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International Boundary Boundary of Tacna under Ancon Treaty- + +++ Boundary of Territory improperly occupied by^ C/vle_ Department Boundaries + + + + + Provincial Boundaries Highways Capitals of Departments. ■ Provinces - Districts Railways (§> O .1*>" 10* £t£^ f/iT&i - ^oA oe PERUVIAN TERRITORY CEDED TO Pta pfch*"> 'Si P IS AG U A Dolores K- ^^'l/^-?'' ,W "*'l"<' l /'a.' l & 'Mll > '" ? %, "'// " UCLNACOTA J 60CR0MA i^W^acapa/'fam ,-'" fsfelM C : i / Chanap.ro. / =. (+1 /f^>s A/fff+UALLAK/M, '="<, CM "'"Z) ^-& C9Pucc wrier It CA UQU, '■"■- QCPCAPmtfl Co. Cff/GUANl xj V'y- Phrapasa/tgjp^ *>. xV C/7'/Z£ 5/ THE/ TREATY OF AN CO A/ (7883) i 73 72 7/ THE QUESTION OF THE PACIFIC An Edition in English of the Work of Dr. Victor M. Maurtua. Enlarged and brought up to, date, with Map of disputed Territory. BY F. A. PEZET, F.R.G.S. First Secretary to the Legation of PERU WASHINGTON, D. C. PHILADELPHIA : Press op Geo. F. Lasher, Printer and Binder. igoi. CONTENTS. The Ancient Geography 5 The Possession of Atacama by Bolivia 8 Encroachment and Invasion 9 The First Dismemberment 13 The Treaty of 1874 19 The Alliance ;.... 21 The Ten-cent Controversy 33 The Mediation of Peru 43 The War 51 The Conquest 58 Mediation 61 The Mediation of the United States 68 Chile and the Proposed International Congress at Panama 89 The Mediation of the United States (Second Period) 91 Making and Unmaking Governments 100 The Mediation of the United States (Third Period) 122 The Mediation of the United States (Fourth Period) 127 The Treaty of Peace 137 The Value of the Annexation 147 A Further Dismemberment 164 The Tacna and Arica Question — Preliminary Negotiations 165 The Delay 165 First Peruvian Effort 170 The Protocol Bacourt-Errazuriz 172 The Second Effort 181 The Third Peruvian Effort 184 The Fourth Effort 188 The Fifth Effort 191 The Bolivian Treaties 193- Treaty of Truce Between Chile and- Bolivia 200 Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Chile and Bolivia. . 204 Special Treaty upon the Transference of Territory 206 Additional and Illustrated Protocols 209 The Mission of Sefior Lira 212 Other Conferences 215 The Billinghurst-Latorre Protocol 217 The Conferences 219 A Brief History of International Plebiscitums 229 The Vicissitudes of the Protocol 244 Chileanizing "By Reason or by Force" 248 Affirming the Conquest 252 The Recall of the Peruvian Legation 279 The Battle over the Program of the Pan-American Congress .... 294 PREFACE. "LET US HAVE PEACE."— General Ulysses S. Grant. Some short time ago I went to New York to receive Dr. Victor M. Maurtua, the newly-appointed Consul-General of Peru at the city of Mexico. As we were admiring the beautiful monument to the memory of General Grant we conversed on the misfortunes of our country, and he spoke to me of a work, which he had just published, on the burning question of the day in South America. He told me that he should like to have his work put into English, because, as he stated, "the United States had sym- pathized so deeply with us during the weary years of our war with Chile, and their government had taken such an active part in trying to bring about an honorable and lasting peace that he regarded it as a duty to give to the public of this great republic a correct version of the question that was still agitating the southern hemisphere." And he did me the honor to request me to undertake the work, giving me carte blanche to add to his text whatever I might think fit, so as to make the English edition a thoroughly compre- hensive and accurate statement of the affair, and to bring it up-to-date in every respect. Looking up toward the beautiful monument that a generous and grateful nation had raised to the statesman and soldier who had helped to make her great and prosper- ous, by giving her the blessing of peace, I saw the words that I have quoted, and, inspired by them, I soliloquized thus: "Peru seeks peace, lasting and true peace, that will allow her to heal her wounds and to rise again prosperous and happy to work out her destiny. But this cannot come while a portion of her territory is held in bondage and her children i II in captivity. To have peace she must be free from all anxiety, she must feel that she has done her duty, and for her to her duty means for us all to do ours towards her." "Yes," I said to my friend, "let us have peace, and if to attain it we must expose the hand that holds it back it can- not be helped; we owe it to our country. At least we shall have done our duty and others will judge our motives." The Peruvian edition of this work has a preface from the pen of Sefior Javier Prado y Ugarteche. It is written in his best style, clear and to the point. As I address myself to another public, to one who, how- ever generously and sympathetically he may feel towards our misfortunes, cannot feel as we feel the scourge of the Chilean whip as it strikes us again and again, making our very souls bleed in cruel agony. I shall only give such passages of his remarks as have a direct bearing on the question. He opens these with the following paragraphs : "The nations of America, after having achieved their emancipation by a common effort, and having been consti- tuted on the impulse of generous ideals, free from the heredi- tary privileges and obstacles that obstruct the evolution of the ancient communities of Europe, possessing vast and rich territories that require population and development, and pro- claiming the principles of justice and equality, fruits of our civilization, as inseparable from a republican form, every- thing tended to show that this privileged region of the world would become the tranquil home of work, of peace, of liberty and of confraternity. "But in the life of nations, the same as in that of individ- uals, there are terrible passions that rise and agitate them. "Which is the nation that has lighted the torch of discord and of war, and that maintains all of her neighbors in such a state of anxiety and unrest until it would appear as if there were no other help than to turn these regions into so many Ill fortified camps and give over their waterways to the naviga- tion of warlike fleets? "History has had already to record, sorrowfully, the name of the disturber, and, even to-day, without any need of recall- ing the past, we contemplate with profound bitterness the sombre spectacle presented in the final liquidation of the war of the Pacific — Tacna and Arica." :,'i :ji i sj: % -jje ^c j}; Hfi "What Chile does when pretending to undertake in good faith any negotiations is to follow certain methods well known to her. One of these consists in getting up formalities, pretexts, conferences, discussions, agreements and surprises so as to obtain concessions or to mislead the public mind, and then to invoke titles and rights that she has never possessed, using measures of violence, while bringing charges to bear and threats against her neighbors so as to blame them for a situation created solely through her arbitrary and disloyal conduct. "This has been the traditional diplomacy of Chile; it be- came apparent in the treaties of '66 and '74 with the ob- ject of justifying her usurpation of Bolivian territory; it used the treaty of defensive alliance between Peru and Bolivia as a pretext for the war against Peru and to deprive her of her wealth; in the Elias-Castellon convention to shamefully drag us to the arbitration of Berne. The circular note of Senor Errazuriz Urmaneta, and the documents issued during the war by her Ministers Fierro and Balmaceda have responded to the same purpose. "At other times, when she appears to have listened to the voice and counsels of justice and conciliation, she has done so because, by so doing, she has allayed, for the time being, perils that alarmed her, as in the instance of the Billinghurst- Latorre protocol, that was only fraught with the intention of crossing us and of eliminating them when fearing, indeed, the possibility of a war with Argentine, or vice versa, as when during our war when she thus utilized the mission of Balma- ceda to the Argentine. "Perhaps to-day it might not be difficult for Chile to ap- parently make some agreement, so as to delay and gain time IV wherein to carry out her plan for the Chileanization of Tacna and Arica, and at the same time to obstruct under the pre- text of pending diplomatic negotiations with Peru, the atti- tude that she fears may be assumed by the Congress at Mex- ico or of some of the American States. "For the moment, undoubtedly, Peru cannot prevent Chile from continuing to occupy by force the territory of Tacna and Arica, but she is bound, to-day more than ever, to defend her rights with dignity and with excessive prudence, and not to allow herself to be surprised by Chilean astuteness. "On no account, either, must the plebiscitum of Tacna and Arica be determined under unfavorable conditions. "How could we, for instance, consent to its being held under the policy that Chile is to-day enforcing in those un- fortunate provinces? How could we accept that every indi- vidual should vote that the conqueror chose to import for that purpose? How can the plebiscitum ever be held under Chilean military authority?" * & & H~ -.: * * :£ * "Our cause is the cause of justice and of American solid- arity. We do not uphold either conquest or war, neither spoliation nor extermination. We desire for peace and the respect of the rights of others. In the name of these sacred principles we have a legitimate title to make ourselves heard. "Victory, even if at the beginning it were only to be of a moral nature, has great value. An international conscience, the same as an individual conscience, represents an enormous power; it furnishes energies, gives strength and even unfore- seen aid to those who obtain its support while it raises insur- mountable barriers against those who remain outside its pale. "As time advances it is no longer a question of barriers ; it is the threatening phantom that begins to move, leaving a hollowness in its trail and creating immense repulsion against the culprit. "Perhaps some day Chile shall realize that the policy to which she is committed is bad, that if it is easy for her to be proud thereof to-day, she is playing with her future; but perhaps when she awakens from the hallucination and opens her eyes to the- reality, it may be too late; and then may fall, crushed by the weight of universal condemnation, the nation who has tried to enthrone force and violence in Amer- ica and erect them into the supreme law of mtions." In the pages of this book I have kept as closely to the original text and style as was consistent with the nature of the work itself; but I have added a great deal of new data, and inserted important documents and information culled from official records and authors of high standing. I have quoted very freely from the works of unbiased writers, and in not a few cases from Chilean sources. My guiding thought has been to present a true statement of facts founded upon official documents, and supported by history. I have searched in archives, dipped into libraries, and brought together in a clear and interesting form the salient points of the controversy. The press of the whole world has done justice to the cause of Peru, and especially in America it has proved itself righteous in its judgment. During the days that I have labored upon this book I have derived no small consolation and energy to help me carry out my undertaking, from the unmistakable proofs of sympathy that my country has received from all classes in the United States, and from their representative press. And while this sympathy of the people has spurred me. on, the con- sciousness that such men as Garfield, Arthur, Blaine and Mc- Kinley had upheld on every possible occasion the principles that Peru defends, made it still more apparent that, indeed, I was defending a noble cause, outside from every considera- tion that it was my country's cause. VI The late President McKinley, in his last great speech at Buffalo, said: "God and man have linked the nations together. No nation can longer be indifferent to any other. And as we are brought more and more in touch with each other, the less occasion is there for misunderstandings, and the stronger the disposition, when we have differences, to adjust them in the court of arbitration, which is the noblest forum for the settle- ment of international disputes.'' And President Arthur, in his message to Congress in 1882, used the following words : "It is greatly to be deplored that Chile seems resolved to exact such rigorous terms of peace, and indisposed to sub- mit to arbitration the terms of an equitable settlement. No peace is likely to be lasting that is not sufficiently equitable and just to command the approval of other nations." These words of two Chief Magistrates of this great com- monwealth are well worthy of consideration and of applica- tion to present conditions, together with Secretary Olney's memorable words in his statement on the Venezuelan bound- ary question; they constitute a lasting judgment against the present attitude of Chile in her stubborn determination of neither settling, directly or by arbitration, the Tacna and Arica dispute. "Upon what principle," wrote Secretary Olney, "except her feebleness as a nation, is she to be denied the right of having the claim heard and passed upon by an impartial tribu- nal? No reason, nor shadow of reason, appears in all the voluminous literature of the subject. 'It is to be so because I will it to be so,' seems to be the only justification Great Britain offers." F. A. PEZET. October, 1901. THE ANCIENT GEOGRAPHY. The vast desert of Atacama, situated between 23° and 2J° of south latitude, was from time immemorial practically a no-man's-land, but a century before the Spanish invader discovered and conquered the great Inca Empire, Tupac Yupanqui, the warrior Inca, sent an expedition to the south of his domain and extended his empire to the Maule river, thereby incorporating the desert of Atacama with his vast possessions of South America. The Spanish adventurers who overran this empire were the first to divide up its territory and form the first demarca- tions of the future independent republics. Francisco Pizarro, the conqueror of Peru, as early as 1529 obtained a concession of territories comprising a length of 470 leagues, and the American historian, Prescott, takes this concession to extend from 1° 20' to 25° 31' 24" south latitude. Diego de Almagro, Pizarro's lieutenant, likewise ob- tained a concession of 200 leagues to the south of his chief's concession. The Royal Charter of the Crown of Spain, whereby this concession is granted, reads 'thus : "He will discover, conquer and people the lands and provinces extending along the seaboard to the south and toward the east within 200 leagues in the direction of the Straits of Magellan, taking these 200 leagues from the point where end the limits of the government, which by the conces- sion and our provisions we have entrusted to Captain Fran- cisco Pizarro" * * * * To the south of Almagro's concession, a third conces- sion was granted to Pedro de Mendoza, the governor of the River Plate. This concession was likewise of 200 leagues, and extended from the southern limit of Almagro's posses- sions in the direction of the Straits of Magellan. 5 Almagro was succeeded by Pedro de Valdivia, the foun- der of the city of Santiago, the present capital of Chile ; he was appointed Governor of Chile by President La Gasca, who was then governing Peru in the name of the Spanish Crown. La Gasca wrote on May 7th, 1548, to the Council of Indies, as follows: "On the 23d of April, 1548, Pedro de Valdivia was sent as Governor and Captain-General of the Province of Chile known as 'Nuevo Estremo,' and which limits from Copiapo, which is at 27° from the equinoxial line toward the south until 41" to the north, to south straight meridian, and wide from the sea inland 100 leagues west to east." The Spanish monarch, Emperor Charles V, confirmed this concession in the following terms : "Whereas, Licentiate Pedro La Gasca, our President, who was of the Royal Audiencia of the Provinces of Peru, and who at present is Bishop of Placencia, while being in the said Provinces of Peru, by virtue of the special powers which he held from us to appoint new Governors and make new conquests * * * * we declare to be valid for the time which our grace and wish may last, or until we shall decide otherwise, that you shall have the Government of the said Province of Chile, within the limits which the said Bishop of Placencia indicated to you." This primitive divisory line, which shows the territorial rights of Chile and Peru, was never altered, and it was sanc- tioned by the principle of American public law, known by the incorrect name of Uti possidetis of 1810. The Yiceroyalty of Peru, which was constituted on the basis of the ancient government (gobernaciones), comprised all the vast dominions of the Spanish Crown in South Amer- ica. In later years it was broken up in order to organize the Yiceroyalties of Santa Fe and of Buenos Aires. But neither of these partitions affected the northern boundary of Chile. During the several centuries of the Spanish domination, that boundary line was invariably respected. None of the concessions which were made in favor of the Audiencias of Lima, Charcas and Santiago of Chile, altered this northern boundary, and it remained as it had been drawn up by La Gasca. During all this time 27 south latitude was the ac- knowledged northern limit of the government of Chile. In 1646, Reverend Father Ovalle published at Rome his celebrated work, "Historic Relation of the Kingdom of Chile," on the frontispiece of which appeared a map on which at the point designated as Copayapu, which he names Port of Copiapo, was inscribed the following sentence : Peruani et Chilcrmisis regni confma. And it is worth recalling that this boundary was not drawn by an imaginary line ; it was marked out by means of regular landmarks. These landmarks occupy nearly ex- actly the position of the parallel which the concessions of Almagro reached. Viceroy Abascal, in his report for the year 1806, says : "The Viceroyalty of Peru, after the last dismember- ments and annexations, has the following limits : On the north, the Province of Guayaquil ; on the south, the desert of Atacama * * * * comprising in all its territory from 32' to the north of the equinoxial line to 25 10' of south latitude."' The several constitutions which have been promulgated by Chile have always acknowledged as the northern bound- ary of the Republic the line which divided it from the Peru- vian Viceroyalty at Copiapo. The following are extracts from such constitutions : 1822. The territory of Chile recognizes as its natural boundaries, on the south, Cape Horn; on the north, the desert of Atacama. 1823. The territory comprises from Cape Horn to the desert of Atacama. 1828. The Chilean nation extends in a vast territory, limited on the north by the desert of Atacama. 1832. Its territory comprises from north to south, from the desert of Atacama to Cape Horn. 1833. The territory of Chile stretches from the desert of Atacama to Cape Horn. On March 31st, 1823, the Chilean Government estab- lished its most northern department, according to the follow- ing text : . j First Department: From the desert of Atacama to River Choapa. In 1826, this division was declared a province, as fol- lows : First Province : From the desert of Atacama to the River Choapa. This province shall be known as Province of Coquimbo ; its capital city will be La Serena. When Spain finally acknowledged the independence of Chile by the treaty of 1844, its boundaries were thus de- scribed: "All the territory which extends from the desert of Atacama to Cape Horn." And finally, President Bulnez, of Chile, and Minister Montt, in 1842, acknowledged the Papal Bull by which the Bishopric of La Serena was created, wherein the territory of this diocese is described as extending from the River Cho- apa to the desert of Atacama. THE POSSESSION OF ATACAMA BY BOLIVIA. Bolivia, before the War of Peruvian Independence, was known by the name of "Upper Peru." When General Simon Bolivar finally emancipated South America from the Spanish yoke, and definitely set up Peru as a free and independent republic, he constituted Upper Peru into an independent State under the name of Republic of Bolivia. General Sucre, the first President of the new Republic, commissioned Colonel Francisco B. O'Connor, in 1825, to proceed to the Province of Atacama to make a thorough sur- vey of its coast and to establish a seaport. In his instruc- tions the following appears : "There are three ports, and of these you may select the best. The said ports are : Atacama, Mejillones and Loa; the two first have no water, and the third is the one which the Liberator prefers, although it does not afford good anchorage, but solely on account of its close proximity to Potosi and of its river. Should it not be desir- able, you will survey the other two, or any other, with a view of establishing thereat a large city * * * *." General Bolivar, the Liberator, issued on the 28th of December, 1825, the following decree: Simon Bolivar, Liberator, etc., etc., whereas : First. These provinces have no established port, and, as in the partido de Atacama, there exists a port known by the name of "Cobija," which offers many advantages ; And considering that it is a just reward to the merits of Grand Marshal Don Jose de La Mar, victor at Ayacucho,. that his name be given to the above mentioned port : After hearing the permanent deputation ; Hereby decrees : First. That from the first of January next, the port of these provinces be established at Cobija, under the name of Mar. Second. That the necessary offices be established there,, etc. ENCROACHMENT AND INVASION. The beginning of Chilean encroachment on Bolivian ter- ritory was concurrent with the discovery of guano in the desert of Atacama. Until 1842 Bolivia had been in unmolested possession of the littoral which she had acquired at the time of her erection as an independent republic. In that year the Minister of Finance of Bolivia wrote to the Prefect of Cobija as follows : "I have resolved to inform that prefecture that the most stringent measure be adopted, so as to prevent any incursions by the parties holding guano concessions outside of the limits of the Rivers Loa and Pa- poso, which comprise the littoral of this Republic." Bolivia at the time had a custom house at the mouth of the Paposo river. Between the years 1842 and 1845 the Consul of Bolivia, at London, brought a suit against the Chilean frigate "Lacaw" for having taken clandestinely a cargo of guano from the littoral. The British law courts sen- tenced the said ship, and the Chilean Minister at London raised no objection either to the suit or to the sentence. The Government of Bolivia, in order to protect its guano IO deposits from any possible raids, commissioned the brig "General Sucre" as a war vessel, and some time later this vessel captured the "Rumcra," a Chilean ship, which was load- ing guano in Bolivian territory. From the time of the guano discoveries, the incursions and raids on the Bolivian deposits by Chileans was continu- ous, so much so that finally the authorities at Cobija decided to put a stop thereto, and to this effect they captured and carried away a party of Chileans who were clandestinely ex- tracting guano near Mejillones. The Chilean war ship "Chile" came to their rescue, freed them, and landing a force at Mejillones, constructed a sort of small fort, over which they hoisted the Chilean flag. When the Bolivian Minister in Chile presented his Gov- ernment's claims against Chile for this and other aggressions, he stated that "the present policy was in contrast with the course which had been followed only a short time before, when in the case of the schooner 'Jancqueo,' accused of a similar offense, ample satisfaction had been given to the Bolivian Government, and that the aggressive act perpetrated by the man-of-war 'Chile' did not prove a pacific act of pos- session, but that it implied an outrage.'' Doctor E. S. Zeballos, who was at one time Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, and Plenipoten- tiary of that Republic at Washington, in his treatise on Span- ish-American Public Law, referring to the action of Chile, says : "This is how Chile first appeared in Atacama, to the north of the Paposo river." Sehor Montt, the President of Chile, in his Message to Congress on July 31st, 1842, said: "Inasmuch as the usefulness of the substance known as 'guano' has been recognized in Europe, although from time immemorial it has been used as a manure for fertilizing the land on the coast of Peru, I deemed it advisable to send a commission to explore and examine the seaboard from the port of Coquimbo to the head of Mejillones, for the purpose of discovering if any guano deposits existed in the territory of the Republic, which, properly worked, might furnish a new II source of revenue to the treasury; and notwithstanding that the result of the expedition has not come up to our expecta- tions, guano has been discovered from 29 35' to 23° 6' of south latitude." This Presidential Message served as the introduction to the bill that was discussed and passed by Congress on Oc- tober 31st, 1842, to the effect that: "All the guano deposits which exist in the Province of Coquimbo, in the littoral of Atacama, and in the adjacent islands, are hereby declared as national property." From the passing of this law dates the first official step of Chilean expansion to the north of her original frontiers. But no sooner had this bill become law than Seiior Olafieta, Bolivian Plenipotentiary in Chile, acting on instruc- tions from his Government, demanded that the Chilean Ex- ecutive "should request Congress to formally revoke this law which extended the frontiers of the Republic to the prejudice of Bolivia (January 30th, 1843). The Chilean Foreign Office, in its reply, feigned surprise, stating that "whatever opinion the Government might form, in view of the reasons and grounds that might be adduced, it could never enter its province to alter the existing laws, by making the declaration which it had been called upon to make." And thus was started the diplomatic controversy which has extended over a period of sixty years, and caused already one bloody war and created so much ill feeling in the south- ern continent. Minister Aguirre succeeded Sefior Olafieta as Bolivian Plenipotentiary at Santiago. His mission was likewise fruit- less, and while it lasted there were new Chilean aggressions, the protests of Bolivia being invariably met by Chile in the most haughty manner and with little, if any, success. So matters stood until 1857. By this time the wealth of the Bolivian littoral was a well-known and established fact, and whether, owing to this or to other causes, it matters little, the fact is that on August 20th, 1857, the Chilean man- of-war "Esmeralda" entered the port of Mejillones, and with- 12 out further preamble landed a military force, seized the Boli- vian miners and organized the local administration. When the knowledge of this new act of aggression reached the Government of Bolivia, Congress passed a law urging upon the Government "to employ the necessary means for repairing the national dignity and honor, out- raged by these acts of despoliation, and so as to revindicate the integrity of the territory." As an outcome of this law the Bolivian Government sent Sefior M. M. Salinas as Minister Plenipotentiary to Chile. Following his arrival at Santiago, the Minister demanded that the usurped territory be immediately restored to Bo- livia. To this Chile refused, declaring that the utmost con- cession which she was willing to make would be to draw up a boundary treaty, dividing by halves x\tacama, between Bolivia and Chile. The Salinas mission having failed to obtain proper re- dress, the Bolivian Government sent Sefior Santivaiiez, with new powers ; and perhaps feeling its weakness he was in- structed to acquiesce in a measure to the Chilean proposals, and to negotiate a boundary treaty. And thus, by a stroke of the pen, Bolivia forgot the outrages against her sover- eignty, the de facto and vandalic expansion of Chile, the seiz- ure and imprisonment of her citizens, and the dismissal of her own authorities ; and by consenting to discuss a boundary treaty, she admitted the possibility of a doubt in regard to her territorial rights, and thereby opened up a question which had no precedents whatever to sustain it. Santivaiiez proposed that 25° of south latitude should be the common frontier. The Chilean Government wanted it to be the 23 of south latitude. Either nation appeared unwill- ing to recede, until Bolivia proposed that the question be sub- mitted to the arbitration of Great Britain. Again the Chilean Government remained inflexible and absolutely refused to ac- cept this conciliating measure. In the meantime the years had rolled on; the two Gov- ernments were still discussing the question, when the Span- iards suddenly appeared in the Pacific, and quickly picking up a quarrel with Chile and Peru, seized upon the Chincha 13 Islands the great guano deposits, invoking the principle of re- vindication (1864). In the consternation which followed Chile saw a new opportunity to further her policy of usurpation, and hoisted her flag at Chacaya, to the north of Mejillones. The successive Bolivian missions to Chile, from that of Olaheta until that of Frias, had vainly striven to obtain re- dress from their aggressive neighbor ; their demands had been rejected, both the restoration of Bolivian ownership ■over her entire territory, as likewise her appeal for arbitra- tion. During those eventful years, Bolivia had been in the throes of prolonged internecine strife, and to her great mis- fortune the notorious Melgarejo had now attained power. THE FIRST DISMEMBERMENT. It is indeed curious, that whereas Melgarejo was consid- ered on all hands to be nothing better than a vulgar adven- turer and a tyrant, he was, however, the recipient of the high- est honors at the hands of the Chilean Government, who de- creed him a generalship in its army, while the Chilean press gratified his coarse vanity in the most gushing manner. It is not surprising, therefore, that his regime should have proved profitable to Chile; although, be it said in justice to the man, and more especially to his country, that he did not go to the extent to which Chile wished him to go. A Chilean mission was sent to La Paz with Sehor Ani- ceto Vergara Albano as Plenipotentiary, and Sefior Carlos Walker Martinez as Secretary; their first steps were directed toward securing a treaty of alliance with Bolivia against Spain, and the idea of a further alliance between the two nations for the settlement of their boundaries was likewise broached. It is interesting, in view of subsequent events, to notice how Chilean diplomacy acted on this occasion. The Vergara Albano mission was ostensibly sent to Bolivia to negotiate an alliance with that country, and to settle, if possible, the boundary dispute ; but the Chilean envoy, notwithstanding the fact that Peru and Chile were at the time allies against Spain, took advantage of the opportunity to insinuate to Melgarejo's Government the advantages of forming a Chile- Bolivian alliance against Peru. A brief history of this perfidious insinuation is best told by Senor Mariano D. Munoz, who was at the time Secretary of State of the Bolivian Government. In a communication which he addressed on April 21st, 1879, to tne Bolivian Plenipotentiary at Lima, he makes the following revelations : "About the month of March, 1866, Senor Aniceto Ver- gara Albano was received as Envoy Extraordinary and Min- ister Plenipotentiary of Chile, in Bolivia, with the object of negotiating and carrying out the proffered alliance (against Spain), and to renew the conferences still pending on the boundary question between both nations. ''The first object having been fulfilled, we next under- took to reopen the conferences, Senor Yergara Albano as Chilean Plenipotentiary, and I as General Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs. "After every argument had been exhausted, I formulated the basis, which, in the opinion of the Bolivian Government, might conciliate the interests of both republics, adopting as a basis the partitioning of the disputed territory, actuated by a sentiment of confraternity, and as a friendly and equitable compromise. "It was in the course of these conferences that I heard the Chilean Plenipotentiary make the propositions to which you refer in the letter to which I now answer, and to the effect that 'Bolivia should agree to renounce all her rights to the disputed zone, from 25° south latitude to the River Loa, or at least to and including Mejillones, with the precise promise that Chile would aid Bolivia, in the most efficacious manner, to acquire by armed occupation the Peruvian littoral as far as the Morro de Sama, as compensation for the cession of the Bolivian littoral to Chile ; the reason adduced being that the only natural outlet of Bolivia to the Pacific was through the port of Arica.' "This proposition was repeatedly made by Senor Ver- 15 gara Albano, I may say, from the first to the last conference which we held, and he did not fail to reiterate it to President Melgarejo, whose warlike spirit and tendencies he tried to flatter, insinuating the idea, of his carrying out a glorious campaign which his predecessors had not been able to under- take. With tenacious perseverance Sehor Vergara Albano was seconded in his efforts bv his secretary, Sehor Carlos Walker Martinez, who had gained the intimate sympathy of Melgarejo, and from whom he obtained the brevet of major in the Bolivian army, offering himself as his aid-de-camp in the future campaign against Peru, to which they were both urging him. In the files of the army register of that date the entry of this commission is undoubtedly to be found. "The loyal and firm refusal with which both Melgarejo and myself met these insinuations did not suffice ip make the Chilean Government desist from its absorbent tendencies and from its aims of usurpation ; because, when I was at Santiago on a special mission, a few days before the final termination of the boundary treaty, which was signed at that city on the ioth of August, 1866, between the Plenipotentiaries, Alvaro Covarrubias on the part of Chile, and J. M. Muhoz Cabrera on the part of Bolivia, Sehor Covarrubias strenuously in- sisted upon the demarcation and exchange of littorals which Seiior Vergara Albano had proposed to me ; and it was not solely Covarrubias, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, who insinuated the same idea to Muhoz Cabrera and myself, but also many other notable persons of that city, who, al- though using other arguments, strove to persuade us that Chile was advocating in favor of Bolivia, and that she only had in view the equilibrium of the nations of the Pacific, and the desire of rectifying the boundaries of the three countries in the most natural manner. "Vergara Albano., Covarrubias and Walker Martinez, and many others to whom I refer, are still living; let them give me the lie if they refuse to lend their homage to the truth of this statement." Although this perfidy of Chile did not meet with suc- cess, still it is clear to see how the diplomacy of that nation was shaping itself for subsequent events. i6 The boundary treaty of August ioth, 1866, concluded be- tween Chile and Bolivia, was a most curious document, and it was worded in such a manner as to foreshadow fresh dif- ficulties. Substantially it became a cession of territory. Article 1st of said treaty says: "The line of demarcation of the boundaries between Chile and Bolivia, in the desert of Atacama, shall be hereafter the parallel 24 of south latitude, from the Pacific coast to the eastern boundaries. Chile to the south, and Bolivia to the north, shall have the dominion and possession of the terri- tories extending as far as the above mentioned parallel 24, with power to exercise therein all and every act of jurisdic- tion and sovereignty pertaining to the owner of the land. "The exact fixing of the line of demarcation between both parts shall be undertaken by a commission formed by experts and properly qualified persons, named in equal proportion by each one of the high contracting parties. "As soon as this line shall have been fixed upon, it shall be marked on the ground by means of regular and permanent landmarks ; the expense which their erection entails shall be divided between the Governments of Chile and Bolivia in equal proportion." Sehor Marcial Martinez, a leading Chilean statesman and diplomatist, explains in the following words how his country happened to result owner of the land extending from the north of Coprapo to parallel 24 : "That in every transac- tion it becomes necessary that consummated acts should be taken into consideration and to a measure acquiesced in, and that although Chile had not possessed without contradic- tion the port of Mejillones during a sufficiently long period which would allow her to claim it by prescription, in the ab- sence of a better title, nevertheless, the fact of being in pos- session could not be overlooked at the time of arranging for a settlement." Notwithstanding that Chile recognizes Bolivia's rights to the territory to the north of said parallel 24, Article II of the treaty stipulated that "the Republics of Chile and Boli- via shall divide by equal parts the proceeds of the exploitation of the guano deposits discovered at Mejillones, and of all 17 other deposits of this manure that may be discovered between the degrees 23 and 25 south latitude, as likewise the export duties collected on minerals, mined within the above men- tioned territory." Article III establishes that Bolivia should be obliged to open and appoint the port of Mejillones, and to establish therein a properly equipped custom house, which should be the only fiscal office for the receipt of the guano revenues and the exportation dues on minerals. The Government of Chile being authorized to appoint fiscal agents to inspect the Me- jillones custom house and to receive the part of the profits belonging to Chile. The same privilege being granted to Bolivia to receive and collect such revenue and dues, in the territory comprised between 24° and 25" south latitude." Article IV was to the effect that "all the products of the territory comprised between 24° and 25 , and exported from the port of Mejillones, should be free of duty." By Article V it was stipulated that the system of expor- tation or the sale of guano and the export dues on minerals mentioned in Article 2, should be determined upon by mutual agreement, either by special convention or by other means. Article VI contained a curious stipulation to the effect that "the high contracting parties bind themselves not to transfer their rights to the territory divided, in favor of another State, society or private individual; and that in the event that either of them should desire to make such a transfer, the purchaser may only be the other contracting party." Acting upon this treaty Chile established at the port of Mejillones her fiscal intervention without loss of time^ and at once began to create new difficulties to her neighbor. When the rich silver lode of Caracoles Xvas discovered, as it happened to be located in a territory extending over twelve miles, and through the centre of which runs parallel 23 , she claimed that the whole of the territory belonged to her. Later on she declared that all inorganic substances, even if they did not contain minerals, should come under the special provisions of Articles II and V of'the treaty. i8 She likewise demanded that her fiscal agents should ex- tend their intervention to all the other Bolivian ports estab- lished within the limits of parallel 24. All the while these successive encroachments and de- mands were producing quite a crop of diplomatic claims and counter-claims, and brewing danger generally. About this time the Chilean settlers on Bolivian soil had organized a political society known as ("La Patria") The Fatherland, whose chief aim was to annex the territory to Chile, and to this end a regular propaganda was started. Its members caused all the disturbances and riots ; they openly helped the political factions in their revolutionary attempts, and were a constant menace to peace and order. The Bolivian authorities had, therefore, a most difficult task to perform, and it stands to their credit that, notwith- standing the many obstacles and difficulties which they en- countered, they invariably acted with considerable tact, and managed to smooth the most trying situations. The Chilean residents were allowed to exercise a nearly complete control over the local affairs ; they voted in all municipal elections, they formed the juries and held the more important posts in the municipal councils of Cobija, Anto- fagasta and Caracoles. Bolivia gave in to every one of Chile's demands, and to this Sehor Alarcial Martinez, the well-known Chilean diplo- matist, bears witness, in his book "Chile and Bolivia" (pub. 1873). "Never did Bolivia," says this writer, "refuse to ac- cept the Chilean tariff with slight modifications." And, re- ferring to the classifying of all inorganic substances as min- erals, he says : "Chile cannot loyally say that it has cost her any great effort to obtain this from the representatives of Bolivia." And, when further on he speaks of the fiscal inter- vention which Chile pretended to exercise over all the Boli- vian custom houses, he says : "In my opinion we should take into account and give Bolivia credit for the relative modera- tion with which she has acceded to the Chilean demands. The closing of these incidents, to a large extent, has been achieved by the good-will which Bolivia has displayed to- wards Chile on more than one occasion ; a good-will which 19 has not been brought about by our diplomatic ability, but from its own virtue." THE TREATY OF 1874. All of the foregoing incidents which had given rise to so much ill feeling on either side, and which had been productive of very lengthy and tedious diplomatic negotiations, were finally embodied in a protocol drawn up between both parties on the 5th of December, 1872. According to this protocol the Chilean Government ex- tended its claims to the interior of the desert of Atacama towards the east, and thereby altered the original nature of the question, which, as has been seen, was one relating only to the littoral. Now, the question was more properly one of boundaries, it being the desire of Chile to fix permanently its northern frontier, and to this effect she claimed by Article I, "that the eastern boundaries of Chile, mentioned in Ar- ticle I of the treaty of 1866, shall be the highest peaks of the Andes, and, therefore, the line of division between Chile and Bolivia is the 24° of south latitude, from the Pacific Ocean to the summit of the cordillera of the Andes." This protocol was not approved of by the Chilean Con- gress or by the Bolivian Assembly, and further negotiations becoming necessary in order to reach a final understanding, in 1874 the following treaty was celebrated: Article I. The parallel of the 24° from the ocean to the cordillera of the Andes, in the divortia aquarum, is the boundary between the Republics of Bolivia and Chile. Article II. For the effects of this treaty the lines of the parallels 23 and 24, established by Commissioner Pissis and Mujia, and to which the acts of the proceedings of February 10th, 1870, bear testimony, shall be considered as holding and subsisting. Should there arise any doubts as to the true and exact location of the Caracoles mining district, or of any other min- eral-bearing land, and it is thought that they are outside of the zone inclosed between both parallels, their exact ubi- 20 cation shall be determined by a commission of two experts, each contracting party appointing one, with power to appoint a third to act as umpire, and in the event that they should not be able to agree upon the umpire, this appointment shall be left to the decision of H. M. the Emperor of Brazil. Until it shall not be proved to be otherwise, it shall be understood, as it is at present, that this mineral district lies within the aforesaid parallels. Article III. The deposits of guano which now exist, or which mav be discovered in the future, within the limits men- tioned in the preceding article, shall be divided in moiety be- tween Bolivia and Chile; the Governments of the two Repub- lics shall agree by mutual consent on the method of working, administrating and selling the guano, adopting the manner and form hitherto employed. (This article was enlarged by the treaty of July 4th, 1875, which stipulated that the guanos which should be worked conjointly were such as lay within parallels 23 and 24, and that all and every question which might arise in reference to the interpretation and scope of the principal treat)' should be submitted to the decision of an arbiter.) Article IV. The export duties to be levied on the minerals mined within the zone mentioned in the preced- ing articles shall not exceed those which are in force at the present time; and the Chilean capital, their persons. and their industries, shall not be subject to any other taxes of what- soever kind than at present exist. The conditions expressed in this article shall be binding for a term of twenty-five years. Article V. The Chilean natural products which may be imported through the Bolivian littoral, comprised within par- allels 23 and 24, shall be free and exempt from the payment of any duty ; and as reciprocity the natural products of Boli- via shall enjoy the same privilege on entering the Chilean littoral comprised within the parallels of 24 and 25. Article VI. The Republic of Bolivia binds herself to open and establish Mejillones and Antofagasta as permanent ports of the Bolivian littoral. Article VII. From this date the treaty of August 10th, 1866, is abrogated in all its parts. ' Article VIII. The present treaty shall be ratified by each of the contracting Republics, and the ratification ex- changed at the city of Sucre within a term of three months. THE ALLIANCE. In the preceding chapters it has been shown how the several encroachments and aggressions on the part of Chile against Bolivia had successively given rise to the treaties of .1866 and 1874, and how Bolivia had spent over thirty years trying to avert a war which every now and then appeared inevitable. During all the years which followed upon the discovery of guano and minerals in the Bolivian littoral, Chile at no moment overlooked her boundary question with the Argen- tine Republic, and while. she advanced toward the north and acquired a share in the riches of Atacama, she steadily pushed her frontiers to the south and to the east. Surrounded, therefore, by international questions of her own making, it was but natural that she should prepare against any emergency, and to this effect she utilized all her available resources and her credit abroad. But while acquiring material strength she sought to con- solidate her own political institutions and to weaken her neighbors. The latter was not a difficult task, as the history of Bolivia, Argentine and Peru shows. These countries were continually in the throes of civil wars, their finances were consequently disturbed, and Chile, seizing her opportunity, did not scruple to foster these evils and more or less openly intervened in their internal politics, and by aiding and abet- ting the several revolutionary leaders and conspirators who sought refuge in her territory, helped materially to keep up a situation which was in every respect favorable to the accom- plishment of her ends. The earliest aim of Chile was to push Bolivia out of Ata- cama, and to give her possession of the Peruvian coast as far as Arica, and to displace Argentine from Patagonia and the fertile valleys of the eastern slopes of the Andes. And 22 it is to-day possible to notice how very consistent her policy has been in both respects. A few instances of this policy may be recalled here. Sir Clements R. Markham, the President of the Royal Geographical Society of London, in his "History of Peru," referring to the Chilo-Bolivian boundary question, says : "Thus being admirably prepared, the Chileans began by en- croachments on the territory of their Bolivian neighbor * * * * and when Admiral Fitz Roy executed his surveys, inquiries were made of the Chilean authorities as to the posi- tion of the boundary, and it was placed to the south of 25 south. It was only when the great value of the Atacama minerals was discovered that any question was raised. Then Chile claimed the 23d parallel." The same historian, referring to the Peru-Bolivian Con- federation of 1836, says : "The confederation found an implacable enemy in the Chilean Government. Chile, which had been a colony and subordinate government of the Viceroy during Spanish times, was also a financial drain on the resources of Peru. She had never paid her own way and needed an annual Peru- vian subsidy. * * * * The leading Chilean families re- garded with bitter jealousy the prosperity of a neighbor. The pretexts for war were that Arica had been made a free port, that advantages were given to vessels that had not touched at any place in Chile, and that General Freire (the Chilean liberal leader) had been allowed to buy two vessels in Peru. The commercial differences between the two coun- tries did not supply the shadow of a cause for declaring war. As regards the expedition of Freire, the Government of the confederation did not know of it, and offered all the satisfac- tion in its power. Portales (the leading spirit in Chile) re- solved to add treachery and national dishonor to injustice. He sent two vessels, the "Aquiles" and "Colocolo," to Callao, and in time of peace, and in the dead of the night, the Chilean commander treacherously seized the Peruvian fleet of three vessels, lyino- unarmed and unmanned. The Chilean his- torian, Yicufia-Mackenna, has characterized the proceeding- as 23 'one of the most odious acts recorded in the annals of our Republics.' Having thus perfidiously deprived Peru of the means of defending her coasts, the Chilean Government pro- ceeded to declare war." In the Argentine and in Bolivia the same policy of inter- fering in internal questions was followed. Dr. E. S. Zeballos, an Argentine writer, statesman, and at one time diplomatic representative of his nation at Washington, referring to Chilean aggressions against his country, says : "In 1866, the Argentine army had invaded Paraguay * * * * the allies had been defeated by 5,000 heroic Paraguayans. * * * * At that critical moment, a force of 7,000 men, coming from Chile, crossed the Andes, invading the provinces of Mendoza, Rioja and San Juan. Coming ap- parently as friends, their real purpose was to endanger Ar- gentine institutions and to help to destroy our army. And while such an aggression was taking place, the Chilean diplo- matic representative made us a proposition for the parti- tioning of Patagonia. "Once before, during our civil wars, the policy of Chile had already made itself apparent, and in 1872 it reasserted itself; we were then facing a possible conflict with Brazil, and while exerting every influence to avert such a calamity, a Chilean commissioner arrived at Buenos Aires, and in an of- ficial communication to our Government, declared that 'the Republic of Chile has a right to Patagonia,' as far as the mouth of the River Santa Cruz, and that it will not tolerate there the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic." In 1864, during the time of Spanish aggression on the Pacific coast, the Chilean Plenipotentiary at Quito, Ecuador, Nicolas Hurtado, drew up a preliminary treaty of alliance with the Government of Ecuador against Peru. In 1872 Chile offered to help the Bolivian revolutionary leader, Quintin Quevedo, to attain power under the under- standing that in exchange of the cession of Atacama he would receive material support in acquiring for his country the Peruvian littoral of Tarapaca and Arica. Nearly every revolutionary movement directed against the established Governments of Lima and La Paz has had its 2 4 cradle in Chile; Chilean money, Chilean adventurers, and Chilean supplies have always been forthcoming. And while Chile has lent her aid to these movements she has not, for a single moment, neglected the opportunities which such situa- tions have offered her for strengthening her own position and preparing herself for the accomplishment of her well matured plans of future conquest. Already in 1868, while the state of war against Spain ex- isted, and Peru and Chile were still supposed to be close allies, the Chilean representative at London signed a con- vention with the representative of Spain, by which the British Government was asked to allow the release of two Spanish iron-clads and two Chilean gunboats, retained in English waters by reason of the neutrality of the British Government in the Spanish-South American conflict. This unprecedented action of the Chilean Government, taken without the consent or even the knowledge of its allies, caused some surprise when it became known, and the Peruvian Minister at London, in calling his Government's attention to it, clearly points out its grave significance at a time when the international relations between Chile and its neighbors, Argentine and Bolivia, are more or less disturbed. In 1 87 1 Chile had already a pretty good navy for her actual requirements ; but in the furtherance of the policy which she had framed she needed to strengthen it. There- fore, Congress had passed a bill authorizing the construction of two powerful iron-clads and two auxiliary cruisers. And while these were building, her arsenals were being replen- ished with up-to-date war material of every description. In Peru a war with Chile was not dreamed of, and, although in 1873 Peru had actually entered into a defensive alliance with Bolivia, the country had made no warlike prep- arations. Sefior Alejandro Garland, in his recent publication, "South American Conflicts and the United States," makes this quite clear when he says: "That the opinion of neutrals respecting Chile's warlike preparations and her military ele- ments previous to the outbreak of the war may be known, 25 notwithstanding Chile's assertions to the contrary, it suffices to read that part of the official despatch sent by the United States Minister at Santiago to the Department of State, giv- ing an account of the Pacific solution, due to the good offices of the United States, of the serious boundary questions exist- ing between Argentine and Chile. The paragraph to which he refers is the following : "For years they have been engaged in supplying them- selves, at a great expense, with the elements deemed neces- sary for such a contingency. Millions of dollars, which ought to have been devoted to the development of material inter- ests, have been expended in the purchase of iron-clads and destructive artillery — all in anticipation of the war which seemed inevitable." These preparations naturally alarmed Argentine and Bolivia, and while the first mentioned power was able to make certain preparations, Bolivia was unable to do so, and there- fore she sought to strengthen her position by means of alli- ances which in case of need might serve her to repel any foreign aggression. It was with this aim in view that the Bolivian National Assembly promulgated the following law : The National Assembly decrees : Article i. The Executive shall enter into a treaty of defensive alliance with the Government of Peru against all foreign aggression and authorizes it, in case of necessity, to carry out the agreement stipulated and to declare war in the case of danger being imminent, in accordance with Articles 22 and 71, 1 8th Attribute of the Political Constitution of the State, under obligation of giving account to Congress at its next sessions. Article 2. In the event that naval hostilities should be undertaken against any portion of the coast of the Republic, and that this should occasion its consequent occupation, the Executive is empowered to issue letters of marque, irrespec- tive of the assistance which the squadron of the allied nation may give. Article 3. This law is to remain secret until the Ex- ecutive shall require its enforcement. 26 To be notified to the Executive that it may be duly com- plied with. Given at the Hall of Congress, La Paz, November 8th, 1872. (Signed.) TOMAS FRIAS, President. MACEDONIO D. MEDINA, Deputy Secretary. BELISARIO VIDOEL, Deputy Secretary. Palace of the Supreme Government, La Paz, November nth, 1872. When this law was passed the difficulties between Chile and Bolivia had reached a climax, the former threatening to seize de facto the Bolivian seacoast. The Chilean press urged the Government to do this on the ground that Bolivia had not complied with the treaty of 1866. And even to-day, notwith- standing that one of Chile's ablest statesmen and diplo- matists, Senor Marcial Martinez, has repudiated the charges made against Bolivia, they still find a place in the statements and writings of latter-day defenders of Chile's international policy. Thus in Senor Rafael Egana's book, "The Tacna and Arica Question,'' which has been recently widely circulated, we find the following paragraphs : "Five years passed in this permanent infraction of the conditions of the treaty, when in 1871 the Chilean Govern- ment decided to reclaim their fulfillment. "In 1871, the Chilean Government reclaimed the ful- filling of the treaty and became convinced that the bad faith of Bolivia did not arise from forgetfulness, but from a pre- conceived purpose. "These deliberate infractions of the treaty, some of them defended as though they were legitimate acts, and some of them offensive to the dignity of our country, would have au- thorized abrogating the treaty of 1866." No better reply to these charges can be given than in the words of Senor Marcial Martinez, who, in his book, "Chile and Bolivia," says: "It is utterly inexact that Bolivia did not comply with the treaty of 1866. The treaty has been ful- filled by both parties, substantially, and the questions which subsequently have arisen and which have engaged their attcn- 27 tion, coming now from one part and now from the other, are derived from the compact itself, as happens generally in every treaty. Some people seem to think that Chile should adopt some de facto measures, such as the pressure which was brought to bear by Hernandez Pinzon. I am very far from concurring in that opinion. We would not have a semblance of reason wherein to justify before America our warlike con- duct." Notwithstanding this noble defense by one of Chile's most able statesmen, public opinion in that country appeared to be irresistible, so much so that the Bolivian representative at Lima appealed to the Government of Peru "in the name of the interests of Peru which are intimately bound with the in- dependence and integrity of Bolivia." On November 19th, 1872, nearly a year before the alli- ance, the Government of Peru declared that it would lend its aid "to reject any demands which it should consider as unjust or menacing to Bolivian independence.'' In declaring this, the Peruvian policy moulded itself in its old time traditions. This policy had always been one of decided Americanism. It was the cult for this policy which prompted Peru, immediately after the war of emancipation, to adhere in 1826 to the Congress of Panama, advocating an alliance of the American Republics ; in 1848 she gave the voice of alarm against Spain and again urged the necessity of an American alliance ; when the war of European aggres- sion against Mexico and Santo Domingo, the voice of Peru was among the first to be heard in strong protest, and her money and men were freely given; in 1857, when Nicaragua and Costa Rica were in trouble, Peru came to their aid ; in 1864 Peru invited her sister Republics to meet in conference at Lima, to discuss a vast plan of Latin-American consolida- tion, and in the following year she declared war against Spain, and becoming the ally of Chile, avenged at Callao, on May 2d, 1866, the bombardment of Valparaiso; during the Paraguayan war, Peru offered her good offices and mediation to bring about peace, and protested "in her own name and in the names of Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia, against the triple alliance and against any acts that might lessen the sover- 28 eignty independence and integrity of the Paraguayan Re- public;" faithful to these high principles, she made common cause with the people of Cuba in their first struggle for free- dom, and her money and her sons have both helped the Cubans in their glorious fight for liberty; while at all and every gathering of American diplomatists she has upheld the policy of peace and fraternity among the nations of the continent. From the date of South American independence until 1871, Peru was undoubtedly stronger than her neighbors, yet she never abused of her strength to conquer them or to ex- tend her frontiers beyond the limits which the Uti possidetis of 1810 gave her. It is not, therefore, surprising to see her in 1872 form an alliance with Bolivia, at a time when Bolivian indepen- dence was seriously threatened and when the Argentine Re- public had such grave boundary questions at issue with her more aggressive neighbors. Such a treaty was the natural consequence of her policy;, its scope was defensive, and if the Argentine Government had had the least bit of foresight it would have joined the alliance and by so doing averted the calamity of 1879. The treaty of alliance is the following: Article I. The high contracting parties unite and bind themselves mutually to guarantee their independence, their sovereignty, and the integrity of their respective territories, engaging themselves within the terms of the present treaty,, to defend each other against all foreign aggression, whether of one or of several independent States, or of a force having no flag and belonging to no known power. Article II. The alliance shall be made effective for the maintenance of the rights expressed in the preceding Article and in the following cases of offense : First. Acts committed with intent to deprive either of the high contracting parties of a portion of its territory, for the purpose of obtaining dominion thereover or of ceding it to a third power. Second. Acts tending to oblige either of the high con- 29 tracting parties to accept a protectorate, the sale or cession of any territory, or to establish any kind of superiority over it, or right or preeminence which may lessen or attack the complete exercise of its sovereignty and independence. Third. Acts tending to annul or to change the form of Government, political constitution or laws which the high contracting parties have established or enacted in the exer- cise of their authority. Article III. Both the high contracting parties recog- nizing that all legitimate acts of alliance are based upon jus- tice, the right is hereby established for either party to judge "whether the offense received by the other can be included among the ones mentioned in the foregoing Article. Article IV. Once the casus fccdcris having been de- clared, the high contracting parties agree to immediately break off all diplomatic relations with the offending State by handing the passport to its diplomatic representatives, can- celling the commission of its consular officials, prohibiting the importation of its natural and industrial products, and closing its ports to its ships. Article V. The contracting parties will appoint pleni- potentiaries to protocolize the arrangements which may be required for fixing the subsidies, the contingents of military and naval forces, or the aid of whatsoever kind which must be supplied to the offended or attacked Republic, and like- wise to arrange the manner in which the forces should act, and how help should be furnished, and everything else that may be necessary for assuring the success of the defense. The meeting of the plenipotentiaries shall be held at such a place as the offended party may decide. Article VI. The high contracting parties bind them- selves to provide the offended or attacked party with such means of defense as either may judge within its power to ■supply, even though the arrangements prescribed by the fore- going Article have not been carried into effect, provided that the case is deemed urgent. Article VII. The casus foederis having been proclaimed, the offended party will not be at liberty to celebrate any 3° peace conventions, truces or armistices, without the consent of the ally who has, joined in the war. Article YIII. The high contracting parties likewise agree to the following: First. Preferentially to employ, always provided that it be possible to do so, every possible conciliatory measure^ to avoid a rupture, or such as may tend to put an end to the war, if it has already broken out, considering that the arbi- tration of a third power shall be the most effective way of attaining this end. Scco-nd. Not to concede to or accept of any nation or government a protectorate or superiority, limiting their inde- pendence or sovereignty, nor to grant or dispose of in favor of any nation or government, any portion of their territory whatsoever, except where a better demarcation of their boundaries should make it necessary. Third. Not to sign boundary treaties or other territorial arrangements without having previously advised the other contracting party. Article IX. The stipulations of the present treaty do not extend to acts practiced by political parties, or arising through interior commotions independent of the interven- tion of foreign Governments ; because as the main object of the present treaty of alliance is the reciprocal guarantee of the sovereign rights of either Nation, none of its clauses should be interpreted in opposition to its original object. Article X. The high contracting parties, either sepa- rately or collectively, may invite the adhesion of one or of several other American States to the present defensive treaty of alliance, when by a later agreement they may consider it to be convenient to do so. Article XL The present treaty shall be exchanged at Lima or at La Paz so soon as it is constitutionally perfected^ and will come into full force twenty days from its date of signature. Its duration shall be indefinite, but each of the contracting parties reserves itself the right of cancelling it whenever it may consider expedient to do so, in which case a notification of this resolution must be addressed to the 3i other party, when the treaty will become null and void four months from the date of said notification. Sefior Felipe de Osma, the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his recent circular note to the Peruvian Legations in foreign countries, refers to this treaty in the following language : "Peru at the time had no conflict or controversy pending with Chile; her condition of military and naval superiority precluded any possibility of an aggression on the part of Chile. She had nothing to obtain or to claim from Chile,, from which she was separated by the Bolivian seacoast, and consequently her conduct was dictated solely by the prin- ciples which have always inspired her international policy. "For this reason, in all and every document bearing on the subject that was addressed to Bolivia in regard to the agreement, or to the Argentine Government with a view of obtaining her assent thereto, and, so as to emphasize the pacific nature of the said treaty, declarations were made limit- ing the objects of this defensive alliance to existing boundary disputes, and to such questions as might arise involving any of the allies. Besides, Article VIII of the treaty stipulated the employment by the contracting States of such concilia- tory measures as would tend to avoid a rupture, or to put an end to the war, even though the rupture had actually taken place, recommending the arbitration of a third power as the most effectual way to attain this end. "This latter stipulation, which was destined by its very nature to preclude the use of force whenever difficulties might arise, constituted the best proof which the allies could give of the loyalty and" nobleness of their intentions ; and, indeed, the other States of America, by becoming parties to this treaty, would have found in it the solution of all ques- tions pending among them. So that it can reasonably be said, that .the guarantee reciprocally agreed to constituted, for the contracting nations, an effective obligation of a bind- ing character in favor of arbitration, which was destined to spread with the adhesion thereto of such States, and serve as a barrier to those which should feel inclined to trample upon the political or territorial rights which it guaranteed. 32 "But, if any doubt might still exist with regard to the straightforwardness and significance of that treaty, it is dis- pelled by the note in which the representative of Peru, Sefior Don Manuel Irigoyen, proposed to the Argentine Govern- ment, that it should join the alliance. In this note the gen- erous and eminently American intentions of the treaty pre- dominate. ''Besides, the other Spanish-American States had acted since 1822, and until then, in a similar if not identical manner when a peril, common to all or peculiar to any one nation, menaced their territorial integrity, without any one thinking that the leagues or defensive alliances which were successively contracted, carried the purpose of provoking hostilities which it was their precise aim to avoid. In 1873, more so than at any other time, such an alliance became necessary, because the then Government of Chile, appeared to wish to solve by a territorial occupation of Argentine and Bolivia all the boun- dary questions pending with these States. Therefore the treaty of alliance was the sole means of forestalling any such aggression." In his communication to the Argentine Government, on September 24th, 1873, the Peruvian Minister said: "This treaty, which, by virtue of its approval by the re- spective Congresses and the exchange of ratifications at La Paz, on the 2d of July last, has become a perfect pact, is, as Your Excellency will perceive at a glance, free from all hos- tile or aggressive intent against any nation in particular, and from all ambitious intentions against the rights of others. On the contrary, all its stipulations tend to the pure and simple protection of autonomy and territorial integrity Statin st all foreign aggression, and likewise to prevent a rupture by the removal of all pretexts for war ; for, in the first paragraph of the eighth Article, arbitration is established as the only just and rational means to be employed for the settling of boundary questions. From this point of view, which, undoubtedly, is of the highest interest, the treaty means the establishing of a grand principle in American pub- lic law and may therefore be considered as the surest guaran- tee of peace and union, not only between Peru and Bolivia, 33 "but also between the rest of the American States which may give their adhesion thereto; and this is all the more impor- tant at the present moment because, as Your Excellency is aware, many of the said States have the fixing of their bound- aries still pending, for, although happily the questions that have up to the present arisen have not led to serious conse- quences, still they are not free from difficulties which may, perhaps, later on lead to complications and serious dangers, which it is well, at any price, to forestall." Later on it will be seen how the existence of this treaty was known to Chile, although its Government, on the eve of the war, pretended to affect surprise and turned it into a pre- text for waging war against Peru. THE TEN-CENTS CONTROVERSY. On the 15th of November, 1878, Mr. Osborn, United States Minister to Chile, writing to the Department of State, Washington, said : "The Chile navy is moving in the direc- tion of the Straits of Magellan, and it is understood here (Santiago) that the Argentine Government is sending its war vessels in the same direction. Negotiations are, however, being carried on here looking to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, and I have reason for believing that actual hostilities will be avoided." On the 19th of November, 1878, the United States Min- ister at Buenos Aires wrote to Secretary Evarts as follows : "The President and his ministers, with a few of the leading men of the country, are in secret conference almost daily in reference to the Chilean troubles. The press has been re- quested to publish nothing in relation to the movements of the Argentine fleet. "Two of the iron-clads have already sailed under secret orders for Santa Cruz river, and three other war vessels will follow as soon as they can be put in readiness. Reports are here, and are believed, that Chile has sent some two or three gunboats to Patagonia with engineers on board to fortify the Straits of Magellan." 34 Senor E. S. Zeballos, the Argentine diplomatist, who has been frequently quoted in these pages, referring to this critical episode of the boundary controversy, says : "At that moment the war fever had reached its height in Chile, the mob paraded the streets of the principal cities in hostile demonstrations to our country. A Chilean war vessel had seized in Argentine waters a foreign ship. This last act de- cided President Avellaneda and his ministers to take action, and although our obsolete river war vessels were in a State of painful neglect, and were utterly unfit for service, still the Government felt that it was necessary to stand by its dignity and to send a naval force to the Santa Cruz river to defend our territorial sovereignty. Chile sent a fleet to meet ours, and in the meanwhile the friends of peace in either country worked bravely in its interest and war was averted. The Chilean fleet received orders to turn back, but in so doing it turned against unarmed Bolivia and leveled its guns against Bolivia and Peru, because Chile at the time felt the necessity of fighting someone. "The war against Bolivia was brought about on the pre- text that the Government of this nation had decreed a tax of ten cents on the nitrate exported by an English company working under a Chilean charter ; and when the Chilean con- quest of the Bolivia littoral was consummated the Chilean Government raised the tax to one dollar." These several quotations, referring to the state of mind of the Chilean nation at that particular time, will serve to prove that Chile was not only prepared for war, but that she had made up her mind to wage it against one or another of her neighbors. Everything would prove that her real objectives were Bolivia and Peru, or, in other words, the two nitrate-produc- ing countries. Because, although the Chilean public became enthu- siastic over the possibility of a war with Argentine in Novem- ber of 1878, it is a proven fact that her statesmen would take no risks and that they exerted every influence to avert it, es- pecially when they saw the decided stand which the Argentine Government was determined to make. But this sort of bluff 35 was of very great importance to Chile, and while she worked it off, it gave her ample time wherein to increase her naval strength to such an extent as to no longer fear Peru. Sefior Alejandro Garland, speaking of the financial situa- tion of Chile previous to the war, says : "Great sums having been spent in the accumulation of warlike elements, the financial position of Chile was very critical. "The Government revenues had diminished; the rich silver mines at Caracoles began to deteriorate and wheat and copper fetched but low prices. In order to maintain the Gov- ernment machine in its customary form and to put off the effects of a crisis, it was necessary to contract new loans in London, not for the purpose of carrying out useful public works, but in order to be able to continue the regular service of loans previously contracted, and to meet the expenses of the administration of the country. "The impossibility of again having recourse to this ex- pedient, in view of the attitude of the London financial mar- ket, the public credit being exhausted at home, the incon- vertible paper money appeared — an unmistakable sign of ruin and bankruptcy. "It was under the pressure of this situation that Chile, re- gardless of justice and of the rights of her South American sisters, took possession, by the force of arms, of the rich prov- ince of Tarapaca which promised her ample means for the rehabilitation of her empty treasury. This is what decided Chile to go to war — great was the want felt at home, and great was the booty in prospect — so great, indeed, that greed overcame every scruple. "The public men of Chile no longer vacillated in entering upon a war of conquest in 1879, thus breaking with American traditions and replacing the rule of justice by that of violence. And, truly, the riches acquired, and the pecuniary advantages afforded to Chile, by the conquest of Atacama and Tarapaca, greatly exceeded the most sanguine hopes of the Chileans." The United States Minister to Chile, who, in November, called the attention of the Secretary of State to the contro- 3 36 versy between Chile and Argentine, wrote as follows to Sec- retary Evarts, on the 20th of February, 1879: "Chile is in- volved in another dispute concerning her boundaries. It is with Bolivia now, and concerns the territory on the Pacific coast, lying between the 24th and 25th degrees of latitude. The country referred to as the disputed territory is in the heart of what is known as the desert of Atacama, and was regarded, until about the time of the execution of the first treaty (1866), except for the deposit of guano at Mejillones, its northern boundary, as of little or no value. The discovery of vast nitrate deposits about that time, however, in that part of the territory set apart for Bolivia by the treaty, soon brought it into prominent notice, and companies were organized for the purpose of developing that industry. "The business seems to have been monopolized by a cor- poration known as 'La Compafiia de Salitres y Ferro-Carril de Antofagasta,' a company composed mainly of gentlemen of means, citizens of Chile. It is claimed in behalf of the com- pany that it had full authority from the Bolivian Government for the prosecution of its business, and that it relied upon the good faith of Bolivia in making its investments. 'Tn February of last year the Bolivian Congress enacted a law exacting a tax of ten cents a quintal on all exportations of nitrate, and from this has arisen the present difficulty with Chile. The Chilean Government promptly protested against the execution of this law, claiming that it was in direct conflict with the guarantees of the treaty of 1874. The law was allowed to remain dormant for several months, but no action was taken looking to its revocation. A short time since, however, the Bolivian authorities notified the company at Antofagasta that the law was to be executed. "The Chilean Government protested anew, and caused Bolivia to be informed that if she insisted upon executing the law, Chile would regard the treaty (1874) as abrogated, and would proceed to assert her right of dominion to the ter- ritory claimed by her prior to 1866. Notwithstanding this threat the works at Antofagasta were levied upon, and notice was given that they would be sold; whereupon, on the 12th inst, the Chilean Minister at La Paz was instructed by tele- 37 graph to demand his passport, and forces were immediately forwarded by water with instructions to take possession of the territory on the coast as far north as the 23d degree of latitude. On the 14th the Chilean forces occupied Anto- fagasta without firing a gun, and the disputed territory is now held by Chilean troops. "The course of the Government here meets with a hearty approval from all classes. The movement was an exceedingly popular one. It is doubtful, indeed, if the administration could have taken another course and sustained itself. There is much anxiety concerning the course which Peru is likely to take. "The Chilean Government is endeavoring to prepare itself for any emergency. The naval force has all been sent to the North, and troops are being forwarded as rapidly as pos- sible." And the United States Minister at Lima, when inform- ing the State Department of the situation, wrote on February ' 19th, 1879, as follows : "By a law passed in the Bolivian Con- gress, February 14th, and decreed the 23d, 1878, it was or- dered that all nitrate exported from Antofagasta should pay ten cents per quintal as contribution. The nitrate company and the Chilean Minister at La Paz interposed to prevent, if possible, the carrying out of the law; the company, on the ground that their rights, legally acquired, were attacked ; the Minister, in defense of an existing international treaty. Mat- ters remained in this state, when, on the 8th of November last, the Chilean Government, through its Minister at La Paz, in- formed the Government of Bolivia that if the law of contribu- tion was put into force Chile would declare the treaty of limits of 1874 annulled, and would throw the responsibility on Boli- via. "The Government of Bolivia answered that there was no room for such a measure, as the tax was imposed on an association or company. * * * * On the 18th the Chilean Minister, in a note to the Bolivian Government, stated that on receiving the note ordering the tax to be col- lected, he, in the name of his Government, declared the treaty of 1874 abrogated. 38 "On the 26th. of December the Bolivian Government answered the Chilean Minister, saying that the course taken by the Chilean Government was to be regretted; that it was justified in its procedure, and reminding the Minister that, according to Article 2 of the treaty, there was always a chance in such cases for arbitration. "It appears that Bolivia held off, and would have left the question to be regulated by Congress on its meeting, or by arbitration ; but the action of Chile, in its note of the 8th of November, aroused the feelings of the Bolivians, and caused the order for the carrying out of the decree." *********** "I have heard on various occasions that there existed a secret treaty for an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Argentine Republic, Bolivia and Peru, against Chile." From the foregoing it will be seen that Chile was deter- mined to pick up a quarrel with Bolivia for the definite pos- session of the nitrate beds and guano deposits, and to this effect she turned the action of the Bolivian Government into a legitimate reason for violently abrogating the existing treaty. And who was to stop Chile? Bolivia, shut up in her highlands, with no military or naval strength, was hopelessly at her mercy, while Peru, her ally, was utterly unprepared for war, and in a perfectly impecunious state. Neither Bolivia nor Peru had anything to gain by the war, whereas Chile, without risking anything, went in to win a very big stake. Had the fortune of war been favorable to the allies they could not have reaped any benefit from their victory, even if they had been willing to extend their territory at the expense of Chile. Peru and Bolivia had lived previous to the war in a more or less constant state of political unrest. Their finances were crippled, and by reason of the natural resources of Tarapaca and Atacama their statesmen had not felt the keenness of the struggle for life. While in Peru the poetical and sentimental ideals of international fraternity and of justice, transmitted 39 since the days of the common fight for freedom of the South American people reigned supreme, in Chile a more practical community had sprung up, and feeling itself hemmed in, as it were, between two great barriers, the Andes and the ocean, a strong desire to expand had made itself felt, and to reach out toward the fertile valleys on the eastern slopes of the Andes and toward the guano and nitrated-covered regions of the north. Balmaceda, the great Chilean statesman, early saw this, and it was he who said that "in the Pacific coast of South America there are but two centers of action and of progress : Lima and Callao, and Santiago and Valparaiso; it is neces- sary that one of these two centers shall fall that the other may rise. On our part, we need Tarapaca as a source of wealth, and Arica as our furthermost point on the coast. This is why the people of Chile demand Arica and Tarapaca." These ideas of the great Chilean leader, although ex- pressed with such brutality, did not remain as empty words ; they were quickly taken up by the popular writers, such as Vicuna Mackenna, Isidoro Errazuriz, and others, and formed the keynote of Chilean national aspiration. Besides, the financial situation of Chile was so bad that it only served to make them covet the more their neighbor's enormous national wealth. In 1842 Chile's foreign debt was $8,000,000, and in 1878 it had grown to thirty-five millions. Her income, on the con- trary, had fallen off about two millions between 1877 and 1878, and in the best year it was never higher than fifteen millions. But this fiscal penury was not the only trouble; poverty was aggravated by the disorganized state of the ad- ministration. An official commission, in its report, stated that "the fiscal funds are being administered in the most fan- tastical manner ; the public revenue is being spent without re- gard to the law, the Government making light of the man- dates of Congress; frauds are of frequent occurrence; loans follow upon loans; and taxation is ever on the increase, in consequence of the excessive expenses lavished upon super- fluities." Contrasting with this fiscal penury the dazzling glitter of 40 the wealth of Tarapaca and Antofagasta was a sore to Chile, and enough to destroy the moral sense of a nation anxious to attain power, and who, in its endeavor to reach this end, had resorted to the accumulation of great military elements, and, in the meanwhile, fed its people with ideas of expansion. The truth is, that in 1878 Peru had about 5,000 rifles, representing eleven different types, and an obsolete navy, her two best vessels having been built in 1865, whereas, Chile had some 13,000 rifles of modern type, and an up-to-date fighting fleet, comprising two of the most powerful iron-clads of the time, "Almirante Cochrane" and "Blanco Encalada." We will now show how Chile managed to bring these ele- ments into play and to develop her national policy. For this we must go back to the time of the Melgarejo administration in Bolivia. The favors that the Government of Chile and its repre- sentatives received at the hands of the famous Dictator wrere destined to have such far-reaching consequences as no one at the time could have foreseen. Foremost among these favors, and apart from the treaty of 1866, to which reference has already been made in the foregoing pages, was a concession, to a group of Chileans, of five square leagues of land, with a privilege of fifteen years wherein to work and export the ni- trate from Atacama. Melgarejo, whose vain head had been turned by the many honors which the Chilean Government had showered upon him, did not adhere to the laws, or to any sense of equity. Neither did he give any thought to the fu- ture security of his country. He granted everything that was asked of him, because he was in the halcyon days of his honeymoon with Chile. As was quite natural, Melgarejo's despotic rule came to an end ; he was overthrown and his regime gave way to a more conservative Government. The many concessions and illegal bargains which he had sanctioned should have died with him, but the new Bolivian administration temporized, and while it declared the concession to be unreasonable, it granted the holders thereof, who constituted the "La Compania de Salitre y Ferro-Carril de Antofagasta," the right to carry on the 4i same privilege of working and exporting nitrate over a tract measuring fifteen leagues from north to south, and twenty- five leagues from east to west. The company would not hear of any such thing, and declared that it would not accept an inch less than the whole desert, and despising and defying the sovereignty of Bolivia, it set about to build a railroad in the- desert. Sefior Marcial Martinez emphasizes the conduct of his countrymen when he says that "they would not have acted differently had they been in a land owned by savages." The Bolivian Government tried to enforce its rights, and notified the company that they should not build the railroad line without its permission. The company ignored the Gov- ernment and went ahead with the work. The Chilean statesman so often quoted, referring to this,, says : "In England, in France, in Belgium, in Chile, or in any other country, the invaders of the territory would have has- tened to leave it; but in Bolivia things happen otherwise; here the idea is to race the Government, and even to waylay it, so that it may meet accidents on the road; they imagine that Bolivia cannot have national aims and aspirations be- cause she is unworthy of having them.'' And while the company was acting in this manner it ap- pealed to the Chilean Government for protection, and thus- created constant difficulties to the Government of Bolivia. The latter Government, fearing the great influence that the company wielded, compromised, and enlarged the concessions in exchange for a 10% share of the profits of the business. The compromise was settled, and in this manner Bolivia gave her wealth away that she might at least avoid fresh difficulties, and enjoy peace. The settlement was submitted to Congress for approval,, and this body sanctioned it, substituting the 10% share of the profits with a tax of ten cents per quintal of nitrate exported. Whether this substitution was good or bad, it was an affair of the Government with the company. Nevertheless,. the Chilean Government protested against it, in a note dated July 2d, 1878, on the grounds that by the treaty of 1874 it 42 was forbidden to impose any higher taxes than those already existing upon the persons, industries and capital of Chile. The La Paz Government defended its policy, but to no purpose, the Chilean Government declaring that, if its de- mands were not complied with, it would break the boundary treaty. The Government of Chile ignored the arbitration clause of that very same treaty, and threatened from the outset to abrogate the treaty on its own authority. In view of the stand taken by Chile the Bolivian Government offered to re- peal the law levying a tax of ten cents, if Chile would but withdraw its threatening and insulting note. Chile refused. At this stage the company declared that the substitution of the 10% share of profits by a ten-cent tax was not accept- able, and naturally the Bolivian Government declared that the compromise remained without effect. Such was the true and correct state of affairs. At the best it was a case to be settled according to common law, an everyday ordinary controversy. But the Chilean Govern- ment did not look at it in this light; it was decided to keep the controversy open, and in order to close every possibility for a peaceful settlement, it sent a 48-hour ultimatum, at the expiration of which it occupied the Bolivian territory by a military force. Mr. Gibbs, the United States Minister at Lima, writing to Secretary Evarts in reference to this, on the 12th of March, 1879, savs : "Up to the present, I have no information of a formal declaration of war having been made, either by Chile or Bolivia. Chile has, by force of arms and through her ves- sels of war, taken possession of the coast of Bolivia from its limits, latitude 24° south, down to Tocopilla, north of the 22 , within 30 miles of the River Loa, which is the boundary line between Peru and Bolivia, and holds the whole coast, estab- lishing marine, military and civil Government. From articles here published, taken from the Chilean press, it is said to be only a reoccupation of territory that belonged to Chile, ceded by treaty for certain rights granted, which, not being carried out, Chile has merely repossessed themselves of their own, or, in Spanish, "revindication," which may be translated "re- 43 instation." The only official action taken by Bolivia is a proclamation by President Daza, which is not a declaration of war." THE MEDIATION OF PERU. (the lavalle mission.) It was the very clear duty of Peru, with an alliance or without one, to moderate the pressure which a power such as Chile was bringing to bear upon a defenseless country like Bolivia. And to procure, at all events, that there should be no war. Peru accomplished this duty with great loyalty, and possibly with excessive good-will. The question at issue referred to a dispute between Chile and Bolivia as to the right of the latter to change or alter a clause in an agreement that was being drawn up with a private company; or, if preferred, according to the Chilean version, it referred to the levying of a tax of ten cents. This affair had nothing to do with the integrity, with the honor, nor even with the vital interests of either nation. As United States Minister Gibbs said: "It is to be greatly regretted that these South American States should be so easily led into war, and for such trifling causes." The interests at stake being of such small amount, Peru believed that its friendly mediation would be sufficient to ■end the conflict. Already as far back as January, 1879, when the first re- ports of the conflict became known, the Charge dAffaires of Peru at Santiago, Sefior Pedro Paz-Soldan y Unanue, informed the President of Chile that his Government was ready to offer its good offices as soon as the fear of a rupture of relations should arise. At. the time the President ap- peared to favor a friendly settlement, and offered to have the Peruvian representative au courant of the events, so that at the proper moment his Government's good offices might be tendered. Nevertheless, on the 14th of February the in- vasion of the Bolivian territory was carried out without Peru having even suspected it. 44 From that time onward it was clearly apparent that Chile resented any interference by Peru, and that she was deter- mined to pass over Peru. The Peruvian representative saw it thus, and he urged his Government in the following- manner: "As a Peruvian, and as a Minister, I advise you to be on your guard. * * * *" But the Government, however, did not abandon the hope of bringing- about a settlement, and insisted on its concilia- tory policy. Bolivia had expressed her willingness to abide by any just solution and that she accepted the mediation of Peru. On the strength of these declarations, Peru sent a special mission to Santiago. Sir Clements R. Markham, the Eng- lish historian, referring to this mission, says: "Don Jose Antonio Lavalle was sent to Chile, and the pretence of nego- tiations was kept up with him by Santa Maria for a short time. Grievances against Peru were then alleged, and complaints were made that the nitrate monopoly would in- jure Chilean interests, and that the Chilean Government was kept in ignorance of the treaty of 1873 between Peru and Bolivia. As these were the only pretexts for war that were alleged, it will be well to consider them in this' place. To the first the Chilean historian, Vicuna Mackenna, himself gives the answer: "It is necessary to confess that in adopt- ing any course relating to a Peruvian product, the Peruvian President was within his right according to the law of na- tions, because he was free to legislate on domestic affairs as seemed best for the interests of his country." The pro- visions of the treaty of 1873 had been public since 1874 certainly, for the Chilean Minister at La Paz, Carlos Walker Martinez acted on his own knowledge of them and referred to them in a book published in 1876. Moreover, the Argen- tine Republic was officially invited to become a party to the treaty, and the question was publicly discussed in 1877. These pretexts were, therefore, illusory. No others were even hinted at. Lavalle was allowed to offer suggestions for settling the dispute between Chile and Bolivia by arbi- tration, and he made proposals which would have been doubtless acceptable, if a settlement had been desired. But 45 Chile had no such desire. On the contrary she intended 16 fix a quarrel on Peru also. Santa Maria suddenly made three demands to be treated as an ultimatum. Peru was at once to cease all defensive preparations to abrogate the treaty of 1873, and to declare her neutrality. No nation with a spark of self-respect could possibly accept such terms They were made, because it was impossible, and because the Chileans were now ready to enter upon their career of depredation. Sefior Lavalle was dismissed and the Chilean Government declared war upon Peru on the 5th of April, 1879." With the landing of. Lavalle at Valparaiso, on March 4th, 1879, the true state of Chilean sentiment toward Peru became apparent. He was met at the landing stage by a hostile mob that openly insulted him and his country. A fly-sheet which was profusely distributed a few days be- fore the arrival of the Peruvian Envoy was couched in the following language: TO THE PEOPLE! Fellow-citizens : On Tuesday next, according to trustworthy information, .an emissary from Peru is to arrive; he comes, according to some, to interpose his officious mediation in our quarrel with Bolivia; and, according to others, with the intention •of demanding a strict account from our Government for the "revindication" of our northern territory. Chile on putting her foot upon the desert has said, as MacMahon did at Malakoff: J'y suis et J'y teste. There is no reason for the mission of the Peruvian Envoy. This is what our country should be made to know, with undeniable force and by means of public and solemn unmis- takable acts. Diplomacy has its uses, its hypocrisies, its circumlocu- tions, and its reticence; but the people know nothing about 4 6 it, nor do they have any use for it; the people only listen to and understand the manly and honest language of truth. And the people of Chile wish to have it understood by the Peruvian Plenipotentiary that, no matter if he comes as an officious mediator or as an examining judge, his mis- sion is vain and hateful; and in like manner they wish that the Government of Chile shall know that the gates of the Moneda (the Executive Mansion) are to be closed against him who should wish to enter them clothed in the very thin disguise of a fallacious diplomacy. It is for this purpose that the inhabitants of Valparaiso are hereby asked to meet on Tuesday next, the 4th in- stant, at eight o'clock in the evening, at the Plaza de la Intendencia, that they may give form and expression to these views, and so as to adopt in the presence of the Peru- vian Envoy, the dignified attitude which becomes the sons of Caupolican and Lautaro. Therefore, get thee to the Plaza de la Intendencia, noble people of Valparaiso, March 4th, 1879. When the explosions of the first moment had subsided, and the people no longer found any pleasure in attacking the houses of the Peruvian Commissioners, Minister Lavalle started in earnest his important work. But from the very first conference it was easy to see that the Chilean mind was not well fixed on the reasons for the quarrel. From Presi- dent Pinto's words, it was apparent that the true issue was no longer based on the question of a ten cent tax, nor on the canceling of the contract with the Nitrate Company, but that it rested upon the dominion of the invaded territory. Such a sudden change in the aspect of the conflict re- quired that the Peruvian Minister should communicate at once with his Government and obtain fresh instructions. But in the meantime, and realizing that his mission was one of peace he submitted the following agreement: First. That Chile shall disoccupy the Bolivia littoral, 47 leaving that territory isolated, while an arbiter determines who is to be its rightful owner. Second. That it be placed in charge of an autonomous municipal administration, to be constituted by persons elected in such manner as shall be determined by a special convention, under the protectorate and guarantee of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru, who shall arrange as to the manner in which the protectorate should be made effective. Third. That the fiscal revenues of the said territory shall be applied to the needs of its administration, and that what- ever surplus remained after defraying such expenses should be divided between Chile and Bolivia. This basis for a settlement of the dispute was so equitable and honest that it seemed impossible that it should not be acceptable to Chile. Nevertheless, the Santiago Govern- ment demurred, until suddenly it brought forth a fresh pre- text wherewith to frustrate all hopes of a speedy settle- ment. It was then that it made use of the secret treaty of alli- ance, and in an intensely alarmed and indignant spirit it made known to the Peruvian Envoy that the existence of such a treaty, aimed against the sovereignty of Chile, was a barrier to further negotiations until Peru should explain her con- duct and answer whether or not the treaty existed. Lavalle applied for instructions, and then replied that as a fact the treaty existed, but that it was purely defensive, and did not bind Peru until, according to her judgment, the cassus foederis was proclaimed. And while the negotiations at Santiago were pending, the Chilean representative at Lima, Senor Godoy, strained every effort to cross the path of Lavalle and bring about a rupture. It was to this purpose that on the 17th of March he addressed a communication to the Peruvian Foreign Office, urging that a definite and precise declaration of neu- trality should be made, and at the same time hinted at the existence of a secret offensive and defensive alliance between Peru and Bolivia. The Peruvian Government, in replying to Senor Godoy, stated that its special mission at Santiago had been duly 48 instructed on the points referred to by him; this mission having been specifically created in order to arrange with Chile "all incidents that have happened, or may take place in the future on the coast of Bolivia, which the Cabinet at Santiago has not as yet made known." Arid in its written instructions to its Special Envoy Serior Lavalle, the head of the Foreign Office, said: "After the instructions which I have given you in my notes of the 8th the 19th instants (March), it is no longer necessary that I should go into any lengths in reference to the question •of the existence of the secret treaty with Bolivia. Suffice it to add that, before replying to Serior Godoy's communica- tion, H. E. General Prado saw him personally and expressed lo him verbally and with the most complete frankness what was the character and range of that treaty, the stipulations •of which neither contain anything of an offensive nature nor are they directed against Chile, and that they do not exclude, but rather determine, a prior diplomatic action for reaching a settlement by the methods which international law advises. "On the other hand, the imperious necessity for Peru of maintaining with Bolivia relations that cannot be easily altered, because therein is interested the very active trade between both countries, and their reciprocal tranquility, was the primary motive, if not the only one, for such a treaty, the effects of which have corresponded to the end in view. Thanks to this tight bond of union, it has been possible, indeed, to prevent or to smooth difficulties, which otherwise, would have been perhaps unavoidable. "I have only to speak of the last and most important part of Serior Godoy's communication, that in which by special command of his Government he calls upon the Government of Peru to make a formal declaration of its neutrality in the existing conflict with Bolivia. "At the time of Sehor Godoy's communication, and even at this date, we are in ignorance of the terms of the exposi- tion which, according to the advices of the press, the Cabinet of Santiago intended addressing to the Governments of the foreign nations, in reference to the occupation of the Bo- 49 livian littoral; and until we have this knowledge it will be impossible to judge what is the true and definite range of that action. When this document reaches us it will be, therefore, time to express the opinion which it will give rise to, and to state the attitude which in consequence thereof we may have to assume. "From this viewpoint, we must regard as premature the neutrality which is asked. "Besides, the line of conduct that we may have to pursue in this grave matter, depends upon two conditions which should not be overlooked : "First. The existence of the secret treaty with Bolivia, the stipulations of which, in reference to the casus foederis, shall have to be examined by Peru, if every hope for a set- tlement is to be abandoned. "Second. The ruling of Congress, this body has been called to meet in extraordinary sessions, in order to mark out the line of conduct which ultimately the Government shall have to follow. "In reading Senor Godoy's communication you will not fail to notice the passionate tone of some of its para- graphs, which I deliberately abstain from qualifying, trusting that the Government of Chile willbe the better judge to do so. "You will please read this communication to Sehor Fi- erro, and leave him a copy thereof should he so desire it." Godoy's attempt to cross the Peruvian mediation had immediate results. Following upon it, the Chilean Government assumed an attitude of reserve and suspiciousness toward Lavalle, and a few days later the basis for an agreement which he had presented was turned down. But Lavalle now saw clearly that Chile was trying to involve Peru in the conflict, and he set to work to frustrate such a plan and to bring about a peaceful settlement of the, controversy. He, therefore, presented the following form of agreement: First. That a truce and suspension of hostilities be- 5Q tween Chile and Bolivia shall be proclaimed, for a period to- be fixed by them. Second. Withdrawal of the Chilean forces to the limits of the territory comprised between parallels 23d and 24th of south latitude, and restitution to Bolivia of Cobija, Toco- pilla, and Calama. Third. Bolivia to cancel the decrees referring to the expulsion of Chilean citizens, confiscation of their property etc., etc. Fourth. Chile, Peru, and Bolivia to suspend their arma- ments. Fifth. A meeting of Plenipotentiaries at a conference in Lima so as to arrange and definitely settle all questions. But Chile was not in a peaceful mood; her line of con- duct had been decided upon already, she was only waiting for an opportunity to present itself, and seeking a reasonable pretext to force war upon her rival. Therefore, she rejected the Peruvian proposals and demanded a peremptory declara- tion of neutrality. And while the Government was working out its plan, the impatient populace, fearing that they might be cheated out of their expectations of a war which they had been nursed to consider as necessary to their salvation, gave vent to their feelings, assaulting and outraging Peruvian residents and the official residences and emblems of the Peruvian rep- resentatives and nation. On the 1st of April the press announced that the Govern- ment of Chile had consulted the Council of State on the advisability of declaring war on Peru. This news further excited the populace against the Peruvian officials. Three days later the Government of Chile broke off its relations with Peru, and on the 5th of April, the formal dec- laration of war was announced. Up to that moment Peru had not revealed her intention of siding with Bolivia, she had only manifested the wish to avoid a Chile-Bolivian war. All her efforts had been di- rected to that end, and it is simply absurd to accuse Peru of trying to gain time, and to have employed the period of 5i negotiations, one month, to arm herself for a war of aggres- sion. As a matter of fact, Peru did, during that month, hustle about, but as Mr. Gibbs very wisely put it, in his dispatch to the State Department: "This Government continues its preparations," I suppose following the old adage: "If you wish peace prepare for war." And the same authority, re- ferring to the seeming possibility of war between both na- tions, says in his dispatch of March 26th: "I should not be surprised if Chile takes the first step and not await for a declaration of war from Peru, but strike the first blow. If they do, it will be unfortunate for this republic, as it appears to me they are not ready to enter into a conflict." Chile, on the other hand, did not heed the insinuations of Peru in favor of a peaceful settlement, and dragged Peru into a war for which she was totally unprepared, and in which Chile had nothing whatever to lose and everything to gain. THE WAR. As has been shown in the preceding chapters, Peru was dragged into this war, wholly unprepared. Chile had skill- fully manoeuvered her diplomacy in such a fashion as to bring about this result, which was the only solution to her financial situation. United States Minister Osborn, writing to the State Department, says: "The grievance of Chile is the alleged secret treaty between Peru and Bolivia, and the apparent preparation making by Peru for war." Had Peru dreamed of the possibility of a war with Chile or prepared for it as Chile asserts was the case, she would not have found herself at the outbreak of the conflict with Bolivia lacking in everything necessary for carrying on a war. It is a well proven fact that the Peruvian navy was ob- solete in type and unfit for active service, it being in a piti- fully neglected condition. Sir Clements R. Markham refer- ring to it, says: "It had been increased by two iron-clads since 4 5 2 the Spanish aggression (1866), but no vessels had been or- dered after the retirement of General Pezet, under whose ad-, ministration the turret ship 'Hnascar' was built at Birkenhead. This vessel was 200 feet long, of 1,130 tons and 300 horse- power; the armor around her revolving turret was only $y 2 inches thick, and there was a projecting belt of /£/z inches. She was armed with two 20-inch Armstrong, and two 40-pound Whitworth guns. The 'Independencia,' likewise ordered under the^same administration, was a broadside iron-clad of the old t/pe, 215 feet long, of 2,004 tons and 550 horse-power,, with only 4^ inch armor. She was armed with twelve 70- pounders on the main deck, and two 150-pounders with some smaller guns, on the upper deck. The 'Union,' which dated since 1864, was a wooden corvette armed with twelve 70-pounders, and capable of going 13 knots; the 'Pilcomayo,' built in 1874, a smaller vessel was armed with two 70-pound- ers, four 40-pounders, and four 12-pounders. There were also two antiquated old monitors built in the United States and purchased in 1869; they had 10 inches of iron on their turrets, and were armed with two 15-inch smooth-bore Rod- man guns, but they were merely floating batteries, unfit for work at sea." Against this very questionable fighting strength, Chile had the two modern and powerful iron-clads "Almirante Cochrane" and "Blanco Encalada," each carrying six 9-inch Armstrong 12-ton guns, some light guns and Nordenfelt machine guns, their armor being 9 inches thick at the water line, and from 6 to 8 around the battery. Besides she had two sister corvettes, "Chacabuco" and "O'Higgins," armed with three 150-pound 7-ton Armstrong guns, and machine and light guns — "Magattanes," "Abtao," "Es- imralda)" "Covadonga," wooden vessels, and a splendid fleet of merchant steamers armed as fast cruisers. And during the course of the war she added materially to her naval strength with the acquisition of torpedo boats, and fast steamers. On land, at the outbreak of the war, Peru had some 2,000 well drilled troops, but poorly armed. Later on she had some 30,000 troops in the field, but they were armed with 53 at least six different types of guns, and this caused great confusion and was no small factor in bringing about their defeat at Tacna, Chorrillos, and Miraflores. Chile, on the other hand, had from the commencement of the war some 15,000 men under arms, and this she increased to over 40,- 000 in the campaign against Lima. Bolivia, shut in in the Andes highlands, with no accessible roads, no money, no navy, and with very few arms, all of which were more or les.s obsolete, could not be of any material help to Peru, and at no time did ^ she put more than 5,000 troops in the field. Peru, therefore, stood practically alone against a na- tion eager for expansion and prepared for a war of conquest and devastation. , It is due to these facts that the war was a long series of disasters for the Peruvian arms, brightened up here and there by the heroic deeds of her soldiers and sailors. Thus it was at Tarapaca, on the 27th of November, 1879, where a small Peruvian remnant of the army which had been routed on the 19th at Dolores, in the desert, without artillery and cavalry inflicted a crushing defeat on its pur- suers, taking from them their field pieces, flags, and trains of ammunition; and thus that the exploits of Admiral Grau with the "Huascar" filled during several months all the naval circles of the world with admiration. To the heroism of Bolognesi and his small band of comrades, Peru is in- debted for the glorious defense of Arica, June 5th, 1880. Other episodes of this cruel war show how great, if unfortu- nate, was the bravery of the Peruvians, and of the Bolivians. But there was nothing but fruitless glory for the allies, and this did not deter the victor from carrying on the war in all its hateful savagery. All the several foreign historians who have written up this war are unanimous in their condemnation of the Chilean methods employed both in battle and when raiding the country that came into their hands. The United States Minister at Lima, referring to the atrocities committed by the Chilean soldiery after the taking of Tacna and Arica, says: "The Chilean soldiery killed most of the wounded found on the field; that after 5+ the battle all the allied officers found dead upon the field were stripped, robbed, and left naked." * * * Mr. Nugent, United States Consular Agent at Arica says : "I must say that the behavior of the Chileans, both in Tacna and Arica, is most disgraceful. In Tacna the greater part of the houses have been robbed and many of them de- stroyed. Murders are committed every day. In Arica they murdered the helpless and wounded. The greater part of the town has been burned and sacked." The French Consular Agent in his report says: "That after Arica had been taken and all resistance had ceased, the Chilean soldiery, apparently under the command of their officers, came to the house where our Consular Agent had kept his office, and took indiscriminately 59 men, who were there — took them on to the public plaza and there deliber- ately shot them all." And, the Minister adds: "This, if true, is not war, but deliberate wholesale murder, unprovoked by anything yet done by the allied forces, and in the cause of civilization and humanity calls for an indignant protest from all civilized nations." In 1880, while active preparations for a campaign against Lima were going on, the Government of Chile de- cided to utilize its naval forces in a work of the most wanton destruction of property along the Peruvian coast. In a cer- tain measure this inglorious feat of the Chilean army and navy thwarted the action of the United States mediation. United States Minister Osborn, writing from Santiago to the State Department, thus refers to it: "The destruc- tion of Chimbote and other places in northern Peru, may be accepted as an indication of the character of the change in the policy of the Government. It is claimed in justifica- tion of this expedition that the resources of the Peruvian Government are being derived from the rich sugar planta- tions north of Callao, and that the destruction of these es- tates has therefore become a necessity. It is further urged that the men of wealth in Peru must be made to experience some of the horrors of war, to the end that the Government may be forced to sue for peace." 55 But the history of this expedition has been written by a Chilean, and will best be given in his own words: "The Chileans sent an expedition to carry a torch of havoc, of desolation, and of provocation to implacable war and eternal rancor along the coast of Peru. This crusade of violence and destruction is that which is known as the expedition of Lynch. Its object was to desolate the rich valleys and factories of the north of Peru. It is impossible to conceive an undertaking more unreasonable, even leaving its barbarity out of consideration. Although destined against Peru in appearance, it was in reality injurious to ourselves. We were reviewing the days of pirates in our midst, when the whole world by common consent has agreed to put an end to them. Events have established the truth of this, and the ample justification for the protest which the author of this history, in his position as a Senator, made against these enterprises. One great evil arising from them is the employment of our soldiers on work which will not advance their morality nor our civilization. Another is that such deeds will inevitably alienate the sympathies of ioreign countries when they become known. * * * * These valleys in the north of Peru produced over 80,000 tons of sugar in 1879. Th e expedition of Lynch destroyed this industry between September 4th and November 10th, 1880. After the work of destruction was completed at Paita, the same odious scenes of destruction were repeated at many other points in the coast valleys and in the ports." This is the opinion of a Chilean historian and states- man. It is at least gratifying to know that even at that date there were some men in Chile who could blush at their country's crimes, and raise their voice in protest. To-day, twenty-one years later, when the din of battle is no longer heard, and Chile is a powerful nation resting on her ill-gotten wealth but as resentful of Peruvian prog- ress as she ever was, her press, her orators and politicians urge her, the same as a former generation did, against de- fenseless Peru. The history of the Lynch expedition is the mirror 56 wherein is reflected the history of the Chilean people, and the expansionist policy of its Government. The horrors of the war and its wild scenes of Chilean savagery are better told by Chilean and foreign writers. Their accounts, at least, will not be considered as biased. It is from such impartial sources that we now gather and col- lect the following true statements: "El Mercurio" of Valparaiso, in its issue of June 4th, 1879, said: "At 12.45 p. m. it was all over. The "Independencia" was lying on her starboard, her crew were falling into the sea, her boats were being swallowed up and the firing with the small arms from the "Covadonga" was kept up and played havoc." * * * * Tomas Caivano, the noted Italian historian, referring to the battles of Chorrillos and Miraflores, 13th and 15th January, 1881, says: "From 5 o'clock in the evening all Chorrillos was turned into a hor- rible scene of robbery, orgy, blood, and ruins; a veritable hell-furnace. The General-in-Chief, who had established his headquarters at the magnificent palace of the Pezet family, was forced to abandon it at 10 at night, when it was burned to the ground. All the houses were sacked and afterward burned. And all this took place in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief, and of all the commanding officers of the Chilean army. If other proofs were needed, this alone would suffice to show that the destruction of Chorrillos and its suburbs, and the pillaging and burning of these summer resorts were not merely the effects of a drunken and un- disciplined soldiery." Sir Clements R. Markham, referring to the same sub- ject, says: "The Chileans gave no quarter. They bayoneted not only all the wounded but the defenseless civilians in Chorrillos, including the respected old English physician, Dr. Maclean, whom they foully murdered. The town was burned amidst hideous scenes of slaughter and rapine. Mira- flores was committed to the flames, all the country houses around it were sacked and burned. "During their occupation of Lima, the Chileans seized the University for a barrack, destroying and throwing away the archives. The public library contained 50,000 printed 57 volumes and 8,000 priceless manuscripts. It was appro- priated as another barrack, the books being sold as waste paper, or thrown into the street. The pictures and every- thing of value in the Exhibition building, the laboratory and appurtenances of the School of Medicine, all the models and appliances for teaching in the Schools of Arts, Sciences and Trade, and the public monuments were destroyed or carried off. The 'benches in the lecture rooms were cut up' to make packing cases For the plunder." Mr. Christiancy, United States Minister in Peru, refer- ring to all these horrors, says, in his dispatch to Mr. Evarts : "It is quite true that the towns of Chorrillos, Barranco and Miraflores were wantonly and unnecessarily burned, after all resistance had ceased. I also think that it is entirely true that the Chileans murdered upon the field of battle at least such wounded soldiers as they found; and the general re- port from Chilean officers, as given to me from officers who have conversed with them, is that as a rule they killed on the field all the Peruvian wounded. I know that when at Arica in September, the Chilean Governor of the place in- formed me that in taking Arica they took no wounded Peruvian soldiers there, and from all I could learn from all sources, the same was substantially the fact at the battle of Tacna." With the occupation of Lima the war was practically ended, great numbers of the most distinguished Peruvians had fallen in the bloody battles round Lima and in the two campaigns of Tarapaca and Tacna. The whole country was overrun by a horde of Chilean looters, robbing, sacking and devastating everything. The President and Government of Peru were wanderers among the mountain recesses. Chile was the sole arbiter of the situation. And it established the most oppressive military rule. After there was nothing left to sack and to carry away, General Saavedra, the military authority in command, issued a proclamation levying a war-contribution of one million silver pesos monthly from the departments of Lima and Callao. On the 7th of March he issued the further decree 58 ior the collection of $1,000,000 for the month of February, •divided among- fifty persons named. The penalty for non- payment was the destruction of property of the delinquent to three times the amount. It looked as if Chile had de- cided to wipe out Peru from existence. And so it would -appear from the following articles of the Chilean press, "La Actualidad," the Chilean Government organ, published at .Lima said: "The Chilean authorities have determined to fol- low and will still continue to dispose of national property -of Peru, with the indisputable right conceded by all the nations of the world to the conqueror. This is what they have done with the cartridge factory, the apparatus of the School of Arts, with books and scientific apparatus, and paint- ings; they can do it to-morrow, and can continue to do so, -with all the public buildings, beginning with the palace of Government, and ending with the last sentry-box, and again, the day after, they can again do so with all the public works, -beginning with the railroads and ending with all the bridges over water-courses and crossing public roads. "This is the right of the conqueror, and that of the van- quished is to keep silent." And "La Patria'' of Valparaiso advised the Government to destroy everything "'so as not to allow Peru at any future time to recover from the effects of the crushing defeat." THE CONQUEST. At the very outset of the war, Mr. Osborn, the United States Minister at Santiago wrote to his Government say- ing: "Tarapaca extends to the northern frontier of Bolivia and is supposed to contain almost inexhaustible wealth in its nitre and guano deposits. If Chile succeeds in getting possession of Tarapaca, she will, I judge, insist upon hold- ing it. An intelligent gentleman with whom I have con- versed upon the subject, and who formerly lived in Tarapaca, estimates the value of its nitre deposits alone at four hun- dred millions of dollars." Mr. Osborn judged rightly. No sooner did Tarapaca 59 iall into the possession of Chile than every one in Chile made evident what was the desire of the nation. It was clear that Ihe conquest of the rich nitre fields had been Chile's great ■aim, and from the moment that her victorious arms occu- pied the territory there was but one mind in the country. Chile had gone to war knowing that she had everything to gain and nothing to lose. She had been successful, and -she was decided to make the most of her success. Whatever may have been her scruples at the outset about proclaiming a war of conquest, these were now for- gotten, and her press did not lose an opportunity to remind the Government what the nation demanded of it. "La Patria," -of Valparaiso, expressed its view thus : "A nation that wages war has a right of conquest, because this is but the logical consequence of war.'' In the Senate the same sentiment was freely voiced; and when Senator Lorenzo Claro tried to oppose it he was ■denounced by the press as a traitor: "Antofagasta and Tara- paca in the hands of our enemies means our impoverishment, a repetition of the war, the resurrection of the Peruvian fleet, the continuation of our commercial crisis, it would make us a laughing-stock of all our enemies; such a course would disappoint the nation, and above all it would mean our impotence." The following extract from the debates in the Chamber of Deputies on the 5th and 8th of January, 1880, will convey .an idea of the haste in which Chile appeared to be to affirm her conquest. "Senor D. A. Arteaga rises to propose to the Chamber the following, which he considers to be a well-founded prop- osition which meets with the approval of the whole nation. "Our territory has been extended to the 17th degree :south latitude through the bravery and energy of our .soldiers. "Our poor ragged (rotos) have gone and taken posses- sion of that territory to which they have given life by their labor and their efforts, while our capitalists have promoted industry therein." 6o In view of these and other considerations, he proposes the following: Tentative resolution: "The Chamber of Deputies would receive with pleasure a bill from H. E. the President of the Republic to the effect that the territories conquered and oc- cupied by the armies of Chile during the present war be definitely incorporated with the territory of the Republic, and subjected to the civil, political, and administrative legis- lation of Chile." Deputy Don Carlos Walker Martinez is of opinion that the resolution presented by Sefior Arteaga is very ac- ceptable, most courageous, and an honor to the nation. Deputy J. M. Balmaceda declares that he agrees with Sefior Arteaga in all that refers to Chile's rights of conquest; but he thinks that the present is not the proper moment for treating the subject, and that for this reason he will vote against it. Deputy Mclver declares that he will vote against the proposition, because it is not yet known what is the Govern- ment's intention in the premises, and that for this reason he considers the proposition untimely. Besides, the proposi- tion is based solely upon the right of conquest, whereas, later on the incorporation of the conquered territories with this Republic would be made in virtue of the right of indemnity, which is more sacred than the right of conquest. Deputy V. Reyes is of opinion that things will shape themselves, and that Sefior Arteaga's proposition only an- ticipates events which sooner or later must happen. Deputy Arteaga says that he fears that if this opportunity is allowed to pass by, later on, when the time for making peace arrives, friendly nations, actuated by the desire of tendering their good offices, may have a certain influence which might be harmful to the true and legitimate interests of our country. "We should not lose this opportunity, now that we hold all the rights of the victor, and it is. our duty to act as I have suggested." Deputy Reyes asks that the debate be renewed at a subsequent session. In the session of the 8th, Sefior Santa Maria, the Prime 6i Minister, who clearly saw the inconvenience and untime- liness of Deputy Arteaga's proposition, used his great per- sonal influence to have the debate dropped. He told the Chamber that Chile was in no hurry and that everything would come at the proper moment. And so it came to pass, that although no further men- tion of conquest was made in official quarters, the seeds had been successfully planted in a rich soil, and were destined very soon to bear fruit. Eight months later this was seen at the Arica Peace Conference on board the United States man-of-war Lackawanna. MEDIATION. FRIENDLY OVERTURES BY- DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS. From the yery outset of the war in the Pacific, the Gov- ernments of Ecuador -and of Colombia made overtures to the belligerents for a cessation of hostilities and a return to peace. General Urbina, an ex-President of Ecuador, was at Santiago, Chile, as early as July, 1879, on a special mission from his Government in the interest of peace. On his way to Chile, he had an interview with Presi- dents Prado of Peru, and Daza of Bolivia, which resulted in his being informed that Peru and Bolivia would consent to a cessation of hostilities and an arbitration of the matters in dispute upon the condition that the status quo ante helium should be restored, and should continue pending the arbi- tration. The Government of Chile refused this condition, making the status quo as at present the basis of her accept- ance to entertain any talk of peace. The National Congress at Bogota adopted a resolution requesting the President to send a special envoy to the Re- publics of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, for the purpose of offer- ing the mediation of the Colombian Government. This important mission was entrusted to Senior Pabjp Arosemena, 62 a former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and one of Colombia's- most talented diplomats. In due time he arrived at his destination, but his mission was a failure, he having been privately made to understand 1 while at Santiago, that the good offices of his Government were not desired; he therefore returned to Lima without formally tendering the good offices of his Government. In June, of 1879, simultaneous but independent overtures- were made to the Government of the United States by the Cabinets of London and Berlin, looking to a future formaF proposal from Great Britain and Germany, to act with them in a mediation between the belligerents. In August, 1879, tne Hon. Mr. Newton Pettis, United States Minister at La Paz, Bolivia, undertook a personal mission to Lima and Santiago with a view of ascertaining the grounds upon which the Governments of Peru and Chile would be willing to enter into negotiations for a cessation of hostilities. Although Minister Pettis' mission was a self-imposed act, he not having acted on instructions from the Govern- ment of the United States, and though it did not lead to practical results, still it is worthy of mention in these pages- in so far as it shows the disposition of the belligerents to- ward peace. In June, 1879, Mr. Pettis had an interview at La Paz: with Seiior Pedro J. de Guerra, Minister of Foreign Rela- tions and acting President of Bolivia, in the absence of President Daza. Senor Guerra said that he had sought the interview for the purpose of learning, if possible, the views of the Government of the United States in connection with the war. Mr. Pettis declared that while he was without any instruction from the Government at Washington upon the subject, he felt confident that so desirous was the Presi- dent of the United States of a peaceful solution to the con- flict that he and his Cabinet would expect every one con- nected with the legation to exert themselves in the interest of peace, and that, therefore, it would be his highest ambi- tion and greatest pleasure to exert in the absence of special 63 instructions his efforts toward this end, and would give,, in consequence, an attentive ear to all that his Excellency might have to say. The Bolivian acting President declared that the country and the Government desired peace, but could not see how it was to be obtained amicably at present, with the armies- and navies of the belligerents opposing each other. Mr. Pettis expressed the opinion that it might be obtained by some amicable arrangement such as arbitration, adding that while, as H. E. suggested, arbitration is usually resorted' to prior to the actual commencement of hostilities, prece- dents were to be found in the conciliatory path of negotia- tion in the past, by which this objection or difficulty might be overcome, and the terms of equality restored between the- powers interested, so as to make arbitration proper, accept- able, honorable, and profitable. This interview was renewed later in the day when H. E.. the acting President of Bolivia handed to Mr. Pettis the fol- lowing memorandum: "All under the special condition not to take any decis- ion or compromise without the knowledge and approval of the Peruvian Government. "The authorities of Chile, civil and military, to withdraw from and disoccupy all territory that they have taken pos- session of upon and since the fourteenth day of February, 1879, leaving all things in the condition and state they were in previous to the fourteenth day of said month. "Then, if arbitration is agreed upon, the arbitrators to* hear, determine, and decide all matters in dispute between Bolivia and Chile and Peru, and establish the divisionary line between Bolivia and Chile, Bolivia claiming the bound- ary line affixed by the Chilean Constitution, taking in con- sideration the damages caused by the act of 14th February,, and the subsequent aggressions claimed by Bolivia, as well, as the expenses of the war- "That reference may be made to the President of the United States of America as sole arbitrator, or to the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, or to the Minis- ters of the United States in Peru, Bolivia, and Chile; a de- 6 4 cision by a majority of the arbitrators sitting to be valid and binding upon the parties, to be approved in its execu- tion and perpetuity by the President of the United States." Armed with this memorandum, Mr. Pettis set out upon his mission; he first conferred at Lima with his colleague Mr. Christiancy, who introduced him to Sefior Manuel Irigoyen, the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who de- clared that if Chile proposed arbitration upon the terms sug- gested in the Bolivian memorandum, Peru would accept. Mr. Pettis was satisfied that Peru, like Bolivia, desired peace, and that both countries preferred arbitration by the United States high above any and every other power. His next step was to see Presidents Prado and Daza at Arica, and having ascertained from them that they fully concurred in the views of their Ministers, he proceeded on to Valparaiso, where he was met by the United States Min- ister, Mr. Osborn, who introduced him to Sefior Hu- neeus, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the interview which followed, Sefior Huneeus re- quested Mr. Pettis to give his views on paper, that he might submit them to President Pinto. Mr. Pettis informed him that although he had no authority to make any proposition, he had great pleasure in discovering to him, and his Govern- ment through him, the views of Peru and Bolivia, and which would lead to an early peace if met by Chile in a humane spirit. At the Chilean Minister's request, the following un- signed memorandum of these views was drafted and handed to him: "Whereas it has been suggested through a friendly me- dium that even now the pathway to an early, honorable, and profitable peace leads in the direction of arbitration at the hands of some known and acknowledged power, alike friendly to Peru, Bolivia, and Chile; and desiring, in the spirit of conciliation and compromise, and in the interests of peace and humanity, to transfer and elevate the contest of principle from the theater of force to that of reason and conscience; "It is agreed that all differences and all matters in dis- pute between Peru and Bolivia upon one side, and Chile 65 upon the other side, of whatever character, class, kind, de- scription, or extent, be submitted to * * * * who shall be requested to meet upon the * * * * of Sep- tember, 1879, f° r the purpose of receiving and considering the statements, of the proper representatives of each of the three Republics in support of their respective views and claims, and, after such presentation, hearing, and considera- tion, to determine and decide upon all matters concerning which Peru, Bolivia, and Chile are now at variance. And the same being reduced to writing and signed by a majority of the arbitrators, to be final, binding, and conclusive upon the said Republics and the Governments thereof." Upon reading this paper Sefior Huneens requested Mr. Pettis to add the following: "And in the event that the arbitrators should be of ■opinion that Bolivia is justly and equitably entitled to any territory south of the twenty-third parallel, south latitude, it is understood that the arbitrators, or a majority of them, shall ascertain and fix the amount that Chile shall pay to Bolivia, and the manner of payment for said territory, pro- vided the respective legally constituted representatives be- fore the arbitrators cannot agree upon such amount as •compensation therefor, and the divisory line between Chile and Bolivia shall thereupon by such arbitration be estab- lished upon the said parallel twenty-third south latitude; there- fore it is stipulated: "That from this day of August, 1879, hostilities of •every character shall cease, and neither party augment its force on land or sea; that Chile at once disoccupy all terri- tory north of the 23d degree of south latitude, withdraw- ing all her forces, both by land and sea, south of said 23d degree, leaving clear to Bolivia as well the coast south •of said degree ten minutes below said 23d parallel but in all other respects the status quo to remain as at present. This instrument to have no force or validity until signed by the proper authorities of the three Republics." The next day Senor Huneeus called upon Mr. Pettis and informed him that, so far as Bolivia was concerned, there was no difficulty in submitting all matters to arbitra- 66 tion, but that as to Peru the Cabinet was not prepared to say, and desired a little time to feel their way in Congress. On his return journey to Bolivia, Minister Pettis saw Presidents Prado and Daza at Arica, and to them he reported the result of his labors. The Presidents, while thanking him, and fully appreciating the high motives which had guided him, were disappointed at the failure of the move- ment in favor of arbitration, President Prado stating that Peru was in the war out of consideration for Bolivia, and that if Bolivia said peace, let it come; if war, so be it; and if she desired arbitration, Peru accepted this form of set- tlement. The foregoing narrative, which has been taken from official documents, clearly proves that Bolivia and Peru were perfectly willing from the commencement of hostilities to end the war, and to submit the whole controversy to the arbitration of the United States, but that Chile while pre- tending to accept, made her conditions so unacceptable as to preclude any possibility of an amicable solution being reached. It also shows the spirit which guided Chile against Peru. Her Government appeared willing to settle with Bolivia, but not with Peru. During the course of the war this spirit of envy and ill- will made itself manifest on several occasions which it is well worth recalling, because it proves to what an extent Chile had premeditated attacking Peru and depriving her of her nitrate provinces. Early in the war Chile made overtures to Bolivia, through her agent, Don Justiniano Sotomayor, to induce Bolivia to desert Peru and enter into an alliance with Chile, attack Peru and divide between themselves the Departments of Tarapaca, Tacna, and Moquegua. Later on Sefior Domingo Santa-Maria, the Chilean Min- ister for Foreign Affairs, instructed a special agent of Chile to submit to the Bolivian Government an agreement embodying the following: "Republic of Chile, Department of Foreign Affairs: 67 "First. The friendly relations that have ever existed be- tween Chile and Bolivia, and which have only been inter- rupted since February of the present year, shall be resumed. Consequently the war between the two Republics shall cease, and the armies of each shall be considered in future as allied in war against Peru. "Second. In attestation that all motives of discord shall disappear between Chile and Bolivia, the last-mentioned Re- public shall recognize as the exclusive property of Chile all the territory that has been mutually disputed, and which is comprised within the parallels 23 and 24 south latitude. "Third. As the Republic of Bolivia has need of a portion of Peruvian territory in order to readjust its own, and give it an easy means of communication with the Pacific, which it has not at present, without being subject to the trammels which the Peruvian Government has ever laid upon it, Chile will not embarrass the acquisition of such territory neither will it oppose its definite occupation by Bolivia, but, on the contrary, will give it the most efficient aid. "Fourth. The help given to Bolivia by Chile during the actual war with Peru will consist of arms, money, and other articles necessary for the better organization and service of its army. "Fifth. Peru being conquered, and the time for peace stipulations having arrived, peace cannot be made by Chile unless Peru celebrates it also with Bolivia; in which case Chile will respect the concessions of territory that Peru may make to Bolivia or that she may impose on Peru; neither may Bolivia effect a peace without the concurrence and interposal of Chile. "Sixth. Peace being proclaimed, Chile will leave Bolivia all the armament that may be considered necessary for the use of its army and for maintaining in security the territory that may have been ceded by Peru, or have been obtained from it by occupation, without any claim being made for the sums of money that may have been disbursed during the war, which at no time will exceed $600,000. "Seventh. It remains, in consequence, established that the indemnity of war that Peru may have to pay Chile must . 68 of necessity be guaranteed, considering the financial condi- tion of Peru and its informality in the fulfillment of its prom- ises, by the saltpetre works of the department of Tarapaca and the guano and other substances that may be found there. "A special convention will arrange this matter. "Similar conventions will be instituted regarding other points which it may be necessary to demand, investigate, and arrange. "(Signed) "J. E. DE GUERRA, Chief of Section." Later on, at the Arica conferences, a fresh attempt was made by the Chilean representatives to induce Bolivia to abandon Peru, thus giving proof of the spirit in which they attended that supreme effort of the United States and of the allies, to secure a lasting peace. THE MEDIATION OF THE UNITED STATES. THE ARICA CONFERENCES. Mr. Rutherford Burchard Hayes, President of the United States, wishing to prevent further destruction of property and bloodshed, and fearing that the continuance of the struggle might endanger the interests of the republi- can system in this continent, offered the mediation of the United States to the belligerents, as is to be seen by the of- ficial notes of Mr. W. M. Evarts, Secretary of State at the time. This having been accepted, as a matter of course, the conferences were held in the Bay of Arica on board the mediating nation's war-ship Lackawanna under the auspices of the representatives of the United States in Chile, Peru and Bolivia, Messrs. Thomas A. Osborn, J. P. Christiancy and General Charles Adams, respectively, the first named diplomatist acting as Chairman. Peru, Bolivia, and Chile appointed their respective Pleni- potentiaries. 6 9 The following is a copy of the report of Messrs. Osborn, Christiancy, and Adams to Secretary Evarts: On board the U. S. S. Lackawanna, Bay of Arica, October 27th, 1880. "Sir: The undersigned Ministers of the United States, accredited to the Governments of Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, respectfully, report that, in pursuance of arrangements con- cluded by us with the Governments to which we are ac- credited, on the 22d of October instant, the following named Plenipotentiaries met in conference in our presence on board the United States ship Lackawanna, then anchored in the Bay of Arica, for the purpose of discussing the existing complications between the three belligerents and conclud- ing, if possible, a peace: "Don Mariano Baptista and Don Juan Crisostomo Car- rillo, Plenipotentiaries of Bolivia; Don Eulojio Altamirano, Don Juan Francisco Vergara, and Don Eusebio Lillo, Pleni- potentiaries of Chile; and Don Antonio Arenas and Don Aurelio Garcia y Garcia, Plenipotentiaries of Peru. "The powers of the various Ministers were duly ex- changed, and after a brief session the conference adjourned. "It again convened on the 25th of October, when the discussion of the subject which brought them together was entered upon and continued at length. An adjournment was finally had with the understanding that there should be another reunion on the 27th. On this latter day the con- ference again assembled and, after again exchanging views, the conclusion was unanimously reached that, in view of the instructions which they had received from their respective Governments, it would be useless for them longer to con- tinue their efforts for the purpose of bringing about a peace. "Having exhausted on our part all efforts to produce a desirable result, we were reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that a dissolution of the conference was unavoid- able. Thereupon the conference was declared closed." 7 o The conferences began on the 22d of October, 1880, and Mr. Osborn declared, in his opening speech, that the independence of the United States was the origin of repub- lican institutions in America and that the United States considered themselves in a manner responsible for the ex- istence of the said institutions; that the independence of the South American Republics was acknowledged, first of all, by the United States, and the stability of the institutions founded upon the said independence, being put to a most severe test by the war, he hoped all the belligerent Repub- lics, impelled by the same wish that animated the United States, would endeavor, by every means in their power, to put an end to the war, by an honorable and lasting peace; — Mr. Osborn finshed his speech, expressing confidence that the efforts of his Government would be crowned with suc- cess. From the outset the Chilean Plenipotentiaries assumed a haughty attitude, and shut out any possibility of an agree- ment based on justice and equity. Ignoring the rights of Bolivia and Peru, Senor Altamirano submitted the follow- ing memorandum of "the essential conditions which Chile demands in order to arrive at a peace": "First. Cession to Chile of such territory of Peru and Bolivia as extends to the south of the valley of Camarones, and to the west of the line of the Andean Cordillera which separates Peru and Bolivia as far as the valley of the Cha- carilla, and to the west also of a line which, being prolonged from this point, would strike the Argentine frontier, passing through the center of Lake Ascotan. "Second. Payment to Chile by Peru and Bolivia jointly of the sum of twenty millions of dollars, four millions whereof are to be paid in cash. "Third. Return of the properties of which Chilean citi- zens in Peru and Bolivia have been despoiled. "Fourth. Return of the transport 'Rimac' "Fifth. Abrogation of the secret treaty made between Peru and Bolivia in the year 1873, leaving at the same time the steps taken to bring about a confederation between the two nations void and of no effect whatever. 7i "Sixth. Retention on the part of Chile of the territory of Moquegua, Tacna, and Arica, occupied by Chilean forces, until the obligations to which the preceding condi- tions refer have been complied with." The Peruvian and Bolivian Plenipotentiaries requested that the necessary time be allowed them to look over and study the memorandum just presented by Serior Altamirano, of the contents of which they were still ignorant. Before adjourning it was agreed that Serior Arenas should indicate through Mr. Osborn, a day for a second meeting. At this meeting, held on the 25th of October, the Chilean memorandum formed the ground for debate. The following excerpt from the protocol of this con- ference throws important light on the attitude assumed by the Plenipotentiaries of either side : Serior Arenas stated that the representatives of Peru had carefully studied the Chilean memorandum, that he waived the consideration of the words forming the title of that document, because, although some of them appeared unacceptable, he believed they had been employed without preconceived design; nor would he allude to the causes which had brought on the war, nor the reasons which have been adduced to justify it, since a discussion of these points would be barren under present circumstances, and would only tend to remove the discussion from that calmness with which it is desirable to treat the grave question which has given rise to the conference. Mr. Arenas said in regard to the conditions proposed by his excellency the plenipotentiary of Chile that they had pro- duced upon him a painful impression, since they close the door upon any reasonable or tranquil discussion; that the first one, especially, is so insurmountable an obstacle in the way of pacific negotiation that it is equivalent to an intima- tion to proceed no farther; that Chile has obtained advan- tages in the present war, holding in military occupation in consequence thereof certain districts of Peruvian and Boliv- 72 ian territory over which she had never claimed any jurisdic- tion, but having occupied them after various combats, she to-day believes herself transformed into the owner thereof,, and that her military occupation is a title of dominion; that like doctrines certainly were sustained in other times and distant regions, but in Spanish America have not been in- voked from the time of the independence down to the present time, having been considered incompatible with the tutelary bases of republican institutions; they lapsed beneath the powerful influence of the existing political system, and be- cause they were highly dangerous for all South American republics. Leaving these general considerations, which refer to the interests and tranquility of the nations of this section of America, his excellency proceeded to examine the first of the conditions of peace presented by Chile, in its relation to Peru. The Republic of Peru, he said, by reason of its predominant ideas, the principles it professes, and the feelings animating all classes of society, is incapable of consenting to the seizure of any portion of her territory, and still less of that which to- day constitutes the principal source of her wealth. He was not unaware that nations, in the absence of a supreme judge who might settle their controversies, generally decide them upon the battlefield, the conqueror who has obtained the de- cisive victory (which is not the case in the present war) exact- ing that the party conquered, and without the means of con- tinuing the struggle, shall yield to the demands which were the cause of hostilities ; that in Peru these ideas are rooted in the public mind, being those professed and respected in republican America, and that he therefore believes, taking into consideration the present situation of the belligerents, a peace which was founded upon a cession of territory and a revival of the obsolete right of conquest would be an impos- sible peace; that even were the plenipotentiaries of Peru to accept and their government to ratify it — a supposition im- possible to entertain — national sentiment would reject it and the continuation of the war would be inevitable; that if the first condition be insisted upon, presenting it as indispensable in order to arrive at a settlement, all hope of peace must be 73 relinquished, the efforts now being made become fruitless,, with the prospect of new and disastrous hostilities before the- belligerents ; that, finally, the representatives of Peru deplore this result, not merely as patriots, but as Americans and as sincere friends of humanity. The fault cannot be imputed to< them or to their government, since, if these negotiations fail, it will be through the influence of certain passions which have become inflamed so as to present as necessary the carrying on of a war of extermination, the consequences of which, if they be not measured to-day, will be suffered to-morrow. His excellency Mr. Altamirano said that his government believes that to give these conditions to a peace, it is indis- pensable to advance her line of frontier. She would thus endeavor partly to compensate the great sacrifices made by the country, and insure the peace of the future. This demand is for the Government of Chile, for the country, and for the plenipotentiaries who speak in her name, at this moment,, indeclinable, because it is just. The regions extending to the south of Camarones owe their present development and their progress entirely to- Chilean labor and Chilean capital. The desert had been fer- tilized by the sweat of her laboring men before it was watered by the blood of her heroes. To' withdraw the authority and the flag of Chile from; Camarones would be a cowardly abandonment of thousands of her citizens, and a return, with aggravation, to the old and untenable situation. His excellency Sefior Altamirano continued, saying that he could not conceive how his excellency Sefior Arenas could' affirm that this pretension of Chile was in conflict with ac- cepted principles and with established practice. The history of all modern wars contradicts his excellency and the ex- amples of ratification of frontiers in America are numerous- and belong to contemporaneous history. In the so-called' conquest by Chile there is but one new phase, the fact that the territory in question, as he had stated a moment since,, owes its present status to Chilean labor and enterprise. I again repeat, Chile cannot withdraw her flag from that territory. The plenipotentiaries of Chile cannot sign any 74 treaty so providing, or, should they sign it, their government and country would refuse their sanction. His excellency Dr. Arenas stated that he would not refute, point by point, the arguments of his excellency Senor Altamirano, since such refutation would be barren of results. Judging from the remarks he had just heard, Chile would not recede from her demands. There might be, nevertheless, in the opinion of his excellency, some means which, without compromising the future, might conduce to an honorable and permanent peace. He believed that the people of this continent have political and social affinities; that the ani- mosities born of the momentary struggle are not to be eternal, and hence deduces the necessity for resolving this question with elevated judgment and abnegation of sentiment. His excellency Senor Baptista said: "The categorical declarations of his excellency Senor Altamirano appear to close the door to discussion. I appreciate, on the other hand, the frankness and courtesy with which he has proceeded. I will endeavor to keep pace with him in dignity of expression and clearness of reasoning. Let my words, therefore, if of no higher worth, be taken as the expression of our opinions. Their object is twofold; the one will be the collective state- ment of our views, the other an individual utterance of my own. "We, the plenipotentiaries of Bolivia, find ourselves in perfect accord with the explicit declarations of his excellency Senor Arenas upon the fundamental point of the acquisition of territory, be it called advance, cession, compensation or conquest, and we so think, inspired by the origin and develop- ment of the political life of our America. "As conquerors and conquered, we should equally suffer from an abnormal condition of affairs, which would leave for the one the sullen labor of revenge, and for the other the sterile and costly task of preventing it. The reasons given by Mr. Altamirano, to justify the necessity of his first condi- tion, would be more than satisfied by the study of another proposition, which I beg to present as a simple personal in- dication of my own. I declare frankly that the natural results •of success should be recognized and accepted. In the course 75 of this campaign the advantages are on the side of Chile. Let us shape our action according to the requirements of the events of the war, as they have occurred. It may, therefore, he assumed that the payment of an indemnity to Chile would he just. Let her retain the territory occupied as security, and let proper measures be taken to satisfy the demands ■which could justly be made against us out of the revenue •derived from the same territory. This course could protect and guarantee the interests of all, and might be supplemented by other measures, which should insure satisfactorily the property and enterprises of Chile. "To sum up, we do not accept the appropriation of the territory as a simple result of belligerent acts, whatever the name to the seizure. But I yet hope that a ground of dis- cussion may present itself, whereon conciliatory measures may find room." His excellency Sefior Altamirano observed that the solu- tions to this question are not infinite. There are, perhaps, but two ; that indicated by Chile, and that which his excel- lency Sefior Baptista has been pleased to suggest. If the plenipotentfary of Chile declared for his part in the first con- ference that the condition proposed was indeclinable, and now repeats it, it was because his government considers the second combination deficient and inacceptable. It is' sad, he observed in conclusion, to have to resist appeals such as those which have just been made to us by their excellencies Messrs. Arenas and Baptista, but if the ■extension of the frontier be an insuperable obstacle to peace, Chile cannot, ought not, to remove that obstacle. His excellency Sefior Garcia y Garcia stated that he had given profound attention to the remarks of his excellency Mr. Osborn, when, in the inaugural session, he 1 said that the Government of the United States was to a certain extent re- sponsible before the world in regard to the republics of the new continent, derived from the political principles and sys- tem of government which the former had implanted by their ■example, and which, under no circumstances, should be al- lowed to fall into discredit. These fraternal declarations are doubtless founded upon that great principle, uttered as a 7 6 notification in the face of the world by one of the most illus- trious Presidents of the Union, and practically maintained by- all of his worthy successors. "America for the Americans," exclaimed President Monroe upon a solemn occasion, and in. framing that immortal sentence he established the founda- tions of the new American public law, which, destroying all- hope of usurpation, banished forever from the new continent those lords of divine right so well schooled to conquest as the surest means of expanding their territory. Hence it fol- lows, since right and justice are one, and equally applicable abroad and at home, that the right of territorial sovereignty in America can only be voided by the spontaneous consent of nations, ratified by the approbation of the respective peoples. If, unfortunately, these prudent maxims be disregarded or violated, there would be at once sown broadcast the seeds of interminable dissensions, like those which with frequency occur on the old continent, and which would compel each State, as his excellency Sehor Baptista has well said, to main- tain those immense armies and navies, the insatiable guard- ians of what they are pleased to call "armed peace or Euro- pean equilibrium," which are nothing more than the precau- tions taken by each to avoid being dismembered or absorbed by the other, his neighbor. Nor is it possible for his excellency Sehor Garcia y Gar- cia, as he desires to place upon record, to pass over in silence- one of the reasons given by his excellency Senor Aitamirano as a singular title for the dominion which Chile seeks to- establish over the territory of Tarapaca. He remembers that his excellency the plenipotentiary of Chile maintained that the entire population of that province being Chilean, and the: capital and labor employed in its establishments being like- wise Chilean, therefore to them belongs possession of the territory. While his excellency Sehor Garcia waives the considera- tion of the extension of "entire," as employed by his excel- lency Sehor Altamirano, since, as the expression is totally at variance with the facts, he cannot believe that he would, pretend to sustain it, nor that such was his intention, he can- not restrain the natural expression of his surprise at hearing 77 reasoning so remarkable from one whose profound learning and elevated political stature render him a figure in American history he has ever contemplated with admiration. But his astonishment is greater upon reflecting that such views have been uttered in the presence of their excellencies, the three mediating ministers, whose great nation owes its immense development precisely to the foreign capital and labor which daily flow to its shores. "With what hilarity," he exclaimed, "would be received in the political circles of Washington the doctrine that should assert the right of Prince Bismarck to annex some of the newer Western States to the German Empire, the bulk of their population being German; or that Her Majesty Queen Victoria could, under like title, take possession of New York, a large portion of the inhabitants whereof are Irishmen!" He proposed that all the points of these differences to which his excellency Senor Baptista has alluded, and which shall be detailed in posterior discussions, be submitted to the arbitration without appeal of the Government of the United States of America, called to that high position by their ele- vated morality, their position on the continent, and the spirit • of concord manifested impartially in favor of all the belliger- ent nations here represented. His excellency Senor Arenas added, seconding the views of his excellency Senor Garcia y Garcia, that the arbitration proposed is the most practical and decorous solution that could be reached, abandoning thus the crooked paths trodden by these countries since the war began. He begged, once and again, their excellencies the representatives of Chile to ponder and mediate upon the direful consequences of a con- trary determination. His excellency Mr. Vergara said that he would confine himself to the proposal of arbitration which had been pre- sented for debate, in order to declare peremptorily in the name of his government and in that of his colleagues that he does not accept it, in any form whatever. Chile seeks an enduring peace, which shall consult both her present and future interests, which shall be proportioned 78 to the elements and power she possesses to obtain it, to the labor already performed, and to well-founded national aspira- tions. This peace she will negotiate directly with her adver- saries when they accept the conditions she deems necessary for her security, and there is no reason whatever why she should deliver up to other hands, honorable and secure as they may be, the decision of her destinies. For these reasons she declares that she rejects the proposed arbitration. His excellency Sefior Lillo said that he had not expected to have addressed this solemn conference, but the proposal of arbitration presented by his excellency Sehor Garcia y Garcia compelled him to forego his intention. He believed it his duty to fully indorse the rejection of that proposal already manifested by his honorable colleague, Sefior Ver- gara. He understood and accepted arbitration when it was de- sired to avoid a war. This is the most worthy, the nobler course, harmonizing best with the principles of civilization and fraternity which should guide enlightened nations, and more especially those who by their antecedents and intimate relations form a single family; but arbitration has its oppor- tune moment, and this, for the negotiations of peace which occupy us to-day, has unfortunately passed. Chile neither desires nor will she ever consent to estab- lish the right of conquest. What she asks is a just compen- sation for her sacrifices in this fatal struggle, and protection to communities essentially Chilean, who would not accept the fact of their abandonment, since they live and flourish to-day under the shadow of her flag. Cession of territory, after great advantages obtained ia war, is a fact which has frequently occurred in republican America in modern times. Nations which have so acted have had no reason to repent, since, while seeking just compen- sation for their efforts, they carried wealth and progress to the regions surrendered to them. Arbitration, and arbitration at the hands of the great nation, model of republican institutions, will be always ac- cepted by Chile with the applause of the people; but the opportune moment has gone by, and to accept it, under pres- 79 ent circumstances, would be, for Chile, an act of vacillation and of weakness. He understood that the plan proposed by his excellency Senor Baptista might be taken into consideration. Accord- ing to it, Chile would fix her war indemnity and her condi- tions, retaining possession of the Peruvian territory now occupied by her arms, as a guarantee, until she should receive the satisfaction of her demands. He repeats that he under- stands this solution, but it is not that which the instructions of their government impose upon them, and although per- sonally he thinks these indications worthy of consideration, he is compelled to remain within the limits of the instructions received. His excellency Mr. Carrillo said: "The grave and positive declarations which have been made in regard to the principal proposition presented are calculated to almost extinguish the hope of a peaceful ar- rangement. Nevertheless, the idea is so grand, so great the interest of the questions submitted to the deliberations of this honorable assembly of plenipotentiaries, that I deem it indis- pensable to endeavor, if possible, yet to find a formula of acceptable solution, which if not immediately considered as being irreconcilable with existing instructions, might be sub- mitted by their excellencies the plenipotentiaries, to their respective governments. "Arbitration has just been proposed, and in this highly conciliatory measure may perhaps be found a peaceful solution. "We cannot ignore that the deliberations of the present conference attract, at this moment, the attention of the civil- ized world. Here is to be decided, not only the fate and future of the three republics, but the great interests of America. The precedents for the new public law of South America are about to be established, a legislation which, from the special character of its conditions, cannot but diverge from European doctrines. There the traditions of predom- inance, the diversity and tendency of races to unification, maintain a permanent struggle between the past and prog- ress. Europe, in spite of her noble aspirations, still finds her- 8o self confined within a circle of iron from which she cannot -escape. In the meanwhile America, formed of peoples ushered into political life by their own exertions, and estab- lished under identical institutions, knows no other tradition than that of having struggled against conquest and against the mastery of force, from which she has separated forever. With her, wars of preponderance have no reason to exist, and even the practices of war must become less disastrous and cruel. "Thus international disagreements, however grave, be- tween nations closely bound by their origin and common des- tiny, should in preference be settled by conciliatory methods, such as the proposed arbitration. Arbitration, your excel- lencies, as an honorable expedient, is the supreme aspiration of nations, and there is no question, however grave and diffi- cult, that cannot, by this means, reach a most satisfactory result. "The only objection that has been urged against arbitra- tion consists in that, in the opinion of his excellency Sefior Lillo, the Republic of Chile cannot permit that a third party estimate the price of the blood of her sons, or the value of her sacrifices. I fail to find sufficient solidity in this reason- ing. The very expression, 'estimate the price of blood,' is not in my opinion the most proper. The arbitrator, in his high impartiality, would appreciate the demands of the Gov- ernment of Chile, with due reference to her sacrifices, to the blood shed and to the advantages obtained, up to the present, in the field. If these demands are just, if the blood that has been shed confers upon a belligerent the right to obtain con- cessions, if the securing of peace requires sacrifices from the other States, even to the modification of their international frontiers, and if all this is in conformity with the rights of war, the friendly power, constituted by common confidence into a tribunal of arbitration, will so decide; its award will consult that which is most equitable, most proper for the establishment of a lasting peace. If this procedure is worthy of all concerned, there is no reason to doubt that the arbi- trator would consult the interest of Chile, in the state in which the war is at this moment. This decision would come 8i out from the sacred regions of impartiality, it would be the calm expression emanating from justice, and would bring with it reconciliation and true peace, entirely honorable for Chile and acceptable without humiliation by the other re- publics. "If the arbitral award should prove adverse to the in- terests of Bolivia and of Peru, and should declare the neces- sity of territorial concessions, the allied republics, even in this case, would bow to this decision in homage to this su- preme tribunal of nations. "For the first time and at the expiration of more than a year of war, too protracted for young republics who are sac- rificing their population and their resources, has the voice of reason instead of force, for the decision of the question of the Pacific, been raised by an American nation. The only expedient remaining is arbitration; through it American in- terests and republican institutions may yet be saved. "From the midst of Europe, where international bound- aries are frequently changed in contradiction to the progress of right; where a race or a power rules over another to-day, to be in turn perturbed to-morrow; from there the brightest minds, the profoundest thinkers, contemplate America as the true country of the justice, the equality and the fraternity of nations. From that continent is sent forth the brilliant light of progress and justice to find unobstructed realization in America. ''"Will the republic of Chile, which has attained, earlier than the rest, remarkable progress, and which is consequently called upon to march in the van of this movement, introduce into the policy of America the practices imposed upon Europe for reasons adverse to progress? "I recall another argument against arbitration, 'that it could only be accepted before war.' Arbitration, your excel- lencies, which reconciles all differences, is acceptable, in my judgment, at the outset of a war, to prevent it; during its course, to stop its ravages, and up to the close of the contest, in honor of the victor, who should have the wise foresight to leave the declaration of conditions to the arbitration of a respected neutral power. Victory would thus insure her ad- 82 vantages, and achieve peace without the hatred of the van- quished. "Moreover, international arbitration is distinct from that employed in questions of private interest. In these the judge confines himself to the decision of the original question, its conditions remaining unaltered. International disagreements are appreciated and decided with all amplitude, and according to the condition of the parties or the belligerents, and in con- formity to the rights derived from the war. "The proposition of my colleague, his excellency Sefior Baptista, has been expressed as his private opinion; for my own part, I indorse it, and am persuaded that, for the sake of great international interests, it will be approved by the government of my country. I renew it, therefore, in this form: 'Statu quo of the territory occupied by the forces of Chile, pending the decision of the tribunal of arbitration pro- posed upon all points in dispute; a solution frank and American. "Before concluding, I deem it opportune to state that when the respected mediation of the most excellent Govern- ment of the United States was offered to Bolivia, my govern- ment, as well as public opinion, felt satisfied that peace would result; for that mediation was accompanied by another word — arbitration — which signifies justice and honor for all, humiliation to none. "In this persuasion, and with a policy of frankness, the Bolivian plenipotentiaries have come to this conference." His excellency Mr. Osborn remarked that it seemed proper to him, as well as to his colleagues, to place upon record that the Government of the United States does not seek the position of arbiter in this question. A strict compli- ance with the duties inherent to that position would involve much trouble and great labor, and while he could not doubt that his government would accept the position if duly re- quested to do so, it was nevertheless proper that it be under- stood that its representatives did not court that distinction. His excellency Sefior Altamirano stated it was very pain- ful for him and for his colleagues, and doubtless will be for his government, to refuse a proposal for arbitration; to decline «3 to accept a judge so highly placed and so nobly inspired as the Government of the United States. It is necessary therefore, to clearly establish that arbi- tration is the standard which Chile has invariably raised in her international questions, and it is, above all, necessary to remember that, in order to avoid this sanguinary war, she also offered to appeal to judges before drawing the sword. That was the moment, and it is most deplorable that her offer was not accepted. According to his excellency Sefior Carrillo, if this con- ference should close with the acceptance of arbitration it would be an epoch of glory for America, and a just, lofty and noble policy would be inaugurated for the future. His excellency Mr. Altamirano concurred with his excel- lency in the desire to see arbitration elevated to the position of the sole and obligatory method of deciding differences be- tween nations ; but if it were in the present instance accepted by the plenipotentiaries of Chile, they would be justly accused and justly condemned at home as guilty of desertion from duty, and almost of treason to the clearest rights and inter- ests of their country. At the third and last meeting, held on the 27th October, Mr. Osborn signified his readiness to hear any suggestions that it might be thought proper to make: He then addressed himself to each one of their excellen- cies the plenipotentiaries of Chile, asking them if they had any- thing to observe in relation to the matters under discussion. Their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of Chile stated that in conformity to their instructions it was impossible for them to make any modification whatever in the condition laid down. His excellency Mr. Osborn then invited each one of their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of Peru to manifest, if so disposed, their ideas upon the subject. Their excellen- cies the plenipotentiaries of Peru declared, in reply, that as Chile insisted upon the maintaining of the first condition, and the arbitration proposed by them not having been ac- cepted, it was impossible for them to go into an examination 8 4 of the other conditions; that every door had been closed to them, and the continuation of the war rendered necessary; and that the responsibility of its consequences must not rest upon Peru, who had indicated a decorous means of reaching peace. His excellency Mr. Osborn invited in turn their excel- lencies the plenipotentiaries of Bolivia to make known their ideas, and they stated that for their part they considered the situation to be clearly and sharply defined. There is one con- dition, the first presented by their excellencies the plenipoten- tiaries of Chile, as indeclinable, which the allies cannot accept. There is another, that of arbitration, suggested by their ex- cellencies the plenipotentiaries of the allied republics, and rejected by those of Chile; and there is finally a third, which has been proposed separately by the representatives of Bo- livia, but which has not been taken into consideration. They consider, in view of this result, that the negotiation has reached its close, and regret that the political situation of the respective countries should not have permitted a common agreement to have been reached. His excellency Mr. Osborn declared that he and his colleagues profoundly lament that the conference should not have yielded the pacific and conciliatory results hoped from it, and believe that the same impression will be made upon the government and people of the United States when the fact is communicated to them that the friendly mediation of the United States has been fruitless. He therefore declared the conference closed. Mr. Osborn's lukewarm attitude whilst presiding at the Arica conferences and his declaration that the Government of the United States did not pretend to act as arbitrator, "as that position would involve much trouble and great labors," was disapproved by Secretary of State Evarts, who, on the 27th of December, 1880, addressed an official note to him to that effect, asking for an explanation and stating, -amongst other things, the following: 85 "If it was your purpose to. convey the impression that we would not cheerfully assume any labor and trouble in- cidental to arbitration in the interest of peace, and in the service of justice, you have not correctly interpreted the views and ideas of this Government." The Hon. Mr. Christiancy wrote to the State Depart- ment as follows: "When the conferences at Arica had completely failed, on October 27th I proposed to Mr. Osborn (who was the senior minister of the United States, who had presided at the conferences) that he should telegraph to you, not only the fact that the conferences had failed, but that the two points of disagreement which lead to that disagreement, viz., the refusal of Peru to cede Tarapaca and the rejection by Chile of the arbitration of the United States. He seemed to be particularly anxious to avoid telegraphing that Chile had re- fused the arbitration of the United States, and declared that he should only telegraph you that "the conference had ended without result." I then informed him that I thought it proper to let you know the points of difference which caused the fail- ure to agree, and that I proposed to telegraph that Peru refused to cede Tarapaca and Chile rejected the proposed arbitration of the United States. Upon the last point Mr. Osborn, I thought, seemed to be peculiarly sensitive and very unwilling that it should be announced that Chile had rejected the arbitration of the United States. "The basis of negotiations, so far as related to the ac- quisition of territory by Chile, as foreshadowed by Mr. Bap- tista, viz., that a certain sum should be agreed upon as due to Chile for the expenses of the war, and that Chile should retain the possession of the whole or a part of the territory now in her possession as security for the payment of that sum, seemed to me to offer the only light out of the dead- lock in which the parties found themselves. I therefore urged upon the Peruvian plenipotentiaries that they should make a proposition upon this basis. I was, in reply, told by them that they would have been quite willing to do so if they had not been precluded by the positive declaration of the Chilean plenipotentiaries that no such proposition could be 86 «ntertained, but that the unqualified acceptance of their first proposition was an indispensable condition to all further attempts at negotiation. And this being the fact, as appears by the protocols, I could not urge them further to make such a proposition." The Hon. General Adams wrote to the State Depart- ment as follows: "I have the honor to advise you that I have returned to my post after the failure of the peace conference at Arica. I do not think that either our government or its representa- tives have any cause to reproach themselves nor feel that the efforts made, although without apparent result, have been ■entirely misplaced. "A short dispatch of the abrupt termination of the con- ferences was signed by me jointly with Messrs. Osborn and Christiancy, and this, with a report of the proceedings and official protocols of the three conferences, will be transmitted to the Department by the latter, who is accompanied by our joint secretary, so that it is unnecessary for me to make a separate report; but some observations may not be perhaps out of place, especially as I am cognizant of some matters affecting the negotiations as between Chile and Bolivia, which were not brought forward in the conference, but never- theless may be of interest to yourself in order to completely understand the situation. "The decided expressions of the plenipotentiaries not to modify their first bases, no doubt influenced by public opinion in their country, which was opposed to peace, and the causes of this feeling said to be mainly based upon an official note to Mr. Christiancy by the Government of Peru, will probably be fully explained and commented upon by Mr. Osborn; as will also Mr. Christiancy, without doubt, give his views upon the popular feeling in Peru, and how much the government of that republic through its plenipotentiaries was able to concede, and also upon the rather proudly, if not offensively, expressed refusal by Chile to accept arbitration as proposed by Peru and accepted by Bolivia. "The matters are as between Chile and Peru, and I wish to add to the history of the proceedings simply that the 87 proposition made by Bolivia to surrender the coveted terri- tory under failure to pay a large war indemnity in a fixed limit of time, which would have guaranteed its peaceful pos- session to Chile, as neither Peru nor Bolivia would have been able to pay it, seemed to me at least well worthy of respectful consideration; but inasmuch as the proceedings do not show that the government at Santiago had even been consulted thereon, and its plenipotentiaries in the conference had but little to say about it, it seems to me that that govern- ment was not very much in earnest in its desires for peace; that the conditions at first submitted were meant to preclude any probability of being accepted and that from the first our efforts might be considered inutile and in vain. "The main endeavors of the Chileans in private confer- ences with the Bolivians, communicated to me confidentially by the latter, were made to break up the alliance between Peru and Bolivia, and engage the latter republic in an alliance with themselves as the unavoidable result of such action. Great inducements were held out, a share in the conquests already and still to be made; but I am pleased to be able to say that such perfidy and disregard of national honor was not •consummated; and if, on being consulted on that subject, I took a decided stand in declaring that such proceeding, no matter how beneficial it might be to Bolivia, would be con- sidered by my government, and no doubt by the world, as ■one of the most infamous transactions in history, would re- flect no credit on either nation, but lasting infamy on all persons connected therewith, and that I would neither be a party thereto nor even be considered officially cognizant 'thereof, X hope that I only expressed your own sentiments. The advances so made by one of the Chilean plenipotentiaries were rejected; and if by the unfortunately existing alliance with Peru Bolivia is deprived from making peace, which it so much needs and desires, it can at least hold up its head amongst nations and be able to say that it will bear mis- fortune rather than dishonor. "I have only to add my views upon one point as appear- ing in the second protocol, when Mr. Osborn, in rather strong terms, it seemed to me, stated the Government of the 88 United States would not care to accept the office of arbitrator on account of the labor and trouble involved. In my dis- patch No. 26 D, inclosure 5, I had the honor to transmit a memorandum of a conference with Mr. Carrillo, which, con- sidering arbitration a natural consequence of the offered me- diation and upon its failure the only practicable road to peace, I had no hesitation in declaring that such arbitration would be accepted by my government if desired by all the belligerents. In that sense the mediation was accepted by Bolivia, and in that sense I wrote to Mr. Osborn (inclosure 6, No. 26), and having been informed by him that he had acquainted the Government of Chile of its import, and never having been by him advised that the construction I had placed upon the terms of mediation was wrong and ill- founded. I at least may be permitted to say that both the rejection of such arbitration by Chile and Mr. Osborn's speech thereon appear to me strange and inexplicable, espe- cially as no instructions had been received by either of us on that subject." The revelations which Minister Adams makes, prove once more, how base has been the policy of Chile during the war. It is well to bear this in mind, because it has always been Chile's pet contention that her resentment against Peru, and the war itself, were due to the treaty of alliance between Bolivia and Peru; a treaty which she has declared was a plot against her sovereignty. In the face of her various ignoble attempts to sever the alliance and to destroy Peru- vian sovereignty, it is difficult to understand how she can uphold such a preposterous contention. 8 9 CHILE AND THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS AT PANAMA. The several attempts which had been made to bring about a lasting peace between the belligerents had been frus- trated by Chile's wayward policy. On the 3d of September, 1880, a convention was entered into at Bogota by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colom- bia and the Chilean diplomatic representative, by the terms of which both countries agreed to submit to- arbitration the decision of all questions that may arise between them and which it may be found impossible to decide by diplomacy. The President of the United States was designated as ar- bitrator. This convention should have been ratified at Bogota or Santiago on or before the 3d day of September, 1881. On the strength of this arbitration treaty, the Govern- ment of Colombia, that had not abandoned the hope of restor- ing peace in the South American continent, conceived the idea of convening an international American Congress to meet at Panama on December 1st, 1881, and to this effect invitations were issued to the several governments. In July, 1879, Setior Don Pablo Arosemena, while on his mediation mission to Chile, Bolivia and Peru, freely stated that in his opinion it would be highly desirable to reach a settlement of all the many complicated questions ex- isting in Latin America by means of an international confer- ence, and he suggested that such a proposition coming from the President of the United States would be gladly and re- spectfully received. This sentiment prevailed among all of the Latin nations of the continent and, in consequence, Colombia's invitation was favorably viewed by them. But Chile, fearing that the conference would disapprove of her treatment of Peru and Bolivia and attempt to rob her of the fruits of her victories, exerted herself to defeat the noble initiative of Colombia, and go to this purpose she led a campaign against the holding of such conference. Sefior Luis Aldunate, the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his report to Congress, stated that "although the convention of September 3d, 1880, had been entered into by a Chilean diplomatic agent and presented to Congress for its ratification, the Government judged that, the date for its -exchange and ratification having expired, present conditions advised the administration not to insist at all in its renewal." He next referred to Chile's acceptance of Colombia's in- vitation to the Panama Conference, stating that although, the representative at Bogota had offically assured the Colom- bian Government that Chile would attend the conference, the Government had given positive instructions to the said repre- sentative to state that for the reasons given above Chile would not renew the arbitration treaty and would not attend the conference to be held at Panama, and the said representa- tive was further charged to make known to Colombia, in a discreet but positive manner, Chile's present state of mind, and to express that it was his nation's wish that the said conference should not be held. And in furtherance of the policy which Chile had now traced herself, Sefior Aldunate, in the aforesaid report, gives some very interesting points, which in view of recent events in connection with the forthcoming Pan-American Congress at the City of Mexico 1 , show how consistent has been the policy of that nation whenever the question of arbitration of pending disputes has been brought to the consideration of the Americas. "It was not sufficient that we should address ourselves to the inviting Government. We, therefore, sent our repre- sentatives to Ecuador, to the Central American Republics and to Mexico, with instructions to thwart the idea of the International Conference. The Colombian Government was surprised at our action, but was forced to accept them as the logical result of circumstances beyond our wish, and which were imposed upon us by actual conditions. "Ecuador judged that our request for a postponement was reasonable, because the conference would be unable to estab- 9i "lish any sort of American public law with Chile out of the conference, and with the convention of September 3d, 1880, that served as a basis to its reunion, withdrawn. "This action by the Ecuadorian Government gave rise to -a violent discussion between the diplomatic representative of Colombia at Quito and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, and which at one moment threatened to produce serious consequences." These words of the Chilean statesman prove how true is the charge winch has often been brought against his coun- try of trying by every possible means to create an imbroglio among the nations of the Southern Hemisphere. They prove, moreover, the selfishness and aggressive arrogance which characterizes Chilean diplomacy and her international policy. In December of 1880 the Argentine Government tried to induce the Government of Brazil to> join it in an effort to "bring about peace between the belligerents. Sehor Aldunate refers to this action in the following terms : "The Chilean Government understood from the moment in which it became acquainted with the work which the Ar- gentine Government had undertaken, that it behooved it to adopt a well defined and clear policy; consequently, it in- structed our plenipotentiary in Brazil to' act in the premises, and to decline at once whenever such a proposition should be made to- him." THE MEDIATION OF THE UNITED STATES. SECOND PERIOD. The official communications exchanged between the United States Minister at Paris and the Secretary of State at Washington show how very jealous the Government at Washington was that there should be no European inter- ference in the affairs of South America. This policy of the United States undoubtedly prompted Secretary Blaine to try again to bring about an honorable and lasting peace between the belligerents; besides, he could not overlook the fact that his country had been instrumental, Q2 at the early stages of the war of the Pacific, in effecting a satisfactory arrangement of the boundary dispute between Argentina and Chile, a dispute which, if it had not been set- tled thus, might have induced Argentina to throw in her lot in favor of the allies, and the settlement of which, in any case, allowed Chile to feel perfectly secure from any danger from that quarter; and, therefore, enabled her to direct the whole of her energies, in the most complete security from any possible conflict with her powerful transandean rival, against the allies. When dealing with this feature of the war of the Pacific it is impossible not to see how unfortunate it was for the allies that the Washington Government should have taken up such a position, and that, having once entered upon the policy of friendly mediation it did not carry it out in the interest of future peace and harmony on the continent. But, in order to be just, it is necessary to consider the many unfortunate and .unforeseen circumstances that sur- rounded the attempts made by Secretary Blaine from the time when he appointed as Minister to Chile and Peru, respective- ly, Messrs. Kilpatrick and Hurlbut, to the sad and tragical death of General Garfield, and the sending of Mr. Trescot to South America. Mr. Morton, the United States Minister at Paris, wrote in August, 1 88 1, to Secretary Blaine as follows: "The attitude and correspondent relations of France, England and the United States, with the South American States, Chile and Peru, since the late termination of hostili- ties was the subject of a private interview which I had the honor to have yesterday afternoon, at the palace of the Ely- sees, with President Grevy. The meeting was unofficial and sought by his excellency for a mutual exchange of thoughts on a subject which appeared to have received his careful study. In the conversation which ensued, his excellency alluded to the two abortive attempts on the part of the gov- ernments of France and England toward effecting some practical agreement between these two South American 93 States. He referred in a general way to the desirability of establishing between our respective governments the basis •of a mutual understanding in regard to the policy which might be jointly adopted by us both toward securing an early return of order and stability in the affairs of Chile and Peru, as far as comports with our national, traditions and usages in the management of public affairs with foreign States. He .•spoke of the many unsatisfied claims of French subjects on the Peruvian Government, and expressed his strong dis- approval of the extravagant demands made by the Chilean 'Government and conditions of peace which, if literally en- forced, he apprehended would . achieve the permanent en- feeblement, perhaps annihilation of the Peruvian State. In using this language, his excellency indeed acknowledged the right of Chile, as a conquering power, to certain indemnities and privileges to be embodied in the final treaty of peace, •etc., but which he thought required particular modification, and he was of the opinion that another attempt at mediation, •on the part of foreign governments, and especially of the United States, was requisite for the purpose of reaching a satisfactory solution of the present state of chaos and dis- order, which now there obtains. "In my reply I said I had received from my govern- ment, as yet, no instructions or intimation in regard to the •course it might pursue toward these South American States. I felt, however, his own views, as expressed to' me, would, if presented, receive the most favorable consideration. I ■continued to say my government, I believed, had already striven, but without success, to interpose, as the equal friend between Chile and Peru, with a view to a reconciliation, and I had no doubt that, as suggested by President Grevy, a third attempt at mediation on our part would be ventured. And I concurred with his excellency in the hope the heavy ■demands of Chile might possibly be modified, as I also felt -that, if executed, they must limit, if not extinguish, in that State the future development of private enterprise, as well as the employment of foreign capital, by which alone its natural resources could receive extension. At the close of this interview his excellency requested the informal trans- 94 mission to you of the substance of his remarks, which I have- the honor herewith to do, and I take pleasure to add that I regard this meeting with President Grevy as a renewed in- stance of the cordial relations now so happily existing be- tween our two republican governments." To this communication Secretary Blaine replied as fol- lows on September 5th, 1881 : "I have to acknowledge the reception of your dispatch, No. 6, of date August nth, 1881, giving an account of your interview on the day previous with the President of the republic in regard to the attitude and correspondent rela- tions of France, Great Britain and the United States with- the South American States, Chile and Peru. "The remarks made and the suggestions offered by President Grevy concerning the situation of affairs in Peru: have received that careful and respectful consideration due- to the utterances of so eminent a statesman and the Chief" Magistrate of France. I hasten to say that this government agrees with him in profoundly deploring the disorders and! sufferings that have already fallen upon, and the others that continue to impend over the people of Peru, and fully shares- the humane and enlightened sentiments which have inspired in him a personal interest in that unfortunate struggle, and. have induced him to suggest a concerted effort by France,. Great Britain and the United States to bring the conflict- to an end. "Such interventions are frequent in European diplomatic- history, and have been sometimes followed by beneficial re- sults in preserving the equilibrium of the powers. But the United States has not belonged to that system of States, of" which France and Great Britain are such important mem- bers, and has never participated in the adjustment of their contentions. Neither interest nor inclination leads this country to wish to have a voice in the discussion of those questions; but our relations to the States of the American: continent are widely different, and the situation is so nearly reversed, that this government, while appreciating the high and disinterested motive that inspired the suggestion, is con- strained to gravely doubt the expediency of uniting with 95 European powers to intervene, either by material pressure or by moral or political influence, in the! affairs of American* States. These republics are younger sisters of this govern- ment. Their proximity of situation, similarity in origin and frame of government, unity of political interest on all ques- tions of foreign intercourse, and their geographical remote- ness from Europe have naturally given to American States close and especial relations to each other, and in the course of time removed them further from the European system. "The interests, commercial and political, of the United' States, on this continent, transcend in extent and importance those of any other power, and where these immense interests are deeply involved this government must preserve a posi- tion where its influence will be most independent and effi- cient. In the contest between Peru and Chile, the United States has watched the progress of the struggle with painful' interest, and endeavored, as opportunity offered, to arrange terms of peace; and you will say to the French Government that, while the interest which President Grevy has manifested" for the cause of peace, and his sympathy with the unhappy victims of this war, find an earnest response here, both from the government and the people, the United States declines, to enter into negotiations with European powers for a joint intervention in the affairs of Chile and Peru." Later on, Mr. Morton wrote, saying that President Grevy had stated that "annexation by a victorious nation of the whole or a large part of the territory of the subdued nation, or even the exaction of an undue indemnity of war,. was contrary to the now admitted rights of nations as well as to the interests of neutrals. That a victorious nation had the right to secure the fruits of its victories, there was no doubt, but it had not the right to impose upon its powerless- enemy burdens amounting to annihilation." Senor Alejandro Garland, in his very interesting publica- tion, "The South American Conflicts and the United States,"' refers to the action of the United States at the time, and he shows how Mr. Blaine acted in order to bring about peace. From the pages of his publication we gather the following statements : 9 6 "It was equally understood at Washington that the ap- plication of the Monroe Doctrine, as set forth in Secretary Blaine's letter, practically deprived Peru of the benefits to be derived from the interference of her friends and the good offices of the European Powers, and that consequently the moral duty of quickly bringing the war to a close, on honor- able terms for all the belligerents, was incumbent on the United States. "All this was evident to the eminent statesman Mr. Blaine, the Secretary of State at the time, influenced, as he was, by the noble sentiments and elevated views that so great- ly distinguished the unfortunate Mr. James A. Garfield, who had already assumed the Presidency of the Republic. "It was a matter undoubted that the attitude premedi- tatedly assumed by the Department of State, when declaring 'its resolution to secure peace exclusively through its own exertions, rejecting the interference and even the cooperation of all other powers, entailed, as the unavoidable consequence, the imposition of peace by the United States if, as we under- stand, she intended to honor her moral responsibilities and thus retain her prestige and influence as the leading republic in the world. "Mr. Blaine set his mind on the attainment of this noble idea and, with his clear understanding of the grand future in store for American republicanism, as a furthered of the prog- ress and welfare of humanity and civilization, he gave definite instructions to the functionaries under his orders to strive by ■every means in their power to secure peace without terri- torial dismemberment. Mr. Blaine did not admit the prin- ciple of military conquest as a means of territorial aggran- dizement in the international relations of the free American countries. "Swayed by these ideas, he accredited new ministers to the belligerent republics of the Pacific. General Stephen A. Hurlbut was chosen, for Peru and General Judson Kilpatrick for Chile. "The instructions given to these agents are dated June 15th, 1881. "Mr. Hurlbut was charged, in the strongest terms, to 97 endeavor to eliminate the cession of territory as a condition for the initiation of peace negotiations and, to this end, he received the following instructions : 1 : ' 'It will be difficult, perhaps, to obtain this from Chile;; but, as the Chilean Government has distinctly repudiated the idea that this war was a war of conquest, the Government of Peru may fairly claim the opportunity to make proposal^ of indemnity and guarantee before submitting to- a cessioa of territory. If you can aid the Government of Peru in secur- ing such a result, you will have rendered the service which seems most pressing. Whether it is in the power of the Peru- vian Government to make any arrangements at home or abroad, singly or with the assistance of friendly powers, which will furnish the necessary indemnity or supply the required guarantee, you will be better able to advise me, after yon have reached your post.' \ , "Mr. Kilpatrick, a copy of whose instructions was given to Mr. Hurlbut, was addressed' as follows : " 'Difficult as would be the intervention of the United States under ordinary circumstances, our position is furthej: embarrassed by the failure of the conference at Arica, under- taken at our suggestion. It is evident from the protocols of that conference that Chile was prepared to dictate and not to discuss the terms of peace, and that the arbitration of the United States upon any questions of difference with the allied powers of Peru and Bolivia was not acceptable and would not be accepted by the Chile Government.' "And he was, therefore, charged to observe a conduct of expectation, yet commanded toi take advantage of every opportunity, but without officious intrusion, to induce Chile to desist from her demand that the sine qua non condition for the reopening of negotiations for peace be the readiness of Peru to cede a portion of her territory, it being a necessity to provide Peru and Bolivia with all and every possible op- portunity to offer a fair war indemnity and an acceptable guarantee. 'If these powers fail to offer a reasonably suffi- cient indemnity and guarantee, then it becomes a fair subject for consideration whether such territory may not be exacted as the necessary price of peace.' 7 9 8 "As is seen from the tenor of these instructions, the \yish of the United States was that all diplomatic negotiations re- ferring' to annexation of territory should be postponed, only to be considered in the case of the vanquished republics being unable to pay an equitable indemnity of war. "Mr. Hurlbut was furthermore constituted the active agent in the new mediation and chief Minister cwi the Pacific •coast. "Mr. Hurlbut's proceedings were of a most active char- acter. A few days after his arrival at Lima and on the 5th of August, 1881, he addressed his Santiago colleague, inform- ing him of the intentions of the Government of the United States, resuming the contents of his official note in the follow- ing terms : " '1st. That peace on fair and honorable terms should be .arranged as speedily as possible. " '2d. That the integrity of the Peruvian territory should be maintained. " '3d. That a full, fair and reasonable indemnity ought to be made to Chile for the expenses of the war, adding: The United States are not disposed to recognize, on this con- tinent, the European notion of addition to territory by con- quest. "His reception speech contained similar declarations and, taking advantage of the opportunity offered him by General Lynch, Commander-in-Chief at Lima, he forwarded to the latter, on the 25th of August, 1881, a memorandum which was published immediately afterward and which contained ■the following paragraph : " T wish to state further, that while the United States recognize all rights which the conqueror gains under the laws of civilized war, they do not approve of war for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement, nor of the violent dismember- ment of a nation except as a last resort, in extreme emer- gencies.' "Mr. Hurlbut lost no occasion for making this propa- ganda, and taking the full advantage which his diplomatic 99 representation gave him, he encouraged Peru to prolong the resistance, inspiring her with full confidence in the efficacy of the ultimate intervention of the United States, that was to save her from any dismemberment of national territory, the one aspiration of all Peruvians at that time. "The following telegram shows how the situation created at Lima by Mr. Hurlbut's activity was interpreted by the Chilean authorities: " 'Lima, August 26th, 1881. " 'Secretary of State, Santiago. " 'Hurlbut, the United States Minister, has notified Cal- deron that the United States will, under no circumstances, permit annexation of territory to Chile ; he has also repeated this statement to outside parties. It is the subject of conver- sation here, complicates and endangers our occupation. " 'LYNCH, Commander-in-Chief.' "In the meanwhile, Mr. Kilpatrick, who* was rather sick at Santiago, remained entirely inactive. "The Chilean Government was alarmed by the attitude assumed by Mr. Hurlbut in Lima. Mr. Kilpatrick allowed himself to be interpellated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in reference to the conduct of his colleague at Peru, which he criticised in an unsuitable manner, and, proceeding under the mistaken supposition that Mr. Hurlbut's instructions agreed with his own, he disauthorized the emphatic declara- tions made by this diplomatist, in the name of his Govern- ment. "On Mr. Blaine's receiving information of the false step taken by his Minister in Chile, he sent him an official letter dated the 22d of November, 1881, strongly disapproving the latter's singular conduct, and ordered him to state to the Chilean Government that the President of the United States had decided to send a special commissioner charged to inform it 'of his views upon the deplorable condition of affairs in South America, a condition now fast assuming proportions which make its settlement a matter of deep concern to all the republics of the continent.' IOO "Nor was Mr. Hurlbut's aggressive attitude entirely satisfactory to the Secretary of State, who disapproved the manner of some of his acts. "It was inevitable that Mr. Kilpatrick's conduct should greatly annoy Mr. Hurlbut, and henceforth no understanding between them was possible, and as it became consequently impossible for the two diplomatists to cooperate, it was deemed necessary at Washington to accredit a Special Envoy, furnished with full powers, to the three belligerent republics." MAKING AND UNMAKING GOVERNMENTS. While Chile was obstructing every attempt at peace and avoiding, through her diplomacy, the mediation or inter- vention of friendly powers, her efforts were directed to pre- vent the reorganization of any reasonable form of free gov- ernment in Peru. Her plain object was to present Peru to the world as an impossible factor for self-government — un- able to guarantee any treaty of peace; and in the meantime to take advantage of such a condition so as to further her plans of definitive conquest of the rich nitrate provinces. This statement is no vain supposition of the Peruvians, it is borne out by declarations of Chilean statesmen. Thus, a Cabinet Minister, Sefior Vergara, stated on August 6th, 1881, before the Chilean Chamber of Deputies, that "to cele- brate peace at the present time would signify leaving Peru free to regain in a more or less short time her strength; that, therefore, the policy of the Government of Chile was the wisest, namely: to prolong the occupation indefinitely until Peru should be reduced to a state of complete and irretriev- able decadence." And Deputy Errazuriz, on August 9th, declared: "We should establish our rule in Peru more thor- oughly, obtain from her every advantage, weaken her to the very utmost, and until we get everything which we wish. * * " "The Mint is still standing intact at Lima; the railroad from Mollendo to Arequipa has not been destroyed. It is necessary to destroy Peru without delay; take away the rails, IOI so as to lay them at Pozo Almonte and Agua Santa, or between Parral and Cauquenes. * * * If we abandon Lima we shall lose the revenues from the Callao customs and the other ports to the north, the war taxes, the guano from the deposits at Lobos and Chincha, and we shall revive the alliance which is already dead. Neither Garcia Calderon, nor Pierola, nor Montero, nor any other will sign the treaty of peace which we wish. "On the other hand the war has given rise to new indus- tries for our fellow-countrymen, who stifled in this small territory. Already the occupation pays and leaves a nice sur- plus. The ruin which the crisis had brought is disappearing, and we should now take advantage of Peru and of the booty consequent on victory. The Peruvian customs are endless sources of wealth, they represent five or six millions of dollars to our country. * * * We should not call upon the Peruvian law courts to administer justice; we should ad- minister it ourselves." The following excerpts from Mr. Hurlbut's official cor- respondence with Secretary Blaine tend to show the trend of Chilean sentiment at the time, and how very distant from Chile was the desire to make an honorable peace: "The evidences of an intention to occupy Peru for an indefinite time are multiplying. "The Chilean authorities are preparing a full system of internal government, including judicial functionaries. They are carefully examining all sources of internal revenue here- tofore belonging to Peruvian authorities, and announce the intention to collect all these by their own officials; "It is stated that this new order of things will go into effect on the first of December. The effect of such a declara- tion will be disastrous to all foreign interests in this country and will at once revive war in its worst form. "The custom houses now yield to Chile from nine to ten millions per annum. Add to this the internal revenues, and it is evident, that so far as the Chilean Government is con- cerned, they will make money by the occupation. 102 "The establishment of this policy by Chile means abso- lute ruin to these interests, involving- many millions of dollars." "There is a very decided tone of arrogance, both in the press of Chile and among their officers, born I think of their singular success in this war, which may easily become offen- sive. "The mask which the Chilean Government has worn to cover the real purpose of this war is now removed, and it is openly avowed that peace will not be permitted except on condition of cession of territory. "In looking back upon the whole history of events, prior to hostilities and since, I can have no doubt but that the purpose, end and aim of this war, declared by Chile against Peru and Bolivia, was in the beginning, and is now, the forci- ble acquisition of the nitrate and guano territory both of Bolivia and Peru. "Everything else is made to bend to this purpose, and there is no reality in any pretense of peace on any other terms." It was thus that Chile refused to negotiate with Presi- dent Pierola shortly after the fall of Lima. His plenipoten- tiaries were scornfully treated by Senors Saavedra and Alta- mirano, the peace commissioners appointed by Chile, who when pressed for a reason for such conduct declared their unwillingness to treat with the representatives of an author- ity which they did not recognize, and insinuated the idea that Peru should establish a new Government agreeable to Chile. By this action Chile sowed the seed of the internal struggle which came as a climax to Peru and finished the work of devastation which they had begun. Referring to this very unfortunate condition in Peru the United States Minister at Lima wrote to the State Depart- ment as follows: "It is evident that Chile means to leave Peru in a condi- tion which shall not render her a dangerous neighbor here- after. She will now probably demand the cession, not only 103 of Tarapaca, but of the province of Moquegua, including Arica and Tacna, thus depriving Peru of most of her nitrate deposits and many of her guano beds. And, judging from the tone of the Chilean paper in Lima (the Actualidad), there is some reason for supposing that Chile is now en- deavoring to instigate the government of Ecuador to seize upon the northern portion of Peru, a part of which once be- longed to Ecuador; and I should not be surprised if Brazil, taking advantage of this opportunity, should take possession of a large portion of Northeastern Peru (the best portion of it, but now held by the wild Indians), and that by these sev- eral means the most important portions of Peru should be partitioned among her neighbors, a result which, should it take place, will not be calculated for the preservation of peace in any of these countries." "The Chilean authorities here have definitely determined not to treat with Pierola, at present the only recognized government of Peru, recognized by all the other govern- ments who have representatives here, and by Chile herself by treating with him at Arica. "A movement has therefore been initiated among some of the leading citizens of Lima and Callao, and encouraged by the Chilean authorities, to establish a new government in opposition to that of Pierola (who is still at Tarma or Jauja). And at a meeting of 113 of those citizens a Mr. Francisco Garcia Calderon was, by a fair majority of that meeting, declared to constitute, to use their own language, the 'unipersonal government' of Peru." As Peru was really anxious to reach a definite peace, and to return to a normal condition, the leading public men of Lima, animated by this one desire, resolved to attempt the formation of a government which would command the approval of all Peruvians and inspire respect among foreign nations. To this end a group of influential gentlemen elected Senor Francisco Garcia Calderon, a talented and wealthy lawyer, to fill the position of provisional President. It was K>4 their intention to submit his election and the new govern 1 - rhent by them instituted to the people of Peru, who would Be invited to sanction this government until a Congress could be called together to ratify it or to establish another in some form. No sooner did the Chilean Government see a disposition on the part of Peru to organize a stable government than it began to put difficulties in the way; it was clear, as Mr. Christiancy puts it, that the aim of Chile was to deprive Peru of any recognized form of government, although professing to wish to do so. To this effect the aforesaid American diplomatist says : "Perhaps I ought to add here (what sufficiently appears in my former dispatches), that the principal' grounds upon which the Chilean authorities claim to base the right to adopt this policy of indefinite occupation, viz. : that it has be- come necessary, because the Peruvians have neglected to form a government with which they could treat, and the an- archy which results from this state of things has been de- liberately produced by their own action, and, to all appear- ance, for the very purpose of furnishing a pretext for the policy which they have finally adopted. They could have readily treated with Pierola, who was anxious to treat, and who had been and still is recognized by all the governments represented here, and by the Chileans themselves at Arica. But they refused to treat with him, and encouraged the set- ting up the provisional government of Calderon, and from time to time encouraged that government in its efforts, to some extent, but soon began to treat it with contempt, and to cut off from it one privilege after another, still allowing it to appeal to the people of Peru for their adhesion, and to call Congress together, thus dividing the people of Peru between Pierola and Calderon in a manner which threatened civil war. "The ruse has been successful in producing the result desired, but quite unsuccessful so far as relates to the con- cealment of the true motives of their action." * As the Government of the United States was anxious to bring about a lasting peace between the belligerents, it 105 instructed its Minister at Lima to recognize the Calderon government. In replying to Secretary Blaine on this sub- ject Mr. Christiancy, prior to his return home, says : "Senor F. Garcia Calderon is a wealthy man, and the representative of the Goyeneches, the wealthiest family in Peru. I am inclined, nevertheless, to believe that he is act- ing in good faith to Peru, with the hope of establishing peace, but I do not feel certain of it. If he is acting in good faith, I am satisfied the Chileans are deceiving him. , "Now, on looking carefully at your dispatch No. 143, I see clearly that one of your objects in recognizing the Cal- deron government is to bring about peace with Chile, which implies your desire for the continued national existence of Peru, and does not admit the idea of its permanent conquest by Chile. "But I am now fully satisfied that Chile does not intend to make peace with Peru at all unless driven to do so by out- side pressure. For the grounds of this opinion I refer you to my last dispatch, No. 319, and wish now to say further, that on Sunday last (19th instant) Mr. Godoy, the political representative of Chile here, called upon me at the legation, and we had a free and general conversation upon the whole situation. I remarked to him (as I had before) that I had received instructions from my government under which I might feel authorized to recognize the Calderon government, which I had supposed and believed my government had sup- posed would be looked upon by Chile as rather friendly than hostile to Chile, inasmuch as the Calderon government had been encouraged by Chile. He again repeated that Chile had not yet recognized it. I said substantially that if the Calderon government should succeed in obtaining a quorum of Con- gress it would be strong evidence that it represented the nation. To this he seemed to assent. "I further remarked' that while my government pre- served its strict neutrality, it was anxious for peace between the belligerents at the earliest practicable period; and I thought this might be brought about if a quorum of Con- gress should be obtained, or at least as soon as the govern- ment should be able to get back fully to a constitutional gov-' io6 ernment. To this he replied, 'It will be a very long time be- fore a peace can be settled.' "He did not know that I knew he and the Chilean au- thorities had been coquetting' with the friends and commis- sioners of Pierola. But I could readily see from this, as well as the conversation referred to in my dispatch No. 319, that they did not wish any encouragement or prestige to be given to the Calderon government, except what they might choose to give ; and I could not but infer they were playing off the Calderon government against that of Pierola, for the pur- pose of furnishing a plausible pretext for holding the whole of Peru, or so much of it as they could." When Mr. Hurlbut arrived at Lima he reported the con- dition of Peru to the State Department in the following terms : "I now propose to state to you the difficulties and special hardships which surround the Calderon government in their honest attempt to procure fair conditions of peace. "In the first place the Chilean authorities have never recognized this government in any clear and distinct form. It has, from the beginning, been tolerated, consented to and, in some particulars, aided, by the Chilean military authorities; a procedure on their part which may either be from a real desire to reestablish order in Peru, or more probably to foster a division in the nation, which would still farther diminish' her capacity for resistance. "Pursuant to the resolution of Congress Mr. Calderon named his plenipotentiaries to confer on terms of peace with Mr. Manuel Godoy, the Chilean commissioner. Mr. Godoy has so far declined to receive these plenipotentiaries, and the reason is evident. By reception and the exchange of creden- tials the government of Mr. Calderon would be effectually rec- ognized as the authority in Peru, Godoy then proposed to confer directly with President Calderon, but insisted that the conferences should be of a private character. To this the Peruvians replied that the making of peace was an affair of the highest public nature with which they could only deal in 107 their public character, and reiterated their request for ex- change of credentials. Mr. Godoy has taken time to-day to refer the question by telegraph to Santiago. "It is the purpose of the Peruvians to insist on recogni- tion, and to prolong the discussion as much as possible. "I gather from various sources, and with reasonable cer- tainty, the actual purposes of Chile. "It appears to be the declared intention of the existing government in Chile to make the cession of the 1 department of Moquegua up to the River Ilo, the sine qua non of peace. "To such cession it is simply impossible for any Peruvian Government to consent; first, because public indignation would overthrow any that should so consent ; second, because the constitution of Peru expressly forbids the execution of any treaty which diminishes the territorial integrity or re- duces the sovereignty of Peru; and third, because the posses- sion of that territory by Peru is the only visible means of future support, and of payment of their large public debt. "Yet it is in the power of the Chilean military authorities to extinguish the Calderon government, and thus leave the country to anarchy; and I feel satisfied that if they cannot obtain from Calderon submission to such terms as they are likely to dictate, they will dissipate his government, unless it shall be sustained by some stronger power. "Mr. Calderon says to me that he will not consent, in any event, to the division of Peruvian territory, and that he will endure any consequences. He also says that he is prepared to pay any indemnity in reason, to> twenty, thirty, or even forty millions of dollars, and inasmuch as the Chilean Govern- ment officially states that $30,000,000 is the limit of their war expenses, and that they have received large sums, the indemnity would seem to be abundant. I fear that Peru, alone, cannot hope for endurable terms of peace from Chile, yet although utterly beaten in the war, she ought still to be considered as a nation. "All South America, except Brazil, is opposed to the pretensions of Chile, and all, without exception, look to the United States as the sole hope for the future of Peru, and as the only power capable of checking this greed of conquest. io8 "It is, in my deliberate and carefully considered judg- ment, the proper time for the United States to act as a friend to both parties, and to say very kindly, but very firmly, to Chile, that war has fulfilled all its legitimate purposes; that longer continuance of the state of war would be disastrous to both countries, and an unnecessary invasion of the rights of neutrals, engaged in commerce or owning, as they do, large properties in Peru ; and that a peace honorable to both countries should be concluded as soon as possible, on fair terms as to indemnity. It will be remembered that Chile in the Arica conferences denied any purpose of acquiring terri- tory by conquest, and placed her demand for cession of terri- tory solely upon the ground that Bolivia and Peru had not the means to pay a money indemnity. "Inasmuch as Peru offers to pay and can pay a money indemnity, the forcible annexation of territory ought not to be permitted. By such action on the part of our government we would gain the highest influence in South America, we should subserve the purposes of a truer civilization, and in- augurate a higher style of national and international law on this continent. "In whatever form this may be done, if done at all, it ought to be done very speedily, and as a very serious emer- gency may arise at any time, I should be happy to receive from the Department by telegraph some indication of ap- proval or disapproval of my views. "As I am at present advised, after careful consideration of the instructions given to myself and Mr. Kilpatrick, and the personal conferences held with you, I shall not interfere with Mr. Godoy or his negotiations unless it shall be apparent that the purpose is to crush out the national life of Peru. In that case I shall calmly and strongly protest against such a course, and indicate in distinct terms that such action does not at all conform to- the wishes of the United States, and meets with its disapproval. This, however, only in case the emergency shall arise before I hear from the Department. "I am well aware that the proper channel of communi- cation is at Santiago, but inasmuch as the peace conferences have been undertaken here, I should desire full instructions. tog "The condition is very serious, and demands prompt action if it be the purpose of the United States to save Peru from being obliterated as an independent power. "You may be assured that I shall not precipitate matters, but shall endeavor in all ways to have the preliminary nego- tiations prolonged, that you may have full time for considera- tion and for transmission of instructions both to Lima and Santiago. I close by repeating that no such opportunity for the just extension of American influence in the interest of human- ity has been presented to my knowledge, and that the failure to use it would, in my judgment, relegate the whole of South America over to European influences, which are openly or covertly hostile to the United States, at all events so far as their representatives on this coast are concerned." We will now see how Chile behaved toward the newly- constituted Peruvian Government. And as the intention of the writers of this book has been throughout to give the unbiased opinions of third parties, and to this effect they have based their statements on well-proven historical facts and official documents, I shall now reproduce Minister Hurl- but's statement of these facts, when reporting them to his government, and such official documents as serve to demon- strate the bad faith of Chile : "Since the date of my last (No. 15) events have occurred which demand precise statement, and deliberate considera- tion. "As you are aware, from the correspondence, of my pre- decessor, the dictatorship of Pierola crumbled to pieces after the battles in front of Lima. Pierola himself disappeared. There was no government in fact. "In this emergency, many gentlemen of high standing attempted to reconstruct a constitutional government, and to that end requested of General La Puerta, who was the consti- tutional Vice-President, overthrown by the Pierola rebellion, that he wouM resume his lawful power. This he positively refused to do, on account of his inability from ill-health to perform the duties. The situation was peculiarly pressing, because the Chilean military authorities, on occupying the no city of Lima, had imposed a pecuniary contribution of one million of soles, in silver, per month, and in accordance with their somewhat peculiar notions, had apportioned this im- mense sum on certain private citizens, supposed to be wealthy, in fixed amounts charged to each one, with the penalty that if not paid their property in this city should be destroyed and themselves imprisoned. "With such an order hanging over them it became neces- sary to establish some form of government which might represent them. Praclo, the constitutional President, had run away from Peru before the Pierola revolution was made and has never returned. La Puerta succeeded as Vice-President, was overthrown by Pierola, and, as I have stated, declined to serve. "Garcia Calderon was chosen to act as provisional Presi- dent ; was permitted to act as such by the Chilean authorities ; was assigned a certain neutral zone or space near Magdalena by the Chilean authorities; was allowed to appoint all his ministers and other officers ; to publish decrees ; to assemble hisi Congress ; to keep an armed force of one thousand men, and generally to perform the functions of government. Ne- gotiations for peace were opened with him by Godoy, on be- half of and by the authority of Chile. He was allowed to bor- row money on the faith of Peru, and to issue about eight millions of paper money, out of which he paid a heavy sum in ransom of the city of Lima. He was recognized by foreign nations as the lawful head of the Government of Peru, and as such received official visits, and publicly and openly exercised all the prerogatives of sovereignty. This chain of facts consti- tute recognition by Chile of the Calderon government, fully as effective as if given in terms, and in official communi- cations. "Some four weeks since, Admiral Lynch, the Chilean commander-in-chief, disarmed the Peruvian guard in Magda- lena; but in an official communication to Mr. Calderon, as well as in conversation with me, put this act exclusively on a military basis, giving as a reason the actual or probable deser- tion of the force, which reason I accept, as a proper military precaution. "On the 26th of September, without any notice, he seized the treasury and has it now under guard, and stopped by military order, the payment of all funds of any kind; ap- pointed Chilean officers to collect certain local revenues ac- cruing to the Calderon authorities, and forbade the Bank of London, Mexico and South America, in which the Calderon funds were deposited, from paying over. "Having thus seized the means of living, he then, on the 28th of September, issued the decree and sent the letter, which I forward translated, and enclosed in translation of let- ter from Mr. Galvez to me, thereby virtually commanding Calderon to cease hisi functions, and to surrender all his archives, books and papers. "Mr. Calderon consulted with me on receipt of this or- der, and said very firmly that he should not obey it. Inas- much as it was very probable that this act of disobedience would be pomptly followed by military arrest, I suggested to Mr. Calderon the propriety of making some arrangement by which some legitimate successor could be provided in case he was disabled from acting. To this end the Congress, all of whose members were in Lima, was quietly assembled, and they proceeded to elect Admiral Montero, now in command in the north of Peru, outside the Chilean lines, as Vice-President, thus continuing the constitutional succession. All of these acts are strictly legal, and not only according to the practice of Peru, but to the tenor of the constitution. "I also received from Mr. Galvez, the Secretary of For- eign Affairs, such books, documents and correspondence as he considered essential, and shall hold them in this legation. "These precautionary measures having been adopted, Mr. Calderon replied, under date of September 29th, to Admiral Lynch, in a well reasoned and dignified letter, which I also enclose in print, and in Spanish, as I have not yet found time to translate so long a document. "This letter has been sent by Admiral Lynch to his government, and since that time no further action has been taken, and I suppose none will be, until he receives instruc- tions from Santiago. 112 "I send, also in Spanish, the printed copy of Lynch's reply to Calderon's letter of the 29th. "I am not positive as to the real meaning of these extra- ordinary acts, but am inclined to think that the purpose is to abolish by force all respectable authority in Peru, and especially the one which the United States have recognized. "It is a self-evident proposition that no act of Chile, whether from its civil or military authorities, can in any way operate upon the relations which the United States have maintained, or may choose to maintain, with any government in Peru, nor can any military order prevent my treating with Mr. Calderon as representing the sovereignty of Peru. "I doubt whether the Chilean doctrine, as ex-pounded by Lynch, of the rights of conquerors will go so far as that. Yet, I see in the future no special limits to their possibilities of dictation. "There is a very decided tone of arrogance, both in the press of Chile and among their officers, born I think of their singular success in this war, which may easily become offen- sive. "The mask which the Chilean Government has worn to cover the! real purpose of this war is now removed, and it is openly avowed that peace will not be permitted, except on condition of cession of territory. "In looking back upon the whole history of events, prior to hostilities and since, I can have no doubt but that the pur- pose, end and aim of this war, declared by Chile against Peru and Bolivia, was in the beginning and is now the forcible acquisition of the nitrate and guano territory, both of Bo- livia and Peru. "Everything else is made to bend to this purpose, and there is no reality in any pretense of peace on any other terms." "Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Lima, September 28th, 1881. "Mr. Minister : On this day His Excellency the Presi- dent has received the note and decree, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose to you. "3 "The measures already taken by the commander of trie army of occupation, in first disarming the guard which my government had at Magdalena, and afterward in placing; guards in the offices of the minister of hacienda, and in the public treasury, seizing upon all the funds of the government,, gave reason to believe that the purpose of the Chilean Gov- ernment was to cause all government in Peru to disappear, in order to carry into effect not only the military occupation of Peru, the territory of the republic, but also the complete domination over the country. To-day, Mr. Minister, this pre- sumption is a reality. The commander of the Chilean forces, not only takes the direction of public affairs in Peru, but also> suppresses all national government, prohibits the exercise of any act of sovereignty, and even demands, as if my govern- ment were a dependency of Chile, the surrender of the archives and documents! which may be in its possession. "My government, which owes its existence to the choice of the people of Peru, and has for its rule of conduct respect to the constitution and the laws: my government which, in the presence of this same army of occupation has quietly ex- ercised its functions, finds itself, to-day, compelled to protest in the most solemn manner against this violent act of the Chilean Government which, I repeat, suppresses all national government, and necessarily prevents all negotiation for peace, and tends directly to absolute dominion over the whole republic. "The internal dissension in Peru will be the pretext under which Chile will insist that there is no government with which to treat, but the undoubted fact is that Chile does not wish that there should be any government in Peru with whom to negotiate, as a step to the destruction of the Peru- vian nationality. "In giving to you, sir, the knowledge of such vastly im- portant events, it is with the hope that you will communicate them ; to your government, so that it may plainly appear be- fore America, and before the world, that my government in no respect admits the pretensions of Chile, and that at all times, under all circumstances, and in whatsoever place it may be found, it represents, and will represent, the supreme authority H4 of Peru, until that nation, sole arbiter of its own purposes, shall decide as may correspond to its dignity and its interests. "I have the honor, Mr. Minister, to subscribe myself, your excellency's most faithful and obedient servant, "M. M. GALVEZ. "His Excellency Stephen A. Hurlbut, "Envoy Extraordinaire and Minister "Plenipotentiary of the United States.'' "Lima, September 28th, 1881. "Dr. Francisco Garcia Calderon : "Sir: I have on this day issued a decree, by which I order the suspension of the exercise of all authority which is not derived from these headquarters, except those municipal authorities actually in existence and allowed to continue for the purpose of collecting local taxes. "I take occasion to send to you, with this, a copy of my decree, the terms of which put an end to the government which, until now, has been in existence by our toleration, and presided over by you, and inasmuch as the documents, archives and other effects in possession of the functionaries who have served under your orders do not belong to them, but are public property, I trust that you will take the neces- sary measures to prevent any disposition of them, and will do me the favor of sending to my office, as soon as possible, a list of all of them. "With sentiments of distinguished consideration and esteem, I subscribe myself, your obedient and faithful servant, "P. LYNCH." "Lima, September 28th, 1881. "The General-in-Chief of the Army of the North, Republic of Chile. "Inasmuch as I have this day decreed as follows : "Hereafter in such part of the territory of Peru as is now, or may hereafter be occupied by the forces of the army under my command, no acts of government will be permitted "5 to be done, or exercised by any other functionaries or author- ities than those established by these headquarters. The mu- nicipal authorities, which at present exist, shall, however, subsist and continue tot receive municipal taxation for the purpose of providing for the necessities of local service. "Let this be recorded and report made. "In order, therefore, to give full notice to all persons, let this be published by proclamation, and by notices fixed on the most public places of the city. "P. LYNCH." Excerpts from President Garcia Calderon's reply to the letter of Admiral Lynch, Chilean commander-in-chief , communicating his order suspending the exercise of all civil authorities not appointed by the Chilean headquarters : "Yesterday I received your letter of the same date, in which you inform me that in pursuance of the proclamation, of which you have sent me a copy, you have put an end to my government, and asking me for a statement of the papers, archives and other effects which the officials who have served under my orders may hold. "If I was not in possession of other facts, beside your letter, Ij would have but few words to say in reply to it, be- cause neither the letter nor the proclamation express the real motive of your order. "But the facts which have developed since the disarma- ment of my troops at Magdalena ; the conferences held toward the settlement of peace between Peru and Chile; the taking possession of the treasury offices under my administration, and the publications, both in the Chilean press and the Lima newspaper La Situacion,, explain the motives of your pro- ceedings and make perfectly clear that as soon as the Govern- ment of Chile became convinced that I am not and have never been disposed to sacrifice the territory of Peru in a treaty of peace it began to take measures hostile to me, which have been carried on to the extreme of declaring my government abolished. "So explained, your proclamation has not the character of a simple military measure within the action of martial law, n6 and on this account my reply cannot be short. It is neces- sary that the serious and momentous measure contained in the proclamation should be analyzed in detail, and for this reason I must occupy your attention for some time. * * * "In February of the present year a respectable majority of this capital and Callao, considering that the government of Sefior Pierola had come to an end for reasons of domestic politics, to which it is not necessary to refer here, decided to form a new government, which would satisfy the exigencies of the situation, and appointed me the Provisional President of Peru. "Being in possession of this authority, strengthened by the will of the people, I commenced to exercise my functions, and the most important ones which I executed at the inaugu- ration of my government were the following two: The nego- tiations for the disoccupation by the Chilean forces of the zone within which I was to exercise my functions, and the payment of the war tax levied upon Lima and Callao. "If, on exercising those acts, I had thought that my powers did not derive from the people who have intrusted them to me, but from the Chilean authorities, I would cer- tainly not have agreed to anything nor made engagements of any kind, because I would have had no power to enter into contracts. "This being so, and it being also proved by the foregoing facts and by other facts of public notoriety that my govern- ment was established by the popular will and not by order or consent of the Government of Chile, I cannot accept your proclamation, which declares my government abolished as if it were one of the offices under your orders. My authority derives from the people who elected me and fromi the Peru- vian Congress, who has confirmed and extended my powers, and as long as these two authorities do not appoint another to occupy my place, I am and shall continue to be the Presi- dent of Peru, whatever may be the contingencies to which I may be exposed. "My powers do not, consequently, owe their existence to the toleration of the Chilean authorities, as you state, but they derive from a fountain beyond the control of those au- I£7 thorities. The sovereignty of Peru, which is the source of my powers, is not subject to the authority of Chile, or to speak more correctly, it has not disappeared by the occupa- tion of a part of the Peruvian territory, nor will it disappear if the whole territory were occupied. The word occupation itself expresses it clearly. On the other hand there would be toleration on the part of the forces who occupy the territory if the establishment of a government in the occupied terri- tory were contrary to martial law. In such a case it could be said with reason that its acts were tolerated (not having then the right to practice any). "Martial law gives to the occupants the right to forbid all acts which may make the occupation insecure, and on this account they may forbid whatever may endanger their safety. In accordance with this rule, established by international law and by the practice of nations, you may oppose my having troops and my practicing all acts of hostility. Acknowledg- ing this right, when my troops at Magdalena were disarmed I protested against that act, not because I have the right to keep an army, but because it violated our preexisting engage- ments, and inasmuch as it might imply a rupture of relations with me. But as you declared that that measure was a purely military one, and dictated only by motives of safety, I recog- nized the force of martial law, and I did not insist on my reclamation. I continue, however, occupying without troops the zone of Magdalena, Miraflores and Chorillos, and the authorities appointed by me are to this moment at those places, which your troops have not again occupied. "This fact, apparently insignificant, proves that you and I are perfectly in accord as regards the extent of martial law. I understand that I' cannot exercise in Lima any func- tion which may have the character of a public act or of an act of force, and I abstain from practicing the same ; and you must be convinced that you cannot oppose any acts outside of that sphere, and for the same reason you have not opposed my constituting offices in Lima, transacting business in them, and practicing in general all governmental acts which do> not require a public manifestation as an essential requisite for their validity. n8 ''According to these principles, you have had no right to take possession of the treasury nor to sequestrate the funds which the government possesses in the Bank of London, and which proceed from loans made by the bank itself; nor to demand the surrender of the other offices under my adminis- tration. Those establishments are not of a warlike character, and I myself have no war powers, consequently martial law cannot be invoked for such acts. Martial law is not con- quest ; martial law does not transfer Peruvian territory to the Chilean Government, and consequently in spite of that law I can and must exercise my authority, with the limitations indicated ; and the offices under my administration should and must continue in operation. "To these considerations must be added the fact that many foreign nations have recognized my government as the legitimate government of Peru; and in virtue of that recog- nition I have contracted with foreigners residing in this coun- try obligations which I must fulfill. If those countries had believed that my government could disappear by an order from the Chilean authorities, they would have never recog- nized me. But they have thought that Peru has the right to govern herself, and have established relations with me, and have now the right to require the fulfillment of the contracts entered into with their nationals. "I have, however, stated at the beginning of this letter that my resolution not to cede any Peruvian territory as the basis of the treaty of peace is the cause of the measures taken against me. Even under this supposition it will be easy to show that what is now required of me is not justifiable. "When my election took place, I received the mission to conclude a treaty of peace with Chile ; and from that mo- ment I made efforts not only to know the true opinions of the republic as regards the treaty, but also to study the terms proposed at Arica, and to find out if they were or not reasons strong enough to make them advisable. It does not require a great effort to see that the majority, if not the whole of Peru, is opposed to the cession of territory, and this being the fact, the treaty of peace, in which that cession were stipulated, would produce as a result, not only the overthrow of the U9 government who were to sign it, but also the necessity of undertaking another war. "The first of these reasons, which belongs exclusively to the domestic politics of Peru, does not in truth concern the Republic of Chile ; but the second reason is of serious im 1 port to Chile. To her and to Peru it is of the highest import : ance that the peace concluded should be such that it shall no.t be in future altered, and that hostilities be not again renewed; and as this end cannot be attained by accepting a condition of peace which the republic rejects, I ought not and must not sign a treaty in which, under the name of peace, I should make a legacy of perpetual wars to my country and to the Republic of Chile. "The example of what passes in Europe cannot be air leged to destroy the force of the preceding consideration. On the contrary the extension of frontiers among the nations of Europe has been from the remotest time, and will continue to be in the future, the cause of formidable wars which dev stroy millions of men. In spite of the exuberance of popula r tion and wealth of the European nations, their large perma r nent armies are the cause of immense evils, and these are the natural consequence of the wars of frontiers, boundaries and conquest. If this system were to be introduced into America it would produce sooner or later the ruin of the continent. Our republics are not rich in capital or in popu- lation, as is proved by the fact that all are in need of immigra- tion, and that the least commotion compels them to raise new loans, and to issue paper money. "If, in consequence of her first war, Chile has been forced to have recourse to the use of paper money, of which she was free, what will happen when she shall be obliged to sus- tain two or three more wars, or at least to keep up a consider- able army to maintain the extension of her frontiers. Listen- ing only to the passions of the hour, some may say that the future which I foresee will never be realized; but only ordi- nary minds will think so, and neither you nor the statesmen of Chile will agree with such. "Nations never perish ; reactions easily operate in them, 120 and frequently their reconstruction is as surprising as their fall had been unexpected. "Convinced as I am of all this, and longing' for a lasting peace, I cannot make up my mind to dismember the territory of Peru. I do not wish that my name shall pass to posterity with the stigma of reprobation with which the people of America will brand the man who will legalize among them the fatal system of conquest ; a high feeling of American pol- icy guides me in this case, and compels me not to consent to the cession of territory. "I know very well that these ideas will not be agreeable to a considerable portion of the Chilean people, because at all times popular feeling has been intemperate. But I believe at the same time that you and all other Chilean statesmen will think as I do, because I have believed, and now believe, that your government will conclude a treaty of peace without