will bJ 1461 V27 if;fill1li llnfli .11 '1 ilL^ >iiiiiiiiin)iii;!ifiiiniiniiiii|illu iiii!!ii;ifi'ii!niiiiiiii CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM G.JJ.'^ubine DATE DUE MAY 17 1949 Ji i Cornell University Library BJ1461 .V27 Why of the will: the unity of the univer olln 3 1924 029 205 890 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029205890 THE WHY OF THE WILL THE UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE BY P. W. VAN PEYMA, M. D. BOSTON SHERMAN, FRENCH & COMPANY .1910 Copyright, 1910 Sherman, French & Company ? if 'r o /li^v/^^y ^yrv- " Man cannot, as a rational be- ing, do otherwise than endeavor by the investigation of the whole phenomena of the case, to verify, analyze, combine and co-ordinate his notions as to spiritual things so as to work them up into a com- prehensive, consistent, firmly es- tablished, adequately certified, nat- urally organized whole." REV. ROBERT FLINT, D. D. LL. D. Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh. PREFACE The views presented in the following pages have been held by the writer for many years. They constitute the result of long and earnest thought, in a sincere and reverent search for truth. Distinct and vivid is the recollection of the origin of the fundamental thought. Nearly forty years ago, one warm summer day, while resting in serene and meditative ease, thinking thoughts and weaving fancies with the fresh creativeness of youth, suddenly there came the mental picture, the clear and definite conception, of the necessarily determined nature of human thoughts and human actions. Fur- ther thought, and some acquaintance with the literature of the subject, has confirmed, as well as elaborated, the original conception. In questions, such as that of the "freedom of the will," so-caUed, the quiet, unbiased thought of a well trained and fairly intelligent mind, is of more value than is extensive reading. That a question so old, so absolutely funda- mental, and as is believed, essentially so clear, should continue to be a subject of conflicting views, may well appear strange. In the opinion of the writer, the reasons for this unsettled state are to be found in two general facts: the first, a mistaken interpretation of self-consciousness ; PREFACE and the second, certain general preconceptions of a dogmatic nature, varying somewhat ac- cording to the individual and the sect. Attempts by various writers to reconcile the testimony of reason and of real consciousness, with various dogmatic preconceptions, have resulted in arti- ficial obscurity and needless confusion. The reader's open-minded and deliberate con- sideration is invited to what constitutes or makes up full consciousness in the matter of freedom or determination. Particular attention is also called to the views regarding the relation of determinism to the subject of responsibility and fatalism, and to ethics and moral progress and development. That in all discussions we must ever recog- nize the limitations of finite understanding, needs no argument. It is clearly idle to attempt to go "beyond the beginning of knowledge." We must accept the "ultimate and inexplicable facts of human nature." We should, also, never forget that there is no proportion, no commen- suration between things finite and infinity. Infinity as seen in eternity, immensity and ab- solute energy is plainly beyond our finite con- ception. " Measure not with words Th' Immeasurable, " Nor sink the string of thought into the Fathom- less. ..." Who asks doth err, who answers, errs." PREFACE The question of the personality of the Deity is not entered into, and the terms Creator, eter- nal power, forces of nature, and primal cause are employed practically interchangeably. The discussion of many subjects more or less alhed to the main thought, such as individual- ism, phenomenalism, the nature of energy and matter, the essential nature of mind, and its re- lation to the brain, has been omitted as not di- rectly relevant and as tending to distract from the main line of argument. These and similar questions bear no direct and necessary relation to the main thought. Many of them, also, are believed to be absolutely beyond the mental grasp of finite beings. The attempts of certain transcendentalists to solve these and similar problems seem somewhat like the efforts of a microscopist, who, in his eagerness to see more and better, is not satisfied with that which a perfect focus gives him, but pushes the lens a little nearer, and gets the obscurity of disper- sive rays. The fact that finite knowledge is never ab- solute, but is necessarily limited to an under- standing of the relation of things, is by many not rarely ignored. The distinction between things, that in some of their extensions go be- yond our knowledge, and those that in their very essence are directly opposed to reason, is, also, not infrequently overlooked. PREFACE In the course of the argument many illus- trations have been taken from the inorganic world and from physiology, but it does not fol- low that the interpretations imply the "dread- ful dogma" of materialism. To the main ques- tion the concept of spiritualism or of material- ism is irrelevant, and the argument for deter- minism admits of either postulate. Whether the mind is a product of the brain, or the brain simply the organ of the mind, does not affect the question. And yet it will undoubtedly be found true, that persons who are somewhat familiar with the essential truths of physiology, especially with those relating to the nervous system, will more readily follow many of the arguments, as well as find them more convincing. The fact that belief in the independence, in the "freedom" of human activities, and of the human will, is held so generally by the masses, is, of course, not convincing as an argument. The history of the world is replete with in- stances of the abandonment of beliefs that were once generally accepted. Besides, in all ages many thoughtful minds have maintained, to the contrary, that our actions are determined. The difficulty of finding language to clearly and exactly express one's views, is recognized by all writers on philosophical subjects. To PREFACE find the exact words to express a definite thought, is not alone, frequently difficult, but, on account of the many-sided character and uses of words, they often express too much, or something different than is intended. The writer has, therefore, many times employed, perhaps tautologically, several words to express a single idea. Also, he has used the same words and phrases repeatedly, sacrificing rhetoric to clearness. While it is quite possible, that, occa- sionally, there may occur an expression that is open to the criticism of ambiguity, yet, it is be- lieved, that, taking the argument as a whole, the meaning is distinct and obvious. If sometimes the expressions may seem too positive and authoritative, there is certainly no intention to be dogmatic. If the reader will simply mentally add to any such expressions, "in the opinion of the writer," he will get the spirit intended, and will insert that which, too frequently repeated, would have interrupted and marred the text. As Sydney Smith was wont to say : "When I say that a thing is so, I mean that I think it is so." In describing certain physiological processes, the desire and intent to be very brief have some- times resulted in stating the fact incompletely as to detail. Since, however, more complete de- scription would not have changed the nature or PREFACE the force of the illustration, but would have lessened the directness of the argument, the technical omission subserves a useful purpose. The writer has written what he believes, what he has believed a long while, and what he be- lieves worth while. He hopes that the thoughts will be read in a spirit as earnest and sincere as that which has prompted their writ- ing. A subject so profoundly important merits serious, intelligent and unprejudiced consid- eration. THE WHY OF THE WILL THE UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE I Science is based upon the uniformity, the in- variability, of the processes, the manifestations of nature. There is law in the universe. Where like conditions exist, like results obtain. Ante- cedent and consequent are in everlasting rela- tion. It is the persistence of attributes, of in- herent qualities, that makes knowledge possible, and without it there could be no knowledge. As a general proposition this is so clearly recognized that it is accepted without argument. And yet, it appears that in one department of human inquiry, this otherwise universally ad- mitted fact is questioned. It is maintained by some, that in the operations of the human mind, including the will, this otherwise universal law finds an exception. It is undeniable that the more common con- ception of human actions is that they are either wholly, or, at least to some extent, independent of law, that they are erratic, capricious, "free," "spontaneous." On the other hand, there have always been thinkers, who, from time to time, have main- tained that the operations of the mind — delib- 1. 2 THE WHY OF THE WILL eration and volition included — are subject to the same laws of uniformity and necessity, as are all the other phenomena of nature; — ^have maintained, in fact, that psychology may be truly a science. Beside the persons entertaining these oppo- site views, there is a third group, composed of those who believe that the question of the "freedom of the will," so-called, is an insol- uble philosophical or psychological puzzle. It seems improbable that a question so basic to the conception of moral responsibility should be beyond the understanding of man. The present article is written in the belief, that it can be shown that the subject is essentially clear, and that the trouble in understanding arises from preconception and prejudice, from apprehension of supposed moral and religious consequences; and from a superficial, non-criti- cal and imperfect conception of consciousness. In the inorganic world confidence in the uni- formity of nature is unquestioned. It is seen when the chemist, relying upon the known prop- erties of certain chemicals, in bringing them to- gether confidently looks forward to certain defi- nite reactions. The conditions being given, he predicts the resulting reaction with positive as- surance. The conditions or circumstances being the same, the result is the same one time as an- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 3 other. And this result is recognized as involved in the inherent properties of the chemicals em- ployed. When, for example, nitric acid and a definite solution of bicarbonate of soda are mixed, the equation which expresses the inter- action and the result is definite and positive. So, also, the physicist, in heating a mass of iron a certain number of degrees, obtains a defi- nite amount of expansion. And if he continues the application of heat, he knows that at a cer- tain temperature the iron will melt. And this result is the same one day as another. If he reproduces the conditions he repeats the result. With the positiveness of mathematics he calcu- lates in advance the power of a steam or an elec- tric engine; and this positiveness depends upon the known and unchanging attributes of the agents employed. The astronomer, assured of "the fixed arith- mic of the universe," computes the orbits of the heavenly bodies. If a discrepancy is discov- ered between the computation and actual obser- vation, he reviews his figures. If his calcula- tion is found to be without error, he concludes the existence, and searches for the, as yet, un- discovered stellar body which will explain the deviation. He, also, never for a moment, doubts the immutability of the laws of nature. In the organic world, too, the botanist, the 4 THE WHY OF THE WH^L horticulturist, the physiologist entertain the same confidence in the uniformity of the pro- cesses of nature. "The sesamum was sesamum, the corn was corn." An acorn gives an oak, a rosebush yields roses. The seed, the soil, the season being good, the agriculturist confidently predicts the crop. If occasionally he fails in his expectations, he questions not the unvarying character of the laws of nature, but searches for some hitherto unrecognized factor. Here, again, is a recognition of inherent properties, of un- varying attributes. Here, also, like conditions bring like results. And so in the animal kingdom we find exem- plified the same principle of uniformity, of in- variability. In fact, in their lowest and sim- plest forms plants and animals are often dif- ficult to distinguish. The ordinary physical, chemical and metabolic characteristics and ac- tivities which serve to distinguish the higher animals and plants, here show innumerable ex- ceptions, transitions, and even complete rever- sals. Thus among fungi and in many sapro- phytic and parasitic forms of vegetable life, we have variations in metabolism which simulate those found in animals. The absence of chloro- phyl in certain plants produces similar varia- tion. On the other hand, in the direct imbibition of UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE * 5 nourishment, as seen in certain animal para- sites, we have a process usually considered char- acteristic of vegetable life. Similar connecting links are seen in insectivorous plants and in sponges and corals. It is claimed also that cel- lulose and chlorophyl are occasionally products of certain lower animals. In passing up the scale of both vegetable and animal life we observe increasing complexity of structure and function. But, through all this gradation, the physiological properties are es- sentially the same. Between the very lowest and the very highest, between the simplest and the most complex, there exists a gradational series, exempKfied at every step ; and the inher- ent properties of living tissue, of protoplasm, are found throughout the scale. If by a "cell" we understand, simply a small mass of protoplasm, we may take an Amoeba as an example of a unicellular organism. This little organism, with the very simplest structural constitution, possesses all the funda- mental physiological, vital properties found only in a more differentiated form in the very highest. This minute mass of protoplasm, while it has, in the ordinary sense, no muscles, no nerves, no stomach, yet, may be said to be all nerves, all muscle, all stomach, since throughout its structure it possesses the functions of all of 6 THE WHY OF THE Wn.L these. It has the contractility of muscle, the irritability of nerves and nerve centers, the powers of absorption and assimilation of food, of excretion and of reproduction; in fact, it has all the fundamental properties possessed by any living being. The highest animals may be considered as combinations or associated groups of such cells, no longer all alike, but differentiated in struc- ture and function ; the morphological differen- tiation of structure corresponding to, and being based on, the principle of the physiological dif- ferentiation of labor. The development here is similar to that occurring in Society, where from a primitive state, in which every man is his own carpenter, shoemaker and farmer, there gradu- ally develops a higher civilization, with increas- ing specialization and perfection of labor. We have, then, in the higher and more com- plex organisms, nerves, muscles, glands, organs of the special senses, organs of reproduction. But all these higher organisms, including, even, the most complex of all — ^the human being — are derived by a process of multiplication and dif- ferentiation from a single cell. A microscopic cell, the ova-sperm, derived by fusion from the two sexual cells, the ovum and the spermatozoon, is the morphological and po- tential beginning of man. UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 7 In this reproduction of the species, in this beginning as a single cell, the very highest and the very lowest forms of life are alike. In the lowest forms this power of reproduction is not specialized. All parts of the organism possess this power, and no special stimulus seems to be required to excite its activity. In the higher, this power of reproduction is specialized in cer- tain organs, and a stimulus derived from an- other individual of the oposite sex, is required. In the lower forms, the little mass simply throws off a portion of its body, which thereby becomes a separate individual. In the higher forms, the fusion of cells from opposite sexes is a prerequisite to reproduction. But, between these asexual and sexual forms of reproduction, we find a most interesting, important and in- structive series of gradations. Some organ- isms, having been asexual, become in later gen- erations sexual, and may then revert to the asexual type. Sometimes every alternate gen- eration is reversed. Then, again, we have or- ganisms where the bodies still remain attached, in a way that leaves the question open, whether they are really separate individuals, more or less attached to each other, or whether it is one in- dividual with numerous feeding, ocular, loco- motor and generative attachments. There is reason for believing that in Hydrozoa evolu- 8 THE WHY OF THE WILL tion has brought about a gradual change, and that "many buds which now remain attached, as organs of the parent, formerly became early disconnected as free individuals, in turn devel- oping the characteristics of adults." In every possible way nature emphasizes the transitional, the evolutionary relation of the higher to the lower forms. In its development the ova-sperm becomes by a process of cleavage or division, called multi- plication or segmentation, a group of cells. These cells, which in the course of a single week's development have come to number mil- lions, at first appear uniform, but rapidly be- come modified in structure and limited in func- tion. It is thus that homogeneity gives way to heterogeneity, and that we have built up the various tissues of the body, the connective tis- sues, the bone, muscles, nerves, glands, etc. The human embryo, in its development from the unicellular stage, passes through many stages exemplifying the fully developed growth of lower forms of life. Very early, there is the tubular or vermiform stage. Later occurs the development of gills or branchia, like those of a fish, and so on. In the early wormlike stage the human embryo is a simple tube composed of three concentric layers of cells, — an inner, mid- dle and outer. Of these layers the inner con- UNITY. OF THE UNIVERSE 9 stitutes the intestinal canal, — the digestive tract, — with its later diverticula, the lungs, the liver, etc. ; the middle develops into the frame- work of the body, — the bones, ligaments, mus- cles, etc. ; while it is from the outer layer, — ^the one in contact with the outside world, that are derived all the structures and organs which later enable us to recognize our environment, — that is to say, the nervous system and the organs of the special senses. In its fundamental steps, the development of the nervous system and the organs of the spe- cial senses is very simple. And it is as interest- ing, instructive and suggestive as it is simple. The outer layer of cells develops two parallel longitudinal ridges extending along the dorsal surface of the embryo. As a result of their continued growth, the intervening furrow deep- ens. This process continues until finally the opposite ridges fold over, meet and coalesce, converting the furrow into a complete canal, extending along what is now the vertebral re- gion. The enclosing wall thickens, the cephalic end enlarges to become the brain, the remain- der becomes the spinal cord. All the nerves of the body are branches of this original nerve mass. The organs of the special senses are likewise derived from the outer layer of cells, in part directly, in part 10 THE WHY OF THE WILL from the previously involuted cerebro-splnal tube. The sympathetic or organic nervous system, consisting of a series of nerve ganglions with connecting trunks, is also derived from and re- mains connected with, the cerebro-spinal system. It presides over organic life, and its activities are involuntary, and normally unconscious. In the Amoeba, the whole mass shows ner- vous irritability. In the tubular organism with its three coats or cell walls, only the outer is distinctly nervous. In the higher animals, we have the nervous irritability limited to the spe- cial nerve centers and branches, just referred to. But, whether the nervous tissue be generally diffused or localized, and whether the irritation and the appropriate response be direct and im- mediate, as in the lower forms, or indirect by means of the nerve trunks leading to and from the nerve centers, as in the higher organisms, the essential nature of the process is the same. And this is equally true whether the irritant is from without, or is one developed within the body. In these processes the nerves are the carriers of the impulse to and from the nerve centers. Somewhat like the wires of an electric battery, they carry the current back and forth. Those carrying the impulse to the centers are called sensory or afferent nerves, while those UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 11 transmitting the impulse from the centers to the periphery are called motor or efferent nerves. If one of the lower organisms, possessing no particular differentiation of structure, as, for example, an Amoeba, is mechanically or other- wise irritated, there results an explosion of stored-up, latent nervous energy. This energy set free, taking to a very large extent the form of motion, is directly proportioned in quantity, as well as determined in character, by the form and intensity of the irritant or stimulant, and the inherent nature and actual state of the or- ganism. The two factors of organism and en- vironment determine the exact and inevitable result. A similar definite physiological process oc- curs in the case of the higher organisms pos- sessing definite nervous and muscular systems. Here the stimulation or irritation experienced is transmitted by the aflFerent or sensory nerves to the nerve center, and there transformed, in some way, into a resulting motor impulse, which is sent along the efi'erent or motor nerves to the corresponding muscle or muscles. This action, in its simplest form, is called a purely reflex act. Its nature, also, depends upon the nature of the factors involved; in other words, upon the character of the stimu- 12 THE WHY OF THE Wn.L lant and the constitution of the organism. The interaction of these two factors determines the result. These being given, the result is de- termined. Even in the case of vertebrata, possessing a cerebro-spinal nervous system, many of the re- flex activities are limited to the spinal cord and its appropriate nerves, and do not involve the brain. The well known physiological experi- ments with the headless frog illustrate this fact. It is generally admitted that in these spinal re- flex acts, there is no option or choice of action. The result here, also, is determined by the na- ture of the factors involved. In fact, a noted physiologist has aptly expressed this fact, in saying that every part of the central nervous ganglion responds as definitely as a key struck brings forth its appropriate sound. In all the instances reviewed the result is defi- nite and positive ; and with the conditions given, could not be otherwise. The only way to obtain a diiFerent result would be to change one or both of the factors involved. To generalize the foregoing conclusion, we may say, that a nerve cell whose properties are represented by A, in circumstances represented by B, receiving an impulse C, will give the effer- ent result D. The properties of any substance remaining constant, the variety of changes UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 13 which it undergoes will depend on variations in its environment, — on the impulses which the substance receives. The environment remaining constant, any diversity of change or interac- tion will depend on variation in the substance. Both remaining constant, the changes or activi- ties are necessarily constant. Similar sub- stances, in the same or similar conditions, must act alike. The substance has no choice or op- tion. Its action or behavior is determined by the reaction between its inherent properties and the impulses it receives from its environment. It is sometimes maintained that all forms of nervous activity involve consciousness. In the purely reflex acts, however, consciousness, if present, is of a vague and indefinite kind; and it is certain that in all these acts there is no conscious volition and no deliberation. There remain for consideration the more com- plex reflex nervous activities, involving in their circuit the higher nerve centers of the brain. Here consciousness is definite, and a certain phase of it now receives the name voli- tion or "will." To a certain extent this cerebral process is common to all the higher animals. No one disputes that the higher animals pos- sess consciousness, nor that they manifest voli- tion. However, it is in the human being that this 14 THE WHY OF THE WILL process attains its highest form. The cerebral activities usually comprised in this process, are generally designated as Sensation, Perception and Ideation. In other words, the stimulus transmitted to the brain results in conscious- ness, a recognition of the nature of the stimu- lus, and a train of thought having reference to the relation existing between the stimulus, or its source, and the individual. When this occurs, and when, after some thought or deliberation, the nature of the impulse received and its rela- tion to the person have been given considera- tion, and when, finally, an appropriate impulse is returned by means of the efferent nerves, the act is then said to be conscious, intelligent, vol- untary, purposive. To what degree all this is true of animals in general, need not enter into the discussion. It is certainly true of human beings. Neither is there need, here, to enter into a re- view of the anatomy or histology of the brain; nor is it important to discover which part or convolution of the brain is involved. It is not the exact locality, but the real nature of the process which is of interest in this connection. For this is the process, which by many is claimed to be not subject to the nature of the factors involved, not determined, at least not wholly, by the quality and intensity of the im- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE M6 pulse or stimulus and the character and state of the nerve cells. It is maintained, that, in some way, this conscious, intelligent, volitional act is undetermined, is independent, is "free." Also, that no matter what the train of thought, as excited by the sensory impulse, may be, a certain something, called the "Will," may and frequently does, in spite of all reasoning decide arbitrarily, without any dependence upon or reference to the circumstances of the case ; that, in other words, the constitution of the organ- ism or individual and the nature of the stimu- lant, impulse or argument, are not factors which control and determine the result. And in attempts to explain this erratic, unrelated, un- determined action, the "Will," the "Soul," "Spirit," "Personality," are variously invoked. And it is further maintained, that, no matter what arguments, more or less specious, or even logical and convincing, may be adduced, ap- pearing to prove the proposition of determin- ism, one is still conscious, to the contrary, that he can do as he will, — that he is "free." Right here, it is of primary importance to learn, so far as we may, what actually takes place in an act involving consciousness, delib- eration and volition. As has been stated, there is a sense in which it may be said that every impulse received by 16 THE WHY OF THE WILL a living being excites a form of consciousness. But here there is reference to a clearer and more definite consciousness, — namely, that which expresses the impressions received by the brain, and there exciting certain activities. Certain impressions are received, resulting, it may be, in the recognition of a state of one's body, or of environment, and having a bearing on one's well-being. A train of thought is started, the subject matter is considered. After due deliberation a decision as to the appropriate efferent impulse is arrived at, and a definite ac- tion is taken. Conceive of any action, deliberative and vol- untary in its nature; one in which the "Will" is recognized as active. A choice of action is presented to the mind; we consider, we weigh the various considerations or arguments, we de- termine which, to our mind, are the weightier, which overbalance or preponderate, and we make our decision. While the process of delib- eration is in progress, additional arguments continue to occur. Some tend to influence in one direction ; others in other directions. Dur- ing this time we feel ourselves unsettled, unde- termined, the question of ultimate decision and action is in abeyance. Finally, however, no additional arguments or considerations are received. We have deliber- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 17 ated so far as our individual ability and the cir- cumstances of our environment permit, and the time for decision has come. To determine, amid the many mutually reinforcing and mutually opposing influences and arguments, the final balance or preponderance, involves a process similar to that employed in the simplification of an algebraic equation, with the resulting de- termination of the value of X. Of course, all arguments or influences are not of equal importance or weight, and it may hap- pen that one overpowering argument, recog- nized as conclusive, determines the decision at once. It may, also, occasionally occur that one is temporarily quite evenly balanced, and un- able, for the time being, to decide. Fortu- nately, in important matters, this state of inde- cision rarely continues for any considerable period. We are not constituted like the legend- ary ass, who being of absolutely symmetrical construction, and placed between two equidis- tant, and exactly similar bales of hay, starved to death because he could not decide from which bale to bite. In considering the interacting circumstances and influences of environment and of individu- ality, it is self-evident that it must be the pre- ponderance which determines the decision and the action. To maintain either of the two other 18 THE WHY OF THE WILL possible conceptions : that it is an exact balance or equipoise, or that it is the weaker or lesser of the influences which controls, is, of course, un- thinkable, absurd, a contradiction of language and of thought. We take note of the preponderance of argu- ment in any particular case, and we decide in accordance with this preponderance. Did we decide differently, it would be similarly and equally for a sufficient and predominating rea- son ; even were it only to seem to ignore all ordi- nary reasons, and to appear to act free. This is, again, a definite reason, and one not infre- quently influential and controlling. The influences which result in the final deci- sion need not be, and frequently are not, solely arguments appealing purely to the mind. The physical state of the individual, with its appe- tites, passions, inclinations and disinclinations, states of vigor, lassitude, health and sickness; with its ardor of youth and its conservatism and prudence of maturer years, has also its power- ful influence, sometimes overruling, sometimes being overruled by, the more purely mental considerations. But whether the influences be corporal or mental, or both combined, it is nec- essarily the preponderance which controls and determines. An argument may be just as con- trolling as any physical influence or interaction ; UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 19 as controlling, even, as compelling physical pressure or impulse. Another essential fact to be observed, is that all the factors of the problem, — namely, the in- dividual and the environing circumstances or conditions, — owe their particular existence, at any given moment, simply and wholly to the natural course or sequence of events. Their ex- istence and their particular nature at any given time are in no sense accidental or fortuitous, but are, in reality, simply the expressions or results of a natural series of antecedent and conse- quent, of cause and effect. The influences which affect and control us, in- cluding all arguments appealing to our minds, are based upon, and owe their existence to, these two facts of individuality and environment. All reasoning is founded upon and determined by them. The two essential points in the proposi- tion of determinism are: first, that our thought and actions are determined by the circumstances of the moment, individual and environing; and, secondly, that these circumstances or conditions are but phenomena expressing the natural course of events ; are but links in the endless chain of antecedent and consequent. But, as has been stated, it is maintained by some that all arguments and influences, as well as all physical conditions, can be and frequently 20 THE WHY OF THE WH^L are ignored and set aside, and that in these cases, the "Will" determines in some manner ab- solutely independent. We would thus have an act unrelated as to antecedent, an act absolute, and that by a finite creature. As has been already observed, the usual argu- ment offered in support of this view consists in an appeal to self -consciousness. It is contended, that, no matter how clear or how convincing the argument for determinism may be made to ap- pear, still we are conscious of a power to decide "as we will," ignoring or overriding all argu- ments, all ordinarily influencing considerations. There are still others, who, while recognizing the powerful control of circumstances and con- ditions, individual and environing, yet maintain, not that the "Will" is wholly "free," but stiU that it is so in part. And this amounts to the same thing, for it is here, really, only a ques- tion of determinism or independence. The ar- gument for determinism is either true or false. If it is not wholly true, then it is, to some ex- tent, false. Such an attempt at compromise settles nothing. It rests only with the oppon- ents of determinism to show a single instance where an intelligent, volitional act is, in never so small a part, independent of and undetermined by the circumstances involved, and the case is theirs. As has been pointed out, while we are delib- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 2l crating, while arguments or considerations of any kind are still coming to the mind, or being evolved by it, and while these continue to mod- ify our views, we feel ourselves in a state of abeyance and indecision, or, as some would ex- press it, "free." Of this period of indecision we are conscious, and it would seem, that by many persons this temporary, evanescent first stage is mistaken for, and accepted as, the com- plete mental process. And the conclusion is that this settles the question in favor of the "freedom of the will." But it will be noticed, that up to this time there has been no decision; no exercise of the "Will." And if we examine and study this mental process more carefully, more completely, it becomes clearly and convincingly evident that self-consciousness in this matter goes farther, and that, instead of stopping at the first step, it rounds out and concludes the process. While it is true, that during the time that ad- ditional arguments and considerations continue to present themselves, we feel ourselves unde- cided, undetermined, yet, it is equally true, that when this flow of influences, individual and en- vironing, ceases, we then take cognizance of the state of our mental balance, recognize the pre- ponderance, and decide and act in accordance. When at the conclusion of a definite deliber- 22 THE WHY OF THE Wn.L ation, a preponderance is recognized, when it is found that the mental scale or balance is turned in one or other direction, we are conscious of this our mental state; in other words, we know our decision. The "Will" is simply this con- sciousness, this recognition of preponderance, this conscious decision. The "Will" is no entity. It is simply the mental state, in which we recognize a decision, a preponderance of influences ; influences as they affect our individuality; and a preponder- ance that expresses a definite state of the indi- vidual mind at this particular moment, a men- tal state, in which we recognize the result of the interaction of our individuality and our envi- ronment ; the necessary inevitable interaction of inherent properties. This expresses the substance of our con- sciousness in a deliberative, voluntary act. To be convinced of the truth of this statement, one's examination of self-consciousness need only be full, fearless, and absolutely without bias or preconception. As has already been observed, even if a per- verse desire to appear to act contrary to the otherwise sensible, reasonable balance of influ- ences, is the controlling motive, this means only, that the desire to appear "free," to appear un- predictable is the overwhelming and deciding consideration. UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 23 So, also, when one says, "I wanted to do one thing and did another," this simply means that there were considerations presented in favor of both sides of the question; that the person wanted, more or less, to do one as well as the other, — but, of course, it does not show, that it was the weaker influence or argument, or the total absence of arguments that decided. There was certainly a controlling reason for making the decision which was made, although there were, also, considerations which made the per- son feel that he would like to do something else. But, of course, one cannot do something and not do it at the same time. And the prepon- derance decides which it shall be. Again, it is often asserted that we are con- scious of doing as "we will." Probably no one disputes this. But it is equally true, that upon careful examination, we find that our willing is not alone always in accord with the facts of our individuality and our environment, but that it is naturally and necessarily so, and is, in reality, only a conscious expression of these facts. We will as we do, because we see and judge as we do. We are never conscious of deciding contrary to the real preponderance of influences. No more are we ever conscious of deciding absolutely without a reason. A certain writer has said, that we believe our- 24 THE WHY OF THE WH^L selves free because we are conscious of our ac- tions but not of their causes. Another has stated this truth paradoxically by saying, that we are conscious of being free in our willing, only when we are ignorant of the influences that control us. The inherent attractions of chemical elements are no more controlling in determining their interactions, than are the equally inherent na- tures or affinities of living organisms. Even, though, in the higher species the interaction may be definitely ccmscious, and, though, in these we may name the inherent attraction or afiinity "Will," this does not alter the essential nature of the interaction. And, conceiving chemical elements as having consciousness, we might with complete analogy speak of their in- teraction as expressing their will. And so, also, we might say of a physical scale or balance, that it wills to turn toward the side holding five pounds as against the side with only four pounds. The fact of consciousness or uncon- sciousness does not affect the certainty, the in- evitableness of the result. The controlling de- termining factor, in each case, is the preponder- ance of influences. When the greater attraction or the preponderance of influences is consciously recognizable, we call the interaction or decision a voluntary decision, — a volitional act. But, UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 25 of course, a volition determined by influences or bound by reason, appetite or other circum- stance is not independent, is not "free." Physical properties, chemical affinities, or- ganic attributes or natures, the behaviour and reactions of inorganic matter, nervous irrita- bility, unconscious reflex responses and involun- tary actions, and, finally, conscious, voluntary activities are all expressions of something in- herent, immanent; something constant and de- termined. Once more, then : the two determining factors are the individual and his environment. Their interaction gives the result. These given, the result is determined, is constant, invariable; is, even, sometimes predictable; and to an omni- scient being would always be predictable. To a finite being the result is frequently, perhaps generally, unpredictable, but this is only be- cause of the great number and variety of influ- ences involved; — ^because of the complexity of the problem. As an illustration: Conceive a man whose avarice is so great as to overbalance and con- trol all other considerations. Such a man, when considering investments, will weigh the proba- bilities of greatest gain, and his decision wiU inevitably be in the line that his judgment de- cides his interests to lie. Here, even a finite 26 THE WHY OF THE WILL mind might foresee the result. In ordinary in- dividuals one consideration scarcely ever pre- dominates to this extent, but here the control- ling influences are but multiplied, the problem is more complex, the resultant more diiBcult to foresee, but no essentially different element en- ters into the case. It is only by varying or changing one or both of the factors that the result can be changed. Alexander Bain makes clear the truth of this proposition in his well known illustration of the schoolboy. He says: " The school boy whose animal spirits carry him to a breach of decorum, or whose anger has made him do violence upon a schoolfellow, will sometimes defend himself by saying that he was carried away and could not restrain himself. In other words, he makes out a case closely allied to physical compulsion. He is sometimes answered, by saying that he could have restrained himself, if he had chosen, willed, or sufficiently wished to do so. Such an answer is really a puzzle or para- dox, and must mean something very diflferent from what is apparently expressed. The fact is that the offender was in a state of mind, such that his conduct followed according to the uniformity of his being, and if the same antecedents were ex- actly repeated, the same consequences would be exactly reproduced. In that view, therefore, the foregoing answer is irrelevant, not to say non- sensical. The proper form and the practical UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE * 27 meaning to be conveyed^ is this: It is true that as your feelings then stood your conduct resulted as it did, but I am now to deal with you in such a way, that, when the situation recurs, new feelings and motives will be present, sufficient, I hope, to issue differently. I now punish you or threaten you, or admonish you, in order that an antecedent motive may enter into your mind as a counterac- tive to your animal spirits, or temper, on another occasion, seeing, that, acting as you did, you were plainly in need of such a motive." In the chapter on "Liberty and Necessity," the following occurs : " When a person purchases an article out of several submitted to view, the recommendations of that one are said to be greater than of the rest, and nothing more needs really to be said in de- scribing the transaction. It may happen that for a moment the opposing attractions are exactly balanced and decision suspended thereby. The equipoise may even continue for a length of time, but when the decision is actually come to, the fact and the meaning are, that some consideration has risen to the mind giving a superior energy of mo- tive to the side that has preponderated." The illustration just given answers also the common assertion, "I could have done differ- ently than I did." The answer is simply : "Yes, you could, and you would have done differently, if the circumstances of your individuality or of 28 THE WHY OF THE WHliL environment, or of both had been different. But it is also clear, that one cannot, at the same mo- ment, prefer a certain article and not prefer it, or, in other words, prefer one article and pre- fer another. To take another example: A traveller comes to a fork of the road. He can take either the road to the left or the one to the right. He hesitates, he deliberates. Finally, he decides upon and takes the road to the left. If he now says, "I could have taken the other road," what is the exact truth regarding this statement? The facts are that the choice of roads pre- sents itself to the mind of the traveller; both roads are open; both present certain attrac- tions. But, since he cannot take both at the same time, it is a self-evident fact that if he is to go ahead, he is, in the very nature of things, obliged to decide which road it shall be. He takes the one which the balance of arguments causes him to prefer; and it is inconceivable, that, with the balance as it is, he should prefer or choose the other. To another person the road to the right might appear more attractive; and even the traveller who has chosen the road to the left might, at some other time prefer the one to the right ; but in the latter case either the in- dividual or the road or both would have to be different than they are at the moment when he UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 29 prefers the one to the left. It is to be further observed that the actual choice or decision is only the expression of the natural, essential in- teraction of the individual and his environment. In this connection the question may also arise, as to what is the difference between an in- dividual who is said to have a strong will and one whose will is regarded as weak. The differ- ence is one of individual disposition, and is somewhat similar to the difference between a feather and a stone. The one is moved by every current and counter-current, while the other is much less easily moved, but being moved, its momentum is also less easily over- come. Strength of will, so-called, may be an admirable quality, as seen, for example, in de- votion to high ideals, but it is also not infre- quently an indication of, and a synonym for, conceit, selfishness and arrogance. To deny that our actions are determined by the interaction of our individuality and our en- vironment, and to maintain, to the contrary, that they are independent or "free," even to the slightest degree, is to assert, that, to that ex- tent, at least, we act without an adequate cause or reason, or, what amounts to the same, con- trary to the preponderance of the sum total of the influences. It is to contend that to some ex- tent, at least, even if not wholly or always, our 30 THE WHY OF THE WH^L acts may be unrelated as to antecedent, may be absolute. To finite creatures all knowledge is but a recognition and an understanding of relations. Absolute knowledge is not given to us, is not even conceivable. An absolute act or fact, be it the "Will" or anything else, is to finite minds incomprehensible. The human mind, especially if logical and scientific, is not satisfied with a simple recognition of fact. It is eager to know the relation of this fact to other facts. The de- sire and effort to know the reason of things are universal and unquenchable. Man is not satis- fied until he has found an answer to the ever- recurring "Why.!"' And the present discussion as to "the Why of the Will" is but a renewed testimony to the truth of this general affirma- tion. In all discussions it is absolutely essential to recognize our finiteness. Infinity, be it God, eternity or space is not given to mortal man to conceive. The proposition of the absolutely un- related, undetermined human will is not alone opposed to but is absolutely beyond the possi- bility of human conception. It is, of course, impossible to think of any act as without effect. It is equally impossible to think of any act as without antecedent ; that is, to think of it as ab- solutely unrelated to all and everything preced- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE ' 31 ing it. Of a state of mind, of the will, for ex- ample, it would be saying that it came of itself out of nothing. To say that we will simply because we wiU is to assert that our willing is pure happening, pure chance, and, though there may be found persons who maintain such a belief, still, even these wiU scarcely deny, that every volition or act of willing implies, and must necessarily have, a purpose. It is clear, also, that there can be no purpose without something to which this purpose refers; and, further, that the concep- tion of this object must precede or antedate the formation of the purpose. Every volition or act of willing involves an antecedent conception. The volition is based upon, and extended from, this antecedent conception by a process of rea- soning; and the course of reasoning is deter- mined by the inherent nature of the circum- stances, subjective and environing. The human "Will" is no exception to the uni- formity of nature, nor to the interdependence of its phenomena. Human acts simply fall in with the natural sequence of events. In things ma- terial the sway of natural law is universally rec- ognized. " The unseen things are more^ men's hearts and minds. The thoughts of peoples and their ways and wills. Those, too, the great Law binds." 32 THE WHY OF THE WILL Man is a scale or balance, conscious and in- telligent, conscious of recognizing the prepon- derance and conscious of being determined by, and of deciding according to, this preponder- ance. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the word "deliberate" is derived from the latin "libra" a balance. To deliberate is to weigh, to ponder in the balance of the mind. The acts which involve definite consciousness, intelligence and volition appear to be as much determined or necessitated by the nature of the factors of individuality and environment, as are those of the lowest organisms. And, Ukewise, in the higher animals we find that, in this re- spect, also, the purely reflex activities of the spinal cord and the dehberative, volitional ac- tivities are alike. In the latter we are conscious of the interaction involved, and feel the pre- ponderance which determines the result. In the former we are very generally unconscious of the process. In the one case the inherent quaU- ties of the factors necessitate the result. In the other, also, this is true, only here consciousness is added, the mind recognizes the interaction of influences and the final preponderance. Our mental state when recognizing this preponder- ance we call "the Will." A connecting Hnk between these two varieties of nervous activity is found in the class some- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE ' 33 times called automatic, meaning thereby those purposive nervous activites, which at first con- scious, become gradually, as the result of fre- quent repetition, practically unconscious or sub- conscious. Learning to walk; learning to play a musical instrument ; in fact, learning to do al- most anything well, will serve as illustrations. Here, also, belong the thousand and one little daily activities, neither, on the one hand, purely reflex, nor, on the other, involving any definite deliberation. It is especially in this class of ac- tivities that the causes of action are generally unrecognized. But, while we may, in these cases, be ordinarily quite unconscious of the causative influences involved, yet a thoughtful analysis, based on a knowledge of physiological and psychological principles, discloses their ex- istence. It is, especially, to this class of com- mon, everyday activities that the remark ap- plies, that "we believe ourselves free only be- cause we are conscious of our actions and not of their causes." But this is true only in the absence of intelli- gent analysis. The greater the intelligence, and the more careful the examination, the fuller will be the recognition. According to the preceding argument, also, there is no escape in the common assertion that we can change the factors of individuality and 34 THE WHY OF THE WH.L environment, and thus control the result. It is clear, that any such act would be of the same nature, and as much determined as any other. The matter would still be one of antecedent and consequent, would still be a case of natural and necessary sequence. When it is said of a per- son that "he has risen above his environment," it means simply that he has experienced a change of relation, the result of an interaction which has had an upward tendency. When the upward movement has been rapid, and when the causes are not very apparent, it is not, perhaps, surprising that it should, at times, be looked at as something spontaneous, something inde- pendent of the interplay of individuality and environment. That one should "rise above his environment" is no more strange than that an- other should "sink below it." Strictly speaking, however, both statements are incorrect as to facts. The real fact is that both our individuality and environment are con- stantly changing, and with them, the relation of one to the other; and sometimes the interac- tion tends in one direction, sometimes in an- other. There remains another argument which has a direct and important bearing on the question under discussion. Probably no one, whatever his views on other questions may be, will care to UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE - 35 maintain that at the time of his conception, or even of his birth into separate existence his "free will" was active in choosing or determin- ing either his environment or his individuality. One may occasionally hear a fond parent, in acknowledging the good qualities of his chil- dren, humorously explain that they were care- ful in the choice of their parents. But, in gen- eral, parents will scarcely be inclined to assume such precocity on the part of their children. Our individuality, — our characteristics and our potentiality, — and our environment, have been, in some way, determined for us at the time that we begin our earthly career. At birth every child possesses certain char- acteristics, many, of course, wholly latent. His environment, also, is unique and particular to him. At any later time, the individual is but the child at birth plus his development. This development consists of his reactions with his environment. The earlier activities of an infant, clearly lacking in full consciousness and in delibera- tion, are designated as instinctive, automatic, reflex, involuntary. Later they gradually be- come more conscious, more deliberative, more clearly volitional, more purposive. But neither physiology nor psychology furnishes us with any evidence that there is here shown any es- S6 THE WHY OF THE WILL sential change of nature. The change is simply one of gradual development. The earlier activ- ities are clearly the expression of the interac- tion of the organism and its environment. The later activities, not less clearly dependent, dif- fer chiefly in the gradual increase of influences appealing to, and acting through, the mind. The earlier involuntary differ from the later voluntary in that, in the latter, the determinism is conscious. That to this conscious determin- ism we give the name of "will," does not change the nature, nor the inevitable character of the act. In the young infant the activities are pre- dominantly vegetative or organic, and corre- sponding to this, the cerebro-spinal activities seem to have much in common with those of the organic or sympathetic nervous system. In the natural sequence of events, both the individual and his environment are constantly changing. And this is true, not alone of liv- ing organisms, but, also, of the inorganic world, — of all nature. Disintegration and re- integration are constantly going on, — change everywhere and always. In all that has been said of the definite interaction of these two fac- tors, it is, of course, understood that this is true of them at any given moment of their existence. Just before, and just after, a moment earlier, UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 37 or a moment later, the circumstances of indi- viduality and of environment are different ; al- though just as controlling, just as determined. And each moment is connected with that pre- ceding and that following as links in a natural chain of antecedent and consequent, leading back not alone to infancy, but back to ancestral life ; and not alone to the third and fourth gen- erations, but back beyond the stretch of finite imagination. So, also, a person looking back upon a life nearing its natural close, may rec- ognize in the retrospect, the logical unfolding of the early tendencies of individuality and envi- ronment; may recognize how true is the saying that "the child is the father of the man." Observing the uniformity, the immutability of the processes of nature, we recognize that each fact has its antecedent, and this again its own, and so on, until in retracing the processes we lose ourselves, after fewer or more steps, in the single universal cause. We lose ourselves in infinity, we recognize the manifestations, the workings of the eternal power, — in ourselves as well as in nature generally. And we know from history, human, geological and astronomical, that thus has nature manifested herself since time has recorded. The universal energy works through us. We really originate nothing, we initiate nothing. 38 THE WHY OF THE WILL We originate no force or energy, any more in the world of mind and will, than in the world material. Since we have learned the fact of the correlation and the conservation of energy, we have ceased to waste our time and strength on the building of material "perpetual motions"; and, in due time, our fancy or imagination will also cease to occupy itself with the construction of the immaterial variety, as exemplified in the so-called "dominant Will." We are agents in the hands of the Creator; instruments of the universal energy. Conscious instruments, intelligent agents, but controlled. Controlled both through the mind and the body. Foreordained, predestined in our every act, physical, chemical, vital, reflex, automatic, instinctive, intuitive, deliberative, volitional, purposive. The will of the Almighty is our will. We originate nothing, and when by our actions we modify anything, it is as links in the endless chain of nature's sequences. We are parts, or better said, phases of the eternal en- ergy. And, as has been observed before, the interacting circumstances of individuality and environment which determine our actions, owe their existence, at any given moment, simply and wholly, to the natural course or sequence of events. Now, while all this, in so far as it recognizes UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE . 39 infinity, is beyond our complete mental grasp, yet it is not opposed to finite reason. It trans- cends our limited intelligence in its depth and in its infinite relation. The "primal cause" we do not and cannot fully understand ; and in our attempts to fathom it we lose ourselves, as al- ready intimated, in the depths of the Unknow- able. "Veil after veil will lift, but there must be veil upon veil behind." But to the existence of the universal enduring energy, all our con- sciousness testifies. While many of the arguments for determin- ism are drawn from facts in the material world, and especially from those of physiology, it does not follow that the argument is, therefore, purely and whoUy materialistic. That based upon self-consciousness certainly is not. The essential nature of human volition does not de- pend upon the question whether the mind is a product of the brain, a secretion as some have held, or whether the brain is simply an organ or instrument made use of by the mind, the "soul," the "spirit," the "personality." Even the ac- ceptance of the latter view, does not settle the question of the nature of human actions — of their dependence or their independence. The question still remains open, and simply becomes one of the nature of this assumed presiding "spirit," "soul" or "personality." And the real 40 THE WHY OF THE WILL question is whether this "spirit" is something apart from, distinct and independent of the uni- versal, eternal Energy, Soul, Spirit or "Per- son." Is there unity, duality or multiplicity in the universe? Is there one force, or are there two or many? In addition to the all-pervading, en- during, unchanging energy, is there another, erratic, capricious, wilful, absolutely independ- ent, essentially unpredictable? Or are there as many as there are human beings? In other words, are we all gods? In the world's history it has not infrequently happened that the distinction between gods and men has become a little confused. Various hu- man attributes, such as jealousy, capricious- ness, vengeance, have been ascribed to deities; while, on the other hand, human beings have as commonly arrogated the supposed qualities and powers of gods. In the question between a single pervading, enduring energy, and several independent ener- gies, limited and erratic, it would seem, in view of the present state of intelligence, that the burden of proof rests with those who claim such a remarkable exception to the uniformity and the universality of the laws of nature, and where is the evidence that can estabHsh a "rea- soned and intelligent conviction" of such a pro- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 41 position? "For all belief and faith we are bound to have real evidence, and enough of it." Behef in the so-called "freedom of the will" is a relic and an inheritance of an unscientific past ; an age of belief in devils and witches, in magic and miracles ; in divine interpositions and special providences. But "as knowledge wid- ens" we find "that the range of possibilities narrows until to perfect knowledge possibiUty is lost in necessity." According to the preceding review, neither analogy nor consciousness supports such a pro- position. Analogies from the inorganic and the organic world bear uniform witness against it. Chemical elements and living organisms speak against it; and consciousness adds its convincing testimony against it. Only a hasty and most superficial impression of a primary, temporary stage of self-consciousness has been supposed to lend support ; but upon closer, deeper examination and understanding, also consciousness disproves it. There exists no contradiction between imme- diate consciousness and reason. The mind is not in contradiction with itself. It would in- deed be strange were this the case. It is contended, then, that to a mind un- biased ; one without dogmatic preconceptions ; one seeking only the truth, regardless of where 42 THE WHY OF THE WH^L it may lead, or what the supposed consequences may be, that to such a mind the evidence is clear, crystal clear, and is entirely in favor of the uniformity of nature, entirely in favor of a single cause. Only when attempts are made to reconcile de- terminism with various dogmatic assumptions, is the argument confused and obscured. Many great minds, clearly recognizing the irresistible logic of determinism, have made attempts to reconcile, to harmonize, the fixed, narrow and often unenlightened dogmatism of past ages, with the wider, progressive, more intelligent and more reverent concepts of the students and apostles of truth of more modern times. The attempts have failed and the only result has been an oversubtle, deeply involved, contorted, confused and obscure argument, in striking contrast with the natural, simple and clear ex- position which characterizes truth. It should always be clearly borne in mind, that to maintain the so-called "freedom of the will" involves the possibility of conceiving an action that is unrelated, that stands by itself, that is absolute; an act without an antecedent motive, one without a cause or reason. To a finite mind such a conception is impossible. Otherwise, we were not finite. But every in- telligent man, in his right senses, knows that he UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 43 is. Our consciousness consists, simply, in recog- nizing a small part of the natural sequence of events. Our intellect is but "a link in the great movement of thought." And our decisions and our actions, whether involuntary or voluntary, whether conscious or unconscious, are simply the expressions of the existing correspondence and interaction. When this interaction is con- scious we call the result "Will," when uncon- scious, we give it various other names. All things, all beings, are but instruments or agents of the aU-pervading energy. Whether this energy be in the form of molecular or mo- lar motion in matter in general ; or whether it be in the form of stimulation of a nerve center, re- sulting, in certain cases, in the recognition of adequate motive directing an intelligent being, the result is equally definite and sure, and there is in it all, "no variableness, neither shadow of turning." II A subject closely related to the foregoing, is that of the relation of the emotions to mental activity. A deliberative, volitional act involves percep- tion, due consideration and appropriate action. While we can conceive of such a process as practically free from any marked emotion, yet 44 THE WHY OF THE WH^L it is certain, that every volitional act implies some degree of interest, and therefore, taking the word in its broadest sense, some degree of emotion. To say that the heart as well as the mind is involved in this process, is a common way of expressing this fact of subjective inter- est, as well as the co-relative fact that mental activities vary in the degree of calmness of de- liberation. Between the two extremes of a cool, quiet, phlegmatic state of mind, and one shaken by the most violent emotions, we find in actual life all gradations, innumerable steps of transition. Strictly speaking, these conditions differ only in degree. And, if, in a similarly strictly scien- tific sense, it can perhaps be truly said that no deliberative act, no matter how well considered, is ideal or perfect, that is, is exactly adapted to its purpose, it must be clearly evident, that when the mind is disturbed by violent emotions this shortcoming is likely to be correspondingly increased. That a proper consideration of a subject not only admits of, but even implies, a certain de- gree of emotion, evidencing interest, is believed to be true. But it is even more apparent, that beyond this limited degree, the opposite is true. That the emotions often effect even very UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE * 45 positive physical changes is fully and generally recognized. Volumes have been written on this subject. It has been shown that emotions may result in anaesthesia, hypersesthesia and paraes- thesia; may cause aberrations of the special senses ; may bring about irregular and violent muscular contractions, or convulsions ; and may lead to mental and muscular paralyses. The heart, the blood vessels, the bodily temperature, the iris, the intestines, the hair, the central ner- vous ganglions, the unborn child, are all sub- ject to its occasional powerfully modifying in- fluences. If, then, the emotions are capable of affect- ing such positive physical changes of the vari- ous parts of the body, it follows, admitting the brain to be the organ of the mind, that corre- sponding changes or modifications of percep- tion and reflection must result. If the brain, at its best, is not a perfect organ, and if the emotions are, occasionally, so disturbing, it is not strange that the aberrations of mind and the perversions of will, thus produced, should, at times, be decidedly serious; should, even, some- times result in very positive forms of insanity. And these conditions have this in common with other forms of insanity, that the aberration is essentially a matter of degree. Some of these cases are diflBcult to grade and classify. 46 THE WHY OF THE WILL In the words of Bain : " The difficult case is what is called moral in- sanity, where there are impulses morbidly strong which can yet be, to some degree, counterworked by motives, or the apprehension of consequences. There is a shading-off here into the region of mere passionate impulse, such as a person counted perfectly sane may fall victim to." And Wood, in his work on nervous diseases, says: "Insanity is not a definite disease, but an ab- normal state, varying indefinitely in intensity, separated by no tangible lines from sanity It is a mental weakness, and it would be as absurd to ask for a definite line, separating the physically weak from the physically strong, as to ask one separating the mentally weak from the mentally strong." Of the classifications of insanity, he says that they are "arbitrary," and that "almost every grade of case exists in nature, uniting, by an unbroken series, the various symptom groups." But there is another modification, in addition to that of mental aberration, which strong emo- tion imposes upon dehberative, volitional action. Time, as well as a healthy brain, is required in UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE ' 47 forming just conclusions. The evil conse- quences arising from hasty, ill-considered ac- tions while under the influence of emotions are proverbial. But it is argued that "all this may be pre- vented by the exercise of self-control," and to a certain extent this is true, but this truth has its limitations. We aU recognize the fact that the provocation occasionally becomes too great for the most self -controlled. That the "worry, distractions and provoca- tions incident to our condition may be in some instances overwhelming," is observed by Bain, and even courts and juries recognize this. This being admitted, it follows that such cases must be wanting, in some degree, in the element of re- sponsibility — using this term in the more usual sense. And, thus, we come to the general ques- tion of responsibility. The term responsibility is variously em- ployed. We may speak of responsibility to physical laws. If one sits in a cold draught, if one eats or drinks excessively or becomes over- heated, or greatly fatigued, or if one overap- plies his mind, or worries, the consequences show themselves in impaired health and suffering. These consequences are natural, are involved in the transgression, and, therefore, in this sense, we are held accountable, answerable or respon- sible, for violations of the laws of health. 48 THE WHY OF THE WILL Very similar is what is sometimes called re- sponsibility to oneself. We are subject to the inevitable consequences of our every thought and action. Every thought and action has its logical consequence, and in this sense we are ab- solutely accountable, answerable or responsible to ourselves ; and incur the inevitable penalty or reward inherent in the action. We also speak of legal responsibility, ethi- cal responsibility, responsibility to our fellow- man or social responsibility. If all human laws were just, the terms legal and ethical, as used in this connection, would be practically synony- mous. Unfortunately this is far from being the case. Society, for its protection and integrity, as- sumes the right and the authority to enact laws, and to insist on their observance ; and for any violation of these it imposes penalties. And, even, though we deny the "freedom of the will" this is reasonable. For it is clear, that the ex- istence of penalties and rewards is a factor or motive in determining the actions of individuals. And so, when any particular transgression or crime is on the increase, we may infer that, per- haps, the penalty is insufficient ; and the weight is increased until the balance is again on the right side. In this way we are held responsible to legal requirements. UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 49 If a person is insane to the degree that penal- ties do not appeal to his mind — have no deterr- ing influence, Society no longer holds him re- sponsible. The question is, how high shall the standards of self-control and mental soundness be placed? And, thus, we come to the conclu- sion, that emotions, with their mental and vo- litional consequences, including positive mental aberration; and responsibility to social laws are matters of degree. And the practical deduc- tion is, that in society and in our laws we should recognize this. No longer should we simply say this man is sane or insane, no longer, he is responsible or irresponsible, but the verdict should be worded: "We find this individual sane or insane to such a degree, responsible or irre- sponsible to such a degree, that Society does or does not require his restraint and his treat- ment." So, also, in the case of emotional excitement the statement of fact should be worded, "he has or he has not exercised the self-control which Society at present requires of its members." And in coming to a conclusion, wise men would take into consideration, so far as finite possibili- ties go, all the facts in each individual case: the heredity, early training, later influences, physical and mental characteristics, condition of health, habits, exciting provocation, etc. 50 THE WHY OF THE WILL This is the only method, which does not ig- nore, or do violence to immutable natural laws, the only method which does not do cruel injus- tice to humanity. There remains for consideration the question of responsibility to the Creator, responsibility as involved in the relations of human beings to the Eternal. The responsiblity already re- ferred to, shown in the consequences of viola- tions of the inexorable laws of nature, might be considered as coming under this head. Here, however, the penalty is inherent in the trans- gression. This is quite different, though, from the ordinary conceptions, which, assuming a form of moral responsibility aside from the in- herent consequences, pictures an offended Deity, and dire future punishment at his hands. According to the doctrine of determinism we act as we do because we and our environ- ment are what they are. And if the Creator created both, it is His work and the result is His. We are but agents in His hands. Assum- ing a purpose in the universe, we serve as in- struments toward the accomplishment of that purpose. To avoid transgressions and conse- quent suffering, we must learn to understand the laws of the universe, and to live in harmoni- ous accord. We must "re-enact, as it were, for ourselves" the divine law, and repeat, so far as UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE * 51 is possible to finite beings, the transcendent act of will in which truth and goodness had their origin." But it will be said that the doctrine of de- terminism, thus, does away with all morality, that it makes the universe dead, feelingless; and that it removes all incentive ; that it means fatalism, in the sense that what is to be will be, and that, therefore, all personal activity is meaningless. Before proceeding to a consideration of these questions, it should be observed that the real or supposed consequences of the acceptance of a proposition, bear no essential relation to its truth or falsity. No matter what the bearings of a fact or truth may be, no matter how disas- trous the consequences may appear, this of itself does not affect the truth or falsity. But truth involves no real disaster; in fact, it is the only way to genuine and permanent harmony. Both history and commonsense teach this. It has been well said that "in a true system unity is produced by harmonizing apparent differences, and in a false system by ignoring differences." A proposition so fundamental to our concep- tion of our wide and varied relations in the uni- verse as is that of determinism, should admit of some coherent and consistent scheme of soci- ology and of cosmology. And, as might be an- ticipated, there is no difficulty in showing that 52 THE WHY OF THE WILL the conceptions involved in such words as effort, endeavor, voluntary and involuntary, incentive, development, good and bad, morality and im- morality, continue to have real and definite meanings, although, some of them, somewhat different from those at present commonly ac- cepted. Likewise the various emotions, such as gratitude, dislike, fear, sorrow, regret, love, faith, hope and charity have fuU play in this concept. Whether our activities are foreordained or not makes no difference as to their efficiency or positive nature. Even though they be deter- mined, and though they be but particular man- ifestations of the universal energy, still our in- dividual efforts remain potent factors, in the de- velopment of the future; and the result will be just as exactly proportioned to the energy in- volved, as if, in some unexplained way, this ac- tivity were entirely independent of the force ex- hibited in the natural sequence of events. No matter how the state of mind which results in works comes about, the work will have its lesiti- mate effect. And so, if one man is diligent and the other folds his arms and says, "Allah's wiU be done," the difference in the result will be quite apparent. The first will accomplish something, for which others may be wilhng to give in return ; the second will starve if he con- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE - 53 tinues in his foolishness and others do not come to his relief. Effort and endeavor will always obtain their natural and legitimate reward. That the result may be valuable, intelligence must of course co-operate. Whether it be fore- ordained that one shall work and another repose in idleness, does not make the result any differ- ent than if the difference came about in any other way. And the essentially interesting fact is, that so far from removing incentive, deter- minism permits the recognition of ability and of value which results in work. If we recognize the benefit to be derived from work, no matter how this idea may have come to us, and if it becomes the predominant con- sideration, this state of mind results in our working. The antecedent in the form of a mo- tive is there, and it matters not how it got there. It need scarcely be added that all this presup- poses physical ability. And not only can we distinguish between work and no work, and between little and more work, but we can also distinguish as to quality. No matter how the work comes about, its na- ture is not changed. Even though we are but agents in the hands of the Creator, but instru- ments of the universal energy, we may still dis- tinguish between good and bad instruments, as well as between good and bad work. 54 THE WHY OF THE WH^L Much has been written on the nature of good- ness, and there has not always been full agree- ment as to what constitutes goodness and bad- ness. Still it may be said, in a general way, that moral or ethical conceptions are based on the experience of the past. And it would, per- haps, not be difficult to show that this is also true of those which are assumed to be founded on the authority of special revelation. Agen- cies the result of whose operations are in har- mony with the prevailing concensus are es- teemed good, those in conflict therewith are con- demned as bad. And the concept of determinism in no way changes the matter. We may still speak of good and bad agencies and influences. Looked at broadly, those agencies are good that promote enduring harmony and accord be- tween ourselves and the rest of the universe; and those bad that cause or result in lasting dis- cord, misery and suffering. And, even, as believers in determinism, we may still dislike and fear agencies that are harmful; may stiU feel gratitude for benefits received, and regret for unhappy occurrences; may still love our friends, and mankind in gen- eral; may still experience the various emotions to which mankind has been subject. Right here it may well be asked, since, accord- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE . 55 ing to determinism, all acts are determined, what is the difference, if any, between a harm- ful act that is purely accidental, and uninten- tional, and one that is based upon deliberate, malevolent purpose? It is clear that the two are alike in that both are expressions of actual states of individuality and environment, and of their interaction ; but they differ in that the sec- ond expresses, also, a state of individual char- acter, or rather of want of character. No matter what the state of the individual may be his interaction, conscious or unconscious, is definite and positive ; and one may often rea- son from an act back to the character and cir- cumstances which the act implies and expresses. That this reasoning may be correct and just, as to the charatcer of an individual, in any partic- ular, the circumstances, — the environment — must also be known, and must be carefully and exactly pondered and weighed; since it is neither the individual nor the environment alone, but the interaction of the two which de- termines the result. Determinism, also, admits of regret for past occurrences and acts. The fact that an act, with its inevitable and inherent consequences, is determined, does not alter its quality, does not affect its resulting happiness or unhappiness. One may, therefore, deeply regret a certain act. 56 THE WHY OF THE WH^L while still recognizing that it was a necessary resultant of the actual factors ; the state of the individual and the nature of the circumstances. The recognition of one's misdeeds and regret therefore may become a potent factor in refor- mation. Remorse, however, in the sense of implying a term, is not consistent with the conviction or guilt that was wilful, in the usual sense of the conception of determinism. In judging ourselves and our fellowmen, two interesting facts come up for consideration, — namely, the essential self-interest of motives and the gregarious, social nature of man. Man has justly been called a gregarious or social animal. He is not happy when alone, he needs companionship ; the fellow instinct is deeply im- planted in his nature. And, therefore, nor- mally, he can be reaUy happy only when, at least fairly in harmony with his fellowmen. That the fellow feeling is strong in us has al- ways been recognized. That "man is naturally a sociable animal" was remarked by Aristotle. Upon this fellow instinct, as refined and special- ized in love, depends the very continuance of the race. This instinct is inherent in our very being, is an ultimate fact of our being. From considerations such as the foregoing, many have concluded that man possesses the in- UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 57 stinct of altruism. But upon careful examina- tion, it seems clear that pure altruism, in the ordinary sense, does not exist. The unity of the universe is again seen in the fact, that strictly speaking, all motives have a single common ori- gin, and are based on self-interest, real or sup- posed. It is impossible to conceive of a motive that is not one of interest, and interest, in the present sense, is self-interest. As used here, motives and self-interest are synonymous. To say that one's interests are purely altruistic is a contradiction of terms, — is self -contradictory. "All actions of wiU are but forms of the self- assertive tendency and, thus, one with our very being." But while maintaining all this, we need not overlook the fact, that the two extremes: — the narrowest, most shortsighted selfishness, and that wider, higher recognition of self-interest, which almost attains to pure unselfishness, are as far apart, and as opposite, as the antipodes. The latter, taking into account, in the fullest sense, our relation to mankind, while still a self- interest, recognizes that the highest and most enduring self-interest is that which has thought and consideration, not alone for mankind, but for all living, sentient creatures. It is by vir- tue of this recognition of self-interest, that we come to have an interest in all creatures, in all 58 THE WHY OF THE WILL life, in all energy, in the whole universe. And it is the practical application of this truth that gives the highest and most enduring pleasure. By observing a proper "balance of self -regard- ing and social affections" we make coincide our pleasure, with what is generally called our sense of duty to others. It is in this sense, that it has been said that the "happiness of man is the cri- terion of virtue once removed." On this subject Herbert Spencer says: " Subjectively considered, then, the conciliation of egoism and altruism will eventually become such that though the altruistic pleasure, as being a part of the consciousness of one who experiences it, can never be other than egoistic, it will not be consciously egoistic." Determinism not alone admits the conception and the practice of the higher qualities, but it strengthens them. Recognizing, in ourselves, as in our fellow beings, that our shortcomings are not, in the ordinary sense, wilful, but are inherent in our natures and in the, at times, un- toward influences of our environment ; that they are due to weaknesses, comparable to the physi- cal weaknesses of ill health; and appreciating also the unhappiness which they always sooner or later entail, one naturally has a feeling, not, as is now too often the case, of scarcely unmixed UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 59 repulsion and abhorence, with perhaps cruel so- cial condemnation and ostracism, but rather of sorrow, of sympathy and of charity. And there follows the further recognition, that the correc- tive measures called for by the condition of sin and crime, are not simply penalties and restraint and neglect, but rather true moral education, assistance and fellow feeling. In the many cases where the body, also, is at fault, where the appetites and passions are ab- normal, also the body needs careful attention. Physicians are learning, more and more, to rec- ognize in unhealthy bodily states the causes of many perverted habits. This is especially true, for example, of alcoholism. The understanding of what constitutes true happiness, and the knowledge of how to gain and to maintain it, can be relied upon, in due time, to guide and control the masses, for the "greater good" is the desideratum of all. "We needs must love the highest when we see it." The ancients were not unmindful of this truth. Socrates recognized it when he identi- fied knowledge with virtue. And Plato recog- nized the harmony of the soul in the "subordi- nation of the impulsive elements to reason." The wise have always recognized that "vicious pleasures are not true pleasures." The argument is often advanced, that in de- 60 THE WHY OF THE WILL nying our moral responsibility to the Creator, and in thus removing the fear of punishment, both here and hereafter, all restraint is taken away, and sin and wickedness are given full rule and empire. As has been pointed out, the punishment of sin is involved in the act, is in- herent. Violations of the laws of health bring sooner or later their sure result. Violations of the moral or ethical laws, when these laws are just, and are really based on the experience of mankind, bring likewise their sure results in the recurrence of the unhappy consequences, which, in past ages, taught our ancestors. Sin is a hard, and, apparently, at times, a cruel teacher in the school of experience. In proportion as we learn to understand the true nature of genuine ethical laws, and the in- evitable consequences of their violation, this rec- ognition, this wisdom, will become a factor ever tending to discourage and lessen wrong-doing, ever working for righteousness. Those who live in nearer accord may be looked upon as having reached a higher plane, as having at- tained so much nearer the ideal. And their hap- piness is their adequate reward. The wise man is he who has learned, as all must learn, that permanent happiness is only attainable by being in accord with certain rules which we call natural, physical and moral laws. UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE ' 61 There have been and there, doubtless will con- tinue to be, ebbs and flows in the moral progress of the world, but truth can always be relied upon for good. And determinism, rightly and fully understood, wiU be found to bring us nearer to nature, and nearer to nature's God. It may be objected, by those believing in an om- nipotent and benevolent Creator, that it is a strange and an unworthy conception of the Cre- ator, to assert, or to imply, that he makes use of instruments of evil. But there is no denying that sin exists; that, as yet, all is not perfect harmony ; that the miUenium has not arrived. It has often been suggested, that the explana- tion is to be found in the need of trial to develop character. Sin means transgression, means hu- man imperfection. The inevitable consequences of transgressions, when wisely interpreted, must result in development, and tend toward perfec- tion. It is not sin, but its consequences which develop character and wisdom. A recent writer, in an attempt to explain the existence of pain and suffering in the animal world, feeling himself forced to choose, between the omnipotence and the benevolence of the Cre- ator has based a scheme of Cosmology upon the concept of limited power, thus attempting an explanation of the world's development by slow and halting steps. These and many similar 62 THE WHY OF THE WH^L questions are beyond finite understanding and determination. The possible use of pain and suffering is well suggested in the following lines: " The dark brown mould's upturned By the sharp pointed plow — And I've a lesson learned. My life is but a field. Stretched out beneath God's sky Some harvest rich to yield. Where grows the golden grain? Where faith? Where sympathy? In a furrow cut by pain." We can only watch the course of temporal events, and in an unbiased, honest, fearless, truth-seeking and reverent spirit deduce what appear to be the lessons taught. Determinism is based on no fixed and anti- quated creed, but rests on a recognition and study of the natural course and sequence of events. As this unfolds and develops, and be- comes better understood, so, also, will scientific and religious belief expand. The progress of a creed thus founded is synchronous and paral- lel with with the advance of knowledge. To the "Scriptures" of the nations we must add the scriptures of the Universe, whose leaves UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 63 innumerable are ever unfolding, ever presenting new and greater truths, ever exciting to wider and nobler conceptions and participations. The lessons of the Universe, with especial re- gard for those of humanity, must be studied with the earnestness and single-mindedness of the discoverer and lover of truth. As true knowledge increases so wiU the recognition of the limitations of our knowledge — actual and potential ; — and with it intellectual modesty and reverence. In these we shall find the requisites and the assurances of true progress, material and spiritual, moral and religious. For while at any given moment human action is fixed and determined, yet both we and our environment are constantly changing. That this change may be progressive, we need only increase our knowledge and wisdom, and, profiting by ex- perience, need only rise from our dead selves to our higher selves. The history of the world shows how unreli- able and conflicting, is a morality based upon assumed authority. The variances of conven- tionalities are notorious. That which in one country or age is esteemed as right, in another place or time is condemned as wrong. Deter- minism places morality on the sound basis of reason and intelligence ; and we can surely rec- ognize in the steady increase of true intelli- 64 THE WHY OF THE WILL gence, paralleled by the growth of real mo- rality, as seen in the history of mankind, the germ and the assurance of continued develop- ment towards perfection. With personal development will come better understanding and better control of our physi- cal condition and of our general environment. We shall learn to establish a better harmony between ourselves, our fellow beings and the universe generally. Our conceptions of fellow relationship wiU become more just, and our ac- tions correspondingly more considerate. Of the belief in determinism we can confi- dently say, that it is thinkable, is consistent and is elevating. Through it we recognize ourselves as included in the universal energy, its intellec- tual agents, working out its destiny, — we have faith to say, its beneficent purpose. " Yet I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs. And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the sun." As our intelligence increases, our vision wid- ens, deepens, our judgment of ourselves and of others becomes more just, and we incline to charity. Recognizing the complexity of human nature and its infinite relations, we no longer judge UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE. 66 rash and cruel judgment. No matter how seri- ous the sickness of sin, we confidently hope for, and have abiding faith in ultimate restoration; if not in this world then in some other. We frown on those who by word and deed discour- age the sick one ; and we recognize as noble and Christlike benefactors those who, never weary in the work of hopeful encouragement and wise support, have faith in the final outcome, believ- ing that in the end all will be well. " Before beginning and without end. As space eternal and as surety sure. Is fixed a Power divine which moves to good, Only its laws endure Such is the Law which moves to righteousness. Which none at last can turn aside or stay. The heart of it is Love, the end of it is Peace And consummation sweet. Obey." As knowledge and wisdom increase, as our eyes are opened more fully to the eternal veri- ties, as we more fully realize the marvellous wonders of the universe, and as we shall be in better accord, we may finally come to recognize that "our consciousness of God, is only part of God's consciousness of himself, all bodies modes of infinite extension, all souls modes of infinite thought." 66 THE WHY OF THE WILL And, as we see more clearly, and feel more vividly that "we are inherent parts of its glori- ous unity, we may hope to reach that ultimate real principle of knowledge and being without which there can be no rest for reason, or unity in the universe."