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 HAROLD TEMPERLE\ 
 
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FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 AND 
 
 KAISER JOSEPH 
 
a a 
 
FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 AND 
 
 KAISER JOSEPH 
 
 AN EPISODE OF WAR k DIPLOMACY 
 IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 BY 
 
 HAROLD TEMPERLEY 
 
 FELLOW Ot PKTSBHOCBB, OAMJKIBOB 
 
 LONDON 
 DUCKWORTH & CO. 
 
 3 HENRIETTA ST., COVENT GARDEN, W.C. 
 1916 
 
All rights reserved. 
 
 D^B 
 
TO 
 
 GLADYS 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The following study had its origin nearly five 
 years ago at the Record Office. Incidentally 
 I happened to have occasion to refer to some un- 
 pubhshed despatches from Berhn and Vienna 
 in the years 1776-79. As I read them I per- 
 ceived that the attitude of English statesmen 
 towards Berlin was a relatively impartial and 
 detached one, and that the incidents relating 
 to the Bavarian Succession involved nearly 
 all the typical elements of eighteenth century 
 diplomacy : the intense personal influence of 
 ralers, naked aggression veiled by genealogical 
 pedantry, the struggle for the " balance of 
 power," the assertion of raison (Vetat as a plea 
 for all crimes, the rapier play of contending 
 forces, the ruthless crushing of small or neutral 
 Powers by the military aggression of larger ones. 
 In a word, here was an episode of war and 
 diplomacy which seemed to nje to have great 
 typical significance. Clausewitz maintained 
 that, in war, more could bfe learnt from a 
 detailed study of a few operations than from a 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 broad general knowledge. I believe the same 
 can be said of diplomacy in this instance, and 
 it is greatly to be regretted that Carlyle, in his 
 great study of Frederic, practically laid down 
 his pen after 1763. 
 
 The view taken by English diplomatists of 
 the events of 1776-79 was, on the whole, a 
 detached and impartial one, for it was to the 
 interest of England to be neutjal. In previous 
 years she had been very hostile to Frederic, but 
 now she became reconciled. Hence in these 
 few years the English diplomatic despatches 
 have something of the value which Ranke has 
 claimed for those of Venice at an earlier date. 
 They seize the central line of diplomatic tend- 
 ency and show the direction in which Europe 
 as a whole was moving. Ev=ery other source 
 — ^French, German, Russian, Austrian, Saxon, 
 Bavarian — ^has been explored by one foreign 
 historian or another, but the Enghsh comment 
 still remained practically unknown to them. 
 It seems to me that these despatches complete 
 the picture and place the episodes of the time 
 in their true relation to one another. 
 
 The despatches of Keith, Harris, and Elliot 
 abound in vivid portraiture and characteriza- 
 tion. All of them have passages which hght 
 up even the dreariest byways of diplomacy 
 with a flash of wit or insight. Each studied 
 his sovereigns carefully, and there are no more 
 striking characterizations of the great person- 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 alitics or events of the period than Harris's 
 brilliant sketch of Frederic and Catherine, or 
 Elliot's indictment of Bavarian foreign poHcy. 
 Keith is a more sober writer but not without 
 humour and satire, and the interview in which 
 he relates how Kaiser Joseph told him his 
 opinions of Catherine shoWs considerable 
 hterary art. Nor can any despatches be more 
 interesting than the little touches by which 
 he gradually builds up a full-lpngth portrait of 
 Kaiser Joseph — that most unfortunate and 
 fascinating of Austrian rulers. 
 
 The moment at which this book appears, and 
 the subject-matter which it tfeats, lay it open 
 to the charge of being written for the occasion. 
 As the reader may easily find a dozen curious 
 analogies between the Prussian militarism of 
 the great Frederic and that of* his imitator and 
 successor, it may be well to forestall criticism. 
 The book itself has been written for some time, 
 but the need of verifying details from the 
 enormous mass of monographic literature and 
 of constructing a proper apparatits critici 
 has delayed its appearance until now. But 
 the process was largely a technical one, and 
 the amendments purely those of detail and 
 minutiae. In point of fact all the chapters 
 except the last were written in the Royal 
 Library at Berlin more than three years ago. 
 At that moment I was enjoying the great 
 facilities to historical students afforded by the 
 
X PREFACE 
 
 Prussian Government, and was deeply conscious 
 of my obligations to German scholarship. Under 
 such circumstances the opinions that were then 
 expressed were not likely to be biased by any 
 views that may be prevalent in 1914. 
 
 One word more : it has never seemed to me 
 the business of the historian to be non-moral 
 any more than it shovJd be his pleasure to be 
 dull. But where I have pronounced judgment 
 I have tried to give my reasons for so doing, 
 and to give ample references to contrary 
 opinions. I have sought also to give a truthful 
 presentation of the episodes selected for treat- 
 ment, with the comment of relatively detached 
 contemporaries, and the criticism of modern 
 historians. 
 
 My best thanks are due to the Marquess of 
 Lansdowne for permission to pubUsh General 
 Burgoyne's valuable report on the Prussian 
 and Austrian military systems, of which two 
 copies are in the MSS. at Lansdowne House. 
 The poem in Appendix III.- is from an old 
 Czechish broadside, preserved in the National 
 Czechish Museum at Caslar, and lent to me 
 for purposes of translation by the curator. 
 Dr. Felix Kalm. I have to thank my old 
 friend Professor Henrik Marczali for the gift of 
 a valuable original manuscript, written in 1780 
 by Francis Katalay, the confessor of Kaiser 
 Joseph, which throws considerable light on the 
 Emperor's personal character. 
 
PREFACE xi 
 
 My general acknowledgments to friends are 
 so great tliat I must make many in the mass. 
 I should like, however, to select first and lore- 
 most Sir A. \V. \Vard, Master of my own College, 
 for the patience and care with which he read 
 the proofs and for invaluable criticism and 
 comment. I have to acknowledge much assist- 
 ance from those in other lands, most of all from 
 Professor Henrik Marczali of ihe University of 
 Budapest ; from Professor Paul Mitrofanov 
 of the University of Petrograd ; from Professor 
 Delbriick of the University of BerUn, and from 
 Professor R. H. Lord of Harvard University, 
 U.S.A. I owe much also to encouragement or 
 advice given me by Professor J*. B. Bury, by Mr. 
 G. P. Gooch, by Mr. D. A. Winstanley, Fellow 
 of Trinity College ; my old pupils, Mr. J. E, S. 
 Green, now Fellow of Trinity Hall, and Miss 
 Kate Hotblack, late of Girton College. To 
 Mr. W. F. Reddaway, the Censor of Non- 
 Collegiate Students at Cambridge and bio- 
 grapher of Frederic the Great'; I owe my first 
 stimulus and interest in the Prussian King, 
 which came to me as we tramped his Silesian 
 battlefields together. 
 
 In the purely military part of my study I 
 have to acknowledge my obligations to my 
 brother, Captain A. C. Temperley, now Brigade- 
 Major to the New Zealand ExjJeditionary Force. 
 The study of the Prussian military system, the 
 account of the Frederician strategy, and the 
 
xii PREFACE 
 
 narrative and criticism of the campaign of 
 1778 raised problems which are still of con- 
 siderable interest and which could only be 
 attempted with the aid of practical military 
 experience. It is I hope needless to repeat that 
 this advice was given without reference to 
 present events, and was in fact embodied in a 
 memorandum now more than three years old. 
 While expressing my great obligations to all 
 those who have aided me, I should like to make 
 it clear that they must in no way be held re- 
 sponsible for any statements contained in this 
 little book. 
 
 HAROLD TEMPERLEY, 
 Lieut. Fife and Forfar Yeomanry Reserve Regiment. 
 
 Fenstanton, 
 Nov. 21, 1914. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAQB 
 
 Preface ....... vii-xii 
 
 I. Introduction to Eighteenth. Century 
 
 Diplomacy ..... 1-12 
 
 Its motives and aims — Importance of commerce — 
 " The balances of trade and of pow^r." 
 
 II. Austria and Prussia (1763-77) . . 13-48 
 
 Prussian Internal Resources (pp. ll-23). — Results 
 of the " Seven Years' War " — Personal character of 
 Frederic — As " Philosophic Despot " — Evils of his 
 despotism. 
 
 Austrian Internal Resources (pp. 23-^6). — Diversity 
 of peoples — Reforms in finance — Character of the 
 " Three Kings of Vienna," Maria Theresa, Prince ' 
 Kaunitz, Kaiser Joseph — Reforming efforts of 
 Joseph. 
 
 TJie Diplomatic Situation (1763-77), pp. 36-48. 
 — The Polish problem — Frederic's Treaty with 
 Catherine (1764) — His meetings with, Joseph (1769- 
 1770) — Austrian claims on Poland — Frederic's 
 remedy— The " Partition of Poland " — Value of 
 acquisitions to the partitioning Powers — Joseph 
 annexes Bukovina — Will he annex ^avaria ? 
 
 III. Bavaria before the Storm (1763-77) . 40-80 
 
 (1) The Last Elector of Bavaria arid his Rule (pp. 
 49-72).— Mcdiacvalisra of Bavaria — Hugh Elliot's 
 report on (1776) criticism of Max Joseph — Max 
 Joseph's reforms and enlightenment — Hugh P^lliot 
 OD his foreign policy — Joseph's designs on Bavaria — 
 
xiv CONTENTS 
 
 PAOE 
 
 Austrian intrigues in Munich : Max Joseph's hatred 
 of, and attempts to subvert — Death of Max 
 Joseph, December 30, 1778. 
 
 (2) Claim and Counterclaim on the Inheritance of 
 Max Joseph (pp. 72-80). — Keith and EUiot on prob- 
 able claimants to Bavaria — History of Karl Theodor's 
 rights — Claims of Joseph — ^Max Joseph's attempts 
 to multiply them, 
 
 IV. The Stobm Bubsts .... 81-112 
 
 Effects of Max Joseph's death. 
 
 Kaiser Joseph (pp. 83-95). — Kaunitz negotiates 
 the Partition-Treaty of January 3 with Ritter — 
 Karl Theodor accepts it — Maria Theresa's deUght — 
 Joseph's hopes of France — ^Louis XVI. and Ver- 
 gennes refuse to recognize a casus . foederis — Con- 
 sternation at Vienna. 
 
 King Frederic (pp. 95-112). — ^Frederic and Hugh 
 Elliot — The Alliance with Saxony — Frederic decides 
 on war. 
 
 V. The Plum and Potato War . , . 113-150 
 
 The reorganization of the Austrian'army by Lasey 
 and Kaiser Joseph — ^Prince Henry of Prussia as a 
 general — The Frederician strategy — The Austrian 
 plan of defence in 1778 — ^Laudon's proposal to crush 
 Frederic. 
 
 The Western Campaign (pp. 125-134). — Prince 
 Henry advances and seizes ToUenstein (July 31) — 
 Laudoa's hurried retreat. 
 
 The Eastern Campaign (pp. 135-14?). — ^Frederic's 
 advance (July S) — His refusal to force the Austrian 
 Unes — Retreat of the two Prussian armies — Criti- 
 gsm of Frederic and Prince Henry, and of Laudon — 
 Credit due to Kaiser Joseph and to Lascy-CLord 
 Sydenham on the strategic importance of the 
 " Plum War-'J 
 
 VI. A Neutral State in an Eighteenth Century 
 War: Bavaria during and after the 
 War (1778-79) .... 151-175 
 
 Unfortunate position of Bavaria — Character of 
 Kari Theodor— His first appearance, at Munich— 
 
CONTENTS XV 
 
 TAOIl 
 
 His nttempts nt flnancial nntl military reform — 
 Refusal of Chnrlcs Duke of Zwcibriickcn to accept 
 till- Partition-Treaty — Goera sent liy I'"rc(leric to 
 Bavarian patriots — ICden on the distress of Karl 
 Thcoilor — Lehrbach triis to force him into the war — 
 His refusal — UiBlculties of Karl Theodor at the 
 Peace of Toschcn — His quarrel with Zweibriicken — 
 Karl Theodor arrests and banishes thg three patriots 
 — Consternation in Munich — Unpopularity of Karl 
 Theodor and admiration shown for Frederic in 
 Bavaria. 
 
 VII, The Peace of Teschen and Russia's En- 
 trance INTO Gekmany (1778-79) . . 176-212 
 
 Maria Theresa's intervention — The Braunau 
 negotiation — Her appeal to the Diet — Frederic's 
 attitude towards Russia — French^ and Russian 
 mediation^Hugh Elliot denounces the " Balance of 
 Power " as the basis of negotiatidn— Catherine's 
 polity — Her instruction to Prince Repnin (October 
 a2, 1778) — Prince Repnin reaches Breslau and 
 negotiates with Frederic — Attitude of Frederic — 
 Mediation of France in conjunction, with Russia — 
 Frederic criticizes Russian diplomacy to Prince 
 Henry — " La Vieille \'enus " at Teschen — Con- 
 clusion of Peace, May 18, 1779-pDiplomatic results 
 of the Treaty : its real significance — Russia's entry 
 into Germany — Moltke on the fear pf Russia — The 
 end of the old regime.! 
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 I. James Harris (Ist Earl Malmesbury) and 
 Hugh Eli.iot on the Character and 
 Court of Frederic the Great (Record 
 Office MSS.) 214-223 
 
 II. General Burgoyne's Report on the Prussian 
 AND Austrian Armies (1766-67) {Marquess 
 of Lansdowne's MSS.) . . . 228-225 
 
XVI 
 
 CONTENT^ 
 
 III. Kaiser Joseph's Impressions ofthe Empress 
 Catherine the Great (1780-82) (Record 
 Office MSS.) 225-228 
 
 \/IV. Gratitude to Kaiser Joseph (Czechish Poem) 228-230 
 
 V. Voltaire on the Causes of War in the 
 
 Eighteenth Century . . . 230-232 
 
 Notes 
 
 . 233-251 
 
 List op British Diplomatists mentioned in the 
 
 Period ....... 253-254 
 
 Note on Publications of the Papers of British 
 
 Diplomats of the Period ., . . 254-255 
 
 A Critical Estimate of the English Diplomatic 
 
 Despatches of the Period (1776-80) . . 255-265 
 
 Index 
 
 267-273 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Frederic ..... 
 
 PACE PASB 
 
 . FrontispifCf. 
 
 Maria Theresa ... 
 
 13 
 
 Joseph ..... 
 
 81 
 
 Tmudon ..... 
 
 118 
 
 Map to illustrate the War in Bohemia 
 
 . 185 
 
 Bavaria and the Palatinate , 
 
 151 
 
INTRODUCTION TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 DIPLOMACY 
 
 The motives of war and the aims of diplomacy 
 in the eighteenth century have been drawn for 
 us by a prophetic and ironic genius. " Some- 
 times the quarrel between two princes is to 
 decide which of them shall dispossess a third 
 of his dominions where neither of them pretend 
 to any right. . . . Sometimes*a war is entered 
 upon because the enemy is too strong ; and 
 sometimes because he is too meak. Sometimes 
 our neighbours want the things which we have, 
 or have the things which we want ; and we both 
 fight till they take ours or givc.us theirs. It is 
 a very justifiable cause of a war to invade a 
 country after the people have' been wasted by 
 famine ... or embroiled by factions among 
 themselves. It is justifiable to enter into a 
 war against our nearest ally, when one of his 
 towns lies convenient for us, or a territory of 
 land, that would render our dominions round 
 and compact . . . poor nations are hungry, and 
 
 1 B 
 
2 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 rich nations are proud ; and pride and hunger 
 will ever be at variance. For these reasons the 
 trade of a soldier is held the most honourable 
 of all others." How many have turned Swift's 
 page with a smile and dismissed it as the dis- 
 charge of the venom of one whose malignant 
 temper and misfortunes made him the enemy 
 of the human race ! 
 
 None the less — as a summary of diplomatic 
 motive and military aim in the eighteenth 
 century it cannot be held a mere fantasy. The 
 injustices inflicted upon the nations that were 
 poor and weak — ^upon Spain, Austria, Poland, 
 and Turkey ; the pride and tyranny of the 
 nations that were strong — of France, Prussia, 
 Russia, and England, — ^these were grim realities. 
 The seizure of Silesia, the Partition of Poland, 
 the attempted Partition of Turkey, are but the 
 three most sordid incidents in a whole epoch of 
 duplicity and selfishness, and a long array of 
 state papers reveals an indictment of the un- 
 paralleled avarice, corruption, and self-seeking 
 of the age, that is almost as damning as any 
 which Voltaire or Swift may have drawn. The 
 historian has only to consult the acts of 
 eighteenth century rulers, in order to justify 
 the satirists. 
 
 But while it is unnecessary to prove the 
 unscrupulous character of eighteenth century 
 policy, it may be desirable to explain and, in 
 some degree, to extenuate it. The different 
 
AND Kj\.ISER JOSEPH 8 
 
 epochs of human history have a certain under- 
 lying unity, the texture is the same, though the 
 patterns on it are different, and for this reason 
 it is well to bring the eighteenth century so far 
 as possible into comparison with our own age. 
 It is true that the eighteenth century was the 
 age of kings and dynastic wars, and the nine- 
 teenth the age of peoples and nattional wars. But 
 though it is not always the kin^s who now dream 
 of war, the people seem almost as ready as they 
 were to sacrifice justice to expediency, and in 
 this fact if in nothing else we are enabled to 
 perceive an essential unity between the ages. 
 In the nineteenth or twentieth century per- 
 suasion rather than force is the rule for internal 
 government, and even a despotically minded 
 sovereign finds it expedient to flatter popvdar 
 passions and ideals. In the eighteenth century 
 the sovereign, who possessed a strong mercenary 
 army and a submissive and inarticulate people, 
 was not afraid of taking action far in advance, 
 or flatly in defiance, of the latter's wishes. In 
 no age perhaps has power been concentrated in 
 so few hands, and in no age has the result been 
 more momentous. During the mid-eighteenth 
 century Europe was bound in thought by the 
 ideas of a few resolute and logical individual 
 thinkers, with Voltaire at their head ; in action 
 she was cquaUy bound by a few determined 
 and fearless individual rulers — ^led by Voltaire's 
 friend, enemy, and hero, Frederic the Great. 
 
4 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Clear thought produced clear action, and power 
 vested in a few irresponsible rulers delivered 
 the fortunes of states to the mercy of individual 
 prejudices and passions to a degree unknown 
 in previous history. 
 
 But though half a dozen persons controlled 
 the destinies of Central Europe, it would be a 
 great error to suppose that their policy was 
 always subservient to personal or dynastic 
 ends. The orators of the French Revolution 
 delighted to exhibit the tyranny of kings, to 
 whom peoples were sacrificed, to point to the 
 wars produced by the smiles of mistresses and 
 to the peaces concluded by the bribery of 
 courtiers. Such a picture has its true side. 
 In the eighteenth century a prince dealt with 
 his own principality as a landlord with his 
 land. It was an age when a system not of 
 states but of estates prevailed in Europe, when 
 kings resembled tyrannous country squires. 
 It involved no violation of current feeling or 
 established right that a ruler should exchange 
 Bavaria for Belgium, or Lorraine for Tuscany, 
 without consideration for the wishes of the 
 inhabitants, who were handed over to an alien 
 ruler as freely as they were hired out to be 
 killed under a foreign general. For a prince 
 could lend his army to a foreign ruler without 
 committing his own state to warfare, or 
 despatch thousands of patient mercenaries to 
 shed their blood in alien lands in quarrels for 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 5 
 
 which neither ho nor they cared anything. 
 Even Avith the most cnhghtened rulers of the 
 ago, the claims of their subjects and the true 
 interests of their states often weighed somewhat 
 little in the balance against their personal 
 wishes. Catherine, " the most.liberal of rulers," 
 habitually chose her generals from among her 
 lovers, and Frederic, the " first servant of the 
 state," imprisoned the Venetian ambassador 
 that he might force the Doge of Venice to 
 send him a dancing-girl for his new opera at 
 Berlin ! 
 
 Such incredible instances might justify im- 
 passioned rhetoric, and explain the savagery 
 of the hatred towards kings at the moment of 
 revolutionary vengeance. It is none the less 
 true that personal vagaries were not seldom 
 subordinated to state interests, and that most 
 rulers in the mid-eighteenth century, despite 
 occasional lapses, sought the real happiness of 
 their countries. For example, though personal 
 influences counted for much, dynastic ones 
 availed relatively little. The interests of Spain 
 were not sacrificed to those of France because 
 Philip V. was a kinsman of LquIs XV., nor was 
 Prussia the ally of England because Frederic 
 was the nephew of George II. It is easy to 
 Single out personal influences which deflected 
 policy in the eighteenth century, hard to dis- 
 cover dynastic ones ; Swift is as near the mark 
 when he says that " Alliance by blood, or 
 
6 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 marriage, is a frequent cause of war between 
 princes, and the nearer the kindred the greater 
 is their disposition to quarrel," as are those 
 historians who ascribe the union of the House of 
 Bourbon purely to the ties of blood, and delight 
 to contrast the dynastic policies of the eight- 
 eenth century with the national ones of the 
 nineteenth. The differences in the two ages 
 — despite the far greater infliience of the per- 
 sonal views of individual rulers in the eighteenth 
 century — are in truth more apparent than real. 
 The diplomatic language of the eighteenth 
 century is dynastic in tone. We are be- 
 wildered by fantastic claims of sovereign right 
 which are alleged to be the origin of long and 
 bloody wars of succession or inheritance. But 
 the fancifulness of these claims need not dis- 
 guise the reality of facts or deceive the historian. 
 Eighteenth century monarchs used dynastic 
 claims as pretexts for advancing the sub- 
 stantial interests of their countries, and claimed 
 territory in virtue of the private rights of a wife, 
 a niece, or a cousin, as the modern statesman 
 claims it in virtue of the public rights of nation- 
 ality, of humanity, or of necessity. The pirate 
 ship steers the same course with a new figure- 
 head in the bow and with different colours at its 
 masthead ; the essential objects are the same, 
 only the pretexts are different. No historical 
 claims can be more flimsy than those which 
 Frederic asserted in favour of his claims on 
 
AND I^ISER JOSEPH 7 
 
 Silesia, or which Joseph brought up to defend 
 his Partition of Poland, yet it was not from the 
 Heralds' College that they dfcrived their real 
 arguments, but from the need of rounding off 
 territory, the redress of the balanee of power, 
 the right of force. Fantastic aiitiquarian argu- 
 ments were the fashion of the day and the 
 decorous screen for aggression, injustice, or 
 necessity. No one at least would be more 
 amused at our generation, which defends so 
 many acts of the eighteenth" century on the 
 plea of history, than Frederic of Prussia, 
 the cynical philosopher of Sans-Souci, who 
 wrote, as he was leaving to capture Silesia, 
 " the question of right (droit) isthe affair of the 
 ministers," and, at a later date, " the jurispru- 
 dence of sovereigns is commonly the right of 
 the stronger." * 
 
 The dominant thoughts, by which rulers like 
 Frederic the Great of Prussia and Joseph II. of 
 Austria were inspired, were those of intellectual 
 rationalism. Mysticism, sentimental religious 
 scruple, obtrusive morality, these were for 
 women and for priests. Prejudice, tradition, 
 prescription, the whole fabric of established 
 order crumbled in the crucible of reason. 
 " When one has an advantage," said Frederic, 
 "is he to use it or not ? " Arid on the hardest 
 
 • Compare the eighteenth century histori[|n with the ruler — " For 
 every war a motive of safety or revenge, of; honour or zeal, of right 
 or convenience, may be readily found in the jurisprudence of con- 
 querors " (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, chap. Ixv.). 
 
8 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 ground of rationalism his question was un- 
 answerable. Before these mechanical philo- 
 sophers the precepts of international law, the 
 respect for the neighbour's landmark, the sacred- 
 ness of treaties, the rights of independent 
 states and universal morality had little chance. 
 Reason dictated not an obedience to vague and 
 mystic conceptions of international good, but 
 a clear calculation of individual interests. 
 Reason denounced not an infringement of 
 treaties, but an infringement of treaties which 
 brought no advantage to the perjurer ; success 
 was the best demonstration as it was the only 
 canon of right. This mental attitude will 
 explain many of the most questionable acts 
 of the period, Frederic's seizure of Silesia, 
 Joseph's unprovoked attack upon Turkey, or 
 the long record of Catherine's treachery towards 
 Poland. 
 
 But there were causes other than those of 
 a scepticism sapping morality, which pushed 
 forward eighteenth century rulers to many 
 acts of aggression and perfidy. There existed 
 economic, physical, political forces which the 
 rulers could hardly control, causes which they 
 but dimly apprehended, pressures against which 
 they could hardly strive — even if they often 
 strove but feebly. With Louis XIV. and 
 Leopold I. had perished the last rulers whose 
 ideas were coloured and wl^w^se policy was 
 directed by genuine religious influences ; the 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 9 
 
 influences of the mid-eighteentli century were 
 rather commercial or political. Rulers went to 
 war not over questions as to " whether flesh was 
 bread or the juice of a berry blood," but as to 
 whether the wine-tariff should be raised or the 
 herring-duty lowered. In those days the tariffs 
 or the trading companies of otlier nations could 
 only be reduced or abolished by an appeal to 
 the sword. The mercantilist creed of the age — 
 a creed held with an intensity and force wholly 
 wanting to more orthodox beliefs — declared 
 that foreign commerce and internal trade were 
 the very blood and sinews of a nation, the source 
 alike of wealth and of power. To injure com- 
 merce was to drain away the, life-blood of the 
 state, and any hostile power, which attempted 
 to do this, was a species of vampire whom it 
 was needful immediately to destroy. Trade 
 motives influenced all the Powers of Europe 
 towards war, especially the maritime nations 
 — ^the Dutch, French, and English, whose wars 
 in Eiirope are often but an incident in struggles 
 for the Indies of the East or of the West. The 
 motive, more dominant among more purely 
 continental Powers, like Austria, Prussia, and 
 Russia, is the need or desire for territory. 
 
 At first sight there seems little connection 
 between the struggle for the balance of trade 
 and the struggle for the balance of power ; the 
 unity becomes more obvious when we realize 
 that increase of territory in Europe meant as 
 
10 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 much wealth to a land power, as increase of 
 trade in America or the Indies did to a mari- 
 time one. Colonization was even more pro- 
 moted by territorial annexation than by trade. 
 Montcalm began by nailing fteur-de-lys on to 
 tree trunks in the Mississippi valley and Kaiser 
 Joseph by advancing boundary posts topped by 
 Austrian eagles into the Zips district. When 
 once the annexation was complete more settlers 
 followed Joseph into Poland than followed 
 Englishmen into Canada. During most of the 
 eighteenth century colonization was in fact 
 more active and successful in North and East 
 Europe than in North America. In Europe the 
 increase of territory was thought to be always 
 an increase of strength because, if well managed, 
 it meant increase of population and wealth. 
 The sovereign who added province to province 
 felt as great an addition to his wealth as does 
 the landowner who piles estate upon estate ; 
 and the thirst for adding field to field possessed 
 every ruler in Central Europe, from the pettiest 
 German prince up to King and Kaiser. But it 
 was produced by necessity as well as by greed. 
 The strategic position of Prussia, its scattered 
 territories, its piecemeal provinces, forced its 
 ruler to maintain an enormous army, kept him 
 constantly on the alert and almost compelled 
 him (had he needed compulsion) to profit by his 
 neighbour's necessities. The case of Austria, 
 whose possessions lay promiscuously along the 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 11 
 
 Danube and the Rhine, and stretched from 
 Baltic and Nortli Sea to Adriatic, was an 
 even more obvious ease of goQgraphy making 
 conscience impossible. The smallest change in 
 Central or Western Europe was likely to affect 
 or to threaten one or other of the sporadic pos- 
 sessions of the Habsburg. Territorial increase 
 was the eighteenth century measure of safety, 
 and Frederic was deemed to have attained 
 that security for Prussia by wresting from 
 Austria the rich and fertile province of Silesia 
 (1740). It mattered not that its possession 
 divided Frederic's dominions even more than 
 before; that disadvantage wa^ outweighed by 
 the sohd increase of sixteen thousand square 
 miles of land and over a milhon subjects. In 
 exactly the same proportion the position of 
 Austria had been rendered unsafe, and the 
 territorial balance of power endangered. It 
 was no advantage that Austria severed a huge 
 district from the dying Polish state in 1772, for 
 Prussia also exacted her share* of Polish spoils. 
 Until it had measured out fo.r itself with rule 
 and line a piece of territory equal to the Silesian 
 province which Frederic had torn from it, the 
 House of Habsburg deemed itself, and was 
 deemed to be, unsafe. 
 
 Hence it was that Austrian statesmen cast 
 longing eyes on Bavaria — ^the great Catholic 
 state of South Germany, whose territory rounded 
 off the south-western corner of Austria — 
 
MARIA THERESA. 
 
II 
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA 
 
 (1763-1777) 
 
 Das aUe Heilige Rdmische Reich 
 Wie halt es noch zusammen. 
 
 Goethe. 
 
 In the winter of 1777 the chances of a European 
 War depended on the skill- of a Bavarian 
 physician. If the Elector of Bavaria died under 
 his hands, his blunder would give the signal for 
 a disputed succession and a, European War. 
 For Kaiser Joseph would majTch his Austrian 
 troops into the south of Bavaria, and King 
 Frederic would begin to drill his grenadiers on 
 the Potsdam parade-ground. It was true that 
 the succession ought to have been undisputed, 
 and that by rights the Bavarian inheritance 
 and possessions fell to Karl Theodor, Elector 
 Palatine. But undisputed successions were 
 not common in the eighteenth century. Legal 
 rights were of less avail than naked force, and 
 a good army always justified a bad claim. The 
 eighteenth century had been an age of disputed 
 successions : from 1702 to 17l3 was the War 
 
 13 
 
14 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 of the Spanish Succession (arid indeed of the 
 English also) ; from 1733 to 1735 the War of 
 the Polish ; from 1740 to 1748 the War of the 
 Austrian Succession ; in all of which history 
 shows the right of the stronger to have been 
 invoked against equity and justice. Now it was 
 the turn of Bavaria, and as Joseph, the Roman 
 Caesar, had many legions, and Karl Theodor, the 
 Elector Palatine, had but few, it was not sur- 
 prising that Austria should erect a claim to the 
 succession. It was clear that Austria was 
 ready to fight, the only questixjn was whether 
 the Elector Palatine was ready to resist. As 
 his own resources were negligible, his only hope 
 lay in an appeal to the justice of Europe, or — 
 more properly — ^to the interests of other states. 
 Yet it so happened that only two Powers in 
 Europe could, by any possibility, interfere. 
 England was engaged in a death-grapple with 
 her revolted colonies, and France was already 
 certain to be drawn into that struggle ; Turkey 
 was too distant and too weak to exercise in- 
 fluence, Poland was helpless, in a state of 
 guaranteed and consecrated anarchy, and the 
 opposition of lesser German states was either 
 not to be expected or not to be feared. Of the 
 other important Powers there remained only 
 Russia, which was just recovering from the 
 severe strain of a Turkish war, and Prussia. 
 Joseph had an " advantage " and was justified 
 in using it by Frederic's logic, though it by 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 15 
 
 no means followed that the logician would 
 approve of his pupil's application. All eyes 
 were therefore turned towards Prussia, for it 
 was obvious that, in case of war, she would be 
 protagonist in the struggle with Austria, and 
 tliat upon the action of her king depended the 
 fate of Bavaria and the future of Germany. 
 
 1. Internal Resoprces 
 
 (a) Prussia 
 
 To estimate how far the conditions between 
 Austria and Prussia were equal, towards what 
 issue destiny seemed to point, some glimpse of 
 the previous history of each stq,te, of their exist- 
 ing resources and of the personalities controlling 
 them, becomes necessary. Ever since his acces- 
 sion in 1740 Frederic II. of Prussia had been the 
 disturbing genius of Germany. No one had 
 taught the age so many lessons in war or policy, 
 none had equally surprised, terrified, and con- 
 founded it. In the winter of 1740 he had first 
 attacked Austria, and conquered by force of 
 arms that province of Silesia, which no con- 
 federation of foes, no disaster in the field, and 
 no defeat in diplomacy could ever persuade 
 him to relinquish. It was not- that in this and 
 in other enterprises Frederic did not commit 
 many errors, but that his resolute will, his in- 
 finite resource, and his matchless energy always 
 enabled him to repair them. In 1746 Silesia 
 
16 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 was ceded to him in full so-\rereignty, and he 
 retired from a war in which every important 
 European Power had been engaged, but from 
 which none but he derived substantial profit. 
 Such dazzling success was dangerous, for it set 
 other Powers against him, and during the next 
 decade Nemesis was gathering for Frederic. 
 The King, whom no Power trusted, soon found 
 all continental Powers united against him, and 
 was called upon to face a vast, coalition, which 
 eventually included Austria, Russia, France, 
 Sweden, Saxony, and the Germanic Empire 
 as a whole. Conscious of the gathering danger, 
 Frederic was able only to strengthen himself 
 by an offensive and defensive alliance with 
 England, before the storm burst. The new 
 and gigantic struggle of the Seven Years' War 
 (1756-63) was to reveal him in a new light, to 
 show him tried by every adversity of fortune 
 and yet equal to every danger, often defeated 
 but always drawing victory itself out of disaster. 
 Before 1757 Frederic was known to be a skilled 
 commander, and his army believed to be superb, 
 after that it was known that he or they could 
 baffle and defy the united hosts of Europe. 
 No numbers could daunt the soldiers who had 
 won victory at Rossbach, no General could 
 compare with the leader who had dazzled the 
 world by his exploits at Leuthen. Even the 
 disasters of the later period of the Seven Years' 
 War could not dim his fame or eclipse his 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 17 
 
 terrible renown. When he ciiu ifrod from the 
 war — exhausted but triumphiiut — he had ac- 
 quired an authority to whieh no German ruler 
 could pretend since the days of Charles V. He 
 had shnttercd the Austrian armies, he had 
 driven the French beyond the; Rhine ; and in 
 these two exploits he had foreshadowed the 
 future of Germany. 
 
 The personal character of Frederic shaped 
 so much of his system of administration, of 
 diplomacy, and of warfare, that even the most 
 minute research into it may be illuminating. 
 The portraits that we see of hihi differ so amaz- 
 ingly from one another that it is difficult to 
 believe that they are those of the same man, and 
 that fact is no bad index to his strange person- 
 ality. In the most authentic likenesses the 
 famous large blue-grey eyes light up the whole 
 expression, and lend the only touch of softness 
 or of human weakness to the. grim iron face. 
 They are all that make possible to us the story 
 that he let street-boys ride on his horse, that he 
 patted grenadiers on the shoulder and asked 
 them to call him " Old Fritz,^" or that nobler 
 tale of how he burst into tears at the Te Deum 
 at Charlottenburg after the close of the war. 
 From the hard satiric lines, from the iron-bound 
 jaw, from the air of ruthless Energy pervading 
 his face, we can read a hundred confirmations 
 of his bitter jests against religi^on, of his revolt- 
 ing meanness towards old friends, of his cold 
 
 c 
 
18 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 brutality towards one of his brothers and many 
 of his veterans. Despite some acts of kindness 
 he was not a generous man, despite hfe-long 
 devotion to the pubHc service he was in few 
 senses a good man, yet he is incontestably a 
 very great one. He would have fulfilled Burke's 
 idea of one of the " great bad men of history " 
 better than any man of his generation, and, 
 though he lacked the profound insight of a 
 Richelieu or the magical inspiration of a Pitt, in 
 all the qualities which secure immediate practi- 
 cal success he has had few rivals in his own 
 or in any age. 
 
 Frederic is important not only for his 
 achievements in war but for those in internal 
 reform and administration, and because he 
 created that type and model of the mid- 
 eighteenth century ruler — the Philosophic 
 Despot. He gave the world the best, though 
 not the first, example of the enlightened ruler, 
 who lived in Spartan simplicity, banished harlots 
 and luxury from his courts, and worked for the 
 general interests of his whole land irrespective 
 of creed, party, or privilege. The creation of 
 a justice which should be equal for rich and 
 poor, and should be without the degradations 
 of torture ; the codification of the law ; the ex- 
 tension of toleration to civil and religious 
 opinion ;— these Were reforms which he intro- 
 duced or immensely popularized throughout 
 Europe. The administrative machine, which 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 19 
 
 he improved though he had not fashioned it, 
 Avas unparalleled for efficiency, smoothness, 
 and economy. Prussia under Frederic seemed 
 to Hegel the ideal of what a state should be, and 
 no land-agent ever knew the capacities of an 
 estate, or lent more effort to developing them 
 than Frederic gave to his kingdom. The King 
 himself took as eager an interest in the raising 
 of chickens, the price of coffee, and the manu- 
 facture of porcelain, as in increasing revenues, 
 in manoeuvring armies, or acquiring provinces. 
 A hierarchy of officials, entirely subservient to 
 the King, interfered in every activity of life, 
 originated or developed manufactures, intro- 
 duced immigrants, founded colonies in waste 
 places, drained marshes, cultivated deserts, 
 built roads, cut canals, relieved poverty, en- 
 couraged thrift and punished idleness. Nor did 
 less material interests suffer.' Frederic, said 
 Voltaire, was Spartan in the mtorning, Athenian 
 in the afternoon. Though he erected barracks 
 and fortresses without number, he also built 
 palaces for himself and academies of learning 
 for his subjects, attracted men of letters to 
 Berlin, built opera-houses, encouraged art and 
 patronized literature. The state still remained 
 in a sense feudal and mediaeval ; the nobility 
 still enjoyed great social and political privileges, 
 such as exemption from taxation and the 
 monopoly of posts in the army; the mass of 
 the agricultural population stiil remained serfs 
 
20 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 burdened with heavy imposts. But what the 
 people gave in one way was returned to them 
 in another, for organization and discipUne had 
 made the nobles obedient servants of the crown. 
 No land was safer against assailants from 
 without, no peasants were more certain of 
 justice from within. Nowhere were peace and 
 order better maintained, communications more 
 rapidly improved, or material resources more 
 speedily developed. One great advantage 
 Frederic had over almost every other state : his 
 economy was so great, his stewardship so care- 
 ful that even in the strain of war he had never 
 resorted to loans. England's subsidies and 
 his own parsimony had enabled him to pay for 
 everything as it fell due. Hence, though the 
 Seven Years' War imposed gigantic sufferings 
 on Prussia, it did not tax or mortgage her 
 resources in the future. At the moment when 
 Austria was labouring under mountains of debt, 
 Prussia, owing to Frederic's system of making 
 income balance expenditure, was encumbered 
 by no tax on posterity. Frederic likened 
 Prussia at the close of the war to a man bleed- 
 ing from a hundred wounds, but when once he 
 had staunched the flow of bldod, there was no 
 festering sore, no rankling wound, which might 
 reopen. 
 
 The real fault of the civil administration 
 lay in its success, the machin^e worked so per- 
 fectly that it rendered everything mechanical. 
 
ANl) KAISER JOSEPH 21 
 
 So long as the Imnd of Frederic controlled the 
 machine, his mighty energy inspired and 
 vibrated thi'ough every part of it, but there 
 were not wanting signs towards the end of his 
 reign that even his strength was unequal to the 
 task, and that no single brain could foresee 
 tlie needs and anticipate the wishes of millions. 
 Prussia was stereotyped in itst routine, its very 
 energies were mechanical, its creative power 
 was gone, and this exhaustion of strength 
 was already perceptible about the time at 
 which our narrative opens (1777). It was 
 in that year that Hugh Elliot wrote of 
 it : " The Prussian monarchy reminds me of 
 a vast prison in the centre of which appears 
 the great keeper occupied in the care of his 
 captives." * 
 
 The defects in Frederic's civil administration, 
 the inelasticity of the system, the rigour which 
 was stifling individual energy and natural force 
 in the state as a whole, was even more injurious 
 to the army. Frederic had inherited from his 
 father, Frederic William I., the most perfectly 
 drilled infantry in the world," and had shown 
 that he could manoeuvre them in battle as 
 easily as upon the Potsdam' parade - ground, 
 but it can hardly be said that*he had improved 
 
 * Lady Minto's Memoir of Hugh Elliot, p. 105. Practically the 
 same phrase is used by Wraxall, November 9, 1777, who visited 
 Potsdam and Berlin in that year. He knew Elliot well, and the 
 reader may determine for himself the true authorsliip of the phrase j 
 cp. Wraxall's Court of Berlin, etc., vol. i., London, 1700, p. 205. 
 
22 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 their spirit or their discipline. During his later 
 years his absolutism grew, and whereas he had 
 once extended a wise discreticwi to his marshals 
 and generals, he gradually became jealous 
 of any show of independence or originality. 
 His favourite leaders were those who meekly 
 executed his general orders without reference 
 to particular circumstances, or who readily 
 assumed blame for disasters which they them- 
 selves could have averted. The individual had 
 become an automaton in the grip of a merciless 
 machine directed by a single intelligence. The 
 logical and inevitable result of such a system 
 was that the generals deteriorated in intellect, 
 the troops in vigour and resource. Their 
 mechanical drill, their automatic perfection 
 was still as great as ever, but the spirit, which 
 had inspired his soldiers at Leuthen, the train- 
 ing, which had made generals like Schwerin 
 or Seydlitz possible, were absent from his 
 armies in 1778. Everything in Prussia de- 
 pended upon the King, but Frederic was no 
 longer the Frederic of old, and possessed 
 neither in himself nor in his soldiers the vigorous 
 and buoyant strength which had brought them 
 both safe through so many disasters in the past. 
 Prussia was still strong in her traditions, in 
 her discipline, in her sovereign's immeasurable 
 renown, but it was the strength of one whose 
 muscles are still powerful when the internal 
 vigour is decaying. Frederic's civil adminis- 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 23 
 
 tration and his military fanje were yet the 
 admiration of Europe, but 
 
 Power, unto itself most commendable, 
 Hftth not a tomb so evident -as a chair 
 To extol what it hath done. 
 
 (6) Austria-Hungary 
 
 No contrast could well be greater than that 
 between the mechanically drilled, uniform, and 
 united Prussia of Frederic the Great in 1778 
 and the mediaeval and disorganized Austria- 
 Hungary of Maria Theresa in 1740. Mari^ 
 Theresa succeeded to a realm whose possessions 
 were even more scattered than. those of Prussia, 
 and some of whose inhabitants were sunk in a 
 barbarism compared with whiph the ignorance 
 of Prussian serfs was enlightenment. Her 
 possessions in the Netherlands and Italy, her 
 territories scattered like dust over South and 
 West Germany, were a source of danger rather 
 than of strength, as they offered temptations 
 to the greed of Spain or France. In Austria- 
 Hungary itself the most extraordinary diversity 
 of custom and administration prevailed, no- 
 where was mediaevalism so apparent nor order 
 so frequently the exception. In truth Austria- 
 Hungary is, and always has been, not a country 
 but a continent in itself, and there was as much 
 difference between the noble of Vienna and the 
 peasant of Transylvania as b^ween the grand 
 seigneur of Paris and the serf of Russia. The 
 
24 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 contrasts of race, of climate, and nationality, 
 as well as of wealth and culture, were (and still 
 are) amazing. The Archduchy of Austria, 
 Styria and Carinthia, and the Tyrol and Silesia 
 were mainly German in population, and con- 
 sequently were the easier to rule by German 
 methods and on uniform principles, while 
 their inhabitants were the most prosperous 
 and intelligent throughout Austria-Hungary. 
 Bohemia and Moravia offered totally different 
 problems for solution, their soil was poor, the 
 people were Czechs, who were wretchedly ig- 
 norant and rebellious towards their tyrannical 
 German landowners. In lUyria was a barbar- 
 ous and ignorant population, whose habits and 
 manners were as low as or lower than those 
 of Russian serfs. There was a wide and deep 
 distinction between all these districts (united 
 under the general title of Hereditary Provinces) 
 and the Hungarian Kingdom. Hungary was 
 an independent kingdom, strong and self- 
 centred, ruled by the proud and passionate 
 Magyar aristocrats, who clainied the right to 
 tax and to govern their own country, and to 
 exclude foreigners {i.e. Germans) from its 
 borders. A perfect type of a feudal aristocracy 
 had been, as it were, embalmed and preserved 
 in this country, and mediaeval Hungary con- 
 trasted as markedly with eighteenth century 
 Austria as did the Hungarian noble with his 
 feathered kalpag, his furred dolman, crooked 
 
AND ICAISER JOSEPH 25 
 
 scimitar, liorcc moustache an4 long hair, with 
 tlie smooth-shaven, periwipfTcd; and silk-clothed 
 aristocrat of Vienna. It was this hopeless 
 complexit}' of strangely associated states that 
 the various European Powers, with Frederic 
 at their head, came to partition and despoil 
 in 1740. The result was the loss of Silesia, 
 and — bitter as was the blow — perhaps a gain 
 to the House of Habsburg. 
 
 The very greatness of the disaster, the 
 terrific impact of modern organizations and 
 ideas upon a system that was hopelessly 
 mediaeval, produced changes that were highly 
 beneficial to Austria - Hungary as a whole. 
 If they were to escape similar disasters in the 
 future the Habsburgs must make the most 
 drastic and strenuous efforts* to adapt their 
 states to modern conditions. By inclination 
 Maria Theresa was strongly conservative, but 
 she pushed on the work of regeneration with 
 resolute determination after 1748, in especial 
 the work of military reform. Her efficient 
 professional army, which confronted Frederic 
 during 1756-63, was by no means equal to his 
 own, but it was immeasurably superior to the 
 hired mercenaries, the rude feudal levies, or 
 the gallant irregulars who had served her in 
 the first Silesian War. A transformation had 
 likewise been effected in the internal govern- 
 ment of the state, the finances were revised, 
 methods of taxation improved, and the ad- 
 
26 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 ministration rendered more efficient. A council 
 of state — erected in 1758 — brought the hope- 
 lessly conflicting mass of executive boards, 
 committees and councils, into something like 
 order, and the same idea of co-ordination and 
 centralization was cautiously but systematically 
 extended throughout the Austrian domains. 
 In Hungary, partly from gratitude for her 
 loyalty in the dark days of 1740, partly from 
 prudence, Maria Theresa was too wise to attempt 
 far-sweeping change. Hungary remained an 
 independent unit governed by her backward 
 and patriotic nobles, though not entirely un- 
 affected by the breath of reform. The proud 
 Hungarian noble was flattered, was attracted 
 to the court of Vienna, and induced to learn 
 German and forget his patriarchal usages, but 
 no serious effort was made to tarnish or to 
 dim the aurea libertas which he cherished. In 
 Bohemia and Moravia the nobility was mainly 
 German and the task of centralization easier. 
 Accordingly these districts, instead of enjoying 
 a quasi-independence under the sleepy rule of 
 petty councils of local tyrants, were brought 
 within the reach of the efficient bureaucracy 
 of Vienna. The civil service became more 
 public-spirited and energetic, organization and 
 discipline passed from ideal into reality, in- 
 creased administrative efficiency doubled the 
 yield from the taxes, and Austria-Hungary, 
 which, under Charles VI., had been governed 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 27 
 
 as badly as Poland, was governed in the 
 last years of Maria Theresa at least as well as 
 France. 
 
 Austria-Hungary, like Prussia, was governed 
 by a dynasty whose rule was intensely personal. 
 Yet, as was often reported after 1765, there 
 was only one king at Potsdani, but there were 
 three at Vienna. These wer6 Maria Theresa, 
 the Empress-Queen ; Joseph, her son, Holy 
 Roman Emperor ; and Kaunitz the Chancellor, 
 almost the Grand Vizier, of Austria-Hungary. 
 Among the long gallery of faces, cynical or 
 coarse, voluptuous or depraved, that confront 
 us in the mid-eighteenth century, Maria 
 Theresa's womanly face exercises an indescrib- 
 able fascination. The brow is broad and 
 noble, the mouth firm yet seAsitive and kind, 
 the eyes direct, clear and true, the whole 
 expression one of innocence, sincerity, and 
 strength. The air is noble and commanding, 
 and yet the dignity of the queen in no way 
 lessens the sweetness and motherhness of the 
 woman. That her face could remain thus, after 
 the revelations of the private vices and public 
 crimes almost daily forced upon her, is one 
 more testimony to the exquisite purity and 
 strength of her character. Without perhaps 
 the highest gifts of statesmanship, she possessed 
 the power of awaking enthusiasm, a resolute 
 will, unshaken courage at a crisis, and an un- 
 erring practical insight. Despite an unfaithful 
 
28 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 husband, a vicious court, and a corrupt adminis- 
 tration, she contrived to win the respect of her 
 enemies for her womanhness, her courage, and 
 her statesmanship, to be the one Habsburg 
 loved by Austrians and Hungarians ahke, and 
 to impart to her reign the aspect of a golden 
 age of happiness and renown. During her 
 reign the province of Silesia was lost, during 
 the rule of her father the Netherlands had been 
 added to Austria ; but no one has ever ventured 
 to compare his reign with hers in respect of 
 splendour or prosperity. 
 
 No contrast could well be greater than that 
 portrayed in the characters and the portraits 
 of Maria Theresa and of her Minister, Kaunitz. 
 His lean, hard, mask-like face contrasts as 
 markedly with her open, generous, and hand- 
 some one as did the exquisite finesse, the 
 subtlety and craft of his policy with her un- 
 affected simplicity, her piety, and zeal for 
 truth even in diplomacy. Prince Kaunitz, 
 the Austrian Chancellor, who exercised such 
 sway over his mistress, was a typical mid- 
 eighteenth century statesman, foppish and 
 aristocratic to the finger-tips, his hair always 
 powdered and his coat laced in the latest 
 fashion, his manner suave, urbane, and polished. 
 No one knew so well how to make frivohty and 
 diplomacy serve one another ; some of his most 
 important confidences were made in the billiard- 
 salon or the ball-room; many of his diplo- 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 29 
 
 matic triumphs were achieved by means which 
 only a hbeitinc could have used. He was too 
 much a son of his age, had too great a scorn of 
 humanit>', and too much natural cynicism, not 
 to have imbibed the cool philosophy which 
 denounced priests as hypocrites and religion 
 as superstition. His respect for Maria Theresa 
 caused him to conceal the extremes of this 
 tendency during her reign, but no statesman 
 of any country showed himself at heart more 
 resolutely anti-clerical. As a reformer of the 
 internal administration he suffered too much 
 from the prejudices of his class, from his anti- 
 popular views, from his easy disbehef in human 
 nature, to effect very much. But as a diplo- 
 matist he had many of the highest qualities : 
 cynical self-possession, ready resource, un- 
 failing suavity and grace, an intelligence that 
 was clear if not profound, an ingenuity that 
 was real if somewhat fantastic. He was the 
 chief architect of that diplomatic masterpiece, 
 the coalition of Austria, Russia, and France, 
 which so nearly destroyed Frederic in the Seven 
 Years' War. But Kaunitz built too much on 
 coalitions, on finesse, and ori diplomacy ; if, 
 indeed, these could have been decisive, Frederic 
 would have been overthrown. The practical 
 realities of the situation mocked at the airy 
 conceptions of Kaunitz, and the result of the 
 struggle brought enhanced glory to the Prussian 
 Jdng, and somewhat dimmed the reputation 
 
30 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 of the Austrian diplomat. Austria had in- 
 curred an enormous debt, had strained her 
 resources to breaking-point, and had failed to 
 recover Silesia. That was the result of the 
 Seven Years' Struggle which ended in 1763. 
 At such a time it was not unnatural that Maria 
 Theresa might be willing to listen to other 
 counsels than those of her Chancellor. 
 
 It was about the year 1765- that Joseph first 
 came into prominence, and Austrian policy 
 henceforward assumes a new character for 
 vigour and reforming zeal, partly owing to the 
 pressure of events, and to the impulse of the 
 Empress and the Chancellor, but in no small 
 degree also to Joseph. His early portraits 
 have a deep and even a melancholy interest, 
 for they enable us to trace in his countenance 
 the qualities which made him at once the best- 
 loved and the best-hated of his race, which 
 caused him to be adored by philosophers and 
 detested by priests, which won him the love 
 of all German-speaking folk and the hatred of 
 all Hungarians. Some have accounted for his 
 striking gifts and his. no less amazing defects 
 by declaring that he was a Lorrainer, the child 
 of his father, the Emperor Francis I., and no 
 true son of Rudolph or Maximilian. But, 
 while the contour of his face is unlike that of the 
 Habsburgs, the eyes are characteristic of Maria 
 Theresa. His early portraits show a smooth 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 81 
 
 oval face, open and pleasing, a mouth full, 
 mobile, and sensitive, the expression frank, 
 generous, and engaging. But his real character 
 is seen in those large hquid blue eyes, which 
 were tlie admiration of all Vienna ; whose 
 expression of passionate sympathy, of warm 
 humanity, of thoughtless eagerness, reveal the 
 true man. Joseph's faults were many, some 
 fickleness and confusion of thought, great 
 recklessness and misdirection of energy, much 
 harshness towards subordinates; but none can 
 deny him as warm a zeal for his people, as 
 genuine a care of the poor and degraded and 
 weak, and a heart as tender as ever beat in 
 the breast of a sovereign. TJie history of his 
 devoted efforts, of his pitiful failures are 
 written in those passionate eyes and upon 
 those tremidous lips. 
 
 The dominating characteristic of Joseph 
 was the imion of strong humanitarian impulses 
 with a rigid and mechanical' logic. He was 
 half a warm-hearted philanthropist, who sacri- 
 ficed everything to impulse and sentiment, half 
 a ruthless bureaucrat, who carried out pedantic 
 ideas with military precision and force. It is 
 in the former character that posterity has re- 
 garded him, and legend has been as busy with 
 him as with Haroun-al-Raschid. He loved 
 to travel into the remote corners of his wide 
 dominions, vmannounced and with a scanty 
 escort, wearing a plain black coat and assuming 
 
32 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 the pseudonym of Count Falkenstein ; preferring 
 to sleep in the village inn rather than in the 
 castle on the hill, to fraternize with the peasants, 
 and to see everything with his own eyes, like 
 a true father of his people. Once at an inn 
 near Kolin he entered hastily, dirtying with 
 his boots the damp brick floor which the maid 
 was scrubbing. " Go away ! " screamed she 
 furiously, but the tall young stranger smiled 
 and gave her a ducat. Who could throw away 
 so much money but the great — ^nay the greatest 
 — ^the Kaiser himself ? So thought the maid, 
 inquired accordingly, found it was he, and 
 was properly abashed.* On another and more 
 famous occasion near Briinn, taking the plough 
 from the hand of a Czechish peasant he drove 
 a furrow with it, to show his love for the peasant 
 and for the noblest of all industries. f In the 
 hearts of peasants, at least, Kaiser Joseph found 
 his reward, however statesmen or historians 
 judged him. His portrait hung in their huts 
 beside that of the Virgin, and a thousand 
 legends and songs enshrined- the memory of 
 the good Emperor, of the Peasants' Kaiser who 
 sought to free the peasants from serfdom, who 
 brought to so many of them, the first gleams 
 of hope and of sympathy, and who wished 
 
 * This story came to me from the lips of an old Czechish school- 
 master well versed in folk-tales. 
 
 t This is the most famous of all the stories about him, and the 
 original (?) plough together with a portrait of the peasant is still 
 shown in the Museum at Brunn. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 33 
 
 himself to be known as " I)er Schatzer der 
 Mensehen " (The Lover of Mankind), 
 
 On tlie death of his father in 1765 Joseph, 
 being already King of the Romans (1764), was 
 chosen as Holy Roman Emperor. He thus 
 became recognized head of the Germanic Body 
 and titular ruler of Christendom, but his 
 power as Emperor over Gerrftany was almost 
 as small as his more indefinite lordship 
 over the civilized world. With his usual 
 impetuosity he endeavoured to infuse some 
 energy into the withered and worm-eaten 
 structure of the Empire, but was met by the 
 most humiliating rebuffs. The organs for the 
 common government of G^ermany, the Aulic 
 Council (Reichs-Hofrath), the Imperial Court 
 of Justice (Hofgericht), and Reichskammer- 
 gericht, were outworn, inefficient, or corrupt. 
 Joseph's efforts to evoke some common order 
 and unity in the lumbering machinery of 
 Empire not only failed, but aj3tually produced 
 strong and not unjustifiable suspicions that he 
 was merely trying to use his Imperial position 
 to further Austrian aims. 
 
 Foiled in these designs, Joseph turned his 
 attention to the internal development of Austria, 
 which he had been co-regent since 1765. His 
 youthful impetuosity soon broke against the 
 experience of Kaunitz and the caution of Maria 
 Theresa, but, none the less, he effected im- 
 portant reforms. Joseph was chiefly instru- 
 
 D 
 
34 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 mental in promoting economy and reform of 
 the finances, measures most urgently needed. 
 The one constant feature of Austria in history 
 has been the ever-threatening peril of bank- 
 ruptcy ; and after this war the situation for 
 a time almost portended ruin. But in 1775 
 the rigour of the economies actually made it- 
 possible for a genuine surplus of revenue over 
 annual expenditure to be triumphantly an- 
 nounced. To obtain this result Joseph had 
 subjected the Court to the most rigid economies, 
 had handed over twenty million gulden of his 
 private fortune, and pledged his numerous 
 estates in Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, and 
 Hungary, finally even his Duchy of Teschen, 
 to support the credit of the State. By these 
 means the interest on the State debt was re- 
 duced from a 6 and 5 to a 4 per cent average, 
 and at last credit and expenditure actually 
 balanced one another. It can" hardly be denied 
 that these measures, and these measures alone, 
 saved the State from bankruptcy, and that this 
 inestimable boon was due to Joseph more than 
 to any one else. It was not his only service. 
 Measures for the amehoration of the prisons, 
 for the humanizing of the criminal code by 
 removal of the more barbarous forms of torture, 
 for the promotion of education, and. for the 
 abolition of serfdom in the Austrian lands, owed 
 much, if not everything, to his eager advocacy. 
 Considering that many df Joseph's ideas 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 85 
 
 were Avholly impracticable, owihg to the doctrin- 
 aire precision of his mind and to his ruthless 
 disregard for tradition and precedent, Kaunitz 
 and Maria Theresa were right in resisting a 
 considerable number of thern. But such an 
 opposition could hardly be maintained without 
 bitterness against a young man as ardent and 
 impetuous as Joseph, even tiiough he was a 
 most dutiful son. It was therefore with the 
 view of diverting his attention from other 
 matters that Maria Theresa placed the sole 
 direction of the army in his hands (1765). The 
 idea was ingenious but tmfortunate, for no 
 species of administration could have been more 
 hkely to encourage arbitrary 'and domineering 
 tendencies in him. The study of military 
 affairs strengthened him in the belief that 
 peoples could be taught to move in a given 
 direction as easily as regiments, that laws 
 Could be framed and executed with the pre- 
 cision of mihtary commands, and that force 
 availed against every species of opposition. 
 His energy, combined with the skill of his 
 friend Marshal Lascy, led, as we shall see, to 
 many improvements in the personnel and the 
 material of the army. As with the army, so 
 with the State as a whole. Austria-Hungary, 
 which had been mediaeval in 1740, was by no 
 means modern in 1778, but she had advanced 
 with great rapidity, her resources had been 
 greatly developed, her administration, as com- 
 
36 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 pared with previous periods, was at least 
 relatively efficient, uniform, and centralized. 
 She had neither the technical perfection nor 
 the immense moral prestige of Prussia, but 
 she was not so tied to old traditions nor so 
 hampered and stereotyped by success ; and 
 the two countries, if not equal, were at least far 
 more evenly balanced than at any previous 
 time in Frederic's reign. It only remains, there- 
 fore, to inquire into the history of the years 
 that followed 1763, to see how far the diplo- 
 matic situation favoured one or the other. 
 
 2. The Diplomatic Situation, 1763-77 
 
 In foreign policy Frederic had the great 
 advantage of exercising undisputed sway, whilst 
 the control of the external affairs of Austria- 
 Hungary was shared among three persons. 
 Maria Theresa was pious and honourable in all 
 things, and her regard for international morality 
 was often as much outraged by the suggestions 
 of both Joseph and Kaunitz as her practical 
 good sense was offended by the impetuous 
 rashness of the Kaiser or the fantastic in- 
 genuity of the minister. In the control of the 
 internal affairs of Austria she managed to hold 
 her own, and to dictate her pohcy to her two 
 chief advisers, but in foreign, policy the case 
 was otherwise. The position of Joseph as head 
 of the army and his rank as Emperor gave him 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 87 
 
 great advantages for influcneirig foreign policy, 
 and when his \'i(n\ s were supported by the vast 
 diplomatic experience of Kaunitz, their union 
 often carried the day against Maria Theresa. 
 Frederic, on the other hand, treated his advisers 
 as mere clerks, and was able to impart complete 
 imity and decision both to the. conception and 
 execution of his designs. 
 
 The situation of Austria and Prussia after the 
 Seven Years' War was, in each case, critical. 
 Each had been abandoned by her ally ; Austria 
 by Russia, Prussia by Engl&nd. These two 
 defections determined the diplomatic situation 
 of Central Europe for the next twenty years. 
 Without an ally each of the German Powders 
 was unsafe. Austria clung to France, who was 
 pledged to her by treaty, and still a friend if 
 a wavering and uncertain one. Russia under 
 Czar Peter III. had actually deserted Austria, 
 and entered into an offensive alliance with 
 Prussia (1762). Catherine II,, his murderess, 
 widow and successor, had withdrawn from the 
 Prussian alliance, but had remained neutral, and 
 so enabled Frederic to close tlie war triumph- 
 antly, without the loss of an, inch of Silesian 
 territory. Events in Poland" were, however, 
 soon to force Catherine into closer relations with 
 Prussia. On October 5, 1763, King Augustus 
 III. of Poland died. As the Polish throne 
 was elective, and as the Polish nobles were 
 influenced by bribes and threats from outside. 
 
38 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 there was the certainty of a disputed succession 
 and the prospect of a long and bloody war. 
 Catherine, fearing that the Franco-Austrian 
 alliance would be hostile to her design of placing 
 her own nominee on the Polish throne, turned 
 to Frederic. A treaty was signed on April 
 11, 1764, between Frederic and the Czarina, 
 which included an eight years' offensive and 
 defensive alliance between the two Powers, 
 and a regulation of the Polish Succession accord- 
 ing to their wishes. The results were startling : 
 Russian battalions promptly terrorised the 
 Polish nobles, and on September 7, 1764, set 
 Stanislas Poniatowski, Catherine's old lover 
 and new servant, upon the throne of Poland. 
 This move was made with the moral support 
 of Frederic. So serious was the blow to 
 Austrian prestige that Kaunitz would have 
 advised Maria Theresa to declare war had 
 not the internal condition of Austria impera- 
 tively forbidden any such design. Worse 
 difficulties were to come : the Catholic reaction- 
 ary Poles rebelled against their tolerant and 
 apparently Russian King Stanislas. Catherine 
 supported her lover with arms, and drove his 
 opponents into Turkish territory. The re- 
 monstrances of the Russian Ambassador with 
 the Grand Vizier as to the harbouring of these 
 refugees produced his own imprisonment in 
 the Seven Towers at Constantinople and a 
 declaration of war upon the Sultan from the 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 89 
 
 Czarina. Thus the direct result of the Pohsh 
 disturbances was a dangerous war between 
 Catherine and Turkey. The prentice clumsiness 
 which Russian and Turkish generals proceeded 
 to show in the war amused that supreme 
 military artist, Kng Frederic, as much as the 
 diplomatic dangers distressed him. In 1769 
 Russia — after giant sacrifices of men and money 
 —had conquered and occupied all Moldavia, 
 and this alteration of the balance of power not 
 only seriously disturbed Frederic, but almost 
 compelled Austria to interfere. Under these 
 circumstances, Austria and Prussia began to 
 regard one another more favourably. Kaunitz 
 revived a project — as old as 1766 — for securing 
 a meeting between King Frederic and Kaiser 
 Joseph, and on August 25, 1769, their world- 
 famous meeting took place at Neisse in Silesia. 
 The meeting of the old hero of Prussia and the 
 young hope of Austria, the soldierly familiarity 
 with which Frederic treated Laudon the 
 Austrian hero of the Seven Years' War, the 
 ease with which Joseph waived his Imperial 
 dignity to show his respect for the old King, all 
 these details made the meeting of Neisse famous. 
 But what seemed a world-event to contem- 
 poraries was in reality but a picturesque 
 incident. Joseph wrote to his mother that the 
 King was a genius but a rasqal, and that he 
 thought his ideas peaceful at the moment 
 merely because he dared not venture upon war ; 
 
40 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Frederic wrote to his Minister saying the 
 Kaiser was full of energy and rashness, and a 
 firebrand who would set Europe aflame when 
 he had the power. The meeting had no result 
 in drawing the two rulers closer together, but 
 it frightened the Czarina, induced her to sign 
 a new treaty with Frederic on October 23, 1769, 
 and produced a Russo-Prussian Alliance which 
 lasted until March 1780. 
 
 A second meeting between Frederic and 
 Joseph at Neustadt (Moravia) at the Austrian 
 manoeuvres on September 30,= 1770, had really 
 more important results than that of Neisse. It 
 was memorable because Kaunitz, who had not 
 seen Frederic for a generation, clasped hands 
 with the man who had so often baffled all 
 his diplomatic finesse. Frederic spoke freely 
 to Kaunitz of the -dangers created by this 
 " cursed Turkish War." Each agreed that the 
 aggression of Russia formed a serious danger, 
 and, while not abandoning their respective 
 allies, each arranged to urge moderation on the 
 Czarina. Prince Henry of Prussia went on a 
 mission to Catherine at the end of 1770, and 
 heard from her that she would insist on the 
 Russian occupation, or at least on the complete 
 independence, of Moldo-Wallachia. The news 
 of this made Frederic write to his brother that 
 he disapproved the terms, ar^d was not going 
 to support Russia in her aggression, in order 
 finally "to be spitted like Polyphemus." The 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 41 
 
 Austrian trio were of tlic same opinion — but 
 distrustod Frederic as much a§ Catherine. 
 
 The means by which this mutual distrust 
 among the three Powers w£^s removed, and 
 the Turkish difficulty adjusted, were extra- 
 ordinary. It was by the Partition of Poland. 
 
 The state of anarchy in Polpnd had already 
 caused an Austrian corps of observation to be 
 stationed on its borders, and Joseph without 
 opposition from Stanislas had already carried 
 out a delimitation of boundaries. He had 
 included Zips in Austria, a- district mainly 
 (ierman in speech, which had hitherto been 
 regarded as Polish territory. It had been 
 pledged to Poland by Sigismund, King of 
 Himgary, in 1412, and the Hujngarian Diet had 
 declared in favour of its re-incorporation in 
 Himgarian territory on many occasions and 
 last of all in 1756. As Poland's claims to it 
 were possibly disputable. King Stanislas not 
 only allowed, but even requested Kaiser Joseph 
 to annex Zips (May 1769). But it was ill 
 making concessions to Kaiser Joseph, for he 
 took the opportunity not only to occupy Zips, 
 but to claim also Sandez, Neumarkt, and 
 Gsorsztyn, to march troops irito them, and to 
 Surround them with boundary posts topped 
 with Austrian eagles. WhQ,tever may be 
 thought of the occupation of Zips, it can 
 hardly be denied that this other unjustifiable 
 act of aggression gave the first direct sug- 
 
42 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 gestion for immediate annexation on a larger 
 scale. If Austria had already acquired by 
 ells, why should not Frederic and Catherine 
 by miles ? 
 
 To Frederic in 1771 the situation seems to 
 have shaped itself as follows : " Russia occupies 
 a large part of Turkish territory and threatens 
 Poland, Austria holds a part of Polish territory 
 and threatens yet more. Each appeals to me 
 against the other, and at present I am in the 
 situation of an arbiter, who possesses no 
 equivalent of land to balance their proposed 
 acquisitions." His remedy was ingenious and 
 characteristic, and as early as February 1771 
 he was instructing Prince Henry to suggest to 
 Catherine a partition of Polish territory among 
 the three Powers. By such acquisitions each 
 Power could deal fairly with the other, Russia 
 could relinquish too extensive a spoliation of 
 Turkey, Austria could increase her Polish gains, 
 and Frederic himself be satisfied with that 
 modest remnant, Polish West Prussia. He 
 made it quite clear that Prussia could not 
 allow Austrian expansion in Poland, or Russian 
 expansion in Turkey, to proceed unchecked. 
 He was prepared to resist them to the last 
 extremity except upon these terms which he 
 laid down. Catherine was unwilling to re- 
 linquish her hold either upon Poland or Turkey, 
 but it was clear that persistence in her single- 
 handed attempt to despoil the Poles meant war 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 48 
 
 with Prussia, while to rob the Turks meant 
 war with Austria. It was onfy at the expense 
 of Polai\d that Prussia, Austria, and Russia 
 could alike gain accessions of power, and the 
 oiJy solution acceptable to all three parties, 
 the sole way out of this maze of conflicting 
 interests, was to guarantee the integrity of 
 Turkey by securing the dispiemberment of 
 Poland. 
 
 Whatever may be thought; of the morality 
 of these transactions it was the policy of them 
 alone that seems to have been considered by 
 Frederic and Catherine. Neither do Kaimitz 
 and Joseph appear to have troubled their 
 consciences, for much as the latter loved 
 justice to be done to peasants he cared nothing 
 about it for princes. Still one obstacle re- 
 mained in the way of these heartless intriguers, 
 the conscience of Maria Theresa. Her old- 
 world piety, her sense of honour and of inter- 
 national fair-dealing, were outraged by this 
 shameless proposal to prevent the destruction 
 of one independent state by proceeding to the 
 dismemberment of another. But in truth her 
 opposition was hopeless, Joseph's seizure of 
 Zips and Neustadt — however insignificant in 
 size as compared with the wholesale acquisi- 
 tions proposed — had been tiie halloo which 
 started the chase. It was useless to call off the 
 hunters now that hounds were in cry and the 
 quarry at view. Therefore with sighs and tears 
 
44 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 and protestations, and with warnings of the 
 penalties which awaited international perjurers, 
 she gave way, 
 
 " She took though she wept," sneered 
 Frederic. "She carved territory from Poland 
 with one hand and used her handkerchief with 
 the other," laughed the French ambassador at 
 Vienna. This heartless ridicule of her motives 
 and attitude shows how little old-fashioned 
 virtue was impressive, or even intelligible, to 
 the diplomatist of the day. The fact that 
 England showed no indignation against the 
 partition when once commercial advantages 
 were secured to her, and that France made but 
 a feeble remonstrance, proves the stagnation 
 of international morality. 
 
 Hence arose the famous, or rather the in- 
 famous. Partition of Poland among Austria, 
 Russia, and Prussia. On August 5, 1772, the 
 treaty of partition among the three Powers 
 was signed, and in September the project was 
 revealed to the world. The historical claims, 
 by which the three Powers masked their aggres- 
 sion and which were solemnly put forward in 
 this document, have deceived no one except 
 some historians of the nineteenth century. 
 Even apart from the fact th^it, in advancing 
 hereditary claims, they only adopted a typical 
 eighteenth century device, the previous negotia- 
 tions show that their case w^s entirely based 
 on expediency. Apart from the injustice of 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 45 
 
 the original seizures, the portioits were equitably 
 adjusted, the balance was he^d with an equal 
 hand. Frederic gained only an addition of 
 6i4 square geographical miles \vith 600,000 in- 
 habitants, but the acquisition of West Prussia to 
 him, by strengthening and knitting together his 
 scattered dominions, was of immense strategic 
 importance. Catherine acquiitd part of White 
 Russia — 1975 square miles — with 1,800,000 
 inhabitants, the lion's share in acreage; Austria 
 but 1400 square miles (including Zips), yet 
 with a population of 3,000,000 inhabitants, 
 and with control over the ri<;h salt-mines of 
 ^Vieliscka, whose vast extent and wealth still 
 win admiration from the modern traveller. 
 In short Prussia had the advantage in strength, 
 Austria in wealth, Russia in quantity, and on 
 these grounds Frederic, with abausing cynicism, 
 appeared to regard the transaction as inaugurat- 
 ing a new era of international justice and good 
 feeling. The honour, found among even less 
 princely robbers, was at least present in the 
 deahngs of these rulers with one another. The 
 worst accusation against them indeed is not 
 that they dismembered Polan.d, but that they 
 guaranteed to her the old anarchic constitution, 
 and thus provided themselves with an excuse 
 or opportunity for further dismemberment. 
 
 These transactions can only be incidentally 
 noticed here, so that their bearing on the general 
 situation may be seen. They had decisively 
 
46 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 shown that the diplomatic cards were again 
 being shuffled. Austria was no longer passive 
 or pacific; the ardent Kaiser Joseph and the 
 restless Kaunitz had obviously increased their 
 influence over Maria Theresa, and had become 
 the chief directors of Austrian policy. Russia 
 was, for the time being, somewhat estranged 
 from her ally Prussia ; for Frederic had done 
 much to cause the Polish partition and had 
 thus checked the Russian absorption of Poland. 
 For the next few years there was some revival 
 of good feeling between the two German 
 Powers, greatly to the benefit of Austria. Their 
 union had already compelled Catherine to share 
 her Polish spoils ; it was now to force her to 
 disgorge many of her Turkish ones. In 1771 
 Austria had concluded a convention with 
 Turkey by which, in return for permission to 
 occupy Little Wallachia and for commercial 
 advantages, Austria had agreed to modify the 
 Russian demands. In 1772 a united attempt 
 by Austria and Prussia to summon a congress 
 for the settlement of Eastern affairs resulted in 
 failure, but at last in 1774, after a series of 
 disastrous defeats, the Turks signed the Treaty 
 of Kustchuk Kainardji under Austro-Prussian 
 mediation. Along the Black Sea Russia gained 
 largely at the expense of Turkey, but, in return 
 for a species of protectorate over Orthodox 
 Christians in the Turkish dominions, she with- 
 drew from Moldo-Wallachia. This evacuation 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 47 
 
 was the point about which Joseph and Frccicric- 
 cared most, for it was here thfit the balance of 
 power was really most endangered. How little 
 either regarded the Turk as such is shown by 
 the fact that Joseph refused to withdraw from 
 the Bukowina, the north-west part of Moldavia 
 ---on the specious plea that he had carried out 
 the convention of 1771 by forcing Russia's 
 evacuation of Moldo-Wallachia (1775). This 
 military occupation of the Bukowina continued 
 till 1786, when it was fornaally annexed to 
 Austria. This addition to Austrian territory 
 was not formally opposed by Frederic but was 
 viewed by him with the greatest suspicion. 
 Kaiser Joseph was ruling the other two 
 " Kings " at Vienna, and the firebrand was 
 already threatening Europe. 
 
 The questions of the E^st had for the 
 moment been settled, Poland was helpless, 
 Turkey quiescent, and Joseph and Kaunitz 
 had adroitly used circumstances to filch terri- 
 tory from both. But Prussia and Russia 
 were still allies, and now that the Polish and 
 Turkish problems were adjuste'd for the moment 
 Austria looked westwards. From 1775 onwards 
 Joseph's attention was turned to Germany, 
 where he again attempted to breathe life into 
 the old and nerveless Imperial machinery, in 
 order to further Austrian designs. But here 
 again he failed as he had failed before, he set 
 Cathohc and Protestant states against one 
 
48 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 another in the Chambers of the Diet, threatened 
 to impose arbitrary decisions upon them, and 
 frightened every one with his imperious ways 
 and impetuous energy. No real advance and 
 much genuine suspicion were inspired by these 
 efforts. It was natural that, in the awakened 
 strife between Catholic and Protestant states, 
 Joseph should pay attention to Bavaria, the 
 most powerful Catholic state in Germany after 
 Austria itself. With the death of the Elector 
 in December 1777 the whole prospect opened, 
 and Joseph promptly occupied the south-east 
 part of Bavaria with troops. "From 1763 on- 
 wards Austrian policy had been marked by a 
 good deal of aggression and thirst for territory, 
 gratified first at the Polish expense and then 
 at the Turkish. Frederic had balanced Austria's 
 gain in Galicia by his gain in Prussian Poland, 
 he had been unable or unwilling to check the 
 acquisition of the Bukowina. Would he now 
 suffer Germany to be partitioned like Poland 
 or Turkey ? 
 
Ill 
 
 BAVARIA BEFORE THE STORM 
 
 (17C3-1777) 
 
 1. The Last Elector of Bavaria and 
 HIS Rule 
 
 In the earlier part of the eighteenth century 
 two different kinds of State 9,nd two opposed 
 ideals of government were visible in Germany. 
 One was Catholic, indolent, aind agrarian, the 
 other mihtary, energetic, and Protestant. Pro- 
 gressive states like Prussia under Frederic 
 ^Villiam I. sacrificed everything to efficiency, 
 dressed ambassadors and ministers in rags in 
 order to put soldiers in uniform, and levelled 
 everything as flat and as bar6 as the Potsdam 
 parade-ground. Mediaeval states, like Austria 
 under Charles VI., surrendered everything to 
 indolence and dignity, wrung money from their 
 peasants for the splendours of the Court, and 
 dreamt only of " playing burst frog to the ox 
 of Versailles." By the mid-eighteenth century 
 Prussia and Austria had changed all this ; 
 Frederic had united the arts with arms, and 
 
 49 E 
 
50 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 the Habsburgs had ceased to be mediaeval. 
 In the lesser German States, however, fidelity 
 to each respective type had been sternly main- 
 tained, the mihtary efficiency of some was still 
 great, the slumbers of others were still profound. 
 In its mean ambitions and gigantic extrava- 
 gance, in the pettiness of a policy which im- 
 poverished a whole people to build a capital 
 of Dresden china. Saxony clung to a vanishing 
 ideal. In this respect even Bavaria was not 
 so representative; its capital at least felt a 
 breath of the new age, if the country as a whole 
 showed more of the mediaeval atmosphere than 
 any other German State. In the sunny valleys 
 the peasant ploughed his land,- the forester shot 
 his deer in the woodlands, the robber waylaid the 
 traveller on the highways, the official pocketed 
 his gains in the Chancery, just as in the im- 
 memorial past. There were mutterings of a 
 storm, there was stirring and movement of 
 uneasy limbs, but none the less an enchanted 
 sleep seemed still to hang over prince, court, 
 and people. 
 
 At this very moment (1776) the English 
 Foreign Office demanded information as to 
 the condition of Bavaria. Their request was 
 answered by a report, dealing' with the history, 
 constitution, and resources of Bavaria, and 
 presenting a picture which would read like 
 a satire to any one unacquainted with the 
 possibilities of government in the eighteenth 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 51 
 
 century,* ' Tlic (H)nstitution of Bavaria — the 
 report declares — ^\as mediaeval in type, and 
 the ruler was in theory restrained by a parlia- 
 ment of throe estates or orders. In fact a full 
 meeting of the three estate^ had not been 
 called since 1669, and, though a committee with 
 representatives from each order met every 
 year to supervise the administration, their 
 duties were perfunctory and their protests 
 frequently disregarded. The Elector might be 
 a limited monarch in theory, but " the restraints 
 on his power are at present to be traced only in 
 the authors who have written concerning the 
 Bavarian constitution." The Elector imposed 
 taxes, legislated, and acted Without limitation 
 or restraint. He had a Cabinet Council of chief 
 officials for great affairs of policy, but only 
 consulted them when he wished ; he directed 
 the army with the advice of such councillors 
 and officers as he chose to select, and was con- 
 fronted with no body which .could act as an 
 effective check upon his wil|. Nowhere was 
 power more absolute, nowhere were its results 
 more disastrous. As to the army — which Avithin 
 the last century and a half had been made the 
 terror of Christendom by one Duke and the 
 scourge of Islam by another-^it had become 
 a laughing - stock. " I must own they (the 
 
 * Memorial, S.P.F. German States, BavaT}a,\o{.\\\,subfin. The 
 report is dated 177C and unsigned, but based on excellent information 
 and apparently written by Hugh Elliot (uide S.P.F. Bavaria, vol. 
 118, July 10, 1778, Eden to Suffolk). 
 
52 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Bavarian troops) are upon the worst footing 
 of any I have seen in Germany," wrote Hugh 
 EUiot.* The memorial gave further details, it 
 put the standing army at some 9000 men on 
 paper and at about 5000 in reality, the militia 
 at a nominal figure of 60,000, of whom one- 
 tenth only could be raised within a short space 
 of time. The artillery was "ill - constructed 
 and indifferently served," the troops were "in 
 bad order," and while the establishment " is 
 loaded with supernumerary officers of all de- 
 nominations, there is not one name known to 
 the rest of Europe who has distinguished him- 
 self in real service " ; after which it was not 
 very consoling to learn that the small -arms 
 were numerous and in good order/j" ^ 
 
 With regard to finance, of which the Elector 
 had again complete control, the situation was 
 very grave. Revenues were scarce, it was only 
 pensions that were abundant. There could be 
 little doubt that expenditure exceeded income, 
 and that the Elector had mortgaged all the 
 possessions he could alienate; there was a 
 general feeling that he was " avaricious," and 
 that the country was oppressed and " im- 
 poverished by the exactions of the Court." In 
 
 * S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Ratisbon, April 1, 1776. 
 Elliot to Sufeolk, Private and Secret. 
 
 t These statements do not appear irreconcilable with the evidence 
 from Bavarian sources. Vide P. Miinnich, Geschichte der Eniwickelung 
 der bairischen Armeen seit mwei Jahrhunderten, Miinchen, 1863, pp. 
 79-115. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 58 
 
 fact, tlie chief intelligence shown by the govern- 
 ment's management of finance was in its refusal 
 to produce its accounts. Certain figures had 
 indeed been published, but thpse were illusory, 
 for the Elector and his finance minister " are 
 alone acquainted ^vith the real amount, and " 
 (quite intelligibly) " think their interest en- 
 gaged to conceal it." At such hands commerce 
 fared no better than finance, despite the fact 
 that the soil and resources of Bavaria afforded 
 excellent opportunities for producing raw mate- 
 rials " were the wisdom of the government or 
 the interest of the people eq^ial to any com- 
 mercial enterprise." So little had been done for 
 internal manufactures that some of those which 
 had been inaugurated had been abandoned; 
 so unskilful was the management of the customs 
 that they produced hardly any revenue.^ 
 
 After these instances of governmental mis- 
 management, it may not be surprising to learn 
 that the writer of the report considered the 
 character of the ministers to be distinguished 
 only by their situation ; one was idle, another 
 extravagant, a third of low birth, and a fourth, 
 Kreittmayr, the Chancellor, being remarkable 
 for candour, integrity, and a mind enlarged by 
 study, was (not unnaturally) disgusted with the 
 rest of them. As for Max Joseph the Elector, 
 he was reputed to be wea% unsteady, and 
 avaricious, though the reporter adds discreetly : 
 " Separated from the ordinary intercom'se of 
 
54 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 society, Princes are only seen through the 
 medium of public transactions . . . certain it 
 is that those who approach the Elector of 
 Bavaria in his private moments will discover 
 many accomplishments and more virtues." * 
 His pubhc conduct is thrown into a strong light 
 by the following incident. " The inhabitants 
 of a small town, called Osterhoven, situated 
 near the banks of the Danube, have long exer- 
 cised a right of pasturage upon an adjacent 
 common of considerable extent. This spot, 
 which is at present in a state of nature, was 
 represented to the Elector as capable of im- 
 provement, and he ordered a division of it to 
 be made among the people of the place. They 
 complained both of the general hardship of the 
 measure and of the particular injustice of the 
 person entrusted with the execution of it — 
 Count Bercheim, bailiff of the district — who, it 
 was affirmed, had assigned the largest and most 
 fertile portion of it to one of his own family. 
 They even went so far as by open violence to 
 impede the partition, and to throw down the 
 fences that were attempted to be raised. 
 Upon this, the Elector ordered a Military 
 Execution, which was rigorously put in force. 
 Last week a number of the sufferers came to 
 
 * 8.P.F. German states, Bavaria,-vol.lll,'EnioVa Unsigned Report 
 on State of Bavaria. Liston describes in a private letter an instance 
 of how Elliot approached the Elector " in his private moments " 
 and made him diunk with punch (Minto's. Memoir of Hugh Elliot, 
 p. 35). 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 55 
 
 jMunich, with ropes about their necks, threw 
 thoinsolvos upon their knees belV)re the gates 
 of the Palace, and implored, from the justice of 
 the Elector, either the redress of their griev- 
 ances or an immediate death. His Electoral 
 Highness thought proper to dismiss them, with 
 a promise to enquire into the ^tate of the case, 
 and in tlie meantime has ordered matters to 
 remain upon the old footing." * 
 
 Beside this grim picture we can place an en- 
 chanting one, for indolence in government was 
 balanced by energy in pleasure. Hugh Elliot 
 admitted that " in music and debauchery " at 
 least the Court was " on a par with the rest of 
 Europe." Nymphenburg, the summer palace 
 of the Elector, was a miniature Versailles, a 
 world of "Watteau and Dresden china. There, 
 driving through the woods by moonhght in 
 phaetons, floating on the lake in-gilded gondolas, 
 or wandering through the frescoed galleries, 
 the Elector and his gay court spent their time, 
 Hugh Elliot the gayest and most scandalous 
 of them all. In Munich the scene was equally 
 bright, and there was the additional joy of a 
 French opera and of card-parties at which huge 
 
 * Vide S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. Ill, April 27, 1770, 
 Munich, Listen to Eden. Italics my own. Even Liston was shocked 
 by this action, and pointed out that the exc,rtion of such a riglit by 
 the Elector might involve all uncultivated lands in his domains, 
 as the rights to them were only held by immfemorial possession ; the 
 amount thus possibly involved was said to amount to nearly a fourth 
 of the whole Electorate. 
 
56 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 sums could be lost. Sometimes religion over- 
 whelmed the Court, and the Electress, who so 
 often led the revels at Nymphenburg, would 
 direct the pieties of the capital. In company 
 with her chief ladies, and attended by twelve 
 poor girls of the town, she would lead a peni- 
 tential procession (entitled with a certain irony 
 the " Slaves of Virtue ") and visit all the 
 churches and chapels of Munich on foot. The 
 fair pilgrims assumed white dresses like those 
 of nuns, to show their pious simplicity, though 
 some of them so far remembered the world as 
 to wear rouge upon their cheeks. In such a 
 court and company it was hard to be serious 
 save in pleasure.* 
 
 To German historians the verdict of ElHot 
 in 1776 may seem somewhat surprising, for 
 the reign of Max Joseph (1745-77) is always 
 regarded as the beginning of the age of en- 
 lightenment, and the ruler as one of the 
 Philosophic Despots. To EUiot's pictures of 
 an indolent and luxurious tyrant they have 
 added another which shows fiim as a man of 
 feeling heart. During the terrible famines of 
 1770-71 Max Joseph was sedulously kept in 
 ignorance of the sufferings of the people by his 
 Ministers. But one day as he drove from his 
 palace gates, a crowd of wasted and famished 
 wretches surrounded his carriage, shrieking for 
 food. The kindly Max burst into tears : " Your 
 children shall have bread," hei exclaimed to the 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 57 
 
 crowd, and he kept liis word. Two million 
 gulden of his private fortune were spent in 
 importing corn from Italy to relieve the sufferers, 
 and two corrupt officials were sentenced to 
 death." This action, as well as the fact that 
 he was the last Bavarian \\'ittelsbach, earned 
 him the title of " Vater Max " and " Der 
 Vielgehebte " (Much -beloved).* But history 
 is a sharp inquisitor, and she cannot perinit 
 an amiable character or isolated examples 
 of benevolence to excuse a ruler whose 
 policy tended to be harsh, indolent, or 
 corrupt. 
 
 Elliot's verdict on the ruler appears indeed 
 in some senses to be too sterri. No one could 
 accuse Max Joseph of not loving pleasure, but 
 he had some sense of restraint and economy 
 in its pursuit, and never imitated the Oriental 
 extravagance of a Saxon Augustus or a French 
 Louis. Considerable efforts td reduce expendi- 
 ture had been made, though unfortunately 
 most of the retrenchment wa& at the expense 
 of the army. Still most of the* Court offices had 
 been made honorary posts, and the general 
 Court expenditure, as compared with that of 
 other German states and previous Bavarian 
 rulers, was moderate. The chief item open to 
 criticism in Court expenditure was the pensions, 
 which cost two hundred thousand florins a year. 
 The largest part of this sum consisted of pensions 
 granted to his very numerous bastards by Max 
 
58 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Joseph's father — ^the Emperor Charles VII. 
 The pensions actually granted by Max Joseph 
 himself were moderate, but the pension list 
 as a whole was unjustifiably large, and it was 
 much curtailed by Max Joseph's successor.® 
 Any one who studies either the portraits or 
 the policy of Max Joseph can see these char- 
 acteristics at once in the mild, weak, pleasant 
 face of the prince, or in the careless, well- 
 intentioned disorder of his rule. Yet Max 
 Joseph is not one of the apes, of Versailles, he 
 is entitled to a place among the enlightened 
 despots, though he was less enlightened and 
 more despotic than most of them. The be- 
 ginning of his reign has perhaps justly been 
 regarded by Bavarians as the dawn of a new 
 day ; its end and outcome, as pictured by Elliot, 
 forms a rather tragic contrast. None the less 
 real efforts and some progress had been made. 
 During the years 1751-56 Ma,x Joseph caused 
 his Vice-Chancellor Kreittmayr to draw up a 
 complete civil and criminal code upon the 
 approved principles of the age.' Kreittmayr 
 executed the project with applause, and Max 
 Joseph took rank as the Bavarian Justinian. 
 In imitation of the Codex Fridericianus this 
 code was termed Maximileanus, and thus be- 
 trayed the source and origin of its inspiration. 
 Max was not above taking a hint from the King 
 of Prussia in other respects* Frederic once 
 called Bavaria " a land fair as Paradise in- 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 59 
 
 habited by fiends," and the denizens of his 
 Inferno were the Cathohe clergy. Max Joseph 
 did something to restrain the. excessive power 
 of Jesuits and priests in his land, and in the 
 teeth of their opposition he founded his famous 
 Electoral Academy of Sciences (1759).* He 
 also did something to introduce a scientific 
 spirit into education, and to improve the high 
 schools and Universities, an^ in especial to 
 benefit poor scholars. In 1771 he went further, 
 and instituted a universal system of compulsory 
 education.* * The funds necessary for so great 
 a project were supplied by appropriations from 
 the property of the Jesuits, who were dissolved 
 as an Order in 1773. All these reforms were 
 worthy of the highest praise, but they were 
 sketches rather than realities, and their in- 
 fluence and effect were not apparent at once. 
 Under happier auspices indeed the remembrance 
 or the preservation of these ideals enabled them 
 to be translated into reality, and in the earlier 
 years of the nineteenth century Bavaria became 
 a genuine centre of enlightenriient. The liber- 
 ahty of the clergy had become equal to the 
 learning of the scientists, and Munich derived 
 equal lustre from her theology and her Academy. 
 From this elevation Bavarians looked back and 
 paid a too-generous homage tb the memory of 
 Max Joseph. 
 
 ♦ It is rather amusing that Elliot should criticize Bavarian 
 education as old-fashioned. In this particular respect Bavaria was 
 exactly a century in advance of England. 
 
60 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 In truth that ruler was happier in ideals 
 than in achievements, and it is the latter which 
 are criticized by contemporaries. Judged by 
 any practical or material standard a contem- 
 porary might well think that Bavaria had not 
 awakened, that she had only stirred in her 
 sleep. In one respect Max Joseph indeed 
 deserves his fame; the enlightened ruler who 
 humanized the law and instituted a state- 
 system of education at such a period, deserved 
 well both of Bavaria and humanity. At the 
 moment, indeed, the results of this policy were 
 not apparent, for the fruits of education ripen 
 slowly, though they bear a hundredfold at the 
 last. Apart from education, the bitter verdict 
 of Elliot had much truth, despite the good 
 intentions and occasionally well-directed efforts 
 of Max Joseph. In manufactures and state 
 control of industry there was little practical 
 improvement ; among the people and in the 
 government offices there was little diminution 
 of corruption, of expense, or of misery. Per- 
 haps one reason of the failure was the brutish 
 ignorance and suspicion of the Bavarian 
 peasants, and the obscurantist opposition of 
 the clergy. But no far-reaching reforms were 
 carried in any land at this time without serious 
 opposition, and the blame of failure rests to 
 some extent on Max Joseph. What really able 
 and energetic ruler wotdd have waited to be 
 stirred into action by the horrors of a starving 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 01 
 
 multitude, or by the sight df wretches with 
 ropes roiuid their necks ? Wliat would not 
 a stern practical Frederic, or an ardent Kaiser 
 Joseph, afire for the betterment of his people, 
 have effected in Bavaria ? Ignorance of the 
 people may be an excuse fof- despotism, but 
 a tyrant, who lacks perseverance, destroys the 
 justification of his power. It may, indeed, be 
 pleaded that IMax Joseph failed by attempt- 
 ing too much rather than too little, and that his 
 very enlightenment proved his failure. Yet 
 everywhere else the enlightened despot intro- 
 duced energy into the administration and 
 economy into the finances, and greatly 
 strengthened the military forces of his state. 
 Max Joseph did httle to stir his sleepy and 
 corrupt bureaucracy into action and, though 
 he effected a shght improvement in the financial 
 system, only did so by utterly destroying the 
 military one. It is difficult to see how any 
 prince of intelligence could have permitted his 
 army to dwindle and to rot at a moment 
 when he knew a disputed succession to be 
 inevitable in a few years. A powerful or well- 
 organized force would have given Bavaria 
 some status and consideration in the eyes 
 of Europe. Without this Bavaria could have 
 no voice in settling her own affairs when 
 the succession was' disputed. At no time 
 and in no state was a strong army more 
 needed to preserve national independence and 
 
62 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 dignity, and the failure to provide it actually 
 lured on ambitious Powers to dismember 
 the country. Judged by that iron test Max 
 Joseph cannot be held to have deserved well 
 of Bavaria. 
 
 A land so governed invited annexation ; a 
 prince, who ruled thus in the age of philosophic 
 despots, deserved to lose his power. Premature 
 attempts at enlightenment had not wholly 
 failed, but for the moment served only to reveal 
 the stagnation. Ideals may be stronger than 
 armies, but as yet the soldiers were at hand 
 and the ideals afar off; Bavaria seemed the 
 very land for an ambitious neighbouring ruler 
 to covet, or to browbeat, to threaten, to conquer 
 or annex. Was not the rule of the ardent 
 Kaiser Joseph — with his thousand schemes for 
 freeing the serf, for developing commerce and 
 industry — ^likely to be more merciful and more 
 just than that of their Elector, amiable and 
 enlightened though he was ? 
 
 If the internal situation of Bavaria was bad, 
 the external aspect of her affairs was infinitely 
 worse. Indeed the fact that the English Foreign 
 Office asked for a report and information as to 
 the internal condition of Bavaria was, in itself, 
 highly alarming. The England of that day had 
 no commercial concern with a state which only 
 received £3000 worth of her goods, and had 
 no interest in her whatever from the abstract 
 or antiquarian standpoint. English interest 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH G3 
 
 was not excited by l};ivari;i luisiH, but because 
 Bavaria's Elector was the last of his race, and 
 because his territory was likely to be parted 
 amonjj the Powers on his death. On January 
 6, 1770, Hugh Elhot, perhaps the acutest 
 Enghsh diplomatist then living, who had been 
 sent to watch the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon 
 (Regensburg), reported that it- was the opinion 
 of most members of the Diet as well as his own 
 " that we are upon the eve of some great 
 change in the political state of Germany." * 
 The attempts of Joseph to revive and re-inspire 
 the Empire had only shown its weaknesses, and 
 the result of the Diet of 1776 had divided the 
 different states more than ever. It had served 
 to reveal Austria, at the head of one body of 
 states, bitterly opposed to Prussia at the head 
 of another, and each alike unchecked by the 
 old traditions of law and order and respect for 
 the Germanic body. "Where law had lost its 
 force, force would have its Jaw. When the 
 two powerful states were at variance it was 
 time for the smaller ones to tremble, especially 
 when the Bavarian Successidn came up for 
 settlement at the Germanic Diet. It seemed 
 unlikely to English diplomats that this, or one 
 or two other successions pending, would be 
 settled peacefully at the Diet. Should no such 
 arrangements be made " the Courts of Vienna 
 
 * S.P.F. German Slates, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Elliot to' Suffolk, 
 January 6, 1776, 
 
64 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 and Berlin will either proseciite their separate 
 claims by the sword and involve Germany in 
 war, or they will even extend the same system 
 of partition into the Empire that proved so 
 irresistible in Poland." * " It was of the ut- 
 most importance to Europe as well as to 
 Germany to set bounds to the hardened ambi- 
 tion of a monarch grown old in the arts of 
 conquest and acquisition, to check the aspira- 
 tions of a young prince fired with ideas of 
 military glory and aggrandisement." f But 
 unfortunately no power existed that could 
 impose these bounds on Frederic or Joseph, for 
 England had her eyes on America, and France 
 had her eyes on England, To the clear judg- 
 ment of Elliot it was apparent therefore that 
 the struggle in Germany must come soon, and 
 must centre round Bavaria. " Nothing could 
 better serve the purpose of extending, and at 
 the same time uniting, the dominions of the 
 House of Austria than its acquisition." The 
 statesmen of Vienna — with Kaunitz at their 
 head — were of no other opinion. 
 
 On military as well as political grounds 
 Kaiser Joseph realized the unspeakable import- 
 ance of Bavaria to Austria. In the wars of 
 1703-4 and of 1741-42 it was from Bavaria 
 
 * S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Memorial on the Diet 
 of Ratisbon, 1776. That the authorship of this report also is almost 
 certainly Elliot's is proved by S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 
 118, July 10, 1778, Eden to Suffolk. 
 
 t Ibid. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 65 
 
 that Vienna had been threatened ; within the 
 last sevcMity >cars it had bcka twice proved 
 that a hostile Bavaria could endanger tlie very 
 existence of the Austrian State. Yet the 
 pohtics of iMuuich were so unstable that her 
 friendship could not be trusted, least of all in 
 the decade before 1778. Hence, if the danger 
 from this side was to be averted, it could only 
 be by annexation of Bavaria, Or at any rate of 
 a part sufficient to give strategic safety to 
 Austria. Command of the Innds round the 
 Inn would allow Austria to control the Upper 
 Danube ; Passau would become the bridgehead, 
 the Janiculum of Vienna, and a broad band of 
 German territory would bind Bohemia to the 
 Tyrol, thus increasing the Teutonic population 
 of Austria. On every ground the annexation, 
 or at least the partition, of Bavaria appeared 
 to be a vital necessity to Kaiser Joseph.^" 
 The diplomatists of Europe had all realized 
 the danger probable on the death of the now 
 ageing Elector. As early as 17=60 Kaunitz and 
 Frederic had been glancing towards Bavaria. 
 During 1776 English diplomatists were speculat- 
 ing on it, and drawing up lists of possible 
 claimants, France and Prussia were watching, 
 and every German Court was eagerly expectant 
 for the first signs of the opening storm. Only 
 the Court which was most af|ected seemed to 
 be least disturbed. " Munich," wrote Hugh 
 EUiot, " is perhaps the Court in Europe the 
 
66 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 least acquainted with its own interests or the 
 designs of others." * 
 
 Thus in the opinion of all statesmen, the 
 horrors of a disputed succession were soon to 
 hang over Bavaria, the stormy waters of diplo- 
 macy were soon to turn a sleepy hollow into a 
 whirlpool, but the Court at Munich slumbered 
 still. Even though its army and resources were 
 contemptible, a wise and firm diplomacy and 
 a knowledge of German politics might have 
 given Bavaria a prominent position. But the 
 Elector and his council could not be aroused 
 from their lethargy to take any interest or 
 active share in politics, even by Kaiser Joseph's 
 attempts to revive the vitality of the Empire, 
 by all his visitations and appeals, by his schemes 
 and his threats. So little did the Elector and 
 his council know of the laws of' the Empire, that 
 they imposed customs-duties in direct contra- 
 vention of them (1763 and 1770). Then when 
 the other German States protested, instead of 
 allowing the matter to be settled at the Diet, 
 the Bavarian Elector appealed directly to the 
 Emperor for his arbitration, "a step which 
 equally betrayed a want of resolution and of 
 good policy." f 
 
 Kaiser Joseph decided against him and 
 
 * S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, April 3, 1776, Munich, 
 Elliot to Suffolk. 
 
 t S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, Munich, April 14, 1777, 
 Private, Eden to Suffolk ; also vol. Ill, Memorial on the Diet of 
 Batisbon, 1776, pp. 55. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 67 
 
 ordered him to withdraw tlfe new cusioiiis- 
 dues. The Elector protested, shullled, refused, 
 but was finally frightened into submission by a 
 show of force (1771). " It were to l)c wished," 
 adds Eden sardonically, " th'at this was the 
 only instance wherein the real solid interests 
 and happiness of this country are sacrificed to 
 the pride and pique of the monlent." * Hence- 
 forth the Elector and his ministers distrusted 
 Austria and pursued towards, her a policy of 
 mingled servility and duplicity, though without 
 showing any more diplomatic wisdom than 
 before. Even when contentions ran high at 
 the Diet over Kaiser Joseph's reforms, when 
 deputies from all Germany intrigued, fought, 
 and baffled one another, Bavarian ministers 
 took no active, intelligent part in the politics 
 of the Diet, though it met on Bavarian soil. 
 Their influence was used bHndly upon the 
 Austrian side without inquiry into the merits 
 of the disputes and without exacting conditions 
 of support. 
 
 The Elector himself, though accorded the 
 rights of a sovereign prince, degraded himself 
 to Austria " by making the Imperial Am- 
 bassador a visit and giving $im the hand in 
 his Palace, which certainly no crowned head 
 in Europe would do." So reported Stormont 
 on January 16, 1765 ; Elliot and Eden gave 
 
 • S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, Munich, April 11, 
 Eden to Suffolk. 
 
68 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 equally bad reports in 1776-I.T. Count Hartig, 
 the Austrian Commissary in Munich, displayed 
 an almost regal ostentation and magnificence, 
 and dazzled the Elector and his Court. To the 
 irreverent Elliot he appeared only as a " little 
 decrepit man." However that was, Hartig 
 spared no effort or entertainment to please the 
 Bavarian nobles, employing spies and bribes 
 without number to form an Austrian party 
 among them. Austrian ideas had begun to 
 enter Munich, Austrian nobles were encouraged 
 to spend their money there. A Viennese 
 merchant had improved the manufacture of 
 saltpetre, Viennese bankers were ready to 
 accommodate Elector or courtiers with loans, 
 Austrian enterprise was evidently benefiting the 
 country. More significant even than these efforts 
 were the attentions bestowed by the Austrian 
 dynasty upon Bavaria. The Emperor Joseph II. 
 married Josepha the Elector's sister in 1764, 
 and though she died in 1767 the Austrian in- 
 fluence was maintained. The fat and amiable 
 Archduke Maximilian visited Munich in 1775, 
 causing some scandal by promoting festivities 
 in Lent and some amusement by the bourgeois 
 decorum of his behaviour. Then in the spring 
 of 1777 came Kaiser Joseph himself on one of 
 his usual mysterious visits, wearing his plain 
 black coat, bearing the pseudonym of Count 
 Falkenstein, bringing a train of only twenty- 
 eight persons, lodging as usual at the principal 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 69 
 
 inn, but so tar condcscendiiig to etiquette as to 
 dine every day with the Elector.* No doubl all 
 that Josepli heard and saw tendfed to confirm him 
 in his design to make Bavaria- in name what it 
 alread>' appeared in fact — a pro^'in(•e of Austria. 
 Austrian diplomacy certainly did not under- 
 rate the weakness and ignorance of Bavarian 
 ministers, it understood that they were always 
 amenable to threats or to bribes, but it had 
 forgotten to consider one important factor — 
 the Elector himself. His own personal pride 
 had been cruelly wounded by the humiliations 
 of 1771, and for that reason, as well as for family 
 ones, he wished to hand down, the whole of his 
 territory unimpaired to his heir, Karl Theodor, 
 the Elector Palatine. Therefore he hated 
 Austria and, though afraid to show his resent- 
 ment, he sought everywhere for allies against 
 her. It was useless to turn to France, once a 
 faithful friend ; she was now an Austrian ally 
 and took so little interest in Bavaria that she 
 did not even always have a minister there. 
 For a moment the Elector thought of turning 
 to England, and — conscious that she was think- 
 ing of hiring German mercen^tries to quell the 
 American disturbances — sought out Hugh Elliot 
 and offered him his ragged tatterdemalions for 
 hire. The astute British repa-esentative, who 
 
 • S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. Ill, despatih of July 6, 
 177C. Vide also Memorial, ibid. vol. 112, Munich, Eden to Suffolk, 
 April 6, 1777. 
 
70 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 knew the worthlessness of the Bavarian troops, 
 replied with polite ambiguity. " With a view 
 to sound the Elector's connections with Austria 
 and France I pretended surprise, and said that 
 I had considered His Highness as too closely 
 united with other Powers to have been at liberty 
 to dispose of his troops without their con- 
 currence." This subtlety roused His Highness 
 effectually, induced him to declare his perfect 
 liberty to dispose of his own troops as he would, 
 and led him to speak " of the conduct of the 
 Court of Vienna with great bitterness and 
 enmity." His sister's (Josepha's) marriage with 
 the Emperor had only served as a pretence for 
 loading him (the Elector) with accumulated 
 mortifications and indignities. " He particu- 
 larly dwelt upon his certainty that the Emperor 
 sought for an opportunity of extending the 
 same system of envahissement into Germany 
 which had been so successful in Poland. The 
 Elector then added with great- seriousness that 
 what he said to me upon this occasion might 
 convince his (British) Majesty" of his confidence 
 and trust in him, as the Court of Vienna would 
 not fail to revenge itself of such language were 
 it ever to transpire. The Elector concluded 
 by strongly recommending to rhe not to mention 
 to any of his ministers his having shown a 
 desire to enter into subsidiary treaties with His 
 Britannic Majesty ; as he did not choose to 
 be exposed to the disagrement of having it 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 71 
 
 known, witlioiit a {)rospcct ol' reaping some 
 advantage from it." * 
 
 Sucli was the hai)lrss plight of tlic Elector, 
 hating Austria, trusting no one arovuid him, 
 '■ in a Court so evidently sold to Austria and 
 France that the Prince himself thought it 
 proper to warn me against his own ministers." 
 But, weak as the Elector may have been, it was 
 an element of strength to him that he knew 
 his own weakness and that of his ministers. 
 Already, as a matter of fact, he had drawn up 
 a will, leaving everything that he could leave 
 to the Elector Palatine — his nearest legal heir. 
 He at least had enough attachment to his 
 nearest relative to wish to hand down his 
 territories undivided, and so far as possible 
 he made State-morality and treaty-obhgation 
 stand sentries for the due observance of his 
 wishes. Having made his will he sought, and, 
 as we have seen, vainly, to get allies who might 
 possibly support it. During 1777 he was 
 pushed hard by the Austrian S'linister to make 
 some arrangements for partitioning his territory, 
 but he was able to procrastinate and delay till 
 the end. This was not far off; on December 
 14, 1777, Eden the British resident reported a 
 shght indisposition in the Elector — measles — 
 
 ♦ S.I'.F. (Jerman Slates, llav/tna,vo\. IIP, llutisbon, A|)ril 1, 1770. 
 Ratibbon — Elliot to Suffolk, [jrivate and secret. Klliot adds a P.S. : 
 " I hope this letter will not appear in my olDcial ii)rris|Kindcncr," 
 of which, fortunately, no notice was taken. I'art of tliU letter is 
 printed in F. Kapp, Der SoldiUcn-IIandcl Deutschcr Fiir.tlrn iiach 
 Amerika (1776-83), Berlin, 1861. 
 
72 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 and " those of the most favourable sort" (that 
 is, presumably native and German). But the 
 physician had blundered, for it was not measles 
 but smallpox ; his remedies were inappropriate, 
 and the Elector sank rapidly. On December 30 
 he said to his confessor, " I dreamt that I shall 
 die to-night and it will be so. Good-bye, dear 
 and beautiful Bavaria ; beloved wife, farewell ; 
 dear subjects, farewell, I will pray for you the 
 blessing of God." * These were the last 
 words of this amiable Prince. Eden recorded 
 bitterly, " It will not be too harsh a judgment 
 to pronounce that the life of this prince has 
 been sacrificed to the bigoted ignorance of his 
 confidential physician, who would not at first 
 allow his indisposition to be — what it reaUy 
 was — ^the smallpox ; and who, even after being 
 convinced of it, still refused to aid the efforts 
 of his constitution by any assistance, of any 
 kind — ^internal or external." f But more than 
 the life of the Prince had been sacrificed. The 
 untoward suddenness of his death imperilled the 
 destiny of Bavaria and the future of Germany. 
 
 2. Claims and Countek-Cxaims to the 
 Inheritance of Max Joseph 
 
 While Bavaria stands hushed at the death- 
 bed of Max Joseph we may turn aside and 
 
 * Buchner, ix. 279. 
 
 t S.P.F, German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, Munich, December 
 30, 1777, Eden to Suffolk. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 73 
 
 imitate the publicists and slatcsiueii oJ' Europe 
 in considering the possible claims and <'luiniants 
 of the inheritance. 01" these far the most 
 important weie Kaiser Joseph, who claimed 
 portions of Bavaria both as Holy Roman 
 Emperor and as Austrian heir, and Karl 
 Theodor, Elector Palatine, >^ho claimed the 
 whole inheritance in virtue ofi hereditary right. 
 Karl Theodor's claims were embarrassed ])y 
 the pretensions of his nephew and heir, Charles 
 Duke of Zwcibriicken (Deux-Ponts). If he 
 consented to abrogate a portion of his rights 
 to other claimants, it by no means followed 
 that Zwcibriicken would do t»he same, and it 
 is on the disputes between these two that a 
 good deal of the Succession turns. Besides 
 these principals, there were minor claimants 
 to portions of the inheritancfe, the Elector of 
 Saxony and the Duke of Mecldlenburg-Schwerin, 
 but these were not, in the real sense, important 
 and need not for the moment detain us. 
 
 It needs no plunge into dusty folios nor 
 turning of yellow parchments to decide on 
 the merits of the claimants. One German 
 historian has reckoned that 288 contemporary 
 books were written on the subject at the time, 
 since when the learned dissertations upon it 
 have not been few." It is, however, difficult 
 to conceive any research less fruitful and more 
 purely antiquarian in interest. The British 
 records preserve two reports on the probable 
 
74 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 claimants to the inheritance— each written by 
 an acknowledged master of diplomacy.^^ Keith 
 our Austrian and Elliot our Bavarian ambassador 
 both drew up reports in 1776,„ before the actual 
 claims were put forward, and their judgment 
 on the whole question has therefore an unusual 
 impartiality. It is worth noting that, though 
 the insight of one of these men discovered the 
 tract of territory that Kaiser Joseph was to 
 claim, all his learning had not revealed to him 
 the actual nature of the claim; That fact is no 
 bad commentary on its intrinsic value. 
 
 Lower Bavaria was the chief territory 
 claimed by Kaiser Joseph, and the claim first 
 appears in the Treaty of Partition of January 
 3, 1778, concluded between representatives of 
 Karl Theodor and Joseph, which will be 
 described later. There it is stated that Austria 
 claimed the districts round the Inn and a great 
 part of Lower Bavaria, in virtue of the letter 
 of investiture given by the Eniperor Sigismund 
 to Duke Albert V. of Austria iii 1426.1^ Keith 
 wrote acidly that such a claim was manifestly 
 open to contestation, as in 1430 the Emperor 
 gave a final decision, which divided the succes- 
 sion amongst the remaining branches of the 
 Bavarian House to the exclusion of Albert. 
 It was also singular that in the two " great 
 wars of 1700 and 1740 when all Bavaria (for 
 a time) was possessed by the Austrians no 
 mention was made of such a Right." Subse- 
 
AND KAISiai JOSEPH 75 
 
 quently it was discovered iliat AJbcrt had 
 ai'tually made an Aft. uC roininciatioii ol" his 
 right in 1 1'JO. Facu if this Iftst Act was not 
 a I'orifoiy, as the Aiistriaiis declared it to be, 
 the original claim had lain dormant three 
 hundred and fifty >'cars. It Was in any case 
 singidarly weak. Maria Theresa does not 
 appear to have believed in it, and — irony of 
 ironies — Frederic himsell" seei^is to have had 
 a better claim, had he wished to urge it ! ^* 
 
 Elliot gi\'es the best comlnentary on the 
 whole tangle of genealogical confusion. " In 
 this age the cabinets of the greater Powers 
 dispose of the territories of the less without 
 much previous negotiations.'". . .* " In an 
 age marked with the violence of military 
 usurpation the future state of the Electorate 
 is more Ukely to be decided by the Political 
 arrangements of its powerful neighbours than 
 by the legal sentences of a tribunal of Justice." | 
 The real claims rested on the strength of 
 Joseph's army and on Frederic's view of the 
 necessities of the balance of power ; the real 
 tribunal was the battlefield. 
 
 None the less parchments and precedents 
 were never without some effect in the eighteenth 
 century ; in 1772 Joseph and Frederic had called 
 Up historical ghosts from the records to justify 
 
 ♦ SJP.F. German Stales, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Elliot to SuHoIk, April 
 3, 1776. 
 
 t Ibid. Memorial on Bavaria, 1770. 
 
76 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 even the Polish Partition. When it concerned 
 succession to a part of the Germanic Empire this 
 process was much more necessary, and Austrian 
 and Prussian pubhcists speedily marshalled 
 their pale armies of precedents. For the 
 further understanding of the negotiations the 
 nature of these claims must be stated. Otto I. 
 — ^the first Wittelsbach Duke of Bavaria — ^had 
 acquired the Duchy in 1180 ; his grandson Otto 
 II. likewise acquired the Electorate of the 
 Palatinate by marriage. In 1329 these terri- 
 tories were divided among two. branches of the 
 family, by an arrangement known as the Treaty 
 of Pavia. The elder or Rodolphine branch of 
 the family (from which Karl Theodor was 
 descended) took the Lower and Upper Pala- 
 tinate with Sulzbach, the younger or Wilhel- 
 mine branch (from which Max Joseph was 
 lineally descended) taking Upper Bavaria and 
 Neuburg. Lower Bavaria is not mentioned 
 specifically in the treaty, because it was in- 
 herited separately by the Emperor Lewis, who 
 was the Wilhelmine representative in the Pavia 
 Treaty. But by custom, usage, and the 
 practice of agnation it appears to have become 
 well understood that neither branch of the line 
 could alienate their estates without consent of 
 the other, and that the whole territories would, 
 in the case of the extinction of either line, re- 
 vert to the other.^^ One subsequent altera- 
 tion had been made in these arrangements by 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 77 
 
 the consent dT the Germanic Diet in Ki'^.'J, and 
 confirmed at the IVace of Wesiphaha in 1648 — 
 the Upper Pahitinate h;id l)een transferred from 
 the Elector Palatine to the Elector of Bavaria, 
 but it had hctu specially provided that this 
 province should revert to the Rodolphinc line 
 if the ^^'illu'lnune line became extinguished. 
 On these principles the claims of the Rodolphine 
 Karl Theodor — Elector Palatine — to the Wil- 
 helniine lands of 'Max Joseph are clear enough. 
 By the Treaty of Pa^ia he was entitled to Upper 
 Bavaria Xeuburg, Sulzbach, and the Lower 
 Palatinate, to the Upper Palatinate by the 
 Treaty of ^Vestphalia; Lower Bavaria he 
 claimed by the doctrine of .agnation. \Vith 
 regard to these dominions his rights seemed 
 indisputable, the only one admitting of any 
 question being his claim on Lower Bavaria. 
 But with regard to other parts of the Bavarian 
 dominions, not thus mentioned, the claims of 
 Karl Theodor were much more dubious. Since 
 1329 there had been a large number of acqui- 
 sitions and accretions made by the various 
 Dukes of Bavaria at different times, of which 
 the disposal had not been expressly regulated 
 by law. Some of these acquisitions were 
 Imperial Fiefs, which might fairly be held to 
 escheat to the Emperor on the death of the 
 last male heir of the Wilhelniine hne ; othere 
 were allodial properties which might be con- 
 sidered to descend to the nearest female relative. 
 
78 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 The heiress to these allodial properties was the 
 Dowager Duchess of Saxony^ who had made 
 over her rights to her son, the Saxon Elector. 
 They were not, however, very numerous or 
 important, and from the very- beginning it was 
 thought that this claim might be settled by 
 monetary compensation and small concessions. 
 The question of the Imperial Fiefs was a 
 different and more serious one. By custom 
 all feudal questions of this kind came before 
 the Aulic Council, but the Aulic Council could 
 be controlled by the Emperor, and Kaiser 
 Joseph was likely to give decisions on the 
 questions of the Imperial Fjefs in a purely 
 Austrian sense and interest.* The question as 
 to what were Imperial Fiefs might be applied 
 to various towns and districts, such as Mindel- 
 heim, once the principality of the great Duke 
 of Marlborough, some fiefs in the Upper 
 Palatinate, and the like. But the whole ques- 
 tion of the lordship over these fiefs, and their 
 acquisition by Kaiser Joseph would not be of 
 great importance. The real point was whether 
 he could advance any title to Lower Bavaria. 
 
 Max Joseph was determined to put Austria 
 legally in the wrong on all points. Even if he 
 could not hand down his possessions unim- 
 paired to Karl Theodor, he could at least give 
 him the best moral claim to them. In 1766 
 
 * S.P.F. Oerman Stales, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Anonjrmous Report 
 (Elliot). 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 79 
 
 ]\I;ix Joseph had conchidcd a secret family 
 compact with the KUitor Palatine, reullirming 
 the union of Wilhelmine and Rodolphine posses- 
 sions on his death. In 1769 he drew up a i'onnal 
 and definite will on the same basis, whieh was 
 kno^v^l only to a few Bavarian ministers and to 
 Karl Theodor and one of his Palatine coun- 
 cillors.^® In 1771 and 1774 iMax Joseph con- 
 cluded fresh compacts on the same basis, and 
 renewed the old treaties. To strengthen these 
 bonds Karl Theodor made an agreement with 
 Charles Duke of Zweibriicken, his own nephew 
 and heir, on August 5, 1777, each party 
 agreeing to do nothing with regard to the 
 succession \vithout the consen,t of the other. 
 Just at this moment Zweibriicken informed 
 Max Joseph that Karl Theodor was negotiating 
 secretly with Austria. The news caused the 
 greatest agitation to Max Joseph, and he was 
 looking everywhere for support against the 
 hated Austrian and the treaclierous Elector 
 Palatine, when death overcame:him. 
 
 By the death of Max Joseph, Zweibriicken, 
 the next heir after Karl Theodor, was left 
 deserted, and it appeared that his future 
 possessions might now be dismembered. Svich 
 a project he was resolved to resist, and he 
 looked around everywhere for support. The 
 day after Max Joseph's death the Duchess of 
 Zweibriicken, who was residing at jMunich in 
 the absence of her husband, received a visit 
 
JOSEPH 
 
IV 
 
 THE STORM BURSJS 
 
 AUein ein Pergament, beschrieben und bepragl, 
 Isl ein Gespatsl, vor dem sich Me scheuen. 
 
 Goethe, 
 (SailUess — a mil bescribbkd and dose-sealed 
 A phantom is from which all shrink in terror.) 
 
 The death of a sovereign always produces an 
 excitement quite unequal to the importance 
 of the event itself. That of Max Joseph, 
 since he was the last of his race and had left 
 a succession in the highest degree uncertain, 
 caused a confusion and amazement that were 
 indescribable. Crowds thronged the churches 
 and wept in the streets of Munich fearing for the 
 future and bewailing their lost Prince. Some 
 hours after his death the Bavarian ministers 
 assembled to take counsel together. Rumours 
 had already begun to fly, but to the Austrian 
 party among the ministers, at any rate, the 
 reality was to be more surprtsing than any 
 conjecture. To the universal amazement Count 
 Seinsheim and the Chancellor produced the will 
 of 1769, of whose existence scarcely any one 
 had known. Hardly had the councillors re- 
 covered from their surprise at the existence of 
 
 81 G 
 
82 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 the will, when they perceived that a codicil 
 on the exterior forbade it to be opened until 
 the arrival of the Elector Palatine. For the 
 moment all were astonished and embarrassed. 
 Suddenly the Palatine - Resident at Munich 
 (who was in the secret) appeared before the 
 Bavarian ministers and produced orders signed 
 by their dead and by his living master. These 
 required the ministers to proceed immediately 
 to the proclamation of Karl Theodor, and to 
 exact the oath of allegiance from the civil and 
 military. The Austrian intriguers were baffled, 
 and the Elector Palatine was exultantly pro- 
 claimed successor to the whole Bavarian in- 
 heritance.^ For the moment the stroke had 
 succeeded. Max Joseph had been more power- 
 ful in his death than his life, and his nearest 
 relative was legally and formally installed in 
 his full possessions. But unfortunately legal 
 and moral claims in the eighteenth century were 
 not always the strongest of titles. The shadow 
 of Austria already darkened the future. No 
 one doubted that Kaiser Joseph would send his 
 Whitecoats into Bavaria, all that they wondered 
 was when and how he would do it. So from 
 the first of January 1778 onwards there was 
 breathless expectation in Munich. Court and 
 beerhouse alike buzzed with incredible rumours, 
 couriers rode hourly through the streets with 
 messages, and sentinels watched anxiously from 
 the walls of Braunau and Straubing for the 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 88 
 
 first glimmer of steel upon Ailstrian bayonets 
 over the border. 
 
 1. Kaiser Joseph 
 
 By whose proud siilc the ugly Furies run 
 Hearkening when he shall bill tliem plague Ike world. 
 
 Majilowk, Tatiiburlaine. 
 
 Great as may have been tlie anxiety, hope, 
 and bewilderment at jMunich, it was hardly 
 'ess at Vienna. " The first accovmts arrived 
 on Thursday, during the drawing - room of 
 New Year's Day." The whole nobility was 
 present and " the Court at' Galla " [sic). 
 Kaiser Joseph was suddenly accosted by an 
 attendant and left the room. Returning in a 
 few moments, he went straight up to the table 
 at which Maria Theresa was playing, leant over 
 and whispered in her ear that Max Joseph was 
 dead. " She instantly let fall the cards, and 
 rising up with evident marks of emotion, quitted 
 the apartment. The painful impression made 
 on Maria Theresa was visible to everybody." 
 Merriment ceased abruptly to be succeeded by 
 " fermentation," and since then a " thousand 
 various conjectures have furnished occupation 
 to the politicians of this capital." * It was not 
 till the next morning that the astonished 
 
 * S.P.F. Germany, Europe, vol. 2'2(), Japiiary 3, 1778, Minnn, 
 Sir R. M. Keith to Earl of Suffolk; \\ nix.ill, Cnnrt of Berlin, etc., 
 1799, vol. i., pp. 800-7. Both were present and I mingle their iinprcs- 
 sion.s of the moment. The incident is alluded 1o in F. v. Haumer, 
 Beitriige zur neueren Geschichte, Leipzig, 1839; Bd. v. pp. 801-6. 
 
84 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 courtiers learnt the cause of Maria Theresa's 
 agitation. Clever Murray Keith, the English 
 Ambassador, at once sought counsel with the 
 Saxon minister, whose master had some minor 
 claims on the inheritance. But he had to 
 confess himself baffled in this as in other 
 directions ; he could see couriers riding post- 
 haste, troops drilling, he could hear abundant 
 rumours at every street corner, but for the 
 space of almost three weeks he found no real 
 information from diplomatic sources. " Upon 
 this (as well as upon some former occasions) " 
 Prince Kaunitz threw an " unsurmountable 
 bar in the way of all ministerial curiosity by 
 refusing to give any answers to questions put 
 to him, without express orders (from above) 
 and (with still more discretion) by never admit- 
 ting the word Bavaria in his public conversa- 
 tion." * At last, however, on January 20, the 
 Austrian Chancellor sent a communication to 
 Keith, revealing the course of events that had 
 occurred at Munich. 
 
 The news was even more surprising than 
 could have been imagined. The death of Max 
 Joseph, though unfortunate and unexpected 
 in its suddenness, was an event for which 
 Austrian statesmen had been preparing. 
 Kaiser Joseph and Kaunitz* had long been 
 determined to seize part of Bavaria by one 
 
 * S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, January 19, 1778, 
 Keith to Suffolk. 
 
AND IvAISER JOSia»II 85 
 
 means or another, tlicy had realized the 
 obstinacy of the late Eleelor, and were ahcady 
 communieating with his liiture sueccssor the 
 Elcetor Palatine. Karl Theodor was a weak 
 and spiritless man, without enthusiasm for the 
 Bavarian land or people whom he was in future 
 to govern. His own real anxiety, though 
 natural, was not entirely creditable ; he wished 
 to leave ample provision after his death for 
 his numerous illegitimate children. On this 
 weakness Austrian statesmen could work, and, 
 in return for the cession of a large part of 
 Bavaria, they were willing to guarantee large 
 sums to support Karl Theodor' s natural family. 
 It is difficult to see how even eighteenth 
 century ethics could justify a transaction, 
 which sacrificed a large territpry and the in- 
 terests of thousands of Bavairians to bastards 
 born in the Palatinate. An arrangement, by 
 which one ruler bargained for territory and 
 another for bastards, is, in fact, the reductio ad 
 absurdum of the principle of personal rule in 
 the eighteenth century. None the less a treaty 
 in this sense was being negotiated at Vienna 
 during the winter of 1777 between Prince 
 Kaunitz and Ritter, the Plenipotentiary of the 
 Palatinate Elector. Now it was suddenly and 
 most unfortunately interrupted'by Max Joseph's 
 death. Well might Maria Theresa look grave 
 at the news, and Kaunitz decline to mention 
 the word Bavaria in public. 
 
86 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Kaiser Joseph thought at first that the 
 whole fruits of weary months of diplomacy 
 would be lost. It seemed that the Elector 
 Palatine had been deluding them, for in Max 
 Joseph's will, to the signature of which he had 
 been privy, Karl Theodor was assigned the 
 undivided Bavarian dominions. By his pro- 
 clamation and by his solemn acceptance of the 
 will, Karl Theodor had secured the moral 
 advantage ; if he was to be made to acquiesce 
 in the scheme of partition, there was no time to 
 be lost. As it happened a treaty on these lines 
 had already been drafted by the plenipoten- 
 tiaries in Vienna.^ Accordingly on January 3, 
 1778, the day after the Elector's arrival at 
 Munich, Ritter, his plenipotentiary, signed at 
 Vienna a treaty of Partition with Kaunitz, a 
 treaty subsequently ratified by Karl Theodor 
 on January 14 at Munich. By the terms of 
 the treaty the Emperor Joseph and Maria 
 Theresa recognized Karl Theodor's succession 
 to Bavaria but at a terrible loss to that ruler. 
 He was forced to agree that the lands granted 
 to Albert V. of Austria in 1426 should come 
 into the possession of the Austrian House. 
 These included nearly all Lower Bavaria and 
 Straubingen. With regard to territories in- 
 volving the rights of the Imperial or Bohemian 
 crown, such as Mindelheim and certain other 
 small fiefs and territories, Karl Theodor agreed 
 to submit to the Emperor's judgment in the 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 87 
 
 matter. This last concession was damaging 
 enough, becuiuse it opened the door for adjust- 
 ment and exehanires of territorSjr in the Austrian 
 interest. But in regai'd to Lower Bavaria 
 and Straubingen the Austrian gains were 
 eN'en greater. Rather more than one-third of 
 Bavaria fell to Austria, and the value of this 
 concession far exceeded its actual size. The 
 new acquisition not only rendered Vienna safe 
 from attack in the future but gave a strategic- 
 ally defensible frontier to Auslyia. It was also 
 the most valuable and fertile part of Bavaria — - 
 there were situated the rich salt mines of Reichen- 
 hall, there was grown the corn* that fed most of 
 the land. The arrangement rendered Bavaria 
 entirely subservient to Kaiser Joseph, alike in 
 a strategic, political, and economic sense. 
 
 Rumours as to this treaty had already been 
 busy in Vienna even as early as January 6. 
 These were confirmed by K^launitz to Keith 
 iipon the 20th, though he only informed him 
 that an amicable treaty invQlving cession of 
 territory to Austria had been signed, without 
 giving any precise details.' Meanwhile it was 
 necessary to support paper by iron and to 
 enforce treaties by the sword. On January 15, 
 one detachment of Austrian troops advanced 
 and occupied Straubing, thus- holding the line 
 of the Danube and the Inn, and threatening 
 both Regensburg, the seat of the Imperial Diet, 
 and Munich, the capital of Bavaria. Other 
 
88 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 detachments occupied the Upper Palatinate, 
 the Bavarian troops retiring in each case before 
 them with protests but without firing. An 
 Austrian manifesto was pubhshed to the effect 
 that these troops were only occupying the 
 territory until an amicable settlement could 
 be adjusted. No one believed this manifesto, 
 every one recognized that the unscrupulous 
 readiness of Kaiser Joseph and Kaunitz had 
 won the first point in the game. Despite Max 
 Joseph's will Karl Theodor had been forced 
 into a scheme of partition,, which not only 
 violated all his own professions but which 
 realized all Austria's hopes. In addition 
 Austrian troops were already in possession of 
 important strategic points in Bavarian territory. 
 The Austrian troops occupied' a part of Lower 
 Bavaria, the granary of the whole country, in 
 which were situated the estates of many of 
 the prominent Bavarian nobles and ministers. 
 Hence by the threat of forbidding the export 
 of corn, or of ravaging the territory he held, 
 Kaiser Joseph could put pressure alike on the 
 people and on the Court at Munich. Time and 
 circumstance, everything indeed except one 
 man, seemed to favour Kaiser Joseph. 
 
 For the moment even Kaiser Joseph's thirst 
 for territorial aggrandizement was satisfied, 
 and he boasted that he had seized an oppor- 
 tunity which might occur but once in a hundred 
 years. Acting with the agreement of Kaunitz 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 89 
 
 he had overborne the womanfy ftars of Maria 
 Theresa and the womanish cowaidicc of Karl 
 Theodor. The strong hand sccnicd to have 
 prevailed, for Karl Theodor (who had at first 
 demurred to the Partition-Treaty) yielded to 
 threats and ratified the Treaty with reluctance 
 on January 14. This news made even Maria 
 Theresa forget her fears and write to Kaunitz 
 that the result was due to him. Europe will 
 have to confess that " I possess its greatest 
 statesman." On January 26 Joseph was writ- 
 ing to his brother Leopold, Du:ke of Tuscany : 
 " Our decision was a good one, and will bring 
 as much solid advantage to us as honour and 
 renowTi." The Grand Duke, surveying the 
 diplomatic world from his lit'tle duchy with 
 calm, wise eyes, may well have smiled to read 
 the Kaiser's thoughtless paean. 
 
 We may anticipate events a little on the 
 Austrian side to show the diplomatic situation 
 with more clearness, and to explain the jubil- 
 ance of Joseph. The point of most importance 
 to the Kaiser was to make allies or friends of 
 Karl Theodor, of the Saxon Elector, of the 
 French King, and the Russian Czarina. The 
 Elector of Saxony was indeed a claimant to 
 part of the Bavarian inheritance, but Joseph 
 expected to win him over to the Austrian in- 
 terest. With regard to the two great Powers 
 he was hopeful. Russia — Fi'ederic's ally — had 
 just received an ultimatum from Turkey and 
 
90 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 was therefore incapable of active or immediate 
 interference. The situation of France — his own 
 ally — convinced Joseph that he had taken the 
 chance of a century. On January 29 he writes 
 to Leopold, his brother, in Tuscany : " France 
 has not yet declared herself quite clearly ; but 
 even if she is really angry I do not see what 
 she can say or do, as she finds herself on the 
 eve of a war with England. The King of 
 Prussia has still said no word ; he is very much 
 distressed and knocks at every door to find 
 some one to make common cause with him ; 
 but when he finds himself universally repelled 
 he will have to suffer alone, as he will not dare 
 to go forward by himself. So, unless I am 
 mistaken, this matter, to every one's astonish- 
 ment, will be settled very peacefully." It was 
 not the world that was to be astonished, nor 
 the Kaiser who was to be right. 
 
 France had been made the ally of Austria 
 by Kaunitz, and, as the pledge of that alliance, 
 Marie Antoinette, daughter of Maria Theresa, 
 had become Queen of France. But Louis XVI. 
 was not yet the slave of his Ai3.strian wife, and 
 his devotion to purely French interests was 
 strengthened by his foreign minister Vergennes, 
 the last considerable statesman of the old 
 regime. Dynastic considerations weighed little 
 with one who had seen and feared the ambitions 
 of Joseph, and who had long ago expressed the 
 view that it was to the interests of France that 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 91 
 
 Germany should be kept tranquil by main- 
 taining an even balance between vVustria and 
 Prussia. These eonsiderations of Vergt nnes 
 were strengthened by recent events, especially 
 the paramount one that France was about to 
 dieclare war with England. Further, he had 
 recent grievances against Austria, who had 
 revealed very little to France of her negotia- 
 tions with Karl Theodor in 1777. About the 
 destinies of the Palatinate France was naturally 
 sensitive, and the secrecy of the Austrian in- 
 trigues had excited in her a natural suspicion. 
 France had her own intrigues with Zweibriicken, 
 and nothing that she heard from him was 
 favourable to Austria.* 
 
 In a moment of generosity Kaunitz had 
 once declared that one ally ought not to receive 
 an accession of power or territory without 
 equivalent compensation to the other. Yet 
 on January 8, 1778, when he announced the 
 substance of the Partition-Treaty to Breteuil, 
 the French ambassador at Vienna, Kaunitz 
 said nothing of benefits to France. These 
 actions were not likely to remove the deep- 
 rooted antipathy and suspicion of Vergennes. 
 
 To explain a dubious transaction, to atone for 
 a want of frankness, to persuade an ally against 
 his best interests, were tasks to baflle even 
 " Europe's greatest statesman." Is it wonder- 
 ful that Kaunitz did not succeed, especially 
 as Kaiser Joseph was pushing him on at 
 
92 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 every step with thoughtless eagerness ? The 
 cold and practical Vergennes was impervious 
 to blandishment ; he received the Austrian 
 statements with courtesy but refused to declare 
 himself further. Finally he was stirred into 
 action by the circular issued by Austria on 
 January 20, declaring her intentions as regards 
 Bavaria, and by her verbal explanations that 
 these met with the goodwill of her ally. On 
 February 2 Vergennes drew up a memorandum 
 for circulation to the Powers, in which he 
 explicitly denied that France had any share in 
 supporting the Austrian pretensions to Bavaria. 
 Joseph then played his trump card and tried to 
 deflect French policy by the influence of his 
 sister Marie Antoinette. The tears of a beauti- 
 ful woman might effect what the Kaiser and 
 Kaunitz had sought for in vain. On February 
 14 Marie Antoinette sought out her husband 
 at Versailles, and begged his aid. " I beg you," 
 said she, " to put an end to the unrest in 
 Europe." To her amazement Louis answered 
 coldly and sternly, that the unrest of Europe 
 was due chiefly to her relatives, and that at 
 this very moment France was about to inform 
 the continental courts that she disapproved 
 of the Partition of Bavaria, which had taken 
 place against her wishes. On February 26, 
 just one month after his paean, Kaiser Joseph 
 wrote again to Leopold that affairs had an ill 
 outlook on all sides, that nearly all hope of 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 93 
 
 peace had vanished, and that courage was 
 needed to meit the crisis. 
 
 By February '20 Wrirennes had practically won 
 over his royal master to declare Franer neutral 
 in the Bavarian dispute.^ This cUeision was 
 all the more nectssary as war with England 
 had already been decided on, and as its actual 
 outbreak may be dated from March 13. It was 
 more necessary than ever to encourage Frederic 
 to resist Austria, and to secure an even balance 
 in Germany. French negotiations with the 
 King of Prussia had already been initiated, but 
 Vergennes did not mean to risk anything or to 
 allow Frederic to improve the occasion. On 
 ^larch 10 he informed the Prussian ambassador 
 at Paris that France intended to be neutral 
 in the Bavarian question, but that, while 
 friendly to Frederic, she positively declined 
 any close or separate alliance with him. 
 
 Of this Joseph and Kaunitz knew as yet 
 nothing, but their ambitions, actually grew 
 while their hopes of peace were lessening. Not 
 only were they about to ask France to give 
 them active assistance in case of war with 
 Prussia, but were going to ask her consent to a 
 new and very ambitious project of exchange. 
 By this arrangement Karl Thecidor was to hand 
 over all the rest of Bavaria to* Joseph, and to 
 obtain the Austrian Netherlands in exchange* 
 These proceedings were sharply checked. 
 Kaunitz got very little encouragement for 
 
94 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 his schemes from Breteuil, the French Am- 
 bassador at Vienna ; so he renewed direct 
 representations to Louis, demanding the assist- 
 ance of 24,000 French troops in accordance 
 with the Treaty of 1756, and requesting France 
 to sanction the new exchange -project. The 
 answer was slow in coming and Vienna was 
 excited. Maria Theresa was already writing 
 piteous letters to her son Joseph, the Kaiser 
 was ordering out the reserves, drilling troops, 
 and sleeping already in his camp-bed. Slumber 
 forsook him at nights, but he carried a bold face 
 by day. " I run no danger," said he, "if it 
 be my misfortune to undergo a defeat, that has 
 always come at the hands of the hero of this 
 century, but if I have success it will be so much 
 the more glorious for me." Kaunitz naturally 
 grew anxious, and pressed hard for a definite 
 reply to his French overtures. On March 22 
 at Vienna, when Breteuil hinted pretty plainly 
 to him that France would be neutral, the 
 " greatest statesman of Europe " grew warm, 
 refused to take any such assurance save in 
 writing, and parted from Breteuil in wrath. 
 The polite Kaunitz might well show passion 
 when the Franco- Austrian Alliance, that master- 
 piece of his diplomacy, was dissolving under 
 his very eyes. On March 24 Mercy at last 
 brought Vergennes to explanations at Versailles, 
 and learnt that France declined to recognize 
 an obligation under the 1756. Treaty, and not 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 95 
 
 only reluscd active assistance to Austria in case 
 of war, but declared her inteiitiJon oi" observing 
 a strict and inOexible neutrality. This decision 
 was a great blow both to Kaunitz and to Kaiser 
 Joseph. It not only niatle the grandiose project 
 of exchanging all Bavaria for Belgium impos- 
 sible at the moment ; it rendered the Par- 
 tition-Treaty and the hold on Lower Bavaria 
 precarious in the future. The fairest part 
 of the dream had then vajiished ; Maria 
 Theresa was wringing her hahds, " Europe's 
 greatest statesman " was sitting mournfully 
 among the ruins of his famous alliance, and the 
 Kaiser, tossing at nights on hi^ camp-bed, was 
 indulging a last desperate hope that Frederic 
 might not take the field in person. 
 
 2. King Frederic 
 
 Who treadeth Fortune underneath his feet 
 And makes the mighty God of Amis his slave. 
 
 Marlowe, Tamburlainc. 
 
 The eyes of Europe, which had been fixed 
 upon Munich in the last fortnight of the Old 
 Year, upon Vienna in the first fortnight of the 
 New Year, turned towards Berlin at the end of 
 January 1778. Unless Frederic moved. Kaiser 
 Joseph's bid for Lower Bavaria had succeeded, 
 and for nearly a month all Europe waited in 
 breathless expectation lor the det-ision of the 
 grim Prussian King. Hugh Elliot was now 
 British Ambassador at Berlin, and it is from 
 
96 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 his despatches that we gather the breathless 
 suspense that prevailed from day to day, how 
 every look, word, or gesture of the old King 
 was noted, how rumour outdid rumour in 
 extravagance, and how all the while soldiers 
 went on drilling on the Potsdam parade-ground. 
 On January 17 Hugh Elliot reported Frederic 
 " in high spirits, almost unnaturally so," and 
 this was just after the Austrians had marched 
 into Bavaria. Was it that the old hero 
 was scenting battle, and that his spirit rose 
 with danger ? Hugh Elliot had a rather more 
 prosaic explanation : " There are not wanting 
 persons who ascribe this unusual appearance 
 to the effect of the quantity of wine (!) mixed 
 with too great a proportion of spice, which the 
 King of Prussia takes as remedy for the gout." * 
 In spite or because of the remedy Frederic had 
 an attack of gout about this time, so serious 
 that it was believed at one time to threaten 
 his life. Again the fate of Bavaria depended 
 not so much on physicians — for Frederic 
 despised and often repulsed them — but on the 
 health of a man of advanced age. Yet the 
 danger passed, Frederic recovered and set his 
 ministers examining the Austrian claims. So 
 early as February 3 Hugh Elliot — ^from whom 
 few diplomatic secrets were hid — ^judged it to 
 be the intention of the King of Prussia " to 
 
 * S.P.F. Prussia, 102,'Hugh Elliot to Suffolk, Berlin, January 17, 
 
 1778. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 97 
 
 take the field in the Spriii<r," though he could 
 not decide whether Frederic* meant to attack 
 Austria, or merely " to seize on neighbouring 
 territory as an equivalent." 
 
 By consummate diplomacy Hugh Elliot, 
 the Ambassador of a Power to which Frederic 
 cherished an undying hatred for abandoning 
 him in 1702, managed to penetrate the designs 
 of the old King and to advance the English 
 interests. Frederic had been secretly urging 
 FVance to support the rebellion against England 
 in America, and William Lee, a diplomatic 
 agent of the revolted Americans, was already 
 in Berhn. No situation could well be more 
 unfavourable to the new Anibassador, but 
 Elliot characteristically turned to his advantage 
 the moment of the Bavarian Elector's death, 
 which made England's assistance important 
 to Frederic in Germany. Having been coldly 
 received, he applied for leave; of absence, a 
 request which brought him an immediate visit 
 from Prince Henry (King Frederic's brother). 
 The Prince paid him eompUments, but let out 
 the reason of them by expressing a fear that 
 Elliot's request for absence wa| made with an 
 intention not to return. Elliot pleaded the 
 coldness of the King, but the Prince replied — 
 " que j'agissois avec trop de viyacit^." Elhot 
 begged leave to substitute " sensibilit6." Prince 
 Henry tried to smooth matters over, saying 
 the coldness was not personal but was due to 
 
 H 
 
98 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 England's conduct in the last peace (1763). 
 Elliot replied that this was long passed, and that 
 he knew of these matters only from history. 
 To the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, one of 
 Frederic's favourites, he used even stronger 
 language, saying the presence of a rebel agent 
 (Lee) made " forbearance difificult," and so on.* 
 Hugh Elliot's language was strong, but he knew 
 his man ; concession was useless to Frederic, 
 who showed " ill humour " when it could be 
 shown " with impunity," but was always 
 impressed by courage. By the middle of 
 February (12th) Frederic saw pretty clearly 
 that France was not going to interfere on the 
 Austrian side, and that the friendship of 
 England was too important an asset in the 
 Bavarian affair to be sacrificed. This fact 
 and Hugh Elliot's bold front secured two 
 important declarations from Frederic, first 
 that he would have no more to do with the 
 American rebels, second that, in case of war 
 in Germany, he would respect the neutrality 
 of Hanover.'' Russia, being at the moment 
 afraid of war with Turkey, was apparently 
 
 * S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, February 22, 1778, Hugh Elliot 
 to Suffolk. Hugh Elliot's " forbearance " had been shown shortly 
 before this by breaking open the house of the said " rebel agent," 
 stealing his papers and returning them only when the important 
 ones had been copied under his direction. He repaid the " coldness " 
 pf Frederic by a well-known repartee. King Frederic : " Qui est ce 
 Hyder All qui sait si bien arranger vos affaires aux Indes ? " Hugh 
 Elliot : " Sire, c'est un vieux despote qui abeaucoup piI16 ses voisins, 
 mais qui, Dieu merci, commence h, radoter," Vide Minto's Elliot, 
 p. 228. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 99 
 
 going to stand aloof, so King Frederic and 
 Kaiser Joseph were brought face to face. 
 
 The problem before Frederic was certainly 
 not settled by research into musty parchments — 
 that was the affair of his ministers ; he decided 
 by facts and Prussian interests, setting others to 
 make out the case from history and precedent. 
 To Frederic himself there were only two choices 
 open : either Austria must be satisfied with far 
 less important acquisitions than those she had 
 attained, or she must share some of the spoil 
 with Prussia by means of a partition. Poland's 
 Partition cast a sinister shadow, and this last 
 design was suggested by Elliot as the probable 
 solution of the difficulty.* We cannot tell 
 whether Frederic ever seriously considered it, 
 but it is obvious that no Bavarian Partition 
 could give to Prussia more than, an isolated piece 
 of territory, which it would be hard to defend. 
 It would be impossible to acquire anything to 
 act as a real balance to the inftreased strength 
 of Austria, and this fact may haye weighed with 
 Frederic. The only alternative was for him to 
 insist upon Austria renouncing all such claims 
 to Bavarian territory as gaV^e her any con- 
 siderable advantage or accession of power. 
 Now this last meant nothing else but war, and 
 it was natural that Frederic should ponder its 
 chances. His own advanced age, the possi- 
 bility of defeat, and the dangers of war spread- 
 ing over the Continent were all considerations 
 
100 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 of importance, and explain why his brother 
 Prince Henry vigorously counselled moderation. 
 On the other hand, Frederic's prestige would 
 suffer, he would obviously become the second 
 power in Germany if Austria, which he had so 
 humbled, was at last to be triumphant. 
 
 Whether or no Frederic was to go to war 
 the immediate objects were clear to him ; it 
 was of great importance to turn the moral 
 opinion of the Empire and of Europe against 
 Kaiser Joseph, and it was an absolute necessity 
 to cut htm off from all possible allies in Ger- 
 many. The first object was best secured by 
 inducing Zweibriicken to repudiate the action 
 of Karl Theodor, and to decline all agreement 
 with the Partition-Treaty. In order to secure 
 this Frederic sent off an envoy incognito and 
 post-haste to assure Zweibriicken of Prussian 
 support. The romantic history of that negotia- 
 tion will be related elsewhere; it is sufficient 
 here to describe its success. On February 8 the 
 Prussian envoy knew that Zweibriicken would 
 refuse to endorse the Partition-Treaty, and sent 
 off a letter to Frederic to that effect. Ironically 
 enough, the messenger who delivered it was 
 one of the Bavarian " fiends " {i.e. a monk), 
 a fact which caused the royal sceptic some 
 amusement.' 
 
 It remained for Frederic to secure allies, 
 Karl Theodor was hopeless — he was Joseph's, 
 body and soul. Something, however, might 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 101 
 
 be done with FiTdciie Augustus, Elector of 
 Saxony, the third most powc rful of the Princes 
 of Germany. Saxony was very jiear to Bavaria, 
 and her Elector might well fear a similar fate 
 from Kaiser Joseph in the future. But he 
 stood in awe and suspicion of King Frederic 
 as well. Dresden, with its noble river and 
 splendid rococo palaces, had been the scat of a 
 great civilization under Augustus's magnificent 
 ancestor, who had there entertained Frederic 
 when Crown-Prince of Prussia with more than 
 Oriental profusion. In return Frederic had 
 treated both the land and its inhabitants with 
 merciless brutality during the Sfeven Years' War. 
 He had bled and impoverishe4 the people with 
 his requisitions, had impressed the Saxon troops 
 to serve in his army, brutally Carried off Saxon 
 women to people his Silesian cplonies, and even 
 kidnapped Saxon potters frojn Meissen and 
 forced them to disclose the secrets of Dresden 
 cliina to the factories of Potsdam.* Frederic 
 Augustus had forgotten such nhheard-of rigour 
 in view of more recent wrongs and insults 
 from Austria. In 1777 he had had a painful 
 dispute with Austria over the Schonburg in- 
 heritance, which culminated in the Austrian 
 troops forcibly expelling the Saxon ones from the 
 lordships of Glauchau, Waldcnburg and Lichtcn- 
 
 * It ia characteristic that, while Frederic issued these commands 
 from Dresden, he went every day to loolt at Kapliael's " Madonna di 
 San Sisto." 
 
102 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 stein, and fencing in the disputed territory 
 with eagle -topped boundary posts. Frederic 
 Augustus could with some justice complain that 
 the action was arrogant and high - handed.^" 
 He was naturally alarmed at Karl Theodor's 
 Partition-Treaty, which referred all the disputed 
 claims on the Bavarian Succession to the award 
 of the Emperor. After Schonburg even a less 
 suspicious man than Frederic Augustus might 
 be forgiven for doubtitig whether the Emperor's 
 judgment wovdd be impartial or disinterested. 
 His applications to Vienna were met with such 
 dark and discouraging answers that he at once 
 turned to Frederic.^^ 
 
 At Dresden the English chargi noted " the 
 greatest consternation and very great con- 
 fusion " throughout January. But even diplo- 
 matic dangers could not interrupt the revels 
 of Dresden and its ruler. On February 25 we 
 learn that " His Electoral Highness " was 
 " indisposed with a violent cold occasioned 
 (being very fond of dancing) by over-heating 
 himself this carnaval." The same despatch 
 shows that serious business had already begun : 
 " A stranger arrived here last week from Leipzig, 
 who it is assumed is incognito at the Prussian 
 Minister's. It is certain from the time of that 
 Gentleman's arrival the Prussian Minister has 
 been locked up under the Pretence of being ill, 
 and receives no one." Some said the mysteri- 
 ous stranger was Prince Henry of Prussia, but 
 
AND ICA.ISER JOSEPH 103 
 
 in the ond it turnod out tq be a Prussian 
 general, who liad been sent by Frederic to 
 reconnoitre the ground between Dresden and 
 Bohemia, and to give expert mihtary advice 
 to tlie Elector. Tliis and other evidence led 
 the English chargS to the correct conclusion : 
 " In case of a rupture Saxony enters into a 
 Treaty of Alliance with the King of Prussia. 
 Tliis is a matter of fact." * It was indeed ; 
 on ]\Iarch 14, the rupture seeming imminent, 
 Frederic despatched an envoy with full powers, 
 and on March 18 a Convention was signed 
 between Prussia and Saxony,, which pledged 
 them to mutual support, and was equivalent 
 to a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance.^" 
 By the end of February Frejderic had readily 
 guessed that he could count oh Saxony, that is 
 on an army of 30,000 men, in. case he went to 
 war. He was, as he said, " no Don Quixote," 
 to sacrifice himself for petty princes, whose 
 troops consisted chiefly of the gentlemen of 
 their ante - chambers. But the aid of the 
 strongest army in Germany (after his own 
 and the Austrian) made his task relatively 
 simple. England, France and Russia stood 
 aside ; Saxony was his. It remained to see what 
 he could make of the other German princes. 
 Joseph had already frightened these gentry 
 — he had treated the unfortupate Karl Theo- 
 
 * S.P.F. Poland (Saxony), vol. 1 15, Dresden, February 25, March 8, 
 June 21, 1778, J. Milliquet to W. Eden. 
 
104 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 dor with offensive callousness, had not even 
 troubled to observe the conditions of the 
 Partition-Treaty with any strictness, and had 
 allowed his troops to occupy parts of Bavaria 
 not mentioned in that agreement.^^ Meanwhile, 
 Zweibriicken, with the open favour of Frederic 
 and the secret support of France, was trumpet- 
 ing his grievances to the Diet of the Empire, 
 An early communication from Frederic to 
 Vienna protested against the occupation of 
 Bavaria by Austrian troops. Later ones — the 
 most important that which reached Kaunitz 
 on March 9 — disavowed the Partition- Treaty 
 and pointed out the genealogical flaws in its 
 provisions. Finally, on March 16 the substance 
 of this letter was communicated to the Diet 
 of the Empire at Regensburg. The representa- 
 tives of Zweibriicken and the Saxon Elector 
 supported the protest eagerly, and the other 
 German princes learnt with undisguised pleasure 
 that Frederic had taken his stand against the 
 Kaiser in defence of the Liberty of Princes and 
 the Rights of the Empire. Kaunitz replied by 
 shelving (as well he might) the discussion of 
 claims, and spoke of Austria's desire to satisfy 
 every one, but refused to admit the King of 
 Prussia as the " umpire of her claims." * 
 
 March 16 has been called a memorable day 
 in the history of the Empire : it certainly had 
 
 * S.P.F. Germany, Empire (Austria), vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to 
 Suffolk, March 14, 1778. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 105 
 
 the result of iixing the lycs of all Gtiinany and 
 of Europe upon Frrilrrio. But for him, the 
 laws of the Empire NVt)uld have bc(;n defied, the 
 wishes of German pi'incehngs disregai'ded, and 
 the rule of Austria insolently enforced by the 
 threat of an appeal to the sword. Onee more 
 Frederic appeared as holding the balance, once 
 more he seemed the arbiter of Germany, but 
 now he was more popular and powerful than 
 ever ; Saxony was at his side, Hanover was 
 favourable though neutral, most Princes of 
 the Empire saluted him as the guardian of 
 legality and right. To Frederic the part he 
 played must have seemed nelw and stimulat- 
 ing, for no one had done more than he in his 
 young days to injure state morality and to 
 break up the Germanic Empire. Just now, 
 however, it was to his interesjt to appear dis- 
 interested, and his pose as the benign defender 
 of law and order throughout the Empire was 
 of the highest importance, in branding Austria 
 as an aggressor and in teaching the other 
 German States to regard Prussia as their 
 natural leader. " The hasty conduct " of the 
 Court of Vienna " must at the first view be 
 extremely alarming. If claims of obsolete date 
 are, in the first instance, to be decided by the 
 Law of Arms, there can be no security for the 
 weaker members of the Empire whose territories 
 may unfortunately be situated in the neighbour- 
 hood of powerful Princes, and the Constitution 
 
106 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 of the Empire will only exist in the Records of 
 the Diet." * 
 
 Even to England Frederic now became a 
 tolerable person. From 1762 till the beginning 
 of 1778 the despatches of English ambassadors 
 had frequently consisted of unbounded diatribes 
 against the Prussian King, now they began to 
 speak of his virtues, and the pious King George 
 even exchanged compliments with him. If 
 anything shows the moral advantage gained 
 by Frederic more clearly than the approval 
 of England it would be that of the Catholic 
 Powers of Germany (" his fiends "). Eden 
 records — with a certain unction indeed — that 
 " Protestant Powers as usual " are " favour- 
 able to the cause of Justice and Liberty," and 
 adds, " The Catholics are indeed favourable 
 in the present case — though their dependence 
 on the Court of Vienna prevents them declaring 
 themselves openly." " This last consideration 
 made Frederic dream of a League of German 
 Princes, which should include Catholics and 
 Protestants and should exclude Austria. In 
 the first week of April he commanded his 
 Ministers to consider such a project, and to 
 form a League of Princes under Prussian head- 
 ship. For one delirious moment a foreshadow- 
 
 * S.P.F. German States (Bavaria), vol. 113, St. James, Suffolk to 
 Eden, AprU 7, 1778 ; Munich, Eden to Suffolk, April 30, 1778 ; vide 
 also S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102 ; Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, March 3, 
 1778 ; St. James, Suffolk to ElUot, April 7;..1778 ; Berlin, May 30, 
 ElUot to Suffolk. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 107 
 
 ing of Bismarck's Gtrmany hovtrs faintly upon 
 a far horizon. But the project was premature, 
 Frederic was above all things practieul, and, 
 as Catholic Princes would not openly declare 
 against Austria, he postponed these dreams 
 till a time when they could' have a better 
 chance of realization. The reason lay, not in 
 him, but in those other Pririces, who were 
 "all fear without energy," '' the shame of the 
 century," and who made him " blush " for 
 Germany.* 
 
 For the rest the eulogies on his conduct 
 amused no one more than the Cynical old King. 
 He had of course no objection to being wor- 
 shipped by the minor Princes as a Don Quixote 
 of legality, and he took pains to sustain that 
 part in public, " Je ne prefererai pas mon intdret 
 personnel a celui de tout rempire." f In private 
 he let fall the mask and candidly confessed 
 to his brother that in the whole affair he pushed 
 the Prussian interest alone. 
 
 Though Frederic made his decision, and 
 adhered to it subsequently with inflexible 
 firmness, he did not make it easily, and he 
 delayed pushing matters to a crisis as long as 
 possible. Something in this tardiness may 
 
 * Frederic's expressions are from a letter to Prince Henry of 
 March 8, SchOning, Der Bayerische Erbfolgekrig, p. 20; cp. Rei- 
 mann, Pr. Gesch. ii. 78-79. 
 
 f Frederic to Sohms, Prussian Ambassador at Petrograd, March 
 2-1, 1778, Reimann, Preuss. Gesch. ii. 43 ; to Prince Henry, March 0, 
 ibid. ii. 77. 
 
108 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 perhaps be ascribed to conscious art, since he 
 wished to appear forced into war, but some- 
 thing more to genuine reluctance, and to the 
 approach of age, which had dulled even his 
 fire. He set on his publicists, with his minister 
 Hertzberg at their head, to produce the 
 pamphlets, proclamations, and letters needed 
 for the occasion, and a brisk paper campaign 
 — in which official despatches stood for the 
 heavy guns and pamphlets for the sharp- 
 shooters — preceded and did something to occa- 
 sion the real war. Hertzberg was a fanatical 
 Prussian, rash and impulsive, but also able and 
 determined. He possessed considerable know- 
 ledge of genealogy and history, and in the main 
 the pamphlet - literature, which he inspired, 
 was superior in argument and weight to the 
 Austrian. Kaiser Joseph took little means to 
 conciliate Frederic or to divide his enemies 
 by diplomacy. Violent pamphlets against the 
 Prussian King were issued in Vienna, and it was 
 known " that hardly a word on the Bavarian 
 Succession went to Press In the Austrian 
 Capital without being cautiously examined in 
 the Chancery." * 
 
 After the storms of March came a lull 
 during April; neither side was ready for war, 
 both were making ample preparations for 
 it. Prussian troops were pushing beyond 
 
 * S.P.F. Germany, Empire,vol. 220, Vienna, May 23, 1778, Keith 
 to Suftolli. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 109 
 
 BiTslaii to the border, Saxon troops were 
 concentrating at Dresden, and zVustrian soldiers 
 were ncaring the frontiers both ol' Silesia and 
 Saxony. Every day Kiith saw troops hurry- 
 ing through Viinna — Croats, Hussars, Italians, 
 Hungarians — accompanied by* waggons con- 
 taining vast stores of meat, corn, and ammuni- 
 tion. On April 11 Kaiser Joseph and his 
 brother, Archduke Maximilian, left the capital 
 and proceeded to Olmiitz to direct operations 
 for the coming war. The Kaiser was in the 
 field, and on the 13th, writing as it wore from 
 the saddle, sent a letter in his own hand to 
 Frederic, appealing to him to avoid war. If 
 Frederic would recognize the Partition-Treaty 
 of January 3, Austria would endeavour to 
 compensate the other competitors and would 
 recognize the succession of Frederic to the 
 Margravates of Ansbach and Baireuth. The 
 letter reached Frederic in camp at Schonwalde 
 on the 14th, where he was surrounded by 
 officers instead of by ministers. He answered 
 shortly " as an old soldier," disavowing any 
 desire for war, but declaring it impossible to 
 accept the Kaiser's basis of negotiation. His 
 own succession to Ansbach-Baireuth had no- 
 thing whatever to do with BaVaria or Austria, 
 besides, as he added ironically, " our rights 
 here are so unassailable that none can dispute 
 them." To accept the Partition-Treaty was 
 to acknowledge that the Kaiser was a despot 
 
110 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 in the Empire, and Frederic was personally- 
 resolved to defend the Laws and Liberties of 
 Germany. Joseph answered smartly on the 
 18th that the Partition-Treaty was a friendly 
 arrangement, which he had concluded, not in 
 his capacity as Kaiser, but as Elftctor of Bohemia 
 and Archduke of Austria. This kind of personal 
 dispute between royalties was hardly dignifie<i 
 and, after a third letter and answer, pleni- 
 potentiaries on each side took up the negotia- 
 tion. It is hardly worth while to detail their 
 course, because neither Joseph nor Frederic 
 seems to have entertained any real hope of 
 their success. Each of the principals seems to 
 have intended them as a means of deluding 
 his opponent until the time for action was 
 ready. Only the influence of Prince Henry of 
 Prussia on the one hand and the agonized 
 anxiety of Maria Theresa on the other pro- 
 longed the make-believe for two months. For 
 a moment, indeed, there was a hope, as Kaunitz 
 was willing that Frederic should receive Lusatia 
 in exchange for Ansbach-Baireuth if he would 
 recognize Austria's claim on Lower Bavaria. 
 Frederic saw the value of Lusatia, which would 
 knit his dominions together in much the same 
 way as Lower Bavaria would unite the Austrian. 
 But he kept his head cool and was statesman 
 enough to reahze that he must not throw away 
 his newly found asset as guardian of law and 
 morality. He had already been negotiating 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 111 
 
 on this vory matter, and had made it clear that 
 he would only agree to this arrangement if the 
 Saxon Elector gave a free consent ; Hertzberg 
 soon convinced Frederic that this was wholly 
 out of the question, and so thetproject dropped 
 and with it all chances of real accommodation 
 (May it).!^ 
 
 The English watchers at Berlin, Vienna, 
 Dresden, and INIunich had decided that peace 
 was already hopeless by the end of May, But 
 war had been averted so long that hopes still 
 lingered throughout June. Even on the 22nd 
 Joseph was writing to Kaunitz that a firm front 
 might still carry the day.^" But negotiation 
 was really impossible, for Frederic never swerved 
 from the terms of his first letter to Joseph. 
 On June 27 Frederic in his canip at Schonwalde 
 received a final despatch from Kaunitz and 
 resolved on war. On the same day the learned 
 and masculine but over-conscientious Hertzberg 
 sent Frederic a last new plan of ingenious paper- 
 exchanges and genealogical calculations. This 
 plan he begged Frederic to Study before he 
 " crossed the Rubicon." But the die was 
 already cast, and the old King was not 
 merciful to his Monsieur de la timide politique. 
 He returned Hertzberg's communication with 
 the following endorsement : " Allez vou^ pro- 
 mener {sic) avec vos Indignes plans, vous etes 
 {sic) fait pour estre {sic), le Ministre de gens 
 coujons comme VElecteur de Baviere, mais nan 
 
LAUDON. 
 
THE PLUM AND POTATO WAR * 
 
 O selig der, dem er im Siegesglanze 
 
 Die blut'gen Lorbecrn um die SclUafe mindet.' — Goethe. 
 
 Happy the man in victory's golden moment 
 When Death with bloody laurels binds his brow. 
 
 In the war which now began the outlook for 
 Austria was not so gloomy as Was imagined by 
 many, and especially by Maria Theresa, whose 
 heart was sad because she had sent three sons 
 to the front. In military resources the two 
 Powers were not very unequal, though the 
 Prussian army had also the Saxon one to back 
 it. In all the details of military equipment, 
 transport, commissariat, and drill, the energy 
 of Joseph and the organizing skill of Lascy 
 had produced a real revolution in the Austrian 
 army. Already in the Seven Years' War there 
 had been evidence of more science, more skill, 
 and more thought, and this change had been 
 carried much further during the years 1763-78. 
 There had been revolutions in every direction, 
 
 • The best modem maps of the ground are the Karte des Deulschen 
 Belches, Bureau des Konigl. Bach. Generalstabes, 1880, sheets 'H4-7. 
 liiere is a very fine old map, Carte chorogriphique el militairc de la 
 partie de la Saice el de la Bohime ou sont entries les Anm'c.i combindes 
 , , , aux Ordres de S.A. Prince Henri de Prusse en 1778, which marks 
 the positions of Prince Ileniy's army throughout the campaign. 
 
 113 I 
 
114 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 improvements or changes in everything, great 
 and small. The erection of studs for produ- 
 cing cavalry chargers, of schools for educating 
 soldiers' children, of hospitals for invalids and 
 veterans, of military academies for training 
 young officers, all attested the diverse activities 
 of the new military reformers. The troops 
 had been constantly exercised on parade and in 
 manoeuvres, fortresses had been remodelled 
 or rebuilt, magazines formed,^ vast quantities 
 of food and ammunition collected, while Kaiser 
 Joseph had been indefatigable and ubiquitous, 
 inspecting barracks, paying surprise-visits to 
 distant garrisons, and endeavouring to infuse 
 energy and vigour everywhere. Defects there 
 undoubtedly were, some of the reforms were 
 too hasty or ill-considered, others failed owing 
 to the corruption always latent in the Austrian 
 bureaucracy, or to the nepotism prevalent 
 among its aristocracy.^ Hereditary custom 
 placed most of the high commands in the hands 
 of nobles, to whom war was not a profession 
 but a superior kind of sport, and this privilege 
 of paying the tax of blood was one of which 
 even Joseph dared not entirely deprive them. 
 But when a soldier of fortune like Laudon 
 could rise to high eminence, and when princes 
 like Liechtenstein and de Ligne could reach 
 a high degree of professional skill, the 
 practice was not as harmful as at first sight 
 might appear. Any ill effects were further 
 
AND KAISER JO^SEPH 115 
 
 counteracted by the fact that Austria now for 
 the first time really possessed a well -organized 
 general staff, whose cfBcicncy was to be proved 
 both in this and in subsequent wars. In the 
 lower ranks of command there were many 
 Austrian veterans of distinction, and their 
 training, even if unequal to the Prussian, was 
 not such as to deprive them entirely of initiative 
 and resource. On the other hand, Frederic's 
 chief generals were dead, and their successors, 
 like his more subordinate officers, had been 
 trained to a perfectly mechanical rigidity and 
 precision. What had always been a serious 
 fault with Frederic had now become almost a 
 mania. Under such circumst^ces the Prussian 
 officer's superiority in technical skill might well 
 be balanced by the greater sense of independ- 
 ence which the Austrian officer possessed. 
 
 The Austrian army showed a better spirit, 
 organization, and training than at any time 
 in the Seven Years' War, but it undoubtedly 
 had one serious defect. ThoUlgh a professional 
 army in the main, its character was miscellane- 
 ous and polyglot." For example, while the 
 regular army was trained and organized in 
 ordinary fashion, there were other forces which 
 were not. The Hungarian nobles voted and 
 equipped at their own expense levies of 
 " insurgents," as they were called, which joined 
 the regulars. At this time the!re was no system 
 of conscription in Hungary, and the majority 
 
116 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 of its troops were still feudal levies officered by 
 hereditary commanders. Bravery they pos- 
 sessed indeed, but the Magyar feudal leaders 
 mixed as hardly with the German officers of 
 Vienna as did Prince Charlie's Highland chiefs 
 with his French officers. Then, again, the 
 Croats, who appeared to Keith " as hardy and 
 active soldiers as I have seen," were gallant 
 irregulars, but almost as hard to combine with 
 ordinary troops as if they had been Red Indians. 
 In spite of all Lascy's labours there was still 
 something of the air of a feudal host about 
 some component parts of the Austrian army. 
 It is true that it would not be easy to organize 
 the Prussian and Saxon armies as a unit, but it 
 was an infinitely harder task so to organize the 
 Austrians. Still the latter was a well-appointed 
 force, and its inferiority to the Prussian was one 
 of degree not of kind. Had it been as boldly 
 handled as it was well trained it might have 
 done much. As it was, it was the only Austrian 
 army between the days of Prince Eugene and 
 of the Archduke Charles which engaged in a 
 war without suffering a disastrous defeat. 
 
 As numbers, war material, and fighting 
 qualities were approximately equal, the real 
 decisions of the campaign rested with the chief 
 leaders. Here also at first sight the advantage 
 would appear to rest, though not very de- 
 cisively, with the Prussians. Bohemia was to 
 be invaded from two sides, from the Silesian 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 117 
 
 side by King Frederic, Irom the Saxon side by 
 Prince Henry of Prussia, the brother of the 
 Iving. Lascy and Kaiser Joseph were to face 
 the King, Laudon to command against the 
 Prince. Prince Henry had been well known in 
 the Seven Years' War. In 1759, at the most 
 tragic moment of Frederic's fate, his admir- 
 able manoeuvres had restorfi'd confidence to 
 his brother and perhaps saved the existence 
 of Prussia, Even Frederic, who practised 
 economy in compliments, once pointed out 
 Prince Henry to his generals, saying : " There 
 is only one of us who never rpade a mistake." 
 Napoleon, whose military judgment overtops 
 even Frederic's, was of opinion that Prince 
 Henry had occasionally to thabk his opponents 
 for not revealing his mistakes, ^especially in the 
 year 1 759. " The faultless genei^al ' ' was, none the 
 less, a soldier of great renown, much experience, 
 and high professional skill. He was the only 
 Prussian general, except the great Kjng himself, 
 who had led Prussian troops to victory in a 
 pitched battle in the Seven Years' War. His 
 judgment was at once superlatively clear and 
 exquisitely cool, and he — alonte of all Prussian 
 generals then living — dared to face Frederic, 
 and declined to sacrifice his independence or his 
 troops at the royal command;. His fault was 
 perhaps that he balanced juSt a thought too 
 nicely, and complimented his opponent a little 
 too much in thinking that he. judged as aceu- 
 
118 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 rately as himself.' For Laudon, though no 
 contemptible opponent, was endowed with 
 erratic genius rather than with steady talent. 
 Alone of all Austrian generals in the Seven 
 Years' War he had shown himself capable of a 
 daring initiative, had inspired his troops with 
 dash and spirit, and had wrung compliments 
 as to his military capacity even from Frederic 
 himself. At his best, as at Kunersdorf, he had 
 known how to defeat even Frederic himself; at 
 his worst he would be unequal to Prince Henry. 
 The invasion from Silesia promised less 
 decisive results ; Frederic needed no early 
 success to add to his immeasurable renown, 
 and an early reverse might detract from it. 
 Moreover, the great Prussian king was sixty- 
 six years old, prematurely aged by hardship 
 and labour, tortured with gout so that he could 
 barely mount his horse. Old friends who saw 
 him were shocked at his broken-down appear- 
 ance, at his wrinkles and his grey hair ; it was 
 only in the wonderful eyes that they saw a trace 
 of the old energy and fire. On the Austrian 
 side the character of Lascy, who exercised great 
 influence on Kaiser Joseph, was not one to 
 induce him to stake all on a battle with so great 
 a warrior as Frederic. Lascy's great adminis- 
 trative and organizing talents suited him ad- 
 mirably for a commander-in-chief or chief of 
 staff, but he trusted too much to the slow 
 evolution of long-formed plans, and lacked the 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 119 
 
 elasticity and resource, the siuldcn divination, 
 and the instant decision needed by a commander 
 in the field. Kaiser Joseph had indicd some 
 of these qualities which Lascy lacked, some 
 personal magnetism, something of initiative 
 and of quick, imperious resolve, but his inex- 
 perience in war, and his regard, for his peasants' 
 and his soldiers' welfare, disinclined him to 
 stir Lascy into activity. Indeed Lascy's whole 
 train of thought dissuaded him from fighting 
 great battles, for he had been brought up by 
 Daun, in that Austrian School which was to 
 have its greatest exponent in the Archduke 
 Charles, and which maintained that the holding 
 of fortified places, the manoeuvre and counter- 
 manoeuvre for favourable ground, were the 
 supreme ends of war. That more modern and 
 decisive school of strategy, which teaches that 
 the real object is the destruction of the enemy's 
 army in the field, was alien, to Lascy from 
 military training and conviction, and to Kaiser 
 Joseph also for political reasorts.* 
 
 On the other hand, Frederic had until now 
 been the most strenuous disciple, if not the 
 originator, of a very different military doc- 
 trine, which was afterwards to have its ablest 
 exponent in Napoleon. In the Seven Years' 
 War no one had more brilliantly proved than 
 Frederic how much depends on a bold initiative, 
 how often a thrust is the best parry in warfare, 
 how far more important it is to destroy an army 
 
120 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 even at a great loss than to secure a position 
 at a small one. That to a numerically inferior 
 force a daring aggression is the best defence, 
 had ever been one of his cardinal maxims.® 
 Now when his forces were, what they had very 
 seldom been in the past, approximately equal 
 to the Austrian, would Frederic uphold his own 
 maxims ? If he forswore them, there would be 
 no fighting worth mentioning on the Silesian side, 
 for the game would become one of stalemate. 
 
 If the two opposing armies appeared fairly 
 balanced in leaders and in men, the same might 
 be also said of the natural conditions of the 
 ground in which the armies were to operate. 
 Bohemia — the scene of the campaign — ^is a 
 fortress enclosed within mountain walls which 
 stand four-square to every wind of battle. 
 On the two sides from which she was now open 
 to an attack, from the Saxon or western side 
 and from the Silesian or northern one, her 
 barriers of rugged rock and dense forest are 
 exceptionally strong. Yet from these two 
 sides Bohemia, by universal concession and 
 experience, is " easy to invade." A glimpse 
 into the Middle Ages serves better to explain 
 this paradox than the dissertation of a modern 
 tactician. Mediaeval robber-barons had a keen 
 eye for planting castles upon inaccessible crags, 
 whence they could sally out upon unsuspecting 
 foes or upon peaceful merchants, and we may 
 trust their instinct to find the: real sluice-gates. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 121 
 
 where the rich slow-moving streams of com- 
 merce, or the roaring tides of war, could be 
 dammed or let through — at a price. There are 
 three gates in these Bohemian mountain walls, 
 two on the Saxon side, at Konigstein-Lihen- 
 stein and at ToUenstein, and one on the 
 Silesian side, at Nachod. Each of them was 
 guarded by a castle in the Middle Ages. South 
 from Dresden down the Elbe ran a road which 
 was blocked by the twin castles — Konigstein- 
 LiUenstein (twin eagles' nests on opposite 
 crags !) ; from Lusatia south over Rumburg the 
 second road was guarded by the romantic keep 
 of ToUenstein ; the third ran south from Silesia 
 over Glatz and was closed by the castle of 
 Nachod. Those castles — once the toll-houses 
 of these three entrances — were, now their sentry- 
 boxes. If they were to be defended in the 
 eighteenth century it must be by living and not 
 by dead walls, a fact which serves to testify to the 
 eternal sameness of the principles of strategy, 
 and to their infinite difference in application. 
 
 The broad outline of the attack and defence 
 will be found to be simple when these facts are 
 realized. It was known thait King Frederic 
 was preparing to lead the Silesian Army, Prince 
 Henry the Saxon one, each with a striking force 
 of some 80,000 men.* Therefore the Austrian 
 
 • The exact numbers of the striking force were, on July 1, 1778 — 
 Frederic, 80,000 men, 483 guns ; Kaiser Joseph, 128,000 men, 423 
 guns ; Prince Henry, 80,000 men, 483 guns ; Laudon (afterwards 
 reinforced), 70,000 men, 252 guns. 
 
122 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 plan was to make a concentration, and to keep 
 all their forces within as small an area as 
 possible, in order to strike either way at the 
 invader. The whole Austrian Army of about 
 190,000 men was to be collected in a triangle, 
 of which the base rested on Niemes and Jaromer, 
 and the apex on Zittau. The left or Saxon 
 wing was concentrated under Laudon at Niemes, 
 the centre under Lascy at JiCin, the right under 
 Hadik at Jaromer, the whole being under the 
 command of Kaiser Joseph. By this arrange- 
 ment all the armies were within three or four 
 marches of one another, and any threatened 
 points could be effectually reinforced at very 
 short notice. So long as the Austrian forces 
 remained unbroken Prince Henry could not 
 push past Niemes and on to Prague, or Frederic 
 past Jaromer to KoniggratZ. It was from 
 Silesia that the Austrians expected the real 
 danger. Frederic would, of course, enter 
 Bohemia through the Nachod gate, and display 
 his far-famed capacity for marching swiftly 
 and for striking heavy blows early in the 
 campaign. Speaking of this. Kaiser Joseph is 
 reported to have said : " When it is a question 
 of fighting he (Frederic) rises up earlier than 
 other people, but he shall never find me 
 asleep." * With a view to receiving his attack 
 the ground behind Nachod from Arnau to 
 
 * Calonne, Notes sur la vie de Josef II, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 
 27487. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 123 
 
 Jaromer had bicn cart luUy fortified against the 
 Prussian attack. Here lay the post of danger, 
 here the greatest crisis would come, thought 
 Kaiser Joseph. When on July 5 Frederic 
 passed over the border at Nadhod, the Arnau- 
 Jaromer line was immediately manned, the 
 Austrian armies of the centre and the right were 
 at once united under the command of Lascy 
 and the Kaiser. It was decided to entrust 
 Laudon with the army of the left as an in- 
 dependent command, in order that he might 
 make head against Prince Henry. Thus there 
 were now only two Austrian armies. Joseph 
 with the Eastern was defending the Nachod 
 gate against Frederic, Laudon with the Western 
 was to hold against Prince Henry the mountain 
 gate of ToUenstein and the river gate by Aussig. 
 In actual result — for reason^ that will sub- 
 sequently appear — the danger was to be for 
 Laudon, and during the first six weeks of the 
 war the interest of the campaign shifts entirely 
 to his army. On July 5 Laudon lay with his 
 main force at Niemes, where he received the 
 one dazzling inspiration which came to him 
 in this campaign. Frederic was within two 
 or three marches of Jaromer and Joseph, but 
 Laudon knew that Prince Henry's army was 
 located at Dresden, a good ten days' maroh 
 from any seemingly threatened point on his 
 side. Before finally deciding to go westwards 
 Laudon devised a brilliant scheme. He wrote 
 
124 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 from Niemes to Kaiser Joseph on July 7 point- 
 ing out that the Austrian armies had still the 
 advantage of interior lines, and could move 
 more quickly than the widely severed Prussian 
 armies. Prince Henry's movements were neces- 
 sarily slow and, according to the best informa- 
 tion, Laudon thought that he personally could 
 have nothing to fear until about the 15th. So 
 the thought came to him whether he could not 
 profit by this interval and with united force 
 (that is, by concentrating our Western and 
 Eastern armies) set off at King Frederic himself 
 and attack him, unless he stood in an entirely 
 unassailable position. He thought that within 
 four days the two armies would be united.* 
 Laudon himself would bring some 42,000 men 
 to Arnau, making the forces there up to 55,000 
 in all, and with these crush the King of Prussia's 
 right wing. Meanwhile Kaiser Joseph with 
 72,000 men could sally out against the Prussian 
 left and centre. Frederic with 80,000 would 
 be caught by 120,000 men, and would be 
 outnumbered and crushed between the two 
 Austrian armies. The plan was a great one, 
 resembling that of the Metaurus or Blenheim, 
 though upon a smaller scale. It meant the 
 leaving of a skeleton force before the first enemy 
 who could not readily take the offensive, and 
 the sudden union of two armies to destroy the 
 second. Had it been followed it might have 
 resembled Blenheim yet more, in transferring 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 125 
 
 the scene of action to the enemy's frontier, in 
 conquering a duchy in a day, and in destroying 
 a long and hardly earned reputation for victory. 
 But so bold a plan was not for the Kaiser and for 
 Lascy. It was unsafe to take liberties with 
 Frederic, and the cautious Joseph refused this 
 suggestion. Laudon — after this brilliant flash of 
 intuitive insight — turned to the work of defence, 
 in which he was to prove prosa^ic enough. 
 
 Laudon had been allotted the most difficult 
 task in the defence of Bohemia. In the first 
 place he had two gates to defend, not one like 
 Kaiser Joseph, and in the second place he had 
 not in his hands the crags of Konigstein- 
 Lilienstein, but had to conteiit himself with 
 Aussig as a post from which to bar any advance 
 up the Elbe. Again, the area of defence was 
 much more extensive than that assigned to 
 Kaiser Joseph ; to hold both gates Laudon 
 had to cover a line stretching from Aussig to 
 Zittau, a region covered with, hills and forests 
 in which scouting was difficult. It was there- 
 fore I possible for the enemy, manoeuvring 
 secretly behind the lofty curtain of mountain 
 and wood, to fling overwhelming force upon one 
 gate by Aussig or on the other by ToUenstein, 
 before Laudon could divine their intention. 
 Laudon's best plan would have been to con- 
 centrate his army at Hirschberg, to hold Aussig 
 in force, and to send a suffieient detachment 
 to bar the gate of ToUenstein. The Hirschberg 
 
126 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 concentration would have masked his disposi- 
 tions, prevented Prince Henry frona discover- 
 ing his real intentions, and enabled Laudon to 
 block both entrances. As it was, he assumed 
 that Prince Henry was adva:ncing down the 
 Elbe — the most probable line of approach — 
 and neglected to place more than a few skir- 
 mishers at ToUenstein. Now, if Prince Henry 
 was a general whom a stroke of genius might 
 have deceived, he was not one in whose presence 
 it was safe to make any ordinary blunder. 
 
 After moving out his Saxon-Prussian Army 
 from Dresden Prince Henry made feints in 
 several directions, especially towards Dippoldis- 
 walde, with the view of deceiving Laudon. 
 Then on July 28 he crossed the left bank of the 
 Elbe on three bridges just above Pirna. His 
 intelligence — such as it was — confused and 
 perplexed Laudon, and made him believe that 
 Prince Henry was coming down both sides of the 
 Elbe at once. Hence he began to concentrate 
 his forces at Bleiswedel, from which town he 
 could cover both sides of the stream. There 
 let us leave him for a time, waiting in anxious 
 expectation. 
 
 Instead of going down the Elbe Prince Henry 
 advanced through the forests on its right bank 
 (July 28), and made straight for Rumburg. 
 Using this town as a base he purposed to seize 
 ToUenstein Pass, where was the only gap in 
 Bohemia's armour of forest and hill. The 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 127 
 
 enterprise was bold in that ha advanced over 
 roads unused to heavy traffic and streaming 
 with mud from the rain, and into a country 
 whence he could only retreat with difficulty in 
 case of failure. On the 30tb, some Prussian 
 cavalry with Lothosel's infantry surprised and 
 routed a hundred Austrian ciavalry at Rum- 
 burg, and pursued them to the first wood- 
 patch outside the town. There fifty Austrian 
 chasseurs came to their aid, but the Prussian 
 infantry came on again, Prussian guns hurried 
 up from Rumburg, and the Prussian cavalry 
 took them in flank. The Austrians gave way 
 again and were pursued four good miles as far 
 as Georgenthal, where the Prussian cavalry 
 bivouacked. Meanwhile the advance guard 
 of the Prussians had filed into Rumburg, and 
 aill night long further reinforcements kept 
 arriving. 
 
 From Rumburg to ToUenstein there is a 
 rift in the mountains, a series of gentle slopes 
 studded with thick patches and clumps of dark 
 firs. Across this wooded plateau infantry could 
 advance and seize the Pass of ToUenstein. On 
 the next day, July 31, an advance was made 
 in four columns. General Belling's colvunn 
 marching over Georgenthal to ToUenstein to 
 seize the key of the whole position. Let us 
 advance with General Belling. The way from 
 Rumburg to ToUenstein lies oyer broad downs, 
 yeUow with the harvest of oats or green with 
 
128 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 other crops, now somewhat draggled in the rain. 
 Here and there BeUing's column marches be- 
 tween dark fir -forests, varied by more open 
 country towards the east. On presses the 
 column in hot haste, past the low-browed huts 
 of Schonlinde down to Georgenthal, which lies 
 low and flat in the valley, where the Prussian 
 cavalry were already awaiting them. A^ Belling 
 looked up and ahead he could see westwards 
 (to the right) the dark impenetrable forests, 
 through which another Prussian column was 
 hastening. Straight in front of him — ^not four 
 kilometres farther on — is the goal of his hopes. 
 A great ruined keep frowned at him from the 
 grim rock of ToUenstein, a pass winding amid 
 stunted hills on one side of it, on the other the 
 tall fir-clad mass of Tannenberg Hill, a gigantic 
 sentry guarding the defile that is the key of 
 Upper Bohemia. Behind it again rolled back 
 a, seemingly endless and impenetrable sea of 
 fir-clad summits. Those dark masses of hills 
 might conceal any number of troops; at any 
 moment hot Laudon and his hussars might be 
 rushing to the rescue. There was no time to 
 lose; Belling gave the word for advance, the 
 cavalry swept swiftly forward towards the Pass, 
 surprising a few Austrians by the way but 
 scattering them easily right and left. They 
 clattered under the keep of ToUenstein, finding 
 Austrian infantry in the Pass. On come the 
 Prussian Grenadiers for a time easily up gentle 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 129 
 
 slopes, then up steeper ones, as they draw near 
 the Keep of ToUenstein, frowning from the 
 crest of its hill. A few minutes more and they 
 sweep round the base of the hill while shots 
 splutter and kill one or two in the ranks. 
 \Miat matter ! The handful qf Austrians fly 
 before the Grenadiers and the Prussian cavalry 
 sweep at last round the base of the hill. The 
 keys of Bohemia have fallen fr6m the girdle of 
 Laudon ! 
 
 All the night of the 31st two companies of 
 Grenadiers stood to arms in the Pass to guard 
 against surprise, while Prussian cavalry pursued 
 the Austrians into the depth and darkness of 
 the woods beyond. But the precantiou was 
 needless, for on the fateful Slst three other 
 Prussian columns, marching op parallel lines, 
 emerged at different points and secured the 
 route for Belling. The most important of 
 these, under MoUendorf, had njarched to the 
 west through the thick forests and over the 
 higher slopes past Nixdorf. Thie woods around 
 there were said to be haunted and to hold 
 strange beasts within their depths, but they 
 surely never held more dreadful monsters than 
 MoUendorf met, fierce Croatian Irregulars. 
 MoUendorf pressed on through the woods over 
 three abattis, and, despite fierce sporadic 
 fighting with the Croats, reached open country 
 beyond Dittersbach. There he encamped for 
 the night, having pushed on farther than any of 
 
 K 
 
130 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 the three other columns. The parallel move- 
 ment of the other columns rendered everything 
 safe, and in the next few days Prince Henry with 
 the main army advanced easily over this ground 
 towards Gabel. The whole had been achieved 
 with very small loss. At Rumburg and ToUen- 
 stein the Saxon-Prussian army lost but four 
 dead and a dozen wounded, the Austrians 
 seventeen dead and thirty-two wounded or 
 prisoners. Fighting there was in this war in 
 which there were far more losses than this, but 
 for importance in result there is nothing to 
 equal it. 
 
 At Rumburg Prince Henry, when he heard 
 of the capture of ToUenstein, must have smiled 
 to think that he had out-generalled the best 
 Austrian leader by a move that was at least 
 as daring as it was unexpected.* His own con- 
 fession shows his appreciation of the feat. 
 " Considering the impracticable roads that we 
 traversed, such as no army ever crossed yet, 
 this expedition might seem rash. That was 
 the very consideration that determined us to 
 undertake it, on the supposition that Marshal 
 Laudon would never believe we would wish to 
 attempt it. This supposition cannot indeed 
 do any wrong to the intelligence we recognize 
 in that Marshal. If the post of ToUenstein 
 had been held by only two battalions, that 
 
 * It is of some interest to note that, in 1866, the Prussian army of 
 the Elbe advanced from Dresden, and did not descend the Elbe, but 
 followed Prince Henry's route over Rumburg. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 181 
 
 would have prevented the army from entering." ' 
 Indeed it seemed a great Prussian triumph and 
 appeared to have opened a way to the heart 
 of Bohemia. 
 
 Just at this very moment poor Maria Theresa 
 was writing in exultation to jNIarie Antoinette 
 in France that " our cruel enerrly " the old King 
 Frederic had been checked for a month, 
 " wliilst from Zittau to Aussig from the side of 
 Prince Henry there is nothing to fear." * The 
 news that Prince Henry had accomplished the 
 unwonted march by ToUenstein and was 
 threatening his flank, not only bewildered Maria 
 Theresa, it almost unmanned Laudon himself. 
 Impetuous in action like a true cavalry soldier, 
 he reasoned quickly as to Prince Henry's 
 designs. The Prince's main army was now 
 in or near Rumburg; his @wn position at 
 Bleiswedel was now untenable^ so that he must 
 evacuate the line of the Elbe altogether and 
 fall back behind the Iser. Prince Henry's 
 advance was cautious and Laudon's retreat 
 speedy, so that the new positioins were occupied 
 without much bloodshed. On August 2 the 
 main body of Laudon's forces reached Hirsch- 
 berg, on the 4th it crossed the Iser and 
 concentrated at Kosmanos. Prince Henry's 
 columns — creeping through the woods from 
 ToUenstein like swift serpents — seized upon all 
 
 * Aupist 8, 1778. Maria Theresa und Marie Antoinette, Von 
 Ameth, Wien (1865), p. 252. 
 
132 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 the positions Laudon evacuated, and were 
 presently gazing at the Austrians over the Iser. 
 Laudon was still nervous and wrote to Joseph 
 in great anxiety, stating (erroneously) that he 
 was outnumbered, and that he had to defend 
 the line of the Iser, a distance of some 90 
 kilometres, with 70,000 men. He thought this 
 feat impossible and complained to Joseph, 
 asking to be relieved or reinforced. But for 
 once Kaiser Joseph proved the better military 
 adviser, and, judging the situation more 
 correctly, wrote with masterly firmness : " Since 
 you have lost ToUenstein, the key-point of your 
 new position is Turnau. Hold that — and both 
 you and we are safe. Lose it — and Prince 
 Henry has everything ; he will join hands with 
 his brother the King, drive you back one way, 
 and us another, and ruin all. After all, too, 
 your (Laudon's) estimate of Prince Henry's 
 numbers is doubtful, a strong Saxon corps has 
 remained behind in Dresden, and eight new 
 Austrian battalions will be sent to reinforce 
 you, and enable you to hold the Iser from 
 Turnau to Semil — at all costs." * Thus Kaiser 
 Joseph directed the dispirited Laudon, both 
 wisely and confidently, in the first week of 
 August, showing alike the great importance of 
 the loss of ToUenstein and of the retention of 
 Turnau. On August 11 the Kaiser actually 
 
 * In fact Prince Henry had only 65,000 ^ectives while Laudon 
 had 70,000. Criste, Kriege, p. 102, prints the letter here summarized. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 188 
 
 visited Laudon in his headquarters at IMiinclicn- 
 griitz, found him in gvvat dejection, and eauic 
 back criticizing both general and army.* 
 
 During the second week of August, just after 
 what Frederic called this " pretty d^but " of 
 Prince Henry, diplomacy suddijnly intervened. 
 But as this negotiation was made behind the 
 back of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, and 
 hardly affected the military situation, it can 
 be noticed later. On August 15 Frederic ended 
 the diplomatic interlude, and all parties braced 
 themselves afresh to a rougher game. There is 
 something rather ludicrous in Laudon's attitude 
 of agonized apprehension behind one bank of 
 the Iser, especially as Prince Henry showed 
 remarkable caution on the other. The latter 
 was sensible as to the great advantage he had 
 gained in the past, but speculative as to the 
 future. He feinted towards Biidin, to pretend 
 that he was threatening Prague," but he intended 
 to take no risks. Even as it was, he put Laudon 
 in great apprehension, caused, him once more 
 to send piteous appeals for reinforcements, and 
 nearly induced him to abandon Miinchengratz 
 and the Iser. Indeed Laudon* actually issued 
 orders to this effect on August 29, and only 
 recalled them when he found the Prussians were 
 retiring.' Prince Henry's mjain object was 
 defensive, to prevent Laudon retaking Gabel 
 (and with it ToUenstein). " Once we lose the 
 roads leading to Lusatia retreat is impossible. 
 
134 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 One does not pass through this neighbourhood 
 unpunished twice." * Prince Henry judged 
 the situation as usual with exquisite accuracy ; 
 he had already risked his army once and 
 achieved an important success. He would not 
 endanger it once more, though it is clear from 
 Laudon's actions from August 26-29 that a 
 slightly more determined action on the part 
 of Prince Henry would have forced the passage 
 of the Iser. But Prince Henry would risk no 
 more : he resolved that any further move must 
 come from Frederic, and this determination 
 shifts the interest to the Prussian King and 
 the Austrian army opposed to him. 
 
 The situation in which Frederic found him- 
 self was indeed a difficult one, and this fact 
 may explain why he had r^nained for five 
 weeks, arms crossed and immovable, glaring 
 at the Austrians over the river, admiring though 
 not emulating the fine exploits of his brother. 
 The King had marched on July 5 through the 
 gate of Nachod, Just as Crown Prince Frederic 
 did in 1866, only to find himself checked by a 
 counterscarp immediately behind it. The old 
 King seems to have been much astonished to 
 find resistance so soon, and in fact appears to 
 have thought that the Austrian concentration 
 was at Olmiitz. In any case, he moved with 
 great slowness in his advance, and his delay of 
 
 * Prince Henry to Frederic, Niemes, August 17, 1778, quoted in 
 Crista, Kriege, p. 97. 
 

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AND KAISER JOSEPH 185 
 
 two precious days enabled the Austrians to 
 strengthen still further their HnVs before the first 
 Prussian reconnaissanee. " floth (Iloheuelbe 
 and Arnau) would in all probability have fallen 
 had not the mareh of the troops, intended to 
 attaek them, been too much retarded." * 
 
 From Arnau to Jaromer stretched a long 
 fortified line held by Austrian troops. The 
 line was less strongly defended between Arnau 
 and Koniginhof, but from the last village to 
 Jaromer stretched a perfect wall of entrench- 
 ments. By Koniginhof the Elbe is very near 
 its source ; it is no wide stream, and its course 
 is not always discernible even from a short 
 distance. Though now fouled, by factories, it 
 was then a clear thin silver st,ream fordable at 
 many points, and flowing between banks which 
 are generally flat and low. It^would have been 
 easy for a Prussian force to cross the stream, 
 but it would have been extremely difficult to 
 secure their landing. From the wooded heights, 
 which rise at a distance of about half a mile 
 on the Austrian side and stretch right from 
 Koniginhof to Jaromer, wejl- placed cannon 
 could riddle any landing pajties. The dark 
 curtain of wood on the Austrian side completely 
 concealed guns and positiorjs, and Frederic 
 knew that the pupils of Daun understood the 
 art of entrenchment. All that, skill in choosing 
 
 • S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, December 1, 1778, Elliot to 
 Suffolk, relying on the evidence of olUc^s taking part in the 
 campaign. 
 
136 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 and fortifying positions, of which Lascy was 
 
 an acknowledged master, had been lavished 
 
 upon this one, 
 
 " The walls made high and broad;. 
 The bulwarks and the rampires large and strong. 
 With cavalieros and thick counterforts." 
 
 Cannon were planted all along the lines, 
 trenches dug, abattis and palisades erected 
 at threatened points, whilst those parts of 
 the river where landings could be effected 
 were defended by triple lines of trenches 
 and by a specially concentrated artillery fire. 
 The whole line had been linked together 
 by special roads running parallel with the 
 stream, an arrangement of very great im- 
 portance, as the roads ran perpendicular to 
 the stream on the Prussian side. Hence, in 
 the case of any attempt to force their lines 
 or turn their position, the Austrian guns, 
 troops, and war material could be moved to 
 a threatened part with the greatest ease, the 
 Prussian only with difficulty. In fact the 
 Elbe — though small in volurrie — ^was almost a 
 better defence than the mountains behind it, 
 and this thin silver ribbon of a stream checked 
 the old King even more effectually than the 
 Iser restrained his brother. For six weeks 
 now the two armies had been watching one 
 another, separated by only a kilometre or two 
 of ground, so near that bullets and cannon balls 
 were frequently whistling and humming across. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 137 
 
 while in the day-tinio the ghnt of stcil was 
 visible, and at night the hundred watch-fires 
 sparkled like fireflies from opposing heights. 
 
 Frederic was never renowhed for patience, 
 and he now played the waiting part with a very 
 bad grace to the accompaniment of much pro- 
 fanity, silent on the part of others, vocal on 
 his own. He censured his officers severely, 
 taught one how to form a camp, with many 
 pungent criticisms, and said, " Go to the devil ! " 
 to a second, who wished to measure a distance 
 by trigonometry instead of by the eye. All 
 shrank from crossing or offending the venomous 
 old King, and his nephew and heir, Frederic- 
 WiUiam, now on his first campaign, earned 
 much commendation for his ridicule of his great 
 kinsman as " old Sourface." To his occupa- 
 tion of reprimanding or satijizing his officers 
 Frederic added others not less characteristic. 
 By his orders the soldiers were* given bread and 
 meat gratis in addition to their usual pay, twice 
 a week they were sold beans very cheaply, and 
 other provisions were on sale at or nearly at 
 cost price. At the same time he increased the 
 already iron rigour of discipline. Later in the 
 campaign, in the camp at Schatzlar, he showed 
 his Athenian side as well, and composed an 
 Eloge de Voltaire, just dead at Paris, whose 
 enmity and friendship alike had contributed 
 so much to his own renown. The dead satirist 
 himself could not have drawn a character in 
 
138 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 fiction more strange or complex than that re- 
 vealed by Frederic at this moment — the first 
 ruler and soldier in the world, brought to a 
 check by leaders of but ordinary talents, and 
 beguiling his time now by cursing his officers, 
 now by handling a secret negotiation, now 
 by improving the food of his men, now by in- 
 creasing their punishments, yet again by writing 
 a copy of bad French verses. His inaction had 
 much effect on both officers and men, to whom 
 " Der Alte Fritz " had been the model of daring 
 and celerity in war, and there was a " great 
 diminution of that confidence in his abilities 
 and enthusiasm for his person which inspired 
 the troops at their outset." * The news of 
 ToUenstein and the final rupture of the negotia- 
 tion with Austria (August 15) at length forced 
 Frederic into action. Unless he now took the 
 initiative the position must become one of 
 stalemate. So long as Kaiser Joseph and 
 Laudon could pivot their forces round the two 
 points of Turnau and Arnau, the Austrians 
 had the advantage of interior lines ; their 
 two armies were safe until the hinge between 
 these two points was broken down. As Prince 
 Henry had declined to cross the Iser to seize 
 Turnau, Frederic must seize Arnau — the 
 
 * S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, Hugh Elliot to SuSolk, 
 December 1, 1778 ; vide also vol. 103, ih. to ib. January 12, 1779. In 
 each case Elliot's accounts are based on reports of participants in 
 the campaign. Until the end of 1778 his knowledge of the campaign 
 had been small ; vide Minto, Memoir of Hugh Elliot, p. 164. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 189 
 
 weakest point of tlie Austrian lines — or abandon 
 the campaign. To Fi'eclevic, tlie forcer of so 
 many lines, the victor over so piany odds, delay 
 in the field had always been distasteful. But 
 though he now (August 15) decided to move, it 
 was not with the old matchless rapidity and 
 energy. He moved cautiously and slowly, 
 very careful of his laurels and (in a nobler wise) 
 careful also of the lives of his mcn.^" But 
 that proud confidence in himself which had led 
 him to so many triumphs or* sacrifices in the 
 past was no longer with him. 
 
 On August 15 Frederic encamped at Burkers- 
 dorf not far from the historic field of Sohr, 
 where long ago he had beaten the Austrians 
 by the happiest combination of daring and 
 fortune. The very ground rhight have given 
 him inspiration. On the 16t,h he thought of 
 forcing Arnau, writing to Prince Henry that 
 his move — if successful — would compel the 
 Austrians to evacuate their lines and fall back 
 on Czaslau, and that he wag almost certain 
 that the Kaiser's army had been forbidden to 
 fight (of course by Maria Theresa) so as not to 
 endanger Joseph's person. ^^ Frederic's move 
 was not unobserved, Austrian forces at Arnau 
 were hurriedly strengthened. Kaiser Joseph 
 himself came riding up to the post of danger. 
 Frederic saw the reinforcenicnts advancing, 
 judged the task too arduous, and held his hand, 
 writing to his brother that "this place is the 
 
140 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 most devilish of the whole neighbourhood." 
 Again there was manoeuvre, march and counter- 
 march, and on August 27 the two armies faced 
 one another near Oels, Frederic with 60,000, 
 Joseph with 70,000 well entrenched. Once 
 again the old King declined battle. 
 
 After these happenings there was only one 
 thing possible for either Prussian army. Neither 
 leader was willing to risk his men in any further 
 venture, but retreat was a sore humiliation for 
 both. The country could afford no further 
 sustenance for either army, disease was working 
 sad destruction, Frederic had already lost over 
 10,000 men by sickness or desertion.^^ In 
 September retreat became inevitable for both, 
 and in this hard decision Prince Henry again 
 took the lead. At the beginning of the cam- 
 paign Frederic had suggested that the Prince's 
 line of retreat should be by Leitmeritz and up 
 to the Elbe, thus enabling him still to live at 
 the enemy's expense. Later the King had 
 indicated the more direct retreat over Zittau 
 as desirable, but Prince Henry now adopted 
 the original suggestion. The retreat by Leit- 
 meritz was, to use the military term, an 
 eccentric one, and involved a change of base. 
 It had the advantage of still further exhausting 
 the enemy's country, of eating it bare. It 
 was not very hazardous in any case, and its 
 unusual character might deceive Laudon. On 
 September 10 the main force of Prince Henry 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 141 
 
 began its retreat, yet, though he executed it 
 with skill, his movements wne not those which 
 should have bi-en unnoticed or unharasscd by 
 a leader of unshaken nerve.* There were 
 extraordinary difficulties to encounter; the 
 weather was stormy, and the roads, at no time 
 good, were now streaming with mud and almost 
 impassable, so that horses sank to the hocks 
 and waggons to the axle. Heavy guns fre- 
 quently stuck in the morasses, and the labourers 
 of the country-side were requisitioned to haul 
 them out with ropes and cart-horses, the cavalry 
 had to dismount and lend; their chargers. 
 Hundreds of putrefying horses, scores of men 
 dead or fallen from exposure, shattered waggons, 
 and abandoned weapons marked the line of 
 retreat. When Prince Henry; reassembled his 
 forces at Dresden, he found that he had lost 
 in the campaign, of which the most important 
 engagement counted 16 casualties, nearly 8000, 
 or about one - eighth of his complete force. 
 Information or presence of mind must have 
 been terribly lacking to Laudon at this time, 
 for he completely neglected the opportunity of 
 displaying his old vigour in harassing Prince 
 Henry's retreat. 
 
 The retirement of Frederic was not so 
 difficult, since his route was very much shorter 
 and more direct. It began on September 8, 
 
 • The Saxon part of the army retreated by way of Zittau, whither 
 Laudon followed them, thinking them the main army. 
 
142 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 but Frederic halted near Schatzlar and re- 
 mained there composing his ode to Voltaire, 
 until he received news that Prince Henry had 
 reached Saxony. Again the Prussian retreat 
 showed the same difficulties and losses in 
 execution, the Austrian advance the same 
 hesitation. Several rearguard fights took place, 
 in which Wurmser on the one side and Prince 
 Frederic - William on the other distinguished 
 themselves much, but, despite the entreaties of 
 Hussar Officers and the almost open murmurs 
 of his troops. Kaiser Joseph sternly forbade 
 all determined attempts to harass the retreat. 
 After all, the great general might be luring the 
 Austrians to their destruction, and the genius 
 loci was unfavourable in a neighbourhood 
 where the Prussian King had vanquished 
 Austrian armies in the past. The terrible 
 renown of Frederic, garnered on a hundred 
 fields, still protected him in failure as it had 
 once done in success. 
 
 Though some of the troops murmured at the 
 close of the campaign, it was no small triumph 
 for an Austrian army, unaided by any other 
 Power, to have rendered it impossible for the 
 greatest of living generals to winter either of 
 his armies in Bohemia. During all the wars 
 of the last forty years Austria had never by 
 herself forced an enemy to evacuate her 
 territory in the first year of invasion. Kaiser 
 Joseph perhaps did not think of this feat as 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 148 
 
 a triumph, for he was ahiiost in despair at the 
 cruel svifferings inflieted on the pc asants in tiie 
 country oeeupied by tlie Prussians. In the 
 matter of requisitions Prince Henry and his grim 
 brother "did not their work neghgently." " 
 But, deeply as Joseph felt for his peasants, it 
 may be doubted whether tlieii- sufferings were 
 not avenged by the blow to Frederic's military 
 renown. As. with curses on his lips and rage in 
 his heart, the old King turned- his back upon 
 Bohemia, he at least had lost much of what 
 was as dear to him as was his cottage to a 
 Czechish peasant. He who had always been 
 first in the field and famed fdr his lightning 
 speed in action had at last been brought to a 
 standstill by the pupils of Daun, that general 
 he had so often derided and defeated. The 
 astonishment of the world was immense, the 
 Arnau-Jaromer lines anticipated Valmy, and 
 first taught Europe that Prussian grenadiers 
 could be resisted. 
 
 Skirmishes of one kind or another went on 
 through the winter, and till tlie beginning of 
 March of the next year, but for all practical 
 purposes the war ended with the retreat of 
 Frederic from Bohemia. It is. not altogether 
 easy to criticize the chief movements of the 
 campaign because so little was actually accom- 
 plished. The initial blunder seems to have 
 been made by Frederic in dividing his two 
 armies in about equal parts. The result was 
 
144 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 that both he and Prince Henry were opposed 
 by armies whose numerical strength was almost 
 on an equality, while they had the great addi- 
 tional advantage of acting upon interior lines. 
 By a brilliant manoeuvre Prince Henry suc- 
 ceeded in turning Laudon's flank and forcing 
 him back on the Iser, but even this stroke did 
 not relieve the pressure on Frederic or deprive 
 the Austrian armies of their advantages of 
 position. The fact is that Frederic's original 
 plan seems to have been based on the idea that 
 one part of the Austrian force intended to ad- 
 vance on Lusatia — and so to threaten Berlin.^* 
 To prevent this design he sent Prince Henry 
 into Saxony with a sufficiently strong force to 
 take them in flank. It was not till after the 
 opening of the campaign that Frederic dis- 
 covered his mistake and found the main 
 Austrian army entrenched within a few miles 
 of the Silesian frontier, instead of dispersed 
 over a line from Koniggratz to Moravia. As 
 he very early discovered the difficulty of forcing 
 the lines at Arnau, his only real chance would 
 have been either to effect a formidable diversion 
 in Moravia, or to spur Prince Henry on to 
 further efforts against Laudon. Eventually 
 he did neither, he sent only detachments to 
 Moravia and good advice to Prince Henry. 
 
 In spite of his briUiant exploit Prince Henry 
 is really open to some criticism, for Laudon's 
 orders for evacuating the Iser line on August 29 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 145 
 
 show that a bold offensive on his part 
 would have been succissful. If Laudon had 
 been foreed from the Iser, the position of 
 Kaiser Joseph at Arnau-Jaromcr would have 
 become untenable, and deeisive results for 
 Prussia must certainly have followed. The 
 risk in such a move is admitted, but it was the 
 risk that a commander of genius would have 
 taken. The difference between the ideas of 
 Prince Henry and Frederic on such a question 
 are admirably seen in a correspondence be- 
 tween them in January 1779. Prince Henry 
 then remonstrated with Frederic on some of 
 the dispositions for the coming campaign as 
 rash, calling up precedents of the fatal temerity 
 of Villeroi at Ramillies, of Cumberland at 
 Eontenoy, and of the Austriaij Prince Charles 
 at that victoire la plus inoiiie of Leuthen. 
 Frederic replied tartly that it was not rashness 
 but bad dispositions of troops or bad choice 
 of ground which made these cpmmanders fail. 
 "La guerre et la nobless (sic) ne vont pas en- 
 semble ; quiconque n'cntreprend rien aprds 
 avoir bien refl^chi sur sa besogn.e, ne sera jamais 
 qu'un pauvre sire. Voila ce que nous dit 
 Texp^rience et I'histoire de toiites les guerres. 
 C'est un grand jeu dc hazard, oh celui qui calcule 
 le mieux gagne k la langue." * The two letters 
 outline sharply tlie difference between a general 
 
 • SchOning, pp. 252, 254. Letter of Trince Henry, February 17, 
 of Frederic, February 10. 
 
146 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 of talent and one of genius. It would be diffi- 
 cult to better Frederic's teaching, but in this 
 campaign the leader had done nothing at all, 
 and Prince Henry had won fresh laurels, though 
 he had declined to make just that last bid for 
 victory which would have given him immortal 
 fame. He had not done what Frederic would 
 infallibly have done, had he been in his place 
 and a few years younger. Frederic now was 
 content to utter wise military saws after the 
 time for decisive action had passed. 
 
 But if Frederic was no longer the Frederic 
 of Leuthen, still less had Laudon proved the 
 Laudon of Kunersdorf. Always a little un- 
 certain, Laudon had now been almost con- 
 temptible, and no one can be surprised at the 
 comparative neglect into which he fell for a 
 decade. Maria Theresa had e-^en wished to dis- 
 miss him, but this action had been prevented 
 by Kaiser Joseph.^^ Prince Henry alone of 
 the old heroes of the Seven Years' War had 
 enhanced his reputation. Never losing a 
 chance, nor risking too much, this man of 
 exquisite talent had outshone the two men of 
 genius. As for Lascy and Kaiser Joseph their 
 parts had been simple but creditable enough, 
 and if they were no more than respectable 
 tacticians they had proved at least excellent 
 administrators. The troops had been well 
 organized and handled, the provisions good, 
 the entrenchments strong, the enemy's loss 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 147 
 
 must have been \vtll over 20,000 nun. For all 
 this the main credit rests with Lasey, but some- 
 thing also falls to the Kaiser, until then untried 
 in the Beld.i* However muek he deferred to 
 the judgment of Lasey in militalry affairs, Joseph 
 could not, from his very nature, be a mere cipher, 
 and, in any case, he had done much to restore 
 the nerve of Laudon at the critical moment 
 after ToUenstein, and shown discretion and 
 judgment by insisting upon the' retention of the 
 Iser and of Turnau. That he was over-anxious 
 about exposing the homesteads of his peasants 
 and the persons of his soldiers to danger was 
 an amiable weakness, which is explained by his 
 regard for the welfare of both.*' Moreover, 
 even though the army grumbled at the close 
 of the campaign, Joseph had done much to 
 break the tradition of Austrian defeat and to 
 restore the military spirit. If he feared to ex- 
 pose his men, he at least did not fear to expose 
 himself, and when men saw a Kaiser sleeping 
 on the bare ground covered only with a cloak, 
 found him fraternizing with his men and some- 
 times sharing their food, or saw him riding 
 boldly where bullets were whistling, their 
 general feeling was voiced by the soldier's 
 utterance, " Why should I fear when the crown 
 of my sovereign is as exposed as my cap ? " * 
 On the whole the campaign well earned its 
 
 • Of. a similar saying of Josepii's ofQcet'i about their Kaiser's 
 conduct under fire in this campaign in Calonnc, Notes sur la vie de 
 Joaei II, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 27,487. 
 
148 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 nickname of the Potato or Plum War, because 
 the soldiers of each side devoted more time to 
 stealing and deserting than to fighting, and 
 Joseph spoke with as much truth as wit when 
 he said in August, " The King of Prussia stays 
 here to forage and I to recruit." It is the 
 classic instance of the war of positions, of 
 manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre. None the 
 less it was destructive to the Prussian army, 
 and, though no battles were fought, the story 
 of Prince Henry's bold seizure of Tollenstein 
 and the mystery of Frederic's inaction are well 
 worthy of military study. It is the more to be 
 regretted that Laudon's superb intuition at 
 the beginning of the campaign' was not put into 
 practice. His design to join forces and crush 
 Frederic in the early days of the campaign was 
 a dazzling opportunity, but, considering all, 
 perhaps one which the cautious Lascy and the 
 Kaiser were right to reject. When had Frederic 
 ever cared till now for superiority of numbers, 
 above all, what reinforcement to the Prussian 
 army was the renown of Frederic himself at 
 the beginning of this campaign ? Napoleon 
 estimated his personal presence on the battle- 
 field as equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 
 men, and the cautious Wellington endorsed 
 this view.i* When one remembers how often 
 Frederic had triumphed over odds, how his 
 name was one of fear to all Austrians and of 
 pride to all Prussians, it seems hard to estimate 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 149 
 
 it at much less. At least, at the beginning 
 of the campaign his soldiers would not have 
 done so, when they leaincd that battle was at 
 hand, and watched the old King riding down 
 the lines in his faded blue aind red uniform, 
 the bent figure still firm in the saddle, the 
 famous crook-stick in his hand, and the thin old 
 eagle-face once more alight with the glow of 
 battle. 
 
 Prince Henry had done enough in this 
 campaign, King Frederic far more than enough 
 in a score of others, for the assurance of their 
 renown, and for them were to be no more the 
 chances of defeat or of victory: For Lascy and 
 Kaiser Joseph, as by a sort of tragic retribution 
 for their momentary success, the near future 
 held military disgrace and shame. As for 
 Laudon, the man of genius ^hose reputation 
 had sunk most in this campaign, he was to 
 know once more the joy of battle and the rap- 
 ture of victory, and gloriously to redeem his 
 fame. Ten years from now, when Austria's 
 hopes were at their lowest, and when his head 
 was already white, Laudon was to rival the 
 most famous exploit of Euge,ne, and to enter 
 Belgrade amid the thunder of guns and the 
 triumphant shouts of his soldiers. Te Deums 
 in countless churches, the prayers and the 
 blessings of thousands were t6 be his, and the 
 humbled and dying Joseph was to salute him 
 as the Generalissimo of all his armies. But 
 
VI 
 
 A XEUTRAL STATE IN AN EIGHTEENTH 
 CENTURY WAR 
 
 BAVARIA DURING AND AFTER THE WAR 
 
 (1778-1779) 
 
 Der Ehre schhne GBtUrlust, 
 
 Die, wie ein Meteor, verschwindet. 
 
 Goethe. 
 Honour's godlike joy. 
 The meteor that a moment dances. 
 
 The story of Bavaria from December 30, 1777, 
 to the Peace of Teschen is the story of her 
 Elector Karl Theodor, whose shifts, turns, 
 and doublings exhibit the hapless condition of 
 a minor state and ruler when forced into the 
 current of great events by thte action of great 
 Powers. The diplomatic morallity of an age is 
 most apparent in the treatment accorded to 
 minor states, for a great state always has some 
 claim to justice because it has some show of 
 force behind its pretensions. In the eighteenth 
 century the ruler of a minor state found it 
 difficult to retain his own conscience, or to 
 hold any one else to an obligation ; and ever 
 
 since December 30, 1777, the impossibility of 
 
 101 
 
152 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 doing either of these things had become 
 apparent to Karl Theodor. 
 
 Though destiny was to expose him to the 
 ridicule of mankind, Karl Theodor was not 
 without merits either as a man or as a sovereign. 
 His portrait shows his character — ^the forehead 
 high, the nose hooked and prominent, a chin 
 coarse and sensual, but redeemed by a tolerably 
 firm mouth and by sharp kindly eyes which 
 peep from beneath high black brows. His 
 face is the very image of an artistic epicurean, 
 who took life easily and yet like Chesterfield 
 could be serious when occasion demanded. 
 Though his supper-parties were as gay as those 
 of Louis Quinze, though his admirers called 
 him " the first cavalier in the Holy Roman 
 Empire," he was no trifler in the science of 
 government or in the patronage of the arts. 
 He had introduced business methods and strict 
 supervision into the finances of the Palatinate, 
 and was a methodical and skilful administrator. 
 He had devoted the money thus saved to 
 industry, to learning, and to the arts. He had 
 encouraged commerce by cutting canals, by 
 improving the roads and by starting a porcelain 
 factory. He was himself well read in the 
 classics, the patron of such men as Lessing and 
 Schiller, the devoted friend of learning, and the 
 founder of an Academy of Science and Literature 
 at Mannheim (1766). As Heidelberg had been 
 ruined by the wars, he had fixed his capital at 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 158 
 
 Mannheim, whicli he etnbcllislied with line 
 buildings, and sought to nmi<c' the home of the 
 arts and the Athens of the Rhine. Landseape 
 gardens, pictures and statuary abounded in 
 the capital, but it was for music that it was 
 most renowned. The opera was famous, the 
 ballet and the orchestra were the best in 
 Germany, and both owed nearly everything 
 to the personal supervision and support of 
 Karl Theodor. lie was a weU-read, polished 
 and refined man of the world, and though a 
 strict Catholic by no means a bigot. His sub- 
 jects had long ago acknowledged their obliga- 
 tions to his learning and taste, and he had 
 certainly governed the Palatinate with more 
 discrimination and success than Max Joseph 
 had achieved in Bavaria.^ In foreign policy 
 both princes were ineffective, but it is an irony 
 of history that the internal policy of the last 
 Bavarian Wittelsbach should be acknowledged 
 as admirable, \\ hile that of hi.s able and more 
 cultured successor is forgotten or denounced. 
 
 \Miatever had been the abilities or character 
 of Karl Theodor, his situation after December 
 30, 1777, was one in which ev^en the profound 
 politician might have failed. His choice lay 
 between a balance of opposite humiliations. 
 There was the menace of Austria on one side, 
 on the other that of Zweibriicken — backed by 
 Frederic. Worst of all, each side had incriminat- 
 ing documents by which they could publicly 
 
154 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 prove his duplicity ; in particular Zweibriicken 
 had a whole array of family compacts and 
 agreements by which he could establish that 
 Karl Theodor had sworn to keep Bavaria 
 indivisible. In 1766, 1771, 1774, as also in 
 connection with the will of Max Joseph, Karl 
 Theodor had solemnly pledged himself to the 
 late Elector in writing not to alienate or cede 
 any part of Bavaria — when he inherited it. 
 On August 5, 1777, Karl Theodor had made 
 a similar written agreement with Zweibriicken, 
 in which each party agreed to do nothing with- 
 out the other. Immediately afterwards Karl 
 Theodor began secretly negotiating with Kaiser 
 Joseph and Kaunitz in an exactly opposite 
 sense.^ The death of Max Joseph revealed 
 these numerous perjBidies. On December 30, 
 1778, Karl Theodor's representative at Munich 
 made a solemn oath and proclamation that his 
 master would accept the Bavarian heritage 
 undivided. Four days afterwards his repre- 
 sentative at Vienna signed an equally solemn 
 agreement with Kaunitz to divide it and to 
 cede a third of that heritage = to Austria, On 
 January 4 Karl Theodor arrived in Munich 
 and was invested with the whole Bavarian 
 heritage, which he swore to keep intact. On 
 January 14, after a show of reluctance, he 
 agreed to divide it by ratifying the Austrian 
 Partition-Treaty. On January 15, Austrian 
 troops invaded Bavaria without meeting any 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 155 
 
 resistance from his soldiers. J^lumours of tfu- 
 Partition -Treaty (details of which were not 
 public till the third week of February) had 
 greatly excited the people in Munich. Even 
 that pitiful mediaeval shadow, the Committee 
 of the Estates, remonstrated with the new 
 ruler, and scathing pasquinades attacked his 
 ministers as well as the Emperor, whose slave 
 Karl Theodor appeared to b6. When he ac- 
 cepted the Golden Fleece from Kaiser Joseph, 
 it was regarded as the badge? of disgrace and 
 the price of treachery. Despite severe punish- 
 ments the satires redoubled, and at least one 
 really humorous piece of doggerel appeared : 
 
 " In other times the woolly Fleece 
 AY as profit to the Shearer, 
 The Sheep from Shearer gains increase 
 In our quite novel era." 
 
 One of Karl Theodor' s first measures had 
 been to expel almost all the Bavarian ministers 
 and introduce Palatine ones, the chief being 
 Vieregg, a man of whom " even his friends 
 rather choose to dwell upon the praise of 
 his private virtues than public capacity." * 
 Neither such measure nor such ministers 
 were calculated to win Bavarian hearts, Karl 
 Theodor's unpopularity was unhappily pro- 
 moted as much by his good actions as by his 
 
 * Vieregg appears to have been appointed by Karl Theodor to the 
 direction of his foreign policy, becmiBc he was a pliant man who could 
 be easily coatrolJed ; vide Karl Obscr, MitI, fUr Ost, Gcsclt. Bd. xviii. 
 489, xix. 844. 
 
156 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 bad ones. He had brought with him De 
 Hompeche, who was made President of the 
 Chamber of Finances. This individual was 
 " said to have merit as a Financier, he was 
 soon proved to possess all the unfeelingness 
 of one ... by his little menagement of indi- 
 viduals in the regulations which have taken 
 place. Reforms without doubt were necessary, 
 but they might have been made with a more 
 distinguishing hand. Many Families being now 
 reduced to Misery ; the Pensions granted by 
 the late Elector to some of his Favourites with- 
 drawn, and even those given to the Natural 
 Children of the Emperor Charles VII. greatly 
 diminished." * Considering that Karl Theodor 
 had bartered a third of Bavaria for a pension 
 to his own bastards, it was unfeeling to be 
 niggardly to those of his predecessors. Further 
 projects for a more equitable scheme of taxa- 
 tion thoroughly alarmed the nobles of Bavaria, 
 who were to be made to share some of the 
 financial burdens with the people. Even the 
 people were not conciliated, because they were 
 threatened with a system of universal military 
 service. So great was the alarm occasioned 
 by these wider plans that even trifling reforms 
 were viewed with suspicion. An effort to 
 reform the discipline of the troops caused 
 frequent desertions and general dissatisfaction. 
 
 * Quoted from S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. .113, Munich, 
 January 22, 25, 29, February 12, 22, April 23 ; Ratisbon, July 10. 
 Eden to Suffolk. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 157 
 
 Discontent was apparent cvcFywhcre, and the 
 national and popular rtscntnvnt at I5;ivaria's 
 humiliation was greater than could have been 
 imagined.* 
 
 Unfortunately for Karl Theddor his arbitrari- 
 ness at ^Munich could not conceal his subservi- 
 ence at Vienna, and even the rhost unobservant 
 noted his deference to the Imperial Commissary. 
 Kaiser Joseph had indeed sent him the Order 
 of the Golden Floccc, but otherwise treated him 
 with great contempt. Joseph, began by viol- 
 ating the Treaty of January 3, and sending 
 Austrian troops into parts of the Bavarian 
 territories not ceded in that agreement. In 
 February he for a moment showed a desire 
 for still more ambitious projects of exchange 
 than that in the Partition- Treaty, and dangled 
 before Karl Theodor's eyes the prospect of a 
 crown and kingdom in Galicia, in return for 
 further Bavarian territory to Austria. When 
 this scheme dropped, the Kaiser, who had pre- 
 viously guaranteed neutrality to Karl Theodor 
 in case of war, actually tried to force him 
 to join Austria at the end of April. This 
 proposal was more than eveft Karl Theodor 
 could endure, and he refused in spite of the 
 severe pressure which was put upon him. 
 Perhaps he was not altogether uninfluenced 
 by the fact that his soldiers, would probably 
 have refused to fight for the Austrians.* 
 
 Karl Theodor quite realized the importance 
 
158 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 of gaining over his nephew and heir, Charles 
 of Zweibriicken, to his Partition- Treaty. Ac- 
 cordingly on January 22 he wrote a private 
 letter to the Duke of Zweibriicken, informing 
 him that he had done the best he could for 
 the honour of himself and the safety of his 
 country, and that, in accepting the Treaty 
 of January 3, he had yielded to superior force. 
 With a judicious disregard of the pensions to 
 his bastards, he declared that he had paid more 
 attention to the common interest than to his 
 own, and finally urged his nephew to forgive 
 him.* It remained to be seen whether his 
 nephew would accept this explanation. 
 
 A great deal of high policy was now to depend 
 upon the decision of an obscure country squire, 
 whose chief occupation was hunting, and who 
 ruled a territory no bigger than an English 
 estate. Zweibriicken had his own plenipoten- 
 tiaries with the great Powers, and his favour 
 was courted by three great sovereigns. It was 
 to the King of France that he inclined, for a 
 long residence in that country had made him 
 an ape of its methods and ideas. He wished 
 to turn Zweibriicken into a miniature Versailles, 
 and had chosen a petty Du Barry for himself in 
 the shape of Madame d'Esebeck, the wife of his 
 chief adviser. He copied Lo,uis XV. both in 
 vice and in extravagance, and for the last 
 reason became not only the imitator but the 
 pensioner of France. The receipt of an annual 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 159 
 
 income from Louis X\'I. of 300,000 livres made 
 him a political as woU as a financial subordinate. 
 But, though idle and extravagant, he was not 
 entirely contemptible. His portraits show a 
 stout, dark-t, yed man, with a sensitive mouth 
 and chivalrous bearing. He; was admitted 
 to have a sense of honour that was high in that 
 age, and he was to show considerable firmness 
 in the crisis. 
 
 The news of Max Joseph's dekth reached him 
 on January 31, 1778, while out hunting at 
 Zweibriicken, but he did not immediately 
 come to Munich, The initiative was taken 
 by the all-observant Frederic, who at once sent 
 off an emissary (Count Eustace Goerz) first 
 to Munich to see Karl Theodor and, if possible, 
 to wean him from Austria. If that scheme 
 failed Goerz was to work on the elements of 
 opposition in Munich, and to use every effort 
 to prevent Zweibriicken acceding to the Parti- 
 tion-Treaty. Goerz divided his time between 
 Regensburg and Munich. In the latter city he 
 found a congenial ally in Maria Anna, the 
 Dowager Duchess of Bavaria, who had been 
 bitterly opposed to any partition of the country, 
 and was ready to use any means to defeat 
 and discredit Karl Theodor.** She possessed 
 
 • This Dowager Duchess is not to be confounded with Max 
 Joseph's widow, the Dowager Electress. Maria Anna was a daughter 
 of the Palsgrave Karl von Sulzbach, and had married (act. 15) Duke 
 Clement of Bavaria. The latter had been, nearest heir of Max 
 Joseph, but had died in 1770 at the early age of forty-one. 
 
160 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 valuable advisers in three Bavarian patriots, 
 Andre, her confidant, and Obermayer and Lorij, 
 who were both Privy Councillors. These com- 
 municated much secret intelligence to Goerz, 
 which was of the greatest value to him at this 
 crisis.^ 
 
 On February 6 Goerz suddenly returned to 
 Munich incognito, and took up his residence 
 in a summer-house in the grounds of the 
 Duchess. That evening he held a secret con- 
 sultation with her and with Zweibriicken, who 
 had just arrived in the capital. On February 7 
 Zweibriicken, primed by their instructions, 
 went to see Karl Theodor at his palace, and 
 discussed the Partition- Treaty in the presence 
 of the Austrian minister Lehrbach. The inter- 
 view was satisfactory to neither party, and on 
 February 8 Goerz, from his hiding-place, wrote 
 exultantly to the Dowager that Zweibriicken 
 was safe, and would do nothing without consent 
 of France or Frederic. Events followed fast ; 
 on February 14 Zweibriicken politely declined 
 the Golden Fleece, which Kaiser Joseph had 
 sent him ; on the 28th he definitely refused to 
 sign the Partition- Treaty.* Early in March he 
 submitted a lengthy appeal to the Diet, in 
 which he proved that Karl Theodor had been 
 false to four separate agreements, that the 
 
 * On the day before (February 27) Zweibriicken had received a 
 friendly letter from Louis XVI., confirmingihim in his resolution and 
 promising the continuance of his pension. Cp. Reimann, Preuss, 
 Gesch. ii. 74-75. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 161 
 
 Partition-Tivaty was in defiance of the peace of 
 Wcstplialia, and lliat the Kniyer was ossailing 
 the liberties and riglits of Ilavavia. On Mareh 
 16, in full session of the Germanic Diet, King 
 Frederic added to Zweibriiclien's claim the 
 formal weight of his authority and the real 
 support of his sword.'' 
 
 As has already been described, the effect of 
 these manoeuvres was to give the complete 
 moral victory to Frederic. During the summer 
 this advantage was mercilessly pressed home 
 by the Bavarian Dowager, by Frederic, and by 
 Zweibriicken, who incessantly itispired Bavarian 
 discontent with Karl Theodor, and sent anti- 
 Austrian pamphlets and protests to the Diet, 
 The account of these communications may 
 be shortly summarized. In December 1778 
 Frederic published a copy of the secret letter 
 of Karl Theodor of January 22, 1778, to 
 Zweibriicken (in which he admitted that he 
 had signed the Treaty of January 3, 1778, 
 under compulsion). An even more deadly 
 blow was dealt on the advice of the Dowager 
 and her Bavarian councillors. Austria claimed 
 Lower Bavaria in virtue of Albprt's Investiture 
 of 1126. Frederic now published to the Diet 
 that Albert had formally reno\|nced this claim 
 in 1429, and that the original Act of Renuncia- 
 tion still existed. If it did n©t, Zweibriicken 
 asserted that the Austrians had destroyed it. 
 This was a bombshell. It was in vain that the 
 
 M 
 
162 FREDERIC THE QREAT 
 
 Austrian ministers shuffled and declared at the 
 Diet that the Act of Renunciation was a 
 forgery. The Dowager Duchess and her ad- 
 visers had plausible proofs that the Act had 
 existed : two highly respectable witnesses were 
 brought forward by them to swear to its exist- 
 ence, or at any rate to the existence of authentic 
 copies but a few years before. Clear evidence 
 was advanced to show that the archives at 
 Munich had been badly kept of recent years, 
 and strong suspicion was levelled against 
 Austrian diplomats of having purloined or 
 destroyed the original document. Heathcote 
 did not scruple to suggest that Austria would 
 have purloined the original if it had been 
 to advantage ; Suffolk, with less insinua- 
 tion, mildly described the Prussian arguments 
 as " unanswerable ".* ® Unquestionably, the 
 Dowager and her advisers had worked behind 
 the scenes with deadly effect. Throughout the 
 whole period Zweibriicken stood firm claiming 
 his inalienable rights, while Frederic's repre- 
 sentatives at the Diet and in the press brought 
 forward their solemn and convincing proofs 
 of the utter worthlessness of Austria's claims, 
 impugned her good faith, and injured her 
 reputation. All the evidence was not mar- 
 shalled till the beginning of 1779, but in the 
 first half of 1778 there was already enough to 
 
 * S.PJ'. Archives, vol. 45, Ratisbon, July 26, Axigust 5, 23, 
 September 6, 13, 23, Heathcote to Fraser. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 168 
 
 bring deep discredit alike upon Karl Thcodor 
 and Kaiser Joseph. On October 21, 1778, the 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna dared to tell 
 Prince Kaunitz that the RusSian Government 
 adhered solely " k I'opinion g6n6ralemcnt re- 
 pandue et accr^dit^e du peu de validity des 
 pretentions de la Cour de Vienne." * The 
 Dowager had aimed her shaft well. 
 
 It is time to return to Karl] Theodor. Diffi- 
 culties of all kinds threatened the hapless 
 Elector, nor is it at all surprising that he proved 
 unequal to the crisis. Even Morton Eden, 
 forbidden by the " respect due from individuals 
 to persons of his elevated rank " to coincide 
 in the many censures passed on his conduct, 
 could not find that in a " political light " his 
 character bore " any marks of qualities either 
 good or striking." Under the stress of his 
 anxiety the spirits of poor Karl Theodor had 
 already given way by April 23,; 1778 ; he " grew 
 pale and his legs swelled." By November 1 
 not only " his body but his le'gs and his hands 
 considerably swelled." [Truly a plague of 
 sorrow and sighing it blows a man up like a 
 bladder.] " He shows an ajv-ersion to busi- 
 ness (which yet he formerly loved) ... he 
 is haunted by a perpetual anxiety ; ... he 
 drinks every evening to excess." It is small 
 wonder that he sought to dissipate his cares, 
 but it is rather surprising that at this stage 
 
 ♦ Martens, Sbomik, IxV. 76. 
 
164 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 there should have come to him " a kind of 
 dawning conviction that he has acted with 
 imprudence and precipitation, if not even with 
 weakness and impropriety." " His Electoral 
 Highness appears to regret the lost affections 
 and confidence of his subjects, he finds himself 
 coldly served by his ministers ; and, above all, 
 he is said to be extremely concerned at that 
 silent contempt, with which he is treated by 
 the very Monarch (Frederic), who has drawn 
 the sword in his cause,* By this last circum- 
 stance he is more particularly affected, as it is 
 not alleviated by any attention shown either 
 to his person or sentiments (eVen at this critical 
 conjuncture) by the other Powers of Europe. 
 I am assured, that he has very lately in con- 
 fidence complained of this neglect with great 
 bitterness, adding these strong expressions : 
 ' Je ne desire pas mieux, que de sortir de 
 I'embaras [sic], oh je me trouve — mais que 
 faire ? on me laisse seuL' This article of being 
 left alone (by which His Electoral Highness 
 means the not having any foreign minister near 
 him to whom he could explain himself, and who 
 should be authorized to hear him), joined to the 
 impolitic insolence of behaviour adopted by 
 
 * Frederic's comment to Goerz was, " Quaut k I'EIeoteur Palatin, 
 il faut I'abandonner entiferement h, son sort, p'est son propre ouvrage 
 . . . apr^s I'extreme foiblesse qu'il a eue de se laisser emb6guiner 
 par la Cour de Vienne, ce, seroit [sic] peine perdue que de vouloir 
 seulement tenter de la ramener." — February 12, 1778, Goerz, M^. 
 Hist. Frankfort, 1812, p. 109. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 165 
 
 the Austrian minister (Lehrbach) at Munich, 
 has principally contributed to o\Kn his eyes 
 to the error of his conduct. Add to all this, 
 that the total disregard paid by the Imperial 
 Court to his repeated representations relative 
 to the one and twenty bailliagcs (the keeping 
 possession whereof is a manifest injustice even 
 upon the principles of the Treaty of the 3rd of 
 January) has made him tremble for the certainty 
 of that establishment of his natural children, to 
 secure which was perhaps one of his principal 
 motives, which induced him to sign it. I ought 
 not to omit remarking, that it is on this side 
 undoubtedly, that the Elector Palatine is the 
 most vulnerable ; and the only person, to 
 whom, during my stay at Munich I saw him 
 address himself with any appearance of pleasure, 
 was his (illegitimate) daughter the Princess 
 Isembourg." * The whole scene would be one 
 of comedy were it not for a certain pathos 
 running through it, which makes it a classical 
 illustration of the way in which great Powers 
 may deprive small states andt their rulers first 
 of territory, then of dignity, and last of respect. 
 After operations in the field closed in- 
 decisively in September 1778, Kaiser Joseph 
 sought help on every side for the ensuing 
 campaign of 1779. Accordingly, in the third 
 week of November Lehrbach, the Imperial 
 
 * S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 110, Eden to Suffolk, July 
 10, 1778. S.P.P. For. Arch. Bavaria, vol. 45, Ratisbon, November 
 8, 1778, Heathcote to Fraser. 
 
166 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 minister at Munich, again renewed the question 
 of Bavaria's neutrality and tried to force the 
 Elector to depart from it. Lehrbach's argu- 
 ments were of the simplest. He produced 
 statistics (not in point of fact accurate) to 
 show that in the coming campaign Prussian 
 forces would be greater than those of Austria, 
 ergo Bavaria must join the Igitter and violate 
 her neutrality. This demand Karl Theodor 
 had again firmness enough to refuse, but 
 Lehrbach then pressed him to vote in the forth- 
 coming Diet against the reunion of Ansbach 
 to Prussia. To this request the Elector at 
 first yielded.' Then after consideration he 
 began to doubt, he had already repented his 
 partiality to Austria, and now she was evidently 
 weaker than before. At last he came under the 
 influence of better counsels, of the polite Vieregg 
 who had at length become anti- Austrian, 
 and of Kreittmayr the Chancellor, who had 
 always held these views, though he had been 
 afraid to express them until now. Finally, 
 Karl Theodor revised his decision, and informed 
 Lehrbach, with some firmness, that he would 
 take his own course without previous engage- 
 ment or pledge. 
 
 Though he had not been free from vacillation 
 or weakness even in this last negotiation, Karl 
 Theodor emerged from it without much loss. 
 He had only broken one promise, had shown 
 relative dignity, and for a moment must have 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 167 
 
 enjoyed an unwonted feeling of self-respect. 
 But the negotiations for pcauc, which bcTfaii 
 to be seriously discussid at the end of I lie ycai-, 
 forced him in the end to drjnk even deeper 
 draughts from the cup of humiliation than those 
 to which his misfortunes had driven him of 
 evenings. His conviction that he had been 
 the dupe of Austria led him to play a more 
 independent part ; he succeeded only in making 
 an original and characteristic" though by no 
 means an impressive, appearance. First of all 
 his representative arrived at Teschen without 
 powers and instructions, and the whole Peace 
 Conference was kept waiting' while a special 
 courier was despatched to Munich to procure 
 them. The instructions which arrived were 
 startling enough, because they contained Karl 
 Theodor's refusal to satisfy the allodial claims 
 of Saxony by a payment of four million florins, 
 and asserted that he would not pay more than 
 one million. This resolution very nearly broke 
 the Congress, because Frederic thought that 
 Karl Theodor took this bold stand with the 
 collusion of Austria, and possibly of France. 
 The chancelleries were alarmed, peace hovered 
 in the balance, and Frederic despatched a 
 courier to Vienna demanding a categorical 
 answer as to whether or no the Viennese Court 
 would guarantee the Saxon claims to the four 
 millions. Their Imperial Majesties at Vienna 
 replied evasively to Frederic, approving though 
 
168 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 not guaranteeing the Saxon claim, and de- 
 cisively dissociating themselves from any 
 concert with Karl Theodor. The last part of 
 this answer sufficed once again to discredit 
 the unfortunate Elector. For a moment he 
 had impressed the Congress, because it was 
 thought that one, or even two, great Powers 
 stood behind him. Directly it was realized 
 that only his own opposition was in question 
 he was disregarded.^" 
 
 The difficulty, which was raised by Karl 
 Theodor in this case, was probably due to the 
 fact that he had not been sufficiently consulted 
 in the settlement of the preliminaries, in which 
 there was another article that he was prepared 
 hotly to contest with his nephew of Zweibriicken. 
 This was the arrangement by which Austria 
 yielded up her pretensions to Bavaria, on 
 condition of the cession of Burghausen to her. 
 As Karl Theodor had signed an agreement in 
 1778 to cede one-third of Bavaria to Austria 
 it seems a little difficult to see why he should 
 refuse to sign one in 1779 which ceded only 
 one-sixth of his territory. His heir, the Duke 
 of Zweibriicken, had indeed more reason for his 
 protest and his indignation, and the Duchess 
 Dowager of Bavaria now advised him to refuse 
 consent to the cession of Burghausen and 
 appealed to France. Zweibriicken's friends 
 drew up a plan to regulate, his conduct at 
 Teschen, which described Karl Theodor as 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 169 
 
 the slave of Austria, nnd insistnl on tlic in- 
 divisibility of Bavaria. The* paper was sent 
 by Zwoibriickcn to the Freiich and Russian 
 reprcscntativis at the Congress. Both replied 
 evasively, advising him to " apply to the 
 Elector Palatine for some gratilieation, by way 
 of indenmifying tlie loss, "\\*hich a country, 
 where His Highness was the presumptive Heir, 
 was going to suffer by the Cession to be made 
 to the House of Austria : promising in case of 
 necessity , . . mediation and support " ! The 
 Duke decided to ask Karl Theodor for the 
 Principalities of Neuburg and Sulzbach, " or, 
 if that was thought too exorbitant . . . the 
 sum of 300,000 German Crowns, and demanded 
 these by a Courier who arrived in Munich 
 on April 6th." " The Elector received this 
 despatch whilst at dinner, and, for the first 
 time throughout the whole business of the 
 Bavarian Succession, betraydd strong marks 
 of surprise and indignation." His nephew had 
 already plagued and insulted him sufficiently, 
 and poor Karl Theodor seems to have thought 
 it the worst insult of all, that,the Duke — after 
 objecting to a division of Bavaria among 
 foreigners — should wish to divide it among 
 legitimate kinsmen. At any rate he returned, 
 the very same afternoon, in a; letter "couched 
 in language sufficiently warm, a flat and 
 positive refusal to comply with so unreasonable 
 and ill-timed a request." " 
 
170 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Karl Theodor was in future so indignant 
 with Zweibrucken that it was thought extremely 
 probable that, despite all his numerous pledges 
 to the contrary, he might '"' dismember the 
 remainder of the Bavarian Succession in favour 
 of his illegitimate children." So Zweibrucken 
 spared no pains to get an article inserted in the 
 Treaty of Teschen, which would bind the 
 elastic Karl Theodor to fulfil the pledges of 
 the Pacts of 1767, 1771, and 1774, and leave 
 his estate indivisible. This object he eventu- 
 ally attained, and an article to that effect was 
 inserted in the Treaty, ^^ so that even if Karl 
 Theodor broke his thrice - pledged word, he 
 could be brought to order by the two foreign 
 guarantors of the Peace of Teschen, and by the 
 Germanic Diet as a whole. Such an obligation 
 even Karl Theodor was unable to elude, and 
 the solemn treaty compulsion laid upon him 
 yet one more humiliation. It had needed all 
 the German States and two foreign Powers to 
 reconcile the two kinsmen to" an arrangement 
 to which they had both agreed on August 5, 
 1771. Never was there greater justification 
 of Swift's savage epigram : " Alliance by blood 
 or marriage is a frequent cause of war between 
 princes, and the nearer the kindred the greater 
 is their disposition to quarreL" 
 
 After the end of the negotiations at Teschen 
 it might have been thought that the Elector 
 would sink into insignificance, but he was 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 171 
 
 destined, for a moment, again to startle the 
 diplomatic world. In June 1779 the great 
 Powers learnt with astonishment that three 
 distinguished Bavarians had been seized, and 
 imprisoned under the authority of lettres de 
 cachet issued by Karl Theodor." Of these 
 Andr^, the special confidant and friend of the 
 Dowager Duchess of Bavaria,- was conducted 
 as a prisoner of state to the castle of Rothen- 
 burg ; Obermayer and Lorij, also her advisers 
 and both Privy Councillors, were deprived of 
 their rank and emoluments, their papers seized, 
 and the one exiled to Ambej-g, the other to 
 Xeuburg. All Munich was thrown into con- 
 sternation and alarm by this act, and Prussia 
 immediately and peremptorily remonstrated. 
 However, for once Karl Theodor stood on firm 
 ground; he was not to be intimidated, and 
 treated Frederic's angry rerhonstrance with 
 indifference. He punished the three offenders 
 in question, because they had principally con- 
 tributed to the discrediting of Austria's claim to 
 that part of Bavaria ceded to her in his Treaty 
 of January 3, 1778. It was they also who had 
 ehcouxaged Zweibriicken in his attitude of 
 stern and steady condemnation. One of the 
 many ironies which befell Karl Theodor was 
 that he was now punishing the men who had 
 discredited Austria in 1778, though he himself 
 was bitterly at variance with her in 1779. The 
 simple truth is that he punished somebody in 
 
172 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 order to gratify his general resentment at the 
 hundred humiliations to which he had been 
 subjected. It must have been some satisfac- 
 tion to him to hurt the feelings of the Dowager, 
 to insult Zweibriicken, and to defy King 
 Frederic. Towards Andre, the special con- 
 fidant of the Dowager Duchess, Karl Theodor 
 soon showed signs of relenting, perhaps from 
 fear of Prussia. He released him speedily, and 
 allowed him to go to a country house of the 
 Duchess near the Tyrol. However, Andre was 
 soon recommitted, because some of his papers 
 fell into the hands of Karl Theodor and re- 
 vealed the extent of his secret transactions. 
 The last mention of the fate of these men is on 
 September 19, 1779; Andre's sentence, it was 
 thought, would be irrevocable, Obermayer and 
 Lorij still remained in enforced banishment.*^* 
 Having accomplished all which Karl Theodor 
 set off for the Rhine, to visit his opera and 
 his ballet -girls at Mannheim, very glad to 
 leave the new dominions where he had experi- 
 enced so much degradation, unpopularity, and 
 failure. 
 
 As he left Munich for Mannheim Karl 
 Theodor might well have reflected upon the 
 
 * S.P.F. For. Arch. vol. 45, Heathcote to Fraser, September 19, 
 1779. Lorij had much to do with founding the Academy of Sciences 
 at Munich. After his exile, when asked by the Government to write 
 an historical introduction to a book on coins, he replied that he could 
 only do so if he consulted archives at Munich. He never saw his 
 beloved city again and died at Neuburg in 1787. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 178 
 
 vory singular result which his latest action 
 would produce upon his Bavarian subjects. 
 For the three men whom he hiid imprisoiird or 
 exiled were precisily the three most popular 
 men in Bavaria. They had done more than 
 any other Bavarians to expose the designs of 
 Vienna, to avert the Partition^, and to reduce 
 Austrian acquisitions from one-third to one- 
 sixth of Bavarian territory. Their reward for 
 these services was imprisonment, exile, or 
 disgrace, from the hand of one who had sacri- 
 ficed the interests of Bavaria to those of Palatine 
 bastards. To this unhappy pass was the small 
 state in Germany brought by the weakness of 
 a ruler and the injustice of the great Powers. 
 On the whole situation the words of the English 
 representative may serve as a fit comment and 
 conclusion, in the style of the old Greek chorus : 
 " Well may it therefore create just matter of 
 astonishment, that they, whose labours have 
 so principally contributed to save their country 
 from ruin, should meet with* a recompense, 
 which the rectitude of their intentions gave 
 them so little reason to expect." 
 
 " It is impossible to describe the consterna- 
 tion and discontent, which the issuing of these 
 lettres de cachet has occasioned at Munich. No 
 one is secure of his liberty a moment ; and by 
 a combination of circumstances, strange to 
 conceive, each individual feels himself obliged 
 to tremble for his safety, in proportion as he 
 
174 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 thinks he has discharged the duty of a faithful 
 servant to his Master." ^^ 
 
 Any one in high position who was known to 
 be opposed to Karl Theodor became popular 
 with the Bavarians. The Dowager was saluted 
 as a heroine and her name was blessed through- 
 out the land, while her councillors became the 
 martyrs of the people. Zweibriicken was 
 praised for his firmness and applauded when- 
 ever he came to Munich. King Frederic even 
 attained the dignity of a saint in the land 
 which he had declared to be peopled by 
 fiends and swine. On one occasion the Watch 
 stopped and presented arms before Frederic's 
 picture in a shop window ; the anniversary of 
 his birthday was celebrated in Munich with 
 illuminations, dinners, and dances. Peasants 
 in the country erased the last name in the 
 famous prayer beginning, " Jesus, Maria, 
 Joseph" and replaced it by that of Frederic, 
 and prayed before his picture as before that of 
 the Virgin. The passionate national feeling 
 of the Bavarians found its output in these 
 strange ecstasies, because it could have no 
 reverence for their foreign prince, whose refined 
 tongue could not be reconciled to their speech, 
 and whose foreign policy was so ominous for 
 their future. It was an obvious expedient to 
 lay all the blame on the shoulders of Karl 
 Theodor. Yet this execrated ruler gave to 
 Munich the most beautiful of its gardens, and 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 175 
 
 to Bavaria an improved system of finance and 
 the beginnings of a national army. But despite 
 everything the Bavarian people suspected, and 
 rightly, that Karl Theodor did not care for them, 
 and would exchange Bavaria for the Nether- 
 lands without a pang, if ever the opportunity 
 came. Therefore the nation loaded his name 
 with curses, mourned the less competent Max 
 Joseph as a great ruler, and made a Joan of 
 Arc out of Maria Anna, and a Barbarossa out 
 of Frederic. A score of years later, when the 
 hapless Karl Theodor lay gasping on his death- 
 bed, the churches remained empty, and the news 
 of his death was the signal for public rejoicings. 
 For it was a son of the steadfp,st Zweibriicken 
 who now became Elector, and who was one 
 day to be the first King and the most popular 
 ruler that the Bavarian land had known. 
 
VII 
 
 THE PEACE OF TESCHEN AND RUSSIA'S 
 ENTRANCE INTO GERMANY 
 
 . (1778-1779) 
 
 Solemn Majesties all . . . on thrones rich as Ormuz with their treaties, 
 war-treaties . . . and finance-schemes . . . not to speak of innumer- 
 able little German Dukes, mith their sixteen quarterings, their stiff 
 Kammer Herrs and thick quilted ceremonials', — Good Heavens, they are 
 gone like ghosts and with an unmusical screech. — Cablyue. 
 
 To a war which had produced no decisive 
 results succeeded a peace which was to bring 
 forth many. The first essays at negotiation 
 had been originated by the womanly fears of 
 Maria Theresa, even before the war had well 
 begun, and with unhappy results. In the 
 direction and control of war those women who 
 have been great rulers have rarely showed to 
 advantage, however great their subtlety or 
 wisdom in time of peace. Elizabeth of England 
 sent at least one worthless lover to command 
 her armies, Catherine of Russia sent many, 
 Maria Theresa — no unworthy rival of either 
 in greatness — outdid them also in littleness. 
 
 176 
 
FREDERIC THE GREAT 177 
 
 Having entrusted her darling son with the 
 command of her army, she first suggested that 
 it should not fight a battle so as not to endanger 
 his person, and then negotiated secretly behind 
 his back with the enemy. Criticism of Maria 
 Theresa's statesmanship in this or any particu- 
 lar might be reckless, were it hot for the fact 
 that she is herself her sternest, judge. In her 
 agonized letters to Marie Antoinette during this 
 time she over and over again confesses that her 
 mother's love, her anguish and foreboding for 
 the fate of Joseph and his two brothers, now 
 confronting the " wicked man " — " our cruel 
 enemy " — have completely robbed her of all 
 statesmanlike instincts. Her sole anxiety is 
 to see her darling sons safe back from the war, 
 and to this consideration she has sacrificed 
 everything. " I draw on myself the shame of 
 great pusillanimity — I confess it, my head 
 turns ; my heart is long since already 
 withered." * It was indeed only ten days after 
 the war began that she wrote with her own 
 hand to King Frederic, without the knowledge 
 of Joseph, offering terms of peace, and making 
 a personal appeal to his honour. It was on 
 July 16 that she wrote this* appeal to the 
 honour of one of whom she had written but two 
 months before (May 17) that " no prince in 
 Europe had escaped his perfidies." Frederic 
 
 • Maria Theresia und Marie Antoinette, Btiefwechsel von Arneth 
 (Paris, 1865), p. 254. 
 
 N 
 
178 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 was not unwilling to negotiate, but he was not 
 the man to be generous, to fail to take advantage 
 of divided counsels, secret negotiations, of a 
 mother's love or a son's ignorance. In the 
 interval preceding direct negotiation Prince 
 Henry obtained his startling success at ToUen- 
 stein, and Kaiser Joseph learned of Maria 
 Theresa's secret diplomacy with mingled wrath, 
 amazement, and despair. The Austrian nego- 
 tiator appointed to discuss definite terms with 
 Frederic was Baron Thugut — a favourite of 
 Maria Theresa's and one day to be Chancellor 
 of Austria — " plain, unaffected, and steady," 
 said Keith, but hardly tactful enough for so 
 delicate a negotiation. The terms which he 
 eventually offered to Frederic at the conference 
 of Braunau (August 13-15) were that Austria 
 should retain a part of the Bavarian Succession 
 productive of about a million florins revenue 
 a year,* give equivalents for any further claim, 
 and arrange due settlement for the whole in the 
 Aulic Council. In return the- Austrian Court 
 promised to make no opposition to Frederic's 
 succession to the Margravates of Ansbach and 
 Baireuth. These proposals were not such as 
 Frederic was likely to favour ; he was resolved 
 to settle the question of the succession of 
 Ansbach entirely without reference to Austria. 
 
 * This was interpreted by Thugut as a line stretching from 
 Kufstein along the Inn to Wasserburg over Lankvat, Mildenau, and 
 Retz to Waldmiinchen. Possession of this territory would have 
 united Austria to the Tirol and Italy. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 179 
 
 It was not only that the raising of this question 
 was inconvenient for Prussia, but that, by 
 doing so, she would confess that the Bavarian 
 Suecossion was to be regulated, not according 
 to principles of law but according to the 
 doctrines of bargains and equivalents. There- 
 fore to Frederic, eitlicr as Prussian King or as 
 defender of the rights and liberties of the 
 Germanic body, this proposal was inadmissible. 
 As for Austria's existing claim to Bavaria, 
 he saw no real alteration in her demands ; she 
 still desired the strategic command of too large 
 a part of Bavaria. Last of all, being already 
 in the field, Frederic thought, himself justified 
 in insisting upon more, rather than upon less, 
 of his original demands.^ Accordingly, on 
 August 16 he broke off furtlier negotiations, 
 and Thugut returned to Vienna. It is by no 
 means clear that Frederic's action was wise, 
 because Austria had more to lose over the whole 
 matter by delay than he had. Joseph was 
 naturally enraged, so that it led to a breach 
 with his mother — " a little humour " as she very 
 euphemistically called it to Marie Antoinette. 
 The whole negotiation had been a complete 
 failure, and Maria Theresa bewailed in secret 
 to her sympathetic daughter how much this 
 step of directly addressing " our cruel enemy " 
 had cost her.* 
 
 The negotiation at Braunau, though ill- 
 
 • Maria Theresia und Marie Antoinette, Arneth, p. 258. 
 
180 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 timed and rash, marks a highly significant stage 
 in Austrian policy. Ever since the Partition 
 of Poland (1772) the influence of the unscrupu- 
 lous Kaunitz and the autocratic Joseph had 
 been the main forces in the foreign policy of 
 Vienna. The proceedings at the Diet of 1776, 
 the negotiations over the Partition-Treaty of 
 January 3, 1778, and the subsequent diplomacy 
 until the end of June evidently bear the impress 
 of the ruthless diplomat and the impetuous 
 Kaiser. Now, for the first time since 1772, 
 comes a revolt on the part of Maria Theresa, 
 and with it a return to less harsh methods, 
 a recognition of the moral opinion of Europe, 
 of the rights of treaties and obligations, which 
 is quite foreign to the policy which had intimi- 
 dated Karl Theodor. The concessions offered 
 and the attitude assumed at Braunau conspired 
 with the logic of events to support Maria 
 Theresa. Had France shown any desire to 
 assist, had Kaiser Joseph won a decisive victory 
 in the field, he and Kaunit:2 might have re- 
 covered their ascendancy, readopted their 
 drastic methods of settling the Bavarian Succes- 
 sion, and adhered to the Partition-Treaty of 
 January 3. The result of the campaign was 
 not indeed discreditable to Austria, but it was 
 not such as to permit her statesmen to adopt 
 this attitude of proud assertion. The poUcy 
 of force had failed, and with it. fell the Partition- 
 Treaty of January 3. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 181 
 
 During July, AuEfust, and September rela- 
 tions bctwotu Austria and Prussia liad been 
 fvuthcr cmbittcrt'tl by an angry wrangle at 
 the Diet, which had continued to sit at Regens- 
 burg during the war. The dispute concerned 
 Albert's Act of Renunciation of Lower Bavaria, 
 which the representatives of Austria pro- 
 nounced with passion to be forged, and that 
 of Prussia asserted, with reason, to be genuine. 
 After the Braunau negotiations and the in- 
 decisive campaign, Austrian policy entered a 
 new phase. The first results were secret and 
 were seen in an appeal to France to act as 
 mediator. On August 20 the Cabinet of Ver- 
 sailles addressed a letter to their minister (M. 
 Haussen) at Berlin, which outlined a scheme 
 and offered French mediation to secure it.* 
 Frederic replied unfavourably, and a month 
 afterwards Austria disclosed the course of 
 negotiations and renewed her offer to Germany 
 as a whole. On September 23 the members 
 of the Diet received a Representation and 
 Request from Austria. The; Imperial Court 
 described the Braunau negotiations, and men- 
 tioned their desire for a satisfactory peace, 
 and their willingness to submit their claims to 
 the judgment of the Diet. It then explained 
 its new proposals (which had already been 
 made to Prussia by French mediation). For 
 the sake of public tranquillity, Austria formally 
 renewed the offer to the Germanic Diet as a 
 
182 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 whole. The Imperial Court was ready to 
 restore and evacuate all Bavarian territories, 
 to abrogate the Partition-Treaty, provided that 
 there the Prussian King renounced the succes- 
 sion to Ansbach and Baireuth. Finally, the 
 Diet of the Empire was asked to interpose its 
 good offices to persuade Frederic to accept 
 these terms .^ 
 
 The Josephine policy of force, which rode 
 roughshod over existing rights, was thus suc- 
 ceeded by the Theresan one of conciliation and 
 respect for the old order. At any rate this 
 was the first impression upon the members 
 of the Diet, All the minor states naturally 
 desired peace, because, so long as there was war, 
 their neutrality and their existence were equally 
 endangered. The Austrian " Representation " 
 now suggested to them that it was Frederic, 
 and not Joseph, who was now standing in the 
 way of peace, and therefore it was regarded 
 as a " Master stroke in Politicks " at Vienna, 
 and such for the moment and for the Diet it 
 was. Frederic, who had risked so much for 
 the general interest, now seemed to be acting 
 adversely to it by refusing to negotiate on these 
 terms. In truth he was somewhat hardly used, 
 for his succession to Ansbach had no direct 
 bearing on the Succession to Bavaria, but 
 Austria had manoeuvred so cleverly as to bring 
 it under discussion. The proposal was indeed 
 hardly ingenuous, because, if Frederic were 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 188 
 
 induced to resign his claim to Ansbach it would 
 be by moral pressure, whenas, force alone had 
 induced the Court of Vienna to resign its eluini 
 to Bavaria. Frederic had sacrificed much for 
 the common cause, yet, if he did not give up 
 Ansbach, he might incur the; full odium and 
 blame of prolonging the war and seeking his 
 own ends. " After having announced himself 
 as the Protector and Defender of the Germanic 
 System, he may (over and above the expenses 
 he has incurred) find himself reproached, de- 
 serted, perhaps attacked {sic) even by his 
 friends, as the grand enemy and disturber of 
 the Publik TranquiUity." A curious reversal 
 had taken place in the partSk which he had 
 played as the Defender, and Kaiser Joseph 
 as the Invader, of the Rights of the Empire.* 
 
 Thus, by a clever diplomatic manoeuvre, 
 Austria had placed Frederic in a somewhat 
 dangerous situation. However, he was not 
 ^vithout resources or sympathy,.his combinations 
 had already been working for his advantage, 
 and he was to be rescued from this quandary by 
 his ally, who had deserted him at the beginning 
 of the war. He had felt strong enough to 
 reject the French mediation in August, for the 
 French army was not to be feared. There was 
 only one Power in Europe which could inter- 
 vene with effect at the moment — a Power already 
 gaining vastly in importance, Still more in its 
 sense of importance, under the- direction of the 
 
184 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 most whimsical, vicious, and brilliant woman 
 then living. Catherine the Great of Russia was 
 herself a German princess by birth, and her 
 friendship and alliance with Frederic had 
 heightened her interest in German affairs. 
 During the early months of 1778 she had been 
 daily expecting an ultimatum from Turkey, 
 and therefore had neither the power nor the 
 desire to interfere in Germany. By the middle 
 of the year this danger had passed, and she 
 had leisure to contemplate the politics of the 
 West. France was now at war with England, 
 and therefore unable to interfere in Germany 
 with effect, so that a dazzling prospect opened 
 for Catherine. Campaign and negotiation had 
 each failed to produce any real change in the 
 balance of power between Austria and Prussia, 
 but, if Catherine intervened and offered her 
 good of&ces to bring about peace, she might 
 be the mediatrix of Germany and the arbitress 
 of the West. Half a dozen years before, 
 Austria and Prussia had interfered with her 
 regulation of Poland ; it would be a fine return 
 to interfere with their regulation of Germany. 
 The glory of the part she designed to play, the 
 consciousness of the strength given her, alike 
 by her armies, by her reputation, and by the 
 voices of her flatterers, strengthened her desire 
 for fame and her confidence of success.^ 
 
 The idea of a Russian mediation had crossed 
 the minds of diplomatists before the outbreak 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 185 
 
 of war, and, singularly enough, it had been 
 stimulated, perhaps even suggested, by a diplo- 
 matic ruse on the part of Frederic. Catherine 
 and her ministers had denied that the war with 
 Austria formed a casus joederisAn their alliance 
 \vith Prussia, but had openly expressed their 
 sympathy with Frederic's attitude in the 
 Bavarian question. To the general surprise 
 Frederic had shown himself aterse from their 
 interference, and had even dropped his usual 
 practice of communicating to them his diplo- 
 matic plans — more especially' those relating 
 to the negotiations of Bavaria.. The vanity of 
 Catherine, and of Count Panin IJier minister, was 
 stvmg by this apparent neglect and clumsiness 
 on the part of Frederic. In rea:lity the shrewd 
 old King had played a master-stroke, apparently 
 with full intention and calculation. His in- 
 attention commanded attention ; roused their 
 activity and directed their irnmediate glance 
 to Germany. In the meantime Frederic won 
 over to his side by many promises — and " lured " 
 on Prince Potemkin with the expectation of 
 the Duchy of Courland — the brilliant and power- 
 ful favourite of Catherine. Frederic had also 
 an ally in the Grand Duke Paul, Catherine's 
 son, who maintained a great admiration for 
 him, while the tears of the Grand Duchess, and 
 the persuasions of Potemkin, helped to decide 
 Catherine and Panin upon interference.* 
 
 The result of these manoeuvres soon ap- 
 
186 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 peared. Prince Kaunitz had been living in 
 a fooFs paradise, for he had been assured at 
 the beginning of the campaign that Russia 
 did not regard the Bavarian War as a casus 
 foederis. Hence he communicated the Repre- 
 sentation and Request to Petrograd, and asked 
 for the good offices of Russia, in conjunction 
 with those of France. His suggestion coincided 
 — or rather actually interfered — with Russia's 
 design for intervention, and Panin showed his 
 annoyance. He answered the Austrian over- 
 ture at first ungraciously, hinting pretty strongly 
 that, under certain circumstances, Russia might 
 become a party in the war herself.' Shortly 
 afterwards a corps of 30,000 Russians was 
 ominously moved into West Poland in the 
 direction of Austria. Before Kaunitz had done 
 wondering at this startling move of Russian 
 diplomacy, Frederic had turned not only his 
 own but Austria's ally to good account. " Not 
 content with having secured to himself the 
 certain assistance of Russia, in case of a con- 
 tinuation of the war, he attempted a step still 
 more difficult, but in which it should appear 
 he has proved equally successful : that of 
 creating a mistrust between France and Austria, 
 and renewing the coolness which had so long 
 subsisted between France and Russia. For 
 this purpose, he took advantage of the senti- 
 ments the Court of Versailles expressed to him 
 in the month of August, and in answer to their 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 187 
 
 offer of becoming mediators, said he was ready 
 to accept their mediation, as he sliould be that 
 of the Empress of Russia, in ease she should 
 think proper to propose it, I^rance, convinced 
 that the King of Prussia acted on sure grounds, 
 and desirous, from every kind of reason, of 
 drawing towards this Court, immediately made 
 here (Petrograd) the proposals of the joint- 
 mediation, and as in consequence of the King 
 of Prussia's advice a similar offer had been 
 sent from hence to Paris (fbe two couriers 
 actually crossing on the road), it was accepted 
 without hesitation ; no time was lost in making 
 their mutual intentions known to the Court of 
 Vienna." * With the exception of the last 
 sentence Harris's account may serve as a true 
 picture of Frederic's feat, and §hows the clever- 
 ness with which this old King, though brought 
 to a dead halt in war, found his way out of 
 his difficulties by diplomacy. Some time neces- 
 sarily elapsed before the joint-mediation could 
 be arranged ; Kaunitz, baffled and furious, was 
 a little brusque in his communications with 
 Petrograd ; ^ Catherine and her foreign minister 
 Panin were not on the best terms with Ver- 
 sailles. Catherine, womanlike, showed a good 
 deal of caprice, impatience, and hesitation, 
 according as her fancy favoured Panin the 
 lukewarm or Potemkin the ardent friend of 
 Frederic. However, she was clear - sighted 
 enough to see that J'rance could not be very 
 
188 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 effective as a mediator if she was engaged in war 
 with England, and that the real glory of interven- 
 tion would belong to Russia. In the first week 
 of November France made known to Petrograd 
 her willingness to act as co-mediator.^" The 
 only stipulation which she made in consenting 
 to act as co-mediator, was that each mediating 
 Power should act as umpire, not as ally. The 
 stipulation was to be fairly observed by France 
 but hardly by Russia ; the one was to be a weak 
 judge, the other a strong advocate. 
 
 French diplomacy was not content with a 
 stipulation for guiding the mediators, it laid 
 down also a principle for guiding the media- 
 tion, which is so characteristic of the age as 
 to deserve attention. In the present state of 
 affairs in Germany, when Force is opposed to 
 Force, the original rights can have no effect, 
 and any discussion of them could only tend to 
 prolong the war : " Que la Convenance et non 
 les Droits reels des Parties interessees devroit 
 faire la Base de la Negotiation." "A most 
 extraordinary principle to be laid down by the 
 chief guarantor of the Peace of WestphaUa," 
 rightly commented Elliot." Austria seems 
 quite willing to have adopted this view, indeed, 
 by introducing the Ansbach question into pre- 
 vious negotiations, had expressly committed 
 herself to doing so, and Prussia, though more 
 hesitatingly, seems to have acceded. It was 
 Just as well that some protest should be made 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 189 
 
 against principles, which appeared to dissolve 
 society into its natui'al eknients in order to 
 rearrange them according to the system of the 
 Balance of Power. To France the dissolution 
 of the Germanic Empire, which she had done 
 so much to accomplish in the past, could hardly 
 appear an evil, but to both England and 
 Hanover it was naturally the worst of calami- 
 ties, for it endangered the security of the one 
 and the existence of the other. Hence English 
 diplomacy was induced to adopt a line in 
 accordance with high international morality, 
 a Une, it must be admitted, not always to be 
 discerned in her policy at this period. From 
 the Enghsh representative at Regensburg came 
 an even more impressive indictment than had 
 come from EUiot.* " Much reasoning has 
 been advanced . . , derived from the notion 
 of a certain Ballance of Power. The partizans 
 of the Imperial Court have continually urged 
 the necessity of setting bounds to the aggrand- 
 izement of the House of Brandenbourg, those 
 of Prussia have not less insis.ted on the same 
 necessity against that of Austria ; and both 
 have been forward to hold forth this mode of 
 argument, as more conclusive and more likely 
 to influence the general vote, than any plea of 
 real right founded in the justice of their re- 
 spective pretensions. This lajiguage has been 
 
 * SJ'J'. Archives, Bavaria, vol. 45, RatisboD, Heathcote to 
 Frascr, November 15, 22, 1778. 
 
190 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 heard with too much complacency. It has 
 been forgotten, that the Germanic Body is 
 a PoHtical System, whose basis rests on Laws 
 and Treaties ; Laws, made by universal con- 
 sent, and Treaties guaranteed by some of the 
 principal Powers of Europe, and that conse- 
 quently it is to these Laws and these Treaties, 
 and to these only, that all reasoning relative 
 to this System, is to be referred, and, by which 
 every Dispute arising therein ought to be 
 decided. From this just and only true point 
 of view the States of the Empire have been 
 artfully diverted ; and, wandering from the 
 remembrance of their own inherent conse- 
 quence, have been led to think and act, as if 
 the only object they had or ought to have in 
 view was to ballance the Court of Berlin against 
 that of Vienna. But this is surely a Doctrine 
 by no means adapted to the spirit or the 
 interests of the Germanic Constitution, for 
 it not only exposes the members of this Con- 
 stitution to be the indiscriminate supporters 
 or opposers of any cause whatever, whether 
 just or unjust, but is utterly subversive of every 
 principle and every tie, on which their Political 
 Dignity and even Existence ultimately depends. 
 Its influence, however, notwithstanding this 
 obvious reflection, has been but too general ; 
 so much so, that when the Empress-Queen in 
 her last Negotiation with the- King of Prussia 
 offered to keep possession of such an extent of 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 191 
 
 territory only, as should pro{l.ucc a revenue of 
 one million of florins per annum, and that hjj 
 xvay of equalling the acquisition which the 
 Prussian Monarch would make in the Mar- 
 grnviates of Ansbach and Baircuth, many did 
 not scruple on that very account to pronounce 
 the proposal reasonable." "- It is so unusual 
 to hear the wind of moral indignation sweep- 
 ing through the diplomatic chancelleries in the 
 eighteenth century, that such sentiments de- 
 serve emphasis. They were adopted by the 
 Home Government, and so far as England's 
 weight went — unfortunately no great distance 
 — it was flung into the scale, of establishing 
 rights by law and by precedent, not by pre- 
 tension and power. 
 
 The adoption or rejection of the sentiments 
 of morality depended apparently on the joint- 
 mediators, but in fact upon Russia. France 
 was a guarantor of the Treaty of Westphalia, 
 but at war with England at the moment ; 
 Russia was for the first time, introduced into 
 German affairs, and behind her negotiators 
 stood the vast mass of the Russian army. 
 France could not go to war for her ally Austria, 
 Russia could for her ally Frederic. Breteuil, 
 the French negotiator, was a shrewd and able 
 diplomat, with moral force o^ly behind him ; 
 Prince Repnin was not only the Russian Pleni- 
 potentiary, but had 30,000 troops under his 
 command. That fact was the essential differ- 
 
192 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 ence between the two mediators. Catherine, 
 herself one of the finest of diplomats, thoroughly 
 understood the situation, and used every art 
 to enhance the Russian influence and procure 
 the Russian triumph. Her sentiments were 
 seen in her long instruction sent to Prince 
 Repnin (October 22, 1778), whom she had 
 chosen as Russian Plenipotentiary in the coming 
 Congress. Catherine showed a strong Prussian 
 bias, denounced the claims of Austria as against 
 law and justice, blamed Joseph for his violence 
 in invading Bavaria, and for the shock given 
 to all the smaller Powers, and praised Frederic 
 for his attempt to maintain the rights and 
 liberties of the Germanic Empire. Panin had 
 already written that " Germany, as much by 
 its position as by its power, is the centre of all 
 the affairs and all the interests of Europe," 
 and that every change in its constitution con- 
 sequently affected all other nations. Catherine 
 drove home this view in her instruction, and 
 added that the maintenance of the existing 
 Germanic Constitution accorded with Russian 
 interests. Austria must therefore be informed 
 that Russia could no longer remain an in- 
 different spectator. Catherine did not intend 
 to enter too deeply into juridical questions, 
 though she thought a general support and 
 flattery of the minor German potentates was 
 desirable. Neither England nor France, at 
 war with one another, could, well oppose the 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 198 
 
 Russian lead. " In this way wc shall have 
 the honour, in the eyes of all Germany, of 
 liaving produced the ncctssary denouement, 
 and perhaps even of having united many 
 princes in one system. This result will produce 
 for Russia the advantage it has so long desired, 
 of being named Guarantor for the future of 
 the Germanic Constitution, a position to which 
 France owes its preponderant influence in 
 affairs." As, however, it was dangerous to 
 allow the war to continue, and as flattery and 
 moral sentiments might not stop it, Russia was 
 prepared to give substantial aid to Frederic, and 
 to enforce peace by sending an auxiliary army 
 to assist Prussia in the spring. Nothing, how- 
 ever, was to be risked, for Catherine still feared 
 a Turkish invasion. The Russian army was 
 not to join Frederic in Silesia^ but would only 
 make a diversion in Galicia and Lodomeria.^' 
 The whole instruction is a masterly state- 
 paper, full of shrewd insight and cool calculation. 
 It must have given Catherine exquisite pleasure 
 to think that she, the once= despised petty 
 German princess, was now as Russian Empress 
 about to mediate between the two greatest of 
 German sovereigns. 
 
 A subsequent confidential note from Panin 
 to Repnin made it quite clear that Russia was 
 determined to exact a price for. her aid. Panin 
 said Frederic had rejected too sharply Kaunitz' 
 suggestion that Austria should make her with- 
 
 o 
 
194 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 drawal from the Partition-Treaty contingent 
 on her recognition of Frederic's succession to 
 Ansbach-Baireuth. Austria must receive some 
 slight compensation to soothe her vanity. 
 Repnin was to start from " the principle of giv- 
 ing something," and not too much, and always, 
 be it carefully understood, in return for the con- 
 firmation of Frederic in the Ansbach-Baireuth 
 Succession.!* The policy of high virtue and 
 justice was thrown over altogether, that of 
 equivalents and expediency was dominant. It 
 looked as if it was to be one of the old Con- 
 gresses, where 
 
 " Diplomats' dinners take place in fine weather, 
 And they cut up their mutton and Europe together." 
 
 In fact, the whole negotiation was to turn on 
 the question of how large a slice of Bavarian 
 mutton Joseph was prepared to accept. 
 
 On November 19 Prince Repnin, as repre- 
 senting the Czarina, left Petrograd ; he reached 
 King Frederic at Breslau in December. On the 
 19th he opened negotiations on the basis out- 
 lined by Catherine, and promised the support 
 of an auxiliary Russian corps in the next cam- 
 paign. Prince Repnin had been commander 
 of the 30,000 Russians who had been moved in 
 the direction of Lublin by the Austrian border 
 in November. He now left his army behind, 
 but had the same policy as then, for his character 
 was " by no means gentle.'* Frederic took 
 care to flatter him much, but he could not have 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 195 
 
 found all his communications agreeable, thougli 
 glad to find that Repnin held the Austrian 
 demand for over a third of Bavaria to be un- 
 tenable. But if Frederic was a little annoyed 
 ■svith his ally, his resentment Was as nothing to 
 that which Austria had for France. Through- 
 out the war the French policy had been not 
 unjustly suspected by Austria, and as was now 
 to be seen the French plan of pacification was 
 unquestionably unfriendly to Austria.^' Their 
 memorial (January 21), which was agreed to 
 by Russia, proposed, in substance, that Austria 
 should limit her pretensions to the triangle 
 formed by the junction of Inn and Danube, 
 including Neuburg, Braunau, hnd Burghausen, 
 but excluding the salt mines of Reichenhall. 
 Austria was to recognize the complete rights of 
 Karl Theodor to the whole Bavarian territory 
 apart from this district, and to Mindelheim, 
 and to arrange for a monetary compensation 
 to the allodial heir, the Elector of Saxony. 
 She was also to recognize the rights of Frederic 
 to the eventual succession of Ahsbach-Baireuth. 
 These articles, which were td" be ratified by 
 the Imperial Diet, formed the basis of the 
 Preliminaries. The formal peace was to be 
 arranged by a conference of Principals and 
 mediators at Teschen." 
 
 These Prehminaries could hardly cause satis- 
 faction at Vienna. On New Year's Day, 1779, 
 the Empress-Queen, as on the previous anniver- 
 
196 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 sary, showed marks of anxiety and depression, 
 while " care and dissatisfaction " marked the 
 brow of Kaunitz." Keith did not note the 
 expression of Kaiser Joseph, but it was certain 
 that the whole negotiation had caused him 
 intense mortification. However, the pressure 
 was too strong, the French ally had proved 
 faithless to them, the Russiafi ally but too 
 faithful to Frederic, and the " three kings of 
 Vienna " were not in a position to resist. The 
 cautious eye of Keith noted a slackening of 
 military preparations, which served as a politi- 
 cal barometer. On February 16, 1779, the 
 Court of Vienna declared its acceptance of the 
 Preliminaries, to which Frederic and the two 
 mediators had already agreed, and peace ap- 
 peared upon the horizon. The consent of 
 Karl Theodor, Elector of Bavaria, and of the 
 Duke of Zweibriicken, had not been formally 
 obtained, but the protests of these distinguished 
 potentates, in so far as they affected their 
 family affairs, have already been related. Karl 
 Theodor's objections to the compensation to 
 be paid to the Elector of Saxoiiy for a moment 
 attained international importance, but in general 
 their complaints and objections ruffled the 
 surface, without diverting the current, of the 
 streams flowing towards peace. 
 
 While it is not needful to discuss in detail 
 the actions of the smaller Powers at the Con- 
 gress of Teschen, some attempt must be made 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 197 
 
 to estimate the motives of the great Powers. 
 With so many contraeting parties, and with 
 so miicli disputable matter, the Congress could 
 not pass off in complete harmony. The Aus- 
 trian attitude does not need rhuch further out- 
 lining; the diplomacy of the Court of Vienna 
 had made the essential concession, agreeing 
 to abrogate the Partition-Treaty in return for 
 the district of Burghausen, but it had made 
 it with a bad grace. Kaunitz and Kaiser 
 Joseph had not yet done wondering at the 
 unfriendly attitude of Russia, they felt that 
 they acted under coercion from the mediating 
 Powers, and accordingly they were not con- 
 ciliatory or obliging in the subsequent negotia- 
 tions. 
 
 The objects and policy of Frederic — after the 
 Prehminaries — had become perfectly simple and 
 precise. In September the Austrian offer of 
 restitution had for a moment made him appear 
 an aggressor. But his skilful manoeuvres 
 brought Russia and France go quickly to his 
 aid that he had been able oncp more to expose 
 Austria to defeat. He was determined to 
 restrict Austrian pretensions to Bavaria to the 
 insignificance of the Inn-Danube triangle. He 
 steadfastly refused to yield his* own pretensions 
 on Ansbach, and was unshakfen either by the 
 Austrian threat of refusal to recognize them 
 or by her offer to consent to that succession at 
 a price. At the same time he was acute enough 
 
198 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 to leave the game to be played by the two 
 mediating Powers, and practically to limit his 
 action to promoting their union. Now and 
 again he interfered, sometimes with a compli- 
 ment, sometimes with a threat, sometimes by 
 demanding a categorical answer from Vienna, 
 or even by an order to set his troops in motion. 
 But, for the most part, he stood as he had 
 done opposite Arnau, not himself attacking the 
 enemy, but with arms crossed and immovable, 
 admiring the fine exploits of some one else. In 
 diplomacy this masterly inaction was as success- 
 ful as it had been fruitless in the field. 
 
 Of the two negotiating Powers France had 
 by far the most difficult part to play, and 
 Vergennes, her minister at Paris, and Breteuil, 
 her Plenipotentiary at the Congress, woiild 
 have found it hard in any case to act without 
 duplicity. France was the ally of Austria, 
 but she had almost openly sympathized with 
 Zweibriicken's claims, and had not remon- 
 strated with Frederic for going to war. Her 
 reason was that, locked as she was in a death- 
 struggle with England in the New World, 
 France could not intervene with effect or with 
 commanding force in the Old. Under these 
 circumstances her interests Were best served 
 by the smallest possible disturbance to the 
 existing arrangements in Germany. Such were 
 the views of Vergennes at Paris and the in- 
 structions of Breteuil at Teschen, and both 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 199 
 
 were carried out with dexterity and effect. 
 Vergennes smoothed the way for Russian diplo- 
 macy at Constantinople by mollifying the Turks, 
 and sent the French plan of pacification for 
 Germany to Petrograd in company with flattery 
 of the most subtle and agreeable kind.^* So 
 successful was this policy, so gratified was 
 Count Panin by the flattering unction so freely 
 poured forth, that he even extoUed French 
 diplomacy and politeness in unmeasured terms 
 to the British Ambassador at Petrograd. Harris 
 Ustened in great disgust, and,* when he replied 
 by hinting some doubts as to French good 
 faith, Panin overwhelmed him "by a long 
 Reasoning, drawn, I am convinced, from His 
 Prussian Majesty's Letters." At any rate, it 
 embodied Frederic's favourite; idea of a union 
 of France, Russia, and Prussia, though dis- 
 creetly omitting the latter from the argument. 
 " The Purport was that France would ever be 
 jealous of the aggrandizement of the House of 
 Aiistria ; and that, as long as it was in the 
 power of Russia to assist France in keeping 
 the Court of Vienna within bounds, they always 
 should have an influence over that of Versailles. 
 He (Count Panin) talked as if he had entirely 
 forgot that France was at war With us, and as a 
 person who, with one favourite object in his 
 head, makes all others subservient to it." 
 
 The note struck in this passage is entirely 
 characteristic of Russian diplomacy at the 
 
200 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 moment. Catherine and Panin were so in- 
 toxicated by the splendour of their position, 
 by the alternate flatteries of Frederic and 
 Vergennes, by the submission of Austria, that 
 they dreamed a " golden dream " of a humbled 
 Germany receiving peace from the hands of 
 the Empress of the East. In the beginning 
 their interest in the negotiation was absorbing ; 
 " the small proportion of time Count Panin 
 devotes to Business is wholly employed on this 
 subject," and Catherine, between one flirtation 
 and another, looked " with uncommon satisfac- 
 tion " on the progress of a pacification of which 
 she regarded herself as the sole promoter.^' 
 The result of this conduct was to make lookers- 
 on, even the most acute of them, imagine that 
 Russian diplomats misused their opportunities — 
 even Frederic thought they suffered by com- 
 parison with the French. " Les Frangais sont 
 foibles, mais ils agissent rondement. . . . Les 
 Russes sont d'une gaucherie dans les affaires, 
 comme si les negociations ouvraient pour eux 
 une carriere toute nouvelle. Soyez persuad6 
 que ce n'est pas le moindre de mes embarras, 
 que celui de leur desiller les yeux et de les 
 empecher de faire des sottises." * Frederic 
 flattered himself too much,= Catherine's in- 
 struments were Russian and did not always 
 behave in a Western and diplomatic fashion. 
 
 * Schoning, p. 226, Frederic to Prince Henry, Jan. 10, 1779 ; cp. 
 June 8, 1779, Harris to Weymouth. 
 
AND ICAISER JOSEPH 201 
 
 Panin could be boastful, Repnin could be crude 
 in his diplomatic methods. Yet if their diplo- 
 matic technique was at fault, the main purpose 
 and object of Russian policy- was grasped by 
 them with masterly firmness* Behind Panin 
 was Catherine, and behind Repnin were thirty 
 thousand men, a combination which proved 
 irresistible in the end. 
 
 It was not to be expected that, even after 
 the signature qf the Prehmiriaries, the Court 
 of Vienna could submit without a struggle. 
 Even though Kaunitz and Joseph had been 
 forced to abandon their origiital design of get- 
 ting Lower Bavaria, they intended to pursue 
 their subtle attempt to drag in the question 
 of Frederic's claim to Ansbach. Therefore 
 they had no intention of making the cause 
 of mediation easy, or of giviilg way on minor 
 points during the negotiations leading to the 
 final peace. Keith watched their movements 
 with the greatest attention, feeling their pulse 
 almost from day to day. The activity or 
 otherwise of military preparations was his 
 great political barometer, and on February 20, 
 four days after the acceptance of the Pre- 
 liminaries at Vienna, he notedjwith great satis- 
 faction that the " Mules from Italy, the In- 
 surgents from Hungary, and all the Levies 
 from Transylvania and the other distant pro- 
 vinces are countermanded." This might have 
 seemed decisive, but on March 3 he was again 
 
202 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 alarmed by rumours : " Never did there exist 
 so strange a mixture of warfare and negotia- 
 tion." ^ As late as February 28 a skirmish 
 took place along the frontier, and till March 7 
 no truce was proclaimed. The Congress did 
 not meet at Teschen till the second week of 
 March ; Frederic described it as follows : 
 " Teschen n'est pas le lieu le plus agreable. 
 C'est un triste s^jour dont une vieille Venus de 
 soixante-dix ans, fait tous les delices. M. de 
 Breteueil s'en est expose, et cette divinite preside 
 a toutes leurs assemblees " (Schoning, p. 268). 
 These not very thrilling diversions were stimu- 
 lated by some diplomatic excitements. The 
 Court of Vienna had indeed ceased to co-operate 
 with Karl Theodor, but it showed him just 
 sufficient countenance to make the other Powers 
 suspect a secret understanding without giving 
 him sufficient support to achieve any substantial 
 result. In the same way it lent some counten- 
 ance to a host of minor claimants, who hastened 
 to put in their pretensions before the whole 
 question of the inheritance was definitely 
 decided at the Congress. Such pretensions 
 were in any case unlikely to be granted, because 
 the Preliminaries had already marked the 
 limits of distribution. But none the less, the 
 Duke of Wiirtemberg, the Archbishop of Salz- 
 burg, and the Bishop of Augsburg produced 
 claims, none of which were very good either in 
 law or fact. Heathcote satirically remarked 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 208 
 
 that the claims of the lust named on Mindcl- 
 heim Avcre much inferior to those which the 
 existing Duke of Marlborough might have put 
 forward. Other pretensions "vyere on the same 
 level, and all were regarded as "so many- 
 secret engines employed by the Court of Vienna 
 in order to perplex the question of the Bavarian 
 Succession." *^ However, these claimants and 
 this opposition were gradually swept aside by 
 the strong forces compelling peace. There 
 was none the less much suspicion and frequent 
 alarm. At last Keith was cheered by the sight 
 of the Croatian regiments returning home 
 through Vienna, and this tin^e the barometer 
 was not at fault. Peace was finally signed on 
 May 13 — ^Vienna rejoiced, Te Deums were sung 
 — and Prince Repnin and Breteuil, the two 
 representatives of the mediating Powers, each 
 received from Maria Theresa Ijer picture " very 
 magnificently set round with Diamonds."* 
 
 The final arrangements did not materially 
 differ from the Preliminaries, despite the opposi- 
 tion of Austria, the resentment ©f Karl Theodor, 
 and the angry buzzing of the swarm of minor 
 claimants. Austria received Burghausen, and 
 renounced any further rights on Bavaria. The 
 Elector of Saxony in compensation of his claims 
 as allodial heir obtained thd Principality of 
 
 • Frederic gave Repnin his picture " very richly set (to be worn 
 at the buttonhole) estimated at 20,000 dqllars," and Breteuil " a 
 very fine box but not of equal value." — Letters of Earl MaXmcabury 
 (1870), i. 407. 
 
204 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Mindelheim and four million florins. The rest 
 of the Bavarian dominions were guaranteed 
 to Karl Theodor, Elector Palatine, and by 
 the eighth article the whole was to descend 
 indivisibly to his nephew and heir, the Duke 
 of Zweibriicken. The King of Prussia triumph- 
 antly asserted his rights to the direct succession 
 to Ansbach, and in return Austria was recog- 
 nized as having some reversionary rights on 
 Lusatia, in case of the extinction of the Saxon 
 Line. These arrangements were accepted by 
 Austria and Prussia, were to be supported by 
 them for ratification in the Diet of the Empire, 
 and were solemnly guaranteed by France and 
 Russia. Every species of legality was pressed 
 into the service to defend them : Prussia and 
 Austria supported the tottering fabric of the 
 Empire like two pillars against danger from 
 within ; it was defended from without by two 
 buttresses in the shape of Russia and of France. 
 Diplomatically the results of the peace 
 must be considered a triumph for Frederic, 
 whom Joseph called the " Anti-Kaiser, sup- 
 ported by Russians," though his gains were 
 negative in character. At the beginning of the 
 dispute he had disavowed any idea of acquiring 
 territory at the expense of the Empire, a dis- 
 claimer that was as astonishing as it was new 
 from the invader of Silesia and recent parti- 
 tioner of a foreign country. He had taken 
 up arms, ostensibly to prevent any acquisition 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 205 
 
 of territory within the Empire by n Power 
 without consent of the Diet and regard for 
 the Law, really to prevent the disturbance 
 of the balance of power. In cither case he 
 had kept his word and achieved his object. 
 He had not gained his way by arms — his 
 soldiers had done nothing but steal plums ; 
 but his diplomacy had prevented Austria steal- 
 ing provinces. Alone and unaided, save by 
 Saxony, he had first asserted the rights of the 
 Empire to limit the pretensions of Austria, 
 and then induced other Powers to intervene, 
 who had solemnly confirmed and supported 
 his actions. At the end also t^ had stubbornly 
 held out for full compensation for Saxony ; 
 privately convinced that it was unwise to 
 abandon Prussia's only German ally, and pub- 
 licly asserting his zeal for tjie Laws of the 
 Empire. It is true that the respect for Ger- 
 manic Liberties and the Diet was more apparent 
 than real, for the sohd arrangements dated 
 from the Peace of Teschen, not from its con- 
 firmation by the Imperial Dietj, None the less, 
 the Diet was treated with far rft'ore respect than 
 it had been at other times and other seasons 
 by Frederic himself. The minor states, as a 
 whole, were grateful to Frederic for uphold- 
 ing their rights and standing forth as their 
 champion, and their moral support was of the 
 greatest possible value to him. Weymouth, 
 at the EngUsh Foreign Office, spoke of " the 
 
206 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 very noble, dignified, and disi^terested manner 
 in which His Prussian Majesty has acted." 22 
 Peasants in Bavaria hung his portrait in their 
 huts beside those of the Virgin and lighted a 
 candle before each ; it would be difficult to 
 say whether the tribute of minister or rustic 
 was the more spontaneous or important as 
 marking the achievement of Frederic. 
 
 In future Frederic was able to point to 
 Kaiser Joseph as the tyrant who wished to 
 crush the ancient Liberties of Germany, and 
 to himself as their defender. In this peace 
 and in this attitude is to be found the strength 
 of Frederic in the last years of his life, which 
 enabled him to defeat every scheme of Kaiser 
 Joseph to secure further territory in Germany. 
 The formation of the Fiirstenbund (the League 
 of Princes) to resist Joseph in 1785, the last 
 diplomatic achievement in Frederic's life, has 
 its origin in the events of 1778-79. But it was 
 not only in Germany that Frederic had suc- 
 ceeded in isolating Joseph, though such a 
 success would have been quite serious enough 
 in itself. Frederic had isolated Austria in 
 Europe as well as in the Empire, and his action 
 was to be the problem and the pivot of European 
 politics in the immediate future. 
 
 The general moral influence and aspect of 
 the Treaty of Teschen is perhaps of most 
 interest, for it marks the decisive defeat of an 
 attempt at Partition which had few parallels 
 
AND IvAISER JOSEPH 207 
 
 even in eighteenth century history. The 
 Partition of Poland — ^the most typical of the 
 age — had indeed exhibited the unscrupulous 
 lengths to which diplomats cpuld go. But at 
 least there was the excuse that there was 
 anarchy in Poland, that the seijse of nationality 
 was dead, and that the Act violated only the 
 general obligations of international right. None 
 of these excuses could be advanced for the 
 Treaty of Partition by which Kaiser Joseph 
 was to obtain Lower Bavaria. No plea that 
 Bavaria was in a state of anarchy or that 
 its people were incapable of resenting foreign 
 occupation could apply to this case. Here 
 there was no vague injury to the vague and 
 indefinite sanctions of international obligation, 
 but a precise one to the sharp and defined rules 
 and Laws of the Germanic Empire. The Kaiser 
 — the Head of the Law and the Empire — 
 was deliberately assaihng both, with dubious 
 genealogies as his sole excuse. A dozen Laws 
 and a dozen Treaties were dehberately torn 
 up, and a peaceful tenitory invaded, by the 
 soldiers of the Kaiser. It is difficult to con- 
 ceive any case in which the restraint of law 
 was less operative and the licence of force more 
 evident. The niles which the" Kaiser applied 
 to the territory of a German prince were such 
 as a modern European Power might apply to 
 that of a native African chief. Desiring to 
 increase or round off its possessions at his 
 
208 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 expense, it would offer him the option of war 
 or of cession of the desired territory, and con- 
 firm its rights by a treaty published to the 
 world. This was precisely the method of 
 Kaiser Joseph, except that he veiled his aggres- 
 sion by a claim, dug from the mediaeval records, 
 which deceived few, least of all himself. Such 
 actions have their precedents, but not their 
 justifications, in Europe. 
 
 A Partition of Germany on the lines of the 
 Partition of Poland had been constantly feared. 
 To this such a measure as the Partition of 
 Bavaria was the obvious prelude, and it was 
 in fact averted by two of those very Powers 
 which had taken their share of Polish spoils. 
 That Catherine and Frederic were hardly the 
 rulers best calculated to protest against parti- 
 tions and infractions of international morality 
 mattered little ; that they did actually so pro- 
 test and enforced their argument by arms or by 
 the threat of them mattered infinitely much. 
 Whatever may have been their private reasons, 
 Catherine suffered something and Frederic 
 much for a cause in which they appeared 
 disinterested. England, which in this matter 
 may seem fairly impartial, gave unstinted 
 praise to the way in which they had supported 
 the liberties of Germany and the law of nations. 
 In this way some real advance was made, 
 because the whole tendency of the diplomacy 
 was to demonstrate that Austria had gone too 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 209 
 
 far in her aggressive schemes. Kaiser Joseph 
 is indeed interesting for this very reason, that he 
 always represented his age in its extreme tend- 
 encies. In tlie Partition-Treaty of January 3 
 and the subsequent diplomacy he displayed 
 the qualities of cynicism, of aggression, of 
 tliirst for territory in their most naked form, 
 and the logical tendency of his mind gave a 
 memorable completeness to this policy. It was 
 for this reason that he was defeated. Logic went 
 too far, boldness overreached itself, and the 
 stretched bow broke. That there were limits 
 even to the scruples of diplomacy under the old 
 regime, it was the fate of Kaiser Joseph to 
 establish. 
 
 If traced to the root, the objection to the 
 action of Kaiser Joseph will be found to have 
 consisted far less in the violation of right than 
 in the acquisition of power which he purposed 
 for himself. Frederic and France acted as 
 they did because the Balance of Power was 
 endangered, England approved their action for 
 the same reason, Russia acted both from reasons 
 of state and for glory. None the less at the 
 Congress the phrases of morality and fair deal- 
 ing were on the lips of all, and; their reality was 
 occasionally present. The Peace of Teschen 
 did not deal absolute justice : it gave Austria 
 part of the disputed territory in virtue of claims 
 that were flimsy, but it stopped the more 
 marked display of force. It protested with 
 
210 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 effect against unbridled aggression. The helpless 
 Bavaria had received some justice, the stronger 
 Austria some condemnation, from the " juris- 
 prudence of princes." For Germany the omin- 
 ous sign was that even the strength of Prussia 
 had not availed to protect her against Austria. 
 Frederic had at last been baffled in war, and, 
 though he attained success in diplomacy, the 
 price was a dreadful one. It was the diplo- 
 matic introduction of Russia into Germany, and 
 it brought before Germans that terrible un- 
 known power which has remained a standing 
 menace to Teutonism ever since. " An English 
 officer once congratulated Moltke on the splen- 
 did army which he had created and led. The 
 marshal shook his head, and replied that the 
 German army was a terrible burden on the 
 country, but that the long Russian frontier 
 raade it a necessity." * The Treaty of Teschen 
 for the first time revealed that danger, and it 
 was brought about by the great predecessor of 
 Moltke. 
 
 ^r ^F ^r ^n T* T* 
 
 Whatever its shortcomings, the Peace of 
 Teschen was one of the few Treaties in that — or 
 indeed any — ^generation which provided for the 
 restoration, and not for the division of territory, 
 which was summoned to compel restitution and 
 not to sanction annexation. For that distinct 
 achievement, even without its vaguer and more 
 
 * Acton, Modern History, p. 195, 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 211 
 
 indefinable influences, it was. and deserved to 
 be, memorable. 
 
 In the story of the settlement of the Bavarian 
 Succession almost every elenicnt and motive 
 tj-pical of the old regime appeared. The 
 personal force of rulers, dominating their 
 peoples, is seen in Frederic, Joseph, and 
 Catherine ; the shameless claim, backed by 
 forgeries and supported by arms, the resistance 
 to it by one who had dismembered the Empire 
 of old and who now posed as its champion; 
 the war which ruined the peasa,nts of Bohemia 
 for objects of which they knew* or cared nothing, 
 the peace which made half-Oriental Russia a 
 guardian of the sanctity of Germanic treaties ; 
 last of all the piteous spectacle of Bavaria her- 
 self, ruled by one ready to betray her, hurled 
 this way and that in the eddies of diplomacy, 
 imable or afraid to lift a sword in her own 
 defence at the moment that her very existence 
 was in the balance. It was silch incidents and 
 such rulers that caused the shame and the 
 splendour, the glory and the misery, of the old 
 regime. 
 
 The days of the old regipie were indeed 
 already numbered. The despots were soon to 
 prove themselves unable to ^tem the tide of 
 revolutionary vengeance, and the armies which 
 Frederic and Joseph had trained were to go 
 down in utter ruin before the MarsHllais^ and 
 the ragged volunteers of France. Already, too, 
 
212 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 there was playing among the Corsican rocks a 
 boy who was to teach the world that it was 
 not only the despots who dreamt of war, and 
 that the armed champion of the rights of the 
 people could plan partitions more shameless 
 than those of Poland and conquests more 
 extensive than those of Bavaria. 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 I HAVE ventured to print some; extracts from the 
 British despatches, a report from the Lansdowne MSS. 
 on the Prussian army, and a poem on Joseph, found 
 by me at Czaslau in Bohemia, which I had translated 
 from the Czech. These all afford excellent contem- 
 porary views of the personalities in q-uestion. Sir James 
 Harris and Hugh Elliot in their three despatches give 
 a living picture of Frederic the Great and of his nephew 
 and heir, Frederic-William, afterwards King Frederic- 
 William II., and of their surrouildings literary and 
 social. Burgoyne's report shows ihe condition of the 
 Prussian and Austrian armies. In Keith's despatch 
 Kaiser Joseph tells his impressions of Catherine the 
 Great ; whilst a Czech peasant's' poem reveals the 
 popular impression of Kaiser Joseph. 
 
 I. Sir James Harris (Lord Malmesbury) and Hugh 
 Elliot (Lord Minto) on Frederic the Great — his 
 character and court. 
 
 (o) March 18, 1776. Charactef sketch of Frederic 
 the Great and his successor. 
 
 (b) May 18, 1780. Hugh Elliot on Frederic's 
 
 hterary diversions. 
 
 (c) August 13, 1776. Harris on the visit of the 
 
 Grand Duke Paul of Russia (afterwards 
 Paul I.) to Berlin. 
 
 II. General Burgoyne's report- on Austrian and 
 Prussian armies, c. 1766-67. 
 
 213 
 
214 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 III. Kaiser Joseph's impressions of Catherine the 
 Great, 1782. 
 
 IV. A Czechish peasant's impressions of Kaiser 
 Joseph, 1785 {?). 
 
 APPENDIX I 
 
 (a) Sir James Harris (Lord Malmesbury) on 
 THE Character and Court of Frederic the 
 Great. 
 
 Berlin, Monday, 18th March 1776. 
 
 Harris to Suffolk 
 
 The Basis of His Prussian Majesty's Conduct, 
 from the Time He mounted the Throne, to this day, , 
 seems to have been the considering Mankind in general, 
 and particularly those over whom He was destined 
 to reign, as Beings created merely to be subservient 
 to His Will, and conducive to the carrying into execu- 
 tion whatever might tend to augment His Power, 
 and extend His Dominions — Proceeding on these 
 Grounds, He has all along been guided by His own 
 Judgment alone, without ever consulting any of His 
 Ministers or superior Officers ; not so much from the 
 low opinion He entertains of their abilities, as from 
 a Conviction, from His own Feelings, that if He im- 
 ployed them otherwise than as simple Instruments, 
 they would in time assume a Will of their own ; 
 and instead of remaining Accessories, endeavour to 
 become Principals. To persevere in this System, it 
 was necessary for Him to divest Himself of Compassion 
 and Remorse ; of course of Religion and Morality. 
 In the room of the first. He has substituted Super- 
 stition ; in the place of the latter, what is called in 
 France Sentiment ; and from hencp we may, in some 
 
AND ICAISER JOSEPH 215 
 
 measure, account for that motley Composition of 
 Barbarity and Humanity which so strongly mark His 
 CiiaracttT. I have seen Him weep at Tragedy ; 
 known Him pay as much care to if, sick Grey Hound, 
 as a fond jNlother could to a favourite Child : And yet 
 the next day. He has given Orders for the devastating 
 a Province : or by a wanton increase of Taxes, make 
 a whole district miserable ; and what will perhaps 
 appear still more contradictory, contribute to His 
 own Brother's Death [August-Wilhelm, father of 
 King Frederic- William II.], by continuing to him 
 Marks of His displeasure the whble Time of his last 
 Illness. Again, He is so far from being sanguinary, 
 that He scarce ever suffers a Criminal to be punished 
 capitally, imless for a most notorious Offence : Yet, 
 the last War, He gave secret Orders to several of His 
 Army Surgeons, rather to rvm the risk of a wounded 
 Soldier's dying, than by the Amputation of a Limb, 
 increase the Number and Expence of His Invalids. 
 Thus, never losing sight of His Object, He lays aside 
 all Feelings, the moment that is, concerned : And 
 although as an Individual, He often appears and 
 really is Humane, Benevolent, and Friendly ; yet, 
 the Instant He acts in His Royal Capacity, these 
 Attributes forsake Him, and He carryes with Him, 
 desolation. Misery and Persecution, where ever He 
 goes. From an easy Transposition of the same 
 erroneous principle, to the internal Government of 
 His Dominions, we may easily see, why He never can 
 be taught to believe, that a large Treasure laying 
 dormant in His Coffers impoverishes His Kingdom. 
 That Riches increase by Circulation ; That Trade 
 cannot subsist without reciprocal Profit ; That 
 Monopolies, and exclusive Grants, put a Stop to 
 Emulation, and of course to Industry ; and in short. 
 
216 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 that the real Wealth of a Sovereign, consists in the 
 Ease and Affluence of His Subjects. These Errors, 
 however capital they are, have rather served to 
 augment the Misery of these Subjects, than impede 
 the Progress of His own Grandeur : If He has failed 
 in several points, Resolution and Cunning, imployed 
 as the Occasion required, and always supported by 
 great Abilities, has carried Him, with Success, through 
 almost every important Undertaking He has at- 
 tempted. We have seen Him end a War, with almost 
 all the great Powers of Europe, by an advantageous 
 Peace : And since We have seen Him gain such an 
 Ascendency over those who were His most natural 
 Enemies, as to make them contribute to the Execution 
 of His ambitious Projects. His iinmense increase of 
 Revenue, the gigantick Army He maintains ; And the 
 wonderful preponderance He bears in Europe, will, 
 in future History, appear incredible. He foimd, on 
 His Father's Death a Revenue of 13,000,000 of 
 Crowns ; a Treasure of 16,000,000 ; no debts ; and 
 an Army of 50,000 Men [in fact it was nearer 
 100,000] ; And, at the time, this was reckoned as 
 the greatest Effort of Oeconomy. He has now an 
 Income of 21,000,000 of Crowns ; three times that 
 Smn, at least, in His Coffers ; and near 200,000 
 effective Men. He undoubtedly owes this, in great 
 measure to His superior Talents ; Yet, I think, We 
 may find another Cause, in the Character and 
 position of His Subjects. In general they are poor, 
 vain, ignorant, and destitute of Principle : had they 
 been rich. His Nobility could never have been brought 
 to serve as Subaltern Officers, with Zeal and Ardour : 
 Their Vanity makes them think, they see their own 
 greatness in the Greatness of their Monarch ; Their 
 Ignorance stifles in them every notion of Liberty and 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 217 
 
 Opposition ; And their want of, Principles, makes 
 them ready Instruments to execute any Orders they 
 receive, without considering whether they are founded 
 on Equity, or not. — His Prussian Majesty has well 
 known how to take advantage of this Character, by 
 keeping them at a most awful distance : They con- 
 sider a Word or a Smile from Him as a Boon, and by 
 never rewarding them according to their Merits, they 
 are taught to believe they have no merit at all. The 
 superior Indowments Nature has" given Him over 
 them, and the Preeminence which He constantly 
 affects, makes them look up to Him as a divinity ; 
 And although they feel the Rod of Iron with which 
 they are governed, yet few repine, and none venture 
 to murmur. At those moments when He lays aside 
 the Monarch, and indulges Himself in every kind of 
 debauchery, that a depraved Imagination, and worn 
 out Constitution, can devise, H6 never suffers the 
 Instruments, or partakers of these Excesses, to have 
 the smallest Influence over Him,? some few He has 
 rewarded, discarded several, but left most of them in 
 the Situation He found them. Having said thus 
 much, it is perhaps less wonderful than it generally 
 appears, that such a Sovereign, governing such a 
 people, should have raised to sO great a pitch of 
 Glory, a Country which, from itst geographical Posi- 
 tion, its Climate, and its Soil, sfems to have been 
 calculated to act a very secondary Part amongst the 
 European Powers ; And it is nqt very difficult to 
 foresee, on its changing Masters, that its preponder- 
 ance will greatly sink, and as this' Event is certainly 
 not very distant, I hope I shall not trespass on Your 
 Lord's time, in turning my Thoughts, for a moment, 
 to the futme State of these Dominions. 
 
 Having already spoken to Your Lordship very 
 
218 FREDERIC THE CREAT 
 
 fully to the Character of the Princfe of Prussia [after- 
 wards King Frederic- William II.], I can now only add, 
 that I am confirmed in what I then wrote. His style 
 of Life, at the Moment when He was at the Eve of 
 becoming King, convinces me that when He actually 
 is so, He wUl never change it, of course that He will 
 neither be an active Monarch, or His own Minister ; 
 That He will look upon Business as a Task, and seek 
 pleasure with avidity. The Nation aware of this turn, 
 have been in a constant Ferment, from the Moment 
 His Prussian Majesty's Illness h^s carried with it a 
 serious Aspect ; and there is not an insignificant 
 Conseiller de Province who does not aspire to some 
 important post under the new Reign. Unused to 
 be allowed to think or reason for themselves, the 
 Art of intriguing and forming Court Cabals sits 
 very awkward on them : The Apprehension they 
 are under of incurring the King's displeasure, by 
 paying open Court to the Prince of Prussia, and 
 that of offending the Prince by behaving to Him 
 as they have hitherto done, makes it difficult to 
 follow their Motions or to know exactly what they 
 would be at. 
 
 On the whole, however, I thipk we may divide 
 those who expect to be future Ministers, with any 
 degree of probability, into three Sets. At the head 
 of the first is Prince Henry, whose Creatures are 
 Kiiiphausen who was in England ; The Wruch 
 Family, and several Favourites of His Royal Highness, 
 who have no other Merit than their fair Complexion, 
 and extreme good nature. The second is composed 
 of M'- de Hertzberg, one of the present Ministers of 
 the foreign Department, a Man of great Application 
 and sound Sense ; M'- de Schulembourg, who has the 
 direction of the Bank, also a Man of Parts, and their 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 219 
 
 dependants ; and this is undoubtedly tho Party the 
 best Cidculated to constitute a Klinistry, adeqnutc 
 to the Goveninient of this Country. The most likely 
 to succeed, however, though they, by no means, come 
 under the same description, are tljose who look upon 
 themselves as the Prince's Favourites ; Amongst the 
 first of whom stands M'- de Humboldt, formerly a 
 Commissary in the Allied Army, afterwards Chamber- 
 lain to the Princess Elizabeth now at Stettin ; a Man 
 of plain Understanding, and fair Character, and who 
 owes the good Will the Prince bears him, to the Assist- 
 ance he has given His Royal Highness in pecuniary 
 Matters ; M'- de Horst, whom His Prussian Majesty 
 lately dismissed from the Head of the Department 
 of Trade, an enterprizing Genius-, lively Parts, but 
 totally void of Judgment ; and a Number of young 
 Officers, partakers of His Royal Hjghness's Pleasures, 
 who, tho* they have no desire to become active 
 Ministers, all expect Employmenjts, Decorations, or 
 Pensions. 
 
 It is easy to be foreseen, that whichever of these 
 Sets should come into place, or even supposing what is 
 next to impossible, that the future Sovereign of this 
 Country should take the Reias of Administration into 
 His own Hands, that the essential difference there 
 will be ia the first case, between it^ being governed by 
 many Ministers, who necessarily must be biassed by 
 private Views and family Connexions ; and in the 
 second, by a young Prince, scarce known in Europe 
 but by His Pleasures, instead of having at its Head 
 a Monarch of tryed Abilities, and good Reputation, 
 that it will be no longer the same great Nation, formid- 
 able to its Neighbours, and whose* Alliance is almost 
 universally courted ; It will gradually sink to its 
 natural Bulk, and, in the course of a few Years, have 
 
220 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 no right to be reckoned amongst the leading Powers 
 of Europe. 
 
 (6) Hugh Elliot on King Fkederic's 
 Literary Diversions 
 
 Bekmn, 13 May 1780. 
 Elliot to Stormont 
 
 Notwithstanding the assiduity with which the 
 King of Prussia continues to preside over every 
 Department of the State, His Majesty still finds 
 opportunities to cultivate Letters and the Conversa- 
 tion of men of genius. Ever attentive to attach to 
 His service those whose talents may be profitable 
 or ornamental to His Court, He admits to private 
 Interviews the Strangers who frequent it, and has, in 
 several instances during the course of His reign, 
 selected those of the greatest celebrity for the Com- 
 panions of His leisure hours. — ^His Majesty has of 
 late made choice of the Marquis of Lucchesini, an 
 Italian, to attend His person at Potsdam. — To an 
 extensive knowledge and agreeable address this Gentle- 
 man is said to add a strong resemblance to the late 
 Count Algarotti, and to have attracted the King's 
 attention by this circumstance. He was last week 
 named one of His Majesty's Chamberlains, with a 
 Pension of 2000 Crowns a year and is since gone to 
 Potsdam. 
 
 Out of Cypher it would be imprudent not to approve 
 of His Prussian Majesty's Choice though in reality it 
 is considered as the Effect of Whim and Caprice. 
 The Marquis Lucchesini is a young Man, and rather 
 possessed of a plain sound understanding, and happy 
 Memory, than of any bright Genius, or entertaining 
 Talents. There are few of His Prussian Majesty's 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 221 
 
 anemployed Subjects of the same Rank in Life, who 
 ore not hurt at tlio Preference shewn to a Stranger, 
 whose Name is hitherto unknown to the PubUck. 
 
 Mr. Liston has been upon an iiitniuate Footing with 
 the Marquis, before my arrival ; arid I may reap some 
 Benefit from his near Approach to- the King. 
 
 Smce the Company of professed Men of Letters 
 seems to be as necessary to the King as Connections 
 of a different Nature to the Heir apparent, it is perhaps 
 riot mifortunate that neither of these Places are, as 
 usual, occupied by French Subjects ; for the Prince 
 has of late frequented an Italian. Mistress. If how- 
 ever any Conjecture may be formed from prior 
 Examples, neither of the Favourites can flatter them- 
 selves with a long Reign, as it is difficult to determine, 
 whether the King of Prussia is more inconstant to 
 His learned Friends, or The Prince to his female ones. 
 
 The only Circumstance of any Importance, that 
 has come to my Knowledge, since I had the Honour 
 of writing to Your Lordship, is, that it is intended, 
 that The Prince of Prussia shall riiake a Journey to 
 Petersburg, in the Month of October. 
 
 (c) Harris on the Visit of the Grand Duke 
 Paijl (afterwards Czar Paul I.) to Berlin 
 
 Private. Berlin, Aug. 18, 1776. 
 
 Harris to Eden 
 
 I am heartily glad our bustle is over, I have now 
 leisure to write to you, and it has furnish'd me with 
 ^laterials to make my letter less insipid than usual. 
 I forbore in my Official Correspondence, giving a 
 circumstantial Account of our Magnificence and 
 Splendour, not only from such Festivitys being much 
 less delightful in description than in reality, but 
 
222 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 because I felt my Pen would be greatly inferiour both 
 in style and accuracy to those of the Gazettees du bos 
 Bhin and other Continental news-writers : I must 
 indeed do them the justice to say that on this occasion 
 they have been very exact, and as far as regards the 
 descriptive part of the Ceremony have scarce in a 
 single instance deviated from the truth : I shall 
 therefore not interfere in their department, but 
 mention only such collateral facts as may have 
 escap'd their observation. 
 
 Paul Petrovitch were names as you may suppose 
 written on every triumphal arch — that must be wrong 
 says the Mayor of a Bourg in Pomerania, the Grand 
 Duke is certainly a Gentleman — put Paul von Petro- 
 vitch. 
 
 All the Domesticks belonging to the Imperial 
 Family in Russia have military rank — the Grand 
 Duke's Coachman and He of His Prussian Majesty 
 going one evening to drink together a dispute arose 
 about Precedence — " What is your rank ? " says the 
 Prussian. " Lieutenant Colonel," says the other. 
 " Ah 1 but I am a Colonel," answers the German 
 and walks first into the Alehouse. The Fact came to 
 y« King's ears — ^the Colonel was sent for three days 
 to Prison to receive fifty Coups de Canne. 
 
 When the Grand Duke left Berlin it rain'd and 
 thunder'd — Cannons were continually firing — a 
 German Poet with an Imagination bolder than that 
 of the Frenchman, remark' d, that Angels join'd their 
 tears to those of the People for the departure of 
 H.I.H., and that Jove and Frederick accompany'd 
 him with their Thunder. 
 
 Seventy thousand Horses and thirty thousand 
 Peasants were employ'd to convey the Grand Duke 
 from Memel to Berlin. Prince Henry in talking to 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 228 
 
 one of them said, '• You certainly cannot join in the 
 publick joy, but imprecate a journey which takes you 
 from your HarAcst and other necessary occupations." 
 '• No," rephed the courtierlike boor, " we are all happy 
 to be employed on this occasion, since we foresee it will 
 prevent us and our horses from being kill'd in future 
 times by dragging Artillery and other complements 
 of war." 
 
 Formey the Honest Secretaire perpetuel of the 
 Academy of Sciences in haranguing the Grand Duke 
 made use of this expression, " C'eit I'homme Men plus 
 que le Prince que noits admirons et ce a qui V entree 
 de nos coeurs est Men plus ouverte que celle de ce 
 lieu" — the entry of the Academy is a Porte cochere — 
 for the rest of the Bathos in this speech, I refer you 
 to the original whicli I enclose ; this same good Formey 
 on the death of the late King of Sardinia said in one 
 of his Academical discourses, " Mettons plus de ferveur 
 que jamais dans nos prieres pour la conservation des 
 jours de Notre auguste Souverain — il est devenu le 
 doyen des Rois il est dans la breche — L'ange de la mort 
 tient le glaive suspendu sur sa tetej' You may guess 
 whether such a language however ^ell intended gave 
 pleasure. 
 
 APPENDIX II 
 
 Obskbvations on the present Military State of 
 Prussia and Austria by General Burgoyne, 
 c. 1766-67 (" Shelburne Papers," Lansdowne 
 MSS. vols. 42 and 137). 
 
 The excellence of the Prussian troops appears the 
 more extraordinary when we consider the disadvan- 
 tages attending them unknown to other States. The 
 
224 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 ranks are filled up perhaps more than a third part 
 with strangers, deserters, prisoners, and enemies of 
 various countries, languages, and religions. They 
 cannot therefore be actuated by any of the great 
 moving principles which usually cause extraordinary 
 superiority in armies ; they have neither national 
 spirit nor attachment to their prince, nor enthusiasm 
 nor hopes of fortune, nor even prospect of comfortable 
 old age to inspire them. 
 
 In an army thus composed it is wisdom and sound 
 policy to sink and degrade all intellectual faculties, 
 and to reduce the man as nearly as possible to mere 
 machinery, and indeed as nature has formed the bulk 
 of the King of Prussia's subjects that is not very 
 difficult . . . many of his disciples suppose his 
 necessity to be his choice . . . the vigour of the army 
 is in the subalterns and non-commissioned officers 
 who undoubtedly are the best in the world. It 
 seems to decline as the ranks ascend, and as other 
 qualifications than those of mere execution become 
 requisite. 
 
 The greater part of the present set (of generals) 
 have recommended themselves by their assiduity on 
 parade, and are men of very confined education. 
 
 Prussian officers by length of time and experience 
 only become more expert artificers to prepare and 
 sharpen a fine weapon, diligent and proud to deliver it 
 into the hands of their master in perfect order, 
 awkward and ignorant if compelled to employ it 
 themselves. 
 
 If this survey of the Prussian army is just it will 
 be found . . . that its most forniidable power exists 
 in the King or in his Brother, Prince Henry. All the 
 energy of action and expedient is ih them ; and when- 
 ever they fail and the direction of that stupendous 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 225 
 
 machine fulls to Priiicos of the common Cast, it must 
 soon appear that immediutcly the principles of de- 
 cline are extended and interwoven with its apparent 
 strength. 
 
 The army is more harassed with precautionary 
 guards against their own soldiers, than against the 
 enemy. 
 
 Desertion in peace supposed to = a fifth ; after 
 defeat " the number missing usually trebles the 
 number to be accounted for by death or capture." 
 
 The Emperor's army shows all the natural advan- 
 tages the Prussians want : the sources of men and 
 money are great and natural, the officers have liber- 
 ality, the soldiers have national spirit. There is 
 sufficiency and excellency in every- part of the basis — 
 it is the superstructure alone which has hitherto been 
 defective. 
 
 [Burgoyne ends by commending Lascy and praising 
 Laudon.] 
 
 APPENDIX III 
 
 Kaisek Joseph's Impressions of the Empress 
 Catherine the Great 1(1780-82) 
 
 Two years after his famous visit to Catherine, a 
 characterization of her was given by Kaiser Joseph. 
 " Walking alone in the Augarten (at Vienna) on 
 August 19, 1782," he confided to Keith the British 
 ambassador his own impressions of Catherine and 
 Russia * : — The Emperor asked me who was the 
 
 • Foreign Office, Austria, vol. 5, Vienna, October 19, 1782, Kritli 
 to Grantham, " most secret and confidential." Keith writes in the 
 first person and calls the reported conversaj^ion " a faithful extract 
 of my notes." 
 
 Q 
 
226 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 successor of Sir J. Harris at that court (St. Petersburg), 
 I said I had every reason to believe that he would 
 remain there. — Kaiser Joseph. Your Ministry judge 
 well. Sir James (Harris) possesses the Talents, 
 Activity, and Adroitness which qualify him for that 
 Mission, and I fancy that his situation at Petersburg 
 has of late grown much more comfortable. — Keith. 
 I hope so. Sir, but the part a Foreign Minister has 
 to act there, is accompanied with great difficulties, 
 owing to the continual fluctuation of Politicks in that 
 Cabinet. — Kaiser Joseph. Yes and No. The great 
 Art is to enter into the Empress's Character, and to 
 humour it. She is no doubt a Princess of distinguished 
 Genius, but she cannot do everjrthing. Whoever 
 has to deal with her must never lose sight of her sex, 
 nor forget that a woman sees things and acts differ- 
 ently from one of our sex. I speak from experience in 
 saying the only way to keep well with her is ni de la 
 gater ni de la heurter de front ; to give her her way in 
 matters of little consequence, to render every necessary 
 Refusal as palatable as possible, to let her perceive 
 a constant desire of pleasing, yet at the same time a 
 firm adherence to certain essential Principles, and a 
 just sense of one's own Right. When She expresses 
 a wish for a thing that can be granted without de- 
 parting from these Principles, to indulge her with that 
 complaisant Attention which is ever due to a Lady, 
 but when She insists on what ought not to be com- 
 plied with, to make her sensible that tho' She may 
 often lead. She cannot drive. Iji this manner one 
 may hope to live upon a fair footing with her, guarding 
 against the Heat and Impetuosity of her feelings, and 
 convincing her that in essential Points, every sovereign 
 has an unquestionable Right to draw the great line 
 of his own Conduct, and to adhere to it strictly. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 227 
 
 The singular Misfortune of the Empress is that of 
 having no IVrson about her who dares to restrain, 
 even to repress, the first effusion of her Passions. 
 Count Osternian (X'ice-CiianccUor) is un hoiinnc dr. 
 PaiUe ; he does nothing, ;iud hus.no weight. As to 
 M. Besborodko,* he is an Upstart ; he was a low 
 scribe, a mere Interpreter, under M. Romanzow, and 
 he retains the Sentiments of that class of Men. To- 
 gether with some Ability he poss&ses the routine of 
 his o^Mi Business, but he has read little and knows 
 nothing of the great Scale of Politicks, or of the per- 
 manent Interests of Princes. When his Sovereign 
 calls for his Pen and dictates the Strongest and often 
 the wildest expression of her feelings of the moment, 
 the Secretary has not the Firmness, and perhaps not 
 the Inclination, to repress her halsty effusions, but 
 writes down in their full Energy all her crude Ideas, and 
 probably says to himself, " Ce n'est pas mon Affaire 
 de peser ou de remontrer sur des Consequences. Que 
 le Roi de France, de I'Angleterre, ou VEmpercur se 
 iirent de ce mauvais pas comme Us pourront." This 
 is the case with the Empress, and 'Whoever is engaged 
 in any important Transaction with her, must keep 
 these circumstances in his mind. 
 
 Keith [con expressione]. It is an unhappy thing 
 for Princes that they are forced to give their con- 
 fidence to men of low Birth, sordid Education and 
 loose or timid Principles ; but has not the Empress 
 Prince Potemkin for a Confidential Counsellor, since 
 the Disgrace of Count Panin ? — Kaiser Joseph. O 
 Yes, and a very insufficient Counsellor he is. He has 
 little knowledge, joined to great Indolence, and even 
 the Empress affects to treat, or at least to speak of 
 him as a Scholar of her own in Politicks, and con- 
 • Alexander Andrejevic Besborodko, first secretary to Catherine. 
 
228 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 sequently as a man who is more likely to need a Guide 
 than to become one. It is a favourite Phrase of hers 
 to say, "II est mon SUve. C'est a Moi qu'il doit toute 
 la Connoissance des Affaires." You will easily Con- 
 ceive that when the Empress talked in this manner, 
 the Person She spoke of did not push his frankness 
 so far as to say, " Oui, Madame, il est votre Eleve, et 
 en viritS il vous fait tres peu d'honneur." 
 
 Keith. Does it then appear. Sir, that Prince 
 Potemkin's Weight and Influence are diminished ? — 
 Kaiser Joseph. Not at all, but in Politicks they have 
 never been what the World imagined. The Empress 
 of Russia does not wish to part with him, and from 
 a thousand Reasons, and as many Connections, of 
 every sort, She could not easily get rid of him ; if even 
 She harboured the wish of doing so. One must have 
 been in Russia to comprehend all the particulars of 
 the Empress's Situation. 
 
 [Compare with this Joseph's conversation with 
 Verac, in Corberon, Journal (Paris, 1901), 257 n.] 
 
 APPENDIX IV 
 
 Gratitudk to Kaiser* Joseph 
 Poem by a Czechish Peasant (written about 1785) 
 
 Thanksgiving to the great and illustrious father of 
 our dear Country — to Joseph the Second. 
 
 Gratitude from an unworthy subject, Wojtec 
 Kotera ; written in the year of our Lord, 17[85 ?], 
 and printed by Frantisek Vinience Korec at Kutna 
 Hora [Kuttenberg]. 
 
 Rejoice with me you nations and listen to the many 
 truths and thanksgiving, that I am going to tell you. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 229 
 
 in praise of the wisdom from wlych sprang blessing 
 and joy in our country, and which has done away 
 with many sufferings. 
 
 When our great monarch, Joseph the Second, suc- 
 ceeded to the throne as tiie ruler of our country, he 
 reigned wisely, guided by wisdom, love and righteous- 
 ness, all over the world ; but especially over his dear 
 subjects. 
 
 As an eagle tries to soar towa|rds the sky, so his 
 heart longed for righteousness and. wished to do away 
 with many wrongs, and this hope strengthened his heart. 
 
 He hoisted the flag of the Imperial Eagle, visited 
 all the departments of state in person, and degraded 
 many officials whom he found unworthy of their office. 
 
 His zeal for justice was not to be deceived, his 
 sharp eye saw in the darkness, he rnade many changes 
 among the evil-livers and well rewarded the righteous. 
 
 He walked among his subjects with a loving heart, 
 and enchanted all of them vnth his kindness. People 
 laid before him the wishes and desires of their hearts, 
 and all found support in his might}^ spirit of goodwill.* 
 
 Many a poor tradesman could have found his 
 fortune had he sought it in anothet district, but could 
 not leave as he must redeem his bondage from his 
 lord. How grateful then were they to their sovereign, 
 when they were permitted to go freely wherever they 
 could find their living.f 
 
 This good-hearted monarch considered all the taxes, 
 for he wished to tax all equally, and found out him 
 who tried to conceal his riches or to speak falsely 
 about his estates, and also him who oppressed his 
 fellow-men. 
 
 ♦ In the Controlor-Gang in his Imperial Palace at Vienna Joseph 
 received all his subjects without disUnction., 
 
 t Refers to the Kmancipation of Serfs in Austria and the break-up 
 of the Gild-system. 
 
230 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Oh, who would not submit to such good teaching, 
 the aim of which was to survey the land. God was 
 pleased with our sovereign's penetrating eye, with 
 his judgment, his zeal for learning and his enlighten- 
 ment. 
 
 The numerous schools which he built show with 
 what attention this loving father sought to awake 
 his peoples to better morality. Mindful was he that 
 teaching should progress, especially that little children 
 should learn. 
 
 In old times people spent long in learning, yet when 
 they grew up knew not why they came into the world. 
 And, even if they learned to read, understood not 
 what they read, and remained in darkness as before.* 
 
 Princes came from all quarters of the earth to give 
 him honours, and to meet him in his splendid palace. 
 
 Take my thanks, O mighty sovereign, for thou 
 lovest the simplicity of my speech" m.ore than fine art. 
 I invoke the blessing of our Lord and His protection 
 for our dear Emperor — ^Joseph the Second ! 
 
 APPENDIX V 
 
 VOLTAIRE ON THE CAUSES OF WAK IN THE 
 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 (Article "La Guerre" in Dictionnaire philosophique.) 
 
 [This marvellous effort of wit was originally written 
 in 1764, as a reflection on Frederic's conduct in 
 the first Silesian War, which caused that monarch 
 considerable annoyance. As, in fact, it might serve 
 
 * An attack on the Jesuit educational system, wUch Joseph 
 supplanted. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 231 
 
 as a history of tlie War of the Bavarian Succession, 
 I have inserted it here.] 
 
 " Un genealogiste prouve k un prince qu'il descend 
 en droitc Ugne d'un comte dont les parents avaient fait 
 un pacte de famille, il y a trois qu quatre cent ans, 
 avec une maison dont la m^moire meme ne subsiste 
 plus. Cette maison avait des pretentions ^loign^es 
 sur une province dont le dernier possesseur est mort 
 d'apopl^xie : le prince et son conseil concluent sans 
 diffieult6 que cette province lui appartient de droit 
 divin. Cette province, qui est k quelques centaines 
 de lieues de lui, a beau protester qu'elle ne le connait 
 pas, qu'elle n'a nulle envie d'etre gouvern^e par lui ; 
 que, pour donner des lois aux gens, il f aut au moins avoir 
 leur consentement : ces discours he parviennent pas 
 seulement aux oreilles du prince, dont le droit est in- 
 contestable. H trouve incontinent un grand nombre 
 d' homines qui n'ont rien k faire ni rien k perdre ; il 
 les habille d'un gros drap bleu a cent dix sous I'aune, 
 borde leurs chapeaux avec du grqs fil blanc, les fait 
 toumer k droite et a gauche, et ma^clie k la gloire. Les 
 autres princes qui entendent parlet de cette 6quip6e y 
 prennent part, chacun selon son pouvoir, et couvrent 
 une petite ^tendue de pays de plus de meurtriers 
 mercenaires que Gengis-Kan, Tamerlan, Bajazet, 
 n'en train^rent k leur suite." 
 
 That there is no undue satire ift the description of 
 the claims advanced by a sovereign is shown by the 
 Bavarian Succession, as well as the following delight- 
 ful extract, which satirizes Joseph as much as Voltaire 
 satirized Frederic, " Advices frorh different Quarters 
 continue to give Hints and to mention Circumstances, 
 which suppose ambitious projects, on the part of the 
 Emperor (Joseph), and an intention sooner or later 
 to disturb the tranquillity of the Empire. From 
 
232 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Vienna we are told that His Imperial Majesty has 
 lately adopted the Plan long in Contemplation by 
 Prince Kaunitz, of extending his Dominions towards 
 the South, and that the Archives have been searched 
 anezv, and Titles made out to different territories of the 
 Bepublick [sic] of Venice.* 
 
 * S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 103, Listen to Fraser, Berlin, November 
 30, 1779. 
 
NOTES 
 
 ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 S.P.P. state Papers Fort'lgii—uupubllflhed foreign coViegpondenco preserved at the 
 
 KriUsli Record Om.-o. 
 Ad. ^SS. Additional Manuscripta pivseiTcd at the BMtlah Museum. 
 Sbornii:. Bussiau Imperial Historical Soi-iety Publication of Archives. 
 
 CHAPTERS I AND II 
 
 These two chapters are based on material so familiar to historians 
 that I have not thought it needful to give detailed references. For 
 these chapters, as for the whole period, the best general bibliography 
 is Dahlmann - ^aitz, Quellenkunde der deiUschen Geschichte, 8te 
 Auflage, Leipzig, 1912. 
 
 It may be worth while to mention a few of the main works below. 
 
 AoBtria. Akneth. Maria Theresia. 10 Bde. Vienna, 1879. 
 Himgary. Mahczali, H. Hungary in the Eighteenth Century. 
 Cambridge, 1910. 
 The most up-to-date documentary study on Joseph II. is that by 
 P. V. MrrROFANOv. 2 Bde. German translation. Vienna 
 and Leipzig, 1910. 
 Pmsaia. Kcser, R. Konig Friedrkh der 'Grosse. 2 Bde. Stutt- 
 gart and Beriin, 1903 and 1913. 
 Reim^vnn, E. Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Slaates [Gcsch. 
 
 der europ. Staaten]. 2 Bde. Gotha, 1888. 
 A very suggestive comparison of Austriah and Prussian adminis- 
 trative methods may be found in 
 
 HiNTZE, Otto. Der osierrcichische und der pretissische Beamteii- 
 Slaat. Historische Zeitschrift. Bd. j.* 
 Oeneral. Ranke, L. Die Deutschen Mdcht eund der FUrstenbund, 
 2 Bde. Leipzig, 1871-72. 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 ' Memorial S.P.F. German Stales, Ilmaria, vol. Ill sub fin. 
 The date is 1776 and, though unsigned, the report is based on good 
 information. It is undoubtedly written by Hugh Elliot. Cp. 
 S.P.F. Bavaria, vol. 113, July 10, 1778, Eden to Suffolk. 
 
 ' These statements of Elliot's should be compared with those 
 233 
 
234 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap. 
 
 of Schreiber, Max Joseph III., Miinchen, 1863, pp. 193-98, and of 
 Munnioh, Gesckichte der Entwiekelung der bairischen Armee, Munchen, 
 1863, pp. 79-115. Both writers base their evidence on the archives, 
 which witness to the numbers, but not to the efficiency, of the army. 
 Heigel, whose works are an honour to Bavarian history, touches only 
 briefly on this period. The best modern' account is in Doeberl, 
 Entwickelungsgesckichte Bayerns, Miinchen^ 1912, ii. pp. 254-331, 
 with good general bibliographies. It should be remembered that 
 I am not concerned solely with Max Joseph's internal policy, and 
 that my criticism of him is largely based on the fact that he had no 
 external policy worth the name. 
 
 ' See Elliot's unsigned Memorial, apud 1776. S.P.F. German 
 States, vol. Ill (passim). I have softened the rhetoric of some of his 
 denimciations, but its conclusions seem on the whole sound. 
 
 Buchner, Geschichte von Baiern, Miinchen, 1853, Bd. ix. 241, fol- 
 lowed by Hoffman, pp. 149-69, mentions instances of some improve- 
 ment in the principles of taxation. Buchner, ix. pp. 250-51, ascribes 
 the failure to improve the agriculture to the suspicion of the peasants, 
 and blames the ignorance of the Bavarian populace for the relative 
 failure of the attempts to start factories and introduce foreign 
 artisans. Only one manufacture, that of- beer, responded to the 
 enlightened poUcy of the princes, especially under Maximilian the 
 Great. That worthy is usually renowned for his acquisition of the 
 Upper Palatinate and the Electoral title in 1623, but his encourage- 
 ment of beer is his chief merit in the eyes of an anonymous writer. 
 For that " the Elector can glorious be, and the whole land will 
 reverence his undertaking so long as the world lasts. Nowhere now 
 save in this land does one drink such good and health-giving beer." 
 Indeed Munich still holds its reputation. (Emil Struve, Entwiekelung 
 des bayerischen Braugewerbes in XIX. [Schmoller, ii. Heft 1, p. 11].) 
 
 For general econornic conditions, see J. Kaizl, Der Kampf um 
 Gewerhereform und Gewerbefreiheit in Bayern (1799-1868), Leipzig, 
 1880, p. 47, where he accounts for the failure of Bavarian industries 
 in the eighteenth century by the exhaustion produced by the wars. 
 
 L. Hoffman, Okonomische Geschichte Bayerns untcr Montgelas, 
 Erlangen, 1885, gives a study of later economic developments with 
 a useful retrospective sketch. 
 
 On the extraordinarily primitive conditions of the Bavarian 
 peasants in the country districts, see Wraxall, Memoirs of the Counts 
 (1777-79), London, 1779, vol. ii. p. 199. He considers them very 
 inferior to the Saxons in intelligence, wealth, and physique. Like 
 so many backward races — compare the Slavs in the Balkans of 
 to-day — the Bavarian peasant possessed a natural and beautiful 
 peasant art, as the remains in the Bayerisehe National Museum still 
 show. 
 
m] AND KAISER JOSEPH 235 
 
 * Minto's Memoir pj Hugh Elliot. V. J'. Lipowsky, Max Joseph, 
 pp. 1S8-03, shows Uirtt the charitable efforts were not wholly 
 speetacuhvr. Ho gives insUinccs of llic foundind of hospitals for 
 waifs aiul strays ; nnd Biuhner, pp. 25:2-53,,mcntion8 the allowances 
 made to poor students at the universities. 
 
 A good study of Nymphenburg, in its histoiieol and artistic 
 aspects, is given by K. T. Hcigel, Neue hist'. Vorlriige, Munich, 1883, 
 pp. 287-308. 
 
 ' The incident is related by Buchner,. Geschichte Bayerns, ix. 
 pp. 254-55 ; other amiable traits of Max Joseph are given on p. 240. 
 Compare Rothanimer, Leben Max Joseph von Bayern, MUnchen, 
 1785 ; L. Westenrieder, Gesch. von Baiern fUr das Jugend und das 
 J'olk, ii. pp. 660-70, Miinchen, 1785 ; F. 3. Lipowsky, Leben und 
 thaten Max Joseph, Miinchen, 1838 (well Written, but based chiefly 
 on official acts), esp. ii. pp. 238-80. 
 
 The work based on most modem reseofph is that of F. A. W. 
 Schreiber, Max Joseph III., Munich, 1863. 
 
 For reasons given in the text, I find myself unable to agree with 
 Buchner's view or with that of more recent historians. The study 
 which holds the scale most evenly is L. II., Pfah-Baiem gegen Ende 
 des IS. Jahrhunderts [F. v. Raumer, Hist. Taschenbuch, Leipzig, 
 1864]. Doeberl is the best among recent historians. 
 
 * Krennek, Fr. von. Finanzxustand in den Jahren 1777, 1792, 
 
 1798-99, 1880. Miinchen, 1803. 
 BucHNEK, ix. pp. 253-55. Cp. Lipowsky, Max Joseph, pp. 
 
 165-67, 279-81. 
 Seyfbied, J. E. VON. Gesch. der standischen Gerichtsbarkeit 
 
 in Bayem. 2 vols. Pest und Leipzig, 1791-98. 
 
 S[eyfried], J. E. VON. Zur Geschichte bairischer Landschaft 
 
 und Steuem. Miinchen, 1800. 
 
 Elliot (Memorial, 1776, SJPJ'. German SlaUs, vol. 111) reckons 
 
 the average income at 3,376,000 florins (excluding the customs, 
 
 which brought in little in his day), but exyiift'sslyiadds that these are 
 
 "ordinary computations," and tliat the Elector concealed the real 
 
 state of the finances, though expenditure certainly exceeded income. 
 
 In 1803 a Bavarian balance-sheet of the year 1777 was published 
 
 by Franz von Krenner, an old financial official. According to him 
 
 the income was 4,381,427 florins, the expenses 4,453,379 florins, and 
 
 the deficit, therefore, 71,932 florins. The Cpurt cost 729,822 florins, 
 
 of which 173,976 florins went in pensions. Buchner put the pension 
 
 item at 200,000 florins. As German rulers went at this time, the 
 
 expenditure of the sixth of the total on the Court was moderate. 
 
 Timeschange, and between 1801 and 1867tlieexpense8 of the Bavarian 
 
 Court were reduced to one-fifteenth of the national income. Other 
 
 financial statistics of Bavaria under Max Joseph are quoted by L. H. 
 
236 FREDERIC THE fiREAT [chap. 
 
 in Pfalz-Baiern gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts [F. v. Raumer, 
 Historisches Taschetibmh, 4te Folge, 5ter Jahrgang, Leipzig, 1864, 
 314-15 sqq.). 
 
 No one will deny that Max Joseph made" some financial improve- 
 ments (Buchner, ix. 233-85, 241 ; Elliot, Memorial). The most 
 important of these was the establishing of a Sinking Fimd, which 
 reduced the debt from forty million florins to sixteen. None the 
 less, the evidence seems to me conclusive that Max Joseph was less 
 skilful as a financier than Karl Theodor. By 1792 the latter had 
 wiped out all deficits, and had a surplus of over fifteen thousand 
 florins. See on the whole subject Ludwig- Hoffman, Geschichte der 
 direJiten Steuern in Baiern adii. - saiiii, [SchmoIIer's Forschungen, 
 Bd. iv. Heft 5, Leipzig, 1883, pp. 149-218, with Bibhography]. 
 
 ' Cp. Schreiber, Max Joseph III. 135-53. On the code and 
 judicial system see A. von Bechmann, Kreittmayr, Der oberbayerische 
 Kanzler, Festrede, Mtinchen, 1896. This lecture deals chiefly with 
 his legal reforms. Compare the biography in Deutsche allgemeine 
 Bibliographie. The French commend hira for his talents, Reetieil 
 des instructions, Baui&re Palatinat, Dews Pords, Andr6 Le Bon, Paris, 
 1899, pp. 322, 331, and pension him for his services, p. 345. Elliot 
 does him full justice in the English despatches {e.g. Memorial, 1776, 
 S.P.F. German States, vol. Ill), where he says he " is not more 
 remarkable for a mind enlarged by study, than for candor and 
 integrity, occupied with the duties of his office, perhaps disgusted 
 with the men in power, or averse from the measures prescribed, he 
 meddles little in political business"). We shall see later on that 
 when he did so meddle the part he played was fairly creditable. 
 
 ' Buchner, ix. 258. Compare L. Westenrieder, Geschichte der 
 Akademie der Wissenschaft, Bd. i. 196-218 ; " Aus den Handschrift 
 nachlassen L. W." (Abkand. der Miinchner Akademie, Bd. xvi.). 
 Westenrieder, a critic partial to Bavaria, admits that its general level 
 of culture (c. 1770) was poor. Cp. Schreiber, Max Joseph, pp. 226-53. 
 
 ' Lipowsky, Geschichte der Schulen in Bayern (1825) ; Buchner, 
 ix. 271 sqq. ; August KZuckhohn, " Der Freiherr von Ickstatt und das 
 Unterrichtswesen in Bayern unter dem Churfiirsten Max Joseph HI." 
 (Vortrag in der offentlichen Sitzung der Koniglichen Akademie der 
 Wissenschaften am SS. Juli 1868), Miinchen, 1869. The ecclesiastical 
 and educational reforms are shortly described in Schreiber, Max 
 Joseph, 199-252. Max Joseph displayed a certain amount of 
 liberality with regard to the press - censorship, and inaugurated 
 a freedom, strictly qualified indeed, but one which was a great innova- 
 tion on the previous Press restrictions. Cp. K. T. Heigel, Neue 
 historische Vortrdge und Aufsatze, Miinchen, 1883, 236-45. 
 
 " That, after 1772, the main initiative in the designs on 
 Bavaria lay with Joseph and not Maria Theresa is abundantly clear 
 
xnl AND KAISER JQSEPH 287 
 
 from Arneth, Geschicble -l/nrtii Tlieresias, Viiiuio, 1870, BU. x. 201 
 sgq. It sif ins ncnlli-ss Ui prove u uiiiveisfilly (ibvious propoHition. 
 The most important single documents are Kiifmitz, " Dinksclnifl iiljcr 
 Baiern, December -"2, 1770," Arcliivfilr Gut. (.'(sch. Bd. xlviii., N'icnna, 
 1872. Kr»-dcric's views may be found in! Wuvres (edition, 1780), 
 vol. iii. pasxiiii. and Nugent reports an interview witli liim on the 
 subjeit on May 0, 1770, tu .Maria Theresa (May 25, 1770) ; see Arneth, 
 Maria Theresa, viii. r)7:j-7(i, and E. Hcimann, Preuss. (n'sch. ii. 008. 
 The instruction of \'crgennes to the Chevalier de la Luzeruc, French 
 envoy extraordinary to Uu\ario, of December, 1770, is a masterly 
 summary of the situation at the very moment before tlie crisis 
 (see Heciteil des inslniclions, Baviirr Palatinat, Deux Fonts, par 
 Andr* Le Bon, Paris, 1880, pp. 300-78). 
 
 " Cp. Sboniik, Ixv, 301-14, which giVes the view of Zwei- 
 briicken. The best modern discussion of the claims is to be found 
 in E. Reimann, Geschichle des bairischen Erbfolgekrieges, Leipzig, 
 1809, pp. 101-108, with more modern treatment in his Neucrc 
 preusisisclie Geschichte, Bd. ii., Gotha, 1888^ His view is generally 
 favourable to Prussia. .\ good study of the Pact of 1721 is in K. T. 
 Heigel, Geschkhtlkhe Bildcr und Sh-izzcn, Miincheii, 1897 ; Die 
 wittelsbachische Uaui-Uiiion von 17 C 4, pp. 1*1,1-74 (ii(/f infra, nn. 11, 
 13, 14, etc.); and Bitterauf, Die v^ilielsbacldsche Ilaus-Union von 
 1746-1747, Munich, 1903. A. Beer, "Zur Qeschichte des bairischen 
 Erbfolijekrieges," Hist. Zeit. Bd. xxxv., [1876], is anti-Austrian. 
 
 " SJ'.F. German Stales, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Elliot to Suffolk, 
 April 3, 1776 ; see also Report on Bavaria^by ElUot. The second 
 report is by Sir R. Murtay Keith, British Ambassador to Vienna, and 
 is contained in SJ'.F. Germany, vol. 218, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, 
 December 22, 1770. Keith plumes himself much on the learning 
 of his essay and the accuracy of his forecasts, cp. S.P.F, Germany, 
 vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, Januajy 3 and 21, 1778. Cp. 
 Vergennes, Instructions i De la Luzerne, December 1776, Recueil 
 des instructions, Baviirc, Paris, 1889, pp. 307-78. 
 
 " S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, January 6, 1778, 
 Keith to Suffolk ; see also 1776 Elliot's report, S.P.F. German States, 
 vol. 111. 
 
 " For Maria Theresa's view see Arneth, Maria Tlicresin und 
 Joseph II. Hire Korrespondenz, Bd. ii. Vienna, 1807, p. 171 , M. T, an 
 Joseph, January 2, 1778 ; " Si mdmc nos pretentions sur la BaviOre 
 fetaient plus constat^eset plus sohde8f|u'ellcsneSont, on dcvraitliteitcr," 
 and so on in the same strain. See also Bricfr, Maria Tlicresin an Hire 
 Kinder und Freunde, M. T. an Leopold, March 12, 1778, Vienna, 
 1881, Bd. i. pp. 88: "Nous ne pouvons . . . avouer notre faute." 
 Hertzberg's views on the superior justice of Frederic's claimi may 
 be found in A. Unzcr, Ilerlzberg'a Anteil an der preuaaisch-dstcr- 
 
238 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap. 
 
 reichischen Verhandlungen, 1778-1779, Frankfort a. M., 1890, 26, 
 130-31. 
 
 IB Definite family compacts, laying down the principle of 
 reciprocal inheritance between the Wilhelmine and Rodolphine 
 branches, had confirmed this practice at different times [1524, 1618]. 
 It had also been ratified by several Emperors and by the Peace of 
 Osnabruck (1648). The Family Compacts had been renewed in 
 1673, 1724, and in 1766, 1771, and 1774, during the Ufetime of Max 
 Joseph. See Keith's Report and K. T. Heigel, Die wittelsbachische 
 Haus-Union von 17S4 (Gesch. Bilder und Skizzen, Miinchen, 1897), 
 pp. 141-74, and Sbornik, Ixv. 301-307, note of Hohenfels " touchant 
 la garantie des trait6s et pactes de famille de 1766, 1771, et 1774." 
 
 ^' Text of will is in Buchner, ix. 280. A more detailed history 
 of these negotiations may be found in Chapter VI. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 1 For the whole account here, see S.P.F. German States, 
 Bavaria, vol. 112, Munich, January 1, 1778, Eden to Suffolk. It is 
 not altogether fanciful to compare this succession scene with that by 
 the bedside of Queen Anne in England in 1714. There was the same 
 baffling of intriguers, the same excitement and confusion, the same 
 dramatic close. Note, Karl Theodor, being already Elector Palatine, 
 was not allowed at the subsequent Peace of Tesehen to assume 
 the title of Elector of Bavaria, and Bavaria's Electoral vote was 
 abolished. 
 
 2 The transaction with Karl Theodor is obscure. Bitter's full 
 powers were signed by Karl Theodor on No.vember 29, 1777, and 
 on December 14 he appeared in Vienna. He appears to have been 
 ignorant of the Facte of 1774 between Max Joseph and Karl Theodor, 
 See A.Unzer, "Die Entstehung des Pfalz-osterreichischen Konvention, 
 Januar 8, 1778," Mitteil. des Instituis fiir osterreichische Geschichte 
 Bd. XV., Vienna, 1894, p. 102, and the whole article for detailed 
 study. The leading general authorities are : Austrian, Arneth, Maria 
 Theresia, Vienna, 1879, Bd. x. pp. 294-318 ; and Prussian, E, 
 Reimann, Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates (Gesch. der 
 europaischen Staaien), Gotha, 1888, Bd. ii. pp. 23-33, and Appendix, 
 681 - 98. Reimann criticizes Arneth somewhat severely, but has 
 pointed to some positive errors of fact both in his account and that 
 of Beer. There is some useful criticism of Arneth in A. Erhard, 
 " Hcrzogin Maria Anna von Bayern und der Teschener Friede," Ober- 
 bayrisches Archivfur valerlandische Geschichte, Bd. xl. pp. 6-8. The 
 public documents connected with this whole crisis are most of them 
 given in E, F, v. Hertzberg, Recueil des didttctions manifestes traitis 
 etc., publics par la cow de Prusse, 3 vols., Berlin, 1789. 
 
.V] AND KAISER JOSEPH 239 
 
 • The full text wns only publislu'il on Februnry 10, see S.P.F. 
 Bavaria, vol. 113, Kdon to Suffolk, I'cljnmry i!2, 1778. The pensions 
 to the bnstonls of Kiirl Theoiior were not BfHciflcully niiincd in tlie 
 treiity, but may reiisomibly be infLrroil froni tlie evidence. Sec 
 SJ'.F. Havana Archiws, vol. xlv., Katisbon, Novtiiibcr 8, 1778, 
 Ileathi-otc to FrnsiT, sio Frederic, Qiuvre.i posthumis [1789), iii. p. 
 314. His informntion was based on Goer/, (letlcr to Kridoric, 
 April 1778, Mill, dts Iiisl. fiir osl. Gcsclt. xviii. p. 489) and on tlie 
 evidence of Duchess Maria Anna, February 6, ,1777, quoted in Goerz, 
 Xlihnoire historiquc de la nfgociation en 177^ pour la succession de 
 BavUre, Frankfort, 1812, pp. 78-79. Cp. Edelsheim to Finckenstiin, 
 January 10, 1778 : " Quant 4 I'Electeur il ne paralt rien avoir |)lug 
 fortement h cocur que I'ttablissemcnt de 7 b4tards d6clar6s auxquels 
 il souhaite de pouvoir assurer un sort brillant aprds sa raort. S'il 
 est \Tai qu'il se propose d'en rcconnaitre deux autres dans peu ses 
 embarros 4 cet £gard n'en feraient qu'augmenter davantage," K. 
 Obser in Mitt, des Inst, fiir ost. Gesch. Bd. xix?. p. 845. 
 
 • Hitter and Karl Theodor had, in fact, ^e^•ealcd most of the 
 negotiations to Vergennes, see A. Unzer, Friede von ieschen, Kiel, 
 1903, pp. 36-41. Karl Theodor's letter to Zwelbriicken, admitting 
 the compulsion under which he had signed the treaty, was not known 
 to Russian diplomats until December 1778. See Imperial Russian 
 Historical Society Archives (Sbomik), vol. Ixy. pp. 84-85, Dolgorukov 
 (BerUu) to Bariatinsky, Paris, December 13, 1778. 
 
 • For the neutrality of France the best general account is 
 A. Unzer, Der Friede von Teschen, Kiel, 1903, pp. 1-101 ; see also 
 Tratchewsky, " La France et I'Allemagne sous Louis XVI," Revue 
 hiatmique, tome xiv. Breteuil's news cart be found in F. von 
 Raumer, Beilrdge zur neueren Geschichie, Leipzig, 1839, Bd, v. pp. 
 301-46 ; for those of Vergennes, see Flassan, Hist, g^nirale de la 
 diplomatie franfaise, ii. 189 sq., vii. pp. 13!S-40 (2nd edition) ; see 
 also Bailleu, Revue critique. No. 31, 1881 ; and Rccucil des Instruc- 
 tions donnies aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France, Baviire 
 Palatinat, Dnux Fonts, A. Le Bon, Paris, 1889, pp. 306-78, 527-30. 
 For the Austrian view of French policy, see Arneth, Maria Theresia, 
 X. pp. 41-48, 663, 665 ; and Ameth et Flammermont, Correspondance 
 secrite du Comte de Mercy- A rgenteau avec Fenipereur Joseph II, 
 tome ii. pp. 520-26 ; Ameth et Geffroy, Correspondance secrite entre 
 Marie TMriae et le Comte de Mercij-Argenleau, iii. 10-18, 151-53 ; 
 Ameth, Marin Theresia und Marie Antoinette, Ihr Brirjwechsel 1777- 
 1780 (Paris and Vienna, 1865), pp. 215-50. 
 
 • Frederic and France, see the short notice in Frederic, (Euvres 
 postkumes, iii. pp. 810-19, and Unzer and other authorities as before, 
 with the addition of Kozer's classic Biography of Frederic, Berlin, 
 1908, Bd. ii. S17-30, and Reimann, Ncuerc Geschichie des preussiachen 
 
240 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap. 
 
 Staaies, Gotha, 1888, Bd. ii. Frederic's Poliiische Korrespondenz 
 has as yet been published only till 1774. 
 
 ' Frederic seems to have cherished a hope that Hanover might 
 actively assist Vienna as late as June 28, K. W. v. SchOning, Der 
 bayerische Erbfolgekrieg, Beriin, 1854, p. 57. 
 
 8 S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, February 3, 
 1778. Cp. S.P.F, German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, Ratisbon, 
 January 9, 1777, Listen to Eden, and Max Joseph's utterance to 
 Elliot, April 1, 1776 (vide supra). Frederic's letter, February 16, 1778, 
 to Prince Henry disclaims all aggrandizement or acquisition 
 (Sehoning, p. 16), and indicates a line of action which was consistently 
 adhered to. 
 
 * O. Eustache de Goerz, Mimoire historique de la rUgodation en 
 1178, Frankfort a. M., 1823, pp. 88-84, and vide infra Chap. VI. passim, 
 
 i" Over the Sohonburg affair, cp. Arneth, Maria Tkeresia, Vienna, 
 1879, Bd. X. pp. 278 et seq. and note 11, infra. Alvensleben (Prussian 
 ambassador to Saxony) writes to Frederic, March 6, 1778: "C'est 
 vraiment depuis ce moment (the raising of the Schonburg question) 
 que je date le changement de la Cour et de la Nation en faveur de 
 votre Majesty, car jusqu'^ cette 6poque ils nous craignoient," quoted 
 by E. Reiinann, " Friedrich August IH. and Karl Theodor," Neues 
 Archivfiir sacksische Geschichte (Dresden, 1883), Bd. iv. p. 316. 
 
 " S.P.F. German Empire (Austria), vol. 220, Vienna, January 
 28, 1778, Keith to Suffolk ; A. Beer, " Zur Geschichte des bayrischen 
 Erbfolgekrieges," Hist. Zeit. Bd. xxxv. (1876) ; see also E. Reimann, 
 " Friedrich August und Karl Theodor," Neues Archiv fiir sdchsische 
 Geschichte und Alterihumskunde, Dresden, 1883, Bd. iv. pp. 316-39. 
 The last pages contain a severe criticism of Arneth, who is charged 
 with " grosse Parteiliehkeit." 
 
 '2 Saxon-Prussian Alliance, see S.P.F. Poland (Saxony), vol. 
 115, Dresden, February 25, March 1, 8, April 8, 12, J. Milliquet to 
 Eden. Cp. E. Reimann, " Friedrich August III. und Karl Theodor," 
 Neues Archiv fiir sdchsische Geschichte, Bd. iv., Dresden, 1883 ; vide 
 also A. Unzer, Hertzberg's Anteil an den preussiseh-osterreichischen 
 Verhandlungen 1778-1779, Frankfort a. M., 1890, pp. 10-11, 15, 19-20, 
 and A. Beer, Hist. Zeitschrifi, Bd. xxxv. p. 110. 
 
 1' S.P.F. Bavaria Archives, vol. 45, Ratisbon, November 8, 
 1778, Heathcote to Fraser, see also December 16, 1778, which gives 
 Karl Theodor's letter of January 22, 1778 to Zweibriieken on this 
 very subject. 
 
 " S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 113, Ratisbon, 
 Morton Eden to Suffolk, July 10, 1778. Further evidence of this 
 fact is to be found in Germany (States), Cologne, vol. 155, April 6, 
 1778, Bonn, Cressemer to Lord Suffolk, " By what I learn in Dis- 
 course with the Elector (of KO'n) most of the Electoral Princes and 
 
V] AND KAISER JOSEPH 2H 
 
 states of tlie EUnpiro secretly wisli the IIoiinc of AuHtriii may not 
 kctp wtint tlicy hiivc token of the Succession of the laic l-llcclor of 
 Bavarin, as that wouki render the l.nipcror too powerful," etc. etc., 
 cp. Heimann, Preuss. (If.ich. ii. 78-7!). 
 
 " Keiniann, Pretissischc Htxchichlc, ii. pp. 02-l)t ; A. Unzer, 
 Ilerlsberg's Antril, pp. 39-tl ; ibid., Neues Archiv fiir siiclm. Gcsch. 
 iii. W2j-ii ; A. Beer, Hist. Zeil. Bd. xxxv. p. 145. (p. l-iedeiic in 
 (Euvres poi/Awmfs (1789), tome iii. pp. :i2l-22; the correspondence 
 l^tween Frederick and Joseph is gi\en on pp. 305-80. Note S.P.F. 
 Archives, Heathcotc to Fraser, July 12, 1778. 
 
 " .\. Beer, Hist. Zeil. Bd. xxxn. p. 141*. I should not like to 
 give the impression that Hertzberg was worthy of the contempt 
 here bestowed on him by Frederic. He wa.s a fanatical Prussian, 
 and at times too rash and eager, but he was a resolute and thoughtful 
 statesman, whom Frederic esteemed as welf as derided. See Study 
 by Bailleu, Hist. Zeil. Bd. xlii., and Leben, hy A. T. Preuss, Berlin, 
 1908. 
 
 CHAPTER V' 
 
 • Calonne, Nok$ sut la vie de Josef II, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 
 27487. Cp. Oskar Criste. Kriege unter KaisfT Josef II., Wicn, 1904, 
 pp. 8-15. Nosinieh, Kaiser Josef als Fcldkerr, ^^'ien, 1885, is 
 less document than Criste. Cp. a very important MS. report in Lord 
 Lansdowne's MSS. vol. xlii., by Burgoyne (of Saratoga), Appendix 
 II., which criticizes the Prussian army on the lines mentioned in the 
 text, and praises the Austrian. See also SJ'.F. Empire, vol. 220, 
 Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, February 15, 17, 1778. 
 
 « SJ'.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, 
 April 8, 1778. There is a good deal of information as to the re- 
 organization of the Austrian army betwecnJ1768 and 1778 scattered 
 through Keith's despatches. In a Memorandum written after the 
 war Laudon (see Janko, Loudon's Lebeft„ ^^■ien (1869), 394-97) 
 criticized the Austrian War OfQce for not having built enough 
 fortresses in Bohemia, for a shortage in hospital requisites, for the 
 absence of a properly organized general sfaff, and for a deficiency 
 in light troops. 
 
 • The miUtary ability of Prince Henry deser\-es more study 
 and attention than it has received. As a, strategist he appears on 
 the whole as an advocate of the Austrian S<;hool {vide nn. 4 and 5). 
 There is no first-rate modem study of the Bavarian War from the 
 German side. SchGning, Der baycrische ErbfolgckricU. Berlin, 1854, 
 is antiquated, but valuable for the corresfjondcncc of Frederic and 
 Prince Henry. R. Koser, " Prinz Heinrieh und General MOllendorf 
 im bayrischen ErbfolgckrieR " (Fofrsch. z. bjrand. und preuss. Gesch., 
 \-ol. xxiii.). Thicro is a fairly good anonymous account in Kampagne 
 
 U 
 
242 FREDERIC THE GREAT [ohap. 
 
 des Prinzen Heimich, 1778-79, Bde. Ixiv., Ixv. [Zeit. fur Kunst, 
 Wissenschaft und Geschichle des Krieges, Berlin, 1845]. 
 
 « The Austrian School was at least intelligible and consistent 
 in appljdng the principle that fortification, choice of ground, and 
 manoeuvres for position were the real ends of war. These conten- 
 tions were strengthened by the natural caution and indolence of 
 the Austrian temperament, and by the exercise of control over 
 armies in the field by the War Office at Vienna. It is worth noting 
 that the most successful Austrian generals ofthe eighteenth century, 
 Eugene and Laudon, were those who paid least attention to Vienna, 
 and who were least bound by the traditional Austrian tactic and 
 strategy. The typical Austrian general of the mid-eighteenth century 
 is Daun or Lascy. Between the latter and Laudon an interesting 
 comparison was made in 1778 by Wraxall, Mem. Courts of Berlin, 
 Vienna, etc. (1799), vol. i. pp. 331-44. 
 
 6 In these sentences I raise the whole question of the strategy 
 and tactics of the Frederician period. The extreme view is put thus 
 by Lord Acton : 
 
 " Even in his own army, on his own staff, in the royal family, 
 there were two opinions. There was a school which taught that 
 actual fighting must not be resorted to until the use of brains has 
 been exhausted, that the battle comes in when the manoeuvre has 
 failed, that the seizure of a strategic position, or a scientific retreat 
 ... is the first defence of armies, so that a force which is tactically 
 inferior may be strategically superior. Frederic was, I believe, the 
 first great soldier to reject this doctrine, and to act on the principle 
 that nothing can destroy the enemy except a pitched battle, and 
 that the destruction of the enemy, not the weakening of the enemy, 
 is the right object in war. His battles were very numerous and very 
 sanguinary, and not always decisive. Napoleon followed in his 
 footsteps, manoeuvring less, as he grew older, and fighting more. 
 It is the adopted teaching of the Prussian School, since Clausewitz 
 and Moltke." — ^Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History, Loudon, 
 1906, p. 298. 
 
 The assumption appears to be that Frederic emancipated war 
 from the theories of what I may call the Austrian School (the school 
 which advocated warfare of manoeuvre for positions), and initiated 
 the theory of the Clausewitz School, in which the supreme object of 
 the campaign is to lead up to a decisive battle and to ensure the 
 destruction of the field-army of the enemy* 
 
 The question has been hotly discussed in Germany by historians 
 and military experts. The controversy is well summed up by 
 Professor Hans Delbruck in his articles " tJber die Verschiedenheit 
 der Strategic Friedrichs und Napoleons," and in " General von 
 Clausewitz" (Historische und politische Aufsdize, 2te Auflage, Berlin, 
 
V] AND KAISER JOSEPH 248 
 
 IB08, i>p. 205-301). His miun contention ia thnt in the cixlitccnth 
 century {i.e. before 1780) certain fundimiental diffiTcnccH |irtvcntcd 
 tJic waging of a lampaijjn on tlie linis favoured liy Niipoleon or hy 
 Clausewitz. Tliese differences are (1) the mueli snialier number of 
 troops which could be conccntrateil in a siiiigle theatre of wur. In 
 such concentrations Frederic never assembled more tlian 100,000, 
 Napoleon often three or four times tliat, total. (2) The hetero- 
 geneous character of the troops, half of Frederic's being non-Prussian, 
 and pressed or hired men vrilh no special enthusiasm. This necessi- 
 tateil an iron discipline, for to many of the troops appeals to nation- 
 ality and national pride would be meaningless. The stick and not 
 the flag was therefore the military symbol, and Frederic liimself 
 lays down that it is necessary to make troops respect the bftton and 
 fear their own officers more than the enerny. Tliis rigid discipline 
 necessitated close linear formations and prevented the use of tirail- 
 leurs. (3) The difficulty of procuring supplies for the troops under 
 Frederic contrasts strongly with the Napoleonic method. Under 
 Napoleon large portions of a French national army could be detached 
 to make " requisitions." Under Frederic only a few trusted regi- 
 ments could be allowed to forage, the main Jjody being concentrated 
 to prevent escape or desertion on the part of any of the heterogeneous 
 troops. Accordingly, the Fredcrician host was strictly tied to a 
 long Une of communications and magazine^. Its movements were 
 slow in proportion, victories could not quickly be followed up, nor 
 retreats rapidly accomplished. The Fredcrician army was like a 
 diver in the sea, its movements strictly limited and tied by the long, 
 slender communicating tube which gave it life. 
 
 If these fundamentals be granted as to (1) The smallness of the 
 Fredcrician armies in actual numbers, (2) their denationalized charac- 
 ter, (3) their difficulties as to supply, certaih conclusions necessarily 
 follow. Under Frederic there could not be the same available 
 margin for risks, the same power of inspiring the masses with 
 enthusiasm, or the same power of rapid advance and concentration 
 as under Napoleon. Accordingly for the} Prussian a battle was 
 neither as necessary nor as decisive an incident in a campaign as it 
 was for the French emperor. 
 
 Considerations like these solve the question of the differences 
 between the warfare of the mid-eighteenth century and that of the 
 early nineteenth. The Austrian military scliool under Daun under- 
 stood these considerations to impose great cjiution on a commander. 
 They made warfare chiefly an affair of oapturing fortresses and 
 convoys, and forbade him to risk a battle except when he was certain 
 to win. Frederic's utterances on the sulijeet are not altogether 
 consistent ; he can be quoted as lending some support both to the 
 Austrian School and to the Napoleonic. lie understood, as Clause- 
 
244 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap. 
 
 witz did not, the real conditions of eighteenth century warfare, 
 and knew that for armies such as he led, the lightning advance, the 
 unexpected concentration, the decisive battle, and the fall of the 
 enemy's capital were only ideals. Where Frederic differs, and differs 
 decisively from Prince Henry, Daun, Lascy, and other commanders 
 of his age, is in recognizing the moral advantage of inspiring troops 
 with enthusiasm, and the unique opportunity which a battle gives 
 for this purpose. The Frederician method is illustrated best by the 
 battles of Rossbach and Leuthen, when he frankly appealed to the 
 nobler instincts of his soldiers and boldly resolved on a decisive battle. 
 In significant contrast, however, to Napoleon, Frederic manoeuvred 
 more and fought less as he grew older, as .is markedly seen in the 
 1778 campaign. 
 
 The general result of his investigation may be summed up as 
 follows. The Austrian School advocated the scientific manoeuvre 
 for position, and regarded the supreme object as the destruction 
 of hostile supplies and the occupation of strategic points. The 
 school of Napoleon and Clausewitz has since advocated the scientific 
 manoeuvre in order to force a decisive action, regarding the supreme 
 objective as the destruction of the hostile-army in the field. The 
 ardent genius of Frederic drove him in the direction of Clausewitz, 
 but his common-sense recognition of the limitations which a semi- 
 mereenary army and the diificulties of supply imposed on him, 
 prevented any complete acceptance of that strategy. He fought 
 battles oftener than the Austrian School considered right, and less 
 decisively than Clausewitz would have expected. The explanation 
 is to be found in the conditions of the age, which did not allow 
 Frederic to revolutionize the art of war, though his genius broke 
 through the precise rules of the existing school, and formulated 
 military axioms for another age to carry out. (The subject may 
 be further studied in R. Koser, " Preussische Kriegfiihrung im 
 7jahrigen Kriege," Hist. Zeit. xcii.; R Bernhardi, Delbruck, 
 Friedrich der Grosse und Clausewitz, Berlin, 1892 ; Bonnal, L'Esprit 
 de la guerre moderne, Paris, 1903 ; Treitschke, c. 23, Politik, Eng. 
 trans., 1914.) 
 
 « Criste, 83-84. Judged by a modern military criticism, Laudon's 
 suggestion would be sound and right, but not entitled to the special 
 commendation given in the text. I think, however, a study of the 
 conditions of contemporary warfare (cp. n. 5 and Delbriick) shows 
 that the enterprise was a daring one for any eighteenth century com- 
 mander to propose. It was specially daring in an Austrian general, 
 and in an enterprise directed against the Prussian master of warfare. 
 
 ' S.P.F. Prussia, 102, Berlin, EUiot tb Suffolk, August 4, 11, 
 1778. This letter of Prince Henry's is not printed elsewhere, but 
 the positive affirmation of Elliot leaves no doubt as to its genuineness 
 
v) AND KAISER JOSEPH 245 
 
 (cp. one from Henry to Frcileric of August .'i. quoted by ScliOning, 
 /Vr bayrrischf Krbfolgekrieg, IJiTlin, \HM), lOil). Klliut speaks at 
 till- ^iiolo ns n " nuircli tlmt does lionoiir to llio military tiilcniN even 
 of Prince llonry." 
 
 Cp. " Kiunpnj^nc dcs Prin7.cn Ileinrich (1778-70)," Zeilnchrifl 
 fiir Kunst, }yissenschafl und Geschichle des Krieges, Berlin, IS'IS, 
 Bd. Ixiv., pp. 102-68, which gives details bf the dilliculties of the 
 marcli. Consult also Gruf Lippe on MOUendorf, Jahrbuch fiir die 
 deutsche Annee, Bd. eix. 
 
 « Criste, 90-96, 97, 102. The defence of Laudon is undertaken 
 by W. E. von Janko, Loudon's Leben, i^ach Original-Artni des 
 K, K. Haus- Hof- Stoats- und Kriegs-Archivs, Correspondciizen uiul 
 Qttenen, Wien, 1869, pp. 373-98. G. B. Malleson's Life of Laudon, 
 London, 1887, is merely a summary of Janko. Both speak of 
 " masterly raanoEuvres," on the part of Laudon, but neither attempts 
 to defend his neglect to strengthen Tollepstein. Note review of 
 Janko by Schaefer, Hist. Zeit. Bd. xiii. 
 
 ' Criste, 103-4, 132-33 ; Janko, 388, 390-91. Laudons action in 
 ordering this retreat puts the finishing touch on his feebleness in 
 this campaign. In justice to him it should be mentioned that his 
 information appears to have been very imperfect, and in liis subse- 
 quent memorandum on the campaign (J^nko, 304), Laudon em- 
 phasizes the inadequacy of the scouting system and the absence of 
 a general staff. 
 
 »• Keimaim, Preussische Geschichle, ii. 166. 
 
 " Schoning, Der bayerische Erbfolgekrieg, 115-16. 
 
 " The losses of the Prussian army have been variously reckoned, 
 and it is difficult to separate those of Prinfce Henry from those of 
 Frederic. Prince Henry admits a loss of 2000 men by September 30 
 (SchOning, pp. 159-64). Janko, Loudon's Leben, p. 383, puts 
 Frederic's losses alone up to September at 12,000 killed, wounded, 
 and sick ; Nosinich (p. 189) at 14,000 ; .lanko puts losses of both 
 Henry and Frederic at 20,000. Criste, p. 1 1 1 , puts the totul Prussian 
 losses at 18,000, and Nosinich, p. 241, reckons the Austrian losses 
 at about the same. There are only two relatively impartial esti- 
 mates — that of Prince Charles of Hesse, himself a general and a volun- 
 teer in this campaign, though not an absolutely trustworthy witness, 
 whoputs I-'rederic's losses alone at over20,00(}(Mft«ot>f >.■, Copenhagen, 
 1801,pp. 80, 86, lOe) ; and that of Sir John Stepney, British Minister 
 at Dresden, who, on the strength of authentic knowledge, puts 
 Prince Henry's losses at 7000 to 8000 men. (SJ'.F. Poland {SaMny), 
 vol. 115, September 23, October 28, 1778,;Stcpney to Suffolk.) I 
 think, therefore, that we may reckon Prussia's total loss at at least 
 25,000, or about one-seventh of her forces. 
 
 " In a speech to his ofTicers on April 3, 1778, at Berlin, Frederic 
 
246 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap. 
 
 enjoined " humanity to unarmed enemies," as a " most sacred duty 
 ... in every situation," but he certainly did not spare their pro- 
 perty. Here are one or two illustrations. Requisitions of 10,000 
 rixdales from the seigniory of Neuschlosif; beer, wine, and pro- 
 visions from the district. From Reic^enberg-Kuhendorf, 200 
 ducats, 80,000 rixdales, 2500 boisseaux of corn, and the same of 
 forage ; 80 fat bvdloclcs, 100 oxen, 150 cows. From the circle of 
 Satz, requisition of 132,000 florins {Supp. Exf"- a la Gazette de 
 Vienne, August 10, 1778). There is an interesting account of the 
 treatment of the small village of Kuesdorf in this war. According 
 to the village schoolmaster all the potatoes were dug up ; the young 
 shrubs cut down, and much firewood requisitioned ; 136 beasts 
 (horses, oxen, and cows) were taken ; and the total damage done was 
 estimated at 60,712 fl. \ kr. ; while some men of the village were held 
 to ransom and others requisitioned for service (" Zur Geschichte des 
 Kartoftel - Krieges," Mittheilungen des Vereins fur Geschichte der 
 Deutschen in Bohmen, Prag, Leipzig, and Wien, 1879, pp. 58-61), 
 There is no better account of the sufferings of peasants in eighteenth 
 century warfare, and it reveals a striking absence of patriotic 
 Austrian feeling, vide n. 17. 
 
 " See the April campaign scheme of Frederic quoted in Nosinich, 
 Kaiser Josef (Wien, 1885), 109. Frederic's omission to plan any 
 real advance into Moravia seems to have been due to a belief in 
 the speedy intervention of Russia, to which he clung with much 
 persistence. See Schoning, 132 ; Reimann, Preuss. Gesch. 144, 161 ; 
 Unzer, Friede von Teschen, 151 sqq. 
 
 The scheme quoted above throws the best light on the whole 
 action of Frederic in this campaign, which is still somewhat of a 
 mystery, and not cleared up by his own account or utterances. 
 There can, however, be no doubt that he intended originally to 
 attain decisive results and not to play a game of mere inaction. 
 Prince Charles of Hesse, not altogether a trustworthy witness, 
 declares that Frederic explained his inaction at Oels by the gout 
 (MHnoires de mon temps, p. 109). There can be no doubt that the 
 Braunau negotiations and poUtical conditions generally hampered 
 Frederic's military decision. But age, illness, and a very curious 
 political situation are hardly sufficient to account for his inaction. 
 The effort made by Frederic to increase the mobility of the army after 
 1778 shows that the slowness of the movements of the troops may 
 have been a contributory cause, and tMs is borne out by evidence 
 from Elliot, S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 104, June* 4, 1780. 
 
 Of one military criticism that is sometimes made it is best perhaps 
 here to dispose. It is stated that Prince Henry might have joined 
 forces with Frederic by marching north of Turnau. He could then 
 have broken through the Austrian centre, and forced the evacuation 
 
V] AND KAISER JOSEPH 2t7 
 
 of the Arnnu-Jaroiucr line. It iippcars, liuwcvcr, crilaiii Hint bftd 
 roniU, hill, unit forest renilcreil it imiinssibk- to transport guns tlirough 
 tlieso roifions, and decisively viloivl tlic pmjrct iix n whole. 
 
 The best Miodern teclinieiil critique of tlie war iind its military 
 lessons is in Xosinieh, pp. 2K)-1:j, though. there is more detail in 
 Criste. 
 
 " Criste, 101. Older authorities, e.g. Janko, .'!8.5, say that 
 Lnudon wished to harass Prince Henry's retreat, but was forbidden 
 by Joseph. Criste, 133, ap|)ears to diseredft this view, and makes 
 Lnudon responsible for his own inaction. 
 
 " The modern military critic would assail the whole of Lascy'a 
 scheme on the ground that it was one for defence and not for \ictory. 
 This charge is unquestionably true, as may be seen from the Defen- 
 siottsplan drawn up by Lascy, .\pril 28, 1778 (given in Criste, 
 2(U)-H2). The whole plan was in accordahce with the traditional 
 Austrian strategy, and its adoption explt\ins why Joseph refused 
 to allow Laudon to join forces with him to crush Frederic at the 
 beginning of the campaign, and also to permit serious rearguard 
 actions at the close. 
 
 " Lascy was undoubtedly the most important military in- 
 fluence on the Austrian side. Prince Charles of Hesse (Mimoires, 
 109) quotes an instance of the confusion ,into which Joseph was 
 thrown by having to take a decision in the absence of Lascy. La.scy 
 seems to have reaped the chief credit at Vienna among the populace. 
 Laudon was still the hero of Bohemian peasants, who received liim 
 with shouts of joy and passed by Joseph and Lascy in silence (Janko, 
 377). Joseph was regarded by these peasants with mingled feelings, 
 as was shown when he went on an expedition to Maxen in disguise 
 with four oflBcers at the end of 1779. " On their return His Imperial 
 Majesty, being very inquisitive, got into a dispute at Guisuble 
 (Giessbubel) with some Peasants of that Place, and without the 
 very mild and prudent interposition of one of the Company it would 
 have ended in blows. That part of the Country having suffered 
 greatly during last Year's Campaigns, the Cpmmon People of course 
 are much exasperated against the Emperor ; they knew him, yet 
 would have used him very ill, under the Pretence of being ignorant 
 who those five officers were." Could irony or ingratitude further 
 go ? S.PJ". Poland, vol. 115, Dresden, December 29, 1779, Milliquet 
 to Fraser. 
 
 " Acton, Lectures in Modern History,, p. 298. "During the 
 French campaign of 1814 Napoleon said to Miirmont, ' Wc are still 
 100,000.' ' No,' said the marshal,' ' only on.ooo.' ' l-^xaetly,' Napoleon 
 replied, ' and myself, that is 100,000.' " Cp. t'roker, Diaries, \o\. iii. 
 p. 277. Wellington endorsed this estimate with his usual cautious 
 reservation.?. See Stanhope, Conversations lOith Wellington, 9, 81-83. 
 
248 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap. 
 
 For evidence of dissatisfaction of Prussian troops at the close of 
 the campaign, see Koser, 534 ; Criste, 111 ; Arneth, x. 534. 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 1 The chief work on Karl Theodor as a ruler is K. T. dessen 
 Leben und Taien, F. J. Lipowsky, Sulzbach, 1828. This is antiquated, 
 as is A. Buchner, Geschichte von Baiern, Munich, 1853, Bd. ix. 
 HSusser, Geschichte der Rheinpfalz, 2 Bde., 1868 ; and Pftdz-Baiern 
 gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Raumer's Historisches Tasckenbuch, 
 1865), give general histories of the Palatinate. Consult also K. 
 Hauck, Karl Theodor Kurfilrst von Pfah-Baiern ; Manuheimer, 
 GeschichtsblcUier, i. ; K. T. Heigel, Neue hist. Vortrage, Munich, 
 1883, pp. 304-6, is one of the few Bavarian historians who gives 
 credit to Karl Theodor for throwing open the artistic treasures of 
 Munich to the people, and who compares him, not unfavourably in 
 this respect, even with the beloved Max Joseph. Cp. also Heigel, 
 Geschichtliehe Bilder (Mimioh, 1897), p. S73. Doeberl, Entmicke- 
 lungsgeschichte Bayerns, vol. ii. p. 295, n. 2, quotes the evidence of 
 courtiers who favoured Karl Theodor. 
 
 » S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 113, April 30, 1778, 
 Eden to Suffolk ; cp. Chap. IV. n. 3, for authorities. The chief are 
 A. Unzer, " Die Entstehung der Pfalzkonvention," Mitt, des Inst, 
 fur ost. Gesch. Forsch., Innsbruck, 1894, Bd. xv., and E. Reimann, 
 " Karl Theodor und Karl August," Neues Archiv fiir sdchsische 
 Geschichte, Bd. iv. pp. 316-39. 
 
 ' Karl Theodor's own defence of his conduct in these negotia- 
 tions was that Bavaria had no army, and that his measures prevented 
 it becoming the seat of war. See his account in Buchner, Geschichte 
 Baierns, Bd. ix. pp. 128-31. 
 
 The characters of Vieregg and Hompfeche are also described in 
 the despatches of Edelsheim to Finckenstein, see Karl Obser, Mitt, 
 fiir 6st. Gesch. Bde. xviii. and xix., where Vieregg is represented as 
 having been appointed to direct foreign policy because he was pliable 
 and easily controlled. 
 
 • S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 113, Munich, January 22, 25, 
 29 ; April 23 ; Ratisbon, July 10, 1778. Eden to Suffolk. 
 
 s S.P.F. Bavaria Arch. vol. 45. Heathcote to Praser, June 6, 
 1779. Karl Theodor's letter to Zweibrucken (January 22, 1778) is 
 in id. to id. December 16, 1778. Cp. comment of Prince Dolgorukov 
 (Berlin), December 2, 1778, Sbornik, vol. Ixv. pp. 84-85, 
 
 The chief authorities on the mysterious and complicated negotia- 
 tions between Zweibriioken and Frederic, the Dowager Duchess, and 
 Karl Theodor are as follows ; A. Eckhart, " Graf du Moulin, Zwei- 
 
v.] AND KAISER JOSEPH 249 
 
 briickcn und \'orsiiilles." Nine Ileidclberger Jahrbikher, Bd. v., 
 1804 ; Th. v. Iloigcl, " Dio nrzieluinpcii Karl Aui^'ijst unci Max 
 Josef und Zwcibriickcii /u PrcuBScn," I'rniss. Hist, I' in I., Leipzig, 
 1900, Bd. iii. pp. '-'T-IH ; (iocra, ft. ICustuclie'von, Mtmoire liistorique 
 de la nfgociation en 177t! pour la sticcession de liavidrc, I'riinkfort 
 u.M., 1S2;1 ; A. I'.rhard, " Maria .\nna von Baycrn und der Teschener 
 Friede," Oberbaynsches Archiv, Bd. xl. (cp. also Allgem. Zeilung, 
 1SS2, No. 302) has a useful bibliography ; H, Meissner, M. A. v. B. 
 und der pretisaischer liciclisgesandler von ScfiwaTzenau, Jauer, 1890 
 (contains little save an important letter of Goertz, February 8, 1778). 
 Cp. also \. Viizer, "Zwcibriicken und die Sendung des Grafen GOrtz," 
 Mitleilung des Inst, fiir dsterreichische GeschicMe, Bd. xviii., and 
 K. Obser, " Zur Sendung des Grafen GOrtz an den Zweibriicfcen Hof," 
 ib. Bd. xix. 
 
 • V. Goerz, M&m. Hist. 83-100 j Meissner, Xl.A.v. B. und Schwarze- 
 nau, p. 9 ; A. Erhard, M. A. v. B. und der Teschener Friede, pp. 
 10-11. 
 
 ' Reimann, Pr. Gesch. ii. 63-67. 
 
 • SJP.F. Archives Bavaria, vol. 4.i, Rafisbon, July 26, August 
 5, 23, September 6, 13, 23, Heathcote to Fraser. 
 
 • SJJ'. Arch, vol, 45, November ^, December 6, 1778, 
 Heathcote to Fraser. 
 
 10 SJ>.F. Prussia, vol. 103, Berlin, March 27, AprU 7, 1779, 
 Elliot to Weymouth. For a sketch of the conduct of Karl Theodor 
 during the period see Sbomik, vol. Ixv. pp. 3Q2-63, Galitzin to Repnin, 
 March 23, 1779. 
 
 " S.P.F. Arch. vol. 45, April 11, 1779, Heathcote to Fraser, 
 and Sbomik, vol. Ixv. pp. 407-08. 
 
 " Article VIII. of the Traits de Paix between Maria Theresa 
 and Frederic, Martens' Recueil des Trait^s, Petrograd, 1875, p. 70. 
 
 " SJP.P. For. Arch. vol. 45, Heathco'te to Fraser, June 10, 
 1770 ; sec SJP.F. Prussia, vol. 103, Beriin, August 1, 1779, Liston 
 to Fraser. 
 
 " SJ'.F. For. Arch. vol. 45, September 10, 1779, Heathcote to 
 Fraser. 
 
 " Jb. June 16, 1770, id. to id. 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 1 S.P.F, Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, Harris to Suffolk, August 
 14, 1778; S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 1 02, Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, September 
 8, 1778 ; Adolph Beer, " Die Sendung Thuguts an Braunau und der 
 Friede zu Teschen," Hist. Zeitschrifl (1871), Bd. xxxviii. pp. 421-48. 
 
250 FREDERIC THE GREAT [ohap. 
 
 For general study of the whole negotiations, consult Martens, 
 Papiers du Prince Repnin, in Sbornik, vol. Ixv., Petrograd, 1888 ; 
 and A. Unzer, Der Friede von Teschen, Kiel, 1903. The former gives 
 the papers from the Russian Archives ; the latter the results of the 
 latest study of the archives of BerUn, Dresden, Munich, Vienna, and 
 Paris. The papers of the British diplomats, which arc quoted in 
 the present volume, are the only considerable source yet unexplored. 
 The text of the Treaty is in Martens, TraiUs et conventions conclus 
 par la Bussie, Petrograd, 1875, tome ii. pp. 61-96, with useful com- 
 ments. Note for French policy Journal de Corberon, par L. H. 
 Labande, Paris, 1901, esp. ii. 200 n. 
 
 ^ Sbornik, vol. Ixv. pp. 120-27. Soma valuable extracts from 
 Breteuil's despatches are in " F. v. Raumer, 1763-83," Beitrdge sur 
 neueren Geschichte, Leipzig, 1839, Bde. iii.-v. 
 
 " S.P.F. Archives, vol. 45, Ratisbon, September 27, 1778, Heath- 
 cote to Fraser. 
 
 * S.P.F. Archives, vol. 43, Ratisbon, September 27, Heathcote 
 to Fraser. S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, September, 
 30, 1778, Keith to Suffolk. 
 
 ^ Solms attributed the Russian intervention to Potemkin and 
 the tears of the Grand Duchess Paul, see Harris to Suffolk. S.P.F. 
 Russia, vol. 102, October 2/13, 1778. 
 
 « S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, 
 June 24. S.P.F. Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, Harris to Suffolk, 
 August 3/14, October 2/13, December 20/81, 1778 ; Harris twice 
 states that Frederic won over Potemkin. Cp. Unzer, F. von T., 208 ; 
 Arneth, Maria Theresia, x. 598 ; and Sbornik, Ixv. passim. 
 
 ' S.P.F. Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, September 21, October 2, 
 October 2/13, October 5/16, 1778, Harris to Suffolk. 
 
 8 S.P.F. Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, Harris to Suffolk, October 
 2/13, December 20/31, 1778 ; Sbornik, vol. Ixv., November 10/21, 
 1778, Vienna, Galitzin to Panin. 
 
 • Sbornik, vol. Ixv., Vienna, Galitzin to Panin, November 10/21. 
 On November 19 at an interview with the Russian ambassador, 
 Prince Galitzin, he showed " extreme embarrassment " and " extra- 
 ordinary perplexity and agitation." PrinCe Galitzin spoke of the 
 peu de validiU of the Austrian pretensions to Bavaria, to which 
 Kaunitz replied his Court must choose between an entire sacrifice of 
 its dignity or run the risks of a murderous and perhaps general war. 
 Galitzin : " It would be infinitely glorious for the humanity of the 
 Empress Queen to renounce even evident and legitimate rights to spare 
 effusion of blood." 
 
 >» S.P.F. Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, October 5/16, November 
 6/17, 1778, Harris to Suffolk. 
 
 u S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, November 24, 1778, Elliot 
 
vn] AND KAISER JOSEPH 251 
 
 to Suffolk. Cp. Kniinitz' luigry reply tii llrctiiiil's rcncctioriH of 
 October 18 : " to n'ost pas sur dcs conveniihces siir dcs tilns cl ties 
 droits ijuo la muisou <rAiitriclie s'c^t ^irrangfc," etc. 
 
 " S.P.F. Foreign .Irchivcs, Mil. t.j, Ratisboii, November l.'j, 
 Noveiubor 22, 177S, Heatln'olo lo Fnuser. 
 
 " Slioniik, Ixv. pp. 30-40 ; (.'alhuiiiit-'N report is dated October 
 27 : for Puiiin's letter to Galitzin of September 21, see p. 106. 
 
 >* Sboniik; Ixv. pp. 30-50. 
 
 " vS'.P.f . German Empire, Vienna, vol.* 220, Keith to Suffolk, 
 December 211, 1778. S-PJ". Archives, BoEvaria, vol. 15, Munich, 
 Hcftthcotc to rr:\MT, January 21, 1770. 
 
 " S.P.F. Archives, Bavaria, vol. 45 ; Munich, January 21, 1770, 
 Heuthcote to Fraser. 
 
 " S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 221, Vienna, January 2, 1779, 
 Keith to Suffolk. 
 
 " Impression had already been made before the Preliminaries, 
 see Panin to Bariatinsky, Russian ambassador at Paris, December 8, 
 1778. Sbornik, Ixv. 
 
 " SJ'J'. Russia, vol. 108, Petrograd, December 28, January 
 8, 1778-70, Harris to Suffolk. See also December 20/31, 1778 ; 
 January 11/22, 1779 ; last two quoted ip Malmesbury's Diary, 
 220-26. 
 
 "> S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 221, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, 
 February 20, March 3, 1779. Cp. Frederic to Prince Henry, Febru- 
 ary 24, 1779, SchOning, p. 257. 
 
 n SJ'.F. Archives, vol. 45, April 4, 1779^ Heatheote to Fraser. 
 SJ'J'. German Empire, vol. 221, Vienna, May 10, Keith to Wey- 
 mouth. 
 
 " SJ'.F. Prussia, vol. 103, St. James's, May 28, 1779, Earl of 
 Weymouth to Elliot. Weymouth was acting for Suffolk, being the 
 other principal Secretary of State. 
 
LIST OF BRITISH DirLOI\Ix\TISTS 
 MENTIONED IN THIS- PERIOD 
 
 Principal Secretaries of State 
 
 1775-82. Kaiiliern Department. — ^Thomas, 3rd Viscount 
 Weymouth (afterwards Marquis of Bath). 
 
 1771-79. Southern Department. — Henry Howard, 12th 
 Earl of Suffolk and Bcrksliire. 
 
 1779-82. Southern Depaiimeiit. — David Murray, Viscount 
 Stormont (afterwards Earl of Mansfield). 
 
 1779-82. Under Secretary (Southern Department). — 
 William Eraser. 
 
 A'MBASSADOHS 
 
 Austria and Empire — 
 
 17G.3-72. David Murray, Viscount Stormont. 
 
 1772 02. Sir Robert Murray Keith, K.C.B. 
 France — 
 
 1772-78. David Murray, Viscount Stormont. 
 
 Other Ministers and Envoys 
 
 Russia — 
 
 1771-70. Robert Gunning (afterwards Sir R.) (envoy 
 extrfiordinary and minister pleni- 
 potentiary). 
 1770-83. J. Harris (afterw.ords Sir R. and Earl 
 Malmesbury) (minister plenipotentiary). 
 253 
 
254 
 
 FREDERIC THE QREAT 
 
 Prussia — 
 1772-76. 
 
 1776-82. 
 Saxony — 
 
 1775-83. 
 Bavaria — 
 
 1773-76. 
 
 1776-79. 
 
 1779. 
 1780. 
 
 1781-83. 
 1773-76. 
 
 James Harris (afterwards Sir R. and Earl 
 
 Malmesbury) (envoy extraordinary).] 
 Hugh Elliot (envoy extraordinary). 
 
 Sir John Stepney (envoy extraordinary). 
 
 Hugh Elliot (afterwards Sir H.) (minister 
 plenipotentiary to Bavaria and minister 
 to Diet of Ratisbon). 
 
 Moreton Eden (afterwards Sir M. and Lord 
 Harley) (minister plenipotentiary to 
 Bavaria and minister to Diet of Ratis- 
 bon). 
 
 Richard Oakes (minister to Diet of 
 Ratisbon). 
 
 Hon. J. Trevor (minister plenipotentiary to 
 Elector Palatine and minister to Diet of 
 Ratisbon). 
 
 Ralph Heathcote (minister plenipotentiary 
 to Elector of Koln). 
 
 Robert (afterwards Sir R.) Liston {charge 
 at Munich, 1776-79 at Berlin). 
 
 NOTE ON PUBLICATIONS OF THE PAPERS 
 OF BRITISH DIPLOMATS OF THE PERIOD 
 
 Elliot, Hugh, Memoir of. By Lady Minto. London, 1853. 
 
 Keith, Sir Robert Murray, Memoirs and Correspondence of. 
 Ed., Mrs. Gillespie Smith.. 2 vols. London, 1849. 
 
 Letters of the 1st Earl of Malmesbury to Family and 
 Friends. Ed., Earl of Malmesbury. 2 vols. London, 
 1870. 
 
 Political Diaries and Correspondence of 1st Earl of Malmes- 
 bury. Ed., Earl of Malmesbury. 4 vols. London, 
 1844. 
 
AND KAISER .lOSEril 255 
 
 Memoirs of the Courts of Ucrlin, Ditsdcn, \Vaisiuv, and 
 Vieniui. 1777-71). N. W. W'nixrill. London, 1799. 
 
 Flight to A'luvnnes and othci' llislorical Kssaj's. Oscar 
 Browning [contains two good tssuys on Hugh EUiotJ. 
 
 Of the above worlds the first three aic largely personal 
 in chivractcr. Tlio Political Diaries o| Lord Malmcsbury 
 include some political information mixed up with still 
 more personal gossip and scandal. They contain a picture 
 of Catherine and her Court, overdrawn and jet alive and 
 interesting. The work of \Vraxall, who knew Keith, 
 EUiot, and Harris, is of the same kind, but of a lower order 
 of merit. It has, however, far greater \'alue than the 
 English Memoirs associated with his name. 
 
 A CRITICAL ESTDL\TE OF THE ENGLISH 
 DIPLOMATIC DESPATCHES OE THE PERIOD 
 
 (1776-1780). 
 
 There has not often in our history been a trio of 
 abler British ambassadors than Keith, Elliot, and Harris. 
 It is certain that at no time in Enghsh diplomatic history 
 did such a distinguished trio of ambassadors narrate and 
 criticize the same series of events, ajid it is upon their 
 despatches that our commentary on the Bavarian Succes- 
 sion and the Russian Mission is mainfy based. 
 
 Each of these three ambassadors had already made his 
 name known to the world by a striking feat of diplomacy 
 before 1778. Keith was in Denmark at the time of the 
 grim tragedy of the fate of Queih CaroUne Matilda 
 (George III.'s sister), and it was onjy his powerful in- 
 fluence, exerted under circumstances^ of dramatic force, 
 that saved the Queen from life-long imprisonment and 
 perhaps even a darker fate (177'2). This feat won Keith 
 a K.C.B. from George IH. and the admiration of all 
 England. Harris was already renowned for a great 
 diplomatic coup in 1770, when liis admirable firmness at 
 
256 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 Madrid averted war between England and Spain. Hugh 
 Elliot had startled the world in 1777 by secretly purloin- 
 ing the papers of the American agent Lee from Berlin, 
 copying them and returning them to the owner under cover 
 of darkness. But none of their exploits ended here. Keith 
 was to raise both his own fame and that of his country to 
 the highest pitch by the peace of Sistova, 1791, the fitting 
 cover to a long diplomatic career. Hugh Elliot was to be 
 the hero of wild and daring exploits, yet again to break 
 his cane over Kuyphausen and fight a duel with him, to 
 deport the Court of Naples to Sicily despite Queen Caroline 
 of Naples, and to be assured by Gustavus III. that he alone 
 had been the saviour of the Swedish Monarchy. Harris 
 was to be the chief inspirer of the foreign policy of Pitt, the 
 architect of the Great Triple Alliance of 1787, and to close 
 his career as the Nestor of EngUsh diplomacy, at whose 
 feet the greatest of EngUsh foreign ministers, George 
 Canning himself, was to sit. Enough has been said to show 
 that their exploits and their reputation were, in each case, 
 remarkable, and to indicate that their commentary on the 
 diplomatic events of 1777-80 is hkely to be of interest. 
 
 In order to estimate the probability of bias in their 
 narratives, a close examination of their individual tempera- 
 ments is needed. During the period 1777-80, Harris and 
 Elliot were still young men, the first in the thirties, the 
 latter actually yet in the twenties. Their despatches 
 have, therefore, an interest and a fire, which is quite un- 
 usual among diplomatists. Their private correspondence, 
 in each case, is filled with mirth, satire, and pungency, 
 which often overflows into their diplomatic communica- 
 tions and profanes the solemnity associated with des- 
 patches. Harris has more brilhancy of literary style, 
 Elliot more mordancy of wit ; the one has more epigram, 
 the other more knowledge. Each Was an adept at diplo- 
 matic intrigue, and knew how to extract a secret by a 
 judicious bribe or confidence. Elhot, however, was less 
 scrupulous than Harris, and his reckless courage and 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 257 
 
 biting tongue sometinus placed him in nwkwnrd situations. 
 He wtis never afraid of provoking a crisis, of exceeding his 
 instructions, or of abandoning orthodox mcthf)ds. Thus 
 he was occasioniUly rebuked from home, he was publicly 
 censured for copying Leo's papers* (though privately 
 praised and rewarded with £500), and his repartees to King 
 Frederic can hardly always have benefited his country. 
 Harris, on the other hand, erred in exactly the opposite 
 way : though in private his opinions were expressed with 
 extraordinary freedom, he was always discreet and 
 polished to the highest degree in public or to officials. 
 He also had a strong will, but he trusted to adroitness and 
 flattery rather than to boldness, to ciarry him through a 
 diplomatic crisis. Thus, while the results Elliot secured 
 were great or disastrous, those of Harris were neither, and 
 he failed in his great object of winning Russia over to an 
 aUiance with England diuing these years (1778-80), for 
 all his cleverness and despite his great personal triumph 
 at the Court of Petrograd. The truth is that in diplomacy 
 it is possible to be too diplomatic, and brusqueness of 
 manner is sometimes more effective ithan suavity. The 
 general result of the difference between Harris and Elliot 
 seems to be this : Harris is unsurpassed at unraveUing an 
 intrigue, Elliot at judging a diplomatic situation. Each 
 has great political insight, but the ojne excels in finesse, 
 and the other in force. For this purpose they could 
 hardly have been better placed than in Berlin and in 
 Petrograd, the one to estimate the iron nature of Frederic 
 and the adamantine strength of his policy, the other to 
 foUow the caprices and intrigues of Catherine through all 
 their labyrinthine windings. Elliot judged the general 
 situation of the Bavarian Succession and the actions of 
 Frederic in most masterly fashion, he nealized more clearly 
 than any one that the claims of Austria or Bavaria were 
 not a question of right but of force, he divined sooner than 
 any one that Frederic would fight rather than yield to 
 them. In general his judgment on the dynamics of the 
 
 S 
 
258 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 situation during the war, and of the readjustments made 
 by the Peace of Teschen, are of the highest value. On 
 the other hand, for estimating and discovering the im- 
 portance and narrating the course of such a diplomatic 
 intrigue as the Mission of Count Falkenstein and of the 
 Prince of Prussia, Elliot was not the equal of Harris, 
 who understood better than any one the secrets of the 
 backstairs and the closet. The genius of the one was for 
 estimating a situation, of the other for describing a court. 
 It is not an accident that the commentary of Harris on 
 the German events of 1778, and that of Elliot on the 
 Russian events of 1780, is relatively of more importance 
 than the rest of their despatches. It was the natural 
 result of the temperaments and gifts of each individual. 
 The difference is, however, only relative, for each had many 
 of the best diplomatic qualities. 
 
 Their relative accuracy is hard to estimate, each was 
 occasionally led into exaggeration by desire for epigram 
 or effect; one cannot believe Catherine so foolish or 
 Frederic so cruel, nor their courtiers or ministers such 
 blockheads as one or the other sometimes pictures them 
 to be. But, on the other hand, the general accuracy of 
 their estimates is hard to dispute. Harris unquestionably 
 had the most varied sources of information, but was by 
 no means always able to distinguish between gossip and 
 act.* He had not a mind entirely accurate in detail, 
 and he rather subordinated particular facts to general 
 descriptions. 
 
 The diplomatist who sentences or characterizes in- 
 dividuals or events on the evidence of the day with pre- 
 cision and an air of finality has more claims on our sense 
 of pleasure than on our sense of belief. It is hardly possible 
 
 * We may quote here one example of his inaccuraoy, e.g. Malmes- 
 bury Diaries, i.p. 2. He tells us (1767) that Frederic raised the army 
 of Prussia from 70,000 to 150,000, and (1776) p. 143, gives the figures 
 " 50,000 to near 200,000," The inaccuracies are relatively slight 
 in the first (and for us most important) volume but they abound in the 
 fourth. 
 
AND KAISER JdSEPH 259 
 
 to accept judgmciUs of tliis kind as wc do those of the 
 historian, writing from the accumulated testimony of 
 years. ^Vh^Io for hvintj interest and vivid power of 
 niuration few despatches can compare with those of 
 Harris, a word of caution must be addressed to accepting 
 their confident pronouncements. He is too resolved to 
 find chaos, caprice, and corruption everywhere not to 
 succeed in his wish. Still he had- access to so many 
 sources of information, was a man of such strict honour 
 and integrity, so incapable of misrepresenting what he 
 behevcd to be facts, that even wheij we differ from him 
 we must always do so with great diffidence. His biases 
 are ob\'ious — he hates and despises the Russian Court for 
 its alien French levity and its native Slav barbarism, he is 
 shocked by its moral laxity, and scornful of its notions of 
 statesmanship, and he is induced by his Uterary skill to 
 make the most of these contrasts and defects. In addition 
 he has a fierce hatred of Prussia and all its influences at 
 court and an easy tolerance of Austria. When we allow 
 duly for these biases, and for an occasional inaccuracy of 
 detail, or over-emphasis of phrase, we are in a position 
 to form a picture of the Russian Court and policy, in a 
 detail and with an accin-acy that it is quite unusual to 
 obtain from diplomatic communications. 
 
 EUiot's sources of information at Berlin were by no 
 means so ample as those of Harris at Petrograd. He never 
 slipi)ed out from a ball to talk pohtics with Frederic in a 
 dressing-room, nor was he in the habit of calling upon 
 Finekenstein or Hertzberg when they were in bed. Prussia 
 and its chief personages, both from their hatred of Eng- 
 land and from remembrance of his celebrated coup in 
 copying Lee's papers, regarded ElUot with by no means 
 unjustified suspicion. But Elliot triumphed over many 
 difficxdties. With the king he could never hold any really 
 cordial relations, and they hardly ever met save on public 
 and formal occasions, when their conversation was chiefly 
 limited to repartees in which the king was not always the 
 
 s2 
 
260 FREDERIC THE C^REAT 
 
 winner.* In the eighteenth century it was of the greatest 
 possible importance to obtain direct knowledge of the 
 ruler from personal intimacy and acquaintance, and the 
 greatest triumphs of Keith and Harris were achieved by 
 this means. It was of more importance to know Frederic 
 with intimacy than any other sovereign, for no ruler was 
 so independent and so uninfluenced by others. As he 
 was unable to do this, Elliot started with a serious dis- 
 advantage, which he parried as well as he could. He 
 bribed some of the body-servants of the king, who gave 
 him valuable information; his attache Listen knew in- 
 timately at least one savant who was a royal confidant, 
 Elliot himself knew well Keith, Earl Marischal of Scotland 
 — ^the Jacobite transplanted to Berhn — ^than whom none 
 was more intimate with the old king. With Frederic- 
 WiUiam, Prince of Prussia, and Prince Henry, he was as 
 friendly as it was possible to be with princes, but less with 
 the former than the latter. He also knew well the 
 Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, who " enjoys the ear, the 
 favour, and the confidence " of Frederic, t Both EUiot 
 and his friend Liston were intimate with Hertzberg, whom 
 the latter visited on his estate, and found in aU his glory 
 a true Prussian Junker, like a " Cincinnatus from the 
 plough," wearing a round hat and unpowdered hair, 
 selling his own milk to peasants, and pressing strong brown 
 beer of his own brewing upon viators. J EUiot's irre- 
 sistible address in society gained him many advantages 
 also, and he drew valuable military information from 
 ofiicers who were friends of his. In a coimtry which 
 depended so absolutely on its monarch, the most skilful 
 
 * E.g. : Frederic. What do they think of my new ambassador 
 in England ? (a notoriously objectionable man). 
 
 Elliot (bowing). Digne r^pr^sentatif de votre majesty, [etc. etc.] 
 
 t See especially S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Beriin, February 22, 
 "private and secret," and another "secret" ; for relations with Prince 
 Henry, see ib. May 30, June 2, all Elliot to Suffolk; for relations with 
 Prince Frederic- WUliam, see ib. 104, Elliot to Stormont, 1780. 
 
 J See for above details Minto's Elliot, p. 191. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 261 
 
 diplomatist was at a disadvantage when he was not 
 only not intimate with the ruler, but when that ruler's 
 whole influence was exerted to deprive him of adequate 
 sources of information. The character of his disclosures, 
 therefore (despite his great coup in purloining the papers 
 of Lee) is not in ;:;cneral as striking as* that of Harris. He 
 confessed himself (September 13, 17.80), " I cannot pre- 
 tend to any direct knowledge of the secrets of the Cabinet 
 of Potsdam." He did not discover any signs of Joseph's 
 mission to Russia in 1780 till long after it was known to 
 Hiuris ; his information on the affaii]s of Bavaria in 1778 
 was inferior to that of Keith. On the other hand, his 
 knowledge of German courts and diplomacy was wide 
 and deep; he had delved in charters and chronicles to 
 elucidate Joseph's claims on Bavaria. From personal 
 knowledge he thoroughly understood the working of the 
 Imperial Diet at Ratisbon. The Extent of his actual 
 knowledge, combined with the accuracy of his judgment, 
 often suppUed the place of more precise information. To 
 give an example or two. It was on February 8, 1778, that 
 he judged that Frederic would fight -Joseph, anticipating 
 accurately the decision which the Prussian king himself 
 made later. Again, when he makes the general statement 
 in discussing Bavarian claims that in this age force, not 
 justice, decides questions of prescriptive right, his evidence 
 as characterizing the diplomacy of the age is of great and 
 unusual weight, for in such matters it surpasses the more 
 partial insight of Harris or the massive common sense of 
 Keith. In the same way the various reports (which are 
 certainly his) upon Bavaria, and iipon the Imperial 
 system in the year 1776, are masterly gtate-papers, models 
 of lucidity and wisdom, and his criticism of Frederic's 
 internal administration is admirable. 
 
 The bias of Elliot is equally obvious, though not as 
 great as that of Harris. The latter (^escribed the Russian 
 nobles as " monkeys grafted on bears " ; the former said 
 that in Prussia he found " nature plunged in sand and 
 
262 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 mankind in slavery." He found the, men of the country, 
 for the most part, rude, and even the women seemed to 
 him grenadiers. He had sufficient of eighteenth century 
 sentiment to protest against the rudeness and coarseness of 
 the life around him, enough of EngUsh feehng to resent 
 a despotism however hberal and intelligent. Moreover, 
 he was convinced that England's interests had suffered 
 in the past by showing too much deference to Frederic's 
 feelings and by supineness to his repeated attempts to do 
 her an ill turn. All these feelings infected his despatches, 
 and made him darken the colours in = which he portrayed 
 Frederic, in order that he might stir his own Government 
 to more vigorous action and to approval of his own deter- 
 mined poHcy. ElUot's character was hardly so scrupulous 
 or honourable as that of Harris, and we may suspect an 
 occasional over-emphasis that is not; quite unintentional. 
 He denounces the " restless ambition " of the Prussian 
 king, his " deep-rooted iU-will " and " most violent 
 disUke," " implacable and unprovoked resentment " to 
 Great Britain, such that he refuses. " to repeat the ex- 
 pressions he (Frederic) is sometimes heard to let faU." 
 At the same time he pronounces him " precipitate," and 
 denies him " any regular plan of politics." He was con- 
 tinually enraged by Frederic's " evident predilection for 
 France." * All this did not induce him to favour Frederic, 
 At the same time, he is sometimes driven to admit that 
 Frederic worked ceaselessly for the welfare of his people, 
 and even in diplomacy he testifies td the strength of his 
 wiU, the ingenuity of his devices, and his extreme resource- 
 fulness. He attributes endlessly base motives to Frederic 
 at different times, but he by no means succeeds in always 
 bringing them home to him. Yet in the incidents of 
 our period Frederic is treated with much less partiality 
 than at a later date. Owing to the Umitations of his 
 knowledge Elliot's accounts are seldom complete; owing 
 
 * S.P.P. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, January 10, February 22, 
 November 7, 1778 ; vol. 104, May 13, June.4. 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 268 
 
 to his bias they arc sometimes unfair to Frederic, but 
 as summaries of the events of diplomacy during these 
 years, as judgments of poUtical situations by a contem- 
 porary these despatehes have rare and unusual merits. 
 
 The despatelies of Listen, Elliot's friend and cicerone, 
 have simihu- qualities and defects, though they are more 
 doll and detailed, and show somewhat less masterly grasp. 
 The repUes to the despatches of both, by the Secretaries 
 of State at St. James's, are occasionally of some interest. 
 Stormont was a really learned minister, who knew diplo- 
 macy abroad as few men of that day did, and his judg- 
 ments are often of the greatest value and weight, but 
 they agree, on the whole, with the sentiments of EUiot 
 and Harris. Those of Suffolk, " tl^e Arch Pecksniff " 
 of diplomacy, are perhaps of more interest, because his 
 knowledge appears to have been sUght, and accordingly 
 his judgments are interesting and unaffected by precon- 
 ceptions. They record the opinions pi a fairly able man, 
 relatively ignorant of continental affairs, who, while 
 condescending to adopt a tone of unction in certain re- 
 spects, usually judges with a singularly unbiased mind. 
 In its way his judgment on the Austrian claims to the 
 Bavarian Succession is a masterpiece of grave and half- 
 conscious irony — " I am not sufficiently versed, either in 
 Imperial Genealogies, or German Law, to remove the 
 DifEculties you find in conjecturing the Grounds on which 
 the Court of Vienna may have formed its Pretensions," 
 nor, he naively adds, "will this diflSculty be removed by 
 the manifesto — proclaiming their rights — that has just 
 been received." * 
 
 It would be a gross injustice to Keith to compare him 
 to Suffolk, either in point of knowledge or in diplomatic 
 capacity. But, in fact, his massive solid understanding 
 has more in keeping with that of the heavy Earl than 
 
 ♦ SJPJ'. German States (Bavaria), vol. 118, St. James's, Suffolk 
 to Eden, February 3, 1778. Eden'8 despatches are valuable and 
 accurate. For the general sketch of Bavaria, see passim. 
 
264 FREDERIC THE GREAT 
 
 with those of the volatile Harris or the witty Elliot. 
 Keith had not the brilliance and the natural abiUties of 
 either, but his industry and persistence, his immense 
 diplomatic experience (he was at Vienna twenty years), 
 his strong will and sound judgment eventually carried 
 him as far as either of the others. His task was almost 
 equally difficult with that of Elliot, for Kaunitz feared 
 and hated England almost as much as Frederic did, and 
 it was only by personal acquaintance with Kaunitz, 
 Joseph, and Maria Theresa that Keitii could hope to learn 
 much of the secrets of Austrian policy, then the most 
 closely guarded in Europe. Much could be learnt 
 from actual indiscretions of utterance from Frederic or 
 Catherine; at Vienna Keith had to form his judgment 
 from the frowns or smiles of Joseph or Maria Theresa. 
 He does not seem to have been specially acquainted with 
 nobles of the Court, the Prussian and French ambassadors 
 naturally avoided him, from the Russian he could learn 
 little, and he depended on the envoys of minor courts, 
 such as that of Saxony, on spies, and on the pubUc news- 
 letters and journals for much of his information. Accord- 
 ingly his despatches of the years 1778-80 must be held 
 as on the whole inferior in interest to those of Harris or 
 Elliot. He had not the youthful enthusiasm, which led 
 each of the others occasionally to summarize the whole 
 diplomatic situation or characterize the Court to which 
 they were accredited, and (comparing the relative ease of 
 his position for obtaining information) the actual amount 
 of information he got was less. Both Harris and Elliot 
 criticized and described the earlier and later stages of the 
 Bavarian Succession negotiation with more relative fulness 
 of detail. On the other hand, when Keith does utter a 
 judgment or opinion it is usually of weight, and small as 
 were his opportunities of obtaining information on passing 
 events as compared with his colleagues, its quality some- 
 times far exceeded their quality. Of this we have an 
 excellent test in the matter of the famous Russian mission 
 
AND KAISER JOSEPH 265 
 
 of Joseph in ITSO. Of this c\'int llnlris fjuvc a full diary, 
 and Elliot a fur more I'ircumstuiitial account tlian Kcilli, 
 while each spcculatccl much on its i^csult. Yet the con- 
 tribution of either to the knowUiliri* of that event can 
 hivrdly compare with Keit li's eommunifation to tlic F(irci;,'n 
 Otlice of Kaiser Jostph's own verbal narrati\'e of the 
 whole affair (sec Appendix II.). It is true that it was 
 not obtained till tMo years after the event, but the whole 
 conversation threw a most valuable! hght on the future 
 pohcy of Czarina and Kaiser as well p,s on tlic past. The 
 steady patience of Keith enabled him, to accompUsh much, 
 and fmaJly to gain confidential personal interviews with 
 both Maria Theresa and Joseph, which, though few in 
 number, were often of the greatest service. 
 
 All these diplomatists quoted sometimes make admis- 
 sions as to Prussian pohcy, ^vhich show that the interests 
 of England required a certain impartsiahty of view at this 
 time. The result is that, despite' the hatred which Prussia 
 and England had felt for one another since 1763, the 
 English despatches of 1776-80 giva the decisions of a 
 relatively neutral umpire. Frederic is probably more 
 fairly judged at this time by Enghsh diplomats than at 
 any other period of his career. On the whole their 
 diplomatic judgments on the merits of the Bavarian 
 Succession are the most impartial that we find in the 
 Archives of any great Power. Aqd of all these des- 
 patches the weightiest in judgment are certainly those of 
 Sir Robert Keith. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Albert V. (Duke of Austria, 
 l-tll-39, anii EUnperor, 1437- 
 1439), invested with Lower 
 Bavaria (1420), 74 ; Act of Re- 
 nunciation (1420), 75, 16I-'2, 
 180-81 
 
 Andrt, 160 ; arrested, 170-71 
 
 Augustus Frederic II. (ICing of 
 Poland and Ejector of Saxony, 
 1734-68), death, 37 
 
 Augustus Frederic III. (Elector 
 of Saxony, 1763-1806 ; King, 
 1806-1827), claims on Ba- 
 varia, 73, 89 ; negotiation and 
 Treaty with Frederic (March 1 8 , 
 1778), 101-8 ; SchOnburg dis- 
 pute with Austria, 101 ; ap- 
 peals to Diet, 104 ; proposed 
 compensation to, 167-8, 195-6 ; 
 actual, 208-5 
 
 AiMust - Wilhelm (Prince of 
 Prussia), 215 
 
 Austria. See Joseph, Maria 
 Theresa, etc. 
 
 Bavaria. Ste Max Joseph III. 
 and Karl Theodor 
 
 Belling, W. S. (Prussian Lieu- 
 tenant-General), 127-9 
 
 Bercheim, Count, 54 
 
 Breteuil, Baron de Louis- Auguste 
 le Tonnelier (French Ambas- 
 sador at Vienna and Pleni- 
 potentiary at Teschen), 91 ; 
 negotiations with Kaimitz, 94 ; 
 at Teschen, 191 ; his policy 
 there, 198-9 ; attracted by a 
 Venus, 202 ; receives presents, 
 203 
 
 Brunswick, Charles William 
 Ferdinand, Hereditary Prince 
 of (Dukeof, 1780-1806), 98, 260 
 
 Burgoyne, Lieutenant - General 
 Sir J., report on Austrian and 
 Prussian armies (1706-67), 
 App. II. 223-5 
 
 Burke, £., quoted, 18 
 
 Canning, George, 256 
 
 Catherine II. (the Great, Czarina 
 of Russia, 1762-96), her char- 
 acter, 183, described by 
 Emperor Joseph, App. III. 
 22:j-8,; her foreign policy 
 (1762), 87 ; Treaty (1764) 
 with Frederic, 38-0 ; renewed 
 alliance, 40 ; designs on 
 Turkey and Poland, 42-8 ; 
 shares in Partition, 45 ; her 
 Turkish poUcy, 46 ; at first 
 neutral in Bavarian Succession 
 but influenced by Frederic, 
 184-5!; her views on media- 
 tion, 187 ; her Instruction to 
 Prince Repnin, 191-3 ; her 
 policy, 199-200 ; mentioned, 
 5, 8, 176, 199, 210 
 
 Charles (Archduke of Austria), 
 116, ^9 
 
 Charles (Prince of Hesse), on 
 Hertzberg, 112 n., 245 n. 12, 
 240 n. 14 
 
 Charles VI. (of Austria, and 
 Empea-or, 1711^0), 49 
 
 Charies VII. (of Bavaria, 1726- 
 1745, and Emperor, 1742-15), 
 58, 156 
 
 Codex Fridericianus, 58 
 
 Codex Maximileanus, 58 
 
 Cumberland, William, Duke of, 
 145 
 
 Daun (Austrian Field-Marshal), 
 119, 186, 148 
 
 267 
 
268 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Deux-Ponts (Charles, Due de). 
 See Zweibriicken, Duke of 
 
 Eden, Morton (Minister Pleni- 
 potentiary to Bavaria and 
 Minister to Diet of Ratisbon, 
 1776), views on Karl Theodor, 
 163-4 ; quoted, 51 n., 55 n., 60 
 n., 67 n., 68 n., 71 n., 72 and n., 
 70-80, 105-6, 156 n., 165, 252-3 
 sqq. 263 n. 
 
 Elliot (afterwards Sir), Hugh 
 (1773-76, Minister Plenipoten- 
 tiary to Bavaria and Diet of 
 Ratisbon; 1776-82, Envoy 
 Extraordinary to Prussia), on 
 Frederic, 21 and n. ; report on 
 Bavaria in 1776 quoted, 50-53, 
 and passim Chap. Ill, ; makes 
 Max Joseph druok on punch, 
 54 n. ; on German foreign 
 policy in 1776, 63, 65-6; on 
 Max Joseph's offer of Bavarian 
 troops for America, 69-71 ; at 
 Berlin, 95 ; negotiates with 
 Frederic] over Bavarian Suc- 
 cession, 96-9; his famous re- 
 partee to Frederic, 98 n., 99; 
 on his policy, 105-6 ; letters 
 on Frederic's campaign, 135, 
 138 and n. ; denounces the 
 " Balance of Power " as a 
 principle for regulating the 
 Treaty of Teschen, 189-91 ; on 
 King Frederic's literary diver- 
 sions, 220-21 ; critical estimate 
 of, 252-63 
 
 Francis I., Emperor (1745-65), 49 
 Frederic Augustus III. (Elector 
 of Saxony, 1763-1806 ; King, 
 1806-1827), claims on Bavaria, 
 73, 89 ; negotiations and alli- 
 ance with Frederic (Match 18, 
 1778), 101-3 ; Schonburg dis- 
 pute with Austria, 101 ; ap- 
 peals to Diet, 104 ; proposed 
 compensation to, 167-8, 195-6 ; 
 actual, 203-5 
 Frederic the Great (King of 
 Prussia, 1740-86), character 
 and achievements till 1777, 
 15-23, 214-20; Treaty with 
 
 Catherine, 1764, 38 ; meeting 
 with Joseph at Neisse (1769) 
 and Neustadt (1770), 39-40; 
 views on Austrian and Russian 
 foreign policy (1771), 42-3 ; 
 share in Partition of Poland, 
 42-5 ; claim on ^Bavaria, 75 ; 
 negotiations with France over 
 Bavarian Succession, 93, and 
 with England, 95-8 ; views on 
 Bavarian question, 98-9 ; offen- 
 sive and defensive alliance 
 with Saxony (March 18, 1778), 
 101 - 3 ; supports protest 
 against Austrian claims in 
 Germanic Diet (March 16, 
 1778), 103-5 ; considers pro- 
 ject of a League of Princes, 
 106-7 ; real reasons of his 
 defence of Bavarian independ- 
 ence, 107 ; correspondence 
 with Joseph, 109-10 ; rejects 
 proposals of Kaimitz and de- 
 cides, on war. 111; rebukes 
 Hertzberg and invades Bo- 
 hemia (July 5), 112 ; military 
 character and ideas of, 118-20, 
 145-6*; forces of, in 1778 cam- 
 paign, 121 and n. ; Austrian 
 plans' against, 124-5 ; his ad- 
 vance in Bohemia and check 
 before the Axnau- Jaromer line, 
 134 - 40 ; composes ode on 
 Voltaire, 137-8 ; his retreat, 
 141-3 ; criticism of his cam- 
 paign, 144-5 ; his correspond- 
 ence with Prince Henry, 145-6; 
 his negotiations with Zwei- 
 briicken, 160-61 ; appeals to 
 Diet (December 1778), 161-2 ; 
 opinion of Karl Theodor, 164 
 n. ; his popularity in Bavaria, 
 173 - 4 ; corresponds with 
 MariaTheresa, 176-7 ; negotia- 
 tion of Braunau, 178-9 ; em- 
 barrassed by Austrian appeal 
 to Diet, 182-8 ; turns to 
 Catherine of Russia, 183-5 ; 
 his negotiation, 186-7 ; the 
 Russian reply, 192-3 ; meets 
 Prince Repnin, 194 ; motives 
 in the Treaty, 197-8 ; letter to 
 Prince Henry, 200, 202 ; gains 
 
INDEX 
 
 269 
 
 from Pence of Tesehcn, 203-0 ; 
 thcpriifof Hiissiaiimctliutidit, 
 200-10 ; skoUli of liis char- 
 aetor by lliirris, App. I. -1 t- 
 220, tuid of his literary diver- 
 sion byKlliot,-"2l)-21,nii(lrliar- 
 actcr, 2;)7-ii.'l ; UiirKoyne on his 
 armv, 222-5; mentioned, ;!, 
 5, 7,"S, 11, 11, 15, 2U, 3T, 48, 01, 
 frt, 75. 89. (15, 101, 115-10, US, 
 131, 15:!, 160, lot, 107, 175, 
 191-2, 199, 201, 208 ; receives 
 visit from Grand Duke Paul, 
 221-3; satirized by Voltaire, 
 App. V. 230-31 ; the Freder- 
 ician strategy, 2 12-3 n. 5 
 
 Frederic-William (Crown Prince 
 of Prussia, afterwards Frederic 
 \Vil)iam II.), in the campaign 
 of 1778, 135, 137, 142 ; char- 
 acter drawn by Harris, 218- 
 221 ; mentioned, 215, 260 
 
 Frederic \ViUiara I. (King of 
 Prussia, 1712-^0), 49 
 
 Galitzin, Prince D.'M. (Russian 
 Minister at Vienna), negotiates 
 with Kaunitz, 250 n. 9 
 
 George II. (King of Great Britain 
 and Elector of Hanover, 1727- 
 1765), 5 
 
 Gibbon, Edward, quoted, 7 n. 
 
 Goerz,Courrt J.Eustace (Minister 
 of Frederic to Z weibriicken , 
 1778), 159-61 
 
 Harris, James (afterwards Sir J., 
 and Ist Earl of Malmesbury ; 
 1772-70, Envoy Extraordinary 
 at Berlin ; 1776-83, Envoy Ex- 
 traordinary and Minister Pleni- 
 potentiary at Pctrograd), 177 ; 
 details Frederic's negotiation 
 with Catherine, 180-7 ; objects 
 to French influence on Panin, 
 199 ; on character and court 
 of Frederic the Great, 214-20 ; 
 on Grand Duke Paul's visit to 
 Berlin, 221-3; criticism of, 
 2.-.2-fJ3. 
 
 Hartig, Count (Austrian Com- 
 missary in Bavaria), 68 
 
 lIaussen,.IM. de (French Minister 
 at Itcrlin), 181 
 
 Ueiithcotc, Ualjih (1781-83, 
 iMinisHiir Plciiipolc-ntiary to 
 Elect(|r of KOIn), on Austriun 
 clainH, 102, 11)5 ;i. ; on Karl 
 Theodor's conduct, 172-4 ; on 
 evils of BaliiMcc of Power, 189- 
 101 
 
 Henry (Prince of Prussia ; d. 
 1802), Ills mission to Russia 
 (1771), 40, 42 ; interviews 
 Hugh, Elliot, 97-8 ; tries to 
 avert war with Austria, 110 ; 
 military chanietcr of, 116-18 ; 
 forces.of, in campaign of 1778, 
 121 and n. ; plans and effects 
 seizure of ToUcnstein, 126-30 ; 
 liis letter on it, 130-31 ; im- 
 portance of this success, 131- 
 133 ; refuses to cross the Iser, 
 134 ; retreats via Leitmeritz, 
 140-41 ; losses in the campaign, 
 141, 245 n. 12 ; estimate of his 
 military success, 144-5 ; corre- 
 sponds with t'rederic, 145-6 ; 
 further criticism of, 147-50 ; 
 letter from Frederic to, 200 ; 
 influence on Frederic, 210 ; 
 mentioned, 102, 123-5, 138, 
 143, 177-8, 224, 241 n. 3, 244 
 n. 7, 215 n. 12, 260 
 
 Hertzbel-g, Count E. F. (Prussian 
 Minister; d. 1795), character, 
 108, 2i;o ; sharply rebuked by 
 Frederic, 111-12, 218 
 
 Hompfrdhe, Baron de (Hompesch, 
 F. K. ; d. 1800), made Finance 
 Minister in Bavaria (1778), 
 156, 1,73 
 
 Isembiu'g, Princess, 165 
 
 Joseph JI. of Austria (Holy 
 Roman Emperor, 1765-90), 
 character, 80 - 33 ; attempts 
 to reform Empire, 33, and 
 Austrta, 33-4 ; improvements 
 in the Austrian Army and 
 Finariccs, 85-0; meets 
 
 Frederic at Neisse, 89, and at 
 Ncustadt, 40 ; annexes Zips 
 district of Poland, 41 ; atti- 
 
270 
 
 INDEX 
 
 tude on Polish Question (1771- 
 1772), 42-3 ; annexes Bukovina 
 (1775), 47 ; views on import- 
 ance of Bavaria to Austria, 
 64-6; action in 1771, 67; 
 visits Bavaria (1777), 68-9; 
 nature of his claims on Bavaria, 
 73-4, 78 ; hears of Max 
 Joseph's death, 83 ; his gains 
 by Partition - Treaty (Janu- 
 ary 3, 1778), 86-7 ; invades 
 Bavaria, 87-8 ; letters to his 
 brother Leopold, 88-9, 90, 92- 
 93 ; further Partition schemes, 
 93-4 ; ill-treatment of Saxony 
 over Schonburg affair (1777), 
 102 ; fails to prevent Saxony 
 joining Frederic, 103 ; corre- 
 spondence with Frederic at 
 Schonwalde, 109 ; effects of 
 his reforms on the Austrian 
 Army, 113-16 ; forces of, in 1778 
 campaign, 121 and n,, 122 ; 
 Austrian concentration and 
 plan of campaign of, 122-3 ; 
 criticizes Laudon for his failure 
 to hold Tollenstein and for the 
 state of his army, 131-3 ; 
 checks Frederic at Arnau, 139- 
 140, and forces him to retreat, 
 141 ; but forbids a pursuit in 
 force, 142-3 ; credit acquired 
 by him during the campaign, 
 146-9 ; sends Golden Fleece 
 to Karl Theodor, 154 ; his 
 arbitrary behaviour towards 
 Bavaria, 157 ; anger at the 
 Braunau negotiation, 178-9 ; 
 Maria Theresa's influence on,' 
 182 ; his defeat at Teschen, 
 203-5 ; a representative of his 
 age, 208-9 ; designs on Venice, 
 231-2 ; his own accoimt of his 
 interviews with Catherine, 225- 
 228 ; Czechish peasant's poem 
 to, 228-30 ; mentioned, 7, 8, 
 10, 12, 14, 36, 47-8, 61-2, 75, 
 80, 82, 84, 95, 103, 108, 112, 
 138, 145, 150, 160, 165, 167, 
 172, 174, 180, 182, 183, 197, 
 206, 207, 211, 231-2 
 Josepha (sister of Max Joseph of 
 Bavaria), married to Kaiser 
 
 Joseph (1764), 68, and ill- 
 treated by him, 70 
 
 Karl Theodor (Elector Palatine, 
 1743 ; afterwards also ruler 
 of Bavaria, 1777-99), 69, 71, 
 73; character and abilities as 
 a ruler, 150-53 ; claims on 
 Bavaria, 76-8 ; family com- 
 pacts with, 79 ; death of Max 
 Joseph, 71-2 ; succeeds to 
 Bavarian inheritance, 82 ; his 
 representative signs Partition- 
 Treaty with Austria, 85-7 
 ratified under compidsion, 89 
 conduct on his accession, 154 
 attempts at reform, 154-7 
 ill-treatment by Austria, 158 
 fails to win Zweibrucken, 159 
 161 ; his anxieties, 163-5 
 Frederic's view of, 164 n. ; re- 
 fuses to abandon neutrality, 
 165 ; blimders at Congress of 
 Teschen, 167 ; quarrels with 
 Zweibriicken, 168-70 ; arrests 
 Andr6, etc., 171-4 ; objects to 
 Repnin's proposals, 195 ; gains 
 from Treaty of Teschen, 203-4 ; 
 mentioned, 13-14, 100, 102-3, 
 151, 196 
 
 Kaunit?, Prince A. W. P. (Chan- 
 cellor of Austria; d. 1794), 
 character, 28-30 ; attitude 
 towards Prussia (1764), 38 ; 
 views on importance of 
 Bavaria, 65 ; action on Max 
 Joseph's death, 84 ; negotiates 
 Partition-Treaty with Bavaria 
 (January 3, 1778), 85-7, 88 ; 
 French policy, 90 ; his further 
 Partition schemes, 93-4 ; his 
 reply to Protests in the Ger- 
 manic Diet, 104 ; his last pro- 
 posal to Frederic before the 
 war, 110-11 ; Partition-Treaty 
 with Karl Theodor, 154 ; 
 Russian Ambassador dis- 
 counts his Bavarian claims, 
 163 ; Maria Theresa's influence 
 upon( August-September 1778), 
 180; his proposed terms to 
 Diet, 181-2 ; much astonished 
 atRiisianattitude,185; forced 
 
INDEX 
 
 271 
 
 to ncoopt joint-nicdinlion of 
 Riissii) and l-'nincc, 1H7 ; de- 
 &ijfits on Venice, '1,\2 ; mcn- 
 
 tiomxi, 2T, aa, as-ii, iro, ids, 
 
 107. 2li-t 
 
 Keith, Sir Robert Mumiy (Ara- 
 bnssador at Vieiinii, 1772-02), 
 memorandum on Austrian 
 claims in Hiivaria, 7-4-5 ; de- 
 scribes Austriiin policy in 
 Bavaria (January 1778), 83 ; 
 praises Croat soldiers, IKi; 
 on the Teschen negotiation, 
 195,2t)l-2: characterized, 255- 
 256, 2(i3-5 ; mentioned, 87, 
 109, 195-6, 225 
 
 Kreittmayr, W. A. (Chancellor 
 of Bavaria; d. 1790), character, 
 53, 58, 166 
 
 Lascy (Austrian Field-Marshal), 
 35 ; hia reforming influence on 
 Austrian array, 113-16 ; mili- 
 tary character of, 118-19; plans 
 campaign of 1778, 122-3 ; 
 estimate of his success, 147-9 ; 
 BTeat influence on Kaiser 
 Joseph, 247 nn. 16 and 17 ; 
 praised by Burgoyne, 225 ; 
 mentioned, 242 n. 4 
 
 Laudon(Austrian Field-Marshal), 
 meets Frederic, 39 ; military 
 character of, 117-18 ; his share 
 in campaign of 1778, 122-3 ; 
 scheme for crusliing Frederic, 
 123-5 ; difficulty of his t;isk, 
 125-6 ; fails to defend Tollen- 
 stcin, 130-31 ; retires to Iser, 
 131~1 ; fails to harass Prince 
 Henry's retreat, 141 ; military 
 criticism of, 144-5 ; praised 
 by Burgoyne, 225 ; mentioned, 
 114, 138, 144, 149-50 
 
 Lee, William (American agent in 
 Europe), 97, 98 n., 256-7 
 
 Lehrbach (Austrian Conmiissary 
 at Munich), IfiO, 105-7 
 
 L/eopold (Grand Duke of Tuscany, 
 1705-90; afterwards Emperor, 
 1790-92), receives letter from 
 Joseph, 89, 00, 92-3 
 
 Lessing, patronized by ICarl 
 Theodor, 152 
 
 LIston, Bobert (afterwards Sir 
 U. and Lord Ilarlcy, chargi at 
 Munich and at Berlin), on 
 Bavaria and Max Joseph, 51-5 
 and n. ; mentions Joseph's 
 designs on Venice, 281-2, 252-8 
 S(^q. ; estimated, 261, 268 
 
 Loni, J. O. von (Bavarian Coun- 
 cillor), 160 ; arrested, 171-8 
 
 LothOsel (Prussian General), 127 
 
 Louis XIV. (King of France, 
 1643-1715), 8 
 
 Louis XV. (King of France, 
 1715-74), 5, 152, 158 
 
 Louis XVI. (King of France, 
 1774-93), attitude towards 
 Austrian policy in Bavaria, 
 00 ; d^linee to be influenced 
 by Marie Antoinette, 92-8 ; 
 declares, French neutrality, 
 93 ; letter to Zweibriicken, 
 160 n. j mentioned, 159 
 
 Maria Anna (Dowager-Duchess 
 of Bavaria), 159 and n., 160, 
 162, 168, 168-9 J her coun- 
 sellors fl'rrested, 171-74 ; men- 
 tioned, 175 
 
 Maria Theresa (Empress-Queen 
 and ruler of Austna-Hungary, 
 1740-800, character, 25-7 ; re- 
 sults of her reign, 27-8 ; con- 
 duct over the Polish Partition, 
 43-4 ; admits the weakness of 
 Austrian claims on Bavaria, 
 7.S ; fears war, 110 ; letter to 
 Marie Antoinette on war, 131, 
 177, 179 ; to Frederic, 177 ; 
 initiates peace negotiations at 
 Braunau, 178-9 ; her influence 
 towardssettlement at Teschen, 
 180-82; presents to Repnin and 
 Breteuil, 208 ; mentioned, 28, 
 33, 35, 86-7, 88, 85, 95, 189, 
 105, 208 
 
 Marie Antoinette (daughter of 
 Maria Theresa and Queen of 
 France), fails to influence 
 French policy, 92-8 ; letters 
 from ^!aria Theresa, 177-9 
 
 Maximilian, Archduke (son of 
 Maria ^heresa and Archduke 
 of Austtja), 68 
 
272 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Maximilian Joseph III. (Elector 
 of Bavaria, 1745-77), character 
 and internal rule. Chap. Ill, 
 passim ; foreign policy, 64-7 ; 
 offers Bavarian troops for 
 America, 69-71 ; claims on 
 his inheritance, 72-80 ; family 
 compacts with Karl Theodor, 
 79 ; death, 71-2, 81, 82 ; men- 
 tioned, 1S3-4, 175 
 
 Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Frederic 
 the Kind, Duke of, claims on 
 Bavaria, 73 
 
 Mercy, Comte de (Austrian Am- 
 bassador at Paris), 94 
 
 Milliquet, J. (British chargi at 
 Dresden), quoted, 102-3 
 
 MoUendorf, W. J. H. (Prussian 
 Field-Marshal ; d. 1816), 129- 
 130 
 
 Moltke, Count H. K. B. (Prussian 
 Chief of Staff), on Russia, 210 
 
 Obermayer (Bavarian Council- 
 lor), 160 ; arrested, 171-2 
 
 Palatinate. See Karl Theodor 
 Panin, Count N. I. (Foreign 
 
 Minister of Russia), 186-7; 
 
 letter to Prince Repnin, 193-4 ; 
 
 negotiations at Teschen, 199- 
 
 200 ; mentioned, 251 n. 18 
 Paul, Grand Duke (afterwards 
 
 Czar Paul I., 1796-1801), 183 ; 
 
 his visit to Frederic described 
 
 by Harris, App. I. 221-3 
 P€ter III. (Czar of Russia, 1762), 
 
 allies himself with Frederic, 37 
 Philip V. (King of Spain, 1700- 
 
 1745), 5 
 Potemkin, Prince G. A., his 
 
 influence on Catherine, 185 
 
 and n. ; how influenced by 
 
 Frederic, 185 ; described by 
 
 Joseph II., 227-8 
 Prussia. See Frederic the Great 
 
 Repnin, Prince N. V. (Russian 
 Plenipotentiary at Tesohen), 
 instruction from Catherine, 
 192-3 ; from Panin, 193-4 ; 
 peaches Breslau and meets 
 Frederic, 194 ; proposes Pre- 
 
 liminaries, 195 ; concludes 
 Peace, 203 ; value of his 
 papers as a source, 250-51 ; 
 passim 
 
 Ritter, Baron (Plenipotentiary 
 of Karl Theodor at Vienna), 
 negotiates with Kaunitz in 
 1777, 85-6 ; forced to sign 
 Partition-Treaty (January 3, 
 1778), 86-7 
 
 Russia. See Catherine the Great 
 
 Saxony. See Augustus Frederic 
 II. and III. 
 
 Schiller, J. W. von, patronized 
 by Karl Theodor, 152 
 
 Sohwerin (Prussian Field - 
 Marshal), 22 
 
 Seydlitz, Freiherr F. W. (Prussian 
 Cavalry General), 22 
 
 Stanislas II. (Augustus Ponia- 
 towski ; King of Poland, 1764- 
 1795), how elected, 38 ; asks 
 Joseph to annex Zips, 41 
 
 Stepney, Sir J. (Envoy Extra- 
 ordinary to Saxony, 1775-83), 
 on Prussian losses in the war, 
 245 n. 12 
 
 Stormont, David, 7th Viscount 
 (Secretary of State Southern 
 Department, 1779-82), 67, 
 252-3 sqq., 263 
 
 Suffolk, Henry, Earl of (Secretary 
 of State Southern Department, 
 1771-79), 162, 252-3 sqq., 263 
 
 Swift, Jonathan, quoted, 1-2, 170 
 
 Thugut, Baron (Austrian nego- 
 tiator at Braunau, afterwards 
 ChanceUor), 178-9 
 
 Venus, appears at Teschen, 202 
 Vergennes, Comte C.G. de (iS-ench 
 Foreign Minister, 1774-87), 
 attitude towards Austrian 
 Partition-Treaty with Bavaria 
 (Januarys, 1778), 90-91 ; Or- 
 cular to Powers, 92 ; declares 
 French; neutrality, 93 ; nego- 
 tiates with Frederic, 93 ; with 
 Mercy, 94-5; views at Teschen, 
 198, 199 
 Vieregg, Baron, made Councillor 
 of Bavaria, 155 and n., 166 
 
INDEX 
 
 273 
 
 Villcroi, V. de Noiifville, Duo do 
 (bYcneh Miirshiil), 115 
 
 Voltiuro, F. A. de (dentli 1778), 
 degv on, com^msoil by 
 Freaeric, 1M7-8 ; his satire on 
 Frederic nnd oiLTlitccnth een- 
 tury wiir, "230-31 ; mentioned, 
 2, 8, 19 
 
 Wtfymouth (Thomas, \'iscount, 
 aJfterw-ards 3rd Rlarquis of, 
 Bath ; Soorotarv of State 
 NorUi Department, 1775-82), 
 203, 251 n. 22 
 
 Zweibrucken (Deux-Ponts), 
 Charles, Duke of, character. 
 
 78, 70, 1B8 ; refuses to sign 
 rartition^Troaty, 100 ; ap- 
 peals to Geniinn IJiit, 104 ; 
 rehitions «itli Karl Tlicodor, 
 1 "it ; nef;<iti:ites with Frederic 
 through (Joerz, 159 ; refuses 
 Golden I'leeee and Partitiori- 
 Treiitv, 100^01 ; supported by 
 Frederic at Diet, 101-2 ; re- 
 fusrs to accept I'reliminaries 
 of Teschen, 108 ; quarrels 
 with Karl Theodor, 169 ; ac- 
 cepts Peace of Teschen, 170 ; 
 his policy at Teschen, 196- 
 198 ; mentioned, 153, 171, 172, 
 175 
 ZweibrUcken, Duchess of, 79-80 
 
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