Gift of the 
 £ Labadan Family of the Philippines i)' 
 
 in honor of 
 |^ Mario M. Labadan, Ph.D. '69 >; 
 and 
 Mario C. Labadan, Jr. MS '96 P 
 
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CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
 188 
 
 A STRAIGHTFORWARD TALE. 
 
 BY 
 
 CLAY MacCAULEY. 
 
 Reprinted from the 
 
 Boston "Evening Transcript, " July 5, 1899. 
 
 PUBLISHED BT THE 
 
 ANTI-IMPERIALIST' LEAGUE- 
 1899 
 
ASIA 
 
 US 
 
 
 Ql^ 
 
 
 Ml»3 
 
 
 fs«H 
 
 A STRAIGHTFORWARD TALE. 
 
 By Clay MacCauley. 
 
 " Mr. MacCauley is well known hereabouts and what- 
 ever he says commands the confidence that attaches to 
 high character and sincere motives. . . . The facts 
 which he presents regarding the situation in January 
 Jast establish the contention . . . that the responsi- 
 bility for the war rests on the Administration, and not 
 on the opponents of the Paris treaty. It was the 
 Administration which ungratefully cast off the allies it 
 had courted, by whose aid it had captured Manila and 
 its Spanish garrison. The United States might have 
 continued the master of the Philippines, the respected 
 and trusted protector of their people, stronger, we be- 
 lieve, in that quarter of the world than it can ever make 
 itself by alienating the sympathy of those teeming pop- 
 ulations, without provoking this dreadful war and its 
 century-long train of rankling disappointment and hate." 
 — Boston " Herald " (formerly Administration and Impe- 
 rialist newspaper), July 7, 1899. 
 
 Tokyo, Japan, June 3. 
 
 Several letters concerning what has appeared over my 
 name in the "Transcript's" columns about the relations 
 of the Government of the United States with the Philip- 
 pines have recently reached me. The political future of 
 these islands has already been determined, probably 
 beyond changing, and the end of the present conflict may 
 have come before what I now write shall get to America. 
 Yet I wish to answer these letters publicly. I may in 
 this way clear up much that is obscure in the minds not 
 only of some of my correspondents, but in the thoughts 
 of many others of the " Transcript's " readers. Besides-, 
 it is desirable for the purpose of reference hereafter, I 
 think, that there should be upon record a plain recital of 
 
the experiences that induced me to speak as I did. The 
 importance of the matter will excuse exceptional per- 
 sonal reference. 
 
 I am no " politician ; " my work lies outside of " poli- 
 tics." Yet I am profoundly concerned over anything 
 that may seriously affect the welfare of the United 
 States. So far as I am at all a political partisan, I am a 
 Republican, and have been a Republican since the begin- 
 nings of the party. I served as a soldier in the Civil 
 War, and, for a time, after the battle of Cha'ncellorsville, 
 was confined in Libby Prison. During the late war with 
 Spain I thoroughly sympathized with the humanitarian 
 aim that seemed to guide it, and I welcomed the pros- 
 pect of our gaining for their protection and guidance the 
 peoples of the West Indies and the Philippines, assum- 
 ing all along that these peoples desired our help. 
 
 My visit to Manila in January last was not made, as 
 it has, been said, " for the purpose of investigating the 
 situation." It was undertaken because I was not well 
 at the time, and believed that the voyage to the Philip- 
 pines would be diverbing and helpful. That the trip 
 was the occasion of the opposition I have shown in the 
 " Transcript " and elsewhere to the " annexation policy " 
 of our country's Administration was not of my wishing'; 
 indeed, hardly anything has ever caused me more regret 
 than the necessity I came under at the time to antago- 
 nize the course of action disclosed in the Philippines, 
 as authorized and commanded by President McKinley 
 and his advisers. For a long time I could not believe 
 that the disastrous drift of events there was going on 
 known to the Washington authorities. I was inclined 
 to lay the responsibility for the increasing .perils upon 
 the military commander directly in charge. I still think 
 that General Otis, conscientious, faithful administrator 
 and brave soldier that he is, was not as tactful as one 
 should have been in his dealings with Aguinaldo and his 
 followers. A commander temperamentally more like the 
 President himself would probably have avoided much 
 that hastened the grave alienations between Filipinos 
 and Americans. Yet now it seems clear to me that 
 General Otis did his work, in the main, in literal obedi- 
 ence to his superiors in America ; that there it was 
 assumed that the whole right and duty concerning the 
 future disposition and control of the Philippine Islands 
 lay in the wishes and will of the United States ; that 
 what the Filipinos themselves might wish need not be 
 
taken into the account in formulating plans for their 
 government. I think now that information of the in- 
 creasing dangers that I found almost at their full when 
 I arrived in Manila had been steadily communicated to 
 the authorities at Washington, but that the authorities 
 there upon principle regarded them as unworthy their 
 attention, except as signs of a rebellion that should be 
 forcibly dealt with should they lead to any resistance. 
 
 Apparently, from the downfall of Manila, the principle 
 that guided 'the American Administration was that the 
 only party to treat with in the settlement of the Philip- 
 pine problem was Spain; that the Filipinos should be 
 wholly passive to American dictation or suffer such con- 
 sequences as one meted out to rebels. However, this 
 question may meet us again. I shall for the present 
 speak of the experiences I. had at Manila that were de- 
 cisive for me. 
 
 One of the first things that led me into serious conver- 
 sation about the situation was a remark at dinner the day 
 of my arrival by a friend resident in Manila. "You 
 should have been here a few days ago and seen the sight. 
 It took nine regiments to post one sentry." In the talk 
 that followed I learned that at last an acute and danger- 
 ous crisis had been reached in the relations of the Fili- 
 pinos and our forces. It appeared that while, up to the 
 capture .of Manila, the Filipino insurgents against Spain 
 had been practically allies of the Americans, — in large 
 part armed by us, associated with us in the siege of the 
 Spanish army, and helpful to us in bringing about the 
 surrender of Manila, — very soon after the surrender they 
 were looked upon as an "obstacle" to our movements. 
 I was told a long story of the repeated demands our 
 officers had made upon the Filipinos, who had been occu- 
 pying lines of attack upon the Spaniards drawn by them 
 in cooperation with our forces, to "fall back," and to 
 make place for our soldiers. They were, at first com- 
 pliant, giving up their trenches and breastworks. During 
 the summer and autumn the Filipinos yielded position 
 after position in front of Manila to our regiments. Grad- 
 ually a line of American soldiers was drawn around the 
 captured (fity. The Filipinos Were left outside our mili- 
 tary circuit, an army once our " allies," but at last become 
 only an embarrassing crowd, supplanted, repulsed, and, 
 as soldiers, ignored. This changed relation of the two 
 forces was not the result, so I was told, of the wishes of 
 our own soldiers. 
 
The American officers had but obeyed commands sent 
 to them from Washington. One of my friends declared : 
 " These people seem to have no existence of their own so 
 far as Washington is concerned. No one there seems to 
 care a bit for what they think or wish." Was it any 
 wonder, then, that as the Filipinos were again and again 
 ordered to " fall back ; " as they saw the American en- 
 closure of Manila completed ; as they saw the American 
 fleet and army increase week after week ; and as they 
 were made to understand more fully their exclusion from 
 social and official intercourse with their former friends, 
 they began 'to look upon the doings oj: the Americans as 
 aggressive against themselves and as threatening an as- 
 sumption of political sovereignty over them ? Naturally 
 their protests against the repeated demands made upon 
 them to " fall back " began to arouse them to antagonism. 
 They insisted upon their rights as our allies and as the 
 people of the Philippines. They lost their idealization 
 of their American "emancipators" with great unwilling- 
 ness, but in the end they accepted the fact that they were 
 dealing with would-be masters. They refused to with- 
 draw farther. At a point near Paco, I think it was, they 
 made their 'first attempt at resistance to our forces. They 
 advanced somewhat their own lines. It was of this 
 episode that my friend had spoken. Our demand, had 
 been insisted upon with a display of force. We had had 
 our way. But we had also set gradually kindling fires of 
 hate and revenge into full flame. ; The posting of that 
 sentry cost us far more than it had gained. Thus it 
 came about that the beginning of my visit to Manila was 
 more like entrance into a besieged city than into a city 
 that our armies had set free. But open hostilities were 
 not yet. Persons without weapons had unchallenged 
 ingress and egress through the two opposed lines. 
 
 it was during the time of this critical state of affairs 
 that General Otis issued; in the President's name, the 
 fateful proclamation of January 4, isstied from the 
 " Office of the Military Governor of the Philippine 
 Islands." The day after I arrived in Manila the procla- 
 mation appeared. Immediately afterwards came Agui- 
 naldo's counter-proclamation, protesting' in "most solemn 
 and earnest terms against "this act, so little expected, of 
 the sovereignty of America in these islands." So far as 
 I heard persons discuss the matter, — and I he#rd many, 
 — the proclamation of the President was regarded as 
 neither happily put nor well-timed. But it at least made 
 
the fact clear to every one that the American Govern- 
 ment had determined to " administer affairs in the Phil- 
 ippine Islands," and that "the mission of the United 
 States " was proclaimed as " one of beneficent assimila- 
 tion." The further fact was made clear, also, that at 
 last a "rupture of amicable relations between the Filipi- 
 nos and the army of the United States" had really 
 occurred, and that the Filipinos felt confident that they 
 had " done everything possible to avoid a rupture, even 
 to the extent of sacrificing uselessly many clear rights." 
 The bitterness of the disappointment of these people 
 was expressed in Aguinaldo's words : " I was convinced 
 that the American forces must sympathize with the 
 revolution which they had assisted to foment, and which 
 saved them much bloodshed and hard work, and above 
 all I had absolute confidence in the history and traditions 
 of a nation which struggled for its independence, and for 
 the abolition of slavery, and held itself up as the 
 champion liberator of oppressed peoples under the safe- 
 guard of the good faith of a free people." These strong 
 words, I know, have been ridiculed, but when I first read 
 them under impressions made upon me by the judgment 
 of men who believed Aguinaldo at least in earnest and 
 sincere, I felt a profound pity for their writer and his 
 people, and I longed to plead for him and his cause with 
 the legislators at home who then held the liberties of 
 the Filipinos under their unspoken wills. 
 
 Within two days after the President's proclamation 
 and Aguinaldo's answers, I had the honor of a conversa- 
 tion with Gen. E. S. Otis, the military governor at Ma- 
 nila. I had become so much disturbed over the coming 
 of the conflict which I then saw inevitable, unless some 
 immediate preventive measure were devised, that possi- 
 bly I attempted overmuch. However, General Otis re- 
 ceived me courteously: I violate no confidence -in 
 repeating some of his words. He " hoped " that the 
 crisis would " pass without trouble." I told him of my 
 intention to write to some acquaintances, members of the 
 United States Senate. I asked him whether there was 
 anything he was willing to say that would aid me in my 
 appeal. In answer, among other things, General Otis 
 expressed regret that there was not a better knowledge 
 of the situation among the Washington legislators than 
 there seemed to be. And he impressed me deeply by his 
 declaration : " I was ordered to this post from San Fran- 
 cisco. I did not believe in the annexation of these 
 
1 
 
 islands when I came here, nor do I believe in their an- 
 nexation now." General Otis has done his duty without 
 wavering, all through the terrible months since the 
 struggle began, yet I often now think of our Philippines 
 commander — the careworn, anxious man I saw in Janu- 
 ary last — as doing his present duty without the inspira- 
 tion that should make his burden light. Of course I 
 speak thinking only of what General Otis believed at the 
 time we had our talk. 
 
 I also had the privilege of conversation with Admiral 
 Dewey. I violate no confidence in repeating some things 
 he also said to me. I tell of these things that friends 
 and the public generally may. understand why I have 
 been pleading so earnestly for the Filipinos and for the 
 preservation of what I believe to be that which most 
 honors our country among the world's nations. In talk- 
 ing with Admiral Dewey I went even so far as to say that 
 I believed the people of the United States would support 
 him were he to take some immediate initiative to pre- 
 vent the threatening struggle. I shall not repeat his 
 answer at length. But he spoke much of his concern 
 over the turn affairs had taken, and added that he " was 
 powerless to act." Yet at one point in his remarks he 
 declared: "-Rather than make a war of conquest of this 
 people, I would Up anchor and sail out of the harbor." 
 lie, like General Otis, has done his duty since then in 
 giving his ships to aid the army in an attempt at restoring 
 order to the islands, but I am sure that • the duty has 
 been sadly done, and that it was done only because it was 
 duty. 
 
 Not only did I find the eommanders of our army and 
 navy opposed to the annexation of the Philippine Islands, 
 but more outspoken in opposition were most of the offi- 
 cers high* in command, both on the shore and in the- 
 fleet, — I mean those I had the pleasure of meeting. It 
 is not necessary to tell of this fact at length. Moreover, 
 our consul at Manila said decidedly that Aguinaldo and 
 his immediate associates were not appreciated at home 
 for their real worth. He, like our army and navy chiefs, 
 did not believe in a conquest of. the Filipinos ; and he 
 deprecated the unfortunate series of events that had led 
 up to the hostile alienation that daily threatened an out- 
 break into war. 
 
 When I left Manila immediate danger had apparently 
 been done away with bythe appointment of commissions 
 from both the opposed camps for the purpose of deliber- 
 
s 
 
 ation. For clays war had seemed to be only a question 
 of each hour. But by means of the commissions time at 
 least had been gained aiid a modus vivendi was possible. 
 Each commander of the hostile forces had forbidden any 
 aggressive act on the part of his soldiers. During the 
 voyage to Hong Kong I still believed that, did the Presi- 
 dent only know the situation as it was, he could and 
 would remove the whole trouble by a proclamation as- 
 suring the Filipinos of autonomy under an American pro- 
 tectorate. When I reached Hong Kong, January 15, the 
 outlook at Manila was promising for peace, for a while 
 at least. Since time had been gained I tried to reach 
 the people and our President by the cable service of the 
 New York "Herald," closing the despatch with the 
 words, " Immediate action is imperative." I am not in- 
 clined to be an alarmist, but knowing what I did know, 
 almost hopeless though the appeal seemed, I could not 
 do other than make it. I could only do my part as every 
 American citizen should, since all of us, in every station, 
 large or small, share in our country's honor or disgrace. 
 Assuming as a privilege that an American citizen may 
 express opinion freely on all matters affecting his 
 country's welfare, and urged by the fearful perils con- 
 fronting our nation at Manila, I wrote to President Mc- 
 Kinley immediately upon my making Hong Kong. I 
 had met him in Washington and I could refer him to 
 well-known public men with whom I am acquainted. I 
 shall here make parts of this letter public. " One of the 
 chief misfortunes attending our occupation of Manila," I 
 wrote, "has been the inability of our officials at home 
 and there to announce to .the Filipinos, definitely, as a 
 thing established, an administrative policy. The Fili- 
 pinos do not understand that the United States by act 
 of Congress has not yet assumed the sovereignty of the 
 islands. Moreover, most of their leaders are convinced 
 that our assumption of this sovereignty naturally means 
 assumption of it for our own use, and not as a trust to 
 be held by the United States for them. In consequence 
 . . . the alienation now so acute began, and as a 
 result . . . our officers were obliged to decline offi- 
 cial intercourse with the Filipinos. Soon social inter- 
 course with them lessened, and finally it ceased. As a 
 further result of this absence of a definite policy, the 
 proclamation of January 4 in your name was misinter- 
 pretated by Aguinaldo, and thus widened instead of nar- 
 rowing the chasm between our people and the Filipinos. 
 
Aguinaldo answered General Otis as though it had been 
 decreed by you that the Philippines had become subject 
 to the United States, their people denied henceforth any 
 form of autonomy, taken under control wholly without 
 their consent and wholly without our having had any 
 conference with them to that end. . . . But, what- 
 ever the cause, it is the lamentable fact that the Fili- 
 pinos and the Americans are no longer friends. And 
 they might have been good friends could our benevolent 
 policy have been authoritatively announced months ago, 
 and a sympathetic attitude towards them taken from 
 the first by those in charge of the military administra- 
 tion of Manila." 
 
 I spoke then to the President of how formidable the 
 Filipinos had become as armed enemies during the course 
 of their alienation from us ; in having " at first supplied 
 them with arms as though they were our allies." I then 
 described the dangers in the then present situation, and 
 some scenes I had witnessed when I was within the in- 
 surgent lines and during the critical, excited clays just 
 before I had left Manila, asserting that only some " trifle 
 would precipitate irremediable disaster." 
 
 In my appeal for some action that would avoid this 
 calamity I wrote : " If it is among the possibilities Con- 
 gress should so act. that you can at once definitely an- 
 nounce the will of the American people concerning these 
 islands. But, if it is the will of our people to assume 
 actual sovereignty of the Philippines as an integral part 
 of our body politic, I am sure that, unless some device 
 is adopted by which the Philippine insurgents voluntar- 
 ily accept the annexation of their country, we shall have 
 to enter upon a war before which the calamities of our 
 Seminole War in the Florida swamps would be insignifi- 
 cant. Annexation might be accomplished peaceably were 
 we to do what we can to undo the effects of our attitude 
 hitherto, that is, were we to assume sympathetic relations : 
 to recognize Aguinaldo and his army as our allies during 
 the past six months ; to assure him a high command in 
 the military or civil department of our Philippines' 
 administration ; to pay to the. soldiers who served with 
 him during the war ; . ■ . . to enlist a large body of 
 these soldiers ; ... to conduct as far as possible the 
 civil government ... by means of native employees. 
 The quicker way to peace and good feeling, however, is 
 beyond question a decision by the American Congress 
 that the Philippine people shall be autonomous under the 
 protection of the United States. 
 
10 
 
 " I assume much in making this expression of opinion,, 
 but I have studied this question with anxious interest. 
 Besides, residence for some years in this part of the 
 world has given me some insight into the character and 
 needs of the peoples native here. I do not think the 
 sudden incorporation of an Oriental, especially this 
 Malay people into our body politic would help us. Our 
 history does not justify us in making any race our sub- 
 jects. . . . Moreover, the upper classes of the Philippines 
 are intelligent and cultivated enough to make national 
 self-government possible, or to endanger a government 
 imposed upon them from another land. With a protec- 
 torate we can influence and help the Filipinos much. A 
 possession on this seashore would give us a commanding 
 interest in their foreign relations, and also in the manage- 
 ment of our part of Asiatic commerce. In time closer 
 relations might come naturally between our country and 
 these islands. Then the result would satisfy and benefit 
 us all." 
 
 I said much more in this letter to the President. I do 
 not know that it ever reached him. Its receipt was, 
 however, acknowledged by his secretary. But I was so 
 much aroused by the crisis at Manila that I was com- 
 pelled to make at least the effort to secure the President's 
 attention. 
 
 As the world now knows, the threatened danger was 
 not escaped. Within three weeks after the time of which 
 I speak, the present terrible war began. As soon as I 
 reached Japan I sent my first letter to the " Transcript," 
 summarizing reasons why the Philippines should not be 
 annexed to the United States and telling of my forebod- 
 ings should there be no change in our evident policy 
 towards them. At the outbreak of the hostilities I 
 denounced the treatment of the Filipinos that had led 
 up to the outbreak and told of where I thought the 
 responsibility for our humiliation lay. To-day's letter 
 will make clear why I took the positions shown in those 
 letters. From what I have said here all will now clearly 
 understand that my words were not written without 
 urgent reason ; that so far as events have happened I 
 did not warn without ample 1 cause; and that I have 
 nowhere predicted imaginary evils. The Filipinos are 
 now called '' rebels " and are branded as felons. But 
 they were never, in fact, either our fellow-citizens or our 
 subjects. How, then, could they enter, in any true sense, 
 into " rebellion " against the United States ? I say this 
 
11 
 
 not unmindful of the transfer of sovereignty over them 
 made in the " Treaty of Paris " by Spain to our country. 
 That was really an empty transfer so far as this people 
 were involved. They had long refused to acknowledge 
 Spain as their sovereign, and we had # helped them make 
 this revolt a success. They were their own masters in 
 every real sense of the word when Manila fell, whatever 
 the technicalities of international law may be. Further, 
 men, really citizens of the United States, who now 
 oppose this war for the conquest of the Philippines, are 
 by many, so I see, denounced as " traitors " to the coun- 
 try. I return the charge, for I hold that " treason " for 
 an American lies much nearer those who would bring 
 about the subjugation of a people struggling for civil 
 liberty than it- does near those who pity them and who 
 lament over the wrongs that arrayed them against our 
 country. Of course I would give no aid or comfort- to 
 any one in arms against the -United States, but I cannot 
 do other now than oppose the misguided faction of my 
 own people, that would complete the great wrong in 
 progress in the Philippines. I must plead with my fel- 
 low-citizens to save our land from the dishonor that now 
 threatens, if it does not already possess it. 
 
 What the larger obligations of the present Administra- 
 tion at Washington may be I do not know. These are 
 " world-politics " now. According to international law 
 the legalized parties to the political transfer of the Phil- 
 ippines were the United States, the conquerors of Spain, 
 and Spain, the defeated state. The Pilipinos, techni- 
 cally the subjects of Spain, possibly had no technical will 
 that the governments negotiating about them were 
 bound to respect. They were and had be'en for years in 
 rebellion against Spain. We helped them, in their rebel- 
 lion. We accepted their help in our war upon Spain. 
 Why our sudden cnange towards them ? Was there any 
 influence, not yet publicly acknowledged, that at the 
 downfall of Manila compelled the Administration of the 
 United States to push forward, so unreasoningly and re- 
 lentlessly, its determination to ignore the Eilipinos, their 
 "allies," and to make of the Philippines an American 
 " colony " or " possession," whether the Philippines' peo- 
 ple so wished or not ? Possibly, though this is the 
 merest speculation, the American Administration is under 
 some obligation, connected with certain rapidly matur- 
 ing crises in "world-politics," and must do this act, let 
 the peoples of the Philippines think what they will and 
 
12 
 
 try to save themselves as they may. It is exceedingly 
 difficult to guess well at any satisfactory explanation 
 of this singular overthrow of the fundamental prin- 
 ciples upon which the American democracy is based, but 
 there may be the possibility, that our seizure of this 
 Asiatic archipelago is in part fulfilment of some pledge 
 our authorities have made, that the solution of the bar 
 Eastern question, when it comes, shall have the United 
 States as a factor in its completion. 
 
 Were this the true explanation, some good men might 
 persuade themselves to endure the present evils for the 
 sake of some overwhelming gain. Even this explanation, 
 however, would not remove the record of mistakes, mis- 
 understanding, and injustice with which the course of 
 e vents Jn the Philippines was marked during the diplo- 
 matic developments last year in the "world-politics" 
 that made the arbitrary and heedless assumption of 
 political sovereignty by the United States a necessity. 
 If there is any truth in this speculation it will in time 
 be known. At present the Ear Eastern question is has- 
 tening to a definite discussion. The opposing nations 
 are becoming more and more clearly known. It is now 
 generally assumed in this part of the world that the 
 United States is irrevocably involved in- the portentous 
 issues of the struggle that the great powers will at length 
 not be able to avoid. 
 
 We have been brought, as a nation, to the coast of 
 Asia. Over this fact I have heard some Europeans in 
 Japan express undisguised pleasure. "You are in for 
 it now and can't get away," was the form in which this 
 satisfaction was expressed to me not long ago. Yes ! we 
 are " in for it ;'" but where are we " in for it " to uphold 
 before the world now the standard of popular liberty, of 
 a government of the people, for the people, and by the 
 people ; of a government basing its dominion upon the 
 consent of the people it governs ; of a government striving 
 to realize the ideals that induced our forefathers to yield, 
 with sacred devotion, property, person, and life ? Where 
 for these great purposes we are " in for it " at Manila it is 
 just now difficult to see. As far as present evidence dis- 
 closes facts, one is sorely tempted to lament of our 
 republic, " How are the mighty fallen ! " 
 
 To friends and to fellow-citizens I declare that I 
 sought in my " Transcript " letters to tell only the truth 
 concerning the situation in the Philippines, and nothing 
 but the truth. I may not have told the whole truth, but 
 
13 
 
 what I have put upon record has in large measure been' 
 justly a source of reproach to us, and should lead us to 
 an undoing of the wrong, as far as possible ; not into 
 bravado or into condemnation or persecution of those 
 who have sought to hold our beloved country true to its 
 original faith and past deeds. 
 
 This plea becomes only the more forcible when, in the 
 light of lately published official records, we follow the 
 course of the interrelations of the Washington Adminis- 
 tration and the leaders of the Filipinos. What do these 
 records show but confusion and disaster resulting from 
 the operation of cross-purposes held with simple persist- 
 ence and devotion on each side from the very beginning ? 
 These pages disclose a pathetic self-delusion — so it 
 proved to be — , among the Filipinos ; a precipitate sym- 
 pathy and attempts to cooperate with the Filipinos 
 among the American officials than in the far East, that 
 the Washington authorities at once disavowed; an un- 
 swerving, uncompromising, and unconciliatory determina- 
 tion on the part of the Washington Administration to 
 complete its own purpose of assuming the sovereignty of 
 the Philippines ; and finally the bitter disappointment , 
 of the Filipinos, engendering a hostile alienation that in 
 the end became — who knows just how ? — a terrible 
 war. 
 
 The following extracts f^om the records tell the 
 lamentable story : " On the twenty-fourth day of April 
 Aguinaldo met the United States consul and others at 
 Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in con- 
 junction with the operations of the United States navy 
 at Manila. This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey." 
 Admiral Dewey at once replied : " Tell Aguinaldo to 
 come as soon as possible." Aguinaldo left Singapore on 
 April 26. With seventeen other " revolutionary chiefs," 
 early in May he was taken on the United States steamer 
 " McCulloch " to Manila Bay. " They soon after landed 
 at Cavite, and the admiral allowed them to take such 
 guns, ammunitions, and stores as he did not require for 
 himself." On May 24 Aguinaldo published at Cavite his 
 first proclamation, beginning, " Filipinos : The great 
 nation, North America, cradle of true liberty, and 
 friendly on that account to the liberty of our people, 
 oppressed and subjugated by the tyranny and despotism 
 of those who have governed us, has come to manifest 
 even here a protection which is decisive, as weM as dis- 
 interested, toward us, considering us endowed with 
 
14 
 
 sufficient ' civilization to govern by ourselves this our 
 unhappy land." But on June 16 Secretary of State 
 William L. Day, in a despatch to the consul-general at 
 Singapore concerning Aguinaldo's cooperation with 
 Admiral Dewey, wrote : " This Government has known 
 the Philippine insurgents only as discontented and 
 rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with 
 their purposes. The United States in entering upon the 
 occupation of the islands, as the result of its military 
 operations in that quarter, will do so in the exercise of 
 the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect 
 from the inhabitants, without regard to their former 
 attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience 
 which will be lawfully due from them." On July 4 
 General Anderson, then commanding, wrote to Agui- 
 naldo : " I desire to have the most amicable relations with 
 you and to have you and your people cooperate with us 
 in military operations against the Spanish forces." 
 
 Within three weeks afterwards, July 22, General An- 
 derson addressed Aguinaldo : " Commander General 
 Philippine forces, I observe that your Excellency -has 
 announced yourself as dictator, and proclaimed martial 
 law. I have no authority to recognize this assumption." 
 " In order to prevent my countrymen from making com- 
 mon cause with the Spanish against the North Ameri- 
 cans," answered Aguinaldo, " I came from Hong Kong." 
 For this reason he had " proclaimed the dictatorship." 
 This dictatorship was rapidly changing into A govern- 
 ment of a "democratic and popular character/' "My 
 Government has not been acknowledged by any of the 
 foreign powers, but we expected that the great North 
 American nation, which struggled first for its indepen- 
 dence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is 
 now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, 
 would look upon it with greater benevolence than any 
 other nation." August 1, writing to Consul Williams, 
 Aguinaldo said : " You say all this and yet more will re- 
 sult from annexing ourselves to your people, and I also 
 believe the same, since you are my friend and the friend 
 of the Filipino, and have said it. But why should we 
 say it ? Will my people believe it ? Is it intended, in- 
 deed, to carry out annexation against the wish of these 
 people, distorting the legal sense of that word ? If the 
 Revolutionary Government is the genuine representative 
 by right and deed of the Filipino people, as we have 
 proved when necessary, why is it wished to oppress, 
 
15 
 
 instead of gaining their confidence and friendship ? 
 . . . The Filipino people have learned to love liberty, 
 order, justice, and civil life. ... I and my leaders 
 know how to admire and are ready to imitate the disin- 
 terestedness, the abnegation, and the patriotism of the 
 grand men of America, among whom stands preeminent 
 the immortal George "Washington." 
 
 Soon after the downfall of Manila Aguinaldo's troops 
 were ordered, " by threats of violence/' he writes, " to 
 retire from positions taken." General Merritt, then 
 commanding, on August 20 specified an evacuation of the 
 places at the time held by the " Philippine forces " with- 
 in the suburbs of Manila. To this demand Aguinaldo 
 yielded upon the acceptance of certain conditions by 
 General Merritt. These conditions were declined by the 
 American commander, and the evacuation insisted upon, 
 with the explanation, " I am the more insistent in this 
 particular, because recent instructions from my home 
 Government contemplate this course." Aguinaldo sub- 
 mitted to General Merritt's order, still pleading for the 
 acceptance of his conditions, that in case the United 
 States should return the islands to Spain the Americans 
 would restore to him the military positions he gave up 
 to them. 
 
 "I comprehend," he wrote, August 27, "the incon- 
 venience of a double occupation of the city of Manila 
 and its environs, but you must also understand that 
 without the wide blockade maintained by my forces you 
 would have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, 
 but never the surrender of the Spanish forces, who would 
 haVe been able to retire to the interior towns. Do not 
 make light of the aid given by us to secure the capitula- 
 tion. Greatly though justice may suffer, and risking 
 well-founded fears in regard to my city, I do not insist 
 upon the retention of all the positions conquered by my 
 forces within the environs, at the cost of much bloodshed, 
 unspeakable fatigue, and much money. I promise to 
 withdraw them to the following line. ... I hope 
 that this time a spirit of justice will be manifest which 
 is worthy of a free and admirably constituted government 
 such as that of the United States of America." From 
 this time forward the alienation of our army and the 
 Filipinos from one another steadily grew more grave. I 
 have already told its story. 
 
 How the end will come who can predict ? My own 
 earnest prayer is that the people of the United States 
 
16 
 
 may, as in years past, even yet realize that there is a 
 higher law than that written in the books of legislators 
 and bureaus of state. We observed this law when we 
 emancipated the slave. We obeyed it again when we 
 started to set Cuba free. We have been long violating 
 it in the Philippines. The Treaty of Paris, international 
 law, the proclamations of the American President, do 
 not justify us in our disobedience to its commands. Our 
 Government may relentlessly proclaim that its deeds are 
 only done because "it is so nominated in the bond." 
 But " the quality " of justice, like that " of mercy, is not 
 strained." And as a people we may well bethink our- 
 selves of a time when by the decrees of the Court that 
 transcends all human power we may " have justice, more 
 than we desire," and go smitten and degraded among the 
 nations. 
 
 ROCKWELL AND CHURCHILl PRESS, BOSTON.