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 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 JACOB H. SCHIFF 
 
 Endowment for Studies 
 
 IN 
 
 Human Civilization 
 
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The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028439374 
 
RECOLLECTIONS 
 
 OF A 
 
 FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 (Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky) 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 CHARLES LOUIS SEEGER 
 
 GARDEN CITY, N. T., AND TORONTO 
 
 DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 
 
 1921 
 
A5 
 
 't.^^' 
 
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1921, BY 
 
 DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 
 
 ALL EIGHTS RESERVED, INCLtTDINQ THAT OF TRANSLATION 
 
 INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE 
 
 This is but a fragment of the work that the author 
 had planned, covering the period of his activities 
 as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1906-1910) and Am- 
 bassador to France (1910-1917). It was to consist 
 of three volumes, the first treating of the events fol- 
 lowing the granting of a constitutional charter to 
 Russia; the second revealing many unpublished 
 details of the negotiations between Russia and 
 Austria in relation to the annexation of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina and the ensuing formation of the Triple 
 Entente. The third was to deal with the Balkan 
 Wars and finally the Great War and the causes which 
 led to it. 
 
 The year of illness and anxiety for the future of his 
 beloved country, preceding his death in August last, 
 interfered with his literary work and prevented the 
 completion of even the first volume. The consequent 
 loss to history is diflicult to estimate, but a careful 
 reading of these memoirs, as far as they go, will give 
 some measure of what that loss means, for every page 
 testifies to the honesty, exactitude, and insight with 
 which he records the important events and portrays 
 the characters of the men who figured in them during 
 the period covered by these few chapters. 
 
 The great value of M. Iswolsky's book is due not 
 
vi TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE 
 
 only to his having been one of the most prominent and 
 effective statesmen concerned in European political 
 affairs for twelve years prior to the collapse of the 
 Russian Empire, but even more to his innate sense of 
 truth, which never allows him to alter or conceal a 
 fact for the purpose of strengthening an argument. 
 He states only what he knows, and if he mentions a 
 rumour he calls it that, plainly. He combined in a 
 rare degree the qualities of a man of action and a 
 critic. This enabled him to tell of events in which 
 he took part with the penetration of a keen observer, 
 added to a personal knowledge of details which even 
 the most intelligent looker-on must often be unable to 
 ascertain. j 
 
 Too many of the books that we read about Russia 
 have been written by foreigners who have mistaken 
 a partial knowledge, gained by travel and an ac- 
 quaintance with people in this or that part of the 
 Empire, for a real comprehension of its problems. It 
 is true that the work of a gifted writer of another 
 nationality may occasionally afford a clearer insight 
 into the underlying causes of a series of events than 
 that of a native of the country in which those events 
 took place. Carlyle, for instance, drew a picture of 
 the French Revolution such as no Frenchman could 
 equal at the time, but Russia has not yet had her 
 Carlyle, and meanwhile there is no doubt that the 
 world has been poorly informed by newspaper cor- 
 respondents and other foreign writers who, in spite of 
 conscientious effort and perhaps because of too great 
 a desire to be readable, ha,ve utterly failed to present 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE vli 
 
 the truth. Russia is too vast and her people too 
 vague, complex, and idealistic to be photographed 
 by snapshots, as it were; nothing short of a life- 
 experience, and the sympathy which comes of identity 
 of blood and mentality, can enable one to portray 
 Kussia and the Russians with entire faithfulness. 
 
 This, then, is why the contents of this book are so 
 illimiinating in spite of their fragmentary nature. 
 M. Iswolsky was not only the most patriotic of 
 Russians, knowing the nature of his coimtrymen in 
 every class of society, from the aristocrat to the 
 peasant, and fervently desirous of justice for all, but 
 he had the advantage of a cosmopolitan training 
 which enabled him to study the problems of other 
 cotmtries, to discover how those problems had been 
 solved, and to apply the knowledge so acquired to the 
 improvement of social conditions In Russia. 
 
 Long before the revolutionary outbreak of 1905 
 he saw clearly the dangers that beset Russia, because 
 of the persistence with which the short-sighted 
 bureaucrats who surrounded Nicholas II. clung to 
 their antiquated notions of government. He saw no 
 other way to avoid a reign of anarchy than to estab- 
 lish in Russia some form of representative govern- 
 ment, but without destroying what was good in the 
 existing system. He had too great an appreciation 
 of law and order to believe that, by merely tearing 
 down the edifice, another would miraculously arise 
 in its place with no faults of construction. In other 
 words, he was a meliorist, and so met the usual fate 
 of that unpopular and often bitterly hated class, hav- 
 
viii TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE 
 
 ing to endure the attacks of the extremists on either 
 side. It is a melancholy fact that great wrongs can 
 seldom be redressed by moderate means. Obstinacy 
 is vociferous on the one hand and fanaticism on the 
 other, while the voice of the perfectly balanced re- 
 former remains unheard. So, in Russia, the efforts 
 of M. Iswolsky and other moderate liberals, mo- 
 mentarily successful though they were, ended by 
 pleasing neither side. He was violently accused of 
 being an upholder of Czarism in the worst sense of 
 that word, namely reaction, persecution, and in- 
 justice. At the same time he was attacked with no 
 less violence by the reactionary Press as being a 
 dangerously revolutionary member of the Cabinet 
 during his tenure of the portfolio of Foreign Afifairs. 
 His fears proved only too true, and he lived to see the 
 pendulum swing from autocracy to Bolshevism. 
 There was no place for moderation, tolerance, and 
 broad-mindedness in the passionate struggle for 
 supremacy between the reactionary and revolu- 
 tionary parties. 
 
 Alexander Iswolsky was bom at Moscow on the 
 17th March, 1856. His family was of ancient Polish 
 origin, established in Russia for centuries, and be- 
 longed to the rural gentry, who, as he tells us in his 
 memoirs, preferred a quiet, comfortable, and cultured 
 life upon their estates to the turmoil of political Ufe 
 and the social activities of the capital. He graduated 
 from the Imperial Lyceum at St. Petersburg in 1875, 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE ix 
 
 the youngest of his class, receiving the gold medal, 
 the highest reward attainable at the Lyceum. His 
 thesis was the Brussels Conference of 1874 on the laws 
 and customs of war. 
 
 Immediately after finishing his studies at the 
 Lyceum he entered the Foreign Office as Attach^ to 
 the Chancellerie of Prince Gortchakofif, and three 
 years later he became secretary to the International 
 Commission at Philippopolis for the organization of 
 Eastern Roumelia. As a reward for his brilliant 
 work upon that commission he was appointed first 
 secretary of legation at Bucharest. He was then only 
 twenty-three years of age. 
 
 From Bucharest he was transferred to Washington, 
 where he studied with the greatest interest a system 
 of government differing as completely as possible 
 from anything he had known in Europe. He made 
 full use of the opportunity to gain a thorough knowl- 
 edge of the origins of the American Constitution as 
 defended in the Federalist by Hamilton and Madison 
 and as interpreted by Marshall and other great 
 jurists. The young diplomat's serious occupations 
 did not prevent him from entering with enthusiasm 
 into the social life of Washington and New York, 
 where he made many friends. 
 
 In the year 1890 he had his first great opportunity 
 to distinguish himself in diplomacy. The relations 
 between Russia and the Holy See having lapsed, M. 
 Iswolsky was sent to Rome with a view to their re- 
 establishment. His overtures were so tactfully pre- 
 sented that he won the interest and regard of Leo 
 
X TRANSLATORS PREFACE 
 
 Xni., and soon became a favourite of that great 
 pontiff as well as of Cardinal RampoUa. It was not 
 long before his efforts were crowned with success. 
 Diplomatic relations were resumed and M. Iswolsky 
 was appointed Minister Resident at the Vatican. 
 
 It was at that period that he married the beautiful 
 and accomplished Countess Toll, a daughter of the 
 Russian Minister to Copenhagen, M. Iswolsky 
 was wont to attribute to his charming wife a large 
 share of his success in the important diplomatic posts 
 which he afterward filled. In one of the chapters of 
 this book he ascribes the first interest that the Em- 
 press Dowager of Russia displayed in his efforts for 
 constitutional reform to her affection for Madame 
 Iswolsky. At the time of his death the journals of 
 Paris, in their obituary notices, recalled her kindness, 
 tact, and gracious hospitality when Ambassadress at 
 the French capital and her untiring solicitude for the 
 woimded during the dark days of the war. 
 
 After his brilliant record at Rome, M. Iswolsky 
 became Minister Plenipotentiary at Belgrade, and 
 afterward occupied successively the posts of Munich, 
 Tokio, and Copenhagen. In 1906 he assumed the 
 heavy responsibilities of Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 and it is the earlier part of his tenure that forms the 
 subject of these memoirs, though they also cover in a 
 general way his activities while at Copenhagen and 
 his reasons for resigning his post at Tokio. 
 
 While unsuccessful in his negotiations with Count 
 von Aerenthal, at Buchlau in 1908, concerning Aus- 
 tria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, his tact 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE xi 
 
 prevented a serious rupture between Russia and 
 Austria, and led indirectly to the consummation of 
 the entente with England and France and the re- 
 newal of friendly relations with Japan. Toward 
 the close of his service as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 the political affiliation with M. Stolypin, which he 
 describes in his memoirs, suffered a change, due to 
 his disapproval of M. Stolypin's nationalist ideas, 
 notably with respect to Finland, and he resigned 
 from the Ministry to become Ambassador to France 
 in 1910. 
 
 His love for France, his understanding of her people 
 and his admiration for their heroism and endurance 
 made the years which he spent at Paris most valuable 
 politically and most agreeable socially. His fidelity 
 to the cause of the Allies and his faith in their ultimate 
 victory was unwavering. The writer of these lines 
 recalls the emphasis with which he said one day in 
 June of 1918, when the German Army was approach- 
 ing Paris, that the world would not be worth living in 
 if so preposterous an outcome should result as Ger- 
 many's triumph. 
 
 M. Iswolsky ceased to be Ambassador and his 
 political career ended when the provisional Govern- 
 ment of Prince Lvoff was supplanted by Kerensky's 
 ephemeral dictatorship. Thereafter he divided his 
 time between Paris and Biarritz, always hoping for a 
 regstablishment of orderly conditions in Russia. It 
 was in the spring of 1918 that he began the writing 
 of his memoirs. In May of that year he was placed 
 at the head of the "League of Russians Faithful to 
 
xii TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE 
 
 the Fatherland and Her Alliances," and he conferred 
 often with his compatriots in France regarding steps 
 that might be taken in conjunction with Llic Allies 
 for the formation of a stable government in Russia. 
 But his political activities were terminated in Decem- 
 ber, 1918, by a severe attack of influenza, from the 
 effects of which he never fully recovered, and early 
 in the summer of 1919 he was taken to a sanatorium 
 in Paris, where, after several months of intense suf- 
 fering heroically endured, he died on the 16th of 
 August. 
 
 A nice appreciation of M. Iswolsky's character and 
 achievements as a statesman cannot be arrived at 
 without taking into account the refined tastes and 
 the high culture which distinguished him in his 
 private life, for they reveal the same love of order 
 and proportion that inspired his political ideas and 
 aims, and, in fact, as his daughter has pointed out 
 in a brief sketch, they are symbolic of his wider 
 activities. Mademoiselle Iswolsky writes: 
 
 "My father was a passionate lover of architecture, 
 interior decoration, and the laying out of gardens. 
 There is not a house that he lived in during his 
 journey through the world which did not gain in 
 beauty by his care. Drafting plans, consulting 
 architects and decorators was his favourite pastime. 
 The Russian Embassy in Tokio and its garden, the 
 reception rooms of the Foreign Office at St. Peters- 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE xiii 
 
 burg, the dainty French garden of the Embassy in 
 Paris, are all the happy results of his planning. He 
 loved beautiful houses, and his own home was what 
 he loved best of all. 
 
 "This taste for harmony, beauty, and elegance 
 was deeply implanted in his being and was very 
 characteristic of his personality. His keen sense of 
 the fitness of tilings guided him in all matters both 
 private and public. He was just as particular about 
 the smallest reception held at his house as if it were 
 the most important diplomatic meeting. He dis- 
 liked a disproportionate building as he disliked a 
 disproportionate mind, and it seems to me that his 
 great admiration for things beautiful, orderly, and 
 noble may be said to have served as a motto for his 
 whole life." 
 
 Mention has been made of the retired life led by 
 the riu*al gentry to which his family belonged. It 
 would seem most natural that he should have been 
 content to enjoy the quiet pleasures that that life 
 could have aflForded him, instead of entering the 
 arena of politics at the earliest opportunity. The 
 explanation Ues in his love of work, his insatiable 
 thirst for greater knowledge with which to attack 
 the problems that beset the Russia of his day, and the 
 consequent need of studying conditions in other 
 countries and coming in contact with leading men 
 of other nationalities. This gave him a constantly 
 broadening outlook and a tolerance which left his 
 mind always open to new impressions and new cur- 
 
xiv TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE 
 
 rents of thought. Throughout his Hfe he was a great 
 reader of history, poHtical economy, and philosophy. 
 By applying the learning so acquired, and the prac- 
 tical experience gained from his association with 
 other men of culture in many countries, to the prob- 
 lems which confronted him in the course of his dip- 
 lomatic and political activities, he developed the sane 
 judgment which characterized his decisions. 
 
 During his stay in Rome he seized the opportunity 
 to study Italian hterature and art, of which he was a 
 passionate admirer. He became a profound con- 
 noisseur and, at a later period, when he went to 
 Japan, he was equally appreciative of the workman-^ 
 ship and the subtle artistic sense of the Japanese, 
 of whom he always spoke in terms of the greatest 
 admiration. Their ways and customs, as well as 
 those of other peoples with whom he came in contact 
 at his different diplomatic posts, interested him and 
 were respected by him instead of arousing the criti- 
 cism which is so often expressed by the ordinary 
 traveller. He mastered their languages and gained 
 a real comprehension of their national peculiarities 
 and points of view rarely acquired by an outsider. 
 
 His literary style was remarkably clear and exact 
 in whatever language he used. His diplomatic notes 
 were models of correct expression. Nothing vexed 
 him more than a grammatical mistake, a carelessly 
 written letter, an obscure phrase, a vulgar or an 
 inappropriate word, and he was quite as critical, even 
 over-critical, of his own work as of that of others. 
 
 An instance of this was his decision not to write his 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE xv 
 
 memoirs in English as he had intended. After finish- 
 ing one chapter he felt that he had not as perfect 
 command of that language as of French, and might 
 at times be hampered in expression. The fear of us- 
 ing a foreign idiom, a wrong preposition, a single word 
 that might not be the best word to convey his mean- 
 ing, was suflScient to deter him. The result was his 
 choice of French for the original manuscript, but, with 
 the exception of the last chapter, the translation 
 had the advantage of being revised and commended 
 by the author, whose fine sense of values in both 
 languages detected the slightest variation from his 
 meaning and prevented any error in that regard. The 
 meetings with M. Iswolsky for the purpose of discuss- 
 ing the form and scope of the work and for the read- 
 ing of the English text will always be remembered 
 with the utmost pleasure by the translator, who trusts 
 that these memoirs, unfinished as they are, of so 
 eminent a statesman and diplomatist will constitute 
 a permanent and authoritative record of the interest- 
 ing period of Russian history which they cover. 
 
 Charles Louis Seegeb. 
 Paris, February, 1920. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTEB PAGE 
 
 I. Russia's Political Situation, 1905-1906 . 3 
 
 II. The Secret Treaty of Bjorkoe . . 27 
 
 m. The First Duma 74 
 
 IV. Count Witte 107 
 
 V. The Provincial Nobility .... 141 
 
 VI. The Goremykin Cabinet . . . .169 
 
 VII. M. Stolypin and the Cadets . . . 202 
 
 Vni. Terrorism 225 
 
 IX. The Emperor Nicholas II 252 
 
RECOLLECTIONS OF A 
 FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
Recollections of a Foreign Minister 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 Russia's Political Situation, 1905-1906 
 
 MY APPOINTMENT to the post of Minister 
 of Foreign AflFairs took place in the month of 
 May, 1906, and coincided with the opening 
 of the first Duma. I was a diplomate de carriere and, , 
 from the time that I entered the service of the State, I ' 
 had been concerned solely with its exterior relations. 
 But, in October of the year before, certain circum- 
 stances had led me to take an active part in the 
 domestic afiFairs of Russia, and this was not without 
 influence upon the decision of Emperqr .Hiabplas to 
 entrust me with the direction of my country's foreign 
 policy. 
 
 The circumstances to which I have referred were, in 
 part, as follows: 
 
 I was, at the time, Minister Plenipotentiary at 
 Copenhagen, having been transferred from Tokio in 
 1903, about a year before the outbreak of the Russo- 
 Japanese War. This post was considered a very 
 desirable one, in the diplomatic world, by reason of 
 the close relationship of the Danish royal family with 
 several European courts and the long and frequent 
 
4 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 visits that the Czar and the King of England were in 
 the habit of making at Copenhagen. The German 
 Emperor, too, was fond of appearing there un- 
 expectedly, and, as a natural result of the presence of 
 the rulers of Europe, the Danish capital became a 
 centre of diplomatic activity at such times, affording 
 the foreign ministers accredited there a particularly;: 
 favourable opportunity to be in evidence. Two of 
 \ny predecessors. Baron Mohrenheim and Count 
 ' Benckendorff,had been promoted from Copenhagen to 
 mibassies of the first rank; a third, Count Mouravieff, 
 fi man of the most mediocre capacities, having suc- 
 /ceeded in making himself personally agreeable to 
 Emperor NicholasAhad left Copenhagen to become 
 Minister of Foreign AffairsHr 
 
 After the death of the Emperor Alexander III., and, 
 still more, of Queen Louise, who was called "the 
 mother-in-law of Europe," Copenhagen had suffered 
 somewhat in importance, but it was nevertheless a 
 good point of observation and, from time to time, 
 although at less frequent intervals, a visit from one or 
 another of the royal relatives gave it again the prestige 
 of former days. As wiU appear later in these memoirs, 
 it was in the course of one of King Edward's sojourns 
 that I had the opportunity, during long interviews 
 with him, to establish the bases of the agreement con- 
 cluded in 1907 between Russia and England, which 
 exerted so great an influence on the sequence of events 
 in Europe. 
 
 Personally, however, I had had every reason to 
 consider my appointment to Copenhagen as in the 
 
RUSSU'S POLITICAL SITUATION, 1905-1906 5 
 
 nature of a disfavour, because, while I was at Tokio, 
 I had been resolutely opposed to the "strong" policy 
 adopted by Russia toward Japan and inspired by an 
 irresponsible coterie which had gained great influence 
 over the Emperor. Without going at length into a 
 relation of the events which led to the Russo-Japanese 
 War, it will suflBce for the moment to say that, in my 
 capacity as representative of Russia at Tokio, I had 
 recommended with insistence a conciliatory attitude 
 toward Japan and an agreement with that country on 
 the burning questions of Manchuria and Korea. My 
 efforts in that direction had resulted in the mission to 
 Europe of that distinguished statesman. Marquis Ito, 
 with the object of attempting a rapprochement be- 
 tween Russia and Japan. That mission, if it had 
 succeeded, would have changed the course of events 
 and prevented the war, but the poor reception ac- 
 corded to the Japanese emissary at St. Petersburg and 
 the dilatory answers given him by the Russian 
 Government resulted, unhappily, in its utter failure. 
 The clever Minister of Japan in London seized the 
 opportunity to hasten the conclusion of the Anglo- 
 Japanese Alhance. 
 
 Convinced, from that moment, that the policy 
 adopted by my sovereign, vmder the guidance of M. 
 Bezobrazoff and Admirals Abaza and Alexeieff, was 
 leading us inevitably into war, and not wishing to be 
 made the instnunent for carrying it out, I asked leave 
 to return to Europe. On my arrival at St. Petersburg 
 I was received very coldly by the Emperor, and the 
 advice that I tried to give regarding the affairs of the 
 
6 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Far East and our relations with Japan was systemati- j 
 cally disregarded. There was another reason for my 
 cold reception: I had the reputation at the court of 
 Tsarskoie-Selo of being a "Liberal," and of sympa- 
 thizing with the movement which was already, even 
 at that period, making itself felt in Russia, in favour 
 of constitutional reform. This could not by any 
 possibility predispose the Czar in my favour, and still 
 less the Czarina, who, even then, manifested re- 
 actionary tendencies. Although she had not yet 
 acquired the influence that became so dominant dur- 
 ing the last days of the monarchy, her prejudice 
 undoubtedly contributed to deprive me of the 
 Emperor's confidence. Under these conditions there 
 appeared to be but little chance of my obtaining a 
 diplomatic post of any importance; but, on the other 
 hand, the Dowager Empress, daughter of King 
 Christian IX., treated me with marked good will. 
 This was in great part due to the friendship which she 
 felt for my wife, who had, so to say, grown up under 
 her eye. (My wife was the daughter of Count 
 Charles Toll, son of the famous general of that name, 
 and during many years the Russian Minister of 
 Copenhagen.) The Czar, in deference to his mother, 
 never named a minister to Copenhagen without first 
 consulting her. So it happened that, in conformity 
 with her wishes, I received the post, a very honourable 
 one, no doubt, but which bade fair to be void of any 
 political importance in my case and in view of the 
 circumstances. 
 
 As time went on, however, and the unhappy events 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION, 1905-1906 7 
 
 of the Russo-Japanese War gradually dispelled the 
 Emperor's illusions, he seemed inclined to recognize 
 my foresight and to be willing to entrust me with a 
 more active role. Toward the end of the campaign he 
 caused me to be notified of his intention to appoint 
 me Ambassador to Berhn, a post which was soon to 
 become vacant by the retirement of the aged Count 
 Osten-Sacken. I learned afterward that, in the mean- 
 time, the Emperor purposed putting to good use the 
 special knowledge of Japanese affairs that I had ac- 
 quired during my stay in the East. As a result of the 
 mediation of President Roosevelt, negotiations were 
 about to be opened at Portsmouth for the conclusion 
 of peace, and the Emperor had hesitated for a long 
 time over his choice of a plenipotentiary. This post 
 had been offered first to M. NeUdoff, Ambassador at 
 Paris, then to M. Mom-avieff, Ambassador at Rome. 
 Both had refused, the one giving as a reason his in- 
 competence in Far Eastern affairs and the other the 
 state of his health. It appears that, after these re- 
 fusals, the Emperor had fixed his choice upon me, and 
 that, for forty-eight hours, I had been considered as 
 the chief of the mission which was to be sent to 
 America; but my candidature was vigorously opposed 
 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Lamsdorff, 
 who advocated the appointment of M. Witte, with 
 whom he was closely allied, not only personally but 
 politically. Now, the candidatiu-e of M. Witte was 
 particularly distasteful to the Emperor, who had 
 conceived a dislike to that eminent statesman, and a 
 distrust of him that was no less enduring, even when 
 
8 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 he svunmoned him to the highest duties in the Empire 
 at a later date. As for me, I was absolutely ignorant 
 of what was going on at the time; since the beginning 
 of the war I had made it a rule not to meddle, in my 
 oflScial dispatches, with matters tiiat were alien to my 
 own special duties, and to refrain from oflFering any 
 advice whatever to the Government concerning the 
 difificulties that presented themselves. Neverthe- 
 less, I was so persuaded of the enormous importance 
 that the personality of our representative would have, 
 in connection with the success or failure of the peace 
 negotiations, that I decided to break my silence, and I 
 wrote a letter to Count LamsdorflF, in which I ex- 
 pressed my conviction, with all the energy of which I 
 was capable, that the only man iu Russia who could 
 cope with a task so overwhelming was M. Witte. My 
 conviction was based upon the knowledge that I pos- 
 sessed in regard to the exceptional prestige which 
 M. Witte enjoyed in Japan, and the kindly feeling 
 that the Japanese retained for him on accotmt of the 
 part he had played during the period just preceding 
 the war. My letter reached St. Petersburg at the 
 very moment when Coimt Lamsdorff was at a loss for 
 arguments in favour of M. Witte's candidature, and, 
 as he himself told me afterward, it helped to overcome 
 the objections of the Emperor. 
 
 M. Witte went to America, and everyone knows 
 with what consummate talent, I may almost say with 
 what genius, he acquitted himself of his task. The 
 Emperor, when yielding to the advice of Count 
 Lamsdorff, expressed a desire that I should ac- 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION, 1905-1906 9 
 
 company M. Witte as second plenipotentiary, but at 
 that time M. Witte was so strongly prejudiced against 
 me that he insisted on the appointment of my suc- 
 cessor in Japan, Baron Rosen, whom he considered 
 to be a more docile colleague. However that may be, 
 not only have I never regretted for a moment having 
 intervened in favour of the selection of M. Witte, but 
 I am convinced that, if my intervention really con- 
 tributed thereto, I rendered a veritable service to my 
 country. It is a matter of common knowledge that 
 public opinion in Russia has shown scant appreciation 
 of the remarkable achievement of M. Witte at Ports- 
 mouth; in this, as in other matters, his compatriots 
 and contemporaries have done him Uttle justice. 
 Personally, I was never on intimate terms with M. 
 Witte, and I felt obUged to oppose energetically some 
 of his poUtical ideas in the domain of foreign aflFairs, 
 but I am in duty bound to render him homage for 
 what he did at Portsmouth. Neither I nor any other 
 diplomat by profession could have done it; the task 
 demanded aU the personal prestige of that " self-made 
 man" to make a proper impression upon the great 
 public of American democracy, and to obtain for 
 Russia, in spite of her reverses, a moral predominance 
 over the representatives of her adversary. One of the 
 causes of this predominance was the cleverness with 
 which M. Witte knew how to make use of the Press in 
 America, as well as in England, thanks to the devoted 
 and intelligent cooperation of the correspondent of 
 the Daily Telegraph, Dr. E. J. Dillon. That re- 
 markably talented pubhcist had been for a long 
 
10 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER , 
 
 time on close terms of friendly intimacy with M. 
 Witte, and enjoyed his fullest confidence. He ac- 
 companied him to America, and I have no hesitation 
 in attributing to Dr. Dillon a large part of the success 
 achieved by the Russian delegation. In closing my 
 comment upon this episode, I will add that, when I 
 first had occasion to address the Duma, I made it my 
 duty to tmdertake the defence of the Treaty of Ports- 
 mouth, although it demanded some httle courage to 
 do so at that particular time, and I have the satis- 
 faction of knowing that M. Witte, whose heart was in 
 the right place, in spite of his many faults, cherished 
 thereafter a warm feeling of gratitude toward me, his 
 declared political adversary. s 
 
 While the negotiations at Portsmouth were in prog- 
 ress, I remained aloof from all active participation in 
 politics, but, a little later, in the month of October, 
 1905, I was pushed suddenly into a sphere of action 
 that hitherto had been quite unfamiliar to me — ^the 
 domestic affairs of the Empire. In this way I was 
 brought into direct contact with the Czar and the 
 leading actors in the drama that was then playing in 
 my country. 
 
 At that epoch of her history Russia was passing 
 through a most serious internal crisis. The revolu- 
 tionary movement, which had resulted from the re- 
 verses of the Russian Army in Manchuria, culminated 
 in a general strike, which not only stopped all means 
 of communication, but also completely paralyzed the 
 economic life of the country. Violent disorders broke 
 out in the provinces and the agitation assumed a 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION, 1905-1906 11 
 
 menacing aspect throughout the Empire and es- 
 pecially in the capital. The Dowager Empress, who 
 was then Uving at Copenhagen, became extremely 
 alarmed at this state of things, and in her conver- 
 sations with me frequently expressed apprehension. 
 I took advantage of these conversations to try to con- 
 vince her, and through her to convince the Czar, of 
 the necessity of making concessions, before it was too 
 late, to the reasonable demands of the moderate 
 liberal party, so as to have the help of that party 
 in resisting the steadily increasing exactions of the 
 radicals and the revolutionaries. My efiForts in this 
 direction were seconded energetically by the brother 
 of the Empress, King Frederick Vlll., a man of great 
 good sense in poUtical matters, who had just suc- 
 ceeded his father. King Christian IX., on the throne of 
 Denmark. The Empress consented to write to her 
 son and persuade him to grant Russia a constitutional 
 character of his own accord, and it was decided at the 
 same time that I should go to St. Petersbm-g, deliver 
 the letter, and act as the interpreter and the advocate 
 before the Emperor, of the counsel which it contained. 
 It was not an easy matter to reach St. Petersburg 
 quickly, the journey by land being impracticable by 
 reason of the railway strike, and there was no direct 
 steamship conmiimication between Denmark and 
 Russia; but, at the request of King Frederick, the 
 Danish East-Asiatic Company placed at my disposal 
 one of their cargo boats, the St. Thomas, which had 
 just discharged freight at the port of Copenhagen. I 
 was able, consequently, to embark directly for St. 
 
12 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Petersburg; the voyage was rapid, if not agreeable, 
 the St. Thomas being in ballast and the Baltic most 
 turbulent at that season. 
 
 At the moment of my arrival at St. Petersburg the 
 crisis was nearing its maximum. I do not wish to 
 surcharge this part of my story with the details of my 
 three weeks' stay at the capital in those historic days | 
 of the latter part of October, 1905; it will suflBce to 
 say that, during the three weeks, I was not only an 
 attentive observer of the events which took place at 
 the time that the Manifesto of October 30th was 
 published, but I also took part in those events, which i 
 brought me in frequent contact with Emperor 
 Nicholas, as well as with the principal ministers and | 
 political personages of the moment. Simultaneously 
 with the promulgation of the constitution, Count 
 Witte, upon whom this title had been conferred im- J 
 mediately after his return from America, was made : 
 president of the first constitutional cabinet and ap- 
 plied himself to the task of establishing the foun- j 
 dations for the new organization of the Empire. He 
 commenced this arduous labour by summoning to St. 
 Petersbiu-g the leading representatives of the Liberal 
 and Moderate Liberal parties, who were then in con- 
 ference at Moscow and upon whose collaboration 
 he counted for aid in the accomplishment of his task. 
 Among them were Prince Lvoflf (afterward head of 
 the first provisional government in 1917), Princes 
 OuroussoflF and Troubetzkoy, Messrs. Goutchkoff^j 
 Stakhevitch, Roditcheff, and Kokoschkin, who was 
 assassinated in prison by the Bolsheviks in the year 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION, 1905-1906 13 
 
 1918. Count Witte's object was to draw up, in con- 
 junction with them, a governmental programme, and 
 to persuade some of them to join his cabinet. In the 
 course of these negotiations I devoted myself to an 
 earnest advocacy, before the Emperor, of the for- 
 mation of a homogeneous government, composed 
 of men sincerely desirous and capable of putting in 
 practice the constitutional reforms contained in the 
 Manifesto, but resolute in a determination to resist 
 the ever-increasing demands of the revolutionaries. 
 Among the personages convoked by Count Witte I 
 had some personal friends, and I did my best to per- 
 suade them to meet him halfway, but, unfortunately, 
 this plan, the only one whose realization appeared to 
 me to be feasible, was doomed to failure. None of the 
 men invited by Count Witte consented to collaborate 
 with him; political passions were too intense and party 
 tyranny too absolute to permit of their deciding 
 wisely. I consider, even now, that their refusal to 
 sustain Count Witte was a grave political fault and a 
 great misfortune for Russia, for that refusal left him 
 no other alternative but to fall back upon hetero- 
 geneous and strictly bureaucratic elements for the 
 formation of his cabinet — elements that were essen- 
 tially unpopular in the country and unable to give 
 him any strength with which to face the future 
 Duma. 
 
 Toward the end of my stay at St. Petersburg the 
 situation was by no means favourable: the publica- 
 ition of the Manifesto had been followed in the prov- 
 inces by a series of disorders and anti- Jewish "po- 
 
14 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 pogroms." These events had taken Count Witte by 
 surprise and provoked an immediate counter-move at 
 court. The reactionary party took occasion to raise 
 its head and to endeavour to regain its influence over 
 the Emperor; a lively struggle ensued between that 
 party and Count Witte, who had expected, after the 
 act of October 30th, a general acquiescence, but in- 
 stead found himself the object of violent attack on the 
 part of the extremists of both Right and Left, as well as 
 the contempt of the moderate liberals. When I took 
 leave of Count Witte to return to Copenhagen, I was 
 struck by the pessimism of his remarks. "The 
 Manifesto of the 30th October," he said, "has pre- 
 vented an immediate catastrophe, but it has brought 
 no radical remedy to a situation which is still fraught S 
 with peril. All I can hope is that I may get along, 
 without too much jostling, until the opening of the 
 Duma; but even that is only a hope and far from 
 being a certainty. A new revolutionary explosion 
 is always possible." A like pessimism on the part 
 of so energetic a man could not but surprise me; it 
 was only explainable by the profound disappointment 
 that he had experienced in the immediate results} of 
 the Manifesto, and, above 'all, the defection of the 
 moderate liberal party, which he had not foreseen and 
 to which he alluded with the greatest bitterness. 
 
 The part that I had taken in the pourparlers witK 
 the Moderate Liberals made it quite natural that 1 
 should be the most probable choice for the post of 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs in a cabinet that might be 
 formed with their cooperation. The Emperor, who, 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION, 1905-1906 15 
 
 at the time, appeared to be sincerely receptive to the 
 idea of such a cabinet, looked with favour upon my 
 candidature. When he received me in final audience 
 he told me that Count Lamsdorff, a typical func- 
 tionary of the old regime, who could not and would 
 not accommodate himself to the new order of things, 
 would retire before the opening of the Duma, and that 
 he had me in view as Count Lamsdorflf's successor. 
 
 After returning to Copenhagen, I maintained a 
 close watch upon the progress of events in Russia, and 
 I was more and more convinced that matters were 
 drawing to a crisis. Count Witte was facing formid- 
 able diflSculties and it was no secret that the Emperor, 
 while recognizing his extraordinary capacities as a 
 statesman, was imable to overcome the distrust and 
 repugnance with which he had long regarded his 
 minister. Count Witte, as well, could hardly dis- 
 guise his aversion for the successor of Alexander III., 
 with whom he had collaborated and whose fullest 
 confidence he had enjoyed. I will endeavour later to 
 define Count Witte's leading traits of character; he 
 was beyond doubt a great minister, even one of 
 genius, but his strong will, at that critical moment of 
 his country's history, was destined to be bruised and 
 broken against a chain of circumstances. One of the 
 reasons for this check in his career, and not the least, 
 was the absolute contrast between him and his 
 sovereign. The fact is that he had been forced upon 
 the Emperor by the progress of events and at a mo- 
 ment when no other choice seemed practicable. The 
 ideas of the liberals were in the ascendant at Court for 
 
I(( IMX'OLMOCnoNS OK A HHIKKiN MINISTKU 
 
 llir |iin(< lH'ir)«, hul Km<'"ftlly ''"' iniclioiinj-.y jxirly 
 rcf<jiiin'(J ilH fonmir itifluciirtr <»vrr Nicli<»l(i« II-. find 
 il wuH rud diflicult for lliut piuly l<» revive \\\h miim> 
 [)iri()iiH <»l' llie I'rcinicr. 1 1, was iiiMimiiiliMl I liii I ( !oiiiil 
 Witlc WUH MtnhilioiiH, rciuly uimI willing lo ovcrllii'ow 
 lite irioiijircliy iiiid jtrocliuiri liirriHcH' l'r«'Mi*l<'iil of llic 
 RuHisiun R<>[>ul>lic; I hiiii r<-iLM(»ri lo know, iJiroii^li 
 irifonnalion I'lirMiHlicd lo kic hy corn'MifoiKlciilM nt 
 home, Ihul \]u'. V]it\\n'r*>r wm cvidcnlly irion; luid 
 inon; iri(;liri(!d lo liHlcn lo hii«-1i itiMitiii/ilioHK. i 
 
 Vor my purl, I pluccd full vcVuuirv. upon ('ourit 
 WilUi'w good I'ailli mid lln; hournly of \i\n i'l]'i)r\M 
 lovvurd uiioluliou of llic (jrobifin willioul<'ud(iugmn|| 
 IIm! niouurcliicid i)riuripi«' tior IIk- <lyuawiy, niul will)- 
 oul, moreover, liiniliuf^ lIu- iinix-riiiJ pn*ro>/ii,liv('i( 
 bt'youd ft poiul Uiul wu« n'U<l<"n'd iu<!vilal)l«* by ihc 
 l<-rior of llie ('oriHliluliorud rliurlrr. A^/,tlh\, there* 
 fore, J hud r«!courHe lo llic fri«'n«lKliip of llie l^tuprew 
 Dowuj/f-r, wlio WUH Mlill living /il T'opcuhngrn; my 
 ol^jrc'l h(!if)g lo jM-rHiindc llic Kinjxtror lo Iri/Ml liiiriM^f 
 lo C.'ount Wille find ulford liiin fidl m<;oj)c for eurrylllj 
 oul }ji» progniunn*;. Srvrnd Ifllcnt of ih'tH tuiiUJi 
 w«'n; wrill«;n by IIk! Knipre«« lo li«'r won, hul, iip" 
 punmlly, with no lu«liug t:i\r<-\,. ( loiml Will** liintwfK 
 WUM Tiol only fully r-o^nizjinl of lln- dillimlli'*;! of hil 
 lUMk, but WUH le«H und U-hh hwvi; of Ix'ing »d>l< lo flllilll 
 
 il HliCfCHrtfully. 
 
 Tlie MunifcMio of llic :{Olli 0«lr,b..r, Imd ii been fWO' 
 rnulgalcd wix uif^nthn curlier, m u Hpr)nl/inc,r>iji« act 
 |)rornpl«-d by llic ('//m-'h own Mcnw; of juclicc, jni><l)t 
 fi.'ivc conciliulcd the <liHcord(inl clnncnlfi nn i'nuiii 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION. 1905-1906 17 
 
 Witte had expected; but, as it was, that act was con- 
 sidered by the revolutionary party as having been 
 forced upon the Emperor by the pressure of the 
 general strike. That party openly declared that it 
 would not be contented with the concessions already 
 granted by the imperial power, and that the same 
 method would be employed to wrest from that power 
 other and more sweeping privileges. 
 
 The revolutionary agitation was rekindled, but, at 
 the same time, it was countered by a movement which 
 arose from the sufferings inflicted by the strike upon 
 the population of the provinces. This counter-move- 
 ment was cleverly fostered by the reactionary party, 
 which had founded a vast association, called the 
 "League of the Russian People." This league, with 
 the connivance of the local authorities, organized the 
 so-called "Black Himdreds," composed of the dregs 
 of society and charged with the job of instigating anti- 
 revolutionary disturbances. Far from putting an 
 end to the crisis, the act of October 30th seemed 
 destined to create a new condition of extreme agita- 
 tion; in fact, the first three months following the 
 granting of the Constitution were marked by a series 
 of sanguinary encounters, beginning with the Cron- 
 stadt revolt. This revolt gave the signal for other 
 military and naval mutinies at Sebastopol and else- 
 where; the Volga region and others were the theatre 
 of agrarian disorders and anti-Jewish pogroms. 
 These disturbances were particularly violent in the 
 Baltic provinces, where they assumed the character 
 of a veritable Jacquerie, and, finally, in the month of 
 
18 RECOLLECTIONS OP A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 December, came the armed insurrection of Moscow, 
 which could only be suppressed with the aid of regi- 
 ments of the guard from St. Petersburg and at the 
 cost of great bloodshed. | 
 
 The effect of all these happenings was to weakei| 
 considerably the position of Count Witte, whos® 
 influence was at the same time being undermined 
 systematically by a member of his cabinet, M. 
 Dournovo, Minister of the Interior, one of the 
 bureaucrats to whom he had been forced to have 
 recourse, on account of the defection of the Liberals. 
 M. Dournovo had long been a functionary in the 
 police service and was quite as unscrupulous as he 
 was ambitious; but, on the other hand, he was en- 
 dowed with remarkable intelligence and energy. He 
 was backed by the famous General Trepoff, the all- 
 powerful chief of police during the period which pre- 
 ceded the promulgation of the Manifesto of October 
 30th, and, at the time with which we are now con- 
 cerned, prefect of the imperial palaces, a position 
 which brought him in daily contact with the Emperor 
 and enabled him to play upon his sovereign's preju- 
 dice and indecision. But that which gave to M. 
 Dournovo still greater strength was the protection 
 accorded to him by the Czarina, whose reactionary 
 tendencies were no secret. Thanks to all these 
 circumstances, M. Dournovo, who had now become 
 the soul of the reactionary party, was in a fair way 
 to acquire a preponderating influence over the Em- 
 peror, whom he incited with the utmost perseverance | 
 to annul the constitutional charter and to restore the 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION. 1905-1906 19 
 
 former autocratic government. The Czar himself 
 appeared to incline more and more to these counsels; 
 in the month of December, 1905, when receiving a 
 deputation of reactionaries who came to petition for 
 a reestablishment of the autocracy, he had still 
 maintained that the Manifesto of the 30th October 
 was the "expression of his unchangeable will and 
 could not undergo the slightest attaint"; but, some 
 weeks later, he replied to another deputation, which 
 insisted upon the removal of Coimt Witte and pro- 
 tested against the emancipation of the Jews, that he 
 would "bear alone the burden of power" that he had 
 assumed at Moscow, and for which he acknowledged 
 "responsibility to God alone," and he added: "The 
 light of truth will soon burst forth and all will become 
 clear; children of Russia, unite and hold yourselves 
 ready." This enigmatic language, coloured with mys- 
 ticism, gave proof of the progress attained by the 
 labours of the reactionary party and seemed to point 
 to an anti-revolutionary crisis in the near future. 
 
 In spite of all these alarming symptoms, the 
 situation improved perceptibly at the beginning of 
 March. Yielding to the advice of Count Witte, the 
 Emperor issued a new manifesto, accompanied by 
 two ukases, defining the new organization of the 
 Empire in conformity with the principles enounced in 
 the Manifesto of October 30th. The legislative 
 power was delegated to two chambers: a Cotmcil of 
 the Empire, or Upper House, with a membership half 
 nominative and half elective, and the Duma, all of 
 whose members were to be elected. 
 
20 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 This organization endowed Russia with a complete* 
 constitutional system, which, although subject to 
 criticism as being defective and insufficient in many 
 respects, was none the less a decisive step forward,? 
 and, for that reason, it was frankly accepted by all 
 those, including myself, who represented the Moderate 
 Liberal party. This party, which had taken the name 
 of "Octobrist," continued to oppose Count Witte 
 on personal rather than political grounds, but de- 
 clared itself ready and willing to support any cabinet 
 sincerely desirous of carrying out the above reforms. 
 On the other hand, the more advanced Liberals, called 
 officially the Constitutional Democratic party, a 
 name abbreviated to K.D. and then, by a play of 
 words, transformed to "Cadet," remained hostile and 
 maintained that the faculties accorded to the Duma 
 were not sufficient, especially those concerning the 
 vote on the budget and the right of interpellation. 
 The Cadets, who were strongly organized, prepared 
 for an active electoral campaign and placed at the 
 head of their programme a demand for an extension 
 of the powers of the Duma, the opening of which was 
 to take place on the 10th of May, As that date drew 
 nearer it became more and more evident that it would : 
 be the signal for the dismissal of Count Witte, who 
 was abandoned by the Emperor and opposed by 
 all the political parties. Several prominent persons j 
 were mentioned as being likely to succeed him all 
 belonging to the bureaucracy, and a number of minis- 
 terial slates were drawn up and circulated, almost all 
 of which contained my name for the Ministry of 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION. 1905-1906 21 
 
 Foreign Affairs, causing me no little disquiet, for, 
 while quite willing to join a cabinet composed of men 
 sharing my own political ideas and with whom I 
 could cooperate in putting the new measures into 
 working order, I did not enjoy the prospect of allying 
 myself with a group of bureaucrats, who would be 
 sure to fall foul of the Duma. Furthermore, having 
 been out of all active diplomatic work for three years, 
 I felt inadequately prepared for the task of directing 
 the foreign affairs of my country at so troubled and 
 critical a period. I resolved, then, to try to persuade 
 the Emperor to place at the head of the Ministry of 
 Foreign Affairs, for the time being, an older and more 
 experienced diplomatist — ^M. Nelidoff, for example — 
 and appointing me, as he had at first intended, to 
 one of the important embassies for a while, in order 
 that I might acquire a better knowledge of the under- 
 current of European politics. 
 
 In the month of March I obtained a three-weeks' 
 leave and went to Paris and London, where I wished 
 to confer on the general political situation, and my 
 relation thereto, with our ambassadors in those 
 capitals, M. Nelidoff and Count Benckendorff. I 
 expected also to rejoin in Paris our Ambassador to 
 Rome, M. Mouravieff, a near relative. I was on 
 terms of great intimacy with all three, besides being 
 in perfect accord with them respecting the leading 
 political questions of the day, so that it was highly 
 important for me to discuss thoroughly with them the 
 international situation created by the foreign and 
 domestic crisis that Russia had just undergone. I 
 
22 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 hoped, too, to gain M. Nelidoff 's consent to the plan 
 that I intended to propose to the Emperor. 
 
 My stay in Paris and in London resulted most 
 happily for me, in that it gave me the cnance to arrive 
 at a complete communion of ideas with M. Nelidoff, 
 Count Benckendorff, and M. Mouravieff as to the 
 policy to be adopted by Russia. It was, in fact, the 
 identical policy that I submitted to the Czar when, 
 only a few weeks later, I became Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, and it finally developed into the arrangement 
 which became known to the world as the "Triple 
 Entente." This communion of ideas endured 
 throughout the entire term of my Ministry, and it is 
 with a sentiment of profound gratitude that I invoke 
 in these lines the memory of those three eminent 
 statesmen who gave me, on every occasion, their 
 most intelligent and most loyal cooperation, and 
 not one of whom, alas, is now numbered among the 
 living. 
 
 On the other hand, my plan for bringing about the 
 appointment of M. Nelidoff to the post of Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs met with a categorical refusal on his 
 part, and no other course remained open to me than 
 to prepare myself, quite against my will, for under^ 
 taking a task that was rendered peculiarly diflBcult 
 and irksome by circumstances. 
 
 My sojourn at Paris and London coincided with an 
 exceedingly interesting political phase — ^the last days 
 of the Algeciras Conference. The debates at Alge- 
 ciras summed up, one might say, the diplomatic work 
 that had been accomplished in Europe for a year 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION, 1905-1906 23 
 
 past, and it was of great interest to me to inform my- 
 self of all that had taken place behind the scenes at 
 the Conference. M. Nelidoff and Count Bencken- 
 dorff, with the best of good will, initiated me into all 
 the details of the complex play of rival interests 
 that became manifest during that memorable meet- 
 ing. 
 
 That period was marked by an incident to which 
 the historians of the Conference have given but little 
 attention, but which, to my mind, exerted great in- 
 fluence upon the relations between Russia and Ger- 
 many, and, consequently, upon the course of events 
 in Europe; I allude to the circular note of Count 
 Lamsdorff, directing the Russian representatives to 
 convey to the governments participating in the Con- 
 ference the instructions that had been issued to the 
 Russian plenipotentiaries at Algeciras with regard to 
 the crucial question of the police. The object of that 
 circular was to put an end to the rumours, started in 
 Berlin, to the effect that Russia refused to support 
 France in that controversy and was ranging herself 
 under the German flag. M. Nelidoff, alarmed by 
 those rumours, considered it necessary to calm French 
 public opinion, and with that end in view, communi- 
 cated the contents of the dispatch to the French 
 journalist, M. Tardieu, who published a resum^ in 
 Le Temps. This provoked a violent outburst of 
 anger on the part of the German Emperor, who not 
 only was disappointed because of the assistance given 
 to France by Russia in the premises, but felt that a 
 personal injury had been done him by the publicity 
 
24 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 with which it had been accompanied. He did not 
 hesitate to criticize Nicholas II. in public, and in most 
 uncomplimentary terms, for the Czar's black ingrati- 
 tude to Germany, and, at the same time, the German 
 Press, reverting to the well-worn subject of the bene- 
 fits heaped upon Russia by Germany during the war 
 with Japan and Russia's ingratitude therefor, com- 
 menced a violent campaign against Russian diplo- 
 macy, pursuant, no doubt, to government order. 
 Finally, the German banks were directed, under pre- 
 tence of reprisals, to abstain from all participation 
 in the Russian Loan which was being negotiated in 
 Paris and a slice of which had been reserved for them. 
 It was not until later, when, in my capacity as 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, I gained full knowledge 
 of the Kaiser's efforts to draw Emperor Nicholas into 
 an alliance with Germany, that I was in a position to 
 comprehend completely the underlying causes of the 
 German Emperor's disappointment and chagrin. 
 His temporary success in that direction, through the 
 famous interview at Bjorkoe, has since been fully 
 revealed, as will be recounted in the next chapter, in 
 which I will also explain how the Kaiser's plan was 
 thwarted by the intervention of Count Lamsdorff. 
 At the moment of which I am speaking, the German 
 Emperor had not lost hope of holding the Czar to the 
 Bjorkoe agreement, but the publication of Count 
 Lamsdorff's dispatch furnished him with a tangible 
 proof that his plans were definitely upset, and he 
 straightway conceived for Emperor Nicholas a hatred 
 that he managed to conceal for some years, but which 
 
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SITUATION, 1905-1906 25 
 
 burst all bounds when he finally decided to throw 
 off his mask in the month of August, 1914. 
 
 This incident of the dispatch of Count Lamsdorff 
 had a curious epilogue at Berlin. Prince von Bulow, 
 on being interpellated concerning the subject by Be- 
 bel in the Reichstag, rose to reply, when he was seized 
 with a fainting-fit. Although his health was re- 
 established, he remained in private life for some time 
 after. It is certain that his reply, if it had not been 
 suddenly interrupted, would have revealed to the 
 public the radical change that had taken place in the 
 Russo-German relations, a change which, at that 
 time, was not fully comprehended except by those 
 conversant with all the facts. 
 
 It was during my visit to Paris and London that I 
 learned the first results of the elections for the Duma. 
 These results proved clearly that the Cadets were 
 about to win a crushing victory, not only over the 
 reactionaries but over the Octobrists as well. The 
 supremacy of the Cadets was due, principally, to their 
 superior organization, but the Government, or, rather 
 M. Dournovo, had contributed to their success by a 
 policy of blind and brutal repression that had exas- 
 perated the more moderate elements. This confirmed 
 my fears that the new cabinet, as it was to be consti- 
 tuted, would be brought into coUision with the Duma 
 at the very start, and I felt all the more repugnance 
 at the prospect of belonging to it. 
 
 Shortly after my return to Copenhagen I was sum- 
 moned to St. Petersburg by the Emperor, to succeed 
 Count Lamsdorff. I had no choice but to obey, and 
 
26 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 I arrived at St. Petersburg the same day that the 
 Duma opened, just in time to be present at that mem- 
 orable ceremony in the Winter Palace. The Emperor 
 accepted the resignation of Count Witte on that day, 
 and appointed M. Goremykin Prime Minister. An 
 almost complete change in the personnel of the Cab- 
 inet followed; I made a final attempt to stay out, but 
 the Emperor appealed to my loyalty in terms which 
 made it quite impossible for me to persist in my re- 
 fusal and, a few days afterward, my appointment to 
 the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was gazetted. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 The Secret Treaty of Bjorkoe 
 
 BEFORE speaking of my entrance upon my 
 new duties, it seems necessary to explain the 
 general political situation in Europe as it 
 existed at that time, and, in connection therewith, 
 I must dwell at length upon an episode which has 
 been of particular interest to the public in France 
 and England. I allude to the secret treaty between 
 the Czar and the German Emperor, signed at Bjorkoe 
 in the summer of 1905. 
 
 The publication of this treaty by the Russian revo- 
 lutionary Government in 1917, together with the 
 telegraphic correspondence exchanged by the two 
 sovereigns, has given rise to many controversies and a 
 copious literature. Some of the books and news- 
 paper articles in which it has been discussed are clearly 
 partisan in their nature, and charge Emperor Nicholas 
 unjustly with being guilty of the most heinous of 
 crimes: that of betraying his ally, France; others, 
 written in a more equitable spirit, are necessarily 
 incomplete and fail of convincing because the authors 
 did not have access to the original documents. 
 
 The Treaty of Bjorkoe was signed the year before 
 I assumed the direction of the foreign policy of my 
 country, so I played no immediate rdle in that epi- 
 
 27 
 
28 EECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN iSHNISTER 
 
 sode, but in my capacity as Minister of Foreign?; 
 Affairs I was enabled to infonn myself minutely of all 
 the facts bearing upon it. I am convinced that I 
 should fall short of my plara duty toward the unfor- 
 tunate sovereign whom I served for so many years 
 and whose good qualities, as well as whose weaknesses, 
 I recognize, if I did not contribute my testimony to a 
 discussion that has been imduly confused by polemics. 
 But, in giving considerable space to this incident, my 
 object will not be solely to endeavour to reestablish 
 the real facts; the affair of the secret treaty illumines, 
 in a peculiarly clear and striking manner, the entire 
 international situation as I found it when I took up 
 my new functions. I myself was obhged from the 
 b^inning to take its consequences into accoimt, and 
 my recital would be incomplete, and even almost 
 incomprehensible, if I shoidd not enter into the de- 
 tails of this affair at the start. 
 
 The international situation, in the spring of 1905, 
 presented an aspect that was pecxiliarly complex and 
 even threatening. The unfortimate war with Japan 
 had not only resulted in the enfeeblement of Russia, 
 but had shaken the whole edifi(» of European poUtics. 
 This political system, for a long period, had been 
 based upon an equilibriimi of forces, notoriously un- 
 stable: a dual alliance between Russia and France, 
 counterbalanced by the triple alliance between Ger- 
 many, Austria-Himgary, and Italy, The immediate 
 and natural effect of the enfeebling of Russia by the 
 war, and, more still, by the revolutionary movement 
 provoked by her military defeats, had affected dan- 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 29 
 
 gerously the Dual Alliance. It was realized in Paris, 
 as well as in London, that the balance of power could 
 not be reestablished unless England should renounce 
 her traditional policy of "splendid isolation" and 
 develop a very much closer understanding with 
 France. An Important step in this direction had been 
 taken, under the special inspiration of King Edward 
 VII., by the Anglo-French agreement regarding 
 Egypt and Morocco, in 1904. This agreement de- 
 veloped rapidly and soon took the form of a veritable 
 entente cordiale. During the Russo-Japanese War 
 this entente made itself felt in the most efficacious 
 manner by helping toward a peaceful solution of the 
 quarrel between Russia and England, which arose 
 from the Dogger Bank incident and threatened to 
 end in an armed conffict.* 
 
 *The Dogger Bank incident took place on the night of the Slst of October, 1904, when Admiral 
 Rojdestvensky's fleet, en route for the Far East, waa crossing the North Sea. Falling in with a 
 flotilla of Hull fishermen, and believing that he was surrounded by Japanese destroyers, whose 
 presence in those waters had been reported by the Russian Bureau of Information, the admiral 
 opened fire. An English trawler was sunk and several others were seriously damaged. One of the 
 Bussian cruisers, the Aurore, was also hit. Admiral Bojdestvensky surely must have recognized 
 his blunder tiie next morning, but none the less he continued his voyage without stopping and per- 
 sisted in his version of a Japanese attack. This incident aroused the liveliest indignation in Eng- 
 land, and came near provoking a rupture with Russia. Being at that time Minister at Copen- 
 hagen, I was naturally the 6rst to be informed as to the truth of what had taken place in the North 
 Sea. A few days before, I had visited the fleet during its passage through the Grand Belt, and 
 I conld see that iJie admiral and many of his officers were in a state of nervous excitement over the 
 report that had reached them, to the effect that d^troyers had been dispatched by Japan to 
 European waters. This report emanated from an individual who called himself Harting, but whose 
 real name was Landesen, a former anarchist who had come into the service of the Russian Police 
 and who later became notorious as the chief of the Russian Secret Police in Paris. He had come to 
 Copenhagen several times, and commimicated to me his reports on the subject of the presence of 
 Japanese destroyers in the vicinity. Being distrustful of him, I made my own investigations and 
 was soon convinced of the fanciful nature of his information, the sole object of which was to extort 
 huge sums of money from the Russian Government. I believed it to be my duty to inform whom 
 it might concern in Russia, but my warning was unheeded. For my part, I perceived a danger for 
 our fleet, not from Japanese destroyers, but because of its hasty and defective preparation,which 
 rendered its passage through the Grand Belt very hazardous. I obtained from the Danish Govern- 
 ment, not only the help of its best pilots, but also the presence of its gunboats, which were stationed 
 so as to indicate the dangerous points throughout the entire length of the straits. The passage 
 
30 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 On the other hand, the German Emperor, who had 
 done everything in his power to encourage the Czar 
 in his policy of adventure in the Far East, now pro- 
 fited by every occasion to poison the relations between 
 Russia and England. The ruler of Germany had 
 long nourished a plan for isolating England and re- 
 grouping the European Powers so as to form an anti- 
 English league on the Continent. A similar grouping 
 had been effected temporarily in 1895, when Russia, 
 France and Germany joined in presenting an ultima- 
 tum to Japan after the treaty of Simonoseki. Em- 
 peror William was the soul of this hybrid combina- 
 tion, in which France only joined half-heartedly, 
 Russia more or less unconsciously, and from which 
 England prudently withheld. This combination had 
 only a short life, but, nevertheless, it produced abom- 
 inable results, for to it may be ascribed the initial 
 causes of the troubles which took place in the Far 
 East in 1900, and, in consequence, of the subsequent 
 conflict between Russia and Japan. 
 
 of the Grand Belt was thus effected without confusion or accident, but immediately after emerging 
 from the straits an incident ensued which, happily, entailed no serious consequences. The admiral, . 
 sighting some Norwegian cargo-boats, mistook them for Japanese destroyers and fired several 
 shots, without, however, reaching them. I was therefore but little astonished when I learned what 
 had taken place a little later in the North Sea. Some time afterward I obtained the testimony of 
 an eye-witness, a Danish bandmaster who accompanied the admiral and who, after leaving the 
 fleet at Tangier, had come back to Copenhagen. I reported his testimony to my Government, 
 which refused to believe it and continued to give credit, against all the evidence, to the version of 
 Admiral Rojdestvensky. 
 
 Finally, the French Government, profiting by its close relations with Russia as well as England, 
 interposed its good offices, which led to the formation, in conformity with the Hague Convention 
 of 1899, of an investigating commission, composed of French, American, and Austrian delegates, 
 who met at Paris under the presidency of Admiral Fournier. The very able report of this commis- 
 sion, while verifying the error committed by Admiral Bojdestvensky, recognized his good faith and 
 exonerated him from all blame as far as concerned his duty to humanity. Russia agreed, with 
 good will, to pay indemnity for the damage caused. It may safely be said that, thanks to the 
 amicable character infused by France into the labours of the commission, this painful difficulty 
 was settled, not only without further embittering the relations between Russia and England, but 
 in a manner predisposing the two nations toward greater friendship in the future. 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OP BJORKOE 31 
 
 In fact, after Laving set on foot a diplomatic pro- 
 cedure which evicted Japan from the continent of 
 Asia, the German Emperor himself took forcible 
 possession of Kiao-Chiau and encouraged the Czar 
 to seize the peninsula of Liao-Tong, with Port Arthur, 
 which had just been torn from the grasp of Japan, 
 This action, essentially immoral in itself, excited 
 bitter resentment on the part of the Chinese as well 
 as the Japanese. In China it was the point of de- 
 parture of the Boxer movement, which brought the 
 forces of the Powers to Pekin and served as a pretext 
 for the occupation by Russia of a part of Manchuria. 
 In Japan it heightened the feeling of anger against 
 Russia for having aided in depriving the Japanese 
 of the fruit of their victories. Later, it was again due 
 to the impulsion of Emperor William that the Czar 
 engaged in political activity in the Far East; in this 
 connection the famous telegram may be recalled to 
 mind, in which the Kaiser, after an interview off 
 Reval, saluted Emperor Nicholas with the pompous, 
 but all too illusory, title of "Admiral of the Pacific." 
 Most characteristic of the methods of William II. 
 is the fact that, at the same moment when he was 
 pushing the Czar into difficulties with Japan, he was 
 doing his very best to further the establishment of the 
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which strengthened Japan ' 
 and increased the chances of a conflict with Russia; 
 the posthumous papers of Count Hayashi, signer of 
 the treaty, which were pubhshed at Tokio in the year 
 1913, leave no doubt whatever on this point. Be- 
 sides, it is only too evident that Germany had nothing 
 
32 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 to lose and everything to gain by a war between 
 Russia and Japan; if Russia should come out Adctor- 
 ious, she would be involved for many years in Far- 
 Eastern affairs, and all her energies would be absorbed 
 in preparation for a possible revanche on the part of 
 Japan; while, if she should be defeated, she would be 
 enfeebled and profoundly humiliated. In either case 
 the influence of Germany would be increased in pro- 
 portion and her emperor would become the arbiter of 
 Europe. 
 
 As it turned out, the Kaiser's plans were marvel- 
 lously seconded by the course of events. Russia 
 suflPered more than one could have foreseen by the 
 war, and, above all, the domestic circumstances that 
 were brought on by her defeats. During the entire 
 length of the war the Kaiser profited by every oppor- 
 tunity to proclaim the services that he had rendered 
 to Russia and the claims which he pretended to have 
 acquired for the gratitude of Emperor Nicholas. In 
 reality, the Kaiser's adoption of an attitude that 
 caused Russia to lessen her defences on her western 
 front was evidently for the purpose of urging Russia 
 farther and farther into the quicksands of the Far 
 East; besides, Germany had been recompensed al- 
 ready, very liberally, for this apparent service by the 
 signing of a treaty of commerce, extremely advanta- 
 geous to the Germans and onerous for Russia. Did 
 not Count Witte, who found himself obliged to sign 
 this treaty, declare that its eflFects were equivalent 
 to a heavy war indemnity imposed upon Russia? 
 
 We have seen that Emperor William neglected no 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 33 
 
 means of keeping alive the feeling of resentment that 
 the Czar cherished toward England, and that he made 
 use of all incidents of a nature to estabUsh the com- 
 plicity of the English with the Japanese. Nothing 
 could be more instructive in this connection than the 
 secret telegrams exchanged between the two sov- 
 ereigns, found by the Russian revolutionary Govern- 
 ment in the archives of Tsarskoie-Selo and published 
 by its order in the Russian and foreign periodical 
 Press.* For instance, a propos of the Dogger Bank 
 incident, he telegraphed to Emperor Nicholas on 
 the 30th of October, that is to say, at a moment 
 when there could no longer be any doubt of the 
 non-existence of Japanese destroyers in the North 
 Sea: 
 
 Heard from private source that Hull fishermen have already 
 acknowledged that they have seen foreign steam-craft among 
 their boats, not belonging to their fishing fleet, which they knew 
 not. So there has been foul play. I think the British Embassy 
 in Petersburg must know this, news whereto are kept from the 
 British public till now for fear of "blamage." 
 
 When no incident of this nature presented itself, the 
 Kaiser collected with great care and communicated 
 to Emperor Nicholas all the gossip and all the calum- 
 nies calculated to increase to the latter's distrust of 
 England, nor did he hesitate to resort to the fabrica- 
 tion of false news when it appeared advisable. 
 
 *The two emperors spoke and corresponded in English, and the original text of the telegrams 
 found at Tsarskoie-Selo was published in the New York Herald in the months of September and 
 October, 1917. The telegrams cited here are reprinted from the same source. 
 
34 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Let us take, for example, his telegram of the 15th 
 November: 
 
 From reliable source in India I am secretly informed that 
 expedition a la Thibet is being quickly prepared for Afghanistan. 
 It is meant to bring that country for once and all under British 
 influence, if possible direct suzerainty. The expedition is to 
 leave end of this month. The only not English European in 
 Afghanistan service, the director of the arms manufactory of the 
 Emir, a German gentleman, has been murdered, as priambule 
 to the action. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the "English expedition to 
 Afghanistan" had been announced by the English 
 Press since the beginning of the month, and all it 
 amounted to was the sending to Kabul of a political 
 mission, which was to stay there for a few weeks. 
 
 And is not this other telegram of the Kaiser's, dated 
 November 19th, an extraordinary hodge-podge of 
 invention and perfidious advice? In spite of its 
 length, it is worth quoting in its entirety: 
 
 Lamsdorff* leaves to-night with letter. My statements about 
 India in last telegram are corroborated by the speech of Lord 
 Selborne, who alluded to the Afghanistan question. I hear from 
 trustworthy private source that authorities in Tokio are getting 
 anxious at the future outlook of the war. They have expressed 
 their mortification at not having gained a real success at Liao- 
 yang, considering enormous loss of men, because they were with- 
 out any fresh reserves. The steady pouring in of fresh battalions 
 from Russia is quite far beyond their expectations, as they never 
 thought the Siberian railway capable of keeping up the trans- 
 
 •This is not the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs of that period, but a German officer of similu 
 name, whom the Kaiser bad sent as an attache to the Czar personally. 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 35 
 
 ports unremittingly. They begin to see in consequence that, 
 though they are at an end with their cadres, and especially oflGi- 
 cers, your army is daily increasing in strength, men, and striking 
 power, and that the scales of war are slowly but surely turning 
 against them. A Japanese general went so far as to say : " The 
 soup we have cooked we must now eat it up." My suspicions, 
 accordingly, that the Japanese are trying secretly to get other 
 Powers to mediate because they are now at the height of their 
 successes, have proved correct. Lansdowne has asked Hayashi 
 •to intimate to England the conditions upon which Japan would 
 conclude peace. They were telegraphed from Tokio, but were 
 so preposterous that even blustering Lansdowne thought them 
 too strong and urged Hayashi to tone them down. When they 
 made a wry face and difficulties, Lansdowne added : " Of course 
 England will take good care that a medieval Russia will be kept 
 well out of Manchuria, Korea, etc., so that de facto Japan will 
 get all she wants." That is the point the British have in their 
 eye when they speak of friendship and friendly mediation. 
 France, as I hear from Japan, is aheady informed of these plans 
 and, of course, a party to this arrangement, taking, as usual 
 in the new entente cordiale, the side of England. They are going 
 to oflPer you a bit of Persia as compensation, of course far from 
 the shore of the Gulf — ga va sans dire — ^which England means 
 to annex herself, fearing you might get access to the warm sea, 
 which you must by right, as Persia is bound to fall imder Russian 
 control and government. This would give either a splendid 
 commercial opening, which England wants to debar you from. 
 Probably your diplomatists will have reported all this to you 
 before, but I thought, nevertheless, it my duty to inform you 
 all I know, all of which are authentic serious news from ab- 
 solutely trustworthy sources. Lansdowne's words are authentic, 
 too. So you see the future for your army is brightened up and 
 you will soon be able to turn the tables upon the enemy. May 
 God grant you full success, while I continue to watch everywhere 
 for you. Best love to Alice. 
 
 WlhhY. 
 
36 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 In this telegram the German Emperor is seen to 
 be not merely inciting the Czar against England, but 
 even suggesting doubt as to the loyalty of France. 
 Other telegrams reveal similar attempts in that di- 
 rection. In one he denounces a pretended plan on 
 the part of England and France "to revive the old 
 Crimean combination"; in another he accuses France 
 of having "clearly abandoned Russia throughout the 
 war, while Germany has aided Russia in every way 
 possible." 
 
 The telegraphic correspondence between the two 
 sovereigns enables one to follow, almost from day to 
 day, the progress of Emperor William's efforts to win 
 over the Czar to his project of a continental league 
 against England. The unfavourable turn in the 
 events of the war caused Nicholas II. to be all 
 the more receptive to the ideas of his cousin, who 
 took advantage of the situation to show his cards 
 more plainly, to the extent of proposing a treaty 
 between Russia, Germany, and France, destined 
 "to put an end to English and Japanese inso- 
 lence." 
 
 But at the very moment when the Kaiser thought 
 he had attained his object a serious difference arose 
 between them: the German Emperor insisted upon 
 an immediate signing of the treaty by Russia without 
 the knowledge of France, which was to be invited to 
 join afterward; the Czar positively refused his assent 
 to such a proceeding, repugnant to his feeling of loy- 
 alty to France as well as to his good sense. The 
 following telegram, addressed by him to the German 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 37 
 
 Emperor on the 23rd November, 1904, gives proof of 
 the Czar's sentiments: 
 
 Before signing the proposed treaty, I think it would be proper 
 to submit it to France; as long as it remains unsigned one can 
 make certain modifications of details in the text, while, if aheady 
 approved by us both, it will seem as if we tried to enforce the 
 treaty on France. In this case a failure might easily happen. 
 Therefore, I ask your agreement to acquaint the Government of 
 France with this project, and, upon getting their answer, shall at 
 once let you know by telegraph. 
 
 Now it was precisely the scheme of "enforcing the 
 treaty on France" that the Kaiser had in mind, so he 
 hastened to reply to Emperor Nicholas by the follow- 
 ing telegram, which I cannot refrain from quoting in 
 extenso for the reason that, from the first line to the 
 last, it strikes me as being so thoroughly characteris- 
 tic: 
 
 Best thanks for telegram. You have given me new proof of 
 your perfect loyalty by deciding not to inform France without 
 my agreement. Nevertheless, it is my firm conviction it would 
 be absolutely dangerous to inform France before we both signed 
 the treaty. It would have an effect diametrically opposed to 
 our wishes. It is only the absolute, sure knowledge that we are 
 both bound by the treaty to lend each other mutual help that 
 will bring France to press upon England to remain quiet and keep 
 the peace, for fear of France's position being jeopardized. 
 Should, however, France know that a Russian-German treaty is 
 only projected, but still unsigned, she will immediately give 
 short notice to her friend — if not secret ally — England, with 
 whom she is bound by entente cordiale, and inform her imme- 
 diately. The outcome of such information would doubtless be 
 the instantaneous attack by the two allied Powers, England and 
 
38 EECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Japan, onGermany, in Europe as well as in Asia. Their enor- 
 mous maritime supremacy would soon make short work of my 
 small fleet, and Germany would be temporarily crippled. 
 
 This would upset the scales of the equilibrium of the world 
 to our mutual harm and, later on, when you begin your peace 
 negotiations, throw you alone on the tender mercies of Japan 
 and her jubilant, overwhelming friends. It was my special 
 wish and, as I understood, your intention, too, to maintain and 
 strengthen this endangered equilibrium of the world through 
 expressly the agreement between Russia, Germany, and France. 
 That is only possible if your treaty becomes fact before and if 
 we are perfectly d' accord under any form. A previous informa- 
 tion of France will lead to catastrophe. 
 
 Should you, notwithstanding, think it impossible for you to 
 conclude a treaty with me without the previous consent of France 
 then it would be a far safer alternative to abstain from con- 
 cluding any treaty at all. Of course I shall be as absolutely 
 silent about our pourparlers as you will be; in the same manner 
 as you have only informed Lamsdorff*, so I have only spoken to 
 Biilow, who guaranteed absolute secrecy. Our mutual relations 
 and feelings would remain imchanged as before, and I shall go 
 on trying to make myself useful to you as far as my safety will 
 permit. Your agreement of neutrality was commimicated to 
 me by the Emperor of Austria, and I thank you for your tele- 
 gram doing the same. I think it very sensible and it has my 
 fullest approval. Best love. 
 
 These arguments were not successful in overcoming 
 the objections of Emperor Nicholas, and, in the month 
 of December, the proposed treaty appeared to be 
 definitely abandoned. We then see the Kaiser re- 
 newing in another direction his efforts to bring the 
 Czar into an alliance. At that time England was 
 
 The truth is that CouUt Lamsdorff, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was not kept informed 
 by Emperor Nicholas with regard to the projected treaty. 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 39 
 
 causing diflficulties in the supply of English coal for 
 the Russian fleet, and the German Emperor took ad- 
 vantage of this opportunity to offer Russia the assis- 
 tance of the German merchant marine and obtained 
 in exchange a declaration from the Russian Govern- 
 ment that "Russia considers herself bound to sustain 
 Germany by every means in her power in connection 
 with any difficulties that may arise from having de- 
 livered coal to the Russian fleet during the present 
 war." 
 
 This amounted almost to a treaty of alliance, but it 
 was regarded as merely a half-success by Emperor 
 William, who, after letting several months pass with- 
 out renewing his efforts, finally decided, toward the 
 end of the summer of 1905, to try a master-stroke. 
 If he had not been able to convince the Czar through 
 correspondence, he told himself, he could gain his end 
 by getting into personal contact with his cousin. In 
 this he planned most cleverly, for whenever the two 
 sovereigns were together, the impetuous personality 
 of the German Emperor had always dominated the 
 weaker and more refined nature of Nicholas II., who, 
 for his part, was quite conscious of this inequality and 
 distrusted his powers of resistance to the shock of his 
 cousin's fiery eloquence. On several occasions I have 
 noticed the nervousness with which the Czar contem- 
 plated an approaching interview with him, a sort of 
 dread that did not pass until their meeting had ter- 
 minated. It is easy to understand, therefore, why 
 the Kaiser resolved to make an unexpected visit to 
 Emperor Nicholas. 
 
40 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 On account of the difficulties existing between 
 Sweden and Norway that year, the German Emperor 
 had given up his usual voyage to the Norwegian 
 fjords and was cruising in the Baltic, off the Swedish 
 coast. At the same time, the Czar had betaken 
 himself to the waters of the Finland archipelago, 
 near Viborg, seeking rest after the' emotions and 
 fatigue of that anxious summer in Russia. On the 
 23rd of July the world was surprised by the unlooked- 
 for appearance of the Kaiser, on board the Hoken- 
 zollern, in the roads of Bjorkoe, where the Czar's 
 yacht Pole Star was anchored at the time. There 
 it was that the famous interview took place and the 
 secret treaty was signed that has aroused such wide^ 
 spread interest and comment since its disclosure by 
 the Russian revolutionary Government. 
 
 It has been proved beyond all doubt that the Bjor- 
 koe interview was adroitly brought about by Emperor 
 William, in spite of the claims of the German Press, 
 inspired by the Wilhelmstrasse, attributing the initia- 
 tive to the Czar. The telegraphic correspondence 
 between the sovereigns of itself is sufficient to estab- 
 lish the truth, but there are these other circumstances 
 to be taken into account, namely, that the German 
 Emperor knew very well that the Czar had only his 
 family and personal entourage at Bjorkoe; that Count 
 Lamsdorff, whose opposition he had good reason to 
 fear, was not included in his sovereign's suite; it was 
 imperative to forestall his being summoned from St. 
 Petersburg, only a few hours away. Finally, when 
 proposing in his telegrams to visit the Czar, the 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 41 
 
 Kaiser imposed the utmost secrecy as to his project, 
 and the secret was so well guarded that no one on 
 board the Hohenzollern, nor in Germany, and still less 
 in Russia, knew a word of it until the last moment. 
 In a telegram dated the 21st of July the Kaiser ex- 
 pressed himself as rejoicing in the prospect of seeing 
 what a face his hosts would make when he appeared 
 in view of the Pole Star. "A jBne lark — tableau /" 
 he added, at the close of the telegram. 
 
 Following is the text of the secret treaty signed at 
 Bjorkoe, as it was found by the Russian revolutionary 
 Government in the archives of Tsarskoie-Selo and 
 published, simultaneously with the telegraphic corre- 
 spondence exchanged between the two Emperors be- 
 fore and after its signature: 
 
 Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor of all the Russias, of 
 the one part, and the Emperor of Germany, of the other part, 
 with the object of assuring the peace of Em-ope, have agreed 
 upon the following points of the treaty hereinafter related, with 
 reference to a defensive alliance: 
 
 Article I. If any European State shall attack either of the 
 two Empires, the allied party engages to aid his co-contractor 
 with aU his forces on land and on sea. 
 
 Article II. The high contracting parties agree not to conclude 
 a separate peace with any enemy whatsoever. 
 
 Article III. The present treaty shall be in force from the 
 moment of the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan 
 and may only be cancelled by a year's previous notice. 
 
 Article IV. When this treaty goes into effect, Russia will 
 take the necessary steps to make its terms known to France 
 and invite her to subscribe to it as an ally. 
 
 (Signed) Nicholas. 
 William. 
 
12 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 The publication, in August, 1917, of the secret 
 treaty of Bjorkoe produced great excitement in France 
 ind in England; there was a tendency in the Press of 
 both countries to qualify it, as far as the Czar was 
 concerned, as an act of bad faith — even treason, if you 
 ike — to his ally France. Although this interpreta- 
 tion did not tally with the text of the treaty, nor with 
 the circumstances in which it was signed, it was war- 
 ranted, in a way, by an article of a Russian journalist 
 svhich had appeared some little time before the publi- 
 :;ation of the secret documents found at Tsarskoie- 
 3elo. In that article he related certain disclosures 
 (vhich had been made to him on the same subject 
 ay Count Witte, whose intimate friend he represented 
 liimself to be. 
 
 Here is what Count Witte is described as having 
 said to the aforesaid journalist, after swearing him to 
 secrecy for the period of that statesman's life: 
 
 "Within a few days after I had entered upon my 
 iuties as president of the Council, the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs notified me that he desired to confer 
 (vith me upon an affair of state of the highest impor- 
 tance. It was then that I learned from him of the 
 existence of a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance 
 between the two emperors. I was astonished and 
 shocked by the knowledge of this secret document, 
 which I deemed contrary to all the rules of political 
 equity, of governmental honesty, and to all permissi- 
 ble forms of conduct. Against what country was an 
 Dffensive meditated? Who had countersigned the 
 treaty? Against whom? Evidently against France, 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 43 
 
 which always had been an object of William's cu- 
 pidity; against the same France whose people had 
 concluded an alliance with us in the interest of their 
 safety." 
 
 This declaration of Count Witte, if it was really 
 made in the words above quoted, is not only inexact 
 as to material facts, but it contains a statement that 
 he must have known to be quite false. As will appear 
 later. Count Witte had knowledge of the Treaty of 
 Bjorkoe, not for the first time when he was appointed 
 President of the Council, that is to say, in October, 
 1905, but three months earlier, inunediately after his 
 return from America in August. This may be no 
 more than a lapse of memory on the part of the 
 author of the article, but that which undoubtedly 
 emanates from Count Witte himself is the assertion 
 that the Treaty of Bjorkoe was an offensive and defen- 
 sive treaty directed against France, the ally of Russia. 
 
 The same assertion reappeared later in the book, 
 so remarkable in many respects, written by the Eng- 
 Ush publicist. Dr. Dillon, and entitled "The Eclipse 
 of Russia," which was published in 1918 and con- 
 tained a recital of facts communicated by Count 
 Witte personally to the author, who, as is well known, 
 enjoyed his full confidence. Dr. Dillon, being obliged 
 to recognize the falsity of his friend's statements, upon 
 comparing them with the text of the treaty, saves 
 himself from the dilemma arising out of this very 
 evident contradiction by explaining that Count 
 Witte's memory was not always to be relied upon 
 during the last years of his life, and that he was 
 
44 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 oppressed by the danger of the treaty being con- 
 strued as a move hostile to France. 
 
 The truth is, I regret to say, that it is not a question 
 of weak memory on the part of Count Witte, but that 
 in this case, as on other occasions, he misrepresented 
 the facts on account of the deep-seated disUke which 
 he felt toward Emperor Nicholas, a feeling which, in 
 his later years, developed into a veritable hatred. 
 While endeavouring to be fair and just to the memory 
 of Count Witte, who towered above the level of or- 
 dinary men, not merely by his great qualities, but 
 even in his failings, I cannot too severely condemn 
 such an act of posthumous revenge as he committed, 
 not only in revealing to a journalist a state secret of 
 such tremendous importance, but still more in having 
 accused his sovereign of a crime of which he must 
 have known him to be innocent. 
 
 Now that we know the exact text of the Treaty of 
 Bjorkoe and the circumstances surrounding its signa- 
 ture, it is quite impossible to sustain the accusation 
 brought against Emperor Nicholas by Count Witte 
 and accepted by Dr. Dillon as well as by some other 
 writers of lesser standing, of having committed an 
 act of treason toward France. At the time that the 
 Russian revolutionary Government published the 
 secret documents, I took pains to correct, as far as 
 lay in my power, the false construction placed upon 
 the treaty, by communicating what I knew about the 
 subject to an editor of Le Temps, M. F. de Jessen, 
 ivhose interview with me was published in the issue 
 af September 15, 1917, Having learned all that 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 45 
 
 had taken place at Bjorkoe and having an exact 
 knowledge of the terms of the treaty and the contents 
 of the telegrams exchanged between the emperors — a 
 knowledge gained, as before-mentioned, during my 
 subsequent direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 — it was manifestly my duty to correct an inaccurate 
 version that not only smirched the reputation of 
 Nicholas II., but was also calculated to reflect dis- 
 credit upon all Russia. 
 
 I have the satisfaction of knowing that the article 
 in Le Tem'ps contributed materially to enlighten the 
 public with respect to the role played by the Czar 
 in this affair, but inasmuch as Count Witte's accusa- 
 tion of treason has been revived with remarkable 
 force and talent by Dr. Dillon in his work, "The 
 Eclipse of Russia," I cannot refrain from reentering 
 the debate with the more competent, authentic, and 
 complete testimony that my former office as the 
 Emperor's Minister of Foreign Affairs enables me to 
 contribute. 
 
 It is necessary, in the first place, to recall the cir- 
 cumstances in the midst of which the Czar found 
 himself on the arrival of the German Emperor, and 
 to endeavour to reconstitute his state of mind and 
 feeling at that jimcture. In the course of the few 
 months preceding the famous interview he had seen 
 his armies defeated by the Japanese in Manchuria; his 
 fleet, under the command of Admiral Rojdestvensky, 
 had been annihilated at Tsushima; the revolution 
 was spreading throughout Russia and the absolute 
 power of the Czar was menaced by the masses, 
 
46 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 who claimed the right of representation in the coun- 
 cils of the nation. All this, in the eyes of Emperor , 
 Nicholas, was the consequence of his war with Japan, 
 that distant Power which would never have dared 
 to provoke Russia, never would have had the slightest 
 chance of vanquishing her on the battlefield, but for 
 the aid of England, the hereditary enemy who crossed 
 Russia's path everywhere, in Europe as in Asia. Is 
 it to be wondered at that, under such conditions, it 
 was not diflScult for the Kaiser to persuade the Em- 
 peror of Russia to join him in his plan for a conti- 
 nental coalition against England, and to serve as an 
 instrument for drawing France in also? We have 
 seen, however, that after several months of corre- 
 spondence the German Emperor had not succeeded in 
 overcoming the sentiment of loyalty which prevented 
 the Czar from signing the treaty without previously 
 having secured the adhesion of France. The moment 
 and the place were admirably chosen by the Kaiser 
 for triumphing over the scruples of his cousin, who 
 was alone at Bjorkoe, defenceless, one may say, 
 against the impetuous attacks of a guest who, at the 
 end of his three days' stay, had gained complete 
 domination over the will of his host. 
 
 I was told by the Czar himself that the treaty was 
 signed only a few minutes before Emperor William's 
 departure, after a breakfast that took place on board 
 the Hohenzollern. Certain writers have ventured to 
 insinuate that the quality and the quantity of the 
 wine served at that repast had something to do with 
 the consent of Emperor Nicholas — a piece of vulgar 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 47 
 
 gossip that it is easy to refute when one has had occa- 
 sion, as I have, to be often present at similar break- 
 fasts. A like hypothesis is moreover superfluous for 
 explaining the Kaiser's success, as he understood too 
 well how to manage the Czar without having recourse 
 to so brutal a proceeding. At each interview the 
 Kaiser, consununate actor that he was, took pains 
 to appear in a different rdle; every part that he took 
 was carefully studied in advance and adapted to the 
 particular circumstances of the place and the mo- 
 ment; he gave his victim no time to reflect and no 
 chance to escape his flowery eloquence and overbear- 
 ing manner of argument. 
 
 "When the two sovereigns, left alone, had aflSxed 
 their signatures at the foot of the text, which had 
 been previously prepared by the Kaiser, the latter 
 insisted that the instrument should be countersigned. 
 He had taken pains to bring with him on his voyage 
 a high functionary of the Department of Foreign 
 Affairs of the Empire, Herr von Tchirsky, who after- 
 ward became Secretary of State for that Department 
 and whose signature covdd be considered to take the 
 place of his chief's. There being no personage of 
 equal rank or capacity in the Czar's suite, the German 
 Emperor suggested calling upon Admiral Birileff, 
 Eussian Minister of Marine, who happened to be on 
 board the Pole Star as a guest. The old sailor, en- 
 tirely unversed in matters pertaining to foreign poli- 
 tics, was summoned at the last moment and did not 
 hesitate to set his hand to a document of whose con- 
 tents he was not even afforded any knowledge; in 
 
48 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 fact, one of the persons in the Czar's suite told me 
 that, while Admiral BirileflF was writing his name 
 at the foot of the page, the upper part was covered 
 by the Emperor's hand. When the Admiral was 
 interrogated by Coimt Lamsdorff afterward, he de- 
 clared that if he should find himself in the same posi- 
 tion a second time he would do the same, considering 
 that his duty as an officer of the navy obliged him to 
 obey without question any order given him by his 
 sovereign lord. 
 
 Now, after having reviewed the circumstances 
 attending the conclusion of the Treaty of Bjorkoe, if 
 one examines the text thereof with due care, one 
 cannot but be convinced that Emperor Nicholas 
 never dreamed of entering into an alliance hostile to 
 France and, consequently, there can be no question 
 of treason on his part. It is true that the first article 
 of the treaty provides that "if any European State 
 attacks either one of the two Empires, the allied party 
 engages to aid his co-contractor with all his forces on 
 land and sea"; the imperfect phrasing of this article, 
 if construed without regard to the context, might 
 perhaps warrant the supposition that in case of an 
 aggression by France against Germany, Russia would 
 be bound to take the side of the latter power, but 
 such an interpretation is rendered absolutely impossi- 
 ble by the tenor of Article 4 of the same treaty, accord- 
 ing to which Russia was to take the necessary steps 
 to acquaint France with the terms of the treaty as 
 soon as it was in force, and to propose that France 
 adhere to it as an ally. It is superfluous to demon- 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OP BJORKOE 49 
 
 strate the absurdity of inviting France to join an 
 alliance directed against herself. 
 
 The evidence, therefore, all goes to show that the 
 Treaty of Bjorkoe was in no way an act of treason to 
 France. It is equally clear that it was aimed against 
 England, and England alone. At the time the treaty 
 was signed, England was still the almost open enemy 
 of Russia; an armed conflict between the two coun- 
 tries had just been avoided, thanks to the friendly 
 intervention of France, but the hostile influence of 
 England continued to make itself felt everywhere, 
 to the detriment of Russia. Was it not natural, even 
 legitimate, on the part of the Czar, to seek a guarantee 
 against England, by means of a continental coalition.'' 
 
 But while Emperor Nicholas must be absolved from 
 any intent of treason toward France, it is true, none 
 the less, that he was guilty of a grave error in judg- 
 ment when he yielded, after so long a resistance, to 
 the persuasion of the German Emperor and allowed 
 himself to sign the treaty without having previously 
 obtained the adhesion of his ally. As soon as the 
 Kaiser had departed and he had leisure to reflect upon 
 what he had done, he realized his mistake, and when 
 he retiu*ned to St. Petersburg, so Count Lamsdorff 
 told me, he appeared to be very much worried and 
 even embarrassed, dm-ing the audiences which he 
 granted to his Minister of Foreign Affairs. He let 
 some fifteen days pass before he decided to speak of 
 the treaty; Coimt Lamsdorff was literally appalled 
 when he learned of it, and exerted himself with all 
 the force at his command to show the Emperor the 
 
50 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 danger of the situation and the absolute necessity of 
 taking immediate measures for the annulment of the 
 treaty. The Czar saw that he had fallen into a trap 
 and gave Count Lamsdorff carte blanche to take what- 
 ever steps might be necessary to get him out, a task 
 to which Count Lamsdorff applied himself with all 
 his experience of affairs and with an energy worthy of 
 the highest praise. 
 
 At this stage of the game Count Witte appeared on 
 the scene, having recently concluded the treaty of 
 peace with Japan at Portsmouth. Count Lamsdorff, 
 on account of their personal and political intimacy, 
 counted upon his help to escape from the imbroglio 
 caused by the weakness of the Emperor. On his way 
 home from America Coxmt Witte had stopped at Paris 
 where his visit coincided with the most acute phase 
 of the dispute between France and Germany on 
 the subject of Morocco; he had occasion to meet the 
 French Ministers, who did not conceal from him their 
 fears of a possible rupture. Knowing that Count 
 Witte had been invited by Emperor William to visit 
 him at his himting lodge of Rominten, the French 
 Government asked him to do whatever he could to 
 smooth the existing difficulties and to bring about an 
 arrangement. Count Witte was all the more ardent 
 in lending his aid to the Ministers of the Republic 
 because he was engaged in preparing the way for an 
 important loan, destined to reestablish the financial 
 situation of Russia after the war, and because he well 
 knew that the success of the loan depended upon the 
 turn that the Moroccan affair might take. At Ro- 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 51 
 
 minten the Kaiser showered flattery and attentions 
 of all sorts upon Count Witte, whom he recognized as 
 soon to be the head of the Russian Government, going 
 so far as to treat him almost as a royal personage. 
 There is little doubt that the conversations between 
 the Russian statesman and the German Emperor had 
 a favourable influence upon the negotiations in prog- 
 ress at that same period between the French Govern- 
 ment and the German Ambassador at Paris. Was 
 the Treaty of B jorkoe also touched upon, or did the 
 Kaiser reveal its contents? I used to think so, for 
 one reason, because he telegraphed to the Czar on the 
 11th of September, asking if Count Witte, whose ar- 
 rival at Rominten he was expecting, had been in- 
 formed of the treaty, and, if not, whether he might 
 speak of it to him. Emperor Nicholas replied that 
 so far only the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Minister 
 of War, the Chief of the General Staff, and Count 
 Lamsdorff had knowledge of the treaty, but that he 
 had no objection to having Count Witte informed. 
 In spite of this, however, according to a detailed 
 account of his visit at Rominten, communicated by 
 Count Witte to Dr. Dillon and related in the latter's 
 book, the Kaiser spoke only in a general way of his 
 plan for a great coalition of Continental Powers, hav- 
 ing for its object the assurance of a permanent peace 
 in Europe, and abstained from any direct allusion to 
 a treaty already signed by him and the Czar. Count 
 Witte explained to Dr. Dillon later that the Kaiser's 
 reserve was probably due to a fear that the revelation 
 would call forth a vehement protest, such as he had 
 
52 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 made some years before against the arrangement 
 concerning Kiao-Chiau and Port Arthur. While the 
 account quoted by Dr. Dillon contains numerous 
 errors, I believe it is exact as far as concerns this 
 point, and that it was not until after his return to 
 St. Petersburg that Count Witte was informed of 
 what had taken place at Bjorkoe, by Count Lamsdorff, 
 
 Truth compels me to say here that Count Witte, 
 when asked by Count Lamsdorflf to aid him in his 
 efforts to annul the unfortimate treaty, gave most 
 intelligent help and displayed the greatest energy. 
 For so doing he deserves all the more credit because 
 he had for a long time cherished the idea of an alliance 
 between Russia, Germany, and France. It seemed 
 to him that such an alliance, if not expressly aimed 
 against England, should be, at least, formed without 
 the participation of that Power. He believed, more- 
 over, that it woTild tend to link the interests of con- 
 tinental Europe to those of the United States of 
 America. Dr. Dillon mentions in his book a very 
 curious conversation on this subject between Count 
 Witte and the German Emperor, during the latter's 
 first visit to St. Petersburg after his accession to the 
 throne in 1888. On that occasion the young Em- 
 peror expressed his approval of Count Witte's idea 
 in general, but objected strongly to the exclusion of 
 England from the combination and maintained that 
 America was the enemy against which all Europe 
 should wage a tariff war without mercy. 
 
 In an article dealing with the Bjorkoe affair, appear- 
 ing in the Revue de Paris during 1918,' M. Bompard, 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 53 
 
 Ambassador of France at St. Petersburg at the time 
 the treaty was signed and an extremely intelligent 
 observer of men and things in Russia, after portraying 
 Count Witte to the life, gives his opinion of that 
 statesman and his foreign pohcies in the following 
 terms : 
 
 M. Witte was anxious to avoid at any price the calamity of a 
 European war. Now it was very evident that a European war 
 could only have its source in Germany. I am convinced that 
 he placed no reliance upon the military power of Russia to pre- 
 vent it; therefore he could think of nothing more effective than 
 
 , an alliance with Germany. But such an alliance, of itself, would 
 have made of Russia the satellite of Germany, so he persisted 
 
 y in his idea of bringing France in as a third party. In the mind 
 of M. Witte, Germany represented force and France money; 
 associating herself with both these nations, Russia would at the 
 same time benefit by the force of the one and the money of the 
 other, without running the risk of having to submit to cither's 
 hegemony. He was obsessed by this idea and advocated it 
 whenever occasion arose. It would be a mistake to conclude 
 that he had in view the enslavement of France to Germany in 
 place of Russia; his opposition to the Treaty of Bjorkoe, which 
 would have had that very effect, is abundant proof that he en- 
 tertained no such thought. He did not reaHze that the inevita- 
 ble outcome of his cherished plan would be prejudicial to France, 
 no matter how it might be brought about. A Franco-German 
 alliance, with or without the accession of Russia, was distinctly 
 Utopian, and the German Government itseK had never contem- 
 plated it seriously, except in the fashion attempted at Bjorkoe. 
 
 These lines impress me as being a most exact re- 
 sume of Coimt Witte's state of mind. It would not 
 have been strange, especially after his flattering re- 
 ception by the German Emperor, if he had taken up 
 
54 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 the defence of the Treaty of Bjorkoe, but he was too 
 far-sighted not to comprehend the Czar's blunder as 
 soon as he saw the text of the treaty, and he did not 
 hesitate to join Count Lamsdorff in his efforts to get 
 out of the difficulty. 
 
 The negotiations which ensued between St. Peters- 
 burg and Berlin, and which only bore fruit after 
 passing through a succession of varying phases, were 
 most delicate and arduous, as may easily be under- 
 stood. Two accounts have been published, so far, on 
 this subject: that of Count Witte, reproduced by Dr. 
 Dillon in his book, "The Eclipse of Russia," and that 
 of M. Bompard, in his article in the R&vue de Paris* 
 Both records, although inexact as regards certain de- 
 tails of no great importance, concur with the facts 
 which I learned from Count Lamsdorff and from a 
 study of the documents filed in the Ministry of For- 
 eign Affairs and in the private archives of Emperor 
 Nicholas in the Palace of Tsarskoie-Selo. 
 
 I will now state, in brief, what happened. Count 
 Lamsdorff began operations with a triple attack of an 
 unofficial nature, by means of a private letter from 
 ;he Czar to Emperor William, a letter from Count 
 Witte to Emperor William, and an informal commu- 
 lication of the Russian Ambassador at Berlin to the 
 
 •In this article, substantiated by original documents and characterized throughout by the great- 
 st impartiality, M. Bompard does not hesitate to affirm that for all those who knew Emperor 
 Nicholas well, himself included, the loyalty of the Emperor to France admits of no doubt. The 
 mpartiality of the former Ambassador of France at St. Petersburg is all the more praiseworthy 
 lecause he might well have been prejudiced by a natural feeUng of dislike for the Emperor. I will 
 efer later to the circumstances which led to the departure of M. Bompard from St. Petersburg, 
 ?hen he was accused, most unjustly, by the police of carrying on improper relations with the most 
 dvanced radicals in the Duma. These reports of the police had the effect of mating Nicholas 11. 
 uspicious of the distinguished French diplomat, and, in spite of all my efforts, I was unable to dis- 
 el a prejudice that eventually caused the Ambassador's recall. 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 55 
 
 Chancellor. The object of these representations was 
 to call attention to the invalidity of the Treaty of 
 Bjorkoe on account of its not having been counter- 
 signed by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 and to the contradictions in the text, which made 
 it necessary to subject the contents to a careful 
 examination and revision. None of these proposals 
 met with any success. (The reply to Count Witte's 
 letter was made by the Chancellor.) 
 
 Meanwhile, Russia and Japan were about to ratify 
 the Treaty of Portsmouth, and it will be remembered 
 that this was the time indicated for the Bjorkoe 
 agreement to become operative. Count Lamsdorff 
 accordingly resolved to press the negotiations with 
 greater energy, and he wrote forthwith to M. Neli- 
 doff, Ambassador of Russia at Paris, asking if it was 
 possible to sound the French Government on the 
 subject of an eventual adhesion of France to the 
 Treaty of Bjorkoe. M. Nelidoff hastened to reply, 
 without even consulting the French Government, 
 that France, which had never become reconciled 
 to the order of things created by the Treaty of 
 Frankfort and which had just entered into the en- 
 tente cordiale with England, would never consent 
 to join such an alliance. A new letter was thereupon 
 addressed by the Czar to the German Emperor for 
 the purpose of explaining the impossibility of carrying 
 out the provisions of the Treaty of Bjorkoe under the 
 existing circumstances, and, at the same time. Count 
 Lamsdorff sent instructions to Count Osten-Sacken 
 to declare in a formal manner that, the adhesion of 
 
56 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 France not being obtainable for the moment and the 
 obligations of the Treaty of Bjorkoe being incom- 
 patible with those of the treaty of alliance between 
 France and Russia, it was necessary that the Bjorkoe 
 treaty should remain inoperative until such time as 
 an agreement on this subject could be established 
 between Russia, Germany, and France. Count Osten- 
 Sacken was instructed to add that considerable 
 time and patience would be indispensable for per- 
 suading France to join Russia and Germany, but 
 that the Russian Government would use its best 
 eflForts to attain that end. 
 
 None of the responses obtained by Count Lams- 
 dorff or Count Witte from Berlin contained — ^my 
 recollection on this point is positive — any formal 
 acknowledgment of the annulment of the Treaty of 
 Bjorkoe, and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 was obliged to content himself for a while with a 
 partial acquiescence; but he held in reserve his in- 
 tention to demonstrate later, by actual deed, that 
 Russia did not consider herself bound in any way 
 to Germany and remained faithful to her alliance 
 with France. The occasion for this presented itself 
 at the time of the Algeciras Conference. 
 
 The Czar made no further reference to this ques- 
 tion in his private correspondence with Emperor 
 WiUiam, although the correspondence was continued 
 for some time, without, however, being couched in 
 its former tone of intimacy and confidence, and with 
 less and less frequency as time went on. The Ger- 
 man Emperor, on the other hand, did not abandon 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 57 
 
 his project at first, and tried in every way to per- 
 suade his cousin to acknowledge the vahdity of the 
 agreement which they had signed at Bjorkoe, not 
 contenting himself with repeating his former argu- 
 ments and his calumnies against France and England, 
 but endeavouring to prevail upon the Czar's mind 
 by the employment of dramatic phrases and of 
 language coloured with mysticism. A curious ex- 
 ample of these efforts is to be foimd in a telegram 
 which he sent to Emperor Nicholas on the 12th of 
 October, 1905, that is to say, at the moment when 
 Count Osten-Sacken had just delivered his decisive 
 message at Berlin: 
 
 Glucksburg, Ostsee, 
 
 October 12th, 1905. 
 The working of treaty does not — as we agreed at Bjorkoe — 
 collide with the Franco-Russian Alliance, provided, of course, 
 that the latter is not aimed directly at my country. On the 
 other hand, the obligations of Russia toward France can only 
 go so far as France merits them through her behaviour. Your 
 ally has notoriously left you in the lurch during the whole war, 
 whereas Germany helped you in everyway as far as it could with- 
 out infringing the laws of neutrality. That puts Russia morally 
 also under obligation to us; do ut des. Meanwhile, the indiscre- 
 tions of Delcasse have shown the world that, though France is 
 your ally, she nevertheless made an agreement with England 
 and was on the verge of surprising Germany, with British help, 
 in the middle of peace, while I was doing my best to you and 
 your country, her ally. This is an experiment which she must 
 not repeat and against a repetition of which I must expect you 
 to guard me. I fully agree with you that it will cost time, labour, 
 and patience to induce France to join us both, but the reasonable 
 people will in future make themselves heard and felt. Our 
 
58 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Moroccan business is regulated to entire satisfaction, so that the 
 air is free for better understanding between us. Our treaty is a 
 very good base to build upon. We joined hands and signed 
 before God, Who heard our vows. I therefore think that the 
 treaty can well come into existence. 
 
 But if you wish any changes in the words or clauses or provi- 
 sions for the future, or different emergencies — ^as, for instance, 
 the absolute refusal of France, which is improbable — I gladly 
 await any proposals you will think fit to lay before me. Till 
 these have been laid before me and are agreed upon, the treaty 
 must be adhered to by us as it is. The whole of your influential 
 Press, Nowosti, Novoie-Wremia, Rouss, etc., have since a fort- 
 night become violently anti-German and pro-British. Partly 
 they are bought by heavy sums of British money, no doubt. 
 Still, it makes my people very chary and does great harm to 
 the relations newly growing between our countries. All these 
 occurrences show that times are troubled and that we must have 
 clear courses to steer; the treaty we signed is a means of keeping 
 straight, without interfering with your alliance as such. What 
 is signed is signed, and God is our testator. I shall await your 
 proposals. Best love to Alice. 
 
 Willy*. 
 
 It is evident, from the above, that Emperor 
 William, in spite of the clear refusal of the Russian 
 Government to ratify the treaty, cherished the illu- 
 sion, or at least the hope, of maintaining his influence 
 over the Czar, and that it was only after the publica- 
 tion of Count Lamsdorff's instructions to the Russian 
 plenipotentiaries at Algeciras that he was obliged 
 to admit his discomfiture. 
 
 During the two years that succeeded the events I 
 have just described, the emperors had no further 
 
 •I have the impression that this telegram, the original of which I had an opportunity to peruse, 
 was signed: "Your friend and ally, Willy." 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 59 
 
 meetings, and when, in the year 1907, an interview 
 took place at Svinemtinde, at which I was present 
 in the capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
 Czar so dreaded a recurrence of the Kaiser's insist- 
 ence that he charged me to forewarn the German 
 Chancellor that the Treaty of Bjorkoe must be con- 
 sidered as definitely abrogated, and that he could 
 not listen to any arguments on the part of the Ger- 
 man Emperor in favour of its revival. 
 
 I have already done justice in these pages to the 
 far-sightedness shown by Count Witte in connection 
 with the Bjorkoe treaty. Although he had meditated 
 for a long while upon a project of alliance between 
 B,ussia, France, and Germany, he had the good sense 
 to perceive, from the beginning, that the method 
 adopted by Emperor William could not help causing 
 a rupture of the bonds which imited Russia to France. 
 Nevertheless, he was still a strong partisan of the 
 project, and, feeling very sure of his own diplomatic 
 ability after his success at Portsmouth, he thought 
 he could induce France, in time, to adopt his ideas, 
 and, with this object in view, he had an ardent desire 
 to obtain the post of Ambassador of Russia at Paris. 
 In France, as well as in Germany, he enjoyed a con- 
 siderable prestige in the financial world, and counted 
 upon carrying out his plans with the help of certain 
 groups belonging to la haute finance. He tried by 
 every means in his power to supplant M. Nelidoff at 
 Paris, but always met with a firm refusal from Em- 
 peror Nicholas. For my part, I was convinced that 
 the appointment of Count Witte to Paris was inad- 
 
60 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 visable and even dangerous from the point of view 
 of our relations with France and with England, and 
 I confess that I consistently opposed it while I was 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs. I believe that Count 
 Witte was seriously displeased at this opposition. 
 During his frequent visits to Paris, he did all he 
 could to further his Utopian plan, but failed to gain 
 any considerable number of adherents. 
 
 A few days after the conference of the emperors at 
 Bjorkoe, and while I was still Minister at Copen- 
 hagen, I learned that the Kaiser had sent word to 
 King Christian IX. that he would stop at Copen- 
 hagen on his way back to Kiel, on board the Hohen- 
 zollern. I have already mentioned the sudden visits 
 that Emperor William was in the habit of making 
 at the Danish capital; each time he came there 
 was a flurry of excitement, not only at the Court, 
 but throughout the country, due to the resentment 
 of the Danish people against Prussia and the Hohen- 
 zoUerns, dating from the spoliation of 1864 and still 
 enduring. The royal family shared this resent- 
 ment in the fullest degree, and the presence of the 
 Kaiser at Copenhagen was always a source of bitter 
 reflection to King Christian IX. and his suite. The 
 aversion of the Empress Dowager of Russia, second 
 daughter of the King, for Germany and everything 
 German was so pronounced that, when she came to 
 see her father, she arrived always on her yacht, in 
 order not to have to cross Germany; when bad 
 weather or the season of the year obliged her to re- 
 turn by land through Germany, she refused to cross 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 61 
 
 the narrow straits between the Danish isles and the 
 German coast in a steamer flying the German colours, 
 and, instead, took a Danish boat to Warnemtinde, 
 where a special train of Russian railway carriages 
 awaited her and transported her to the Russian 
 frontier with as few stops as possible. King Chris- 
 tian's third daughter, the Princess Thyra, married 
 to the Duke of Cumberland, had a still greater hatred 
 for the Germans, if that were possible, for, during 
 the unfortunate War of the Duchies, she had not 
 yet left the paternal home and had shared the an- 
 guish and even the physical fatigue of her father, 
 and the remembrance of all those sufferings had never 
 been effaced from her memory. At the period of 
 which I am now writing, her husband, son of the 
 last King of Hanover, who had been dispossessed 
 by Prussia, shared her feelings.* It happened that 
 one of the Kaiser's unexpected visits caught the 
 Duke and Duchess of Cumberland unawares at 
 Copenhagen; rather than be compelled to meet the 
 German ruler, the ducal couple hastened to leave 
 the Danish capital on the same day he arrived. 
 This incident gave the Princess Marie d'Orleans, 
 wife of Prince Waldemar, King Christian's third 
 son, an opportunity for one of those witty remarks 
 for which she was famous at the Court of Denmark; 
 at a great dinner, given that day at the royal palace 
 in honour of the German Emperor, she was heard 
 to exclaim clearly enough not to escape the ear of 
 
 *At a later date, in spite of this prejudice, the lure of the Guelph millions and the Duchy of Bruns- 
 wick induced him to consent to the marriage of his son with the daughter of Emperor William. 
 
62 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 the imperial guest: "Oh, what a nice sauce, and 
 how well it runs; it might be called Cumberland 
 sauce!" 
 
 As for Emperor William, he never appeared to have 
 any misgivings regarding the impression which he 
 produced upon his hosts; on the contrary, he seemed 
 to be confident that his mere presence and the ir- 
 resistible effect of his personality won all hearts. 
 Treparing a role to suit the occasion, as was his wont, 
 he affected an exaggerated deference for the person 
 of the old King, whom he knew to be adored by 
 his people, imagining that this would endear him 
 to the Danish public. For instance, at the close of 
 one of his visits, when taking leave of the King at 
 the station, he astonished the bystanders by kissing 
 the hand of Christian IX. All his efforts to gain 
 popularity were of no avail, however, and every time 
 he came to Copenhagen the Danish authorities were 
 obliged to take measures to prevent hostile demon- 
 strations on the part of the populace. 
 
 In the summer of 1905 public feeling in Denmark 
 was particularly inimical toward the Kaiser for two 
 reasons : during that summer the German authorities 
 had accentuated the vexatious measures to which 
 the Danish population of Schleswig was subjected, 
 and had caused the expulsion of a certain number of 
 young Danes; moreover, there were persistent ru- 
 mours in circulation to the effect that the Emperor 
 was trying to persuade Sweden and Russia to join 
 him in closing the Baltic to the men-of-war of all 
 States not bordering on that sea. ^ A campaign in 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 63 
 
 favour of this plan had been inaugurated by the 
 semi-official Press of Germany, causing uneasiness 
 in Denmark as well as in England, and even determin- 
 ing the British Government to order one of its squad- 
 rons to cruise in the Baltic Sea, touching at different 
 Danish, Swedish, and German ports. This cruise, by 
 the way, displeased the Kaiser particularly, and gave 
 rise to comments that were far from courteous, on 
 the part of the German Press. 
 
 Emperor WUliam's visit to Copenhagen, or rather 
 to the ChMeau of Bernstorff where the royal 
 family was in residence, was understood to be of a 
 private character, and consequently there was no 
 occasion for the foreign diplomatic corps to meet him. 
 I was therefore very much astonished when the 
 German Minister, Herr von Schoen (afterward 
 Ambassador at St. Petersbm-g, Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs, and, finally. Ambassador at Paris 
 when War was declared in 1914), came to tell me 
 that the Emperor wished to see me; he added that, 
 as no similar invitation had been extended to any 
 other member of the diplomatic corps, I was re- 
 quested to say nothing about it to my colleagues. 
 In my efforts to discover the reason for being hon- 
 oured in a manner so exclusive, I could not, of course, 
 imagine that the Kaiser considered me as the repre- 
 sentative of a new and precious ally whom he flattered 
 himself to have acquired at Bjorkbe; I came to the 
 conclusion that the Czar had spoken to him of my 
 probable appointment to Berlin, and that he was 
 cm-ious to know something about me beforehand. I 
 
64 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 had never met Emperor William, and the prospect 
 of a conversation with him, I confess, profoundly 
 impressed me. 
 
 The audience took place at night, in the German 
 Legation, and was attended with a certain air of 
 mystery. It was to this conversation that the Kaiser 
 alluded in a telegram which he addressed to the Czar 
 on his return to Germany, the 2nd of August, 1905, 
 and in which he gave an account of his stay in Den- 
 mark. I will recite this telegram without abridg- 
 ment: 
 
 Sassnitz (Island of Riigen), 
 
 August 2nd, 1905, 
 
 1 o'clock, night. 
 H.M. THE Emperor: 
 
 My visit passed off well under the extreme kindness shown me 
 by the whole family, especially by your dear old grandfather. 
 After my arrival I soon found out through reading the Press 
 reports, Danish and foreign, that a very strong current of mis- 
 trust and apprehension was engendered against my visit, es- 
 pecially from England. The King had been so intimidated and 
 public opinion so worked upon that I was una ble to touch the 
 question we agreed I was to mention to him. 
 
 The British Minister, dining with one of my gentlemen, used 
 very violent language against me, accusing me of the vilest plans 
 and intrigues, and declaring that every Englishman knew and 
 was convinced that I was working for war with and for the') 
 destruction of England. You may imagine what stuff a~man 
 like this may have been distilling into the minds of the Danish 
 family. Court and people. 
 
 I did all in my power to dispel the cloud of distrust by behav- 
 ing quite unconcernedly and making no allusion to serious poli- 
 tics at all. Also, considering the great number of channels 
 leading from Copenhagen to London and the proverbial want 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 65 
 
 of discretion of the Danish Court, I was afraid to let anything 
 be known, as it would have been communicated immediately 
 to London, a most impossible thing as long as the treaty is to 
 remain secret for the present. 
 
 By a long conversation with Iswolsky, however, I was able 
 to gather that the actual Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count 
 Raben, and a number of persons of influence, have aheady come 
 to the conviction that, in case of war and impending attack on 
 the Baltic from a foreign Power, the Danes expect, their inability 
 and helplessness to uphold even the shadow of neutrality against 
 invasion being evident, that Russia and Germany will imme- 
 diately take steps to safeguard their interests by laying hands 
 on Denmark and occupying it during the war, as this would at 
 the same time guarantee the territory and the future existence 
 of the dynasty and coimtry. 
 
 The Danes are slowly resigning themselves to this alternative, 
 and making up their minds accordingly, this being exactly what 
 you wished and hoped for. I thought it better not to touch the 
 subject with the Danes, and refrained from making any allusions. 
 It is better to let the idea develop and ripen in their heads and 
 let them draw final conclusions themselves, so that they will 
 of their own accord be moved to lean upon us and fall in line with 
 QUI two coimtries. Tout vient a point a qui sail attendre. 
 
 The question about Charles going to Norway has been ar- 
 ranged up to the smallest detail, England having consented to 
 everything, and there is nothing to be done any more. I talked 
 with Charles about his prospects, and found him very sober, 
 and without any illusions about his task. What do you say 
 to the programme of festivities for your allies at Cowes? The 
 whole of the Crimean veterans have been invited to meet their 
 "brothers-in-arms" who fought with them against Russia. 
 Very delicate indeed. It shows I was right when I warned you 
 two years ago of the reforming of the "old Crimean combina- 
 tion." They are fast warming up again with a vengeance. 
 Weather was fine. Best love to AHce. 
 
 Willy. 
 
66 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 In this telegram, as one may see, Emperor William, 
 after having recounted and explained in his own 
 fashion the apprehension and distrust caused by his 
 visit to Denmark, refers for the first time to a plan 
 which evidently had been discussed between him and 
 Emperor Nicholas at Bjorkoe, and which provided 
 for the occupation of Denmark by their joint forces, 
 in case of a war between Russia and Germany on the 
 one side and England on the other. At the same 
 time, the Kaiser attributes to me certain statements 
 with respect to a supposed tendency, on the part of 
 the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other influential 
 persons of Denmark, to seek in the proposed plan a 
 guarantee for the integrity of their coimtry and the 
 safety of the dynasty. When this telegram was 
 published by the Russian revolutionary Government 
 in 1917, it caused some little consternation in the 
 Scandinavian countries, particularly in Denmark, for 
 it revealed a project concerning which nothing had 
 transpired up to that time, and seemed to imply 
 that Russian diplomacy, in my person, had contrib- 
 uted to its formation; it behoves me, therefore, to 
 make some explanation. 
 
 My conversation with the German Emperor lasted 
 for more than an hour, during which certain of the 
 words which he uttered struck me as being so signifi- 
 cant that I hastened to convey my impressions in a 
 private letter to Count Lamsdorff ; imfortunately, I 
 did not preserve the rough draft of that letter, but 
 I have a very clear recollection of the conversation, 
 nevertheless. 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 67 
 
 For instance, I remember distinctly how astonished 
 I was when the Kaiser, after saying a few words about 
 his interview with Emperor Nicholas at Bjorkoe, but 
 of course without disclosing all that had really oc- 
 curred, took up the question of the general political 
 situation and proceeded to explain with great elo- 
 quence the necessity of assuring the peace of Europe 
 by entirely new methods, expressing the conviction 
 that this object could only be attained by a union 
 of the three great Continental Powers, Russia, Ger- 
 many, and France, directed explicitly against Eng- 
 land. Not thinking for a moment that he had any- 
 thing in mind beyond a sort of paradox or political 
 Utopia, I replied that such a plan would be undoubt- 
 edly admirable if one could bring it to pass, but that 
 a grouping of the Powers named appeared to me 
 impossible, for the simple reason that France, in the 
 actual state of affairs, wovdd never consent to join it. 
 
 My reply appeared to displease the Emperor, who 
 insisted upon knowing the reasons upon which I based 
 my opinion; consequently, I could do no else than 
 explain in the most prudent terms at my command 
 that France was divided from Germany by a deep 
 abyss, created by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and 
 that until thp,t abyss was filled up the French people 
 would never be the friends of the Germans. 
 
 At these words, the Emperor's displeasure devel- 
 oped into immistakable anger, and it was in a voice 
 almost beyond his control that he made this most 
 astonishing declaration: 
 
 "The question of Alsace-Lorraine," he cried, "I 
 
68 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 consider to be not only non-existent at the present 
 hour, but as having been cut out for all time by the 
 French people themselves. I threw down the glove 
 to France, a propos of the Moroccan afifair, and she 
 dared not pick it up; having then declined to fight 
 Germany, France has renounced for good and all any 
 claims she may have had in respect of her lost prov- 
 inces." 
 
 I thought at first that this outburst was merely one 
 of the boutades for which the Kaiser was famous, but 
 I soon perceived that it was a deep-seated conviction 
 of his, for he reverted several times in the course of 
 our conversation to the strange idea that, from the 
 moment that France had bowed to the German 
 threat, at the time of the Moroccan dispute, she no 
 longer had any right to invoke her long-standing griev- 
 ances as a ground for refusing friendship with Ger- 
 many. As I continued to express my doubts of a 
 material change in the psychology of the French 
 people, the Emperor surprised me still more by de- 
 claring that, if, after all, France persisted in her re- 
 fusal to join the projected alliance, there were ways 
 to bring her into it by force. 
 
 This part of the conversation made such a vivid 
 impression upon me and so absorbed my attention 
 that my recollection of the other subjects discussed 
 by the Emperor is somewhat less precise; but I am 
 absolutely sure that the words which he attributed 
 to me, regarding the supposed tendency of Denmark 
 to see a guarantee against possible aggression on the 
 part of England, by means of a Russo-German 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 69 
 
 occupation, were misconstrued, to say the least. I 
 knew, as everybody knew, that the Danes lived in 
 constant dread of foreign invasion, but no one in 
 Denmark had in mind any other possible invader 
 than Germany; the Government was perfectly cog- 
 nizant of the military weakness of Denmark and the 
 impossibility of resisting aggression alone for any 
 length of time, but its traditional policy had been to 
 seek aid from Powers whose great fault in the past 
 had been to allow the subjugation of Denmark by 
 Germany. Furthermore, it was a notorious fact that 
 there existed in Denmark a party — ^that of the radicals 
 and socialists — ^which opposed any increase what- 
 soever in military expenditure and preached non- 
 resistance to outside invasion from any source; it is 
 very possible that, in response to a question of Em- 
 peror William's regarding the state of the public mind 
 in Denmark, I may have mentioned this fact, but it 
 would be absurd to attribute such ideas to the Danish 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, when I knew that Count 
 Raben's chief reason for being more inclined than his 
 predecessors to cultivate good relations with Ger- 
 many was to ameliorate the lot of the Danish popula- 
 tion of Schleswig. Besides, how could I have spoken 
 of an attack by England and a Russo-German occupa- 
 tion of Denmark when I was in total ignorance of 
 the conversations that had taken place at Bjorkoe? 
 Such eventualities, in my view, were beyond all prob- 
 ability. 
 
 There was still another reason why I, of all the 
 diplomats accredited to Copenhagen, should ^have 
 
70 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 been least suspected of treating lightly the question of 
 Denmark's neutrality or sympathizing with an even- 
 tual violation thereof. It will be recalled that I- had 
 been requested during the Russo-Japanese War to 
 obtain permission for the passage of Admiral Rodjest- 
 vensky's fleet through the Grand Belt, that is, through 
 straits controlled by Danish sovereignty. This oc- 
 curred before the Hague Conventions had definitely 
 regulated matters concerning the passage of neutral 
 straits in time of war. Japan made every effort to 
 persuade the Danish Government not to grant right 
 of way to the Russian fleet, or, at least, not to lend it 
 the assistance of licensed pilots; but, basing my de- 
 mand upon the precedent established during the 
 Crimean War, in favour of the allied fleets of France 
 and England, I succeeded in obtaining the same 
 facilities, and others still more important, for the 
 Russian fleet, thereby helping to establish a great 
 principle of international jurisprudence, namely, that 
 of the free navigation of neutral straits in war-time. 
 So it would have been, to say the least, illogical and 
 unnatural on my part to discuss with Emperor Wil- 
 liam a possible violation of this principle. At a later 
 time, when Minister of Foreign Affairs, I was instru- 
 mental in maintaining the status quo in the Baltic, 
 which signified, among other things, the inviolability 
 of the territory of Denmark and the respect for her 
 rights as a neutral Power. 
 
 The foregoing pages, it seems to me, throw a suffi- 
 cient light upon the general international situation as 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 71 
 
 it existed at the moment when I took charge of the 
 foreign poUcies of Russia. It was a moment of ex- 
 treme trial for the Russian Empire, still suffering from 
 the blows received during the war and the ensuing 
 revolutionary troubles, and face to face with grave 
 problems at home and abroad. As Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs I was called upon to take a definite stand 
 with regard to the poUcy that the Russian Govern- 
 ment intended to pursue in its relation to other 
 countries. 
 
 The position of Russia in Europe was determined 
 by the fact that for the past fifteen years she had been 
 bound by a formal treaty of alliance to France. The 
 Czar, it is true, had yielded momentarily to the in- 
 sidious efforts of the German Emperor to engage 
 Russia in a political system of a nature that did not, 
 perhaps, involve a complete detachment from France, 
 but would have placed her at least in a situation in- 
 finitely more complicated and uncertain. Fortu- 
 nately, the error of Emperor Nicholas was not per- 
 sisted in, being contrary to his sentiments of honour 
 and to his good sense as well, so he had succeeded, 
 with the help of Count Lamsdorff, in extricating him- 
 self from the trap that had been laid for him, and the 
 alliance with France was intact. But we have seen 
 that the preceding two years had witnessed great 
 changes in the terrain of European politics; France 
 and England had renounced their old quarrels and an 
 era of mutual confidence and friendship had been 
 inaugurated between the two Powers; Russia had 
 already benefited to a marked degree by the existence 
 
72 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 of the Anglo-French entente during the war with Ja- 
 pan, but, in order to derive permanent and completej 
 advantages, it was clear she also must draw closer to/ 
 England, and that was manifestly impossible unless 
 she followed the example of France and found some 
 means of settling the numerous difficulties that sepa- 
 rated her from England. Moreover, a rapprochement 
 with that Power was not sufficient, the necessary 
 corollary being a sincere reconciliation with Japan. 
 The adoption of such a policy not only would fortify 
 Russia's position as an ally of France, but would lay 
 a new and more solid foundation for the whole edifice 
 of the Dual Alliance. If, on the contrary, Russia neg- 
 lected to draw the logical conclusions from recent 
 international developments and maintained her 
 strained relations with England and Japan, she would 
 find herself, sooner or later, in a difficult situation 
 between her ally, France, and those two Powers; 
 Germany would seize that opportunity to renew her 
 efforts to detach her from France and direct her ener- 
 gies toward Asia, and perhaps might even succeed in 
 drawing her into an opposing political system. Now 
 there could be nothing more dangerous for the future 
 of Russia and the peace of the world than such a 
 renversement des alliances, to use the term applied to 
 the radical change that took place in Europe at the 
 middle of the eighteenth century and which was fol- 
 lowed by the Seven Years' War. If Russia turned 
 her back on France and England and engaged in a 
 contest for preponderance in Asia, she would be 
 obliged to renounce not only her historic r61e in 
 
THE SECRET TREATY OF BJORKOE 73 
 
 Europe but also all economic and moral independ- 
 ence vis-a-vis Germany, becoming, to all intents and 
 purposes, a vassal of the German Empire and bring- 
 ing disaster upon all Europe as well, for, when once 
 free of all danger on her eastern frontier, Germany 
 would only have to choose her hour for a decisive 
 attack on France and England, in order to realize her 
 dream of world-supremacy. 
 
 Such was the formidable dilemma that confronted 
 the Russian Minister of Foreign Afifairs and de- 
 manded a prompt and irrevocable decision. It will 
 be remembered that this question had been thor- 
 oughly discussed with M. NelidoflF, Count Bencken- 
 dorff, and M. Mouravieff during my visit to London 
 and Paris, and we had arrived at the unanimous con- 
 clusion that the foreign policy of Russia must continue 
 to rest upon the unchangeable base of her alliance 
 with France, but that this alliance must itself be for- 
 tified and enlarged by agreements with England and 
 Japan. This was the programme that I determined 
 to submit to the Emperor upon taking up my new 
 duties, and I had already made up my mind that I 
 would not definitely undertake those duties until I 
 was assured of the Emperor's entire conformity. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 The First Duma 
 
 PREVIOUS to the inauguration of the Duma, 
 on the 10th of May, 1906, there were widely 
 varying opinions at Court as to the proper 
 place for that ceremony, and heated discussions en- 
 sued between those who favoured the Tauride Palace, 
 which had been especially fitted up as a temporary 
 seat for the new assembly, and those who preferred 
 the Winter Palace. The reactionary party were im- 
 willing that the Emperor should go to the Duma, and 
 the extremists went so far as to advise the Emperor 
 not to appear in person before the deputies, but to 
 have the session opened in his name by the Prime 
 Minister. It was finally decided that the Emperor 
 should follow the procedure adopted at Berlin for 
 the opening of the Reichstag, summoning the depu- 
 ties to the Winter Palace and opening the session 
 with an address from the throne. 
 
 Arriving that same day, I had barely time to don 
 Court uniform and present myself at the Palace. As 
 my nomination had not yet appeared in the Official 
 Gazette, I did not join the cabinet ministers, whose 
 place had been assigned in the throne-room reserved 
 for the inauguration, but by virtue of my rank as 
 Chamberlain of the Imperial Court I had only to take 
 
 74 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 75 
 
 my place in the cortege that was to precede the en- 
 trance of the Emperor, in order to witness a ceremony 
 whose very novelty made it exceptionally interest- 
 ing. 
 
 While awaiting the formation of the Emperor's 
 cortege, I walked through some of the rooms of the 
 Palace, where were assembled several thousand gen- 
 erals, oflScers of all ranks, and civil functionaries. 
 Resplendent with multi-coloured uniforms, glittering 
 with gold and silver lace, and covered with decorations 
 they were so disposed as to leave a passage free 
 through the various rooms for the entry of the Im- 
 perial procession. 
 
 At first there was nothing to be observed that 
 differed in any respect from what one was accustomed 
 to see at the Winter Palace on days of great ceremony 
 but now, suddenly, between the two hedges of bril- 
 liant uniforms, began the sombre procession of the 
 representatives of the people, on their way to the 
 throne-room, where they were to await the Czar, and, 
 for the first time in that elegant rococo palace, built 
 for the Empress Elizabeth by the Italian Rastrelli, 
 where for one hundred and fifty years had been dis- 
 played all the pomp of one of the most sumptuous 
 coxu'ts of Europe, a crowd of the most democratic 
 aspect was to be seen. Here and there in the throng 
 one could see a few provincial lawyers or doctors in 
 evening dress, and an occasional uniform was to be 
 noticed; but that which predominated was not even 
 the simple dress of the bourgeois, but rather the long 
 caftan of the peasant or the factory-workman's blouse. 
 
76 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Such a contrast could not help being novel and strik- 
 ing, but it was especially impressive, as the deputies 
 filed past between the two rows of officers and func- 
 tionaries, to observe the expression of the faces on the 
 one side and on the other. Here an old general, 
 there a bureaucrat, grown white in the service, could 
 hardly conceal the consternation, the anger even, 
 that the invasion of the sacred precincts of the 
 Winter Palace by these intruders caused him. And 
 the faces of the deputies, as they passed, were lighted 
 by triumph in some cases and in others distorted by 
 hatred, making altogether a spectacle intensely dra- 
 matic and symbolical. The Russia of yesterday 
 found itself face to face with the Russia of to-morrow; 
 what was to be the result of such an encounter? 
 Would the old hierarchy of Czarism prove capable 
 of welcoming these newcomers and endeavour to 
 work with them for the regeneration of the nation, 
 or would there be a collision between the two forces, 
 engendering new struggles of still greater bitterness 
 and perhaps bloodier than before? 
 
 For my part, I was at that time full of hope that 
 a new era of grandeur and prosperity for Russia was 
 dawning, but I was conscious, none the less, of a cer- 
 tain feeling of anguish at finding myself on the thresh- 
 old of so radical a^hange in the destinies of my 
 country — a change which the spectacle before me ren- 
 dered visible and tangible, so to speak. 
 
 The Imperial cortege was about to form; I took my 
 place and soon reached the room reserved for the cere- 
 mony, only a few steps away from the Emperor, who 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 77 
 
 stood before the throne. I had not seen him since 
 the exciting days of the preceding autumn, and I was 
 struck by his careworn appearance; he looked much 
 older and as if he were deeply moved by the signifi- 
 cance of the event. He took a few steps toward the 
 deputies who had collected at the foot of the room and 
 unfolding a paper which he held in his hand, read his 
 address in a rather low voice, but without embarrass- 
 ment or hesitation, articulating each word distinctly 
 and emphasizing a phrase here and there. 
 
 The discourse of the Emperor was listened to with 
 the greatest attention and in perfect silence; it was 
 easy to see that it produced a good impression upon 
 the deputies. Inasmuch as, in the majority of the 
 Czar's preceding addresses and in the acts recently 
 promulgated by the Government, all mention of a 
 constitution or of any limitation whatsoever of sov- 
 ereign rights had been carefully avoided, it might well 
 have been feared that the Emperor would profit by 
 this occasion to proclaim once more the autocratic 
 character of his power, so one may judge of the agree- 
 able surprise with which the deputies listened to the 
 following passage of the imperial discourse: 
 
 For my part, I will protect in an inflexible manner the institu- 
 tions which I have granted, for I am firmly convinced that you 
 will employ all your forces to serve the fatherland with devotion, 
 so as to give satisfaction to the needs of the peasants, so dear to 
 my heart, and to promote the education of the people and the 
 development of their prosperity, remembering always that the 
 true prosperity of a state requires rwt liberty alone, but also 
 order, based upon the principles of the Constitution. ' 
 
78 IlECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 The prudent warning conveyed in these last words, 
 particularly emphasized by the Emperor, did not 
 prevent the deputies from appreciating the fact that 
 the word "Constitution" had been heard for the first 
 time from the lips of the sovereign. In spite of the 
 good impression produced by the address, it was not 
 greeted with any applause at the close, but this could 
 easily be explained by the restraint to which the depu- 
 ties were subjected by an atmosphere and surround- 
 ings that were so strange to them. And on the whole 
 it was the general opinion that the day had passed off 
 extremely well. 
 
 The deputies then took possession of the Tauride 
 Palace, which was placed temporarily at their dis- 
 posal pending the construction of a special building 
 for the use of the Duma. 
 
 The palace in which the first Russian representa- 
 tive assembly met was built by the Empress Cather- 
 ine II. for the famous Potemkin, "Prince of the 
 Tauride," in the neo-classic style introduced in Russia 
 by the Scottish architect Cameron, and which has 
 left its mark upon the majority of the great edifices 
 erected at St, Petersburg at the end of the eighteenth 
 and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. His- 
 tory has told of the power and wealth which Cather- 
 ine's favour conferred upon Potemkin, styled "The 
 Magnificent," after the manner of Lorenzo de Medici. 
 The Tauride Palace, standing in the midst of its vast 
 gardens, was the scene of the legendary fdtes offered 
 by the favourite to his imperial mistress; later, it 
 became for a time the residence of Emperor Alexander 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 79 
 
 I., but for more than half a century it had been al- 
 most completely abandoned and, its superb halls, 
 lined with their impressive columns, remained empty 
 or were used for storerooms; the oflSces of the palace 
 were occupied by a crowd of small pensioners of the 
 Court, and the gardens were opened to the public as 
 a pleasure resort for the people of the quarter. In 
 my youthful days, at the close of the reign of Alex- 
 ander n., and under his successor, the Emperor 
 Alexander III., a part of the gardens was reserved in 
 winter for the exclusive use of the Court. Montagnes 
 de glace were installed, and there was skating on the 
 lake; several times a week a small circle, composed of 
 members of the imperial family and their guests, 
 met there, and those delightful reunions, the charm 
 of which I shall never forget, were brightened by the 
 grace and radiance of the Grand Duchess Maria 
 Feodorowna, at that time the wife of the heir to the 
 throne, afterward the reigning Empress, and now the 
 Empress Dowager, who presided over that series of 
 informal gatherings, where all manner of etiquette 
 was for the moment forbidden and forgotten. 
 
 This, then, was the scene, haunted by so many 
 memories of other days, that was set for the meetings 
 of the first Russian Duma; the changes necessary to 
 adapt it to its new uses had disfigured but little the 
 palace of Potemkin, and, although certain arrange- 
 ments and conveniences common to other European 
 parliaments were lacking, the palace offered to the 
 delegates of the Russian people a domicile of the 
 most noble and imposing aspect. 
 
80 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 The hall designed for the session of the Duma had 
 formerly enclosed a winter garden and was of great 
 dimensions; the interior arrangement was copied after 
 the French Chamber of Deputies, the raised tribune 
 of the President dominating that of the speaker and 
 both facing the hemicycle formed by the benches of 
 the deputies. The Ministers' bench, however, was 
 not placed in the first row, as in France, but at the 
 right of the President's tribune, fronting the deputies. 
 
 I mention these details because it has always 
 seemed to me that the arrangement of the hall in 
 which the sessions are to take place, and the outward 
 form given to the debates by a certain arrangement, 
 exert great influence upon the labours of an assembly. 
 When organizing the Duma, the Government would 
 have done well to introduce the forms adopted by 
 the assemblies of the Zemsts^os (the local provincial 
 councils), which dated from the liberal period of 
 Emperor Alexander II., who evidently had in mind, 
 when he prescribed them, that thgy-would-foFm-the 
 embryo-ol^_ future political representation of the 
 nation. The Zemstvos were not provided witET^a 
 tribune; the members, when addressing the house, 
 spoke from their respective places, facing the presid- 
 ing officer instead of their feUow members, as is the 
 custom in the English House of Commons. The re- 
 sult was that the orators were less tempted to rely 
 upon the effect of their eloquence and the debates 
 were characterized by rather more familiarity. If 
 this way of doing, which had been followed for more 
 than half a century, had been adopted in the Duma, 
 
THE FIEST DUMA 81 
 
 the many members of the Zemstvos present would 
 perhaps have communicated to their colleagues their 
 own habits of prudence and moderation in oratory. 
 It is a matter of common knowledge that the mere 
 fact of speaking from a tribune incites the orator to 
 an excess of eloquence, which often exerts a harmful 
 influence upon the deliberations of a yoimg assembly, 
 and I believe that I make no mistake in affirming 
 that the use of the rostrum brought into the first 
 rank of the Duma, 1906, certain personalities of dema- 
 gogic tendencies, to the detriment of other elements 
 more serious and more moderate. 
 
 It is a curious fact that the Government itself was 
 to blame for this unfortunate result. Prior to the 
 opening of the Duma, a high functionary, M. Trepoff 
 (he who was for several weeks President of the Coun- 
 cil in 1917, on the eve of the fall of the monarchy), 
 was deputed to go the rounds of the European capi- 
 tals for the purpose of studying the working of 
 the different parliamentary assemblies. M. Trepoff 
 brought back from his trip a ready-made plan, based 
 upon what he had observed at Paris, and it was 
 adopted without criticism by the Government; the 
 very simple idea of continuing the forms already in 
 use by the assemblies of the Zemstvos did not occur 
 to the Russian bureaucrats, or, to speak more exactly, 
 their inveterate hatred of these assemblies, which they 
 chose to consider as hotbeds of revolutionary effort, 
 caused them to shun anything that savoured of 
 similarity to the manner of proceeding of the Zemst- 
 vos. In this matter, as, alas, in many others after- 
 
82 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 ward, the Russian bureaucracy gave evidence of its 
 utter lack of comprehension, not only of the psychol- 
 ogy of representative assemblies in general, but of the 
 spirit of their own people. i 
 
 The collision between the bureaucratic Govern- 
 ment and the elected assembly occurred, as we know, 
 at the very first session of the Duma, and was followed 
 by a series of conflicts which, after a three months' 
 struggle, brought about its dissolution; but before 
 reciting the vicissitudes of this struggle I should 
 like to outline the traits of the principal adversaries 
 on either side. 
 
 I will not for the moment undertake the diflBcult 
 task of portraying the Emperor Nicholas II., who was 
 the central figure of the resistance which organized 
 itseK in defence of the monarchic principle against the 
 encroachments of the Duma, but will confine myself 
 to a description of the new ministers, who were 
 brought into prominence by the course of events and 
 whose colleague I had most unwillingly become. A 
 strange collection of functionaries they were, to be 
 sure; united to each other by no common interest nor 
 programme, if we except their antipathy to the new 
 order of things and to the very principle .of repre- 
 sentative government. 
 
 At the head of the Ministry stood M. Goremykin, an 
 old bureaucrat who even at that period had already 
 been fifty years in the service of the State; everyone 
 will remember the astonishment which greeted his 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 83 
 
 reappointment to the same high office a little while 
 before the outbreak of the great European War; he 
 himself was surprised at being called to power at so 
 critical an epoch and compared himself to an old fur 
 coat that one might take out of a box for protection 
 against an unexpected bit of bad weather. Unfor- 
 tunately, his metaphor was only too exact, for in 
 1906, as in 1914, that overcoat proved to be entirely 
 worn out and unfit for sheltering the monarchy from 
 the tempest which threatened it. 
 
 There was a striking contrast between the new 
 head of the Government and Count Witte, who had 
 just retired; the more the latter continued to domi- 
 nate even his enemies by his talents and energies, in 
 spite of the disappointments he had suflFered during 
 the concluding months of his tenure, the more did 
 M. Goremykin pale into insignificance. What could 
 have caused the Emperor to choose him for so import- 
 ant an office? The most plausible explanation was 
 that he had known how to make himself personally 
 agreeable to the Czarina, as a member of the different 
 benevolent societies over which she presided. M. 
 Goremykin prided himself on being an accomplished 
 courtier and affected the manners peculiar to old-time 
 Court etiquette, but what appeared to please the 
 Empress above all was the ostentation with which he 
 displayed his ultra-monarchical sentiments. 
 
 The most notable representative of the old bu-, 
 reaucracy in the Cabinet was, beyond question, the 
 Minister of Finance, M. Kokovtzoff. He became 
 President of the Council after the assassination of 
 
84 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 M. Stolypin, and was succeeded in turn by M. 
 Goremykin. Endowed with a prodigious capacity 
 for labour and distinguished for his universally 
 recognized probity, he had passed through all 
 grades of the official hierarchy and acquired vast 
 experience, not only in financial matters, but in widely 
 differing administrative branches. Shortly before, 
 he had been entrusted with the negotiation at Paris 
 of the great loan arranged by Count Witte, and had 
 acquitted himself of the delicate task with entire 
 success. Contrary to the majority of his colleagues, 
 he was animated by no preconceived hostility to the 
 Duma, and showed himself willing to collaborate 
 sincerely with that body, but his ingrained bureau- 
 cratic habits and his lack of experience in dealing with 
 parliamentary assemblies rendered this task difficult 
 and often caused an irritation that could easily have 
 been avoided with a little more diplomacy on his 
 part. So it was that when he wished to point out 
 on a certain occasion that the Ministers, according 
 to the charter of 1905, were not accountable to the 
 Chambers, but only to the sovereign — instead of 
 saying that there was no parliamentary government 
 in Russia, he provoked the unanimous indignation of 
 the Duma by declaring that there was " no Parliament 
 in Russia, thank Heaven!" On the other hand, M. 
 Kokovtzoff possessed the enormous advantage of 
 being remarkably eloquent; the long speeches which 
 he made in the Duma, characterized not only by a 
 perfect knowledge of his subject, but also by an im- 
 peccable oratory, were listened to with the closest 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 85 
 
 attention, and, as a general thing, were favourably 
 received by the deputies. 
 
 What can I say of most of the other Cabinet mem- 
 bers? The portfolio of war was held by General 
 Rudiger, an old soldier who had had an insignificant 
 career in the administrative branches of the Army, 
 and whose short term in the Ministry left no trace; 
 at the head of the Marine was that same Admiral 
 Birileflf who affixed his signature to the Treaty of 
 Bjorkoe without having read it, and whose almost 
 total deafness made it impossible for him to take part 
 in the debates of the Council of Ministers and the 
 Duma. Other posts, no less important, were held 
 by such pronounced reactionaries as M. Stichinsky, 
 Minister of Agriculture, and M. Scheglovitoff, Minis- 
 ter of Justice, who became later the leader of the 
 extreme right in the Council of the Empire; the func- 
 tions of Attorney-General of the Holy Synod 
 {Ministre des Cultes), so greatly dreaded in the time 
 of the famous PobiedonostzeflF, were filled by Prince 
 Schirinsky-Schichmatoff, a narrow devotee and a 
 fanatical partisan of the autocratic regime, who was 
 convinced that the granting of the Constitution was 
 little short of sacrilege. Finally, to cap the climax, 
 we were humiliated by the presence among us of 
 M. Schwanebach, Comptroller of the Empire (or 
 President of the Court of Accounts, ranking as a 
 Minister in Russia), an insupportable babbler, belong- 
 ing to that class of functionaries of German origin, 
 often very laborious, but who succeeded in rising 
 from a very humble milieu to the higher grades of the 
 
86 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Russian hierarchy by dint of intrigue and vile pro- 
 cedure. M. Schwanebach made a specialty of violent 
 criticisms directed against the financial administra- 
 tion of Count Witte, and procured their circulation 
 about the Court by surreptitious means, hoping thus 
 to attract the attention of the Emperor. In this way 
 he had acquired the reputation, entirely unmerited, 
 of being an able financier, and succeeded in getting 
 appointed to an office for which he was quite unfitted. 
 Aspiring to fill many roles, and with no qualms to 
 interfere with his acceptance of the crookedest ones, 
 M. Schwanebach became intimate with the Austrian 
 Ambassador, Baron von Aerenthal, whose name will 
 often occur in the following pages, and served him as 
 an informer regarding the domestic affairs of Russia. 
 It will be seen how great an influence his information 
 exerted upon Austrian policies in relation to Russia, 
 and how serious a wrong was caused to Russian in- 
 terests. 
 
 I have so far omitted, intentionally, to mention the 
 most remarkable of all the Cabinet members — ^M. 
 Stolypin, Minister of the Interior, who was soon to 
 replace M. Goremykin at the head of the Govern- 
 ment, He deserves, in fact, more attention than 
 any of his colleagues, and I will speak of him at 
 greater length, not only because of the important role 
 which he played in the political life of his country, 
 but also because the close relations that I maintained 
 with him up to the time when, for reasons which I 
 will explain later, I was obliged to separate from him, 
 enable me to trace his portrait in a manner that I 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 87 
 
 dare hope will place in a true light his remarkable 
 personality, so often misunderstood during his life- 
 time and calumniated after his death. I hasten to 
 add that the reasons for our separation were purely of 
 a political natiu-e and did not lessen my great admira- 
 tion for his moral character nor our personal friend- 
 ship, which endured until the day of his death. 
 
 Pierre Stolypin was of gentle origin and belonged 
 by birth and relationship to the high society of St. 
 Petersburg; his father had occupied one of the great 
 positions at Court and his mother was the daughter 
 of General Prince Gortchakoff, who was commander- 
 in-chief of the Russian Army at Sebastopol. From 
 my youth upward I was in cordial relations with his 
 family, and I became acquainted with him when we 
 were finishing our studies, he at the University and 
 I at the Imperial Lyceum. We were of about the 
 same age, and I remember him as a charming young 
 man, greatly loved and respected by his comrades, a 
 little awkward and timid on account of a slight de- 
 formity; his right hand was stiflF, as the result of an 
 accident, and he made use of it with some difficulty. 
 He married when very young, and in romantic fashion, 
 the fiancee of his elder brother, who was killed in a 
 duel and who on his death-bed placed his brother's 
 hand in that of the young girl whom he tenderly 
 loved. Instead of entering the military or civil ser- 
 vice of the State, as was the custom of young men of 
 his station in life, he retired to his properties, situated 
 in one of the western provinces of Russia, and led the 
 life of a rich country gentleman. After some time 
 
88 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 he accepted the duties of Marechal de la Noblesse of 
 his district. The marshals of the nobility — ^who 
 were elected in the central provinces of Russia, or 
 appointed by the Government in those provinces 
 where the Russian elements were in conflict with the 
 Polish — ^were not only expected to care for the in- 
 terests of their body, but were clothed with general 
 administrative functions of considerable extent. Hav- 
 ing shown talent and energy in the performance of 
 his duties, M. Stolypin was offered by the Govern- 
 ment the post of Prefect of the Province of Sara- 
 toff, which was disturbed at that period by the revolu- 
 tionary agitation. He decided to accept, in a spirit of 
 duty to his country and his sovereign rather than of 
 ambition, and during the time that he occupied that 
 difficult position he proved himself to be an excellent 
 administrator, as well as a man of remarkable courage 
 and sang-froid. Like most of the governors of prov- 
 inces at that time, he was subjected to the danger of 
 assassination, and on one occasion he seized and dis- 
 armed a revolutionary who had fired several shots at 
 him without effect. 
 
 An anecdote is told of his presence of mind and his 
 domination over a crowd. A mutiny had broken out 
 in one of the quarters of the town at the instigation of 
 certain revolutionary leaders, whose chief had lately 
 been a soldier in one of the regiments of the local garri- 
 son, and M. Stolypin knew that he had been an oflScer's 
 servant. Before resorting to force, the Governor re- 
 solved to try persuasion; arrived at the scene of the 
 disorders, and perceiving in the front row of the crowd 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 89 
 
 the aforesaid ringleader, he walked straight toward 
 him and, before haranguing the mutineers, tossed him 
 quickly his cloak as it slipped from his shoulders, and 
 ordered him to hold it. The ex-orderly, accustomed 
 to passive obedience, did as he was told before he 
 realized it, and so lost in an instant, by the mere per- 
 formance of a servile act, all prestige in the eyes of the 
 mob, who presently became docile and yielded to the 
 injunctions of the energetic Governor. 
 
 It was this very reputation for energy that com- 
 mended M. Stolypin to the Emperor's choice for the 
 oflBce of Minister of the Interior. Totally out of his 
 element in the bureaucratic world of the capital, this 
 country gentleman of a rather provincial aspect ap- 
 peared at first to play an insignificant part at the 
 meetings of the Council of Ministers, but very soon 
 his robust and original personality imposed itself 
 strongly upon the routine functionaries who com- 
 posed the majority of the Cabinet. As for me, I fell 
 a victim to his charm at once, and was happy to find 
 among my chance companions a man to whom I felt 
 drawn by a communion of ideas and political convic- 
 tions, for at that time M. Stolypin appeared to me 
 to be an especially sincere partisan of the new order 
 of things, resolved to collaborate with the Duma 
 in every way possible. Like him, for reasons which I 
 will explain later, I was a stranger to the bureaucratic 
 environment of St. Petersburg, and felt more in sym- 
 pathy with the members of the provincial nobility 
 and the Zemstvos, who had sent to the Duma some 
 of their best representatives. The more M. Goremy- 
 
90 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 kin, sustained by the reactionary Ministers, empha- 
 sized his hostile attitude toward the assembly, the 
 more closely I drew to M. Stolypin, with whom I 
 formed, so to speak, the left wing of the Cabinet. 
 
 M. Stolypin was gifted with a very clear and 
 healthy turn of mind that enabled him to comprehend 
 the general significance of matters submitted to him 
 for decision, and to master them in their details as 
 well; his capacity for work and his physical and moral 
 power of endurance were prodigious. Accustomed 
 as he was to the duties of a landowner, engaged in the 
 development of vast properties, and, afterward, to 
 the activity in practical affairs that was requisite 
 for the efficient administration of a province, he had 
 little patience with bureaucratic routine and as- 
 tonished everyone by the simplicity and good sense 
 with which he attacked the most arduous problems 
 of State, that had been the subject of many discus- 
 sions at the meetings of the Council of Ministers. 
 
 Ajciuality which was lacking, unfortunately, in M. 
 Stolypin's character— and he was conscious oi^this 
 himselfr— was a broad culture, in the European sense 
 ofj^^word.. I do not mean to say that he was devoid 
 of education, for he had pursued serious studies at 
 the University, was well-read and well-informed in a 
 general way; but his opinions on the great political 
 and social questions'which he was called upon to con- 
 si^deFTiaJ'nbt passed" through the sieve of modern 
 scientificjcriticism, and^is sta^^^ of mind was strongFy 
 influenced by certain intellectual currents which pre- 
 vailed in Russia during Eiiyouth, and which may be 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 91 
 
 summed up in what, by common consent, albeit im- 
 properly, is termed "SlavopEilism." 
 ' E^rvmg"f6rtufther afidrSore'idetailed discussion 
 a theory that has had so great an influence on the for- 
 eign and domestic policies of Russia, it will suffice for 
 the present to say that Slavophilism condemns Euro- 
 pean civilization en bloc, as being corrupted by athe- 
 ism and an excess of individualism. It attributes to 
 the Russian nation the providential mission of creat- 
 ing a superior culture; in the domain of religion the 
 Slavophiles proclaim that the Russian Orthodox 
 Church alone has remained faithful to the precepts of 
 Christ; and in the political domain they denounce 
 the reforms which Peter the Great borrowed from 
 the Occident and demand a return to the "national" 
 systems of the Muscovite period. One of their prin- 
 cipal doctrines has for its basis a claim that the com- 
 mune, or Mir, is an original invention of Russian 
 genius, and they find in communal proprietorship 
 the essential foundation for the social and economic 
 organization of Russia. 
 
 I will tell how, and thanks to what influences — 
 after having been attracted by the arguments of the 
 Slavophiles, together with almost all the other men of 
 my generation and M. Stolypin's— I freed myself 
 from their obscure teachings at a comparatively early 
 period; as for M. Stolypia, without professing their 
 faith to excess, he remained an adherent in many 
 respects. If he had enjoyed the opportunity, as I 
 did, to study the political and social life of Western 
 Europe, I am certain that his clear and vigorous mind 
 
92 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 would have rejected all their errors ultimately. In 
 dealing with one of the questions most vital to Russia 
 — ^that of agrarian organization — ^he did not hesitate 
 to abandon the fatal theory of the Mir, cause of so 
 many evils, and to adopt, against violent opposition, 
 the system of small individual ownership. On the 
 other hand, unfortunately, he was never able to rise 
 superior to certain particularly dangerous concep- 
 tions of the Slavophiles, and so it was that, in spite of 
 all my efforts to dissuade him, he veered toward a 
 narrow and even exaggerated nationalism, which had 
 the most lamentable consequences, and finally caused 
 the rupture of our political relations. 
 
 But that which constituted the incontestable and 
 imdisputed superiority of M. Stolypin and established 
 from the outset his ascendancy over his colleagues was 
 a rare ensemble of qualities, both of heart and char- 
 acter. I have referred already to the reputation that 
 he had acquired for courage and sang-froid, of which 
 he gave example later in a still more striking manner. 
 These two traits were the expression of a vital energy 
 that I have seldom seen equalled, especially in an in- 
 dividual of my race; however, when meeting him for 
 the first time, one was impressed and attracted by a 
 simplicity and a sweetness which gave to his personal- 
 ity an irresistible charm, and, upon further acquaint- 
 ance, one discovered in him a high-mindedness and a 
 nobility of soul that the exercise of a power, which, 
 at certain times, became even dictatorial, never in the 
 least affected. His exalted and chivalrous conception 
 of duty made of him a servant, devoted to the point 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 93 
 
 of martyrdom, of his sovereign and his country, but, 
 at the same time, he was so proud of his name and 
 jealous of his Uberty that he ever maintained, toward 
 a court and a bureaucracy which regarded him in the 
 light of an intruder and were more or less hostile to 
 him from the beginning, an attitude of reserve and 
 independence to which one was little accustomed in 
 that sphere, and which, I am sorry to say, was never 
 appreciated at its worth by the Czar and his intimates. 
 The portrait which I have essayed to draw of this 
 distinguished man would be incomplete were I to 
 omit to mention his marvellous gift of oratory; in his 
 first address to the Duma he revealed himself as a 
 public speaker of extraordinary power. -I use the 
 word "revealed" because, up to that moment, no 
 one had the slightest knowledge of his talent as an 
 orator, and, in all probability, he himself was equally 
 unconscious of possessing such a talent, for, prior to 
 the meeting of the first Duma, there was no school 
 in Russia in which parliamentary oratory could be 
 acquired. We have seen that the debates in the 
 assemblies of the Zemstvos were of a rather -familiar 
 and informal character, unfavourable to the cultiva- 
 tion of an oratorical style. The Russian, as we have 
 since discovered, especially during the period follow- 
 ing the fall of the monarchy, is not only endowed 
 with a natural gift of eloquence, but is, alas, too much 
 inclined to abuse this gift to the detriment of action. 
 I have no hesitation in repeating that the use of the 
 rostrum produced an unhealthy effect upon the de- 
 bates of the Duma, but, in the case of M. Stolypin, 
 
94 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 it became a mighty instrument of government. In 
 the assemblies of the Zemstvos, in which he had taken 
 part before he became a Minister, he had been trained 
 to speak without preparation, and the most remark- 
 able speeches pronounced by him in the Duma were 
 purely extempore. Oftener than not he mounted the 
 tribime on the spur of a sudden impulse, without 
 manuscript and even without notes, and for more 
 than an hour held his hearers spell-bound by his fiery 
 eloquence, accentuated by an irresistible sincerity; at 
 such times a sUght fault of enunciation, common to 
 his mother's family, disappeared completely, and it 
 was with a clear and vibrant voice that he pronoimced 
 those "winged words" with which he was so often 
 inspired, and which became a rallying cry for thou- 
 sands of Russians who read his speeches. It was an 
 invaluable advantage for the Government to be able 
 to oppose orators of the strength of M. Stolypin, and 
 the clearness of M. Kokovtzoff, to their adversaries, 
 who, although they counted among their number 
 some very notable speakers in the first Duma, could 
 boast of none that were superior or even equal to those 
 two eloquent Ministers. 
 
 I win limit myself for the moment to this rapid 
 sketch of the personality of M. Stolypin, whose figure 
 will stand out in greater rehef in the course of my 
 recital of the events which marked the years of my 
 collaboration with him; but I cannot refrain from ex- 
 pressing my surprise at the scant justice which has 
 been given him by certain writers, who had failed to 
 present him in his true character to the Em"opean 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 95 
 
 public. In France M. Stolypin is known to most 
 readers by M. Charles Rivet's book: "The Last 
 RomanoflF." This book, which is fuU of misstate- 
 ments and false judgments, and of which the least 
 that can be said is that one is astonished to recognize 
 as its author a French joiUTialist who was under 
 great obUgations to the Government duriag his stay 
 of several years in Russia, has a chapter devoted to 
 M. Stolypia which is particularly marred by preju- 
 dice. M. Rivet deliberately charges him with acts 
 and tendencies which, in reaUty, he combated with 
 the utmost energy and which it is impossible to im- 
 pute to him with the least regard for truth. I will 
 not stop to refute these charges point by point, for I 
 am quite sure that the pages which are to foUow will 
 demonstrate their falsity sufficiently. 
 
 In Dr. DiUon's book, "The Echpse of Russia," in- 
 structive as it is, I find, among other subjects on 
 which I entertain different opinions from its talented 
 and clearsighted author, that he, too, fails to treat 
 the activity of M. Stolypin with proper consideration, 
 in that he virtually passes it over in sUence. Upon 
 reading that work, so rich in documentary evidence, 
 but, alas, so often partial in its conclusions, one can- 
 not but be stuprised that a description of the epoch 
 of Russia's political history which was dominated by 
 the personality of M. Stolypin contains scarcely any 
 mention of his name. I can only explain this by the 
 supposition that Dr. DiUon was so intent upon 
 glorifying Count Witte (for which I would be the 
 last to reproach him), and knew so well the profound 
 
96 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 dislike that his hero felt toward M. Stolypin, that he 
 preferred to omit all reference to a subject regarding 
 which Count Witte's judgment impressed him as 
 being unfair and open to question. 
 
 When, after having come in contact with the person- 
 nel composing M. Goremykin heterogeneous Cabinet, 
 I turned my attention to the Duma, the spectacle 
 of that assembly's strange composition presented 
 itsetf to me as being equally disconcerting. I have 
 already told how I was struck by the great number 
 of. peasants among the deputies who figured at the 
 ceremony attending the opening of the Duma at the 
 Winter Palace. According to the terms of the elec- 
 toral law, the Duma was to have 524 members, but 
 the elections not having yet terminated in certain 
 parts of the Empire, there were not over 500 present 
 at theJtime of its inauguration. Of this number some 
 200 belonged to the peasant, class; next came the 
 Cadets, who, for reasons which I have before ex- 
 plained, had gained a signal victory over the Con- 
 servatives and over the Moderate Liberals, or Octo- 
 brists, as well. The Cadet party, of pronounced 
 radical tendencies, very compact and strongly or- 
 ganized, counted 161 members, and was reinforced 
 by two groups, less radical in their ideas, but who 
 voted invariably with the Cadets: the "Party of 
 Democratic Reforms" and the "Party of Legal 
 Order." These two groups were not strong numeri- 
 cally, but they comprised some striking personalities 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 97 
 
 in their ranks. The Moderate Liberal, or Octobrist 
 party, was represented by a mere handful of deputies 
 who were scarcely to be distinguished from the Con- 
 servatives together with whom they hardly exceeded 
 thirty in number. Of Socialists there were only seven- 
 teen, and even they had not been elected, as such, for 
 the two avowed revolutionary parties, the "Revolu- 
 tionary-Socialists" and the "Socialist -Democrats," 
 had declined to take part in the elections, demanding 
 the meeting of a constituent assembly and integral 
 universal suflfrage, as well as the boycott of a Duma 
 founded upon a charter of 1905. The national- 
 auto nomist group s: Polish, Lithuanian7~Estbnian,~" 
 Lett, and those of the western provinces, numbered 
 aU together seventyjQiembers, and were of democratic 
 tendencies with the exception of the Polish group, 
 which was Congervatiye but, for national reasons, 
 joined the others in opposition to the Government. 
 Finally, there were a certain number of deputies who 
 belonged to no party, and were undecided how to 
 cast their votes at the start, but ended by giving sup- 
 port to the ranks of the opposition. 
 
 The salient characteristic of the first Duma, there- 
 fore, was an Opposition bloc, embracing more than 
 half of its membership. "This bloc, composed of differ- 
 ent" groups, was entirely controlled by the Cadets, 
 and to counteract this formidable -Opposition, there 
 was no clearly defined Conservative element, and no 
 Moderate Liberal group of any consequence. But, 
 apart from all the rest, there rose a confused and 
 formless mass^^ composed of two hundred peasants 
 
98 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 diversified only here and there by their village 
 "popes," long-haired and hirsute-faced, who differed 
 but httle in appearance and mentality from their com- 
 panions, the tillers of the soil. 
 
 The introduction of this peasant .^mass intojthe 
 Duina Had been the pet idea of the Government, and, 
 with this object in" view, the elections had been regu- 
 lated by an electoral law, whose responsible autho!r 
 wats M. Boulyguin, a mediocre bureaucrat, who had 
 given his name to the first project of a constitution 
 which had never gone into effect. The law had then 
 been retouched and completed by the Government of 
 Count Witte; it was prodigioudy^ compUcated and 
 artificial, and was designed to favour the peasant 
 class to the disadvantage of all other classes in the 
 - country. The Government hoped thereby to benefit 
 by the presence m tne Duma of an element to oe 
 depended on for^its conservative spirit, its loyalty 
 \ tcTtliep^son of the Czar, and its docilit^jtothe_voice 
 of the established authorit;^ and the oflScial Church. 
 Never did the bureaucrats who ruled the'desflllfer 
 of Russia commit a greater blunder, nor one which was J 
 more fatal to the very cause which they had at heart, 
 for, as will be seen presently, the peasants entered the 
 Duma possessed of the fixed idea~tFat they were to 
 obtain a division of land in favour of their class. 
 Profoundly ignorant of all the other questions that 
 were to come before the Duma, and indifferenttiff the 
 political liberties demanded by the Liberals, they were 
 ready to support any party that would promise them 
 the complete realization of their agrarian aspirations; 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 99 
 
 so, inasmuch as the Cadets had inscribed at the head of 
 then- programme not only the distribution among the 
 peasants of the lands belonging to the Crown, the 
 imperial family, and the convents, but also the forced 
 expropriation of land held by the great proprietors, 
 and even that of the lesser landowners, it was clear 
 that the Radical party could count upon the support 
 of the great majority of peasant deputies. Under 
 these auspices, and with the participation of the 
 Socialists, the so-called "Labour party" was formed 
 — cranking second in the Duma in point of numerical 
 importance — composed principally of peasants pro- 
 fessing agrarian socialism, and cotmting about a 
 hundred members. The other peasants, even those 
 who considered themselves as belonging to the Con- 
 servative party, fell more and more under the sway 
 of the Cadets as the agrarian question grew rapidly 
 to be the chief subject of debate in the Chamber. 
 As is well known, this question was the cause of the 
 final clash between the Government and the first 
 Duma,, resulting in its dissolution. 
 
 M. Stolypin recognized the Government's mistake 
 and its fatal consequences at the first glance, and I 
 shared his opinion. But what else could have been 
 expected of bureaucrats confined to the atmosphere 
 of the Ministries of St. Petersburg, and total strangers 
 to the rapid growth of new ideas and the intensity 
 of life that was manifesting itself in the interior of the 
 country? Believing that they already held in check 
 the revolutionary spirit of the "intellectuals" of the 
 large cities by the methods of the police, they were 
 
100 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 for the moment concerned with the task of stemming 
 the rising tide of Liberalism in the Zemstvos, and as 
 regarded the peasants, the illusions which prevailed in 
 the Governmental circles of the capital were half a 
 century old. They cherished the innocent belief that 
 the peasant was the natural bulwark of the Throne 
 and of the Altar, and, incredible as it may seem, they 
 took no account of his agrarian appetite and the 
 anarchistic tendencies which had become so patent 
 to every intelligent observer during the years just 
 passed. That functionaries of the type of M. Bouly- 
 guin should share these illusions, I repeat, is nothing 
 to cause astonishment, but that Count Witte, clear- 
 sighted and practical statesman as he was, could have 
 fallen into the same error, I have never to this day 
 been able to comprehend. Had not Count Witte 
 been president of the great commission which had 
 studied the agrarian question a short time previous, 
 and had he not then an opportunity to gauge the 
 intensity of the aspirations of the peasant class? I 
 have often tried, without success, to penetrate this 
 mystery by questioning, now Count Witte himself, 
 and again his principal co-workers; only lately I 
 hoped to find the key of the enigma in Dr. Dillon's 
 book, but that author, in spite of his familiarity with 
 the most hidden thoughts of his distinguished friend, 
 limits himself to a mere record of his error without 
 attempting to explain it. So the riddle remains 
 unsolved and, to my mind, weighs heavily upon the 
 memory of Count Witte, for it was this fundamental 
 mistake which was the chief cause of the shipwreck 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 101 
 
 that overtook the first Duma and of the difficulties 
 which ensued therefrom. 
 
 We have just seen how curious was the com- 
 position of the Diuna; it was no less curious that the 
 two leading parties which had contested the elections 
 — ^the Cadets and the Octobrists — ^were not repre- 
 sented in the assembly by their declared chiefs. 
 The Cadet party, which had triumphed all along the 
 line, had failed to have their leader. Professor 
 Milioukoflf, admitted. He had been elected by a 
 heavy majority at St. Petersburg, but was excluded 
 by the Government for some technical reason which I 
 do not remember. The Government derived no 
 particular advantage, however, for M. MilioukofiF 
 continued, none the less, to direct his party from the 
 outside, and, in fact, I have always thought that his 
 presence in the Chamber would have been less troub- 
 lesome to the Cabinet than his activity in the lob- 
 bies, especially as the Cadets did not lack able rep- 
 resentatives on the floor of the Duma, such as 
 Professor Mourontzoff (President of the first Duma), 
 Messrs. Golovin (who became President of the sec- 
 ond), Roditcheff, Nabokoff, Vinaver (the best three 
 orators belonging to the party). Prince Schakovskoy, 
 Messrs. Petrounkievitch, Kokoschkin, and Hertzen- 
 stein. The two affiliated Liberal parties — ^those of 
 "Democratic Reform" and of "Legal Order" — 
 although so small ia number as to suggest somebody's 
 remark that they were like a "general staff without 
 any troops," were also well represented by men of 
 acknowledged ability; the first by its founder. Pro- 
 
102 RECOLLECTIONS OP A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 fessor Kovalevski, since deceased, who had many 
 friends in France, and by General Kouzmin-Kara vaieff , 
 one of the best orators of the Duma; the second by 
 its leader, Count Heyden, who had occupied a high 
 station at Court and whose moral influence was uni- 
 versally recognized. As for the Octobrists, their 
 two chiefs, Messrs. Goutchkoff and D. Schipoff, had 
 been beaten in the elections; the Conservatives had 
 sent no one of any importance, and were merged, 
 more or less, with the Octobrists; among the Moder- 
 ate Liberals were to be noticed Messrs. Stakhovitch 
 and Lvofif (not to be confounded with Prince Lvoff, 
 future President of the Provisional Government, 
 who was not a member of the first Duma), but I 
 cannot remember whether they were registered as 
 belonging to the Octobrist group or to that of "Legal 
 Order." The Polish "Kolo" was headed by M. 
 Dmovski, chief of the Polish National Democratic 
 party, who still plays an important part in his coun- 
 try's affairs, and the Bishop of Vilna, Baron Ropp, 
 both orators of the first order. Finally, the LaboUr 
 party was led by M. Aladin, a brilliant speaker, who 
 alSPected a certain elegance, and, with the aid of the 
 red flower which he seldom forgot to wear in his but- 
 tonhole, did much to relieve the monotony of the gray 
 mass of peasants who composed the great majority 
 of his party. 
 
 The Council of the Empire — ^which had corre- 
 sponded under the old regime to the first Napoleon's 
 Conseil d'Etat, and in which were framed and dis- 
 cussed the most important laws and measuresi per- 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 103 
 
 taining to domestic policy, to be submitted thereafter 
 to the Emperor for his decision — ^was transformed 
 into an Upper Chamber, composed in equal number 
 of members appointed by the Emperor and of those 
 elected; the former, although subject to confirmation 
 by the Czar at the beginning of each year, were to 
 serve for life, and comprised, ahnost without excep- 
 tion, bureaucrats who had occupied high positions 
 in the civil and military hierarchy: former Ministers 
 of State, Governors-General, Commanders of army 
 corps, ambassadors. Supreme Court judges, etc. The 
 elected members were designated for a term of nine 
 years by the high clergy, the assemblies of the nobil- 
 ity, the academy of sciences and the universities, 
 the chambers of commerce and the Bourse, the manu- 
 facturing interests and, finally, the greater number by 
 the Zemstvos in those parts of the Empire where 
 those assemblies existed, and everywhere else — ^as, for 
 instance, in Poland, Lithuania, the western provinces 
 and those of the Baltic — ^by the landed proprietors. 
 
 By virtue of its composition, the Council of the 
 Empire was in reality a more modern assemblage than 
 most of the upper houses of Europe, in countries en- 
 joying constitutional government, as, for example, the 
 House of Lords or the Italian Senate. In spite of my 
 little admiration for the Russian bureaucracy, I must 
 admit that among the members of the Council there 
 were a nmnber of men of great ability and eminent 
 worth. Some of them had been in office during the 
 liberal reign of the Emperor Alexander II., among 
 others, my wife's uncle. Count Pahlen, who, at the 
 
104 RECOLLECTIONS OP A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 age of thirty, had been chosen by the Czar to introduce 
 into Russia, in his capacity of Minister of Justice, the 
 judiciary reform which is recognized as one of the 
 great acts of Alexander II.'s reign. Count Pahlen 
 was a gentleman of the old school, of most distin- 
 guished bearing and appearance, laden with honours, 
 and a great favourite at Court, but noted for his abso- 
 lute independence toward the Government, and uni- 
 versally respected for his integrity and nobility of 
 character. In company with him were such men as 
 Count Solsky, M. Goloubeff, the two brothers 
 Sabouroflf (one of whom had been Ambassador to 
 Berlia until he was obliged to leave his post by reason 
 of his antagonism toward Prince Bismarck), Ger- 
 hardt, Koni, and others, all bureaucrats, but gifted 
 with large views, wide knowledge, and great expe- 
 rience in public affairs. It was a curious thing that 
 the elder bureaucrats were distinguished for their 
 liberal spirit, or, in other words, the spirit of the reign 
 of Emperor Alexander II., while the yoimger func- 
 tionaries were imbued with the reactionary ideas of 
 the later period of Alexander III. 
 
 A place apart in the Council of the Empire was 
 occupied by Count Witte, who had just left power, 
 and whose future attitude toward the Government 
 was a matter of guess-work. In the next chapter I 
 purpose to sketch the portrait of that powerful figure, 
 whose political role appeared to be interrupted only 
 for a time. 
 
 While the elected members of the Council of the 
 Empire were to serve for nine years, a third of the 
 
THE FIRST DUMA 105 
 
 membership was designated by lot every year to be 
 replaced by an equal number newly chosen, under the 
 same conditions as their predecessors. For this rea- 
 son I cannot recall with certainty the composition of 
 the first lot of members belonging to this category, 
 and it is possible, therefore, that I may mention some 
 persons who did not enter the Council until later. The 
 Academy and the Universities were represented by 
 such eminent professors as Prince Galitzin, Messrs. 
 Oldenburg, Grimm, and TagantzeflF; the commercial 
 and manufacturing industries and the Bourses by men 
 of equal note in their respective branches, among 
 whom I will cite Messrs. Krestovnikoff, Avdakoff, and 
 Timiriazeff ; the nobility, the Zemstvos, and the landed 
 proprietors sent some of their best representatives, the 
 greater part of whom joined the party of the Centre, 
 i.e., the Moderate Liberal party, which was presided 
 over by one of my intimate friends. Prince Pierre 
 Troubetzkoy, formerly Marechal de la Noblesse of 
 Moscow, destined, alas, to perish soon after by the 
 hand of an assassin. Among the members belonging 
 to these last three categories I numbered several 
 other friends of long standing, as, for example, Prince 
 Boris Vassiltchikoff, Marechal de la Noblesse of 
 Novgorod, all imbued with the best liberal traditions 
 of their class. To conclude, the Poles were repre- 
 sented by several very distinguished and enlightened 
 men, almost all good orators, such as M. Kozvin- 
 Milevsky, well known in Paris, Coimt Wielepolski, 
 Messrs. Skirmant and Schebeke. 
 
 On the whole, at the moment of which I am now 
 
106 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 speaking, the Council of the Empire had not begun to 
 have the character, which distinguished it later, of an 
 assemblage guided by reactionary principles, or ready 
 to serve as a docile instrument in the hands of the 
 Government. Its transformation was effected little 
 by little, thanks to the pains which were taken in high 
 places to prevent the appointment of any one who did 
 not belong to the parties of the Right. As far as 
 concerned its procedure during the first session, the 
 Council of the Empire not only gave proof of great 
 independence and of a broad and enlightened spirit, 
 but, as we shall see, it strenuously opposed the in- 
 coherent Cabinet of M. Goremykin and did not in the 
 slightest degree deserve the hostility a priori that was 
 shown by the Duma. 
 
 In spite of the well-established custom by virtue of 
 which the Ministers of State, immediately after tak- 
 ing oflSce, were appointed members of the Council of 
 the Empire, I did not enter that assembly until two 
 years later, on account of the opposition that the 
 reactionaries made to my candidacy, and because 
 of their influence upon the Emperor. It was only 
 after an energetic protest from M. Stolypin that these 
 obstacles were overcome, with the result that I en- 
 tered th^ Council at the same time with my brother, 
 and we feoth joined the party of the Centre. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 Count Witte 
 
 I AM now about to take up a most difficult task : the 
 portrayal — ^whieli I desire to make as faithful as 
 possible — of that great statesman, Count Witte. 
 <Few Ministers have been more diversely judged and 
 with greater passion. He had his share of enemies 
 and implacable detractors, but he had also, and still 
 retains, most enthusiastic panegyrists, who spare no 
 superlatives when eulogizing his character and his 
 deeds. None knew better than he how to inspire his 
 friends with the warmest and truest devotion, a con- 
 spicuous example of which is shown by Dr. E. J. 
 Dillon, in his book, "The Eclipse of Russia," which he 
 dedicated "to the memory of my friend, Russia's 
 unique statesman, S. I. Witte." For my part, I 
 never fell under the glamour of Count Witte's power- 
 ful personality, nor, on the other hand, did I expe- 
 rience the feeling of violent aversion that he inspired 
 in so many of his contemporaries, notably Emperor 
 Nicholas, who never was able to conceal his anti- 
 pathy. Not having been on intimate terms with 
 Count Witte, I feel that I am in a position to portray 
 him with entire freedom and in a manner that I will 
 endeavour to make as objective as possible. 
 The most striking points in his personal appearance 
 
 107 
 
108 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 were his great height and massive shoulders. He 
 stood half a head taller than most other men, even in 
 Russia, where men are generally of high stature, and 
 his whole frame suggested something that might have 
 been shaped by the rude blows of an axe. His fea- 
 tures would have had character, were it not for a 
 malformation, almost a fracture, of the nose, which 
 gave him a certain resemblance to the portraits of 
 Michelangelo. His bearing was rough and appar- 
 ently so by intention; perhaps he affected a brusque 
 manner to hide the embarrassment which he felt at 
 Court and in the high society of the capital, a milieu 
 to which he never became accustomed. But in spite 
 of his rather shabby appearance and the awkwardness 
 of his manners, he produced, on the whole, a great 
 impression of force and originality. 
 
 One thing which always affected me disagreeably 
 in Count Witte was his voice, the notes of which 
 sounded out of tune, as it were, and especially his pro- 
 nunciation, acquired during his youth, when he lived 
 at Odessa, where the population is a mixed one, com- 
 prising Greeks, Rumanians, and other meridionals. 
 That pronunciation, as well as a rather common man- 
 ner of speech, was displeasing to my ear, habituated 
 as I was to the piire and elegant tongue perfected by 
 our great national poet, Pouschkin, and spoken by 
 Russians belonging to the cultivated classes of the 
 two capitals, especially Moscow. 
 
 Count Witte was, as is well known, a "self-made 
 man"; not that his birth was exceptionally humble, 
 for his father, who was a provincial functionary of 
 
COUNT WITTE 109 
 
 foreign extraction (Dutch, I believe), had attained 
 quite a high position in the Government employ, and 
 his mother belonged to one of the best families in 
 Russia; but, after finishing his education in his native 
 province, he did not enter the bureaucratic career, 
 which was the only road to high oflBcial rank and hon- 
 ours at that period. He went into the service of the 
 powerful private company which operated the south- 
 western railroads of Russia, and it was in that environ- 
 ment that the first twenty years of his activity were 
 spent. Endowed as he was with rare energy, he passed 
 through all branches of the service, without disdain- 
 ing the most humble duties, even such as those of 
 station-master, and thanks to his thorough knowledge 
 of railroad operation and management, when he was 
 r summoned to St. Petersburg by Emperor Alexander 
 III., as an expert on the railway question that was 
 then so important in Russia, he easily dominated 
 the routine bureaucracy of the capital by his practical 
 experience and good sense. 
 
 At St. Petersburg his untiring activity overstepped 
 the bounds of his speciality, and he became an author- 
 ity, not only on railway matters, but on the whole 
 economic life of the country; his rise in the official 
 hierarchy was marvellously rapid, and it was only 
 a few years after his arrival at the capital when he was 
 placed at the head of the Finance Ministry, a position 
 not only very influential in itself, but to which he 
 imparted a particular importance. He occupied 
 that post, with two years of interruption (1903-1905), 
 until the day when, as we have seen, he became 
 
110 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 chief of the first Constitutional Government of 
 Russia. 
 
 Count Witte's mind always turned toward the 
 practical side of things; his political and economic 
 conceptions, even the most far-reaching, were not as 
 a general rule inspired by a comprehensive view of the 
 functions of a State, nor by the great laws which 
 govern human society. This explains in part, I 
 think, some of the errors that he committed, but 
 although I have been struck more than once by his 
 lack of superior culture and certain general funda- 
 mental ideas, I do not go so far as to agree with M. 
 Bompard, who, in a recent article in the Revue de 
 Paris, asserted that Count Witte was devoid of the 
 most elementary knowledge of financial science, and 
 that he had never pursued his studies of the theory 
 of economics beyond the reading of a treatise by M. 
 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. 
 
 / In spite of these statements, M. Bompard recog- 
 ^ nizes in Count Witte "an administrator of superior 
 intellectual power, a financier of wide views, and an 
 eminent statesman." This judgment does honour to 
 the impartial spirit of the former French Ambassador 
 at St. Petersburg, whose political adversary Count 
 Witte never ceased to be, but it seems to me that it 
 does not render entire justice to his genius. I do not 
 hesitate to use the word genius, for Count Witte un- 
 doubtedly displayed much more than mere talent in 
 certain phases of his activity. 
 
 Can one rightly say, as Dr. Dillon does in his book, 
 that Count Witte was "the only statesman that Rus- 
 
COUNT WITTE 111 
 
 sia has produced since Peter the Great?" I do not 
 think so; his work shows too flagrant lapses, and some 
 of his mistakes have been too cruelly expiated by Rus- 
 sia to permit one to assign him so high a place in the 
 history of his country. I beUeve it would be more 
 just to say that there were certain hours in his career 
 when, by the audacity of his conceptions, and by the 
 energy with which he carried them out, he put him- 
 self on a par with the greatest statesmen of all time 
 and all nations; but at other times, and, unhappily, 
 on some critical occasions, he was strangely inferior 
 to himself. This was due rather to deficiencies of 
 character than of intellect, for in contra-distinction 
 ,to M. Stolypin, he revealed himself as a man whose 
 Amoral qualities were not always up to the standard of 
 ^^is mental faculties. 
 
 Without attempting a comprehensive view of the 
 prodigious work accomplished by Count Witte, one is 
 immediately struck by the fact that it did not pro- 
 ceed from a consistent scheme of action in the realm 
 of poUtical economics, but presented widely differing 
 and often contradictory phases. To explain this 
 anomaly, it is indispensable to imagine oneself under 
 the influences to which he was subject during his fif- 
 teen years of untiring activity in public life. 
 
 Until the promulgation of the Constitution of 1905 
 L there was no homogeneous Cabinet in Russia; there 
 twas no President of the Council of Ministers, nor even 
 Jany permanent Council, properly speaking. The 
 Emperor, on certain occasions, called the Ministers 
 /together imder his presidency, to consider one or an- 
 
112 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 other question of particularly grave importance, but 
 such occasions were rare, and, as a general rule^each 
 Minister worked separately with the Emperor^nd 
 accepted no other mandate than that which emanated 
 from the Sovereimp The result was that the Minis- 
 ters not only had no common bond of unity between 
 them, but considered it a point of honour to maintain 
 an attitude of complete independence to each other. 
 The Czar Alexander III., jealous of his autocratic 
 power, carefully restricted his Ministers to this way 
 of doing, and any attempt on their part to confer to- 
 gether for the purpose of concerted action was treated 
 by him as an attack upon his prerogatives. Emperor 
 Nicholas made no change in this state of affairs, 
 and even emphasized it by calling his Ministers to- 
 gether more seldom than his father had done. If one 
 also considers that the Ministers were not subject 
 to any Parliamentary control, and that all effort of 
 the Zemstvos to extend their sphere of activity was 
 severely repressed, it is a wonder that such a system 
 did not bring about, long before, a complete disorgani- 
 zation of the vastest empire known to modern times. 
 No sooner had Count Witte become Minister of 
 trinance than he gave evidence of a tendency to 
 dominate all the other members of the Cabinet, and 
 tb become, ds facto, if not de jure, the real head of the 
 Russian Government. In the pursuit of this object 
 he was strengthened, not only by his powerful will 
 and his incontestable superiority over his colleagues, 
 but still more by the fact that, as Grand Treasurer 
 of the Empire, he held all the departments of the 
 
COUNT WITTE 113 
 
 State subject to an indirect dependence, for Emperor 
 Alexander III. placed absolute confidence in him, and 
 refused to sanction any credit of which he disapproved. 
 But it was not long before this indirect supremacy 
 failed to satisfy the ambition of Count Witte, who 
 sought to extend his ceaseless activity to every ramifi- 
 cation of the political and economic life of the coun- 
 try, and fitnally succeeded. Then a phenomenon, 
 strange and incomprehensible to the European mind, 
 was witnessed — ^that of a Finance Minister who had 
 created, little by little, a State within a State, and who 
 had superimposed, so to speak, upon the many differ- 
 ent organs of the Government, other organs of similar 
 functions, but deriving their powers directly and solely 
 from his Ministry. Li this way Count Witte had the 
 control of an innumerable crowd of functionaries of 
 all denominations and all ranks, a network of schools 
 of lower and even higher grades, a vast territory — a 
 veritable kingdom, in fact, of which he was sole mas- 
 ter — an army, a fleet, even a diplomatic service. Fur- 
 thermore, on account of his constant tendency to 
 extend mdefinitely the power of the State to the detri- 
 ment of a personal initiative and activity which was 
 still in its infancy in Russia, one may say that for 
 some ten years he was the real master of the 
 160,000,000 inhabitants of the Empire. Truth com- 
 pels me to say that the greater part of the elements 
 composing the system created by him were better 
 organized, performed their functions more perfectly, 
 and were imbued with a broader and more modern 
 spirit than the correspondmg Government services. 
 
114 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 but it is easy to understand, nevertheless, that so 
 paradoxical an organization of the State involved 
 a great waste of force and gave rise to a chaotic con- 
 dition of affairs that was eventually fatal to Russia, 
 especially when Count Witte was no longer there to 
 sustain it with his all-powerful energy. 
 
 I have already remarked that Count Witte's com- 
 patriots have never done justice to his work. It seems 
 to me that a Minister who has at his credit these three 
 achievements — ^the monetary reform, the Treaty of 
 Portsmouth, and the Constitutional Charter of 1905 
 — deserves to be ranked with the greatest statesman, 
 not only of Russia, but of the world. 
 
 The first of these, i.e., the establishment of a metal- 
 lic circulating medium and the fixing of exchange, 
 would of itself have sufficed to give him that place. 
 This reform, which met with formidable obstacles 
 and owed its success solely to the indomitable will 
 of Count Witte, enabled Russia to go through the 
 Russo-Japanese War and the revolutionary year 
 of 1905 without undergoing a financial crisis. I have 
 already expressed my opinion of the Peace of Ports- 
 mouth, and have no hesitation in qualifying it as an 
 unhoped-for success for Russia that no diplomate de 
 carriere could have achieved. Finally, the Manifesto 
 of the 17th October, in spite of the late hour at which 
 it was wrimg from Emperor Nicholas II., undoubtedly 
 saved the Russian monarchy for the time from the 
 ruin that overtook it twelve years later for having 
 abandoned the road laid out by its great Minister. 
 
 While I do not feel competent to sit in judgment 
 
COUNT WITTE 115 
 
 upon the economic policy of Count Witte, I believe I 
 am not wrong in saying that it calls for some very 
 serious criticisms. I have mentioned his tendency 
 to stretch beyond all reason the attributes of the 
 State in economic matters, thanks to a series of meas- 
 ures like the systematic purchase of the raihoads, the 
 exploitation en regie of the vast domains of the Crown, 
 a severe supervision of the manufacturing industry, 
 etc., in consequence of which the State ended by 
 controlling, and even almost completely absorbing, 
 the private initiative and energy that was still so 
 undeveloped in the coimtry. But apart from this 
 exaggerated etatisme, one may well ask if the very 
 foundations of the economic framework of Russia were 
 not weakened by some of the measures for which 
 Coimt Witte was responsible. 
 
 In his book, "The Eclipse of Russia," Dr. Dillon 
 says that Count Witte realized the feebleness and lack 
 of cohesion of the different elements composing Czar- 
 ism, and believed that these elements could be con- 
 solidated and bound together by the force of a 
 grandiose economic transformation which would create 
 powerful national interests and would be the instru- 
 ment of a veritable national reeducation. To my 
 mind, if these lines do not characterize Count Witte's 
 general plan— for it has always seemed to me that he 
 lacked precisely any consistent plan — ^they do at 
 least describe the tendency of his political activities. 
 The weakness and disunion of the elements con- 
 stituting the Russian Empire could not escape the 
 attention of any statesman, even the least observing. 
 
116 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 and were bound to reveal themselves in fatal fashion 
 later, when the monarchy fell; but I belong to a po- 
 litical school which has always sought a remedy for 
 this state of things, not in State control a outrance, 
 nor in the strengthening of a central officialdom, nor 
 even in the artificial stimulation of material interests, 
 but in the development of local self-government, in a 
 representative regime built up from that principle, 
 and, finally, in the satisfaction of the reasonable aspir- 
 ations of distinct nationalities and the systematic in- 
 culcation of a spirit of personal initiative in the minds 
 of the people. 
 
 There is a consensus of opinion that one of Count 
 Witte's principal merits was the immense effort which 
 he made for the development, or rather the creation, 
 of a great manufacturing industry in Russia. With- 
 out depreciating the brilliant results that he achieved 
 in that direction, one may ask if he did not, in vulgar 
 parlance, "put the cart before the horse"? In 
 giving all his attention to the workshop, did not 
 Count Witte fail to comprehend the character, es- 
 sentially agricultural, of Russia and her need of a 
 preparatory phase, in which to develop her rtiral 
 industries with the object of perfecting the raw mater- 
 ial of agricultm-e and so benefiting the former.? And 
 was it not due to the financial policy of Count Witte 
 — ^notably the colossal growth of the foreign debt, 
 contracted for the purchase of the railways, whose 
 maintenance and operation demanded enormous 
 sums of ready money — ^that great quantities of agri- 
 cultural products had to be exported, thereby 
 
COUNT WITTE 117 
 
 disturbing the economic balance and even affecting t 
 the physical condition of the rural population? In ! 
 short, the political school to which I belong always 
 maintained that the creation of a nxmierous labouring 
 class, crowded together in the cities, and forming 
 the revolutionary element 'par excellence, as was 
 proved in 1917, ought to have been preceded by an 
 extensive agrarian reform, in the sense of a develop- 
 ment of small private ownership. This would not 
 only have increased the product of the soil, but would 
 have inculcated in the peasant mind a spirit of con- 
 servatism which it totally lacked. 
 
 I will only mention, in passing, one of Count 
 Witte's measures which gave rise to a great deal of 
 controversy: the monopoly of the sale of spirits. 
 Personally, I am of the opinion that this measure, 
 considered as a palhative, was good in itself and 
 showed a marked improvement over the preceding 
 state of affairs; but is it not to be regretted that, in- 
 stead of being satisfied with this palliative. Count 
 Witte did not apply his immense energy to the abol- 
 ishment of a fiscal system based upon .alcoholism, 
 and consequently upon the demoralization and im- 
 poverishment of the masses .? And can one help being 
 moved to admiration by the heau geste of the unfor- 
 tunate Emperor Nicholas, who, at the beginning of 
 the world-war, dared to suppress with one stroke of 
 the pen this source of so much physical and moral 
 evil in Russia? 
 
 A subject with which I feel myself more competent 
 to deal is that of the Russian poUcy in the Far East. 
 
118 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Count Witte exerted a great influence upon that 
 policy, and must be considered responsible for it, if 
 not solely, at least in great measiu'e. The r6le he 
 played in the drama was a most complex and varied 
 one. 
 
 If one wishes to locate the initial act which led to 
 the unfortunate war between Russia and Japan, it 
 will be necessary, in my opinion, to go back to the de- 
 cision adopted by the Russian Government, at Count 
 Witte's behest, to push the main line of the Trans- 
 Siberian railway through to Vladivostok by way of 
 Chinese territory, thus shortening the distance con- 
 siderably, but, at the same time, creating on the 
 eastern confines of the Empire a singularly compli- 
 cated and dangerous situation. It was the first 
 thing to awaken the suspicions of Japan and to reveal 
 to that Power the imperialistic ambitions of Russia 
 in the Far East. Having been at all times a stout 
 partisan of a European policy for Russia, I never 
 was in favour of anything that tended toward trans- 
 ferring the field of Russian action to a point so dis- 
 tant from the centre of our traditional interests, and 
 thus weakening our position in Europe. It has al- 
 ways seemed to me that Siberia should be considered 
 above all as a reserve against the day when Russia 
 might find herself obliged to overflow the boundaries 
 of Europe and seek an outlet there for her surplus 
 population and energies. But that day was still 
 distant, and meanwhile it was at least premature to 
 force, in so conspicuous a manner and across foreign 
 territory, an access to the vast theatre of the Pacific 
 
COUNT WITTE 119 
 
 where we could not and ought not to play other than 
 a secondary part at that hour. 
 
 I am, however, quite willing to recognize the audac- 
 ity and ability with which Count Witte carried out his 
 plan, and I further admit that, if it had stopped there, 
 the Trans-Siberian railway, under his firm control, 
 might have become an instrument of economic de- 
 velopment for Russia, but, unhappily, it was com- 
 pletely spoiled by her subsequent political activity 
 in the Far East, and above all by the seizure of the 
 Chinese peninsula of Liao-Tong, with the ports of 
 Dalny and Port Arthur. 
 
 I hasten to add that Count Witte was personally 
 opposed to that policy, which was in reality the out- 
 growth of a plan conceived by the German Emperor 
 for the seizure of Kiao-Chiau. It was during his 
 first visit to St. Petersburg after the accession of 
 Nicholas II. to the throne that the Kaiser made his 
 host promise not to oppose the cowp de main that he 
 had in view, and suggested that the Czar should 
 follow his example by taking possession of the ex- 
 tremity of the peninsula of Liao-Tong. ' Count 
 Mouravieff , who was at that time Minister of Foreign 
 \Affairs, and who was as destitute of forethought as he 
 Ij^as ignorant of affairs in general and of the affairs 
 of the Far East in particular j was fascinated at once 
 "by a scheme which promised to increase his personal 
 prestige, and it was from his own lips that I learned 
 what had passed in the council convoked by the Czar 
 for the discussion of this question. Of all the members 
 present Count Mouravieff was the only one who sup- 
 
120 RECOLLECTIONS OP A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 ported Emperor Nicholas in his project, which was 
 opposed by the other Ministers, and most vigorously 
 by Count Witte, who was perfectly well aware of the 
 danger involved in such a flagrant violation of the in- 
 tegrity of China. The Czar deferred to the opinion of 
 the majority and the scheme was temporarily aban- 
 doned, but Count Mouravieff refused to admit defeat, 
 and succeeded later in persuading the Emperor that, 
 according to secret information, a British squadron 
 was about to take Port Arthur as a reply to the seizure 
 of Kiao-Chiau by the Germans, and that it was neces- 
 sary at any cost to get ahead of England. The re- 
 sult was that Admiral Doubasoff, Commandant of 
 the Russian naval forces in the Far East, received 
 from Emperor Nicholas a direct order to enter Port 
 Arthur and to hoist the Russian flag. Thereupon 
 Count Mouravieff took great credit to himseK for 
 having gained so signal a victory over Count Witte, 
 and for having won the two Chinese ports for Russia. 
 If Russia had been a constitutional State, or if it 
 had even possessed a homogeneous and unified Gov- 
 ernment, a Minister who was opposed to so decisive 
 and important a step would have resigned. Count 
 Witte did nothing of the kind, and even profited 
 by the occasion to extend more widely than ever the 
 circle of his powers. Enlarging the primitive scope 
 of the Trans-Siberian, he carried the terminus of the 
 line from the Russian port of Vladivostok to the 
 extremity of the Chinese peninsula of Liao-Tong. 
 Under pretext of providing for the needs of the rail- 
 way, the Russian Government, guided entirely in this 
 
COUNT WITTE 121 
 
 matter by him, procured from China, not only the 
 lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, but also of a wide 
 zone of territory on each side of the track. 
 
 Taking Cecil Rhodes as a model and copying his 
 role as an "Empire Builder," Count Witte made of 
 this zone, which was subject to the exclusive control 
 of his Ministry, a domain over which he ruled with 
 quasi-sovereign powers. In that vast territory new 
 cities sprang up, like Harbin, and new ports, like 
 Dalny. He had a veritable army under his command 
 in the form of a guard for the protection of the rail- 
 way, as well as a river and ocean fleet. A multitude 
 of functionaries, under his direction and independent 
 of the central authority of the Empire, administered 
 the leased territory, which constituted, in fact, an 
 important colonial possession on the remote confines 
 of Russia in Asia, of which he was sole master. 
 
 It was inevitable that an experiment of this nature 
 should weigh heavily upon the rest of the Empire, for, 
 whUe the work of Cecil Rhodes met the needs of 
 England by providing an outlet for its surplus popu- 
 lation, capital, and energies. Count Witte's enterprise 
 was of a purely artificial character, satisfactory only 
 to the unbounded ambition of that statesman, and 
 anything but helpful to the true welfare of Russia, 
 under-populated as it was and undeveloped tech- 
 nically and economically. The effect was to absorb 
 coimtless millions in money and a wealth of labour 
 that could have been employed with infinitely greater 
 profit in the interior of Russia. 
 
 Count Witte's Manchurian undertaking, useless 
 
122 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 and even harmful as it was per se, was particularly 
 fatal from the point of view of Russia's foreign rela- 
 tions, and it may be considered as the primary cause 
 of the Russo-Japanese War. If the Government 
 had been content to use the extremity of the Liao- 
 Tong peninsula as a base for its Pacific fleet (although 
 the Russian port of Vladivostok was amply sufficient 
 for that purpose), it is probable that Japan would 
 have accommodated herself to the situation in time; 
 but the occupation of a part of Manchuria, in addi- 
 tion to the peninsula, gave rise to apprehensions 
 that soon grew into serious complications and finally 
 brought about the collision between Russia and 
 Japan, for it was the attack of the Boxers on the Chi- 
 nese Eastern railway which led to the occupation of 
 Manchuria by the Russian troops in the year 1900, 
 and this, in turn, became one of the chief points of 
 the Russo-Japanese dispute. 
 
 When, not long afterward, the Manchurian mis- 
 take was supplemented by the mad adventure of 
 Messrs. Bezobrazoff, Abaza and company in Korea 
 and on the Yalu, the hour for the settlement of ac- 
 counts between Russia and Japan was merely has- 
 tened thereby, for, I repeat, the germ of the Russo- 
 Japanese conflict is to be found in the imperialistic 
 pohcy of Count Witte. The Korean adventure, never- 
 theless, was the immediate cause of the war. Count 
 Witte, as well as his friend Count Lamsdorff, openly 
 opposed the band of courtiers and irresponsible 
 schemers who succeeded in drawing the Czar into 
 it and in playing the r61e of an occult governing 
 
COUNT WITTE 123 
 
 power, which, for the time being, ousted both the 
 Finance Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 from the command of Far-Eastern matters. But while 
 recognizing the far-sightedness shown by Count Witte 
 and Count Lamsdorff in the premises, it is impossible 
 to absolve them from all responsibility for the out- 
 come. It is pertinent to call attention, for the second 
 time, to the fact that, in any country possessing a 
 well-organized Government, Ministers finding them- 
 selves in a similar situation would have presented their 
 resignations, and would not have remained in office 
 unless they received satisfaction. Instead of this, 
 we see Count Witte staying tranquilly at his post and 
 watching, as a disapproving but resigned spectator, 
 a policy that he is powerless to prevent. As for his 
 alter ego, Count Lamsdorff, he not only did not resign, 
 but, when criticised for remaining in power under 
 the circumstances, he advanced the stupefying theory 
 that in Russia the Minister of Foreign Affairs could 
 not quit his post until dismissed by his sovereign, 
 and that his sole function was to study the questions 
 pertaining to. the Empire's foreign relations and pre- 
 sent his conclusions to the Emperor, who, in his 
 quality of autocrat, would decide for or against, and 
 his decision would thereupon be obligatory for the 
 Minister. Count Witte's ideas were certainly too , 
 advanced to permit of his sharing such an opinion, so ' 
 it must be concluded that hia,,,aaixi&t3i,iQ, remain in 
 ^^posKCr overbalanced all other considerations and pre- - 
 vented him, not only from resigning his portfolio, j^-^'. 
 but even protesting to the Emperor in a sufficiently ^'.i 
 
 ,4 !. 
 
124 RECOLLECTIONS OP A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 vigorous manner against a policy which he knew must 
 end in catastrophe. 
 
 This lack of jfirmness of character, which marked 
 certain phases of Count Witte's career in the period 
 preceding the war, brings out in all the clearer relief 
 his energy and statesmanlike qualities as they were 
 displayed during the disastrous progress of the cam- 
 paign. Dr. Dillon includes in his book a letter ad- 
 dressed by Count Witte to Emperor Nicholas, under 
 date of the 28th of February, 1905, in which are set 
 forth with a frankness and exactitude worthy of the 
 highest praise the reasons why it was imperative 
 to make immediate overtures for peace with Japan. 
 In the same letter he insisted, with still greater cour- 
 age, upon the necessity of not delaying any longer 
 to calm public feeling in Russia, profoundly disturbed 
 by its defeat, by taking up sincerely and resolutely 
 the question of constitutional reform. With untiring 
 perseverance he sustained this argument against the 
 Czar himself as well as against the majority of his 
 advisers, both civil and military, and from that mo- 
 ment vmtil the treaty was finally signed Count Witte 
 displayed a firmness and sureness of vision that place 
 him in the rank of the greatest Ministers. 
 
 In the course of the 'pourparlers at Portsmouth he 
 showed not only extraordinary talent as a negotiator, 
 but also an elevation of character and a self-f orgetful- 
 ness which did not distinguish him at other stages of his 
 career. Toward the end of the discussions there was 
 a supreme moment when, although he reahzed that he 
 wouldhaveto face his compatriotsonhis return, bearing 
 
COUNT WITTE 125 
 
 alone all the responsibility and perhaps all the odium 
 of a treaty resulting from an unfortunate war and 
 necessarily onerous to Russia, he had the moral cour- 
 age to override orders from St. Petersburg that were 
 often contradictory and sometimes bore the marks 
 of insincerity — accepting on his own authority a 
 compromise more favourable than Russia had any 
 right to expect, but even so of a nature that well might 
 subject him to bitter reproaches later. 
 
 The conditions of the Peace of Portsmouth, in view 
 of the circumstances, bore very lightly on Russia; the 
 Japanese renounced all demands of a nature that 
 would affect the vital interests or the dignity of the 
 Russian Empire; Russia paid no war indemnity, re- 
 tained her fleet, and lost not an inch of her national 
 territory. It is true that she ceded to Japan the 
 southern part of the island of SaghaUen, but that 
 island had only been acquired at a comparatively 
 recent date, and hardly any use had been made of it, 
 while the Japanese had always maintained certain 
 pretensions to its ownership. The Treaty of Ports- 
 mouth, then, may be considered as favourable to 
 Russia in itself, but that which gave it especial value 
 was its opening of the way for a resxmiption of normal 
 relations with Japan, and more than that — a, verita- 
 ble rapprochement and even an alliance between the 
 two countries. Count Witte deserves great credit for 
 having foreseen this possibility even before he went to 
 Portsmouth, and for having made indirect overtures, 
 through Dr. Dillon, to the Japanese Ambassador at 
 London. While nothing was accomplished in that 
 
126 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 direction at the time, Count Witte had not lost sight 
 of his objective when it came time to define the condi- 
 tions of the treaty, and it was that which gave me an 
 opportunity later, when I was Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, to pick up the thread of his ideas and to 
 bring about an understanding with Japan which, in 
 its development, bore results so beneficial to Russia 
 and to the entire Triple Entente. 
 
 It was a bitter disappointment to Count Witte, on 
 his return to Russia, to see how unappreciative his 
 countrymen were. The Emperor conferred upon 
 him, it is true, the title of Count, a recompense which 
 was accorded by established custom to the negotiator 
 of a treaty of peace, but the reception he gave him 
 was rather cold than otherwise. Public opinion and 
 that of the Press was distinctly hostile; some humor- 
 ous person dubbed him the "Count of Half- 
 Saghalien"; in short, the triumph which he expected 
 and to which he had an indisputable right was not 
 forthcoming, and he received little else but attacks 
 and ridicule. 
 
 I believe that I entered into sufficient detail, in the 
 first chapter of this book, with reference to Count 
 Witte's activity at the head of the first constitutional 
 Cabinet. What were the causes that checked his 
 activity and to what extent could he have given a 
 more favourable turn to events? This is a problem 
 that future historians of this troubled period will 
 have to solve, and regarding which I hesitate to pro- 
 nounce an opinion; but does it not seem that in such 
 critical circumstances Count Witte failed to exhibit 
 
COUNT WITTE 127 
 
 all the firmness and consistency of character that were 
 requisite for the occasion? How are we to explain 
 his choice of M. Dournovo for Minister of the Interior 
 and the latitude he gave that Minister for the exercise 
 of a blind and brutal repression, which forced into 
 conflict with the Government the most moderate 
 elements of the country, and contributed to the vic- 
 tory of the most radical parties? And, above all, 
 how can we justify his electoral law, whose effect was 
 to give to the peasants the predominance in the first 
 Duma and so cause its eventual shipwreck? 
 
 It is difficult to attribute such errors to a lack of 
 foresight on the part of a statesman of Count Witte's 
 calibre, and one is forced to admit that he allowed 
 himself to be guided by considerations affecting his 
 personal interests rather than the permanent success 
 of the work of reform which he had undertaken. 
 ^v. Count Witte, as a financier, was inclined to seeH in 
 / ^ptt^ely material sources the dominating motive of all 
 ,K /politics, whether foreign or domestic, and to neglect 
 ■the imponderabilia, to which even so positive a mind 
 as Prince Bismarck's assigned a role of the highest 
 importance in the life of nations. The result was 
 that Count Witte often committed grave errors in 
 his diagnosis of the international situation. A 
 striking instance was his absolute failure to compre- 
 hend the nature of the relations between France and 
 Germany and the psychology of the French people; 
 obsessed by the Utopian idea of a continental coali- 
 tion, he was convinced that no real obstacle stood in 
 the way of a participation by those two nations in 
 
128 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 such a coalition: ' I have already mentioned that 
 when Count Witte was Minister of Finance he had 
 under his orders a^eritable diplomatic service, 
 composed of so-called financial agents! attached \o 
 the Russian embassies and legations of the two hemi- 
 spheres. These agents, rnost of whom were extremely 
 active and intelligent^ (^performed their duties in 
 complete independence of their nominal diplomatic 
 chiefs,' correspondedtinr cipher with ithe -PiBance 
 Minister without even exhibiting their reports to 
 their superiors, and did not scruple to adopt and 
 maintain political ideas that were .opposed to those 
 of the official Russian diplomacylp/ It was on these 
 agents that Count Witte relied to obtain support 
 for his project of an alliance between Russia, France, 
 and Germany, based upon a community of material 
 interests and aimed against the preponderance of 
 England in the domain of finance and commerce. 
 
 In the last years of the period preceding the world 
 war, when I was Ambassador at Paris, I had occasion 
 to discuss this question several times with Count 
 Witte, who used to stop at Paris on his way to Biar- 
 ritz to join his family. In the course of these dis- 
 cussions he expressed the conviction that France 
 had lost all remembrance of its ancient warlike vir- 
 tues; that the immense majority of Frenchmen cared 
 not a whit for the lost provinces, which were only 
 of interest to a handful of Chauvinists, possessing 
 little or no influence in the country; and finally that 
 the French nation, imbued with the ideas of interna- 
 tional socialism and the pacifist propaganda, would 
 
COUNT WITTE 129 
 
 always shrink from an anned conflict with Germany, 
 especially if it grew out of oriental affairs. Ascribing 
 an exaggerated influence to certain financial groups 
 in Europe, he persuaded himself that with their 
 "" ~^d great business aflFairs of common interest to 
 V/Fisance and Germany could be built up, and so pre- 
 pare the way for a political rajyprochement. He had 
 no doubt that, if he were Ambassador at Paris, he 
 could bring about that result. 
 
 Having been an attentive observer of French na- 
 tional life, I was far from sharing his opinions. Soon 
 after my arrival in Paris, at the end of the year 1910, 
 I witnessed, on the occasion of the Agadir crisis, the 
 awakening of the patriotic spirit in France, in resist- 
 ance to the brutality of Germany's foreign policy. 
 I was convinced that the French nation, in spite of 
 superficial appearances, had lost nothing of its at- 
 tachment to the great principles of justice, liberty, 
 and progress which had made France the beacon- 
 Ught of the world. In my dispatches, while noting 
 the pacific tendencies of the French Government, 
 I repeatedly aflarmed that an unjustifiable provoca- 
 tion on the part of Germany would disclose France 
 as ready to take up arms at the side of Russia and 
 England, not only for the defence of her territory 
 and the return of her patrimony, but also to assure 
 the triumph of her ideas of right and independence 
 in the world. Moreover, I knew too well the over- 
 bearing spirit that governed Germany's foreign policy, 
 the constantly increasing power of the Pan-German- 
 ists, and the determination of the Kaiser to impose 
 
130 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 the German hegemony on the world, to have any 
 faith in the possibihty of an aUiance in which Ger- 
 many would consent to enter on an equal footing with 
 Russia and France. Accordingly, I founded my ob- 
 jections to Count Witte's arguments upon my firm 
 conviction that in pursuing the chimera of his pro- 
 posed alliance we should be running the risk of weak- 
 ening our position with France and England and so 
 destroying our only protection against the monstrous 
 growth of Germany's military power. I maintained 
 that it was imperative to hold ourselves ready against 
 the day when Emperor William, impelled by the war 
 party, would let loose the aggression that had been 
 prepared so long in advance; in short, that the only 
 way to avert that danger was to fortify by every 
 possible means the political, military, and economic 
 power of the Triple Entente. As for France, I was 
 convinced that we could count upon her loyalty 
 and that at the supreme hour the French people 
 would rise as one man against the aggressor, regaining 
 in a moment their patriotic elan and their traditional 
 valour. I may add that I was called upon to defend 
 this belief, not only against Count Witte, but against 
 a group of Russian diplomats who looked with favour 
 upon a rapprochement with Germany, among whom 
 figure his colleague at Portsmouth, Baron Rosen; 
 the Russian Minister at Lisbon, N. Botkin, who was 
 in high favour at Court, and others. My last conver- 
 sation with Count Witte took place some months 
 before the outbreak of the great war; I never saw him 
 again, and I know not if he recognized, before his 
 
COUNT WITTE 131 
 
 death, how he had been mistaken about France, and 
 how the moral factor often is of much greater import- 
 ance in the hfe of peoples than elements of a purely 
 material nature. 
 
 When Count Witte yielded his place at the head of 
 the Russian Government to M. Goremykin, there was 
 no little curiosity as to the attitude that he would 
 assume toward the new Cabinet. Nicholas II., as 
 well as his new Ministers, were not without some 
 anxiety on this point, and with good reason, because, 
 in his capacity as a member of the Council of the 
 Empire, or Upper House, Count Witte, author of the 
 Manifesto of the 30th October, could easily become 
 the leader of the Liberal party in that body, and gather 
 about him the enemies of the bureaucratic Cabinet of 
 M. Goremykin. This was what everybody expected, 
 and it was with great surprise that he was seen to 
 renounce that r6le and to join in a rather conspicuous 
 manner the reactionary group in the Council of the 
 Empire, at the head of which he found his former 
 colleague and adversary, M. Dournovo. He main- 
 tained this attitude throughout all the vicissitudes 
 that followed the opening of the Duma, and in the 
 last years of his life it became so exaggerated that 
 there was good reason to believe that his intellectual 
 faculties had been affected by an old malady. It has 
 even been said that he humbled himself to the point 
 of seeking the aid of Raspoutin in the hope of regain- 
 ing the favour of the Czar and being recalled to power. 
 I can hardly believe in such an aberration, but I recall 
 a remark which he made in the course of a conversa- 
 
132 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 tion during one of his visits to Paris at the time of the 
 Balkan War, to the eflFect that, if Russia was not 
 drawn into the war, it was not due to any effort of M. 
 Sazonoff, whose pohcies he violently attacked, but 
 thanks to the influence exerted upon the Emperor by 
 Raspoutin in the direction of peace, and I remember 
 how astonished I was at the time to hear so extraor- 
 dinary a statement from him. 
 
 Personally, in spite of my repugnance to admit such 
 a conclusion, I do not hesitate to attribute his changed 
 attitude to motives of selfish ambition. Accustomed 
 for fifteen years to the exercise of a power, the extent 
 of which I have described above. Count Witte was 
 unable to become resigned to the loss of his official 
 position, and aU the strength of his great wiU was 
 concentrated upon one object — the regaining of his 
 former prestige. Knowing the tendencies of the 
 Emperor and those who enjoyed his favour, he con- 
 sidered that the surest way to attain his end was to 
 put himself at the service of the reactionaries, and 
 so, abjuring his faith and abandoning a role in which 
 he could still have rendered brilliant service to his 
 country, he became the follower of such men as 
 Dournovo, Sturmer, and other reactionary leaders, 
 losing thereby the respect of the Liberals without even 
 gaining the Emperor's favour or the confidence of the 
 reactionary party. It was a lamentable spectacle 
 to see his fine intelligence and his superior gifts as a 
 statesman consumed in the thirst for power and in 
 the vain hope of regaining his former rank in the 
 official world; especially so because it was evidently 
 
COUNT WITTE 133 
 
 not due alone to his desire for political power, but 
 rather to enjoy anew the external attributes of power. 
 Owing to his not having attained high rank in the 
 bureaucratic world until rather late in life, and so 
 not having succeeded except at the cost of great efifort 
 in making a place for himself and his wife at Court 
 and in the high society of the capital, this man of 
 genius, but of awkward manners and aspect, attached 
 an exaggerated importance to the social advantages 
 which he had acquired with so much diflSculty, and 
 was conspicuous for the puerihty of his social am- 
 bitions and for the eagerness with which he pushed 
 himself in the first rank of the ohgarchic caste which 
 surrotmded the Emperor. To attain this end he did 
 not hesitate to make use of his position as Grand 
 Treasurer of the Empire, and it was no secret that, 
 in order to force the doors of certain ultra-exclusive 
 salons of St. Petersburg, he employed a golden key, in 
 the form of loans and State subsidies to personages 
 of social prominence who happened to be afflicted 
 with pecuniary troubles. 
 
 Count Witte's enemies have charged him with be- 
 ing venal, and have cited facts and figures in support 
 of their accusations, but I have never beUeved them 
 to be true; he always seemed to me to place much 
 greater importance on the honours of official position 
 than on money. He left power without any evidence 
 of having acquired a great fortxme, and, in order not 
 to lose his chances of returning to office, he declined 
 offers that were made by one of the greatest financial 
 estabhshments of Russia and would have assured 
 
134 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN IVIINISTER 
 
 him a most brilliant position from a pecuniary point 
 of view, but would have been incompatible with his 
 remaining a member, on the Emperor's appointment 
 of the Council of the Empire, by virtue of which he 
 had access to the Court and belonged to the official 
 world. 
 
 The facts related in the foregoing pages explain my 
 assertion that the character of Count Witte was not 
 always equal to his intellectual gifts; but, at the same 
 time, he possessed certain traits that were extremely 
 sympathetic and attractive. He was a faithful and 
 devoted friend, and inspired the warmest friendships 
 in return. His devotion to the memory of the Em- 
 peror, Alexander HI., was almost passionate in its fer- 
 vour, and he preserved for the sovereign who had 
 distinguished him and elevated him to power a pious 
 gratitude. He also knew how to hate, and could be a 
 redoubtable enemy and adversary. 
 
 A very lovable trait was his affection for his family; 
 it was touching to see this giant, who was accustomed 
 to bend the most unruly to his will, transformed into 
 the slave of his little grandson and giving him the 
 tenderest care. And when he sought with such in- 
 sistence the outward show of power, was it so much 
 for his own personal gratification as, perhaps, to se- 
 cure a more brilliant career for a wife and a daughter 
 whom he passionately loved? 
 
 My personal relations with Count Witte were never 
 on an intimate footing, as I have already said, and for 
 a considerable time his attitude toward me was a 
 hostile one, possibly because he feared that I might 
 
COUNT WITTE 135 
 
 acquire an influence over aflFairs contrary to his. Dr. 
 Dillon mentions in his book the opposition made by 
 Count Witte to my appointment to the post of Min- 
 ister of Foreign Affairs after the death of Count 
 Mouravieff ; distrusting my spirit of independence, he 
 persuaded the Emperor to name Count Lamsdorff, 
 whom he was certain of managing, and so was con- 
 fident of becoming the absolute master of the Govern- 
 ment's foreign policies. Dr. Dillon adds that Count 
 Witte made a mistake, and, precisely because of my 
 independence, I would have seconded him much more 
 effectively than did Count Lamsdorff, for I would not 
 have tolerated the formation behind my back of an 
 occult power composed of adventurers, and would 
 either have resigned or obliged the Emperor to dis- 
 miss M. Bezobrazoff and his friends. Inasmuch as 
 Dr. Dillon was told this by Count Witte himself, 
 and because it tallies with what I have heard from 
 another source, I have every reason to believe it. 
 That which is certain is that he failed to appreciate 
 the homely truth that one cannot lean upon something 
 which gives no resistance, and so voluntarily de- 
 prived himself of a collaborator quite as strongly op- 
 posed as he himself was to the Korean adventure, and 
 who would not have hesitated to fight it in the most 
 vigorous manner, instead of following Count Lams- 
 doff's stupid doctrine of passive obedience to the will 
 of the sovereign. 
 
 I am not sure if I have succeeded in tracing, as I 
 planned, sine ira et studio, the portrait of Count Witte. 
 His character was most complex, made up as it was 
 
136 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 of qualities which reached a veritable grandeur, 
 mingled with others of surprising weakness; but, take 
 him all in all, it would be diflacult to define him in 
 better words than those which Shakespeare put into 
 the mouth of Antony when eulogizing Brutus: 
 
 . . . the elements 
 So mixed in him, that Nature might stand up 
 And say to all the world. This was a man. 
 
 Turning now from Count Witte to Count Lams- 
 dorff. Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1900 to 1906, 
 one cannot help being impressed by the absolute con- 
 trast between the two men, which, however, never 
 interfered with their close personal friendship and 
 their intimate political relations. In contra-distinc- 
 tion to the rough, impolished man of genius. Count 
 Lamsdorff was a type of the most fixiished courtier; 
 brought up, one might say, on the steps of the throne, 
 he had inherited, from several generations of high 
 f imctionaries at the imperial Coiul, the manners and 
 ideas of another age, quite out of date even in the 
 artificial environment of Nicholas II. He was a 
 little man, extremely young looking for his age, with 
 light reddish hair and diminutive moustache, always 
 dressed, prinked, and jjerfmned with the utmost care, 
 and whose affected manner and falsetto voice gave 
 no Kttle chance for pleasantry. By the coquetry 
 of his dress, the affectation of his speech, his habits 
 of retirement, and his little quasi-feminine vanities, 
 he recalled the portrait which the chroniclers of the 
 eighteenth century have handed down to us of the 
 
COUNT WITTE 137 
 
 Prince of Kaunitz, when that famous Austrian dip- 
 lomat was Ambassador at Paris. Possessing only 
 the instruction acquired at the Corps de Pages, he 
 lacked the advantages of a complete education, but 
 he was gifted with an ensertMe of qualities which made 
 him from the start a functionary of the first order. 
 Prodigiously industrious, discreet, never letting his 
 work be interfered with by the usual distractions 
 habitual to young people, he succeeded in making 
 himself indispensable, as a confidant and intimate 
 collaborator, to four Ministers of Foreign AflFairs 
 in succession: Prince Gortchakoff, !M. de Giers, 
 Prince Lobanoff, and Coxmt Mouravieff. During 
 the tenure of Count Moura\'ieflF he became the verita- 
 
 "■^le mainspring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
 ^d, by his industry and knowledge of its details, 
 
 /m^e up for the indolence, ignorance, and flippancy 
 
 ;\of Ahat astonishing Minister, but up to that point 
 his work was done entirely in the shade; he avoided 
 systematically aU direct contact with the foreign 
 Ambassadors, who sometimes almost doubted the 
 existence of this Grey Eminence, whom they never 
 saw but of whose hidden influence they were conscious. 
 
 , As we have seen, it was due to the inteiA^ention of 
 Count "Witte, who coimted upon ha^ong in Covmt 
 
 \ Lamsdorff an instrument entirely obedient to his will, 
 
 / that, after the death of Coimt Mou^a^-ieff, his in- 
 dustrious and influential subordinate became the 
 real head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 From that moment Count Lamsdorff, whose 
 vaguely defined character yielded to the vigorous 
 
138 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 personality of Count Witte, let himself be dominated 
 in all matters by his great friend, and thereupon 
 the two Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs 
 were merged, so to speak, in one and the same person, 
 Count Witte furnishing the motive and directive 
 force and Count Lamsdorff placing at the service 
 of the combination his great experience and perfect 
 knowledge of diplomatic technique. No one was 
 better versed than he in all the subtleties of diplo- 
 macy; the least important billet which he addressed 
 to a foreign Ambassador, always on gilt-edged paper 
 and delicately perfumed, was a model of style and 
 elegance; he had at his fingers' ends all the minutiae 
 of the protocol, and took as much pains in arranging 
 an exchange of decorations as in drawing up the proj- 
 ect of the most important international convention. 
 In all the chancelleries of Europe it was well known 
 that any error with regard to the exact ribbon he was 
 to receive after an exchange of signatures would for- 
 feit the good will of the Russian Minister for all time, 
 but it was equally well known that no negligence in 
 the framing of a diplomatic instrument could possibly 
 escape his practiced eye. His memory was prodig- V 
 ious and he was never at a loss for a precedent or an 
 argument drawn from the archives of his department. 
 Had Count Lamsdorff a definite plan of a general 
 foreign policy, and did his mind grasp the interna- 
 tional situation of Russia in its entirety.? I confess 
 that I have always doubted it. By family tradition, 
 being of German origin, and by his turn of mind, 
 he was rather inclined toward Germany, and, as a 
 
COUNT WITTE 139 
 
 thorough partisan of the autocratic regime, he felt 
 ill at ease with democratic France and constitutional 
 England; but, on the other hand, he had been in 
 intimate collaboration with his predecessors in the 
 Ministry of Foreign AfiFairs, who negotiated, at first, 
 the rapprochement, and afterward the aUiance with 
 France. Having become Minister in his turn, he 
 continued to maintain and conduct with scrupulous 
 exactitude and, as we have seen in the Bjorkoe affair, 
 with intelligence and ability, the system of the double 
 alliance, to which the Emperor gave his unreserved 
 adhesion; but, in view of the strange idea he had 
 of the functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
 Russia, there is every reason to believe that he would 
 have devoted equal care and conscience to any other 
 system from the moment that it might be adopted by 
 the Emperor, to whose will he considered himself 
 bound to render a blind and passive obedience. 
 
 Count Lamsdorff's conduct of his department had 
 an imfavourable effect upon the composition and 
 efficiency of the central services of the Ministry of 
 Foreign Affairs as well as of its services abroad. He 
 was almost inaccessible to the majority of his subor- 
 dinates, and shut himself up with a circle of personal 
 friends, who were bound to each other by elective 
 aflSnities of an extremely intimate nature, and 
 among whom he distributed the most desirable posi- 
 tions at his command. This sort of "round table," 
 to employ an expression often used at the Court of 
 Berlin, dispensed favours, promotions, and appoint- 
 ments to such an extent that when one had no pro- 
 
140 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 lector there, as was my case, one must needs give up 
 hope of agreeable places and be content with remote 
 posts and those which were little sought after. As it 
 happened, the scant favour which I enjoyed in that 
 cenacle turned out to be very useful, for it is to that 
 circumstance that I owe my experience at different 
 posts in the Balkans and the Far East, which were not 
 prized by diplomats, but where it was easier to ac- 
 quire a practical knowledge of affairs than in the most 
 brilliant Embassies and Legations of Europe. When 
 I succeeded Count Lamsdorff as Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs I had a great deal of trouble in replacing the 
 personnel of my department in more normal condi- 
 tions, and some of the measures of purification that 
 I was obliged to take gave rise to animosities and en- 
 mities which made themselves felt in the field of 
 politics later. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 The Provincial Nobility 
 
 WHEN speaking of the causes that contrib- 
 uted to my rapprochement with M. Stolypin 
 on entering the Cabinet of M. Goremykin, I 
 mentioned that M. Stolypin and I were both straTigers 
 to ^the bureaucra tic circle of St. Petersburg and that 
 I was much m ore in s^mpathy_with_±he memheEs_QL 
 the provincial nobility^ and the Zeinsivos, JsdlD Jiaii 
 SOTt to tEe~Duma and the Council of the Empire 
 some of their ablest representatives. 
 
 As this circumstance had an important bearing 
 upon my conduct in oflSce, I believe it will not be 
 superfluous to insert at this point a few autobiograph- 
 ical details of a nature that will not only help to 
 explain the political role that I played in my country, 
 but wiU throw light upon certain aspects of the in- 
 terior situation in Russia, at that period, which are 
 scarcely known abroad. I will begin with a short 
 description of the social structure of the country and 
 the different classes that are called upon to take part 
 in Russian political life. 
 
 Russia has never po ssessed , an arist ocracy in the 
 sense ^of~an exclusive caste hke that of Western 
 Europe, proceeding from feudalism, and whose 
 members enjoy a privileged position in the State by 
 reason of the nobility of their origin. At the end of 
 
 141 
 
142 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 the fifteenth century, when the Grand Princes of Mos- 
 cow succeeded in freeing themselves from the yoke of 
 the Mongols and in assembling under their sceptre 
 the majority of the other principalities which con- 
 stituted Russia, they did not have to struggle against 
 powerful feudal lords, and they aggrandized them- 
 selves only at the expense of their own family, whose 
 different branches already ruled those principalities. 
 As for the very nmnerous territorial nobility, or 
 Dvorianstvo, it was composed of the most hetero- 
 geneous elements — descendants of the ancient com- 
 panions-in-arms of the first Varangian Princes, of 
 Norman origin, who were the founders of the mon- 
 archy in Russia during the ninth century; minor 
 military chiefs, a sort of condottieri, who had come 
 from the neighbouring States of Poland, Lithuania, 
 Hungary, even Germany and Italy, at the head of 
 small armed detachments; and Tartar chiefs, who had 
 been vanquished by the Russian arms and had come 
 over with their hordes to the service of Muscovy. 
 Among all these elements the aborigines, properly 
 so named, had but a feeble representation. They 
 were a very democratic collection of merchants, arti- 
 sans, and especially farmers. The nobles, or Dvo- 
 riane, received from the Prince territorial domains, 
 or pomestia, and were bound to furnish him in return, 
 in case of war, armed contingents in proportion to the 
 extent of the domains granted to them. At first the 
 Dvoriane had only a very limited power over the 
 peasants who peopled their lands. The peasants had 
 a riglit to leave the domain of their lord, at certain 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 143 
 
 fixed periods of the year, and establish themselves on 
 the land of another who offered them better terms, 
 and it was not until some time later, under the Czar 
 Boris Godounoff (1593-1605), that this right was 
 taken away and the peasants were attached to the 
 soil, thus becoming real serfs of their respective lords. 
 It is well known that serfdom was abolished by the 
 Emperor Alexander II. in 1861, so it lasted for only 
 about 250 years in Russia; and this is only true of 
 Russia proper, for in Little Russia, or the Ukraine, it 
 was not introduced until the close of the eighteenth 
 century by the Empress Catherine II., and conse- 
 quently lasted a little more than a half century. 
 
 The Dvorianstvo, whose cosmopolitan origin I have 
 just referred to, blended very quickly with the native 
 population of Russia. There were several reasons for 
 this rapid assimilation, the chief of which were the 
 total absence of caste prejudice among the Dvoriane, 
 who mixed readily with the common people of their 
 respective localities, and, in a general way, the great 
 absorbing force which the Russian nation has always 
 possessed. It may, therefore, be said that the Dvo- 
 rianstvo never had the character of a real aristocracy, 
 but rather constituted a class of servers of the State. 
 There was no title of nobility in ancient Russia except 
 that of Prince, preserved by courtesy for those be- 
 longing to the branches of the reigning house, media- 
 tized by the Grand Princes of Moscow, like the 
 Bariatinskys, the Galitzines, Dolgoroukys, Gortcha- 
 koffs, and others; but the title conferred no special 
 privilege upon those who bore it, and a great many 
 
144 RECOLLECTIONS OP A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 of those descendants of Rurik (still called at the pres- 
 ent day by the generic name of Rurikovitchi) soon 
 became confounded with the ordinary Dvoriane. A 
 certain number of families belonging to the Dvorian- 
 stvo were, it is true, distinguished above others and 
 formed about the throne a sort of oligarchy, whose 
 members bore the title of Boyards; but, although in 
 those families the son generally succeeded to his 
 father's title, or rather dignity, of Boyard, it was 
 never strictly hereditary, and the ranks of the Boy- 
 ards were always open to those of the Dvoriane who 
 were successful in pushing themselves forward in 
 the service of the State. The Grand Princes, and 
 afterward the Czars of Moscow, who chose their 
 wives from among the daughters of their subjects, 
 made no distinction in this regard between the 
 princely families and those of the Boyards, or even 
 the simple Dvoriane, and when an heir to the Musco- 
 vite throne was of age to marry, some hundreds of 
 young maidens belonging to the various grades of the 
 Dvorianstvo were summoned to Moscow and the 
 futtu-e Czarina was selected, the preference being 
 given to her who possessed the greatest personal 
 attractions, beauty, health, and so forth, but without 
 regard for the superior or minor importance of her 
 house. The family, sometimes of modest origin, 
 which gave in this way a reigning Princess to the 
 country, gained naturally a position of great power 
 at Moscow, as was the case with the Godounoffs, 
 the Naryschkins, the Lopouchins, etc. The Ro- 
 manoffs themselves, one of whom founded a new 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 145 
 
 dynasty, were only allied to the ancient reigning house 
 on the female side. 
 
 Toward the end of the seventeenth century, that 
 is, on the eve of the reforms of Peter the Great, the 
 Dvorianstvo formed a class manifesting a high sense 
 of the part they had to play in the service of the State, 
 and distinguishing themselves by a remarkable apti- 
 tude in assimilating the customs of occidental civiliza- 
 tion, to which the doors of Russia were about to be 
 opened. It was from this class that Peter the Great 
 recruited the greater part of the young men whom he 
 sent abroad to acquire the knowledge necessary for 
 the transformation of the country, and who furnished 
 an important contingent to the new governmental 
 personnel created by the great reformer. Abolishing 
 the old social distinctions (he named no more Boyards 
 the last of whom. Prince Ivan Troubetskoy, died in 
 1750), Peter the Great established a new scale of 
 rank, based entirely upon the personal services ren- 
 dered to the State in all departments of the civil 
 and military hierarchy. This new order absorbed a 
 good many representatives of the Dvorianstvo, but 
 without affecting, as a whole, their attachment to 
 the soil, nor their consciousness of belonging to a 
 distinct class, having its roots in the Russia of the 
 past. 
 
 Under the successors of Peter the Great there 
 developed at St. Petersburg a strongly centralized and 
 essentially bureaucratic government, whose personnel 
 became more and more diverse in its origin, compris- 
 ing foreigners as well as native Russians . Eventually 
 
146 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 thfijjirone was surrounded-by^arcasfeeof courtiers-and 
 functionaries who_stiU bore no resemblance to tiie 
 nobility of the French Court nor to the English aris- 
 tocracy, but wh o monopoliz ed all the offices and 
 positions of importance and who constituted the 
 high society of St. Petersburg. It was at this point 
 that titles-jof- nobility, borrowed from Occidental 
 Europe, began to be conferred. Barons, Counts, 
 and even Princes were crgated, but it is curious 
 to note that all these new titles were of an exotic 
 character for a long while, and when a Russian 
 sovereign wished to ennoble one of his subjects he 
 did not do it himself, but obtained the respective 
 patent from the Holy Roman Emperor. So the 
 only real Russian title continued to be that of Prince, 
 and belonged only to a descendant of the house of 
 Rurik. 
 
 It is easy to understand then that the high, society 
 of St. Petersburg was of the most heterogeneous ori- 
 gin." It comprised not only the authentic descendant 
 of Rurik, but those of a pastryman's apprentice, hke 
 the Princes MenschikoflF, of a Little Russian peasant, 
 like the Princes Razoumovsky, or of a soldier of for- 
 tune, like the Princes OrloflP. One of the most fre- 
 quent sources of titles, fortune, and influence was the 
 favour of the Empress, Elizabeth or Catherine, ac- 
 corded to a young officer of the guards, and some- 
 times even to a servant of more humble rank. The 
 great poet of the Russian nation, Pouschkin, himself 
 a descendant of one of the families belonging to the 
 ancient Dvorianstvo and having furnished Boyards 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 147 
 
 to the Court of the Czars of Moscow, referred to this 
 same society in the following lines: 
 
 With us the nobility is young, 
 And the younger it is, the nobler. 
 
 During the reigns of the Emperors Paul I. and 
 Alexander I. the division between the provincial 
 Dvorianstvo and the society of the Court became 
 more marked. While the latter lived at St. Peters- 
 burg or followed the sovereign to his summer resi- 
 dence, the provincial nobility lived on their estates 
 during the summer and passed the winter months by 
 preference in the ancient capital of the Czars, Moscow. 
 It was in this milieu, at the time of the Napoleonic 
 wars, that the liberal ideas imbibed by the young 
 Russian oflScers, dtu-ing the stay of the AUies at Paris, 
 found the most encouragement, and it was also the 
 class that furnished the greater part of the actors in 
 the conspiracy of December, 1825, against Emperor 
 Alexander I., the object being to obtain from his suc- 
 cessor a constitutional charter for Russia. History 
 tells of the severity with which Emperor Nicholas I. 
 suppressed that movement and of the fate of the 
 Decembrists, some of whom, like Princes Wolkonsky 
 and Troubetzkoy, belonged to the greatest families of 
 Russia, and almost all of whom were recruited from 
 the nobility of the provinces. 
 
 The rule of iron exercised by Nicholas I. during 
 hisjthirty years' reign jdid not succeed in stifling the 
 progressive spirit of this class, and when Emperor 
 Alexander II. inaugurated in 1856 a new era of liberal 
 
148 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 reforms, it was again the provincial nobility which 
 gave the most enthusiastic support to his reforms. 
 
 The principal act of the fine reign of Alexander II. 
 was, of course, the emancipation of the serfs. This 
 reform, before being put into efifect by the Ministers 
 of that sovereign, had been the subject of an active 
 propaganda made by a brilliant group of thinkers and 
 writers, almost all of whom belonged to the provincial 
 nobility, and whose most typical representative was 
 Ivan TourgueneflF.* This class, which comprised the 
 only owners of domains peopled by serfs, sacrificed 
 their material interests to the great principle of eman- 
 cipation, which had as its corollary the dividing 
 among the serfs of a large part of the lands belonging 
 to the nobles, and, although the proprietors were to 
 have been indemnified, the economic revolution which 
 ensued was a serious blow to their welfare. 
 
 The other refor ms of Emperor Alexander II ., such 
 as the reQr^anizatioj[i,jof justicejaidJi^,^^ of 
 theJocal-self^goyerningJbodies, or Zemstvos, were also 
 most^cordiaUy .welcomed by the provincial nobility. 
 It became the fash ion for the ;yming nopestOL shun 
 the bureaucratic institutions aLSLPetersbonrg^and to 
 serve in^ the provinces as marshals of the nobility, 
 members of the Zemstvos, judges, and arbiters of the 
 peace. (The latter acted as intermediaries between 
 the proprietors and the peasants for the purchase of 
 land.) I have aheady mentioned that the intention 
 of Alexander II. was to have the Zemstvos form the 
 embryo of a veritable national representation; the 
 
 TourgueneS's lands in the province of Tonla were adjacent to those of my family. 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 149 
 
 future Russian parliament was to be composed of 
 delegates from those assemblies, which became in 
 consequence the school of Russian parliamentarism. 
 
 After the assassination of Emperor Alexander II., 
 when the era of liberal reforms came to an end and his 
 successor inaugvirated a reactionary regime, with a 
 bureaucratic centralization a outrance, the Zemstvos 
 became more and more of a refuge for the liberal 
 elements of the country; some of these, as, for ex- 
 ample, the Zemstvo of the province of Tver, grew to 
 be very conspicuous in that direction and were perse- 
 cuted by the Government on that account. Finally, 
 Moscow, the ancient capital of the Czars, celebrated 
 for its patriotism and its ultra-national spirit, and 
 always regarded in official circles as the citadel of 
 loyalty to autocracy, became in reality the stronghold 
 of the propaganda in favour of constitutional reform. 
 
 At the beginning of the reign of Nicholas.H. the 
 provmoaTnohility^were still prominent in the Zem- 
 stvos, and placed themselves at the head of the mod- 
 erate libefaTmovi^ent in the hope of persuadihg the 
 young Emperor to returnJto the ideas jof his grand- 
 father. In response to an address presented by the 
 Zemstvo of Tver, petitioning in the most loyal terms 
 the privilege of national representation. Emperor 
 Nicholas, acting on the advice of M. Pobiedonostzeff, 
 treated their aspirations as "insensate dreams." 
 This reply marks the origin of th^projound dissension 
 betweenrthe Emperor and his people, which grew 
 stronger from day to day throughout his reign, to the 
 extent that, when finally, after ten years, he was 
 
150 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 obliged to yield to the revolutionJand convoke jfche 
 Duina,>„the representati TOSIa aiQaJjiat-bmiZ-andJbo 
 the Council of the Empire by the provincial nobility 
 and tJifiZemstvoSu adopted an attitude uninista,kably 
 hostile to the bureaucratic Government of the Em- 
 peror. 
 
 This rapid sketch of the part played in Russia by 
 the class to which I belonged by birth and family 
 [tradition will help the reader to understand .the p e- 
 culiar pQsitiaB~w]iicL X.occupied when I entered the 
 Ithor oughly bureaucra tic Cabinet of M. Goremykin. 
 \ Mj family has, in fact, belonged to the"llussian 
 Pvorianstvo since the middle of the fifteenth century; 
 its founder, a native of Poland, came to Russia in 
 1462, according to authentic documents, with his 
 armed troop, to offer his services to the Grand Prince 
 of Moscow, John III., and was granted by him certain 
 lands, of which I still retain a part (that is, if the revo- 
 lution has not relieved me of them for good and all). 
 Since that epoch and throughout the entire Muscovite 
 period my ancestors acquitted themselves faithfully 
 of all the obligations incumbent upon them therefor. 
 Two of them figured in the siege of Kazan in 1552 at 
 the head of their contingent, and others occupied 
 prominent positions in Moscow, but they never rose 
 to any exalted rank in the Muscovite oligarchy, al- 
 though, by reason of the extent of their domains, they 
 Swere disiingmshedja.ember« of jy^ Dvo- 
 
 rianstvo. They retained this position during the 
 Petersbvu-g period, but were never numbered among 
 the courtiers and high functionaries who thronged the 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 151 
 
 palaces and government offices of St. Petersburg, and 
 continued to reside upon their lands and to gravitate 
 toward Moscow, which was always considered by the 
 Dvoriane to be the real capital. 
 
 My farther, who was born in the first quarter of the 
 nineteenth century, was a typical representative of 
 his class. Open-minded and erudite, he had fre- 
 quented as a young man the salon of Madame Ela- 
 guine, which was the centre of the cultivated society 
 of Moscow. He met there, besides the coterie of 
 Pouschkin, such adepts of occidental culture as 
 Tchaadaieff and the historian Granovsky, as well as 
 the first apostles of Slavophilism, among whom were 
 Samarrn, Khomiakoff, and the brothers Kireievsky. 
 He had begun by serving in the army, like all well- 
 born yovmg Russians of that period, but soon aban- 
 doning the military career, he was for several years 
 the trusted assistant of a near relative of my mother's. 
 Count Moiu-aviefif-Amoursky, Governor-General of 
 Eastern Siberia, who had gained great renown as con- 
 queror and organizer of the vast region of the Amour. 
 
 Count Mouravieff-Amoursky was noted for his 
 liberal ideas, and had gathered about him in Irkoutsk, 
 the capital of Eastern Siberia, a group of distin- 
 guished young men imbued with the same ideas. 
 This group became intimate with the families of the 
 Decembrists, who had been exiled to Siberia thirty 
 years before, for having taken part in the conspiracy 
 of 1825, and who, after passing many years in the 
 more remote regions of Siberia, had finally obtained 
 permission to establish themselves at Irkoutsk. In a 
 
152 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 recent article published in the Revue de Paris, entitled 
 "Une elite en Exil," my daughter described, from 
 memoirs of that epoch, the life led by the Decem- 
 brists, some of whom, such as the Princes Wolkonsky 
 and Troubetzkoy, belonged to the most illustrious 
 families of Russia and all of whom were progressive 
 and cultivated people. The result was that the capi- 
 tal of that distant province became noted for having 
 a society distinguished by a high intellectual culture 
 and by the most liberal ideas. Count Mouravieff- 
 Amoiu-sky and his wife, a Frenchwoman by birth (she 
 was a Mademoiselle de Richemont), opened wide to 
 the exiles the doors of their home, and my parents did 
 the same — ^for my mother, in spite of the great haz- 
 ards of the journey, had accompanied my father to 
 Siberia. They were often denounced at St. Peters- 
 bm-g for what was considered to be an undue benevo- 
 lence toward the Decembrists. Not long after, on 
 the accession of the Emperor Alexander II., a full 
 pardon, which had been obstinately refused for more 
 than thirty years by Nicholas I., was granted to the 
 exiles, and they were allowed to retiu-n to Russia, 
 where some of them took up anew the brilliant social 
 life that they had led before their banishment. My 
 parents maintained the closest intimacy all their lives 
 with several Decembrist families, who remained 
 faithful always to their liberal traditions, and one of 
 whose descendants. Prince Wolkonsky, I found among 
 the Duma. He became one of its vice-presidents 
 eventually. 
 
 After having been Count Mouravieff-Amoursky's 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 153 
 
 lieutenant in Siberia, my father was for some years 
 Governor of two provinces of Central Russia in suc- 
 cession. Dm-ing that time he applied himself with 
 great zeal to putting in practice the liberal reforms of 
 the Emperor Alexander II., but he resigned before 
 long and retired to his estates, where he led the life of 
 a coimtry gentleman until his death, retaining always 
 a keen interest in all the manifestations of European 
 culture and the progress of liberal ideas. 
 
 My mother's family was much more closely con- 
 nected with the Court of St. Petersburg than my 
 father's, but those relations were broken after one of 
 the palace tragedies that have marked almost every 
 succession to the throne of Russia from the reign of 
 Peter the Great to the beginning of the nineteenth 
 century, so that it could well be said of Russian autoc- 
 racy that it was "a despotic regime tempered by 
 regicide." 
 
 In fact, my mother's grandfather, Prince Yaschvill, 
 who occupied a very important military position 
 under the reign of Paul I., was one of the principal 
 actors in the drama which had its epilogue in the 
 violent death of that Emperor, and the situation of his 
 descendants was materially affected thereby. 
 
 We all know of the inconsistencies and outrages 
 which marked the four-years' reign of the madman 
 who succeeded the great Catherine on the throne of 
 Russia at the close of the year 1796. When the year 
 1801 opened, the insanity of Paul I. assumed such pro- 
 portions that the leading personages of the imperial 
 Court found themselves obliged to consider what 
 
154 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 measures could be taken to put an end to a situation 
 which threatened the very safety of the Empire. 
 Was the heir to the throne, afterward the Emperor 
 Alexander I., cognizant of the conspiracy that was 
 forming for that purpose, and which was headed by 
 Count Pahlen, military governor of the capital? 
 The historians who have recorded this event, includ- 
 ing the most recent and most conscientious of all, the 
 Grand Duke Nicholas Michailovitch, agree that the 
 conspirators had received the assent of Alexander 
 for a plan for bringing about the abdication of the 
 Emperor, but it appears certain that the assassination 
 of his father was a cruel surprise to him, and caused a 
 shock to his sensitive nature from which he never re- 
 covered, and which had much to do with the mystic 
 and even morbid turn of mind that afflicted him in 
 after life. 
 
 Prince Yaschvill took a direct part in the tragic 
 event which occurred on the night of March 23, 
 1801. The new palace, just built by the Emperor 
 Paul, in which the imperial Court had been installed 
 without even waiting for the walls to dry, was guarded 
 that night by a regiment particularly devoted to the 
 Grand Duke Alexander. The group of conspirators 
 who penetrated the palace included my ancestor and 
 some ten other personages, all occupying high posi- 
 tions in the Empire, such as Count Pahlen, Prince 
 Zouboff, the last favourite of the Empress Catherine, 
 his brother Count ZouboflF, Prince Wolkonsky, Count 
 Benigsen, and General OuvaroflF. Their avowed 
 purpose was to arrest the Emperor Paul and force him 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 155 
 
 to abdicate in favour of his eldest son. What hap- 
 pened when these men reached the bedroom of the 
 Emperor? The exact circmnstances have never come 
 to Ught. Paul I., hearing the sound of their approach 
 and trying to escape by a passage leading to the 
 apartment of the Empress, is supposed to have found 
 the door of the passage locked on the outside and to 
 have taken refuge behind a window curtain. The 
 story is that when the conspirators found that the 
 Emperor was not in bed, they feared they were lost, 
 and were about to beat a retreat, but Count Pahlen, 
 having touched the sheets, cried : " The nest is warm, 
 the bird cannot be far ofiF." The Emperor's hiding- 
 place having been discovered, he tried to defend him- 
 self, but succumbed after a short struggle, pierced 
 by the conspirators' swords, according to some, and, 
 if we may believe others, strangled with Prince Yasch- 
 vill's sash, the emblem of his rank and service.* 
 
 The contemporaneous records of this event repre- 
 sent Priace Yaschvill as a man of great nobility of 
 character, but of fiery and vindictive nature. Cer- 
 tain chroniclers of that epoch ascribe his participation 
 in the conspiracy to a motive of personal revenge, 
 asserting that he had been struck by the Emperor 
 Paul with his cane on the parade ground, and had 
 sworn to wash with blood the stain to his honour. I 
 know not if this tale is true, but, whatever his per- 
 sonal feelings were toward Paul I., a document piously 
 
 *The death of Paul I. xvas made the subject of a drama by M. Mereikovsky, one of the most 
 brilliant writers of the new Russian school, who made use of the memoirs of the period and oral 
 traditions handed down to the descendants of some of the conspirators. In this drama, which has 
 never been permitted to be played in Russia, M. Merejkovsky assigns to Prince Yaschvill a particu- 
 larly active and even brutal rdle. 
 
156 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 preserved in my mother's family proves beyond a 
 doubt that his act was inspired by an earnest desire, 
 shared also by the other conspirators, to save Russia 
 at any cost from the danger to which its sovereign's 
 madness exposed the country. 
 
 The document I refer to is the rough draft of a 
 letter addressed by Prince Yaschvill to the Emperor 
 Alexander a short time after the event of March 23rd. 
 In this letter, a complete translation of which was 
 published for the first time by the Grand Duke 
 Nicholas Michailovitch in his fine book, entitled 
 "The Emperor Alexander I.," my ancestor gave his 
 reasons for having joined the conspiracy and pointed 
 out in the boldest words the duties that were incum- 
 bent upon the young Czar. 
 
 The text of the letter follows: 
 
 Sire, 
 
 From the moment that your imhappy and demented father 
 momited the throne, I resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice myself 
 for the good of Russia, which has been the plaything of favour- 
 ites since the reign of Peter the Great and finally became the 
 prey of folly. 
 
 Our fatherland is subjected to autocratic power — of all powers 
 the most dangerous, for it causes the fate of millions of men to 
 hang upon one man's grandeur of mind and soul. Peter the 
 Great bore the burden of autocracy with glory and wisdom, and 
 under his aegis the country prospered. 
 
 The God of Truth knows that if we have stained our hands 
 with blood, it was not for any motive of self-interest; may it 
 please God that the sacrifice we have made shall not prove ster- 
 ile. 
 
 Rise, Sire, to the height of your vocation; show yourself on 
 the throne, if it be possible, a Russian citizen and an honest 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 157 
 
 man; do not be unmindful that for despair there are always 
 means of redress. I am now even greater than you, for I desire 
 nothing more, and if it should be necessary to safeguard your 
 glory, which would not be so precious in my estimation if it 
 were not at the same time the glory of Russia, I would be 
 ready to die on the scaffold; but it is useless — all the fault falls 
 upon us, and the Imperial mantle has covered much greater 
 crimes. 
 
 Adieu, Sire. In the eyes of the Sovereign I am the saviour 
 of our native land; in those of the son I am the murderer of his 
 father. Adieu, and may the benediction of the Almighty be 
 with Russia and with you, her terrestrial idol. May she never 
 have cause to blush for you. 
 
 None of those who took part in the conspiracy were 
 subjected to formal prosecution, although the former 
 preceptor of Alexander I., Laharpe, who was then 
 living in retirement in Switzerland, hurried to St. 
 Petersburg and endeavoured to convince the Em- 
 peror of the necessity of bringing to judgment those 
 at least who were designated as the actual murderers, 
 and among them Prince Yaschvill. But in spite of 
 the great influence which he retained over his pupil, 
 his efforts were unsuccessful. Not only did the 
 guilty ones remain unpunished, but some of them, 
 notably General Ouvaroflf, enjoyed eventually the 
 special favour of the Emperor Alexander. Count 
 Pahlen and the two Zouboff s left the capital and spent 
 the rest of their lives on their lands. Count Benigsen, 
 who was of German origin, continued his military 
 career and won great fame during the Napoleonic 
 wars, but he was never persona grata at Court, and 
 could never obtain the b^ton of marshal, although 
 
158 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 it was awarded to other Germans of inferior merit, 
 such as Sachen and Wittgenstein. 
 
 Prince Yaschvill alone received an order banishing 
 him to his estates. At the time of the French inva- 
 sion he put himself at the head of the militia levied 
 by the nobility of the province and gained signal 
 successes over the enemy, but nevertheless he was 
 never permitted to show himself at St. Petersburg, 
 nor even at Moscow, and he lived until his death on 
 one of his properties, where I passed a part of my 
 childhood and youth, and where the memory of his 
 imposing figure still endured. 
 
 According to the traditions existing in my mother's 
 family, the true cause of Prince Yaschvill's banish- 
 ment from Court was not the active part attributed 
 to him in the drama of March 23rd, but rather the 
 haughty letter which he addressed to the Emperor 
 Alexander, and, above all, it was thought, that pas- 
 sage in which he alluded to the "means" which would 
 always be found to remedy the despair of a country 
 menaced with ruin through the excesses of autocracy. 
 That letter, which I knew by heart almost from my 
 infancy, fiUed me with admiration for my ancestor, 
 whom I pictured as an emulator of Brutus. It is 
 more than probable that this contributed to inculcate 
 at an early age the aversion which I have always felt 
 for autocracy, and to turn my mind toward liberal 
 and constitutional ideas. 
 
 Prince Yaschvill's banishment had the effect of 
 keeping my mother's family in the provinces and 
 almost cutting off its relations with the Court. After 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 159 
 
 his death his descendants Hved on their estates in 
 summer and at Moscow in winter — ^an existence that 
 has been described in so vivid a manner by Tolstoy 
 in "War and Peace." I was in my seventh year 
 when serfdom was aboUshed, and during my child- 
 hood the family life of a landed proprietor in comfort- 
 able circumstances varied little from what it had been 
 under the old regime. It was not only broad and 
 often luxurious, but, considering the enormous dis- 
 tances and the difficulty of communications, it was 
 quite remarkable in its adoption of the forms of 
 Western Europe. Most of the manorial residences 
 dated from the epoch of the Empress Catherine II. 
 and had been built in the neo-classic style introduced 
 in Russia during her reign; in the most remote regions 
 of the Empire were found the columned fagades and 
 the triangular frontons which even at the present day 
 give so peculiar a cachet, not only to St. Petersburg, 
 but still more to Moscow and the provincial cities of 
 Russia. It is curious that this style, born under 
 Attic skies, applied by Palladio to the villas of 
 Venice's patricians and by Inigo Jones to the homes 
 of England's aristocracy, should have been acclimated 
 in Russia to the point of becoming, so to speak, a 
 national form of architecture, associated with the 
 most brilliant epoch of the Russian monarchy at the 
 close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nine- 
 teenth century. The chateau was generally sur- 
 rounded by a park, laid out in the prevailing taste of 
 that period, that is, in accordance with the ideas of 
 J. J, Rousseau, with which he inspired the creator of 
 
160 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Ermenonville. There were temples dedicated to 
 friendship, rustic hermitages, artificial ruins, and 
 monuments ornamented with inscriptions touching 
 the human feelings. The library, in most cases, con- 
 tained a complete collection of the French ency- 
 clopaedists and the English philosophers. It often 
 happened that all this sort of thing did not fit particu- 
 larly well the landlords' behaviour, which in certain 
 regards retained the stamp of ancient Russia; there 
 were examples of an abuse of seigneurial power and of 
 arbitrary methods, encouraged by the absence of an 
 eflScient control over the right of serfdom, but such 
 excesses were rather rare and, in general, the manners 
 of the land-holding nobUity were gentle and polite. 
 My parents were humane masters to their serfs, and 
 the greater part of their servants, or, as they were 
 called in distinction to the peasants attached to the 
 soil, les gens de la cour, remained in their service even 
 after they had been freed. As far back as I can 
 remember, there was in my parents' house a perma- 
 nent staff of cosmopolitan instructors : English maids, 
 and French, English, and German tutors and govern- 
 esses. This was also a common custom in other 
 houses of the same standing and it explains why the 
 majority of my compatriots belonging to this class and 
 this period spoke the principal foreign languages with 
 such perfection. The French language, particularly, 
 was in current use, not only at the imperial Court, 
 in the elegant society of St. Petersburg, and in Rus- 
 sian diplomacy (up to the reign of the Emperor 
 Alexander III. all diplomatic correspondence was 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 161 
 
 carried on in French), but also among the Russian 
 provincial nobility. I do not remember ever having 
 written to my parents except in French — ^a French 
 teeming with Russianisms that were sometimes most 
 amusing, but retaining certain forms which dated 
 from before the great revolution and which gave it a 
 peculiar originality. 
 
 After finishing the usual preparatory com-ses of 
 youth I entered, at the same time with my elder 
 brother, the Imperial Lyceiun to complete my educa- 
 tion. The Lyceum, which was a school of advanced 
 political studies, was founded by the Emperor Alex- 
 ander I. at the commencement of his reign, when, 
 with the aid of a group of young and brilliant collabo- 
 rators, Speransky, Czartoryski, Kotchouboy, etc., 
 he imdertook to remodel the institutions of the Em- 
 pire on a liberal plan, the object of that particular 
 foundation being to form a chosen body of young men 
 to constitute the personnel of the new institutions. 
 In order to gain admittance it was necessary to belong 
 to the class of the nobUity, or, in default of title, to 
 be the son of one of the high fimctionaries of the 
 Empire. The first group of yoimg men educated 
 within the walls of the Lycexun, to which the Em- 
 peror Alexander had assigned premises in his own 
 palace at Tsarskoie-Selo, was particularly brilHant. 
 Its distinguishing glory was that it gave to Russia 
 her greatest poet, PouschMn, and together with him 
 one of her most eminent statesmen. Prince Gortcha- 
 koff, future Chancellor of the Empire. From that 
 time and up to the present day the Lyceum was the 
 
162 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 cradle of a long line of servants of the State, of poets, 
 of writers — ^almost all animated by ideas and aspira- 
 tions derived from the traditions of that first group 
 of pupils, which has received the name of the "pleiade 
 de Pouschkin." 
 
 My years of study at the Lyceum coincided with 
 the events that led up to the Russo-Turkish war of 
 1877 and with the reawakening in Russia of the Slavo- 
 philist theories. These theories had their birth at 
 Moscow in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
 their spiritual fathers being the poet-theologian 
 Elomiakoff and the two brothers Kireievsky, who 
 were soon joined by a number of thinkers, savants and 
 publicists, such as the two Aksakoffs, Samarin, 
 Lemansky, and Hilferding. All had been nourished 
 on the German philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, 
 who reigned supreme at that time in the Russian 
 universities, and it was from their philosophy, and in 
 a general way, from German romanticism that the 
 doctrine which came to be known, improperly enough, 
 as Slavophilism was derived. It is very curious to 
 note that this doctrine, in the last analysis, is of Ger- 
 man origin and quite similar to that which gave rise 
 to the notion of a German Kultur, superior to all other 
 cultures and destined to dominate the world. I have 
 no hesitation in saying that it did great harm in 
 Russia, especially when, as we shall see, its adherents 
 tried to translate it from a purely speculative plane 
 to that of practical politics. 
 
 At the beginning of the reign of Alexander II. 
 Slavophilism was relegated to comparative unimpor- 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 163 
 
 tance by the_gEtlJiusiasiiL.-witli. which-tlie .,Eus&ian 
 public welcomedJiis-xef onos , concgiyed as Jtilfiy. were 
 in a spirit of European liberalism , but, at the period 
 of which I am now speaking, those reforms had been 
 halted and even received a set;back, owing to the 
 agrarian troubles that followed the emancipation of 
 the serfs and by the rapid growth of the revolu- 
 tionary movement, which manifested itself in a 
 series of attempts to assassinate the Emperor and 
 some of the high dignitaries. The Slavophiles, who 
 were always tinged with reactionary ideas, began^to 
 profit by this turn of affairs, but that which contrib- 
 uted more than anything else to br ing their doctrine s, 
 into new favour was the impression produced in 
 R^si a by lSe ^vents that came to passim the Balkan 
 pCTinsiila_al:JJiat.^»eiiDd, and which drew the atten- 
 tion and sympathy of all classes of Russian society 
 to the unhappy lot of the Slav populations who were 
 subjected to the oppression of the Turkish Empire. \ 
 Up to that time Slavophili sm had only been professed I 
 
 bit^^'^^^^^emb^rsIS^ 
 
 buLlh &^insurrec tion in Brjsnia and Herzegovina, Jhe 
 Serbo-Turkish war, and_the„ Bulgarian atrocities 
 aroused a great enthusiasm for the "brother Slays" 
 all over Russia and pushed the Slavophiles to the fore. 
 The Slavophile theory had been expounded some 
 twenty years before and, so to speak, crystallized into 
 a doctrine by a writer of great talent, Mj.DgmleKsky, 
 whose book, "Russia-and Europe," little noticed by 
 the Russian pubUc at the time of its appearance, was 
 now in^xerybody^ hands. This book proclaimed in 
 
164 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 inflammatory terms the profound a^tagonkm^be- 
 tween Russia and the, occidental world, and the 
 inferiority of European culture to that of Russia, 
 \based upon the principles dear to the hearts of the 
 /Slavophiles. In the field of foreign political relations, 
 Danilevsky claimed that Russia should unite all the 
 Slavs, if not under her sceptre, at least under her 
 hegemony; that Constantinople should become the 
 capital of the R^ussjSn"Empire and at the same time 
 the capital of the future Slavonic federation. These 
 results, he maintained, could only be attained by an 
 armed conflict with the Orient and with the rest of 
 Europe; the victory should be gained by the Greco- 
 Slavs, led by Russia, and should establish the definite 
 triumph of its civilization over that of the Germano- 
 Roman peoples. 
 
 Danileysky's bqok did much to create in Russia a 
 bellicose state of mind which eventually led to the 
 declaration of war against Turkey. In th^is respect 
 it may be compared to Houston Stewart Chamber- 
 lain's "The Foundations of the Nineteenth Cen- 
 tury," which played a similar part later in Germany, 
 when, having become the vade mecum of the Kaiser, 
 it helped to stimulate the dominating appetite of the 
 Germans and to urge them on to the assault against 
 their peaceable neighbours. Is it not curious that, 
 within a quarter of a century, two books, only no- 
 ticed at first by a small number of readers, should 
 have had afterward such a tremendous effect upon 
 the pubUc at large and upon the course of history? 
 And is it not a proof that the destinies of nations are 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 165 
 
 ruled by ideas and by abstract and psychological fac- 
 tors rather than by purely material considerations? 
 
 Skvophihsm, in spite of its national and religious 
 creed, was at first regarded with mistrust by the 
 Russian Government and suspected of demagogic ten- 
 dencies. After being confined to Moscow and sub- 
 jected to the annoyances of the police, the Slavo- 
 philes, thanks to the current of feeling started by the 
 events in the Balkans, gained little by little a footing 
 in St. Petersburg and even at the Court of Alexander 
 II., where they found a powerful protectress in the 
 person of Countess Bloudoff, Lady of Honour to the 
 Empress, possessing great influence in the high so- 
 ciety of the capital and enjoying special favour with 
 the imperial family. The salon of this grande dame 
 was thrown open to the propaganda for the inter- 
 vention of Russia in freeing the Oriental Slavs from 
 the Turkish yoke. The Ministry of Foreign Afifairs, 
 under the direction of the Chancellor, Prince Gortcha- 
 koff, of keen and sound intelligence, despite his ad- 
 vanced age, attempted to oppose this propaganda 
 for some time, but ended by following the cm-rent. 
 Moreover, one of the most ardent advocates of Slavo- 
 philism was a high functionary in the Ministry, M. 
 Tutscheff, a poet of great talent and a brilliant talker, 
 who was listened to with the highest interest in Coun- 
 tess Bloudofif's salon and at the Court. 
 
 The two years which preceded the war of 1877 were 
 marked by an ever-increasing effervescence of Russian 
 sympathy for the cause of the Slavs in the Orient. 
 This movement pervaded all classes of society, and 
 
166 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 manifested itself by a great warlike enthusiasm on the 
 part of the young men of Russia and by the enlist- 
 ment of many volimteers in the Serbian army^ My 
 elder brother entered _a regiment of the^guaid, ^afld 
 when war was declared against Turkey he went to 
 the'lEontjT^was burning to follow ^^is example, but 
 my youth prevented, so I kept on with my studies, 
 and when, being scarcely nineteen years of age, I was 
 finally free to follow my own wishes, the war had just 
 been terminated by the peace of San Stephano 
 (March 3, 1878). In order not to lose my chance 
 of taking part in the events that were ensuing in the 
 Balkans and in which I was passionately interested, 
 I entered the diplomatic service and made my debut 
 some months later as an attache at Constantinople. 
 The Russian Government had renewed diplomatic 
 relations with Turkey, sending as Ambassador Prince 
 Lobanoff, later Minister of Foreign AflPairs. Thanks 
 to the protection and constant friendship of that 
 eminent statesman I climbed quickly the first steps of 
 the diplomatic career, but that which I owe to him 
 above all else is the mere contact with his high in- 
 tellectual culture and the remarkable lucidity of his 
 judgment, which broadened my ideas and saved me 
 from many of the errors common to the younger 
 generation of that period. 
 
 If it were not for a fear of tiring my readers I should 
 like to give the space which it deserves to a portrait of 
 Count Lobanoff; I will only say that he was one 
 of the most brilliant representatives of the group of 
 public men brought up under the liberal reign of 
 
THE PROVINCIAL NOBILITY 167 
 
 Alexander II. By birth a grand seigneur, the Laban- 
 off-Rostovskys being descended from one of the 
 elder branches of the house of Rurik — ^the Princes 
 Rostoff — ^he was also distinguished as an historian 
 and a man of great learning. He was a diplomate de 
 carriere, but for family reasons he remained out of 
 the service dm-ing a considerable period, until he 
 resumed diplomatic activity as Ambassador to Con- 
 stantinople. After occupying the Embassies of 
 Vienna and London, he became Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs in 1895, but died the year following, while 
 accompanying Emperor Nicholas on a journey 
 abroad. It was only a short time before that he had 
 again given evidence of his friendship for me by pro- 
 posing my name to the Emperor for the post of his 
 assistant, or Under-Secretary of State, but his death 
 prevented my appointment. When I was called, in 
 my tm-n, to direct the foreign relations of Russia, I 
 did not always walk in his footsteps, nor did I follow 
 certain of his poHtical beliefs, but I preserve to this 
 day a great veneration for his memory and am proud 
 to have been numbered among his favourite pupils. 
 
 If I have risked, in the present chapter, the re- 
 proach of having given too much room to my antece- 
 dents and my earlier years it is because it has seemed 
 to me that I could best explain thereby certain aspects 
 of the social and political structure of Russia that are 
 not generally appreciated by the outside world. A 
 detailed recital of the vicissitudes that have marked 
 my long diplomatic career would not, on the contrary, 
 present any particular interest from that point of 
 
168 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 view, and so I am quite sure that my readers will 
 be grateful to me for sparing them the fatigue. It 
 will be sufficient to enumerate the successive etapes — 
 Turkey, Bulgaria, Roumania, the United States, 
 Italy, Serbia, Bavaria, Japan, and finally Denmark, 
 whence I proceeded to St. Petersburg to take charge 
 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Aui^igjhese Stapes, however, there was oner=the 
 mission that I fulfilled at the Vatican from 1886 jto 
 1897, in the time of Pope Leo Xlll.-^that placed me 
 at odds with the Russian -bureaucracy from that jiay. 
 on and had a marked influence upon the position 
 , whidi I took afterward on certain questions of domes- 
 tic politics, notably those concerning religious liberty 
 andjthe treatment of the foreign populations of Rus- 
 sia. For this reason I will devote some pages in a 
 future chapter to that mission, which marked one of 
 the most interesting periods of my diplomatic career, 
 but, for the moment, I will avoid further digressions 
 and proceed to the recital of the events which followed 
 the opening of the first Duma. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 The Goremykin Cabinet 
 
 AS WAS to^be^ejqjccted, the Duma not ..only 
 /\ adopted from ^^start an attitude bitterly 
 J. JL h^iK~1^3Se_Jji^^QiYerimient,.> hut showed 
 plp,inly a determination to go beyond the prerogatives 
 accorHed by the charter of. 1905^ This was first 
 manifested in the proposed reply to the address from 
 the throne, prepared by a committee of thirty-three 
 members, all belonging to the Opposition. This 
 reply embodied almost point by point the electoral 
 programme of the Cadet party, comprising the sup- 
 pression of the Council of the Empire,^.KiinisteKiaL 
 responsibility to the Duma, universal suflFrage, abro- 
 gation of all exceptional laws and all class privilege, 
 absolute liberty of conscience, public meetings and 
 the Press, abolition of capital punishment, etc. The 
 agrarian question was treated in the most radical fash- 
 ion, even to the distribution to the peasants of all the 
 crown and convent domains and the forced expropria- 
 tion of a part of the lands in private ownership. It 
 further aflSrmed the principle of full and entire am- 
 nesty for all political crimes and misdemeanours. 
 The discussion of the proposed reply lasted a week 
 and terminated in a particularly exciting night ses- 
 sion, in the covu-se of which the best orators of the 
 
 169 
 
170 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER ^ 
 
 Cadet party, like Messrs. Petrounkevitch and Rodit- 
 cheff, pronounced inflammatory discourses reproach- 
 ing the Government for the brutal repression of the 
 revolutionary movement and demanding the im- 
 mediate release of all who had been imprisoned during 
 the recent disturbances. The address was unani- 
 mously approved by vote of the members present, 
 the small group of Octobrists and Conservatives 
 having left the hall without daring to vote against it. 
 The adoption of the address amounted undoubt- 
 edly to an attempt on the part of the Duma to arro- 
 gate to itself the rights of a constituent assembly, and 
 -^ to revise the charter of 1905 in an ultra-radical sense, 
 jit caused the greatest consternation in Government 
 circles, and was followed by a dispute between the 
 representatives of the nation and the monarchical 
 power with regard to the manner in which it was to 
 be presented to the Emperor. He refused to receive 
 the delegation appointed for the purpose by the Du- 
 ma, and sent word to the President that he would not 
 accept the address except through the hands of the 
 Minister of the Court. The deputies resented this 
 affront all the more keenly because they had used 
 the utmost pains to clothe their requests in language 
 that was most correct and even imbued with loyalty 
 toward the person of their sovereign. Thanks to the 
 good sense of some of the leaders of the Cadets, the 
 point was not pressed; the Duma declared that it 
 was the tenor of the address that mattered and not 
 the mode of presentation, and, recognizing that the 
 Emperor's refusal, which apphed equally to the Coun- 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 171 
 
 cil of the Empire, implied no blame, they submitted 
 to what they chose to consider as a mere conformity 
 with the protocol of the imperial Court. 
 
 But soon afterward the antagonism between the 
 Dimia and the Government grew more acute, when 
 M. Goremykin mounted the tribune for the first time 
 to read a declaration from the ministry in response 
 to the address, which amounted to an absolute non 
 possumus. 
 
 The ministerial declaration had been the subject of 
 a prolonged discussion in the Council of Ministers; 
 for my part I had not only protested strongly against 
 the terms in which it was conce^ived, but had ques- 
 tioned the propriety of a reply by the Government_tO- 
 the Duma. Arguing from the practice of other par- 
 liamentary assemblies, I tried to convince my col- 
 leagues that the Cabinet, as such, was not called upon 
 to intervene in a dialogue between the sovereign and 
 the representatives of the nation, and that the sole 
 result of a like intervention would be to provoke a 
 qpnflict_at a moment when it. would be particularly 
 sterile and dangerous. I suggested, moreover, that 
 it would be well to submit to the Duma at once as 
 many projects of laws as possible, so as to furnish , 
 matter for debate and cut short all attempts to over- 
 step its prerogatives. r 
 \, My objections , which received the support of M. j < 
 'I Stolypin alone, were set asid e, and on the 26th of May |^ 
 y M. Goremykin betook himself with^eat pomp andl^^ 
 \\ ceremony to the Duma to read his declaration, accom- \ { 
 \\ panied by all the members of the Cabinet. 
 
172 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 This first brush between the Government and the 
 assembly was deplorable from every point of view. 
 Apart from the contents of the declaration, which 
 roused the indignation of the majority present, the 
 haughty attitude and disdainful tone assumed by 
 M. Goremykin while he was reading displeased even 
 the Octobrists and Conservatives, who had refused 
 to vote on the address to the throne, the result being 
 that the Duma again exceeded the rights granted by 
 the charter of 1905 and hastened to vote in the same 
 session, by a crushing majority, an order of the day 
 condemning the 'Government and demanding the 
 resignation of M. Goremykin's Cabinet, and its re- 
 placement by a Ministry enjoying the confidence of 
 the assembly. 
 
 Dating from this session the relations between the 
 Duma and the Government grew more impossible 
 every day. This was only natural and confirmed my 
 forebodings, but a thing absolutely unforeseen and 
 surprising was the form which the strife between M. 
 Goremykin and the national assembly assumed. The 
 Government evidently had the choice of two ways: 
 to try sincerely to discover a common ground of un- 
 derstanding and collaboration with the Duma, in 
 spite of the unfortunate beginnings, or else to break 
 lances without further parley by dissolving the par- 
 liament and proceeding to new elections. I was in 
 favour of the first method, while fully appreciating 
 that the composition of the two parties to the conflict 
 offered little chance of success. At the same time I 
 could have understood the opposite course, in imita- 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 173 
 
 tion of Bismarck's example in 1862 and 1863, and 
 which would have been to send the rebeUious deputies 
 to their homes. M. Goremykin did neither the one 
 nor the other, but took a position which, I believe, 
 has no precedent in history — ^he resolved simply to 
 ignore the Duma, affecting to consider it as a collec- 
 tion of tiresome persons, whose doings were of no 
 real importance, and declaring publicly that he would 
 not even do them the honour to argue with them, but 
 would act as if they did not exist. He never ap- 
 peared during their debates, and charged the other 
 Ministers to follow his example, or else to send their 
 subordinates to represent them. The preceding 
 Cabinet had made the mistake of not preparing any 
 bills, to speak of, for the consideration of the Duma 
 when it met; to be exact, there were only two demands 
 for credits presented at its opening, one being for the 
 inauguration of a school and the other for the con- 
 struction of a steam laundry for the University of 
 Yourieff. M. Goremykin tiot only failed to remedy 
 this mistake, but he took pleasure in aggravating it 
 by omitting to present any new projects to the Duma. 
 The results were not slow in appearing; exasperated 
 by the Government's attitude of disdain and lacking 
 material for practical work, the Duma resorted to an 
 uninterrupted series of interpellations addressed to 
 the Ministers on the most varied subjects. There 
 were more than three hundred of these interpella- 
 tions, and they gave opportunity for the most furious 
 attacks against the Government on such subjects as 
 capital punishment, the provocative methods of the 
 
174 EECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 secret police, and especially the anti-Jewish pogroms, 
 which the Government was accused of organizing. 
 M. Stolypin alone, of all the Ministers, faced the tu- 
 mult and succeeded in impressing the Duma by his 
 calm courage and the manifest sincerity of his re- 
 sponses; the others made no reply, or else did so by 
 the voice of their subordinates, which exasperated 
 the deputies still more. On several occasions the rep- 
 resentatives of the Government had to leave the hall 
 of sessions most precipitately, pursued by the jeers 
 and insults of the assembly. 
 
 Another result of the failure on the part of the 
 Government to submit proposals for laws to be en- 
 acted by the Duma\was the taking of the initiative] 
 by that body itself, and in that way the most radical! 
 bills were introduced, particularly in relation to the 
 agrarian question, which soon became the dominating 
 subject of discussion on account of the violent passions! 
 and agitation that it engendered. The long and ', 
 heated discussions of this great question ended by '''■ 
 provoking so decisive a collision with the Govern- 
 ment that it became the immediate cause of the 
 dissolution of the first Duma. 
 
 Let us stop for a moment to examine the history 
 of the Russian agrarian problem. 
 
 It originated with the great act by which the Em- 
 peror Alexander abolished serfdom in Russia fifty 
 years before. Contrary to what had taken place 
 in the countries of occidental Europe, the Russian 
 peasants not only were given individual liberty, but 
 were also granted l?inds, This particular provision 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 175 
 
 of the reform of 1861 would have placed the agrarian 
 regime in Russia on extraordinarily firm foundations, 
 and would have assured the peasant class a future of 
 great prosperity if, unhappily, the Government had 
 not committed the gravest error — that of basing the 
 regime, not on individual ownership, but on the mir, 
 or collective and communal ownership, the object 
 being not only to maintain in Russia a system which 
 was believed to be essentially Russian in its origin, 
 but to create a state of things that would carry out 
 the most advanced ideas of social science. It was 
 confidently expected that the formation of an agrarian 
 proletariat would thereby be prevented for all time, 
 and a revplution against individual riches and pros- 
 perity would be rendered impossible, because the 
 aspirations of European revolutionists would be 
 practically met by the mir. Inasmuch as all the land 
 belonged to the commune and was redistributed to its 
 members at the end of a certain period, the individual, 
 it was claimed, would not become poor, for, even in 
 case of the impoverishment of the father, the son still 
 had a right to his lot of land, as the result of a new 
 distribution. Moreover, the system of the mir 
 satisfied the desires for equality, which had always 
 been the fashion in Russia and especially at the time 
 the agrarian law was enacted. 
 
 In reality, far from marking any progress from au 
 economical and social point of view, the regime of the 
 mir maintained and consecrated a state of affairs that 
 was virtually a remnant of primitive times, incom- 
 patible with the demands of modern civilization, and 
 
176 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 prevented the development of agriculture as well as 
 any improvement in the welfare of the rural class. 
 
 Was the idea of the mir deeply rooted in the heart 
 of the Russian people? It will be recalled that this 
 was the theory of the Slavophiles, and that communal 
 ownership was proclaimed by them as one of the es- 
 sential principles that were to confirm the superior- 
 ity of Russian civilization over that of Western 
 Europe. We have seen that all their theories in a 
 general way were inspired by German philosophy, 
 and it is curious to note that in this particular ques- 
 tion of agrarian organization the Russian lawmaker 
 was guided in the main by a German "savant," 
 Baron Haxthausen, who was charged by the Govern- 
 ment to inspect the agricultm-al regions of Russia and 
 present a report, which served as a basis for the agra- 
 rian law of 1861. This Westphalian Junker, styled 
 "Prussian Privy Councillor" and possessed of no 
 further scientific baggage than a study of the agrarian 
 situation in Prussia, became, if not the inventor of 
 the Russian mir, at least the most influential advocate 
 of the nebulous conceptions of the Slavophiles, and so 
 it is to German science that Russia is indebted for 
 having preserved this remnant of ancient barbarism, 
 an error from which she sufiFered for a long time and 
 which she is expiating cruelly at the present hour. 
 
 Beginning with the first years of the twentieth 
 century, the economic situation of the peasants, which 
 had steadily grown worse under the system of the mir, 
 gave rise to frequent agrarian troubles and caused the 
 Government great anxiety. Local committees were 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 177 
 
 appointed at iGbrst to study the matter, followed by a 
 grand commission presided over by Count Witte, and 
 later by M. Goremykin. In 1905, as a result of sev- 
 eral bad harvests, the reverses of the Russo-Japanese 
 war, and the ensuing revolutionary agitation, the 
 agrarian disturbances reached a climax. The de- 
 mands of the peasants were based upon a hypothesis 
 of the utmost simplicity: they had received a part of 
 the lands of the great proprietors a half century be- 
 fore; consequently, if they still suffered poverty, it 
 must be because sufficient land had not been given 
 them, and the remedy could only be found in the ses- 
 sion of the properties remaining in the hands of their 
 former masters. This was a proposition particularly 
 favourable to the revolutionary propagandists, who 
 had little difficulty in inciting the peasants to appro- 
 priate the desired lands by violence. The Govern- 
 ment took no measures of a comprehensive nature for 
 a solution of the problem, and limited itself to an 
 attempt to suppress the movement by force. No 
 steps had even been taken to submit to the Duma the 
 draft of a law which might have served as a basis for 
 the discussion which was bound to take place as soon 
 as the new assembly met. We have seen the advan- 
 tage that the radical and revolutionary parties were 
 able to derive from this situation by promising the 
 peasants a complete realization of their aspirations 
 and so gaining the support of the bloc of two hundred 
 peasant deputies that the Government had foolishly 
 introduced into the Duma. 
 The debates on the agrarian question lasted ufain- 
 
178 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN IVflNISTER 
 
 terruptedly until the Duma was dissolved, and gave 
 rise to innumerable speeches which kept alive the 
 agitation and spirit of discontent among the peasant 
 deputies and the rural population of the most remote 
 corners of Russia. In default of any proposal from 
 the Government for an agrarian law, the Duma soon 
 had before it for consideration no less than three proj- 
 ects, each rivalling the other in its radical tendencies. 
 All three enunciated unequivocally the principle of 
 the obligatory expropriation of all lands belonging to 
 the great proprietors, a principle which appeared to 
 meet the almost unanimous wish of the majority of 
 the assembly, but which had just been qualified as 
 absolutely impossible by the governmental declara- 
 tion. 
 
 The most sober of the three plans was that of the 
 Cadet party, which practically controlled the Duma 
 at the time. Its author was M. Hertzenstein, who 
 was designated by that party as the spokesman of 
 the agrarian commission appointed by the assembly. 
 This project, while proclaiming the principle of forced 
 expropriation, admitted the justice of a fair indemnity 
 for the landowners and provided for the establish- 
 ment of a reservation of land to be placed at the dis- 
 position of the State. 
 
 A second project, called that of the 104, went fur- 
 ther in the radical direction, and called for the na- 
 tionalization of all the lands of the Empire, and the 
 administration thereof by local committees to be 
 elected by the people themselves. 
 
 Finally, the extreme left of the Duma presented a 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 179 
 
 plan abolishing all private ownership of land, and de- 
 claring it to be common property, which every citizen, 
 male or female, had a right to enjoy, according to the 
 measure in which each person could contribute per- 
 sonal labour. 
 
 The Government, having left the initiative to the 
 Duma, had nothing to oppose to these three projects 
 beyond a pallid discourse pronounced by the Minister 
 of Agriculture, M. Stichinsky, a typical representa- 
 tive of the old regime, well known for his iiltra-reac- 
 tionary ideas. His speech was limited to vague 
 promises of an extension of the operations of the peas- 
 ants' bank and the development of emigration to 
 Siberia. It produced a most deplorable eflFect, which 
 grew to the height of exasperation when M. Goremy- 
 kin, alarmed by the turn that the debates were taking 
 and by the agitation that they created among the 
 peasants, but always faithful to his pose as an ignorer 
 of the Duma, caused to be published in the official 
 gazette a long communique on the agrarian question, 
 declaring plainly that the Government did not admit 
 the principle of forced expropriation. By choosing 
 this manner of making known the views of the Gov- 
 ernment, i.e., in addressing the country over the 
 heads of the Dimia, M. Goremykin again gave evi- 
 dence of his scorn for the national assembly, and it 
 was the form of the communication rather than its 
 contents which roused the unanimous indignation of 
 the deputies. The Duma at once resolved to give tit 
 for tat, and directed the agrarian commission to draw 
 up a direct appeal to the country, in the form of a 
 
180 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 reply to the communique of the official gazette. It 
 was this step, taken ab irato, which sealed the fate of 
 the Duma, for it gave M. Goremykin, as we shall see 
 later, a pretext for denouncing this appeal to the coun- 
 try before the Emperor as an overt revolutionary act. 
 If the relations between the Government and the 
 Duma became more strained from day to day, it was 
 equally true that concord was far from reigning in the 
 bosom of M. Goremykin's Cabinet. I have already 
 mentioned its heterogeneous character; the more its 
 members learnedrtoTcnow each otKefTEhe more marked 
 became their divergencies of opinion, preventing 
 any agreement on the questions submitted for their 
 consideration. M.. JGroremykin. who had affected 
 at the outset a sort of Olympian calm, and who was 
 visibly pleased with the r6le, tookjio patn^ixrconceal 
 the little respect he Jiad^not only for- the Duma, but 
 evenjfor the Council of. Ministers, considering that 
 institution as a useless innovation and giving his col- 
 leagues to understand that he called them together 
 merely for the sake of form. One can easily imagine 
 what the meetings of the Council amounted to under 
 such conditions: M....Garg]3aykii3.,j)jesided in a tired 
 and absent-minded fashion, hardly deigning to take 
 notice of the contrary views expressed by its members 
 and generally terminated the discussions by stating 
 that he would submit his own opinion to the Emperor 
 for decision. If his attention was drawn to the dis- 
 turbed state of affairs in the Duma, and the bad effect 
 it might have on the country, he replied that it was 
 all "childishness," and cited the ultra-conservative 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 181 
 
 newspapers, subsidized by himself, as proof that the 
 entire population was devoted to the monarchical 
 power and therefore he did not let himself be influ- 
 enced by anything that happened in the Palace of the 
 Tauride. The extreme reactionary Ministers, Prince 
 Schirinsky-Schihmatoff and M. Stichinsky, main- 
 tained an injured air, and, when expressing an opinion 
 upon any matter, never omitted to add that no 
 governmental activity would be possible as long as the 
 autocratic power was not restored. M. Schwanebach 
 wasted time in interminable digressions and attacks 
 upon Count Witte and the preceding Cabinet, never 
 faiUng to betake himself after each meeting to the 
 Austrian Embassy, where he talked over the details 
 of the discussion with his friend. Baron von Aerenthal, 
 and the next morning his version thereof was known 
 at Vienna, and at Berlin also, no doubt. Admiral 
 Virileff , being quite deaf, did not even try to follow 
 the debates; General Rudiger never uttered a word; 
 Messrs. Stolypin and KokpytzoffaJone endeavoured 
 to'^i^'aTsirlQUS and dignified character to the dis- 
 cussions, explaining clearly and competently the 
 affairs ~df their respective departments, but obtaining 
 scarcely any attention on the part of their colleagues. 
 As for me, I felt that my efforts to bridge the gap be- 
 tween the GoYSiaxQient and -the Duma were „dapmed 
 tpigiiure, and^servedoDly to give mgjthe reputation, 
 in the minds of M. Goremykin and his fjriends, of 
 being a dangerous Liberal whom it was necessary to 
 get. rid of at any cost, and with, as Jittle delay as 
 possible^ 
 
182 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 The strange line of conduct adopted by M. Goremy-\ 
 kin — neither to collaborate with the Duma nor to \ 
 fight it, but to boycott it, so to speak — was not long 1 
 in bearing fruit. The least attempt on the part of the / 
 Government to cooperate sincerely with the Duma 
 would have been hailed with appreciation and sym- 
 pathy by the numerous Moderate Liberal circles in all 
 parts of the country, while a contrary policy, even 
 to an immediate dissolution of the Duma, would at 
 least have contented the reactionaries, and perhaps 
 the bourgeois classes, who were tired of the revolu- 
 tionary agitation and were always impressed by an 
 exhibition of vigour; but the "non-resistance to 
 evil," so dear to Tolstoy, practised by M. Goremykin, 
 was treated as an evidence of weakness, and had the 
 effect of discrediting the Government irremediably 
 in the eyes of an immense majority of the Russian 
 public. 
 
 Toward the end of June the general lack of confi- 
 dence in the Goremykin Cabinet manifested itself in 
 a manner particularly apparent, a propos of the fol- 
 lowing incident. The Government, having need of 
 funds for the relief of the people who were suffering on 
 account of the bad harvest, decided for the first time 
 to present to the Duma the draft of a law providing 
 for the opening of a credit of fifty million roubles. 
 The Duma reduced the credit to fifteen million rou- 
 bles, granted for one month, and the Council of the 
 Empire, upon which M. Goremykin counted to restore 
 the original figure, maintained the reduction, thus 
 associating itself with the Duma in a vote that signi- 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 183 
 
 fied lack of confidence in the Government. This vote 
 was a serious check for M. Goremykin, and definitely 
 destroyed the prestige of his Cabinet even in the eyes 
 of the Conservative party. 
 
 Seeing clearly the impossible situation in which the 
 Government found itself, I took advantage of my 
 personal relations with some of the members of the 
 Moderate Liberal party in both the Duma and the 
 Council of the Empire to confer with them in the 
 hope of finding some way out of the difficulty. Our 
 conversations, in which we were joined by M. Stoly- 
 pin, took a more and more interesting turn as time 
 went on, and confirmed me in the conviction that it 
 was entirely possible to create an understanding be- 
 tween the governing power and the national represen- 
 tation. I decided finally to try to open the eyes of 
 the Emperor to the dangers of the situation, and in- 
 form him of the result of my investigations. The 
 enterprise was a hazardous one, for it went contrary 
 to all bureaucratic custom; the Emperor might easily 
 refuse to hear the first word of such an interference 
 on the part of his Minister of Foreign AflFairs with a 
 matter which did not strictly concern his department, 
 but in that event I was resolved to present my resigna- 
 tion without further delay. 
 
 With the utmost secrecy I called together at my 
 house the small group of my political friends, and we 
 drew up together a memorial which I engaged to sub- 
 mit to the Emperor at the first audience that might be 
 accorded to me in the palace of Peterhof . 
 
 The writer of this memorial was a young deputy of 
 
184 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 great talent belonging to the Moderate Liberal party, 
 M. Lvoflf. I am going to append a translation of the 
 document in extenso, because it covers in a most com- 
 plete and satisfactory manner the situation that 
 presented itself in Russia at that period: 
 
 The relations between the Duma and the Government, as 
 represented by the present Council of Ministers, are entirely 
 Eibnormal and constitute a veritable menace to the establish- 
 ment of order in the Empire. 
 
 All connection between the Duma and the Government is 
 broken and an abyss has been created between them by their 
 mutual distrust and enmity. 
 
 It is clear that such a state of affairs destroys all possibility 
 of any creative work in common. Th is disunion arises in the 
 first place from the very composition of the Ministry, a conipbsi- 
 tion~wWchTtoes'h6t respond by any means Jo^ the needs of the 
 preseni, political situation. The personnel of the Minis try was 
 chosen from the ranksjofj^ bureaucracy, and so inspires the 
 most profounddistrust on the part of the masses. It is to this 
 same bureaucracy that all the evils aflBictmg Russia are imputed 
 — ^the disorder and ruin at home as well as the disasters of the 
 Japanese war — and it cannot be denied that reproaches for what 
 has occurred in the past, whether justified or not, will always 
 hamper any bureaucratic Ministry. The present Cabinet has 
 not only failed to dissipate this fatal misunderstanding, but 
 has intensified it by certain errors which it has committed. 
 Moreover, any Ministry recruited entirely from the bureaucracy 
 will inevitably lack comprehension of elective assemblies, with- 
 out which it is impossible to acquire the necessary authority 
 over them. No matter what the qualities of the chief of such- 
 and-such a department may be, neither his experience nor his 
 good intentions will assure him preeminence in political life. 
 The very habits he has acquired in the fulfilment of his bureau- 
 cratic duties will unfit him for the solution of new problems 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 185 
 
 arising from the complications of a totally different situation. 
 Therefore, while the sympathies of the people are with the Duma 
 all their hostility is directed against the Ministry, andj:^ -can^_ 
 .not.help teading_to consecjuences fatal to Jheadmimstrgijonof, . 
 _tbe State^and the trang^uillity of the country. 
 
 The Duma, driven into a position of hostility to the executive 
 power, ignored by that power and meeting with nothing but 
 opposition therefrom, is itself forced into a course of obstinate 
 opposition, and torn from the fertile soil of practical legislative 
 activity. A Duma of sur^ a. natun?; pfia sfis tn he a. p a.pif)f nrggn ^^^ 
 of legislatigtt and^ecomes^ a hotbed rf^ passions. 
 
 The present Duma, poorly equipped, it must be confessed, 
 for legislative work because of the insuflScient development of 
 the majority of its members, cannot, however, be characterized 
 as essentially revolutionary; it is true that it comprises extreme 
 elements, but these are not dominant. Its majority is composed 
 of partisans of peaceful legislativereforms and enemies of revolu- 
 tion; it is only tfe^bnormal situation ^nd the necessity of con-' 
 fining all action Mritself' that incites the Duma to protestation 
 and strife against the Government. The laws drawn up by 
 the Duma,Jb£ing-condemned,to-rejeGticux.in.adKance^re neces- 
 sariIy_tcansformed~into-sQ_inan3!Lfa:QtestS^ 
 
 Placed in a position of this kind, the Duma loses little by little 
 the consciousness of forming part of the powers of the State, 
 and becomes accustomed to regard the Govermnent as a hostile 
 outside force, and consequently a legitimate prey. It is an un- 
 deniable fact that the Duma, thanks to a deplorable electoral 
 system, does not faithfully represent the entire population of 
 Russia; on the contrary, there are wide circles of society, having 
 great weight and influence in the country, which are not repre- 
 sented at all. The peasa.nt-SLArg far from bpi'ng ^^present.ed hv 
 mcnjsia-expBesaJil»fijeal-.^Ky»,3f^^ The 
 
 Duma is especially dominated by the so-called intellectuals of 
 the cities and the semi-intellectuals of the rural districts. But 
 in spite of all this the Duma must be recognized as a very im- 
 portant entity; thatjwhii^ gives itjtrengthjs^^^the^h^^^ that is ' 
 
186 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 centred in it, the gen eral belief t hat it alo ne .can find a.jSoIjitiDn 
 for the crisis through which Russia is passing, and, finally, the 
 absolute lack of faith that the..country„Jias.m-a bureauor^tic 
 government. In the mind of the unenlightened peasant mass 
 there is also a superstitious idea that the Duma is omnipotent, 
 that it can bestow land upon all and save everybody from 
 wretchedness and famine. 
 
 This circumstance alone is of a nature to make it, not only 
 undesirable, but excessively dangerous to allow an open rupture 
 to ensue between the Government and the Duma. The only 
 
 ^ ■ni ii ff i— We ill III ii ri 
 
 way to prevent it is to reestablish the relations between the 
 two, and that is impossible except on condition of replacing the 
 present Cabinet by a new Ministry. It is indispensable to call 
 to power men who are capable of acquiring influence over the 
 Duma and maintaining control. A new Ministry can alone save 
 the authority of the Government and restore in full force the 
 confidence and respect of the people. It would not be desirable, 
 however, to have the new Ministry composed of representatives 
 of a single party or political group. That which would best 
 meet the exigencies of the situation would be the formation of 
 a Ministry of^ixed, jhatacter. This is all the more evident 
 because at the present moment the Government should be free 
 of party influence and of all dependence upon narrow views and 
 
 --theories. In fact, the various j^oups in the Duma have^nptthe '" 
 chMactgr^ real political parties in the exact rnftgming, pfjhe 
 w;ord,.,and,ha>:e.npt yet Jt^^gp d,*5fij"teiorm during,the4jerJiGdJ8f 
 f^aangataiKaUyb^t Jgjj^sia is now passing through, nor do, they 
 cornectly represent _the. different social iorces .qf,, the country. 
 
 ~ A Ministry made up of the members of a single party would be - 
 paralyzed in its movements and hampered at every step by a 
 network of declarations and promises made in the past. It is 
 indispensable that a change in the direction of domestic politics 
 shall proceed from the untrammelled initiative of the Monarch, 
 and not be forced upon him by one or another of the parties. 
 The Emperor is free to replace one Ministry by another, and, in 
 doing so, to be guided by a solicitude for the general welfare, not 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 187 
 
 by party exigencies arising from political conflict. This does 
 not mean, however, that certain individual members of the 
 Duma should not be selected for positions in the new Ministry; 
 on the contrary, the Government would give proof in that way 
 of its resolve to break away from the former bureaucratic sys- 
 tem. The present Ministry is impotent because it carries the 
 burden of errors and traditions that are now universally con- 
 demned. 
 
 A new,jituatio n demands new mea <_ The formation of a 
 Ministry in which members of the Duma participate, besides 
 having the advantage of exerting a salutary influence upon 
 public opinion, will at the same time have the effect of splitting 
 the ranks of the opposition. All the moderate elements will 
 unite in defending the Ministry against the attacks of the ex- 
 tremists, who will become disorganized in consequence, and the 
 fatal knot, which results from the distrust prevailing between 
 the people and the ruling power and which binds the opposition 
 to the revolutionary movement, will be cut. Finally, the mere 
 fact of a participation by members of theDuma i^ the_executive 
 power will increase the efficiency of the Duma itself. It will then 
 have a clearer idea of the complexity of problems that confront 
 a State and will feel all the weight of power. This will calm the 
 extremists and create the tendency toward moderation which 
 is inevitably produced by a feeling of responsibility for action 
 in which one shares. 
 
 For the presidency of the Council of Ministers no better man 
 could be chosen than the actual President of the Dimia, M. 
 Mouromtzoff, who possesses a great moral authority over the 
 members of that body. M. Mouromtzoff, who is a man of cool 
 disposition and positive mind, has the advantage over other 
 public men that he is not trammelled by any party ties which 
 might impede his political action. His extraordinary self-con- 
 trol and sang-JrM would very quickly assure him the necessary 
 authority in administrative circles. The fact that the Duma 
 will lose a president of the first order, if M. Mouromtzoff becomes 
 President of the Council, must not be regarded as an obstacle. 
 
188 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 for the result will be that the centre of influence will be trans- 
 ferred from the Duma to the Government and the Duma's impor- 
 tance will be correspondingly diminished. The Government 
 and not the Duma will then find itself in control of the trans- 
 formation of Russia. 
 
 The most difficult thing will be to find a Minister of the 
 Interior. It is evident that the employment of armed forces 
 and the police to repress the destructive and revolutionary move- 
 ment should only be confided to a man who would be resolved 
 to act in a most circumspect manner and at the same time to 
 reestablish in his department the discipline and devotion to 
 duty that are so necessary. A man must be found, therefore, 
 who will himself be impressed by a sense of his duty to the State, 
 the service of which at the present moment demands a complete 
 sacrifice of the individual. Such a Minister could be found in 
 the person of the present incumbent, M. Stolypin, or in that of 
 M. MouromtzoflP, who might combine the functions of President 
 of the Coimcil with those of Minister of the Interior, on condi- 
 tion that he have the collaboration of M. MoukhanoflE and 
 Prince Lvoff* as his assistants. It will be much less difficult to 
 provide for the other Ministerial portfolios. 
 
 It is very important that M. Schipoff be included In the Min- 
 istry, because he possesses an immense influence among certain 
 social strata which diflFer widely in their political aspirations, 
 and because he personifies a movement which has only a few 
 representatives in the Duma, but which is very much in evidence 
 among the members of the Zemstvos. M. Kouzmin-Karaviefi 
 might be made Minister of Justice. The participation in the 
 Ministry of M. Milioukoff would be especially well regarded, for, 
 although he has no seat in the Duma, his influence is very great 
 with the public as well as with the Duma itself. In spite of all 
 his defects — an immense ambition and a certain tendency 
 toward intrigue — ^he is a man endowed with a very keen percep- 
 tion and an extremely clear political sense. His entrance into 
 the Ministry might even be unavoidable, for he would become 
 
 •Afterward President of the first Provisional Government following the revolution of 1917. 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 189 
 
 the most vigorous defender of the Government against the at- 
 tacks of the extreme left. He is the only one who would be 
 capable of organizing a Governmental party under conditions 
 that are as novel as they are difficult. 
 
 T he participat ion of members of the Duma in the Ministry 
 wUfnoLs^X_resfft"Tnr?eptemg;ffie"pres^^ wTth new 
 
 men, but will 1;ransfer the initiatiye of reform from the Duma to 
 theGoveHimen1L_ J?he only refOTmsTIhat will pariry the blows 
 of the revolutionary movement are those that may issue from the 
 ^xecutiye_gower. This method must be adopted with courage 
 and resolution. 
 
 On the 8th of July, after having finished the verbal 
 report on foreign matters that I used to make to the 
 Emperor once a week at the Peterhof Palace, I took 
 up resolutely the subject of the domestic situation of 
 Russia. The Emperor listened with great benevo- 
 lence to what I had to say, made no objection to re- 
 ceiving from my hands the memorial, which I had 
 brought in my portfolio, and promised to study it 
 carefully. This was a point gained at the start, and 
 I returned to the city full of hope that the remarkable 
 expose drawn up by M. Lvoflf would produce the de- 
 sired effect upon the mind of the Emperor, who had 
 appeared in a general way to be animated by inten- 
 tions comparatively conciliatory toward the Duma. 
 
 Some days after the presentation of the memorial 
 I was summoned by the Emperor, who told me that 
 he had read it w^ith great interest and had been struck 
 by the force and the justice of some of the arguments 
 contained therein. I seized this opportunity to en- 
 large, with all the eloquence of which I was capable, 
 upon the principal points of the document, and to try 
 
190 EECOLLECTIOXS OF A FOREIGN :\nXISTER 
 
 to convince the £mperor of tiie urgency of pu tting 
 them in effect by replacing M- JGoremykin's Calrinet- 
 with a coahtion Ministry, in_which the mj^ibfirs of 
 tEelDuma and of the CouncS of the BinpiMi^shc«Jd-be 
 largely represented. I begged_him to make jm_effort 
 to go outside of the najiQ2t_cilcle to which he^had 
 limited~himself hitherto for the choice of his Minis- 
 ters; belonging myself to the milieu of the provincial 
 nobihtyjand the Zemstvos, I guaranteed jjiat clas s to 
 benojess loyal to the monarchy than the bureaucracy 
 which formed an impassable barrier between the 
 thfone-and" the people. "The only end," I said, 
 " fKat rhy nnlitiofll frie]^ds-,aJfd I have in view is to 
 strpTi ^Tiep the exeriitive powerraangerously shaken 
 b ^ the revolutionary disturbances and bv the mis- 
 takes that the Government has committed. Do not 
 be afraid toj)lace„trust Jn us, even if we may appear 
 to be imbued jsgjtiti too liberal ideas. Again, nothing 
 so tempers radicalism as the responsibilities that 
 come with power; in the course of my long diplomatic 
 career, passed among widely differiog peoples and in 
 all latitudes, I have seen m any pubhc men, who we re 
 notorious for theicjcsdical tendencies as long as th ey 
 were in the opposition, become. the surest .guaEdxaJis 
 o f ordCT jjuLautiiority. Has it not been said with 
 good reason that the best poKce are recruited from 
 the ranks of the smugglers? Is it possible to beUeve 
 that men like M. Mouromtzoff, M. Schipoff, and 
 Prince Lvoff, all of whom are important landowners 
 and so vitally interested in the maintenance of tran- 
 quillity and a peaceful solution of the agrarian ques- 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 191 
 
 tion, are less dependable and less conservative than 
 bureaucrats of the order of M. Schwanebach, who 
 have no attachment to the soil and whose only solici- 
 tude is to cling to the emoluments which they receive 
 on the twentieth day of each month?" 
 
 Passing then to another series of arguments, I drew 
 the Emperor's attention, in my capacity as Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, to t he impression produced by ou r 
 interior crisis upon foreign cabinets and European 
 public jogin^n. I explained that beyond the fron- 
 tiers of Russia there was unan imous condemnation 
 of the proceedinjgs of M. Goremykin's Ministoy, and 
 that no one hoped for the reestablishment of normal 
 conditions in Russia until other men came into power 
 and other policies were inaugurated. This obstructed 
 in advance any steps we might take in our foreign 
 relations and, as the Finance Minister undoubtedly 
 could testify, destroyed the foundations of our finan- 
 cial credit. 
 
 As I went on, I had the satisfaction of perceiving 
 ^hat-the Emperor appeared to waver more and more. 
 He made, however, numerous objections. In his eye^ 
 the Duma was entirely dominated by a most danger- 
 ous spirit, and resembled a revolutionary meeting 
 Irather than a parliamentary assembly. Under such', 
 conditions, what chances were there of bringing it to 
 order by the means which I proposed? Would not a 
 like concession be regarded as a proof of weakness on 
 the part of the monarchical power, and would it not 
 be necessary, all the same, to have recourse to ener- 
 getic measures after a very short time? 
 
192 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 I replied to these objections that, even supposing 
 we were completely mistaken, and the Duma con- 
 tinued to be intractable, the situation could hardly 
 be made worse by following our counsels, because, if 
 it should become necessary to dissolve the Duma, 
 there would be every advantage in not having pro- 
 ceeded to that extreme until after a sincere endeavour 
 had been made to arrive at an understanding. The 
 whole country would be grateful to the sovereign, 
 and if it became evident that his endeavour had failed 
 of success because of a revolutionary predilection on 
 the part of the Diuna, the sane elements of the nation 
 would support the Government all the more willingly 
 in the direction of repression. It was not improbable 
 that, after having exhausted all effort at conciliation, 
 the sovereign might have to resort to the establish- 
 ment of martial law, but, even so, anything, would, be 
 preferable to the actual situation that had been cre- 
 ated b^. an impotent Govemmen t, which had become. 
 a laughing-stock in Russia as well,j§_a,brpad. 
 
 I At the close of the audience,^-which had lasted for 
 more than an hour, t he Emperor, without committing 
 himself to any definite course, aut horized me toPTltpr 
 into 2'0Mr2?arZer5j?i|h the personages mentioned in the 
 rnemoriaJj_as_ffidLit§J5lith others _whom circumstajaces 
 might render available, with a view to t he formation 
 of a coalition Cabinet. It was understood at the_ 
 same time that I should be seconded in this task by 
 M. Stolypin, to whom the Emperor wrote a few words 
 withTiis own hand for me to convey to my colleague. 
 
 \ On my letum to St. Petersburg I hastened to carry 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 193 
 
 out the Elgji. In accord with M. Stolypin I had secret 
 interviews with the leading members of the Duma, 
 beginning with its president, M. Mouromtzoflf, and 
 for my negotiations with the Council of the Empire 
 I sought the aid of my cousin, M. Yermoloff, who 
 played a prominent part therein as president of the 
 Moderate Liberal group or centre. M. Yermoloff 
 belonged, like myself, to the class of the provincial 
 nobility, and was distinguished for his vast knowledge 
 of agronomy. His acquirements in that science were 
 well known, not only in Russia, but also in foreign 
 countries, France especially, where he had published 
 several books on the subject. During the reign of 
 the Emperor Alexander III. he was Minister of Agri- 
 culture, and continued to hold that oflSce for some 
 time under Nicholas II. In spite of his bureaucratic 
 connections M. Yermoloff allied himself with the 
 Moderate Liberals in the Council of the Empire, 
 and at the period of which I am now speaking he was 
 recognized as the leader of that party in the Upper 
 Chamber. It was at his house that my secret confer- 
 ences took place with the members of that assembly 
 whom we had chosen to take part in the new Cabinet. 
 M. Stolypin engaged in parallel conferences, and 
 every night we compared results. 
 
 In the opinion of all the political leaders whom we 
 consulted the most natural candidate for the presi- 
 dency of the Council of Ministers was M. Mouromt- 
 zoff, who enjoyed the full confidence of the Duma 
 and the sympathies of the people, but it was well 
 known that the Emperor did not regard him with 
 
194 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 favour, and serious obstacles were feared on that 
 account. The next available candidate, M. Schipoff, 
 particularly influential with the Zemstvos, had a 
 better chance of being welcomed at Peterhof , but was 
 needed more for the Ministry of the Interior. The 
 great difficiilty was to find a portfolio for M. Miliou- 
 koff, who, it was feared, on account of his strong posi- 
 tion as chief of the Cadet party and his ambition to 
 rule, would not be content to take a secondary place, 
 but would demand for his party and himsetf the 
 leading role. 
 
 All these preliminaries had occupied a certain time, 
 and we were just on the point of terminating our la- 
 bours preparatory to a conference with M. Milioukoff , 
 who had not yet been sounded by us, when events 
 suddenly took a critical turn. It was the 8th of July 
 when I presented the memorial to the Emperor; on 
 the 17th the Duma entered upon a discussion of the 
 proposed appeal to the coimtry, which, it will, be re- 
 called, was to serve as a reply to the Government's 
 communique on the agrarian question. This was the 
 occasion that M. jGoremykin was looking for, as a 
 pretext for a decisive"battre. Three days later he 
 called a meeting of the Council of Ministers an d de- 
 cl^r^2_^.ithout even deigning to ask the opinion of 
 his colleagues, that the Duma having openly takgn^ 
 up a revolutionary attitude he had decided to propose? 
 to the Emperor on the following day an immediate 
 dissolution of that assembly. The members of the 
 Council were requested at the same time to meet at 
 M. Goremykin's house on that day, i.e., the 21st of 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 195 
 
 July, to await his return from Peterhof, bearing the 
 ukase for the dissolution of the Duma, after obtaining 
 the Emperor's signature. 
 
 What was it that caused M. Goremykin to make_^ 
 
 thislEasty decision? Did JaaJia-v,e- wind of our Tpour- 
 
 ^miAers, entered into with the utmost secrecy, with 
 -^IfiDuma and the Council of the Empire? It is 
 more than probable, but I have never been able to 
 find out. However that may be, I knew too well the 
 character of the Emperor to doubt for a moment the 
 outcome of M. Goremy kin's plan; I saw all my hopes 
 crushed; there was nothing left for me to do but to 
 present my resignation to the Emperor, once the ukase 
 was signed, and I was firmly resolyed.la-cesign. as 
 wg,s_jJsaJVl^t<}%^n,- who shared' my-««^*tiffl«»ts-and 
 was prepared to follow me in retirement from office. 
 
 Both M. Stolypin and I had to take certain meas- 
 ures of precaution in view of the grave event which 
 was impending; he, as Minister of the Interior, was 
 obliged to provide for the maintenance of public 
 order, which might easily be disturbed by the dis- 
 satisfaction that would be likely to follow the dissolu- 
 tion of the Duma, and to cope with this eventuality 
 he decided to call in the troops of the guard who were 
 then in the training corps near the capital; it devolved 
 upon me to see that none of the embassies or legations 
 should suffer from possible riots. It was especially 
 necessary to look out for hostile demonstrations 
 against the German Embassy, for the Kaiser was 
 suspected by the public of giving Emperor Nicholas 
 advice in a reactionary sense, but, as it was impossible 
 
196 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 to give ostensible protection to that embassy alone, 
 it became necessary to take measures applicable to 
 all the foreign representatives. On the following 
 morning I addressed a circular to all the ambassadors 
 and heads of foreign missions, warning them that 
 strikes were expected in some of the factories in the 
 capital, and as a popular movement might result, 
 detachments of troops would be posted in the neigh- 
 bourhood of their residences on the night of July 21st- 
 22nd, to give them such protection as might be re- 
 quired, in case of need. I added that the troops 
 were forbidden to cross the thresholds of the diplo- 
 matic premises unless directly invited by the head of 
 an embassy or mission. Having taken these precau- 
 tions, I spent the day in setting everything in order 
 at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, so as to be able 
 to turn over my duties to my eventual successor with 
 as little delay as possible. 
 
 Here it seems necessary to mention in parentheses 
 a statement that has been made verbally and in print* 
 to the effect that, when all cooperative relations be- 
 tween M. Goremykin's Cabinet and the Duma had 
 become manifestly impossible, toward the end of 
 June, General Trepoff, who was then Commandant 
 of the Imperial Palace, took the initiative of forming 
 a Cadet Cabinet, and his failure to come to terms 
 with the leaders of that party led directly to the dis- 
 solution of the Duma. 
 
 I believe I may testify that this story, although true 
 
 •See "La Vie PolUique dant lei Deux Mondei," published under the direction of AchiUe Viallste. 
 Ihe Annie. Empire Rtisae, par M. Paul Boyer. 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 197 
 
 in part. Is not entirely exact. As far as I know — and 
 I think I am particularly well informed on this sub- 
 ject — at the precise moment of which I speak, im- 
 mediately before the dissolution, there had been no 
 other authoritative 'pourparlers with regard to the 
 formation of a new Cabinet than those which the 
 Emperor had requested M. Stolypin and me to under- 
 take. Soon after the dissolution, however, imder 
 circumstances to be discussed later. General Trepoff 
 did actually conceive the idea of getting together a 
 Cabinet from the ranks of the Cadet party, and con- 
 ferred with the representatives of that party with 
 that end in view. I am perhaps the only one to- 
 day who knows in all its details the singular role 
 played by General Trepoff on that occasion, and, 
 since revelations only partially correct have been 
 made on the subject, in Russia as well as abroad, I 
 wiU make it my duty to furnish in the next chapter 
 more precise and more complete information than 
 has heretofore been available in connection there- 
 with. 
 
 The night of the 21st of July I dined at the British 
 Embassy with Sir Arthur Nicolson, now Lord Car- 
 nock, whose name will often appear in the following 
 chapters of this book. One of the very few guests 
 was Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, who had already 
 had a brilliant career in journalism as correspondent 
 of the Times before and during the Russo-Turkish 
 War, and who was then in charge of the foreign poUti- 
 cal department of that great English organ. He was 
 considered in England as the foremost authority on 
 
198 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Russian affairs, having written a remarkable book on 
 Russia, which he was occupied in amending, to bring 
 it down to contemporary events. He spoke Russian 
 with a fluency which he had acquired during several 
 years which he passed in the heart of the Russian 
 provinces, living with the humble family of a village 
 priest. He was acquainted with all the diflferent 
 classes of Russian society, and when the Emperor 
 Nicholas made his great journey to the Orient as heir 
 to the throne Sir Donald Wallace was attached to his 
 person by the British Government during the Em- 
 peror's stay in India. He was, therefore, personally 
 known to the Emperor and also highly esteemed, so 
 much so that King Edward VH. took advantage of 
 the fact to send him on a confidential mission to St. 
 Petersburg at the time of which I am now speaking. 
 The purpose of this mission was to study the domestic 
 situation of Russia, which was causing considerable 
 anxiety in London, and to serve as a counsellor to 
 Sir Arthur Nicolson, who was still new at his post and 
 not yet au courant of things Russian. Sir Donald 
 performed this task with great intelligence and tact. 
 He was received in audience by the Emperor, to 
 whom he spoke with entire frankness of his observa- 
 tions, taking pains to support the ideas of the Moder- 
 ate Liberals. I had frequent interviews with him, and 
 as we were naturally in full agreement on the subject 
 and I could count entirely on his discretion, I had in- 
 formed him of my negotiations for the formation of a 
 new Cabinet. 
 
 While talking with him after dinner on the balcony 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 199 
 
 of the Embassy, where we enjoyed a superb view of 
 the Neva, Sir Donald soon took notice of the state of 
 discouragement into which I had been plunged by the 
 shattering of my hopes, and questioned me closely 
 regarding the situation. I did not try to hide from 
 him that events had taken an imfavourable turn, but 
 I could not reveal the dramatic stroke that was pre- 
 paring for the morrow. At this moment we were 
 rejoined by Sir Arthur Nicolson, who asked me what 
 the exact reason was for the circular that he had re- 
 ceived that day. Having no right to tell him the 
 whole truth I could only reply that the Government 
 had reason to expect serious disorders the next day, 
 but that he need have no fear for the security of his 
 Embassy. 
 
 From the British Embassy I walked along the 
 quays to the residence of M. Goremykin, where the 
 members of the Council of Ministers were to await 
 his return from Peterhof . Even at that late horn" the 
 Neva, majestic in its bed of granite, still reflected the 
 sickly light of an invisible sun, which only dips below 
 the horizon of St. Petersburg for a few minutes at that 
 time of year. "When evoking the memory of that 
 night, after twelve years have passed, I am again 
 conscious in all its force of the feeling of profound 
 sadness which oppressed me at that moment, when 
 Russia, already so severely tried by suffering and 
 discord, was about to enter upon a path at whose end 
 I could foresee naught but new and still more cruel 
 trials. The melancholy induced by the picture that 
 I saw before me intensified that feeling, and I remem- 
 
200 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 ber that as I went on my way and thought of all the 
 misfortunes that my country was enduring I repeated 
 involuntarily these lines of one of our poets, who 
 imagines Night herself as a prey to pitiless insomnia: 
 
 While on my tireless way I come and go 
 Above you, I look down with anxious eyes 
 
 Upon such agony and tears and woe 
 That sleep even to me its balm denies. . . . 
 
 In M. Goremykin's study I found all the members 
 of the Council of Ministers waiting, with the excep- 
 tion of M. Stolypin, who had remained at the Minis- 
 try of the Interior to superintend the precautionary 
 measures rendered necessary by the coup de force that 
 was to take place on the following day. While await- 
 ing the return of M. Goremykin the Council dis- 
 patched a few routine affairs, and finally, toward 
 midnight, we heard the bell announcing the arrival 
 of the President of the Council. Presently we saw, 
 framed in the doorway, his figure — truly that of the 
 typical bureaucrat. Assuming his grand Court man- 
 ner, and standing on the threshold, he addressed us in 
 French, using the following phrase, which he had 
 evidently concocted with great care on his way back: 
 "Eh hien, messieurs, je vous dirai comme Madame de 
 Sevigne apprenant a sa fille le mariage secret de Louis 
 XIV.: 'Je vous le donne en cent, je vous le donne en 
 mille, dcvinez ce qui se passe.'"* 
 
 *" WeU, gentlemen, I will say to you as did Madame de S6vign6 when she told her daughter of 
 the secret marriage of Louis XIV: 'I give you a hundred chances, I give you a thousand chances — 
 guess what has happened'." 
 
THE GOREMYKIN CABINET 201 
 
 On hearing these words I had a faint glimmer of 
 hope that the proposal of dissolution had been re- 
 jected by the Emperor, but my hope was of short 
 duration. After enjoying for a moment our aston- 
 ishment, M. Goremykin announced that he had in 
 his portfolio the ukase of dissolution, signed by the 
 Emperor, but that at the same time His Majesty had 
 deigned to relieve him of the duties of President of 
 the Council, and had decided to appoint as his suc- 
 cessor M. Stolypin, who would receive from the 
 sovereign further instructions as to other changes in 
 the Cabinet. 
 
 Early the next morning the ukase of dissolution 
 appeared in the official gazette, and when the depu- 
 ties presented themselves at the Tauride Palace 
 they found it occupied by the soldiery and were not 
 allowed to cross the threshold. Some attempted 
 demonstrations in the streets near by were easily 
 stopped by the police. In short, there was no serious 
 disorder anywhere in the capital, and the success of 
 this first coup deforce appeared to justify those who 
 had maintained that the Government had only to 
 make some show of energy to impose its will upon the 
 revolutionary elements. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 M. Stolypin and the Cadets 
 
 THE Emperor's decision, not only to dissolve 
 the Duma, but at the same time to put M. 
 Stolypin at the head of the Government in_ 
 place of M. Goremykin, was a veritable cowp de 
 theatre that no one had expected, and least of all M. 
 Goremykin himself. It sprang from the personal 
 initiative of Nicholas II., who hoped by that means 
 to extenuate the bad impression that the dismissal of 
 the assembly was liable to create throughout the 
 country. In reality, however, it met the fate of all 
 half -measures; that is to say, jfc jailed to satisfy an y- 
 body. The parties of the Opposition, without ex- 
 c^iting the Moderate Liberals, regarded it as the 
 preface to a complete abrogation of the charter of 
 1905, while the reactionaries were indignant at the 
 slight of which M. Goremykin was the victim and at 
 the appointment of a man whom they considered to 
 be tainted with Liberalism. 
 
 As for M. Stolypin, he was entirely taken by sur- 
 prise. He had worked with me in the utmost sin- 
 cerity toward preparing a way for the formation of a 
 coalition Cabinet, in which he was ready to take a 
 secondary place under the direction of a person en- 
 joying the confidence of the Duma, but he did not 
 
 202 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 203 
 
 consider himself as designated, nor as entirely fitted, 
 for the leading r6le in the Government. Still, the 
 moment was too critical to admit of any long hesita- 
 tion on his part, and, having been received in audience 
 by the Emperor on the day after the dissolution, he 
 had _no choice.Mt to ar mnt th e lipa v y task imposed 
 iJ2on,him. At the same time, he made it a condition 
 that two of the Ministers, M. Stichinsky and Prince 
 Schirinsky-SchihmatofI, who had made themselves 
 conspicuously odious by their reactionary tendencies, 
 should be dismissed at once. He also reserved ex- 
 pressly the right to further alter the character of the 
 Cabinet by adding members of the Duma and the 
 Council of the Empire, in accordance with our orig- 
 inal plan. 
 
 The situation was lumecessarily compUcated by the 
 thoughtless attitude adopted by a great number of 
 the deputies, an attitude for which I hold the Cadet 
 party responsible, for it was that party that virtually 
 controlled the Duma. On this occasion, as was 
 often the case, unfortunately, the leaders of the Ca- 
 dets, and especially M. Milioukoff, conducted them- 
 selves as doctrinaires devoid of a true sense of the 
 practical side of politics, with the result that their 
 party voltmtarily missed the chance to play a part at 
 that jimcture of circumstances, which would have 
 brought them naturally into power, had they known 
 how to meet the situation with calmness and modera- 
 tion. 
 
 The ukase pronouncing the dissolution annoimced 
 at the same time that the next Duma would be con- 
 
204 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 voked on March 5, 1907. This provision charac- 
 terized the Emperor's act as rightful for any constitu- 
 tional sovereign and in entire accordance with the 
 charter of 1905. The sole flaw was the omission to 
 fix a date for the new elections, but this was only an 
 error of form, and was rectified soon after; the act of 
 July 21st was none the less constitutional in itself. 
 It was, as remarked in the French Press, not a 2nd of 
 December, but a 16th of May. The merest good 
 sense indicated that it was all to the advantage of the 
 Cadet party to regard it as such, because it was sure 
 of victory in the coming elections, a majority in the 
 second Duma, and a part in the Government as "His 
 Majesty's Opposition." 
 
 This was the way that matters were envisaged 
 abroad, especially in England. At the very moment 
 of the dissolution a delegation from the Duma hap- 
 pened to be in London, taking part in the Inter- 
 Parliamentary Conference. In welcoming this dele- 
 gation, the British Prime Minister, who had just heard 
 news of the event, pronounced these words, so widely 
 echoed and commented upon: "The Duma is dead: 
 long hve the Duma!" Mr. Campbell-Bannerman 
 clearly intended to emphasize by this phrase his view 
 of the dissolution as a perfectly normal act, involving 
 no attack upon the existence of the Duma as an in- 
 stitution; but such was the ignorance of constitutional 
 law in our Governmental circles that his exclamation 
 was taken for a challenge and an impertinence ad- 
 dressed to the Emperor. I had the greatest trouble 
 to explain to my colleagues and to convince the Em- 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 205 
 
 peror himself that Mr. Campbell-Bannerman had only 
 paraphrased, in applying it to the Duma, the time- 
 honoured announcement which expressed in ante- 
 Revolutionary France the idea of the continuity of 
 the monarchical principle: "Le Roi est mort: vive le 
 Roi!" 
 
 Instead of adopting the construction indicated by 
 the British Prime Minister, the Cadet leaders incited 
 a great body of the deputies to take a most impru- 
 dent step. One hundred and ninety members of the 
 Duma met in Finland, under the presidency of M. 
 MouromtzofiF, and there signed the famous appeal to 
 the Russian people known as the "manifesto of 
 Wyborg." 
 
 In this manifesto the Government was denounced 
 for having punished the Duma solely because that 
 assembly had demanded the forced expropriation of 
 the land in favour of the peasants. At the same time 
 the Russian people were exhorted to defend the rights 
 of the representatives of the nation by refusing to pay 
 the taxes, to furnish recruits for the army, and to 
 recognize any loan that the Government might issue 
 without the consent of the Duma. The manifesto 
 terminated with these words, which amounted to a 
 call for revolution: "Not a copeck for the Treasury, 
 then, not a soldier for the army; be firm in your re- 
 fusal; defend your rights, all, as one man; no force 
 can resist the inflexible will of the people. Citizens, 
 in this inevitable struggle, we whom you have elected 
 will stand by you," 
 
 We know, of course, that the manifesto of Wyborg 
 
206 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER i 
 
 fell flat, so to speak, because the people possessed ;| 
 more political good sense than the leaders of the Cadet 
 party supposed. When they realized their mistake 
 some time afterward, they tried to justify themselves 
 by alleging that their object had been to forestall 
 revolutionary manifestations of still more serious 
 character, as, for example, an uprising of the peasants 
 in the Volga region, etc. I believe, however, that this 
 puerile act was quite simply an expression of their 
 pet theories and their lack of political experience. 
 
 M. Stolypin had the good judgment not to take 
 the Wyborg prank seriously. He let the signers of 
 the manifesto return to St. Petersburg unmolested, 
 and only as a matter of form instituted judiciary pro- 
 ceedings against them, which, however, resulted in 
 rendering the principal Cadet leaders ineligible for 
 election to the next Duma. M. Milioukoff, not being 
 a deputy, had not signed the Wyborg manifesto, and 
 so escaped prosecution. Another prominent Cadet, 
 M. Roditcheflf, happened to be with the delegation in 
 London at the time, and likewise avoided the fate of 
 the majority of his comrades. 
 
 While the Cadets were exhorting the people to 
 oppose to the Government a passive resistance, con- 
 sisting in the refusal of taxes and recruits, the Social- 
 ists attempted recourse to the means which had been 
 so successful in 1905; in other words, the organization 
 of a general strike. This had no better luck than the 
 manifesto of Wyborg, being quickly suppressed with- 
 out any of the public services having suffered any 
 serious inconvenience. 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 207 
 
 Of much graver importance were the military re- 
 volts which took place at that period in different 
 parts of the Empire. Already in the month of June 
 trouble had broken out in one of the regiments of the 
 Imperial Guard, and what especially disturbed the 
 Emperor in connection with the incident was the fact 
 that he himself had passed a part of his military ap- 
 prenticeship in that very regiment — ^that of Preo- 
 brajensky — and considered it to be particularly de- 
 voted to the monarchical cause. It turned out, how- 
 ever, that the disturbance had no pohtical meaning, 
 and was due to defects in the command, to remedy 
 which the necessary steps were quickly taken. But 
 at the end of July and the beginning of August mu- 
 tinies that could be clearly attributed to revolution- 
 ary propaganda followed thick and fast at Cronstadt 
 and at Sveaborg, within a short distance of the 
 capital. 
 
 I recall vividly how trying a moment this was for 
 M. Stolypin, who had just come into power and had 
 ^E yet had. time to master -the,.details.-iif, his new 
 duties. The Russian army, after having been beaten 
 in Manchuria, had come back to its cantonments 
 precisely at that period. The reverses which it had 
 suffered produced that natural effect of diminishing 
 the soldiers' respect for their officers, and, besides, 
 they had traversed on their homeward march the vast 
 region of Siberia, where the revolutionary movement 
 of 1905 had gained great headway. The majority of 
 the soldiers belonged to the peasant class, and con- 
 sequently were especially accessible to the agitation 
 
208 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 kept up by the Socialists in the interest of their agra- 
 rian campaign. For these reasons the Government 
 had grave doubts whether the army would adhere to 
 its old spirit of discipline or would run the risk of being 
 contaminated by the revolutionary propaganda. 
 
 M. Stolypin came out of this first dangerous crisis 
 with honour. The military revolts were suppressed 
 without recourse to an excessive severity, and the 
 facility with which the Government obtained the 
 mastery was the best evidence that the Russian army, 
 in spite of all the misfortunes that it had suffered, 
 remained faithful to its chiefs. 
 
 It was on the occasion of the Cronstadt revolt that 
 I had a chance to observe for the first time the Em- 
 peror's self-control and his power of retaining a calm 
 demeanour in the face of untoward circumstances. 
 This faculty, which he possessed to an extraordinary 
 degree, of self-mastery even in the midst of tragic 
 events, gave rise to widely varying and sometimes very 
 unjust interpretations. It was regarded as a proof 
 of a sort of innate insensibility and even an atrophy 
 of moral sense. This, in fact, is the explanation 
 given by Dr. Dillon in " The Eclipse of Russia." But 
 having passed more than one critical moment at the 
 side of Emperor Nicholas I am convinced of the ab- 
 solute falsity of that opinion, and I desire with all my 
 heart to show in its true light this particular phase of 
 my unfortunate sovereign's character. 
 
 On the day when the mutiny reached its culminat- 
 ing point, I happened to be with the Emperor, mak- 
 ing my weekly verbal report concerning the affairs of 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 209 
 
 my department. It was at Peterhof, in the imperial 
 villa, situated on the border of the Gulf of Finland, 
 facing the island on which stands the fortress of Cron- 
 stadt, some fifteen kilometers distant. I was seated 
 before the Emperor at a little table placed in a bay- 
 window giving upon the sea. From the window could 
 be distinguished in the distance the line of fortifica- 
 tions, and as I lay before the Emperor the different 
 matters of interest we heard distinctly the cannonade, 
 which seemed to grow louder from one minute to an- 
 other. He listened attentively, and, as was his habit, 
 asked questions now and then, showing his interest in 
 the smallest detail of my report. Glance as I would 
 in his direction, I could not detect the slightest trace 
 of emotion in his countenance, although he knew 
 well that it was his crown that was at stake at that 
 moment, only a few leagues away. If the fortress 
 remained in the hands of the mutineers, not only the 
 situation of the capital would become very precarious, 
 but his own fate and that of his family would be 
 seriously menaced, for the cannon of Cronstadt could 
 prevent any attempt at flight by sea. 
 
 When my report was finished, the Emperor re- 
 mained a few moments looking calmly out of the 
 open window at the line of the horizon. For my part, 
 I was oppressed by a profound emotion, and could 
 not refrain, even at the risk of infringing the rules of 
 etiquette, from expressing my surprise at seeing him 
 so unmoved. The Emperor did not apparently re- 
 sent my observation, for he turned to me with a look 
 which has so often been described as of extraordinary 
 
210 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 gentleness, and replied In these few words, deeply 
 engraven in my memory: 
 
 "If you see me so calm, it is because I have the 
 firm, the absolute conviction that the fate of Russia, 
 my own fate, and that of my family, is in the hands of 
 God Who placed me where I am. Whatever happens, 
 I wiU bow to His will, conscious of never having had 
 a thought other than that of serving the country that 
 He confided to me." 
 
 That same night the revolt was definitely subdued, 
 and I knew that he had received the news with the 
 same sang-froid with which he had listened to the 
 sound of the cannon a few hours before. 
 
 Often since then I have had occasion to verify the 
 impressions that I formed on that day, and I have 
 never had reason to change them in any respect. I 
 am profoundly convinced that the source from which 
 Emperor Nicholas derived his serenity and his faith in 
 the providential character of his destiny was a relig- 
 ious sentiment of a rare intensity. I will speak fur- 
 ther of this essential trait when I attempt his por- 
 traitvire, and will merely mention at this point the 
 sort of mysticism which ruled over the mind of 
 Nicholas H. ever afterward, and which the tragic 
 events of his reign and the influence of a feminine 
 nature even more exaltee than his own only served to 
 increase. 
 
 I have already said that M. Stolypin had reserved 
 the right to submit to the Emperor a change in the 
 Cabinet membership by means of the introduction of 
 elements outside of the bureaucracy. In accordance 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 211 
 
 with the plan set forth in the memorial which I had 
 presented to the Emperor, he had in view the forma- 
 tion of a coaUtion government, in which the principal 
 parties would be represented, with the sole exception 
 of such groups as were clearly revolutionary in their 
 aims. Despite the attitude of the Cadets, M. Stoly- 
 pin did not give up the idea of bringing into the 
 Cabinet M. MilioukoflP, who had come out unscathed 
 from the Wyborg escapade. On the day after his 
 appointment he set to work on his project, commenc- 
 ing by asking me to retain the portfolio of Foreign 
 Affairs in the new Cabinet, and to continue to take 
 part in the 'pourparlers with those whom he had in 
 view for the different ministerial positions. 
 
 M. Stolypin occupied at that time, in the imme- 
 diate suburbs of St. Petersburg, a country house, or 
 datcha, situated on one of the islands of the Neva 
 estuary. This house belonged to the State, and 
 served as a summer residence for the Ministers of the 
 Interior; it was of quite modest appearance, but 
 possessed a beautiful garden. Any one who has lived 
 at St. Petersburg in the summer time must remember 
 the peculiar charm of the islands in the Neva, with 
 their many villas standing out from a background of 
 dense foliage and reflected in the clear surface of the 
 river. I lived at the time in the palace of the Minis- 
 try of Foreign Affairs, and every day, late in the after- 
 noon, I went to M. Stolypin's datcha, to confer with 
 him and to meet the different political leaders who 
 were smnmoned in turn. These conferences lasted 
 sometimes until a very late hour of the night, and I 
 
212 EECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 have a vivid recollection of my rapid drives across the 
 islands in the wonderfully clear nights of July. 
 M. Milioukoff will remember, I am sure, how, after a 
 conference in which he had taken part, and finding 
 himself without a carriage to take him back to the 
 city, he accepted the offer of a place in mine. It 
 was almost morning by that time; we were in an open 
 victoria, and all the way back we passed other car- 
 riages, returning from the many pleasure resorts near 
 by, when it suddenly occurred to me what a strange 
 impression must be produced by the sight of the 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs driving at four o'clock in 
 the morning with the chief of the Cadets, who had 
 only just returned from Wyborg, and whom the public 
 had every reason to suppose to be in prison. I men- 
 tioned it to my companion, who replied that he had 
 just thought of it himself, and that we both ran the 
 risk of being seriously compromised — he in the eyes 
 of the Opposition, and I in those of the Conservatives. 
 There was nothing to do but laugh heartily at the 
 situation, which, by the way, had no disagreeable 
 outcome. Luckily none of the smart officers or young 
 diplomats with whom I exchanged salutations recog- 
 nized M. Milioukoff, and so failed to notice the odd 
 companionship. 
 
 The attempt to form a coalition Cabinet met with 
 no success. After a fortnight's negotiations, and in 
 spite of all the efforts made by M. Stolypin, the 
 different personages with whom he had conferred 
 dechned, one after the other. Like Count Witte the 
 year previous, M. Stolypin found himself confronted 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 213 
 
 with the utter impossibihty of introducing in the 
 Government any public men who were strangers to 
 the bureaucratic and Court circles. He decided to 
 fill, for the moment, only the two posts vacated by 
 M. Stichinsky and Prince Schirinsky-Schihmatoff, 
 and offered them to Prince Boris Wassiltchikoff, who 
 became Minister of Agriculture, and to my brother, 
 Pierre Iswolsky, whom he named Attorney-General 
 of the Holy Synod, i.e.. Minister of Public Worship. 
 Neither of the two belonged to the real bureaucracy; 
 Prince Wassiltchikoff, a great landowner and Marshal 
 of the Nobihty for Novgorod, was an elected member 
 of the Council of the Empire, and had no connection 
 with the oflficial world, except as Vice-President of 
 the Red Cross, an institution placed under the direct 
 authority of the Empress Dowager; my brother, who 
 had had a brilliant university career and made a 
 specialty of educational subjects, had been entrusted 
 a short time previous with the duties of assistant to 
 the Minister of Public Instruction. Both Prince 
 Wassiltchikoff and my brother had the reputation of 
 being Moderate Liberals with Octobrist sympathies. 
 M. Stolypin regarded these two appointments as 
 merely provisional for, in spite of the disappointment 
 he had suffered in the failure of his cherished plans, 
 he did not give up hope of forming a coalition Cabinet 
 and intended to try again at the opening of the second 
 Duma. 
 
 What were the exact causes of M. Stolypin's fail- 
 ure.? It might seem at first blush that the very plan 
 of a coalition Cabinet was impracticable, and that his 
 
214 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 mistake, and mine as well, was in insisting upon such 
 a combination, instead of carrying out at once the 
 idea of a Cabinet, composed only of Cadets, as planned 
 — mirabile dictu — by General Trepoff. Often since 
 that time I have pondered over the dilemma, and 
 I have always come to the same conclusion, that 
 M. Stolypin and I were in the right. It must not be 
 forgotten that, at the period we are discussing, even a 
 Cabinet headed by M. Stolypin, but with the addi- 
 tion of elements not strictly bureaucratic, appeared 
 to be an innovation full of danger to the Emperor, 
 who had only consented to it with great misgiving. 
 Nevertheless, such a Cabinet would have meant a 
 long step forward, a^d would have opened the way 
 for further progress in the direction of constitutional 
 government, while the scheme of forming immediately 
 a Cadet Cabinet would, on the contrary, lead cer- 
 tainly to a violent conflict between the Supreme 
 Power and the new Government, which would have 
 demanded at the start that its complete party pro- 
 gramme should be carried out, embodying radical 
 reforms to which the Emperor would not have con- 
 sented. 
 
 In refusing their cooperation to M. Stolypin, the 
 Moderate Liberals, like Prince Lvoff, Count Heyden, 
 and others, again made a serious mistake, and showed 
 how unripe the political parties in Russia were at 
 that time, and how they were controlled by the 
 passions of the moment. The real cause of their 
 refusal was that the dissolution of the Duma had 
 produced in all the Liberal circles, even the most 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 215 
 
 moderate, a strong feeling of discontent, and conse- 
 quently those personages were afraid of losing their 
 prestige and their influence in the country if they 
 should join the Government just then, M. Stolypin 
 reaUzed this very well, and was influenced thereby to 
 put oflf the execution of his plan until the opening of 
 the second Duma, when political passions would have 
 had time to calm down and the public would have 
 been persuaded of the loyal intentions of the Prime 
 Minister. 
 
 Here comes in the very curious episode of General 
 Trepoff's scheme for the formation of a Cabinet to be 
 composed purely of Cadets. Before proceeding to 
 throw full light upon this incident, I will say that my 
 recital may possibly err in certain minor details of a 
 material order, simply because several of those details 
 are still unknown to me. It rests with M. Milioukoff 
 and those of his friends who treated with General 
 Trepoff to adjust any such points, and I accept their 
 rectifications in advance, but as for the essential 
 features of the affair, I am the only one who is able 
 at the present time to make them known. 
 
 I repeat what I have already declared, that before 
 the dissolution of the Duma there had been no au- 
 thorized pourparlers for the formation of a Cabinet 
 other than those with which M. Stolypin and I had 
 been entrusted by the Emperor and which were 
 abruptly interfered with by M. Goremykin's action. 
 Now, it has been stated* that General Trepoff began 
 
 •A. Viallate. "La Vie Poliiiqne daru U» Deux Mondet" Article de M. Paul Boyer, '^Empire 
 Russe" 
 
216 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 negotiating for the formation of a Cadet ministry in 
 the latter part of June; also that, on the very eve 
 of the day when the ukase of dissolution was pub- 
 lished, the Cadets, confident of their success, were 
 planning the distribution of the ministerial portfolios 
 among themselves. These facts, of which neither 
 M. Stolypin nor I had knowledge, may be materially 
 true, but if so it presupposes that General Trepoff 
 had commenced to treat with the Cadets, not only 
 without the consent, but without the knowledge of 
 the Emperor. 
 
 On the other hand, a few days after the dissolution, 
 M. Stolypin was surprised to learn, through a secret 
 channel at first and then from the lips of the Emperor 
 himself, that the Prefect of the Palace had declared in 
 favour of the formation of a Cadet ministry, and that 
 he was conferring on the subject with M. Milioukoff 
 and other members of his party. 
 
 This revelation gave us great concern, as General 
 Trepofif was known to be the most fervent partisan of 
 autocracy and the soul of the reactionary party.' It 
 was impossible to believe that M. Milioukoff's elo- 
 quence had converted him to the radical views of the 
 Cadet Party. It was equally inadmissible that he 
 had been influenced by the threats of that party. 
 His bravery was above suspicion; in the most critical 
 days of the revolutionary troubles of 1905 he had dis- 
 played a remarkable sang-froid, and his order of the 
 day, issued to the troops about to attack the rioters: 
 "Don't spare your cartridges," had become famous. 
 How then could one admit that this soldier, courage- 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 217 
 
 ous to excess and devoted to the extent of fanaticism 
 to the cause of absolute monarchy, would be capable 
 of entering into a compact with a party whose de- 
 clared purpose was to reduce the Emperor to the 
 role of a constitutional monarch? 
 
 It did not require much time nor any great effort to 
 find the answer to this enigma. Driven to the wall by 
 M. Stolypin, General TrepofiF could do no other than 
 reveal a part of his plan at least, and the remainder 
 was easily guessed. 
 
 This, then, was the truth of the matter. General 
 Trepoff, unswerving in his fidelity to the principle of 
 absolute monarchy, feared only one thing in reality, 
 and that was the success of any effort to bring the 
 Emperor under the influence of the Moderate Liberal 
 parties and so consolidate the order of things estab- 
 lished by the charter of 1905. He saw the Emperor 
 yielding little by little to the counsels of M. Stolypin 
 and to mine, and he considered it an imperative duty 
 to prevent at any price the formation of the coalition 
 Cabinet which we were advocating. It was then 
 that the idea occurred to him that the surest means 
 of thwarting our plan was to set up a ministry com- 
 posed purely of Cadets. He calculated with good 
 reason that such a Cabinet, at the vety start, would 
 not fail to enter into a violent conflict with the Em- 
 peror; as soon as that happened he would take strong 
 measures, with the aid of the troops in the capital, 
 to suppress the Cadet Government and substitute a 
 military dictatorship of which he himself would be the 
 chief. From that point to the abrogation of the char- 
 
218 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 ter of 1905 there was only a step, and that step Gen- 
 eral Trepoff was firmly resolved to take, without 
 the slightest doubt. 
 
 It was a few days after the dissolution of the Duma 
 that General Trepoff unfolded this audacious plan to 
 the Emperor. Was Nicholas II. tempted to adopt 
 it, and did he permit himself to give some encourage- 
 ment to the General? His vacillating nature and his 
 tendency to revert to the old order of things do not 
 exclude this possibility. It is certain, at least, that 
 he had knowledge of the pourparlers that took place 
 between the Prefect of the Palace and M. MilioukoflF, 
 but it is also certain that, even if he had been fasci- 
 nated at first by the General's propositions, he did not 
 decide to approve them without previously consulting 
 M. Stolypin, to whom, in fact, he communicated them 
 of his own accord at the earliest opportunity. M. 
 Stolypin naturally opposed the scheme with all his 
 might, and after a short struggle with General 
 Trepoff came off entirely victorious. The Emperor, 
 thoroughly convinced by the arguments of his Prime 
 Minister, ordered General Trepoff to desist from his 
 project and to break off his dealings with M. Miliou-' 
 koff. The General was conlpelled to bow before the 
 express will of his sovereign, but he cherished a bitter 
 hatred agamst M. Stolypin. From that day the 
 Emperor's demeanour toward the Prefect of the Pal- 
 ace showed a marked coldness, indicating to such an 
 extent his loss of favour that it may have had much 
 to do with his sudden death shortly after, toward the 
 middle of September, while the Emperor was cruising 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 219 
 
 on his yacht oflF the coast of Finland. His tragic 
 end gave rise naturally to many rumours, and suicide 
 was suspected in some quarters. A careful inquest 
 was secretly conducted, and pronounced that death 
 was caused by the rupture of an aneurism, but it is 
 more than probable that the disease of the heart from 
 which General TrepoflF suffered was aggravated by 
 the shock which he had undergone in the failure 
 of his project and the consequent forfeit of his mast- 
 er's favour. 
 
 In revealing the true facts connected with this in- 
 cident, it is not my purpose to tarnish the memory of 
 General Trepoff, for, while disagreeing with his politi- 
 cal ideas and condemning his methods, I have al- 
 ways respected and even admired his energy, his 
 indomitable courage, and his unbounded devotion to 
 the person of his sovereign. In planning his coup 
 de force he was merely following his profound convic- 
 tion that the safety of Russia and of the monarchical 
 principle demanded at any cost a return to autocratic 
 government. I even believe that the prospect of be- 
 coming dictator was of secondary importance to him. 
 Soon after the Emperor had quashed his plans, I had 
 quite a long conversation with him at Peterhof , in the 
 course of which he freely admitted the pm-pose of 
 his pourparlers with the Cadets, and I recall that on 
 that occasion, as also when I met him during the 
 critical days of October, 1905, he gave me the impres- 
 sion of a man endowed with remarkable force of will. 
 
 Is it true that M. Milioukoff and the other Cadet 
 leaders took General Trepoff's propositions seriously 
 
220 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 and believed that they were about to attain power 
 with his assistance? Certain distinguished writers in 
 sympathy with the Cadets, as, for example, M. Paul 
 Boyer, have so asserted. Personally, I have not been 
 able to persuade myself of this, for it would throw 
 doubt upon their perspicacity and their appreciation 
 of political eventualities; I rather think that M. 
 Miloukoff was "beating about the bush" in his talks 
 with General Trepoff on the one hand, and with M. 
 Stolypin on the other, pending the moment when the 
 certain triumph of his party in the next elections 
 would make him master of the situation. 
 
 As far as concerns the Emperor's behaviour on this 
 occasion toward General Trepoff and M. Stolypin, 
 it was particularly characteristic and may serve to 
 throw light upon a number of subsequent episodes. 
 Easily influenced by the force of natures stronger than 
 his own, especially when it happened to be exerted 
 in the direction of his reactionary tendencies, Nicholas 
 II. was nevertheless open to arguments which ap- 
 pealed to his good sense and his innate integrity. 
 This explains why M. Stolypin, endowed as he was 
 with a strong will as well as a keen sense of justice, 
 had little diflSculty in dissuading him from following 
 the counsels of General Trepoflf. When, at a later 
 period, imder particularly trying circmnstances, the 
 Emperor yielded to influences which led to his fall 
 and caused the debacle of Russia, I am profoundly 
 convinced that it was because he had no longer at his 
 side a man of the moral strength of M. Stolypin, 
 whose premature death was an irreparable disaster. 
 
M. STOLYPIN AND THE CADETS 221 
 
 Not a little disappointed, but by no means dis- 
 couraged, at his failure to form a coalition Cabinet, 
 M. Stolypin resolutely set to work to make the best 
 use of the interval of seven months and a half before 
 the meeting of the second Duma. His programme, 
 which was made public a little later, in the course of 
 the month of September, had a double purpose — on 
 the one hand to maintain or rather to reestablish 
 by the most vigorous measures the public order, 
 which was so seriously disturbed in the cities and more 
 still in the country; on the other, to draw up a series 
 of bills to be laid before the Duma. He considered 
 it most important to avoid repeating the error of the 
 preceding Government and letting the new assembly 
 flounder in empty debates and waste its time in sterile 
 declamations. Upon reentering the Tauride Palace 
 the deputies were to find awaiting their consideration 
 a number of proposed laws, the object of which was to 
 introduce liberal reforms into the most diverse spheres 
 of the national ex;istence. This vast programme em- 
 braced the following principal questions: religious 
 liberty, habeas corpus, civic equality. State insurance 
 for benefit of the working-classes, reform of the local 
 autonomies or Zemstvos, the creation of Zemstvos 
 In those parts of the Empire where they did not al- 
 ready exist (the northwestern and Baltic provinces), 
 the creation of Zemstvos and municipalities in Poland, 
 the transformation of local tribunals, reform of the 
 higher and intermediate schools, a tax on incomes, 
 and the reform of the police. 
 
 But, outside of this programme, sufficient In itself 
 
222 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 to occupy the Duma for a long time, there were at 
 that period certain burning questions which demanded 
 immediate solution on the part of the Government 
 if dangerous consequences were to be avoided. For 
 instance, it was necessary to abrogate at once several 
 decrees that were particularly odious in their restric- 
 tion of religious Uberty and their bearing upon the 
 condition of the Jews and Old Believers, but, above 
 all, it was still the agrarian question that called for 
 prompt measures, as it had by that time reached 
 a most acute stage. 
 
 In order to provide for this necessity M. Stolypin 
 decided to resort to Article 78 of the constitutional 
 law, which gave the Government, during a suspension 
 of the Duma's labours and in the case of exceptional 
 circumstances requiring legislative measures, the right 
 to take such measures by means of decrees, on condi- 
 tion of submitting them to the Duma within two 
 months after the resumption of work by that as- 
 sembly. 
 
 M. Stolypin has often been blamed for the large 
 use that he made of Article 78, copied from the famous 
 Article 14 of the Austrian Constitution, and I myself 
 grew^in tijofi-ta disapprove of Jbis exaggerated jMerpre- 
 tation of that article for the purpose of using it as a 
 weapon against tfie Duma and especially against the 
 Council of the Empire. In fact, this was one of the 
 causes of buF'eventuat disagreements and our final 
 rupture; but at the critical period of which I am now 
 writing the immediate adjustment of the agrarian 
 question was really a matter that could rightly be 
 
M. STOLPYIN AND THE CADETS 223 
 
 construed as belonging to the "exceptional circum- 
 stances" provided for in Article 78, for that question 
 not only was the cause of all the disturbances in the 
 country districts, but had become, so to speak, an 
 object for the bids of rival revolutionary parties, 
 who made use of it for the purpose of drawing into 
 their ranks the rural population with promises of 
 solution, more or less radical and Utopian. 
 
 In asking me to retain the portfolio of Foreign 
 AffairsTn hisT'abinet M: Sttflypin knew that he could 
 count upon my Hearty Cooperation in carrying out his 
 prog-amme of reforms and in preparing the ground 
 for future-Jiarmony between the Duma and the Gov- 
 ernment. In^ spite of the considerable work de- 
 manded by the affairs, of my department— I had just 
 commenced the laborious negotiations which brought 
 to pass a year later the agreements with England and 
 Japan — ^I took an active part in the meetings of the 
 Council of Ministers, during which were discussed, 
 several times a week, the different laws in process 
 of formation. Following the inveterate habit of the 
 Russian bureaucracy of working at night — ^for it is 
 well known that in Russia, as also in Spain, late hours 
 are the fashion — these sessions took place at an ad- 
 vanced hour of the evening and lasted until three or 
 four o'clock in the morning. Moreover, having 
 acquired abroad the habit of early rising, I was ac- 
 customed to receive during the forenoon the reports 
 of my different chiefs of service, and consequently 
 I was unable to get more than four or five hours of 
 sleep during that entire period of intense activity. 
 
224 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 If to all this is added the super-excitement universally 
 prevalent as a result of current events, and, soon 
 after, heightened as it was by an unprecedented series 
 of terrorist attacks, one can easily comprehend the 
 physical effort as well as the nervous tension that my 
 daily tasks incurred. I was sustained, however, in 
 their accomplishment by the passionate interest in- 
 spired in me by the great work mapped out by M. 
 Stolypin, whose high aims and absolute devotion to 
 the cause that he served commanded my admiration 
 more and more as the days passed. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Terrorism 
 
 DURING the whole period that the first Duma 
 was in session, the Socialist-Revolutionary 
 party had suspended the series of terrorist 
 attacks against the high dignitaries of the Empire 
 and the agents of the police, which they had carried 
 on without cessation since the beginning of the revo- 
 lutionary movement. Early in the summer that 
 party had published in the foreign Press an announce- 
 ment to the effect that, "in view of the deliberations 
 of the Duma and while waiting for the political situa- 
 tion to be clearly understood by the people, it would 
 refrain from terrorist tactics, without, however, 
 ceasing its preparations for the combat; and that the 
 Central Committee of the party would decide at 
 what moment revolutionary activities should be 
 resumed." 
 
 The.dissolution of the Duma gave the signal for a 
 return to terroriSTand it was decided that it should 
 be inaugurated by a most conspicuous deed of vio- 
 lence. On Saturday, the 25th of August, about 
 three o'clock in the afternoon, a formidable explosion 
 destroyed a part of the villa occupied by M. Stolypin 
 on the islands. The Prime Minister was not injured, 
 
 225 
 
226 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 but some thirty people were killed and as many more 
 wounded, several of them seriously, among these, 
 two of M. Stolypin's children. 
 
 I was in town at the time, receiving at the Ministry 
 of Foreign Affairs a visit from M. Nitroff, Master of 
 the Court of the Grand Duke Wladimir, who had re- 
 quested him to consult me on some matter of the 
 protocol. This business being finished, I detained my 
 visitor, whose artistic taste I knew and apprecialted, 
 about a half hour longer, in order to show him cer- 
 tain interior decorations that were in progress in the 
 palace of the Ministry. After leaving me, M. Nitroff 
 was to go to the residence of the Prime Minister on 
 some other commission entrusted to him by the 
 Grand Duke, and so it happened that this accidental 
 delay saved him from the explosion at M. Stolypin's 
 villa, where he would otherwise have arrived a few 
 minutes before the catastrophe. 
 
 Informed by telephone of what had happened, I 
 jumped into my carriage at the door of the Ministry, 
 and in twenty minutes reached the scene of the dis- 
 aster, the horror of which passed all description. 
 About a third of the villa was blown to pieces, and 
 if the destruction was not more complete it was only 
 because the house had been built of wood; a stone or 
 brick structure would have been entirely demolished 
 and the number of victims would have been that 
 much more numerous. Partly buried imder piles 
 of beams and wreckage one could see human bodies, 
 some inanimate, while others still gave signs of life. 
 Here and there were shreds of clothing and torn and 
 
TERRORISM 227 
 
 bleeding limbs; cries of anguish and calls for help 
 wrung the heart; before the entrance a shapeless mass 
 of wood and twisted iron and the carcases of two 
 horses were all that was left of the equipage which 
 had brought there the perpetrators of the horrible 
 deed. Literally nothing remained of the vestibule 
 and the three rooms on the ground floor leading to 
 that occupied at the time by M. Stolypin; as if by a 
 miracle the effect of the explosion terminated at the 
 very threshold of the Prime Minister's workroom. I 
 found him in a little pavilion in the garden, pale, 
 but quite calm and self -controlled, giving orders in a 
 quiet voice for the succour of the wounded, among 
 whom one of his daughters, a girl of fifteen years, 
 had just been discovered. He himself had rescued 
 his only son, four years of age, from a pile of debris 
 with his own hands. He told me how he had been 
 about to put his foot on the heap of plaster and splin- 
 ters when he caught sight of a child half buried under 
 it and recognized his son. The little boy was not 
 seriously hurt, but his daughter's condition was very 
 grave ; she had been given such first aid as was possible, 
 and the arrival of the distinguished surgeon Pavloff, 
 who had been summoned by telephone, was anxiously 
 awaited. 
 
 Following is an exact account of what had hap- 
 pened, according to the information I gained at the 
 scene of the catastrophe: 
 
 Saturday being M. Stoly pin's reception day, there 
 were a good many people waiting to see him in the 
 lower rooms of the villa. With his accustomed cour- 
 
228 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER s 
 
 age he had disregarded the warnings that had come 
 to him of an attempt at assassination, and persisted in 
 maintaining the informal and free access of the public 
 to his receptions. All were admitted who had any- 
 thing to ask of the Minister or any matter to submit 
 to his attention, without presenting any letter of in- 
 vitation or credentials or even having to identify 
 themselves. A few agents of the secret police were 
 stationed in the first ante-chamber and scrutinized 
 with experienced eye the visitors as they arrived. 
 In the second ante-chamber General Zamiatin, a high 
 functionary in the service of the Ministry, assisted 
 by several secretaries, took the names of the arrivals 
 and questioned them as to their objects before per- 
 mitting access to the waiting-room that adjoined the 
 ministers' workroom running at right angles and 
 giving on the garden. On the floor above were the 
 apartments occupied by M. Stolypia's children. 
 
 The reception had begun at two o'clock and there 
 were some forty persons in the waiting-room, of all 
 sorts and conditions — ^high officials, financiers, pro- 
 vincials who had arrived in the capital only the night 
 before, retired employes or widows of employes solicit- 
 ing pensions or help, and even peasants sent by their 
 communes to lay their needs before the Minister. At 
 half-past two a hired landau brought to the perron 
 of the villa three individuals wearing military uni- 
 form. As they were passing through the first ante- 
 chamber, the police probably noticed something ir- 
 regular about their dress or conduct, for they stopped 
 them at the door of the second room. The noise of a 
 
TERRORISM 229 
 
 struggle was heard, followed by a cry "Vive la 
 Reyolution!" and iromediately thereafter by the 
 terrible explosion. All the people in the first ante- 
 chamber were killed outright, including the three 
 criminals, whose bodies were never identified. In the 
 second. General Zamiatin was grievously wounded 
 and the other officials either killed or wounded. In 
 the waiting-room about a third of the occupants were 
 killed and all the rest woimded. The three rooms 
 were completely destroyed, as well as those overhead, 
 but because of the elasticity of the wooden framework 
 of the house the remainder of the building was left 
 almost intact. The door between the waiting-room 
 and the Minister's cabinet was torn from its hinges 
 and M. Stolypin, who was talking with a visitor, was 
 thrown to the floor, but neither of them suffered harm 
 beyond a few sUght bruises. 
 
 Among those killed were a former provincial 
 governor, a marshal of the nobility, Colonel Schultz, 
 chief of police of the Tam^ide Palace, and a few others 
 of high rank, but the majority of the victims were 
 either police agents or humble petitioners, among 
 whom was a poor woman in an advanced state of 
 pregnancy, horribly eventree. The force of the ex- 
 plosion was such that the trees along the bank of the 
 Neva were uprooted and all the window-panes in the 
 houses on the opposite bank were shattered. For 
 hundreds of metres round about were scattered the 
 mangled remains of human limbs and bits of clothing, 
 torn and stained with blood. 
 
 M. Stolypin's two children were buried in the debris 
 
230 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTEK 
 
 when the upper story collapsed. His little son 
 escaped with a simple fracture, but his daughter had 
 both feet completely crushed and suffered ^terribly; 
 after the first examination, most of the doctors who 
 had been called advised immediate amputation, but 
 Dr. Pavloff , the highest authority in surgery, opposed 
 it, and thanks to him Mile. Stolypin was eventually 
 able to walk, after several years of complicated treat- 
 ment. For a long time, however, it was feared that 
 she would be, if not mutilated, at least crippled for 
 life. 
 
 That same evening M. Stolypin removed with his 
 family to the official residence of the Minister of the 
 Interior, but a few days later, on account of the dif- 
 ficulty of protecting the building against terrorist at- 
 tacks, he established himself in an apartment of the 
 Winter Palace, which had not been occupied by the 
 Emperor since the beginning of the revolutionary 
 movement. 
 
 It was my custom, every Saturday night, to leave 
 town and pass Sunday at Peterhof, where the Court 
 resided at the time and where the Emperor had placed 
 at my disposal an apartment in the Imperial Palace. 
 But M. Stolypin having asked me to go to his house 
 that evening to take part in an extraordinary meeting 
 of the Council of Ministers, I put off my departure 
 until the following day. I shall have more to say of 
 this meeting, which lasted almost all night, and had 
 so great an influence upon the subsequent course of 
 events. On Sunday I arrived at Peterhof, where I 
 was to breakfast with the Emperor; on leaving the 
 
TERRORISM 231 
 
 train I perceived a great stir on the station platform, 
 and found that the body of General Minn, who, as 
 commanding officer of the Semenovsky regiment, 
 had played the principal role in the repression of the 
 Moscow revolt, had just been brought to the station. 
 The General was killed by a woman, who fired re- 
 peated shots with a revolver and, when arrested upon 
 the spot, warned the police not to jostle her because 
 she was carrying a bomb, to have been used in case 
 General Minn had escaped the revolver. The bomb, 
 which was of the size and shape of a sardine box, was 
 taken from her, placed carefully on a bench, and 
 guarded by two policemen. A subsequent examina- 
 tion proved that it contained a very powerful explo- 
 sive, the discharge of which would have produced ter- 
 rible havoc. 
 
 At breakfast the Emperor showed profound emo- 
 tion with regard to the attempted assassination of 
 M. Stolypin, and questioned me minutely as to all 
 the details of the catastrophe. He gave evidence 
 of the keenest solicitude for the Minister and his 
 family and bestowed upon them the most touching 
 attentions. Having been a witness of the attitude 
 of Nicholas II. on this occasion and several others of 
 the same nature, I am able to qualify as absolutely 
 false the accusations that have been made against 
 him as being strangely insensible to the sufferings of 
 others. 
 
 Beginning with that memorable Saturday, the 25th 
 of August, a series of terrorist attacks continued for 
 several months with hardly a day of interruption, not 
 
232 RECOLLECTIONS OP A FOREIGN MINISTER i 
 
 only at St. Petersburg, but all over Russia. Due to 
 the energetic methods of repression adopted by M. 
 Stolypin they became gradually less frequent. He 
 showed extraordinary bravery and, in spite of the 
 fact that his own life was especially aimed at, he 
 took but little precaution against possible attempts, 
 escaping a succession of plots, one of which was par- 
 ticularly audacious and original. A group of terror- 
 ists were arrested by the police at the very moment 
 that they were about to carry it out, their plan being 
 to launch a superb red automobile of German make, 
 loaded with deadly explosives, at full speed against a 
 door of the Winter Palace leading to the apartments 
 of the Prime Minister. If this plot had not been 
 discovered in time the destruction would have been 
 formidable. 
 
 In order to give some idea of the excessive nerve of 
 M. Stolypin I will mention here an episode which did 
 not take place until three years later, but which is very 
 characteristic of the entire period. He was present, 
 together with several members of his Cabinet, at one 
 of the first aviation trials in Russia, made by a group 
 of pilots just returned from France, where they had 
 learned to fly. One of the aviators begged M. Stoly- 
 pin to go up with him, and his comrades joined enthu- 
 siastically in the request, declaring that they would 
 all feel greatly encouraged by such a proof of confi- 
 dence in their skill. M. Stolypin, without a moment's 
 hesitation, accepted the invitation of the pilot, an 
 oflScer by the name of Matzievski, and accompaniedj 
 him in a flight which lasted for about half an hour. 
 
TERRORISM 233 
 
 When he landed he found all the police in a state of 
 tremendous excitement, and with good reason, for 
 information had been received a few days before to 
 the effect that Lieutenant Matzievski belonged to one 
 of the most dangerous terrorist organizations. M. 
 Stolypin had cognizance of that information before 
 going to the aerodrome, and when he consented to 
 ascend with Matzievski he knew perfectly well to 
 what a strange companion he was entrusting his life. 
 On leaving the field he congratulated his pilot warmly 
 and expressed himseU as delighted with the expe- 
 rience. Shortly after, this incident had an unexpected 
 epilogue. In the course of a flight Lieutenant Mat- 
 zievski fell from a great height and was instantly 
 killed. The cause of the accident was inexplicable, 
 for the pilot had been seen to fall separately from the 
 machine, which showed no trace of having sustained 
 any damage before crashing to the ground. This 
 led to the firm conviction on the part of the police 
 that Matzievski had committed suicide, and that this 
 fate had been imposed by the terrorist committee as a 
 punishment for having let the chance escape of doing 
 away with M. Stolypin. 
 
 All these details, incredible as they may appear, 
 were fully confirmed to me by M. Stolypin himself. 
 When I asked him why he had risked his life without 
 necessity and with full knowledge of the danger in- 
 curred, he replied, after thinking a moment: 
 
 "I am inclined to believe that it was an instinctive 
 act on my part, but I recollect also having said to 
 myself that they must on no account be allowed to 
 
234 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTEU 
 
 think I am afraid of them. Besides," he added, 
 "before I took my seat in the machine Hooked 
 squarely in the eyes of Lieutenant Matzievski, and 
 saw plainly that he would not dare. In fact, it is 
 quite possible that it was the spirit of the sportsman, 
 in love with his art, that prevailed over him at that 
 moment, rather than that of the terrorist." 
 
 It was not until the 14th of September, 1911, after 
 escaping a series of attempts upon his life, that M. 
 Stolypin finally met his death at Kieff, having re- 
 ceived several pistol shots during a theatrical repre- 
 sentation at which the Emperor and all the Imperial 
 Court were present. It is curious that, while con- 
 fronting peril with the utmost courage, and even 
 braving it needlessly at times, he always had a pre- 
 sentiment that he would die a violent death. He 
 spoke of this to me several times and with entire 
 conviction, but at the same time with perfect calm- 
 ness. I remember that I listened to him with all the 
 more incredulity because, in spite of the warnings 
 that reached me from time to time of an attempt upon 
 my own life in the near future, I felt an absolute in- 
 stinctive certainty that I should suffer no harm. 
 
 Eveiy one of the Ministers was individually con- 
 demned to death by decision of the central terrorist 
 committee. Sometimes the police had, or pretended 
 to have, precise information as to the person charged 
 with the assassination of this or that Minister. For 
 instance, according to their discoveries, I was to 
 perish at the hands of a woman known among the 
 terrorists under the name of the "Princess," who was 
 
TERRORISM 235 
 
 described to me as of Oriental type, very dark, and 
 distinguished by remarkable beauty. As a matter of 
 fact, I was never favoured with even a glimpse of any 
 person answering to this description, and I gave but 
 little thought to this detective story. The "Prin- 
 cess," if she had existed, would have had no trouble 
 to speak of in carrying out her plan, for I did not place 
 much reliance upon the measures of precaution offered 
 by the police service and preferred to trust to my star. 
 Nevertheless, as the assassinations became more and 
 more frequent, and it was necessary to provide for 
 the worst, I took pains to arrange so that the affairs 
 of my Department need not suffer any interruption in 
 case of my disappearance; a sealed envelope, lying 
 upon my desk, contained all the necessary instructions 
 to enable my eventual successor to enter upon his 
 duties without delay. This precaution turned out 
 to be quite superfluous; in spite of the sinister pre- 
 dictions of the secret police, I was never personally 
 an object of terrorist attack. I came very near, 
 however, being the victim of a plot against the Grand 
 Duke Nicholas, afterward commander-in-chief of the 
 Russian armies in 1914. It was on my return from 
 Tzarskoei-Selo, the winter residence of the Court, 
 where I had been to make my weekly report to the 
 Emperor. The Grand Duke Nicholas had also gone 
 there that same day, and instead of returning to St. 
 Petersburg in his special train he stayed to dinner 
 with the Emperor. So it happened that I took his 
 place in the empty train, and just before it arrived at 
 St. Petersburg station the engine driver noticed a 
 
236 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTEK 
 
 person putting something on the track and then run- 
 ning away. He brought the train to a sudden stop, 
 only a few turns of the wheels from an infernal 
 machine, the explosion of which would have destroyed 
 not only the train, but a good part of the railway 
 station. This incident confirmed me in my fatalism, 
 and I have never regretted refusing to be bothered 
 with the protection of a police service which M. 
 Stolypin never succeeded in completely reforming 
 and whose agents, as was proved by M. Bourtzeff's 
 revelations of the double r6le played by the notorious 
 Azeflf, were sometimes no less dangerous than the 
 avowed terrorists. The murder of M, Stolypin ap- 
 pears to have been committed by one of those agents, 
 who served and betrayed in turn, and even simulta- 
 neously, both the police and the revolutionaries. 
 
 The terrorists attacked not only the high dignitaries 
 of the Empire, such as Ministers, Governors, Gen- 
 erals, Governors of Provinces, etc., but functionaries 
 of all ranks, and particularly the agents of the police, 
 who were literally tracked in the streets, and perished 
 in ever-increasing numbers. Besides the attacks upon 
 individuals there were many others against the banks, 
 churches, and public depositories. These were digni- 
 fied by the name of "expropriations " and yielded con- 
 siderable sums to the terrorists, as, for example, the 
 robbery in broad daylight in the streets of St. Peters- 
 burg of six hundred thousand roubles which were 
 being transferred from the customs house to the State 
 bank, under guard of eight mounted Cossacks and 
 several agents of the police. 
 
TERRORISM 237 
 
 The list of the higher functionaries alone who met 
 death at the hands of the terrorists during this period 
 is too long to be related. The murder of General 
 Minn was quickly followed by those of General Count 
 Ignatieflf, General Kozloff, General von der Launitz, 
 Prefect of St. Petersburg, the Governors of Warsaw, 
 Samara, Penza, the Commandant of the Black Sea 
 Fleet, etc. 
 
 The terrorists carried out their plans with the ut- 
 most audacity, and contemplated willingly the sacri- 
 fice of their own lives when that was necessary to 
 ensure success. For instance, a woman, who was 
 arrested in the street where she was waiting to kill 
 the Grand Duke Nicholas, wore a sort of jacket con- 
 taining a considerable quantity of dynamite, which 
 she intended, but lacked the time, to explode in case 
 the Grand Duke escaped the shots from her revolver. 
 I was a witness of two assassinations and was able to 
 judge of the sang-froid that characterized the terror- 
 ists' operations. General Kozloff was killed in the 
 most frequented part of the Peterhof park, a few steps 
 from the wing of the old Palace, where I had an apart- 
 ment, and I saw the murder from my window. The 
 poor General, who was a most retiring and harmless 
 person, had the misfortune to resemble in appearance 
 General Trepoff, whom the assassin really aimed to 
 destroy. General von der Launitz, prefect of the 
 capital, fell at my very side, after receiving a num- 
 ber of shots as we came away from the inaugural 
 ceremony at the Pasteur Institute in St. Peters- 
 burg. 
 
238 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER i 
 
 The Council of Ministers, held in the evening of 
 August 25th, after the explosion, at the town residence 
 of the Prime Minister, was of great moment. M. 
 Stolypin opened it with an address, in which he began 
 by declaring in the most energetic manner that the 
 attack upon him, which had barely missed depriving 
 him of his children, could not influence in the slightest 
 degree his political course; his programme remained 
 unchanged: pitiless repression of all disorders and all 
 revolutionary or terrorist acts; carrying into effect, 
 with the help of the next Duma, a far-reaching plan 
 of reforms in the direction of liberalism; immediate 
 solution of the most urgent problems by executive 
 decrees and, first of all, a settlement of the agrarian 
 question. M. Stolypin added that we must expect 
 the reactionary party to profit by the occasion and 
 make it a pretext for inciting the Emperor to proclaim 
 a military dictatorship, and even to annul the charter 
 of 1905 and return to the old regime of absolute power. 
 He announced that he would oppose with all his 
 strength any such reaction and, rather than abandon 
 his constitutional course, he would resign his office. 
 He ended by expressing the hope that his colleagues 
 would support him whole-heartedly in his efforts to 
 hold the Emperor to his word. 
 
 While M. Stolypin was speaking there was a hurry- 
 ing to and fro of doctors and nurses in the halls and 
 adjoining rooms, and now and then the stifled cries 
 of the children could be heard through the doors and 
 partitions as their wounds were being bandaged. 
 Nevertheless, M. Stolypin continued his address with- 
 
TERRORISM 239 
 
 out displaying the least emotion, thereby creating a 
 profound impression upon his hearers. 
 
 In spite of the initial changes that M. Stolypin had 
 made in the Cabinet, it was still far from being homo- 
 geneous in its character. There were avowed reac- 
 tionaries among us, such as M. Schwanebach, Comp- 
 troller of the Empire; others, like M. Scheglovitoff, 
 Minister of Justice, concealed cleverly enough their 
 leanings toward the extreme Right until later, when it 
 became evident that their views would please the 
 power above. But such was the strength of M. 
 Stolypin's eloquence that the Council approved his 
 words unanimously and promised to support him 
 before the Emperor. 
 
 It was not long before M. Stolypin's fears were / 
 realized. During the period immediately following 1 
 the explosion of the 25th August there arose a verit- '^ 
 able mutiny against the Prime Minister in the reac- / 
 tionary camp and the inner circle of the Court. His ( 
 immediate replacement by a military dictatorship was 
 insisted upon, and the hope was openly expressed 
 that this would be only the first step to a restoration 
 of absolutism. In short, the situation recalled that 
 following the assassination of the Due de Berri, on 
 the 13th of February, 1820, which gave the Duke and 
 Duchess d'Angoul^me and the "ultra" party a pretext 
 for a violent campaign against the Due Decazes, 
 whose object was to "reconcile France with the Bour- 
 bon monarchy " by means of a moderate liberal policy. 
 But whereas Louis XVIII., despite his tender at- 
 tachment for the Due Decazes, ended by sacrificmg 
 
240 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER \ 
 
 his favoiirite to the reactionary movement which ^ 
 he inwardly disapproved, Nicholas II., on the con- 
 trary, had the merit to yield to M. Stolypin and per- 
 mit him to carry out his programme, although his 
 secret sympathies were with the extreme Right. 
 
 The struggle between M. Stolypin and his adver- 
 saries was a very bitter one. The reactionaries, 
 abandoning their eflforts to accomplish the fall of the 
 Premier, called loudly for the adoption of violent 
 measures against the terrorists. Asserting the in- 
 efficacy and delay in the regular course of justice, they 
 insisted that the police should be invested with power 
 to execute the criminals without trial and on mere 
 accusation. M. Stolypin protested vigorously against 
 such a procedure, the effect of which would have 
 been to create a state of complete anarchy in the 
 Empire, He was even obliged to defend his position 
 against certain members of his Cabinet, notably 
 Messrs. Schwanebach and Scheglovitoff, who were 
 backed by the Ministers of War and the Marine. 
 At the same time the terrorist attacks grew more and 
 more serious and demanded exceptional measures of 
 repression, and, by way of compromise, M. Stolypin 
 had the Emperor sign a decree instituting coimcils, 
 of war to take cognizance of grave crimes comLmittedi|! 
 in such regions as were xmder martial law, including 
 at that period the capital and the greater part of the 
 provinces of the Empire. M. Stolypin has been 
 severely criticised for having established these tri- 
 bunals, copied after the Austrian Feldkriegsgerichte, 
 but it must be remembered that he was forced to meet 
 
TERRORISM 241 
 
 exceptional diflaculties. Pressure had been brought 
 upon him to do away with all legal procedure and to 
 delegate to the police a sort of lynch power. While 
 the justice exercised by the new tribunals was evi- 
 dently of a summary character, it was nevertheless 
 justice, and, by instituting these courts, he cut short 
 the efforts of the reactionary party to oppose the red 
 terror by a white terror. 
 
 It was during the excitement caused by these 
 events, and in an atmosphere surcharged with the 
 heat of party strife, that M. Stolypin had to formu- 
 late the reforms which he had undertaken to submit 
 to the Duma within six months. The Cabinet had 
 just been completed by the appointment, as Minister 
 of Commerce, of M. Filosofoff, an enlightened man of 
 liberal views; but, due to its heterogeneous make-up, 
 M. Stolypin was obliged to superintend and direct 
 the preparation of the different bills. As for the agra- 
 rian question, the most important of all, he took 
 upon himself the task of studying it in all its details, 
 and the series of ukases by which it was regulated 
 may be considered as his own personal achievement. 
 
 As I was the only member of the Cabinet who 
 possessed any intimate knowledge of the working of a 
 constitutional and parliamentary regime, I was called 
 upon to decide all questions arising from the need of 
 adapting the new legislation to the conditions created 
 by the charter of 1905. While I accepted willingly 
 this extra labour, that which occupied me particularly 
 in addition to my regular duties was the agrarian 
 question, in which I had always been intensely 
 
242 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOEEIGN MINISTER | 
 
 interested. On this subject I had long and frequent 
 consultations with M. Stolypin, during which I cham- 
 pioned the system of small private ownership. 
 
 I have told elsewhere how, thanks to my study of 
 the social and economical life of Western Europe, I 
 had long ago given up the Slavophile doctrines, and 
 among them the harmful theory of the Mir. It was 
 with especial satisfaction that I saw M. Stolypin, 
 despite his belief in many of the Slavophile doctrines, 
 grow more and more in favour of the suppression of 
 communal property and the establishment of small 
 individual ownership among the peasants. In order 
 to convince him the more, I furnished him with in- 
 teresting data relating to the history of agrarian re- 
 form in Europe, which I had collected in different 
 countries, especially in Denmark during my stay 
 there, when I had made a series of reports to the Gov- 
 ernment on the same subject. The transition from 
 communal to private landholding in Denmark took 
 place more recently than in other parts of Europe, 
 that is to say, at the close of the eighteenth century, 
 and was effected under the Ministry of Count Bern- 
 storff, who began by applying the reform to the do- 
 mains of the Crown and his own estates. While 
 studying the documents preserved at Copenhagen,?! 
 had noticed the similarity of the agrarian conditions, 
 as they existed in Denmark before the reform, to 
 those which still prevailed in Russia, and I was par- 
 ticularly impressed by the beneficent results obtained 
 in an extraordinarily short period by Count Bern- 
 storff's reforms. I had a number of these documents 
 
TERRORISM 243 
 
 copied atid photographs made of the plans showing 
 the parceUing and distribution of the old communal 
 properties among the peasants. These data inter- 
 ested M. Stolypin in the highest degree, and I like to 
 think that they played no small part in crystallizing 
 his own projects for agrarian reforms. \ 
 
 By conferring upon the Russian peasant the right \ 
 of individual ownership of land, M. Stolypin created/ 
 at the same time a new personal status for the peas- 
 ant. Up to that time the rural classes enjoyed only 
 limited civic rights and were subject to the burden- 
 some authority of the communes. The new legisla- 
 tion was a veritable act of enfranchisement, abolish- 
 ing the special courts and tribunals which hitherto 
 had had jurisdiction over the peasant, freeing him 
 from collective responsibility for the payment of taxes 
 and permitting him to mortgage his piece of land, to 
 establish industrial enterprises, and to take part as a 
 landholder in the elections and assembhes of the Zem- 
 stvos. In short, the peasants were no longer a class 
 apart in the State, and became for the first time 
 Russian citizens in fact. 
 
 But while M. Stolypin conferred upon the peasants 
 the right of owning land individually, he absolutely 
 refused to attack the rights of the large and inter- 
 mediate landholders, and he rejected the principle of 
 forced expropriation in favour of which the Duma had 
 voted, under the influence of the Cadets and revolu- 
 tionaries. His prevailing idea was to develop in the 
 mind of the peasant a respect for property which 
 neither serfdom nor the distribution of land in 1861 
 
244 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 nor the regime of the Mir had been able to inculcate. 
 It is true that, in 1861, the peasants had redeemed the 
 lands which fell to their lot, but the payment, being 
 in the form of annual instalments, was hardly to be 
 distinguished from a real estate tax. Consequently, 
 the fact of having bought the land which he owned 
 was completely forgotten by the peasant, and he lis- 
 tened all the more willingly to the agitators who 
 explained to him that he ought to receive free of 
 charge the land that remained in the possession of his 
 former master. 
 
 Prom an economic point of view, the preservation 
 of the land belonging to the larger landholders was 
 considered by M. Stolypin to be an essential condi- 
 tion for the development of agriculture and an in- 
 crease of production. A distribution of these hold- 
 ings among the peasants, even if it were complete, 
 could not have brought any real relief, because the 
 total number of great and intermediate landholders 
 in Russia hardly exceeded 130,000, and their acreage 
 only amounted to 165 millions, against some 400 
 million acres belonging to the peasants. Divided 
 among the peasants this would have meant but an 
 insignificant addition to the holding of each individ- 
 ual. Furthermore, the great and intermediate prop- 
 erties were the centres of cultivation and agricultural 
 progress, and their disappearance could not but have 
 an unfavourable eflFect on the yield of the soil. It 
 was evident that a just combination of large, interme- 
 diate, and small holdings, after the fashion of France 
 and England, would bring about the best results. 
 
TERRORISM 245 
 
 In order to provide for the real need of the peas- 
 ants, M. Stolypin had in view, on the one hand, the 
 acquisition by purchase of the land belonging to the 
 Crown and the private holdings of the imperial family 
 with the aid of the "Peasants' Bank"; and, on the 
 other, the development of emigration to the fertile 
 regions of Siberia by granting to the colonists the 
 "cabinet" lands which were the personal property 
 of the Emperor. As an initial measure two ukases 
 were issued oflFering for sale in small lots about ten 
 million hectares belonging to the first two categories. 
 
 These and other measures constituting M. Stoly- 
 pin's agrarian reforms were embodied in a series of 
 ukases of which the principal one, which liberated the 
 peasants from the domination of the Mir, bore the 
 date of November 25, 1906. Being decreed under 
 the famous Article 87, it was necessary that they be 
 submitted to the Duma within three months after its 
 convocation so as to conform to the Constitution. 
 As the second Duma had only an ephemeral existence 
 it was to the third Duma that the task fell of formulat- 
 ing the decrees into a definite law. 
 
 The agrarian reforms were adopted by the Lower 
 House with scarcely any modification and by a heavy 
 majority, but in the Council of the Empire they met 
 with a lively opposition and were passed by a majority 
 of one vote, counting those of the Ministers who were 
 members of that assembly. My brother and I had 
 been appointed members of the Council by the Em- 
 peror only a few weeks before, and it was due to our 
 two votes in favour of the Government's plan that 
 
246 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 M. Stolypin's agrarian reform escaped a check that 
 would have seriously complicated the situation. 
 
 Curiously enough, this reform was opposed simul- 
 taneously by the two extremes, both Right and Left. 
 The Socialists rejected it because of their communistic 
 theories, and as for the reactionaries, they regarded it 
 as an attack upon the sacrosanct traditions of the past 
 and a step in the direction of the equalization of the 
 classes — a, strange aberration on the part of a party 
 calling itself Conservative, but at the same time join- 
 ing hands with the revolutionaries to defeat a law 
 which had for its object the strengthening of the 
 principle of ownership of property. 
 
 It was the reactionary party that had organized 
 the opposition to agrarian reform in the Council of 
 the Empire. When the law came up for discussion 
 that party was particularly strong because the Em- 
 peror had limited his appointments to persons who 
 were well known for their reactionary tendencies. 
 My appointment, as well as my brother's, had been 
 refused several times by the Emperor, and it was only 
 due to M. Stolypin's insistence that we were finally 
 admitted. 
 
 M. Stolypin's agrarian reforms met with extraor- 
 diuary success, surpassing the most optimistic expec- 
 tations. The Russian peasant, prone as he is to lis- 
 ten to revolutionary propaganda when it appeals to 
 his dominant passion for more land, is nevertheless 
 possessed of a keen intelligence. He was not slow in 
 going ahead of the measures decreed for facilitating 
 the ownership of the land which he farmed and finding 
 
TERRORISM 247 
 
 means for acquiring additional land by proper and 
 legal methods. Under the able and firm direction of 
 M. Krivochein, who succeeded Prince Wassiltchikoff 
 as Minister of Agriculture, the new legislation, rein- 
 forced by a considerable extension of the activity and 
 power of the "Peasants' Bank," produced wide-spread 
 results in a surprisingly short time. These results 
 were so satisfactory that, on the eve of the revolution 
 of 1917, it is safe to say that the entire agrarian prob- 
 lem was in a way to be definitely solved, and that 
 only a comparatively short period would have sufficed 
 to put the agrarian regime in Russia on a solid founda- 
 tion. The social and economic upheaval caused by 
 the revolution destroyed, alas, those magnificent re- 
 sults, and no one can foresee when or how Russia will 
 recover from the blow she has received. 
 
 Toward the middle of September, M. Stolypin 
 furnished to the newspapers a long and vigorously 
 worded statement of his political programme, in which 
 he announced the intention of the Government to 
 repress the acts of the terrorists in the most ener- 
 getic manner, and to maintain order in the country 
 at any cost. He declared that the plans of the 
 Government were not to be modified in the least by 
 the aggression of criminals. This or that person 
 could be killed, he said, but it was impossible to kill 
 the idea which inspired the Government. "The 
 crimes of the terrorists make the final object more 
 difficult to attain, but they are only occasional. The 
 
248 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Government will oppose force to violence, but it can- 
 not hold back all reforms and suspend the life of the 
 nation merely for the sake of giving attention to the 
 suppression of the revolution. The Government has 
 to deal with a number of measures, some of which are 
 to be referred to the Duma and the Council of the 
 Empire, while others, particularly urgent, like the 
 agrarian question and that of the religious restric- 
 tions, will be regulated immediately." The projects 
 of laws that were to be submitted to the Duma were 
 then enumerated, and in conclusion the people of 
 liberal views, who desired the tranquillity of the 
 State and its freedom from peril, were urged to sup- 
 port the Government. 
 
 M. Stolypin's appeal to the country, although 
 scorned by the revolutionary and extreme liberal 
 parties, produced an excellent impression upon the 
 public in general. Some weeks later the first anniver- 
 sary of the constitutional charter of 1905 was to 
 occur, and the alarmists predicted disorders and hos- 
 tile demonstrations against the Government for that 
 date. But nothing of the kind materialized. The 
 terrorists, it is true, continued their operations but 
 these, to use the words of M. Stolypin, were only 
 "occasional acts," and it began to look as if the whole 
 country desired order and tranquillity and had confi- 
 dence in the energy as well as the sincerity of the 
 Government. 
 
 Abroad, and especially in France and England,i 
 public opinion had criticised severely the dissolution 
 of the Duma and had shown little confidence in M. 
 
TERRORISM 249 
 
 Stolypin's projects at the start. It was all the more 
 encouraging to note that the European Press now 
 began to do justice to his efforts. An example of this 
 change of view was shown by the following extract 
 from the Journal des Debats of a date early in No- 
 vember: 
 
 For the first time since the beginning of the Russian crisis 
 there appears to be a Government that knows what it wants 
 to do and does it forthwith. M. Stolypin has proclaimed that 
 he would enforce order and eflEect reforms, and he has proceeded 
 to carry out simultaneously these two main points of his pro- 
 gramme. It is true that he has used harsh measures, condemned 
 by sensitive souls, too much inclined to share Rousseau's illu- 
 sions regarding the superior nature of man. We have never 
 sympathized with the indignation inspired by their optimism. 
 It had always seemed to us that if the Government, sole main- 
 tainer of order in a coimtry so imaginative, so Utopian, so 
 deficient in elementary political education and with no knowl- 
 edge of the rudimentary structure of public life, were over- 
 thrown, Russia would fall into anarchy far more cruel in its 
 results than the repression designed to avoid it. We do not 
 mention the danger that would menace the national existence of 
 Russia in such a crisis; there are people of superior mind for 
 whom so abstract a consideration is a negligible quantity. M. 
 Stolypin's Government has repressed disorder, as it was obliged 
 to. At times, unfortunately, too much severity has been em- 
 ployed, as our St. Petersburg correspondent has stated. But 
 at such times a Government can hardly be expected to be an 
 instrument of precision, capable of adjusting its acts in exact 
 proportion to the result necessary to produce. It is to be 
 hoped that, with the progress of order and the stability of the 
 Government, the necessary coercion may be kept within reason- 
 able and useful limits. But it must be admitted that M. 
 Stolypin has done much for the pacification of Russia, and has 
 
250 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 proved by his acts as well as by words that mere repression was 
 not his aim. He has accompanied it with reforms of the greatest 
 importance. He has provided for the peasants a vast extent 
 of land, with liberal terms and facilities for payment. He has 
 liberated the Jews from the heaviest of the legal burdens and 
 persecutions under which they formerly struggled. He has 
 given the benefits of the common law to millions of Old Believ- 
 ers, who were subject to an intolerable restriction of privileges. 
 These reforms have convinced the pubHc of the sincerity of this 
 firm man, who dealt harshly with anarchists of all sorts, but 
 kept his promises at the same time. His repeated declarations 
 that the elections would take place and that the Duma would be 
 convened have inspired confidence, little by little. It is no 
 longer feared that the obstruction of the Minister will nullify 
 the good will and the promises of the Czar. 
 
 I have cited the opinion of a great French journal, 
 which is particularly competent to judge of foreign 
 political matters, to substantiate my own testimony 
 in favour of the results obtained by M. Stolypin dur- 
 ing the first few months following his appointment as 
 Premier. Most of the other French newspapers, as 
 well as the English Press, were equally appreciative of 
 his efforts, and for the first time since the commence- 
 ment of the revolutionary movement the situation in 
 Russia appeared to inspire confidence all over Europe. 
 
 I decided to profit by these circumstances and visit 
 France. It was the custom for a newly appointed 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, whether Russian or 
 French, to take the first opportunity that offered to 
 visit the capital of the allied country in order to get 
 in touch with the men in power. Accordingly, I 
 obtained the Emperor's permission to go to Paris, 
 
TERRORISM 251 
 
 where I was to be received by the President of the 
 Republic, and to confer with the members of M. 
 Sarrien's Cabinet, in which M. Bourgeois was Minis- 
 ter of Foreign Afifairs, M. Clemenceau Minister of the 
 Interior, and M. Briand Minister of Public Worship. 
 To avoid passing through Berlin I planned to go by 
 way of Bavaria, where my family, whom I had not 
 seen for five months, was spending the summer at 
 Lake Tegernsee. My wife was to go with me from 
 there to Paris, but, on my return, in accordance with 
 established custom, it would be necessary to stop at 
 Berlin, where I was to be received by Emperor 
 William and see the Chancellor, Prince von Billow. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 The Emperor Nicholas II. 
 
 IT IS in the place to which I have retired for the 
 writing of these memoirs, and at the very mo- 
 ment chosen for undertaking the difficult and 
 delicate task of defining the characteristic traits of 
 the Emperor Nicholas II., that news has just come to 
 me of the death of the unfortunate sovereign, foully 
 murdered in a remote corner of Russia, separated from 
 the wife and children whom he so tenderly loved, and 
 worn to a shadow of his former self, it is said, by more 
 than a year of physical and moral suflFering and priva- 
 tion. The first effect of this terrible shock was to 
 impel me to drop my pen and abandon the attempt. 
 Could I pronounce judgment upon Nicholas II. so 
 soon after his death, and, while essaying to defend his 
 memory from calumny — a task impossible of accom- 
 plishment unless the whole truth be told — fall into the 
 danger of wounding the loving hearts that, as I sin- 
 cerely hope, have not ceased to beat and endure their 
 grief, in spite of sinister rumours that his family 
 shared his tragic fate? 
 
 I cannot, however, desist from this undertaking for 
 the following reasons : The world, shocked as it has 
 been by so many tragic events during the last four 
 years, received the news of the Emperor's assassina- 
 
 252 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 253 
 
 tion with a sort of indiflFerence. Most of the news- 
 papers in the countries of the Entente printed the 
 shortest of obituaries and gave the impression that 
 their writers refrained, for motives of deheacy, from 
 expressing their real thoughts. One could not help 
 feeling that this reserve veiled an overwhelming con- 
 demnation of the character and acts of the late sov- 
 ereign. There was one glaring exception to this 
 "conspiracy of silence" — the London Daily Telegraph 
 published a series of articles, signed by Dr. Dillon, 
 which not only embodied a violent accusation against 
 Nicholas II. on the score of his faults as a ruler, but 
 also attributed to him certain traits that were un- 
 sympathetic, if not actually repugnant. In view of 
 Dr. Dillon's acknowledged talent as a writer and his 
 reputation as an authority on all matters pertaining 
 to Russia I could not help fearing that his statements 
 would confirm a public opinion, already contaminated 
 by irresponsible tales from the pens of other and less 
 respected writers, for, since the fall of the Russian 
 monarchy, there have appeared a series of books 
 whose authors — ^to name only M. Rivet (in "The Last 
 Romanoff") and M. Bienstock (in "Raspoutin, La 
 Fin d'un Regime") — devoted themselves to the cheap 
 task of piecing together without the slightest critical 
 examination any and all rumours and stories that 
 they could pick up which were of a nature to blacken 
 the Emperor's memory. 
 
 Confronted with such misleading and untruthful 
 statements it has seemed to me to be my plain duty to 
 contribute a testimony based upon personal observa- 
 
254 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 tion and acquaintance. This testimony will, I hope, 
 be all the more valuable because at no moment during 
 my collaboration with Nicholas II. have I been blind 
 to the mistakes of his public life, and because I am con- 
 scious of having made every effort to dissuade him 
 from a course which could not but lead him to ruin 
 and at the same time bring Russia to destruction. 
 Rather than conform to his ideas I chose, when it be- 
 came necessary, to resign my post, and no one has 
 been, or still is, more severe upon Nicholas II. in re- 
 gard to his shortcomings as sovereign and master of 
 the destinies of his people than I. Nevertheless, I 
 feel it to be all the more incumbent upon me to pro- 
 claim that, as a man, he inspired, by a union of rare 
 qualities of heart and charming traits of character, 
 a sentiment of deep sympathy, which I felt in common 
 with all who knew him intimately. Even after part- 
 ing from him politically I have never ceased to cherish 
 the most profound and faithful attachment for his 
 person, and his tragic end has been one of the great- 
 est sorrows of my life. 
 
 As a general rule it is necessary to have lived in 
 close proximity to a sovereign and to have breathed 
 the air of a court in order to pass judgment upon cer- 
 tain psychological phenomena which proceed from 
 a peculiar environment and special conditions not 
 foimd elsewhere. If it is true that a sovereign sees 
 men and things through a false atmosphere, which 
 often transforms them and obscures his vision, it is 
 equally true that he himself is rarely revealed as he 
 is, and so becomes, as it were, a legendary person, 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS H. 255 
 
 known to the world only as described by writers who 
 have lacked opportunity to know him thoroughly. 
 The error conunon to authors of books of the sort I 
 have just mentioned consists in a belief that it is 
 possible to judge of so complex and vague a character 
 as that of Nicholas II, by the mere reading of docu- 
 ments and by hearsay. A nice appreciation of his 
 personality is the more difficult, hedged as it is within 
 a restricted circle, and therefore, known veritably to 
 a very limited group of people. 
 
 It is a curious fact that the usual descriptions of 
 the Emperor's physique have been misleading. His 
 smallness of stature has been exaggerated and he has 
 been represented as of quite insignificant appearance. 
 When he was seen amidst the members of the im- 
 perial family, all of high stature, it is true that he 
 looked small in comparison with the others. Neither 
 did he resemble his imcles and cousins in his features, 
 which he inherited from the Danish princess, his 
 mother. In fact, he was the only one of the imperial 
 family who showed none of the distinctive traits of 
 the RomanoflFs.* 
 
 The high stature and remarkable beauty of almost 
 all the members of the imperial family came from the 
 wife of Paul I., a princess of Wtirtemberg-Monbeliard. 
 (Paul I. himself was so conspicuously ugly that, when 
 
 *lt must be remembered that the present Russian imperial family is descended from the Roman- 
 offs only through the female line. After the death of the Empress Elizabeth the throne of Russia 
 fell to a Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, whose mother was a daughter of Peter the Great. He, under 
 the name of Peter III., became the progenitor of the Russian imperial line. If it is true, however, 
 that the birth of Paul I., successor of Peter HI., was irregular and that his real father was a gentle- 
 man of the Court, named Soltykoff, then the members of the imperial family have not a drop of 
 Romanoff blood in their veins. The memoirs of Peter m. and mother of Paul I., the authenticity 
 of which is generally conceded, appear to confirm this version. 
 
256 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 he arrived in Paris in 1782, under the name of the 
 Comte du Nord, the French populace did not refrain 
 from unfavourable comment during his passage, 
 through the streets.) These distinctive physical 
 traits reached their perfection in the person of the 
 Emperor Nicholas I., who, according to a contempo- 
 rary record, resembled a Greek hero in his youth. 
 For three generations this physical excellence en- 
 dured; the Emperor Alexander III., father of Nicho- 
 las II., although not fine of feature, was a man of 
 Herculean strength and majestic presence. * 
 
 When the Emperor Nicholas II. came to the throne 
 he gave the impression of belonging to a race entirely 
 different from that of his predecessors. He had none 
 of the outward physical gifts that impress the crowd, 
 and it was only upon a nearer view that he was seen 
 to be, if not tall, at least well set up, graceful in his 
 movements, and much stronger than he appeared 
 to be from a distance. 
 
 Those who were least partial to Nicholas II. never 
 denied his charm, the perfect simplicity in his bearing, 
 and the sweet expression of his eyes, which were com- 
 pared to those of a gazelle. Personally, I confess to 
 have fallen under the spell of his attractive nature, 
 and never more so than when I saw him together with 
 the Kaiser, whose loud exuberance and theatrical 
 bearing was in direct contrast with the simple and 
 unaffected behaviour of Nicholas II. But these very 
 characteristics, graceful and lovable as they were, 
 could not shed their light beyond the small circle 
 which surrounded him and, by their intimate nature, 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 257 
 
 could not bring him the widespread popularity en- 
 joyed by the German sovereign — a popularity, it 
 must be admitted, that Nicholas never prized nor 
 sought. 
 
 Was the Emperor naturally gifted and intelligent? 
 I do not hesitate for a moment to affirm that he was. 
 I was often struck by the ease with which he seized 
 every nuance of an argument submitted to him 
 and by the clearness in which he expressed his own 
 ideas. I foimid him always receptive to reasoning or 
 to a logical demonstration. If he followed after- 
 ward an opposite course it was not because he had 
 failed to comprehend or see clearly, but because, 
 meanwhile, he had fallen under the influence of a will 
 stronger than his own. Furthermore, he possessed 
 in a high degree a gift which presupposes intelligence 
 — ^the gift of tact, which has been well defined as the 
 "intelligence of the heart." 
 
 But, unhappily, his natural intelligence was counter- 
 acted by a lack of higher education and intellectual 
 culture. To this day I have been quite unable to 
 understand how a prince, destined from his cradle to 
 govern one of the greatest empires of the world, could 
 have been left without any serious preparation for the 
 overwhelming task that lay before him. The educa- 
 tion of Nicholas II. was really that of a lieutenant of 
 cavalry in one of the regiments of the Imperial Guard, 
 whose officers belonged to the jeunesse doree and paid 
 more attention to sport and social accomplishments 
 than to any special studies, even those useful for a 
 soldier's career. 
 
258 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 While the Emperor Nicholas I., an admirer of Prus- 
 sian militarism, had nevertheless had the good judg- 
 ment to confide the education of his eldest son to one 
 of the most eminent men of his time, the poet Jou- 
 kowsky, a friend of Poushkin and his pleiade of writers, 
 whose works still rank high in Russian literature — 
 the Emperor Alexander III. chose as preceptor for the 
 young heir to the crown an obscure general by the 
 name of Danilowitch, who does not appear to have 
 possessed any qualifications for such important and 
 delicate duties unless his ultra-conservative views 
 may be so considered. However that may be, he 
 turned out to be a preceptor in name only, and had no 
 real influence upon his pupil's course of studies, 
 leaving him apparently to his own devices, except 
 for such teaching as he received from an Englishman, 
 Mr. Heath, who was engaged as a private tutor ia 
 the imperial family and who took a real interest in 
 the education of Nicholas H. 
 
 It chanced that I knew Mr. Heath very well, and I 
 can even consider myself as having been his pupil in 
 almost the same sense as the Emperor. In fact, this 
 rarely gifted and charming man had been a teacher 
 in the Imperial Lyceum at the time that I was a stu- 
 dent there. Although he was very strict, he was 
 adored by the young men under his charge, and he 
 sought in every way to inculcate high sentiments of 
 honour and duty. He was possessed of a fairly good 
 education and some talent; among other accomplish- 
 ments he painted well in water colours. But he ex- 
 celled particularly in outdoor sports, and took great 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 259 
 
 pains to give his pupils a taste for these and all sorts 
 of athletics. It was to him that Nicholas II. owed 
 his perfect knowledge of English and his skill in all 
 sorts of sport, but it is easy to understand that Mr, 
 Heath, who hardly spoke a word of Russian, and had 
 not the advantage of a university education, was un- 
 able to impart the necessary knowledge to prepare 
 his pupil for his rdle as the future sovereign of Russia. 
 
 I have often had occasion to talk about this im- 
 perial pupil with Mr, Heath, who remained in Russia 
 for quite a long time after finishing his duties at the 
 Court, He spoke of Nicholas II, always in terms of 
 warmest affection, even with tenderness, praising 
 above all his great simplicity and the delicacy of his 
 sentiments. As Mr. Heath had nothing of the cour- 
 tier in his character, and was distinctly plain-spoken 
 and frank almost to the verge of rudeness, the sin- 
 cerity of his praise cannot be doubted. "When I, 
 in my turn, came in contact with Nicholas II., I was 
 able to verify all that he had said of the Emperor 
 to the last details and to appreciate his powers of 
 observation. The Emperor, on his part, always 
 retained a real attachment for his former teacher, 
 and often spoke of him to me. As he knew that I 
 had been one of Mr. Heath's favourite pupils at the 
 Lyceum, and that I had the most grateful memories 
 of him, it may be that the affection which we shared 
 in common for that excellent man contributed to the 
 establishment of a friendly understanding between 
 us at the outset of my relations with the Czar. 
 
 In order to appreciate fully certain phases of the 
 
260 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 character and mentality of Nicholas II. one must first 
 take account of the environment in which he passed 
 his childhood and youth until the day when, at the 
 age of twenty-six years, he came to the throne after 
 his father's sudden death. This milieu was entirely 
 dominated by the powerful personality of the Em- 
 peror Alexander III., whose strong will absolutely 
 controlled all persons who were brought in contact 
 with him. 
 
 The superabundant health and strength of Alexan- 
 der III. seemed to exclude all possibility of an im- 
 minent change of reign. As we have seen, the young 
 heir to the throne received no instruction to fit him 
 for his duties as sovereign; he was not allowed to 
 take any part in the affairs of State; being naturally 
 timid and reserved and extremely juvenile in appear- 
 ance, he continued to be treated by his parents as a 
 little boy even after outgrowing his youth. He was 
 never really the Czarewitch but remained, in the 
 eyes of his family and intimates, to the very day of 
 his father's death, merely "Nicky," a charming and 
 gentle young man, loving sport and literature (he 
 had an extraordinary memory for verse), but com- 
 pletely a stranger to the political life of his country. 
 
 The only occasion on which the heir apparent had 
 to show himself in an independent r61e was his jour- 
 ney to the Far East in 1890-91. This journey, if it 
 had been properly organized, would certainly have 
 aided in developing the natural intelligence of Nicho- 
 las II., and enabled him to acquire some ideas which 
 he lacked. Unfortunately, instead of sending men 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 261 
 
 of special experience and knowledge with him, his 
 suite was made up of young and brilliant officers of 
 the Guards, and headed by General Bariantinsky, 
 a gentleman of the Court, very poUshed and agree- 
 able, but absolutely lacking in the necessary qualities 
 and education for conducting a journey of that na- 
 ture. The Court of London displayed much better 
 judgment, and attached to the heir to the Russian 
 throne, during his stay in India, a man particularly 
 competent — Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, of whom 
 I spoke in a preceding chapter. He was thoroughly 
 appreciated by the Czarewitch, who asked nothing 
 better than to learn all that he could from his travels. 
 
 It will be remembered that Nicholas II., pursued as 
 he was throughout his tragic career by a sort of fatal- 
 ity, was the victim of an attack by a Japanese fanatic 
 during his stay in Japan. The would-be assassin 
 struck at his head with a sword, but the blow was 
 parried in part by the walking-stick of his cousin, 
 Prince George of Greece, who rushed to his help. 
 The wound was quite deep, but not really serious. 
 It has been asserted that the intellectual faculties of 
 Nicholas II. were weakened by the blow, but, as a 
 matter of fact, there is no ground whatever for such 
 a statement. On the contrary, I was told by the 
 Emperor himself that, after that incident, he had 
 never again been troubled by the frequent headaches 
 from which he had suflFered since his childhood. 
 
 But, if the attempt upon his life at Kioto did no 
 physical harm, I believe that it gave rise to a feeling of 
 antipathy, and even hatred, to Japan on the part of 
 
262 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Nicholas II., and this may not have been without in- 
 fluence upon his Far-Eastern policy, which had as its 
 epilogue the Russo-Japanese War. 
 
 Brought up, as he was, in an atmosphere of self- 
 effacement and passive obedience, Nicholas II. ren- 
 dered to the memory of his father an almost supersti- 
 tious reverence. The Emperor Alexander III., as we 
 know, personified the idea of absolute monarchical 
 power, and governed Russia with an iron hand for 
 thirteen years, carrying out a rigorous system of con- 
 servatism and bureaucratic centralization. This sys- 
 tem became the dogma of the men who had been the 
 counsellors of Alexander III., and who retained their 
 place at the beginning of the new reign. They did all 
 in their power to preserve the young Emperor's 
 respect for what they were pleased to call "the tradi- 
 tions bequeathed by the Czar Pacificator." Any 
 tendency on the part of Nicholas II. to free himself 
 from these traditions was quickly stifled by his ad- 
 visers, and one may say, almost without metaphor, 
 that, during the first years of the new reign, the Rus- 
 sian Empire continued to be governed by the shade 
 of the dead Emperor. Alas, I do not exaggerate 
 when I add that, when the counsellors of Alexander 
 III. had yielded their places to men chosen by Nicho- 
 las II. himself, the Empire was not governed at all, 
 or else was misgoverned in the stupid manner that I 
 have already described. 
 
 The reverence of the Emperor Nicholas for the 
 memory of his father manifested itself occasionally 
 in strange ways. For instance, he, the supreme chief 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS H. 263 
 
 of the Russian army, never consented to assume a 
 higher rank in the army than that of colonel, to which 
 he had attained under the preceding reign. This 
 touching but somewhat puerile act of filial piety did 
 not help his prestige in military circles, where he came 
 to be referred to always as "The Colonel," a sobriquet 
 which in the end savoured of mockery and a certain 
 disdain. 
 
 This same cult for the traditions of the foregoing 
 reign may be held responsible, in a way, for a political 
 error which led to the most serious consequences for 
 Russia's future and the destiny of Nicholas II. 
 himself. 
 
 The death of the Emperor Alexander III., having 
 taken place sooner than could have been expected, 
 revived the hopes of the great Liberal party that had 
 been held in check during his thirteen years' reign. 
 The leaders of this party, banished from the Court 
 and from all bureaucratic employments, had taken 
 refuge and foimd a field of activity in the provincial 
 Zemstvos. In these circles it was thought that the 
 young Emperor, whose intelligence and gentle dis- 
 position were recognized, might well do as so many 
 other monarchs had done, in Russia as well as in 
 other countries, and adopt a line of conduct entirely 
 different from that of his predecessor. The possibil- 
 ity presented itself of making known to the young 
 sovereign the liberal aspirations which, it may be 
 safely said, were those of the great majority of clear- 
 thinking Russians. With this object in view it was 
 decided to take advantage of an audience that the 
 
£64 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Emperor was to grant to the representatives of the/ 
 Zemstvos, who were deputed to present the congratu- 
 lations and good wishes of those assemblies a few 
 days after his accession to the throne. 
 
 The petition for a constitutional government, more 
 or less clearly expressed in the addresses of almost all 
 the Zemstvos, was rather more definitely formulated 
 in that of the Zemstvo of the province of Tver, which 
 was well known for its liberal tendencies, and there- 
 fore very unfavourably regarded at Court. It was 
 in response to this last address that Nicholas II. pro- 
 nounced those unfortunate words, qualifying the 
 aspirations of the Zemstvos, presented however mod- 
 erately or respectfully, as "insensate dreams," and 
 declared his firm intention of maintaining intact the 
 absolute power that he had inherited from his father. 
 
 Here is the way in which one of the authors cited 
 above has recounted the scene which occurred at the 
 Winter Palace on the day when the representatives of 
 the Zemstvos called to present their homage to the 
 Emperor Nicholas: 
 
 The autocrat strutted pompously into the brilliantly lighted 
 hall, and with knitted brows and tightly drawn lips turned 
 wrathfully upon the chosen men of the nation, and, stamping 
 his Kttle foot, ordered them to put away such chimerical notions, 
 which he would never entertain. 
 
 I am sorry that I must differ from my friend Dr. 
 DiUon in my accoimt of this scene, but, in reality, 
 things happened in quite another fashion. I have it 
 from several eyewitnesses that, far from addressing 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 265 
 
 the representatives of the Zemstvos in a pompous or 
 haughty manner, the attitude of the Emperor 
 Nicholas was one of timidity and embarrassment, and 
 it was with some hesitation and a lack of assurance 
 that he read from the paper which he held in his 
 hand, containing the famous address. Furthermore, 
 I know from an absolutely indisputable source, that 
 the response which the Emperor was to make had 
 been the subject of lively discussion between the 
 Emperor and his advisers. Nicholas II. hesitated 
 to break lances with the delegates of the Zemstvos, 
 and inclined toward a less peremptory reply, but 
 his counsellors, headed by M. PobiedonostzeflF, per- 
 suaded him that he owed to the memory of his father a 
 firm maintenance of the traditions of the preceding 
 reign and that he must cut short all liberal preten- 
 sions. It was M. Pobiedonostzeff who drew up the 
 address which the Emperor received from his hands 
 at the last moment before entering the hall of audience. 
 He read it in a bungling manner, and certainly with- 
 out a clear comprehension of its significance. 
 
 When one thinks of the wide circulation of this un- 
 fortunate speech, brought back by the representatives 
 of the Zemstvos to their constituents in the utter- 
 most corners of Russia, one will understand my asser- 
 tion that this first contact of Nicholas II. with his 
 people marks the beginning of a misunderstanding 
 which from that day never ceased to prevail between 
 the sovereign and the Russian nation, and which had 
 its epilogue twenty-three years later in the abdica- 
 tion of Pskoff. 
 
266 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 The author of the Emperor's reply to the Zemstvos^ 
 M. Pobiedonostzeflf, retained his former office — ^that 
 of Procurator of the Holy Synod — ^under the new 
 reign. This man, who was called the Russian Tor- 
 quemada, was truly the evil genius of Nicholas IL, 
 whom he succeeded in drawing completely under his 
 influence. I will not stop to portray this sinister 
 personage, who retired from the stage of political 
 life on the very day that I joined the first constitu- 
 tional Cabinet of Russia. He is a familiar figure in 
 history, and to describe him properly would take, 
 not only a chapter, but an entire volume. So I 
 will limit my comment to the bare statement that to 
 my mind M. Pobiedonostzeflf always personified that 
 which was most detestable in the old Russian bureauc- 
 racy, and that he, rather than the Emperor Nicholas 
 himself, was chiefly responsible for the errors of the 
 unhappy sovereign's reign. I may add that on every 
 occasion when I was brought in contact with him— 
 and such occasions were quite frequent when I rep- 
 resented the Russian Government at the Vatican — 
 we had violent disagreements, and to this very day 
 it is a subject of great satisfaction to me to remember 
 that I defended against his tyranny the cause of re- 
 ligious liberty in Russia at an epoch when there was 
 no little risk in that course. 
 
 Among the men who are not as well known, but 
 whose influence upon Nicholas II. at the beginning of 
 his reign was hardly less fatal than that of M. Pobie- 
 donostzeflf, I must mention Prince Mestchersky, 
 proprietor and sole editor of the ultra-reactionary 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 267 
 
 journal, Le Grajdanine. This enigmatic personage, 
 grand seigneur by birth, journalist— and journalist 
 of great talent — ^by vocation, had played a very 
 important r61e at the Court and in the intimate circle 
 of Alexander III. His success is all the more inex- 
 plicable because his scandalous reputation, corres- 
 ponding exactly to that of Prince Eulenbourg at the 
 Court of Berlin, contrasted sharply with the purity 
 of habits which distinguished the father of Nicholas 
 II. as well as Nicholas himself. 
 
 Prince Mestchersky, who had devoted himself to 
 journalism from his earliest years, never cared for any 
 bureaucratic employment or oflScial position at Court. 
 He enjoyed none the less direct influence upon the 
 aflFairs of State during the reign of Alexander III. 
 It was in the editorial rooms of the Grajdanine and in 
 his salon, where he gave weekly receptions, that the 
 ministerial candidatures were prepared, as well as 
 the reactionary measures which marked that reign. 
 These Wednesday receptions, which I never had the 
 privilege of attending, were of the most heterogeneous 
 aspect, it appears. Mingled with Ministers of State, 
 high functionaries lacking a portfolio, generals, 
 prelates, and journalists, there were to be seen beard- 
 less youths of decadent appearance to whom their 
 host's protection had opened the doors to the most 
 varied careers, without excepting diplomacy.* 
 
 In May, 1896, during his coronation at Moscow, 
 
 •When, after succeeding Count Lamsdorff, I was obliged to dismiss certain of these prot^& of 
 Prince Mestchersky from the Ministry of Foreign A&aira, the editorial rooms of the Grajdanine 
 became the most active centre of the intrigues against my person and my policies. During my 
 four years as Minister hardly a single issue of that journal appeared without a violent attack upon 
 me, denouncing me as a "Cadet in disguise," and almost as au accomplice of the revolutionists. 
 
268 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Nicholas II. came in contact with his people for the 
 second time, and he was quite as unfortunate as be- 
 fore. The fatality, which followed the entire life of 
 the ill-starred sovereign, seems to have seized upon 
 this occasion to mark in advance the tragic outcome 
 of his reign. No one has forgotten howjjifijfistivi- 
 ties at the coronation _of_Nicl},Qlas -II. were over- 
 shadowed by a catastrophe very similar to thai whidL_ 
 took place during the popular rejoicings organized at 
 Paris in ITT'O^ on the occasion of the marriage, of 
 Louis XVI. The same cause, a hopelessly careless 
 preparation by the authorities in charge of the„ ar- 
 rangements, produced the same effect in both cases: 
 an enormous crowd, in an enclosure that wasjaot 
 only too small, but badly arranged and without 
 proper provision for entrances and exits, were seized 
 by sudden panic, and a" wild rush for safety ensued 
 with horrible loss of life. 
 
 The Moscow catastrophe, regarding which I had an 
 opportunity to learn precise details at the time it oc- 
 curred, gave rise to the most inexact accounts and the 
 most unfair comment. Dr. Dillon, in the book that 
 I have so often cited, states that the awful calamity 
 ensued at the very moment when the imperial couple 
 took their places in the oflScial tribune, saluted by the 
 military band playing the national hymn, and when 
 "HaK a million voices acclaimed the young autocrat 
 of Holy Russia and his consort." The author con- 
 tinues, insinuating that the Emperor showed, little 
 or no emotion over this public calamity, and ascribes^ 
 to his inaccessibility to human sorrow and his incapa- 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 269 
 
 ^t^lofrgaJi zing the d e pth and force of p iihl jc opinion 
 
 the fact that the dis^ier did j aot integ upt the series 
 
 of^dinners"^315iIIsl?TGi3G"to^j^^ 
 
 t he foreign embassies until the ver^end of the fes- 
 
 tivitie s. * " 
 
 III— I II -I -— -- -^i.-'x'.v - 
 
 The facts were as follows: 
 
 I was at the time Russian envoy to the Vatican, 
 and, as PopeXeo XIILjgai&represented at the~coEona- 
 ti(^j!eiemonies by an ambassador extraordinary, Mgr. 
 AgUardi, I had been asked by Prince Lobanoff, the 
 Russian Minister of Foreign Aflfairs, to go also to 
 Moscow to look after thejjetai ls of th e-DrotocoL which 
 were particularly complicated and delicate in con- 
 nection with the presence of an apostolic Nuncio. 
 In addition to my rank in the diplomatic service, I 
 was a Chamberlain of the Imperial Court, and conse- 
 quently had to fulfil the duties of that position during 
 the coronation ceremony. While in Moscow I shared 
 the apartment of my cousin, M. N. Mouravieff, who 
 was then Minister of Justice, and not a day passed 
 without my seeing intimately my wife's uncle. Count 
 Pahlen, who had been invested with the dignity of 
 Grand Master of Ceremonies. This meant tha t I 
 h§d,jia£xcellfint opportunity to f oUow, not only the 
 natj2al,coiu:se_^^ejgstisiliea»butalg^ 
 details of what was going on behind the scenes and 
 in the intimate life of the Court. 
 
 The catastrophe occurred at a very early hour of 
 the day, and long before the Emperor and the Im- 
 perial Court were expected to arrive at the scene 
 of the popular fete. A few moments after, my cousin 
 
270 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 was called to the telephone, and then came to wake 
 me, telling me what had occurred and proposing that 
 I accompany him to the scene of the disaster, whence 
 he was obliged to proceed in his official capacity. 
 
 Even to-day, after twenty-two years, I cannot 
 without a shudder think of the spectacle that we saw 
 when we reached the Hodynskoie-Polie, the parade 
 ground where the f6te took place. My readers will 
 understand how painful it would be for me to dilate 
 upon the details of the awful scene. It will suffice 
 to say that, pending the arrival of the Minis ter of 
 Justice, whose duty it was to make the preliminary 
 investigations, nothing had been done beyond first 
 aid to the wouncjed and dying, and no removal h?^ 
 yet_beOT effected of the jdead, numbiering pygL-thiee 
 thousand, who lay in heaps in front .of the ga tes at 
 which food and gifts, were to have been distributed. 
 I passed the greater part of the day on that field of 
 death and desolation, doing my best to assist in 
 rescuing the victims, and not returning to the city 
 until evening to attend to the duties of my position. 
 
 I had no occasion to be in the Emperor's presence 
 during the days immediately following, but through 
 M. Mouravieff and Count Pahlen, as well as through 
 other persons in Court circles, I was well informed in 
 all its details of the effect produced by the catastrophe 
 at the palace of the Kremlin. I am able, therefore, 
 to testify, with full knowledge of the circumstances, 
 that, far from being insensible and indifferent, Nicho- 
 las II. was deeply moved, and his first impulse — a 
 generous one — ^was to order the suspension of the 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 271 
 
 festivities and to retire to one of the monasteries in 
 the environs of Moscow for the purpose of giving 
 public expression of his pity and sorrow. This proj- 
 ect was the subject of a heated discussion among the 
 members of his suite, some of whom, like Count 
 Pahlen, commended his idea, and advised him to 
 punish severely, without regard to their position, 
 the personages responsible for the disaster — and first 
 of all the Grand Duke Sergius, the Emperor's uncle 
 and Governor-General of Moscow — ^while others, 
 notably M. Pobiedonostzeff and his friends, main- 
 tained that such action would upset the minds of the 
 people, and produce a bad impression upon the num- 
 erous princes and foreign representatives gathered at 
 Moscow. They claimed also that to give public recog- 
 nition to the fault of a member of the imperial family 
 would be equivalent to an attack upon the mon- 
 archical principle. These evil counsels, alas, pre- 
 vailed, as they have too often. The festivities fol- 
 lowed their course. The same evening there was to 
 be a ball at the French Embassy, in presence of the 
 imperial couple and all the Court. The Ambassador 
 Marquis de Montebello, and his wife, both of whom 
 were greatly loved in Russian society, and who 
 naturally knew what was going on at the KremUn, 
 waited anxiously for notice that the sovereigns would 
 not be present at their fdte, and prepared to cancel 
 thdr invitations. No word came and they could do 
 no other than throw open the doors of the Embassy 
 on that day of national mourning. I was at that ball 
 and distinctly remember the dismal aspect that 
 
272 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 reigned. The efifort that it caused the Emperor and 
 Empress to appear in public could be clearly seen in 
 their faces. There were some who blamed the French 
 Ambassador for not having taken the initiative and 
 cancelling the ball. I can certify that the Marquis 
 and Marchioness, possessed as they were of keen sen- 
 sibility and perfect tact, were obliged, much against 
 their will, to conform to the superior will proceeding 
 from the deplorable counsels I have mentioned. 
 
 Coimt Pahlen, former Minister.of Justice under the 
 liberal feign of Alexander II. — a man of advanced 
 years and of the most distinguished bearing, well 
 known for his independence and rectitude — was desig- 
 nated by the Emperor personally to inquire into the 
 causes of the catastrophe and to decide who were 
 responsible. Thanks to my intimacy with him, I was 
 able to follow day by day his investigations, and 
 I was astonished, as I have been on other occasions, 
 by the- strajage-.di]djiffll ..£xistmg;_in ,Ru^^^ 
 different administrative departments. In this case, 
 the popular fete, which was to bring together nearly 
 a million people, had been organized by two distinct 
 powers, the Grand Duke Sergius, Governor-General 
 of Moscow, and Count Vorontzoff-Daschkoff, Min- 
 ister of the Court, each of whom threw the blame 
 upon the other. It was proved that, if the Grand 
 Duke Sergius was not the only one guilty, he was suf- 
 ficiently involved to warrant a severe disciplinary 
 penalty. Coimt Pahlen did not hesitate to demand 
 his punishment, but he encountered a storm of opposi- 
 tion from the other Grand Dukes and the ultra- 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 273 
 
 monarchical party, who carried off the victory with 
 all the more ease because it concerned the brother-in- 
 law of the Empress. The Grand Duke Sergius, who 
 had great influence upon Nicholas II. at that period, 
 was married to Princess Elizabeth of Hesse, sister of 
 the Empress Alexandra. She was an angelic creature 
 who, after the tragic death of her husband (killed by 
 the terrorists in 1905), retired to an almost monastic 
 life, devoted entirely to works of practical charity. 
 In the end a few subordinates had to bear the blame, 
 and the Grand Duke, having been exonerated, con- 
 tinued to govern the old Russian capital, whose in- 
 habitants disrespectfully baptized him "Prince 
 Hodynsky," in memory of the spot where his negli- 
 gence had worked disaster. 
 
 The deplorable incident which marred the Em- 
 peror's coronation was considered by the public as of 
 evil augury for the future of his reign and for his 
 personal destiny. People saw in it a presage of 
 events similar to those which afflicted Louis XVI. A 
 few days later another thing happened, which re- 
 mained almost unknown, but which, if it had been 
 noised abroad, would have strengthened this im- 
 pression. 
 
 I was myself a witness of this mishap. As a cham- 
 berlain of the Court the Emperor had designated me, 
 with five other chamberlains, to hold the imperial 
 mantle of cloth of gold, lined with ermine and four or 
 five metres in length, which the Emperor put on 
 again during the ritual, after having received the 
 sceptre and globe from the hands of the Metropolitan 
 
274 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 of Moscow and before placing the imperial crown 
 upon his head. At the most solemn moment of the 
 ceremony, when Nicholas, followed by his assistants, 
 and wearing his crown and imperial mantle, passed 
 through the nave of the cathedral toward the grand 
 altar to receive the unction which consecrated him 
 Emperor — a chain in brilliants, of the collar of the 
 Order of Saint Andrew, came loose from the mantle 
 and fell at his feet. One of the chamberlains bearing 
 the mantle picked it up and handed it to the Minister 
 of the Court, Count Vorontzoff, who put it in his 
 pocket. All happened so quickly that it was noticed 
 by no one except those who were next to the Emperor. 
 As I have said, I was of that number and so missed 
 nothing of the incident, of which I am perhaps the 
 only surviving witness. After the ceremony all 
 those who saw it were ordered not to speak of it, and, 
 curiously enough, it never reached the ears of the 
 public, and I myself disclose it now for the first 
 time. 
 
 If I have stopped to relate the incident, which may 
 appear to practical minds as rather insignificant, it is 
 because I am sure that it produced a profound impres- 
 sion upon Nicholas II., and contributed perhaps to 
 increase his natural tendency toward fatalism and 
 superstition. He saw in it a warning of the trials 
 which he had resolved to bear, as coming from the 
 divine will, and which eventually he did bear, in fact, 
 with extraordinary calmness and resignation. 
 
 The few years following the coronation at Moscow 
 were the only relatively calm and prosperous years of 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 275 
 
 his reign. During this period the character of 
 Nicholas II. gradually developed into the definite 
 form which manifested itself in the epoch marked 
 by the beginnings of the revolutionary movement in 
 1905 and by the Russo-Japanese War. 
 
 There were many influences that shaped this un- 
 favourable development of the Emperor's character: 
 a persistence of the impression made upon a feeble 
 and sensitive nature by the dominating will of the 
 Emperor Alexander III. ; systematic effort on the part 
 of the former coimseUors of his father to preserve 
 the traditions of the preceding reign; later, the per- 
 nicious promptings of frivolous and servile ministers 
 like M. Sipiaguin, or so unscrupulous as M. Plehve, 
 and of mere adventurers like M. Bezobrazoff; lastly, 
 and above all, the empire over a mystical and super- 
 stitious natm-e of a feminine mind stronger than his, 
 but even more steeped in mysticism, so that both 
 fell victims to the hypnotic powers of such impostors 
 as the medium Philippe and the peasant Raspoutin. 
 
 Even if we concede a certain respect to statesmen 
 of the stamp of M. Pobiedonostzeff, moved by deep 
 convictions and putting in practice their talents and 
 undisputed abilities, however mistaken they might be 
 — ^what is there to say in favour of that category of 
 Ministers, as inconsequent as they were ignorant, 
 whose only aim was to advance themselves in the 
 favour of their sovereign by flattering his reactionary 
 tendencies and his taste for puerilities. The most 
 accomplished type of these "amusers" was M. Sipia- 
 guin, Minister of the Interior, who owed this post to 
 
276 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 his family connection with one of the prominent men 
 of the reactionary party Count Scheremeteff . It was 
 this Minister who had the idea of reviving at the 
 Russian Court the traditions of the reign of the 
 Czar Alexis MichaUovitch, the second Romanoff, and 
 father of Peter the Great . In contradistinction to the 
 restless period of reforms borrowed from the Occident 
 by the son, the patriarchal and purely Muscovite 
 epoch of the father was lauded, and it became the 
 fashion among the intimates of Nicholas 11. to eulo- 
 gize the "Most Tranquil Czar" (Tichaishij Tzar) 
 given to pious exercises, governing by kindness, de- 
 voted to his family and kin, and making place at 
 his councils for the beautiful and virtuous Czarina 
 NathaUe Narichkin. It was because of his fanciful 
 predilection for the Czar Alexis that Nicholas II. gave 
 to his heir a name that had fallen into disuse among the 
 Russian sovereigns since the tragic death of the son 
 of Peter the Great, the unfortunate Czarewitch Alexis 
 who revolted against the progressive ideas of his 
 father and was sacrificed by the great reformer for 
 reasons of State. This fancy sometimes took a pic- 
 turesque form, as it did one winter when nothing was 
 thought of in the Emperor's circle and the high society 
 of the capital but the organization of a masquerade 
 ball which reproduced in the haUs of the Winter 
 Palace the semi-Asiatic splendours of the Court of the 
 Czar Alexis ^Vlichailovitch. I was abroad at the time 
 and so I only knew of it through the enthusiastic de- 
 scriptions of those present. It was an extraordinarily 
 gorgeous affair. The imperial couple, clothed in 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 277 
 
 splendid garb which displayed to great advantage 
 the juvenile grace of the Emi>eror Nicholas and the 
 majestic beauty of the Empress Alexandra, personi- 
 fied the Czar Alexis and the Czarina Nathalie re- 
 spectively. The Grand Dukes, Grand Duchesses, and 
 members of the high society of St. Petersburg rivalled 
 each other in their display of priceless furs and 
 precious stones. This ball, which was not only a 
 marvellous spectacle, but also a sort of symbol of the 
 Emperor's poUtical ideas and those of his counsellors, 
 marked the halfway and the apogee of the reign of 
 Nicholas 11., soon to be darkened by the approach of 
 all manner of troubles and calamities that crowded 
 the second haK. 
 
 It was this same M. Sipiaguin who had a room in 
 his official residence at St. Petersburg decorated in the 
 style of the apartments of the ancient Czars in the 
 Palace of the Kremlin, and there received the Em- 
 peror Nicholas with aU the rites observed at the 
 Muscovite Court of the seventeenth century. Again 
 at this performance the Emperor played the part of 
 Alexis MichaUovitch, and M. Sipiaguin appeared as 
 the Boyard Morozofif, the all-powerful Minister of the 
 Czar. 
 
 While the Emperor and his singular Minister of the 
 Interior were amusing themselves with these innocent 
 masquerades, the real functions of a Morozoff were 
 exercised by M. Pobiedonostzeff. The influence of 
 this sinister personage made itself felt in all the aflFairs 
 of the State, and his action alienated more and more 
 the intelligent and enlightened classes of Russian 
 
278 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN INHNISTER 
 
 society and threw them into the opposition, if not into 
 the revolution itself. 
 
 The method adopted by M. Sipiaguin and his 
 friends was to flatter the young sovereign systematic- 
 ally and to give him an exaggerated notion of his 
 power and administrative talents. In this direction 
 none surpassed Count Mouravieff, Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs from 1897 to 1900, whose sycophancy was 
 only equalled by his ignorance of public business. 
 His predecessor, Prince Lobanoff, was a veritable 
 statesman, but his ministry was cut short by his 
 death, having lasted but a few months. That emi- 
 nent diplomat and historian of the first order had set 
 himself the task of grounding Nicholas II. in history 
 and diplomatic science when he made his verbal re- 
 ports. He appreciated the keen intelligence of his 
 sovereign, and had a quasi-paternal affection for him. 
 The Emperor, habituated to a totally different pro- 
 cedure on the part of his other Ministers, submitted 
 with deference, but not without a certain ennui, to 
 these lessons from the former servitor of his grand- 
 father. The lessons came to an imtimely end when 
 Count Mouravieff succeeded Prince Lobanoff, and 
 lost no time in taking a diametrically opposite course 
 from that of his predecessor. He declared to all who 
 cared to listen that he was only the obedient executor 
 of his master's orders, and that the Emperor, whose 
 profound diplomatic knowledge he vaunted on every 
 occasion, decided the smallest details of the nation's 
 affairs in complete independence. I recall that one of 
 the foreign Ambassadors accredited to St. Petersburg 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 279 
 
 asked me one day if such statements were to be taken 
 literally or if Count Mouravieff considered it as a 
 clever way of escaping responsibility. I had trouble 
 to convince the diplomat referred to that such was, 
 in fact, the method adopted by our Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs in his relations with the sovereign. 
 
 We have seen that Count LamsdorflF, who suc- 
 ceeded Count Mouravieff in 1900, improved upon 
 this method, and carried his self-effacement so far as 
 to remain at his post even when he ceased virtually to 
 exercise his functions and the Emperor decided the 
 most important questions of his department with the 
 help of M. Bezobrazoff and his band. 
 
 To close the list of Ministers who contributed 
 toward the formation of the Emperor's character I 
 have only to add the name of M. Plehve, who suc- 
 ceeded M. Sipiaguin as Minister of the Interior. We 
 now have to do with a personage of much greater cali- 
 bre. Endowed with remarkable intelligence and a 
 strong will, he pursued untiringly his objects, which 
 were to strengthen the autocratic power and the 
 system of bureaucratic centralization. He was a 
 veritable incarnation of the police system, carried to 
 its highest degree, and was absolutely unscrupulous 
 in the choice of his methods, some of which were of 
 the mosjt surprising nature. He it was who organized 
 with the help of a certain Zubatoff the workmen's 
 associations, whose duty it was to combat the influ- 
 ence of the Socialists by resorting to the same means 
 as were employed by the latter. In other words, 
 they were to organize strikes, which, however, were 
 
280 EECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 secretly directed by the police. He must also be 
 credited with having fathered the police system of 
 using two-faced agents, who served the Government 
 and the terrorists at one and the same time. One of 
 the most notorious of these agents, Azeff, was un- 
 masked by the Russian publicist, M. Bourtzeflf. 
 M. Plehve himself ended by being a victim of this 
 astonishing organization, for he perished in the course 
 of a plot in which Azeff took an active part, as was 
 discovered later. The same Azeff was concerned in 
 the assassination of the Grand Duke Sergius some 
 time afterward. 
 
 The ministry of M. Plehve coincided with the events 
 immediately preliminary to the Russo-Japanese 
 War. Although thoroughly cognizant of the true 
 character of M. Bezobrazoff and his friends, he not 
 only refrained from withstanding their influence over 
 the Emperor, but, repeating the error which has led 
 so many times to ruin — that of seeking in a foreign 
 war an escape from the danger of revolution within — 
 he pushed Nicholas II. further and further upon the 
 way to a conflict with Japan. 
 
 It can easily be imagined how the men whom I have 
 just described succeeded in destroying gradually 
 whatever good judgment he might originally have 
 possessed, and prepared the way for the adventurers 
 who won his confidence soon after and led him into 
 the most foolish and hazardous of schemes. Of all 
 these adventurers the most astonishing and persua- 
 sive was M. Bezobrazoff. That this half -mad, pre- 
 posterous person could have played a leading r6Ie for 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 281 
 
 several years, to the extent of plunging Russia into 
 war, still passes my comprehension. He was of good 
 family, his father being reputed very wealthy and 
 having been Marshal of the Nobility for the Province 
 of St. Petersburg. M. Bezobrazoff was at first an 
 officer in one of the crack regiments of the Imperial 
 Guard, to which my brother also belonged, and I met 
 him often at that period. He suffered reverses of 
 fortune and left the regiment to take service, it was 
 rumoured, in the civil administration of Siberia. It 
 was not until twenty-five years later that he appeared 
 on the horizon of St. Petersburg, and it was learned 
 with some astonishment that he had succeeded by 
 obscure means in gaining the confidence of the Em- 
 peror, to whom he had submitted a vast plan for politi- 
 cal and economic expansion in the Far East. It was 
 no less a matter than the famous forest concessions 
 of the Yalu, which became afterward the stumbling- 
 block in the negotiations between Russia and Japan 
 and the final cause of the war between the two coun- 
 tries. 
 
 I will not tire my readers with the details of the 
 schemes of M. Bezobrazoff, who claimed he was about 
 to throw open vast political perspectives to Russia, 
 and promised fabulous profits to the subscribers at 
 the same time. Suffice it to say that it was precisely 
 the fantastic and venturesome side of the project that 
 appealed to the imagination of Nicholas II., always 
 receptive to chimerical ideas. A more difficult thing 
 to explain is the ascendancy gained by that incoherent 
 and pretentious braggart over a nature as fine as the 
 
282 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Emperor's. One theory to account for the favour- 
 able reception of M. Bezobrazoff's schemes was that 
 the Emperor was dazzled by the billions that were 
 jflashed before his eyes. This is absurd, as Nicholas 
 was absolutely indifferent to money, and had no 
 thought of its value. He inherited his father's simple 
 tastes, and the enormous sums inscribed in the budget 
 for the expenses of the Court, added to the revenues 
 derived from the properties of the Imperial Cabinet, 
 were more than sufficient to provide for his needs and 
 those of his family. To substantiate this assertion I 
 will say that Count Witte, who was then Minister of 
 Finance, was informed by the Emperor of the Yalu 
 affair and opposed it strongly, but, in spite of his well- 
 known dislike of Nicholas, he never imputed any 
 interested motives to the Emperor in connection with, 
 the scheme. 
 
 However that may be, M. Bezobrazoff, backed by 
 the Admirals Abaza and Alexeieff, gained such influ- 
 ence over the Emperor that he put in the adventurer's 
 hands, not only the organization of this politico- 
 commercial enterprise, but the entire direction of our 
 diplomatic relations with Japan. He was promoted 
 to the dignity of a Secretary of State and became, as 
 it were, a Minister without portfolio, who arrogated 
 to himself the right to correspond directly with the 
 Emperor's representatives in the Far East, and 
 communicated the imperial orders to them over 
 the head of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As I 
 have said in a preceding chapter, it was because of 
 this new turn in our relations with Japan that I 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 283 
 
 asked to be relieved from the post of Minister at 
 Tokio.* 
 
 Is it to be wondered at, after reading all this, that 
 the Emperor should have fallen under the influence of 
 a vulgar impostor, the notorious Philippe, who began 
 life as a butcher's boy at Lyons, became a spiritualist, 
 hypnotist, and a quack, was accused of various ras- 
 calities in France, and ended by being the favourite 
 guest of the Russian Imperial Court, consulted by the 
 Emperor and Empress, not only on all that concerned 
 their personal affairs, but even, it is said, the most 
 serious state matters? 
 
 One can hardly help being struck by the similarity 
 in the fortunes of Philippe, and of Raspoutin a little 
 later, with the r61e played in French high society at 
 the close of the eighteenth century by quacks and 
 mesmerists of the same class. It seems as if a mys- 
 terious law of history worked the same result in these 
 two instances, a century apart, decreeing that, upon 
 the approach of a great revolutionary crisis, a society 
 verging upon dismemberment must needs take refuge 
 in the supernatural and the marvellous. It is true 
 that Philippe was an impostor of the most inferior 
 
 *In order to give an idea of the Emperor's credulity and hia tendency to listen to the wildest 
 propositions, I will mention these two cases; while I was Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Council 
 of Ministers took up a project — with no intention of endorsing it, of course — that had been pre- 
 sented to the Emperor by a foreign contractor, and which contemplated the joining of Siberia to 
 North America by a bridge to be built across Behring Straits. The plan provided for a concession 
 to the contractor of vast stretches of territory on both sides of a railroad that was to terminate at 
 the bridge. Another time it was an American who succeeded in persuading the Emperor that be 
 had discovered a way to defend the frontiers of a country, even as vast as Russia, by the use of 
 electric currents of such force that no enemy could possibly cross the line. This discovery was to 
 do away with the maintenance of an army. He demanded, naturally, certain pecuniary consider- 
 a^ons in advance "before revealing his secret,'and it was only with a good deal of trouble that the 
 Emperor was dissuaded from going further. 
 
284 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 order, and can hardly be classed with a Count of St. 
 Germain, a Saint Martin, or even a Cagliostro; but 
 the origin of their success is the same, and the influ- 
 ence of the " Comte pour rire"* over the Landgrave of 
 Hesse, of the "Unknown Philosopher "f over the 
 Duchesse de Bourbon, or of Joseph BalsamoJ over the 
 Cardinal de Bourbon, does not dififer from the control 
 of Nizier Vachol, alias Philippe, over the Emperor 
 and Empress of Russia. 
 
 Philippe's stay at the Court of Russia was of short 
 duration and had no particularly serious consequences. 
 The butcher's boy of Lyons appears to have had 
 only pecuniary gains in view, and never sought to 
 put his influence to the uses of a Court cabal or a po- 
 litical intrigue. His death left a place free for a 
 much more formidable person, Grigori Raspoutin, 
 who contributed materially to the downfall of the 
 Romanoff dynasty and the dismemberment of the 
 Russian Empire. 
 
 The prodigious adventure of this unlettered, 
 drunken, and shameless peasant, who left a remote 
 village of Siberia to become the intimate, the coun- 
 sellor, and, one may even say, the idol of the Russian 
 imperial couple, has already given rise to a copious 
 literature. The many books which treat of his in- 
 credible career are naturally of unequal value. That 
 which appears to me to be the clearest and best sub- 
 stantiated is the work I have so often quoted, Dr. 
 Dillon's "Eclipse of Russia." I will not go into the 
 
 *Name applied by Voltaire to the Comte de Saint Germain. 
 tThis was what Louis Claude de Saint Martin called himself. 
 {The real name of Cagliostro. 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 285 
 
 matter here, for I am not able, from my own knowl- 
 edge, to add anything useful or interesting. In fact, 
 although Raspoutin's first appearance at St. Peters- 
 burg appears to date from 1905 or 1906, at about the 
 time I became Minister of Foreign Aflfairs, he did 
 not meddle with matters outside of the Court and the 
 purely domestic affairs of the imperial family during 
 those years, and while I was a frequent visitor at the 
 palace I never chanced to see him and have no per- 
 sonal remembrance of him whatsoever. All I knew 
 of him at that time I had from M. Stolypin, from 
 some of the intimate frequenters of the Court, and 
 from my brother. Dr. DiUon states that my brother 
 resigned his post as Procurator-General of the Holy 
 Synod because of the intrigues of Raspoutin. This is 
 perfectly true. It was due to the intervention of the 
 Empress Alexandra in a series of ecclesiastical ap- 
 pointments that he did not approve. The Empress 
 was instigated by Raspoutin, who did not venture yet 
 to meddle in state affairs, but was anxious to oust 
 certain prelates who were hostile to him and protect 
 others upon whose connivance he could count. 
 
 I find only one part of Dr. Dillon's recital that is 
 Inexact. He repeats a story to the effect that M. 
 Stolypin was cured by Raspoutin of a nervous shock 
 caused by the explosion on the 25th of August. I can 
 certify that M. Stolypin was absolutely calm and seff- 
 contained at the time, and that he never had any idea, 
 on that occasion or any other, of having anything to 
 do with a person of whom he always spoke in terms of 
 the strongest aversion. 
 
286 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 I have my doubts also with regard to Dr. Dillon's 
 assertion that it was due to the advice of Raspoutin 
 that Nicholas II. refused to go to war in connection 
 with the events of the year 1912 in the Balkans. The 
 author evidently repeats what Count Witte once told 
 me, but failed to convince me of its credibility. 
 
 I have already spoken of the deep religious senti- 
 ment that was at the root of the Emperor's spiritual 
 life. How and by what steps this sentiment, which 
 at the start inspired nought but respect and sympa- 
 thy, was transformed into a vulgar superstition and a 
 complete subjection to so false a prophet as Raspoutin 
 is a problem that I had no opportunity to solve by 
 personal observation. I can only explain this evolu- 
 tion by the influence of the Empress Alexandra, 
 whose exaggerated mysticism must have proceeded 
 from pathological causes. To judge of a case of that 
 kind it is not enough to be an attentive observer; it 
 requires special knowledge, which I do not pretend to 
 have, of the obscure phenomena of moral contagion 
 and suggestion. 
 
 It is not less difficult, especially for occidental 
 minds, to discern the complex causes of the power 
 that a Raspoutin was able to exert, not solely over 
 such vulnerable natures as those of the Emperor and 
 the Empress, but in different degrees upon the ma- 
 jority of those who knew him. This power cannot, 
 I think, be explained by the hypnotic faculties which 
 he possessed to an exceptional degree. To compre- 
 hend this enigma it is necessary to have some knowl- 
 edge of the different religious and mystical move- 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 287 
 
 ments that have started in Russia at one time and 
 another, some of which grew to have a tremendous 
 influence upon the souls of the Russians, whether 
 among the masses or the upper classes. The common 
 tendency of all these beliefs was in the direction of a 
 sentiment of deep pity for the failings of the sinner, 
 and the criminal even, and was accompanied by a faith 
 in regeneration by divine grace. This so-called 
 "religion of pity," which is to be found in the writings 
 of Tolstoi and Dostoiewsky, sometimes suffered the 
 strangest distortions, and degenerated into the ex- 
 treme theory that, in order to obtain pardon, it was 
 necessary to begin by sinning. Hence the curious 
 customs of certain Russian sects, among them that 
 of the "Khlystys," one of the most widespread. 
 Their rites, which recall those of the flagellants, and 
 convulsionists, and in which mysticism is combined 
 with erotic excitement, have had adepts, not only in 
 the lower orders, but in the highest circles of Russian 
 social hfe. Early in the nineteenth century the high 
 society of St. Petersburg suffered a violent attack of 
 mysticism. The Emperor Alexander I., on his return 
 from Paris in 1814, set the example, under the influ- 
 ence of Baroness Krudener, and, if the famous woman 
 who inspired the Holy Alliance did not herself join in 
 the excesses of morbid piety which were the fashion, 
 some of her admirers and imitators at least appear 
 to have overstepped the line dividing mysticism from 
 certain pathological manifestations. It will suflSce 
 to mention Madame Tatarinoff, a friend of Baroness 
 Krudener, and openly protected for some time by the 
 
288 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 Emperor Alexander I. The reunions in the apart- 
 ment which she occupied in one of the imperial 
 palaces of St. Petersburg appear to have resembled 
 somewhat those of the "Khlystys." 
 
 I will go no farther than to mention these elements 
 of the problem without venturing upon any analysis 
 thereof, and without going into unpublished and sen- 
 sational details of a subject which I have touched 
 upon only with the deepest regret. I agree entirely 
 with Dr. Dillon's views, as expressed in his book, that 
 the real importance of Raspoutin was to symbolize 
 in the eyes of the enlightened people of Russia all that 
 was odious in the autocratic regime, and that his func- 
 tion, which might be likened to that of a chemical 
 reagent, consisted in bringing together and uniting 
 all the elements of Russian society that were adverse 
 to autocracy. 
 
 At the time when I assumed the duties of Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs and came in contact with the Em- 
 peror Nicholas, he showed no excessive tendencies as 
 yet toward mysticism and the ultra-reactionary ideas 
 which characterized the latter part of his reign. The 
 misfortunes of the Russo-Japanese War and the 
 revolutionary outbreak that followed the war had 
 visibly sobered and ripened him. After having had 
 the happy inspiration to replace M. Goremykin by 
 M. Stolypin, he showed every disposition to follow 
 the advice of his Prime Minister. He deserves all 
 the more credit, it seems to me, for remaining faithful 
 to the new institutions, because his education and 
 natural preferences inclined him toward reaction. I 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 289 
 
 may say that as long as the influence of M. Stolypin 
 prevailed and, I will add without false modesty, mine 
 also, Nicholas II. never refused to listen to any appeal 
 to his reason or his sentiments of loyalty. 
 
 This leads me to another accusation — ^the gravest of 
 all — ^which has been brought against the Emperor 
 Nicholas II., that of having been disloyal and treach- 
 erous. 
 
 I believe that I disproved, in a preceding chapter, 
 certain interpretations of the attitude of Nicholas II. 
 in the matter of the secret Treaty of Bjorkoe, and 
 demonstrated that, although he displayed weakness 
 and imprudence, nothing was further from his 
 thought than treason toward his ally. It even seems 
 to me that his spirit of loyalty is most clearly proved 
 by the manner in which he behaved toward France 
 and the other Allied Powers to the last day of his 
 reign. Did not the former British Ambassador to 
 Russia, Sir George Buchanan, render public homage 
 to the Emperor's good faith when he declared that it 
 was his duty to refute the story that the Czar of 
 Russia had favoured the conclusion of a separate 
 peace with Germany? 
 
 "I am convinced," said Sir George Buchanan, 
 "that there is not a word of truth in this rumour. 
 The Emperor, without doubt, had many faults, but 
 he was not a traitor. He would never have betrayed 
 the cause of the Allies, and was always the faithful 
 and loyal friend of England." 
 
 The French Government confirmed this statement 
 by publishing at the same time a letter addressed by 
 
290 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 the Emperor Nicholas on May 13, 1916, to Presi- 
 dent Poincare, whicli clearly shows that, in spite of all 
 the efforts employed to persuade him to treat with 
 Germany, he never consented to abandon the Allies. 
 
 It has been said that a short time before his assas- 
 sination a German general brought to him in his place 
 of captivity a proposal from the Kaiser to obtain his 
 liberty on condition that he would openly espouse the 
 cause of Germany, and that Nicholas II. refused to 
 receive him, thus practically signing his death warrant 
 and that of his family. It is impossible to prove the 
 authenticity of this story, but in the minds of all who 
 knew Nicholas II. well, there is not a shadow of doubt 
 that it is the only response that he would be capable 
 of making to such an offer. 
 
 The Emperor has been severely criticised for the 
 manner in which he dismissed one or another of his 
 Ministers, and for pretending to approve the advice 
 of one of his counsellors and then following a line of 
 conduct directly contrary. In proof of this the case 
 was cited of a Minister of State who left his Ministry 
 convinced that he enjoyed the full confidence of his 
 sovereign, only to find, when he reached his home, 
 that he had been dismissed. 
 
 This account is true. I myself have had experience 
 of the facility with which Nicholas allowed himself to 
 be dissuaded from decisions that he had taken with 
 every appearance of firmness and conviction. But 
 all this proves only one thing — ^an instinctive fear, 
 common to many very good and very weak men, a 
 fear which beset him to excess — of saying or doing 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 291 
 
 anything disagreeable to a person in his presence. 
 When he had decided to dismiss a Minister he lacked 
 the moral courage to tell him so to his face, but, on 
 the contrary, treated him with twice his usual courtesy 
 and attention and then had recourse to a written 
 communication. If it had been said of him with 
 some show of truth that he always agreed with the 
 person with whom he was talking, it can be explained 
 by the need that certain very sensitive natures feel, 
 of attracting and charming all with whom they are 
 brought in contact. There are men, and especially 
 women, with whom this attitude is only an artifice 
 and who employ flattery and a systematic agreement 
 with other's views as a means of making dupes. 
 (One of the masters in this art is the former Chan- 
 cellor of the German Empire, Prince von Billow.) 
 In the case of the Emperor Nicholas, I am convinced 
 that this characteristic was involuntary and unpre- 
 meditated. It may have contributed to the reputa- 
 tion of being a ckarmeur which he enjoyed, but without 
 the shadow of calculation or conscious deception on 
 his part. 
 
 Having now analyzed, in a manner which, I hope, 
 has not been too diffuse, the character of Nicholas, as 
 formed by the influence of his environment from 
 childhood up, it is with a certain measure of diffidence 
 that I enter upon the corresponding synthesis. His 
 was a character essentially vague and elusive, of 
 nuances and half-tones, and is difficult to define in 
 exact terms. The dominant trait appears to have 
 been a feeble will, which prevented his undoubted 
 
292 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 qualities of heart and mind from asserting themselves 
 with any effectiveness. 
 
 At the time of the crisis oLl905-it wa& this very 
 weakliess that saved the monarchy. The revolution- 
 ary movement which succeeded the reverses of the 
 Russo-Japanese War was really due to causes much 
 more remote, dating back to the preceding reign. 
 This movement, repressed for thirteen years by 
 Alexander III., would in time have inevitably broken 
 bounds, even under the iron ride of that sovereign, 
 and, with greater reason, under the more feeble rule 
 of his successor. But whereas Nicholas II., submit- 
 ting to the inevitable, avoided a catastrophe by 
 granting the charter of October 30, 1905, the in- 
 flexible will of Alexander III., in all probability, would 
 not have bent to the storm of events and would 
 finally have been broken. As in the fable of the oak 
 and the rose-bush, the weak survived where the 
 strong would have succumbed. 
 
 Twelve years later, Nicjiolas 11.^ imder.the guidance 
 of the reactionary party, perished because he tried to 
 combat the forces which could not be withstood. 
 The real cause of the fall of the Russian monarchy 
 was the senseless effort of that party to revive and 
 p^petuate in the twentieth century, and in contempt" 
 of the needs of a modern State, the anachronism of 
 autocratic power; "the most dangerous of all powers," 
 wrote fnyTncestor, in the spirit of prophecy, to the 
 Emperor Alexander I., "for.it causes the fate of 
 thousands of men to depend upon the, grandeur of 
 mind and soul of one man." Despite his good qual- 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 293 
 
 ities, Njcholaa JL dMnot j)os^^^^ ^andeur_^ 
 
 mind and soul" necessary to withstand the poison of 
 reaction, and so Became the cause of the unprece- 
 dented catastrophe which has overwhelmed his mil- 
 lions of subjects. A redoubtable power, indeed, 
 which pulls down an empire in its fall, and whose 
 collapse throws a great nation into anarchy. 
 
 If, notwithstanding considerable hesitation, I de- 
 cided to take part in the controversy over the grave 
 of the Emperor Nicholas, it was because I thought 
 that my testimony, based as it is upon direct observa- 
 tion and an intimate knowledge of his character, could 
 at the same time serve the cause of truth and clear 
 his memory of certain unjust imputations. It might 
 be difficult for me to put forward the same reasons for 
 adding to what I have already said of the Empress 
 Alexandra, In my relations with her I never crossed 
 the barrier that Court etiquette prescribes between a 
 subject — ^be he even a Minister and Counsellor of the 
 sovereign — ^and the Empress. I wa&JQ£y.e,r, adiaiLLted 
 tqthjaJia*F©,wjaJCcle-which surrounded her, and always 
 felt as if I were held at a distance. The evident cause 
 of her coldness toward me was my tendency in the 
 direction of liberal and constitutional ideas. There- 
 fore, in passing any judgment whatever upon her per- 
 sonality, I should be afraid of falling into the error of 
 repeating unconsciously the exaggerations and mis- 
 taken statements that others have been guilty of. 
 In this respect the Empress Alexandra met exactly 
 the same fate as the unfortimate Marie Antoinette, 
 in that the vindictive public charged her with all the 
 
294 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 faults of a regime that had gained the hatred of a 
 whole nation. It is certain that Marie Antoinette 
 merited the title of "the Austrian" no more than the 
 Empress deserved to be held up to public hatred as 
 "the German." On this precise point I do not hesi- 
 tate to speak explicitly: never did the consort of 
 Nicholas II. have the shadow of a tendency to betray 
 the interests of Russia. Stranger as she was by birth 
 and by education to the country of her adoption, con- 
 fined within the artificial atmosphere of the Court, 
 and seeing men and things through a distorting prism, 
 as it were, it is no wonder that she misimderstood the 
 real aspirations of the Russian people, but it was in 
 aU sincerity and in the honest conviction that she was 
 a Russian of the Russians when she favoured the an- 
 tiquated methods of the ultra-conservatives and 
 believed in the attachment of Russia for all the forms 
 of autocracy. Never to my knowledge did she seek 
 to dissuade the Emperor from his fidelity to the 
 French alliance. On the contrary, that alliance, in 
 the eyes of the two sovereigns, was beyond discussion. 
 It is true that the Empress Alexandra was unfriendly 
 to the rapprochement with England, and gave her 
 opinions very freely on that subject during my ne- 
 gotiations with the Cabinet of London, but at that 
 time she did not play the prominent part in politics 
 that she assumed later, and I never had reason to 
 complain of any interference by her in those negotia- 
 tions. 
 
 This is all that I can say of my own knowledge with 
 regard to the Empress Alexandra. I will not touch 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 295 
 
 upon the influence that her religious hysteria pro- 
 duced upon Nicholas II., nor upon the delicate subject 
 of the protection which she accorded to Raspoutin. 
 I can throw no new light on those two points, and my 
 testimony would serve no useful end. My readers 
 wiU comprehend, furthermore, the feehngs that impel 
 me to bow in silence before a calamity which has over- 
 whelmed, not only the Empress, but also the wife and 
 mother, and which perhaps has been even more hor- 
 rible than reported at first. 
 
 I feel more at ease in offering the tribute of an un- 
 reserved admiration to the mother of Nicholas II., the 
 Dowager Empress Maria Feodorowna. Her charm, 
 her goodness, and her gracious demeanour illumined 
 the rather sombre reign of Alexander III., and she 
 was able to create an atmosphere at Court that some- 
 times mollified the most persistent criticism of that 
 sovereign's excessive absolutism. Since the fall of 
 the monarchy in Russia she has been reproached for 
 having tried to keep her son too long in leading strings 
 and for giving her support to the counsellors of his 
 father when they smothered the slightest inclination 
 on the part of Nicholas II. to free himself from his 
 father's precepts. Without denying this accusation, 
 I cannot agree that any blame attaches to the Em- 
 press Maria Feodorowna; she knew the vacillating 
 nature of the young Emperor, and his lack of prepara- 
 tion for his task of governing the Empire. It was 
 only natural that she should seek, at the beginning 
 of his reign, to preserve his respect for the traditions 
 left by his father, whose powerful personality had 
 
296 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 dominated in the most absolute manner all those 
 who came in contact with him. But we have seen 
 that, when she came to understand the danger that 
 the continuance of those traditions involved for the 
 monarchy, she did not hesitate to advise her son to 
 make reasonable concessions, and she helped to save 
 the situation in 1905. When other influences had 
 prevailed over hers in the councils of the Emperor 
 Nicholas, there was nothing for her to do but remain 
 a sad spectator of events which it was not in her 
 power to prevent. And, to-day, can one imagine a 
 more poignant tragedy than that of this superior soul, 
 stricken in every fibre of her being by the martyrdom 
 of her son and by the downfall of an Empire, of which 
 she had been the good genius in other days.f* Having 
 had the privilege of knowing the Empress Maria 
 Feodorowna under particularly favourable condi- 
 tions, and of receiving from her the most precious 
 marks of confidence, I fulfil an imperious duty in 
 laying at her feet the deep-felt homage of my devotion 
 and of the pity that fills my heart when I evoke the 
 image of her Calvary. 
 
 I will make but brief mention of some of the other 
 members of the imperial family, none of whom played 
 any conspicuous political role at the period covered by 
 these memoirs. The Grand Duke Sergius at one time 
 possessed considerable influence, and it was he who 
 recommended to Nicholas II. certain Ministers who 
 were noted for their reactionary ideas; but he was 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 297 
 
 killed by the terrorists in 1905. I have already- 
 spoken of his widow, the Grand Duchess Elizabeth, 
 sister of the Empress Alexandra. After she retired 
 to the religious community which she had founded at 
 Moscow she gave up all connection with the outside 
 world. But despite her tendency toward the same 
 forms of piety practised by her sister, she evinced 
 great hostility to Raspoutin, and she tried in vain to 
 destroy bis influence over the Empress. 
 
 The Grand Duke Nicholas, later generalissimo of 
 the Russian armies in 1914, commanded at the time 
 the troops of the Imperial Guard, and gave all his 
 attention to his military duties to the exclusion of 
 politics. 
 
 The Grand Duke Vladimir had preceded the Grand 
 Duke Nicholas in that command, but, having con- 
 tracted the malady that proved fatal soon after, he 
 was unable to remain in the army. He was a man of 
 remarkable culture, and his knowledge of history was 
 often the subject of admiring comment on the part of 
 leading French savants. He rather inclined toward 
 liberal ideas, and it was without any foundation what- 
 ever that he was represented as having urged Nicholas 
 II. in the direction of reactionary measures, and es- 
 pecially as having had anything to do with bringing 
 about the regrettable event of the 22nd of January, 
 1905.* 
 
 He was always very sensitive on the subject of this 
 
 •On Sunday, January it, 1905, a procession of several thousand workmen, headed by the 
 prieat-agiUtor Gapon, set out in the direction of the Winter Palace to present a petition to the 
 Emperor in favour of constitutional reform. The procession was halted by the troops, who fired 
 upon the manifestants and killed a considerable number. This "Bloody Sunday" is generally 
 regarded as the commencement of the revolution of 1905. 
 
298 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 false accusation, and I have often heard him speak 
 in the severest terms of the methods adopted by 
 the ultra-conservative party. His wife, the Grand 
 Duchess Pavlowna, a German princess by birth, but 
 thoroughly Russian and I might say French at heart, 
 had many friends in Paris. She, also, was the object 
 of unjust attacks for her supposed predilection for the 
 interests of her native country. I happen to know 
 that she was far from having any such tendencies, 
 and that her opinion of the character and policies of 
 the German Emperor was particularly severe — a, judg- 
 ment that the facts have since fully justified. During 
 the winters, at St. Petersburg, she had an extremely 
 agreeable salon, frequented by the 61ite of Russian 
 society and the diplomatic corps, to whom she con- 
 tinued to dispense a generous hospitality at her 
 summer residence at Tzarskoie-Selo. 
 
 Among the other^embers of the imperial family 
 I will only mention the Grand Duke Nicholas 
 Michailovitch, so well known in Russia, as well as in 
 France, as the author of historical works which pro- 
 cured him the honour of being elected a corresponding 
 member of the French Institute. Highly cultivated 
 and remarkably talented, he was the only one of his 
 family who adopted really liberal ideas, and he ex- 
 pressed them with such frankness that he was nick- 
 named "Philippe Egalit6 " at Court. He was on the 
 best of terms with the Emperor, to whom he used to 
 speak with entire freedom. They had a taste in 
 common for historical studies, the Grand Duke being 
 the active president of the Imperial Historical Society 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 299 
 
 of which the Emperor was honorary president. That 
 society was founded during the reign of Alexander 11. 
 by a group of eminent men, headed by Prince Lo- 
 banoflf and M. Palowtzoff, the latter well known for 
 his great wealth and as an art collector. He rendered 
 great service to Russian historical knowledge by pub- 
 lishing a very considerable number of diplomatic 
 documents, taken from the principal archives of 
 Europe. I was one of the very restricted list of mem- 
 bers, and this brought me into frequent contact with 
 the Grand Duke, who honoured me with his personal 
 friendship for more than twenty years. The Em- 
 peror used to call a meeting of the Historical Society 
 once a year, and he presided on those occasions. 
 Communications on historical subjects were read by 
 diflferent members and all etiquette was banished. 
 During the discussion which followed the Grand 
 Duke shone in the front rank by reason of his pro- 
 found erudition and prodigious memory. Despite 
 the high esteem in which Nicholas II. held him, the 
 Grand Duke had no political influence and held no 
 State position. Like the Empress Dowager, with 
 whom he was on intimate terms of friendship, he re- 
 mained a spectator and watched events as they took 
 place, regarding them with a clear insight and often 
 with anxiety and foreboding. The only reproach that 
 I can bring against him is for not having risen above 
 his passivity, and for not having made use of his great 
 talents in more active and practical service to his 
 country. As I write these lines I am still in ignorance 
 of his fate since the triumph of Bolshevism, and I 
 
300 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 know not if he has fallen a victim to the massacres 
 which have taken place recently in Russia. 
 
 This study would not be complete if I omitted 
 mention of the persons who made up the intimate 
 circle of the Emperor Nicholas and the Empress 
 Alexandra. Great political influence has been re- 
 peatedly attributed to this entourage, and it has been 
 said that there existed at Court a "Potsdam clique," 
 intent upon detaching Nicholas II. from France and 
 throwing him into the arms of Germany. This report 
 appeared the more plausible on account of the German 
 sound of the names borne by the two principal mem- 
 bers of his suite, Baron Frederick, Minister of the 
 Imperial House, and Count Benckendorff, Marshal 
 of the Court. There is no truth in the story; the 
 Emperor Nicholas, like his brother, was extremely 
 careful to draw a line of demarkation between his 
 private life and the domain of politics; none of the 
 people who belonged to his intimate circle were ever 
 permitted to give advice upon public matters, which 
 he discussed only with his Ministers. (He did not 
 vary from this rule except, alas, in favour of a few 
 persons like M. Bezobra,zoff, but they came from the 
 outside, as it were, and never figured in his official 
 suite.) In their turn, the Ministers never penetrated 
 into the private life of the imperial couple, and out- 
 side of their hours of conference with the sovereign 
 they appeared at the palace only on official occasions. 
 It is true that the Emperor made a certain exception 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 301 
 
 in my favour, and I often had occasion to approach 
 him in more intimate fashion than my colleagues, 
 but this intimacy was, nevertheless, but relative and 
 I was never, properly speaking, one of the very re- 
 stricted number of persons who shared the familiar 
 and personal life of Nicholas II. The personage who 
 was nearest to the sovereign was Baron Frederick, 
 Minister of the Emperor's House. In his youth he 
 had been one of the most brilliant officers of the 
 Imperial Guard, and even at his advanced age he 
 retained a most distinguished and elegant bearing. 
 He was of an essentially loyal and straightforward 
 nature, affable to everyone, and universally loved and 
 respected. He had for the Emperor the devotion of 
 an old servant who had grown up in the Court, and 
 for the Empress a sort of chivalrous cult. He enjoyed 
 the sovereign's absolute confidence and had an un- 
 deniable influence over him, which he never sought 
 to employ except for a good and just cause. This 
 influence, however, as I have said, did not extend to 
 the domain of public matters, in any permanent 
 manner at least. There were, undoubtedly, occa- 
 sions when one or another of the Ministers had 
 recourse to him to place their ideas in a favourable 
 light before the Emperor, but if he yielded to any such 
 request it was always to forward a liberal and equit- 
 able cause. He refused to be an instrument of the 
 reactionaries, and I can bear witness to the fact that 
 he never sought to influence Nicholas II. in a sense 
 hostile to France and favourable to Germany. 
 All that I have said of Baron Frederick applies 
 
302 RECOLLECTIONS OF A FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 equally to the Marshal of the Court, Count Paul 
 Benckendorff, younger brother of the late Ambassa- 
 dor to London. He had great personal charm and 
 distinction, and confined himself strictly to the duties 
 which the complicated customs of the Court imposed. 
 Although very enlightened and libe^-al in his opinions, 
 he never had any opportunity, unfortunately, to 
 advocate them before the Emperor. He was not in 
 the least degree an agent of German propaganda at 
 Court, but on the contrary was particularly disliked, 
 as was his brother, the Ambassador, by William II. 
 
 Neither can any political r61e be attributed to 
 the Grand Marshal of the Court, Prince Alexander 
 Dolgorouky, familiarly called "Sandy." This grand 
 seigneur, belonging to one of the most illustrious 
 families of Russia and to a branch of that family fa- 
 mous for their personal beauty, was a striking figure, 
 of noble carriage and with the grand manner of the 
 true aristocrat. With Baron Frederick and Count 
 Benckendorff he formed a trio which gave to the 
 ceremonies and receptions at the Imperial Court, a 
 cachet of elegance and good form such as I have never 
 seen surpassed in any other court. 
 
 It is none the less true that there existed in Russia 
 at that epoch a very powerful Germanophile party. 
 It was not to be found at Court, but among the ultra- 
 conservative members of the Council of the Empire. 
 The Emperor contributed, perhaps without knowing 
 it, to the strengthening of that party by systematic- 
 ally appointing to the Upper Chamber men profess- 
 ing reactionary views. 
 
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 303 
 
 At the Lead of the Empress Alexandra's suite was 
 the Grand Mistress of the Court. This position was 
 filled at first by the Princess M. Galitzin, and, after 
 her death, by Madame Z. Naryschkin. Both were 
 veritable grandes dames, cultivated, distinguished, and 
 affable, but neither one nor the other obtained any 
 real influence over the Empress, who did not admit 
 them to complete intimacy. The only person who 
 attained that distinction was Madame Wyrouboff, 
 who had no official status at Court. Her name has 
 been often mentioned in connection with that of Ras- 
 poutin, one of whose first and most fervent adepts she 
 appears to have become. I never met her but once 
 or twice in my life, and I will abstain from any com- 
 ment whatever with regard to her. 
 
 THE END 
 
THE COtTNTHT LIFE PRESS 
 6AKDEN CITT, N. T. 
 
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