Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924020416610 
 
Cornell University Library 
 E 715.H19 
 
 Full official history of the war with Sj 
 
 3 1924 Q2Q 416 610 
 
Full Offiqial History 
 
 OF 
 
 k 
 
 THE WAR/WITH SPAIN 
 
 WRITTEN OVER THE WIRES IN THE DISCHARGE OF PUBLIC DUTY 
 
 J= 
 
 By the Highest Authorities of the Government, Heads of Departments and Bureaus 
 
 of State, War and Navy, Cabinet Secretaries, the Adjutant General, the 
 
 Commanders of Fleets and Armies in Active Service, and the 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 4 
 
 The Earliest Example of Historical Work Wrought from the Records Automatically Authentic, 
 OF the Inner Truths of War, with the Latest Facilities of Scientific Inventions 
 
 I The FigutDS Touched with Life and Ihe Scenery with Colors S^. 
 
 BY MURAT HALSTEAD 
 
 duthorof "The Story of the Philippines," "Our New Possessions," "History of American Expansion,' 
 > Story of Cuba," "Our Country in War." "The White Dollar," ,^f.The Life of 
 '% William McKinley," " The Conventions of 1 860," etc. 
 
 >itc 
 
 Superbly Illustrated with Half-tone Engravings, Made from Many Photographs Taken by Signal Service 
 
 Photographers Expressly for This Work;' and by Reproductions of Official Maps and 
 
 I Plans of Battles, Campaigns, Fortifications and Ships, Prepared by the 
 
 War and Navy Departments of the United States. 
 
 SOLD BY SUBSCRIPTION ONLY 
 
 1899; 
 
 THE DOMINION COMPANY 
 
 publisher fine books 
 
 CHICAGO, U. S. A. 
 
 ^ 
 
Copyrighted, 1899, by 
 
 H. L. BARBER, 
 
 Chicago, 111., U.S. A. 
 
 The engravings in this volume were 
 made from original photographs, and are 
 specially protected' by copyright; and no- 
 tice is hereby given, that any person or 
 persons guilty of reproducing or infring- 
 ing upon the copyright in any way will 
 be dealt with according to law. 
 
%nscvVbt& 
 
 to tEje 
 
 ^istory ITfakers of tlje Untteb States, 
 
 d?e PrestSent, d?e Cabinet, C£?e Congress 
 
 anb tf^e 
 
 Officers anb (gnlisteb ZTTen 
 
 of tl?e 
 
 Ctmerican CJrmjj anb tcaDjj, 
 
 rDI?ose Deebs OfficiallB IDritten 
 
 3n Clction 
 
 Clre Jlecorbeb in tEfjese Pages, 
 
 (£biteb by tJje Clutljor; 
 
 (X Wat for ^umantty in t^e 
 
 Ztame of Cibertij 
 
 Became ®ne of Beneficent Conquest, 
 
 imposing Duties of (Emancipation anb Dominion, 
 
 Ctbbtng to tlje Broab £anbs of tl?e ^ree, 
 
 Spanning tlje Continent,. 
 
 ^Ije 3slanbs of tl?e Soutl^ern Seas, 
 
 IDIjile tlje (Energy of tfje Conquerors 
 
 XOas 2HercifuI to tlje i)anquisl)eb 
 
 ^or tlje Startling Strokes of Conclusice Pictorg 
 
 Brougt)t tlje Sroift 2?eturn 
 
 ®f tlje Security of 
 
 Peace. 
 
THE PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. 
 
 The Full Official History of the War with Spain is, in essentials, com- 
 posed exclusively of material for which the highest authorities of the govern- 
 ment of the United States are responsible. The true way to impart to 
 biography its greater charm is to use the words of the person portrayed, and 
 the better way to write history is in the authoritative language of its makers. 
 
 Modern inventions have afforded such facilities for communication 
 between capitals and camps, the departments of war and navy, and the com- 
 manders of armies and fleets in action, that there is centralization of supreme 
 command, and the work of war, as well as of diplomacy, is absolutely in the 
 hands of the Great Officer, charged by the Constitution of the United States 
 with the command-in-chief of our armed forces, naval and military. This 
 wise provision of the republican form of government significantly subordinates 
 all generals and admirals to the Chief Magistrate of the nation, conclusively 
 as the colonel of the regiment is the superior of the captains of the companies 
 that compose it. 
 
 When the flag of this country flies over the White House, the President 
 is there in the discharge of public duty, and near the executive mansion, 
 westward, in an immense building, are grouped the departments of State, 
 War, and Navy, through which our government comes in contact, whether in 
 peace or war, with the nations of the earth. Thus within a small space are 
 gathered the executive offices and appliances of the American people. 
 
 The wires in the White House place the President in touch with all the 
 departments represented in his Cabinet and joined to the wonderful web spun 
 round the world, over which is wrought the mighty magic of telegraphy ; and 
 in the recent war the defense of our coast, and the offense of our ships and 
 battalions in the Indies, East and West, the President was constantly in swift 
 and sure communication with the front — and no word of his is found that did 
 not command and cheer the advance and testify his courage and vigilance. 
 
 13 
 
^4 THE PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. 
 
 . The intelligence of the world's business day b)"- day — the order and reports 
 of affairs, large and small, flash continually on the wires, and from the begin- 
 ning of history there has been no material of and for it, comparable with the 
 dispatches reduced to writing at both ends of the lightning lines. Never m 
 all the countless experiences of mankind was the story of a war recorded and 
 made definite and certain by the leading actors in it as in our combat with 
 Spain that began and was fought to a finish in the year 1898. It was the 
 first case of the kind, and this book is in a striking degree the fruit of it. All 
 enlightened peoples participated in ^pur current information, but the gen- 
 eral dependence was on formal reports — statements in greater part always, 
 and, as a rule, prepared entirely for the public by officers for their superior 
 officers, or writers of features for the p"ress, according to the colors or the 
 theories that the proprietorship of the papers preferred. 
 
 The inner truths, passing clouds, transient impressions, local atmosphere, 
 the very tints of the scenery, were in the private and confidential telegrams, 
 official and pertinent as possible — words of command and of explanation, 
 * admonition and suggestion, that passed between the President, the Cabinet 
 Secretaries, the Heads of Bureaus, the Adjutant-General, and the Generals 
 and Admirals Commanding. These were incessantly interchanged, and will 
 be forever the highest anithority as to the points contested. It is what a man 
 wrote on the spot, the immediate, unrevised impression, that will be called 
 forth to settle disputes. Each dispatch is a flash-light of the scene as it was 
 — with every attribute and incident of verity. There are thousands of them in 
 the reports of the War and Navy Secretaries, and in the bureaus and in the 
 Adjutant-General's office especially, filling bulky volumes, and given to the 
 public with unprecedented candor. Such a thing as this library of revelations 
 of bottom facts, no matter whom they helped or hurt, never before was pre- 
 sented to the people. The volumes printed from bales of telegrams, inestima- 
 ble as evidence and incontestable, are supparted by marvels of photography 
 The kodaks had the effect upon ships and armies in activity of the kinetoscope 
 It is aptly stated in the title-page of this book that there is in The Official His- 
 tory of the War with Spain, automatic accuracy. There is the truth the 
 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, told infallibly by the greatest energies 
 and illuminants of the universe, electricity and sunshine. 
 
 The author's embarrassment was the excessive riches of the matter with 
 which the astonishing official publications are filled, surpassing all example 
 
' THE PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. iS 
 
 alike in quality and quantity. He has brought to his iinprecedented task of 
 the presentation in popular form of this Full Official History, the expert train- 
 ing of long and laborious journalism. 
 
 The Official History of the War with Spain is the first of its kind among 
 historical voltunes — because the appliances of modern invention affording the 
 facilities have not existed and been employed through other wars; and as 
 surely as it is the earliest of the official character it bears, it is the forerunner 
 of the war books that tell the truth in the future — in which the instrumentali- 
 ties of our advanced civilization will make conspicuous the sacred veracity of 
 history ; when the fiction that betrays and the formalities that obscure will be 
 eliminated from the established record of deeds great and good; and the 
 measure in which men accomplish them, so that there will be gain and glory 
 through the solid simplicity of faultless justice. 
 
 The imperfections of the historical work are admitted, but the surpassing 
 excellence of the material embodied is manifest in these pages. 
 
 THE JPUBLISHERS 
 
i? s 
 
 II.L.ENCCO. ^^ttj M 
 
I^ATTOChEY <sm GI3I0G5 , 
 
 PEE3IBENT McKINLEY AND HIS CABINET. 
 
MUEAT HALSTEAD, THE AUTHOH. 
 
THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
 
 In modern wars the relations between the staff correspondents of the- 
 newspapers, and the staff officers of the armies engaged, have been under- 
 stood, by those who hSve knowledge of the administration of the Press and 
 that of the military establishments, as full of difficulty; and there has been no' 
 approximation to a satisfactory solution of the embarrassments found in the 
 course of our recent experiments. One of the vital matters when nations lift 
 the sword against each other is to restrict the circulation of intelligence, and 
 the incessant increase of wires whose business is to convey news over conti- 
 nents and under seas, magnifies the problem of the adjustments of military 
 necessities and the rights of the people represented by the Press. Inferior as 
 Spain was in resources to the United States, the fact that for some weeks she 
 knew the movements of our ships, and we were largely mystified as to the 
 location of her squadrons, placed us at a disadvantage. If there had been 
 equality in the naval strength of the belligerents, the one where the ciirrent 
 intelligence was irrepressible would have been exposed to dangers in the dark, 
 from which the one capable of suppressing the swift difEusion of truth would 
 have been exempt. As it was, we credited the Spaniards with greater activities 
 than they undertook, and felt unwarranted apprehensions of aggressive adven- 
 tures on their part. The maneuvers of Cervera's fleet of swift cruisers for a 
 , time caused great perplexities. It was not absolutely ascertained for some 
 time that Cervera was in Santiago harbor. We were slow in making out that 
 his supplies were so scanty he was constrained to go there as a refuge, instead 
 of making the port of. Cienfuegos, and having railroad connection with 
 Havana. A rumor of Spanish cruisers detained our troops when embarked at 
 Tampa for Santiago. There were Spanish gunboats on the Pacific Ocean 
 thought capable of attacking some of our tratrsports, and Admiral Dewey was 
 watchful more than three months to prevent attempts of the Spaniards 
 at Manila to attack his ships with torpedoes. Once he had news that a 
 
 19 
 
no THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 superior Spanish fleet was in the Red Sea on the way to the Philippines. It 
 was known in Spain better than in the United States that General Merritt was 
 on the Newport with three tons of gold coin, and that our transports, with 
 more than a thousand men on each, were steaming westward on the twentieth 
 parallel of latitude. Cervera's fleet was expected to sail from the Cape Verde 
 Islands to intercept the Oregon, which ran out of her way eastward of the 
 West Indies and appeared off the coast of Florida. If we should have "war 
 with a power whose sea force is strong as our own, on either or both our 
 ocean fronts, there, would be, for the sake of fair-play for public safety, an 
 imperative requirement that the Press should not publish — that the wijes 
 should not carry — information of the movements of ou^ ships of war. Gen- 
 eral Sherman said the attack upon his left wing by Johnston in North Caro- 
 lina, when on his way from Savannah to Washington, was caused by an item 
 in the shipping news of the New York Tribune, that a ship loaded with forage 
 had cleared for Newberne. It is not wise, however, for military or naval 
 commanders to regard the items the papers contain from day to day. The fact 
 that four ships of war, believed to be American, were seen from the coast of 
 Luzon was stated in a Manila paper on the day before Dewey surprised those 
 who were presumably defenders of the harbor. 
 
 The Press of the United States largely took very extraordinary attitudes 
 with respect to the war of our country with Spain. It was the belief of sev- 
 €ral great journals and journalists that they must be held accountable for the 
 state of hostilities. They assumed airs of authority as to its management, 
 its objects; and, as General Halleck wrote on the back of a letter of good 
 advice from an able editor, "Halstead M. writes — how this war should be 
 carried on." The Press, in its most ostentatious illustrations of public policy, 
 gave as much prominence to views as to news, and pursued the cultivation 
 and vindication of theories with even greater warmth and energy than they 
 gathered and displayed from day. to day the incidents of intelligence that 
 were of the nature of information about the conduct of hostilities. In no war 
 that ever took place did the Press go so expensively into the enterprise of 
 reporting the current history, through special representatives, employ so many 
 young men of courage and talent as historians on the spot, as in this Spanish- 
 American combat of three and one-half months. The sums of money spent in 
 newspaper enterprise were enormous. The expense account of the Asso- 
 ciated Press was unexampled. Several newspaper proprietors employed- 
 
THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 21 
 
 steamers for their personal convenience and to supply newspaper service such 
 as never before was imagined. It is said the foundation of the fortune of the 
 Rothschilds was much augmented by the success of a representative of the 
 house, who witnessed the ruin of Napoleon's army at Waterloo, and had luck 
 in catching a boat, landing in England, hastening to London and using his 
 knowledge in the market. If the fashion of last summer is to prevail, the 
 time will come when the war correspondents will be a factor in the physical 
 force of armies in the midst of operations; and when there are contentions as 
 to supremacy in "sea power," the private yachts of the newspapers, ■ and the 
 spectators, may outnumber the battleships and their crews. After all the 
 prodigious effort and extravagance of the Press to assist in various ways and 
 -with a variety of means to carry on the late war, and shape it according to 
 their policy, the* general result is not symmetrical. There are many imposing 
 fragments, but they are at once colossal and sinister, not an edifice — not a 
 structure with cornerstones and walls that reveal an architect, but a Stone- 
 henge, massive yet fragmentary, — features stalwart without sequence but 
 significant, — a stoneyard clogged with roughl5'-cut pillars and chips of rock 
 that need the hammer and chisel and mortar. It is not a case of building 
 wiser than the builders knew, but of not working on the straight pursuit of 
 truth, — not building according to knowledge. There has been an indulgence 
 in personalities and conceits, in phantoms, the very vanities of morbid fancies. 
 There has been in the work of the Press mechanical obstacles not over- 
 come — wasteful haste in slamming at the world daily chapters constructed not 
 to enlighten but to startle — not to lay each day a brick of fact — but to erect a 
 tower of Babel, no matter if it leaned like that of Pisa, or tottered to ruin 
 before the design was achieved — the whole subordinated to the principle that 
 accuracy is not so important as precedence — that no matter about the yester- 
 days, the great day is always this afternoon or to-morrow. The magazines 
 have been picture galleries, many of the paintings brilliant — some splendid 
 strokes with pen and pencil ; but one would not go to the galleries of Ver- 
 sailles, — rather to the libraries and official records and the files of newspapers 
 that tell their respective stories in a representative way, for the history of 
 France. The certainty that the history of the war of the United States and 
 Spain in 1898 has not been written as a whole and in due proportion, has been 
 for some time obvious to observers of experience, and students faithful to 
 facts. 
 
22 THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 The task of historical writing has been remarkably simplified by the open 
 door policy of the President and his Cabinet, in oificially telling the people 
 "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," the secrets of a war 
 in its evolution in the drift of events at first glacial, then torrential, "shooting 
 Niagara" into the whirlpool, in the course of preparations and plans, the con- 
 duct of campaigns, the talk over wires from battle-fields to the White House 
 and the War Department — all this never until now has been so unreservedly 
 placed before the world. It does not seem to be in the way of the newspapers 
 to go baek and enrich their columns with the sweeping confidences that the 
 government of the people has made to the people — but it seems that the task 
 of writing a Full Official History of the War with Spain is distinctly in the line 
 of the work of one who has had the training of many years in the- valuation 
 and presentation in condensed and consecutive form, of the news of the 
 times. It is this precisely that the author of this volume proposed in the 
 beginning of his task, gaining confidence in the accomplishment of it, which 
 is as attractive, he feels, as he hopes it may be useful — as the treasures stored 
 in the ample and open official records are revealed rich in the golden ore of 
 history — imperishable in truthfulness and excellent in testimony — that our 
 country in the expansion of victory is supported by the might of its manliness 
 and the grace of its womanliness, going to the front accepting a call of 
 duty, gaining land for the people — providing the resources of all climes for 
 the hereafter of the Republic that is stronger for order than monarchy — with 
 a freedom that is fairer than the anarchies that the broods of oppression con- 
 ceive—lifting up for the children of the people the flag of the free, all the 
 brighter because it floats over the Indies, Asiatic and American, and the 
 Hawaiian and Aleutian archipelagoes — and above all this the radiant atmos- 
 phere of the righteousness that exalts men and nations. 
 
 MURAT HaLSTEAD. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Since Spain lost her colonies on the American continents it has been in 
 evidence that she must lose her islands, unless the character of her govern- 
 ment and people should be so changed as to radically reform her colonial 
 system. The wars of independence by Mexico, Peru, Chili, Argentina, and 
 the central and northern South American States, were caused by like griev- 
 ances and marked by the same characteristics. The tedious tragedies of the 
 redemption from Spanish misrule southwest of us have common distinctions, 
 kindred features, familiar paths trampled with bloody footsteps, marking the 
 march of destiny — the trail of the serpent over all! Spain, not unaware of her 
 fatality, but without ability to change her course, has long consciously con- 
 fronted the doom that has overtaken her. It was the foreshadowed misfortune 
 in Cuba that embittered the Spaniards, who could read on the map that dis- 
 plays the West Indies and the Atlantic and Gulf coast of the United States, 
 the inevitable, irresistible attraction of gravitation of the bulk of the conti- 
 nent for the islands of the seas southeast. As certainly as we shall dominate 
 the Gulf, and have won and maintained with the sword, all from the keys of 
 Florida to the mouth of the Rio Grande, the great island of Cuba will be 
 Americanized and our possession, the other Indies will be leagued with her, 
 and accept our protection, glad to be our dependencies — this by the processes 
 of the principles of our dominion and the growth of our homes. In due time 
 it will be as evidently the order of nature and the course of empire, that we 
 shall supersede European influences, and wield the sovereignty of peace over 
 the island's, that were the prizes of the living Western nations of the older 
 civilization beyond the Atlantic for three centuries, as that we have acquired, 
 assimilated and Americanized the Mississippi valley and the Pacific slope ; and 
 the great Republic as an armed nation will be an empire of peace. We shall 
 not permanently have the enmity of Spain because we have gained the islands 
 she has lost. If she had wisely administered the government of her depend- 
 
 23 
 
24 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 encies she would have sustained the position th'ey once gave her of the fore- 
 most of the kingdoms, but the fact that neither the people of Spain nor the 
 colonies had rights the crown was bound to respect, caused the combination 
 of greed and cruelty, corruption and tyranny, that has wrought the downfall 
 of Spain abroad and her decline at home. The peninsula is still rich in 
 resources, and the people, in ceasing to waste their energies in the oppression 
 of others, may teach themselves the lessons of orderly liberty, that will restore 
 their country to the prosperity that has perished and the dignity that disap- 
 peared when pride became pretension. The Spanish people, carried into a 
 war that was hopeless, have not been found lacking in devotion to their 
 country, and the honor of the Spanish arms has been upheld by the valor of 
 their soldiers, when their ranks were so steadfast that it conferred glory upon 
 the American army that overcame them ; and the chivalry of Cervera will be 
 held in honorable remembrance by the generous manhood that overmatched 
 him and rescued his slaughtered sailors from their burning and sinking ships. 
 More than once Cuban influences have profoundly impressed the politics of 
 the great organizations through which the American people govern them- 
 selves. The commanding votes in the government of the Union of our States, 
 were once, in the words of Abraham Lincoln; "half free and half slave" ; and 
 the States involved in the peculiar domestic institution were dominated by its 
 influences. The issue was made that the slave system must hold the balance of ' 
 power in the Senate, if nowhere else, and by consolidated force prevent the 
 predominance of the free States by holding in one of the essential factors of 
 the government, a veto power. Cuba was wanted, as Texas and California 
 were, in this interest. In the case of the great State on the Gulf and the great 
 State on the Pacific, the increase of territory, the extension of our boundaries, 
 profited the cause of the larger liberty. The foundations of the Republic were 
 broadened, even the urgency of the slave propaganda magnifying the area of 
 freedom. It was in the interest of possessing Cuba to preserve the balance 
 that the power identified with slavery might not be successfully assailed in the 
 States, that the claim the constitution carried slaves into the territories, until 
 forbidden by State sovereignty thereon founded, was made, that the Ostend 
 conference was called and the manifesto bearing that name promulgated by 
 the assembled American ministers, to Spain, France and England,— and the 
 influence of the very able Mr. Soule, of Louisiana, turned the tide in the Ci 
 cinnati National Convention of the Democracy in 1856, from Doup-]a 
 
INTRODUCTION. 25 
 
 Buchanan, making incalculable changes in the history of the country so far as 
 incidents and individuals are concerned. The direction of the general 
 movements of mankind, it is safe to say, must have been about the same, 
 though possibly varying widely in time, place and circumstance. Humanity 
 does not "stagnate, though there are centuries that are as years. The Ostend 
 Conference, though composed of men of high place in diplomatic functions, 
 did not partake of the nature of the proceedings of diplomacy. If the motive 
 of the meeting was to open negotiations with Spain for the purchase of Cuba, 
 the words employed were too pungent. If- the purpose was to provoke war 
 the expression was awkward. Spain was not seriousl}' influenced beyond an 
 agitation that was effusive in lofty language. It was the United States that 
 was deeply disturbed. Filibustering in the name of Cuban liberties became 
 a romantic occupation of American adventures, some of which were con- 
 ducted and advertised as festivals. The sailing of the ill-fated Critten- 
 den expedition from New Orleans was without shadow of concealment, and 
 the Spaniards were especially well-informed. Spanish spies -aje believed to 
 have largely personally conducted the enterprise. The Virginius affair was 
 flagrant, and resulted in an execution at Santiago that was a massacre. There 
 never was, however, any rational question as to the character of the filibuster 
 ship. The scene of this tragedy has witnessed a desperate battle, in which the 
 blood of a thousand American soldiers was shed, the surrender of a Spanish 
 army ; and those rugged hills and rocky shores were shaken by a cannonade 
 that destroyed a Spanish fleet. The place of the sacrifice is under the Stars 
 and Stripes! It has been known in Spain for half a century that the United 
 States would pay liberally for Cuba and Porto Rico, but the Spanish cabinets 
 have been too sensitive about the public opinion of the country, made danger- 
 ous to rulers by Carlists and anarchists, to transact business on its merits. 
 The masses of Spaniards were not informed of the power of the American 
 . nation.- In this they have been accompanied by the bulk of the people of 
 other nations, whose average enlightenment it would perhaps be discourteous 
 to doubt. It must be confessed, however, that Americans have not thoroughly 
 measured and comprehended themselves, though it has often been in the 
 minds of our people that such armies as were put into the field by the Nation 
 and the Confederacy, a generation ago, would, alj marching one way, be equal 
 to self-defense, no matter how large the coalition against us, and competent to 
 conquer a bigger world than Alexander overcame. 
 
«6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Cuba as a Spanish possession represented the worst form of European 
 dominion in the Americas, and the growth of a great nation in North Amer- 
 ica, defiantly independent of the great Powers of Europe, was an increasing 
 threatening of the inheritance of the mediaeval monarchy that held the fairest 
 ■oi American islands situated within a few hours of our shores, that as our 
 influence augmented in proportion to our power, the airs and the water, the 
 winds and the waves, would waft in unison the magnetic doctrine that the 
 lands of America, whether drained by vast rivers or surrounded by seas, 
 should be the property of America. Cuba and 'the United States had attrac- 
 tions for each other, and while there was obvious the reciprocity of nations, 
 there was a racial antagonism — an effervescence of contentious civilization — a 
 Tepulsion of conditions and friction of characteristic institutions. 
 
 If it had not been for Cuban politics Stephen A. Douglas would have held 
 the Democratic -party together, deferring the time for the summons to arms 
 to fight out the "irrepressible conflict" ; and then our great heroes and states- 
 men would tave had other names than those now of highest fame, names 
 now not known, for it is the personal genius of republican government that 
 great men are developed by events, and are representatives of the masses, and 
 revealed by movements they do not originate and that widen into magnitude 
 like streams running riverward. 
 
 Cuba, in the mouth of the Mediterranean of our hemisphere, was a vol- 
 ■cano. The explosion of the Maine in the harbor of Havana was an indigenous 
 eruption. It was in the chemistry of the conditions. Repeatedly we were 
 on the verge of war. Hostilities between the United States and Spain were 
 for half a century a question of time. During the administration of Millard 
 Fillmore, we were so near a collision with England and France about Spanish- 
 Cuban affairs that there was a state paper from the pen of John J. Critten- 
 den, of Kentucky, that even yet has the alarm-bell ring in its sentences. We 
 quote from Mrs. Chapman Coleman, the daughter and biographer • of Mr. 
 ■Crittenden : 
 
 "In 1851 Mr. Webster was Secretary of State and Mr. Crittenden 
 Attorney-General in Mr. Fillmore's cabinet. Mr. Webster's health failed, 
 and he was compelled for awhile to withdraw from Washington, and during 
 this vacation Mr. Crittenden was Acting Secretary of State. At that time an 
 expedition of about five hundred men escaped from New Orleans, and landed 
 -upon the island of Cuba. They were soon captured, and many of them 
 
INTRODUCTION. 27 
 
 executed, and M. Sartiges, Minister of France, communicated to the United 
 States government that the French government had issued orders to its ships 
 of war to prevent by force any adventurers of any nation from landing with 
 hostile intent on the island of Cuba. The British government gave notice 
 also to the State Department that it had issued similar orders to its naval 
 force. The following is the letter addressed by Mr. Crittenden (then Acting 
 Secretary of State) to M. Sartiges. A distinguished gentleman who has occu- 
 pied a high position in this government has written to me that this diplomatic 
 letter was pronounced perfect in tone and style, and would compare favorably 
 with any paper which had ever emanated from the State Department: 
 
 "Department of State, Washington, October 22, 185 1. 
 "The undersigned. Acting Secretary of State of the United States, has 
 the honor to remind M. de, Sartiges, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
 Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, that in the interview which he had 
 with him on the 8th instant, he stated that he might have occasion to address 
 him in writing on the subject of the information which M. de Sartiges then 
 communicated, that the French government had issued orders to its ships of 
 war, then in the West Indies, to give assistance to Spain, and to prevent by 
 force any adventurers of any nation from landing with hostile intent on the 
 island of Cuba. Having imparted that information to the President, the 
 undersigned has now the honor, by his direction, to address M. de Sartiges in 
 regard to it. ' ' 
 
 We quote the paper in part : 
 
 "M. de Sartiges is apprised that a few days prior to the interview 
 adverted to the charge d'affaires of her Britannic Majesty had given to this 
 Department ofBcial notice that his government had issued similar orders to its 
 naval forces. The President had regarded this as a matter of grave impor- 
 tance, but its gravity is greatly increased by the concurrence and cooperation 
 of France in the same measure. It cannot be doubted that those orders have 
 been occasioned by the recent unlawful expedition of less than five hundred 
 men, which, having evaded the vigilance of this government, and escaped 
 from New Orleans, were landed by the steamer Pampero upon the island of 
 Cuba, and were soon captured, and many of them executed. 
 
 "The geographical position of the island of Cuba in the Gulf of Mexico, 
 
28 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 lying at no great distance from the mouth of the River Mississippi, and in the 
 line of the greatest current of the commerce of the United States, would 
 become, in the hands of any powerful European nation, an object of just 
 jealousy and apprehension to the people of this country. A due regard to 
 their own safety and interest must, therefore, 'make it a matter of importance 
 to them who shall possess and hold dominion over that island. The govern- 
 ment of France and those of other European nations were long since officially 
 apprised by this government that the United States could not see without con- 
 cern that island transferred by Spain to any other European state ; President 
 Fillmore fully concurs in that sentiment, and is apprehensive that the sort of 
 protectorate introduced by the orders in question might, in contingencies not 
 difficult to be imagined, lead to results equally objectionable. 
 
 "The system of government which prevails most generally in Europe is 
 adverse to the principles upon which this government is founded, and the 
 undersigned is well aware that the difference between them is calculated to 
 produce distrust of, if not aversion to, the government of the United States. 
 Sensible of this, the people of this country are naturally jealous of European 
 interference in American affairs. And although they would not impute to 
 France, now herself a republic, any participation in this distrustful and 
 unfriendly feeling towards their government, yet the undersigned must repeat 
 that her intervention in this instance, if attempted to be executed, in the only 
 practicable mode for its effectual execution, could not fail to produce some 
 irritation, if not worse consequences. The French cruisers, sailing up and 
 down the shores of the United States to perform their needless task to pro- 
 tect Cuba and their ungracious office of watching the people of this country as 
 if they were fruitful of piracies, would be regarded with some feeling of 
 resentment, and the flag they bore— a flag which should always be welcome 
 to the sight of Americans— would be looked at as casting a shadow of 
 unmerited and dishonoring suspicion upon them and their government. The 
 undersigned will add that all experience seems to prove that the rights, inter- 
 ests, and peace of the continents of Europe and America will be be'st pre- 
 served by the forbearance of each to interfere in the affairs of the other. 
 The government of the United States has constantly acted on that principle 
 and has never intermeddled in European questions. The President has 
 deemed it proper to the occasion that his views should be fully and franklv 
 
INTRODUCTION. 29 
 
 presented for the friendly consideration of M. de Sartiges and his govern- 
 ment, in order that all possible precautions may be used to avert any mis- 
 understanding, 'and every cause or consequence that might disturb the peace 
 or alienate, in the least, the sentiments of confidence and friendship which 
 now bind together the republics of the United States and France. The 
 undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to M. de Sartiges the 
 assurance of his very distinguished consideration. 
 
 "JOHN J. CRITTENDEN." 
 
 Spanish diplomacy had been at work with England and France, and en- 
 gaged them to interference with the United States filibusters. Spain had man- 
 aged to persuade the governments of the two countries that she was engaged 
 in the abolishment of the slave trade, and that this was preparing the way for 
 emancipation, while the United States was a slave power and wanted the 
 extension of slavery, as was witnessed by the enterprise of lawless expedi- 
 tions. Mr. Crittenden's vigorous protest was presently followed by a notifi- 
 cation from England and France that the dangerous orders had been 
 revoked. It requires only the simple recitation of the facts to demonstrate 
 that the triple alliance of the powers most interested, traditionally, his- 
 torically, politically and commercially, in the West Indies against the United 
 States, was a most grave affair. Hardly less so was the Black Warrior Case, 
 that culminated in a war message from President Franklin Pierce — appended : 
 
 XXXIIId Congress, ist Session. Ex. Doc. No. 76. 
 
 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 Transmitting a Report in Reference to the Seizure 
 of the "Black Warrior. " 
 
 March 15, 1854. 
 To the House of Representatives: 
 
 In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 
 10th inst, I herewith transmit a report containing all the information 
 received at the Department in relation to the seizure of the Black Warrior, at 
 Havana, on the 28th ultimo. 
 
 There have been, in the course of a few years past, many other instances 
 of aggression upon our commerce, violations of the rights of American citi- 
 zens, and insults to the national flag, by the Spanish authorities in Cuba, and 
 
30 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 all attempts to obtain redress have led to protracted and as yet fruitless 
 negotiation. 
 
 The documents in these cases are voluminous, and, when prepared, will, 
 be sent to Congress. 
 
 Those now transmitted relate exclusively to the seizure of the Black 
 Warrior, and present so clear a case of wrong that it would be reasonable to 
 expect full indemnity therefor, as soon as this unjustifiable and offensive con- 
 duct shall be made known to her Catholic Majesty's Government; but similar 
 expectations, in other cases, have not been realized. 
 
 The offending authority is at our doors, with large powers for aggression, 
 but none, it is alleged, for reparation. The source of redress is in another 
 hemisphere; and the answers to our just complaint, made to the home 
 government, are but the repetition of excuses rendered by inferior officials to 
 their superiors, in reply to representations of misconduct. The peculiar situ- 
 ation of the parties has undoubtedly much aggravated the annoyances and 
 injuries which our citizens have suffered from the Cuban authorities, and 
 Spain does not seem to appreciate, to its full extent, her responsibility for the 
 conduct of these authorities. In giving very extraordinary powers to them 
 she owes it to justice, and to her friendly relations with this government, to 
 guard with great vigilance against the exorbitant exercise of these powers, 
 and, in case of injury, to provide for prompt redress. 
 
 I have already taken measures to present to the government of Spain the 
 wanton injury of the Cuban authorities, in the detention and seizure of the 
 Black Warrior, and to demand immediate indemnity for -the injury which has 
 thereby resulted to our citizens. 
 
 In view of the position of the island of Cuba, its proximity to our coast, ' 
 the relations which it must ever bear to our commercial and other interests, it 
 is vain to expect that a series of unfriendly acts infringing our commercial 
 rights, and the adoption of a policy threatening the honor and security of these 
 States can long consist with peaceful relations. 
 
 In case the measures taken for amicable adjustment of our difficulties 
 with Spain should unfortunately fail, I shall not hesitate to use the £uthority 
 and means which Congress may grant, to insure the observance of our rights 
 to obtain redress for injuries received, and to vindicate the honor of our 
 flag. 
 
 In anticipation of that contingency, which I earnestly hope may not arise 
 
INTRODUCTION. 31 
 
 I suggest to Congress the propriety of adopting such provisional measures as 
 the exigency may see'm to demand. FRANKLIN PIERCE. 
 
 Washington, March 15, 1854. 
 
 This message is one of the most trenchant that has emanated from our 
 Executive Department of the Government. It is a plain suggestion to Con- 
 gress to give the President authority to make war on Spain. It did not have 
 the desired effect, as it produced comparative peace. It is another illustration 
 that the United States has long been subjected to the inconvenience of a 
 house on fire next door. There was a time in the course of the negotiations 
 in the Virginius case that President Grant assembled a powerful fleet at Key 
 West. This was so soon after the war of the sections and states that we had 
 a strong array of war ships. 
 
 We quote from the report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1874, page 9, the 
 official record of the mustering of a squadron at Key West, to promote Span- 
 ish-Cuban negotiations. Here is a passage of Secretary Robson's report : 
 
 "The North Atlantic Station. — At the date of the last report the whole 
 available force of the navy which could be put afloat on the Atlantic Ocean 
 was under orders to reinforce this station. In addition to the regular force as 
 stated in the last report, every available wooden and iron-clad ship in 
 ordinary was dispatched as rapidly as it could be put in order and properly 
 manned and organized. The Lancaster and the Ticonderoga were recalled 
 from the South Atlantic, and the whole European fleet from the Mediter- 
 ranean, and ordered to concentrate at Key West. The force thus concen- 
 trated on the Station consisted of the Franklin, Minnesota, Wabash, Colorado, 
 Lancaster, Brooklyn, Congress, Worcester, Alaska, Ticonderoga, Canap- 
 daigua, Shenandoah, Juniata, Ossipee, Wachusett, Powhatan, Wyoming, 
 Kansas, Shawmut, Sangus, Mahopac, Manhattan, Ajax, Canonicus, Dictator, 
 Despatch, Pinta, Fortune, and Mayflower; and Rear- Admiral Case, as senior 
 officer present, assumed command, in pursuance of orders to that effect, Jan- 
 uary 3, 1874, the date of his arrival at- Key West. Rear-Admiral Scott 
 remained in command of a division. 
 
 "The causes which led to this concentration of force were generally and 
 briefly alluded to in my last report, and it may now be proper, in order to 
 complete the record of the action of the navy in connection with the Virginius 
 affair, to recite the more prominent of the proceedings in relation thereto in 
 wl ich it took part." 
 
32 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 It was while the American fleet of thirty ships of war was at Key West 
 that the proceedings in the case of the Virginius were closed by the agree- 
 ment of Spain to surrender the captured ship, a filibuster taken on the high 
 seas, to salute the American flag restored to her, and pay an indemnity. The 
 United States at this time had not resumed specie payments or established 
 high credit, while the great fleet at Key West was enough to shake the stock 
 market and alarm men of business in general, and President Grant was not 
 moved by the demand that Spain should have been attacked. Spain was 
 stronger then than now in her European relations, though suffering from 
 home disorders. 
 
 The chapter of this volume that is of "The American Minister in Madrid" 
 refers particularly to the period of General Sickles and General Gushing. 
 The latter was a man of genius in literature and law, the former a man of 
 affairs who made the closest approach to doing business with the Spaniards, 
 proposing the purchase of the Spanish rights in the West Indies, and suggest- 
 ing that we might pay $125,000,000. It was believed in Madrid at the time 
 that Marshal Prim, the Spanish Premier, was about to sell Cuba and Porto 
 Rico, asking for the two islands $200,000,000, and it is the opinion of General 
 Sickles that Prim's assassination was on that account. The influence behind 
 the assassins was so strong that they were protected. The act of murder is 
 not attributed to a patriotic emotion, but to the resentment of a corrupt circle 
 that Cuba should not be retained for the harvesting of plunder by favorites. 
 Prim was the foremost man of his time in his country. 
 
 Many Spaniards knew when rushing into war with us their country would 
 be better off to sell Cuba than to exhaust all resources in a hopeless combat 
 and yet they did not know the weakness of their country. The swift destruc- 
 tion of their fleets and the surrender of the armies were stunning surprises. 
 The military government of Cuba under Gomez, with a civil accompaniment 
 of inferior consideration, embarrassed all advances to Spain looking to the 
 relinquishment of Cuba, because the Cubans were in the way, and the Gomez 
 policy of destroying industries to deprive the Spaniards of revenue to carry on 
 the war, and recruit the insurgent forces by annihilating the chances of peace- 
 ful occupation, impoverished Cubans, so that they could have no credit unless 
 their bonds were guaranteed by the United States; and that could not be done 
 on a basis of bloody ashes. Cuban combinations were meant to force this 
 country to make war upon Spain, and while they were being worked that 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 33 
 
 accommodation should be impracticable, the blowing up of the Maine made 
 peaceful solution impossible, and with the inflammatory conditions excited, 
 the inevitable conflict was, to our disadvantage, for the moment precipitated, 
 when the situation was not more serious than when there were Cuban crises 
 during the administrations of Fillmore, Pierce and Grant. . 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 13-15 
 19-22 
 
 23-33 
 43-50 
 51-52 
 
 Publisher's Statement . . . 
 
 Preface . . . . ... . . . ...... 
 
 Introduction ...... . .... 
 
 List of Illustrations . ...... 
 
 List of Maps, Charts, Plans, Drawings, etc. . . . . 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. 
 
 American Good Will for Spain — The Situation in 1869 — The Sickles and Prim Negotiation 
 — Prim Willing to Sell Cuba — "The Honor of Spain" — Diplomatic Papers That 
 Should Be Studied — Spain Sends an Army to Cuba — The Valmaseda Proclamation — 
 The Wrongs of Cuba — We Must Find the Real People of Cuba 53-73 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN IN OUR CENTENNIAL YEAR FEARED WAR. 
 
 A Remarkable Correspondence — Suggestive of the Doom of Spanish Rule — ^The Gradual 
 Approaches of the Spanish War— A Circular Claiming the Cuban Rebellion Was 
 Crushed — Cushing as Master of Ceremonies — General Grant's Personality . . . • 74-97 
 
 CHAPTER in. * 
 
 THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 
 
 European Newspaper Comment on the Cuban-Spanish-American Situation Twenty-two 
 Years Ago— Not Much New in Later Commentary— "Stable Government" Not a New 
 Phrase— Cuban Troubles Those of Inheritance— Disastrous Influences of the Rebel 
 Policy of the Torch— Suggestion of Bombardment of Our Cities by Spaniards 
 
 113 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 
 
 The Stir about it in Europe— The Money Resources of Spain Stated by Minister Cushing 
 
 ' -Europe against Our Intervention in Cuba-The Filibuster Hostility to President 
 
 Grant-The London Times on Hamilton Fish— A Minister Promises Too Much 
 
 I 14-130 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS OF THE PENINSULA AND OF CUBA. 
 
 Some Testimony That Is Not Partial to Cuban Insurgents-Caleb Cushing on Inherent 
 Spanish Character-More Than One Kind of Our Naturalized Citizens-A List^f 
 Them and of Claims-Conflicting Testimony as to Cuban Armies-Two Pictures 
 
 Witnesses 
 
 34 
 
 que 
 131-175 
 
GENERAL NELSON A. MILES, COMMANDER OF THE UNITED STATES AEMY. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 37 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 
 
 The Food Supplies in Cuba — Introduction of the Torch by the Insurgents — Garcia's Fine 
 Army with an Engineer Corps — The Double Tax on Sugar-Making — Spanish Methods 
 of Making War — The Policy of Annihilation — A Government in Light Marching 
 Order 176 193. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 GENERAL LEE's CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 
 
 Tiie Conservative Administrations of Grant, Cleveland and McKinley — A Variety of 
 "American Citizens" in Havana — Judicious Discrimination of Consulate Authorities 
 — A Young Man Who Gave Himself Away — The Brave Stand of the President against 
 Bulling the Market for Bonds Issued on a Basis of Bloody Ashes 194-205- 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE ACTUAL EXPERIENCE AND SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 Two Parties of Malignants — The Firm Stand of the President at the Beginning of the 
 War — A Study of the Historical Truth of the Situation — The President's Language 
 Contrasted with That of the Fire Bugs — Extreme Views of Senators Davis, Daniel, 
 Foraker, and Others — The Fury of the War Party — Cuban and Spanish Desperadoes 
 — The Massacre of the Maine — The Findings of the Courts — Lifet of the Lost on the 
 Ship . . . ■ . . . 206-22S. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE SAN DOMINGO TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 
 
 The Policy of Maximo Gomez, and the Famine in Ctiba — The Reports of American 
 Consuls in Cuba on the Cane Burning and Its Relation to the Starvation of the People 
 — The Agent of the Cubans in Arms Justified Barbarism — The Testimony of Our 
 Consuls that the Gomez Policy was the Cause of the Death of Thousands — Direct 
 Evidence of Blackmail Taxes, and the Anxiety of Cuban People to Be Annexed to the 
 United States — The Desperado Orders by Gomez before Weyler Came to Cuba. . 229-243: 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 The Declaration of War — The President's Call upon Congress to Take Action — Fit and 
 Few Words — The Constant Scramble in Congress for the Cuban Ghost-JDance Govern- 
 ment — The Official Text of the President's War Proclamations — The Navy Had First 
 to Take Command of the Seas — The Timely Dispatches from the Navy Department — 
 Making Ready for War — Major-General Miles and His 50,000 Cubans .... 244-274; 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY TOLD BY THOSE WHO WON IT. 
 
 The Battle of Manila Bay — Confidential Information from Madrid, Showing Spanish Con- 
 fidence in Their Navy — Rapid Exchange of Cables between Dewey and Long — 
 Energetic Inquiry in the .Navy Department — Everything Rushed from the Start — 
 
38 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Dewey's Masterly Movements and Immortal Victory — The Official Reports Full of 
 Stories of the Battle That Will Be News to the People— Details of Uncommon Value 
 — Spanish Official Report Exceedingly Interesting — ^Admiral Montejo was not Sur- 
 prised, but Fired First — The Celebrated Breakfast Caused by a False Alarm , 277-308 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 AFTER THE MAY-DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 
 
 Dewey's Cables During the Time He Held the Harbor with the City of Manila under His 
 Guns — Dispatches Full of History and Rich in Personal Characteristics — Authentic 
 Information from the Inside — The Official Story — Dewey's Unfavorable Opinion of ' 
 Cubans — Capture of the City — Trouble with Agninaldo — Our Ships and Crews . 309-328 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON. 
 
 The People Instructed for the Army by the Experience of the Navy — The Run from 
 Washington State to Florida — Splendid Spirit of the Men — The Fearful Storm in the 
 Straits of Magellan — The Threat of Destroying a Spanish Torpedo Boat at Rio — The 
 Finish Alone and in Good Form, and Famous the World Over 329-338 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 
 
 Putting the Army into the Combat — The Plans of Campaign — The Proposed Waiting and 
 Equipping Policy of the Major-General Commanding — His Strange Confidence in the 
 Cuban Story of an Army of 50,000 Rebels to Help Us — Reasons Why We CQuld Not 
 Wait Six Months after Declaring War before Striking Decisively with the Army 341-352 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR. 
 
 Activity in the War Department before the Declaration of War— The Precautionary Policy 
 of the Major-General Commanding— Differences of Opinion in High Places about an 
 Early Invasion of Cuba— Importance of Healthful Camps— The Dangers of Water 
 Supplies— The Inside History of a Troubled Time-Shafter's Sagacity as to the 
 Importance of a First Engagement-TheDemandforaCompetent Army Enforced. 353-367 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 THE PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 
 
 Admiral Cervera Sailed into the Unknown, and Became a Mystery and a Menacf>_H^ 
 Appeared and Disappeared, and Was at Last Found at Santiacm h,. r„ a 
 Schley-lmperative Demands for Information Answerfd-S Sirs of Generll 
 Shifter and Plans of General Miles-Dramatic Scenes at Tampa-- Was he Gr.« 
 Fleet Was Sailing Another Spanish Hoodoo Fleet Was Announced-^ Ster ai'' 
 Prosperous Voyage and Easy Landing ' 
 
 368-383 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 39 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 THE SHARP STRAIN OF THE STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 General Miles as a Loyal Soldier — Shafter's Fine Voyage and Safe Landing — The First 
 Blood in Battle — Rush of Supplies and Reinforcements to the Army — Alger Wants 
 Shafter to "Get a Good Ready"— Why Siege Guns Were Not Unloaded— Work Cut 
 Out for the Regulars — Parallel with the British Siege of Havana — The Sword Had to 
 Be Swift to Save from Pestilence 384-399 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 
 
 The Supreme Test of American Valor — The Thin but Steady Regular Line, and the 
 Essential Assistance by the Foremost Volunteers — The Whole Story from the First 
 Skirmish to the Last Assault Told in War Office Dispatches far More Interesting 
 than the Formal Reports of the Of&cers and More Sensational than the Lurid Chap- 
 ters in the Journals — Their Publication an Admirable Example of the Candor of the 
 Authorities — An All-Night Watch for News at the White House — Shafter's Memor- 
 able Third and Fourth of July 400-416 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 THE STRANGE STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER OF SPAIN. 
 
 The Cables That Passed Between Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares During 
 the Crisis of the Spanish War in Cuba — A Diary Telegraphed from Santiago to 
 Havana, Giving the Inside of Spanish Affairs from the Attack to the Surrender — Cer- 
 vera Not Well Fitted Out, Forced to Flight, Protesting that He Was Going to Destruc- 
 tion — The Cables Are a Gallery of Paintings of Spanish Character .... 417-453 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 THE SANTIAGO SITUATION AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 
 
 Cipher Dispatches — Too Much Publicity — Shafter Demands the Help of the Navy, and is 
 Supported by the War Department — He Heard Firing at Midnight and Hoped it Was 
 Sampson — Garcia's Men Who Were Always Going to Do Something To-mprrow — 
 "Terrible Fight" July ist — Reinforcements, Lighters and Tugs Wanted — An Ener- 
 getic Rush to Aid Shafter, but Not by the Navy — Cable Direct to Corbin — The 
 Yellow Fever Appears — Preliminaries to the Capitulation — The President Sticks to It 
 that Spaniards Must Unconditionally Surrender — Fortunate Arrival of Miles in the 
 Blue Rams 454-473 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 THE LESSON FOR THE COUNTRY OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 Value of the Reports of the Inspector-General — His Keen Suggestions and Brilliant 
 Sketches with Expert Information — Tribute of Breckenridge to Shafter — The Volun- 
 teers in Camps — Chickamauga as an lUustiation — The Location of the Wrongs That 
 the Soldiers Suffered Unduly — We Must Build Regiments as We Do Battleships — ^The 
 Fault cf Poor Preparation Not Personal — Let Congress for the Country Mend It 474-491 
 
40 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 The Cape Verde Squadron Smashed, Burned and Sunk, and Admiral Sampson Makes a 
 Present of the Wrecks to the Nation — The Reports of the Admiral and Commodore 
 Schley — Their Difference in Opinions, Methods and Manners — Intensely Interesting 
 Extracts from Reports by Captains and Executive Officers — A Series of Stifling 
 Pictures — ^Admiral Cervera's Official Lamentation — Extracts from the Spanish Diary 
 of Uncommon Value — The Story of Fugitives from the Fleet Who Found Their Way 
 to the Spanish Trenches — Admiral Omits to Improve Opportunity of His Life. . 492-520 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 THE SCENES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 The Appearance of General Miles at Santiago — His Moral as well as Military Force — 
 Spanish Obstinacy in the Negotiation for Capitulation — The Iron Hand at Washing- 
 ton — The Practical Question Was How Much Would Victory Cost Us? — The Spanish 
 Case Was Hopeless — They Sought to Save their Military Honor — The Scenes and 
 Terms of the Surrender — An Inspector-General's Picturesque Story — Telegrams That 
 are Photographs — The President's Proclamation of Principles and Purpose in Cuban 
 Government — Comparative Proportions of Great Surrenders " 523-543 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 THE JOINT WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 
 
 The Reasons Why Admiral Dewey Remained After Destroying the Spanish Fleet — Why 
 There Was Not a Slaughter at Manila Like That at Santiago — The Old Fort That 
 Was the Key of the City — The American Army Drove the Spaniards and Dusted the 
 Insurgents Out of the Way— A Very Neat Job — We Did Not Make War on the Span- 
 iards for the Sake of the Tagalos . . 544-567 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 
 
 The Preliminary Plans and Movements of General Miles— Sharp but Courteous Corre- 
 spondence with General Shaffer, Closing Cuban Experiences— Place of Landing in 
 Porto Rico Changed at Sea— The Progress of the Campaign Closed by the Peace 
 News— The Constant and Conclusive Success of the American Arms— Some of the 
 Cablegrams that Passed that Remain of Interest ^eS-svS 
 
 CHAPTER XXVL 
 
 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 
 
 The Casualties at Santiago-Haste to Ship the Spaniards to Spain and the Americans 
 North-The Parting of the Armies That Met in Bloody Strife-Shafter's Opinion of 
 Immunes-A Curious Proclamation from Spanish Soldiers-23,726 Spanish Soldiers- 
 
 . ,r , ^ ^ — . r-""" ""i^icis- i!3,72o opanisn fcjoldiers 
 Surrendered— American Volunteers Begging to be Hurried to the Front While the 
 War Lasted, and When It Was Over They Wanted to Go Home cgi 
 
 599 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 4i 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 THE PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 The Marvelous Improvement of the Artillery on Our Ships of War — The Splendid Equip- 
 ment of the Several Vessels — Full Particulars of the Armament of All Our Ships— ^ 
 Vigilance of the Ordnance Bureau to Continue Progress — The Thirteen-Ihch Guns to 
 Be Superseded in the New Navy by Twelve-Inch — Important Recommendations — The 
 Way the Navy Was Prepared to Win — Plans for Continued Progress — The .Spanish 
 Side as Seen and Described by One of Her Officers — Hopes and Happenings in 
 Bombarded Santiago — Service of Cervera's Fleet — ^Mystery of the Merrimac-^Earth 
 quake-Throwing Vesuvius — German Opinion — Work of the Marines .... 600-629 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Its Organization and Numbers Before and During the War — Strejigth and Location of 
 the Several Army Corps — The Distribution of the Military Forces and Their Numbers 
 — Casualties During the War, in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines — Deaths in the 
 Camps — ^The Incidents of Hardship and the Yellow Scandals — Spanish Account of the 
 Valor of Their Troops and Story of the Conflict — Scarcity of Provisions— Cruel 
 Battles of El Caney and San Juan — Suffering in Santiago '630-657 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 THE INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES IN ARMS. 
 
 Our Relations With and Responsibilities for Them — The Cuban Soldiers Found on the 
 Pay Roll— A Military Service of Importance and the Only One Performed by 
 Armed Cubans in Our War — The Spanish Account of It — Cubans Kept 3,500 of the 
 Best Toops of Spain Away from El Caney — Testimony Taken at Paris by the Ameri- 
 can Commission of the True Character of the Philippines — General Merritt, General 
 Greene and Major Bell State the Facts . . 658-667 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 The Official Terms in Which the Spaniards Sued for Peace and Accepted the Demands 
 of the Peace Protocol of August 12 — "The Demand Strips Us of the Very Last 
 Memory of a Glorious Past" — The Treaty Commissioners That Met in Paris — Official 
 Text of the Treaty of Peace of December 10 — The Spaniards Contend That the 
 Philippine Insurgents Constantly Change the Status Quo and tliat the Americans 
 Must Stop Them — Contention that the Transfer of Sovereignty Meant Transfer of 
 Debts — Protracted Debate Over the Cuban Obligations — Claim the Capture of Manila 
 Was Not Lawful — Insinuation that General Merritt Had Heard of the Protocol Before 
 Storming the Town — Spaniards Able and Adroit — Americans Firm but Courteous 
 — The Official History of the Preparation of the Peace Protocol— The Part Taken by 
 the President— His Strong Hand Felt in Paris . . 668-731 
 
42 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 REVIEW OF THE WAR AND THE COMMISSION ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 
 Importance of a. Day Lost or Gained — The Protocol Was the Treaty — Military Com- ' 
 missions to Arrange the Spanish Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico — Appearance of 
 the Cuban Army — Narrow Margins on Which the War Was Ended so Speedily — 
 Inspiration of Dewey's Victory — Energy in Following It Up — Outbreak of Criticism 
 on the Conduct of the War as Soon as It Was Over — The Commission of Investigation 
 Appointed by the President — Extraordinary Interest in the Action of the Commission 
 and Its Authoritative Report — Weaknesses in Systems and Persons Not Spared — 
 Origin and Extent of the Canned Meat Controversy — Fault Found in High Places 
 — The Army, Regular or Volunteer, of and for the People 732-751 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 
 
 The Spanish Peninsula Too Narrow to Sustain the Crown System Over Continental 
 Colonies — ^The Loss of Her Archipelagoes Has Been the Logic of Her Experiences — 
 Comparative Expansion of England and the United States — Our Magnificent Growth 
 Across the Continent the Greatest of National Triumphs — Our Arms Around the World 
 — Our Bugle Call and British Drum-Beats Following the Course of the Sun — The 
 Whispering Wires that Unite the Nations — The Malay Revolt Against Liberty for 
 Tyranny — The Ghastly Demagogy that Meddles with the Army — Pleasing Prospects 
 of Our Possessions Except the Philippines — The Aguinaldo Conspiracy and Tagalo 
 War — The Motives and Malice of It — American Arms Without Stain — Our Soldiers 
 Without Reproach 752-764 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Frontispiece — Government Building at Washington, Occupied by the State, War, and 
 Navy Departments. 
 
 I — President McKinley and His Cabinet 17 
 
 2 — Murat Halstead, the Author 18 
 
 3— General Nelson A. Miles, Commander of the United States Army..'. 35 
 
 4 — The "Iowa," in Command of Fighting Bob Evans 36 
 
 5 — Queen Regent and Boy King of Spain 45 
 
 6 — Stewart L. Woodford, Minister to Spain When War Was Declared 46 
 
 7 — Tablet Commemorating the Execution of the "Virginius" Prisoners. One of the 
 
 Early Causes of the War with Spain 63 
 
 8 — Admiral Dewey under the "Olympia's" Big Guns 64 
 
 9 — ^Admiral Dewey and Staff on the "Olympia" 64 
 
 10 — The Cathedral at Santiago 8r 
 
 II — Kiosk in Main Plaza at Ponce, Porto Rico 82: 
 
 12 — The Captain-General's Palace in Havana gg 
 
 13 — The Plaza in Ponce, Porto Rico 100- 
 
 14 — ^Artillery Wagon Park, Porto Rico 100 
 
 15 — Church and Palms in Juana, Porto Rico loo- 
 
 16 — Captain Bethel and General Ernst Reconnoitering in Porto Rico 100 
 
 17 — The Military Hospital in Ponce, Porto Rico 105 
 
 i8r-Battery B, Fourth Artillery, in Action in Porto Rico 106 
 
 ig — Fire Department Building, Ponce, Porto Rico 106 
 
 20 — On the Picket Line in Porto Rico. 106 
 
 43 
 
44 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 21 — Catholic Church in Ponce, Porto Rico io6 
 
 22 — Leading Cuban Generals Who Comrrianded Insurgent Forces in Cuba 115 
 
 23 — Military Telegraph Office and Barracks at Ponce, Porto Rico u6 
 
 24 — Fortifications of San Juan, Porto Rico 121 
 
 25 — The Quay, San Juan, Porto Rico 122 
 
 26 — General Blanco, Who Commanded Spanish Forces in Cuba 139 
 
 27 — La Perla Theatre in Ponce, Porto Rico 140 
 
 28 — A Picket Squad of Cuban Soldiers 145. 
 
 29 — General Castellio and Staff 145 
 
 30 — Plaza in Santiago, Cuba 146 
 
 31 — Group of Native Women in Ponce, Porto Rico 146 
 
 32 — Battery F of the Fifth Artillery 155 
 
 33 — A Dwelling in Santiago 155 
 
 34 — Effect of Torpedo Explosion in "Vizcaya" 155 
 
 35 — 5.5-inch Gun and Cartridge on "Vizcaya" 155 
 
 .36 — The Major, His Adjptant, Orderly, and Wife 156 
 
 37 — Partial View of Arsenal, Facing the Bacoor, in Cavite, Philippines 156 
 
 38 — Cuadrilleros, or Rural Guards, in the PhiUppines 161 
 
 39 — The Princess Promenade, San Juan, Porto Rico 162 
 
 40 — City of San Juan, Porto Rico : i^g 
 
 41 — Street of the Cross, San Juan, Porto Rico 180 
 
 42 — Market Women of Porto Rico igc 
 
 43 — A Porto Rico Country House i85 
 
 44— Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, Consul at Havana When War Was Declared 195 
 
 45 — The Sea Wall of San Juan, Porto Rico jn6 
 
 46 — Horses Loaded with Maloja, in Matanzas, Cuba 201 
 
 47 — The Yumuri River at Matanzas, Cuba 202 
 
 48— The United States Battleship "Maine" 210 
 
 49— Captain Sigsbee, Who Commanded the lU-Fated "Maine" 220 
 
 50— Funeral of the Victims of the "Maine" Disaster 225 
 
 51— The Court of Inquiry into the Fate of the "Maine," in Session 226 
 
 52— Quarter-Deck of the U. S. S. "Brooklyn" 
 
 53— Fire-room of the U. S. S. "Brooklyn" 216 
 
 54 — A Fruit Vendor in Havana 
 
 241 
 
 55— Twelve-Inch Breech-Loading Mortars, Weight 28,980 Pounds Each 242 
 
'^J 
 
 
 " ir> 
 
 -^£'^;:'in0^^'^' 
 
 -«./-^ 
 
 /- 
 
 ^ '^ 
 
 
 I S 
 
 QUEEN' REGENT iND BOY KING OF SPAIN. 
 
STEWART L. WOODFORD, MINISTER TO SPAIN WHEN WAR WAS DECLARED. 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 47 
 
 PAGE 
 
 56— The Flying Squadron '. 259 
 
 57 — Admiral Dewey as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, United States Navy 260 
 
 58— Guns Used by United States Infantry, Breech Closed 265 
 
 59 — Guns Used by United States Infantry, Breech Open 265 
 
 60 — United States Light Artillery at Port Tampa 266 
 
 61 — Artillery Practice at Port Tampa 266 
 
 62 — Deck View of the U. S. S. "Indiana" 275 
 
 63 — Regiment in Heavy Marching Order at Camp Alger 276 
 
 64 — Admiral Dewey's Fleet That Won the May-day Victory in Manila Bay 2S1 
 
 65 — Admiral Dewey, the Hero of Manila 282 
 
 66— Admiral Montijo, Commander of the Fleet That Admiral Dewey Sunk 299 
 
 67 — Views of the Navy Yard at Cavite, Philippines 300 
 
 6S — The Arena, Constructed of Bamboo, in Which Bull Fights Are Given at Manila 305 
 
 69 — Views in and around Manila : 306 
 
 70— Views in the Philippines, Mostly in and around Manila 315 
 
 71 — Views from the Philippines 316 
 
 72 — Native Method of Plowing — Scene in the Pi-ovince of Batangas, Philippines 321 
 
 73 — A Country Marriage in the Philippines 322 
 
 74 — Captain Clark, of the "Oregon," in His Office 339 
 
 75 — The "Oregon," the Bulldog of the Navy 340 
 
 76 — Transport "Newport," of the Philippine Expedition, Leaving San Francisco 345 
 
 77 — Regiment Breaking Camp at Camp Alger 346 
 
 78 — United States Volunteer in Full Marching Order 355 
 
 79 — Model of Guns Used on Aft Decks 356 
 
 80 — Ten-Inch Disappearing Gun Carriage, Model of 1896, Buffington-Crozier System 356 
 
 81 — Daiquiri, Where Our Troops Landed in Cuba 361 
 
 82 — The Beach at Daiquiri 361 
 
 83 — The Pier at Daiquiri 361 
 
 84 — A Part of Daiquiri. Cuba 361 
 
 85 — The Way Milk Is Sold and Delivered in Havana 362 
 
 86 — Chart Showing Daily Positions of the American Fleet in the Campaign Against the 
 
 Spanish Squadron in Cuban Waters 379 
 
 87 — Daily Positions of the Spanish Squadron in Cuban Waters, Under Admiral Cervera.... 380 
 88 — Third Light Artillery Going into Camp, on Their Way to the Front, Six Miles from 
 
 Siboney 385 
 
48 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 89 — General Hawkins, Who Led the Famous Charge of the First Brigade at San Juan, 
 
 July ist, 1898 386 
 
 90 — Capron's Battery in Action in Their Position in General Lawton's Division 395 
 
 91 — Wounded on their Way to Dressing Place at the Battle of San Juan 396 
 
 92 — Artillery Men Trying to Locate the Enemy's Batteries While under Fire 401 
 
 93 — General Wheeler and General Sumner in the Latter's Headquarters before Santiago 402 
 
 94 — The Church at El Caney 419 
 
 95 — Scene in a Field Hospital after the Battle of San Juan 420 
 
 96 — Bombproofs Thrown Up by Rough Riders to Protect Them from Spanish Shell and 
 
 Shrapnel 425 
 
 97 — Colonel Roosevelt's Men Cooking Their First Dinner at Daiquiri ; Fried Bacon and 
 
 Hard Tack the Menu 426 
 
 gS — Grave of Captain Wetherell, Who Fell in the Famous Charge of San Juan Hill 435 
 
 99 — "Oquendo," Starboard Side, Showing Exit of Thirteen-Inch Shell 436 
 
 100 — "Oquendo," Starboard Side, as Abandoned 436 
 
 loi — Views of the Notorious Prison at Santiago 441 
 
 102 — Cast Iron Projectiles Used in the Navy 442 
 
 103— Petty Officers of the U. S. S. "New York" 443 
 
 104 — Stone Fort at El Caney. Effect of Cannonading 459 
 
 105 — Snap Shot of General Shafter in the Field 460 
 
 106 — American Troops in Santiago. Relief of the Guard 465 
 
 107 — Scene on the Wharf at Santiago de Cuba 466 
 
 108 — Crushing-Mill on a Sugar Plantation in Cuba 475 
 
 109 — Valley of the Yumuri River, Cuba 4^(5 
 
 no — A Group of Spanish Prisoners before Santiago 481 
 
 III — Col. John Jacob Astor, of Astor Battery Fame, near Spanish Trenches ; 482 
 
 112 — The Naval Heroes of Santiago 400 
 
 113— Wreck of "Reina Mercedes," and Estrella Battery, Santiago.... 500 
 
 114— Admiral Cervera, Who Commanded the lU-Fated Spanish Fleet at Santiago 505 
 
 113 — Side of the "Cristobal Colon" after the Battle 506 
 
 116 — Bow of the "Vizcaya." After the Santiago Battle 515 
 
 117— Forecastle of the "Oquendo"; Showing Sinking of Spar Deck 516 
 
 118— "Vizcaya," after the Santiago Battle, Showing.the Results of American Gunners' 
 
 Marksmanship ,21 
 
 119— "Cristobal Colon" as Finally Abandoned 522 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 49 
 
 PAGE 
 
 120 — Santiago de Cuba, North Half, as Seen from the Baj- 539 
 
 121 — Entrance to Harbor at Santiago de Cuba; "Merrimac" Shown in the Foreground 540 
 
 122 — Generals Miles and Shatter on Board Headquarters Boat "Seguranca" 545 
 
 123 — Tree Under Which Surrender of Spanish Forces at Santiago Was Made 546 
 
 124 — Major-General Thomas M. Anderson and Staff, in Command of First Division, 
 
 Eighth Army Corps, at Manila 555 
 
 125 — Rift in the Jungles that Line the Coast of the Philippines 556 
 
 126 — Roadway in Botanical Gardens, Manila 556 
 
 127 — The Road to the Cemetery in Tansa, Province of Iloilo 561 
 
 128 — Landscape View Showing Beauty and Luxuriance of Vegetation in the Philippines... 562 
 
 129 — United States Transports in the Harbor of Ponce, Porto Rico 579 
 
 130 — The Citadel at Ponce, Porto Rico 580 
 
 131 — A Corner in the Market of Santiago, Cuba 585 
 
 132 — Head of Pack Train Leaving San Luis for Manzanillo 586 
 
 133 — Sugar Mill. Scene of the San Luis Riot November 4, 1S98 595 
 
 134 — Soldiers in Insurgent Army of Cuba 505 
 
 135 — The Palace of Santiago, Cuba , 5g6 
 
 136 — Effect of Eight-Inch Shell through Port Head of "Vizcaya" 601 
 
 137 — Starboard Side of "Vizcaya. " After the Battle 601 
 
 138 — A Cuban Plowman 602 
 
 139 — Sword Ordered by Congress to be Given Admiral Dewej- as a Token of the Nation's 
 
 Gratitude 619 
 
 140 — Bust of Columbus, Found on "Cristobal Colon." Now in War Department at 
 
 Washington 620 
 
 1 4 1 — Department Headquarters of United States Army at Santiago 63 7 
 
 142 — General W. F. Randolph 5^8 
 
 143 — Bob Wrenn and Billy Larned gjg 
 
 144 — Train of Pack Mules 5,g 
 
 145 — Sergeant Dan Hewitt, Hero of Caloocan 5,3 
 
 146 — View Inside of the Trenches grj 
 
 147 — Camp at Port Tampa 55, 
 
 148 — Headquarters in the Field gc, 
 
 149 — View of the Trenches gee 
 
 150 — Loading Pack Mules g-g 
 
 151 — A Cuban Villa g.g 
 
so LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 152 — Placing Guns into Position 656 
 
 153 — Members of the Ninth Cavalry, Colored 656 
 
 154— The Battlefield of San Juan, July 2, 1898 673 
 
 155 — "Maria Teresa," Showing Hole in 5.5-Inch Gun Shield, Inner View 674 
 
 156 — The American Peace Commissioners 681 
 
 157 — The Spanish Peace Commissioners 684 
 
 158 — "To George Dewey, with the Compliments of the President, Congress and the People 
 
 of the United States" 691 
 
 159 — Major-General Thomas M. Anderson, Commander of First Division, Eighth Army 
 
 Corps, at Manila 692 
 
 160 — General E. S. Otis and Staff on Porch, Malacanan Palace, Manila 709 
 
 161 — Malacanan Palace and Pasig River, Manila 710 
 
 162 — General Otis and Staff in Dining Room of Malacanan Palace, Manila 710 
 
 163 — Signatures of American and Spanish Peace Commissioners to Treaty of Peace 727 
 
 164 — Last Joint Session of American and Spanish Peace Commissioners at Paris 728 
 
MAPS, CHARTS AND PLANS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I — Map of Santiago and Vicinity, Showing Intrenchments and Positions of the Fifth 
 
 Army Corps, U. S. Army, and Those of the Spanish 403 
 
 2 — Plan Showing Position of Both Armies before Santiago, July 3, 1898 408 
 
 3 — OfiScial Diagram Showing Plan of Naval Battle off Santiago, July 3, 1898 493 
 
 4 — Official Sketch Showing External Injuries Sustained by the "Brooklyn" at Santiago, 
 
 July 3, 1898 495 
 
 5 — Official Sketch Showing External Injuries Sustained by the "Iowa" at Santiago, 
 
 July 3, 1898 495 
 
 6 — Official Diagpram Showing Where the Spanish Vessels Were Abandoned off Santiago, 
 
 July 3, iSg8 497 
 
 7 — Official Sketch Showing Damage Done to Chain Locker by a Spanish Shell, July 3, 
 
 1898 501 
 
 B — Official Plan of "Vizcaya," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Probable Size 
 
 of Projectiles 503 
 
 9 — Official Plan of "Oquendo," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Probable Size 
 
 of Projectiles 503 
 
 10 — Official Plan of "Maria Teresa," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Probable 
 
 Size of Projectiles 507 
 
 II — Official Plan of "Cristobal Colon," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Prob- 
 able Size of Projectiles 507 
 
 12 — Plan Showing Stations of American Fleet at Santiago before the Battle, July 3 518 
 
 13 — Official Map Showing Plan of American and Spanish Trenches before Manila in 
 
 August, i8g8 557 
 
 51 
 
52 MAPS, CHARTS AND PLANS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 14 — Official Map Showing Country South of the Pasig River and West of the Paranaque 
 River, in Which the Military Operations before Manila Were Conducted in August, 
 
 1898 : : 559 
 
 15 — Official Sketch Showing Positions of First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Corps, in 
 
 Operations against Manila, August, 1898 563 
 
 16 — Map of Porto Rico, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys 765 
 
 17 — ^Map of Cuba, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys 767 
 
 18 — Map of Hawaii, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys 769 
 
 19 — Map of the Philippine Islands, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys 771 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Origin of the War Between the United States and Spain. 
 
 American Good Will for Spain — The Situation in 1869 — The Sickles and Prim Negotiation — 
 Prim Willing to Sell Cuba — "The Honor of Spain"— Diplomatic Papers that Should be 
 Studied — Spain Sends an Army to Cuba — The Valmaseda Proclamation — The Wrongs ot 
 Cuba — We Must Find the Real People of Cuba. 
 
 More than four centuries after the discovery of the West Indies by Chris- 
 topher Columbus, there was in the celebration of that event in the vanished 
 yet memorable White City at Chicago, a revelation to the nations and 
 people accustomed to regard us as a mass of material rudely fashioned, of the 
 advance of American art and the accomplishments of our higher civilization. 
 There was also manifest, to the students of the progress of mankind, a tre- 
 mendous force of public opinion, and an augmented excellence in character 
 and fervor of expression, of a distinctive national character, clean cut and 
 glowing with public pride and patriotism. One of the features of the celebra- 
 tion was the kindly popular sentiment respecting Spain, and a regard for the 
 people of the peninsula of Europe that enters the Atlantic. One of the 
 treasured and consecrated figures shining in our traditions was Isabella, the 
 friend of Columbus (who offered to pledge her jewels that he might sail west- 
 ward and expand the area of cultivation and Christianity) — Columbus, the 
 first of our heroes, not a Spaniard, but one who gave Spain a new world and 
 his ashes, whose incomparable discoveries became august through the ages by 
 the" misfortunes that closed his illustrious life in gloom. The pen of Wash- 
 ingfton Irving made the Alhambra dear to Americans; and in the mellow 
 splendor of his pages the ancient romantic traditions and tragic histories of 
 the land of Cervantes were enriched in a golden atmosphere like that of the 
 
 53 
 
54 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 
 masterpieces of Murillo. The descendants of Columbus, coming by way of 
 Havana; the Princess of the royal reigning house of Spain; and the chosen 
 ships of her navy, were welcomed to our shores, homes and harbors, and 
 entertained with a superb hospitality, so profuse that the fault of its pomp 
 was forgiven on account of its sincerity. Almost forgotten were the stories of 
 Spain's cruelties; nearly effaced from American soil the crimson of her foot- 
 Steps. The olden grandeur of Spain was for the youth of our country a 
 fascinating story, half history, half romance. So far as we knew how far we 
 were misjudged by Spain, our resentment was softened by remembrance of 
 her fallen fortunes, and compassion for austere vanity and solemn conceit that 
 was content with ignorance. We were even hopeful of Spanish Republican- 
 ism. There was something that Whittier sang, ' ' The north wind told to the 
 pines, the wild duck to the sea. " It was that the Lord was showing signs the 
 slaves should sometime be free. There were many signs that the day was 
 soon coming that Cuba should be free, and few Americans have ever doubted 
 that the freedom of Cuba meant she was to be under the wing of the Great 
 Republic of the North. This was written when the island first grew green in 
 the summer seas, and the Americas emerged from chaos. This was not a 
 secret held in the mind of Spain, though an arrow piercing the Spanish heart. 
 Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, whose grandson fell foremost in the 
 charge of the Rough Riders at Santiago, wrote July 29,- 1869, to General 
 Sickles at Madrid in terms that equally well described that time and the situa- 
 /• tion in 1897. The official synopsis of the State papers describes the communi- 
 cation of Mr. Fish in these terms: "The insurrection of Cuba is causing 
 great devastation, and will result, if continued, in the destruction of the 
 productive capacity of the island. Reasons why the United States have a 
 peculiar interest in the fortunes and prosperity of the island. Contest one for 
 self-government and freedom. Self-government for every part of the Ameri- 
 can hemisphere and freedom from transatlantic rule a growing .sentiment in 
 the United States. This has been recognized by other powers. Spain may, 
 with honor, recognize it and treat for the surrender of her rights in Cuba. " 
 
 Marshal Prim's reply on behalf of Spain was that he recognized the 
 inevitable termination of colonial relations in America, but Spain could not 
 be reconciled to that till hostilities ceased. General Sickles replied that Spain 
 was not asked to treat with insurgents, but with a friendly power and old 
 ally. Prim responded that the United States might be assured of the good 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. (Q 
 
 faith of Spain, but that the insurrection had not assumed proportions that 
 could require a government to treat during hostilities. The insurgents held 
 no port or ships, and had no army that offered or accepted battle. The 
 language o£ Mr. Fish in writing to Mr. Sickles at this juncture was: "It cam 
 no longer be a question of national dignity, nor can the proper pride or the 
 just susceptibilities of a great power refuse to consider the question of a 
 voluntary severance of past relations between itself and distant possessions. 
 Spain herself was one of the first of the great European powers to cede volun- 
 tarily its distant colonial possessions, for she transferred Louisiana to France 
 and subsequently ceded Florida to the United States. ' ', 
 
 The Secretary proceeded: "The strife still continues in Cuba. It has 
 already marked its track by devastation and ruin — towns sacked, houses 
 burned, plantations destroyed, and lives lost. On either side the war has 
 been one of desolation, and, if continued, must result in the entire destruction 
 of a large part of the productive capacity of the island as well as of an 
 immense amount of property and of human life. 
 
 "It is not impossible that the Cubans may be conquered, if Spain devotes 
 her whole energies to the work; but they can never again be contented, 
 happy, faithful, or quiet subjects of that power. Assuming that Spain may 
 eventually subdue the present insurrection, she will find herself in possession 
 of a devastated and ruined territory, inhabited by a discontented people. 
 The enlightened statesmen of Spain cannot fail to appreciate that the feelings 
 and the affections of the entire native population of the island are not only 
 estranged, but they are deeply hostile to the continuance of Spanish rule. 
 Nor can they fail to recognize the advancing growth of that sentiment which 
 claims for every part of the American hemisphere the right of self-govern- 
 ment and freedom from transatlantic dependence. 
 
 ' ' England, botmd as she has been to the traditions of thp past, tenacious 
 as she has been of her possessions, and conservative of all her rights and 
 interests, has recognized the force of this feeling, and has anticipated events 
 by granting self-government to her North American provinces. Denmark, 
 approving the policy of the separation of colonies from the parent state, ib 
 endeavoring to part with her insular possessions." 
 
 The example of Russia in selling Alaska was pertinently quoted. 
 
 In a striking picture of recent conditions the fate of Porto Rico was fore- 
 shadowed by Secretary Fish June 29, 1869: "The same causes which have 
 
56 THE ORIGIN OP THE WAR. 
 
 produced the present convulsion in Cuba exist latent in Porto Rico, and may 
 be fanned into flames hereafter should free government and a system of free 
 labor be brought in immediate contact with that island by establishing them 
 in Cuba. Q.t is not improbable, therefore, that the cabinet of Madrid may 
 think it wise to determine the political condition of both islands at the same 
 time." 
 
 There is close correspondence between the situations of 1869 and of 1897 
 in the relations of the United States and Spain, respecting the final disposition 
 of the Cuban question. The ten years of civil war in Cuba had been in prog- 
 ress one year when Secretary Fish sent a special observer and negotiator to 
 Madrid and wrote Minister Sickles to propose to the Spanish government the 
 purchase of Cuba, which was not, it should be well remarked, received as 
 intolerable insolence, but as a business affair to be given the most considerate 
 attention. The Spanish executive authorities were cautious and sensitive, 
 but consoled by the customary diplomatic flatteries, and after shrinking from 
 the attitude of expectant but favorable attention, resumed the use of tentative 
 phrases, suggesting additional offers of compensation, always saying much of 
 the essential requirements of the dignity and honor that must be at all 
 hazards maintained. Marshal Prim, after stating that Spain had lost Cuba 
 practically, and desiring to know how much would be paid for the relinquish- 
 ment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rico, discovered and 
 declared that his colleagues were less inclined than himself to entertain that 
 form of flnding a solution of the making of peace in Cuba by the abandonment 
 of the island. The Spanish statesman knew that Minister Sickles had been a 
 factor in the Ostend Conference, and intimately associated with the influences 
 that made James Buchanan President of the United States, and that it 
 could hardly be accidental Sickles had been chosen Minister of the United 
 States to Spain, by President Grant, who looked to intervention and the 
 annexation of Cuba, and whose military prestige had so considerably been 
 manifested in our international affairs. Two telegrams from General Sickles 
 to Secretary Fish signify too much' to allow omission : 
 
 "August I, 1869.— Communicated to Prim informally basis of convention. 
 He pressed me to say how much Cuba and Porto Rico would give. I said I 
 had no instructions, and suggested one hundred and twenty-five millions as 
 probable. Prim said Spain might arrange preliminaries with United States 
 and concede autonomy of Cuba and Porto Rico for satisfactory equivalent as 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 57 
 
 soon as hostilities ceased. He promised to bring the whole subject before the 
 council to-night. " 
 
 "August 6, 1869. — Prim says sudden illness of Secretary of State has 
 delayed reply." 
 
 In conversation with Senor Silvela, a few days after the delay on account 
 of the sudden illness of the Secretary of State, Senor Silvela said to Minister 
 Sickles: "The liberal party in Spain finds itself, to its own infinite regret, 
 forced into a seeming sympathy with the reactionary party in Cuba ; and the 
 liberals of Cuba, who ought to be its firm friends, are converted, by the 
 fatality of the situation, into its bitterest enemies. There is no sentiment 
 dearer to the hearts of the liberal leaders than that of freedom to all men ; yet 
 they stand before the world, in this Cuban conflict, as opposed to self-govern- 
 ment and resisting the abolition of slavery. ' ' He considered the insurrection 
 as a most deplorable misforttme and mistake, both for Cuba and for Spain, 
 saying: 
 
 "If a way could be found to settle all these questions in such a manner as 
 to do justice to Cuba, without infringing upon the honor of Spain, the govern- 
 ment would be greatly gratified. There is no intention or desire among the 
 liberals of Spain ever again to work (exploiter) the island of Cuba on the old 
 selfish system. It has been their constant hope and wish to grant to the 
 Cubans the administration of their own affairs and the full fruits of their own 
 labor, preserving their commercial connections, and some shadow of their 
 political relations." 
 
 Before the utterance of these somewhat vague but pleasing sentiments, 
 marked with the sonorous cadence of the diplomacy of Spain, with which her 
 decline and fall as a great nation has been accompanied from the beginning 
 of her decadence to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the Minister 
 evaded with the necessary courtesies the line of business conversation in 
 which Marshal Prim had indulged. On the day after the interview of General 
 Sickles with the Minister of State, who had infinite regrets that the posi- 
 tion of the liberal party was so painfully involved with the Cuban insurrection, 
 the Minister General made a "prescribed visit of ceremony" to Marshal Prim, 
 the President of the Council of the Ministers of Spain, and the Marshal, 
 "with much animation and even warmth of manner, protested that Spain 
 would not entertain the suggestion of an armistice with the insurgents, nor 
 consider the question of the independence of Cuba, while the insurgents were 
 
58 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 
 in arms against the government; that Spain would grant a full and complc 
 amnesty as soon as the insurgents laid down their arms ; and that being doi 
 the whole subject would be open for consideration; that he was disposed 
 meet the question frankly and practically; that perhaps he was somewhat 
 advance of the views of his colleagues, but he had no doubt they were unai 
 mous in the hope that the influence of the United States might be successful 
 exerted to relieve the question from the embarrassments which now si 
 rounded it. " He added that, in regard to emancipation, Spain would pref 
 to leave that matter to the Cubans themselves, saying, "That is your glory 
 America, the reward of your philanthropy, and we do not wish to deprive y^ 
 of it." 
 
 The Marshal repelled th,e idea of a conference in Washington, in whi 
 Spain, Cuba and the Cubans should be represented, asserting that Cuba ecu 
 be heard only through the deputies elected to the Cortes, adding that Spa 
 might deal with the United States but not with Cuba. The next day Marsi 
 Prim notified General Sickles that Spain "accepted the good offices of t] 
 United States." This was on impossible conditions, viz., that the Cubi 
 insurgents should lay down their arms, Spain to give amnesty full and coi 
 plete, Cubans by universal suffrage to vote on the question of independenc 
 and if the majority were for it, the Cortes consenting, — Cuba should pay sat: 
 f actorily, guaranteed by the United States, safe conduct through Spanish lin 
 to be given when preliminaries were settled. After the good offices of t 
 United States had been accepted by Marshal Prim, President of the Council 
 Ministers, Senor Silvela, Minister of State, was restored to health, and Ge 
 eral Sickles says: "I expressed my regret that the Spanish government, 1 
 choosing to treat the subject as a purely legal question to be settled by thf 
 own forms of procedure, had apparently closed the door to any arrangeme 
 by which the good offices of the United States could be made immediate 
 effective." 
 
 The reply of the Minister of State was with great animation, and 
 thought the view Minister Sickles took was precisely wrong— for securi: 
 simultaneous disarmament and amnesty was "a great step in advance " a 
 then Mr. Silvela "entered upon a very full analysis of Article io8 of t 
 Spanish Constitution. " The American Minister did not follow upon that, t 
 pointed out that a "practical view should be taken," and something should 
 done speedily, as there would be "complications increasing the difficulties 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 59 
 
 reaching an accommodation." Mr. Silvela referred to "the present temper 
 and spirit of the Spanish people," which would not permit haste. This was 
 doubtless true then, and never novel. 
 
 This is the Section of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy — of the 
 transmarine provinces : 
 
 "Article io8.- — The Cortes Constituyentes shall reform the present sys- 
 tem of government in the transmarine provinces when the deputies of Cuba or 
 Porto Rico shall have taken their seats, in order to extend to the same, with 
 the modifications that shall be deemed necessary, the privileges set forth in 
 the Constitution." 
 
 The memorandum of the conversation between the Spanish Minister of 
 State and Minister Sickles August lo, 1869, was signed by Manuel Silvela and 
 D. E. Sickles, and contained passages reporting the former, whose familiar 
 flavor soon impresses the student of the negotiations that they proceed to "no 
 thoroughfare." We quote them as illustrative of the fine flowing evasions of 
 the literature of Spanish diplomacy: "After the revolution of September had 
 taken place,' and conformably to the principles thereby proclaimed, Spain 
 would already have given all constitutional liberties to Cuba if the unfortu- 
 nate insurrection of Yara and the cry of 'Death to Spain,' uttered by some 
 Cubans, had not alienated the sympathies of the nation and obliged the 
 government to accept the impolitic contest to which it was provoked ; that a 
 good proof of its desire to settle in a liberal sense the question of the Antilles 
 is shown not only by the election of the deputies of Porto Rico, who are to 
 take their seats in the Cortes Constituyentes at their next session, but also by 
 the 108th Article of the Constitution, in which, notwithstanding the period in 
 which it was adopted, it was provided that the concurrence of the deputies of 
 that province is necessary to fix the future form of government of the island. 
 
 "In view of these indisputable facts, and taking account of and appreci- 
 ating the traditional pride of the Spanish people, the government considers that 
 it can come to no definite decision in regard to the political situation and 
 future government of the island of Cuba, until the insurgents lay down their 
 arms and cease the struggle. 
 
 "This being done, the government is disposed to grant a full and gener- 
 ous amnesty to the insurgents, and when quiet is established, to proceed to 
 the freest election of representatives of Cuba. 
 
 "The national dignity being thus preserved intact, and it being practi- 
 
6o THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 
 cable to comply with the article of the Constitution, the moment will have 
 arrived for concerting with its representatives the necessary measures in rela- 
 tion to the legal future of the island of Cuba, submitting them to the indis- 
 pensable approbation of the Constituent Cortes. 
 
 "In conclusion, if the United States, by their natural influence in America, 
 are able to contribute to the cessation of the effusion of blood, in the pacifica- 
 tion of the island of Cuba, and its entrance, by the election of its deputies, 
 into the exercise of its rights, the government of Spain cannot but be grateful 
 for these good offices." 
 
 Secretary Fish, August i6th, telegraphed General Sickles to "urge accept- 
 ance on basis proposed by the United States." These were: 
 
 1. The independence of Cuba to be acknowledged by Spain. 
 
 2. Cuba to pay to Spain a sum, within a time and in a manner to be 
 agreed upon by them, as an equivalent for the entire and definite relinquish- 
 ment by Spain of all her ri|ghts in that island, including the public property of 
 every description. If Cuba should not be able to pay the whole sum at once 
 in cash, the future payments, by installments, are to be adequately secured 
 by a pledge of the export and the import customs duties under an arrange- 
 ment to be agreed upon for their collection, in trust, for the purpose of secur- 
 ing both the principal and interest of those installments imtil their final 
 discharge. 
 
 3. The abolition of slavery in the island of Cuba. 
 
 4. An armistice pending the negotiations for the settlement above 
 referred to. 
 
 Secretary Fish telegraphed that the Spanish proposition that the insur-. 
 gents should lay down their arms as a preliminafy was "incapable of attain- 
 ment," and the ascertainment of the Cubans by a vote "impracticable because 
 of the disorganization of society," and the prevalent terrorism, "the violence 
 and insubordination of volunteers." The will of the majority had been 
 "recognized and admitted." 
 
 On the date of this important dispatch of Secretary Fish (August 16, 
 1869), General Sickles wrote to him at length, marking the dispatch "as confi- 
 dential for obviously prudential reasons." He reported General Prim as 
 saying some of his colleagues did not realize as he did "the difficulty of carry- 
 ing on a war in America," and they had great deference for the popular 
 sentiment in Spain, which would sacrifice blood and money for honor. Mr. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 6i 
 
 Silvela, a lawyer and leader, inclined to a purely legal view, while as for him- 
 self he would say to the Cubans, "Go, if you will; make good the treasure you 
 have cost us, and let me bring home our army and fleet, and consolidate the 
 liberties of Spain." The Marshal, President of the Council, added, with 
 much animation, that the great difficulty in the way was the defiant attitude 
 of the insurgents; that here was the mistake of the United States, in propos- 
 ing an armistice and asking Spain to treat on the basis of independence with 
 insurgents with arms in their hands; and he added, emphatically, "I am sure 
 no human power could obtain from the Spanish people the most insignificant 
 concession as long as the rebellion maintains its footing." 
 
 The reply of General Sickles stated the case with uncommon brevity and 
 force in these words : 
 
 "No one appreciated more highly than the President," and it should be 
 remembered the President was General Grant, "the elevated tone of the Cab- 
 inet of Madrid, and that he would be the last to make an)- proposal derogatory 
 to the honor of Spain ; that in his view a measure, that would stop the indis- 
 criminate sacrifice of life and property in Cuba, pending negotiatiens for 
 ulterior arrangements, was prompted as well by considerations of humanity as 
 of policy; that Great Britain had recognized the independence of the United 
 States simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities, and that if, as I was 
 glad to be assured, the future relations of Cuba to the mother country 
 admitted of adjustment hereafter on the basis of the independence of the 
 colony, then surefy some means might be devised by which, without offense 
 to Spain, the conflict could be arrested pending the negotiations with the 
 United States, a friendly power offering its good offices to promote a settle- 
 ment." To this the General added "with emphasis" that there was a "press- 
 ure of events," and President Grant was embarrassed by the delay, and that 
 "unless Spain was prepared to forego whatever advantage might be gained 
 through the mediation of the United States, prompt action was necessary." 
 General Sickles. concluded this communication, which substantially summarizes 
 the negotiations of this interesting period of our Cuban solicitudes and con- 
 troversies, with this valuable paragraph of personal side-light : 
 
 "Observe the duplex form the negotiation receives in the Spanish 
 Cabinet. The reserve of the Minister of State and the frankness of the 
 President of the Council are in striking contrast. The explanation is to be 
 found as well in the solicitude of the Minister of vState to hold a position 
 
62 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 
 easily defended in the Cortes, if the negotiation fail, as in the characteristics 
 of the men ; one deals with the question as a successful revolutionary leader 
 wielding almost absolute power, the other purely as a jurist and a parliamen- 
 tarian." 
 
 The dispatch of General Sickles to Mr. Fish, dated Madrid, August 20, 
 1869, has unusual historical importance. On that day General Sickles had 
 met General Prim by appointment, who said he was ready to argue upon the 
 basis of an arrangement contemplating the independence of Cuba, but that he 
 could not give to the arrangement the sanctions of a treaty, nor stibmit the 
 propositions to the Cortes for their' ratification while the insurgents were in 
 arms ; he said he had no doubt that whatever might be the result of the con- 
 flict, Cuba would eventually be free; that he recognized with hesitation the 
 manifest course of events on the American Continent and the inevitable 
 termination of all colonial relations in their autonomy as soon as they were 
 prepared for independence; but that no emergency and no consideration 
 would reconcile Spain to such a concession until hostilities ceased. 
 
 The American Minister reminded the President of the Spanish Council 
 "that Austria had transferred Venice to France, and assented to its imme- 
 diate transfer to Italy, before peace was declared; that the independence of all 
 the American States had been recognized at one time and another during the 
 progress of hostilities ; and that in coming to an agreement with the United 
 States on the subject Spain would not treat with the insurgents, but with a 
 friendly power, offering its good offices to an old ally." To these and like 
 amplifications of the argument the President of the Spanish Council replied 
 with great earnestness and emphasis: "Let the United States be assured of 
 the good faith and the good disposition of Spain, and especially of the frank- 
 ness and sincerity with which the President of the Council has promised to 
 treat with the Cabinet at Washington, on the basis of the independence of 
 Cuba, as soon as it is possible to do so consistently with the dignity and honor 
 of Spain; formidable as the insurrection of Cuba may become, it has not yet 
 approached the proportions of any of those conflicts in which governments 
 have found themselves constrained to treat during hostilities. The Cuban 
 insurgents hold no city or fortresses; they have no port, no ships; they have 
 no army that presumes to offer or accept battle ; and now, before the period 
 arrives for active operations, when Spain will send the ample reinforcements 
 she holds in readiness, it is only necessary for the Cubans to accept the assur- 
 
By Courtesy of Frank R, Roberson. 
 ADMIRAL DEWEY UNDER THE "OLYMPIA'S" BIG GUNS. 
 
 By Courtesy of Frank R. Roberson. 
 ADMIRAL DEWEY AND STAFF ON THE "OLYMPIA.' 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 65 
 
 ance of the United States, given on the faith of Spain, that they may have 
 their independence by laying down their arms, electing their deputies, and 
 declaring their wish to be free by vote of the people." 
 
 This conversation is able on both sides and sheds a strong light upon 
 the Cuban-Spanish situation for a quarter of a century, reaching from 
 the time since the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain 
 was signed. 
 
 In the course of the amplification of the conversation (August 20, 1869, of 
 General Prim and General Sickles), the Spanish General said, "Between the 
 revolutionary movements by which the Republics of the Western Continent 
 gained their independence, and the Cuban insurrection, there was a vast 
 difference. " In the examples quoted, "negotiation was resorted to after cam- 
 paigns had been fought, and battles lost and gained; they had armies in the 
 field and organized governments supporting them. We see nothing of this in 
 Cuba; only mere roving bands, who fly when they are pursued, and who have 
 never been found in numbers sufficient to give or accept battle. It is very 
 possible that in the lapse of time the insurrection may become more formi- 
 dable ; it may raise armies ; it may take cities and fortified places ; it may 
 demonstrate, what has not yet been in any way demonstrated, that it is sup- 
 ported by the majority of the population. In that case Spain will have some- 
 thing tangible to treat with. But we hope to avoid all this bloodshed, 
 disaster, and ruin by making some amicable arrangement now. It is impos- 
 sible for us to treat with Cubans now, but the United States, when once 
 convinced of the good intentions and good faith of the Spanish government, 
 can then assure the Cubans that by following the programme I have indi- 
 cated, they can have their liberty without firing another shot. ' ' 
 
 The reply of Mr. 'Fish by telegram, August 24, was: 
 
 "Washington, August 24, 1869. — The propositions of Spain are incom- 
 patible with any practicable negotiation. The representatives of the insur- 
 rectionary government are necessary parties to a negotiation. Free 
 communication through the Spanish lines is immediately necessary. 
 
 "The United States cannot ask the insurgents to lay down their arms 
 unless the volunteers are simultaneously effectually disarmed, and in good 
 faith disbanded. This, if practicable, would require time. We want to 
 arrest the destruction of life and property, and to stop the outrages and annoy- 
 ances to our citizens. An armistice would effect this immediately, and the 
 
66 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 
 terms of the compensation to be made to Spain by Cuba could then be 
 arranged between them under the mediation of the United States. 
 
 "You may say that we deem an armistice indispensable to the success of 
 any negotiation. Spain may in honor grant this at the request of the United 
 States, and in deference to the wishes of a friendly power, whose good offices 
 she is willing to accept. This being done, negotiations can immediately be 
 opened that will probably result in peace, and her receiving a fair compensa- 
 tion." 
 
 This dispatch might have closed the negotiation, though there was a 
 great deal more correspondence. There was a resulting difficulty then as later 
 and now in the intangibility of the ostentatious Cuban government. It was 
 unfortunate that there was on both sides a strained sense of the necessity of 
 much formality, and there were far-reaching consequences that could not be 
 ineasured with exactness and weighed as fixed and determining events for 
 many days. The Spaniards might have recognized as something sufficiently 
 formidable to demand their business as well as distinguished consideration, 
 the bands of guerrillas who were so desperate and tenacious that a treaty was 
 made with their leaders nine years later. Statesmanship in Spain could have 
 saved the desolation of the island and the infliction of frightful calamities 
 upon a million people who were innocent of political crime and of military 
 belligerency. Spain did not close the ten years' war without negotiating 
 with insurgents who did not put up their arms, and the vain presumption that 
 caused long delay cost her dearly. 
 
 The words, "honor of Spain," that stood there obstructive, were often 
 unrealities. The Spanish excitement about the rumors that the Cubans would 
 be recognized as belligerents was not called for. They would themselves 
 more than their enemies have been gainers by the ac:£nowledgment of the 
 United States that the Cubans were belligerents. If the claim of the Spanish 
 Premier that there was a vast difference between the Cuban revolt and the 
 revolutions that resulted in the independent States established in Spanish 
 America was a detail in part true, then there should have been no objec- 
 tion to overlooking it. The grievances of the people of Caba are the same as 
 those of the Mexicans and the Central and Southern Americans ; and there 
 stands the poetic record that "freedom's battle once begun, bequeathed 
 from bleeding sire to son, though baffled oft, is always won." The decision 
 of the United States government, U, S. Grant, President, and Hamilton Fish, 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 67 
 
 Secretary of State, pronounced against the concession of belligerency to the 
 Cubans, was on the grounds generally that the Spaniards rested their protest 
 upon. The impossible issue, according to the correspondence, was imaginary. 
 The study of our diplomatic correspondence, however, fails to be convincing 
 that the government of the United States left nothing undone, to deal with 
 Marshal Prim, taking him at his word that for a sum of money not extortionate 
 or extravagant, the Cubans might have had their liberties under the protective 
 possession of the United States without firing a gun after September, 1869. 
 In the twenty-nine years that have passed, Cuba, no matter how made free, 
 would have been Americanized and ours — and the most prosperous island in 
 the world, instead of the most desolate and horror-haunted. 
 
 Mr. Fish, September 15th, telegraphed the Minister of Spain: "Omit- 
 ting the plebiscite, can the President of Council give assurance that if the 
 United States induced the insurgents to lay down arms, and deputies to the 
 Cortes be elected by Cuba, that the Cortes will grant independence? The 
 plebiscite is impracticable, because in the present circumstances and conditions 
 of the island a popular vote can be no indication of the popular will. " 
 
 There is an abiding embarrassment in Cuba, in the lack of means to 
 record reliably the popular will. The telegram of the 15 th approached the 
 practical too nearly to be accepted as possible, but on September 25th a 
 dispatch from the Minister at Madrid catalogued the following fair promises : 
 
 ' ' Resume of interview last evening with President of Council : 
 
 "Plebiscitum not insisted upon. Election of deputies required by consti- 
 tution ; indispensable preliminary to independence. Measures already taken 
 to disarm volunteers simultaneously with cessation of hostilities. Severe and 
 positive order given to stop the scandalous execution of captives and like 
 cruelties? General de Rodas promises to do so at all hazards. 
 
 "A decree will be promulgated forthwith for the gradual abolition of 
 slavery. Government will proceed with liberal reforms without waiting for 
 termination of war." 
 
 But at this hopeful opening Spain insisted that our offer of mediation 
 should be withdrawn, for "the Spanish Cabinet distinguish between inediation 
 and good offices. To prevent recognition of belligerents they seem anxious 
 to hold us to our offer of good offices, while declining mediation as long as 
 there is hope of suppressing insurrection." 
 
 October i, 1869, the Spanish Cortes met. The United States' offer of 
 
68 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 
 "good ofHces" was withdrawn, and Mr. Silvela wrote to General Sickles th; 
 the Spanish government would not have consented to the independence ( 
 Cuba, because, even if they had wished it, it was "not within their comp( 
 tence to consent to a dismemberment of the territory of this monarchy, witl 
 out the permission and the authorization of the Cortes; but the Cortes, h 
 from permitting and authorizing this, manifested by a unanimous resolution c 
 their permanent commission that they were ready to lend their entire suppoi 
 to the government, in an elevated and dignified policy in the Cuban questioi 
 calculated to preserve the integrity of the territory and the national honor. 
 
 September nth Secretary Fish telegraphed the Minister of the Unite 
 States to Spain : 
 
 "We hope there is no truth in the rumor that Spain is about to sen 
 additional troops to Cuba. It would exhibit a want of confidence in the penc 
 ing negotiation that might compel the withdrawal of the offer of this goverr 
 ment to attempt a reconciliation. It might prolong the struggle, and th 
 destruction of life and property, with questionable influence on the result. I 
 certainly would embarrass the negotiations. ' ' 
 
 The Secretary requested to be advised of the sending of additional Spar 
 ish troops to Cuba. The answer to this dispatch was in the form of a news 
 paper piiblication as follows, correctly described by Mr. Sickles in transmittin: 
 a translation as an "interesting document." 
 
 (From the Gaceta, December 5, 1869.) 
 
 "The President of the Council said: 'Last Saturday Senor Navarro 
 Rodrigo addressed certain inquiries to the minister of war which I could no 
 answer immediately. I said, however, that there had gone to Cuba thirty 
 thousand men, and to-day I will read a statement of land and sea forces, am 
 of the material which has gone to Cuba since the revolution, because thi 
 proves the vitality and energy of the government and of all Spain exercisei 
 in the preservation of the island of Cuba. 
 
 "'The first forces which went there were 771 volunteers; then 5,40 
 men of the regular service, afterwards the series of battalions which wer 
 asked for by General Dulce* (may he rest in peace!) ; 1,000 went from Baza 
 1,000 from Chiclana, 1,000 from San Quintin, and 1,000 from Simancas, wb 
 were so thoroughly equipped that they were about to take the field imme 
 diately on their arrival. Since that the successive departures have reached 
 
 * Driven from Cuba by the Volunteers 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 
 69 
 
 total of 20,966 of the army of the peninsula; of marines, 2,600; of recruits, 
 I, 371; and of volunteers, 9,563; which gives a total of 34,500 men, according 
 to the accompanying statement. I would call attention to the fact that this 
 immense sum would represent a great effort for any nation whatever. 
 
 " 'There have gone also 14 ships of war, among them two iron-clad 
 frigates; a complete equipment for a regiment of mountain artillery, with 24 
 pieces, 24 caissons for artillery of 8 centimeters bore; 20 Krupp steel guns, 
 of 8 centimetei's bore; 4,000 projectiles for the same; 5,000 kilograms of 
 powder; 7,400,000 cartridges of 14^ caliber, model of 1857 and 1859; 1,000,- 
 000 metallic cartridges for needle guns; 10,500,000 caps; 15,000 kilograms of 
 lead; 9,600 carbines, model of 1857; 3,600 muskets, model of 1859; 8,000 
 Enfield rifles ; 3,000 Berdan; 500 short carbines; 1,000 lances; 2,000 sabers. ' " 
 
 Estimate of the Spanish forces composing the "Army of Cuba," compiled 
 from the statement published in La Iberia of December 26, 1869, and from 
 semi-official sources of information. The strength of battalions, batteries, 
 and squadrons conforms to the regulations of the Spanish service: 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 Eight regiments of infantry of the line, two bat- 
 talions of eight hundred each . . 12,800 
 
 Twenty-five battalions of light infantry, one thou- 
 sand each . .... . 25,000 
 
 Two battalions of the guardrail veterans — one 
 
 thousand each . ... . . 2,000 
 
 Two battalions of militia (estimated) . 1,600 
 
 Eleven battalions of infantry, organized in Cuba 
 (estimated to be of the same strength as penin- 
 sular light infantry) . 11,000 
 
 52,400 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 One regiment, two battalions of four batteries each 
 
 — eight companies . . 1,000 
 
 One regiment of mountain artillery, two battalions 
 
 of four batteries each — eight companies . . 1,000 
 
 2,000 
 
70 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 Field artillery being organized, force not stated. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 Twenty-five squadrons— fifty companies of one hundred and 
 fifty each (full strength in Spanish army) . • • 
 
 ENGINEERS. 
 
 One battalion— ten companies of one hundred and fifty each 
 
 MARINES. 
 
 Four battalions 
 
 Beside these forces in the field, there are more ttian forty 
 thousand volunteer troops doing garrison duty 
 
 Grand total . . • ■ • • 
 
 7,5°o 
 i,5°o 
 
 4,000 
 67,400 
 
 40,000 
 107,400 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 Infantry, fifty-six battalions 52,0°° 
 
 Artillery, four battalions, sixty-four guns . . . . 2,000 
 
 Cavalry, twenty-five squadrons 7,5°° 
 
 Engineers, one battalion 1.500 
 
 Marines, four battalions ' ■ , 4, 000 
 
 Volunteers doing garrison duty 40,000 
 
 Total 107,400 
 
 Responding to these figures, correctly described as "interesting," Secre- 
 tary Fish, January 26, 1870, made the following very interesting and pertinent 
 statement and suggestion : 
 
 "The public interest felt in the United States in the Cuban struggle has 
 decreased since the flagrant violations of laws by the agents of the insurgents 
 became known, and alienated the popular -sympathy. 
 
 "Had the Cuban Junta expended their money and energy in sending to 
 the insurgents arms and munitions of war, as they might have done con- 
 sistently with our own statutes and with the law of nations, instead of devoting 
 them to deliberate violation of the laws of the United States; and had they, 
 in lieu of illegally employing persons within the dominion of the United States 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 71 
 
 go in armed bands to Cuba, proceeded thither unarmed themselves to take 
 jrsonal part in the struggle for independence, it is possible that the result 
 ould have been different in Cuba, and it is certain that there would have 
 ;en a more ardent feeling in the United States in favor of their cause, and 
 ore respect for their own sincerity and personal courage. ' ' 
 
 But the Secretary, as if foreseeing the emergency that confronted Presi- 
 3nt McKinley, twenty-eight years after, remarked over the contention 
 igarding the belligerency demanded, for and against : 
 
 "Should Spain, after her great and exhaustive effort, fail to restore a state 
 E peace on the island, the President must reserve to himself a complete 
 berty of action in that event." 
 
 The favored Spanish method of putting down rebellion, the knowledge of 
 ■hich, no doubt, caused the inquiries of Secretary Fish about troops from 
 pain to pacificate Cuba, is found in the following proclamation of evil fame : 
 (From the Diario de la Marina, April 29, 1869 — Translation.) 
 
 "The Redactor (of St. Jago de Cuba), in its number of 21st instant, pub- 
 shes the following important proclamation of General Count Valmaseda : 
 
 "Inhabitants of the country! The reinforcements oT troops that I have 
 een waiting for have arrived ; with them I shall give protection to the good, 
 nd punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion against the govern- 
 lent of the metropolis. 
 
 "You know that I have pardoned those that have fought us with arms; 
 lat your wives, mothers, and sisters have found in me the unexpected pro- 
 jction that you have refused them. You know, also, that many of those I 
 ave pardoned have turned against us again. 
 
 "Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it is not possible for me to be the 
 lan that I have been ; there is no longer a place for a falsified neutrality; he 
 lat is not for me is against me, and that my soldiers may know how to 
 istinguish, you hear the order they carry : 
 
 "ist. Every man, from the age of fifteen years, upward, found away from 
 is habitation (finca), and does not prove a justified motive therefor, will be 
 lot. 
 
 "2d. Every habitation unoccupied will be burned by the troops. 
 
 "3d. Every habitation from which does not float a white flag, as a signal 
 lat its occupants desire peace, -will be reduced to ashes. 
 
 "Women that are not living at their own homes, or at the house of their 
 
72 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 
 relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguani, or Bayamo, where maintenance 
 will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted 
 forcibly. 
 
 "The foregoing determinations will commence to take effect on the 14th 
 of the present month. El Conde de Valmaseda. 
 
 "Bayamo, April 4, 1869." 
 
 This proclamation offered an ample reason for the objection, which was 
 regarded as somewhat obstinate, of the insurgents to throw down their arms, 
 if promised by Spain "simultaneous amnesty." However "liberal," accord- 
 ing to their views, the Spanish ministers and commanding officers in the army 
 might be, there were many things that displayed the implacable temper of 
 the populace of Spain, and of the Spanish volunteers in Cuba. The spirit of 
 the volunteers was shown in deposing Captain General Dulce June 2, 1869. 
 Mr. Hall, consul at Matansas, reported the governor of that important juris- 
 diction thrown out by the volunteers because he was a friend of Dulce and 
 refused to deliver up to them an insurgent ; and it appeared to be a part of 
 their programme to displace every Cuban holding any ofi&cial position what- 
 ever, as also every "peninsular" Spaniard whose family connections might 
 lead him in any way to sympathize with the natives of Cuba. These incidents 
 identify the character of the Cuban insurrection with the movements in con- 
 tinental colonies. Mr. Plum, Consul at Havana, wrote Mr. Fish, two days 
 after the deposition of Dulce : 
 
 "On the 2d instant, a captain-general of Cuba was displaced from his 
 command by the resident Spaniards of the island. This event, without 
 precedent here, opens an epoch in the history of, this Spanish possession. 
 Some fifty years ago a similar event occurred in Mexico. An insurrection had 
 been for some time in progress there, and either induced by the course of 
 events at home, or from dissatisfaction at the conduct of the war, the resident 
 Spaniards deposed the viceroy. A new viceroy was sent out, but arrived too 
 late, and no other representative of the mother country ever succeeded to the 
 place. The resident Spaniards there, as soon as they cut loose from entire 
 obedience to the home authorities, turned the scale in favor of independence." 
 The core of the subject was stated by Mr. Plum, describing the business men 
 of the islan-d: "They incline to the idea of taking the management of affairs 
 here, in the name of the mother country, more or less in their own hands. 
 They are residents, identified to a great extent with the prosperity of the 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 
 
 73 
 
 island, having their business and their property here, and as the island has 
 to pay its own expenses, contributing largely, many of them, to the burden 
 of the support of the war, both by their money, and now by their time as 
 volunteers. They desire to see the war ended, and to have the former tran- 
 quillity, upon which their prosperity depends, restored. They may believe, 
 especially as liberal institutions are urged in Spain, that they have as full 
 right and are as capable to manage the affairs of the island, of which they 
 are the loyal residents, as officials without any local interests or responsibili- 
 ties, sent out from home to make their fortunes from the public revenues, not 
 in commerce and industry, here. Yet, until now the resident Spaniards in 
 business or having property here have had little more chance than the native 
 Cubans to participate in the government of the island. All the offices, mainly, 
 have been filled by frequently renewed officials, sent out for the purpose from 
 Spain. The consequence has been that the public burdens are felt to be 
 unnecessarily increased, and now the feeling has been engendered that the 
 military operations against the insurrection have not been energetically con- 
 ducted by those who, if they fail here, not having any identification with the 
 island, simply return home to the mother country, leaving the Spanish resi- 
 dents to their fate, or, in some instances, it may be believed that these officials 
 have been too lenient, or have inclined too much in favor of the insurrection, 
 which, if it is successful, would place the control of the island in native Cuban 
 rather than resident Spanish hands." 
 
 It is in these men, not of the Spanish residents, the volunteers or the 
 professional rural insurgents, that the United States will find the people of Cuba 
 capable of political organization and policy. It should be the popular under- 
 standing in this country that there is a distinction between the people of Cuba 
 and the representatives of the New York Junta, a community of Cubans who 
 should not be allowed to monopolize the patriotism of the island or to have 
 exclusive charge of its resources. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 The American Minister to Spain in our Centennial Year Feared War. 
 
 A Remarkable Correspondence— Suggestive of the Doom of Spanish Rule— The Gradual 
 Approaches of the Spanish War— A Circular Claiming the Cuban Rebellion was 
 Crushed— Cushing as Master of Ceremonies— General Grant's Personality. 
 
 Mr. Cushing attached the greatest importance to the meeting of General 
 Schenck and Lord Derby, even disturbing Secretary Fish with a lurid dream 
 of war, if England did not stand shoulder to shoulder with us. This was a 
 matter evidently in which Mr. Cushing took his intellectual exercises too 
 seriously. He conferred fully with the British Minister to Spain, on the even- 
 ing of December 5, 1875, and the Minister, whose words were expected to 
 be so momentous, was found of the opinion that "the present is a very 
 unfavorable moment for attempting intervention, friendly or other, between 
 Spain and the insurgent Cubans. People in Spain are now animated and 
 hopeful as to both civil wars, in view of the large reinforcements recently sent 
 to Cuba, of the pacification of Valencia and Cataluna, and of the extensive 
 military preparations for moving on the positions of the Vasco-Navarrese. 
 Spain needs, he thinks, to be left to try the experiment of the operations of 
 this winter. They are not likely to succeed, at least not in Cuba; and if 
 interfered with now, she will attribute the failure which is to come not to her 
 own weakness or the strength ot-the insurgents, but to the disturbing action 
 of the United States. But, left to herself, and thus failing, she will then feel 
 discouraged in proportion as she now feels exalted, and will be in the mood 
 to listen to judicious counsels, whether coming from the United States or 
 from Great Britain. 
 
 "These remarks of Mr. Layard could not fail to impress me, and so much 
 the more, in consonance as they were with the views expressed in my note of 
 the 30th of October. 
 
 "The impression which Lord Derby's observations to General Schenck 
 
 74 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 75 
 
 make on my mind is that of a disposition on the part of the British govern- 
 ment to aid us in a mediatory form rather than as a cooperator in the exercise 
 of forcible pressure on Spain. 
 
 "Our advance to Great Britain in the present question insures good offices 
 at least, and may go further. ' ' 
 
 Nothing turned out precisely as Mr. Gushing feared and prophesied, but 
 there was no effacement of his superb complacency, and no abatement in the 
 course of his admirable confidence. January 4th he wrote in his international 
 capacity to the State Department: 
 
 "Speculation is active as to the ultimate question of what the United 
 States will do if left alone b}'' other powers — whether the President will inter- 
 vene by force, and if so, whether in armed alliance with Spain, or whether in 
 arms against her and in aid of the insurgents, which it is assumed would be 
 war. Observation of what is going on at the present time in Constantinople 
 respecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, and what occurred there formerly in the 
 matter of Greece, leads many persons to anticipate the development of a 
 similar series of incidents at Madrid as respects Cuba. " 
 
 Nothing in the newspapers escaped Mr. Cushing. The journals of 
 Madrid, Paris, London and New York were searched with ceaseless assiduity. 
 One day Mr. Cushing reviewed the London Times, the next the Madrid 
 sheets were scrutinized and annotated. The Galignani Messenger and the 
 Havas Agency were mustered in and reviewed. Even the dispatches from 
 Philadelphia to the London Times could not escape, and at last the Minister 
 appeared as a New York newspaper expert in the paragraph annexed : 
 
 "A letter, purporting to be addressed from Madrid to the New York 
 Herald of the isth ultimo, puzzles me. Supposing that the pretense of inter- 
 view with Mr. Canovas del Castillo and Mr. Ruiz Gomez, two of the Spanish 
 gentlemen plainly alluded to, is fictitious, yet the fact remains that although 
 the Herald has a correspondent here, yet he did not arrive until after the 
 date of this letter ; and no American has been Jiere capable of entering so 
 minutely or intelligently into the question at issue. On the other hand, it is 
 not easy to suppose (although it is possible) that with the aid of some Span- 
 iard of considerable political and juridical experience, such as are continually 
 passing between Spain and Cuba, the letter may have been got up in New 
 York. 
 
 "On the whole, although the letter contains errors of fact and of language 
 
76 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 which a Spaniard of the instruction of Mr. Ruiz Gomez, for instance, would 
 not have committed, still the matter of the letter may have been prepared 
 here by some Spaniard of intelligence desirous of thus making his views 
 known to the people of the United States, and sent to New York to be worked 
 into its present shape in the ofiBce. " 
 
 Of course, it is improbable that Mr. Gushing, in the plenitude of his 
 labors, could have dictated the production of the mysterious letter that puzzled 
 him, but it is not impossible. The facilities of journalism are equal to inven- 
 tions even more involved than this presumption. 
 
 Speedily Mr. Gushing quoted "the Epoca ministerial journal," and El 
 Cornista, El Tempo, The Gologne Gazette, and the Presse of Vienna, took 
 turns of examination along with New York and London papers, and January 
 8 and lo, 1876, the annexed papers were produced: 
 
 (Mr. Gushing to Mr. Fish.) 
 
 "Legation of the United States, Madrid, January 8, 1876. — Sir: The 
 ministerial journals of last evening continue to rejoice over the tenor of the 
 communique of the Marquis de Molins, reported in my No. 748, of the 4th 
 instant. 
 
 "They now publish a variation by way of New York and London, as 
 follows : 
 
 " 'The [American] government admits having sent to the European 
 Powers a circular respecting the affairs of Cuba. 
 
 " 'It denies having proposed a confederation of Cuba and Porto Rico 
 under a Spanish governor, but it does not publish the text of the circular. ' 
 
 "All this, pursue the journals in question, is nothing but the document 
 so coldly received by the Powers to which it was read by the representatives 
 of the United States. 
 
 "But, nevertheless, in the very same journals appears the following tele- 
 graphic item, which seems likely to put a new face on things, namely: 
 
 " 'Berlin, January 7.— It is positively asserted that the German govern- 
 ment shows itself favorable to the American circular relative to Cuba, in conse- 
 quence of the injuries which the present situation of the island involves to the 
 commerce of Germany. ' 
 
 "I hear nothing further as to the alleged intentions of Great Britain. 
 
 "I have, etc., C. GUSHING. 
 
 "P. S.— Since the above dispatch was written the London Times has come 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 77 
 
 to hand, containing a telegram from Vienna, which is annexed. It is con- 
 fused, illogical, and incorrect, like all such telegraphic reports. 
 
 "If 'Cuba' is a European question, of 'incalculable consequences,' as 
 the telegram asserts, then you had good cause to consult Europe, and Europe 
 has good cause to act in the premises. ' ' 
 
 (Mr. Cushing to Mr. Fish.) 
 
 "Legation of the United States, Madrid, January 10, 1876. — Sir: I annex 
 translation of an article from the Cronista, a serious ministerial paper, 
 containing a very formal semi-official denial of the alleged concurrence 
 of Germany in the suggestion by the United States of intervention in Cuba. 
 
 "There is report here of the capture of a German vessel charged with 
 supplying arms to rebels in the Filipinas. Count Hatzfeldt informs me that 
 he has no information respecting the affair, but apprehends it will be the 
 occasion of unpleasant controversy. 
 
 "I annex translation of an article on the subject from a ministerial jour- 
 nal of respectability, the Tiempo. 
 
 "I have the honor, etc., C. CUSHING." 
 
 (Translation of article from El Cronista of January 8, 1876.) 
 
 "A dispatch of the Agenda Fabra from Berlin, which we published j^es- 
 terday, as did our contemporaries, gave news, which would be grave if true, 
 that the German government showed itself favorable toward the American 
 circular referring to Cuba, because of the damage brouo-ht upon German 
 commerce by the condition of the island. 
 
 "Duly informed, we are able to assert that the statement referred to is 
 not true, and that the Cabinet of Berlin continues to express the greatest 
 sympathies for our country. 
 
 "The circular of the Government of the United States has not met with 
 a favorable reception from any European power. ' ' 
 
 (Translation of article from El Tiempo of January 8, 1876.) 
 
 "We again call the attention of the government toward our possessions in 
 the Philippine Archipelago. We know that the enemies of Spanish integrity 
 rest not, although their affairs in London have recently assumed a bad aspect, 
 and that the English government looks upon them with suspicion. 
 
 "Upon that immense network of islands of Oceanica belonging to Spain 
 they have fixed their vision. They do not overlook that these offer excellent 
 
78 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 positions, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to snatch some 
 one of the rich pearls of so precioiis a jewel. 
 
 "There, more than anywhere, will they direct their efforts, because else- 
 where they will find immediate opposition from first-class powers. If there 
 be vigilance, more than sufficient is Spanish patriotism against all conspir- 
 acies, native or foreign ; and not for a moment do we doubt that there will be 
 such (conspiracies), as is proved by the news which gives rise to these lines." 
 Mr. Gushing' s frequent translations from Spanish papers were full of 
 information, and certainly gave the Secretary of State the phases of the public 
 opinion of Madrid, and so clear were they that they lighted up later events. 
 
 The Epoca of Madrid, January 14, 1876, said of the Cubans: '.'The only 
 thing we know for certain is that the religion of the insurgents is idolatry, 
 which must be very gratifying for the traitors, who, in order to escape merited 
 chastisement, go to swell the ranks of the rebels." And here is an editorial 
 article from El Cronista, Madrid, January 14, 1876: "The right which is now 
 the right of Spain in the affairs of Cuba is so clear and so patent that it could 
 not fail to have been recognized, even though shamefacedly and in private 
 circles, by the President of the United States, General Grant. We were right 
 in asserting, as we have repeatedly done, that the parliamentary curvets 
 (excarceos) of the government of the American Republic with respect to the 
 question of Cuba, obeyed, rather than its own opinions, electoral machina- 
 tions, and the pressure of the filibuster element, so numerous in the United 
 States. 
 
 ' 'We say this apropos of an important piece of news which we received 
 to-day by the Cuban mail. A Habana paper publishes correspondence from 
 New York, in which it is positively said that the President of the United 
 States has declared in private circles that he considers the independence of 
 the island of Cuba as impossible, and that its annexation to the United States 
 would cause immense injiiHes to the country. 
 
 "The island of Cuba,. not being able to govern itself well as an independ- 
 ent and sovereign State, could still less do so as an autonomic semi-State, and 
 in such circumstances it were in every way impossible for Spain to reserve to 
 herself a protectorate which, without positive benefijt to Cuba, would drag the 
 mother country into the most serious complications within and without this 
 territory. 
 
 "To prove this aDsolute impossibility so many considerations throng 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 79 
 
 to the subject that it is no small task to select the prominent ones. In the 
 island of Cuba there exists an immense majority which does not desire separa- 
 tion, which does not desire annexation, which does not desire autonom)', 
 which wishes to keep on in the same conditions as those in which they have 
 lived with respect to the mother country. In the island of Cuba there exists 
 a slender minority which is split up into 'independents, ' 'annexationists, ' 
 and 'autonomists. ' The immense majority reject autonomy, which _would 
 weaken their ties with the mother country. The independents and the annex- 
 ationists are not content with autonomy, which does not satisfy their aspira- 
 tions. The autonomists would be the only ones left satisfied, but they are so 
 few in number that they would lack moral and material strength. 
 
 "The Eco de Cuba, then, is right: the Great Antilla is not fitted to be 
 anything save what it has been hitherto. Thus it is that the right of Spain is 
 supported by every kind of reason based upon expedience. Therefore, in 
 spite of all the efforts of the ambitious ojalateros (sans-culottes) of- New York, 
 and in spite of the misdeeds of the criminals of the Managua, the island of 
 Cuba will continue to be a Spanish province. ' ' 
 
 ~Mr. Cushing had a conversation with the Spanish Minister of State, who 
 
 said that "the United States could desire nothing in the sense of peace, good 
 government, or liberty in Cuba," that the Spanish government did not want 
 more than we desire. This made an impression upon Mr. Cushing's mind, 
 that may or may not have been intended, nevertheless, it seemed to him that 
 "the inner thought behind the words" was: 
 
 "If the United States, whether by the use of their naval squadron 
 or by landing troops, intervene by force to prevent Spain from subduing 
 the insurrection in Cuba, that is war, and Spain must, of necessity, fight, at 
 whatever cost and ultimate loss, or cease to hold up her head as an independ- 
 ent nation in Europe or America. 
 
 "But if the view of the United States is to act by mediation in behalf of 
 the insurgents, to induce them to lay down their arms, to make acceptable 
 terms for them, to secure the execution of these terms, to provide for the 
 introduction of good government and the abolition of slavery in officious 
 concert or in formal treaty with Spain, then Spain is ready to meet the United 
 States half-way in such action, to receive, and even invite, their interposition 
 in the affairs of Cuba. 
 
 "The impression on my mind to this effect was so strong as to half tempt 
 
8o THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 me to say, 'Will you then accept our mediation?' But I restrained myself, in 
 the doubt whether my present instru.ctions would justify me in thus committing 
 the United States. 
 
 "I limited myself, therefore, to thanking him cordially for the frankness 
 and friendliness which seemed to inspire what he said, and to assure him that 
 I would lose no time in communicating the same to you, as nearly as possible 
 in his own words, and regretting that no mere written report could do justice 
 to the impressiveness of oral representation. 
 
 "He then referred briefly to the mere robber character of what there is 
 now in insurrection in Cuba, composed of scattered parties of negroes and 
 mulattoes, without the slightest pretension to any government — directed, so 
 far as they had any general direction, by foreigners, mere desperado adven- 
 turers, without right or stake in the country (I interrupted him here to say 
 there were no citizens of the United States among them, to which he assented,, 
 and then continued), engaged in mere plunder and incendiarism, not in war — 
 the worst form of that tendency to guerrilla hostilities in the place of the 
 regular warfare which the Spaniards inherited from their remote Celtiberian 
 progenitors, and which, if one of the glories, was not the less one of the 
 national calamities, of Spain. 
 
 "But of all this, he said, the President's message showed that we in the 
 United States had a clear conception ; and he added that neither such bad 
 foreigners as Maximo Gomez in the Managua, nor worse Spaniards- like 
 Miguel Aldama in New York, could ever make of Cuba any better republic 
 than Hayti; and that appeared to be their only purpose^to ruin where they 
 could not rule. 
 
 "It was impossible for me conscientiously to contradict these apprecia- 
 tions, and therefore, I could but listen attentively, and, when he had con- 
 cluded, take leave, assuring him that he would be informed at once when my 
 expected instructions should arrive in Washington. 
 
 "The concluding remarks of Mr. Calderon y Collantes suggest to me 
 some considerations, which you will permit me to subjoin by way of 
 commentary. 
 
 "The Spaniards have great qualities, as many a page in their history 
 demonstrates, but they have also the defects of those qualities; and my dis- 
 patches have not been sparing in the exhibition of those defects, such as 
 intolerance of opinion, exaggerated individualism, ill-regulated ambitions. 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 83 
 
 dispositions to pronunciamentos, insurrection, civil war, and especially guer- 
 rilla warfare. " 
 
 No man of his generation exceeded Mr. Gushing in knowledge of the 
 current history of the world, and his intimate acquaintance with the Spanish 
 language and people gives what he had to say as Minister to Spain during the 
 closing years of General Grant's administration a force and sharpness of appli- 
 cation having much more than official weight, and his papers are full of 
 matter in which the interest abides. The way the desperate antagonism in 
 Cuba between the peninsular and Cuban Spaniards arose is thus sketched by 
 Mr. Cushing: 
 
 "When the insurrection in French Santo Domingo put an end to the 
 cultivation of sugar and coffee there, that cultivation passed to Cuba ; it flour- 
 ished there, with the, consequent development of slavery and the slave trade; 
 how overflowing wealth ensued, and with it came ill-directed education, 
 unwholesome ambitions, and traitorous plots of annexation to the United 
 States, not for the promotion of liberty, but for the securit}' of slavery ; how, 
 thereupon and therefore, came acts and measures of angry repression on the 
 part of Spain. 
 
 "If the Cuban -emigrants in the United States are a proper sample, as 
 they possibly may be, of the better Cuban Spaniards, what are we to think of 
 those of average or inferior degree? 
 
 "While those emigrants have made themselves ridiculous in spending their 
 time in quarreling with one another in the newspapers and in public meetings, 
 instead of fighting the common enemy in the field, they have rendered them- 
 selves odious by their systematic violation of the law of the land of their 
 asylum, and the acts of fraud and perjury which that implies, and by their 
 frantic hostility to the government of the United States. 
 
 "Meanwhile, we see what the insurgents at home are, after six years' 
 experience — incapable, as the President so clearly shows, of independence, 
 unworthy even of the concession of belligerence. 
 
 "If the emigrants in the United States were now in Cuba, if the insur- 
 gents in arms were to lay down their arms, could they and the rich sugar- 
 planters and merchants of the seaports of the western part of the island, with 
 or without anterior solution of the slavery question, live in peace together as 
 a republic based on free popular suffrage, which is the only intelligible con- 
 ception of a republic? To me it seems impossible. To say nothing of Santo 
 
84 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 Domingo, we may look to the case of Jamaica, where, without any civil war 
 to embitter men against one another] with generously regulated emancipa- 
 tion, with a colonial policy just, nay, amicable and even kind, it has been 
 found impossible to maintain the existence of well-ordered society except by 
 tlje constant exercise of paternal authority on the part of the metropolis. 
 
 ' 'AH which leads me to the conclusion that the United States would have 
 an immense task on their hands in undertaking the pacification of Cuba alone 
 and by hostile force, inferring the necessity not only of a fleet and an army of 
 operations, but also of occupation to keep the peace, but might well con- 
 tribute efficiently to the result in cooperation with Spain. ' ' 
 
 In February, 1876, Mr. Cushing wrote: "The concentration of ships of 
 war at Port Royal impresses the Spaniards as a menace against Spain. 
 They say : 'We have not made any naval demonstrations in the waters of' the 
 Antilles ; . we have done nothing to call for defensive preparations on the part 
 of the United States, and we are unable to account for these naval prepara- 
 tions of theirs unless intended for the invasion of Cuba in aid of the insurgents, 
 in imitation of the action of Navarino. ' 
 
 ' 'Their suspicions in this respect stand greatly in the way of more friendly 
 diplomatic negotiation in the sense of mediation. 
 
 "Now, as to the naked question of intervention or mediation in Cuba, the 
 only foreign minister here who speaks to me in a helpful spirit is Mr. 
 Layard." 
 
 Mr. Cushing did not seem to see that "mediation" was a dream. How 
 ever, it is clear that the policy of the most able Minister was severely against 
 intervention, and he no doubt felt the necessity of an affirmative policy. 
 
 Through, Mr. Layard, the British Minister, appeared in 1876, as through 
 other representatives of English policy in 1897, the sympathy of the Empire 
 of Great Britain with our tentative as with our finally positive measures of 
 intervention in Cuba. La Politica, Madrid, February 4, 1876, contained a 
 long editorial on "American Affairs," referring especially to the agitation in 
 Europe caused by the policy of President Grant to invite European coopera- 
 tion. The government of the United States, "having passed to its represent- 
 atives in Europe a note to the end that, without having a copy of it, may be 
 read to the European Ministers of Foreign affairs." 
 
 The effect of this note was. La Politica explains, "to discover immediately 
 the impression that would be produced by its interference, direct or indirect, 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 85 
 
 in the relations of Spain with her Antillean province." The Spanish journal 
 accuses American filibusters of responsibility for the insurrection in Cuba 
 and provinces : 
 
 "When all the combustibles have been accumulated for a conflagration, 
 and the blaze has been kept knowingly stirred up, it is a rare sight to see 
 those who have done all this lamenting the ravages of that fire, shrinking 
 appalled from its horrors, and clamoring before Europe for the rights of 
 humanity. ' ' 
 
 After further sarcasm of the sort comes this : 
 
 ' 'What remains besides that which has been set forth to serve as a sup- 
 port to the United States in order to pretend to the direct or indirect inter- 
 vention which they propose? In our conception, it has for its basis no other 
 thing than the eternal tendency which, from the beginning of the century and 
 from one motive or another, has been ever manifested by the partisans of the 
 Monroe Doctrine — a policy which served to rend from Mexico the greater 
 part of her territory ; a policy which has ever been sought to deprive Spain 
 of the brightest jewel of her crown, of the jewel which symbolizes a world of 
 memories for the nation which discovered America. 
 
 "The notes of Mr. Henry Clay to Mr. Everett, in 1825, to the end that 
 Spain should conclude the wars of Mexico and Colombia for the sake of 
 humanity; subsequently those of Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders, Minister in 
 Madrid, for the purchase of Cuba for one hundred millions of dollars, recom- 
 mending him to get it as cheap as possible ; the mission of Mr. Soul€ ; the 
 Ostend Conference ; the refusal of the United States to subscribe the compro- 
 mise with England and France to guarantee to Spain the possession of the 
 island of Cuba, and a thousand other antecedents which we might evoke, if 
 the scope of this article permitted us to do so, are the key to explain this 
 stroke of humanity with which tbe United States present themselves before 
 Europe, soliciting its moral cooperation to end the war in Cuba. ' ' 
 
 The conclusion of this article is the same as the last communication from 
 the Spanish Minister, DuPuy de Lome— that "what is undoubtedly indis- 
 pensable as a measure of salvation is that this insensate insurrection in Cuba, . 
 v/hich gives rise to so many conflicts, be terminated as soon as possible. ' ' 
 
 The 30,000 soldiers Spain had sent tc Cuba to crush the rebellion here 
 referred to, and the sum of the need of Spain was to make an end of the 
 insurrection by crushing military forces. And yet the war dragged on two 
 
86 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 years, and terminated in a treaty with the insurgents, who were, according to 
 Spanish report, well convinced with hard cash that the time had arrived to be 
 pacificated. 
 
 The question most discussed in Madrid, Mr. Gushing stated in a letter 
 dated February i8, 1876, was as to the kind of "intervention" the United 
 States meant to make in the affairs of Cuba and Spain, whenever, if they did 
 ever intervene, and he said: 
 
 "In this connection there is much comment on the line of action pursued 
 by the intervening powers in the matter of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as being 
 the reverse of that pursued by the same powers in the matter of Greece, 
 seeing that in the latter case the demonstration of force was against Turkey 
 and in favor of her rebels ; while in the former it is against the rebels and in 
 favor of Turkey, as manifested by the concentration of Austrian troops in 
 Croatia and of a fleet of the allies off Ragusa, in the avowed purpose of com- 
 pelling the impenitent and persistent insurgents to accept the terms of reform 
 arranged at Constantinople. ' ' 
 
 That is to say, the Spaniards wanted to know — so diplomatic were our 
 forms of expression, as Mr. Cushing modulated them, that Spain wanted to 
 know whether the threatened intervention was to be on her behalf or for the 
 Cubans. At this time the Spanish Minister of State sent a diplomatic circular 
 to the Powers of Europe and the United States, giving the following account 
 of the beginning of the insurrection, that is now popularly characterized as 
 the ten years' war: 
 
 "The first cry of insurrection was raised at Yara, an unimportant town 
 situated in the eastern department of the island, on the nth day of October, 
 1868, immediately after the receipt of the news of the revolution begun at Cadiz 
 on the 17th of September, and consummated at Madrid on the 29th of the same 
 month. The leaders of the rebellion availed themselves of the preparations 
 which they had doubtless previously made, and of the favorable circumstance 
 that the government had not more than 7,500 troops all told on the island at 
 the time, and that, too, for a territory peopled by 1,400,000 inhabitants, and 
 having an area of 12,000 square miles, including the keys and the adjacent 
 islands. The flag of the independence of the island was not raised at the 
 outset, much less that of annexation to any other State. The only cries 
 were, 'Hurrah for Prim!' that general being there regarded as the leader of 
 the Spanish revolution, and 'Hurrah for the revolution!' Thus it was that 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 87 
 
 many joined in the insurrection who, while really loving Spain, thought that 
 the only object had in view was a political change, and, subsequently repent- 
 ing when they became aware of the tendency which the enemies of the country 
 were seeking to give to the movement, voluntarily took up arms against it." 
 
 The Spanish circular admits that the movement in Cuba for secession 
 carried away a part — not the greater part — of the white population, "espe- 
 cially the unreflecting and rash youth," but the secession movement was 
 disguised as a "desire of securing reforms" — but it became evident this was a 
 pretext. The contest was carried on with a certain regularity, both parties 
 respecting property, until the insurgent leader and soldiers became barbarous 
 in their methods. 
 
 However, at this time — February, 1876 — after eight years' war, "of the 
 leaders of the secession movement, Cespedes, the Agramontes, Cavada, 
 Donato, Marmol, Castilla, Mola, the Betancourts, the Angueros, Jesus del 
 Sol, Bembeta, Salome Hernandez, Marcono, Inclan, Goicuria, Rosas, and 
 others, all of whom were Cubans, and really opposed to Spain, not one is now 
 living. Of those who have succeeded them in the command not a single 
 one is a Cuban. Maximo Gomez, the principal one, and Modesta Diaz, the next 
 in importance, are Dominicans ; Rulof is a Pole ; the person known by the nick- 
 name of 'el Inglesito' is an Englishman; and the rest, who are now few in 
 number on account of the great diminution of the insurgent forces, are 
 adventurers from various countries, without antecedents, and having no inter- 
 est in the island. The same may be said of almost all the insurgents. Their 
 forces now consist of negroes, mulattoes, Chinese, deserters from the bat- 
 talions which were formed provisionally in Santo Domingo during our brief 
 rule there, and a few independent bodies which were formed in Spain during 
 the most disorderly period of ^the revoluiion, and which were larely composed 
 of the most turbulent elements of the country, and it may be confidently 
 asserted that there are to-day not more than eight hundred white natives of 
 Cuba with arms in their hands in the insurgent ranks. ' ' 
 
 Here is manifested the Spanish policy which has been pursued to the 
 present hour, to convince the great Powers of Europe that the release of Cuba 
 from Spanish rule was necessarily to make of the island a greater San 
 Domingo — and it is due the truth to say the way the insurgents carried on the 
 war that was resumed by Marti and Gomez, has countenanced the malignant 
 representation by the Spaniards. The destruction of the agricultural Indus- 
 
88 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 tries of the island was not in the interest of liberty, damaged Spaniards less 
 than Cubans, and was barbaric, very largely accountable for the famine, and 
 chargeable with much of the hideous suffering of the innocent in the camps of 
 the reconcentrados. The diplomatic circular of Spain, goes on to say that the 
 insurgents were destroyers, while the Spaniards were preservers, and that it 
 would be a "great error to suppose that the Cuban emigrants to the United 
 States, who took good care to keep out of harm's way themselves," would be 
 able to constitute a government. Those insurgents who were brave enough 
 to face death on battlefields had fallen or surrendered. 
 
 ^* In this circular the naval and land forces of Spain were set forth — ' 'forty- 
 five vessels of all classes, with a nominal force of 4,770 horses, 135 cannon", 
 and 2,426 seamen, 55 battalions, 6 regiments of cavalry, 2 of artillery, i of 
 light field troops, i company of naval mechanics, 3 regiments of civil guards- 
 men, I sanitary brigade, i battalion of engineers, 33 companies of skirmishers, 
 2 squadrons of dragoons, and i transport brigade, making altogether a total 
 of 273 chiefs, 3,054 officers, 68,115 soldiers, 8,478 horses, 462 mules, and 42 
 pieces. Since the foregoing enumeration was made, moreover, 10,370 men 
 have embarked for the island. 
 
 "There are also the volunteer bodies, consisting of natives of the Penin- 
 sula and Cubans, amounting to upward of fifty thousand men. These last 
 figures are official and irrecusable, and show what is the true spirit of the 
 island and its adhesion to the mother country; for while the Cubans who are 
 fighting for the insurrection are less than one thousand in number, those who 
 have voluntarily taken up arms against it number more than forty thousand." 
 
 The volunteers in Cuba have all the while been Peninsular Spaniards, 
 given, by the policy of discrimination against Cuban Spaniards, places that 
 should be filled by the natives of the island. This has been one of the most 
 odious forms of oppression. At this point in the circular there was an effort 
 to explain "one fact" that might seem incomprehensible to those not familiarly 
 acquainted— and that "the duration of the contest, in spite of the disparity 
 existing between the forces of the contending parties." As this is a matter 
 that has perplexed Americans from the beginning of the Cuban conditions 
 that interested them, we are sure the official explanation of that mystery will 
 be read with exceedingly great interest. 
 
 The Spanish Minister of State said: "Cuban rebels are, for the most 
 part, negroes and mulattoes, who do not experience the ordinary necessities of 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 89 
 
 civilization. They are able to live in the jungles and deserts of the island, 
 and thence fall upon estates and other property like birds of prey, pillaging 
 and applying the torch of the incendiary. They live on the fruits of the 
 country, such as the plantain and others which grow spontaneously in that 
 fertile soil. Salt, and hogs and other animals are so numerous that they are 
 everywhere met with, and serve as food. ' ' There is a considerable amount of 
 truth in this, but the prominence given the "negroes" is exaggerated. It is 
 true, however, that the black men in the insurgent forces endured the hard- 
 ships of guerrilla warfare in the Cuban jungles, in a greater proportion than 
 their white compatriots, so that when the American army landed in Santiago, 
 were in the eastern province of the island, the numbers of white Cuban sol- 
 diers were a small percentage, the whites generally finding occupation as 
 officers. And the explanatory fact is mentioned in the circular. 
 
 ' 'The Baracoa district, having an extent of ninety miles, had but forty-two 
 inhabitants, while there was about the same number in Las Tunas and the 
 territory which separates the Mayari district from Guantanamo. The aver- 
 age number of inhabitants to the square geographical league throughout the 
 island is 350. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the insurgents 
 should be able to sustain themselves as nomadic tribes in a country of such a 
 character — uncultivated, almost a wilderness, extremely broken and moun- 
 tainous, and covered with immense forests which cannot even be set on fire 
 by reason of their constant and extraordinary humidity. Thus it is that they 
 have never been able to establish even the shadow of a government. ' ' 
 
 There is a good deal of explanation in this, but it does not cover the 
 whole ground of the mysterious incompetency of 100,000 Spanish troops in 
 Cuba to overcome the bands of guerrillas led by Garcia in the eastern or more 
 revolutionary end of the island. The circular we have been quoting con- 
 tinues: "If the insurgents were regular troops and carried on a civilized 
 warfare, the contest would long since have been ended by two or three 
 battles. The matter, however, becomes one of much greater difficulty when 
 they avoid all fighting save from an ambuscade, and run and hide when they 
 see our troops, in order to meet again in their lurking places when the danger 
 is past. It is thus seen why it has never been possible to entirely destroy 
 the so-called palenques, or bands of fugitive negroes, who have fled from the 
 estates, and who seek refuge in the aforesaid Baracoa district." 
 
 It was many years after this that Maximo Gomez made a march of five 
 
90 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 hundred miles through the island, burning cane fields, and the inconsiderate 
 boast of the insurgents was that the red skies displayed the progress of the 
 army of liberation. It was an unhappy association that the cause of freedom 
 should have been identified to that extent with a raid of devastation. 
 
 The ministerial circular continued: "In the western department there 
 were and still are — for, far from diminishing, their number was increased dur- 
 ing the war — 1,070 sugar estates, while in the central department there were 
 but 102, and in the eastern 200. The quantity of sugar produced in the first- 
 named department amounted to 500,000,000 kilograms, which quantity has 
 also been increased, while that of the second only amounted to 17,000,000, and 
 that of the third to 35,250,000 kilograms. The quantity of tobacco produced 
 in the western department is 44,000 quintals, in the central department only 
 5,500, and in the eastern 252,000. It must be remembered that in the terri- 
 tory comprised between Pinar del Rio and Guanajay, in the first of those 
 departments, the exquisite tobacco known as that of La Vuelta de Abajo is 
 exclusively produced. ■ The price of this tobacco is constantly increasing, and 
 is much higher than that produced in the eastern department, which is a 
 second-class article. The quantity of coffee produced in the western depart- 
 ment amounts to 3,750,000 kilograms, and that of the central department to 
 3,750,' and that of the eastern to 5,000,000. Finally, the value of the cattle of 
 all kinds in the western department is 2,000,000 pesetas, or $4,000,000; in the 
 central and eastern departments, |i, 000, 000 each. It is therefore seen that 
 the real wealth and the bulk of the population of the island of Cuba are in the 
 western department, which has scarcely suffered at all from the insurrection, 
 and which, for the most part, has remained perfectly tranquil. ' ' 
 
 All this' oificial appeal to the Powers of Europe has been proven by events 
 to have been utterly inadequate. The war was carried into the extreme 
 eastern end of Cuba. Maximo Gomez was at a point on the coast, west of 
 Havana, when Captain-General Weyler landed, from which he could see the 
 Morro Castle light, and counted the guns of the salute. 
 
 Secretary Fish was constant in urging Mr. Gushing to force upon th* 
 Spaniards an impression of the danger of American "intervention. " That he 
 was influenced in this instance by the personal views of President Grant 
 there is inner evidence— and yet it has been a part of the filibuster creed to 
 hold that General Grant was too careful, and to assert that his conservation 
 comprehended caution in the extreme. There is a close parallel between the 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN, 91 
 
 bearing of President Grant and that of President McKinley in the earnestness 
 with which each sympathized with the Cuban cause. Grant failed to disco'ver 
 a public duty in the recognition of either the independence of the Cuban 
 insurgents' Republic, or the belligerent rights of an organization that had no 
 ports and no courts or fixed places of official residence or certainty of areas of 
 authority. 
 
 Mr. Cushing found it necessary to explain repeatedly why he did not 
 press the impending intervention, and his first point was that no Power in 
 Europe would join with us. England had limited her cooperation to "good 
 offices." Lord Derby wanted, in his talk with General Schenck, "postpone- 
 ment of definite action, " and repelled in various forms of expression the idea of 
 any pressure, and he instructed the British Minister to Spain that there should 
 be "no thought of mediation" until after Spain had been further unsuccessful 
 in trying to suppress' the Cuban insurrection with her own forces. Charged 
 by Secretary Fish with evading the great question of intervention by confin- 
 ing talk to "our particular griefs," Mr. Cushing stated the Spanish Minister 
 introduced and dwelt upon our "private griefs," and did so evidently to^ 
 evade the general question of the condition of Cuba as distinguished from our 
 affairs. Mr. Cushing did not think it a convenient occasion "then and there 
 to push him on the question of intervention." Mr. Cushing had supposed 
 there was to be no pressure for intervention until it was known what action 
 the Powers would take. "Why else invoke their moral support?" 
 
 Mr. Cushing, at this point having concluded his defense for not pushing 
 intervention, advanced aggressively to the instruction af the State Depart- 
 ment in these embattled paragraphs : 
 
 "The interests of vSpain and of the United States in Cuba are identical. 
 At present we derive great net benefits from it ; she, none. The imminent 
 destruction of its productiveness would be alike disastrous to her and to us. 
 
 "She is willing enough to confide in us if we will let her. The proof of 
 that is to be found not in profession (although that we have), but in the 
 analysis of the diplomatic relations of Spain with other powers, contained in 
 previous dispatches. In fine, whatever causes of grief or jealousy she has 
 against us, she has greater against others. Nevertheless, she is now anxious 
 and suspicious with regard to the United States. She knows that thousands 
 of bad Spaniards (called Cubans), having a holy horror of the smell of gun- 
 powder, have fled to 'snug harbor' in New York, Key West, and New 
 
92 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 Orleans, have been dedicating themselves there for years, by distribution of 
 bonds, by speeches, newspapers, solicitations, exaggerated claims, violations 
 of law, and in every other possible way, to the task of embroiling the two 
 governments in war, and are the efficient authors of all our troubles with her, 
 directly or indirectly, including the tragedy of the Virginius. 
 
 "I dread emigrant rebels. How fatal were the French emigres to Prussia 
 in the early years of the French Revolution ! How frequently the Jacobites 
 involved France in fruitless hostility with England! How the refugee Poles 
 lured Napoleon I. to his destruction by Russia, and refugee Mexicans 
 Napoleon III. to the commencement of his destruction in America! I do not 
 yet forget the picture of the disastrous intrigues of the rebel emigrants of the 
 Greek Republics, more prejudicial to their friends than to their enemies, as 
 drawn by the masterly 'hand of Thucydides, or of those of the Italian 
 Republics, so graphically described by Guicciardini and Machiavelli. 
 
 "God forbid that these dishonored men, who prate of the independence 
 of Cuba, without manliness or courage to fight for it, preferring the safer 
 occupation of trading in bogus bonds and calumniating the President and 
 yourself, should succeed in making our country the instrument of their 
 rancorous hatred of their own country, Spain. 
 
 "In this connection, be it remembered that the President's message 
 asserts the absolute non-existence in Cuba at the present time of the essential 
 elements of an independent State, and thus proclaims this fact to the world. 
 "Then, Spain is told every day, by leading newspapers of the United 
 States, that the object of our naval preparations is to force the hand of Con- 
 gress and of the people by producing some casus belli for electoral purposes; 
 and although nobody really believes what newspapers say, yet they have their 
 effect in the propagation of mischievous irritations and dangerous suspicions, 
 as so well exposed in the late remarkable speech of Prince Bismarck in the 
 German Reichsrath. 
 
 "I meet all these things as well as I may by pointing to the kindly assur- 
 ances contained in your note of November 5, in the President's message, and 
 in sundry special dispatches, such as your No. 281, notwithstanding their 
 being dispatches of complaint against acts or omissions of the Spanish govern- 
 ment. 
 
 "But the obstacles which thus far it has been impossible for me to get 
 over are in the insolent assumption of the knots of Spanish traitors in New 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 93 
 
 York and Paris, who presume not only to dictate to Spain, but also to^ the 
 United States, and in the impracticable character of the Dominican chiefs of 
 the insurgents in Cuba. 
 
 "If you can answer for them, there is no hope for peaceful and har- 
 monious action between the two nations, to the end of peace, emancipation, 
 and good government in Cuba, by the mediation of the United States, with 
 or without the aid of Great Britain or German)-. 
 
 "As for these European powers, suffer me to say, 'Timeo Danaos et dona 
 ferentes.'" 
 
 Mr. Gushing saw the Russian Minister, who was polite and vague and not 
 informed, but "he spontaneously offered good offices and friendly advice, if 
 this course should be in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor;" not, Mr. 
 Gushing added, a very satisfactory reservation. This diplomat was "profuse 
 in the utterance of courtier expressions, and in professions of sympathy with 
 the United States;" and yet he represented to others that the United States 
 was pressing Spain as a means of forwarding private claims ! That, of course, 
 was his ignorance. March i, 1876, Mr. Fish wrote Mr. Gushing: "Discovery 
 and long occupation have made the island of Cuba a possession of Spain, and 
 the United States has no desire to disturb the relations which result there- 
 from. Part of the territory of the one power, it is the seat of immense trade 
 for the other. But it has been found up to the present time impossible to 
 conquer a peace by force of arms, and every suggestion that amnesty, reform, 
 and the certainty of good government might be effective where force has 
 failed has been repelled. More than six years ago such was the condition of 
 affairs, and it remains the same to-day. ' ' 
 
 Mr. Gushing wrote March 2d that the President's message had a salutary 
 effect, that Spain "has been made more pliant by the confidence in the 
 message of the disinterestedness of our government and in our recog'nition of 
 the non-existence in Cuba at the present time of the necessary elements of 
 independence. " And Spain longed to have peace. 
 
 Mr. Gushing sent March 7th a summary of the criticisms of the Spanish 
 Press in these terms : 
 
 "Much is said of the discreditable character and acts of the pretended 
 directors of the rebellion in New York, who, it is charged, are mainly occu- 
 pied in criminal intrigues against the peace of the Un+ted States. 
 
 "It is alleged that most of the reclamations put forward by the 
 
94 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 United States are for slave property, to the discredit of our emancipation pro- 
 fessions. 
 
 "Much is alleged as to the dishonest character of the citizenship of the 
 claimants; most of them Spaniards of recent naturalization, few of whom, 
 it is said, ever had bona fide residence in the United States. 
 
 "The Minister of State has more than once alluded to this point in terms 
 the more disagreeable for being founded on truth. ' ' 
 
 On July II, 1876, Mr. Gushing administered "some observations of a 
 consolatory tendency" to Secretary Fish, "in reference to the non-success of 
 your earnest efforts to meliorate the condition of things in Cuba. First, 
 neither party to the contest in Cuba was disposed to listen to the counsel of 
 wisdom and friendship. ' ' The true cause and character of maladministration 
 in Cuba was that "the governors are incapable of conducting and the governed 
 equally incapable of receiving good government. They are all Spaniards 
 alike, as General Prim so often said, whether you call them Peninsulars or 
 Cubans. And (to say nothing of the colored population) it is not the best of 
 the Spaniards, Creole or Peninsular, which constitutes the population of Cuba. 
 Have there been rebellions in Cuba, guerrilla warfare, burnings, sacking of 
 towns, military executions, deportations, embargo of private property, banish- 
 ments, suspension of suffrage, arbitrary domination of captains-general? So 
 all these things have been occurring in Spain. She has had nought else for 
 more than sixty years but alternations betwixt anarchy and despotism. The 
 few periods of comparative, but transient, tranquillity she has enjoyed during 
 the reign of Queen Isabel were due to the mere usurpation of two great 
 generals, Narvaez and O'Donnell, to whose administrations of the sword men 
 look back now as to the halcyon days of Spain. Since the dethronement of 
 Queen Isabel — that is, during the very period of the civil war in Cuba — there 
 has not only been civil war in Spain, but, simultaneous therewith, a rapid 
 succession of provisional and experimental governments, each destitute of 
 inherent stability, and every one of which subsisted only by means of irre- 
 sponsible dictatorships, except that of King Amadeo alone, who fell simply, 
 as men say, because he was the only man in Spain scrupulously faithful to his 
 oath and obstinately adhesive to the constitution of the country. 
 
 "And yet, constitutionally honest as he was, his ministers betrayed him 
 and assassins (not yet punished) fired on him on a bright moonlit evening in 
 one of the most frequented and brilliantly lighted streets of Madrid. Possibly 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 95 
 
 Prim had not been assassinated in the street (by men, they also, not yet 
 nished), Spain might have been saved from her extremest days of misery, 
 5 cantonal insurrection, but that is doubtful, since the misfortunes of Spain 
 d of Cuba are conditions of the national character, as manifested alike in 
 lain and in all Spanish America. 
 
 "For, let me repeat, the governors and the governed, all the same in 
 :e, and with defects aggravated in the latter by tropical life and by associa- 
 n with slaves, are at least equally to blame for the calamities of Cuba. 
 
 "In fine, looking at the subject from the point of view of the interests of 
 3 United States, which , alone is of account in the face of a civil contest 
 lere both parties are deaf to the coimsels of friendship and to considerations 
 sympathy and humanity, it seems to me that we have much to lose and 
 thing to gain by compromising ourselves in the matter of Cuba, it being 
 perabundantly evident that, whether as to Lopez and his companions laboring 
 ofessedly to betray their country to a foreign nation for the promotion of 
 ivery, or in case of Aldama and his associates, laboring to betray it to the 
 tne nation for the gratification of personal resentment and ambition, they all 
 ve but one thought as respects us, namely, to make a cat's paw of our gov- 
 timent, while ready to emulate, on the earliest possible opportunity, the 
 iblime ingratitude' of Schwartzenberg. C. CUSHING. " 
 
 This formidable indictment of Spain and Spaniards is made the more 
 imendons by the proof in the Madrid dispatches of the author that he was 
 t a partisan of the Cuban insurgents, but distrusted them and was high- 
 npered against their representatives in the United States. As to "inter- 
 ntion" in Cuba, it was never perfectly defined until President McKinley did 
 in his message so coldly received by. the warlike element in Congress, 
 len he calmly stated the situation in which it would be necessary to "inter- 
 ne with force, ' ' and intervention with force is war — and was war. 
 
 Of course, there was no change in the Spanish system. Mr. Cushing by 
 lil mentioned that the Spanish Minister of State said he would not have 
 isented to leave the post of minister of grace and justice, which best suited 
 n as a lawyer and a magistrate, and to take that of state, which was out of 
 ; line of his lifetime pursuits, "save only in the hope of being able to cooper- 
 ! with me in healing all differences, in order to do which he counted much 
 our long-standing personal friendship and mutual confidence ; that he had 
 ■efully read and considered the contents of your No. 266, and must confess 
 
96 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 that the United States had good reason to complain, not only of unjustifiable 
 acts on the part of the local authorities of Cuba, but of the delays and half- 
 measures of the Spanish government to accord redress ; that the local admin- 
 istration of Cuba, civil and military alike, had, in his conception, been greatly 
 injurious to the interests of Spain herself, even more than to the United - 
 States; that, as a jurist, he repudiated on principle the sequestration of the 
 property of foreigners in Cuba; that if the Spanish note of the isth ultimo 
 should prove acceptable to the President as a basis, he should be prepared to 
 take up each individual grief as presented, and consider and decide promptly; 
 that while not able conscientiously to admit that by the letter of the treaty 
 civil courts were stipulated for to the exclusion of military, yet he was ready 
 so to arrange the ground of controversy in that relation as to put an end to all 
 reasonable complaint in the premises on the part of the United States. 
 
 "I could but declare the high gratification it afforded me to receive from 
 his lips the communication of these just and elevated statements, which it 
 would be my pleasure to transmit immediately to my government. ' ' 
 
 Mr. Gushing could not fail to exercise his brilliant imagination on the 
 international aspects of the questions arising in our relations with Spain; 
 he quoted an article in the Epoca newspaper that seemed to be inspired by 
 the government, and set it forth in a series of flashing fancies as follows: 
 
 "The definite references of the Epoca to my interview with Mr. Calderon 
 y Collantes on the 30th, and to the telegrams received from Mr. Mantilla, 
 sufficiently show that the Epoca received its information from some member 
 of the government. 
 
 "I have never mentioned the contents, date, or even existence of your No. 
 266 to anybody except Mr. Calderon y Collantes, not even to Mr. Layard, 
 until he came to speak to me concerning.it, on the ist instant, by telegraphic 
 direction from Lord Derby, as reported in another dispatch. 
 
 "Of course, all which the Epoca says of the contents of that note must 
 have been derived from the government. 
 
 "Four things are, it seems to me, worth noting in that article: 
 
 "ist. In speaking of your No. 266, it undertakes to characterize the first 
 part, devoted to the exposition of particular grievances, but makes no allusion 
 to the second part. 
 
 "2d. It gives quite a novel turn to the question of intervention and the 
 relations of Great Britain to that subject, supposing it to be on the part of 
 
THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 
 
 97 
 
 some "great continental Power' between the United States and Spain. I have 
 no knowledge, nor any ground of conjecture even, as to what Power is thus 
 intended. Is it Germany? Or France? Or Russia? 
 
 "3d. The Epoca seems to put forward the article of the Herald by way 
 of insinuating the opposition of Great Britain to any positive action of ours on 
 the side of Cuba. 
 
 "4th. It is observable that the Epoca, thus inspired by the government, 
 does not speak excitedly, or otherwise betray signs of irritation on the part of 
 the government on occasion of the suggestion of our possible intervention, ex 
 nomine, as intimated in your instructions, and also expressly in the oral 
 statement made by me to Mr. Calderon y Collantes. " 
 
 Secretary Fish was constant and strong in urging Mr. Cushing to force 
 upon the Spaniards an impression of the danger of American "intervention." 
 That he was influenced in this insistence by the personal views of President 
 Grant there is inner evidence, and yet it has been a part of the filibuster 
 creed to hold that General Grant was too careful, and to assert that his con- 
 servatism comprehended caution in the extreme. 
 
.M.;-^'^/'^''*' 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The Old, Old Story in Spain. 
 
 European Newspaper Comment on the Cuban-Spanish-American Situation Twenty-two Years 
 Ago — Not Much New in Later Commentary — "Stable Government" Not a New Phrase — 
 Cuban Troubles Those of Inheritance — Disastrous Influences of the Rebel PoUcy of the 
 Torch — Suggestion of Bombardment of Our Cities by Spaniards. 
 
 Considerable agitation was produced in the diplomatic circles of Europe 
 by the steady pressure of Secretary Fish with his instructions to Minister 
 Cushing to bring the Spaniards to conclusions. Repeatedly the Secretary 
 had to qualify the forms of expression of the several ministers intrusted with 
 ■copies of the formal paper. Mr. Baker was admonished that he had been too 
 strenuous in St. Petersburg in making the moat of a prince's politeness, and 
 ■explained that he quoted the Russian Prince Gortchakoff by an almost 
 unconscious recollection. Mr. Orth, at Vienna, over-played his part a shade, 
 ■and a supplementary direction was that he should not require a reply in 
 writing to his suggestive communication. The Vienna Presse, of January 5, 
 1.876, contained this expression of Austrian pulchritude : 
 
 "North America labors vigorously and incessantly to make the Cuban 
 question an international one, and to elevate it to the position of a burning 
 one before the Spanish arms can succeed in making it disappear from the 
 world. To-day it is announced by telegram from New York that the note of 
 the government of the United States to the Powers relative to Cuba proposed 
 the union of Cuba and Porto Rico under one Spanish governor-general. The 
 European diplomacy, which was enlightened with the hearing of the extraor- 
 •dinarily long American document— a copy of the same was not left— might 
 be not disagreeably astonished to learn what actually might be the small 
 meaning of the long discourse. The omission of every conclusion in the 
 document of Mr. Secretary Fish was until now everywhere remarked; he had 
 bitherto excused the European governments from the duty of giving an 
 
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THE OLD, :OLD STORY IN SPAIN. loi 
 
 answer to the Washington Government, and the Madrid government did not 
 this time require, as with the message of President Grant, to answer with a 
 formal memorandum. Substantially, the long and short of the American note 
 was to the effect that the insurrection in Cuba must come to an end. It was 
 careful to represent, in constantly recurring phrases, that no individual inter- 
 est of any kind had actuated the United States, who positively had not the 
 least thought of appropriating the Pearl of the Antilles," 
 
 As there was a Carlist war on hand, it did not seem to the European 
 governments a striking opportunity to be especially urgent in demands that 
 Spain should mend her ways in Cuba. There was at least propriety in the 
 precedence of home rule. The edge of the policy set forth by Mr. Fish was 
 that Spain should make a finish of the Cuban war by abandoning the attempt 
 to conquer the island, if military success was impracticable. Precisely the 
 contention of the Secretary was the thing not possible for Spain — and, there 
 were many insinuations abroad that President Grant was playing for a third 
 term by contriving a war with Spain. The London Times, January 24, 1876, 
 put in this weighty observation apropos of the stirring communications of 
 Mr. Fish: 
 
 "This remarkable correspondence can hardly fail to excite American 
 politicians, not because there is likely to be any difference of opinion in the 
 United States as to the iniquities of Spain, but because the policy of inviting 
 the cooperation of the European powers is a bold departure from the political 
 traditions of the United States. The invitation has not been addressed to 
 Great Britain alone, but also to the governments of France and Italy, and to 
 the three Empires. This is manifestly an abandonment of the 'Monroe 
 Doctrine,' which has so long controlled American policy, and has discon- 
 nected it, at all events in theory, from the general web of political interests 
 throughout the civilized world. To exclude from the American continent not 
 , only every advance by annexation or colonization of the monarchical powers 
 of Europe, but every direct influence of those governments for good or evil, 
 was in substance the political dogma which takes its name from President 
 Monroe. This monstrous pretension at the time when the Democratic party 
 and the slave power were in close alliance had nearly assumed an aggressive 
 form, and if events had not checked and rebuked it, would probably have 
 tempted the Union into a ruinous filibustering policy. 
 
 "The civil war prevented the United States from actively asserting the 
 
102 THE OLD, OLD .STORY IN SPAIN. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, though the intervention of France," England, and Spain in 
 the affairs of Mexico, excited . vehement protests on the other side of the 
 Atlantic. But Mr. Fish's invitation to the European powers, recognizing, as 
 it does, the fact that the nations of Europe have interests to watch and defend 
 on the American continent, marks very distinctly the progress of the people of 
 the United States in political good sense. It is sheer folly for any country, 
 however powerful and however confident in its destiny, to take upon itself to 
 wall off half the world, and say to the commonwealth of nations, 'You have 
 nothing to do with all on this side. ' The claim is as inadmissible as that of 
 the Holy See to partition the unknown lands of the East and the West 
 between Spain and Portugal." 
 
 The Pall Mall Gazette, January 25, 1876, editorially called attention to 
 the statement that Mr. Fish communicated the substance of his instructions 
 "on the eve of the November elections,'' and presented an essay dwell- 
 ing with varied application upon the difficulties of the establishment of a 
 "stable government" in Cuba. 
 
 It has not been forgotten that at the time President McKinley used the 
 phrase, "stable government," the members of Congress .distinguished for 
 high temperature held that it was fatally lacking in propriety, because the 
 word "government" was not qualified by "Republican form," which was the 
 only sort of thing we could endure. We quote the Pall Mall Gazette : 
 
 "Whatever force there may- prove to be in the plea that General Grant 
 must be elected President a third time in order to carry on a war with the 
 Vatican, there is seemingly no popular conviction that it is worth while to 
 provoke a war with Spain in order to overcome the prejudice against a third 
 term. It does not indeed require any keen political acumen to detect the 
 difficulties which surround both the alternatives suggested in Mr. Fish's dis- 
 patch. It is a cheap exercise of international officiousness to hope that Spain 
 may spontaneously adopt measures for the organization of a stable and satis- , 
 factory system of government in Cuba, but if Mr. Fish had to state in words 
 what the measures in question should be, the impossibility of framing them 
 would be at once apparent. If Spain succeeds in putting down the insurrec- 
 tion, a stable government of a certain kind may be established! If the 
 United States go to war and annex Cuba, a stable government of a certain 
 kind may be established. 
 
 "But to talk of a stable government in an island in which the passions 
 
THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 103 
 
 excited by quarrels of race, of color, of social position, have raged with 
 scarcely any restriction for more than five years, while proclaiming in the 
 same breath the impropriety of these passions being subdued by the hand of 
 any external power, is to use words which have no meaning. The concession 
 of independence to Cuba might mean peace as between the mother country 
 and her emancipated colony, but it would not mean peace in Cuba itself. On 
 the contrary, it would only mean war, renewed with greater determination, and 
 conducted with greater fierceness, between the insurgents and that part of 
 the population which, as Mr. Fish very truly puts it, 'has sustained- and 
 upheld, if it has not controlled, successive governors-general. ' How this con- 
 flict would end we do not pretend to say, but is safe to predict that while it 
 lasted it would be characterized by j'et greater atrocities, and inflict yet greater 
 annoyances on foreign residents than the war which has gone on so long. 
 
 "After a time the exhaustion of resources and the partial extermination 
 of the fighting population would bring active hostilities to an end ; but the 
 experience of West Indian and South American independence does not make 
 their subsequent resumption at all unlikely. It is to create this sort of 
 wilderness within sight of the United States that the American people were 
 invited to run the risk of a war with Spain. For that a war with Spain 
 involves very grave risk to the United States is undoubted. At the outset of 
 a contest which can only be carried on at sea, the comparative wealth, num- 
 bers, and resources of the combatants go for little, except so far as they are 
 embodied in actual ships. 
 
 "The power of Spain, such as it is, is so embodied; the power of the 
 United States is not ; and it is at least possible that the first act of a war 
 between the two countries might be the bombardment of every American 
 seaport. It does credit to the good sense of the American people that they 
 have not cared to run this risk for the doubtful benefits of annexing an island 
 which they do not want and being ruled for four years longer by General Grant. ' ' 
 
 The recklessness of a large portion of this utterance does not remove the 
 pertinence of the discussion of the troublesome responsibilities attendant upon 
 governing Cuba — even after the Spanish have departed, and when the chances 
 of the bombardment of our ports seem to be very remote. We have Cuba 
 under the American flag, and it is there the symbol first of order, for the state 
 of the country demands the direct care of the military method of preserving 
 the peace of society. 
 
104 THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 
 
 The domination of Spain in Cuba for four centuries and six years has 
 stamped upon the people characteristics that wrii not-for a long time- cease 
 from troubling, and the first installment of difficulty comes in the extravagant 
 presumption of the insurgents, who have throughout the warfare that the 
 Spaniards have been too sluggish to suppress, failed utterly in candor with 
 the friends of the freedom of Cuba, and they have with system grievously 
 falsified the situation. The cause of Cuba would have been far better pre- 
 sented if the truth had been told, but sensations, red and yellow — the colors of 
 Spain — were in endless demand by those engaged in the preparation of 
 bulletins, the primary purpose of which was to bring on war between the 
 United States and Spain, assuming that we would conquer the island and turn it 
 over to the first comers claiming to have provided a Republican Cuban govern- 
 ment. It is fortunate that we are pledged to give Cuba, as the first fruits of 
 victory, a "stable government." Stability is the first necessity. The only 
 way of redeeming the promise of stability is through military government, 
 and that must continue until we have discovered the constituency of a 
 "stable government." It was the policy of Maximo Gomez to annihilate 
 the two great industries in Cuba-^sugar and tobacco production — and he did 
 it ruthlessly, that the Spaniards might be impoverished. In a greater degree 
 he has made the Cubans poor. He desired to combine with Xhe desolation of 
 the cane and tobacco fields the abolishment of peaceable occupation, so that 
 the laboring men could be driven to fight with him. The disorganization of 
 civilization was, with this stroke of barbarism, made complete. Notwith' 
 standing the armies under Gomez declined in numbers and active service, and 
 he has been more and more cautious in actual warfare, content to hold areas 
 of tropical wilderness by scattered squads with a system of speedy dispersion 
 and concentration. Maceo was hard pi-essed in Pinar del Rio, west of Captain- 
 General Weyler's trocha, and for months had maintained against great odds, 
 with high courage and consummate address, a combat in the theretofore 
 unviolated Paradise of tobacco, hoping for the return of Gomez from the 
 east, where after his wonderful westward march he receded to the mountains 
 and swamps, in whose shelter it was the explanation of friends that he was 
 gathering a host of freedom to swoop down upon Havana, after the manner 
 of many Key West bulletins, relieving Maceo from the strain of a situation of 
 desperate hardihood. The more certain it was that Gomez could only move 
 from one obscure retirement to another, the wilder grew the Key West music 
 
THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. i°7 
 
 on the wires announcing the invincible hero proceeding by forced marches on 
 the way to Havana, which certainly he would assault in a few days! This 
 methodical fabrication was in its nature the same discovered in the oificial 
 Spanish dispatches. The truth was not valued on either side. Maceo fell in 
 a skirmish after he had crossed Weyler's trocha and met four hundred men 
 who were advised of his coming. He was not "lured" by the Spaniards 
 under a flag of truce and assassinated, as stated with all the pomp of fiction. 
 He rode up to the firing when a Spanish column was, not unexpectedly, 
 encountered, and was killed by a Mauser bullet through the neck. The story 
 of his betrayal and murder was frantically worked, in the hope that Ameri- 
 cans might be exasperated to madness and rushed headlong into war. The 
 Spanish falsehood for this incident was that there was a "battle" in which 
 the soldiers of Spain were most brave and that the rebels were routed, Maceo 
 falling in the midst of the affray. The "battle" was a skirmish-line affair, 
 over in a few minutes, and Maceo's men, recovering his body, gave it secret 
 burial. With his fall the aggressive impulse" of the insurgents ceased, with 
 the exception of the operations conducted in the eastern provinces by General 
 Garcia. There was no intermission, however, in the triumphant chapters of 
 militant Cuban literature, transmitted from Key West. The Cuban army, as 
 it appeared when the American army landed in Cuba, was not what had been 
 represented, and it was evident that there had been deliberate deception 
 carried on by the Cuban Bureau of Intelligence, specially provided for its 
 effect upon the American people. However, the Gomez policy had been 
 successful in stopping work in the fields, and the "troops" of the Cuban 
 government were willing to receive rations from the American army of 
 liberation, but they were resolute to. retain their arms until they could find a 
 paymaster; and they will not go into another rebellion while their names are 
 on a payroll. It is their misfortune that under the guidance of Gomez they 
 destroyed the industries of their country that Spain might be harmed, Ixit 
 made themselves poor indeed. 
 
 When the ten years' war in Cuba began in 1868, there were less, than 
 seven thousand Spanish regulars on the island, and after reinforcements, one 
 hundred thousand strong, had been sent across the Atlantic, neither the 
 military nor the civil administration of Spain in the last of her great provinces 
 had been improved. The sharpest offense that could be given the Spaniards 
 was to propose as a tentative alternative that the insurgents should have 
 
io8 THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 
 
 rights as belligerents, and yet the greatest army any nation ever transported 
 three thousand miles was year after year unable to report decisive progress in 
 campaigns of pacification. There was not a public man in Spain who did not 
 know that the one thing needful to the Spanish cause in Cuba was military 
 success, and there was an army of regulars that should number nearly or 
 quite one hundred thousand, with firemen, policemen and volunteers nearly 
 fifty thousand, and a swarm of gunboats and ships of war forming a coast 
 guard; and yet there were no results from the presence of this immense 
 array which was consuming the life, of Spain. The Spanish Cabinet and 
 diplomatic representatives prayed for military success to build a hope upon, 
 but the only victories for the Spaniards were the extension of deserts, the 
 spread of famine, and the stalking abroad of pestilence. The distance from 
 Spain to Cuba was greater than the fleets or legions of the Romans covered, 
 and the British armies that crossed the Atlantic in the attempted subjugation 
 of the thirteen revolted colonies, never showed fifty per cent of the numerical 
 strength of the Spaniards of the regular army in Cuba. The Spanish volun- 
 teers were additional, and yet, until in the final strife that preceded the 
 armed intervention of the United States, the western provinces of Cuba were 
 not seriously molested, and the sugar and tobacco crops up to that time 
 increased. It is only in the studies of Spanish character, both in the penin- 
 sula and the island, by Caleb Cushing, our Minister to Spain in the closing 
 years of Grant's administration, that the phenomenon of the inability of the 
 Spanish forces to take a vigorous initiative is explained. The military 
 capacity of the Spanish race has in modern times been almost exclusively 
 defensive. The side that has the privilege of ambuscades and can pursue the 
 strategy and the tactics of evasion, elusion and procrastination is unconquer- 
 able, except by soldiers of a tougher fiber and a more alert and determined 
 spirit in advancing upon concealed foes than themselves. The Cubans 
 could no more fight battles with Spanish regulars in the open field than the 
 Spaniards could fight the French in regular order in the warfare with 
 Napoleon. Wellington found his Spanish allies, during the Peninsular war, 
 uncertain and fantastic, as the American generals discovered the Cubans, 
 who emerged from the swamps and mountains when Shaffer's divisions were 
 climbing the hills of Santiago, alternately scorched and drenched, and 
 stricken with ghastly fevers. It turned out that the Spaniards, ineffectual in 
 attacking the Cuban guerrillas in familiar fastnesses, when intrenched 
 
THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 109 
 
 behind entanglements of barbed wire, were keen and steady as defenders, 
 standing up to their work manfully; but their courage in resisting assaults 
 was no more testimony that their colonial system was not disastrous infamy, 
 than the success of the Cubans in bushwhacking was evidence that they had 
 organized a Republic and should resume the art of government where the 
 Spaniards left it. 
 
 All there was of the Cuban question that concerned us was thrashed over 
 during the ten years' war, 1868-78. Out of a hundred thousand men the 
 Spaniards then had in Cuba, they lost seventeen thousand from sickness in 
 1877, and the next year treated with the armed insurgents, bribing some, 
 cajoling others, promising all things with a broad profusion that was proof 
 they attached no value to their words. There was peace for a few years — 
 that is, there were intrigues in place of skirmishes, when, as has been the 
 stated custom in the stories of Spanish colonial conflicts, the stipulations of 
 reformation without performance having run their course, hostilities were 
 resumed at the old stands in the well-known ways, with the usual Junta in 
 New York, and the regular equipments all around. This time the brain that 
 organized the customary outbreak was in a civil capacity Jos^ Marti, with 
 Maximo Gomez as the military chieftain, supreme in general direction, and 
 Antonio *Maceo, a soldier of personal daring and many high qualities. Early 
 in the conflict Marti, exposing himself to encourage followers, was slain, and 
 within two years the two Maceos, ' plunging into desperate situations, 
 perished. The chieftains of the insurgents invaded eastern Cuba in small 
 boats, finding their way from Hayti to appointed Cuban coves, where friends 
 awaited them, and it was not long before the development that a revolt against 
 the Spaniards of the Peninsula, of a more sanguinary and destructive nature 
 than ever, had been encountered. The constant cry of the Spanish through 
 the years of bloody contention was that the Cuban rebels would, if it was in 
 their power, make of the splendid island an enlarged San Domingo — and the 
 horrors of French experience were recited to terrorize all who were unwilling 
 to accept barbarism as freedom. The Spanish cartoons on display in Havana 
 always represented the rebellion as personified by a black man, uncouth and 
 horrid, torch and knife in hand, grossly threatening Cuba drawn as a beauti- 
 ful white woman; Uncle Sam — an unwieldy hog with snout and tail, a 
 starry hat and striped coat-tails and trousers — instigating the black monster to 
 violence. It was the Gomez policy to accept this issue by the use of the 
 
no THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 
 
 torch, and the war took on a dreadful aspect, in widespread planta:tion fires 
 rolling westward, the fiery clouds of conflagrations consuming the cane fields 
 and mills, and finally the tobacco houses stored with leaves precious as fine 
 gold. The insurgents burned the better houses and laid waste the areas of 
 black and red sugar and tobacco land, whose cultivation had yielded mar- 
 velous opulence. In turn the Spaniards burned the humbler dwellings and 
 the villages they could not garrison. The Cubans were accomplished horse- 
 men, and domestic animals and the fruit trees afforded the shifty, irregular 
 cavaliers food supplies. The Spaniards slaughtered the horses and cattle they 
 could not ride or drive away, and the sheep and pigs it was inconvenient to 
 capture and hold in pens were massacred. On both sides there was infuriated 
 savagery, and the wretched camps, where famine and pestilence made war 
 most hideous, were the result. The responsibility rested upon both parties 
 to the interminable conflict of barbarities. . Weyler and Gomez were the 
 representative men of this diabolical warfare. More and more, the people in 
 Cuba of intelligence equal to understanding that there must be order before 
 prosperity could be restored, and that authority must be found and applied, 
 not committed to the everlasting confusion and reprisals of the partisans of 
 vengeance, before the restoration of hopefulness would be rational, were 
 persuaded and convinced that with the people of the United States and their 
 army and navy must rest the responsibility, and in them be found th,e 
 capacity for saving jurisdiction. The Cuban Republic, if the island 
 should be turned over to the Key West and New York colonies, and the 
 bands that are in arms looking for money that they may continue to be an 
 army, and play the part the Spaniards have played out, would make the 
 fruition of American sacrifices the extension of unmitigated San Domingo 
 terrors. It is the first obligation of the United States in possession of Cuba, 
 to American civilization, to use the force necessary to prevent this consum- 
 mation, most devoutly to be deprecated, and the fact should be fearlessly 
 presented, discussed without hesitation, declared without the shadow of 
 misgiving, that the correct policy of our country is and always has been that 
 of the ultimate annexation of Cuba. The island wants American rule, and 
 not a continuance of the Spanish styles of tyranny, corruption and spoliation, 
 whether direct or indirect. We did not make war in Cuba for our health, and 
 in the island of the palm and the orange, coffee and cane, tropic woods and 
 iron ores, of fruits and flowers, birds and fishes of surpassing beauty and 
 
THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. m 
 
 utility, the government must change hands actually and the wholesome heal- 
 ing American influences prevail through stable government under the law- 
 sustained by the American people, armed and puissant. 
 
 The correspondence of our State Department has for a generation been 
 unnecessarily littered with disavowals of the logic of history and the teachings 
 of geography on this subject of the occupation and possession of Cuba by and 
 for ourselves. We would at any time have paid Spain one hundred millions 
 of dollars for the island, and twenty-five millions for Porto Rico, and the 
 actual trouble, deeper than any other in embarrassing the negotiations, has 
 been the necessity of providing a large margin for the middleman. It 
 would be a strange official transaction in Spain, and one certain to decline and 
 perish by the way, if there were not a reserved fund amounting to a large 
 percentage for the gentlemen who took the risks of the delicate antecedent 
 manipulations. The Cuban Republic — that is, the civil side of the guerrilla 
 war — lost the opportunity to gain the first foothold and title to the island, 
 and finance the rebellion when under the Gomez policy, of destroying Spanish 
 resources by desolating Cuban plantations; the" credit of the country itself, 
 with all its wealth of plantations, was annihilated. Cuba might have been 
 purchased by Cubans, if the war had not been made a sacrifice of civilization. 
 Cuba, with the sugar and tobacco fields preserved, would have been good for 
 a loan of $150,000,000, at 6 per cent. The customs of the two principal ports 
 guaranteed in the hands of American appointees for the interest on the bonds 
 — $100, 000, 000 purchase money, and the $50,000,000 judiciously distributed, it 
 is demonstrated that the Cubans by themselves could never have freed them- 
 selves. Whatever good there was, or harm, in extinguishing the $150,000,000 
 scheme belongs to the torches of Gomez, but in the fires of the plantations 
 were consumed the one opportunity for the Republic of Cuba to become, in 
 the .language that so often rings around the walls of the halls of Congress, 
 one of the nations of the earth. The insurgents burned their ability to 
 establish a stable government. We, the people of the United States, only, 
 have the will and the power to dispose of the sovereignty of Cuba, and the 
 duty of our destiny confronts us upon that line, and imposes upon us the 
 acconiplishment of the purposes of the war, upon which we entered with 
 generous sentiments, unprepared save in the reserved forces of our inherent 
 strength — the war which we conducted speedily to a triumphant and glorious 
 conclusion. 
 
112 THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 
 
 During the twenty years following our centennial celebration of the 
 declaration of our independence, when we were seeking in the courts of 
 Europe cooperation in demanding of Spain actual concessions that would 
 prevent her exhaustion in 3. struggle that the character of her people made 
 them incapable of conducting to success — or to terminate at all — the prestige 
 of the Spaniards as a nation has declined, while our advancement has been 
 incessant, and conspicuous. The statistics of our progress have notified all 
 whom it might concern that here was one of the great Powers, and that 
 when she came to the front there would be none to dispute her right to be 
 heard at the ends of the earth, and at the opening and closing of great ques- 
 tions. The Spanish people should not be decried, but rather there ought to 
 be free affirmation that they made extravagant sacrifices for Cuba of the 
 young men of the country, and called upon the last scrap of credit — indeed, of 
 everything but her incompetent pride and prejudice-»-to save the province. 
 Spain was the less reasonable because dealing with her children. The quali- 
 ties of those in the name of liberty insurgents were the same possessed by 
 the oppressors whose perpetual outcry was of the dignity and hono"r of Spain, 
 both of which were perverted from the ways of wisdom in which were alone 
 the paths of peace. Spain had not appreciated human decadence, or esti- 
 mated the proportions of our gigantic consolidation of force. She counted a 
 great army and many ships of war, and in the course of her many years of 
 strife in Cuba she had relied upon bulk and severity, not upon the keenness 
 of weapons and the relentless energies that strike quickly and pursue without 
 sleep a fixed purpose to the end. The Spanish armies were handled in 
 columns, like droves of patient cattle. The men were excellent soldierly 
 material, but there was the taint of corruption in every detail of the manage- 
 ment, and the marches to and fro were without a common purpose, or a 
 special object. The Spanish soldiers were not instructed to go into the fire, 
 to penetrate the hearts of ambuscades with rushes of steel. They were not 
 equipped for mobility, and the fairest of islands, with the gift of beauty and 
 endowment of riches, was ill provided with roads, a deadly disability for 
 Spanish columns. Finding themselves at last committed to war with the 
 United States, and presently realizing that they were overmatched, the Span- 
 ish statesmen remembered the diplomatic situation of twenty years before, 
 when no court in Europe countenanced President Grant's administration in 
 putting a pressure upon Spain to part with Cuba, except upon the condition of 
 
THE OLD, OLD STORY IN SPAIN. 
 
 113 
 
 an impossible conquest of the island for herself. It was the last reliance of 
 the Spaniards that there would be European intervention to fix limitations 
 upon our ambitious aggrandizement. When Spain sued for peace she soon 
 became conscious that the world was changed. She had expended herself 
 upon her own faults in Cuba, and had to surrender islands as she had given up 
 continents. It was for her an old story. The Powers that were aloof when 
 Secretary Fish pleaded so ably and with perseverance for intervention in the 
 name of peace in Cuba, and gave Spain two decades to adjust the affairs that 
 she claimed as her own, refused to intervene in behalf of Spain beaten down, 
 and there was something more than the wreck of her fleets and the captivity 
 of her armies or the poverty of her treasury. She was primarily accountable 
 for the elements of discordance that brought woe and ruin upon the island 
 and humiliation upon the peninsula, and the cruelties of the system of -warfare 
 pursued on both sides were her own. Even more, it was the fault of the 
 misgovernment of Spain at home and abroad that the world was shocked by 
 incidents of atrocity incredible with other surroundings, from the individual 
 ferocities of slaughter and the vengeful, remorseless, cowardly executions, to 
 the massacre of the crew of the Maine! The consensus of human judgment 
 had declared, after four hundred years, the execution of sentence of death 
 upon the colonial system of Spain. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Ten Years' War in Cuba. 
 
 The Stir About It in Europe — The Money Resources of Spain Stated by Minister Cushing— 
 Europe Against Our Intervention in Cuba — The Filibuster Hostility to President 
 Grant — The London Times on Hamilton Fish — ^A Minister Promises Too Much. 
 
 The Senate of the United States, March 24, 1896, requested the State De- 
 partment to furnish the papers relating to the "mediation" or "intervention" of 
 the United States, between Novembers, 1875, and "the date of the pacification" 
 of Cuba in 1878. The resolution called for the letter of the Secretary, Hamil- 
 ton Fish, to Minister Caleb Cushing, of the date of November, 1875, and all 
 notes, dispatches, and telegrams, so far as compatible with the public inter- 
 est. Mr. Fish said that when Mr. Cushing departed for Madrid, apart from 
 the generally unsatisfactory state of things in Spanish relations, there were 
 several prominent questions unadjusted, the settlement of which was deemed 
 necessary before affairs with Spain could be established in a satisfactory way. 
 Among these questions, Mr. Fish said some arose from the embargo and con- 
 hscation of estates of American citizens in Cuba in violation of treaty obli- 
 gations, and the claims arising out of the capture of the Virginius, including 
 the trial and punishment of General Burriel. It had not been pretended, so 
 far as the Secretary was aware, that any legal justification for these wrongs 
 had been attempted on the part of the authorities of Spain, or that the pro- 
 ceedings in Cuba were defended or upheld. 
 
 On the contrary, pursuant to the decree issued by the government on the 
 12th of July, J873, the illegality and indefensible character of the acts were 
 admitted, "and the embargoes ordered to be removed and the property 
 restored. This decree was at first received in Cuba with calm indifference, 
 not even published or adverted to, and the proceedings of the authorities were 
 in no notable respect changed thereby." 
 
 This shows the protracted power of the inertia" of Spain. Mr. Fish cited 
 in this connection specimen cases, and the promises of the Spanish Ministers, 
 
 114 
 
L 
 
 LEADING GENERALS WHO tOMMANDED INSURGENT FORlES IN CUBA. 
 
THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. . 117 
 
 unperformed, and the Secretary remarked the simple mention of the facts, of 
 "the promises made-andr repeated, the assurances- given from time to time,- that 
 something should be done, the admission of the justice of the demands of this 
 country, at least to the extent of expressing regret for these wrongs and 
 promising redress, followed as they have been by absolutely no performance, 
 and no practical steps whatever toward performance, heed no extended com- 
 ment." He added: 
 
 "In the cases of embargo and confiscation, not only have wrongs been 
 long since done, but continuing and repeated wrongs are daily inflicted. The 
 authorities of Spain in Cuba, during all this time, have been and are using the 
 revenues of the confiscated or embargoed estates, appropriating much of 
 the property itself, and in some cases executing long leases, or actually mak- 
 ing sales, either on the allegation that taxes were due or without any excuse 
 whatever. 
 
 "In .the cases of arrest and punishment, citizens of the United States, in 
 like manner, have undergone punishment because the authorities of Spain do 
 not meet the issue and decide the question." This ought to have been like a 
 live coal on the Spanish back, but there were no results. 
 
 After referring to the Virginius case, and the payment of a sum of 
 money by Spain, settling clainis of English and American citizens, the 
 Secretary added impressively: 
 
 "I regret t& say that the authorities of Spain have not at all times appre- 
 ciated our intentions or our purposes in these respects, and, while insisting 
 that a state of war does not exist in Cuba and that no rights as belligerents 
 should be accorded to the insurrectionists, have at the same time demanded 
 for themselves all the rights and privileges which flow from actual and 
 acknowledged war. 
 
 "It will be apparent that such a state of things cannot continue. [But 
 they did nearly twenty-three years, long after the honorable career of Mr. 
 Fish had terminated. — Editor.] It is absolutely necessary to the maintenance 
 of our relations with Spain, even on their present footing, that our just 
 demands for the return to citizens of the United States of their estates in 
 Cuba, unincumbered, and for securing to them a trial for offenses according 
 to treaty provisions and all other rights guaranteed by treaty and by public 
 law, should be complied with. 
 
 "Whether the Spanish government, appreciating the forbearance of this 
 
ii8 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 
 
 country, will speedily and satisfactorily adjust the pending questions, not by 
 the issue of empty orders or decrees without force or effect in Cuba, but by 
 comprehensive and firm measures which shall everywhere be respected, I 
 anxiously await further intelligence. 
 
 "Moreover, apart from these particular questions, in the opinion of the 
 President the time has arrived when the interests of this country, the preser- 
 vation of its commerce, and the instincts of humanity alike demand that some 
 speedy and satisfactory ending be made of the strife that is devastating Cuba. 
 
 "A disastrous conflict of more that seven years' duration has demon- 
 strated the inability of Spain to maintain peace and order in an island lying at 
 our door. Desolation and destruction of life and property have been the only 
 results of this conflict. 
 
 "The United States sympathizes in the fact that this inability results in a 
 large degree from the unhappy condition of Spain at home and to some extent 
 from the distractions which are dividing her people. But the fact remains. 
 Added to this are the large expanse of ocean separating the peninsula from 
 the island and the want of harmony and of personal sympathy between the 
 inhabitants of the territory of the home government and those of the colony, 
 the distinction of classes in the latter between rulers and subjects, the want of 
 adaptation of the ancient colonial system of 3pain to the present times and to 
 the ideas which the events of the past age have impressed upon the peoples 
 of every reading and thinking country." 
 
 The aggravations of the case of Spain in provoking the United States to 
 take summary methods have not been stated with greater force than in these 
 quiet sentences. There are two other passages necessary to complete the 
 statement of facts, with the calm solidity that bears down opponents, with 
 the inherent moderation that shows the weaknesses of the exaggeration that 
 impairs the integrity of true strengthl. The note of Mr. Fish to Mr. Cushing 
 was duplicated to General Schenck, Minister of the United States to England, 
 who was instructed to read it to Lord Derby, and Cushing was directed to- 
 wait for the result of the effort to obtain the cooperation of England. Mr. 
 Cushing was of the judgment that this letter of instructions from Secretary 
 Fish was dangerous, and might result in war. To this effect he wrote a letter 
 and sent a telegram November 2Sth, saying in the letter he "almost wished" 
 his instructions "were less specific." He said the condition of Spain was a 
 -temptation to her to go to war. 
 
THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 119 
 
 Many of the most thoughtful men in Spain, he affirmed, really longed for 
 a foreign war as the only efficient remedy for the domestic dissensions that 
 distracted the country. 
 
 "Moreover, the statesmen of the country foresaw that on the close of the 
 war in the North (the Carlist conflict), which cannot fail to come in the course 
 of the winter or early in the spring, there will be an army of two or three 
 hundred thousand men to dispose of, with its officers, who will be but, too 
 much disposed to dominate in public affairs and push the civilians into the 
 background." In addition to which, there was a multitude of "unthoughtful 
 men, proud, angry, resentful, who would gladly rush into a war with the 
 United States." Finally, there were "the mercenary, the ambitious, the 
 declasses and the bad, to whom war presents the usual attractions. 'Multis- 
 utile bellum,' says Sallust." 
 
 More than this, Mr. Gushing declared: "It is the received opinion in 
 Spain that for the commencing period of a war she has a more efficient navy 
 than ours,"- and, "In these circumstances, if Great Britain declines to 
 cooperate with us, Spain will, at the least, despatch to Guba at once a large 
 fleet laden with troops, there to await the eventualities of diplomacy, anC 
 she may break off relations, with a hostile appeal to the European Powers. ' ' 
 
 In his telegram of Novembei' 25 th, General Gushing said of the mission of 
 General Schenck to sound Lord Derby, that if England joined us Spain would 
 "succumb in sullen despair," but if England stood off Spain would think she 
 had the sympathy of Europe, especially as by her note of the 15 th she had 
 gone to "the ultimate point in satisfaction of each of the particular griefs of 
 the United States." Mr. Gushing urgently pressed the Secretary, "in 
 proportion" as he "desired peace," to give explicit and specific, replies in 
 regard "to certain most needful instructions he would ask for by telegraph if 
 a negative answer came from Great Britain." In case of that negative 
 answer, Gushing cabled: "There will be war, and a popular though desper- 
 ate one on the part of Spain, unless she can be convinced that the real and 
 true object of the contemplated measure is to prevent war, as I understand it 
 to be intended. -But to ward off war will exact the steady exercise of all my 
 personal influence here (which my colleagues tell me is great), and will require 
 that influence to be efficiently backed by my government both here and at 
 Washington. I am to 'obey orders though it break owners, ' as the shipmasters 
 say." 
 
120 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 
 
 The Spanish note to Mr. Gushing contained proposals for adjustment for 
 existing differences between the United States and Spain. Its substance was 
 telegraphed to Mr. Fish by Mr. Gushing November i6, 1875. It had no 
 reference to mediation or intervention by the United States in the affairs 
 of Guba. 
 
 November 27th, Gushing was telegraphed that in consequence of his 
 telegram Schenck was instructed to delay the reading of the Gushing instruct 
 tions to Derby! and the Secretary said the instruction was "not intended to be 
 minatory in any sense, but in the spirit of friendship." 
 
 Mr. Gushing was a man of extraordinary range of information and a 
 faculty of literary expression very rare. His paper addressed to the State 
 Department on the financial situation of Spain is an excellent example. We 
 quote in full : 
 
 "Madrid, November 26, 1875. — The finances of Spain are in a very bad 
 condition, simply for want-of credit in the stock market of Europe. 
 
 "Nevertheless, she is enabled to carry a large floating debt by loans on 
 short time, say six months or a year, and to renew the bonds as they fall due 
 by merely adding the interest to the mass of such floating debt. 
 
 "But she has considerable resources in reserve for times and occasions of 
 desperation. 
 
 "ist. The Bank of Spain possesses a large metallic fund which the 
 government could and would seize upon in such emergency, in imitation of 
 what Great Britain did in wars of the French Revolution. 
 
 "2d. There is really much wealth in the country, and it would be drawn 
 forth in a war with the United States. Patriotic gifts would come in, forced 
 loans would be submitted to, and the domestic capitalists would more freely 
 advance to the government. 
 
 "3d. Spain might recur to forms of credit which all other nations resort 
 to in the last necessity, as we ourselves did in the legal-tender act. The 
 process would begin with indefinite issue of bills of the Bank of Spain in the 
 whole country, instead of, as now, in the province of Madrid alone ; and would 
 extend to the issue of treasury notes or certificates. To be sure, such action 
 would speedily raise the price of gold, but not to a higher point than it 
 reached with us in similar circumstances. 
 
 "Meanwhile, the augmented circulation would serve, as it did with us, to 
 prompt new enterprises, and thus add to the actual productive resources of 
 
THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 123 
 
 the country, not only in industries dependent on war, but in mines and in 
 undeveloped agriculture, to the ultimate advantage's of Spain. 
 
 "The Spaniards are a people preeminently sober in food and drink, 
 economical, and enduring under privations and hardships — as you may infer 
 from the wages of labor, which vary according to the quality from two to 
 three or four pesetas a day, where, in the United States, similar labor would 
 be reckoned at the sarde number of dollars. Hence, armies are contentedly 
 supported here, and always have been, so cheaply as to constitute a real addi- 
 tion to the relative military resources of Spain. The contrast in this respect 
 between Spanish and English soldiers struck the Duke of Wellington. 
 
 "I note these facts as being material and important in the present 
 question. That is, we must not confide in a deficiency of financial resources 
 standing in the way if Spain be hard pushed and stirred up to make sacrifices 
 in case of a war with the United States. 
 
 "And the finances of Spain are not in a much worse condition than they 
 were in the time of Charles V. and his successors of the Austrian dynasty. 
 Great loans were rarer then than now. Spain relied much on wealthy Jews 
 for anticipations, although Jews and Gentiles, in the matter of money lending, 
 incurred hazards quite in proportion to the profits, as illustrated in the hard- 
 ships of the Jews in Spain and the case of Jacques Cosur in France. In truth, 
 the Fuggers of Augsburg are among the few houses of that class which 
 remain to this day. Hence the terrible financial straits which the Philips — 
 II., III., and IV. — were constantly suffering in Spain. Nevertheless, they 
 sustained great wars all over the world. 
 
 "I add that, according to telegrams received from Havana, the mission of 
 Mr. Rubi has already produced important results, so that he is able to make 
 assurance of having equalized the revenue and the expenditures and of under- 
 taking to pay regularly all current obligations after the ist of January. 
 
 "I have, etc., — C. Gushing." 
 
 Of this it is now to be remarked that Spain has exhausted all these 
 resources, and if it is the opinion of that country that the honor of the nation 
 is saved, there should be no disputation of that consolation. 
 
 Mr. Gushing reports his interview with the Spanish Minister of State on 
 November 30th, saying, "A little to my surprise, he took the whole matter 
 very coolly," notwithstanding possible "intervention" was expressly men- 
 tioned. The Minister of State said Spain was not in a hurry to go to war 
 
124 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 
 
 with the United States, and was assured the United States was not in a 
 hurry to go to war with Spain. In his remarks to the Spanish Minister of 
 State, Mr. Gushing said: "In the hope that the contents of the Spanish note 
 may be satisfactory, the President desists from the concrete purpose expressed 
 in the dispatch of the 5th and substitutes a proposition which is merely expect- 
 ant. Meanwhile, I am charged in the first place to explain to you confi- 
 dentially what will be the actual text of the message.- The President will 
 discountenance the concession of the recognition of either independence or 
 belligerence to the insurgents of Cuba; he will allude to the injuries inflidted 
 upon the United States and on their citizens b)' the prolonged struggle in 
 Cuba, and the absence as yet of clear indications of its termination; he wilt 
 intimate, as an ulterior necessity, intervention, unless positive results be soon 
 reached, but he will abstain from advising it at present. 
 
 "I am instructed to deliver to you a copy of the said dispatch of the 5th 
 instant, written before the delivery to me of the Spanish note, and, as is to b*e 
 supposed, without knowledge of the intention of the government of His 
 Majesty. 
 
 "This dispatch is not conceived in any minatory sense, but on the con- 
 trary, in a spirit of friendship, as a notice of a pressing necessity, which may 
 force the President in given circumstances from which he desires to save him- 
 self and desires Spain to aid him in escaping them. ' ' 
 
 This is an entertaining example of Mr. Cushing's views for obeying the 
 letter of his instructions, and imparting to his conversation a spirit of concilia- 
 tion in contradiction of the administration of the State Department. He 
 certainly succeeded in conveying the intimation of intervention, and the fact 
 of the impatience of President Grant, in terms so gentle that there was no 
 agitation. Mr. Cushing knew well the current ideas of the Spaniards, their 
 understanding that they had a navy superior to ours in the seventies, and the 
 ultimate capacity of the government to find money for war purposes, but 
 there had not been within the range of his observation any experience that 
 would warrant the anticipation of public opinion on the Peninsula for giving 
 up the distant colonies. But with all his versatile astuteness, Mr. Cushing 
 could send this effusive telegram : . 
 
 "Madrid, December 4, 1875. — Brief important interview with Minister of 
 State. He takes office solely in the hope of settlement with us ; has carefully 
 read your 266; admits our grievances; is opposed in principle to sequestra- 
 
THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 125 
 
 tion of property of foreigners ; condemns the delays of redress ; will take up 
 and promptly settle each case; will remove all cause of complaint as to 
 treaty; reprobates conduct of local authorities in Cuba as more injurious to 
 Spain than to the United States. Cushing. " 
 
 The filibuster opinion that President Grant and his Cabinet were guilty 
 of a conservation touching closely timidity toward the Spaniards for their 
 misdemeanors in Cuba, has had such free course that it has in some degree 
 affected the popular intelligence and caused discoloration and distortion of 
 affairs. The truth is President Grant did not respect the style of war-making 
 of the cha,mpions of the Cuban cause with whom he came in contact. He 
 understood perfectly that it was the policy of the insurgents in Cuba to cause 
 by any means war between the United States and Spain and repay this 
 country with a supercilious show of gratitude — the leaders in the war out of 
 the island to assume the prerogatives and largely resume the methods of the 
 peninsular Spaniards, so that the difference between the government over- 
 thrown and that established would be the sort of reform the fox referred to 
 when he asked that the old swarm of fleas be allowed to remain, for the fresh 
 ones would be the greater bloodsuckers. The filibuster expeditions were 
 arranged and expected -to cause the United States to rush into war. The 
 demand for belligerent rights was expressly to increase the chances of conflict. 
 This story is a generation old. It has been duplicated within recent years, 
 and the game was being played with ever augmenting audacity, when the 
 catastrophe of the Maine influenced public opinion and the hour struck for the 
 settlement long deferred. The demand that the Maine should be sent to the 
 harbor of Havana was started by those who hoped something would happen to 
 make trouble, arid the Spaniards, infatuated with their own animosities and 
 verbose imbecility, played to the hand of the insurgents, for the lapse of time 
 had taught them folly only ; and when some of them were able to comprehend 
 the power of the United States .they thought of two things — the very small 
 army of this country, the inefficiency of our military systems for the speedy 
 mustering of our strength in the field, the deficiency of our docks for handling 
 war ships and the slight our demagogues had put upon both army and navy. 
 Our immense reserve of public spirit was not at all comprehended. The 
 Spaniards had deceived themselves as to our character. They really believed 
 we were not a warlike people. They forgot that we had taken grand lessons 
 of war in fighting each other — ^had kept for four years an unparalleled war 
 
126 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 
 
 school. Of course, there were Spaniards not so stupid as to suppose we should 
 he unable to get upon our feet, with old boys enough to teach the young ones 
 — ^but Spain felt herself after all her experiences of ill-fortune a great Euro- 
 pean power, and had faith that we would be called to account by the same 
 combination of monarchs that throttled poor Greece, while Turkey reduced 
 the plethora of the Greeks by blood-letting. The difference between life and 
 death in nations was not appreciated by the moribund. The Spaniards read 
 in the modern diplomatic history of their country, took courage from the 
 attitude of the great monarchies when President Grant , had them sounded as 
 to "intervention" by the United States in the affairs of Cuba. Then none 
 were pronounced in our favor, and the whole trend of monarchial opinion was 
 agaijist our policy, which, though well guarded in civil language, meant that 
 the young American giant was ascertaining his strength, and proposing, per- 
 haps "deeply innocent but probably after meditation, the disturbance of the 
 old scales in which the balance of power, understood to be the higher law of 
 the military nations, had been adjusted. Only the very well informed in this 
 country had a realizing sense of the persistent push of the purpose of inter- 
 vention in Cuba if peace was not restored that took place in our centennial 
 year. That was the epoch in which we were incomparably engaged in cele- 
 brating ourselves and at the same time the State Department was hard at 
 work, and the courts of Europe incessantly but quietly advised of our tend- 
 encies to put forth our hands and stop the desolation of the noblest of 
 American islands lying in a commercial and military sense at the mouth of the 
 Mississippi, whose valley is the heart of America. The Spaniards wanted to 
 know whether we would interfere for or against the insurgents, who no more 
 then than now had commanded the admiration of competent witnesses, and 
 deserved a good deal of what Mr. Cushing said of them, because they and 
 their peninsular Spaniards had so many fatilts in common. How very much 
 this article from the Evening Standard of London, January 29, 1876, reads as 
 if it might have appeared two years instead of twenty-two years ago : 
 
 "The Cuban insurrection is as long-lived as the Carlist revolt. There is 
 no calculating the amount of blood and treasure which have been drawn from 
 the mother country to restore quiet to the island within the past few years. 
 Reinforcements of troops have been sent periodically from Cadiz and San- 
 tander, not a tithe of whom Avill ever see Spain again ; captain-general sue- ■ 
 ceeds captain-general with the regularity of clockwork, and notwithstanding 
 
THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 127 
 
 the end never is, but always to be. The insurgents are beaten on the average 
 twice a month, yet somehow they always turn up in excellent health and 
 spirits as if they thrived on repeated defeat. It is very difficult to get at the 
 truth about Cuba ; but one prediction may be made with safety : As long as 
 Don Carlos parades Navarre and the Vascongadas, the pacification of Cuba 
 will be adjourned. No Spaniard with the spirit of a true hidalgo will allow 
 for a moment in public controversy that his country can part with the island, 
 and yet there is scarcely one traveled and educated Spaniard, we venture to 
 affirm, who will not admit in the intimacy of private conversation that his 
 country can not hold the island. ' ' 
 
 The London Times, of January 26th, said: 
 
 "In Europe at least there will be a tendency to do injustice to Mr. Fish's 
 indictment of Spain, precisely for the reason which may render it effective 
 among his own countrymen. When American diplomacy states a complaint, 
 it usually makes a large call on those general terms of invective which please 
 half-educated readers, but shock the taste and rouse the suspicions of the more 
 fastidious students. 
 
 "Critical minds are apt to fancy that the rhetoric has been framed for the 
 purpose of touching the Americans themselves, and when they mentally 
 translate it into scholarly English they tend to cut away much of the truth as 
 well as to improve the style. We speak the more frankly because Mr. Fisk 
 seeks to obtain the moral support of European countries in his contest with 
 the Spanish Minister of foreign affairs respecting the civil war in Cuba. He 
 would, we assure him, have been much more effective if he had given specific 
 examples of the wrongs or hardships suffered by his countrymen and left his 
 readers to supply general phrases of indictment. Nevertheless, there need be 
 no doubt that his charges are substantially just, and the truth itself so grave 
 as to need little ornament from rhetoric. 
 
 "In Cuba Spain owns one of the fairest and most fertile islands in the 
 world, and it has been detestably misgoverned. While we have allowed our 
 colonies to rule themselves in their own way, Spain has persisted in keeping 
 Cuba in the same state of tutelage as when she herself was the greatest power 
 in the world, and when the very idea of colonial rights had scarcely arisen. 
 The island has been dependent on the will of a government changed every 
 few years by a pronunciamiento or a popular revolution. It has been used as 
 a place of honorable banishment for unruly soldiers. The dangerous spirits 
 
128 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 
 
 of the army have been sent to Cuba to be kept out of mischief, and they have 
 let loose in the colony the temper .which had been found perilous at home. 
 Freed from responsibility, they have often displayed a repetition of that 
 domineering spirit, that contempt of the rights of others, and that cruelty 
 which once added dark chapters to the history of the Spanish conquest. The 
 slaughter of the crew of the Virginius was an act which would have been quite 
 natural three centuries ago, but which, when committed in our time, seems 
 wonderful on account of its folly as well as of its atrocity. If the author of 
 such a deed had been an Englishman, he would assuredly have been hung ; 
 yet he is still at liberty, and we believe he has still some kind of command. 
 
 "We cannot wonder that Mr. Fish,, who speaks for a people as proud in 
 their own way as the Spaniards and immeasurably more powerful, should 
 peremptorily demand the trial of General Burriel. America has also many 
 other causes of complaint. Her citizens owned much property in Cuba, and 
 a great deal of it has been confiscated by the Spanish government. Restitu- 
 tion has been promised and evaded. ' ' 
 
 It is amusing to note the London Times giving lessons in English to the 
 Honorable Hamilton Fish. The Times had to say, January, 1876, further: 
 
 "If the documents just presented to Congress are serious at all, they are 
 most important documents, and we incline, after making every allowance for 
 the necessities and peculiarities of President Grant's position, to believe that 
 they are more serious than is generally imagined. It is perfectly possible 
 that General Grant has decided in his own mind that he will not quit office 
 without inflicting punishment on Spain, and that he has renewed his com- 
 plaints with an intention of making them Jieard, and that he is now deliber- 
 ately warning Congress, the American people, and the European States that 
 he means to have either redress or war. 
 
 "He may be trifling with the world, but it is much more probable that he 
 is not ; and if he is not he is taking precisely the steps European diplomatists 
 would expect. He is demanding definitely and distinctly a just thing, the 
 trial of General Burriel, which the Spanish government cannot, without risk- 
 ing a collision with the volunteers, concede, except on paper. He is telling 
 Madrid in the plainest words he can use that unless he can obtain redress he 
 shall propose to resort to force. 
 
 "It seems to us that to imagine President Grant, with a Democratic 
 majority in the House of Representatives, a great Spanish fleet in the harbor 
 
THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 129 
 
 of Habana, and the Presidential convention almost at hand, is doing all this in 
 order to court a slap in the face from Madrid, a slap which, unresented, would 
 send him on his retirement into a discredited obscurity, is almost absurd ; and 
 if he is in earnest the situation is most serious. It is all verj'- well to talk of 
 the American Constitution and the Democratic majority and the absence of 
 material preparations in the United States. The President can order any 
 movement, either of fleet or army, that he pleases. The Spaniards are in no 
 humor to bear interference, and if they defy the Union neither Democrats nor 
 Republicans will remember party squabbles. They might refuse the Presi- 
 dent his third term, and might be ready to hang him, but they would plunge 
 into war with none the less fierceness and carry it on with none the less 
 decision. ' ' 
 
 This is a character sketch not quitfe friendly, but written after some 
 studies that did not lead to total darkness. 
 
 Mr. George H. Boker, Minister to Russia, wrote from St. Petersburg, 
 January, 1875, that Prince Gortchakoff was warmly sympathetic with the 
 United States, and seemed surprised at the patience and the forbearance with 
 -which our government had acted, not only toward the government of Spain, 
 Taut toward the more easily approached provincial authorities of Cuba. He 
 said, significantly, that history does not show us that this has been the usual 
 conduct of strong powers toward weaker ones. He commended the reluctance 
 which the government of the United States seemed to feel in proceeding to 
 serious measures with a country in the distracted^condition of Spain, and he said 
 that this last act, the laying of the question before the great powers for their 
 consideration and possible action, was a display of candor and of magnanimity 
 on our part that was almost without precedent in international affairs, and the 
 prince was good enough to say it set forever. at rest the report that the United 
 States "had views of territorial extension in the direction of Cuba." And 
 Gortchakoff told Boker that the course of Spain would depend altogether upon 
 the action of the British government, and the representations which might be 
 made by it at the court of Madrid, regarding the unsatisfactory relations 
 between the United States and Spain. He said that the combined influence 
 of all the other powers was not equal to that of Great Britain with the Spanish 
 government. 
 
 The Hon. George P. Marsh had a full conversation at Rome in 
 December, 1875, with Mr. Viscomti Venosta, and stated that "the editorial 
 
13° 
 
 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 
 
 tone of many journals in the United States, and that of many articles 
 in journals not professedly advocating the annexation, was prompted by fraud- 
 ulently naturalized Cubans, refugees, and other persons interested in severing 
 the connection between Spain and Cuba; that I knew no reason to think that 
 the general population of the United States, still less the more enlightened 
 and patriotic classes, desired the possession of the island. ' ' And Mr. Marsh 
 referred, by way of illustration, to the pretense of French, and to some extent 
 of .Italian, journals that the intervention of the Emperor Napoleon III. in 
 Mexico was rendered necessary by the ambitious views of the United States in 
 regard to territorial extension, and pointed out that "after the capture of the 
 City of Mexico by General Scott we were virtually in possession of the whole 
 country, and could have retained it if we had so desired, but that we volun- 
 tarily surr'endered it, retaining only California, and some other territory then 
 thought to possess little value, and paying to Mexico a large sum as an 
 indemnity. " The painstaking of Mr. Marsh to free Americans from the charge 
 of wanting more land seems to show that gentleman to have been more 
 amiable in his sentiments than accurate in his observations. 
 
 -'",%■"'' - 
 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Duty of Fair Play to the Spaniards of the Peninsula 
 
 and of Cuba. 
 
 Some Testimony That is Not Partial to Cuban Insurgents — Caleb Gushing 'on Inherent 
 Spanish Character — More Than One Kind of Our Naturalized Citizens — A List of Them 
 and of Claims — Conflicting Testimony as to Cuban Armies — Two Picturesque 
 Witnesses. 
 
 There is no duty plainer in writing the story of the conflict between the 
 United States and Spain than that of showing fair play to the people who- 
 were so signally discomfited, and whose weaknesses have been uncovered by 
 war. The Hon. Caleb Cushing had the lawyer's accomplishment of stating a 
 case for friend or foe with little reference to personal judgment, and he 
 always presented the facts that were the frame of his argument with a vivid- 
 ness peculiarly his own. In April, 1876, he took occasion to say, in the 
 course of his correspondence with the State Department, that "all our 
 troubles with Spain have been incidents of the delirium tremens of anarchy 
 and revolution which seized upon her in 1868, involving civil war in Cuba, in 
 the northern provinces, indeed all over the peninsula." Mr. Cushing pro- 
 ceeded to say that all Madrid believed that "faulty as has been the adminis- 
 tration of Spain in Cuba, most of the maladministration has been the logical 
 effect of the factious, ungovernable, and traitorous spirit and conduct of the 
 Cubans themselves, rebellious, as all Spaniards are prone to be, by their hered- 
 itary national character." Beyond this it was alleged that "no repressive 
 measures would ever have been adopted in Cuba but for the frequent rebel- 
 lions or attempted rebellions there in times of complete order, tranquillity, 
 and prosperity, as in 1823, 1829, 1837, and 1854, including the infamous acts 
 of Narciso Lopez in twice recruiting armed foreign adventurers to invade the 
 island, the worst of all forms of treason.' This, however, is not the judicial 
 department of the kind of which Mr. Cushing is speaking, but is the presenta- 
 
 131 
 
3 32 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 tion of one side — that which was bitterly wrong — by one who was for the 
 moment the passionate advocate of those whose case he was stating. In the 
 next paragraph Mr. Gushing says all Americans bear witness, after seeing 
 both Cubans and Spaniards that "Cubans are Spaniards, with all the faults of 
 Spaniards in aggravated degree; and whereas discontent is the habit in 
 Spain, and violence the ordinary manifestation of discontent — whereas in 
 Spain opposition parties systematically pursue the practice of quarreling with 
 any and all governments, however well-intentioned these may be, and deliber- 
 ately provoking measures of repression in order to have pretext to declaim 
 against oppression and tyranny — so the Spaniards say it always has been in 
 Cuba." Herein, however, Mr. Cushing loses sight of the teachings of 
 American history. What he says of the excessive faults of the Cubans, would 
 have applicability and would not be quickly and confidently contested, if the 
 Spaniards had not been troubled in other colonies the same as in Cuba. The 
 Cubans are Spaniards as the Mexicans, Peruvians, Chilians, and the rest of 
 the free and independent States of what was once Spanish America were — • 
 but it was not the delirium tremens of 1868 that moved Mexico, Bolivia, 
 Argentina, and all the rest of the American Spanish to rise up against the 
 Spaniards of the peninsula. The methods of Cuban rebellions were disagree- 
 able in the extreme, especially when they followed the examples of the ways 
 and means of Spanish repression. We believe it to be true that the Spaniards 
 thought it a justifiable act of war to fire the cane fields of Cubans known to be 
 against the perpetuity of Spanish rule in the island, before Gomez carried the 
 torch through the provinces of Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. Mr. 
 Cushing drew a picture of the state of Spanish politics in a letter reviewing 
 the debate in the Cortes on the address to the king, saying it mainly con- 
 sisted of easy exhibition of the inconsistencies, the errors and the crimes, the 
 tergiversations, pronunciamientos, treasons, and insurrections of which all 
 parties have heretofore been guilty, as, one after the other, they attained the 
 giddy heights of political power, or sank into the depths of angry, impatient, 
 and factious opposition. In these mutual recriminations of parties, in this 
 general settlement of political account between successive governments and 
 administrations — which has only served to show that all of them, as they roSe, 
 ascended on the ruins of their country, and, as they fell, left behind a deplor- 
 able deficit of wisdom and usefulness to the debit of each — the home 
 government of Spain passed through all the disorders of the dissolution of 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i33 
 
 •greedy and corrupt tyranny and in the colonial wars following the Napoleonic 
 occupation. The one binding tie in the peninsula became the oppression of the 
 American Spaniards. Hence, at last, the chaos Gushing sketches, and out of 
 a series of revolutions came an horrible confusion of cruelties. 
 
 In a general review of the diplomatic situation in Europe, written in 
 March, -1876, Mr. Gushing closed: 
 
 "I stand behind the players here and see the cards they are playing. It 
 is not our game. We can do much with Spain, but it will have to be done on 
 ■our own ground. We have no cause, in my belief, to expect aid from the 
 European Powers, not even, from Great Britain. The problem rather is to 
 work out our own policy in such way as to avoid obstructions on the part of 
 those powers. ' ' 
 
 It was in 1878 that the Spaniards came to the conclusion, as the insurrec- 
 tion had lasted ten years, and one hundred thousand regular soldiers could not 
 •overcome it bj' force, that the rebels might be heard as to terms of peace with- 
 out 'giving up their arms, and the result was the peace of Zanjon, negotiated 
 with the insurgent leaders by Martinez Campos. The latest and last of the 
 insurrections against the rule of the Spaniards broke out in February, 1895. In 
 the twenty years before the United States and Spain found themselves at war, 
 there had been in Cuba over thirteen years' warfare and less than seven of the 
 comparative reduction of flagrant disorders characterized as peace. Martinez 
 Campos was regarded as the great military chieftain of Spain, and his country- 
 men did not care to inquire too particularly into the preliminaries to the peace 
 ■of Zanjon. He was commissioned as soon as the war broke out afresh in Feb- 
 ruary, 189s, to put down the rebellion, and heavy masses of troops were 
 hurried from the peninsula to the island. The old field marshal of Spain 
 began his work with an appearance of confidence and exceptional vigor. It 
 was soon ascertained that the spirit of the insurgents was more implacable 
 than ever — that they had larger forces and better equipments, and were more 
 resolute and desperate than on former occasion s^while Campos was in the 
 field there was sharp skirmishing — indeed, some of the fighting was the most 
 severe that ever occurred in the island, until the American army moved upon 
 Santiago. Campos made a strenuous effort to confine the scenes of warfare to 
 the three eastern provinces, as had been the case from 1868 to 1878, but 
 Gomez had a large following, horses were abundant, sugar carts numerous, 
 and there was food in the pastures and fruity forests. 
 
134 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 He did the unexpected thing moving west, and succeeded in opening new 
 regions for devastation. Campos, with the utmost use of steamers and rail- 
 ways, and his superior forces, could not check the adventurous rush of the 
 swarm with Gomez, whose right arm was the indomitable Antonio Maceo. 
 The Spaniards were exasperated by their failures, and furious that the rebels 
 had broken all bounds and records. The flood marks of rebellion were wider 
 and higher than in the ten years; and then Campos was not killing prisoners 
 in satisfactory numbers. He was attempting to carry on war according to the 
 usages of civilization, and that was not the way the Spaniards desired to make 
 peace. The prestige of the soldier faded rapidly, and there were fierce 
 demands from the volunteers, of whom there were eleven regiments in 
 Havana alone, for more bloodshed, not in battle, but in executions. A change 
 was called for both in Madrid and Havana. Campos was recalled, and General 
 Weyler designated for the vacancy, Ex-Captain-General Marin serving ad 
 interim. The news of Weyler' s appointment filled the Cubans with horror, 
 and at once the steamers for all ports on the Gulf, and for Key West, Savan- 
 nah, Charleston and New York, were crowded with fugitives. Weyler was 
 already a man of terrible reputation. He had been in the ten years' war a 
 lieutenant-colonel in charge of a Spanish column, distinguished for the per- 
 sonal havoc that was committed in its marches. He was boastful of his body- 
 guard of black men, and always ready to receive men of color in camp or in 
 the palace. He was alternatively claimed as and accused of being a Repub- 
 lican ! There were many stories of his personal participation in outrages of 
 an incredible nature, not a few of them physically impracticable. It is in this 
 sort of fiendish romance that Spaniards and Cubans revel, as the only ade- 
 quate expression of their astonishing animosities. The evil most keenly 
 anticipated by the Cuban sympathizers in Havana from Weyler was that he 
 would issue decrees ordering and commanding all business men to show their 
 colors — to be explicitly for or against Spain in Cuba, and condone evasions 
 only upon spending their fortunes in bribes rather than awaiting the more 
 summary processes of execution and confiscation. Life and fortune might be 
 preserved for a time by this giving up everything on the installment plan. 
 The Cuban ladies were shocked by the very name of Weyler, saying there was 
 no safety where he was for the innocent. There was a panic, and when Wey- 
 ler was announced at Porto Rico, there was wild haste to get away to 
 Yucatan, Venezuela, Mexico, or the United States. There was reported a 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i35 
 
 blood league among the Cubans, the purpose being the assassination of the 
 new captain-general the moment he set foot on the soil of Cuba. He was 
 duly warned but unmolested, and his safety was accounted for by the repre- 
 sentation that those who had sworn to sacrifice themselves that the monster 
 should die, were convinced that such an act as the murder of a captain- 
 general would be injurious to the Cuban cause, and that the better way was 
 to stand "well with sympathetic public sentiment. 
 
 There was little time lost in the development of General Weyler's policy. 
 It was rigorous and remorseless. He denied for a time the charges of 
 cruelty, protested that he did not approve as many executions as Campos had 
 done. His proceeding did not vary much from the regular course of Spanish 
 suppression of rebellion, but never before had the system of the Spaniards in 
 pacificating colonies been exhibited to the world in so strong a light. As the 
 line was drawn between those true and false to the peninsular Spaniard, it 
 became evident that the people of Cuba were almost unanimously against 
 Spain. On the side of the peninsula were the Spanish army and navy, the 
 swarms of office holders, and their subordinates, the volunteers given the 
 situations that should be occupied by the Cubans, the contractors and all busi- 
 ness men who made money out of the war — the officials of all descriptions, 
 the sycophants of power, and those still striving by complacency to avoid the 
 rugged issues of responsibility. The Spanish army was so numerous that 
 garrisons were in all the considerable towns, and there were thousands of little 
 forts ; and some sugar plantations were paying taxes and assessments to Wey- 
 ler and Gomez alike. The people at large outside the fortified lines were 
 against Spain, with few exceptions. Weyler could not get information about 
 the movements of insurgents, but there was not a Spanish column in motion, 
 that was_not signaled. The stones in the road and the trees by the wayside 
 told from day to day of all Spanish activity. There was not a country store, 
 not a magazine for the rebellion — not a swift pony or a fat pig, a drove of 
 cattle or sheep, a tree full of fruit, or a potato patch, that was not contraband 
 of war. The country houses and villages that the insurgents spared Were fired 
 by the Spaniards, and the massacre of domestic animals and destruction of 
 food supplies of all kinds, made way for famine. It was the Spanish policy to 
 make the country untenable by bodies of hostile irregulars. 
 
 The peasantry were not allowed to till the fields, and this was the answer 
 to the rebel burning of cane and tobacco. As the Cubans at large gave the 
 
136 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 news of Spaniards moving about, the country people were concentrated 
 under the supervision of the regular garrisons. On both sides the conduct of 
 the war forced this result, and due accountability was not admitted by 
 either. Those who were wild for war between the United States and Spain 
 found fault with the Spaniards alone, and the first material undertaking in the 
 war by our country for humanity was in sending food to those perishing by 
 starvation and medicine to those wasted by the plague of fever. It was plain 
 to all observers that after all the sacrifices the Spaniards had made for Cuba 
 they would conquer the island only by the annihilation of the elements of the 
 prosperity that once had remarkable celebrity. Weyler's greatest military 
 effort was to pen Maceo in the west end, by a fortified line — trocha — twenty- 
 one miles long, the narrowest part of the island. Maceo broke through just 
 before his death, but when he was gone the western province was generally 
 quieted. There were the accustomed btilletins about the achievements of the 
 successors of Maceo, but there were none who answered that description. 
 The sheer weight of the Spanish columns was felt by their antagonists and the 
 strength of the rebellion had largely declined, though holding a great deal 
 of territory. There were symptoms of exhaustion all around, but on ' ' Horror's- 
 head horrors" accumulated. That the insurgents took a part in forcing these 
 dreadful issues is certain — for the devastation of plantations for five hundred, 
 miles was the visible sign of' the memorable campaign of Gomez, the Domin- 
 ican Commander-in-Chief. The Spanish government, March i, 1897, 
 addressed to the Hon. Hannis Taylor, the American Minister, a communication 
 of explanation of the arrest of certain alleged citizens of the United States- 
 captured and taken to Santiago de Cuba, suspected of being American spies. 
 When released they each claimed damages in the sum of ten thousand dollars. 
 The defense was that the arrest of these people was not for landing in Cuba, 
 but "at the beginning of a formidable insurrection," when "on every point of 
 the coast landed large and small expeditions — arrived from several ports 
 and shores of the Mexican Gulf. Many of those who afterwards took a 
 part in the rebellion as chiefs, rank soldiers, and scouts, came precisely 
 from Haiti, as is well known, using small crafts similar to that of the 
 claimants. In no other manner did the well-known chief, Antonio Maceo, 
 join the insurgent bands, and so great was the number of those who used 
 this means of coming to and*going from the island that I do not consider it 
 venturesome to say that at a certain time there was a regular communication. 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 137 
 
 by means of small crafts and open boats between' Cuba and the Antilles and 
 the nearest keys. ' ' 
 
 One of the most frequent irritations manipulated to increase the strain 
 upon the relations of the United States and Spain was the arrest by Spanish 
 authorities of naturalized American citizens. The Senate of the United 
 States, December 21, 1896, directed a report of all naturalized citizens 
 arrested since the breaking out of the insurrection in Cuba February 24, 1895. 
 There were seventy-four such persons. The Secretary of State of the United 
 States, Mr. Olney, in sending the list, said : 
 
 "Passports, certificates of naturalization, registration in the consulates of 
 this government on the island of Cuba, and service on ships sailing under the 
 flag of the United States, having been alike accepted by our consular officers 
 and the Spanish authorities as prima facie evidence of citizenship, establishing 
 the rights of the claimants to the treatment secured to our citizens under our 
 treaties and protocols with Spain, it has been deemed advisable to include in 
 the subjoined list all persons of the classes referred to who have been arrested. 
 
 "Of the 74 persons arrested, 7 have been tried, namely: Nos. i, 36, 70, 71, 
 72, 73, and 74. In the cases of 2 of these (Nos. i and 36) appeals have been 
 taken, and in the cases of the other 5, the Competitor prisoners, a new trial 
 has been ordered. 
 
 ' 'Thirty-six persons arrested have been released after the charges against 
 them had been investigated and found to be baseless. 
 
 "Eighteen have been expelled from the island, after periods of confine- 
 ment lasting from a few days to nearly a year in the case of Jose Aguirre (No. 
 2); while 17 cases are still pending. The charges against 14 of the 17 are as 
 follows : 
 
 "Nos. 31 and 35, sedition and rebellion. 
 
 "No. 38, rebellion. 
 
 "Nos. 37, 40, 61, and 62, rebellion with arms in hand. 
 
 "No. 43, purchase and concealment of arms and ammunition. 
 
 "No. S3, disorderly conduct and insults to Spain. 
 
 "Nos. 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74, landing arms from Competitor for insurgents. 
 
 "In the remaining three cases (Nos. 35, 47, and 52), the nature of the 
 charges having not yet been ascertained, demand has been made both at 
 Habana and Madrid that they be at once formulated and communicated, or 
 that prisoners be released." 
 
338 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 We present in full the list of American citizens, native and naturalized, 
 arrested and imprisoned in Cuba since February 24, 1895, to date, stating also 
 cause of arrest, charges, place of confinement, whether tried, released, 
 ■deported, or cases pending : 
 
 1. Julio Sanguily, 49 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested 
 February 24, 1895 ; charge of rebellion ; tried November 28, 1895 ; found guilty 
 and sentenced to life imprisonment; case appealed to supreme court, Madrid. 
 Was also tried on charge of participation in the kidnapping of the sugar planter 
 Fernandez de Castro, in 1894,' by the late bandit, Manuel Garcia, and 
 acquitted. Tried for the second time December 21, 1896, for rebellion, the 
 case repianded from Spain, and again sentenced December 28 to life imprison- 
 ment ; an appeal taken. Has been imprisoned in the Cabana fort. 
 
 2. Jose Marie Timoteo Aguirre, 52 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 
 188 1 ; arrested February 24, 1895; charge of rebellion; confined in Cabana 
 fort; acquitted and deported September 6, 1895 ; went to the United States. 
 
 3. Francisco Peraza, arrested at Sagua, March 2, 1895 ; charge of partici- 
 pation in the robbery of some cattle; released March 4, 1895. 
 
 4. Francisco Carrillo, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1891; 
 arrested at Remedies on February 24, 1895, upon a gubernative order for not 
 baving inscribed himself in the register of foreigners in any province of the 
 island; confined in Cabana fort; released and deported to United States 
 May 29, 1895. 
 
 5. Juan Roderiguez Valdez, native of Cuba; naturalized 1876; arrested 
 at Puerto Principe April 5, 1895; released April 6. 
 
 6. Justo Gener, 68 years; native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at 
 Matanzas April 6; released April 9, 1895. 
 
 7. Jose Maria Caraballo, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877; 
 arrested, at Matanzas April 6; released April 9, 1885. 
 
 8. Manuel Fuentes, 33 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1889; corre- 
 spondent New York World; arrested at Caimanera April 30, 1895; released 
 May 4, 1895, on condition that he return to United States. 
 
 9. Manuel Vargas, arrested at Remedios July 3, 1895; released and 
 expelled July 13, 1895; charged with being an agent of the insurgents, etc.; 
 naturalized. 
 
 10. Domingo Gonzalez y Alfonso, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 
 1876; arrested at Quivican July 3, 1895; expelled September 3, 1895, for the 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 141 
 
 reason that his presence in the island is a source of danger to the govern- 
 ment. 
 
 11. Victoriano Bulit Perez, 33 years, native of Cuba, of Apierican par- 
 ents; arrested at Sagua July 12, 1895; accused of "proposing treasonable 
 acts"; released November 8, 1895. 
 
 12. Joseph Ansley, 56 years; born in Habana, of American parents; 
 arrested at Sagua August 26, 1895; charge, "presence prejudicial to peace of 
 island"; deported to United States September 21, 1895. 
 
 13. Aurelio Ansley, 34 years; son of Joseph Ansley. Same as above. 
 
 14. Luis Ansley, 30 years; son of Joseph Ansley. Same as above. 
 
 15. John A Sowers, 65 years; native of Virginia. Same as above. 
 
 16. Carlos M. Garcia y Ruiz, 28 years; bprn in the United States; 
 arrested at Sagua September 7, 1895 ; accused of attempting to join the insur- 
 rectionists; released October 7, 1895. 
 
 17. Jose Martinez Gonzalez, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1873; 
 arrested at Sagua September 12, 1895; charge of riding on railroad without 
 paying fare; no evidence against him; released September 19, 1895. 
 
 18. Mariano Rodriguez Zayas, native of Cuba ; arrested Habana Septem- 
 ber 17; released September 19, 1895; naturalized; no charges. 
 
 19. Jos6 Martinez Mesa, 41 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; 
 arrested at Habana September 17, 1895; released September 19, 1895; no 
 charges. 
 
 20. Eugene Pelletier, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877; 
 arrested at Cienfuegos December 5, 1895 ; charged with recruiting for the 
 insurrection; released, under surveillance, May 17, 1896, 
 
 21. Joseph J. Trelles, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Matanzas 
 December 24, 1895; released December 26, 1895; no charges. 
 
 22. Manuel M. (or W.) Amieva, 39 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 
 1878; arrested at Matanzas December 24, 1895, as a suspect; released Decem- 
 ber 31, 189s; no charges. 
 
 23. Solomon, Chas. S., native of the United States, arrested and 
 released. 
 
 24. Marcos E. Rodriguez, 57 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1875; 
 arrested January 17, 1896, on board American steamship Olivette; charge, 
 aiding the rebellion, sedition, etc. ; released April i, 1896. 
 
 25. Louis Someillan, Sr., 58 years; born in Cuba; naturalized Key 
 
142 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 West, 1878; arrested January 17, -1896, at Habana; released April i, 1896; 
 charge, aiding rebellion, sedition, etc. 
 
 26. Louis Someillan, Jr., 36 years; born in Habana, son of above; 
 arrested January 17 at Habana; released April i, 1896; charge, aiding rebel- 
 lion, sedition, etc. 
 
 27. Ladislao Quintero, born. in Key West; made a prisoner of war 
 February 22, 1896, at Guatao, where he had been wounded by Spanish troops; 
 released April 11, 1896. 
 
 28. Walter Grant Dygert, 25 years; born in the United States; arrested 
 February 23, 1896; imprisoned at Guines; supposed to be insurgent leader El 
 Inglesito; finally released and sent to United States April 24, 1896. 
 
 29. Rev. Albert J. Diaz, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at 
 Habana April 16, 1896, charged with forwarding rebel correspondence; con- 
 fined at police headquarters; expelled April 16, 1896; accused of abetting 
 insurrection. 
 
 30. Alfred Diaz ; brother of above ; arrested, same charge ; both of the 
 Diazes were released April 22, 1896, on condition of leaving the country; 
 went .to Key West. 
 
 31. Joseph L. Cepero, native of Cuba; naturalized 1881; arrested 
 prior to January 20, 1896, on board steamer from Cienfuegos to Bata- 
 bano ; case now pending before civil court Santa Clara ; confined in Santa 
 Clara prison ; charge, sedition, rebellion, etc. 
 
 32. Luis Martinez, arrested' about March i, 1896; charged with treason- 
 able correspondence; released April 13, 1896, on $400 bail; naturalized 1873. 
 
 33. William A. Glean, native of Cuba, of American parents; arrested at 
 Sagua April, 1896; charge, rebellion; military jurisdiction inhibited in favor 
 of civil July 28, 1896 ; released and returned to the United States. 
 
 34. Louis M. Glean, brother of the above; same as above. 
 
 35. Frank J. Larrieu, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Cardenas 
 May IS, 1896; case pending; charges not made known. 
 
 36. Louis Someillan, 58 years; native of Cuba; naturalised; arrested 
 July 7, 1896, for second time; charge, aiding rebellion; turned over to civil 
 courts, is confined in city prison; trial held January 8, 1897; sentenced Jan- 
 uary 13 to imprisonment in chains for life; appeal taken. 
 
 37. Manuel Fernandez Chaqueilo, 19 years; native of Key West; cap- 
 tured July 9, 1896; was the companion of Charles Govin; is in Cabana fort; 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i43 
 
 case pending, under military jurisdiction; charge, "rebellion with arms in 
 hand. ' ' 
 
 38. George W. Aguirre, 25 years; born in the United States; captured 
 by a Spanish gunboat July 10, 1896; case pending before civil court of Jaruco; 
 confined in Cabana fort ; charge of rebellion. 
 
 39. Samuel T. Tolon, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; 
 arrested on board American steamer Seneca September 3, 1896; incommunicado 
 twenty-two days; charged with being a delegate to the Cuban Junta; released 
 and deported September 30, 1896; went to New York. 
 
 40. Oscar Cespedes, 20 years; native of Key West; captured without 
 arras in insurgent hospital near Zapata swamp about September 5, 1896; 
 imprisoned at San Severino fort, Matanzas; question of competency between 
 military and civil jurisdiction decided in favor of military; case pending. 
 
 41. Francisco E. Cazanas, arrested as suspect at Matanzas October 14, 
 1896; released October 16, 1896. 
 
 42. Alfredo Hernandez, 44 years; native of Matanzas; naturalized 1876; 
 arrested at his house at Habana September 6, 1896; suspicion of being 
 concerned in the insurrection ; expelled September 23, 1896 ; went to Key West. 
 
 43. Antonio Saurez Del Villar, native of Cuba'; naturalized; arrested at 
 Cienfuegos September 5, 1896; charged with purchase and concealing of arms 
 and ammunition; case sent to civil jurisdiction December 23, 1896; in prison 
 at Cienfuegos ; case pending. 
 
 44. ]osi Curbino, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Rincon, Sep- 
 tember 18, 1896; surrendered to military authorities without arms; released 
 and is residing at Santiago de las Vegas. 
 
 45. Joseph Austin Munoz, native of New Orleans; arrested at Matanzas 
 September 18, 1896; released September 19; claimed that arrest was by 
 mistake. 
 
 46. Ramon Rodriguez, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested September 
 20, 1896, upon requisition from governor of Matanzas; had been in insurrec- 
 tion ; surrendered and failed to report regularly ; sent to Cardena and released. 
 
 47. Esteben Venero, 22 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1895; 
 arrested at Los Palos (Habana province) about September 22, 1896; charges 
 not stated ; Captain-General asked for evidence of American citizenship on 
 December 9, which was sent him; case pending cognizance of military or civil 
 jurisdiction. 
 
144 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 48. Adolf o Torres, native of Cuba ; naturalized ; arrested October 4, at 
 Sagua; charges not stated; release ordered November 23, 1896, question of 
 competency not established ; released November 26, officer remarking, "We 
 have no charges against you." 
 
 49. Esteben Cespedes (colored), born in Cuba; naturalized Key West, 
 1891; arrested October 13, 1896, charged with naniguismo (voodoo); expelled 
 November 7, and wrent to Key West. 
 
 50. Ramon Crucet, 48 years; born in Cuba; naturalized 1873; arrested 
 in Colon November i, i8g6; charges, public censure of acts of Spanish 
 government; released December 18, 1896; no grounds of complaint. 
 
 51. Louis Lay, 18 years; native of Cuba, of American parents ; arrested 
 November 9, 1896, during a raid upon a social club in Regla; confined in 
 Cabana fort; case ordered to be transferred to civil court at Guanabacoa, 
 December 23; charges, aiding rebellion. Released January 15, 1897. 
 
 52. Jose Gonzalez, 63 years; native of Bejacal, Cuba; naturalized 1882; 
 arrested at Las Mangas November 10, 1896, taken to prison at Pinar del Rio; 
 charges not yet made known to consulate-general, Habana. 
 
 53. Theodore L. Vives, native of Cienfuegos; naturalized 1891; arrested 
 November 19, 1896; charges, first disorderly conduct aiid then insults to 
 Spain; case pending cognizance of military or civil jurisdiction; is confined 
 in jail. 
 
 54. Henry J. Delgado, native of the United States; captured about 
 December 10, 1896, at an insurgent hospital in Pinar del Rio province, after 
 having been ten weeks in a hut sick; sent to Havana to Cabana fort; removed 
 to hospital December 28, 1896, where, our consul-general reports, he received 
 best medical attention; died in hospital January 19, 1897. 
 
 55. Gaspar A. Betancourt, 63 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877; 
 arrested December 26, 1896, confined at police headquarters incommunicado, 
 charged with sedition. 
 
 . 56.' Fernando Pino Hernandez, 19 years (colored) ; native of Key West, 
 charged with naniguismo (voodoo); ordered to be expelled December 30, 
 1896 ; will be sent to Key West. 
 
 57. Amado Pino Hernandez, 2 1 years ; brother of the above ; same as above. 
 
 58. Jos^ Antonio Iznaga, native of Cuba; naturalized; expelled in 
 August, 1896; no report. 
 
 59. August Bolton, naturalized 1893. 
 
A PICKET SQUAD OF CUBAN SOLDIERS. 
 
 GENERAL CASTELLIO AND STAFF. 
 
PLAZA IN SANTIAGO, CUBA. 
 
 GEODP OF NATIVE WOMEN IN PONCE, POETO RICO. 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i47 
 
 60. Gustave Richelieu, naturalized 1870; taken in a boat near Santiago 
 de Cuba about February 23, 1896; released from prison about March i, 1896; 
 subseqi:ently rearrested and recommitted for leaving Guantanamo without 
 permission ; consul considers second arrest an excuse for detention ; release 
 granted shortly after. 
 
 61. Frank Agramont, and 62, Thos. Julio Sainz, arrested with arms in 
 their hands, May, 1895; charge, rebellion; to be tried for armed insurrection 
 against the government; Santiago de Cuba. 
 
 63. John D. Ferrer, no evidence against him; released March 23, 1896; 
 naturalized at New York, 1878. 
 
 64. Pedro Duarte; 65, Jorge Calvar, and 66, Ramon Romagosa, arrested 
 at Manzanillo for alleged conspiracy in insurrection; expelled August 11, 1896. 
 
 It will be noted that there was a strong tendency displayed by naturalized 
 citizens, whose names did not themselves declare American ancestry, to par- 
 ticipate in the contested affairs of Cuba. In the case of the men who crossed 
 from Haiti to Cuba in a fishing boat, they obtained able counsel,- and we find 
 it stated respecting the Spaniards, by this gentleman in a letter to the State 
 Department : 
 
 "The euphuistic palaver and the circumambient correspondence of the 
 Spanish authorities thinly veils a deliberate purpose to advisedly disregard 
 these obligations. ' ' 
 
 This language of the counsel of naturalized citizens, it may be observed, 
 while possibly circumambient, is not cast in the circumlocution molds of the 
 curved palaver of stately diplomacy. 
 
 The claims stacked in the State Department, brought before the Senate 
 in January, 1897, were in the order following; 
 
 August Bol ten, 'arrest and imprisonment . . . $ 10,000.00 
 
 John D. Ferrer, arrest ajid imprisonment . . . . . 25,000.00 
 
 Mrs. C. J. Diaz de Clarke, property losses 116,335.00 
 
 John F. Java, property losses . . . ..... 90,585.00 
 
 Jose Ignacio Toscano, property losses 15,000.00 
 
 Pedro Plutarco Ortiz, property losses . 84,000.00 
 
 F. J. Cazanas, property losses . 39,843.00 
 
 Jos6 G. and Jos^ M. Delgado, property losses . 178,534.00 
 
 Jos6 Antonio Iznaga, property losses 156,500.00 
 
 Ricardo Machado, property losses 64,900.00 
 
148 DUTY OF FAIR. PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 Francisco Seiglie, property losses $778,510.00 
 
 Jose Rafael de les Reyes y Garcia and wife, property losses . . 729,161.00 
 
 Frederick P. Montes, property losses 160,000.00 
 
 George L. Lay, property losses value of horse 
 
 Andres L. Terry, property losses . 334,905.00 
 
 John A. Sowers, arrest, imprisonment, and expulsion .... 200,000.00 
 
 Perfecto Lacosti, property losses 652,900.00 
 
 Wm. A. and Louis M. Glean, imprisonment 150,000.00 
 
 Wm. A. Glean, property losses 4,668.00 
 
 Louis M. Glean, property losses 7,547.00 
 
 Whiting & Co., property losses .... 60,240.00 
 
 Mrs. A. L. Whiting, property losses 17,000.00 
 
 J. B. Carillo de Albornoz, property losses 36,000.00 
 
 -Ignacio Larrondo, property losses 129,472.38 
 
 Cristobal N. Madan, property losses and personal injuries . . 88,000.00 
 
 Antonio A. Martinez, property losses 35,000.00 
 
 Joaquin P. Cruz and wife, property losses . . 70 000.00 
 
 George W. Hyatt, property losses 285,490.54 
 
 Manuel A. R. Morales, property losses 275,000.00 
 
 Peter Dominguez, expulsion . . .... 10,000.00 
 
 Teresa Joerg, property losses . . 2,500.00 
 
 James A. Glean, property losses . . . 28,425.00 
 
 Peter S. Rodriguez, property losses . . 40,796.00 
 
 Antonio M. Jimenez, property losses 19,158.45 
 
 Pedro C. Casanova, property losses 40400.00 
 
 Pedro C. Casanova, personal injuries . 40 000.00 
 
 Walter G. Dygert, arrest and imprisonment 100,000.00 
 
 Frederick A. Libbey, property losses . . . ... 23 166.00 
 
 Jose M. Caraballo, property losses . . po 470.00 
 
 Jos6 M. Caraballo, arrest, imprisonment, etc. 60 000.00 
 
 Angel Gronlier, property losses . . , 34,779.00 
 
 Albert V. de Goicouria, property losses 130000.00 
 
 Rosa A. Maragliano, property losses 30,000.00 
 
 Juana M. C. de Maragliano 25000.00 
 
 J., de Armas y Armas, property losses 69,525.00 
 
 Maximo M. Diaz, property losses 10000.00 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. ^49 
 
 Wm. W. Gay, expulsion $ 25,000.00 
 
 Thomas R. Dawley, arrest, imprisonment, etc 100,000.00 
 
 George Fortier, property losses 32,450.00 
 
 L. F. Marejon y Marquez, property losses 15,000.00 
 
 Wm. G. Thome, property losses . . 25,000.00 
 
 M. D. J. Garcia y Pino, executrix, etc., property losses . . . 200,000.00 
 
 Manuel Prieto, property losses . . 58,850.00 
 
 Guscave Richelieu, imprisonment a fair indemnity 
 
 Miguel de la Vega y Gener, property losses 71,683.00 
 
 J. Sanchez y Coba, property losses 16,290.00 
 
 F. J. Terry y Dorticas, property losses 202,952.50 
 
 J. C. de Albornoz O'Farrill, property losses 106,105.49 
 
 A. C. de Albornoz O'Farrill, property losses 130,703.12 
 
 Heine Safety Boiler Co. , property losses 27,316.80 
 
 R. M. y de la Cruz, property losses .... . ... not stated 
 
 Francisco Rionda (Central Tuinucu Sugar Cane Manufacturing 
 
 Co.), property losses 527,480.20 
 
 Charles Rosa, property losses 882,840.00 
 
 Rabel & Co. , property losses 75,785.00 
 
 Joseph M. Duenos, property losses 15,000.00 
 
 P. P. de Leon, property losses 379,000.00 
 
 J. F. de Cossio, property losses 20,000.00 
 
 Peter E. Rivery, personal injuries suitable indemnity 
 
 Samuel T. Tolon, personal injuries 50,000.00 
 
 Samuel T. Tolon, property losses 100,000.00 
 
 Adolphus Torres, imprisonment 25,000.00 
 
 A. L. Terry y Dorticos and A. E. Terry, property losses . . . 81,888.00 
 
 A. E. Terry, property losses . . .... 110,500.00 
 
 Frederick L. Craycraft, personal injuries . 25,000.00 
 
 Thomas E. Rodriguez, property losses, banishment, etc. . . . 61,000.00 
 
 Oscar Giguel, property losses . , 100,000.00 
 
 Jose Tur, property losses ... 251,500.00 
 
 Adolfo Santa Maria, property losses 120,803.32 
 
 Enrequita Santa Maria, property losses 94,953-32 
 
 Joseph M. Fernandez, property losses 61,115.61 
 
 •George Becket, property losses . 75,000.00 
 
15° DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 Manuel F. Lopez, killing of son, S. N. Lopez .... . $100,000.00 
 
 Adolf o Torres, arrest and imprisonment 25,000.00 
 
 There was a great deal of Cuban investigation by committees of Congress, 
 the object of which seemed to be to persuade the American people that Amer- 
 ican captives were subjected to indignities that must be compensated, and to 
 celebrate the glories ,of the armies of the rebellion. In truth, there were 
 several kinds of American citizens, and a large assortment of insurgents; 
 and any resinous wood that could be thrown where it would flame for 
 war was welcome and pitched on the fire. The American people need first of 
 all for their own sake, to sift the truth about the Cuban people, and see how 
 many of those who were So rapid to be naturalized citizens before the war are 
 faithful Americans after the war ; and to what extent the Cuban Republic, as 
 it was magnified by the mysteries around it in the war, may claim that they 
 have acquired title to the country, for which they speak with and of authority. 
 As to the number of troops in the field for Cuba, Mr. Frederick W. Lawrence, 
 May 20, 1896, said: "Generals Gomez and Maceo have now under their 
 command in the neighborhood of 100,000 men, whose numbers would be verj' 
 largely increased if the men who desire to form them could pass through the 
 Spanish lines." The imagination of Mr. Lawrence must have been pro- 
 foundly affected. He said: "General Gomez, with nearly 30,000 men, is 
 marching westward, and has reached a point in Matanzas close enough to the 
 city of Havana to cause great trepidation." This was a dream. Gomez 
 never had one-half of 30,000 men, and at this time was not marching west- 
 ward, and there was no trepidation at Havana about him. Mr. Lawrence 
 thought Havana could be taken easily, and added: "In the opinion of mili- 
 tary men whom I have seen, defenses of Habana are totally inadequate to 
 protect the city from an invasion on the land side." The only protection the 
 capital has from an attack by land are a few insignificant stockade forts 
 erected around the outskirts and garrisoned by poorly equipped, undrilled, 
 half starved volunteers, who, during the hours when they are off duty, may 
 ■ be seen in the streets of Habana asking alms of citizens, like ordinary beggars. 
 It seems incredible that such men would succeed in holding Habana against 
 an attack by such fighters as the Cubans under General Gomez have on more 
 than one occasion proven themselves to be." It seems strange that an intel- 
 ligent man could believe these assertions, that would be ridiculous if they 
 had not been a part of the war whoopery that was for a time a leading feature 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 151 
 
 with our public men who wanted war in a few minutes.- If Gomez had 30,000 
 men, what happened to them when our 18,000 all told landed and lost 
 1,500 men, killed, wounded and missing, in carrying Spanish positions near 
 Santiago? Mr. Lawrence was deceived. The 30,000 troops of Gomez, the 
 nearly 100,000 thundering at the gates of Havana, were an array of impostures, 
 the object of Which was to subordinate the United States to Cuba, and play 
 second fiddle to Gomez with the army of the United States. We fortunately- 
 escaped from the consequences of the conspiracy of falsification, and we are 
 indebted to the solid sense of the President for the escape. There was good 
 fighting done, with slender forces in Pinar del Rio by Maceo, but Gomez. 
 "Oriented" himself and was hors de combat. Where did he bury his 100,000 
 heroes, or what otherwise became of them? Mr. Lawrence was good enough 
 to add: 
 
 "Up in the mountains the leaders of the army of the Republic have estab- 
 lished ranches, where men are engaged in breeding and raising cattle for 
 food purposes. The raising of vegetables is also encouraged by the Cuban 
 commanders, and in addition to this means of subsistence they have the native 
 food plants that grow in wild profusion all over the island. 
 
 "From this it will be readily understood that no matter how long the war 
 should last, or how much privation they might suffer in other directions, the 
 Republican army will never suffer dangerously from lack of food. ' ' 
 
 They did not seem to be flush of provisions when they first struck our 
 troops in Santiago. We quote again from Mr. Lawrence : 
 
 "The Cubans have been accused of incendiarism in a criminal sense because 
 they have destroyed sugar cane, tobacco, mills, and plantations. They insist 
 that they should not be regarded as criminals, but that the orders which the 
 commanders issued for the destruction of the island were justifiable war 
 measures. 
 
 "I have personal knowledge that in a great many cases the plantations 
 have been destroyed with the consent of the owners. In fact, a great number 
 of owners of plantations that have been destroyed informed me personally that 
 they had invited the Cubans to do so because they did not want to grind their 
 cane, and thereby supply revenues to the Spanish government." 
 
 The cane-burning was barbarian, inflicting immense losses upon the 
 Cubans, destroying the only chance they had of really providing a govern- 
 ment. 
 
IS2 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 The Rev. A. J. Diaz saw the armies of Maceo and Gomez — great crowds 
 of men, Maceo seven or eight thousand, Gomez -ten thousand, and Mr. Aguirre 
 had an army. 
 
 "Q. Now, what class of people did that army consist of? — A. The best 
 class of young men in Habana, generally. 
 
 "Q. Do you mean the Province of Habana?— A. No; the city. 
 
 "Q. Aguirre's command consists mostly of city boys, does it? — A. Yes, 
 sir. 
 
 "Q. How many were there? — A. He had at that time about 2,000; that 
 was his escort. 
 
 "Q. He had others? — A. Oh, yes. He had in the province 10,000 or 
 15,000 men, scattered all over the Province of Habana in different camps. 
 
 "Q. Now, what kind of people did the army of Maceo appear to be? — A. 
 Very fine people, too ; white people ; doctors, lawyers, druggists. 
 
 "Q. Intelligent people? — A. Intelligent people. 
 By Senator Davis: 
 
 "Q. What kind of people were the privarte soldiers in Maceo's army? — A. 
 Well, they have some colored people, too — many — and they have some of these 
 intelligent people as private soldiers, a great many of them people who do not 
 want any rank; just wanted to be soldiers, just to do that in the democratic 
 line to encourage others. ' ' 
 
 There are fifteen thousand city boys from Havana, eh ! What happened 
 to them? What were they doing when Blanco was fortifying the city? 
 
 Senator Morgan wanted to know how many Spanish troops were in Cuba 
 in the May before we attacked Spain, and Dr. Diaz said : 
 
 "A. I think they have in Cuba only about 70,000 or 80,000 soldiers. I do 
 not think they have more than that. 
 
 "Q. How many have come there since this war broke out? — A. Nearly 
 150,000 to 180,000. 
 
 "Q. What has become of the balance of them? — A. Well, a great many 
 of them have been killed, and many of them have joined the rebels. 
 
 "Q. Joined the rebels? — A. A great many of them ; yes, sir. " 
 
 Dr. Diaz was hard at it to make up a rebel army of about 100,000 men, 
 but having mustered them in he has never been .able to find ten per cent of 
 them. The mighty Cuban armies had arms! We quote again from the 
 examination of Dr. Diaz: 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i53 
 
 "Q. Do the Cubans get any arms and ammunition from the villages cr 
 people? — A. Yes; they get them from Habana. 
 
 "Q. How do they get them? — A. Exactly, I do not know the way they 
 manage it, but I know they get all they need. ' ' 
 
 Mr. William D. Smith was once a soldier in the United States army. He 
 was examined by Senator Morgan June 3, 1897. He joined Gomez, he says, 
 in the midst of a battle. The Cubans lost 68 killed and no wounded. The 
 Cubans dug up 180 dead Spaniards by order of Gomez, and reburied them at 
 once. He wanted to count the dead. Mr. Smith was a gushing talker; He said : 
 
 "There were 242 engagements I have been in with General Gomez, besides 
 little skirmishes I did not count. It is a dash and a few shots, and get out of 
 the way where they outnumber you. There were 242 engagements where he 
 stood his ground and camped on the ground of the Spaniards, the last engage- 
 ment just a few days before I left, when General Gomez and General Weyler 
 met for the first time. 
 
 "Q. Where was that? — A. At La Reforma. 
 
 "Q. A sugar estate? — A. No, sir; not a sugar estate; it is a cattle range; 
 the most beautiful place, I think, in La Villias. It is General Gomez's favor- 
 ite~camping ground, because his son was born there. 
 
 "Q. How did the last battle wind up? — A. General Weyler withdrew the 
 troops and went to Puerto Principe, and Gomez camped on the ground. 
 
 "Q. How many troops were engaged? — A. Gomez had 1,500, or pos- 
 sibly 2,000 — I am trying to get this as near right as possible — I do not want to 
 overestimate. The Spanish had 20,000 men — General Weyler had 20,000 
 troops with him. 
 
 "Q. 20,000 in bodies within reach of each other? — A. No, sir; 20,000 men 
 right in the fight at one time ; not in a mass, in any one body, but he had 
 20,000 in columns. The fighting down there requires explanation. It seems 
 ridiculous that 1,500 men would stand and fight 20,000, but the Spaniards 
 always march in a column of 1,000 men and one piece of artillery — one cannon. 
 They came into Reforma in twenty diEEerent directions. The trap was being 
 laid by General Weyler to capture General Gomez. The General was cog- 
 nizant of it for two weeks, and waited for them to come. The way he fought 
 those 20,000, he would have 100 men fight one column, and 50 men fight 
 another column, and 100 men fight another, and 75 still another column, and 
 so on, and he stood them off like that. I .have known 10 Cubans to hold a 
 
154 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 Spanish column of i,ooo men until General Gomez could get together his, 
 impedimenta and get out — hold them at a dead standstill. I account for it 
 by the reason that the Spaniards thought that there was a trap, an ambuscade, 
 and they would not run into it. That is Genei-al Gomez's tactics; he has done 
 it several times. 
 
 "Q. What is the area of that estate? — A. Between ten and twelve thou- 
 sand acres. 
 
 "Q. What were the losses in the battle of La Reforma? — A. The last one? 
 
 "Q. Yes, sir. — A. The Cuban losses were 26, I think, killed, during the 
 two days' fighting. 
 
 "Q. How many days? — A. Two days. 
 
 "Q. How many wounded? — A. The wounded it is hard to estimate. We 
 never know the exact number wounded, because so many are wounded who 
 do not pay any attention to it. I saw one man wounded who was shot with a 
 Mauser bullet, which passed right through him, and we never knew anything 
 about it for two days. That seems almost miraculous, but it is true. I sup- 
 pose you have seen that Mauser bullet. The lead is covered by some metal. 
 I can show you a wound that you would have said, if it had happened with 
 any other cartridge, that I would have had to have an amputation. One 
 went right through my ankle, and I was only in the hospital two hours — long 
 enough to have it done up. The bullet does not make any fracture. I. have 
 never seen a case of amputation since I have been on the island, and it does 
 not cause septicaemia. There is the wound [exhibiting]. The bullet entered 
 here [pointing to his ankle], and came out there. I was never laid up a min- 
 ute. The doctor in camp simply dressed it with iodoform and a little anti- 
 septic. That is why I say it is almost impossible to give an exact account of 
 . the wounded. 
 
 "Q. About how many? — A. I shouldsay 50 or 75. 
 
 "Q. What was the loss to the Spaniards? — A. Their loss was 180 or 185 
 killed, and the wounded we never know, although in getting here after leav- 
 ing camp I ran across a practico — that is, a guide — and he told us he had 
 guided General Weyler's forces across the Rio Sassa, and he got it from the 
 soldiers that they had 300 or 400 wounded. 
 
 "Q. Weyler was in personal command on the one side and Gomez on the 
 other at that time?— A. Yes, sir; the first time they had ever met. The 
 New York Sun gave an account of it. 
 
o 
 
 H 
 
 
 r 
 
 H 
 
 O 
 
THE MAJOR, HIS ADJUTANT, ORDERLY, AND WIFE. 
 
 PAEriAL VIEW OF THE ARSENAL, FACING THE BACOOR, IN CAVITE. 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 157 
 
 "Q. Where did Gomez's troops camp after that battle? — A. At Reforma, 
 on the battlefield. He has always marched over the battlefield since I have 
 been with him. 
 
 "Q. General Gomez is commander in chief of the Cuban army? — A. He 
 calls himself the general in chief. The commander in chief is Cisneros 
 Betancourt. 
 
 "Q. Under whom does he hold his commission?- — A. Under the Cuban 
 government. He has a diploma, the same as I have — I have seen it — only, of 
 course, with different names and grades. 
 
 "Q. Do all the officers hold their commissions from the civil government? 
 -■ — A. Everything above a captain. 
 
 "Q. Does Gomez make report to the civil government? — A. Daily. They 
 may not get them daily, but there is a daily report made by Gomez to the 
 civil government. He makes them up, and every two or three days they are 
 sent by couriers. Of course, there may be a jump of a day or two. 
 
 "Q. Does he report for his own command or entire army? — A. For the 
 entire army. 
 
 "Q. The army, then, is divided into ? — A. Into six army corps." 
 
 This old soldier should have been at the head of the literary bureau at 
 Key West. Examined by Senator Morgan, he said : 
 
 "Every Cuban on the island of Cuba, unless he has run away and got 
 under the protection of the Spanish government, is supposed to have a gun in 
 his hand or be working for those who have a gun ; and they do it with a royal 
 good will. These men work ten hours a day; the pacificos go to the moun- 
 tains and till the soil. I saw in Trinidad, where there were 15 or 20 acres on 
 the slope of the mountains where they have cut the timber down and planted 
 sweet potatoes, and you can kick out sweet potatoes as large as that cuspidor. 
 I have not eaten a meal on the island without having all I wanted, and the 
 finest honey and beef and sweet potatoes. Gomez is husbanding the beef, 
 and I think he has enough to last time immemorial. They are only allowed 
 to kill what is actually consumed. The same can be said of the horses ; all 
 under the control of the Cubans are in depositos. He does not allow a soldier 
 to ride a mare, only geldings; that is in case the war is prolonged, so that 
 they may have their horses, They systematically propagate horses, mules, 
 and cattle. 
 
 "Q. From your knowledge of resources of Cuba and its power to produce 
 
158 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 animal life, how long do you think that the Cuban government could sustaitt 
 an army of fifty or sixty thousand men? — A. Under the plan or system they 
 are working now, I do not know why they should not support it for ages. I 
 know that the cattle are apparently just as many as when I went there a year 
 ago, and more vegetables, because they have been accumulating them all the 
 time. The civil government works at that all the time, and there are more 
 of them than a year ago. 
 
 "Q. How are the women and children provided for? — A. Those in the 
 interior — their husbands, the pacificos — the rule is: The civil goverhment 
 allows one man to provide food for every five women and children. These 
 can be five women, or one woman and four children, but it allows one man to- 
 stay away from the army — or a portion of the time — one man for"five women 
 and children. That is the civil law. And they have their houses in these 
 mountains, and the)' raise their pork and vegetables, and a great many of the 
 women work in the shops where they are making clothes for the soldiers. In 
 one portion of this shop there was a great number — I never counted them — 
 daughters of the Cubans in the field and their wives, in there making clothes. 
 I have seen 10,000 suits of clothes at one time, piled out there. That includes 
 a pair of pants, a coat, and shoes. 
 
 "Q. Is the Cuban army well fed? — A. The best I ever saw in any army. 
 I have not had a meal — and that applies to the army, when I say myself I 
 mean all — I have not had five meals on the island 
 
 "Q. What? — A. There have not been five meals on the island when I 
 have not had my coffee and sugar. I say sugar ; sometimes we had honey in 
 place of the sugar 
 
 "Q. Where is the coffee raised? — A. Certain kinds of coffee grow wild in 
 this province of Santa Clara. In these Trinidad hills there is one vast forest 
 of coffee, where I have seen coffee on the ground two inches thick — on the 
 ground rotting. 
 
 "Q. Is it good coffee? — A. It is fair coffee. It is not the best coffee. 
 Their best coffee is not the very best grade of coffee 
 
 "Q. It makes a good, wholesome beverage? — A. Yes, sir;' it is good 
 enough, so that when the soldiers don't get it they growl considerably. 
 
 "Q. You would say the army is well fed?^A. Yes, sir; I hardly think 
 that expresses it ; they have luxuries. 
 
 "Q. Take the body of the Cuban army, the white people in it, are they 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 159 
 
 as intelligent as the average of people in the rural districts here — what we 
 call backwoods of the United States? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Are they patriotic? — A. As much so as any class of people I ever 
 saw. So much so that I not only heard General Gomez and the government 
 and the officers, but I have heard private soldiers talk. I will say that there 
 is not a man in the escort or in the Victoria regiment that I have not heard an 
 expression from similar to this : That before they would lay down their arms 
 they would let every Spaniard in Spain walk over their dead bodies, and they 
 "would not accept anything but absolute independence. If you want to make 
 them angry, talk autonomy to them. They say they have been caught once,- 
 but they will never be the fish to be caught again with the same bait. And I 
 have heard Gomez say that they should be glad to have the United States 
 recognize them, but t-hat they will keep up the war until they secure inde- 
 pendence if it takes twenty years to do it. 
 
 "Q. Is there any considerable proportion of native Americans in the 
 Cuban army? — A. I do not think there is over 20 in the army." 
 
 Mr. Smith, once upon a time of Ohio, with a record of over two hundred 
 battles alongside General Gomez — in one of which 20,000 Spaniards under 
 Weyler were defeated by 1,500 Cubans — gave this account under pressure of 
 cross-examination of the escort of the famous Dominican chieftain : 
 
 "I was appointed a captain in Gomez's escort, where they are all officers, 
 appointed over the heads of old Cubans who have been in the service for 
 years — some of them with him in the ten-year war — appointed second in 
 command, jumping over all the others, and there is no jealousy of me. 
 
 "Q. About what is the strength of that escort?— A. From 70 to 90. 
 
 "Q. All officers? — A. Yes, sir With the exception of myself, there is no 
 man in it who has got in except through some special act of bravery. They 
 are General Gomez's body-guard. He goes into an engagement, and they are 
 first into the fight and the last to leave, and, by reason of that, I know they 
 have from 10 to 15 or 20 in the hospital, and they have nearly all been 
 wounded more than once. I have never been wounded except the once. 
 
 "Q. What is the strength of thTs Victoria regiment? — A. When it came 
 into Las Vegas it was 142 ; when I left there, the other day, they were all, 
 with the exception of 38, in the hospital, wounded." 
 
 Mr. Smith went so far as to describe Cubitos. The Cuban President, he 
 said, had headquarters at Nahassa — and proceeded : 
 
36o DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 "Q. The same place you call Cubitos? — A. It is in the vicinity. Nahassa 
 is a very level piece of country, a beautiful river running through it, and fine 
 grass for the horses. Cubitos is a little back of it. ' ' 
 
 It will be observed that Cubitos was the only place Mr. Smith did not 
 know all about, and Cubitos is the capital of this land of milk and honey, fat 
 cattle and sweet potatoes as big as cuspidors. But it is a "little back. "- 
 
 Did the Cubans have a coast-guard? Oh, yes — to be sure they had — and 
 Smith told all about it, though he thought his talk might hurt. He said: 
 
 ' ' There is a continuous .guard of armed men around that island, called the 
 coast-guard. The)'- are fully armed, witTi plenty of ammunition. 
 
 "Q. About how many men? — A. I presume in that coast-guard about 
 5,000 men. They fight if necessary, but it is a complete chain of guards. 
 Now, there are several reasons for that guard. The Cuban government has a 
 perfect line of communication, as I say, all through the island. They also 
 liave a perfect line of communication with the United States." 
 
 Mr. George Bronson Rea, of Brooklyn, was examined June 11, 1897. 
 He was an electrical engineer and newspaper correspondent, and before the 
 war had charge of an electrical light plant. January 18, 1896, he took the 
 field with Gomez in Pinar del Rio. After being with Gomez for a month he 
 joined Maceo, was with him six months, and then slipped through the Span- 
 ish lines, visited New York, and returned in January,- 1897, to Cuba, and was 
 with Gomez until the middle of April. Asked how great an army Gomez had, 
 Mr. Rea said: "About 150 under his personal command — the escort and the 
 Victoria regiment — each about 80 men." The grand army of Gomez in the 
 province of Santa Clara was in "two divisions and various regiments." Mr. 
 Rea proceeded to give an intelligible story of Gomez's forces, at the time the 
 oratory of senators was seeking to subordinate the United States to this mili- 
 tary pastmaster. "I can in one minute," said Mr. Rea, "give the total 
 accurately." This was a frightful menace, but it had to go! Mr. Rea said: 
 
 "This recent campaign of Gomez in the eastern part of La Villas has been 
 carried out by the first division of what they call the fourth army corps, 
 divided into three brigades: The brigade of Remedies, about 800 men; the 
 brigade of Sancti Spiritus, about 600 men ; and the brigade of Trinidad, 
 about 400 men. There are three more brigades, composing the second 
 division: That of Cienfuegos, about 500 men; the brigade of Sagua, about 400 
 men; and the brigade of Villa Clara, probably 500 more. That is all in that 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 163 
 
 province. In the province of Matanzas there are very few insurgents; 
 indeed, I think they could be safely estimated at about 400 or 500 men in the 
 whole province. In the province of Havana, probably at the present time 
 there are 2,000 insurgents. Last November — or October, I meant to say — I 
 was down in the province of Havana about one month or a month and a half, 
 and then there were about that number, and the force has not augmented. 
 Contrary to all stories as to their number, the force has not increased. I 
 left Maceo in Pinar del Rio with 6,000 men. The number of men in the east- 
 ern part of the island is — what I have said already in regard to the western" 
 part can be relied on, but in the eastern part of the island I would not like to 
 give any testimony to be depended upon as accurate — as to my opinion as to 
 the number of men, there are, I should judge, probably about 4,000 or 5,000 
 men in the two eastern provinces. 
 
 "Q. What provinces? — A. Santiago de Cuba and Camaguey. The total 
 I have not figured, but in my estimation they do not exceed 25,000 armed 
 men on the island. ' ' 
 
 Of this 25,000 armed Cubans, four thousand were of Maceo's forces, 
 and they dwindled after his death. 
 
 An effort was made by the examiners to show Mr. Rea was not the 
 friend of the Cubans, but he had simply been telling the truth, and put 
 down the land army of the Cuban commander-in-chief at one hundred and 
 fifty men in hand, the rest scattered so as to scare the Spaniards a little 
 everywhere. We quote the report: 
 
 "Q. As far as the Spanish were concerned, you were watched? — A. Yes, 
 sir ; I suppose, if caught, I should have suffered the fate of Govin. 
 
 "Q. What did they do with him? — A. They chopped him up. 
 
 "Q. Have you any knowledge of that? — A. Yes, sir; no personal knowl- 
 edge. 
 
 "Q.. Whence is your information derived? — A. From two persons who 
 were with him ; one Lieutenant-Colonel Mirabal and the other Colonel Gordon 
 — both dead now. They were in a fight between Major Valencia, who had 60 
 or 80 men, and the Spaniards under General Ochoa from Jaruco. It took 
 place near the sugar estate of Jiquiabo, and, as generally the case in a little 
 fight, the Cubans, after firing a few volleys, got out of the way, and Govin, 
 never having been in a fight before, found himself alone and the Spaniards 
 very close to him. They told me that Govin, when he saw he was to be cap- 
 
i64 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 tured, walked forward to meet the Spanish column to surrender, hoping his 
 American citizenship would help him in this case; but it seems that his 
 papers — parties told me who said they were watching and saw it done (but I 
 do not attach much importance to the statement myself, because I never saw 
 a Cuban that would stay near a Spanish column long enough to watch much) 
 — but they said the papers were torn up and thrown in his face, and he was 
 tied to another man and taken to San Mateo and kept there all night, and the 
 next morning as they were led out to march to Jaruco he was untied from 
 the other prisoner and fastened to a tree and chopped up with machetes. ' ' 
 
 Govin was killed, Rea said, because he was an American. Rea added that 
 he did not carry a revolver, for he could get out of the way when the Spaniards 
 came "by keeping up with the Cubans." He once engaged in hostilities to 
 this effect, though a man of peace: 
 
 ' ' I directed Gomez once how to burn out a locomotive, and that is all. I 
 took no actual hand in it ; I told the old man how they could do it, and men 
 — Cubans — went to work and did it. That is as far as my experience in 
 helping the insurgents has ever gone. 
 
 "Q. What do you mean by burning out a locomotive — destroying it? — A. 
 Yes, sir. If the water gets low and the fire is kept going, it will burn out the 
 tubes and then it will not stand the pressure. 
 
 "Q. He had captured the locomotive, and wanted to destroy it?— A. Yes, 
 sir. He asked me how to do it — he knew I was an electrical engineer — and I 
 gave him the benefit of my experience. 
 
 "Q. Did you give him the benefit of your experience in firing dynamite 
 shells? — A. No, sir. 
 
 "Q. You knew how to do it? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Did he ever ask for your assistance? — A. Maceo intimated as much 
 to me once or twice, but I thought I was not there to do that; I was there as 
 a neutral, and it was not my business. They have had a few foreigners come 
 there to show them how to blow up railroad trains and use dynamite 
 cartridges, and they have treated them badly, in such a way as to disgust 
 them and drive them away. A Frenchman came along and was to show the 
 Cubans how to make dynamite — and there was also a powder maker. Two 
 bombs were prepared, but the Cubans were jealous, as the bomb-maker was 
 going to get some glory, and so only eighteen men were sent to help him. 
 The bombs were exploded, and when the engine went off the track they had a 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 165 
 
 couple of liand bombs which they were to throw into the train, but when the 
 engine was derailed and the Spanish soldiers poured out of the cars the 
 Cubans got scared and ran away and left the Frenchman alone. He got 
 away safe, but was disgusted, and left them. " 
 
 Evidently the way Mr. Rea talked was not what the investigators 
 wanted, but the cross-examination helped the story of the witness. 
 By Mr. Morgan : 
 
 "Q. How many fights have you been in, did you say? — A. More or less, 
 about 80 ; not counting little shooting scrapes. 
 
 "Q. How many? — A. About 80, not counting shooting scrapes. 
 
 "Q. In how many battles have the Cubans held the ground? — A. I have 
 only seen the Cubans advance twice. 
 
 "Q. I only speak of holding the ground. — A. They may hold the ground 
 temporarily — for one minpte or ten minutes or fifteen. 
 
 "Q. I mean after the battle is over. — A. They generally come back after 
 the Spaniards give up the pursuit. 
 
 "Q. After the pursuit? — A. Yes, sir. I was with Antonio Maceo in 
 those fights around Tapia, and we had about a dozen of them, hot and heavy. 
 He would wait until the Spaniards came up, and from one hilltop he would 
 hold them back until they grew too strong for him and then retreat to the 
 next hilltop, going back and back until the Spaniards would give it up after a 
 while and retire, getting tired of the conflict. 
 
 "Q. When they got tired, Maceo would come back? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Who would win the battle? — A. I would call it a draw. There is 
 one strange thing about it; I rarely saw a Cuban killed." 
 
 These distasteful accounts of Cubans are like those that came out of the 
 conversation of the private American soldiers who met both Spaniards and 
 Cubans at Santiago. 
 
 Mr. Rea was asked why the rebels ought to be in the open, as he had said 
 they were hiding themselves too much in Matanzas province, and he answered, 
 "To subsist, ' ' for they had to go to the cultivated zones for vegetables. Asked 
 whether it was not in those zones where people were starving, the witness 
 contumaciously said, "The starvation business has been exaggerated"; and 
 he proceeded to tell how the sweet potato — the boniato — would grow by itself: 
 
 "Q. Suppose the worst for the Cubans, can not they plant boniatos; and 
 when not assailed by the Spaniards can not they live? — A. Yes, sir; they can, 
 
1 66 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 and to a certain extent they do, but in the province of La Villas they have 
 shown a wasteful spirit by eating all they have to-day, and never giving a 
 thought of to-morrow. 
 
 "Q. Maybe they want to prevent Weyler from getting it? — A. The 
 Cubans recognize, too, that they must have enough to eat if they want to wait 
 until the United States intervenes and recognizes them. ' ' 
 
 Senator Morgan does not seem to have made much headway with this 
 young man. The examination proceeded : 
 
 "Q. Pinar del Rio — how did you subsist there with 6,000 men [Rea's 
 estimate of Maceo's forces]? — A. I left Pinar del Rio last year, last October. 
 The northern part of the province, from Mariel to a point called La Mulata, 
 cattle had about disappeared. There were a few corralled in the hills by the 
 Cubans. Vegetables had completely disappeared, except those planted around 
 the Spanish forts. The cane fields had been burnt ; there was not a stalk of 
 cane standing. It was a devastated country in every sense of the word. This 
 was not done by the Cubans, but by the Spaniards, to take away the fodder 
 for the Cuban cavalry, and the fire spread in all directions ; to the thickets, 
 and palm groves, and everywhere else. Antonio Maceo sent every three 
 nights an armed force of men with the impedimenta (two or three hundred 
 unarmed men) down near Cabanas to bring the boniatos out, or, in lieu of 
 that, they went to the zones of cultivation near the large fortified sugar 
 factories La Linza and Braraales, between Cabanas and Bahia Honda, where 
 there were also a few vegetables. In through the hills, a« that time, Antonio 
 Maceo had quite a large number of vegetables planted. He was a very prac- 
 tical man, who saw ahead more than any of the rest, and he took all the 
 impedimenta, probably 1,500 men, and he set them to work planting sweet 
 potatoes, so he must have had quite a sufficient supply to last him that cam- 
 paign in the hills. Along the southern coast, or the part of Pinar del Rio 
 lying south of the Cordillera, there was quite a supply of cattle, and, in fact, 
 all south of the railway was grazing ground, and large cattle ranches were 
 scattered throughout the country, but I should not think there was many 
 cattle left at the present time, because the policy of Weyler, when he found 
 that he could not corner the Cubans, was to destroy their means of subsist- 
 ence ; and all cattle found in the hills and on the plains have been killed. 
 
 "Q. About how many troops had Weyler? — A. About 40,000. 
 
 "Q. And Maceo about 6,000? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 167 
 
 "Q. It appears the Spaniards, then, were engaged in raising potatoes to 
 feed Maceo's command, principally? — A. Yes, sir; in this case. 
 
 "Q. Whenever they got out of potatoes they sent out and got them from 
 under the fort? — A. That is right. 
 
 "Q. If I understood you correctly, there was never a battle-grgund that 
 Maceo's command did not return to after the battle was over? — A. No, sir; 
 there were several occasions where he came back, especially in that country of 
 Pinar del Rio, where the hills are. In the open country he never came back. 
 I was with Antonio Maceo when he returned after the first invasion of Pinar 
 del Rio and had so many big fights in Havana province. There was where I 
 joined him, and during the month or more I was with him in this section, 
 there was a constant succession of fights, one after the other, and we could not 
 come back and camp where we were the day before. It was simply one con- 
 tinuous skirmish, day after day, moving from place to place. ' ' 
 
 One thing Mr. Rea did not approve. The insurgents in Matanzas hid 
 themselves in the swamps too much — "could not establish prefectos in Havana 
 or Matanzas provinces. ' ' 
 
 "Q. Why? — A. Because the country is very open. They have a few in 
 the swamps, but in the provinces of Havana and Matanzas it is practically 
 impossible to hold a prefectora. 
 
 "Q. You say it is open? — A. It is the open country of that island. 
 
 "Q. Because the Spaniards hold the towns? — A. Because the towns are 
 close together and the Spanish columns are continually on the ■ move, and 
 there are no hills and nooks where they can hide themselves in any force, 
 except, along the southern coast in these swamps, which are terrible places to 
 live in. The insurgents cannot hold out in the province of Matanzas a day. 
 
 "Q. Is it not a fact that they are holding out? — A. Well, if you want 
 to immerse yourself in the swamp and stay there you are holding out, but 
 you are not doing anything. 
 
 "Q. But they are still there?— A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. The Spanish have not driven them out? — They have driven them 
 off the open country where they ought to be." 
 
 The judicial examiners stood up for the patriots immersed in the swamps,, 
 and would not consent that those fighting by immersion were not conquering 
 heroes, though in hiding until they wanted beef they hooked it from the 
 Spaniards. Maceo was the real great fighting man of the rebellion. Rea 
 
i68 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 spoke of the concentration of the Cubans — of their forcing the Spaniards into 
 the towns at first. Asked to explain, he said : 
 
 "When the invasion reached the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio 
 (I was in the island from the time the revolution broke out), when the Cubans 
 reached these provinces, they found a large majority of the people living 
 there were Spanish storekeepers, clerks, etc. , many belonging to the volunteer 
 corps. (All Spaniards coming to Cuba have to belong to the volunteer corps. ) 
 If they have not served in Spain, they join the volunteers to free themselves 
 from the enforced military service which all have to suffer in Spain. Also in 
 Pinar del Rio the large bulk of the population are Canary Islanders, not 
 Cubans, and all stanch supporters of the Crown, an^ t>elong to the volunteer 
 corps. A large majority of the tobacco planters are also Canary Islanders, as 
 are also many of the sugar planters in Havana and Matanzas. The Cubans 
 commenced their career of — well, they really commenced the atrocities them- 
 selves then. The Spaniards of the volunteer corps were taken and hung, and 
 the trail of Bermudez could be followed by the bodies of those who were hung 
 on the trees. 
 
 "Q. Did you ever see an instance of that kind? — A. Yes, sir; two of 
 them — three of them. 
 
 "Q. Where? — A. The first was on the sugar estate of Santa Teresa, in 
 the province of Havana. The second — hold on, he was not a Spaniard, he was 
 a Cuban — I believe, near Rio Bayamos, also in the province of Havana. In 
 the province of Pinar del Rio, while I did not see them, I know of the case 
 where Bermudez hung 2 1 — everybody spoke of it — 2 1 to one tree, of these 
 Spanish volunteers. 
 
 "Q. Who was Bermudez? — A. Bermudez led the vanguard of Macao's 
 army during the invasion. Bermudez was a bandit before the war, and is 
 called, among the people who lived in the fields, the Weyler of the Cubans. 
 
 "Q. What has become of him? — A. He is still there, if he did not die of 
 his wound, received just before Maceo crossed the trocha. I do not mean to 
 say that this was approved by Maceo, for when Maceo found that so many 
 people had been killed, he deprived Bermudez of his command. 
 
 "Q. It was done by a bandit? — A. An ex-bandit; but he was a colonel in 
 the Cuban army. , * 
 
 "Q. He was deprived of his command by Maceo? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Because of these outrages? — A. Yes, sir. Antonio Maceo and all the 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 169 
 
 rest of these Cuban chiefs, when they got this invasion finished, or had 
 carried their revolution to the far western part of the province, started to 
 organize their various zones and appointed local chiefs. One of the first steps 
 of these local chiefs was to eliminate from the country people all those who 
 had Spanish tendencies. All who lived in the country who were in any way 
 suspected of Spanish sympathy and all who belonged to the volunteer corps, 
 were ordered to the towns and their houses were burned over their heads. 
 That started the concentration business. When Weyler began his concentra- 
 tion, there was not a man living in the open fields who was not at least 
 morally, if not openly, a Cuban insurgent. A man to live in the fields has to 
 work for the Cuban government, and plant vegetables for them, and he is, 
 technically, an insurgent, living under the laws of the Cuban prefecto, and he 
 has to acknowledge their authority or go to the town. They give no choice. 
 
 "Q. They do not kill him, but send him to town? — A. They do not kill 
 them. They have hung several for various little offenses. 
 
 !'Q. What kind of offenses? — A. One fellow in the province of Havana, a 
 Cuban colonel — Col. Raul Arango — invited me once to a double hanging. 
 One man he had ordered to town, and had been seen outside afterwards, and 
 he was going to catch him and hang him 
 
 "Q. Treat him as a spy? — A. I suppose so. The other man was to be 
 hung because he had taken cattle into town without permission. 
 
 "Q. Treated him as a spy also? — A. The cattle were his own. If they 
 catch any one who is giving help to the Spaniards they string him up. 
 
 "Q. The Cubans treat those who are not with them as the enemies of the 
 Republic? — -A. Yes, sir. It was only recently, in the province of Villa Clara, 
 that I called Gomez's attention to it, and asked him what he meant, and if it 
 was his policy. Around the small town of Fomento the Spaniards had not 
 operated for a long time. It was about the beginning of Weyler's campaign, 
 in the month of January or February. There were probably 100 families, or 
 800 individuals, living within a radius of, say, 3 leagues of this town — all little 
 farmers, most of them Cubans and insurgent sympathizers working for the 
 cause. Many were families of the insurgents where the men were out fight- 
 ing. To show that Gomez is bound to force this concentration business him- 
 self, these people were ordered several times to vacate their homes and either 
 go to the towns or to the hills. They did not obey. I believe the order was 
 given twice, and still they did not notice it. Major Herrera — a Cuban major 
 
I70 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 — was given orders by Brigadier' Bravo, of Trinidad, to burn the houses of 
 every one and thus force them to move. The orders were carried out, and the 
 houses of these people were looted and burned, and their money and valuables 
 taken away by their own countrymen. These people left destitute, and a 
 great many, enraged at the treatment they received, went to the town and 
 joined the local guerrillas. I reported it to Gomez, and asked if that was his 
 policy, as he was always decrying the Spaniards for employing these methods. 
 He said : ' Those people would not get out of there, and I did it as a humane 
 measure. The humanity consists in forcing them to go away, because if they 
 stay there the Spaniards will come along and kill them. ' The idea is to get 
 the people out of the country. It is just as much to Gomez's ends as to those 
 of the Spaniards not to have too many people around. It is onlj' because he 
 is at present in a country where there are no people, or where there are no 
 pacificos living, that he is able to elude the vigilance of the Spaniards. This 
 policy was not started recently, but long ago, and Weyler has taken the same 
 precaution as Gomez had done previously. 
 
 "Q. Around what town was this? — A. Fomento. 
 
 "Q. After they had their houses burnt, they joined the guerrillas? — A. A 
 great many, as they were enraged at the treatment they received at the hands 
 of those they thought their friends. 
 
 "Q. Do you know — you have had good opportunity for observing — have 
 you known any case where Gomez or Maceo, or any other Cuban general, has 
 caused prisoners captured either in battle or out of battle to be shot? — A. I 
 once had occasion to write about the conduct of Lieut. Col. Frederico Nunez, 
 in the province of Pinar del Rio. He captured five Spanish soldiers on the 
 estate Susi, near Cayajabos, and strung them up. 
 
 "Q. Did Maceo know of that? — A. No; he was very indignant about it 
 when he heard of it. 
 
 "Q. What did he do about it? — A. Reprimanded him, I guess. 
 
 "Q. What was the excuse for doing it? — A. I forget. the excuse. There 
 was quite a little talk about it. He had some trouble with General Arolas at 
 the time, and there was something behind it ; I could not explain. 
 
 "Q. Did he do it as an act of retaliation upon some Spanish general? 
 —A. No. 
 
 "Q. Because they were spies? — A. No. 
 
 "Q. Well? — A. He might have done it because they were spies. He 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 captured them near the trocha, as Cayajabos was the first town outside 
 trocha. 
 
 "Q. How did Maceo know about them? — A. Nunez made the report himself. 
 
 "Q. Made the report that he captured them and hung them? — A. Yes, 
 sir. You asked me did I know anything. I have a copy of an official docu- 
 ment of one of these executions, committed by a Cuban sub-chief without the 
 knowledge of his superiors. Here is a letter from Juan Ducasse, commanding 
 the southern brigade of the province of Pinar del Rio. 
 
 "Q. No, sir. — A. 'I have notice that you have verified some executions 
 in the district under my command without my previous knowledge ' 
 
 "Q. Who was that from? — A. Ducasse to his subordinate. 'I direct this 
 present letter to you so that in the future you will abstain from doing this 
 without filling all the legal requirements that are necessary in such cases. 
 Please acknowledge the receipt of the present letter. ' This was, as I say, 
 sent by Ducasse to one of his subalterns (Maj. Thomas Murgado) who had 
 caused a couple of pacificos to be executed. 
 
 "Q. In every case the act, when it came to the knowledge of the com- 
 mander, was disapproved and rebuked — the man sometimes deprived of his 
 rank? — A. Yes, sir. In another case I had the confession of a man who did it. 
 Dr. Roj as 'Sanchez was a commander in Zayas's force. He boasted of having 
 been given eight prisoners to deliver to the Spanish authorities, and openly 
 bragged that only four got there. 
 
 "Q. Did he say he reported that fact to his commanding officer? — A. 
 No, sir. 
 
 ' ' Q. He kept that concealed? — A. Yes, sir ; to show that Zayas was acting 
 in good faith, when he made a big raid into the town of Esperanza, near Santa 
 Clara city, this same major openly boasted that he refused to go into the town 
 unless given permission to use his machete on all pacificos, and Zayas would 
 not allow him to go in, but ordered him to stay outside the town. A story 
 comes to my mind 
 
 "Q. A story I don't care about. — A. It is not a story; it was told to me 
 by two soldiers 
 
 "Q. I don't care about putting in this record the stories 
 
 "A. I am perfectly convinced of it." 
 
 It was a great point that the investigating senators did not care about 
 stories. 
 
J-1^ DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 "Q. How do you know any orders were given by any Cuban officer to 
 loot and burn, to machete the men, but respect the women? Do you know 
 that order was ever given? — A. I have heard it at La Palma. I have been at 
 attacks on towns, and I have heard the order to loot and burn the town, but 
 to respect women and children. The reason Maceo suffered such a defeat at 
 Palma was because he put in all his unarmed men to assist in looting, they 
 were so anxious to get clothing. His men were nearly naked. 
 
 "Q. You went as an electrical engineer when you first went to Cuba? — 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. How long did you work at that? — A. Until the year after the war 
 began. 
 
 "Q. Establishing telegraph lines? — A. No, sir; putting up electric light 
 plants. ' ' 
 
 There was much anxiety about Mr. Rea's occupation, but his answers 
 were clear and to the point, and the more he was examined, the greater 
 amount of truth, as in this case : * 
 
 By Mr. Davis: 
 
 "Q. Do you not understand that those concentrados are mostly women 
 and children and old men? — A. I do not understand that at all. 
 
 "Q. Have you ever witnessed one of those places?— A. I saw just as many 
 young men as there were old men. 
 
 "Q. When? — A. Just before I came home — a few months ago. 
 
 "Q. Men that have come in from the country — Cubans? — A. I saw just 
 as many young men as old men. The Cuban who has his country at heart 
 — who was a patriot — went out during the first year. Those who have joined 
 during the last year have been forced out by various circumstances — by lack 
 of food, by persecutions of the Spaniards, etc. All the Cubans who had 
 money when this war broke out came to the United States, and are carrying 
 on the war from here. Leaving out those who rose up against Spain during 
 the first year of the outbreak, the men, carrying on this war in the island are 
 those who could not help themselves or had no money to get away. This 
 insurrection was going on for a year in the provinces of Camaguey and Santa 
 Clara, and those in the west did not have the nerve to take up arms. 
 
 "Q. Did you ever have any difficulty with Gomez? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. What was it?— A. It is quite a long story. General Gomez and I 
 were very good friends until— I do not say he is a bad friend of mine now, but 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 173 
 
 he treated me very badly. He did not treat me as he had others. He 
 treated Scovil much better. He offered him twenty men to help him get 
 through, and did not offer me any. 
 
 "Q. What do you mean by impartial manner? — A. He showed partiality 
 to the others. 
 
 "Q. In what month or in what year did this partiality begin? — A. When 
 I first met the old man. 
 
 "Q. What other correspondents were in the camp? — A. Sylvester Scovil, 
 correspondent of the World. 
 
 "Q. He treated him better than you? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. That continued until you ceased all relations with him? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Now you can go on and make any statement you want to. — A. I had 
 been away from him to Trinidad. I saw things that astonished me — that 
 ought not to have taken place in the Cuban government. I saw many things 
 that would work against them if printed and prove detrimental to their char- 
 acter. Among other things Smith and I witnessed — not exactly witnessed, 
 but we were within half a mile of the town of Paredes. At i o'clock at night 
 the Cubans attacked the town. There were 16 Spanish soldiers in the garri- 
 son — in one fort 5, in another 9, in another 2. They attacked the town and 
 captured two forts, and there were but 5 Spaniards to deal with, when some 
 one raised the cry, ' Here comes the Spaniards, ' and they ran out of the town, 
 leaving their dead and wounded. The Cuban commander made a report to 
 Gomez, saying he had gained a big victory, while exactly the opposite was the 
 case. He left his dead and wounded in the streets and ran away. Also, 
 Smith and I had experience with the 'majas' or unarmed men, who live in the 
 hills and steal the food from the pacificos and respect no one's authority. We 
 also had seen several cases on the part of the government prefectos, who 
 would not attend to their business. When I got to Gomez's camp, the old 
 man asked me, very honestly, 'How about your trip?' I said, 'I have not 
 enjoyed it very much;' and I went on to explain what I had seen. I told the 
 old man, for his benefit, what I had seen, and Smith did also, and the old man 
 was quite interested until finally he got mad and walked away ; a,jid I talked 
 some with the other officers and made some criticisms on what had passed and 
 that they did not know anything about. Gomez came to me after supper 
 when I was passing through the camp, and said, 'What do you mean, Mr. 
 Rea, by telling me all these things that you saw on that trip?' In the after- 
 
174 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 noon before that he came to me and said, 'You have told me these 
 things, I suppose, because you sympathize with me and want them cor- 
 rected.' Afterwards he called to me and asked what I meant by it, and I 
 told him again what I had said before. He said it was not true, and I told him 
 it was not my habit to lie. 
 
 "Q. Was Smith in the camp? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Did you call on him to corroborate you? — A. No, sir; Smith is 
 afraid of the old man. Gomez said, 'What did you mean by saying my 
 brigadier made a false report?' and I said that he did make a false report if 
 he had said that he won a victory, after he had run away and left his dead 
 and wounded. He said, 'What do you think of it, and what are you going to 
 write about it?' I said, 'I am to write the truth,' and he said that I had no 
 business to write the truth. 
 
 "Q. Did he make any point that you had made the same statements that 
 you made to him to the various men in his command? — A. No, sir; the various 
 men in his command have made these statements to him. He got very mad 
 about it, and said that if I wrote these stories he would shoot me. I looked at 
 him in surprise. I thought perhaps the old man might take it into his head to 
 do it then. I said that it was a pretty serious thing to shoot a man, especially 
 an American, and he answered that as the United States or nobody else had 
 recognized him as a belligerent, and his status was that of a bandit, he would 
 shoot me, and that he could not be held responsible. After awhile he calmed 
 down, and we parted very comfortably. In the morning Gomez, in the front 
 of all his forces, started again on the American Congress, the New York 
 Herald, the American public, Grover Cleveland, and everybody else, and I 
 told him I could not stand it any longer. He said all we cared about it 
 was what we could get out of it or the money" we- might make. 
 
 "Q. What did you say about that? — A. I said he was way off— that is not 
 exactly what I said. 
 
 "Q. Give us exactly.— A. I. said, 'General Gomez, you are very unjust. 
 You very well know that if the United States should set its foot down, and cut 
 off your chance of getting arms and ammunition, your revolution could not 
 last. ' 
 
 "Q. Was that between you and Gomez alone?— A. No, sir; the whole 
 army was there— that is, the whole of the army he had, 150 men and staff. 
 
 "Q. They heard it all?— A. Yes, sir. After it was all over they came to 
 
DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 
 
 175 
 
 me and tried to smooth it. over. I said they could not smooth it over until 
 the old man apologized. Smith was there, and was very mad. He went up 
 to Gomez and told him that he must stop abusing Americans or he would 
 resign. 
 
 "Q. Did he give a reason for this? — A. Because he had insulted the 
 nation and Americans. 
 
 "Q. Smith did not show he was very much afraid of the old man, then? 
 — A. No, sir. 
 
 "Q. He didn't- like it?— A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Did you leave Gomez after this incident? — A. About an hour after- 
 wards. 
 
 "Q. Did you leave his camp then? — A. About an hour afterwards. 
 
 "Q. Did you report these facts to your paper? — A. To the paper, yes, 
 sir; I did not publish them. I did not know whether I was right in publish- 
 ing them or not. The old man made these remarks to me, and raised the 
 dickens for no cause whatever. He was quite put out because, I suppose, the 
 old fellow thought we ought to have been arrested and put in prison by the 
 Spanish government, so as to raise an issue between that government and our 
 own. 
 
 "Q. Did you say anything about the partiality he had shown to other cor- 
 respondents? — A. No, sir ; I never said a word about it. He was comparing 
 me with the other correspondents. He said that it would be a very good 
 thing if Scovil or I were arrested, and then the United States government 
 would get into trouble with Spain in regard to it, and he made the same 
 remark that morning, and he made a comparison between Scovil and myself, 
 and I said: 'General, the day I get arrested by the Spaniards, I don't think it 
 will cause a war that will redound to your benefit. ' 
 
 "Having read and corrected the above statement, I hereby sign the 
 same. ' GEO. BRONSON REA, 
 
 "355 Sixth Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y. " 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 The Two Sorts of Spaniards in Cuba. 
 
 The Food Supplies in Cuba— Introduction of the Torch by the Insurgents — Garcia's Fine 
 Army with an Engineer Corps— The Double Tax on Sugar Making— Spanish Methods 
 of Making War — The Policy of Annihilation — A Government in Light Marching Order. 
 
 The importance of Mr. Rea's testimony is in the fact that it has been 
 substantially confirmed by the revelations made in the American conquest of 
 Cuba. The insurgents have been found generally as Mr. Rea represented, 
 with the exception, perhaps, that he was occasionally excited by his sense of 
 humor, and as the cue of the Commission was to deal with the Cubans as 
 saints and martyrs, this exuberance was discouraged. However, the efful- 
 gency of Mr. Smith may be accepted as compensation. The Spaniards and 
 the Cubans made war upon the same general principles, with the exception of 
 the treatment of prisoners and wounded. The cruelty of the Spaniards in 
 dealing with those combatants was systematic and rarely allowed an instance 
 of mercy. The Cubans as a rule did not torture helpless enemies, and they 
 seldom "chopped up" prisoners, but the humane purposes of the leaders were 
 often evaded. It was plain policy on the part of the, Cubans to deal tenderly 
 with the disabled and spare those who had surrendered, for they hoped to 
 have their hospitals respected. Dr. Diaz states as within his personal knowl- 
 edge that Martinez Campos favored the ministrations of the Red Cross, but 
 Weyler held charitable attention was due Spaniards only. Cubans, however, 
 used the torch without hesitation, and at last were mad with the illusion that 
 when property was destroyed the Spaniards were the exclusive sufferers. The 
 Cuban zeal for everlasting war faded perceptibly during the last year of the 
 struggle. Mr. Rea estimated that when Maceo's western army gradually 
 disappeared after the fall of their one magnetic leader, -there were not more 
 than twenty thousand Cubans in the army, while the whole force of the Span- 
 iards was not less than 135,000 men. Mr. Rea was asked the question: 
 
 176 
 
THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 177 
 
 "Q. Have you any way of accounting for the fact that the Cubans — 
 according to your estimate being only 25,000 strong — have been able to pre- 
 vent the 135,000 Spaniards fi-om running over and destroying them? — A. You 
 cannot lick a man if he vfiU. not let you, or if he runs away from you all the 
 time. 
 
 "Q. Cuba is bounded by the sea on every side, and is patrolled by the 
 navy of Spain? — A. There are a great many hills and woods, etc. A body of 
 1,000 men does not take up much space. That is the reason Gomez has divided 
 his men into bodies of about 150 men, so he can get into the woods. 
 
 "Q. If his force does not shrink considerably, how long can he protract 
 this struggle? — A. As long as he has anything to eat. 
 
 "Q. What are his resources for feeding his forces?-^A. When I left the 
 province of La Villas, two months ago, the 'Eastern part, where Gomez is, had 
 quite a large number of cattle, owing to the reason that it is a grazing coun- 
 tr)', quite the reverse to the western provinces, which are devoted to the 
 culture of cane and tobacco. The eastern provinces of La Villas and Cam- 
 aguey are devoted to cattle and grazing, the eastern part of La Villas espe- 
 cially. While he had plenty of cattle to last him, economically, for about a 
 year, he had no potatoes, no vegetables, of any account." 
 
 In Matanzas there were practically no insurgents. The few existing took 
 refuge in the swamps, and subsisted chiefly on a species of jutia or racoon 
 and crocodile steaks — no vegetables and no cattle, except as they could forage 
 on the Spaniards. There were wild dispatches, however, day by day, about 
 the wonderful war going on in Matanzas. 
 
 The most unreserved of the admirers of General Gomez is Capt. W. D. 
 Smith, who was also an admirer of Garcia, and gave in his sworn testimony 
 the account of the army of the "Oriente" : 
 
 "Garcia has the finest equipped army on the island. His chief of staff is 
 General Menocal, a very good engineer, who speaks very good English. He 
 has organized an engineer corps; he has got a signal corps; he has got his 
 cavalry and his artillery, and his engineer corps is pretty fine, too. It is right 
 up to date. Any one who ever told me before I went down there that the 
 Cubans had a good engineer corps I would have laughed at him, but it is 
 true. ' ' 
 
 The insurgent troops that came out of the woods at Santiago were there- 
 fore the very flower of the Cuban army. Smith bestowed upon the Cubans, 
 
178 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 
 
 finding what was wanted, more than 60,000 men, saying, "They can put in 
 the field a little over 60,000 men. " As for Gomez personally: 
 
 "General Gomez called me the morning I left there, and said: 'I want to 
 speak to you. There have been false reports, and some may say to you that I 
 have been sick.' Gomez is a man over 70 years old. He put his hand on the 
 pommel of his saddle and vaulted right over, and put his other hand on and 
 vaulted right back again. He said to me, 'You do that,' and I told him that 
 I had business elsewhere. 'A sick man cannot do that,' he said." 
 
 The way Gomez harassed the Spaniards is thus, according to Captain 
 Smith : 
 
 "Just the moment Gomez gets news that a column has left Sancti 
 Spiritus or any other fort he marches toward that column and they meet. I 
 have never known Gomez to lie idle when there was a Spanish column out; 
 when they meet there is a fight right off. At night the Spaniards halt, and 
 Gomez retires a mile or so. The Spaniards dare not put out a picket at night ; 
 their only guard is in their camps. Just as quick as dark comes, Gomez 
 details an officer with 15 or 20 men to keep that camp awake, firing into them 
 all night, and then at daybreak Gomez attacks the camp, and so on, and 'they 
 are fighting all day and night, and so on. Whenever they go into camp there 
 are 15 or 20 men more keeping them awake all night, and the result is that 
 the Spanish troops are exhausted, and obliged to return to the town for 
 rations or from fatigne, 
 
 "Q. The Spanish commanders are obliged to go back for provisions? — A. 
 Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Is the island of Cuba, in the places which were not cultivated, heavily 
 timbered? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Forests dense? — A. Yes, sir; some of the finest forests the eye ever 
 saw ; thousands upon thousands of acres of the finest mahogany, stretching as 
 far as the eye can see. ' ' 
 
 Mr. Stephen Bonsai, journalist, described the policy of the concentration 
 of the peasantry. The orders were issued October, 1896, and, "Every peasant 
 and every person living in the four western provinces outside the garrison 
 towns were driven into stations of concentration, their houses were all burnt, 
 their crops and the palm trees destroyed, all the roots that grew — yams, etc. 
 — were dug up, with the idea, many of the officers told me, to rob insurgent 
 bands in these so-called 'pacified' provinces of the means of subsistence." 
 

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THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. i8i 
 
 * 
 
 In the four western provinces there were twenty sugar estates protected, 
 by regular and irregular Spanish troops, paid by the sugar men. Where 
 there were twenty sugar estates, there had been 200, and: "You go along 
 through the western provinces and you can see the standing chimneys" — all 
 the great machinery burned ! There is a close relationship that should be in 
 mind between the sugar estate burning and the concentration abomination. 
 No matter how much the Spaniards were paid to protect the sugar estates, 
 they were burned unless the rebels were paid also. That is, there had to be 
 "two taxes paid to the two governments." Mr. Bonsai says sometimes a 
 man who paid a thousand soldiers would refuse to pay the Gomez tax, and 
 "the crop was always burned." This happened to an American named 
 Stillman. "He was somewhat sluggish and his crop was burned." This was 
 the bottom of the policy of the insurgent commander in chief. He would 
 allow the Spanish to make sugar if the cause of liberty got a share of the 
 blackmail that was impartial as it was infamous. 
 
 Mr. Bonsai was asked whether the payment of sugar protection was an 
 open bargain, and he said : 
 
 "It was a bargain. It was arranged at the palace in Havana, and they 
 had to pay extra there. It was a written contract. They had to pay extra to 
 keep the comandante sweet. It cost them a pretty penny to have this garri- 
 son. Every man had to — the way they did this, they would have these places 
 declared strategic points. That was the way the Spaniards would excuse the 
 fact that they were having large bodies of troops in places where they were 
 absolutely of no use. So Mr. Atkins' or the sugar planters would go to 
 Havana and have breakfast with the Marquis Palmerola, and have a talk, 
 and have their places declared a strategic point, and the Captain General 
 would order a certain number of troops there until further orders, with the 
 understanding that the proprietor would pay so much bounty. I visited one 
 estate where there were a thousand men. 
 By Mr. Davis : 
 
 "Q. What estate? — A. Azpeztequia, on the southern coast, belonging to 
 the Marquis, now in Madrid, and who belongs to the constitutional or tory 
 party in Cuba. It had eighty forts defending it. 
 
 "Q. Eighty forts? — A. Fortines. They look like forts in Sebastopol, a 
 game we used to play when I was a boy , 
 
 "By Mr. Morgan: 
 
i82 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 
 
 "Q. Did you learn whether this destruction of sugar plantations was the 
 work of one side exclusively or both? — A. I think it was both sides. It is a 
 rather difficult question, because they have each changed their policy. The 
 Spanish idea the first year of the war, the last campaign, as announced over 
 his own signature by Mr. Dupuy de Lome, was to make the sugar crop. 
 That was to show that the revolution was merely local and of little impor- 
 tance. This letter was published in the New York Herald, being the ideas of 
 the representative of the Spanish government in the United States, and at 
 that time they took steps to protect the sugar estates to the best of their abil- 
 ity. Azpeztequia was the first man to fortify his estate. As soon as they 
 found out, as they did a year and a half ago, while the first sugar crop was 
 making, that even the most loyal Spaniard, being a business man, was per- 
 fectly willing to pay 50 cents a bag for the sugar he made to the insurgents, or 
 to the Cuban prefecto — when they found out that the people they were pro- 
 tecting were paying taxes into the patriot treasury they concluded it would 
 be a good thing to destroy all the sugar. 
 
 "By Mr. Davis: 
 
 "Q. By 'them' you mean the Spanish? — A. Yes, sir. This year they 
 have done nothing for the sugar people, because they knew all the sugar 
 people, whether American, French, German, or the most loiJ-al Spaniard, 
 were paying tribute on their prospective crop to the insiirgent local repre- 
 sentatives. It is so easy to burn cane. One man can burn cane, and 4,000 
 can not stop it. So the policy of the Spanish government in Cuba on the 
 sugar question changed entirely. Last year it was to make the crop ; this year 
 they think to hurt the Cubans more by destro}4ng it." 
 
 It should be carefully observed that the cane conflagrations became so 
 fashionable that the Spaniards participated like the others, but few people 
 have reflected that in this war with the torch, the incendiary San Domingo 
 method of destroying all that fire would burn, the worst of the atrocities of 
 the war had their origin— and Weyler and Gomez will be held participants in 
 the crime as far as history enlightens men. Mr. Bonsai said in his evidence 
 about the perishing people crowded around the Spanish garrisons — a horrible 
 example being at Matanzas : 
 
 "Judge Day asked me two or three days ago, I do not suppose confi- 
 dentially, what would happen if the Spanish government should change its 
 policy and drive these people back to the places whence they came. I said 
 
THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 183 
 
 that many would die on the way ; that many more would die of starvation after 
 they arrived. 
 
 "Q. And very few would survive? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. So it is death to stay, and death to go back to their homes? — 
 A. Yes, sir." 
 
 It does not occur to everybody, as it certainly should, that this horrible 
 system of warfare never was known in Cuba until General Gomez led his 
 columns five hundred miles through the island, burning plantations ; the Cuba 
 Libre journals in New York setting forth in glowing terms that the ruddy 
 skies were the token of the triumphant progress of the liberating army. 
 There was no devastation like this in the ten years' war from 1868 to 1878! 
 That was comparatively civilized. The firebrand was thrown in 1896 in 
 the name of freedom, and the end was blackmail, famine, pestilence, and 
 death. The leaders in this were not the Spanish, but the Cuban officers. 
 The Spaniards did not at first throw fire, but they followed the San Domingo 
 example and became destroyers, as the insurgents were. The very Cubans 
 who began this desperado work, complaining bitterly because their own fashion 
 was imitated, are the foremost and most venomous of the enemies of the United 
 States, insisting that their government of shadows and army of false pretenses 
 must be consoled with money for the horrors they themselves so largely 
 originated. The Spaniards are said to have avowed that they had a policy of 
 extermination. This is in Mr. Bonsai's testimony: 
 
 "The Spaniards say that the policy of what they call 'kindness' has 
 failed, and that now they have quite made up their minds that the only thing 
 is extermination ; that there will never be peace on the island as long as there 
 are any of these Cubans left, or any considerable number of them. 
 
 "Q. The policy is then to exterminate? — A. Yes, sir; and they are not at 
 all squeamish about admitting it. 
 
 "Q. They propose to destroy the peasant population? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. And then to repopulate with Spanish? — A. Yes, sir. They have 
 already exterminated one race, and Las Casas tells how they did it. They 
 will probably follow the same methods with the Creole race. 
 
 "Q. None of the Indians are living? — A. No, sir; within forty years of 
 taking possession by the Spaniards, the Caribbean or Giboney race quite disap- 
 peared, although they had numbered 400,000 or 500,000, in a generation and 
 a half." 
 
i84 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 
 
 But why did the Cubans introduce into this war the lurid features of bar- 
 barism, the firebrand with which the meanest savage can lay in ashes the 
 proudest monuments of civilization — the greater achievements of art, the 
 grandest realizations of the creative forces of industry? "The Cuban 
 Republic" has this question to answer before the people of the United States, 
 who have now to deal not with the peninsular Spaniards, but with Spania,rds of 
 the island who are not an improvement on the old stock. We know well how 
 freely the Spaniard has shed blood, how he has for a century stained his 
 colonies with red rivers, how cruel, haughty, revengeful he has been, but 
 what we want to ascertain absolutely now is whether he has precedence as an 
 incendiary and freedom reached by sacrifice of fire? By whom was laid waste 
 the production of one million tons of sugar per annum in Cuban plantations? 
 The peninsular Spaniards did not do that savagery. Mr. Bonsai said: 
 
 "General Weyler is not unpopular among what you might call the most 
 powerful section of the Spaniards in the island of Cuba. On the contrary, he 
 is quite popular. He is just the man they want. They believe with him in 
 command this policy of extermination will be carried out to its logical con- 
 clusion. I remember, in Santa Clara, in the Club of Merchants, in the town 
 of Santa Clara — it was at the time when it was proposed that Gen. Martinez 
 Campos should come to Cuba — they said to me, these men of influence, 
 unanimously, that 'if Martinez Campos comes to the island of Cuba and 
 makes any proposition of compromise, as he had before, we will shoot him in 
 the streets of Havana. We do not want General Weyler removed, because he 
 is our man. He is bloodthirsty, and he is the man we want. ' " 
 
 Certainly ! The tale of bloodthirstiness is the old, old Spanish story, and 
 Weyler was a man of blood. But was he the first of the firebugs in this war? 
 Why deny Gomez the credit of the premier firebrand policy? Dr. F. B. Winn 
 said there were 4,700 insurgent troops at his time in Havana province, and 
 the concentrados numbered about 80,000 "paiaonos — farmers." 
 
 "Q. What class of people constitute these concentrados? — A. Small 
 farmers, renters, what ' we would call in this country, I suppose, tenant 
 farmers ; a good many storekeepers. Out there they have these small stores 
 scattered all over the country. It is a very old country, and near the sugar 
 plantations or in the thickly settled community they would have five or six of 
 these small grocery stores to sell groceries, small articles, and drinks, etc. — to 
 sell everything ; and those people have been scattered and their stores burned. 
 
THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 187 
 
 They are loyal ; but the greater part of the concentrados are little farmers who 
 were unable to get out of the island, and did not care to join the insurgents, 
 and wanted to get to town ; lived in bad houses, which the Spaniards burned. 
 The Spaniards burned all these houses, all the wooden houses. 
 
 "Q. Was that generally through the province of Havana, the burning of 
 houses of the common people? — A. Complete; all burnt; none left standing. 
 
 "Q. None at all? — A. None at all; not a house left standing outside of 
 the fortification. ' ' 
 
 This was the first of the Spanish answers to the sugar plantation firebug 
 crusade. The famine followed. 
 
 "Q. Are these little palm leaf huts furnished with any furniture or con- 
 veniences for living? — A. No, sir. Some have a chair — you can get a chair 
 pretty near any place in the island. I could camp any- place in the province 
 and have a' chair to sit down on. in five minutes. The whole island is strewn 
 with chairs, sewing machines, tables, and household articles, etc. 
 
 "Q. Broken out of the houses? — A. Yes, sir. These concentrados can 
 not come out for them, and they make their chairs and provide the houses 
 pretty well. 
 
 "Q. By whom has this wreck of the houses been conducted and carried 
 on? — A. The large stone houses, of which there were a good many in that 
 province — the wealthy people's houses — were destroyed by the insurgents, as 
 they regarded them as possible fortifications for the Spanish army. The little 
 wooden houses, the small houses, were destroyed by the Spaniards. ' ' 
 
 Dr. Winn gave a most interesting and important account of the "sur- 
 rendered people, ' ' saying : 
 
 "They are people who came to America, ran away from Cuba to America, 
 and came to the Junta and were a charge on the Junta, and to get them off 
 their hands they sent them back to the insurgent lines. For the most part 
 they were young men who lived in Havana ; dudes, as we would call them 
 here ; some bachelors, with a diploma from a college. They would come back 
 to Cuba with their • diplomas and call themselves captains, majors, and colo- 
 nels, and they would come up and represent themselves to the men who have 
 been fighting in the field for two years, and they would say: 'We come from 
 the Junta, and you get us a horse and a negro and we want commands in the 
 army,' and the officers would say: 'You get yourself a horse and a negro, if 
 you want them, and get to fighting,' and they would fight for a day or two. 
 
i88 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 
 
 and then slip into the brush and wait their chance to come into the Spanish 
 lines. There is another class of presentados called maja, who are in the 
 woods. They took to the woods when the orders of concentration came. 
 They are supposed to be there to fight when arms are sent to them. When 
 arms are furnished them, they are ordered to the force to fight. About 40 per 
 cent of thenn sneak into the first town and surrender. They will not sur- 
 render until they have a gun, but when they have a gun it is a sort of guaranty 
 for them. That is another kind of presentados. " 
 
 The doctor gave this unquestionable statement of the way a Spanish 
 column searches a thick wood for Cuban hospitals, that they may chop up the 
 wounded with machetes : 
 
 "I at one time got out of the woods before the soldiers got in, and sat on 
 a hill 300 or 400 yards away and watched them go into the woods. The chief 
 stopped about 300 yards from where they entered the brush, and the infantry 
 marched up and all the officers stood back, and tEe sergeant or lieutenant or 
 small officers ordered the men in. The men marched up to the brush, and 
 then they would hesitate, and these officers would draw their canes — they 
 nearly all carry canes — or some of them machetes, and they would whip them 
 in. They would grab a man by the arm and strike him with a cane and drag 
 and push him in. By the time a man got a little ways in he would cry 'Viva 
 Espagnol,' and then the others would follow, and they would all rush in and 
 set the houses afire, and yell and raise the mischief generally, and those on 
 the outside would run up and try to set the brush afire, try to set the whole 
 army afire, as it looked to me. If it had been dry brush, like American 
 undergrowth, they would have burnt the entire army up. 
 
 "Q. By brush do you mean trees and bushes that have been cut down? 
 — A. No, sir; it is short growth that has not been cut down." 
 
 Dr. Danforth, of Milwaukee, for a year physician to Cisneros, President 
 of Cuba, was examined June, 1897, and when asked the favorite question 
 about the mysterious Cuban capital, he said : 
 
 "They have had no capital until about the ist of February of this year, 
 and then they put up a number of houses- at Aguira, about three leagues to 
 west of the city of Wymero, in Puerto Principe, and they established that as 
 the seat of government. 
 
 "Q. Were they not at Cubitos? — A. No, sir. 
 
 "Q. Have they ever been driven out of their seat of government by the 
 
THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA, 189 
 
 Spaniards? — A. Not up to the time I left ; but I will tell you in candor that 
 all the Spaniards have to do, if they want to, is to march 100 men down there 
 and drive the Cubans out. I was there on the 29th of April, and they had 
 but 8 men in the capital. 
 
 "Q. Is there any regular postal service? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. In what manner is it conducted?-^A. On this plan: They have the 
 prefects of these districts, and they act as distributing officers in the postal 
 service, I believe. 
 
 "Q. They are from 3 to 6 leagues apart? — A. Yes, sir. All the people 
 in their districts are coming and going to and from their place. They usually 
 7isit the prefects at least once every week or two to get mail. " 
 
 "Once every week or two" was the regular mail service of this country 
 with a capital city containing eight men and located for several months where 
 it was the greater part of the time visible only by the all-searching eye of 
 Omnipotence. 
 
 Dr. Danforth is a gentleman of large figures. He estimated the 
 Spanish forces in Cuba at 300,000 men — the Cubans about .one in ten. 
 As to food : 
 
 "In Camaguey, where I was, they have boniato, or sweet potatoes. Some- 
 times they will have yucca, sometimes plantains, sometimes cochanchilla, a 
 mixture of honey and hot water. Sometimes they will have coffee, sometimes 
 they will not have anything except, perhaps, meat. 
 
 "Q. How about their supply of meat? — A. It is ample. 
 
 "Q. Where is that obtained? — A. Everywhere, anywhere. By the laws 
 of the Cubans, by the law of the land, it is a fact that the Cuban rulers 
 declared, when this war first started, that all horses and all cattle in the 
 island, wherever found, were to be regarded as public property. The result 
 is you can find cattle everywhere in Camaguey. I do not believe I have 
 ever ridden three miles without seeing more or less cattle. The yucca grows 
 without any care at all. They have also a great many bananas, or plantains, 
 as they are termed, growing at Cubitos at the present time. They have a great 
 many of those, and they send over from the rest of the province every once 
 in a while to secure several mule loads of the yucca and plantain, or boniato 
 — the sweet potato. 
 
 "Q. I do not understand about that plant yucca. Is that a plant which 
 grows in moist soil, like a radish? — A. No, sir; it belongs to the family of 
 
igo THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 
 
 tubers, I believe. It is the root, and the root will increase in size, and will 
 weigh anywhere from 5 to 100 pounds. They are very large. 
 
 "Q. Is it palatable and nutritious? — A. Indeed, it is. It is just about like 
 our Irish potato; just about the same thing. 
 
 "Q. Do they cook it in the same way as Irish potatoes? — A. Yes, sir; they 
 cut it up and put it in water and allow it to boil just about as with Irish 
 potatoes. 
 
 "Q. It comes out mealy? — A. No, sir; it comes out in the original pieces, 
 very nicely done — mealy and nice to the taste. 
 
 "Q. They eat it with salt, just as you would an Irish potato? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. That food does not require cultivation? — A. No, sir. 
 
 "Q. Grows indigenous? — A. Yes, sir; wherever you chance to put it. 
 
 "Q. I have been interested, too, in another thing, and that is, what is 
 the production of hogs in the island of Cuba? — A. They have an immense 
 number. Contrary to the custom in the United States, they allow them to 
 run wild, and they eat whatever they find. ' I do not know exactly what they 
 do live on, but they live very well. They 'have what they call hog dogs, and if 
 you want a hog you call the dogs , and they will take after the hogs, and after 
 chasing them around, the dogs will seize them by the ears and maintain their 
 hold until the man comes up, and then they tie their legs together and sling 
 him across the saddle and take him to the house and kill him. 
 
 "Q. They are in good condition? — A. Always. 
 
 "Q. Have the Spanish ever attempted to drive them out of there? — A. 
 Never as yet, up to the time I left Cuba, although one day there was word 
 sent that a Spanish column of 4,000 men was only a league and a half off, 
 and we had orders to get our horses up and saddled, and everything on 
 them, ready to start at a moment's notice. However, it proved to be 
 a false rumor. 
 
 "Q. And where is the treasury of the government kept? — A. That is 
 somewhat complex. The treasurer of the government is Mr. Pina, and he 
 receives and disburses all moneys, and as fast as he will get on hand any 
 considerable store of money that money is sent, I believe, to New York, in 
 some way or another, to the Junta, and there is used for the purposes that are 
 best calculated to help the revolutionists. 
 
 "Q. In the meantime, where does he keep his money; where does he 
 have it for safe-keeping? — A. In the chests. 
 
THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 191 
 
 "Q. Carried with the government? — A. Yes, sir; with the President's escort. 
 
 "Q. Carried along with the archives? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. About what proportion of the Cuban army is negroes? — A. Well, I 
 should say less than 50 per cent. I do not know how much less, but less than 
 50 per cent. 
 
 "Q. As a rule, are the negroes under white officers, white Cuban officers? 
 — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 "Q. Are they good soldiers? — A , Yes, sir; very good, indeed; and 
 splendid fighters, too." 
 
 It is agreeable to hear that the money, gathered, we presume, chiefly 
 through what we may call the supplementary sugar tax, was shipped to the 
 New York Junta. The wars of independence of Spanish colonies were always 
 a competition of Juntas, the original Spaniards holding that they were the 
 divinely appointed ruling class. It was in Cuba only that the insurgents got 
 ahead of the regulars in the use of fire — and this was ominously under lead of 
 the military chieftain from the east end of Haiti. 
 
 We have followed the testimony taken by the Senate committee of investi- 
 gation sufficiently to show the character of the war in Cuba, and have 
 endeavored to apportion judicially the measures of the degrees of the respec- 
 tive responsibilities for the peculiar horrors of the conflict between the 
 antagonists. There was an awful accumulation of evidence of unparalleled 
 atrocities. We have to so far acknowledge the rights of the belligerents as to 
 admit the consanguinity of the combatants. We shall quote in addition to the 
 passages that truly set forth the situation of the woeful island during the last 
 year before the American intervention and participation in war, only a few 
 lines from the statement of Mr. C. F. Koop, of Boston, who described fearful 
 brutalities on the cars by Spanish officers : 
 
 "Q. You can state some of the instances which impressed you as being 
 characteristic of the situation. — A. One of the saddest, if not the saddest 
 sight I saw was the case of a woman who stood in front of a hotel in Santa 
 Clara, and who dropped dead when I handed her a piece of bread. That was 
 the saddest sight I saw on the whole trip. 
 
 ■'Q. Did she undertake to eat it? — A. She dropped the baby whicl* she 
 had in her arms, grabbed the piece of bread which I handed her, drove her 
 teeth into it and fell over dead. She had a baby in her arms and two little 
 children hanging on to her skirts. 
 
19^ THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 
 
 "Q. What became of the baby she let drop?— A. The baby died that 
 night or the next morning. I found out in the morning that it had died; and 
 the other two children died a: day or two afterwards. 
 
 "Q. Died of starvation?— A. Yes; starvation." 
 
 Mr. Koop was a man traveling in the tobacco business, and he expressed 
 the opinion that the true purpose of the Spaniards in herding the farmers in 
 the "Zones" of cultivation was to cause them to perish of fevers and starva- 
 tion. We quote: 
 
 "Q. Do the Spanish treat the Cubans with repugnance? — A. They feel 
 that a Cuban is worse than a dog. 
 
 "Q. You think, then, that the purpose of the regulation was really to 
 starve these people to death? — A. Yes; the sole purpose. It is well known 
 that 900,000 of those natives were forced in from their homes, and out of that 
 number 500,000 have died already. Therefore, the results have proved the 
 motive. 
 
 "Q. What was the apparent relation between the soldiers and these 
 reconcentrados, or did the soldiers seem to have any sort of human regard for 
 them?— A. Many of the soldiers are low spirited and absolutely incapable of 
 having such resentment, because, in the majority of cases, they were mere 
 boys and in such a condition as to be hardly able to take care of themselves. 
 The repugnance was largely among the officers and the Spanish guards, which 
 is the flower of the army. They are in better condition than the common 
 soldiers. The Home Guard, picked men, are also in better condition. 
 
 "Q. What is the feeling of this class that are in better condition — what is 
 their feeling towards these poor reconcentrados, as you saw it? — A. There is 
 a sort of a feeling between them that they would eat at one another's table, if 
 they could. If one had anything, they would give it to the other. There 
 was no animosity among the ordinary soldiery of the Spanish army." 
 
 During the examination of witnesses by Senators to ascertain accurately 
 the state of the island, much attention was given any one who had ever been 
 in or about the Cuban capital, and anything that supported the view that the 
 Cubans had a civil government somewhere in the woods was dwelt upon and 
 madt impressive as possible. This was with a view' of putting the Cubans to 
 the front as constituting a Republic. There was found, to the satisfaction of 
 the .pro-Cuban party, that there was an organization camped in a secluded 
 spot, in light marching order, with a President, and a cabinet and all the 
 
THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 193 
 
 formal appurtenances. As the Cubans could not maintain themselves at any 
 particular port, they were given to magnifying the formalities and celebrating 
 the functional equipments of their government and to claiming for it a "com- 
 plete" postal system, and also an all-encircling coast guard, but this machine 
 lacked a great deal of perfection, and indeed the uses to which it was 
 applicable were rather in anticipation than performance — like the Cuban army 
 in the later months befor.e the United States declared war. The far-sighted 
 'organizers remote from the scenes, seeing that they had ready a government 
 to claim the sovereignty to be wrested by our arms from the Spaniards, set 
 up an official ring as the people of Cuba, with power to mortgage the bloody 
 ashes of the island, and assume to rule when their turn came as the Spaniards 
 had done. The history of the island in the future must depend in a cornpre- 
 hensive way upon the dealing with the professors of official Cubanism, by the 
 government of the United States, whose specific promise to the people of 
 Cuba and the United States and all civilized men, was and remains to estab- 
 lish a "stable government." The immediate necessity is that the possessions 
 with which Spain has parted are to be subordinated to our military forces, 
 under the inviolable guaranties of "the faith and honor of the army of the 
 United States." 
 
3ea_iuu..M 
 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 
 General Lee's Consul-Generalship in Cuba. 
 
 The Conservative Administrations of Grant, Cleveland and McKinley — A Variety of "Ameri- 
 can Citizens' ' in Havana — ^Judicious Discrimination of Consulate Authorities — A Young 
 Man who Gaye Himself Away — The Brave Stand of the President against Bulling the 
 " Market for Bonds Issued on a Basis of Bloody Ashes. 
 
 The consul-generalship of General Fitzhugh Lee, at Havana, lapping the 
 national administrations of President Cleveland and President McKinley, was 
 an important incident in the development of the public opinion and official 
 policy of the United States in the affairs of Cuba. The lines pursued by 
 President Cleveland and the State papers of Secretary Olney did not depart 
 widely from those of the concluding administration of President Grant and 
 the grave and powerful but reserved communications from Secretary Fish, 
 whose correspondence from Ministers Daniel Sickles and Caleb Cushing at 
 Madrid was marked by individual distinctions so strong that their letters are 
 a most valuable source of interior intelligence, indispensable to a correct 
 understanding of the course of events from the Ostend manifesto to the 
 declaration by the United States of war against Spain. There is to be 
 marked the consistent straightforwardness of the administrations of General 
 Grant, Grover Cleveland and William McKinley, in the performance, under 
 circumstances of constant difficulty, of our duty toward Spain as a friendly 
 power in the maintenance of our international obligations. Though this was 
 a subject of a great deal of polite writing and speaking by the diplomatic 
 representatives of Spain, it was a fact perfectly within the scope of the intel- 
 ligence of the American people that the popular feeling in Spain was that we 
 encouraged filibusters and were considerably accountable for the Cuban 
 insurrections that were so disastrous to the credit of the Spaniards. Our 
 people did, of course, sympathize with the Cubans, and entertained no doubt 
 that Spain would and should lose the island, as Mexico, Peru, and the rest of 
 
 =Q4 
 
L T. .T> /-t-CXTCT> A T ■CTmryTTTmXT TTPTT Or^MOTTT ATI CT A TT A XT A tttttttixt irr . 
 
GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 197 
 
 the continental Spanish-American States were lost. The interests the United 
 States had in Cuba were presented with extraordinary force in the course of 
 the later of the ten years' war, by Secretary Fish, whose pen had the poten- 
 tiality of representing his own great ability and the Presidency of Grant. 
 
 There was a deep impression made upon Spain, in the course of this cor- 
 respondence, but it was not, on the whole, conciliatory, for it clearly was a 
 warning that the time could not be far distant when the United States would 
 intervene in C^ba. The Spaniards had two hopes — one that they might over- 
 come the rebellion, and the other that Europe would support their Cuban 
 sovereignty against that which would naturally seem to the monarchies 
 American aggression. President Grant, while pressing Spain to take decisive 
 action, was not fortunate in opportunity, because his period of executive power 
 was coincident with a series of Spanish revolutions, but he urged that it was 
 the duty of other nations to sustain our tentative advances, and associated 
 with this appeal to the powers was necessarily the strict observance of the 
 conventionalities of the usages of the strong governments with respect to 
 declarations of independence and the recognition of belligerent rights. Mr. 
 Cleveland's conservatism on this subject remained unshaken, and the assaults 
 of the literary laborers in the filibuster cause were disregarded without indica- 
 tions of uneasiness, while the anxious urgency of the Cuban agents that they 
 should be considered the representatives of a Republican form of government 
 found no countenance in the White House or the State Department. The 
 Cuban desire was for right of belligerency, and it was supported by exaggera- 
 tions of all shams of Cuban organization, the general and particular purpose 
 being to gain recognition of rights as combatants, and to manage that condi- 
 tion so as to drive the United States to make war with Spain. The State 
 Department, in the closing months of Cleveland's administration, was in doubt 
 as to the condition of Cuba, holding that there was no reliable information 
 from that quarter, positively nothing that called for action by the nation. 
 The naturalized citizens of the United States in Cuba had, to a distinct 
 degree, been actuated in declaring their intentions by the hope of protection 
 in time of political trouble, and many of them were disposed to interpret as 
 among their privileges as American citizens, exemption from punishment 
 when they interfered with Spanish rule. The more persistent they were in 
 getting into dangerous places, the more intense their appreciation of the 
 duties toward them as Americans, of the representatives of the government of 
 
198 GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 
 
 the United States. They laid special claim to the protection of the Consulate 
 of the United States at Havana, and were there very frequently with griev- 
 ances. It was not, as a rule, in proportion to the dimensions of their actual 
 wrongs that they were insistent in presenting them; and if their affair was 
 insignificant they were apt to become exasperating. The office of the Con- 
 sulate was well provided for matters of business, but it was not redolent of the 
 flavor most pleasing to the Cubans who were sympathetic with the insurrec- 
 tion. Consul-General Ramon O. Williams had long been a pian of affairs 
 in Havana, and had an extensive acquaintance and many friendly relations 
 with S]Daniards. He was an expert in the obligations of his office, and knew 
 every point of the law. The Spanish language was familiar to him, and he 
 had for some time contemplated resigning his official place, in which case Vice 
 Consul Joseph A. Springer was the best equipped man for the succession in 
 case the ordinary promotion for long and effective service was considered. 
 Mr. Springer was thoroughly informed, had facile command of the Spanish 
 language, was learned in the law's, and familiar with the customs of the 
 people. As Cuba became the center of news-interest in the United States, the 
 Havana hotels were thronged with correspondents of the newspapers of Amer- 
 ica and Europe, with their interpreters and secretaries, and the office of the 
 Consul-General was a much favored rendezvous. It became manifest to the 
 young gentlemen in the service of the press that all "American citizens" were 
 not alike welcome; and that a naturalized Cuban, who had never been out of 
 the island, and had shown a talent for the intrigues indigenous in an insurgent 
 atmosphere, was not promptly waited upon when he desired United States 
 officials to find his valuable mule confiscated as a bearer of burdens of 
 smuggled goods — struck a chilling frost when making known his claim upon 
 the great Republic that should have felt much complimented when the citizen- 
 ship of the sufferer was for the fortieth time vociferated. Omissions on the 
 part of Williams or Springer to find a lost mule, or something of that nature, 
 were liable to be celebrated in some of the most famous journals that ever put 
 forth their leaves for the help of the human race. One young man, whose 
 passage had been paid to Havana by the Spanish Consul in New York, to 
 write the stories to please Spain, and whose appetite for gold increased with 
 indulgence, caused him presently to hate Spanish, and then to offer his serv- 
 ices as a spy, to report on other correspondents, and give away their confi- 
 dence—this versatile youth toolc it upon himself to lecture Consul-General 
 
GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 199 
 
 Williams as to the use he made of law books, and instruct him in the detail of 
 official duty. He also denounced Williams to his face, and encountered no 
 incivility. Some time later the young man was disturbed to find out that Mr. 
 Williams had in his desk a few scraps of paper that proved the Spanish rela- 
 tions of his assailant, but scorned to strike him down with his own letters. 
 President Cleveland concluded some months later to accept the resignation 
 of Mr. Williams, which he had on file to be used when convenient, and to 
 appoint to fill the vacancy General Lee. Undoubtedly this was a judicious 
 selection. Fitzhugh Lee was, in the first place, a man of good nerve, and 
 of military experience. He was a Southern man, and the Spaniards would 
 not be able to deceive him with their perpetual protestation that they were 
 engaged in putting down a negro insurrection ; and he was a man of such 
 home distinction that he could not be easily turned from his purposes by 
 that which wsls said of him pro or con. President McKinley had made known 
 before his inauguration that he would call an extra session of Congress. He 
 had no personal desire to avoid the presence of Congress, but was sincerely of 
 the judgment that the members were of incomparable utility as the Senators 
 of the several States, and direct representatives of the people. The course of 
 the Cleveland administration, in doing things and refraining to do other things, 
 so as to leave unembarrassed by action the successors upon whom must fall the 
 weight of responsible decisions, was well considered and in excellent form, 
 and General Lee had shown so cleverly and with such serious deportment his 
 sense of the high duties committed to him that he was continued in office, and 
 gained more, and more the confidence of his countrymen. He supported 
 forcibly the first movement of the government in the McKinley administration 
 demanding the speedy trial or release of the American citizens under arrest, 
 and the resolute tone with which this policy was presented had an immediate 
 influence. At the same time, there was less of the friction of frivolous mani- 
 festations that were expressly intended to aggravate contentions. There was 
 a change in Captain-Generals in Cuba ; General Weyler, having been identified 
 with so much that was oppressive and exasperating, was withdrawn and Gen- 
 eral Blanco, a more gracious character, with a better military reputation, 
 substituted; and Blanco's policy presently was shaped so as to placate, if 
 practicable, the rising indignation of the people of the United States. These 
 things were believed to make for the preservation of peace, rather than to 
 cause war between the United States and Spain ; and hence the fierce agitation 
 
200 GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHTP IN CUBA. 
 
 of the Cuban war party, whose hopes and struggles were to fight, and they 
 became ferocious at the thought of peace. They were soon in a super-heated 
 state, and as incessant as Red Indians rubbing sticks of wood together to 
 kindle a fire, to communicate their incandescence to Congress. The Presi- 
 dent's message December 6, 1897, was a State paper of excellent temper, and 
 of the profoundest logic, legal and historical, and yet it did not favorably 
 impress our public men and papers who insisted the time had come for war, 
 and inconsiderate of our unprepared situation in a military sense, chafed 
 against all restraints of composure. 
 
 President McKinley's message to the Fifty-fifth Congress, assembled in 
 regular session, stated the most important problem with which the government 
 was called upon to deal in its foreign relations concerned its "duty toward 
 Spain and the Cuban insurrection. ' ' The President referred to the disquieting 
 prospect that Spain's weak hold upon the island might lead to the transfer of 
 Cuba to a continental power, and the declarations of policy that any change 
 must be in the direction of ' 'independence or acquisition by or through pur- 
 chase. " The ten years' war was outlined in a few sentences, with the Peace 
 of Zanjon, and the "present insurrection in February, 1895" — its "remark- 
 able increase" and "tenacious resistance against the enormous forces" that 
 Spain massed against it. The offer of friendly offices in 1876 had failed. No 
 mediation on our part had been accepted. The answers were: "There is no 
 effectual way to pacify Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the 
 rebels to the mother country. " The President denounced the cruel policy of 
 concentration initiated in February, 1896, that depopulated the districts com- 
 manded by the Spanish armies. He proceeded, after characterizing this policy 
 as cruel, to say of it : "The agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about 
 the garrison towns, their lands laid waste, and their dwellings destroyed. 
 This policy the late Cabinet of Spain justified as a necessary measure of 
 war and as a means of cutting off supplies from the insurgjents. It has 
 utterly failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was 
 extermination." The part of the Cuban leaders in burning out the civiliza- 
 tion of the island to cut off Spanish resources was not mentioned, for it was the 
 President's basis of operations that there was po responsible Cuban govern- 
 ment to deal with. The persecution of American citizens had especially 
 aroused the President, and he did not feel it incumbent upon him to investi- 
 gate naturalization papers. His first duty was "to make instant demand for 
 
GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 203 
 
 the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest, and before the 
 change of the Spanish Cabinet in October last twenty-two prisoners, citizens 
 of the United States, had been given their freedom." Then came the work of 
 charity. The message of the President very seriously recited the develop- 
 ments of the situation leading up to the most grave utterance that ever came 
 from a chief magistrate of this country, touching our international obliga- 
 tions as Americans, and the conservative propriety of our interest in the peace 
 of communities of the neighborhood. 
 
 The culmination of the message was in this paragraph : ' 'Sure of the 
 right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by upright and 
 patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the govern- 
 ment will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American 
 citizens, and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies 
 a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear 
 to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and 
 humanity, to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and 
 only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the 
 support and approval of the civilized world." 
 
 " The remarkable words were "to intervene with force." Spain well knew 
 what the four words signified, but those engaged in shouting war cries in Cuba 
 and this country were not satisfied. They had been screaming for years 
 against General Grant and Grover Cleveland, because they did not accept the 
 New York Junta as a nation, entitled to use the arms of the United States for 
 the faction in Cuba that sought with our aid to supersede the Spaniards. 
 President McKinley offended the filibusters . when he declared: "The wise 
 utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December 7, 1875, 
 are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may be whole- 
 some now to recall them. ' ' This, of course, was simple treason to the 
 Republic of Cuba. President Grant said, and President McKinley quoted with 
 approbation, these words : ' 'A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, 
 in my opinion, irqipracticable, and indefensible, the question which next pre- 
 sents itself is that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the 
 contest." More than this. President McKinley said : "In a former message 
 to Congress I had occasion to consider this question, and reached the con- 
 clusion ^that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as were its inci- 
 dents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war. " In a word, the President 
 
204 GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 
 
 did not propose to use the United States for the pretended Cuban Republic, 
 and that was the very pith of the Cuban war party's position. The President, 
 instead of floundering into war headlong for the Cuban incendiaries, who pre- 
 pared at once to destroy property and issue certificates of bonded indebtedness, 
 made a last sincere and pressing effort to defer war, and so far as was pos- 
 sible interpreted events as helpful for the preservation of peace. He said he 
 regarded the recognition of belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as "now 
 unwise and therefore inadmissible" — and he held that "a hopeful change has 
 supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba. A new government has taken 
 office in the mother country. It is pledged in advance to the declaration that 
 all the effort in the world cannot sufi&ce to maintain peace in Cuba by the 
 bayonet; that vague promises of reform after subjugation afford no solution 
 of the insular problem ; that with a substitution of commanders must come a 
 change of the past system of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy. " 
 
 These were the promptings and teachings- of a generous heart, and there 
 was behind them the wisdom of expediency, for if we were drifting to war, we 
 would be great gainers by the time occupied. All the American citizen 
 prisoners in Cuba were released. There could be nothing lost save as to the 
 Cuban Republic, and bonds based on the naked chimneys, monumental of 
 ancient and prosperous industry! The President was in position to say: 
 "Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of 
 whom this government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate 
 whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the 
 Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately 
 involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency 
 of further and other action by the United States will remain to be taken. 
 When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of indispu- 
 table right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the 
 light of the obligation this government owes to itself, to the people who have 
 confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity. ' ' 
 
 There was behind the President all the powers of the people, and all the 
 dignities of decency and civilization ; and the grim necessity of which he had 
 knowledge exceeding others — for, if war was just ahead, we should not make 
 haste to get into it without preparation. 
 
 There was an ignorant and inflammatory public opinion — part vanity and 
 part malice — fed by the falsehoods of Spanish Cubans through the convenient 
 
GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 205 
 
 wires, and it was foolishly and wantonly and insolently wrong, as regards the 
 conditions under which we were moving to encounter in Cuba — first, the 
 rainy season; second, the sweltering venom of the yellow fever; third, 
 insufficient water supplies and inadequate facilities for the water transportation 
 even of our regular army and the articles requisite to its higher efficiency. 
 Last, but not least, there was not abroad in our country understanding of the 
 fighting abilities of the Spaniards on the defensive, or the fruitfulness of the 
 soil that made starvation outside prisons a tedious task — for we could only 
 blockade the ports. The marvels of the soil and sky of Cuba in providing 
 food remained, and not until the full story of the war is read will the people 
 at large be truly informed of the endowments of the island, golden in all but 
 the yellow metal. The Cuban Spaniards and American filibusters were rank 
 with violence that would have been ludicrous if it had not closly approached 
 criminality, because the President held open to the last hour it was practicable 
 the door that led to the paths of peace. It was Cuban influence that burnt the 
 sugar plantations that did not yield the Republic a special tax, that branded 
 the insurrection with the San' Domingo mark, dnd redoubled outcries for 
 recognizing independence, on preposterous grounds, granting belligerency, 
 and putting firebrands wherever there was fuel for war. 
 
 _yv 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Actual Experience and Sentiments of tiie People of Cuba. 
 
 Two Parties of Malignants — The Firm Stand of the President at the Beginning of the War — 
 A Study of the Historical Truth of the Situation — The President's Language Contrasted 
 with that of the Fire Bugs — Extreme Views of Senators Davis, Daniel, Foraker, and 
 Others — ^The Fury of the War Party — Cuban and Spanish Desperadoes — The Massacre 
 of the Maine — The Findings of the Courts — List of the Lost on the Ship. 
 
 The public sentiment in Havana did not easily appear to strangers. It 
 was of vital consequence to those who were owners of real estate or engaged in 
 business, surrounded with families, to assume an attitude as far as permissible 
 from partyism— to be moderate in all things, cultivate good will, put out, as 
 a form of consenting to the conditions, the Spanish colors, wear dress suits on 
 occasions of ceremony, welcoming General Weyler, for example. There 
 were those who took the risks of avowed sympathy with the insurgents, but 
 they had reasons for refraining from active service. One of the ways of 
 preventing persecutions was in the susceptibility of many .holding Spanish 
 commissions to the acceptance of concessions in cash or its equivalent. 
 
 The processes of protection in the city were like those that prevented the 
 burning of a few cane fields and mills, and the dispersion of the carts and 
 horses that were an impbrtant part of the equipment of plantations — that is, 
 the payment of a double tax. There were those who communicated with the 
 avowed rebels in Key West, New York, and elsewhere, and the Spanish 
 officials were complacent about that. The price of taking a small package of 
 "private" letters to the United States post office was a five dollar. Spanish gold 
 piece. Often Spanish or insurgent officers were transported to and fro from 
 Havana— visiting the United States— at regular rates, according to the rank of 
 the travelers. Under this system it was not difficult to account for adventures 
 that were touched up with superficial mystery. What was the need of daring 
 when bribery w^s so facile? Heroism was as marketable as Mauser cartridges 
 
 206 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 207 
 
 at Morro Castle ! The men of sincerities ascertained that there were deplor- 
 able disadvantages in persistent integrity. There were two besetting dangers 
 for an honest man. One was to give mortal offense to the important Span- 
 iards by telling the truth of them — and the other was to insult the civilian 
 insurgents by truthfulness respecting them, the capital crime being to doubt 
 the ability of the government in the woods to issue bonds, command armies, 
 and exercise all the supreme functions of anational sovereignty. Those who 
 absorbed this fictitious officialism held that it was treason to question their 
 regularity, and they were sure as possible of everything and in a state of 
 infallibility all the time. It was highly criminal to fail in faith in any false- 
 hood invented in and telegraphed from the Florida bureaus. It was the most 
 wicked way of being treasonable to Cuba Libre to hesitate to believe that the 
 New York Junta and the literary manufactures, carried on outside Cuba with 
 the making of Havana cigars, were not the veritable and the only people of 
 Cuba. One development of scoundrelism in Cuba fostered another. The 
 canker of corruption in the Spanish service was not unknown among the 
 Cubans. There were pecuniary reasons for the protraction of the war. 
 There is a real .people of Cuba behind all this. There is also a real Spanish 
 manhood that is not revealed in this outrageous distemper of dishonesty. If 
 one got the unreserved confidence of true Cubans — ^those who in spite of mis- 
 government had made the island prosper — the truth would break out about in 
 this way: "We have been taxed regularly and irregularly, by the Spaniards 
 and the rebels — double taxed in custom houses — forced to pay for things done 
 and undone — compelled to pay all sorts of soldiers and loafers to care for 
 us, openly and secretly — have everything offered now as always for money— 
 and are refused justice in any case without it. Now we are exhausted. Our 
 money is gone. We are not politicians. This is a rich country. There is lio 
 end of money to be made here. We only want order — no matter whether 
 under a monarchy or a republic— anything so that we can do business. We 
 know that if the Spanish conquer the island and rule it again we shall be 
 ruined utterly. We are almost in a condition of beggary now. It will be 
 very little, if any, better for us if these fellows who claim to have a Cuban 
 government should become the masters of the island. They will ruin us just 
 the same as the Spaniards. In either case we are reduced to poverty, and 
 shall be without hope. We have one chance— that we shall sometime soon — 
 very soon, before it is too late for us and our children— become a part of the 
 
2o8 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 United States." Notwithstanding the terrible indictment of the Spanish 
 colonial system, of which the last and worst development was in Cuba, by tha 
 President in his message of December, 1897, it would have been impossible 
 to have framed a paper more disturbing and alarming to the managers of the 
 Cuban policy than the whole document as it appeared with its plain use of the 
 plain words "intervention with force." The Cuban holders of commissions 
 or diplomas, as they say, wanted intervention with force, to be sure, but for 
 them, in their way. The programme was for the United States to make the 
 war and finish it and turn over the island to the Cuban republic. There was a 
 huge speculation in this contrived to be at the expense of the United States, 
 and President McKinley's straightforward course was an interference. One 
 of the Cuban outcries had been stifled. It was that crowds of "American 
 citizens" were imprisoned and not tried. That was at an end. Weyler was 
 gone like a gory scapegoat, 'and Blanco had arrived, dressed in regimentals 
 that he gave assurance were white robes. He made an impression that there 
 was a real meaning behind his good words. He seemed to be taking himself 
 in earnest. The Spanish language was not exhausted. The President 
 appeared to have hopes that his policy of peace could prevail. 
 
 It was necessary that there should be something done in Havana to 
 change the current. There was always under Spanish rule a chance for a 
 panic there. The vindictive volunteers were ever ready for the indulgence 
 of resentments. They hated the Blanco style, and opposed it with the same 
 malignity that their extreme opposites — the firebug 'patriots — denounced the 
 pacific President of the United States. They discovered that the American 
 citizens in Havana were in peril, that they needed ships of war to protect 
 them ! That was one of the cultivated alarms always ready for an emergenc)'. 
 The incendiaries had failed to impress General Lee. There was a solidity 
 about his composition that gave them sore grief. Lee was fearless and posi- 
 tive as against Spanish misconduct toward American citizens, no matter how 
 defective their title might be. He acted on the face of the papers — ^but the 
 incandescent Cuban officialism did not appeal to him strongly. He did not 
 submit himself to those people or take them into his confidence. He was an 
 American, not a Cuban, but he could not see, as the United States and 
 Spain were in friendly relations, officially, why there should not be one of our 
 ships of war in the Havana harbor — on the like terms of those of the favored 
 nations. The Cuban theory that our war ships were wanted in the harbor to 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 209 
 
 protect Americans was unsound. The real want was to use and display our 
 ships of war so as to promote the war conspiracy! It was certain that if we 
 sent ships to Havana waters to rest there as fixtures we would sacrifice many 
 lives to the pestilential influences of that spot where centuries of filthiness have 
 made provision for plagues of fever. It was clear also to any observer that if 
 there were Americans in personal danger, a ship of war more or less could 
 not save them, for the ships would necessarily be out of the way of the resorts 
 of the city, and under the German guns with which the old forts and the new 
 fortifications were armed. It was provided that there should be arranged 
 an exchange of courtesies between Spanish and American ships of war, and 
 two ill-fated cruisers were appointed, the Maine to visit Havana and the 
 Vizcaya to call at New York. 
 
 The malignants on both sides in Cuba, the extreme peninsular Spaniards, 
 and the extreme Cuban Spaniards, the filibusters and adventurers, were joyful 
 over the massacre of the Maine, and used the awful story to fan the smolder- 
 ing embers of war into a conflagration. They were aided by the Cuban war 
 party in the United States, and a great, irresistible wave of emotion that was 
 deeper than anger, and of indignation that rises like the ocean uplifted by an 
 earthquake and rolls mighty billows upon distant shores. It was the Presi- 
 dent's duty, and he performed it, to be clear headed for the country, to hold 
 the balances of judgment serenely higher than the sphere of the tempests. It 
 is not often in the annals of mankind that a man has had a loftier and broader 
 responsibility to discharge, and the President, awed by the overmastering 
 sense of the destiny upon him, was not disquieted and depressed, but calmed 
 and elevated by the magnitude of events, as became a President of the people, 
 and there were those who would have belittled the days as they passed with 
 sound and fury, and cheapened themselves with hatefulness and fancies that 
 haste and clamor would be thought identical with the expression of serious 
 duties, — and the sensationalists displayed themselves on fire lines and 
 illuminated the distortions of their own insignificance. In proportion as the 
 people of the United States knew war and were of general intelligence, they 
 sustained with their moral sympathy and political force the equipoise of the 
 Executive Department; they commended the request of Captain Sigsbee of 
 the Maine for a suspension of public opinion as to that catastrophe, and the 
 deliberate reserve of the President, accepting the tenders of courtesies of 
 Spanish military and naval civil authorities in the way of regrets and condo- 
 
2IO SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 lences for the victims of the Havana harbor explosion. In the message of the 
 President May nth, after quoting state papers of Cleveland and Jackson, and 
 reciting once more the hideous sitiaation in Cuba and the elements of danger 
 and disorder, he said these had been ' ' strikingly illustrated by a tragic event 
 which has deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already 
 transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of inquiry on the 
 destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night 
 of the 15 th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the 
 national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave 
 sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied 
 security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want 
 brought to their homes, and sorrow to the nation. 
 
 "The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the 
 unqualified confidence of the government, was unanimous in its conclusion 
 that the destruction of the' Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of 
 a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That 
 remains to be fixed. 
 
 "In any event, the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, 
 is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intoler- 
 able. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government 
 cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the har- 
 bor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there. ' ' 
 
 Further, dwelling in this connection on recent diplomatic correspondence, 
 "A dispatch from our Minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the state- 
 ment that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs assured him positively that 
 Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter of 
 the Maine. The reply above referred to of the 31st ultimo also contained an 
 expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the 
 differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by 
 the note of the Spanish Minister at Washington of the loth instant, as 
 follows : 
 
 " 'As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views 
 between the reports of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that 
 the facts be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose 
 decision Spain accepts in advance. ' 
 
 "To this I have made no reply. " Nothing was wanted of Spain's experts. 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 2ir 
 
 The date of this message was within ten days of the declaration of war, 
 and the President closed in these words, that will ever reflect honor upon him : 
 
 "I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take 
 measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the 
 government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the 
 establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and 
 observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the 
 security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval 
 forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes. 
 
 "And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the 
 starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and 
 supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public 
 Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens. 
 
 "The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I 
 have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which 
 is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation , imposed upon me by 
 the Constitution and the law, I await your action. 
 
 "Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, oificiat 
 information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of 
 Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to pro- 
 claim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not 
 yet been communicated to me. 
 
 "This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, have 
 your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are 
 about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspira- 
 tions as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be 
 only another justification for our contemplated action." 
 
 It does not seem, now that the war is over, fairly and swiftly won, that 
 there was lacking in this measured language anything becoming the dignity 
 of the United States, the spirit of resolve and sacrifice of the people at large, 
 or any sign of negligence in the discharge of the tremendous functions of the 
 Presidential office. The words "contemplated action" were of deep meaning. 
 
 There was something of injustice, for a time, in the criticisms of the 
 course of the President, of the steadfast, imperturbable demeanor with which 
 he met the extraordinarily exacting demands upon him, but the people pres- 
 ently knew, not from spoken words or through the pomps of complacency, but 
 
212 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 the deeds that were wrought from day to day, that their Chief Magistrate, the 
 Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, was at the front and never 
 flinched under fire. There appeared in the message, April ii, this passage of 
 solemn caution — then justified — now amply vindicated: 
 
 "I said in my message of December last, 'It is to be seriously considered 
 whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of 
 statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its 
 favor. The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered 
 when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question ; for no less 
 positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser ; while, on the 
 other hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal 
 policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors when the recog- 
 nition of belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable, 
 factors when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition 
 is or is not independent beyond peradventure. 
 
 "Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or 
 prudent for this government to recognize at the present time the independence 
 of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order 
 to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit 
 this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba 
 might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward 
 the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be 
 subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be 
 required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a 
 friendly ally. 
 
 "When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a govern- 
 ment capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a 
 separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and 
 attributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recog- 
 nized and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation 
 adjusted." 
 
 This excellent medicine was a bitter dose in the bellies of the Cubans who 
 were doing their fighting out of the island whose soil was contested. Among 
 the forces the President was obliged to restrain from misadventure was the 
 report of Mr. Davis, of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who paraded 
 several resolutions of Congress. Mr. Davis said one-third of the people of 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 213 
 
 Cuba in the eastern end of the island were subordinate to the insurgent gov- 
 ernment and "that third of population pays taxes to them, serves in their 
 armies, and in every way supports and is loyal to them. This situation has 
 existed ever since the first few months of the war. The armies of Spain 
 under Campos, Weyler, and Blanco, successively have been repelled in every 
 invasion that they have attempted of the eastern half of the island. The cause 
 of Spain has continually grown weaker, and that of the insurgents has grown 
 stronger. ' ' 
 
 This was not warranted. It was the acceptance of the exaggerations of 
 the Spanish Cubans, and it was the temporary misfortune of the country that 
 this falsified current history could not be as conclusively exposed as it has been 
 by the accounts of the army and navy of the United States. Throughout the 
 able and ingenious report of Mr. Davis, the injudicial element cropped out, 
 and the absence of the impartial spirit, that gives due weight to all facts, is evi- 
 dent in the omission of the truth that the insurgent forces were the first, to 
 use the torch and originated the savage policy of desolation. 
 
 The President was equal to the firm presentation of the truth: "As I 
 Said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare ; it was 
 extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and 
 the grave. Meanwhile, the military situation in the island had undergone a 
 noticeable change. The extraordinarj' activity that characterized the second 
 year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed 
 fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the 
 city of Havana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and 
 eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar 
 del Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural 
 country, without immediate improvement of their productive situation. 
 Even thus partially restricted, the revolutionists held their own, and their 
 conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis 
 of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outset." 
 
 Here is the exercise of the judicial faculty. Mr. Davis reported: "It is 
 the opinion of this committee that the time to interpose has arrived; that 
 intervention which will stop the war and secure the national independence of 
 Cuba should at once take place. ' ' 
 
 Even this was not going far enough. The annexed document is an 
 essential part of the record : 
 
214 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 "VIEWS OF MINORITY. 
 
 "The undersigned members of said committee cordially concur in the 
 report made upon the Cuban resolutions, but we favor the immediate recogni- 
 tion of the Republic of Cuba, as organized in that island, as a free, independ- 
 ent, and sovereign power among the nations of the world. 
 
 "DAVID TURPIE. 
 "R. Q. MILLS. 
 "JNO. W. DANIEL. 
 "J. B. FORAKER." 
 
 There was for a time a formidable following of this doctrine, which was an 
 effusion of passion and an apotheosis of imposture, and it will claim a fixed 
 place in the popular recollection, to mark the danger escaped, showing that 
 when the Senate tottered on the edge of a precipice, the quality of public 
 safety was found in the House. Far beyond all other investigating commit- 
 tees, the army of the United States discovered the whole truth, and there are 
 clouds of witnesses that our recognition of the Cuban "Republic" as an estab- 
 lished government would have been a degradation of ourselves. This does 
 not imply that the Cuban insurgent forces are not largely composed of brave 
 and honest men, and that there is not capacity in them to participate in good 
 government, but all that concerned them was subjected to competitive 
 deceptions from the peninsular and insular people who had the same habits of 
 both misapprehending and misrepresenting themselves and prevaricating, 
 whether as friends or foemen. The Cuban cause would have been greatly 
 benefited if it had been truthfully served, though nothing could have excused 
 or even considerably extenuated the confirmation of the Spanish accusation of 
 following the precedent of San Domingo, a cause that produced heroes and 
 yet bequeathed to the world a startling lesson of the crimes that may be com- 
 mitted in the name of liberty, the. barbarism of which license is productive. 
 
 However, the greater crimes in the Indies have had their origin in the 
 wrongs inflicted upon labor paid with the lash, and the greed of the strong in 
 consuming the earnings of the weak. 
 
 The events immediately preceding the blowing up of the Maine are pre- 
 sented in the dispatches passing between Consul-General Lee and Secretary of 
 State Day. January 12, 1898, 'mobs, led by Spanish officers, attacked the 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 215 
 
 offices of three newspapers advocating autonomy. The autonomists were 
 rhetoricians, who thought reform could be founded in fine words. Mobs, on 
 the 13th, shouted against Blanco and for Weyler; the palace and consulate 
 were guarded. General Lee thought if Blanco could not control the situation, 
 "or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must be sent;" and 
 it was added they must be ready to move promptly. Quiet prevailed for a 
 few days. January' 24th Mr. Day telegraphed Mr. Lee : 
 
 "It is the purpose of this government to resume friendly naval visits at 
 Cuban ports. In that view the Maine will call at the port of Havana in a day 
 or two. Please arrange for a friendly interchange of calls with authorities. ' ' 
 
 Lee telegraphed at once : 
 
 "Advise visit be postponed six or seven days, to give last excitement 
 more time to disappear. Will see authorities and let you know_ result. Gov- 
 ernor-General away for two weeks. I should know day and hour visit." 
 
 Mr. Day responded, 24th: 
 
 "Maine has been ordered. Will probably arrive at Havana sometime 
 to-morrow. Cannot tell hour ; possibly early. Cooperate with authorities for 
 her friendly visit. Keep us advised by frequent telegrams. " 
 
 The next dispatch from Lee was on January zsth, that the "authorities 
 profess to think United States has ulterior purpose in sending ship — would 
 obstruct autonomy, produce excitement, probably demonstration;" and they 
 asked that the Maine should not be sent until instructions could be received 
 from Madrid, and the closing words of the dispatch were that the authorities 
 said, "If for friendly motives, as claimed, delay unimportant." On the same 
 day, "Ship quietly arrived" at eleven in the morning. There was no demon- 
 stration. Spanish commanders called on the commander of the Maine, and 
 salutes were exchanged. It will be observed that the first feeling of the 
 Spaniards was unfriendly to the Maine, and this was succeeded by civility. 
 General Lee, with Captain Sigsbee, and two officers, called oh the acting 
 '"aptain-General January 27th, and the following day Lee telegraphed: 
 
 "Acting Governor-General Parrado and staff went with me this morning 
 to return visit of Sigsbee. Inspected the Maine, were entertained and given 
 the appropriate salute. Expressed pleasure at their reception and admiration 
 for the splendid battleship. " 
 
 On the 4th of February the Secretary of the NaA^y thought it "not prudent 
 for sanitary reasons" to remain long in Havana. If there was another vessel 
 
2i6 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 than the Maine sent, what kind of a ship should it be? Lee replied same 
 day: 
 
 "Do not think slightest sanitary danger to ofEcers or crew until April or 
 even May. Ship or ships should be kept here all the time now. We should 
 not relinquish position of peaceful control of situation, or conditions would be 
 worse than if vessel had never been sent. Americans would depart with 
 their families in haste if no vessel in harbor, on account of distrust of preser- 
 vation of order by authorities. If another riot occurs, will be against 
 Governor-General and autonomy, but might include anti- American demonstra- 
 tion also. First-class battleship should replace present one if relieved, as 
 object lesson and to counteract Spanish opinion of our Navy, and should have 
 torpedo boat with it to preserve communication with Admiral. ' ' 
 
 February .nth Lee telegraphed: "Sigsbee attended General Blanco's 
 reception with me last night. This morning paid him and others of govern- 
 ment officials visit. ' ' The next telegram in order was : 
 
 (General Lee to Mr. Day.) 
 
 "Havana, February i6, 1898, 12:30 p. m. — Maine blown up and destroyed 
 to-night at 9 :4o p. m. Explosion occurred well forward under quarters of 
 crew; consequence many were lost. It is believed all officers saved, but 
 Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Cause of explosion yet to be 
 investigated. Captain-General and Spanish army and navy officers have 
 rendered every assistance. Sigsbee and most of his officers on Ward steamer 
 City of Washington. Others on Spanish man-of-war and in city. Am with 
 Sigsbee now, who has telegraphed Navy Department." 
 
 On the 8th of January General Lee wrote Secretary Day : 
 
 "I estimate that probably 200,000 of the rural population in the provinces 
 of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara have died of starvation 
 or from resultant causes, and the deaths of whole families almost simultane- 
 ously or within a few days of each other, and of mothers praying for their 
 children to be relieved of their horrible sufferings by death, are not the least 
 of the many pitiable scenes which were ever present. In the provinces of 
 Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba, where the 'reconcentrado order' could 
 not be enforced, the great mass of the people are self-sustaining. ' ' 
 
 The following is one of General Lee's inclosures : 
 
 "Statistics of death rafe in Santa Clara (a town of 14,000 inhabitants) : 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE. OF CUBA. 217 
 
 1890 578 
 
 1891 720 
 
 1892 596 
 
 1893 619 
 
 1894 687 
 
 189s 872 
 
 1896 (epidemic of yellow fever 
 among army and Cubans) . 1,417 
 
 5,489 
 1897 (no epidemic) .... 6,981 
 
 (1,492 more than in seven previous years.)" 
 
 After the funeral civilities over the victims of the Maine, the Spanish 
 officials found, through a Naval Board of inquiry, March 2 2d: 
 
 "That the character of the proceedings undertaken and respect for the 
 law which establishes the absolute extra territoriality of a foreign war vessel 
 have prevented the detern^nation, even by conjecture, of the said internal 
 origin of the disaster, to which also the impossibility of establishing the 
 necessary communication either with the crew of the wrecked vessel or 
 the officials of their government commissioned to investigate the causes 
 of the said event, or with those subsequently intrusted with the issue, has 
 contributed. 
 
 "Sixth. That the interior and exterior examination of the bottom of the 
 Maine, whenever it is possible, unless the bottom of the ship and that of the 
 place in the bay where it is sunk are altered by the work which is being 
 carried on for the total or partial recovery of the vessel, will prove the 
 correctness of all that is said in this report; but this must not be 
 understood to mean that the accuracy of these present conclusions requires 
 such proof." 
 
 The United States naval court of inquiry, convened by Rear-Admiral 
 Montgomery Sicard, in pursuance of orders of the Department, found 
 that: 
 
 "The destruction of the Maine occurred at 9:40 p. m., on the 15th day of 
 February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored 
 to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were 
 two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but dis- 
 tinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a 
 marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was 
 more in the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosign 
 was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion 
 was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or 
 more of the forward magazines of the Maine. ^ 
 
^i8 SEISTTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 "At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point 11% feet from the 
 middle line of the ship, and 6 feet above the keel when in its normal position, 
 lias been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the surface of the 
 water, therefore about 34 feet above where it would be had the ship sunk 
 ■uninjured. 
 
 "The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape (^), the after 
 wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 32 feet in length (from frame 17 to 
 frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same 
 plating, extending forward. 
 
 "At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent 
 into an angle similar to the angle formed by ihe outside bottom plating. 
 This break is now about 6 feet below the surface of the water, and about 30 
 feet above its normal position. 
 
 "In the opinion of the court this effect could h§,ve been produced only by 
 the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 
 18 and somewliat on the port side of the ship. 3" 
 
 "The court finds that the loss of the Maine on the occasion named was 
 not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers 
 or members of the crew of said vessel. 
 
 "In the opinion of the court the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of 
 a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the 
 forward magazines. 
 
 "The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for 
 the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons. ' ' 
 
 There is no rational question that the condition of the wreck of the Maine 
 demonstrates the first explosion was exterior, and that exempting the higher 
 Spanish officers from the charge of guilty knowledge, there must have been 
 some concerned who had official information and responsibility. We give 
 the official casualty list on the Maine. It far exceeds in extent of fatalities all 
 the losses of the American navy in all the service of our squadrons in the 
 annihilation of the fleets of Montijo and Cervera at Manila and Santiago, and 
 all the combats with the shore batteries of Cuba and Porto Rico: 
 
 "U. S. S. Maine, ist rate, blown up in Havana harbor, February 15, 1898. 
 List of officers, sailors, and marines on board of the U. S. S. Maine, who were 
 killed or drowned when that vessel was wrecked in the harbor of Havana, 
 February 15, 1898, or who subsequently died of their injuries." 
 
CAPTAIN SIGSBEE, WHO COMMANDED THE ILL-FATED "MAINE." 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 221 
 
 (The men marked with an asterisk (*) died subsequently of injuries 
 received when the U. S. S. Maine was destroyed.) 
 
 OFFICERS. 
 
 Jenkins, Frederick W., lieutenant. 
 Merritt, Darwin R., assistant engineer. 
 
 SAILORS. 
 
 Adams, John T. , coal passer. 
 Aitken, James P., boatswain's mate, 
 
 first class. 
 Anderson, John, boatswain's mate, 
 
 second class. 
 Andersen, Holm A., coal passer. 
 Anderson, Charles, landsman. 
 Anderson, Gustav A., seaman. 
 Anderson, John, seaman. 
 Anderson, Axel C, seaman. 
 Andrews, Frank, ordinary seaman. " 
 Anfindsen, Abraham, cockswain. 
 Anglund, Bernhard, blacksmith. 
 Auchenbach, Harry, fireman, second 
 
 class. 
 Barry, John P. ,, apprentice, first class. 
 Barry, Lewis L., coal passer. 
 Baum, Henry S., landsman. 
 Becker, Jakob, chief machinist. 
 Bell, John R., cabin steward. 
 Blomberg, Fred, landsman. 
 Bookbinder, John, apprentice, second 
 
 class. 
 Boll, Fritz, bayman. 
 Bonner, Leon, seaman. 
 Brinkman, Heinrich, seaman. 
 Brofeldt, Arthur, chief gunner's mate. 
 Bruns, Adolph C. , quartermaster, third 
 
 class. 
 Burns, Edward, coal passer. 
 Burkhardt, Robert, quartermaster, 
 
 second class. 
 
 Butler, Frederick F., machinist, 
 
 second class. 
 Boyle, James, quartermaster, first 
 
 class. 
 Clarke, James C, shipwright. 
 Caine, Thomas, blacksmith. 
 Cameron, Walter, seaman. 
 Carr, Herbert M., gunner's mate, 
 
 second class. 
 Caulfield, William R. B., landsman. 
 Chingi, Suke, mess attendant. 
 Christiansen, Charles A., fireman, 
 
 first class. 
 Clark, Thomas, coal passer. 
 Cochrane, Michael, fireman, first class. 
 Cole, Thomas M., bayman. 
 Coleman, William, ordinary seaman. 
 Coleman, William, fireman, second 
 
 class. 
 Conroy, Anthony, coal passer. 
 Cosgrove, William, fireman, second 
 
 class. 
 Curran, Charles, cockswain. 
 Dahlman, Berger, seaman. 
 Dennig, Charles, seaman. 
 Donoughy, William, ordinary sea- 
 man. 
 Drury, James, fireman, first class. 
 Edler, George, seaman. 
 Eiermann, Charles P. W., gunner's 
 
 mate, first class. 
 *Erikson, Andrew V., seaman. 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 SAILORS— Continued. 
 
 Etts, John P., seaman. 
 
 Evensen, Karl, seaman.- 
 
 Fadde, Charles F. J., apprentice, 
 
 first class. 
 Falk, Rudolph, oiler. 
 Faubel, George D., chief machinist. 
 Fewer, William J., boatswain's mate, 
 
 second class. 
 Finch, Trubie, apprentice, first class. 
 *Fisher, Frank, ordinary seaman. 
 Fisher, Alfred J. , oiler. 
 Flaherty, Michael, fireman, first class. 
 Fleishman, Lewis M., seaman. 
 Flynn, Patrick, fireman, second class. 
 Fougere, John, coal passer. 
 Fountain, Bartley, boatswain's mate, 
 
 first class. 
 Frank, Charles, apprentice, first class. 
 Furlong, James F., coal passer. 
 Gaffney, Patrick, fireman, first class. 
 Gardner, Frank, coal passer. 
 Gardner, Thomas J., chief yeoman. 
 Gorman, William H., ordinary sea- 
 man. 
 Gordon, Joseph F. , fireman, first class. 
 Graham, James A., chief yeoman. 
 Graham, Edward P., coal passer. 
 Grady, Patrick, coal passer. 
 Greer, William A., apprentice, first 
 
 class. 
 Griffin, Michael, fireman, second 
 
 class. 
 Gross, Henry, landsman. 
 Gnipp, Reinhardt, coal passer. 
 Hallberg, John A. , oiler. 
 Hamburger, William, landsman. 
 Hamilton, Charles A., apprentice, 
 
 first class. 
 Hamilton, John, chief carpenter's 
 
 mate. 
 
 Hanrahan, William C. , cockswain. 
 
 Harris, Edward, water tender. 
 
 Harris, Millard P., quartermaster, 
 third class. 
 
 Harley, Daniel O'C. fireman, second 
 class. 
 
 Harty, Thomas J., coal passer. 
 
 Hassell, Charles F., gunner's mate, 
 third class. 
 
 Hauck, Charles, landsman. 
 
 Hawkins, Howard B., ordinary sea- 
 man. 
 
 Hennekes, Albert B., gunner's mate, 
 second class. 
 
 Herriman, Benjamin H., apprentice, 
 first class. 
 
 *Holzer, Frederick C, ordinary sea- 
 man. 
 
 Holm, Gustav, boatswain's mate, 
 second class. 
 
 ♦Holland, Alfred J., cockswain. 
 
 Horn, William J. , fireman, first class. 
 
 Hough, William L., landsman. 
 
 Hughes, Patrick, fireman, first class. 
 
 Ishida, Otogiro, steerage cook. 
 
 Johansen, Peter C. , seaman. 
 
 Johnson, Charles, ordinary seaman. 
 
 Johnson, John W. , landsman. 
 
 Johnsson, Peter, oiler. 
 
 Johnson, George, coal passer. 
 
 Jones, Thomas J. , coal passer. 
 
 *Jectson, Harry, seaman. 
 
 Jencks, Carlton, gunner's mate, third 
 class. 
 
 Jernee, Fred, coal passer. 
 
 Just, Charles F., apprentice, first 
 class. 
 
 Kane, Michael, coal passer.. 
 
 Kay, John A., machinist, first class. 
 
 Kelly, Hugh, coal passer. 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 223 
 
 SAILORS— Continued. 
 
 Kelly, John, coal passer. 
 KeskuU, Alexander, seaman. 
 Keys, Harry J., ordinary seaman. 
 Kihlstrom, Fritz, ordinary seaman. 
 Kinsey, Frederick E., machinist, 
 
 second class. 
 Kinsella, Thomas F., machinist, 
 
 second class. 
 Kitagata, Yukichi, warrant officers' 
 
 cook. 
 Kniese, Frederick H., machinist, 
 
 first class. 
 *Koebler, George W. , apprentice, first 
 
 class. 
 Kranyak, Charles, apprentice, first 
 
 class. 
 Kruse, Hugo, painter. 
 Laird, Charles, master-at-arms, third 
 
 class. 
 Lambert, William. Fireman, second 
 
 class. 
 Lancaster, Luther, boatswain's mate, 
 
 second class. 
 Lapierre, George, apprentice, first 
 
 class. 
 Lawler, Edward, coal passer. 
 League, James M., chief yeoman, 
 ' Lee, William J., apprentice, first class. 
 Leene, Daniel, coal passer. 
 Lees, Samuel, ordinary seaman. 
 Leupold, Gustav, fireman, second 
 
 class. 
 Lewis, John B., water tender. 
 Lewis, Daniel, oiler. 
 Lieber, George, apprentice, first 
 
 class. 
 Lorenzen, Jorgen J., oiler. 
 Louden, James W., apprentice, second 
 
 class. 
 Lowell, Clarence E. , ordinary seaman. 
 
 Lund, William, cockswain. 
 
 Lydon, John T., ordinary seaman. 
 
 Lynch, Matthew, coal passer. 
 
 Lynch, Bernard, fireman, first class. 
 
 Malone, Michael, fireman, second class. 
 
 Marshall, John E., landsman. 
 
 Marsden, Benjamin L., apprentice, 
 first class. 
 
 Martensson, Johan, gunner's mate, 
 third class. 
 
 Mason, James H., landsman. 
 
 Matiasen, Carl, seaman. 
 
 Matza, John, coal passer. ' 
 
 Meilstrup, Elmer M., ordinary sea- 
 man. 
 
 Merz, John, landsman. 
 
 Mero, Eldon H. , chief machinist. 
 
 Miller, George, seaman. 
 
 Miller, William S., apprentice, second 
 class. 
 
 Mobles, George, cockswain. 
 
 Moore, Edward H. , coal passer. 
 
 Monfort, William, landsman. 
 
 Moss, Gerhard C, machinist, first 
 class. 
 
 Moss, John H., landsman. 
 
 Mudd, Noble T., seaman. 
 
 Murphj', Cornelius, oiler. 
 
 McGonigle, Hugh, fireman, second 
 class. 
 
 McManus, John J., fireman, second 
 class. 
 
 McNiece, Francis J. , coal passer. 
 
 Nielsen, Sophus, cockswain. 
 
 Nielsen, John C, seaman. 
 
 Nolan, Charles M., gunner's mate, 
 third class. - 
 
 Noble, William, fireman, second class. 
 
 Nagamine, Tomekichi, mess attend- 
 ant. 
 
224 
 
 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 SAILORS— Continued. 
 
 Ohye, Mas, mess attendant. 
 Ording, Gustav C, carpenter's mate, 
 
 third class. 
 O'Connor, James, chief boatswain's 
 
 mate. 
 O'Hagan, Thomas J., apprentice, first 
 
 class. 
 O'Neill, Patrick, fireman, second 
 
 class. 
 O'Regan, Henry H., water tender. 
 Paige, Frederick, landsman. 
 Palmgren, John, seaman. . 
 '^Perry, Robert, mess attendant. 
 Phillips, Francis C, apprentice, first 
 
 class. 
 Pinkney, James, mess attendant. 
 Porter, John, coal passer. 
 Powers, John, oiler. 
 Price, Daniel, fireman, first class. 
 Quigley, Thomas J., plumber and 
 
 fitter. 
 Quinn, Charles P., oiler. 
 Reilly, Joseph, fireman, first class. 
 Reiger, William A., gunner's mate, 
 
 first class. 
 Rising, Newell, coal passer. 
 Robinson, William, landsman. 
 Roos, Peter, sailmaker. 
 Rushworth, William, chief machinist. 
 Safford, Clarence E., gunner's mate, 
 
 first class. 
 Salmin, Michael E., ordinary seaman. 
 Schroeder, August, ordinary seaman. 
 Scott, Charles A., carpenter's mate, 
 
 second class. 
 Scully, Joseph, boiler maker. 
 Seery, Joseph, fireman,, first class. 
 
 Sellers, Walter S., apothecary. 
 
 Shea, Patrick J., fireman, first class. 
 
 Shea, Thomas, landsman. 
 
 Shea, John J., coal passer. 
 
 Sheridaji, Owen, fireman, second class. 
 
 Shillington, John H., yeoman, third 
 class. 
 
 Simmons, Alfred, coal passer. 
 
 *Smith, Carl A. , seaman. 
 
 Smith, Nicholas J., apprentice, first 
 class. 
 
 Stevenson, Nicholas, seaman. 
 
 Sugisaki, Isa, wardroom steward. 
 
 Sutton, Frank, fireman, second class. 
 
 Suzuki, Kashitara, mess attendant. 
 
 Talbot, Frank C. , landsman. 
 
 Tehan, Daniel J., coal passer. 
 
 Thompson, George, landsman. 
 
 Tigges, Frank B., coppersmith. 
 
 Tingman, William H., landsman. 
 
 Todoresco, Constantin, fireman, first 
 class. 
 
 Troy, Thomas, coal passer. 
 
 Tuohey, Martin, coal passer. 
 
 Walsh, Joseph F., cockswain. 
 
 Wallace, John, ordinary seaman. 
 
 Warren, John, fireman, second class. 
 
 White, Charles O., chief master-at- 
 arms. 
 
 Whiten, George, seaman. 
 
 White, Robert, mess attendant. 
 
 Wickstrom, Johan E., seaman. 
 
 Wilson, Albert, seaman. 
 
 Wilson, Robert, chief quartermaster. 
 
 Wilbur, George W., apprentice, first 
 class. 
 
 Ziegler, John H., coal passer. 
 
SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 227 
 
 MARINES. 
 
 Wagner, Henry, first sergeant. 
 Bennet, John, private. 
 Botting, Vincent H., private. 
 Brosnan, George, private. 
 Burns, James R. , private. 
 Brown, James T., sergeant. 
 Dierking, John H., drummer. 
 Downing, Michael J., private. 
 Johnson, Charles E., private. 
 Jordan, William J. , private. 
 Kean, Edward F., private. 
 Kelly, Frank, private. 
 Lauriette, George M., private. 
 Losko, Peter A., private. 
 
 Monahan, Joseph P., private. 
 McDermott, John, private. 
 Newton, C. H., fifer. 
 Newman, F. J., private. 
 Richter, A. H., corporal. 
 Roberts, James H., private. 
 Schoen, Joseph, corporal. 
 Stock, H. E., private. 
 Strongman, James, private. 
 Suman, E. B., private. 
 Timpany, E. B., private. 
 Van Horn, H. A. , private. 
 Warren, Asa V. , private. 
 Wills, A. O., private. 
 
 LIST OF OFFICERS, SAILORS, AND MARINES ON BOARD 
 OF THE U. S. S. MAINE WHO WERE SAVED. 
 
 Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee, commanding. 
 Lieut. Commander Richard Wainwright. 
 
 Lieuts. George F. W. Holman, John Hood, and Carl W. Jungen. 
 Lieuts. (Junior Grade) George P. Blow, John J. Blandin. 
 Naval Cadets Jonas H. Holden, Watt T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson, and 
 David F. Boyd, Jr. 
 
 Surg. Lucien G. Heneberger. 
 
 Paymaster Charles M. Ray. 
 
 Chief Engineer Charles P. Howell. 
 
 Passed Assistant Engineer Frederic C. Bowers. 
 
 Assistant Engineer John R. Morris. 
 
 Naval Cadets (engineer division) Pope Washington and Arthur Crenshaw. 
 
 Chaplain John P. Chidwick. 
 
 First Lieut, of Marines Albertus W. Catlin. 
 
 Boatswain Francis E. Larkin. 
 
 Gunner Joseph Hill. 
 
 Carpenter George Helms. 
 
 Pay Clerk B. McCarty. 
 
 SAILORS. 
 
 Allen, James W., mess attendant. 
 Anderson, Oskar, cockswain. 
 Awo, Firsanion, steerage cook. 
 
 Bergman, Charles, boatswain's mate^ 
 
 first class. 
 Bloomer, John H., landsman. 
 
228 
 
 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 
 
 SAILORS— Continued. 
 
 Bullock, Charles H., gunner's mate, 
 
 second class. 
 Cahill, Francis D., landsman. 
 Christiansen, Karl, fireman, first class. 
 Cronin, Daniel, landsman. 
 David, George, ordinary seaman. 
 Dolan, John, seaman. 
 Dressier, Gustav J., apprentice, first 
 
 class. 
 Durckin, Thomas J., ordinary seaman. 
 Flynn, Michael, seaman. 
 Foley, Patrick J., apprentice, first 
 
 class. 
 Fox, George, landsman. 
 Gartrell, William M., fireman, first 
 
 class. 
 Hallberg, Alfred, cockswain. 
 Ham, Ambrose, apprentice, first class. 
 Harris, Westmor-e, mess attendant. 
 Heffron, John, ordinary seaman. 
 Herbert, John, landsman. 
 Herness, Alfred B. , gunner's mate, 
 
 third class. 
 Hutchings, Robert, landsman. 
 Johnson, Alfred, seaman. 
 Kane, Joseph H., landsman. 
 Kushida, Katsusaburo, warrant of- 
 ficers' steward. 
 Lanahan, Michael, landsman. 
 Larsen, Peder, seaman. 
 Larsen, Martin, seaman. 
 Load, John B., master-at-arms, third 
 
 class. 
 
 Lohman, Charles A., coal passer. 
 
 Mack, Thomas, landsman. 
 
 Matsen, Edward, ordinary seaman. 
 
 Mattisen, William, ordinary seaman. 
 
 Melville, Thomas, coal passer. 
 
 Mikkelsen, Peter, seaman. 
 
 Moriniere, Louis, seaman. 
 
 McCann, Harry, seaman. 
 
 McNair, William, ordinary seaman. 
 
 Panck, John H., fireman, first class. 
 
 Pilcher, Charles F. , ordinary seaman. 
 
 Rau, Arthur, seaman. 
 
 Reden, Martin, seaman. 
 
 Richards, Walter E., apprentice, 
 
 second class. 
 Rowe, James, ship's cook, fourth class. 
 Rusch, Frank, ordinary seaman. 
 Schwartz, George, ship's cook, first 
 
 class. 
 Shea, Jeremiah, coal passer. 
 Teackle, Harry, seaman. 
 Thompson, William H., landsman. 
 Toppin, Daniel G., wardroom cook. 
 Turpin, John H. , mess attendant. 
 Waters, Thomas J., landsman. 
 Webber, Martin V., landsman. 
 White, John E., landsman. 
 Williams, James, gunner's mate, third 
 
 class. 
 Williams, Henry, cabin cook. 
 Willis, Alonzo, apprentice, second 
 
 class. 
 Wilbur, Benjamin R., cockswain. 
 
 MARINES. 
 
 Anthony, William, private. 
 Coffey, John, private. 
 Galpin, C. P., private. 
 Germond, C. V., private. 
 Lutz, Joseph, private. 
 
 Thompson, 
 
 Loftus, Paul, private. 
 McDevitt, William, privalte. 
 McGuinness, William, private. 
 McKay, Edward, private. 
 Meehan, Michael, sergeant. 
 G., corporal. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The San Domingo Torch in Aid of the Cuban Rebellion. 
 
 The Policy of Maximo Gomez, and the Famine in Cuba — The Reports of American Consuls 
 in Cuba on the Cane Burning and its Relation to the Starvation of the People — The 
 Agent of the Cubans in Arms Justified Barbarism — The Testimony of Our Consuls that 
 the Gomez Policy was the Cause of the Death of Thousands — Direct Evidence of Black 
 Mail Taxes and the Anxiety of Cuban People to be Annexed to the United States.— The 
 Desperado Orders by Gomez Before Weyler Came to Cuba. 
 
 One of the well remembered circumstances of the agitations that preceded 
 the declaration of war with Spain a few days was the intensity with which the 
 champions of the freedom and independence of the Republic of Cuba demanded 
 the reports that the American-Cuban consuls had furnished the State De- 
 partment, respecting the Spanish policy of the malicious extermination of 
 the Cuban people, and there was a clamor because it was held to be prudent 
 to revise those papers, or withhold them for a few days, in order that the Span- 
 iards might not find, in the official statements of the consuls, reasons that 
 would seem to demand the slaughter of writers of truth about the island. 
 
 There were two or three days' waiting, when the consuls were withdrawn 
 from their posts, and preserved, events following so fast that what they had to 
 say about Cuban affairs has never received very much attention. The real 
 character of the documentary evidence will, as a rule, be in the nature of news 
 to those who read this volume. The newspapers having the country in charge 
 and having undertaken the management of the war, had not much space to 
 give Cuban outrages when once there was assurance that we were going to 
 war with the Spaniards. 
 
 On the day the Maine was blown up, February 15, 1898, General Lee 
 wrote to President McKinley, enclosing a letter from the insurgent General 
 Maximo Gomez, without date, in which the general said : 
 
 "The revolution, as absolute master of the country, has never prohibited 
 
 any citizen, whatever his nationality, from earning his living, and it has hap- 
 
 229 
 
230 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 
 
 pened that as soon as the barbarous concentration decree was promulgated 
 innumerable families have left and still leave the city for the field, impelled by 
 hunger to wrest from the fruitful Cuban vegetation the means of relieving the 
 most pressing needs of life. Those unhappy beings ignore the fact that if the 
 Spaniards, by steel and privation, have shrouded their hearths in mourning, 
 so also it might be said that the flora of Cuba was in mourning, devastated by 
 the bullet and torch. ' ' 
 
 It must, of course, have been a solemn occasion when General Gomez 
 referred to the "torch," at the same time claiming that he had done nothing 
 to prevent the gaining of a livelihood by any man. When the Hon. T. 
 Estrada Palma, in 1895, December 7th, wrote to the Secretary of State Rich- 
 ard Olney, he made a statement of points upon which he asked "that the rights 
 of belligerency be accorded them by your government;" and he stated many 
 propositions and elucidated many principles, but gave the greater part of his 
 interesting narrative to the achievements of Gomez, especially the celebration 
 of his campaign against Captain-General Martinez Campos, who was as a fact 
 pretty roughly handled. The strategy of fire by the military Commander-in- 
 Chief was given a good deal of space ; and as far east as Santa Clara Mr. 
 Palma mentions that "a most important work of the forces" under Gomez, 
 "whicTi occupied considerable time and caused many encounters with the 
 enemy, was the destruction of telegraph and telephone communications and 
 railroads, of which there are many lines or branches in this district." Of 
 course, this was just preparing the island to enter upon a superior course of 
 internal improvements, but Gomez had everything his own way, the Spanish 
 not interfering, and. we quote Mr. Palma's report: "Early in July he issued 
 the first of the now famous orders relative to the sugar crop, and announced 
 his intention of marching through Santa Clara and into Matanzas in the 
 winter in order to superintend the carrjring out of his decrees." This is an 
 official avowal to the Secretary of State of the United States by the authorized 
 agent of the Cubans in arms, of the begiiming of the destruction of the greatest 
 industry in the richest island in the world — and as Gomez marched westward 
 the skies over Cuba were flushed with fire, so that the red glow was visible at 
 once from the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. We continue to quote 
 from Mr. Palma — page 8, following the demand of the U. S. Senate commit- 
 tee, that Cuba should at once take her place as a sovereign sister among the 
 nations of the earth. 
 
TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 231 
 
 "It was not the intention of General Gomez when he planned his winter 
 campaign to march on and lay siege to the capital, his only object being to 
 prevent the grinding and export of the sugar crop and the consequent flow of 
 treasure into the Spanish coffers, and to demonstrate to the world that he 
 could control the provinces and enforce his orders. 
 
 "While this march of the main bodies of troops westward has been carried 
 on, the Cuban forces of the other army corps have also succeeded in carrying 
 out the orders concerning sugar cane and preventing the establishment of 
 Spanish lines of communication." 
 
 We suppose that it must have been simply the modesty of Gomez that he 
 did not "lay siege" to Havana. That was undoubtedly the way to fire Cuba 
 — or it would have been if it had not been for the regulation of the sugar busi- 
 ness with "the torch." But Gomez wrote to President McKinley on the day 
 of the Maine massacre that he never interfered with a day's work that was to 
 get a living. 
 
 Mr. Palma describes in his letter to Mr. Olney that the Cuban army con- 
 sisted of five army corps, and says: "The first two corps consist of 26,000 
 men, mostly infantry; the third, of about 4,000 men, mostly cavalry; the 
 Fourth and Fifth Corps consistied before the late invasion of Gomez of over 
 20,000 men, both infantry and cavalry, which force has been considerably 
 increased in these last days. ' ' - 
 
 Now, here was a magnificent army of liberation of 50,000 men, with more 
 coming, and arms and ammunition pouring in, and a good supply, as Mr. 
 Palma mentions, of artillery. What had become of them when Maximo 
 Gomez was thundering at the gates of Havana two hundred and fifty miles 
 away, with his body-guard and the Victoria regiment, eighty men in each of 
 the august regiments? And where were the first, and second, fourth and fifth 
 army corps of ten thousand men, at least, in each, with 4,000 cavalry to boot, 
 and field pieces galore? Where were those glittering hosts when our small army 
 of 17,000 men landed near Santiago to cooperate with the Cuban cavaliers and 
 legionaries? Why did not Gomez take his swelling ranks, already victorious 
 in setting on fire hundreds of plantations, and set up a republic sure enough? 
 The particular object in gathering the Cuban consuls' reports was to 
 kindle a blaze with them like that of a flaming cane field, so as to fan high the 
 blasts of war with the intelligence, indisputable because official, of the horrors 
 of the camps where the small farmers were passing away with fevers and 
 
232 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 
 
 starvation, the grim results of the desolation of the plantations of sugar and 
 tobacco. Now, General Lee believed in the sincerity of Captain-General 
 Blanco, and his chief of staff, Pando — believed they honestly sought to make 
 an end of the famine, and in a letter from Lee to the Secretary of State, Day, 
 November 23, 1897, we find the perfectly frank and true story of the situation: 
 
 "First. The insurgents will not accept autonomy. 
 
 "Second. A large majority of the Spanish subjects who have commer- 
 cial and business interests and own property here, will not accept autonomy, 
 but prefer annexation to the United States rather than an independent repub- 
 lic or genuine autonomy under the Spanish flag. 
 
 "Third. The Spanish authorities are sincere in doing all in their power 
 to encourage, protect, and promote the grinding of sugar. The grinding 
 season commences in -December. 
 
 "Fourth. The insurgents' leaders have given instructions to prevent 
 grinding wherever it can be done, because by diminishing the export of sugar 
 the Spanish government revenues are decreased. It will be very difficult for 
 the Spanish authorities to prevent cane burning, because one man at night 
 can start a fire which will burn hundreds of acres, just as a single individual 
 could ignite a prairie by throwing a match into the dry grass. ' ' 
 
 Precisely, and just as a fool or a fiend can burn a house or a city. Notice 
 the reference to Spanish subjects wanting to be citizens of the United States. 
 
 Mr. A. C. Brice was the consul at Matanzas, and wrote, January 17, 
 1898: 
 
 "The scenes of misery and distress daily observed are beyond belief. 
 Here is one out of hundreds. In a family of seventeen living in an old lime- 
 kiln, upper part of city limits, all were found dead except three, and they 
 barely alive. ... A few of the strongest of these people have been sent 
 out to sugar plantations, which expect to grind. They get 30 cents per day 
 and board themselves. 
 
 "A few plantations are grinding cane. In every case they are heavily 
 guarded by Spanish troops, and have paid insurgents for so doing. Was 
 shown a letter from insurgent chief to owner of a large plantation, in which 
 the price demanded for grinding was 2, poo centones ($10,600 United States 
 gold). It was paid. To make crop of sugar this season money, oxen, and 
 laborers must be had. I am, etc., A. C. BRICE, 
 
 "United States Consul." 
 
TORCH IN AID OP THE CUBAN REBELLION. 233 
 
 Here we see what was the great principle of "the torch" to which Gomez 
 refers in such a dainty way in his letter through Lee to the President. He 
 was an insurgent chief who wanted $10,000 United States gold for a permit to 
 make sugar on one plantation ; and the perishing Cubans of the famine camps 
 could have had work if this blackmail tax had been paid to the Republic of 
 Cuba. The torch of liberty was to light the flames of total ' destruction in k 
 great cane mill that offered employment to the starving — if the machinery 
 moved without a rebel permit ; and yet Gomez would not allow restraint upon 
 working for a livelihood — except in a case where $10,000 American gold was 
 wanted to send to New York for patriotic purposes. Some of our great 
 Statesmen have discovered in Gomez a second George Washington, but closely 
 studied there is to be found some difference between the two men. 
 
 Mr. Hyatt, U. S. Consul at Santiago de Cuba, writing November 20, 
 1897, said: 
 
 "The Spanish residents of the island are becoming very outspoken in 
 favor of closing the war and annexation to the United States. There are 
 numerous inquiries among them of how they can become citizens of our 
 Government. There are also quite a number of Spanish soldiers making the 
 same inquiry. The business Spaniards here declare that they are tired of 
 doing business at a loss, and that peace and prosperity can only come by 
 annexation. Many are greatly disappointed that the United States consul 
 cannot make American citizens of them at once. 
 
 "With highest, etc., PULASKI F. HYATT, 
 
 "United States Consul." 
 
 December 5, 1897, Mr. Hyatt wrote: "Mr. Rigney, an American sugar 
 planter near Manzanilla, was preparing to grind during the coming season. 
 A few nights since the insurgents fired seven cannon shots among his build- 
 ings, one ball passing through the roof of his house. Americans were hope- 
 ful that they would be allowed to make their crop, and several are making 
 ready to do so ; but the action of the insurgents toward Mr. Rigney gives the 
 problem a doubtful aspect. It may have been a personal matter against Mr. 
 Rigney. The number of destitute Americans fed by this consulate decreased 
 from 89 to 64, but is again on the increase. " 
 
 It is to be taken into consideration that here is another consular report of 
 Spanish residents wanting to become Americans, through "annexation to the 
 United States." We think it entirely probable that these people may soon 
 
234 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 
 
 know enough to help govern themselves. Spanish soldiers are making the 
 same inquiry. Here it is mentioned as a matter of business that as insurgent 
 cannon balls were fired to stop sugar making, the destitution of American 
 citizens was on the increase. The connection between fire and famine is 
 distinctly made. 
 
 American Consul McGarr, writing from Cienfuegos, January lo, 1898: 
 
 "Consulate of the United States, Cienfuegos, January 10, 1898. — Sir: All 
 the sugar mills in this consular jurisdiction, 23 in number, have been grind- 
 ing since the first of the month, and at the busy centrales the various indus- 
 tries incident to the gathering of the crop and the manufacture of sugar are 
 in full and steady operation. 
 
 "Several of the principal estates are owned by American citizens and cor- 
 porations, and most of their skilled employes are brought from the United 
 States. 
 
 "The demand for labor on the sugar estates has drawn from the towns a 
 great portion of the unemployed laborers and given employment to the male 
 'concen trades,' manj' of whom were in a state of enforced idleness and 
 destitution. As a consequence, few of them are now seen here, and the labor 
 'congestion' has been relieved. 
 
 "Small predatory parties of insurgents make frequent attempts to fire the 
 cane fields, and it requires constant and active vigilance to prevent their 
 destruction. The dry weather and the high winds prevailing at this season 
 render it a simple matter for one person (who can easily conceal lumself in 
 the tall cane) to start a conflagration that will, unless promptly extinguished, 
 destroy hundreds of acres in a few hours. 
 
 "Hence the almost impossibility, with the utmost watchfulness and using 
 every practicable safeguard, to prevent some loss of cane by the fires started, 
 often under cover of darkness, by the stealthy incendiaries familiar with the 
 locality and always on the alert for an opportunity to apply the torch. 
 
 "The sugar crop is the support of all classes, and especially of the labor- 
 ing class, and should it be in large part destroyed a famine in reality would 
 be inevitable. 
 
 "I am, etc., OWEN McGARR, 
 
 "United States Consul." 
 
 This does not seem to have been exactly what was expected in the 
 consular reports, but it is extremely pertinent and valuable, and it could never 
 
FIRE ROOM OF THE U. S. S. "BROOKLYN." 
 
TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 237 
 
 have had a greater opening for usefulness than just now, as the flag of the 
 United States ia raised over Cuba. 
 
 The Consul, Mr. Hyatt, at Santiago de Cuba, writing December 21, 1897, 
 said: 
 
 "As yet planters are all at sea as to whether they will grind cane or not. 
 It is no secret that they will have to make terms with the insurgents if they 
 do, and I understand that an agreement by which 50. cents per bag, or about 
 15 cents per 100, will be paid for Cuban hands off. Planters say this will 
 leave them no profit, but leave their plantations in better order for future 
 operations. 
 
 "The three Rivery brothers, American citizens and owners of coffee, 
 cocoa, and orange groves, are about to return to their places. They are abso- 
 lutely penniless, and say they woul'd have surely starved but for the food 
 issued from this consulate. I shall continue to supply them with food, and 
 issue a month's rations of such food as rice, beans, codfish, crackers, etc. , as 
 their homes are over 30 miles away." 
 
 The letter following, from a historic place, is of historical importance : 
 
 (Mr. Hyatt to Mr. Day.) 
 
 "Consulate of the United States, Santiago de Cuba, January 12, 1898. — 
 Sir: I deem it a duty to lay before the honorable Department of State the 
 situation here as affecting American interests, and to inclose herewith an 
 order issued by command of General Maximo Gomez, and a translation of the 
 same, forbidding the griiiding of the sugar crop for the years 1897 and 1898. 
 
 "In this part of Cuba, so far as I can learn, all idea of making a sugar 
 crop is entirely abandoned. 
 
 "I regret to say that the stoppage of industries, from present appearances, 
 will not halt at the sugar crop, but coffee and other agricultural crops fall 
 under the same ban. 
 
 "I had hoped that, after the reconcentration order was revoked, through 
 the energetic adSibn of the present administration, we would find no trouble 
 in reinstating American industries ; but it appears that all of the benefits that 
 should have accrued to our citizens are thwarted by the action of the insur- 
 gents, who refuse to allow them to return to their sugar, coffee and other 
 estates. The Pompo Manganese mines, owned by Americans, which would 
 
238 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 
 
 at the present time be a very profitable investment if allowed to operate, 
 are also being held up by the same power. 
 
 "The three Rivery brothers, whom I informed you recently I was about to 
 assist in returning to their coffee and fruit estates, got there only to find they 
 could not go to work until permission was obtained from the insurgent com- 
 mander, which permission seems doubtful, I myself, as I understand my duty, 
 being inhibited from rendering them any assistance at this point. 
 
 "These, with several sugar estates within my consular district, are held 
 up and becoming more worthless than before. 
 
 " It is beyond the power of my pen to describe the situation in eastern 
 Cuba. Squalidity, starvation, sickness, and death meet one in all places. 
 Beggars throng our doors and stop us on the streets. The dead in large num- 
 bers remain over from day to day in the cemeteries unburied. 
 
 "Very respectfully, PULASKI P. HYATT, 
 
 "United States Consul." 
 
 The connection between the blackmail, sugar burning policy of the insur- 
 gents reaffirmed by Gomez, and the "squalidity, starvation, sickness and 
 death" is absolutely established. 
 
 Mr: Walter B. Barker, writing November 20, 1897: 
 
 "As to grinding the present crop, I have interviewed most of the largest 
 planters in this consular district, who stated that unless assured of immunity 
 from the insurgent chief — Gomez — they would not jeopardize their property 
 by attempting to grind. ' ' 
 
 "Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, December 15, 1897. — 
 Sir : Thinking it may interest the Department, I have the honor to transmit 
 herewith clippings from a leading Spanish journal published in Havana, 
 . . . calling attention to the inability of the mills to grind in the Province 
 of Santiago de Cuba, which is one of the obstacles to grinding in this (Santa 
 Clara) province, where the planters are not able to pay tribute required by 
 the insurgents. 
 
 "The grinding season being at hand without preparations having bepn 
 made dissipates all hope of a beginning. ^B^ 
 
 "Not to grind the present crop, small as it must be, will bring distress far 
 greater than can be imagined. 
 
 "I am, etc., WALTER B. BARKER, 
 
 "ConsuL" 
 
TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 239 
 
 (Mr. Barker to Mr. Day.) 
 
 "Consulate of the United States, Saguala Grande, December 28, 1897. — 
 The suffering and destitution among the concentrados ... is fearful, and 
 must continue to grow worse. 
 
 "How could the situation be otherwise, since the island is producing 
 absolutely nothing, save some growing cane, and at the same time completely 
 exhausted of all food. Relief alone can be obtained from the outer world 
 in the way of charitable contributions. 
 
 "This — Santa Clara — province is capable at this season of produ'cing, 
 perhaps, two-thirds of whatever cane might be made in the entire island. 
 
 "To grind this cane without interruption would be the means of saving 
 the lives of thousands who, without this or outside aid within the next thirty 
 to fifty days, must die of actual hunger. Over a month since, the planters 
 were officially advised of Spain's inability to provide protection in order to 
 operate their mills. This leaves the sugar growers entirely in the hands of 
 the Cubans in revolt, as to whether they will be allowed to grind without 
 hindrance or fear of total destruction of their property. I know that strict 
 orders have been given to subordinate commanders under no circumstances 
 must mills be permitted to grind, under penalty of violation of the order 
 forth destruction of property. 
 
 "Without contributions of food and medicine from the outer world, and 
 at once, a sacrifice of lives will ensue, the responsibility for which no Chris- 
 tian people can face. 
 
 "I am, etc., WALTER B. BARKER, Consul." 
 
 Here is the proof in consular reports that were expected to fill the 
 United States with horror toward the Spaniards, furnishing the proof that the 
 insurgents, carrying on their blackmail war upon industry, refused to save 
 thousands of lives by permitting sugar making. 
 
 "Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, January 51, 1898. — At 
 my suggestion several families returned to the American-owned 'Central 
 Santa Anna, ' the owner having been forced to abandon the property in order 
 to prevent further spoliation of the mill machinery. Although a government 
 guard is stationed on the place, they (former tenants) were ordered to leave. 
 
 "One sugar mill is running, not without interruption, with chances of 
 making one-fourth of a crop. Another — just started up — was attacked yester- 
 
24° TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 
 
 day b)' a band of insurgents, killing 14 and wounding 5 of the guerrillas paid 
 by the estate to protect the operatives. Seven laborers were killed, the 
 insurgents leaving two of their dead. 
 
 "An adjoining estate, the property of the British consul, was also attacked, 
 the growing cane burned. This precludes further attempts to grind, as men 
 cannot be induced to work while the insurgents roam at will over the country. 
 
 "lam, etc., WALTER B. BARKER, Consul." 
 
 We do not say that Maximo Gomez meant to inilict famine upon Cuba, 
 for he probably had the barbarian instinct that led him to think that to fling 
 firebrands was a way of announcing liberty. He issued a proclamation dated 
 at Sancti Spiritus, November 11, 1895, placing the responsibility, as he said, 
 for the great ruin he was about to inflict, upon "passive" people. He added: 
 
 "This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the liberty 
 of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood without 
 effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples and fears which do not con- 
 cur with the character of the men who are in the field. ' ' 
 
 July I, 189s, at Najasa Camaguay, Gomez issued an address to the plant- 
 ers and cattle ranchers : 
 
 "Whereas, all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and 
 resources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the 
 General-in-Chief to issue this general order throughout the island that the 
 introduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and .cattle, into the towns 
 occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar plantations will 
 stop their labors, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the crop notwith- 
 standing this order, will have their cane burned and their buildings demol- 
 ished." 
 
 I 
 
 Any one disobeying this order was to be considered an enemy and 
 *' treated as a traitor." Gomez also issued a peremptory order as follows: 
 
 "Headquarters of the Army of Liberation, Territory of Sancti Spiritus, 
 November 6, 1895. — Animated by the spirit of unchangeable resolution in 
 defense of the rights of the revolution of redemption of this country of colo- 
 nists, humiliated and despised by Spain, and in harmony with what has been 
 decreed concerning the subject in the circular dated the ist of July, I have 
 ordered the following: 
 
 "Article I. That all plantations shall be totally destroyed, their cane and 
 ■outbuildings burned, and railroad connections destroyed. 
 
mm fi*.^ ^ 
 
 T/^ :'.'-awB>. 
 
TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 243 
 
 "Alt. II. All laborers who shall aid the sugar factories — these sources 
 of supplies that we must deprive the enemy of — shall be considered as traitors 
 to their country. 
 
 "Art. III. All who are caught in the act, or whose violation of Article 
 II. shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all chiefs of operations of the army of 
 liberty comply with this order, determined to unfurl triumphantly, even over 
 ruin and ashes, the flag of the Republic of Cuba. 
 
 "In regard to the manner of waging the war, follow the private instruc- 
 tions that I have already given. 
 
 "For the sake of the honor of our arms and your well-known courage and 
 patriotism, it is expected that you will strictly comply with the above orders. 
 
 "M. GOMEZ, General-in-Chief. 
 
 "To the chiefs of operations: Circulate this." 
 
 Here we have the official announcement of the policy of firebugs, as that 
 of liberation, and it is the confirmation of this firebug policy that is now thrust 
 like a torch in the face of the United States, in the name of freedom and 
 independence. 
 

 'M'k&Ms^ki^AiV - 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The Way the War Business was Handled. 
 
 The Declaration of War— The President's Call upon Congress to Take Action— Fit and 
 Few Words— The Constant Scramble in Congress for the Cuban Ghost Dance Govern- 
 ment—The Official Text of the President's War Proclamations —The Navy had First to 
 Take Command of the Seas— The Timely Dispatches from the Navy Department, Mak- 
 ing Ready for War — Major General Miles and his 50,000 Cubans. 
 
 A considerable number of members of Congress were slow in appreciating 
 the exdellence of the attitude of the President in holding fast the last chances 
 of peace and at the same time urging forward as part of the same policy works 
 of charity and preparations for war. He was better understood and held in 
 higher esteem during a few days of agitation, abroad than at home, and the 
 general consent of civilized nations that the international position of our 
 country was unassailable, that contributed to our success, was in a great 
 measure due to the propriety of the course of the President, which presently 
 consolidated public sentiment in all the States, and appealed with dignity to 
 the Powers, whose interest became as intelligible as it was indisputable. 
 Especially was the far-sighted thoughtfulness of the President comprehended 
 and respected in England, and through all the months of exciting trial and 
 straining tests we felt the firm grasp of her friendly hand, and the growth of 
 mutual regard stronger than treaties, because it was the genuine self-evidence 
 of the kindred blood of the nations, and that their joint influence would be 
 without conventions one of the mightiest in the betterment of the world. 
 
 The weight of the President's message of April i ith was felt to be over- 
 whelming in gravity and import. He said, "I ask Congress to authorize and 
 empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination 
 of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and 
 to insure in the island the establishment of a stable government." The words 
 had been picked for their places, and were "stable." There was wanted, 
 
 244 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 245 
 
 the President added, a government in Cuba "capable of maintaining order 
 and of observing its international obligations — insuring peace and tranquillity, 
 and the security of its citizens as well as its own." This was just as plain as a 
 proclamation could have been written, that the ghost dance of the Cuban 
 Republic was not what was wanted — that their government was a gang not to 
 be put in possession by our arms of the island they had devastated with the 
 torch. The next words were that the President wanted the authority of Con- 
 gress "to use the military and naval forces of the United States" — and this 
 as might be "necessary for those purposes." The next four sentences were 
 clear as shafts of white light, keen as steel, and terminal, "The issue is now 
 with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every 
 effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. 
 Prepared to execute' every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution 
 and the law, I await some action. ' ' These were the words of truth and 
 sobriety. The country was the stronger for this soberness, and knew it. 
 There was no need to quote Grant and Jackson, but it was done, and well 
 done. There was no question as to the commander and pilot of the Ship of 
 State. On the 13th of April the House resolved for immediate intervention, 
 334 to 19. The terms of the resolution were tinged with the preliminary 
 temper, but the bxisiness was in the words: "The President is hereby author- 
 ized and directed to intervene at once, to stop the war in Cuba.'' The Presi- 
 dent's words were not, in the part of the resolution that was definite and 
 certain, far departed from. The purpose of the intervention was defined to 
 be "permanent peace and order," and "establishing by the free action of the 
 people" a "stable and independent government of their own," and the Presi- 
 dent was empowered to use the army and navy for that purpose. But the 
 filibuster war party strove to twist into the texture of the proceedings an 
 advertisement of the intended Republic, and a quit claim deed to its pro- 
 fessional managers; the scramble was for this perversity. There was a joint 
 resolution that "the United States government hereby recognizes the inde- 
 pendence of the Republic of Cuba." This was defeated, 191 to 150. The 
 Senate, with a whereas about the Maine, resolved, "That the people of the 
 island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent. " It was 
 amended to read, "That the people of the island of Cuba of right ought to be 
 free and independent." The House voted, yeas 178, nays 156. The next day 
 the President wrote on the joint resolution engrossed on parchment, 
 
246 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 "Approved, William McKinley, April 20, 1898." The passports of the Span- 
 ish Minister were dated the same day, and the next day the American 
 Minister left Madrid, handing the interests of the American citizens and 
 affairs to the Minister of England. The President's blockade message was of 
 the date of April 25th. The call for volunteers, in the aggregate 125,000, was 
 on the 23d of April, and it was certified as done by the President, by John 
 Sherman, Secretary of State. 
 
 "MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 "Transmitting Copies of Correspondence Recently Had with the Representa- 
 tive of Spain in the United States, with the United States Minister at 
 Madrid, and through the Latter with the Government of Spain, Showing 
 the Action Taken under the Joint Resolution Approved April 20, 1898. — 
 April 25, i8g8. — Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
 ordered to be printed. 
 
 "To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
 America: — I transmit to the Congress, for its consideration and appropriate 
 action, copies of correspondence recently had with the representative of 
 Spain in the United States, with the United States Minister at Madrid, and 
 through the latter with the government of Spain, showing the action taken 
 under the joint resolution approved April 20, 1898, 'for the recognition of the 
 independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain 
 relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and with- 
 draw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the 
 President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United 
 States to carry these resolutions into effect. ' 
 
 "Upon communicating to the Spanish Minister in Washington the demand 
 which it became the duty of the Executive to address to the government of 
 Spain in obedience to said resolution, the Minister asked for his passports and 
 withdrew. The United States Minister at Madrid was in turn notified by the 
 Spanish Minister for foreign affairs that the withdrawal of the Spanish repre- 
 sentative from the United States had terminated diplomatic relations between 
 the two countries, and that all official communications between their respect- 
 ive representatives ceased therewith. 
 
 "I commend to your especial attention the note addressed to the United 
 States Minister at Madrid by the Spanish Minister for foreign affairs on the 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 247 
 
 2ist instant, whereby the foregoing notification was conveyed. It will be per- 
 ceived therefrom that the government of Spain, having cognizance of the 
 joint resolution of the United States Congress, and in view of the things 
 which the President is thereby required and authorized to do, responds by 
 treating the reasonable demands of this government as measures of hostility, 
 following with that instant and complete severance of relations by its action, 
 which by the usage of nations accompanies an existent state of war between 
 sovereign powers. 
 
 "The position of Spain being thus made known and the demands of the 
 United States being denied with a complete rupture of intercourse by the act 
 of Spain, I have been constrained, in exercise of the power and authority 
 conferred upon me by the joint resolution aforesaid, to proclaim, under date 
 of April 22, 1898, a blockade of certain ports of the north coast of Cuba, lying 
 between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and of the port of Cienfuegos on the 
 south coast of Cuba; and further, in exercise of my constitutional powers arid 
 using the authority conferred upon me by the act of Congress approved April 
 22, 1898, to issue my proclamation, dated April 23, 1898, calling forth volun- 
 teers in order to carry into effect the said resolution of April 20, 1898. Copies 
 of these proclamations are hereto appended. 
 
 "In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the adoption of 
 such other measures as may be necessary to enable me to carry out the 
 expressed will of the Congress of the United States in the premises, I now 
 recommend to your honorable body the adoption of a joint resolution declar- 
 ing that a state of war exists between the United States of America and the 
 Kingdom of Spain, and I urge speedy action thereon, to the end that the 
 definition of the international status of the United States as a belligerent 
 power may be made known, and the assertion of all its rights and the main- 
 tenance of all its duties in the conduct of public war may be assured. 
 
 "WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 "Executive Mansion, Washington, April 25, i8g8. " 
 
 No. I. 
 Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford. 
 (Telegram in Cipher.) 
 
 "Department of State, Washington, April 14, 1898 — Tuesday noon. — 
 House of Representatives, 324 to 19, passed yesterday afternoon resolution 
 authorizing and directing the President to intervene at once to stop the war 
 
248 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 in Cuba, with the purpose of securing peace and order there and establishing- 
 by the free action of the people thereof, a stable and independent government 
 of their own, and empowering him to use the land and naval forces to execute 
 that purpose. Senate committee on Foreign affairs reported yesterday reso- 
 lution declaring that the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought 
 to be, free and independent, demanding that Spain relinquish authority and 
 government in Cuba and withdraw land and naval forces therefrom, and 
 empowering the President to use Army and Navy and militia to carry reso- 
 lutions into effect. It will probably be decisively voted to-day. Ultimate 
 resolution in conference can not now be forecast, but will doubtless direct 
 intervention by force, if need be, to secure free Cuba. The situation is most 
 critical. JOHN SHERMAN." 
 
 No. 2. 
 Mr. Day to Mr. Woodford. 
 (Telegram, in part cipher.) 
 
 "Department of State, Washington, April 17, 1898. — The Senate, Satur- 
 day evening, by 67 votes to 21, passed a resolution amending all of the House 
 resolution after the enacting clause. It declares as follows: 
 
 " 'Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
 States of America in Congress assembled : 
 
 " 'First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought 
 to be, free and independent, and that the government of the United States 
 hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of 
 that island. 
 
 " 'Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the 
 government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government 
 of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, 
 and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. 
 
 " 'Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is 
 directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United 
 States and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the 
 several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions 
 into effect. 
 
 " 'Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or 
 intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island. 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 249 
 
 except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is 
 accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people. ' 
 
 "The House has taken a recess until 10 Monday morning, when vote will 
 be taken on concurring in the Senate amendments. If the House non-concurs, 
 conference follows. Ultimate form of resolution cannot yet be foreseen. 
 
 "Sunday morning, i o'clock. DAY, Acting." 
 
 No. 3. 
 Mr. Day to Mr. Woodford. 
 (Telegram, in cipher.) 
 "Department of State, Washington, April 19, 1898. — At 3 this morning, 
 after prolonged conferences, the Senate and the House of Representatives 
 adopted the joint resolution the text of which was telegraphed to you Satur- 
 day night, omitting from the first section the words 'and that the government 
 of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and 
 lawful government of that island.' Vote in Senate, 42 to 35; in House, 310 
 against 6. 
 
 "An instruction will be telegraphed you later, immediately on the Presi- 
 dent signing the joint* resolution. In the meantime you will prepare for 
 withdrawal from Spain, and notify consuls to be ready for the signal to leave. 
 If any consul is in danger, he may quietly leave at his discretion. 
 
 "DAY." 
 
 No. 4. 
 Mr. Woodford to Mr. Day. 
 (Telegram, in cipher.) 
 "Madrid, April 20, 1898. — Have received telegram of Tuesday morning ; 
 am prepared to withdraw ; have notified consuls to be ready. 
 
 "WOODFORD." 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford. 
 
 (Telegram, plain.) 
 
 "Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1898. — You have been 
 
 furnished with the text of a joint resolution voted by the Congress of the 
 
 United States on the 19th instant (approved to-day) in relation to the pacifica- 
 
250 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 tion of the island of Cuba. In obedience to that act the President directs you 
 to immediately communicate to the government of Spain said resolution, with 
 the formal demand of the government of the United States that the govern- 
 ment of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island 
 of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. 
 In taking this step the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or 
 intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island 
 fexcept for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is 
 accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people 
 under such free and independent government as they may establish. 
 
 "If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April, instant, 
 there be not communicated to this government by that of Spain a ' full and 
 satisfactory response to this demand and res.olution whereby the ends of peace 
 in Cuba shall be assured, the President will proceed without further notice to 
 use the power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the said 
 joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry the same into 
 eifect. SHERMAN." 
 
 No. 6. 
 Mr. Sherman to the Spanish Minister. 
 
 "Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1898. — Sir: I have the 
 honor to communicate to you a copy of an instruction sent this day to the 
 United States Minister at Madrid, by telegraph, in obedience to a joint reso- 
 lution of the Congress of the United States of America in relation to the 
 pacification of the island of Cuba, approved this day, of which a copy is 
 hereto annexed. 
 
 "I avail myself of this opportunity to repeat to you the assurances of my 
 highest consideration. JOHN SHERMAN." 
 
 "Joint Resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of 
 Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority 
 and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval 
 forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the 
 United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to 
 carry these resolutions into effect. 
 "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 251 
 
 States of America in Congress assembled, First. That the people of the 
 island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent. 
 
 "Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the 
 government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government 
 of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba 
 and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. 
 
 "Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, 
 directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United 
 States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of 
 the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these reso- 
 lutions into effect. 
 
 "Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or 
 intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island 
 except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is 
 accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people. 
 
 "Approved, April 20, 1898." 
 
 No. 7. 
 
 Spanish Minister to Mr. Sherman. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 "Legation of Spain, Washington, April 20, 1898. (Received 11:35 ^■ 
 
 m.) — Mr. Secretary: The resolution adopted by the Congress of the United 
 
 States of America and approvecj to-day by the President is of such a nature 
 
 that my continuance in Washington becomes impossible and obliges me to 
 
 request of you the delivery of my passports. 
 
 "The protection of Spanish interests will be intrusted to the French 
 Ambassador and to the Austrian-Hungarian Minister. 
 
 "On this occasion, very painful to me, I have the honor to renew to you 
 the assurances of my highest consideration. 
 
 "LUIS POLO DE BERNAB]^." 
 
 No. 8. 
 Mr. Sherman to the Spanish Minister. 
 "Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1898. — Mr. Minister: I 
 have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this day's date, in 
 
252 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 which you state that the resolution adopted by the Congress of the United 
 States of America, and to-day approved by the President, is of such a nature 
 as to make your continuance in Washington impossible and constrains ytou to 
 request that your passports be given you. You add that the protection of 
 Spanish interests is intrusted to the Ambassador of France and the Minister 
 of Austria- Hungary. 
 
 "In response to your request I have the honor to hand you a passport for 
 yourself, your family, and your suite. I beg also to inform you that arrange- 
 ments have been made for a guard to attend you during your presence in the 
 territory of the United States. 
 
 "Sincerely regretting the step that you have felt constrained to take, I 
 avail myself of this opportunity to again tender you the assurances of my 
 highest consideration. . JOHN SHERMAN." 
 
 Copy of passport handed to Minister Polo de Bernabe. 
 No. — .) United States of America. 
 
 "To all to whom these presents shall come greeting: Know ye that the 
 bearer hereof, Seiior Don Luis Polo de Bernab^, Envoy Extraordinary and 
 Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain to the United States, is about to travel 
 abroad, accompanied by his family and suite. 
 
 "These are therefore to request all officers of the United States, or of any 
 State thereof, whom it may concern, to permit them to pass freely, without 
 let or molestation, and to extend to them friendly aid and protection in case 
 of need. ' • 
 
 "In testimony whereof, I, John Sherman, Secretary of State of the United 
 States of America, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the 
 Department of State to be affixed at Washington, this 20th day of April, A. D. 
 1898, and of the independence of the United States of America the one hun- 
 dred and twenty-second. 
 
 "(Seal.) SHERMAN." 
 
 No. 9. 
 
 Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford. 
 
 (Telegram, in part cipher.) 
 
 "Department of State, April 20, 1898.— Senor Polo de Bernabe, Spanish 
 
 Minister to the United States, upon being informed, shortly before noon 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 253 
 
 to-day, of the action of this government taken in pursuance of the resolutions 
 of Congress of April 19, 1898, has asked for his passports. In compliance with 
 his request passports for himself, his family, and suite have been handed him, 
 with assurances of safety while within the territory of the United States. 
 
 "Unless previously handed your passports, you will be expected to 
 remain near the Court of Spain till Saturday noon of this week, and unless b)- 
 that day and hour some communication is received from the government of 
 Spain which you deem will be satisfactory to this government, you will ask 
 for your passports and safe conduct. SHERMAN. " 
 
 No. 10. 
 
 Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman. 
 
 (Telegram, received in cipher.) 
 "Madrid, April 21, 1898. (Received 9:02 a. m.) — Early this (Thursday) 
 morning, immediately after the receipt of your open telegram and before I 
 had communicated same to Spanish government, Spanish Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs notified me that diplomatic relations are broken between the two 
 countries, and that all official communication between their respective repre- 
 sentatives has ceased. I accordingly asked for safe passport. Turn legation 
 over to British embassy and leave for Paris this afternoon. Have notified 
 consuls. ' ' 
 
 No. II. 
 
 Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman. 
 
 (Telegram. ) 
 
 "United States Legation, Madrid, April 21, 1898. — Following is text of 
 
 official note received this morning at 7 i^o o'clock from Spanish Minister of 
 
 State : 
 
 " 'In compliance with a painful duty, I have the honor to inform your 
 excellency that, the President having approved a resolution of both Chambers 
 of the United States which, in denying the legitimate sovereignty of Spain 
 and in threatening armed intervention in Cuba, is equivalent to an evident 
 declaration of war, the government of His Majesty has ordered its Minister in 
 Washington to withdraw without loss of time from the North American ter- 
 ritory with all the personnel of the legation. By this act the diplomatic rela- 
 tions which previously existed between the two countries are broken off, all 
 
254 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 official communication between their respective representatives ceasing, and 
 I hasten to communicate this to your excellency in order that on your part 
 you may make such dispositions as seem suitable. 
 
 " 'I beg of your excellency to kindly acknowledge the receipt of this note, 
 and I avail myself, etc. ' WOODFORD. " 
 
 No. 12. 
 
 Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman. 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 "Madrid, April 21, 1898. (Received 3:01 p. m.) — Following is text of my 
 reply to official note received this morning at 7 130 o'clock from Spanish Min- 
 ister of State : 
 
 " 'I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt this morning of your note 
 of this date informing me that the Spanish Minister at Washington has been 
 ordered to withdraw with all his legation and without loss of time from North 
 American territory. You also informed me that by this act diplomatic rela- 
 tions between the two countries are broken off, that all official communica- 
 tion between their respective representatives ceases. I have accordingly this 
 day telegraphed the American Consul-General at Barcelona to instruct all the 
 consular representatives of the United States in Spain to turn their respective 
 consulates over to the British consuls and to leave Spain at once. I have 
 myself turned this legation over to Her Britannic Majesty's embassy at 
 Madrid. That embassy will from this time have the care of all American 
 interests in Spain. I now request passports and safe conduct to the French 
 frontier for myself and the personnel of this legation. I intend leaving this 
 afternoon at 4 o'clock for Paris. I avail myself, etc' 
 
 "WOODFORD." 
 
 No. 13. 
 
 (Blockade of Cuban Ports.) 
 
 By the President of the United States of America. 
 
 "A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 "Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved 
 April 20, 1898, and communicated to the government of Spain, it was 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 255 
 
 demanded that said government at once relinquish its authority and govern- 
 ment in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba 
 and Cuban waters ; and the President of the United States was directed and 
 empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and 
 to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several 
 States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into 
 effect; and 
 
 "Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of the 
 United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade 
 of the north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said coast, between 
 Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast 
 of Cuba: 
 
 "Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, 
 in order to enforce the said resolution do hereby declare and proclaim that 
 the United States of America have instituted and will maintain a blockade of 
 the north coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and 
 Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, afore- 
 said, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations 
 applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent 
 the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral ves- 
 sel approaching any of said ports, or attempting to leave the same, without 
 notice or knowledge of the establishment of such blockade, will be duly 
 warned by the commander of the blockading forces, who will indorse on her 
 register the fact, and the date, of such warning, where such indorsement was 
 made ; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, 
 she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceed- 
 ings against her and her cargo as prize as may be deemed advisable. 
 
 "Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establish- 
 ment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom. 
 
 "In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of 
 the United States to be affixed. 
 
 "Done at the city of Washington, this 22d day of April, A. D. 1898, and 
 of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second. 
 
 "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 "By the President: 
 
 "JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State. " 
 
2S6 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 1 No. 14. 
 
 (Call for Volunteers — Spain.) 
 By the President of the United States. 
 
 "A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 "Whereas a joint resolution of Congress was approved on the twentieth 
 day of April, 1898, entitled 'Joint resolution for the recognition of the inde- 
 pendence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain 
 relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and with- 
 draw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the 
 President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United 
 States to carry these resolutions into effect ;' and 
 
 "Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled 'An act to provide for tempo- 
 rarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of 
 war, and for other purposes,' approved April 22, 1898 ; the President is author- 
 ized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for 
 volunteers to serve in the Army of the United States: 
 
 "Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by 
 virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and deem- 
 ing sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby do 
 call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry 
 into effect the purpose of the said resolution ; the same to be apportioned, as 
 far as practicable, among the several States and Territories, and the District 
 of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for . two years, unless 
 sooher discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communi- 
 cated to the proper authorities through the War Department. 
 
 "In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and cau'Sed the seal of 
 the United States to be aifixed. 
 
 "Done at the city of Washington, this twenty- third day of April, A. D. 
 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and 
 twenty-second. 
 
 "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 "By the President: JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State." 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 257 
 
 PROCLAMATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT RELATING TO THE 
 
 WAR WITH SPAIN. 
 
 (Blockade of Cuban Ports. ) 
 By the President of the United States of America. 
 
 "A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 "Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved 
 April 20, 1898, and communicated to the government of Spain, it was 
 demanded that said government at once relinquish its authority and govern- 
 ment in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba 
 and Cuban waters ; and the President of the United States was directed and 
 empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and 
 to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several 
 States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into 
 effect; and 
 
 "Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of the 
 United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade of the 
 north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said coast between Cardenas and 
 Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba: 
 
 "Now, therefore, I, William ]McKinley, President of the United States, 
 in order to enforce the said resolution, do hereby declare and proclaim that 
 the United States of America have instituted, and will maintain a blockade of 
 the North coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and 
 Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, afore- 
 said, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations 
 applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent 
 the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessel 
 approaching any of said ports, or attempting to leave the same, without notice 
 or knowledge of the establishment of such blockade, will be duly warned by 
 the commander of the blockading forces, who will indorse on her register the 
 fact, and the date, of such warning, where such indorsement was made ; and 
 if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, she will be 
 captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against 
 her and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable. 
 
258 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 "Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establish- 
 ment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom. 
 
 "In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand. and caused the seal of 
 the United States to be affixed. 
 
 "Done at the city of Washington, this 22d day of April, A. D. 1898, and 
 of the independence of the United States, the one hundred and twenty- 
 second. 
 
 "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 "By the President. 
 
 "JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State. " 
 
 (Call for Volunteers — Spain. ) 
 By the President of the United States. 
 
 'A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 "Whereas, a joint resolution of Congress was approved on the twentieth 
 day of April, 1898, entitled 'Joint resolution for the recognition of the independ- 
 ence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relin- 
 quish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its 
 land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the Presi- 
 dent of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States 
 to carry these resolutions into effect, ' and 
 
 "Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled 'An act to provide for tempo- 
 rarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war 
 and for other purposes,' approved April 22, 1898; the President is authorized, 
 in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for vol- 
 unteers to serve in the Army of the United States : 
 
 "Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, 
 by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and 
 deeming sufficient occasion to existj have thought fit to call forth and hereby 
 do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry 
 into effect the purpose of the said resolution ; the same to be apportioned, as 
 far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and the District 
 
I I I I 
 
 I I I I 
 
 i i i i 
 
 ! ! ! ! 
 
 I I I I 
 
 i i i i 
 
 I I I I 
 
 I I I I 
 
 I I I I 
 'till 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 261 
 
 of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless 
 sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communi- 
 cated to the proper authorities through the War Department. 
 
 "In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of 
 the United States to be affixed. 
 
 "Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-third day of April, A. D. 
 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one-hundred and 
 twenty-second. 
 
 "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 "By the President: 
 
 "JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State. " 
 
 (War with Spain — Maritiine Law. ) 
 By the President of the United States of America. 
 
 "A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 "Whereas, by an act of Congress, approved April 25, 1898, it is declared 
 that war exists and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, A. D. 
 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the 
 Kingdom of Spain ; and 
 
 "Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be conducted upon 
 principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by 
 their recent practice, it has already been announced that the policy of this 
 government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of 
 the Declaration of Paris: 
 
 "Now; therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States of 
 America, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the 
 laws, do hereby declare and proclaim : 
 
 "i. The neutral flag covers enemy's gpods, with the exception of con- 
 traband of war. 
 
 "2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation 
 under the enemy's flag. 
 
 "3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective. 
 
 "4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places within the United 
 States, shall be allowed till May 21, 1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes 
 
262 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 and departing from such ports or places; and such Spanish merchant vessels, 
 if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue their 
 voyage, if, on examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes 
 were taken on board before the expiration of the above term ; Provided, that 
 nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish vessels having on board any 
 officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal (except such 
 as may be necessary for their voyage), or any other article prohibited or con- 
 traband of war, or any dispatch of or to the Spanish government. 
 
 "5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21, 1898, shall 
 have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or place in the United 
 States, shall be permitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her 
 cargo, and afterward forthwith to depart without molestation ; and any such 
 vessel, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue 
 her voyage to any port not blockaded. 
 
 "6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard for the rights 
 of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers are not to be interfered with 
 except on the clearest- grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of 
 contraband or blockade. 
 
 "In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of 
 the United States to be affixed. 
 
 "Done at the city of Washington, on the twenty-sixth day of April, in 
 the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the 
 independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second. 
 
 "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 "By the President: 
 
 "ALVEY A. ADEE, Acting Secretary of State." 
 
 (Second call for Volunteers — Spain.) 
 By the President of the United States. 
 
 "A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 "Whereas, an act of Congress was approved on the twenty-fifth day of 
 April, 1898, entitled 'An act declaring that war exisfs between th^ United 
 States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, ' and 
 
 "Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled 'An act to provide for tem- 
 porarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 263 
 
 time of war and for other purposes, approved April 22, 1898; the President is 
 authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation for 
 calling for volunteers to serve in the army of the United States : 
 
 "Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, 
 by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and 
 deeming suificient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby 
 do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 75,000 in addition to the 
 volunteers called forth by my proclamation of the twenty-third day of April, 
 in the present year; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among 
 the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, according to 
 population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The pro- 
 portion of each arm and the details of enlistment and organization will be 
 made known through the War Department. 
 
 "In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of 
 the United States to be affixed. 
 
 "Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of May, in the 
 year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the 
 independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second. 
 
 "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 "By the President: 
 
 "WILLIAM R. DAY, Secretary of State." 
 
 (Blockade — Southern Cuba and San Juan, Puerto Rico. ) 
 By the President of the United States. 
 
 "A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 "Whereas, for the reasons set forth in my Proclamation of April 22, 
 1898, a blockade of the ports on the northern coast of Cuba, from Cardenas to 
 Bahia Honda, inclusive, and of the port of Cienfuegos, on the south coast of 
 Cuba, was declared to have been instituted ; and 
 
 "Whereas, it has become desirable to extend the blockade to other Span- 
 ish ports: 
 
 "Now, therefore; I, William McKinley, President of the United States, do 
 hereby declare and proclaim that, in addition to the blockade of the ports 
 specified in my Proclamation of April 22, 1898, the United States of America 
 
264 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 has instituted and will maintain an effective blockade of all the ports on the 
 south coast of Cuba from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz, inclusive, and • also of 
 the port of San Juan, in the Island of Porto Rico. 
 
 "Neutral vessels lying in any of the ports to which the blockade is by the 
 present Proclamation extended, will be allowed thirty days to issue there- 
 from, with cargo. 
 
 ' ' In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the Seal 
 of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 ' ' Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-seventh day of June, A. 
 D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and 
 twenty-second. 
 
 "(Seal.) WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 "By the President: 
 
 "J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State." 
 
 The various departments of the government of the United States have 
 performed the part of a government by the people, of and for the people, in 
 giving full information of the conduct of the war with Spain. The policy of 
 candor has prevailed. Since nations lifted the sword against each other there 
 has been no war more obstinately and weakly, though vindictively, provoked 
 than that which Spain insisted upon with the' United States. Notwithstanding 
 a remarkable lack of preparation in military matters, owing to the unthinking 
 habit as to the possible occurrence of speedy and costly war measures forced 
 upon us — a habit in the indulgence of which as a political luxury Congress 
 fairly represented and competed with the people — the war was a wonderful 
 sxiccess. The Spaniards had in their colonies that we assailed ten regular soldiers 
 to every man of our regular army, and they were -thoroughly supplied with 
 rifles, almost equal in range, and better supplied with fixed ammunition than 
 ours, and field artillery up to date. They had for many years been of the 
 opinion that they would sometime in this generation have to fight us for the 
 West India Islands, and so had in their calculations pitted their navy against 
 that of the United States, with results in their minds flattering to themselves. 
 As long ago as during the second administration of General Grant, it was 
 Spanish public opinion, with which there was general concurrence in Europe, 
 with the possible exception of England, that we were not a match for Spain at 
 sea. This idea was based upon the estimation in which Europe held the 
 lighter class of vessels for war purposes — the smaller cruisers, the gunboats, 
 
GUNS USED BY UNITED STATES INFANTRY. BREECH CLOSED. 
 
 GUNS USED BY UNITED STATES INFANTRY. BREECH OPEN. 
 
UNITED STA.TES LIUHT ARTILLERY AT PORT TAMPA. 
 
 ARTILLERY TARGET PRACTICE AT PORT TAMPA. 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 267 
 
 torpedo boats and torpedo destroyers. In these Spain certainly outnumbered 
 us. But our naval men had not lost time in their studies of the squadrons of 
 the greater sea powers, and fortunately they had early reached the conclusion 
 .that the battleship able to cross the great oceans was the old reliable style of 
 combatant, and that comparatively a few guns of very high power, supported 
 by rapid-fire guns, stood many chances of proving the most effective combina- 
 tion that could be devised. It seems to be established by our experience that 
 two battleships — say the Oregon and the Iowa — could have sunk, without 
 receiving a serious scratch, all the torpedo and destroyer and light cruiser 
 boats in the Spanish navy. There were twelve gunboats in the squadron of 
 the Spaniards in the Philippines that did not in the war period show sign of 
 existence, though they were invited to adventure by our transports on the 
 Pacific, bearing practically unarmed regiments. It is characteristic of modern 
 wars that they are practically short, owing, to the rapidity with which orders 
 are sent by telegraph and troops by railways and steamers ; and the concen- 
 trated destructiveness of monster war ships, and rapidly mobilized armies, are 
 such enormous consumers of men and money that expenses in active opera- 
 tions cannot long be endured. 
 
 However, our war with Spain was fought to a finish in a fortnight and a 
 hundred days, and we had a procession of triumphs from start to end. It may 
 have been a fault that victory became too monotonous for some of our men, 
 prepared as they presumed to draw prizes, and for the journalism of fragmen- 
 tary distortion that covers all countries wrapped up in newspapers and yet is 
 adapted only to sea serpents, earthquakes and the land where earthquakes 
 abide and typhoon and the cyclone are at play, and no music is tolerated that 
 is gentler than the calliope. There never was as much that was difficult 
 accomplished in warfare in the same time as by this country, with so small a . 
 loss of life, or more gratifying acts of good conduct in which heroes came 
 from all ranks in the service, and yet there is a literature of criticism of the 
 conduct of the war. It is the ordinary fortune of war that the exposures, 
 fatigues and privations of camp life and the march cost more lives than are 
 lost on battlefields, but for these things our country seemed to be least 
 prepared, and feeling sure abundant provision was made for the soldiers, 
 there have been disappointments demanding victims, and we have volumes of 
 testimony taken by the commission appointed by the President to investigate 
 the business of the War Department in the war with Spain. 
 
268 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 The report of the Major-General commanding the army, Nelson A. Miles, 
 contains this passage : 
 
 "At the commencement of the war the problem was largely a naval one, 
 and until the question of superiority between our navy and the Spanish navy,, 
 or such naval forces as might be furnished by any other European power or 
 combination of powers supporting the Spanish government, was determined, 
 military operations had to be determined by the success or failure of our naval 
 forces. 1 was fully convinced that should our navy prove superior the posi- 
 tion of the Spanish army in Cuba would be rendered untenable with a mini- 
 mum loss of life and treasure to the United States." 
 
 It was the first certainty of the war that the command of the sea must 
 be settled before military operations took place outside our own lines. The 
 navy Department had its work cut out for it — knew what was on hand, the 
 possibilities, where the ships were and how manned and equipped, and three 
 months in advance of the declaration, precautionary orders were issued. Many 
 of them are presented in the Appendix Report of the Bureau of Navigation, 
 and these are described as "only part of the more important precautionarj^ 
 orders issued by the Department," and as "orders not elsewhere included." 
 This further preface is given : 
 
 "No attempt has been made to indicate the vast amount of work done by 
 the bureaus and offices of the Department in putting ships and yards in the 
 highest state of efficiency and in purchasing and manufacturing war material. 
 Arrangements for purchases abroad began in February, but the correspond- 
 ence in relation thereto is so voluminous that it is not published. ' ' 
 
 Washington, January i6, 1898. 
 Selfridge, Villefranche-sur-Mer : 
 
 Retain men on this enlistment. Detailed ihstructions by mail. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 Washington, January 11, 1898. 
 Helena, Funchal, Madeira: 
 
 Secret and confidential. In view of recent events, it is considered advisa- 
 ble to delay departure from Funchal. Can you obtain good berth behind 
 breakwater for a considerable time? LONG. 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 269 
 
 Washington, January 17, 1898. 
 Chester, Cincinnati, Montevideo, Uruguay: 
 
 Secret and confidential. Affairs are very disturbed at Cuba. It is con- 
 sidered advisable to change the disposition of ships. Announce unofficially 
 your intention to proceed with the Cincinnati and Castine (on) cruise to north- 
 ward for exercise and drill, and to visit the most northern part of the South 
 Atlantic Station. As soon after as possible, without thereby causing com- 
 ment, proceed to Para, Brazil, at discretion, and there await further orders. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 Washington, January 17, 1898. 
 Helena, Funchal, Madeira: 
 
 Proceed to Lisbon, Portugal, at discretion, and there await further orders. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 Washington, January 17, 1898. 
 Wilmington, Basseterre, Guadeloupe: 
 
 Delay execution of orders of December 9 for the present. Cruise in 
 Windward Islands, not touching at Spanish ports. Will keep in telegraphic 
 communication. About February 14 proceed to La Guayra, and there await 
 further orders. Do not detach Ensigns Bretherton and Dayton. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 (The orders of December 9 directed the Wilmington to proceed to the 
 South Atlantic Station.) 
 
 Washington, January 26, 1898. 
 Selfridge, Villefranche : 
 
 Orders were sent by steamer of January 19 naval force on European 
 Station, proceed to Lisbon after February 2. Orders have been issued to 
 Commander of Helena. Will remain until further orders at Lisbon. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 Washington, January 27, 1898. 
 Dewey, Olympia, Yohohama, Japan: 
 
 Retain until further orders the crew of the squadron whose terms of 
 enlistment have expired. CROWNINSHIELD. 
 
270 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 Washington, February 17, 1898. 
 Cincinnati, Para, Brazil: ^ 
 
 The Cincinnati and Castine proceed to such ports as you think best to the 
 
 north of Para, Brazil. Keep in telegraphic communication with Washington. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 Washington, February 24, 1898. 
 Bunce, Navy Yard, New York : 
 
 Keep closest watch on submarine boat. Inform captain of Vizcaya about 
 her. If in your judgment circumstances warrant it, seize her. Learn, if pos- 
 sible, from Nixon or otherwise where she has gone and what interest controls 
 her. LONG. 
 
 Washington, February 25, 1898. 
 Howell, Lisbon: 
 
 Secret and confidential. Keep the squadron at such port as it may be in 
 (Lisbon) until further orders. Keep filled with coal. ROOSEVELT. 
 
 Washington, February 25, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 Secret and confidential. Order the squadron, except Monocacy, to Hong- 
 kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war, Spain, your 
 duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, 
 and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until 
 further orders. ROOSEVELT. 
 
 Washington, February 26, 1898. 
 Wilmington, La Guaira: 
 
 Proceed to Barbados and report for duty to the Commander in Chief 
 United States Naval Force on South Atlantic Station. LONG. 
 
 Washington, February 26, 1898. 
 Chester, Barbados: 
 
 Keep full of coal, the best that can be had. When Castine has been 
 docked, order her to Barbados. Wilmington has been ordered to Barbados. 
 
 LONG. 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 271 
 
 And on this February 26th — two months before the war was on, Miller, 
 Honolulu; Howell, Lisbon; Dewey, Hqngkong; Sicard, Key West, were tele- 
 graphed by the Secretary of the Navy, "Keep full of coal, the best that can be 
 had." There was no stinting about that. Uncle Sam's ships were not to be 
 caught without coal. From January 27th to April 7th, there were four cables 
 for the Navy Department to Dewey. Hongkong: First, hold enlisted men 
 whose terms were expired, for further orders; second, go to Hongkong; third, 
 in case of war see that the Spanish fleet does not get away; fourth, keep full 
 of coal, then offensive operations in Philippine islands. Keep Olympia! All 
 this five weeks before the war was declared. Keep full of coal, was reiter- 
 ated. April 7th, Dewey, Hongkong, was told in plain terms to "prepare for 
 action. ' ' 
 
 Washington, March 3, 1898. 
 Navy Yard, League Island : 
 
 Enlist seamen, firemen, and petty officers for general service for crews of 
 Columbia and Minneapolis. Direct commanding officers of those vessels to 
 get them in readiness for service at sea. CROWNINSHIELD. 
 
 (Note. — Enlistments under this and following order exceeded quota 
 established by law.) 
 
 Washington, March 3, 1898. 
 Navy Yards, Brooklyn, Boston : 
 
 Enlist seamen, firemen, and petty officers for general service for crews of 
 Columbia and Minneapolis. CROWNINSHIELD. 
 
 Washington, March 3, 1898. 
 Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal. : 
 
 Order Mohican, navy yard. Mare Island, to receive on board ammunition 
 now there for the naval force on Asiatic Station; then proceed at once to 
 Honolulu and transfer to the Baltimore. As soon as Mohican arrives Balti- 
 more will leave for Hongkong. Orders by mail. When will Mohican be 
 ready? LONG. 
 
272 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 Navy Department, Washington, March 4, 1898. 
 Sir: The Department has this, date directed, by telegraph, that the 
 ammunition now at the navy yard, Mare Island, intended for the Asiatic 
 Station and for the U. S. F. S. Baltimore, shall be shipped to that vessel by 
 the Mohican. You will please prepare the Mohican to receive this ammuni, 
 tion, and have her proceed to Honolulu at the earliest practicable date. 
 
 Very respectfully, JOHN D. LONG, Secretary. 
 
 Commandant Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal. 
 
 Washington, March 7, 1898. 
 Brooklyn, La Guayra: 
 
 The situation is getting worse. Proceed without delay to Hampton 
 Roads. , LONG. 
 
 (Note. — The above order was in contemplation of the formation of the 
 Flying Squadron.) 
 
 Washington, March 9, 1898. 
 Sicard, Key West: 
 
 Not to expend ammunition, target practice or as a test, until further 
 
 orders. LONG. 
 
 Washington, March 12, 1898. 
 Howell, Lisbon : 
 
 Direct Bancroft to proceed at once to Norfolk. Direct Helena to proceed 
 at once to Key West. LONG 
 
 Washington, March 14, 1898. 
 Howell, Lisbon, Portugal: 
 
 Proceed at once to Newcastle-upon-the-Tyne. Upon arrival communi- 
 cate immediately with the , United States naval attach^ at London. Hoist 
 United States flag upon Amazonas and Abreu. Appoint to the command of 
 former Lieut. Commander A. P. Nazro and sufficient officers and crew of the 
 San Fjancisco. Proceed to New York. San Francisco to convoy. Utilize 
 your staff watch, duty. LONG 
 
THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED, 273 
 
 Washington, March 15, 1898. 
 Chester, Barbados: 
 
 Order the squadron to proceed to Port Antonio. The Annapolis left 
 yesterday from Curacao (for a) cruise to the northward, to arrive not later 
 than March 31 at Key West. I could not communicate by telegraph, and he 
 does not know the altered situation. Try to intercept and direct to proceed 
 to Hampton Roads, Va. LONG. 
 
 (The Annapolis had left on a practice cruise with apprentices on board, anu 
 was to remain at sea for seventeen days. ) 
 
 Washington, March 17, 1898. 
 Sicard, Key West, Fla. : 
 
 Send Texas and Massachusetts to Hampton Roads, Va. , without delay. 
 
 LONG. 
 ' (Note. — The above order was issued to carry on the formation of the 
 Flying Squadron.) 
 
 Washington, April 4, 1898. 
 Sampson, Key West, Fla. : 
 
 Be ready on receipt of order to take possession of Ke)'' West cable and 
 
 telegraph office, and to place an officer in charge. He will not permit the 
 
 transmission to Cuba of any telegram relating to the action of the President 
 
 or Congress. Will be further instructed. The business of the company not 
 
 to be interfered with any more it is necessary. The officer assigned upon this 
 
 duty must be one discreet and judicious. LONG. 
 
 Washington, April 7, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 Land all woodwork, stores, etc. , it is not considered necessary to have for 
 operations. LONG. 
 
 Washington, April 19, 1898. 
 Navy Pay Offi-ce, San Francisco, Cal. : 
 
 Send the following cipher message to Admiral Miller by first steamer: 
 ■ Proceed with your personal staff to San Francisco immediately by steamer. 
 Order Mohican to San Francisco. Keep Bennington at Honolulu. Bring 
 squadron records. LONG. 
 
274 THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. 
 
 Washington, April 21, 1898. 
 Navy Yard, Boston, New York, Norfolk, Mare Island; 
 
 The naval force on the North Atlantic Station are blockading Cuba. 
 War has not been declared. War may be declared at any moment. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 Washington, April 23, 1898. 
 Schley, Fort Monroe: 
 
 Send Minneapolis immediately to Eastport, Me., skirting coast above 
 Cape Ann; Columbia to Newport, R. I. Both will receive, upon arrival, 
 further orders. LONG. 
 
 Fort Monroe, April 24, 1898. 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington : 
 
 Minneapolis and Columbia left at 1 1 p. m. Saturday night, having pro- 
 ceeded in obedience to orders. SCHLEY. 
 
 It should be remembered that while the wires were worked in this way 
 the world around, a part of the intellectual force of Congress was spent in 
 getting up time tables and holding stop watches to hurry the President into 
 war, and the disregard of yellow fever and rainy weather and passion to run 
 our ships against forts, and land a few of our sjnall force of regulars to aid the 
 standing army, 50,000 strong, of the free and independent Republic of Cuba. 
 The Major General commanding, howpver, refers to "an auxiliary force of 
 50,000 natives. " As we did not before the battles put ashore twenty thousand 
 regulars and volunteers, it is our army that would have been the "auxiliary 
 force." The natives, we infer, were already in the island, for General Miles 
 mentions the landing at "the harbor of Banes, on the north coast of Cuba, 
 which has been held during the war by the Cubans. ' ' This harbor should 
 have been discovered earlier, for it would have been a great help to the' sister 
 Republic. There was landed, "for the lo^ooo Cubans under General Garcia," 
 7,500 rifles, 1,000,000 cartridges, 5,000 uniforms and other material." We 
 presume it was these new and fresh Cuban uniforms that so much impressed 
 our comparatively small force at Santiago. 
 
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 1-4 
 
"CTDTPTETl'^XI. 
 
 The Story of Dewey's Splendid Victory Told by Those Who Won It. 
 
 The Battle of Manila Bay — Confidential Information From Madrid, Showing Spanish Con- 
 fidence in Their Navy — Rapid Exchange of Cables between Dewey. and Long — Ener- 
 getic Inquiry in the Navy Department — Everything Rushed from the Start — Dewey's 
 Masterly Movements and Immortal Victory — The OfScial Reports Full of Stories of the 
 Battle That Will be News to the People — Details of Uncommon Value — Spanish Official 
 Report Exceedingly Interesting — Admiral Montijo was not Surprised but Fired First — 
 The Celebrated Breakfast Caused by a False Alarm. 
 
 The Bureau of Navigation publishes a communication dated Madrid, the 
 i6th of April, 1898, five days before the war opened — the name of the 
 writer not given. He was evidently a deeply interested and well instructed 
 observer. Attention is called to an article April 6th, in the Heraldo of 
 Madrid, that caused much comment. We quote : 
 
 "We had an opportunity to-day to talk for a long time with General 
 Beranger, the last secretary of the navy under the Conservative Cabinet. To 
 the questions which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending with 
 the United States he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely 
 in the triumph of our naval forces. The attack on our island ports is not to 
 be feared, he said, by an enemy taking advantage of the darkness of night. 
 The reason of this is that Havana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and San- 
 tiago, are defended by electrical and automobile torpedoed, which can work at 
 a great distance (have a large radius of action). Senor Canovas del Castillo, , 
 who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in agreement with me, the 
 shipping to Cuba of 190 torpedoes, which are surely located in these ports at 
 present. The transportation and installation of these war machines was in 
 the charge of the distinguished torpedoist, Seiior Chacon. I have already 
 said that we shall conquer on the sea, and I am now going to give yoti my 
 reasons. The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our 
 war ships, and the second, as soon as fire is opened the crews of the American 
 
 277 
 
278. THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 ships will commence to desert, since we all know that among them are people 
 of all nationalities. Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared. 
 .1 believe that the squadron detained at Cape de Verdes, and particularly the 
 destroyers, should have and could have continued the voyage to Cuba, since 
 they have nothing to fear from the American fleet. In this class of ships we 
 are on a mach higher level than the United States." 
 
 This Heraldo was the most important of the Madrid journals, and the 
 statement about torpedoes, coming at the juncture it did, is quite striking. 
 The Madrid correspondent who furnished the Heraldo translation wrote on 
 that "the press has fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about the 
 superior bravery of the Spanish sailor, the superior discipline on board the 
 Spanish ships, and the greater fighting power of the navy. The belief in this 
 superiority of the Spanish navy over that oi the United States accounts, in a 
 large measure, in my opinion, for the determination to fight us. This opinion 
 is shared also by many intelligent persons, in fact, I believe, by all Spaniards. 
 They say they have nothing to lose, they could not be worse off with the war 
 than without it, as they are about to lose Cuba anyhow; but they can do 
 incalculable damage to our commerce; seriously injure, if not destroy, our 
 navy, and, although they would probably be beaten in the end, they will have 
 taught us a salutary lesson in the meantime. One of the most intelligent, 
 best-informed Spaniards I have met here, a man who has traveled much, and 
 claims to have a great admiration for the United States, and who knows much 
 about our history and resources, a senator from the Kingdom, told me yester- 
 day that the thing that he dreaded most was the long period that the hostilities 
 would last. He was sure that three years would be the very least that the 
 struggle would continue." 
 
 At this time the Spaniards thought they were rapidly getting their navy 
 in order, and were in course of preparing Cervera's fleet, which sailed from 
 "the Cape Verdes thirteen days later. The correspondent gave the Spanish 
 vessels that were believed to be approaching an efficient state. "The torpedo 
 squadron, consisting of three destroyers, three torpedo boats, and the con- 
 verted cruiser Cuidad de Cadiz, with the Colon and Maria Teresa, are at the 
 Cape de Verdes awaiting instructions. It is said that the Colon and Teresa 
 left Cadiz in such a hurry that they were not properly provisioned. Provisions 
 and coal have been sent to them. I have no reason to believe that they have 
 not a'fuU supply of ammunition. The Oquendo and Vizcaya from Porto Rico 
 
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 279 
 
 should arrive at Cape de Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite informa- 
 tion, I believe the Pelayo arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from Cartagena. 
 It was intended that she should go, after a few days' necessary delay in 
 Cartagena, and it is reported that she was sighted in the Straits of Gibraltar 
 day before yesterday. The Proserpina, Osado, Destructor, Barcelo, 
 Retamosa, Habana, Halcon, torpedo boats and destroyers, and the Vitoria, 
 are now practically ready in Cadiz, awaiting the arrival of the Carlos V. and 
 the Pelayo. The Alfonso XIII. is also about ready in Cartagena. The 
 installation for moving the guns by electricity in the Carlos V. is not com- 
 pleted, and I am unable to get at the estimate of the date when she will be 
 entirely ready for service. It is said on good authority, however, that in an 
 emergency she could be used at once, working such parts as have not power 
 applied by hand. Work is being pushed, also, as rapidly as possible on the 
 Cisneros, but she can hardly be ready for many weeks. The trans- Atlantic 
 steamers Mexico, Panama, Santo Domingo, San Augustin, and Villaverde, 
 now in Cuban waters, are , being armed as auxiliary cruisers. Nine trans- 
 Atlantic steamers in Spanish ports at present are also being armed as 
 cruisers. To this number should be added the Columbia and Normannia, 
 recently purchased in Germany, and the Giralda, now being converted in 
 Barcelona. This makes twenty-one auxiliary cruisers concerning which I 
 have quite definite information. The two steamers bought in Germany were 
 strengthened there, and are in condition to receive their artillery and crew 
 when they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected to-day. ' ' 
 
 Other ships were to be taken by the government, and there were extraor- 
 dinary precautions to prevent the getting out of news about the ships, upon 
 the assumption that Cervera would do the unexpected. This publication 
 gives in better form than it has been found elsewhere, the basis of fact upon 
 which the Spanish rested their anticipations of successfully disputing our 
 supremacy at sea. 
 
 The cable was in April kept busy between the Navy Department at 
 Washington, and Admiral George Dewey at Hongkong. The dispatches run : 
 
 Washington, April i, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 Fill up with provisions purchased on station ; then how many days' pro- 
 visions have you on hand? How much soap and tobacco shall I ship? 
 
 LONG. 
 
28o THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 Washington, April 4, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 Can you purchase immediately supply steamer? What will be the cost of? 
 
 LONG. 
 
 Hongkong, April 4,. 1898. Secretary of the Navy, Washington: 
 
 I have chartered the British steamer Nanshan, having over 3,000 tons of 
 coal now on board. Before the outbreak of hostilities can and would purchase 
 this steamer. I request the earliest information in order to conclude arrange- 
 ments. Cannot be made after the outbreak of hostilities. DEWEY. 
 
 Washington, April 6, i89'8. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 Purchase immediately Nanshan and one more vessel for supplies. 
 Charge special appropriation. Send the receipts to the Department. Enlist 
 for special service, if possible, one year, unless sooner discharged, the crew 
 of. Detach and order assume command of each an officer. Arm if possible. 
 War may be declared. Condition very critical. LONG. 
 
 Washington, April 6, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 The receipt of telegram of April 4 is acknowledged, I approve action. 
 Expedite delivery. April 6 may be last opportunity. LONG. 
 
 Hongkong, April 6, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 I have purchased Nanshan, and I have engaged her crew. Will detail an 
 officer for command. I have ordered three officers, 50 men from Monocacy to 
 fill vacancies here. I hope to get another steamer. . . . The receipt of 
 telegram April 6 acknowledged, to expedite delivery. DEWEY. 
 
 It was April 7th that Dewey was cabled by Long, "Land all woodwork.'" 
 There was but little more time to lose or use before action. Long's cable was 
 the equivalent of "Clear for action!" 
 
 Hongkong, April 9, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington: 
 
 I have purchased th^ British steamer Zafiro, for supplies, for ;^i8,ooo 
 sterling. I will arm, equip, and man vessel immediately. DEWEY. 
 
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THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 283 
 
 Washington, April 21, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 The naval force on the North Atlantic Station are blockading Cuba". War 
 has . not yet been declared, but may be declared at any moment. I will 
 inform you. Await orders. LONG. 
 
 Washington, April 24, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at 
 once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly 
 against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost 
 endeavors. LONG. 
 
 Hongkong, April 25, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 The squadron will leave for Manila, Philippine Islands, immediately upon 
 the arrival of the United States consul from Manila. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, April 25, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 In accordance with the request of the governor of Hongkong, the squad- 
 ron leaves to-day for Mirs Bay, China, to await telegraphic instructions. 
 Address, Hongkong. I will communicate by tug. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, April 27, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Williams, the United States consul from Manila,, has arrived. The 
 squadron will sail immediately for the Philippine Islands. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, May 7, 1898. (Manila, May i.) 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington : 
 
 The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately 
 engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels : Reina Christina, 
 Castillia Don Antonio de Biloa, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de 
 Cuba, General Lezo, Marquis del Duaro, El Curreo, Velasco, one transport, 
 Isla de Mandano, water battery at Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dis- 
 pensatory. The squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. I 
 
284 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 request Department will" send immediately from San Francisco fast steamer 
 with ammunition. The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul 
 at Hongkong. DEWEY. 
 
 Washington, May 3, 1898. 
 Dewpy (care American consul), Hongkong: 
 
 I send hearty congratulations to yourself and your officers and .men. 
 The President highly appreciates your achievement. I await report from 
 you, on receipt of which further action will be taken arid any supplies that 
 you wish will be forwarded. LONG. 
 
 Hongkong, May 7, 1898. (Cavite, May 4.) 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington : 
 
 I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavite, Philippine Islands, 
 and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications bay entrance, 
 paroling garrison. Have cut cable to mainland. I control bay completely, 
 and can take city at anj' time, but I have not sufficient men to hold. The 
 squadron excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully known; 
 very heavy; 150 killed, including captain, on Reina Christina alone. I am 
 assisting and protecting Spanish sick and wounded, 250 in number, in this 
 hospital, within our lines. Will ammunition be sent? I request answer 
 without delay. I can supply squadron coal and provisions for a long period. 
 Much excitement at Manila. Scarcity of provisions on account of not having 
 economized stores. Will protect foreign residents. DEWEY. 
 
 Washington, May 7, 1898. 
 Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong: 
 
 The President, in the name of the American people, thanks you and your 
 officers and men for your splendid achievement and overwhelming victory. 
 In recognition he has appointed you acting rear-admiral, and will recommend 
 a vote of thanks to you by Congress as a foundation for further promotion. 
 The Charleston will leave at once with what ammunition she can carr)'. 
 Pacific Mail Steamship Company's steamer Pekin will follow with ammunition 
 and supplies. Will take troops unless you telegraph otherwise. How many 
 will you require? LONG. 
 
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 2^5; 
 
 Washington, May 7, 1898. 
 Sir: Under the authority of section 1434 of the Revised Statutes of the- 
 United States, you have been assigned to the command of the United States 
 naval force on the Asiatic Station, with the rank of rear-admiral. 
 
 You will hoist the flag of a rear-admiral, will wear the uniform, and will- 
 afSx that title to your official signature. Respectfully. 
 
 JOHN D. LONG, Secretafy, 
 Commodore George Dewey, U. S. N., 
 
 Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station, 
 U. S. Flagship Olympia. 
 
 Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 The following is correct list Spanish vessels destroyed May i : Two pro- 
 tected cruisers, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon ; five unprotected cruisers, Reina 
 Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Velasco; 
 two gunboats, General Lezo, Marquis del Daero; one transport, Isla de 
 Mindano; one- surveying vessel, Argos, both armed. The following have 
 been captured: One transport, Manila; one gunboat, Callao. 
 
 DEWEY. 
 
 Manila, November 26, 1898. 
 Secretary Navy, Washington : 
 
 Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, and Don Juan de Austria have been raised 
 and docked. My anticipations as to their value fully realized. Will leave 
 shortly for Hongkong under their own steam. Constructor Capps deserving 
 highest commendation. DEWEY. 
 
 (Report of engagement of squadron with Spanish forces at Manila Bay.) 
 "(No. 240 D.) U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Flagship Olympia, 
 
 Cavite, Philippine Islands, May 4, 1898. — Sir: I have the honor to submit the 
 
 following report of the operations of the squadron under my command : 
 
 "The squadron left Mirs Bay on April 27, immediately on the arrival of 
 
 Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at Manila, who brought important 
 
 information and who accompanies the squadron. 
 
 "Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30, and, finding no vessels 
 
286 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 there, proceeded down the coast and arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay 
 on the same afternoon. 
 
 "The Boston and Concord were sent to reconnoiter Port Subic, I having 
 been informed that the enemy intended to take position there. A thorough 
 search of the port was made by the Boston and Concord, but the Spanish fleet 
 was not found, although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal 
 (inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their intention to go 
 there. 
 
 "Entered the Boca Grande, or south channel, at ii 130 p. m., steaming in 
 column at distance at 8 knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery 
 on the south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots taking effect. 
 The Boston and McCulloch returned the fire. 
 
 "The squadron proceeded across the bay at -slow speed, and arrived off 
 Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5:15 a. m. , by three batteries at 
 Manila and two at Cavite and by the Spanish fleet anchored in an approxi- 
 mately east and west line across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in 
 shoal water in Zanacao Bay. 
 
 "The squadron then proceeded to' the attack, the flagship Olympia, under 
 my personal direction, leading, followed at distance by the Baltimore, Raleigh, 
 Petrel, Concord, and Boston, in the order named, which formation was main- 
 tained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5 141 a. m. While 
 advancing to the attack, two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, too 
 far to be effective. 
 
 "The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying 
 from 5, 000 to 2,000 square yards, countermarching in a line approximately 
 parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but 
 generally ineffective. 
 
 "Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the Olympia with 
 the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One was sunk and the other 
 disabled by our fire and beached before an opportunity occurred to fire tor- 
 pedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish flagship Reina Christina made a desperate 
 attempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was 
 received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the Olympia being con- 
 centrated upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the 
 point. The fires started in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished 
 until she sank. 
 
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 287 
 
 "At 7:3s a. m., it having been erroneously teported to me that only 15 
 rounds per gun remained for the s-inch rapid fire battery, I ceased firing and 
 withdrew the squadron for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, 
 if necessary. 
 
 "The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the 
 beginning of the engagement, which fire was not returned by this squadron. 
 The first of these batteries was situated on the south mole head, at the 
 entrance to the Passig river, the second on the south bastion of the walled 
 city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one -half mile farther south. 
 At this point I sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the 
 batteries did not cease firing the ^ ity would be shelled. This had the effect of 
 silencing them. 
 
 "At 11:16 a. m.^ finding that the report of scarcity of ammunition was 
 incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the attack. By this time the flag- 
 ship and almost the entire Spanish fleet were in fl3,mes, and at 12 :3o p. m. the 
 squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burnt 
 and deserted. 
 
 "At 12:40 p. m. the squadron returned and anchored o£E Manila, the 
 Petrel being left behiiid to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats, 
 which were behind thp point of Cavite. This duty was performed by Com- 
 mander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible. 
 
 "The Spanish lost the following vessels: 
 
 "Sunk — Rein a Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa. 
 
 "Burnt — Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General 
 . Lezo, Marques del Duero, El Correo, Velasco, and Isla de Mindanao (trans- 
 port). 
 
 "Captured — Rapido and Hercules (tugs), and several small launches. 
 
 "I am unable to obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and 
 wounded, but believe their loss to be very heavy. The Reina Christina alone 
 had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded. 
 
 "I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron under my 
 command was inconsiderable. There were none killed, and onlj^ 7 men in the 
 squadron very slightly wounded. As will be seen by the reports of the com- 
 manding officers which are herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were 
 struck and even penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the 
 squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle. 
 
I 
 
 288 THE StORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 "I beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander-in- 
 chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more loyal, efficient, 
 and gallant captains than those of the squadron now under my com- 
 mand. Capt. Frank Wildes, commanding the Boston, volunteered to remain 
 in command of his vessel, although his relief arrived before leaving 
 Hongkong. 
 
 "Asst. Surg. C. P. Kindleberger, of the Olympia, and Gunner J. C. 
 Evans, of the Boston, also volunteered to remain after orders detaching them 
 had arrived. 
 
 "The conduct of my personal staff was excellent. Commander B. P. 
 Lamberton, chief of staff, was a voluntey for that position, and gave me 
 most efficient aid. Lieut. T. M. Brumby, flag lieutenant, and Ensign W. P. 
 Scott, aid, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly creditable 
 manner. The Olympia being short of officers for the battery, Eusign H. H. 
 Caldwell, flag secretary, volunteered for and was assigned to a subdivision of 
 the 5 -inch battery. 
 
 "Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and 
 now correspondent for the New York Herald, volunteered for duty as my 
 aid, and rendered valuable service. 
 
 "While leaving to the commanding officers to comment on the conduct of 
 the officers and men under their commands, I desire especially to mention the 
 coolness of Lieut. C. G. Calkins, the navigator of the Olympia, who came 
 under my personal observation, being on the bridge with me throughout the 
 entire action, and giving the ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was 
 proven by the excellence of the firing. 
 
 'On May 2, the day following the engagement, the squadron again went 
 to Gavite, where it remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns 
 and magazines of the batteries there. The first battery, near the end of 
 Sangley Point, was composed of two modern Trubia B. L. rifles of 15 centi- 
 meters caliber. The second was one mile farther down the beach, and con- 
 sisted of a modern Canet 12-centimeter B. L. rifle behind improvised 
 earthworks. 
 
 "On the 3d, the military forces evacuated the Cavite arsenal, which was 
 taken possession of by a landing party. On the same day the Raleigh and 
 Baltimore secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island, parol- 
 ing the garrison and destroying the guns. 
 
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 289 
 
 "On the morning of May 4 the transport Manila, which had been aground 
 in Bakor Bay, was towed off and made a prize. 
 "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 "GEORGE DEWEY, 
 "Commodore, U. S. N., 
 "Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station. 
 "The Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C." 
 
 "U. S. Naval Force' on Asiatic Station, Flagship Olympia, Cavite, 
 Philippine Islands, July 9, 1898. — Sir: Referring to section 46355 of the 
 Revised Statutes, I have the honor to forward the following list of the com- 
 plements of the vessels of the enemy destroyed by the squadron under my 
 command in the battle of Manila Bay on May i, 1898, taken from the official 
 list of the Spanish Navy : 
 
 Ship. Officers, etc. Total complement. 
 
 Reina Christina 57 352 
 
 Castilla 52 349 
 
 Don Juan de Austria 28 179 
 
 Don Antonio de Ulloa 31 159 
 
 Isla de Cuba . 31 156 
 
 Isla de Luzon . . . . . 31 156 
 
 - Marques del Duero .... 18 96 
 
 General Lezo . . .... 20 115 
 
 Argos . . . . ' 21 87 
 
 Velasco 28 147 
 
 1,796 
 
 "The trans-Atlantic Company's steamer Isla de Mindanao was armed and 
 took part in the battle, and was also destroyed. Her complement is not 
 known, but it is estimated at 120. 
 
 ' ' From the above it appears that the enemy had more men in this engage- 
 ment than the United States squadron. In this connection I beg to invite the 
 attention of the Department to a letter from the commanding officer of the 
 Petrel, dated June 26, 1898, which has already been forwarded and which 
 
2go THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 gives a statement by one of the crew of the Reina Christina, showing that the 
 crews of the Spanish vessels were largely in excess of the complements given 
 here. 
 
 "I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
 
 "GEORGE DEWEY, 
 "Rear- Admiral, U. S. N., 
 "Commanding U. S. Naval Forceon Asiatic Station. 
 "The Secretary of the Navy, 
 
 "Navy Department, Washington, D. C. " 
 
 The lamented Captain Gridley's report of working the Olympia in the 
 famous action demands a place in history, and is a most realistic picture of the 
 resources and vicissitudes, the mishaps and the stern work of the flagship : 
 
 "(No. 6-C.) U. S. Flagship Olympia, Off Manila, Philippine Islands, 
 May 3, 1898. — Sir: I have the honor to make the following report of this 
 ship's engagement with the enemy on May r: 
 
 "On April 30 we stood down for the entrance to Manila Bay. At 9:42 
 p. m. the crew were called to general quarters (the ship having been previ- 
 ously cleared for action), and remained by their guns, ready to return the fire 
 of the b|,tteries if called upon. 
 
 "About 11:30 p. m. we passed through Boca Grande entrance of Manila 
 Bay. The lights on Corrigidor and Caballo islands and on San Nicolas Banks 
 were extinguished. 
 
 "After this ship had passed in, the battery on the southern shore of 
 entrance opened fire at the ships astern, and the McCuUoch and the Boston 
 returned the fire. 
 
 "At 4 a. m. of May i coffee was served out to officers and men. At day- 
 break sighted shipping at Manila. Shifted course to southward and stood for 
 Cavite. At 5 :o6 two submarine mines were exploded near, Cavite bearing 
 south-southeast, distant 4 miles. At 5:15 battery on Sangley Point opened 
 fire, but the shell fell short. Other shells passed over us, ranging 7 miles. 
 At 5 :4i a. m. we opened fire on Spanish ships with forward 8-inch guns, 
 which were soon followed by the 5 -inch battery. A rapid fire was kept up 
 until the close of the action. 
 
 "The range varied from 5,600 to 2,000 yards. 
 
 "A torpedo boat ran out and headed for this ship, but was finally driven 
 
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 291 
 
 back by our secondary battery. She came out a second time and was again, 
 repulsed. This time she had to be beached, as several shot had hit her. 
 
 "Batteries from Manila fired occasional shots at the ships during the 
 action, but did no damage. 
 
 "At 6 :2o turned to starboard and headed back in front of the Spanish line. 
 The Olympia led the column three times to the westward and twice to the 
 eastward in front of the Spanish ships and shore batteries. On one occasion 
 the Spanish flagship Reina Christina was hit by an 8-inch shell from our for- 
 ward turret and raked fore and aft. At 7 135 ceased firing and stood out into 
 Manila Bay. 
 
 "The men went to breakfast. 
 
 "Many of the Spanish ships were seen to be on fire, and when we returned 
 at 11:16 to complete the destruction of the Spanish fleet, only one, the Don 
 Antonio de Ulloa, and the shore batteries returned our fire. The former was 
 sunk and the latter was silenced. 
 
 "At 12:40 p. m. stood back to Manila Bay and anchored. 
 
 "Besides making the ordinary preparations of clearing ship for action, the 
 heavy sheet chains were faked up and down over a buffer of awnings against 
 the sides in wake of the 5 -inch ammunition hoists, and afforded a stanch pro- 
 tection, while iron and canvas barricades were placed in various places to 
 cover guns' crews and strengthen moderate defenses. 
 
 "The vessel was struck or slightly hulled as follows: 
 
 "i. Plate indented i^ inches starboard side of superstructure just for- 
 ward of second 5-inch sponson. 
 
 "2. Three planks torn up slightly in wake of forward turret on starboard 
 side of forecastle. 
 
 "3. Port after shrouds of fore and main rigging. ■ 
 
 "4. Strongback of gig's davits hit and slightly damaged. 
 
 "5. Hole in frame of ship between frames 65 and 66 on starboard side 
 below main deck rail ; made by a 6-pounder. 
 
 "6. Lashing of port whaleboat davit carried away by shot. 
 
 "7. One of the rail stanchions carried away outside of port gangway. 
 
 "8. Hull of ship indented on starboard side i foot below main-deck rail 
 and 3 feet abaft No 4 coal port. 
 
 "The forward 8-inch guns fired 23 shells. The ammunition hoist was- 
 temporarily out of commission on account of the blowing of the fuse. The 
 
292 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 right gun worked well with the electrical batteries. Battery of left gun failed 
 to explode the primer after the first shot ; also resistance lamp in dynamo cir- 
 cuit broken. Used percussion primers in this gun with good results after the 
 •first shot. 
 
 "The after turret fired 13 shells. Had three misfires with battery of right 
 gun and two with dynamo circuit, as fuses blew out. In renewing fuses they 
 were immediately blown out; so shifted to percussion primers with good 
 results. In left gun i shell jammed, after which used half -full and half- 
 reduced charge, which fired it. Battery of this gun gave good results. One 
 primer failed to check gas. 1 
 
 "The smoke from the s-inch battery and from the forward 8-inch guns 
 gave considerable trouble, and in both turrets the object glass of the telescopic 
 sights became covered with a deposit from the powder and had to be wiped off 
 frequently. These are, nevertheless, considered good sights for heavy guns ; 
 but it is recommended that bar sights be installed in case of emergency, as 
 there is no provision for sighting other than with the telescopes. 
 
 "The batteries for the 5 -inch guns found to be unreliable. Used dynamo 
 circuit on 3 guns with good results. Ammunition poor. Many shell became 
 detached from the cases on loading and had to be rammed out from the 
 muzzle. Several cases jammed in loading and in extracting. Guns and gun 
 mounts worked well. Fired about 281 s-inch shell. 
 
 "The 6-pounder battery worked' to perfection, firing 1,000 rounds. 
 Fired 360 rounds of i-pounder and 1,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition. 
 
 "From 9:42 p. m. of April 30 till 12:40 p. m. May i, two divisions of the 
 engineer's force worked the boilers and engines, keeping up steam and work- 
 ing well, notwithstanding the heat of the fire and engine rooms. The third 
 division worked at their stations in the powder division. 
 
 "The ship needs no immediate repairs, and is in excellent condition to 
 engage the enemy at any time. 
 
 "There were no casualties nor wounded on this ship. 
 
 "Where every officer and man did his whole duty there is only room for 
 general praise. Pay Inspector D. A. Smith, Fleet Pay Clerk Wm. J. Right- 
 mire, and Pay Clerk W. M. Long all volunteered for and performed active 
 service not required by their stations. Ensign H. H. Caldwell, secretary to 
 the commander-in-chief, volunteered for fighting duty and was assigned to the 
 command of a subdivision of the 5-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, corr% 
 
THE STORY Ot' DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 293 
 
 spond^ent of the New York Herald (and formerly a naval officer of exceptional 
 ability), served as a volunteer aid to the commander-in-chief and rendered 
 valuable assistance in carrying messages and in keeping an accurate account 
 of the battle. One 6-pounder was manned by a crew of marines, and two 
 relief crews for the 5 -inch guns and two for the 6-pounders acted as sharp- 
 shooters under Capt. W. Biddle, U. S. M. C. 
 
 "The range was obtained by cross bearings from the standard compass, 
 and the distance taken from the chart. 
 
 "I am, sir, very respectfully, CH. V. GRIDLEY, 
 
 "Captain U. S. N., Commanding U. S. Flagship Olympia. 
 
 "The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Station." 
 
 Captain J. B. Coghlan, of the Raleigh, says that at 12:10 a. m.. May ist, 
 there was a flash as a signal, and five minutes later a shot was fired from El 
 Saile Island and returned without effect. At 5 a. m,, nearly five hours later, 
 "when the squadron was nearly abreast the city of Manila and the flagship was 
 turning to pass down toward Cavite, the Lunetta Battery, of apparently heavy 
 guns, at Manila, opened fire and continued so long as the squadron was in 
 action. ' ' This was a dangerous battery of Krupp guns, with a large supply 
 of ammunition. The captain says his vessel was struck but once, "and then 
 by a 6-pounder shell, which passed through both sides of the whaleboat (above 
 her water line), and then glanced along the chase of the starboard 6-pounder 
 on our poop. The gun was not injured, and the whaleboat but slightly, and 
 she is again ready for service. ' ' 
 
 In conclusion the captain says to the admiral: "Permit me to congratu- 
 late you upon the very brilliant victory you achieved over a naval force nearly 
 equal to your own, and backed by extensive shore batteries of very heavy 
 guns, and this without the loss of a single life. History points to no greater 
 achievement. ' ' 
 
 Captain Asa Walker, of the Concord, says : "In passing the city a big gun 
 opened on the fleet, to which I replied with two shots. The Concord held her 
 position in the line until your order to withdraw from action. The Concord 
 was not hit. The following is a list of the ammunition expended : One hun- 
 dred and fifteen 6-inch full charges, sixty-seven 6-inch reduced charges, six 
 shrapnel, one hundred and seventy-six 6-inch common shell, two hundred and 
 twenty 6-pounder cartridges, one hundred and twenty 3-pounder cartridges, 
 
294 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 and sixty i -pounder cartridges," or seven hundred and sixty-four shots firec 
 The executive officer of the Concord reports : 
 
 "Three complete turns were made by our squadron in front of th 
 enemy's line, the ships firing whenever the guns would bear. 
 
 "At 7:40 a. m. we ceased firing, in obedience to signal from the con: 
 mander-in-chief, and at 8:10 a. m. the crews went to breakfast. At this tim 
 several of the enemy's ships were in flames and explosions took place o: 
 board one of them; some were sinking -and others withdrawing for protectio: 
 behind Canacao and Cavite. 
 
 "At 12:25 not a Spanish flag was flying in the harbor except from th 
 staff of the sunken cruiser Don Antonio de Ulloa, submerged behind Sangle; 
 Point; the Reina Christina was a mass of flames, and sunk near the bastion a 
 Cavite, and the Castilla was burning rapidly in Caiiacao Bay. 
 
 "At 1 :45 we started to rejoin the squadron, but were ordered to go to thi 
 Petrel at Cavite, where she had seen sent to destroy the vessels at th< 
 arsenal. She signaled as we anchored, 'Have destroyed eight vessels here. 
 White flags were flying at various points on shore, and there was no longe 
 any resistance. " 
 
 Captain Dyer, of the Baltimore, makes a most interesting report, saying 
 
 "At early daylight the fleet had reached a point close up to the shipping 
 off the city of Manila, when the signal was made, 'Prepare for genera 
 action. " Spanish batteries near Old Manila opened flre at long range a 
 about the same time. Flagship leading, with port helm, bo're down 01 
 the right of Spanish line of vessels, formed in a somewhat irregular crescen 
 at anchor. 
 
 "Our column passed down the enemy's line, turning with port helm ai 
 their left was reached, engaging them with starboard battery on the return 
 This maneuver was performed three times at distances from the enemy's shipi 
 varying from 2,600 to 5,000 yards, when you signaled to 'withdraw fron 
 action' at 7:35. 
 
 "Upon reaching a convenient distance in the bay, you signaled, 'Let th< 
 people go to breakfast' ; and at 8 :4o, 'Commanding officers, repair on board th( 
 flagship. ' 
 
 "While on board the flagship I received an order to intercept a steame: 
 coming up the bay, reported to be flying Spanish colors. 
 
 "Soon after starting on this duty I discovered the colors of the strange: 
 
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 295 
 
 to be British, and so reported by signal, you having in the meantime made 
 general signal to get under way and follow your motions, this ship being at 
 the time some 2 miles to the south-southwest of the flagship on her way to 
 intercept the supposed Spanish steamer. 
 
 "At 10:55 yo^ made general signal, 'Designated vessel will lead," with 
 Baltimore's distinguishing pennant, and in a few minutes signal to 'Attack 
 the enemy's batteries or earthworks' and for fleet to 'close up'; in obedi- 
 ence to which order this ship led in, with starboard helm, to a position off 
 the Caiiacoa and Sangley Point batteries and opened fire with starboard 
 battery at a distance of about 2,800 yards, closing in to 2,200, between which 
 and 2,700 yards our best work was done, slowing the ship dead slow, stopping 
 the engines as range was obtained, delivering a rapid and accurate fire upon 
 the shore batteries and a gunboat just inside of Sangley Point. You 
 signaled, at 1:20, to 'Prepare to anchor,' and at 1:30, 'Anchor at discretion.' 
 
 "The victory was complete." 
 
 The executive officer of the Baltimore reports: 
 
 "The Baltimore was struck five times, with small projectiles, all of which, 
 with one exception, exploded or broke up. The most serious hit, happily 
 attended with no serious injury to any officer or man, came from a 4. 7-inch 
 steel projectile, which entered the ship's side forward of the starboard gang- 
 way, about a foot above the line of the main deck. It passed through the 
 hammock netting, downward through the deck planks and steel deck, bend- 
 ing and cracking deck beam in wardroom stateroom No. 5, then glanced 
 upward through the after engine room coaming, over against the after 
 cylinder of No. 3 6-inch gun (port), carrying away lug and starting several 
 shield bolts and putting the gun out of commission ; deflected over to the star- 
 board side, striking a ventilator ladder and dropping oh deck. In its passage 
 it struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition of the fourth division, exploding 
 several charges, and wounded Lieutenant Kellogg, Ensign Irwin, and 6 men 
 of the gun's crew — none very seriously. A second shot came in about a foot 
 above the berth deck, just forward of the blowers, passed through the 'thwart- 
 ship alleyway, hitting the exhaust pipe of the starboard blower, causing a 
 slight leak. A third shot struck about 2 feet above the water line on the port 
 side, abreast bunker B-iio, passed into the bunker, cutting blower drain and 
 main air duct, and exploding in bunker. A fourth shot came in about 6 feet 
 above the berth deck, starboard side, abreast the forward end of the forward 
 
296 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 wash room, and broke up in a clothes locker. A fifth struck the starboard 
 forward ventilator, slightly bending it. 
 
 "The upper cabin skylight, the after range finder, and the two whaleboats 
 hanging at the davits were all destroyed by the shock of discharge from the 
 8-inch guns of the second division." 
 
 Commander E. P. Wood, of the Petrel, reports: "Just as day was break- 
 ing, about 5 o'clock, the shore batteries below Manila began firing. It was 
 scarcely light enough to distinguish signals from this vessel when flagship 
 made signal to 'Prepare for action,' so signal was repeated from the Balti- 
 more. During time column was forming and closing up, the batteries from 
 below Manila were firing. As flagship stood to southward the ships and 
 batteries at Cavite began their firing, and gradually, as we approached, we 
 could make out ships under way in harbor and three guns on shore firing. ' ' 
 
 The Petrel expended in three turns before breakfast: "Ninety-two 
 6-inch common shells, eighty-two 6-inch full charges, ten reduced charges, and 
 two hundred and fifty-three ■3-pounders. Several times during rounds had to 
 cease firing on account of smoke and in order to economize ammunition. 
 
 "The action of ammunition was exceedingly good. There was expended 
 during action, one hundred and thirteen 6-inch common shells, three 6-inch 
 armor-piercing shells, eighty-two 6-inch full charges, thirty-four 6-inch 
 reduced charges, and three hundred and thirteen 3-pounder ammunition. 
 Owing to the heat due to firing, the pads swelled and made it very difficult to- 
 lock the bree(ih plug. Nothing would remedy this save shifting plugs, 
 replacing hot plug by the one from the other gun which was cool. The wedge- 
 of firing lock jammed frequently, due to hot parts. This was remedie'd by 
 shifting locks. 
 
 "The percussion primers worked very unsatisfactorily; sometimes four- 
 primers would be expended before one would act. Primers leaked badly, 
 causing excessive deposit in primer seat, hard extraction, and delay in prim- - 
 ing of gun and requiring frequ:ent boring of vent. ' ' 
 
 Lieutenant Hughes reports: "The ship was gradually cleared for action, 
 this work having been, begun in Hongkong, when the fore and foretopsails . 
 yards, fore trysail gaff, ladders, diving outfit, part of the running rigging, 
 etc. , were placed on board the transport Nanshan, and completed the day 
 before the squadron entered Manila Bay. In the operation of preparing the- 
 ship for action certain articles and material in the equipment and construction 
 
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 297 
 
 departments were necessarily thrown overboard. Among these may be men- 
 tioned all of the varnishes, inflammable paints and oils, tar, turpentine, etc., 
 lumber, two boats' strong backs, one turpentine chest, one ice chest, one large 
 hammock box, the carpenter's bench." 
 
 Captain Wilder, of the Boston, brought up the rear, and makes a model 
 report for brevity and prose. He remarks : 
 
 "Several shots were fired by the batteries in Manila, and two shots were 
 given in reply. At 5:35 (a. m.) action with the enemy commenced, and was 
 continued at varying distances, steaming in a circle, until 7:35 a. m., firing 
 with a fair degree of deliberation and accuracy. At times the smoke was 
 dense, interfering very materially with maneuvering and firing. 
 
 "The Spanish fleet and shore batteries replied vigorously, and an attempt 
 was made with an improvised torpedo boat, but our fire was overpowering and 
 the enemy received heavy damage and loss. 
 
 "In obedience to signal, I withdrew from action at 7:35, and gave the 
 crew breakfast and rest. 
 
 "At II :io the action was renewed, and continued until the enemy ceased 
 firing and his ships were all burned, sunk, or withdrawn behind the arsenal of 
 Cavite. 
 
 "It gives me pleasure to bear witness to the courage and resolution of the 
 Spanish fleet, and to say that they defended themselves creditably. " 
 
 This report of the working of the guns is interesting : 
 
 "There being no quick and accurate method of finding the range, it was 
 found that a considerable number of the shots apparently fell short. Had the 
 ship been provided with a range finder the effectiveness of the firing would 
 -have been somewhat increased; as it was, the result was generally good. 
 After passing the enemy, a countermarch was made, and fire was opened with 
 the starboard battery. This maneuver was repeated several times, until the 
 enemy seemed to be silenced. During this part of the engagement full 
 charges with common shell were used in all guns of the main battery. 
 The guns generally worked well, but after an hour's fighting it was found that 
 most of the breech plugs of the 6 and 8 inch guns were expanded by the heat, 
 so as to make it a somewhat difficult operation to close the breech. After 
 firing the forward 8-inch for half an hour it was found necessary to put in a 
 new gas-check pad, and the firing was then continued. The wire breechings 
 of No. 2 6-inch gun (starboard) were carried away near the end of the firing. 
 
298 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 The lock of No. 3 6-inch (port) was disabled, and a spare one substituted. 
 The action was resumed at 11:10 a. m., the starboard battery being first 
 ■engaged. The reply was principally from the forts, but these were soon 
 silenced. Advantage had been taken of the interval to put the battery in 
 order again. The breechings on No. 2 6-inch were replaced by the gunner's 
 mate of the division. The guns were still very hot, and the breech plugs 
 "became still harder to work. The forward 8-inch gun was put out of com- 
 mission for about twenty minutes from this cause. At 12:20 the ship was 
 turned around and the port battery brought into play. At 12 :4o p. m. 'Cease 
 firing' was sounded, a white flag having been raised at Cavite. " 
 
 The executive officer, J. A. Howe, says of the officers and men: "Very 
 few, if any of them, had ever been under fire before, but their cool- 
 ness was remarkable. They were full of zeal, energy, and enthusiasm, and 
 were untiring. Where the conduct of all was so commendable it would be 
 impossible to single out any individual for special praise. One noteworthy 
 feature was the conduct of the Chinese messmen, who 'were stationed in the 
 after powder division. While they are usually considered entirely alien in 
 their ideas, and are not regarded as good fighters, yet ,in this case they dis- 
 played as much zeal, bravery, and energy as any other person. The uninter- 
 rupted ammunition supply in the after part of the ship was largely due to their 
 efforts." 
 
 In the Spanish official report. Admiral Montijo mentions that he left the 
 Eay of Manila for Subic with his squadron April 25, at 11 p. m., and had one 
 wooden cruiser disabled on the way through leaks and disabled machinery. 
 The admiral found, "with much disgust," of the defense of "the western 
 entrance to Subic, that "the guns which should have been mounted on that 
 island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the shore 
 batteries that the navy had installed (with. very little difficulty) at the entrance 
 of the bay of Manila, under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval artil- 
 lery, Senor Garces, and Lieutenant Beneavente, were ready to fight twenty- 
 four days after the commencement of the work. 
 
 "I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy of the few 
 torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there. 
 
 "The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of the 
 island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Ameri- 
 cans with its own resources, in 40 meters of water, and with little security. 
 
-^ 
 
 ADMIRAL MOXTIJO, COMMANDER OF THE FLEET THAT ADMIRAL DEWEY SUNK. 
 
VIEWS OP THE NAVY YARD AT CAVITE, PHILIPPINES. 
 
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 301 
 
 Our vessels could not only be destroyed, but they could not save their crews. 
 I still held a hope that the Americans would not go to Subic, and give us time 
 for more preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish 
 consul at Hongkong a telegram which said: 'Enemy's squadron sailed at 2 p. 
 m. from the bay of Mira, and according to reliable accounts they sailed for 
 Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila. ' 
 
 "This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find 
 my squadron, and that the port of Subic had no defenses. ' ' 
 
 There was held a council of war, and returned to fight "under less insup- 
 portable conditions" in the bay of Manila, but "not near the City, because far 
 from defending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which 
 doubtless would have been demolished on account of its few defenses. It 
 was -unanimously decided that we should take position in the bay of Caiiacao, 
 in the least water possible, in order to combine our fire with that of the bat- 
 teries of Point Sangley and UUoa. 
 
 "I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most 
 strategic point of the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn the coal and 
 stores- before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the 
 Don Juan de Austria to Manila to get a large number of lighters filled with 
 sand to defend the water line of the Castilla (which could not move) against 
 the enemy's shells and torpedoes. At 10 a. m. on the 29th I left Subic with 
 the vessels of my squadron, towing the Castilla by the transport Manila. 
 
 "In the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Caiiacao in 
 8 meters of water. On the following morning we anchored in line of battle, 
 the Christina, Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, Don Juan de UUoa, Luzon, 
 Cuba, and Marques del Duero, while the transport Manila was sent to the 
 Roads of Bacoor, where the Velasco and Lezo were undergoing repairs. 
 
 "At 7 p. m. I received a telegram from Subic announcing that the enemy's 
 squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our 
 ships, and from there they had sailed with course for Manila. 
 
 "The mail steamer Isla Mindanao arrived in the bay. I advised her cap- 
 tain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the eneriiy could not get into 
 the entrance probably before midnight. As he was not authorized from the 
 trans- Atlantic, he did not do so, and then I told him that he could anchor in 
 shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor. 
 
 "At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning 
 
302 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 of the I St of May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels 
 were throwing their search lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which 
 they had exchanged several shots. I notified the commanding general of the 
 arsenal, Seiior Sostoa, and the general-governor of the plaza, Capt. Senor 
 Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery 
 to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle. ' ' 
 
 Montijo details the tonnage of vessels and the character of guns, to show 
 the odds in favor of the Americans, adding all his vessels had been painted 
 dark gray color, had taken down their masts and yards ; and the boats, to 
 avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters, had their anchors buoyed and 
 cables ready to slip instantly. At 5:15 the signal to open the fire of the 
 Spanish fleet was made, and the American answer came promptly. Montijo 
 says: 
 
 "The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless 
 projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves 
 almost entirely to fight the Christina, my flagship. A short time after the 
 action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action 
 all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the for- 
 ward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieut. Jose 
 Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation, 
 steering until the end of the fight. In the meanwhile, another shell exploded 
 in the orlop, setting fire to the crews' bags, which they were fortunately able 
 to control. 
 
 "The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, 
 covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7:30 one shell destroyed 
 completely the steering gear. I ordered to steer by hand while the rudder 
 was out of action. In the meanwhile, another shell exploded on the poop, and 
 put out of^ action 9 men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead, bringing 
 down the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. A fresh 
 shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroy- 
 ing the wounded who were -being treated there. Another exploded in the 
 ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the 
 working of the hand steering -gear. As it was impossible to- control the fire, 
 I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode. 
 
 "Amidships several shells of smaller caliber went through the smokestack, 
 and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out of action i 
 
THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 303 
 
 master gunner and 12 men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the 
 starboard bow gun ; while the fire astern increased, fire was started forward 
 by another- shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck. 
 
 "The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were 
 only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the 
 guns' crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with 
 steering, all of whom were out of action. 
 
 "The ship being out of control, the hull, smoke pipe, and mast riddled 
 with shot, or confused with the cries of the wounded ; half of her crew out of 
 action, among whom were 7 officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the 
 ship before the magazines should explode, making signal at the same time 
 to the Cuba and Luzon to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they did, 
 aided by others from the Duero and the arsenal. 
 
 "I abandoned the Christina, directing beforehand to secure her flag, and 
 accompanied by my staff, and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the 
 cruiser Isla de Cuba. 
 
 "After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell 
 destroying her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the 
 rescue. 
 
 "The UUoa, which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns 
 which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered the water line, put- 
 ting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those which 
 were only remaining for the service of the two guns stated. 
 
 "The Castilla, which fought heroically, remained with her artillery use- 
 less, except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled 
 with shot and set on fire by the enemy's shells, then sunk, and was abandoned 
 by her crew in good order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo 
 Algado. The casualties on'this ship were 23 killed and 80 wounded. 
 
 "The Austria, very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the 
 Castilla. The Luzon had three guns dismounted, and was slightly damaged 
 in the hull. TJie Duero remained with one of her engines useless, the bow 
 gun of 12 centimeters and one of the redoubts. 
 
 "At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended its 
 fire, I ordered the ships that retnained to us to take positions in the bottom of 
 the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they 
 should be sunk before they surrendered. 
 
304 THE STORY OF DEWEY.IS SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 "At 10:30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal 
 and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which 
 we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had 
 mounted. 
 
 "There remained the last recourse, to sink our vessels, and we accom- 
 plished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing pennant, 
 the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns, and 
 the signal codes. 
 
 "After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de 
 Cavite, to be cured.of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a 
 brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results. 
 
 "It remains only to say that all the chiefs, officers, engineers, quarter- 
 masters, gunners, sailors, and soldiers rivaled one another in sustaining with 
 honor the good name of the navy on this sad day. 
 
 ; "The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the 
 lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seamen 
 gunners ; the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of 
 rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the. enemy, and the unprotected char- 
 acter of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided 
 the sacrifice which we made for our country and to prevent the possibility of 
 the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the conviction that 
 with the scarcity of our force against the superior enemy we were going, to 
 certain death and could expect a loss of all our ships. 
 
 "Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 381 men 
 killed and wounded. ' ' 
 
 There is a surprising amount of information in the official reports of 
 Admiral Dewey's famous victory that will be of the nature of novelty to 
 people at .large. The fact becomes prominent that a great deal of credit is- 
 due the Navy Department, for its foresight, vigilance, incessant industry in 
 supplying to the Commander-iurChief of the Asiatic fleet the news of the day, 
 cautioning him not to spare expense where there wag anythijig in reach or 
 sight to aid the fighting ships when the decisive hours came. The conversa- 
 tion between the Navy Department and the Asiatic command was right to the 
 point. Nothing seemed to escape, or to be misunderstood. The movement-s 
 op behalf of the United States were .characterized by confidence, certainty of 
 purpose, promptitude and precision of execution. The Spaniards were hesi- 
 
41. Street in the Suburb of La Ermita. 42. Rosario Street iu La Ermitrt. 43. LunetaSquare ia Manila. 
 44 Hospital of San Juan de Dios. 45. Manila (-athedral. 46. Royal Street in Malate. "47. Royal Street 
 in Snuta Ana. 48. Monument of Don Simon de Auda y Salazar in tlie Malecon Square. 
 
 VIEWS IN AND AROUND MANILA. 
 
THE- STORY OP DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 307 
 
 tant, uncertain, confused, and the doom that was upon them was announced 
 plainly — the one redeeming feature for them being in the personal bravery of 
 the officers and men. The rottenness of the government of Spain provided 
 the elements of defeat. The prepar^ations by the Spaniards for the battle con- 
 trast effectively with those of the Americans. Admiral Montijo was 
 "disgusted" to find nothing done at the vital point for the defense of Subic, 
 and warned that the Americans were on the way, made haste to Manila 
 Bay, where he planned -his line of defense so as to be flanked by shore 
 batteries, and yet to spare the city — a strategy afterward sharply resented by 
 Admiral Dewey when he sent his compliments to the authorities in Manila 
 with the message that another gun fired at an American ship and the city 
 would be destroyed. The flanking batteries were of powerful German guns, 
 several of them firing heavier metal than any in the American squadron, and 
 they were well located to do hurt to our ships. Montijo's line had been formed 
 with reference to them, and he had contrived to be in part protected by shal- 
 lows. He had towed a ship that he calls a floating battery, from Subig, and 
 sought to protect this machine with other vessels. The Americans stripped 
 for the battle, their ships and themselves, throwing overboard all that was 
 inflammable, sparing nothing that would splinter or burn. The Spaniards 
 were much encumbered with fuel, and the fires kindled by our shells were 
 inextinguishable. There have been doubts whether the Spaniards were sur- 
 prised by the American visit. They certainly were not. Admiral Montijo 
 had two days' warning, heard the guns at the mouth of the harbor at mid- 
 night, and made full preparation for the shock that he knew was approaching. 
 He gave the signal for the firing to commence, and the Americans were 
 received by two shore batteries and a floating one and the entire Spanish 
 squadron. The American i;eply was immediate, and the hour was that of 
 daybreak. The victory of our ships was so thorough, and the loss on our side 
 so insignificant, that our countrymen have hardly ascertained how many things 
 there were to think about, and with what efficacy the hard work was done, or 
 through what strife with tribulations it was accomplished. The gunners 
 found out in battle much they had not been familiar with, in handling their 
 tools. The dreadful and beautiful machines they used were fashioned 
 delicately as telescopes, and might in several particulars be mistaken for 
 instruments of science of refined construction and nice adjustments. One 
 of the words of caution to the men that the Commander-in-Chief made 
 
3o8 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 
 
 impressive was that ammunition was not to be wasted. They were far from 
 home, and in a protracted engagement might disarm themselves. It was 
 an erroneous report that only fifteen rounds remained of the ammunition for 
 the four-inch rapid fire battery that caused the remarkable intermission in 
 the battle — and the celebrated recess. The boys, it will be remembered, 
 wanted to finish the job before they had coffee, but the Commander-in- 
 Chief insisted on breakfast all around, and not a minute was lost. First the 
 smoke of the firing and the burning ships covered the scene of action, though 
 the American ships were kept in motion. Second, the guns were so hot it 
 was hard to work them. Third, the heat was excessive — May is the hottest 
 month of the year at Manila. The rest was refreshing and reassuring to the 
 Americans. They saw their victory, and poured in what Admiral Montijo 
 calls "a horrible fire" that soon closed the conflict with the annihilation of the 
 Asiatic, squadron of Spain. 
 
 At 12:40 the flagship signaled "Cease firing. " The resistance of the 
 Spaniards had ended. There were only the slain and wounded, the wrecks 
 and ships on fire, the swarms of prisoners and fugitives, the burning houses 
 at Cavite, the silenced batteries — a battle won whose proud story shall never 
 fade, the American arms with freshly-wrought splendors on the seas, the flag 
 of the Great Republic with brightened stars and stripes, the sound of Ameri- 
 can guns ringing around the globe, great news on the streets of the capitals 
 of all nations, another radiant chapter in our inheritance of glory. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 After the May Day Battle in Manila Bay. 
 
 Dewey's Cables during the Time He Held the Harbor with the City of Manila under His 
 Guns — Dispatches Full of History and Rich in Personal Characteristics— Authentic 
 Information from the Inside — The Official Story — Dewey's Unfavorable Opinion of 
 • Cubans — Capture of the City — Trouble with Aguinaldo — Our Ships and Crews. 
 
 During the days Admiral Dewey was on the way from Mirs Bay to that of 
 Manila, the news got into circulation that something was to be expected from 
 our Asiatic squadron. Our ships of war in time of war could not remain in 
 neutral ports, and those "on the coast of China had been ordered to assume the 
 offensive in the Philippines, especially, it was the early public understanding, 
 to "remove" the Spanish fleet, so that our commerce on the seas of Asia 
 might not be assailed or obstructed. We had a very vigilant consul at Hong- 
 kong, who had been at pains to inform himself as to affairs in the Spanish 
 archipelago, and was favorably impressed by the Filipino insurgents, and 
 when Admiral Dewey departed on his important errand, his line of communi- 
 cations was "by tug" through the consulate. The first account of the action 
 in Manila Bay was, from the defeated Spaniards, and in the course of explain- 
 ing their misfortunes they confessed to disaster that at length included all the 
 ships in that part of the world flying the flag of Spain, with the exception or\ 
 a few gunboats scattered so far among the islands that they disappeared from 1 
 all scenes of action. The immediate impression made by the loss of cable/ 
 connection with Manila while it was relating the story that the navy of Spain 
 had vanished in the Orient, so valiantly defended that the Americans were 
 "compelled to maneuver repeatedly, " was that the Spaniards had cut the wires 
 so as to keep the extent of their broken fortunes to themselves. The cable 
 was cut' by order of Admiral Dewey, who selected a suitable place, took 
 out a section of the cable, coiled it away and buoyed both ends. He first pro- 
 posed to preserve the line for the use of both parties, but the offer was 
 
 3°9 
 
3IO AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 
 
 quickly rejected. After a few hours the minds of the authorities of Spain 
 were changed, and they sent an acceptance of the conservation of the privilege 
 of talking to Madrid in exchange for admitting the American Admiral to 
 equal rights, but it was too late. There was a weary wait for news from 
 Dewey, and the full orbed intelligence had to travel by dispatch boat to Hong- 
 kong. When the city of. Manila fell into our possession the cable was soon 
 spliced, and money poured into the company at the rate of four dollars a 
 word. The dispatches by Admiral Dewey through the combination of tugs 
 and cables, during the intermission in through wire service, and his cable- 
 grams afterward, are so many thunderbolts of history, and the journals gener- 
 ally have been so busily magnifying current matters that this treasury of 
 solid knowledge has not been attractively displayed, until, thanks to the 
 Navy Department, it appears in these pages : 
 
 Hongkong, May 12, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington: 
 
 There is little change in the situation since my last telegram. I am 
 transferring to transports steel breech-loading rifles .from sunken Spanish 
 ^men-of-war; also stores from arsenal in my possession. I am maintaining 
 strict blockade. Add Argos to the list of destroyed vessels. El Correo prob- 
 ably El Cano. I send this telegram to Hongkong. ... It. has been 
 reported at Manila that Pel^yo and another vessel are en route to Philippine 
 Islands. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, May 15, 1898. (Cavite, May 12.) 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington: 
 
 I thank the President for my promotion. Forcibly recommend that Com- 
 mander Lamberton, chief of staff; Captains Wildes, the commander of the 
 Boston ; Coghlan, the commanfler of the Raleigh ; Gridley, the commander of 
 the Olympia; Dyer, the commander of the Baltimore; Walker, the commander 
 of the Concord ; Wood, the commander of the Petrel — without whose aid I 
 
 could have done nothing, each to be advanced ten numbers. 
 
 DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, May 15, 1898. (Cavite, May 13.) 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington : 
 
 The squadron thanks the President for his message in your telegram of 
 May 7. T am maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe rebels 
 
AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 311 
 
 are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and making no demon- 
 strations. Great scarcity of provisions in the city. I believe the Spanish 
 Governor-General will be obliged to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any 
 moment. To retain possession and thus control Philippine Islands would 
 require, in my best judgment, well-equipped force of 5,000 men, although 
 United States troops sent by Pekin will be very useful to relieve the Olympia of 
 guarding Cavite. United States troops should make provision for extremely 
 hot, moist climate. Spanish force is estimated 10,000 men. The rebels are 
 reported 30,000 men. I should suggest the Charleston or Pekin bring a few 
 officers and about 100 men, partly Engineers' Department, to man transport 
 Manila and captured vessels. I am loading Manila with ordnance from the 
 Spanish man-of-war. I propose to assign Lieutenant-Commander Singer to 
 command. Captured on May 12 the Spanish gun vessel Callao attempting to 
 run blockade ; released on parole officers and men. I have plenty of coal for 
 the present and can purchase more in Chinese ports. Will hold frequent com- 
 munication with Hongkong. One British, one French, two German, one 
 Japanese men-of-war here observing. Baltimore requires immediately one 
 Mark IV mount for one 6-inch B. L. R., a supply of extractors for Hotchkiss 
 3-pounders and for Hotchkiss 6-pounders ; also locks most recent design for 
 main battery. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, May 24, 1898. (Cavite, May 20.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Situation unchanged. Strict blockade is continued. Great scarcity pre- 
 vails at Manila. Foreign subjects fear an outbreak of the Spanish soldiers. 
 Arrangements have been made for them to be transferred to Cavite by the 
 foreign men-of-war, if necessary. Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief, 
 was brought down by the McCuUoch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and 
 may render assistance that will be valuable. I do not consider submarine 
 mines practicable here, on account of great depth and width of bay and 
 entrance. If attacked by superior force, the squadron will endeavor to give 
 good account of itself. • The American bark Saranac was captured off Iloilo, 
 Philippine Islands. Upon the arrival of the Charleston with ammunition, I 
 propose to recapture and to clear the island of small Spanish gun vessels. 
 When is Charleston expected to arrive? I request you will send to the Asiatic 
 Station the Bennington and the Yorktown, if possible. Will be more useful 
 
312 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 
 
 than the Philadelphia. How many troops coming here Pekin? When 
 expected to arrive? I request send provisions for the squadron — 2,000 men 
 for three months. Also small stores. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, May 27, 1898. (Cavite, May 29.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 No change in the situation of the blockade. Is effective. It is impossible 
 for the people in Manila to buy provisions, except rice. The French men- 
 of-war must go to Saigon for provisions. It is important that I should know 
 as early as possible whereabouts and strength of the possible Spanish expedi- 
 tion to the Philippines, and, if possible, that the squadron should be reinforced 
 with a battleship or armored cruiser. The captain of the Olympia (Gridley) 
 condemned by medical* survey ; is ordered home ; leave by Occidental and 
 Oriental Steamship Company's steamer from Hongkong on May 28. Com- 
 mander Lamberton has been appointed to the command of the Olympia." 
 Steamer has just arrived from Amoy with 3,000 Mauser rifles and great 
 amount ammunition for Aguinaldo, whose force is increasing constantly. 
 . Bark Saranac is sailing under the British flag ; is loading with sugar 
 at Iloilo for New York. » • DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, May 30, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington: 
 
 Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited the Olympia yesterday. He 
 expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt ability to succeed. Situa- 
 tion remains unchanged. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, June 6, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 The following telegram has been received, addressed United States 
 consul, Hongkong: 
 
 "Direct Captain Hodgson, McCuUoch, turn over command Foley; return 
 home. CRIDLER." 
 
 I request to be informed is this official? DEWEY. 
 
 (The reply, through Allen, Acting Secretary, was "official.") 
 
AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 313 
 
 U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, 
 Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, June 12, 1898. 
 Sir : I take pleasure in bringing to the attention of the Department the 
 zeal and efficiency of Capt. Daniel B. Hodgson, R. C. S. , commanding the 
 McCulloch, while serving in the squadron under my command. 
 
 The McCulloch steamed from Hongkong to Manila Bay in the squadron 
 formation, and ran the batteries at the entrance with the squadron, and while 
 not in the line of battle at the battle of Manila Bay, was kept near by and in 
 readiness to assist any vessel that might be disabled. 
 
 Since joining my command, and up to the time of his detachment. Cap- 
 tain Hodgson has kept the McCulloch in a high state of efficiency, and ready 
 to move at a moment's notice, and has made her a valuable auxiliary to the 
 squadron. 
 
 I request that the Department will communicate this report to the hon- 
 orable Secretary of the Treasury. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
 
 GEORGE DEWEY, 
 Rear- Admiral, U. S. N., 
 Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station. 
 The Secretary of the Navy Washington, D. C. 
 
 Hongkong, June 6, 1898. (Cavite, June 3.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Receipt of telegram of May 26 is acknowledged, and I thank the Depart- 
 ment for the expression of confidence. Have acted according to the spirit of 
 Department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered 
 into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can 
 reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless 
 until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession. 
 
 DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, June 6, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 There are no guns of recent design available to mount upon shore, being 
 
 without breech mechanism, mounts, or ammunition. There is no telegraphic 
 
 communication Bolinao to Hongkong. Have just received 4,500 tons of coal; 
 
 I have sufficient coal for two months. Insurgents have been engaged 
 
314 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 
 
 actively within the province of Cavite during last week ; they have won several 
 small victories, taking prisoners about i,8oo men, 50 officers; Spanish troops, 
 not native. I am preparing arsenal and Cavite for the occupation United 
 States troops, and will have vessel of Cape Engano to meet United States 
 transports. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, June 27, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Receipt of telegram of June 14 is acknowledged. Aguinaldo, insurgent 
 leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by permission, on Nanshan. 
 Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and 
 organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a 
 personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way 
 with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined 
 requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the 
 arrival of th'e United States troops. At the same time I have given him to 
 understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common 
 enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose 
 of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the 
 squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. 
 I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to take 
 such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have 
 advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invari- 
 ably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. 
 The United States has not been bound in any way to assist .insurgents by any 
 act or promises, and he is not, to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I 
 believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt 
 ability, they not yet having many guns. . In my opinion, these people are far 
 superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the 
 natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded Manila. 
 They have taken 2,500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat most humanely. 
 They do not intend to attack city proper until the arrival of United States 
 troops thither ; I have advised. Twelve merchant vessels are anchored in the 
 
33. In the Valleys of Carabao. 34. Street in the District of Paco, Manila. 35. Aristocratic Residences 
 in thn Suburbs of San Juan del Monte. 36. Square of Santa Ana in the District of San .Sebastian Manila. 
 37. View of the Royal Highway of La Concepcion. 38. The King's Wharf, Manila. 39. The A.guilar Barrier 
 in Tondo, Manila. 40. The Cathedral of Jaro in Ilo-Ilo. 
 
 VIEWS IN THE PHILIPPINES, MOSTLY IN AND AROUND MANILA. 
 
17. Royal Street in Lipa, Batangas Province. 18. School of Arts and Commerce in Ilo-Ild. 19. MolOj 
 Church in Ilo-Ilo. 20. A Filipino Funeral Party in Ilo-Ilo. Grouped Around the Tomb. 21. A View of 
 San Sebastian Hielnvay, Manila. 22. Pomblon— Capital of the Island of Su Nombre. 23. View of the Paseo 
 de Aguadas, Manila. 24. Filipino Carpenters of Ilo-Ilo at Work. 
 
 VIEWS FROM THE PHILIPPINES 
 
AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 317 
 
 bay with refugees on board under guard of neutral men-of-war; this with my 
 permission. Health of the squadron continues excellent. The German com- 
 mander-in-chief arrived to-day. Three German, two British, one French, one 
 Japanese men-of-war now in port; another German man-of-war is expected. 
 I request the departure of the Monadnock and the Monterey be expedited. 
 
 DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 13.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 I request the Department will send six months' supplies in all depart- 
 ments, including medical, for the squadron, including McCulloch, Zafiro, 
 Nanshan, Manila, complement about 50 men, and Callao, complement about 
 25 men. It is practically impossible to obtain further supplies within the 
 limits of the station during the war. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 I request the Department send 350 men and 20 marines to fill vacancies 
 existing to replace men whose terms of enlistment have expired or will expire 
 before October i. DEWEY. 
 
 Cavite, June 17, i8g8. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 No change since my telegram of June 12. Have sent the Baltimore, 
 
 Cape Engano, Luzon Island, to meet American transports. The health of 
 
 the squadron continues excellent. Another French man-of-war has arrived. 
 
 DEWEY. 
 
 Cavite, June 17, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Commanding officers have no recommendation to make under Revised 
 Statutes, sections 1407 and 491. All officers and men did their whole duty 
 nobly, but the nature of the action did not admit of any individual display of 
 personal heroism. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong. (Received June 27, 1898.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 No change in the situation since my telegram of June 17. Five German, 
 3 British, i French, i Japanese men-of-war in port. Insurgents constantly' 
 
3i8 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 
 
 closing in on city. The United States transports and the Charleston have not 
 yet arrived. The Baltimore is at Cape Engano awaiting them. Have 
 received information Cadiz squadron passed Gibraltar Friday morning, June 
 17, bound eastward. Shall the Monadnock and the Monterey arrive in time? 
 In my judgment, if the coast of Spain was threatened, the squadron of the 
 enemy would have to return. One hundred and twenty-one officers, United 
 States Navy, 6 paymaster's clerks, and 1,709 men were engaged battle of 
 Manila Bay. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, July i, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Referring to your telegram of June 21, the crew now on board is more 
 efficient than new men would be. I consider, however, that in justice to 
 them, and to prevent discontent, if not dissatisfaction in the squadron, men 
 whose terms of enlistment have expired should be relieved from duty in this 
 hot and unhealthful climate as soon as possible. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, July i, 1898. (Cavite, June 26.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 I shall have vessel at Hongkong on or about July i. The Charleston and 
 transports have not yet arrived. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, July i, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington: 
 
 The British bark Austria has gone to Hongkong without cargo. In my 
 opinion allowing to return to load might give cause for complaint to other 
 neutral nations whose ships have been warned off. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, July 7, 1898. (Cavite, July 4.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 The receipt of telegram is acknowledged. The United States troops have 
 landed and have been comfortably housed at Cavite, Luzon Island. Insur- 
 gents are still active. The Chinese subjects have been permitted' to leave 
 freely. Cold-storage steamer has not yet arrived. Aguinaldo proclaimed 
 himself president of the revolutionary republic on July i. DEWEY. 
 
AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 319 
 
 Hongkong, July 13, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Aguinaldo informed me his troops had taken all of Subic Bay except Isla 
 
 Grande, which they were prevented from taking by the German man-of-war 
 
 Irene. On July 7 sent the Raleigh and the Concord there ; they took the 
 
 island and about 1,300 men, with arms and ammunition; no resistance. The 
 
 Irene retired from the bay on their arrival. I shall send the Boston Cape 
 
 Engano about July 16, to meet second army detachment. It is not practicable 
 
 to send Guam. No chartered vessel available. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, July 20, 1898. (Cayite, July 17.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Situation unchanged. Second army detachment arrived to-day. All 
 well on board. The health of the squadron continues good. No sickness 
 whatever. I have taken the coal of the British ship Honolulu and I am 
 retaining her until the port is opened. Have provisions for six months. The 
 receipt of telegram of July 7 is acknowledged; in view of the information 
 therein shall retain Pekin and China as auxiliaries. I do not expect the 
 Monterey before August 5, and the Monadnock ten days later. If necessary, 
 shall proceed with the squadron to meet the Monadnock to the east Cape 
 Engano, Luzon. Shall return other transports to the United States as soon 
 as possible. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, July 30, 1898. (Cavite, July 26.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 Merritt arrived yesterday in the Newport. The remainder of the 
 expedition is expected within the next few days. Situation is most critical at 
 Manila. The Spanish may surrender at any moment. Merritt's most diffi- 
 cult problem will be how to deal with insurgents under Aguinaldo, who has 
 become aggressive, and even threatening toward our army. The Monadnock 
 was at Honolulu on July 8 ; expected to leave four days later. . . . 
 
 DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, August i, 1898. (Cavite, July 29.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington: 
 
 Referring to your telegram July 20, strict blockade continues. The 
 neutral vessels are not allowed to enter. From information, which I consider 
 
320 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 
 
 reliable, Spanish Governor-General would surrender to United States forces 
 at once, if. it was not for insurgent complication. In any event, they must 
 capitulate very soon. Merritt and I are working together to this end. The 
 remainder of Merritt's forces has not yet arrived. Pekin will leave to-morrow 
 for San Francisco, Cal. DEWEY. 
 
 Hongkong, August 9, 1898. (Cavite, August 4.) 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington : 
 
 The receipt of telegram of July 26 acknowledged. Have provisions for 
 three months, fresh; also plenty of coal. Do not need provisions from 
 Australia. The Monterey and Brutus arrived to-day. DEWEY. 
 
 Washington, August 12, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 Peace protocol signed by President. Suspend all hostilities and blockade. 
 
 ALLEN. 
 
 Washington, August 12, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 The protocol, signed by the President to-day, provides that the United 
 States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the 
 conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposi- 
 tion, and government of the Philippines. This is most important. 
 
 ALLEN, Acting. 
 
 The dispatches from Admiral Dewey are at once characteristic and his- 
 torical — strikingly so. 
 
 His career during the lonesome months, before Anderson, McArthur, 
 Greene and Merritt came, was full of dramatic situation, and there is a cutting 
 sparkle in his cabled words that scintillates intelligence. May 12th he was 
 "transferring to transports steel breech-loading rifles from sunken Spanish 
 men-of-war." There is a picture int a sentence. The Admiral "forcibly 
 recommends" promotions of officers "without whose aid I could have done 
 nothing." "The squadron thanks the President for his message." In reply 
 as to whether he "would desire submarine mines," "in case of attack by a 
 
< 
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 B 
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 H 
 K 
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 B 
 
 O 
 >n 
 
 O 
 
 5 
 
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AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 323 
 
 superior force," the answer eight days later was the squadron would 
 "endeavor to give good account of itself." 
 
 Aguinaldo had visited the Olympia and overrated his ability. The 
 insurgent general had stated he would make a general attack on Manila. 
 Captain Hodgson, "up to the time of his detachment," had kept his ship 
 "in a high state of efficiency," and made her "a valuable auxiliary." 
 
 The Admiral had entered into, no alliance with the insurgents] or any 
 faction. He declined to cooperate with the fleet in aid of the insurgents. 
 Aguinaldo had been allowed to help himself at the Spanish arsenal. As the 
 insurgents were opposed to a common enemy, they were "friends." 
 Aguinaldo "expected" to take Manila, but had not the force to do it, and never 
 could have taken it if he had had twenty thousand men at his back. Indeed, 
 the Spaniards, if they had not been afraid of the American fleet, could have 
 marched out and raised the siege. The most striking of the sayings of the 
 Admiral was that he knew familiarly both the Filipinos and Cubans, and 
 "these people (Filipino) are far superior in their intelligence and more 
 capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba. ' ' The movement of the 
 Cadiz fleet was a subject of great interest; and the Admiral, July 17th, said 
 he would, "if necessary, proceed with the squadron to meet the Monadnock 
 to the east of Cape Engano" — the northeast corner of Luzon. The necessity 
 was in case of the arrival of the Cadiz fleet with battleships, the Monadnock 
 still lingering on the Pacific. Dewey's idea was that with the two monitors 
 he would be master of the situation, and prove it by sinking a second Spanish 
 fleet. Fortune did not favor him to that extent. In a dispatch to Admiral 
 Dewey, Secretary Long stated, May 20th, mentioning a rumor of Spaniards 
 sending troops and battleships to the Philippines, that "oui: means of receiv- 
 ing intelligence from Spain are very untrustworthy." May 29th, Long cabled 
 Dewey, "There is no Spanish force en route to Philippines." Long tele- 
 graphed, August ist, report that monks and other prisoners in the hands 
 of insurgents at Cavite were in danger of being "unjustly put to death," 
 and "this should not be permitted" if the Admiral was "in a position to pre- 
 vent it. " June 6th Navy Department cabled Dewey, "Cold-storage steamer 
 from Australia is due about June 20 at Manila, with fresh provisions for the 
 squadron." And July 26th this comprehensive inquiry was- made: 
 
 Do you want another fresh provision ship or anj^thing else from Australia? 
 
 LONG. 
 
324 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 
 
 The following cable is a model of compliment and caution : 
 
 Washington, May 26, 1898. 
 Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong: 
 
 You must exercise discretion most fully in all matters, and be governed 
 according to circumstance which you know and we cannot know. You have 
 our confidence entirely. It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for 
 your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or 
 any faction in the islands that would incur liability to- maintain their cause in 
 the future. LONG. 
 
 July 27th the Admiral desired the British foreign office should be 
 informed of his "deep appreciation" of the services of the British Consul 
 Walker, who had "performed the trying duties of acting United States consul 
 during the last three months in a most able and painstaking- manner, and has 
 been of invaluable assistance to me, being my only means of communication 
 with the Spanish authorities, and the chief agent in the protection of foreign 
 residents." 
 
 The Admiral's account of the fall of Manila was that the city surrendered 
 "to our land and naval forces after a combined attack" — a "division of the 
 squadron shelled the forts and intrenchments at Malate, on the south side of 
 the city, driving back enemy, our army advancing on that side at the same 
 time." 
 
 On the day of the surrender of Manila : 
 
 Washington, August 13, 1898. 
 Dewey (care American Consul), Hongkong: 
 
 The President desires to receive from you any important information you 
 
 may have of the Philippines; the desirability of the several islands; the 
 
 character of their population ; coal and other mineral deposits ; their harbor 
 
 and commercial advantages, and in a naval and commercial sense which 
 
 would be the most advantageous. If you have other information which may 
 
 be of value to the government in their negotiations, the President may desire 
 
 your presence here. If he should request you to come, take the quickest route 
 
 of travel. ALLEN, Acting Secretary of Navy. 
 
 Manila, August 20, 1898. 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington : 
 
 Referring to the Department's telegram of August 13, important islands 
 are: Colon, Luzon, Panay, Cebu, Negros, Leyte. Others, owing to the 
 
AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 325 
 
 nature of the inhabitants, have a small amount of civilization, want of cultiva- 
 tion. They may be neglected, especially isles of southern group. Luzon is 
 in all respects the most desirable to retain. Contains most important com- 
 mercial ports. Manila is farthest north. Produces all of the good tobacco. 
 Friendly natives. Civilization somewhat advanced. Not yet developed. 
 Possible rich minerals. Population, 825,000. Subic Bay best harbor for 
 coaling purposes and military. Water deep; landlocked; easily defended. 
 Strategically, command of bay and city of Manila, with arsenal at Cavite, 
 most valuable. Panay, Cebu, Negros thickly populated, most civilized, and 
 well cultivated. Iloilo second commercial port; center of sugar trade ; a good 
 harbor strategically ; in view of the situation, good for defense. Cebu third 
 commercial port ; a good harbor, very desirable. No coal of gqod quality can 
 be procured in Philippine Islands. Some has been mined on Cebu, English 
 company. I trust it may not be necessary to order me to Washington. 
 Should regret very much to leave here while matters remain in present critical 
 condition. DEWEY. 
 
 Washington, August 27, 1898. 
 Dewey, Manila: 
 
 The President received your telegram, and will respect your wishes and 
 not direct you to leave your present duty. He desires you to communicate to 
 General Merrift your views upon the general question of the Philippines, 
 with such information as you have, and to transmit to the President in writing 
 by the quickest method (possibly by hand of Merritt) the substance of your 
 suggestions to Merritt. ALLEN. 
 
 There had been no account of the Philippine Islands in which there was as 
 much said in a few words as Dewey's dispatch of August 20th. The 
 President was well pleased because the Admiral evidently understood the 
 critical importance of the situation and wanted to stay at his post. When the 
 American army entered Manila — and it is to be remembered the action of the 
 navy prevented heavy loss of life — the insurgents were "dusted out of the ^ 
 way," driven out of the city while the Spaniards were forced into the walled'^ 
 portion. There were 8,500 Americans in the army. The Spaniards surren- 
 dered 13,180, and the insurgents mustered about 14,000. As early as July 26th, 
 the Admiral, who had been judicious in friendliness to Aguinaldo,- stated 
 
326 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 
 
 Merritt's most difficult problem would be in dealing with the insurgents 
 under Aguinaldo, "who has become aggressive and even threatening toward 
 our army, ' ' and four days after the Americ&n army was in possession a joint 
 dispatch was sent by Merritt through the Navy Department to the Adjutant 
 General : 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington: Hongkong, August 17, -1898. 
 
 Send the following telegram : 
 
 "To Adjutant General :^Insurgents demand joint occupation of the city. 
 Inform me how far I shall proceed in forcing obedience of the insurgents in 
 this matter and others that may arise. Is the government, willing to use all 
 means and . . . the natives to submit to authority of United States? — 
 Merritt." DEWEY. 
 
 Washington, August 17, 1898. 
 Dewey, Hongkong: 
 
 Answering your joint cable, the President directs as follows: 
 There must be no joint occupation with the insurgents. The United 
 States, in the possession of city, bay, and harbor of Manila, must preserve 
 peace, protecting persons and property in the territory occupied by their mili- 
 tary and naval forces. Insurgents and all others must recognize the military 
 occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities 
 proclaimed by the President. Use any means in your judgment necessary to 
 this end. All law-abiding people must be treated alike. ALLEN. 
 
 But the "cable" was not "joint. " The line had not been mended, and 
 Dewey's dispatch boat had to furnish the facilities to Hongkong. Dewey dis- 
 patched Merritt's dispatch with, "Send the following telegram to the 
 Adjutant General." The return message is plainly the President's own, and 
 the insurgents were permitted and required to occupy themselves with the 
 rural department. 
 
 The burning question of the Philippines came up in a cable from Consul 
 Williams to the State Department as follows: • 
 
 "Large number Spanish priests and civil officers, an element dangerous 
 to United States, wish to leave for Hongkong. No means of transportation. 
 Army authorities willing to send transports same via Hongkong, but lack 
 authority. Will War Department cable me authorization? No expense to 
 government. Officers all advise measure. WILLIAMS, Consul." 
 
AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 3^7 
 
 This was sent to the Admiral asking for the President what he thought, 
 and Dewey's reply was: 
 
 "Am advised that in addition to Spanish civil authorities there are about 
 750 priests, who are anxious to leave the country. Strongly advise that they 
 be given passage to Hongkong, as they are heartily disliked by the insur- 
 gents, and their departure would tend to appease latter and to promote har- 
 mony. ' ' 
 
 Information was asked August 29, ^t the instance of the French Ambas- 
 sador in Washington, as to the treatment of Spanish prisoners ; and Dewey 
 replies : 
 
 "From my observation and that of my officers, the Spanish prisoners are 
 not treated cruelly by theMnsurgents, but thtey are neglected, not from design, 
 but owing to want of proper food supply, medical outfit, and attendance. ' ' 
 
 The President directed that Dewey should, during the suspension of hos- 
 tilities, exert his influence "to restrain insurgent hostilities toward Spaniards, 
 and while maintaining a position of rightful supremacy as to the insurgents, to 
 pursue, so far as possible, a conciliatory course to all. ' ' 
 
 It was a few days before this that General Aguinaldo became careful to 
 refer matters of account to his "Council. " He put off the part of dictator, 
 and found it a necessary ceremony to confer a great deal. He took advice as 
 to the Spanish priests he had captured and imprisoned, concluding to hold 
 them asjiostages. The Belgian Consul at Manila established himself in the 
 confidence of Admiral Dewey, who wrote th^t Mr. Audie, knowing the fall of 
 Manila certain, was "most assiduous in his endeavors to bring about its sur- 
 render without loss of life or property. ' ' There was a new Governor-General 
 appointed, because he. was for fighting to the end, and the Belgian Consul, 
 "much to his credit," the Admiral says, overcame the resistance of the 
 new man, and also "acted as intermediary between the two Governor-Gen- 
 erals on the one hand and General Merritt and myself on the other, carrying 
 several important communications, among them a message from me to the 
 Governor-General to the effect that if the numerous batteries on the water 
 front of the walled city kept silent the city would not be shelled. The effect 
 of this was the capture of this rich and populous city without loss of life to the 
 squadron or to non-combatants and with little or none to our army. ' ' 
 
 If the cable had been in working order from Manila to Hongkong and 
 bej'ond during the early days of August, the signing of the protocol would in 
 
328 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 
 
 all probability have been delayed until the surrender of the city, but the fact 
 that the capitulation was signed a day later than the protocol, Washington and 
 Madrid time, did not materially change the situation. 
 
 The crushing defeat of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey had a ter- 
 rorizing influence, and the fact that the City would be destroyed as well as the 
 fleet, influenced all proceedings, and as the Admiral describes, saved the 
 effusion of blood when the American advance took place. It is curious to 
 note in the business report by the Admiral of our Asiatic squadron that there 
 are a good many things the matter with the vessels — "the boiler tubes of the 
 Boston give out frequently, the Raleigh's engines and boiler. are under con- 
 stant repair, and the construction of her fire rooms faulty ; the boilers of the 
 Baltimore are only fair." The squadron has, under Dewey, burned 36,815 
 tons of coal. The price of 4,000 tons not reported. The 32,813 tons cost 
 $330,060.71 — of this $96,802.04 was consumed by the Olympia and tenders. 
 
 The Admiral grimly says: "Regular target practice was held according 
 to prescribed methods during the first half of the fiscal j^ear, after which it 
 was discontinued, the ammunition being needed for war purposes. Especial 
 attention has been paid to subcaliber practice. The marksmanship in action 
 vas excellent, and during four months in Manila Bay there has been almost 
 10 sickness. ' ' 
 
 Vessel. 
 Olympia . 
 Baltimore 
 Boston . . 
 Charleston 
 Concord. . 
 McCulloch 
 Monadnock 
 Monocacy 
 Monterey . 
 Petrel . . 
 Raleigh 
 
 Sick, per cent. 
 1-25 
 
 Deaths. 
 4 
 
 1.24 
 2. 16 
 2.88 
 2.58 
 8.80 
 
 1. 16 
 
 2. 17 
 1. 19 
 2.48 
 5-77 
 
 o 
 2 
 o 
 o 
 
 2 
 O 
 
 I 
 
 o 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 Hospital. 
 36 ' 
 18 
 
 9 
 12 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 22 
 
 19 
 
 18 
 
 o 
 
 IS 
 
 Home. 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 o 
 o 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 I 
 I 
 2 
 2 
 
 Total 
 
 159 
 
 24 
 
^'^^>^A^f0 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 The Object Lesson of the Voyage of the Oregon. 
 
 The People Instructed for the Army by the Experience of the Navy — The Run from Washing- 
 ton State to Florida — Splendid Spirit of the Men — The Fearful Storm in the Straits of 
 Magellan — The Threat of Destroying a Spanish Torpedo Boat at Rio — The Finish 
 Alone and in Good Form, and Famous the World Over. 
 
 The lesson of the War with Spain that will prove most profitable to the 
 people of the United States, if they accept the teachings of a costly experience, 
 is the comfort, economy and self-respect of strengthening the army, providing 
 for it ungrudgingly the arms most approved by the nations in arms, and mak- 
 ing the posts schools of military science and marksmanship with the firearms of 
 precision great and small. It will not be the part of wisdom to go on scolding 
 Congress for its neglect of duty to the army. All demagogy aside, and we 
 find the army has been immensely improved since the close of the war of the 
 States and sections, and the gradual decline almost to departure of the Indian 
 question, as an army problem. This is the condition of enlisted men, and 
 their character. Now thousands of young men go into the army as an occu- 
 pation, and take pride in being soldiers. More than that, they are often 
 inspired to educate themselves — and they find the zeal of competition and the 
 flush of accomplishment in target practice, as our pioneer backwoodsmen 
 rejoiced to excel in "shooting at a mark." There is an art in handling the 
 modern rifle, that requires training, as certainly as there is skill and deft- 
 ness in perfecting musical gifts. There is a tradition that in the second of our 
 wars with Great Britain a Kentucky soldier killed an Indian at the measured 
 distance of a mile. The feat was one of celebrity, and there was much said 
 for years of the calculations required to give the long-barreled, old-fashioned 
 gun the correct elevation, how necessary it ,was that the rifle grooves should 
 be cut with a care equal to the finest workmanship on a watch, that the ball 
 should be perfectly round, and equally solid in every part, and the ''patch" 
 
 329 
 
330 THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 
 
 that fitted it so that it should be so guided in the initiatory whirl, as not to have 
 a thread amiss, or too thick or thin, just so that the full force of the powder 
 would be applied, and the missile sent on its long flight with all possible 
 mechanical aids — all these details demanded that the firm nerve, the cool 
 intelligence, the keen eye, the alert executive will, the steady hand, should 
 answer to the impulse of the brain of the man. It is not a feat held to be re- 
 markable now to shoot accurately more than a mile. There are many of our 
 soldiers who could pick an enemy out of a tree top at that distance, and there 
 ought to be more of them. Thfe improvement of the gun gives a wider scope 
 and surer chances for the faculties of the man — the thing indispensable. The 
 advance of the army has been rapid, in quality, in ■ bulk, and in the favor of 
 the people, who remember that the sword as an emblem, and the rifle as a 
 fact, should be the weapons of liberty, that despotism with]^its tools may 
 not have conceded, through the, carelessness or the over-confidence of popular 
 government, advantages that may be fatal, and are sure to be costly, in 
 contests with freedom. If republicanism is to v/in in the world, it must be 
 stronger in the hands and that which they hold, than empire — even for the 
 reason that the people should show the .capacity for greater realization from 
 stated resources, when they control and levy upon themselves, than govern- 
 ments of inheritance in which the potency of manhood for the enterprise of 
 man is classified away. It was well said when the war of the States was over 
 that the war had legislated. 
 
 It has been ascertained that the momentous enactments of war were not 
 always placed in forms of law, constitutional or other — were not invariably 
 reduced to writing, and that so far had we advanced in governing by the will 
 of the people that there was jurisprudence in the instincts of man, efficacy in 
 traditions and public opinion that will not await the solemnities of dfeliberate 
 representative bodies or pause to be valid, until the church or the courts have 
 given them consecration. The great Republic has recognized that the army 
 may be of and for the people, and yet not be irregular, spasmodic, undisci- 
 plined—that it is a mathematical establishment and an instrument scientific 
 as astronorny — just as a modern piece of artillery is wrought to resemble a 
 telescope, and is aimed at an enemy in the blue distances on "land or sea as 
 stars are found and defined in the abyss in which they are as motes of dust 
 incandescent in the light of the sun. Much as cfUr army was advanced and 
 elevated in and by the generation that has just passed between wars, it did 
 
THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 33^^ 
 
 not gain comparatively as the navy did at the same time in the things that are 
 the essentials, when the great trials by battle, the Supreme Courts of the last 
 resort, came to pass like bolts from the blue, in the hours of destiny when the 
 unexpected happens and is not the more anticipated because it has occurred a 
 thousand times. 
 
 A great American writer of the English language. Captain Mahan, taught 
 England the significance of the words "Sea Power "i— how nations had been 
 rising to greatness through the ages, with increased velocity and augmented 
 certainty, as they gained respect and held dominion on the seas, commanding 
 from stormy waters the fertile shores. It was not inapt that one of our 
 countrymen made this reassuring revelation to England, for it was in Ameri- 
 can waters, after both France and England had lost their fairest colonies oil 
 the North American continent, that the centuries of conflict between the 
 greater nations of Western Europe, for supremacy on the central oceans and 
 over all the world-wide waters, was in the West Indies — the archipelago — at 
 the broad gates of the American Mediterranean — closed in favor of Great 
 Britain as the mistress of the seas, not to be again contested until we ourselves 
 p,re the contestants. It auspiciously transpired, when England's con- 
 sciousness was quickened by Captain Mahan to comprehend her own great- 
 ness, that events were in the air that would bring the English speaking 
 people nearer each other in sympathy, with broader common interests, than 
 ever before, and that the greater sea power warmly congratulated us upon our 
 accession of victories, honors and trophies. 
 
 There could have been no more acceptable evidence of the timeliness of 
 our triumphs than the British cheerg that greeted them. We were fortunate 
 in the high education of our naval officers and' in the good will that came down 
 to us from days of glory long ago for the navy, and developed in a degree of 
 Congressional enlightenment that seconded the studies of our men of science 
 as navigators and constructers, the result being that unprepared for war on 
 land as we were, when we were swept by currents surveyed long ago, made 
 wild by recent storms, into the Spanish war, we had the consummate fighting 
 ships whose names have been added in letters of light to the old rolls of the 
 records of renown. 
 
 Even when we got the navy we did not get the docks and arsenals, that 
 are the homes of fleets, where they clothe their necks with thunder, and 
 make ready for glorious enterprise. However, having gotten so much, we 
 
332 THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 
 
 should go on and remove the factional restraints of conservatism. Sup- 
 pose we, the people of the United States, had done as well for the army as for 
 the navy — that is, suppose we had just doubled our regiment's, troops and 
 batteries — and then had added a reserve for the field, say 96 guns (Blanco, 
 the last Spanish defender of Cuba, had 183 pieces of field artillery). Suppose 
 we had fixed up one port on our southern coast where there was an inex- 
 haustible supply of good water — a dockyard where our battleships could have 
 been scraped, and we had ascertained the elementary principles of putting an 
 army on ships, and at the same time arranged for getting them off again — we 
 would have saved time and expenses, and escaped the friction about small 
 matters that has distracted the measure of attention due the events that, after 
 all embarrassments and obstructions, have uplifted our countrymen with the 
 heroic sentiment that is the charm of history and the vital glow that gives 
 color to the memory of nations ; imparts a lofty spirit of patriotism, and fills 
 the atmosphere with the illumination of gfreat and shining deeds that will be 
 the footsteps of light on the hills of the hereafter of the land, that has almost 
 hesitated to accept the gifts the gods have provided in the South seas, east and 
 west, and that came to us with the endowment of the tropics, the affluence of. 
 achievement and the opulence of the beautiful. 
 
 The army had to wait on the shore of Florida for the navy to clear the 
 seas, and it was a superb dramatic scene, for which all the world was a stage, 
 that while the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic squadron was warned at 
 Hongkong to clear for action in the Philippines, the battleship Oregon, built 
 at San Francisco, was called from the North Pacific to make haste around 
 South America to reinforce the Atlantic' fleet, to ward off the stroke which 
 Spain seemed to be delivering to defend the last of her American possessions. 
 There was an early and forcible call for the Oregon in this brief but sufficient 
 telegram : 
 
 Washington, March 7, 1898. 
 Oregon, Bremerton, Wash. : 
 
 The situation is getting worse. You should go to San Francisco as soon 
 as possible and get ammunition. LONG. 
 
 (Oregon arrived at San Francisco March 9, 1898.) 
 
 Washington, March 12, 1898. 
 Sir : When in all respects ready for sea, proceed, with the vessel under 
 your command, to Callao, Peru, and await further orders. 
 
THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 333 
 
 In view of the present critical condition of affairs, the Oregon should 
 leave San Francisco at the earliest possible date, and arrive at Callao as soon 
 as practicable. 
 
 The crew is to be constantly drilled, the passage of the ship not to be 
 delayed thereby. Very respectfully, 
 
 JOHN D. LONG, Secretary. 
 Commanding Ofl&cer, U. S. S. Oregon. 
 
 (Through Commandant, Mare Island, Cal.) 
 
 Washington, March 12, 1898. 
 Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal. : 
 
 Prepare Oregon for sea with all possible dispatch. Long cruise. Fill 
 with coal. When will she be ready to sail? LONG. 
 
 (On March 17 Capt. C. E. Clark assumed command of Oregon, relieving 
 Capt. B. J. McCormick, condemned by medical survey. 
 
 On March 19 the Oregon left San Francisco for Callao, arriving at the 
 latter port April 4, 1898, having made an average speed of 10.7 knots.) 
 
 Washington, March 22, 1898. 
 Marietta, Panama, Colombia: 
 
 Proceed to Callao, Peru, and make arrangements to coal Oregon upon 
 arrival. Left March 19 from San Francisco for Callao. LONG. 
 
 Washington, March 29, 1898. 
 Marietta, Callao, Peru: 
 
 Contract for best coal to be delivered on board Oregon immediately upon 
 arrival: Oregon to coal utmost dispatch. You proceed at once to Valparaiso. 
 It is possible you may take possession of Chilean armored cruiser. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 U. S. S. Marietta, 3d Rate, Callao, Peru, March 31, 1898. 
 Sir: I respectfully acknowledge the receipt this day of the Department's 
 cipher dispatch dated the 29th instant. 
 
 In compliance therewith I have made necessary contract for coal for the 
 
334 THE OBJECT LfiSSON OF THE OREGON. 
 
 Oregon, and have 750 tons in lighters for her now, which will be placed along- 
 side the moment she arrives. 
 
 This vessel leaves to-night for Valparaiso, Chile. 
 
 Respectfully, 
 
 F. M. SYMONDS, 
 
 Commander, U. S. N., Commanding, and Senior Officer Present. 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy, 
 
 Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Callao, Peru, April 5, 1898. 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington : 
 
 Will complete work necessary boilers and engines. Will be ready to sail 
 
 Thursday night (7th). I can make Montevideo, perhaps Rio Janeiro, not 
 
 stopping at Valparaiso, and if coal may be obtained at Sandy Point, Patagonia, 
 
 I could make Bahia. - CLARK; 
 
 Callao, April 6, 1898. 
 Secretary of Navy, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 On account of navigation of Magellan Strait, and reported movements 
 
 Spanish torpedo vessel near Montevideo, I should recommend Marietta to 
 
 accompany this vessel. If required, I could touch Talcahuana, Chile, for 
 
 orders six days after my sailing. CLARK. 
 
 Washington, April 6, 1898. 
 Oregon, Callao, Peru: 
 
 Proceed at once to Montevideo or Rio Janeiro. The Spanish torpedo 
 boat Temerario is in Montevideo. Marietta has been ordered to proceed to 
 Sandy Point, Patagonia, to arrange for coal. How many tons of coal will you 
 require? The Marietta and Oregon to proceed together. Keep secret your 
 destination. Keep secret this message. LONG. 
 
 (Oregon sailed from Callao April 7 for Sandy Point.) 
 
 Washington, April 7, 1898. 
 Marietta, Valparaiso: 
 
 Oregon leaves to-day from Callao for Sandy Point, Patagonia. Go ahead 
 and secure 600 tons of coal for her and accompany to the north. The United 
 States consulates in Cuba have closed. United States Consul-General is 
 coming home. LONG. 
 
THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 335 
 
 The authorities at Valparaiso were very cautious and careful in their treat- 
 ment of American ships on the way to the Atlantic at this time. There had 
 been threats by Spanish residents that the Marietta should be destroyed in the 
 harbor of the capital of Chile. The commander of the Marietta reported : 
 
 "Although we had a patrol boat about the vessel, and made necessary 
 preparations on board for a night attack, still it was unnecessary, as by orders 
 of the civil authorities shore boats were not permitted under any pretext to 
 approach the vessel within 300 meters during the night, and I learned that a 
 government detective force on shore closely watched suspected localities and 
 persons." 
 
 Captain Clark, of the Oregon, writing at Rio Janeiro April 30th, of his run 
 from Callao, states he left that port April 7th, one boiler under repairs, tak- 
 ing 1, 100 tons coal in eighty hours, 100 tons in bags on deck, and reached 
 the Straits^^ift comparatively good weather, "though a heavy swell, increased 
 by fresh southerly winds, made the ship pitch heavily, the jack staff some- 
 times disappearing under the solid seas that swept all but the superstructure 
 deck. The vibrations and the racing of the propellers were very marked at 
 times, but the condition of affairs and the Department's instructions warranted 
 a high rate of speed. 
 
 "Entered the straits at about 3:30 p. m. on the i6th, aAd that evening 
 anchored outside Port Tamar. One of the severest gales of the season broke 
 before an anchorage could be reached, and as the wind and rain became so 
 dense that the abrupt shores could not be seen, while no soundings could be 
 obtained, the Oregon was for a time awkwardly placed. Just before dark the 
 anchors were let go on a rocky shelf, fringed by islets and reefs, in 38 and 52 
 fathoms of water, and they fortunately held through some of the most violent 
 gusts I have ever experienced." 
 
 The Oregon made 11^ knots an hour, but was, after meeting the Mari- 
 etta, detained by her low rate of speed during the run to Rio. "Owing to the 
 chance that the Spanish torpedo vessel, the Temerario, might, if war existed, 
 sight us before dark and get near enough to dispatch a torpedo during the 
 night, only the leading vessels showed any lights, and these were screened at 
 the sides. The 8-inch and 6-inch guns were loaded with shell, and ammuni- 
 tion for the rapid-fire guns was kept on deck, four crews in each watch being 
 stationed at the guns. Orders for the maneuvering of the two ships in the 
 event of falling in with a suspicious-looking vessel were issued. ' ' 
 
336 THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 
 
 The crews were in high spirits, the engineer officers, for instance, "volun- 
 tarily doubling their watches when high speed was to be made, and the 
 attempts of men to return to the fire room after being carried out of it 
 insensible ; and most of the crew, who were working by watches day and night 
 at Sandy Point, preferred to leave their hammocks in the netting until they 
 could get the ship coaled. ' ' 
 
 At Rio was a cable from Long stating war was declared, nine days 
 before, and to await orders — the Spanish torpedo boat probably on the way 
 from Montevideo for Rio. On Dewey's great day this dispatch from the Navy 
 Department showed a sense of apprehension : 
 
 "Washington, May i, 1898. — Oregon, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Four Span- 
 ish armored cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo boat destroyers, sailed 
 April 29 from Cape de Verde to the west, destination unknown. Beware of 
 and study carefully the situation. Must be left to your discretion entirely to 
 avoid this fleet and to reach the United States by West Indies. You can go 
 when and where you desire. Nictheroy and the Marietta subject to the 
 orders of yourself. ' ' 
 
 Next day Captain Clark was ordered to await orders, and the next that 
 order was countermanded, and then came the news of the annihilation of the 
 Spanish Asiatic fleet. 
 
 Captain Clark telegraphed May 4th: "Keeping near the Brazilian coast, 
 as the Navy Department considers the Spanish fleet from Cape de Verde 
 Islands superior, will be unsuitable. I can coal from the Nictheroy, if 
 necessity compels it, to reach the United States. If the Nictheroy delays too 
 much I shall hasten passage, leaving her with the Marietta. Every depart- 
 ment of the Oregon in fine condition. ' ' 
 
 Clark was impatient, and telegraphed from Bahia May 9th : 
 
 "Much delayed by the Marietta and the Nictheroy. Left them near Cape 
 Frio, with orders to come home or beach, if necessity compels it, to avoid ~ ~ ^ 
 capture. The Oregon could steam 14 knots for hours, and in a running fight 
 might beat off and even cripple the Spanish fleet. With present amount of 
 coal on board will be in good fighting trim, and could reach West Indies. If 
 more should be taken here I could reach Key West; but, in that case, belt 
 armor, cellulose belt, and protective deck would be below water line. Where- 
 abouts of Spanish fleet requested. CLARK." 
 The next Word from the Navy Department was to push on, avoiding the 
 
THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 337 
 
 Spaniards, but the belief of the Board was that the Oregon would defeat the 
 Spanish fleet. It was determined not to send ships to assist the Oregon. 
 Writing on the Oregon at sea, May i8th, Captain Clark said, being advised the 
 night after his arrival at Rio of the Spanish torpedo boat going to that port, 
 he sent an officer to the captain in command of the Brazilian flagship and 
 explained to him, "that the Oregon, a $5,000,000 battleship, might be disabled 
 or even destroyed by the torpedo vessel of the nation that had blown up the 
 Maine, and that I relied upon the Brazilian naval forces to prevent any such 
 act of hostility in their waters, but that if the Temerario entered the harbor 
 and approached the Oregon with a hostile purpose I must destroy her. ' ' 
 
 Captain Clark moved further up the bay after delivering this message, 
 and instructed the commander of the Marietta "to send her steam launch to 
 the Temerario if she appeared, and inform the commander that if he 
 approached within half a mile of the Oregon he would be sunk. " The Mari- 
 etta was ordered to keep her search light on the vessel all the time. 
 
 The Brazilians upon this became extremely vigilant and courteous. The 
 torpedo boat did not appear, and Captain Clark grew weary of waiting for his 
 two companions — one slow and one crippled — and the night of May 5th, 
 " believing that the Department needed the Oregon at the seat of war, and 
 knowing that if we fell in with a Spanish fleet of superior force, with torpedo 
 vessels, I must make a running fight of it at full speed, which meant leaving 
 the Marietta and Nictheroy to escape the best way they could, as even the 
 former could not be counted a factor in such an encounter," the Oregon 
 moved on at high speed, and arrived at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, May 24th, hav- 
 ing made a straight run north from the Brazilian coast beyond the islands, 
 and then a run west. This congratulatory correspondence followed : 
 
 Washington, May 26, 1898. 
 Oregon (through Naval Base, Key West, Fla.): 
 
 The Department congratulates you, your officers, and crew on the com- 
 pletion of your long and remarkably successful voyage. LONG. 
 
 U. S. S. Oregon, ist Rate, Key West, Fla., May 27, 1898. 
 Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the Department's telegram of 
 yesterday, which was received and read to all hands at muster the same even- 
 ing, causing great enthusiasm and spontaneous cheers. That the officers, 
 who have labored so faithfully and intelligently to bring the ship around in 
 
338 
 
 THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE OREGON. 
 
 our efficient condition for fighting and steaming, and especially that the crew, 
 
 who individually and collectively have made real sacrifices and who for two 
 
 months have asked for nothing but the privilege of doing extra work that 
 
 might hasten the progress of the ship, should be mentioned and congratulated, 
 
 affords me, as the commanding officer, especial gratification. 
 
 Very respectfully, C. E. CLARK, 
 
 Captain, U. S. N.. Commanding. 
 The Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 There could be no happier illustration than that furnished by the Oregon, 
 in the long voyage and subsequent history, of the perfection attained in the 
 building of our battleships, the superior excellence of their armament, the 
 high spirit of the crews and the admirable tone aiid distinction of the officers 
 equal as always found to all occasions. 
 
 It is plain that the confidence of the Navy Department and of Captain 
 Clark was increased as the voyage of the Oregon progressed. The Captain 
 was not in luck that he did not meet Cervera's fleet. As instructed by the 
 experiences of the war — of what the Oregon did, and the fate of the fugitive 
 ships at Santiago^ — only a series of accidents that there is no occasion to think 
 probable would have prevented that ship, single handed, from destroying 
 the entire squadron reserved for the doom that overtook the fated ships July 
 3d on the Coast of Cuba west of Santiago. 
 
CAPTAIN CLARK, OF THE 'OREGON," IN HiS OFFICE. 
 
H 
 W 
 H 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 The Report of the Secretary of War. 
 
 Putticg the Anny into the Combat — The Plans of Campaign — The Proposed Waiting and 
 Equipping Policy of the Major General Commanding — His Strange Confidence in the 
 Cuban Story of an Army of 50,000 Rebels to Help Us — Reasons Why We Could not 
 Wait Six Months after Declaring War before Striking Decisively with the Army. 
 
 The report of the Secretary of War for the year of the war with Spain and 
 the peace also, is a document necessarily memorable and that has other than 
 adventitious distinctions. It is remarkable for its fullness and the absolute 
 fair play given those who have found fault with the administration of the War 
 Department, and the sweeping frankness with which the true inwardness has 
 been told, by the insertion of the original dispatches, that tell the bottom 
 facts. As the war was over when the report was prepared, though the treaty 
 had not then been signed, there was an -unusually early opportunity to take 
 the public into complete confidence by spreading in plain print the documen- 
 tary truth — the whole truth, too — in the official history of the war. The story 
 is told now and forever, and if it could be gathered into volumes unabridged, 
 and each of the millions of the" American people had them to read, without 
 note or comment, there would be no special occasion, though abundant room, 
 for this book. 
 
 The annual report of the Secretary of War for the year 1898 is in a large 
 sense the original papers of the history of the Spanish war, which freed the 
 possessions of Spain from centuries of misrule and from all oppression, except 
 the things for which all peoples are brought to judgment, aside from disabili- 
 ties that are the fault of misgovernment, inflicted upon the character of the 
 people themselves. It is impossible that in the flash of a sword, however 
 mightier it may be than the wand of a magician, the wrongs that are the 
 growth of centuries shall be dissipated. We may give masses of mankind 
 
 equalities of opportunity aftd they themselves must be responsible for the 
 
 341 
 
342 THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 
 
 results. We have cast down the tyrant, and the people are free to rise. We 
 have possessed lands, and that are resources for the future generations — the 
 assurances that there is subsistence in the soil, the skies, the waters, and the 
 sunlight, for the children of God — the toilers that are to be. 
 
 The Secretary thus gives the history of the war in a few words: 
 "An army of about 250,000 volunteers and recruits for the regulars was 
 called into existence from civil life, which, with the regular army, made a 
 total force of 274,717 men. It -was organized, ^rmed, and equipped (no 
 supplies being on hand other than those for the regulars, save Spring^eld 
 muskets), and 50,000 men of this force were transported by land and sea to 
 battlefields in the tropics 12,000 miles apart, where they won theirvictories 
 without a single defeat, and all within the period of one hundred and thirteen 
 days from the declaration of war to signing the protocol. ' ' 
 
 ' The report crowds two hundred and thirty-one pages. The report of 
 the Major General commanding the army, with the accompanying reports of 
 the commanders of independent expeditions, are given in full by the Secre- 
 tary. Major General Miles, in the course of a few of the first weeks of the 
 war, produced a series of orders or recommendations, for the preparations 
 of ideal campaigns, and that which he directed and suggested was persuasive 
 as well as peremptory, but not in actual business affairs so precise as to be 
 convincing that the line.s were drawn upon which the work could be done 
 smoothly.. It was not possible to be sure of the detail of a campaign on an 
 island with a large army of regulars as defenders, before all disputes were 
 settled as to the command of the surrounding waters. The plans of the 
 general commanding were of course constructed of material in which theories 
 played a great part — and it was lost time to be elaborate, before the disap- 
 pearance of the elementary uncertainties. In the proposals of General 
 Miles there are the marks of vigorous industry and the professional and 
 technical points of the military business. On the 13th of April, the 
 General issued a careful expression of his judgment, of which we give this 
 paragf aph : 
 
 "The history of the expedition to the Crimea and to Egypt indicate the 
 necessity of complete and perfect equipment of each military organization, 
 and the army should be thoroughly and effectively organized in every depart- 
 ment — infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineer corps, signal corps, construction 
 train for building wharves, piers, etc., and repairing railway tracks and 
 
THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 343 
 
 bridges, corduroying roads, etc. , pontoon trains and appliances for depot and 
 reserve trains — in order that upon landing on foreign soil every company, 
 battery, regiment, brigade, and division shall be in perfect condition, fully 
 supplied and equipped to render effective service. Hence the regiments of 
 infantry, cavalry, and light batteries of artillery should be fully supplied with 
 tentage, camp equipage, arms, ammunition, intrenching tools, and transpor- 
 tation, with medical supplies, and rations and food for men and animals for 
 at least six months. The command should also be supplied with field artil- 
 lery, siege guns, howitzers, and mortars for offensive work against any field- 
 works or fortifications of the enemy, or for the protection of camps and depots 
 that might be established. ' ' 
 
 All this is well stated, but it is in the nature of general conversation, 
 and does not bear the positive edge and point of military direction, but no 
 doubt it had its value in impressing the people that there was much to do in 
 preparing for war. The plans of operation of the Major General command- 
 ing will long be read with the deepest interest, but they had a common fault, 
 requiring too much time for execution April 9th the Major General in com- 
 mand made various recommendations, one of which was, "that at least 22 regi- 
 ments of infantry, 5 regiments of cavalry, and the light artillery be mobilized, 
 and placed in one large camp where they can be carefully and thoroughly 
 inspected, fully equipped, drilled, disciplined, and instructed in brigades and 
 divisions, and prepared for war service. This will give approximately a force 
 of 30,000 men." This was in addition to other recommendations, and fol- 
 lowed by one "that the President call for a volunteer force from the different 
 States and Territories of at least 50,000 men, in addition to the above force, 
 to constitute one army for any offensive movements against the Spanish army 
 in Cuba, estimated at 150,000 men, of which number 80,000 are reported as 
 effective for military service. The entire force should be fully equipped with 
 mountain, field, and siege artillery, and all the appliances and equipments 
 required for actual war service. ' ' 
 
 Also there were to be available for any emergency that might arise, 
 "State troops along the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts," and in addition fo 
 "any emergency" there might be "threatened attacks upon the towns, villages 
 or cities that are exposed," and "for the concentration of the large force that 
 may be required in the future." It was apparent to all that the first thing 
 was to know whether the sea was to be our basis of offensive operations. If 
 
344 THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 
 
 it was, we did not require a diffusion of strength with a view of defending 
 ourselves. If we invaded Cuba we were not to be invaded or even as.saulted 
 in turn. The one sure thing in the situation was that we had first to dispose 
 of the Spanish fleets. If Spain was going to fight for Cuba, she had to do it 
 with her navy, for her available army was there. The Major General wanted 
 "at least" 30,000 men for one large camp where they should be "carefully 
 and thoroughly inspected, " and another "at least" 50,000, "to constitute our 
 army for any offensive movements against the Spanish army in Cuba," 
 estimated at 150,000. This would, of course, mean logically the land army 
 that was in due time to be under the command of the Major General com- 
 manding, and engaged in the reduction of Havana. Certainly this ambition 
 of the Commanding General was the logical outlook of his position, the 
 natural consequence of the impending war, but it was qualified with severe 
 and repeated warnings that the real work was, with the view of saving the lives 
 of our soldiers, to be postponed for a considerable time. The contemplation 
 of the Major General commanding is stated in his official report, with refer- 
 ence to letters to the Secretary of War, that the real "plan" was "harassing 
 the Spanish forces and doing the enemy the largest amount of injury during 
 the time necessary for our Navy to demonstrate its superiority — the rainy or 
 sickly season, and the time actually required to equip and instruct the volun- 
 teer forces with the least possible loss to ourselves. ' ' In that letter he also 
 asserted the belief ^s entertained from the first, that "we could secure the 
 surrender of the Spanish army in the island of Cuba without any great sacri- 
 fice of life. ' ' In the letter here referred to, the General said : 
 
 "In my opinion, it is extremely hazardous, and I think it would be 
 injudicious, to put an army on that island at this season of the year, as it 
 would undoubtedly be decimated by the deadly disease, to say nothing of hav- 
 ing to cope with some 80,000 troops, the remnant of 214,000, that have become 
 acclimated, and that are equipped with 183 guns. And still another element 
 of extreme danger would be to place an army there with the possibility of 
 our own navy not being able to keep the waters between our 'own territory 
 and that island clear of hostile ships or fleets. 
 
 "By mobilizing our force and putting it in healthful camps and using such 
 force as might be necessary to harass the enemy and doing them the greatest 
 injury with the least possible loss to ourselves, if our navy is superior to 
 theirs, in my judgment, we can compel the surrender of the army on the 
 
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 GENERAL MERRITT ON THE BRIDGE. 
 
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THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 347 
 
 island of Cuba with very little loss of life, and possibly avoid the spread of 
 yellow fever over our own country. 
 
 "There is still time, if this is favorably considered, to put a small force of 
 regular troops, number approximately 18,000 men, in healthful camps until 
 such time as they can be used on the island of Cuba with safety. ' ' 
 
 This was planning, on the i8th of April, to allow all summer for the navy 
 of the United States to demonstrate its superiority to the Spaniards, and to 
 put off the aggressive opening of the war six months at least, our troops being 
 instructed in fhose healthful camps that were so numerous in the general 
 understanding in April and so scarce a little later. 
 
 After the rainy and sickly seasons were over in Cuba, there was to be one 
 masterly effort by a grand army perfected in every respect — to consist of 
 50,000 men at least, to overpower Blanco's 80,000 effectives and 183 guns; 
 our ships harassing the Spaniards with their target practice at old forts, we 
 presume. But the Major General commanding had several reserves to bring 
 up — the 50,000 jnen who were to be the one specifically great and authorita- 
 tively conducted army — and one of thein was "an auxiliary force of 50,000 
 natives." Here the Major General comriianding (page 20 of the report of 
 the Secretary of War) apologizes for the small force comparatively that was 
 to be ready to move six months later. He says he "deemed it of the first 
 importance to well equip such force rather than to partly equip a much larger 
 number. ' ' With all possible respect for General Miles, there is evidence here 
 of unsound calculations. Any expedition beginning with the anticipation that 
 invaders of Cuba could be reinforced by 50,000 natives would have been 
 founded on a rotten romance. Our soldiers did not find forces of natives 
 reliable for the fire lines, when they got ashore -at Santiago. There is a cer- 
 tain reserve on the subject, as a more uncertain enthusiasm that has been 
 countenanced by some of the generals, but the private soldiers tell a different 
 story. The list of Cuban casualties was 2 killed and 4 wounded, when we 
 lost 1,500 men. 
 
 There is quoted a dispatch from Admiral Sampson to the Secretary of 
 the Navy and repeated to Miles at Tampa, as follows: 
 
 "Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti. — General Miles's letter received through 
 Colonel Hernandez on June 6. Garcia regards his wishes and suggestions as 
 orders, and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points 
 indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of his 
 
348 THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 
 
 expedition to Banes Port, Cuba, but he will march without delay. All of his 
 subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark the United States troops, and 
 to place themselves under orders. Santiago de Cuba well fortified, with 
 advanced intrenchments, but he believes position for artillery can be taken as 
 Miles desires. (Approximate) twelve thousand (12,000) regulars and three 
 thousand (3,000) militia between Santiago and Guantanamo. He has sent 
 force in order to prevent aid going to Santiago from Holguin. Repeats every 
 assurance of good will, and desires to second plans. SAMPSON." 
 
 The General comments: "It will be observed that General Garcia re- 
 garded my requests as his orders, and promptly took steps to execute the 
 plan of operations. He sent 3,000 men to check any movement of the 12,000 
 Spaniards stationed at Holguin. A portion of this latter force started to 
 the relief of the garrison at Santiago, but was successfully checked and 
 turned back by the Cuban forces under General Feria. General Garcia 
 also sent 2,000 men, under Perez, to oppose the 6,000 Spaniards at Guan- 
 tanamo, and they were successful in their object. He also sent 1,000 men, 
 under General Rios, against the 6,000 men at Manzanillo. Of this gar- 
 rison, 3,500 started to reinforce the garrison at Santiago, and were en- 
 gaged in no less than thirty combats with the Cubans on their way before 
 reaching Santiago, and would have been stopped had General Garcia's 
 request of June 27 been granted. With an additional force of 5,000 men 
 General Garcia besieged the garrison of Santiago, taking up a trong posi- 
 tion on the west side and in close proximity to the harbor, and he afterwards 
 received General Shaffer and Admiral Sampson at his camp near that place. 
 He had troops in the rear, as well as on both sides, of the garrison at San- 
 tiago before the arrival of our troops. ' ' 
 
 The Major General commanding accepted Cuban stories as facts so far as 
 to say that Garcia was besieging Santiago, and proceeded to give Garcia one 
 force of 3,000 men, another of 2,000, another of 1,000 men, and then "with 
 an additional force of 5,000 men besieged the garrison of Santiago." Here we 
 have four Cuban armies, in round numbers 11,000 men in all. We know what 
 15,000 men who were with Shaffer have to say about these besiegers of the 
 garrison of Santiago. They saw only a few scattering bands. Major-Gen- 
 eral-Commanding Miles was incorrectly informed. He did not see and count 
 the troops, and he did not have reliable intelligence about the thirty combats. 
 As Garcia obeyed the wishes of General Miles as orders, why did not the 
 
THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 349 
 
 American General commanding wish to have the ii,ooo men brought in to 
 crowd the Spaniards somewhat? General Garcia had such Cuban troops as 
 there were anywhere in sight, excepting the grand army of i6o men under 
 Gomez, who were constantly encamped for their health in a salubrious part of 
 the country mountainous in its character. The romantic 50,000 Cuban army 
 had existed so long in the Key West Bureau, and Gomez was so constantly 
 thundering at the gates of Havana, from his elevated point of observations in 
 the mountains of the Cuban Orient, that delusions were propagated and still 
 find believers. According to the report of the Commanding General of the 
 United States, as reproduced in the report of the Secretary of War, the plan 
 of campaign with which he opened was to do the best we could to harass the 
 Cubans until the rainy season and the sickly season were over, about the 
 middle of December, four months after the surrender of Spain in consenting 
 to the terms of the protocol. Then everything was to be perfectly prepared for 
 a movement with 50,000 men, when the fighting was to be hot and heavy. Of 
 course, the rainy season and the yellow fever were most serious reasons for 
 not rushing the war. The President did not want to invade Cuba in the midst 
 of the yellow fever season, and to subject the troops to the torrential rains 
 when it was death to sleep on the ground — he wanted to use some time in 
 preparation, and thought peace might be preserved after all if the people 
 would consider the actual facts, and be patient, but all that had been over- 
 ruled by Congress. Honorable members wanted to know who was afraid of 
 the rain. The yellow fever was not a subject of jesting, but there was evi- 
 dence in abundance that the yellow journals were immunes. The Major 
 General commanding had a wholesome sensibility as to the fatality it would be 
 to attack Havana as the English did in 1762 in the midsummer — that season 
 being selected owing to the dread of the hurricanes to be expected in October 
 and almost always on hand in that month except when Columbus discovered 
 America. At the same time the Major General commanding held the opinions 
 expressed in these words from his official report : 
 
 "Congregating tens of thousands of men, many of whom were not uni- 
 formed, and scarcely any properly equipped, in great camps away from their 
 States, rendered it difficult for them to be properly supplied with food, cook- 
 ing utensils, camp equipage, blankets, tentage, medical supplies, transporta- 
 tion, etc., and was to a great extent the cause, in my judgment, of the 
 debilitating effect upon the health and strength of the men, who were other- 
 
35° THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 
 
 wise in good physical condition. The material necessary to clothe and equip 
 large armies was not even manufactured at that time, and the consequent 
 condition of the troops for weeks and months was injurious to the commands 
 in many ways." 
 
 What better could have been done under the "plan" of the Major General 
 commanding does not appear. The analysis and comparison of various plans 
 of campaigns that were not tried cannot fail to be unprofitable, and it is desir- 
 able to avoid the contentious exercise, for there is a drift in it away from higher 
 considerations. Many of the suggestions by Major-General-Commanding Miles 
 were excellent. His orders as a rule were judicious. If they seem sometimes- 
 too vague now, it is to be remembered that the very subjects to which they 
 related were at the moment foggy. But the plan of waiting as long to pre- 
 pare a force to conquer Cuba as the Army of the Potomac was held for the 
 movement on Richmond, was inadmissible, first because public opinion would 
 not have permitted it ; second, as the event proved, because it was not neces- 
 sary. If there was any doubt of our command of the seas as against 
 Spain, after Dewey's victory at Manila, it was not in existence after 
 the Oregon from the North Pacific joined the North Atlantic squadron. The 
 President's plan was more specific than that of the military head of the 
 army, and as he was the Commander-in-Chief of the army and the navy, he 
 tried it and it had the merit of simplicity, proving efficacious. It was to 
 mobilize the regular army, which was wonderfully well done, and with the 
 most available volunteer regiments, strike a blow, not at Havana, but at some 
 other vital point possibly, in Porto Rico, more probably in southern or eastern 
 Cuba. Major General Miles, among others, had two harbors on the north 
 shore in his mind. The run of Cervera's fleet into the harbor of Santiago 
 decided the spot to deliver the blow, and the delivery proved to be the 
 decisive event. 
 
 The President of the United States had more to study than the necessity 
 of the inspection and instruction of the troops who were called out for a war of 
 invasion. It required no prophet, civil or military, to tell him that there 
 were two things apparently much in the mind of Congress that must be 
 avoided. Our navy, while conclusions with the navy of Spain were untried on 
 the Atlantic waters, was not to be thrust against the fortresses and stone walls 
 of Havana. That was not the way to prepare to meet the Spanish fleet, 
 which was obliged to appear in all available force for the protection of Cuba 
 
THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 35 1 
 
 and Porto Rico, or abandon at the outset the assertion of the competency of 
 the kingdom to care for itself. The declaration about the bombardment of 
 Havana was not worthy to be considered. It was also of common understand- 
 ing, aside from the consecutive production of the current literature of prac- 
 tical politics, that the way to open the war was not, while the West India 
 waters were in controversy, to scrape together all the transports that could be 
 found, and land the mass of our soldiers, regular and volunteer — irrespective 
 of the condition of the latter — in the province of Havana, to enter speedily as 
 forced marches would carry our columns, into the yellow fever territory, where 
 there were floods falling from the skies, and the supply of wholesome water 
 very short indeed. The foremost and most fantastic ideas of campaigning in 
 Cuba had therefore to be returned marked officially, "Not approved,'' to the 
 journals that were happy to believe they were the authors of the war, and 
 about to finish it after a few days' flurry. 
 
 Secretary Seward, in the tentative days between the secession of the 
 extreme southern States, and the red deluge that swept over the land, assisted 
 public confidence by coldly studied, airy declarations that the disorder would 
 be ended in ninety days. The people on both sides of the line about to burst 
 into fire would have been appalled and shaken if they could have foreseen one 
 battlefield, where, years later in the struggle, many thousands perished. Mr. 
 Seward's ninety days will be a byword for centuries, to measure great mis- 
 takes with, but it is questionable whether that acute statesman was ever 
 mistaken for a minute. It was his duty to be confident, and especially his 
 calling for the period of- initiation, as he was the representative of his 
 country in affairs international. The parallel case in Cuba was the feeling of 
 some who possessed dual reputations as soldiers and statesmen, that a three 
 weeks' blockade of Havana, with an occasional thirteen-inch shell, would 
 turn over the great city to the United States. In the beginning there was 
 impatience because our will-power did not seem equal to the immediate con- 
 quest of Cuba, but' very soon the immense comnlon sense of the people 
 asserted itself, upon the proposition that we could afford to wait, and there 
 was a vivid recollection that we had not been developing the army along 
 with the navy, and that one of the penalties for the public fault of procrasti- 
 nation was that we had to encounter the expenses and endure the disappoint- 
 ments of delay. The Major General commanding had the hard-earned 
 reputation of a gallant soHier. Scarred with wounds, an officer who had led 
 
352 
 
 THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 
 
 his men, sword in hand, on the bloody hillsides sloping north to the Rappa- 
 hannock, and he .was firm in the general estimate as a man of bravery, decision 
 of character, and experience. His various orders, prognostications and 
 plans excited interest as they became known, and their influence was in the 
 correct direction of giving the people intelligence to the effect that the war 
 was a very serious business, that must be pressed with comprehensive energy, 
 and that the first lesson was to "learn to labor and to wait." Plans, as plans, 
 though accompanied with statistics, did not seize the people. What they 
 wanted was to get at the Spaniards. The first utterance of the Major General 
 commanding was not believed to be a happy one, for it had a chill in it, and 
 did not appear to be demanded. It was that we did not want to begin this war 
 with a Bull Run. Still, this was meant to assist in forming public opinion to 
 sustain the authorities in the works of preparation. And yet it would have 
 been a colossal blunder to have held the troops assembled, with our enormous 
 railroad facilities, in camps all summer. If we couldn't command the sea, 
 an offensive war was impossible. Clearly we had the sea power. The 
 prodigious victory of Dewey was the thing needed, to tell the world the true 
 story, and it satisfied our self-esteem while it demanded action, if not all along 
 the line, at least wherever the enemy obtruded a mark. It would be ruinous 
 to linger. We were spending a million dollars a day, and every dollar must 
 be accounted for. Our regular army could and would shoot a Spanish force 
 in pieces, as our Asiatic squadron had smashed the fleet of Spain at Manila. 
 The thing to do was to disregard the maneuvers of the Cape Verde fleet, and 
 in the east end of Cuba, where the only insurgent forces of any value were 
 held to be, or Porto Rico, a healthful island abounding in good roads, water, 
 supplies, and provisions in the fields and woods, strike quick and hard, leav- 
 ing the pen and pool, and pestilence, and famine, of Havana to the Spaniards. 
 It was so ordered in time and place befitting. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 The Early Correspondence of the Department of War. 
 
 Activity in the War Department before the Declaration of War — The Precautionary Policy 
 of the Major General Commanding — Differences of Opinion in High Places about an 
 Early Invasion of Cuba — Importance of Healthful Camps — The Dangers of Water 
 Supplies— The Inside History of a Troubled Time — Shafter's Sagacity as to the Im- 
 portance of a First Engagement — The Demand for a Competent Army Enforced, 
 
 "The telegraphic and other correspondence relating to the war," is the 
 unpretending headline that follows the official reports of the generals having 
 dependent commands and engaged in actions of importance ; and a remarkable 
 collection of dispatches and communications appear. The utter candor of this 
 official publication is displayed in these few introductory words, in the 
 type that declares the remarks of the Secretary: 
 
 ' ' Early in May a movement upon Havana was contemplated, as it was 
 believed that the city could be assaulted and captured before the rainy season 
 set in, but the plan was subsequently abandoned on account of the reported 
 movements of the enemy's fleet. 
 
 ' ' It was proposed to send a portion of the army of invasion from Tampa, 
 and to gather another part of it at Key West, on account of the close proximity 
 of the latter place to Mariel, Cuba (a point about 26 miles west of Havana)." 
 
 This, the Secretary says, "will be shown by the following dispatches. " 
 There is a great deal more than this shown in that which is given, and the first 
 thing one is reminded of in reading the lines that it was believed Havana 
 "could be assaulted and captured before the rainy season," is that the war 
 Secretary was warlike from the first day of the war and an opponent of delays, 
 holding that to strike promptly was the way to do business. 
 
 The Spanish fleet had the advantage of associating itself with mysteries. 
 The Cape Verde squadron appeared in the West Indies and disappeared, and 
 the Spaniards were able to hide their purposes and the deficiencies of their 
 ships, by the suppression of intelligence. The presence of a squadron of. half 
 
 353 
 
354 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 
 
 a dozen heavily armed cruisers and some torpedo boats that had a reputation 
 fos ability to be destructive far beyond their performance, was a menace, and 
 caused a suspension of the invasion of Cuba. If Cervera's fleet had returned 
 to Spain, and there had been a show of mustering the naval force of that 
 nation for a rush upon the Philippines or into the harbor of Havana, the 
 course of war events would have been largely changed, though there is no 
 reason to be persuaded that changed results would have been reached. 
 Still, the commitment of our army to the siege of Havana would have been a 
 dangerous first move, for from what we know of the array and armament of 
 Blanco, his force in the field and the formidableness of his fortifications, it 
 would have been beyond our strength to take the capital city of Cuba before 
 the rainy season, and we should have been constrained "to fight it out with the 
 Spaniards in the place where they were most thoroughly prepared, and could 
 have concentrated their whole army, while our troops would have been 
 sufferers from insufficient or impure water supplies, and victimized by the 
 yellow fever. Once occupied in besieging Havana, we could not have aban- 
 doned it, and our ill-prepared regiments must have taken the lines of the 
 enemy by assault as the way that would save the soldiers from fevers by 
 shedding their blood. That is to say, the Santiago policy must have been 
 introduced at an earlier day and on a larger scale ; and whila the victory at 
 Havana the valor and numbers of our soldiers should have won, might have 
 been more conclusive than that of Santiago, it must have been more costly. 
 It is not surprising that the Secretary of War and the Major General com- 
 manding did not come to an agreement on plans of campaign, for it is accord- 
 ing to the weight of the facts in the scales, that in theory of war the General 
 wanted too much professional elaboration, and the Secretary had a hazardous 
 confidence the war could be suddenly finished by rushing it and deliver- 
 ing blows with the utmost celerity, assuming the enemy to lack in preparation 
 for defense, as much as we were wanting in equipage for offense. It was 
 Cervera's fitful fleet that put an end to the proposed assault upon Havana, 
 that it might be captured before the rains and the fevers came to destroy the 
 tens of thousands while the sword devoured its thousands. 
 
 The first telegram of the long series is this : 
 
 "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C, May 9, 1898. — The 
 Major General commanding directs that the following orders be sent by 
 telegraph to General Wade, at Tampa: 
 
UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER IN FULL MARCHING ORDER. 
 
MODEL or GUNS USED ON AFT DECKS. 
 
 10-INCH DISAPPEARING GUN CAEEIAGE. MODEL. 1896. 
 
THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 357 
 
 "Direct Major-General Shafter to move his command, under protection 
 of Navy, and seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of 
 Cuba, and where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his 
 command with all the forces sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly 
 as possible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped; 
 send abundance of ammunition and ship with them food for men and animals 
 for sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies. 
 
 "J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General." 
 
 There is a certain uncertainty about this, not removed by the words 
 "ample," to describe "territory," or "rapidly as possible," "fully equipped," 
 "abundance of ammunition." There is more cadence than command in this. 
 It is a flourish of phrases rather than an order. But the Secretary of War 
 and the Commanding General appear to have started together. • Adjutant 
 General Corbin forwarded the order that the Major-General commanding, 
 with the approval of the Secretary, directed. Of course this meant the execu- 
 tion of the Havana plan. The first difficulty was the lack of fresh water at 
 Key West. This interfered with the concentration of a large force there. 
 
 The Commanding General, April 15 th, had sent orders to all departments. 
 The generals in the field were designated as follows: Maj. Gen. John R. 
 Brooke, Chickamauga Park ; Brig. Gen. William R. Shafter, New Orleans, La. ; 
 Brig. Gen. J. J. Coppinger, Mobile, Ala. ; Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade, Tampa, 
 Fla. 
 
 The war telegrams from the war office began to fly April 15 th. The first 
 in order after the preparatory dispatches to the army posts, were these : 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, April 15, 1898. 
 Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade, 
 
 Commanding Department Dakota, St. Paul, Minn. : 
 
 With approval of Secretary of War, the Major General commanding army 
 directs, as necessary for the public service, that you, accompanied by your 
 adjutant-general, proceed with least practicable delay to Tampa, Fla., to 
 assume command of troops ordered to rendezvous there. Please designate 
 officer to perform duties of adjutant-general at department headquarters and 
 submit names of other staff officers whom you desire to take with you. 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
3S8 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, April 15, 1898. 
 Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade, 
 
 Commanding Department Dakota, St. Paul, Minn. : 
 
 Referring to previous telegrams on the same subject, the Major-General 
 commanding army, with approval of Secretary of War, directs, as necessary 
 for the public service, that you order your chief quartermaster to proceed 
 immediately and in advance of your own departure to Tampa, Fla. , for the 
 purpose of selecting suitable ground as a camp for the troops ordered to 
 rendezvous there for your action on arrival. SCHWAN, A. A. G. 
 
 This was a week before the declaration of war. Three days before the 
 declaration, April i8th, in full view of the impending crisis, the Major-General 
 commanding put in the strongest terms his admonitions that the troops should 
 be located in healthful camps, and his opinion that it would be "extremely 
 hazardous" and injudicious to put an army in Cuba, considering the season of 
 the year, "as it would undoubtedly be decimated by the deadly disease, to say 
 nothing of having to cope with some 80,000 troops, the remnant of 214,000, 
 that have become acclimated, and that are equipped with 183 guns. And 
 still another element of extreme danger would be to place an army there with 
 the possibility of our own navy not being able to keep the waters between our 
 own territory and that island clear of hostile ships or fleets." The feeling of 
 the Commanding General that the navy might not be able to afford perfect 
 protection to the army in course of transportation, or after disembarkation on 
 a hostile shore, was not shared seriously by naval officers whose confidence in 
 victory over the Spanish was never clouded, but no intelligent persons 
 could escape the presence of peril in placing the army in Cuba before the 
 question of commanding the surrounding seas was settled by actual combat or 
 the retirement of the Spaniards from the scenes of activity. The Major- 
 General commanding shared in the ordinary expressions of well-informed 
 public opinion, among which was the spread of the yellow fever in our own 
 country as an incident of our military expeditions, and he thought it possible 
 to "compel the surrender of the army on the island of Cuba with very little 
 loss of life. ' ' There was manifestly a reliance in the military mind upon the 
 blockade which was in the thoughts of all men— and indeed distorted by the 
 popular imagination. The food productiveness of Cuba had not been realized. 
 It had, surprisingly, survived the torch, the machete, and the "zones of cultiva- 
 tion, ' ' of the desolation of which so much was said. 
 
THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 359 
 
 There was "still time, " the Commanding General said, "to put a small 
 force of regular troops, numbering approximately 18,000 .men, in healthful 
 camps until such time as they can be used on the island of Cuba with safety. ' ' 
 Here was the first development of disagreement. The experienced officers 
 understood the meaning of "healthful camps," but Congress and the country 
 basked in a state of enthusiasm, and were slow of comprehension of the most 
 sinister feature of the conditions — the inability of new troops to make use of 
 their rations and take care of themselves in camps. In the presence of a 
 combination of the inexperience both of officers and privates, and impractica- 
 bility of providing the articles demanded for nearly a quarter of a million men 
 turned suddenly into the fields from their habitations, there was no avoidance 
 of discomfort, and the carelessness of the men in exposing themselves, so as 
 to be partially disqualified for instruction, was as certain as the rains and the 
 changing temperature by day, and night, of the winds. It was much easier to 
 talk of healthful camps than to find them, and still harder to preserve the 
 wholesomeness of grounds selected. 
 
 The American people in the hurries of their labors in expanding the 
 cultivation of the continent, building cities and mills, clearing away forests, 
 establishing the drainage of thickly settled communities, have fallen into 
 methods of improvement that unfortunately have promoted the washing away 
 of the fertile properties of the soil — this to a great extent by the inconsiderate 
 waste of forests — the diminution in volume of the brooks that once turned 
 grist mills, beautified the country, and were full of food fishes, and the 
 pollution of living streams from villages, towns, cities, and, above all, manu- 
 factories, wherein the conversion of raw materials into articles involved 
 chemical and mechanical changes. At the same time, the water supplies for 
 the centers of concentrated population have been found in dangerous associa- 
 tion with the drainage of impurities. 
 
 There were imperative reasons for camps in Florida, that peninsula being 
 the closest approximation of our land to that of the Spaniards — Cuba being 
 within a day's run of Tampa. This was fair striking distance. It permitted 
 the close prognostication of the weather, an exceedingly important advan- 
 tage in the transfer of an army by ships to make a landing that would be in 
 all probability disputed by heavy masses of infantry and artillery. It was held 
 that the sojourn of our young men in Florida would in a degree be an 
 advanced step of acclimatization, a half-way resting place between the fields" 
 
36o THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 
 
 and shops of America, and the trials of the threatening Cuban climate, famous 
 for its deadly influences upon invading armies, as both Spanish and English 
 history gave expositions. This memorandum for the Adjutant-General, and 
 the response of that officer, gave the official history of the direction to General 
 Shaffer to take command of the regular army that was to be the head of the 
 spear to penetrate Cuba: 
 
 Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C, April 29, 1898. 
 The Major-General commanding desires that, by letter. Brig. Gen. 
 William R. Shaffer be directed, upon his arrival at Tampa, Fla. , to assume 
 command of all troops now assembled there. 
 
 J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, 
 
 Washington, April 29, 1898. 
 Brig. Gen. William R. Shafter, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Sir : Under instructions from the President, the Secretary of War directs 
 that upon your arrival at Tampa, Fla. , you assume command of all the troops 
 assembled there. Very respectfully, 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 The water supply deficiency was the first embarrassment encountered. 
 This was known to be an awaiting woe at Key West, but was not expected to 
 lurk at Tampa also. General Shaffer's first dispatches disclosed that his 
 plunge into the task assigned him had located a rising tide of troubles : 
 
 Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 7, 1898 — 3:44 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Am crowding work of watering and coal transport, and put in pen and 
 stall for sortie (stock?). Will have it completed Wednesday sure. Many 
 
 obstacles to SHAFTER, Brigadier-General. 
 
 (Note. — Telegram apparently not completed.) 
 
 Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 7, 1898 — 6:50 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General, United States Army, 
 
 War Department, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Colonel Lawton just returned from Key West. Brings message from 
 
 Commodore Watson that water is absolutely necessary; that supply on all 
 
 ships is very short, and that if can assist him in getting supply it will be a 
 
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 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 363 
 
 start in morning for Key West, towed by one of ships under charter. Cost of 
 water two cents per gallon. No tug here for hire. Shall I send it? 
 
 SHAFTER, Brigadier-General. 
 
 The footnote that the telegram of Shatter appeared to be unfinished is an 
 example of the thoroughness with which the telegraphic correspondence has 
 been given to the public. The dispatch had a word evidently of erroneous 
 writing, and the unbroken termination tells that a work of "watering" was in 
 progress, and between the words is the easy reading that the work watering 
 ships was slow, and that the least of the evil consequences was loss of time. 
 The news from Key West was that those who got further along were faring 
 worse. 
 
 Adjutant-General Corbin's reply to Shatter's dispatch of May 7th, dated 
 6:50 p. m., about the short water supply at Key West, was rushed the follow- 
 ing morning: 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 8, 1898. 
 General Shatter, Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla. : 
 
 Your telegram concerning water supply for Commodore Watson received, 
 and Secretary of War directs you to make every possible effort to furnish any- 
 thing and everything to help him along. In this and other cases Secretary of 
 War approves any action you take, but desires every such order of yours 
 reported for his information. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 May loth, by direction of the Major-General commanding, the invasion of 
 Cuba was postponed for a week : 
 
 Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C, May 10, 1898. 
 
 The Major-General commanding directs that the following orders be 
 telegraphed General Wade, Tampa, Fla. : That the movement of troops to 
 Cuba is delayed until Monday, May 16, 1898. In the meantime, he will send 
 the infantry in the ships, with an abundant supply of water and whatever else 
 is required with them, to Key West, there to disembark. The ships are to 
 return to Tampa to carry more infantry to Key West, until there are about 
 12,000 men there. These will move from Key West, to Dry Tortugas and 
 Cuba, on ships coming from New York. Also, that General Brooke has been 
 directed to send to Tampa from Chickamauga the Second, Seventh, Eighth, 
 Twelfth, and Sixteenth Infantry. These can be forwarded to Key West 
 by any means available. 
 
 J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
364 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 
 
 The ne?ct day after the order of 12,000 troops to Key West, came to hand 
 this jarring information about the water supply: 
 
 Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 11, 1898. 
 
 (Received Washington, 8:12 p. m.) 
 Adjutant-General United States Army, for Commanding General, 
 War Department, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Water for large body of troops at Key West is serious question. Abso- 
 lutely no water there. Only water barge from this port, capacity 130,000 
 gallons, should reach Key West to-morrow with water for navy, and be back 
 Friday. Transports carry considerable water, but have no way of distillation. 
 Is imperative that water be placed in Key West before troops begin to arrive. 
 Quartermaster-General has been asked to charter, clean, loan, and start 
 1,000,000 gallons tank steamer with light draft barge for unloading. Dry 
 Tortugas reported to have brackish water in cisterns. Am now trying to 
 ascertain quantity and quality. Expect information. 
 
 J. F. WADE, Brigadier-General. 
 
 On the same day the Major-General commanding directed the troops at 
 Tampa to be in readiness to ship to Dry Tortugas (ominous name !) to be 
 there on the morning of the i6th. 
 
 Here is an example of a way a rumor appears in an official telegram : 
 (Telegram. — Rush. — Confidential.) 
 ' Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 13, 1898. 
 Col. A. S. Kimball, Army Building, New York City: 
 
 Report at once any information you have about Spanish war boats on our 
 coast. Give full information. Hold transports until further orders. 
 Acknowledge. NELSON A. MILES, 
 
 Major-General Commanding Army. 
 
 It has often been remarked that as a rule a dispatch is more important at 
 the delivery than at the receiving end of the wire over which it passes, and 
 that the magnifying power of a wire is in proportion to its length. A "head- 
 quarters' ' will be more stirred up by a telegram than the personal report of a 
 scout- An official dispatch increases the phenomenon of long-distance teleg- 
 raphy. 
 
 The dispatches from Major-General Shaffer were at this period thoughtful, 
 and straight shots. He recommended legislation to enable soldiers on the 
 field "to exercise the frg,nking privilege as was done during the War of the 
 
THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 365 
 
 Rebellion," urged that recruits should join their regiments when they could 
 be under the control of the officers who would command them, stopped part 
 of the volunteer regiments at Jacksonville owing to "difficulty of finding suit- 
 able camping ground with abundant water supply. ' ' 
 
 On this last dispatch Corbin telegraphed that the Secretary of War 
 wanted "further recommendation on this line as to distribution of troops, with 
 view to their comfort and their ultimate transport from Tampa." 
 
 The Seventy-first New York regiment attracted the attention of Shafter, 
 who telegraphed : 
 
 Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 22, 1898. 
 
 (Received, Washington, 6:33 p. m.) 
 Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Upon personal report to me by colonel of the Seventy-first New York 
 that 300 of his men have never fired a gun, I have ordered 15,000 rounds of 
 ammunition be given that regiment for target practice. Will do same with 
 other volunteer regiments that I find uninstructed. 
 
 SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 General Corbin telegraphed Shafter asking him to take up and solve the 
 question of organization of the Fifth and Seventh corps and "do a very great 
 service." The dispatch from Shafter, one of the important papers, is as 
 follows : 
 
 Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 24, 1898. 
 
 (Received, Washington, 2:45 P- m-) 
 The Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Recommend brigades to consist of three regiments of infantry, three 
 brigades to a division. Regular regiments to be brigaded together, adding 
 two volunteer regiments to the sixteen regular regiments already here to form 
 first and second divisions of Fifth Army Corps, the other corps to be formed 
 in like manner from volunteer regiments. General officers in order of rank of 
 respective corps to command divisions as fast as organized; others to com- 
 mand brigades. Staff officers recently appointed to be assigned as far as 
 practicable with the volunteers, in order to give brigade commanders the 
 benefit of their experience. The five cavalry regiments here now to be 
 formed into two brigades of three and two regiments respectively. Should 
 cavalry volunteer regiments be assigned here, brigades then to be formed 
 with two regiments each. The number of regiments for each brigade as I 
 
366 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 
 
 have indicated is approved by General Wheeler. Other general officers whom 
 I have consulted agree with me as to the number of regiments to constitute a 
 brigade. Recommend placing all the regular regiments in one corps, so that 
 they may be taken first for service in Cuba. If this is not satisfactory, half 
 of the regulars can be assigned to each corps, and in event of an ad- 
 vance on Cuba the regulars in each corps formed for the advance. I think, 
 however, that it would be better to have all regulars in one corps. The 
 light artillery should (remain), as at present, all together under charge of 
 Colonel Randolph. They should accompany the advance, and then be 
 assigned one battery to each division and one to cavalry corps, the remainder 
 to constitute the reserve. If this project is approved, I request early order, 
 and I will immediately proceed to complete the organization. I have been led 
 to make the recommendations in view of an early advance, and from the fact 
 that I believe the first battle will be the decisive one and that the best troops 
 should bear the brunt, suppoi'ted as strongly as possible by the volunteers. 
 
 SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding. 
 
 This dispatch is a model of executive statement and the last sentence not 
 only contains the outlines of the Santiago campaign, but is marked by the 
 sagacity that solved the situation — "the first battle will be the decisive one, 
 and the best troops should bear the brunt." It was sound military sense in 
 Shafter to discern six weeks ahead of the fact that the decisive battle would 
 be the first one, and he wanted no mistake about that. General Shafter thus 
 emerged from the moonshine of distant speculation, and put himself in the 
 place of the critical command and mapped the event, without knowing where 
 on the island the fateful field was located. 
 
 In the wars that may Hereafter come upon us, this is an example to be 
 quoted. It is a line of sunlight to be distinguished in the morning, followed 
 to the noon of victory. The importance of the increase of the regular army 
 is tremendously increased by the truth, plain now and to be more and more 
 made known to the comprehensive assimilation of the intelligence gathered by 
 prescient observation, that the decisive battles will be the first ones, or at 
 least that the losers of the opeiiing engagements will find the cost of the 
 restoration of fallen fortunes intolerably augmented by the education of 
 sufficient armies, after the wars are on. In the campaigns of modern warfare 
 there is no instance but that in our war of States in the United States in 
 which the winners of the first serious combat were not those who gained the 
 
THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 
 
 367 
 
 closing triumph; and it was a terrible road to travel from Manassas to 
 Appomattox. In the Crimean war the allies held the field of battle of Alma. 
 In the Franco- Austrian war Marshal McMahon was the victor at Magenta, and 
 it was followed by Solferino. The Prussians won the first events in the 
 advance into Silesia in the combat with Austria, and Sadowa was the finish. 
 In the Franco-German war the French lost the skirmishes on the frontier, the 
 battles of Woerth and Saarbriick, and the end was Gravelotte, Sedan, and the 
 capitulation of Paris. The same fatality was visible in the English invasion 
 of Egypt, the Chilean assault upon Peru, the Japanese advance into China, the 
 Turkish htimiliation of the Greeks. 
 
 These object lessons all tell the same story. They mean the necessity 
 that is imposed upon a nation of great resources— a fine place for looting, as 
 Blucher said of London — to have a competent army ; first for the insurance of 
 peace with dignity and honor, second to guard against the misfortune of 
 insufficiency at the start when the red flame of war bursts through the roofs 
 and the walls of the world, and one disaster makes way for another — following 
 fast and following faster — all modern improvements hastening and extending 
 the original impulse to ruin. Every decent sentiment of national duty 
 demands of the people of the United States that they shall be an armed 
 nation. It turned out at Santiago as Shaffer said it would somewhere, that 
 the decision would be made where the armies of the belligerents first *met in 
 battle array. It was the foresight that put the regulars to the front where the 
 swords crossed, that enabled us to close the campaign with a clap of thunder 
 and a blaze of glory. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 The Phantom Fleets of Spain in Cuban Waters. 
 
 Admiral Cervera Sailed into the Unkno-wn and Became a Mystery and a Menace— He 
 Appeared and Disappeared and Was at Last Found at Santiago by Commodore 
 Schley-^Imperative Demands for Information Answered — The Orders of General 
 Shatter and Plans of General Miles — Dramatic Scenes at Tampa — Just as the Great 
 Fleet was Sailing Another Spanish Hoodoo Fleet was Announced — After All a Pros- 
 perous Voyage, and Easy Landing. 
 
 The fleet of Admiral Cervera sailed from the Cape Verde Islands April 
 29th, four arinored cruisers, and three torpedo gunboats. The destination 
 could only be conjectured. The surface- indications were that the Spaniards 
 had done the best they could, but the Cadiz squadron was not in form for 
 fighting. The Cervera fleet was obviously unequal to raising the blockade of 
 Cuba, and must have for its objective an appearance on our North Atlantic 
 coast, with the view of exciting an alarm that would be a diversion, or to 
 maneuver in the West Indies, to disturb the disposition of those destined to 
 invade Cuba. 
 
 The Spanish cruisers had a high reputation for speed, and were undoubt- 
 edly swifter than the fleet of Admiral Sampson, which was limited in move- 
 ment to the rate at which the monitors could be towed, and for a time it was 
 held by those who gave time to conjecture that the real object of the 
 Spaniards was to capture the Oregon, whose voyage from the Pacific to the 
 Atlantic was of universal knowledge, and the interest in it constant and keen. 
 There was a hawk in the sky, and it might strike anywhere. May 7th Admiral 
 Sampson was informed at Cape Haitien that the Spanish squadron was 
 reported at St. Thomas. May 14th the. roving cruisers of Spain were off 
 Curacoa. The bombardment of San Juan, Porto Rico, by Admiral Sampson's 
 fieet, took place on the loth of May. On the 226. was received a dispatch' from 
 Key West that Cerveca's fleet was in the Santiago harbor. The Naval 
 Department had information that— we quote the Secretary of the Navy— the ' 
 
 36S 
 
PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 369 
 
 "Spanish fleet had munitions of war destined for the defense of Havana, and 
 was under imperative orders to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a port connected 
 with Havana by rail; and that as Cienfuegos appeared to be the only port ful- 
 filling the conditions, the Flying Squadron would be instructed upon arrival 
 at Key West to proceed to Cienfuegos. Instructions were at the same time 
 given to Admiral Sampson to increase the Flying Squadron by such armored 
 ships as he might deem desirable. ' ' 
 
 It turned out that for a time Cervera's fleet, which had taken refuge at 
 Santiago, because short of coal and provisions, occupied the attention of 
 both our superior squadrons, and detained the army that was going to Cuba. 
 May 27th, the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War: "If the Span- 
 ish fleet is in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I expect absolute information to 
 that effect from our naval commanding officer at any moment. On receipt 
 of that, information, the movement to Santiago should be made without a 
 moment's delay, day or night," and of this he had advised Admiral Sampson 
 and Commodore Schley. The Secretary telegraphed Sampson : 
 
 "If Cervera's division is proved to be in Santiago, it is intended to make 
 immediately a descent upon that port with 10,000 troops, landing about eight 
 miles east of port. You will be expected to convoy the transports, probably 
 fifteen or twenty, going in person and taking with you New York, Indiana, 
 Oregon, and as many smaller - vessels with good batteries as can possibly be 
 gathered. ' ' 
 
 This was partly in apprehension of the torpedo vessels. The blockade of 
 Havana was to be provided for by the monitors and gunboats. 
 
 The Secretary's telegram to Commodore Schley was: 
 
 "The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether 
 Cervera's division is in Santiago harbor, as, if so, an immediate movement 
 against him and the town will be made by the navy and a division of about 
 10,000 of our troops, which are all ready to embark. Your difficulties regard- 
 ing coaling must be surmounted by your own ingenuity and perseverance. 
 This is a crucial time, and the Department relies upon you to give quickly 
 information as to Cervera's presence, and to be all ready for concerted action 
 with the army. Two colliers have been ordei^ed to St. Nicolas Mole." 
 
 The coast line of Cuba is almost as long as that of our country on the 
 Atlantic. The island is nearly eighteen hundred miles from east to west, and 
 there are many islands and reefs. Blockading vessels looking for a hostile 
 
370 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 
 
 fleet are surprising consumers of coal, and battleships are, as a rule, hard to 
 coal unless in comfortable quarters. Commodore Schley was not convinced 
 as quickly as others that the Cape Verde fleet was at Santiago, and hesitated 
 whether to go to Key West for coal. He knew that if Cervera was to give 
 relief to the city of Havana, he must do it from Cienfuegos, within easy reach 
 of the capital by rail, and that if he was aggressive. But Cervera, instead of 
 seeking enemies, was striving to elude them, and secure coal and provisions 
 for his men, do what was possible in the way of clearing his ships to restore 
 their much declined speed. The Commodore, however, concluded after he 
 had sent out dispatches that he was going to Key West, that his first duty was 
 to find certainly that Cervera was or was not at Santiago, and wisely 
 turned his ships about and drove them east. May 28th he cabled from 
 Kingston : 
 
 "Have been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, 
 Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leav- 
 ing Key West. The Brooklyn alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed 
 to Key West ; cannot remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account. 
 Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to south- 
 westerly winds. Harvard reports coal sufficient for Jamaica ; leaves to-day for 
 Kingston; reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole. Minne- 
 apolis only coaled for Key West ; also Yale, which tows Merrimac. Much to 
 be regretted, can not obey orders of Department. Have striven earnestly; 
 forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Cannot 
 ascertain anything respecting enemy positive. Obliged to send Eagle — 
 admitted no delay — to Port Antonio, Jamaica; had only 25 tons of coal. 
 Will leave St. Paul off Santiago de Cuba. Will require 10,000 tons of coal at 
 Key West. Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold. " 
 
 On the same day Long telegraphed : 
 
 Washington, May 28, 1898. 
 Harvard, care American Consul, Kingston, Jamaica: 
 
 Following must be delivered to Schley as soon as possible;, utmost 
 urgency. Unless it is unsafe, your squadron Department wishes you to 
 remain off Santiago, so can not you take possession of Guantanamo, occupy 
 as a coaling station? If you must leave, are authorized to sink collier in the 
 mouth of harbor if you can obstruct thereby, but if not so used and not 
 necessary to you, it would be desirable to leave her Nicholas Mole or vicinity. 
 
PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 37 1 
 
 You must not leave the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it is unsafe your 
 squadron, or unless Spanish division is not there. LONG. 
 
 Sampson to Long, Key West, May 28 : 
 
 "He has sufficient coal aboard, undoubtedly, to keep sea for some time, 
 as all except Iowa left here full. The importance of absolutely preventing 
 departure of Spanish squadron of paramount importance, and demands the 
 most prompt and efficient use of every means. ' ' 
 
 May 29, Sampson to Long: 
 
 "The failure of Schley to continue blockade must be remedied at once if 
 possible. There can be no doubt of presence of Spanish division at Santiago. ' ' 
 
 Long to Schley, May 29: 
 
 "Schley, Mole Haiti. (Also sent to Port Antonio and to Kingston, 
 Jamaica). — ^It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish fleet is in 
 Santiago and report. Would be discreditable to the navy if that fact were not 
 ascertained immediately. All military and naval movements depend upon 
 that point. ' ' 
 
 Schley to Long : 
 
 "Off Santiago de Cuba, May 29, 10 a. m.— Enemy in port. Recognized 
 Cristobal Colon, Infanta Maria Teresa, and two torpedo-boat destroyers 
 moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. I have 
 not sufficient coal. ' ' 
 
 Long to Sampson, 29: 
 
 "Schley has seen the Spanish fleet at Santiago." 
 
 Washington, May 29, 1898. 
 
 Cotton, U. S. S. Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica: 
 
 Return to Schley with this message. Hold on at all hazards. New York, 
 Oregon, and New Orleans are on the way. St. Louis and Yankee just leaving 
 New York for Santiago, via Nicholas Mole. Two more colliers en route. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 Washington, May 30, 1898. 
 Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica: 
 
 Deliver Schley following: Where are the other two armored cruisers, 
 Spanish fleet? When discovered, please report promptly. Commander-in- 
 Chief North Atlantic Station has started to join you. ■ LONG. 
 
 Commodore Schley made for Santiago in .good time. The tone of the 
 Sampson and the Long dispatches was not that of approval of the Commo- 
 dore's disability from lack of coal. The Secretary asked, on the 30th of May, 
 
372 PHANTOM FLEETS OP SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 
 
 where the two apmored cruisers of Spain Schley had not seen were. Schley 
 had seen two of the four cruisers, and the two torpedo boats — and reporting 
 them by name, added, "Doubtless the others are here." Of course, that was 
 according to the probabilities, but it was necessary to be sure of all the Span- 
 iards, — and so the energetic Secretary cautioned : 
 
 Washington, May 31, 1898. 
 Sampson, care Cable Office, Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti: 
 
 It is essential to know if all of four Spanish armored cruisers in Santiago, 
 as our military expedition must wait for this information. Report as soon as 
 possible. LONG. 
 
 Schley's answer, May 31st, mentioned that he needed more picket boats 
 very badly, and he added: "Have seen one more vessel of the Vizcaya class 
 in port. " The Commodore would not, however, swear it was the Vizcaya. 
 
 On the 29th Sampson had come around to this: 
 
 "Telegram just received from Schley shows that he is to-day blockading 
 Santiago de Cuba, and will continue to do so until coal supply has been 
 reduced to safe limit for large ships. " 
 
 Two days later Schley was telegraphing from in front of Santiago. 
 * ' Smooth sea here now. ' ' The waves were not running so high, but Schley 
 had not seen all the Spanish cruisers, and it would not do to let any of them 
 ^et out when our transports were on the wing. 
 
 The Secretary of the Nayy had a slight attack of Cuban stories delivered 
 in this official form: 
 
 Washington, May 30, 1898. 
 Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica: 
 
 Deliver following to Schley: Sagua, 25 miles east of Santiago, is reported 
 a good place for landing, and that the insurgents have entire possession of 
 this vicinity, and some horses of their cavalry are kept about a mile inland. 
 Prom thence it has been reported easy to reach the heights in the rear of 
 Santiago, commanding view of the whole harbor, without any probability of 
 meeting with the Spanish forces. Por miles the road is mountainous, and 
 after this very fair. LONG. 
 
 The subsequent proceedings at Santiago did not show that the reports to 
 the Secretary that he sent on to Schley were strictly accurate. The Cuban 
 cavalry of the coast guard did not muster in force when wanted, and the 
 heights in the rear of Santiago were not "easy to reach" without meeting 
 
PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 373 
 
 several Spaniards, and right in the neighborhood the Cubans to sacrifice 
 their lives for their Republic were not reported as numerous, and never were 
 found by burial parties. But Admiral Sampson proceeded to Santiago 
 waters, on this dispatch from Long dated May 29th: "Department thinks it 
 very desirable that you carry out recommendation to go yourself with two 
 ships to Santiago de Cuba;" and the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic 
 squadron certified to "a reliable Cuban" as follows: 
 
 Mole Haiti, June 4, 1898. 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington : 
 
 Off Santiago, June 3.— Some observations made to-day by a reliable 
 Cuban, in accordance with my instructions, made four armored vessels and 
 two torpedo destroyers at Santiago. At that time repairs and more coal 
 needed by them. SAMPSON. 
 
 This made up the full list of the Spanish fleet seen in the harbor of 
 •Santiago. 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy, on May 31st, wanted to know from the War 
 Department, as there seemed to be a movement of the army at hand, ' ' what 
 means are to be employed by the War Department for landing the troops, 
 artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other heavy objects, when the 
 pending military expedition arrives on the Cuban coast near Santiago. ' ' 
 
 It was pointed out that the crews of the armored ships "ought not to be 
 fatigued by the work incident to landing troops, stores, etc." They were 
 going to have to remove Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish fleet in 
 .action, and so must not be overworked. The boys were eventually able to 
 help themselves ashore, but the transfer from the ships to the land was not 
 accompanied with facilities of the most modern sort. We were a shade 
 deficient in that line, but the men were shifty and glad to swim ashore when 
 boats were scarce, but they left their supplies. 
 
 It seemed that the time for action had arrived, and that the personal tele- 
 grams of General Corbin and the cipher dispatch to General Shafter following 
 made the start of the embarked army definite and certain : 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 30, 1898 — 11:30 p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla. : 
 
 My telegram just now said important telegram would reach you in a few 
 minutes. It may be an hour before I can have it ready, but no more. 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
374 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 
 
 War Department, Washington, May 30, 1898. 
 
 (Sent in cipher May 31, 1898, 2:30 a. m.) 
 Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla. : 
 
 With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your 
 command on transports, proceed under convoy of tho Navy to the vicinity of 
 Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as 
 your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto 
 the high ground and bluffs, overlooking the harbor, or into the interior, as shall 
 best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there ; and cover the navy as 
 it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or with the aid of the navy 
 capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago Harbor. 
 You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the govern- 
 ment relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of your 
 command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplishing 
 this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your assistance any 
 of the insurgent forces in that vicinity, and make use of such of them as you 
 think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are 
 cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside of your 
 troops. You will take every precaution against ambuscades or surprises or 
 positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces. 
 You will cooperate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agree- 
 ing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to 
 Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion of this enterprise, 
 unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain in the harbor 
 of Santiago de Cuba, reembark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Port 
 de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders and future 
 important service. This with the understanding that your command has not 
 sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your transports and 
 convoy. When will you sail? 
 
 By command of Major-General Miles : 
 
 H. C.CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 31, 1898—11:58 a. m. 
 Gen. H. C. Corbin, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Telegram received 3:45 this morning now being deciphered. Yourboy 
 will go with me, and I shall take same care of him I would my own. Much 
 love. SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding. 
 
PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 375 
 
 On the 27th of May General Miles had addressed a letter to the Secretary 
 of War, saying he thought it would be advisable to "land transports with a 
 strong force, ' ' and so on, and with army and navy together capture the harbor, 
 garrison and fleet at Santiago. If this happened prematurely, the General 
 argued, "We will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a combined 
 effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrison, provided it is done 
 before it can be reinforced from Spain. The distance from Key West to 
 Porto Rico is 1,040 miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Porto Rico, it is about 
 4,000 miles. The possession of Porto Rico would be of very great advantage 
 to the military, as it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thou- 
 sand prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a 
 most excellent port for our navy, which could be speedily relieved from any 
 responsibility in the charge of that port, as we could leave a sufficient garrison 
 to hold it against any force that might be sent against it." 
 
 After this there was to be "a movement toward the west," and a base 
 found at Nuevitas along the Puerto Principe railroad — insurgents to be 
 supplied with the usual "abundance of arms and munitions of war," our 
 people acting in conjunction "with the forces of Lieutenant-General 
 Garcia, and General Gomez" — and the general gave this cheerful reassur- 
 ance: 
 
 "These movements, in my judgment, can all be accomplished during the 
 rainy season, through a country comparatively free from yellow fever, well 
 stocked with cattle, and having grass sufficient for our animals. While this is 
 ^eing accomplished our volunteer army will be prepared to land in the vicinity 
 of Mariel, Havana, or Matanzas in sufficient force to complete the capture or 
 destruction of the Spanish forces upon the island of Cuba. The advantage of 
 this movement will be that the army and navy will act in concert and close 
 unison." 
 
 Another recommendation was that this would not divide the navy, and 
 the General adds: "I believe that the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos can 
 be obstructed or blockaded by one or two monitors to better advantage than 
 to send the army there, where it would have to meet a strong garrison, which 
 is already there."' 
 
 The only detail neglected is as to the two monitors. The General does 
 not say whether they should be allowed to float — if they may be said to float 
 — or sunk altogether; and the General does not say whether the "close unison" 
 
376 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 
 
 of the army and navy could be best secured by himself or Admiral Sampson, 
 becoming Commander-in-Chief of both Army and Navy. Of course, the only- 
 real objection to this happy adjustment would be that the Constitution of the 
 United States is an instrument that reserves the command in chief of the sail- 
 ors and soldiers, afloat and ashore, to the President alone. In the instructions 
 sent by General Miles to General Shafter from Washington, May 31, 2:30 a. 
 m., Shafter was told to move his army as liis judgment might dictate, "onto 
 the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior." 
 
 Shafter being thus instructed, the Major-General left for Tampa at once, 
 arriving June ist. 
 
 The first bulletin from the Major-General commanding, General Miles, 
 after his arrival at Tampa was that men were working night and day, and. 
 there was an important and gratifying telegram to the effect that "Dorst, 
 Captain," had at Port Banes, northern coast, directly opposite Santiago, 
 "landed over 400 armed and equipped Cubans; 1,300,000 rounds ammuni- 
 tion, Springfield and Remington; 7,500 Springfield rifles; 20,000 rations,, 
 besides large quantities equipment and clothing; 24 horses; 74 mules." 
 
 As for Spanish troops there were 40,000 in the province of Santiago, and 
 "nearly 1,000 insurgent troops" had arrived at Banes, a favorite resort, no 
 doubt, of the Cuban navy! General Miles reported favorably June 2d as to 
 work going on, saying: "The working force at Tampa has been divided into 
 three reliefs, each working eight hours during the twenty-four, nine ships, 
 being loaded at one time. ' ' 
 
 Rear Admiral Sicard recommended that to secure secrecy as to army 
 movements, "the commanding officer of the army in Tampa and of the navy 
 at Key West be directed to seize and detain all press boats, of whatever 
 character, in those ports, and to prevent their following the expedition, plac- 
 ing, if necessary, a file of soldiers or marines on board to enforce obedience; 
 and likewise that the commanding naval officer of the convoy be directed, in 
 case a press boat joins the fleet, to take charge of her and compel her to- 
 remain until he reaches the Commander-in-Chief, who shall also detain her so- 
 long as he thinks expedient to do so. ' ' 
 
 Orders were issued accordingly. Shafter telegraphed that the difficulties 
 in loading could not be appreciated. General Miles illustrated the embarrass- 
 ments: "Fifteen cars loaded with uniforms were sidetracked 25 miles away 
 from Tampa, and remained there for weeks while the troops were suffering. 
 
PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 377 
 
 for clothing. Five thousand rifles, which were discovered yesterday, were 
 needed by "several regiments. Also, the different parts of the siege train and 
 ammunition for same, which will be required immediately on landing. ' ' 
 
 It was the next day that Admiral Sampson cabled that the Merrimac was 
 in the channel, and Cervera "safely bottled up." The Secretary of the Navy 
 says in his report that when Sampson arrived off Santiago he found "Schley's 
 squadron in column to the westward of the mouth of the harbor, ' ' and ' ' on June 
 3rd an attempt was made to close the harbor by sinking across its entrance the 
 collier Merrimac. This attempt, though unsuccessful in its object, was dar- 
 ingly executed. It is now one of the well-known historic marvels of naval 
 adventure and enterprise, in which Naval Constructor Hobson and his men 
 won undying fame. ' ' 
 
 The President became impatient and wanted to know why there was so 
 much delay in getting off. Shaffer replied, June sth, 6:32 a. m., that "delays 
 occur that cannot be prevented or foreseen" — and, "Siege guns have only 
 been assembled late this evening. They will be loaded on cars to-night and 
 sent to transports early in the morning, and the loading rushed. Will begin 
 putting men on to-morrow p. m., if possible, and be ready to start Monday 
 night or Tuesday morning. The last of the troops from Chickamauga are 
 expected to-night. Officers engaged in loading transports have worked night 
 and day. The main cause for delay has been the fact that great quantities of 
 stores have Ijeen rushed in promiscuously, and with no facilities to handle or 
 store them. The last 10 miles before reaching the wharf is a single track, 
 and very narrow place in which to work. The capacity of this place has been 
 greatly exceeded. Could have put the troops on and rushed them off, but not 
 properly equipped as I know the President wishes them. I will not delay a 
 minute longer than is absolutely necessary to get my command in condition 
 and start the earliest moment possible. ' ' 
 
 June sth Gener'al Miles telegraphed that the delay had been caused 
 "through no fault of any one connected with it," and contained the principal 
 part of the army, "which for intelligence and efficiency was exceeded by no 
 body of troops on earth." The General requested "ample protection" for 
 this command from the navy while at sea — and he added: "This 
 enterprise is so important that I desire to go with this army corps, or to 
 immediately organize another and go with it to join this, and capture position 
 No. 2." 
 
378 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 
 
 General Miles telegraphed the day following that there should be "a 
 few regiments well equipped at Camp Alger." The words "few" and 
 "well" here are not of military precision — but the general proposition stands 
 ^ood. 
 
 Admiral Sampson had, on June 7th, "silenced works quickly without 
 injury of any kind. ' ' The general opinion is after the war that this sentence 
 should have read, "without injury of any kind to the works." The Admiral 
 also remarked: "If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be ours within 
 forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. 
 If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet. ' ' 
 
 This observation was not confirmed by Shaffer's experience with 18,000 
 men. Santiago was a hard, hot nut to crack. 
 
 The night of June 7th the Secretary of War telegraphed Shaffer: "The 
 President directs you to sail at once with what force you have ready," and 
 Shaffer's reply was worthy the occasion: 
 
 Tampa, Fla., June 7, 1898 — 9 p. m. 
 Secretary of War, Washington : 
 
 I will sail to-morrow morning. Steam cannot be gotten up earlier. 
 There is loaded to-night one division of infantry (9 regiments), 16 companies 
 of dismounted cavalry, 4 light batteries, 2 siege batteries artillery, 2 companies 
 of engineers, and the troops from Mobile. I will try and get on the rest of 
 the cavalry and another division of regular infantry by morning. I will sail 
 then with whatever I have on board. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 Executive Mansion, Washington, June 7, 1898. 
 General Shaffer, Tampa, Fla. : 
 
 About how many men will you have ready by morning? 
 
 CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 Port Tampa, Fla. (direct), June 7, 1898— 10:15 :p. m. 
 Adjutant-General Corbin: 
 
 I expect to have 834 officers, 16,154 men on transports by daylight, and 
 will sail at that hour. SHAFTER. 
 
 General Miles telegraphed that the last of the troops from Chickamauga 
 "arrived this morning and hurried to the steamers. " 
 
PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 381 
 
 This was a remarkable situation, and the next thing was a startling 
 shift of scenery : 
 
 War Department, Washington, D. C, June 8, 1898. 
 Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla. : 
 
 Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick. 
 
 R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 Port Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 4:06 p. m. 
 R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be able to stop 
 them before reaching the Gulf. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 War Department, Washington, June 8, 1898. 
 Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. : 
 
 The reason for countermanding order you will find in the following. 
 The order was given at the request of the Navy Department by direction of 
 the President: 
 
 "Key West, June 8. — Spanish armor cruiser, second class, and Spanish 
 torpedo-boat destroyer seen by Eagle, Nicholas Channel, Cuba.-^Remey. " 
 
 "Key West, June 8. — Last cipher just came by Resolute, just arrived; was 
 pursued by two vessels, Nicholas Channel, Cuba, last night. Shall I order 
 Indiana and all available cruisers to coast of Cuba? More detail to follow. — 
 RemeJ^" 
 
 Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 11:42 p. m. 
 Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 If that report is true, those Spanish vessels could be within six hours of 
 the loaded transports now, and there to-morrow. Have ample measures 
 been taken by the navy to insure their safety? MILES, Commanding. 
 
 General Miles took advantage of the interval to submit several questions, 
 suggestions and plans of campaign. He rattled the Secretary of War. 
 
 June 9th, 6:50 p. m. : "Think it would be well to announce that the army 
 got on board transports and started, as they did yesterday. Say nothing 
 about its being recalled, but let our naval vessels go over the course that our 
 transports would have gone over, with the hope of finding those Spanish 
 ships." 
 
 Now, the General wanted to know whether the presence of Spanish war 
 
382 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 
 
 vessels didn't render it extremely hazardous to send troops on transports until 
 
 the Spaniards were "captured, destroyed or driven away." The General 
 
 wanted to know whether he should go on with the organization of Expedition 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 The reply of the President was : 
 
 War Department, June 9, 1898. 
 Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. : 
 
 The President directs me to say that no change of plan will be made ; that 
 Expedition No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as possible. We are looking 
 for transports, and are satisfied the navy will take care of that problem. Give 
 nothing out. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 General Miles at once had another plan — not a change in the plan, but a 
 new one, right from the mint. It took hold heartily of the navy, and awak- 
 ened its drowsy consciousness thus : 
 
 Tampa, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 2:45 P- ^i- 
 Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 It seems that it is a naval problem yet unsolved, and it might be advis- 
 able for the command now on board transports to have the protection of the 
 entire navy to convoy it to number i, numUer 2, or Nuevitas, or, if this is 
 considered too hazardous, then keep the troops in healthful camps, as they are 
 now, and assist the navy to destroy the Spanish fleet. There are here 25 
 good steamers that could be used to carry water, coal, and supplies, guns, 
 revolving cannon, and mortars, etc. , and they could be added to the force of 
 the navy. It seems strange to be suggesting that the army assist the navy in 
 this way, but I am sure we would receive most loyal support when the waters 
 are safe for crossing with the army. 
 
 MILES, Major-General, Commanding Army. 
 
 There was talk of disembarking the troops, but Shaffer said it was not 
 practicable. They could not be encamped comfortably, but were taken off in 
 detachments to exercise. June 17th it was stated that the expedition should 
 get under way and meet convoy at Rebecca Shoal. 
 
 Port Tampa, Fla., June 10, 1898 — 9:30 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Practically all the transports have been in canal, where men have had 
 free access to shore, and they have been off the greater part of two days. 
 This afternoon all but -eleven of the transports have been drawn a short dis- 
 
PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 383 
 
 tance into the stream, where the men are much more comfortable than in -the 
 canal, with excellent facilities for swimming and keeping clean. The com- 
 mand is being increased only by recruits, of which there are several hundred, 
 the exact number of which will be telegraphed jj^ou in the morning, and by 
 one troop of cavalry mounts. The transports how here are practically filled, 
 though it might be possible to get one more regiment of volunteer infantry 
 on. Will be able to tell to-morrow, when a rearrangement of some of the 
 troops will be made. If I find it possible to take another regiment I prefer 
 the Thirty-second Michigan. SHAFTER, 
 
 Major-General, United States Volunteers, Commanding. 
 
 June 12th, 7:18 p. m. , Shaffer telegraphed Corbin: 
 
 "Have consulted with senior naval officer present, who says we must 
 have daylight to get down to lower bay. Will start the transports at dajdight 
 to-morrow, and with good luck will meet convoy from Key West before 
 Wednesday noon. ' ' 
 
 Port Tampa, Fla., June 13, 1898 — 1:10 p. m. 
 Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Steamers are moving out to sea and should be away by i o'clock. 
 
 MILES, Major-General. 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti. 
 (Received at Washington June 22, 1898, 6:22 p. m.) 
 Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 OfE Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 1898. — Landing at Daiquiri this morning 
 successful. Very little, if any, resistance. SHAFTER. 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 The Sharp Strain of the Struggle at Santiago. 
 
 General Miles as a Loyal Soldier — Shafter's Fine Voyage and Safe Landing — The First 
 Blood in Battle — Rush of Supplies and Reenforcements to the Army — ^Alger Wants 
 Shafter to "Get a Good" Ready" — ^Why Siege Guns were not Unloaded — Work Cut Out 
 for the Regulars— Parallel with the British Siege of Havana — The Sword Had to be 
 Swift to Save from the Pestilence. 
 
 The credit is due General Miles of pulling steadily in the harness. 
 When one of his suggestions did not take root, he was soon ready with 
 another. If one of his campaigns on paper was blown away in the niorning, 
 he was as fertile as ever in the evening. He saw, after the Santiago expedition 
 was under way, that it was the primary enterprise, and would in all ways take 
 precedence, and he was ready and willing to go on with number two. If he 
 was not to comrrland in Cuba, he was persevering for Porto Rico. His plans 
 might be subjected to all trials except that of being tried, but his loyalty 
 as a soldier was never impeachable. In all aspects of his versatility 
 he was facing to the front. If he thought it wise to wait, he said so at 
 large and in particular, but when the word was to go, he was up and doing at 
 the tap of the drum, buttoned and buckled, alert and stepping out to the 
 music. In his contentions with the critics he can always say that his faults 
 were in words, and the facility with which they are flashed about the world, 
 but his feet were rather jubilant than laggard, and the toes of his boots 
 pointed to the enemy. When Shafter's fleet sailed down the bay. General 
 Miles telegraphed the War Department the hour and the minute — June 14, 
 1898, 10:30 a. m. — when "the last one was out of sight," and he mentioned 
 an auxiliary cruiser, that would go in six hours, and for a wonder the Major- 
 General commanding did not know the destination of the boat. This was 
 signed simply, "Miles, Commanding," but his command at the moment was 
 "out of sight" so far as the regular army was concerned. Major-General 
 
 384 
 
GENL. HAWKINS WHO LED THE FAMOUS CHARGE OF THE 1ST BRIGADE AT SAN JUAN, 
 
 JULY 1ST, 1898. 
 
SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 3^7 
 
 Brooke telegraphed the Adjutant-General of the army July 14th that he was 
 "directed to fully equip 15,000 men for duty elsewhere," and he wanted to 
 know whether "the ordnance equipment for 23 regiments" was on the way to 
 the Chickamauga Park, or likely to arrive soon. This was to the point. 
 Miles, commanding, telegraphed the Secretary of War June 14th, 9:50 p. m., 
 that he thought their "telegrams crossed in transit," not at all an improbable 
 conjecture — though what happened when they collided has not yet been the 
 subject of an investigation. But the fact Miles wanted to get through was 
 that one-half the "troops for No. 2" — the army for Porto Rico^were at 
 Tampa, "fully eqtiipped and drilling every day as artillery. Siege trains, 
 balloons, heavy ammunition, commissary and quartermaster's stores" were 
 also there. 
 
 Balloons and everything all ready, Shatter was sailing on the blue sea 
 under the indigo sky of the subtropics. There had been a change at Tampa, 
 — there were 2 1 feet of water, and nine ships could load at a time. Just at 
 this hour Inspector-General Breckenridge made a call for officers in these 
 terms, addressing himself to the Secretary of War : 
 
 "Regular officers are sadly needed among volunteers, but regular organi- 
 zations are also already suffering from paucity of officers. Regular organiza- 
 tions furnish a remarkably fine training school for officers and all that can be 
 so trained are already needed. Can not regular service be immediately 
 supplied with all the junior officers the law allows, especially as the good of 
 the service evidently demands it? Then additional second lieutenants can 
 increase the numbers now so greatly needed. It must be evident to all now 
 that we need a larger perfectly trained and equipped force, especially officers, 
 and the best place for quick training is among the regulars. It would be well 
 if we had several hundred more regular officers immediately. ' ' 
 
 On the 15th of June the Secretary of War concluded he must see Major- 
 General-Commanding Miles speedily and telegraphed "Important business 
 requires your presence here; report at once," and at 5:23 p. m. General Miles 
 was able to say over the wire, "I leave by the first train, 7:20 this evening," 
 and the telegrams, which are of the kinetoscope order, show that he was in 
 three days transacting business from the Washington army headquarters in 
 the usual way. Telegrams show vigorous work in the camps preparing the 
 volunteer troops. General Coppinger, June 26th, telegraphed that cars were 
 being as rapidly unloaded as delivered by railroads. Some days 70 were 
 
388 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 unloaded, then only 13, because they could not be placed. There were in cor- 
 rals 1,811 unassigned mules, and there' were 1,791 assigned draft mule and 
 15 Red Cross ambulances. 
 
 Shafter, Major-General Volunteers, commanding, telegraphed: 
 "Playa del ^ste, via Haiti, June 25th, 2:45 P- ™- — Daiquiri, "23. — Had 
 very fine voyage, lost less than 50 animals, 6 or 8 to-day; lost more putting 
 them through the surf to land than on transport?. Command as healthy as 
 when we left. Eighty men sick. Only deaths 2 men drowned in landing. 
 Landings difficult. Coast quite similar to that in vicinity of San Francisco, 
 and covered with dense growth of bushes. Landing at Daiquiri unopposed. 
 All points occupied by Spanish troops ; heavily bombarded by navy to clear 
 them out. Sent troops toward Santiago and occupied Juragua City, a natur- 
 ally strong place, this morning. Spanish troops retreating as soon as our 
 advance was known. Had not mounted troops or could have captured them 
 — about 600 all told. Railroad from there in. Have cars and engine in pos- 
 session. With assistance of navy disembarked 6,000 men yesterday and as 
 many more to-day. Will get all troops off to-morrow, including light artillery 
 and greater portion of pack train, probably all of it, with some of the 
 wagons; animals have to be jumped to the water and towed ashore. Had 
 consultations with Generals Garcia, Rader, and Castillo, i p. m. of 20th, 20 
 miles west of Santiago. These officers were unanimously of the opinion that 
 landing should be made east of Santiago. I had come to the same conclusion. 
 General Garcia promises to join me at Juragua City to-morrow with between 
 3,000 and 4,000 men, who will be brought from west of Santiago by ships of 
 the navy to Juragua City and there disembarked; this will give me between 
 4,000 and 5,000 Cubans, and leave 1,000 under General Rabi to threaten Santi- 
 ago from the west. General Kent's division is being disembarked this after- 
 noon at Juragua City, and will be continued during the night. The assistance 
 of the navy has been of the greatest benefit, and enthusiastically given. 
 Without them I could not have landed in ten days, and perhaps not at all, as 
 I believe I should have lost so many boats in the surf. At present want 
 nothing. Weather has been good. No rain on land, and prospects for fair 
 weather. ' ' 
 
 There is not a sentence lost in this dispatch. It is not long, and tells all. 
 If General Garcia came with between three and four thousand Cubans, he 
 would have between four and five thousand of them. So there must have been 
 
SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 389 
 
 about 1,000 already in the neighborhood ready for rations. A few of the 
 Cubans had a skirmish with the Spaniards — no casualties reported. The first 
 fighting was when General Young, with 964 officers and men, one squadron of 
 the First cavalry, one of the Tenth cavalry and two of the First U. S. Volun- 
 teer cavalry, on the morning of the 24th, became engaged with Spaniards 
 entrenched in a strong position at La Guasimo, three miles from Siboney on 
 the Santiago road. General Shaffer says in his official report : 
 
 "The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field 
 with considerable loss. Our own loss was i officer and 15 men killed; 6 
 officers and 46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 
 killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiriting effect upon our 
 tnen, and doubtless correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now 
 plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance 
 upon them under a heavy fire delivered from entrenchments. General 
 Wheeler, division commander, was present during the engagement, and 
 reports our troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. This 
 engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front, on which to 
 encamp our troops. ' ' 
 
 In his telegram to the Adjutant-General about this affair, General Shaffer 
 said: "The Spaniards occupied a very strong, intrenched position on a high 
 hill. The firing lasted about an hour, and the enemy was driven from his 
 position, which is now occupied by our troops, about a mile and a half from 
 Sevilla. The enemy has retired toward Santiago. ' ' 
 
 One sees in the telegrams following the opening fight that there was' 
 intense interest and exertion in the War Department. The army was com- 
 mitted irrevocably to the Santiago stroke, and it was seen that there was to be 
 the fight of the war. Coppinger wires, June 25th, 6:35 p. m., in answer 
 to inquiries as to what could be done to reinforce Shatter: "If transports and 
 ammunition are provided, I can ship 629 officers and 12,860 men from Tampa. 
 No transports have reported to me. I understand there are five transports 
 and two ocean tramps at Port Tampa. " 
 
 Cor bin telegraphs Coppinger to know "whether in the transports at Port 
 Tampa there are two or three lighters that can be sent at once to General 
 Shaffer. Having lost one going over, the tug he has is not sufficient to meet 
 demands of the service. Time is essence of situation, and an immediate 
 answer is desired. " 
 
39° SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 There is evidence here that the War Department was alive to the fact that 
 Shafter might need help. As to the ships at Tampa, there were seven, "capac- 
 ity about 5,000 men, if loaded and shipped at once. This will, however, be 
 increased when the boats are fitted up. At present there are but two boats 
 which are in proper condition to load and ship and get maximum results. ' 
 
 The Secretary of War made .a memorandum June 25th, that 15,000 men 
 were to be taken from Chickamauga,vand 12,000, if so many were fit, from 
 Coppinger's command, Snyder's division to embark at once to go as soon as 
 convoy could be had, to reinforce Shafter at Santiago. Orders were issued to 
 establish telegraphic communication between Shaffer's headquarters and cable 
 stations. Corbin telegraphed Shafter, June 28th: 
 
 "From Mobile the large steam tug Nimrod and light draft lighters Ben, 
 Ora, and Tourat, have been ordered to get out of Mobile just as soon to-day as 
 possible, going with all dispatch, taking into consideration the safety of the 
 lighters. The depot quartermaster at Tampa has been ordered to send the 
 Bessie to report to you. The Bessie is a steam lighter, and sister to the 
 Laura. General Duffield will arrive on the Yale to-morrow morning with 
 1,300 men. Balance of his brigade left Fort Monroe this morning. Orders 
 have been given to have a division sent you from Tampa this week. The 
 wagon transportation will leave to-morrow. ' ' 
 
 There were anxious inquiries already about the remains of our dead and 
 questions raised wlvether bodies could be embalmed, which was not possible. 
 The Secretary of War telegraphed that the parents of Hamilton Fish and 
 others were "very desirous of recovering the bodies of their boys." June 27th 
 Alger telegraphed Shafter: "Have you landed the siege guns?" and the order 
 on this telegram was "rush." Two light batteries, Lemly's and Macomb's of 
 the Seventh Artillery, at Fort Mayer, Va. , were ordered to Tampa — and the 
 six light batteries at Tampa were ordered on fastest steamers immediately, 
 but this was subject to "when convoy arrives" — as there might be Spanish 
 gunboats hiding in the many shady places looking for an unarmed transport. 
 Alger had telegraphed Shafter that he hoped he would "take time to get a 
 good ready." Shaffer's reply was from Siboney, June 27th: "Will not act 
 hastily, though I believe I can take the place within forty-eight hours, but I 
 fear at considerable loss of life. There is no necessity for haste, as we are 
 growing stronger and they weaker every day. The health of the command is 
 reported to me by the surgeon as remarkable. Outside of the wounded there 
 
SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 391 
 
 are to-day less than 150 men sick. So far no wounded have died, and but two 
 men of disease since leaving Tampa. Am very glad to know that tugs and 
 lighters are on the way. Hospital steamer Relief is all that we need at 
 present. ' ' 
 
 The roads were dusty, and a position was taken within three miles of 
 Santiago, and in plain view of th-e town! June 28th the convoy was ready at 
 Key West, and Corbin asked Coppinger what he had ready to go next day, 
 and the answer was, "Six batteries, 800 recruits for Shaffer's infantry, and 
 the First Illinois. ' ' Incidentally these telegrams passed : 
 
 Playa del Este, June 28, 1898 — 4:15 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General U. S. A. , Washington : 
 
 Daiquiri, Cuba, June 27. I have just been shown a telegram from 
 Greely to Major Greene, of my staff, requesting daily confidential reports of 
 operations of my command. I have ordered him never to send any report 
 relating to my command that is not first submitted to me. I do not under- 
 stand by what authority General Greely presumes to ask confidential informa- 
 tion from a member of my staff. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, June 28, 1898. 
 Major-General Shaffer, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 Your telegram of this date concerning giving of information by staff 
 officers has been read by the Secretary of War, and your action therein is 
 approved by him, without any reservation whatever. 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 The inference is that General Greely, who was censor of the press dis- 
 patches, wanted points to make his duties of suppression clear, and was not 
 guarded as to the form of stating the desire. The rush and urgent telegrams 
 were now flying day and night. The form of "Acknowledge receipt and 
 report execution" appears frequently. 
 
 Shaffer wanted, June 28th, "Thirty-six sides Lutigo leather ; 36 sides har- 
 ness leather; 50 pounds copper rivets, one-half inch; 5,000 pounds mule 
 shoes, Nos. 2 and 3; 500 pounds nails, horseshoe No. 6; 6 shoeing hammers; 
 24 rasps, farriers'; 12 coils five-sixths rope; 12 coils three-eighths rope ; 12 
 hand punches, saddlers'; 1,200 yards canvas, 72-inch, heavy; 1,200 yards 
 canvas, 22 -inch; 2 small field forges for pack train; 2 small anvils for pack 
 
392 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 train; 35 dozen snaps, i^-inch, with guard. The 22-inch canvas is to make 
 ' over sacks for carrying forage." 
 
 Here is one of the Commanding General's telegrams: 
 
 "Siboney, Cuba, June 28, 5 p. m. Have just learned 8,000 Spaniards are 
 en route here from Manzanillo with pack train and beef cattle on the hoof; 
 probably 54 miles from here to-day; advancing at the rate of 12 miles per 
 day." 
 
 This was probably from a "reliable Cuban" who wanted reinforcements 
 and rations. Corbin telegraphed June 29th from Washington: 
 
 "Six transports will leave Port Tampa this evening for Santiago. 
 Specialist and Unionist carrying artillery horses and artillery guard. The 
 Comanche will carry artillerymen, the Hudson infantry recruits for your com- 
 mand. The City of Macon and Gate City will take First Illinois and such 
 cavalry recruits and signal corps as can be loaded. ' ' 
 
 Coppinger telegraphed the Adjutant-General June 29th, 12 : 15, replying 
 to telegram that deducting troops about leaving on transports there were at 
 Tampa — "infantry, 12,661; cavalry, 4,693; cavalry horses, 5,000; heavy artil- 
 lery, 917; horses, 378; signal corps, 147; also about 160 men awaiting dis- 
 charge and unequipped recruits belonging to General Shafter's command, 
 and about 150 tons of regimental and company property, and tentage left 
 by General Shaffer with the cavalry, being about 1,000 tons of prop- 
 erty of all kinds. Quartermasters estimate 4,300 mules, 840 cavalry and 
 artillery horses, 921 Cuban horses, 1,000 tons hay, 500 tons oats, and 12,000 
 tons coal; about 1,000 tons miscellaneous quartermaster's property, ordnance 
 material, and forage with siege train; 1,200 tons commissary stores and prop- 
 erty; about 4,000 tons ordnance." 
 
 There was great inquiry as to Shafter's slowness in getting the siege 
 artillery to the front, and he cabled the Secretary of War : 
 
 "I have not yet unloaded the siege guns, but will do so as soon as I can. 
 I do not intend to take them to the front until we are stopped or need them. 
 It is going to be a very difficult undertaking to get them up, 'and if attempted 
 now would block the road. I have four light batteries at the front, and they 
 are heavy enough to overcome anything the Spaniards have. If we have to 
 besiege the town I will get the guns up. The advance picket is now within 
 2j^ miles of Santiago. Officers making reconnoissances were within \}i 
 'miles to-day, and met with no opposition." 
 
SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 393 
 
 There was a necessity as imperious as can arise in the affairs of a great 
 nation in days of destiny, that the blow the United States had to strike Spain 
 when declaring war upon her, must be delivered as soon after the declaration 
 as was mechanically practicable. Owing to national inattention and the con- 
 servatism of Congress, the army in hand that was efficient was small. Under 
 the circumstances, it was a success that in the end proved to be the assurance 
 of speedy and complete victory and honorable and triumphant peace, to get 
 together and embark in time, when the actual beginning of the war was in May, 
 so considerable an army as that which sailed and made a prosperous voyage 
 under Shaffer. 
 
 The mobilization of this force and its embarkation and disembarkation 
 would have been wholly impracticable if it had not been for the construction 
 just in time of our battleships that gave us the unequivocal superiority over 
 Spain at sea, and the improved character of the regular army. Thorough as 
 the confidence of the country has been in our volunteer military system, the 
 people are educated by the Spanish war as never- before, not to depend upon 
 it to the exclusion of an army prepared to meet emergencies that may strike 
 us by cablegrams, through orders flying in the twinkling of an eye by tele- 
 graph. We had not the force to attack Havana at the time the Santiago army 
 scrambled through the Cuban surf to remove Spain from the Americas. If 
 we had landed in the west instead of the east end of the island, as was at first 
 proposed, we could undoubtedly have made the landing and held the ground, 
 though there would have been hard fighting to do that, and our regular army 
 could not have marched straight to Havana. The Santiago campaign demon- 
 strates that. Blanco would have opposed us with from fifty to sixty thousand 
 men, and 150 guns, and on several fortified lines. It would have been neces- 
 sary to hasten the embarkation of all the volunteers, fairly armed, in all the 
 Southern camps, to aid the regulars in advance, and we would have had 
 seventy thousand raen attacking Havana in the rain and the yellow fever. 
 We could have produced in and about the city of Havana the horrors of the 
 besieged Jerusalem as described by Josephus, and repeated in our camps the 
 ■awful experiences of the English, the New Englanders, and the New Yorkers 
 and New Jersey men who conquered Cuba by taking Havana in August, 1762. 
 The change of the point of attack from Havana to Santiago saved tens of 
 thousands of our fellow citizens from Cuban graves, but it was the cost of the 
 war and not its eventual substantial fortunes, changed by the determination 
 
394 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 that hung upon the will of the President, who had the genius of good sense 
 to choose the better way. The change made the sea voyage i,ooo miles, 
 instead of 200,. and a fearful augmentation of difficulties that forced delays, 
 forcing upon Shaffer's army the deadly demand of storming the lines of the 
 enemy instead of crushing them with siege artillery. 
 
 To those who have not ascertained this vital point the story of the cam- 
 paign is a nightmare dream of bloody blundering. Given the understanding 
 that interprets the circumstances, the conquest " of Santiago, while an enter- 
 prise that was hazardous, was a deed of the highest military accomplishment. 
 The exertions of the government through its respective departments to pro- 
 vide for the army of the invasion of Cuba were something gigantic. To go- 
 from Tampa to the west end of Cuba was like a voyage from New York to 
 Norfolk, but from Tampa to Santiago, the excursion was equal to the journey 
 from Philadelphia to Havana. Aware of the certainty 'Of wounds and sick- 
 ness, the steamer John Engliss was purchased for $450,000, and fitted up as a. 
 hospital ship at a cost of $136,851.11, and named the Relief. She was pro- 
 vided with every appliance, as the Quartermaster-General comprehensively as- 
 well as particularly states, "for the ease, comfort and treatment of the sick 
 and wounded. The inferior was remodeled; electric plant for light and 
 purifying, sterilizing and laundry plants, and two steam launches were pro- 
 vided. ' ' The launches were like cradles, to carry the helpless men from the 
 shore to the ship. 
 
 After the first of July there were chartered on the Atlantic coast the 
 steamers Wanderer, La Grande Duchesse, Tarpan and Ute, for the transpor- 
 tation of troops and supplies to Cuba and Porto Rico, and with these the 
 tonnage was 111,000 tons, the carrying capacity 250,000 men. 
 
 The Quartermaster-General reports : 
 
 "The carrying capacity of the chartered steamships employed in connec- 
 tion with General Shaffer's army for the invasion of Cuba was not found 
 adequate to promptly transport the number of troops, in addition to that 
 army, required for Cuba and Porto Rico, and it therefore became necessary to- 
 increase the number of transport vessels with larger carrying capacity for men 
 and animals, with bilge keels to prevent rolling, and thus make the ships 
 more comfortable for stock. 
 
 "Congress being averse to admitting foreign ships to American registry, 
 the Secretary of War decided to direct the purchase of vessels, and have them 
 
WOUNDED ON THEIR WAY TO DRESSING PLACE AT BATTLE OF SAN JUAN. 
 
SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 397 
 
 fitted up to meet the needs of the army for the safe and comfortable transpor- 
 tation of men and animals and the transportation of army supplies. Fourteen 
 large steamships were purchased and fitted up for carrying men, animals, 
 freight,' etc. The following is a list of these vessels : 
 
 Name of Vessel 
 
 Panama No. i'. 
 
 Port Victor, No. 2 
 
 Rita, No. 3 
 
 Mohawk, No. 20 
 
 ■Mobile, No. 21 
 
 Massachusetts, No. 22., 
 
 Manitoba, No. 23 
 
 Minnewaslca, No. 24.... 
 Mississij)pi, No. 25....... 
 
 -Michigan, No. 26 
 
 Roumanian, No. 27, 
 
 Obdam, No. 30 
 
 Berlin, No. 31 
 
 ■Chester, No. 32 
 
 Total. 
 
 I'onnage 
 
 Cost 
 
 2,085 
 
 $ 41,000 
 
 2,792 
 
 175,000 
 
 2,194 
 
 125,000 
 
 5,658 
 
 660,000 
 
 5,780 
 
 660,000 
 
 5,673 
 
 660,000 
 
 5,673 
 
 660,000 
 
 5,796 
 
 660,000 
 
 3,732 
 
 350,000 
 
 3,722 
 
 350,000 
 
 4,126 
 
 240,000 
 
 3,656 
 
 250,000 
 
 5,641 
 
 400,000 
 
 4,770 
 
 200,000 
 
 61,298 
 
 5,431,000 
 
 Class 
 
 ...Freighter. 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 .Combination.. 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 ..Troop ship.... 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 Carrying Capacity ' 
 
 Officers Men Animals 
 
 10 
 25 
 15 
 80 
 80 
 80 
 -80 
 100 
 40 
 40 
 45 
 50 
 75 
 
 720 
 
 400 
 
 400 
 
 700 
 
 1,000 
 
 1,000 
 
 1,000 
 
 1,000 
 
 1,200 
 
 800 
 
 800 
 
 1,100 
 
 1,300 
 
 2,000 
 
 12,700 
 
 1,000 
 
 1,000 
 
 1,000 
 
 1,000 
 
 1,000 
 
 800 
 
 800 
 
 50 
 
 100 
 
 6,750 
 
 "Eight of these vessels were provided with refrigerators for the transpor- 
 tation of fresh meat, seven of them having a capacity of 1,000 tons each. 
 " Two, the Panama and the Rita, were captured by the navy, and were pur- 
 chased by this Department after having been condemned as prizes by the 
 proper courts and offered for sale. 
 
 "All of these were merchant vessels and were temporarily fitted up as 
 army transports to meet the urgent demands of the service for which purpose 
 an expenditure of $178,018.37 was made. 
 
 "The fleet of transport ships which was concentrated at Port Tampa, Fla., 
 in June last for the transportation of the army of General Shafter to Cuba, 
 •consisting of 38 vessels, including 2 water boats, 3 steam lighters, i collier, 
 and I tug, had been fitted out for a voyage to the vicinity of Havana, distant 
 about 400 miles ; 2 degked barges were also provided by the Engineer Depart- 
 ment. One of the steam lighters, the tug, and a decked barge failed to reach 
 Cuba. 
 
 "Upon embarkation of the troops it was found that the vessels would not 
 safely and comfortably carry more than about 16,000 men with their 2,295 
 animals, equipments, ammunition, subsistence, and medical supplies, on a 
 voyage of 1,000 miles." 
 
398 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 To relieve the fighting soldiers and the seamen from the heavy task of 
 landing supplies — the very line of labor that exhausted and sickened the 
 British when they were besieging Havana — the Quartermaster's Department 
 entered "into contract with the firm of D. Van Aken & Co., of New York 
 City, to fit out an expedition with a large force of mechanics of various trades, 
 and laborers, with machinery, such as pile drivers, implements for construc- 
 tion of docks and railways, with the necessary materials — iron and lumber — 
 for building docks, lighters, repairing railroads and engines. The company 
 was furnished the steamship Panama and two fine ocean tugs, the Gladisfen, 
 which was chartered, and the Gypsum King, which was purchased. ' ' This 
 outfit afforded great aid and relief. 
 
 The English expedition which assailed and captured Havana in 1762 was 
 not as large as Shafter's army. The force of Lord Albemarle was only 
 11,351 men. The vessels of the squadron numbered 203, including "six ships- 
 with the baggage of general ofiicers, " 93 transports and 43 ships of the line;, 
 and 1,000 negroes were purchased to relieve the troops of drudgery, and with 
 the provincials and the sailors saved the enterprise from failure. 
 
 Colonel Humphrey, Chief Quartermaster, worked hard at Tampa and 
 Santiago, and says of the transports that began to arrive early in May at 
 Tampa, that they were as fast as reported, "fully coaled and watered and 
 policed, and later fitted with bunks and stalls for the comfort of men and 
 animals. The loading of the transports began at once, and was carried on 
 speedily and systematically. This was, at best, difficult, owing to the limited 
 wharf facilities. The place affords, in all particulars, most insufficient facili- 
 ties for fitting out the many ships and embarking so large a force. The load- 
 ing of all classes of stores was completed at 11 a. m of June 6th, and by 9 p.m., 
 June 8th, the troops were all on board and the expedition was fully embarked.. 
 The departure, however, was delayed until Jtme 14th, by reason of a report 
 made by the naval authorities that the Spanish war vessels were seen in 
 Nicholas Channel. The transports when sailing were in good order, but not 
 in so prime condition as when the troops and animals were embarked. ' ' 
 
 No effort was spared, no cost counted in any department, or nook, or 
 corner of the government of the United States, to assist the plain purpose of 
 the Shaffer expedition. The General recited the facts of the bitter fight of 
 the 24th, in which out of 964 our loss was 16 killed and 52 wounded in.an hour. 
 The loss of the enemy reported 9 killed and 27 wounded; that the engagement 
 
SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 399 
 
 had "inspirited the men." They were hardy men who believed that they had 
 tried the tether of the enemy under circumstances that were and would be 
 characteristic of the campaign, and that they could win out, but the effect at 
 Washington — and it is well that it was so — was to hurry telegrams that all get 
 ready instantly to reinforce the army at Santiago. That the fighting right at 
 hand would be of the severest nature, with the fearful climate and the dread- 
 ful ambuscades to contend with, was already clear. Moreover, the certainties 
 were that the few Cubans who had emerged from their mysteries could not be 
 relied upon for hot work, and that the Spaniards were well armed and abun- 
 dantly supplied with ammunition, that their Mauser rifles and smokeless 
 powder were haunting as a superstition, and that they would in shelter do 
 things to truly save the military character of their country from contempt. 
 There was also a deep conviction of danger that Shaffer needed more men, and 
 that the quicker they could reach him the surer the result for us, and the 
 smaller the expenditure of the blood of the heroic few. The United States 
 is a mighty nation, and there was that in the air more fiery than "the 
 rocket's red glare" in the song of the banner, but while the people waited 
 with anxiety and the trains rumbled, and there were busy scenes at the ports, 
 and the volunteers were massed and rushed to the rescue, while steamers 
 blackened the sky and whitened the waters, as they throbbed through the 
 waves to the scene of the conflict, the brunt of the battle was to be borne by 
 the thin lines already in the sultry forests and on the steep hillsides where 
 the boys stood in disciplined devotion, the siege guns not ashore, incredible 
 toil the only way to get forward to those ready tb famish the necessaries 
 of life. Then arose the specter of the ghastliest fever that blights the strong, 
 and so the breasts of the boys and the steel they bore must be driven home 
 by stormy rushes, that the sword might win the salvation it was vain to 
 hope for when the pestilence surely on the wing would swoop down upon 
 the bivouacs of the brave. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 The Field Fighting for Santiago. 
 
 The Supreme Test of American Valor — The Thin but Steady Regular Line, and the Es- 
 sential Assistance by the Foremost Volunteers — The Whole Story from the First 
 Skirmish to the Last Assault Told in War Office Dispatches Far More Interesting 
 than the Formal Reports of the Officers and More Sensational than the Lurid Chap- 
 ters in the Journals — Their Publication an Admirable Example of the Candor of the 
 Authorities — An Ail-Night Watch for News at the White House — Shaffer's Memorable 
 Third and Fourth of July, 
 
 The President sent thanks to General Shafter and his army for "the gal- 
 lant action" of the 24th June. On the 26th the Secretary of War communi- 
 cated to General Miles that with the least possible delay an expedition would 
 be organized under the immediate command of Major-General Brooke, 
 "composed of three divisions taken from the troops best equipped in the First 
 and Third Army Corps, and two divisions from the Fourth Army Corps, for 
 movement and operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico. The 
 command under Major-General Shafter, or such part thereof as can be spared 
 from the work now in Jiand, will join the foregoing expedition," and the 
 whole was to be commanded in person by General Miles, who was to place 
 himself "in close touch with the senior officers of the navy in those waters, 
 with the view to harmonious and forceful action. ' ' This telegram was sent on 
 the day of the assignment of General Miles to the Porto Rico occupation : 
 
 Washington, June 26, 1898. 
 Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, Commanding United States forces in Cuba: 
 
 In burying the dead, be sure and detail a competent officer to have a 
 map made giving resting place of each, so that friends can find the remains 
 of their loved ones. _ R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 There have been serious perplexities about the graves. It is true that 
 they were sometimes shallow, because- the men detailed to dig them were so 
 weak from the heat and affected by exposure to the sun and rain that they 
 
 400 
 
404 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 
 
 could not wield the grave-digger's tools more than a very few ininutes at a 
 time. Another reason exists for some of the lost graves, which were identified 
 by bottles tightly corked, containing the name, organization and home of the 
 deceased, and buried close by the remains. There was also an external 
 identification — strong stakes driven at the head of the graves and marked so 
 as to be intelligible. Some of the stakes were removed by Santiago refugees 
 and Cubans who professed to be soldiers, because it was convenient to make 
 use of them to cook coffee. This was resented by our soldiers to the point of 
 shooting several of the miscreants informally, but the mischief was done. 
 
 On the 29th the advance pickets were within a mile and a half of Santi- 
 ago, and Shafter was expecting to put a division on the Caney road between 
 that place and Santiago on the ist of July, also "advance on the Sevilla road to 
 the San Juan road, and possibly beyond," and Garcia with 3,000 men was to 
 "take the railroad north of Santiago and prevent Pando reaching the city. " The 
 figures of Garcia's force show that the "scatterment" he reported of his fol- 
 lowers when the time came to show them up had not been reformed alto- 
 gether. Still his army greatly outnumbered that of the Commander-in-Chief 
 Gomez, who for strategic reasons kept only 150 men about his person, holding 
 the others in reserve in the recesses of the wilderness, where no human eye 
 beheld them when the cane burning orgies were over. June 30th the First 
 Illinois, 1,200 men, sailed from Tampa, also Shaffer's regular recruits, some 
 hundreds, and two hundred thousand rations. Certainly the government was 
 doing all that could be done. 
 
 The advance of the ist of July developed the enemy and Shafter tele- 
 graphed 9:34 a. m: "Action going on, but firing only light and desultory — 
 began on the right near Caney— Lawton's division." The movement was on 
 the northeast of Santiago. But the light firing deepened, and then its desul- 
 tory character changed. July ist was a bloody day. The first dispatch from 
 the field to the War Office was: 
 
 Siboney. — Had a very heavy engagement to-day, which lasted from 8 a. 
 m. till sundown. We have carried their outer works and are now in possession 
 of them. There is now about three-quarters of a mile of open country 
 between my lines and city. By morning troops will "be intrenched and con- 
 siderable augmentation of forces will be there. General Lawton's division 
 and General Bates's brigade, which have been engaged all day in carrying El 
 Caney, which was accomplished at 4 p. m., will be in line and in front of 
 
THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 405 
 
 Santiago during the night. I regret to say that our casualties will be a-bove 
 400. Of these not many are killed. W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 The second dispatch added significance to the story of the fight "from 8 
 a. m. till sundown": 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti. 
 (Received at Washington July 2, 1898 — 1:12 a. m.) 
 Adjutant-General, Washington: 
 
 Headquarters near Santiago de Cuba, i. — I fear I have underestimated 
 to-day's casualties. A large and thoroughly equipped hospital ship should be 
 sent here at once. Chief surgeon says he has use for 40 more medical officers. 
 Ship must bring launch and boat for conveying wounded. 
 
 W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, Fifth Corps. 
 
 The response from Washington was that the hospital ship and medical 
 officers would be sent "as soon as possible," and was confident of "ultimate 
 complete success." The Secretary of War suggested the navy could "help" 
 in the care of the wounded. 
 
 July ist, the President disapproved of a "plan" by General Miles to at 
 once capture the Isle of Pines. The Major-General -commanding had thought 
 that subject all over, and concluded that it would be the very thing to take the 
 celebrated retreat of the pirates in the Pines, as : 
 
 "It is said to have the most delightful climate in the West Indies, being 
 entirely free from yellow fever. It can be made extremely useful for the 
 establishment of a hospital and a camp of prisoners, and, also, eventually, as 
 a base for supplying the Cubans, and possibly for the cavalry operations on 
 the main island of Cuba. 
 
 "I think the one steamer now at Tampa can, with a battery of artillery, 
 and one regiment of infantry, take the island, land from two to six months' 
 supplies, and return to Tampa inside of ten days, when the steamer would be 
 ready to be used for any future military purpose. ' ' 
 
 This was one episode of the day. Another was, Brooke telegraphed from 
 Chickamauga he was "pressing the whole corps for movement. " The return 
 of as many transports as possible from Santiago was ordered "at once. " July 
 3d, at 5:25 p. m., there was a telegram from Tampa to the Adjutant-General: 
 
 "General Randolph and six light batteries on the Comanche and two 
 English 9-knot transports, and the First District of Columbia infantry, on 
 the Catania, have sailed for Key West to-day." 
 
4o6 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 
 
 At 7:55 p. m., Coppinger telegraphed from U. S. Camp, Florida: 
 
 "Specialist, with 225 horses, and Unionist, with 300 horses and 2 mules, 
 both carrying artillery material and 75 men each, sailed at 8:35 this morning. 
 The Comanche, with General Randolph and balance of men of the six light 
 batteries and 50 horses, left at ii:-4o. The first two are 9-knot freight- 
 era; the Comanche is a i6-knot boat. The Catania, with the First District 
 Volunteers, less Captain Looker's company, remaining here as provisional 
 engineers, left at 12 :3o p. m. " 
 
 The Adjutant-General was advised: "Depot quartermaster has conferred 
 with us as to movement Tampa to Savannah. Both Florida railroads have 
 sent to Chickamauga their passenger equipment, which is being held in readi- 
 ness for movement from there. We can get together equipment for the rough . 
 riders, but it would simplify matters if you could order Chickamauga move- 
 ment to begin at once, and we could use that equipment to carry the 5,000 
 troops to Savannah. ' ' 
 
 The first of July, 1898, was Friday. On Sunday morning the Secretary 
 of War sent a telegram to the general commanding the army assailing Santi- 
 ago that shows as distinctly as a tremor of the earth is recorded by a seis- 
 mometer, the strain of the critical hours : 1 
 
 "Executive Mansion, Washington, July 3, 1898 — 1:56 a. m. 
 Major-General Shaffer, Playa del Este : 
 
 (To be forwarded at once to headquarters in the field.) 
 
 The following is just received — midnight — from sources unofficial: 
 "Cervera has been ordered to shell the town (Santiago) when Americans 
 get possession. All foreign consuls have been notified to retire at that time 
 to- places of safety outside of city. ' ' This information may or may not be 
 correct, but is sent for your consideration. We are awaiting with intense 
 anxiety tidings of to-day. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 The President was up all night. There was no news, and it was hard 
 to have faith that it was good to hear nothing. 
 
 This is the Secretary's telegram, of the up-all-night-after-the-battle vigil 
 at the White House : 
 
 War Department, July 3, 1898. 
 Major-General Shaffer, Commanding United States Forces, Cuba: 
 
 I waited with the President until 4 o'clock this morning for news from 
 you relative to Saturday's battle. Not a word was received, nor has there been 
 
THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 407 
 
 up to this hour, 1 1 a. m. , except an account of the battle of Friday, upon which 
 I congratulate you most heartily. I wish hereafter that you would interrupt 
 all messages that are being sent to the Associated Press and others, and make 
 report at the close of each day, or during the day if there is anything of 
 special importance, at once. The Relief left New York yesterday. She has 
 17 surgeons aboard, and will come to you as quickly as possible. 
 
 R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 The Relief was the scientifically provided hospital ship, purchased and 
 fitted out in anticipation for such an emergency, but too late to go with the 
 expedition. 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti. 
 (Received Washington, July 4, 1898 — 12:15 a. m.) 
 General Alger, Washington : 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, Cuba, 3. — Did not telegraph, as I was too 
 busy looking after things that had to be attended to at once, and did not wish 
 to send any news that was not fully confirmed; besides, I was too much 
 excited myself. The Spanish fleet left the harbor this morning and is 
 reported practically destroyed. I demanded surrender of the city at 10 o'clock 
 to-day. At this hour, 4:30 p. m., no reply has been received; perfect quiet 
 along the line; situation has been precarious on account of difficulties of 
 supplying command with food, and tremendous fighting capabilities shown by 
 the enemy from his almost impregnable position. 
 
 SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 This dispatch tells the story that Shafter had been sorely tried. The 
 forceful candor of his way of putting things is well illustrated here, but he 
 had suffered from illness and despondency, and in the darkest hour he sent 
 this dispatch, which is a remarkable contribution to the full story of historical 
 events : 
 
 Playa del Este, July 3, 1898. (Received Washington, 11:44 a. m.) 
 The Secretary of War, Washington: 
 
 Camp near Sevilla, Cuba, 3. We have the town well invested on the 
 north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of 
 such a character and the defenses so strong it will be impossible to carry it by 
 storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing 
 about 5 miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the 
 San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our sup- 
 
4o8 
 
 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 
 
 SKETCH OF THE POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON JULY 3. 
 
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 Z^ Jthrri? Cej/Jlf 
 
 ■f-. T'x^a^ardiSaJSIsyi 
 
 S. fba-cierj^a^jue 
 
 7. C<eflre/£/y 
 
 8 ^XKU^J/? JSsZ&VSJ 
 
 3... .^/iJiery?iu}f. 
 
 h Ciznoja Jbrt 
 
 K j&ifJasivs tJtinl^Me^t' 
 
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 EEDTTCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT. 
 
THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 409 
 
 plies, to a large extent, by means of the railroad, which we can use, having 
 engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up'to date will aggregate 1,000, but 
 list has not yet been made. But little sickness outside of exhaustion from 
 intense heat and exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday and the 
 almost constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. Wagon road to the 
 rear is kept up with some difficulty on account of rains, but I will be able to 
 use it for the present. General Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably 
 have to go to the rear to-day. General Young also very ill ; confined to his 
 bed. General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made 
 last night, which was handsomely repulsed. The behavior of the regular 
 troops was magnificent. I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force 
 the entrance of the harbor, and will have consultation with him this morning. 
 He is coming to the front to see me. I have been unable to be out during the 
 heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. General 
 Garcia reported he holds the railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and has 
 burned a bridge and removed some rails ; also that General Pando has arrived 
 at Palma, and that the French consul with about 400 French citizens came 
 into his lines yesterday from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them with 
 every courtesy possible. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 The dismal lines in this telegram are relating to the serious consideration 
 of retirement — "withdrawing about five miles." A five mile retreat could 
 not have changed American destiny, but it would have smashed a great deal 
 of highly wrought red, white and blue china. The Secretary of War struck 
 the right keynote when he finally got the news in his dispatch — firm, quiet, 
 strong words that will be long held in honorable remembrance : 
 
 War Department, Washington, July 3, 1898 — 12:10 p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 Your first dispatch received. Of course, j'ou can judge the situation 
 better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, you could hold your 
 present position, especially San Juan heights, the effect upon the country would 
 be much better thaai falling back. However, we leave all that matter to you. 
 This is only a suggestion. We shall send you reinforcements at once. 
 
 R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 On this memorable July 3d, Alger requested that the transports returned 
 should be ordered by the commander of the fleet, "directing that the fastest 
 vessels sail with all possible speed to Port Tampa, in order that they may get 
 
4IO THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 
 
 a supply of coal and water, and commence loading before the others arrive, 
 thus saving time." This was "pushing things" — to use two of Phil. Sheridan's 
 words as he put them. At two o'clock in the afternoon of July 3d, Shafter 
 telegraphed : 
 
 "Camp near Santiago, 3. — Large quantities of underclothing and shoes, 
 enough for entire army, are badly needed." 
 
 The response the next day was : 
 
 St. Paul leaves New York Wednesday direct for Santiago with Eighth 
 Ohio, and underclothing, shoes, stockings, and duck suits for your whole 
 army. How are you, Wheeler, Young, and others? 
 
 R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 But to go back a day : 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 3, 1898 — 5 p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 You can have whatevpr reinforcements you want. Wire what additional 
 troops, you desire, and they will be sent ■ as rapidly as transports can be 
 secured. In addition to the 2,700 troops now en route from Tampa, the St. 
 Paul and Duchess will leave Newport News not later than JVednesday, with 
 3,000 troops of Garretson's brigade; the St. Louis, Yale, and Columbia will 
 sail probably from Charleston, carrying 4,000 more, and others will be sent 
 from Tampa as you may request. 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 War Department, Washington, July 3, 1898. 
 General Shafter, Commanding United States Forces, Cuba: 
 
 We are forwarding reinforcements to you this week. How is your 
 health? Do you think that some one should come to relieve you? A.re you 
 going to be able to stand through? What do you think? Be. very careful of 
 yourself. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 This was a delicate but decided suggestion that Shaffer's resignation 
 was the thought of the War Department and the country. 
 
 Early in the morning of the 4th of July there was this good news in the 
 war office, in reply to the "suggestion" of Alger to Shafter that he had better 
 not yield any ground, but hold what he had got : 
 
THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 411 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti. 
 (Received Washington, July 4, 1898 — 1:16 a. m.) 
 The Honorable Secretary of War, Washington: 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Corps, 3. — I shall hold my present position. 
 
 SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 Holding his present position meant two things. A little later Shafter 
 felt better, as this witnesses : 
 
 Playa, July 4, 1898. 
 (Received Washington July 4, 1898 — 9:30 a. m.) 
 The Adjutant-General's Office, U. S. Army, Washington: 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago. — Your telegram inquir- 
 ing about my health just received. I am still very much exhausted. Eating 
 a little this p. m. for the first time in four days. The good news has inspired 
 everybody. When the news of the disaster of the Spanish fleet reached the 
 front, which was during the period of truce, a regimental band that had 
 managed to keep its instruments on the line, played "The Star-Spangled 
 Banner" and "There will be a hot time in the old town to-night," men cheer- 
 ing from one end of the line 'to the other. Officers and men, without even 
 shelter tents, have been soaking for five days in the afternoon rains, but all 
 are happy. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. A. 
 
 The American eagle has a fashion of flying high on the 4th of July, and 
 this was no exception. There are two dispatches from General Shafter that 
 should be printed together — the following : 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti. 
 (Received Washington July 3, 1898 — 7 p. m.) 
 Secretary War, Washington: 
 
 Camp near Santiago, 3. — Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, is just in from 
 my extreme right, which is on the railroad running north from Santiago and 
 which overlooks the entire baj'. Lieutenant Allen states that Cervera's fleet 
 was in full view until nearly 10 o'clock this morning, when it proceeded down 
 the bay, and shortly afterwards heavy firing was heard. Duffield, at Siboney, 
 has just telephoned me that Captain Cotton, of the Harvard, just sent him 
 word that Admiral Sampson had signaled Cervera had come out and had 
 escaped, and that he was in pursuit. The Harvard immediately left. The 
 French consul informed General Garcia, into whose lines he went yesterday, 
 that Admiral Cervera had stated that he would run oiit at 10 o'clock this 
 
412 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 
 
 a. m., and that was the hour Allen witnessed his departure. Cervera told 
 such consul it was better to die fighting than blow up ships in harbor. 
 
 SHAFTER, Commanding. 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti. 
 (Received Washington July 3, 1898 — 7:31 p. m.) 
 Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington : 
 
 Camp near Santiago, Cuba 3. — Early this morning I sent in a demand 
 for immediate surrender of Santiago, threatening bombardment to-morrow. 
 Perfect quiet on lines for one hour. From news just received of escape of 
 fleet am satisfied place will be surrendered. SHAFTER, Commanding. 
 
 It was very good of the French consul to inform General Garcia when 
 Cervera was to go out, and Shafter was quick and hair-triggered in his 
 rebound, demanding the surrender of Santiago within the same day that he 
 had considered a fall-back of five miles. The following is the text of the 
 demand : 
 
 Headquarters United States Forces, 
 Near San Juan River, Cuba, July 3, 1898 — 8 :3o a. m. 
 To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba : 
 
 Sir : I shall be obliged unless you surrender to shell Santiago de Cuba. 
 
 Please inform-the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children 
 that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. Army. 
 
 The reply of Jos6 Toral, the Spanish commander at Santiago, was: 
 
 "I advise the foreigners and women and children that they must leave 
 the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you 
 that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls 
 and inhabitants of the contents of your message. ' ' 
 
 The British, Portuguese, Chinese, and Norwegian consuls came to Gen- 
 eral Shaffer's lines and asked if non-combatants could occupy the town of 
 Caney and railroad points, and wanted until 10 o'clock of the 5th instant 
 before the city was fired on. "They claim" — we quote Shafter — "that there 
 are between 15,000 and 20,000 people, many of them old, who will leave. 
 They ask if I can supply them with food, which I cannot do for want of 
 transportation to Caney, which is 15 miles from my landing." 
 
THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 413 
 
 Shafter concluded that solely in the interest of the poor women and chil- 
 dren he would delay the bombardment until noon of the 5 th, if in the interval 
 no demonstration was made on the American lines, and added in com- 
 municating this to the Secretary of War : 
 
 "I do not know that these extreme measures which I had threatened be 
 justifiable under the circumstances, and I submit the matter for the action of 
 the President. The httle town of Caney will not hold one thousand people, 
 and great suffering will be occasioned to our friends, as we must regard the peo- 
 ple referred to ; and it is now filled with dead and wounded, the dead still 
 unburied. The consuls tell Dorst that there are not to exceed 5,000 troops in 
 the city. I can hold my present line and starve them out, letting the non- 
 combatants come out leisurely as they run out of food, and will probably be 
 able to give such as are forced out by hunger food to keep them alive. I 
 await your orders. ' ' 
 
 The Secretary of War responded, early in the morning of the 4th : 
 
 "While you would be justified in beginning to shell Santiago at expira- 
 tion of time limit set by you, still under the conditions named in your dispatch 
 and for humanity's sake the postponement of the bombardment to noon of 
 July 5th is approved. ' ' 
 
 And later the Secretary continued to Shafter : 
 
 "You are the best judge of the situation, and all the country has every 
 faith in your wisdom. How are you physically, anyway?" 
 
 The dispatch from Shafter, showing depression so deep he was consider- 
 ing retirement to a line abandoning five miles of lands and territory,' continued 
 to disturb, if not dismay, the War Office, as this telegram perfectly expresses: 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 4, 1898. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 After conference with the President and the Secretary of War, I am 
 directed to say your continued illness brings sorrow and anxiety. In case you 
 are disabled. General Wheeler would, of course, succeed to command. His 
 illness, which we also regret, is feared to be so serious as to prevent his 
 assuming command. You must determine whether your condition is such as 
 to require you to relinquish command. If so, and General Wheeler is dis- 
 abled, you will order the next general officer in rank for duty to succeed 3'ou 
 and to take up the work in hand. It is not expected that our forces will make 
 assault until they are ready. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
414 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 
 
 The reply was not thoroughly reassuring, but raised the pressure of 
 severe anxiety that might take the form of duty to order the resignation of 
 the officer who was ill. 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti. 
 (Received Washington, July. 6, 1898—5:403. m.) 
 Adjutant-General, Washington: 
 
 Camp near Santiago, Cuba, 5.— I am not at present so much ill as 
 exhausted from the intense strain that has been on me for last two]; months. 
 I am also suffering from an attack of gout, which prevents me from moving 
 about. I have, however, the whole business in my hand, and am managing 
 it through able staff officers. When I do have to give up I will of course 
 follow your order, but I hope to be better soon. SHAFTER. 
 
 This day, July 6th, the Commanding General at Santiago was notified that 
 "Hobson and men" were to be exchanged, and the next day Shafter had the 
 pleasure of telegraphing : 
 
 "Lieutenant Hobson and all his men have just been received safely in 
 exchange for Spanish officer and prisoners taken by us. All are in good 
 health except two seamen, convalescent from remittent fever. ' ' 
 
 The apprehensions of General Shafter as to the safety of his position when 
 he considered falling back were in some degree accountable by the state of his 
 health. He was seriously sick. He is a man of uncommon bulk, and the 
 climate was to him unexpectedly trying. He could not endure the full power 
 of the sun, and suffering from an attack of gout was an additional burden. 
 
 The line the American troops occupied on the Friday night when there 
 was such an oppression in the atmosphere was, as General Shafter described 
 it, "very thin." So exhausting had been the experiences of the day, so many 
 men had been killed and wounded, and so many had been overcome by heat, 
 or fatigued into disability, and the carrying of the wounded to the rear had 
 been a grievous labor, demanding many bearers, that in the judgment of 
 most competent officers not more than, three thousand of our men were in a 
 defensive position. The question was whether the Spaniards would advance, 
 and there was concern on that subject. General Joseph Wheeler, instead of 
 yielding to his illness, managed to shake it off, a-nd was on the thin line 
 encouraging the men, and expanding his conviction to them that they were 
 safe from an attack by the Spaniards they had driven before them ; that the 
 Spaniards would not dare to fling themselves against our position, and must 
 
THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. . 415 
 
 get the worst of it if they did. But the line, considering its great extent, was 
 thin, biit good as the "thin red line" the British held against the solid Russian 
 masses, good stuff as they were, at Balaklava and Inkerman. The four dis- 
 patches following display the exact lines of the conditions : 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti. 
 (Received at Washington July 5, 1898 — 7 a. m.) 
 Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington: 
 
 1:07 p. m. Headquarters United States forces near San Juan River, 
 Cuba, 4. — I regard as necessary that the navy force an entrance into the har- 
 bor Santiago not later than 6th instant, and assist. in the capture of the place. 
 If they do, I believe the place will surrender without further sacrifice of life. 
 
 SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. Volunteers. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898 — 11:20 a. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 Secretary of War instructs me to say that the President directs that you 
 confer with Admiral Sampson at once for cooperation in taking Santiago. 
 After the fullest exchange of views, you will agree upon the time and manner 
 of attack. 
 
 By command Major-General Miles: 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898 — 3:10 p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 Your telegram this date has been submitted'to the President. After con- 
 sideration, the Secretary of War directs me to say that it is evident from your 
 several reports that you do not consider your force strong enough to make a 
 successful assault upon the Spanish army entrenched in Santiago. This 
 being the case, it is the part of wisdom to await reinforcements, the embarka- 
 tion of which you have already been advised. As you have already been 
 advised, you must be judge of the time and manner of assault. The Presi- 
 dent has directed that you and Admiral Sampson have a conference and 
 determine a course of cooperation best calculated to secure desired results with 
 least sacrifice. 
 
 By command Major-General Miles: 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
41.6 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 6, 1898 — 2 -.$0 p. m. 
 Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 The Secretary of War is anxious to know what prospect there is of breaking 
 through the__mines. He would be very glad, even with a delay, to have coopera- 
 tion of the navy, thus saving many lives. The St. Paul, sailing from New 
 York to-day, has nearly everything you asked for. The lighters, sent a long 
 time since, ought to be with you by this time. We are trying to make 
 arrangements for light-draft steam vessels for carrying orders, etc. , to be sent 
 you as quickly as possible. Can you not procure from the navy steam 
 launches to aid you in landing supplies and carrying dispatches while we are 
 getting crafts of our own for that object. It is expected you will communi- 
 cate freely, setting forth any assistance that can be given you in the way of 
 suoplies of any kind. 
 
 By command Major-General Miles: 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 General Shafter, when his Santiago Fouth of July was but fifteen minutes 
 old — 12:15 a. m. — had accounted for being too busy to telegraph the current 
 intelligence to the _ President and Secretary of War, who waited in vain 
 until four in the morning, that he did not want to be sending what might not 
 be confirmed, and there was a further embarrassment in "the tremendous 
 fighting capabilities shown by the enemy." The words that followed — "from 
 his almost impregnable position" — did not take away the great compliment 
 which ought to be useful to Spain in her home rule, for the good positions, 
 though they may be defended by fighting men instinctively, are not found 
 marked out and made almost impregnable accidentally. 
 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 The strange Story of the Secret Official Cipher of Spain. 
 
 The Cables that Passed Between Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares During the 
 Crisis of the Spanish War in Cuba — A Diary Telegraphed from Santiago to Havana, 
 Giving the Inside of Spanish Affairs from the Attack to the Surrender— Cervera not Well 
 Fitted out. Forced to Flight, Protesting that he was Going to Destruction— The Cables 
 Are a Gallery of Paintings of Spanish Character. 
 
 In association with the official history of the war between the United 
 States and Spain, as recorded in our departments of War and the Navy, and 
 published officially for the information of all nations and people, we are 
 indebted to the journalistic investments in the news of the day — the liberal 
 purchase of intelligence in the market — for the unquestionably authentir 
 cable and wire dispatches of the Spanish Cabinet, the Premier and Ministers 
 of War and Navy ; General Blanco, Admiral Cervera, the military commander 
 of the defenders of Santiago, the spies of Spain in Canada, and others, com- 
 municating with each other, privately and confidentially, in the crisis of the 
 struggle between the several storm centers of the Spaniards — Madrid, Santi- 
 ago and Havana — stating without reservation the "true inwardness" of their 
 most important trusts, exposing their own shams, expressing facts, exchang- 
 ing opinions, giving orders, embodying the secrets of State, camp, field, fleet 
 and city. These cablegrams and telegrams are simply the Spanish war 
 secrets revealing, presenting nakedly their fears and hopes, jealousies and 
 sentiments, public and personal. The grim privacies of many wars have been 
 revealed, after the lapse of many years, in the examination of musty papers 
 from personal collections, and the disturbance in pigeon holes of reserved 
 documents, too momentous to trust to the world until the generation of their 
 production was gone and the freshness of their significance made dull by the 
 
 417 
 
4i8 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 passage of time, but this ancient history was stinted, not merely by public and 
 personal policy, but on account of the limitations of the methods in old times 
 of exchanging facts and ideas, and of the preservation in permanent form of 
 the precise words of conversations, and therefore the-inexactness of all ways of 
 conveying messages. The introduction of telegraphy, the almost universal 
 use of the wire, and the reduction of messages to writing, changes many con- 
 ditions and contributes mechanically to the veracity of the wonderfully com- 
 plete material of history, never so strikingly illustrated as in this volume, the 
 purpose of whose author is to tell the story of the war. in the words of those 
 whose deeds are celebrated ; not the elaborated after-thoughts of the actors, 
 but their hot words in action. Here are thousands of snap shots, true as the 
 Kodak, picturing the thoughts of men responsible for decisions in masterful 
 minuteg, setting forth strongly as if painted in colors the strokes of will power 
 that were materialized in events. It seems almost incredible that we have 
 already in print the records of Spain's unhappy war, as written by those who 
 were the chieftains entrusted with the fleets and armies of the kingdom, in 
 the capitals of Spain and Cuba, and in Santiago, the city made memorable in 
 bombardments, by modern ships of old style fortresses, and desperate battles 
 afloat and ashore, in which both sides had blood on their hands and breasts. 
 
 The dispatches that' we give were the discovery of the New York Journal, 
 and of course made their first appearance in the pages of that paper. There 
 are two facts that account for this publication, and the first in order may be 
 mentioned now that the flag of the United States floats over Cuba. 
 
 The telegraphic operators on the island did not, as a class, regard the 
 Spanish cause or oificers with favor, and they and other young men having 
 the handling of instruments for the transmission and the transfiguration of 
 intelligence were like minded. Many a Spanish secret was clicked away 
 according to the Morse alphabet, or conveyed by the soundless signals with 
 forefingers that experts give and take. An operator says to a reporter, both 
 telegraphers, at a way-station on a railroad, for instance, as a message with 
 pith in it is on the wire: "Here, listen to this!" and the sounds are translated 
 into characters that are imperishable, if that which they contain has the 
 indestructible vitality of truth. Then the Spanish official is apt to be cor- 
 rupted by the large latitude with which he interprets the word concessions. 
 There was a time when, as a matter of business, cartridges sold to the insur- 
 gents were carried out of Morro Castle in market baskets. A golden key 
 
THE CHURCH AT EL CANEY. 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 421 
 
 unlocks more secrets in Spain than in countries where ofiScialism is less firmly 
 commissioned and strictly classified. 
 
 The Journal was able to say : 
 
 "Very interesting are the almost daily bulletins of movements of the 
 American army and navy from the Spanish spies at Montreal. The originals 
 of these documents have been kept in the Captain-General's safe in Havana, and 
 were copied from the original Spanish by a Journal representative, and were 
 then carefully translated into English. The Journal has in its possession 
 full copies in the original Spanish." 
 
 We give preference in the order of presentation of the dispatches to the 
 story of Santiago as cabled from Captain Dedemonte, the commander of the 
 naval station at Santiago, to Admiral Ventura Manterola, at the Navy Yard, 
 Havana : 
 
 April 12, 1898. — Molins and Galicia will probably leave on Saturday. 
 Both went to-day to arrange the defense at the mouth of the harbor, which the 
 Mercedes had been guarding. They planted the first group of torpedoes this 
 .morning, and began work on the second group. 
 
 April 14. — Ship arrived to-day with 6,000 tons of coal. 
 
 April 24. — I have requested permission to extinguish the lights at the 
 mouth of the harbor. 
 
 April 21. — The first line of electric torpedoes is ready. 
 
 April 28. — The Mercedes has sent ashore her 16-centimeter Hontoria 
 guns. The huts in which are stationed the men who guard the torpedoes are 
 defended with a Nordenfeldt and four machine guns, all served by sailors from 
 the Mercedes. 
 
 May I. — Two lines of electric torpedoes are now fully installed. 
 
 May 9. — Two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns have been added to the Zocapa 
 fortifications. German steamer Polaria has arrived with a case of explosives. 
 
 May 5. — Since one o'clock this morning two ships, believed to be Ameri- 
 can, have been standing off the mouth of the harbor. One of them, with all 
 her lights shaded, approached within a pistol shot of Morro. As soon as she 
 was discovered by the tug on guard there she turned and fled, and was later 
 seen to exchange signals with the other. I think they were trying to cut the 
 cable. It is not probable that they were endeavoring to destroy the submarine 
 torpedoes. At dawn neither of them could be seen. 
 
 May 18. — A small vessel, which looked like the one that tried to cut the 
 
422 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 cable, and a large transatlantic steamer, converted into a war ship, have 
 exchanged shots with the forts at the mouth of the harbor. No damage was 
 done on either side. At 4 o'clock this afternoon both ships sailed away. 
 The light at Morro Castle has been extinguished. 
 
 May 19. — Maria Teresa, Oquendo, Colon, Vizcaya, and Pluton have just 
 entered Port. 
 
 May 23. — Four ships of the enemy are reported. 
 
 May 25. — At dawn this morning two Of the enemy's ships captured an 
 English steamer. 
 
 May 26. — Six of the enemy's ships reported. Although the squadron has 
 taken on 1,300 tons of coal, yet it has not enough. 
 
 May 31. — Blockading fleet has just finished firing on the batteries at the 
 mouth of the harbor. The enemy kept up the firing for an hour and a half. 
 Not one of our men even wounded, and no damage whatever done. It is 
 believed that Iowa and another ironclad were badly injured, and another of 
 the ships set on fire. All of their big ships engaged in the fight. Our Colon 
 enfiladed the entrance to the canal with a disastrous fire, as did the guns of the 
 Mercedes, which had been mounted on land. Our ships in the harbor also 
 took part, throwing a number of projectiles at a high elevation. Grand 
 enthusiasm; excellent feeling. 
 
 June I. — Crew of the Mercedes thanks you most sincerely for your con- 
 gratulation. I recommend very highly for promotion the brave Ensign 
 Venancia Nardiz, who commands the land battery; his companion, Ricardo 
 Bruguedas, and Artillerist Antonio Raga. 
 
 June 3: — The enemy's ship Merrimac tried to force the entrance at half- 
 past three this morning. She was discovered in her attempt, and Morro 
 immediately opened fire upon her, followed in lively fashion by the inner 
 fortress of the fort, and by the battery manned by the sailors from the Mer- 
 cedes. The Mercedes and the two torpedo boat destroyers later joined the 
 combat. Our disastrous fire sunk the ship in the channel. It does not wholly 
 block the entrance. No damage whatever was done to us. We captured a 
 lieutenant and seven sailors. 
 
 June 4. — The squadron has exhausted the stock of powdered coal. 
 
 June 5. — The squadron needs at least seventeen hundred tons of coal to 
 refill its bunkers. 
 
 June 6. — Announcement of the landing of the enemy at Aguadores was 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 423 
 
 an error of Morro. Firing was exceedingly lively by the squadron for three 
 hours. No damage done to ships of our squadron, but six were killed on the 
 Reina Mercedes; among them was Lieutenant-Commander Don Emilio 
 Acosta. Three were seriously wounded, and a large number only slightly. 
 Among the latter were Ensign Alexandro Bolino, temporarily on the Reina 
 Mercedes, and the boatswain. 
 
 June 7. — In battle yesterday Reina Mercedes was badly injured. She was 
 twice set on fire by shells of the enemy. Lieutenant-Commander dead. 
 
 June 9. — Nineteen ships reported. 
 
 June II. — Seventeen ships reported. 
 
 June 12. — Seventeen ships reported. 
 
 June 13. — Thirteen ships reported. 
 
 June 14. — Early this morning enemy's ships opened fire on the batteries 
 at the mouth of the harbor. Three ships took part. R. Bruquetas and two 
 marines slightly wounded. At midnight the batteries fired at random at the 
 enemy's ships. Fourteen ships now on the blockading stations. 
 
 June 16. — During the bombardment to-day one sailor was seriously 
 wounded and three others slightly so, while one marine and one sailor, both 
 stationed on the Mercedes, were killed. Fourteen ships on] the blockading 
 station. According to Morro, the dynamite crusier Vesuvius here since 
 yesterday. 
 
 June 17. — ^The ship Sumefido (?) has been sunk in the middle of the 
 canal, near Zocapa Point. It does not obstruct the passage of large ships. 
 She was sunk in twelve fathoms of water. 
 
 June 18. — The form of the' blockading line is that of an arch, whose 
 points rest on Punta Cabrera, on the west, and Aguadores on the east. The 
 ships of the enemy are all the time appearing and disappearing toward the 
 east. An night they flood the coast and the entrance of the harbor incessantly 
 with light from the electric searchlights, and when they are on blockading 
 duty they never station themselves farther than eight miles from Morro, while 
 at Cabrera and Aguadores they stand in as close as three. There are four- 
 teen ships now on the line. Our wounded are doing well. It is exactly a 
 month to-day since they fired the first shot against us. Since that time they 
 have discharged over four thousand projectiles, causing us no material dam- 
 age whatever, and only insignificant injuries. 
 
 June 21. — The Admiral of our squadron has had more Bustamente tor- 
 
424 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 pedoes planted in the harbor. Since last night four were placed between 
 Cayo Smith and the ship Sumerfido (?), and three between, that ship and Punta 
 Solado. At 3 150 o'clock this afternoon thirty-nine ships of the enemy returned 
 unexpectedly. They had sailed early this morning, going eastward. There 
 are sixty now in sight from Morro. The thirty-nine that left early this morn- 
 ing had large bodies of troops on board of them. I have reason to believe that 
 they expect to land at once at Guantanamo. 
 
 (Several other dispatches sent during later hours of the afternoon and 
 night of this date, June 21st, indicate that the lookout man at El Morro was 
 kept busy tallying our ships by the frequent departures of transports.) 
 
 June 22. — According to information received from El Morro, the enemy 
 began embarking troops early this morning at Berracos, while their ships kept 
 up a furious bombardment of the coast, El Morro and the battery at the 
 mouth of the harbor. 
 
 June 23. — In front of the- mouth of the harbor are eight iron-clads, two 
 torpedo boats, and the Vesuvius and eight transports, the reinainder up to 
 71 having gone down the coast. We believe that the landing of troops is 
 continuing. 
 
 June 24. — Twenty-two ships blockading the port. The remainder up to 
 63 are at Baiquiri. Others are bombarding the coast. 
 
 The Admiral has caused the Mercedes to be anchored within the harbor. 
 He says he now has provisions for sixty days. 
 
 June 25. — Alvarado has provisions for forty-five days. 
 
 I learn from the Military Governor that the troops of the enemy must 
 have suffered very severely from the fire of our men, who compelled them to 
 abandon their position. 
 
 June 26.— In one storehouse alone there are 4,800 rations at the disposal 
 of Admiral's squadron. Forty-two ships in sight on station. El Morro says 
 that last night Vesuvius fired two dynamite shells, which completely destroyed 
 the house of the torpedo officer and caused great injury in the fortress, result- 
 ing in three sailors of the Reina Mercedes being wounded. 
 
 June 27.— Morro says that Vesuvius fired three more dynamite shells last 
 night, but they did no damage, for they fell in the water. 
 
 July I.— Since early this morning a battle has been in progress with more 
 or less vigor between our troops and the enemy, lasting until 2 o'clock this 
 afternoon. A few shells fell in the city, causing great commotion. A few of 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 427 
 
 the ships fired at an elevation with the object of hitting the ships of our 
 squadron, but failed to do so. I have not yet learned of the result of the 
 battle on land. Captain Bustaniente,,of the navy, is seriously wounded. It is 
 said that General Vara del Reye was killed, together with many other officers, 
 and that many officers have also been wounded. Killed and wounded among 
 the troops will reach a high figure. General Linares was also wounded. Day 
 before yesterday squadron of the enemy captured steamer which was 
 endeavoring to enter this port. A captive balloon was sent up from the 
 camp of the enemy and inspected our advance positions and probably 
 harbor also. 
 
 July 2. — ^The battles on land and sea were renewed this morning, the 
 squadron of the enemy firing on the batteries of the fort, and our ships. The 
 firing is spirited. At 8 o'clock the firing ceased. Our losses were three killed 
 and three wounded — at the Reina Mercedes battery at Punta Gorda. Among 
 the wounded are Ensign Peina and a sailor from the Mercedes. The Zocapa 
 battery has been silenced. 
 
 July 3. — Our squadron has left. It was met outside by a very sharp fire 
 from the enemy's ships. It has apparently succeeded in running the block- 
 ade, going out of sight of land in a westerly direction. 
 
 June 4. — One hundred and eight members of the crews of the Pluton, 
 Terror and Infanta Maria Teresa have arrived here. Not a single officer 
 among them. Nobody has any definite news of the Admiral. Military 
 Governor has sent a cablegram for the General-in-Chief, instructing me to 
 sink at the mouth of the harbo'r the Reina Mercedes. This will be done 
 to-night. 
 
 Enemy bombarded again to-day. Enemy apparently intends to force the 
 port. I have confidence in the first line of electric torpedoes, but there are 
 only four in the second line, the rest having been raised to enable our squad- 
 ron to pass out. I have proposed to the Military Governor to sink the Reina 
 Mercedes across the channel in eight fathoms of water. He is now consulting 
 with the General-in-Chief. Reina Mercedes is without armament, crew or 
 officers, her batteries having been sent to the mouth of the harbor. Her boil- 
 ers are worthless. I consider our situation as grave. 
 
 July 5. — There are twenty -four ships of the enemy in sight at dusk. 
 Reina Mercedes was sunk at the mouth of the harbor by the guns of the 
 enemy. 
 
428 STORY' OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 July lo. — At 9 o'clock this morning there were twenty-four ships of the 
 enemy on blockading station, and an abundance of American troops on land. 
 Rebels on every side of us also. Although the bombardment has ceased, it 
 seems that, there is a suspension of hostilities, but for what purpose I do not 
 know. From half-past 4 to half-past 6 the firing between our troops and the 
 enemy has been exceedingly lively. A few projectiles fell among the ships of 
 the squadron and the land batteries. We drove the enemy from the first line 
 of trenches. Our loss not heavy. Our men behaved with rare courage. If 
 we had had an abundance of ammunition we would have inflicted a severe 
 blow on the enemy. 
 
 July II. — Random firing between the advanced lines of both sides. Two 
 ironclads at the mouth of the harbor, two in Baiquiri and fifteen at different 
 points toward the east. From 9 to 2 the enemy's ships have been firing on 
 the city, using projectiles of large caliber, but a majority of them fell short of 
 their mark and exploded in the bay. Several buildings were damaged. 
 
 July 12. — Situation the same, but firing has ceased for the sake of a 
 parley. 
 
 July 13. — Both sides have agreed to cease firing till 12 o'clock to-morrow. 
 
 July 16. — Suspension of hostilities continued, General Toral holding con- 
 ferences with American General. I believe that the capitulation, in the event 
 of that being the result of the conferences, will be on the basis of the repatria- 
 tion of our men and those of the squadron and the Reina Mercedes. Number 
 of people dying from hunger and the like is increasing. Military Governor has 
 issued a decree against pillage, robbery and incendiarism. There are in Cuba 
 to-day 50,000 Americans, sixty cannon, the squadron and the rebels. 
 
 July 17. — The city has capitulated, and over it and the Alvarado the 
 American flag has been raised. Thus ends my authority, as well as that of 
 my associates on this naval station. 
 
 This diary is only remarkable because it was written day by day in 
 Santiago and sent to Havana, and shows the shifting shades of the situation. 
 We reproduce, according to their dates, the Spanish cipher • cables that the 
 Journal certifies are accurate and careful translations from the original Span- 
 ish copies of the cipher dispatches, as they were received or sent by Captain 
 General Blanco : 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 429 
 
 Admiral Cervera reports his arrival at Santiago : 
 
 Santiago, May 19, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Arrived to-day in this port, where the entire squadron, desirous of cooper- 
 ating in defense of the country, has the pleasure of saluting you. 
 
 CERVERA. 
 
 Linares, at Santiago, reports Cervera's squadron: 
 
 May 19, 1898. 
 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Cervera's squadron arrived here at 7 o'clock this morning, the Maria 
 Teresa flying the flag of the Admiral. The Colon brings neither her forward 
 nor stern guns, not having been able to mount them. The squadron is com- 
 posed of the cruisers Teresa, Oquendo, Vizcaya and Colon, the torpedo boat ' 
 destroyers Pluton and Furor, and two steamers of the Transatlantic Line. 
 The Terror remained in Martinique, repairing the damages sustained on the 
 voyage. The Alicante is with the Terror. They both need coal and pro- 
 visions. By reason of the increase in consumption caused by the arrival of 
 the squadron, the provisions of this place will only hold out until the end of 
 June. LINARES. 
 
 Blanco cables Cervera can't fight: 
 
 Havana, May 20, 1898. 
 General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid : 
 
 Cervera's squadron has arrived at Santiago de Cuba, without the Terror, 
 which remained at Martinique with the Alicante, both blockaded by the ships 
 of the enemy. The squadron comes without provisions or coal, which it will 
 take on there, but it will not be able to remain a long time, since it would 
 expose itself to be blockaded, thus shutting itself off completely and limiting 
 itself to the scant resources of the city If it had brought the Pelayo and the 
 Carlos Quinto and a flotilla of torpedo boats, it would be able to attempt 
 something important and to contribute powerfully to the defense of the island. 
 Reduced as it is, however, it will be obliged to avoid a combat as much as 
 possible, limiting itself to maneuvers which will not expose it to dangers, but 
 which, on the other hand, cannot produce great results. The squadron has 
 not brought with it any transport, either with coal or provisions, which would 
 have been as advantageous for us as arms and ammunition. The question of 
 
43° STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 provisions threatens to be very serious, for hardly enough remains for one 
 month. The efforts which I have been making to obtain supplies have thus 
 far been without success. The only thing that can be done is to arm some 
 fast transatlantic steamers and send them to run the blockade, advising me of 
 the probable date of their arrival, so that we may distract the attention of the 
 enemy. I have to-day issued a decree suppressing all the duties on merchan- 
 dise and making every port of the island free. I consider it indispensable 
 that the squadron of Cervera be reinforced as much as possible, and that the 
 torpedo boat destroyers be sent here to increase our strength. I am assured 
 on good authority that the enemy plans invasion with 28,000 men next week. 
 
 BLANCO. 
 
 Linares's impressions of Cervera's fleet: 
 
 Santiago, May 20, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Yesterday, when I gave an account of the number of ships and their 
 classes composing the squadron, I did not send you my impressions, expecting 
 , to confer with the Admiral, because I supposed that you were fully informed. 
 Neither here nor in the Peninsula is there available a better squadron than 
 that of Cervera, who says that he can only be reinforced with the Carlos 
 Quinto, but no cruiser, nor the Pelayo. If they have continued mounting 
 their old armament they could not be expected to strengthen the other 
 vessels, since they would lack the facilities for coping with vessels enjoying 
 modern equipments. As it now stands, Cervera's squadron cannot go out 
 and search a battle. It will have to limit itself to maneuvering cleverly in 
 order not to compromise any portion of our naval power. If it remains here 
 long enough it will be blockaded, and thus completely shut off from com- 
 munication, and reduced to the scant resources of this place. It is my duty 
 to lay before you clearly the situation and to assure you that I will meet all 
 the dangers of the situation with all energy. However, the government 
 should know the real state of affairs, so that if the naval forces and the army 
 should be unable to accomplish anything, the failure will not be attributed to 
 lack of skill and bungling. I have furnished to the squadron 2,400 tons of 
 coal, 600 from the San Luis Railroad Company's storehouse, and 1,800 from 
 the Yuruago and Baiquiri mines. LINARES. 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 431 
 
 Spanish government's understanding of Cervera's position: 
 
 Madrid, May 21, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 In the name of the government I thank you for your congratulation in 
 regard to the safe arrival of Cervera's squadron. The Admiral says that he 
 expects to provision it in as short a time as possible, because it is his opinion 
 that that place (Santiago) will shortly be in a very difficult position. He, 
 however, asks that reinforcements be sent to him. Assure him that the 
 government appreciates the gravity of affairs, and is fully alive to the 
 situation. CORREA. 
 
 Spanish Consul at Montreal tells of Schley's departure: 
 
 Montreal, May 22, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Madrid: 
 
 Schley's squadron has sailed for the south of Cuba. It is composed of 
 four monitors and a coast defense vessel. BO.NILLA. 
 
 Blanco reports a British collier: 
 
 Havana, May 22, 1898. 
 General Linares, Santiago: 
 
 I have information that the American battleship Iowa and the American 
 cruiser Brooklyn and two other large ships and three small ones are off 
 Cienfuegos. I have also to inform you that an English ship loaded with coal 
 has sailed from Curacoa for Santiago. BLANCO. 
 
 Spying on our fleets: 
 
 Santiago, May 23, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 The two ships of the enemy which withdrew yesterday, going westward, 
 returned this morning with another cruiser. LINARES. 
 
 Havana. May 23, 1898. 
 General Linares, Santiago: 
 
 The Indiana, the New York, Montgomery, Dolphin, Wilmington, and 
 three other cruisers, left the blockading station off Havana to-day. 
 
 BLANCO. 
 
432 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 Santiago, May 23, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 The squadron will leave to-morrow morning. I do not know what direc- 
 tion it will take. It is said it will abandon the coasts of Cuba. 
 
 LINARES. 
 
 Montreal, May 23, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Four powerful war ships sailed on the 21st, with instructions to find and 
 -destroy Cervera's squadron. The Cincinnati and Vesuvius have been sent to 
 patrol the Yucatan Channel. ' BONILLA 
 
 Havana May 24, 1898 
 ■General Linares, Santiago: 
 
 Be sure and notify me of departure of squadron. Am eager to learn of 
 its departure. BLANCO. 
 
 Cervera decides to stay at Santiago : 
 
 Santiago, May 24, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Cervera, after having consulted with the commanders of his various ships, 
 
 has been to see me. He has decided to remain here until assured that he 
 
 will not be pursued by the Americans when he endeavors to leave the port. 
 
 He will wait until they make a move on Porto Rico. He thinks it will be 
 
 best to go to Curacoa. Unless the future movements of the enemy should 
 
 change the situation he does not think it would be well to go to Cienfuegos, a 
 
 point which is connected with Havana and other places with resources and 
 
 provisions. A few ships could close the narrow mouth of this port and render 
 
 difficult for an indefinite time a' departure from it. Thus the American forces 
 
 would be permitted to resume without embarrassment the attack on Havana, 
 
 "with the moral advantage of having rendered our squadron useless. 
 
 LINARES. 
 
 Blanco's wishes for success: 
 
 Havana, May 24, 1898. 
 General Linares, Santiago: 
 
 Your observations regarding the squadron very acceptable. If it had 
 
 gone to Cienfuegos it would certainly have entered that port without incident. 
 
 Your situation is certainly difficult to-day, for the reasons which you indicate, 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 433 
 
 but it is to be hoped that the ingenuity and valor of your Admiral and other 
 chiefs will enable a departure from there to be made with success, for which I 
 offer you again my sincerest wishes. BLANCO. 
 
 Cervera warned against being "bottled up": 
 
 Havana, May 24 1898. 
 General Linares, Santiago: 
 
 Oregon arrived to-day at Key West. The flying squadron will move upon 
 
 Santiago to-day, and Sampson expects to arrive to-morrow. Report to 
 
 Cervera that he may take steps to prevent himself from being shut up in the 
 
 harbor. BLANCO. 
 
 Blanco encourages Madrid : 
 
 Havana, May 27, 1898. 
 Genera] Corea, Minister of War, Madrid : 
 
 Cervera's squadron has made a great impression on the Americans. They 
 
 have dispatched seven ships to Santiago. BLANCO. 
 
 Spanish Consul sends word of Hobson's plan: 
 
 Montreal, May 27, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Believing that our squadron is in Santiago, the government of the United 
 
 States is thinking of sinking large hulks at the entrance of the bay after the 
 
 destruction of the fortifications. I advise that notice of this be sent to our 
 
 squadron. The American government announces an agreement with Maximo 
 
 Gomez. It is said that a steamer will touch at Key West very soon to take on 
 
 an expedition, which will disembark at various points. BONILLA. 
 
 Correa, Minister of War, much pleased : 
 
 Madrid, May 30, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 The belief that General Linares is not in cable communication with you 
 and the interruption of the telegraphic land line cause us to notify you that we 
 will expect you to send us information of the Eastern Department and of 
 Cervera as you may receive it. The last paragraph of your dispatch has 
 created a very favorable impression on the government. CORREA. 
 
434 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 Plot to smash Dewey: 
 
 ' Madrid, June 3, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 The very serious situation in the Philippines compels us to send there 
 ships and reinforcements of troops as soon as possible. In order to be able to 
 cope with the squadron of the enemy in Manila, it will be indispensable to 
 send there a squadron that is not inferior. Now there are only two ships of 
 war there, and one of them, I think, cannot pass the canal. The only thing 
 that we can do is to send such ships of Cervera's squadron as may be able to 
 leave Santiago, but before adopting a resolution to that efEect the government 
 desires to know your opinion as to the effect that would be produced in the 
 people of Cuba by the withdrawal of Cervera's squadron. This move would 
 be only temporary, and, once the object was obtained in the Philippines, the 
 squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reinforced. 
 
 CORREA. 
 
 Blanco says withdrawal of Cervera's fleet would mean the loss of Cuba: 
 
 Havana, June 3, 1898. 
 General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid : 
 
 I would be lacking in my duty if I should conceal from you the fact that 
 the departure from these waters of Cervera's squadron would produce here 
 such a dismal effect that I doubt if I would be able to cope even with force 
 with the situation that it would provoke. The volunteers at present, primed 
 to their utmost by reason of the smallness of Cervera's squadron and sus- 
 tained in their exaltation by the hope of the arrival of reinforcements from 
 one moment to another, would arise in a body on learning that instead of rein- 
 forcements the ships that are here would leave. It would necessitate the 
 shedding of considerable blood, even if the army would agree to fire upon the 
 volunteers, which I doubt. In that case the loss of the island by reason of 
 the terrible uprising which would thus be caused would follow. That is my 
 opinion, and I express it without any exaggeration. So my conscience directs 
 — and permit me to add that in my judgment the salvation of Spain and of the 
 dynasty is here in Cuba, and here, therefore, you ought to send as many ships 
 as you possibly can. If the Indians of the Philippine Islands are loyal, they 
 ought to be sufficient to save that country. If they are not loyal there is no 
 means of saving the Philippines. BLANCO. 
 
"OQUENDO," STAEBOAED SIDE, SHOWING EXIT OF 13-INCH SHELL. 
 
 " OQUENDO," STAEBOAED SIDE, AS ABANDONED. 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 437 
 
 Cervera's Marines ordered to land : 
 
 Havana, June 13, 1898. 
 General Linares, Santiago: 
 
 In order to resist the attack on Santiago, either by sea or by land, the 
 
 marines of Cervera's squadron shoiild be landed and the rapid fire guns, and 
 
 thej', it seems, could be also used to good effect. BLANCO. 
 
 Blanco asks authority over Cervera: 
 
 Havana, June 21, 1898. 
 General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid: 
 
 I have regretted very much that the independence enjoyed by Cervera's 
 squadron has prevented me from intervening in the matter of its operation 
 notwithstanding the fact that on me will fall whatever the consequences may 
 be, especially as since the arrival of the squadron in Santiago and its pro- 
 longed stay there I have had to change the campaign. If at least he had 
 endeavored to put himself in communication with me, with Linares, or 
 Admiral Manterola, chief of the navy yard in Havana, it is probable that 
 between us all we would have found a more advantageous solution of the 
 problem than that which is offered to-day, namely, either an unequal combat 
 within the harbor or a dash through the enemy's line for either Haiti OT 
 Jamaica, where, in turn, they would be again shut up. It would be prefer- 
 able, perhaps, to come to Cienfuegos or Havana, which is possible at the pres- 
 ent time, or to go back to Spain if there is no possibility of being reinforced. 
 It is better to take all these risks rather than to remain shut up in Cuba and 
 to be compelled to surrender because of hunger. The situation is very grave, 
 and I do not doubt that the government will order in these critical times that 
 which will be best for the country and the throne. Permit me, however, to 
 suggest, with all respect, the advisability of combining all military action in 
 the present war, decreeing that in me shall reside all authority as command- 
 ing chief of all the forces, both land and water, operating in these parts. 
 
 BLANCO. 
 
 Cervera told of a good time to escape : 
 
 Havana, June 24, 1S98. 
 General Linares, Santiago : 
 
 Tell Admiral Cervera that I desire to know his opinion of the situation 
 and his plans. Tell him I think that he ought to leave as soon as possible for 
 whatever port he may think most advisable, because his position in that 
 
438 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 harbor, in my opinion, is as dangerous as it can possibly be. Last night alone 
 there were seven ships there, while in Cienfuegos there were only three, and 
 here there were nine, in spite of which the Santo Domingo and Montevideo, 
 which left at 2 o'clock in the morning, were able to run the blockade with 
 ease. BLANCO 
 
 Madrid, June 24, 1898. 
 Captain- General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 The squadron of blockading ships being reduced to seven at Santiago, the 
 government thinks this would be an excellent occasion for our squadron to 
 endeavor to-make its escape. CORREA. 
 
 Cervera's view of the situation: 
 
 Santiago, June 25, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, 
 
 (Through Admiral Manterola, Chief of the Navy Yard), Havana: 
 
 Since my last dispatch to you, I have received a letter from General 
 
 Linares, transmitting to me a dispatch from you, in which you say you desire 
 
 to know my opinion on the situation. In my former letter I indicated what it 
 
 was, and on the present occasion I shall go into details. It is not true that the 
 
 blockading squadron has even been reduced to only seven ships. Even the 
 
 six principal ones represent a force three times greater than mine. The lack 
 
 of long-range guns in the fortifications at the mouth of the harbor prevents us 
 
 from keeping the American ships at a great distance. It therefore happens 
 
 that they are always near to the mouth of the harbor, and with their strong 
 
 searchlights they make it impossible for me to escape, except by giving them 
 
 battle and overpowering them. In my judgment, an attempt to leave this 
 
 port would surely involve the loss of the squadron, the death of a majority of 
 
 the crews of all the ships, a course which I would never take upon myself, 
 
 but if you order it I will execute it. In my opinion, the loss of the squadron 
 
 was settled when I was ordered to come here, so that the present grievous 
 
 situation is not a surprise to me. You will command whether or not we shall 
 
 go forward to this sacrifice, which I think will be useless. 
 
 CERVERA. 
 
 Admiral Cervera a subordinate: 
 
 Santiago, June 25, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 The government orders me to place myself under your orders, in accord- 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 439 
 
 ance with the decreeof November 13, 1872, which I do with the greatest of 
 pleasure, believing it to be my duty, and I shall explain to you the condition 
 of the squadron. 
 
 Of three thousand shells for the Hontoria guns of fourteen centimeters, 
 only six hundred and twenty are available, the others being absolutely useless, 
 not having been replaced by good ones because of the lack of facilities at the 
 time of -our departure from Spain. Two Hontoria guns of fourteen centi- 
 meters on the Oquendo are not good, and I have ordered them changed for 
 others. The greater number of the quick matches are useless, as they lack 
 their caps. The Colon is without her main batteries. The Vizcaya's bottom 
 is foul, and the ship has therefore lost her speed. The Maria Teresa has no 
 guns for landing parties, and those of the Vizcaya and Oquendo are worthless. 
 Moreover, we have very little coal and provisions for the month of July. The 
 blockading squadron is four times superior. Therefore, our attempt to leave 
 this port would mean our immediate, absolutely sure destruction. A great 
 part of my crews are on land, reinforcing the garrison there. On the 23d I 
 considered it to be my duty to place before the government the information 
 contained in the following telegram: "The enemy is at sea. He has captured 
 Baiquiri. To-day he will surely capture Siboney, in spite of the brilliant 
 defense which will be offered. Yesterday five battalions left Manzanillo. 
 They will arrive in time to prolong the agony, for I very much doubt if they 
 will be able to save the city. As it is absolutely impossible for the squadron 
 to escape under these circumstances, I expect to offer all the resistance in my 
 power in the event of necessity, and to destroy the ships as a last resort. ' ' 
 This is the expression of my opinion, which agrees with the opinion of the 
 -commanders of all my ships. I await your instructions. 
 
 CERVERA. 
 
 General Blanco orders Cervera out (copyright, 1898, by W. R. Hearst) : 
 
 Havana, June 26, 1898. 
 Admiral Cervera, Santiago: 
 
 Your two telegrams received. I reciprocate highly the satisfaction which 
 
 you express at being placed under my orders, and I consider myself highly 
 
 honored, and I desire that you shall regard me more as a companion than as 
 
 a chief. It appears to me that you exaggerate somewhat the difiBculties of 
 
 leaving Santiago. There is no necessity of fighting. All that you are asked 
 
440 STORY OP THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 to do is to escape from that prison in which the squadron now finds itself, and 
 I do not think it is impossible, if you take advantage of opportune circum- 
 stances, such as a dark night, stormy weather, etc. Thus you might be able 
 to mock the vigilance of the enemy and to take whatever course you might 
 deem best. Moreover, in the case of your being detected, remember that the 
 aim at night is uncertain, and although you may sustain some damage, yet 
 they would be trivial when the saving of the ships is taken into consideration. 
 You tell me that the loss of Santiago is assured, in which case you would 
 destroy the ships — and this is all the more reason why you should endeavor to 
 escape, since it is always preferable for a soldier to succumb in a battle where 
 he would have many chances of success. For my part, I repeat that I think 
 it would be very difficult, indeed, even admitting the strength of the enemy's 
 ships, that leaving the port on a dark night and taking advantage of a good 
 opportunity, the departure or temporary reduction of the enemy's squadron 
 for any purpose, they would cause much damage. A proof of this is the 
 departure of the Montevideo and Santo Domingo from this port, with nine 
 ships on the blockading station, the departure of the Purisima Concepcion 
 from Casilda, with three, and the arrival of the Regina Christina in Cienfu- 
 egos, with three also. If your ships should be captured in any way whatever 
 in a Cuban port, the effect in all the world would be disastrous and the war 
 would then be held to be ended in favor of the enemy. To-day all the nations 
 of the earth have their eyes fixed on your squadron, and in it is wrapt up the 
 honor of the nation, as I am sure you understand. The government is of the 
 same opinion. The situation offers no doubt to my mind, for indeed, I have 
 great confidence in the success of it. I shall leave completely to your discre- 
 tion the course which you will have to take, even thougli some ships will have • 
 to be sacrificed. As a favorable sign I will say to you that the captain of the 
 Oerman cruiser Geier has expressed the opinion that the squadron can effect 
 its departure from Santiago without exposing itself to great risks. 
 
 BLANCO. 
 
 Admiral Cervera's reply to Blanco: 
 
 Santiago, June 27, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Your cable of yesterday received. Many thanks for your very kind words. 
 
 I ought to bow to your judgment without discussing it, the more so, having 
 
 already given you my full opinidn after mature reflection. I have always 
 
VIEWS OF THE NOTORIOUS PRISON AT SANTIAGO. 
 
CAST IRON PROJECTILES USED IN THE NAVY. 
 
 PETTY OFFICERS OF THE U. S. S. " NEW YORK." 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 443 
 
 believed that there were more competent sailors than I, and I am very sorry 
 that none of them can come to take command of the squadron, making me his 
 subordinate. I consider your telegram as an order to leave the port, and in 
 consequence I shall ask General Linares to re-embark the forces which were 
 landed from my ships in conformity with your orders. I beg you to confirm 
 the order to leave the port, because it is not stated in explicit terms, and I 
 should be very sorry not to interpret your orders correctly. 
 
 CERVERA. 
 
 Santiago, June 28, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Impossible to reembark troops from Cervera's ships until the arrival of 
 reinforcements. LINARES. 
 
 Madrid presses Cervera to escape : 
 
 Madrid, June 26, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 The government believes that on the first opportunity offering all the ships 
 of the squadron, or those whose condition would lead to the hope that they 
 may be able to save themselves, should leave the port, and that the Admiral 
 should be given full liberty to take whichever direction he pleases. 
 
 CORREA. 
 
 Blanco orders a postponement of the fleet's "departure" : 
 
 Havana, June 28. 
 Admiral Cervera, Santiago : 
 
 I desire to improve as much as possible the situation in Santiago. I am 
 •doing all I can to send you rations, and if I can get them I will send you 
 more reinforcements, thus prolonging the defense and perhaps raising the 
 siege, with the result of saving the squadron. In the event of not securing 
 reinforcements for you, you will have to leave the port in spite of the diffi- 
 culties, which I recognize. My decision is that the squadron remain there, 
 quietly until the rations are received, watching a favorable opportunity to 
 depart, going wherever you may think convenient, but in the event of affairs 
 becoming grave, even to the point of your believing the fall of Santiago to be 
 imminent, the squadron must leave immediately as best it can, its destination 
 
444 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 to be determined by you and the distinguished officers who command the 
 ships, and undoubtedly they will confirm with their acts the reputation which 
 they enjoy. BLANCO. 
 
 Cervera accepts his doom : 
 
 Santiago, June 28, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Your telegram received. Please repeat it from the word "grave" to the 
 
 end of the sentence, as I do not understand it perfectly at that point. All 
 
 the rest will be complied with as well as possible, notwithstanding the fact 
 
 that the scarcity of coal will make it difficult. These ships require twelve 
 
 hours of firing up, and if the fires are ready to enable them to take advantage 
 
 of any opportunity which may offer, they will each burn up fifteen tons a day ;. 
 
 but I believe I understand the purport of your order, which is that if I can 
 
 get a favorable opportunity we shall make the best of it, and if not, at the last 
 
 hour it is to be done even though the loss of the squadron will be inevitable. 
 
 CERVERA. 
 
 Blanco orders Cervera to leave : 
 
 Havana, July i, 1898. 
 Admiral Cervera, Santiago: 
 
 I have learned of the advance made by the enemy in spite of the heroic 
 
 defense of the troops at Santiago, and in accordance with the opinion of the 
 
 government you must reembark those of your crew who were landed, and 
 
 you must take advantage of the earliest possible opportunity to leave the port 
 
 with all your ships. You are to follow whatever course you may consider 
 
 opportune, and you are authorized to leave there any of your ships which, 
 
 because of its slowness or for other reasons, would have no chance of saving 
 
 itself. I must inform you that in Cienfuegos there are only three blockading 
 
 ships and at Havana nine, none of them of any importance. 
 
 BLANCO. 
 
 Cervera seeks delay: 
 
 Santiago, July i, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 As a continuation of my cable of yesterday, I have to inform you that 
 
 General Linares has answered me that he cannot return the sailors because 
 
 they occupy positions on the firing line and in the trenches, and that if they 
 
 are removed the Americans would be able to advance through the places thus 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 445 
 
 vacated. Without these men the squadron cannot leave the port. I request 
 further instructions from you. CERVERA. 
 
 Santiago, July i, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 From General Toral you know of the battle of to-day. General Toral 
 thinks that the withdrawal of my sailors would result in the loss of Santiago, 
 and without them I cannot attempt to escape. My opinion is the same as 
 that of Toral, and our departure would in that event be like a flight. My cap- 
 tains also think so. Send instructions for which I have asked. 
 
 CERVERA. 
 
 Squadron given twelve hours to leave : 
 
 Havana, July 2, 1898. 
 Admiral Cervera, Santiago: 
 
 Ship with the greatest haste all your sailors and leave immediately with 
 the squadron. • BLANCO. 
 
 ' (In his own handwriting Blanco added the following words to this dis- 
 patch, writing them on the back of the telegram: "Twelve hours only are 
 necessary for Cervera to get ready.") 
 
 Madrid approves : 
 
 Madrid, July 3, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Instructions given to Cervera are approved. CORREA. 
 
 General Toral, of Santiago, reports Cervera's flight: 
 
 Santiago, July 3, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 At half-past nine this morning Cervera's squadron departed in perfect for- 
 mation, firing like the devil on the ships of the enemy, including the Indiana, 
 Massachusetts, Iowa, Texas, Brooklyn, New York, and a number of con- 
 verted yachts, which were near the mouth of the harbor. After an hour of 
 sharp firing our squadron disappeared from sight, going toward the west, 
 having maneuvered with the greatest celerity and without losing a single 
 minute. The enemy's squadron was thrown into confusion and was not able 
 to approach our ships, notwithstanding their superiority, and it was only after 
 our squadron had run the blockade that the enemy's ships followed in pur- 
 suit. I regret to have to report the loss of the two torpedo boat destroyers. 
 
446 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 One of them ran on the rocks near Punta Cabrera, and the other received such 
 injuries, including the loss of its rudder, that it was in vain that it endeavored 
 to return to port. Attacked by a ship of the enemy, it sustained the battle 
 and then was compelled to ship its crew in two boats. One of them was 
 captured, while the other reached the shore. A short time afterward the 
 destroyer blew up. From Morro it was impossible to see whether the crew of 
 the one that was stranded at Punta Cabrera was able to save themselves. As 
 this battle, which was distinguished by heroic conduct on the part of all our 
 sailors, much to the glory of our navy, may awaken in the Admiral command- 
 ing the enemy's squadron a desire to force the entrance to the harbor and 
 bombard the city, which I think would be easy, I have decided to block the 
 mouth of the harbor. TORAL. 
 
 Cienfuegos ordered to congratulate Cervera: 
 
 Havana, July 3, 1898. 
 General Aguirre, Military Commander, Cienfuegos : 
 
 Make preparations for the reception of the squadron commanded by 
 Admiral Cervera, which left Santiago this morning, and* which may arrive at 
 any moment at Cienfuegos. Facilitate the Admiral with whatever he may 
 need, and congratulate him for me for the distinguished victory over the 
 enemy. BLANCO. 
 
 First news of the squadron's destruction: 
 
 Santiago, July 3, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 A number of shipwrecked sailors from the destroyers and one from the 
 Maria Teresa presented themselves this evening in Zocapa Castle. The sailor 
 from the Maria Teresa said that when far from Santiago that cruiser was lost, 
 and that the Oquendo was on lire at the time. A number of other sailors 
 from the Maria Teresa have made their way here. It is not known what has 
 been the fate of the Admiral. TORAL. 
 
 Santiago, July 4, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 The American General tells me that our squadron has been destroyed 
 and that Cervera is a prisoner. * TORAL. 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 447 
 
 Madrid hears of the squadron's fate: 
 
 Havana, July 4, 1898. 
 General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid : 
 
 According to advices received from the military commander of Santiago 
 de Cuba, a number of sailors from the Maria Teresa have arrived here, and 
 they say that their ship, the Oquendo, the Pluton and the Furor were beached 
 with fire on board, and that the Colon and Vizcaya were lost to sight with the 
 enemy in full pursuit. BLANCO. 
 
 Cervera reports his capture : 
 
 Playa del Este, July 5, 1898. 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 I left Santiago de Cuba yesterday morning with all the squadron, and, 
 after an unequal combat and against forces more than three times greater 
 than my own, my entire squadron was destroyed, I having given orders to run 
 them on the rocks. The Maria Teresa, the Oquendo and the Vizcaya blew 
 up, and the Colon, according to information given me by the Americans, 
 beached and turned over, and the destroyers were sunk. I am not yet aware 
 of the number of lives lost, but it will undoubtedly exceed six hundred dead 
 and many wounded, although not in such a great proportion. We, the sur- 
 vivors, are all prisoners of the Americans. My men behaved with the greatest 
 courage, and they won the plaudits even of the enemy. The commander of 
 the Vizcaya was permitted to retain his sword. I am highly pleased with the 
 generosity with which they treated us. Villamil is among the dead, and I 
 believe that Lagaza was also killed. And among the wounded is Eulate. 
 We have lost everything, and need -funds. 
 
 CERVERA (a prisoner at that time). 
 
 Blanco tries to shift blame : 
 
 Havana, July 5, 1898. 
 Admiral Cervera, Playa del Este : 
 
 I have read your telegram with great sorrow, and I admire the bearing of 
 the chief officers and crew. Perhaps if you had selected some other hour to 
 leave port the result would have been different. Sampson says in his tele- 
 gram that he has not suffered more than three killed and wounded. Is that 
 possible? Tell me what funds you need, and where and how I can remit to 
 
448 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 you. I beg you, as well as all the chiefs and officers and men under your 
 command, to receive the expression of my lively interest and desire to allevi- 
 ate your situation to the full extent of my ability. BLANCO. 
 
 Madrid cables "great joy": 
 
 Madrid, July 6, 1898. 
 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 The departure of the squadron has caused great joy here. 
 
 CORREA. 
 
 Blanco advises holding out: 
 
 Havana, July 8, 1898. 
 General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid : 
 
 The army, always ready for any sacrifice for the sake of the nation, 
 remains intact up to the present time, and is still full of spirit, for it is main- 
 taining itself in Santiago de Ciiba with vigor. After many brilliant battles, 
 in which, although some ground has been lost, every inch of territory was 
 disputed with great valor, severe losses have been inflicted upon the enemy. 
 It is my opinion that the majority of the military classes would listen with 
 little patience to any peace proposition, much less to any proposition for the 
 abandonment of territory which the army has been defending so valorously. 
 With provisions and ammunition we could maintain our position for many 
 months, and still render very dear the victory to our enemies, although the 
 absolute possession of the sea, which the Americans enjoy, will make life 
 painful for the lack of food, battles extremely difficult by reason of the 
 scarcity of ammunition, and hamper the government considerably, because of 
 the frequent disturbances of public order, which will result from a famishing 
 condition on the part of the people. To sum up, then, permit me to say 
 that the army in general desires war for the honor of arms as well as for its 
 own honor, and that it would be exceedingly sorrowful to them to abandon to 
 the enemy without fighting a land which it has been preserving for so many 
 long 3'ears at the cost of its own blood. That is the opinion I also hold, and 
 that I have always held. BLANCO. 
 
 Blanco's tribute of admiration to Cervera : 
 
 Havana, July 9, 1898. 
 
 Admiral Cervera, Care French Consul, New York : 
 
 Insisting on my desire to alleviate the condition of those brave defenders 
 
 of the nation who so valorously succumbed in unequal combat, and to whom, 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 449 
 
 as to 3'ou, I offer a tribute of admiration, I beg you to let me know what sum 
 of money you need, and where I can send it to you, which end and to save 
 time I am directing this telegram to the care of the French Consul in New 
 York. ■ BLANCO. 
 
 Madrid, July 14, 1898. 
 General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Your telegram received. CORREA. 
 
 Prime Minister Sagasta's appeal: 
 
 Madrid, July 12, 1898. 
 Blanco, Governor-General, Havana: 
 
 Absolute masters of the siege, the Americans, knowing by experience 
 
 how costly it has been to them to engage our brave soldiers in battle, will 
 
 limit themselves in the future to extending and strengthening the blockade 
 
 and to bombarding ports, at the same time detaching ships to attack Porto 
 
 .Rico, the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, and even cities on the coast of the 
 
 Peninsula, expecting that, aided by the Indians, they will secure possession of 
 
 the Philippines, and surely also disturb public order in the nation. The 
 
 unmistakable duty of any government is to avoid such great and such 
 
 irremediable evil by seeking by all means the end of such an unequal and 
 
 disastrous combat. Peace could be obtained to-day on conditions that would 
 
 be accepted and honorable to the aftny. But once Cuba has been reduced by 
 
 starvation, Manila lost, a part, if not all, of Porto Rico occupied and the most 
 
 important cities on our coast bombarded, it will not be possible to think of 
 
 peace. The discomposure and ruin of this calamitous country would be the 
 
 result. I trust that in view of these reasons you and the generals under your 
 
 orders, to whom our institutions and, above all, our country, are so dear, will 
 
 know how to respond to the discipline of the ever valorous army, and to 
 
 render obedience to the resolutions of the government regarding peace. I 
 
 await with anxiety your reply which I beg you to send me with all possible 
 
 haste. SAGASTA. 
 
 Correa explains Madrid's position: 
 
 Madrid, July 12, 1898. 
 
 Captain-General Blanco, Havana: 
 
 Your telegram No. 202 received. I am surprised that the honor of your 
 
 indomitable army being already saved, as undoubtedly and to the admiration 
 
450 STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 of the whole world, as well as to the great glory of the nation, it has been, that 
 the forces at Santiago persist in continuing a war in which they surely can 
 gain no more laurels nor arrive at any other result than that of being com- 
 pelled to surrender in a short time for lack of provisions and ammunition. It 
 'is not to be believed that the enemy, being fully aware of the lamentable 
 conditions existing among the troops at Santiago, will be in any hurry to 
 suffer or risk new losses, especially since being able, by means of the block- 
 ade, to prevent any help being sent from here, they can possess themselves of 
 the island without new sacrifices of blood on their part. 
 
 Neither can I explain to myself your tenacity in maintaining a position in 
 an ungrateful land which repels us and makes itself odious to us by its desire 
 to separate itself from the mother country. I should think that the army 
 would prefer the grief of abandoning it to the ruin and desolation which such 
 a disastrous persistency would bring to this unfortunate country, which, in 
 view of the future which awaits it, is clamoring for peace with honor, the pres- 
 ent being the time when it could be secured. 
 
 But let it be whatever it will, and without ceasing to feel in the bottom of 
 my heart the real pride of a Spaniard and a soldier in the exalted sentiments 
 of your unrivaled army, I conceive and deduce that it will not permit its 
 noble aims to interfere with discipline, and that the soldiers will never forget 
 their duties of obedience and submission to the decrees of the government, 
 giving such attention to them as will be sure to preserve the honor of the 
 army. 
 
 I therefore believe that whatever may be the decrees of the government 
 the army will execute them, and that it will not pretend to constitute itself a 
 danger to the nation, thus bringing upon itself, the great misfortune of hav- 
 ing to surrender for lack of provisions and other means of sustaining itself. 
 
 I nevertheless desire to have an absolute assurance of this, and this you 
 alone can give me. Be so kind as to let me have it as soon as possible, for 
 these are critical moments. CORREA. 
 
 Havana, July 13, 1898. 
 General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid : 
 
 The matters you discuss in your confidential telegram No. 107, addressed 
 to me, being of supreme gravity and importance, and as the majority of the 
 generals are absent at the front from their commands, it will not be possible 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 451 
 
 for me to answer you before to-morrow. Please excuse this short delay, 
 which I trust will be for the better. BLANCO. 
 
 Blanco demands a continuation of the war : 
 
 Havana, July 14, 1898. 
 Senor Sagasta, Prime Minister, Madrid: 
 
 The ruling opinion in the army in Cuba, in which we the generals all 
 share, demands a continuation of the war. We believe that the honor of the 
 army demands several more sacrifices, but the army will never present itself 
 an obstacle to the fulfillment of the orders of the government, which it will 
 obey, as it is its duty to do. Prpfoundly grateful on my part for the very 
 flattering phrases which yeu direct to me in your telegram of the 1 2th, it is 
 exceedingly painful for me to inform you that I can no longer continue at 
 the head of this army in the' event of the government deciding to sue for 
 peace. BLANCO. 
 
 ^ Havana, July 14, 1898. 
 
 General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid : 
 
 The ruling opinion of the army, which we the generals all share, is for 
 the continuation of the war, believing that enough has not yet been done for 
 the preservation of its honor. It would therefore view with shame the 
 abandonment of the island which it is occupying and defending with such 
 bravery, but you may be sure that it will respect the orders of the govern- 
 ment, and will not oppose its decisions. This much the generals promise you. 
 In these most difficult circumstances I beg to assure you of my best wishes. 
 
 BLANCO. 
 
 Blanco reports Santiago's fall: 
 
 Havana, July 17, 1898. 
 General Correa, Minister of War, Madrid : 
 
 The surrender of Santiago was effected this morning without any inter- 
 vention whatever of my authority, according to information which I have 
 transmitted to you. In spite of this dismemberment of the island, the army 
 continues spirited and the war can be continued if you will only send us pro- 
 visions, which would be advisable under ships flying a neutral flag, seeking 
 also the means of sending us ammunition. The fall of Santiago has no true 
 
452 STORY OF THE. SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 military importance, and it can be said that the war has not in reality begun 
 yet. Several days ago I issued orders for the concentration of the divisions of 
 Holgiain and Puerto Principe to maneuver according to the movements of the 
 enemy. The decisive campaign will have to be fought out on this side of the 
 trocha, and the enemy will have to suffer very severe losses in order to pene- 
 trate this section. BLANCO. 
 
 These dispatches are confessions of the incompetency of the Spaniards for 
 peace or war. The colonial system that stimulated their arrogance disturbed 
 their balances, and they became profligates in public business. The fatal loss 
 was that of the honesty of the servants of the government in dealing with the 
 people, and the immediate natural consequence was the people became false 
 to their government — hence disorderly revolution. 
 
 The character of Spain was impaired by. her injustice to her colonies. 
 The degradation that she imposed upon them reacted on herself. It has 
 appeared in weakness for the preservation of domestic order, as well as in 
 asserting her ancient authority beyond the lines of the peninsula; and it 
 has been still more signally displayed in fighting a foreign foe. The dis- 
 patches of Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares, telegrams 
 written in the cipher code of Spain, are in every sense official. They betray, 
 as hardly anything else could, the decadence of the country, not only in the 
 facts they reveal, but in the fact of publicity. There is no doubt that it was 
 public opinion in Spain, fpr'years before the war with us came, that the Span- 
 ish navy was more powerful than that of the United States — that they had 
 battleships superior to ours in armor and arms, cruisers that were swifter and 
 equally staunch, and torpedo boats and destroyers that greatly overmatched 
 our gunboats. It was the policy of the Government to misinform the people. 
 
 It appears in the plain English of the secret Spanish cipher that the fleets 
 of Spain were largely shams. They failed in the equipments essential in 
 modern warfare. They had but one thing left. On the defensive — not asked 
 to brave the terrors of bushwhacking, the honor of the Spanish infantry, once 
 equal to any in Europe, was sustained, and the crews of the doomed ships at 
 Manila and Santiago, beaten and crushed, burning and sinking, behaved with 
 intrepidity to the last. Spain was not able to send east or west a squadron 
 that could cope with ours, and the only advantage they got from their navy 
 H^as that they had so deceived themselves as to persuade others that their 
 
STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER. 
 
 453 
 
 illusions were real, and we were for a time embarrassed by apprehensions. 
 We made the safe mistake of over-valuing the ability of our enemy, and 
 yet we had so neglected our army that the fate of the day at Santiago 
 depended upon a thin and strained line. The Spaniards dealt with themselves 
 badly when they believed the fancies that were the foolishness of their pride, 
 and as their last step before collapse was taken, their condition was incom- 
 prehensible by them. When Cervera was ordered from Madrid and Havana 
 to flee from Santiago, there was no real plan that had a promise in it, of more 
 than a few days' respite from ruin, for the utmost success expected was that 
 some of the fugitives might get into the harbor of Gienfuegos. 
 
CHAPTER XX. 
 
 The Santiago Situation After the Spanish Fleet was Gone. 
 
 Cipher Dispatches — Too Much Publicity— Shafter Demands the Help of the Navy, and is 
 Supported by the War Department — He Heard Firing at Midnight and Hoped it was 
 Sampson — Garcia's Men who were Always Going to do Something To-morrow — 
 "Terrible Fight" July ist — Reenforcements, Lighters and Tugs Wanted — An En- 
 ergetic Rush to Aid Shafter, but not by the Navy — Cable Direct to Corbin — The 
 Yellow Fever Appears — Preliminaries to the Capitulation — -The President Sticks 
 to It that Spaniards Must Unconditionally Surrender— Fortunate Arrival of Miles in 
 the Blue Rains. 
 
 The anxieties of the War Office to receive the very latest news from 
 General Shafter's headquarters during the fighting at Santiago, and at the 
 same time to so far control the publications about the battles as to interfere 
 with recklessly panicky communications, caused repeated "hurry" sugges- 
 tions from Washington and orders to send that which was important in cipher. 
 
 The following dispatches have the effect of a searchlight : 
 
 Playa del Este, July 4, 1898 — 1:13 a. m. 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington: 
 
 Camp near Santiago, 3. — I will send important dispatches hereafter in 
 cipher, when possible, but you must understand that we have no time to 
 spare, no facilities for the work. Messages sent you this afternoon would 
 require until to-morrow to workout. Captain Alger is 10 miles from here; 
 also my staff officer in charge of cipher is absent, on duty. 
 
 SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 4, 1898 — 1 145 a, m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 Secretary War directs me to say for you to exercise your own judgment 
 about using cipher and not inconvenience yourself in any way, as it is fully 
 understood how you are occupied. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 Captain Alger, the son of the Secretary, was an expert in ciphers, but 
 
 454 
 
AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 455 
 
 there was no time for the exercise of his skill, and there was a good deal of 
 circulation of intelligence. 
 
 The extreme activity enforced upon the army headquarters in the field 
 may perhaps account for this paragraph in the report of Admiral Sampson, 
 explaining that he did not refuse to endeavor to force his way into the Santi- 
 ago Harbor. The Admiral was aroused to remark: "I here, moreover, 
 would animadvert upon the apparently extraordinary openness with which 
 every detail of hope, effort, or suggestion on the part of the army has 
 been published. The unwisdom of such procedure is too manifest for 
 discussion. ' ' 
 
 When Cervera's fleet was smashed, burned, wrecked on the rocks, and Shaf- 
 fer was demanding the surrender of the Spanish garrison, the wires were ting- 
 ling with hotly rushed telegrams driving the officers in charge of transportation 
 by rail and steamers to hasten reinforcements and supplies to sustain the boys 
 who had been in the thick of the fight, and were waiting through the long 
 days of a truce, subject to the vicissitudes of calculations whether they 
 should be thrown in storming columns" upon the Spanish lines, to save them 
 from the fearful blight of the yellow fever. July 5th, Shaffer said if Sampson 
 would force an entrance to the harbor, which did not seem to ordinary obser- 
 vation utterly bej'ond reason after the annihilation of Cervera's fleet, the city 
 would be taken "in a few hours." If the army was to take it, 15,000 troops 
 were "wanted speedily, " and it was not certain about the landing, "as it is 
 getting stormy." The "sure and speedy" way, the General said, was 
 "through the bay" — and Shafter wired he was "now in position" to do his 
 part. The President wanted cooperation between the army and navy, and 
 telegraphed accordingly. 
 
 July 5th, Shafter wired: "Navy should go Santiago Harbor at any cost. 
 If they do, I believe they will take the city and all the troops that are there. 
 If they do not, the country should be prepared for heavy losses among our 
 troops. ' ' 
 
 Meantime, Shafter had talked wi<-h the French Consul and others, and 
 concluded to "keep up fire on the trenches," but not on the town, for "if it 
 was simply a going out of the women, and to outside places where they could 
 be cared for, it would not matter much, but now it means their going out to 
 starve to death or be furnished with food by us, and the latter is not possible 
 now." 
 
456 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 
 
 The General wanted the Secretary's views very much, and the President 
 interposed — if that may be said of one whose hand was all the time visible and 
 busy and nigh — that "it was the part of wisdom to await reinforcements, the 
 embarkation of which you have already been advised," and Shafter and 
 Sampson were directed to "have a conference and determine, a course 
 of cooperation," that there might be secured "desirable results with the least 
 sacrifice. ' ' 
 
 As an example of the promotion of movement in spite of difficulties, we 
 quote General Wilson at Chickamauga, July 5th, 3 145 p. m. : 
 
 "Just leaving for Charleston. No signal officers or men. No engineers' 
 supplies. No intrenching tools, and no funds for any of the supply depart- 
 ments, except commissary. Please arrange at Charleston to meet these 
 requirements. Place to my credit at Charleston at least $5,000 for each 
 department, total, $30,000, with check books." 
 
 Here is a stirring suggestion from the Adjutant-General's office that the 
 army might get along without the navy: 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898 — 4:30 p. m. 
 Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 Your telegram concerning .the navy entering Santiago Harbor is 
 received, and your action thoroughly approved. The Secretary of War 
 suggests that if the navy will not undertake to break through, take a trans- 
 port, cover the pilot house in most exposed points with baled hay, attach an 
 anchor to a towline, and, if possible, grapple the torpedo cables, and call for 
 volunteers from the army — not a large number — to run into the harbor, thus 
 making a way for the navy. Before acting, telegraph what you think of it. 
 One thing is certain ; that is, the navy must get into the harbor, and must 
 save the lives of our brave men that will be sacrificed if we assault the enemy 
 in his intrenchments without aid. This is strictly confidential to you. 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 Shaffer's dispatch to the Adjutant-General on the same day mentioned the 
 large number of women and children coming out of Santiago, and touched the 
 harp again as to Sampson : 
 
 "Heavy firing about midnight, which continued an hour, at entrance to 
 bay. Don't know cause. Hope it was Sampson clearing the entrance of 
 torpedoes. Appearance of fleet in harbor will settle Santiago." 
 
AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE, 457 
 
 Admiral Sampson goes into an exhaustive explanation of his relations 
 with General Shafter at Santiago, and it is of exceeding interest. The 
 General commanding the expedition testified in terms of enthusiastic appreci- 
 ation, that the landing of the troops was handsomely supported by the fleet. 
 The disagreements developed after the battles of the ist and 2d of July, and 
 became intensified when the fleet of Spain ceased to be a factor in the war. 
 The Admiral had met General Garcia, who thought he had "4,000 men back 
 in the country," and he left behind him 3,000 men." The Admiral seemed 
 to think that these forces made 7,000 men, but the surface show is that 3,000 
 men were counted twice in order to make up the 7,000. The 4,000 men 
 were about forty-five miles away, and as General Miles would say, perfectly 
 "equipped in every respect," the Florida expedition that landed at Banes 
 . having supplied all deficiencies. The Admiral paid this compliment to the 
 insurgent chieftain in a letter to the Secretary of War : 
 
 "My impressions of General Garcia are of the most pleasant character. 
 He is a large, handsome man, of most frank and engaging manners, and of 
 most soldierly appearance. He remained some time on board, though, unfor- 
 tunately, so seasick that he was obliged to lie down during the whole of his 
 visit. ' ' 
 
 There is no opportunity lost in paying compliments to the Cubans, but 
 the 50,000 auxiliary forces General Miles put down in his first plan of cam- 
 paign did not materialize. The few that came were "amply provided" with 
 food and enjoyed the change — eating abundantly and leaving fighting to the 
 Americans. 
 
 June 26th the- Admiral dispatched to the Secretary of War: 
 
 "Channel was not obstructed by the Merrimac, and we must be prepared 
 to meet the Spanish fleet if they attempt to escape. I am preparing torpedo 
 attack in order to hasten their destruction. Regret to resort to this method 
 because of its difficulties and small chance of success, torpedo boats being 
 subject to small arms and rapid-fire guns from the shore for a long distance. 
 I should not do this were present force to be kept here, as it now insures a 
 capture which I believe will terminate the war." 
 
 The explanation of the last line is that it was proposed to send some of 
 the heavy ships to attack Spain. 
 
 June 30th Shafter sent Sampson a communication dated Camp near San 
 Juan River, as follows : 
 
458 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 
 
 "Sir: I expect to attack- Santiago to-morrow morning. I wish you would 
 bombard the forts at Aguaddres in support of a regiment of infantry which I 
 shall send there early to-morrow, and also make such demonstration as you 
 think proper at the niouth of the harbor, so as to keep as many of the enemy 
 there as possible. ' ' 
 
 July ist Shaffer sent his compliments to Sampson, saying: 
 
 "General Shaffer's compliments to Admiral Sampson. Wishes him to 
 keep up his fire on Santiago on the water front. Enemy has 6-inch guns 
 there, annoying us very much in our moves. Our troops watching within a 
 hundred yards of city on the east side. Will assault at daylight to-morrow 
 morning. ' ' 
 
 On this day Sampson's official report states: "The New York and 
 Oregon took up position and fired a number of 8-inch shell over the hills in 
 the direction of Santiago and the ships in the bay, using a range of from 3)^ 
 to 4 miles. ' ' 
 
 Shaffer recognized the shooting in these uncertain terms: "A few shells 
 of large size fell some distance behind our lines to-day. It is hardly possible 
 that they come from your ships, but I cannot account for them unless they 
 come from the enemy's navy." 
 
 Shafter's report to Sampson of the battle of July 1st is brief but forcible: 
 
 "July 2. — Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched 
 about three-fourths of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort 
 immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which 
 are already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can. 
 Please telephone answer. ' ' 
 
 Lieutenant Staunton telephoned Shaffer: "Admiral Sampson has this 
 morning bombarded forts at entrance of Santiago, and also Punta Gorda 
 Battery inside, silencing their fire. Do you wish further firing on his part? 
 He began at 5 :3o, finished at 7 :3o. Your message to him here. Impossible 
 to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines — a work of some time 
 after forts are taken possession of by your troops. Nothing in this direction 
 accomplished yesterday by the advance on Aguadores." 
 
 Shaffer telephoned in return: "It is impossible for me to say when. I can 
 take batteries at entrance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those 
 which we have been pitted against, it will be some time and a great loss of 
 life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire 
 
STONE FORT AT EL CANEY. EFFECT OF CANNONADING. 
 

 
 
 SNAP SHOT OF GENERAL SHAFTER IN THE FIELD. 
 
AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 461 
 
 as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means 
 keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, how- 
 ever, in time and with sufficient men, to capture the forts along the bay." 
 
 Sampson reports that he wrote General Shafter and "began making 
 preparations to countermine, and, with the object of arranging an attack upon 
 the batteries at the entrance, a visit was arranged to General Shafter, so that 
 the matter might be thoroughly discussed, and combined action take place. I 
 had in view the employment of the marines for an assault on either the Morro 
 or Socapa battery, while at the same time assaulting the defenses at the 
 entrance with the fleet. ' ' 
 
 In his letter to Shafter at this time Sampson said: "Our trouble from the 
 first has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation 
 mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships 
 if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of 
 the attempt to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of 
 further progress on our part. 
 
 "It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries, 
 from the rear, would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes. 
 
 "If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at 
 ■once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours 
 "would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt. 
 
 "We have in our outfit at Guantanamo 40 countermining mines, which I 
 will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in 
 freeing the entrance of mines by their use, I will enter the harbor. 
 
 "This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time. 
 
 "It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until 
 now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port. ' ' 
 
 This was written on the day before the incident of the departure and 
 removal of Cervera's fleet. The distance Admiral Sampson was from the 
 scene of action is accounted for in his official statement in these quiet terms 
 suppressing sensibility : 
 
 "I started the morning of the 3d July, by prearrangement, to confer with 
 the General as to a plan of combined attack, but this conference was pre- 
 vented by the battle with the Spanish fleet. ' ' 
 
 Later the Admiral made a more particular statement as follows: 
 
 "In consequence of General Shafter's request for assistance, a consultation 
 
462 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 
 
 was arranged to take place the morning of July 3, and horses were sent to. 
 Siboney for that purpose. I started for Siboney about 9 o'clock, but the sortie of 
 Admiral Cervera's fleet, of course prevented my carrying out the arrangement. 
 
 "The plans which I had proposed laying before General Shafter, and 
 which had been very thoroughly discussed on board by myself and staff, 
 included the countermining of the harbor entrance, the immediate entrance 
 of the fleet, and the carrying of the Morro by assault with a thousand marines 
 landed in Estrella Cove; or, using the marines for carrying the western bat- 
 tery, the Morro to be attacked by a detachment of the army, the advance 
 being from the direction of Aguadores. Orders had been sent to Guantanamo 
 June 28th ordering up the Resolute, with a view of using the mines stored on 
 board of her. 
 
 "These facts are given to show how early the matter of forcing the har- 
 bor entrance was taken in hand with a view to assisting the army. My own 
 views had always been that the first effort of the army should have been 
 toward the carrying of the batteries at the harbor entrance to enable us ta 
 enter and countermine without a loss of ships, and this was, in fact, the view 
 of General Shafter when he first arrived, as expressed to my chief of staff 
 when he first went on board the headquarters ship, and also stated by 
 General Shafter on consultation with General Garcia and myself at Acerraderos. 
 the same day. The reasons for change on his part I do not know. ' ' 
 
 General Shaffer's Fourth of July greeting to Admiral Sampson must 
 appear with all the tassels on it: 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, July 4. 
 Admiral Sampson, Commanding United States Navy Forces : 
 
 Through negligence of our Cuban allies, Pan do, with 5,000 men, entered 
 the city of Santiago last night. This nearly doubles their forces. I have- 
 demanded their surrender, which they refuse, but I am giving them some 
 wounded prisoners and delaying operations to let foreign citizens get out, and 
 ■there will be no action before the 6th and perhaps the 7th. Now, if you will 
 force your way into that harbor the town will surrender without any further 
 sacrifice of life. My present position has cost me 1,000 men, and I do not 
 wish to lose any more. With my forces on one side and yours on the other — 
 and they have a great terror of the navy, for they know they cannot hurt you. 
 — we shall have them. I'ask for an early reply. Very respectfully, 
 
 WM. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. V. 
 
AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 463 
 
 On this the annotation of the Admiral is : 
 
 "This dispatch shows a complete misapprehension of the circumstances 
 which had to be met. 
 
 "On the nig^ht of July 4, the Reina Mercedes was sunk by the Spaniards 
 in a manner which would certainly obstruct the larger ships and possibly the 
 smaller ones. Extensive shore batteries were known to exist, and if our 
 smaller vessels were sent in and were sunk, either by the mines or by the fire 
 of the batteries, the ,harbor would be efiEectually closed to us. It was 
 essential to the new scheme of attack of this mine field that the positions occu- 
 pied by the eastern and western batteries should be carried, and this was the 
 scheme of action first • proposed by General Shatter in his discussion with my 
 chief of staff, who was sent by me to meet General Shatter the day of his 
 arrival. The chief of staff carried with him a chart of the harbor and 
 explained the situation, stating- that it was regarded by us as a movement of 
 primal importance that these points should be carried before any attention 
 was paid to the city. The possession of these points insured the- destruction 
 of the mines by us, the entrance of our heavy ships in the harbor, and the 
 assault on Admiral Cervera's squadron inside. To this General Shatter gave 
 most cordial assent, and stated that he had no intention of attacking the city 
 proper, that here (pointing to the entrance) was the key to the situation, and 
 that when we had this we had all. This was repeated in his interview with 
 General Garcia at Acerraderos. ' ' 
 
 Shaffer's few days before Santiago were full of troubles — for instance: 
 
 Playa, Jiily 7, 1898 — 2:05 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington: 
 
 The failure to have tugs and lighters for use in handling the fleet is of so 
 serious a nature that I must again refer to it. Transports go off miles from 
 shore and there is no way of reaching them or compelling them to come in. 
 It is a constant struggle to keep them in hand. Had it not been for the 
 lighter Laura, the army could not have moved. It is with the greatest diffi- 
 culty that one day's food can be issued ai. a time. 
 
 SHAFTER, Major- General, Commanding. 
 
 Two more dispatches of the 7th show it was a bad day : 
 
 Playa, July 7, 1898—4:50 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington: 
 
 Had consultation with Sampson. Navy disinclined to force entrance 
 
464 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 
 
 except as a last resource. They will bombard the city, which is within easy 
 range of their big guns, beginning at noon of the 9th, and if that is not effect- 
 ive, after twenty-four hours, will then force entrance with some of the 
 smallest ships. I still have hopes they will surrender. Made a second 
 demand on them yesterday, calling attention to the changed conditions 
 because of the loss of the Spanish fleet, and offering to give them time to con- 
 sult their home government, which General Toral has accepted, asking that 
 the British consul return to the city with employes of the cable company to 
 permit him to do so. Meanwhile, I hope my reinforcements will arrive. Not 
 one in sight yet except the 200 recruits for the Second Infantry, who came a 
 week ago. As a last resource I will try running in transports. I do not 
 consider my force sufficient to warrant an assault on the city, though I believe 
 it would be successful, but at a fearful loss. Of course, it would be criminal 
 to hope for the end to be gained, which is merely the capture of a few thou- 
 sand men, and when we see we are getting them by siege. Nothing has yet 
 been seen of tugs, lighters, and launches promised ten days ago. 
 
 SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding. 
 
 Playa, July 7, 1898 — 4:55 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington: 
 
 When ought I to expect reinforcements? They sadly needed. Nothing 
 
 in sight to-day. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 War Department, July 7, 1898 — 5:30 p. m. 
 Major-General Shaffer, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 The President directs that you order transports to stand in by the shore 
 and enforce demand, so that they may be able to get supplies more easily. 
 We are distressed about the tugs and lighters, which were ordered long since 
 and ought to have reached you before now. Your long dispatch concerning 
 second demand on city received and approved. We will be very glad if you 
 can finish up that work without another assault. 
 
 By order Secretary of War : 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 7, 1898. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 One tug should reach you to-day. A large, powerful one leaves New 
 
AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 467 
 
 Orleans to-night. Fifty laborers went on the St. Paul, leaving New York to- 
 da)"^, and stevedores are on boats going to you. 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti, July 7, 1898 — 7 :42 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington: 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, Camp near Santiago, Cuba, 7.- — Please 
 send some fast ship from nearest point with 100 stevedores, 100 drivers, and 
 as many niedicines and dressings as can be obtained. It is reported to me 
 medicines are very scarce. Two steam launches should be bought. Too 
 much trouble to get things from navy, and we have but partial control of 
 them when we do get them. This is not a matter to be put off. Sent 90,000 
 rations ashore to-day. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 Playa del Este, July 7, 1898 — 8:35 P- ™- 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington: 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago, Cuba.— The hospital 
 ship Relief just arrived with a large amount of medical stores. Want the 
 teamsters, stevedores, and steam lighters as wired you, and the sooner they 
 can be gotten here the better. ' W. R. SHAFTER. 
 
 General Miles left Washington at 10:40 the night of July 7th on the way 
 to Santiago and Porto Rico, with instructions not to supersede Shaffer if he 
 was able for duty. At Rockhill, South Carolina, he telegraphed the Secre- 
 tary of War request "20,000 .30 caliber rifles, using government ammunition, 
 be sent at once, to be used at Santiago or other places, with strong canvas 
 web belts and ammunition, and that all troops sent to Cuba be supplied with 
 smokeless powder rifles. The Winchester and Remington companies furnish 
 arms and ammunition. The Lee rifle does good service for the navy. 
 Horstman's, military dealers, Philadelphia, has 12,000 Mauser rifles and 
 ammunition for sale. Modern rifles can be obtained from other parties." 
 
 Corbin telegraphed Miles: "There are 12,000 Krag-Jorgensen rifles at 
 Tampa available, with 1,800,000 rounds of ammunition, with larger amount in 
 hands of General Shaffer at Santiago. The output of new ammunition of this 
 caliber is 250,000 rounds per day." 
 
 July 8th Corbin telegraphed Shafter: "Do you recommend the arming of 
 
468 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 
 
 Henry's division, or any other volunteers of your command, with Krag- 
 Jorgensen riiies? We have 1,800,000 rounds of ammunition at Tampa, and 
 manufacture 250,000 per day, so you may know what the supply will be. 
 What are your wishes?" 
 
 Shafter replied: "By all means arm in field Henry's division and the 
 volunteer regiments now here with Krag-Jorgensen rifle. The use of black 
 powder instantly brought volleys against regiments using Springfield, and was 
 very demoralizing on those regiments. ' ' 
 
 The President's telegram to Shafter on the battle of July ist got lost on 
 the wires, and was repeated on the 8th as follows : 
 
 "The President directs me to say you have the gratitude and thanks of 
 the Nation for the brilliant and efEective work of your noble army on Friday, 
 July I. The steady valor and heroism of officers and men thrill the American 
 people with pride. The country mourns the brave men who fell in battle. 
 They have added new names to our roll of heroes. ' ' 
 
 The fact is not obscure in the official dispatches, that General Shafter was 
 exceedingly anxious to have the Spaniards in Santiago surrender to him. 
 Indeed, when he made the demand he was sick and despondent, and his 
 correspondence with Admiral Sampson shows that he was not in high spirits. 
 July 9 at I p. m., he got a proposition from the commandant in Santiago to 
 march out of the city with arms and baggage, not to be molested until he 
 reached Holguin, surrendering the territory to the Americans. This, Shafter 
 remarked, was, as the Spaniards stated it, to save the city and avoid useless 
 bloodshed. Shafter closed his communication: "This will give me another 
 day to get up troops from Siboney, the first transports of reinforcements hav- 
 ing just arrived. In my opinion, they will have to surrender unconditionally 
 very soon after I open fire on them." 
 
 The General received this conclusive dispatch : 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 9, 1898— i :5o p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 Your telegram setting forth terms on which the enemy will evacuate 
 Santiago has been submitted to the President by the Secretary of War, who 
 instructs me to say that you will accept nothing but an unconditional sur- 
 render, and should take extra precautions to prevent the enemy's escape. 
 
 By order Secretary of War : 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 469 
 
 Playa del Este, via Haiti, July 9, 1898 — 9 p. m. 
 Secretary of War, Washington : 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago. — I forwarded General 
 Toral's proposition to evacuate the town this morning without consulting any 
 one. Since then I have seen the general officers commanding divisions, who 
 agree with me that it should be accepted. First, it releases at once the har- 
 bor; second, it permits the return of thousands of women, children, and old 
 men, who have left the town fearing bombardment, and who are now suffer- 
 ing where they are, though I am doing my best to supply them with food; 
 third, it saves the great destruction of property which a bombardment would 
 entail, most of which belongs to Cubans and foreign residents ; fourth, it at 
 once relieves the command, while it is in good health, for operations else- 
 where. There are now three cases of yellow fever at Siboney, in Michigan 
 regiment ; and if it gets started, no one knows where it will stop. We lose by 
 this simply some prisoners we do not want and the arms they carry. I 
 believe many of them will desert and return to our lines. I was told by sen- 
 tinel, who deserted last night, that 200 men want to come, but were afraid our 
 men would fire upon them. W. R. SHAFTER, General. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 9, i8g8 — 11:15 p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 In reply to your telegram recommending terms of evacuation as proposed 
 by the Spanish commander, after careful consideration by the President and 
 Secretary of War, I am directed to say that you have repeatedly been advised 
 that you would not be expected to make an assault upon the enemy at Santi- 
 ago until you were prepared to do the work thoroughly. When you are ready, 
 this will be done. Your telegram of this morning said your position was 
 impregnable, and that you believed the enemy would yet surrender uncondi- 
 tionally. You have also assured us that you could force their surrender by 
 cutting oflE the supplies. Under these circumstances your message recom- 
 mending that Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without 
 molestation to Holguin is a great surprise and is not approved. The responsi- 
 bility of destruction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely with the 
 Spanish Commander. The Secretary of War orders that when you are strong 
 enough to destroy the enemy and take Santiago that you do it. If you have 
 not force enough, it will be dispatched to you at the earliest moment practi- 
 
470 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 
 
 cable. Reinforcements are on the way, of which you have already been 
 
 advised. In the meantime, nothing is lost by holding the position you now 
 
 have and which you regard as impregnable. Acknowledge receipt. 
 
 By order of the Secretary of War : 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 The annexed telegram is of no little significance : 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 9, 1898 — 11:20 p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 
 
 It is suggested that all official telegrams, particularly those requiring 
 action, be addressed to the Adjutant-General. This will insure more prompt 
 action, as the office is kept open twenty-four hours a day. 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 General Corbin has been likened to the engineer of a locomotive, or the 
 fireman. He certainly fed the fires and pulled the lever day and night, and 
 did a grand work, being on duty about two-thirds of the twenty-four hoUrs 
 per day. 
 
 July loth Shafter telegraphed Corbin, 1:30 a. m. : "If two lighters and 
 tugs have arrived, navy must have them. They have not, up to sundown, 
 reported at Siboney or Daiquiri." 
 
 The tug and lighters had stuck at Guantanamo, and the Quartermaster- 
 General asked the naval authorities to send them to Shafter, who "needs them 
 badly." Shafter telegraphed July loth, 2:50 p. m., tliat his position was 
 impregnable against attack, but he had not troops enough to surround the 
 town, adding, "The Cuban troops are not to be depended upon for severe 
 fighting." General Wilson telegraphed from Charleston, as he was about 
 sailing for the seat of war, that if they had to go out of sight of transports 
 there would be a paralysis by the absence of Miles. * Corbin caught this on 
 the first bounce, and replied: "The transports that will take the First Bri- 
 gade of your division will carry, in addition to the men, 800 mules, without 
 interfering with the comfort of soldiers. General Brooke has been directed to 
 send you your wagon transportation. ' ' 
 
 July nth Shafter telegraphed: "Navy fired few shots from the sea near 
 Aguadores. Effect not perceptible." Major General Miles commanding 
 arrived off Santiago July 12th. On the next day Corbin telegraphed him: 
 
 "Contracting party, with steamship, two powerful sea tugs, steam sea- 
 
 * Not the Commanding General. 
 
AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 47i 
 
 going barges, and fleet of lighters, supplied with timber, iron, bolts, black- 
 smith's outfit, pile-drivers, derrick, etc., for dock building, also loo mechanics 
 and skilled laborers and 250 common laborers, will sail from New York late 
 to-morrow afternoon or early Thursday morning direct for Santiago. ' ' 
 
 General Miles never knew heavier rains. Shaffer telegraphed, if 
 rains continued roads would be impassable. There had been "no attempt 
 to enter the harbor by the navy. They should be required to make a 
 determined effort at once." If roads stopped rations, the town would have to 
 be assaulted. Jose Toral, commander of the forces in Santiago, July 12th 
 wanted a solution that would leave the honor of his troops intact, and Shafter 
 asked the Adjutant-General : 
 
 "Will any modification of the recent order be permitted? I have been 
 perfectly satisfied that he can be taken, but if he fights, as we have reason to 
 believe he may, it will be at fearful cost of life ; and to stay here with disease 
 threatening may be as great loss from that cause. The suffering of the 
 people who left the town is intense. I can only supply food enough to keep 
 them from starvation, and if blue rains continue I do not knov/ how long I can 
 do that." 
 
 The reply was there could be no modification of former orders. General 
 Miles telegraphed July 13th, the Spanish General "offers to surrender Santi- 
 ago province, force, batteries, munitions of war. , etc. , all except the men and 
 small arms. Under ordinary circumstances would not advise acceptance, but 
 this is a great concession, and would avoid assaulting intrenching lines with 
 every device for protecting his men and inflicting heavy loss on assaulting 
 lines. The siege may last many weeks, and they have the provisions for two 
 months. There are 20,000 starving people who have fled the city and were 
 not allowed to take any food. ' ' 
 
 Behind this urgency were 100 cases of yellow fever in the army and the 
 certainty of its rapid increase. The Secretary of War wrote to the Secretary 
 of the Nav}' requesting him to order the fleet off Santiago to force its way into 
 the bay. The reasons for immediate action were these: "First, the very 
 heavy rains that are falling almost constantly have made the roads nearly 
 impassable and threaten to cut off our supply of provisions for the army in the 
 trenches altogether; second, the rains are making the holding of our lines 
 almost impossible, as the trenches are filled with water; third, the lives of our 
 men are in great danger from yellow fever, which has broken out among our 
 
472 AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 
 
 troops and is spreading rapidly, and, fourth, the character of the works of thi 
 enemy is such that to take them by assault would be a terrible sacrifice o 
 life." 
 
 General Shatter's position before Santiago after the Spanish fleet wa 
 extinguished was dangerbus. There can be no doubt of it. The strain upoi 
 our small army in fighting through tropical jungles, with insufficient artillery 
 under the frightful fire from Mauser rifles of range almost equal to field guns 
 using smokeless powder, so that the messenger of wounds and death seeme( 
 to be a killing storm from clear air, had been almost unbearable. The kill 
 ing and wounding of more than 1,500 men was unexpected, and for that reasoi 
 made the greater impression, though the percentage of loss was but a fractioi 
 of that often suffered on both sides when our national and confederate armie 
 confronted each other. Shafter's illness was distressing, and, his dispatche 
 show, affected his moral as well as physical condition. He hung on wit] 
 fierce resolution to his job, but gave the impression in the War Office of ai 
 uncertain quantity, so that he was admonished daily by inquiries as to hi: 
 health, that there was the gravest personal solicitude about him, and severa 
 times he was pressed as to what should be done if he had to give up. It coul( 
 not well be told at a distance what percentage of a sick man's petulance an( 
 fanciful confidence there was in his asserted betterments in health. His pro 
 posal at the close of the hardest fighting to yield five miles of ground seemec 
 like. the retreat across the Rappahannock after Chancellorsville, and there wa 
 a crispness in the calm phrase in which the Secretary of War cabled that i 
 would be much better to stay where he was. He thought so himself on th( 
 Fourth of July. Though George Washington was a paroled prisoner on tha 
 date at Fort Necessity, it was when he was a young man, before the conse 
 cration of the day. That the navy was not doing what it might to help thi 
 siege, when there was no more blockading to do, was an opinion Shafte 
 shared with the country. The slender army had lost in killed, wounded 
 missing, sick and exhausted, 2,000 men, and the navy two killed and si: 
 wounded. The evidence was not easily made to appear of a full performance 
 duty, though the entrance to the harbor of Santiago was very narrow an( 
 strongly fortified, and a Spanish ship had been sunk July 4th to block the wa 
 against our battleships. Farragut and Dewey disregarded torpedoes, but th 
 former lost a ship with its crew at Mobile, and the latter had a broa 
 entrance to Manila Bay. The conditions were certainly not the same at Nei 
 
AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. 473 
 
 Orleans, Mobile and Manila, but in those cases the navy was foremost in the 
 fray, and gloriously cleared the path for the army ; so it was not unreasonable 
 to feel that the spirit of aggression at Santiago in handling our ships was not 
 according to the most illustrious precedents. General Shaffer, however, had 
 been painfully willing to allow the Spanish troops to get away, without insist- 
 ing upon the "U. S. " preliminary insisted upon at Fort Donaldson by U. S. 
 Grant, that of "unconditional surrender," but the President supplied the 
 deficiency, and used the very words, as there, were none suitable or stronger. 
 Shaffer had been keenly disappointed by the Cubans, who became at last 
 more numerous than valuable when they were fed, armed, clothed, and 
 treated v/ith much consideration, but they were still deficient in every military 
 service but that of scouting, and managed to be in at the coffee and out of the 
 fight. They were not adapted, as Shaffer said, to severe fighting. They let 
 Spaniards into Santiago, and did not help to put them out. The fifty thou- 
 sand Cubans General Miles had regarded as one wing of his grand army when 
 he planned a great . campaign, dissolved, except in a small way, when their 
 bodies needed nourishment. However, as General Miles arrived late at 
 Santiago, and did not take command, for he found Shaffer able to ride, he 
 managed to retain his early kindness for the Cubans as soldiers. The last and 
 worst blow to Shaffer was the dreadful presence and rapid development of the 
 yellow fever, with the "blue rains," the torrents from the skies that threat- 
 ened the pork and cracker line. It cannot be denied that there was a combi- 
 nation of discouraging circumstances. General Miles, according to his soldierly 
 way, supported the views of Shaffer, and gave him wholesome encouragement. 
 Indeed, the arrival of the General at Santiago was as timely as it had been 
 carefully and wisely planned. The presence of the military head of the army 
 of the United States meant to the Santiago Spaniards that while they were 
 utterly forsaken, all the forces that seventy million people could array were 
 centering there. The arrival of the head of the army was an appeal to the 
 imagination, and the watchmen of the beleaguered city at the signal stations 
 by the sea reported fifty-seven ships, many of them swarming with 
 troops. General Jos^ Toral had to say in his explanation that, in his opinion, 
 the garrison could have held the reserve lines against Shaffer's army, but 
 there was no hope as against the fresh forces pouring in. And so Santiago 
 surrendered. "All is well that ends well." 
 
CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 The Lesson for the Country of the Hills of Santiago. 
 
 Value of the Reports of the Inspector-General — His Keen Suggestions and Brilliant Sketch' 
 with Expert Information — Tribute of Breckenridge to Shaffer — The Volunteers 
 Camps — Chickamauga as an Illustration — The Location of the Wrongs that the Sc 
 diers SuiSfered Unduly— We Must Build Regiments as We do Battleships — The Pan 
 of Poor Preparation not Personal — Let Congress for the Country Mend it. 
 
 There is extraordinary value, professional and literary, in the officii 
 papers of Major General of Volunteers, Inspector General J. C. Breckenridg( 
 His military intelligence is constantly manifested in what he says, and h: 
 vigor of expression presents information clear-cut and in a strong light, th 
 outlines sharp, the color vivid. He said of the earliest military expeditio 
 out of this countr)', that to Santiago, that it was composed of "the flower c 
 the American army" — and writing as it was getting under way, he said: 
 
 "Despite the newspaper freedom of assertion, its purpose is said tot 
 definitely known to but few, hut it is doubtless worthy of its high qualitj 
 America has no fighting force of equal size, worthy to represent her, if this : 
 not. Every general and line officer has come up through the different grade 
 in her military service, and is as ripe as any we have for their respective con 
 mands ; and many of the staff officers have had broad experience perhaps eve 
 in their present particular positions. The adaptability of Americans is illus 
 trated tjy the admirable work being done by many officers outside their ow 
 legitimate field. Officers of the line are doing every kind of staff duty in 
 manner it is impossible to too highly appreciate. The elasticity and adver 
 turousness of youthful vigor may occasionally be somewhat lacking, and th 
 siege artillery material may lack preliminary adjustment and practice i 
 expeditions seaward, or even in the ordinary experience in the practici 
 maneuvers of large bodies of men, and under a questionable policy is partic 
 ularly deficient in military transportations. An immobile army is ridiculoui 
 
 474 
 
o 
 ta 
 
THE LESSON OP THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 477 
 
 "Many foreign countries are also studying every detail and the varying 
 lases of -this expedition with most critical care, for few are exempt from 
 tnilar possibilities. The Fifth Corps is not alone in need of all the benefits 
 lat can be gleaned from such experience ; the whole army should derive full 
 Ivantage from it. The difficulties have been immense, and have been over- 
 )me with remarkable energy. Only the ultimate result can fully approve 
 ow well or how ill every possible contingency has been provided for and 
 let. The careful, painstaking preparation and study of every detail of the 
 roblem to be met, and the persistent exertion to fully meet it to the utmost 
 mit of the powers of a great department of the government, and with the 
 Dmbined provision and united effort of every bureau, which was so admirably 
 lustrated in the naval expedition to the Philippines, is, of course, also to be 
 spected in this. ' ' 
 
 One of the lessons of the war of the sections and states was sharply 
 pplied by General Breckenridge to this : 
 
 "It is believed that special attention should be called to the general 
 bsence of intrenching tools as a regular part of the equipment of the troops. 
 [ardly any intrenching tools, save the usual small number of picks and shovels 
 )r public purposes, accompany this expedition ; though this nation, in the war 
 f the rebellion, brought the use of hasty intrenchments into such prominence 
 3 to materially affect the tactics and strategy of its armies. If the use of the 
 ayonet or other makeshifts for this purpose was formerly inadequate, it is 
 
 longer so. The modern shelter trench for skirmishers is normally 2 y^ feet 
 
 1 thickness, for protection against the penetration of modem small arms, and 
 lis would seem to require the use of a tool specially adapted for the purpose 
 jquired. So patent has this need become that one young company com- 
 lander is said to have purchased masons' trowels at Tampa, for the use of his 
 jmpany in Cuba." 
 
 In regard to the volunteers, General Breckenridge refers to their "zeal, 
 ire intelligence and adaptability and the having of many of them in some of 
 le more excellent schools of the National Guard, ' ' and remarks that these 
 iialities are evident all along the line, and that "every advantage should be 
 .ken of all the military instruction which our military sj'stem affords, and 
 ;rhaps full use is not being made of the graduates of our hundred of military 
 •lieges, nor of the army itself as a training school for young- officers, 
 oubtless we could promptly commission several hundred bright young citi- 
 
478 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 .zens in our regular regiments, and put them into thorough trainihg immedi- 
 ately, and so release and utilize more of the superbly trained regular officers, 
 and have them serve with, and perhaps command, volunteer regiments and 
 brigades — men of the age of Sheridan and Custer when they won their fame 
 — and we could attract many more graduates of our military colleges into 
 places of command ; so the whole situation might be benefited and much less 
 discomfort be felt and quicker efficiency for battle be attained. Already 
 there is progress everywhere. The work is devolving upon the better officers, 
 and a general insight as to how and when it is to be done and the best way to 
 do it is spreading rapidly. ' ' 
 
 This was especially applicable to the first stage of preparation in the 
 camps, and meant for the encouragement of those bearing the burdens of 
 those preliminaries. The General struck a common experience in this state of 
 things at Chickamauga Park in May: "The worst from some States are better 
 equipped than the best from others, and they are apt to know how to continue 
 to get things. The struggle and delay in supplies is still apparent, and the 
 more inexperienced suffer." In one division were two regiments without 
 arms, and "some other regiments have none for 30 to 40 per cent of men, and 
 guards walk posts with wands. Many rifles, especially older models, even if 
 not already unserviceable, can hardly be expected to last through a campaign. 
 An issuing arsenal and repair shop seem needed. " 
 
 On the way to Tampa the General wrote that "brigade and division com- 
 manders, rather under than over 45 (alert, vigorous, and experienced, but not 
 stale), are especially needed for instruction and leading an improvised army to 
 promptly and successfully meet the requirements of the modern battle lines, 
 and well-instructed staff officers for these subordinate commands, even if not 
 so young, are also needed. There are almost none with the brigades." 
 
 General Breckenridge urged striking Spain a blow at home in order to 
 make an impression on her where she lives, "and if possible the solar plexus 
 blow, now that the pace is set." July 25th the General wrote: "Daiquiri 
 having been selected, the landing could not have been effected with less loss, 
 and the movements of the troops thereafter were merely limited by the speed 
 with which supplies could be gotten from the vessels, even with the advan- 
 tage of Siboney also, both of which were little more than indentations on an 
 open coast without landing facilities. And it was seldom, indeed, that the 
 supplies were brought up to the fighting lines in any great excess of their 
 
THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 479 
 
 imediate needs, and the entire absence of the usual comforts and conven- 
 aces of even the simplest army life during the whole of this expedition, and 
 metimes medical essentials, even in the hour of utmost need,' was one of the 
 ost marked features of the landing." 
 
 In a few sentences the General gives the story of the fighting on land for 
 mtiago : 
 
 "The remarkable marksmanship of our trained soldiers was hardly more 
 cploited than the gross ignorance of our reSruits. The books say that it 
 ight not to be possible to successfully assault in front unshaken, still more, 
 ell-fortified infantry, under modem conditions. But in this instance dis- 
 ounted cavalry, as well as its confrere of the infantry arm, did, without 
 lyonets, successfully assault infantry posted on commanding ground, behind 
 ater, well intrenched, valiant and unshaken, and the severity of the task is 
 .dicated by the list of casualties, as compared with the actual numbers 
 le immediately opposing trenches will hold. And when the fight was over, 
 lough successful everywhere, we had no reserves. 
 
 "Doubtless, through telegrams and otherwise, there have been sufiScient 
 idications of the intense strain in the whole military situation on the field of 
 aerations which led to the consultation at the El Poso house on the night of 
 ily 2d, and to some of the general officers favoring a retrograde movement 
 iring the day or two prior to our intrenchments taking shape and the 
 ■mistice being agreed upon, which latter remained almost unbroken until the 
 irrender. Probably it is now evident to all that it was far better to stand 
 eadfast, and perhaps quite possible to advance rather than retreat, so near 
 le 4th of July ; and certainly we have demonstrated our ability to hold our 
 wn. Indeed, the fighting of this army came up to the highest expectations, 
 id accomplished results beyond what it is usual to expect of a force so 
 mstituted. ' ' 
 
 General Breckenridge has been quoted without authority as having given 
 srsonal encouragement to General Shafter in moments of doubt as to the 
 smands of the hour, and to have been steadily urgent to stand firm until the 
 ord could be given to advance, and some of the language quoted above may 
 s taken to refer to his exertions and confirm in part the general statement of 
 is timely tenacity. His accounts of the fighting days contain this reference 
 I the action of Las Guasimas : 
 
 "The First and Tenth regiments "of regular cavalry (dismoimted) 
 
48o THE' LESSON OF THE HILLS OF vSANTIAGO. 
 
 deployed, and charged up the hill in front; the First Volunteer Cavalr 
 deployed upon the other or ridge road from Siboney, which forks at this poin 
 with the valley road, and charged in flank on the left, driving the enemy fror 
 his position, but not until we had sustained severe losses in both killed an' 
 wounded. Our forces pushed on, and at nightfall occupied a line a mile o 
 more in advance of the position occupied by the enemy in the morning. Th 
 conduct of the troops, both white and colored, regular and volunteer, wa 
 most gallant and soldierly, and General Young's dispositions, plan, and execu 
 tion were skillful, dashing, and successful." 
 
 The soil of the portion of Cuba containing the battlefields, he says, "i 
 rich and supports a luxuriant growth of trees, brush, and vines,- making 
 chaparral rather noticeably thorny and poisonous, that is often impossible t' 
 penetrate unaided by the machete. The streams in this vicinity are for th 
 most part readily fordable, except for a few hours immediately after heav; 
 and long-continued rains. The roads become then almost impassable, but dr 
 up very quickly." 
 
 The movements of the troops were between the fighting days favored b; 
 the moon, and- many hoxirs of the night were useful for changes that couli 
 not have been possible in darkness. In the preliminaries to the battle of E 
 Caney, "General Ludlow's brigade took up a position' west of the village, ii 
 order to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards when they should be driven ou 
 and attempt to retreat to the city of Santiago. But with soldierly instinct anc 
 admirable effect, he closed in upon the "defenses of the village, and his whit 
 sailor hat became a target for the enemy during the hours he hugged thi 
 blockhouses on his flank of the well-defended village. ' ' 
 
 The artillery was on this occasion served with great effect. The divisioi 
 commander, between one and two, directed the battery "to concentrate it 
 fire upon the stone fort, or blockhouses, situated on the highest point in thi 
 village on the northern side, and- which was the key point to the village 
 This fort was built of brick, with walls about a foot thick, about 45 by 35 feet 
 with semicircular bastions diagonally opposite each other. The practice o 
 the artillery against this was very effective, knocking great holes into the for 
 and rendering it untenable. " 
 
 At about 6:30, after the El Caney fight, "General Lawton went forwar( 
 with his staff to find and definitely locate the position which his troops were b 
 occupy, and continued along the road to within about a mile of the city, whei 
 
li^ r 
 
 
 -!«..««/ 
 
 
 
 *;.?>■ 
 
 
 
 ( OL. JOHN JAI'OB ASTOR, OF ASTOB BATTEKV FAME, XEAK SPANISH TRENCHES. 
 
THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 483 
 
 he was fired into by the Spanish pickets. He then returned and sent forward 
 a strong patrol of Cubans to find out the condition of affairs. He then 
 reported the matter to corps headquarters and waited until about 2:30 a. m., 
 and not receiving any report from the Cubans, or any further direction from 
 headquarters, he started forward again, and was ordered to take a position 
 on the right. " 
 
 Nothing was heard from the Cubans after they were directed to do some- 
 thing. General Breckenridge says: 
 
 "Firing was kept up during the whole of the 2d of July by both sides, our 
 troops having thrown up hasty intrenchments in many positions the night 
 previous. During the 2d of July there were a great many casualties, result- 
 ing not entirely from aimed fire, but from bullets clearing the crest of our 
 intrenchments and going far beyond, striking men as they were coming up to 
 gather into position, or as they were going back and forth, bringing water, 
 caring for the wounded, and so on. Many casualties also resulted from the 
 fire of sharpshooters, stationed in trees with such thick foliage that the sharp- 
 shooters could not be seen. It seemed incredible that men should be so 
 reckless as to remain within our lines and continue firing, and it was believed 
 by many that what was reported to be fire from sharpshooters was simply 
 spent bullets that came over the crest of our works. But I and the members 
 of my staff can testify to the fact that, in many places along the road leading 
 up to the center of our lines, the sharp crack of the Mauser rifle could be heard 
 very close to the road ; and there were all the usual indications of the near 
 and selected aim against individuals. Scouting parties were sent out from 
 time to time to get hold of these fellows, and a number of them were captured 
 or shot. It was not until a day or two afterwards, however, that they were 
 all cleared out. 
 
 "On the morning of the 2d, three batteries of artillery went into action 
 near San Juan, right behind the infantry intrenchments, and about 600 
 yards from the enemy's intrenchments. Firing black powder, instead 
 of smokeless, they, of course, instantly drew all fire in that vicinity, and 
 being unable to work the guns, were obliged to withdraw. The question 
 as to smokeless powder, intrenchments, and batteries of both light and 
 siege artillery, were matters of the highest moment to the men most nearly 
 exposed to the steady fire from the intrenched lines, so admirably laid out 
 and stoutly defended as in this fight. During the night of the 2d our troops 
 
484 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 continued intrenching on a crest from 500 to 1,500 yards distant from the 
 crest occupied by the Spanish intrenchments, and in more cases having higher 
 command. The Spaniards made an attack on the night of the 2d upon our 
 lines, which was repulsed with very little loss to ourselves." 
 
 These are remarkable accounts of Spaniards, who not only remained 
 within our lines to do sharp-shooting from tree tops, but ventured upon a 
 night attack. General Breckenridge says the bravery of the Spanish soldier 
 fighting on the defensive is beyond doubt, and the Mauser rifle "an excellent 
 and rapid weapon," while the smokeless cartridge adds to its special efficacy. 
 It is loaded with five cartridges at a time, held in a clip "detached from the 
 belt and placed in the rifle in one motion." 
 
 The account General Breckenridge gives of the Cubans is discriminating 
 and judicial, and we quote the words herewith : 
 
 "In the beginning the Cuban soldiers were largely used as outposts on our 
 front and flanks. There has been a great deal of discussion among officers of 
 this expedition concerning the Cuban soldiers and the aid they have rendered. 
 They seem to have very little organization or discipline, and they do not, of 
 course, fight in the battle line with our troops. 
 
 "Yet in every skirmish or fight where they are present they seem to have 
 a fair proportion of killed and wounded. They were of undoubted assistance 
 in our first landing, and in our scouting our front and flanks. It is not safe, 
 however, to rely upon their fully performing any specific duty, according to 
 our expectation and understanding, unless they are under the constant super- 
 vision and direction of one of our own officers, as our fiiethods and views are 
 so different, and misunderstanding or failure so easy." 
 
 The General says: "We were told when we entered upon this campaign 
 that it was necessary above all things not to sleep on the ground, and hammocks 
 were recommended to secure this end. . Some were seen in the original bales 
 on the transports, and it is doubtful whether the soldiers could have carried 
 hammocks in addition to what they already had to carry. Even such heavy 
 intrenching tools as were on hand were felt to be a burden. The Kahki 
 quickly loses its shape and dandy color, and is not strong enough to withstand 
 thorns. There were many lost packs, and apparently the Cubans and the 
 sick found some comfort from the owners' loss. Bayonets were found 
 useless in this war except to dig with. 
 
 "It has certainly been clearly demonstrated that smokeless powder is an 
 
THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 485 
 
 absolute necessity for both small arms and field guns. Often we fought for 
 hours against an invisible enemy who was firing fatally upon us all the time. 
 The volunteers, as soon as the Springfields were fired, at once revealed their 
 position and drew the fire of the enemy, besides hiding the enemy from their 
 view. They found it difficult to contend with an invisible enemy, pouring in 
 an effective fire from a position impossible to determine. 
 
 "The Spanish blockhouse is ubiquitous and a more elaborate structure 
 than we had been led to expect. It has the air of an evolution during a course 
 of years for dominating an inimical and insurgent country at every high point 
 and crossroad. It is usually placed upon a commanding position and affords 
 a lookout, the lower part built of stones and earth, and two tiers of fire, and 
 the upper part of wood, the top of the parapet being the top of the stone wall, 
 so that up to the height of the breast there is complete protection against 
 small-arms fire. 
 
 "Around the blockhouses and connected with it by intrenchments are 
 sometimes several successive lines of field intrenchments. These intrench- 
 • ments are very narrow in profile, and instead of earth being thrown to the 
 front it is more often thrown to the rear, to one side, so that the protection in 
 front of the trench is natural solid earth. The soil is of such a nature that it 
 will stand almost vertical in its natural condition, so that the slope of the 
 trench is very slight. 
 
 "Such a trench as this is extremely difficult to injure, even in artillery 
 fire, and it is extremely difficult to reach men in the intrenchments, as they 
 are thoroughly protected, even from artillery fire, by crouching. The 
 trenches are usually very short, so that there is not much chance of bringing 
 an enfilading fire upon them. 
 
 "The old Springfield seemed a begrimed and suicidal blunderbuss upon 
 the battlefield. Of course it can still administer death to enemies, like the 
 obsolete cannon in the enemy's trenches did to us, as a pitiful makeshift. 
 
 "Among the telling features frequently remarked upon by those present 
 were the conspicuous gallantry of the gray-haired officers (General Hawkins 
 at San Juan and Captain Haskell at the Caney blockhouse), when they led 
 their commands to the final assaults, and the courage and conduct of the 
 colored troops and First United States Volunteers seemed always up to the 
 best. The admiration certain other organizations also elicited from their 
 comrades was noticeable where all were such good soldiers. ' ' 
 
486 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 The concluding lines of the report of the battles of Santiago by the 
 Inspector General are personal. General Lawton is referred to as in "every 
 exigency of campaign and battle capable of adequately performing more than 
 was ever assigned to him, though some of the severest military tasks and 
 duties were performed by him. This judgment still stands well established, 
 though the command of a division of regulars and the front and swinging right 
 wing of an invading and assaulting army has been intrusted confidently to his 
 command. The reserve force and quiet self-control with which every step in 
 action was conducted equaled his proverbial energy, endurance, courage, and 
 tenacity. ' ' 
 
 General Shafter is characterized as of phenomenal force and activity, and, 
 "if permitted me, it seems due that I should bear willing testimony to the 
 remarkable energy, decision, and self-reliance which characterized General 
 Shaffer's course during this distinguished military adventure throughout its 
 arduous course to its most honorable conclusion. At every stage of this 
 proceeding General Shafter was the dominant spirit at the scene of action. 
 
 "Oppressed with sickness and overweighted with responsibilities and care, 
 he carried the fate of his army to a successful and glorious issue. And any 
 precedent is rare where, amidst such natural obstacles and dangers and 
 limited means and opposing defenses, a more numerous, well disciplined, and 
 gallant force capitulated to invaders who had upon their fighting line a smaller 
 force than that surrendered. The glory of this belongs to General Shafter 
 and his army and the administration sustaining it. And whatever influence 
 was felt from this army toward the driving out and- destruction of the Spanish 
 fleet may also go to its credit." 
 
 That the volunteers who got to the front at Santiago were of the same 
 sort that have established themselves in the public confidence and the favor- 
 able opinion of the masters and leaders of armies, goes without saying. They 
 were, as a rule, under the direction of men who knew something of the busi- 
 ness of war, but suffered from inexperience. They were hurried from, 
 camps that had not been found particularly healthful, because the sorrows of" 
 embarrassing troubles that could not be provided against, were encountered 
 everywhere the men were gathered for the instruction of discipline and the 
 accouterments of army life. They in the flush of enthusiasm chose officers 
 who could not draw requisitions or give the convenient tips for the ameliora- 
 tion of hardships or even the preparation of rations for consumption. The 
 
THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 487 
 
 average thought of the average citizen of the United States was, when Chick- 
 amauga Park became a camp for volunteers and regulars too, it was an ideal 
 selection for the schooling into soldiership of an army of the people. It was 
 the battle-ground that in a higher degree than any other — all points included 
 — had illustrated the devoted spirit and desperate endurance of American 
 manhood on the fields smitten under the stress of the grim game of war. 
 There were higher percentages of losses of both sides at Chickamauga, on 
 those terrible and. glorious Sep'-'^mber days, that all then and now living 
 in this country remember so well, and that those born since, here and else- 
 where, must know all about if they would comprehend the perseverance of 
 valor, and the capacities of sacrifice, that is in the nerve of the men of the 
 nation, and it seemed that our young men assembled there from the States 
 north and south, whose regiments lost most heavily by the stream that the 
 Creeks called "the river of death" (Chickamauga), would find in the atmos- 
 phere an inheritance of the inspiration of heroism. 
 
 In the order of recommendations was the presence a few miles to the 
 north of the splendid River Tennessee, and on the spot was the Cherokee 
 Spring, pouring forth an unfailing pure broad stream, that managed with 
 knowledge and energy and guarded with vigilance would water an army 
 greater than that of Xerxes. There was also the mountain air of Georgia, 
 and the farmers' fields and the breezy woods, and great spaces where army 
 corps could be mustered and put through their evolutions. 
 
 Even into this paradise of soldiers' schools came plagues of flies and other 
 plagues, and with the Chickamauga River and the Crawfish Spring and wells 
 by the score, each yielding inexhaustible supplies of the better beverage of 
 man, there were bitter complaints of the water as v/ell as of the insects. 
 There was, counting all the circumstances of the crisis, no quick and certain 
 help for these things. They must all be considered in the argument for a real 
 army, not necessarily for a monstrous host, but a suiScient force to prevent 
 the awful expensiveness of the profligate system of accepting challenges to 
 war, or galloping into it, as the unthinking horse goes to battle, headlong 
 and squandering in a few summer weeks, and then with disappointing results, 
 the substance of the people, the gain of laborious and thrifty years and the 
 lives of the youth just grown up into usefulness. 
 
 In those profuse outlays that the zeal of patriotism and the pride of 
 manliness and the gracious sympathies of womanliness call for irresistibly 
 
488 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 and without stint, there cannot be full compensation found. Lost time is 
 irrecoverable, and we have put ofE for the mystical to-morrows those pro- 
 visions for bad weather that must come to us as to all others, and that the 
 story of every age foreshadows. 
 
 If we had been as presciently thoughtful for the army as on behalf of the 
 navy we would not have depended in the days big with destiny in July, 1898, 
 upon the thin lines of indomitable sufferers, who stormed and held the hills 
 beyond Santiago and were a great salvation. If we had been really ready for 
 entrance upon such a campaign, as all other nations of thirty per cent" of our 
 ability, with the exception of China, are, we would have sent troop ships with 
 lighters and tugs, laborers, and all the well known wants of such a& enter- 
 prise and the requirements of life in southern Cuba. We would have had 
 shipped a narrow-gauge railroad, rails, cars, locomotives, engineers, all but 
 conductors, with expert railroad builders to put it down, and our soldiers could 
 have been and would have been supplied with full rations and medicines, thsir 
 packs delivered on the firing lines with all their shelter tents, blankets, 
 tobacco, and all the other little comforts, the sum of which is so great, and 
 along with these full advanced, swiftly placed, and provided long range and 
 rapid fire guns to sweep away the Spanish blockhouses and score and search 
 the ridges, thickets and ditches with an intolerable flight of iron hail. 
 
 But such things cannot be extemporized at Tampa, Camp Alger, Chicka- 
 mauga, or anywhere else. What artillery might have done may be seen in 
 what one battery did at El Caney. It was only with extreme exertion that 
 the fateful battery that prepared the victory was placed where it wiped away 
 the Spaniards with their smokeless Mausers, that scourged our lines as if with 
 swarms of hornets, flying from invisible nests with stings of death. Our 
 shells smashed their blockhouses, killing the defenders, or the decisive charge 
 could not have been made. 
 
 Our Congress, and it is another way of saying our public opinion, seeing 
 our ocean and gulf coasts exposed to modern squadrons, and apprised of the 
 nature and power of the armaments of the great powers abroad, made the 
 navy more than the army a non-partisan and non-sectional matter, and appro- 
 priations were, after due discussion, given for battleships, a fact that stands out 
 and shines forth in honor of the States that are far from salt water, or 
 the mountains where the rivers run to the great river, the Father of floods and 
 the greater ocean of the globe. The national American spirit was abroad in 
 
THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 489 
 
 them, and they began in time the magnificent machines of steel, that are fit 
 for ocean service, bearing enormous burdens, endowed with prodigious forces, 
 equipped with thunderbolts as volcanoes are — such marvels of mechanism as 
 the Oregon, her voyages no less renowned than her fights, and her speed 
 sends her where her artillery smashes the foe that stands or flees. Gigantic 
 embodiments like this could not be built and sent booming forward and 
 back, around Cape Horn, from Washington to Florida, and New York to 
 Manila, unless for years the furnaces flamed and the hammers rang. " 
 
 Now, if Congress will come to the realizing sense that it takes as long to 
 make out of our matchless material of men a battle regiment, as it does to 
 delve in the mines for iron and coal and build a battleship, and construct a 
 navy, we shall no more be grieved over the privations of the camps, as well 
 as the perils of those who form the fire line. When the thunders of hostile 
 guns deliver the messengers of death and immortality in the ranks of our 
 heroes, we shall not again mourn that precious lives were lost, that might 
 have been saved by the aggregate will and wisdom of the people at large, 
 whose government we have and whose army is their own — -their flesh and 
 blood, as the navy is bone of their, bone. Regular regiments must be 
 enlisted, officered, drilled and altogether uplifted to competency, and live to 
 the straight line and the broad precept of faith and glory of the fathers — as the 
 steel broadsides from which the far-flashing guns send their armor-piercing 
 bolts, and the crackling shells that light the stormy gloom of battle. 
 
 There was a great wrong in that our army at Santiago was so small and 
 so poorly furnished when they stood between the nation and humiliation, and it 
 is to be hoped the war has educated us so that we have surely located the 
 fault and seriously mean to find and apply the remedy that experience has 
 once more revealed. Was it the negligence, the indifference, the incompe- 
 tency, the ruthless selfishness, the ambition that would deal destruction, 
 hoping to harvest lucrative reputation and forward private ends, of the 
 Secretary of War, the Major-General who commanded the army of the United 
 States, the Adjutant-General of the army, the Major-General Commanding 
 at Santiago, or the Adjutant-General or some commissary or quartermaster? 
 
 Those who answer yes belittle the great and grave facts. It is due the 
 dignity of the country that the tirade of personalities, in and outside journal- 
 ism, the screeching demagogues, in and out of public life, the chatter of 
 speculators in unwholesome exciting agitations should cease. There are 
 
49° THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 before us volumes of reports of investigation, all of which must be useful, and 
 yet all could have been spared, but for the fact that there was a popular 
 demand for fair and full information as to the grievances of all who had stepped 
 forward to serve the country whether they reached the fire line or not. 
 
 The "clamor for investigation" was one of the forms of the appearance 
 of public opinion that the records of the war demanded "army reform." 
 Unquestionably that is true judgment, and the concrete mass of it, hammered 
 down to a solid proposition, is that the regular army should be enlarged, and 
 that the improvements of recent years having such excellent and admirable 
 results in the army already, shall be extended and continued. 
 
 Concerning the innumerable incidents of a disagreeable, distressing and 
 exasperating nature that have aroused indignation, and provoked unseemly 
 differences and recriminations, there is to say that the Santiago expedition 
 was, with the exception of the invasion of Mexico, the first ever undertaken 
 by our military organizations in a tropical country, and that Vera Cruz was 
 not so distant or difficult a point to disembark and meet the enemy as Santi- 
 ago. More than this, the pressure of time was not so acute in Mexico as in 
 Cuba, nor was the race with the yellow fever so close. 
 
 It was not the Spaniards in front that shook the fortitude of General 
 Shafter, but the precarious nature of the landing. He realized the peril of 
 bad weather in the obliteration of inadequate roads, the exhaustion of those 
 who were handling the supplies, the certainty that the army would melt away 
 if a regular siege was attempted ; that it was unable to dig trenches, stewed 
 in the heat by day, or soaked by rains and chilled at night. Sleeping on the 
 ground because the hammocks could not be carried, the soldiers knew that 
 they were being saturated with poison. Unable to charge through the sultry 
 air and thorny thickets upon the Spanish intrenchments and entanglements, 
 bearing packs and tools, blankets and tents, for the ways were steep and 
 the heat horrible, our boys stripped for the fighting, and were nearly 
 naked, and yet must sleep in the mud. It was hard to say which was the 
 worst trial — the burning sun or the pouring rain by day, or the chill earth and 
 the heavy dew by night. 
 
 It is no wonder the Commanding General, himself ill, viewed with dismay 
 the prospect of the total failure of the wretched roads, and thought seriously 
 of falling back, or letting the Spaniards go on easy terms. 
 
 The surroundings justified apprehension, and the wires at Washington 
 
THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 491 
 
 sent only firm words, and spurred fainting resolution, while the country was 
 in a frenzy of wrath that war was a horror and glory so dearly won, that the 
 machinery that made up and moved armies was broken here and there under 
 the stress of unaccustomed emergencies. 
 
 The victory was won at last, and the teachings of its costliness will have 
 a value beyond price if there is consent that the truth is'true, and the remedy 
 easily in the hands of Congress; and if there is a victim demanded, let the 
 sacrifice be the folly that has found favor with many, that we are not as other 
 people, amenable to the laws of progress and of destiny, and to the domestic 
 and international obligations, to be armed that we may defend ourselves, by 
 taking care that we are ready for war if a foeman seeks us or we have to go 
 beyond the seas to find him, for the field is the world in war for warriors as 
 well as for the preachers of peace. The sword has its missions divine. 
 
CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 The Day of Doom for Cervera's Fleet. 
 
 The Cape Verde Squadron Smashed, Burned and Sunk and Admiral Sampson Makes a 
 Present of the Wrecks to the Nation — The Reports of the Admiral and Commodore 
 Schley — Their Difference in Opinions, Methods and Manners — Intensely Interesting 
 Extracts from Reports by Captains and Executive Officers — A Series of Startling 
 Pictures —Admiral Cervera's Official Lamentation — Extracts from the Spanish Diary 
 of Uncommon Value — The Story of Fugitives from the Fleet Who Found Their 
 Way to the Spanish Trenches — Admiral Omits to Improve Opportunity of His Life. 
 
 Admiral Sampson announced the destruction of Cervera's fleet in the 
 following message : 
 
 July 3, 1898. 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington : 
 
 The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July 
 present the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9:30 this 
 morning. At 2 the last ship, the Cristobal Colon, had run ashore 75 miles 
 west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The Infanta Maria Teresa, 
 Oquendo, and Vizcaya were forced ashore, burned, and blown up within 20 
 miles of Santiago. The Furor and Pluton were destroyed within four miles 
 of the port. SAMPSON. 
 
 The President and Secretary of War responded in thiese telegrams: 
 Executive Mansion, Washington, July 4, 1898. 
 
 You have the gratitude and congrattilation of the whole American 
 people. Convey to noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors 
 have been added to the American Navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation 
 of the Nation. • WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 Navy Department, Washington, July 4, 1898. 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your 
 
 fleet, remembering equally your dead comrade, grateful acknowledgment of 
 
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THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
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494 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 your heroism and skill. All honor to the brave. You have maintained the 
 glory of the American Navy. JOHN D. LONG. 
 
 On the second day of July Admiral Sampson had arranged to meet Gen- 
 eral Shafter to consult about the cooperation of the army and navy, and was 
 on his flagship New York, four miles east of his usual position, three miles 
 east of the harbor entrance, going on that errand. Commodore Schley, on his 
 flagship Brooklyn, was two miles west of the harbor and the flight of the 
 Spaniards' fleet was his way. Admiral Sampson says the speed of the Spanish 
 vessels was from eight to ten knots as they came out "shrouded in the smoke 
 from their guns," and "turned to the westward in column, increasing their 
 speed to the full power of their engines," firing vigorously upon the block- 
 ading vessels. The American crews were at Sunday quarters for inspection 
 and "cheered as they sprang to their guns," those in range opening fire in 
 eight minutes. The Admiral relates that the New York toward the end of 
 the chase made sixteen and one-half knots, but "was not, at any time, within 
 the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to 
 receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and 
 to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be 
 attempting to escape from the Gloucester." 
 
 "It was," the Admiral says, "the heavy vessels that speedily over- 
 whelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. " The Brooklyn and Texas "had at 
 the start the advantage of position," and "the Brooklyn maintained this lead;" 
 the Oregon, however, "steaming with amazing speed from the commencement 
 of the action, took first place. The skillful handling and gallant fighting of 
 the Gloucester excited the admiration of every one who witnessed it," says 
 Admiral Sampson, and her fire upon the destroyer was "accurate, deadly and of 
 g^eat volume." At 11:15 the Vizcaya was on fire, "turned in shore and was 
 beached at Assenderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely and with 
 her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode." The 
 Admiral says the rescue of prisoners, including wounded, "from the burning 
 Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant con- 
 duct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve 
 ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire 
 would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was 
 Tunning just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers 
 and men until their work of humanity was complete. ' ' 
 
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
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496 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 , The Cristobal Colon is called by the Admiral "the best and fastest 
 vessel" of the Spaniards. The Brooklyn and Oregon, overhauling her slowly, 
 opened fire, at 12:50 and an Oregon shell struck beyond her, and at 1:20 she, 
 the last survivor of the fleet, hauled down her colors and ran ashore forty- 
 eight miles from Santiago. This fine ship, not injured by shots or fire, was 
 treacherously sunk by the opening and breaking of her sea valves and 
 Sampson says: "When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, 
 she was pushed by the New York bodily up on the beach, the New York's 
 stem being placed against her for this purpose — the ship being handled by 
 Captain Chad wick with admirable judgment. ' ' 
 
 It is the opinion of the Admiral that the blockade had been made so 
 •'stringent and effective' during the night that the enemy was deterred from 
 making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the 
 attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the com- 
 manding officer of the Cristobal Colon. ' ' 
 
 The special feature of the blockade was the search light, and of it the 
 Admiral says: "To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of 
 lighting the channel. Moving up to thaport, at a distance of from one to 
 two miles from the Morro — dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere 
 — ^they threw a search light beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily 
 there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel, for half a mile 
 inside of the entrance, so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could 
 be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the search light ship 
 ^ was always a matter of surprise to me ; but they never did. Stationed close to 
 the entrance of the port were three picket launches and, at a little distance 
 farther out, three small picket vessels — usually converted yachts — and, 
 when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this 
 arrangement there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the 
 harbor undetected. 
 
 "After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish 
 admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance 
 was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed 
 alongside the search light ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel 
 in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The com- 
 manding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which 
 they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The Massachusetts, 
 
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 497 
 
 
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498 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 which, according to routine, was sent that morning' to coal at Guantanamo, 
 like the others had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better 
 fate than to be absent that morning." 
 
 On the point of absence that morning the Admiral was naturally sensitive, 
 as he happened to be fated to have placed himself out of the combat on 
 business that was the most important matter on hand until the Spaniards 
 sought to escape. The Admiral only mentions Commodore Schley to say that 
 he did not modify an order that officer issued, giving the Spanish officers their 
 personal effects. Of course it was unpleasant and unfortunate for the 
 Admiral to be out of the combat, but this was not in any sense a fault, and 
 as he had been sharply critical of the Commodore for a miscalculation as to 
 the movements of the Spanish fleet, it would have been handsome to have 
 pleasantly characterized the good fortune of Schley in being so well placed, 
 and as this has been quite visible there has been a strong public feeling that 
 there should be made up to the Commodore anything lacking in the apprecia- 
 tion of his services on the great occasion by his superior in rank — and the 
 frigid temperature of the Admiral toward the officer and ship leading the way 
 in the running fight, is compensated by superheated admiration. 
 
 Admiral Sampson's remark on the failure of the fire of the Spanish ships 
 is highly interesting. He says: "Our loss was one-man killed and one 
 wounded, both on the Brooklyn. It is difficult to explain this immimity 
 from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the 
 best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight 
 and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced 
 their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by 
 observation. The Spanish vessels as they dashed out of the harbor, were 
 covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in 
 volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries 
 of the battleships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An 
 examination of the stranded vessels shows that the Almirante Oquendo 
 especially had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere 
 pierced and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who 
 had fallen. ' ' 
 
 The preparations the Admiral had made for contingencies of the blockade 
 were remarkably thorough. June 7th he ordered: "The weather permitting, 
 three picket launches, detailed from the ships of the squadron each evening, 
 
THE NAVAL HEROES OF SANTIAGO. 
 

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 501 
 
502 THE DAY OF DOOM FOE. CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 will occupy positions one mile from the Morro, one to the eastward, one to 
 the westward, and one to the south of the harbor entrance. On a circle 
 drawn with a radius of two miles from the Morro will be stationed three 
 vessels — the Vixen to the westward, from one-half to one mile from the shore, 
 the Suwanee south of Morro, and the Dolphin to the eastward, between one- 
 half mile and one mile from the shore. The remaining vessels will retain the 
 positions already occupied ; but they will take especial care to keep within a 
 four-mile circle. 
 
 "All vessels may turn their engines whenever desirable, to keep them 
 in readiness for immediate use, and while so doing may turn in a small 
 circle, but without losing proper bearing or distance. 
 
 "The signal for an enemy will be two red Very lights fired in rapid suc- 
 cession. If the enemy is a torpedo boat, these two red lights will be followed 
 by a green light. ' ' . 
 
 In this connection attention was called in the strongest terms to the 
 impatience of the service — closing: "The end to be obtained justifies the 
 risk of torpedo attack, and that risk must be taken. The escape of the 
 Spanish vessels at this juncture would be a serious blow to our prestige and 
 to a speedy end of the war. " 
 
 The duties of each ship were minutely defined. Three battleships took 
 turns of two hours each during the dark hours in keeping one search light 
 directly on the harbor entrance. The order of June 8th closes with this 
 admonition : 
 
 "Attention is called to bad and careless handling of seach lights. 'Last 
 night some of the lights were kept high in the air, and were again swept 
 rapidly from side to side. Under such circumstances a search light is worse 
 than useless. 
 
 "The beams must be directed to the horizon, and must be moved very 
 steadily and slowly. Not less than three minutes should be employed in 
 sweeping through an arc of 90 degrees. 
 
 "The best way to discover a torpedo boat is by its smoke, and even this 
 ■will not be seen unless the light is very well handled. ' ' 
 
 Commodore Schley reports: "The concentration of fire of the squadron 
 upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and gre.at damage 
 was done them." 
 
 As to the close of the combat he says: "The Oregon having proved 
 
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 503 
 
 10 
 
 m 
 
504 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the Brooklyn, together with 
 the Texas and another vessel which proved to be your flagship, continued 
 westward in pursuit of the Colon. This pursuit continued with increasing 
 speed in the Brooklyn, Oregon and other ships, and soon the Brooklyn and 
 Oregon were within long range of the Colon, when the Oregon opened fire 
 with her 13-inch guns, landing a shell close to the Colon. A moment after- 
 wards the Brooklyn opened fire with her 8-irich guns, landing a shell just 
 ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the Colon, now in range 
 of the Brooklyn's and Oregon's guns. Her commander, seeing all chances 
 of escape cut off, and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and 
 struck her flag at 1:15 p. m., and ran ashore at a point some 50 miles west of 
 Santiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time. I 
 would mention, for your consideration, that the Brooklyn Occupied the most 
 westward blockading position, with the Vixen, and, being more directly in 
 the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes, 
 possibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west 
 battery, at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards from 
 the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon 
 diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range. 
 
 "I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting 
 as was done by the ships of your command as they closed 'in on the Spanish 
 squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to you, for such action 
 as you may deem proper, the gallantry and. dashing courage, the prompt decis- 
 ion, and the skillful handling of their respective vessels of Captain Philip, 
 Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially of my chief of staff. Captain 
 Cook, who was directly under my personal observation and whose coolness, 
 promptness, and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke of the 
 combat shut out from my view the Indiana and the Gloucester, but, as these 
 vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was 
 under your immediate observation. The torpedo boats were destroyed early in 
 the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say 
 to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen 
 from your flagship. " . 
 
 The one American killed, G. H. Ellis, Chief Yeoman, and the one 
 wounded, J. Burns, fireman, in the engagement, were on the Brooklyn, and 
 the Commodore says: "The marks and scars show that the ship was struck 
 
ADMIRAL CEKVEK 
 
 ;a, who commanded the ill-fated Spanish fleet at Santiago. 
 
SIDE OF THE "CRISTOBAL COLON." AFTER THE BATTLE. 
 
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 5°7 
 
So8 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars as the result of 
 her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898. The 
 speed-cone halyards were shot away, and nearly all the signal halyards. The 
 ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it down at the close of 
 the action it fell in pieces. 
 
 "I congratulate you most ^sincerely upon this gteat victory to the 
 squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to 
 contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us." 
 
 There is a strong contrast between the reports of the Admiral and the 
 Commodore, that appears most positively in the references the distinguished 
 officers make to each other. There is something that approaches neglect in 
 the observations of Sampson and it is difficult to say whether the 
 repetitions in Schley's remarks as to the excellent views the Admiral had 
 at various times of the combat, have a tone of courteous attention or 
 patronage rather too highly flavored to be pleasant to the taste. The Com- 
 modore says that in conversation with Captain Eulate of the Vizcaya and 
 Commodore Canheras of the Colon he learned the Spanish Admiral's scheme 
 was to concentrate all fire for awhile on the Brooklyn and the Vizcaya to ram 
 her, in hopes that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be 
 increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship' of our squadron. 
 This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the Vizcaya 's action in the earlier 
 moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly 
 defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close 
 range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's 
 squadron as it was coming out of the harbor. 
 
 Captain Cook of the Brooklyn, adds: "The Brooklyn was engaged with 
 the three leading ships of the enemy, which were forging ahead, the 
 Texas, Iowa and Indiana keeping up a heavy fire, but steadily dropping 
 astern. The Oregon was keeping up a steady fire and was coming up in the 
 most glorious and gallant style, outstripping all others. It was an inspiring 
 sight to see this battleship, with a large white wave before her, and her 
 smokestacks belching forth continued puffs from her forced draft. We 
 were making fourteen "knots at the time, and the Oregon came up off our 
 starboard quarter at about 600 yards and maintained her position, though 
 we soon after increased our speed to "fifteen knots, and just before the 
 Colon surrendered were making nearly sixteen. ' ' 
 
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 509 
 
 Captain Cook adds: "The 8-inch guns worked satisfactorily; some 
 trouble and delay was caused by jamming of locks. The turrets worked 
 well. The 5 -inch battery gave great trouble with the elevating gear. At 
 the end several were rendered useless for battle. Two are bulged at the 
 muzzle. This ship should have new elevating gear for 5-inch as soon as 
 practicable. We fired 100 rounds of 8-inch, 473 of 5-inch, 1,200 of 6-pounder, 
 and 200 of i-pounder ammunition." 
 
 Captain Clark of the Oregon says of the firing of the ship: "We 
 soon passed all of our ships except the Brooklyn, bearing the broad 
 pennant of Commodore Schley. At first we only used our main battery, 
 but when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats were following 
 their ships we used our rapid-fire guns, ks well as the 6-inch, upon them with 
 telling effect. As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships she 
 headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her as we passed, pushing 
 on for the next ahead, using our starboard guns as they were brought to 
 bear, and before we had her fairly abeam, she too was making for the beach. 
 The two remaining vessels were now some distance ahead, but our speed had 
 increased to sixteen knots and our fire, added to that of the Brooklyn, soon 
 sent another, the Vizcaya, to the shore in flames. The Brooklyn signaled, 
 'Oregon, well done. ' Only the Cristobal Colon was left, and for a time it 
 seemed as if she might escape ; but when we opened with our forward turret 
 guns and the Brooklyn followed she began to edge in toward the coast 
 and her capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach 
 her flag came down and the Brooklyn signaled, 'Cease firing, ' following 
 it with 'Congratulations for the grand victory, thanks for your splendid 
 assistance.' " 
 
 The effect of a shot on the Texas is thus stated by an executive ofiicer : 
 
 "A shell of about 6 inches in diameter entered the starboard side above ■ 
 the main deck near top of hammock berthing immediately forward of ash- 
 hoist, angle of entrance being about 20 degrees forward of the beam; shell 
 apparently exploded immediately after passing through the outer plating of 
 hammock berthing, passing into the forward air shaft to forced draft blower, 
 destroying doors of both air shafts and the adjacent bulkheads. Several 
 pieces passed through the doorway of after shaft and penetrated the after 
 bulkhead of the shaft.' The mass of shell pieces passed on through 
 bulkhead and casing of starboard smoke box, producing an aperture 
 
Sio THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 therein, irregular in form, measuring about 3 feet vertically, 2 feet fore and 
 aft. TJie ash hoist machinery was badly damaged." 
 
 The effect upon the Texas of her own guns this officer relates: "The 
 'steel deck has in several places become separated from the beams through 
 the stretching or breaking of rivets, and there are now leaks in several 
 places. 
 
 "The rivets securing the head of midship stanchions to the web of 
 beams of frames 55 and 56 have been sheared off. 
 
 "The condition of starboard side of the main deck is attributed partly to 
 the firing of the 12-inch turret guns over the deck during the engagement, 
 as mentioned in my report of June 6, but mainly by similar causes during the 
 battle of yesterday. 
 
 "The marked increase in the injuries to the deck may be attributed not 
 only to the repetition of great strains over a surface whose support was already 
 weakened, but to an increase in the charge of powder ; i. e. , reduced charge 
 previously used to full charge used during this battle. 
 
 ' ' I am of opinion that the framing of the deck in this ship is too light to 
 permit the further firing of the 12-inch guns over the decks without serious 
 injury." 
 
 The reason given by Admiral Sampson for ordering the Indiana to turn 
 back when the Brooklyn had the Colon well in hand is: "There were still 
 some armed vessels remaining in the harbor of Santiago — at least two, and we 
 did not know then how many more — which could have come out in the 
 absence of the fleet and produced great havoc among the troopships, which 
 were defenseless in the absence of an armed vessel. ' ' 
 
 Commodore Eaton of the Resolute says of the fire of the Indiana, 
 which he had an excellent opportunity to observe: "As the Vizcaya came 
 out, I distinctly saw one of the Indiana's heaviest shells strike her abaft the 
 funnels, and the explosion of this shell was followed by a burst of flame, 
 which, for the moment, obscured the after part of the Vizcaya. 
 
 "The Cristobal Colon, as soon as she was clear of Morro Point, fired her 
 first broadside at the Indiana. 
 
 "The Oquendo, in coming out, also fired her first broadside at the 
 Indiana, and I could see some of the Indiana's shells strike the Oquendo 
 as she steamed south. 
 
 ' ' Following close astern of the Colon and the Oquendo came the destroyer 
 
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET, 511 
 
 Furor, and I distinctly saw her struck by an 8-inch or 13-inch shell from the 
 Indiana, which was followed by an explosion and flames on board of the 
 Furor. 
 
 "The Spanish officers who were prisoners from the Colon and the Vizcaya 
 have since told me that the fire from the Indiana and the Oregon as the}"- 
 passed from the harbor was deadly in its destructiveness, and that although 
 the Colon escaped with small injury, due to her greater speed and being in a 
 measure covered by other ships, the Vizcaya was hopelessly crippled before 
 she had gone a mile from the Morro. ' ' 
 
 The way the Iowa dealt destruction to the Maria Teresa — Admiral 
 Cervera's flagship — is thus related by Captain Evans: "When it was certain 
 that the Maria Teresa would pass ahead of us, the helm was put to starboard, 
 and the starboard broadside delivered at a range of 2,500 yards. The helm 
 was then put to port and the ship headed across the bow of the second ship, 
 and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to starboard and she received 
 in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at a range of about 1,800 
 yards. The Iowa was again headed off with the port helm for the third ship, 
 and as she approached the helm was put to starboard until our course was 
 approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position at 'a range of 1,400 
 yards the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns, was poured into 
 the enemy's ship. 
 
 "The fire of the main battery of this ship when the range was below 2,500 
 yards was most effective and destructive, and after a continuance of this fire 
 for perhaps twenty minutes it was noticed that the Maria Teresa and Oquendo 
 were in flames and headed for the beach. ' ' 
 
 The ammunition expended by the Iowa was: 12-inch semi-armor- piercing 
 shell, with full charges, 31; 8-inch common shell, with full charges, 35. 4- inch 
 cartridges, common shell, 251; 6-pounder cartridges, common shell, 1,056; 
 i-pounder cartridges, common shell, 100. 
 
 Captain Evans says of his crew that they were "magnificent" and "so 
 long as the enemy showed his flag, they fought like American seamen ; but 
 when the fla.g came down they were as gentle and tender as American 
 women. ' ' 
 
 The Gloucester had a special combat with the Spanish torpedo destroyers 
 and the executive officer reports an exchange of fire between automatic gtms : 
 "The monotonous reports of an automatic gun could be heard after the 2,500 
 
512 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 yard range was passed and the zone of fire could be distinctly traced by a 
 line of splashes describing accurately the length of the ship and gradually 
 approaching it. But at a distance, variously estimated f/com lo to 50 yards, 
 the automatic firing suddenly ceased. It was afterwards found to be from a 
 i-pounder Maxim, and the execution aboard'would have been terrible during 
 the few minutes that must have elapsed before- the ship was sunk had the 
 fire reached us. Meanwhile the service of our own guns was excellent, and 
 at range of 1,200 yards, the two 6-millimeter automatic Colt rifles opened 
 on the enemy." 
 
 When the fight was over there was found "a horrible state of affairs" 
 on the Furor. "The vessel was a perfect shambles. As she was on fire and 
 burning rapidly, they took off the living and then rescued all they could find 
 in the water and on the beach. The Pluton was among the rocks in the surf 
 and could not be boarded, but her crew had made their way ashore or were 
 adrift on life buoys and wreckage. These were all taken on board. I have 
 since learned that the New York passed a number of men in the water who 
 had doubtless jumped overboard from the destroyers to escape our fire. All 
 these were probably drowned. 
 
 "While this work was going on several explosions took place on the 
 Furor, and presently — at about 11:30 — she threw her bows in the air, and 
 turning to port slowly sank in deep water. ' ' 
 
 The Spanish lieutenants Cabellero and Bustamente commanded the 
 Spanish destroyers, so summarily destroyed, and escaped. Cabellero of the 
 Pluton says that when the Furor sank "We were making a great deal of 
 water; we continued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we 
 were close to the headland which it forms, we received a 3 2 -centimeter 
 projectile which exploded the forward group of boilers, blowing up the whole 
 deck and cutting off communication between the two ends. She then veered 
 to starboard and struck on the headland, tearing off a great part of the bow. 
 The shock threw her back some distance ; then she struck again. I jumped 
 into the water and reached the shore. 
 
 "I climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there for about 
 fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When it was at an end I 
 went into the mountains and gathered up such personnel of the ship as I 
 met — about 20 or 25 — and with them I went around a small hill for the par- 
 pose of hiding from the coast and took the road to Santiago de Cuba, avoiding 
 
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERAS FLEET. 513 
 
 the roads and seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot, on pretext 
 that the road which 1 was following was not a good one, left us and did not 
 again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an easterly direction 
 — some clothed, others naked, and the rest half clothed — ^for two hours, resting 
 now and then, and trying to keep close to the coast." 
 
 "This troop of fugitives reached the Spanish trenches that night. Busta- 
 mente of the Furor reported that one of the American projectiles struck one 
 of the hatches of the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and 
 consequently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were 
 falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Boatswain 
 Duena,s, cutting him in two; one part fell between the tiller ropes, 
 interrupting them momentarily, and it was necessary to take it out in pieces. 
 Another projectile destroyed the engine and the servo-motor, so that the 
 ship could neither proceed nor maneuver. Another had struck the after 
 shell room, exploding and destroying it. 
 
 "Our torpedoes had their war heads on and were ready to be used, but we 
 did not launch them because we were never at a convenient distance from 
 the enemy. Under these circumstances the commander of the destroyers. 
 Captain Fernando Villaamil, gave orders to abandon the ship, aiid I with 
 part of the crew jumped into the water, about three miles from the coast. In 
 the water, one of the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by 
 a bullet in the head and buried in the water forever. The ship in the mean- 
 time, after a horrible series of explosions, went down. When we reached the 
 land, we went in an easterly direction towards Santiago. Shortly after we 
 met Lieutenant Caballero and with him and his men we reached Santiago." 
 
 The Heraldo of Madrid, August 22d, published the report of Cervera. 
 ' He says the Brookljm was "on account of her speed the vessel most 
 dreaded" and when the departure was effected "we steered the prearranged 
 course in view of the disadvantages that existed for us, which became' evi- 
 dent as soon as the exit had been accomplished. The enemy's fire produced 
 terrible damages on board the Infanta Maria Teresa, destroying the 
 elements of defense — among others the net for protection against fire. In this 
 critical moment the captain of the ship, Seiior Concas, fell wounded, and it 
 wasmecessary to withdraw him, I taking command of the vessel, because it 
 was impossible to find the second commandant of the Maria Teresa. 
 Immediately afterwards they reported to me that my cabin was burning 
 
514 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET, 
 
 in consequence of an explosion. The fire soon became very great and ignited 
 other parts of the ship. I gave orders to my aid to flood the after magazines, 
 but it was impossible. Dense clouds of smoke impeded walking in the 
 passages and practicing any kind of operations. In this situation I could only 
 think of beaching the ship, and did so, running aground on Punta Cabrera. 
 The contest was impossible on our side, and there was nothing more to be 
 done but to save as much as possible. I thought to lower the flag, but that 
 was not possible on account of the fire, which prevented all operations. In 
 these anxious moments two boats came to the aid of the Maria Teresa, into 
 which a number of us jumped. Those that were not dying were saved with 
 nothing. 
 
 "The Teresa lowered" a small boat, which sank before it could be of any 
 service. Subsequently they succeeded in launching a steam launch, but this 
 also sank after , making one voyage to the beach. I succeeded in saving 
 myself with nothing, two sailors helping me, one named Andres Sequeros 
 and the officer D. Angel Cervera, all of us arriving on board the American 
 ship Gloucester naked. At this time we were all naked. 
 
 "It remains to communicate to you that our enemies behaved toward 
 us with great chivalry, providing us with good clothes, and suppressing 
 almost entirely the usual hurrahs, to prevent hurting our self-respect. The 
 3d day of July has been to us a horrible disaster, as I had foreseen. The 
 number of the dead, nevertheless, is less than what I feared. The country 
 has been defended with honor, and the satisfaction of the duty done leaves 
 our conscience tranquil." 
 
 According to the purser of the Oquendo, the history of this ill-fated ship 
 was as follows: "The unequal battle became more so when a hostile projectile 
 entered the forward turret, killing the whole personnel, with the exception of 
 one gunner, who was badly wounded. Of the 14-cm. battery 2 guns only 
 remained in action, and these fought with incomparable energy. The after 
 turret was soon without a commanding officer; he had been killed as he 
 opened the door, being almost asphyxiated inside of the turret. There were 
 two fires on board the Oquendo, one in the orlop deck forward, which was 
 soon gotten under control, and the other in the stern, which could not be sup- 
 pressed, the pumps failing to give water. From the very beginning of the 
 battle the 14-cm. ammunition hoists failed to work.. When our commander, 
 Mr. Lazaga, saw that the fire could not be controlled and that all the guns 
 
o 
 
 •H 
 fell 
 
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 517 
 
 were out of action, he prepared to beach the ship, first giving orders to 
 discharge all the torpedoes in order to prevent the enemy from approaching. 
 Driven to the last extreme, and after consulting with all the officers present, 
 he ordered the flag to be hauled down. The second and third commanders 
 and three lieutenants had. already been killed, and while Mr. Lazaga was 
 directing the rescue of the crew he gave his own life for his country. The 
 men of the Oquendo witnessed calmly and without becoming terrified, the 
 constant explosions on board, determined above all things that the enemy 
 should not set foot on the ship." 
 
 The secret cipher official telegrams of the Spanish premier, Sagasta, the 
 Captaiii General of Cuba, Blanco,. the Minister of the Navy of Spain, and the 
 military commander of Santiago, given in the chapter of this book relating to 
 them, should be read in connection with the extracts from our own official 
 papers, touching the Santiago expeditions and the battles on land and sea. 
 The two collections of the papers that are of absolute sincerity, verity and 
 inwardness, perfect the accounts of the episode that was demonstrative that 
 the fortunes of the war were all against Spain. This was so certain, that it 
 would have been irrational not to surrender. The secret ciphers of the 
 Spanish officers complete the explanation of the almost incredible inferiority 
 of the ships of Spain as against ours. Admiral Cervera was not duped by 
 vanity on this subject and did not condescend to boastfulness, or conceal the 
 truth from those higher than himself in authority, yet he confessed after the 
 annihilation of his squadron that he would not have believed the ships he 
 commanded could have been knocked in pieces so rapidly. The fire of the 
 American fleet was overwhelming — battleships, protected cruisers, gunboats, 
 heavy and light, participating with equal vigor, efficiency and immunity 
 from harm. 
 
 The identification of the Spanish ships of war in the harbor of Santi- 
 ago de Cuba as Admiral Cervera's fleet was reported by Commodore 
 Schley. The War Department was able to inform General Miles, then at 
 Tampa, of it, on the 2nd of June, one month and one day before the day 
 of the doom of the squadron. The movements of the Spanish cruisers and 
 torpedo boats commanded by Cervera, had been managed with such skill to 
 prevent their precise location that they had an extraordinary degree of the 
 public attention and there was the gravest concern that they might be located 
 and that no pains should be spared to put them out of the possibility of action. 
 
5i8 
 
 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 The campaign plans in Cuba were disturbed by the existence of Spanish 
 war ships in West India waters. One swift and heavil)' armed .cruiser could 
 sink an army of unprotected transports. The news that the flitting squadron 
 of Spain had become fugitives and taken refuge in Santiago Bay was of the 
 greatest consequence. The next thing was to assemble off Santiago an over- 
 whelming blockading fleet, and this done, the organization was in two 
 squadrons : 
 
 First squadron (under the personal command of Admiral Sampson) : New 
 York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter. 
 
 Second squadron (Commodore Schley) : Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, 
 Marblehead, Vixen. 
 
 Morro. 
 
 Zm. 
 \m Vixen. 
 
 w 
 
 \% Marblehead. , 
 
 "^yJ^Broohlyn. 
 
 "^^Texiis 
 
 V 
 
 \ Mayflower. |; 
 
 ^Nem Or/earn, ki 
 \. •' 
 
 \ / 
 
 \ / 
 
 N / 
 
 Por/ej>s 1/ 
 
 A/ew) 
 
 York. ^/ 
 "^•^^J^Masa. Zona. Or^on.^^,'' 
 
 The order was : "The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keep- 
 ing about six miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the 
 lighter vessels well in shore. The first squadron will blockade on the east 
 side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries 
 to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavo;r 
 to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel." 
 
 One thing that contributed greatly to the success of the blockade was the 
 use of search lights held steadily on the mouth of the harbor. The diagram 
 
THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 519 
 
 annexed was drawn to accompany the tirder of battle, dated June 2nd, and 
 shows the method of the formation. 
 
 The Spanish Office of Naval Intelligence has published the diary of 
 Lieutenant Jos^ Muller y Tejeiro, second in command of Naval forces of the 
 province of Santiago de Cuba. We quote the opening passages : 
 
 "On the 1 8th of May the first hostile ships were sighted from the Morro 
 of Santiago de Cuba and the first gunshots were heard, which since that date, 
 for the space of two months, have hardly ceased for a single day. 
 
 "On the following day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, commanded by Rear 
 Admiral Cervera, entered with very little coal, which it was absolutely 
 • necessary t;o replenish. 
 
 "From that time on I have kept an exact diary * * * of everything I 
 saw, or that came to my notice, or that passed through my hands in my official 
 capacity, or that I knew to be accurate and trustworthy." 
 
 A part of the entry, under the date of July the 4th, has special significance : 
 
 "July 4. — Opposite the mouth of the harbor, the New York, Brooklyn, 
 Indiana, Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Vesuvius, i yacht, and 17 merchant 
 vessels. At 8 p. m. the cruiser Reina Mercedes started up. 
 
 "As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the fleet, 
 as the Bustamente torpedoes {six of them) had been taken up so that the fleet 
 "could go out and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines 
 no longer existed, the commander of mariiie decided — General Toral also being 
 of his opinion — to sink the Mercedes (the only ship that was suitable for that 
 purpose) in the narrow part of the channel ; consequently the commander of 
 the cruiser received orders to do so. Hurriedly, for time was pressing, the 
 wounded and sick from .the lost fleet were transferred to the steamer Mejico, 
 which had been converted into a ' hospital, and hoisted the flag of the Red 
 Cross. Important papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms, 
 beds, and the most necessary things, were taken off the Mercedes, and at 8 
 p. m., with her commander. Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the necessary 
 sailors, and Pilots Apolonio Nunez and Miguel Lopez, started toward the 
 entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring on the cable ready. ' ' 
 
 The ship was sunk under a heavy fire by the American fleet, but the 
 Spanish diary we quote says: "Unfortunately, the ship did not come to lie 
 across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut the spring on the ca,ble; 
 the sacrifice was useless and the harbor was not obstructed. Yet it was not 
 
S20 
 
 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 
 
 entirely useless, since the enemy coiild not take possession of her, as she is 
 all riddled by bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she 
 can ever again be used. " 
 
 One thing that is of the utmost importance and that has escaped critical 
 notice, is the fact that when Admiral Sampson ordered the Indiana to turn 
 back to protect our transports, he missed the opportunity of his life. He 
 was alarmed quite unnecessarily by the fancy that there was danger more 
 Spanish war ships would come out and avenge the loss of Cervera's squadron. 
 That was not, after the experiences of the day, possible. The Admiral was 
 right to turn the Indiana back from the pursuit, but wrong in not discon- 
 tinuing the long chase after the Brooklyn and Oregon, then steadily overhaul- 
 ing the Colon. There was no business demand for the Admiral to be a per- 
 sonal spectator of the surrender of the Colon, and to hold a reception for 
 the prisoners. 
 
 It is plain now, and ought to have been then, that "the Indiana should 
 have gone in where the Spaniards came out. There were Ho torpedoes to 
 fear. The batteries were not alarming — would not have been to Farf agut or 
 Dewey or Lord Nelson. The torpedoes had not been replaced, the mines no 
 longer existed. Our fleet was not damaged. The Indiana and New York 
 should have gone at full speed for the open door, signaling the battleships to 
 follow, and the Fourth of July would have, seen the harbor and city in pes- ' 
 session of the fleet, and the Spanish army's surrender must have been 
 immediate and unconditional. There was a gate- of glory open, unseen. 
 

 t\ [M^ 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 The Scenes and Significance of the Surrender of Santiago. 
 
 The Appearance of General Miles at Santiago — His Moral as well as Military Force — 
 Spanish Obstinacy in the Negotiation for Capitulation — The Iron Hand at Washing- 
 ton — The Practical Question was, How Much Would Victory Cost Us? — The Spanish 
 Case was Hopeless— They Sought to Save their Military Honor — The Scenes an6 
 Terms of the Surrender — An Inspector General's Picturesque Story — Telegrams that 
 are Photographs^The President's Proclamation of Principles and Purpose in Cuban 
 Government — Comparative Proportions of Great Surrenders. 
 
 It was July 7th that the Major-General commanding the army of the 
 United States left Washington City for the seat of war in Cuba, and with the 
 aid of a fast train to Columbia, South Carolina, and a "special" for Charles- 
 ton, took the "Yale," having 1,500 troops aboard, and arrived at Santiago on 
 the morning of the nth, finding Admiral Sampson bombarding the Spaniards 
 at the mouth of the harbor, but not forcing his way in, as Shaffer desired. 
 The General was en route four nights and three days. 
 
 ■ There had been a good deal of conjecture whether the real intention of 
 the war office in hastening the transit of the head of the army from the 
 national capital to the scene of action, might not to be to supersede Shafter, 
 who was a sick man, sorely perplexed ; and within the horizon of the popular 
 observation there were heavy clouds, though the navy of the Spaniards was 
 no longer considered. The purpose of General Miles — his plan presumably — 
 was to assist in the capture of Santiago and press on to Porto Rico, precisely 
 that which he did. Santiago was to him a spectacular episode. 
 
 The General commanding the United States army and the Admiral com- 
 manding the North Atlantic squadron soon got together. General Miles 
 desired to land troops west of Santiago, and make a diversion in that quarter, 
 the Cubans not getting up in our fashion of fighting. In his note to Samp- 
 son, Miles did not take into view that a force comprising the greater part of 
 fifty or sixty thousand Cubans ought to be, according to his original plan, 
 
 523 
 
524 'THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 somewhere in the neighborhood to storm the Spaniards out of Santiago. 
 Shafter had cabled Miles July 4th: "I am delighted to know that you are 
 coming that you may see. for yourself the obstacles which this army had to 
 overcome. My only regret is the great number of gallant souls who have 
 given their lives for our country's cause. " 
 
 A telegram of congratulation sent by General Miles July 3d was read at 
 the head of each of the regiments that had been engaged. Miles told Samp- 
 son that he desired the cooperation of the navy in the west end movement, and 
 Sampson cordially acquiesced, offering every assistance of his fleet to 
 cover the debarkation of the troops and also to enfilade the Spanish position 
 Tvith the guns of the ships. 
 
 It will be noted that it was the plan of Miles, and not the plan of Shafter, 
 in which Sampson so cordially acquiesced. There was one thing about which 
 the Admiral held positive opinion, and that was, as the Spaniards had done 
 what the gallant Hobson had not, blockaded the mouth of the harbor, he 
 did not mean to risk the sinking of a battleship in attempting a "no thorough- 
 fare." After meeting Sampson, Miles went on shore and communicated with 
 Shafter, who said he had troops enough to hold his position, and Miles gave 
 the orders for the movement on the west. 
 
 The next morning, July 12th, Miles rode to Shafter 's headquarters, and 
 the news of the arrival of the Major-General commanding was sent the Spanish 
 General, afso the fact that large reinforcements had arrived, and that others 
 were ori the way, and that Shafter and Miles desired to meet him between the 
 lines at any time agreeable to him. The Spanish General courteously replied 
 that he would see the American generals at 12 o'clock on the following day. 
 On that day Shafter announced "nervousness" in the army on account of the 
 yellow fever, "which is among us certainly, twenty -nine new cases yesterday 
 and probably one hundred and fifty all told." 
 
 General Toral had been seen and "a good impression made on him," and 
 Shafter supplemented that information with these words: "I will open on 
 him at twelve noon to-morrow with every gun I have and the assistance of the 
 navy with thirteen-inch shells. " The Spanish General agreed to surrender on 
 the basis of being returned to Spain — the proposal including all eastern Cuba. 
 There were about 12,000 Spanish troops in Santiago, and as many at other 
 points. The Spaniards were eagerly urgent to be allowed to have their arms 
 shipped with them. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 525 
 
 July i6th the Spaniards surrendered, the main point with them being 
 
 that they were to go home with their side arms and that they were to take 
 
 with their military archives, the arms they had so valiantly defended. 
 
 General Shafter did not seem to think it an essential matter whether the old 
 
 Spanish guns went to Spain or not, but Secretary Alger insisted that it was 
 
 not possible to concede that the arms should go. The letter of General Toral 
 
 notifying Shafter of Blanco's acceptance of the terms that had been definitely 
 
 agreed upon, was wired to the Adjutant-General of the United States at 
 
 Washington by the American General commanding in the field, who added: 
 
 "I have stood the delay, as I believe it will come out all right, and a fight 
 
 which we can have at any time will cost a lot of men. ' ' The letter was as 
 
 follows : 
 
 Santiago, Cuba, 14. 
 General in Chief of the American Forces. 
 
 Honored Sir: His excellency the general in chief of the army of the island 
 of Cuba telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 p. m. the following: "Believ- 
 ing that business of such importance as the capitulation of that place should 
 be known and decided upon by the government of His Majesty, I give you 
 notice that I have sent the conditions of your telegram, asking immediate 
 answer, and enabling you also to show this to the general of the American 
 army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government, which can 
 not be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by way of 
 Bermuda is more slow than Key West. In the meanwhile your honor and the 
 general of the American army may agree upon capitulation on the basis of 
 returning to Spain." I have the .honor to transmit this to you that in case 
 you may find the foregoing satisfactory he may designate persons representa- 
 tive of himself, who, with those in my name, may agree to the clauses of 
 capitulation upon the basis of return to Spain, accepted already in the begin- 
 ning by the general in chief of this army. Awaiting a reply, I am. 
 Very respectfully, your servant, JOSE TORAL, 
 
 Commanding, Chief of the Fourth Army Corps. 
 
 July 14th, 3 :24 p. m.. General Miles telegraphed Toral had formally surren- 
 dered on the understanding that his troops should be returned to Spain. 
 The General pronounced that this was "very gratifying" — and "General 
 Shafter and the officers and men of this command are entitled to great credit 
 for their sincerity, fortitude, and in overcoming almost insuperable obstacles 
 
526 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 which they encountered. A portion of the army has been infected with yellow 
 fever." 
 
 Then came to the Santiago army headquarters this important dispatch 
 
 from the White House : Executive Mansion, 
 
 Washington, July 15, 1898 — 12:35 p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Camp before Santiago, Cuba: 
 
 Have you received the absolute surrender of the enemy? We are await- 
 ing the conditions with impatience. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 Shafter announced that the dilcussion as to terms lasted until ten o'clock 
 the night of the 14th, and was to be settled on the evening of the 15th at 9 :3o, 
 and that the great point of the Spaniards was to have their arms "shipped to 
 them." It was not possible for them to fail to complete arrangements. The 
 following telegrams complete the links of the chain of events : 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, 
 Washington, July 15, 1898 — 4:45 p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este : 
 
 Secretary of War suggests, is it not possible that Toral is gaining time to 
 get reinforcements that may be on the way to assist him? 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 Playa del Este, via "Hayti. 
 (Received at Washington July 15, 1898 — 9 p. m.) 
 Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington : 
 
 Headquarters near Santiago, Cuba, 15. — I do not believe that Toral is 
 trying to gain time in hopes of getting reinforcements. Cubans have forces 
 in vicinity of all Spanish troops. Toral asked to-day to send messages to 
 ■ Guantanamo and to Palmas to notify Spanish troops of condition. Wheeler, 
 Lawton, and Miley are thoroughly convinced that they are earnest, and they 
 have been in consultation with the Spaniards twenty-four hours. Am told by 
 reliable persons Santiago the Spanish officers are greatly pleased at the 
 thought of going home, but generals are afraid of the consequences with 
 themselves unless terms of surrender are sanctioned by the Madrid govern- 
 ment. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 Executive Mansion, Washington, July 15, 1898 — 5:59 p. m. 
 Major-General Shafter, Camp near Santiago, Playa: 
 
 Is it not possible that you are entertaining the proposition of permitting 
 the Spanish to carry away their arms? Such a suggestion should be rejected 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 5^7 
 
 instantly. You have been instructed the terms of surrender acceptable to the 
 President, and they must be concluded on these lines. 
 
 R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 Playa del Este, via Hayti. 
 (Received Washington July 15, 1898 — 11:20 p. m.) 
 Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington: 
 
 Headquarters near Santiago, 15. — I do not entertain the proposition for 
 the Spanish to retain their arms. They are to surrender them absolutely 
 immediately after articles of capitulation are signed, but they beg, as an act of 
 consideration to them, that I will intercede with my government that they be 
 shipped with them to Spain. I regard this as a small matter that in no way 
 binds the government, but is one I would not let stand between clearing 20,000 
 Spanish soldiers out of Cuba, or leaving them there to be captured later, and 
 probably with much loss to ourselves. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 The text of the terms agreed upon is as follows: 
 
 Terms of the military convention for the capitulation of the Spanish forces 
 occupying the territory which constitutes the division of Santiago de Cuba, 
 and described as follows : All that portion of the island of Cuba east of a line 
 passing through Aserradero, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo, 
 and Aguidora, said troops being in command of Gen. Jos^ Toral, agreed upon 
 by the undersigned commissioners : Brig. -Gen. Don Federico Escario, lieuten- 
 ant-colonel of staff; Don Ventura Fontan, and, as interpreter, Mr. Robert 
 Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, com- 
 manding the Spanish forces on behalf of the kingdom of Spain, and Maj.-Gen. 
 Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V.; Maj.-Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V.; and First 
 Lieut. J. D. Miley, Second Artillery, A. D. C. , appointed by General Shaffer, 
 commanding the American forces, on behalf of the United States : 
 
 1. That all hostilities between American and Spanish forces in this dis- 
 trict absolutely and unequivocally cease. 
 
 2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war material in said 
 territory. 
 
 3. That the United States agrees with as little delay as possible to trans- 
 port all the Spanish troops in said district to the kingdom of Spain, the troops 
 being embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrisons they now 
 occupy. 
 
528 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 4. That the officers of the Spanish army be permitted to retain their side 
 arms and both officers and private soldiers their personal property. 
 
 5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American 
 navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the 
 harbor of Santiago and its mouth. 
 
 6. That the commanders of the Spanish forces deliver, without delay, a 
 complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in 
 above-described district to the commander of the American forces ; also a 
 roster of said forces now in said district. 
 
 7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in leaving said district, is 
 authorized to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to 
 the Spanish army now in said district. 
 
 8. That all that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, mov- 
 ilizadoes, and guerrillas who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are permitted 
 to do so upon condition of delivering up their arms and taking a parole not to 
 bear arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war 
 between Spain and the United States. 
 
 9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with 
 honors of war, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed 
 upon, to await their disposition by the United States government, it being 
 understood that the United States commissioners will recommend that the 
 Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended. 
 
 10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become operative 
 immediately upon its being signed. 
 
 Entered into this i6th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned commission- 
 ers, acting under instructions from their respective commanding generals and 
 with the approbation of their respective governments. 
 
 JOSEPH WHEELER, 
 Major-General, United States Volunteers. 
 
 a. W. LAWTON, 
 Major-General, United States Volunteers. 
 J. D. MILEY, 
 First Lieutenant, Second Artillery, A. D. C. to General Shafter. 
 
 FEDERICO ESCARIO. 
 VENTURA FONTAN. 
 ROBERT MASON. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 529 
 
 The President sent this eloquent message of congratulation : 
 
 Washington, D. C, July 16, 1898. 
 General Shafter, Commanding, Front near Santiago, Playa: 
 
 The President of the United States sends to you and your brave army the 
 profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at 
 Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops 
 and territory under General Toral. Your splendid command has endured not 
 only the hardships and sacrifices incident to campaign and battle, but in stress 
 of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome 
 men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most con- 
 spicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation. The hearts of the 
 people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father 
 of Mercies protect and comfort them. WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, 
 Washington, July 17, 1898 — 9:55 a. m. 
 General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba : 
 
 Your telegram saying that our ^ag would be hoisted in Santiago at 9 this 
 morning was received by the President and Secretary of War and members of 
 the Cabinet with a sense of profound satisfaction. This feeling is general 
 with all the people. I hope you are well. 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 Shafter telegraphed Corbin : 
 
 "Upon coming into the city I discovered a perfect entanglement of 
 defenses. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have cost 
 5,000 lives to have taken it." 
 
 Major and Inspector-General Reade reported: 
 
 "Fighting famine and fever extorted from even such a man as Col. Theo- 
 dore Roosevelt the statement: 'Twenty-five per cent of my Rough Riders 
 ■can't carry a pail of water from the creek to the trenches. No man can decry 
 me or my regiments, but we must accede to the next proposition from the 
 enemy. ' One characteristic of our soldiers is their unwillingness to go upon 
 the sick report. The regulars do duty when really not fit to perform it, but 
 they do duty all the same. Regiments have a pride in maintaining on paper 
 a small percentage of sick. ' ' 
 
530 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 General Reade wrote this most interesting account of the raising of the 
 flag of the United States over the Governor's Palace of the ancient capital of 
 Cuba. 
 
 It was 9 o'clock in the morning of July 17th. Within a few feet of Gen- 
 erals Shafter, Wheeler and Kent "were three officers wearing Panama hats, 
 dressed in cotton, having narrow stripes of blue and white; their hats had 
 rosettes on the side, and they wore either top boots of black leather or white 
 canvas slippers," and "a fine looking man with a gray moustache was General 
 Toral, who saluted General Shafter like a graceful, dignified soldier." 
 
 "Just then Lieutenant Miley, Fifth Artillery, aid-de-camp to General 
 Shafter, dashed to the rear, shouting to an orderly to 'Bring up the sword.' 
 After some delay, a sword, having the belt and slings twisted around the hilt, 
 was handed to General Shafter. It was then by him turned over to General 
 Toral. Our trumpets then sounded, after which, by Captain Brett's order, the 
 hundred cavalry executed left front into line, forming in single rank, on our 
 left, facing some dismounted Spanish infantry soldiers, armed with Mauser 
 rifles. The lines were not fifty yards apart. 
 
 " 'Present sabers!' by our cavalry was immediately followed by a like com- 
 pliment by the Spanish. It was then 9:25 o'clock. General Toral shouted 
 out something in Spanish. The Spanish trumpets then sounded a march. 
 We were then told by Mr. A. C. Nunez that the tune was played only for the 
 King of Spain or the Captain-General of Cuba. We were also told that the 
 soldiers facing our cavalry comprised the bodyguard of General Toral. A 
 little later the Spanish infantry forged down the road, eastward, without their 
 rifles, to the point where the Thirteenth Regiment, United States Infantry, 
 received them as prisoners of war. I counted them. Their number was 330. 
 
 "As they filed along I wheeled my horse and noted trifling things. They 
 had to step over the vulture-picked carcass of a horse lying in the road. 
 Across the tall Guinea-Panama grass came the warbling trill of a mocking 
 bird, imitating the 'Plant! plant' chut, chut-a-deel' so familiar to the New 
 England ears. A few hundred feet to the westward, hiding Campo de Marte 
 from sight, the crest was lined with the now empty trenches, from which 
 thousands of guns had belched torrents of lead at the United States lines, 
 after the First Division had assaulted, captured and held Fort San Juan, the 
 principal Spanish stronghold, during the seventeen days of battle and siege^ 
 which had cost us, in killed and wounded, nearly 2,000 officers and men. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 53i 
 
 "All of the Americans were silent for perhaps two or three minutes. After 
 General Toral's surrendered bodyguard had passed us our generals led the 
 way through a gap that had been made in the wire-fence, and we filed out into 
 the road leading to Santiago. In order to get ^here, distance about two miles, 
 we had to pass through the outlying military suburb called Campo de Marte. 
 It is made up entirely of barracks, military storehouses, and hospitals. 
 
 "These latter are very large buildings, and throughout the siege numerous 
 white flags, each having the red cross, sacred to neutrals, had fluttered prom- 
 inently from the roof of every hospital. No doubt the charge will be made 
 that during the siege our forces did not respect, but fired upon and into the 
 buildings displaying the Geneva flag. 
 
 "Thousands of us can testify to two facts: First, that the most damaging 
 battery of artillery of the enemy, one shell from which put eleven men of the 
 Sixteenth United States Infantry out of action, was so located that our return 
 fire imperiled the hospital buildings ; second, that the trenches of the enemy 
 were, in part, directly between these hospital buildings and our own trenches, 
 so that the direct return fire of our infantrj' brought the hospitals, Geneva 
 flags and all, into line. 
 
 "Moreover, in the course of our triumphal entry from the field of surren- 
 der to Santiago, through Campo de Marte, we noted that the hospitals had 
 trenches about them, close in, and the street barricades of tierces filled with 
 earth; also the barbed- wire entanglements were constructed with evident 
 defensive purposes by the enemy if driven from their outer intrenchments. 
 The structures were carefully scanned to see if their plastered surfaces showed 
 any bullet marks. Few indications were observable of bullet impact or pene- 
 tration. 
 
 "The cavalcade of army officers passed Spanish refugees who were wend- 
 ing their way back into town. Most were afoot. A few carretas, two-wheeled 
 vehicles, drawn by a single mule or Cuban pony in shafts, were passed. Some 
 had as many as ten children huddled in one ; only one four-wheeled carriage, 
 a sort of barouche, hauled by a pair of undersized Cuban ponies, contained 
 one or two adults and eight or ten juveniles. The streets are mostly paved 
 and quite. narrow, not wide enough for a field battery of artillery. 
 
 "Santiago is built upon a siding. Some of the houses were built of brick, 
 then plastered; some were built of adobe, or sun-dried brick, and then plas- 
 tered ; some were mud-and-stick houses. Many had, blue fronts. The front 
 
532 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 doors were of double or triple layers of wood studded with nails and of great 
 strength. Many resembled a jail entrance, because supplemented with iron 
 doors. Barred windows were common. Nearly every residence showed both 
 door and window gratings, frojn behind which many women and children 
 peered at us; a few men also peered. Shops were numerous, but the major- 
 ity were closed on July 17. 
 
 "Here and there floated the flag of a foreign consulate. The Spanish flag 
 was not anywhere seen. Soldiers were numerous. At the principal street 
 corners armed sentinels with Mauser rifles were posted. They appeared to be 
 doing police patrol duty. All of the Spanish privates were what we term 
 undersized men. We passed sad-eyed women, scowling-eyed women, and 
 coquettish-eyed women. Many of these latter smiled at the procession of 
 American officers from second-story balconies. As a rule, the women were 
 thin, uncomely, and slatternly; only a few had their hair neatly arranged ; 
 less than five per cent wore mantillas; their faces were more wan than 
 handsome. 
 
 "Absolutely naked children stood in doorways, on the balconies, in win- 
 dows, or in the streets. A general paucity existed of decent clothes or 
 necessities. Numerous starveling cats and kittens .were visible. On the 
 ground porch of one house a burro was lariated to the front door. More 
 negroes, I should call them, than Spaniards were seen. Lines of refugee 
 Cubans, carrying bundles, pails, furniture, even trunks, upon their heads 
 were seen. All appeared to be entering the city, none departing. Perhaps 
 they were of the 15,000 non-combatants who fled from Santiago to avoid the 
 perils of the bombardment. A few, a very few, led or drove poor-looking 
 milch cows. 
 
 "We were impressed by the marked physical contrast between the under- 
 sized, wiry, cotton-clad Spanish soldiers and our men. Nobody braced up, so 
 far as I noticed. I was surprised to see so many well-stocked stores, although 
 the warehouses of the pawnbrokers were more abundantly filled with furniture 
 and other household belongings than any. Santiago has several stores whose 
 shelves display what good judges say are $10,000 worth of general merchandise 
 on sale. There is a hardware store in Santiago de Cuba carrying a $20,000 
 stock of goods. One warehouse had 500,000 pounds of rice in 200-pound 
 sacks. Great quantities of olive oil, mostly in tin cans, are on hand. 
 
 "We had heard such touching tales of the general destitution prevailing in 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 533 
 
 Santiago, as, for instance, that the Spanish soldiers were subsisting on horse 
 meat to avoid starving, that the evidences of sale goods were especially 
 noted. Capt. E. F. Taggart, commissary of subsistence, United States Vol- 
 unteers, also called my attention to a kind of parched barley put up in metal- 
 lined cans. 
 
 "But to resume. Reaching a plaza, the generals dismounted, we of the 
 Staff following suit. All in order of rank entered a large building. For a few 
 minutes we wandered about without let or hindrance. This is what I saw : 
 Tiled floors, marble freshly wet. The floors of the halls and the rooms that 
 I visited were not all alike. Some had black and white tiles alternating. 
 Some of the rooms had planked floors. All of the windows had Venetian 
 shutters. All of the rooms were cool. The windows had lambrequins. There 
 were also portieres, and an abundance of chairs — arm-chairs, cane-seated, and 
 cane-backed. 
 
 "In the great reception room was a life-sized oil painting, probably of some 
 Spanish Queen. Quantities of bamboo furniture, iron-barred windows, glass 
 chandeliers, crystal pendants of the old style, something like mother's can- 
 delabra, marble-topped tables, green-topped tables, irresistibly suggestive of 
 poker, several cheval glasses six feet high outside the frame, and perhaps four 
 feet six inside, were conspicuous. Strolling back, I passed into bedrooms. 
 There were no closed doors. The beds all had canopies. Decorated china 
 toilet sets, eau de quinine, puff boxes, 'Roger Gallet' French soap. 
 
 "Servants were engaged in setting a table for ten. It had a floral center- 
 piece, cut-glass decanters, three sizes of wine-glasses, and the usual china and 
 cutlery appointments of civilization. Later our ranking generals lunched 
 there. An electric push button hung on the wall of the hall. " 
 
 This is ofiicial, and -more, a bit of color, and an admirable pencil painting. 
 
 A little before noon the generals and their respective staffs massed in the 
 Plaza facing the governor's palace. On the roof of the palace were three 
 officers — Lieutenant Miley held the halyards attached to our national flag. It 
 was about the size of the recruiting or storm flag, only shorter. General 
 Chambers McKibben was with a military band behind, and gave the command 
 "Present arms," and the command was repeated by General Breet just as 
 twelve o'clock chimed out of the cathedral clock — the flag, our flag, was raised 
 to the top of the staff, the band played "The Star-Spangled Banner." Three 
 cheers called for by a soldier were given General Shafter. 
 
534 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 The Inspector-General Reade, from wliom we have quoted, writes a shock- 
 ing account of the sick army after its movement when the city surrendered, to 
 get out of the infected camps : 
 
 "The change of camping ground demonstrated sadly the enfeebled condi- 
 tion of our men. They straggled along the roads ; some fell out and pros- 
 trated themselves anywhere where shade could be obtained. Some of General 
 Ames's men, Thirteenth Infantry, completed the march and then dropped 
 unconscious or went crazy. He has a wall tent as his headquarters and for 
 personal occupancy. In that tent he sheltered and cared for several exhausted 
 or delirious privates. He said that during his entire military experience and 
 command, 1861 and succeeding years, he never saw as heavy a percentage of 
 used-up men. Unless more food and a greater variety of food is furnished 
 these soldiers their condition will become pitiable indeed. They also need to 
 be relieved of the necessity of having to travel a mile and a half for a canteen 
 full of water. 
 
 "They have no camp kettles; all were left aboard the transports 25th of 
 last month, and have remained at Siboney, twelve miles from here, ever since. 
 Ditto as to extra clothing. They need better shelter than shelter tents. All 
 canvas beyond what could be carried upon the person was ordered left behind 
 when the army of invasion left the transports. That was June 24th and 2sth. 
 The tents are still on the vessels, and it is much to be hoped that they will be 
 landed at Santiago, together with other supplies. Major McLaughlin, com- 
 manding Sixteenth United States Infantry, says that his men can no longer 
 stomach canned bacon. 
 
 "According to the statement, soldiers vomit at the sight of a label having 
 printed on it the name of Libby or Armour. They lived on it during a sea 
 voyage of eighteen days ; have lived on it since, and now want some nourish- 
 ing food that their stomachs can retain. Major McLaughlin says that he 
 would like vinegar and tobacco for his regiment. Regarding vinegar, 
 Colonel Miner, commanding Sixth United States Infantry, says: 'My men 
 drank what vinegar was issued them like hungry wolves. ' The officer last 
 named says that what is issued as canned beef is refuse from which all nour- 
 ishment has been extracted. Dr. Calhoun says that it is not possible for 
 officers to buy pure lime juice at twenty-seven cents per large bottle. He 
 believes that the article sold by the Subsistence Department as such is 
 injurious. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 535 
 
 "Asst.-Surg. W. D. McCaw, Medical Department, on duty with the Sixth 
 United States Infantry, reports that symptoms of scurvy are showing them- 
 selves in certain fever cases, and asks that issue be made of vinegar, onions, 
 potatoes, tomatoes, etc. Dr. McCaw states that he has not shelter or canvas 
 enough for his sick. Wants cans of beef extract. He predicts that a startling 
 increase in the sick list will occur, due to lack of the essentials, food and rest, 
 and proper clothing. All of the indications sustain this prediction, and the 
 sooner the sick are placed aboard transports, the better. ' ' 
 
 Such was the sad state of United States troops after the Spaniards, made 
 hopeless by the loss of their fleet and overawed by the arrival of our reinforce- 
 ments, surrendered. 
 
 The exchange of observations between General Shafter and Admiral 
 Sampson put a strain on their courtesies as the siege of Santiago was 
 about to terminate. The Secretary of the Navy cabled Sampson that the 
 Commanding General of the army and the Secretary of War requested "that 
 navy force harbor. ' ' The matter was left to the discretion of the Admiral, 
 "except that the United States armored vessels must not be risked. — Long." 
 Sampson cabled that published telegrams of General Shafter reflected on the 
 navy, and added: "I wish the Department and the President to understand 
 that the first requisite to opening harbor of Santiago de Cuba is the occupa- 
 tion of forts and intrenchments at its entrance gTiarding mine fields, and that 
 the general has never made a move to do this, although before his army 
 landed he stated that such was the primary object of his operations. ' ' 
 
 The next thing was the capitulation. Sampson, informed of articles 
 about to be agreed upon, wanted the stipulation added that the Spaniards 
 should remove all torpedoes from the harbor entrance and the harbor itself. 
 Miles had Sampson signal that, he should send ashore an ofiicer to represent 
 him "during negotiations for evacuation. " The use of the word "evacuation" 
 is an indication that Miles did not think unconditional surrender could be 
 exacted. Sampson wished to know when his representative was wanted and 
 where he could get a horse. 
 
 The next signal from shore to flagship was that Santiago had been surren- 
 dered, and then Shafter signaled, "Hitch in negotiations. We may have to 
 fight them yet." July loth Shafter telegraphed "Surrendered," and asked 
 whether a navy representative would be sent, and Miles telegraphed that 
 there was "a little delay," but the Spaniards had surrendered "in a formal. 
 
536 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 positive manner." A copy of the agreement was sent Sampson, who, quoting 
 the Commanding General's communication, says: "The foregoing certainly 
 shows clearly the most absolute joint action, and I took for granted that we 
 should be joint signatories of any capitulations, as is customary in all services 
 in such circumstances." 
 
 The Admiral's representative. Captain Chadwick, " arrived at the front at 
 the earliest hour it was possible for him to do so, and informed General 
 Shaffer of my expectancy in the matter, but General Shaffer peremptorily 
 refused. The convention had already been signed, and he stated as one 
 reason that nothing had been said of the army in my report of the fleet action 
 of July 3d. There would have been as much reason for mentioning the navy 
 in the report of the land action of July ist, when assault was made by our 
 army on the Spanish lines. 
 
 "No mention was made of the shipping in the capitulations, and Captain 
 Chadwick informed General Shaffer that all Spanish ships would be regarded 
 by us as property to be turned over to the navy. He said he would refer such 
 a matter to the Secretary of War, but that, of course, could have no bearing 
 upon what I considered my duty in the matter, particularly in the view of our 
 late experience of Spanish perfidy in regard to injury of ships, which, in my 
 opinion, made it necessary to look after their safety at once. I thus, after the 
 hauling down of the Spanish flag, sent prize crews on board the gunboat 
 Alvarado and to the five merchant steamers in the harbor. An officer of the 
 army was found on board the Alvarado, who stated he had been sent to take 
 charge of her, whereupon I addressed the following letter to General Shafter: 
 
 " 'U. S. Flagship New York, July 17, 1898. 
 " 'Sir: Upon sending in an ofScer to take charge of the captured Spanish 
 gunboat, the Alvarado, it was found that one of your officers was on board, 
 evidently with the expectation of taking charge of her. It should hardly be 
 necessary to remind you that in all joint operations of the character of those 
 which have resulted in the fall of Santiago all floating material is turned over 
 to the navy, as all forts, etc., go to the army. I have been lying within 500 
 yards of the Morro, from which the Spanish flag was hauled down at 9 o'clock 
 and upon which the United States flag has not yet, at 2 p. m., been hoisted. 
 Although my forces have frequently engaged these forts and yours have not 
 exchanged a shot with them, I await the arrival of a detachment of your 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 537 
 
 troops to take possession, as they must eventually occupy them. I expect the 
 same consideration. 
 
 " 'I request that you will relieve Lieutenant Caruthers of the duty given 
 him, as I have directed Lieutenant Marble to assume command of the 
 Alvarado. Very respectfully, etc. ' 
 
 "Early on the morning of the i8th I received from the senior naval 
 officer in the harbor a paper sent him, of which the following is a copy: 
 
 " 'Santiago, July 17, 1898. 
 
 " 'Lieutenant Doyle can keep his men on the ships for the night, and in 
 the morning one of the tugs will get up steam and transfer him with his 
 officers and men to their respective ships. C. McKIBBINS, 
 
 " 'Brigadier-General, Commanding.' " 
 
 The Admiral quoted this, and remarked: 
 
 "I will not enter into any expression of surprise at the reception of such 
 a paper. 
 
 "No mention of the shipping was made in the articles of capitulation, 
 though I specially requested that it be included by my message to you of 
 July 13th. 
 
 "Our operations leading to the fall of Santiago have been joint, so directed 
 by the President and so confirmed by their character. All propriety and 
 usage surrenders the floating material in such cases to the naval force, and I 
 have taken possession of it. 
 
 "I am unable to recognize the authority of the Secretary of War over my 
 actions. I have telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy and await his 
 instructions. 
 
 "In the event of a difference of opinion between the departments, the 
 question will, of course, be decided by the President of the United States; 
 until then my prize crews must remain in charge, and I have so directed. 
 "Very respectfully, 
 
 "W. T. SAMPSON, Rear Admiral U. S. N. 
 "Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
 
 "Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shafter, U. S. V., 
 "Commanding Fifth Army Corps." 
 
 Shafter's explanation of his refusal to allow a naval officer's signature on 
 the capitulation agreement is this : 
 
538 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 "Santiago, August i, 1898. 
 "I do not acknowledge the authority of the Secretary of the Navy in the 
 matter in which you wire me. The surrender of Santiago was made to me by 
 General Toral in person, in surrendering verbally all the prisoners and public 
 property of Spain in the district commanded by him, and I accepting the 
 same in the presence of troops representing all the respective armies. The 
 details fer carrying this into effect were arranged by three commissioners on 
 each side. These articles were signed by the respective commissioners in 
 duplicate, one copy of handed to General Toral and the other was sent by me 
 to the Secretary of War. Neither General Toral nor myself signed them. 
 Certainly could not and would not permit these articles to any officer for 
 signature, my own not being affixed, and I shall protest to the Secretary of 
 War against your signature to that document. I respectfully invite your 
 attention to the fact that no claim for any credit for the capture of Cervera and 
 his fleet has been made by the army, although it is a fact the Spanish fleet did 
 not leave the harbor until the investment of the city was practically completed, 
 and Cervera had sufficient losses on land on July 1 and 2, notably among 
 them his chief of staff. W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General." 
 
 The President's proclamation of the i8th of July was of a character that 
 
 gives it permanent interest. It is the foundation of the policy of the 
 
 government of the United States with respect to Cuba, which is by the treaty 
 
 of peace with Spain our military possession. President McKinley's declaration 
 
 is as follows : 
 
 "Adjutant-General's Office, 
 
 "Washington, July 18, 1898 — 6:30 p. m. 
 "General Shafter, Santiago, Cuba: 
 
 "The following is sent you for your information and guidance. It will 
 . be published in such manner in both English and Spanish as will give it the 
 widest circulation in the territory under your control : 
 " 'To the Secretary of War: 
 
 " 'Sir: The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in 
 the eastern part' of the province of Santiago, and the occupation of the 
 territory by the forces of the United States, render it necessary to instruct 
 the military commander of the United States as to the conduct which he is to 
 observe during the military occupation. 
 
 " 'The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 541 
 
 e severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the estab- 
 hment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things, the 
 habitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in 
 eir persons and property, and in all their private rights and relations. It is 
 y desire that the inhabitants of Cuba should be acquainted with the purpose 
 
 the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this 
 gard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the army of occupa- 
 )n to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not to 
 ake war upon the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any party or faction among 
 em, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their 
 irsonal and religfious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by 
 )uest submission, cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give 
 feet to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and 
 •otection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible. 
 
 " 'Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, 
 id immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the 
 unicipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of 
 frson and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered 
 1 continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of 
 tings, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; 
 id in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in 
 irce, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they 
 ere before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, 
 
 be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials 
 innected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the supremacy 
 
 the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land, as 
 :tween man and man, under the supervision of the American commander- 
 -chief. The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable, be pre- 
 rved. The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations 
 ill be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so. 
 
 " 'While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be 
 ch as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a 
 fferent kind, if, unfortunately, the course of the people should render such 
 easures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then 
 issess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether, 
 
 substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or to 
 
542 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the 
 exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judg- 
 ment and his experience and a high sense of justice. 
 
 " 'One of the most important and most practical problems with which it 
 will be necessary to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection 
 and administration of the revenues. It is conceded that all public funds and 
 securities belonging to the government of the country in its own right, and all 
 arms and supplies and other movable property of such government, may be 
 seized by the military occupant and converted to his awn use. The real 
 property of the State he may hold and administer, at the same time enjoying 
 the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military 
 necessity. All public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines, 
 cables, railways, and boats belonging to the State may be appropriated to 
 his use, but unless in case of militaiy necessity they are not to be destroyed. 
 All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and 
 sciences, all school houses, are, as far as possible, to be protected, and all 
 destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of hist(irical monuments, 
 or of archives, or of works of science or art, is prohibited, save when required 
 by urgent military necessity. 
 
 " 'Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to 
 be respected, and can be configcated only for cause. Means of transportation, 
 such as telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats. May, although they 
 belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military 
 occupant, but, unless destroyed under military necessity, are not to be 
 retained. 
 
 " 'While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions 
 upon the enemy in their seaports, towns, or provinces which may be in his 
 military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the 
 expense of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that 
 it may not savor of confiscation. As the result of military occupation the 
 taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become 
 payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to substitute for them 
 other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government. The 
 moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of 
 government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of the judges 
 and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 543 
 
 " 'Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for, when 
 possible, in cash at a fair valuation; and when payment in cash is not 
 possible receipts are to be given. 
 
 " 'All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of 
 our land and naval forces will be opened to the commerce of all neutral 
 nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, upon payment 
 of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of 
 importation. 
 
 '"WILLIAM McKINLEY.' 
 
 "By order Secretary of War: 
 
 "H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General." 
 
 The Spanish soldiers surrendered at Santiago by General Toral with the 
 approval of Captain-General Blanco and the Spanish government outnumbered 
 two to ohe the combined armies of Burgoyne and Comwallis surrendered at 
 Saratoga and Yorktown, and were a larger force than was engaged on either 
 side in our two wars with England, and forty per cent greater than the 
 armies of Taylor that crossed the Rio Grande and won at Monterey and 
 Buena Vista; and of Scott, the conqueror of the city of Mexico, who unfurled 
 over the "Halls of the Montezumas" the flag that now floats at Havana. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 The Joint Work of the Army and Navy at Manila. 
 
 The Reasons Why Admiral Dewey Remained After Destroying the Spanish Fleet— "Why 
 there Was Not a Slaughter at Manila Like that at Santiago— The Old Fort that Was the 
 Key of the City — Tlie American Army Drove the Spaniards and Dusted the Insurgents 
 Out of the Way— A Very Neat Job— We Did Not Make W^ on the Spaniards for the 
 Sake of the Tagalos. 
 
 « 
 We have seen in the official communications by cable between the 
 
 Secretary of the Navy of the United States and the Commander of the 
 American fleet on the Asiatic station, that before the declaration of war 
 there were forceful and particular preparations to strike a blow at the 
 Spaniards in the East Indies as soon as the war hurricane broke in the West 
 Indies. The great possessions of Spain in Asian waters seemed almost 
 literally at the end of the world, and were little known. The duty confided 
 to Admiral George Dewey was first the protection of American commevce 
 with China and Japan from the Spanish squadron known to be maintained at 
 Manila, and in the .channels and harbors of the Philippines, and it was 
 strongly expressed over the wires from Washington to the squadron of U. S. 
 cruisers at anchor in Hongkong harbor that the way to defend our commerce 
 on the other side of the globe, was to destroy the Spanish war ships. 
 
 There was extraordinary energy in the Navy Department. Mr. Long, 
 the Secretary, is a man of high attainments and forecasting intellect. He 
 had for Assistant Secretary, Governor Theodore Roosevelt of New York, who 
 was a grizzly-bear killer before he was a Rough Rider; and indeed the 
 strong, keen and brilliant character that was a dominant factor in the admin- 
 istration, of the Navy, itself a high school of heroes. 
 
 Admiral Dewey was substantially instructed to clear for action and strike 
 the squadron of Spain before the declaration of war. "Fill np with coal — 
 the best to be had, ' ' was the first order issued that had the ring of battle 
 
 544 
 
TREE UNDER WHICH SUEKENDER OP SPANISH FORCES AT SANTIAGO WAS MADE. 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 547 
 
 thunder in it. Coal is even more essential in providing a war ship for active 
 service, than gunpowder. There is no more inert mass of matter than a 
 battleship without steam. With coal steam can be raised, and the ponderous 
 structure of iron becomes a thing of life that parts the waters with enormous 
 power, and drives through stormy seas, an engine of wrath and violence, 
 crushing whatever floats in its way, but the utmost accurate range of a 
 rifle is half a dozen miles. 
 
 "Fill up with coal — the best to be had" is a good phrase, the very thing 
 for a beginning. It was followed up and the Spanish Asiatic fleet in a fevr 
 days passed away. It will be a welcome task, for Americans to tell the story 
 of the glory of the battle of the Bay of Manila, for the gallant Dewey and 
 his captains bold, and sailors and gunners, and all the officers and crews, 
 the Chinese waiters included, who waited on the boys at the flaming guns 
 with ammunition as cheerfully as they served the tables at one time — but we 
 have to recite another story now. 
 
 When Admiral Dewey left Hongkong he had no home for his ships 
 nearer than San Francisco. He had no boarding house, no tavern in which 
 he could take his time and his ease. He found himself on the evening of the 
 first of May destroyer of a fleet, the conqueror of a broad bay with heavy 
 batteries still frowning upon him from the shores, a great city held by an 
 army of thirteen thousand men amply armed under his guns, a litter of 
 wrecks where the fleet of his enemies had been, his own command less 
 numerous than the crews of the ships he had annihilated and his ammunition 
 seriously reduced by hours of rapid firing, it being one of the. characteristics 
 of war ships that they consume stores of powder, shells and bolts at a rate 
 never in old times thought possible. 
 
 What should he do? Run to Singapore and be permitted to take coal 
 enough to move him to the next port and so on home, getting into American 
 waters in two months, leaving a lot of Spanish gunboats known to be hidden 
 about the islands to go out and prey upon our commerce? Or would it be 
 the better way to hold the Bay of Manila, make it a place of shelter for his 
 fleet and a base of operations, implying as the situation did, that we had 
 gained command of a group of islands extensive as New York, Pennsylvania 
 and New Jersey, one of them more spacious than the State of Ohio, the 
 group rich as our Gulf States? The Admiral of course remained, and announc- 
 ing that he would lay waste the city if again fired on, established a con- 
 
54.8 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 
 
 dition that was satisfactory until the re-enforcements, the ships, provisions, 
 coal and fixed ammunition cabled for after the Spanish fleet was removed, 
 arrived. 
 
 The alternative to go away and allow the Spanish gunboats to do us a 
 great mischief was not chosen. The Admiral could have proceeded to Singapore 
 and cabled for further orders, but it was cheaper and stronger to stay, hold 
 Cavite, use the insurgents to employ the Spaniards, protect our interests as a 
 nation, and "possess" what his artillery dominated. The Administration did 
 not order him to sail away from islands equal in soil, climate, minerals, fruits 
 and agricultural productions to all the West Indies. The Admiral saw no 
 departure from duty in the service of a Republican government, in a conquest. 
 As for the government of the people by a majority of the heads or hands shown 
 we cannot profess to do that indiscriminately, and never have done so. We 
 depend upon votes, but it is desirable to mix votes with brains before casting 
 them, and to measure the rights of the people by the American standard, 
 and base the qualifications of statehood in an indissoluble union, upon 
 Arnerican manhood. 
 
 The Admiral had to stay at Manila, and he was glad to stay. He .could 
 not in honor get away, either to leave the Spaniards in possession, or to turn 
 over the civilized communities to the insurgents, whose first idea was to 
 avenge in a few months the wrongs that had been endured for centuries. The 
 United States is like the Admiral. It has a duty to preserve order until there 
 appears a people capable of caring for themselves and governing themselves. 
 Those who have that capacity will not begin the redemption of their race by 
 acts of barbarism — neither of robbery, nor brutal destructiveness. The same 
 class of people who were always distressed by more territory, terrified because 
 they were so much superior to others that the country ought to be small and 
 select for their special use and fashioned according to their personal 
 peculiarities, which were not of generous proportions, grieved over Dewey's 
 protection of his own and the national honor. 
 
 We have a territorial system that will serve excellently as a colonial 
 system, for the assimilation of elements from regions remote, and we can 
 govern them through our executive and legislative dep^artments with such 
 measure of military force as may be necessary to preserve peace and 
 promote tendencies to civilization. There is no hurry about more states. 
 Indeed it would be a sound conservation to refuse henceforth to organize 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY. AND NAVY AT MANILA. 549 
 
 territories into states, unless they are so Americanized as to come into our 
 Union so naturally that opposition would be to antagonize ourselves and 
 assail the precedents that are behind our laws and customs. 
 
 The President of the United States has sustained Admiral Dewey and 
 honored him at every step, from the first day of the war when they made 
 their acquaintance intimate over the cable, but he reserved one decision until 
 he was able to consult public opinion. That was what we should do with the 
 Philippines when the time came to make the treaty that must follow the war 
 with Spain. All questions were settled in the Protocol but that of the Spanish 
 East Indies. That was absolutely but not expressly referred to the matured 
 judgment of the citizens of the United States and the result was the decision 
 that we should hold the islands. There are but few against the verdict. If 
 there had been a popular vote on it the majority would have been ten 
 millions to keep the prize so gallantly won. Those opposed to raising 
 the objections are, the survivals of the antique ideas of the delightful 
 symmetry of small countries and the delicious refinement of little things, 
 and in addition there are those who think that they can gain something by the 
 vulgarity of figuring on the twenty millions of indemnity to Spain, the 
 expense of three weeks of war ; and there is the soft, flabby demagogy of 
 suffering for the sake of the people we have relieved from the Spanish yoke. 
 
 The line that we draw is that we are quite prepared to consent to the 
 government of Cuba by Cubans and of the Philippines by the Filipinos, but 
 we hold they would improve rapidly in the art of government by the 
 experience of liberty under our guidance. We shall not fight them as against 
 self-government, but they must not fall prey to a class of Spaniards inferior to 
 those who fought for Spain, and of Malay chiefs, whose vanity, inflamed by 
 possible prosperity and modified by material aid, is conspicuous with gilt and 
 titles of distinction. We want to find the real people of the islands of 
 Cuba and Luzon, and others, and we have not evidence that Aguinaldo and 
 Gomez are men of the people. They are powerful in letters and proclamations 
 that have the tropical features of literature, so floridly tinctured that it 
 needs, to assume a wholesome aspect, to be tinged with the tones and 
 strengthened with the American air of the North Temperate Zone. 
 
 We are content that the islanders in question shall have the government 
 that pleases them, as soon as they shew that they have a people whose 
 policy has not been that of firebugs, and ravenous seekers of spoil. There 
 
5SO WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 
 
 are people in Cuba and Luzon; let them step to the front. Distinction ii 
 superstition or accomplishment in assassination are not sufficient to constrai 
 the United States to set up mutual administration and speculation societie 
 of insurgents as a ruling class who shall govern over us as "well as th 
 Cubans and the Filipinos. This insufficiency is not held in favor by thos 
 who studied the art of government in swamps and the thorny underbrush c 
 the wilderness. Those both in Cuba and Luzon who are threatening us wit 
 guerrilla warfare, if we do not submit to their presumption, appear, as the wa 
 manifested, to have voracity for the official privileges the Spaniards enjoyed 
 and would be willing, in consideration of our war of humanity, to aid us in 
 zealous and lucrative manner to carry on the government of the Unite 
 States. 
 
 The elementary principles of the policy of expansion, are to improve th 
 opportunities that occur for the appropriation of more land for the people 
 our people — we the people of the United States. George Dewey held th 
 prize he won and William McKinley has sustained him handsomely for th 
 sake of the people, and the people will stand with them while there is Ian 
 for labor and power for guns. 
 
 Admiral Dewey knew General Merritt was coming. He had helpe 
 Aguinaldo against the Spaniards, but had ignored or opposed his fantasti 
 pretensions. Then the insurgent chief was pleased to be, in the language o 
 the Admiral, "threatening" toward Americans. The chief is surrounded b 
 a queer assortment of fanatics, some of whom hold that he has a "charm 
 that makes him proof against bullets and poison, but he has to obtain th 
 consent of certain persons before he can do anything. The great grievanc 
 against the Americans by the insurgents was, after the Spaniards surrendere 
 Manila, that they were not allowed to enter the town in triumph and indulg 
 the passions of revenge and looting. 
 
 They had been boasting that they could take Manila, but that was not i 
 their power. It was the fleet of the United States in the bay that allowe 
 the insurgents to blockade the city. It was the fleet too, that by drawin 
 the line between the city and Forte 'Malate, preserving the former am 
 crushing the latter, broke the Spanish line of defense without such loss of lif 
 as occurred at Santiago. We were the master of Manila with a loss sma 
 compared with the experience of carrying trenches in Cuba, because the^av 
 forced the mouth of the harbor and made an end of the fleet in the bay wit! 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 551 
 
 out hanning the city In storming the Spanish lines after the naval bombard- 
 ment had cleared the entrance by the shore, the Arnerican forces were 
 about one-third the Spaniards and Filipinos counted together. With two 
 divisions of our troops engaged, one drove the Spanish and the other held 
 back the insurgents. It was a divided duty and a double job, and an 
 altogether artistic and effective piece of work. This event took place, it will 
 be remembered, after the Protocol negotiated by the French Minister had 
 been signed, but before knowledge of peace had reached the Oriental seat of 
 war. 
 
 One of the dangers in sending an American army across the Pacific was 
 that there were loose Spanish gunboats, that might attack transports that 
 were without convoys or effective batteries and crowded with troops. 
 When the peril was realized, there were in several instances rifled cannon 
 mounted on deck and men trained to handle the guns. General Greene pre- 
 pared the China in her voyage out to Manila with rifles that it was believed 
 would stand off a gunboat, and the same provision was made on the boat that 
 carried Major General Otis, who had an artillery company of regulars on board, 
 but the steamers with the soldiers, while stanch in encountering bad weather, 
 were frail vehicles to be extemporized for ships of war. The voyages 
 were according to orders on lines easily followed. This cable will explain 
 the method: 
 
 Washington, June 27, 1898. 
 Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong: 
 
 The Monadnock sailed June 25 from San Francisco, accompanied by collier 
 Nero. Was ordered to proceed at utmost speed safely possible, and stops as 
 short as possible, and to make the best of way to a point 600 nautical miles 
 east true from Cape Engano, and thence to run to the west true until up to 
 Cape Engano. If then she has not received from j'^ou a message to the 
 contrary, she will proceed at once to Manila. This enables you to meet the 
 Monadnock or to send a message to her within 600 nautical miles of Cape 
 Engano, if you desire to do so. Furthermore, General Merritt's third division 
 of transports will leave about June 27 from San Francisco with about 4,000 
 men and not convoyed, but he has been advised to make and to sail the 
 600 knots east and west line as described for the Monadnock. 
 
 LONG. 
 
 The Spaniards were not enterprising, and there was no danger visibly 
 
552 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 
 
 threatened. Admiral Dewey was kept well advised of the movement of 
 reenforcements. The Secretary of the Navy cabled him June i8th: "Second 
 division of the army expedition, about 3,500 men, in four steamers, sailed 
 from San Francisco [at] noon on June 15. The army estimates they wiU 
 make average speed 10 knots per hour, and touch two days at Honolulu. 
 Sustained sea speed seems doubtful." 
 
 June 25th the Secretary cabled Dewey via Hongkong: "Second army 
 division. Gen. F. V. Greene commanding, left San Francisco to touch at 
 Honolulu and Guam. Estimated to arrive at Guam July 10 and expects to 
 meet convoying vessel from you at Guam. If practicable, send one. If you 
 cannot do, then charter vessel and send naval officer Guam. Inform com- 
 manding officer expedition to come to Engano or Manila without convoy. 
 The War Department states Greene would not touch Guam, but now 
 announces he will touch there." 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy cabled: 
 
 "The Spanish fleet from Cadiz passed Cape Bon, going to the east, June 
 22, 3 p. m. Expected to go to Manila. Comprise Pelayo, Emperor Carlos 
 V. , three torpedo-boat destroyers, three auxiliary armed steamers, and seven 
 transports. In all 15 sail. 
 
 "Monterey and the collier sailed [for] Manila from San Diego on June 11. 
 The Monadnock and the collier will follow June 20 if possible. Could not you 
 have a vessel at Hongkong to receive notice concerning Spanish fleet 
 passing Suez?" 
 
 June 29th Long wired to Dewey as follows: "The different re- 
 en Corcements sent to you are as follows: First army detachment and the 
 Charleston sailed May 21 from San Francisco via Honolulu and Guam. 
 Estimated sea speed, 10 knots. The Monterey sailed June 11 from San Diego, 
 Cal., via Honolulu and Guam, probably estimated sea speed, 10 knots per 
 hour. The Monadnock sailed June 25 from San Francisco for Honolulu and 
 then direct. Estimated sea speed, 6 knots per hour, perhaps more. Third 
 army detachment sailed June 27 from San Francisco; was recommended to 
 go direct. Squadron under Watson, the Iowa and Oregon, the Yankee and 
 the Dixie, the Newark and the Yosemite, and four colliers preparing with 
 all possible dispatch to start for Spanish coast. The Spaniards know this." 
 
 Twenty thousand tons of coal were reported to be aboard supply vessels 
 for the war boats announced to Dewey June 27th in these terms: 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 553 
 
 "Camara's fleet arrived off Port Said June 26, and is reported by our agent 
 there as follows: Pelayo, Carlos V., Audaz, Osada, Proserpina, Patriota, 12 
 guns, and three unarmed transports, Colon, Covadonga, and San Francisco. 
 They will coal immediately — to be supplied by Cory Brothers, whose agents 
 are Savon Bazui. " 
 
 There was according to all appearances a serious line of business in this 
 movement, but it evaporated. Dewey's purpose was to evacuate the harbor at 
 Manila if the Spanish fleet, too strong to fight without getting the worst of it, 
 should pass into the China Sea and reach the Babujan Islands north of 
 Luzon. Long's cable to Dewey July ist is proof of this. 
 
 General Merritt, Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine expedition, sailed 
 from San Francisco June 29th and arrived at Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25th. 
 General Thomas M. Anderson was in command of the United States troops 
 up to that time, his headquarters being in Cavite. General F. V. Greene 
 with his brigade was encamped along the bay near the village of Paranague, 
 "about five miles by water and twenty-five miles by the roads from Cavite, 
 and a strip as described by General Merritt, "of sandy land running parallel 
 to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the 
 great difficulties of landing supplies, the greater portion of the force had 
 shelter tents only and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being 
 situated in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun 
 or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at 
 this season. ' ' 
 
 General Merritt was "at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient, 
 even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circum- 
 stances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American 
 soldiers, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary hardships of the 
 work they have undertaken to do, has grown and increased with every phase 
 of the difficult arid trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine 
 expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion." 
 
 The General found that the left or north flank of Greene's command 
 "extended to a point on the 'Calle Real,' about 3,200 yards from the outer 
 line of Spanish defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at 
 the powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of 
 the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched 
 away to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, through 
 
554 WORK OF THE ,ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 
 
 swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the .town ai 
 encircling the city completely." 
 
 This fact was the key of the defensive position of the Spaniards and the 
 lines were formidable. There were marshes, rice fields and trenches, and.mt 
 barricades, and the advance would have to be over open ground, covers 
 completely by the Spanish rifle fire. The position of the Spaniards w; 
 stronger than that of Santiago, for here they were well protected ar 
 storming columns could not be sheltered in the least, but the old fort by tl 
 seaside was not tenable under the fire of the American fleet. As to Gener 
 Aguinaldo, whose forces had surrounded the city with irregular skirmis 
 lines, and who was publishing proclamations of independence and belief th; 
 he was about to capture Manila, he seems to have thought it was General Me 
 ritt's. object in coming to place the United States army at the disposition i 
 the insurgent Junta. General Merritt says in his official report that at tl 
 time of his arrival "the entire edifice of executive and legislative departmei 
 and subdivision of territory for administrative purposes had been accomplishe 
 at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many poin 
 in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila. 
 
 ' ' As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his servic( 
 as subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President ful 
 contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, ar 
 state that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme ar 
 immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, ' I did m 
 consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leadi 
 until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would m 
 until then be in position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, : 
 the event that his pretensions should clash- with my designs. 
 
 "For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city we: 
 pressed and military operations conducted without reference to the situatic 
 of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of thi§ course was subsequently ful 
 established by the fact that when the troops of m}"- command carried tl 
 Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road, on the e: 
 treme Spanish right, we v/ere under no obligations, by prearranged plans 
 mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the insu 
 gents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city ai 
 suburbs." 
 
EIFT IN THE JUNGLES THAT LINE THE COAST OF THE PHILIPPINES. 
 
 ROADWAY IN BOTANICAL GARDENS, MANILA. 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 557 
 
 EEDDCED FEOM OFFICIAL PLAN PEEPAEED BY WAE DEPAETMENT. 
 
5SS WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 
 
 At the part of the defenses of Manila that must be carried to possess tl: 
 city, the insurgents were gathered in considerable numbers and had impe 
 fectly intrenched themselves, occupying space that they had not the cap; 
 bility of using offensively. Under General Merritt's instructions Gener; 
 Greene, by finesse and crowding, dispossessed the Filipinos from the grounc 
 they could not use with decisive advantage, and advanced the trenches, comin 
 into sharp conflict with the Spaniards, who used at Santiago the Mauser an 
 Remington rifles, the former especially with smokeless powder, and there wei 
 no men so brave as not to admit that when under this fire the tingling wh: 
 of the projectiles was "very disagreeable." 
 
 The expenditure of cartridges by the Spaniards was a surprise, but th 
 astonishment cleared up when they finally surrendered 22,000 stand of arn 
 and 10,000,000 cartridges. The usual supposition that the Spaniards were o 
 the point of starvation was contradicted by the presence of large quantities c 
 rice. ■ The fatal flaw of the Spanish position, the one that demoralized thei 
 so that they were even intimidated by the insurgents, was, that the city we 
 under the guns of the American fleet. If they opened their batteries for th 
 defense of Manila on our fleet, they knew the shells from our heavy ship-gur 
 would fire the, town ; and they were also aware that our gunners had th 
 range of objects in the city, the walled city in particular, so that they coulc 
 as one of them said, "aim at the batteries on the point and hit the Arcl 
 bishop's'palace every shot." 
 
 Nothing had escaped the vigilance and studious observation of our navi 
 officers. The commander of each ship had his orders in case the signal! 
 destroy Manila was made, and knew the spot where he was to go, and tli 
 angle at which the guns were to be fired and the direction the shells wei 
 to take to sweep the streets and smash buildings. There was apparent! 
 nothing out of the sight of Admiral Dewey. The Spaniards were guided i 
 their treatment of him by their experience with him. They judged what I 
 would do by what he had done. He had an understanding with them that i 
 long^as the ships were not fired upon he would not shell the city, and this wi 
 construed during the siege by American troops, to mean that the fightin 
 ashore was exempt from attention by the Lavetta battery and the fleet. Th 
 was no secret. Everybody knew all about it, except some of the repoi 
 ers who interpreted the old peace basis Dewey had established, to mean the: 
 was a bargain between the armies that the fighting was to be a sham, ai 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 559 
 
 '2l=,.t..iy,. 
 
 EEDTJCED FROM OFFICUL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT. 
 
s6o WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 
 
 therefore the figfht a fake. The old convention was not disturbed and tha 
 was all. The Spaniards fought all they could. 
 
 General Greene had entered actively into the work of opening trenche 
 to drive out the Spaniards and found he was' losing men in the long rang( 
 Mauser fire, and that at the same time the troops were harassed exceedingh 
 by the torrents of rain to which they were exposed, and he became iippatien 
 for the action of the navy. General Merritt sympathized with him and officeri 
 waited upon Admiral Dewey to urge opening fire upon the enemy by th( 
 ships of war. The army and navy are sometimes sensitive as to their relative 
 rights and duties, as there is but one man, the President, whose authority tc 
 command both is given in the Constitution of the United States itself, and 
 Admiral Dewey was not approached to invite his immediate cooperation in 
 the manner to which he was accustomed. There was no serious disagree- 
 ment, but a rub, not of flint and steel, but of two edges of steel, slight but 
 distinct. General Greene, one of the old friends of the Admiral, was able tc 
 make an adjustment that was satisfactory to all. The leading feature was 
 that the combined action of the army and navy should be defined for the per- 
 fection of a giant plan, and meantime, if the position of our troops was 
 endangered, and General Greene burned a blue light as arranged, the fleet 
 should proceed to bombard the town. The emergency did not arrive. 
 
 The surrender of Manila was demanded, that the foreign residents and 
 women and children might find places of safety. The Spanish answer was a 
 refusal to submit, but an admission that the non-combatants had no place 
 to go. This was correctly interpreted, that the Spanish officers were aware of 
 their helplessness, but felt that they must make a show of fight in deference 
 to public and official opinion at home. It was the same notion that had 
 possessed the Spanish officers when they were in the act of surrendering San- 
 tiago, to be so pathetic in their insistence that they should have their arms 
 shipped with them. 
 
 When General Merritt had 8,500 men in position he thought the time bad 
 come to strike and had a meeting with the Admiral. The correspondence 
 followed relative to the capitulation of Manila, and a joint note by Merritt and 
 Dewey opened it. Merritt, when the wording of the letter was discussed, 
 proposed to give time to get the non-combatants out of the way of harm, or the 
 city at a given hour be bombarded. This, was changed by the Admiral with 
 the cheerful consent of the General to read that "the defenses" of the city 
 
H 
 W 
 H 
 
 W 
 O 
 > 
 D 
 
 O 
 H 
 
 a 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 563 
 
 REDUCED FEOM OFFICIAL PLAN PEEPAEED BY WAE DEPARTMENT. 
 
S64 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 
 
 wouW be bombarded. This kept up the truce as to the pacific attitude of th 
 fleet and the city batteries with respect to each other. General Merril 
 officially says : "The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situate 
 that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, an 
 as the bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick an 
 wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property, could only b 
 justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and mysel 
 that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish lin 
 of intrenchments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops 
 which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy 
 
 "It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case th 
 enemy should hold it in strong force, until the navy had made practicabl 
 breaches in the works and shaken the troops holding them, which could not b 
 done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. This is indi 
 Gated fully in the orders and memorandum of attack hereto appended. It wa 
 believed, however, as most desirable, and in accordance with the principles o 
 civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out o 
 his entrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city. 
 
 'About 9 a. m. on that day our fleet steamed forward from Cavite am 
 before lo a. m. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fir 
 projectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powde 
 magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in position in ou 
 trenches near the 'Calle Real,' began firing with great accuracy." 
 
 At 10:25 a. m. the fleet had done its work, so that when our troop 
 advanced at that hour the fort, which was the key of the city, was foun( 
 deserted ; also the flanking trenches, but the second line of the Spaniards wa 
 defended for a few minutes, and among our men killed was the soldier wh^ 
 pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own 
 General Merritt records his "appreciation of the admirable manner in whicl 
 the orders for attack and the plan of occupation of the city were carried ou 
 by the troops exactly as contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter unde 
 fire a town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all principa 
 points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing fo 
 admission, to quietly disarm an army of Spaniards more than equal in num 
 bers to the American troops, and finally by- all this to prevent entirely al 
 rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 565 
 
 city of 300,000 people, filled with natives hostile to European interests, and 
 stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside 
 trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate, resolute Ameri- 
 can soldier, well and skillfully handled by his regimental and brigade com- 
 manders, could accomplish." 
 
 The insurgents were "dusted out of the way," and there was developed 
 among them a good deal of resentment. Three days after the Spaniards had 
 surrendered, the final article of the capitulation being: 
 
 "This city, its inhabitants, its churches, and religious worship, its educa- 
 tional establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed 
 under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army. ' ' 
 That is to say, on the i6th the President's proclamation directing a suspension 
 of hostilities was cabled. 
 
 The casualties in the Army of the United States during the operations 
 before Manila were seventeen enlisted men killed, ten officers and ninety-six 
 enlisted men wounded. The insurgents were much irritated because they were 
 not permitted to be joint occupants of the city. They have continued their 
 false pretenses of ability to capture Manila, but the only thing to say of 
 that is that it would be extremely discreditable to the military spirit of the 
 Spaniards that they, when equal in numbers to the native assailants, allowed 
 themselves to be driven into Manila, holding only the suburbs, but for the 
 facts the Filipinos had been supplied with arms by the Americans and allowed 
 to help themselves at the arsenals of Cavite to cannon and ammunition, and the 
 Spaniards were aware when their fleet was destroyed and our fleet anchored 
 in the bay and reinforcements had arrived, that the Americans were masters 
 of the situation. The Spaniards were disheartened by the fire of the Ameri- 
 can fleet on the first of May, which was more rapid, certain and crushing than 
 they imagined possible. It was this special dejected condition of the Span- 
 iards and their general weakness on the offensive that caused them to permit 
 the insurgents to press upon them and at last forced surrender. 
 
 It was necessary to suppress the Filipinos in their ardent desire to assume 
 the role of conquerors at the expense of the Americans, precisely as it has 
 been required by common sense and decent humanity to chill the tropical 
 temper of the alleged Cuban army, since their bombardment of Havana 
 by Key West reports of fake fights was extinguished by the news of 
 the surrender of the Spanish armies and the obliteration of Spanish 
 
S66 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 
 
 fleets by the American army and navy on the shores of Cuba — the Cuban 
 looking on. 
 
 General Merritt's proclamation to the people of the Philippines was ; 
 document concerning the construction of which the Filipinos were not con 
 suited. The General used this language assuring "the people" of the island 
 — not alone the army that was of far more considerable force than appeared ti 
 represent the Cuban ' ' Nation, ' ' when they were excited to do military work- 
 but all the peaceably disposed people, that "so long as they preserve the peao 
 and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States the; 
 will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may b' 
 found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and th^ 
 benefit of the people of the Philippines." 
 
 Here are the paragraphs of promise in the proclamation : 
 
 "The government esta"blished among you by the United States is ; 
 government of military occupation and for the present it is ordered that th^ 
 municipal laws, such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulat 
 local institutions and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considere( 
 as continuing in force so far as is compatible with the purposes of militar 
 government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunal 
 substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the govern 
 ment of occupation. 
 
 "The Port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the Philippine 
 which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces, will b^ 
 open, while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of al 
 neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, an( 
 upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at th' 
 time of the importation. ' ' 
 
 There is a likeness between the disturbance of mind of General Aguin 
 aldo at Manila and that of General Garcia at Santiago, a great difference ti 
 note in the men. Both Aguinaldo and Garcia wanted to participate as repre 
 sentatives of an independent power in an American triumph. Also the; 
 desired to figure in the procession, to participate in the ceremonies, to pu 
 their names into the papers as parties to the transaction. 
 
 The insurgents wanted at Manila and Santiago, after an almost impercef 
 tible show of themselves in the fields during the sieges, to have a joint occtj 
 pation. General Garcia expected to be Governor of Santiago, Gener£ 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 567 
 
 Aguinaldo would be dictator at Manila. In the two cities the military 
 supremacy of the United States tolerated no companionship. The Americans 
 had conqtiered in Cuba and Luzon, and divided authority and responsibility 
 with no pretenders to statesmanship, given to proclamations as in the Philip- 
 pines ; and not even a character heroic as that of Garcia could be made an ex- 
 ception to an imperative and inviolable rule. 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 The Porto Rico Campaign. 
 
 The Preliminary Plans and Movements of General Miles — Sharp but Courteous Correspom 
 ence with General Shafter, Closing Cuban Experiences — Place of Landing in Por 
 Rico Changed at Sea — The Progress of the Campaign Ended by the Peace News — Tl 
 Constant and Conclusive Success of the American Arms — Some of the Cablegrams thi 
 Passed that Remain of Historical Interest. 
 
 We have been at pains to trace the plans and the movements of the Majc 
 General Commanding from the earliest evolutions of campaigns in his min 
 to the surrender of Santiago, and we have found that he began with the idea c 
 thoroughly preparing a great army of fifty thousand in a mass, to be suj 
 ported by a Cuban auxiliary force of equal number and reinforcements £ 
 might be required. It was in the General's view absolutely necessary to kee 
 the main body of our troops out of Cuba until the rainy season was over an 
 the virulence of the yellow fever had abated. This meant the commencemei 
 of decided operations in the late autumn, and it was proposed to strike blov 
 meantime at the Isle of Pines, Porto Rico and the north shore of the east en 
 of Cuba, and also clear the West India seas of Spanish ships so that all sa 
 water would serve for a secure basis of operations. However, it was held I 
 be essential that we should use our regular army of something over twen1 
 thousand effective soldiers as soon as our sea power was established, and prei 
 the organization, equipment and advancement of volunteers, so as to pus 
 forward and aid whatever enterprises lingered, owing to the lack of numbe: 
 of the regular force. 
 
 The country could not have tolerated the course of preparations that tl 
 
 Commanding General recommended,, and he was overwhelmed by the Adrai: 
 
 istration and the course of events. It was the visible line and logic of the ph 
 
 of the Commanding General, that while movements of secondary considerati( 
 
 interested the public and harassed and damaged the Spaniards, the grai 
 
 army, to be commanded by himself, should be in due time landed in the we 
 
 S68 
 
THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 569 
 
 end of Cuba, and move under his personal direction upon Havana, after the 
 pestilence and the floods from the skies had abated. As a military mechanism 
 this plan of the Major-General was perfect, asd as the country was not pre- 
 pared for putting in motion great armies within a few weeks, there was no 
 difficulty in presenting for the course of proceedings contemplated a very fair 
 seeming sort of argument, but science had to yield to a sense of exigency and 
 the war was ended before, as General Miles desired to manage it, the real 
 struggle should be made, and Havana was captured by the destruction of 
 Cervera's fleet, and the surrender of armies of Spain, one thousand and ten, 
 thousand miles away from the capital of Cuba. 
 
 Just when it had been determined to strike Spain in Porto Rico and the 
 insurrectionary end of Cuba, on the north side of the island by preference, 
 the retreat of the fleet of Cervera to the harbor of Santiago forced the dispatch 
 to that city of our regular army and concentrated there our Atlantic fleet with 
 the exception of the vessels necessary to preserve the legal existence of the 
 blockade of the principal ports of the island. General Miles was present at 
 the embarkation of the troops at Tampa and saw plainly what Shafter had 
 already made out as a tendenc5'', that the most important campaign of ^the 
 war would be when the land forces of the hostile nations first camein,,, 
 conflict, and the Major-General expressed his liking to take perspnal chargi^p^,|^ 
 the enterprise, but it did not seem according to usage , or just, to de^privej., 
 Shafter of his assignment when he had been the first officer 9,f,,his r^l^giij^jl^e _,| 
 ground, and General Miles was recalled to Washington as Shafter was s,a,ili||g„,^„ 
 and took in hand the Porto Rico campaign (No. 2) to overrun that whol^spme 
 and beautiful island. . , , 
 
 He arrived at Santiago in time to make a perceptible impression on the. 
 enemy, whose surrender, as rescue was impossible, could soon be exacted by 
 overwhelming forces. The next thing was to hasten the movement of the 
 victorious soldiers who had sickened under the exposure in the infected villages 
 and the horror-haunted camps upon the soil whose rankness made it poisonous. 
 Then General Miles gathered a competent force and sailed for Porto Rico. 
 Commander C. H. Davis, of the U. S. S. Dixie, reported to Admiral Sampson, 
 from Guantanamo, Cuba, August 2d, giving information regarding the 
 island of Porto Rico, "gathered by me on my recent visit to the island, partly 
 through intercourse with natives and residents, and partly through personal 
 observation, as follows: 
 
57° THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 
 
 "There are about 7,000 regular Spanish troops on the island. The num 
 ber of volunteers and irregular troops is indefinite, but those would not coun 
 against our invading force, as popular sentiment in the island is overwhelm 
 ingly in favor of the United States. The people struck me as being superio 
 intellectually to the Cubans. 
 
 "After the occupation of Guanica and Ponce by our navy and army th 
 Spanish forces began to concentrate on San Juan de Porto Rico, the seat o 
 the colonial government. This will be the last stronghold of Spanisl 
 authority on the island. It will be difficult to take San Juan by a land invest 
 ment unsupported by the fleet. 
 
 "General Miles' headquarters are now at Ponce. All transports are beinj 
 collected there and reinforcements, material, and baggage landed as rapidl; 
 as possible. The troops which landed at Guanica will march overland t( 
 Ponce to join the main army. I understand that General Miles' plan of cam 
 paign is an advance in force across the island from Ponce to San Juan and ; 
 regular investment of that place. The distance is about 60 miles in a straigh 
 line. It must be much more by the windings of the road. The roads are good 
 ^"The natives assured me that General Miles would meet with very littl( 
 opposition before reaching the vicinity of San Juan. San Juan is the key t( 
 the island. It would be the natural policy of the enemy to concentrate for iti 
 . defense. The Governor-General of Porto Rico has telegraphed Madrid tha 
 he cannot hold the colony for Spain unless strongly reinforced, and San Juai 
 is already beginning to suffer for want of food. The people of the country 
 would rise against the Spanish authority if stimulated. The Spanish officia 
 class and Spanish sympathizers will take refuge in San Juan, which may b( 
 regarded as a purely Spanish city. General Miles cannot hold the island unti 
 he takes the city of San Juan de Porto Rico and compels the surrender of the 
 colonial government. 
 
 "I am strongly of the opinion that San Juan de Porto Rico could be takei 
 by the fleet under your command and by a coup de main without the assistancf 
 of the army and in advance of its approach from the south and the complete 
 conquest of the island of Porto Rico accomplished by this means. The plai 
 would be to send a flag.of truce in advance of the fleet with the usual notice 
 of bombardment. The monitors might occupy the western end of the line 
 and engage the batteries on and to the westward of Morro Point. The battle 
 ships and cruisers would continue the line from the position of the monitori 
 
THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. S7i 
 
 easterly nearly to Necambron Point and bombard the city itself and the land 
 defenses and suburbs, and command the road by which alone egress may be 
 had from the city. 
 
 "Two or three. light-draft vessels mounting 5 -inch guns stationed near El 
 Soquoron could sweep and destroy San Antonio bridge and its approaches and 
 command the San Antonio Channel and Isla Grande. The landing force of 
 marines, convoyed by gunboats, could land a mile to the westward of Paloseco 
 and occupy the shore on the west side of the harbor within easy range of the 
 town for field pieces, automatic guns, and small arms, or the marines could 
 be held in reserve to land and garrison the town on its reduction by the fire 
 from the ships, whose volume would, I believe, insure an immediate surrender 
 of the city and with it the possession of the whole island, or would entirely 
 destroy the place. ' ' 
 
 There is something very clever and positive about this, but the Navy was 
 not destined to pick up the golden sheaves in the harvest field of glory. 
 Before getting away from Cuba General Miles had this interesting and 
 instructive correspondence with General Shafter. 
 
 Headquarters of the Army, Playa del Este, July 17, 1898 — 7 p. m. 
 General Shafter: • 
 
 What is the condition of your command to-day? Sent you report of medical 
 board, with direction for changing camps, etc. If it is thought more advisable 
 to move troops to fresh camps on the foothills or mountain sides, and surgeons 
 advise, act accordingly. 
 
 The St. Paul should be unloaded immediately, and every transport 
 unloaded and returned as soon as possible, as they are needed. 
 
 MILES, Major-General Commanding. 
 
 Siboney, July 17, 1898 — 8:48 p. m. (Received July 18, 1898.) 
 General Miles, On Board Yale : 
 
 Letters and orders in reference to movernent of camp received and will 
 be carried out. None is more anxious than myself to get away from here. It 
 seems, from your orders given me, that you regard my force as a part of your 
 command. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than serving under you. 
 General, and I shall comply with all your requests and directions, but I was 
 told by the Secretary that you were not to supersede me in command here. I 
 
572 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 
 
 will furnish the information called for as to condition of command to Gil 
 more, Adjutant-General, Army Headquarters. 
 
 SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 Headquarters of the Army, 
 Playa del Este, July i8, 1898. (Sent about 11 -.^o a. m.) 
 General Shafter: 
 
 Telegram received. . Have no desire and have carefully avoided ani 
 appearance of superseding you. Your command is a part of the Unitec 
 States Army, which I have the honor to command, having heen duly assignee 
 thereto, and directed by the President to go wherever I thought my presenc( 
 required, and give such general directions as I thought best concerning mill 
 tary matters, and especially directed to go to^ Santiago for a specific purpose 
 You will also notice that the order of the Secretary of War of July 13 left thi 
 matter to my discretion. I should regret that any event should cause you o: 
 any part of your command to cease to be a part of mine. 
 
 NELSON A.MILES, 
 Major-General Commanding. 
 
 Half an hour later than the da'teTif the above Miles wrote to the Secretary 
 of War, that he thought it "important to go direct to Pt. Fajardo, Cape df 
 San Juan," and he wanted "a strong, fast, sea-going dispatch boat to be seni 
 to Porto Rico," and he also wanted Keif er's Division, from Miami, Florida, "oi 
 troops from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and Florida," a! 
 "a part of the command of Porto Rico." Before leaving Siboney he said ii 
 general field orders No. i of the Santiago army: "Under drencljing storms 
 intense and prostrating heat, within a fever-afHicted district, with little com 
 fort or rest, either by day or night, they pursued their purpose of finding anc 
 conquering the enemy. Many of them, trained in the severe experience of the 
 great war, and in frequent campaigns on the western plains, officers and mer 
 alike exhibited a great skill, fortitude, and tenacity, with results which hav( 
 added a new chapter of glory to their country's history. Even when theii 
 own generals in several cases were temporarily disabled, the troops fought 01 
 with the same heroic spirit until success was finally achieved. 
 
 ' ' In many instances the officers placed themselves in front of their com 
 mands, and under their direct and skillful leadership the trained troops of i 
 brave army were driven from the thickets and jungles of an almost inaccessibli 
 
THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 573 
 
 countr}'. In the open field the troops stormed intrenched infantry, and car- 
 ried and captured fortified works with an unsurpassed daring and disregard of 
 death. By gaining commanding ground they made the harbor of Santiago 
 untenable for the Spanish fleet, and practically drove it out to a speedy 
 destruction by the American navy. ' ' 
 
 The General proceeded to say: "While enduring the hardships and 
 privations of such a campaign, the troops generously shared their scanty food 
 with the 5,000 Cuban patriots in arms and the suffering people who had fled 
 from the besieged city. ' ' 
 
 It should be stated that if there were five thousand native troops seen by 
 the American forces, the Spaniards did not get sight of that number of them. 
 
 The General continued: "With the twenty -four regiments and four 
 batteries, the flower of the United States army, were also three volunteer 
 regiments. These, though unskilled in warfare, yet, inspired with the same 
 spirit, contributed to the victory, suffered hardships, and made sacrifices with 
 the rest. " 
 
 Instead of going to Pt. Fajardo, Porto Rico, General Miles concluded 
 to land at Guanica. The reason the General assigned for this change, which 
 was a surprise, he states: "As all cablegrams concerning our landing place 
 had passed over foreign cables, and as it was important to deceive the enemy 
 (who, I afterwards learned, were marching to and intrenching the ground we 
 were expected to occupy, at the very time we were taking possession of the 
 southern coast of Porto Rico)." 
 
 While at sea, he wrote to Captain Higginson: "Our objective point has 
 been Pt. Fajardo or Cape San Juan, but so much time has occurred since the 
 movement was decided in that direction and such publicity has been given the 
 enterprise, that the enemy has undoubtedly become apprised of our purpose. 
 While it was advisable to make a demonstration near the harbor of San Juan 
 near Pt. Fajardo, or Pt. Figueroa, I am not decided as to the advisability of 
 landing at either of these places, as we may find them well occupied by strong 
 Spanish forces. If we draw them to that vicinity, we might find it judicious 
 to quickly move to Puerto Guanica, where there is a deep water near the shore 
 — four and one half fathoms — and good facilities for landing. ' ' 
 
 The correspondence of the General makes clear the completeness of his 
 information. The General says in his report to the Secretary of War that he 
 arrived off Guanica near daylight July 25th, and entered the harbor unopposed. 
 
574 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 
 
 "The guns of the Gloucester, Commander Wainwright commanding, fired 
 several shots at some Spanish troops on shore. The landing of the marines, 
 sailors, and our troops immediately commenced, and after a short skirmish 
 the Spanish troops were driven from the place, and the flag of the United 
 States was raised on the island. 
 
 "In this, and in subsequent movements, I was very ably and cordially 
 assisted by the navy, which rendered invaluable aid in disembarking troops 
 and supplies from the transports, using their steam launches to tow the 
 lighters loaded with men and animals from the transports to the shore. Ten 
 lighters were captured at Guanica and seventy at Ponce." 
 
 Major-General Wilson arrived July 27th. Commander Davis of the Dixie 
 entered the Port of Ponce on the same day and found it was not fortified. In 
 order to encourage the dissatisfaction with the Spaniards on the island, Gen- 
 eral Miles issued a proclamation "To the Inhabitants of Porto Rico," stating 
 that our war against Spain was "in the cause of liberty, justice and human- 
 ity," and the United States forces "came bearing the banner of freedom," and 
 he closed with this sounding sentence, equal to the Spanish style in sonorous 
 phrase: "This is not a war of devastation, but one to give to all within the 
 control of its military and oaval forces the advantages and blessings of enlight- 
 ened civilization. ' ' 
 
 The General seems to have hit his audience squarely. Major-General 
 Brooke arrived July 31st. There were several sharp skirmishes on August 
 8th, 9th and loth. In the affair of the gth the Spanish commanding officer 
 and the second in command were killed and one hundred and sixty-seven 
 prisoners taken. There were six engagements during the campaign when at 
 Asomante, on ijie 12th of August, the artillery of General Wilson's com- 
 mand began shelling the enemy's position preparatory to an advance in front, 
 while a rear attack was to be made by General Ernst's brigade. This com- 
 mand was under arms and ready to move August 13th, when orders were 
 received suspending hostilities. 
 
 July 30th General Miles telegraphed from the Port of Ponce of the prog- 
 ress of the Porto Rico campaign: "We have now landed in a perfectly 
 healthy country, well settled, and where, if necessary, a large amount of beef 
 can be obtained, and also transportation. 
 
 "Marching across country, rather than under the guns of the fleet, will 
 have in every way a desirable effect upon the inhabitants of this country. At 
 
THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 575 
 
 least four-fifths of the people will hail with great joy the arrival of United 
 States troops, and requests for our national flag to place over public buildings 
 come in from every direction. 
 
 "This is a prosperous and beautiful country. The army will soon be in 
 mountain region; weather delightful; troops in best of health and spirits; 
 anticipate no insurmountable obstacles in future results." 
 
 July 31st the General telegraphed: "Volunteers are surrendering them- 
 selves with arms and ammunition. Four-fifths of the people are overjoyed at 
 the arrival of the army; 2,000 from one place have volunteered to serve with 
 it. They are bringing in transportation, beef cattle, and other needed sup- 
 plies. The custom house has already yielded $14,000." 
 
 General Miles remarked by wire August 2d: "Abundance of beef, 
 cattle, cofEee, sugar, and supplies of that character can be obtained in the 
 country. Request that no more fresh meat be sent, as it cannot be used more 
 than a day from the coast. I also recommend that the manufacture of Spring- 
 field rifles, .45 -caliber ammunition, all white canvas tentage and black leather 
 equipments of every description be discontinued, as they are obsolete and 
 should not be part of the army equipment. ' ' 
 
 August 3d General Alger replied: "As you ought to know, the last 
 caliber .45 Springfield rifle was manufactured in ninety -three. Smokeless 
 powder cartridges are now being manufactured and will be forwarded. I sug- 
 gest that you get along with what the government has on hand. ' ' 
 
 August 14th General Miles telegraphed from "near Los Morias; notice on 
 map our troops occupy best part of Porto Rico. They were moving in such 
 strong column in concert that nothing could check their progress. They 
 would have occupied the entire island within four days if they had not been 
 stopped by order to suspend hostilities. ' ' 
 
 One of the difficulties of the war was the scarcity of supplies of pure 
 water, and the vehement demand for it. At last, as the original difficulties 
 had passed away in great measure, there was a gleam of humor in the four 
 brief dispatches appended : 
 
 New York, August 26, 1898 — 12:51 p. m. 
 Hon. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Please see that Troops A and C, New York Volunteer Cavalry, about to 
 embark on return voyage from Ponce, are not overcrowded and are supplied 
 with abundance of water. T. C. PLATT. 
 
576 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 26, 1898 — 11 p. m. 
 Hon. T. C. Piatt, Manhattan Beach Hotel, Long Island: 
 
 Will give instructions that A and C troops are not crowded on return 
 voyage. Pray tell me when they took to water? 
 
 H. C CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 New York, August 26, 1898 — 2:25 p. m. 
 Henry C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D.C. : 
 
 Troops A and C, New York Volunteer Cavalry, are coming home from 
 Ponce. Please do not overcrowd, and give them plenty of water. 
 
 GILBERT E. JONES. 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 26, 1898 — 11 p. m. 
 Gilbert E. Jones, 222 Madison Avenue, New York City: 
 
 I will see that your darling pets are not crowded, but since when did they 
 take to water? H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 This is in another vein : 
 
 New York, August 26, 1898 — 4:33 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General Corbin, War Department, Washington, D. C. : 
 Please wire Porto Rico to find when schools will be open. 
 
 D. BUTTERFIELD. 
 Corbin replied, Porto Rico cables "School opened August isth. " 
 
 Ponce, August 8, 1898 — i :5o p. m. 
 Adjutant-General, Washington : 
 
 Replying to General Butterfield's inquiry concerning public schools in 
 Porto Rico, there are 546 public and 38 private. GILMORE. 
 
 The schools opened two days after the Stars and Stripes appeared as the 
 sovereign standard of Porto Rico. 
 
 General Butterfield was instrumental in sending a large supply of the 
 Stars and Stripes to Porto Rico, and they were gladly received. 
 
 Ponce, via Bermuda, August 21, 1898 — 7:28 p.m. 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington: 
 
 The arrangements for supplying flags through Butterfield and Bakewell, 
 Lafayette Post, satisfactory. The larger of the sizes sent will be acceptable. 
 Please notify them. NELSON A. MILES, Major-General. 
 
THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 577 
 
 Ponce, via Bermuda, August 14, 1898 — 9:30 p. m. 
 Secretary of War, Washington : ' 
 
 Messrs. Potter, Van Rennsaller, Vanuxem, and Groff arrived on private 
 yacht May with load of supplies, which will greatly contribute to the comfort 
 of the troops, and especially the sick and wounded. They also brought a 
 large number of American flags, which have been sent to the different towns 
 and cities, and soon will be waving over the best part of Porto Rico. The 
 action of these patriotic and philanthropic gentlemen, and the National Relief 
 Commission, which they represent, is highly appreciated by a grateful army, 
 while the display of our national colors will give great joy to the people. 
 
 NELSON A. MILES, Major-General Commanding. 
 
 Ponce, via Bermuda, August 21, 1898 — 8:05 p. m. 
 Secretary of War, Washington: 
 
 Everything accomplished that could be desired. Only details to be 
 arranged by cammission for evacuation of Spanish troops. Some Spanish 
 troops now marching to San Juan preparatory to embarking for Spain. I 
 have 106 guns, mortars, and howitzers, field and siege. I intended to use 
 at S.an Juan if Spanish had not been captured outside, which our troops 
 were doing. These available if needed elsewhere. Among number are ten 
 light, very powerful dynamite guns. If desirable, any of above, with ammu- 
 nition and men, can be shipped, via New Orleans and San Francisco, to 
 Manila. I expect very soon to return to Washington. MILES. 
 
 General Miles said in concluding his report: "The success of the enter- 
 prise was largely due to the skill and good generalship of the officers in 
 command of the different divisions and brigades. Strategy and skillful tactics 
 accomplished what might have occasioned serious loss to achieve in any other 
 way. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded and captured was nearly ten 
 times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 wounded. Thus the island of 
 Puerto Rico became a part of the United States. It embraces nearly 3,700 
 square miles, and has a population of nearly a million souls. 
 
 "It is gratifying to record that during the war not a single defeat has 
 been met, and not a prisoner, color, gun or rifle has been captured by the 
 enemy. In this respect the war has been most remarkable, and, perhaps, 
 unparalleled. Under all circumstances and in spite of many most trying 
 
578 
 
 THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 
 
 difficulties the troops have maintained the fortitude of the American character 
 and the honor of their arms. ' ' 
 
 After planning many campaigns it was not the good fortune of General 
 Miles to conduct the one which he commanded to the surrender of the army of 
 opposition. Suddenly there was peace. The "war drums throbbed no 
 longer." It is conceded that when the intelligence that Porto Rico was ceded 
 to us by Spain reached the Commanding General he had played to the win- 
 ning point a very handsome game of war chess, and had announced checkmate 
 in three moves, though nearly all the pieces were on the board. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 After the Fighting Was Over in Cuba. 
 
 The Casualties at Santiago — Haste to Sliip the Spaniards to Spain and the Americans 
 North — The Parting of the Armies that Met in Bloody Strife — Shaffer's Opinion of 
 Immunes— A Curious Proclamation from Spanish Soldiers — 23,726 Spanish Soldiers 
 Surrendered — American Volunteers Begging to be Hurried to the Front "While the 
 War Lasted, and When it was Over They Wanted to Go Home. 
 
 The fighting in Quba with the Spaniards was at an end when the sur- 
 render of "the Spanish army took place. The report of casualties in the 
 United States army in the actions of July i, 2, and 3 were: killed, 23 officers 
 and 208 enlisted men; wounded, 80 officers and 1,203 men; missing, 81 men; 
 and there was included in a supplementary return 15 additional names, the 
 grand total being, killed, wounded and missing, 1,610. General Miles, before 
 going to Porto Rico, stated in a telegram : 
 
 "There is not a single regiment of regulars or volunteers with General 
 Shaffer's command that is not infected with yellow fever, from one case in 
 the Eighth Ohio to thirty-six cases in the Thirty-third Michigan. After 
 consulting with best medical authorities, it is my opinion that the best mode 
 of ridding the troops of the fever will be as I have directed, namely, the 
 troops to go up as high into the mountains as possible, selecting fresh camp 
 every day.. If this does not check the spread of the disease, the only way of 
 saving a large portion of the command will be to put them on transports and 
 ship them to New England coast. ' ' 
 
 The sanitary report August 14th at Santiago, telegraphed the Surgeon- 
 General, was: sick, 2,715 ; fever cases, 1,506; new cases, 129; number of fever 
 cases returned to duty, 226. August i6th General Shaffer wired General 
 Corbin reporting taking customs duties, $20,000 on the day before, and 
 $19,000 that day, $80,000 since occupation. 
 
 General Shaffer reported on Cubgm and immune regiments as follows : 
 
 581 
 
582 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 
 
 "I have asked no questions whatever whether a man was a Cuban or a 
 Spaniard. Most of the officials are Cuban officers, or Cubaii born. I hope that 
 in a short time things will quiet down. The whole trouble here is that there 
 is nothing for men to do in the country. It has absolutely returned to its wild 
 state, and has got to be settled and made anew. The attitude of the pro- 
 nounced Cubans is hostile. They so far show no disposition to disband and 
 go to work, and until they do there will be trouble, for they have got to live, 
 and they will have to live by robbery — there is no other way. A dual govern- 
 ment can't exist here; we have got to have full sway of the Cubans. It is 
 sincerely to be hoped that wise counsels will prevail among the Cubans, and, 
 as war is no longer possible to them except with ourselves, that they will 
 resume their peaceful vocations and without delay, but it is hard for those 
 who have been' living by violence and without working to resume their former 
 conditions. The immune regiments that have reached here are, I think, 
 among the worst that I have ever seen, being poor material, without discip- 
 line, vicious, and degraded. I think it will be necessary to muster them out 
 as soon as danger from disease is over, and replace them with better men." 
 
 At Baracoa and Suquade Tonamo there were surrendered 7,756 officers 
 and men, 2,321 stands of arms, 413,000 rounds of ammunition, and five 
 Krupp guns. The Spaniards had not heard then of the destruction of 
 Cervera's fleet, and thought Dewey had been whipped at Manila. 
 
 The telegrams following show exertions made to succor the sick and send 
 home the boys no longer needed at the front : 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 18, 1898. . 
 Commanding Officer Twenty-third Kansas Volunteer Infantry, Topeka, Kans. :, 
 
 Secretary of War directs that you proceed by rail with your regiment, 
 fully armed and equipped, to New York city, in time to reach there next 
 Wednesday, 24th instant, to embark upon a transport to be provided to take 
 your command to Santiago, where, upon arrival, you will report to the 
 commanding general. Department of Santiago, for duty. Communicate with 
 the chief commissary at Omaha, Neb., concerning your travel rations, and 
 with chief quartermaster at the same point for your transportation. Take 
 every precaution for the comfort and convenience of your men, and sufficient 
 stores of all kinds for the journey. Acknowledge receipt, and communicate 
 to this office from time to time progress in execution. 
 
 HEISTAND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
* AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 583 
 
 Santiago de Cuba, via Haiti, August'19, 1898 — 1:15 a. m. 
 Pierson, War Department, Washington: 
 
 Tell Secretary Alger I appreciate to the greatest possible extent his 
 responsive and practical sympathy. His suggestions are better than I had 
 asked, and are promptly adopted. If the Clinton is unloaded in time, I will 
 leave here Saturday morning. Will take 40 mules. Fago here. Need two 
 additional wagons and harness for all my mules. Please give me some horse 
 feed from here. CLARA BARTON. 
 
 Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, N: Y., August 19, 1898 — 6:30 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Many sick on Mobile. Ship is at pier and sick men being taken to hospital 
 in ambulances. The well men will remain aboard until weather clears. We 
 are providing for them. I specially request that Colonel Weston be ordered 
 to-day to be chief commissary here; if not permanently, until organization is 
 perfected. I have arranged to have full benefit of services of Generals 
 Young, Rand, and Williston. They are active and efficient. 
 
 JOSEPH WHEELER, Major-General. 
 
 Pennsylvania Depot, Jersey City, N. J., August 20, 1898 — 9:i8 a. m. 
 Adjutant-General Corbin, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Reported arrival of Mobile with 1,600 on board; 300 sick; z died on the 
 way. She ought never to have carried over half the number. This is 
 against positive orders, which were to give men plenty of room and 
 crowd no ship. Have lo investigate at once.' Cable Shafter. Relief here. 
 Order her to Santiago to-morrow. The hospital ship Missouri will sail 
 Monday. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. 
 
 Corbin telegraphed Alger : 
 
 "Find the Mobile had carrying capacity of 1,000 men/ and like number of 
 animals. As there were no animals it is not thought that the ship was over- 
 crowded. Have wired General Shafter your instructions that abundant room 
 be given on every transport. Also informed him of the reported bad condi- 
 tion of the Mobile. ' ' 
 
 Shafter telegraphed: 
 
 "Referring to your telegram about overcrowding the Mobile, her captain 
 reported that, loaded as she was, going to Porto Rico he could carry 3,000 
 
S84 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 
 
 men, and that he could carry 2,000 comfortably, therefore did not consider a 
 few less than 1,700 as too many. Ship was carefully inspected by a board of 
 officers, and Dr. Ives, a member of the board, states it was not overcrowded. 
 Accommodations for officers were, however, somewhat deficient. The large 
 number of deaths can probably be accounted for by the fact that this brigade 
 took nearly all their sick with them. Greatest care has been taken in this 
 respect. Transports have been loaded with from 200 to 300 men less than the 
 same ship brought down. ' ' 
 
 The total number of Spaniards who surrendered in and about Santiago 
 was 23,726. The following very curious Spanish document from the depart- 
 ing Spaniards seems to show a Spanish preference for United States soldiers 
 over Cubans in arms: 
 
 Santiago, via Haiti, August 22, 1898 — 11:17 p. m. 
 H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington: 
 
 The following letter has just been received from the soldiers who are 'now 
 embarking for Spain : 
 
 "To Major-General Shaffer, Commanding the American Army in Cuba. — 
 Sir: The Spanish soldiers wTio capitulated in this place on the i6th of July 
 last, recognizing your high and just position, pray that through you all the 
 courageous and neble soldiers under your command may receive our good 
 wishes and farewell, which we send them on embarking for our beloved 
 Spain. For this favor, which we have no doubt you will grant, you will gain 
 the everlasting gratitude and consideration of 11,000 Spanish soldiers, who 
 are, your most humble servants. 
 
 "PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO, Private of Infantry." 
 
 Also the following letter addressed to the soldiers of the American 
 Army : 
 
 "Soldiers of the American Army: We would not be fulfilling our duty as 
 well-born men, in whose breasts there lives gratitude and courtesy, should we 
 embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most cordial and 
 sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor, with all our 
 strength, endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or 
 hate toward the American nation. We have been vanquished by you (so our 
 generals and chiefs judged in signing the C9,pitulation), but our surrender and 
 the bloody battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment 
 against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in 
 
.AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 58? 
 
 compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the 
 power of our respective States. 
 
 "You fought us as men, face to face, and with. great courage, as before 
 stated, a quality which we had not met with during the three years we have 
 carried on this war against a people without religion, without morals, without 
 conscience, and ^f doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but, 
 hidden, spot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled. 
 This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You 
 have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the 
 armies of the most civilized nations of the world, have given honorable burial 
 to the dead of the vanquished, have cured their wounded with great humanity, 
 have respected and eared for your prisoners and their comfort, ajid, lastly, to 
 us whose condition was terrible, ypu have given freely of food, of your stock 
 of medicines, and you have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after 
 the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony. 
 
 "With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but 
 to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happi- 
 ness and health in this land which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, 
 but will be yours, who have conquered it by force and watered it with your 
 blood, as your conscience called for, under the demand of civilization and 
 humanity, but the descendants of the Congo and of Guinea, mingled with the 
 blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers, these 
 people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a 
 burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized communities. 
 
 "From ii,ooo Spanish soldiers. 
 
 "PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO, 
 "Soldier of Infantry, Santiago de Cuba, 21st August, 1898." 
 
 SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 Three days later, August 25th, Shaffer cabled the War Office: "Com- 
 mand all embarked this morning except Twenty-fourth United States 
 Infantry, detachment of recruits for First Illinois Volunteer Infantry, and a 
 part of the Ninth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, all of which will embark 
 to-raorrow morning on transport now here," and at noon of August 25th 
 General Shafter sailed for Montauk Point, where he arrived September 1st, 
 and wrote the Secretary of War September 3rd : 
 
 "I am very sorry not to be able to come to meet you and the President 
 
588 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 
 
 on your arrival this morning, but I am still in detention camp, and yesterday, 
 for the first time, had considerable fever. I am feeling much better, how- 
 ever, this morning, though rather weak." 
 
 The American armies that fought at Santiago hastened away to East 
 Long Island, where there was at least pure air and sand, and the Spaniards 
 were glad to go home. The captive Spaniards far outnumbered the conquer- 
 ing Americans, and the Fifth Corps was disbanded. 
 (General Orders, No. 50.) Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 
 
 Camp Wikoff, Long Island, October 3, 1898. 
 
 In compliance with instructions of tliis date from the Secretary of War, 
 the disbandment of the Fifth Army Corps is hereby announced. 
 
 The short and successful campaign of this corps before Santiago de Cuba 
 will fill a brilliant page in the history of our country. 
 
 By command Major-General Miles. E. J. McCLERNAND, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 The official dispatches are full of evidence of the high spirit of the young 
 men of the country, showing in a special and striking way the eagerness, as 
 the war seemed about to close, to find some fighting to do before the end 
 came. The War Office received a shower of telegrams soliciting the privilege 
 of being in the last events of the war, if peace had to come. The following 
 are specimens of these patriotic messages: 
 
 Chickamauga Park, Ga., August i, 1898 — 11:05 a. m. 
 Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 In assigning troops and officers to expedition for Porto Rico, won't you 
 allow the State of Texas a representation and give me a command with at 
 least one Texas regiment? J. R. WATIES, Brigadier-General. 
 
 Austin, Tex., August 1, 1898 — 12:48 p. m. 
 Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 I respectfully indorse the request of Brigadier-General Waties. 
 
 C. A. CULBERSON, Governor. 
 
 St. Louis, Mo., August i, 1898 — 1:25 p. m. 
 Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Dear General Alger; If you can, send Fifth Missouri with General Wade. 
 Company H is Sons of Veterans company, and the regiment is first class. 
 
 JNO. W. NOBLE. 
 
AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 589 
 
 Indianapolis, Ind., August i, 1898 — 2:10 p. m. 
 Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 The One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Indiana was among the first to reach 
 Chickamauga. Only three regiments .have been there longer. Will be 
 obliged if they can go with Wade; they are a splendid lot of men. 
 
 CHAS. W. FAIRBANKS. 
 
 Rockbridge Alum Springs, Va., August i, 1898 — 3:20 p. m. 
 Secretary Alger, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Please send Fifth Missouri to Porto Rico. My son, Ralph, lieutenant, 
 Company F, that regiment, anxious to join expedition. 
 
 JOHN J. INGALLS. 
 
 New York, August i, 1898 — 8:10 p. m. 
 Gen. H. C. Corbin, War Department, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Do send the First Missouri, now at Chickamauga, to the front with 
 General Wade. This regiment are nearly all St. Louis boys. There is a 
 tremendous appeal from influential men in St. Louis in their behalf. Why 
 not send them with General Wade? R. C. KERENS. 
 
 Indianapolis, Ind., August i, 1898 — 8:45 P- "i- 
 Hon R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 I earnestly urge acceptance of the One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Indiana 
 regiment, now at Chickamauga, for the Porto Rico expedition. 
 
 JESSE OVERSTREET. 
 
 Fort Grant, Ariz., August i, 1898 — 10:33 p. m. 
 
 Gen. H. C. Corbin, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Will the Adjutant-General help in the matter referred to in my official 
 message of to-day? Have written so many letters and made so many efforts 
 in other ways that I venture to address him personally and beg his assistance. 
 
 GRESHAM, Captain. 
 
 Fort Grant, Ariz., August i, 1898 — 10:30 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 One hundred and thirty-seven men and one officer, constituting L and 
 M troops. Seventh Cavalry, at this post, beg to be part of the 50,000 volun- 
 
590 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 
 
 teers to occupy Porto Rico, Cuba, and Philippines. They are a fine set of 
 men, fairly drilled, equipped, and most eager to go to the front. Shortage 
 of officers can be supplied if necessary by good non-commissioned officers. 
 
 GRESHAM, 
 Captain, Seventh Cavalry, Commanding L and M troops. 
 
 St. Louis, Mo., August i, 1898 — 5:05 p. m. 
 Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 The undersigned respectfully urge that the First Regiment Missouri 
 Volunteers be included in General Wade's selection for Porto Rico service. 
 
 HENRY ZIEGENHEIN, 
 
 Mayor. 
 CHRIS SHARP, 
 President Merchants' Exchange. 
 JNO. C. WILKINSON, 
 President Business Men's League. 
 L. D. KINGSLAND, 
 President Manufacturers' Association. 
 I. W. MORTON, 
 
 President Commercial Club. 
 
 French Lick, Ind., August i, 1898 — 5:30 p. m. 
 Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 The men and officers of One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Indiana Regiment 
 urgently request that they be detailed for Porto Rico expedition, and I second 
 their request. DAVID TURPIE. 
 
 Van Wert, Ohio, August 2, 1898 — 1:12 a. m. 
 Hon. R. A. Alger, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Second Ohio was one of the first reg-imeiits mustered. They beg to go to 
 Porto Rico. I earnestly urge their prayer. G. L. MARBLE. 
 
 Minneapolis, Minn., August 2, 1898—11:45 a. m. 
 Hon. R. A. Alger, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Minnesota boys at Chickamauga impatient to go to front. Can you not 
 befriend them and place them where they may face the foe? Their sires 
 
AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 591 
 
 fought and fell at Gettysburg. If there be more fighting, their sons seek the 
 field of honor and danger. W. H. EUSTIS. 
 
 Prescott, Ark., August 2, 1898 — 11:45 ^- n^- 
 Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 I sincerely trust you will allow the Arkansas troops to participate in 
 the Porto Rico expedition. THOS. C. McRAE. 
 
 Northfield, Minn., August 2, 1898 — 11:49 s- '^• 
 Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary, Washington: 
 
 Respectfully urge that Fourteenth Minnesota Regiment be sent on Porto 
 Rico expedition. Men anxious to go. Sincerely hope you will. 
 
 JOEL P. HEATWOLE, 
 Member Congress, Third District. 
 
 North Tonawanda, N. Y., August 2, 1898 — 12 m. 
 Hon. George D. Meiklejohn, 
 
 Assistant Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 If possible, please have Third Regiment New York Volunteers included 
 in Porto Rico expedition. J. P. LINDSAY. 
 
 Little Rock, Ark., August 2, 1898 — 1:31 p. m. 
 Hon. G. D. Meiklejohn, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Please do all you can to have First Arkansas, now at Chickamauga, 
 ordered out with next expedition. HENRY M. COOPER. 
 
 Little Rock, Ark., August 2, 1898 — 2 :o2 p. m. 
 Hon.~ Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Second Arkansas, Colonel Cook, anxious to go with General Wade. Will 
 highly appreciate it if you will give Arkansas boys a chance for active service. 
 
 A. S. FOWLER. 
 JOHN McCLURE. 
 
 Port Chester, N. Y., August 2, 1898 — 3:08 p. m. 
 General Alger, Secretary of W^r, Washington, D. C, : 
 
 Eighth New York most anxious for immediate service. Can' t you send 
 them to Porto Rico and oblige them and yours? 
 
 JOHN MURRAY MITCHELL. 
 
592 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 
 
 Atlanta, Ga., August 2, 1898 — 3:18 p. m. 
 Gen. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Please favor number of your Georgia friends by sending First Georgia to 
 the front. W. H. JOHNSON. 
 
 Eureka Springs, Ark., August 2, 1898 — 4:03 p. m. 
 Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Officers and men of First and Second Arkansas Volunteers, now at Chick- 
 amauga, are ready and anxious to go to Porto Rico. Hope you can send 
 them. J. H. BERRY. 
 
 Indianapolis, Ind., August 2, 1898 — 4:15 p. m. 
 Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :' 
 
 I cordially indorse Colonel Durbin's application to have the One Hundred 
 and Sixty-first Regiment Indiana Volunteer attached to General Wade's 
 expedition to Porto Rico. JAMES A. MOUNT, Governor. 
 
 Indianapolis, Ind., August 2, 1898 — 4:16 p.m. 
 Hon. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. : 
 
 I cordially indorse Colonel Durbin's application to have the One Hundred 
 and Sixty-first Indiana Volunteer Infantry attached to General Wade's expe- 
 dition to Porto Rico. JAMES A. MOUNT, Governor. 
 
 Chattanooga, Tenn., August 2, 1898 — 7:50 p. m. 
 Gen. Henry C. -Corbin, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Third Brigade, including Second Ohio, want to be sent to Porto Rico. I 
 was transferred on assurance that my brigade would move. Others are work- 
 ing to supersede us. Can't you push us along to join our commander? 
 
 ABE S. BICKAM. 
 
 Minneapolis", Minn., August 2, 1898 — 1:05 p. m. 
 Hon. G. D. Meiklejohn:. 
 
 The Fourteenth Minnesota, now at Chickamauga, very anxious to go to 
 Porto Rico next expedition. Won't you see that they go? 
 
 • I.. FLETCHER. 
 
AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 593 
 
 New York, August 3, 1898 — i p. m. 
 Gen H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C: 
 
 If you have the disposition to confer lasting favor upon me and friends of 
 Fourteenth New York, Wilder's regiment, please send same to Porto Rico. 
 The command full, well equipped. Its career in your hands. 
 
 HENRY H. ADAMS. 
 
 St. Paul, Minn., August 4, 1898. 
 Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 It is thought by our people that one of the Minnesota regiments at 
 Chickamauga ought to be sent to Porto Rico, and I think so, too. 
 
 C. K. DAVIS. 
 
 Augusta, Me., August 4, 1898 — 1:37 p. m. • 
 Gen. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 I earnestly recommend the sending of General Mattocks and his brigade 
 to Porto Rico, and his appointment to the military and civil governorship. 
 
 E. C. BURLEIGH. 
 
 Bangor, Me., August 4, 1898 — 2:06 p. m. 
 Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 General Mattocks earnestly desires his brigade, including Maine regi- 
 ment, be ordered to Porto Rico. Hope you will send his brigade. 
 
 C. A. BOUTELLE. 
 
 New York, August 4, 1898 — 5 :56 p. m. 
 Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 We respectfully request and urge that our well-drilled and able-bodied 
 Fourteenth New York Regiment, commanded by a Regular Army officer, 
 'Colonel Wilder, be included in any command to be sent to Porto Rico or into 
 active service. No regiment better fitted or commanded. 
 
 C. P. Huntington, F. D. Tappin, Howard Gould, W. L. Strong, 
 
 Edward E. Poore, H. W. Cannon, Charles A. Moore, R. A. C. Smith, 
 
 Charles Stewart Smith, J. Edward Simmons, Dumont Clark, and 25 
 
 others. 
 
 This telegram tells the story about the going home of the sick soldiers 
 
 from Cuba. 
 
594 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 
 
 Santiago de Cuba, August 14, 1898 — 12:41 a. m. 
 H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Rio Grande, Seneca, and Comanche, with Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, Fourth 
 and Twenty-fifth Infantry all loaded, and will go out this afternoon unless 
 ■ hurricane, of which reports have been had as blowing south of Jamaica, pre- 
 vents. The Breakwater, City of Macon, and Arkadia will go to-morrow with 
 two light batteries and Twelfth and Seventeenth Infantry. One of the hard- 
 est rainstorms we have yet had is raging this afternoon. Am getting the sick 
 left behind in very comfortable condition. Two thousand Spanish troops to 
 be loaded lo-morrow, and only other ship that is in as soon as it can coal, 
 probably two days. My own health is excellent ; not been better for years. 
 Hope to get troops off so as to be able to start the latter part of the week for 
 the United States. As you see, number taken sick rapidly decreasing for 
 lack of fuel, nearly all of three divisions having left, but we have a large 
 number of sick men. Are doing the very best by them possible. Will ship 
 400 convalescents on Catania Monday. SHAFTER, Major-General. 
 
 It was a great mercy peace was made so soon as to allow those who were 
 ready to perish from Cuban fevers to go where the sanitary conditions were 
 good and hope helped to save. In this telegram is a cheerful tone and happy 
 promise : 
 
 Montauk, N. Y., August 14, 1898 — 2:15 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Sailed from Santiago, Cuba, Monday last, 8th- instant; arrived this morn- 
 ing. Condition of troops on board (Sixth and Thirteenth Infantry, regulars) 
 much improved by voyage; no new cases of sickness developed; no yellow 
 fever; no deaths. A. AMES, 
 
 Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding. 
 
 The emergency for moving the troops north, ;even from Florida, is seen 
 in the telegram of General Rogers, Chief of Artillery, from Tampa, 
 August 7th: 
 
 "The Secretary of War having stopped the further shipment of the siege 
 train to General Miles, I now request instructions as to the disposition to be 
 made of the batteries serving with the train, the ordnance material, and quar- 
 termaster's transportation. There are about 1, 800 men, 1,300 animals, and a 
 large amount of artillery material collected here. A considerable time will 
 
SUGAR MILL. SCENE OF SAN LDIS RIOT, NOV. 4. 1898. 
 
 SOLDIERS IN INSURGENT ARMY OF <;UBA. 
 
AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 597 
 
 be necessary to complete the shipment of the command. After consulting 
 with General Coppinger and the chief surgeon, I report that the condition of 
 health of the men and animals requires their removal at once from the South, 
 and if it is considered advisable to maintain any portion of this siege train for 
 service or future instructions, I am of the opinion that the interests of the 
 service vsrill be subserved by moving it to a point at -least as far north as 
 Washington. The chief surgeon. Fourth Army Corps, informs me that the 
 sanitary conditions at Jacksonville, Fernandina, or other points along Gulf or 
 South Atlantic coast would .not afford relief from conditions existing here ; 
 also that there are many cases of typhoid fever in camp, and although it is 
 the healthiest camp at Tampa, a rapid depletion of the command may be 
 expected from this disease, if not from infection." 
 
 There was much of wholesome significance in this brief telegram: 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, 
 Washington, August 13, 1898 — 11:30 p. m. 
 General Shaffer, Santiago: — Yoti may discontinue press censorship. 
 
 H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 
 
 The Surgeon-General issued a circular the wisdom of which has been 
 shown by experience. He said: 
 
 "No doubt typhoid fever, camp diarrhoea, and probably yellow fever are 
 frequently communicated to soldiers in camp through the agency of flies, 
 which swarm about fecal matter and filth of all kinds deposited upon the 
 ground or in shallow' pits, and directly convey infectious material, attached to 
 their feat or contained in their excreta, to the food which is exposed while 
 being prepared at the company kitchens or while being served in the mess 
 tent. It is for this reason that a strict sanitary police is so important. Also 
 because the water supply may be contaminated in the same way or by surface 
 drainage. 
 
 "It is unsafe to eat heartily or drink freely when greatly fatigued or over- 
 heated. 
 
 "Ripe fruit may be eaten in moderation, but green or over- ripe fruit will 
 give rise to b©wel corriplaints. Food should be thoroughly cooked and free 
 from fermentation or putrefactive changes." 
 
 The Surgeon-General said, in accounting for sickness in' the army, that the 
 strength of the many men was undermined by dissipation, the temptations of 
 
598 AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 
 
 great cities, and though there was supposed to be inspection, so many men 
 were found in the camps unfit for service, from causes existing prior to enlist- 
 ment, that special arrangements had to be made for their discharge. 
 
 Soon after the newly raised levies were aggregated in large camps sickness 
 began to increase progressively from causes that were so general in their oper- 
 ation that scarcely a regiment escaped. These may largely be referred to 
 ignorance on the part of officers of the principles of camp sanitation, and 
 of their duties and responsibilities as regards the welfare of the enlisted men 
 in their commands. Medical officers, as a rule, were also without experience 
 in the sanitation of camps and the prevention of disease among troops. The 
 few who knew what should be done were insufficient to control the sanitary 
 situation. 
 
 Officers and men in these camps were rife for war, and drill, parades, 
 practice marches, and military camp duties occupied the whole of their time 
 and energies. Considerations of domestic economy and sanitation in the com- 
 panies and regiments were not given proper attention, and men who were 
 being taught to meet the enemy in battle succumbed to the hardships and 
 insanitary conditions of life in their camps of instruction. 
 
 The sites of certain of the camps have been instanced in the newspapers 
 as the cause of the sickness which was developed in them ; but a review of the 
 whole situation shows that it was not the site, but the manner of its occupa- 
 tion which must be held responsible for the general spread of disease among 
 the troops. The density of the military population on the area of these con- 
 tracted camps prevented the possibility of a good sanitary condition. Camps 
 of this character may be occupied for a week or two at a time without»serious 
 results, as in the case of National Guardsmen out for ten days' field practice 
 during the summer, but their continued occupation will inevitably result in 
 the breaking down of the command by diarrhoea, dysentery, and typhoid fever. 
 
 Practically nothing was done to make thie inen comfortable or to remedy 
 the insanitary conditions until these were brought to the attention of the 
 Secretary of War, by inspectors sent out by special orders from the War 
 Department. Then the camps held for so long were abandoned, but not before 
 the manifestations ^of typhoid infection were rife in them. New sites were 
 carefully selected, regimental camps were expanded, company tentage 
 increased, and board flooring provided. Then, for the first time, the troops 
 went into camps suitable for continued occupation. 
 
AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. 599 
 
 Malarial fevers added to the sick lists of camps in Florida and of Soutli^rn 
 regiments in the camps in Georgia and Virginia. 
 
 It was typhoid fever which broke down the strength of the commands 
 generally, the outbreak becoming distinctly manifest in July. Sporadic 
 cases appeared in most of the regiments in May and June, these cases having 
 been brought in many instances from the State camps. In fact, some regi- 
 ments, as the Fifteenth Minnesota, suffered more from this disease at their 
 State rendezvous than any of the regiments in the large Federal cataps. 
 
 In view of the necessity for the return of the troops of the Fifth Army 
 Corps from Santiago, Cuba, preparations were made for encamping them at 
 Montauk Point, Long Island. These included the establishment of temporary 
 tent hospitals, not only for the treatment of the large number of sick brought 
 by each command, from Cuba, but for the isolation and treatment of those 
 from transports lying under the suspicion of yellow fever infection. 
 
 The difficulties in the way of administering the affairs of the detention 
 hospital were very great, owing to the rapidity with which the transports 
 followed each other in their arrival. As many as four reached the Point on 
 some days from August 13 to 31, most of them bringing sick requiring 
 detention for medical observation. But the sick men were as well cared for 
 and as comfortable in their cots here as afterwards when transferred to the 
 general hospital at Montauk Point. 
 
 The Secretary of War remarks under this head: "The Red Cross and 
 other relief associations contributed in a very large degree to the care and 
 comfort of our sick soldiers, and should receive the grateful thanks of the 
 nation for the work they so nobly and unselfishly performed.," 
 
 Thousands of valuable lives were saved by the wonderful intelligence and 
 energy displayed in shifting the fever infected troops from Santiago to East 
 Long Island, and it was one of the rare things in history that so much 
 courage, address and liberality, as well as executive ability, have been displayed 
 in war with such beneficent results in saving, not destroying heroic men. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 The Public Opinion That Advanced the Navy. 
 
 The Marvelous Improvement of the Artillery on Our Ships of War — The Splendid Equip- 
 ment of the Several Vessels — Full Particulars of the Armament of All Our Ships — 
 Vigilance of the Ordnance Bureau to Continue Progress — The Thirteen-Inch Guns 
 to be Superseded in the New Navy by Twelve-Inch — Important Recommendations 
 — The Way the Navy Was Prepared to Win — Plans for Continued Progress — The 
 Spanish Side as Seen and Described by One of Her OfRcers — Hopes and Happenings 
 in Bombarded Santiago — Service of Cervera's Fleet — Mystery of the Merrimao — 
 Earthquake-Throwing Vesuvius — German Opinion — Work of the Marines. 
 
 ■Nations abroad have persistently undervalued our navy, and remember- 
 ing the great armies with which our sectional and state war was fought, 
 have over-estimated our military resources imrnediately available. This 
 country has been slow in the construction and equipment of battleships, but 
 there has been thoughtful and highly-educated service in the Navy Depart- 
 ment. We have been fortunate in secretaries of the navy, for many years, 
 and the organization of the several bureaus has been exceptionally strong, 
 alert and progressive. The very costly experiments of England, France, 
 Germany, Italy and Russia in armored vessels and high-power guns, have 
 been intelligently followed by our naval experts, and the lessons attainable 
 regarded studiously and developed. 
 
 It happened, not by accident, that as we turned out first-class fighting 
 ships, in hull, armor and machinery, there were ready for them guns that 
 were formidable weapons of the finest finish, and in the hands of marksmen 
 capable of being more destructive at greater distances than any of which 
 there were records of the armament for sea-firing of other powers. The 
 traditions of our navy were so brilliant that its history appealed especially to 
 the pride of the people,- and to the imagination of all our countrymen. , 
 
 When the voting tests came it was apparent that the dwellers in the 
 
 Mississippi valley and the mountains, on the head-waters east and west of the 
 
 600 
 
EFFECT OF 8-INCH SHOT THROUGH PORT HEAD OF "VIZCAYA." 
 
 h 
 
 l^BKm 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 w- 
 
 ^Sr 
 
 
 
 ■ - % ^^^^^^^jJaW 
 
 f ^r 
 
 s 
 
 ->'4>*k. 
 
 • 
 
 ,1 ^*- .— »*^s^ 
 
 
 
 Mk 
 
 l#^ -^, A... *■ 
 
 **^BI 
 
 STARBOARD SIDE OF "VIZCAYA." AFTER THE BATTLE. 
 

 ^s - ^V ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 603 
 
 Great River, had idealized the ocean and were fonder of the ships and sailors 
 they never saw than the inhabitants of lands watered by tidal rivers and beside 
 the sea, to whom salt water and the iron leviathans of the great deep were 
 familiar. The grandeurs and mysteries of the oceans are profounder and 
 more fascinating to mountaineers and those whose homes are in the green 
 valleys far from the surf, than to those who have been rocked from infancy on 
 the waves or looked out in all stages of life upon the majestical expanses of 
 mighty waters. 
 
 It is not the boy or girl who sees the Atlantic or Pacific every day, or so 
 often that the splendors have faded in fancy, who, looking out toward sunrise 
 or sunset from the shore, thinks of it that the first land over there eastward is 
 Spain, or there westward is Asia. The youth born a thousand miles inland is 
 fired by the first glimpse of the everlasting glory of the ocean, and thinks of 
 the galleys of the Carthaginians and Romans, the galleons of the Spaniards, 
 or the privateers and thundering liners of England. The votes of the moun- 
 tain states, those of the central valley, will join those from the borders of the 
 Gulf of Mexico and from the "unsalted seas" of the North and from the ocean 
 fronts, to put the nation behind the navy. 
 
 Looking over the reports of the Bureaus, to the Congress that adjourned 
 in war to meet in peace, we find much information that re-assures us that the 
 care taking of the navy that has been so superbly justified in the conflict with 
 Spain, is the manifestation of a system that is to be continued, a part of the 
 permanent policy of the people of the United States. 
 
 The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance reports, October i, 1898, the total 
 guns ordered for the navy were 790. Of these four lo-inch and two 6-inch 
 guns were "lost on the Maine." Of the 790 guns ordered thirty-nine were at 
 the date of the report completed, and 131 forgings were ordered. Of the 
 13-inch guns there are assigned four each to the Indiana, Massachusetts, 
 Oregon, Kearsarge, Kentucky, Illinois, Alabama and Wisconsin. The num- 
 ber of guns completed, with their calibers, were as follows: 13-inch, 35 
 caliber, 29; 12-inch, 35 caliber, 14; lo-inch, 30 caliber, 24; 10 inch, 35 cali- 
 ber, 2; 8-inch, 30 caliber, 9; 8-inch, 35 caliper, 65; 8-inch, 40 caliber, 2; 
 6-inch, 30 caliber, 123; 6-inch, 35 caliber, 6; 6-inch, 40 caliber, 43; 5-inch, 30 
 caliber, 2; 5-inch, 40 caliber, 171; 4-inch, 40 caliber, 130; 4-inch, 50 caliber, o. 
 The total is 620 guns. A "caliber" is the calibers of the length of the gun. 
 
 The total guns for the new navy are 564. Of these 133 are 4-inch, 8 are 
 
6o4 
 
 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 4.7-inch, 127 are s-inch, 160 are 6-inch, 74 are 8-inch, 18 are lo-inch, 4 are 
 12-inch, and 32 are 13-inch. The total number of guns, made, in progress, 
 or ordered, is 790, 237 being 4-inch, 199 are 5-inch, 197 are 6-inch, 83 are 
 8-inch, 26 are lo-inch, 14 are 12-inch, and 34 are 13-inch. The new navy get 
 544 guns — old vessels, 18; training ships, 19; available for auxiliary cruisers 
 or reserves, 209. The batteries of the New Orleans and Albariy were pur- 
 chased with those vessels, and are to be considered separately from our own 
 proportion. The full strength of our navy is shown with admirable intelli- 
 gence in the table following : 
 
 BATTERIES PLACED ON VESSELS PURCHASED, CHARTERED 
 
 AND TURNED OVER TO THE NAVY BY 
 
 OTHER DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 
 u 
 
 "E 
 .2 
 
 
 Type. 
 
 Main battery. 
 
 Secondary battery. 
 
 
 Name. 
 
 u 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 a 
 
 •g 
 
 .5 
 
 CO 
 
 to 
 
 p 
 
 '3 
 
 a 
 
 33 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 V 
 □ 
 
 
 a 
 
 CO 
 
 u 
 
 V 
 
 a 
 
 — V 
 
 s . 
 
 ■J i-i 
 
 55 
 
 .is 
 
 .3 s 
 
 1 
 
 Aileen 
 
 Tons. 
 289 
 
 Yacht 
 
 Cruiser ...... 
 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 ' ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 6 
 4 
 4 
 
 I 
 6 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 Badger 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 Buccaneer ' 
 
 Buffalo 
 
 7,500 
 7,500 
 
 594 
 492 
 
 173 
 136 
 192 
 506 
 786 
 11,550 
 545 
 494 
 494 
 185 
 175 
 
 Yacht 
 
 Cruiser 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 Dixie 
 
 do 
 
 Yacht 
 
 do 
 
 do. 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 ig 
 
 Dorothea 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 Eagle 
 
 Elfrida 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 ■6 
 
 2 
 
 Enquirer 
 
 Free Lance. . . 
 
 do 
 
 do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .... 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 Frolic 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 Cruiser 
 
 
 2 
 
 '6 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 8 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 12 
 
 I 
 
 '"'6 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 Gloucester .... 
 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 Harvard 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 Hawk 
 
 Yacht 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do. 
 
 Cruiser ...... 
 
 Yacht 
 
 Cruiser 
 
 ] * 
 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 3 
 I 
 
 
 
 2 
 I 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 I 
 
 4 
 I 
 
 6 
 
 Hist 
 
 
 ■■ 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 Hornet 
 
 Huntress 
 
 Kanawha .... 
 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 2 
 6 
 
 Inca 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Mayflower 
 
 Oneida 
 
 2,690 
 273 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 '"6 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 Panther 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 Peoria 
 
 Prairie 
 
 . 625 
 
 7,500 
 
 194 
 
 850 
 
 315 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 Yacht 
 
 do 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 7 
 16 
 
 Restless 
 
 Scorpion. . . . . 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 3 
 2 
 
 4 
 12 
 
 Shearwater, . . 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 
 3 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 Siren 
 
 ■ ■ 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 605 
 
 Batteries Placed on Vessels Purchased, Chartered and Turned Over to the 
 Navy by Other Departments — Continued. 
 
 
 a 
 S 
 
 a 
 u 
 
 "a 
 
 .a 
 
 
 
 Type. 
 
 Main hattery. 
 
 Secondary battery. 
 
 
 Name. 
 
 J3 
 U 
 
 .2 
 
 •s 
 
 c 
 in 
 
 a 
 
 i 
 
 -a 
 § 
 1 
 
 u 
 
 a 
 3 
 
 a 
 6 
 51 
 
 •g 
 
 u 
 11 
 -c 
 
 
 
 p. 
 
 u 
 
 1 
 
 u 
 
 -a 
 
 
 p, 
 <6 
 
 ii 
 
 i 
 
 a 
 
 CO 
 
 1- 
 
 P 
 
 i 
 
 i. 
 
 a" 
 
 ii 
 
 B 
 
 i ■ 
 
 1 
 
 St. Louis 
 
 Tons. 
 16,000 
 16,000 
 546 
 
 302 
 
 1,700 
 
 271 
 
 800 
 
 750 
 
 11,550 
 
 7,500 
 
 879 
 
 7,500 
 
 187 
 
 296 
 
 Cruiser 
 
 
 4 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 6 
 2 
 6 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 '"'6 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 "& 
 
 2 
 3 
 
 4 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 .... 
 
 12 
 
 St. Paul 
 
 do. 
 
 
 I3 
 
 Stranger 
 
 Sylph 
 
 Sylvia 
 
 Topeka 
 
 Viking 
 
 Vixen 
 
 Yacht 
 
 
 5 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 I 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 I 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 Yacht 
 
 do. 
 
 do 
 
 Cruiser 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 S 
 
 Wasp 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 Yale .'.'.'.'..... 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 do. 
 
 
 I& 
 
 
 Yacht 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 i3 
 
 
 Tug 
 
 do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 Alice 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 .... 
 
 
 Apache 
 
 516 
 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 6 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 Chocktaw .... 
 
 Hercules 
 
 Iroquois 
 
 151 
 198 
 702 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 I 
 I 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 .... 
 
 7 
 
 do 
 
 do. 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 156 
 571 
 631 
 401 
 
 677 
 194 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 Piscataqua 
 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 3 
 
 
 do. 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 . . . - 
 . . . . 
 
 2'- - . . 
 
 : 
 
 
 3 
 
 Powhatan .... 
 Seminole 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 . . . . 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 2 
 3 
 
 Sioux 
 
 155 
 196 
 214 
 441 
 300 
 
 _ 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Uncas 
 
 Vigilant 
 
 Waban 
 
 
 I 
 
 r 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 Wotnpatuck ... 
 
 462 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 Abarenda 
 
 Alexander 
 
 Arathusa 
 
 6,782 
 
 7,492 
 
 Collier 
 
 do 
 
 Water boat 
 
 Collier 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 Brutus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cassar 
 
 5,834 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 4 
 3 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Glacier 
 
 East Boston . . 
 Gov. Russell. . 
 Hannibal 
 
 4,181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 Ferryboat 
 
 
 I 
 
 -■ 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 Collier 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
6o6 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 Batteries Placed on Vessels Purchased, Chartered and Turned Over to the 
 Navy by Other Departments — Continued. 
 
 
 i 
 
 & 
 
 3 
 
 Type. 
 
 Main battery. 
 
 Secondary battery. 
 
 
 Name. 
 
 1 
 
 CO 
 
 ■g 
 '1 
 
 •g 
 
 i 
 
 a 
 
 1 
 
 si 
 
 S 
 1 
 
 ■g 
 
 ^ 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 u 
 
 ■§ 
 
 a 
 
 
 5- 
 
 s 
 
 B . 
 
 s 
 
 •1* 
 
 
 
 Hector 
 
 Tons. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. ....:. 
 
 do. ...... 
 
 Steamer 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 Collier 
 
 Transport 
 
 Collier 
 
 do 
 
 do. 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 4 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Justin 
 
 4,857 
 3,375 
 6,034 
 
 2 
 
 Lebanon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 Leonidas 
 
 Marcellus 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 Merrimac .... 
 
 7,500 
 4.925 
 4,640 
 2,975 
 3,712 
 5,420 
 5,294 
 4,729 
 2,549 
 
 . .'. . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Nero 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 3 
 
 Niagara 
 
 
 
 3 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pompey 
 
 Resolute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Saturn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Scindia 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 Southery 
 
 Sterling 
 
 Supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 Supply ship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Vulcan 
 
 3,543 
 174 
 250 
 
 174 
 980 
 
 1,280 
 397 
 525 
 370 
 
 1,600 
 620 
 700 
 
 2,185 
 
 Steainer 
 
 Reventte-cutter . . 
 do 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 26 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Calumet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 Hamilton 
 
 
 
 I 
 • I 
 
 3 
 3 
 7 
 
 Hudson 
 
 do. ...... 
 
 do 
 
 
 .. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Manning 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 McCulloch.... 
 
 do 
 
 do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Morrill 
 
 
 -> 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 Windom 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 3 " 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 Woodbury .... 
 
 do 
 
 Light-house tender 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 
 
 6 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 7 
 
 Armeria. 
 
 
 
 
 Mangrove 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maple ... 
 
 Suwanee 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 2 
 
 5 
 7 
 .7 
 
 6 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 '■ 
 
 Albatross 
 
 Fish commission 
 
 vessel 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 Fish Hawk . . . 
 
 
 24 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 Total 107 ships 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 160 
 
 
 
 70 
 
 576 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 t — 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 607 
 
 ASSIGNMENT OF SECONDARY BATTERIES— THE SMALLER 
 
 GUNS FOUND EXCEEDINGLY EFFECTIVE IN THE 
 
 ACTUAL SERVICE WE HAVE RECENTLY 
 
 EXPERIENCED. 
 
 Vessei,. 
 
 14-pound- 
 er. 
 
 6-pound- 
 er 
 
 3-pound- 
 er. 
 
 1-pound- 
 er. 
 
 sr-mil- ' 
 limeter 
 
 17-miI- 
 imeter 
 
 Ma- 
 chine 
 guns. 
 
 Field 
 guns. 
 
 Total, 
 
 
 
 7 
 2 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 4 
 14 
 12 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 6 
 8 
 8 
 6 
 6 
 6 
 2 
 8 
 6 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 20 
 20 
 20 
 12 
 
 12 
 20 
 12 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 4 
 2 
 2 
 
 '"s" 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 2 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 er 
 2 
 I 
 2 
 
 7 
 6 
 
 3 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 I 
 2 
 2 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 7 
 6 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 2 
 4 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 4 
 4 
 3 
 3 
 3 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 2 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 2. 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 "4' 
 4 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 I 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 4 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 Boston ; . . . . 
 
 
 13 
 
 13 
 
 8 
 
 17 
 15 
 II 
 
 8 
 15 
 24 
 25 
 5 
 3 
 18 
 
 Atlanta 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Newark 
 
 Charleston 
 
 Yorktown 
 
 
 Petrel 
 
 
 Baltimore 
 
 
 Olympia 
 
 
 Texas 
 
 
 
 
 Gushing 
 
 Philadelphia 
 
 
 San Francisco 
 
 
 18 
 
 Concord 
 
 
 9 
 9 
 
 13 
 13 
 15 
 
 Bennington 
 
 Monterey 
 
 
 Cincinnati 
 
 Raleigh 
 
 
 
 
 Montgomery 
 
 
 Detroit 
 
 
 
 Marblehead 
 
 
 
 Bancroft 
 
 
 
 New York 
 
 
 14 
 
 Puritan 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 Miantonomoh 
 
 Amphitrite 
 
 13 
 14 
 II 
 
 Monadnock .'■ 
 
 
 Terror 
 
 
 Machias 
 
 
 8 
 
 Castine 
 
 
 
 
 g 
 
 Katahdin 
 
 
 4 
 31 
 30 
 29 
 17 
 
 4 
 17 
 30 
 
 Indiana 
 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 
 Oregon 
 
 
 Columbia 
 
 
 Ericsson 
 
 Minneapolis 
 
 
 
 
 Brooklyn 
 
 
 Nashville 
 
 
 9 
 13 
 
 Wilmington 
 
 
 Helena 
 
 
 Foote 
 
 Rodgers 
 
 Winslow 
 
 AnnaT)oli<5 
 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 g 
 
 
 
 Newport 
 
 
 8 
 
6o8 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 Assigmfient of Secondary Batteries — Continued. 
 
 Vessel. 
 
 14-pound- 
 er. 
 
 6-pound- 
 er 
 
 • 
 
 3-pound- 
 er. 
 
 1-pound- 
 er. 
 
 37-mi 
 limet 
 
 1- 47-mil- 
 er limeter 
 
 Ma- 
 chine 
 guns. 
 
 Field 
 guns. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Princeton 
 
 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 20 
 20 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 6 
 6 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 4 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 2 
 
 4 
 4' 
 4 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 I 
 I 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 .... 
 
 I 
 I 
 I 
 4 
 4 
 
 I 
 2 
 2 
 I 
 2 
 
 2 
 I 
 2 
 I 
 I 
 2 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 I 
 
 4 
 
 I 
 I 
 I 
 2 
 2 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 I 
 [ 
 I 
 I 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 g 
 
 Wheeling 
 
 Marietta 
 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 Kearsarge.. 
 
 
 32 
 
 32 
 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 8 
 
 7 
 
 9 
 g 
 
 
 
 Porter ." 
 
 
 Du Pont 
 
 
 2 
 2 
 4 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 I 
 4 
 4 
 6 
 
 4 
 I 
 
 Rowan 
 
 Monongahela 
 
 Alert 
 
 Es.sex 
 
 Alliance 
 
 
 fjanra*iteT 
 
 
 13 
 
 5 
 7 
 8 
 
 
 
 Hartford ■*. 
 
 
 Adams .... 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 Pensacola 
 
 Pinta . '. 
 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26 
 
 26 
 
 Illinois 
 
 Alabama 
 
 
 16 
 
 16 
 
 l5 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 
 DalilEfren 
 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 24 
 7 
 
 24 
 4 
 3 
 3 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 New Orleans 
 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 4 
 
 
 
 Karragut 
 
 
 
 
 Fox 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 Morris . 
 
 
 Talbot 
 
 
 Gwin 
 
 
 I 
 
 McKee , 
 
 Fern 
 
 
 I 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 ' 4 
 
 Torpedo boat No. 19 
 
 Torpedo boat No. 20 — 
 Torpedo boat No. 21 — 
 
 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 
 Total 
 
 
 62 
 
 233 
 
 39 
 
 2 
 
 140 
 
 73 
 
 1,023 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Charles O'Neil, reports: 
 "Since the date of last report, 112 guns of various calibers from 4 tp 13 
 inch have been completed at the naval gun factory, viz. : Sixteen 4-inch, fifty- 
 four s-inch, twenty-nine 6-inch, one 12-inch, and twelve 13-inch, and thirty- 
 three 6-inch and two 8-inch guns of ordinary type have been converted into 
 quick-firing guns. 
 
 "Thirty-seven 4-inch guns and mounts under contract with private firms 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 609 
 
 have also been partly completed. Forgings have been ordered for five 
 8-inch, twenty s-inch, twenty-six 4-inch, and one 3-inch (14-pounder) guns. 
 
 '"While no material change has been made during the year in the general 
 system of construction of guns under manufacture, new designs have been 
 prepared for future guns of all calibers, calculated to insure a much greater 
 muzzle energy than is now obtained from guns of the same caliber at present 
 in service. The first of these new guns will be installed on board the battle- 
 ships Maine, Ohio, and Missouri, and on board of the four harbor-defense 
 monitors authorized at the last session of Congress. 
 
 "The guns and mounts and their appurtenances in service have been 
 severely tested during the recent war, and it is gratifying to be able to report 
 that their performance has been in general thoroughly satisfactory. Some 
 minor defects in the details of some of the mounts for guns of small caliber 
 developed, and were quickly, or are being, corrected. 
 
 "Reports have been received from the various vessels as to the perform- 
 ance of their ordnance, and the general tenor of them has been that guns, 
 mounts, turrets, and ammunition worked well. That such should be the case 
 in so complex a structure as is a battleship and its equipment is certainly 
 gratifying. Improvements are constantly beiftg made, and each new vessel is 
 superior to her predecessor in many details of her armament and ordnance 
 outfit." 
 
 It is proposed in future to expand the electric plant in our ships. This 
 is owing to the "facility of running cables as compared with steam, pneumatic 
 or hydraulic pipes, the absence of heat, perfection of control and ease of 
 manipulation," of which electricity is susceptible. The electric system is 
 "immeasurably preferable to any other which depends upon long leads of 
 pipes under high pressure with numerous packed pistons, valves and 
 joints." 
 
 One great advantage of the use of electricity is because it is in a barely 
 perceptible degree heating. There must, of course, be an auxiliary sys- 
 tem to serve when wires are broken. "Guns in turrets," the Chief of 
 Ordnance says, "operated by electric power can be more accurately laid upon 
 and made to follow a moving target than when operated by steam, hydraulic, 
 or pneumatic power. There are no water pipes to freeze, no steam pipes to 
 burst, and no delay in obtaining a full working pressure, and no troublesome 
 OT noisy exhaust pipes to deal with. A burnt-out fuse .can be quickly 
 
6io , PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 replaced or a broken wire repaired, and as the wires can be led below the 
 armored deck, there is little liability of the latter becoming necessary. 
 
 "Guns of over four inches in caliber are fitted with attachments for using 
 either electric or percussion primers,- but the Bureau will use only percussion 
 ammunition in guns of and below five inches in caliber." The electric firing 
 is preferable, but the production more elaborate and the faults more difficult 
 to locate. The fuses of shells are to be made more sensitive, as it can be done 
 safely. . The Chief of Ordnance reports : 
 
 "All new guns of and above four inches in caliber are fitted with tele- 
 scopic sights, and in addition an auxiliary horizontal bar sight is supplied to 
 ship in place of the telescope in case of accident to the latter. 
 
 "As the weakest part of a turret is its sighting hood, in which has hitherto 
 been located the only means of sighting the turret guns, the Bureau has 
 decided to attach to all turret guns a bar sight to be used through a slit in the 
 armor, in addition to the telescope in the sighting hood. A 6-inch projectile 
 at moderate range would probably destroy any sighting hood if fairly struck, 
 and, while the turret and guns might still be intact, the means of sighting 
 would be gone. 
 
 "The Bureau has in process of manufacture at the Naval Gun Factory loo 
 heavy i -pounder automatic guns, nearly half of which are practically com- 
 pleted. These guns fire at the rate of 250 shots per niinute, but are nearly as 
 heavy and as large as a 6-pounder, and have the disadvantage of using their 
 ammunition from belts, which is always a source of more or less trouble." 
 
 The I -pounder guns are regarded as useful for boats but not for ships. 
 
 The 6-pounder semi-automatic gun is favorably considered. One was 
 recently fired one thousand rounds without hitch or failure. This class of 
 weapon is especially meant for torpedoes and torpedo boat destroyers. We 
 quote again the report: 
 
 "A new high-powered 3-inch gun (14-pounder) has been designed, calcu- 
 lated to have a muzzle velocity of 3,000 foot-seconds, and the forgings for the 
 type gun have been ordered. A new mount is also being made for this gun. 
 
 "Several years ago when the Bureau began the manufacture of rapid- 
 firing guns, it had two 6-inch guns made with the ordinary obturator and 
 quick- working breech mechanism operated by a lever, which worked admir- 
 ably, but as brown powder alone was then in vogue, it was considered neces- 
 sary to use a brass case to contain the charge to prevent fouling of the powder 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 6ii 
 
 chamber, and in order that sponging the gun might be dispensed with ; hence 
 the general adoption of the brass cartridge case for all rapid-firing guns. - The 
 advent of smokeless powder has changed the conditions, and fouling of the 
 bore and sponging are no longer factors in the case, and the Bureau has 
 recently designed, built, and tested a 6-inch rapid-firing, gun that does not 
 require a brass cartridge Qase ; and this will be a feature of all 6-inch rapid- 
 firing guns hereafter. In smaller calibers, where the ammunition is complete 
 and handled as a whole — that is, where the projectile is inserted in the case — 
 the brass cases will be retained to facilitate rapidity of loading. The new 
 type of 6-inch gun is 45 calibers in length and weighs 8 tons, and is designed 
 for a muzzle velocity of 3,000 foot-seconds." 
 
 It is evident throughout this remarkable report that the Ordnance Bureau 
 was never more active than now in progressive work, and has made a study 
 with a view to improvements of every pertinent incident in the recent war. 
 Decisive as was the efficiency attained, there is a fine enthusiasm to cultivate 
 advantages and to reach conclusions from experiments. There is made a 
 constant study of experimental battle order indicators and range finders. The 
 nice questions as to the thickness of armor and how it shall be located are 
 under consideration. The merits of turrets are also discussed. "The lessons 
 of the day," the report says, "indicate that the greatest execution (except 
 against the heaviest armor) may be expected from the quick firing guns of 
 small caliber." The larger the gun the greater the sacrifice of space and 
 weight. Heavy guns in. turrets are a recognized necessity, but the turret is 
 horribly hot and the field of view from the sighting hood limited, and the 
 13-inch gun is not popular as it was; and these paragraphs show that an 
 important change has been substantially decided upon after "much thought" 
 has been bestowed. 
 
 "Heretofore the 13-inch rifle of 6oj4 tons weight, 35 calibers in length, 
 having a muzzle velocity of 2,400 foot-seconds, with smokeless powder, and a 
 capacity to penetrate with a capped projectile 19 inches of face-hardened armor 
 at a distance of 2,500 yards, has been regarded as the best type for the heavy 
 turret guns of our first-class battleships, and all heretofore built (excepting 
 the Iowa, which has 12-inch guns), have been equipped with guns of this class. 
 
 "The development of the 12-inch gun has been so great and its power so 
 much increased that the Bureau is of the opinion that hereafter it will be the 
 maximum caliber that it will be advisable to install on future battleships, 
 
6i2 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 and that these should be supplemented by an auxiliary battery of 6-inch 
 quick-firing guns in casemates, with a secondary battery of 6-pounders and 
 1 2 -pounders. 
 
 "The reduction in weight of the 12-inch gun alone is not great, being but 
 7}^ tons less than is that of the present 13-inch gun; but the reduction in the 
 size of and consequently in the weight of the turrets, barbettes and ammuni- 
 tion is very great. ' ' 
 
 There has been a notable exemption from mishaps during the hurry and 
 inexperience of the war, in the handling of fixed ammunition, this notwith- 
 standing "the recent great increase of our naval force, by the introduction of 
 so many new and untrained officers and men, seriously aggravated the danger 
 of mistakes and accidents, and the urgent pressure." 
 
 Among the most urgent recommendations by the Bureau is that a uni- 
 form caliber and standard small-arm cartridge should be adopted for the 
 army, navy, Marine corps, and militia. The gratifying statement is made 
 that the "resources of the country to supply war material were scarcely 
 touched, and unquestionably there is no limit to the amount that can be pro- 
 cured of all kinds, in case of need, provided time is not too important a 
 factor. " And the way to provide that time is not too important a 'factor is to 
 improve the times of peace to prepare for those of war. 
 
 One of the ^reat features has been the old style "columbiads, " a genera- 
 tion ago our most powerful shooting iron, and the pyramids of cannon balls. 
 In the report under review this appears: 
 
 "While a number of smoothbore guns were prepared for service, none 
 were put in use during the late war except such XV-inch guns as were on 
 board the coast-defense monitors. The Bureau is convinced that it is useless 
 to longer retain the old cast-iron smoothbore guns that are on hand in large 
 numbers at all the navy yards with their mounts and ammunition, and will 
 take steps to have them surveyed with a view to disposing of them, as no 
 contingency is likely to arise which could render them of any use whatever, 
 and it is useless to regard them as a partof the country's naval assets." 
 
 Here is the official presentation of the fact that the old smoothbores and 
 their big pot-metal bullets' are as obsolete as the monstrous thunderers of the 
 Hellespont and those used in the siege of Constantinople that first illustrated 
 the power of gunpowder; and the huge marble balls that were held to be the 
 most irresistible missiles ever hurled at a ship or wall. The better way to get 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 613 
 
 rid of the old smoothbores and spheres made for cannonades that will never 
 come, is to give them away to every town, village and schoolhouse where they 
 would be held to be decorative and markers of the events that testify the 
 progress of the times. 
 
 In the annual report of the superintendent of the naval gun factory at 
 the United States navj' yard at Washington is this honorable mention of the 
 workingmen : 
 
 "The extraordinarily large amount of inspection and other work done in 
 the short time of six months could not have been accomplished except for the 
 prompt and ready compliance of the various mechanics to the instructions 
 received and attention to their work, and taking into account the relative 
 number of hours worked, fully 20 per cent more has been accoinplished than 
 ordinarily the case, and the men did more work in the same time under the 
 stimulus of a patriotic object to be gained." 
 
 In giving an account of the work turned out in the gun factory at the 
 navy yard, this paragraph, related to the one above, occurs: 
 
 "Of the above guns, twenty 6-inch, thirty-three 5-inch, and sixteen 4-inch 
 40 caliber guns have been built since the declaration of war against Spain, 
 and sixteen ordinary 6-inch guns have been converted into rapid fire. This 
 represents about one year's work on ordinary working hours." 
 
 Under the head of "Sights'" there is this very interesting statement of 
 work: 
 
 "Since March i, twenty-eight 6-inch pedestal mounts, sixty- seven 5 -inch 
 pedestal mounts, and twenty 4-inch recoil slides have had telescope sights 
 adjusted; eight 6-inch recoil mounts, two 5-inch pedestal mounts, three 4-inch 
 pedestal mounts, two 4-inch recoil mounts, and fifteen of the American 
 Ordnance Company's mounts have had their telescope sights readjusted on 
 the mounts; two Mark I 4-inch guns, two Mark I 5-inch guns, six Mark III 
 6-inch guns have had their bar sights overhauled and readjusted on the gnns; 
 six telescope sights were adjusted to the Princeton's 4-inch pedestal mounts, 
 when her mounts were overhauled, and top carriages replaced and all the 
 auxiliary bar sights above mentioned have been made. 
 
 "This large amount of work in the sighting line has never before been 
 accomplished in any one year, and it has been done in five months by often 
 working on Sundays, including the twenty-four hour work of week days." 
 
 In addition to the showing of the high spirit and effective zeal of the 
 
6i4 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. , 
 
 mechanics, this declares that our workmanship, now so celebrated, is to have 
 all possible facilities for improvement. 
 
 Of the class -of seamen gunners this is said : 
 
 "The men have generally exhibited zeal and intelligence, and fully 
 appreciate the benefits to be derived from making a good record in study and 
 work, much of which has been due to the examples set by the instructors, 
 who have given a great deal of their time out of work hours in explaining and 
 helping in difficult matters. Much of the ambition of the present class seems 
 to be due to the fact that three of the instructors are seamen gunners with 
 warrant rank. ' ' 
 
 Of the smokeless powder manufactory it is remarked : 
 
 "A small-arm powder promising satisfactory results when cut and 
 graphite'd after twenty hours' drying in the sheet between blotting paper has 
 been made and tested. This powder has a dried grain of o.oii to 0.012 inch 
 thickness. Experiments are now in progress for the manufacture of this 
 powder on a larger and more economical scale. 
 
 "Experimental work on i-pounder, 6-pounder, and 3-inqh powders have 
 included nitration, kind and proportion of metallic nitrates, composition of 
 solvent, proportion of solvent to dry ingredients, dimensions of strips, and 
 methods of manufacture. 
 
 ' ' Marked improvements have been made recently in the methods of manu- 
 facture of these thin ribbon powders. Pyrocellulose as a base and ether alco- 
 hol as a solvent has been used only in experiments. But little data was 
 available as a guide to the regular manufacture of smokeless powder for the 
 various calibers. 
 
 "In addition to various experimental work, smokeless powder has been 
 manufactured, October i, 1898, as follows: 
 
 6-pounder Rounds, 10,351 
 
 3-inch " 13,008 
 
 i-pounder . " 2,623 
 
 "With the beginning of the hostilities a demand was made for special 
 countermines for use in the operations of the flee_t. 
 
 "Suitable mine cases, primer cases, etc., were designed, and orders for 
 the construction of the heavy mine cases were placed with two separate 
 establishments. 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 615 
 
 "Mine cases were sent to the station as fast as they were made. They 
 were quickly loaded, and all other parts and appurtenances of the outfit were 
 assembled rapidly. 
 
 "Loading was begun within five days, and within ten days from the 
 receipt of the order forty mines were loaded with guncottoru and ready for 
 shipment. 
 
 "The countermining outfit sent to the North Atlantic fleet included forty 
 mines (each containing about 530 pounds of gun cotton), with 18,000 feet of 
 insulated electric cable, and all necessary ropes, batteries, buoys, primers, 
 testers, exploders, and instructions for handling them in five separate parts. 
 They were loaded with 21,160 pounds of gun cotton. The total boxed weight 
 of this outfit was 37,186 pounds." 
 
 Commander A. B. Condin, Inspector of Ordnance, at the proving ground, 
 Indian Head, Maryland, says: 
 
 'The supply of smokeless powder has been small in comparison with the 
 needs of the service, though considerable quantities of 5 and 6 inch powder 
 have been supplied. There seems to be no difficulty in supplying an entirely 
 satisfactory powder. Trials are necessary to determine the size of grain 
 suitable for each caliber, in order to reach a combination of burning all the 
 powder in the charge, high velocity, and moderate pressures. 
 
 "Large numbers of armor-piercing projectiles of all calibers have been 
 tested during the year ; very few rejections have been necessary. A distinct 
 improvement in the quality of these projectiles is a gratifying evidence that 
 the makers are making every endeavor to carry out the clause of their con- 
 tract which binds them to supply the best article possible and to incur any 
 expense necessary for this purpose. There is on the ground here a hand- 
 some array of projectiles of all main battery calibers which have stood very 
 severe tests and are absolutely unaltered in dimensions." 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy gives in his annual report the names of the 
 auxiliary vessels purchased, their names before and after purchase, the date 
 of purchase, the purchase price, and the previous owners. This would seem 
 to the senatorial current historian great news, if pulled out of the pigeon- 
 holes by a committee of investigation, but it is quite commonplace now. 
 
 The Hornet was purchased from Henry M. Flagler for $117,500; the 
 Mampatuck from the Standard Oil Company for $65,000; the Mayflower from 
 the Ogden Goelet estate for $430,000; the Nictheroy, El Cid, renamed 
 
6i6 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 Buffalo, from the Brazilian government for $575,000; the Amazonas, renamed 
 New Orleans, from the Brazilian government for $1,429,215; the Almirante 
 Abru, renamed the Albany, from the Brazilian government for $1,205,000; 
 the Merrimac from the Hogan Line for $342,000. The Gloucester, purchased 
 from Pierpont Morgan, price $225,000, was in the thick of the fight at San- 
 tiago, and a very effective vessel. H. M. Hannah sold the Comanche, which 
 came out the Frolic, for $115,000. 
 
 The number of enlisted men in the navy was raised during the war from 
 12,500 to 24,123. The maximum fighting force of the navy, classified, was as 
 follows: Battleships (first class), 4; battleships (second class), i; armored 
 cruisers, 2 ; coast defense monitors, 6 ; armored ram, i ; protected cruisers, 
 12; unprotected cruisers, 3; gunboats, 18; dynamite cruiser, i; torpedo 
 boats, 11; vessels of old navy (including monitors), 14. Auxiliary navy: 
 auxiliary cruisers, 11; converted yachts, 28; revenue cutters, 15; lighthouse 
 tenders, 4; converted tugs, 27; converted colliers, ig; miscellaneous, 19. 
 
 The Secretary's report says that in contemplating the work during the 
 past year "the country as well as the service has cause for congratulation in 
 the results which have followed, and which have been so generally approved, 
 and in the further fact that no personal feeling has arisen to mar the glorious 
 victories and magnificent work of the service." 
 
 The casualties of the Navy are shown in the following table : 
 
 Number of casualties. Killed. Wounded. 
 
 Action of Manila Bay 9 o 9 
 
 Action of Cienfuegos 12 i n 
 
 Action off Cardenas ..... 8 5 3' 
 
 Action off San Juan, Porto Rico . . 8 1 7 
 
 Engagement at Guantanamo, Cuba .22 6 16 
 
 Engagement off Santiago (June 22) .10 i 9 
 
 Engagement off Santiago (July 3) .11 r 10 
 
 Eagle (July 12) i o i 
 
 Bancroft (August 2) i i o 
 
 Amphitrite (August 6) i i o 
 
 Yankee (August 11) i o i 
 
 Total 84 17 67 
 
 Efforts to improve the signal system are earnestly pressed by the Navy 
 Department, guided by the experiences of the war, and yet this example of 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 617 
 
 what was done between the fleet and army at Santiago indicates that this 
 
 important work is pretty well done. 
 
 Signal messages received and sent: 
 
 July II, 7:50 a. m. Shore to ship: "General Shafter's compliments to 
 
 Captain Chadwiqk, and he wishes fire commenced early this morning. Two 
 
 maps have been sent to Admiral Sampson which give the distance to the 
 
 cathedral. ..." 
 
 8:10 a. m. From ship to shore: "We are about to commence firing; will 
 
 fire very slowly, and wish every shot reported. ' ' 
 
 8:40 a. m. From flag to shore: "Where did that shot fall?" 
 8:45 ^- ™- From shore to flag: "We are waiting report from front." 
 9 a. m. From flag to shore: "Ask front if fall of shot was observed." 
 9:15 a. m. From flag to shore: "Next shot will be fired at 9:25; keep 
 
 sharp look-out. ' ' 
 
 9:30 a. m. From shore to ship: "Your shot fell 200 yards east of Del 
 
 Loute Hospital. Shot should be directed half mile farther west." 
 
 9:45 a. m. From ship to shore: "Give us the fall as quickly as possible." 
 9:50 a. m. From shore to ship: "Second shot was well placed. A 
 
 vigorous bombardment until 12 noon requested." 
 
 10:20 a.m. From ship to Vesuvius: "Fire shot every five minutes. Our 
 
 shot are falling right, using range 8,500 yards, NNW. , from our position." 
 11:25 a. m. From ship to Vesuvius: "Please fire three shots every five 
 
 minutes. ' ' 
 
 11:25 a. m. From ship to shore: "How is our firing?" 
 
 11:32 a. m. Shore to ship: "Striking city, with no apparent result. I 
 
 think firing with big guns should begin. — Shaffer. " 
 
 11:40 a. m. Ship to shore: "Shall we cease firing at 12 o'clock?" 
 
 11:45 ^- ™- Vesuvius to flag: "Do you know how shells are falling?" 
 
 11:50 a. m. From flag to Vesuvius: "Striking in city." 
 
 12 m. Shore to ship: "Please continue firing with heavy guns until one 
 
 o'clock; then cease firing until further orders. " . ^ 
 
 12:35 p. m. "General Castillo reports that Santa Anna church has been 
 
 turned into a powder magazine. — Shaffer." 
 
 12:45 P- ™- Shore to ship: "The church is west of Reina Mercedes 
 
 Barracks. Discontinue at once; am going to put up a flag of truce. — 
 
 Shaffer." 
 
6i8 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 4:45 p. m. Vesuvius to flag: "General Shafter states fire from ships 
 very accurate, shell falling in city. Lines have been advanced. Flag of truce 
 went forward to demand unconditional surrender. Will communicate with 
 you fully directly to Aguadores as to time of firing and result of truce." 
 
 The congratulatory paragraphs in the annual report of the Chief of the 
 Bureau of Construction and Repair are full of the dignities of moderation in 
 the statement of a great and signal success that is conspicuous before the 
 world : 
 
 "The behavior of all classes of our naval vessels throughout the various 
 conditions of war under which they served during the past months is a source 
 of gratification to the Bureau, in which the designs of the greater part of 
 them have been developed. The many complicated and inter-dependent 
 considerations involved in the several classes, together with the large amount 
 of petty detail, could not but afford opportunity for criticism from various 
 standpoints, as well as for actual errors of judgment in applying too little or 
 too great weight to any of the many considerations referred to. 
 
 "Moreover, the lack of reliable data regarding the behavior of the modern 
 ship of war in action lent a very considerable amount of uncertainty to the 
 expectations regarding the conduct of our own vessels in an engagement with 
 the enemy. Although the results of the encounters in which our fleets have 
 engaged demonstrated their superiority so overwhelmingly as to throw doubt 
 upon the value of any deductions which might be made therefrom, the 
 behavior of all classes of vessels, both in action and in general service on the 
 blockade,, appears to have been such as to thoroughly demonstrate their 
 integrity and their suitability for the service for which they were designed." 
 
 The work of Lieutenanr Jos6 Muller, of the Spanish navy, contains much 
 that is of the deepest interest of the conditions within Santiago, and the 
 means and details of her defense. The best artillery the Spanish had was 
 taken from the cruiser, the "Reina Mercedes," and Lieutenant Muller says 
 there was substantially no other artillery, and "we who witnessed and sus- 
 tained the blockade of Santiago, feel satisfaction and pride in being able to say 
 that we kept the American fleet, notwithstanding its power and the number of 
 its guns, for seventy days, namely, from May 18 to July 17, in front of the 
 mouth of the harbor, on the sea, and at a respectable distance from our bat- 
 teries, which they were unable to silence, and not daring to force the entrance. 
 
 ■'It is only just to say, and I take pleasure in doing so, that this result is 
 
o 
 
 w 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 w 
 
 d 
 w 
 
BUST OF COLUMBUS, FOUND ON "CEISTOBAL COLON.' NOW IN WAR 
 DEPARTMENT AT WASHINGTON. 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 621 
 
 due, in the first place, to the cruiser Reina Mercedes, under the command of 
 Captain Rafael Micon, and in the second place, to our fleet anchored in the 
 hay, and which the enemy would have had to fight after forcing the harbor, 
 provided they had succeeded in doing so, but they do not appear to have 
 thought of it." 
 
 Further information will show the gallant Spaniard that it was not for the 
 lack of thinking of it that it was not attempted. The Mercedes was detained 
 at Santiago by bad boilers, when on the way to Havana. The Lieutenant 
 remarks of Spanish belief in their fleets before the trial by battle : 
 
 "When the war between Spain and the United States became a fact, it is 
 hard to tell how much was said and written about the Spanish fleet, or rather, 
 fleets; everybody knows of the thousands o*f items which appeared in the 
 newspapers concerning the purchase of ships, to such an extent that, if all 
 could have been believed, our navy would have been vastly superior to that 
 of the United States, in number and quality. And this is so true that the 
 least optimistic, the most reasonable people, those whom we considered best 
 informed as belonging to the profession, and who knew to a certain extent 
 what we could expect, counted on not less than eight battleships leaving the 
 Peninsula." 
 
 When Cervera ran into Santiago May 19, famishing for coal, and hoped to get 
 it and get away, it was "one of those beautiful mornings that are so frequent 
 in tropical countries; not the slightest breeze rippled the surface of the water, 
 not the least cloud was to be seen in the deep blue sky, and still, notwith- 
 standing all that the local papers have said, very few were the people who 
 came down to witness the arrival of the ships. With the exception of the 
 oificial element and a small number of Peninsulars, the arrival of our warships 
 inspired no interest, nor even curiosity." 
 
 The Peninsulars alone were enthusiasts. Coaling facilities were such 
 that the fleet was detained until blockaded. The troops required 360,000 
 rations a month, enough with economy for half a month. This would seem 
 to mean that there were 24,000 troops, but this must be a miscalculat on. As 
 to the business men, this example is sufficient : 
 
 "The man who had the contract of furnishing water at the bay, relying 
 on the letter of his contract, tried to charge the ships of the fleet for the 
 water which they were getting at Las Cruces pier, this water being the 
 property of the American company of the Juragua mines, for which the 
 
622 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 Spanish government could therefore not contract, and was conveyed on board 
 by means of the water pipes, which are there for that purpose, the pump 
 being kept going night and day by the soldiers of Colonel Borry's column. 
 Nearly all the ships took over 500 pipes of water each, which, at 4 pesetas a 
 pipe, amounts to several thousand dollars. The contractor in question, 
 whose name I do not wish to remember, is from the Peninsula, a captain of 
 volunteers, and, as he says himself, 'a better Spaniard than Pelayo.' " 
 
 Before the siege was over this writer says there was famine in Santiago, 
 and many persons starved to death. He saw a man at the entrance to the 
 Brook House who "died because he had nothing to eat," and "horses, dogs 
 and other animals were dying from hunger in the streets and public places, 
 and the worst thing was that their carcasses were not removed. I also saw 
 — this is significant on account of the fatal consequences that might follow — I 
 saw, I repeat, a dog throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour 
 him. The water from the aqueduct had been cut off, and the city was 
 exposed to the danger of the dogs going mad. ' ' 
 
 The Lieutenant continues: "We who belonged to the captaincy of the 
 port finally dined, breakfasted and slept there — or rather, did not sleep there, 
 for there never was a night when it was not necessary to transmit to the 
 Admiral two or three urgent papers, orders, or other cablegrams, at all 
 hours, and the telephone did not stop a minute and did not give us any rest." 
 
 Of what service to Spain was the Spanish fleet in Santiago? This ques- 
 tion Lieutenant Muller answers: 
 
 ' ' Compelling the enemy to sustain with superior forces the blockade of 
 Santiago de Cuba, with all its difScalties and dangers. While our ships were 
 in port, safe from the ordinary dangers of the sea, using hardly any coal, not 
 exhausting their engines, and waiting for a favorable opportunity to 
 maneuver, when and as best they could, the hostile fleet was obliged to cruise 
 on the coast day and night, using a great deal of coal, constantly doing sea 
 service, which is always laborious, especially in time of war, exhausting their 
 engines, and exposed to the danger of having to abandon the blockade in case 
 of a storm from the south or east, still more if the season of cyclones should 
 come." And, "If it had been possible for us, besides the ships that were at 
 Santiago, to have two at Cienfuegos, for instance, and two more at Nuevitas, 
 which ports are well suited for placing lines of torpedoes, owing to their nar- 
 row entrances, there is no doubt but that the Americans, who, outside of the 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 623 
 
 ships they had in the Philippines, had gent their whole fleet to the island of 
 Cuba, would have had to blockade those three ports with forces superior to 
 ours and to keep watch at Key West if they did not want to expose themselves 
 to a serious disaster, or would have had to force one of the ports, thereby 
 exposing themselves to a hecatomb; and we only need think of the number of 
 their ships to understand that they could not successfully threaten so many 
 points ; though they only had to deal with Santiago and had almost all the 
 ships of the fleet in front of it, they would have found it necessary to desist 
 'from taking the offensive." 
 
 The Americans, the Spaniards thought, never before Santiago lacked 
 secret ' information, and the sinking of the Merrimac was a mystery to the 
 Spaniards. The Spanish writer visited Hobson to take his deposition, and 
 Hobson wanted to know why the British Consul was not present, as he had 
 charge of the American Consulate, and also, "by whose authority he was 
 being examined; and he stated that, since he had been taken prisoner by 
 Admiral Cervera himself in his own boat (as was true), it was his understand- 
 ing that he could and should answer only Admiral Cervera, or some one 
 delegated by him. And although all this was said in the very best form and 
 with a thousand protestations of his respect and deference for me, it did not 
 prevent our positions from being reversed, and far from my asking the pris- 
 oner questions, it was he, on the contrary, who asked them of me. 
 
 "I told him so, asking him through the interpreter to state categorically 
 whether he was disposed to answer. He replied he was ready to answer the 
 questions which he thought he ought to answer, but not those which he 
 deemed untimely. Therefore, and in order not to lose time, I at once asked 
 him one question which I knew beforehand he would refuse to answer, 
 namely, by whose order and for what purpose he entered the harbor; he 
 replied: 'By order of Admiral Sampson; the second part I cannot answer.' I 
 then deemed my mission at an end. ' ' 
 
 Having finished with Hobson, the Spanish officer stood on the esplanade 
 in front of the Morro and admired the American fleet. It was a beautiful 
 evening, and seventeen American ships were in sight. June 6th the Ameri- 
 can fleet opened fire, and "it was so intense and the' shots followed each other 
 in such quick succession that it might have seemed like a fusillade if the 
 mighty thunder of guns can be compared with the crackling of small arms. 
 
 "By 9 o'clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after reaching again the 
 
624 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 same intensity, then decreasing once more at 10:15, and again becoming 
 terribly intense. 
 
 "At_2 p. m. there arrived at the royal pier a boat from the Reina Mer- 
 cedes, towed by her steam launch, with Lieutenant Ozamiz, bringing three 
 seriously wounded sailors, who were taken to the military ' hospital. This 
 officer reported the death of Commander Emilro de Acosta y Eyermann, 
 second in command of the cruiser, and of five sailors; also, that Ensign 
 Molins, one boatswain, and several other sailors had been wounded. ' ' 
 
 Again,, the writer says, "the fire resembled one prolonged thunder," and 
 he "had no -idea that any firing could be as terrific as that of those ten ships," 
 and he "does not believe the bombardment of Sebastopol and Alexandria 
 could be as terrible as that suffered at Santiago." It was computed that the 
 Americans fired eight thousand projectiles. The belief of the writer was that 
 the insurgents had located everything, and he was sure when he saw the aim 
 of the Americans, who fired so close to the Maria Teresa and Vizcaya, that it. 
 was a miracle they were not hit. The Mercedes, though protected by a hill, 
 was hit thirty-five times." 
 
 "Comniander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann was directing the extinguish- 
 ing of the fire in the forecastle, when a large shell cut off his. right leg at the 
 hip and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly. But he lived for half an 
 hour after that, ,and kept on looking after the fire, as I was told by Mr. Ozafniz, 
 who was close to him in those critical moments. I do not like to think of it ; 
 he had been a fellow-student of mine at college, and our old friendship had 
 always remained the same. As there was no safe place in the ship, his body 
 was placed on a cot and taken to the Socapa coast ; five soldiers who had been 
 killed the same day were also carried there, and all of them were covered 
 with the flag which they had been defending and for which they had died. 
 
 "The large projectiles shot through the space across the bay, causing a 
 tremendous noise which only those who heard it can understand ; some fell on 
 the opposite coast (to the westward), raising, as they exploded, clouds of dust 
 and smoke; others could not be seen falling, which proves that they must have 
 dropped in the hills at a great distance. This explains that they did not only 
 reach the city, but went thousands of meters beyond. 
 
 "The inhabitants of Cay Smith had to take refuge in the northern part, 
 which is very abrupt, and many were in the water up to the waist; if they 
 had not gone there, most of them would have been killed, for nearly all the 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 625 
 
 dwellings which were located in the southern part suffered from the effects of 
 the shells. The following day the Cay was abandoned." 
 
 June 2ist it was found out that forty-two ships had during the day before 
 sailed and proceeded eastward. They were the transports bearing Shaffer's 
 army, on June 23. 
 
 "Opposite the Morro entrance, and at a distance of about six miles from 
 it, 8 battleships, 2 destroyers, the Vesuvius, and 8 merchant vessels. The 
 rest, as many as 63, continued the landing on the coast, protected by some of 
 the war ships. 
 
 "Every night, with great regularity (between 11 and 2), the Vesuvius 
 threw her three dynamite bombs on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, 
 with the greatest humanity possible, for it will be remembered that such was 
 the pretext of this war. For that purpose she would come close to the coast, 
 accompanied by another ship, usually a battleship — for the mission of the 
 Vesuvius is only the offensive, she has no defensive qualities — and as soon as 
 she was within convenient distance she would discharge three tubes at regular 
 intervals. If the projectiles dropped close to a battery its ruin was 
 certain, for one must see the effects of one of these projectiles to under- 
 stand them. 
 
 "This ship is the only one of her class;' her projectiles and the apparatus 
 throwing them are not .known, and she has made her d^but here. One of the 
 projectiles which fell on the northern slope of the Socapa tore up trees right 
 and left for a distance of about 20 meters. From a certain distance, as I could 
 see the day I went to the Mercedes, it looked as though a road had been 
 opened across the mountain. 
 
 "Another, which fell a short distance from the one just referred to, made 
 an excavation, not very deep, but very wide ; I was told that it would hold 
 twenty horses. ' ' 
 
 The sound of the battle in which Cervera's fleet perished is thus related: 
 "A terrific cannonade commenced, such as I have never heard, nor will prob- 
 ably ever hear again, a cannonade more intense than that of June 6, a thing 
 which I believed impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the air. 
 I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Bustamente like an 
 imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word. I felt something that 
 commenced at my feet and went up to my head, and my hair must have stood 
 on end. Then suddenly, without taking leave, I went out, got on my horse 
 
€26 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 and rode down the hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly understand how it 
 was that I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port, 
 where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last clerk, with 
 emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the direction of the mouth 
 of the harbor. The noise caused by the gunshots, which the mountains and 
 -valleys echoed, was truly infernal and comparable to nothing." 
 
 The pilot who took out the Spanish flagship tells of his personal experi- 
 ence. His name is Miguel Lopez, and he says : 
 
 "I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as 
 calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing 
 the channel and the hostile ships, and only said these words : 
 
 "'Pilot, when can we shift the helm?' He had reference to turning to 
 starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamante Bank. 
 After a few seconds he said: 
 
 " Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.' 
 
 " 'I will advise you. Admiral,' I answered. 
 
 "A few moments later I said: 'Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.' 
 
 "In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited, 
 as calm as usual, said: 'To starboard,' and the next minute, 'Fire!' At the 
 same moment, simultaneously, the two guns of the turret and those of the 
 port battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the Indiana. I thought 
 the ship was sinking. I cannot tell you, Don Jose, all that passed. By this 
 time there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, and I believe 
 that in spite of the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. 
 The Admiral said to me: 
 
 " 'Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because 
 you have earned it well.' And he continued to give orders. " 
 
 It was for eight hours believed in Santiago that Cervera's fleet had 
 escaped. There was at first four great clouds of smoke. The mountains, as 
 the ships passed westward, presented a view of the sea except from a few 
 points, and no ship was burned or disabled within the range of vision. The 
 Spanish officers confirmed the view taken by Admiral Sampson of the value 
 of the incessant use at night of the searchlights. 
 
 The effect of the cannonades by the fleet was more serious when we read 
 the Spanish story than in the American accounts. The reason Cervera ran 
 into Santiago harbor was lack of coal, and the reason he did not get out at first 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 627 
 
 was because he could not fill the bunkers in time. There was scarcity of 
 baskets to handle coal, for one thing. The American fleet came in force to 
 Santiago because the Spanish fleet was there, and our army arrived because 
 the fleets were there. Hence the fame forever of Santiago. 
 
 Rear Admiral Pluddeman, of the German navy, has published critical 
 ^'comments" on the main features of the command in Spain, and we have a 
 translation from the November number of the Marine Rundschau. The 
 Admiral opens with the remark that there is nothing in the events of the war 
 which might lead to a radical revolution of present ideas, but while the war 
 has "enriched former experiences," no essentially new appliances have been 
 made use of. The torpedo and ram have not been used, but they have no 
 •doubt been found less formidable in fact than in imagination. Torpedoes 
 have been tried and found wanting, and it appears that in the state of 
 ■efficiency of artillery the use of the ram has become, like cavalry charges 
 upon steady infantry with magazine long-range rifles, impracticable. 
 
 The supremacy of the battleship, with a few heavy guns and a greater 
 array of secondary batteries, is hardly disputed. The Oregon would have 
 great chances to destroy all the torpedo boats and torpedo boat destroyers 
 that could be launched against her. There is a general conviction that our 
 thirteen-inch guns are too big, that eight and ten inch guns to the same 
 amount of weight are better, anithat the smaller rapid-fire guns are weapons 
 that have a way of doing a greater share of execution than the huge steel 
 tubes that shiver and shatter their own foundations. 
 
 It is said by the Admiral that many of our shells did not explode, and our 
 Navy Department is already making provision for more sensitive shells. 
 Our monitors are slightingly spoken of, and Admiral Sampson thought he 
 found them a nuisance, holding back his fleet, yet the Monterey and the 
 Monadnopk crossed the Pacific Ocean, and Admiral Dewey was extremely 
 glad to add them to his squadron, for they gave him the ability to smash 
 batteries that had caused him uneasiness, and if Camara's fleet had appeared 
 in the waters of Asia, he proposed to wait for the monitors on the way before 
 undertaking the sinking of a second Spanish squadron. 
 
 The Colonel Commandant of the United States Marine Corps states: 
 
 "During the war 57 vessels had marine guards, varying in strength from 
 ■80 down to 6 men, making a total of 2,055 enlisted men at sea. There were 
 •623 in the battalion and 50 at Key West, making a total of 2,728." 
 
628 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 A battalion of marines saw very active service at Guantanamo. Land- 
 ing on the loth of June at Guantanamo Bay, they were on the nth attacked 
 by a superior force of Spaniards, and a constant fire was kept up for three 
 days. The bay was important, as it was the only one where the vessels could 
 take shelter in the hurricane season. The necessity for the marines to hold 
 their position is stated in the official report of the commander: "Owing to "the 
 dense undergrowth, affording safe shelter to the Spanish sharpshooters, it 
 would have been impossible for the vessels, by shelling the shore, to keep the 
 enemy from harassing those on board the ships with their Mauser rifles to 
 such an extent as to make it dangerous for them to remain there." 
 
 Admiral Pluddeman has written critically on the matters of interest in 
 our naval experience, and says of Guantanamo: "In the entrance of Guanta- 
 namo Bay the Americans found quite a number of mines. These might have 
 caused considerable damage if they had operated, for the Americans entered 
 the bay without any precautionary measures, and the screws of the Marble- 
 head tore two of the mines loose from their anchorages so that they rose to 
 the surface of the water. Then the whole bay was systematically searched 
 for mines. This was done on June 2 1 by the boats of the Marblehead and 
 Newark. Four steam launches, under the fire of Spanish infantry hiding on 
 the shore, fished up thirteen mines on the first day with light chains they 
 were towing. The ships, of course, fired on the hostile position, which was 
 soon abandoned. 
 
 "During the next few days thirty-five more mines were found and taken 
 ashore. These proved to be charged with 120 pounds of guncotton each. 
 Many of them showed evidences of having been in contact with ships' bottoms 
 or screws, but the firing mechanism was not capable of operating. The 
 fuses showed such grave defects that it was quite evident that the work of 
 constructing them had not been done under the supervision of a superior. 
 
 "The mines raised in Santiago Harbor after the surrender of the place 
 proved on the whole to be in better condition. Still, the outer row contain- 
 ing contact mines was of doubtful value. One mine was found, for instance, 
 in which half of the guncotton had been burned, leaving no doubt that it had 
 been in contact with some object — probably the Merrimac — and that the fuse 
 had acted, but that the guncotton charge had become spoiled. 
 
 "The second row of mines (electric) was in pretty good condition, and 
 might easily have destroyed one or more ships if an attempt had been riiade 
 
PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 
 
 629 
 
 to force the entrance. These latter mines contained a charge of 200 pounds 
 of guncotton each. All the mines in Guantanamo as well as Santiago Bay- 
 were thickly overgrown with barnacles and seaweeds. ' ' 
 
 This covers a point of some delicacy, owing to the controversy over the 
 management of the fleet off Santiago in confining the assaults at the mouth of 
 the harbor to cannonading. A study of the whole matter of the reports from 
 both sides leads to the conclusion that Admiral Sampson was right in his 
 objection to Shaffer's change of plans after arrival, the weak point of the 
 defense being at the mouth of the harbor, which could have been forced 
 easily if troops had been landed to drive the Spaniards from their lower 
 batteries, those of the' old guns on the castle not being serious in modern war- 
 fare. It appears, however, that the dangers of driving into the mouth of the 
 harbor were not as great as imagined. All experiences with Spanish tor- 
 pedoes and mines discredit them, and plainly, if after Cervera's fleet had dis- 
 appeared during the hours the harbor was open, the only grave peril was in 
 the navigation of the difficult channel. However, it was Secretary Long's 
 order that a battleship should not be "risked," but he evidently did not mean 
 a literal interpretation of the caution. 
 
 It is ungracious to find fault systematically, arid to award praise in stinted 
 measure of either Sampson or Shafter, when the closing scenes were the 
 annihilation of the fleet of Spain and the surrender of her army and of the 
 ancient capital of Cuba; however, the distinguished Admiral and General 
 are responsible for the rather fierce exchange of letters that so grounded and 
 inflamed controversy that the grounds upon which it was established and the 
 temper with which it was conducted cannot be neglected. The abundance of 
 glory is insufficient to establish harmony. 
 

 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 The Army of the United States. 
 
 Its Organization and Numbers Before and During the War— The Strength and Location 
 of the Several Army Corps— The Distribution of the Military Forces and their Num- 
 bers—Casualties During the War, in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines— Deaths 
 in the Camps— The Incidents of Hardship and the Yellow Scandals— Spanish Account 
 of the Valor of their Troops and Story of the Conflict— Scarcity of Provisions -Cruel 
 Battles at El Caney and San Juan— Suffering in Santiago. 
 
 The regular army of the United States at the beginning of the war with 
 Spain was composed of 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men. Of general 
 officers and staff corps there were 532, with 2,026 enlisted men; cavalry, 437 
 officers, 6,047 enlisted men; artillery, 288 officers, 4,486 enlisted men; 
 infantry, 886 officers, enlisted men 12,828. 
 
 The army was increased in March and April, 1898. In the four months 
 following the declaration of war with Spain, the enlisted men in the regular 
 army numbered, in May, 41, 934; June, 49,513; July, S3,93i; August, 56,365. 
 These figures include 5,365 men of the hospital corps. The regular officers 
 were 2,191 in May, and 2,323 in August. The enlistments in the regular 
 army were, in May, 9,569; June, 9,311; July, 6,586; August, 3,400. There 
 were 387 regular officers appointed in the volunteer army. There were 15 
 major-generals, 45 brigadier-generals, 86 officers of volunteer regiments. 
 The enlisted men in the infantry of the .volunteer army were, in May, 118,580; 
 June, 153, 355; July, 203,461; August, 188,947. 
 
 The searching care taken in filling the ranks of the regular army appears 
 in a strong light in the remarkable figures of this paragraph from the Ad- 
 jutant-General's report: 
 
 Of the 29,521 accepted applicants, 24,490 were native born and 5,031 of 
 foreign birth; 27,140 were white, 2,345 colored, and 36 Indians (scouts). The 
 enlistments numbered 24,248, and the reenlistments, 5,273. Excluding 
 reenlistments, the percentage of native-born applicants for original enlistment 
 was 87, the balance being naturalized citizens. The reports show that the 
 
 ' 630 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 631 
 
 recruiting officers making the 29,207 enlistments embraced in the first two 
 items of the foregoing list rejected 98,277 applicants — a little over 77 per cent 
 of the number seeking enlistment — as lacking in legal, mental, and moral or 
 physical qualifications; 5,209 of these were rejected as aliens, and 4,788 for 
 illiteracy. 
 
 The aggregate strength of the regular and of the volunteer armies foi 
 each of the months of May, June, July and August was as follows: 
 
 May — 
 
 Regular army 
 Volunteer army . 
 
 Aggregate . . 
 
 June — ■ 
 
 Regular army . , 
 Volunteer army . 
 
 Aggregate . 
 
 July- 
 
 Regular army 
 Volunteer army . , 
 
 Aggregate . , 
 
 August — 
 
 Regular army 
 Volunteer army . 
 
 Aggregate . . . 11,108 263,609 274,717 
 
 The Adjutant-General's repott states that May 31, a month and tei\ days 
 -after the declaration of war, nearly 125,000 volunteers were mustered into 
 service, and "the suspension of hostilities, resulting from the short but bril- 
 liant operations of the army against Santiago, Cuba, leadingto its capture and 
 •of that of the Spanish forces defending the city, the surrender of Spanish 
 troops in Porto Rico, no less than the successful operations of our troops in 
 the Philippines, led to the determination to muster out 100,000 men, nearly 
 ■one-half of the entire volunteer force, and the first order looking to that end 
 was issued on the i8th of August." 
 
 The Adjutant-General speaks of the delicate duty of selecting the organi- 
 zations to be mustered out, it being impossible "to preserve the absolutely 
 •correct arithmetical proportion, in the first instance, to the State quotas, and, 
 in the second, to the actual number of troops from the several states, ' ' and he 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted men. 
 
 Grand total, 
 
 2,191 
 
 6,224 
 
 41,934 
 , 118,580 
 
 44,125 
 124,804 
 
 8,41s 
 
 160,514 
 
 168,929 
 
 2,198 
 7,169 
 
 49,513 
 153,355 
 
 51,7" 
 160,524 
 
 9,367 
 
 202,868 
 
 212,235 
 
 2,327 
 8,633 
 
 53,931 
 203,461 
 
 56,258 
 212,094 
 
 10,960 
 
 257,392 
 
 268,352 
 
 2,323 
 8,785 
 
 56,365 
 207,244 
 
 58,688 
 216,029 
 
632 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 adds : "Since the signing of the Protocol the officers and men of the volunteer 
 regiments have remained at their posts of duty, in most cases at great per- 
 sonal sacrifice. That they have done this cheerfully and without complaint 
 makes it all the~more desirable that a speedy increase of the regular army be 
 provided for in order that the volunteers may be released from further service 
 and be allowed to return to their peaceful vocations." 
 
 Relating to staff organization, the Adjutant-General remarks: "If, as 
 recommended, additional officers are given the line of the army, so as to give 
 plenty of trained officers for staff duty in time of war, the main objection will 
 have been met ; and it is doubtful if, under all the conditions peculiar to this 
 government, a general reorganization of the staff, or the adoption of new 
 systems, will be found to be desirable ; certainly nothing radical should be 
 entered upon. 
 
 "Under the present system, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan conducted 
 great and successful campaigns ; it has worked well in our Indian wars, and 
 it is confidently asserted that, when the work of the staif departments in this 
 war is more fully understood, it will receive the approval of military men and 
 of the people generally. That there can be improvements in many ways 
 there is no doubt; that this should be done as the result of experience is also 
 true." 
 
 The regiments of the regular army, with few exceptions, got their orders 
 to proceed to southern points April 15th, and considering the situation of the 
 army, the extent of territory over which the posts were scattered in small 
 detachments, the movements of concentration were executed with remarkable 
 swiftness, order and ease. It was an excellent lesson of mobilization, and the 
 complete success of this initial step made practicable the stroke at Santiago 
 which proved fatal to Spanish pretension, preventing a lingering schooling of 
 volunteers in the several camps for a greater enterprise vmder the Major- 
 General Commanding, to resemble the important instruction imparted when for 
 many months of "masterly inactivity" under McClelland all was "quiet on 
 the Potomac." The infantry regiments' changes were made in the general 
 shifting in this Order : 
 
 First United States Infantry, California, to New Orleans. 
 Second United States Infantry, Montana and North Dakota, to Chicka- 
 mauga Park, Ga. 
 
 Third United States Infantry, Minnesota, to Mobile, Ala. 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 633 
 
 Fourth United States Infantry, Illinois, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Fifth United States Infantry, Georgia, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Sixth United States Infantry, Kentucky, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Seventh United States Infantry, Colorado, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. 
 
 Eighth United States Infantry, Wyoming, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. 
 
 Ninth United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Tenth United States Infantry," Oklahoma, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Eleventh United States Infantry, Missouri and Arkansas, Mobile, Ala. 
 
 Twelfth United States Infantry, Nebraska, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. 
 
 Thirteenth United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Sixteenth United States Infantry, Idaho and Washington, to Chicka- 
 mauga Park, Ga. . 
 
 Seventeenth United States Infantry, Ohio, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Eighteenth United States Infantry, Texas, to New Orleans. La. 
 
 Nineteenth United States Infantry, Michigan, to Mobile, Ala. 
 
 Twentieth United States Infantry, Kansas, to Mobile, Ala. 
 
 Twenty-first United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Twenty-second United States Infantry, Nebraska, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Twenty-third United States Infantry, Texas, to New Orleans, La. 
 
 Twenty-fourth United States Infantry, Utah, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. 
 
 Twenty-fifth United States Infantry, Montana, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. 
 
 Company E, Engineers, West Point, to Tampa, Fla. 
 
 Seven army corps were formed by order of the President, May 7th, com- 
 bining both regulars and volunteers, and the Philippine expeditionary force 
 was June 21st the Eighth Corps. The First and Third corps were organized 
 at Camp Thomas, Ga., Major-General John R. Brooke commanding the First, 
 and Major-General James F. Wade the Third. The combined strength of 
 these corps, on the last day of the month of April, May, June, July and 
 
 ' ^^ ■ Officers. Enlisted men. 
 
 April 383 6,328 
 
 May 2,igi 42,036 
 
 June 2,004 56,544 
 
 July 1,563 42,260 
 
 August 436 12,725 
 
 In July the First Division of the First Corps, under General Wilson, was 
 detailed for duty in Porto Rico, and August 22 the Second and Third divisions 
 of that corps were sent to Lexington, Ky., and Knoxville, Tenn., respectively. 
 
 The Third Army Corps was transferred early in September to the camp 
 established at Anniston, Ala., and by the end of the month but a small 
 detachment remained at Camp Thomas, Ga. 
 
634 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The Second Corps, Major-General William M. Graham commanding, 
 
 was organized at Camp Alger, Virginia, and removed when that camp was 
 
 discontinued in July to Ca,mp Meade, Middletown, Pa. The Strength of the 
 
 Corps was: 
 
 Officers. Enlisted men. 
 
 May 903 17.406 
 
 June ... 887 22,624 
 
 July 802 21,373 
 
 August 768 20,686 
 
 The headquarters of the Fourth Corps, Major-General John J. Coppinger 
 
 commanding, were at Mobile, and the strength present was : 
 
 ' Officers. Enlisted men. 
 
 May 343 7,45^ 
 
 June 763 20,053 
 
 July 548 13,485 
 
 August. 413 9,933 
 
 The Fifth Army Corps, Major-General William R. Shaffer commanding, 
 
 was organized June 7th at Tampa, and embarked for Santiago June 14th. 
 
 The strength of this corps for the months indicated was as follows: 
 
 Officers. Enlisted men. 
 
 May 769 15,657 
 
 June 791 14,945 
 
 July 840 18,619 
 
 August 518 14,347 
 
 This corps, seventy days after embarking from Tampa, was returned to 
 the United States, owing to the prevalence of sickness. They had in the 
 meantime received the surrender of nearly double their number of Spaniards 
 at Santiago. 
 
 The Sixth Corps was not organized. General Wilson, who was to have 
 commanded it, was assigned to the first division of the first corps. 
 
 The Seventh Corps was commanded by Major-General Fitzhugh Lee. 
 
 Its strength was: 
 
 Officers. Enlisted men. 
 
 May 496 8,847 
 
 June 781 i8,37s 
 
 July 909 23,193 
 
 August 1,025 27,817 
 
 The Eighth (Philippine Corps), Major-General Wesley Merritt command- 
 ing, sailed from San Francisco for Manila in seven expeditions, the first, 
 under General Thomas Anderson, 115 officers and 2,386 enlisted men. They 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 635 
 
 sailed May 25th and arrived June 30th. The second expedition, General F. 
 V. Green, 158 officers and 3,428 men, sailed Jtine isth and arrived July 17th. 
 The third expedition, General Merritt, 197 officers and 4,650 enlisted men, 
 sailed June 27th and 2gth, and arrived July 25th and 31st. The fourth. Gen- 
 eral E. S. Otis, 42 officers and 1,640 enlisted men, sailed July isth and arrived 
 August 2ist. The fifth expedition. Colonel H. C. Kessler, 54 officers and 
 1,294 men, sailed July-igth and arrived August 24th. 
 
 The sixth expedition, General H. G. Otis, sailed July 23d and arrived 
 August 24th, 50 officers and 846 men. The seventh expedition, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Lee Stover, 25 officers and 814 enlisted men, sailed July 29th and 
 arrived August 31st. The total of the seven expeditions was 641 officers and 
 15,058 enlisted men. Since that date, October 19, 27, 28 and 30, the troops 
 that sailed for Manila were 99 officers and 2,565 men. The grand total of 
 United States officers and enlisted men who have made the voyage from San 
 Francisco to Manila is 17,363. 
 
 The subjoined table exhibits the strength and distribution of the Army of 
 the United States through the Spanish war: 
 
 Resume; of strength and distribution of troops. 
 
 Command. 
 
 May. 
 
 o 
 
 ■aa 
 
 June. 
 
 m 
 o 
 
 ■aa 
 
 July. 
 
 O 
 
 ■aa 
 
 August. 
 
 O 
 
 PI i 
 
 Department of California 
 
 Department of Colorado 
 
 Department of Columbia 
 
 Department of Dakota 
 
 Department of the East 
 
 Department of the Gulf 
 
 Department of the Lakes 
 
 Department of the l^Iissouri 
 
 First and Third Corps 
 
 Second Corps 
 
 Fourth Corps 
 
 Fifth Corps 
 
 Seventh Corps 
 
 Eighth Corps (Dept. of Pacific) 
 
 Porto Rico 
 
 Department of Santiago 
 
 At State Camps, en route, at 
 recyaiting stations, on fur- 
 lough, etc 
 
 45 
 
 21 
 
 24 
 
 530 
 
 230 
 
 18 
 
 23 
 
 2,191 
 
 903 
 
 342 
 
 769 
 
 496 
 
 636 
 
 2,176 
 956 
 
 431 
 
 662 
 
 12,093 
 
 4,921 
 
 221 
 
 757 
 42,036 
 17,406 
 
 7.456 
 15.657 
 
 8,847 
 13.179 
 
 87 
 39 
 38 
 16 
 586 
 232 
 
 31 
 
 20 
 
 2,004 
 
 867 
 
 763 
 
 791 
 
 781 
 865 
 
 1,716 
 
 1,250 
 
 997 
 
 722 
 
 15,576 
 
 5,792 
 
 597 
 
 591 
 
 56,544 
 
 22,624 
 
 20,058 
 
 14,945 
 
 18,375 
 
 22,124 
 
 70 
 
 41 
 
 41 
 
 67 
 
 577 
 
 249 
 
 28 
 
 20 
 
 1,563 
 
 802 
 
 548 
 
 890 
 
 909 
 
 917 
 
 377 
 
 1,745 
 1,329 
 1,256 
 2,056 
 17,240 
 7,228 
 646 
 
 598 
 42,260 
 
 21,378 
 13,485 
 18,619 
 
 23,193 
 
 22,536 
 
 9.084 
 
 2,089 
 
 33,716 
 
 2,227 
 
 20,957 
 
 3,861 
 
 74,739 
 
 100 
 40 
 43 
 32 
 804 
 280 
 20 
 
 19 
 
 438 
 768 
 413 
 518 
 1,025 
 899 
 641 
 299 
 
 4,771 
 
 2,390 
 1,516 
 1,416 
 
 955 
 
 23,248 
 
 7,262 
 
 185 
 
 522 
 
 12,725 
 
 20,688 
 
 9.933 
 
 14.347 
 
 27,817 
 
 22,046 
 
 16,332 
 
 6,748 
 
 95,479 
 
 Grand total.. 
 
 8.415 
 
 160,514 
 
 9,367 
 
 202,868 
 
 10,960 
 
 257.932 
 
 II,IOf 
 
 263,609 
 
636 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Casualties. — The ,following is a statement of the several actions in which 
 United States troops were engaged during the war with Spain, and of the 
 losses sustained by them from April 21 to August 13, 1898: 
 
 Operations in Cuba. — May 2 : Point. Arbolitos, Companies E and G, 
 First Infantry, under Capt. J.H. Dorst, Fourth Cavalry. No casualties. 
 
 Siege and Surrender of Santiago, June' 22 to July 17. (Maj.-Gen. Wil- 
 liam R. Shafter, commanding Fifth Army Corps) : 
 
 June 24. — La Quasina: Cavalry division, Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, 
 commanding. Second Cavalry Brigade, Brig. -Gen. S. B. M. Young. 
 
 Present for duty, June 20, 74 officers and 1,067 enlisted men. Killed, one 
 officer and 15 enlisted men; wounded, 6 officers and 44 enlisted men. 
 
 Officers killed and wounded, 7. Killed: Capt. A. K. Capron, First 
 United States Volunteer Cavalry. Wounded: Majs. J. M. Bell, First 
 Cavalry, and A. O. Brodie, First United States Volunteer Cavalry; Capts. T. 
 T. Knox, First Cavalry, and J. H. McClintock, First United States Volunteer 
 Cavalry; First Lieuts. G. L. Byram, First Cavalry, and J. R. Thomas, Jr., 
 First United States Volunteer Cavalry. 
 
 July 1-12. — Operations against Santiago, embracing the actions at San 
 Juan, El Caney, and Aguadores, July 1-3, and actions around Santiago, 
 July 10-12. Present for duty, June 30, 858 officers and 17,358 enlisted 
 men. 
 
 Killed: 22 officers and 222 enlisted men; wounded, 93 officers and 1,288 
 enlisted men. 
 
 Officers killed and wounded, 122. Killed: Col. C. A. Wikoff, Twenty- 
 second Infantry; Lieut.-Col. J. M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry; Maj. A. G. 
 Forse, First Cavalry; Capts. C. W. Rowell, Second Infantry; A. M. 
 Wetherill, Sixth Infantry; John Drum, Tenth Infantry; T. W. Morrison, 
 Sixteenth Infantry, and William O'Neill, First United States Volunteer 
 Cavalry; First Lieuts. W. E. Shipp and W. H. Smith, Tenth Cavalry; J. G. 
 Ord, Sixth Infantry; G. H. Field, Second Massachusetts Infantry; Second 
 Lieuts. J. J. Bernard, Fourth Infantry; E. N. Benchley, Sixth Infantry; T. 
 A. Wansboro, Seventh Infantry; L. H. Lewis, Ninth Infantry; W. A. 
 Sater, Thirteenth Infantry; D. M. Michie, Seventeenth Infantry; J. A. 
 Guerney and J. N. Augustin, Twenty-fourth Infantry; H. L. McCorkle, 
 Twenty-fifth Infantry, and Acting Assistant Surgeon H. W. Danforth, who 
 was on duty with Ninth Cavalry. 
 
GENERAL W. F. R.\XDOLPH. 
 
 
 
 BOB WEENN AND BILLY LAENED. 
 
 /i'. 
 
 I 
 
 TRAIN OP PACK MULES. 
 
 SERGEANT DAN HEWITT. 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 639 
 
 Wounded: Brig. -Gen. H. S. Hawkins. Lieut. -Cols. Henry Carroll, 
 Ninth Cavalry; H. C. Egbert, Sixth Infantry; W-. S. Worth, Thirteenth 
 Infantry; J. T. Haskell, Seventeenth Infantry; E. H. Liscum, Twenty-fourth 
 Infantry; J. H. Patterson, Twenty-second Infantry. Majs. H. W. Wessells, 
 Third Cavalry; T. J. Wint, Tenth Cavalry; J. H. Smith, Second Infantry; 
 A. W. Corliss, Seventh Infantry; S. H. Lincoln and R. I. Eskridge, Tenth 
 Infantry; P. H. Ellis, Thirteenth Infantry, and W. C. Hayes, First Ohio 
 Cavalry. Capts. H. L. Mills, A. A. G. Volunteers (first lieutenant, First 
 Cavalry); G. K. Hunter and G. A. Dodd, Third Cavalry; J. B. Kerr and A. 
 P. Blpcksom, Sixth Cavalry; C. W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry; John Bigelow, 
 Jr., Tenth Cavalry; C. D. Parkhurst, Second Artillery; W. J. Turner, 
 Second Infantry; Z. W. Torrey and G. B. Walker, Sixth Infantry; J. B. 
 Jackson, Seventh Infantry; R. C. Van Vliet, Tenth Infantry; James 
 Fornance, J. B. Guthrie, and H. G. Cavanaugh, Thirteenth Infantry ; Willianl 
 -Lassiter, W. C. McFarland, and T. C. Woodbury, Sixteenth Infantry; H. B. 
 Moon and J. B. Rodman, Twentieth Infantry; F. B. Jones, J. J. Crittenden, 
 and Theodore Mosher, Twenty-second Infantry; A. C. Ducat and J. J. 
 Brereton, Twenty-fourth Infantry; W. S. Warrener, Second Massachusetts 
 Infantry, and Capt. M. J. Henry, commissary of subsistence volunteers. 
 First Lieuts. Arthur Thayer, A. C. Merrillat, and O. B. Meyer, Third 
 Cavalry; W. S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry; R. L. Livermore, E. D. Anderson, 
 and M. H. Barnum, Tenth Cavalry; W. C. Neary, Fourth Infantry; J. S. 
 ^rissard, Seventh Infantry; J. R. Seyburn, Eighth Infantry; Carl Koops, 
 Tenth Infantry; A. B. Scott, Thirteenth Infantry; S. W. Dunning, Sixteenth 
 Infantry; W. M. Dickinson, Seventeenth Infantry; G. J. Godfrey, Twenty- 
 second Infantry; H. G. Lyon and J. E. Brett, Twenty-fc^urth Infantry; R. 
 C. Day and J. A. Carr, First United States Volunteer Cavalry. Second 
 Lieuts. W. C. Short, Sixth Cavalry; F. R. McCoy, T. A. Roberts., H. C. 
 Whitehead, and H. O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry; B. H. Wells and W. J. Lutz, 
 Second Infantry; J. H. Hughes, Fourth Infantry; L. H. Gross, C. N 
 Purdy, John Robertson, R. S. Turman, and W. H. Simons, Sixth Infantry 
 H. A. Lafferty, Seventh Infantry; M. C. Saville, Tenth Infantry; W. E 
 Dove and Clark Churchman, Twelfth Infantry; L. S. Sorley and R. E 
 Spence, Sixteenth Infantry; B. F. Hardaway, Seventeenth Infantry; F. R 
 Meade, Twenty-first Infantry; W. H. Wassell, Twenty-second Infantry; 
 Albert Laws, Twenty -fourth Infantry; J. S. Murdock and H. L. Kinnison, 
 
640 THE ARMY- OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Twenty-fifth Infantry; D. J. Moynehan and C. D. Hapgood, Second Massa- 
 chusetts Infantry; W.» E. Trull, Seventy-first New York Infantry; D. J. 
 Leahy and H. K. Devereaux, First United States Volunteer Cavalry, and 
 Acting Second Lieut, (cadet M. A.) Ernest A. Haskell, First United States 
 Volunteer Cavalry. 
 
 Operations in Porto Rico, July 25 to August 13 (Maj.-Gen. Nelson A. 
 Miles, commanding) : 
 
 July 25. — Guanica road: i officer and 3 enlisted men wounded. 
 
 August 5. — Guayamo: 4 enlisted men wounded. 
 
 August 8.— Four miles north of Guayamo: 5 enlisted men wounded. 
 
 August 9. — Near Cdamo: 6 enlisted men wounded. 
 
 August ]o. — Hormigueros: i enlisted man killed; i officer and 15 enlisted 
 men wounded. Officer wounded: First Lieut. J. C. Byron, Eighth Cavalry, 
 A. D. C. to General Schwan. 
 
 August 12. — Pass near Arbonito: 2 enlisted men killed; 2 officers and 3 
 enlisted men wounded. Officers wounded: Capt. F. T. Lee, Third Wisconsin 
 Infantry, and Lieut. J. P. Hains, Third Artillery. 
 
 August 13. — At crossing of the Rio. Prieto, near Las Marias: No 
 casualties. 
 
 The total casualties in Porto Rico were 3 enlisted men killed and 4 
 officers and 36 enlisted men wounded. 
 
 Operations in Manila, Philippines, July 30 to August 13 (Maj.-Gen. 
 Wesley Merritt, commanding) : 
 
 July 30 - August s. — In the trenches before Manila: Thirteen enlisted 
 men killed; 7 officers and 57 enlisted men wounded. 
 
 Officers wounded: Capts. C. V. Hobbs, Third Artillery, Reinhold Richter, 
 First California Infantry, and J. A. Loar, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry; 
 First Lieuts. E. F. Davis, First California Infantry, and R. D. Laird, Tenth 
 Pennsylvania Infantry; Second Lieuts. A. J. Buttermore and G. L. Gordon, 
 Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry. 
 
 August 13.— Assault on Manila: 4 enlisted men killed; 3 officers and 39 
 enlisted men wounded. 
 
 Officers wounded: Capts. Oscar Seabach, A. W. Bjomstad, and First 
 Lieut. C. G. Bunker, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry. 
 
 The total casualties in Manila were: 17 enlisted men killed, 10 officers and 
 96 men wounded. 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 64) 
 
 Grand total of casualties in killed and wounded during the war with 
 
 Spain : 
 
 , Killed ^ , Wounded ^ 
 
 Enlisted Enlisted 
 
 Where — Officers. men. Officers. men. 
 
 Cuba 23 237 99 1,332 
 
 Porto Rico ...... 3 4 36 
 
 Manila . . 17 10 96 
 
 Total 23 257 113 1,464 -^ 
 
 The number of deaths from all causes, between May i and September 30 
 inclusive, as reported to the Adjutant-General's office up to October 3, were: 
 Killed, 23 officers and 257 enlisted men; died of wounds, 4 officers and 61 
 enlisted men; died of disease, 80 officers and 2,485 enlisted men. Total, 107 
 officers and 2,803 enlisted men, being an aggregate of 2,910 out of a total 
 force of 274,717 officers and men, or a percentage of lyf^-if- 
 
 Statement showing the embarkation of Spanish prisoners, officers, and 
 enlisted men, and the wives of officers and their children over 5 years of age, 
 priests, monks, and sisters of charity, from Cuba to Spain, as reported to the 
 Quartermaster-General's office by Mr. Solon F. Massey, agent, Quarter- 
 master's Department: 
 
 Name of vessel. 
 
 Where 
 embarked. 
 
 "1 fa 
 Pi 
 
 CU 
 
 O 
 
 Number of persons. 
 
 ■aa 
 
 O cj 
 
 
 S 5 
 
 o 
 
 Alicante 
 
 Isle de Luzon 
 
 Covadonga 
 
 Villaverde 
 
 Isla de Panay 
 
 P. de Satrustegui.. 
 
 Montevideo 
 
 Cheribon 
 
 Colon 
 
 Colon 
 
 Leo XIII 
 
 Sanlgnacio 
 
 Leonora 
 
 Ciudad de Cadiz..., 
 
 San Augustin 
 
 San Francisco 
 
 Santiago 
 
 Santiago 
 
 Santiago 
 
 Santiago 
 
 Santiago 
 
 Santiago 
 
 Santiago 
 
 Santiago 
 
 Santiago 
 
 Guantanamo 
 
 Guantanamo 
 
 Guantanamo 
 
 Guantanamo 
 
 Guantanamo 
 
 Guantanamo 
 
 Guantanamo 
 
 Aug. 9 
 Aug. 14 
 Aug. 16 
 Aug. 19 
 Aug. 19 
 Aug. 22 
 Aug. 25 
 Aug. 27 
 Aug. 28 
 Aug. 30 
 Sept. I 
 Sept. 3 
 Sept. 6 
 Sept. 12 
 Sept. 17 
 Sept. 17 
 
 38 
 137 
 109 
 
 5 
 
 99 
 128 
 
 136 
 
 18 
 
 100 
 
 23 
 113 
 
 59 
 15 
 53 
 65 
 18 
 
 1,069 
 2,056 
 2,148 
 
 565 
 1,599 
 2,359 
 2,108 
 
 905 
 1,316 
 
 726 
 2,209 
 1,408 
 1,118 
 
 800 
 
 588 
 
 1,107 
 
 2,193 
 
 2,257 
 
 617 
 
 1,698 
 
 2,487 
 2,244 
 
 923 
 1,416 
 
 749 
 2,322 
 
 1,467 
 
 1,133 
 
 53 
 
 865 
 
 606 
 
 I 
 16 
 
 34 
 18 
 
 19 
 31 
 53 
 12 
 36 
 3 
 51 
 
 10 
 
 5 
 24 
 45 
 16 
 
 7 
 37 
 69 
 25 
 23 
 
 2 
 
 57 
 10 
 
 13 
 
 1,124 
 2,237 
 2,336 
 
 651 
 1,729 
 ^=,555 
 2,368 
 
 960 
 1,475 
 
 754 
 2,430 
 
 1,499 
 
 1,133 
 
 86 
 
 910 
 
 617 
 
 Total.. 
 
 1,163 
 
 20,974' 22,137 
 
 331 
 
 348 
 
 27 22,864 
 
642 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Principal camps of United States troops, dates of establishment, and 
 number of deaths by disease, accidents, etc., at each to September 30, as 
 reported to the Adjutant-General's Office: 
 
 Date of 
 
 Camps — establishment. Deaths. 
 
 Camp Thomas, Chickamauga Park, Ga. . . Apr. 14 425 
 
 Camp Cuba Libre, Jacksonville, Fla. . . May 26 246 
 
 -Tampa, Fla May 2 56 
 
 Cuba (not including killed or died of wounds) June 22 427 
 
 At sea, en route from Cuba to Montauk Point Aug. and Sept. 87 
 
 -Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, N. Y. . . Aug. 7 257 
 
 Manila, Philippine Islands June 30 63 
 
 Porto Rico July 25 137 
 
 Camp Alger, near Falls Church and vicinity May 18 107 
 
 Camps in San Francisco May 7 139 
 
 Camp Poland, Knoxville, Tenn Aug. 21 23 
 
 Camp Shipp, Anniston, Ala. . . . Sept. 3 12 
 
 Camp Meade, near Middletown, Pa. . , . Aug. 24 64 
 
 Camp Hamilton, Lexington, Ky. . . . Aug. 23 29 
 
 Camp Wheeler, Huntsville, Ala Aug. 17 , 35 
 
 At posts, minor camps, etc • 378 
 
 Total 2,485 
 
 The report of the Quartermaster-General, M. J. Ludington, gives an idea 
 of the magnitude of the problem of supplying an army of 275,000 men with 
 the machinery and stores provided for an army of 25,000. The General says: 
 
 "This Department set upon this task without a moment's delay; every 
 known expedient was at once resorted to with a view to obtaining the neces- 
 sary quartermaster supplies. Many difficulties were in the way. Contracts 
 were promptly entered into for all the articles of clothing and camp equipage 
 for which there would be an early demand, great care being taken to prevent 
 the supply of articles of inferior quality. The kerseys and flannels of stand- 
 ard quality used for making army blouses and trousers were not to be had in 
 the market, and it was necessary to have them manufactured. In the mean- 
 time, the Department, as far as possible, endeavored to procure articles con- 
 forming as nearly as practicable to existing standards, but had to resort, at 
 first, to some extent, to the purchase of dark-blue trousers, so that the men 
 might be quickly supplied. ' ' 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 643 
 
 The peace and war figures of the principal articles purchased or con- 
 tracted for are instructive when the two periods are contrasted : 
 
 July 1, 1897, to 
 
 Apr. 30, 1898, 10 
 
 months peace 
 
 period. 
 
 May 1, 1898, to 
 
 Aug. 15. 1898, 3% 
 
 months war 
 
 period. 
 
 22,000 
 
 546,338 
 
 
 274,232 
 
 77,000 
 
 230,000 
 
 
 31,601 
 
 
 31,590 
 
 
 50,000 
 
 43.340 
 
 1,056,990 
 
 
 153,169 
 
 18,040 
 
 476,705 
 
 11,000 
 
 588,800 
 
 ... 
 
 129,000 
 
 32,9-5 
 
 325,385 
 
 
 548,634 
 
 
 76,093 
 
 27,95° 
 
 782,303 
 
 
 1,996,699 
 
 40,006 
 
 150,942 
 
 Blankets, wool 
 
 Blouses 
 
 Caps, forage 
 
 Canvas, fatigue coats . 
 Canvas fatigue trousers, pairs 
 Drawers, canton flannel, pairs 
 Drawers, summer, pairs . 
 Field and summer uniforms 
 Hats, campaign .... 
 
 Leggins 
 
 Overcoats 
 
 Ponchos, rubber .... 
 Shirts, dark blue flannel 
 Shoes, barrack, pairs . . 
 Shoes, calfskin, pairs . 
 Stockings, cotton, pairs 
 Stockings, woolen, pairs 
 
 It is not surprising to learn that "the shoes procured at the outbreak of 
 hostilities, and which were found to be essential for the immediate equipment 
 of the organizations then being rapidly mustered into service, did not conform 
 altogether to the newly adopted army shoe." 
 
 This does not look like inattention: "The clothing of part of the troops 
 returning from Cuba was ordered to be destroyed to prevent contagion, and 
 the issue to each of the men, free of charge, of another suit in lieu of the one 
 destroyed was authorized. Similar issue was also made to the men in hos- 
 pitals whose clothing was destroyed for the same reason." 
 
 There is much said in few words in this paragraph : 
 
 "Fourteen ships were chartered to June 30, 1898, on the Pacific coast, 
 having a total tonnage of 41, 152 and carrying capacity of 629 officers and 13,059 
 men, with their complete outfit of camp and garrison equipage, arms, ammu- 
 nition, medical and subsistence stores for a voyage of over 7,000 miles. " And 
 this was without a serious accident. The movements of troops up to Septem- 
 ber 15 was: to Cuba,. 28,195; to Porto Rico, 17,460; to Manila, 16,405; to 
 
644 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Honolulu, 6^9; returned from Cuba, 21,686; returned from Porto Rico, 5,541; 
 civilian employes transported, 2,920; the total being 92,863. 
 
 A r6sum^ of the work done by the Quartermaster's Department at 
 Tampa in the short space of four months is as follows: Army corps equipped, 
 2; freight cars handled (loaded or unloaded), 13,239; officers and men trans- 
 ported, 66,478; horses and mules transported, 15,309; horses and mules 
 received, 11,389; horses and mules issued, 9,919; wagons "set up," 604; 
 teams "broken out" (6 mules), 141; teams "broken out" (4 mules), 520; pack 
 trains equipped, 21; wagons and ambulances repaired, 699; transports fitted 
 out, 33; transports cleared, 78. 
 
 The Quartermaster in his general summary observes : "Practically every- 
 thing needed for the largely increased army had to be purchased or manu- 
 factured and then transported to the numerous camps." 
 
 During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, transportation was furnished 
 for 709,617 persons, 60,632 animals, and 1,529,585 tons of war material. 
 
 One of the public complaints, widespread and bitter, of the disadvantages 
 to which our soldiers were exposed when facing the enemy at Santiago and 
 Manila, was that the Spaniards had the advantage of us in smokeless powder, 
 and that their rifle, the Mauser, was an excellent long-range gun. General 
 D. W. Flagler, Chief of Ordnance, gives in his .report to the Secretary of 
 War this interesting information: 
 
 "The especial advantage of the magazine rifle is its reserve of five 
 cartridges in the magazine, the very important advantage of its flatter tra- 
 jectory, and the lighter weight of its ammunition, which enables the soldier 
 to carry more cartridges. The most serious defect of the Springfield rifle 
 during the war was the fact that at the origin nothing but charcoal powder 
 could be furnished for it. As rapidly as possible this defect was overcome, 
 and the manufacture of smokeless ammunition for the caliber .45 rifle was 
 carried on extensively. The large reserve of Springfield rifles on hand will 
 be supplied with smokeless-powder cartridges should their use become neces- 
 sary in the future, a use which is not now anticipated. The arms, however, 
 are being cleaned and repaired and made fit for service as rapidly as 
 turned in. 
 
 "Reports of officers who were in the Santiago campaign, as received by 
 a special board which proceeded to Montauk Point to investigate the subject, 
 confirm the excellence of the magazine rifle, caliber .30, in all respects. 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 645 
 
 Notwithstanding rough usage, unusual exposure in a bad clijnate, which pre- 
 vented the exercise of the usual care in preserving the arm, the breech 
 mechanism is reported to have worked smoothly and well." 
 
 The American magazine rifle has had fastened upon it the name Krag- 
 Jorgensen. General Flagler says: 
 
 "At Springfield Arsenal there were manufactured up to June 30, 1898, 
 some 30,000 magazine rifles, 12,000 magazine carbines, an output of about 
 11,000 more than during the last fiscal year, but this does not show the large 
 increase incident to the war. The maximum was not reached until August 
 13, when about 370 per day, or over 100,000 per year, were being manufac- 
 tured. The average daily output before March 15 was about 120. This put- 
 put was gradually increased to the maximum by working double shifts of men 
 and putting them on as rapidly as was practicable. The utmost output at 
 Springfield with the present plant would not' exceed about 500 per day. In 
 February the manufacturers were given orders to work on smokeless powder to 
 their full capacity. Under these orders, with the charcoal powder obtained, 
 the amount on hand brought the supply up to a reasonably safe point. The 
 first issues of powder for field and siege guns were made from charcoal powder 
 on hand; but before the end of May the supply of smokeless powder was 
 ready, and this was issued thereafter. ' ' 
 
 The Secretary of War remarks : 
 
 "The supply of powder was a most troublesome question at the outbreak 
 of the war. There are only two establishments in this country which manu- 
 facture smokeless powder, and they own patents upon the process. These, 
 however, like all other companies called to aid the government, responded 
 with alacrity, ran their works day and night, and produced in a short time an 
 ample supply. The same can be said for all manufacturers of tents, cloth- 
 ing, all kinds of guns, cartridges, and other war material, and but for their 
 most energetic exertions we would have been sadly deficient." 
 
 The Secretary recommends that there should be 500,000 magazine rifles 
 in our arsenals. General Greeley, in his report on the Signal Service, says 
 the work of the corps "affords a beautiful example of the rapidity and 
 efficiency with which electrical communications can be established and main- 
 tained between military posts and advancing armies when the commanding 
 general of such armies takes proper equipments," and instances: "The peace 
 protocol reached the outposts of Generals Brooke, Wilson, and Henry within 
 
646 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 thirty.-three minutes of the time it was received at Ponce, and thus prevented 
 battles at two points where the troops were moving out." 
 
 One hundred and seventy miles of line were operated in Porto Rico when 
 the end of the war came. General Greeley says : 
 
 "Cables had to be manufactured to order, steamer chartered, cable gear 
 obtained, and the Chief Signal Officer opened negotiations, with commercial 
 telegraph companies whereby the whole system would be harmonious. As a 
 result of two months' labor, the Signal Corps opened a station at Cainanera, 
 Guantanamo Bay, June 20, a day in advance of the landing of General 
 Shaffer's army* and within five minutes telegraphically of the Executive 
 Mansion and War Department. ' ' 
 
 The pages of this volume given to telegrams prove that this marvelous 
 connection between the President and headquarters in the field did not, as has 
 been the rule in wars, cripple the armies, taking the initiative out of the gen- 
 erals commanding and confronting the enemy, but, on the contrary, energized 
 them, and constantly facilitated rather than retarded the decisive movements. 
 
 Next to the belated and scandalous disturbance about fresh "meat, there 
 was the most disheartening palaver and clamorous outcry relating to water 
 in the camps, and the spot selected to overwhelm this storm was the camp at 
 Chickamauga Park. And yet twenty-seven wells were drilled through the 
 solid rock underlying the park, though springs abounded. General H. V. 
 Boynton, of the Park Commission, says: 
 
 "By casing and surrounding the wells at the surface v/ith masonry set in 
 hydraulic cement, surface contamination was rendered impossible. While 
 this work was in progress an emergency pipe line, designed primarily to pro- 
 vide water for cooking, for the large number of animals, and for washing, was 
 recommended and authorized by the Secretfi-y of War, and constructed by the 
 engineer of the park. The intake was established on Chickamauga Creek at 
 the farthest point of park ownership of the stream, and above any possible 
 wash from the camps, in spite of all that has been asserted to the contrary. 
 This stream is fed entirely from mountain springs, and the valley it flows 
 through is exceptionally clean and wholesome. Ten miles of mains and 
 laterals were expeditiously laid, furnishing abundant water to nearly all the 
 camps, and shower baths for all who cared to arrange them. 
 
 "All the springs and wells on the park, and the water of the pipe line, 
 were analyzed by competent chemical authority as soon as any question was 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 647 
 
 raised as to the purity of the water supply, and all in use by troops pro- 
 nounced fit for domestic use, exeept two wells, which at first were regarded 
 as doubtful, and their use stopped, but which were found by more thorough 
 analyses to be good. The pipe-line water was twice analyzed chemically, and 
 once bacteriologically by Dr. C. F. Craig of the army, a recognized authority, 
 and pronounced good. While the water supply of the park was abundant and 
 wholesome, the outcry against it, though not based on analyses, became so 
 general as to lead to much hauling of spring water for considerable distances, 
 to the great inconvenience of the troops and the hospitals, and the unneces- 
 sary disturbance of the country. ' ' 
 
 There is no doubt that a good deal of bad stuff called "beef" was sent to 
 the army, and it has been decorated with the descriptive word "embalmed," 
 while it is asserted that "chemicals" were used, and frightful fluids injected 
 — something different from the common chemistry of salt, we infer. The 
 magnificent energies of the modern journalism were largely bestowed upon 
 this chemical terror, and after a war into which the Administration of the 
 Government was forced when there was a plentiful lack of preparation and 
 through which the Nation passed triumphantly, there was a sensation that 
 rivaled the Dreyfus scandal in France, but fortunately Americans are less 
 excitable and fantastic in expression than Frenchmen. 
 
 The motive forces of the emotion seemed to spring from the soil where 
 there was a failure to cultivate the primary opportunities in the season when 
 the seed was sown for the harvest of events. The personalities that figured 
 in the unseemly proceedings need not be noticed. They were embodiments of 
 vanities and other weaknesses of ostentation that lacks substantiality. The pose 
 of passion that was full of tears and has a tendency to tatters may be forgiven 
 sooner than the pride that stooped to folly and fancies cloudy campaigns. 
 
 Napoleon and Wellington had tormenting troubles with the providers of 
 provisions, meats in particular, for their armies, and prescribed the shooting 
 of the commissaries ; and Patrick Henry heaped an immortality of ridicule 
 upon a contractor who had sold beef to the old Continentals, filling the air 
 with cries of ' ' Beef, beef ! ' ' Some of the journals that in their majestic pre- 
 sumption not only conducted the war, but claimed the honor of causing it, 
 and indulged in the tropical luxuriance of their imagination, sounded the 
 brasses, and blowed the wind about their luxuriant theme. 
 
 There was enough shown of carelessness, experimental or speculative, or 
 
648 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 of alack of executive intelligence in discrimination, to warrant anger, but the 
 exaggeration of details that offend, distort and magnify until wrath is wasted 
 in weariness, and there is a stage set with strange scenery, reminding one of 
 the poetry of a lunatic describing a wilderness in which his mind was lost : 
 
 "Yonder indigenous endogen wave 
 
 Banner-like blades from a mystical bole, 
 And with a vigor perennial, brave 
 Boreal blasts from the Alien pole. ' ' 
 
 Fresh meat is hard to manage in hot countries in good form, whatever 
 may be the experimental chemistry of speculation. The ship anchored near- 
 est the flagship of Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay was a Belgian cold-storage 
 iron steamer from Australia, filled with frozen beef and mutton. A boat-load 
 of it was conveyed to the deck of the Olympia everyday, placed on and cov- 
 ered by a sail, that it might slowly thaw. If the flesh is released from the ice 
 suddenly, if cooked' before the process of thawing is complete, it turns black 
 and cannot be eaten, loses flavor and acts like something "embalmed." Let 
 the thaw occur gradually, and the beef and mutton become — -it is the 
 Admiral's word — "delicious. " 
 
 The fact as to the embalmed beef is that, as it was known the meat of 
 steers became ill-flavored in from twelve to sixteen, hours, there was offered 
 an experiment in fresh meat alleged to have been prepared so that it would 
 remain good seventy hours. It was referred to General Young, who reported 
 against the experiment. Then permission was asked to put .some of it on two 
 transports for "trial. That was granted. The experiment failed, and the 
 stuff was thrown overboard. 
 
 Lieutenant Jose Muller is the Spanish officer who called on Lieutenant 
 Hobson in Morro Castle and insisted upon asking him questions with an air of 
 severity, but was questioned himself, and it finally developed that he had been 
 playing a part of intimidation, he and Hobson separating as good. friends in 
 pleasant fellowship. His account of the battles and capitulation of Santiago 
 de Cuba is valuable, and we quote from his work passages of interest to the 
 American army and all students of its history. He says of the situation of 
 the city in the middle of June : 
 
 "One of the first articles that gave out was flour, and no bread could be 
 baked. Hardtack (galleta) was used instead, but only a few people could pay 
 for it; there was no milk to be had, indispensable for the sick and for babies. 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 649 
 
 The soldiers commenced to eat bread made of rice and rice boiled in water, 
 which weakened them very much; and though they were not suffering actual 
 hunger, everybody knew that calamity was not far off and was inevitable, for 
 no provisions could be expected, either by land or sea." 
 
 It was the scarcity of provisions, Lieutenant MuUer says, that "conipelled 
 General Linares to defend the line, which, beginning at Ermitano and pass- 
 ing through El Caney, San Miguel de Lajas, Quintero Hill and the hills of La 
 Caridad and Veguita, would protect the railway to Sabanilla and Mordn and 
 the aqueduct. If the troops could have maintained this line, they would not 
 have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor would the 
 food, as long as we remained in possession of the cultivated region, have been 
 reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in water, which the soldiers could not 
 stand and which made them unfit for active operations. There was nothing 
 left in Santiago except rice, and only 500,000 extra cartridges outside of the 
 regular supply of the soldiers, namely, 150 each; for although there were 
 many more included in the surrender of the Park, they are of the Remington, 
 Argentine Mauser, and other types, and of calibers differing from those of the 
 Spanish Mauser, which is the weapon carried by almost all of our forces. Of 
 course, 150 cartridges are used up very rapidly. 
 
 "If El Caney and the San Juan position had not been taken we should not 
 have lost our communications with the cultivated region, nor would the 
 aqueduct have been cut, and it is easy enough to understand how much these 
 two things had "to do with later events. 
 
 "The ships would no doubt have reduced the city to ashes and ruin, but 
 there would have been water and more provisions, and the army would have 
 b?en able to maintain itself and fight, at least until the last cartridge was gone. " 
 
 Here the lamentation comes in that the insurgent Cubans had held back 
 Escario's column, with which it is assumed that the long line could have been 
 maintained on the 27th of June. 
 
 "The Vesuvius had discharged two bombs the preceding night, one com- 
 pletely destro5'ing the house of the lighthouse keeper, the other seriously 
 damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of the Mercedes, and a soldier 
 of the garrison." And yet the German Admiral who has been writing of the 
 lessons of America for the benefit of our countrymen pronounces the dyna- 
 mite boat as without value. The Spaniards by watching the transport ships 
 X'ere able to tell approximately the number of the Americans on hand. 
 
650 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 This account is given of the numbers and organization of the defenders 
 of Santiago : 
 
 ' ' The advance post of Caney (a league and a half — about 6 miles — from 
 the city), in command of General Vara del Rey, was defended by three com- 
 panies of the battalion ' Constitucidn' (the 29th), one company of guerrillas 
 on foot, in all 430 men, 40 soldiers of the Santiago regiment, and 50 of the 
 mobilized troops, being a total of 520 men. 
 
 "The line of the precinct (9 kilometers), extending from Dos Caminos del 
 Cobre, west of the city, to the fort of Punta Blanca, to the east, on the sea- 
 shore, was defended by the following forces : 
 
 Corps of sailors from the fleet (four second companies) ... 458 
 
 Four companies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico . 450 
 
 Talavera Battalion, No. 4 (Peninsular) 850 
 
 Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion, No. it . . 440 
 
 Total, army 2,198 
 
 Three companies of mobilized troops 330 
 
 Volunteers : 440 
 
 Total 2,968 
 
 "Also a small number of gunners, for there was not a sufficient number 
 to serve the guns installed. It may therefore be said that there were, in 
 round numbers, 3,000 men. This was the fighting force." There was also 
 the cavalry, the firemen and 970 men at the mouth of the harbor. 
 
 The Spanish story of the battles of El Caney and San Juan is intensely 
 interesting. General Vara del Rey had 520 men, with two Plasincia guns, 
 and the position of San Juan was occupied by 250 men. They claimed that 
 General Wheeler had 12,000 men, a remarkable exaggeration. Another 
 statement is that Wheeler's command was 3,500 men, supported by another 
 brigade, "while Colonel Chaffee, with 2,000 men, attacked the hill and fort of 
 San Juan." Lieutenant Muller says: 
 
 "The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with truly 
 admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney, which General Vara 
 with his 520 men converted into as many fortresses, threw forth a hail of pro- 
 jectiles upon the enemy, while one company after another, without any pro- 
 tection, rushed with veritable fury upon the city. The first company having 
 been decimated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 651' 
 
 soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that expression for 
 want of a better) rather than men ; but they met heroes, and although the 
 houses had been riddled with bullets by the artillery and musketry, and 
 although the streets were obstructed with dead and wounded, El Caney had 
 been converted into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it 
 impossible to go near it. 
 
 "Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost without having 
 stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased for some time, and 
 General Vara del Rey took advantage of this circumstance to have his sol- 
 diers re-form the lines and again get ready for the battle. 
 
 'General Linares, who was repulsing the attacks at the position of San 
 Juan, upon learning the result of these assaults, warmly congratulated the 
 handful of lions in these words: 'When the American army attacked El Caney 
 they had not counted on a general of Vara del Rey's stamp and on troops as 
 fiery and inured to warfare as those he had under his command. ' 
 
 "The fighting commenced once more, and the enemy attacked again and 
 again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, and the 
 Americans, on the contrary, had a great man-f, the battle was no longer pos- 
 sible under these circumstances. The General was wounded almost simul- 
 taneously in both legs by two musket balls, and as he was being carried aw^j 
 on a stretcher, the bullets falling around him like hail, he was killed by a 
 third one, at the same moment as two of the men who were carrying him. 
 
 "The greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two rela- 
 tives of the General) were dead or wounded, as also the majority of the sol- 
 diers. Finally, at 7 p. m., the commander being dead and those ^20 men 
 having been reduced to less than 100, and most of these slightly wounded and 
 bruised, that handful of heroes, for want of forces and a commander, retreated 
 from the site, which for ten hours they had been defending without being able 
 to get any reinforcements, for there were none to be had, and the enemy 
 ■occupied the position in which he in his turn had made such a bold attack. ' ' 
 
 Only eighty of the 520 Spaniards who fought at El Caney returned. The 
 Spaniards organized and entrenched at San Juan, and "the Americans 
 attacked about noon with cannon, machine gun and musket fire. The Spanish 
 position became critical," as "one half of the officers had fallen under the 
 action of the lead that was pouring down upon the line. The enemy was 
 advancing in large and compact masses, firmly resolved to take the positions, 
 
652 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 but Baquero, the brave soldier who had distinguished himself so highly in the 
 campaign, was there, keeping up by his example the spirit of the troops, 
 almost annihilated by hunger and fatigiie, and decimated by the clouds of bul- 
 lets and grapeshot. 
 
 "At this critical moment the cavalry was ordered to advance rapidly in 
 order to protect the retreat of Colonel Baquero 's forces and save the artillery 
 if possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Sierra hastened to carry out the order, as 
 Commander Arraiz had done before him at San Juan. 
 
 "The line which General Linares commanded personally now formed the 
 vanguard. With his assistance the General's aids and his chief of staff had to 
 organize the remnants of the first line. 
 
 "It was necessary to maintain that position at any cost, for its loss would 
 give the enemy free entrance into the city. The brave men of the first line 
 were retreating. Colonel Baquero had disappeared, killed, no doubt, when he 
 led that retreat under the hail of grapeshot and lead. The enemy was 
 advancing in compact masses, and rushing upon what was now the first line. 
 Fortunately, the fire of our infantry, accurately aimed, compelled the Ameri- 
 cans to recede, and they retreated behind the positions of San Juan. At that 
 moment General Linares and the brave commander of infantry, Arraiz, fell 
 wounded; the latter officer, who had already shed his blood at Cacarajfcara, 
 was one of the most beautiful examples of the army. 
 
 "The San Juan forces tried once more to recover themselves. Others came 
 to their assistance, among them the company of marines which had been 
 stationed at the Plaza de Toros with Captain Bustamente ; but the enemy was 
 already strongly occupying the position, our forces were scant, and success 
 was impossible. ' ' 
 
 The Spanish writer speaks of "the cruel battles of El Caney and San 
 Juan." At 3:30, at the Plaza de Dolores, he met General Linares. He was 
 on a stretcher being carried to his house. The battle was at an end, and 
 "many commanders and officers were arriving all tired- out and almost dj'ing 
 from thirst." The Spanish hospital was near the trenches, ' and "musket 
 balls were falling in great quantities in the court and on the roof. Later on 
 shells were flying in all directions." The loss of El Caney was the loss of 
 both provisions and water by the Spaniards, and the writer we are quoting 
 gave up the ghost of a chance in these words: 
 
 "We had to confine ourselves to the defense of the precinct, knowing full 
 
THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 653 
 
 well that, though the sad end might be held o£E for a day or two longer, there 
 was no possibility of avoiding it." 
 
 He claims that the Americans were inspired by the fighting of the Span- 
 iards with respectful admiration; and says the Americans did not after the ist 
 of July expose themselves as on that day, but "entrenched themselves and set 
 up their artillery as fast as they received it, and did not again come out from 
 behind their fortifications." And "it was difficult to convince them that only 
 520 men had been defending El Caney for' ten hours. When doubt was no 
 longer possible, their admiration had no limits. When they entered Santiago 
 de Cuba the American soldiers and ours looked upon each other without any 
 prejudice or jealousy, perhaps because they knew that both had fought like 
 brave men, and whenever the Americans saw one of our men of the Twenty- 
 ninth (the number of the battalion 'Constitucidn,' which had defended the 
 city, and has been referred to so many times) they would call him, look at 
 him, and treat him with great admiration, wondering, perhaps, how so simple 
 a soldier could do such great things. 
 
 "The men of the Twenty-ninth, known to have done something worth 
 doing, were loved and feasted by every one and spent whole hours with the 
 Americans, who did not understand them, but applauded everything they said, 
 on the assumption, perhaps, that he who is brave must also be bjight. 
 
 "Incidents like these I saw, not once, but a hundred times, and they have 
 made me believe and say what I have stated. I may be mistaken, but I do 
 not believe it, because I have also noticed that the Yankees treat the insur- 
 gents, although they are their allies, very differently. ' ' 
 
 According to their own list, the casualties of the Spaniards were: 
 
 Killed: Brigadier-General Joaquin Vara del Rey, 3 commanders, 12 
 officers, and 78 men. 
 
 Missing: Colonel of Infantry Jose Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 men. 
 The Colonel was probably killed, but this could not be verified. 
 
 Prisoners: Two officers. 
 
 Wounded: Lieutenant-General Arsenio Linares Pombo, 6 commanders, 
 30 officers, and 339 men. 
 
 (Among the wounded officers was Colonel of Engineers Caula and Colonel 
 of Artillery Ordonez). Total, 595. 
 
 The Spanish story of the siege is that the Americans opened fire by land 
 and sea. "Each hour that elapsed fortified the circle that enclosed us," and 
 
6S4 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 in the night the Americans "kept up most incessantly a violent musket and 
 terrific gun iire," bombarded the city, dismounted one of the two effective 
 guns on the Socapa, and on the 2d of July the companies of the fleet 
 embarked, and "a pilot was sent to each one of the ships, which latter took in 
 their boats and steam launches and loosened the spring on their cables, and 
 the gunboat Alvarado, which had come out of the slip and was afloat, raised 
 at night the six Bustamente torpedoes that were obstructing the channel to 
 the west. Everything indicated,' without leaving room for doubt, that the 
 fleet was about to go out; but when and how?" That question was answered 
 the next morning. Even that night the Spaniards believed there was a fleet 
 coming from Spain to the rescue of Santiago. On the next day after the 
 destruction of Cervera's fleet, July 4th, Lieutenant Muller says, the Mercedes 
 was sunk to obstruct the harbor channel. 
 
 "As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the 
 fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the 
 fleet could go out, and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line 
 of mines no longer existed, the commander of inarine decided — General Toral 
 also being of his opinion — to sink the Mercedes. ' ' 
 
 This took place about noon, the harbor having been open twenty-four 
 hours for our victorious and unharmed squadron, and one of the two 
 guns that fought our fleet at the mouth of the harbor was dismounted. If 
 advantage had been taken of the situation, the controversy between Shaffer 
 and Sampson, representing the army and the navy, might have been 
 avoided. 
 
 After the departure of Cervera's fleet from the harbor, and from life, the 
 streets of Santiago were "dark as wolves' dens," and infested by robbers. 
 General Toral issued a decree that, "All soldiers who shall destroy or set on 
 fire buildings or property, or commit any acts of violence on persons, shall be 
 punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, after previous degrada- 
 tion, in conformity with Article 239 of the Code of Military Justice. The 
 penalty of death shall be imposed upon the instigators, or persons employing 
 soldiers for this purpose." 
 
 This was dated July 16. On the loth the Americans opened a lively fire 
 from their trenches, and the fleet also. The Spanish loss was 7 killed and 47 
 wounded. A single shell from the fleet completely ruined a house in the city 
 Twenty-three projectiles fell within a small space. On the 12th of July 
 

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 W 
 
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THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 657 
 
 General Linares, wounded and in his bed, telegraphed the Commander-in-Chief 
 and Minister of War : 
 
 "The situation is fatal; surrender inevitable; we are only prolonging the 
 agony ; the sacrifice is useless ; the enemy knows it, fully realizing our situa- 
 tion. Their circle being well established, they will exhaust our forces without 
 exposing theirs as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation with- 
 out our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by the fleet, which 
 has full advices, and is bombarding the city in sections with mathematical 
 accuracy. 
 
 "There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of 
 the government and the whole nation; for these long-suffering troops have 
 saved that honor many times since the i8th day of May, when they sustained 
 the first bombardment. 
 
 "If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons which I 
 ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the responsibility of the 
 denouement anticipated and announced by me in several cablegrams, I offer 
 myself loyally on the altar of my country for the one purpose or the other, 
 and I will take it upon myself to perform the act of signing the surrender. ' ' • 
 
 The vaunted volunteers fought well in the first battle, but became dis- 
 couraged, and many of them put away their uniforms and guns and retired. 
 The Spanish historian says of the scenes after the surrender: "When a 
 Yankee officer of artillery and another of engineers took possession of the 
 Morro, they inquired about the defenses and artillery of the fort. 'There 
 they are, ' said the governor, pointing to the land batteries and old guns. The 
 American officers did not believe him; personally they went all over the place 
 in search of guns and more important works of fortification. And when they 
 had convinced themselves that they had been told the truth, they exclaimed : 
 'That fleet' (pointing to Admiral Sampson's) 'has no excuse for not having 
 gained possession of the harbor and defeated the city and its defenses in so 
 many days.' " 
 
 It is perfectly apparent by the Spanish accounts that the sufferings, the 
 exposures and privations of the defenders of Santiago were even greater than 
 those of the assailants, and the situation, regarded after the battle of El Caney 
 and the flight of the fleet, as not containing a chance of success. On each 
 side there was surprise and apprehension at the proven fighting qualities of 
 the other. 
 
CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 The Insurgents in Arms of Cuba and the Philippines. 
 
 Our Relations with and Responsibilities for Them — The Cuban Soldiers Found on the- 
 Pay Roll — A Military Service, of Importance and the Only One Performed by Armed 
 Cubans in Our War — The Spanish Account of It — Cubans Kept 3,500 of the Best 
 Troops of Spain Away from El Caney — Testimony Taken at Paris by the American- 
 Commission of the True Character of the Philippines — General Merritt, General 
 Greene and Major Bell State the Facts. 
 
 All the Spaniards in Cuba during the dreary wars that culminated in the 
 decisive struggle between the United States and Spain, were not engaged in 
 the cause of the Peninsulars. The insular Spaniards were not in many" 
 re'spects unlike their oppressors and antagonists. Though in conflict about 
 government, their idea about systems of governing were kindred. The hope 
 of better days in Cuba is in the people of the island, not in either wing of th& 
 Spaniards. The supporters of the Junta closely resemble in views of adminis- 
 tration the representatives of the regency. The destroyers of the industries 
 of Cuba, that were prosperous under misgovernment, are themselves the vic- 
 tims of false education, and are incapable of organizing reformation. 
 
 Liberty with order, fair play for all, and integrity in official life, is not 
 within the comprehension of those who burned the cane and trampled th& 
 tobacco. Those golden productions were transferred from Hayti to Cuba,, 
 while the horrors of barbarism ruined the former island, when the abolition of 
 slavery established anarchy; and in the latter and greater island the inherit- 
 ance of the torch has perished by the torch in the hands of the Dominican, 
 chieftain, Maximo Gomez. 
 
 It is the repeatedly expressed opinion of Admiral Dewey that the Fili- 
 pinos are more capable of self-government than the Cubans, and they might 
 be that if we confounded the Cuban name with the Key West and New York 
 
 syndicates, gotten up in the old Junta form, and employed with the facility oil 
 
 658 
 
INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 659 
 
 experience, in the accomplishments of the pomps and vanities of the Spanish 
 language, including the fables of history and the follies of freedom. 
 
 Gomez had two objects in firing the fields from which the wealth of the 
 island he invaded from Dominica comes — one was to. destroy property, because 
 it was an expression of civilization, and the other to destroy labor, because 
 he wanted men to abandon the productive occupations to become destroyers. 
 
 General Miles expected 50,000 Cubans to line up with his grand army for 
 the siege of Havana, but there would not have- been as many of them there as 
 appeared at Santiago. They have, however, materialized in regard to the 
 toay-roll, and Gomez and his bodyguard and recruits after the war assume 
 that they are a people and that the object of the United States in conquering 
 the island was to give it up to them to rule after the manner of the Spaniards. 
 The difference between one class of Spaniards and another, in the cultivation 
 of the art of government, does not matter much to the cultivators of the soil 
 and the managers in the ways of enterprise that are conducted according to 
 the methods of civilization and yield fruitful harvests to the labor that gains 
 bread in the sweat of the face. 
 
 No doubt it was the judgment of Gomez of Dominica that the way to free 
 fertile land was to burn the crops, and that one savagery must be met by 
 another, one victim of an outrage compensated by another victim. The 
 Cubans burned the fine houses and the Spaniards the cottages, and both sides 
 plied the chopping-knife to massacre domestic animals. This was the broad 
 road of bloody ashes to famine.* 
 
 In the Philippines we do not have as many Spaniards of any sort as in 
 Cuba, but the Malay makes up for any lack of the elements of mischief ; and 
 the Tagalo rivals the Cuban Spaniard as an adventurer to claim what the 
 sword of America has conquered. He wanted joint occupation of Manila, and 
 tickled himself that he was about to make reprisals in days of the accumulated 
 wrongs of centuries. If he had been logical in action he would have applied 
 the torch to the city instead of firing the country, and the property of Eng- 
 lish, Germans, and Chinese would have been burned in the name of liberty, 
 after the capacity'' of the insurgents for booty had been determined by the 
 occurrence of physical exhaustion. 
 
 There is a notable difference in the racial questions between the isles of 
 Cuba and Luzon. There is no negro blood in the Philippines. The Spanish 
 monarch for whom they were named did not permit African slavery in his 
 
66o INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 
 
 Indian possession, but Spanish officialism is the same in the East Indies as in 
 the West. Incidents in the cities of Manila and Santiago, under military 
 government, will indicate the likeness. 
 
 Some of the men of affairs of Manila were importing goods upon which 
 there were duties, and they were so accustomed to paying their respects to the 
 officers who consented to the importations, in pecuniary compliments, that 
 they did not know any other style of transacting business. They gathered a 
 few hundred new Mexican dollars, and for several days carried it around in 
 bags to find "the right man," to whopi was to be confided the little testimonial 
 of their respectful confidence, and they asked many tentative questions, and 
 began to feel at last that their modesty must have become offensive. When, 
 at last, they referred in plain terms to the custom of the country, and their 
 desire to conform to it, and were told they would be forgiven just once but 
 never more, there was amazement. The deputation of gentlemen tottered 
 away bearing bright silver dollars refused, and then they wondered whether 
 they did not make a mistake in not having their silver converted into gold. 
 
 In Santiago there was a little dinner party in which the representative of 
 the American Republic was entertained, and his guests had arranged for him 
 a pleasant surprise. They wanted to do certain things in which they judged 
 money was to be made, and they were provided with thousands, when the 
 Manila people had but hundreds, aiid when the time for talking came, they 
 offered their visible means according to the ancient Cuban custom, and heard 
 the incredible response that the Americans did not do public -business in that 
 way, that the request they made was proper and there was no reason why 
 they should pay a dollar for the privilege, for it was already their right, and 
 they must not allow such a mistake to occur again, for if it did they would be 
 held to have committed a misdemeanor. 
 
 The Cuban army on the pay-rolls, hearing that money was rolling in at the 
 custom houses, had no notion of going home to work, and of course they held 
 that the Americans were shoveling the cash into their own pockets. They 
 no doubt believed they were entitled to pay for several years' picnics, and 
 would go back to the Ten Years' War rather than have nothing to be so 
 unhappy about, as to take away their appetite for employment. These 
 are examples of Asiatic and African sentimentalities and of the thrift of 
 the mixed races, as developed under Spanish instruction for a dozen 
 generations. 
 
INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 66i 
 
 In a Spanish pamphlet translated and issued by the office of Naval Intel- 
 ligence, Lieut. Jos6 Muller y Tejrio, the writer on the battles and capitulations 
 of Santiago de-Cuba, there is evidence of the usefulness, of the Cubans in the 
 neighborhood of Santiago. It is stated by the Spanish officers that the 
 insurgents firing from ambush on Escario's column, "succeeded in delaying 
 its march long enough so that it could not arrive before the first of July. 
 Fate is not always just." It is important in fairness to the Cuban soldiery to 
 give what the Spanish reinforcements on the way to Santiago have to say of 
 the opposition they met. The Spaniards' column, commanded by Escario, 
 arrived in Santiago July 3d after -marching fifty-two leagues ; the troops nearly 
 all the way "had to march in single file, opening the way with machetas." 
 Their starting place was Man, Janillo, and the column comprised a total of 
 3,752 men. On the Yara River and camping at dark, the Spanish diary, the 
 one we quote, says: "The column had been harassed all day, especially while 
 preparing to encamp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively fire, which 
 lasted ten minutes, killing one man and wounding three." The next day the 
 column had one man killed and one wounded. 
 
 Bayamo, the stronghold of the insurgents, was taken with a rush and 
 without loss, and "we learned afterward that the enemy had ten killed and 
 nine wounded. " On the 28th, "the rebels appeared again, " and near the town 
 of Baire they "opened a galling musket fire. Colonel Ruiz, the second in com- 
 mand of the column, was wounded and his horse killed under him, four soldiers 
 killed and five wounded." On the 29th the column rested and had three more 
 wounded. On the 30th there was hot skirmishing, the rebels numerous. 
 The Spanish losses during the day were five killed and ten wounded, among 
 the latter the captain. July ist there was a sharp fight at Aguacate. The 
 Spanish diar)'^ says: 
 
 "The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened fire at once from 
 Aguacate hill, the station of our heliograph, and adjoining hills to the right 
 and left in an extensive intrenched line. Our soldiers maneuvered as though 
 on drill, and advancing steadily, two-thirds of the column entered the battle, 
 and that hail of lead which strewed death in its path was not sufficient to 
 make them retreat or even check them. Calmly, with fearless heroism, they 
 advanced, protecte4 by the frequent and sure fire of the artillery, and skill- 
 fully guided by their chiefs, and with the cry, 'LoAg live Spain!' and charging 
 with bayonets, they simultaneously took those heights which were so difficult 
 
662 INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 
 
 and dangerous to scale, beating the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that 
 they could not gather up their dead and wounded. 
 
 "Seventeen dead were left on the field, also ammunition of various mod- 
 em types. There were moments during that battle when the tenacity of the 
 enemy and the order with which they fought gave the impression that they 
 belonged to our own column. This report spread rapidly and reached Colonel 
 Escario's ears, who, fearing that this might really be the case, gave orders to 
 suspend the fire, and tried to make himself known by bugle signals. But this 
 precaution was useless, and the commander, becoming convinced that he was 
 fighting rebel forces, ordered the attack to be renewed and the hostile posi- 
 tions to be taken. 
 
 "To do the enemy justice, it must be stated that they defended these 
 well-chosen positions with persistency and in good order, and that they rose 
 to unusual heights that day, making this the fiercest battle which we sustained 
 on the march from Manzanillo to Santiago, and one of the most remarkable 
 ones of the present campaign. Our casualties consisted of 7 dead, and i 
 lieutenant and 42 privates wounded. Large pools of blood on the battlefield 
 showed the severe chastisement the enemy suffered." 
 
 The 3d of July the troops started at 2 a. m. and got to Santiago with 
 "slight skirmishes," and "here it was learned that on the same day our fleet 
 had gone out in search of death;" and the column "had arrived at the post of 
 honor after a supreme effort and after victoriously crossing the Alps of Cuba. 
 It is not to be wondered at that, when they came in sight of the city, they 
 took off their hats, and with tears in their eyes opened their lips in a unani- 
 mous shout of 'Long live Spain!' which rose spontaneously from those noble 
 hearts. 
 
 "The casualties during the whole march were i colonel, 2 officers, and 68 
 privates wounded and 27 killed. Twenty-eight thousand six hundred and 
 seventy Mauser cartridges had been used, and 38 rounds of artillery fired." 
 
 The insurgent troops in this case were of Garcia's command, and the 
 Spanish column of less than four thousand men had forced their way through 
 the most rebellious part of the island and arrived just when the fighting was ^ 
 over. Garcia's estimate of his forces opposed to Escario has been counted 
 as five thousand men. There were not so many, but thev made a resistance 
 that kept Escario from being on the Spanish lines at El Caney, Santiago. 
 
 The Spanish pamphlet says: "When 520 men maintained themselves at 
 
INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 663 
 
 El Caney for ten hours, and 250 at San Juan for four hours, if Escario could 
 have been there thdt day, so that there had been' 3, 000 men more in our lines, 
 neither El Caney nor San Juan would have been lost, though attacked by 
 almost the whole hostile army." The detention of Escario was. the best 
 work done for us during the war by the Cubans, and indeed the only impor- 
 tant diversion they made, and justice demands full credit shall be awarded. 
 
 The statements made before the American Commission at Paris may be 
 classed as the most striking presentation of the attitude of the Philippine 
 insurgents that has been given. General Merritt was before the Commission 
 August 4th, and was first asked about General Frank V. Greene, of whom he 
 said: 
 
 "He was out on the lines all the time, and took a great deal of interest in 
 investigating with the citizens and soldiers. He knew some of the ranking 
 officers, although he did not know Aguinaldo nor have anything to do with 
 him. It was part of my policy that we should keep ourselves aloof from 
 Aguinaldo as much as possible, because we knew trouble would occur from 
 his wanting to go to Manila at the time of its surrender. ' ' 
 
 General Merritt said further he would greatly rely on General Greene's 
 judgment, who "wrote the best and most authentic — the best received — book 
 on the Russian-Turkish war published yet. He is a man who reads a great 
 deal, quite a student, a very bright man. ' ' 
 
 General Greene's memorandum, made August 27th, and handed General 
 Merritt, opened with these trenchant statements: 
 
 "If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will 
 immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were 
 furnished arms and the moral support of the navy prior to our arrival, and we 
 cannot ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which 
 our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish government is completely 
 demoralized, and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. 
 Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them. 
 Spaniards individually stand in great fear of the insurgents. The Spanish 
 government is disorganized and their treasury bankrupt, with a large floating 
 debt. The loss of property has been great. On the other hand, the Filipinos 
 cannot govern the country without the support of some strong nation. They 
 acknowledge this themselves, and say their desire is for independence under 
 American protection ; but they have only vague ideas as to what our relative 
 
664 INSURGENTS IN. CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 
 
 positions would be — what part we should take in collecting and expending the 
 revenue and administering the government. 
 
 "The hatred between the Spanish and natives is very intense, and cannot 
 be eradicated; The natives are all Roman Catholics and devoted to the 
 church, but have bitter hatred for monastic orders — Dominican, Franciscan, 
 and Recollects. Tliey insist that these be sent out of the country or they will 
 murder them. These friars own the greater part of the land, and have grown 
 rich by oppressing the native husbandmen. ' ' 
 
 General Merritt said the Philippines would have to be educated up to 
 self-government, and he added: "They want a protectorate, but they do not 
 exactly understand what that means.' Their idea is that they should collect 
 the revenues and keep them in their treasury, and that we should be at the 
 expense of maintaining an army and a navy there for their protection, which 
 is the kind of a protectorate they, would like very much. " 
 
 Major Frank Barnes stated: "The masses of the people will accept aur 
 government as soon as they understand the form of government that we 
 would oifer. The people are for the most part easily controlled by proper 
 methods, the essence of which can be expressed in two words — justice and 
 firmness. I have definite information also that at least three or four of the 
 leading men of the provinces to the north and east of Manila are not at all in 
 harmony with those in authority around Manila." 
 
 It was the opinion of the Major that if a few of the ambitious chieftains 
 were disposed of, those who controlled the insurgent army, "the masses of 
 the people could be handled without difficulty. At the present it is my opin- 
 ion that these chieftains find themselves in a difficult position on account of 
 the promises made to their followers in regard to looting Manila- said promises 
 being so far unfulfilled. Their troops have been serving up to the present 
 time almost without remuneration, promises being made that their reward 
 would come when Manila capitfllated. I have availed myself of every oppor- 
 tunity to talk with natives and half-castes, both in the insurgent territory and 
 in Manila. I find that many of them would be perfectly willing to accept an 
 American government, and many of them are very anxious that we should 
 take full possession of the islands. Many others hold to the desire of the 
 insurgent chiefs for a Philippine government tmder the protection of the 
 United States." 
 
 Major J. F. Bell, of the Bureau of Information, reported to General Met- 
 
INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 665 
 
 ritt in Manila Bay, that Aguinaldo had about $200,000, and in Baccoar 
 $220,000 in public funds. Major Bell catalogues and describes the leaders 
 among Aguinaldo's following in this highly interesting way: 
 
 "Aguinaldo. — Honest, sincere, and poor, not well educated, but a natural 
 leader of men, with considerable shrewdness and ability; has the power of 
 creating among the people confidence in himself, and is undoubtedly a verv 
 popular man, highly respected by all; but there are many better educated and 
 richer natives who do not think he has sufficient education or experience to 
 be a suitable president. He was a 'little governor' of a small town in one 
 of the provinces. It is also said that he was a school teacher, but I have 
 been unable to verify this assertion. 
 
 "There is no Secretary of State, the place being kept open for one Caye- 
 tano S. Arellano, a prominent native citizen who is said to be the best lawj'er 
 and best man among the native prominent men. He is now in Pagsanjan, 
 and has been repeatedly sent for, but does not return, stating as an excuse 
 that he cannot get through Santa Cruz, which is held by the Spanish. He is 
 an avowed annexationist, and does not b&lieve the Filipino people sufficiently 
 advanced in the arts and laws of civilization to govern themselves. 
 
 "Baldomero Aguinaldo, a first cousin of Don Emilio, is Secretary of War, 
 and is a swelled dunce, and was once a schoolmaster. 
 
 "Mariano Trias, an educated, honest man, of mediocre capacit)', is Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury. He was the Vice-President of a former revolution, and 
 of all the insurgent leaders, he stands next to Aguinaldo in popularity with 
 the people. 
 
 "Leandro Y. Barra, a lawyer and good, honest man, is Secretary of the 
 Interior. , 
 
 "One Estefan de la Rama, a rich and educated man, who speaks English, 
 is commandante de marina, or commander-in-chief of the navy. He is 
 reported honest and capable. 
 
 "Aguinaldo's interpreter and secretary is one Escamilla, a good linguist, 
 speaking Latin, French, Spanish, 'and English — Spanish fluently and English. 
 well, to my personal knowledge. He was a teacher of the piano in Hong- 
 kong, and is one of the best interpreters I have ever seen. 
 
 "One Malabini, a student of law and notary public, honest, but not espe- 
 
 * * cially talented, is one of his councilors. There is a prominent and wealthy 
 
 citizen of this city who is also a councilor, but I prefer not to mention his 
 
666 INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 
 
 name. He is an avowed annexationist, and sincerely hopes the Americans 
 may remain here. 
 
 "Don Felipe Agoncillo is a highly respected lawyer, and has for some 
 time been the Filipino agent in Hongkong. I understand it is he who has 
 been designated by Aguinaldo to go to Paris and America to represent the 
 insurgent cause. 
 
 "C. Sandico, a skilled and well-educated machinist, who speaks English 
 quite well, is a prominent man, and coadjutor of Aguinaldo. His present 
 commissionxis to appear on behalf of political prisoners before the oflBcer 
 charged with investigating such cases. He has been generally useful to 
 Aguinaldo as a delegate and negotiator with Americans. 
 
 "Lieut. -Gen. Emiliano Riego De Dios, the military governor of Cavite, 
 is said to be an honest man, but with little education. 
 
 ' 'JVIajor-General Ricati, in command of operations along the southern zone 
 of trenches, appears and is said to be a well-meaningf, honest man, with a 
 fair education. 
 
 "Maj.-Gen. Pantelon Garcia, in command of operations along the north- 
 ern zone, is not educated very well, but is an able, honest, polite, and agree- 
 able man, who has been a schoolmaster of the primary grade. 
 
 ' ' Brig. -Gen. Pio Del Pilar, a vicious, uneducated ignoramus and highway 
 robber. 
 
 "General Estrella, commanding the military forces in Cavite, has the 
 credit of being an honest man with little education. 
 
 "Brigadier-General Mascardo, fairly educated and honest, but possesses 
 little ability. 
 
 ' 'pen. Gregorio Del Pilar is young, well educated, and honest, but with 
 little experience. He belongs to awealthy family of Nueva Ecija. 
 
 "General Noriel, an honest, fairly educated, well-meaning, reasonable, 
 and agreeable fellow, who has done good service and gained the reputation of 
 a good soldier. 
 
 "Colonel Montenegro, a very conciliatory fellow to meet. Young, small, 
 and well educated. Speaks French, English, and Spanish, the latter fluently; 
 the others very well. He is a considerable of a 'talk a heap. ' Is 'kinder' hon- 
 est and was a clerk in Lalla's hotel, where he received his lessons in honesty. 
 
 "There are other leaders of lesser grade whom it is hardly necessary to • 
 mention here. Aguinaldo has many adjutants, most of whom are young. 
 
INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 
 
 667 
 
 smart, and well educated. In fact, nearly all of the adjutants of all the 
 generals belong to the jeunesse doree Filipino, in whom insurrectionary ideas 
 seem to breed spontaneously. They are all bright, ambitious, active, and 
 well educated. Among them is one Captain Arevela, Noriel's adjutant, who 
 is a dentist, having learned his profession from an American, who also taught 
 him very good -English. He has always possessed great partiality for 
 Americans. ' ' 
 
 Note. — It appears, however, that Maximo Gomez, the old soldier of fortune, has in the 
 schools of misfortune been taught, the lessons of sorrow, and when throwing off his reserve 
 after the war was over he knew the light of reason when he saw it, and was not disposed lo 
 join in playing a bunco game upon the people of the United States. He may yet exploit his 
 ambition to found a confederacy of the "West Indies, but he has shown great dignity and com- 
 mands respect by his qualities of statesmanship. 
 
 -•=5ss.O 
 
CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 The Treaty of Peace. 
 
 The Official Terms in Which the Spaniards Sued for Peace and Accepted the Demands 
 of the Peace Protocol of August 12 — "The Demand Strips Us of the Very Last Memory 
 of a Glorious Past" — The Treaty Commissioners that Met in Paris — Official Text of 
 the Treaty of Peace of December 10 — The Spaniards Contend that the Philippine 
 Insurgents Constantly Change the Status Quo and that Americans Must Stop Them — 
 Contention that the Transfer of Sovereignty Meant Transfer of Debts — Protracted 
 Debate over the Cuban Obligations — Claim the Capture of Manila was not Lawful — 
 Insinuatibn^ that'. General Merritt had Heard of the Protocol Before Storming the 
 Town — Spaniards Able and Adroit — Americans Firm but Courteous — The Official 
 History of the Preparation of the Peace Protocol — The Part Taken by the President 
 — His Strong Hand Felt in Paris. 
 
 The government of Spain, on July 22, 1898, submitted through the 
 Ambassador of France a message to the President, saying Spain wished to 
 show again that in this war, as well as in the one she carried on against the 
 Cuban insurgents, she had but one object, "the vindication of her prestige, 
 her honor, and her name." She had desired to "spare the great island from 
 the dangers of premature independence," and her sentiments were rather 
 inspired by ties of blood than by her interests. "Spain," the message con- 
 tinued, "is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors of 
 war if the United States is likewise disposed." This paper was Signed by 
 the Spanish Minister of State, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio. In reply 
 Secretary Day wrote, July 30th : 
 
 "The President witnessed with profound disappointment the frustration of 
 his peaceful efforts by events which forced upon the people of the United 
 States the unalterable conviction that nothing short of the relinquishment by 
 Spain of a claim of sovereignty over Cuba which she was unable to enforce 
 would relieve a situation that had become unendurable. 
 
 "For years the government of the United States, out of regard for the 
 
 susceptibilities of Spain, had by the exercise of its power and the expenditure 
 
 of its treasure preserved the obligations of neutrality. But a point was at 
 
 length reached at which, as Spain had often been forewarned, this attitude 
 
 668 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 669 
 
 could no longer be maintaiffed. The spectacle at our very doors of a fertile 
 territory wasted by fire and sword, and given over to desolation and famine, 
 was one to which our people could not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to 
 the demands of humanity, they determined to remove the causes in the effects 
 of which they had become so deeply involved." 
 
 Secretary Day proceeded to state substantially the points of the Protocol 
 that was the basis of the treaty of peace.' The reply from Madrid, August 
 7th, by the Minister of State, was: 
 
 "The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being impera- 
 tive, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory shall not 
 have fully reached the conditions required to take rank among other sovereign 
 powers, provide for rules which will insure order and protect against all risks 
 the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban natives still loyal to the mother 
 country. 
 
 "In the name of the nation the Spanish government hereby relinquishes 
 all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and engages to the irremeable 
 evacuation of the island, subject to the approval of the Cortes — a reserve 
 which we likewise make with regard to the other proffered terms — just as 
 these terms will have to be ultimately approved by the Senate of the United 
 States. 
 
 "The United States require, as an indeinnity for or an equivalent to the 
 sacrifices they have borne during this short war, the cession of Porto Rico and 
 of the other islands now imder the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, 
 and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the 
 Federal government. 
 
 "This demand strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, and 
 expels us at once from the prosperous island of Porto Rico and from the 
 Western Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized through the proud 
 deeds of our ancestors. It might, perhaps, have been possible to compensate 
 by some other cession for the injuries sustained by the United States. How- 
 ever, the inflexibility of the demand obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the 
 island of Porto Rico and the other islands belonging to the Crown of Spain in 
 the West Indies, together with one of the islands of the archipelago of the 
 Ladrones, to be selected by the American government. 
 
 "The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be 
 quite indefinite." 
 
670 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 Secretary Day put the case of the United States in these simple and 
 effective terms to the Spanish Minister of State, before the submission of the 
 terms, referred to with such pathetic dignity in the letter of submission by 
 the Duke of Almodovar del Rio : 
 
 "As the result of the patriotic exertions of the people of the United 
 States, the strife has, as your' excellency observes, proved unequal inclines 
 the President to offer a brave adversary generous terms of peace. 
 
 "The President, therefore, responding to your excellency's request, will 
 state the terms of peace which will be accepted by him at the present time, 
 subject to the approval of the Senate of the United States hereafter. 
 
 "Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba intimates that Spain 
 has desired to spare the island the dangers of premature independence. The 
 government of the United States has not shared the apprehensions of Spain 
 in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate 
 condition of the island, aid and guidance will.be necessary, and these it is pre- 
 pared to give. ' ' 
 
 Secretary Day was precise in drawing the Protocol, and yet the Spaniards 
 persuaded themselves that they could find much in it, especially in the clause 
 about the Philippines, susceptible of construction remote from the purppse of 
 the President. August 12th the French Ambassador addressed these lines to 
 the American Secretary of State : 
 
 "Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that I have 
 just received, through the intermediation of the Department of Foreign 
 Affairs at Paris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the Duke of 
 Almodovar del Rio announces to me that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen 
 Regent, the Spanish government confers upon me full powers in order that I 
 may sign, without other formality and without delay, the Protocol whereof the 
 terms have been drawn up by common accord between you and me. ' ' 
 
 The instrument that made this authorization regular was the following: 
 
 DON ALFONSO XHL, 
 
 BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, AND 
 
 IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY, 
 
 DOf?A MARIA CRISTINA, 
 QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM. 
 
 Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at Washington a 
 Protocol in which the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the United 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 671 
 
 States of America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me to empower 
 for that purpose a person possessing the requisite qualifications : Therefore, 
 I have decided to select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency the 
 President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio Cambon, Ambassador 
 Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in the United 
 States of America, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you to pro- 
 ceed, invested with the character of my plenipotentiary, to negotiate and sign 
 with the plenipotentiary whom His Excellency the President of the United 
 States of America may designate for that purpose the aforesaid Protocol. 
 And I declare, from the present moment, all that you may agree upon, 
 negotiate, and sign in the execution of this commission acceptable and valid, 
 and I will observe it and execute it, and will cause it to be observed and 
 executed as if it had been done by myself, for which I give you my whole full 
 powers in the most ample form required by law. In witness whereof I have 
 caused these presents to be issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed and 
 countersigned by the undersigned, my Minister of State. Given in the palace 
 at Madrid, August 11, 1898. 
 
 (L. S.) MARIA CRISTINA. 
 
 JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO, 
 
 Minister of State. 
 
 The city of Manila fell into our hands two days after the suspension of 
 hostilities, and during the discussion of the Commissioners at Paris the 
 Spaniards made a plea that as Admiral Dewey cut the cable, the failure to 
 get the news at Manila before the Americans possessed the town was an 
 American fault. The report of the French Ambassador of his interviews with 
 the President was much quoted by the Spanish Commissioners, but the 
 American Commissioners were inflexible from the first for the plain mean- 
 ing of the treaty. 
 
 OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH SPAIN, 
 SIGNED DECEMBER 12, 1898: 
 
 The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of 
 Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII., desiring to end a 
 state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose 
 appointed as plenipotentiaries : 
 
 The President of the United States, 
 
672 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and 
 Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States; 
 
 And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, 
 
 Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Senate ; Don Buenaventura 
 de Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex-Minister of the Crown; Don 
 Jose de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes, and Associate Justice of the Supreme 
 Court ; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy ExtraordiAfiry and 
 Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, General of 
 Division ; 
 
 Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, 
 which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the 
 matters before them, agreed upon the following articles : 
 
 Article I. 
 
 Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. 
 
 And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the 
 United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, 
 assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result 
 from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property. 
 
 Article II. 
 
 Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other 
 islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of 
 Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. 
 
 Article III. 
 
 Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine 
 Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line : 
 
 A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of 
 north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, 
 from the one hundred and eighteenth (i i8th) to the one hundred and twe,nty- 
 seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along 
 the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude 
 east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes 
 (4° 45' ) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty- 
 five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of 
 longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') 
 east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 675 
 
 nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, to the 
 parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7" 40') north, thence 
 along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') 
 north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (i i6th) degree 
 meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the inter- 
 section of the tenth (loth) degree parallej of north latitude with the one hun- 
 dred and eighteenth (ii8th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, 
 and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (ii8th) degree meridian of 
 longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. 
 
 The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars 
 ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of 
 
 the present treaty. 
 
 Article IV. 
 
 The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the 
 
 exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and 
 
 merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships 
 
 and merchandise of the United States. 
 
 Article V. 
 
 The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send 
 back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war 
 on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers 
 in question shall be restored to them. 
 
 Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, 
 proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms 
 similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for 
 the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the 
 Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are 
 ■ completely executed. 
 
 The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam 
 shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors, 
 uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibers, with their carriages 
 and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of 
 all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines 
 and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclu- 
 sive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in 
 their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the 
 
676 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the 
 meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement 
 between the two governments on the subject shall be reached. 
 
 Article VI. 
 
 Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners 
 of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses, in con- 
 nection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with 
 the United States. 
 
 Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of 
 war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all 
 Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. 
 
 The government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain 
 and the government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, 
 Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their 
 respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, 
 respectively, under this article. 
 
 Article VII. 
 
 The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, 
 national and individual, of every kind, of either government, or of its citizens 
 or subjects, against the other government, that may have arisen since the 
 beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifi- 
 cations of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of 
 the war. 
 
 The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens 
 against Spain relinquished in this article. 
 
 Article VIII. 
 
 In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III, of this treaty, • 
 Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the 
 West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the 
 buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other 
 immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public 
 domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. 
 
 And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case 
 may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect 
 impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 677 
 
 of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private estab- 
 lishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having' legal 
 capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced 
 or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals 
 may be. 
 
 The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all 
 documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that 
 may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such 
 archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be 
 furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally 
 observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the 
 islands above referred to. 
 
 In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also 
 included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in 
 respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the 
 islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or J:he rights and prop- 
 erty of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully pre- 
 served, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to 
 require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills 
 and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may 
 be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in 
 
 the islands aforesaid. 
 
 Article IX. 
 
 Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over 
 which Spain by the present treaty, relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, 
 may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either 
 event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of 
 such property or of its proceeds ; and they shall also have the right to carry 
 on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect 
 thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they 
 remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown 
 of Spain by making, before a court of record within a year from the date of 
 the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to 
 preserve such allegiance ; in default of which declaration they shall be held 
 to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in 
 which they may reside. 
 
678 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the terri- 
 tories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress. 
 
 Article X. 
 The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes 
 her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion. 
 
 Article XL 
 The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty 
 cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well 
 as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, 
 pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same ; and they shall have the 
 right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens 
 of the country to which the courts belong. 
 
 Article XII. 
 Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications 
 of this treaty in th» territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her 
 sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules : 
 
 1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, 
 or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which 
 there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be 
 deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority 
 in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out. 
 
 2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date men- 
 tioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in 
 which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted 
 therefor. 
 
 3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme 
 Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to 
 be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, 
 such 'judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be com- 
 mitted to the competent authority of the place in^which the case arose. 
 
 Article XIII. 
 The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by 
 Spaniards in the island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other 
 ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 679 
 
 shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works, 
 not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to 
 be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to 
 be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. 
 
 Article XIV. 
 Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and 
 places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relin- 
 quished or ceded by the present treaty. 
 
 Article XV. 
 The government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to 
 the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of 
 all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and ton- 
 nage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the 
 coastwise trade. 
 
 This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given 
 by either government to the other. 
 
 Article XVI. 
 It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United 
 States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; 
 but it will upon the termination of such* occupancy, advise any government 
 established in the island to assume the same obligations. 
 
 Article XVII. 
 The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, 
 by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty 
 the Queen regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Wash- 
 ington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. 
 
 In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this 
 treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. 
 
 Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our 
 Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight. 
 
 [Seal] WILLIAM R. DAY. [Seal] EUGENIO MONTERO RIOS. 
 
 [Seal] CUSHMAN K. DAVIS. [Seal] B. DE ABARZUZA. 
 
 [Seal] WILLIAM P. FRYE. [Seal] J. DE GARNICA. 
 
 [Seal] GEO. GRAY. [Seal] W R DE VILLA URRUTIA. 
 
 [Seal] WHITELAW REID. [Seal] RAFAEL CERERO. 
 
68o THE TREATY OF. PEACE. 
 
 . When the conference met at Paris, October ist, the President of the 
 Spanish Commission stated he was charged by his government to lay before 
 the American Commission a proposition of a pressing nature. It was that the 
 status quo was altered and continued to be with daily increasing gravity "to 
 the prejudice of Spain, by the Tagalo rebels who formed an auxiliary force to 
 the regular American troops, and the Spanish Commission demanded of the 
 American Commissioners that the American forces in the Philippines must 
 proceed fully and absolutely to re'store the said status quo, and must abstain 
 from preventing by any means, direct or indirect, the restoration thereof by 
 the Spanish authorities and forces in the territory not occupied by those of 
 the United States." The commissions of American Plenipotentiaries were in 
 these terms: 
 
 William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all 
 who shall see these presents. Greeting : Know ye, that reposing special trust 
 and confidence in the integrity and ability of William R. Day, of Ohio, I do 
 appoint him a Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the United States, under the 
 Protocol signed at Washington of the 12th day of August, 1898, to negotiate 
 and conclude a Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, and do 
 authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of this Commis- 
 sion, with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right 
 appertaining, during the pleasure of the President of the United States. 
 
 In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent, and 
 the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. 
 
 Given under my hand at the city of Washington the 13th day of Septem- 
 ber in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, 
 and the 123rd year of the Independence of the United States of America. 
 
 Signed: WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 By the President: 
 
 Signed: J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State. 
 
 The Commissions of the other American Plenipotentiaries were in the 
 same form, their names being as follows : 
 Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota. 
 William P. Frye, of Maine. 
 George Gray, of Delaware, and 
 Whitelaw Reid, of New York. 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
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682 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 FULL POWER OF AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 
 
 "William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all who 
 shall see these presents, Greeting: 
 
 Know Ye : That, reposing special trust and confidence in the Integrity, 
 and Ability of the Honorable William R. Day, of Ohio, lately Secretary of 
 State of the United States, the Honorable Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota, 
 a Senator of the United States, the Honorable William P. Frye, of Maine, a 
 Senator of the United. States, the Honorable George Gray, of Delaware, a 
 Senator of the United Sta,tes, and the Honorable Whitelaw Reid, of New- 
 York, lately Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to France, I do 
 appoint them jointly and severally to be Commissioners on the part of the 
 United States under the Protocol signed at Washington on the twelfth day of 
 August, 1898, to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of Peace between the 
 United States and Spain, hereby empowering them jointly and severally to- 
 meet the Commissioners appointed or to be appointed under said Protocol on 
 behalf of Spain, and with them to negotiate and sign a Treaty of Peace 
 between the United .States and Spain, subject to the ratification of their 
 government; and the said Commission to hold and exercise during the pleas- 
 ure of the President of the United States for the time being. 
 
 In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent and 
 the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. 
 
 Given under my hand at the city of Washington this 13th day of- Septem- 
 ber, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, 
 and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred 
 and twenty-third. Signed: WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 By the President: 
 
 Signed: J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State. 
 
 The authorization of the Spanish Commission was in the terms and form 
 following : 
 
 DON ALFONSO XIII., 
 BY THE GRACE OP GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION,' KING OF SPAIN, AND- 
 IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY, 
 
 DONA MARIA CRISTINA, 
 QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM: 
 
 Whereas the occasion has arisen for the concluding between Spain and 
 the United States of America a Treaty of Peace, and it being necessary that 
 to such end I should duly confer authority upon persons who shall merit my 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 683 
 
 royal confidence, and you, Don Eugenio Montero Rios, Knight of the Worthy 
 Order of the Golden Fleece, decorated with the Collar of the Royal and dis- 
 tinguished Order of Charles III., President of the Senate, ex-Minister of the 
 Crown, ex-President of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Academician of the 
 Moral and Political Sciences, embody the characteristics which meet the 
 requirements of the case. I have therefore chosen and appointed, and by these 
 presents do choose and appoint you to the end that, pursuant to the stipula- 
 tions of Article V. of the Protocol signed in Washington on the twelfth day of 
 the month of August last, and invested with the character of my Plenipo- 
 tentiary, you may in unison with the other Plenipotentiaries I have appointed 
 under this date and those who may be designated by the President of the 
 United States for the same purpose, confer and agree upon what may be best 
 and most advisable. And everything you may so confer and agree upon, 
 negotiate, conclude and sign, I now confirm and ratif}', I will observe and 
 execute, will cause to be observed and executed, the same as if I myself had 
 conferred and agreed upon, negotiated, concluded and signed it, for all of 
 which I confer upon you ample authority to the fullest extent required by law. 
 In witness whereof I have caused these presents to issiie signed by my hand, 
 duly sealed and attested by the undersigned, my Minister of State. 
 
 Given in the' Palace of Madrid on the twenty-second day of September of 
 eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. 
 
 Signed: MARIA CRISTINA. 
 Signed: JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO, 
 
 Minister of State. 
 
 The commissions and full powers of the other Spanish Plenipotentiaries 
 were in the same form; their names and titles fully given. The Crown 
 Minister led the list : Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom 
 and some time Ambassador and Minister of the Crown. Another Commis- 
 sioner was: Don Jos^' de Garnica y Diaz, Associate Justice of the Supreme 
 Court of Justice, Deputy of the Cortes, Member of the General Codification 
 Commission, ex- Vice-President of the Congress of Deputies; and most dis- 
 tinguished by his title was: Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa- Urrutia, Knight 
 Grand Cross of the Royal Order of Isabel the Catholic, Knight Commander 
 of the Royal and_^ Distinguished Order of Charles III., decorated with the 
 White Cross of the second class of Naval Merit, Grand Cross of the Dutch 
 Lion of the Netherlands, Oak Crown of Luxemburg, the Majidieh of Turkey, 
 
684 
 
 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 JENORW.ZDcYllUUtlllUTI^ 
 
 THE SPANISH PEACE COMMISSIONERS. 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 685 
 
 Knight Commander of the Legion of Honor of France, of the Concepcion de 
 Villaviciosa of Portugal, decorated with the Cross of the second class of the 
 Bust of Bolivar, Knight of St-Maurice and St-Lazarus of Italy, of the Crown of 
 Prussia, of the Crown of Christ of Portugal, Licentiate in civil and canonical 
 law, and through competitive examination, in administrative law Academician 
 Professor of the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation, my Min- 
 ister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of the Belgians. 
 
 John Bassett Moore of New York was appointed Secretary and counsel to 
 the Commissioners of the United States. In his reply to the opening prop- 
 osition of the Spanish Commission relating to the aggressions of the 
 Tagalo rebels, Mr. Moore said: "The American Commissioners can see 
 nothing but a proposal and demand to divert the conference from the object 
 for which it has met to the consideration of a subject which properly belongs 
 to the two governments, and not to the Commissioners here assembled. 
 The American Commissioners do not intend to intimate that the proposal was 
 made with this design, but they think it evident that this would be the neces- 
 sary result of its discussion." And "The American Commissioners, with a 
 view to prevent the diversion and failure of the present negotiations, as well 
 as on the ground of a want of power, deem themselves oTDliged to reply that 
 the questions involved in the present proposals and demands of the Spanish 
 Commissioners having heretofore been presented to the government of the 
 United States and answered in notes of the Department of State, any further 
 demands as to military operations in the Philippines must be addressed by the 
 government of Spain to the government of the United States at Washington, 
 and consequently that they cannot join in the proposed declarations." 
 
 To this the Spanish Commissioners replied that they understood it was 
 their "duty to make known to the American Commissioners that if the status 
 quo existing- in the Philippines on August 12 last, far from being restored, 
 continues to be disturbed to the prejudice of Spain, the government of Her 
 Catholic Majesty, and in her name its plenipotentiaries in this conference, 
 reserve the right to act as they may deem the rights of Spain shall require, 
 since they cannot conceive how the treaty of peace they are charged with 
 arranging with the American Commissioners upon the immutable basis of 
 the Protocol of Washington of August 1 2 last, can be concluded if this basis is 
 being constantly altered in one of its parts, and continually to the greater 
 prejudice of Spain. ' ' 
 
686 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 The first words of the Treaty of Peace of December lo, 1898, are: "Spain 
 relinquishes all claims of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," and the 
 island npon evacuation by Spain was to be occupied by the United States, 
 ' and while the occupation lasted the United States assume and discharge 
 the obligations that under international law resulted from the fact of its 
 occupation for the protection of life and property." The second article 
 is simply that "Spain ceded" certain islands, including Porto Rico and 
 Guam. 
 
 The Spanish Commission began by claiming that under the Protocol of 
 Peace with the United States it was our duty to see that "the insurgents in the 
 Philippines did not change the situation." This shadowy point was sus- 
 tained with an elaboration of phrases, and discussed by the American Com- 
 mission as curtly as the courtesies of peace-making permitted. Of course the 
 Spaniards reserved all rights of protest. 
 
 The Spanish Commission proceeded to propose articles as an amendment 
 to the proposals of the American Commissioners on the subject of the relin- 
 quishment by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba and the cession of Porto Rico. 
 The first article presented by the Spaniards was that the relinquishment and 
 cession was to be accepted by the United States, "that they may in their 
 turn transfer it at the proper time to the Cuban people upon the conditions 
 established in this treaty" ; and the second article was that the relinquishment 
 and transfer embraced : 
 
 "First. All the prerogatives, powers, and rights, which, as an integral 
 part of the sovereignty, belong to Her Catholic Majesty both over the island 
 of Cuba and over its inhabitants. 
 
 "Second. All charges and obligations of every kind in existence at the 
 time of the ratification of this treaty of peace, which the Crown of Spain 
 and her authorities in the island of Cuba may have contracted lawfully in the 
 exercise of the sovereignty hereby relinquished and transferred, and which 
 as such constitute an integral part thereof." 
 
 The English of this was that the United States should pay the debts Spain 
 had charged to Cuba. Article Third of the Spanish propositions detailed the 
 property, immovable and other, to be relinquished, and Article Fourth made 
 the material proposal more definite, saying: 
 
 "First: The charges and obligations to be transferred must have been 
 levied and imposed in constitutional form and in the exercise of its legitimate 
 
THE TREATY Oi' PEACE. 687 
 
 powers by the Crown of Spain, as the sovereign of the island of Cuba, or by 
 its lawful authorities in the exercise of their respective powers prior to the 
 ratification of this treaty. 
 
 "Second: The creation or establishment of such charges or obligations 
 must have been for the service of the island of Cuba, or chargeable to its own 
 individual treasury." 
 
 Article Fifth was : 
 
 "Pursuant to the provisions of the foregoing Article, there shall be 
 embraced in the said transfer all debts, of whatsoever kind, lawful charges, 
 the salaries or allowances of all employes, civil and ecclesiastical, who shajl 
 continue to render services in the island of Cuba, and all pensions in the civil 
 and military services and of widows and orphans; provided that they conform_ 
 to the requirements prescribed in the foregoing Article." 
 
 Therefore the "relinquishment" was interpreted to provide that the pen^ 
 sions and salaries of the priests, among others, should be paid by the United 
 States until turned over to the people of Cuba as a part of their free inherit- 
 ance. The American Commission rejected (October 11) the Spanish articles, 
 and filed a memorandum reciting the Peace Protocol, saying: 
 
 "In the place of the unconditional relinquishment agreed to in the 
 Protocol, it is proposed that the relinquishment now offered shall embrace all 
 charges of every kind which Spain and her authorities in Cuba have lawfully 
 contracted heretofore, and may hereafter contract, prior to the ratification of 
 the treaty of peace; and these 'charges and obligations,' past, present and 
 future, which it is proposed to 'transfer' to the United States, are declared to 
 include debts, civil and ecclesiastical salaries, and civil and military pensions, 
 ostensibly in arrears, as well as yet to accrue. 
 
 "To the American Commissioners this appears to be not a proposition to 
 'relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba, ' but in substance a 
 proposition to 'transfer' to the United States and in turn to Cuba a mass of 
 Spanish charges and obligations. 
 
 "It is diificult to perceive by what logic an indebtedness contracted for 
 any purpose can be deemed part of the sovereignty of Spain over the island 
 of Cuba. In the Article proposed it is attempted to yoke with the transfer of 
 sovereignty an obligation to assume an indebtedness arising out of the rela- 
 tions of Spain to Cuba. The unconditional relinquishment of sovereignty by 
 Spain stipulated for in the Protocol is to be changed into an engagement by 
 
688 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 the United States to accept the sovereignty burdened with a large mass of 
 outstanding indebtedness. 
 
 "It is proper to say that if during the negotiations resulting in the con- 
 clusion of the Protocol Spain had proposed to add to its stipulations in regard 
 to Cuba such as those now put forward, the proposal, unless abandoned, 
 would have terminated negotiations. 
 
 "Tlie American Commissioners, therefore, speaking for their govern- 
 ment, must decline to accept the burden which it is now proposed shall be 
 gratuitously assumed. 
 
 "The American Commissioners further observe that in Article III. of the 
 draft there is a negative clause, by which property not belonging to the Crown 
 of Spain is excepted from the proposed relinquishment and transfer of 
 sovereignty. In one respect this exception appears to be unnecessary, and in 
 another illogical. So far as it affects the question of legal title it is unneces- 
 sary, since such title, if not held by Spain, would not pass to the United States 
 by Spain's transfer of sovereignty. On the other hand, so far as it affects the 
 question of sovereignty, it is illogical, since the sovereignty, which includes 
 the right of eminent domain, would, if excepted from the relinquishment, 
 remain with Spain. We would thus have the singular spectacle of Spain 
 relinquishing her sovereignty over property belonging to the Crown, but 
 retaining it over all other property. 
 
 "Thus again we should witness the utter defeat of the explicit engage- 
 ment in the Protocol that Spain would 'relinquish all claim of sovereignty 
 over and title to Cuba. ' 
 
 "In the articles presented by the American Commissioners there were 
 stipulations in relation to archives and official records, which stipulation? were 
 intended to secure, and, as the American Commissioners believe, would 
 effectually secure, the object of preserving and of furnishing to those in inter- 
 est evidence of title to property in the islands in question. 
 
 "In the articles submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, it is provided 
 that documents and papers relating to sovereignty to be found in the archives 
 of the Peninsula shall be furnished to the United States; 'also 'copies of such 
 portions of other documents and papers relating to other subjects foreign to 
 the island of Cuba and the sovereignty aforesaid as may exist in the said 
 archives. ' 
 
 "It is difficult for the Americans to understand this latter clause ; perhaps 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 689 
 
 its exact meaning is not conveyed in the English translation of the Spanish 
 text. 
 
 "It is to be further observed that in the provisions of the Spanish articles 
 relating to the furnishing of record evidence of titles to lands in Cuba and 
 Porto Rico, it is stipulated that the archives and records shall be at the dis- 
 posal of the United States 'with the same rights and obligations as now attach 
 to them while at the disposal of the Spanish government and its said (insular) 
 authorities.' This restriction, the object of which is not perceived, would 
 seem to limit the control over archives and official records, after Spain's relin- 
 quishment of sovereignty, to the same power, both in kind and in extent, as 
 was formerly possessed by the Spanish government. This appears to be 
 inconsistent with the right of control which every sovereign power should 
 possess over its archives and official records. 
 
 "All the conditions and qualifications above referred to are by general 
 reference incorporated in the articles relating to the cession of Porto Rico and 
 other islands in the West Indies, and render these articles equally inadmissible. ' ' 
 
 It would be troublesome to find a more conclusive "annex" to a "Proto- 
 col" than this. The Spanish Commission came back with a memorandum 
 that displayed the resources of their noble language. First they defined the 
 difference between "relinquishment" and "abandonment," saying: 
 
 "The government of the American Union never demanded that the Span- 
 ish government abandon (abandonar) the sovereignty over Cuba, but that it 
 relinquish (renunciar) the same, so that the island should become independ- 
 ent. It so appears from the diplomatic correspondence in the possession of 
 the government of Her Catholic Majesty relating to the negotiation between 
 the two contracting parties prior to the declaration of war. It was also thus 
 declared by the American Congress in the Joint Resolution of April 19 last, 
 subsequently approved by the President of the United States. The first 
 clause of that resolution reads 'that the people of Cuba are and of right 
 ought to be free and independent. ' ' ' 
 
 There followed the official text of the Protocol in Spanish, and remarks : 
 
 "To undertake to explain the essential difference which according to the 
 elementary principles of public international law and the usage of nations 
 exists between the abandonment (abandono) and the relinquishment 
 (renuncia) of sovereignty, would be to offend the intelligence of the learned 
 American Commissioners. 
 
690 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 "Abandoned territories can of right be acquired by the first occupant, 
 while relinquished territories necessarily pass unto him to whom relinquish- 
 ment is made. And the United States demanded that Spain relinquish in 
 order that the Cuban people might become independent. 
 
 "Although it is true that the United States of America demanded this 
 of Spain in the present case, they also demanded that such relinquishment 
 must be made through them. The United States were to receive the island 
 of Cuba and retain the possession thereof, governing it until its pacification 
 was secured, asserting its 'determination to leave [no one can leave what he 
 does not hold] the government and control of the island to its people, as soon 
 as the said pacification is accomplished.' So was it solemnly set forth in 
 Section 4 of the Joint Resolution of the American Congress and in the des- 
 patch of the Secretary of State to the American Minister at Madrid. And 
 if the United States are not to leave the government and control of the 
 island until the pacification thereof is accomplished it is self-evident that in 
 the meantime the United States are called upon to administer the one and 
 retain the other. " 
 
 This was followed by learned observations about the rights of sovereignty 
 and the variance of the ancient world with the modern and Christian world, 
 the maxims observed by cultured nations and the eternal principles of justice, 
 more or less labored, and of vague application, saying : 
 
 "The special obligations of the particular territories ceded which were 
 contracted by its legitimate authorities, in no single case, not even in those 
 treaties in which the victor has shown himself most merciless towards the 
 vanquished, have the individual and separate charges and obligations of a 
 ceded territory failed to pass therewith. Thus it may be considered as an 
 absolutely essential condition that the cession of territory carries with it the 
 cession of the departmental, communal, and, generally speaking, individual 
 obligations and debts of the ceded territory. " 
 
 The "great conqueror of the century" (Napoleon) never dared to violate 
 this eternal rule of justice and, "The territories discovered by Columbus and 
 other illustrious Spanish explorers who have rendered such great, though not 
 always appreciated, services to civilization being divided into vice-royalties 
 and captaincies-general, each of these small states collected its own revenues 
 and met its own expenses, or contracted obligations to meet the necessities of 
 its own separate government; and when one of these territories found itself 
 
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 "TO GEOEGE DEWEY, WITH THE COMPLIMEXTS OF THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS AND 
 THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES." 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 693 
 
 with a permanent deficit, as was the case in the island of Cuba, the nearest 
 sister-colony came to its rescue. The vice-royalty of Mexico, from 1766 to 
 1806, annually assisted the island of Cuba with heavy sums for its govern- 
 mental needs and the development of its natural resources, at the time unex- 
 ploited, which expenses it could not, at such time, meet from its own 
 revenues. Not less that 108 millions of pesos came into Cuba from Mexico 
 during that period, this assistance being known in the Spanish colonial admin- 
 istration under the name of ' Situado de Mexico. ' ' ' 
 
 The Spanish Commission proceeded to state that grave errors were fallen 
 into "owing to the Spanish colonial system being unknown." The Spanish 
 Commission at this point paid this tribute to the Spanish- American peoples: 
 
 "What has been said up to this point regarding the nature of the colonial 
 obligations and those bound thereby, has never been disregarded (to their 
 honor be it said) by the Spanish-American peoples. They achieved their 
 independence through their own efforts, and the majority of them, before 
 Spain had recognized it, had by prior and solemn act of their legislatures, 
 declared as their own and as having preference those debts which the Crown 
 of Spain had contracted during the continuance of its sovereignty for the 
 service of such territories, and which debts were recorded in their respective 
 treasui-y books. 
 
 "Very few of the Spanish- American republics delayed so honorable a 
 declaration imtil the mother country had recognized their independence, as 
 was said by the Argentine Republic in the treaty concluded with Spain on 
 September 21, 1863, and by Uruguay, in that concluded on July 19, 1870: 'Just 
 as they acquired the rights and privileges belonging to the Crown of Spain, 
 they also assume all its duties and obligations. ' 
 
 "Note that the Spanish-American republics without exception recognized 
 and assumed as their own these debts of every kind whatsoever, specifying 
 them in thetreaty of peace with Bolivia of July 21, 1847, wherein it is stated 
 that they 'include all debts for pensions, salaries, supplies, advances, trans- 
 portation, forced loans, deposits, contracts, and any other debt incurred during 
 war times or prior thereto, chargeable to said treasuries; provided they were 
 corrtracted by direct orders of the Spanish government or its constituted 
 authorities in said territories. ' 
 
 "Spain did not recognize the independence of any American state which 
 had previously been her colony save upon this condition, which those states 
 
694 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 spontaneously incorporated in their respective treaties, as of right they 
 should. 
 
 "Her right and her dignity will not permit her to recognize — without this 
 condition, which now more than ever if possible is still just and proper — the 
 independence of the Cuban and Porto Rican peoples, which they have not 
 been able to achieve by their own unaided efforts." 
 
 The Spanish Commission desired a modification of the sentence in the 
 American Commissioners' Protocol No. 4, that the Spanish Article was a 
 proposition not to relinquish sovereign tyv but to "transfer to the United 
 States a mass of Spanish charges and obligations," and modification was 
 desired "on the ground that it might be thought to imply that they were not 
 acting in good faith. ' ' Out of deference to the Spanish Commissioners this 
 was changed, though the sentence did not sustain the Spanish construction, to 
 read, "a mass of charges and obligations which, in the opinion of the Ameri- 
 can Commissioners, properly belong to Spain. ' ' October 14th the American 
 Commission replied to the Spanish Commission as to the distinction between 
 relinquishment and abandonment, the contention being based upon the fact 
 that "in the various documents referred to the United States required Spain to 
 "relinquish' her sovereignty, but did not demand that she 'abandon' it. 
 
 "A distinction is thus made between a 'relinquishment' and an 'aban- 
 donment' ; and it is argued that while 'abandoned territories' become 
 derelict, so that they may be acquired by the first occupant, "relinquished 
 territories' necessarily pass to him to whom relinquishment, is made. 
 
 "The American Commissioners are unable to admit that such a distinc- 
 tion between the words in question exists either in law or in common use. 
 
 "The word 'relinquish,' as defined in the English dictionaries, means 'to 
 give up the possession or occupancy of; withdraw from; leave; abandon; 
 quit.' Again: 'to renounce a claim to; resign; as, to relinquish a debt.' 
 
 "On the other hand, we find in that great monument of Spanish learning, 
 the law dictionary of Escriche (Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia), 
 under the word 'renunciar,' which the Spanish memorandum declares to be 
 the equivalent of the French word 'renoncer' (used in Spain's version of the 
 Protocol) and of the English word 'relinquish,' the following definition: 'The 
 voluntary giving up of a right exercised or expected to be exercised, or of a 
 thing held or possessed or expected to be held or possessed. ' ' ' 
 
 Commenting upon this definition, Escriche says: "The relinquishment 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 695 
 
 differs from the cession in that the latter requires for its completion the con- 
 currence of the wills of the grantor and the grantee and a just cause for the 
 transfer, while the former is perfect with only the will of the relinquisher. 
 The effect of the relinquishment is confined to the abdication or dropping of 
 the right or thing relinquished. The effect of the cession is the conveyance 
 of the right to the grantee. " 
 
 The American Commissioners noted the declaration in the Spanish 
 memorandum that there was no purpose now to transfer with the sovereignty 
 of Cuba and Porto Rico a proportional part of the national debt of Spain, but 
 "only the obligations and charges attaching individually to the islands," which 
 obligations and charges it likens to the local debts which pass with ceded ter- 
 ritory; but it appears, however, by the explanation given in the memorandum 
 of the origin of these charges and obligations, and of the manner in which 
 they were contracted, that they included the whole of what is commonly 
 called the Cuban debt. And it was shown that this debt did not exist 
 prior to 186 1, and the American memorandum concluded with the statement 
 that the government of the tjnited States had at a great sacrifice of life and 
 treasure prosecuted a conflict to cause the relinquishment by Spain of sover- 
 eignty over Cuba, and one of the results was the unconditional agreement 
 embodied in the first article of the Peace Protocol that Spain "will relinquish 
 all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," and "upon the simple fulfill- 
 ment of that stipulation the American Commissioners are obliged to insist." 
 
 The formatioii of the Cuban debt was thus related by the Commissioners : 
 
 "The revenues of the island were, as a rule, far more than sufficient to 
 pay the expenses of its government, and produced in each year a surplus. 
 This surplus was not expended for the benefit of the island, but was sent to 
 Madrid. The surpluses thus disposed of amounted, from 1856 to 1861 in- 
 clusive, to upwards of $20,060,000. 
 
 "In 1864, in order to meet the national expenses of the attempt to 'rein- 
 corporate' San Domingo into the Spanish dominions, and of the "expedition to 
 Mexico,' the Spanish authorities issued bonds to the amount of $3,000,000. 
 Subsequently new loans were made, so that the so-called Cuban debt had 
 swollen by 1868 to $18,000,000. 
 
 "In tljat year the ten years'Jwar for Cuban independence broke out, a war 
 
 produced by causes so generally conceded to be just as to need no exposition 
 
 , on this occasion. All the expenses of this war were imposed upon Cuba, so 
 
*96 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 that in 1880, according to a statement made at Madrid in that year by a Span- 
 ish Secretary for the Colonies, the so-called Cuban debt amounted to upwards 
 of $170,000,000. 
 
 "Subsequently the Spanish government undertook to consolidate these 
 •debts, and to this end created in 1886 the so-called Billetes hipotecarios de la 
 Isla de Cuba, to the amount of 620,000,000 pesetas, or $124,000,000. The 
 Spanish government undertook to pay these bonds and the interest thereon 
 out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national character of the debt was shown 
 by the fact that, upon the face of the bonds, 'the Spanish nation' (la Nacidn 
 Espanola) guarantee their payment. The annual charge for interest and 
 sinking fund on account of this debt amounted to the sum of 39,191,000 
 pesetas, or $7,838,200, which was disbursed through a Spanish financial insti- 
 tution, called the Banco Hispano-Colonial, which is said to have collected daily 
 from the custom house at Havana, through an agency there established, the 
 sum of $33,339. 
 
 "In 1890 a new issue of bonds was authorized by the Spanish government 
 to the amount, as it is understood, of 875,000,000 pesetas, or $175,000,000, 
 with the same guarantee as before, apparently with a view to refund the prior 
 debt, as well as to cover any new debts contracted between 1886 and 1890. It 
 seems, however, that only a small number of these bonds had been disposed of 
 when, in February, 1895, the last insurrection and movement for independence 
 broke out. The government of' Spain then proceeded to issue these new 
 bonds for the purpose of raising funds with which to suppress the uprising, so 
 that those outstanding on January i, 1898, amounted, according to published 
 reports, to 858,550,000 pesetas, or $171,710,000. In addition to these a further 
 loan, known as the 'Cuban War Emergency Loan,' was, as the American 
 Commissioners are advised, floated to the amount of 800,000,000 pesetas, or 
 $160,000,000, represented by what are called 'five per cent peseta bonds.' 
 
 "Although it does not appear that any mention is made in these bonds of 
 the revenues of Cuba, it is understood that they are regarded in Spain as 
 properly constituting apart of the 'Cuban debt,' together with various unliqui- 
 dated debts, large in amount, incurred by the Spanish authorities in opposing 
 by arms the' independence of Cuba. 
 
 "From no point of view can the debts above described be considered as 
 local debts of Cuba or as debts incurred for the benefit of Cuba. In no sense 
 are they obligations properly chargeable to that island. They are debts 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 697 
 
 created by the government of Spain, for its own purposes and through its own 
 agents, in whose creation Cuba had no voice. ' ' 
 
 In reply to this the Spanish Commission asserted that, "as a general rule, 
 the island of Cuba has not since its discovery covered its own expenses. 
 
 "As long as Spain kept the American colonies the island was sustained 
 by the pecuniary aid of her sisters and specially by that of the Vice-Royalty 
 of Mexico. In this century, for a very few years, she had a surplus, thanks 
 to the development of her natural resources, at last obtained through this 
 assistance, and it is true that this surplus was turned over to the treasury of 
 the Peninsula. But with this exception it is patent that the general accounts 
 of the Spanish state from 1896-1897 show that the treasury of the Peninsula 
 advanced to Cuba, in the years preceding that recent period, a sum amounting 
 to 429,602,013.08 pesetas. There also appears an advance to Porto Rico of 
 3,220,488.67 pesetas, and to Santo Domingo 1,397,161.^9 pesetas. 
 
 "The prosperity of Cuba was of short duration; for the greater part of 
 the time from the days of Columbus, by reason either of the scarcity of its 
 inhabitants or of the slavery of the black race, which formed the majority, or 
 lastly because Spaniards preferred to colonize other parts of America, the 
 island was unable to develop its natural resources ; and it was nevertheless 
 constantly necessary to expend in the island the large sums which were 
 required for the establishment of reform and the creation of the institutions 
 which are the essential conditions of modern life. ' ' 
 
 The Spanish Commission protested against an assertion in the American 
 memorandum that the insurrections in Cuba were the outcome of just griev- 
 ances, and regretted that such an assertion should have been made. The 
 American Commission "would surely, and with good reason, regret that the 
 Spanish Commission should say anything here without an imperative necessity 
 of the justice of the rebellions of the natives of the immense American territory 
 which the United States had so often to suppress with an iron hand, and if it 
 should also say anything of the right by which the Southern States attempted 
 to break the federal bond by the force of arms. ' ' 
 
 It was "very natural," the Spaniards proceeded, "that the American 
 Commissioners should not have such accurate knowledge as is requisite for 
 precise judgment of the acts of the Spanish administration in the Peninsula or 
 in its colonies. 
 
 "And we find a confirmation of this in the facts. 
 
698 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 "In regard to the argument against the recognition of a certain part of 
 the Cuban debt, on the ground that the rebellion of a minority of the Cuban 
 people to obtain their independence was just, we have only to make the fol- 
 lowing remark : 
 
 "The insurgent minority, it is true, rose up in arms to secure the inde- 
 pendence of the island. The United States erroneously believed that their 
 cause was just, and by force of arms caused it to prevail_against Spain. But 
 now the facts have shown that Spain was right, as the United States them- 
 selves have had to recognize that the Cuban people are not as yet in such "con- 
 ditions as are necessary to entitle them to the enjoyment of full liberty and 
 sovereignty. It is upon this ground that the United States have decided to 
 withhold from that people the said privileges and to hold them under Ameri- 
 can control, until they become able to enjoy that liberty prematurely 
 demanded by them. " 
 
 In order to define the debts the Americans should assume the Spaniards 
 presented an article, providing: 
 
 "All pecuniary charges and obligations outstanding upon the ratification 
 of this treaty of peace which, after a minute examination into their origin, 
 purpose and the conditions of their creation, should be held, pursuant to strict 
 law and undeniable equity, to be distinct from such as are properly and 
 peculiarly chargeable to the treasury of the Peninsula, and to have been 
 always properly and peculiarly Cuban. 
 
 "To make the strict examination provided for in the foregoing paragraph, 
 the two High Contracting Parties shall name a Commission of competent and 
 impartial persons in the manner to be determined in the proper article of this 
 treaty." 
 
 As to the powers of the Commissioners, the Spanish Commission quoted 
 the Secretary of State and the President, as follows : 
 
 "After the three conditions which the Secretary of State at Washington, 
 replying on July 30 last to the message of the government of Her Catholic 
 Majesty of the 2 2d of the said month, proposed to Spain for the termination of 
 the war, he said: 'If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety 
 commissioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly author- 
 ized commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details 
 of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above 
 indicated. ' These details do not appear to be circumscribed to the archipelago. 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 699 
 
 ''K 
 "The very President of the American Republic in the conference he held 
 
 on August 10 with the Ambassador of France, representing Spain for the time 
 being, made an absolute distinction between the Protocol and the treaty of 
 peace, stating that the former should only be a mere preliminary document 
 which should have no object or effect other than to record without any delay 
 the agreement of the two governments upon the principles themselves of the 
 peace, and that, therefore, it would not be necessary to reserve therein either 
 the rights of the Cortes or those of the Federal Senate, who were charged 
 only with the ratification of the final treaty. 
 
 "The President, it is true, spoke of the Philippine question to state that it 
 was reserved for the Paris conference ; but he never said, or even intimated, 
 that this subject should be the only, one to be treated by this conference " 
 This was followed up with these interesting observations : 
 "The American Commission, in order to sustain its inadmissible opinion 
 regarding the abandonment by Spain of the island of Cuba, relies on the 
 difference which appears in the Protocol itself. They say that Spain agreed 
 to cede only Porto Rico to the United States, while she bound herself to relin- 
 quish the island of Cuba. From this they deduce that the effects of the obli- 
 gation of Spain with respect to one are broader than with respect to the 
 other. We have already proved by the very text of the draft of articles 
 presented by the said gentlemen that when they drew it up they did not even 
 perceive this difference in the effects with respect to Spain. The difference, 
 nevertheless, is well understood under another aspect. The United States 
 made a demand on Spain and afterwards declared war on her that Cuba might 
 become free and independent. And it is clear that having conquered they 
 could not demand that the island be ceded to them, ignoring the liberty and 
 independence thereof, as this would give cause to the world to believe that 
 such liberty and independence had not been the true cause of the conflict. 
 They did not make the same demand regarding Porto Rico, and did subse- 
 quently claim the sovereignty of the latter island and of the others surrotmd- 
 ing Cuba (which will render impossible its independence without the will and 
 gracious consent of the United States, which will always have it at their 
 mercy owing to their control over the islands surrounding it like a band of 
 iron) in the way of indenanity for the expenses of the war and of the damages 
 which they said American citizens had suffered during the colonial 
 insurrection. This is the natural explanation of why in the Protocol the 
 
700 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 sovereignty of one island appears as relinquished and that of the others 
 as ceded. ' ' 
 
 The Spaniards proceeded to state the fact that we had repeatedly paid 
 for land, citing the cases of Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico and Alaska, and 
 now we were demanding from Spain, in the way of war indemnity, not only 
 the cession of islands but additionally that the burdens which encumbered 
 them, "as well as their sister Cuba, be thrown upon the mother country, who 
 with her own hands introduced them into the life of the civilized world. ' ' 
 
 In concluding their very lengthy and able memorandum the Spanish 
 Commission remarked, with eloquent impressiveness, it is only fair to say : 
 
 ' ' It results, in recapitulation, that the only question up to now in existence 
 between the two Commissions and awaiting their decision is a question of 
 money, which as far as one of the High Contracting Parties is concerned is 
 relatively of secondary importance. That question is the one which relates 
 to the colonial debt. 
 
 "The Spanish Commissioners understand that a question of such a nature 
 as this cannot fail to be solved satisfactorily between two parties, one of 
 V\?hich is the greatest nation of the new world, immensely rich and prosperous, 
 blessed with inexhaustible resources, whether due to nature or to the 
 prodigious activity of its inhabitants, which on the other hand acquires by this 
 treaty territories of great importance, and thereb)' fulfills an aspiration of its 
 policy in America, while the other party is a great and noble nation of the old 
 world, a cordial friend of her late antagonist in days for her more prosperous, 
 but now impoverished through the misfortunes heaped upon her during the 
 century which is about to terminate; whose treasury is overburdened by 
 obligations, and for whom the present treaty will mean the solemn confirma- 
 tion of the loss of the last remnants of her American empire, although through 
 her discovery of the new world she was instrumental in the very existence of 
 the Great American Republic, and to the enrichment of the modern nations, 
 perhaps at the expense of her own welfare and to the detriment of the full 
 development of the great elements of wealth accumulated in her own bosom 
 but neglected through her desire preferentially to attend to her colonies, 
 creatures who like others in the order of nature enlist the utmost solicitude 
 on the part of their mother, who feeds and supports them at the sacrifice of 
 her own welfare. ' ' 
 
 In replying to this remarkable manifesto in a memorandum, which is 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE, 701 
 
 marked by the passionate dignity of an uncommon and transcendent sorrow, 
 the American Commission said that in oflfering the precise stipulations of the 
 Protocol they "sought to put aside the controversy raised by the Spanish 
 proposals as to the relinquishment of sovereignty and the assumption of the 
 Cuban debt, and to afford the Spanish Commissioners an opportunity to meet 
 them on the common ground of what the two governments had unmistakably 
 agreed to. It was and is now apparent that on the composite subject, as the 
 Spanish Commissioners consider it to be, of the relinquishment of sovereignty 
 over Cuba and the assumption of the Cuban debt, the views expressed on the 
 one side and on the other are irreconcilable, and that, unless some common 
 ground is found, the conference is at an end. In this crisis the American 
 Commissioners conceived that both sides might, without any compromise of 
 principle or of opinion, agree that, instead of amplifying the words of the 
 Protocol,' or substituting for them argumentative stipulations, they would 
 execute the promise in the words in which it was made. They regret that 
 the Spanish Commissioners rejected this conciliatory proposition. 
 
 "The Spanish Commissioners, in the memorandum now under considera- 
 tion, recur to the distinction which they have sought to make between the 
 words 'abandon' and 'relinquish.' On this verbal question, which was 
 raised by the Spanish Commissioners in their memorandum of the nth of 
 October, the American Commissioners find no occasion to add anything to 
 what they have already said ; but they feel called upon to repel the imputa- 
 tion that they have sought either to leave Cuba in a derelict condition or to 
 evade any responsibility to which their government is by its declarations or 
 its course of conduct committed." 
 
 Touching the Spanish claims that they had made recent "advances" to 
 Cuba, the American Commission observed: 
 
 "It is to be regretted that details were not given. But, by the very term 
 'advances' it is evident that the Spanish memorandum does not refer to gifts, 
 but to expenditures for the reimbursement of which Cuba was expected ulti- 
 mately to provide ; and the American Commissioners do not doubt that these 
 expenditures were made for the carrying on of the war, or the payment of war 
 expenses, in Cuba. 
 
 "When the American Commissioners, in their memorandum of the 14th 
 instant, referred to the Cuban insurrection of 1868 as the product of just 
 grievances, it was not their intention to offend the sensibilities of the Spanish 
 
702 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 Commissioners, but to state a fact which they supposed to be generally 
 admitted. They might, if they saw fit to do so, cite the authority of many 
 eminent Spanish statesmen in the support of their remark. 
 
 "The American Commissioners have read without offense the reference 
 in the Spanish memorandum to the Indian rebellions which it has been 
 necessary for the United States to suppress, for they are unable to see any 
 parallel between the uprisings of those barbarous and often savage tribes, 
 which have disappeared before the march of civilization because they were 
 unable to submit to it, and the insurrections against Spanish rule in Cuba, 
 insurrections in which many of the noblest men of Spanish blood in the island 
 have participated. 
 
 "Nor are the American Commissioners offended by the reference of the 
 Spanish memorandum to the attempt of the Southern States to secede. The 
 Spanish Commissioners evidently misconceive the nature and the object of 
 that movement. The war of secession was fought and concluded upon a 
 question of constitutional principle, asserted by one party to the conflict and 
 denied by the other. It was a conflict in no respect to be likened to the 
 uprisings against Spanish rule in Cuba. 
 
 "The American Commissioners are unaware of the ground on which it is 
 asserted in the Spanish memorandum that the United States has been com- 
 'pelled to admit that the Cuban people are as yet unfit for the enjoyment of 
 full liberty and sovereignty. It is true that an intimation of such unfitness 
 was made in the note of the Spanish government on the aad of July last. 
 The government of the United States, in its reply of the 30th of July, declared 
 that it did not share the apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but that it 
 recognized that in the present distracted and prostrate condition of the 
 island, brought about by the wars that had waged there, aid and guidance 
 would be necessary." 
 
 The Spaniards had said publicists had declared that the thirteen original 
 colonies of the United States had paid Great Britain ;^i5,ooo,ooo. The Amer- 
 icans replied : 
 
 "The American Commissioners are not acquainted with the works of the 
 publicists who maintain that the thirteen original United States paid to Great 
 Britain ;£ 15, 000, 000 sterling, presumably for the extinguishment of colonial 
 debts. The American Commissioners, however, feel no interest in the 
 matter, since the statement is entirely erroneous. The preliminary and 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 703 
 
 definitive, treaties of peace between the United States and Great Britain of 
 1782 and 1783 were published soon after their conclusion, and have since been 
 republished in many forms. They are the only treaties made between the 
 two countries as to American independence, and they contain no stipulation 
 of the kind referred to. ' ' 
 
 The American memorandum closes with these simple sentences : 
 
 "If it could be admitted, as is argued in the memorandum submitted by 
 the Spanish Commissioners, that the United States in this relation stands as 
 the agent of the Cuban people, the duty to resist the assumption of these 
 heavy obligations would be equally imperative. The decrees of the Spanish 
 government itself show that these debts were incurred in the fruitless 
 endeavors of that Government to suppress the aspirations of the Cuban people 
 for greater liberty and freer government. ' ' 
 
 The next move of the Spaniards was to assume and assert a policy in the 
 cases of the Philippines and the West Indian islands. The reply of the 
 American Commission was : 
 
 "The American Commissioners are not disturbed by this charge of incon- 
 sistency, since they deem it obviously groundless. They based their demands 
 in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico upon the precise terms of the Protocol, 
 because it was in those very terms that the United States had made its 
 demands and Spain had conceded them, by promising to 'relinquish all claim 
 of sovereignty over and title to Cuba, ' and to 'cede' to the United States Porto 
 Rico and certain other islands. The United States, in insisting upon the 
 words of the Protocol on these subjects, merely asked that the precise con- 
 cessions of Spain be made good. 
 
 "In the case of the Philippines, the United States, except as to the bay, 
 city, and harbor of Manila, confined itself to demanding that the subject 
 should be left in the widest and fullest sense for future negotiations. While 
 it did not, with the exception referred to, demand specific concessions, it 
 reserved and secured the right to demand them. Its position, therefore, is, 
 not that its present demands in respect of the Philippines were specifically set 
 out in the Protocol, but that they are justified by and included in the right which 
 it therein expressly reserved and secured to make demands in the future." 
 
 The Spanish Commission had been sensitive from the first meeting of the 
 Commissioners about the fate of the Philippines, and protested October 17th 
 against the sending of American reinforcements to Manila, the president of 
 
704 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 the Spanish Committee stating "that he had received from his government a 
 telegram referring to reports to the effect that two American men-of-war 
 were about to leave American ports with reinforcements of troops for the gar- 
 rison at Manila, and that Spanish prisoners in the possession of the Tagalos 
 are ill-treated." But the telegram was not read. 
 
 There is a curious passage in one of the memorandums, charging that 
 General Merritt, "after the Protocol was signed, contrary to what had been 
 agreed upon, forcibly took possession of Manila," and in the terms of the 
 capitulation the words occurred "or when the American army evacuates," 
 and the Spanish memorandum goes on to say : 
 
 "In the conference held on August 4 last, between Mr. Cambon, 
 Ambassador from France, and President McKinley, in the presence of the 
 United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cambon made some remarks as to the 
 session of Porto Rico in compensation for the expenses of the war, and the 
 President, showing himself inflexible upon that point, repeated his assertion 
 that the Philippine question was the only one not finally settled in his mind. 
 It was then that Mr. Cambon asked for an explanation about the meaning of 
 the above cited phrases in Article III. of the Protocol, relating to the Philip- 
 pine Archipelago, as the language of said Article might lend itself to inspire 
 fear in Spain in regard to her sovereignty over these islands. President 
 McKinley answered him, verbatim, as follows : 
 
 "'I do not want any ambiguity to be allowed to remain on this point. 
 The negotiators of both countries are the ones who shall resolve upon the 
 permanent advantages (notice that Jie said "advantages," and not "rights") 
 which we shall ask in the archipelago, and decide upon the intervention (con- 
 trole), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands.' 
 
 "He further said: 'The Madrid government can rest assured that up to 
 now nothing is decided a priori, in my own mind, against Spain, nor do I 
 consider anything decided by it against the United States.' 
 
 "Is it therefore doubtful that on the 12th of August, when the Secretary 
 of State of the United States signed the Protocol, the President of the United 
 States had no idea of demanding from Spain the cession to the United States 
 of her sovereignty over the archipelago?" 
 
 There was further comment upon the President's open-mindedness as to 
 the Philippines, and this gave rise to the most interesting episode of the 
 arduous and contentious negotiations, which, stated by the American Com- 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 705 
 
 mission, in constant communication by the cable with the President himself, 
 has every authenticity of authority, and is official history. The Spanish Com- 
 mission had gone so far as to say that on the 13th of August, "General Mer- 
 ritt, commander of the American forces in Manila, and the Admiral of the 
 fleet in that bay, demanded the surrender of the place, and as its authorities 
 did not agree thereto, the said forces opened fire on the San Antonio Abad 
 powder magazine and on the trenches which defended the city on the land 
 side, unnecessarily causing a considerable number of losses to the Spanish 
 forces, who would have peacefully delivered the city over to the Americans 
 in obedience to the third basis of the Protocol that they might hold it as a 
 guaranty pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace. 
 
 "General Merritt entered Manila by force, he made prisoners of war of its 
 garrison made up of eight or nine thousand men, he took possession of the 
 public funds and the collection of taxes, including customs receipts, he named 
 as Intendant General and Administrator of the Public Treasury, and Tax 
 ■ Collector, the officers of his army he saw fit, thereby displacing the Spanish 
 officials. He relieved the Spanish Commander of the civil guard charged with 
 the maintenance of public order ; he constituted military courts ; he opened 
 the port of Manila and all the other ports of the Philippines in the possession 
 of his land and naval forces to the commerce of his nation and of neutral 
 nations, conditioned on the payment of the dues in force at the time of his 
 arrival, which were collected by his officials. All of this is recorded in the 
 preliminary minute of the capitxilation of August 13, in the capitulation of the 
 14th itself, in the proclamation of General Merritt of like date, in his orders of 
 the 2 2d and 23d of the same month, and in the others dictated by the Ameri- 
 can authorities and officials in Manila. 
 
 "The Spanish government remonstrated to that of Washington through 
 the French Embassy against everything that occurred there on August 29 and 
 the 3d and i ith of September last, repeating such remonstrances since and 
 down to the present time, signally insisting upon the immediate release of the 
 garrison held prisoners in Manila and upon the return of their arms, since, on 
 the one hand, it could not send reinforcements from the Peninsula to the 
 archipelago, nor would the United States look favorably upon such an 
 action, and, on the other hand, it needed those forces to liberate the thou- 
 sands of Spanish prisoners of the Tagalo insurgents, victims of their ill-treat- 
 ment, and to combat and dominate that insurrection of its own subjects. The 
 
7o6 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 remonstrances of the Spanish government have been up to the present fniit- 
 less. These acts are daily assuming a worse phase. On September 21 
 Captain W. P. MofEatt, appointed by the American Provost Marshal in charge 
 of the Bilibid prisons, with authority to regulate the entrance and release of 
 all kinds of prisoners, released two, named Silvestre Lacoy and Marcos 
 Alarcon, charged with the offense of highway robbery ; two others charged 
 with desertion; six charged with contempt of authority; another charged 
 with assault and robbery, and three others charged with homicide. As is 
 seen, all these prisoners were in jail for common crimes. This unheard-of 
 act was communicated to the government of Her Catholic Majesty by the 
 Commandant General's Office of the station of "Manila." 
 
 The American Commission says of this: "The American Commissioners 
 are loth to assume that the Spanish 'proposition' employs these words for the 
 purpose of intimating that General Merritt could at the time of the capture 
 of Manila have had knowledge of the Protocol. It is a fact doubtless well 
 known to the Spanish government that on the i6th of August last, four days 
 after the signature of the protocol, and four days before the receipt at Wash- 
 ington of the news of the capture and capitulation of Manila, the Depart- 
 ment of State addressed to the French Ambassador a note soliciting the 
 consent of the Spanish government to the restoration of cable communica- 
 tion between Manila and Hongkong, in order that continuous telegraphic 
 connection with the Philippines might be reestablished. ' ' 
 
 "The Spaniards descended from their pose of dignity in this instance. The 
 President of the United States could just as well have forced the cession of 
 the Philippines as of Porto Rico, but deemed it his duty to refer the question 
 of our permanency in the archipelago to the people of the United States. 
 The raid of the Spanish Commission upon the facts as to the Philippines 
 exhibits a weakness that takes away sympathy from the Commissioners when 
 representing the misfortunes of their country ; they were from the beginning 
 conscious that however adroit their ability, or vigorous their protests, the 
 inevitable end was Spain's surrender. 
 
 There is compensation for the general reader in the narration the Ameri- 
 can^Commissioners give of the part of the President in the preparation of the 
 Peace Protocol. 
 
 The President on the a6th of July received a note asking him to name the 
 terms on which peace might be obtained. This note was presented to the 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 707 
 
 President of the United States on the 26th day of July, 1898, by Mr. Cambon, 
 Ambassador of the French Republic at Washington, authorized to make the 
 application, and represent the Spanish government in the subsequent negotia- 
 tions which led up to the execution of the Protocol. At that meeting, the 
 President received the .note of July 22 from the Spanish government, and 
 advised Mr. Cambon that after consultation with his Cabinet he would pre- 
 pare an answer which could be transmitted to the Spanish government. On 
 July 30, following, the terms of peace having been carefully considered and 
 agreed upon by the President and his Cabinet, the President received Mr. 
 Cambon at the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which meeting were 
 also present Mr. Thidbault, Secretary of the French Embassy in Washington, 
 and the then Secretary of State of the United States. The answer of the 
 President to the communication of the Spanish government, dated July 30, 
 1898, was then read to Mr. Cambon. This note was in the exact form in 
 which it was afterwards signed and delivered to Mr. Cambon to be sent to the 
 Spanish government, with a single exception. After some discussion of the 
 terms of the note as to Cuba, and Porto Rico, and other West Indian islands, 
 Mr. Cambon said he did not know what the Spanish government would desire 
 as to the Philippines, and no matter what the note might say as to the Com- 
 mission, the Spanish government would regard the purpose of the United 
 States as being fixed to acquire not only Cuba and Porto Rico, but the Philip- 
 pines as well. The President said that as to the Philippines the note 
 expressed the purposes of this government, and their final disposition would 
 depend upon the treaty to be negotiated by the Commissioners and ratified by 
 the interested governments. 
 
 After further discussion, in which the President reiterated that the 
 treaty must determine the fate of the Philippines, and the note of the Presi- 
 dent on that subject reading then as now with the single exception that the 
 word "possession" was then in Article III., so that it read "control, possession 
 and government of the Philippines," where it now reads "control, disposition 
 and government of the Philippines," Mr. Cambon said that the word "pos- 
 session" translated into Spanish in such a way as to be regarded as of a 
 severe and threatening nature, and suggested a change in that word. He 
 suggested the word "condition." The President declined to change the word 
 except for a word of similar import or meaning. The word "disposition" 
 being suggested, after considerable talk the President consented that that 
 
7o8 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 word, not changing the meaning, being indeed a broader one and including 
 possession, might be substituted. Thereupon the note at the close of the 
 interview of July 30, in exactly the form it was originally cast with the 
 single change of the word "disposition" for "possession," was delivered to 
 Mr. Cambon to be communicated to the Spanish government. 
 
 On Wednesday, August 3, in the' afternoon, Mr. Cambon having inti- 
 mated a desire for a further interview with the President, another meeting 
 between the same persons was held at the Executive Mansion. Mr. Cambon 
 said the Spanish government had received the answer of the President, and 
 that it was regarded by Spain as very severe. After asking a modification as 
 to Porto Rico, to which the President promptly answered that he could not 
 consent, Mr. Cambon said there was a disposition to believe in Spain that the 
 United States intended to take the Philippine group ; that the Spanish govern- 
 ment appreciated that reforms were necessary in the government ; that Amer- 
 ican privileges should be granted ; but that Spanish sovereignty should not be 
 interfered with was a matter which Spain would insist upon. The President 
 answered that the question of Cuba, Porto Rico and other West India islands, 
 and the Ladrones, admitted of no negotiation; that the disposition of the 
 Philippine Islands, as he had already said to Mr. Cambon, must depend upon 
 the treaty which might be negotiated, and that he could not make any change 
 in the terms theretofore submitted. Mr. Cambon called attention to the 
 wording of the note as to the possession of the city, bay and harbor of Manila 
 to be retained during the pendency of the treaty, and asked what was to be 
 done with them afterwards. The President said that must depend upon the 
 terms of the treaty. 
 
 This is the same interview alluded to in the memorandum of the Span- 
 ish Commissioners as having occurred on the 4th of August. It in fact 
 occurred on the afternoon of August 3, the difference fti date arising from the 
 fact, no doubt, that it was reported on the 4th of August. This could make 
 but little difference, as there was but one interview at that time. 
 
 In reporting the conversations, and comparing the memoranda made by 
 Mr. Cambon with those made by the representative of the American govern- 
 ment then present, it must be' borne in mind that Mr. Cambon did not speak 
 or understand English, but communicated with the President through the 
 medium of an interpreter, his Secretary, and that neither of the American 
 representatives understood or spoke the French language. . Making this allow- 
 
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TEtE TREATY OF PEACE. 711 
 
 ance, it is perfectly apparent that the American President, even in the version 
 reported and transcribed in the memorandum of the Spanish Commission, at 
 all times maintained that the treaty of peace should determine the control, 
 disposition and government of the Philippines The President did say that 
 the Philippine question was the only one left open for negotiation and settle- 
 ment in the treaty. It is undoubtedly true that it was not then fully settled 
 in his own mind as to what disposition should be made of the Philippines. 
 Had it been, there would have been nothing to leave to negotiation and 
 settlement in the treaty. It was the purpose of the President in everything 
 written and spoken of to leave to the negotiators of the treaty the most ample 
 freedom with reference to the Philippines, and to settle, if their negotiations 
 should result in an agreement, the control, disposition and government of 
 those islands in the treaty of peace. When Mr. Cambon spoke of Spain's 
 purpose to retain sovereignty over those islands, the President did say he 
 wanted it clearly understood that no ambiguity should remain upon that 
 point, but that the whole matter should be decided as set forth in the treaty 
 of peace, which should determine the control, disposition and government of 
 the Philippine Islands. He certainly did not use the word "intervention," nor 
 limit the subject of negotiation to "advantages" in the Philippines; nor could it 
 be claimed that any report was made to the Spanish government of the precise 
 English words used by the President. In the same paragraph quoted in the 
 memorandum of the Spanish Commission in which it is said he used the 
 words above quoted, it is added that the President also said the negotiators 
 should decide upon the "intervention" (controle), disposition and government 
 of the Philippine Islands. Even this version of the conversation is ample 
 proof that the President showed no uncertainty as to the scope and meaning of 
 the terms used. He did say in substance, in reply to the inquiry of Mr. 
 Cambon as to whether the United States had prejudged the matter of the 
 Philippine Islands and the rights to be acquired therein by the United States, 
 that the case had not been prejudged either as to the United States or as to 
 Spain. The whole matter would be left to the Commission for negotiation, 
 and to be settled by the treaty of peace. In the meantime, the United States 
 would insist upon holding Manila as laid down in the note, and its disposition 
 thereafter would depend upon the terms of the treaty. This is reported in 
 the quotation in the Spanish note as the utterance of the President that "the 
 Madrid government can rest assured that up to now nothing is decided k 
 
712 ^ THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 priori in my own mind against Spain, nor do I consider anything decided by 
 it against the United States." This may not be an unfair interpretation, 
 though not the exact words used by the President. It shows clearly that he 
 did not regard the United States as limited to 'advantages in the Philippines,' 
 but the whole matter, being undecided in the President's mind, was left open 
 in accordance with the terms of the note. The case was not decided in 
 advance in any of its aspects either for or against either government. 
 
 Great stress was laid in the Spanish memorandum upon the allegation 
 that the President had not then determined to take the Philippine group, and 
 indeed did not intend to do so. It is utterly immaterial to inquire as to 
 what either government would then have insisted upon. There was a mutual 
 agreement that the question should not then be decided. Opportunity for 
 full investigation was reserved, the final conclusion to be arrived at as the 
 result of the negotiations then in progress, in the treaty of peace to be con- 
 cluded. 
 
 Further conversation as to the number of Commissioners, the place of 
 meeting, et cetera, terminated the interview. 
 
 On the afternoon of August 9, Mr. Cambon, having received thte note of 
 August 7 sent by the Duke of Almodovar, called by appointment at the 
 Executive Mansion in Washington, at which interview were present the same 
 parties as at the last meeting. The part of that note which relates to the 
 Philippines, in the exact terms in whichit was then presented in English text 
 by the French Ambassador to the President of the United States, is as 
 follows : 
 
 "The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be 
 <|uite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States 
 believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor and the city of 
 Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be that of con- 
 quest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, 
 in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and provided 
 for by the American Admiral, Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish 
 standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole Archipelago 
 of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. 
 Therefore, the government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of 
 Manila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace 
 shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines; 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 713 
 
 but as the intentions of the Federal government by regression remain veiled, 
 therefore the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting the third 
 condition, they do not h priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the 
 Archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms as the 
 condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may 
 render desirable. 
 
 "The government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with 
 the above mentioned declarations. 
 
 "Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish govern- 
 ment has the honor to submit in reply to your Excellency's -communication. 
 They accept the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the 
 Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties. 
 
 "The agreement between the two governments implies the irremeable 
 suspension of hostilities and the designation of Commissioners for the purpose 
 of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, under the terms 
 above indicated. ' ' 
 
 It is translated in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners in 
 language differing somewhat from the terms of the note as presented to the 
 President. In the translation in the memorandum it is said that the treaty 
 shall determine "the intervention, disposition and government of the Philip- 
 pine Islands." In the note as presented to the President it reads, "It is stated 
 that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, ^disposition and govern- 
 ment of the Philippines." The word "entire" precedes "sovereignty" in the 
 translation embodied in the Spanish note. 
 
 It is true that, taking these words of the Duke of Almodovar either as 
 they were conveyed to the President of the United States, or as they were 
 quoted in the Spanish proposition, it may be argued that they did no more than 
 reserve to Spain the right to maintain that she did not in advance of the 
 negotiations for peace renounce her sovereignty over the Archipelago. She 
 did this, by her own declaration, for the reason that the intentions of the 
 United States were "veiled"; clearly perceiving that by the terms of the 
 demand the United States would have the right, if it saw fit to exercise it, to 
 ask that she yield her sovereignty over the group, and that her sovereignty 
 was thus put in jeopardy, she took the precaution to say that she did not 
 intend, in assuming the chance of such a demand, to concede it in advance. 
 
 The American Commissioners did not deny that this might be a fair con- 
 
714 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 struction of this particular paragraph of the Duke's note. The representa- 
 tives of the United States were not willing, however, to leave anything to 
 construction. When, therefore, the Duke's answer was read to the President 
 it was immediately objected to by him and the Secretary of State, in that it 
 was vague and indefinite, purporting to accept the terms laid down in the note 
 of the United States, while requiring some modification. In referring to the 
 Philippines, while in one paragraph it stated the acceptance of the terms, in 
 another it seemed to retain the full right of sovereignty, with such reforms, 
 etc., as that government might see fit to grant. The unsatisfactory character 
 of this answer is more clearly shown when in the subsequent part of the same 
 note, not quoted in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners, it was 
 said without qualification that they (the Spanish government) accepted the 
 proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the Kingdom, as 
 required by their constitutional duties. In 'the part of the note referred to 
 above it is said 'the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting 
 the said condition, they do not k priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain 
 over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators, etc. ' These contradictory 
 statements were called to the attention of Mr. Cambon, and made the note, as 
 was said to him, unsatisfactory to the United States. 
 
 It is to be observed, as has already in effect been pointed out, that even 
 the terms of this note were inconsistent with the claim later put forward that 
 Spanish sovereignty should not be interfered with, for the length to which the 
 statement went in the note is that the Spanish government does not a priori 
 relinquish entire sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, thus leaving it 
 clearly to be inferred that the Spanish government recognized that the 
 negotiations resulting in a treaty might require a relinquishment of Spanish 
 sovereignty consequent upon such negotiations. 
 
 Mr. Cambon, having heard the objections raised by the American 
 representatives to the note; asserted that allowance must be made for different 
 translations which the note had undergone in course of transmission, and to 
 the desire of the Spanish government to express regret at the loss of its 
 colonies; and he was very confident that it was the intention to accept the 
 terms of the United States. It was then suggested by the American repre- 
 sentatives that if this was true, and the note was to be regarded as a full 
 acceptance, the best way to settle the matter was to put the terms in the 
 shape of a definite Protocol, which the President would authorize the. Secre 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 715 
 
 tary of State to sign for the United States, Mr. Cambon to submit to the 
 Spanish government the exact terms of the Protocol, to which an answer Yes 
 or No could be had; and if the Spanish government accepted the Protocol, 
 that would end the controversy. Mr. Cambon concurred in this view, and 
 said if the Protocol was drawn up in proper form he would submit it to the 
 Spanish government, and if authorized would execute it on its part. 
 
 On that evening, August 9, the Protocol was prepared in the State 
 Department at Washington, and taken to the Executive Mansion, where it 
 was submitted to the President and members of the Cabinet there present. 
 On the morning of August 10 Mr. Cambon called at the State Department at 
 Washington, a draft of the Protocol was submitted to and approved by him, 
 and put into French "by Mr. Thi^bault, Secretary of the French Embassy at 
 Washington, and experts in the State Department. It was carefully com- 
 pared with the English text, and then telegraphed by Mr. Cambon to t he 
 Spanish government. On the same day, August 10, the note of the Secre- 
 tary of State enclosing the Protocol was sent to Mr. Cambon in Washington. 
 This note, it is said, contained the admission of the Secretary of State of the 
 United States that the note of the Duke of Almodovar of August 7 "contained 
 in its spirit the acceptance by Spain of the conditions proposed by the United 
 States. ' ' The best answer to this obvious misconstruction of the terms of the 
 note of the Secretary of State is in the text of the note itself, which is as follows : 
 "Department of State, Washington, Augfust 10, 1898. 
 
 "Excellency: Although it is your understanding that the note of the 
 Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday after- 
 noon, is intended to convey an acceptance by the Spanish government of the 
 terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on which the Presi- 
 dent would appoint Commissioners to negotiate and conclude with Com- 
 missioners on the part of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that we concur 
 in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transfor- 
 mations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by 
 telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands 
 of the President, entirely explicit. 
 
 "Under these circumstances, it is thought that the most direct and certain 
 way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a Protocol to be signed by 
 us as the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the 
 terms on which the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken. 
 
7i6 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 ' ' I therefore enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol, in which you will 
 find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of 
 the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of 
 Commissioners to arrange the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba, 
 Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, 
 as well as for the appointment of Commissioners to treat of peace. 
 
 "Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. 
 
 "(Signed) WILLIAM R. DAY. 
 
 "His Excellency, M. Jules Cambon, etc." 
 
 In this note, so far from saying that the Secretarj' of State of the United 
 States understood that the note of the Spanish government of August 7 
 accepted the American terms, it is distinctly said: "Although it is your (Mr. 
 Cambon's) understanding that the note of the Duke of Almodovar is intended 
 to convey the acceptance by the Spanish government of the terms set forth in 
 my note of the 30th ultimo, ... I understand that we concur in the 
 opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations 
 which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by tele- 
 graph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it reached the hands of the 
 President, entirely explicit." 
 
 Here it is distinctly stated that the Secretary of State and Mr. Cambon 
 concurred that the note was not entirely explicit. Was it then to be expected 
 after all this careful negotiation that a note which the American representatives 
 contended did not accept the terms of the United States, and which both 
 negotiators agreed was not explicit, was to be received as a satisfactory 
 answer to the American demand? Not so. 
 
 "Under these circumstances it was thought that the most direct and cer- 
 tain way of avoiding misunderstanding was to embody in a Protocol, to be 
 signed by the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, 
 the terms on which the negotiations for peace were to be undertaken. ' ' 
 
 This is a most emphatic and definite declaration that the note of August 
 7 was not satisfactory, and that it was the purpose of the United States to 
 leave nothing open to misunderstanding, but to embody, in a contract so plain 
 that dispute would be forever foreclosed, the exact terms upon which negotia- 
 tions for peace would be undertaken. The note goes on to say: "I therefore 
 enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol, in which you will find that I have 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 717 
 
 embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimo, 
 together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commissioners, 
 etc." What does this note mean? Does it admit the construction that the 
 proposal was intended to embody the acceptance of August 7, reserving Span- 
 ish sovereignty? It is definitely settled, as a perusal of the document will 
 show, that the Protocol embodied, not the uncertain and equivocal terms of 
 the note of August 7, but the precise terms stated in the note of the American 
 government of July 30. This note to Mr. Cambon enclosed the Protocol just 
 as it was written and just as it was sighed by the parties. It would seem, if 
 ever an attempt was fairly made to have a clear understanding, if ever all 
 precautions were taken which could leave no room for misunderstanding, 
 such was the course pursued in this case. 
 
 It is thus seen how utterly groundless was the declaration in the Spanish 
 "proposition" that, in order to determine the meaning of the Protocol, it is 
 necessary to "bear in mind . . . the negotiations carried on between the 
 two parties which culminated in this agreement, and in which the interpreta- 
 tion of the latter had been given beforehand and officially!" In the corre- 
 spondence thus invoked by the Spanish Commissioners as an interpretation of 
 the Protocol, the two governments did not contemplate the execution of such 
 an instrument; and if the response of the Spanish government to the Ameri- 
 can demands had taken the form of a simple acceptance, no Protocol would 
 have been made. The first suggestion of such an instrument was that made 
 in the interview in which the Spanish response was declared to be unsatisfac- 
 torj'. It was because the Spanish response was unacceptable that the United 
 States demanded a Protocol. And it was upon this rejected response that the 
 Spanish argument for the limitation of the clear scope and meaning of the 
 Protocol was built. 
 
 If further proof of the soundness of the position of the United States 
 were needed, it would be found in a most convincing form in the telegram 
 sent by Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. See the 
 French 'Yellow Book' referred to in the Spanish memorandum, telegram 
 number 9, Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 "No. 9. — M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at 
 Washington, to M. Delcass6, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 "Washington, August 10, 1898. 
 
 "The Federal government has decided to state precisely (preciser), in a 
 
7i8 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 Protocol, the bases upon which the peace negotiations must, in its judgment, 
 be entered upon. 
 
 "I send you herewith this document, which I shall thank you to .transmit 
 to the Spanish government. (Signed) J. CAMBON." 
 
 In this telegram, which was immediately communicated to the Spanish 
 government, and which led to the telegram to Mr. Cambon authorizing him to 
 sign the Protocol, followed by full power from the Queen Regent to Mr. 
 Cambon to that effect, Mr. Cambon distinctly says, not that the American 
 government had accepted the note of August 7, or in any wise agreed to such 
 reservations as were contained therein, but that "the Federal government has 
 decided to state precisely (pr6ciser), in a Protocol, the bases upon which the 
 peace negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon." 
 
 It thus clearly appears that the bases of peace negotiations were to be 
 determined by the instrument which was enclosed, and which it was under- 
 stood put in definite terms the ultimate agreement of the parties. 
 
 It was because the answer made in the note of August 7 was rejected by 
 the United States, and for this reason alone, that hostilities were not upon 
 the receipt of that note declared to be suspended ; and it remained for the 
 Spanish Commissioners in their "proposition" to advance for the first time in 
 behalf of their government the suggestion that Such a declaration should then 
 have been made. It was not so made because that note was not received as 
 an acceptance of the American demands. Hostilities were declared to be sus- 
 pended only upon the signature of the Protocol. 
 
 The correspondence quoted in the French "Yellow Book," no less than 
 the subsequent communications from Mr. Cambon to the American govern- 
 ment, shows distinctly that with the exact terms of this Protocol before it, the 
 Spanish Government, on the nth instant, and subsequently by full power of 
 the Queen Regent, authorized Mr. Cambon to execute the Protocol in behalf 
 of Spain. Observe the language of the note of Mr. Cambon to the American 
 Secretary of State of August 12, 1&98: 
 
 ' ' Embassy of the French Republic in the United States, 
 
 "Washington, August 12, 1898. 
 "Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that I have just 
 received, through the intermediation of the Department of Foreign Affairs at 
 Paris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the Duke of Almodovar 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 719 
 
 del Rio announces to me that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, 
 the Spanish government confers upon me full powers in order that I may 
 sign, without other formality and without delay, the Protocol whereof the 
 terms have been drawn up by common accord between you and me. The 
 instrument destined to make regular the powers which are thus given to me 
 by telegraph will be subsequently addressed to me by the post. 
 
 "His Excellency the Minister of State adds that in accepting this 
 Protocol, and by reason of the suspension of hostilities which will be the 
 immediate consequence of that acceptance, the Spanish government has pleas- 
 ure in hoping that the government of the United States will take the neces- 
 sary measures with a view to restrain (empecher) all aggression on the part of 
 the Cuban separatist forces. 
 
 "The government of the Republic having, on the other hand, authorized 
 me to accept the powers which are conferred upon me by the Spanish govern- 
 ment, I shall hold myself at your disposition to sign the Protocol at the hour 
 you may be pleased to designate. 
 
 "Congratulating myself upon thus cooperating with you toward the 
 restoration of peace between the two nations, both friends of France, I beg 
 you to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the fresh assurances of my very high 
 consideration. (Signed) JULES CAMBON." 
 
 In the light of these facts, it appears there was absolutely no foundation 
 for the claim that the American government accepted the Spanish reservations 
 so far as they are contained in the note of the Duke of Almodovar of August 
 7. Had that note been only a distinct and unqualified acceptance of the terms 
 as contained in the American note of August 30, it would have been 
 unnecessary to require that all uncertainty and doubt would be removed by 
 reducing into few and simple terms, which it was believed could never be 
 misunderstood, the final agreement of the parties. So far from remaining 
 unanswered, ,the note of August 7 was declared unsatisfactory when pre- 
 sented to the President. Thus ended the attempt to come to an agreement 
 by correspondence; and it was decided that a Protocol should embody the 
 ultimate terms. 
 
 The Spanish government telegraphed the amplest authority to Mr. 
 Cambon to execute it. We were then remitted to the terms of the Protocol 
 itself. 
 
720 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 The American government was at a loss to know how stronger terms could 
 have been used to evidence the purpose of the President to keep open the 
 most full and absolute right to deal with and determine the dominion over the 
 Philippine Islands. This was the purpose of inserting the third article of the 
 Protocol, which embodied the terms of the third demand of the United 
 States, as set forth in the note of July 30 of the American government to the 
 Duke of Almodovar, wherein it is said: "Third. On similar grounds the 
 United States is entitled to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila 
 pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the con- 
 trol, disposition and government of the Philippines." 
 
 What are these similar grounds? They are to be found in the next 
 preceding paragraph of the note of July 30, in which the President says that, 
 though not then making any demand for pecuniary indemnity, nevertheless 
 he could not be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States inci- 
 dent to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons 
 and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, 
 require the cession to the United States, and the immediate evacuation by 
 Spain, of the Island of Porto Rico, etc. On similar grounds, to wit, among 
 others the right of the United States to have indemnity for its losses, the 
 United States would hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the con- 
 clusion of a treaty of peace, which should determine the control, disposition 
 and government of the Philippines. 
 
 How could the United States receive indemnity in whole or in part from 
 the control, disposition and government of the Philippines, if Spanish 
 sovereignty was not to be touched? It is difficult to conceive what terms 
 couldhave been used which would more clearly have evidenced the purpose 
 of the parties to afford the fullest latitude in dealing with the Philippine ques- 
 tion. The treaty was to determine not alone the control, disposition and 
 government, but at the same time had full power to determine all that is 
 implied in control, disposition and government. Certainly the word "control" 
 was not used here in the sense of "register" or "inspection, " but in its broader 
 sense of "authority or command; authority over; power over; the regulation 
 or rule of. ' ' 
 
 What word could be broader than "disposition, "which has practically the 
 same meaning in both the French and English languages? "The disposal of; 
 distribution of ; alienation of ; definite settlement of ; ultimate destination. ' ' 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 721 
 
 We have in these two words, then, authority over, dominion of, final and 
 ultimate destination of the subject matter. What is "government" but the 
 right of administration, or exercising sovereignty, the direction, the political 
 management of a state? Either of these terms implies power of interfering 
 with sovereignty. Taken together, they give the fullest scope in dealing with 
 all power, governmental, territorial and administrative. 
 
 It is not argued in the Spanish "proposition" that these words should 
 have a narrow meaning so far as disposition and government are concerned, 
 but transcribed into the French language it is sought to give a narrower 
 meaning to the' word "control. " It must be construed in the connection in 
 which it is found in the Protocol, in its broader sense of power or dominion. 
 "Noscitur a sociis" is a legal maxim which applies to the discussion or 
 determination of the meaning of phrases. "Control" associated with disposi- 
 tion and government of territory might have a very different significance 
 when used in another relation in its less familiar meaning of "inspection or 
 register." The word "disposition" used in another association might have an 
 entirely different meaning, and a. meaning which, in connection with govern- 
 ment and control, would deprive it of all sense. 
 
 The American government, then, felt itself amply supported in its 
 right to demand the cession of the Philippines with or without concessions, 
 relying upon either the exact terms of the Protocol, or those terms interpreted 
 in the light of negotiations, oral and written, which led to its execution. 
 
 The Commissioners of the United States noticed with regret that an 
 attempt had been made in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners to 
 invoke the high authority of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the 
 interpretation of the Protocol, so as to exclude therefrom all mention 9f the 
 right of the treaty to deal with the control, disposition and government of 
 the Philippines. In the French "Yellow Book" cited by the Spanish Com- 
 missioners, it is apparent that as early as the loth of August the French 
 government was in possession of the exact terms of the Protocol, transmitted 
 in the note of that date of its Ambassador, Mr. Cambon. Would anybody 
 believe that in summing up this note the Minister would intentionally omit 
 one of the most essential parts of the Protocol? 
 
 The note No. 19, referred to, is no part of the negotiations;' its purpose 
 was merely to advise the Ambassadors of the French Republic at London, 
 St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, etc. , of the result of the action of the repre- 
 
7" THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 sentative of France in bringing about a suspension of hostilities, and the 
 preliminary agreement as to peace, between two nations toward which the 
 French government was actuated by feelings of humanity and mutual friend- 
 ship. In this note it is said that the points upon which both parties had 
 reached an agreement were set forth in a Protocol. In stating the contents of 
 that instrument, doubtless through inadvertence, it was not stated that the 
 treaty should determine the control, disposition and government of the 
 Philippines. 
 
 The attention of the Minister being called to this matter by the Ameri- 
 can Ambassador in Paris, he very promptly corrected any misapprehension 
 which might exist as to his despatch. This appears in the following letter 
 from the American Ambassador, which was received by the American Com- 
 missioners : 
 
 "Ambassade des Etats-Unis, 18, Avenue Kl^ber, 
 
 "Paris, November 5, 1898. 
 
 "Dear Sir: I beg to inform you that I saw the French Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs in regard to that portion of the reply of the Spanish Peace Com- 
 missioners in which they refer to a letter sent by him to the French 
 Ambassadors dated August 15, 1898, which appears in the French 'Yellow 
 Book, ' and attempt to construe the language used therein as an interpretation 
 of the French Minister of the meaning of the Protocol, and speak of the 
 unquestionable moral weight of the testimony therein given by him regard- 
 ing that instrument. He assured me emphatically and unreservedly that the 
 letter |ref erred to was intended to be simply a brief r^sumd of the general 
 features of the preliminary peace negotiations carried on between the two 
 belligerents, and that he did not attempt to quote the precise language of the 
 Protocol. He disclaimed any intention of giving any views of his own 
 regarding it, having no authority for so doing, ^nd declared that the brief 
 mention contained in his letter could in no wise be construed as an interpre- 
 tation by him of the terms or meaning of that instrument. He promised that 
 he would at once send to the French Ambassadors the full text of the Protocol 
 in order that they might be informed of its conditions in extenso, and that 
 there might be no ground for misapprehension as to its terms. 
 
 "The Minister repeated what he had said several times before, and 
 which I know to be true, that he and his government had all along observed 
 a strict and impartial neutrality between the two powers which were negotiat- 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 7^3 
 
 ing, being equally friendly to both, and that he intended to continue the 
 
 observance of such neutrality. Very truly yours, 
 
 "(Signed) HORACE PORTER. 
 "Hon. William R. Day, 
 
 "President of the American Peace Commission, Paris." 
 
 It was stated that the occupation of Manila was to be only temporary. 
 The Protocol, so far as it relates to the Philippines, is itself provisional. 
 It expressly provides for the doing of certain things pending the conclusion 
 of a treaty which is in this particular to supersede it. Had it provided for 
 the permanent occupation of Manila by the United States, it would have 
 withdrawn the Philippines to that extent from the sphere of future negotia- 
 tion. 
 
 The most presentable and seemly of the pleas of the Spanish commission 
 for shouldering the Cuban debts upon the United States as an obligation of 
 the transferred sovereignty, to be handed over to the Cubans if they became a 
 nation, was this: 
 
 "In the memorandum which we are now answering, the singular affirma- 
 tion is made that the mortgage created by the two issues above named can 
 be called more properly a subsidiary guarantee, and that the party principally 
 bound to pay is the Spanish nation. Undoubtedly the American Commission 
 in making this affirmation had not 'before its eyes Article IL of the Royal 
 Decree of May lo, 1886, authorizing the issue of 1,240,000 hypothecary bonds 
 of the Island of Cuba, or the 2d paragraph of Article II. of the Royal Decree 
 of September 27, 1890, authorizing the issue of 1,750,000 hypothecary bonds 
 of the same island. Both texts read literally the same thing, and it will be 
 sufficient for us to transcribe one of them. Their language is as follows: 
 'The new bonds shall have the direct (especial) guarantee of the customs 
 revenue, stamp revenue of the island of Cuba, direct and indirect taxes now 
 levied or to be levied there in the future, and the subsidiary (general) guar- 
 antee of the Spanish nation. They shall be exempt from all ordinary and ex- 
 traordinary taxes, etc' " 
 
 Unquestionably, from the accustomed foundations for the building of 
 nations, in material facts, it would have been simpler and stronger for the 
 President to have demanded the cession of Cuba as of Porto Rico, but the effu- 
 sion of Congress when it rushed to war had made difficulty in that direction, 
 and the President had deftly and sturdily resisted the torrent that was driving 
 
724 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 him upon the rock of the recognition of the national character of the Cuban 
 faction that had monopolized the functions of the ancient Spanish Junta system, 
 and the notorious Key West bureau of misinformation. The President was 
 greatly wise in this, and in referring the Philippine question to the sober 
 second thougfht of the people of the United States. He did not exert to the 
 utmost the expression of his tremendous power, for that might have been 
 mistaken for imperialism. He followed the high and holy traditions of our 
 form of republicanism, and has been the faithful embodiment of the will of 
 the people; and more than that, he has sought to know their will. 
 
 He had faith in the people of Cuba, taught in schools of sorrow to take 
 their part in a system of self-government, but he has not confounded the 
 Cubans in the United States engaged in finance with credit based upon the 
 ashes of the conflagration kindled by Gomez with the people of Cuba, who 
 would restore the opulent industries of the island. A people of Cuba exist, 
 and they are not entirely or principally those who have appeared in the phan- 
 tom armies that ambuscaded and terrorized the Spanish columns with agility 
 and mystery. 
 
 The people of Cuba are not those who, after applying the torch to the 
 cane fields and the tobacco leaves, that come visible wealth from the red and 
 black soil and the indigo sky of the island, have mustered under the banner 
 of the torch of San Domingo, ready for the American pay-roll, and also to 
 make war for the poor plunder the island affords after the visitation of fire, 
 that impoverished Cuba rather than the Peninsula of Spain. It is true that 
 the deliberation of the President and people of the United States and the 
 characteristic delays associated with the dignities of the Senate, allowed the 
 Tagalos of Luzon to strike for a rule despotic and superstitious dictatorship 
 of their own under a man who may be a soldier but is not a statesman ; and 
 this is in harmony with the stated courses o^the methods of the people who 
 do govern themselves. 
 
 It would have been happy if the Senate had ratified at once the splendid 
 treaty with Spain, the fitting crown of a war of triumphs, but time is needed 
 for obtaining the consensus of a multitude of wills trained in the individu- 
 alities of free politics under popular dominion. The delay was mischievous, 
 but the recompense is in the greater strength that comes, at last, indicating 
 one of the primary and grander truths of republicanism, that it is stronger 
 than the imperialism that rests upon despots and dynasties that are degenerate. 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 7^5 
 
 The country is indebted no less to the military energy of General Mer- 
 ritt than to the brilliant ability and tenacity of Admiral Dewey, for the 
 victories in which but little of the blood of the victors was spilled, for our 
 possession of the capital of the Philippine Ar.chipelago. General Merritt 
 forced the fight, and Admiral Dewey smashed the defense by the seaside of 
 Manila so that the storming of the town became a spectacle rather than a 
 combat, and he was just in time. Neither the Spanish nor the American 
 Commission seemed to have been perfectly informed or quite ingenuous in 
 their information and use of the cable, the disability of which at one time 
 caused delay, and at another hastened conclusion. 
 
 The cable was cut by Dewey after the Spaniards had refused to neutralize 
 its service, and a piece was taken out of it, the operators were scattered and the 
 instruments gone, so that if both sides had been agreed some time must have 
 elapsed before resumption of business. And things that might readily have 
 happened would have vastly changed the Philippine situation — if Dewey had 
 departed after destroying the Spanish fleet, and if Merritt had not rushed the 
 American army, the smaller of the three forces in and about the city, so that 
 he had the Spanish army captives in the walled city, and the Filipino forces 
 relegated to the country, before the peace Protocol was announced. 
 
 The Spanish Commissioners' solemn sentences became grotesque touching 
 this phase of the subject, and the American people took their time and way to 
 find their sovereign will and pleasure, as to the disposition of the Philippines, 
 and their commandments will henceforth be executed both in the East and 
 the West Indies. 
 
 CEREMONIES CONCLUDING THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 
 
 Actually, the war "with Spain that began with the battle of the bay of 
 Manila, May i, concluded August 13, with the capitulation of the city of 
 Manila, the Protocol of Peace having been signed in Washington two days 
 before, the fact, in the broken condition of the cable, not being known in the 
 Philippines until transmitted in dispatch boat from Hongkong. The declara- 
 tion of war by the United States was on the 21st of April. The official close 
 of the war was on April 11, the period of a legal state of hostilities lacking 
 ten days of a year. The importance of fixing the date is in the effect the 
 formal end of the war has upon the terms of enlistment of our volunteers. 
 The ceremony of the restoration of a state of peace under the law was the 
 
726 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 exchange of ratifications in the reception room of the White House. The 
 exact time was April ii, 3 p. m. Among the witnesses attracted by the his- 
 toric character of the event were many members of the Cabinet and officials 
 prominent in the Administration gathered at the White House. These 
 included Secretaries Hay, Wilson and Hitchcock; Senator Davis, one of the 
 Peace Commissioners who negotiated the treaty ; Assistant Secretaries Hill, 
 Adee and Cridler, of the State Department ; Acting-Secretary of War Meikel- 
 john, Adjutant-General Corbin, Solicitor-General Richards, Hon. Wayne 
 MacVeagh, and Mr. Sidney Smith, Chief of the Bureau of Diplomatic Cor- 
 respondence, State Department, who had prepared the American copy of the 
 treaty. A few minutes in advance the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, 
 arrived,v in company with M. Thiebaut, the First Secretary of the Embassy, 
 the latter bearing the Spanish copy of the peace treaty. Mr. McKinley 
 cordially greeted the Ambassador, and, after a brief exchange of well-wishes, 
 the formal ceremony began. The President stood back of the large desk 
 presented to the government by Queen Victoria, while Secretary Hay and 
 Ambassador Cambon occupied places at the desk. Around this central group 
 were ranged the Cabinet officers and others, and officials of the household. 
 The powers of M. Cambon and Secretary Hay were examined, a protocol con- 
 cerning the day's ceremony signed, and other formalities concluded. These 
 preliminaries took some time, so that it was nearly 3 : 30 before the actual 
 exchange began. The signing of the protocol of exchange occurred at 3 : 28 
 p. m. , Ambassador Cambon signing for Spain, and Secretary Hay for the 
 United States. The protocol was in French, and briefly recited the circum- 
 stances leading up to the exchange. This cleared the way for the exchange 
 itself, constituting the final act. The President took from the desk the 
 American copy of the treaty, handsomely engrossed,- bound in dark blue 
 morocco, and encased in a black morocco portfolio, and handed it to M. 
 Cambon. At the same time M. Cambon handed to the President the Spanish 
 copy of the treaty, also engrossed, bound in morocco and encased in a maroon- 
 colored morocco box. There were deferential bows as each received from the 
 other this final pledge of peace. This exchange of ratifications occurred at 
 3: 35 p. m. The President was the first to speak. "Mr. Ambassador," said 
 he, "I will issue my proclamation at once." 
 
 M. Cambon thanked the President for the promptness with which the 
 proclamation followed. This ended the ceremony, and after brief felicitations 
 
<^a«^ , tin/ Atwtl, (^ XiSttx-^- -«« . 
 
 
 
 
 
 .j' / 
 
 
 ^" / 
 
 SIGNATURES OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH PEACE COMMISSIONERS TO TREATY OF PEACE- 
 ^?o T^^».^^^»a/l f^^rn Ph/^f /-.o^ar^h Talron hy Signal Service Officers Expressly for This History, 
 ate Departmeat at Wasliington. 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 729 
 
 the Ambassador and other officials withdrew. Secretary Hay took with him 
 the Spanish copy of the treaty and deposited it in the archives of the State 
 Department. M. Cambon cabled the Spanish government of the final restora- 
 tion of peace, and made known that the American copy of the treaty would be 
 forwarded through the French Foreign Office. 
 
 PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. 
 
 After the ceremony connected with the exchange of the ratification of the 
 peace treaty, President McKinley issued the following proclamation : 
 
 Whereas, A treaty of peace between the United States of America and 
 Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, Don 
 Alfonso XIII, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries 
 at Paris on December 10, i8g8, the original of which is in the Spanish' lan- 
 guage, is word for word as follows : 
 
 (Here full text of treaty is included.) 
 
 And, whereas, The said convention has been duly ratified on both parts, 
 and the ratifications of the two governments were exchanged in the city of 
 Washington on April 11, 1899; now, therefore. 
 
 Be it known. That I, William McKinley, President of the United States 
 of America, have caused the said convention to be made public, to the end 
 that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and ful- 
 filled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof. 
 
 In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of 
 the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the city of Washington, April 11, in the year of our Lord 1899, 
 and of the independence of the United States 123. 
 
 WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 By the President: JOHN HAY, Secretary of State. 
 
 There is something in the documents exchanged that is characteristic of 
 the two countries. The Spanish copy now in our possession is handsomely 
 engrossed on parchment in old English script, with wide double columns, one 
 in Spanish and the other in English, Its binding is of red morocco, heavily 
 embossed in gold, which gives the effect of the yellow and red colors of 
 Spain. The United States copy held by Spain is neat and simple, the text in 
 parallel columns, the left in English and the right in Spanish, surrounded by 
 
73° THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 a narrow border of the national colors. The document is enclosed in a cover 
 of dark blue morocco, with the great seal of the United States upon the face 
 and a decorative design in gilt. 
 
 The Official Gazette of Madrid of April i6 contains a royal decree- 
 appointing the Duke de Arcos to be Spanish Envoy Extraordinary and Min- 
 ister Plenipotentiary to the United States. The decree also creates consulates 
 at Havana, Manila, Iloilo, San Juan de Porto Rico, and Cienfuegos. 
 
 Senor Larrea, now Spanish Consul at Antwerp, is transferred to Havana; 
 Senor Bouila, now at Shanghai, is appointed to Manila, and Senor Uriarte goes- 
 to Antwerp. The Hon. Bellamy Storer, Minister of the United States, has 
 been chosen to represent the United States at the Spanish court. 
 
 General orders of the date of April 12 look to the disbandment of the 
 volunteer forces. The War Department makes this announcement : 
 
 "To be continued in service or appointed under Section 13 of the Act of 
 March 2, 1899, which authorizes the President to appoint or continue in serv- 
 ice Brigadier-Generals not exceeding one for every 4,000 enlisted men actually 
 in service and Major-Generals not exceeding one for every 12,000 enlisted, 
 men: 
 
 "General officers of Volunteers — Maj.-Gen. William R. Shatter, Maj.- 
 Gen. Elwell S. Otis. 
 
 "Brigadier Generals — James H. Wilson, Fitzhugh Lee, Joseph Wheeler, 
 John C. Bates, Samuel B. M. Young, H. W. Lawton, Adna R. Chaffee, Wil- 
 liam Ludlow, Leonard Wood, George W. Davis, Theodore Schwan, Robert 
 H. Hall, Loyd Wheaton, Frederick D. Grant. 
 
 "To be continued in service under the clause of Section 15 of the act of 
 March 2, 1899, which authorizes the President to enlist temporarily in service 
 for absolutely necessary purposes in the Philippine Islands volunteers, officers 
 and men, individually or by organizations, now in those islands: 
 
 "General Officers of Volunteers— Maj.-Gen. H. W. Lawton, Maj.-Gen^ 
 Arthur MacArthur, Brig. -Gen. Charles King, Brig.-Gen. Robert P. Hughes 
 Brig.-Gen. Samuel Ovenshine, Brig.-Gen. Irving Hale. " 
 
 It would be, now that peace is declared, a great saving to the government^ 
 and relieve the Department of the necessity of sending mote troops to 
 the Philippines if the volunteers there could be largely retained. Under the 
 law the service of the volunteer organization terminated with the declaration 
 of peace, but the act of Congress provided that volunteer organizations might 
 
THE, TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 731 
 
 remain in the volunteer service six months thereafter if they so desired. At 
 the end of that time, however, they were to be mustered out whether they so 
 desired or not. The volunteers now in the Philippines have gained so much 
 experience in the field arid have become so well adapted to the service 
 required against the insurgents that it has been thought important to induce 
 them to reenlist in the regular service, either at the present time by demand- 
 ing their discharge from the volunteer army, or to do so at the expiration of 
 the six months after the declaration of peace. 
 
 Volunteer organizations enlisted in the regular army as organizations 
 would therefore bring with them their officers as now assigned. As an 
 inducement to the volunteers to reenter the service of the government, it has 
 been proposed to pay to all reenlisting their full travel allowance for land 
 and sea travel from place of discharge to place of previous enlistment. 
 
 The adjournment of Congress by limitation on the 4th of March pre- 
 vented the accomplishment of an adequate establishment of the army. If it 
 had not been for this incompetency there would have been no anxiety to 
 extend the terms of volunteer enlistments. Fighting men enough, however, 
 will be found to take care of the property and the honor of the country, 
 naval and military. 
 
 
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 ^mtm'^l Wtu m ' 
 
 ■'^'^'r/mffm^ 
 
 WMiM^K^^^XM^Mi^/''' 
 
CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 Review of the War and the Commission on the Conduct of the 
 
 War Department. 
 
 Importance of a Day Lost or Gained — The Protocol Was the Treaty — Military Commissions to 
 Arrange the Spanish Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico — Appearance of the Cuban 
 Army — Narrow Margins on Which the War Was Ended so Speedily — Inspiration of 
 Dewey's Victory — Energy in Following It Up — Outbreak of Criticism on the Conduct of 
 the War as Soon as it Was Over — ^The Commission of Investigation Appointed by the 
 President — Extraordinary Interest in the Action of the Commission and Its Authoritative 
 Report — ^Weaknesses in Systems and Persons not Spared — Origin and Extent of the 
 Canned Meat Controversy — Fault Found in High Places — The Army, Regpilar or Volun- 
 teer, of and for the People. 
 
 One loses a day on the way from Washington City to Manila. The line 
 on which going westward we must correct the almanac, by dropping a day, is 
 the i8oth meridian. When it is midnight in London it is noon of the same 
 day on longitude i8o degrees westj or half-way aroundthe world. Whatever 
 time the magic i8oth degree is struck going west, the next day is sponged off. 
 If you get there "Tuesday, there is no Wednesday that week. And going east 
 there are two of the days on which the mysterious meridian is encountered. 
 The point of this in association with the war is that if we count time to China 
 as we find it coming east, the order of Admiral Dewey to destroy the Spanish 
 fleet was just a little too sharp on time for the actual declaration of war, but 
 if we count on the westward course, the declaration was in time to fairly cover 
 the direction to sink the Spaniards. Either way we go, there was no time 
 lost. It was 103 days from the naval battle before Manila to the signing of 
 the Protocol August 12. Our war with Spain was for 100 days, with a margin 
 of two days, counted as the sun keeps time. It was hard to realize for a while 
 that the Protocol was truly the Treaty of Peace — that the rest was debate on 
 details, and painstaking to weigh and measure and adjust points of difference 
 and formulate the settlement. When Santiago surrendered, Spain was van- 
 quished. Her fate was declared the day it was determined that she could not 
 
 732 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. 733 
 
 contest with us the command of the sea. It was impossible to defend Porto 
 Rico and Cuba if the Spanish armies in those islands were isolated, for the 
 power to overcome them was in the United States, and would be employed. 
 As to the signing of the treaty at Paris, or its ratification at Washington and 
 Madrid, those formalities were needful to legalize action taken. The Protocol 
 was actual peace, but there was a legal continuation of a state of war; and in 
 the first hundred and ten days of this situation there had been mustered out 
 and discharged from the military service an average of one thousand men per 
 day. The order to muster out one hundred thousand men was issued on the 
 i8th of August, less than a week after the proclamation annoim.cing the pro- 
 tocol and suspending hostilities. The administration was as prompt to take 
 advantage of peace, when the war was over, as it had been swift to execute 
 the mandate of war at the beginning. Military committees to superintend the 
 evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the adjacent islands were forthwith 
 appointed; for Cuba, Major-General James F. Wade, Rear- Admiral William 
 T. Sampson, Major-General Matthew C. Butler; for Porto Rico, Major-Gen- 
 eral John C. Brooke, Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, Brigadier-General W. 
 Gordon — who soon afterwards met the Spanish commissioners at Havana and 
 San Juan respectively. Porto Rico was evacuated and the American flag was 
 up on August 1 8th. The task of evacuating Cuba proceeded slowly. The 
 American flag was raised on Morro Castle and the Governor General's palace, 
 January ist, at which time twenty-two thousand Spanish troops remained 
 in the vicinity of Cienfuegos. 
 
 While the war was on there was general solicitude that the freedom of 
 speech and facility of the press should not be abused to harm the cause of the 
 country. There was a great deal of eccentricity in the press, but it consisted 
 in excessive military energy, with the accustomed "instructions" to the com- 
 manders of the active fleets and armies. There was a steady flight of accusa- 
 tions of favoritism, those whose chosen ones were not favored opening fire on 
 the others who were at the front, as a personal favor, it was said. The harm 
 done was not considerable. The journal that might have reported the pres- 
 ence of Cervera's fleet in Santiago Harbor, when he could only go there to be 
 bottled up, would have been forgiven, even by admirals on the look-out, for 
 audacity of pushing in and pointing to the enemy. The usually season- 
 able vehemence of partisans skirmishing for position in future civil campaigns 
 was reduced to inoffensiveness while the fighting was going on, and the Presi- 
 
734 REVIEW OF THE WAR. 
 
 dent's cares were lessened by the loyal moderation of the great mass of his 
 countrymen who had not lined up with him in national affairs until the bugles 
 called for the blue and the gray to put on the uniform of the country and 
 keep step to the national music. The naval victories without loss of life, and 
 the undervaluation of Spanish soldiers as fighting men, on a defensive line, 
 caused the casualty lists of our troops engaged in the Santiago battles to be a 
 surprise that shocked the country, and the illness of General Shafter was 
 charged to his stoutness, and the frank statements he made of his depressions 
 and misgivings were so distressing to the people that the great results attained 
 were not regarded as compensation for loss, though the extraordinary success 
 gained will have a permanent place in the records of decisive battles. The 
 sweeping naval victories of the Americans from Cavite to Santiago, ninety- 
 five days, were so uniform in character, there was a feeling that J;he Spaniards 
 were unworthy to be considered steadj'^ enough to furnish a test of our high 
 quality, and soon there was much said by the perverse about the feebleness 
 of the foe. It is, however, the established truth that the Americans were well 
 commanded, fought in the highest form on all occasions, and in addition to 
 good conduct were attended by good fortune. If the regular army had not 
 been massed at Tampa to strike the southern coast of Cuba, in spite of the 
 rainy and fever seasons, the volunteers must have been held in camps of 
 instruction until there was frost on the cotton fields, or suffered from the 
 Cuban soil and climate immense losses; and military operations against 
 Havana on a very large scale would have been frightfully costly. When, 
 however, the volunteers were engaged, they would have been so prepared 
 and disciplined that they could have closed the campaign quickly. One of 
 the reasons why Admiral Schley was strongly of the opinion that Cervera 
 would put into Cienfuegos was because he knew that port was less than two 
 hundred miles from Havana, and that with the railroad all the available 
 troops of the west end might be rapidly gathered to meet invaders. If Cervera 
 had been in Cienfuegos instead of Santiago the regular army of the United 
 States would have been unable to do the work they accomplished at Santiago, 
 which was isolated, and yet we had no strength to spare in forcing the sur- 
 render. One Spanish column of less than three thousand had a sharp struggle in 
 getting to Santiago just too late to hold lines the loss of which was irretriev- 
 able. At Cienfuegos, the concentration of forces on both sides must have 
 amounted to fifty thousand men on each side, and the war would have been 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. ' 735 
 
 protracted. It was one of the things carrying conviction in the first place 
 that Cervera, at liberty to make choice, would prefer Cienfuegos to Santiago, 
 unless he might have believed the very assurance of preference could make 
 the latter port for the Spanish service dangerous, as any American commander 
 would naturally be on the watch at that place. Sampson and Schley were 
 agreed about this for a time, and it is possible Cervera gave himself the bene- 
 fit of the idea. The retreat of Cervera into Santiago was an admission of the 
 naval incapacity of Spain, unless we can believe that he ran for coal where he 
 thought Americans were unlikely to look for him, and when he was located 
 the American forces followed. Frequently in the congressional debates, ban- 
 quet and platform speeches, and comments of' the press, the idea is advanced 
 that the military lesson of the war is that the regular army should be rigor- 
 ously reduced to a scanty force, as the fact of efficiency of volunteers devel- ' 
 oped in a few months proves their reliability. No American who knew 
 enough of his country to warrant him in views of her resources in war ever 
 disparaged volunteers. The truth is we must depend upon them in great 
 wars, but we require enough regulars to handle a sharp sword promptly, to 
 avoid the necessity for hurried and therefore exceedingly exhaustive prepara- 
 tions. We happened to have regulars enough, such was the ease with which 
 men were assembled from remote posts, to deliver a blow that ended the war 
 before the mustering corps of volunteers could.be provided with that which 
 they must have to fortify themselves to take the field, and it will always be to- 
 the credit of the volunteers that the surrender at Santiago was not so much, 
 the result of what had occurred as the visible evidence that the winners of San 
 Juan and El Caney were but the advanced guard of the grand armyof the 
 United States. There was no doubt of the ultimate result. Loss of time was 
 loss of life. The army that did the fighting was almost disbanded in' the 
 moment of victory. As there were but five hundred and twenty defenders of 
 El Caney, it is clear that if Escario's column of nearly three thousand effec- 
 tives had arrived three days earlier the army of Shaffer could not have carried 
 the hills that were so stoutly held. That would have meant waiting for rein- 
 forcements, and by every hour of detention the sacrifice of scores of brave 
 men. The plan of campaign that was to deal the crushing blow with the 
 regular army without waiting for the thorough equipment of the volunteers 
 in great force, could not have succeeded if Spanish reinforcements had got in, 
 until the Americans were also strengthened, and the failure to give the 
 
736 ' REVIEW OF THE WAR. 
 
 decisive stroke then would have made certain the loss of thousands of our 
 men where hundreds .sufficed. Each week's delay implied disaster for us. 
 On the critical night of the Santiago campaign, when General Wheeler was on 
 the long, thin line held by not more than three thousand men, all extremely 
 weary, needing precisely the encouragement the game old confederate gave 
 them, that the Spaniards were whipped and dared not assume the aggressive, 
 for their losses were greater in proportion than ours, and their exhaustion and 
 privation equal — if the Spaniards could then have had Escario's column 
 massed and sent it forward, the chances were largely in favor of driving us, 
 and regaining the water supply of the city and access to the country for food 
 supplies to supplement rations exclusively of rice. It is a close question 
 whether the continued presence of Cervera's ileet might not alone have post- 
 poned the surrender of the city and province of Santiago for an additional 
 month and greatly reduced the moral effect of the final victory of our arms — 
 the deadly climate and the pestilential fevers sweeping away our heroes by 
 thousands. We then should have won Santiago as the British did Havana in 
 1762, and with like losses. More than half the British and Provincial army 
 perished. After the loss of two fleets and two armies by the Spaniards — it 
 was as clear to all Europe as to ourselves that the Spanish army in Manila 
 could not escape, but must be captives. After the fleet that was essential to 
 its support was annihilated and our troops on the way arrived, the continu- 
 ance of the war under those misfortunes was impossible for Spain; and 
 she sued for peace, accepting subsequently the terms of unconditional sur- 
 render. The debates at Paris were able, but not essential. The policy of the 
 Protocol was after the fall of Santiago. That depended upon the conclusive 
 triumph with the regular army. The event trembled in the balance. We 
 refer to the regulars especially and distinctively, for the military policy of the 
 President turned upon the blow that might be delivered by them. Only three 
 volunteer regiments were at the front at Santiago. The transportation was 
 limited, and the movement on the ragged edge of critical circumstance. The 
 volunteers were eager for the fray, but none knew better than themselves that 
 they needed time to be educated up to the requirements of the high standard 
 they hold in history. 
 
 The Aguinaldo war around Manila has but repeated the experiences that 
 give confidence in the volunteer system, but the objection to it is that it can 
 never be ready to meet the grave and sudden emergencies. Time is the most 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. 737 
 
 expensive item in war and the appropriation of money and manhood for the 
 regular army making it equal to abrupt occasions would be economical. 
 There was good fortune as to the time and place of the decision of the war in 
 Cuba. K Cervera had been able to fill his coal bunkers within a few days 
 after arriving in West India waters he might have entered Havana Harbor, 
 and that would have forced us to attack the city, a work too extensive for the 
 regulars — indeed, involving several corps of volunteers. It was the inspiration 
 of the May-day victory of Admiral Dewey that caused the inauguration of 
 the Santiago campaign, and in this relation the beginning and end of the 
 war are closely linked. The President said, in his annual message, of Dewey's 
 battle : 
 
 ' ' The effect of this remarkable victory upon the spirit of our people and 
 upon the fortunes of the war was instant. A prestige of invincibility thereby 
 attached to our arms, which continued throughout the struggle. Reinforce, 
 ments were hurried to Manila under the command of Major-General Merritt, 
 and firmly established within sight of the capital, which lay helpless before 
 our guns." The" "prestige of invincibility" was the thing, and the glory of 
 Dewey is not so much in the fact that when he came within range of the 
 Spanish fleet he destroyed it, because he took all the chances of torpedoes 
 and mines, land batteries and of the disabilities that might be inflicted upon 
 his ships, seven thousand miles from a home port. He found the torpedoes 
 harmless. Fortune favored the brave. If a torpedo had blown up the Olym- 
 pia or one or two of the cruisers, the result of the day might not have been so 
 influential. If several vessels had been disabled, the situation of the admiral 
 could not have been described by any softer term than precarious. The dis- 
 tinguishing points of the war stand out like mountains. It is easy to trace the 
 impulses behind the actions closing in successes that ended the combat. The 
 reinforcements for Dewey were sent with energetic celerity, and the fall of 
 Manila two days after the Spanish surrendered in the Protocol, an event 
 unknown to the combatants, was due to the animation with which the War 
 Department pressed all advantages. The oilicial statement of the President, 
 giving the facts of supporting the navy by the army at the most remote scene 
 of the warfare, is in these terms : 
 
 "On the 7th day of May the government was advised officially of the vic- 
 tory at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of our fleet what 
 troops would be required. The information was received on the isth of May, 
 
738 REVIEW OF THE WAR. 
 
 and the first army expedition sailed May 25 and arrived off Manila June 30. 
 Other expeditions soon followed." 
 
 When the war was over, the good management, vigilance, precision and 
 strong grasp upon affairs first in order became first in the minds and hearts of 
 the people, and of moment to every fireside, but extensively held to be the 
 commonplace consequence of the lavish use of the resources of the country; 
 and there followed a flood of turbid accusation. The banners bright with 
 victory were clouded with fogs. The origin of these was our unprepared 
 state and the confusion was unavoidable. There was also, owing to impera- 
 tive haste, a great deal of waste, — and yet the oificial history of the war can 
 never be read by a citizen of intelligence and temper of justice without sur- 
 prise that in all departments so much was done so well. 
 
 There never was a war more speedily conducted to a successful and satis- 
 factory end than that of the United States with Spain ; and yet when it was 
 done there was an epidemic of complaint, and the President answered the 
 clamor, which was loud and long enough to show a serious public interest, by 
 appointing a comnlission. General Dodge was chosen president. The follow- 
 ing were the members : 
 
 General Grenville M. Dodge, Iowa, President; Col. James A. Sexton, 
 Illinois; Col. Charles Denby, Indiana; Capt. Evan P. Howell, Georgia; 
 Ex-Governor Urban A. Woodbury, Vermont; Brig-Gen. John M. Wilson, 
 Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.; Gen. James A. Beaver, Pennsylvania; Maj.- 
 Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. A. ; Dr. Phineas S. Conner, Ohio; 
 Richard Weightman, Secretary; Lieut.-Col. F. B. Jones, Chief Quartermaster 
 of Volunteers, Disbursing Officer; Maj. Stephen C. Mills, Recorder. 
 
 The specific duty of this body was "to investigate the conduct of the War 
 Department in the war with Spain. ' ' A great mass of testimony was taken, 
 and there were many precautions to get witnesses who would give all the 
 information they possessed, and to find those who could speak from personal 
 knowledge. Three press associations were represented in the reporters pres- 
 ent during the proceedings. The Secretary of War, the Adjutant-General, 
 the Quartermaster-General, and the Surgeon-General were requested to 
 transmit all the complaints received by them touching the administration of 
 their respective departments. This was promptly done. Public invitation 
 was given September 27th to all persons "having knowledge or belief of any 
 official wronger dereliction" — a most sweeping call — to submit their state- 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. 739 
 
 tnents in writing, accompanied by such collateral proof or information as 
 might be at their disposal. This call met with a remarkable response. 
 Hundreds of affidavits, letters, newspaper clippings, editorial articles, and 
 sermons were received, all of which were thoroughly and laboriously exam- 
 ined. The strong purpose of the commission to get all the facts appears in 
 the determination that in the examination of witnesses the strict rules of evi- 
 dence as applied in legal proceedings should not be adhered to, but consider- 
 able latitude allowed. The way investigation of the whitewashing fashion is 
 conducted is by rigid adherence to the rules of evidence, the question perpetu- 
 ally pressed being: What do you know of your own knowledge? That is a 
 tight stopper upon any expression that is excellent in suggestion but not in 
 legal form. There were nearly five hundred witnesses examined. The 
 report of the commission has disposed of the frivolous fad for a time prev- 
 alent of challenging the good faith of the members. The commission finds 
 that there was too much "red tape" in the departments, too much "paper 
 work," and recommends that there should be more preparation for future 
 wars by Congress, and also suggests retired officers might be utilized. Sum- 
 ming up the results of the war, the commission gives the official figures of 23 
 officers and 250 men killed, and 113 officers and 1,464 men wounded in the 
 field, while the deaths from all causes from May i to September 30, a period 
 of five months, were 107 officers and 2,803 men. The total strength of the 
 army was 274,717, -so that the death rate was a fraction over i per cent. 
 The commission says in the official report of its labors and findings: 
 "No man or woman who has stated to us that he or she had any 
 material matter touching the subject of our inquiry to communicate has 
 been refused a hearing, and there has been no evidehce before us that any 
 one in or connected with the War Department has dishonestly received 
 a dollar. 
 
 "We have made persistent efforts to secure the attendance of persons to 
 whose names rumor has attached an allegation that they knew of corruption 
 of officials in the War Department, but these men have either denied the 
 statements attributed to them, or have maintained silence when invited to tell 
 what they know. 
 
 This criticism and recommendation are important: "The routine work in 
 the departments, in our opinion, is far beyond what is necessary, and each 
 year seems to increase it. The methods employed make it almost impossible 
 
740 REVIEW OF THE WAR. 
 
 to transact business promptly. The heads of all departments, officers of large 
 depots, chiefs of staff departments, corps and divisions have necessarily been 
 obliged to give attention to details which should have been given to matters 
 of larger moment. No well-regulated concern or corporation could transact 
 business satisfactorily under such regulations as govern the staff departments, 
 and the fact that every officer of each of the staff departments holding a 
 responsible position has been forced to ignore routine demonstrates the neces- 
 sity of a new form. ' ' 
 
 A significant utterance is the following: "For many years the divided 
 authority and responsibility of the War Department has produced friction, for 
 which, in the interest of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied. 
 The constitution makes the President commander-in-chief of the army, and^ 
 he cannot transfer that authority to any other person. The President selects 
 the secretary of war, who has his confidence and is his confidential adviser. 
 The commanding general is assigned to duty as such by the President, and 
 under the miltary laws of the United States his duties are defined as follows: 
 
 "The command exercised by the commanding general of the army, not 
 having been made the subject of statutory regulation, is determined by the 
 order of assignment. It has been habitually composed of the aggrerate of 
 the several territorial commands that have been or may be created by the 
 President. The military establishment is under orders of the commanding 
 general of the army in that which pertains to its discipline and military con- 
 trol. The fiscal affairs of the army are conducted by the secretary of war 
 through the several staff departments. (Par. 187, A. R., 1895.) 
 
 "All orders and instructions from the President or secretary of war relat- 
 ing to • military operations or affecting the military control and discipline of 
 the army will be promulgated through the commanding general. (Par. 188, 
 A. R., 1895.)" 
 
 Lieutenant-General Schofield, who has probably had as much experience 
 and given the question as much thought as any one in our country, says in 
 substance : 
 
 "Recent experience has served to confirm all the results of my lifelong 
 study and large experiences that the proper position for the senior officer of 
 the army on duty at Washington is not that of the commanding general, a 
 position which is practically impossible, but that of commander-in-chief, 
 which means, in fact, chief of staff to the President. The title of general-in- 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. 741 
 
 chief was a permanent one during the entire history of the country up to the 
 time when General Grant became lieutenant-general. 
 
 "When I became commanding general I addressed to the President a 
 letter in which I pointed out to him what had been the result of my study and 
 experience, and saying that the only way was to abandon entirely — which I 
 did during my seven years of service — all pretenses of being the commanding 
 general, and to content myself with acting as the chief of staff of the army 
 under the secretary of war and the President. The result was that perfect 
 harmony prevailed during my time, and I did exercise a legitimate influence 
 in command of the army, this because I did not claim to exercise anything 
 that the law did not give me. 
 
 "The President must have the same power of selection of his general- 
 in-chief as he has of his secretary of war. Without this there can be no 
 guaranty that he will give, or that the secretary of war will place in the 
 general-in-chief that confidence which is necessary to perfect harmony. 
 
 "Neither the President nor the secretary of war should have in the 
 command of the army an officer who is not working in harmony with 
 him." 
 
 The work of General Corbin attracts the attention of the commissioners. 
 His services were of the greatest importance. He was the engineer of order, 
 the fireman who kept the furnace roaring, raised steam power, and strove 
 with a giant's strength to subjugate chaos. The report says of him: 
 
 "The adjutant-general testifies that there had not been a deficiency of one 
 dollar reported on the pari of a volunteer staff officer, and that he wished to 
 make it a matter of record that in the distribution of many millions of dollars 
 during this war there was yet to be made the first charge of defalcation 
 against an army officer, regular or volunteer. ' ' 
 
 The remarks upon the War Department, referring directly to the Secre- 
 tary of War, are : 
 
 "The records of the War Department, which have been laid before us, 
 show that the Secretary of War extended to all chiefs of bureaus cordial and 
 full support, and promptly responded to every proper demand made upon him 
 by commanding officers. 
 
 "No testimony has been presented showing intentional neglect of duty or 
 any attempt to serve personal interests. 
 
 "The charges made tl;at the Secretary of War was pecuniarily interested 
 
742 REVIEW OF THE WAR. 
 
 in contracts, purchases and other transactions of the War Department have 
 been thoroughly investigated and found baseless. 
 
 "In the judgment of the commission there was lacking in the general 
 administration of the War Department during the continuance of the war 
 with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was essential to the 
 highest efficiency and discipline of the army. 
 
 "The commission has refrained from criticising certain of the heads of 
 bureaus for not having acted with foresight in preparing their various depart- 
 ments for active war before war was declared, because it has appeared that 
 the national defense fund provided by the act of March 9, 1898, was not made 
 available for use except for the navy and for coast defenses and the expendi- 
 tures incident thereto until after the declaration of war. " 
 
 The commission has not spared the weak places in the War Department, 
 beginning with paper work, asking for the strengthening of the administra- 
 tion by the employment of retired officers, many of whom are among the most 
 capable in the country and as well fitted in the sixties for the higher responsi- 
 bilities and performance of the tasks of elucid9,tion and the removal of 
 entanglements as the active service officers between forty and sixty years of 
 age. The sudden multiplication of the numerical force of the army by ten, 
 and the requisition for supplies in the same proportion, the material to be 
 discovered if not created, necessarily involved occasional gorges in the chan- 
 nels, such as occur in rivers that are choked with ice or timber. One of the 
 worst was the gorge at Tampa, and with all the high rank and gilded talent 
 gathered there, the man to clear the way was not found, and we -hear from 
 the commanding general of the army, himself present, that his remedy for 
 improper rations of meat was to have droves of cattle shipped to the seat of 
 war. If this had been done it would have been necessary to have sent the 
 steers to Cuba and left the soldiers in Florida to overcome by perfect rest on 
 the sand the waste of physical force by the debilitating atmosphere of 
 the floral peninsula. The commission spares not the lack of transportation, 
 the nerveless slump into a bottomless pit of disorder that prevented prompt- 
 ness in embarkation, reduced dangerously the strength of Shafter's army, 
 notified the Spaniards of our plans and incapacities, and nearly spoiled the 
 expedition, upon which depended the grave decision whether we would have 
 to wait for winter or force the fighting. The commissioners say with a 
 moderation of language that stings where epithets would be found totally 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. 743 
 
 insufficient, that "the condition of the railroad congestion during the early- 
 portion of the time Tampa was occupied by troops seems unparalleled, show- 
 ing an almost inexcusable lack of executive ability on the part of those charged 
 with the loading, unloading and handling of the trains. ' ' 
 
 It is the judgment of the commissioners that ships should have been 
 "seized," because when the transports had been assembled, supposed to be 
 equal to carrying 25,000 men, it was found that their capacity had been largely 
 overrated, and it was impossible to carry on them, without great discomfort 
 and danger, more than 16,000 men, with their equipments, artillery, ammuni- 
 tion, subsistence, medical supplies, and 2,295 animals, for a voyage of 1,000 
 miles. It is not, however, even hinted by the commission that a fleet ought to 
 have been impressed to bear burdens of living beef to be cast ashore as wanted 
 by the army ! The following from the commissioners' report is full of phrases 
 that imply more than they express : 
 
 "In spite of the efforts of the quartermaster's department, many of these 
 vessels were poorly equipped with speeding accommodations; the sinks in 
 many instances were inconvenient and insufficient, and some of the " vessels 
 were badly ventilated and filled with disagreeable odors. It has been stated 
 that had the fleet encountered a severe storm while en route for Cuba the dis- 
 comfort would have been intense, and there might have been loss of life. 
 
 "The quartermaster's department ought to have been able to more 
 thoroughly equip these vessels, and surely it should have been more certain of 
 their carrying capacity. 
 
 ' ' It has been noticed that the ships were not loaded systematically, as for 
 example, a battery with its guns and horses would be placed on one vessel, 
 and its ammunition on another. The Second, Seventh and Seventeenth 
 Regular Infantry were each divided up, and portions in each case sent on 
 three different vessels. ' ' 
 
 The expedition was detained until, if we had been opposed by a keen and 
 enterprising enemy, we could hardly have escaped the misfortunes so con- 
 spicuously invited. The horrible bungling extended to the handling of the 
 medical supplies, and yet in that department, in spite of manifest omissions, 
 "a vast deal of good work was done by medical officers, high and low, regular 
 and volunteer, and there were unusually few deaths among the wounded and 
 sick. ' ' At last Shaf ter sailed, got away from the sphere of false and foolish 
 rumor, Spanish war ships flitting like the Flying Dutchman, and the steam 
 
744 REVIEW OF THE WAR. 
 
 launches and lighters to land the troops and stores, frightfully deficient at 
 the start, lost hy the way. The commission points to the facts at the bottom 
 of the muddy pool in this trenchant paragraph : 
 
 "That the shortcomings in administration and operation may justly be 
 attributed, in large measure, to the hurry and confusion incident to the 
 assembling of an army of untrained oificers and men, ten times larger than 
 before, for which no preparation in advance had been or could be made, 
 because of existing rules and regulations. ' ' 
 
 If Captain-General Blanco had been a man of aptitudes and initiative 
 equal to decisions in a few hours, and to stimulating the disturbance of the 
 sullen lethargy of his countrymen, and had possessed the quality of illu- 
 mination from his own brain, he would have acted upon the safe presump- 
 tion that Santiago was the objective point of the American army. The move- 
 ment of our war ships had revealed that to the observant, and he should have 
 hurried his best troops to the rescue, and seen to it that the landing of 
 Shafter's army was resisted to the last extremity of the defenders. That was 
 the Spaniards' chance. Such a policy would have given the army tumbled 
 upon unfit vessels infinite trouble, and made the advance upon the land 
 defenses of Santiago for some time impossible. We owe a great debt to the 
 stolidity that amounts often to stupidity in the Spanish commanders. The 
 quality, of Spaniards v^ho wait to be attacked, if there are officers who stay 
 with the men when the fire storms beat upon them, is, as our troops found on 
 the Santiago hills, as good as that the infantry of Spain celebrated in the 
 middle ages. The march of Escario's column that reached Santiago a few 
 hours too late makes known that if the young Spaniards are bravely led they 
 will go far, clearing their way through ambuscades swarming with sharp- 
 shooters. The manifestations of the manliness of the Peninsulars mean that 
 there is still hope for Spain in her people. 
 
 As soon as we have a congress elevated to the understanding of the 
 economy in the efficiency of the army as well as of the navy, and the necessity 
 of preparation for war in time of peace, it will appear in the halls of national 
 legislation that the work of the commission of investigation of the conduct of 
 the War Department during the war is a document of extraordinary nature, 
 full of information that should be the basis of reforms that will amount to 
 reconstruction. The time will certainly come when this will be done, and the 
 longer the delay the greater price we must pay for the indispensable reforma- 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. 745 
 
 tion. In one matter the commission does not seem to have been as incisive, 
 critical and certain in its work, or as comprehensive and accurate in its sug- 
 gestions as in general. We refer to the "embalmed beef." There must 
 have been present in the minds of the commissioners on that subject a con- 
 sciousness of the prejudiced motives and questionable methods of the accusers, 
 in regard to the "roast beef" thrown upon the army and thrown into the sea, 
 that imparted a certain reluctance to say anything that would palliate the 
 impropriety apparent in the noisy aggressiveness that sought to inflict per- 
 sonal injuries and promoted reckless exaggerations, detrimental to the public 
 service and hostile to a great American industry, thereby giving aid and com- 
 fort to factions at home that, cannot be respected as. animated by sincerities, 
 and enemies abroad of our export commerce, or those careless of hurting 
 business reputation. The cautiousness of this temperament of care in the 
 commission is to be accepted as far as it goes, but the expression following 
 does not cover the case : 
 
 "Many samples of refrigerated beef furnished to the army have been sent 
 by the commission to the chemists of the Agricultural and Interior depart- 
 ments for careful chemical examination. The result of the analysis has been 
 reported to ns in twenty-nine cases, and in no specimen examined has either 
 boric or salicylic acid or other deleterious chemicals been found. In view of 
 the facts set forth, the commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef 
 furnished by contractors and issued to the troops during the war with Spain 
 was subjected to or treated with any chemicals by the contractors or those in 
 their employ." The veracity of this statement is not to be questioned, for it 
 has obviously limitations of applications, but that it is misleading is shown in 
 the headline under which it appears in a reputable journal — this: 
 
 "WAR COMMISSION HOLDS ARMY REFRIGERATED BEEF TO 
 
 BE PURE." 
 
 The word "pure" should be more carefully guarded, and held too precious for 
 doubtful employment. 
 
 The commission says of the canned beef: "Occasionally an inferior 
 article was found. But the records of the army prove that canned beef has 
 been used for many years." The commissioners attempted to confine them- 
 selves in the public regard to their actual and not constructive findings in 
 these terms: "In considering questions concerning canned meats it is not the 
 
746 REVIEW OF THE WAR. 
 
 duty of the commission to inquire into the character, kind or condition of the 
 canned meats that may be in use in this country. Our specific duty is to 
 give an opinion as to the quality of those furnished the soldiers during the 
 recent war with Spain. ' ' Delicacies of distinction are not, however, a notice- 
 able feature in the work of the press, exploited with the headlining that adver- 
 tises news highly seasoned, and presented in a style believed to be alluring, 
 and certainly for sale. A letter is presented showing that the boiled or roast 
 canned meat question was not up in the army during the Spanish war for the 
 first time. The date is October i8, 1897, and the document as follows: 
 
 War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,' 
 
 Washington, D. C, Oct. 19, 1897. 
 W. Clarke Marshall, Produce Exchange, 6646 Wentworth Ave. , Chicago. 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication 
 of the 19th ultimo to the Secretary of War, giving' information regarding the 
 proper food to be taken to the' sufferers in Alaska, and also for the subsistence 
 of the troops there, and ascribing the sickness in that locality to the use of 
 salt meats, and in reply thereto the Secretary of War desires me to call atten- 
 tion to the following remarks of the Medical Department of the army, in 
 which the major-general commanding the army concurs : 
 
 "Canned meats put up by reputable firms are wholesome and have the 
 full nutritive value of the meat contents, and in the absence of fresh meat are 
 to be preferred to any of the three substitutes suggested by the writer. Meat, 
 when salted, loses a certain proportion of its albuminoids and extractives, but 
 what remains is valuable as food, and has no specific influence in the produc- 
 tion of scurvy. With hard bread, bacon, pea meal, and an occasional issue of 
 fresh beef, or in its absence canned meat, a dietary of a satisfactory force 
 value can be provided. To these there should be added for the prevention of 
 scurvy occasional issues of potatoes, onions or canned vegetables, or in their 
 unavoidable absence, dessicated vegetables and dried fruit." 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 W. H. CARTER, 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 All the above in quotation is the indorsement upon the letter of Mr. 
 Marshall, signed by C. Smart, deputy surgeon-general, U. S. A. The 
 indorsement of the major-general commanding is in the following words: 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. 747 
 
 Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C, Oct., 18, 1897. 
 The major-general commanding concurs in the remarks of the deputy 
 surgeon-general, fourth indorsement. J. C. GILMORE, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 The "major-general commanding" here referred to is Major-General 
 Nelson A. Miles. 
 
 The commission reports : 
 
 "On the 2ist day of December last Major-General Nelson A. Miles, upon 
 the written request of the president of this commission, appeared before it. 
 He refused to be sworn, as all other witnesses had been except one, who 
 affirmed, stating that he would make his statements without being sworn and 
 was responsible for what he said. He proceeded, and for the first time in the 
 history of this investigation the allegation was made that refrigerated beef 
 issued to the troops had been chemically treated. 
 
 "In the statement, revised by himself. General Miles said: 
 
 " 'There was sent to Porto-Rico 337 tons. of what is known as so-called 
 refrigerated beef, which you might call embalmed beef. ' 
 
 ' ' He proceeded to read a communication from Dr. W. H. Daly, major and 
 chief surgeon, United States volunteers, on his staff, bearing date of Septem- 
 ber 21, 1898, wherein Dr. Daly stated that: 
 
 " 'In several inspections I made in the various camps and troopships at 
 Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga and Porto Rico, I found the fresh beef to 
 be apparently preserved with secret chemicals, which destroy its natural 
 flavor, and which I also believe to be detrimental to the health of the troops. ' 
 
 "Although Dr. Daly swears that he informed General Miles about the ist 
 of August, 1898, that he suspected that the refrigerated beef was chemically 
 treated, it does not appear that the general informed the War Department that 
 an officer of his staff had made this discovery, nor does it appear that he at 
 the time ordered any of the officers under his command to probe to the bottom 
 an allegation which, if true, concerned the health of 275,000 soldiers of the 
 United States. It appears from the report of Dr. Daly, which he handed to 
 General Miles October 21 last, that he then specifically stated that the refriger- 
 ated beef furnished to the troops was 'apparently chemically treated.' 
 
 "It does not appear that when this charge was made, October 21, it hav- 
 ing been already made to him in August, 1898, that General Miles communi- 
 
748 REVIEW QF THE WAR. 
 
 cated to you or the Secretary of War or to the commissary general the belief 
 or suspicion entertained by him that refrigerated meat, dangerous to health, 
 was issued every day to the troops, in failure to do which there was dereliction 
 of duty. It is true that on September 20 he had directed that an order should 
 be issued asking for reports relative to meats issued, but the order specifically 
 mentions 'canned fresh roast beef,' and nothing else, and it was the reports 
 received in answer to this that were presented in abstract by the general at 
 the time of his appearance before the commission and since. 
 
 "In his report Dr. Daly does not make the all-important statement that 
 he had already chemically analyzed any meat, although he suggests that such 
 analysis should be made. He does state that in the several inspections made 
 by him at Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga and Porto Rico he 'found the 
 fresh beef to be apparently preserved with secret chemicals.' He said that at 
 Ponce the beef he examined 'was also of the same character, being appar- 
 ently preserved by injected chemicals.' 
 
 "For months, as it appears. Dr. Daly concealed the commission of a crime 
 affecting men under his chargp, whom, as an officer and a physician, he was 
 bound to protect. ' ' 
 
 After setting forth in full force the miscellany of mistakes and the genius 
 displayed for blunders so gross as to add an additional sense of misery to the 
 lot of mankind, in the embarkation of the Shafter expedition, the commission 
 states the result that closed the scenes of that decisive movement, with this 
 paragraph : 
 
 "The result of the Santiago campaign was the complete realization of the 
 several objects contemplated — the capture of the city with its fortifications and 
 munitions of war, together with immense supplies of foodstuffs and ammuni- 
 tion (the former estimated by General Wood at 1,200,000 rations) ; the sur- 
 render of the entire province of Santiago de Cuba, with all the troops 
 garrisoning the same, amounting, as already stated, to between 23,000 and 
 24,000; the destruction of the navy of Admiral Cervera's fleet after its'* 
 departure from the harbor, and general demoralization of the Spanish forces 
 and the discomfiture of the Spanish government and people, leading almost 
 immediately to overtures for peace by Spain." There is nothing in the 
 splendid story of American soldiers that exceeds this, telling how the valor 
 and fortitude, the patience under privation and hardihood of endurance, 
 tenacious of duty, overcomes even that solid but diversified stupidity 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. 749 
 
 against which, it is a saying of ancient acceptance, even the gods fight in 
 vain. 
 
 The commission reports in closing that "notwithstanding the haste with 
 which the nation entered upon the war with Spain, the resulting and almost 
 inevitable confusion in bureau and camp, the many difficulties of arming, 
 assembling and transporting large bodies of hitherto untrained men, the 
 carrying on of active operations in two hemispheres, the people of the United 
 States should ever be proud of their soldiers, who, cooperating with their 
 sailors, in less than three months put an end to Spanish colonial power 
 enfranchised oppressed peoples, and taught the world at large the strength 
 and nobility of the republic." 
 
 There was taken in the investiga.tion of the varieties of beef prepared 
 with a view of preservation, statements that increased the public feeling about 
 the wrong done soldiers in supplying them with food that was unwholesome. 
 In handling the subject there were introduced remarks supposed to be humor- 
 ous, to the effect that the regular soldiers were so accustomed to imperfec- 
 tions in rations that their stomachs were prepared for anything, and there 
 were jocose imputations that the volunteers would, as they became veterans, 
 cease to strive against the diet demanded by the "paper work" that is obstruc- 
 tive and establishes conditions of famine in a land of plenty and the midst of 
 abundance. The complaints of soldiers that were not fairly dealt with were 
 very often put in this effective way: "We know that Uncle Sam pays for the 
 things we ought to have, but that there is a way of getting the freight cars on 
 the side track as at Tampa, and sailing away without the necessaries of life. ' ' 
 Thete will sometime be traced to the investigation of the conduct of the War 
 Department in war, and the report of the commission, the existence of laws 
 and regulations promoting the welfare of our citizens who bear arms for the 
 country. The commission does not state along with the notice of the use of 
 canned beef in Alaska, commended on the authority of General Miles, notice 
 of the decisive distinction between the arctic and the tropical climates. It 
 is to be remembered there is no great care necessary for the preservation of 
 meat in Alaska. There is no trouble about refrigeration. The northern end 
 of the earth is extremely frozen. It is different in the Indies. It has come 
 to pass that the word "experiment" as applied to keeping meat fresh is a 
 terror. What "experiment" with the meat of the boys in blue, .white 
 or yellow! One might as well "experiment with the bread and butter 
 
75° REVIEW OF THE WAR. 
 
 of the people!" However, experiments relate closely to experience, and 
 the lamps by which wise men find the paths of safety and keep in them 
 are those that have been tried, that is, experimented with. The canned meats 
 that were good in Old England and New England, excellent on the European 
 continent, were "unfit" in our new possessions of the tropics. The fresh 
 meat in Porto Rico — the island abounds in cattle — was complained of because 
 it was "too fresh. " It had to be eaten almost as soon as the life was out of the 
 carcasses, or not at all, for there was no way of cooling it. General Miles could 
 not take refrigerator cars along with him. In a few hours after the butcher 
 had pursued his profession the fresh meat was spoiled. The way the flies 
 pitched upon it to deposit their eggs was something surprising. There were 
 "experiments with beef" — awful as it appears in the newspapers, the fact is 
 substantially undeniable — to cure it so that it would be "fit" for seventy hours. 
 That was all claimed for the stuff that at the end of twenty-four hours had to 
 be turned into the sea. The War Department did not order it. General 
 Egan reported against it. If General Miles got a whiff of it the fact is with- 
 out official celebration, or any sort of good and regular standing. It is not 
 surprising that there was general confidence in the canned meat of well-known 
 brands, but that failed fast under the tropical test. The notorious investiga- 
 tions into the processes in this country of canning meats will ultimately have 
 a favorable influence in marketing them, for there will be no experiments of 
 preservation untried, and American manufacturers will rise to the occasion in 
 the canning of meats and vegetables good in all climates. The people of the 
 tropics have the advantage over us in their habits of nourishing themselves. 
 They are but light consumers of meat, and a portion of rice, well set up with 
 garlic and pepper, and a banana, is a satisfactory ration. The Cubans and 
 Filipinos want "hot stuff" rather than "heavy" stuff, and do not find out that 
 there is a kind of both hot and heavy food. Americans in the tropics have 
 much to learn in the accommodation of themselves to the conditions of the 
 country so as to be comfortable. The thing is not to abandon the use of 
 meat, but to reduce the quantity of it consumed. One reason for this is the 
 trouble in preservation of fresh meat. If there is ever found a deep and 
 healthful solution of the problem it must be done by Americans. The beef 
 scandals and conundrums, and the whole long list of our recorded trials that 
 were made sore by grievous errors that ought to have been avoidable, and pro- 
 voking incapacities — putting our armies into the field and failing to provide for 
 
REVIEW OF THE WAR. 
 
 751 
 
 them before going or to help them there, as should have been done on behalf 
 of a great, liberal and loving people — surely that which has been revealed 
 will have the respectful attention of the people and of the Congress, and sub- 
 stantially that which is demanded by the distinguished commission will be 
 done. The army, regular or volunteer, is of the blood, brain and bone of the 
 people, and is for the people. 
 
CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 The Occupation of Our New Possessions. 
 
 The Spanish Peninsula too Narrow to Sustain the Crown System Over Continental Colonies — 
 The Loss of Her Archipelagoes Has Been the Logic of Her Experiences — Comparative- 
 Expansion of England and the United States — Our Magnificent Growth across the Con- 
 tinent the Greatest of National Triumphs — Our Arms Around the World — Our Bugle Call 
 and British Drum-Beats, Following the Course of the Sun — The Whispering Wires that. 
 Unite the Nations — The Malay Revolt Against Liberty for Tyranny — The Ghastly 
 Demagogy that Meddles with the Army — Pleasing Prospects of Our Possessions Except 
 the Philippines — The Aguinaldo Conspiracy and Tagalo War — The Motives and Malice of 
 It — American Arms without Stain — Our Soldiers without Reproach. 
 
 The logic of the war with Spain was that we should possess her American 
 colonies and, of course, occupy them. She had ceased for a generation to 
 hold continental land, outside the western peninsula of Europe, so long con" 
 tested by the great tribes of adventurous nations, of the earliest periods of 
 which there are histories. The Carthaginians, Romans, Goths, and Moors^ 
 successively were masters of the extraordinary resources of the country, with 
 a charming climate and fertile valleys, mountains rich in minerals, rivers- 
 romantic in story and name, that became the home of one of the most enter- 
 prising and dominating races of 'men. The tragedies of Spain for two thou- 
 sand years have exceeded even those of Italy. There came to her through 
 Columbus the greatest of new possessions that ever were grasped by any 
 people, the immeasurably endowed Americas. Columbus died neglected and 
 poor, for the greed of the crown of Spain, through the viceroys and their 
 rapacious followers, did not spare the illustrious discoverer or the inoffensive 
 races that were to have been converted to Christianity, but were slaughtered 
 by taskmasters. The American colonies poured wealth into the Peninsula, 
 but the system of governing by the Crown, so that neither the people of Spain 
 nor the natives of the new land they occupied, had rights that were respected, 
 gave up the priceless fortunes conquered or inherited, to favorites of the 
 administrators of the affairs of the kingdom, and their cruelty and profligacjr 
 
 752 
 
THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 753 
 
 prepared the way for the horrible wars that established the independence of 
 the Spanish American States ; and Spain ultimately gave far more in gold and 
 blood for the lands she ruled beyond her borders than she gained by her 
 mastery of the most opulent portions of the earth. Before we of the United 
 States became greatly interested in the decline of Spain and began to feel that 
 we had duties and destinies involved in the final break-up of her pretensions of 
 dominion and power, the American continents were freed from her rule, and 
 her only hold upoQ the mainland beyond her boundaries between the Pyrenees 
 and the Atlantic was a penal colony upon the African shore, near Gibraltar. 
 She still held several archipelagoes, the Balearic, Canary, Philippine, Caroline 
 and Ladrone islands, Cuba and Porto Rico. 
 
 If the war had lasted another hundred days, the Americans would have 
 taken all the Spanish islands, those European and African as well as Ameri- 
 can and Asiatic. The beautiful groups in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, 
 off the coast of Africa, would have been possessions for our people, stripping 
 Spain down to the bones of the old Peninsula. The fate of the Spanish colo. 
 nies is not quotable as an example for nations holding lands abroad, for it is 
 not to be assumed that any of them, the United States least of all, would in a 
 system of administration exclude the people, both at home and abroad, from 
 all rights the officials of the government and their classified assistants need 
 regard. Spain of old was too narrow a basis, both in land and people, to sup- 
 port a colonial expansion that included continents. The wonder is that this 
 pyramid on its apex stood so long. If we had confined our republic to the 
 Atlantic tide-water region, from South Carolina to Massachusetts, and had 
 undertaken to colonize Africa and Australia, the popular contention might 
 well have been that we were attempting a task beyond our strength. We 
 have done a greater work of expansion that any other nation has accomplished 
 — in our increase from the original thirteen colonies of England to the repub- 
 lic that does what no other power can boast — occupies the whole breadth of the 
 American continent between the greater oceans of the globe. If there are 
 exceptions, we name Mexico and Canada, and they hardly, extensive and 
 respectable as they are, can be classed with us. We have also the entire 
 northern line of the central sea of the Americas ; and the further we have 
 moved west, the more rapid our growth has been north and south. There 
 has for some years been a feeling among our people who believe themselves 
 conservative that we were hasty in the admission of territories as states. 
 
754 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 
 
 because we gave some thinly inhabited regions disproportionate power in the 
 national Senate. The specifications of evil anticipated, however, passed away, 
 and the fact that our states are continuous across the continent must be hailed 
 as auspicious because the majestic links of statehood make an incomparable 
 bond of union. There is another bond that has been in full view since we 
 assumed the responsibility devolved upon us by the victory of our arms in 
 Asiatic waters — the sentiment that accords with a gigantic nationality has been 
 developed on both the ocean boundaries of the republic where we find our- 
 selves one of the influences that shall shape the future of Asia. That the ages 
 to come will find Asiatic commerce an increasing factor in the ptogress of the 
 world there is reason to believe. We cross the Pacific on errands to our new 
 possessions, in less time thaai our grandfathers occupied in Atlantic voyages 
 between America and Europe ; and while our troops on the way to Manila are 
 reviewed on parade, at Malta, our warships homeward bound through the 
 Mediterranean exchange salutes with the remnants of the Spanish navy, 
 where the thunder of the guns of Trafalgar was heard. The Pacific coast 
 -will take on a new growth, and the influence of the states on the Pacific, 
 whatever the transitory aberrations of miscalculating men may be — the Pacific 
 influence will be for the expansion of the foundations of our power in Asia. 
 No European nation, not even England or Russia, is so marked out for 
 domination, according to our wisdom of the appropriation of opportunity, as 
 ourselves. We have three Pacific states, the immense territory of Alaska, 
 the Aleutian Archipelago, that stretches westward far along the Siberian 
 coast, many of the islands most valuable ; and now, beyond all question, the 
 Hawaiian group, a splendid acquisition, a part of the Ladrones, and the 
 Philippines, equal alone to all the West Indies. We have in these possessions 
 the potentiality of American civilization in contact with that of ancient Asia. 
 Marco Polo will be famous forever for his stories of the glories of Japan, and 
 the fancy of Columbus, one of the rare adventurers whose imagination 
 became executive, was inflamed by him to sail westward in search of the 
 Indies. Yet he missed in his estimation of the bulk of the world the con- 
 tinents and islands of America. The West Indies were found by ships whose 
 sails were filled with trade winds westward blowing. The Indies west are 
 eastward, not westward, to us. The East Indies were named in the same 
 way, for it was known in the huge vagueness that wrapped the known 
 and the unknown in the same clouds that south and east of Asia were the 
 
THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 755 
 
 Indies. The caravans carried Indian stories, superstitions and merchandise 
 across the Arabian deserts. Palmyra was a green island in a sea of sand, and 
 sprung from trade that found a channel from the further east. The northern 
 Italian cities grew from this golden seed grain, knd flourished when the prom- 
 ise of the Cape of Good Hope became a gorgeous realization, and then faded 
 because the oceans were spread not to divide but to unite the great divisions 
 of land. London and Lisbon profited. England took unto herself the empire 
 of India, and bearing "the white man's burden," became sovereign of the 
 mighty waters, master of colossal shores and countless millions, feeding her 
 grandeur with a colonial system that made her capital the greatest of cities, 
 and her trade the despair of the nations. She was enriched by the expansion 
 that made Spain poor. The English speaking races have gained the gift of 
 colonization that the Latin nations lost. - The United States waited long to 
 take herself consciously, — and conspicuously before all spectators, the world 
 the stage, humanity the audience, — ^her own high place among the powers of 
 the world-wide affairs, not in a way that was ostentatious, but with the simple 
 directness that is fitting for strength, the clear purpose power warrants, the 
 majestical graciousness that an open, honorable purpose yields and wields. 
 
 An order was cabled two-thirds of the way around the world, facing the 
 sun from Washington, to destroy a ileet that menaced our commerce, and in a 
 week the order was obeyed ; and that was literally firing guns around the 
 world. Since' that day we have sent our regiments east and west, steaming 
 into the morning skies from New York, and into the sunsets from San Fran- 
 cisco. Our troopships, going opposite ways, have met in Manila. Those that 
 departed eastward will sail on until they come home from the west! This far 
 exceeds the British drumbeat that follows the sun. The American bugles 
 have been heard morning and evening on the Atlantic and Pacific, the Medi- 
 terranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Sea of China. The boys 
 are upholding the faith and honor of the army and the navy, carrying the flag 
 of America, keeping step to her lofty music, extending the beneficence of 
 Americanism, their field that of the apostles, — the world. 
 
 The campaign for suitable legislation in Congress to meet the changed rela- 
 tions of the country to the armed nations, was like that at Santiago in the fact 
 it was necessary to do a great deal of arduous work within strict limitations of 
 time or make costly sacrifices. Success at Santiago — and there was a meas- 
 ure of it there, striking in proportion, for there were many chances of failure 
 
756 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 
 
 — the American victory at the critical point and certain crisis of the war, 
 depended upon the things that must be done in sharply defined hours, or 
 disastrous expenditure of life and. treasure would have been demanded, in 
 addition to that which sufficed. Congress expired on the 4th of March. It 
 was important not to have that body convened in extra session. A fashion of 
 extra sessions is to be deprecated, because the industrially productive people 
 need intervals of repose from heated terms of politics, when the National cap- 
 ital should be the scene rather of executive labor than legislative agitation. 
 The President was bound by his convictions of what the public prosperity de- 
 manded, to call an extra session, a fortnight after his inauguration, of the Con- 
 gress, whose house was elected on the same day with his own popular election. 
 There were decisive reasons why it was undesirable to foUbw the precedent 
 with the second Congress of his term. The protracted debates on the ratifica- 
 tion by the Senate of the treaty with Spain were injurious in the mere matter 
 of time lost, and jj-et more unfortunate because the nature of the discussion 
 raised doubts even among enlightened peoples, as to the stability of the pur- 
 pose of the government of the United States in regard to the new posses- 
 sions, while the Tagalo conspirators were encouraged to believe that if they 
 made war upon our troops we would be persuaded that the government of the 
 Philippines should be turned over from the Spaniards to the martial law of 
 Tagalo tyrants, burning to be more desperate and destructive, avaricious and 
 violently oppressive, than the Spaniards. The world is a neighborhood of 
 nations, and a whispering gallery over wires. Dr. Rizal, the ablest and most 
 cultivated of Filipino writers, prepared in the form of a short story a tale of 
 the telephone, the leading idea of which was that long-distance telephonic 
 communication was established between Madrid and Manila and so perfected 
 that the priests in the two cities talked with facility, and the Spanish priests 
 at home were wretched to find that the friars in Luzon were so unworthy, and 
 it was decided by the priests of Spain they should fast and pray for their 
 brethren at the other end of the wire that carried their voices on wings of fire. 
 The representatives of tlie Tagalos were free, while in Paris in attendance on 
 the treaty commission, to cable by way of Hongkong whatever representations 
 they saw fit of the attitude of the Americans. There have been for several 
 years centers of Philippine hostility to Spain in Paris and Hongkong, and 
 some of those finding employment in planning revolution had a good deal of 
 money, were liberally educated, and employed the cables. When the Treaty 
 
THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 757 
 
 of Peace was signed at Paris the Filipino commissioner appeared in Wash- 
 ington, and of course was still using cables to inform Aguinaldo by way of 
 private Hongkong messages ; and if the matter sent was not too flagrant and' 
 vicious it passed direct through Manila to the eastward station where the 
 committee that they call an assembly met. That Agoncillo overestimated the 
 influence of the Americans opposed to our ratification of the Spanish treaty, 
 and regarded their utterances as an appeal to the Filipino army to take the 
 offensive, and destroy the steadfastness of the American people, so that con- 
 gressional and other incendiary talk fanned the embers into a flame to be 
 quenched in blood, is an unexaggerated statement of indisputable fact. The 
 most serious and incurable difficulty that besets us when we are anxious to 
 make peace with the swarming Tagalos is that they have no comprehension of 
 our solicitude for pacification, other than that we are preparing the way for 
 our submission to them. That is precisely the way the paths to peace are 
 obstructed. The very proclamations that the President meant to give assur- 
 ances of the purpose of our government to deal liberally and generously with 
 the Philippines, and the orders issued by General Otis pursuant to the advices 
 he received of the eminently pacific disposition of the American government, 
 excited the Tagalos, and influenced them, just because the President 
 announced his sense of responsibility, and thereby presumed to question the 
 dictatorship of Aguinaldo. Further, the Filipinos were persuaded that they 
 had only to strike a blow at our army to disturb the peace of this country. 
 The President had shown anxiety to avoid bloodshed, and while the insurgents 
 were intrenching themselves and mounting guns to enfilade our lines, our 
 sentinels were subjected to the grossest insults and taunted night and day. 
 This aggressive effrontery continued until the attack was made in force, and 
 then the Tagalos got a lesson that was a surprise to them. They had been 
 accustomed when they thought they were besieging Manila, to open fire for a 
 few hours, and then to rest, regarding the proceeding heroic and to be 
 resumed at pleasure. The Americans rushed for them, and put them to flight 
 and slaughter. The result of the effervescence of factions in our Congress and 
 country after the war was over except in a legal sense, was to furnish fire for 
 the fuel accumulated with false pretenses by the Tagalos, and substitute a war 
 with the Filipinos for that with the Spaniards, and at the same time cut down 
 and put aside the army bills, thus encouraging Indian disorders, and other 
 manifestations of hatred and contempt for the authorities. It was possible, 
 
758 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 
 
 however, to save for a time the regular army as it is and give to the discretion 
 of the President power to raise troops enough, as appeared to Congress, to aot 
 on the defensive, until the law-making power should come together in regular 
 session or be called by the President, if that seemed the lesser evil. Congress 
 was good enough to provide for an ad interim army. The President was not 
 commanded — that is, not yet — to throw away the weapons the constitution 
 placed in his hands. There is hardly enough of the army to take care of the 
 military property accumulated in the fortifications and camps, seaside and 
 other, and thinly occupy our vast possessions so that the peace and dignity of 
 the United States may not be unfavorably affected. Fortunately the military 
 arm of the nation does not need to be strongly displayed in Porto Rico and 
 Hawaii, and it is a coincidence that the absence of insurgents is in precisely 
 those places in which our authority is not limited as to time. Porto Rico has 
 been ceded to us, the schools opening under the American flag, the people 
 shouting in joyous response tothe salutes with which the flag was received, 
 and the band played the Star Spangled Banner. We annexed Hawaii in spite of 
 the outcries of those who had profited by the occupation of the monarchy that 
 was surrounded by as many rings as Jupiter has moons. A ship of war or 
 two and a few companies of regulars are enough to keep order there. The 
 people accept it as a fact, as it is, that the annexation is irrevocable. The 
 way to cause disturbance is to question that fact, but it will not be questioned 
 any more until the army submits to the mob. It will be the duty of Congress 
 to make liberal appropriations for the equipment of the old forts at the prin- 
 cipal ports of Porto Rico, with modern artillery, — and as the naval officers 
 agree that the eight and ten inch guns are great enough for battleships, and 
 that the five-inch and small rapid-fire artillery are the most serviceable afloat, 
 we will have and to spare a splendid assortment of our eleven, twelve and 
 thirteen inch thunderers to mount ashore. Porto Rico, the Pacific coast and 
 Hawaii should absorb them. In Cuba we were fortunate not to open the 
 war with Spain by accepting as fact the Key West fiction about the repub- 
 lic of Cuba. That wonderful oganization was apparently gotten up expressly 
 for the issue of bonds and postage stamps. There was a coast-guard and 
 postal system, also a capital city, and an army, accounts of which reminded 
 one of that described in the alliteration, "An Austrian army awfully arrayed. " 
 The American statesmen who have used Cuba as a live coal on their brains, 
 thought it important to have the republic recognized to assist in placing loans, 
 
THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 759 
 
 take command of our armies, and accept rations from our hands. The Cuban 
 Assembly was like that in the Isle of Luzon, representative of a clique, a 
 faction, a gang, not at all of the people. Both gangs, that of Cuba and that 
 of Luzon, are representative only of Spanish misgovernment and the deform- 
 ities of an administration by royal favorites for immigrant stipendiaries. In 
 the character they asserted for themselves, that of representatives of the 
 people, they were self-evident impostors. It was held to be high public policy 
 to disclaim ambition to annex Cuba to the United States, and it seems prob- 
 able the precaution of that profession was wise, for it does much to smooth 
 the way for the final complete absorption of Cuba in the United States. In no 
 other way than by pursuing the path of American reserve, and respect for 
 the orderly expression of the Cuban people when they emerged from the 
 chaos of war and made themselves felt, could the Assembly have been so dis- 
 credited as it is by its own acts. That body was so wild with folly as to take 
 issue with the one man whose power of character, will and fame crush them 
 when they charge him with their own faults. They are shattered by the col- 
 lision, while their animosity inflicted no scratch or stain on the Cuban chief. 
 The intelligence and high-toned public spirit of Martinez Gomez has redeemed 
 the faults of his campaigning, which was that of fighting Spaniards with 
 their own weapons, and burning the fairer places of the island to free it from 
 woes greater than poverty, of hopeless strife with corrupt and venomous 
 oppression. The stand of Gomez for the freedom of the people from false 
 debts was full of the dignity of heroic devotion, sympathy with those really 
 liberated and their true liberators, and scorn for all who would convert the 
 cause of the country into a source of profitableness for pretenders. The 
 future of Cuba too largely depends upon this one-man power, for Gomez is 
 old and worn. The people of the island have acclaimed him one of them- 
 selves, though a Dominican, and his leadership is one he cannot abdicate, for 
 there is no hand but his to guide the sorely-stricken Cubans to the peace of a 
 stable government that the people may voice their aspirations with authen- 
 ticity and efficacy. 
 
 There was, in the Congressional debate on the army bill in association 
 with the current events of the Filipino war, many things said by the opposi- 
 tion that would be entirely deplorable if the standard of intelligence was that 
 of the Tagalos, who must be convinced that Americans are, in view of the 
 warfare that engages their attention around Manila, about to engage in a civil 
 
76o THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 
 
 war at home. One member said war with Aguinaldo could have been avoided 
 if the President had stated he was not going to subjugate them, and this 
 congressman had "mused much" upon the "embattled farmers" who "fired 
 the shot heard round the world," and "wondered if there was anywhere out 
 along the firing line around Manila a spot that looked like Concord Bridge." 
 This is a direct instigation of the assassination of American soldiers doing 
 their duty at Manila. This incident occurred when the President cabled 
 within three weeks of the naval battle of Manila that it would be the duty of 
 the commander of the American expedition to "publish a proclamation 
 declaring that we came not to make war upon the people of the Philippines, " 
 but to "protect them in their homes, their employments and in their personal 
 and religious rights." The proof is perfect that Aguinaldo was false and 
 malicious, a conspirator, hostile all the while to Americans, seeking to deceive 
 and make use of them, to help him with his followers to take the place of the 
 Spaniards as robbers of the people, and ^tyrants irresponsible and unappeas- 
 able. Mr. Wildman, consul at Kongkong, wrote the State Department that 
 Aguinaldo arrived in that city on the day after Dewey's May-day victory, and 
 added: "It was May loth before I could obtain permission from Admiral 
 Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the U. S. steamer McCuUoch. ' ' It was 
 three weeks after the battle when Aguinaldo arrived at Cavite. Just at this 
 time a proclamation was issued at Hongkong by the Philippine insurgents 
 saying: "Where you see the American flag flying, assemble. They are our 
 redeemers!" May 20, Williams, consul, wrote: "General Aguinaldo told me 
 to-day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a 
 colony of the United States of America." While Aguinaldo was at Hong- 
 kong his "compatriots" there busied themselves getting up statements tender- 
 ing their allegiance to the United States. Here is an example : 
 
 To the President of the United States of America : 
 
 Claudio Lopez, merchant and proprietor and vice-consul of Portugal at 
 Iloilo, native of the Philippine Islands, emigrant to this colony of Hongkong 
 for political causes, exposes with great consideration: 
 
 Having known the history and constitution of the noblest liberal and 
 rightful nation of the United States of America, he, for the present, adheres 
 to the Government in annexing his country, and considers that it will be for 
 him a great honor to join his country as an additional star to the always vie- 
 
THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 761 
 
 torious flag of the United States of America and to count him as one of its 
 citizens. 
 
 Hongkong, 9th May, 1898. (Signed) CLAUDIO LOPEZ. 
 
 This was prepared a week after Aguinaldo's arrival at Hongkong, when 
 the news of Deweys victory had been received, and a week before he gave 
 permission for the Malay tribesman, who had accepted Spanish money to 
 accept a Spanish peace for his people, to take passage in a United States 
 ship, return to the country he had left for his country's good, as the sequel 
 shows. There was a struggle without intermission to get the State Depart- 
 ment and Admiral Dewey to consent to an alliance with Aguinaldo and his 
 "government." This was persistently the policy of our consuls at Hong- 
 kong, Manila and Singapore, who were active in the presumed management 
 of the man who had been deported, cash in hand, as the Spanish prom- 
 ised to reform if he would take his share of the country and go away. He 
 knew as well then the nature of the reforms of Spain as he does now. 
 He was, until the American admiral allowed him to appear at Cavite, a 
 professor of Americanism. What he secured through the intervention of 
 our consuls was to advertise himself under the auspices of the United States 
 forces, and the Tagalos presumed he was running the United States. 
 Very soon he became of the opinion that it was his mission to permit and 
 direct the operation of our fleet and army, and he has ever since been violent 
 as an "ally" of the United States, whose "dictatorship" was of such a nature 
 he was called upon to "order and command" all manner of men. The State 
 Department of the United- States several times by cable and mailed letters 
 ordered the consuls to omit negotiations. This was before the war. When it 
 was in the air after the war, they were "cordial" with Aguinaldo that they 
 might "influence him for good. " He was playing upon them a sinister game. 
 Mr. Wildman, however, had written February 22, 1898, that the Spanish cap- 
 tain-general at Manila was asserting he had pacified the islands, so that he 
 could return to Spain with that to his credit, when the truth was "certain 
 rebel leaders were given a cash bribe of -$1,650,000 to consent to public depor- 
 tation to China. This bribe and deportation only multiplied claimants, and 
 fanned the fires of discontent." It was Aguinaldo- who got the money. The 
 sort of peace he secured was described by his friend. Consul Williams, in 
 these words: "On Friday morning, March 25, a meeting of natives was being 
 
762 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 
 
 held near my consulate in Manila, the natives being unarmed. The building 
 was surrounded by police and military, the meeting broken up, twelve natives 
 wantonly shot to death, several wounded, and sixty-two taken prisoners. 
 Saturday morning, March 26, the sixty-two prisoners were marched in a body 
 to the cemetery and shot to death, although it was shown that several were 
 chance passers-by or employes in ships adjoining, not being in attendance at 
 the meeting." We quote again from Mr. Williams: "I was in Hongkong 
 September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with 
 the Spanish government. They waited until the ist of November for the pay- 
 ment of the promised money and the fulfillment of the promised reforms. 
 Only $400,000, Mexican, was ever placed to their credit in the banks." It 
 was on the 3d of November Mr. E. Agoncillo, "late minister of foreign affairs 
 in Aguinaldo's cabinet," tried to make a secret bargain with the United 
 States for arms, and was willing the United States should make some money. 
 "There has been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Aguinaldo and 
 his cabinet," Mr. Williams wrote later, "on account of the questionable 
 terms of their surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month." Mr. Wil-' 
 liams proceeded to argue that Aguinaldo had not sold himself. This was a 
 part of the "diplomatic dealing" with the conspirator who was at work to use 
 the Americans, civil and military, to further his plan for setting up a dictator- 
 ship. Aguinaldo was like the frozen reptile in the fable, found by a wood- 
 man, and warmed before the fire, stung his benefactor. This preposterous 
 Tagalo serpent began to show his fangs at an early date. The first United 
 States troops, under General Thomas Anderson, arrived at Manila to rein- 
 force Dewey June 30th, and the second expedition, under General Green, July 
 2 2d. July 28th Aguinaldo wrote Anderson: 
 
 "I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking 
 North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the 
 Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because, as no formal 
 agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might 
 consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops- as a viola- 
 tion of its rights. 
 
 "I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the 
 Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I 
 take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that, before dis- 
 embarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places 
 
THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 7^3 
 
 that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people 
 haay be advised in due form and [thus] prevent the commission of any trans- 
 gression against friendship. " 
 
 There could not have been anything more insolent than this imagined, 
 but Aguinaldo was soon able to surpass it, expressing astonishment that 
 Americans wanted wood, horses and cattle, and meant to take them if not sold 
 at a fair price. Presently the snaky conspirator, who sought to absorb all the 
 offices of tyranny, claimed it as a virtue that he had "permitted" the Ameri- 
 cans in Manila to obtain pure water, and he began his openly aggressive 
 course that culminated in the war he forced. It was, he held, a condescension 
 to say that the Americans had hastened the revolution by destroying the 
 Spanish fleet! As for himself, he and his 14,000 men, which he represented 
 as 37,000, did nothing toward taking Manila. The American fleet silenced 
 the fort by the seashore that was the key of the city, and the American col- 
 umns, the line of defense broken, entered with slight loss. Then because the 
 Tagalos were not allowed to jointly occupy the place they had not contributed 
 to conquer, there was the claim that we had ill-treated our "ally." The 
 President telegraphed Admiral Dewey, May 26: "You must exercise discre- 
 tion most fully in all matters, and be governed according to circumstances 
 which you know and we can not know. You have our confidence entirely. 
 It is desirable, as far as possible and consistent for your success and safety, 
 not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands 
 that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future. " This was the 
 product, of course, of the consular correspondence which had gone far in 
 sympathy and flattery. The Admiral replied : 
 
 "I thank the Department for the expression -of confidence. Have acted 
 according to the spirit of the Department's instriictions therein from begin- 
 ning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any fac- 
 tion. This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but 
 it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to 
 retain possession. DEWEY." 
 
 August 15th Consul Wildman telegraphed Stajte Department: 
 "The Spanish consul received dispatch Sunday ordering the surrender of 
 Manila. Shall I offer to deliver personally and save more delay? Believe can 
 be of service to Dewey, should Aguinaldo make trouble. WILDMAN." 
 
764 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 
 
 This telegram from Wildman was thus answered by the Secretary : 
 "Spanish consul should deliver dispatch in his own way. Take no action 
 respecting Aguinaldo without specific directions from this Department. ' ' 
 
 !Mr. Wildman finally discovered that Aguinaldo, with whom he had 
 labored hard and long, was treacherous, and wanted to take possession of the 
 country and be the reigning tyrant vice the Spaniards, and at last in ignorance 
 and vanity mistaking the character of the American army and people, made 
 war with the swarm of deluded men of his tribe, not for liberty, but to set up 
 a personal despotism. We have to liberate the people of the Philippines 
 twice, from the Spaniards and from the Tagalos. The American arms have 
 not been tarnished in either conflict, but brightened and glorified in the same 
 good cause, keeping clear and shining on high, the faith and honor of the 
 army and navy of the United States and the absolute integrity of the national 
 government. It was not possible to avoid the war with a tribe of Malays who 
 answered generosity with resentment, . charity with malice, and forbearance 
 with vindictiveness. They are not fighting for personal or public .rights, but 
 for a savage sovereignty, that they may spoil and slay for the sake of robbery 
 and revenge. No reproach rests upon Americans for their conduct at Manila. 
 Under difficult circumstances they have been admirable. There has not been 
 a day since May i, 1898, when they could have left the Philippines \yith honor, 
 for they could not provide for peace except by force. The degradation of 
 submissiveness suggested — the abandonment of dttty and- decency — it is 
 impossible to conceive of our countrymen. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Abarzuza, Don Buenaventura 083 
 
 "Abondanar" and "Renunciar" quibble over terms..... 689 
 
 Almodovar, Duke of 713 
 
 Ambiguity avoided in preparing Peace Protocol 711 
 
 American plenipotentiaries; their powers 682 
 
 American Commissioners not offended by Spanish memorandum regarding Indian rebel- 
 lions and seceding Southern States 702 
 
 American Commissioners uphold .Merritt 706 
 
 American Government accepted no Spanish reservations ; 719 
 
 American Secretary of State's correspondence with Marshal Prim 55 
 
 American Proposal to purchase Cuba 56 
 
 American Minister to Spain 74 
 
 American appeal to European Powers proves inadequate 90 
 
 Americans not believed warlike by Spaniards 125 
 
 Americans arrested and charges 137 
 
 American citizens of two kinds in Cuba 198 
 
 American prisoners in Cuba released 204 
 
 American eagle fiew high on the Fourth of July 411 
 
 American troops had a line "which was very thin" 414 
 
 American army receives grateful letter from defeated Spaniards 5S4 
 
 American armj- at Santiago small and poorly furnished 4S9 
 
 Americans' handsome behavior according to Cervera 514 
 
 Americans' occupy Jamaica and Ponce 570 
 
 American fire from fleet "one prolonged thunder" 624 
 
 After the May-day battle in Manila Bay ". 309 
 
 After the fighting was over in Cuba 581 
 
 Alleged American citizens 137 
 
 Administrations, conservative, of Grant, Cleveland and McKinley 194 
 
 Advance of the first of July ^04 
 
 Agoncillo, Don Felipe 655 
 
 Aguinaldo calls on Dewey 312 
 
 773 
 
774 INDEX. 
 
 JAGE 
 
 Aguinaldo organizes army under protection of Dewey's guns 314 
 
 Aguinaldo, according to Dewe)', unable to capture Manila 314 
 
 Aguinaldo proclaims himself President •. 318 
 
 Aguinaldo becomes aggressive 319 
 
 Aguinaldo and General Merritt 554 
 
 Aguinaldo described by Major Bell 665 
 
 Aguinaldo, Baldamero, Secretary of War 665 
 
 Aguinaldo's treachery 761 
 
 Aguira, seat of Cuban Government i88 
 
 Aguirri, General, at Cienfuegos, is ordered by Blanco to congratulate Cervera on his 
 
 victory 446 
 
 Aguacate Hill, where Cubans made a valiant stand 661 
 
 Alger, R. A., Secretary of War, directs that graves be properly and surely marked 440 
 
 Alger, General, urges Shafter to hold his own ...; 409 
 
 Alger urges joint action of Army and Navy , 417 
 
 Alger, Secretary, thanked by Clara Barton 583 
 
 Arevella, Captain, dentist, soldier 667 
 
 Annexation of Cuba the correct policy no 
 
 Anxiety for latest news from Shafter's headquarters 454 
 
 Army of the United States should have most approved arms 329 
 
 Army seizes prizes in harbor claimed by Navy 536 
 
 Army of the United States 630 
 
 Army corps, officers and men 633 
 
 Army rifle, Krag-Jorgensen, its excellence 644 
 
 Arellano, Cayetano S., avowed annexationist 665 
 
 Art in handling modern rifle .' 329 
 
 Artillery and its great effect 480 
 
 Assaults believed to have been impossible under modern conditions 479 
 
 Authorization of the Spanish Peace Commissioners 682 
 
 Azpeztequia fortifies his estate 182 
 
 Bombardment of American ports suggested 103 
 
 Brice, A. C, Consul at Matanzas, writes of starvation 232 
 
 Barker, Walter B., Consul of Sagua la Grande, tells of inability to grind sugar crop 238 
 
 Baranger, General, sure of Spain's success 277 
 
 Brumby, T. M., Lieutenant, commended by Dewey 288 
 
 Bombardment of San Juan, Porto Rico 368 
 
 Blanco says withdrawal of Cervera's fleet would mean loss of Cuba 434 
 
 Blanco orders Cervera to land marines 437 
 
 Blanco asks authority over Cervera 437 
 
 Blanco advises Cervera when to escape 437 
 
 Blanco orders Cervera out of harbor 439 
 
INDEX. 775 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Blanco postpones fleet's "departure" 443 
 
 Blanco orders Cervera to leave •■ 444 
 
 Blanco advised by Cervera withdrawal of his sailors would mean loss of Santiago 445 
 
 Blanco gives Cervera twelve hours to leave Santiago 445 
 
 Blanco advised of Cervera's departure and loss of two torpedo boats 445 
 
 Blanco orders General Guirri at Cienfuegos prepare to receive Cervera and con- 
 gratulate him on his "distinguished victory" ^ 446 
 
 Blanco tells Madrid fate of Cervera's squadron 447 
 
 Blanco receives report of Cervera of his capture 447 
 
 Blanco tries to shift blame for Cervera's defeat 447 
 
 Blanco advises Madrid to hold out ag-ainst Americans 44g 
 
 Blanco's tribute of admiration to Cervera 448 
 
 Blanco appealed to by Sagasta for help towards peace 449 
 
 Blanco has Madrid's position explained to him by Correa 449 
 
 Blanco demands of Sagasta continuation of the war 451 
 
 Blanco cables Cervera can't fight 429 
 
 Blanco advises Correa army still wants to fight 451 
 
 Breckenridge on need of regular officers among volunteers 387 
 
 Breckenridge, General J. C, his military intelligence 474 
 
 Breckenridge, and what should be done with the volunteers 477 
 
 Breckenridge tells of landing, Daiquiri 47S 
 
 Breckenridge's story of the fighting at Santiago 479 
 
 Breckenridge's account of El Caney 483 
 
 Breckenridge's account of Cubans 484 
 
 Burss, Fireman J., wounded on Brooklyn in fight with Cervera 504 
 
 Brooklyn hit many times 504 
 
 Brooklyn most dreaded by Spaniards 513 
 
 Black powder and its dangers 483 
 
 Bravery of the Spaniards 484 
 
 Baltimore struck five times 295 
 
 Biddle, Captain \V., U. S. M. C, performed valuable services 283 
 
 Belief in her navy accounts for Spain's determination to fight 278 
 
 Boker, Geo. H., Minister to Russia, writes of sympathy there 129 
 
 Burning of houses 187 
 
 Bureau of Ordnance — additional guns 608 
 
 Bureau of Construction and Repair, report of 614 
 
 Bombardment by Sampson according to Santiago Spaniards 628 
 
 Belief in Santiago that Cervera had escaped 626 
 
 Battleship, its supremacy 627 
 
 Boynton, General H. V., on water supply at Chickamauga Park 646 
 
 Beef supplied army, and scandal 647 
 
776 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Beef and the truth about it 647 
 
 Banquero, Colonel, his bravery '..... 652 
 
 Bustemente, Captain, fights valorously for Spain... 652 
 
 Bell, Majoi* J. F., catalogues Philippine leaders 664 
 
 Centennial Exhibition and relations between the two Governments 54 
 
 Cushing, Caleb, as a newspaper reader '. 75 
 
 Cushing's indictinent of Spain and Spaniards 94 
 
 Cushing, Caleb, studies of Spanish character explained 108 
 
 CushiDg's. Caleb, state papers and their importance 114 
 
 Cushing's, Caleb, vie\)v^s as to obeying the letter of his instructions 124 
 
 Cushing, Caleb, put diplomatic facts with a lawyer's impartiality 131 
 
 Carlist war made Eiirope slow to intervene in Cuba .' loi 
 
 Campos, Martinez, negotiates Peace of Zanjon 133 
 
 Campos, Martinez, attempts to quell outbreak of hostilities in 1895 133 
 
 Campos, Martinez, replaced by General Weyler 134 
 
 Claims stacked in State Department and damages asked 147 
 
 Conduct of Cuban troops as witnessed by G. B. Rea 165 
 
 Concenti-ation of peasantry described by Stephen Bonsai, journalist 178 
 
 Camaguey filled with catt'.e 1S9 
 
 Consulate at Havana .-. itJS 
 
 Caldwell, Ensign H. H., volunteer, commended by Dewey 288 
 
 Calkins, Lieutenant C. G. , navigator of Olympia, stood on bridge with Dewey. Highly 
 
 commended by him 288 
 
 CogWan, Captain J. B., of the Raleigh, on Manila victorj? 293 
 
 Cubans inferior to Filipinos, according to Dewey 314 
 
 Cuban Government at Key West 657 
 
 Cuban Government at New York ; 657 
 
 Cuban army on the pay-roll ■ '. 660 
 
 Cuban question thrashed over during Ten Years' War 109 
 
 Cuban Republic at Key West and New York aflfair no 
 
 Cubans according to General Breckenridge 484 
 
 Cuban cavalry on the coast guard did not muster in force 372 
 
 Cuba's one great aid 661 
 
 Cuba and her expenses 696 
 
 Cuba is freed 672 
 
 Cuba should have been ceded as Porto Rico was ' 723 . 
 
 Cuban debt related by commissioners 695 
 
 "Cuban War Emergency Loan" 6g6 
 
 Clark, Captain C. E,, assumes command of Oregon 334 
 
 Clark, Captain of the Oregon, warned of Cape de Verde fleet 336 
 
 Clark, Captain, cables could beat off and cripple Spanish fleet 336 
 
INDEX. 777 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Captain Clark at Rio de Janeiro warns Captain in command of the Brazilian flagship that 
 
 he would blow up Spanish torpedo boat in the harbor if she approached the Oregon ... 337 
 Captain Clark acknowledges congratulations received by crew with "enthusiasm and 
 
 spontaneous cheers" 337 
 
 Captain Clark of the Oregon tells of his ship in action 509 
 
 Correspondence of the Department of War 353 
 
 Camps in Florida 1 359 
 
 Cer vera reported at Santiago 368 
 
 Cervera reported ordered to shell Santiago when Americans got possession 406 
 
 Cervera's position at Santiago is understood by the Spanish Government 431 
 
 Cervera warned against being bottled up 433 
 
 Cervera's marines ordered to land 437 
 
 Correa advises chance for Cervera's escape 438 
 
 Cervera told of a good time to escape 437 
 
 Cervera says attempt to escape would mea.n loss of squadron and men 438 
 
 Cervera advises Blanco he is under his orders 438 
 
 Cervera tells of bad condition of his ships 439 
 
 Cervera ordered out of harbor by Blanco 439 
 
 Cervera's pathetic telegram requesting positive orders from Blanco before leaving 
 
 Santiago 440 
 
 Cervera pressed by Madrid to escape 443 
 
 Cervera's departure postponed by Blanco 443 
 
 Cervera accepts his doom 444 
 
 Cervera ordered to leave by Blanco ; 444 
 
 Cervera seeks delay 444 
 
 Cervera advises Blanco withdrawal of sailors would mean loss of Santiago 444 
 
 Cervera given twelve hours to leave 445 
 
 Cervera reports to Blanco his capture 447 
 
 Cervera paid tribute of admiration by Blanco 448 
 
 Cervera's report of his defeat 513 
 
 Cervera sails from Cape Verde Islands 368 
 
 Cervera famished for coal 621 
 
 Cervera's fleet as seen in Spanish eyes before the disaster of Santiago 278 
 
 Cervera reports his arrival at Santiago 429 
 
 Cer\'era at crucial moment .' 626 
 
 Corbin, Adjutant-General, telegraphs re-inforcements are coming 410 
 
 Corbin, H. C. , sends remarkable telegram to Shaffer about entering harbor with transport 
 
 armored with baled hay 456 
 
 Chancom transported and installed torpedoes in Cuba 277 
 
 Corruption in Spanish army and navy 112 
 
 Correspondence of the Department of War 357 
 
778 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Cambon, Ambassador from France, his conversations with President 704 
 
 Cambon, Don Julio, French Ambassador, negotiates peace for Alphonso XIII .■ 668 
 
 Cambon and Day concurred in believing note explicit 716 
 
 Cambon's instrument of authorization 670 
 
 Cadiz fleet starts for Manila 323 
 
 Captain Cook of the Brooklyn tells story of the naval battle 508 
 
 Capitulation 527 
 
 Casualties in the army operating against Spaniards in Manila 565 
 
 Casualties at Santiago 581 
 
 Clara Barton thanks Secretary Alger ^ 583 
 
 Cabellra, Lieutenant, tells of the destroyer's destruction 512 
 
 Canovas del Castillo shipped torpedoes to Cuba 277 
 
 Correa explains to Blanco Madrid's unfortunate position 449 
 
 Conference interrupted by Cervera's departure 461 
 
 Cavalry dismounted and its work 479 
 
 Chaparral about Santiago 480 
 
 Cable cut by Dewey gave us Philippine archipelago ' 725 
 
 Carter, Assistant Adjutant-General, Letter from 746 
 
 Corruption of Spanish contractor 621 
 
 Casualties 636 
 
 Casualties in Santiago .". 636 
 
 Casualties in Porto Rico 640 
 
 Casualties in Manila 640 
 
 Camps of United States troops 642 
 
 Chickamauga Park and water supply 646 
 
 Craig, Dr. C. F., analyzes Chickamauga water 647 
 
 Constitution, twenty-ninth Spanish regulars crack fighters 653 
 
 Conclusion 725 
 
 Congressional eflfusions make great trouble .'. 723 
 
 Country's debt to General Merritt 725 
 
 Country indebted to Admiral Dewey 725 
 
 Ceremonies Concluding the War with Spain..., 725 
 
 Commission to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department 738 
 
 Derby, Lord, and Gen. Schehes meet 74 
 
 Death of Marti 109 
 
 Death of colonial system of Spain 113 
 
 Duty of fair play to the Spaniards of the Peninsula and Cuba 131 
 
 Diaz, Don JoseGarnica y '. 683 
 
 Diaz, Rev. A. J., tells of immense armies of Gomez and Maceo 152 
 
 Death to those helping Spaniards 169 
 
 Defeat called victory by Cubans 173 
 
INDEX. 779 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Dr. Danforth describes Cuban capital i8S 
 
 Death in Cuba 211 
 
 Different character in explosions of the Maine 217 
 
 Day, Secretary, telegraphs Consul-General Lee 215 
 
 Declaration of War, President places issue with Congress 245 
 
 Day, Secretary, splendidly replies in the name of the President 668 
 
 Day to Woodford 248 
 
 Day states substantially points of protocol 668 
 
 Day to Woodford, Tefegram in Cipher 249 
 
 Day Lost or Gained, Importance of in Closing the War 732 
 
 Dewey's splendid victory 277 
 
 Dewey charters British steamer 280 
 
 Dewey purchases British steamer Zafiro 280 
 
 Dewey announces departure for Manila 283 
 
 Dewey threatened with Cervera's squadron 308 
 
 Dewey's simple announcement of his victory over Spanish fleet 283 
 
 Dewey congratulated by President and Secretary of the Navy 284 
 
 Dewey announces securing naval station at Cavite 284 
 
 Dewey congratulated in the name of American people 284 
 
 Dewey made Rear-Admiral 285 
 
 Dewey sends correct list of Spanish vessels destroyed 285 
 
 Dewey announces raising and docking three Spanish vessels 285 
 
 Dewey's official report of the engagement of his squadron with the Spanish fleet 285 
 
 Dewey happy to report none killed — squadron but slightly damaged..... 287 
 
 Dewey's praise of officers and men 288 
 
 Dewey doubts if any Commander-in-Chief was ever served by more loyal and gallant 
 
 captains 288 
 
 Dyer, Captain, of the Baltimore, makes a most interesting report 294 
 
 Defeated Spaniards give first account of action in Manila Bay 309 
 
 Dewey cuts cable, after first proposing to preserve the line for the use of both Americans 
 
 and Spaniards; which was rejected by the enemy 309 
 
 Dewey thanks President for promotion, and recommends advancement on list of his 
 
 commanding officer j 310 
 
 Dewey's estimate of troops necessary to control Philippine Islands 311 
 
 Dewey sends warning troops should be provided for extremely hot, moist climate 311 
 
 Dewey cabled if attacked by superior force squadron would endeavor to give good account 
 
 of itself 31 1 
 
 Dewey asks for whereabouts and strength of possible Spanish expedition against him 312 
 
 Dewey receives call from Aguinaldo ,12 
 
 Dewey's high commendation of Captain Daniel B. Hodgson 313 
 
 Dewey allows Aguinaldo to organize his army under the protection of his guns 314 
 
78o INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Dewey doubts Aguinaldo's ability to capture Manila 314 
 
 Dewey believes Filipinos more capable of self-government than Cubans 314 
 
 Dewey's anxiety for arrival of monitors 318 
 
 Dewey announces arrival of United States troops 318 
 
 Dewey's duty at Manila 547 
 
 Dewey sustained by the President 566 
 
 Dewey feared by Spaniards 538 
 
 Dewey's trust in monitors 627 
 
 Dewey announces arrival of General Merritt 319 
 
 Dewey announces Aguinaldo is becoming aggressive 319 
 
 Dewey receives announcement of Peace Protocol 320 
 
 Dewey's dispatches are characteristic and historical 320 
 
 Dewey entered into no alliance with Philippine insurgents 323 
 
 Dewey believed could beat Cervera with addition of two monitors 323 
 
 Dewey in few words tells President all about Philippines 325 
 
 Dewey, his country's indebtedness to him 725 
 
 Difficulty in loading transports for Santiago 376 
 
 Daiquiri landing unopposed 388 
 
 Difficulties in the Santiago campaign 399 
 
 Departure of American fleet told to Blanco 430 
 
 Destroyers destroyed at Santiago .' 512 
 
 Destruction of the Maine .' 210 
 
 Diminutive forces of Cuba according to G. B. Rea 160 
 
 Daiquiri and the landing there '. 47S 
 
 Day of doom for Cervera's fleet 483 
 
 De la Rama, OueEstefan, described 665 
 
 Dedios, Lieut.-Gen. Emiliano, Military Governor Cavite 666 
 
 Del Pilar, Brigadier-General 666 
 
 Destruction of Cervera's fleet as seen from shore 625 
 
 Deference to Spanish Commissioners 694 
 
 Dictionary and interpretation of Peace Protocol 694 
 
 "Disposition" and "possession," President'-s change of wording 707 
 
 Duke de Arcos appointed Spain's Minister to the United States 730 
 
 European press comment on Cuban-Spanish- American situation in 1 8 76 98 
 
 European powers hold off during war of 1898 113 
 
 European monarchies relied on by Spain 126 
 
 Exodus Cubans through dread of Weyler 134 
 
 Experience and sentiments of the people of Cuba 206 
 
 Events immediately preceding the blowing up of the Maine 214 
 
 Extra territoriality of foreign war vessel prevented Spaniards investigating Maine disaster 217 
 El Caney and General Ludlow 480 
 
■INDEX. 781 
 
 PAGE 
 
 El Caney according to Breckenridge 483 
 
 European powers addressed by American Government regarding inter\'ention 76 
 
 Evans, J. C, brave conduct at Manila 288 
 
 Evans, Captain Bob, on the Iowa's performance 511 
 
 Ellis, Chief Yeoman G. H., killed on Brooklyn in fight with Cervera 504 
 
 Eaton, Commodore, of the Resolute, on the naval fight 510 
 
 Exterior explosion the verdict 210 
 
 Eyermann, Emilio de Acosta y, killed on Mercedes 624 
 
 Embalmed beef 64S 
 
 Eighth (Philippine) corps 634 
 
 Expeditions to Philippines 635 
 
 Escario's column delayed by Cubans C6i 
 
 Escario's desperate advance to gain Santiago 661 
 
 Escario's delay, according to Spaniards, lost Santiago , O63 
 
 Escamillo, Aguinaldo's secretary ' 665 
 
 Estrella, General 666 
 
 Exact terms of note relating to Philippines 712 
 
 Evacuation of Porto Rico 733 
 
 Evacuation of Cuba 733 
 
 Fish, Secretary of State Hamilton, on former Cuban insurrection 54 
 
 Filibuster expeditions intended to rush United States into war 125 
 
 Fish, Hamilton, instructed in English by London Times 128 
 
 Fish, Hamilton 194 
 
 Firebrand and Freedom 183 
 
 Five-dollar Spanish gold piece sent private letter to United States 206 
 
 Florida Literary Bureau 207 
 
 Field Fighting for Santiago ;.., 407 
 
 Foreign countries closely studied Santiago expedition 477 
 
 Fifth Army Corps and its lesson to the whole army 477 
 
 "Fill up with coal — the best to be had" ^ 544 
 
 Fleet and army cooperate at Manila 446 
 
 Filipinos more capable of self-government than Cubans, according to Dewey 314 
 
 Filipino Commission in Washington 757 
 
 Filibusters accused of responsibility for Cuban insurrection 85 
 
 Famine in Santiago ; 622 
 
 Flagler, Gen. D. W., Chief of Ordnance, on magazine rifle 644 
 
 Fight at El Caney and Spanish version 649 
 
 Fight at San Juan and Spanish version 649 
 
 Fourth Corps 634 
 
 Fifth (Santiago) Corps 634 
 
 Free exercise of religion 678 
 
782 INDEX. 
 
 „.■ ' PAGE 
 
 Former colonies of Spain and their independence in relation to the treaty , 693 
 
 Great Britain's attitude in the Ten Years' War 74 
 
 Guerrilla tactics and length of Cuban War 89 
 
 General Grant was conservative •. 97 
 
 Grant's third term desire alleged to cause America's proposed intervention 102 
 
 Gomez, Gen. Maximo, his annihilation of Cuban industries 104 
 
 Gomez and the torch ; no 
 
 Gomez's two objects in firing fields 659 
 
 Gomez attacks American Government, press and President ." 174 
 
 Gomez's letter to Gen. Lee claiming insurgents kept no one from earning a living 229 
 
 Gomez's address to planters and cattle ranchers 367 
 
 Gridley, Captain, his report of the Olympia 290 
 
 General Greely on Signal Service 645 
 
 Guantanamo and splendid behavior of the Marines 628 
 
 Guantanamo Bay filled with mines 628 
 
 Grant's poor opinion of Cuban war-making 12S 
 
 Greene, Gen. Frank V., wins Merritt's highest praise 663 
 
 Greene's fear of anarchy in the Philippines 663 
 
 Garcia, Pantelon, Major-General 666 
 
 Garcia, Gen., his troops do good work in retarding Spaniards 662 
 
 "Honor" of Spain stood in the way of peace during Ten Years' War 66 
 
 Helping Spaniards meant death 169 
 
 Hogs easy to catch in Cuba ■. igo 
 
 Hyatt, Pulaski F., Consul at Santiago, writes regarding annexation 233 
 
 Hyatt, Consul, writes of distress due to Gomez's order forbidding grinding of sugar crop ... 237 
 
 House of Representatives resolves for immediate intervention 245 
 
 Hughes, Lieutenant, reports Battle of Manila 288 
 
 Howe, J. A., praises officers and men in naval engagement at Manila 298 
 
 Hodgson, Capt. Daniel B., highly commended by Dewey 313 
 
 Humanity in withholding, bombardment of Santiago 413 
 
 Hobson, Lieutenant, and men exchanged , 414 
 
 Humphrey, Colonel, Chief Quartermaster at Tampa, on the Santiago transports 398 
 
 History of the war in a few words 342 
 
 "History points to no greater achievement" 293 
 
 Intervention of European Powers 76 
 
 Investigation by Congressional Committees :-.. 150 
 
 Isle of Pines and General Miles' plan of capture 405 
 
 Intrenching tools should be regular part of equipment of troops 477 
 
 Intervention 203 
 
 Insurgents of Cuba and the Philippines in arms 658 
 
 Indemnity claims mutually relinquished by United States and Spain 676 
 
INDEX. 783 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Interview between President and Ambassador Cambon 708 
 
 Junta's divinely appointed ruling class igc 
 
 Joint work of Army and Navy at Manila 544 
 
 Joint resolution demanding that Spain relinquish its authority in Cuba 250 
 
 Jurisdiction of the courts , 67S 
 
 Koop, C. F., of Boston, describes brutality of Spanish officers : igi 
 
 Killed wounded Cubans ^ 1S8 
 
 Kindelberger, C. P. , assistant surgeon of the Olympia, volunteered, was attached, com- 
 mended 414 
 
 Key West and shortness of water 360 
 
 Key West Bureau of Misinformation 724 
 
 "Keep full of coal" 270 
 
 London Times claims United States departed from political traditions loi 
 
 London Times dares to give lessons in English to Hamilton Fish 128 
 
 Lawrence, Frederic W., on number of insurgent troops 150 
 
 List of ofBcers, sailors and marines killed in the Maine disaster 221 
 
 Logan, Gen., his division carries El Caney a^ 257 
 
 Linare's impression of Cervera's fleet 430 
 
 Linares telegraphs Blanco can't give up Cervera's help 429 
 
 Linares, General, defense of his line 649 
 
 Lesson for the country of the hills of Santiago 474 
 
 Lessons of the War 735 
 
 Las Guasimas and the fighting there as told by Gen. Breckenridge 479 
 
 Ludlow's Brigade at El Caney 480 
 
 Lawton highly commended by Breckenridge 486 
 
 Long's telegrams to naval officers scattered about the world 268 
 
 Long, Wm., Pay Clerk, performed active service, commended 26S 
 
 Long, Secretary, cables Dewey 279 
 
 Long notifies Dewey war has begun 283 
 
 Long telegraphs Oregon to get ready 332 
 
 Long to Schley 371 
 
 Long anxious to know if all Cervera's fleet are at Santiago 372 
 
 Lamberton, Commander Chief of Staff B. P., volunteered and praised by Dewey 288 
 
 Luneta battery, Manila, use Krupp guns 293 
 
 List of the sick and dead of the American fleet at Manila 328 
 
 Lee, Consul-General, telegraphed by Day 215 
 
 Lee's Consul -Generalship 194 
 
 Lee's eminent fitness igg 
 
 Lee's letter to Secretary Day regarding situation 232 
 
 Las Guasimos Spaniards make desperate resistance 263 
 
 Long's high attainments 544 
 
784 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Lopez, Miguel, Cervera's pilot, tells of departure from liarbor 626 
 
 Ludington, Quartermaster-General M. J., shows magnitude of problem supplying big 
 
 army 642 
 
 Limit to the honor of arms 657 
 
 Logic of the War with Spain 752 
 
 Maceo's death and the truth 107 
 
 Marti's death 109 
 
 Maceo breaks through trocha 136 
 
 Maceo's death according to Cubans and Spaniards 136 
 
 Money of Cuban treasury sent to New" York 190 
 
 Manner of forcing Spanish soldiers into the brush 188 
 
 Malignance on both sides in Cuba 209 
 
 Maine destruction .„oi , 210 
 
 Maine sent to Havana 216 
 
 Maine disaster, those killed 221 
 
 McGarr, Owen, Counsel at Cienfuegos, writes of cane grinding and attempts to fire fields 234 
 Message from the President transmitting correspondence between Spain and the United 
 
 States '. 246 
 
 Montijo, Admiral, reports his defeat 298 
 
 Manila falls 325 
 
 Manila fleet resumes regular target practice in captured bay 328 
 
 Mahan, Captain, taught English significance of "sea power" 331 
 
 McCormick, Capt. D. J., condemned by Medical Survey, relieved of command of Oregon 333 
 
 Miles, Major-General Nelson A., reports on work done by bureaus and officers 268 
 
 Miles and his ideal campaign 342 
 
 Miles believed in a big Cuban army 344 
 
 Miles' unfortunate reference to Bull Run 352 
 
 Miles plans to capture Santiago 375 
 
 Miles pulls steadily in the harness and is ready with suggestions 3S4 
 
 Miles telegraphs Spanish General to surrender 471 
 
 Miles appears at Santiago 523 
 
 Miles and Shaffer get together 523 
 
 Miles believed in Cuban Army which failed to materialize 523 
 
 Miles arrives at Shaffer's headquarters 524 
 
 Miles' coming impresses Spaniards 524 
 
 Miles' plans and movements in Porto Rico campaign , 551 
 
 Miles sails for Porto Rico 569 
 
 Miles desires cooperation of navy at San Juan, Porto Rico 570 
 
 Miles changes his plans at sea owing to leak of information 573 
 
 Miles' completeness of information 573 
 
 Miles' sonorous proclamation to Porto Ricans 574 
 
INDEX. 785 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Miles' idea of Cuban aid. ^59 
 
 Miley, Lieutenant, raises flag over Santiago; 532 
 
 Jlerritt's, General, fight after protocol was signed 704 
 
 Merritt upheld by American Commission yot 
 
 Merritt, country indebtefl to him 725 
 
 Merritt decides time to strike 560 
 
 Merritt and Aguinaldo 554 
 
 Merritt's proclamation to Filipinos ; 5(^ 
 
 Merrimac follows up Cervera 253 
 
 Merrimac did not obstruct channel 457 
 
 Merrimac, her sinking a mystery to Spaniards 623 
 
 Mauser rifle 644 
 
 Monitors slightingly spoken of by Puddeman 627 
 
 Marietta ordered to join Oregon 333 
 
 Marine Corps and its work O27 
 
 Mines that did not explode 628 
 
 Marksmanship of trained soldiers compared to that of the volunteers 479 
 
 Map of positions of vessels on blockade duty 518 
 
 Malay as a factor in the Philippines , 659 
 
 Malabani, Counsellor, described 665 
 
 Montenegro, Colonel 666 
 
 Manterola 421 
 
 Madrid presses Cervera to escape 443 
 
 Madrid's^ 'Great Joy," believing Cervera's escape 448 
 
 Madrid hears of Santiago's fall 457 
 
 Merchant vessels of both countries receive same treatment Cyg 
 
 Moore, John Bassett, Secretary to the Commission 685 
 
 Military Committees to Superintend the Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico 733 
 
 Minister to Spain Appointed 730 
 
 Newspaper correspondents at Havana igS 
 
 Naval Court of Inquiry reports on Maine disaster 217 
 
 No effort spared by the Government jgg 
 
 Naval officers, their vigilance and studious observation 554 
 
 Nunez, Lieutenant-Col. Frederico, hangs five Spanish captives 170 
 
 Nunez reproved by Maceo 171 
 
 Noriel, General 666 
 
 Origin of the war between the United States and Spain 53 
 
 Old, old storj- of Spain 98 
 
 Olney, Secretary 194 
 
 Oregon, object lesson of voyage ,29 
 
 Oregon, telegraphed to get ready 332 
 
786 INDEX. 
 
 BAGE 
 
 Oregon commanded by Capt C. E. Clark 333 
 
 Oregon leaves San Francisco 333 
 
 Oregon's coal contracted for at Callao 333 
 
 Oregon reaches Callao 334 
 
 Oregon warned of Spanish torpedo-boat Temerrario 334 
 
 Oregon meets a storm 335 
 
 Oregon reaches Port Tamar 335 
 
 Oregon learns war declared at Rio Janeiro 336 
 
 Oregon delayed by Marietta Nictheroy 336 
 
 Oregon at Rio Janeiro, Brazilians become vigilant 337 
 
 Oregon arrives at Jupiter Inlet, Fla 337 
 
 Oregon Congratulated by Secretary Long 337 
 
 One American killed in naval battle of Santiago 504 
 
 Overcrowding transport Mobile 583 
 
 Oregon's splendid performance at Santiago 594 
 
 Organization and numbers of United States army 630 
 
 Officers killed and wounded 636 
 
 Officers continued in service 730 
 
 One of the Ladrones ceded 669 
 
 Our Pacific Possessions 754 
 
 Prim, Marshal, foresaw end of Spain's colonial possessions 54 
 
 Prim's correspondence with American Secretary of State 55 
 
 Prim and Sickles confer 59 
 
 Pall Mall Gazette claims United States proposed intervention due to General Grant's 
 
 desire for third term , 102 
 
 Peace of Zanjon 133 
 
 Peace conference meets at Paris 680 
 
 President Cleveland and state papers of Secretary Olney 194 
 
 President Grant, Secretary Fish, Daniel Sickles and Caleb Gushing 194 
 
 President McKinley, Gen. Fitzhugh Lee 194 
 
 President's Message to the 45th Congress 200 
 
 President's message asking powers to terminate hostilities between Spain and Cuba 211 
 
 Pesiflent's proclamation regarding Maritime law 261 
 
 President's proclamation calling for volunteers 262 
 
 President's proclamation extending blockade 263 
 
 President asked information from Dewey as to the value of the Philippine Islands 324 
 
 President approves war resolution of Senate and House 246 
 
 President's proclamation blockading Cuban ports 254 
 
 President praises army for work of July ist 468 
 
 President thanks General Shaffer and his army 274 
 
 President offers brave adversary "generous terms of peace" 670 
 
INDEX. 787 
 
 PAGE 
 
 President's commissions to Peace Commissioners 680 
 
 President misrepresented by Spanish Commissioners 699 
 
 President's words with Ambassador Cambon 704 
 
 President's open-mindedness as to Philippines 704 
 
 President's part in preparation of Peace Protocol 706 
 
 President and cabinet meet French Ambassador 715 
 
 President was greatly wise 724 
 
 President instructs Shafter to accept nothing but unconditional surrender 338 
 
 President congratulates Sampson and navy at Santiago 494 
 
 President's proclamation of July 18 showing policy of Government toward Cuba 538 
 
 President sustains Dewey 549 
 
 President's Message on Dewey's battle 737 
 
 Preparations to strike Spaniards in East Indies 544 
 
 Policy of expansion 550 
 
 Philippines and their boasting 550 
 
 Porto Rico campaign „ 568 
 
 Porto Rico ceded 669 
 
 Porto Rico is ceded to the United States 672 
 
 proclamations of the President relating to war with Spain , 257 
 
 Plot to smash Dewey 434 
 
 Passport handed Spanish minister ; 252 
 
 Philippine insurgents demand joint occupation of Manila 326 
 
 Phantom fleets of Spain in Cuban waters 244 
 
 Palma; T. Estrada, asks for rights of belligerents 230 
 
 Palma on Gomez' orders relative to sugar crop 230 
 
 "People of the island of Cuba of right ought to be free and independent" 245 
 
 Pluddeman, Rear Admiral German Navy, comments on naval battle at Santiago 627 
 
 Powder and its supply 645 
 
 Philippine idea of "fixing" custom house officers 660 
 
 Philippines' hatred of monastic orders 664 
 
 Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States 672 
 
 Philippines and the Commissioners 703 
 
 Passionate dignity of Spaniards 701 
 
 Porter, Horace, his note to American Commissioners 722 
 
 Prisoners are released by United States and Spain ^ 676 
 
 Property rights 678 
 
 Proclamation of Peace by the President 729 
 
 Quartermaster-General's report on steamships that carried Shaffer's army of in- 
 vasion 394 
 
 Quartermaster's department at Tampa, its work 644 
 
 Reforms for Cuba proposed in 1869 5g 
 
788 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Risk of war to United States through bombardment of American sea-ports pointed out 
 
 by British critics 103 
 
 Recruits, Cuban, came in small crafts from Hayti 136 
 
 Rea, George Bronson, examined 160 
 
 Rea's difficulties with Gomez 172 
 
 Resources of Cubans ^ 177 
 
 Real Cubans would join United States 207 
 
 Report of Mr. Davis' committee on foreign relations 212 
 
 Recognition of Republic of Cuba 214 
 
 Rigney, American sugar planter, assaulted by Cubans and estate damaged 233 
 
 Recognition of independence of Republic of Cuba defeated 245 
 
 Regular officers needed among volunteers 387 
 
 Reports of Sampson and Schley and their contrast 508 
 
 Rough Riders sick 529 
 
 Reed, Inspector General, writes of sick soldiers 534 
 
 Remarkable letter from Spanish soldiers about to sail for Spain ....^ 584 
 
 Rightmire, W. J., Fleet Pay Clerk, performed active service, commended 292 
 
 Roosevelt, Col. Theodore, his famous dispatch to Dewey 270 
 
 Roosevelt, Theodore, his brilliant record as assistant Secretary 544 
 
 Read, Gen., describes raising of flag over Governor's palace 530 
 
 Reina Mercedes' creditable work 621 
 
 Regular regiments and their stations 633 
 
 Relations and responsibilities for insurgents 658 
 
 Ruiz, Colonel, wounded by Cubans 661 
 
 Rea! people of Cuba 724 
 
 Ratifications of the Treaty of Peace Exchanged at Washington 726 
 
 Report of Commission to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department 739 
 
 Report on Beef by Investigating Commission 745 
 
 Sampson says Schley had sufficient coal , 371 
 
 Sampson's army delaj'ed by phantom fleets 381 
 
 Sampson arrives at Daiquiri .' 383 
 
 Sampson partially explains refusal to force Santiago harbor 455 
 
 Sampson explains relations with Shaffer 457 
 
 Sampson and Shafter were to consult when Cervera's departure interrupted 461 
 
 Sampson's plans for Shafter to take forts at harbor entrance 462 
 
 Sampson announces destruction of Cervera's fleet 492 
 
 Sampson congratulated bj' President and Secretary of Navy 492 
 
 Sampson's absence on duty during the destruction of Cervera's fleet 494 
 
 Sampson's preparations in event of attempt to escape 498 
 
 Sampson gives reasons for ordering Indiana to turn back 510 
 
 Sampson failed to see an open gate to glory 520 
 
INDEX. 789 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sampson agreed with Miles rather than Shafter 524 
 
 Sampson did not sign articles of capitulation 535 
 
 Santiago a hard nut to crack 37S 
 
 Santiago's fall reported by Blanco 439 
 
 Santiago's situation after Spanish fleet was gone 454 
 
 Santiago Harbor open to Sampson for twenty-four hours 654 
 
 Santiago plan of pacifying American custom-house officers 660 
 
 Sandico, C, coadjutor of Ag^inaldo 666 
 
 Sanitary report of Santiago , 581 
 
 San Domingo torch in aid'of Cuban rebellion ; 229 
 
 San Juan de Porto Rico key to the situation 570 
 
 Scoundrelism in Cuba 207 
 
 Scott, Ensign W. P., commended by Dewey 2S8 
 
 Schley telegraphed to locate Cervera 371 
 
 Schley disobeys orders 370 
 
 Schley ordered to remain ofif Santiago 370 
 
 Schley reports to Long that enemy is at Santiago 371 
 
 Schley's departure cabled from Canada to Madrid and Cuba 431 
 
 Secretary of War's report 341 
 
 Seventy-first New York with men who had never fired a gun 365 
 
 Searchlight special feature of blockade 496 
 
 Service of Spanish fleet at Santiago 622 
 
 Second corps 634 
 
 Seventh corps - 634 
 
 Shafter directed to seize and hold Marie! 357 
 
 Shafter directed to assume troops at Tampa .' 360 
 
 Shafter recommends army formation by brigades 365 
 
 Shafter's executive statements and sagacity — "First battle will be the decisive one" 367 
 
 Shafter ordered to proceed to Santiago 374 
 
 Shafter in need of help 391 
 
 Shafter and his army thanked by the President 400 
 
 Shafter reports casualties 405 
 
 Shafter urges Sampson to force the entrance of the harbor" 409 
 
 Shafter suggests a retreat 409 
 
 Shafter's resignation suggested 410 
 
 Shafter improves in health 411 
 
 Shafter demands surrender of Santiago 412 
 
 Shafter insists navy enter harbor ; _^^55 
 
 Shafter explains relations with Sampson 457 
 
 Shafter announces to Sampson he will attack Santiago, and wishes fleet to aid attacking 
 
 Aquadores 458 
 
790 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Shafter's compliments to Sampson 458 
 
 Shafter advises Sampson of terriiic fighting and wants his aid 458 
 
 Shafter's idea Sampson must force harbor 462 
 
 Shafter's Fourth of July greeting to Sampson 462 
 
 Shafter notifies Washington of scarcity of medicines '. 467 
 
 Shafter notifies Government of the appearance of yellow fever 469 
 
 Spanish officers to surrender Santiago 471 
 
 Shafter's serious position before Santiago 472 
 
 Shafter reports on Cuban and Immune regiments , '. 533 
 
 Shafter displeased with Immunes 533 
 
 Shaftei- at Camp Wycoff 587 
 
 Shafter's change of plans in relation to his difiiculties with Sampson 629 
 
 Sherman to Woodford 247 
 
 Sherman to Woodford 249 
 
 Sherman to Spanish Minister •. -. 250 
 
 Sherman to Spanish Minister 251 
 
 Sherman to Woodford announcing Spanish Minister given passport 252 
 
 Schenck, Gen., and Lord Derby meet 74 
 
 Sharp strain of the struggle at Santiago 384 
 
 Shafter characterized by Breckenridge 486 
 
 Schley's report of victory 502 
 
 Shafter's explanation of his refusal to allow a naval officer's signature on capitulation 
 
 agreement 538 
 
 Scandal about beef 647 
 
 Sagasta appeals to Blanco to help towards peace 449 
 
 Shafter wants to know why navy cannot work under fire like army 458 
 
 Shafter cheered by his soldiers 533 
 
 Shells not sensitive enough 629 
 
 Ships chartered on Pacific coast 643 
 
 Shower of telegrams soliciting chance to serve in war 588 
 
 Sickles and Prim confer 59 
 
 Sickles, Daniel 194 
 
 Sicard, Rear Admiral, seeks for secrecy as to army movements 376 
 
 Siboney, the heavy engagement there 404 
 
 Signal service 645 
 
 Smith, D. A., Pay-Inspector, active service, commended 418 
 
 Spain would not confer until Ten-year-war-Cubans laid down arms 58 
 
 Spain sends more troops to Cuba 69 
 
 Spain explains that length of war is due to the guerilla tactics of Cubans 89 
 
 Spain's losses in Cuba 109 
 
 Spain's fear of a second Sari Domingo 109 
 
INDEX. 791 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Spain longed for foreign war during Carlist conquest 119 
 
 Spain's belief in her navy during Ten Years' War 119 
 
 Spain's finances in 1875 , 120 
 
 Spain confident of triumph with her naval force 404 
 
 Spain's character impaired by injustice to her colonies 452 
 
 Spain pleads for peace through France C68 
 
 Spain would spare Cuba 668 
 
 Spain gives up Cuba 669 
 
 Spain cedes Porto Rico ^ 669 
 
 Spain stripped of "last memory of a glorious past" 669 
 
 Spain is paid twenty million dollars 675 
 
 Spain cedes Porto Rico to the United States 672 
 
 Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over, and title to Cuba 672 
 
 Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago of the Philippine Islands 672 
 
 Spain's commercial rights in Philippine Islands 675 
 
 Spain releases prisoners 676 
 
 Spain wished United States to pay her debts 687 
 
 Spain's claim that United States erred in believing Cuban cause just 698 
 
 Spain's pitiful plea 700 
 
 Spain's Minister to the United States appointed 730 
 
 Spain too weak to maintain a Colonial System 752 
 
 Spaniards did not believe Americans warlike people 125 
 
 Spaniards relied upon European monarchies 126 
 
 Spaniards at Manila signaled approach of American fleet shortly after midnight 293 
 
 Spaniards surrender at Manila 211 
 
 Spaniards testify to valor of-American troops 650 
 
 Spanish volunteers hung by Cubans 168 
 
 Spanish manner of seeking hospitals to kill wounded 188 
 
 Spanish wish to investigate Maine wreck 217 
 
 Spanish claim electoral machinations make United States hostile 78 
 
 Spanish inability to conquer Cuba explained by Cushing 108 
 
 Spanish Minister to Sherman 251 
 
 Spanish squadron defeated at Manila, oflBcers and men 290 
 
 Spanish fleet and its mystery 353 
 
 Spanish phantom.fleet reported to General Miles 364 
 
 Spanish cruisers reputation for speed 368 
 
 Spanish war secrets revealed through secret cablegrams 417 
 
 Spanish general agreed to surrender 524 
 
 Spanish shaipshooters and their bravery 484 
 
 Spanish defenders of Santiago ._ 650 
 
 Span'.sh block houses. 485 
 
792 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Spanish story of El Caney and San Juan 649 
 
 Spanish trenches -. 485 
 
 Spanish casualties 653 
 
 Spanish claim President had not determined to take Philippines 712 
 
 Spanish Commission protests 697 
 
 Spanish plenipotentiaries; their names and titles 683 
 
 Spaniards attempted to divert object of commission 685 
 
 Spaniards objected to General Merritt 705 
 
 Spanish soldiers sent back to Spain through Treaty of Peace 675 
 
 Spaniards in>conquered territory may preserve allegiance to crown of Spain 677 
 
 Springfield arsenal 645 
 
 Straightforwardness of three administrations 194 
 
 Statistics of death-rate at Santa Clara 217 
 
 Starvation due to burning policy 238 
 
 Story of Santiago as cabled from Dedemonte to Admiral Ventura Mantelora 421 
 
 Strain on courtesies between Shatter and Sampson 535 
 
 Stars and Stripes popular in Porto Rico ■ 576 
 
 Staff organization 632 
 
 Strange story of the official secret cipher of Spain 417 
 
 Strength of regular and volunteer armies 631 
 
 Stars and Stripes over Santiago 530 
 
 Stickney, J. L., Correspondent New York Herald, rendered "valuable service to Dewey" 388 
 
 Sugar producers paid tribute to Cubans and Spaniards 181 
 
 Superior accuracy of fire won naval battle of Santiago 498 
 
 Smallness of American army at Santiago 489 
 
 San Juan according to General Breckenridge 4S3 
 
 Sampson refuses to enter Santiago harbor until mines are removed 458 
 
 Santiago and its supplies during siege 649 
 
 Status quo bothered Spaniards.' 685 
 
 Senate created trouble through slowness to ratify 724 
 
 Storer, Bellamy, appointed Minister to Spain 730 
 
 Torch, and its awful cost to Cuba , in 
 
 Ten Years' War in Cuba 112 
 
 Two sorts of Spaniards in Cuba 177 
 
 Treatment of alleged American citizens in Havana Consulate 198 
 
 "To intervene with force" 203 
 
 Transportation of Spanish or insurgent officers at regular rates according to rank 206 
 
 Telegrams that made necessary sending of Maine to Havana 216 
 
 Target practice at Manila 331 
 
 Transports, their cost of purchase, tonnage and carrying capacity of officers and men 397 
 
 Toral, Gen. Jose, sends foreigners out of the city 412 
 
INDEX. 793 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Telegraph operators in Cuba opposed to Spanish cause 418 
 
 Toral advises Blanco of capture of Cervera's squadron, and loss of two torpedo boats 445 
 
 Toral sends Blanco first news of Cervera's squadron's destruction 446 
 
 Toral ready to surrender if army allowed to go out of city with arms and baggage 470 
 
 Texas hit by big shells 509 
 
 Tejeiro, Lieutenant Jose MuUer y, tells of removal of mines from Santiago harbor 519 
 
 Taggart, Capt. E. F., tells of sustenance Spaniards had 533 
 
 Table giving assignment of secondary batteries 608 
 
 Tejeiro, Lieutenant Jose MuUer y, on Spanish artillery &18 
 
 Tejeiro on Spanish belief in their fleets C21 
 
 Tejeiro attempts to interview Hobson 623 
 
 Tejeiro tells of terrible Vesuvius 625 
 
 Tejeiro gives example of Cuban usefulness to United States 661 
 
 Table giving grand total of casualties 641 
 
 Table showing sending home of Spanish prisoners 641 
 
 Table showing peace and war iigureson army goods 643 
 
 Table showing strength of regular and volunteer armies 631 
 
 Table giving strength and distribution of troops 635 
 
 Transportation furnished soldiers 644 
 
 Telegrams connecting President and armies in the field 646 
 
 Trias Mariano described 665 
 
 Terms relating to Philippines indefinite, according to Spaniards O69 
 
 Text of the Treaty of Peace with Spain 671 
 
 Twenty-ninth Spanish regiment, its valor 653 
 
 Treaty of Peace 668 
 
 Treaty of Peace: Articles I, II, III 672 
 
 Treaty of Peace: Articles IV, V 675 
 
 Treaty of Peace: Articles VI, VII, VIII 676 
 
 Treaty of Peace : Article IX 677 
 
 Treaty of Peace: Articles X, XI, XII, XIII 678 
 
 Treaty of Peace: Articles XIV, XV, XVI, XVII .' " 679 
 
 United States to send back Spanish soldiers 675 
 
 United States gives Spain commercial rights in Philippine Islands 675 
 
 United States pays Spain twenty million dollars ..'. 675 
 
 United States releases prisoners 676 
 
 United States did not pay Great Britain to extinguish colonial debts 702 
 
 Valmaseda's brutal proclamation 71 
 
 Virginius case 117 
 
 Volunteers force out Campos 134 
 
 Volunteers praised by General Breckenridge 349 
 
 Vegetable food of Cubans 189 
 
794 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Views of minority asking immediate recognition of Republic of Cuba 214 
 
 Valparaiso 'authorities careful in their treatment of American ships 335 
 
 Vessels and the assignment of secondary batteries 608 
 
 Vesuvius dynamite shells terrified Spaniards 625 
 
 Valor of Amei'ican troops testified by Spaniards 650 
 
 Vara del Rey, General .651 
 
 Vara, Leandro y, described ; 665 
 
 Villa, de — Urrutia, Don Wencesnao Rkmirez 683 
 
 Volunteer System, The 736 
 
 Way the war business was handled 243 
 
 Woodford's reply to Day 249 
 
 Woodford to Sherman , announcing that he had asked for passport 253 
 
 Woodford to Sherman, giving" official note from Spanish Minister of State 253 
 
 Woodford to Sherman, text of official note from Spanish Minister of State, and Woodford's 
 instruction to United States consular representatives to turn over consulates to British 
 
 consuls 254 
 
 "Where every officer and man did his whole duty there is only room for general praise"... 292 
 
 Wakler, Capt. Asa, of the Concord, tells of the Manila fight 293 
 
 Wood, Commander E. P., of Petrel, reports 293 
 
 Wilder, Captain, of the Boston, makes a model report for brevity and prose 297 
 
 What it would have cost to have attacked Blanco at Havana 393 
 
 Wheeler, General, praises gallantry of the troops 389 
 
 Wheeler seriously ill 409 
 
 Wheeler to succeed in command if Shaffer continued sick 413 
 
 Wheeler shakes off his illness 414 
 
 Weyler, General, succeeds Campos 134 
 
 Weyler's reputation 134 
 
 Weyler's remorseless policy , 135 
 
 Weyler's attempt to pen Maceo 136 
 
 Winn, Dr. F. B., tells of insurgents and concentrados 184 
 
 Williams, Raymon O., Consul General at Havana 198 
 
 Wilson, Major-General, arrives in Porto Rico 574 
 
 Wounded 639 
 
 Yellow fever at Siboney 469 
 
 Yellow fever prevalent 581 
 
 Young commanders needed 478 
 
 Yara River, fight there 661