HAtH 10 UBRARieS Math«n8tH» Library White Naff 3 1924 058 531 769 DATE DUE IHARl 5?m^ i i 1 GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.S.A. Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924058531769 PRODUCTION NOTE Cornell University Library produced this volume to replace the irreparably deteriorated original. It was scanned using Xerox software and equipment at 600 dots per inch resolution and compressed prior to storage using CCITT Group 4 compression. The digital data were used to create Cornell's replacement volume on paper that meets the ANSI Standard Z39. 48-1984. The production of this volume was supported in part by the Commission on Preservation and Access and the Xerox Corporation. 1990. THE ALGEBRA OF LOGIC BY LOUIS COUTURAT AUTHORIZED ENGLISH TRANSLATION LYDLA. GILLINGHAM ROBINSON, B. A. ■ With a Preface by PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN. M. A. (Cantab.; -se^- CHICAGO AND LONDON THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY 1914 - 1 ■ i&i^ip I'E Copyright in Grtat Britain under tht Act of 1911. PREFACE. Mathematical Logic is a necessary preliminary to logical Mathematics. "Mathematical Logic" is the name given by Peano to what is also known (after Venn) as "Symbolic Logic''; and Sjraabolic Logic is, in essentials, the Logic of Aristotle, given new life and power by being dressed up in the wonderful — almost magical — armour and accoutrements of Algebra. In less than seventy years, logic, to use an expression of De Morgan's, has so thriven upon symbols and, in consequence, so grown and altered that the ancient logicians would not recognize it, and many old-fashioned logicians will not recognize it The metaphor is not quite correct: Logic has neither grown nor altered, but we now see more of it and more into it The primary significance of a symbolic calculus seems to lie in the economy of mental effort which it brings about, and to this is due the characteristic power and rapid development of mathematical knowledge. Attempts to treat the operations of formal logic in an analogous way had been made not in- frequently by some of the more philosophical mathematicians, such as Leibniz and Lambert; but their labors remained little known, and it was Boole and De Morgan, about the middle of the nineteenth century, to whom a mathematical — though of course non- quantitative — way of regarding logic was due. By this, not only was the traditional or Aristotehan doctrine of logic reformed and completed, but out of it has developed, in course of time, an instrument which deals in a sure manner with the task of investigating the fundamental concepts of mathematics — a task which philosophers have repeatedly taken in hand, and in which they have as repeatedly failed. IV PREFACE. First of all, it is necessary to glance at the growth of symbolism in mathematics, where alone it first reached per- fection. There have been three stages in the development of mathematical doctrines: first came propositions with par- ticular numbers, like the one expressed, with signs subsequently invented, by "2 -1- 3 = 5"; then came more general laws hold- ing for all numbers and expressed by letters, such as '\a-Yb)c = ac\bc"; lastly came the knowledge of more general laws of functions and the formation of the conception and expression "function". The origin of the symbols for particular whole numbers is very ancient, while the symbols now in use for the operations and relations of arithmetic mostly date from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and these "constant" symbols together with the letters first used systematically by VifeTE (1540 — 1603) and Descartes (1596 — 1650), serve, by themselves, to express many propositions. It is not, then, surprising that Descartes, who was both a mathematician and a philosopher, should have had the idea of keeping the method of algebra while going beyond the material of traditional mathematics and embracing the general science of what thought finds, so that philosophy should become a kind of Universal Mathematics. This sort of generalization of the use of symbols for analogous theories is a characteristic of mathematics, and seems to be a reason lying deeper than the erroneous idea, arising from a simple confusion of thought, that algebraical symbols nec- essarily imply something quantitative, for the antagonism there used to be and is on the part of those logicians who were not and are not mathematicians, to symbolic logic. This idea of a universal mathematics was cultivated especially by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 — 17 16). Though modern logic is really due to Boole and De Morgan, Leibniz was the first to have a really distinct plan of a system of mathematical logic. That this is so appears from research — much of which is quite recent — into Leibniz's unpublished work, The principles of the logic of Leibniz, and consequently PREFACE. V of his whole philosophy, reduce to two': (i) All our ideas are compounded of a very small number of simple ideas which form the "alphabet of human thoughts"; (2) Complex ideas proceed from these simple ideas by a uniform and symmetrical combination which is analogous to arithmetical multiplication, With regard to the first principle, the number of simple ideas is much greater than Leibniz thought; and, with regard to the second principle, logic considers three operations — which we shall meet with in the following book under the names of logical multi- plication, logical addition and negation — instead of only one. "Characters" were, with Leibniz, any written signs, and "real" characters were those which— as in the Chinese ideo- graphy — represent ideas directly, and not the words for them. Among real characters, some simply serve to represent ideas, and some serve for reasoning. Egyptian and Chinese hiero- glyphics and the symbols of astronomers and chemists belong to the first category, but Leibniz declared them to be imper- fect, and desired the second category of characters for what he called his "universal characteristic".' It was not in the form of an algebra that Leibniz first conceived his charateristic, probably because he was then a novice in mathematics, but in the form of a universal language or script's It was in 1676 that he first dreamed of a kind of algebra of thought,* and it was the algebraic notation which then served as model for the characteristic.^ Leibniz attached so much importance to the invention of proper symbols that he attributed to this alone the whole of his discoveries in mathematics.* And, in fact, his infinitesimal calculus affords a most brilliant example of the importance of, and Leibniz's skill in devising, a suitable notation. ? Now, it must be remembered that what is usually understood by the name "symbolic logic", and which — though not its name — is chiefly due to Boole, is what Leibniz called a Calculus ratiocinator, and is only a part of the Universal ' COUTURAT, La Logique de Leibniz d'apres des documents inedits, Paris, 1901, pp. 431—432, 48. 2 Ibid., p. 81. 3 Ibid., pp. 51, 78. 4 Ibid., p. 61. 5 Ibid., p. 83. 6 Ibid., p. 84. 7 Ibid., p. 84 — 87. VI PREFACE. Characteristic. In symbolic logic Leibniz enunciated the principal properties of what we now call logical multiplication, addition, negation, identity, class-inclusion, and the null-class; but the aim of Leibniz's researches was, as he said, to create "a kind of general system of notation in which all the truths of reason should be reduced to a calculus. This could be, at the same time, a kind of universal written language, very diiferent from aU those which have been projected hitherto; for the char- acters and even the words would direct the reason, and the errors — excepting those of fact — would only be errors of calculation. It would be very difficult to invent this language or characteristic, but very easy to learn it without any dictionaries". He fixed the time necessary to form it: "I think that some chosen men could finish the matter within five years"; and finally remarked: "And so I repeat, what I have often said, that a man who is neither a prophet nor a prince can never undertake any thing more conducive to the good of the human race and the glory of God". In his last letters he remarked: "If I had been less busy, or if I were younger or helped by well-intentioned young people, I would have hoped to have evolved a characteristic of this kind"; and: "I have spoken of my general characteristic to the Marquis de I'Hopital and others; but they paid no more attention than if I had been telling them a dream. It would be necessary to support it by some obvious use; but, for this purpose, it would be necessary to construct a part at least of my characteristic; — and this is not easy, above all to one situated as I am". Leibniz thus formed projects of both what he called a characteristica universalis, aud what he called a calculus ratio- cinator; it is not hard to see that these projects are inter- connected, since a perfect universal characteristic would comprise, it seems, a logical calculus. Leibniz did not publish the incomplete results which he had obtained, and conse- quently his ideas had no continuators, with the exception of Lambert and some others, up to the time when Boole, De Morgan, Schroder, MacCoLL, and others rediscovered his theorems. But when the investigations of the principles of PREFACE. VII mathematics became the chief task of logical symbolism, the aspect of symbolic logic as a calculus ceased to be of such importance, as we see in the work of Frege and Russell. Frege's symbolism, though far better for logical analysis than Boole's or the more modern Peano's, for instance, is far inferior to Peano's — a symbolism in which the merits of internationality and power of expressing mathematical theorems are very satisfactorily attained— in practical convenience. Russell, especially in his later works, has used the ideas of Frege, many of which he discovered subsequently to, but independently of, Frege, and modified the symbolism of Peano as little as possible. Still, the complications thus introduced take away that simple character which seems necessary to a calculus, and which Boole and others reached by passing over certain distinctions which a subtler logic has shown us must ultimately be made. Let us dwell a little longer on the distinction pointed out by Leibniz between a calculus ratiocinator and a characteristica universalis or lingua characteristica. The ambiguities of ordi- nary language are too well known for it to be necessary for us to give instances. The objects of a complete logical symbolism are: firstly, to avoid this disadvantage by providing an ideography, in which the signs represent ideas and the relations between them directly (without the intermediary of words), and secondly, so to manage that, from given premises, we can, in this ideography, draw all the logical conclusions which they imply by means of rules of transformation of formulas analogous to those of algebra, — in fact, in which we can replace reasoning by the almost mechanical process of calculation. This second requirement is the requirement of a calculus ratiocinator. It is essential that the ideo- graphy should be complete, that only symbols with a well- defined meaning should be used— to avoid the same sort of ambiguities that words have — and, consequently, that no suppositions should be introduced implicitly, as is commonly the case if the meaning of signs is not well defined. Whatever premises are necessary and sufficient for a conclusion should be stated explicitly. VIII PREFACE. Besides this, it is of practical importance, — though it is theoretically irrelevant, — that the ideography should be concise, so that it is a sort of stenography. The merits of such an ideography are obvious: rigor of reasoning is ensured by the calculus character; we are sure of not introducing unintentionally any premise ; and we can see exactly on what propositions any demonstration depends. We can shortly, but very fairly accurately, characterize the dual development of the theory of symbolic logic during the last sixty years as follows: The calculus raiiocinator aspect of symbolic logic was developed by Boole, De Morgan, Jevons, Venn, C. S. Peirce, Schroder, Mrs. LaddFranklin and others; the lingua characteristica aspect was developed by Frege, Peano and Russell. Of course there is no hard and fast boundary-line between the domains of these two parties. Thus Peirce and Schroder early began to work at the foundations of arithmetic with the help of the calculus of relations; and thus they did not consider the logical calculus merely as an interesting branch of algebra. Then Peano paid particular attention to the calculative aspect of his symbolism. Frege has remarked that his own symbolism is meant to be a calculus raiiocinator as well as a lingua characteristica, but the using of Frege's symbolism as a calculus would be rather like using a three-legged stand-camera for what is called "snap-shot" photography, and one of the outwardly most noticeable things about Russell's work is his combination of the symbolisms of Frege and Peano in such a way as to preserve nearly all of the merits of each. The present work is concerned with the calculus raiiocinator aspect, and shows, in an admirably succinct form, the beauty, symmetry and simplicity of the calculus of logic regarded as an algebra. In fact, it can hardly be doubted that some such form as the one in which Schroder left it is by far the best for exhibiting it from this point of view.' The content of the 1 Cf. A. N. Whitehead, A Treatise en Universal Algebra wilh Appli- calivis, Cambridge, 1 898. PREFACE. IX present volume corresponds to the two first volumes of Schroder's great but rather prolix treatise.' Principally owing to the influence of C. S. Peirce, Schroder departed from the custom of Boole, Jevons, and himself (1877), which consisted in the making fimdamental of the notion oi equality, and adopted the notion of subordination or inclusion as a primitive notion. A more orthodox Boolian exposition is that of Venn', which also contains many valuable historical notes. We will finally make two remarks. When Boole (cf S 2 below) spoke of propositions deter- mining a class of moments at which they are true, he really (as did MacColl") used the word "proposition" for what we now call a "prepositional function" A "proposition" is a thing expressed by such a phrase as "twice two are four" or "twice two are five", and is always true or always false. But we might seem to be stating a proposition when we say: "Mr. Wn,LiAM Jennings Bryan is Candidate for the Presidency of the United States", a statement which is sometimes true and sometimes false. But such a statement is like a mathe- matical function in so far as it depends on a variable — the time. Functions of this kind are conveniently distinguished from such entities as that expressed by the phrase "twice two are four" by calling the latter entities "propositions" and the former entities "propositional functions" : when the variable in a propositional function is fixed, the function becomes a proposition. There is, of course, no sort of necessity why these special names should be used; the use of them is merely a question of convenience and convention. In the second place, it must be carefully observed that, in S 13, o and I are not defined by expressions whose principal • Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik, Vol. I., Leipsic, 1 890; Vol. II, 1891 and 1905. We may mention that a much shorter Abriss of the work has been prepared by EuGEN MiJLLER. Vol. Ill (1895) of Schr6der's work is on the logic of relatives founded by De Morgan and C. S. Peirce, — a branch of Logic that is only mentioned in the con- cluding sentences of this volume. 2 Symbolic Logic, London, 1881; 2nd ed., 1894.. X PREFACE. copulas are relations of inclusion. A definition is simply the convention that, for the sake of brevity or some other con- venience, a certain new sign is to be used instead of a group of signs whose meaning is already known. Thus, it is the sign of equality that forms the principal copula. The theory of definition has been most minutely studied, in modem times by Frege and Peano. Philip E. B. Jourdain. Girton, Cambridge. England. CONTENTS. Preface „ Bibliography 1. Introdaction 2. The Two Interpretations of the Logical Calculus 3. Relation of Inclusion 4. Definition of Equality 5. Principle of Identity 6. Principle of the Syllogism 7. Multiplication and Addition 8. Principles of Simplification and Composition 9. The Laws of Tautology and of Absorption 10. Theorems on Multiplication and Addition 11. The First Formula for Transforming Inclusions into Equalities 12. The Distributive Law 13. Definition of o and I 14. The Law of Duality 15. Definition of Negation 16. The Principles of Contradiction and of Excluded Middle 17. Law of Double Negation 18. Second Formula for Transforming Inclusions into Equalities 19. Law of Contraposition 20. Postulate of Existence 21. The Developments of o and of i 22. Properties of the Constituents 23. Logical Functions 24. The Law of Development 25. The Formulas of De Morgan 26. Disjunctive Sums 27. Properties of Developed Functions 28. The Limits of a Function 29. Formula of Poretsky 30. Schroder's Theorem 31. The Resultant of Elimination 32. The Case of Indetermination Page- Ill XIII 3 3 4 6 9 II 12 14 15 16 17 20 21 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 30 32 34- 34 37 38 39 41 43 XII CONTENTS. Page. 33. Sums and Products of Functions 44 34. The Expression of an Inclusion by Means of an Indeterminate 46 35. The Expression of a Double Inclusion by Means of an Inde- terminate 48 36. Solution of an Equation Involving One Unknown Quantity ... 50 37. Elimination of Several Unknown Quantities 53 38. Theorem concerning the Values of a Function 55 39. Conditions of Impossibility and Indetermination 57 40. Solution of Equations Containing Several Unknown Quantities 57 41. The Problem of Boole 59 42. The Method of Poretsky 61 43. The Law of Forms 62 44. The Law of Consequences 63 45. The Law of Causes 67 46. Forms of Consequences and Causes 69 47. Example: Venn's Problem 70 48. The Geometrical Diagrams of Venn 73 49. The Logical Machine of Jevons 75 50. Table of Consequences 76 51. Table of Causes 77 52. The Number of Possible Assertions 79 53. Particular Propositions 80 54. Solution of an Inequation with One Unknown „ „ ... 81 55. System of an Equation and an Inequation 83 56. Formulas Peculiar to the Calculus of Propositions 84 57. Equivalence of an Implication and an Alternative 85 58. Law of Importation and Exportation 88 59. Reduction of Inequalities to Equalities 90 60. Conclusion 92 Index 95 BIBLIOGRAPHY.' George Boole. The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (Cam- bridge and London, 1847). — An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (London and Cambridge, 1854). W. Stanley Jevons. Fure Logic (London, 1864). — "On the Mechanical Performance of Logical Inference" {Philosophical Transactions, 1870). Ernst Schroder. Der Oferationskreis des Logikkalkuls (Leipsic, 1877). — Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik, Vol. I (1890), Vol. II (1891), Vol. Ill: Algebra und Logik der Relative (1895) (Leipsic).^ Alexander Macfarlane. Principles of the Algebra of Logic, with Examples (Edinburgh, 1879). John Venn. Symbolic Logic, 1881; 2nd. ed., 1894 (London).^ Studies in Logic by members of the Johns Hopkins Uni- versity (Boston, 1883): particularly Mrs. Ladd-Franklin, O. Mitchell and C. S. Peirce. A. N. Whitehead. A Treatise on Universal Algebra. Vol. I (Cambridge, 1898). — "Memoir on the Algebra of Symbolic Logic" {American Journal of Mathematics, Vol. XXIII, 1901). I This list contains only the works relating to the system of Boole and Schroder explained in this work. » EuGEN MuLLER has prepared a part, and is preparing more, of the publication of supplements to Vols. II and III, from the papers left by Schr6der. 3 A valuable work from the points of view of history and bibliog- raphy. XIV BIBLIOGRAPHY. EuGEN MtJLLER. Ober die Algebra der Logik: I. Die Grund- lagen des Gebietekalkuls ; 11. Das Eliminationsproblem und die Syllogistik; Programs of the Grand Ducal Gymnasium of Tauberbischofsheim (Baden), 1900, 1901 (Leipsic). W. E. Johnson. "Sur la theorie des egalites logiques" {Biblio- thlqtie du Congres international de Philosophie. Vol. Ill, Logique et Histoire des Sciences; Paris, 1901). Platon Poretsky. Sept Lois fondamentales de la theorie des ^galitis logiques (Kazan, 1899). — Quelques lois ultfrieures de la theorie des egalitis logiques (Kazan, 1902). — "Expos6 elementaire de la theorie des egalites logiques \ deux termes" {Revue de Mitaphysique et de Morale. Vol. VIII, 1900.) — "Theorie des egalites logiques a trois termes" {Bibliotfuque du Congres international de Philosophie. Vol. III. {Logique et Histoire des Sciences. (Paris, 1901, pp. 201 — 233). — Thiorie des non-igalitis logiques (Kazan, 1904). E. V. Huntington. "Sets of Independent Postulates for the Algebra of Logic" {Transactions of the American Mathe- matical Society, Vol. V, 1904). THE ALGEBRA OF LOGIC. 1. Introduction. — The algebra of logic was founded by George Boole (1815 — 1864); it was developed and perfected by Ernst Schroder (1841 — 1902). The fundamental laws of this calculus were devised to express the principles of reasoning, the "laws of thought". But this calculus may be considered from the purely formal point of view, which is that of mathematics, as an algebra based upon certain prin- ciples arbitrarily laid down. It belongs to the realm of philosophy to decide whether, and in what measure, this calculus corresponds to the actual operations of the mind, and is adapted to translate or even to replace argument; we cannot discuss this point here. The formal value of this calculus and its interest for the mathematician are absolutely independent of the interpretation given it and of the appli- cation which can be made of it to logical problems. In short, we shall discuss it not as logic but as algebra. 2. The Two Interpretations of the Logical Cal- culus. — There is one circumstance of particular interest, namely, that the algebra in question, like logic, is susceptible of two distinct interpretations, the parallelism between them being almost perfect, according as the letters represent con- cepts or propositions. Doubtless we can, with Boole and Schroder, reduce the two interpretations to one, by con- sidering the concepts on the one hand and the propositions on the other as corresponding to assemblages or classes; since a concept determines the class of objects to which it is applied (and which in logic is called its extension), and a proposition determines the class of the instances or moments of time in which it is true (and which by analogy can also be called its extension). Accordingly the calculus of con- I* 4 LOGICAL CALCULUS AND INCLUSION. cepts and the calculus of propositions become reduced to but one, the calculus of classes, or, as Leibniz called it, the theory of the whole and part, of that which contains and that which is contained. But as a matter of fact, the cal- culus of concepts and the calculus of propositions present certain differences, as we shall see, which prevent their com- plete identification from the formal point of view and conse- quently their reduction to a single "calculus of classes". Accordingly we have in reality three distinct calculi, or, in the part common to all, three different interpretations of the same calculus. In any case the reader must not forget that the logical value and the deductive sequence of the formulas does not in the least depend upon the inter- pretations which may be given them, and, in order to make this necessary abstraction easier, we shall take care to place the symbols "C. I." {conceptual interpretation) and "P. I." [propositional interpretation) before all interpretative phrases. These interpretations shall serve only to render the formulas intelligible, to give them clearness and to make their mean- ing at once obvious, but never to justify them. They may be omitted without destroying the logical rigidity of the system. In order not to favor either interpretation we shall say that the letters represent terms; these terms may be either concepts or propositions according to the case in hand. Hence we use the word term only in the logical sense. When we wish to designate the "terms" of a sum we shall use the word summand in order that the logical and mathe- matical meanings of the word may not be confused. A term may therefore be either a factor or a summand. 3. Relation of Inclusion. — Like all deductive theories, the algebra of logic may be established on various systems of principles'; we shall choose the one which most nearly ' See Huntington, "Sets of Independent Postulates for the Algebra of Logic", Transactions of the Am. Math. Soc, Vol. V, 1904, pp. 288 309. [Here he says: "Any set of consistent postulates would give rise to a corresponding algebra, viz., the totality of propositions which follow RELATION OF INCLUSION. 5 approaches the exposition of Schroder and current logical interpretation. The fundamental relation of this calculus is the binary (two -termed) relation which is called inclusion (for classes), subsumption (for concepts), or implication (for propositions). We will adopt the first name as affecting alike the two logical interpretations, and we will represent this relation by the sign < because it has formal properties analogous to those of the mathematical relation << ("less than") or more exactly <^ , especially the relation of not being symmetrical. Because of this analogy Schroder represents this relation by the sign =$ which we shall not employ because it is complex, whereas the relation of inclusion is a simple one. In the system of principles which we shall adopt, this relation is taken as a primitive idea and is consequently indefinable. The explanations which follow are not given for the purpose of defining it but only to indicate its meaning according to each of the two interpretations. C. I.: When a and b denote concepts, the relation a were viutually exclusive. Jevons, and practically all mathematical logicians after him, advocated, on various grounds, the definition of "logical addition" in a form which does not necessitate mutual exclusiveness,] 12 THE LAWS OF TAUTOLOGY AND OF ABSORPTION. argument may be simplified by deducing therefrom weaker propositions, either by deducing one of the factors from a product, or by deducing from a proposition a sum (alter- native) of which it is a summand. Formulas (2) and (4) are called the principle of composition, because by means of them two inclusions of the same ante- cedent or the same consequent may be combined {composed). In the first case we have the product of the consequents, in the second, the sum of the antecedents. The formulas of the principle of compositioa can be trans- formed into equalities by means of the principles of the syllogism and of simplification. Thus we have 1 (Syll.) {x<^aV) (a6)rc) {b + c)\ But these principles are not sufficient to demonstrate the direct distributive law (a + b) c + c, which thus is shown to be proved. Corollary. — We have the equality ab->r ac ■\- be =(a-\- b) {a + ^ ) (^ + c), for (a + 3) (a + c) {b-\-c)^{aArbc) (b + c) = ab + ac+ be. It will be noted that the two members of this equality dififer only in having the signs of multiplication and addition transposed (compare S 14)- 13. Definition of o and i. — We shall now define and introduce into the logical calculus two special terms which we shall designate by o and by i, because of some formal analogies that they present with the zero and unity of arith- metic. These two terms are formally defined by the two following principles which affirm or postulate their existence. (Ax. VI). There is a term o such that whatever value may be given to the term x, we have o <^ ^. (Ax. VII). There is a term 1 such that whatever value may be given to the term x, we have X = o) <^ {ab = o). We can express the resultant of elimination in other equiv- alent forms; for instance, if we write the equation in the form {a + x) {b->fx) = o, we observe that the resultant ab = o is obtained simply by dropping the unknown quantity (by suppressing the terms x and x'). Again the equation may be written: a x-^ b X = 1 and the resultant of elimination: ci -^-h = I . 42 RESULTANT OF ELIMINATION. Here again it is obtained simply by dropping the unknown quantity.' Remark. If in the equation ax + bx = o we substitute for the unknown quantity x its value derived from the equations, X == a'x + bx , X = ax + H x , we find (abx + abx = o) = (ab = o), that is to say, the resultant of the elimination of x which, as we have seen, is a consequence of the equation itself. Thus we are assured that the value of x verifies this equation. Therefore we can, with Voigt, define the solution of an equation as that value which, when substituted for x in the equation, reduces it to the resultant of the elimination of x. Special Case. — When the equation contains a term independent of X, i. e-, when it is of the form ax + bx' -\- c = o it is equivalent to (a + c)x + (iJ + c)x' = o, and the resultant of elimination is {a + c) (b + c) ^ ab + c ^ o, " This is the method of elimination of Mrs. Ladd- Franklin and Mr. Mitchell, but this rule is deceptive in its apparent simplicity, for it cannot be applied to the same equation when put in either of the forms ax + ix' = o, {a + x') (i'-\- x) = I. Now, on the other hand, as we shall see (S 54), for inequalities it may be applied to the forms ax + ix'^ o, (a + x') (*' -f- ar) =(= I . and not to the equivalent forms (a + x") {i + x)^ o, a'x + d'x''^ I. Consequently, it has not the mnemonic property attributed to it, for, to use it correctly, it is necessary to recall to which forms it is applicable. CASE OF INDETERMINATION. 43 whence we derive this practical rule: To obtain the resultant of the elimination of x in this case, it is sufficient to equate to zero the product of the coefficients of x and x', and add to them the term independent of x. 32. The Case of Indetermination. — Just as the resultant a/> = o corresponds to the case when the equation is possible, so the equality a + l> ^ o corresponds to the case of absolute indetermination. For in this case the equation both of whose coefficients are zero (a = o), (^ ^ o), is reduced to an identity (0 = 0), and therefore is "identically" verified, whatever the value of x may be; it does not determine the value of x at all, since the double inclusion ^ < a: < a' then becomes o<«r bx = 0). Special Case. — When the equation contains a tenn in- dependent of X, ax + tx' -^ c = o, ihe condition of absolute indetermination takes the form a •'r b-\- c = o. For ax -\- bx' + c = {a -^ c)x -^ {b + c)x', (a + f) + (;J + <.-) = a + I* + c -= o. 44 SUMS AND PRODUCTS OF FUNCTIONS. 33. Sums and Products of Functions. — It is desirable at this point to introduce a notation borrowed from mathe- matics, which is very useful in the algebra of logic. Let/(«) be an expression containing one variable; suppose that the class of all the possible values of x is determined; then the class of all the values which the function /(x) can assume in consequence will also be determined. Their sum will be represented by ^/{x) and their product by fJ/(*). This is a new notation and not a new notion, for it is merely the idea of sum and product applied to the values of a function. When the symbols ^ ^^d Y[ ^re applied to propositions, they assume an interesting significance; n[/w = °] X means that f{x) = o is true for every value of x\ and X that /(ar) = o is true for some value of x. For, in order that a product may be equal to i (»'. e., be true), all its factors must be equal to i {i. e., be true); but, in order that a sum may be equal to i {i. e., be true), it is sufficient that only one of its summands be equal to i (i. e., be true). Thus we have a means of expressing universal and particular propositions when they are applied to variables, especially those in the form: "For every value of x such and such a proposition is true", and "For some value of x, such and such a proposition is true'', etc. For instance, the equivalence (a = i) = (ac = be) {a ■\- c ^ b + c) is somewhat paradoxical because the second member contains a term {c) which does not appear in the first. This equivalence is independent of c, so that we can write it as follows, considering c 3S a. variable x Y\[{a = b)^(ax^bx) {a + x = b + x}], SUMS AND PRODUCTS OF FUNCTIONS. 45 or, the first member being independent of x, (a = ^) = ]^[(aa; = 6x) (a + x = i + x)]. In general, when a proposition contains a variable term, great care is necessary to distinguish the case in which it is true for every value of the variable, from the case in which it is true only for some value of the variable.' This is the purpose that the symbols J~J and 2 serve. Thus when we say for instance that the equation ax+ bx' = o is possible, we are stating that it can be verified by some value of x; that is to say, ^'^ax + bx = o), X and, 'since the necessary and sufficient condition for this is that the resultant {ab = o) is true, we must write 2(<2'*+ bx ^ o) = (ab = o), X although we have only the implication (ax + bx' = o)<^ (ab = o). On the other hand, the necessary and sufficient condition for the equation to be verified by every value of x is that a + b^ o. Demonstration. — i. The condition is sufficient, for if (a + ^ = o) = (3 = o) (i5 = o) , we obviously have ax + bx' = o whatever the value of x; that is to say, f][(a^ + bx' = o). I This is the same as the distinction made in mathematics between ideniilies and equations, except that an equation may not be verified by any value of the variable. 46 INCLUSION AND INDETERMINATES. 2. The condition is necessary, for if Yliax + 6x') = o, the equation is true, in particular, for the value x = a; hence a + 6 = o. Therefore the equivalence Yliax + 6x'^ o) = ia + li = o} is proved.' In this instance, the equation reduces to an identity: its first member is "identically" null. 34. The Expression of an Inclusion by Means of an Indeterminate. — The foregoing notation is indispensable in almost every case where variables or indeterminates occur in one member of an equivalence, which are not present in the other. For instance, certain authors predicate the two following equivalences (a , a'b'v -^ a'bv' ^o, 48 DOUBLE INCLUSION AND INDETERMINATES. 35. The Expression of a Double Inclusion by Means of an Indeterminate. — Theorem. The double inclusion b. Now we already have, by hypothesis, dJ) + u abc . . . k] = o, or more simply u{a-\-b + c + ...-\-k){a'xyz + ixyz +c' xy z-\- ...->rk' x'y z) -\-u {a -k-li -Vc +...-\-k'){axyz + bxyz +...-{- kx'y z') = o. If we eliminate all the variables x, y, z, but not the in- determinate u, we get the resultant u{a -\- b -\- c + . . . + k) a b' c . . . k + u {a + b' + c + . .. + k')abc .. .k = o. Now the two coefficients of « and u are identically zero; it follows that » is absolutely indeterminate, which was to be proved.' From this theorem follows the very important consequence that a function of any number of variables can be changed into a function of a single variable without diminishing or altering its "variability". Corollary. — A function of any number of variables can become equal to either of its limits. For, if this function is expressed in the equivalent form abc...k + u{a + b-^c + ... + k), it will be equal to its minimum {abc . . . k) when « = o, and to its maximum {a + b -\- c -\- . . . + k) when « = i. Moreover we can verify this proposition on the primitive form of the function by giving suitable values to the variables. Thus a function can assume all values comprised between its two limits, including the limits themselves. Consequently, it is absolutely indeterminate when abc . . . k = o and a + b-\-c-'r...-\-k^i at the same time, or abc ... k = o = a be . . .k . I Whitehead, Universal Algebra, Vol. I, § 33 (4). IMPOSSIBILITY AND INDETERMINATION. 57 39. Conditions of Impossibility and Indetermination. — The preceding theorem enables us to find the conditions under which an equation of several unknown quantities is impossible or indeterminate. Let f{x, y, z . . .) be the first member supposed to be developed, and a, b, c . . ., k its coefficients. The necessary and sufficient condition for the equation to be possible is abc . . . k = o. For, (i) if / vanishes for some value of the unknowns, its inferior limit abc .. .k must be zero; (2) if abc . . . i is zero, /"may become equal to it, and therefore may vanish for certain values of the unknowns. The necessary and sufficient condition for the equation to be indeterminate (identically verified) is a-^rb-^c...-\-k = o. For, (i) if a + i5 + c + . . . + i is zero, since it is the superior limit of f, this function will always and necessarily be zero; (2) if / is zero for all values of the unknowns, a ■>r b-'r c-'r ...-{■ k will be zero, for it is one of the values of/. Summing up, therefore, we have the two equivalences 2 [/(^' y^ z,..^ =o\ = {abc...k=o). W\f{x,y,z..) = o'\ = {a^b\c...^k = o). The equality abc . . .k = o is, as we know, the resultant of the elimination of all the unknowns; it is the consequence that can be derived fi-om the equation (assumed to be veri- fied) independently of all the unknowns. 40. Solution of Equations Containing Several Un- known Quantities. — On the other hand, let us see how we can solve an equation with respect to its various un- knowns, and, to this end, we shall limit ourselves to the case of two unknowns axy + bxy-\- cxy -^ dx y = o. 58 EQUATIONS CONTAINING SEVERAL UNKNOWNS. First solving with respect to x, X = {ay + b'y) x + (cy + dy) x . The resultant of the eHmination of x is acy ^ bdy = o. If the given equation is true, this resultant is true. Now it is an equation involving jj' only; solving it, y = (a \ c) y + bdy . Had we eliminated y first and then x, we would have obtained the solution y = {ax + ex) y + {bx + dx ) y and the equation in x abx + cdx = o, whence the solution x=^ {a -\-b) X ■\- cdx . We see that the solution of an equation involving two unknown quantities is not symmetrical with respect to these unknowns; according to the order in which they were elim- inated, we have the solution X = {a y + b'y) x + {cy-\-dy') x , y = {a'+ c) y + bdy , or the solution x = {a -^ b) X -\- cdx, y = {a'x + c x) y + {bx + dx) y . If we replace the terms x, y, in the second members by indeterminates u, v, one of the unknowns will depend on only one indeterminate, while the other will depend on two. We shall have a symmetrical solution by combining the two formulas, x= {a + I)) u + cdu , y = {a + c) V + bdv , but the two indeterminates u and v will no longer be inde- pendent of each other. For if we bring these solutions in- to the given equation, it becomes PROBLEM OF BOOLE. 59 abed + ab c uv + abduv + a'ci/uv + b'c dii'v = o or since, by hypothesis, the resultant abcd= o is verified, ab c uv + a bd'uv + a cdu v + b' c du'v = o. This is an "equation of condition" which the indeterminates u and V must verify; it can always be verified, since its resultant is identically true, ab c . a ba . a cd . b c d = aa , bb' . cc . dct =■ o, but it is not verified by any pair of values attributed to u and V. Some general symmetrical solutions, i. e., symmetrical solutions in which the unknowns are expressed in terms of several independent indeterminates, can however be found. This problem has been treated by Schroder', by White- head ^ and by Johnson. ^ This investigation has only a purely technical interest; for, from the practical point of view, we either wish to eliminate one or more unknown quantities (or even all), or else we seek to solve the equation with respect to one particular unknown. In the first case, we develop the first member with respect to the unknowns to be eliminated and equate the product of its coefficients to o. In the second case we develop with respect to the unknown that is to be extricated and apply the formula for the solution of the equation of one unknown quantity. If it is desired to have the solution in terms of some unknown quantities or in terms of the known only, the other unknowns (or all the unknowns) must first be eliminated before performing the solution. 41. The Problem of Boole. — According to Boole the most general problem of the algebra of logic is the follow- ing <: 1 Algebra der Logik, Vol. I, S 24. 2 Universal Algebra, Vol. I, SS 35—37- ^ "Sur la th^orie des igaliles logiques", Bibl. du Cong, intern, de Phil., Vol. Ill, p. 18s (Paris, 1 901). 4 Laws of Thought, Chap. IX, S 8. 6o PROBLEM OF BOOLE. Given any equation (which is assumed to be possible) f{x, y, 2, . . .) = o, and, on the other hand, the expression of a terna t in terms of the variables contained in the preceding equation t==

^ + .... Then reduce the equation which expresses ( so that its second member will be o: (tf + i'(p = o) = \_{dpi + b p:, + c'p^ +...)' + (a/, + bp^ + f/3 + ...)/'= o]. Combining the two equations into a single equation and developing it with respect to /: \{A + Pi- • •)) 'we put the equation in the form (^ + a/+ at)p^ + {£+ b't+ bt)p^+{C+ci-^ct)p^ + ... = o, and the resultant will be (A + a't+at) {B + b't+bt') {C + c t + ct) ...= o, an equation that contains only the unknown quantity t and the constants of the problem (the coefficients of / and of (p). From this may be derived the expression of t in terms of these constants. Developing the first member of this equation {A + d){B + b){C+c)...xt+{A + a}{B+b){C+c)...-xt' = 0. METHOD OF PORETSKY. 6 1 The solution is t={A + a) (B+i) {C+c)...+u{j'a + B'l>+ C'c + ...). The resultant is verified by hypothesis since it is A£C... = o, which is the resultant of the given equation / (^, y,z,...) = o. We can see how this equation contributes to restrict the variability of t. Since / was defined only by the function fp, it was determined by the double inclusion a,Jc...) {b (a ^ = o), the resultant of the elimination of c. When b is eliminated the resultant is the identity [(a + c) ae ^ oj = (o = o). Finally, we can deduce from the equality (i) or its equiv- alent (2) the following 16 causes: I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (abc' = i) = (a = ,) (^ = I) (e = o); (ab'e = i) = (a = i) (^ = o) (c = i); (a'b'e = i) = (a = o) (^ = o) (^ = l); (ab'c = i) = (a = o) (^= o) (c = o); (abc + ab'c = I) = (a= i) (b'=c); (abc + ab' c = i) = (a = (5 = /); {abc + at) c = i) = (^ = o) (a = ^); {ab'c+ ab'c = i) = (b = 6) (c = i); (a^c+ d i c ^ i) = (^ = o) (a = c); {ad c^ d d c = \) = (a = o) (1^ = o); GEOMETRICAL DIAGRAMS OF VENN. 73 11. {abc + ab'c-\- a b' c = i) = (b = c) {c ) -\- {b = o), (a -f ^ = i) = (<7 = i) -t- (3 = ij, we deduce by contraposition ( 61; Resultant of, 40, 41,57,72,73,82; Rule for resultant of, 43, 55. Equalities, Formulas for trans- forming inclusions into, 15, 25 — 26; Reduction of in- equalities to, 85, 91. Equality a primitive idea, 15; Definition of, 6—8; Notion of, ix. Equation, and an inequation, 83; Throwing into an, 75. Equations, Solution of, 50—53, 57—59, 61, 73. Excluded middle. Principle of, 23—24. Exclusion, Principle of, 23 n. Exclusive, Mutually, 29. Existence, Postulate of, 21, 27. Exhaustion, Principle of, 23 n. Exhaustive, Collectively, 29. Forms, Law of, 62, 70; of con- sequences and causes, 69. Frege, vii, viii, x; Symbolism of, vii. Functions, iv; Development of logical, 79; Integral, 29 n; Limits of, 37—38; Logical, 29 — 30; of variables, 56; Properties of developed, 34~37j Prepositional, iv; Sums and products of, 44; Values of, 55. Hopital, Marquis de 1', vi. Huntington, E. V., xiv, 4n., i5n., 2 1 XL Hypothesis, 7. Hypothetical arguments, 2 7 ; reasoning, 89; syllogism, 8. 96 INDEX. Ideas, Simple and complex, v. Identity, vi; Principle of, 8, 2 1, 88; Type of, 27. Ideography, v, vii, viii. Implication, 5; and an alter- native. Equivalence of an, 85; Relations of, 92. Importation and exportation. Law of, 88. Impossibility, Condition of, 57. Inclusion, vi; a primitive idea, ix, 5; Double, 37; expressed by an indeterminate, 46, 48; Negative of the double, 82; Relation of, x, 4—6, 92. Inclusions into equalities. For- mulas for transforming, 1 5, 25—26. Indeterminate, 5 1 ; Inclusion expressed by an, 46, 48. Indetermlnation, 43; Condition of, 57- Inequalities, to equalities, Re- duction of, 85, 91; Trans- formation of non-inclusions and, 81. Inequation, Equation and an, 83; Solution of an, 81, 84. Infinitesimal calculus, v. Integral function, 29n. Interpretations of the cal- culus, 3f. Jevons, viii, ix, xiii, iin., 73; Logical piano of, 75. Johnson, W. E., xiv, 59. Known terms (connaissances), 63-64, 67. Ladd-Franklin, Mrs., viii, xiii, 23 n., 42. Lambert, iii, vi. Leibniz, iii, ivflf., 4, 92. Limits of a function, 37—38. MacCoU, vi, ix, 2 1 n., 30. MacFarlane, Alexander, xiii Mathematical function, ix; logic, iii, iv, 93. Mathematics, Philosophy a universal, iv. Maxima of discourse, 29. Middle, Principle of excluded, 23—24; terms. Elimination of, 61, 63. Minima of discourse, 28. Mitchell, O., xiii, 42. Modulus of addition and mul- tiplication, 19. Modus ponens, 89. Modus tollens, 27, 89. MiiUer, Eugen, ix, xiv, 46 n. Multiplication. See s. v. "Ad- dition." Negation, v, vi, 9; defined, 21-23; Double, 24; Dual- ity not derived from, 20, 22. Negative, 21, 23; of the double inclusion, 82; propositions, 80 n. Non-inclusions and inequal- ities. Transformation of, 81. Notation, v, 2 in, 44. Null-class, vi, 18, 20. Number of possible assertions, 79- INDEX. 97 One, Definition of, ix, 17—20. Particular propositions, 80. Peano, iii, viii, x, Son, 92. Peirce, C. S., viii, ix, xiii. Philosophy a universal math- ematics, iv. Piano of Jevons, Logical, 75. Poretsky, xiv, 28, 73, S2n, 53; Formula of, 38-39, 40; Method of, 62 — 70. Predicate, 7. Premise, 7. Primary proposition, 6, 21. Primitive idea. Equality a, 1 5 ; Inclusion a, ix, 5. Product, Logical, 10. Propositions, ix; Calculus of, 4, 86, 91; Contradictory, 24; Formulas peculiar to the calculus of, 84; Implica- tion between, 92; reduced to lower orders, 86; Un- iversal and particular, 44, 80. Reciprocal, 7, 21. Reduclio ad absurdum, 27. Reduction, Principle of, Sgn. Relations, Logic of, 92. Relatives, Logic of, ix. Resultant of elimination, 40, 41, 57. 72, 73, 82; Rule for, 43. 55- Russell, B., vii, viii, 89n, 92. Schroder, vi, viiif, xiii, 5, 2 in, 29j 41, 59> 61—62, Son, 92; Theorem of, 39. Secondary proposition, 6, 21. Simplification , Principle of, II — 12, 21. Simultaneous affirmation, 1 1 , 20, 24. Solution of equations, 50—53, 57—59, 61, 73; of in- equations, 81, 84. Subject, 7. Substitution, Principle of, 93. Subsumption, 5. Summand, 4. Sums, and products of func- tions, 44; Disjunctive, 34; Logical, 10. Syllogism, Principle of the, 8, ! 15, 62n; Theory of the, 92. : Symbolic logic, iii, v; Devel- I opment of, viii. ! Symbolism in mathematics, iv. Symbols, Origin of, iv. Symmetry, 7, 20, 24. I 1 1 Tautology, Law of, 13, 92. ' Term, 4. Theorem, 7. ' Thesis, 7. Thought, Algebra of, v; Alpha- \ bet of human, v; Economy of, iii. Transformation of inclusions into equalities, 15, 25—26; of inequalities into equal- ities, 85, 91; of non-in- clusions and inequalities, 81. Universal characteristic of Leibniz, v— viii; propositions, 80 n. 98 INDEX. Universe of discourse, i8, 2311, 27. Unknowns, Elimination of, 53, 57, 59, 61. Variables, Functions of, 56. Venn, John, iii, viii, ix; Geo- metrical diagrams of, 73-74; Mechanical device of, 75; Problem of, 71—73. Viete, iv. Voigt, 42. Whitehead, A. N., viii, xiii, 56n., 59, 61 n. Whole, Logical, 62. Zero, Definition of, ix, 17—20; Logical, 62, 76. Printed by W. DruguUo, Leipzig (.Germany. i^neii Ufliwrsitjf Libraries APR 1 1 1991 MATHEMATICS UBRARY