Cf^atnell Hnioecaitg SItbratg 
 
 Htltaca, S)em ^atk 
 
 BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE 
 
 JACOB H. SCHIFF 
 
 ENDOWMENT FOR THE PROMOTION 
 
 OF STUDIES IN 
 
 HUMAN CIVILIZATION 
 
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Cornell University Library 
 D 644.H88 
 
 Peace-making at .Paris. 
 
 3 1924 027 876 063 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tlie Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
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WOODROW WILSON 
 
 AN INTERPRETATION 
 
 By A. Maurice Low. Cloth, 8s. 6d. net. 
 
 A keen and impartial analysis of the charac- 
 fer and motives of the President. 
 
 LLOYD GEORGE 
 
 The Man and his Story 
 
 By Frank Dilnot. Cloth, Ss. net. 
 
 (Second Impression) 
 
 "A vigorous and sympathetic sketch, with 
 many personal touches and a keen appreci- 
 ation of the statesman's humour and warm 
 humanity." — The Observer. 
 
 London 
 T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1 Adelphi Terrace 
 
PEACE-MAKING 
 AT PARIS 
 
 BY 
 
 SISLEY HUDDLESTON 
 
 LONDON 
 
 T. FISHER UNWIN LTD. 
 
 ADELPHI TERRACE 
 
NOTE 
 
 In writing this book I have made some use 
 of articles which I contributed to a number 
 of papers during the proceedings in Paris. 
 Particularly to the Westminster Gazette, to 
 the Contemporary Review, to the Daily Graphic 
 do I wish to make grateful acknowledgment. 
 This is not a day-by-day account of the 
 negotiations ; occasionally I have had to 
 sacrifice purely chronological order, which 
 would have meant jumping from subject to 
 subject like a grasshopper (to employ a figure 
 of speech which became famous), and have 
 grouped a series of events under one head. 
 Nor have I discussed in detail the multipli- 
 city of questions which arose : that would 
 be an interminable task which would be 
 appreciated by few readers. I have rather 
 endeavoured to trace the broad currents of 
 
6 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 the Conference and to ijeveal something of 
 what passed between the chief statesmen. 
 This critical history of the Paris proceedings, 
 which were filled with dramatic moments 
 big with the fate of the world, will help the 
 reader to understand the rival forces, the 
 clashing conceptions of peace, and to review 
 intelligently as a whole the most momentous 
 Conference in the annals of mankind. 
 
 S. H. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. AFTER THE ARMISTICE 
 
 II. THE CONFERENCE OPENS . 
 
 HI. TAKING UP POSITION . 
 
 IV. LIGHT ON PRINKIPO' . 
 
 V. THE LEAGUE IS BORN. 
 
 VI. DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES . 
 
 VII. THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS 
 
 VIII. SOME OF" THE PROBLEJiS . 
 
 IX. THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'s 
 
 X. RUSSIA AGAIN 
 
 XI. CRISIS ON CRISIS 
 
 XII. LEAGUE AND LABOUR 
 
 XIII. AT VERSAILLES . 
 
 XIV. AT SAINT-GERMAIN 
 XV. CONCLUSION 
 
 PACE 
 9 
 
 33 
 
 35 
 49 
 67 
 
 83 
 loi 
 119 
 
 137 
 
 157 
 169 
 
 183 
 194 
 209 
 223 
 
PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 AFTER THE ARMISTICE 
 
 The story of the two hundred odd days in 
 Paris between the signing of the armistice 
 and the signing of the Peace Treaty contains 
 more stirring episodes than years of battle : 
 event followed event with lightning rapidity, 
 although the deliberations dragged, and the 
 tense drama of those months was, especially 
 for those who lived close to the heart of 
 things and knew how frail was the peace 
 struggling to birth, who watched with appre- 
 hension every dispute, every fresh outbreak 
 of fighting, every current of popular opinion 
 which threatened to make the task of the 
 statesmen impossible, a drama which at 
 times was too poignant. The future of man- 
 kind was at stake. There were two alter- 
 natives : reconciliation, the possibility of 
 
10 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 universal co-operation in a spirit of good will 
 to repair th6 ravages of fifty months of war 
 and to make war impossible, or — a blind, 
 egoistic struggle, the fear of general bank- 
 ruptcy and the definite crash of civilization. 
 Many could see no middle course. The war 
 for victor and vanquished had gone on too 
 long and only heroic efforts could save us 
 from utter economic ruin, from a moral 
 debdcle and from the submerging of all 
 humanity's hopes. It was the gravest task 
 that ever faced any body of the peoples' 
 leaders : it was not a mere territorial re- 
 adjustment : it was the rebuilding of the 
 world. Were they equal to their job ? Had 
 they only parochial minds or would they 
 see things with a broad vision ? Their work 
 was interrupted by a series of incidents which 
 time after time nearly broke up the Confer- 
 ence and threw everything into the melting- 
 pot. Chaos threatened, with the black night 
 of a mondial revolution for which many forces 
 openly strove. 
 
 It is my purpose to tell the story of this 
 most critical and important period in the 
 world's history as I saw it. My method will 
 not be to overload the narrative with a mass 
 of detail, but to concentrate upon the salient 
 points, to depict the varied moods of hope 
 
AFTER THE ARMISTICE ii 
 
 and doubt, to relate what took place behind 
 the closed doors and to sum up the results 
 of the long labours. 
 
 November ii was a memorable day. The 
 guns were silent at last. The effect of the 
 armistice on France was magical. Not only 
 Paris but the whole country resounded with 
 articulate happiness. All the suppressed 
 eniotions of the weary months of war had 
 been let loose at last. The radiant faces, 
 the cheerful tongues of a people who were 
 no longer compelled, by the harsh reality of 
 an invader sitting tight on their soil, to keep 
 their breath for the stern business of the 
 doubtful fight, made glad not only the rues 
 of Paris, but animated the remotest villages. 
 Never was the mood of a nation more com- 
 pletely transformed. France expected too 
 much. The disillusion was accordingly greater 
 when the financial position was realized and 
 M. Glemenceau spoke of a Pyrrhic victory. 
 But in those first days Paris buried itself 
 under bunting and prepared all kinds of 
 jubilations. The self-restraint which. had been 
 shown for so long was completely broken 
 down. The pent-up feelings of the people 
 escaped in a flood. France had kept even 
 in the darkest hours a brave but subdued 
 faith, and in the brighter moments she realized 
 
12 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 that the end of which she was so confident 
 was still far off. From that hot day in the 
 summer of 1914 when the boulevards listened 
 with aching ears for the dread word " War " 
 there had been no great demonstrations, no 
 joy bells and no funeral knells. France did 
 not start out gaily with clamorous cries of 
 " A BerHn ! " France stiffened herself soberly 
 for the shock, and she stood stiffly and soberly 
 come weal come woe until this moment, when 
 joy could no longer be denied and overflowed 
 its banks. Crowds played like children in 
 the great Place de la Concorde, where hundreds 
 of captured German guns were parked. Only 
 two still small voices of criticism were heard 
 in this period of carnival — one expressed dis- 
 agreement with the pledges implied in the 
 armistice terms and already spoke of President 
 Wilson doubtfully, the other regretted that 
 La Patrie had not been freed from the invader 
 by force of arms. 
 
 At that moment we really thought that 
 everything would be concluded quickly : we 
 did not foresee the many months of discussion, 
 we did not dream of difficulties between the 
 Allies. It was a new world which was to 
 spring up like a mushroom on the blackened 
 battlefield. Ah, if we could only recapture 
 the first fine careless rapture ! In this round 
 
AKIER THE AKMlSTlCE 13 
 
 of official fetes the visit of King George V 
 was the most notable event. In that trium- 
 phant and turhultuous processional progress 
 through Paris, half a million throats cheered 
 not only England's King but England. The 
 magnitude and the magnificence of the greet- 
 ing was taken as the people's renewal of the 
 alliance of the war, an alliance which has 
 now to withstand the testing time of peace. 
 France, for which I can speak, has learnt to 
 understand and to love the English character, 
 and it is merely superfluous to declare that 
 we are and will be Allies yet. 
 
 The way by which the King and the Princes 
 reached their residence on the Quai d'Orsay 
 is, one may venture to say, incomparably 
 the most splendid in the world — a real Royal 
 Road. Stepping out of the little station at 
 the Bois de Boulogne which has been called 
 the " Gare des Rois," the King was at once 
 in that princely promenade, the Avenue du 
 Bois de Boulogne, with the golden gates of 
 the Porte Dauphine and the great pleasure- 
 ground of the Bois, still beautiful, even in 
 those dying days of the year, behind him. 
 At the top of the sloping alley, between the 
 banks of high, white buildings, with here a 
 superb palace in rose-coloured marble, is the 
 dominating Napoleonic Arc de Triomphe, im- 
 
14 PEAtE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 mense, grand in its simplicity of contour. 
 From the huge space in which it lifts its 
 noble lines run eight imposing avenues, and 
 it was the finest of them all — the finest in or 
 out of Europe — that the Royal and Presi- 
 dential party took. 
 
 Everyone who has ever been to Paris has 
 been impressed with the marvellous perspec- 
 tives of the magnificently planned Avenue 
 des Champs-Elysees, with its architectural 
 glories. The captured cannon, the Venetian 
 masts flying the five flags of the principal 
 Allies, artistically disposed, the profusion of 
 bunting on the roofs and from the windows 
 of the houses and hotels, made an unforget- 
 table triumph of colour and of arrangement. 
 But the keynote of the arrival was the unani- 
 mous welcome of soldiers and civilians who 
 made — in the fine Shakespearian phrase : 
 
 A shower and thunder with their caps and shouts 
 
 — a shower and thunder which, denoting the 
 union of France and England, was a happy 
 augury for the peace of the world. 
 
 Pageant after pageant was unrolled in Paris. 
 Many royal visits were planned, and for more 
 than a month the city gave itself up to joy. 
 The King of Italy was well received and 
 
AFTER THE ARMISTICE 15 
 
 King Albert of Belgium was an honoured 
 figure. Panem et cir censes ! Festival fol- 
 lowed festival. Perhaps it would have been 
 better if we had got on with the Conference. 
 
 Here I note that when King Albfert came 
 again to the capital he came to plead in 
 person the cause of Belgium, who had received 
 no guarantees of priority in the distribution 
 of money and goods to be received from 
 Germany by way of, reparation. Mr. Lloyd 
 George, taking the purely British view, was 
 disposed to argue for an equality of allocation 
 without regard to special needs. That Belgium 
 should be a preferential creditor needs little 
 argument, and the Premier was easily per- 
 suaded. The King on this occasion was also 
 successful in obtaining the promise of loans 
 to help the gallant little nation to its feet 
 again. 
 
 He came by aeroplane, and so consecrated 
 the aeroplane as a means of travel. The 
 conquest of the air may be accepted as suffi- 
 ciently complete when kings wing their flight 
 without fear from capital to capital. The 
 Conference incidentally did much for peace- 
 time aviation, not only in drawing up rules 
 and regulations for international observa- 
 tion but in accepting the aeroplane for 
 daily use. Monarchs and statesmen whose 
 
i6 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 lives would not be lightly risked went to 
 and fro. Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Churchill, Gen- 
 eral Seely, besides a score of diplomatists 
 and military advisers, came from London to 
 Paris frequently by way of the air, and there 
 was inaugurated a special daily aerial postal 
 service from the Hotel Majestic and the Hotel 
 Astoria (the British headquarters in the French 
 capital) to England. 
 
 Neglecting chronological order again, I would 
 here refer to the later visit of the Queen of 
 Rumania. She captured the heart of the 
 Parisians. She was a gracious figure, and 
 she came to plead for her suffering country, 
 stripped bare of the mere necessaries of life. 
 Her intervention was happy, and it is cer- 
 tainly true that she did more to arouse the 
 statesmen to a sense of their duties towards 
 her country than the political personages had 
 succeeded in doing ; and at the same time 
 she won the friendship of the people of France. 
 
 So they flitted across the stage in those 
 preparatory months. But the great event, 
 from the point of view of the Conference, 
 was the landing of Mr. Wilson. At last we 
 were getting to grips with the situation. 
 
 It cannot be denied that even before his 
 setting sail for Europe there was controversy 
 in . France in respect of some of the points 
 
AFTER THE ARMISTICE 17 
 
 of the peace settlement laid down by him. 
 It would be too much to expect that any 
 programme would secure unanimous approval, 
 and French writers are nothing if not frank. 
 Hence the difficulties of certain proposals 
 and the spirit of the peace for Which he 
 stood, were discussed with critical candour. 
 On the other hand, the journals belonging to 
 the Left defended with warmth the views of 
 the President. They saw in him the moral 
 and intellectual genius of peace. His popu- 
 larity in France was formidable. The eager- 
 ness of the common people to testify their 
 sentiment of gratitude to him was unprece- 
 dented. The preparations to tender him the 
 homage of the masses were astounding. He 
 had touched the conscience of the peoples. 
 A huge address, bearing the signatures of 
 grateful Frenchmen, grew daily longer and 
 longer. 
 
 The Socialist Party in particular hailed 
 his coming" with joy. All bodies of workers 
 in or about Paris endeavoured to give a special 
 character to the ovation. Writing in the 
 Humanite, M. Cachin declared that " the 
 messages of Wilson have touched most pro- 
 foundly the sentimentality and the idealism 
 of the proletariat. Alone amid the rulers 
 he has known how to speak, in spite of uni- 
 
 2 
 
i8 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 versal hatreds let loose, the language of 
 good will, of humanity, of international justice ; 
 alone he has protested with the Socialists 
 against Imperialism in all quarters. He has 
 formulated in chiselled terms the objective 
 of the odious war : It must be the last war ; 
 it is necessary to secure this, to build up a 
 family of nations, disarm the peoples for 
 ever, disband the standing armies, establish 
 treaties of commerce which will respect for 
 all the liberty of transactions. Because he 
 has sustained these elevated ideals Wilson 
 has conquered the generous heart of the 
 workers of the world." 
 
 Alas ! these same Socialists five months 
 hence were to declare that he had betrayed 
 the expectations of humanity, that he had 
 been an easy prey to the " Imperialists," 
 the forces he had challenged. Certain it is 
 that a campaign was launched against him 
 from the earliest days in the Paris Press which 
 wields most power : that which belongs to 
 the Right Wing, which is Conservative, often 
 Royalist, generally Clerical, which is wedded 
 to the conception of strong frontiers, big 
 armies, secret alliances — which, in a word, felt 
 exceedingly sceptical of this new conception 
 o^ a Society of Nations, of open diplomacy, 
 of preparations for a final peace of peoples 
 
AFTER THE ARMISTICE 19 
 
 instead of the perpetual piling up of arms 
 for inevitable wars. This scepticism is to be 
 excused because France has twice suffered 
 invasion. But it suffered invasion in spite 
 of the * old system, perhaps because of the 
 old system. 
 
 Even then the battle between the advocates 
 of an imposed treaty which would be based 
 upon military might, which would be a peace 
 leading to the eternal revanche, and the 
 advocates of what was called a Wilsonian 
 peace, which though stern would not repeat 
 the errors of the many centuries of sway- 
 ing strife, had begun. It was from the 
 beginning clear that Wilson would, unless he 
 were a man of iron, as well as of elevated 
 ideals, be beaten by the professional diplo- 
 matists. 
 
 There was a moment when his supporters 
 were very confident. There seemed as he 
 went by the boulevards some magnetism in 
 the man, some transpiercing sincerity, some 
 magical potency which evoked an enthusiasih 
 so immense as to dissipate in the breath of 
 his passage all the clouds of objections, of 
 difficulties, of prejudices of an outmoded 
 diplomacy, which had undoubtedly been 
 gathering in the European sky and threaten- 
 ing a deluge that would drown all noble- 
 
20 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 hearted and generous ideals. If peace could 
 have been made then ! 
 
 Many of the disputes and claims of rival 
 schools of thought, many of the antipathies 
 and doubts, appeared exceedingly frail in 
 the salutary wind that blew upon them from 
 the West. Wilson then was at his best and 
 brightest, and the people saw in him a prophet. 
 Even the Temps at this period uttered a 
 warning against those who obstinately seek 
 to combine, with the new ideas which have 
 sprung from the war, the ancient type of 
 alliances, a combination beside which the 
 quadrature of the circle would seem to be 
 an elementary problem. We must put 
 ourselves, it cried, in the spirit of the new 
 era. 
 
 Great dissatisfaction was caused, however, 
 by an incident which has not been, I think, 
 revealed. The Socialists and the Labour 
 leaders wished to hold a huge demonstration 
 in honour of Wilson. They were told that 
 they could only do so if they obtained the 
 permission of the President ! This was an 
 extraordinary demand to make upon them. 
 They felt that it would be asking Mr. Wilson 
 to be responsible for any disorder which 
 might occur, and they wisely abandoned the 
 idea. Mr. Wilson remained at his window 
 
AFTER THE ARMISTICE 21 
 
 at the H6tel Murat (near the Pare Monceau) 
 waiting for the prohibited procession. This 
 manoeuvre on the part of some official was 
 typical. One could give other examples of 
 the same kind of tactics. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE CONFERENCE OPENS 
 
 The Peace Conference formally opened on 
 Saturday, January i8, in the Salle de I'Horloge 
 at the French Foreign Ministry. But for some 
 weeks before there had been a mustering of 
 statesmen from the four corners of the world 
 in Paris, and the French capital, which with 
 its comings and goings of statesmen and 
 generals had for so long been the Capital 
 of the War, was prepared to become the 
 Peace Headquarters. 
 
 I think that the strongest criticism that 
 can be made of the Allies is that they per- 
 mitted two months to slip away before they 
 even proceeded to consider the peace which 
 the armistice promised. Instead of being in 
 a position to resume our normal life, which 
 we should have done as quickly as possible 
 if we were to recover from the dreadful malady 
 
 of four years' war, we seemed incapable of 
 
 23 
 
24 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 anything but electioneering and holiday- 
 making ; we slacked along for two months 
 without a thought of putting the world to 
 rights again. The effect was, of course, to 
 complicate all the problems. We should haye 
 had, if we had been reasonably ready for 
 peace, at least a preliminary document ready 
 for Germany in January ; and then it would 
 not have been a matter of great importance 
 if we had taken our time in drawing up the 
 final settlement, There were two things to 
 do, each of which depended on the other. 
 One was to make a temporary treaty which 
 would give us a working relationship with 
 Germany. The other was, not only to make 
 peace in the diplomatic sense, but to pacify 
 Europe. We increased our difficulties with 
 Germany by the long delay. We could in 
 'the first flush of victory have imposed our 
 maximum terms almost without protest on 
 the crushed people ; and it would have had 
 an excellent effect to modify them later on. 
 But we muddled, because Clemenceau wanted 
 one sort of peace, Lloyd -George another, and 
 Wilson a third. We got in each other's way, 
 and during two months displayed in our diplo- 
 matic dealings gross incompetence, jealousy, 
 suspicion ; while Europe suffered from hunger, 
 while revolutions groaned in a dozen different 
 
THE CONFERENCE OPENS 25 
 
 countries, while hatred became rooted in 
 peace as it had been rooted in the soil 
 of war. 
 
 It is true, the task was appalling ; but 
 there was a very simple kind of peace which 
 could have been made ; and then it would 
 have been possible, in a more reasonably 
 world, to have accomplished in concert the 
 double business of arranging the distribution 
 of foodstuff and of raw materials, and the 
 working out of the boundaries of the various 
 nations on the principles of common sense 
 and justice. But the fact is that the Foreign 
 Offices could not agree. The conflict on the 
 question of admitting Russia was particu- 
 larly heated between the British and the 
 French. The Quai d'Orsay, which is singu- 
 larly blind to realities and sometimes allows 
 itself to be manoeuvred by foreign reaction- 
 aries, declared hotly against Mr. Lloyd 
 George's and Mr. Balfour's view that Lenin 
 should be invited to make peace and send 
 delegates to Paris. 
 
 This inability to come to an accord on 
 the most elementary matters pursued the 
 Allies ; and it was no wonder that Mr. Wilson, 
 who had been in France for nearly a month, 
 wasting his time, protesting now and again 
 to M. Clemenceau, grew very impatient, and 
 
26 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 urged an instant beginning. At this time the 
 contradiction between the point of view of 
 the American President and that of the French 
 Premier was fiat and flagrant. A deadlock 
 was threatened at the outset. The two men 
 remained courteous, but there was certainly 
 no friendly feeling between them. " If you 
 can persuade me that your plans are better 
 for the peace of the world, I am willing to 
 listen and to learn," said Mr. Wilson. " And 
 if you can persuade me, so much the better," 
 replied M. Clemenceau. " Only — you cannot !" 
 The scenery, the stage setting, was not 
 very impressive in those rainy days of January, 
 when Paris was drenched in constant showers. 
 There is no season of the year when the city 
 looks more dismal. The leafless boulevards 
 and the wet pavements reflecting faintly at 
 night the feeble illuminations make a picture 
 without colour. .But in the busy interiors 
 of the buildings that were devoted to the 
 preparations for peace there was an almost 
 feverish activity. The Pressmen from all parts 
 of the world gathered in great clouds ready 
 to swarm down upon anyone who could furnish 
 them with the smallest tit-bit of information. 
 Motor-cars dashed to and fro under the leaden 
 skies, stopping at the door of this hotel and 
 at the porch of that Government Department. 
 
THE CONFERENCE OPENS 27 
 
 The last touches were put to the arrangements. 
 The papers stacked in prodigious number 
 were classified. Facts and- figures about 
 almost every country in Europe, and statistics 
 about every continent of the world, were 
 available. In short, the supreme moment 
 had arrived when the most immense con- 
 sultation of Powers and of peoples that the 
 world has ever seen was about to begin. 
 
 If you had occasion to come within the 
 shadow of these buildings, whose placid front 
 concealed such , prodigious labour and such 
 stupendous compilations, you felt the gravity 
 of the coming events. There were assembled 
 those upon whose wisdom or folly, upon 
 whose vigilance or blindness, upon whose 
 goodwill or antipathies, the whole future of 
 the world hung. The fate of mankind was 
 poised by a thread. When you came into 
 the sphere of these proceedings you could 
 not avoid a feeling of awe at the terrible 
 responsibilities shouldered by the statesmen, 
 as they were yesterday shouldered by the 
 captains of the Allies and of their associates. 
 
 The British took up their quarters in the 
 Hotel Majestic and in the Hotel Astoria — 
 two huge establishments which are close to 
 the jfetoile. The strictest guard was kept, 
 lest there should be a betrayal of secrets. 
 
28 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 What secrets there were left to betray after 
 the members of the Conference had given 
 away all they knew — except their own quarrels, 
 and those too, wherever it suited them to 
 hint that Mr. So-and-so was preventing an 
 agreement on such-and-such a subject — I 
 really do not know. For my part, I never 
 learnt of anything of any importance through 
 official channels that I had not known before 
 either by personal contact with some member 
 or through the newspapers. There never was 
 such a ridiculous bogy as this fear of publicity, 
 and I am only surprised that the Press did 
 not laugh it to scorn. There were not only 
 men from the Foreign Office but men from 
 Scotland Yard, and the emptying of the waste- 
 paper baskets was a highly important business ! 
 
 In these buildings the delegates lived and 
 worked and played — for the social side of life 
 was developed by the younger folk at the 
 Hotel Majestic. If it was permissible to dance 
 on the eve of Waterloo it was surely per- 
 missible to dance on the eve bf Versailles ; 
 and the amateur theatricals and the concerts 
 and the dinner parties and the afternoon teas 
 in the Hall of the Hotel Majestic made peace- 
 making a fairly pleasant job, provided you 
 were not too busy. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is not at all fair to speak 
 
THE CONFERENCE OPENS 29 
 
 scornfully of this army of officials. They 
 really worked after their fashion exceedingly 
 well. They prepared reports, they put the 
 text of documents in shape, they did the 
 fagging for the British team. Only — the dele- 
 gates afterwards disregarded what they had 
 done and much of their work was wasted. 
 There' was an early outcry about their numbers, 
 but it must be remembered that it was difficult 
 to estimate how large a staff would be re- 
 quired ; and, besides, a number came over 
 for only a week or two. A tribute should 
 be paid to the many girl assistants, who in 
 docketing and filing were superior to the 
 men. Responsible positions were given to 
 women. The uniforms of the young girl 
 messengers soon became familiar to Parisians 
 and were celebrated in song. 
 
 Most of the decisions with regard to the 
 methods of procedure were taken in the week 
 preceding the Conference proper. It was 
 arranged that the big Powers alone were 'to 
 lay down the general lines and the smaller 
 States to be called in afterwards, while the 
 enemy Powers were to come in at the end 
 of the deliberations to receive their sentences 
 at Versailles. There was a feeling in some 
 quarters that it would have been better that 
 everybody should have been united in a big 
 
30 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 conference to agree first on the principles to 
 be applied, and to work out the details in 
 smaller groups. Questions of procedure can- 
 not be regarded as trivial. They have gone 
 very far to make the results of the Conference 
 what they are. 
 
 The opening day recalled an event which 
 coloured the subsequent history of Europe. 
 It was the anniversary of that day in 1871 
 when the German Empire was proclaimed by 
 an army of invasion in the Chltteau at Ver- 
 sailles. It was consecrated by the theft of 
 two French provinces, and, as M. Poincar6 
 said, was thus vitiated from its origin by the 
 fault of its founders. Born in injustice, it 
 ended in opprobrium. The scene in the Salle 
 de I'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay when the 
 seventy delegates met for the first time was 
 an impressive one. The Salle is magnificent, 
 a suitable setting for the drama which was 
 then begun. Looking out on the swollen 
 Seine was M. Bratiano, the Rumanian Premier, 
 in company with M. Pachitch of Serbia. All 
 the Balkan problems which had been hitherto 
 insoluble seemed to be represented by these 
 two men. The picturesque figure of the Emir 
 Feysal, son of the King of the Hedjaz, with 
 his flowing turban falling on his shoulders, 
 reminded one of the tremendous differences 
 
THE CONFERENCE OPENS 31 
 
 of opinion and of interests in the Near East. 
 M. Dmowski and M. Kramarez, from Poland 
 and from Czecho-Slovakia, evoked the diffi- 
 culties and the troublous times ahead of the 
 new States. One foresaw the Adriatic quarrel 
 when Baron Sonnino entered. M. Venfzelos 
 incarnated Greek aspirations and M. Vander- 
 velde carried us in imagination to suffering 
 Belgium. Marshal Foch, Mr. Wilson, Presi- 
 dent Poincare, Mr. Lloyd George and M. 
 Clemenceau formed a group whose points of 
 view it seemed hardly possible to reconcile. 
 After all, when one looked and remembered 
 " so many men, so many minds," it seemed 
 hopeless to expect that they could all be 
 satisfied. 
 
 I think in view of the subsequent results 
 it is as well to recall the salient passage of 
 M. Poincare's speech. 
 
 " You will," he said, " seek nothing but 
 justice — justice that has no favourites— justice 
 in territorial problems, justice in financial 
 problems, justice in economic problems. 
 
 ",The time is no more when diplomatists 
 could meet to redraw with authority the map 
 of the Empires on the corner of a table. If 
 you are to remake the map of the world it 
 is in the name of the peoples and on con- 
 dition that you shall faithfully interpret their 
 
32 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 thoughts and respect the right of nations, 
 small and great, to dispose of themselves, 
 provided that they observe the rights equally 
 sacred of ethical and religious (minorities. 
 
 " While thus introducing into the world as 
 much harmony as possible, you will, in con- 
 formity with the fourteenth of the propositions 
 unanimously adopted by the Great Allied 
 ■Powers, establish a general League of Nations 
 which will be a supreme guarantee against 
 any fresh assaults upon the right of peoples. 
 You do not intend this International Associ- 
 ation to be directed against anybody in future. 
 It will not of set purpose shut out anybody, 
 but having been organized by the nations 
 that have sacrificed themselves in defence of 
 Right, it will receive from them its statutes 
 and fundamental rules. It will lay down con- 
 ditions to which its present or future adherents 
 will submit, and as it will have for its essential 
 aim the prevention so far as is possible of 
 future war, it will above all seek to gain respect 
 for the peace which you will have established." 
 
 How far has this purpose been fulfilled ? 
 He would be a bold man who would pretend 
 that' the high mission has been carried out 
 without deflection and without conspicuous 
 failures. 
 
 The actual representation of the Powers, 
 
THE CONFERENCE OPENS 33 
 
 big and little, was not settled without many 
 protests, and it is now no secret that great 
 discontent was aroused by the allocation of 
 the number of seats to each nation. Mr. 
 Lloyd George soon found an opportunity for 
 his gift of conciliation, since there was indeed 
 much was that arbitrary in the arrangements 
 dictated by material interests. The first in- 
 tention that Belgium should have fewer re- 
 presentatives than Brazil displeased many 
 commentators. The British delegation was 
 regarded as unfair, since Canada, Australia 
 and India, and other parts of the Empire, 
 helped to strengthen the British point of 
 view. The question of the Dominions was 
 certainly a difficult one, for they are entirely 
 British, and yet could not be assimilated. 
 It was obvious that separate representation 
 was due for their great and gallant part in the 
 war, but the clear-sighted French observed 
 the preponderance of the British element thus 
 given, and asked for (and were refused) repre- 
 sentatives from Algeria, Cochin-China and 
 Morocco. The Jugo-Slavs, as such, were not 
 to have a place. The Serbians, who, with 
 their neighbours composing the new nation, 
 were to have so much to say with regard to 
 the Italian claims, had two representatives, 
 and could not therefore speak for three natibn- 
 
 3 
 
34 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 alities (to say nothing of the Montenegrins). 
 The Russian representation, in consequence of 
 the inability of the principal statesmen to 
 agree, was simply left over. Russia was 
 conspicuously absent. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 TAKING UP POSITION 
 
 One of the earliest incidents was the tug-of- 
 war between the Press and the Ministers. 
 The Conference — which quickly reduced itself 
 effectively to ten principal members, the Pre- 
 miers and the Foreign Ministers of the five 
 Great Powers, with the rest merely serving 
 on Commissions whose reports were ignored 
 by the Ten — decided on complete secrecy. 
 This was a thunderclap, since we had been 
 told that the era of open diplomacy and 
 of the peoples' peace had arrived ; and in 
 order that the people should learn all about 
 the peace some hundreds of newspaper men 
 from England alone were gathered together 
 in Paris. America, too, had sent all her big 
 newspaper writers to follow the proceedings. 
 And then they all learnt suddenly that their 
 occupation^ like that of Othello, had gone ! 
 No wonder there were protests on all hands. 
 
36 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 and the newspaper men of the two EngUsh- 
 speaking countries were particularly emphatic 
 in their protest. They were prepared to raise 
 such an agitation that no Ministry could 
 stand against the indignant public clamouring 
 against the dark diplomatists. Mr. Lloyd 
 George was told distinctly that if he tried to 
 maintain his order, he would be overthrown 
 in a week. Naturally he gave way — there 
 was nothing else to do ; and he insisted on 
 a relaxation of the original order. This order 
 practically prohibited the publication of news 
 which was not in the communique issued by 
 the Conference officially — a bald bare state- 
 ment that the Executive Council liad concerned 
 itself with such-and-such a question and had 
 heard such-and-such a person. 
 
 I am bound to record the tameness of 
 the spoon-fed French Press. They have been 
 strangely subservient to the authorities, and 
 seemed on this occasion to lose all their in- 
 dependence. Happily for the peoples, the 
 Anglo-Saxon newspapers are made of sterner 
 stuff. It was all to the good that every 
 subject as it arose was explained to the masses. 
 It was perhaps explained perfunctorily : you 
 cannot expect a writer, however brilliant, to 
 understand the amazing multiplicity of ques- 
 tions which came up ; but it was on the whole 
 
TAKING UP POSITION 37 
 
 dealt with honestly, and it is certain that 
 the ordinary man in the street has to-day 
 a much clearer conception of foreign politics 
 and foreign personalities, and he has accord- 
 ingly learnt how every problem is intertwined 
 with every other problem, how the world is 
 one and indivisible. He knows that we 
 cannot be indifferent to what may happen 
 in Japan. He has become possessed of a new 
 sense of solidarity. 
 
 Although the promise of frequent open 
 meetings was not kept — there was barely an 
 average of one a month — at least there were 
 " sources of information." Twice a day — 
 and at one period three times a day — at the 
 Hotel Astoria or at the Villa Dufayel, where 
 the correspondents enjoyed the advantages 
 of a magnificent club — Sir George Riddell or 
 Mr. G. H. Mair delivered a little lecture on 
 the doings of the day to an assembly, of 
 newspaper men. They both fulfilled their func- 
 tions excellently : they were in special touch 
 with the Prime Minister or with his secretary, 
 and they told all that it was considered ad- 
 visable to tell. But these accounts, though 
 helpful, remained official. They were not, of 
 course, critical of the Conference. It was 
 necessary to learn the whole truth elsewhere. 
 It should be said at once that statesmen 
 
38 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 are not oysters. They will open readily 
 enough ; and as the little world in which 
 they moved was all collected in one spot, 
 indiscretions, intentional or unintentional, were 
 plentiful. Moreover, the members of each 
 national delegation were willing to hint that 
 the other delegations were taking up an 
 attitude which they resented. It was not 
 difficult for anyone who had a few ac- 
 , quaintances to know that Mr. Lloyd George 
 was against the Dantzig settlement which 
 everybody else approved, or that Mr. Wilson 
 was sulking in his bedroom because of the 
 Adriatic affair. 
 
 At that time, in the fashionable hotels of 
 Paris, one could encounter Labour and 
 Socialist leaders. They were on their way 
 to Berne, to hold, as it was stated at the 
 time, a sort of collateral Conference. Nobody 
 seemed to have a clear idea of what the 
 Conference was going to be. There seemed to 
 be an impression in many quarters that it 
 would be all over in a month, and I remember 
 that there was even some fear on the part 
 of the Socialists I met lest they should be 
 too late. The Berne Conference had been 
 delayed largely through the inexperience of 
 Mr. Henderson in interriational affairs. He 
 had not privately arranged for passports before 
 
TAKING UP POSITION 39 
 
 the public announcement of the meeting was 
 made. Naturally there were those who re- 
 presented the Socialists as people who were 
 going to plot against the Conference ; and 
 the fact that Germans and Allies were at 
 last to meet face to face (the Allies' diplomatists 
 could not summon up courage to meet German 
 diplomatists till several months later) fright- 
 ened the Swiss authorities. It was only with 
 difficulty that permission to go to Berne was 
 obtained. It cannot truly be said that the 
 Berne proceedings had any influence on the 
 Paris proceedings. 
 
 The position in the diplomatic sense soon 
 became clear. Whenever two or three 
 politicians or diplomatists are gathered to- 
 gether, they are bound to split into at least 
 two groups, to form combinations which are 
 devious. The Conference did not escape this 
 tendency to grouping. It was, of course, 
 dominated from the beginning by the represen- 
 tatives of the five Big Powers. The true battle 
 was fought upon the little platform of the 
 Basin of the Sarre. Naturally the discus- 
 sion did not turn round and round this 
 point. It was, indeed, put off every time it 
 came on the agenda. Nevertheless, it was 
 secretly the cause of the Latin association 
 against the Anglo-Saxon association. France 
 
40 PEACE-MAKING AT PARJS 
 
 wanted territorial guarantees, but of course; 
 if it were necessary to enfeeble Germany, 
 the Sarre was insufficient. The true annexa- 
 tionists, as M. William Martin pointed out 
 in the Journal de Geneve, were more logical. 
 If the guarantees of peace must be measured 
 in square miles, they will never be great 
 enough. The Sarre is only a finger of territory, 
 but it is the finger caught in the cogwheels. 
 Economically the Basin should perhaps go 
 to France. Territorially these kilometres and 
 the 300,000 inhabitants would not reinforce 
 France, but the contrary. For France, Sarre- 
 bruck is only a question of prestige. I do 
 not think the position could be summed up 
 better than it was by M. Martin, whom I 
 am tempted to quote. What he says is not 
 only true, but is extremely important if one 
 would understand much of what subsequently 
 occurred. 
 
 " Mr. Wilson arrived in France in the month 
 of December convinced that he would find 
 adhesion to, and enthusiastic support for, his 
 ideas. He offered to France an association 
 for the establishment of justice in the world. 
 That adhesion and that support failed him 
 at least in ofiicial quarters. Why ? Essen- 
 tially because of the territory of the Sarre, 
 which should have been renounced at the 
 
TAKING UP POSITION 41 
 
 beginning as an annexation. Mr. Wilson, in 
 order not to rest isolated, turned to England, 
 and there found the aid desired. France in 
 her turn, menaced by isolation, approached 
 Italy. There was thus created at the Con- 
 ference that constellation in which the Anglo- 
 Saxon Powers supported by Japan have the 
 majority, with the two Latin Powers facing 
 them. 
 
 " Italy supported the claims of France. 
 She has on her side historical and strategic 
 rights to put forward, and she seeks aux- 
 iliaries. Thus, French policy has been led 
 to defend, against the unanimous sentiment 
 of the French people, the Italian pretensions 
 and the application of the Treaty of London. 
 In this way France is considered as an adver- 
 sary both in Italy and in Serbia. She receives 
 the imprecations of d'Annunzio. The Italians 
 take to Fiume the French flag, and the Serbians 
 believe themselves betrayed and abandoned." 
 
 He went on to state that even the accord 
 between Italy and France in the bosom of 
 the Conference is not perfect and durable. 
 The Italians, he said truly, lend all their 
 forces to the reunion of Austria with Germany. 
 This reunion is, in fact, inevitable if they 
 obtain the line of the Brenner that French 
 policy tends to concede to them. To obtain 
 
42 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS - 
 
 the Sarre, therefore, France indirectly throws 
 the Austrians into the arms of Germany. 
 To take a number of kilometres from Germany, 
 she gives Germany twenty times more. And 
 it is clear that if Italy seeks to have a 
 common frontier with Germany, it is not 
 with the idea of fighting the Germans. 
 
 France, he added, presents then the spectacle 
 of a man who lets fall the substance for- the 
 shadow. To have the Sarre she has renounced 
 the support of President Wilson and her 
 intimacy with England. She pursues a policy 
 of which the ultimate consequences will be 
 to throw into the arms of Germany both 
 Austria and Italy, and prepares for herself 
 a position of isolation in Europe. 
 
 He concluded as follows : " There are to- 
 day two systems in opposition. One believes 
 that it is necessary to seek in annexations, 
 in buffer-States, in strategic frontiers, all the 
 guarantees of peace. Twenty centuries of ex- 
 perience are not then sufficient ? The other 
 is the principle of justice, of moderation, of 
 collaboration." 
 
 Paris was a hot-bed of intrigue. Every- 
 body was pulling the strings, and it was almost 
 amusing to observe the fencing and the man- 
 oeuvring for position. Every little nation en- 
 deavoured to obtain the private ear and the 
 
TAKING UP POSITIUN 43 
 
 special support of one of the Ten Statesmen 
 who really mattered. There were two countries 
 in Europe, however, which were particularly 
 active at the Quai d'Orsay. One was Poland. 
 The other was Russia. 
 
 Poland at that time was represented to 
 all intents and purposes by M. Dmowski 
 alone. Dmowski is a charming man of the 
 niost amiable manners. Personally I have no 
 fault to find with him, but politically he is an 
 opportunist, a reactionary and an anti-Semite. 
 How and why he was taken at that time by 
 the Quai d'Orsay as the true and only delegate 
 of Poland, it would be hard to say. The 
 Quai d'Orsay is full of these mysteries. It 
 is of all the Foreign Offices of Europe the most 
 difficult to understand, simply because its 
 policy is generally without purpose; and it is 
 not really acquainted with the personalities 
 of other countries. It has a curious concep- 
 tion of foreign affairs, is obstinate and intensely 
 conservative. The new ideas that were shaking 
 the world were something to be opposed. 
 Dpowski, supple, polished, and Imperialist, 
 appeared to the Quai d'Orsay as a man to 
 be encouraged. He was put forward by a 
 body of emigres, while in Poland itself General 
 Pilsudski governed with the aid of the Social- 
 ists. Socialism, of course, was taken to mean 
 
44 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 Bolshevism, and for a long time Dmowski, 
 in spite of, or rather because of, his associa- 
 tions with the late Czar, his dislike of 
 agrarian reform, and his antipathy to Jews, 
 was supported by' the Quai d'Orsay as 
 against Pilsudski, who was regarded as dan- 
 gerously advanced. 
 
 Needless to say, Dmowski stood for the 
 biggest possible Poland, and he impregnated 
 with his ideas M. Pichon, the French Foreign 
 Minister, who is perfectly sincere, but who 
 is an implacable opponent of all that is not 
 orthodox and which does not conform to the 
 old diplomatic traditions. A soldier like Pil- 
 sudski, with Socialist leanings, at the head 
 of a nation, horrified M. Pichon. Thus we 
 had another clear division in the Conference, 
 France ranging herself with Dmowski against 
 the British Foreign Office and Mr. Wilson. 
 The American President was certainly favour- 
 able to Polish claims, as indeed were Mr. 
 Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour. But they 
 could not lightly consent to the unjust cutting 
 up of Germany even in favour of the Poles. 
 It should be added that later Pilsudski also 
 was anxious to have the biggest possible 
 Poland. 
 
 " You cannot," said Mr. Lloyd George one 
 day, " place millions of Germans, who, what- 
 
TAKING UP POSITION 45 
 
 ever their faults, are a very advanced people, 
 under the domination of the Poles, who are 
 far less civilized." 
 
 This of course was obvious. The position 
 of Dmowski was saved by a compromise 
 which he effected. He proposed M. Pade- 
 rewski as the Premier of Poland. M. Pade- 
 rewski is not only a musical genius, he is an 
 ardent patriot. He had worked hard in 
 America for the recognition of his country 
 and for the succour of his fellow-countrymen. 
 His fingers and his fortune were at their 
 service. The fact that he was more or less 
 the representative of Dmowski did not matter. 
 His popularity was tremendous and there was 
 no difficulty in imposing him upon the people. 
 
 The British accompanied him when he landed 
 at Dantzig, and it cannot be said that the 
 route to Warsaw was chosen with discretion. 
 Grave incidents were inevitable. The Poles, 
 even in what was undoubtedly German terri- 
 tory, put out their flags and became aggres- 
 sive towards the Germans when they saw the 
 British accompanying their Premier. The re- 
 grettable incidents and, indeed, months of 
 fighting or threatened fighting between Ger- 
 many and Poland are partly to be attributed 
 to this cause. 
 
 At any rate, the two men, Pilsudski and 
 
46 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 Dmowski, were reconciled, joined together with 
 Paderewski as the hyphen. Pilsudski re- 
 mained President, Paderewski Premier, and 
 Dmowski the principal delegate in Paris. The 
 real reason why General Haller's army was 
 kept in Paris and was not given facilities 
 for landing at Dantzig was the fear that it 
 might be used for a coup d'etat for or against 
 Pilsudski on the one hand, or would embitter 
 the fighting between Germany and Poland 
 on the other hand. From the beginning 
 America took up a strong attitude against a 
 military expedition in Poland. That military 
 expedition would have been a mad adventure, 
 and yet it found considerable support. France, 
 who was constantly preoccupied with questions 
 of the Balance of Power, was anxious to re- 
 build Poland to serve as a rampart against 
 Germany in the East. The Czecho-Slovak 
 Republic, in the calculations of the diplo- 
 matists, was destined to bar the way to the 
 South-East and to form a second rampart. 
 That Poland should collapse into Bolshevism 
 was the haunting fear of the French Foreign 
 Office, which was in its panic favourable 
 to any aind every military expedition. The 
 fear of Bolshevism, indeed, possessed all the 
 statesmen, and it can only be supposed that 
 the real reason why they did not furnish 
 
TAKING UP POSITION 47 
 
 Poland with the food-stuffs and the equipment 
 for which she vainly asked was because they 
 were stupidly suspicious of the regime in 
 Poland. 
 
 The complete absence of information in 
 those days was appalling. In official circles, 
 not only was there no knowledge of what 
 was happening in Russia and in Poland, but 
 Germany was also an unknown land. It 
 must be said that the Americans were far 
 and away the best informed. The reports 
 of their agents which I was privileged to 
 consult seemed clearer and more accurate 
 than those of any other country. Doubtless, 
 in spite of their effective part in finishing 
 the war, they still preserved something of 
 that character of neutrality which they had 
 had in the earlier years of the war. 
 
 The position in Germany was confused 
 enough. The Spartacists had attempted their 
 insurrection and Liebnecht and Rosa Luxem- 
 bourg lay dead. Ebert and Scheidemann were 
 in power, the former as President, the latter 
 as Chancellor ; but how long they would 
 last nobody dared venture to predict. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 LIGHT ON PRINKIPO 
 
 No decision taken by the Conference created 
 so much surprise as the decision to invite 
 the Russian Government to Prinkipo. It was 
 afterwards bitterly criticized, but at the time 
 it was accepted on all hands as a sign that 
 the Conference really meant to restore and 
 strengthen Russia in a spirit of good will, 
 and that fhey intended to let no political 
 considerations, no personal likes or dislikes, 
 interfere with them in their task not only 
 of making a peace treaty but of pacifying 
 Europe. In my opinion this proposal, with 
 the exception of the site, was statesmanlike 
 and sound, and if it had been sincerely carried 
 out there would probably be no Russian 
 problem to-day. One would suppose, to hear 
 the subsequent comments, that the Allies 
 were simple children who would have been 
 demoralized by the arguments of the Bol- 
 
50 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 sheviks. The fact is that the Prinkipo meet- 
 ing was chiefly designed to bring the various 
 Russian groups together and to enable them 
 if possible to reach an understanding. ^No 
 harm could have been done, and much good 
 might have come out of these negotiations. 
 The fact that Sazonoff, representing two govern- 
 ments, in the South of Russia and in Siberia, 
 and all the other Russians who were not 
 only tolerated but encouraged in Paris refused 
 the offer while the Bolsheviks accepted it 
 conditionally, seems to me to place the anti- 
 Bolsheviks in a sinister light. What were 
 they afraid of ? Many who, like Mr. Lloyd 
 George and Mr. Wilson, were implacably op- 
 posed to the Bolshevik regime, yet considered 
 that Russia, which sacrificed millions of men 
 with us in the war, should have been repre- 
 sented at the Peace Conference. The Prinkipo 
 proposal, which came from Mr. Wilson and 
 which was strongly seconded by Mr. Lloyd 
 George, was a harmless attempt to see if the 
 various parties could not agree upon a saner 
 regime in Russia which would put an end to 
 the devastating civil war. Obviously, the 
 Government which in fact was in power at 
 that moment, and which appeared to be firmly 
 established, could not be left out of account, 
 whatever might be thought of its political 
 
LIGHT ON PRINKIPO 51 
 
 principles, while the emigres and the adven- 
 turers and the dictators, and even the wiser 
 Russian statesmen, who occupied a compara- 
 tively insignificant position, were considered. 
 The Allies, above all, had to avoid the appear- 
 ance of becoming another Holy Alliance, 
 endeavouring to impose their will by force 
 upon a country in revolution. The history of 
 the Russian negotiations is extremely curious, 
 and I propose to throw a little light upon it. 
 
 It is necessary to recall the declaration of 
 the Allies. The vital part of the text is as 
 follows : 
 
 " The single object the representatives of the 
 Associated Powers have had in mind in their 
 discussions of the course they should pursue 
 with regard to Russia has been to help the 
 Russian people, not to hinder them or to 
 interfere in any manner with their right to 
 settle their own affairs in their own way. 
 They regard the Russian people as their 
 friends, not as their enemies, and are wilUng 
 to help them in any way they are willing 
 to be helped. 
 
 "It is clear to them that the troubles and 
 distresses of the Russian people will steadily 
 increase, hunger and privation of every kind 
 become more and more acute, more and more 
 widespread, and more and more impossible 
 
52 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 to relieve, unless order is restored and normal 
 conditions of labour, trade, and transportation 
 once more created, and they are seeking some 
 way in which to assist the Russian people 
 to establisii order. 
 
 " They recognize the absolute right of the 
 Russian people to direct their own affairs 
 without dictation or direction of any kind 
 from outside ; they do not wish to exploit 
 or make use of Russia in any way. 
 
 " They recognize the Revolution without 
 reservation, and will in no way and in no 
 circumstances aid or give countenance to any 
 attempt at a counter-revolution. It is not 
 their wish or purpose to favour or assist 
 any one of the organized groups now con- 
 tending for the leadership and guidance of 
 Russia as against the others. Their sole and 
 sincere purpose is to do what they can to 
 bring Russia peace and an opportunity to 
 find her way out of her present troubles. 
 
 " The Associated Powers are now engaged 
 in the solemn and responsible work of estab- 
 lishing the peace of Europe and of the world, 
 and they are keenly alive to the fact that 
 Europe and the world cannot be at peace if 
 Russia is not. They recognize and accept it 
 as their duty, therefore, to serve Russia in 
 this great matter as generously, as unselfishly. 
 
LIGHT ON PRINKIPO 53 
 
 as thoughtfully and ungrudgingly as they 
 would serve every other friend and Ally, and 
 they are ready to render this service in the 
 way that is most acceptable to the Russian 
 people. 
 
 " In this spirit and with this purpose they 
 have taken the following action : 
 
 " They invite every organized group that 
 is now exercising or attempting to exercise 
 political authority or military control any- 
 where in Siberia or within the boundaries of 
 European Russia as they stood before the 
 war just concluded (except in Finland), to 
 send representatives, not exceeding three 
 representatives for each group, to the Princes' 
 Islands, Sea of Marmora, where they will be 
 met by representatives of the Associated 
 Powers, provided in the meantime there is a 
 truce of arms among the parties invited and 
 that all armed forces anywhere sent or directed 
 against any people or territorj'^ outside the 
 boundaries of European Russia as they stood 
 before the war, or against Finland, or against 
 any people or territory whose autonomous 
 action is in contemplation in the Fourteen 
 Articles upon which the present peace 
 negotiations are based, shall be meanwhile 
 withdrawn and aggressive military action 
 cease. 
 
54 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 " These representatives are invited to confer 
 with the representatives of the Associated 
 Powers in the freest and franTcest way, with 
 a view to ascertaining the wishes of all sections 
 of the Russian people and bringing about, 
 if possible, some understanding and agreement 
 by which Russia may work out her own pur- 
 poses, and happy co-operative relations be 
 established between her people and the other 
 peoples of the world." 
 
 Five minutes after the decision to convoke 
 the Russians was taken, messages were sent 
 out to various agents giving certain instruc- 
 tions. Already the scheme was doomed to 
 failure. I have never been able to understand 
 the policy of acquiescing in public but of 
 opposing in private. Certain it is that the 
 Conference has been frustrated on more than 
 one occasion by this double policy.. Every- 
 thing that could be done was done to induce 
 all the other groups, save the Bolsheviks, to 
 decline to go to Prinkipo. They did not 
 need much persuading, but if they had been 
 flatly told that the price of Allied aid and 
 of Allied countenance was consent to this 
 plan of conciliation, who can doubt that they 
 would have thought twice before refusing ? As 
 it was, they believed that they were carrying 
 out the secret desire of the Allies in killing 
 
LIGHT ON PRINKIPO 55 
 
 the Allied suggestion. With one voice they 
 declared that they could not sit at the same 
 table as the bolsheviks. 
 
 In the meantime there was an unaccountable 
 delay in sendihg the invitation to Moscow. 
 When it was delivered, it was unsigned and 
 bore no indication of its official origin. It 
 might have emanated from some private source 
 and have been, as the Bolsheviks pretended, 
 quite unauthentic. Tchitcherine was ex- 
 tremely cautious. In reply he sent a wireless 
 message, not to the Allied Governments but 
 to a French journalist who was also a deputy 
 and the leader of the Socialist Party. M. 
 Jean Longuet, the grandson of Karl Marx, 
 as his enemies delight to call him, has cer- 
 tainly shown more indulgence towards the 
 Bolsheviks than any other responsible person 
 in France. It was probably for this reason 
 that Tchitcherine appealed to him for informa- 
 tion and for advice. He desired to know 
 whether the offer of the Allies was sincere. 
 The French authorities were puzzled to know 
 whether this message should be delivered to 
 Longuet. We were not at war with Russia, 
 officially at least, but these personal relation- 
 ships were frowned upon. The strange thing 
 is that the message was announced in the 
 columns of the Government-inspired Temps 
 
56 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 in the first instance, and only later reached 
 its destination. 
 
 Another remarkable fact is to be recorded. 
 When the staff of the Populaire (Longuet's 
 paper) drew up their reply, M. Pichon stated 
 that he could not permit the use of the Eiffel 
 Tower as a transmitting station for a private 
 communication, but he would consult his 
 colleagues on the Conference. Some further 
 time elapsed before the definite response of 
 the Allies was known. That response was a 
 blunt refusal. Some consternation was caused 
 when Longuet declared, in his paper that the 
 message had already reached Tchitcherine. 
 
 What had happened was this : no control 
 was placed by the French over the news 
 wired by the Americans or the British journal- 
 ists in France. The two Governments had 
 stipulated that the journalists should be free 
 to do their work. France exercised a strict 
 censorship upon her own newspapers, but the 
 Americans and the British were guests who 
 must be respected. Accordingly, the reply to 
 the Bolsheviks had been handed very simply 
 to an American journal and was sent as news 
 which in due course reached Tchitcherine. Here 
 began the first of a series of particularly un- 
 fortunate attacks upon Mr. Wilson. Without 
 knowing the facts, the French journals accused 
 
LIGHT ON PRINKIFO 57 
 
 him of deliberately flouting the French Govern- 
 ment, and of acting in direct contradiction 
 with the orders given in respect of a subject 
 of France. 
 
 All the delays brought us nearer the time 
 for the proposed meeting, and still no ar- 
 rangements had been made. It was not till 
 within a week of the date that the Bolshevik 
 reply, which was a conditional consent, was 
 received. By that time nobody thought seri- 
 ously of the proposal. No notice was taken 
 of the conditional consent, since in any case 
 it was the only affirmative reply, and it was 
 obviously impossible to meet the Bolsheviks 
 in the absence of the other parties. There 
 was nothing to do but decently bury the 
 . scheme. What is astonishing is that nobody 
 tried to think of any other solution, and for 
 a considerable period the Russian problem 
 was left severely alone. The Bolsheviks 
 consolidated their position and the Allies 
 half-heartedly proceeded to furnish small 
 quantities of arms to their opponents, 
 whether those opponents were Poles, Czecho- 
 slovaks, Rumanians or Russians. 
 
 It is a singular and disquieting fact that 
 at the critical moment when the Allies might 
 have proceeded to make another move Mr. 
 Winston-Churchill came postvhaste in aero- 
 
58 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 plane to Paris to veto any new proposal. 
 There were two voices in the British Govern- 
 ment, one reasonable and the other in favour 
 of a policy A outrance. There was a real 
 quarrel in the British Cabinet, in which there 
 was more than one threat to appeal to the 
 passions • of tlie public. Mr. Lloyd George 
 bowed to the storm. 
 
 At this time the Prime Minister met a 
 number of British journalists in Paris to 
 explain his position. His plea, in effect, was 
 that we knew nothing. What follows is in 
 substance what he said : 
 
 We are ignorant of what is going on in 
 Russia. The veil is drawn upon the fascinating 
 scene, which provokes on the one hand so 
 much abhorrence, and on the other a certain 
 measure of admiration. There are also the 
 most contradictory assertions as to the brutality 
 or the humanity of the Bolsheviks. M. Pichon, 
 for example, tells the most sensational story 
 of the Czar's fate, which he says was told to 
 him by Prince Lvof ; while competent wit- 
 nesses declare that th6se coloured accounts 
 are frankly fabricated. 
 
 Indeed, many of them bear the obvious 
 marks of falsehood. How many celebrities 
 have been killed at least three times ? It 
 would be easier to ask how many persons 
 
LIGHT ON PRINKIPO 59 
 
 with the smallest cl^im to fjame in Russia 
 have not been murdered on several occasions 
 by the orders of the Soviets. This kind of 
 manufactured news casts grave suspicion upon 
 all reports that attribute to the Bolsheviks 
 the responsibility for a reign of terror. Again, 
 how many obviously " faked " documents have 
 been published in the French, the American, 
 and the English Press ? When one sees the 
 deUberate forging of papers to prove the 
 case against Trotsky, it is difficult to resist 
 the conclusion that the case must be very 
 thin indeed. Perhaps it is not ; perhaps the 
 Moscow Government is all that is said of it ; 
 but why, oh why, raise such irresistible doubts 
 in the minds of reasonable men by producing 
 clumsy testimony which is palpably untrue ? 
 
 But if the peoples are ignorant of what is 
 going on in Russia, what of the various Allied 
 Governments ? The British Foreign Office 
 admitted its perplexity. It, too, was in the 
 dark. That is why the British Government, 
 wishing to come out of the clouds of prejudice 
 and of lies that surround the Russian question, 
 proposed that the Soviets should be invited 
 to send representatives to the Peace Con- 
 ference. 
 
 Why the British Press should, speaking 
 generally, have " downed " their own Govern- 
 
6o PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 ment in this matter is perhaps explained by 
 the fact that the Pichon Note of fiery refusal 
 was published first in the Humanite, which 
 is a Socialist paper and directs its fire against 
 the French Government. It had become a 
 habit among correspondents to consider it 
 in the wrong. The French Press, which is 
 most often quoted and is regarded as expressing 
 the views of France, by no means represents 
 the public opinion of the country ; and the 
 British newspaper chorus against the Humanite 
 was not appreciated in high places. 
 
 The cry was for information. More light 
 was needed before anyone could pronouce 
 definitely a verdict upon the Bolsheviks. One 
 may dislike their theories ; one may condemn 
 them academically ; but what was their actual 
 conduct ? Were they or were they not outside 
 the pale of humanity ? 
 
 The foregoing represents the arguments and 
 the state of mind of Mr. Lloyd George as 
 I noted his confession at the time. On the 
 other hand, what was the French attitude ? — 
 since it is the French who were really the only 
 delegates to fight consistently against the 
 Soviets. I had a long talk with a highly 
 placed personage who defended the French 
 point of view. In the first place, he was 
 extremely anxious to make known that France 
 
LIGHT ON PRINKIPO 6i 
 
 has never been animated by reactionary feel- 
 ings towards Russia. 
 
 There had been many heart-burnings in 
 diplomatic circles at the suggestion, put for- 
 ward so frequently in French and foreign 
 newspapers, that France, which has had her 
 own revolution which changed the history of 
 the world, should have become the home of 
 reaction, and that she should be represented 
 as endeavouring to stifle a revolution merely 
 because it is a revolution. France has always 
 regarded herself as in the vanguard of progress, 
 
 " If France is for action against the Bol- 
 sheviks," he went on, " it is not because 
 France is not as advanced as England or 
 America. It is because she has a clearly 
 reasoned point of view and is logical enough 
 to endeavour to express that point of view 
 in action. 
 
 " If a Socialist Republic had been set up 
 in Russia based upon democratic ideals, France 
 would have been ready to welcome it. But 
 something much more deadly, something which 
 menaces civilization itself, has come into being, 
 and it is necessary to combat these evil forces 
 to the full extent of our power." 
 
 I asked him to specify in plain terms the 
 somewhat nebulous accusations that have been 
 brought against the Bolsheviks, and which 
 
62 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 " France " accepts as well founded. He did 
 so as follows : 
 
 1. The Bolsheviks continue to exist by a 
 system of organized terrorism. A comparative 
 handful of men, clever but unscrupulous, 
 maintain themselves in power by methods 
 which are the opposite of democratic. 
 
 2. They have ill-treated the nationals of 
 other countries who happened to be for legiti- 
 mate purposes on their soil. 
 
 3. They agitate perpetually in contiguous 
 countries. "It is," he declared, " necessary 
 for Bolshevism to be essentially dynamic. It 
 is a system which is non-productive. It could 
 not last for a moment if it ceased to act. 
 The rulers realize this, and therefore engage 
 in constant operations against adjoining 
 nations, such as the Baltic States and Poland. 
 They can, as M. Scavenius, the Danish Minister, 
 and M. Noulens, the French Ambassador, said 
 in their evidence before the Peace Conference, 
 only live by motion, by constantly widening 
 the sphere of their influence. They would 
 instantly be overwhelmed by their own people 
 if they had not the appearance of spreading 
 their doctrines abroad, in order to persuade 
 the Russian peasantry that the whole world 
 is in process of being Bolshevized. As these 
 countries in which they work are the friends 
 
LIGHT ON PRINKIPO 6: 
 
 or the proteges of the Allies, the Allies oughi 
 not to tolerate the Bolshevik campaign." 
 
 4. If they succeed in Poland and the Baltic 
 States, then Germany will have at some 
 subsequent period an easy task in colonizing 
 these countries, for they will be permanentl) 
 weakened and will be glad to accept Germar 
 help. 
 
 5. The Bolsheviks, not content to remair 
 even in these border States, pursue theii 
 propaganda through all sorts of channels ir 
 the Allied nations, seeking to disintegrate 
 the Allies and to produce discontent anc 
 disorder in all the nations of the world. 
 
 " Look at the condition of France," he said 
 " France has suffered terribly during the foui 
 and a half years of war. The people have 
 behaved not only with the most exemplary 
 courage but the most perfect loyalty. Never- 
 theless, after such a strain there is bound tc 
 be an inevitable reaction when the tense core 
 is slackened. The world does not revert and 
 cannot revert immediately to the pleasani 
 conditions of peace. There is a natural dis- 
 satisfaction which a clever propagandist mighl 
 easily turn to his own nefarious purposes 
 The field is fertile for the agitator. We cannol 
 allow the Bolshevik to invade with his sub- 
 versive ideas a war- weary France. We musi 
 
64 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 stop all attempts to introduce Bolshevism 
 among us. The Bolshevik is the enemy of 
 all settled order, and some means of coun- 
 ter-acting his deadly propaganda must be 
 found." 
 
 I pointed out that there only seemed to be 
 two alternatives : (i) a state of war with Russia, 
 which would probably necessitate a large 
 number of men, and which he himself ad- 
 mitted was an impossible solution in the 
 existing state of France ; or (2) the beginning 
 of negotiations which offered the possibility of 
 conducting us to a satisfactory understanding 
 with the Russian people. 
 
 " There is a third possibility," he answered. 
 "There is the method of the cordon sanitaire. 
 We should merely supply the cadres in the 
 threatened districts, and by forming a ring 
 round the Bolsheviks effectively prevent their 
 extension to parts of Europe that are not / 
 yet diseased." 
 
 " How do you reply to the fear of such 
 measures developing, by force of circumstances, 
 into an expedition on a grand scale ? " I 
 asked. 
 
 He answered that the formation of an inter- 
 AUied Army was the best guarantee against 
 such results. He believed that the Russians 
 themselves, in the face of ' a cordon sanitaire, 
 
LIGHT ON PRINKIPO 65 
 
 would not tolerate for long the reign of the 
 Bolsheviks. 
 
 The true reason why France took the lead 
 against the Bolsheviks was that, in spite of 
 victory, Revolution was always grumbling in 
 dark corners, and that a great deal of French 
 money (so precious in the financial crisis 
 which was to come upon her) was locked up 
 and lost in Russia. When this French official 
 said " France," it must not be supposed that 
 " France " means the French people, who 
 were tired of strife and were largely against 
 any intervention. A little later the French 
 sailors in the Black Sea hoisted the Red Flag, 
 and the French troops at Odessa and in the 
 South of Russia generally declined to fight. 
 This Russian discussion was like a leitmotiv 
 which was heard continuously throughout the 
 course of the Conference. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE LEAGUE IS BORN 
 
 When Mr. Wilson was obliged by home duties 
 to leave Europe for America in the middle 
 of February, the Conference had really accom- 
 plished nothing. It had made preliminary 
 studies : it had begun the process of setting 
 up a large number of Commissions — a Com- 
 mission on Responsibility, a Commission on 
 Reparation, a Labour Commission, a Com- 
 mission on Ports and Waterways, Territorial 
 Commission — which were divided and sub- 
 divided and were co-ordinated by Super-com- 
 missions : it had heard the claims of this or 
 that nation ; Japan had expressed her views 
 very forcibly though politely on the allocation 
 of the Caroline and Marshall Islands to her, 
 and America had become alarmed at her 
 possible extension in the Pacific, while China 
 had made charges of a Japanese menace of 
 war against her in respect of Kiao-Chow : . 
 
 67 
 
68 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 Mr. W. M. Hughes, irrepressible as ever 
 emphatically declared that Australia must hav 
 her share of German colonies ; Greece ha( 
 aspired even to Constantinople ; Rumania an( 
 Serbia were wrangling over the Banat o 
 Temesvar : and already the division of Turkey 
 in Asia Minor was causing some bad feeling 
 particularly between England and France 
 The small nations had revolted against thei 
 virtual extinction as members of the Con 
 ference, and it had required all the diplomati< 
 art of M. Jules Cambon to pacify them 
 General Botha had been sent off to Polant 
 to try to put a stop to the three wars in whicl 
 this key-State of the new Europe was engagec 
 — with Germany, with the Bolsheviks, anc 
 with the Czecho-Slovaks about the territorj 
 of Teschen, which is a rich mining districi 
 claimed by the two nations. There had beer 
 a Supreme Economic Council nominated tc 
 deal with such questions as finance, food 
 shipping, raw materials, and the blockade 
 But how far had the Conference — or rathei 
 the Big Ten, as the Executive Council o 
 Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries camt 
 to be called — proceeded in its work of drawing 
 up the Treaty ? It must be regretfully acknow 
 ledged that three months were, if not wasted 
 at least filled with mere preliminaries sucl 
 
THE LEAGUE IS BORN 69 
 
 as the constitution of the Conference and of 
 Commissions, with regarding the problems to 
 be settled in the face and then passing on to 
 something else. The most severe criticism 
 must be made in respect of those first three 
 months. The statesmen seemed quite un- 
 conscious that Europe was anxious above all 
 to have finished with war, that the plain man 
 wanted to resume his normal life. Already 
 there were strikes and rumours of strikes 
 in every country of the Allies ; and in Russia 
 and in Germany there was no stability gained 
 by waiting. 
 
 The fact is that there was a great diver- 
 gence of views and that the statesmen were 
 afraid to come to grips with each other. On 
 the one hand, Mr. Wilson stood for a Society 
 of Nations, a peace of reconciliation, a peace 
 in which there should be no punitive indem-, 
 nities, no violation of the right of peoples 
 to dispose of themselves ; while everybody 
 else, though unable openly to oppose these 
 things, Was bent upon obtaining this or that 
 advantage for his country. It must not be 
 supposed that in putting the matter in a 
 sentence I wish it to be believed that American 
 people are much more idealistic than British 
 or French or Italian people. They had their 
 material reward — a bigger material reward 
 
70 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 thaii any other nation could possibly get 
 out of the War. They occupied the foremost 
 position in industry and trade and their 
 shipping had multiplied incredibly. They 
 could well afford to be magnanimous, since 
 they had all they wanted. It is precisely 
 when you have got all you want that you 
 begin to make romantic renunciations. In- 
 deed, it is difficult to see what America could 
 obtain which could be squared with her policy 
 of minding her own business. At the same 
 time Mr. Wilson was, I am persuaded, genu- 
 inely and nobly anxious to help the nations 
 to make a just peace which would be durable. 
 This meant that some Imperialistic hopes 
 of France, for example, had to be set aside. 
 M. Cleraenceau was too good a hater not to 
 wish to despoil Germany, to take a sweet 
 revenge for 1871, careless of the consequences 
 a generation hence. Italy, too, was exceed- 
 ingly chauvinistic and was claiming her booty 
 as victor. The British delegates, though 
 moderate in tone, wavered between the human 
 passion of crushing Germany and the vision 
 of a world joining all its efforts for its redemp- 
 tion. Japan played determinedly for its own 
 hand. Altogether the members of the party 
 in M. Pichon's Gobelins-tapestried room were 
 afraid of each other, tried to outflank each 
 other, to wear out each other. 
 
THE LEAGUE IS BORN 71 
 
 The laying down of a complicated machinery 
 through which every proposal has to pass 
 is the most effective way of " officializing " 
 and so of killing any human idea. It is a 
 mistake to suppose that because the Executive 
 Council was small its methods were simple. 
 On the contrary. Every suggestion had to 
 undergo the process that I have called 
 " officializing." It was written down, a 
 memorandum was made, it was submitted 
 to experts for their observations, perhaps it 
 passed through a Commission. The system 
 was long, long. ... I often felt in those days 
 that if the statesmen could really chat freely 
 together as you and I and our friends discuss 
 the universe over a cup of coffee or a glass 
 of whisky at our fireside in the evening, not 
 only would they understand some of the 
 most pressing problems better, but they would 
 understand each other, and unite in sympa- 
 thetic action. As it was, the relations of 
 the statesmen, in spite of their perpetual 
 personal contact, their pretence at affability, 
 remained official. They moved to the end 
 each in his own sphere. Their orbits touched 
 sometimes, but never interlocked. If they 
 had only put their legs on the mantelpiece 
 in each other's studies. ... 
 
 One thing President Wilson was deter- 
 
72 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 mined to accomplish before he went back 
 to America. He wanted a draft copy of 
 the Covenant of the League of Nations. And 
 yet a week before he was due to sail the project 
 remained a pious resolution. 
 
 Ah, then and there was mounting in hot 
 haste ! One of those bustles which have 
 characterized the Conference — a bustle as if 
 time were the essence of the contract after 
 a long period of time-wasting — took place. 
 No more talk about the Covenant — ^it must 
 be made a reality at once. Never did the 
 Conference work harder than during the few 
 days which preceded Mr. Wilson's departure — 
 except during the days which followed the 
 Germans' arrival, when we had the same 
 sudden flinging together of the Peace Treaty. 
 Would the Commission finish in time ? It was 
 a feverish period, in which midnight meetings 
 took place at the Hotel de Crillon, which the 
 Americans had taken for their headquarters. 
 Mr. Wilson himself was the driving force. 
 There were many schemes prepared, but none 
 of them approached the British in complete- 
 ness ; and it is good here to pay a tribute to 
 Lord Robert Cecil, who showed himself to 
 have a real grip of the subject, and to have 
 a commanding and pleasant personality which 
 made him perhaps the most prominent figure 
 
THE LEAGUE IS BORN 73 
 
 on the Commission. General Smuts, who had 
 drawn up a plan which had many merits, 
 must also be commended for his labours. 
 Throughout the proceedings he has shown 
 himself willing to take up any task in the 
 interests of peace and democracy and has 
 had a truly moderating influence. His sage 
 counsel saved the Conference from committing 
 irreparable errors on many occasions. 
 
 Lord Robert Cecil was insistent throughout 
 on the whole-hearted acceptance of the prin- 
 ciple of the League by- Great Britain. His 
 idea was that the League would be the " watch- 
 dog of peace." There was to be no war begun 
 by the members of the League until every 
 peaceable means had been exhausted. M. 
 Bourgeois, the French exponent of a League 
 of Peace, pressed his point of having an 
 international police force to make the decisions 
 of the organization respected. The Japanese, 
 of whom Baron Makino was the chief spokes- 
 man — a courteous, quiet man who was silent 
 except when Japanese interests were con- 
 cerned — were anxious to express in the Cove- 
 nant the abolition of the colour line so far 
 as it meant the inequality of races. This was 
 a morsel difficult for Mr. Wilson to swallow, 
 since the free admission of Japanese into 
 American life is a vexed question — a question 
 
74 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 which concerns also the Australians. The 
 President in the Commission advocated the 
 need for religious equality in elevated language. 
 
 " And race equality," interrupted the Baron. 
 
 Mr. Wilson's face changed. His " Sunday 
 sermon," as his American critics call his 
 speeches, came to a dead stop. Colonel House, 
 the President's friend and right-hand man, 
 was conciliatory ; and more than once he 
 succeeded in pouring oil on the troubled 
 /Waters. There were deadlocks and delays, 
 but on the whole the Commission worked well 
 with its eye on the clock — a race against time. 
 Thanks to these long after-dinner gatherings 
 a first draft of the Covenant was put together, 
 and on the very eve of his voyage Mr. Wilson 
 presented the text at a full sitting of the 
 Conference. 
 
 It cannot now be denied that everybody 
 was not pleased with the text. There is 
 always a difference between a proposal which 
 is half-defined and the proposal in cold print 
 that disappoints us. The first speech of Mr. 
 Wilson at the January meeting was a ringing 
 challenge. He awoke the utmost enthusiasm 
 with his declaration that he was a Crusader, 
 that no item of his proposals would be abated, 
 that expediency and compromise could not 
 be tolerated. We felt when the concrete 
 
THE LEAGUE IS BORN 75 
 
 thing was presented some sense of disillusion. 
 The Socialists in particular and the advanced 
 parties generally had expected more. There 
 were distinct traces of haste ; the midnight 
 meetings had discreetly left out of the Coven- 
 ant matters on which controversy might have 
 been prolonged. Mr. Wilson stressed the fact 
 that something had been born alive ; and it 
 is precisely this truth which should console 
 us for many lost illusions : the League may 
 grow into the biggest and most effective 
 organization yet put on foot to settle disputes 
 between nations. It has at least saved the 
 Conference from failure. With the League 
 there is always hope of justice in the world ; 
 and the many mistakes of the Conference may 
 be rectified by the League. 
 
 Undoubtedly the most important criticism 
 is that which concerns the enforcement of 
 the decisions of the League. A League which 
 is without power is useless ; for behind moral 
 authority there is still need of the sword. 
 I think I ought to set out the special 
 views of the French. When I discussed with 
 M. Leon Bourgeois, in his study in the shadow 
 of the old church of Saint-Sulpice, his two 
 amendments which were rejected, I could not 
 help feeling, as the rich voice of the church 
 bells broke the old-world silence of this peace- 
 
76 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 ful corner of Paris, that some ingratitude 
 has unwittingly been shown towards the fine 
 old statesman who has devoted his life to 
 the cause of international harmony. We are 
 apt to forget that the League of Nations is 
 only carrying a stage further the thought of 
 M. Bourgeois at The Hague. Without The 
 Hague it may be that not even the war would 
 have made possible a Society of Nations. 
 The idea was launched long ago ; it is only 
 being taken up with a fresh determination, 
 and has been popularized by four and a half 
 years' bitter experience. 
 
 No one is at once more ready to confess 
 that the Hague machinery was not sufficiently 
 complete, and to endeavour to increase the 
 efficiency of the proposed Society, than M. 
 Bourgeois, the father, or at least the god- 
 father, of these previous attempts to regulate 
 the affairs of the world by reason. 
 
 Let me briefly recall that although The 
 Hague did not prevent the final crash of 
 the Great War, it nevertheless, setting up 
 the principle of arbitration at a moment 
 when the peoples were apathetic instead of 
 sympathetic, as they are now, prevented more 
 than one European conflagration. The affair 
 of the Dogger Bank will be remembered : 
 The Hague saved England and Russia from 
 
THE LEAGUE IS BORN yy 
 
 coming to blows. The Casablanca affair wore 
 an ugly aspect ; again The Hague intervened 
 and France and Germany remained peaceful 
 neighbours. There was another incident 
 between Italy and France, in which the 
 nations have reason to be grateful to The 
 Hague. The same principle of arbitration at 
 a period a little earlier prevented a possible 
 misunderstanding between America and 
 Russia. Thus we have all already proved 
 the value of an International Court. There 
 remained, however, the imperative duty of 
 erecting the new Society on a more solid 
 base. 
 
 It is just because the base is not solid that 
 M. Bourgeois, who sees the dream of his life 
 coming true, was so insistent upon two points. 
 There are two questions which are root- 
 questions, and which are not dealt with 
 decisively enough in the Covenant. Unless 
 war can be prevented, any more positive and 
 creative duties cannot be performed. There- 
 fore the League of Nations should have the 
 right of taking effective measures (i) in respect 
 of the disarmament of nations, and (2) in 
 respect of the ability in the last resort to 
 call up instantly troops from every country 
 adhering to the pact in order to prevent 
 aggression. 
 
78 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 The Society of Nations possesses no real 
 controlling power either with regard to dis- 
 arming the various countries or with regard 
 to providing a military weapon in case of 
 need. 
 
 Supposing, as M. Bourgeois said to me, a 
 country — any country, even a country ad- 
 hering to the Society of Nations — chose to 
 manufacture arms secretly. What could be 
 done ? Nothing. Nobody would have the 
 right to investigate. It needs no remarkable 
 flight of the imagination to conceive a nation 
 of bad faith. 
 
 " If there is no continuous control," said 
 M. Bourgeois, " if we only decide to make 
 an inquiry occasionally because we are sus- 
 picious of some particular country and of 
 some particular circumstance, that, indeed, 
 would be deeply wounding to the amour 
 propre of the country concerned. It would 
 be an accusation. It would excite indigna- 
 tion. It would lead to incidents, perhaps of 
 the gravest kind. It might menace the unity 
 of the League of Nations. 
 
 " But if the operation is a constant one, 
 in the regular routine of things, it would be 
 no more humiliating than the regular visit 
 of accountants to check the books of a bank 
 is humiliating. It would be in the natural 
 
THE LEAGUE IS BORN 79 
 
 course of the operations of the permanent 
 Commission of the League of Nations." 
 
 With regard to the practical recommenda- 
 tions of the proposed League as to the 
 precise measure in which every country should 
 disarm, M. Bourgeois again made his point, 
 which was later accepted by the Conference, 
 that the reduction should be regulated not 
 merely in accordance with the size and impor- 
 tance of the country (which would regard its 
 soldiery as a sort of armed police force), but 
 in accordance with the peculiar perils in- 
 volved. There are in Europe several parts 
 which may be regarded as danger-spots. The 
 frontier of France, historically speaking at 
 any rate, is one of them. He contends that 
 you cannot fairly ask France to strip herself 
 of possibilities of defence when she is the 
 advance guard of a certain civilization. There 
 must be, in the interests not only of the 
 French nation but of the League of Nations 
 of which France may conceivably be the 
 first defender, a particular consideration of 
 her position. This is not to say that she 
 wants large armies, but only that they shall 
 not be so inferior to others as a mere pro- 
 portional rule-of-thumb method of calculation 
 would make them. 
 
 His second amendment was equally impor- 
 
8o PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 tant, inasmuch as it logically providesp the 
 Society of Nations with the military means 
 of carrying out its high mission. To leave 
 the Society helpless in case of need would be 
 foolish. The Society after one humiliation of 
 that kind would be a laughing-stock, it would 
 be at an end ; no one would ever respect its 
 authority again. What then ! Is it to have 
 an army of its own — the International Army 
 dear to so many thinkers ? Obviously there 
 are at present difficulties in the way of keeping 
 a mixed army posted at the danger-spots of 
 Europe. That may come later. M. Bourgeois 
 proposes not an International Army but an 
 International Commission, which would not 
 be ready to call upon the various nations after 
 the blow had fallen, but, sitting permanently, 
 would foresee and forearm against trouble, 
 calling upon the contracting countries to 
 furnish troops at the proper time according 
 to a prearranged plan. 
 
 He refrains from calling such a body a 
 G.H.Q. or an Etat-Major, since military terms 
 are not too palatable ; but in reality his 
 scheme provided for a League of Nations 
 G.H.Q., which would not wait for war to 
 be sprung upon it by a nefarious Power bent 
 upon wrecking the peace of the world and 
 hoping to catch the scattered Governments 
 napping, but which would in case of peril 
 
THE LEAGUE IS BORN 8i 
 
 be able to ask each country to furnish its 
 pledged contingents, to be manoeuvred in 
 the vicinity of the danger-spot, just as 
 England and France have manoeuvred their 
 Navy and Army in accordance with possible 
 eventualities a score of times. 
 
 It is not hard to understand why Mr. Wilson 
 absolutely opposed these proposals. America 
 could not permit inspection (when it is a 
 question which strikes home, the difficulty of 
 applying principles is obvious) and could not 
 consent to be at the mercy of a G.H.Q. Later, 
 a special alliance outside the League to pro- 
 tect France in case of attack was agreed to, 
 but it was subject to Parliamentary ratifi- 
 cation. Always this haunting fear of " the 
 next war " ! The millennium is not assured. 
 Nevertheless there were high hopes when Mr. 
 Wilson triumphantly secured the foundation 
 of his League of Nations ; and it was a tre- 
 mendous moment in the history of the world 
 when, with all its defects, the League was 
 accepted in the glittering Salle de I'Horloge. 
 That was Mr. Wilson's apotheosis. After that 
 his star, which had been in the ascendant, 
 began to decline, and he was beaten on almost 
 every point by the diplomatists of Europe, 
 while the politicians of America began to 
 clamour against him. 
 
 6 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES 
 
 After the departure of Mr. Wilson the Con- 
 ference seemed to be in the doldrums. We 
 had come to the middle of February without 
 really taking a single decision, for the Covenant 
 so rapidly prepared was only a first draft, 
 which was subsequently the basis for dis- 
 cussion. And yet nobody regarded this serious 
 interruption of the labours of the Conference 
 with dismay. It was regarded as a natural 
 break in the proceedings, and the general 
 remark in official quarters was that it would 
 allow the Commissions to draw up their reports. 
 Mr. Lloyd George went back to England to 
 endeavour by his remarkable talent for con- 
 ciliation to prevent the strikes and threatened 
 strikes from developing tp a national cata- 
 strophe. Mr. Balfour in the meantime took 
 charge of British affairs in Paris. He has 
 kept in the background, and his name has 
 
84 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 barely been mentioned, but I think that in 
 justice to him I should now say that it was 
 chiefly upon his counsel that Mr. Lloyd George 
 acted. The memoranda which he prepared 
 were models of clearness. It should also be 
 revealed that some of the most ingenious 
 combinations by which two opposite ideals 
 were reconciled came from his subtle brain. 
 Whether the compromises which he invented 
 are good or bad, whether they can possibly 
 last, is another question. What is important 
 to note is that without them the Conference 
 must have come to nothing and have broken 
 up without agreeing. 
 
 Only one of the three outstanding figures 
 was left. Even M. Clemenceau turned his 
 attention to domestic affairs. Most of the 
 British Pressmen went home. Nothing could 
 possibly happen, they said. The world could 
 wait. Peace could be postponed. And yet 
 the next fortnight was the most stirring period 
 in the history of the Conference. 
 
 Clemenceau was assassinated. The news in 
 the early morning of February 19th caused 
 a great sensation. It spread like wildfire. 
 The newspapers which gave the details at 
 midday were eagerly seized from the hands 
 of the sellers, and the picturesque kiosques 
 on the boulevards were raided by excited 
 
DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES 85 
 
 crowds. It is no exaggeration to state that 
 at that time the French Premier was a 
 national hero. The attempt on his hfe 
 aroused deep indignation. The legend had 
 taken root that M. Clemenceau alone had 
 tnade victory possible. Le Pere La Victoire 
 was held in the highest veneration. The 
 circumstances of the attack are as follows : 
 M. Clemenceau left his house in the rue Franklin 
 to call at the Ministere de la Guerre and then to 
 proceed to the Hotel de Crillon for a conference 
 with Mr. Balfour and Colonel House. His 
 motor-car had only travelled a hundred yards 
 when at the corner of the Boulevard Delessert 
 a shot rang out. It was followed by another 
 and yet another. A young man in a state 
 of great excitement ran frantically after 
 Clemenceau's car, firing again and again. Of 
 course, it was almost impossible to hit anyone 
 seated in a closed carriage proceeding at a 
 good pace, and Cottin, the young Anarchist, 
 discharged his Browning very much at random. 
 A policeman was wounded, and the chauffeur 
 was struck by a bullet without being hurt. Of 
 the bullets which entered the limousine, one 
 or two lodged in Clemenceau's clothes and 
 one pierced his shoulder. The windows and 
 the wind-screens were broken, but apart 
 from shock the Premier did not appear to 
 
86 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 have suffered much' injury. There was, of 
 course, an attempt to lynch Cottin by the 
 crowd which instantly collected, and an 
 innocent person who tried to save Cottin 
 from the violence of the bystanders was 
 arrested as an accomplice. The affair was 
 only dangerous because of the advanced age 
 of M. Clemenceau. Although the Premier 
 was cool and cheerful, and although the ball 
 had touched no vital point, fear was felt because 
 of the fact that the patient was nearly eighty 
 years old. In reality, in spite of the reassuring 
 reports which were issued, I was informed by 
 a statesman in daily contact with him that 
 for some time after the incident M. Clemenceau 
 seemed to be greatly affected both mentally 
 and physically. It could not well be other- 
 wise. 
 
 The consternation in Conference circles was 
 extrfeme, and anxious inquiries from marshals 
 and from statesmen were received, while 
 messages of sympathy poured in upon the 
 veteran. He was kept on a low diet and 
 advised by his doctors to sleep in an armchair 
 in order not to disturb the bullet. An opera- 
 tion to remove the bullet was considered in- 
 advisable, and it is probable that he will carry 
 this memento of the Conference to his tomb. 
 As for the young Anarchist, he was tried within 
 
DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES 87 
 
 a few weeks by court martial and sentenced 
 to death. In any case M. Clemenceau, who 
 has on many occasions written vigorously 
 against the death penalty, would have advised 
 the commutation of the sentence. But it 
 so happened that a man named Villain who 
 had, four and a half years before, on the very 
 eve of war, assassinated the great Socialist 
 Jaures and so created a situation dangerous 
 for the national unity, was acquitted a few 
 days later by a Paris jury. It is difficult to 
 understand the mentality of this jury. What- 
 e,ver the political opinions of Jaures were, he 
 was a true patriot and his death was a real 
 loss for France. It was necessary for the 
 Premier in those early war days to promise 
 by placards on all the walls of Paris that 
 Villain should be punished. The trial was 
 postponed year after year, and when this 
 astounding acquittal came, the working classes 
 were rightly indignant and organized a 
 mighty demonstration. Much play was made 
 with the contrast between the respective fates 
 of the two political assassins. The misguided 
 Cottin found his life spared and the penalty 
 reduced to ten years' imprisonment. 
 
 More than ever we were in an interregnum. 
 Officially it was explained that the Executive 
 Committee, known as the Big Five or the 
 
88 PEACEMAKING AT PARIS 
 
 Council of Ten, were really helpless until they 
 had the reports of the separate Commissions. 
 We were assured that no time was being 
 wasted. It is curious now to re-read the 
 statements which were made then to excuse 
 the policy of secrecy. What became of the 
 Plenary Sessions which, it was understood, 
 would be held regularly ? The Ten were, 
 so to speak, to prepare the Agenda. Only 
 their preliminary talks were to be regarded 
 as private. No decision of any sort or kind 
 in connection with peace was to be taken 
 without acquainting the whole world. There 
 was not the smallest intention of concealing 
 any conclusion. As a fact, the conclusions 
 were concealed, officially at least, until "long 
 after Germany knew them. Even the Plenary 
 Sessions were prearranged and were formal. 
 
 Again the criticism which was levelled 
 against the Permanent Committee because it 
 would seem to draw an invidious distinction 
 between the small and the large Powers, 
 condemning the former to impotence, was 
 said to be not fair. It was agreed that among 
 the seventy delegates you had to choose a 
 select committee ; for such an unwieldy body 
 as the Conference presents in the Plenary 
 Session would never arrive anywhere if it 
 were given the job of disentangling the many 
 
DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES 89 
 
 problems that must be solved. It is true 
 that these Powers were not elected by the 
 others, but somebody had to begin the pro- 
 ceedings and decide, the constitution, and 
 how could any fair choice have differed from 
 the composition of the Permaiient Committee 
 as it existed in fact ? It was upon the Big 
 Powers that the heat and burden of the day 
 fell. They had sustained the war. They had 
 the largest interests at stake ; without their 
 help the little nations and the new nations 
 were lost ; their function was not to go over the 
 heads of the smaller peoples, but simply to 
 sift the questions and to decide in what way 
 they should come before the full Conference, 
 where the real decisions must be taken. As 
 a fact, never did they come before the smaller 
 nations except at the very end of the Con- 
 ference, when a rapid resume was made by 
 M. Tardieu, to which it was impossible to reply. 
 During the interregnum, territorial disputes 
 were to be worked out by experts to whom 
 the various problems had been submitted. 
 The League of Nations would be planned in 
 more workmanlike fashion. Such matters as 
 breaches of the laws of war, reparation, 
 regulation of labour, problems relating to 
 finance, etc., would continue to be studied 
 without intermission. The method of the 
 
90 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 Permanent Committee had been to put a 
 large number of questions in train concurrently, 
 so that they might be solved simultaneously. 
 This apologia was of course worthless. The 
 Big Powers became more dnd more the secret 
 and the fumbling arbiters of the world. 
 
 As for Mr. Lloyd George, during the Con- 
 ference vacation he saw England nearer to the 
 brink of disaster than it had ever been during 
 the war. A dangerous wave of wild anarchy 
 swept the country. The railway workers, the 
 electricians, the miners, were all more or less 
 justified in their demands ; but the spirit of 
 the revolt was different from the spirit of any 
 previous revolt. It cannot be denied that 
 if the menace had been realized many things 
 must have been broken. The Peace Confer- 
 ence must have been broken. Perhaps 
 Parliament would have been broken. I know 
 that the most responsible statesmen passed 
 a mauvais quart d'heure. There was an eco- 
 nomic motive in these demands, which were 
 bigger than any previous demands ; but 
 there was more : there was a deep resentment 
 against the existing order of things. There 
 was a sense of disillusion. Peace had not 
 brought peace. To live was harder than ever. 
 The expected Paradise had not been reached. 
 There was a reaction from the horrors of war. 
 
DELAYS. AND DIFFICULTIES 91 
 
 and a reaction from the horrors of being too 
 much governed. Paris, too, had become for 
 the people the place where politicians played 
 or planned dark deeds behind closed doors. 
 Only the presence of Mr. Lloyd George ' in 
 England saved the situation. The setting 
 up of a Labour Parliament was a happy idea. 
 I shall never forget the expression of relief and 
 of jubilation with which the Prime Minister 
 told me, when I met him, that by a miracle 
 the worst moment had been safely passed 
 and that, having got the men to negotiate 
 with their " masters " and the Government, 
 there was every hope that the ugly mood 
 would blow over. He was right. There is 
 after all nothing like talking. If you begin 
 to talk you are lost — as the Conference re- 
 membered a little later, when the Germans 
 were summoned to Versailles with the strict 
 injunction that -there was to be no verbal 
 discussion ! 
 
 At the opening of Parliament, the Premier 
 summed up the position ably enough. It 
 was, he said, not easy to define the causes of 
 the unrest. Some were legitimate, some were 
 not. There had been no unemployment or 
 economic distress during the war, and no 
 poverty. What was happening was due to 
 the strain of the last four years. There was 
 
92 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 also the fear of unemployment, and unsatis- 
 factory social conditions. Working men were 
 intolerant of overcrowding. Building had 
 been at a standstill for five years, and the 
 restrictions on the people's luxuries had 
 probably contributed to the unrest. 
 
 In the meantime Mr. Wilson began to 
 experience difficulties too. They were 
 certainly calculated to discourage him. Oppo- 
 sition to his scheme for a League of Nations, 
 chiefly on the ground that America must 
 not be entangled in the cogwheels of European 
 diplomacy, was openly declared ; while the 
 elections went against him. For the moment 
 he was stirred to defiance. His magnificent 
 speech to the people of America before he 
 crossed the Atlantic again was perhaps his 
 masterpiece. He was in fighting trim. If 
 he had always encountered only open opposi- 
 tion he would probably have won : but when 
 he found the Conference politely against him 
 on this point and on that, he began to give 
 way and was lost. While Mr. Wilson keeps 
 in contact with the people he is strong, but 
 behind closed doors he is weak. He gives 
 way in the end if only he is pressed long 
 enough. He saved the League alive : that 
 is his triumph ; but he abandoned one by 
 one his famous Fourteen Points. 
 
DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES 93 
 
 What is most important to remember is 
 that up to this time the voice of Mr. Wilson 
 had been regarded as the, voice of America. 
 When French reactionaries and British 
 Imperiahsts (they really exist in diplomatic 
 circles) discovered that Mr. Wilson was only 
 an ordinary politician at home, not at all 
 regarded as a demigod, they took heart. 
 It was a smashing blow for the Wilsonian 
 principles when it was seen that America was 
 divided upon them. The prestige of the 
 President never recovered. His position was 
 from that moment vitiated. Indeed, the 
 situation seemed serious enough. It only 
 required thirty-two Senators to vote against 
 acceptance of the League of Nations for 
 the project to be killed, so far as the United 
 States' entry into the organization was con- 
 cerned, and thirty-seven were stated to have 
 actually given their signatures to Mr. Lodge. 
 It appeared certain that others were disposed 
 to act with Lodge. A two-thirds majority 
 was necessary if the Wilson policy was to be 
 accepted. Where was he to obtain the 
 necessary number of votes in support ? 
 
 Some of those in France who had been his 
 political opponents were alarmed when they 
 were faced with the naked possibility of 
 American disinterestedness in France's future. 
 
94 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 They had attacked the President as an idealist, 
 and expressed themselves in favour of the 
 so-called practical policy of secret diplomacy, 
 military alliances, strong frontiers, and spoils 
 to victors. 
 
 Their criticisms had "been sent to America 
 as munitions for the anti- Wilson party there. 
 Suddenly, by Mr. Lodge's action, they saw 
 that for France the sole alternative to the 
 Society of Nations was the old Europe, with 
 balances of power and antagonisms that must 
 lead to fresh warfare, in which France would 
 be without American support. The solidarity 
 of Britain with America also struck them, 
 and they wrote dismally of the isolation of 
 France without the League of Nations. The 
 dilemma in which they were landed was very 
 painful, and they prayed for the defeat of 
 the Lodge policy. At the same time they 
 worked for the defeat of the Wilson policy. 
 
 Altogether, when at list the effective members 
 of the Conference were about to reunite again 
 in the first weeks of March, the horizon was 
 clouded. It was to become blacker still. The 
 problems that faced the Conference with a 
 Europe tumbling in ruins grew harder and not 
 easier with the lapse of time. The Spa incident 
 brought matters to a head. 
 
 The Spa incident, which came opportunely 
 
DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES 95 
 
 enough, and reminded statesmen of their re- 
 sponsibiHties — reminded them that they had 
 the task of reconstruction as well as a punitive 
 task — arose out of a refusal on the part of the 
 German delegates, who met our representatives 
 in the convenient town of Spa, to give up the 
 German merchant fleet according to the terms 
 of the renewal of the armistice until we had 
 on our side given a definite pledge to send a 
 specific amount of food-stuffs into Germany. 
 There was fighting in the streets of Berlin ; 
 and without food Germany was lost. There 
 was a great outcr}^ about German insolence 
 in attempting to " bargain " with us ; but 
 no one who was aware of the truth could 
 do otherwise than rejoice that the crisis had 
 arisen, since it meant that the danger was 
 made plain. Also there is no doubt Germany 
 was technically right. We had undertaken 
 to use her ships to help in feeding her. Mr. 
 Lloyd George is the quickest-sighted man in 
 Europe. It was to him that we owed the 
 right solution of the ships and food contro- 
 versy. In the teeth of the clamour which 
 any leniency for Germany then aroused, he 
 took his stand that Admiral Wemyss should 
 go to Brussels for a new meeting and should 
 give a clear guarantee to Germany instead 
 of brow-beating and bullying her. The advice 
 
96 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 to indulge in mere menaces or treat the 
 situation haughtily was disregarded. The 
 position, indeed, was far too grave to permit 
 of levity or pride. The whole outcome of 
 the Conference, the very existence, in fact, 
 of the Conference, depended upon feeding 
 Germany at this juncture. 
 
 " We simply nnist pour food into Germany," 
 declared Mr. Lloyd George to his colleagues, 
 " otherwise there will be no Germany to make 
 a Treaty of Peace. You must remember 
 that there was nothing in the original armistice 
 terms regarding the merchant ships, and British 
 official opinion is that we made a bargain to 
 employ the ships immediately for the salvation 
 of Germany from hunger." 
 
 A remarkable report, which greatly influenced 
 the Conference to this decision, reaching Mr. 
 Lloyd George while he was speaking and being 
 thrown into the debates with dramatic effect, 
 came from General Plumer, who showed that 
 there was no pretence and no bluff, that 
 the suffering among the German children was 
 terrible, and that the British soldiers in Ger- 
 many could not look on unmoved. It was 
 not a matter of sentiment or philanthrop}'. 
 " Quite apart from decent humanitarian 
 feelings," said the Premier, " we cannot afford 
 to starve Germany now the war is ended. 
 
DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES 
 
 Bolshevism has no chance if German 
 fed, but already leaders, who certainly 
 not Anarchists but belong to the most inte 
 tual class, are beginning to tell the pe 
 that the position cannot be worse, that 
 Allies cannot take away the soil and the m 
 and that if they cannot get food, then Gern 
 will simply go mad. We shall have to 
 long indefinitely the occupation if we 
 faced with passive resistance or Bolshe\ 
 with their incalculable consequences. F 
 would be a far-off vision." 
 
 As early as a month before — at the begin 
 of February — I had in article after ai 
 called attention to the situation in Eui 
 The Conference acted late, and it did 
 even then discern the danger which ex 
 in other parts of Europe. The attempt 
 relief which were made were grotesqueh 
 adequate. There was always a great de 
 haggling about methods of payment. How c 
 the countries pay ? Even Mr. Lloyd Gf 
 was not free from this unfortunate tend 
 to make relief contingent upon cash d 
 You do not begin to hold a long so' 
 inquiry into the estate of a starving i 
 or, if the house of your next-door neigh 
 is burning — a conflagration which may 1 
 down your own house in a blaze — bai 
 
58 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 with him as to the price he will pay for your 
 assistance. But the food-stuffs for Germany 
 were perilously hung up while these delibera- 
 tions took place, while for other countries 
 the distribution continued to leave much to 
 be desired. Still the broad fact remains that, 
 through the timely pleading of the Prime 
 Minister, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, 
 accompanied by Sir Joseph Maclay, Minister 
 oi Shipping, and others, met in Brussels the 
 German Armistice Commission, and resumed 
 negotiations with regard to the surrender of 
 the German mercantile ships and the supply 
 of food to Germany ; and that the British 
 Admiral made a firm offer, and not a nebulous 
 promise. For the next six weeks credits were 
 to be opened, amply covered by the possession 
 of the merchant fleet. After that period other 
 arrangements were made. Over one and a 
 half million tons of fats were to be delivered 
 within the following six months. 
 
 Mr. G. H. Roberts, the British Food Controller, 
 who was in Paris as a member of the Supreme 
 Economic Council, ably and courageously 
 sxposed the situation. He showed that there 
 was no shortage of food in the world. The 
 problem lay partly in the inability of most of 
 the applicants for food-stuffs to pay for what 
 they purchased and partly in the difficulty of 
 
DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES 99 
 
 transport. The shortage was one of shipping. 
 There were large stocks of food in distant 
 parts of the world, but the problem was how 
 to move them. He acknowledged that when 
 he read the letters and reports which the 
 British Government was daily receiving from 
 its agents, he was unable to comprehend how 
 the German people had been able to hold 
 out as long as they had. 
 
 In connection with the question of raising 
 the blockade, Mr. Roberts pointed out certain 
 facts. Several European Governments had 
 large stocks of food accumulated. They were 
 uncertain of the future, and as long as the 
 blockade was maintained they would endeavour 
 to keep these stocks intact. He believed, 
 too, that there was much private hoarding 
 in those countries. When the blockade was 
 iraised and trade became normal, these stocks 
 held by Governments and private hoarders 
 would be released and would help to relieve the 
 situation. At the same time the lot of the 
 poorer people in these countries was appalling. 
 The British representative in Lemberg, for 
 example, reported that there the death-rate 
 was 20 per cent, in excess of the birth-rate. 
 In Vienna the position was critical ; trains 
 were being held up by hungry people and 
 there was a danger of general social disinte- 
 
00 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 ration. Lady Muriel Paget wrote from 
 'rague that people were starving and unable 
 D procure either food or clothing. 
 It was not for want of warning that the 
 .Hies neglected to make the supreme effort 
 'hich was necessary. From the Baltic to 
 le Black Sea there was suffering and star- 
 ation ; and it was not the time to talk of 
 rushing nations which were in the throes 
 f famine. The foe was down ; and it was 
 )r us to come up with the ambulance. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS 
 
 On March igth the Big Four began its work. 
 The Big Four was due to the initiative of 
 Mr. Lloyd George. It is not the first time 
 in his career that he has protested against 
 the waste of time which he supposes to be 
 inevitable when there are many men and 
 many minds. He has always had this tendency 
 to reduce the effective numbers of a delibera- 
 tive and executive council. During the war 
 there was something to be said for it ; war 
 is the most undemocratic thing in the world, 
 the mass of men who are engaged in it depend- 
 ing upon the word of command which comes 
 from a supreme authority, nobody knows why 
 and nobody knows how. It is only necessary 
 to obey. But whether the making of peace 
 involves this secrecy and concentration ' of 
 power in the fewest possible hands is another 
 question. 
 
102 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 It is, perhaps, a misfortune that the peace 
 has been shaped by four men who worked 
 in the fetid atmosphere of a closed room, 
 with the doors and windows pasted up. There 
 was plenty of peeping through the keyhole, 
 but no criticism that, based on the facts, 
 could really refresh the insulated dictators 
 who had abandoned Mr. Wilson's idea of a 
 peoples' peace. It must be confessed that 
 Mr. Wilson did not need much persuasion. 
 He felt sore about the campaign which was 
 directfed against him, and more or less un- 
 consciously sought to evade it in the silence 
 of the Hotel Bischoffen, where he now lived and 
 where many of the subsequent conversations 
 took place. Sometimes they took place at 
 Mr. Lloyd George's house in the quiet littlp 
 rue Nitot in old-world Passy. Sometimes 
 they were held in M. Clemenceau's room at 
 the War Office. Wherever they were held, 
 they were henceforth to be purely confidential 
 talks between the members of the Council 
 of Four. 
 
 The Four were the British Premier, Signor 
 Orlando, the American President and the 
 French Premier, who possesses, with many 
 real qualities, the temperament of an autocrat. 
 The Autocrat of the Green Table was a title 
 coined for Mr. Wilson. It might well have 
 
THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS 103 
 
 been applied to any one of the Four. They 
 were — in theory at least, since leakages still 
 occurred — exempt from criticism : friendly 
 criticism from friendly countries, and un- 
 friendly criticism from enemy countries. They 
 and they alone are responsible for the peace 
 which was prepared. They had their assist- 
 ants, their experts, their advisers ; but they 
 overruled advice, they disregarded reports of 
 Commissions. On their shoulders lay the 
 crushing weight of the world. They were 
 supreme as perhaps no body of men in history 
 has been supreme. No one could control 
 them. Parliaments, which had grown singu- 
 larly subservient, were dumb and were denied 
 all information. The peoples hoped for the 
 best and were divided in their views — half of 
 them desiring a moderate peace, the other 
 half an Imperialistic peace. The Commissions 
 did not complain that the result of their 
 labours was scattered to the winds. The 
 small nations, now entirely out of the picture, 
 bowed down to the four-faced god. The enemy 
 countries were excluded from the debates. 
 Their opinion was not asked, and their counsel, 
 even on points where they might have helped, 
 would have been found impertinent. Four 
 men ! And those four men were to impose 
 peace on the whole earth, to settle territorial. 
 
104 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 economic, financial questions, to reconstruct 
 the map of the globe, in Africa, in Asia, in 
 Europe. While they were doing what had 
 never been attempted before, that map would 
 not keep still. 
 
 There is no doubt that by a characteristic 
 bustle the preliminary treaty for Germany 
 was ready when Mr. Wilson returned, but 
 Mr. Wilson found some of the decisions in- 
 tolerable. He could not agree, for example, 
 to the annexation of the Basin of the Sarre. 
 Nor could he agree with the French view 
 which would have made a separate Republic 
 of the Rhine Provinces under French tutelage, 
 in order that an attachment to France might 
 have been arranged later on. Nor did he 
 approve of too heavy indemnities, which would 
 manifestly have made of Germany a subject 
 nation for several generations. Further, he 
 made many objections to the provisional 
 boundaries of Poland. Fresh from the people 
 — from whom he seemed to draw his strength — 
 he made one last successful fight. The treaty 
 went into the melting-pot. Marshal Foch's 
 pet project of a twenty years' occupation and 
 then a plebiscite after an intensive propaganda 
 in purely German territory had no chance of 
 success. Foch, of course, took the soldier's 
 point of view. 
 
THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS 105 
 
 This was, as I say, Mr. Wilson's moment. 
 He won, because he found Mr. Lloyd George 
 on his side. Mr. Lloyd George was one of 
 Mr. Wilson's converts at this period. He 
 burned with enthusiasm for the rights of 
 peoples. He also saw the folly of any other 
 policy. It would have been madness then 
 to fly in the face of the ideals which had won 
 the admiration of the masses, the hopes of 
 a millennium which had been — perhaps too 
 lightly — raised. But as each particular prob- 
 lem came up for solution, the statesmen saw 
 with dismay that the stern reality was too 
 much for them. 
 
 It may be well to sketch here briefly the 
 portraits of the Four Men who were the rulers 
 of the many millions of mankind ; not only 
 of their contemporaries, but of the millions 
 unborn. Mr. Wilson is not a strong man. 
 I had the privilege of friendship of an admirer 
 of the President who is a keen observer 
 and is not blind to his defects.- Mr. Wilson 
 is, according to his opinion, which he has 
 come to after long observation and some 
 intimacy, not a strong man. He is a sincere 
 man. He is a good man. He is one of the 
 most eloquent of men. He can find the 
 formulae which make ' his speeches master- 
 pieces of persuasive oratory. One cannot argue 
 
io6 . PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 against him when he has spoken in clean 
 moulded phrases into which he pours his soul. 
 But, unlike some men who are inspired by 
 their own utterances, who are stirred to action 
 after listening to themselves, Mr. Wilson ex- 
 pends all his energy in words. He has ex- 
 hausted himself. He has expended his force 
 and does not really care what happens after- 
 wards. This is not to say that he is cynically 
 unmindful of results : it is merely to say 
 that he has no power of resistance left, and 
 is never weaker than when he has been most 
 puissant. There are some men who go on 
 because they have committed themselves : 
 Mr. Wilson, while desirous of translating his 
 principles into institutions, is pushed rather 
 by pride. He is a man of the study who 
 can also be a man of the forum : but he is 
 not a man of deeds : he leaves others to finish 
 his work. In these circumstances he could 
 not succeed in a personal struggle except in 
 the open, whe^-e he would be backed up by 
 the pressure of public opinion. In the cabinet, 
 with everybody against him on many occa- 
 sions, with only Mr. Lloyd George for him 
 on some occasions, he was doomed to defeat. 
 Sooner or later he would give way. Any 
 astute diplomatist could count on that. A 
 direct attack on his position would awaken 
 
THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS 107 
 
 his combative instinct ; but a flank attack 
 and he would be lost. Also, he was capable 
 on some special point of the most prolonged 
 obstinacy. 
 
 M. Clemenceau, the second of the gladiators, 
 is a man who is rather silent, in spite of his 
 ability to express himself in brutal phrases : 
 he is patient : he is clever : he will wait and 
 try again and again, never receding from his 
 real purpose. In these negotiations he had a 
 formidable advantage over the President. He 
 knew what he wanted, and he meant to get 
 it if it took him a year. Mr. "Wilson, on the 
 contrary, was anxious to finish with the whole 
 business. He was tired, while Clemenceau, 
 old as he is, was tireless. The French Premier 
 might close his eyes while the President talked : 
 when he opened them again it would be to 
 repeat what he had ^ already said, whereas 
 Mr. Wilson had accomplished what he felt to 
 be his duty. M. Clemenceau was scornful of 
 idealism. He is, in the most profound signi- 
 fication of the term, a man of 1870, and has 
 not understood that the world has advanced 
 since then. 
 
 Mr. Lloyd George, between these two antag- 
 onists, played the part of intermediary. He is 
 agile, full of brilliant but sometimes dangerous 
 compromises : a man capable of noble im- 
 
io8 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 pulses, but who is too often an opportunist. 
 By leaning first to one side or the other he 
 could turn the scales as he wished. It must 
 be acknowledged that he was the veritable 
 master of the Conference. Sometimes he would 
 be swayed by Clemenceau's arguments ; only 
 he would put them in a smoother, more 
 acceptable manner. He could make the most 
 materialistic consideration sound like a fine 
 principle. Sometimes he would be swayed by 
 Mr. Wilson's arguments ; and then he would 
 interpret them in the practical terms which 
 M. Clemenceau loves. Thus, whichever way 
 he turned he won. He made the French 
 and the American autocrats dance to his 
 piping. He was the super-autocrat. 
 
 As for Signor Orlando, he was not, like the 
 other three, his own man. He was rather 
 inspired by Baron Sonnino, who was frankly 
 an Italian Imperialist. Orlando was concerned 
 purely with Italian politics. He did not desire 
 an Italian hegemony over Europe. The other 
 three wished to dominate Europe. He wished 
 to' dominate the Adriatic. That was his much 
 narrower design, and he was not really inter- 
 ested in all the rest. France could do what 
 she liked : America could hold Europe in 
 the hollow of her hand if she pleased : Great 
 Britain could have a lien upon every nation 
 
THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS 109 
 
 of the Continent — except Italy. Italy and 
 Italy's claims were sacred. Anything you 
 like for yourself on condition that you give 
 me what I ask for. He was, I think, inclined 
 to be moderate ; but his position was difficult. 
 Nationalism in its most exclusive sense, the 
 " sacred egoism," was preached like a crusade 
 in the Peninsula. 
 
 That is the group of men who were to re- 
 fashion the world. Obviously many matters 
 offered only a secondary interest, and did not 
 present any difficulties or occasion an}' dis- 
 cussions between the Four. Holland and 
 Belgium could settle their differences together : 
 the principle of the restoration of Schleswig, 
 if the people desired it, was not in dispute ; 
 France could certainly get rid of German 
 influences and control in Morocco and could, 
 outside the Conference, negotiate with Spain ; 
 the setting up of a Jewish State in Palestine 
 (urged as it was even by anti-Semites in 
 Poland, in Rumania, in Czecho-Slovakia, be- 
 cause it would rid them of the hated Jew) 
 was not a burning question ; the division of 
 Turkey could be postponed ; the allocation of 
 the German colonies did not detain the Con- 
 ference long ; but the French and Polish and 
 Russian questions were constantly before the 
 Big Four, and over and over again the same 
 
no PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 matters were debated and put aside for further 
 consideration, until they became a regular 
 stage army marching in and out in endless 
 procession. Here we touch the real explana- 
 tion of the length of the proceedings. The 
 Four were hoping to tire each other out. 
 It is the purest nonsense to say, as was said 
 constantly, that the statesmen were in accord. 
 They were not. They were desperately in 
 disaccord from the beginning to the end. 
 How could it be otherwise ? Mr. Lloyd 
 George's cry for a diplomatic unity of com- 
 mand was a cry for the moon. 
 
 The truth is, of course, that the Conference 
 had no plan, that it proceeded from day to 
 day without a chart, that its methods were 
 constantly altering and its intentions in a 
 state of flux. For example, it was with a great 
 beating of drums and a clashing of cymbals 
 that we were told that the armistice renewal 
 in February would be unlike the previous 
 armistice agreements, in that it would be for 
 an indefinite date. In a few weeks the pre- 
 liminary treaty of peace would be presented, 
 and therefore only a short provisional pro- 
 longation was necessary. That short provi- 
 sional prolongation lasted nearly four months. 
 There was, I am convinced, no wish to 
 deceive the newspapers or the public. The 
 
THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS in 
 
 Conference was simply the sport of circum- 
 stances. 
 
 The terms were to be all ready for the 
 return of Mr. Wilson, who would, of course, 
 approve of them in twenty-four hours, and, 
 as M. Pichon told me at one of his Sunday 
 morning receptions at the Quai d'Orsay, the 
 world would be happily at peace again by 
 April. Again, when in March the strike 
 troubles at home once more seemed to neces- 
 sitate the return of Mr. Lloyd George, the 
 clever move — the too clever move — was made 
 of his principal colleagues writing him a 
 letter begging him not to leave them at such 
 . a critical moment, and promising that if 
 he stayed the treaty really might be finished 
 this time in a fortnight. The impression 
 produced by this appeal of Mr. Wilson and 
 M. Clemenceau was profound. It was a high 
 testimonial even for the British Prime Minister. 
 His absence helped, on this occasion, to thwart 
 the industrial threat better than his presence. 
 But the fortnight spoken of was a grotesque 
 miscalculation. Six weeks afterwards the 
 quarrel had broken out openly, and the 
 Germans were impatiently asking why they 
 had been brought to Versailles. 
 
 Some details of the private life of the 
 peace-makers in Paris ought, perhaps, to be 
 
112 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 given in this review of their work. For the 
 most part they knew how to unbend and to 
 snatch in a few brief moments oi relaxation 
 that refreshment of spirit which was necessary. 
 The cosmopohtan city little by little recovered 
 its gaiety, and as the lights went up and the 
 sun began to come out, and as social life 
 revived, the statesmen and their entourage 
 took a conspicuous part in the round of 
 pleasure each in his own way. 
 
 Mr. Lloyd George seemed to divide his 
 leisure between taking a cup of tea with the 
 journalists at the Hotel Majestic and enjoying 
 a hasty game of golf. Sometimes, too, he 
 looked in for a few minutes at the dances 
 which were given at the British Peace Head- 
 quarters, and occasionally he had the pleasure 
 of hearing Welsh singers in the improvised 
 concerts which were got up. He beamed 
 upon everyone, and did not seem to have 
 the cares of the world on his shoulders. He 
 was immensely tickled at the quaint notion 
 of calling the Majestic the Megantic, after 
 his daughter, who was a prime favourite 
 there. Sometimes he dined in town, but 
 usually he went home to remote Passy, where 
 he entertained a few friends to dinner. He 
 retired early, but he retired not to rest, 
 but often to begin several hours' work before 
 
THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS 113 
 
 going to bed. Mr. Philip Kerr, his secretary, 
 was his right-hand man, and had much more 
 influence on him than anyone else. 
 
 Mr. Wilson fairly frequently visited the 
 theatre. At Washington it is his great recrea- 
 tion, but naturally in Paris his time was more 
 limited. He dined generally with his doctor. 
 Admiral Grayson, and Colonel House. The 
 evenings were intimate and domestic, and he 
 was rarely out of bed after ten o'clock, except 
 when there was a special rush of Conference- 
 business. 
 
 Mr. Bonar Law was, of course, compelled 
 to spend most of his time in London, leading 
 the House in the Premier's absence, but in 
 the early days he managed to find an opponent 
 at chess, who helped him to while away many 
 pleasant hours. Mr. Balfour, like the Prime 
 Minister, worked late. After dinner often he 
 dictated for a long time to a stenographer. 
 His little private dinner parties were much 
 enjoyed, and he became one of the most- 
 sought hosts in Paris. He frequented 
 a jeu de paume in the rue Lauriston 
 with a few friends, and became a tennis 
 enthusiast. 
 
 The Bois de Boulogne was a favourite 
 resort, and in the course of a single morning 
 one could encounter in the beautiful alleys 
 
 8 
 
114 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 M. Venizelos, the great Greek patriot, his 
 eyes beaming behind his glasses ; M. Dmowski, 
 striding along briskly ; many American dele- 
 gates, and the picturesque figure of Emir 
 Feysul, with his swarthy skin and golden 
 headgear. The Emir did not hesitate to make 
 known his ambition to see a great pan-Arabian 
 State brought into being. He talked con- 
 stantly of this Arab State and of his Arab 
 horses. Mr. Hughes could also be often seen 
 taking a meditative stroll. It was surprising 
 how many of the statesmen preferred to walk 
 from point to point, and they were not often 
 molested by curious crowds. 
 
 A number of the visitors seemed to pass all 
 their spare moments in reading. Mr. Lansing 
 was particularly fond of the French philosopher, 
 Bergson. General Bliss, concerned himself, and 
 was chaffed by his friends for his pains, with 
 the Balkan question, the Turkish question, 
 and the African question. A sort of busman's 
 holiday. It is, of course, well known that 
 Colonel House is constantly occupied with 
 political reviews, which he reads assiduously. 
 Several delegates liked a game of bridge, 
 and card parties became popular. 
 
 The Italians, Signor Orlando and Baron 
 Sonnino, usually remained quietly in their 
 apartments. As for that remarkable man, 
 
THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS 115 
 
 M. Kramarcz, the Premier of the New Bohemia, 
 he was awake at five o'clock, and worked 
 with the utmost method in classifying and 
 studying the great problems until midnight. 
 The habits of the men from the East aroused 
 most curiosity in Paris. The Japanese Am- 
 bassador generally dined in company with 
 his whole entourage before retiring to solitary 
 labours. The Chinese Ambassadors came and 
 went as silent as ghosts. They maintained 
 an inscrutable air of mystery. 
 
 There were several delegates who had old 
 memories of Paris. They were delighted to 
 revisit the scenes of their student days, or 
 even, I believe, in one case of their Ambas- 
 sadorial days. There was one American who 
 was not happy until he had dined chez Paillard, 
 and others until they had spent an evening — 
 strictly incognito, of course — in prowling around 
 Montmartre, which has lost, alas ! its gaiety of 
 the " Chat Noir " or the " Rat Mort," its dancing 
 delights of the " Moulin Rouge" — or in saunter- 
 ing on the Rive Gauche and peeping in at their 
 ancient haunts in less responsible years, before 
 war troubled the world or they became great 
 personages. The Quartier Latin has changed, 
 but it is the quarter which has least changed, 
 and more than once I found a delegate drinking 
 his bock at a little cafe where youth love 
 
ii6 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 to dream dreams and act a little stupidly; 
 or sitting under the trees of the famous terrace 
 of the Luxembourg Gardens among the white 
 Queens of France on their pedestals and the 
 merry crowd of collegians and their grisettes — 
 Mimi Pinsons d, la Musset or d la Murger. 
 
 At the beginning it certainly increased the 
 popularity of both Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. 
 Wilson that they had brought their daughters 
 with them. The social success of shy " Miss 
 Megan " greatly pleased the Prime Minister ; 
 and the American President was proud of 
 the artistic triumphs of his " Miss Margaret " 
 among the soldiers to whom she sang. Their 
 presence in Paris showed the French people 
 that these statesmen were flesh and blood, 
 not thinking machines and thinking machines 
 only. The Frerichman is often regarded as 
 indifferent to the claims of family life. This 
 is a profound error. He is, above all, a family 
 man, and nothing pleased him more than 
 this happy though doubtless unintentional 
 revelation that Wilson and Lloyd George are 
 also family men. Thus they were regarded 
 as human beings and not merely as lofty 
 plenipotentiaries. The Celtic smile of Mr. 
 Lloyd George, which is in the Celtic eyes 
 even more than in the round wrinkles of the 
 Celtic mouth made him quite a " postcard 
 
THE BIG FOUR— AND OTHERS 117 
 
 craze," while there were many busts and 
 engravings of Mr. Wilson (with the smile that 
 irritated d'Annunzio) sold in the shops. As for 
 M. Clemenceau, though afterwards he flagged 
 and became really an old man, in the first 
 months he was, for all his years, a human 
 catapult. You saw him emerge from a door 
 in the courtyard of the Quai d'Orsay, and then, 
 presto ! he was gone. He moved with the 
 velocity of a bullet. He had no eyes and no 
 ears for anyone. He was almost brutally 
 brusque, and was even rude to would-be inter- 
 viewers and photographers. One notable little 
 " human " incident was the presentation of a 
 gold pen wherewith to sign the treaty, made 
 by the girls of a Paris lycee to him. They 
 did not, I assure you, intend it as a delicate 
 hint that the negotiations had lasted too long. 
 Once "Cvhen I encountered Mr. Barnes, the 
 British Labour representative, he was more 
 anxious to know where he could buy a piece 
 of jewellery for his little grandchild than to 
 talk about the labour clauses of the treaty. 
 It must not be imagined by the public that 
 these men are lofty mortals. " Human, all 
 too human," as Nietzsche would say, they 
 were not at all indisposed to have their por- 
 traits painted by Sir William Orpen — " our 
 Bill," as his acquaintances irreverently called 
 
ii8 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 him — who kept thirty or forty canvases going 
 together like a juggler. He was the painter 
 of the official picture to commemorate the 
 Conference, while Major Augustus John was 
 mysteriously engaged in painting a tableau 
 which his artistic enemies described as allegoric 
 or symbolic. I shall not forget the scorn 
 with which he repudiated this description. 
 " I have never painted an allegoric picture in 
 my life," he affirmed. " I don't know what 
 such a thing is. I am a classical painter in 
 the direct line of tradition." Sometimes we 
 had flying visits — in the literal sense — from 
 such men as General Seely, whose witticisms 
 set the dinner-table aroar. I was unable to 
 ascertain what became of his bet with Major 
 Augustus John as to who could produce the 
 three prettiest women. Paris history is cer- 
 tainly not complete without the result of that 
 wager. Perhaps I have sufficiently indicated, 
 however, that the Conference was not a thing 
 of unadulterated gloom or of unrelieved work. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 SOME OF THE PROBLEMS 
 
 Adequate consideration of all the problems 
 which undoubtedly made difficult the task 
 of the Big Four would demand many volumes : 
 it is only possible to group together some of 
 the more important questions which were 
 examined by the statesmen and to glance 
 at them for a moment. The Big Four did 
 not really seem to study any question 
 deeply. Its judgments were provisional, ' and 
 were followed almost invariably by protests 
 and by revision. This revised judgment was 
 itself revised, and thus everything turned in 
 the most vicious of circles. If I attempted 
 to touch upon each subject as it arose I 
 should have to touch upon each subject a 
 dozen times. 
 
 The first time the secret treaties between 
 the Allies were urged Mr. Wilson was mildly 
 surprised : the second time he was annoyed ; 
 
 "9 
 
120 PEACE-MAKING At PARIS 
 
 the third time he pronounced a vigorous dis- 
 course against them ; the fourth time his 
 colleagues took great pains not to shock him 
 by abruptly referring to the ubiquitous secret 
 treaty which barred the way to a sensible 
 and just solution. Mr. Lloyd George was 
 given the job of breaking the news to the 
 President that such and such might be the 
 proper answer to such and such a riddle, only 
 unfortunately a secret treaty made it im- 
 possible to accept the answer. When I asked 
 one of Mr. Wilson's friends why he had not 
 insisted at the beginning upon the common 
 abandonment of secret treaties, I- was in- 
 formed that Mr. Wilson took it for granted 
 that secret treaties were abandoned. The 
 agreement upon his Fourteen Points was in- 
 compatible with the maintenance of secret 
 treaties, which had no justification except 
 passing political expediency. Thus Rumania 
 was rewarded with territory such as the Banat 
 of Temesvar at the expense of our earlier 
 Ally, Serbia. Constantinople was to go to 
 Russia. Turkey was to be cut up with the 
 most cynical disregard for the rights of the 
 inhabitants. Japan held us by secret treaties. 
 Italy came into the war partly because we 
 promised her, among other things, the 
 Dalmatian coast, and in doing so we flew 
 
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS 121 
 
 in the face not only of Serbia, but, in 
 respect of the Dodecanese, of Greece. Turn 
 where one would there were these entangle- 
 ments of secret treaties. Unless we were 
 prepared to make a bonfire of them in the 
 changed circumstances, unless we were to 
 start with a clean slate, there was no hope 
 for the Wilson policy. The trouble was that 
 while everybody was in accord upon the 
 principle of denouncing secret treaties, * his 
 own secret treaty was sacrosanct. 
 
 Every continent in the world was explored 
 at the Quai d'Orsay : every branch of human 
 activity was involved in some way or another 
 in the decisions. When we are inclined to 
 blame the statesmen unduly because they 
 have not given us a new earth, we should 
 remember that never was there such an 
 extensive and complicated settlement. The 
 real point is that the Conference should have 
 concentrated on essentials ; brought the world 
 back to peace ; and afterwards tried at leisure 
 to solve the insoluble problems which have 
 puzzled the brains of diplomatists for cen- 
 turies. The Directoire did not want to 
 relinquish an iota of its power. 
 
 The big questions were always evaded. It 
 was not till comparatively late in the Con- 
 ference that the most important questions 
 
122 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 for France were seriously and definitely 
 tackled. It was Chateaubriand who declared, 
 before two Gernjan invasions lent force to 
 his argument, that France would be obliged 
 at some time or other to transfer the capital 
 to the other side of the Loire or to push her 
 frontier to the Rhine. 
 
 The question of the left bank of the Rhine 
 had, of course, been for long the principal 
 preoccupation of France. During the war 
 one heard very little of the proposal to claim 
 Rhenish territory, but it was in French minds. 
 France was outwardly content with the re- 
 storation of Alsace-Lorraine. A few journals 
 certainly preached the annexation of the left 
 bank of the Rhine in season and out of season, 
 but the idea received little countenance. After 
 the victory, ho'wfever, it assumed a continu- 
 ously growing importance. There are involved 
 a number of considerations of an economic 
 character, but it is not too much to say that, 
 at any rate among those who are not nakedly 
 desirous of taking what they can as victors, 
 the military argument is the most substantial. 
 
 " Are we sure of the repentance of Germany 
 and bf her adhesion to the Wilsonian prin- 
 ciples ? " " Are we sure that the Society of 
 Nations will be effective against German 
 aggression ? " These are the questions which 
 
SOME OF THE PROBLEM^ 123 
 
 even the most moderate men put in France. 
 They declared that it is in the provinces of 
 the Rhine that Germany has been able to 
 accumulate her armies and to prepare her 
 irresistible blows before succour could reach 
 France. It is, therefore, on the Rhine that 
 we must hold the enemy. This is a consider- 
 ation of more importance than all others. 
 
 Thus an able French commentator, the 
 Comte de Fels, stated that the irrefutable 
 experience of centuries proclaims the verity 
 that the fundamental guarantee of European 
 order and of a durable peace is the throwing 
 back of Germany beyond the Rhine. 
 
 It was proposed, then, that there should 
 be an occupation by France of the country 
 on this side of the river. Marshal Foch 
 pressed hard for some sort of permanent 
 control ; and to this end, the influence of 
 President Poincar^ was brought into play. 
 There were indeed some anxious moments 
 during the discussions when Foch seemed to 
 be on the point of throwing up his command 
 if his advice was not heard. Undoubtedly 
 there is a traditional desire in France geo- 
 graphically to complete France by extending 
 her boundaries to the Rhine. Of course, it 
 is obvious that on any ethnological principle, 
 the principle of nationality, France could not 
 
124 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 put forward the smallest claim. If it is true 
 that the Rhine is the natural frontier of 
 France, it is incontestable that the Ardennes 
 and the Vosges are the limits of the French 
 people. On one point there was agreement : 
 that the use of the left bank of the Rhine 
 as a manoeuvring ground by Germany, its 
 fortification, its militarization, could not be 
 tolerated. 
 
 There was a considerable hope, based largely 
 on military grounds, that once France obtained 
 a footing she would be able to maintain that 
 footing. M. de Fels expressed this hope in 
 writing of the intellectual and moral ascen- 
 dancy that France is bound to exercise, and 
 that would infallibly draw the people of the 
 Rhine into the bosom of France. One cannot 
 refrain from remarking that this scheme, 
 though not open annexation, only differed 
 from annexation in the methods employed. 
 An occupation, the elimination of German 
 influence, an intensive propaganda, the intro- 
 duction of French culture — these things would 
 be intended to lead by more or less benevolent 
 means to the incorporation of the districts 
 into France. 
 
 As to Alsace-Lorraine, there was hardly any 
 question of its retrocession to France uncon- 
 ditionally. Not so in respect of the section 
 
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS 125 
 
 of the Sarre coalfields lying beyond Lorraine. 
 An effort was made to find some via media 
 between allowing Germany to retain that 
 section and ceding it to France. The result 
 was a proposal, made in the Conference, 
 under which the Northern Sarre region would 
 be neither French nor German, and its inhabi- 
 tants would not be subject to conscription 
 either by France or Germany, and would not 
 elect delegates for the legislative body of 
 either country, but would have a local legis- 
 lature. 
 
 This proposed regime was afterwards modi- 
 fied : the League of Nations was invoked and 
 a mixed rulership of the region was proposed, 
 with a plebiscite at the end of fifteen years 
 by which France hoped to retain possession 
 of the territory as well as of the coalfields, 
 since even if the vote went in favour of Ger- 
 many, Germany would have to buy back the 
 ground in gold. It is difficult to understand 
 how either Mr. Wilson or Mr. Lloyd George 
 was induced to consent for a moment to 
 such a proposition. It can only be supposed 
 that they did not appreciate its effect, since 
 when Germany complained of the clause they 
 hastened to declare that they had never had 
 such intentions. The fact is that France 
 wanted the Sarre, wanted the old frontier of 
 
126 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 1814. The district was purely German. What 
 was to be done ? M. Andre Tardieu is credited 
 with the notion of suggesting that as France 
 was entitled to reparations, especially in 
 respect of coal, since her own mines were 
 ruined, she should take, as a matter of pure 
 justice, not only the coal but the coalfields 
 of the Sarre, not merely demand delivery 
 but work the mines herself. The idea seemed 
 plausible enough : but of course it meant a 
 curious distinction between the ownership of 
 the mines underground and the administra- 
 tion of the surface area. With the restoration 
 of a vastly improved Alsace and the virtual 
 annexation of the Sarre coalfields, France 
 became rich in minerals of all kinds. 
 
 There was a good deal of controversy over 
 the German Fleet. Should the ships be sunk 
 or not ? The proposal to sink them solemnly 
 was a British one. There was something 
 Machiavellian in the submission. What a 
 glorious demonstration that the era of battles 
 was over, cried Mr. Lloyd George, if we make 
 a mighty holocaust of these great fighting 
 machines ! The League of Nations becomes 
 a reality. Of course, the French did not 
 hesitate to point out that we did not dream 
 of sinking our own ships also, in order that 
 the world might be still more deeply con- 
 
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS 127 
 
 vinced ; while America was frankly engaging 
 upon a programme of shipbuilding for the 
 Navy which would make her a formidable 
 rival to us in sea-power. This astute American 
 move — so irreconcilable with the beautiful ideas 
 of the League and general disarmament — was 
 largely intended to force our hands, to compel 
 us to consent to a halt in this sea-game. 
 America had got a great deal out of the war. 
 She was the foremost nation in trade, in 
 military strength, in financial influence, and 
 accordingly in political power. She wanted 
 to put herself at least on an equality on the 
 ocean, either by a building race or by making 
 us negotiate. France also pointed out that 
 while she was in need of ships (since ship- 
 building had been neglected in her reliance 
 upon us) we were not, and we were jealous 
 of any distribution which would give to France 
 any sort of sea-force. Division would rela- 
 tively weaken British supremacy. Moreover 
 the ships, even if more or less obsolete, would 
 repay breaking up, and it would be a crime 
 to waste millions of pounds on a spectacular 
 display for the principal profit of Great Britain. 
 Whatever may be thought of the arguments 
 for or against, the outcry was so fierce that 
 it was found better to drop the subject. 
 A strange divergence of views also made 
 
128 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 itself manifest between the military men and 
 the statesmen. Foch, for example, favoured 
 the drastic reduction of the German Army ; 
 but as a soldier, fearful of the repercussions of 
 the total disarmament of Germany in France, 
 he proposed that a system of compulsory 
 service should be maintained. There's nothing 
 like leather ! Rather than frankly abandon 
 conscription, the soldiers preferred that Ger- 
 many should be a conscript nation. For my 
 part, I am unable to follow the reasoning, 
 which, I believe, consists in the assertion 
 that a small efficient standing army of pro- 
 fessional soldiers is more dangerous than a 
 large army of short-time conscripts in that 
 it supplies the cadres : I am still as surprised 
 as was the Prime Minister, who fought for 
 the abolition of conscription in Germany. 
 It must inevitably be followed by the abolition 
 of conscription in France as well as in England. 
 It is the death-knell of large armies everywhere. 
 The day of the soldier, we trust, is passing. 
 It should be emphasized that the civilians 
 were unanimously against their military 
 advisers. 
 
 The first demands of the various countries 
 of the Allies in respect of the German colonies 
 were as follows : Japan demanded the German 
 colonies in the Polynesian Archipelago ; 
 
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS 129 
 
 Australia, New Guinea ; Belgium, a portion 
 of East Africa ; France, a portion of Togo- 
 land and the Cameroons, the remainder to 
 be apportioned among the adjoining British 
 colonies ; South Africa,^ German South- West 
 Africa ; and Italy, Somaliland and the Tripoli 
 borders. The division of spoil was justified 
 on the ground that Germany had misused 
 her power over the natives. It is certainly 
 true that German government in her colonies 
 was worse than the government of probably 
 any other nation. This is where the League 
 of Nations came in. The Socialists at once 
 denounced the mandatary system as a sham. 
 They declared that it was merely a thin 
 veneer put upon the appropriation of the 
 colonies by the Powers. Nevertheless, most 
 men of good will saw that the supervision of 
 the League could be made effective, if it 
 were not immediately so, and that our con- 
 ceptions of rule over natives must be 
 changed : pure exploitation without pity, 
 with unabashed brutality, will be impossible: 
 we have duties as well as " rights." 
 
 There was a brush between America and 
 Japan over the islands in the Pacific which 
 she claimed. One point to which great im- 
 portance was attached in America was that 
 there must be no fortifications on these islands. 
 
 9 
 
130 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 If Japan chose to make a naval base on them, 
 there would b6 a great outcry in the United 
 States, but the overseership of the League 
 of Nations would be a guarantee against this. 
 Mr. W. M. Hughes also spoke out very strenu- 
 ously for the control by Australia of the 
 colonies she had wrested from Germany. If 
 Mr. Wilson had been disposed to resist these 
 claims he could not have held out. Moreover, 
 he was not sorry to find something for the 
 League to do. In practice, the " manage- 
 ment " of the colonies by a particular nation 
 under the eye of the League of Nations would 
 be tantamount to actual possession, with 
 certain guiding principles of administration 
 which must be followed. One began with 
 the fact that the German colonies could not 
 be allowed to revert to their old owners. 
 What, then, was to be done with them ? The 
 plan of Mr. Wilson may be thus explained : 
 Wherever you find a people competent to 
 express a real opinion upon their own destinies, 
 you must certainly adopt the principle of 
 self-determination. They must be free to dis- 
 pose of themselves. If they declare for inde- 
 pendence they must have it. If they desire 
 the control of a European Power they must 
 have it. Where you decide to place a back- 
 ward nation under the administration of 
 
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS 131 
 
 another Power, you must not give that Power 
 absolute sway, but must subject it to the 
 rules and the overseership of the League of 
 Nations. The international aspect would con- 
 sist not only in the right of the other nations 
 to intervene, but also in the smashing down 
 of all exclusivism, so that each' administered 
 territory would have an open door by which 
 all nations might enter. 
 
 Should the League of Nations remain en- 
 tirely detached, only intervening in case of 
 actual mismanagement ? Or should the 
 League of Nations be a more active body, 
 and the mandatary Power occupy a mere 
 managerial position under the instructions of 
 the International Board ? All sorts of ques- 
 tions, especially of a financial order, were 
 involved. Mr. Lloyd George raised the inter- 
 esting point of who is to pay the preliminary 
 expenses, which are always considerable in 
 the development of a country, and pointed 
 out that without some guarantee of return 
 for that money no nation would be disposed 
 to proceed far. Naturally, tariffs excited some 
 debate ; and the right of excluding exploiters 
 and capitalists, of keeping oiit the influence 
 and interests of rivals, was another point on 
 which there was a difference of opinion. 
 Obviously, no general principles would cover 
 
132 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 every particular case. There must neces- 
 sarily be some modification of any cut-and- 
 dried scheme, in accordance with geographical, 
 commercial, and ethnological con,siderations. 
 Therefore each special problem must be treated 
 separately in detail. Among the proposals 
 was one by which the League should enjoy 
 the revenue from these internationalized lands, 
 and supply in return the funds for their 
 development. British colonial administration 
 may be taken in some respects as the model 
 upon which the League of Nations would pro- 
 ceed. But what does emerge from this dis- 
 cussion is the fact that it would have been 
 better to have definitely torn up all prior 
 treaties and accords, to have first of all estab- 
 lished on a firm footing the League of Nations, 
 and to have approached these problems in 
 the crystal atmosphere of accepted principles. 
 There were in the course of the Conference 
 many demonstrations by nations who claimed 
 to be represented. Persia made a protest, 
 Egypt alleged that her delegates were " kid- 
 napped," the Koreans clamoured for a hearing, 
 and Ireland of course came into the picture. 
 After the dramatic escape of " President " 
 de Valera, whose appearance we looked for 
 in Paris day after day, the Irish delegate in 
 the French capital bombarded Mr. Wilson and 
 
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS 133 
 
 the other members with applications for a 
 seat at the Quai d'Orsay. There was much 
 intrigue about Syria, France at one time 
 objecting to the detachment of Palestine, where 
 a Jewish State was to be set up. There were 
 among the Jewish 'spokesmen some who made 
 mental reservations, feeling that if Zion were 
 made a nation a Polish Jew, for example, 
 would cease to be a Pole and would become 
 simply a Jew, and would thus be treated 
 as a foreigner in Poland. Throughout the 
 proceedings one had perpetually news of pro- 
 groms in Rumania or in the Ukraine or in 
 Czecho-Slovakia, The Jewish problem was 
 not the least difiEicult. 
 
 I do not wish to extend this rapid review : 
 many of the questions will be touched upon 
 elsewhere ; but it is necessary to mention 
 the vexed debates about Poland, because of 
 an incident which might have had serious 
 consequences. Mr. Lloyd George ranged him- 
 self resolutely against exaggerated Polish pre- 
 tensions. He was opposed to giving Poland 
 territory which was undeniably German. It 
 was clear that Poland, if she were to live, 
 must have a port, an outlet to the sea. But 
 a " corridor " to Dantzig (which is German, 
 but is situated in the midst of land inhabited 
 by Poles) meant the placing of Germans 
 
134 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 under Polish domination. There seemed no 
 help for it. Solutions such as economic agree- 
 ment were dismissed. Germany was to be 
 cut by this corridor. But at least, declared 
 Mr. Lloyd George, make the corridor as narrow 
 as may be. The Polish Commission came 
 to unanimous and clear conclusions. They 
 were signed by the distinguished British 
 official, Sir Eyre Crowe. Mr. Lloyd George 
 promptly rejected the recommendation which 
 the Foreign Office member of the Commission 
 endorsed. The news got abroad. " Such 
 methods," was the French comment, " must 
 bring us to chaos. It is always possible for 
 Premiers to consult their representatives on 
 important Commissions, but apparently the 
 Commissions propose and the Directoire dis- 
 poses." Mr. Lloyd George was very angry 
 at this leakage of information. He even 
 threatened to refuse to go on if the member 
 of the Conference who had inspired the French 
 comment was not found and reprimanded. 
 It was a painful incident, and the Prime 
 Minister was not easily pacified. 
 
 This was a typical episode, whole problems 
 being thrown back into the melting-pot at 
 the moment they appeared to be approaching 
 solution. The problem of Poland in particular 
 was to become a shuttlecock. A manifesto 
 
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS 135 
 
 was at the end of March issued to the Ukrain- 
 ians and the Poles fighting about Lemberg. 
 The rupture of negotiations of Germany 
 with Poland at Posen was another grave 
 symptom. Indeed, everywhere through Central 
 and Eastern Europe there was sporadic fight- 
 ing or the possibility of fighting, but nowhere 
 was there more quarrelling than in Poland. 
 The Conference was incompetent to settle 
 anything. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'S 
 
 I THINK in view of its importance — it was the 
 turning-point of the Conference — the revolt 
 of the M;P.'s ought now to be told more 
 intimately than it has hitherto been told. 
 It was a supreme crisis, when anything might 
 have happened ; when the Conference might 
 have split upon the question of reparations ; 
 when Mr. Lloyd George might have been 
 defeated in Parliament, with incalculable 
 results ; when some preposterous policy of 
 claiming sums which all the experts agreed 
 could not be paid, and which would have 
 definitely made Germany a slave country for 
 ever and England a militarist country, might 
 have triumphed over the more reasonable 
 suggestions of the Prime Minister, who was 
 against attempting the impossible and pro- 
 longing the war for generations. Briefly, the 
 
 facts were these : an article which contained 
 
 137 
 
138 PEACE-MAEING AT PARIS 
 
 certain British views, written by myself, 
 appeared in the Westminster Gazette ; at the 
 same time a message was sent to London 
 inspired by Lord Northcliffe and others ; the 
 attitude of the Conference revealed by 
 these two separate and (I need hardly say) 
 totally independent despatches alarmed a 
 certain group of politicians, who went about 
 obtaining the signatures of the M.P.'s to a 
 minatory message to the Prime Minister ; 
 Mr. Lloyd George came back to London like 
 a whirlwind and in a hurricane speech trounced 
 Lord Northcliffe and his associates, and won 
 the approval of the House for his policy at 
 the Peace Conference. 
 
 Would the peace be a hard or an easy one 
 for Germany ? That was how the question 
 was put. It was of course wrong to put it 
 in that way. It was bound to be hard : 
 Alsace-Lorraine was to be lost, bits of Belgian 
 territory were to be snipped out of Germany, 
 Poland was to be carved oiit of the old Empire, 
 Denmark was to get back part of Schleswig, 
 however the Sarre question was regulated 
 France was entitled to receive great quantities 
 of German coal, the " ton for ton " demand 
 would deprive Germany of her shipping, navally 
 and militarily she had to be disarmed, and 
 she had her own millions of dead and dis- 
 
THE REVOLT OF THE M.P. S 139 
 
 abled. You could not soften these things. 
 What you could do was to demand Arabian 
 Nights reparations and commit obvious in- 
 justices in taking German territory to give 
 to France or to give to Poland. The revolting 
 370 British M.P.'s were for a blood-and-thunder 
 peace at all costs, and were particularly anxious 
 lest Germany should escape a penny of those 
 liabilities which we all agree she owes, without 
 troubling themselves about her assets. 
 
 Among the arrangements for acquainting 
 the Press with the views of the various 
 delegations were meetings which many dis- 
 tinguished statesmen of all countries had 
 with the correspondents. The Americans, 
 the British, the French, in particular, dis- 
 cussed from time to time the progress of 
 negotiations and the problems that arose, 
 sometimes formally, sometimes privately over 
 a cup of tea. There were statesmen, like 
 M. Pichon and Mr. Lansing and Lord Robert 
 Cecil for example, who could be directly 
 " quoted," but there were others who pre- 
 ferred to be described as "a high authority," 
 " an official source," or simply not mentioned 
 at all. These meetings were often really 
 helpful to those who were allowed to attend 
 them. I was privileged to be of this 
 company, and for my part think that the 
 
140 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 system of personal talks with Ministers is 
 good both for the Government and for 
 the people. The Press forms a living link. 
 In the friendly discussion which takes place 
 many things become clear. The mentality 
 and the motives of statesmen are laid bare. 
 It is possible to judge not only of events but 
 of the degree of knowledge which the Ministers 
 possess (sometimes I have discovered a deplor- 
 able ignorance !), their sincerity, their real 
 aims, their method of reasoning. Provided 
 one is, first, an accurate observer with some 
 sense of psychology, and second, is determined 
 not to be a mere pen wherewith the Minister 
 writes — if one is allowed to be independent, 
 to treat the facts with which one is furnished 
 with judgment — then such meetings are really 
 helpful. 
 
 There are, of course, Pressmen who are neither 
 observers nor psychologists, who have no 
 independent judgment, who are obsessed by 
 what may be called " the proper thing to say." 
 There is a tendency to follow each other like 
 sheep. There are certainly many brilliant 
 exceptions : but the unfortunate truth is 
 that a large number of them, through im- 
 proper training, permit their minds to run 
 in a groove. " Down with Germany! " hap- 
 pened to be the deep groove which four and 
 
THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'S 141 
 
 a half years of war had worn for them ; 
 and they could not understand that any 
 delegate was trying to take longer views. 
 " Down with Germany " if you like ; but 
 please don't bring down the whole of civili- 
 zation. The making of peace was rather 
 different from the making of war ; and the 
 old cliches were no longer the last word of 
 wisdom. It was not just a matter of smash- 
 ing hard ; it was a question of building up. 
 When a statesman said these things — they 
 were said very often — he was compelled to 
 utter them discreetly, to lead us gently from 
 the fire-eating mood of war to the more 
 reasonable temper of peace. He was generally 
 misunderstood ; and sometimes he was com- 
 pelled to withdraw hastily. Thus T remember 
 once, when an official tried to say that 
 the Council of Four were inclined to feed 
 Russia (this was long before the Nansen 
 proposal), he was obliged to beat a retreat. 
 "If it were possible to get food-stuffs into 
 Russia," he began ingenuously — and then he 
 paused to examine the puzzled look on the 
 faces of his auditors. It must be remembered 
 how deep certain ideas had struck ; we were 
 inaccessible to new ideas. At any rate, after 
 finding no vestige of sympathy or of interest on 
 any countenance, he thought it better to add 
 
142 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 airily : " But of course there are the Soviets." 
 Thus were the Pressmen robbed of a really 
 sensational piece of news. It was so hard 
 to imagine that even in March the statesmen 
 were considering the possibility and the ad- 
 visability of feeding the Bolsheviks in order 
 to destroy Bolshevism ! 
 
 This is a necessary digression. The whole 
 episode of the revolting M.P.'s turns upon 
 this inability to face new conditions, this lack 
 of elasticity of mind. The newspapers were 
 deaf to these private or public talks because 
 they could not think they were really and 
 truly meant for the public. They had repeated 
 so often that Germany must pay for the war — 
 during the war and during the election — that 
 it had become an article of their creed. It 
 was no longer necessary to ask : How ? 
 When ? If anyone quietly suggested that 
 perhaps the " How " was not so easy to 
 answer, that the " When " was certainly not 
 now, and could not be in fifty years, it was 
 as though an Archbishop had suddenly doubted 
 the existence of God. Their dismay was pain- 
 ful : it was also comic. 
 
 Several times "a high authority" attempted 
 to accustom the Press to the notion that we 
 had to be sensible in our settlements. He 
 hinted again and again at the grotesque 
 
THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'S 143 
 
 impossibility of Germany paying twenty or 
 thirty billions of money. He pointed out 
 how inflated was Belgium's bill ; he suggested 
 that France was asking for the moon ; he 
 bluntly said that we should be lucky if we 
 obtained compensation for mere material 
 damage caused by illegal acts of war, by 
 inexcusable and wanton destructiveness. Once 
 he even went so far as to declare that we 
 might have to help Germany rather than 
 Germany help us. Somehow these judicious 
 observations — which were so far from the 
 accepted belief at that time — passed over 
 the heads of the Pressmen and of the 
 public. They were probably regarded as the 
 idle remarks of these afternoon-tea parties ; 
 bits of private conversation of no public 
 importance. Yet I have reason to know that 
 some statesmen would have been glad to 
 have had their real views gradually dissemin- 
 ated. They were very different from the 
 views spread at the General Election. The 
 disillusion had to come, and more than one 
 delegate desired to prepare the public for 
 the shock. If I may introduce the personal 
 element," I for one was fortunate enough to 
 have a medium through which to express 
 this truth about the indemnity. Over and 
 over again, especially in the Westminster 
 
144 PEACE-MAKING AT PARTS 
 
 Gazette, the Editor of which had asked me to 
 contribute daily an article on the Peace Con- 
 ference, I recorded what was then being openly 
 said. But what were a few papers among so 
 many ? The M.P.'s and the public, and even 
 the Pressmen, clung to the fond belief that 
 Germany would pay — somehow, somewhen. 
 
 It was not till the beginning of April that 
 at last the truth to which everybody seemed 
 blind burst suddenly upon the world. It was 
 not a careful and close financial demonstra- 
 tion which produced this effect : it was an 
 " interview " — the " moderation interview " 
 as it was called — which appeared in the West- 
 minster Gazette ; and it was also that other 
 message which Lord Northcliffe, who has cer- 
 tainly a keen sense of realities and of changing 
 currents, caused to be sent to Colonel Claude 
 Lowther, and which produced consternation 
 in the political camp deeply pledged to heavy 
 indemnities. There was afterwards an attempt 
 to represent the Westminster Gazette as having 
 produced the commotion : that is not exact ; 
 the " very remarkable article," as Mr. Kennedy 
 Jones called it, did really strike home ; but 
 the political action which followed was due 
 to another cause : it was due to the direct 
 instigation of those who wished to force 
 Mr. Lloyd George's hands partly for personal 
 
THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'S 145 
 
 and partly for political reasons. To some 
 extent it was a genuine cry of alarm, but 
 it was also made the pretext and the vehicle 
 for imposing certain desiderata upon the Prime 
 Minister. The article was merely used as a 
 handy weapon. It should be remembered 
 that Lord Northcliffe was in total disagree- 
 ment with Mr. Lloyd George at that moment. 
 The two men were on bad terms. The quarrel 
 was an open one. That is why in the sub- 
 sequent debate Mr. Lloyd George, apparently 
 without reason, attacked Lord Northcliffe. 
 The Westminster Gazette article was left 
 alone, since obviously he could not refute it or 
 directly deny that it represented the opinion 
 of a certain section of the Conference, but he 
 did not hesitate to launch into a tirade against 
 Lord Northcliffe, who had for so long been the 
 power behind the throne, who had placed Mr. 
 Lloyd George in office, who had directed his 
 policy, who had by the immense influence he 
 exercised by means of his great organs been far 
 and away the best-feared and the most puissant 
 director of British destinies. The speech was 
 a turning-point not only in the affairs of 
 the Conference but in domestic affairs. The 
 breach between Lord Northcliffe and Mr. Lloyd 
 George, hitherto an inseparable pair and to- 
 gether strong enough to carry anything in 
 
 10 
 
146 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 the teeth of anybody, was pubUcly announced 
 in the most savage speech ever heard in the 
 House of Commons. 
 
 This speech was in reality a magnificent 
 irrelevance, a splendid digression, the most 
 odoriferous red-herring ever trailed across the 
 path of critics in full cry. What Mr. Lloyd 
 George thought of Lord Northcliffe or Lord 
 Northcliffe of Mr. Lloyd George was not of 
 capital importance : the dissolution of the 
 partnership was incidentally interesting, but 
 what was of paramount interest was whether 
 Mr. Lloyd George was striving for one kind of 
 peace — a peace possible to execute — or another 
 kind of peace — a peace fantastic and operatic. 
 By falling fiercely upon Lord Northcliffe, the 
 Prime Minister produced a sensation and 
 diverted attention from the subject which the 
 M.P.'s were anxious to discuss yvith him. 
 
 Whatever Mr. Lloyd George's personal views 
 were, and whether he agreed with the "high 
 authority" or not, it is certain that the Con- 
 ference as a whole was moved by the Bolshe- 
 vizing of Hungary. While the Big Four were 
 talking, events were happening. Soldiers were 
 — as always — forestalling the decisions of the 
 statesmen. Some blunder was responsible for 
 the resignation of Count Karolyi, President of 
 the Hungarian Republic. He felt that in the 
 
THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'S 147 
 
 excited state of public feeling — an excitement 
 largely caused by Allied military indiscretions 
 — he must make way for the Bolsheviks. 
 Bela Kun — or Cohen — stepped in ; Soviets 
 were set up ; and the Conference in a panic 
 saw the dreadful thing from Russia breaking 
 through all barriers and threatening the whole 
 of Europe. 
 
 It was recognized that the Hungarian revolt 
 was largely caused by the belief that large 
 tracts of territory inhabited by the Magyars 
 would be taken from them and given to the 
 Rumanians and other contiguous peoples. At 
 Paris it was declared that this conception 
 of the ultimate intentions of the Conference 
 was erroneous, and the action of the Hungarian 
 statesmen was premature. " The Conference," 
 I was told, "or at least important sections of 
 the Conference, do not mean to violate terri- 
 torial rights." 
 
 Obviously this was not the whole explana- 
 tion of the trouble, which was undoubtedly 
 due in a considerable measure to the acute 
 distress of the population. But it is certain 
 that it wounded the national pride, and dismay 
 at the reports that the boundaries as finally 
 settled would cut off large tracts of Hungarian 
 land, and bring the Hungarian people under 
 alien rule, caused such a situation that respon- 
 
148 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 sible statesmen could only throw up their 
 hands and invite any desperate and irre- 
 sponsible persons to undertake control of the 
 country that had escaped from all forces 
 making for order. 
 
 Two lessons were read in this outbreak : 
 (i) the danger of publicity regarding Conference 
 decisions which might excite public opinion 
 in defeated countries ; and (2) the need of 
 moderation and a spirit of reasonableness and 
 justice in dealing with frontiers. These lessons 
 were taken to heart. The increased secrecy 
 in which the Conference enwrapped itself was 
 justified by this argument, that all the inter- 
 ested peoples in Europe were in a peculiarly 
 nervous state of mind, upon which newspaper 
 statements, whether accurate or not, might 
 have incalculable results. The spirit of 
 nationality, whether for good or evil, had 
 been developed by the war, and news of 
 deUmitations of territory was news which 
 might react upon the strained attention of the 
 public in a dozen different points of Europe. 
 " These observations," I was told by my 
 " authority," " make it incumbent upon 
 the Conference to see that more discretion 
 is shown, because every item of information 
 concerning particular nations emanating from 
 Paris is published and commented upon in 
 
THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'S 149 
 
 those nations. Particularly is this the case 
 with Germany, and it is hoped that nothing 
 will leak out of the plans now under discus- 
 sion before they are presented to the German 
 delegates at Versailles." 
 
 Mr. Lloyd George himself drew up, or caused 
 to be drawn up, a rough treaty to seirve as 
 a basis for discussion. It was, I beUeve, 
 framed in a spirit of surprising moderation, 
 because he felt that the treaty must be some- 
 thing acceptable and something durable. The 
 argument that " anything is good enough for 
 the Huns " was regarded as fallacious and 
 perilous. The great fear was that Germany 
 should be driven into the position of Hungary. 
 This is why the Polish question was considered 
 so important. Mr. Lloyd George's diflElculty 
 was the transfer of two million undoubted 
 Germans to Poland, and his influence has 
 been to reduce that number by reducing 
 transferred territory. Certainly, where Ger- 
 many deliberately created a wedge of authentic 
 Germans on essentially Polish ground, Germany 
 has only herself to blame if she finds her 
 nationals under Polish administration. Too 
 ambitious claims, then, found British influence 
 arrayed against them. 
 
 " There must be no casus belli left to Ger- 
 many, otherwise you will have blocks of 
 
150 PEACE-MAKrNG AT PARIS 
 
 people clamouring for an alliance with the 
 Fatherland. Our interest is that Germany 
 should sign the treaty, and it is her interest 
 too. We have to put ourselves in the position 
 of Germany, and while stiffening our demands 
 as far as possible, we must not go beyond the 
 danger-line. This, of course, applies to all 
 other German frontier questions, including 
 those especially important to France." 
 
 " We want a sane peace," remarked a Minis- 
 ter, "I repeat, a sane peace. It is difficult 
 perhaps, in the present temper of the world. 
 Righteous passions have been aroused in all 
 Allied countries at the atrocities of Germany. 
 But we have to face realities and prepare a 
 practical treaty which will be signed, and 
 which will not breed new wars, whether it 
 disappoints Allied peoples or not. If we states- 
 men cannot face the situation we must clear 
 out. Our duty is plain and our policy must 
 be not to arouse implacable antagonisms." 
 
 When I now re-read the incriminated inter- 
 view, I wonder why it aroused so much ex- 
 citement, or why the newspapers generally 
 hesitated to take this sensible view. On 
 reparations, this is what was said in this 
 memorable expose, after ruling out payment 
 in gold as out of the question, because the 
 gold in Germany was an infinitesimal quantity : 
 
THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'S 151 
 
 " Take the pre-war figures of imported 
 goods. We sold to Germany 45 million pounds' 
 worth of goods. Germany sold to us 60 
 million pounds of goods. Do you remember 
 the outcry that there was about this balance 
 of 15 millions on the side of Germany ? What 
 do you suppose would be the outcry if the 
 figure were doubled or trebled, or increased 
 ten, twenty, or fifty times ? One has only 
 to look at the proposal to dismiss it. We 
 cannot take German goods by way of repara- 
 tion and so rob our own workpeople of their 
 livelihood. 
 
 " Neither can we take raw materials to any 
 considerable extent, because we have to con- 
 sider the obvious effect of depriving Germany 
 of her very means of subsistence. And, more- 
 over, we do not want them. Who, for example, 
 wants to flood the British market with German 
 coal ? 
 
 " We may take German credits to some 
 extent, though, of course, we have to be care- 
 ful not to depreciate those credits. In taking 
 away Alsace-Lorraine from Germany we are 
 taking away the bulk of her iron, and great 
 quantities of coal in the Sarre Basin, and 
 you cannot go on stripping Germany bare. 
 We shall, however, get something, and I think 
 it will be something worth having. 
 
152 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 " Consider what would happen if we were 
 not moderate. The Allied armies in Germany 
 now cost 350 millions sterling a year for 
 their upkeep. I am reliably informed that 
 Germany does not possess at the present 
 time an army of more than 40,000, and we 
 are only occupying the fringes of Germany. 
 Three hundred and fifty millions sterling for 
 an army of occupation against an army of 
 40,000 in the border districts ! What would it 
 be if we were compelled to increase our army 
 and to sit down in Westphalia, for example, 
 for thirty years ? 
 
 " The miUtary experts declare that if Ger- 
 many became obstinate, if we pushed her 
 too far, we should have to occupy the country 
 with large forces for thirty years. What good 
 would that be to us ? Supposing Germany 
 refused to fulfil our conditions ; suppose she 
 became Bolshevik ? Suppose that, actively 
 or passively, she opposed us ? Have you 
 realized what an occupation of thirty years 
 means ? Suppose she said : ' You can do 
 what you like. Come into the country. The 
 latch is not on the door. Occupy Berlin, if 
 it pleases you to do so.' What satisfaction 
 would that be to us ? 
 
 " Who is going to pay for the occupation ? 
 Where is the army coming from ? Not from 
 
THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'S 153 
 
 America, certainly. America won't occupy 
 Germany in such circumstances. Are we 
 going to keep up conscription for an indefinite 
 period ? Is the army going to exist for the 
 mere purpose of extracting out of Germany 
 enough money to pay for itself ? That would 
 be the limit of absurdity. 
 
 "There is also, of course, the question of 
 economic wastage. An army is non-produc- 
 tive. All that labour power unused at a 
 moment when there is need for production 
 as there has never been before, when com- 
 mercial competition in the world will be 
 greater than ever, would be a scandalous 
 ineptitude." 
 
 The same note with regard to boundaries was 
 struck by my "authority," Every boundary 
 not rightly placed, he pointed out, is a poten- 
 tial war. " In preparing the treaty we have to 
 be particularly careful not to create legitimate 
 grievances. Are we to use over again the 
 arguments of 1871 ? " he cried. " If we do, 
 we shall have 1914 over again." 
 
 Europe cannot again be plunged into a 
 war because we are shortsighted enough to 
 repeat the role of Germany. Certainly Eng- 
 land could not come into a conflagration 
 which was caused by a genuine injustice 
 under which Germany suffered ; and it was 
 
154 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 folly, he argued, to suppose that Germany 
 would always be crushed. 
 
 No Germania Irredenta ! We must not, he 
 insisted, provide trouble for the future. Every 
 step taken now is vital to the world's peace. 
 There are two reasons why we must be just — 
 although at the same time we must be stern,. 
 One is that we must have an orderly Ger- 
 many ready to sign the treaty and observe it. 
 The other is that at some subsequent period, 
 more or less remote, we must not have a 
 belligerent Germany living only for restitution 
 and revenge. 
 
 " Think of the gigantic and complicated 
 problems which we have to unravel," he 
 said. "It is not only their magnitude, but 
 their variety. I confess I was ignorant of 
 the very existence of some of the places now 
 hotly disputed, and upon which the issue of 
 peace and war depends. Every tiny piece 
 of land which is in discussion is a possible 
 battleground which may grow into a battle- 
 ground as big as Europe. Nothing is trivial, 
 nothing is insignificant. 
 
 " There has been an accusation of time- 
 wasting, for example, because we spent some 
 time on the question of ownership of cables. 
 But I assure you this is a vital matter. It is 
 especially vital to America and Japan. Are 
 
THE REVOLT OF THE M.P.'S 155 
 
 the cables to be regarded as the property of 
 those who seized them— as a legitimate spoil 
 of war ? Or are they to be internationalized 
 — the property of the League of Nations ? 
 It is a really big question. 
 
 " Nor does the importance of Poland being 
 shaped on just and reasonable lines appear 
 to have been appreciated by the public. 
 Poland is a test question. If we give Ger- 
 many a deadly wound there, good-bye to 
 the prospects of permanent peace ! Are we 
 going to fight some years hence for what is 
 palpably unfair ? We have to study these 
 questions from every angle, knowing that 
 upon the decision of the Conference the 
 happiness of humanity depends." 
 
 It was the Morning Post which helped to 
 stir up the hornets' nest. Its Conference 
 Correspondent was in the same room at the 
 time these declarations were made, not 
 secretly or lightly, and therefore the real 
 author was known. Yet the Morning Post 
 professed to discover from internal evidence 
 that the begetter was the Prime Minister. 
 "No one but Mr. Lloyd George could have 
 confessed his ignorance of some of the places 
 hotly disputed " ; and afterwards, when Mr. 
 Lloyd George happened to confess in his 
 House of Commons speech his ignorance of 
 
156 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 Teschen in very similar terms, the Morning 
 Post took the repetition as an acknowledg- 
 ment and a signature. For my part, I do 
 not think the Premier's opinion was greatly 
 different, but to identify him with the article 
 was not justified. It was, like the telegram 
 received by Colonel Lowther, part of the plan 
 to force his hands and to make him act in 
 opposition to what was alleged to be his real 
 judgment. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 RUSSIA AGAIN 
 
 A YOUNG British officer welcomed as a deliverer 
 in the Don country, where he had gone as a 
 special envoy of the Allies, was greeted not 
 only by the anti-Bolshevik army but by the 
 people. He addressed some words to them, 
 and wound up by calling on them to sing the 
 Russian National Anthem. Consternation ! 
 Horror ! Here was the British saviour ac- 
 tually asking them to join in the hymn of 
 Czardom. Of course the officers and the priests 
 did not hesitate, but the democratic members 
 of the local government solemnly and s^dly 
 passed a resolution banning the hymn in 
 future, no matter who gave the order that 
 it should be sung. 
 
 This was one of the stories told me by 
 M. Avxentieff, the former President of the 
 All- Russian Government which was overthrown 
 
 by Koltschack's coup d'etat. It is illuminating. 
 
 ' 157 
 
158 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 The whole Russian imbroglio came about be- 
 cause of the incredible incompetence of military 
 men in matters which call for political judg- 
 ment and tact. A certain British officer, 
 who shall be nameless, has wrought irreparable 
 injury by his bStises^ in Russia. He did not 
 understand that he was not there to back 
 up landed proprietors and rob the peasants 
 of their land. He was there to fight the 
 Bolsheviks. Unhappily, the most deplorable 
 advice was continually given ; so that we 
 were constantly making potential friends into 
 foes. Lenin was kept in power by our stupid 
 and unimaginative military representatives, 
 just as the Revolution was largely assisted by 
 diplomatic blunders. No news was available, 
 since it was difficult to come out of Russia 
 unless you were a friend of Czardom. On 
 the Finnish frontier, for example, the effective 
 control was in the hands of Prince Obolensky, 
 the Governor of Petrograd under Protopopoff, 
 and Knegovitch, chief of the secret police of 
 the Czar. The agents of Czardom were every- 
 where in power : they fraternized with the 
 military adventurers and also with the Allied 
 miUtary men. No wonder we were ill served. 
 In the middle of April a bright young man, 
 Mr. W. C. Bullitt, and a shrewd old American 
 iournalist. Mr. Lincoln Steffen. came back to 
 
KUSMA AUAIIN I59 
 
 Paris after having been to Moscow on a special 
 mission. Their mission was — strangely enough ! 
 — to learn the truth. They talked with Lenin 
 in the Kremlin, and they brought back peace 
 terms in their pockets and drew up a remark- 
 able report which revealed the exact position 
 of affairs. 
 
 Mr. Lloyd George was more eager and more 
 interested than Mr. Wilson. He had the 
 bright young man to breakfast with him, and 
 made him recite his story at length. There 
 was grave doubt in his mind in respect of 
 our policy. Why were we supporting a 
 crowd of people on the outskirts of Russia ? 
 Why were the cinematograph operators taking 
 pictures of Bolshevik atrocities with the good 
 French people of Epinal or even Paris as 
 actors ? What was it all about ? Could we, 
 because we disliked the Soviets, really go 
 on fighting the great country in which they 
 were the recognized form of Government ? 
 These were the questions which were asked. 
 Who could define our policy ? What were we 
 driving at ? Why, we had actually Allied 
 military instructors on the side of the Poles 
 when they were fighting the Ukrainians, who 
 were also coached by Allied officers ! Who 
 was who, whether the Germans were our 
 friends or foes (since we joined hands with 
 
i6o PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 them against the Bolsheviks !) — whether Pet- 
 Uura, for example, was with us or against us 
 — nobody seemed to know. In any case, we 
 were manufacturing Bolsheviks not only in 
 Russia by our inadequate and irritating in- 
 vasion, but in Allied countries too. The 
 French troops at Odessa simply refused to 
 fight. The French sailors in the Black Sea 
 simply imprisoned their officers and ran up 
 the Red Flag. The position was dangerous 
 as well as ridiculous. 
 
 The terms of Lenin were plain. He offered 
 to conclude an immediate armistice, suggest- 
 ing that a " Conference be summoned to sign 
 peace terms which would permit each Govern- 
 ment to remain in power, all attempts to 
 overthrow the other Governments being ter- 
 minated; that the Allies raise the present 
 blockade of Russia and re-establish com- 
 mercial and diplomatic relations with her ; 
 that all political offenders be pardoned ; 
 that all Governments of the former Russian 
 Empire acknowledge their financial obligations, 
 and that the Russian gold seized by the 
 Czechs in Kazan and that confiscated by 
 the Allies elsewhere be devoted to the 
 payment of debts ; that Allied , and foreign 
 troops be recalled from Russia, and that 
 all support of counter-Soviet Governments 
 
RUSSIA AGAIN i6i 
 
 cease." He also offered valuable concessions 
 to the Allies. It was touch and go, in spite 
 of Mr. Lloyd George's disclaimer in the House, 
 whether peace should be made. The report 
 of Mr. Bullitt showed that, largely owing to 
 our blockade, a country of over one hundred 
 and fifty millions of people was starving. 
 In the country districts the situation was 
 not so desperate. There was no real, lack 
 of the necessaries of life in Russia. But 
 Russia was nevertheless starving, because 
 it was impossible for the people in the 
 towns to get that food. There was first 
 of all a terrible lack of rolling-stock. 
 There were not available more than 25 per 
 cent, of the locomotives and wagons which 
 existed before the war. The coalfields which 
 were essential for transport were in the hands 
 of enemy troops, and the control of the oil 
 wells which furnished the motive power for 
 the river boats was exercised by the Allies. 
 It was therefore extremely difficult for the 
 Government, as it would be for any Govern- 
 ment of any complexion, to satisfy th€ wants 
 of the towns. 
 
 In Moscow, for example, only a quarter of 
 the calculated minimum of certain necessaries 
 entered the town. Babies died at birth like 
 flies in winter. The grown-up population went 
 
i62 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 about emaciated, walking more or less swiftly 
 towards a universal tomb. The capacity of 
 the human body to exist, to cling feebly to a 
 remnant of life, when deprived of nourishment, 
 is an astounding revelation of the war. A 
 friend of mine who was underfed daily for 
 three months in Germany tells me that he 
 became accustomed to the regime and hardly 
 noticed, except for an almost mad craving 
 for fat of some kind, the long Lent. Only 
 when he came out of Germany and was pro- 
 vided with ordinary food did he realize his 
 feebleness and his lack of vitality. The people 
 in Moscow did not die at once, but they were 
 dying inevitably. The process was more or 
 less gradual. The mortality was of course 
 terrible, but that there were survivors is the 
 extraordinary fact. 
 
 In Petrograd the state of the population 
 was even worse, much worse. There death 
 came more quickly. 
 
 Yet such resources as Russia had she utilized 
 well. The trains ran to time and the fac- 
 tories were kept going as far as it was possible 
 to keep them going. Order was maintained 
 and the streets of the city were as safe as 
 the streets of Paris or London. The reign of 
 terror had ceased, and with the disappearance 
 of counter-revolutionary movements there was 
 
RUSSIA AGAIN 163 
 
 the resumption of a satisfactory system of 
 justice. Always, however, as in all countries, 
 the speculator, the food profiteer, existed. 
 
 We must bear in mind what perhaps we 
 Westerners would call the fanatical character 
 of the Russians. In spite of their sufferings 
 they were resolved to continue the Soviet 
 system of government. If the Czar returned 
 to the throne to-morrow, he would have to 
 govern the country through the Soviets. The 
 Soviet for the Russian is a symbol. He is, 
 for better or worse, wedded to this method of 
 representation. 
 
 As for the Bolshevik representatives, after 
 a year and a half which had been marked by 
 many attempts on the part of the anti-Bol- 
 sheviks to overthrow the Government, Lenin 
 seemed to be more confirmed in power than 
 ever, and to be supported by the people. 
 To have maintained his position and to have 
 strengthened it was, whether we like it or 
 not, an amazing phenomenon. With the threat 
 of an armed intervention in Russia, the prin- 
 cipal opponents of Bolshevism, who left alone 
 would doubtless have shaken, if not overthrown, 
 Lenin, resolved to close up the ranks and present 
 a common front to those whom they regarded 
 as a foreign invader bent upon a restoration. 
 Lenin, too, moved towards the Right, even 
 
i64 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 against the wishes of Trotsky. It was not 
 from the Right that such poUtical antagonism 
 as existed came. It was from the Left. In- 
 credible as it may appear, there were groups 
 of Anarchists and other wild Russians who 
 regarded the Communists as agents of the 
 bourgeoisie, who had taken upon themselves 
 the task of stifling the Russian Revolution. 
 
 There came, while these negotiations with 
 Lenin were pending, a sudden idea to make 
 use of the suggestion of feeding Russia which 
 had been before the Conference unofficially 
 for more than a month. It originated at 
 the Hotel de Crillon in conversations which I 
 and a certain official had ; and this official 
 ended by converting most of his colleagues. 
 The theory was that the revolutionary atmo- 
 sphere was largely caused by the isolation of 
 Russia. Break down the frontiers, smash the 
 windows and let in the air, and Bolshevism 
 would wither away. It was hunger which made 
 Bolsheviks. To attack hunger was therefore 
 to attack Bolshevism. There is only one way 
 to attack hunger — with food. These were not 
 paradoxes, but serious political propositions. 
 They were so serious that eventually the Big 
 Four adopted them — partly in order to avoid 
 a direct reply to the peace propositions as a 
 whole. It was feared that public opinion was 
 
RUSSIA AGAIN 165 
 
 against peace with Russia. But perhaps public 
 opinion was not against sending food-stuffs 
 into starving Russia. Thus we would get on 
 some sort of terms with the Bolsheviks. 
 
 That was how the Nansen letter came to 
 be written. There were conversations with 
 the famous explorer and others, and Mr. 
 Branting, the Scandinavian Socialist chief, only 
 declined to help on account of his health. 
 The ground seemed thoroughly prepared, and 
 the Nansen letter, in which he offered to under- 
 take the distribution of food-stuffs and of 
 general relief work in Russia, was not a spon- 
 taneous effusion. There seemed nothing to 
 do but for the four statesmen to reply in the 
 affirmative and publish the correspondence. 
 
 Things did not happen as simply as 
 that. There were more intrigues. Mr. Lloyd 
 George, Mr. Wilson and Signor Orlando signed 
 the reply. M. Clemenceau, though of course 
 always agreeing with the principle, would like 
 to consult M. Loucheur, or he would like to 
 look up a certain point of detail. He would 
 like to consult somebody or other for nearly 
 a fortnight ; and in the meantime the letter 
 signed by three waited for the fourth signature. 
 Dr. Nansen grew impatient. The placid 
 Colonel House was almost angry ; and it 
 was even hinted rather loudly that if the 
 
i66 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 document was not signed it would be issued 
 to the Press with three signatures ! Then 
 M. Clemenceau signed. In the meantime the 
 first enthusiasm had been killed by doubts. 
 Even this was not, however, enough to wreck 
 the scheme. The Allies said they would feed 
 Russia if all hostilities ceased. Needless to 
 say Koltschack had been given more Allied 
 arms and more Allied promises. He was cer- 
 tainly not expected to stop hostilities, and after 
 all, could the Bolsheviks stop if he went on ? 
 Moreover, the correspondence and the con- 
 ditions were not sent by wireless telegraph to 
 Russia, since it was feared by the Quai d'Orsay 
 that the use of the Eiffel Tower as a transmit- 
 ting station would imply official relations with 
 the Bolsheviks. It was long after that a 
 courier reached Lenin. Needless to add, the 
 plan was dead and done for. 
 
 The British army at Archangel was about 
 this time in some peril, and Englishmen can 
 never leave their fellow-countrymen in peril. 
 White Papers containing tales of somewhat 
 ancient and unverified atrocities found a curi- 
 ously timely publication. Then followed the 
 Koltschiack advance — and a clamour for his 
 recognition. In the flush of his apparent 
 success, it was hoped to get him recognized 
 as the head of the real Russian Government. 
 
RUSSIA AGAIN 167 
 
 The democratic conditions which were proposed 
 to hina were not such as to please the auto- 
 crats who surrounded him. Guarantees were 
 not really demanded, and agrarian reform was 
 not provided for. Even so, the reply of 
 Koltschack was not considered at first to be 
 satisfactory, and before it was received he 
 began to be pushed back. The Allied promise 
 of aid was renewed and the great adventure 
 was pursued, though Koltschack by this time 
 was in full flight. The Russian imbroglio was 
 worse than ever. The riddle of the Sphinx 
 was not answered ; and every day the Entente 
 peoples were growing more tired of interference 
 of any sort whatsoever with Russia. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 CRISIS ON CRISIS 
 
 April was a month of crises. It was not 
 once or twice, but half a dozen times that 
 a smash seemed inevitable. The Hungarian 
 affair alone produced many changes of opinion. 
 The balance leaned to one side and then to 
 another. Were we to treat these Soviets as 
 enemies with whom we could negotiate, or 
 were we simply to crush them ? There were 
 always two voices. On the downfall of Karolyi 
 and the triumph of the Bolsheviks the policy 
 of an influential part of the Conference changed 
 suddenly, as I have indicated. Nevertheless, 
 in spite of the views which were held by the 
 British and American members of the Big 
 Four, General Mangin was sent for, and it 
 was proposed that he, as Commander-in-Chief 
 in the East, should settle this trouble by- 
 force of arms. Then the first voice spoke 
 again. Instead of Mangin, it was Smuts who 
 
 l6g 
 
170 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 was sent, on a peace mission, not on a, war 
 mission. He seemed to succeed, and the 
 fact that a Bolshevik Government was in 
 power in Hungary did not appear to be in 
 any way menacing for the Allies, however 
 much it was to be regretted from the 
 political point of view. Our attitude and 
 their attitude was conciliatory. 
 
 Then the second voice spoke again. Without 
 any reason being given for the change, we 
 learnt that Rumania had begun a new war 
 on Hungary, " by order of the Allies." After 
 Smuts, General Franchet d'Esperey went on 
 a very different mission to Bucharest. It 
 was precisely the menace of a Rumanian 
 snatching of Hungary that overthrew Karolyi 
 and that set up Bolshevism. What this new 
 reliance on force would produce — for the Czechs 
 and the Serbs were also in movement — was 
 to be feared. Were we going to set the 
 Balkans ablaze again ? Why did we always 
 speak with two voices ? 
 
 This was characteristic enough. No wonder 
 that Mr. Wilson, whose temperamental defects 
 I have examined, grew extremely weary of 
 the confusion of tongues. He was disillu- 
 sioned and disappointed. He had many 
 moments of discouragement. He had been 
 saddened, and was tempted to leave the 
 
CRISIS ON CRISIS 171 
 
 wrangling Conference. It was with deep dis- 
 may that the world suddenly heard that he 
 had sent for the George Washington to take 
 him back to America, away from the clamour 
 and contradiction. There is now no doubt 
 that he meant to give up the fight. He was 
 disheartened. He had a diplomatic illness, 
 keeping to his room for some days. He was 
 really wrestling with his conscience. Should 
 he continue or not ? It is almost impossible 
 for two men who speak different moral lan- 
 guages to discuss with each other. The 
 Conference possessed an excellent interpreter 
 of words in Captain Mantoux, a Frenchman 
 who had been a professor in London. Alas ! 
 no one can translate ideas. One possesses 
 them, one understands them, or one does 
 not. The simple propositions of President 
 Wilson were nowhere less understood than 
 in the Conference. 
 
 Step by step he had been persuaded that 
 his Fourteen Points did not exclude the 
 possibilit}' of such-and-such action. Every 
 time he gave way. Perhaps the separate 
 issues were not in themselves important ; 
 perhaps the decisions could be reconciled with 
 the text of the Fourteen Points ; but the 
 sum total was overwhelmingly against the 
 spirit of the Wilsonian peace. For a moment. 
 
172 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 he decided upon this great gesture of abdica- 
 tion, of leaving the world to wrangle. But 
 it was pointed out that if he really carried 
 out his threat there might follow a revolution 
 in every country of Europe. It was not 
 outside the bounds of possibility. On the 
 contrary, the virtual condemnation of the 
 Conference by Mr. Wilson would have caused 
 such a sensation, and such a profound up- 
 heaval, that it is difficult to see how Govern- 
 meuts or institutions could have withstood. 
 His departure meant not merely the collapse 
 of the Conference but the collapse of civili- 
 zation. It was certainly too heavy a 
 responsibility to shoulder; and the George 
 Washington lay quietly at Brest, and then 
 went away after the wild moment of Presi- 
 dential mutiny had passed. It was Wijson's 
 supreme battle, and there is no more thrill- 
 ing " might-have-been " in history than the 
 " might-have-been " of his departure. Would 
 he have brought down the world in ruins ? 
 Would he have made himself a naine execrated 
 or honoured in history — the most execrated 
 or the most honoured in all history ? At any 
 rate, he stayed ; and he lost greatly in prestige 
 by his false step. Threats unfulfilled are worse 
 than futile: they become ridiculous. Mr. Wilson 
 was at once regarded as a mediocre figure. 
 
CRISIS ON CRISIS 173 
 
 The French claims, as expounded by Marshal 
 Foch in a memorable interview in the Daily 
 Mail, were to make the Rhine the real line 
 of defence against Germany. A profound 
 impression was created, not only in England, 
 but in enlightened circles in France. By 
 what right did the Marshal adventure in 
 politics ? Why did he, in effect, criticize 
 the diplomatic conceptions of Mr. Lloyd 
 George and Mr. Wilson ? He was a soldier 
 on service, to give his advice when it was 
 demanded, not to pit his ideas in public 
 against the ideas of the statesmen. These 
 were questions which were asked. But the 
 interview of a French Marshal was concealed 
 from the French public. Only those who 
 could read English and who had bought a 
 copy of the Daily Mail (London Edition) 
 on the boulevards were permitted to hear of 
 this studied indiscretion. Mr. G. Ward Price, 
 who interviewed him, performed his work 
 well and made the most of the Marshal's 
 utterances ; but it was impossible to resist 
 the feeling that there was a curious conspir- 
 acy to force the hands of the British Prime 
 Minister. France was the last country to 
 retain the censorship in full blast, and in 
 these latter months of the Peace Conference 
 it was hard for the French to learn the truth 
 except via London or America. 
 
174 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 Let me recall that when the Czar's Foreign 
 Minister, M. Sazonoff, handed to the French 
 and British Ambassadors a memorandum where 
 the Russian territorial, revendications were 
 set out (namely " Constantinople, Southern 
 Thrace, and much other booty), the British 
 and French Governments consented only after 
 making counter-revendications. An audience 
 was given by the Czar to M. Doumergue, 
 who was the envoy of the French Government, 
 and a few days later the Russian Foreign 
 Minister addressed a note to the French 
 Ambassador at Petrograd pledging the Russian 
 support for the French plans, which were 
 represented as including the return of Alsace- 
 Lorraine, the annexation of the Sarre Basin, 
 the dismemberment of the Rhenish Provinces 
 from Germany, either by incorporation into 
 France or by their constitution as autonomous 
 States with a long French military occupation. 
 No wonder that all who had really looked 
 forward to this result were dismayed at the 
 opposition in the Conference ; and even the 
 strongest protest, going as far as the resig- 
 nation of President Poincare, would not have 
 been altogether surprising. It was an open 
 secret that Marshal Foch was only mollified 
 with difficulty. 
 
 To record all the minor crises would be too 
 
CRISIS ON CRISIS 175 
 
 long a history ; but if Mr. Wilson threatened 
 to leave, and Mr. Lloyd George hinted of 
 possible resignation in certain eventualities, 
 if Marshal Foch stamped his foot impatiently, 
 and if even M. Clemenceau spoke of quit- 
 ting, it was Signor Orlando. who really did 
 go_ out of the Conference slamming the door 
 behind him. 
 
 For once the American President took up 
 an uncompromising attitude, He stiffened 
 his back when the principles of justice and of 
 common sense were violated in a preposterous 
 proposal to give Italy not only the Dalmatian 
 coast, on the other side of the Adriatic — 
 which was peopled in overwhelming majority 
 by the Yugo-Slavs — but also the sole port 
 available to the Yugo-Slavs, namely Fiume. 
 Without access to the sea, not only the 
 Croatians, but all the peoples to the north 
 and east of the Adriatic ran the risk of suffoca- 
 tion. Italy seemed to go mad in a rapture of 
 Imperialism. It is true that for Dalmatia she 
 held the British and the French by a secret 
 treaty, in which, as the price of her help in 
 the war, she was to be given specific things 
 which belonged neither to the British and 
 French to give nor to Italy on any ground 
 of right. That was how iniquitous bargains 
 which can only mean future wars were made ; 
 
176 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 and Mr. Lloyd George felt himself, like M. 
 Clemenceau, bound by the document which 
 wronged one Ally — the Serbians; indeed, two 
 Allies, since the Greeks were also wronged 
 — for the support of another. Not only did 
 Italy want her pound of flesh according 
 to the bond : she wanted also something 
 which was not in the bond — the port of 
 Fiume. 
 
 The trouble had been blowing up for some 
 time. At least a month earlier the British 
 Prime Minister had expressed the intention 
 of postponing the discussions on Itahan claims 
 until after peace had been made with Ger- 
 many. If he was clever, so was Sonnino, 
 and his move was seen. Italy insisted on 
 having a, decision before she consented to 
 the German peace. The position was as 
 follows : Italy wanted Fiume and Dalmatia ; 
 Mr. Lloyd George said : "If you hold us to 
 our pledge we are bound to agree to your 
 possession of Dalmatia, but we shall certainly 
 refuse Fiume, which you want even more, 
 and which we have not promised you " ; 
 Mr. Wilson said : " For my part, I am tied 
 by no secret treaties. You shall have neither 
 Dalmatia, which would be an abomination, 
 nor Fiume, which would be an outrage." 
 There was much negotiation, but when a 
 
CRISIS ON CRISIS 177 
 
 dispute is so manifest there can hardly be 
 a compromise. 
 
 What induced Mr. Wilson to launch a sudden 
 appeal over the heads of the diplomatists, 
 to publish abroad in a fine declaration his 
 attitude and the reason of his stand for 
 honest statesmanship, was the news that 
 Rome was placarded with the announcement 
 that Fiume was definitely annexed. There 
 were also suspicious movements of troops. 
 The moment was critical : either Mr. Wilson 
 had to let judgment go by default or he had 
 to speak out. He spoke out, with the result 
 that in high dudgeon Signor Orlando and 
 Baron Sonnino and the rest went out of the 
 Conference with much noise. 
 
 What would happen ? Would the Confer- 
 ence split up ? Could peace be signed without 
 Italy ? In Italy unprecedented scenes of 
 approval greeted the ItaUan Ministers. Pub- 
 lic opinion had been brought to fever heat, 
 and everybody was persuaded that Italy had 
 been flouted. Orlando went so far as to 
 suggest that the Conference was on the point 
 of agreeing when Wilson launched his message. 
 There never was the smallest chance of agree- 
 ment in those latter days of April. Either 
 Wilson had to deny himself if he gave way, 
 or Orlando (whose political position was not 
 
 12 
 
178 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 too safe and who depended upon the astute 
 Sonnino, who was the most Imperialist of 
 old diplomatists) had to surrender and prob- 
 ably resign the Premiership. It is hard to 
 see how events could have fallen otherwise. 
 As a fact, Orlando, having secured the wild 
 applause of the people, was hopeful of being 
 able quietly to moderate his demands. 
 
 At any rate, while Italy was in an uproar, 
 and the Big Four was reduced to the Big 
 Three, and even war would not have sur- 
 prised anybody, the German plenipotentiaries 
 were preparing to leave Berlin for Versailles. 
 That was the pass to which this inability to 
 face the facts had brought the Conference. 
 
 This was not all. Japan threatened to 
 follow the example of Italy. It seemed inevit- 
 able at one moment that the Germans who 
 had been summoned would find no one to 
 receive them. The facts in the case of Japan 
 were simple :. the Imperialists by this time 
 had taken heart and no longer tried to hide 
 their designs. Let us see, said the Japanese, 
 if. Mr. Wilson will again dare to defy a Great 
 Power. As China stated in a petition to 
 the Conference, Japan was " seeking to estab- 
 lish a system of political and economic 
 servitudes " in the province of Shantung, 
 based upon her claim to be in the right of 
 
CRISIS ON CRISIS 179 
 
 succession to Kiao-Chow and other privileges 
 which Germany formerly possessed. It is 
 inevitable that if one people occupies the 
 territory of another people against its will, 
 there must be, if not "outrages," at least 
 charges of outrages. That is precisely what 
 has been produced. The Chinese did not 
 hesitate to stigmatize the Japanese troops as 
 being responsible for the most indefensible 
 treatment of the inhabitants. 
 
 It is held by the Chinese that when Japan 
 drove the Germans out of Kiao-Chow — which 
 had been leased to Germany in i8g8 under 
 duress — they in turn established themselves 
 in the peninsula by force. The Chinese 
 declare that the settlement contained in the 
 Treaty and Notes signed by China in May 
 1915 was imposed upon the Eastern Republic 
 by Japanese menaces. If China had not 
 agreed then, Japan would have made war 
 upon her. It is not, of course, in this light 
 that Japan presents her claims on Kiao-Chow. 
 She says that China did not take steps to 
 recover the German-held territory, and that 
 there is no reason why she should recover 
 it now that it is held by Japan. 
 
 The famous Twenty-one Demands — which 
 are put in opposition to the Fourteen Points 
 — were used as a weapon by Japan, who 
 
i8o PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 extorted concessions and agreements later in 
 1917 and 1918. Japan, it is urged, im- 
 properly sought to dominate and control 
 China, politically, militarily, and financially. 
 If the Bucharest Treaty, for example, was 
 not allowed to stand because it was signed' 
 at the point of the bayonet, China con- 
 tended that Japan must not profit by the 
 weakness of her neighbour. 
 
 What is more, China makes the specific 
 charge that Japan, considering only her own 
 material interests, prevented China from Com- 
 ing into the war on the side of the Allies 
 earlier. Japan wanted to tighten her hold 
 on China, and therefore kept her from 
 coming into the Alliance. In 1915 there 
 was a veiled threat in the Japanese Foreign 
 Minister's declaration that the awakening of 
 460,000,000 Chinese could not be viewed by 
 Japan " without apprehension." 
 
 At bottom the question is one of secret 
 treaties again. In February 1917 Japan se- 
 cured from the Allies — from Great Britain, 
 from France, from Russia, from Italy- — 
 promises of support for her claim upon Kiao- 
 Chow and to the German rights in Shantung. 
 Once more, it will be observed, America was 
 no party to this agreement. China put before 
 the Conference some simple propositions. She 
 
CRISIS ON CRISIS i8i 
 
 asked in the first place that all German rights 
 in the peninsula should revert to her. She 
 asked that she should be released from agree- 
 ments with Japan which she entered into 
 because Japan was stronger than she was. 
 She asked, lastly, that the secret treaty 
 concluded between the Allies and Japan 
 should be null and void. 
 
 The case against this treaty on grounds 
 of equity is that it was entered into by 
 nations which had no right to fix the fate 
 and future of Chinese territories without con- 
 sulting China, and that it was obtained by 
 Japan as -a piece of blackmail. " Give me 
 these rights," she said in effect, " or I will 
 keep China from declaring war on Germany. 
 It is to your interest that China should 
 come in." 
 
 For a moment Mr. Wilson meant to fight : 
 but he had exhausted all his moral strength : 
 the consequences of defending China too 
 seriously would have been grave. Japan did 
 not go out slamming the door, because Japan 
 got all she wanted by threatening to do so. 
 
 Add to these quarrels the revolt of the 
 little nations, who complained that they had 
 been simply ignored by the all-powerful Four 
 — or Three. The charge was true. Four — 
 or Three — ^men were the masters of the world, 
 
i82 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 disposing of all in sovereign manner. The 
 King of the Belgians himself flew to Paris 
 to represent that Belgium must have a prefer- 
 ential claim to reparations, must have a loan 
 from the Allies if the country was to be 
 restored. Mr. Lloyd George was curiously 
 blind to the needs of Belgium, and more than 
 . once spoke against any allocation of indemni- 
 ties which would put Great Britain after 
 Belgium or France. He was the ultra- 
 patriot, who did not see that a generous 
 gesture was necessary in favour of those 
 nations whose need was greater than ours. 
 Happily, the plea of King Albert prevailed. 
 
 At the same time, there were menacing 
 symptoms in France, where M. Clemenceau's 
 popularity had dropped from the highest 
 heaven to the deepest depths. The slowness 
 of the peace, the delay in demobilization, 
 the indifference of the Government to the 
 industrial and financial affairs of the country, 
 the incompetence of the Ministers in respect 
 of the vie chere, the accumulation of scandals, 
 all helped the rising movement of proletarian 
 revolt. But above all the Allied policy in 
 Russia was attacked, and incitements to dis- 
 obedience were made to soldiers and to 
 sailors. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE LEAGUE AND LABOUR 
 
 While the Conference was struggling with 
 these heart-breaking problems and the differ- 
 ences were at last public, it was thought 
 well to put a bold face on things. Operi and 
 full sittings of the Conference — which had 
 grown rare — were decided upon. The final 
 draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
 and the Labour. Charter, both of which were 
 to be incorporated in the treaty, were to be 
 given to the world with some pomp and 
 ceremony. Even while the German delegates 
 were arriving, the amended Covenant was 
 being passed. 
 
 There was, perhaps, some irony in the in- 
 troduction of the new text of a pact which is 
 to institute the reign of goodwill between 
 nations at the moment when the empty 
 chairs of the Italians were more eloquent 
 
 than any of their occupants at other gather- 
 
 183 
 
i84 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 ings could have been. Those chairs spoke a 
 language that not even President Wilson 
 could make us forget. After his enumeration 
 of the changes in the text, he referred to its 
 capital significance in the promise of justice 
 in international affairs and peace between 
 nations. Where was Orlando ? one asked. 
 The fact is that, although a big thing has 
 been born, it will require a more friendly 
 spirit than is now manifest on the part of 
 all the contracting parties if it is to be a 
 living reality. As I listened, I seemed to 
 hear the invocation to war of Gabriele 
 d'Annunzio ; and I wondered sadly if the 
 statesmen of all the nations really mean to 
 make the League the supreme authority to 
 which they and their people will bow. 
 . Unless there is a new international conscience, 
 the nomination of Sir Eric Drummond as 
 Secretary-General and the immediate pre- 
 paration of plans by the Council, with Brazil, 
 Belgium, Greece and Spain added to the five 
 Great Powers, the subsequent' consultations 
 at London, at Washington, and the housing 
 arrangements at Geneva, will be simply the 
 erection of a piece of dead machinery. After 
 all, the motive-power must be a positive 
 desire for justice and a Will to Peace. 
 Do not let us make any mistake. If the 
 
THE LEAGUE AND LABOUR 185 
 
 League does not work there will be war. 
 We have got to make it a success. And I 
 think we will. I think the League will repair 
 the errors of the Conference. But I cannot 
 deny that at this public gathering in the 
 dismal overheated Grande Salle of the Quai 
 d'Orsay the spark of faith had gone. Yet it 
 is precisely that spark of faith which will 
 make possible the League of Nation^ as a 
 living reality and not a mere document which 
 will become a dead letter. 
 
 Nothing in the whole course of the Con- 
 ference struck me more forcibly than the 
 indifference with which the League was re- 
 ceived. Nobody seemed to care. There were 
 two vital points which, in the opinion of two 
 different countries, had been left out. Did 
 those countries trouble very much ? No. 
 France, who considered (as the " most menaced 
 country ") that a regular inspection of arma- 
 ments and the institution of an International 
 Headquarter Staff were essential, made a pious 
 protest at the omission ; and was content to 
 leave it at that. This is equivalent to saying 
 that France is not convinced that the League 
 of Nations will be an effective instrument. 
 It means that France will not depend upon 
 the League to defend her from another invasion, 
 will not put her trust in the spirit of concord 
 
i86 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 which the League represents, but, regarding 
 Germany as her dangerous neighbour, her 
 hereditary enemy, will keep her powder dry, 
 will watch the bridgeheads of the Rhine, 
 and will form alliances which will strangely 
 resemble the old Balance of Powers. Already 
 we heard whispers in diplomatic circles of 
 feelers being put out to secure precise military 
 engagements, to have special relationships, 
 to revert to the system of secret understand- 
 ings and the grouping of nations against 
 nations. This, I need hardly say, is a de- 
 plorable disappointment. No such equili- 
 brium which will be perpetual, which will 
 not always be on the point of crashing, can 
 be established. It would be a fatal policy 
 if France really pursued it. My impression 
 is that better counsels will prevail ; but for 
 the moment I am trying to point out the 
 cooling off of the first rapturous confidence 
 in a League of Nations. It has been treated 
 as a mere flourish without importance. 
 
 The action of the Japanese in withdrawing 
 their claims for racial equality was another 
 revelation of the comparative insignificance 
 into which the League had been allowed to 
 fall. To the Japanese the recognition of their 
 equality with other members of the League 
 was of great moment. If America and Aus- 
 
THE LEAGUE AND LABOUR 187 
 
 tralia draw the colour line against the yellow 
 peoples, certainly a severe blow is dealt at 
 the spirit of fellowship and of fraternity, 
 certainly the risk of future wars is increased. 
 To me, it was more ominous that Japan did 
 not press her point than if she had insisted 
 on its acceptance before consenting to become 
 a member of the League. It indicated a 
 conviction of its unreality. Yet that day on 
 which the League was established may well 
 be the most memorable day of the Conference. 
 The League may save the world from the 
 consequences of the Conference blunders. 
 
 The Labour Charter was adopted earlier, 
 but it may well be treated here as a pendant 
 to the League. The British Minister, Mr. 
 Barnes, deserves nearly all the credit for it, 
 though Mr. Gompers had had a considerable 
 influence in drawing up the document, which 
 provided a sort of League of Nations in respect 
 of labour legislation. 
 
 There were obvious disappointing defects 
 in the scheme for Conferences of workers and 
 employers and officials, but nevertheless an 
 important step had been taken to find an 
 international instead of a national and sec- 
 tional solution of labour problems. There was 
 a dramatic decisiveness in the unexpected 
 invitation of Mr. Wilson that the first meeting 
 
i88 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 of the new organization should be held in 
 Washington in October of the same year. 
 It was a surprise for everybody in the 
 crowded Grande Salle. It is essential that 
 the body shall begin its operations at an early 
 date ; otherwise its clauses will only remain 
 pious opinions. 
 
 " We have modelled our plan," Mr. Barnes 
 explained, to me, " upon the plan of the 
 Society of Nations. There will be an annual 
 conference of delegates from every country 
 belonging to the Society — for the membership 
 will conform with the membership of the 
 Society of Nations — and there will be s^t up 
 an Executive continuously in session, with 
 a secretariat which will collate the facts, 
 study the subjects, and prepare the pro- 
 gramme for the full gatherings, which, of 
 course, may be, if circumstances demand, 
 held oftener than once a year. 
 
 " It will be within the power of this annual 
 conference to draw up Conventions — Bills, 
 shall we call them ? — which will be pre- 
 sented to the Parliaments of the respective 
 countries." 
 
 " Purely platonic proposals which each 
 Government can accept or reject ? " I objected. 
 
 " We rely upon public opinion," declared 
 
THE LEAGUE AND LABOUR 189 
 
 Parliament — call it what you will — unani- 
 mously recommends a certain thing, how can 
 the Government of a particular country put 
 itself in opposition to the popular will and the 
 general sentiment as expressed in plain terms 
 in a ready-made Bill ? " 
 
 The Bill would have been accepted by the 
 delegates ; it would be published abroad 
 throughout the whole world ; the working 
 classes would demand its realization ; and, in 
 short, the moral pressure, both from within 
 and without, would be sufficient to assure 
 that the Government should come into line 
 and march in step with the rest of the world. 
 
 A third universal organization of great im- 
 portance was planned in these days also — 
 a Health League of Nations. The Society 
 of Red Cross Societies of the world decided to 
 meet at Geneva a month after the signing of 
 the peace. In the meantime the idea was 
 put into practical shape. Doctors and workers 
 met at Cannes and discussed the programme. 
 Mr. H. P. Davison, the American Chairman, 
 summed up' the scheme for me. 
 
 If war is a great scourge against which it 
 is time that the nations were leagued, no less 
 is it time that the nations were leagued against 
 that other scourge of mankind, disease, which 
 kills many more than war. If the losses on 
 
igo PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 the battlefield during four years were terrific, 
 the ravages even of one malady, the mysterious 
 " influenza," were even greater. Millions were 
 slain by shell-fire — more millions by " grippe." 
 Think of the plagues that have decimated 
 mankind in all ages ! Some of them have 
 practically disappeared. Most of them are 
 capable of reduction, if not of total suppres- 
 sion. Tuberculosis, syphilis, in our day ; plague, 
 smallpox, typhoid in an earlier generation. 
 And this new deadly and strange foe, the 
 inevitable result of the immense cosmopolitan 
 commingling of men on the stricken fields of 
 the world, is one which, if it had been fought 
 by the concerted action of scientific men in 
 all parts of the globe, assisted by a universal 
 army of Red Cross soldiers, would have in- 
 fallibly disappeared. A central scientific board 
 will study all disease, fortified by facts gathered 
 from every part of the globe ; will decide 
 what should be done ; and will constitute a 
 kind of Unified Command in the new warfare 
 after the war — warfare against the common 
 enemy. It is indeed possible that the doctor, 
 as one understands his functions to-day, will 
 find his business transformed. What are the 
 causes of disease ? It is these that must be 
 boldly tackled. They are, in some degree, 
 already known ; but they have never been 
 
THE LEAGUE AND LABOUR 191 
 
 sufficiently correlated. Nor have the con- 
 ditions in one country been sufficiently 
 recognized in their effect upon another 
 country. The world is so inter-related that 
 it is impossible for one people to suffer 
 without causing all other peoples to suffer. 
 
 'A new international philosophy is being 
 constructed. We must not be content with 
 the negative policy of ■ preventing war ; we 
 must act in unison against the evils which 
 afflict the peoples. Among those evils are 
 overcrowding, malnutrition, poverty. It will 
 be the business of a real International Health 
 Organization to see to it that the conditions 
 which manufacture disease are abolished — 
 that sweating shall cease, that there shall 
 be a proper distribution of food-stuffs, that 
 no one shall lead a life of material misery. 
 
 These three institutions — the League of 
 Nations, the International Labour Congress, 
 the Union of Red Cross Societies — are really 
 one. They represent the constructive side of 
 the labours of the Conference ; and the fact 
 that they have come out of the Conference 
 makes the Conference different from any other 
 peace gathering in the history of the world. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 AT VERSAILLES 
 
 Just before the arrival of Count Brockdorff- 
 Rantzau, at the close of a dismally wet day 
 of the ending April, at Versailles, an American 
 member of the Conference, whom I had hitherto 
 found optimistic, suddenly gave way to a 
 fit of depression. " Can we make peace ? " 
 he asked me, and answering his own question, 
 he went on : " No. It is possible that during 
 the month of May we shall agree on some 
 sort of treaty which -tinder protest Germany 
 will sign without prejudice to her future 
 action, but our interests are too different, 
 the principles on which we proceed are too 
 opposed, to make of this diplomatic instru- 
 ment a logical and homogeneous document." 
 It was perhaps startling to hear, in the very 
 face of the diplomatic enemy, an official con- 
 fession of hopelessness. For my part, while 
 trying hard to take a more cheerful view of 
 
 13 
 
194 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 the Conference, I could not but regret that 
 the first task of the statesmen in Paris was 
 not to settle a sort of international code, 
 to accept formally abstract rules based upon 
 the Fourteen Points of Mr. Wilson, and, having, 
 after a longer or shorter discussion, thus laid 
 down the irrevocable plan of the peace, to 
 proceed to apply those rules without regard 
 to their pleasant or unpleasant consequences. 
 To act otherwise was to plunge into incoher- 
 ence. And as the German delegates stood in 
 the dim light of that little French station 
 of Vaucresson, it was impossible to resist the 
 melancholy reflection that the Allies were 
 less ready at that moment to receive the 
 Germans than they had been at any period 
 of the previous six months. 
 
 The Count — by far the most dignified and 
 intelligent man among the German delegates — 
 seemed to feel his position keenly. He bowed 
 stiflEly to the little party of journalists and 
 officials ; and his eyes shone with anguish. 
 At one nloment he tottered and nearly fainted. 
 Anything more depressing than this night 
 arrival could hardly be imagined. Colonel 
 Henry, the Allied officer attached to the 
 German delegation, is a kindly enough man, 
 but he always seemed rather too conscious 
 that he was dealing with enemies. Once, a 
 
AT VERSAILLES 195 
 
 little later, when the Count held out his hand 
 to him, he was visibly embarrassed. He could 
 not shake hands, and it would be impolite 
 to refuse. Thereupon he saluted. The little 
 anecdote is an allegory. The Germans were 
 housed at the Hotels des Reservoirs, Vatel 
 and Suisse, and they were allowed to move 
 about fairly freely. The Count himself on 
 several occasions drove to Paris and was seen 
 in the Bois. A portion of the Versailles Park 
 was specially reserved for them, and more 
 than once they wandered about the Bassin 
 de Neptune among the nursemaids, who hardly 
 glanced at them. Some of them seemed very 
 anxious to get Paris clothes, and indeed there 
 were among them several who strangely re- 
 sembled the German tourist of the cartoonist, 
 in tweed overcoat with cape and feathered 
 hat. There were a number of German girls 
 as typewriters who had certainly not lost 
 their prettiness through the regime of the 
 blockade. * 
 
 For them, as for us, the very stones of 
 Versailles contained many sermons. Nothing 
 seemed to me so dramatic as was the announce- 
 ment that the peace of 1871 would be reversed 
 on the spot where it was signed. History, 
 which is no respecter of persons or of nations, 
 speaks to us all, friend, and foe, from the 
 
196 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 venerable chateau of Versailles. It teaches 
 us that in the old methods of military conquest 
 there is no safety and no permanence. When 
 William I, King of Prussia, was saluted here 
 with the unanimous consent of the German 
 States as the German Emperor, he must have 
 imagined that the victory over France was 
 definitive. He could not have foreseen that 
 where the HohenzoUerns laid the foundation- 
 stone of their House, that House would be 
 demolished in less than fifty years. Bismarck, 
 in wresting Alsace-Lorraine violently from 
 France, could hardly have envisaged the day 
 when his country, humiliated and helpless, 
 would sign away its possessions in the historic 
 town. The whirligig of time brings its revenges 
 and its reversals. The whole town is full of 
 those memories of the past, a past which 
 was built upon the shifting sands of Might, 
 and not upon the rock of Right. Grandeur 
 and decadence of monarchs and nations are 
 indelibly associated with the place.* The most 
 pessimistic quatrains of Omar-Khayyam come 
 into one's mind. One thinks of Jamshyd, 
 that great hunter who gloried and drank deep, 
 when one thinks of the " Roi Soleil." One 
 thinks of the vanity of human things when 
 one hears in imagination the gay sound of 
 violins^ the merry laughter of courtiers, drowned 
 
AT VERSAILLES 197 
 
 in the shrill cries of those women from Les 
 Halles who shrieked for the life of unhappy 
 Marie-Antoinette. But the greatest antithesis 
 is this group of German diplomatists who, 
 in 1919, take upon their shoulders the sins 
 of 1871. We, for our part, would do well 
 not to be deaf to the tongues that whisper 
 their warnings from the trees of Versailles. 
 We must work to establish a real peace and 
 not a mere truce between the nations, which 
 may be broken in favour of one group or 
 another group at any time. 
 
 It was high time that the Germans were 
 summoned, and yet one could only regard 
 the apparition of these visitors to Versailles 
 with .apprehension. They came in the midst 
 of an Adriatic crisis, of a Shantung crisis, 
 of a Belgian crisis, of a French crisis, with 
 the smoking ruins of the Near East breaking 
 into flames, with India, groaning ominously, 
 with Egypt ready for revolt, with the whole 
 Mussulman world stirring to action, and with 
 the shadow of Russia falling formidably over 
 every capital of Europe. 
 
 They came either too late or too soon. 
 Nevertheless, the general impression of those 
 who came into close contact with the German 
 representatives was that they were anxious to 
 make peace as early as possible. They would. 
 
igS PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 we told each other, make many feints. They 
 would be clever enough to manoeuvre them- 
 selves into the position of men fighting for 
 justice, on the side of democracy, sticklers 
 for the principle of national integrity. They 
 would try to show that the Allies, on the 
 contrary, had prepared an unjust peace, that 
 they denied the right to submit that peace 
 to the judgment of the people, that they, 
 in spite of a thousand speeches, effectively 
 denied the right of nations to live under 
 their own laws without having large tracts 
 of territory subtracted by force of conquest. 
 They had even a rival scheme for a Society 
 of Nations. These things were legitimate 
 diplomatic weapons. 
 
 Yet one had the impression that they were 
 anxious to bring the Versailles business to a 
 speedy conclusion. Behind them Germany 
 was rumbling : great fissures were constantly 
 appearing : another, and this time an over- 
 whelming, eruption was imminent. The social 
 chaos which goes by the name of Bolshevism 
 menaced all the old institutions — and there 
 were many — which had escaped overthrow in 
 the Revolution. Only peace, and that a 
 speedy peace, could save the situation. Peace 
 meant for them the Hfting of the blockade, 
 the resumption of normal life, with food for 
 
AT VERSAILLES 199 
 
 the hungry mouths and raw materials for the 
 idle factories. Peace meant for them the 
 docility of the people and the rapid regenera- 
 tion of the ruined Empire. Even the harshest 
 peace was better than no peace. In this 
 sense, then, the Germans were more concerned 
 about the differences of the AlUes than the 
 Allies themselves seemed to be, and when 
 day after day went by and no treaty was 
 presented, they began to grow exceedingly 
 impatient. The Conference,' after having called 
 the Germans, could not agree upon the terms ! 
 (TT is necessary to remark that the German 
 delegation was not, like the Russian delegation 
 at Brest-Litovsk, a body unused to the ways 
 of diplomacy. It was in no sense an emanation 
 of the people. The Revolution made many 
 changes in Germany. It swept away the 
 old autocracy. But it did not substitute a 
 proletarian dictatorship. It preserved, above 
 all, the old type of diplomatists. When M. 
 Jules Cambon, at the head of a Commission 
 whose duty it was to verify the powers of 
 the German delegates, began his task, he 
 encountered many old acquaintances. Their 
 faces were familiar to him. They had moved 
 with him in the same sphere. The " intellec- 
 tuals " in the administration and in the per- 
 manent Government oflfices had not been 
 
200 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 dismissed by Ebert and Scheidemann. T^e 
 most casual observer must have been soi^e- 
 what astonished at the list of German rei^re- 
 sentatives. They were largely of |the 
 " Ancien R6gime."^ / 
 
 What were we to conclude from this armis- 
 tice between the revolutionary govemtnent 
 and the " governing classes " (to emploj^ the 
 Socialist phraseology) ? We could only sup- 
 pose that Ebert and Scheidemann were fully 
 conscious of the lack of experience in inter- 
 national affairs of their newer colleagues, and 
 that they placed the interests of the Empire 
 before the interests of their doctrines, On 
 the other hand, the acceptance of the truce 
 by the old diplomacy indicated its flexibility, 
 its adaptation to new conditions. There was, 
 on the side of the " ruling classes," a willing- 
 ness to subordinate their personal dislike of 
 the Revolution to the national welfare. Perhaps 
 even from their political and personal point 
 of view they were wise to keep in their own 
 hands the executive powers. They continued 
 to direct the affairs of Germany. But above 
 all the alliance was against us. There re- 
 mained a unity in Germany, there remained a 
 Germanic spirit in defeat. 
 
 Before the terms were presented Italy was 
 invited back. M. Barrere, the French Am- 
 
AT VERSAILLES 201 
 
 bassador in Rome, had been extremely active 
 and had played a conciliatory part. Orlando 
 came, although the Fiume problem was by 
 no means settled, and dragged desperately 
 on. The statesmen, as though they had not 
 enough on hand, even invited the Austrians 
 to come to Saint-Germain, the little town of 
 Kings, just outside Paris. They made a tre- 
 mendous spurt, one of their characteristic races 
 against the clock, and eight days after the 
 Germans came the treaty really was prepared 
 and presented at a memorable meeting in the 
 Trianon Palace Hotel, (jhe plenipotentiaries 
 took their own places at the horseshoe table 
 before the German party was introduced. 
 The Germans sat facing the Allies — as prisoners 
 their judges, said the correspondents with 
 singular unanimity. M. Clemenceau was al- 
 most brutally brusque, announcing that there 
 would be no oral discussion, and only fourteen 
 days for written observations to be presented. 
 Brockdorff was deathly pale : he did not 
 rise to reply because he was afraid his legs 
 would give way under him ; and he bitterly 
 referred to the hatred which had, he said, 
 inspired the Allied terms, declining to accept 
 for Germany the sole responsibility of war. 
 His speech produced a painful impression. 
 It is not pleasant to hear a beaten enemy 
 
202 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 express his feelings ; and the bad translation 
 did not soften the Count's reply. 
 
 I forget how many pencils and pieces of 
 blotting paper and ash-trays were taken from 
 the salle by souvenir-hunters ; but I expect 
 to encounter these things in every British 
 or French drawing-room ! The German type- 
 writers tapped away, and some shrewd Notes 
 were addressed to the Allies. Some of them 
 really found the weak spots of the treaty. 
 For example, it was pointed out that if no 
 sum were fixed for Germany to pay, if she 
 were to go on paying according to her means, 
 as decided by a Commission, then the harder 
 Germany worked the worse off she would be. 
 It was putting a premium on idleness ; it 
 was discouraging the workers. The trial of 
 the Kaiser, about which the Allies had them- 
 selves adopted three or four different conclu- 
 sions, was not accepted. The Polish bound- 
 aries were seriously disputed. The proposed 
 buying back of the Sarre territory in gold 
 was criticized as a violation of the promise 
 not to barter peoples. The extended occupa- 
 tion of Germany was the subject of grave 
 protest. 
 
 Would Germany sign ? There was much 
 which suggested that she would not. Speeches 
 of defiance were pronounced. Brockdorff- 
 
AT VERSAILLES 203 
 
 Rantzau himself flatly said that he would 
 not. Marshal Foch was ordered to hold his 
 army in readiness to advance ; and with Sir 
 William Robertson he made his plans. Even 
 the bombing of German cities in case of 
 resistance was discussed. When the Count 
 made a trip to Germany it was feared he would 
 not come back. But when the German train, 
 specially fitted with printing apparatus, was 
 brought to Versailles, and when the Count 
 asked for a week's grace to complete his 
 counter-propositions, it was felt that all 
 this labour was not for nothing. The use 
 of force, open coercion by the Allies, would 
 rob the German signature of all moral value, 
 and Mr. Lloyd George was disposed to be 
 conciliatory. 
 
 In the meantime, there was criticism on 
 the Allied side. The treaty, by some incredible 
 stupidity on the part of the Big Four, was 
 not published in Allied countries, though it 
 could be bought in Berlin. It was true that 
 an able official summary existed : but why 
 conceal the original text ? A French news- 
 paper privately printed some hundreds of 
 copies for the deputies and was nearly prose- 
 cuted for its pains. In America the Senate 
 insisted on having it printed from surrepti- 
 tious copies brought over by a banker 
 
204 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 and a journalist, at which Mr. Wilson was 
 very angry. Open diplomacy was not even 
 now pretended. 
 
 As crystallizing the Allied criticisrris, the 
 letter which Mr. W. C. Bullitt, the bright young 
 official attached to the American Mission, 
 sent to Mr. Wilson, is extremely interesting. 
 I found him writing it and packing bags at 
 the same time, in a white heat of indignation. 
 He wrote : 
 
 " I was one of the millions who trusted 
 confidently and implicitly your leadership, 
 and believed you would take nothing less 
 than a permanent peace based upon ' unselfish 
 and unbiased justice.' 
 
 " But our Government has consented now 
 to deliver the suffering peoples of the world 
 to new oppressions, subjections and dis- 
 memberments — a new century of war. 
 
 " And I can convince myself no longer 
 that effective labour for ' a new world 
 order ' is possible as a servant of this 
 Government. 
 
 " Russia — the acid test of good ^yill for me 
 as for you — has not even been understood. 
 The unjust decisions of the Conference in 
 regard to Shantung, the Tyrol, Thrace, Hun- 
 gary, East Prussia, Dantzig, and the Saare 
 Valley, and the abandonment of the principle 
 
AT VERSAILLES 205 
 
 of the freedom of the seas, make new inter- 
 national conflicts certain. 
 
 "It is my conviction that the present 
 League' of Nations will be powerless to prevent 
 these wars, and that the United States will 
 be involved in them by obligations undertaken 
 in the Covenant of the League and the special 
 understanding with France. 
 
 " Therefore, the duty of the Government 
 of the United States, to its own people and 
 to mankind, is to refuse to sign or ratify 
 this unjust treaty, to refuse to guarantee its 
 settlements by entering the League of Nations, 
 to refuse to entangle the United States further 
 by an understanding with France. 
 
 " That you are personally opposed to most 
 of the unjust settlements, and that you ac- 
 cepted them only under pressure, is well 
 known. Nevertheless, it is my conviction that 
 if you had made your fight in the open instead 
 of behind closed doors, you would have carried 
 with you the public opinion of the world, 
 which was yours. You would have been able 
 to resist the pressure and might have estab- 
 lished that ' new international order based 
 upon broad and universal principles of Right 
 and Justice ' of which you used to speak. 
 
 " I am sorry you did not fight our fight 
 to a finish, and that you had so little faith 
 
2o6 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 in the millions of men like myself in every 
 nation who had faith in you." 
 
 It is a curious thing, perhaps, though not 
 really difficult to understand, that Mr. Wilson, 
 in face of this and many other protests of a 
 similar sort which made themselves heard — 
 comparatively little was said by way of criti- 
 cism of the leniency of the treaty, though 
 there must have been disappointments in this 
 sense too — only stiffened his back and became 
 resolute not to alter the treaty. He had 
 agreed to the treaty : therefore it must square 
 with his Fourteen Points. Not for a moment 
 would he acknowledge that it could be other- 
 wise or that he had been outwitted, out- 
 argued, outplayed in the diplomatic game. 
 It was Mr. Lloyd George who, alarmed at 
 the prospect of future wars in which England 
 would be concerned, now tried to soften the 
 terms at the eleventh hour. M. Clemenceau 
 took the logical view that what was agreed 
 upon on May 7th should stand on June 7th, 
 and that nothing should be materially altered. 
 The principal discussion raged round Upper 
 Silesia, the amount of reparations, the length 
 of the period of occupation, and the admission 
 of Germany into the League. Mr. Lloyd 
 George was in favour of an immediate admis- 
 sion ; and, indeed, M. Clemenceau was heard 
 
AT VERSAILLES 207 
 
 to say that if it were not that French opinion 
 was against it, perhaps it would be better. 
 There was always the danger of a rival League 
 in which Russia and Germany would be the 
 chief members. 
 
 "The League is in the treaty," I said to 
 one of the chief delegates. " How can Ger- 
 many sign something to which she is not a 
 party ? " 
 
 " I agree that if she signs the treaty she 
 should be in the League," was the reply, 
 " but M. Clemenceau thinks there would be an 
 angry protest." 
 
 Thus do the statesmen publicly take up 
 an attitude which they do not necessarily 
 think wise, and which does not represent 
 their private view. 
 
 The Allies certainly, after six months of 
 debate, took as long to consider the German 
 proposals as they had allowed the Germans 
 in which to consider their own ioo,ooo-word 
 treaty ! It was, indeed, only owing to Mr. 
 Wilson's firmness that the whole treaty was 
 not thrown again into the melting-pot and 
 conversations begun in June as they might 
 have been begun in January ! 
 
 The incidents which occurred in the Rhenish 
 Provinces occupied by the French, where a 
 movement was begun for a separate republic, 
 
2o8 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 which should not be governed by Prussia, were 
 certainly not looked upon with disfavour by 
 the French. Certain military men — who will 
 never learn the first word of politics — covered 
 the revolters with their protection, and even 
 encouraged them in their proclamation. It 
 was an absurd fiasco ; for you cannot by 
 artificial methods create a popular demand 
 for a separate State. But the Balkanization 
 of Germany, in imitation of the Balkaniza- 
 tion of Austria, was not yet, since the German 
 people are too homogeneous. 
 
 Mr. Wilson was anxious that the reply 
 should be finished by the 13th of June. The 
 date pleased his little foible. He is absurdly 
 superstitious, really believing 13 to be his 
 lucky number. He landed in France twice 
 on the 13th, and he wanted to finish his task 
 on the 13th. He practically succeeded, though 
 some details remained, and it was on June 
 1 6th that the Big Four may be said to have 
 really ceased to be. Their work was done so 
 far as Germany was concerned. The response 
 was ready — a response that might well be 
 used by Germany to justify the signature of 
 the treaty, because it was conciliatory in 
 form. Five days' grace was given and the 
 world now saw peace in sight at last. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 AT SAINT-GERMAIN 
 
 Dr. Renner and his consorts were very 
 different from the German party. They came 
 to Saint-Germain a happy, smiling family- 
 party. The Austrians have earned the repu- 
 tation of being the best and most astute 
 diplomatists in Europe. They had evidently 
 decided that instead of adopting the " fallen 
 angel, glorious even in r,uin," attitude of 
 Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, it would be better 
 policy to pretend that they were just jolly 
 visitors glad to see their old friends in France 
 after a long absence of five years. What 
 effusive smiles and what a pleasant greeting ! 
 Why, they even brought their wives with 
 them, and appeared to be delighted to stay 
 in the lilac and chestnut bower at Saint- 
 Germain, with its high, beautiful terrace look- 
 ing out over the winding Seine towards Paris. 
 They were perhaps right. The newspapers 
 
 14 ' "^ 
 
210 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 take their key-note from these things ; and 
 Austria was not treated as a formidable foe to 
 be crushed and trampled underfoot, but as a 
 country which it might be well to cultivate. 
 There was even a considerable party in France 
 which wanted to form an alliance with Austria 
 in order to prevent Austria from forming an 
 alliance with Germany. And that is indeed a 
 policy. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Allies were again not ready ; 
 and although the Austrians, in their pleasant 
 villas, enjoyed their quiet surroundings and 
 relished the French cooking — oh, those won- 
 derful French pastries, and real sugar ! — they 
 began at last to get home-sick. They had been 
 in France for a week, for a fortnight, and still 
 they were kept kicking their heels. What 
 had they come for ? Why were they asked 
 prematurely ? The Big Four certainly moved 
 in a mysterious way their wonders to perform. 
 Again it was in some measure Italy who proved 
 the stumbling-block. Before she would con- 
 sent to the Austrian terms, she must be 
 satisfied in Fiume and on the Dalmatian 
 coast. Always this diplomatic bargaining ! — 
 one politician called it diplomatic blackmail ! 
 Then, again, there were the ItaUan claims to 
 a. frontier in the North which should push 
 out to the Brenner. Also, if France wished 
 
AT SAINT-GERMAIN 2ii 
 
 to keep Austria from joining Germany, Italy 
 wished to keep Austria from joining the 
 Czechs and the Magyars and the Southern 
 Slavs and forming a great confederation 
 which would resemble- the old ramshackle 
 Austrian Empire and menace Italy. The 
 two diplomatic conceptions were diametri- 
 cally opposed. Apart from boundary questions 
 — difficult enough, since the Czechs and 
 the Italians and every contiguous country 
 wanted to obtain all they could at Austria's 
 expense — the most prickly point was this of 
 preventing the Germans of Austria being in- 
 corporated in Germany. How could you 
 deny them the right to settle their own 
 destiny ? 
 
 The Quai d'Orsay resolved to do all that 
 was possible to prevent a junction which was 
 regarded as disastrous. Purely from the point 
 of view of the old diplomacy, such a union 
 would without doubt constitute a menace to 
 France ; and the old fashion of looking at 
 European combinations as something which 
 shifts the balance from one side to the other 
 apparently cannot be abandoned at once. 
 The old Adam dies hard. 
 
 While we were constantly ' declaring that 
 in the remaking of the world only the wishes 
 of the peoples were to be considered, that 
 
212 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 military power, and therefore the reinforce- 
 ment of military power, is a thing of the 
 past, we were nevertheless apt to look upon 
 each separate event from the old standpoint 
 of national safety. The habit was too deeply 
 engrained to disappear simply because the 
 scheme of a League of Nations was before 
 us and because we had talked of general 
 disarmament. 
 
 M. Pichon, in particular, expressed himself 
 forcibly, and made no secret of the fact that 
 the Allies intended to prevent such a con- 
 summation. Certainly it is comprehensible 
 enough that the results of Allied policy with 
 regard to Austria should cause some alarm. 
 It was seen that the inevitable consequence 
 of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Empire is the return of the water to the 
 riyer, the attachment of the German people 
 to Germany. 
 
 The " danger," of course, is that France, 
 weaker in point of population than ever, 
 should find herself supporting the weight of 
 a Germany stronger in point of population 
 than ever. The load would be heavier. 
 Germany, in spite of her defeat, in spite of 
 the loss of Alsa*ce-Lorraine, if the Constituent 
 Assembly of German Austria ratified its pre- 
 vious decisions, would emerge from the war 
 
AT SAINT-GERMAIN 213 
 
 with territorial additions. A German Mittel- 
 Europa would be formed. 
 
 An intelligent Frenchman at the Conference 
 put the case to me as follows : " We have, 
 in trying to solve the riddle of the Balkans, only 
 succeeded in bringing the Balkans to our 
 doorstep. No longer are the Balkans confined 
 to the Near East. They stretch across Europe. 
 I have every sympathy with the claims of 
 the smaller States which have come out of 
 Austria-Hungary. But the existence of a 
 number of small States nevertheless multiplies 
 jealousies, ambitions, and possible causes of 
 wars, if we do not regulate their position 
 very definitely. Already we have seen Poland 
 and Czecho-Slovakia at grips. The Ukrainians 
 have carried their quarrels to the arbitrament 
 of arms. The Yugo-Slavs are restive, and 
 ' regrettable incidents ' have occurred. These 
 things are symptomatic. We must be careful 
 that we do not sow the seeds of future wars, 
 because even the smallest wars may again 
 set Europe ablaze. 
 
 " Austria-Hungary was a heterogeneous and 
 illogical mass, but it was in a state of equili- 
 brium, and it might have been better if 
 national independence within a federation had 
 been granted to the various peoples that 
 composed it. 
 
214 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 " However, we have taken the poUcy of 
 encouraging the detachment from Austria of 
 all elements that are not Germanic. The 
 Slavs form Slav countries. Vienna is isolated. 
 She has for neighbours potential enemies. 
 It is just as when you break a ther- 
 mometer: the mercury flies asunder in little 
 balls. 
 
 " The Austrians see their weakness as a 
 comparatively small State. It is an open 
 question as to how far small States, if they 
 are to live, must depend for aid on the larger 
 States. At any rate, the Austrian Germans, 
 with their big brother at hand, naturally 
 return to the family. It distresses us because 
 anything that fortifies our hereditary enemy 
 must be unpleasant to us, but I do not think 
 we should be astonished. 
 
 " But after all I do not share to the full 
 the view of those who regard this step as an 
 unmitigated evil. Is not the position to-day 
 better than it was in 1914 ? Leaving aside 
 all question of a permanently peaceful world, 
 placing the situation on the old ground, is it 
 not a fact that, although Austria was not 
 annexed to the German Empire, she acted 
 in every way, diplomatic and military, with 
 the German Empire ? She was bound up 
 by her interests. It was an ineluctable 
 
AT SAINT-GERMAIN 215 
 
 necessity, an ethnical, geographical, and 
 historical necessity. But in 1914 the Czechs, 
 the Magyars, the Italians and the Southern 
 Slav^ were dragged after her. To-day the 
 Germans of Austria are more formally in- 
 corporated into Germany — or at least will be — 
 but the Czechs, the Magyars, the Italians and 
 the Southern Slavs are detached from all 
 liens with Germany. That is pure gain. We 
 must accept the disadvantages and look a 
 little more at the advantages that have resulted 
 for us. The ten millions of Germans in 
 Austria are not ten million new Germans. 
 We must accept things as they are." 
 
 So clamorous did the Austrians become 
 that the Big Four were obliged on June 3rd 
 to give them their terms — in blank ! A sort 
 of treaty was certainly handed over, among 
 the ancient stone weapons of the Museum in 
 the Chateau at Saint-Germain ; but it was 
 a treaty in which all the vital clauses were 
 reserved. It was the most solemn farce in 
 the history of the world ; and when M. 
 Clemenceau intimated that Austria must reply 
 in fourteen days, one really wondered how 
 she could reply to something which she had 
 not got. The smile had left the faces of the 
 Austrian delegation. Such clauses as were 
 published were not all as lenient as was looked 
 
2i6 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 for, and Austria too began to talk about 
 refusing to sign. 
 
 There was the Eastern settlement. There 
 is no doubt that Greece began by jumping 
 her claims, landing men in some of the dis- 
 puted parts of the Turkish Empire. The Allies 
 followed suit, sending warships and soldiers. 
 The Turkish Empire was going to be cut up 
 without treaty. Suddenly there was conster- 
 nation in the Conference. They were informed 
 that if they acted so cynically and without 
 regard to the religious feelings of Mohamedans, 
 for whom the Sultan was still the spiritual 
 chief and Constantinople not only a temporal 
 but the spiritual capital, then there would be 
 one of the greatest uprisings in history. 
 
 It certainly seemed, after the landing of 
 troops in Smyrna and the preparations made 
 by military means to dismember the Turkish 
 Empire, that its days, in Europe at least, 
 were numbered. The sudden volte-face of 
 the Conference was of deep significance. We 
 were told that there would be no treaty with 
 Turkey because Turkey would have ceased 
 to exist. Turkey is far from ceasing to exist, 
 and the miracle of the change of ideas in the 
 Conference inspired the faithful to cry " Allah 
 is Great ! " 
 
 The fact is that the danger of a general 
 
AT SAINT-GERMAIN 217 
 
 rising of Mohamedans around the world if 
 the KaUfat is destroyed in Constantinople 
 gave the statesmen pause. Mr. Wilson was 
 always opposed to the attempt to divide the 
 Ottoman Empire, in accordance with the secret 
 treaties, among the Allies, to disregard the 
 principle of nationality in favour of the prin- 
 ciple of high finance, and was even reluctant 
 to accept a mandate for America in Constanti- 
 nople or in Armenia ; but Mr. Lloyd George 
 now also threw his influence on the side of 
 caution. England is a great Mohamedan 
 Empire. It is not so easy as it seemed to 
 give Italy l^dalia and Koniah, to recompense 
 France with Syria and Central Anatolia, to 
 award Smyrna to the Greeks, to admit all 
 English claims, and to make Constantinople 
 a busy market of modern business men. It 
 is always necessary to remember that the 
 East is the cradle of religions and that religions 
 still play a mighty part in the affairs of men. 
 Mr. Montagu pointed out the dangerous situa- 
 tion in India, and there was also received 
 the following telegram from the Ottoman 
 League : 
 
 " The Turkish nation forms an overwhelming 
 majority of the workers and the possessors 
 of land in Asia Minor. Likewise the Arab 
 nation has proved by its recent manifestations 
 
2i8 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 its determination not to submit to any foreign 
 domination. We warn European opinion that 
 the Turks and the Arabs will have recourse 
 to every means for fighting against Imperialist 
 decisions." 
 
 In other words, a Holy War would be 
 proclaimed, the green flag would be raised, 
 and at the end of the most devastating war 
 in all history, a war which still smouldered 
 in many parts of JEurope, we should be faced 
 with a mighty uprising which it would take 
 all our forces to hold in check. 
 
 It is interesting to recall the bargains that 
 were made during the war with regard to the 
 division of Turkey. In March 1915 the French 
 and British Governments consented to the 
 annexation by Russia of Constantinople and 
 of other portions of Turkish territory. The 
 Allies at Athens offered to Greece the vilayet 
 of Aden. In April 1915 France, England 
 and Russia, in the secret treaty of London, 
 agreed to the principle that Italy should have 
 her part in the Basin of the Mediterranean 
 in the region of Adalia. In the spring of 
 1916, Russia, France and England laid down 
 the lines of their zones of influence and terri- 
 torial acquisitions, which were as follows : 
 
 Russia would receive the provinces of 
 Erzeroum, Trebizonde, Van, and Bitlis, as 
 
AT SAINT-GERMAIN 219 
 
 well as territory in the south of Kurdistan. 
 France would receive Syria, the vilayet of 
 Adane. England would posses? the southern 
 part of Mesopotamia, with Bagdad, besides perts 
 in Syria. The territory between the British 
 and French possessions would form an Arab 
 State or a confederation of Arab States. 
 Alexandretta would be a free port. Palestine 
 would have a special regime. At the Confer- 
 ence at Saint- Jean-de-Maurienne in 1917 
 further concessions were promised to Italy, 
 while Greece made bigger claims. As Sir 
 Theodore Morrison pointed out to me, on 
 January 5, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George specifically 
 repudiated the idea that we were fighting to 
 deprive Turkey of its capital or of rich lands 
 which were Turkish in race ; while Mr. Wilson 
 at Washington also gave a solemn pledge. 
 It was naturally difficult to reconcile the 
 conflicting interests ; above all, it was doubtful 
 if the operation would not disturb the equili- 
 brium of things to a disastrous degree. All 
 this Eastern question was full of pitfalls. 
 But it became clear that Turkey could not 
 be cut up quite as simply as appeared at first 
 sight. Many protests were raised in France. 
 France is one of the principal creditors of 
 Turkey, and the Ottoman debt, already heavy, 
 would have become hopeless if the cutting-up 
 
220 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 policy that was first decided upon had been 
 carried out. The grave warnings which were 
 received compelled the Conference to examine 
 once more the problem, and to endeavour to 
 act wisely in the interests of Europe. Even 
 for Turkey the right of peoples to dispose 
 of themselves remains a principle which could 
 not be lightly abandoned. The Turks are 
 not savages: they are rather a civilization 
 fallen on evil days. The chief cause of our 
 hatred of Turkey is the repeated massacre 
 of Armenians. Whatever happens, we had 
 to take steps to preserve the Armenians 
 from Turkish savagery, but we must not 
 forget that the Turks as a people can hardly 
 be held answerable for the crimes of the 
 Red Sultan or of the Committee of Union 
 and Progress controlled by Germany, or of the 
 murderous bands of Kurds. Armenia must 
 be protected, but that did not necessarily 
 mean Turkish destruction. It was not with- 
 out cause that Turkey had been the sick 
 man without dying for so long, and the last 
 thing that the world wanted was a great 
 rally to the banner of Islam. 
 
 Thus it was that on June 12th, at the station 
 of Vaucresson, in the wooded suburbs of Paris, 
 where the deepening green of the trees and 
 the yellow grass marked the advance of a 
 
AT SAINT-GERMAIN 221 
 
 rainless summer, Damad Ferid Pasha, Grand 
 Vizier, a courteous old gentleman in blue 
 spectacles, wearing a white beard and a red 
 fez, landed to become the adviser of the 
 Conference on Turkish questions. He and 
 his little entourage constituted a consultative 
 body, and were not plenipotentiaries in the 
 sense that the Germans and the Austrians 
 were. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 Dr. Renner at Saint-Germain seemed to 
 be chiefly occupied in making bets about 
 Germany's willingness to sign. He fixed the 
 odds, which soon after the Allied ultimatum 
 went to five to two on the signature without 
 further delay. That such an eminently re- 
 spectable person as Dr. Renner should 
 lead the betting about his companions in 
 distress was explained by a witty British 
 official. " What can the poor man do ? " he 
 cried. " We won't give him a treaty. He must 
 find some pastime." Indeed, it now became 
 certain that all the vast problems which did 
 not concern Germany would be relegated to 
 a sort of second Conference. Europe would 
 continue to be a great running sore. But 
 the plain man in the street would see at least 
 two things accomplished : a treaty signed by 
 Germany, and the League of Nations per- 
 manently established. 
 
 233 
 
224 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 What is worthy of the most particular 
 attention in the final Allied reply to Germany 
 is precisely the admission that the treaty has 
 a provisional character, that Germany may 
 hope to enter the League, and that the terms 
 may then be altered by general consent. 
 Germany took great care to make it known 
 to all the world that this was " a peace with 
 hatred, imposed by necessity, and accepted 
 with loathing," and with a resolve that the 
 treaty should be torn up as soon as circum- 
 stances changed and the Allies could no longer 
 hold down Germany by force. It is a pretty 
 prospect. One could only regard it with a 
 sickening sense of despair, if it were not for 
 the promise of the League of Nations, which 
 simply must be made to work if mankind is 
 to be saved from the agony of eternal warfare 
 in one form or another. 
 
 There are, indeed, in the revised version of 
 the treaty many matters which are definitely 
 deferred. Thus the vexed question of the 
 Sarre is to be reopened in a few years' time, 
 and the plebiscite after a period of intrigue 
 and arrangement will certainly produce a 
 new crisis if a better spirit cannot be made 
 to prevail — that is to say, if the League of 
 Nations does not become a body which will 
 be called in on every difficult occasion and 
 
CONCLUSION 225 
 
 >vhose decisions will command full respect. 
 Even for the more immediate plebiscites, such 
 as those in Upper Silesia, in Eastern Prussia, 
 and in Schleswig, it would be wise to call in the 
 League. One wise modification of the original 
 terms is the assurance that German co-opera- 
 tion in fixing the amount and the method of 
 reparations will be welcomed. 
 
 At the last minute the five days' grace was 
 changed to seven. How and why this ex- 
 tension of time was granted somewhere between 
 the Quai d'Orsay and Versailles would be hard 
 to explain except by the fact that the Big 
 Four permitted their decisions to be inter- 
 preted very loosely by secretaries and officials. 
 An instance of this which is particularly 
 striking is the invitation to Bela Kun to 
 send a Hungarian delegation to Paris. The 
 Big Four denied that they had given such 
 instructions at that time. Yet their message 
 was clear. The mystery was explained to me 
 by a distinguished person who was acquainted 
 with the methods of the statesmen. " They 
 state their wishes roughly," he said, "and 
 leave it to others to draft the terms. Usually 
 they see the draft, but often the proceedings 
 are haphazard and not at all business-like. 
 JNo wonder that mistakes occur." 
 
 When Count Brockdorff-Rantzau left Ver- 
 15 
 
226 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 sailles for Weimar, carrying with him the final 
 treaty, hastily revised in red ink, to consult 
 the German Government, he was the victim 
 of a demonstration which was regrettably 
 un-French. His party was stoned and hissed, 
 and it is to the credit of the authorities that 
 they immediately apologized and dismissed 
 the Prefect and the Police Commissioner whose 
 duty it was to prevent such unworthy scenes. 
 How far this little incident may have altered 
 the course of history and caused Brockdorff- 
 Rantzau, who was wavering between two 
 opinions, to declare bluntly against the accept- 
 ance of the treaty and so bring down the 
 Scheidemann Government, it would be hard 
 to say. It may be one of those little things 
 upon which great decisions turn. The next 
 few days were among the most momentous 
 in the history of the world. A menacing 
 finger was pointed against all the Ministers 
 who had taken part in these peace prelimin- 
 aries. Signor Orlando, who had been so 
 clamorously received by his countrymen a 
 month earlier, learnt the bitter lesson that 
 popularity which is based upon Imperialistic 
 sentiments is a broken reed. The National- 
 ists) who were disappointed at the non-success 
 of the Adriatic negotiations, joined hands with 
 the Socialists, who were disgusted with the 
 
CONCLUSION 227 
 
 Sonnino-inspired policy of aggrandizement 
 while the Italian people were still eating the 
 black bread of war ; and the Orlando Ministry 
 was defeated on the very eve of peace. More- 
 over, it should be noted that the Nitti Cabinet, 
 which succeeded) was largely composed of 
 Giolittists, that is to say, that Italian policy 
 shows an inclination to be oriented in the same 
 direction as before the war. The remarks of 
 the Swiss writer, M. Martin, which I have 
 quoted are well worth re-reading. 
 
 In France the unprecedented popularity 
 of M. Clemenceau was under a cloud. French 
 publicists did not hesitate to say that Great 
 Britain, by her virtual annexation of great 
 tracts of German colonies, by her strengthened 
 sea-power, by her commercial astuteness, had 
 gained much at the expense of France, who, 
 it was feared, might find herself alone facing 
 her old enemy again. This interpretation is 
 not of course true. Financially, France was 
 in a desperate plight, but she had certainly 
 gained Alsace-Lorraine, had a hold on the 
 Sarre, while the Dr. Dortens were in a 
 position to pursue their campaign of detach- 
 ment in the Rhine provinces occupied by our 
 troops. There were nevertheless some curious 
 divisions in the French Chamber, and more 
 than once the Cabinet seemed in peril. The 
 
228 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 internal policy of many of Clemenceau's 
 Ministers was unsatisfactory, and in my opinion 
 a vote of no confidence was only averted 
 because of the delicacy of the international 
 situation on the eve of Versailles, As for 
 Mr. Lloyd George, it was notorious that great 
 changes were contemplated in the Cabinet. 
 The Liberal Party and the Labour Party 
 pursued an untiring campaign and an election 
 seemed to be an early possibility. The Ameri- 
 can Senate, tired of American action in the 
 troubled affairs of Europe, openly disapproved 
 of the peace and demanded a separate settle- 
 ment with Germany, Mr, Wilson had cer- 
 tainly lost all control of the Republicans and 
 no longer enjoyed the confidence of many 
 Democrats, Add to these facts the rising 
 tide of revolutionary feehng which could be 
 observed everywhere and the score of wars 
 which were being fought — the battles of the 
 pigmies after the battles of the giants — and 
 above all the menace of a war in China largely 
 owing to the indefensible Shantung decision ; 
 and it is clear that the Conference had been 
 disappointing and had rather irritated than 
 pacified the nations of the world, 
 
 Scheidemann, in view of his previous utter- 
 ances against the signature and in face of 
 Brockdorff-Rantzau's report against the signa- 
 
CONCLUSION 229 
 
 ture, had no option but to resign. Apart 
 from the Conservative Junker party, egged 
 on by the wild military men, there was no 
 responsible person in Germany in favour of 
 defiance. It was necessary to sign, since 
 the Allied armies were ready to advance and 
 could not be resisted, since the British fleet 
 was prepared to bombard the coast and to 
 tighten up the blockade. It is true that the 
 neutral States refused to take an active part 
 in the proposed Allied blockade, but never- 
 theless the situation of Germany would have 
 been intolerable if she had taken the bold 
 course of saying " No." Weimar voted for 
 the signature, and Bauer took Scheidemann's 
 place. There was still an attempt to play 
 for time, and requests for an extension of 
 the period in which Germany was obliged to 
 respond were made. The Allies stood firm. 
 In the night preceding the expiration of the 
 delay the telephone rang. A final effort was 
 made to obtain a further forty-eight hours 
 for reflection, but in the nocturnal meeting 
 at President Wilson's house the Conference 
 again refused. Then it was that Herr Von 
 Haniel notified the Allies, with two hours to 
 spare, that under duress and without changing 
 their opinion of the terms of the treaty the 
 Germans would sign. The difiiculty remained 
 
230 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 of finding a German who could be regarded 
 as a serious politician to take part in the 
 humiliating ceremony at Versailles. 
 
 I have reason to know that the suicide of 
 the interned German Navy at Scapa Flow 
 hardened the hearts of the Allied statesmen. 
 This last gesture of the German Admiral, 
 deliberately .sinking his fleet, was another 
 proof of German perfidy, of German defiance. 
 It cannot be denied that the good relations 
 of the Allies were in danger of being disturbed. 
 <jreat Britain, it will be remembered, wished 
 to sink these ships, while France was opposed 
 to such a course. The fact that after all, 
 while the controversy was still proceeding, 
 the ships were sunk when they were in the 
 charge of Great Britain, was regarded with 
 a natural scepticism in French diplomatic 
 <;ircles. Why had they merely been interned 
 instead of being surrendered ? It was cer- 
 tainly not the fault of Mr. Lloyd George. 
 The French themselves, supported by the 
 American Admiral Benson, had advised this 
 treatment. At any rate, one wondered what 
 fresh surprise Germany would spring upon 
 us, and the delay in sending a plenipotentiary 
 after signifying that she would sign began 
 to cause grave disquietude in the Conference. 
 
 There is no need here to dwell upon the 
 
CONCLUSION 231 
 
 imposing character of the Versailles ceremony. 
 The date, June 28th, the fifth anniversary 
 of the crime of Serajevo which plunged us 
 into war, is indeed a historic one ; and no 
 one who was at Versailles is likely to forget the 
 solemnity of the occasion, when one by one 
 the delegates from three parts of the globe 
 filed towards the table on which the treaty 
 lay and appended their signatures to the 
 momentous document, pfhe Germans had 
 sent Herr Hermann MuUer and Dr. Bell at 
 the head of their jdelegation. It was in an 
 anxious silence that they stepped forward and 
 executed the fatal deed. For better or 
 worse we had made peace with our principal 
 enemy. The fountains flung up tlieir joyous 
 jets before the marble steps of the Palace, 
 the guard presented arms, the delegates and 
 the spectators were overcome at the consum- 
 mation of their labours, France was delirious 
 with excitement, and the whole world was 
 moved by a profound emotion, realizing that 
 a new era had daiwned— that at last we had 
 emerged from the five years' war and were 
 at peace. Peace ! The word is one which 
 sounds in all men's ears as the most blessed 
 word that was ever spoken. Pray God that 
 we shall not again utter the word " War " ! 
 Two incidents made the world uneasy. 
 
232 PEACE-Mx\KING AT PARIS 
 
 The absence of the Chinese, who refused to 
 sign unless they were allowed to make a reser- 
 vation upon the settlement of Shantung 
 upon Japan — a reservation which was refused 
 them — was more eloquent than many speeches. 
 While the joy bells rang there was this new 
 war in the East, between China and Japan, 
 hanging over our heads. Who would be in- 
 volved ? Would America and Great Britain 
 be drawn in ? Strange treaty of peace that 
 reads in places like a declaration of war ? 
 The other ominous note was the grave manifesto 
 of General Smuts, He announced, with that 
 wisdom and courage which have made him 
 the greatest of all the peace-makers, his 
 reasons for signing under protest. He stated 
 that the Treaty does not achieve the real peace 
 which the nations desire. " There are terri- 
 torial settlements," says General Smuts, 
 " which will need revision. There are guaran- 
 tees laid down which we all hope will soon 
 be found to be out of harmony with the new 
 peaceful temper and the unarmed state of 
 our former enemy. There are punishments 
 foreshadowed over most of which a calmer 
 mood may yet prefer to pass the sponge of 
 oblivion. There are indemnities stipulated 
 which cannot be exacted without grave in- 
 jury to industrial revival in Europe, and 
 
CONCLUSION 833^ 
 
 which it will be to the interest of all to- 
 render more tolerable and moderate." 
 
 General Smuts concluded that he was confi- 
 dent that the League of Nations will yet 
 prove the path of escape for Europe out of 
 the ruin wrought by the war. The abolition 
 of militarism in this treaty, unfortunately 
 confined to the enemy, may soon come as 
 a blessing and relief to the Allied peoples 
 as well. 
 
 It is desirable to sum up the results of 
 the Peace Conference not in material terms — 
 the precise territorial settlements, the amount 
 of reparations, the distribution of the German 
 colonies, the possession of the cables, and 
 similar decisions, have in themselves a narrower,, 
 and one might almost say local significance, 
 though their implications in some cases are 
 tremendous — but in moral terms. The Con- 
 ference set out to do two things. It set 
 out to make a new map of the world, and it 
 set out to give a fixed shape to the new spirit 
 of mankind. It has partially made its map. 
 What has it done with those immense forces 
 which, chaotic and elemental, only needed 
 turning into right channels ? 
 
 As a spiritual platform from which a splen- 
 did appeal would be made to humanity, 
 which would lift us to a higher level, the- 
 
234 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 <3onference has not been the success which 
 some of us hoped it would be. It must not 
 be altogether condemned. There is a Profit 
 and Loss account. There is much to be 
 written on both sides of this spiritual Balance- 
 sheet. Has the Conference left the world 
 better than it found it ? The answer is 
 that the Conference has accomplished some- 
 thing, but is far from accomplishing all that 
 it might have done. I believe that the 
 ^reat universal heart was really athirst not 
 only for peace but for a new order of things. 
 I believe there was a revolt against war, 
 against the Imperiahsms, the national exclu- 
 sivisms, the gospel of hatred that has so long 
 been taught-; and that this yearning for new 
 international relationships, this reaching out 
 for world solidarity, this disgust with mili- 
 tarism and with the ways of the old diplomacy 
 which bartered away peoples as chattels, 
 which worked in the dark and without refer- 
 ence to the masses chiefly concerned, might 
 "well have marked a turning-point in the 
 painful history of humanity. A nobler im- 
 pulse towards co-operation, towards emanci- 
 pation, towards true democracy, might have 
 Taeen given. President Wilson's utterances 
 touched a new note ; the future, in spite of 
 the past of blood and tears, appeared really 
 
CONCLUSION 235 
 
 promising, Mr. Lloyd George also, I have 
 reason to believe, strove hard to put in prac- 
 tical form the aspirations of men of good will 
 in all the countries of the globe. Unfortu- 
 nately, there were ranged against them all 
 kinds of forces which speedily shattered the 
 dream of the instant application of this new 
 international philosophy to the affairs of the 
 world. 
 
 There were not only at home and abroad 
 too many false prophets who pandered to 
 the basest and the most dangerous passions, 
 who directed the emotions of the war-weary 
 peoples into the old paths of greed, and of 
 fear, and of hatred ; but in the bosom of the 
 Conference itself the same influences worked 
 for the fictitious security of territorial guaran- 
 tees and of arms, of expansions and of com- 
 binations, of all the old wheels- within- wheels 
 of an intricate diplomacy. There are a number 
 of danger-points in Europe ; and the battle 
 in the secret conclaves of the Quai d'Orsay 
 and of the private rooms of the plenipoten- 
 tiaries raged round these points. Badgered 
 and besieged, often the last reason which 
 the statesmen urged was justice, and the 
 desire to remove a possible casus belli. It 
 became apparent to the casual reader of 
 newspapers that the elevated language of 
 
236 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 Mr. Wilson had not been understood by some 
 of his colleagues. The inevitable result was 
 that the public looked on cynically. The 
 public became aware of a certain lack of 
 sincerity. 
 
 It would be wrong, however, to indulge 
 in unrelieved pessimism. There is a very 
 unsatisfactory side of the balance-sheet. We 
 should not cherish dangerous illusions. Yet 
 on the credit side we have indeed founded 
 the League. It is woefully incomplete, but 
 it is a beginning. I see for it a golden future. 
 It cannot prevent war at present. In the 
 regulation of armaments it is sadly inefficient. 
 Yet it provides a valuable piece of machinery. 
 It is a factor which cannot be left out of 
 our calculations when we are considering the 
 prospects of peace and of war. It is there 
 to offer its arbitration. It is there to pass 
 a moral judgment. The nations which have 
 subscribed to the principles of the League 
 cannot afford to go on affronting the con- 
 science of mankind. We must not deceive 
 ourselves : we have ledready seen Italy in 
 a warlike mood, and if the same circum- 
 stances arose to-morrow elsewhere we can 
 only presume that the existence of the 
 League would be ignored when national passions 
 reached a certain height. It is rather as 
 
CONCLUSION 237 
 
 an educative organ that I regard the League. 
 It will be perpetually before the peoples. 
 It will hold up an ideal. Gradually man- 
 kind will learn to trust it. There will be 
 a growing confidence among the nations. 
 If war can only be staved off for a generation, 
 I believe the League will be in full working 
 order, that it will have given unmistakable 
 proofs of its value, and that a better feeling 
 will have been created. The Conference, one 
 cannot help saying, has not only neglected 
 to employ the spiritual forces in the world 
 but has actually created general irritation 
 and suspicion. The League, which has been 
 erected by the Conference, will, however, 
 allay that irritation and suspicion, and before 
 long the machine will have a soul. It will 
 be driven by the motive power of an unselfish 
 and humane desire for peace. Two things 
 it must do, and that quickly : it must bring 
 Germany into the fold and it must strive for 
 a general disarmament. 
 
 The Labour Convention, which I am glad 
 to say is chiefly a British achievement, is 
 again a piece of machinery which in itself 
 is disappointing, but which may easily have 
 profound consequences. Here once more I 
 count upon its moral authority. Mr. Barnes 
 is not claiming,^too much when he says that 
 
238 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 this charter will bind together the workers 
 of the world in closer ties, and will bind 
 together the workers and their employers, 
 and will further link up workers and employers 
 with their Governments, and those Govern- 
 ments with each other, by virtue of their 
 common action. The programme which will 
 be immediately submitted is undoubtedly a 
 modest one. But the point is that the Con- 
 vention must have a great spiritual effect, 
 teaching us mutual respect and giving us 
 mutual interests in the people of those nations 
 who are less happy than ourselves. This 
 must react upon our general international 
 relationship. 
 
 There are a number of positive ideas which 
 have been launched. If they have not always 
 been realized, nevertheless the ideas will per- 
 sist and will tend to realize themselves. We 
 have as a result of the Peace Conference a 
 new sense of the rights of nationalities. We 
 accept without question, in theory at" least, 
 the principle of self-disposition for all the 
 nations of the earth. We have pronounced 
 against the old alien oppressions, the perse- 
 cution of minorities, of such communities as 
 the Jews. We have spoken in favour of 
 democratic institutions, and if we have not 
 always acted in conformity with our utter- 
 
CONCLUSION 239^ 
 
 ances, those utterances are no less vitaL 
 Secret diplomacy is condemned to death. 
 It is not dead, and will probably not die just 
 yet. But die it will. We have a new know- 
 ledge of each other; we have learnt to try 
 to understand our neighbours' point of view, 
 and this in the long run will lead to deeper 
 esteem. The old insularity is broken down. 
 "We have a sense, a growing sense, of inter- 
 dependence. One may be properly critical 
 of the Peace Conference, but one cannot 
 deny that great ideas have been sown abroad, 
 and one cannot doubt that those ideas will 
 -bear their fruit. 
 
 Thus there is no need to abandon optimism. 
 The Conference had much to contend with. 
 It had to contend with memories of old wrongs, 
 with visions of new dangers. You cannot 
 stamp out the ancient feuds in a moment. 
 Europe is scarred from the Baltic to the Black 
 Sea with battlegrounds of short and long 
 date. We have lived in water-tight com- 
 partments, always regarding the foreigner as 
 a potential enemy. In the rearrangement 
 of the world it was natural that each nation 
 should claim all that it could possibly claim 
 for itself. The spirit of huckstering which 
 was engendered was not the spirit in which 
 it was easy to construct a Universal League 
 
^40 PEACE-MAKING AT PARIS 
 
 •of Peace. Statesmen were short-sighted. I 
 
 believe that if they had appealed to the 
 
 nobler instincts in their people, the people 
 
 would have responded. But now the period 
 
 -of passions is ending. We shall begin to 
 
 settle down to work again, and we shall realize 
 
 the need of co-operation if we are to build 
 
 up the world on the wreckage. It is then 
 
 that the ideas which have been planted will 
 
 begin to flourish. Even the failures, in the 
 
 spiritual domain, of the Peace Conference 
 
 will help us. We shall see where we went 
 
 astray. It is sincerely to be hoped that we 
 
 shall have bold leaders, men with vision, to 
 
 .guide the great currents which will sweep 
 
 mankind. The reason why Bolshevism has 
 
 succeeded in spite of its crudity is that it 
 
 offered to the aspiring peoples a tangible 
 
 hope of escape from the old conditions. It 
 
 Jed those peoples into a quagmire. It is for 
 
 the true statesmen to realize the desires of 
 
 mankind and to lead them to the Promised 
 
 Land. 
 
 Printed in Great Britain hy 
 
 XiVVflU VROTRBRS, LIMITED, TU£ CHESIIAM PRESS, WOKING AND LONDON