MlUTA R Y BlOGRA PHIES LO U DON COL. a B. MALLESON C. S. I. BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF m^nru W. Sage 1891 MILITARY BIOGRAPHIES. o>«Ko^ Messrs. CHAPMAN & HALL are issuing a Series of Volumes dedicated to the Lives of Great Military Commanders. ■ . -• The Volumes are designed to form a set of Critical Biographies, illustrative of the operations and the art of war, by writers of distinction in the profession of arms, whose competence to weigh t^e miliiary qualities and deeds of the Chiefs can be accepted. Maps will, when necessary, accompany the volumes for the con- venience of students. The aim of these volumes is to be both popular and scientific, combining the narrative of the most romantic and instructive of human lives with a clear examination of the genius of the soldier. The first Volume will be FREDERICK THE GREAT, by Col. C B. Brackenbury, with Maps. MARSHAL LOUDON, by Col. Malleson, C.S.L, will follow it, the two Lives presenting the opposing aspects of the Seven Years' War. CHAPMAN & HALL, Limited. From The Times. BERLIN, March ii, 1884. The Grand General Staff having now completed its history of the Franco-German war, it has been resolved to do the same thing, on as complete and comprehensive a scale as possible, for the campaigns of Frederick the Great. Marshal von Moltke has therefore issued an appeal to the nation for a sight or loan of all hitherto unpub- lished documents, maps, and plans, &c., bearing on the subject which may help the writers in the execution of their huge and patriotic task. Apropos of this, I may quote the remark once vtade by a TJiilitary lecturer connected •with the Grand General Sia^ to an English officer here. He by no means agreed^ said the lecturer in question, "with all Carlyle's political views of the Great Frederick, but he found the English historian's plans of Fredericks battles uDonderfully accurate, and always recommended their use to his students in preference to any others. *»* The Maps used in this Military Biography of Frederick are taken from Carlyle's Life of Frederick. DB 73.L87M25 ""'""'•' """"' Loudon 3 1924 028 117 558 B Cornell University B Library The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028117558 LOUDON. LOUDON: A SKETCH OF THE MILITARY LIFE OF GIDEON ERNEST, FREIHERR VON LOUDON, SOMETIME GENERALISSIMO OF THE AUSTRIAN FORCES. COLONEL 0. B. MALLESON, C.S.L, AUTHOR OF "the DECISIVE BATTLES OF INDIA," ETC. LONDON: CHAPMIN AND HALL, (Limited.) 1884. C LONDON : K. OLAY, SONS, AND TATLOB, PRINTERS, BREAD STEEKT HILL. CONTENTS. CHAPTEK I. PAGE INTKODUCTOKY 1 CHAPTER n. THE EARLY TRAININO 11 CHAPTER III. BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 18 CHAPTER IV. THE EVE OF THE WAR 30 CHAPTER V. LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL 39 CHAPTER VI. COMMANDER OF A CORPS 59 vi CONTENTS. CHAPTER VII. PACK PITTED AGAIKST F^DEKIO 65 CHAPTER yiW. AT HOOHKIROn 80 CHAPTER IX. AT KUNEKSDORF 91 CHAPTER X. LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ 112 CHAPTER XI. BUNZELWITZ AND SOHWEIDNITZ 155 CHAPTER XII. THE LAST CAMPAIGN 186 CHAPTER XIII. BEST AND LEISURE . , . 198 CONTENTS. vii CHAPTER XIV. PAGE WAE OF THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION 205 CHAPTER XV. THE TURKISH WAIt 217 CHAPTER XVI. DEATH AND CHAEACTEK 235 MAPS. To Illustkate Loudon's Campaigns in Saxony, the Laitsitz, Bkandbnbueg, and portions of Silesia and Bohemia To face page 43 To Illitsteatb Loudon's Campaigns in Bohemia, Moeavia, AND pakt as Silesia To face page 113 To Illustrate Loudon's Campaigns in the Bokdbrlands OP Austria Tofacepage 221 General Map Illustrating the Seven Years' War .... Pocket ERRATA. Page 58, line 19, for " confident to " read "confident in." Page 122, line 32, /or "Pischwitz" read " Pischkowitz." Page 149, line 14, /or "15,000" read "50,000." Page 174, line 7, for " a counterwork " read " a counterguard." Page 176, line 8, for " Kaldwell " read " Caldwell." Page 181, line 19, for " 85 " read " 83." Page 206, line 30, for "having" read "leaving." Page 206, last line, for " those " read ' ' his." Page 212, line 51, for "selected" read "selecting." Page 236, line 4, /or "than" read "when." LOUDON. CHAPTER I. INTEODUCTOEY. Chaeles VI., Emperor of Germany, died on the 20tli October, 1740, leaving no male heir, and before he had taken the precaution to have the husband of his daughter, Francis of Lorraine, Grand Duke of Tuscany, crowned King of the Romans. To secure his vast dominions to that daughter, Charles had obtained from every state of importance in Europe a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, an instrument which broke the entail established by his elder brother Joseph, and settled the right of succession, in default of male issue, first on his own daughters in the order of their birth, then on the daughters of Joseph, and, after them, on the Queen of Portugal and the other daughters of his father, the Emperor Leopold. On his death, then, his eldest daughter, Maria Theresa, succeeded, under the title of Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, to all the dominions of the house of Habsburg, and she entertained the hope that the Electoral College B 2 LOUDON. would shortly confer the dignity of emperor upon her husband, Francis of Lorraine. But events were very soon to prove the wisdom of the counsel addre^ed by Prince Eugene to Charles VI., when, noticing the ardour with which the emperor pursued the idea of obtaining from Europe guarantees for the due execution of the Pragmatic Sanction, he told him that the only guarantee worth having was an army of 200,000 men and a full treasury. Charles VI., obstinate and self- willed, was not the man to listen to advice, even when that advice came from Prince Eugene. Throughout his life he neglected the substance and pursued the shadow. Maria Theresa, far from finding, on her accession, an army of 200,000 men and a full treasury to support her title, realised to her dismay that the army, exclusive of the troops in Italy and the Low Countries, did not amount to 30,000 men; that the treasury contained only 100,000 florins, and that even these were claimed by the Empress Dowager as her personal property ! The majority of the guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction very soon convinced the Queen of Hungary how lightly they regarded the engagements wrung from them by her father, how fully they appreciated the helplessness of her position. Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria, at once asserted his claims to the kingdom of Bohemia and the Grand Duchy of Austria, on the ground that the will of Ferdinand I. had devised those territories to his daughters and their descend- ants on the failure of the male line, and that he was the lineal descendant from Anne, eldest daughter of that prince. Philip II., King of Spain and the Indies, as pretended representative of the extinct Spanish line of the Habsburgs, from which he was descended on the mother's side, demanded the cession of the Spanish- Austrian INTRODUCTORY. 3 hereditary lands in Italy as well as Milan, Mantua, Parma, and Piacenza. Emanuel III., King of Sardinia, and Augustus III., Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, who had married daughters of the Emperor Joseph, put forth less extravagant demands. But the most formidable claimant was Frederic II., King of Prussia. This prince had succeeded his father but five months previously, to find ready to his hand the army and the treasury which were wanting to Maria Theresa. Seeing in the actual state of affairs a great opportunity, such as might never occur again, Frederic revived a claim once preferred by his ancestors, but expressly renounced by them in 1688, and again in 1694, to the Silesian duchies of Liegnitz, Glogau, Biieg, and Jagerndorf. Nor was the action of the two great western powers at this crisis calculated to reassure Maria Theresa. France, guided by Cardinal Fleury, vouchsafed no public answer to the notification of the queen's accession. The tone of the private communications from her foreign oflice, coldly polite, signified an intention to hold aloof until the claims of the Elector of Bavaria should have been disposed of, and, in the meanwhile, to use her influence to oppose the election of the Duke of Lorraine to the imperial dignity. England, whilst acknowledging the queen, had accompanied the recognition by an exhortation to distrust the designs of France, and by a proposal that Austria should join her in an alliance against the House of Bourbon. The relations of Maria Theresa with the other powers of Germany were too imoertain to allow her to think of a war of aggression. But still hopeful with respect to France she received with coldness the proposals of the only guarantor of the Pragmatic Sanction who sincerely desired to uphold the conditions of that settlement. 4 LOUDON. The feeling of suspense and uncertainty which the conduct of the several powers of Europe had aroused at the Court of Vienna was not of long duration. Frederic II. of Prussia was the first \o prove the worthlessness of treaties which cannot be maintained by force of arms. Amusing the Court of Vienna for a few weeks with protestations of his readiness to serve the House of Austria, he assembled a considerable body of troops in the vicinity of Berlin ; then, throwing off the mask, he despatched Count Gotter to Vienna to formulate his proposals. Gotter was instructed to place the services of Frederic and his army at the disposal of the queen, to defend her against all her enemies, on condition that she would cede to him the two Silesias, Lower Silesia because Frederic claimed it as a right. Upper Silesia as a compensation for the costs of the war. The Court of Vienna having been informed that Frederic, not waiting for a reply to his demands, had actually entered Silesia, refused to negotiate until his troops should be with- drawn from that province. Gotter was, in consequence, dismissed, and war ensued. Frederic had indeed entered Silesia (16th December, 1740), His progress through that province, unopposed by an Austrian army, was a series of triumphs. On the 3rd January, Breslau opened her gates' to him. The strong fortresses of Glogau, Neisse, and Brieg held out, however, and the Court of Vienna hoped that they would continue their resistance until it should be able to despatch an army against the invader. But Glogau was stormed early in the spring, and Frederic was about to undertake the siege of Neisse, when he was surprised by the march of an Austrian .irmy on his line of communications with Brandenburg. He had nothing for it then but to fight. The battle which followed (10th April, 1741) called from INTRODUCTORY. 5 the village near to which it was fought, the battle of Moll- witz, was decisive of the fate of Silesia. After a contest which lasted five hours, and of which all the earlier phases were in favour of the Austrians, the steadiness and superior armament of the Prussian infantry gained the day. But Molhvitz did more than gain Silesia for Prussia. It served as the signal to rouse continental Europe against the daughter of Charles VI. Had Frederic been beaten on the 10th April, it is more than probable that the provisions of the Pragmatic Sanction would have been carried out without dispute. It was his victory which decided the course of events, which gave courage to Charles Albert of Bavaria, and which put an end to the hesitations of the Court of Versailles. When Louis XV. had been informed that Frederic of Prussia had invaded Silesia he exclaimed, " The man is mad." Five weeks after the battle of Mollwitz, May 18th, 1741, France and Spain signed a treaty with Bavaria for the dismemberment of the Austrian dominions. To this treaty the Elector Palatine, the Electors of Cologne and of Saxony, and the Kings of Prussia, of Sicily and of Sardinia aldhered. The operations of the allies were rapid. Charles Albert, supported by a French army, emerged from Bavaria by way of Passau, and following the course of the Danube, took Linz, 14th August, and pressing on to St. Polten, rummoned Vienna to surrender. Under these difficult circumstances, Maria Theresa, threatened by continental Europe, and whose only ally, England, contented herself with sending her fitful supplies of money and an unlimited quantity of advice, appealed to her Hungarian people. The noble and generous reply, and the spirit evoked by that pathetic appeal, gave to the lion-hearted queen the moral support necessary to her. 6 LOUDON. Two other circumstances tended about the same time to strengthen her cause. The Franco-Bavarian army, renouncing its design upon Vienna, turned ofE to Bohemia, whilst, under ner instructions, one of her generals, Count Neipperg, concluded (October 1742) a secret convention with Frederic, whereby in consideration of the permanent cession of Lower Silesia with Glatz and Neisse before the end of the year, the latter, who had obtained all he wanted, and who had no desire to see a prince of the Bavarian house occupy a strong position in Southern Germany supported by a French army, agreed to remain inactive. Maria Theresa made excellent use of the respite thus obtained. Withdrawing her Silesian army into Moravia, she joined it to another army in that province under the command of her brother-in-law, Charles of Lorraine, and despatched both into Bohemia to resist the Franco-Bavarian invasion. The Austrians were too late indeed to save ■ Prague, but they were able to shut up their enemies in that city. Meanwhile a third Austrian army, led by Count Khevenhuller, and preceded by a crowd of Pandours, had re-taken Linz, Scharding, and Passau, and, penetrating into Bavaria, had occupied Munich on the very day, 12th February, on which Charles Albert of Bavaria, chosen by the Electoral College Emperor of Germany a month previously, was crowned by the name and title of Charles VII. In his despair the new emperor appealed to Frederic, and Frederic, breaking the convention of the previous October, renewed hostilities, took Glatz, and after a visit to Dresden to rouse into action the Elector of Saxony, and another to Prague to concert measures with the French commander. Marshal de Broglie, advanced into Bohemia. Here, however, his difficulties commenced. His allies INTRODUCTORY. 7 could render him no help, and whilst one Austrian army threatened his communications, another, under Prince Charles of Lorraine, advanced from Moravia to meet him. It had been in the power of a really capable commander to crush at once and for ever at this conjuncture the pretensions of Frederic. He himself felt all the dangers of his position, and it was an intense relief to him when, on the morning of the 17th May, the army of Prince Charles attacked him as he lay encamped on the plain between the villages of Caslar and Chotusice (Chotusitz). The battle which followed, well contested, especially by the infantry on both sides, resulted in leaving Frederic master of the field. But his losses had been very severe, his cavalry had been almost destroyed, and although he had gained all the honours of the day, had taken 1,200 prisoners, and captured eighteen guns, the retreating Austrians had done almost as much ; for they too, retiring in good order, had carried off with them a thousand prisoners, fourteen standards, and two pairs of colours. The battle of Chotusitz, whilst it convinced Frederic that his interests would best be served by making such a treaty with the Queen of Hungary as would secure the two Silesias, satisfied the Court of Vienna that to con- centrate all the forces of the monarchy against the Franco-Bavarians it was necessary to come to some understanding with its most persistent enemy. With a heavy heart, then, Maria Theresa, agreed (28th July, 1742) to cede to Frederic Tipper and Lower Silesia and the County of Glatz — with the exception of the principalities, Teschen, Troppau, and Jagerndorf. Very soon afterwards (11th September) she concluded peace, and, the year following, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, with Saxony. About the same time she gained Sardinia by the 8 LOUDON. cession to her of a few unimportant districts in the Milanese ; and she concluded an alliance likewise with England and Holland. Relieved from the presence of the King of Prussia, the Austrian armies, led by Prince Charles of Lorraine and Prince Lobkovic, marched against the French, defeated Marshal de Broglie at Frauenberg, drove him from Braunau, and compelled him to take refuge behind the walls of Prague. That city had become the last refuge of the Franco-Bavarian invaders. It did not protect them long. Provisions within the city began to fail. The commander-in-chief of the French army, Marshal Belleisle, feeling that the toils were closing around him, offered to evacuate Prague and to quit the dominions of the Queen of Hungary, on the condition of retaining his arms, artillery, and baggage. The Court of Versailles made at the same time the most urgent overtures for peace. But the pride of Maria Theresa had been wounded. She believed her enemy to be in her power. Provisions were failing him, the winter was one of the severest ever known ; an attempt made by a relieving army led by Marshal de Maillebois to force the passes had failed, and Prague was blockaded by an army of 18,000 men. Escape seemed impossible. Yet the French general, forming his army of 11,000 foot and 3,000 horse into a single column, providing it with twelve days' provisions, and taking with him thirty pieces of cannon, sallied out on the night of the 16th December, and succeeded in making one of the most daring retreats on record. He gained Eger without leaving the smallest trophy to the enemy, and was joined there a few days later by the six thousand men he had left in the city, and who, after his departure, had been allowed to march out with all the honours of war ! INTRODUCTORY. 9 The practical result was not the less favourable to the Austrian arms. Maria Theresa was crowned Queen of Bohemia at Prague, and received the oath of allegiance at Munich. A few weeks later, 27th June, 1743, George II. of England defeated the French army at Dettingen. These successes greatly augmented her pretensions. She concluded in September of the same year an alliance with England and Sardinia, and, still embittered against France and the Emperor, announced her intention of recovering Alsace and Lorraine, and of annulling the election of Charles VII. with the view of replacing him by her husband. These successes roused Frederic of Prussia once again to action. Under the veil of hostility against France and the emperor, he detected the fixed purpose of Maria Theresa to recover Silesia. The only means he had of saving his con- quest was a prom.pt alliance with the threatened powers. The announced intentions of Maria Theresa with respect to the Emperor Charles VII. furnisbed him. with an excuse for intervention to protect the rights of the emperor. To resist then the pretensions of the Queen of Hungary he summoned the German princes to a meeting at Frankfort. The Elector Palatine and the Elector of Hesse Cassel alone responded to his call. With these, and with Sweden, he made then a treaty of alliance, called the Union of Frankfort, the object of which was to resist the Austrian px'etensions by force of arms. Frederic then turned to France. With her he was more successful. He concluded an alliance based upon a com- bined plan of operations which should at the same time relieve France from the threatened invasion and turn the blow meditated by Austria against herself. It was agreed that before the Austrian armies could overrun Alsace Frederic should invade Bohemia. This invasion would 10 LOUDON. necessitate the prompt recall of the Austrians from the upper Ehine. The French undertook to follow the recalled army so vigorously that it would have no leisure to interfere with Frederic, who, but slightly opposed, would thus have Austria at his mercy. The treaty with France was dated the 5th of June 1744. Little more than two months later (9th of August) Frederic published a manifesto in which he declared he had taken up arms solely to restore to the German empire its liberty, to the Emperor his dignity, and to Europe its repose. Immediately afterwards he entered Bohemia at the head of his army. In the war which followed, known as the second Silesian war, there appeared for the first time serving in the Austrian ranks a Livonian gentleman of Scottish origin, who subsequently became the most formidable antagonist of the invader. As his name will occur more than once in the history of the campaign, it is fit that before entering upon its record I should make the reader acquainted with the early antecedents of Gideon Loudon. CHAPTER II. THE EAELY TRAINING. The ancestors of Gideon Loudon, belonging to a branch of the noble house of Loudoun, had quitted Ayrshire in the fourteenth century, and, emigrating to Livonia, had become the possessors of two considerable landed properties in that province. One of these was registered under the family name, spelt variously as Laudon, Laudohn, and Loudon ; the other under the name it had previously borne, of Tootzen. To these properties were subsequently added others which became in later years the portion of the younger branch of the family. Time did not deal very favourably with the elder branch. The policy of Charles XI. of Sweden and the wars of Charles XII. made great havoc with their resources, and when Gideon Loudon was born Tootzen was the only estate remaining to his branch of the family. At that place Gideon was born in the year 1716. His father, Gerhard (Gerard) Otto, a lieutenant colonel in the Swedish army, had married a daughter of the noble family of the Bornemund, and of this marriage Gideon Loudon was the first child. As such he was naturally intended to be a soldier, and to fit him for that career his father instructed 12 LOUDON. him at an early age in drawing, in mathematics, and in geography. He did not then become proficient in any of these studies but he learned sufficient to make him wish to acquire more, and we shall see how in his maturer years he applied himself to that purpose. The province of which he was a native had been ceded to Russia in 1721. When therefore Loudon arrived at an age to enter upon his career he took service in the Russian army as a cadet. He was then (1731) in his sixteenth year. Like other noblemen of the time he began at the lowest grade. The year after his entrance into the army an opportunity of being under fire presented itself. The election for the succession to the Crown of Poland had resulted in the double choice of Frederic Augustus of Saxony and Stanislaus Leczinski. The Russians, who took the side of the former, sent an army into the country to uphold his claims. Stanislaus, upon this, fled to Dantzig. The Russians pur- sued him and laid siege to that city. Loudon's regiment formed part of their army, and it is recorded that during the siege that followed, and especially during the storming of the Stolzenberg, which cost the lives of many officers, he gave marked proofs of courage and conduct. His health, delicate in his youth, suffered much from fatigue and exposure, and he was laid up for some time after the conquest of the place with an illness of a dangerous character. The year following, Russian troops set foot for the first time on German soil. They came not, indeed, as enem.ies, but as allies of the German empire against the French. They did nothing more, however, than march from the Volga to the Rhine, for on their arrival at the latter river preliminaries of peace between the contending powers had been agreed upon. The Empress Anna was the less unwilling to recall THE EARLY TRAINING. 13 tbern, because the check given by the Ottoman Porte to her designs regarding the Crimea had caused her to declare war against the Turks. The Russian troops then marched from the Rhine to the seat of war with all haste. On arriving there the Turks and Tartars retreated before them, forcing them to traverse, in their pursuit, steppes still burning and to suffer from a want of water almost unbear- able. Loudon, who served with the army in its march from the Volga to the Rhine and thence to the Dnieper, was wont to attribute the chest-complaint which troubled him all his life to this terrible march. The Russian army found itself, on approaching the Crimea, under the command of Marshal Miinnich. That general stormed the lines of Perekop in May, 1736, then besieged and took Oczakow, and laid waste the Crimea. For his services in this campaign, Lo\idon was promoted to the rank of sub-lieutenant, a sufficient proof that he had done his duty. At the close of 1738 he visited his home at Tootzen, on short leave, returned thence to the army early in the following year, was present at the battle of Hawuczane, the overruning of Moldavia, the occupation of Jassy, and the siege and capture of Choczim. He was promoted during the campaign to the full rank of lieutenant. Peace between Russia and the Porte having been signed in the autumn of 1739 Loudon accompanied his regiment to Astrakan. Whilst he was quartered there the death of the Emperor Charles VI. kindled the war of the Austrian succession. For a time Loudon hoped that Russia would take part in that war, but when she remained steadfastly quiescent he took the earliest opportunity to quit her service, and proceeded direct to St. Petersburg, in the hope of obtaining letters of introduction to some influential persons either at Berlin or Vienna. Frequenting there the 14 LOUDON. salons of Count von Lbwenwolde, a Livonian like timself and seneschal to ■ the court, he became intimate with his secretary, an Alsatian named Hochstetten, who had friendly relations with more than one influential family in the capital of Austria. With this man he talked over his prospects, and eagerly clutched at an ofier niade him by his friend to furnish him with letters which would introduce him into good society in Vienna. But just as he was about to set out he learned that the war between Austria and Prussia had been terminated by the peace of Breslau, (June 11, 1742). Still anxious for employment, and learning that the English and Dutch were sending out ships to defend their possessions in the East Indies, he resolved to offer his services to one of those powers. Wishing, however, to take leave of his uncle on his mother's side, who filled a high office at the Swedish court, he proceeded by sea to Stockholm. The tossing which he experienced on this occasion convinced him that he could not stand the long voyage to the East, and, after his arrival at his uncle's, he would appear to have con- sidered the proposal then made to him to enter the Swedish service. The reflection that Sweden was a declining power, and that Prussia had just begun to carve her way to the front rank, induced him to reject the idea. He returned then to Tootzen, and after a last farewell to his father, set out, with thirty ducats in his pocket, for Berlin to seek there an audience and a commission from the great Frederic. Arrived at the Prussian capital Loudon preferred his request to the king. Prederic did not absolutely refuse it, but caused him to be informed that he might remain there and wait till a vacancy should occur. For six months he waited, presuming once during that period to remind the king of his promise. Frederic exhorted him to have patience, but when, just before the term had expired, the Goverrtor TEE EARLY TRAINING. 15 of Berlin, of whom Loudon had made a friend, pressed the king earnestly on his behalf, Frederic gave him no encouragement to persevere, declaring that the heavy eyebrows and the thin lean body of the applicant were alike distasteful to him. The governor, however, did not accept this rebuff as final, and advised Loudon to demand a personal interview, and to press respectfully but firmly for a decisive answer. The audience was applied for and granted. In the light of subsequent events, and in the presence of the fact that the petitioner for employment became the most formidable opponent of the king who refused it — ^that, not many years later, the king meeting him at a royal banquet at which the petitioner, then a general, had modestly chosen a place at the further end of the table on the side opposite to that on which he himself sat, exclaimed, beckoning to him to seat himself near him : " Come here, Marshal Loudon, I would rather see you by me than opposite to me," the interview is worthy of permanent record. At it Loudon represented to the king that he had had experience of war, that he had come to Berlin to have the honour of serving under the greatest soldier of the day, that he had waited six months, had long since exhausted all his resources, and been reduced to earn bare livelihood as a copying clerk ; that he would count the time well spent if the king would graciously bestow upon him the commission of captain in a cavalry regiment. Frederic heard him to the end, then replied : " I must indeed have many squadrons at my disposal if I could give one to every foreign officer who comes to Berlin," and dismissed him. Loudon, bajGBed at Berlin, proceeded to "Vienna. He took with him knowledge which could not but be useful to him were he fortunate enough to obtain service in 16 LOUDON. the Austrian army. He had, in fact, employed his time at the Prussian capital to the best advantage, had thoroughly mastered Frederic's military system, and especially theteforms he had introduced into his artillery. Fortified with the letters of introduction he received from the Austrian ambassador, Count von Rosenberg, he could present himself at the Viennese court as a person who was worth receiving. He reached Vienna in the spring of 1744. The recom- mendations which Count Rosenberg had forwarded on his behalf inspired Maria Theresa with a desire to see Loudon, and she gave directions that he should attend her at Schijnbrunn. Whilst awaiting his turn in the antechamber Loudon was accosted by a stranger, who, in a friendly manner, inquired as to the business which had brought him there. Loudon entered freely into conversation with the man, related with great frankness the history of his past career, and expressed his hopes for the future. The stranger thereupon told him that if he would only speak as frankly and freely to the Queen of Hungary as he had to him his request would certainly be granted. He then quitted him. Summoned a few minutes later to the presence room, Loudon beheld his unknown friend standing by the side of Maria Theresa. He at once recognised that he had been speaking to her husband the Duke of Lorraine. It need scarcely be added that the request was granted. Loudon left the royal presence captain in the Austrian army. Chance took Loudon that same evening to the theatre, and there he met unexpectedly the famous Francis, Baron Trenck, then a Lieut.-Colonel commanding the Sclavonian Free corps, known as the Pandours. Trenck had made Loudon's acquaintance in Russia, and appreciating his THE EARLY TRAINING. 17 value, called him into his box, and offered him the choice of command of one of two companies of his regiment, the first of which was in the Upper Palatinate, the second in Bavaria. Loudon chose the latter and started the next morning to join his command. This happened in April, 1744. CHAPTER III. BEFORE THE SEVEN YEAES' WAE. The Company of Pandours of which Loudon assumed command in Bavaria formed a fraction of the van-guard of the army which Prince Charles of Lorraine was about to lead into Alsace. That army consisted of 46,000 infantry and 22,000 cavalry. The van-guard, of which Trenck's Free corps was a component part, was commanded by Field- Marshal Nadasdy. With a view to deceive the French and Bavarians who were guarding the Rhine near Mayence Prince Charles detached a corps under General Barenklau to occupy their attention in that direction, Nadasdy and Trenck, then^ at the head of 9,000 Hussars and Pandours, crossed the Rhine (30th of June) near Philipsburg; surprised thr^e Bavarian regiments stationed there, and drove them from their camp, killing and taking prisoners 532 of their number. It is stated in the Austrian records that Trenck was the first man, and Loudon the second, to touch the soil on the left , bank of the Rhine. This success secured for the rest of the Austrian army an unmolested passage of the river (1st to the 3rd of July). The very same day, 3rd of July, Nadasdy, always with BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 19 Trenck's Free corps in the van, marched against and took possession of' Lauterburg, on the 6th of Weissenburg, and on the 11th of Hagenau. The French Commander, Marshal de Coigny, after an abortive attempt to recover Weissenburg, fell back behind the Moder, and leaving Alsace to the Austrians, prepared to defend Lorraine. So acutely was the position felt at Versailles that the King of France himself set out to take the command of the army, and issued orders that no important operations were to be undertaken until his arrival. Meanwhile reinforcements from all parts of France were sent into Lorraine, The place in Alsace which had been most fiercely assailed by the advancing and retreating armies was the castle of Elsass-Zabern, called by the French Saverne. Taken by Trenck, Loudon leading the storming party, and occupied by Nadasdy, it had been evacuated by the latter on the approach of a greatly-superior force under the Duo d'Haroourt, and had then been retaken by Nadasdy, reinforced by Biirenklau's corps. As Nadasdy advanced from this place, however, he was attacked in the night by the French and momentarily driven back. The French on this occasion took some prisoners. Amongst these was Loudon, who, fighting in the very front, had been struck by a musket ball in the right bi'east. The ball itself passed through the upper part of the body, but the wound was aggravated by the fact that the bullet had driven into the cavity one of the metal buttons of his doUman. It Was perhaps fortunate for Loudon that he was captured, for at the moment there was no surgeon with the Austrian advance, whereas, taken prisoner, he was placed under the care of a French surgeon possessing alike humanity and skill. His cure was tedious and painful. At last, however, the surgeon was able to extract the button, and the wound then gradually healed. c 2 20 LOUDON. Long before this had occurred London was again with his own people. The Pandours, advancing a few days after their defeat, had recaptured the village in which their captain lay wounded, and with him the surgeon who was attending him. Loudon was sent to the rear of the army to await there his complete recovery. Before that happened circumstances occurred to make a complete change in the military calculations. We have already noted why it was that Frederic II. regarded with great apprehension the success of the French in Alsac^, and the measures which he had taken to baffle the designs of the Queen of Hungary. Taking ad- vantage of the declared intention of Maria Theresa to invalidate the election of Charles YII. he had posed as the upholder of the dignity of the German empire, had enlisted on his side the Palatinate and Hesse Cassel, had made an alliance with France, and had ai-ranged with that power a plan of operations which, if carried out as he had planned them, could not fail to succeed. He waited then till Austria had completely entangled herself in Alsace and was about to invade Lorraine ; till the reinforcements despatched by the Court of Versailles to Marshal de Coigny — 30,000 men under de Noailles — had actually reached him ; till Louis, on his way to join the army, had reached Metz. Then he issued the famous de- claration to which I have referred, and invaded Bohemia ! (August, 1744). Information of this act of hostility reached the head quarters of the Austrian army on the 21st August. The position was very critical : an enemy of superior force in front of them, a broad and unbridged river behind them, severing them from the fatherland invaded by another enemy. Prince Charles was not a great captain himself, BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 21 but, in the person of Count Traim, he had at his side a general second to none of that pei-iod, and who was yet destined to become, according to the admission of the pupil, the best instructor of Frederic in the art of war. But not even the advice of Traun, had it been on all occasions followed, would have saved the Austrian army at this crisis, had the French displayed even ordinary vigour. Frederic's calculations had been perfect, provided every man performed the part allotted to him. But just at the critical moment sickness stepped in and struck down his principal confede- rate, Louis XV., when on the very eve of setting out from Metz (8th to the I5th of August). This contretemps spoiled one part of his plan. The French commanders had received positive instructions not to fight" till Louis should arrive to take command — and now Louis was detained by sickness at Metz. The Austrian commander was able, then, to re-cross the Rhine unmolested. He effected this operation on the 24th of August, destroyed the boats and pontoons he had used, and marching eastward with a haste rare in those days entered Bohemia on the 24th of September. In the course of less than three months the skilful manoeuvres of Count Traun, who directed the operations of the army, forced the King of Prussia to renounce the conquests he had made, to sacrifice his heavy artillery, and to evacuate Bohemia. One month later, January 20th, 1745, the ostensible reasons for the war disappeared. Charles VII., Emperor of Germany died. The election of Francis of Lorraine, the Queen of Hungary's husband, was certain. Frederic could no longer declare that he was waging war to restore to Germany its liberty and to the Emperor his dignity. The events which followed immediately upon the death of Charles VII. diminished still further the grounds upon which he had based his hostile position. Hesse Cassel 22 LOUDON. and the Elector Palatine withdrew at once from the Union of Frankfort; on the 22nd of April, Max Joseph of Bavaria, sncqpssor of the late Emperor in that electorate, signed at FUssen a treaty of peace with the Queen of Hungary ; and on the 28th of May following Saxony en- tered, at Warsaw, into an alliance, defensive and offensive, with the same sovereign. The prepondei'ance had thns re- verted to the House of Austria. Frederic stood alone in Germany against that power. There were not wanting symp- toms, moreover, that he might have Russia on his hands at the same time. Under these circumstances he was will- ing to revert once again to the conditions of the Peace of Breslau. But Maria Theresa had signed that Peace under the pressure of hard necessity. She could not be expected, victorious, to confirm a cession she had made under direct compulsion — to confirm it, too, just after her enemy, unsatisfied with that cession, had thwarted her plans upon France. No — rather would she reduce this disturber of the peace of Germany to the position from which his grandfather ought never to have emerged — the position of an Elector of Brandenburg. For his part Frederic declined to renounce his plunder — and the war continued. Loudon, meanwhile, had recovered from his wound, had joined his corps of Pandours, now transformed into a regular Hungarian regiment, quartered in Upper Silesia, and form- ing part of the army commanded in that province by Prince Esterhazy. Tn the month of May he was present at a suc- cessful attack made by that prince upon a column of 9,000 Prussians despatched from Neisse to take Jagerndorf and who had actually penetrated into that place. They were driven back with loss. During the same month, however, an event occurred which brought him more prominently into notice. BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. C3 On the 20th. of May a Prussian ensign, deserting from Kosel, informed Prince Esterhazy that General von Saldner, commanding in that place, had just died, and gave him such information as decided him to attempt the place by a coup-de-main. The enterprise he entrusted to an officer upon whose intelligence and activity he could depend. Colonel Buccow. Buccow took with him a regiment of Pandours, a Hungarian infantry regiment, and some cavalry, sending on in front Lieutenant-Colonel d'Olne and Loudon, with the advance guard of Pandours. D'Olne came within sight of the place on the 25th of May and despatched Loudon to mate a thorough examination of the fortress and country. Loudon returned and pointed out to d'Olne how, with the small party at his disposal, the place might be surprised and taken. D'Olne, however, was not sufficiently adventurous to make the attempt with- out orders, but sent on Loudon to Buccow for the necessary authorisation. This Buccow at once gave and sent a re- inforcement from the Hungarian I'egiment. The column of attack, composed of 200 men, was then formed, and the command of it given to Loudon. At two o'clock on the morning of the 26th of May, he crept, accompanied by eleven volunteers, at the head of his small column, to the edge of the outer ditch of the fortress, upwards of fifty feet in width and full of water. Nothing dismayed by this obstacle the twelve volunteers crossed it, and scaling the wall, gained the rampart just as the discharge of two muskets by the garrison told them they had been dis- covered. Loudon, the first to reach the parapet, came all at once on a battery of five guns. One of these he promptly turned against the enemy; — waited till more of his men should reach him and then sent a portion of jthem to assail the Prussians, now collecting in force, in flank, whilst .24 LOUDON. he attacked them in front. The fact that the fortifica- tions were unfinished doubtless considerably aided him, for, in a few minutes, he compelled the garrison to evacuate them and to retf eat into the town. Not long, however, was this a refuge for them, for d'Olne and St. Ivary coming up forced the gates and compelled their surrender-. They consisted of nineteen officers and four hundred men. The victors captured likewise twenty-seven guns, of which ten were twelve-pounders, a hundred munition waggons fully laden and a well-stocked magazine. They gained these advantages at the cost of ten men killed and twenty-two wounded. The loss of the garrison was nearly treble that amount, and included the Colonel commanding and the second in command. This was the first occasion on which an opportunity had been given to Loudon to show his capacity in command. His conduct attracted the attention of his comrades and of his superiors, and gave him the reputation of a man who could be depended upon in an emergency. But no one yet discerned in the shy and studious foreigner attached to the Corps of Trenck, a corps always in the front, always engaged, generally with advantage, with the enemy's out- posts, a man who, in the great crisis of Austria's fortunes, would lead her armies. Such a future never presented itself then to the mind of Loudon. Gifted with a character thoroughly practical he was content, in his position as one of the advanced guard of the enemy, to observe, to carry out orders, to show himself always on the alert, to watch for opportunities. It was a capital school for a rising warrior. After the capture of Kosel, Loudon's regiment was attached to th^ corps of Nadasdy, who then, as in the Alsace- Lorraine campaign, commanded the advance of the army BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 25 under the command of Prince Charles of Lorraine. That prince, with Count Traun at his elbow, had, we have seen, forced Frederic, by a series of masterly manoeuvres, to evacuate Bohemia, and, joined by the Saxons, had entered Silesia. But Prince Charles had no longer Traun at his elbow. With a fatuity which has often guided its councils, the Court of Vienna had rewarded that able soldier by bes- towing upon him the Government of Transylvania. Left to his own resources Prince Charles was no match for the King of Prussia. He allowed himself to be surprised and beaten on the 4th June, at Hohenfriedburg, and forced to re- treat into the Bohemiian mountains. Three months later, however, strongly reinforced and spurred on by the Court of Vienna to act. Prince Charles, marching with great secrecy, took up a position, which, if he could have main- tained it, would have cut off Frederic, then lying at Staudenz, from Silesia. The plan, whilst being carried out, was betrayed by a deserter to Frederic, and Frederic, though he knew not precisely from which side an attack would come, prepared himself to meet one from any quarter. Still, he was to a certain extent surprised when, early on the morning of the 30th of September, he beheld the hills on the right of his camp occupied by the enemy. The chances were all in favour of the Austrians. They numbered thirty thousand to Frederic's eighteen thousand ; they occupied a commanding position : they were acting on a preconcerted plan, and, to make^ assurance doubly sure, their general had ordered Nadasdy to march on Liebenthal, four miles to the south-east of the Prussian camp, with instructions that on receiving a certain order, he should fall upon it from the rear. But never was the want of a firm and commanding will more apparent than in the Austrian camp on this eventful 26 LOUDON. day. Had Prince Charles only acted with vigour he had Frederic in his toils. But through the want of that im- pressive will everything went wrong. He himself com- mitted the firsff fault. Having the advantage of position of attack, to a certain extent of surprise, he halted and allowed the Prussians to form and to attack him. Again, the order to attack reached Nadasdy too late, and although, on receiving it, Nadasdy did capture the Prussian camp — and with it the King of Prussia's almost empty treasure-chest and his baggage — it was because there were few to defend it, and his action had no effect on the battle, which had been already won by Frederic. The advantages of numbers, of position, of surprise, were thus neutralised by a want of daring and concert. It was often the fortune of Frederic to be opposed to generals of the stamp of Prince Charles ! The victory of Soor — as the battle was called from the vil- lage occupied by the Austrians before the battle — permitted Frederic to withdraw his army into Silesia and to place it in winter quarters about Eohnstock and Hohenfriedberg. He then started for Berlin, believing that military opera- tions had ceased for the season. In this instance, however, he did not take into calculation the determination of the Empress-Queen — for by the election of her husband to the Imperial dignity (13th of September) Maria Theresa had now assumed that title — to use to the utmost the advantages which superiority in men, in money, and in material had placed in her hands. She was resolved to carry the war into Brandenburg. How the designs of Maria Theresa were foiled by the victories of the Prussians over her armies at Hennersdorf, (27th of November) and Kesselsdorf (15th of December), and how ten davs after the last named battle the war was BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 27 concluded by the peace of Dresden, by which, whilst Austria ceded Silesia and the country of Glatz, Frederic acknow- ledged Francis I. as Emperor of Germany, and how, rather less than three years later, England, Holland, France, Spain and Austria signed the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, (30th of April, 18th of October, 7th of November, 1748), are matters with which the historian of Loudon's life has no concern. For, alm.ost immediately after the battle of Soor Loudon quitted the Austrian service. It happened in this manner : Loudon was under the im- mediate orders of Francis, Bai-on von Trenck. Trenck was a born plunderer, hard, cold, unfeeling, totally without mercy, and preferring pillage to war. It has been urged against him that his desire to plunder the camp of the King of Prussia was the re^l cause of the late arrival of Nadasdy on the battle-field of Soor. His harshness, his insolence, his cruelty, his indifference to military order, grated par- ticularly on Loudon, whose character was exactly opposite. He bore with him long, but, after Soor, he felt he could not serve under a man who would not hesitate to sacrifice the public good for his private advantage. He resigned therefore his post and proceeded to "Vienna. Loudon was still at Vienna when the peace of Dresden was signed. As that peace shut out from him all prospect of military employment he had resolved to try his fortunes in another country, when he received an order to stay where he was, in order to appear as a witness against Trenck, just placed under arrest for malversation and other misde- meanours. Trenck, during the trial, endeavoured to im- plicate Loudon, but the latter had been careful enough to preserve all the orders he had received, and these documents proved that in every instance he had obeyed orders. Whilst, therefore, Trenck was sentenced to pay a fine of 120,000 28 LOUDON. florins to his accusers, the men whom he had plundered, and eventually, to imprisonment for life in the castle of Spielburg, Loudon left the court with an unspotted and even enhanced reputation. His means at this time were very scanty. There lived in the last decade of the last century men who remembered ; well how he used to come every evening to take a glass of cheap wine in a garden in the Alser suburb. His leisure moments he used to devote to a study of geography, of mathematics, with a view to qualify himself luore perfectly for his profession. But every day spent in Vienna diminished his resources, and he had begun to despair of the future, when a friend, who had considerable court influ- ence, and who had formed the highest opinion of him, the well-known musician Salviatti, succeeded in obtaining for him a captain's commission in a regiment of Croats. Salvi- atti' s kindness did not end there, for he lent him a hundred ducats to enable him to join. Loudon's regiment was at Bunic on the Croatian frontier. On his way thither he stopped at Bbsing, about eleven miles from Pressburg, to present a letter of introduction he had received from Salviatti to Madame von Haagen, a widow lady who lived on her property in that neighbourhood. Well received by Madame von Haagen Loudon stayed some time at Bbsing, and soon after married the second daughter, Clara. Pretty, well- educated and clever, Clara von Haagen was just the wife \ for a man of quiet energy, anxious to improve himself, and determined to attain a definite end. She entered into all ' his hopes and aspirations, and during a long married life she proved his best, his truest, his most trusted friend. \ The fortune she brought with her, whilst not large, was yet a sensible addition to a captain's pay. She bore him two sons, both of whom died in their infancy. BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 20 Ten years were spent by Loudon on the Croatian frontier, principally at Bunic. He spent his leisure time in pursuing his studies of history, geography, and geometry. He pro- vided himself for that purpose "with the best maps he could procure. It is related of him that the better to study a very large map which he had procured, he had removed the furniture from the centre of the room and placed the majj on the floor. He repeated this process so long and so often that one day his wife, not quite understanding his pertin- acity, exclaimed with a slight tinge of asperity : " What pleasure can you possibly find in always studying that big map?" "Leave me alone, my dear," replied Loudon, "the knowledge I am now acquiring will be useful to me when I become Field-Marshal " ! In other respects there was little to call for the display of the special qualities which characterised him. Though much discontent, the consequence of the introduction of new regulations, prevailed generally in Croatia, and de- veloped a little later into a regular outbreak of the Croatian soldiers, Loudon put down the disorder in his own company with a very strong hand. Assembling the non-commissioned oflScers, and appealing to their loyalty, ' he arrested and brought to sharp trial the mutineers. So vigorous was his action that in four-and -twenty hours order was restored, never again to be disturbed. In the other districts the disturbances were more prolonged, but the result was the same. Meanwhile Loudon's promotion had been going on. • In 1750 he was promoted to be Major, and in three years later to the rank of second Lieutenant-Colonel. He was serving in that rank when the Seven years' war broke out. CHAPTER IV. TIIE EVE OF THE WAR. Maria Theresa had never forgiven Trederic the seizure of Silesia. For ten long years she brooded over the loss. Every thought of her mind was directed during that period to devise a plan for the punishment of the evil-doer and the recovery of the stolen country. Before even the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had been signed, she had striven hard to win over Kussia to her views. The highly-gifted Sovereign who reigned over that country, the Czarina Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, would not have been inclined, in any case, to view with complacency the growth on her western frontier of a military kingdom, strong enough to bar to her the road to the rest of Europe. Under the actual circumstances she had strong personal reasons for determining to seize the earliest occasion to stifle the growth of Prussia. Her private life had not been and was not so pure as to defy criticism, and Frederic, who gossessed to a high degree the power of satire, and who, like all men specially endowed, could not refrain from the exercise of tha,t dangerous talent, had given vent publicly to sarcasms which could not fail to reach the ears of the Czarina. Elizabeth, then, hated Frederic with a hatred which his destruction alone could satiate. The policy she TEE EVE OF THE WAR. 31 had inherited from her father coincided in this respect with her strong personal feelings. Sure then of the support of Russia, Maria Theresa then had to consider how it might be possible to gain France. The alliance of France would mean the hostility of England, but she had felt herself on many occasions during the previous war so hampered by the advice, and so little benefited by the active assistance, of the latter, that she did not hesitate between the two, In this view she was sup- ported by her chancellor, Count von Kaunitz, a statesman of rare ability and foresight. As the policy of this illus- trious man influenced the House of Austria during the period upon which we are now entering, a short description of him will be necessary. Anton Wengel von Kaunitz was born in Vienna in 1711, the fifth and youngest son of a family of nineteen children. He was originally intended for the Church, but the death of his four elder brothers on the field of battle changed his career, and he was sent successively to the universities of Vienna, Leipzig, and Leyden, to prepare him for diplomatic service. Subsequently, with the same purpose in view^ he visited North Germany, Italy, France, and England. On his return to Vienna in 1735 he was nominated by the Emperor, Charles VI,, an Aulic councillor, and a little later was sent as second Imperial commissary to the diet of Eatisbon. The death of the Emperor withdrew him from this mission, but the following year, 1741, he was nominated by Maria Theresa ambassador to the Holy See, and was gent thence, in 1742, as Minister Plenipotentiary to Turin, to consolidate a defensive alliance between Sardinia and Austria. The ability he displayed on this oceasion very favourably impressed his sovereign ; she sent him to represent her at the court of her brother-in-law, 32 LOUDON. Charles of Lorraine, then Governor of the Low Countries ; and when, shortly afterwards, Prince Charles was com- pelled, by the death of his wife, to absent himself, she confided to him the administration, ad interim, of those provinces. On the return of Prince Charles, he resumed his office of Minister Plenipotentiary, and was with him at the time of the French occupation of Brussels. Subse- quently he represented Austria at the congress of Aix-la- Chapelle, and signed on behalf of his country the Peace which bears the name of that town. On his return from Aix-la-Chapelle, Kaunitz resumed his seat in the Aulic Council. He was present as one of its members when Maria Theresa summoned it to deliberate on the imperial policy to be pursued now that peace reigned throughout Europe. She found opinions divided. Her husband, the Emperor Francis, declared himself in favour of pursuing the traditional policy of the empire — the policy of a cordial understanding with England and Holland^-and recommended the renunciation of all thought of Silesia, and the conciliation of Prussia. Kaunitz opposed this view. In a state paper, remarkable for its logical argument, he laid down that the rise of the electorate of Brandenburg had materially affected the position of Austria ; that whereas, before that rise, the latter had two hereditary enemies, France and the Sultan, she now had three ; that Austria would never be safe till she had recovered Silesia ; but that, to make that recovery certain, it was necessary that she should form a European confederacy to crush her rival ; and of that confederacy France should be a component part. These views, which expressed in well-argued sentences the thoughts of Maria Theresa, were adopted then as the secret policy of Austria, and Kaunitz was despatched to THE EVE OF TEE WAR. 33 Paris to endeavour to win over the Frencli Court. Tlie con- version of a hereditary enemy to the position of an active friend would have been an almost impossible task even for a man whose diplomatic and statesmanlike ability, and whose influence over the politics of the age gained for him at a later day the sobriquet, "the coachman of Europe;" of whom Voltaire records that " he was as active in the cabinet as the King of Prussia was in the field ; " had he not been powerfully aided by Frederic himself. The malicious spirit which had made of the Czarina Elizabeth an implacable enemy had not spared the reigning mistress of Louis XV. It had been possible for Frederic to bind Madame de Pompadour to his interests, for, at the outset, she had a keen admiration for him. But no political con- sideration, no personal friendship, could restrain the love of satire which reigned supreme in the breast of the King of Prussia, and which he exsrcjsed at the expense often of his best friends. Some of his sayings, reported to Madame de Pompadour and to Louis XV., had changed their feelings into bitter hatred, and had predisposed them therefore to listen to the advances of Kaunitz. That great statesman remained two years in France care- fully preparing the bases of an alliance which, at the proper time, was to be concluded. Maria Theresa then recalled him, to assume, as Chancellor of the Empire, supreme direction of her affairs. " She expected his arrival," wrote the English minister to Dresden who had been despatched thence to Vienna on a secret mission, " with the same im- patience as Henry VI II. looked for the return of Cranmer when he was tired of Wolsey." His arrival afSxed the seal to the negotiations which were still pending Practically, Eussia and France were secured. It remained only to gain Saxony. 34 LOUDON. Kg,unltz proceeded then to win over tllat Power. He found the Saxon minister, Count Briihl, sympathetic but timid. Briihl was unwilling to strike until Russia should be actually on*the move. He felt that if Frederic were to deal the first blow his own country would have to parry it.- With the view of preventing this he urged patience on the Court of Vienna on the one side, whilst, on the other, he used every argument at St. Petersburg to induce Russia. to assail the common enemy. The result would probably have corresponded to his wishes had Briihl used common precaution. The depositary of the secrets of two great Powers, upon whose common action depended the fate of a third, it became him to see that the correspondence did not fall into the hands of any but those of whose loyalty he was absolutely sure. This was the more essential as he knew from experience that the king he was plotting against was a man absolutely without scruple. But Briihl took no precautions. It resulted from this that before the pear was ripe Frederic obtained cognisance of the whole plan. It happened in this way. Towards the end of 1752 a Saxon who had been employed in the public oflS.ces in Dresden, and also was about to emigrate into Prussia, gave the Prussian General, "Winterf eldt, a hint that a confederacy was being formed against his master, of which Dresden was the centre. "Winterfeldt informed Frederic. Frederic, naturally suspicious of the designs of Austria, at once directed his minister at the Saxon Court, Count Malzahn, to fiud out some instrument who should penetrate into the aecret archives of its foreign office, and acquaint him with the true nature of the confederacy. Malzahn succeeded in buying a clerk, named Menzel, of a very respectable family, who had been employed for seventeen years in the secret archives of the cabinet. As Menzel had not himself access THE EVE OF TEE WAR. 35 to the keys which closed the presses containing the most private documents, he was furnished with one set from Berlin, and when these would not answer, he returned them indicating the alterations necessary. These having been made and the new keys sent him, he began his treacherous and inglorious work. He continued it till the war began. Frederic obtained additional confirmatory evidence of the plans of the confederates from the second secretary to the Austrian Embassy at Berlin, Maximilian Weingarten. This young man had fallen in love with the daughter of the Governor of Charlottenburg, a friend of General Winterfeldt. The latter, already on the look-out for some means to penetrate the secrets of the Austrian Embassy, persuaded the girl to use her influence with her lover for that purpose. Weingarten was weak enough and base enough to comply. Frederic had thus all the information he wanted. He held the secrets of Russia and Saxony through Menzel, those of Austria through Max. Weingarten. He was very much perplexed. It had become evident in 1755 that war between France and England was impending. The whole Continent would be drawn into it. England, true to her traditional policy, would endeavour to obtain the assistance of the German Empire, represented by the House of Austria. The claims of the latter upon Silesia would certainly be renewed. To what quarter, then, could he look for an ally ? The correspondence showed him that Russia had committed herself; but Austria was not quite sure of France. There was yet time then to gain the alliance of that Power. Full of this hope Frederic turned to France. But his sarcasms had done their work at Versailles. There Madame de Pompadour reigned still supreme, and Madame de Pompadour never forgave. Even on this D 2 36 LOUDON. occasion Frederic committed the mistake of addressing himself to others rather than to her. He soon found that he had no hope of France. His ambassador at Versailles informed him that far from responding to his overtures, the Court was meditating a closer alliance with Austria. At the same time he received information that that Power was concentrating large bodies of troops on the frontier of Silesia. The crisis was indeed at hand. In the spring of ■1756, the Czarina had proposed to Austria an immediate attack upon Prussia, with a view to the partitioning of that kingdom. Austria was to recover Silesia and the country of Glatz ; Russia was to receive Courland and other fractions of Polish territory, whilst Poland was tc> be indemnified by the acquisition of East Prussia. But Maria Theresa was not, at. that date, quite sure of France. A little later in that year, May 1st, 1756, however, she signed with that power a defensive treaty — known as the Treaty of Versailles. But it was clear, even then, to Kaunitz, that France would not support his sovereign in an attack upon Prussia, and the Russian offer was, for the moment, declined. Kaunitz, however, still pressed his skilful negotiations for an offensive alliance. Every week added to the probability of his success. The relations between France and England were becoming more and more strained, and France showed a growing tendency to connect herself more closely with Austria. The hopes of Kaunitz were still further stimulated by the declaration of war, on the 9th of June, between France and England. Frederic, meanwhile, had allied himself with the latter Power. It is possible — well aware though he was, as a consummate soldier, of the advantages which belong to an attacking army — that he would have hesitated to THE EVE OF THE WAli. 37 commit any act likely to decide the still wavering Court of Versailles to declare openly for his enemies, but that, just after the declaration of war just referred to, he received from St. Petersburg letters, purporting to come " in the strictest confidence from a trustworthy source," but which, he had no doubt, were written by the Grand Duke Peter, the heir to the throne of Russia, and his intense admirer, warning him that active measures against him were deferred in consequence of the unready state of the Russian army, but that he certainly would be attacked the following spring. This information decided Frederic. He would not, indeed, attack Russia, but he would dash upon Saxony and Austria before they were ready, upset their calcula- tions and possibly decide the war in a single campaign. Before, acting, however, Frederic, in deference to the wishes of England, addressed, through his ambassador at Vienna, Count Klinggraff, a demand to the Empress Queen, as to whether her armies, assembled on the frontiers of Moravia and Bohemia, had been formed for the purpose of attacking Prussia. Maria Theresa receiving Klinggraff in a private audience (July 26th) answered him that she had deemed it necessary in the existing crisis to take measures for the security of herself and her allies tending to the prejudice of no one. Frederic, disappointed with the nature of this reply, transmitted at once orders to Klinggraff to ask for a less oracular response — a response containing an assurance that Austria would not attack him that year or ' the next. To this demand, transmitted this time in writing, (18th of August) Maria Theresa replied (21st of August) that " the treaty she had made with Russia was purely defensive ; that she had concluded no offensive alliance ; and although the critical state of Europe had compelled her to arm, she had no intention to violate the Treaty of 38 LOUDON. Dresden, but would not bind herself by any promise to refrain from acting as circumstances might require." Frederic received this reply on the night of the 25th of August. On ifche 28th he set out, at the head of his army, to invade Saxony. In this manner began the Seven Years' War. CHAPTER V. LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. When the war broke out, Loudon was still quartered iu Croatia. Most eager was lie to be employed in it. He made application then to be included amongst those officers who were ordered from that province. But General Petazzi, who commanded there, and who during the earlier part of his service in the province, had covered him with praises which had excited the jealousy of his comrades, had, in the later months, conceived a bitter dislike to him, and abruptly refused his request. Enraged at the refusal and at the bitter and scornful terms in which it was conveyed,^ Loudon quitted Bunic without leave and hastened to Vienna. Such a step was not to be tolerated even in those days of comparatively free service, and the military authorities were about to send Loudon back to his frontier station with a curt refusal, when a circumstance occurred to fix his destiny. The successful inroad of Frederic into Saxony— to be presently more particularly noted — had convinced the military advisers of the Empress-Queen of the advantages which would accrue from despatching to the army ' The words used ty General Petazzi were that Loudon neither was fit for war, nor did h». possess the means wherewith to equip himself. 40 LOUDON. contributed by the minor states of Germany, then about to be formed, a regiment of Croats, always to be employed in the front, and to be commanded by a man who should be distinguished for intelligence and, in the largest sense of the term, military knowledge. Maria Theresa then ordered the formation of such a corps, eight hundred strong, and commissioned Kaunitz to seek out an officer possessing the necessary qualities. It happened that there was at Vienna at the time, living in intimate relations with Kaunitz, the same Hoch- stetten who had known Loudon in Russia, and who, fifteen years previously, had been the indirect cause of his entering the Austrian service. With him Loudon had, during his short visit to Vienna, renewed relations. He had given him details of his long frontier training, of the discipline to which he had submitted ; had acquainted him with his disappointments, his hopes, his despair. When then Hochstetten learned the commission given by the Empress- Queen to Kaunitz, he hastened to that statesman and recommended Loudon as a man specially marked out for the command - in question. Hochstetten pressed the matter with so much earnestness that Kaunitz at once sent for Loudon. The messenger found Loudon lodging in the attic of a tailor's shop in the Ungargasse. He proceeded at once to Kaunitz, and held with him a long conversation. Upon the keen-witted Austrian statesman the demeanour, calm, quiet, and self-posseSfSed, of Loudon, made an impression absolutely the reverse of that which the same demeanour had produced on Frederic. In a very brief period, Kaunitz recognised a self-contained man, a man of iron nerve, of great precision of thought, a man who could not only conceive great ideas, but who could carry them out. He LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. 41 had, he felt, before him the very man of whom he was in quest. On the spot, then, he gave him the independent command .of a battalion of Croats, and the commission to lead that battalion with all speed to join the imperial army in Bohemia under the command of Field-Marshal Count Browne, with him to remain till the federation army should be formed. Loudon joined the Field-Marshal at Budin, in September, 1756. Before that date the position of the contending parties had been defined. We have seen how Frederic had set out from Berlin on the 28th of August to invade Saxony. His plan had been to take the Saxons by surprise, and to compel them either to disarm, or to make common cause with him ; then to invade Bohemia, and in combination with a second army under Schwerin, marching from Glatz, to strike such a blow at the Austrians as would give him the entire command of that country before winter should set in. Before referring to the events which followed his attempt to execute that plan, I propose to describe, as briefly as possible, the resources at the disposal of the contending parties. Frederic, well aware that the seizure of Silesia had not been forgiven, and that he would yet have to fight for his prey, had employed the ten years' peace' in increasing and in improving his army. The revenues, amounting to four million thalers, of the conquered Silesia gave him money ; the permission to recruit his army in any part of Germany gave him men for this purpose. "When the war broke out he possessed an army consisting, independent of the troops in garrison, of 130,000 men. Of the component parts of this army it could be aiErmed that the infantry surpassed, alike in quickness of manoeuvre and in correctness of shooting, the rest of the infantry of Europe ; whilst the cavalry, consisting of 10,000 cuirassiers, 12,500 dragoons, 42 LOUDON. and 10,500 hussars, and trained by such men as Ziethen, Budenbrock, Gessler, and Seidlitz, had a similar pre- eminence. On the other hand the artillery had been less attended to* In the first and second Silesian wars Frederic had possessed so great a superiority in this arm that he had made the mistake of concentrating all his attention upon the other two. It remains to be added that during the ten years adverted to Frederic had held yearly exercises of his army on the plains round Spandau, so contriving them that no foreign officers should be present ; that he had himself taught his generals, had impressed the neces- sity of diligent attention upon the more subordinate officers, and had maintained the strictest discipline. Nor during the same period had the Austrian army been neglected. On the death of Count Khevenhiiller in 1744, the practical administration of it had been conferred, under Prince Wenzel von Lichtenstein, upon Count Daun. This general, whose name will often recur, had noticed that the victories of Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years' War, and of Frederic in the two Silesian wars, had been gained principally by their superior number of guns and by the skill of their gunners. Upon his representations, then, the greatest attention had been paid to increasing the number of guns and gunners, to improve their equipment, and to practise them in all manner of manoeuvres, principally in those which had a defensive object. Great success had attended the endeavours of the Austrian leaders, and it is not too much to say that when the war broke out in 1756 their artillery was the finest and the best served in Europe./ Unfortunately Daun had taken part in wars which had been essentially of a defensive character. He could not grasp the necessity of infusing into the' army the daring and dashing spirit which is required in aggressive warf9,re. ■liiin T\^sc«^^^T"r^'^>»'^^ ^ to illustrate Loudon's ii^ Ife ^^L^"'5\4v,ff Campaigns in Saxony, the ■ k ' . » i n^hevoifs'' Lausitz, Brandenburg, and ifc h .J^ri^.^' portions of SUesia and Bohemia. hayncTiei Ecetzsch Braehhstt '■■«'"»} K^Mi ^A^A V9« ,f)^' aid I ^« o1.Jb^ )«.-''^''^ -/„£;=—. «.-*„ . ' ^ \ Si ffertwhbe Lxfbsgei n?^^ 1 I * s-tferm til f^^ lebus I ■4^1^ 8^.^ u ,,„B ^"^-"^ L^#' "n«M ; f »'t-''»^«gj*3 *r^ "3 '/«>«/' J ichei fe,i^"/* ^'^ yV>chutz. o "8'2 , "»»«>(" '""^'r' Yqjsfc„ JtaiTOv. %feH]^ "^o ^*^ "a^ J-^^ ^i^Wfe JB/«(^ ^''"^*a p„aL„ mj" ,jTl r ^ ,3,™.-iM''"*^^\ o' A J?*w '^ntouj ^-^ It, ^ ne iu i 1 ■« r^ a,i,ia„ ^ ^-Jfw/f, t ^'^"^ tsdiin LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 113 composition of the rival armies of Austria and Prussia, Loudon expressed his conviction that the morale of the Prussian army was no longer what it used to be. That of the Austrians, he affirmed, was, on the contrary, all that could be desired. With respect to the Russians he declared himself totally opposed to any system of joint operations with that people ; unless indeed they would attach 20,000 men to an army commanded by an Austrian general. The campaign, he affirmed very strongly, should be an offensive campaign ; it should begin early ; there should be no waiting for the Russians, who would not come, he thought, unless the Austrians were to show boldness in attacking the enemy. On the subject of the distribution of forces, he argued thus. Supposing that, as proposed, there were a total of 160,000 men; 100,000 of these would be with the main army in Saxony ; 40,000 should be used to reconquer the strong places in Upper Silesia, especially Neisse ; and, should the Russians place from 20,000 to 30,000 men at the disposal of the Austrian general, these should join the army in Upper Silesia and attack the enemy wherever he might be found. In this case, and if the operations in Upper Silesia were conducted with energy, the position of the main army would be greatly strengthened. The principle was never to be lost sight of that the king was to be allowed no opportunity of re-uniting with a corps which had once been separated from himself. The re- maining 20,000, Loudon proposed to station at Gitschin in Bohemia, alike to guard the frontier against any sudden incursion of the enemy and to strengthen the Silesian army. Returning again to the Russians, Loudon argued that. 114 LO.UDON. if these, to the strength of 50,000 men, should march on Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and effect there a junction with the Swedes, the king, who would risk much rather than allow his capital to fall into the hands of such an enemy, would certainly rush towards Berlin, and in his haste would place his army between two fires. London held it to be far better that the Russians should be moved to act against the Prussian capital than that they should be brought into Silesia to eat up the resources of the country and hamper the movements of the Austrians. These latter, he insisted, must act energetically in Silesia, and only begin to besiege the fortresses after they had beaten the enemy in the open field. This paper would appear to have made considerable impression on the Aulic Council, for immediately after it had been discussed Loudon was directed to transfer the command in Bohemia to Field Marshal Lieutenant Campitelli and to assume that of the troops in Upper Silesia. On his way thither he wrote, 7th March, from Prossnitz, to his friend Kaunitz to remind him that the truce concluded with Fouquet would expire in exactly a week from that date ; that he had certain intelligence that that general was massing his troops with the view of taking the initiative against the Austrians, and not, as he gave out, against the Russians ; that it was very important that he, the writer, should be in a position to anticipate him, and he therefore hoped that no delay would occur in sending him the troops placed at his disposal : he concluded by complaining that with respect to the composition of those troops, hard measure had been dealt out to him j that of the division of 13,000 men commanded by Dras- kowitch, and placed under his orders, six battalions were garrison battalions who were not to be employed far from the fortress of Obniitz, and that it was very weak in LAND SHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 115 cavalry : further, that there was a disposition to send him only those regiments which were weak in numbers and whose reputation had yet to be made. He appealed to Kaunitz whether a commander could effect anything great with such materials. He also solicited some mark of distinction for the generals who had served under him during the preceding campaign. To this letter he re- ceived in due course a very satisfactory reply, and an assurance that his remarks should be duly attended to. Pursuing his journey from Prossnitz Loudon reached Jagerndorf on the 13th. As the truce was to expire the following day, he ordered his troops to turn out on the 15th, to be ready for an attempt which he contemplated to make on the town of Neustadt, just across the frontier of what is now Austrian Silesia, and to cut up the troops in its neighbourhood. On the 14th, he sent a trumpeter into that town to warn the Prussian commander, General Goltz, that the truce would expire at midnight. Very early on the morning of the 15th Loudon set his troops in motion. They were formed in four columns. The first, consisting of the grenadier battalions called after himself, the dragoons of Lowenstein and the cuirassiers of Palffy, he led in person; the second, composed of four regiments of infantry, was commanded by General Draskowich ; the third, of two regiments of hussars, by General Bethlen ; and the fourth, of four battalions of infantry, one of Croats, and a hundred cuirassiers, by General Vogelsang. Loudon's plan was to attack Neustadt with the first and second columns, whilst the third should cut off the Prussians from Kosel, and the fourth should fall on Leobschiitz, and, if possible, seize Ratibor. The four columns set out at the appointed hour for their destination. Unfortunately for Loudon, however, the I 2 116 LOUDON. heavy rains had flooded the country and made the roads extremely difficult for his infantry. Leaving Draskowich to bring these on as best he could, Loudon pushed on with his horse and reached the environs of Neustadt at daybreak, just as the Prussian commander, General von Goltz, was about to march at the head of two battalions of Pomeranians, one squadron of the dragoons of Baireuth, four six-pounders and one howitzer, for Neisse. Loudon at once despatched the Lowenstein dragoons to bar the road to that place, whilst, following on the rear and flanks of the enemy, he should seize the first opportunity to attack him. The Prussian leader divining this intention, changed his plans, and took the road to Steinau. Loudon .followed him nevertheless, charged him repeatedly, and though owing to the non-arrival of his infantry he could make no decided impression on the gallant Pomeranians, he killed forty of them, took forty more prisoners, and captured thirty wagons laden with meal and regimental clothes. What is more, eighty men deserted to the Austrian stan- dard.i The other movements failed to cut off the Prussians from Kosel because the inundations so delayed the advance of the infantry as to give them time to retire ; but it is not the less true that the entire district from Weidenau to Neustadt and from Neustadt to Eatibor fell into the hands of the Austrians. The failure to cut off the Pomeranians was due entirely to the non-arrival at the appointed time of the infantry, and it is a fact that, though Loudon considered that the state of the roads was difficult, he attributed the failure mainly to the want of energy displayed by Count ' This account, wliioh is taken from Loudon's own letter to Kaunitz, dated 18th March, diifers materially from the "Carlylean" version of the same episode. LANDSHUT, OLATZ, LIEGNTTZ. 117 Draskowicii. This feeling was shared by the oflScers generally. In a letter to Kaunitz Loudon expressed his opinion that whilst Draskowich was capable of rendering good service under superior leading, he was quite unfit for the responsibilities of a detached command. He com- plained likewise of the little capacity displayed by two other divisional commanders, Biela and Vogelsang. The plan of the Austrian campaign recommended by Loudon had not been adopted by the Aulic Council. Instead of allowing the Russian armies to act in Pom- erania and threaten the Prussian capital, it had insisted upon their moving into Silesia. Daun, moreover, always erring on the side of caution, was most indisposed, notwithstanding the weakness of Frederic, to assume the offensive. France was less than ever willing to a;ct vigorously; there remained only Loudon to attempt something great for the House of Austria. The want of systematic energy on the part of the allies is the more unaccountable if we take into con- sideration the number of the forces on both sides. In Saxony Daun stood in and about Dresden at the head of 80,000 men opposed to half that number under the king. On the borders of Silesia Loudon had 10,000 men — shortly to be increased to 40,000 — mostly raw troops, and opposing him were Goltz and Fouquet with 15,000, keeping up com- munications with Frederic by means of a small corps under Schmettau, posted at Gorlitz. Prince Henry of Prussia at the head of 35,000 men was observing 50,000 Russians ; Prince' Ferdinand of Brunswick with 70,000, the French; and General Stutterheim with 5,000, the Swedes. "Whilst then, Prussia could dispose, exclusive of garrisons, of 165,000 men, Austria alone had, including the troops on the Bohemian frontier, 160,000; France 100,000; the 118 LOUDON. Empire 20,000; Russia 60,000; and Sweden 10,000. Pleased naturally as the' King of Prussia would be to see the Russians diverted from an attack upon his hereditary- dominions towards Silesia, it became for him no less an object with him to prevent, by all means in his power, their junction with the Austrians. After his afiair with Goltz, Loudon, whose corps did not even then consist of more than 10,000 men, was directed (23rd of April) to make over his command to Draskowich pending the arrival of Campitelli, to see it march to take up a position in and about Zittau, and then to proceed himself to Vienna. He obeyed these instructions to the letter, reached the Austrian capital the 4th of May, attended an extraordinary meeting of the Council on the 6th, and then started to Dresden to arrange with Daun and Lacy regarding its conclusions. The result of the various conferences, as far as they concerned Loudon, was that he should proceed to Kbniggratz, collect there troops which would increase his army to 40,000 m.en, then march through the county of Glatz on to Frankenstein — nearly midway between Schweidnitz and Neisse — and then act according to circumstances. But Loudon could not expect to have his troops in hand before the 24th : it was then the 14th, and his active spirit grudged every moment of the interval. He wrote then to Yienna, laid before the Council his own plan, begged that he might be allowed " free hand " in its execution, so as to act according to the circumstances of the hour, and promised to run no un- necessary risk. On the 26th of May Loudon received a reply, generally favourable to his plan, and granting him .the powers he desired. When this permission was received the troops already at his disposal were well in hand. They consisted of thirty-four battalions of infantry, thirty-three LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 119 companies of grenadiers, seventy-five squadrons, and forty four guns. With sucli an army Loudon resolved to give the Prus- sians the same lesson which Frederic had so often given to his enemies — to be beforehand with them, to carry the war into their country, and to smite them a blow under which their king would reel. His plan was to penetrate -into the county of Glatz, storm the fortress of that name, and if, before it could be stormed, Fouquet should attempt to relieve it, to turn upon and rend him. With this view Loudon united his troops at Kostelitz the 29th of May, crossed the frontier the next day, and pushed on for Frankenstein. Close to this town he (30th of May) formed his camp, his right wing resting on the town itself, his left on the Grochberg. Here he remained till the 7th of June, ostensibly waiting for his transport train. Mean- while he issued a proclamation to the inhabitants assuring them that he intended to enforce the strictest discipline among his troops, and promising to give payment for the country produce they should deliver. But, though ostensibly waiting for his supplies, Loudon was not the less planning the intended surprise against the fortress of Glatz. He had ascertained that the garrison of that fortress was small — 1,500 infantry and fifty to sixty hussars — that the commandant, Colonel d'O, was in great trouble regarding their Tnorale, and that the citizens were tired of the Prussian yoke. Much de- pended upon concealing his plans from every one. On the 3rd of June then he caused the heights of Kleutsch and Habendorf, in the direction of Landshut, to be occupied. Fouquet, who lay at Landshut with 12,000 men, com- pletely deceived, considered himself threatened by this movement, and, quitting Landshut, fell back by way of 120 LOUDON. Wiirben and Schweidnitz to Rommenau (6th of June), every step taking Mm further from Glatz. Loudon forth- with directed General Wolf ersdorS on the one side to occupy Landshut with six battalions of infantry, five squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns, whilst, on the other, he sent instructions to Field Marshal Lieutenant Mufiling, com- manding his reserve of grenadier companies just formed in Moravia, to move up beyond Mittelwalde and take post at the village of Ebersdorf, twenty-three miles to the south of Glatz. He himself marched on the 7th to Pischkowitz, a place which over-looked and blockaded Glatz. But entirely to secure himself against Fouquet, who, he thought, might, after efiecting a junction with Prince Henry, turn round and endeavour to overwhelm him, he directed (10th of June) General Beck to follow the former with his cavalry and use every effort to attract his attention. On the 11th he learned that the enemy intended to unite and attack him. As he could not, by any possibility, cover at the same time both Glatz and Landshut, Loudon drew back Wolfersdorfi from the latter place, leaving only General Jahnus with three battalions and the Palffy hussars to observe it. He sent likewise instructions to Beck that if the enemy should advance towards Landshut he was to hover on their flanks and rear, whilst he, still blockading Glatz, held himself ready to act according as Fouquet's movements should develop themselves. Meanwhile Fouquet, informed by spies of Loudon's movements against Glatz, had marched from Rommenag to Grbditz. ' Here he received, in quick succession, three letters from the king, full of rebukes for his abandonment of Landshut. The last of the three letters gave him categorical instructions to march at once by way of LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 121" Scliweidnitz, drive the Austrians out of Landshut and maintain himself there. Fouquet felt that the king had issued orders without a due knowledge or proper apprecia- tion of his position. He knew that to obey them was to march to destruction, and he told his officers as much. But he had to obey — and he obeyed. Loudon himself was scarcely less hampered by his in- structions. Neither of his official superiors, the minister of war, Count Von Neipperg — who had always been beaten in the field — nor the commander-in-chief, Count Daun — possessed one tenth part of his military foresight. Neither of them could understand why he had abandoned Landshut to secure Glatz, and they pressed upon him advice and even orders to concentrate his army at the former place. But for the strong confidence felt in him by the chancellor, Kaunitz, Loudon would have been forced to renounce his entire plan of campaign just as it was about to bear fruit. As it was, he held to it, though, to save appearances, he, still against his will, sent four battalions of infantry and a regiment of cuirassiers under General Gaisrugg to support Jahnus near Landshut. Meanwhile Fouquet, in spite of his conviction that his proper course was to occupy a central position, watch Loudon's operations against the Silesian fortresses, and act as circumstances might demand — the course, there can be no doubt, which will commend itself to every military reader— had, in obedience to Frederic's positive orders, retraced his steps (17th of June) to Landshut. On his approach the Austrian general evacuated the town and withdrew to the heights of Reichshennersdorf, covering the Bohemian frontier. Fouquet, who had been strengthened by three battalions, then occupied the intrenched camp, extended his position as far as the heights known as the 122 LOUDON. Doctorsberg, and fortified that also. So confident, however, ■was he that the position was a false one, — so satisfied that Loudon, if he should turn upon him with his whole army, could overwhelm him, that he wrote the same day a press- ing despatch to the king pointing out the dangers he was incurring. He received an ungracious answer directing him at all hazards to maintain his intrenched camp. On read- ing this reply Fouquet declared to those about him that in obeying the order he would either die in the king's sei-vice or never draw sword for him again. So intensely did he feel the false position in which he was forced ! He kept his word. Great was the surprise of Loudon to find that, after all, no junction had been effected between Prince Henry and Fouquet ; that whilst the former was marching further away — towards Frankfort-on-the-Oder — the latter had re- turned, but slightly strengthened, to Landshut. He saw that it was with Fouquet alone, then, that he would have to deal. He recognised, then, with joy, that a great opportunity was at last offered to him — an opportunity of striking a blow which Frederic could not but feel most acutely. He resolved then to march at once on Landshut and storm the Prussian intrenchments. The 16th of June Loudon, to carry out his plan, detached Wolfersdorffi with five battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry to Friedland to support Gaisrugg. The next day Generals Weichs and Jaquesmain marched to Reichshennersdorf with three infantry battalions and two cavalry regiments for the same purpose. On the 18th, leaving only General Unruhe with three battalions and two regiments of cavalry to blockade Glatz, Loudon with the rest of the army quitted his camp at Pisohwitz, marched the same day to Waldenburg, and on the 19th by way of LANDSnUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 123 Gottesberg to the heights overlooking Schwarzwaldau. Here his advanced guard, led by General Nauendorf, came in contact with a reconnoitring party of the Prussians and drove it back with considerable loss. On the 20th Loudon sent his infantry to occupy the heights known as the Forstberge and the Ziegenriicken — both to the east of Landshut and overlooking it — whilst he spread his cavalry from the last named eminence in a north- easterly direction to Hartmannsdorf, thus severing the Prussian communications with Schweidnitz. In order like- wise to prevent the possibility of a retreat upon Schmied- berg, an important town lying due west of Landshut — he recalled Beck from his post of observation at Priedberg — stni further westward — and directed him to take up a position at Hirschberg, the chief town of the district, nine miles north-west of Schmiedberg, all the roads to which it commanded. The only way of retreat now left open to Fouquet was that by way of Bolkenheim. But even this way was morally barred to him, for the king's orders had left him no discretion. He endeavoured, indeed, by two letters, dated respectively the 19th and 21st of June, to inform Frederic of the great danger to which he was exposed and to induce him to modify his orders, but he failed. Frederic, believing the intrenched camp of Landshut to be unassailable, did not believe in the danger. His replies, however, never reached Fouquet. Before the messengers bearing them arrived at Landshut his fate had been decided. The Prussian position at Landshut was rightly regarded by the King of Prussia as extremely strong. The town it- self was situated on the right bank of the river Bober, into which, at this point, there emptied itself a mountain stream running from the south, called the Ziederbach. The 124 LOUDON. slopes of the mountain range known as tlie Riesengebirge were well suited to constitute a strong natural defence against an enemy approaching from the south. The hiUs on the other sides formed likewise points of support easily con- nected with each other and verging on a common centre. The reader will judge from the manner, now about to be stated, in which Fouquet had disposed his troops, of the importance of the position, which in those days was regarded as the key to Silesia. Fouquet, who had with him 11,000 men of all arms, posted them in the following manner : On his extreme right, on the hills by the village of Johnsdorf, looking nearly south by south-west, he placed four battalions of infantry and eight guns. To the left, on the plain below, between those hills and Hahnberg, two battalions of infantry, five squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns. Still further left, on the heights joining each other at Galgenberg and Gerichtsberg, on the left bank of the Ziederbach, three battalions and sixteen guns. The above constituted the right of the position. In the centre, on the imposing hill Kirchberg and round its base, were posted one battalion of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns. Immediately to their left, divided only by the stream, on the hiUs Burgberg and Thiemberg on the right bank of the Ziederbach, were three companies of infantry and two guns. The left wing was distributed as follows : — ■ On and about the hills Buchberg and Tilgenberg were one battalion and three companies of infantry, five squadrons of cavalry, and ten guns. On and about the Doctorberg and Mummelberg, two battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and eight guns. In Landshut itself one battalion LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 125 of infantry and sixty detached men. About Euhbank and Einsiedl, to the north of the town, one battalion and two hundred and fifty cavaky. In a wood running in a south- easterly direction from Mummelberg, 200 detached men; and in the advanced posts by Vogelsdorf 500 cavalry. Of all these positions, that of the Kirchberg, in the centre, was the most important. This is a bare sandstone rock, commanding not only the town but the whole country as far as the base of the chain formed by the Doctorberg, the Mummelberg, the Buchberg, and the Tilgenberg. Of the four hills just mentioned, all of them higher than the Kirchberg, two, the Doctorberg and Tilgenberg, are perfectly bare and smooth. The other two, the Mummelberg and Buchberg, were well wooded, but the wood had on both been cut down to a certain point, to form palisades and to supply other requirements. Of the other hills mentioned, the four on the right of the Kirchberg, it may be briefly stated that whilst they are bare, they are all steep, almost pre- cipitous, on the sides which look towards the Bober. They are still higher than those mentioned previously. Not only were all these hills regularly fortified ; not only had redoubts and flfeches been erected upon them, but they had been furnished with blockhouses, palisades, drawbridges, deep ditches — extending all along the line. The trenches were connected likewise by regular communications. Since the beginning of 1759, Frederic, who, as we know, regarded the position as one of the greatest importance to hold, had lavished all his care to render it unassailable. According to the Austrian official muster rolls, the army corps under the command of Loudon consisted, in the beginning of June, of thirty-eight battalions of infantry, twenty-three companies of grenadiers, six battalions of Croats, three regiments of light horse, three regiments of 126 LOUDON. dragoons, six of cuirassiers, and three of hussars — a total, deducting the sick, of 34,000 men. From these 34,000 must be deducted the 5,000 left with General Unruhe for the blockade of Glatz. It follows that to attack Fouquet's 11,000 men posted in the strongly fortified position I have described Loudon had. 29,000 men. On the 22nd of June, Loudon, after a long and patient examination of the enemy's position, decided on his plan of attack, and wrote out his orders to each several general, assigning to each his exact work. His instructions are a model of clearness and precision, and prove how thoroughly he understood all the points — the strong as well as the weak — of the Prussian fortifications. His plan was to attack simultaneously on his right four of ^ the enemy's fortified hills, the Buchberg and Tilgenberg, the Doctorberg, the Thiemberg ; on his left, the hills above Johnsdorf and the Hahnberg. These captured, the enemy would be surrounded, and would have no choice but to surrender. The troops detailed for the attack were to march silently to take up the positions assigned to them at nine o'clock on the evening of the 22nd. The attack itself was to be made at two o'clock in the morning ; the signal for it to be the firing of four howitzers from the summit of the Steinberg. The night of the 22nd was ushered in by a terrible thunderstorm. So overwhelming was the deluge of rain by which it was accompanied that one of the Austrian generals, he to whom was assigned the first attack — on the Buchberg — sent to his commander to state that the rain had rendered his muskets useless for firing purposes. "Tell him," replied Loudon to the messenger, " that the rain which falls on us does not spare the Prussians ! " LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 127 As soon as the signal was fired, the storming parties under cover of a heavy artillery fire from the heights above them, rushed forward to the attack. General Nasseli was the first to reach the Doctorberg, but he very soon had the satisfaction of hearing the sounds of assault on the Buchberg and the Thiemberg. The enemy opposed a very steadfast resistance, but, step by step, the Austrian stormers, well supported by the reserves of the first line under Baron Miifiiing, made their way. The difficulties of the steep ascent, the obstinacy of the Prussians strengthened by re- inforcements sent by Fouquet from his right, were all over- come, and in three-quarters of an hour the Austrians stood triumphant on the summits of the three conquered hills. When the left of their position was thus taken from them, the Prussians, still defiant, fell back on the Kirchberg, to offer thence, with the aid of the troops already on that hill, a new resistance to their still advancing foe. But they little knew how matters had progressed on their right. Whilst the three Austrian divisions had attacked the left, WolfersdorS had assailed with scarcely less success the hills near Johnsdorf ; for though his first attack had been repulsed, his second had been completely successful. The Prussians, driven from the heights above Johnsdorf, were forced shortly after from the Hahnberg, and just as the fugitives from the Prussian left fell back on Kirchberg, those from their right sought a last refuge on the Galgen- berg. These were the only two heights that now remained to them. To attack these two heights, Loudon, whilst sending his cavalry to Vogelsdorf — to the north of the town — to prevent the possibility of any escape on that side, formed his infantry into two columns. Whilst one of these columns assailed the Kirchberg in front, the other 128 LOUDON. attempted to storm it in rear. The attack was supported by the fire of a battery of twelve guns from the summit of the Eiesnerberg. The first column, opposed by Fouquet in person, steadily made its way up the hill and stormed the redoubt upon it. The second, assailed on its ascent with great fury, was f oi-ced to give ground ; but hearing of the capture of the redoubt it pushed forward with renewed energy, and gaining touch with the first column, all but surrounded the Prussians, and compelled them, with great unwillingness, to retreat on the Galgenberg. They did this in the most perfect order, with the greatest precision, and with still undaunted bearing — the worthiest of enemies. Once on the Galgenberg, Fouquet recognised the impossi- bility of defending the heights. No thought of surrender however entered his heroic soul. It might be possible, he thought, with the small but compact body still under him, to cross the Bober and cut his way through the enemy to Schreibendorf. He made the attempt, but in vain. Scarcely had he crossed the Bober than he came upon the cavalry of Nauendorf and St. Ignon. Still determined to cut his way through, Fouquet formed his men into a square and repulsed the first attacks of the Austrian cavalry. But that cavalry held him fast till the infantry came up. The contest became then too unequal. In a short time Colonel Voigt's regiment of light horse broke through the face of the square, and furious at their previous repulses began to cut and hack on all sides. Fouquet' s horse had been killed just as the face of the square was broken. Falling under the animal he received three wounds from the victorious Austrians, and would certainly have been killed but for the devotion of his servant, who, covering him with his person, exclaimed — " Are you going LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 129 to kill our general ! " Colonel Voigt heard the words, hastened to the spot, cleared the ground, raised the fallen Prussian general,, had his own charger brought, and would have assisted Fouquet to mount it. But Fouquet, covered with blood and dust, refused the offer, exclaiming — ■ " I would not for anything spoil those trappings by staining them with my blood." "I can assure your Excellency," replied Voigt, "that my trappings would gain immeasurably in my estimation if they were sprinkled with the blood of a hero." Voigt had his prisoner's wounds attended to as well as under the circumstances was pos- sible, and then accompanied him to Loudon, by whom he was received with the greatest politeness. Such was the battle of Landshut. Of the 11,000 men with whom Fouquet began the action, 1,185 lay at half- past nine o'clock dead or dying on the battle-field ; 8,315, including three generals, eleven colonels, one lieutenant- colonel, fourteen majors, a hundred and fifty lieutenants, and thirty ensigns surrendered prisoners of war; 1,500 managed to escape to Breslau, In material and trophies the Austrians captured sixty-eight guns and thirty-eight ammunition wagons, thirty-four colours, two standards, and a pair of silver kettle-drums. The loss of the Austrians in killed and wounded was naturally, considering they were the stormers, greater than that of the enemy. It amounted to 2,864, of whom 750 were killed, amongst them eighteen officers of rank. Of the wounded, 2,114, eighty-one were officers. Great as was the victory, the moral effect of it was greater still. It was a blow sufficient to drive to despair any other man but Frederic. Silesia, that Silesia the seizure of which when Maria Theresa was helpless had caused so much bloodshed, seemed now in the grasp of K 130 LOUDON. victorious. Austria. The defending army had disappeared — had been wiped out. This blow, too, had been dealt bj the same hand which had destroyed the Prussian army at Kunersdorf. •"Well might Frederic exclaim when he heard of the catastrophe : " Is it only to me that such misfortunes happen ? " Yet he had caused the catastrophe. Fouquet had only obeyed orders against which he had protested. Frederic had only his own obstinacy to blame. But, it must be added, never was he greater than when once confronted by a calamity which would have been fatal to a second-rate commander. It is impossible, however embittered one may feel against the man, not to admire the splendid genius of this ' warrior-king. When all the world was talking of his approaching downfall, Frederic — with the daring, which, in him, confronted by an over-cautious man like Daun, was the surest prudence — was preparing to take the initiative, and to begin by besieging Dresden ! Loudon, meanwhile, prepared with all possible expedition to take advantage of his victory. The first blow was naturally to be directed against Glatz, already beleagured. He had now, by the arrival of a division from Zittau, 50,000 men under his orders : the siege train was awaiting his orders at Olmiitz. Once master of Glatz all Silesia lay before him. Yet just as he was about to make the one spring necessary, the orders of the over-cautious Daun forced him to inactivity. Daun himself with a powerful army lay at Gbrlitz, a position covering Silesia, on the side of the upper Lausitz ; Lacy, with a corps of 10,000 men, at Bischofswerda, watching Frederic at Gross-Dobsitz. Sud- denly Frederic, secretly hatching a design upon Dresden, made as though he would force his way into Silesia and LANDSHVT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 131 disturb Loudon. Lacy, wliD was to have been swept from his path, discovered betimes his danger, and fell back on Daun ; Daun hastened then to Bautzen, and, alarmed by Frederic's action, transmitted orders to Loudon to defer his operations against Glatz, to leave two small corps only to observe Schweidnitz and Breslau, and to hasten with his whole force along the left bank of the Bober. Compelled then to turn from Glatz, Loudon marched in three columns in the direction indicated by Daun. The first of these columns moved on Guttenberg, the second and third on Kleppelsdorf, where. Loudon had his head-quarters. Here he remained till the 8th. The day of his arrival at Kleppelsdorf Daun marched into Naumburg on the Quels. Loudon then rode over to Naumburg to consult with that commander. It was arranged between them that whilst Daun should continue to occupy the advantageous position he then held, Loudon should march by way of Wolfsberg to the vicinity of Hochkirch, and, placing his own head-quarters at Eichholz, watch there the course of events. These movements of the two Austrian generals were sufficient to baffle any attempt on Silesia. Frederic prepared then, with the fertility of a great commander, to strike the well- considered blow against Dresden. Daun first heard of this intention only when it had begun to take effect. Hastening himself to the relief of the Saxon capital, he gave per- mission to Loudon to resume his operations against Glatz. Still maintaining his position at Eichholz to cover the siege operations, Loudon despatched one corps under General Caramelli to observe Breslau whilst he directed General Draskowich to press Glatz. The town of Glatz is defended by two fortresses, the old and the new, separated from each other by the river K 2 132 LOUDON. Neisse. The town itself lies in a hollow along the left bank of the river. On this side also, pushed forward some three thousand paces and hewn out of the rock, is a flfeche connected by a covered way with the town. The old fortress commands the new one. Colonel d'O commanded" in the former, Colonel Quadt in the latter. The united garrison consisted of about 2,600 men. Two hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the works. B.efore this place Draskowich, although his entire siege- train had not yet arrived, opened trenches on the night of the 20th and 21st of July. On the 23rd the heavy guns arrived, and on the same day Draskowich, who never enjoyed the complete confidence of Loudon, made over his command to General Harsch, a very vigilant and pains- taking officer. Two days later Loudon himself arrived on the spot personally to direct the storm. At daybreak on the 26th a heavy fire opened on the doomed fortress from the Austrian batteries. One of the first effects of this fire was to cause many of the enemy's magazines to explode. The second was not less satisfactory. As Loudon, accompanied by Draskowich and his adjutant. Colonel Kray, proceeded from battery to battery, he noticed several of the enemy abandon their posts and come over to him. He then observed that the flfeche of which I have spoken as having been hewn out of the rock, was either deserted or occupied by but a few men. He at once called for volunteers to storm it. Three hundred men answered to the call and climbing up found the place evacuated. The Prussians, aware now of their mistake, endeavoured to retake it, but the Austrians, supported by fresh troops, not only repulsed them but pursued them along the covered way. Here the Prussians offered a stout resistance, but they were overpowered LANDSaUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 133 and driven to take refuge behind the defences of the old fortress. Loudon, seeing the discouragement of the enemy and wishing to spare further bloodshed, summoned the place to surrender. The garrison, without discontinuing their fire, refused. Upon this Loudon directed Colonel Rouvroy, who commanded the left attack, to storm. Loudon himself superintended the attack, which was entirely successful. As the Austrians advanced, a panic seized the enemy, whole companies threw away their arms, and the old fortress surrendered. There remained yet the new fortress, which I have said was commanded by that which Loudon had just gained. About an hour later this also surrendered unconditionally. In this manner, after an attack which lasted four hours, and which cost them eleven officers and 203 men, did the Austrians storm the most important fortress in Silesia. They took 2,513 prisoners, of whom 110 were officers. They found the forts full of supplies of all sorts, including 203 guns of varying calibres and a large quantity of munitions of war. Whilst Loudon was storming Glatz, Frederic was engaged in besieging Dresden. The better to accomplish his aim he had not hesitated to submit the city to " the torture of fire." His bombardment, though fatal to the innocent inliabitants and magnificent buildings of the Saxon capital, had no effect on the commandant- — the brave and steadfast Macguire. With him, too, Daun, approaching from the northern side of the Elbe, opened communica- tions. Frederic had already given up the enterprise as hopeless, when he learned (the 29th of July) that Glatz, a fortress capable of holding out for months, had sur- rendered to an assault lasting four hours. He at once 134 LOUDON. raised the siege and inarched with all haste towards Silesia. Loudon was on his way to meet him. On the very day of the capture' of Glatz he had despatched the vanguard of his army in the direction of Breslau. For weeks he had been in correspondence with the Russian general, SoltikofE — who at the head of 70,000 men was approaching from the north the bordefs of Silesia — relative to an attack upon its capital. Soltikoff, in a letter dated the 18th of July, had promised to agree to a request made by Loudon to detach 20,000 men to co-operate with him against Breslau, whilst he should cover the operation with his army. But SoltikofE whilst ever ready to promise, was always slow in performing. When Loudon had captured Glatz, Soltikoff was still some seventy miles from Breslau. Just at this moment Loudon received a letter from the Emperor Francis, husband of the Empress-Queen, urging him to try himself a sudden stroke against the Silesian capital with the view of saving it from the horrors of a Russian assault. There were many reasons which would naturally impel Loudon to comply with this strongly expressed wish. He knew Frederic well. He was confident that the blow dealt at Glatz, following so quickly upon that struck at Landshut, would draw him to Silesia ; that he would march as rapidly as Soltikoff would march slowly ; that his one chance of gaining Breslau was to attempt a coup-de-main before Frederic could arrive, before also the garrison had recovered from the consternation caused by Landshut and Glatz. He at once then sent off the vanguard of his army towards Breslau, despatched the main body to follow it on the 28th, and set off himself the same day for Eichholz to bring up the rest of his troops ; thence, • leaving only a small corps under Wolfersdorff at Hochkirch, he hastened LAND8HUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. ' 135 to Breslau and appeared before that town on the 1st of August. The garrison of Breslau consisted of 6,000 men com- manded by General Tauentzin. But of those 6,000 one- third were on the sick list, and the remainder had to guard, besides the fortifications, prisoners numbering as many as the entire garrison. On the approach of the Austrian vanguard Tauentzin had withdrawn his troops behind the walls, abandoning the suburbs. These Loudon found in the occupation of his Croats. He at once summoned Tauentzin to surrender. Tauentzin not only refused, but opened forthwith a heavy fire on the suburbs, which he speedily reduced to ashes. Loudon, not wishing to retaliate on the city, wrote then with his own hand to the Prussian commander a letter in which he set forth his own overwhelming strength, the near approach of the Russians, and the impossibility that the place could offer a lengthened resistance. Tauentzin, however, was not to be cajoled. He replied that Breslau was surrounded by regular fortifications, that its defence had been intrusted to him by his king, and that even were its defences destroyed he would maintain its very last hovel. Loudon's siege train had not arrived, but he had bombs and mortars. To shake Tauentzin's resolution, he, following the very recent example of Frederic before Dresden, caused three batteries of these to be erected, and at ten o'clock of that same night (1st of August) opened fire on the city, and continued it for two hours. At the end of that time, the king's palace, the barracks at the Schweidnitz gate, the convent of the Dominicans, the entire quarter known as the Neumarkt — in all about thirty buildings — were in The next morning Loudon sent Colonel Eouvroy again 136 LOUDON. to Tauentzin to offer him the most favoiirable teims if lie ■would surrender, and to warn him of the consequences of forcing him to storm the place. But the gallant Tauentzin remained urgnoved and defiant. Loudon had now to consider his position. He had failed to take the place by a coup-de-main. To storm it, with the fortifications intact and the ditches full of water, was impossible. The Russians, despite their promises, were still only creeping along. On the other hand Prince Henry was hastening by forced marches at the head of 30,000 men to the relief of the place. Under these circumstances Loudon resolved to accept the failure and reserve his army for a more tempting opportunity. He therefore broke up on the evening of the 4th, and, in obedience to instructions from Daun, marched to Striegau, a position whence he could maintain his touch with that general, and if necessary unite with him. The action of the King of Prussia had rendered such a movement more than ever advisable. Frederic, we have seen, had, after a long and useless bombardment, in which he destroyed more than four hundred houses, raised the siege of Dresden on the 29th of July. Daun, who had drawn to himself Lacy's corps, and whose army exceeded the king's by two to one, had sat watching him, too cautious to attack, and, with no Loudon at his side as at Hochkirch, not daring to take advantage of the many splendid opportunities which offered themselves. Frederic, alarmed at Loudon's. progress in Silesia, broke up his camp on the 29th, and marched towards that province. Daun, however, foreseeing this movement, had sent out parties on the 28th to break down all the bridges, to destroy the cross roads and forest paths by which the king could advance, whilst he himself with his main army occupied the high LANDSHOT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 137 road, leaving Lacy to hang upon the rear of the Prussian army. Seen from a height, the three armies marching towards Silesia might have been taken for one, so small was the distance between them. At Bunzlau the king halted in order to facilitate the junction with Prince Henry. But between that prince and the king there still lay the army of SoltikofE. Frederic, however, hopeful still, marched to Goldberg on the 9th, to Liegnitz on the 10th. On the latter day he had but seven days' provisions left for his army. His supplies were at Schweidnitz and Breslau. Between him and those places lay the armies of Daun and Loudon. For, it was the more completely to hem in the king that Daun had summoned Loudon to Striegau and Jauer. Loudon moving with the celerity characteristic of him had obeyed. The king at last was shut in. With one week's provisions, shut out from his supplies, the roads barred by three armies, and confident that if he fell upon one he would draw the other two upon himself, Frederic was never in greater danger. Never had the Austrians greater reason for believing that the hour of supreme triumph was at hand. On the 10th Daun and Loudon effected a junction at Koischwitz behind the Katzbaoh, their armies occupying the ground stretching from Parchwitz to Goldberg, completely closing to Frederic the road into Silesia by Jauer. They occupied this position till the 14th. During these four days, they, by their position and attitude, baffled the attempts daily made by Frederic to force a way to Schweidnitz. On the 14th Frederic had but supplies for three days. He had scarcely more than 30,000 men. The Austrians had 90,000, and it was known that 20,000 Russians, detached * 138 LOUDON. by Soltikoff from his army, were marclaiiig to join them. DauD, -who had every day planned to attack Frederic cm. the morrow, had been foiled by the daily change of position made by the king. Frederic no longer, as at Hochkirch, remained in one position careless of his enemy. His object being to effect a junction with Prince Henry, who had reached Breslau, he had felt every day one or other of the positions occupied by the enemy. Baffled always by their watchfulness, he had returned to the vicinity of Liegnitz on the night of the 14th. He had occupied the same position before. Daun had reconnoitred it with the greatest care. As soon then as he heard that the king was marching on Liegnitz, he summoned Loudon and Lacy to his tent, and planned with them an attack from three sides on the king's camp, to be undertaken in the small hours of the coming morning. The ooiisultation between the three generals resulted in the following arrangement : — Loudon was to march that night across the Katzbach, then push on to Pfaffendorf and Eiistern, and at daybreak attack the left wing of the king's army in flank and rear : Lacy, with his corps, was to cross the same river at Rbohlitz and attack the rear of the right wing; whilst Daun, crossing the Katzbach between Kroitsch and Hohendorf, should turn then to the right, and attack the centre and right wing of the Prussian army. A glance at the map will show how absolutely perfect was this plan — provided, first, that Frederic still occupied the position which Daun believed that he did occupy, and, secondly, that each of the three Austrian generals punctually carried out the plan assigned to him. But Frederic, very sensible of the danger of his position, displayed on this occasion a caution which, two years before, he would have scorned. It was not the caution of Daun — LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEONITZ. 1S9 a caution whicli neglected the most favourable opportunities unless success were absolutely certain — but a caution the twin sister of daring, a caution which, whilst always ready to strike when opportunity should offer, would yet give the least possible chance to an enemy. Never was this quality more conspicuously displayed than on the days immediately preceding the battle whose history I am about to record. Let the reader mark the position of Frederic. He had perhaps a few hundred men over 30,000. Between him and Breslau, where was Prince Henry, lay Daun with 40,000 men, Loudon with 30,000, and Lacy with 20,000. For several days immediately preceding the 14th of August he had tried to pierce the cordon which these three generals had formed to bar the way to him. He had failed. On the 14th, with only three days' provisions, including the supply for that day, he had returned to Liegnitz, convinced that the direct road to Breslau was not to be forced, and that it remained to him to march by way of Parchwitz on the Oder, cross that river, and march along its right bank to the Silesian capital. With this object in view he had determined, whilst the three Austrian generals were marching on his camp at Liegnitz, to quit that camp, cross the Schwarzwasser, and proceed, in the direction of Parchwitz, to the heights of Pfafiendorf and encamp there. To deceive the Austrians he directed that the sentries and pickets should be left standing at the camp he was quitting, with instructions to keep up the watch-fires and to keep on challenging every quarter of an hour. Between 9 and 10 o'clock, when darkness had set in, Frederic carried out this plan, marched in all stillness past the town of Liegnitz, to the heights known as the heights of Pfafiendorf, and ehcamped there. The reader will recollect that these very heights of 140 LOUDON. Pfaffendorf formed one of the points by which Loudon's march was to be guided. He was " to cross the Katzbach, and then pushing on to Pfaffendorf and Eiistern attack the king's camp at Liegnitz at daybreak." With this view he, too, quitted his camp as soon as darkness had set in, crossed the Katzbach, and marched in the direction of the places indicated. Loudon possessed many of the military qualities which distinguished Frederic. Like that great leader he, too, combined a daring bordering on audacity with the prudence which neglects no precaution. Although he had no reason to believe that Frederic had quitted his camp at Liegnitz he marched with his troops in order of battle as though he might come at any moment upon an enemy. Knowing the immense value to an attacking party of a night surprise, and aware that the king had sent his baggage wagons northwards, he sent out no skirmishers to give warning to an enemy, but led himself the advanced party, which on this occasion con- sisted of his reserves, 7,000 strong. About 3 o'clock in the morning, marching in this order, Loudon came upon five squadrons of Prussian hussars posted in the village of Pauthen. These fell back before his greater force, not, however, before Loudon had gathered from the villagers that a small division of infantry occupied the heights of Pfaffendorf. Believing he had come upon the troops escort- ing the baggage, Loudon at once pushed forward to seize those heights. That a small division only occupied the heights im- mediately in front of him was, in a literal sense, strictly true. The heights of Pfaffendorf consisted of three hills, known as Wolfsberg, Hummeln, and Pfaffendorf. On the first of these was a strong battery of artillery guarded by a weak division of infantry ; on the second, covered by a LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 141 thick forest, the left wing of the Prussian army commanded by the king in person ; on the third the right wing. With the last we have nothing to do on this occasion. One word regarding the terrain. The ascent to the Wolfsberg was extremely diflB.cult for an attacking enemy. Shxxt in by a morass on the right and by a lofty spur on the left, there was no room for an army to deploy. It was impossible to crowd in more than 5,000 men in the space between the two. On the other hand the access to it from Hummeln, the higher spur, was easy. On this height, besides the Prussian left wing, was posted the greater part of their field artillery. The night was clear, the sky cloudless, the stars shone brightly, as Loudon, believing he had to do only with the escort of the baggage wagons, ascended the Wolfsberg. So prompt was his attack that he drove back the division, not yet recovered fromi its surprise, which guarded it, and cap- tured . all the guns. He was preparing to pursue his advantage when suddenly he beheld advancing to attack him the left wing of the Prussian army led by the king in person. Frederic, indeed, rendered cautious ever since the surprise of Hochkirch, had, though not expecting an attack, placed his army in the best possible position to receive one before he lay down to take some rest. His right, on the Pfaffendorf hill proper, watched the camp of Daun, in which, though Daun had quitted it, the watch-fires were still burning and the sentries were still posted ; his left, on Hummeln, faced that occupied the previous day by Loudon and in which the same mock ceremonial was being performed ; the small detachment on Wolfsberg not only secured his main army against a sudden attack, but assured him likewise a very advantageous position for attack upon any enemy who 142 LOUDON. might seize it. Having made these arrangements he had lain down to sleep. From this slumber he was awakened by the shrill voice of Major Hundt, who commanded the five squadronS"which had been forced from the village of Pauthen, calling for the king. Frederic jumping up asked the cause of the cry. "The Austrians are within four hundred paces of us," replied Hundt, " they have driven back my vedettes and are marching on with all haste." Frederic, after sending prompt orders to the Wolfsberg to resist as long as possible, mounted his horse and ranged his order of battle. Day was beginning to dawn when the Prussian king set his troops in motion to drive Loudon from the height he had just won. But with the coming day there rose from the marshes below a very thick fog which obscured the light of heaven. The obscurity acted very unfavourably to Loudon, who knew nothing by experience of the conformation of the ground. He saw, however, enough to convince him that he had a rude morning's work before him. He promptly then sent back orders to his two wings to join him with all haste, and to his cavalry to endeavour to make their way across the marshes and take the enemy in flank. Meanwhile the king attacked him. Frederic had 15,000 men in hand ; at the moment Loudon had but 7,000 ; and though as detachments from his wings came up his numbers increased, yet the nature of the ground pre- vented his employing them to the best advantage. He met the king's attack with great vigour, gained some advantage at the outset, and pushed half way up to Hum- meln. He laboured under this difficulty, however, that Iiis supporting columns could not extricate themselves from the narrow way behind him in sufficient time to give him the support he required. He was thus always inferior LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 143 at the decisive point of the battle to the enemy. The Prussian guns too, on the heights of Hummeln, commanding the only road by which he and his supports could advance, caused him enormous losses. But at this conjuncture the conduct of the Austrian general commanded the admiration even of his enemies. Amid the roar of cannon he was as calm, as collected, as decided as in the council chamber or on the parade ground. He was supported, even amongst all the disadvantages of his position, by the belief that Daun was on his march against what was now the right wing of the enemy, and Lacy against his rear. If he could only hold his own till their attacks should make themselves felt, he might yet hope for victory. He made a vigorous efiort to gain one. But though he was well seconded by his generals, the dis- advantages of the surprise — for on this occasion Loudon, hoping to surprise, was himself surprised — were too great, and he was forced to give ground. Still, if the cavalry could only reach the enemy's flank ! In that hope he manoeuvred to support them should they come on. His cavalry indeed crossed the marshes, and riding up the slope overthrew the hussars in front of them, and were about to make a charge which might have been decisive, when the mass of the Prussian horsemen took them in flank and drove them back. After that the only hope that remained to Loudon was to preserve his army. Of victory there was now no chance; the guns he had brought up the Wolfsberg must be sacrificed, but he had his men still in hand. He sent then pressing orders to Colonel Houvroy to occupy with his remaining artillery the height of Binowitz. He, then, still in perfect order, and with great composure, drew back his army to that new position, and ofiered thence a bold front to the enemy. He had lost 144 LOUDON. the field of battle, but tbe manner in whicb he had fought that battle had gained him the respect of his enemies.^ It was then only 5 o'clock in bhe morning. The Austrian losses had bfeen considerable, amounting in all to 10,806 men. Of these 1,422, including one general and thirty other officers, were killed ; 4,648, including six generals and eighty-two officers of lesser rank, were wounded ; and 4,736 were taken prisoners. They lost also sixty-eight guns, twenty-three colours and 730 horses. The Prussians counted 1,800 killed and wounded ; they lost also fifteen colours and one standard. But, meanwhile, where was Lacy? "Where was Daun? Why had not these generals fulfilled their engagements ? They had, that morning, all the possibilities before them. ■ Why had they not even attempted to seize them ? Daun, we have seen, had arranged to leave his camp, four miles south-east of Liegnitz, cross the Katzbaoh between Kroitsch and Hohendorf, and attack the right and left of the position supposed to be occupied, close to Liegnitz, by the Prussian army. Daun, always over-cautious, sent on his light troops to feel their way before he set his army in ^ Carlyle writes : — " Loudon's behaviour, on being burled back -witb his reserves in this manner, everybody says, was magnificent." Again : "Had his subordinates been all Loudons, it is said, there was once a fine chance for him. " The Prussian historians unite in praising his splendid conduct. Loudon himself wrote the following modest report to Kaunitz. After describing the battle, he adds ; — "I accordingly fell back, and I am bound to say, to the credit of the generals, the staff oflRoers, the regimental commanding officers, and the soldiers, that this retirement was effected in no haste, with no loss of coolness or courage, but with the most perfect self-possession and the most complete order in the presence of a greatly superior enemy. As soon as I found that Colonel Eouvroy had posted his guns on the heights of Binowitz, 1 had the most perfect confidence that the further advance of the enemy was checked, and that my retreat was secure." LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 145 motion, and these returned about 1 o'clock in tlie morning with the information that though the watch-fires were still burning and the guards were all set, the Prussian camp had been abandoned. A circumstance of this sort was just the one to drive a man of Daun's temperament to the extreme of perplexity. He marched indeed across the Katzbach, convinced himself of the truth of the reports given him by the Croats, and then pushed on slowly and cautiously by way of Schemmilwitz, Pahlowitz, and Grosing, feeling towards Lacy, who was between Waldau and Seedorf . At daybreak Daun was within five miles of Loudon, on the opposite side of the PfafEendorf heights. Though a hundred and forty pieces of cannon and some thirty thousand muskets were blazing on those heights, Daun did not, or at least said he did not, hear a sound. Pie still moved with the same caution, reached Liegnitz about 5 o'clock, and emerging from it first noticed the smoke of the firing — retreating alas ! from him. He appears then dimly to have divined that Loudon, carrying out his orders to march on Pfaffiendorf, had fallen in with the king's army and been beaten. To make doubly certain he sent on his Cavalry to feel the enemy. The cavalry rode up the nearer slope of the PfafEendorf height, called the Tijpperberg, driving before them the Prussian posts. Soon, however, they came upon the right wing of the Prussian army, firmly posted. That was enough for Daun. He dared not now risk the blow, but fell back, meditating, first on Liegnitz, then slowly on the camp he had quitted a few hours previously. Lacy had not done more than Daun. He had been commissioned to cross the Katzbach at Rbchlitz and attack the rear of the Prussian right wing. It would appear that he set out at the appointed time, reached the hiUy country I. 146 LOUDON. between Seedorf and Waldau, and there heard that the king had abandoned his camp at Liegnitz. Lacy was then on the direct road to Riistem, was distant from it less than two miles, and knew that that place was one of the points on which Loudon was to have advanced. Had he only- pushed on with his 15,000 men, mostly cavalry, he would have taken Frederic's army on Hummeln in rear just at the very crisis of the battle. Loudon would have done it had he been in Lacy's place. But Lacy was not equal to the occasion. Instead of his whole force, he despatched on the Riistern road only two hussar regiments. These passed through that village and came on the rear of the enemy only to realise their own impotence and the great mistake Lacy had committed in not coming on with his whole force. After a feeble attempt on the Prussian baggage they fell back. No defence then can be made for the conduct of those two generals. They stand condemned alike by their con- temporaries and by posterity. Shallow contemporary opinion, judging from the result, attempted likewise to include, upon other grounds, Loudon in the condemnation. What right, they asked, had he to attack before Daun had set him the example ? It appears to me that the answer given for Loudon by his Austrian defenders is most satis- factory. Loudon had been instructed to occupy the heights of Pfailendorf, as their occupation would cut Frederic's line of retreat. .He marched without skirmishers so as to take the enemy by surprise should he meet him. His astonishment was great when, arriving at the Pauthen, he found that those heights were occupied by the Prussians. He could not tell at the moment whether the latter were in force, or whether a detachment only of their army occupied the heights. The flight of the hussars from Pauthen would LANDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ. 147 certainly give the alarm to the enemy, and it seemed to him that a retreat along a road which their guns on the height commanded, would be more dangerous than a sudden and resolute attack. He determined then, in the spirit of a daring leader, to deal his enemy a blow before he should have time to complete his formation. His first success encouraged him to persevere. The promise of support given him by Daun and Lacy fully justified his conduct. Had only one of the two come up, the battle would have been decisive of the war. It was only when he found he was left to himself, on most unfavourable ground, unable to use more than 15,000 of his infantry — the total engaged on his side that day — that he withdrew to a safe position. Of his losses in guns and of the reason for them, of the hopes that animated him, he thus wrote the same day to Kaunitz : — " As soon as the returns reach me, I shall send a minute report regarding my losses in men and guns. A considerable number of the latter has fallen into the hands of the enemy, partly because many were dismounted and the horses were shot, partly because my reserves " (which it wUl be recollected, formed the front of the battle) " were driven by the overwhelming force of the enemy from the ground on which, the guns were posted, before, from the nature of country they had to traverse, my wings could come to their support. " Had," continued Loudon, " the army under the Feld- zeugmeister Lacy acted in accordance with the settled agreement, and joining touch with mine at daybreak, have attacked the enemy in rear, we should have gained a complete victory. This is the only conclusion to be drawn from the fact I have already related, that, although I had only 15,000 men under fire, I drove back the enemy in the first instance. It would have been very easy L 2 148 LOUDON. for the field-marshal and for Count Lacy to profit from my action.'" To return.. If Daun had possessed a mind to understand, the victory of Liegnitz would have been a barren victory for Frederic. He had but two days' provisions, and Daun could still have barred to him the road to Breslau. But, always over-prudent and over-cautious, Daun had only begun to think of the possibilities before him, just after Frederic had slipped past him, and had secured a junction with his brother, Prince Henry. Loudon meanwhile had fallen back on Koischwitz ; had halted there three days, and had then marched on Striegau, (18th of August). Hence he endeavoured to arrange first with Daun for a sudden attack on Schweidnitz, and then with the Russians for the siege of Breslau. The latter plan was soon rendered impossible by the retreat of Prince Soltikoff across the Oder — a retreat caused by a stratagem on the part of Frederic. The king, as great in trickery as in war, caused to fall into the hands of the Russian commander a letter to his brother Henry, in which, after describing in an exaggerated form the defeat of the Austrians, he added that he was on his way to deal similarly with the Russians. Prince Soltikoff did not wait for him. Daun, meanwhile, had joined Loudon at Striegau. The court of Vienna was daily pressing upon him the necessity of bringing Frederic to battle and finishing the campaign by a great victory. To a large party at that court, at the head of which was the chancellor, Kaunitz, the inactivity of Daun on the day of Liegnitz had acted as a revelation, and great efforts had been made to induce the Empress- Queen to transfer the command-in-chief to Loudon, But Maria Theresa could not forget that, of all her generals, Daun had been the first to defeat Frederic, and the AFTER LIEGNITZ. 149 recollection of Kollin and Hochkirch rose to her mind whenever any one suggested his removal. Even Maria Theresa, however, keenly alive to the importance of the crisis, sanctioned the despatch of pressing instructions to Daun to attack. Daun, though he was probably aware that his credit was failing, could not nerve himself to so desperate an enterprise, and in reply to the orders he received from Vienna, constantly represented the unassail- able position taken up by the king. Frederic himself was by no means at ease. It is true he had