through faulty argu- 
 ments. A review undertaken in a more critical spirit is not, there- 
 fore, an unfair addition to this section. The main criticisms on 
 Kant's space and time doctrine may be reduced to the follow- 
 ing:— 
 
 I . In the first place, it is in the writer's view unquestionable that 
 all which is correct in the Kantian doctrine of space and time should 
 be included under his discussion of the categories. Kant has 
 utterly failed in his arguments to prove that space and time are 
 purely perceptual; and his teaching that space and time are a 
 
 ^ As has appeared from the statement of the antinomy, Kant claims to be dis- 
 cussing 'substances,' by which he here means material things. But the antinomy 
 or contradiction turns on the spatial nature, the extension, of the material sub* 
 stances. 
 
Kant's Doctrine of Space and Time 525 
 
 priori depends for him on the fact that they are manifestly relational 
 in character. The segregation of space-relations and of time 
 from the categories is accordingly misleading. It is apparently 
 due to the unwarranted distinction between sense and thought, 
 and between sense-objects and thought-objects, inherited by Kant 
 from WolfE.i 
 
 2. In the second place, Kant fails to consider what is certainly 
 a possibility — what, indeed, in the minds of many psychologists 
 is a fact — that the space consciousness includes, along with its 
 relations, a strictly sensational factor.^ One of the results (a) of 
 this inadequacy is the unjustified teaching, just criticised, that 
 space truths (geometrical propositions) have a peculiar necessity 
 due to their specifically spatial nature. The persistence (6) of 
 Kant's futile attempt to draw an exact parallel between space and 
 time is another outcome of this neglect to acknowledge that there 
 is in space a sensational factor lacking in the largely relational time 
 consciousness. And finally (c) the false opposition of thesis to an- 
 tithesis in the second antinomy would hardly be made, if Kant 
 distinguished between space-as-object-of-sense (and hence, indeed, 
 incapable of endless subdivision) and space-as-thought. 
 
 h. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES 
 
 By ' category ' Kant means either a way of thinking, an unsensa- 
 tional as opposed to a sensational sort of consciousness — in his 
 own words, a concept of the understanding; ' or else he means the 
 specific object or content of such thought consciousness, that is, 
 an unsensational element or factor of the total object of conscious- 
 ness. The term 'category' means literally 'predicate.' Its most 
 general signification — common to Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel 
 
 ' Most modern mathematicians have rejected Kant's intuitional, or percep- 
 tional, conception of geometry. They regard geometry, like the other branches 
 of mathematics, as a ' science of pure concepts.' Cf. M. Bflcher, " Conceptions 
 and Methods of Mathematics," Vol. I., of the Report of the St. Louis Congress of 
 Arts and Science; L. Couturat, "Les Principes des Mathematique," App., espe- 
 cially p. 307 ; J. Royce, " Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics," Journal 
 of Philosophy, 11., pp. 197 kj.; B. Russell, op. oil., pp. 457 ff. 
 
 ' The irrelevant statement, midway in the first argument for the perceptual 
 nature of space, ' space is a given magnitude,' suggests by its use of the term ' given ' 
 that Kant vaguely recognizes the sense-character of space. For 'given' is a predi- 
 cate which he habitually applies to the sense-datum. 
 
 ' Cf. B, § 20: "Categories are nothing else except functions for judging." 
 
526 Immanuel Kant 
 
 alike — is 'fundamentally important class.' The main difiEerence 
 between Kant and Aristotle in their enumeration of categories is 
 to be found in the fact that Kant starts from the subjective side, 
 considering the categories first as forms of conscious judging, 
 whereas Aristotle — herein followed by Hegel — regards the cate- 
 gories as relations of the objects of knowledge. Kant's opposition 
 to Hume, as has appeared, consists in great part in pointing out 
 that the objects of our consciousness actually do contain unsensa- 
 tional as well as sensational factors. These unsensational ele- 
 ments, as treated by Kant, really fall into two groups, though Kant 
 does not formally make the distinction. Kant implies, in other 
 words, that our judgments are of two fundamentally important 
 kinds: they are either judgments about the relation of known 
 objects (or parts of known objects) to each other; or they are judg- 
 ments about the reality attributed to objects. In the same way, 
 the characters of objects as known by thought, not by sense, are of 
 two sorts : first, relations of known objects to each other (' scientific 
 categories,' I shall call them, though Kant does not use the expres- 
 sion); and second, reality, unreality, etc. ('epistemological cate- 
 gories,' as they may be called). Only categories in the former 
 sense have been discussed in the body of this book. The purpose 
 of the present section is to outline Kant's doctrine of categories 
 as a whole, commenting, however, mainly on the categories not 
 heretofore discussed. In this exposition I shall follow Kant's list 
 and order, but shall try to show that the division into what I have 
 called 'scientific' and 'epistemological' categories underlies his 
 grouping and that his own principle of division obscures this and 
 other important distinctions. 
 
 The category teaching is contained in two arbitrarily separated 
 parts of the "Kritik": first, in the sections numbered in the sec- 
 ond edition 9-15, near the beginning of Book I. of the Analytic; 
 second, in the division called "System of all Principles of Pure 
 Understanding," ' in Book II. of the Analytic. The earlier sec- 
 tions are mainly given over to the enumeration and grouping of 
 the categories. The exact number and the principle of division 
 Kant gains by an artificial method. Understanding by category 
 the object of thought, he argues that thought is judgment, and 
 
 'A, 148 seq.; B, 187 seq.; W., 92 seq. The word 'principle' is here used 
 roughly to mean the ' application of a category.' 
 
Kant's Doctrine of the Categories 527 
 
 that because a proposition is the statement of a judgment, there- 
 fore there must be as many sorts of category as there are sorts of 
 proposition. His Table of the Categories, accordingly, is based upon 
 the traditional Table of Propositions. "• This principle of classi- 
 fication, as has been objected by most of Kant's critics, is at fault 
 in the following way : it too uncritically assumes the adequacy of 
 traditional logic to express all metaphysically important classes 
 of judgment. We may test the criticism by a brief consideration 
 of the different categories, as Kant has grouped them.^ 
 
 (i) Categories of Quantity} — According to their quantity, 
 Kant says, propositions are classed as universal, particular, or 
 singular ; and corresponding with these are the categories of unity, 
 plurality, and totality. Obviously these are categories in the 
 sense that they are all known through thinking, not through sensa- 
 tion. Kant discusses in detail only one of these categories, total- 
 ity. Evidently, totality is a known relation of objects or of parts 
 of objects to each other, and comes thus under the head of what 
 have been called the scientific categories. The essential features 
 of Kant's teaching, that every object is known as totality of its 
 qualities, has been given in Chapter 7.* Here it need only be 
 added that in the course of this discussion of spatial totality Kant 
 efifectively corrects the space doctrine of the Esthetic. For he 
 describes the ' category ' of totality virtually in those terms which 
 he earlier applied to the so-called 'form' of space. This shows 
 
 ' This table (according to Kant) is as follows (A, 70; B, 95; W., 48): — 
 Propositions are — 
 
 1. In Quantity 3. In Relation 
 
 Universal, Categorical, 
 
 Particular, Hypothetical, 
 
 Singular. Disjunctive. 
 
 2. In Quality 4- In Modality 
 
 Affirmative, Problematic, 
 
 Negative, Assertoric, 
 
 Infinite. Apodictic. 
 
 For a discussion of the points at which this table diverges from the conventional 
 one, cf. Caird, op. cit,, I., pp. 339 seq. 
 
 ' For enumeration, cf. "Analytic," Bk. I., Chapter i, §§ g, 10, A, 70 seq., B, 
 95 seq., W., 48 seq. For discussion, cf. the passages cited in the next following 
 footnotes. 
 
 3 Discussed in the "Axioms of Perception," A, 161 jej.; B, 202; W., 92. Foi 
 another formulation of the same doctrine, cf. the "Synthesis of Apprehension," 
 in the so-called Transcendental Deduction of ed. A (A, 98). 
 ♦ Cf. supra, pp. 200 seq. 
 
528 Immanuel Kant 
 
 that he might advantageously have abandoned his teaching that 
 space is perceptual and might thus have regarded the ordering 
 factor of our space-consciousness as a category.' 
 
 (2) Categories of Quality^ — Propositions, Kant teaches, have 
 three distinctions of quality: they are afi&rmative, negative, or 
 'infinite.'* Corresponding with these distinctions he recognizes 
 three categories of quality : reality, negation, and limitation. The 
 last-named category need not be discussed, since Kant says nothing 
 of it beyond the bare definition.* The teaching about reality and 
 negation may be paraphrased somewhat as follows : In making 
 an affirmation, as ' The starfish has a nervous system,' I am con- 
 ceiving something as real ; and conversely in a negation, as ' The 
 Paramecium does not avoid obstacles,' I am denying reality. Evi- 
 dently reality and its companion categories are unsensational ways 
 of thinking and aspects of experience. Evidently, also, they are 
 ' epistemological ' categories. The main feature of Kant's teach- 
 ing about them is his reiterated assertion that only the sensational 
 is real, and that the unsensational is unreal. The 'principle' of 
 the categories of quality is, he says, the following : ° — "In all phe- 
 nomena the real which is an object of sensation has degree." ' 
 
 (3) Categories 0} Relation.'' — Besides having quality and quan- 
 tity, propositions have three relations — as Kant rather artificially 
 calls them; they are categorical, h3fpothetical, and disjunctive. 
 Corresponding, as he says, with these distinctions, Kant recognizes 
 three categories of relation — substance, causality, and reci- 
 procity — which he discusses, one by one, under three separate 
 
 ' Not merely this category of totality but the category of reciprocal determina- 
 tion (c£. p. 531) has to do with space. 
 
 For reference to a less important way in which the " Esthetic " teaching differs 
 from that of the "Axiom of Perception," cf. p. 520, n. 
 
 ^ Discussed in the Anticipations of Sense-perception, A, i66; B, 208 ; W., 96. 
 
 ' Only the first two are distinctions ordinarily admitted. The infinite proposition 
 differs from the negative in that its negation is fused with its predicate. Kant's 
 examples are : of a negative proposition, ' the soul is not mortal ' ; of an infinite 
 proposition, ' the soul is not-mortal.' 
 
 * For a different view, cf. Caird, op. cit., I., pp. 341 seq. 
 
 ' Kant mixes with this teaching of the reality of the sensational a radically differ- 
 ent doctrine of a * real ' phenomenon which corresponds with sensation. Cf. A, 
 175-176 ; B, 217 ; W., 100. For the exposition of the 'real' in this sense, cf. 
 pp. 231 seq. 
 
 ' B, 207; W., 96. Degree is here conceived as midway between the real and 
 negation, that is complete absence of sensation. It has been pointed out in 
 Chapter 7 that by this incidental mention of degree Kant really suggests a group of 
 categories which he does not explicitly discuss — scientific categories of comparison. 
 
 ' For discussion, cf. A, 176 seq.; B, 218 seq.; W., loi seq. 
 
Kant's Doctrine of the Categories 529 
 
 ' principles' : the first, second, and third of the "Analogies of Ex- 
 perience." To Kant's discussion of the first of these categories, we 
 shall at once turn, disregarding the disputed but comparatively un- 
 essential question of the actual correspondence of the categories with 
 the classes of propositions from which he purports to derive them. 
 
 In discussing (a) the category oj substance,^ Kant gives to 
 'substance' two allied meanings — 'permanence' (Beharrlich- 
 keit), &nd 'the permanent' (das Beharrliche). Regarded in the 
 former way, substance, or permanence, is evidently a category, 
 that is, an unsensational aspect of objects-as-thought. But Kant 
 more often means by substance not 'permanence' but 'the perma- 
 nent.' He seems to have in mind what corresponds to the subject 
 of a categorical proposition — substance which stands to its attri- 
 butes in the relation of subject to predicates. In this sense, as 
 Kant says, "the category stands under the head of relation more as 
 condition of relation than as itself a relation." For by substance, 
 regarded as the permanent, is meant that which is presupposed by 
 all change. And the argument for the existence of this 'perma- 
 nent ' is simply the following : so surely as there is change there 
 must be something which changes — a 'permanent,' which under- 
 goes transformations. 
 
 Granting this to be Kant's conception of substance the ques- 
 tion at once arises, what concretely does he mean by substance 
 thus conceived as the permanent-required-by-change? To this 
 question Kant gives no satisfying answer.^ Most of the first 
 Analogy is occupied by a seeming efiiort to identify substance with 
 time, of which Kant says, "time in which all change of phenomena 
 must be thought to be [is itself] permanent and does not change." 
 With this misleading conception of time as essentially perma- 
 nent Kant was, however, rightly dissatisfied,' for he also speaks of 
 'the permanent' as 'in time'; and he even suggests the identi- 
 fication of 'the permanent' with space, by a note written in the 
 margin of his own copy of the first edition of the " Kritik." * This 
 
 ' For discussion, cf. A, iSa seq.; B, 224 seq. ; W., 106 seq. 
 
 'A, 187 seq.; B, 230-231; W., 108 seq. 
 
 ' B. 225. It is very possible that Kant was first misled by the spatial image 
 roused by Newton's definition of absolute time : Tern pus absolutum, verum 
 et raathematicum, in se et natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, squa- 
 biliter fluit. This may very likely have suggested to Kant the hypothesis that 
 substance, the permanent, is time — as distinct from events in time. 
 
 * Erdmann, " Nachtrage," LXXX. 
 
 2 M 
 
530 Immanuel Kant 
 
 note is as follows: "Here the proof must be so carried through as 
 to refer only to substances as phenomena of our external senses, 
 consequently [the proof must be] from space, for space and its 
 determinations exist in all time." Kant suggested this h)rpothesis 
 in a later section of the "Kritik," but he never rewrote the first 
 Analogy in accordance with it. ' The theory, though far more plaus- 
 ible than the identification of substance with time, is merely sug- 
 gested, not formally worked out by Kant; and it overlooks the 
 sensational nature of space, which should effectually prevent its 
 being regarded as mere category or as 'the permanent.' 
 
 We are forced to the conclusion that Kant, though he teaches 
 the existence of a ' permanent ' implied by the facts of change, never 
 unequivocally defines its nature ; and we are left accordingly with 
 full scope for hypothesis about it. From Kant's doctrine of the 
 transcendental self the logical inference is surely that this 'per- 
 manent' is none other than the self. Kant, however, certainly 
 does not adopt this view. Indeed, he expressly opposes it in the 
 "Refutation of Idealism" which he added to the second edition of 
 the "Kritik." Temporal determination, he there teaches, pre- 
 supposes somewhat which is permanent, but this permanent may 
 not be conceived as self, or I, for the permanent, or transcendental, 
 self — so Kant always has taught — is unknown.^ Therefore, 
 he concludes, the permanent presupposed in temporal determina- 
 tion must be a 'thing outside me.' Thus conceived, the perma- 
 nent, or substance, is perhaps neither more nor less than physical 
 nature, the sum total of external phenomena. For though, 
 strictly speaking, it is true that no sum of phenomena has per- 
 manence, still nature, if regarded as a whole (though of con- 
 stantly shifting content), and — in particular — Nature as the 
 object of the transcendental, more-than-individual self, may be 
 conceived as possessing a certain sort of permanence as compared 
 with any particular phenomenon. 
 
 However interpreted, substance as 'the permanent' evidently is 
 not a category coordinate with the others. Paraphrasing Kant, we 
 may say that it is the condition of the categories, that to which the 
 categories are applied. For, while a category is, in Kant's view, 
 a simple way of thinking or a given aspect of an object as thought, 
 substance, if conceived as Nature, would include a complete sum 
 
 ' B, 292; W., 127. ' Cf. Erdmann, " Nachtrage," LXXV. 
 
Kanfs Doctrine of the Categories 531 
 
 or system of categories. If, on the other hand, substance were 
 conceived as I, it would of course be the subject of the cate- 
 gories. 
 
 As second among the categories of relation, Kant discusses, (6) 
 the category of causality. This has been considered in such de- 
 tail ' that no comment need be made upon it beyond pointing out 
 that it is clearly (like totality) a 'scientific' category of relation. 
 
 (c) The category of reciprocal determination ^ is really con- 
 ceived by Kant in a twofold fashion. Sometimes he seems to 
 mean by the term merely 'mutual causality,' that is, the double 
 causal connection between two coexisting bodies. Again, how- 
 ever, he seems to refer to the necessary but reversible relation 
 between spatial positions — one of the relations nowadays widely 
 discussed under the name of forms of order. The important addi- 
 tion to the category-doctrine made — or better, implied — in the 
 second of these teachings has been summarized and amplified in 
 Chapter 7.' On the other hand, Kant's introduction of considera- 
 tions relative to mutual causality obscures the fact that the causality 
 involved is of no new sort.* For evidently mutual causality be- 
 tween two objects is the corresponding relation of their succeeding 
 states. Change No. 2 in the moon's history is both the efiect of 
 change No. i and the cause of change No. 3 in the earth's history; 
 and conversely change No. 2 in the earth's history is both the effect 
 of change No. i and the cause of change No. 3 in the moon's his- 
 tory. The relation is simply represented thus : — 
 
 Moon's states Earth's states 
 I . ^I 
 
 (4) The Categories of Modality .^ —Vro^o?,\i\or\s, and therefore 
 judgments, have three modalities : they are problematic, assertoric, 
 
 ' Cf. supra. Chapter 7, p. zio. 
 
 'For discussion, cf. A, zii; B, 256; W., 118. 
 
 »Cf. p. 217. 
 
 * Kant emphasizes also the here irrelevant teaching that observed or assumed 
 mutual causality between objects may be regarded as an argument for their co- 
 existence. (A, 211; B, 158; W., 118.) 
 
 'Discussed under the heading, "Postulates of Empirical Thought," A, 2x8 
 «g.; B, 265 seq.; W., 122 «j. 
 
532 Immanuel Kant 
 
 or apodictic* Corresponding with these distinctions, Kant enu* 
 merates as categories of modality: (i) possibility, or conformity 
 with the formal conditions of experience; (2) actuality, or con- 
 formity with the material conditions of experience ; and (3) neces- 
 sity, or connection with the real. These are evidently what I have 
 called epistemological, or metaphysical, categories — that is, 
 predications about reality. No one will deny that the conscious- 
 ness of possibility, actuality, or necessity is as such unsensational 
 — in other words, that these are in the general sense categories ; 
 and the interest of Kant's discussion centres, therefore, in his 
 consideration of the proper application of these categories. In 
 concrete terms, Kant here discusses the question : what is possible, 
 actual, or necessary ? 
 
 To begin with the most significant of these categories as dis- 
 cussed by Kant, it is plain that by 'actual' he means the actual- 
 for-us, not the 'ultimately real'; and that he unequivocally teaches 
 that actuality is rightly attributed to sensational phenomena only. 
 According to this view, actuality is, however, a mere synonym for a 
 category already discussed by Kant — that of 'reality.' ^ And the 
 doctrine that only the sensational is real is simply another aflSrma- 
 tion of Kant's theory of the limits of knowledge : the doctrine that 
 transcendental self, God, ultimate realities of every sort, because 
 unsensational, are, therefore, unknown. As has been noticed, 
 this involves a tacit denial of the force of his own teaching that 
 relations, no less than sensations, belong to known reality. 
 
 Kant's treatment of 'possibility' and 'necessity' cannot lay 
 claim to completeness. His treatment of 'the possible' is sum- 
 marized in the statement that conceptions are merely possible, 
 and this is obviously a mere restatement of the doctrine that only 
 the sensational can be actual.' Similarly his definition of the neces- 
 
 ' Observe that these distinctions apply to judgments conceived as affirmations 
 and not with any force to judgments conceived as unifications. For discussion of 
 the distinction, cf. the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 239-S40, 
 with citations. 
 
 2 Cf. supra, p. 528. 
 
 • This teaching is difficult of interpretation by reason of the ambiguity of the 
 term 'concept.' If by 'concept' Kant means category, or pure concept, then the 
 doctrine is in flat opposition to his reiterated teaching that the categories are essen- 
 tial factors of objects of knowledge. If, on the other hand, the term be used in the 
 sense of 'empirical concept' or 'image' — then this doctrine reduces to the obvious 
 but, forKanf s purposes, unimportant observation that the 'possible' is the 'imag- 
 ined' as distinct from the 'perceived.' 
 
Kant's Doctrine of the Categories 533 
 
 sary, as that which is inferred from the actual, harks back to the 
 sensational view of knowledge. It is perfectly evident that Kant 
 does not here pretend to discuss all the senses of the term necessary. 
 
 Midway in the discussion of actuality, the second edition inter- 
 poses certain difl&cult paragraphs making up the "Refutation of 
 Idealism." * The teaching of this section has already been con- 
 sidered: first, in the discussion of the transcendental self's 
 object;^ and second, in the comment on the category of substance.* 
 This teaching is, in brief, the following: "The . . . empirically 
 determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence 
 of objects in space outside me." For (i) I am empirically con- 
 scious of my existence as determined in time; and (2) temporal 
 determination presupposes something permanent. This perma- 
 nent must be, Kant insists, a thing-outside-me. The obvious ob- 
 jection to this argument has already been noticed: on Kant's 
 own showing the permanent being, implied by the succeeding ideas 
 which make up my empirical self, is the permanent or transcen- 
 dental sel], and not primarily any object at all. Kant sets aside 
 the objection on the ground of his unfortunate persuasion that we 
 have no knowledge of such a self.* Evidently he faik to meet 
 the diflaculty, and leaves the things-outside-me with their existence 
 unproved. None the less, as is elsewhere indicated, the exist- 
 ence of these objects is a corollary of his doctrine of the self." 
 
 This discussion of Kant's account of the categories may be sum- 
 marized as follows: As against Hume, Kant has shown conclu- 
 sively that we are unsensationally conscious. He has enumerated 
 and grouped these unsensational forms of consciousness on an 
 artificial principle, by supposing that there are as many of them 
 as there are kinds of proposition. He has thus considered the 
 categories of quantity: singleness, plurality, and totality; the cate- 
 gories of quality : reality, negation, and limitation ; the categories 
 of relation: substantiality, causality, and reciprocity; and the 
 categories of modality: possibility, actuality, and necessity. A 
 critical study of these categories has revealed, in the first place, 
 
 ' B, 274 sej. * Cf. supra, pp. 231 jej. 
 
 » Cf. supra, p. 530. ♦ Cf. supra, pp. 241 jej. 
 
 ' For an iUiuninating discussion of the ' ' Refutation of Idealism," and the kindred 
 teaching of the "Fourth Paralogism" of ed. A, cf. Vaihinger in " Strassburger Ab- 
 handlungen," pp. 85 seq. Vaihinger very clearly exposes the inconsistencies of 
 Kant's different attitudes to idealism, and his misapprehensions of preceding 
 idealists. 
 
534 Immanuel Kant 
 
 several instances in which the category does not conform to the cor- 
 relative proposition. Among the categories themselves, it has 
 distinguished between (i) those which are objects of scientific 
 thinking, relations between known objects or parts of these ob- 
 jects — notably the categories of totality, degree, and causality; 
 and (2) categories which are objects of metaphysical judgment, 
 or afiSrmation, the categories of modality and the parallel cate- 
 gories of quality. The so-called category of substance has turned 
 out to be more ultimate than any category — a ground of relation, 
 not itself a relation. 
 
 When these deductions and amendments have been made, the 
 table of the categories assumes something the following shape : * 
 
 Categories 
 (Unsensational Experiences; i.e. Important 
 Ways of Thinking and Factors of Objects 
 as Thought) 
 Epistemological Categories : — Scientific Categories : — 
 
 Reality or Actuality (o) Of comparison : (6) Of connection : 
 
 Negation Degree Totality 
 
 Possibility Causality 
 
 Reciprocity or 
 Order 
 THE KANTIANS 
 
 I. Writers who expound and develop Kant's Teaching 
 
 Karl Leonhard Reinhold, 1758-1825. (Professor in Jena and in Kiel.) 
 Reinhold summarizes Kant's teaching, and also seeks to improve 
 on it by deriving a posteriori and a priori knowledge from a com- 
 mon 'principle of consciousness.' 
 Chief Philosophical Works: — 
 
 1786. "Briefe iiber die kantische Philosophie," first printed in Wieland's 
 Deutscher Merkur: published Leipzig, 1790—92. 
 
 1789. "Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsver- 
 ._ mogens," Prag and Jena. 
 
 1791. " Uber das Fundament das philosophischen Wissens.," Jena. 
 
 J. C. Friedrich von Schillee (1759-1805). 
 
 Schiller develops Kant's assthetic teaching by the definition ot 
 beauty as ' freedom in phenomenal appearance ' ; and supple- 
 ments Kant's ethical doctrine by the teaching that the aesthetic 
 state, as disinterested, makes the moral life possible. He con- 
 
 ' This sort of reduction ot Kant's categories is no novelty. Schopenhauer, as 
 is well known, attempted to reduce them to the single Law of Sufficient Reason, 
 or Category of Connection (cf. supra, pp. 215 and 345); and a modern critic, 
 Paulsen, retains only the categories of substance and causality. 
 
The Kantians 535 
 
 ceives the 'beautiful soul (schone Seele) ' as that which has 
 transcended the conflict between impulse and duty. 
 Chief Philosophical Works : — • 
 
 1793- "Uber Anmuth und Wiirde" (published in 'Thalia'). 
 
 I79S- "Briefe uber aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen." (published in 
 B-oren). 
 
 1793-96. " Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung," ihid. 
 
 " Philosophische Schriften" (Auswahl), Leipzig, 1896. 
 
 "Essays aesthetical and philosophical" (transl.), Lond., 1875, 'go. (Cf. the 
 philosophical poems: "Die Kiinstler," " Ideal und Leben," etc.) 
 
 JOHANN Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841). (Professor in Konigsberg and 
 Gottingen.) 
 
 Herbart's system is from one point of view a development of 
 Kant's thing-in-itself doctrine. It is formulated in specific opposi- 
 tion to Hegel's monistic idealism. Herbart teaches that there ex- 
 ists a plurality of real beings (Reale) tending to preserve themselves 
 and manifested in phenomenal things. Herbart's philosophy thus 
 becomes a sort of mechanics of substances in their interrelations. 
 He includes 'souls' among his real substances and conceives ideas 
 as the ' self-preservations ' of souls. 
 Chief Philosophical and Psychological Works: — 
 
 1806. " Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik," Gottingen. 
 
 1813. "Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophic," Konigsberg. 
 
 1816. "Lehrbuch zur Psychologie," Konigsberg u. Leipzig. 
 
 1824-25. "Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu gegriindet auf Erfahrung, 
 Metaphysik und Mathematik," Konigsberg. 
 
 1828-29. " AUgemeine Metaphysik, nebst den Aufangen der philosophischen 
 Naturlehre," ihid. 
 
 Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834). (Preacher, and professor 
 at Berhn.) 
 
 Schleiermacher bases an emotional mysticism, allied also to 
 Spinoza's monistic teaching, on the thing-in-itseU doctrine of 
 Kant. 
 Chief^ Philosophical Works : — 
 
 1799. "Uber die ReUgion," Berlin. 
 
 1800. " Monologen." 
 
 1803. "Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre." 
 1841. (Posthumous) "Grundriss der philosophischen Ethik." 
 "Sammtliche Werke," Abth. III., "Philosophie," 9 vols., Bed., 1834-64. 
 
 II. Opponents of Kant 
 
 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (i 743-1819). 
 
 Jacobi holds that knowledge and faith are in necessary opposition. 
 He therefore opposes Kant's doctrine that theoretical reason leaves 
 scope for practical reason ; and himself insists upon the primacy 
 of faith. 
 
536 The Post-Kantian Monistic Idealists 
 
 Chief Philosophical Works : — 
 
 1785. " Uber die Lehre des Spinoza in Brief en an . . . Moses Mendelssohn/' 
 
 1787. "David Hume iiber den Glauben, oder Idealismus u. Realismus." 
 
 1811. "Von den gottlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung." (An antago- 
 nistic criticism of Schelling.) 
 
 "Werke," 6 vols., Leipzig, 1812-20. 
 
 Gottlieb Ernst Schdlze (1761-1833). 
 
 Schulze opposes Kantianism, especially in the form which Rein- 
 hold gives to it, on the ground that it involves the essential con- 
 tradiction of limiting knowledge to experience, and yet at the same 
 time postulating realities beyond experience. 
 Chief Philosophical Works: — 
 
 1792. " ^nesidemus," Helmst. 
 
 1801. " Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie," 11 vols., Hamburg. 
 
 Other critics of Kant are J. G. Hamann, Herder, cited supra, 
 p. 506; and J. G. von Fries who develops a system really mid- 
 way between that of Kant and that of the ' common-sense ' school. 
 
 F. THE POST-KANTIAN MONISTIC IDEALISTS 
 
 JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (i 762-1814) 
 
 I. Life 
 
 The story of the life of Fichte may be briefly told, for it has 
 already been suggested] in the chapter on his philosophy. He 
 was bom, in Saxon Lusatia, in 1762, the son of a poor weaver. A 
 nobleman of the neighborhood, attracted by the boy's precocity, 
 undertook his education, but died before Fichte finished his 
 university course. For years, Fichte followed the difficult career 
 of a family tutor, — a life for which his miUtant sense of duty seems 
 to have made him singularly unfitted. When we hear, for example, 
 of his habit of reading weekly to his employers a list of the faults 
 which they had committed in the government of their children, we 
 are not surprised to know that he seldom held a situation for a long 
 time. To his employment as a tutor he none the less owed the 
 greatest happiness of his life, for it brought him in 1788 to Zurich, 
 and there he met and loved Johanna Rahn, a niece of the poet Klop- 
 stock. Johanna was herself a strenuous-souled young person, 
 and from first to last the union between the two was singularly 
 strong and beautiful. The inexorable need of money drove Fichte 
 to Leipzig, and there, in order to read with a pupil Kant's " Kritik 
 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte 537 
 
 of Practical Reason," he undertook in 1790 that study which 
 revolutionized his whole life. A visit in 1791 to Konigsberg 
 chilled Fichte's hopes of personal friendship and personal help 
 from Kant. Yet, indirectly, Kant made Fichte's fortune, for 
 Fichte's first little book, the "Kritik aller OfiEenbarung," was 
 published anonymously and attributed to Kant. Kant's denial 
 of the authorship was accompanied by words of commendation 
 which favorably introduced the younger writer. 
 
 Fichte was married in 1793 ; and in 1794 was called to the Uni- 
 versity of Jena where he gained an immediate success. He threw 
 himself with ardor into all the phases of university life, and at 
 once became very popular. His philosophical work of this 
 period — the first "Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre" is so diflS- 
 cult and technical a book that one is at a loss to understand why 
 Fichte's lecture room was thronged. Yet his enthusiasm must have 
 inflamed even the phases of the " Unabhangige Thatigkeit" with 
 interest ; and besides these technical lectures he gave others on the 
 history of philosophy and on ethical problems. Whatever his 
 method, Fichte gained so strong a hold on the confidence of the 
 students at Jena that he had almost persuaded them to abandon 
 their secret societies. The failure of this effort seems to have been 
 due to Fichte's over-conscientiousness. He questioned his own 
 right to conduct personally the negotiations with the students, and 
 gained their undeserved distrust by proposing to submit the matter 
 to the university authorities. An incident of another sort brought 
 to an end, in 1799, Fichte's Jena career. He published in the 
 philosophical journal, of which he was an editor, a paper which was 
 criticised for its lack of conformity to the orthodox theology of the 
 day. The university council would have condoned the heresy 
 but could not overlook Fichte's open and straightforward defence 
 of his position. Accordingly, under Goethe's leadership, they 
 dismissed Fichte from his chair. 
 
 Fichte's removal from Jena to Berlin quite upset the regular 
 development of his system. For several years he had no academic 
 affiliations but grew better and better known by his popular lec- 
 tures to Berlin audiences. Some of these were expositions of his 
 system, in which he laid stress on its ethical and religious im- 
 plications. Even stronger in their influence were his lectures on 
 subjects of poHtical and social interest: his arraignment of the 
 
538 The Post-Kantian Monistic Idealists 
 
 frivolity and the indifference of the time in "Characteristics of the 
 Present Age," and his summons to a patriotic revival in the "Ad- 
 dresses to the German People." When, in 1810, the University 
 of Berhn was founded he was called to the chair of philosophy. 
 But his second academic career was of short duration. In 181 2 
 the call to arms stirred all Prussia. Fichte, with difficulty dis- 
 suaded from undertaking service in the army, remained in 
 Berlin exhorting and inspiring the young men in camp. His 
 wife, who had shared all the interests of his life, became a nurse 
 in the soldier hospitals. In January, 1814, she fell ill with fever, 
 contracted during her service. She recovered — but Fichte him- 
 self, who had nursed her devotedly, died of the same disease on the 
 twenty-seventh of January, 1814. 
 
 II. Bibliography 
 
 a. Chief Works 
 
 (For completer list, see Appendix of Thompson's book cited below. Each 
 work is referred to the volume of the "Werke" or " Nachgelassene Werke" 
 to which it belongs. For list of translations, see below.) 
 1792. "Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung," W., V., Kirchmann edi- 
 tion, 187 1. 
 
 1794. "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschlaftslehre," W., I. Transl. by 
 
 Kroeger as "The Science of Knowledge." (The earliest and 
 most influential of all Fichte's works on technical philosophy. 
 For summary, see pp. 318 seq. of this book.) 
 
 1795. "Grundriss des Eigentiimlichen der Wissenschaftslehre," W., I. 
 
 Transl. by Kroeger. 
 
 1796. "Grundlage des Naturrechts." W., III. Transl. by Kroeger as 
 
 "The Science of Rights." 
 
 (The application of Fichte's doctrine to principles of govern- 
 ment. Part I. deals with the conception of rights; Part II. with 
 state organization and with municipal law.) 
 1798. "Das System der Sittenlehre," W., IV. 
 
 (Fichte's theory of ethics and doctrine of duty.) 
 
 1800. "Die BestimmungdesMenschen," W.,II. Transl. by Smith as " The 
 
 Vocation of Man." 
 
 (The best of the popular expositions of Fichte's doctrine. For 
 
 summary, see pp. 310 seq. of this book.) 
 
 1801. "Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre," W., II. 
 
 (Often regarded as a bridge between Fichte's earlier and later 
 .. teaching. Posthumously published.) 
 1803. " Uber das Wesen des Gelehrten," W., VI. Transl. by Smith as " The 
 Nature of the Scholar." 
 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte 539 
 
 1806. "Grundziige des gegenwartigen Zeitalters, " W., VII. Transl. by 
 Smith as " Characteristics of the Present Age." (A passionate 
 arraignment of the f rivohties and lack of seriousness of the period.) 
 
 1806. "Die Anweisung zum seehgen Leben," W.,V. Transl. by Smith as 
 "The Way to a Blessed Life." 
 
 (From the standpoint of Fichte's doctrine that the ultimate real- 
 ity is the absolute though impersonal self — here called Being, 
 Life, and God — the way to a blessed life is shown to be man's 
 surrender of 'his personal individual . . . independence ' and 
 his partaking of ' the only true being, the divine.' For comment, 
 cf. pp. 327, 329 above.) 
 
 1807-08. "Reden an die deutsche Nation." W., VII. 
 
 (The patriotic addresses by which Fichte is best remembered in 
 Germany: a call to rise against French usurpation and a cour- 
 ageous reminder of the great qualities of German character.) 
 
 1810-11. "Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," W., II., pp. 535-691. 
 
 (One of the best of Fichte's many expositions of his doctrine, 
 relatively brief yet complete : The fact of consciousness which 
 is shown to presuppose all truth is my awareness of other people 
 besides myself.) 
 
 1812. "Die Wissenschaftslehre," Nachgelassene W., II., 315-492. 
 
 (One of the most satisfactory single works for advanced readers.) 
 
 h. Editions and Translations 
 
 "Werke," ed. by I. H. Fichte, 8 vols. Berhn, 1845. 
 
 (Volumes including mainly works pubhshed during Fichte's lifetime.) 
 " Nachgelassene Werke," ed. by I. H. Fichte, 3 vols., Bonn, 1834-35. 
 "The Science of Knowledge," transl. by A. E. Kroeger, London, 1889. Cf. 
 
 also Journal of Speculative Philos., vol. 3. (A translation of the " Grulid- 
 
 lage" of 1794, abbreviated, and of the " Grundriss" of 1795.) 
 "The Science of Rights," transl. by A. E. Kroeger, London, 1889. 
 "Fichte's Popular Works," transl. by Wilham Smith, fourth edition, London, 
 
 i88g, including: — 
 
 "The Vocation of Man." 
 
 "The Nature of the Scholar." 
 
 "The Characteristics of the Present Age." 
 
 "The Way to a Blessed Life." 
 "The Vocation of Man," Chicago, igo6. 
 
 (A reprint, with introduction by E. Ritchie, of Smith's translation.) 
 
 c. Biography. (Cf. also the works named under d.) 
 
 Fichte, I. H. "Fichte's Leben und Utterarischer Briefwechsel," Sulzbach, 
 
 1830. 
 Fichte, I. H., and Schelling, K. F. A , " Fichte's und Schelling's philosophischet 
 
 Briefwechsel," Stuttgart, 1856. 
 
540 The Post-Kantian Monistic Idealists 
 
 Smith, William, "Memoir of Fichte," prefixed to his edition of the Populal 
 Works. Published separately, Boston, 1846. 
 
 d. Commentary and Criticism 
 
 Everett, C. C, "Fichte's Science of Knowledge," Chicago, 1884. 
 
 (A critical summary of the first Wissenschaftslehre, prefaced by a bio- 
 graphical chapter.) 
 Thompson, A. B., "The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge," Boston, 
 
 1895. 
 
 (A valuable summary of Fichte's doctrine, supported by analyses and 
 
 citations from most of his works.) 
 Talbot, E. B., "The Fundamental Principle of Fichte's Philosophy," Cornell 
 
 Studies," N.Y., 1906. 
 
 (A scholarly 'study of Fichte's conception of the ultimate principle,' as 
 
 it appears under different names in his writings.) 
 Adamson, R., "Fichte," London, 1881. 
 Lowe, J. H., "Die Philosophie Fichte's," Stuttgart, 1862. 
 Zimmer, F., "J. G. Fichte's ReUgionsphilosophie," Berlin, 1878. 
 
 FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING (1775-1854) 
 I. Life 
 
 The early life of Schelling reads like a romantic episode in this 
 chronicle of philosophers' careers. He was born in a little town 
 of Wiirtemburg, in 1775, the son of a chaplain and professor in a 
 cloister-school, near Tiibingen. Like Berkeley, Schelling made his 
 most significant contributions to philosophy while he was still very 
 young. Throughout his youth he distinguished himself as a stu- 
 dent of lively intellect and astounding precocity. When he was 
 fifteen he entered the University of Tubingen and during the next 
 five years was fellow student of Hegel and Holderlin. His main 
 interests were in historical and speculative problems. He read 
 both Kant and Fichte, and by the time he was twenty had pub- 
 lished philosophical essays of distinct merit — notably the "Vom 
 Ich als Princip der Philosophie." 
 
 During the two years following the university period, Schelling 
 occupied the position of tutor to two brothers of noble family. 
 Most of this time he spent at Leipzig where he heard lectures on 
 medicine and on physical science, and where he published the 
 chief works of his nature philosophy. The result of this rich pro- 
 ductiveness was a call from Jena to a professorship in philosophy. 
 
Friedrich W. J. von Sc helling 541 
 
 Here Schelling spent the years from 1798 to 1803, at first as col- 
 league of Fichte, later in the companionship of Hegel. The years 
 in Jena were distinguished by successful lectures, by notable pub- 
 lications, and by personal relationships of vivid significance. With 
 Goethe, the Schlegels, and the foremost of the German romanticists 
 he hved on terms of close comradeship. The briUiant centre of 
 this brilliant circle was Caroline, August Schlegel's wife — a 
 woman instinct with poetic gift, with swift thought, with unquench- 
 able vivacity, and with immeasurable charm. Between herself 
 and Schelling there sprang up an instantaneous friendship grounded 
 in perfect congeniality of taste and temperament. At first there 
 was thought of a marriage between Schelling and Caroline's 
 daughter, Auguste Bohmer; but Auguste died and in 1803 Caro- 
 line was divorced from Schlegel and married to Schelling. The 
 arrangement was consummated, it appears, without a break in the 
 friendship between Schlegel, Schelling, and Caroline. At the 
 same time Schelling left Jena as a result of certain quarrels due to 
 his habit of free and rather self-confident criticism. 
 
 The three years following he spent as professor in WUrzburg. 
 During this time his philosophy took its turn toward mysticism 
 and he himself was estranged both from Fichte and from Hegel 
 through their criticism of his system. Hegel's charge of senti- 
 mentality (Schwdrmerei) was particularly galling to him, doubtless 
 because of the measure of its truth. In 1806 he entered on his 
 thirty-five years' sojourn in Munich. This was a period of com- 
 parative inactivity. Caroline died in 1809, and three years later 
 Schelling was married to a younger friend of hers. He had a happy 
 family life and was highly honored in Munich where he held an 
 official position in the academy of sciences. But he published little ; 
 and though his occasional lectures — mainly those delivered at 
 Erlangen in 1820-27 — were full of criticism of Hegelian doctrine, 
 this criticism was not published until after Hegel's death in 1834. 
 The years following were marked in Berlin by a sweeping reaction 
 against Hegel's system, due largely to the misconception of Hegeli- 
 anism by Strauss, Feuerbach, and Baur, in their criticism of the 
 New Testament. The anti-Hegelian movement was headed by in- 
 fluential statesmen and it resulted in the call of Schelling to Berlin 
 to the position of privy councillor and member of the Academy, 
 authorized to deliver university lectures. Thus, in 1841, a man 
 
542 The Post-Kantian Monistic Idealists 
 
 of nearly seventy, Schelling once more entered on a career of 
 academic activity. The remainder of his life till his death in 1854 
 was spent in criticism of Hegelian doctrine and in elaboration of 
 his own system. But to the end he lacked the energy or the indus- 
 try to bring this work to a logically effective conclusion. In truth 
 he was cursed as well as blessed by his romantic temperament: 
 he possessed the insight and the warmth of the romanticist, but 
 also his egoism and his restless caprice. 
 
 II. Bibliography 
 
 a. Important Works 
 (The references are to the volumes of the "Werke.") 
 
 I. Earlier Period 
 
 1794. " Uber die Moglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie iiberhaupt," W., I. 
 
 1795. "Vomlch," W., I. 
 
 2. Nature Philosophy 
 
 1797. "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur," W., II. 
 
 1798. "Von der Weltseele," W., II. 
 
 1799. "Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie," W., III. 
 
 (Introduction, transl. by Thos. Davidson, Journal of Speculative 
 Philosophy, I.) 
 
 3. Identity Philosophy 
 
 1800. "System des transcendentalen Idealismus," W., III. 
 
 (Introduction, transl. by Thos. Davidson, Journal of Speculative 
 Philosophy, I.) 
 
 1800. " Vorlesungen viber die Philosophie der Kunst," W., V. 
 
 1801. "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie," W., IV. 
 
 1804. "System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie ins- 
 besondere." (First published in W., VI.) 
 
 4. Philosophy of God and of Freedom 
 
 1804. "Philosophie und Rehgion." W., VI. 
 
 1809. " Untersuchungen (iber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit," 
 
 W., VII. 
 "Werke," ed. by his sons, 1856-61. Vols. 1-14. 
 
 b. Biography and Criticism 
 
 Plitt, G. L., "Aus SchelUng's Leben in Briefen." 3 vols., Leipzig, 1869-70. 
 Waitz, G. "Caroline, Briefe," 1871. 
 
The Romantic School 543 
 
 Watson, J., " Schelling's Transcendental Idealism," Chicago, 1882. 
 
 (Containing good paraphrases and discriminating criticism of Schelling's 
 
 more important works.) 
 Rosenkranz, "Schelling," Dantzig, 1843. 
 Noack, "Schelling und die Philosophie der Romantik," Berlin, 1859. 
 
 Cf . also Kuno Fischer, op. cit., Vol. VI. ; Royce, " The Spirit of Modem 
 Philosophy," Lecture VI. 
 
 THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 
 
 (Cf. R. Haym, "Die romantische Schule.") 
 
 Kakl Wilhelm Fmedeich von Schlegel (i 772-1829). 
 
 Chief Works on Philosophy: — 
 1799. "Lucinde. Ein Roman." Berlin. 
 1804-06. " Philosophische Vorlesungen." 
 "Werke," 10 vols., Vienna, 1822-25 and 1846. 
 NovALis (Friede. Ludwig von Hardenberg, 1 772-1801). 
 "Novalis Schriften," Berlin, 1802. 
 
 (Cf. the works of Tieck, Hoffman, A. W. Schlegel. No one of these is, 
 strictly speaking, metaphysical.) 
 
 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770-1831) 
 I. Life 
 
 Beside the biographies of contemporary philosophers that of 
 Hegel is very prosaic. His life lacked the moral fire of Fichte's, 
 the romantic capriciousness of Schelling's, and the deplorable yet 
 diverting selfishness of Schopenhauer's. In fact, though Kant 
 lived practically all his life in the little town of Konigsberg, whereas 
 Hegel knew the university hfe of Tubingen, Jena, Heidelberg, and 
 Berlin, and lived all his later years in close association with the 
 society of the Prussian capital, yet it is true of Hegel as of Kant, 
 that the greatest events of his life are professional rather than 
 personal, that the publication of his books rather than his more 
 personal achievements claim attention, that the doctrine rather 
 than the man wins one's interest. 
 
 Hegel was born in 1770, at Stuttgart. Of his boyhood little is 
 known, save from the pages of a priggish sort of journal which he 
 kept, partly in German and partly in Latin, from 1785 to 1787. 
 The biographers add that he took snuflf and played at chess and 
 cards from his early youth.' In 1788 he entered the university 
 of Tubingen as student of theology. He occupied himself, how- 
 
 ' Cf . Rosenkranz, " Hegel's Leben," p. 23. 
 
544 The Post-Kantian Monistic Idealists 
 
 ever, with philosophy and with the classics, finding indeed less 
 satisfaction with his university work than in certain friendships — 
 notably with Holderlin, the eager classicist, and with Schelling. 
 
 There followed three years in Switzerland, in the conventional 
 position of tutor. In these years Hegel was mainly occupied with 
 theological and historical studies, but in a letter to Schelling, dated 
 179s, he states that he has taken up again the study of Kant, and 
 significantly prophesies a philosophical era in which the idea of God 
 will be recognized as the idea of the Absolute. From 1797 till 
 1800, still as house tutor, Hegel lived in Frankfort on the Main. 
 These are the years in which for the first time he formally set 
 forth his system. The early draft of it still exists in manuscript, 
 and includes all the essential features of the doctrine as later de- 
 veloped.' 
 
 In 1801, when he was just past thirty, Hegel went to Jena as 
 privat-docent in philosophy. With Schelling, who for several 
 years had been professor of philosophy in Jena, he believed himself 
 to be in entire metaphysical accord. In 1802-03, indeed, the two 
 edited together the "Kritisches Journal der Philosophie," a work 
 in which Hegel had the greater interest. (In later years their dis- 
 ciples quarrelled bitterly over the question of the exact share of each 
 in the work.) The divergence between the two systems soon became 
 evident, and from 1803, when Schelling left Jena, the break wi- 
 dened rapidly. There is a real likeness between Hegel and Schel- 
 ling in their intuitive outlook, and there is even a similarity in their 
 results ; but ScheUing's mysticism is a method as well as an intui- 
 tion and an attainment, whereas Hegel's method is that of patient 
 demonstration and logical reasoning. It is this temperamental 
 difference, coupled with the reaction from an intimacy founded 
 mainly on propinquity and on general philosophical interests, 
 which occasioned the complete rupture between Hegel and 
 Schelling.^ 
 
 Hegel's biographer, Rosenkranz, tells us that he "enchained" 
 the students at Jena by the "intensity of his speculation." ' In 
 
 * Rosenkranz, op. cit., 104 seq. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 201. In 1805, in his first lectures on the history of philosophy, 
 Hegel criticised Schelling but still spoke warmly of him and acknowledged 
 his contributions to philosophy. The open rupture between the two followed 
 on the ironical allusions to ScheUing's method contained in the Introduction 
 to Hegel's "Phanomenologie" (1806). 
 
 'Op. cit., p. a 1 5. 
 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 545 
 
 1805 his ability was recognized by his appointment as professor 
 extraordinarius. One year later his life in Jena was rudely ended 
 by the incursion of the French under Napoleon, 'that world-soul,' 
 as Hegel describes him. The university was closed for the time 
 being, and Hegel went first to Bamberg where he spent two years 
 as editor of a newspaper, and next to Ntirnberg where for eight 
 years he was rector of a gymnasium. In 181 1 he was married to 
 Marie von Tucher, the daughter of an old Nurnberg family, to 
 whom he wrote poetry and love-letters much after the fashion of 
 an unphilosophical lover. In 1812-13 he published his Logic; 
 in 1816 he was called to the professorship of philosophy in Heidel- 
 berg; after two more years he succeeded to Fichte in the uni- 
 versity of Berlin. 
 
 The story of Hegel's life in Berlin, which was only ended by 
 his death in 183 1, is a tale of professional, political, and social 
 achievement. Through all these years he enjoyed the confidence 
 and the support of the government, for his social philosophy, rightly 
 or wrongly, was interpreted as a philosophical glorification of Prus- 
 sian institutions. In the university he dominated the thought and 
 commanded the allegiance of his students ; with his family he en- 
 joyed a peaceful and happy life ; and in the best society of the Prus- 
 sian capital he occupied a commanding position. It is hard for us 
 to imagine Hegel as achieving distinctively social success; but 
 this inscription on a drinking glass which Goethe gave him goes 
 
 far to attest it : — 
 
 " Dem absoluten 
 empfielt sich 
 schonstens 
 zu freundlicher Aufnahme 
 das Urphanomen." 
 
 II . Bibliography 
 
 u,. Chief Philosophical Works in the Order of Publication 
 (The references are to the volumes of the Sam m tliche Werke (W.).) 
 
 1807. "Die Phanomenologie des Geistes." Bamberg u. Wurzburg, W., 11. 
 A curious compound of metaphysics and type-psychology with 
 the philosophy of history and of religion. The book is char- 
 acteristically Hegelian: his voyage of discovery, as Hegel himself 
 called it. 
 
 1812-13. " Wissenschaft der Logik." Nurnberg; 2d ed. in which Vol. I. 
 is thoroughly revised, 1841 ; W., III-V. Vol. I. section on Quan- 
 tity, transl. by Stirling. (For summary, cf. supra, Chapter 10.) 
 2N 
 
546 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
 
 1817. " Encydopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse." 
 Heidelb. 2d enlarged edition, 1827; 3ded. 1830; W., VI, VII, 
 transl. by Wallace. 
 
 This work in three parts, Logic, Philosophy of Spirit and Phi- 
 losophy of Nature, perhaps resembles the synopses of philo- 
 sophical doctrine dictated by Hegel to his older pupils in the 
 Nurnberg Gymnasium. In 1827 Hegel enlarged it, prefixing 
 several introductory chapters. As it appears in the complete 
 edition of his works, it has been further supplemented by notes, 
 taken by the editors from Hegel's lectures. 
 
 1820. "Grundlinien der Philosophic des Rechts," Berl. ; 3d ed., 1854. W., 
 VIII. Transl. by Dyde. 
 
 A study of the objects, or goals, of the individual will. In the 
 first section, will is analyzed and found to consist in the imperious 
 aspect of self-consciousness. The following sections discuss three 
 conceptions of right: i. Abstract right, which in its primary form 
 is property right; 2. Morality, the consciousness of individual 
 obligation; and 3. Social morality, Sittlichkeit, the acknowledg- 
 ment of oneself as morally related to family, state, humanity. 
 The " Philosophy of Right " has, indeed, the appearance of a text- 
 book of social philosophy. 
 
 Posthumous 
 
 The titles following are of books which are really reports of Hegel's lectures 
 published after his death, not from manuscripts of his own but from the col- 
 lated lecture-notes of his students. Evidently they cannot offer an entirely 
 authoritative account of Hegel's philosophy. 
 
 1832. "Vorlesungen uber die Philosophic der Religion, nebst eine Schiift 
 iiber die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes," ed. by P. Marheineke; 2d 
 altered ed. 1840 ; W., 1 1 and 12. Transl. by Speirs and Sanderson. 
 Part I. on the nature of the religious consciousness is followed 
 (Parts II. and III.) by a discussion of the three main forms of 
 religion: "Natural Religion;" "The Religion of Spiritual In- 
 dividuality" (which includes the Hebrew reUgion of sublimity, the 
 Hellenic religion of beauty, and the Roman religion of utility) ; 
 and the " Absolute Religion." Absolute Religion, Hegel teaches, 
 is man's consciousness of union with God, the infinite, personal 
 spirit. Thus, the object of the absolute religion is that of the ab- 
 solute philosophy. 
 
 It should be noted that the second edition of the "Werke" alters 
 and enlarges these lectures on the "Philosophy of Religion." 
 
 1833-36. "Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophic," ed. by K. L. 
 Michelet, 2d ed., 1842; W., 13-14. Transl. by E. S. Haldane. 
 An account of the growth of philosophical systems from each 
 other, which insists that every system is preserved as subordinated, 
 yet significant, element in that which supersedes it. Hegel's treat- 
 ment of ancient philosophy, his appreciation of Spinoza, and his 
 criticism of Kant are of especial value. 
 
Hegelian Bibliography 547 
 
 1835-38. "Vorlesungen iiber die ^sthetik," ed. by H. G. Hotho; 2d ed. 
 1840-43 ; W., 10, Pts. 1, 2, and 3. Translations of portions of 
 the ^Esthetics by Bosanquet, Bryant, and Hastie. 
 ^Esthetics is conceived by Hegel as the philosophy of Art. 
 Part I. treats the aesthetic consciousness as a deepening of self- 
 consciousness by immersion in the object of beauty ; and defines 
 the beautiful object, conversely, as a spiritualized (vergeisHgt) 
 sensuous object. Part II. considers the types of art, symbolic, 
 classic, and romantic ; and Part III. discusses the different arts, 
 architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry — in the order of 
 the more to the less material art. 
 
 1837. "Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte," ed. by E. Gans, 
 2d edition, 1840; W., 9. Transl. by Sibree. 
 The history of humanity imaged as the development of a world 
 spirit; a conception of historical events as vitally related by a 
 growing reconciliation of opposing phases; and a conception of 
 history as the progressively closer relating of human beings. 
 
 Hegel's occasional essays and speeches, in particular his early contribu- 
 tions to the Jena "Kritisches Journal," and his later papers in the 
 "Jahrbiicher fiir Wissenschaftliche Kritik," are found in Volumes i, 16, 17 
 of the "Werke." 
 
 6. Editions and Translations 
 
 "Werke," published 1832-40, by a group of his students. Berlin. 
 
 "The Phenomenology of Spirit," Chapters i, 2, and 3, transl. by Brockmeyer 
 
 and W. T. Harris in Jour, of Specul. Philos., Vol. II. 
 "The Logic," Book I., "QuaHty," transl. by J. H. Stirling in "The Secret 
 
 of Hegel," 1865, 1898 (cf. infra). 
 The Encyclopaedia : — 
 
 "The Logic," transl. by W. Wallace, Oxford, 2d ed., 1892. 
 "The Philosophy of Mind," transl. by W. Wallace, Oxford, 1892. 
 "The Philosophy of Right," transl. by S. W. Dyde, Lond. and N.Y., 1895. 
 "Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion," transl. by E. B. Speirs and J. B. 
 
 Sanderson, 3 vols., Lond., 1895. 
 "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," transl. by E. S. Haldane, 3 vols., 
 
 Lond., 1892 seq. 
 "Lectures on the Philosophy of History," transl. by J. Sibree. Bohn Libr., 
 
 i860. 
 "Lectures on ^Esthetics: Introduction to the Philosophy of Art," transl. by 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Lond., 1886. 
 'Philosophy of Art," abridged, transl. by W. Hastie, Edinburgh. 
 
 For translations of selected parts of the " Logic," " Science of Rights," 
 "History of Philosophy," "Philosophy of Religion," and " ^Esthetics," 
 cf . Journ. of Specul. Philos., Vols. II.-XX. 
 
548 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
 
 c. Biography 
 
 Rosenkranz, K., "Hegel's Leben," Berlin, 1844. (Published as supplemen- 
 tary volume to Hegel's Werke.) 
 " Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph.," Leipzig, 1870. 
 
 Haym, R., "Hegel und seine Zeit," Berlin, 1857. 
 
 Klaiber, J., "Holderlin, Hegel u. Schelling in ihren schwabischen Jugend- 
 jahren," Stuttgart, 1877. 
 
 d. Commentary and Criticism 
 
 i. On Hegel's Logic 
 
 (Of the books and articles named below, Stirling's book and McTag- 
 gart's articles contain detailed text criticism invaluable to the close student.) 
 
 Stirling, J. H., "The Secret of Hegel, being the Hegelian System in Origin, 
 Principle, Form, and Matter," ist ed. in 2 vols., Lend., 1865; 3d ed., 
 I vol., Edin. and N.Y., 1898. 
 
 J. McT. E. McTaggart : — 
 
 (i) A series of articles on "Hegel's Categories," in Mind, N.S., VI. 
 
 and seq., 1897, seq. 
 (2) " Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic," Camb., and N.Y., 1896. 
 
 Harris, W. T., "Hegel's Logic," Chicago, 1890. 
 
 Calkins, M. W., "The Order of the Hegelian Categories," Mind, N.S., XIL, 
 1903. 
 
 Noel, G., "La logique de Hegel," Paris, 1897. (Careful exposition with 
 comments.) 
 
 Hibben, J. G., "Hegel's Logic," N.Y., 1902. (A brief paraphrase, with occa- 
 sional comment, of the " Logic of the Encyclopsedia.") 
 
 Baillie, J. B., "The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic," Lond., 1901. 
 (A suggestive study of the "Logic," in comparison with the " Phanome- 
 nologie.") 
 
 J. On Other Works of Hegel 
 
 McTaggart, J. McT. E. "Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology," Camb., 
 1901. (Discussion of Hegel's doctrines of Immortality, of the Nature of 
 God, of Sin, of Punishment, of Society.) 
 
 Morris, G. S. " Hegel's Philosophy of the State and History," Chicago, 1887. 
 
 Kedney, J. S., "Hegel's ^Esthetics," Chicago, 1885. 
 
 3. General Commentaries 
 
 Wallace, W., "Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and especially 
 
 of his Logic," 2d ed., Oxford, 1894. 
 Caird, E., "Hegel," Edin., 1883. 
 Seth, A., "HegeUanism and Personality," Edin. and Lond., 2d ed., 1893. 
 
 According to this book, personality is virtually denied by HegeUan* 
 
 ism. 
 
Friedrich W. J. von Sc helling 541 
 
 Here Schelling spent the years from 1798 to 1803, at first as col- 
 league of Fichte, later in the companionship of Hegel. The years 
 in Jena were distinguished by successful lectures, by notable pub- 
 lications, and by personal relationships of vivid significance. With 
 Goethe, the Schlegels, and the foremost of the German romanticists 
 he lived on terms of close comradeship. The brilliant centre of 
 this brilliant circle was Caroline, August Schlegel's wife — a 
 woman instinct with poetic gift, with swift thought, with unquench- 
 able vivacity, and with immeasurable charm. Between herself 
 and Schelling there sprang up an instantaneous friendship grounded 
 in perfect congeniality of taste and temperament. At first there 
 was thought of a marriage between Schelling and Caroline's 
 daughter, Auguste Bohmer; but Auguste died and in 1803 Caro- 
 line was divorced from Schlegel and married to Schelling. The 
 arrangement was consummated, it appears, without a break in the 
 friendship between Schlegel, Schelling, and Caroline. At the 
 same time Schelling left Jena as a result of certain quarrels due to 
 his habit of free and rather self-confident criticism. 
 
 The three years following he spent as professor in Wiirzburg. 
 During this time his philosophy took its turn toward mysticism 
 and he himself was estranged both from Fichte and from Hegel 
 through their criticism of his system. Hegel's charge of senti- 
 mentality (Schwdrmerei) was particularly galling to him, doubtless 
 because of the measure of its truth. In 1806 he entered on his 
 thirty-five years' sojourn in Munich. This was a period of com- 
 parative inactivity. Caroline died in 1809, and three years later 
 Schelling was married to a younger friend of hers. He had a happy 
 family life and was highly honored in Munich where he held an 
 official position in the academy of sciences. But he published little ; 
 and though his occasional lectures — mainly those delivered at 
 Erlangen in 1820-27 — were full of criticism of Hegelian doctrine, 
 this criticism was not published until after Hegel's death in 1834. 
 The years following were marked in Berhn by a sweeping reaction 
 against Hegel's system, due largely to the misconception of Hegeli- 
 anism by Strauss, Feuerbach, and Baur, in their criticism of the 
 New Testament. The anti-Hegehan movement was headed by in- 
 fluential statesmen and it resulted in the call of Schelling to Berlin 
 to the position of privy councillor and member of the Academy, 
 authorized to deliver university lectures. Thus, in 1841, a man 
 
542 The Post-Kantian Monistic Idealists 
 
 of nearly seventy, Schelling once more entered on a career of 
 academic activity. The remainder of his hfe till his death in i8S4 
 was spent in criticism of Hegelian doctrine and in elaboration oi 
 his own system. But to the end he lacked the energy or the indus- 
 try to bring this work to a logically effective conclusion. In truth 
 he was cursed as well as blessed by his romantic temperament: 
 he possessed the insight and the warmth of the romanticist, but 
 also his egoism and his restless caprice. 
 
 n. Bibliography 
 
 a. Important Works 
 (The references are to the volumes of the "Werke.") 
 
 1. Earlier Period 
 
 1794. "Uber die Moglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie iiberhaupt," W., I. 
 
 1795. "Vomlch," W., I. 
 
 2. Nature Philosophy 
 
 1797. "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur," W., II. 
 
 1798. "Von der Weltseele," W., II. 
 
 1799. "Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie," W., III. 
 
 (Introduction, transl. by Thos. Davidson, Journal of Speculative 
 Philosophy, I.) 
 
 3. Identity Philosophy 
 
 1800. "System des transcendentalen Idealismus," W., III. 
 
 (Introduction, transl. by Thos. Davidson, Journal of Speculative 
 Philosophy, I.) 
 
 1800. " Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Kunst," W., V. 
 
 1801. "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie," W., IV. 
 
 1804. "System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie ins- 
 besondere." (First published in W., VI.) 
 
 4. Philosophy of God and of Freedom 
 
 1804. "Philosophie und Rehgion." W., VI. 
 
 1809. " Untersuchungen uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit," 
 
 W., VII. 
 
 "Werke," ed. by his sons, 1856-61. Vols. 1-14. 
 
 b. Biography and Criticism 
 
 Plitt, G. L., "Aus Schelling's Leben in Briefen." 3 vols., Leipzig, 1869-yo. 
 Waitz, G. "Caroline, Briefe," 1871. 
 
The Romantic School 543 
 
 Watson, J., "Schelling's Transcendental Idealism," Chicago, 1882. 
 
 (Containing good paraphrases and discriminating criticism of Schelling's 
 
 more important works.) 
 Rosenkranz, "Schelling," Dantzig, 1843. 
 Noack, "Schelling und die Philosophie der Romantik," Berlin, 1859. 
 
 Cf. also Kuno Fischer, of. cit., Vol. VI.; Royce, "The Spirit of Modem 
 Philosophy," Lecture VI. 
 
 THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 
 
 (Cf. R. Haym, "Die romantische Schule.") 
 
 Karl Wilhelm Feiedrich von Schlegel (i 772-1829). 
 
 Chief Works on Philosophy : — 
 1799. "Lucinde. Ein Roman." Berlin. 
 1804-06. " Philosophische Vorlesungen." 
 "Werke," 10 vols., Vienna, 1822-25 ^"d 1846. 
 NovALis (Friede. Ludwig von Hardenberg, 1772-1801). 
 "Novalis Schriften," Berlin, 1802. 
 
 (Cf. the works of Tieck, Hoffman, A. W. Schlegel. No one of these is, 
 strictly speaking, metaphysical.) 
 
 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770-1831) 
 I. LtFE 
 
 Beside the biographies of contemporary philosophers that of 
 Hegel is very prosaic. His life lacked the moral fire of Fichte's, 
 the romantic capriciousness of Schelling's, and the deplorable yet 
 diverting selfishness of Schopenhauer's. In fact, though Kant 
 lived practically aU his life in the little town of Konigsberg, whereas 
 Hegel knew the university life of Tiibingen, Jena, Heidelberg, and 
 Berlin, and lived all his later years in close association with the 
 society of the Prussian capital, yet it is true of Hegel as of Kant, 
 that the greatest events of his life are professional rather than 
 personal, that the publication of his books rather than his more 
 personal achievements claim attention, that the doctrine rather 
 than the man wins one's interest. 
 
 Hegel was born in 1770, at Stuttgart. Of his boyhood little is 
 known, save from the pages of a priggish sort of journal which he 
 kept, partly in German and partly in Latin, from 1785 to 1787. 
 The biographers add that he took snuff and played at chess and 
 cards from his early youth.* In 1788 he entered the university 
 of Tiibingen as student of theology. He occupied himself, how- 
 
 ' Cf. Rosenkranz, " Hegel's Leben," p. 23. 
 
544 The Post-Kantian Monistic Idealists 
 
 ever, with philosophy and with the classics, finding indeed less 
 satisfaction with his university work than in certain friendships — 
 notably with Holderlin, the eager classicist, and with Schelling. 
 
 There followed three years in Switzerland, in the conventional 
 position of tutor. In these years Hegel was mainly occupied with 
 theological and historical studies, but in a letter to Schelling, dated 
 1795, he states that he has taken up again the study of Kant, and 
 significantly prophesies a philosophical era in which the idea of God 
 will be recognized as the idea of the Absolute. From 1797 till 
 1800, still as house tutor, Hegel lived in Frankfort on the Main. 
 These are the years in which for the first time he formally set 
 forth his system. The early draft of it still exists in manuscript, 
 and includes all the essential features of the doctrine as later de- 
 veloped.' 
 
 In 1801, when he was just past thirty, Hegel went to Jena as 
 privat-docent in philosophy. With Schelling, who for several 
 years had been professor of philosophy in Jena, he believed himself 
 to be in entire metaphysical accord. In 1802-03, indeed, the two 
 edited together the "Kritisches Journal der Philosophie," a work 
 in which Hegel had the greater interest. (In later years their dis- 
 ciples quarrelled bitterly over the question of the exact share of each 
 in the work.) The divergence between the two systems soon became 
 evident, and from 1803, when Schelling left Jena, the break wi- 
 dened rapidly. There is a real likeness between Hegel and Schel- 
 ling in their intuitive outlook, and there is even a similarity in their 
 results ; but Schelling's mysticism is a method as well as an intui- 
 tion and an attainment, whereas Hegel's method is that of patient 
 demonstration and logical reasoning. It is this temperamental 
 difference, coupled with the reaction from an intimacy founded 
 mainly on propinquity and on general philosophical interests, 
 which occasioned the complete rupture between Hegel and 
 Schelling.^ 
 
 Hegel's biographer, Rosenkranz, tells us that he "enchained" 
 the students at Jena by the "intensity of his speculation." * In 
 
 ' Rosenkranz, op. cU., 104 sai. 
 
 ^ Ibid. J p. 201. In 1805, in his first lectures on the history of philosophy, 
 Hegel criticised Schelling but still spoke warmly of him and acknowledged 
 his contributions to philosophy. The open rupture between the two followed 
 on the ironical allusions to Schelling's method contained in the Introduction 
 to Hegel's "Phanomenologie" (1806). 
 
 'Op. cit., p. 315. 
 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 545 
 
 1805 his ability was recognized by his appointment as professor 
 extraordinarius. One year later his life in Jena was rudely ended 
 by the incursion of the French under Napoleon, ' that world-soul,' 
 as Hegel describes him. The university was closed for the time 
 being, and Hegel went first to Bamberg where he spent two years 
 as editor of a newspaper, and next to Niirnberg where for eight 
 years he was rector of a gymnasium. In 181 1 he was married to 
 Marie von Tucher, the daughter of an old Niirnberg family, to 
 whom he wrote poetry and love-letters much after the fashion of 
 an unphilosophical lover. In 1812-13 he published his Logic; 
 in 1816 he was called to the professorship of philosophy in Heidel- 
 berg; after two more years he succeeded to Fichte in the uni- 
 versity of Berlin. 
 
 The story of Hegel's life in Berlin, which was only ended by 
 his death in 183 1, is a tale of professional, political, and social 
 achievement. Through all these years he enjoyed the confidence 
 and the support of the government, for his social philosophy, rightly 
 or wrongly, was interpreted as a philosophical glorification of Prus- 
 sian institutions. In the university he dominated the thought and 
 commanded the allegiance of his students; with his family he en- 
 joyed a peaceful and happy life ; and in the best society of the Prus- 
 sian capital he occupied a commanding position. It is hard for us 
 to imagine Hegel as achieving distinctively social success; but 
 this inscription on a drinking glass which Goethe gave him goes 
 
 far to attest it : — 
 
 " Dem absoluten 
 empfielt sich 
 schonstens 
 zu freundlicher Aufnahme 
 das Urphanomen." 
 
 II . Bibliography 
 
 0. Chiej Philosophical Works in the Order of Publication 
 (The references are to the volumes of the Sanuntliche Werke (W.).) 
 
 1807. "Die Phanomenologie des Geistes." Bamberg u. Wiirzburg, W., H. 
 A curious compound of metaphysics and type-psychology with 
 the philosophy of history and of religion. The book is char- 
 acteristically Hegelian : his voyage of discovery, as Hegel himself 
 called it. 
 
 1812-13. "Wissenschaft der Logik." Niirnberg; 2d ed. in which Vol. I. 
 is thoroughly revised, 1841 ; W., III-V. Vol. I. section on Quan- 
 tity, transl. by Stirling. (For summary, cf, supra, Chapter lo.) 
 2N 
 
546 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
 
 181 7. " Encyclopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse." 
 Heidelb. 2d enlarged edition, 1827; 3ded. 1830; W., VI, VII, 
 transl. by Wallace. 
 
 This work in three parts, Logic, Philosophy 0} Spirit and Plii- 
 losophy of Nature, perhaps resembles the synopses of philo- 
 sophical doctrine dictated by Hegel to his older pupils in the 
 Niirnberg Gymnasium. In 1827 Hegel enlarged it, prefixing 
 several introductory chapters. As it appears in the complete 
 edition of his works, it has been further supplemented by notes, 
 taken by the editors from Hegel's lectures. 
 
 1820. " Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts," Berl. ; 3d ed., 1854. W., 
 VIII. Transl. by Dyde. 
 
 A study of the objects, or goals, of the individual will. In the 
 first section, will is analyzed and found to consist in the imperious 
 aspect of self-consciousness. The following sections discuss three 
 conceptions of right: i. Abstract right, which in it? primary form 
 is property right; 2. Morality, the consciousness of individual 
 obligation; and 3. Social morality, Sittlichkeit, the acknowledg- 
 ment of oneself as morally related to family, state, humanity. 
 The " Philosophy of Right " has, indeed, the appearance of a text- 
 book of social philosophy. 
 
 Posthumous 
 
 The titles following are of books which are really reports of Hegel's lectures 
 published after his death, not from manuscripts of his own but from the col- 
 lated lecture-notes of his students. Evidently they cannot offer an entirely 
 authoritative account of Hegel's philosophy. 
 
 1832. "Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Religion, nebst cine Schrift 
 Uber die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes," ed. by P. Marheineke; 2d 
 altereded. 1840; W., 11 and 12. Transl. by Speirs and Sanderson. 
 Part I. on the nature of the religious consciousness is followed 
 (Parts II. and III.) by a discussion of the three main forms of 
 religion: "Natural Religion;" "The Religion of Spiritual In- 
 dividuality ".(which includes the Hebrew religion of sublimity, the 
 Hellenic religion of beauty, and the Roman religion of utility) ; 
 and the " Absolute Religion." Absolute Religion, Hegel teaches, 
 is man's consciousness of union with God, the infinite, personal 
 spirit. Thus, the object of the absolute religion is that of the ab- 
 solute philosophy. 
 
 It should be noted that the second edition of the "Werke" alters 
 and enlarges these lectures on the "Philosophy of Religion." 
 
 1833-36. "Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie," ed. by K. L. 
 Michelet, 2d ed., 1842; W., 13-14. Transl. by E. S. Haldane. 
 An account of the growth of philosophical systems from each 
 other, which insists that every system is preserved as subordinated, 
 yet significant, element in that which supersedes it. Hegel's treat- 
 ment of ancient philosophy, his appreciation of Spinoza, and bis 
 criticism of Kant are of especial value. 
 
Hegelian Bibliography 547 
 
 1835-38. "Vorlesungen iiber die iEsthetik," ed. by H. G. Hotho; 2d ed. 
 1840-43; W., 10, Pts. I, 2, and 3. Translations of portions of 
 the Esthetics by Bosanquet, Bryant, and Hastie. 
 ^Esthetics is conceived by Hegel as the philosophy of Art. 
 Part I. treats the eesthetic consciousness as a deepening of self- 
 consciousness by immersion in the object of beauty ; and defines 
 the beautiful object, conversely, as a spiritualized (vergeistigt) 
 sensuous object. Part II. considers the types of art, symbolic, 
 classic, and romantic ; and Part III. discusses the different arts, 
 architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry — in the order of 
 the more to the less material art. 
 
 1837. "Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Geschichte," ed. by E. Gans, 
 2d edition, 1840; W., 9. Transl. by Sibree. 
 The history of humanity imaged as the development of a world 
 spirit; a conception of historical events as vitally related by a 
 growing reconciliation of opposing phases; and a conception of 
 history as the progressively closer relating of human beings. 
 
 Hegel's occasional essays and speeches, in particular his early contribu- 
 tions to the Jena "Kritisches Journal," and his later papers in the 
 " Jahrbiicher fUr Wissenschaftliche Kiitik," are found in Volumes i, 16, 17 
 of the "Werke." 
 
 b. Editions and Translations 
 
 "Werke," published 1832-40, by a group of his students. Berlin. 
 
 " The Phenomenology of Spirit," Chapters i, 2, and 3, transl. by Brockmeyer 
 
 and W. T. Harris in Jour, of Specul. Philos., Vol. II. 
 "The Logic," Book I., "Quality," transl. by J. H. Stirling in "The Secret 
 
 of Hegel," 1865, 1898 (cf. injra). 
 The Encyclopaedia : — 
 
 "The Logic," transl. by W. Wallace, Oxford, 2d ed., 1892. 
 "The Philosophy of Mind," transl. by W. Wallace, Oxford, 1892. 
 "The Philosophy of Right," transl. by S. W. Dyde, Lond. and N.Y., 1895. 
 "Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion," transl. by E. B. Speirs and J. B. 
 
 Sanderson, 3 vols., Lond., 1895. 
 "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," transl. by E. S. Haldane, 3 vols., 
 
 Lond., 1892 seq. 
 "Lectures on the Philosophy of History," transl. by J. Sibree. Bohn Libr., 
 
 i860. 
 "Lectures on ^Esthetics: Introduction to the Philosophy of Art," transl. by 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Lond., 1886. 
 'Philosophy of Art," abridged, transl. by W. Hastie, Edinburgh. 
 
 For translations of selected parts of the "Logic," "Science of Rights," 
 "History of Philosophy," "Philosophy of Religion," and " ^Esthetics," 
 cf. Journ. oj Specul. Philos., Vols. II.-XX. 
 
548 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
 
 c. Biography 
 
 Rosenkranz, K., "Hegel's Leben," Berlin, 1844. (Published as supplemen- 
 tary volume to Hegel's Werke.) 
 "Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph.," Leipzig, 1870. 
 
 Haym, R., "Hegel und seine Zeit," Berlin, 1857. 
 
 Klaiber, J., "Holderlin, Hegel u. Schelling in ihren schwabischen Jugend- 
 jahren," Stuttgart, 1877. 
 
 d. Commentary and Criticism 
 
 I. On Hegel's Logic 
 
 (Of the books and articles named below, Stirling's book and McTag- 
 gart's articles contain detailed text criticism invaluable to the close student.) 
 
 Stirling, J. H., "The Secret of Hegel, being the Hegelian System in Origin, 
 Principle, Form, and Matter," ist ed. in 2 vols., Lond., 1865; 3d ed., 
 I vol., Edin. and N.Y., 1898. 
 
 J. McT. E. McTaggart : — 
 
 (i) A series of articles on "Hegel's Categories," in Mind, N.S., VI. 
 
 and seq., 1897, seq. 
 (2) " Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic," Camb., and N.Y., 1896. 
 
 Harris, W. T., "Hegel's Logic," Chicago, 1890. 
 
 Calkins, M. W., "The Order of the Hegelian Categories," Mind, N.S., XII., 
 1903. 
 
 Noel, G., "La logique de Hegel," Paris, 1897. (Careful exposition vfith 
 comments.) 
 
 Hibben, J. G., "Hegel's Logic," N.Y., 1902. (A brief paraphrase, with occa- 
 sional comment, of the "Logic of the Encyclopaedia.") 
 
 Baillie, J. B., "The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic," Lond., 1901. 
 (A suggestive study of the "Logic," in comparison with the " Phanome- 
 nologie.") 
 
 2. On Other Works oj Hegel 
 
 McTaggart, J. McT. E. "Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology," Camb., 
 1901. (Discussion of Hegel's doctrines of Immortality, of the Nature of 
 God, of Sin, of Punishment, of Society.) 
 
 Morris, G. S. " Hegel's Philosophy of the State and History," Chicago, 1887. 
 
 Kedney, J. S., "Hegel's Esthetics," Chicago, 1885. 
 
 3. General Commentaries 
 
 Wallace, W., " Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and especially 
 
 of his Logic," 2d ed., Oxford, 1894. 
 Caird, E., "Hegel," Edin., 1883. 
 •Seth, A., "Hegelianism and Personality," Edin. and Lond., 2d ed., 1893. 
 
 According to this book, personality is virtually denied by Hegelian- 
 
The Order of the Hegelian Categories 549 
 
 Rosenkranz, K., "Kritische Erlauterungen des hegelschen Systems," 
 
 Konigsberg, 1840. 
 Kostlin, K., " Hegel," Tubingen, 1870. 
 
 III. Critical Note upon the Order of the Hegelian 
 Categories 
 
 The interpretation, in this book, of Hegel's argument has really 
 proposed a new reading of his Logic. As the summary on 
 page 362 indicates, it has aimed to neglect artificial distinctions, to 
 exhibit the parallelism of many different sets of categories in dif- 
 ferent sections, or books, of the "Logic," and to disentangle dis- 
 tinct lines of argument. At the same time, it has proposed only 
 occasional emendations of Hegel's argument, and it has made 
 only two important omissions: the category of 'Becoming' and 
 the sections included under 'Quantity.' These omissions and 
 reorderings must briefly be justified. 
 
 The category of Becoming has not been discussed, on the 
 ground that it is not, as it claims to be, a synthesis of the first two 
 categories, — Being and Naught, — but is rather the universal cate- 
 gory of the Logic, the common method by which every category 
 is shown to involve its opposite and thus to imply a reality deeper 
 than that of itself or of its other. Becoming, which is merely, thus, 
 a name for the dialectic process, might as well be called the synthe- 
 sis of Somewhat and Other, of Finite and Infinite, or of Essence 
 and Appearance as of Being and Naught. The true synthesis 
 of Being and Naught, on the other hand, is Determined Being; 
 forsincePureBeingand Pure Nothing are shown to be mere fictions, 
 the reality implied by each is that of Determined Being. Hegel 
 admits this by the statement "Being Determinate is the Union of 
 Being and Nothing." ' He virtually admits, also, that Becoming 
 is a universal category, by giving the name to the transition from 
 Somewhat to Other. ^ Indeed, every page of the Logic shows the 
 futility of trying to confine Becoming to any one stage — least of 
 all to an early stage — of the thought development. 
 
 The entire neglect, in this reading of Hegel, of the sections on 
 Quantity and Measure is a more serious matter. The attempt to 
 explain it in detail would involve a complicated discussion, but 
 the reasons for the omission are in general the following : the cate- 
 
 «"Encycl.," § 89. »Werke, III., 115*. 
 
550 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
 
 gories of Quantity are substantially parallel with those of the 
 later sections of Book I. — the categories of Finitude and Infinity, 
 of One and Being-for-Self. For example: (i) The attributes 
 of Quantity, Continuity, and Discretion are explicitly identified 
 with the Attraction and Repulsion (meaning likeness and differ- 
 ence) within the One.^ (2) The discussion of Infinite Quantita- 
 tive Progression differs in no essential respect from the treatment 
 of the subject in the consideration of the Quality-categories, Fini- 
 tude and Infinity. Finally, (3) the discussion of Quantitative 
 Ratio ^ is a close anticipation of the teaching, in Book III., about 
 the interrelation of syllogisms; and the sections in Book III., as 
 we have seen, are really a continuation of the concluding sections 
 under Quality. 
 
 This virtual parallel of the categories of Quantity with those of 
 Quality does away with the alleged necessity of 'reconcihng' 
 Quahty with Quantity in Measure. The section on Measure, 
 therefore, — in all its confusion of empirical illustration with meta- 
 physical analysis, — simply falls away, to the great advantage of 
 Hegel's argument. 
 
 The initial difficulty in the interpretation of Book II. is the 
 arrangement of its categories on the model of the order in Book I., 
 in triad form, as if they grew out of each other by antithesis and 
 synthesis, whereas most of these categories of Book II. are, in the 
 main, restatements of the fundamental opposition, that between 
 Essence and Appearance, the really real and the apparently real. 
 The true movement in the two books may thus be symbolized : — 
 In Book I. In Book II. 
 
 Thesis Antithesis Thesis Antithesis 
 
 Synthesis = Thesis = Antithesis 
 
 : New Thesis Antithesis = Thesis = Antithesis 
 
 etc. etc. 
 
 Synthesis 
 
 ■■ New Thesis Synthesis 
 
 etc. 
 
 * Werke, III., 204; "Encycl.," § 100. 
 2Werke, III., 367^; " Encyd.," § 105'. 
 
The Order of the Hegelian Categories 55 ^ 
 
 Ground and Consequence, Matter and Form, Force and Expres- 
 sion, Inward and Outward, and even Substance and Accidents, 
 are virtually variants of the expression Essence and Appearance, 
 though each set of terms is meant to show more clearly than the 
 last the actual relatedness of the Inner and the Outer, and the con- 
 sequent impossibility of defining ultimate reality in the terms of 
 the Inner only.^ 
 
 This discussion, in Book II. of the "Logic,'' of Reality as Un- 
 knowable Essence has been transposed in the present arrangement 
 to follow on the consideration in Book I. of Undetermined Being. 
 It may be freely admitted that this change of order is not positively 
 required. For the hypothesis, here discussed, that Reality is 
 unknowable might be made at any point of Hegel's argument, 
 and not merely at its beginning. But though the transposition 
 is not strictly necessary, it is, on the other hand, both natural and 
 logical. The destructive analysis of the doctrine of ultimate reality 
 as unknowable Essence is more closely connected with the proof 
 that ultimate reaUty is no Undetermined Being, than with any 
 other section of the "Logic," ^ in that both theories would make 
 a positive metaphysics impossible. For this reason, the Essence 
 hypothesis, like the Pure Being theory, appropriately precedes the 
 positive discussions of the "Logic." 
 
 The transposition of the sections on Identity and Difference, 
 Likeness and Unlikeness, would still, however, be imperatively 
 needed, even if the discussion of Essence were left in its present 
 place. As they stand, these categories — Identity and the others 
 — come midway between the categories of Essence and Appear- 
 ance and the entirely parallel categories of Ground and Conse- 
 quence. But, as our summary of these sections has shown,' 
 Identity, Difference, Likeness, and Unlikeness are not relations of 
 unknowable essence to the world of appearance, but rather cate- 
 gories of the connection of determined realities within the world of 
 appearance. Since, then, it is necessary to dislodge these cate- 
 gories — Identity and the others — from their present position, 
 
 " Cf. "Encycl.," § 136; "Phanomenologie," A, III., "Kraft und Ver- 
 stand." Compare also Hutchinson Stirling's criticism: "The manifestation, 
 he says, depends on the essence and yet, no less, the essence depends on the mani- 
 festation. This is a simple idea, but with this, and this only, Hegel contrives to 
 wash over page after page." {" Secret of Hegel," Chapter 2, C. 3, p. 41.) 
 
 2 Cf. Werke, IV., 127. 
 
 3 p. 369162. 
 
552 The Post- Kantian Monistic Idealists 
 
 there can be no doubt that they follow most naturally on the paral- 
 lel categories, in Book I., of Reality and Negation, Somewhat and 
 Other, and the rest. 
 
 The remaining changes of order suggested in this summary of 
 Hegel's teaching will be readily allowed, when once the need of 
 some change in the present order has been clearly apprehended. 
 Some transposition of the categories is, in truth, demanded by the 
 fact that Hegel's argument, in its present form, has the wholly fic- 
 titious and misleading appearance of progress and steady advance 
 from the earliest categories of Being to the final category of Abso- 
 lute Idea. The truth is, however, that both Book II. and Book 
 III. are largely composed of repetitions, in varied form and termi- 
 nology, of the categories already discussed. Just because it doubles 
 on itself, without proper warning, the Hegelian argument needs 
 to be disentangled. The changes required consist merely in the 
 juxtaposition of groups of equivalent categories ; and the justifica- 
 tion for each change is found — as has been shown — in Hegel's 
 own admission. He himself asserts the equivalence of Identity 
 and Difference not only with the categories of Determined Being, 
 in Book I., but with the categories of the Judgment in Book III. 
 He clearly implies the parallelism of the categories of Syllogism 
 with the categories, in Book I., of Being-for-Self, or One, and he 
 distinctly afi&rms the substantial identity of Mechanism, in Book 
 III., with Reciprocity in Book II. 
 
 This attempted reconstruction of Hegel's order will, however, 
 fail of its object if it in any wise detracts from the value of 
 Hegel's argument. It should, rather, reveal the strength of a 
 system which has triumphed over such difficulties of interpreta- 
 tion. The idealistic critic may, therefore, reshape but he may 
 not reject Hegel's proof that ultimate reality is an absolute 
 self.* 
 
 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (i 788-1860) 
 
 I. Life 
 
 Arthur Schopenhauer, youngest of the great post-Kantian Ger- 
 man philosophers, was born thirteen years after Schelling, in 1788, 
 the only son of a well-to-do merchant of cosmopolitan tendencies. 
 
 ' The greater part of this Note is reproduced from the paper by the writer 
 already referred to, in Mini, N.S., XII., 1903. 
 
Arthur Schopenhauer 553 
 
 At fifteen, accordingly, the boy Arthur travelled with his parents 
 in Holland, in France, and in England. The philosopher's works 
 bear witness to the good which he gained by his sojourn in 
 Paris and in London. No contemporary German philosopher 
 ever attained Schopenhauer's clearness of style, and he has hardly 
 written a chapter which has not gained from his wide acquaintance 
 with modern Uterature. The mercantile career which succeeded 
 upon these Wanderjahre proved a toil and a vexation of spirit 
 to Arthur Schopenhauer. It was terminated, with his mother's 
 consent, soon after the death of his father in 1805. The mother, 
 Johanna Schopenhauer, a brilliant and attractive but self-centred 
 woman, took up her abode in Weimar after her husband's death, 
 and shone in the society of Goethe, Schlegel, and the other men of 
 the brilliant Weimar court. Schopenhauer, however, was not 
 admitted to his mother's circle. The two were indeed utterly 
 antipathetic, so that Johanna Schopenhauer could write to him : 
 "It is needful to my happiness to know your happiness but not to 
 be a witness of it. . . . I will make any sacrifice rather than con- 
 sent to live with you. . . . Your eternal quibbles, your laments 
 over the stupid world and over human misery, give me bad nights 
 and unpleasant dreams." 
 
 From these unsympathetic words one gains a vivid impression 
 of Schopenhauer's temperamental pessimism. His conviction of 
 the misery of human existence resulted not in active warfare on its 
 evils but in self-centred brooding and in nervous fears; his only 
 activity was that of thought. He matriculated at Gottingen; later 
 studied at Berlin; and in 1813, after four years mainly devoted to 
 the classics and to philosophy, gained his doctorate at Jena by 
 the brilliant essay on "The Fourfold Root of SuflScient Reason." 
 
 During the next five years he lived for the most part in Dresden, 
 occupied in writing the first volume of his great work, "The 
 World as Will and Idea." Through the success which he antici- 
 pated for this book he hoped to secure a professional following 
 and a university position. But to his natural disappointment and 
 to his inexpressible scorn the book attracted relatively little atten- 
 tion and the lectures which he offered in 1820, as privat-docent, 
 in Berlin barely gained him a hearing. The announcement of the 
 lectures was repeated until 1831, but Schopenhauer never delivered 
 them again. It was the day of Hegel's vogue, and the philosophical 
 
554 The Post-Kantian Monistic Idealists 
 
 public, accustomed as it was to metaphysics in a barbarous jargon, 
 had no ears for Schopenhauer's keen and clear philosophical analy- 
 sis. No one can blame him for resenting the injustice, but no one 
 can justify his bitter recrimination and his personal abuse of the 
 men he called his rivals. 
 
 From this time until his death in i860 he lived a bitter, selfish, 
 and morose life full of petty personal interests and great only in its 
 intellectual achievements. His most human characteristic vcas 
 a warm kindness to animals, and the dwellers in Frankfort on the 
 Main, where he lived in retirement from 1831, were familiar with 
 the precisely dressed figure of the pessimistic philosopher as he 
 took his daily walks in company with his white poodle. 
 
 II. Bibliography 
 
 a. Works of Schopenhauer in the Order of Publication 
 
 1813. "Uber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom ziireichenden Grunde," 
 Rudolst. Transl. as "The Fourfold Root ..." by Hillebrand. 
 (Cf. supra, Chapter 9, p. 345.) 
 
 1816. "Uber das Sehen und die Farben," Leipz. 
 
 (An essay due to the influence of Goethe, who interested Scho- 
 penhauer in investigations on colors.) 
 
 1819. "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," Leipz., Vol. I. Transl. by 
 Haldane and Kemp as "The World as Will and Idea." 
 Parts I., III., and IV. of this, the most important work of Scho- 
 penhauer, are summarized in Chapter 9. Part III. consists 
 of a brilliant though really irrelevant discussion of aesthetics. 
 The aesthetic consciousness is conceived as the immersion of a 
 will-less self in the aesthetic object, or Platonic Idea, that is, the 
 object freed from the 'forms of appearance,' in particular from 
 time and causaUty. 
 
 To this work Schopenhauer added as supplement an important 
 "Critique of the Kantian Philosophy." He criticises (i) Kant's 
 doctrine of the thing-in-itself ; and with even greater effectiveness 
 (2) Kant's category doctrine. Schopenhauer maintains (a) that 
 Kant should have included space and time among the categories ; 
 (6) that Kant should have omitted all save causality from the list; 
 and (c) that Kant's distinction of 'objective' from ' subjective ' 
 succession is invalid. 
 
 1836. "Uber denWillen in der Natur," Frankf. Transl. by Hillebrand as 
 "On the Will in Nature." (Eight essays, under one title, pref- 
 aced by an introduction abusing the philosophy of the professors, 
 and in particular that of Hegel.) 
 
 1841. " Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik. I. Ober die Freiheit des 
 menschlichen WiUens, II. Uber das Fundament der Moral," 
 Frankf, 
 
Arthur Schopenhauer 555 
 
 1844. "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," 2d ed., Vols. I. u. II. Transl 
 by Haldane and Kemp. (In this edition, Schopenhauer's 
 chief work was enlarged by a second volume of illustration and 
 commentary.) 
 
 1851. "Parerga und Paralipomena," Berl. Transl. in part by Saunders 
 and by Josef e. (Two volumes of essays on subjects philosophi- 
 cal and critical.) 
 
 h. nations and Translations 
 
 "Werke,'' edited in 6 vols, by Frauenstadt. Leipz., 1873-74 (often re- 
 printed). 
 
 "The World as Will and Idea." Transl. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 
 1884-86, Lond., 3 vols. 
 
 " The Fourfold Root " and " On the Will in Nature." Transl. by K. Hille- 
 brand, Bohn Library, revised ed., 1903. 
 
 "Selected Essays," Transl. by Bax, Bohn Library. 
 Selected portions of " Parerga and Paralipomena." Transl. by T. B. 
 Saunders, Lond. and N.Y., 3d ed., 1892, 5 vols.; Chapters i and 2, 
 transl. by C. Josefe in Jour. Specul. Philos., Vol. 5. 
 
 c. Comments, Criticisms, and Biography 
 
 (For fuller bibliography, cf . Wallace and Caldwell quoted below. Scho- 
 penhauer's text needs no elucidation and he is his own best commen- 
 tator.) 
 
 Wallace, W., "Schopenhauer," Lond., 1890; and article in "Encycl. Brit." 
 Caldwell, W., "Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance," 
 
 N.Y., 1896. 
 Gwinner, W., "Arthur Schopenhauer," Leipz., 2d ed., 1878. 
 Frauenstadt u. Lindner, "Arthur Schopenhauer: von ihm; iiber ihn," 
 
 Beri., 1863. 
 Adamson, R., "The Philosophy of Schopenhauer," Mind, 1876. 
 Volkelt, J., "A. Schopenhauer," Stuttg., 1900. 
 
 Cf . Foucher de Careil, Jellinck, Ribot, Seydel, Sully, Zimmern, cited by 
 Rand. 
 
 Note. — An ethical system widely different from Schopenhauer's, that of 
 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900), is based on Schopenhauer's doc- 
 trine of the Will, interpreted in the light of modern evolution-theory. Accept- 
 ing Schopenhauer's estimate of the facts of human misery, Nietzsche sees no 
 ground for hope save in the development and the survival of the 'super- 
 man.' His chief works arc: " Menschliches, Allzumenschliches," 3 vols., 
 1876-80, Chemnitz; "Also sprach Zarathustra," 1883-84, ihid., Engl., 
 A. Tille, Lond., 1896; "Jenseits von Gut und Bose," ibid., 1886; "Zur 
 Genealogie der Moral," ibid., 1887. The "Werke" appeared in 15 vols., 
 Leipz., 1895-1901; Engl, transl. A. Tille, Lond., 1896. 
 
556 Nineteenth-Century Philosophers 
 
 G. NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS AFTER 
 
 HEGEL 
 
 /. POSITIVISTS. (OPPONENTS OF METAPHYSICS) 
 AUGUSTE COMTE (1798-1857). 
 
 1830-42. "Cours de philosophie positive," Paris; Engl, (condensed), bj 
 H. Martineau, Lond., 1853; Lend, and N.Y., 1896. (This work 
 offers, as substitute for metaphysics, a classification of the sciences 
 with mathematics as base and sociology as summit.) 
 M. P. LlTTRE (1801-81). 
 
 1845. "Analyse raisonnee du cours de philosophie positive de M. A. 
 Comte," Paris. 1863. "Comteet la philosophie positive," Paris. 
 JOHiJ Stuart Mill (1806-73). 
 
 Important Works : — 
 1843 ff. " System of Logic," Lond. 1848. " Principles of Political Economy," ib. 
 1863. "Utilitarianism," ib. 1865. "Auguste Comte and Positivism," ib. 
 1865. "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," ib. 
 Other positivists are George Henry Lewes and Frederic Harrison. 
 
 //. OPPONENTS OF IDEALISM 
 
 MATERIALISTS 
 
 (The materialistic movement in Germany was ' reinforced ' by the left- 
 wing Hegelians. Cf . especially Feuerbach. Three of those named in the 
 following list, Biichner, Haeckel, and Ostwald, are often classed among the 
 so-called "monists.") 
 
 Karl Vogt (1817-1895). 
 
 1854. " Kohlerglaube und Wissenschaf t," Giessen. 
 1863. " Vorlesungen iiber den Menschen," ibid. 
 Jacob Moleschott (182 2-1 893). 
 
 1852. " Kreislauf des Lebens," Mainz. 
 Friedrich C. C. Ltjdvwg Buchner (1824-1899). 
 Chief Philosophical Work: — 
 
 1855. " Kraft und StofF,' ' Dantzig ; 19th ed., 1898 ; Engl., " Force and Mat- 
 
 ter,' Lond., 1864; Leipz., 1884. 1857. " Natur und Geist," tJ id. 
 1869-70. "Die Stellung des Menschen in der Natur," Leipz.; Engl., 
 
 Lond., 1872. 1882. " Licht und Leben," Leipz., 2d ed., 1895. 
 Ernst Haeckel. 
 1899. "Die Weltratsel, Gemeinverstandliche Studien uber Monistische 
 
 Philosophie," Bonn; Engl, as "The World-riddle," 1905. 
 WiLHELM Ostwald. 
 
 1902. "Vorlesungen uber Naturphilosophie.'' Leipz. 
 1910. "Natural Philosophy," transl. by T. Seltzer, N.Y. 
 
 W. P. MONTAGtTE. 
 
 1908. "Consciousness a Form of Energy," in "Essays in Honor of William 
 James." 
 
Contemporary Philosophers 557 
 
 MONISTIC REALISTS 
 
 (For critidsm, cf. James Ward, " Naturalism and Agnosticism," 1903.) 
 Herbert Spencer (1819-1903). 
 
 Chief Works on Philosophy and Psychology. 
 1855. "Principles of Psychology," Lond., 1855, sth ed., 1890. 
 1860-62. "First Principles of Synthetic Philosophy," 6th ed., 1889, Lond. 
 1879. "Data of Ethics." 
 
 1892-93. "Principles of Ethics" (including the "Data of Ethics"), 2 vols. 
 Carl Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906). 
 
 Von Hartmann's system is Schopenhauer's with the idealism 
 omitted. Von Hartmann substitutes for Schopenhauer's " Will," 
 as ultimate reality, the " Unconscious." 
 Chief Philosophical Work : — 
 1869. "Philosophie des Unbewussten,'' Berl., loth ed., 1890. Transl. by 
 W. C. Coupland, 3 vols., Lond., 1884. 
 
 NEO-REALISTS (Chiefly DUALISTS) 
 
 (Cf. Holt and others in "The New Realism," 1912; also pp. 402 £[., 566.) 
 
 Alexander S. 
 
 1907-11. Papers in Vols. VIII.-XI., Proc. Arist. Society, N. S. 
 
 I9i4(?). " The Basis of Realism," Proceedings of the British Academy, 
 XL (Alexander is a dualistic neo-reahst who verges toward 
 personalism. He teaches that percepts and images are 'physical,' 
 and that consciousness consists in 'conation,' or 'enjoyment.' 
 
 1910-11. Joseph, H. W. B. Papers in Mind, N. $., XIX-XX. 
 
 1915. Prichasd, H. a. Mind, N. S., XXIV. (Joseph and Prichard are 
 'common-sense' dualists.) 
 
 Russell, B. 
 
 1912. "The Problems of Philosophy," 1914-15. Papers in The Monisi, 
 
 xxrv., XXV. 
 
 1914. "Our Knowledge of the External World," esp. III., IV. (Russell 
 opposes 'neutral monism' and the common-sense realism of the 
 physicist and upholds a theory of ' private,' extra-neutral sense-data, 
 ' perspective ' space, and ' things ' as series of connected appearances.) 
 
 Woodbridge, F. J. E. 
 
 1906. " Problem of Consciousness " in " Studies in Honor of Garman." 
 
 1914. Holt, E. "The Concept of Consciousness," esp. I., V-IX. (Holt, 
 a monistic neo-realist, conceives a universe of 'neutral' entities.) 
 
 ///. IDEALISTS 
 
 I. PHENOMENALISTS 
 Ernst Mach. 
 
 Chief Works with Philosophical Bearing : — 
 1886. "Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen," Jena. Engl., "Analysis 
 
 of Sensations," Chicago, 1897. 
 1901. "Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung," Leipz., Engl. 
 
558 Contemporary Philosophers 
 
 Karl Pearson. 
 
 1892, igii. "The Grammar of Science," Lond. 
 
 191 1. Cf . C. A. Strong, " Why the Mind has a Body,'' 1903, cited pp. 237,405. 
 
 2. PLURALISTIC PERSON ALISTS 
 
 (Of these all save Howison and McTaggart are, in greater or less degree, anti- 
 rationalistic.) 
 William James (1842-igio). 
 1897. "The Will to Believe " (cf. esp. the Preface). 
 1907. "Pragmatism." 
 190S. "A Pluralistic Universe." 
 
 1909. " The Meaning of Truth " (a collection of previously published papers). 
 1911. "Some Problems of Philosophy." (Unfinished.) 
 F. C. S. Schiller. 
 
 1891, igii. "Riddles of the Sphinx," Lond. 
 1903. "Humanism." 
 igo2. "Axioms as Postulates" (a paper in "Personal Idealism," Oxford). 
 
 1905. "The Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism," Mini, N.S., XIV. 
 
 1906. "Pragmatism and Pseudo-pragmatjsm," ibid., XV. 
 Henry Sturt. 
 
 1902. "Art and Personahty" (in "Personal Idealism"). 
 
 1906. "Idola Theatri," Oxf. 
 Hastings Rashdall. 
 
 1902. "Personality, Human and Divine" (a paper in"Personal Idealism"). 
 George H. Howison. 
 
 1895. "The Conception of God." (Cited jw/ra, p. 561.) 
 1901. "The Limits of Evolution," N.Y., 2d ed., 1905. 
 John McT. Ellis McTaggart. 
 
 1901. "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology," Oxf. 
 Charles Renouvier (1819-1903). 
 
 Important Works : — 
 1876-1896. "Essais de critique g6n6rale," 12 vols. 
 
 1903. "Le personnalisme," Paris. 
 Henri Bergson. 
 
 1889. "Essais sur les donn6es imm6diates de la conscience," transl. as 
 "Time and Free Will," by F. L. Pogson, 1910. 
 
 1896, 1903. "Matifire et Memoire," transl. by N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, 
 
 1911. 
 
 1907. "L'evolution cr&itrice," translated as "Creative Evolution," by 
 
 A. Mitchell, 1911. 
 
 Pragnialisls 
 (Cf. James, Schiller, and Bergson cited above.) 
 John Dewey. 
 1903. "Thought and its Subject Matter" (in "Studies in Logical Theory," 
 
 Decennial Publications of Univ. of Chicago, Second Series, XL). 
 1906. "Beliefs and Realities," Philos. Review, XV. 
 
 "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," Mind, N.S. XV. 
 
Pragmatists 555 
 
 Addison W. Moore. 
 
 1902. "Existence, Meaning and Reality" (a paper in the Decennial Pub- 
 
 lications of the University o£ Chicago, Series I.)- 
 
 1903. "Some Logical Aspects of Purpose" (a paper in "Studies in Logical 
 
 Theory"). 
 1910. "Pragmatism and Its Critics." 
 Simon Fraser McLennan. 
 
 1903. " Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment " (a paper in " Stud- 
 ies in Logical Theory "). 
 Henry W. Stuart. 
 
 1903. "Valuation as a Logical Process" (a paper in "Studies in Logical 
 
 Theory"). 
 
 1904. " The Logic of Self- Realization" (a paper in University of California 
 
 " Studies in Philosophy," I.). 
 
 Note : Pragmatism 
 
 Pragmatism is formulated sometimes as a psychological, some- 
 times as a logical, sometimes as a metaphysical doctrine. In 
 the first sense, it has been defined by Mr. Schiller as 'the thorough 
 recognition that the purposive character of mental life generally 
 must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive ac- 
 tivities.'^ In this sense we all are, or ought to be, pragmatists; 
 and we unquestionably owe a debt to contemporary pragmatists 
 for laying stress on the non-cognitive aspects of experience. 
 
 As a logical doctrine, pragmatism has two forms. It teaches 
 either (i) that the conception of the use, value, or consequences, of 
 a reality form part of the conception of it; or (2) that the conception 
 of a reality consists solely in the conception of its use or value. 
 This extreme form of logical pragmatism is formulated in the 
 ' maxim ' of C. S. Peirce: " Consider what effects, that might con- 
 ceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our con- 
 ception to have . Then, our conception of these effects is the whole 
 of our conception of the object." ^ In adherence to the first of these 
 two senses of logical pragmatism we are again practically unani- 
 mous, for to the adequate conception of object, situation, or truth 
 there certainly belongs, as inherent part of it, a conception of its 
 consequences. The opposition to pragmatism is, however, pri- 
 marily dhected against the second of the logical conceptions of it. 
 
 ' " Humanism," p. 8. 
 
 2 Cf. the article by C. S. Peirce in the Poptilar Science Monthly, XII., 1878, 
 which he quotes in his contribution to Baldwin's " Dictionary of Psychology," II.> 
 p. 321. In the later article Mr. Peirce seems, however, to disavow the radical 
 pragmatism of this maxim when ' pushed . to extremes.' 
 
560 Contemporary Philosophers 
 
 The conception of an object, situation, or truth, the objectors in- 
 sist, — in the writer's view, with justice, — is more than a concep- 
 tion of its future, its results, its use, however truly the conception 
 includes this awareness of practical consequences. It must be 
 added that most pragmatists confuse these two views of logical 
 pragmatism, and waste their time by reiterating the accepted state- 
 ments that truth "makes a difference " ^ or that " personal atti- 
 tudes and responses are real," ^ when they should be trying to 
 establish the entirely different conclusion that "the conception of 
 effects is the whole of our conception of the object." 
 
 Metaphysical pragmatism is a consequence of logical pragma- 
 tism of the extreme form, and will stand or fall with it. It is the 
 doctrine that reality is to be defined only in terms of progressively 
 unfolding experience and that there is, therefore, no 'absolute' or 
 ' complete ' reality. It is pragmatism of this sort only which neces- 
 sarily involves pluralism. 
 
 Critics of Pragmatism 
 
 (Most of the papers cited below refer specifically to the articles by James, 
 Dewey, Moore, and Schiller already cited.) 
 
 1904. F. H. Bradley, " On Truth and Practice," Mind, N.S., XIII. 
 
 J. Ceeighton, "Purpose as a Logical Category," PhUos. Review, 
 
 XIII. 
 J. RoYCE, "The Eternal and the Practical," PM05. Review, XIII. 
 Chaeies M. Bakewell, "Latter-Day Flowing Philosophy" (a 
 
 paper in University of California " Studies in Philosophy ") . 
 Charles H. Riebee, "Pragmatism and the A Priori" (a paper in 
 
 the University of California Studies). 
 
 1905. A. E. Taylor. 
 
 "Truth and Practice," Philos. Review, XIV. 
 igo6. "Truth and Consequences," Mind, N.S., XV. 
 
 1905. H. W. B. Joseph, "Professor James on ' Humanism and Truth," " 
 
 Mind, N.S., XIV. 
 
 1906. A. K. Rogers, "Professor James's Theory of Knowledge," Philos. 
 
 Review, XV. 
 
 MONISTIC PERSONALISTS 
 
 Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-81). 
 
 Important Works on Metaphysics: — 
 1841. "Metaphysik," Leipz. 
 
 'Schiller, op. cU., 197'. 
 
 ' Dewey, " Belief s and Realities," Philos. Review, 1906, XV., p. 134. 
 
Monistic Personalis is 561 
 
 1856-64. " Mikrokosmos. Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der 
 Menschheit," 3 vols., Leipz., 4th ed., 1884-88; Engl., Edin. and 
 N.Y., 1885-86. 
 
 1879. "System der Philosophie," 3 Pts., 2d ed., 1884; Engl, ed., Bosanquet, 
 Parts I. and II., "Logic," and "Metaphysic," 1884, 1887. 
 
 1882. "Grundzuge der Religionsphilosophie," Leipz., 3d ed., 1894; Engl., 
 
 G. T. Ladd, Boston, 1885. 
 
 1883. "Grundzuge der Metaphysik," Leipz., Engl., G. T. Ladd, Boston, 
 
 1884. 
 
 Thomas Hill Green (1836-82). 
 
 (Green is the first of the English neo-Hegelians. He teaches 
 that "the unification of the manifold in the world implies the 
 presence of the manifold to a mind for which, and through the 
 action of which, it is a related whole.") 
 
 1874. "Introductions" to Hume's "A Treatise of Human Nature," Lond. 
 
 1883. "Prolegomena to Ethics," ed. A. C. Bradley, Oxf. 
 
 "Works," ed. R. L. Nettleship, 3 vols., Lond., 1885-88. 
 
 josiah royce. 
 Most Important Works on Metaphysical Subjects : — 
 
 1885. "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy" (especially Chapter 11). 
 
 1892. "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy" (especially Lectures X.-XIII.). 
 1895. "The Conception of God," a discussion, by Professors Royce, Le 
 
 Conte, Howison, Mezes, 2d ed., with Supplementary Essay by 
 Royce, N.Y., 1897. 
 The World and the Individual: — 
 
 1900. First Series, "The Four Historical Conceptions of Being." 
 
 1901. Second Series, "Nature, Man, and the Moral Order." 
 R. B. Haldane. 
 
 1903-04. "The Pathway to ReaUty," I. and II. Gifford Lectures. 
 
 Other neo-Hegelian monistic personalists are Edward Caird, William 
 Wallace, and J. H. Stirling (already cited) ; Bernard Bosanquet, Henry Jones, 
 and D. G. Ritchie. 
 
 {Upholders of the Absolute-Experience Doctrine) 
 
 F. H. Bradley. 
 
 1876. "Ethical Studies," Lond. and Edin. 
 
 1883. "The Principles of Logic," Lond. 
 
 1893. "Appearance and Reality," Lond.; 2d ed., 1897. 
 A. E. Taylor. 
 
 1901. "The Problem of Conduct," Lond. and N.Y. 
 1903. "Elements of Metaphysics," Lond. and N.Y. 
 
 Note: The Absolute as Experience 
 
 The position of Bradley and of Taylor is, so far as I understand 
 it, the following : (i) They are numerical monists, teaching that 
 20 
 
562 Contemporary Philosophers 
 
 ultimate reality is an Absolute — not a collection or a mere society.* 
 (2) They are idealists, and indeed spiritualistic idealists, denying 
 the existence of extra-mental reality, and defining ultimate reality as 
 Absolute Experience.^ On the other hand, they refuse to describe 
 the Absolute as 'self or as 'personal.'^ Closely scrutinized, this 
 divergence from the teachings of ' monistic personalism ' seems to 
 me to be purely verbal. The ground of the denial of the Absolute's 
 selfhood is the adoption of too rigid and too complicated a defini- 
 tion of 'self.' In the sense of 'unique, inclusive, and conscious 
 being,' the term 'self seems indeed to mean what Bradley and 
 Taylor mean by 'Experience.' When Taylor speaks of "a super- 
 human experience to which the whole universe is directly present"; 
 and when he says that "an all-containing, coherent experience . . . 
 must apprehend its contents . . . must be aware of them as exhib- 
 iting a structural unity," * he attributes to Absolute Experience 
 precisely the characters which are essential to an Absolute Self. 
 And when Bradley says, "the Absolute holds all possible content in 
 an individual experience," ^ then we are justified in concluding with 
 Royce that " Bradley's Absolute . . . escapes from selfhood . . . 
 only by remaining to the end a Self." ° 
 
 GENERAL WORKS ON PHILOSOPHY 
 I. Introductions to Philosophy 
 
 Kiilpe, O., "Introduction to Philosophy," pp. 245; transl. Pillsbury and 
 Titchener, Lond. and N.Y., 1897, from the German, "Einleitung in 
 die Philosophie," 2d ed., 1898. 
 
 'A short account of the development and present status of philosophy,' 
 useful for brief descriptions of current schools and conceptions of 
 philosophy. 
 
 ' Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," Bk. II., Chapters 13, 14, 20, pp. 135 
 «?.; Taylor,"Elementsof Metaphysics," Bk. II., Chapter 2, §§ 4-5. "TheAbso- 
 lute, " Bradley says (op. cit., p. 144), "is not many; there are no independent reals." 
 "We are committed," Taylor says, "to some form of theory of the type generally 
 known as Monism." The name monism Taylor eschews because of its mislead- 
 ing associations. 
 
 ''Bradley, op. oil., Bk. II., Chapter 14, pp. 144 seq.; Taylor, op. cit., Bk. II, 
 Chapter 2, §§ 6-7, pp. 97 seq.; Bk. IV., Chapter 5, § 7, pp. 394 seg. 
 
 -Bradley, op. cit. Taylor, op. cit., Bk. IV., Chapter 3, pp. 3341^2. 
 
 * Op. cit., Bk. II., Chapter i, pp. 60-61. 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. 1478. 
 
 °"The World and the Individual," I., pp. 550-552. 
 
General Works on Philosophy 563 
 
 Ladd, G. T., "Introduction to Philosophy," N.Y., 1891. 
 
 Marvin, W. T., "An Introduction to Philosophy," 1903. 
 
 Paulsen, F., "Introduction to Philosophy," pp. 429, transl. F. Thilly, N.Y., 
 1895, from the German, " Einleitung in die Philosophie," loth ed., 1903. 
 A brilliantly and popularly written summary and discussion of (i) the 
 problem of metaphysics, whether ontological or cosmological or theo- 
 logical, and (2) the problem of epistemology. 
 
 Perry, Ralph B., "The Approach to Philosophy," pp. 448, N.Y., 1905. 
 
 A book which aims "to introduce the general standpoint and problem 
 of philosophy, through its implication in practical life, poetry, religion, 
 and science." 
 
 Rogers, A. K., "A Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy," pp. 360, 
 N.Y., 1899. 
 
 Watson, John, "An OutUne of PhilosophywithNotes Historical and Critical," 
 pp. 483, Glasgow and N.Y., 1898. 
 
 " A work which tries to fix the main outlines of a complete system of phi- 
 losophy," under the following heads: "Philosophy of Nature," "Phi- 
 losophy of Mind," "Moral Philosophy," "Philosophy of the Absolute." 
 
 Other ' Introductions ' are those of Dilthey and Eucken (cited by Rand) ; 
 of G. S. FuUerton (The Macmillan Co., 1906) ; and of A. E. Taylor (" Ele- 
 ments of Metaphysics "). 
 
 II. General Histories of Philosophy 
 
 Rogers, A. K., "A Student's History of Philosophy," pp. 514, N.Y., 1901. 
 An attempt "to create . . . broad, general impressions" and to give 
 "the thought of the writers in their own words." 
 
 Weber, A., "History of Philosophy," pp. 630; trans. F. Thilly, N.Y., from 
 the French. 
 
 An admirably clear and concise account of systems of philosophy 
 in their development; provided with full references and bibUog- 
 raphies. 
 
 Windelband, W., "A History of Philosophy," pp. 640, transl. J. H. Tufts, 
 N.Y., 1893, i9or, from the "Geschichte der Philosophie," 1892. 
 A topical history of philosophy, discussing ' the formation and develop- 
 ment of its problems and conceptions ' (with full bibhographies). 
 
 Turner, W., "History of Philosophy," pp. 674, Boston, 1903. 
 
 Useful for its unusually long and careful treatment of medieval 
 philosophy. 
 
 Erdmann, J. E., "History of Philosophy," 3 vols., Lond., 1890, transl. 
 W. Hough from the German, " Grundriss der Geschichte der Philoso- 
 phie," 4th ed., Berlin, 1895. 
 
 Ueberweg, "History of Philosophy," 3 vols., N.Y., 1872-74, and 1890, 
 transl. G. S. Morris, from German, "Grundriss der Geschichte der 
 Philosophie." 8th German ed., enlarged by Heinze, Berl., 1894-98. 
 
564 General Works on P hilosophy 
 
 III. Histories of Modern Philosophy 
 
 Falckenberg, R., "History of Modern Philosophy," transl. A. C. Armstrong, 
 
 Lond. and N.Y., 1893, from the German, "Die Geschichte dei 
 
 neueren Philosophie," 2d ed., 1892. 
 Fischer, Kuno, "Geschichte der neueren Philosophie," 8 vols. (Vol. VTI., 
 
 on Hegel, not completed), 1878 sej.; 4th ed., 1899 seq.; Engl, of Vol. I., 
 
 1887. 
 Hoffding, H., "History of Modem Philosophy," transl., Meyer, 2 vols., Lond., 
 
 1900. 
 
Supplement 5^5 
 
 SUPPLEMENT TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 (Names which occur only in this Supplement are not included in the Index.) 
 
 Descaktes. 
 
 The Philosophical Works of Descartes, ed. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. 
 
 Ross, igii. 
 Baillet, La vie de M. Descartes, 2 vols., Paris, i6gi. 
 
 Careil, A. Foucher de, De la Princesse Elizabeth et la Reine Christine, 1879. 
 Geulincx. 
 Haeghen, in Zeiischrift Jiir Philosophie iind Philosophische Kritik. 
 Land, J. P., in Mind, 1891, 0. S., Vol. XVI., pp. 223-242. 
 Maixbranche. 
 
 G. N. Dolson, in Philosophical Remew, 1906, XV., pp. 387^405. 
 Spinoza. 
 
 Boyle, A., transl., " ' Ethics ' and ' On the Correction of the Understand- 
 ing.' " (Everyman edition.) 
 Erhardt, F., "Die Philosophie des Spinoza im Lichte der Kritik." igoS. 
 Rivaud, A., "Les notions d'essence et d'existence dans la philosophie de 
 Spinoza," 1906. 
 Leibniz. 
 
 Cassirer, E., "Leibniz' System in wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen,'' 1902. 
 The Cambridge Platonists. 
 
 G. Lyon, "L'Idealisme en Angleterre," 1888. 
 
 A. O. Love joy, "Kant and the English Platonists" in "Essays in Honor of 
 
 William James," 1908. 
 Flora I. MacKinnon, "The Philosophy of John Norris of Bemerton," 
 Baltimore, 1910. 
 Berkeley. 
 
 Lindsay, A. D., ed., " ' A New Theory of Vision,' ' Principles of Human 
 Knowledge,' ' Three Dialogues.' " (Everyman edition.) 
 ARTHtTR Collier. t- 1. 1 
 
 "Clavis Universalis," edited, with Introduction and Notes, by Ethel 
 Bowman, Open Court Co., 1909. 
 The Enlightenment. 
 
 H. J. T. Hettner, " Litteraturgeschichte des 18 Jahrhunderts," 1872, 
 
 1893-1894. 
 J. G. Hibben, "The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 1910. 
 Karl Rosenkranz, "Diderot's Leben und Werke," 1866. 
 Kant. 
 
 V. Delbos, "La philosophie pratique de Kant," 1906. 
 
 O. Ewald, "Kant's Kritischer Idealismus," 1908. 
 
 L. Goldsmidt, "Kant's 'Privatmeinungen' iiber das Jenseits und die Kant- 
 
 ausgabe der kbniglich preussischen Akademie," 1905. 
 C. Sentroul, "L'objet de la metaphysique selon Kant et selon Aristote," 
 Louvain, 1905. 
 Opponents of Kant. 
 
 "Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule," Gott., 1905. 
 
566 Bibliography 
 
 SCHELLING. 
 
 O. Braun, " Hinauf zum Idealismus; Schellingstudien,'' 1908. (Cf. Braun, 
 Kinkel, Korwan, Schwarz in Zeitschrijt fiir Philosophic und philoso- 
 phische Kritik, 1907, vol. 131.) 
 
 Karl Rozenkranz, " Schelling,'' 1843. 
 
 E. Schertel, " Schelling's Metaphysik der Personlichkeit," 191 1. 
 Hegel. 
 
 " The Phenomenology of Spirit," trans, by J. B. Baillie, 1910. (Cf. trans- 
 lation of chapters 1-3 by J. Royce in Rand's " Modem Classical Phi- 
 losophers," 1908.) 
 
 "Hegel's theologische Jugendschriften,'' ed. H. Nahl, Tubingen, 1907. 
 
 " Die Jugendschrifte Hegel's," ed. W. Dilthey, Berlin, 1908. 
 
 " Entwiirfe zu Hegel's Encyklopadie und Propadeutik," ed. J. LoWenberg, 
 Leipzig, 1912. 
 
 B. Croce, transl. by K. Buchler, "Lebendiges und Totes in Hegel's Philo- 
 sophic, 1909. 
 
 J. McT. E. McTaggart, "A Commentary on Hegel's Logic," 1910. 
 Contemporary Systems. 
 
 Monistic Realism. 
 
 Carveth Read, " The Metaphysics of Nature," 1905. 
 
 Neo-Realism. 
 
 E. A. McGlLVARY, " Consciousness and Object," Phil. Review, 1912. 
 R. B. Perry, " Present Philosophical Tendencies," 1912. 
 
 "The New Realism," The Macmillan Co., 1912. 
 Pragmatism. 
 
 F. C. S. Schiller, " Formal Logic, a Scientificand Social Problem," 1912. 
 Critics op Pragmatism. 
 
 A. O. LovEjOY, " The Thirteen Pragmatisms," Journal of Philosophy, 
 
 1907-1908. 
 
 W. P. Montague, " May a realist be a pragmatist ? " iWd. 
 
 J. B. Pratt, " What is Pragmatism? " 1909. 
 Pluralistic Personalism. 
 
 James Ward, "The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism," 1911. 
 Monistic Personalism. i 
 
 B. Bosanquet, " The Principle of Individuality and Value," 1912. (There 
 
 are ako indications of qualitative pluralism in this book.) 
 R. Eucken. 
 
 1888. " Die Einheit des Geisteslebens." 
 1890. " Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker," sixth edition, 
 
 1905, translated, 1908, by W. Hough and W. Boyce Gibson, 
 
 as "The Problem of Human Life." 
 1896, 1907. " Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt." 
 1907. " Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung," translated, 1911, by 
 
 A. G. Widgery, as " Life's Basis and Life's Ideal." 
 A. T. Ormond. 
 
 1906. " Concepts of Philosophy." 
 Histories of Philosophy. 
 A. E. D. Alexander, " Short History of Philosophy," 1910. 
 H. E. Cushman, " A Beginner's History of Philosophy," Vol. II., 1911. 
 O. Siebert, " Geschichte der neueren deutschen Philosophie," 1907. 
 
INDEX 
 
 [The names of editors and translators, and of authors merely named (not 
 cited) in the Bibliography, are not included in the Index.] 
 
 Abbott, T. K., 497. 
 
 Absolute, The, Nature of, 377 ff. 
 et al.; all-inclusive, 321, 333, 375, 
 378, 435 f-; Individual, 378 ff., 419, 
 286 ff., 320 f., 440; arguments for 
 the existence of: Fichte's argument, 
 316, 320 ff.; Schelling's argument, 
 331 ff. ; Hegel's argument, 418 f. 
 See Substance, God. 
 
 Absolute Self, Nature of, 422 ff. 
 ei al.; according to Fichte, 321 f. ; 
 all-inclusive, 233, 321, 375, 378, 433; 
 active, 321; self-limited, 320, 335; 
 unique, 419; conscious in all ele- 
 mentally distinct ways, 423 ff., 
 good, 430 ff. ; temporal and eternal, 
 392, 441 ff. ; in relation to the partial 
 selves, 435 ff-. I44 U 323. 379; 
 argument for the existence of, 418 ff. ; 
 Schopenhauer's attempted argument, 
 349 ff. ; Hegel's argument, 363 ff., 
 392 ; objections to the doctrine of the 
 personality of the Absolute, 317, 325 f., 
 328 ff., 335; to the doctrine of self as 
 absolute, 413, 421 f. 
 
 Adamson, R., 512, 540, 555. 
 
 Affects, treated by Spinoza, 472, 474, 
 480 f.; classification of, 475 ff. ; 
 control of, 479. See Emotions, Pas- 
 sions. 
 
 Allen, L. W., 378 n. 
 
 Anselm, St. See Ontological Argu- 
 ment. 
 
 Anthropomorphism, Spinoza's aversion 
 to, 298. 
 
 Antinomies, of Kant, 521 ff. 
 
 A posteriori, see A priori. 
 
 A priori, Kant's use of term, 201, 
 205; judgments, 224 f. ; time and 
 space conceived as, 517 ff. (argu- 
 ments criticized, 517 ff.). 
 
 \rgument from Design for the Existence 
 
 of God: formulated by Berkeley, 
 137 f. (criticized 142 f.); criticized 
 by Kant (as physico-theological argu- 
 ment), 250 f. 
 
 Aristotle, Categories of, 525 f. 
 
 Armstrong, A. C, 564. 
 
 Arnold, Matthew, 467, 480. 
 
 Association of ideas, 183; according 
 to Spinoza, 472. 
 
 Attributes of Substance, as conceived 
 by Descartes, 40; by Spinoza, a88 S., 
 294 ff. 
 
 Auerbach, B., 468. 
 
 Augustine, St., 24, 183. 
 
 Avenarius, R., 467. 
 
 Bacon, Francis, 18, 458. 
 
 Badness, denied to Absolute Self, 430. 
 
 Baillie, J. B., 548, 366. 
 
 Bakewell, C. M., 560. 
 
 Baldwin, J. M., 559. 
 
 Baumeister, F. C. B., 504. 
 
 Baumgarten, A. G., 504. 
 
 Baxter, A., 494. 
 
 Beatlie, James, 495. 
 
 Beauty, as conceived by Hegel, 389 ; by 
 Schiller, 534- 
 
 Bentham, J., 503. 
 
 Bergson, B., API, 412, 441, 447 n., 449, 558. 
 
 Berkeley, George, System of, 1 10-148; 
 reality immediately known, myself 
 and my ideas, 113 ff.; external things 
 as ideas, 118 ff., existence of inferred, 
 material reality denied, 126 ff. 
 (arguments criticized, 129 ff.); ex- 
 istence of infinite spirit, God, 134 ff., 
 of other created spirits, 138, of world 
 of nature, 139 ff. Criticism of 
 Berkeley's doctrine of God, 141 ff., 
 of his theory of knowledge, 145 ff. 
 Life, 495 f. Bibliography, 497 f. 
 
 Bdcher, M., 525 n. 
 
 567 
 
568 
 
 Index 
 
 Body, Nature of, according to Descartes, 
 37; toHobbes, 57 £f., 66; to Leibniz, 
 93f. ; toHume, 171 f. 5ee Corporeal 
 Object, External Object, Matter. 
 
 Body and Soul. See Soul. 
 
 Boehme, J., 459. 
 
 Bondage, Life of, 478 f. Cf. Spinoza. 
 
 Bosanquet, Bernard, 411, 561, 566. 
 
 Boscovich, R. J., 130 n. 
 
 Bouillier, F. E., 463. 
 
 Bradley, F. E., 381 n., 410 u., 420 n., 
 s6o, 561 f. 
 
 Britan, E. E., 466. 
 
 Bruno, Giordano, 18, 457 f. 
 
 Brunschvicg, L., 467. 
 
 Buchner, C. C, 398, 401 n., ssfi- 
 
 Burthogge, R., 492. 
 
 Busolt, G., 296 n., 467. 
 
 Butler, Joseph, 503. 
 
 Cabanis, P. J. C, 70. 
 
 Caird, E., 224 u., 411, 512, 527 n., 548, 
 S6i. 
 
 Caird, J., 467, 502, 504, sio. 
 
 Caldwell, W., 555. 
 
 Cambridge Platonists, The, 491 f. 
 
 Camerer, T., 467. 
 
 CampaneUa, T., 459. 
 
 Cantoni, C, 512. 
 
 CareU, A. Foucher de, 468, 486, 553, S6S- 
 
 Categorical Imperative, Kant's, 258, 
 263 ff. See Obligation, Moral law. 
 
 Categories, Aristotle's, 525 f. ; Kant's 
 ('scientific' and'epistemological'), 204 
 ff., 525 ff. : subjective, 218, necessary, 
 220 ff., as implying a self, 227 f., 
 320, 346; Schelling's, 333 f. ; Scho- 
 penhauer's, 345 f., 534 n. ; Hegel's, 
 525, 549 f. Categories of totality, 
 207 f., 527; comparison, 208 f., 
 369 ff.; causality, 210 ff., 372 ff., 
 554; substance, 529 f. ; reciprocal 
 connection, 217, 531 f. 
 
 Causal Argument for the Existence of 
 God: Descartes's argument for God 
 as cause of the idea of God, 27, ex- 
 pounded, 28 ff., criticized, 47 ff. ; 
 Descartes's argument for God as 
 cause of me, 27, expounded, 30 ff., 
 criticized, 49 ff. ; Hobbes's argu- 
 ment for God as First Mover, 58; 
 Leibniz's argument for God as Suf- 
 ficient Reason, expounded, 102 f., 
 
 criticized, 104 f.; Berkeley's argu- 
 ment for God as Cause of sense ideas, 
 expounded, 135 ff., criticized, 141 f.; 
 Kant's criticism of the cosmological 
 (causal) argument, 248 ff. 
 
 Causality, Phenomenal (connection 
 of events): conceived as necessary 
 connection, by Kant, aro ff., by 
 Spinoza, 288, 300 f. ; by Schopen- 
 hauer, 345; by Hegel, 372 f. ; con- 
 ceived as merely customary conjunc- 
 tion by Hume, 155 ff. ; conceived as 
 relation of psychical to physical, 
 42 et al.; conceived as mental transi- 
 tion, 163 ff., 212 ff. {see Necessary 
 Connection). More-than^phenome' 
 nal Causality (cause conceived as 
 ground, 51 n., 103 n.): Kant's 
 noumenal causality of the moral self, 
 249, 259 ff. ; Spinoza's immanent cau- 
 sality of God, 299 f. Causality dis- 
 cussed without reference to these two 
 forms, by Descartes, 27 f., 51 n. 
 (conception criticized, 48 f.), by 
 Hobbes, 61 ; by Leibniz, 102 ff. 
 
 Causal Law, 447. 
 
 Clarke, Samuel, 468, 503. 
 
 Clifford, W. K., 185 n., 237 n., 405 n. 
 
 Cognition, treated by Spinoza, 471 f. 
 
 Colerus, J., 468. 
 
 Collier, Arthur, 498, 565. 
 
 Collins, Anthony, 503. 
 
 Comte, Auguste, 406, 556. 
 
 Concept, Kant's use of term, 532 n. 
 
 Condillac, E. B. de, 505. 
 
 Consciousness, 386, 440; analysis of, 
 408 ff. ; forms of, 423 ff., 435 n.; 
 as implying God, 252, 436; as imply- 
 ing a self, 20 f., 43, 90, 113 f., 189 f., 
 409; conceived as one of two attri- 
 butes of all reality by Descartes, 40, 
 as form of motion by Hobbes, 63 ff., 
 as form of energy by materialists, 
 133, 399 ff., as manifestation of un- 
 known reality by monistic realists, 
 402 f., as complex of elements, by 
 phenomenalists, 405, as subject of 
 ideas by personalists, 407; of 
 monads, 92 ff. ; sensational (see Sen- 
 sational Consciousness) ; affective, 
 i5r, 188, 441 f. (see Emotions); sa 
 attributed to the Absolute Self, 427 f.; 
 relationel, 418 f., 441 f., denied by 
 
Index 
 
 569 
 
 Hume, 153, accepted by Kant, 199, 
 210, 220 f. {see Categories); as attri- 
 buted to the Absolute Self, 422 £E. 
 et al.; of obligation, 257 ff., 314 £f., 
 328, 336, 353, 449 ff., 455; Spinoza's 
 classification of, 471 ff. 
 
 Corporeal Object, Nature of, accord- 
 ing to Descartes, 36 f. See External 
 Object, Body, Matter, 
 
 Cosmological argument for the Exist- 
 ence of God. See Causal Argument. 
 
 Couiurat, L., 224 n., 225 n., 486, 523 n., 
 525 n. 
 
 Creighlon, J., 560. 
 
 Cud-worth, i?., 491. 
 
 Cumberland, R., 502. 
 
 D'Alembert, J. le R., 406, 505. 
 
 Darwin, Erasmus, 337. 
 
 Davidson, T., 542. 
 
 Dedekind, R., 523 n. 
 
 Degree, Category of, 208 f. 
 
 Descartes, Rene, System of, 21-55; 
 preparation for philosophy, doubt, 
 21 f.; existence of myself, 23 ff., 43 f. ; 
 existence of God, 25 ff., 44 £f. ; argued, 
 28 ff. (arguments criticized, 44 ff.); 
 existence of corporeal things, argued, 
 34 ff. (doctrine criticized, 53 ff.); 
 spirits and bodies, as substances, 
 39 ff., as distinct yet related, 41 ff. 
 (doctrine criticized, 54 f.). Life, 19 f., 
 459 ff. ; Bibliography, 462 f. 
 
 Desire (cupiditas), treated by Spinoza, 
 474 f- 
 
 Determinism, first stage of philosophic 
 thought with Fichte, 309, 311 f. ; 
 Spinoza's, 478, 480; scientific, 447. 
 
 Dewey, John, 412, 486, 558, 560 n. 
 
 Dialectic, of Kant, 515 ff. ; of Hegel, 368. 
 
 Diderot, Denis, 197, 505. 
 
 Dillman, E., 486. 
 
 Dilthey, W., 506, 563, 566. 
 
 Doubt, as preparation for philoso- 
 phy, 21 f., as implying the existence 
 of a doubter: doctrine expounded, 
 23 ff., criticized, 43, by Hume, 
 182. 
 
 Dualism, the usual form of qualita- 
 tive pluralism, 17 n.; of Descartes, 
 17 ff. ; of Locke, in f. ; of Wolff, 
 195 ff. 
 
 Duty, nature of, 455; as implying im- 
 
 mortality, 455; emphasized by Kant, 
 263 ff. See Obligation, Categorical 
 Imperative. 
 
 ■aus, H., 295 n. 
 
 Effect, see Causality. 
 
 Ego and Non-Ego, see Self. 
 
 Elkin, W. B., 158 n., 190, 501. 
 
 Emotions, 427, 442; as treated by 
 Hume, 151, 184, by Spinoza, 273 ff., 
 473 ff-, 480; as attributed to the 
 Absolute Self, 427 f. ; more-than- 
 temporal consciousness, 442. See 
 Passions, Affects. 
 
 Endeavor (conatus), discussed by Spi- 
 noza, 475. 
 
 Enlightenment, The, 492, 504. 
 
 Epistemology, of Spinoza, 469 ff. See 
 Knowledge. 
 
 Erdmann, Benno, 215 11., 367 n., 502, 
 510. 511. 512, 529 n., 530 n. 
 
 Erdmann, J. E., 296 n., 379 n., 468, 
 486, 487, 563. 
 
 Error, conceived as abuse of freedom by 
 Descartes, 54 n. 
 
 Eternal, The, 444 f. ; and temporal, 
 442 ff. See More-than-temporal. 
 
 Ethics, of Hobbes, 69, 489; of Hume, 
 188; of Kant, 256 ff., 264 ff.; of 
 Spinoza, 305, 478 ff. ; of Fichte, 
 314 f. ; of Schelling, 336; of Scho- 
 penhauer, 351 ff.; of Nietsche, 357 f., 
 555 n.; British writers on, 502 f. 
 
 Eiicken, R., 407, 441, 449, 486, 563, 566. 
 
 Everett, C. C., 317 n., 540. 
 
 Evil, Attitude towards, of Leibniz, 106; 
 Existence of, reconcilable with good- 
 ness of the Absolute Self, 142 f., 
 
 431 ff- 
 
 Experience, Use of term by Royce, 
 435 n.; as absolute, with Bradley 
 and Taylor, 561 f. 
 
 Extension, conceived as attribute of 
 body by Descartes and Hobbes, 37 f., 
 75; as manifestation of a force, by 
 Leibniz, 76, 99 ; as idea in the mind, 
 by Berkeley, 121 ff. ; as 'attribute,' 
 by Spinoza, 289 f., 296. See Quali- 
 ties. 
 
 External Object. (See Body, Corpo- 
 real Object, Matter, External 
 Thing) conceived as independent of 
 consciousness: extended, 36 ff., 60, 
 
57° 
 
 Index 
 
 without 'secondary qualities,' 37, 
 112; inferred to exist, from the 
 veracity of God, 34 f. (argument 
 criticized, 53, 172), from the inevi- 
 tableness of perception, 35 (argument 
 criticized, 126 £f.,); conceived as 
 'ideal': by Berkeley, 118 ft., by Kant, 
 218 £f., by Schopenhauer, 345 ff. ; 
 as God's idea, 136 ff. ; as simple 
 monad, 93 ff. ; Existence of, denied 
 by Hume, 171 fi. See Body, Matter. 
 
 Faith, as opposed to knowledge, by Kant, 
 270, by Fichte, 314, by Jacob!, 535. 
 
 Falckenberg, R., 564. 
 
 Fichu, Johann Gottlieb, System of, 308- 
 330; his 'popular philosophy,' 310 ff., 
 culminating in ethical idealism, 
 314 ff. ; his technical philosophy, 
 318 ff. : the universe of related self 
 and not-self, 318 ff., implying tite 
 existence of the Absolute, 320, which 
 is Self, 321 ff., but impersonal, 325 ff. 
 (doctrine criticized, 328 ff.). Life, 
 309 f., 536 f. Bibliography, 538 ff. 
 
 Finite Spirit, use of term, 34 n. 
 
 Fischer, K.,g^ n.,342 n., 463, 487, 543, 564. 
 
 Flournoy, T., 410. 
 
 Force, conceived as spiritual, by 
 Leibniz, 76 ff., 99; as will by Schopen- 
 hauer, 350 f. 
 
 Formal, Descartes's use of term, 29 n. 
 
 Forms of Perception, 201. 
 
 Fraser, A. C, 493, 497. 
 
 Freedom, of finite Self, conceived as 
 source of error by Descartes, 54 n., 
 as character of rational monads by 
 Leibniz, 90 ff., as postulate of moral 
 consciousness by Kant, 271, as com- 
 patible with the existence of the 
 absolute self, 446 ff. ; denied by 
 Schopenhauer, 353 ; of God, denied 
 by Spinoza, 292 f . ; life of, accord- 
 ing to Spinoza, 478 ff. 
 
 French MateriaUsts, 504 f. 
 
 Freudenthal, J., 465 n., 468. 
 
 Frieierichs, F., 498. 
 
 Fries, J. G., 536, 565. 
 
 Froude, J. A., 467. (557,563- 
 
 Fullerton, G. S., 185, 400, 403 n., 467, 
 
 Galvani, L., 337. 
 Gerhardl, C. J., 486. 
 
 Geulincx, A., 71 f., 463. 
 
 Gizycki, G. v., 501. 
 
 God, Nature of, according to Des- 
 cartes, 25, 28, 33 f., 40, to Hobbes, 
 58, to Leibniz, 79 ff., 105, to Berkeley, 
 134 ff., to Spinoza, 282 ff , 287 ff., 
 to Hegel, 382 ff. ; as spirit, 134 ff., 
 
 382 ff. ; as body, 58; perfect (com- 
 plete), 105 f. ; good, IDS f. ; postu- 
 lated by Kant, 269 ff. Arguments 
 for existence of God {q.v.) : Onto- 
 logical, Causal, Argument from 
 Design. See Absolute Self, Sub- 
 stance. 
 
 Goethe, 280, 337. 
 
 Goodness, as conceived by Hegel, 389; 
 by Spinoza, 478 f. ; as attributed to 
 the Absolute Self, 430 f. ; recon- 
 cilable with the existence of evil, 
 431 ff- 
 
 Green, T. H., 561, 411, 512. 
 
 Guhrauer, G. E., 487. 
 
 Gminner, W., 555. 
 
 Haeckel, Ertist, Materialism of, 556, 
 398 ff- 
 
 Baldane, R. B., 4 n., 554, 55s, 561- 
 
 Baldane, E. S., 463, 565. 
 
 Hamann, J. G., 536. 
 
 Harris, W. T., 547, 548. 
 
 Harrison, F., 556. 
 
 Hartley, D., 70, 492. 
 
 Harlmann, C. E. von, 357, 557. 
 
 Haym, R., 543, 548. 
 
 Hegel, G. W. F., System of, 360-394: 
 method, 367 f., 550; ultimate reality, 
 neither undetermined nor unknow- 
 able, argued, 365 ff. ; ultimate reality 
 as totality, 369 ff. (criticized, 373 f.) ; 
 as Individual, argued, 375 ff. (argu- 
 ment criticized, 380) ; ultimate reality 
 as Spirit or Person, not mere Life, 
 
 383 ff., nor totality of selves, 385 ff. 
 Order of categories, 549 ff. Treat- 
 ment of history, 390 ff., of religion, 
 392 ff. Life, 543 ff. Bibliography, 
 545 ff-, 566. 
 
 Heine, H., 253, 507. 
 
 Helvetius, C. A., 505. 
 
 Hcrbart, J. F., 245, 535. 
 
 Herder, J. G. von., 9, 280, 337, 468, 506, 
 
 507 f., 536. 
 Eibben, J. G., 548, 565. 
 
Index 
 
 571 
 
 Highest Good, The, as implying God, 
 269 ff. ; as knowledge of God, 482. 
 See Obligation. 
 
 History, relation to philosophy, 390 2. 
 
 Hobbes, Thomas, System of, 56-70; 
 doctrine of bodies, 60 £f. ; argued, 
 62 ff. ; (doctrine criticized, 64 ff .) ; 
 doctrine of God, 58 f. ; Ethics, 69; 
 Life, 485 ff. Bibliography, 490 f. 
 
 Hoffdins, H., 564. 
 
 Holback, P. H. D. eon, 70, 399, 505. 
 
 Howison, G., 378, 407, 412, 413, 414 f., 
 422 n., 558. 
 
 Humanists, 506. 
 
 Hume, David, System, 149-192 ; deri- 
 vation oj idea from impression, 150 f. ; 
 doctrine oJ causality, 153 f., as cus- 
 tomary connection (arguments, 155 
 ff., estimate and criticism, 158 ff., 
 161 n.), as 'determination of the 
 mind' (arguments and criticism, 
 163 ff., doctrine criticiEed by Kant, 
 210 ff.) ; doctrine of external objects, 
 not known by senses, 171 ff., nor by 
 reason, 173 ff. (criticism, 176 ff.) ; 
 doctrine of self, existence denied, 
 179 ff. (criticism, 183 ff. ; by Kant, 
 226 ff.); doctrine of God, 190 f. 
 Life, 498 ff. Bibliography. 
 
 Huntington, E. V., 523 n. 
 
 Hulcheson, F., 502. 
 
 Huxley, T. H., igo n., 463, 499 n., 
 500 n., SOI. 
 
 I, see Self. 
 
 Idea, Ideae, according to Spinoza, 472. 
 
 Idealism, defined, 10; forms of. Spir- 
 itualism and Phenomenalism (q.v.) 
 Kant's "Refutation of Idealism,' 
 S33- 
 
 Ideas, as implying a 'self,' 114 ff. 
 conceived as objects of knowledge by 
 Berkeley, 114 ff., 151 n., as copies of 
 impressions by Hume, 130 ff., 151 n 
 according to Spinoza, 470 n. 
 
 Identity, law of, 222 n. ; consciousness 
 of, 227 u., 318, 442; Schelling's 
 Absolute as, 339 ff. 
 
 Imagination, as attributed to the Ab- 
 solute Self, 425 ; as treated by Spinoza, 
 471 f. 
 
 Immediate, use of term, 409. 
 
 Immortality, of the partial self, 453 S. ; 
 
 maintained by Berkeley, 117: pos- 
 tulated by Kant, 266 f., 271 ; doc- 
 trine of, as affected by monistic, 
 personal idealism, 453 ff. 
 
 Impressions, conceived as source of 
 ideas by Hume,, 150 ff., 181. 
 
 iNDivmUALiiY, Absolute, 408, 438; 
 according to Hegel, 378 ff. ; to 
 monistic personalists, 419 f. ; human, 
 nature of, 437 ff., as reconcilable 
 with the existence of an all-inclusive 
 Absolute Self, 437 3.; identified with 
 will and purpose by Taylor and Royce, 
 438 n. 
 
 Infinity, as discussed in Kant's anti- 
 nomies, 523; modern conception of, 
 523 n. ; as mere endlessness, 441 n. ; 
 of Spinoza's attributes, 288 f., 294 f. 
 Intellect, according to Spinoza: in- 
 finite, 292, finite, 292 ; of God, de- 
 nied, 290 f., invalidity of this distinc- 
 tion, 298 and n. 
 
 Intuitionists, British, 502. 
 
 Jacobi,F.H.,53sf; 94 n., 29on., 408, 501. 
 
 James, W., s, 48 n., g6 n., 207 n., 222 n., 
 412, 419 n., 558 f. 
 
 Janet, P., 409. 
 
 Joachim, H., 467, 473 n. 
 
 Jodl, F., 502. 
 
 Jones, H., 561. 
 
 Joseph, E. W. B.. 560. 
 
 Judgments, Kant's distinctions between 
 analytic and synthetic, 223 ff,, be- 
 tween a priori and a posteriori, 224 f. ; 
 as basis of categories, 529 f. 
 
 Kafka, G., 407. 
 
 Kant, Immanuel, System of, 195-273 : 
 the known object as spatial and tem- 
 poral, 200 ff., 516 ff., as related 
 (categorized), 204 ff., 525 ff. ; the 
 self, argued, 226 ff. ; as transceft- 
 dental and empirical, 229 ff., 241 ff., 
 259 f . ; as subject and object, 234 ff. ; 
 as unknown, 241 ff., yet known in the 
 moral consciousness, 256 ff . ; tkings- 
 in-themselves, as unlcnown, 236 ff., yet 
 as noumena, 254 f. ; God as unproved, 
 247 ff., yet as postulated, 269 ff. Life, 
 507 ff. Bibhography, 509 ff. Out- 
 line of ' Kritik of Pure Reason,' 
 513 ff. See Antinomy, Categories. 
 
572 
 
 Index 
 
 Kantians, The, 534 f. 
 
 Kedney, J. S., 548. 
 
 Klaiber, J., 845. 
 
 Knowledge, Berkeley's theory of, 114 i. 
 (criticized, 145 fi.) ; Hume's impres- 
 sion test of, 152, 163 £f., 180; Kant's 
 restriction of, 239, 243, 256, 271; 
 Fichte's theory of, 314; Spinoza's 
 conception of, as intuitive, 473, as 
 adequate, 482 ; as opposed to faith 
 by Kant, 270, by Fichte, 314, by 
 Jacobi, 535. 
 
 Knuizen, M., 504. 
 
 Kosilin, K.y 549. 
 
 "Kritik of Pure Reason," Kant's, 513 ff. 
 
 Kiilpe, 0., 124 n., 401 n., 562. 
 
 Ladd, G. T., 412 n., 563. 
 
 La Mettrie, J. 0. de, 70, 398, 505. 
 
 Lavoisier, 337. 
 
 Law of Contradiction, 222 n. 
 
 Lee, E., 494. 
 
 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 71-iog : 
 System, 74 ff. : many immaterial 
 monads, 75 f. (criticism, 98 f.) ; su- 
 preme monad, God, 79 f. (criticism, 100 
 f .) ; finite or created numads. So &. 
 (criticism, 107 f.) ; characters com- 
 mon to finite monads. So ff. Life, 
 73, 483 f. Bibliography, 485 f. See 
 Monad, Preestablished Harmony. 
 
 Lessing, G. E,, 279 f., 337, 506. 
 
 Levy-BruM, L., 463. 
 
 Lewes, G. H., 556. 
 
 Life, as central conception of Schel- 
 ling's philosophy of nature, 336 S.., 
 383; not ultimate reality, according 
 to Hegel, 383 ff- 
 
 Littri, M. P., S56. 
 
 Locke, John, System of, in f. Life, 
 492 f. BibUography, 493 f. 
 
 Loeb, J., 384. 
 
 Lotze, R. B., 486, 560 f. 
 
 L'&we, J. E., 540. 
 
 Mach, Ernst, Phenomenalism of, 405 ff., 
 
 557- 
 MacLennan, S. F., 412, 559. 
 McGUmry, E. A., SSI, S65- 
 Mclntyre, J. L., 458. 
 McTaggart, J. McT. E., 378 and u., 
 
 379 n., 381 II., 385 "., 392 "•. 412. 
 
 416 (., 454, 548, 558, 566. 
 
 Magnitude, see Space. 
 
 Mahaffy,J.P.,463. 
 
 Malebranche, Nicolas, 71 I., 145 n. 
 
 MandevUle, B. de, 502. 
 
 Martineau, E., 556. 
 
 Marvin, W. T., 557, 563. 
 
 MateriaUsm, a form of quaUtative 
 monism, defined, 10; taught by 
 Hobbes, 56 ff., by nineteenth cen- 
 tury materialists, 132 ff., 398 ff., 556, 
 by French materiahsts, 504 f., by 
 German materialists, 556; criticized 
 by Berkeley, 126 ff. 
 
 Mathematics, as related to philosophy, 
 281 ; as influencing Descartes, 460 I., 
 Hobbes, 487, Spinoza, 280 f. 
 
 Matter, physical reality, independent 
 of mind, inferred to exist, 57, 126 ff., 
 398 ff. (conception criticized, 126 ff., 
 173 ff.). Conceived by Berkeley as 
 equivalent to non-ideal reality, 126 ff. 
 
 Meinong, A., 502. 
 
 Memory, contrasted with experience by 
 Royce, 446 n. ; discussed by Spinoza, 
 472. 
 
 Mendelssohn, M., 468. 
 
 Metaphysics, a synonym for Philos- 
 ophy (g.v.) in the narrow sense of 
 that term, as misconceived by modern 
 phenomenaUsts, 410. 
 
 Mill, J. S., 227 n., 498, 556. 
 
 Mind (human), power of, over body, 
 166 f., over ideas, 135 f., 143 f., 168 f., 
 186; conceived as 'bundle of percep- 
 tions' by Hume, 183, as subject of con- 
 sciousness {469 f., 287, 297), and sum of 
 ideas by Spinoza, 470 f. See Self. 
 
 ModaUty, Categories of, 531 ff. 
 
 Modern Philosophy, characters of, 17 f. ; 
 forerunners of, 18, 457 f. 
 
 Modes, Spinoza's doctrine of, 286 ff., 
 297, 299 ff . ; infinite, 468 f . 
 
 Moleschott, J., 398, 556. 
 
 Molesworth, W., 57 n., 491. 
 
 Monads, Leibniz's doctrine of, 74 ff., 
 criticized, 100 ff. 
 
 Monism, Numerical, defined, 9: of 
 Spinoza, 277 ff. ; of the post-Kantian 
 idealists, 307 ff., of Schopenhauer, 
 343 ff., of Hegel, 360 ff. ; of Lotze, 
 560 f. ; contemporary, 417 ff. ; Qual- 
 itative, defined, 9, 57, forms of, 
 Idealism, and Non-idealism (g.i).). 
 
Index 
 
 573 
 
 Monistic Realism, of Schelling, 330 fE. ; 
 of Herbert Spencer and others, 401 ff., 
 S57 ; doctrine criticized, 403. 
 
 Montague, W. P., 399, 5S(>, 566. 
 
 MontuoH, R., 491. 
 
 Moore, A. W., 412, 494, 559. 
 
 Moore, G. E., 403 n, 404 n, 557. 
 
 Moral Consciousness, see Obligation. 
 
 Moral Law, discussed by Kant, 237 ff-> 
 formulated, 263 f. ; discussed by 
 Fichte, 316, by Schelling, 336. See 
 Ethics, Categorical Imperative, Ob- 
 ligation. 
 
 Moral Philosophy, see Ethics. 
 
 More, H., 491. 
 
 More - than - temporal consciousness, 
 442 f. 
 
 Morley, J., 506. 
 
 Morris, G. S.. 512, S48, 563. 
 
 Motion, conceived as attribute of body 
 by Hobbes, 60 ff ., 67 f . ; as form of 
 extention by Descartes, 75 n.' ; as 
 manifestation of a force by Leibniz, 
 76, 99; as idea in the mind by Berke- 
 ley, 121 ff. See Qualities. 
 
 Mutter, G. E., 372 n. 
 
 Munk, H., 398. 
 
 MUnslerberg, H., 3S9 n. 
 
 Myself, see Self. 
 
 Natura Nalurans, and Natura Naiu- 
 rata, Spinoza's doctrine of, 300. 
 
 Naturalism, see Materialism. 
 
 Nature, world of, as conceived by Berke- 
 ley, i37i 139 ff-; by Schelling, 336 ff. ; 
 by the absolutist, 455 f. 
 Necessary Connection, temporal, 
 denied by Hume, 157 ff. ; success- 
 fully proved by Kant, 210 ff. ; 
 causal, involving uniformity of recur- 
 ring effect: denied by Himie (argu- 
 ments, IS9 ff. ; estimate, 213 ff.); 
 asserted by Kant (arguments, 213 ff., 
 estimate, 216). 
 
 Necessity (A Priority), logical, or 
 analytic, gi, 157 f., 201, 205 f,, 221 f. ; 
 synthetic, asserted by Kant (concep- 
 tion criticized, 220 ff.); temporal, and 
 causal (see Necessary Connection) ; 
 usually synonymous with univer- 
 sality, 221 n. ; according to Kant, 
 never predicated of the sensational, 
 202, 221 (conception criticized, 222 f.). 
 
 Newton, L., 203 n., 529 n. 
 
 Nielsche, P. W., 357 f., 555 n. 
 
 Noel, G., 548. 
 
 Non-ideaUsm, defined, 10 ; forms of, Ma- 
 terialism and Monastic Realism {q.v.). 
 
 Norris, J., 145 n., 492 f., 494. 
 
 Notion, as conceived by Berkeley, 114 f., 
 145. 
 
 Noumena, see Things-in-themselves. 
 
 Novalis (lion Hardenberg), 11, 543. 
 
 Num, T. P., 557. 
 
 Object, see Seli and External Object. 
 
 Object in Space, as treated by Kant, 
 231 ff., 533- 
 
 Objective, Descartes's use of the term, 
 29 n. ; Kant's use, 201 n., 214 f. 
 
 Obligation, Kant's doctrine of, as fact, 
 257 f., 262 ; as distinct from desire, 
 258, 263 n., as inexplicable, 258 f. ; 
 as implying real self, 259 f., society 
 of selves, 269 ff., freedom, 265 f., 
 449 ff., immortality, 266 f., 433; 
 highest good, 267 ff. ; Fichte' s doc- 
 trine of, 314 f., as implying eternal 
 world, 315; Schelling's doctrine of, 
 336; Schopenhauer's doctrine of, 353. 
 
 Occasionalists, The, 463 ff. 
 
 Oesterreich, K., 410. 
 
 Ontological Argument for the Existence 
 of God, formulated by Anselm, 26, 
 247, 415, by Descartes, 26 f. (argu- 
 ments criticized, 44 ff.), by Leibniz, 
 100 ff.; criticized by Kant, 247 ff.; 
 modified by Hegel, 247 n., 392; 
 restated by Howison, 414 f. 
 
 Opinion, as conceived by Spinoza, 471 f. 
 
 Organism, as treated by SchelUng, 338, 
 by Hegel, 383 ff. 
 
 Ostwald, W., 130, 399, 401, 556. 
 
 Oswald, J., 495. 
 
 Other selves, see Self. 
 
 Pain, as attributed to the Absolute Self, 
 
 444- 
 Paley, W ., 503. 
 Pantheism, 337. 
 Parallelism of the modes, taught by 
 
 Spinoza, 295 ff., 302 ff., 470 f., 474. 
 Passions, Hume's doctrine of, 188; of 
 
 God, denied by Spinoza, 292. Set 
 
 Emotions, Affects. 
 Paulsen, P., s, 6, 224 n., 512, 534 n., 563. 
 
574 
 
 Index 
 
 Pearson, K., 142 n. ; phenomenalism of, 
 405 fE., 558- 
 
 Peirce, C. S., 559 and n. 
 
 Perry, R. B., 557, 563, 566. 
 
 Perception, 423 f., 425 n. ; according to 
 Leibniz, 90, 92, to Hume, iso ff., 
 179, 180, 183 f., to Spinoza, 472; as 
 attributed to tlie Absolute Self, 423 £f. 
 
 Person, see Self. 
 
 Personal Identity, according to Hume, 
 187 f. 
 
 Personalism, 406 n., see Spiritualism. 
 
 Personality, 330, 335, 413 ; emphasized by 
 Leibniz, 108 f. ; of the Absolute Self, 
 437 ; denied to the Absolute by Fichte, 
 317, 32s ff., 328 ff., by ScheUing, 335. 
 
 Pessimism, Schopenhauer's, 352 ff., 
 356 ff-, 553 ; Nietsche's, 357 f., 555 n. 
 
 Phenomena, opposed to things-in-them- 
 selves, 237, 243, 366. 
 
 Phenomenalistic Idealism, defined, 10 ; 
 taught by Hume, 149 ff., by Mach 
 and Pearson, 404 ff., 557 ff. ; attacked 
 by Kant, 198 ff. 
 
 Philosophy, nature; distinguished from 
 insight, 3, from science, 3 f. ; ap- 
 proach, by natural science, 6, by 
 text-study, 7 f. ; types: numerically 
 monistic or pluralistic, 9 ; idealistic or 
 non-idealistic, 10 ; phenomenalistic 
 or spiritualistic, 10: value, 11 ff. ; 
 as conceived by Hegel, 309, in rela- 
 tion to history, 390 ff., in relation to 
 religion, 392 ff. 
 
 Physico-theological Argument, see Ar- 
 gument from Design. 
 
 Plato, 3, 183, 341, 397, 443. 
 
 Plitt, G. L., 542. 
 
 Pluralism, Numerical, 9 . of Descartes, 
 17 ff., of Hobbes, 56 ff-, of Leibniz, 
 71 ff., of Berkeley, no ff., of Hume, 
 149 ff., of contemporary philosophers, 
 411 ff. ; Qualitative, 9: of Spinoza, 
 277 ff. See Dualism. 
 
 Poets, as philosophers, 342. 
 
 Politics, of Hobbes, 69. 
 
 PoUtz, K. H. L., sii. 
 
 Pollock, F., 281 n., 464 n., 467. 
 
 Positivism, 406. 
 
 Positivists, 556. 
 
 Post-Kantians, The, 536 ff. 
 
 Postulates, of practical reason, as con- 
 ceived by Kant, 271. 
 
 Power, conceived as 'determination of 
 mind,' by Hume, 163 f., 166 ff. 
 
 Pragmatism, 559 f., 412, 429; upholders 
 of, 557 ff. ; critics of, 560. 
 
 Preestablished harmony of monads, as 
 taught by Leibniz, 87 ff. 
 
 Priestley, J., 70, 492. 
 
 Prince, M., 237, 410. 
 
 Principle of Contradiction, 102. 
 
 Principle of Sufficient Reason, 102 f., 
 345- 
 
 Principle of Uniformity, 448. 
 
 Proasi, J., 494. 
 
 Propositions, Kant's table of, 527 n. 
 
 Psychtilogy, as science of conscious 
 selves, 408 n. ; of Spinoza, 469 ff . 
 See Emotions, Experience, Imagina- 
 tion, etc. 
 
 Qualities, primary and secondary, as 
 conceived by Descartes and Locke, 
 37 f., 112; distinction denied by 
 Berkeley, 121 f. ; by Hume, 173. 
 
 QuaUty, Categories of, 528, 550. 
 
 Quantity, Categories of, 527 f., 550. 
 
 Rashdall, E., 412, 414 ff., 421 f., 436, 
 558. 
 
 Rationalism, of Leibniz, 196; of Wolff, 
 196. 
 
 Rationalistic Dualists, 504. 
 
 Realism, see Monistic Realism. 
 
 Reason, truths of, 91, 102 ff. ; as con- 
 ceived by Spinoza, 472, 482. See 
 pp. 135, 173 ff-. 270 f. 
 
 Reciprocal Connection, Kant's cate- 
 gory of, 217, 531; Fichte's treatment 
 of, 319 n. 
 
 Recognition, its implication, 226 f. 
 
 Reid, Thomas, 494. 
 
 ReinhoU, K. L., 534. 
 
 Relation, Categories of, 528 ff. 
 
 Relations {see Categories), nature of, 
 381. 
 
 Religion, as conceived by Hegel, 389 f., 
 in relation to philosophy, 392 ff. 
 
 Renan, E., 468. 
 
 Renouvier, C, 82 n., 407, 412, 467, 486, 
 558. 
 
 Rieber, C. H., 560. 
 
 Ritchie, D. G., 561. 
 
 Ritchie, E., 467, 539. 
 
 Robertson, G. C, 62 n., 491. 
 
Index 
 
 S75 
 
 Rogers, A. K., 560, 563. 
 
 Romantic School, The, 543. 
 
 Rosenkranz, K., 511, S43, 544 n., 548, 
 549, 565- 
 
 Rousseau, J. J., ig7, 506. 
 
 Royce, J., 34 n., 118 n., 407, 411, 418, 
 424, 426 n., 432, 435 n., 438 n., 441, 
 442 f., 444, 445 f., 452 f., 455 n., 
 532 n., 525 n., 560, s6i, 562, 
 
 Russell, B., 85, g4, 381 n., 420 n., 486, 
 523 n., 525 n. 
 
 Schelling, Friedrich, Wilhelm Joseph, 
 System of, 330-342 : the universe as 
 unconditional but impersonal self, 
 331 £f. ; as Nature, 336 ff.; as Identity, 
 339 ff. Life, 331, 540 f. Bibliography, 
 542 £., s66. 
 
 Schiller, P. C. S., 221 n., 227 n., 360 n., 
 412, 414, 431, 444 i-, S17 n., 559, 558, 
 566. 
 
 Schiller, J. C. F. von, 534 f. 
 
 Schlegel, A. W. von, 543. 
 
 Schlegd, K. W. F. von, 343. 
 
 Schleier7nacher, F. D. E., 535. 
 
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, System of, 343- 
 359 : the world as idea, 344 ff, ; ulti- 
 mate reality as will, 347 f., argued, 
 348 f. (criticized, 349), as One, 349 ff. ; 
 ethics, 351 ff., pessimism of, 352, 356 f. ; 
 estimate and criticism of doctrine, 
 inadequate conception of will, 355 ff. ; 
 of ultimate reality as will, 358 f. Life, 
 343 f., 552. Bibliography, 512, 554 f. 
 
 Schubert, F.W.,si-i- 
 
 Schulze, G. E., 536. 
 
 Science, distinguished from philosophy, 
 3 ff . : as approach to philosophy, 6 f . ; 
 study of, undervalued by Berkeley, 
 147 n. ; influence upon Schelling, 337 f . 
 
 Scientists, as philosophers, 6 f., 337, 
 399 ff., 508. 
 
 Scott, W. R., 491. 
 
 Scottish School of 'Common-sense,' 
 The, 494 f. 
 
 Self, or Spirit, Person, I, Nature of, 
 407 ff., el al. : conscious, fundamental 
 to 'ideas,' 114 ff., 189, 227 f., 407; 
 inclusive one, 408, 436 ; unique. 108, 
 408, 438; related, 108, 265, 319 f., 
 393 ; free : argued, 446 ff., 259, 265 f . 
 (doctrine criticized, 451); active, 
 107 f., 116 f., 408; limited, 410; 
 
 moral, 256 ff., 451 f, ; temporal and 
 more-than-temporal, 440 ff. (its 
 temporal limits not precisely defined, 
 409 2) ; immortal, 453 ff . ; as related 
 to the Absolute Self, 435 ff. et al., 
 451 ; known without proof, in im- 
 mediate consciousness, 23, 43, 135, 
 173, 226, 246, 335, 347, 409; (existence 
 and consciousness of self denied by 
 Hume, 179 ff. ; by contemporary 
 phenomenahsts, 405 f.). Subject 
 and object self, discussed by Kant, 
 234 ff., 244 ff. ; by Herbart, 245, by 
 Schopenhauer, 346 ff. ; not a funda- 
 mental contrast, 358 f. Transcen- 
 dental and empirical self (see Kant). 
 Other selves : existence argued, 
 34. 138, 146, 409 f.; as objects of 
 obligation, 265, 316; Kant's society 
 of selves, 262 ff. See Mind, Abso- 
 lute Self. 
 
 Self-consciousness, 234: of God, prob- 
 ably accepted by Spinoza, 290 ff., 
 297 f., denied by Fichte, 325 ff., 
 by Schelling, 335, 340. See Con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 Selver, D., 487. 
 
 Selves, see Self. 
 
 Sensational consciousness, as conceived 
 by Wolff, ig6 ; by Kant, 205, 243 ; 
 by Hegel, 398 n. ; as attributed to the 
 Absolute Self, 424 f. See External 
 Object, Impressions. 
 
 Sensations, according to Berkeley, 115, 
 to Hume, 151, to Kant, 200, 239; 
 as related to necessity, 222 f. 
 
 Senses, fallaciousness of, 21 f., 121, 
 172 f., 199. 
 
 Seih, A,, 494, 548. 
 
 Shaftesbury, Anthony, Third Earl of, 
 502. 
 
 Sigwart, H. C. W. von, 491. 
 
 Smith, A., 502. 
 
 Smith, N., 19 n., 463. 
 
 Smith, W., 538 ff. 
 
 Sorley, W. R., 467. 
 
 Soul, as related to body: Descartes's 
 doctrine, 41 f. ; Geulinx's doctrine, 
 71 f. ; Leibniz's doctrine, 93 f . • 
 Hume's doctrine, 166 f. ; Spinoza's 
 doctrine, 470 f. See Mind, Monad, 
 Self, Mind. 
 
 Space, Newton's definition of, 203 n. ; 
 
576 
 
 Index 
 
 conceived as property of body by 
 Hobbes, 60, 66 f., 69 n. ; Kant's 
 conception of, 200 £E., 517 ff. 
 Spencer, H., monistic realist, 131, 253, 
 383, 401, 557- 
 
 Spinoza, Baruck de, Metaphysical sys- 
 tem of, 277-306 : doctrine of one 
 substance, God, 282 £E. ; modes, 286 flf., 
 299 ff. (infinite modes, 468 f .) ; altri- 
 butes, 288 ff., 294 a., 296, paral- 
 lelism of, 302 &., 470 f. (criticism of 
 doctrine, 293 ff., 303 f.). Psychol- 
 ogy and Epistemology, 469 ff. 
 Ethics, 478 ff. Life, 278 f., 464 ff. 
 Bibliography, 466 ff. 
 
 Spirit, see Self, 71 n., 75 n. 
 
 Spiritualism, or Personalism, de- 
 fined, 10; of Leibniz, 70 ff. ; of 
 Berkeley, iioff. ; of Kant, 197 ff. ; of 
 Fichte, 308 ff.; of Schelling, 330 ff.; 
 of Schopenhauer, 343 ff . ; of He- 
 gel, 360 ff. ; of contemporary phi- 
 losophers: pluralistic, 41 r ff. (theistic 
 and antitheistic, 413 ff.), taught by 
 James, Schiller, and others, 557 f. ; 
 monistic, argued, 417 ff., taught by 
 Lotze, Royce, and others, 56° f- 
 
 Stein, L., 467, 484 n. 
 
 Stephen, L., 491, 492, 494. 
 
 Stewart, D., 495. 
 
 Stirling, J. H., 467, 502, 511, 512, 547, 
 548, 551 n., 561. 
 
 Strong, C. A., 185, 237, 405 n. 
 
 Stuart, n. W., 559. 
 
 Stump/, K., 5. 
 
 Sturt, H., 409 n., 412, 558. 
 
 Subjectivity, of space and time, 202 ff., 
 52T ff. ; of categories, 218 ff., accord- 
 ing to Kant. 
 
 Substance, conceived as independent, 
 by Descartes, 39 ff., 283 f., by Leib- 
 niz, 78 ff. ; identified with perception 
 by Plume, 180 f. ; conceived as One 
 by Spinoza, 282 ff., as 'the per- 
 manent' by Kant, 529 f. ; forms: 
 spiritual and material. See Absolute 
 Self, External Object. 
 
 Succession, consciousness of, 442 f . ; 
 as conceived by Hobbes, 67 ; accord- 
 ing to Kant, as subjective and objec- 
 tive, 214 f. ; (doctrine criticized by 
 Schopenhauer, 554). 
 
 Talbot, E. E., 510, 540. 
 
 Taylor, A. E., 51 n., 113 n., 215 n., 
 222 n., 295 n., 374 n., 410 n., 438 a., 
 S6if. 
 
 Temporal, use of term, 440 f. ; as at- 
 tributed to the Absolute Self, 441 ff.; 
 and eternal, 442 ff. 
 
 Tennyson, quoted, 270. 
 
 Theistic Moralists, British, 503. 
 
 Theology, British writers on, 503. 
 
 Thing, see External object and Sub- 
 stance; used by Berkeley to mean 
 'idea,' 123 f. 
 
 Thing-in-itself, sometimes identified by 
 Kant with free self, 261 ; conceived 
 by Schopenhauer as will, 347 ff. See 
 Things-in-themselves, conceived by 
 Kant as unknown, 218, 220, 236 ff., 
 argued for, 238 (doctrine criticized, 
 240 f.), conceived as noumena, 254 f. ; 
 rejected by Fichte, 324 f., by Schel- 
 ling, 339, by Hegel, 366 f. 
 
 Thompson, A. B., 317 n., 327 n., 540. 
 
 Thought, opposed to sense, by Wolff, 
 196, by Kant, 205 ; conceived as 
 attribute by Spinoza, 289 ff., 297 f. ; 
 Hegel's uses of term, 388 n. ; attrib- 
 uted to Absolute Self, 426 f. 
 
 Time, 440 f., conceived by Hobbes as 
 idea, 68 ; by Kant as necessary re- 
 lation, 212 f., 217 f., 522; as related 
 to the Absolute Self, 441 ff. ; plu- 
 raUstic conception of, 445. Newton's 
 definition of absolute time, 529 u. 
 See Succession. 
 
 Tindal, M ., 503. 
 
 Toland, J., 69 f., 492, 503. 
 
 Tonnies, F., 491. 
 
 TotaUty, Category of, 207 f. 
 
 Trendelenburg, A., 468, 487. 
 
 Truth, as defined by Spinoza, 473; by 
 pragmatists, 559 f. 
 
 Truths, necessary and contingent, of 
 Leibniz, 91, 102 ff. 
 
 Turner, W., 563. 
 
 Uberweg, 498, 563. 
 
 Unconscious, The, as treated by Schel- 
 
 Ung, 340, by von Hartmann, 547. 
 Unity of Apperception, Kant's doctrine 
 
 of, 229 f., 241 ff., .^56 ff. See Self. 
 Universals, Descartes's conception of, 
 
 41 n. 
 Unknown Reality, conceived by Kant 
 
Index 
 
 577 
 
 as thing-in-itself (or things-iu-them- 
 selves), 236 ff., by Schelling as 
 Identity, 339 ff., by modern monistic 
 realists, 401 ff. ; doctrine criticized, 
 by Berkeley, 131 ff., by Hegel, 363 ff. 
 Utilitarian Moralists, British, 503. 
 
 Vaihinger, K., 512, 333 n. 
 
 Vogt, K., 133, 398, 556. 
 
 Volition, 429; as conceived by Hume, 
 
 166 ff. ; correspondence with bodily 
 
 movement, 348 f. 
 Volkdt, J., sss- 
 Voltaire, 504 f. 
 Voluntarism, 359 n. See Will. 
 
 Waitz, G., S42. 
 
 Wallace, W., 545 ff., SS5. 561. 
 Ward, J., 402 n., 407, 491, 557, 566. 
 Weber, A., 563. 
 
 Will, 429 f. ; conceived by Fichte aa 
 absolute, 316 ff. ; by Schopenhauer 
 as thing-in-itself, 347 ff., as source of 
 misery, 331 ff. ; of God, denied, by 
 Spinoza, 290, 292 ; attributed to the 
 Absolute Self, 429; identified with 
 self by Miinsterberg, 339 u., with 
 attention by Royce, 435 n. See 
 Freedom, Volition. 
 
 Winckelmann, 337. 
 
 Windelband, W., 190 n., 308 n., 312, 
 563. 
 
 Wolff, Christian, System of, 195 f., 199, 
 219, 239; Kant's criticism of, 218 f. ; 
 chief writings, 504. 
 
 Wollaston, W., 303. 
 
 Woodbridge, F. J. E., 491, 537 
 
 Wundt, W., 183. 
 
 Zimmer, F., 540. 
 
 FiiDted in the United States of America, 
 
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