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 D 505 .G78G7 1914 
 
 Great Britain and tlie European crisis 
 
 3 1924 026 425 169 
 
Cornell University 
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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924026425169 
 
[Crotvn Copyright Reserved, 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 AND THE 
 
 EUROPEAN CRISIS. 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS IN 
 PARLIAMENT. TOGETHER WITH AN IN- 
 TRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. 
 
 
 im^'M^^A 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PBINTED UNDEK THE AUTHOBITT OP HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, 
 
 By TAYLOB, GABNETT, EVANS, Ic Co., Ltd., 
 
 London, IUadchesteb, and Beddisb. 
 
 To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from 
 
 WTMAN & SONS, Ltd., 29, Breams BorLDDJoa, Pbtteb Lane, E.G., and 
 
 54. St. Mabt Stbeet, Cabdifs' ; or 
 
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 ^ or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, 
 
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 T. FISHEK UN WIN, London, W.C. 
 
 1914. 
 Price One Penny. 
 
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' [Croton Copyright Beserved, 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 AND THE 
 
 EUROPEAN CRISIS. 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS IN 
 PARLIAMENT, TOGETHER WITH AN IN- 
 TRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED UNDBK THE AUTHOEITY OP HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONEKY OFFICE 
 
 By TATLOE, GARNETT, EVANS, & Co., Ltd., 
 
 London, Manchesieb. and Reddish. 
 
 To be pnrohased, either directly ov tlirongh any Bookseller, from 
 
 WYMAN & SONS, Ltd., 29, Breams Boildixgs, Fktieb Lane, E.C, and 
 
 M, St. Mary Street, C.vrdifp ; or 
 
 H.SI. STATIONERY' OFFICE (Scottish Branch), 23, Forth Street, EDnCBiTnGn ; 
 
 E. PONSONBY^, Ltd., 116, Grai'TON Street, Dublin ; 
 
 or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Deiiendencics, 
 
 the United States of America, the Continent of Europe, and Abroad, of 
 
 T. FISHKR UNWIN, London, W.C. 
 
 1914. 
 Price One Penny. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Introductory Narrative of Events 
 
 Table el Contents of Gorrespondence laid before 
 Parliatn^nt ... 
 
 '' List 6f iPriiictpal Persons mentioned in the Coffe- 
 spdhdence, showing their official positidha ... 
 
 Parti. — Correspondence laid before Parliament ••■ 
 
 Part II. — Speeches in the House of Commons : — 
 
 (1) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914). 
 
 (2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914). 
 
 (3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914) 
 
 (4) Mr. Asquith (Augudi 5, 1914) 
 
 (5) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914) 
 
 PAGE 
 
 iii 
 
 IK. 
 
 XXV 
 
 1 
 
 89 
 96 
 97 
 97 
 98 
 
INTRODUCTOKY NARRATIVE OP EVENTS. 
 
 (1.) 
 
 On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the 
 Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left 
 Vienna to attend army manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, 
 he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the 
 town accontpanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through 
 the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke aftd 
 Duchess were killed. 
 
 No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; 
 none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both thfe 
 Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any 
 measures, however severe, which she might think it necessarj' to take for the punish- 
 ment of the murderer and his accomplices. 
 
 It immediately appeared, from the reports of our lepresentatives abroad, that 
 the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsi- 
 -bility for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have encouraged 
 a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina. 
 
 That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these 
 two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the 
 provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the 
 Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 
 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the 
 administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then 
 pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not " detract from the rights 
 of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, 
 however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 
 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of 
 salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular 
 apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian 
 Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a " deep injury 
 done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude, 
 coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly 
 brought about a European war : but after six months of extreme tension she was 
 induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good 
 terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were 
 strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 — successes which were 
 compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Servia grew, 
 Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened. 
 
 (2.) 
 
 In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria- 
 Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on 
 patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to 
 sympathise with its motives. 
 
 But the dangers to European peace which it involved were immediately evident 
 from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took 
 place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial 
 Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." 
 Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost 
 without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign 
 punishment of Servia. There were signs that the popular resentment was shared, 
 and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British aiid also 
 the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed. 
 
 In view of these reports, it naturally became hicurabent on disintei-ested Powers 
 to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice 
 with peace Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, 
 to a less degree also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Govxjrn- 
 ment remained almost e(iually obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an 
 attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7tl) 
 
 A 2 
 
IV 
 
 July the Governmeni were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meet- 
 ing of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only 
 concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propa- 
 ganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on 
 the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of 
 the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian 
 Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening commimication from 
 the Austrian Government, and as .late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian 
 ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in 
 Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of 
 events was necessary or even probable. 
 
 His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It 
 was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that 
 Servia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with 
 the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the opinion of the 
 Russian aiid French — and also of the German — Governments was that the Servian 
 Government was not itself to blanie for the crime, but that Servia must be ready to 
 investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and 
 which was said to have originated in part on Servian soil. Sir B. Grey advised 
 Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambas- 
 sador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More 
 could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Servian terri- 
 tory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known 
 tliata court-martial had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were 
 secret. The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Aus- 
 trian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their 
 own investigations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the 
 assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the 
 Austrian Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, 
 that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remem- 
 bered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Servian 
 Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and 
 had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any 
 action, she would disclose to the public her case against Servia. When Sir E. Grey 
 siiid this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he 
 certainly assumed that Austria woUld act upon some case that would be known : but, 
 as a matter of fact. His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the 
 evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August. 
 
 It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be 
 made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing 
 doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable Bletaent which 
 Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know 
 accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple 
 Entente remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured 
 that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey 
 had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had 
 remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans 
 was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the " Balkans for the Balkans," and it 
 was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would 
 be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Servia was, as the Austrian Ambassador 
 said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, " regarded as, being in the Austrian sphere of 
 influence ' ; if Servia was to be humiliated ; then assuredly Russia could not remain 
 indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St Peters- 
 burgh, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the 
 Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been 
 as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war' 
 a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the 
 European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested 
 auring the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of' 
 years could not be pushed aside in a day. 
 
 (3.) 
 
 9^rJ^V^°I''\'''^'"\ I' """^"^.^^ Austria' decided to allow for the task. On the 
 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and 
 required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards 
 
the elimination from Serrian national life of everything which was hostile to 
 Austria. These demands involred the suppression of newspapers and literature, 
 the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, 
 the dismissal of oflScers from the army, the participation of Austrian ofScialsin 
 judicial proceedings inSorvia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of 
 all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances', 
 and immediate notification of the enforcement of thesemeasures. In addition, the 
 Servian Government was to publish on the front page of the " Official Journal" 
 a. prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her alleged errors, 
 and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ulti- 
 matum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corrobora- 
 tive evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater 
 humiliation. 
 
 Betweien the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between 
 Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the 
 whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and 
 ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British 
 attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum. 
 
 Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular 
 movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the 
 Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in 
 the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government 
 of the Balkan States ; she desired, in the. words recently used by the Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that " the Balkan Governments 
 should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of 
 territory is insufficient ; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be 
 enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that 
 interest; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had 
 nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that, he had no concern 
 in that dispute ; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia ; 
 that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was 
 the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then the peace, of 
 Europe was at stake; and, from the first. Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Govern- 
 ment that he did not see how Rvissia, interested as she was in Servia, could take 
 any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. .The 
 peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as. Mr. 
 Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by 
 a " spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice," — by a " loyal spirit of give 
 and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the 
 agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the Euro- 
 pean crisis. 
 
 (4.) 
 
 On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ultimatum 
 was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that " there 
 would be something in the nature of a time Hmit." He immediately expressed his 
 grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum w.xs handed to him, and he 
 learnt that the time Hmit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German 
 Ambassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless. There 
 was no time to advise Russia or to influence Servia. 
 
 At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, " the key of the situation was to be 
 found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the German Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum; officially, the German 
 Government called it " equitable and moderate," and said that they " desired 
 urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that; but it was no 
 time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had 
 summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh, had said that 
 Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain 
 and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was 
 well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning 
 the Russian Government .stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent 
 to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be 
 called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. " Localisation " was 
 a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and 
 with surprise had come universal alarm. 
 
VI 
 
 During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. 
 Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great 
 Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in 
 pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to ' pass 
 on " the message to Vienna. . 
 
 Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germanys and Ita y 
 should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of conciliation. Italy 
 assented; France assented; Russia declared herself ready; Germany said she had 
 no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening. 
 
 Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were 
 instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. 
 
 But it Was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had 
 expired; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, 
 the 2Sth, she returned to Austria a reply which aniounted to an acceptance of all 
 Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new 
 laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an exjjlanation by Austria- 
 Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Alistro-Hungarian 
 officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply weftt far beyond anything whi&h 
 any Powel' — Gerffiany not eseepted^-hiid ever thought probable. But the same day 
 the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press 
 left the impressioll that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that 
 the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to 
 make War inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply, the 
 Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general 
 mobilisation. 
 
 But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an 
 hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the 
 hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with 
 " passing on " the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German 
 Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the 
 fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards 
 that Servia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were 
 all a sham. 
 
 (5.) 
 
 During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one question 
 before Europe — how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? It was 
 evident that Russia did not believe that Austria nould, or could, stop short of the 
 absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it Here again, 
 the question was not merely one of Government policy; the popular sentiment of 
 two great nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with perfect 
 honesty, that she would take no territory from Servia. But the Austrian Ministers 
 were being borne along on a wave of violent popular enthusiasm. They said them- 
 selves that they would be swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire 
 for Ji conflict with Servia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any 
 mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly 
 said that she would have to intervene if Servia were attacked ; but she promised 
 Austria on the 27th that she would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce 
 the Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria 
 to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying 
 it was too late. She declared war on Servia on the 28th. Russia ordered a partial 
 mobilisation on the 29th. 
 
 But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and 
 French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means towards 
 a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted; Russia said she was ready to 
 stand aside ; but Germany refused. She did not like what she called " a court of 
 arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. 
 These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last paragraph, but they 
 were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Servia. Austria then 
 apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, 
 moreover, refused to discuss the Seivian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see', 
 after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, 
 fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London^ 
 which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister 
 for Fbreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way 
 she would consent to work for a settlement. 
 
vu 
 
 This brings the narrative of events down to AVednesclay, the 29th July, llnasia 
 was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops were bombard- 
 ing Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up 
 to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit 
 that the situation was really seriotis ; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and 
 Trance was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. 
 Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna 
 for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the Ovening of the 28th the German 
 Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna 
 and St. Petersburgh. On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances 
 made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed 
 to Berlin once more, in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, 
 urging the Gei-man Government, if thsy did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' 
 conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. 
 " Mediation," he said, " was ready to come into operation by any method that 
 Germany thought possible if only Germany Would press the button in the interests 
 of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of 
 the 29th. 
 
 (6.) 
 
 This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About 
 midnight, a telemt-am arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador 
 at Berlin. The Gefman Chancellor had seiit for him late at night. He had asked 
 if Great Britain Would pfomise to remain neuti-al in a War, provided Germany, did 
 not touch Holland and took iiothiiig fi-oin France but her colonies. He refused 
 to give arty tindeftaking that Grermany would not invade Belgium, but he promised 
 that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her. 
 
 Sir E. Grey's answ^t was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation 
 and an off^r. The tsusiiiess of Eiirope was to work for peace. That was the only 
 question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by 
 her actions now that she desired peace. Great Britain would warmly welcome a 
 futilre agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be 
 thfflwii permanSHtly into the scale of peace in years to come. 
 
 For the B6xt two days peaoe proposals and iicgotiations continued, some initiated 
 and all Silppoi'ted by Grfeat Britain. There remained a spart of hope. But from 
 the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. Oil the 29th 
 July the only eOiiflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Servia and Austria; 
 the only f^ar of further war had laiii in the relations of Russia aad Austria. 
 Germany's dfeclai'atiotis were pacific; Russia had said she desii-ed nothing but a 
 period of pe&cife to allow f ei- hel- internal developmeht ; France would not fight fexcept 
 to hSlp het ally. There had seemed no insuperable difficulty in- keeping the peace ; 
 it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and 
 St. PetersbUtgh. But liOw a ilew element of danger had been introduced. Great 
 Britain flow kn«W that Germany Was contemplating an attack on FfattSS. She knew 
 mdi-e. The indepiSfideiice of the Low Countries had for centaries been eonsid4fed 
 as one Of the stfongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their pOsitiOii and 
 the natui'e df the country reiidered them the natural battlefield Of Northern Europe. 
 If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade thert, war would become 
 inereSlsitiglV diffidtllt Arid dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fiied system 
 of ihtefnitloii^l law fettnded oh treaties, tke neutrality of Belgium had beSn devised 
 as a pStmatieht safeguafd to this end. As such, it had been couseci'ated by two 
 intefriatioiial ti-eaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations 
 of statesiiien. NOvV, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that 
 Ger^nany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of Ihat peace, 
 
 Germany's pdSitlon must be understood. She had fulfillad Bel' treaty obligations 
 in the past; h6r dotion now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme military 
 importadee in a, war with France ; if such a war occurred, it WoUld be One of life 
 and death ; Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, Fratice might do so. 
 In fad6 of this suspicion, there Was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium 
 had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the oUtbi'eak of wars. 
 Th6 PowefiS must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war nocv 
 threatened. The British Government, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked 
 the German and French Governments for an engsigement to respect Belgium's 
 neutrality, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France 
 gave the necessary engagement the same day; Belgium gave it the day after; 
 
Vlll 
 
 Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there could be no doubt of German 
 designs. . , 
 
 Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and 
 Austria. On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop 
 as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia offered 
 to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with 
 Servia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate 
 from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of 
 Servia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had 
 refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of 
 her ultimatum to Servia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the 
 direction of these discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace. 
 
 (7.) 
 
 At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum 
 to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve 
 hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as 
 history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. 
 All that can be said is that, according to tile information in the possession of His 
 Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia 
 as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in 
 Germany till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that 
 day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir 
 E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should 
 be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh 
 presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia 
 assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the 
 Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be 
 kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation 
 when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxem- 
 burg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the 
 Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was 
 cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable. 
 
 Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Government 
 failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral ? 
 The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the state- 
 ments of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this 
 volume,* and no additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be 
 emphasized. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support, to 
 the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France, 
 Sir E. Grey ha,d consistently dechned to give any promise of support to either of 
 our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a 
 disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be 
 enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side 
 in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European 
 peace lay through a show of force. We took no mobilisation measures except to 
 keep our fleet assembled, and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria 
 on the 27th July, and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to 
 remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our 
 present allies, but to Germany we gave three times—on the 30th July the 31st July 
 and the 1st August— ^ clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our 
 of Bel i m °'^ sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutraUty 
 
 .. 'I"®'' /^f™a"y's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st 
 the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows; "In this solemn hour I 
 wish to assure you once more that I have dojie all in my power to avert war" It 
 
 Euro e ^^s'^ria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of 
 
 Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914. 
 
 • See Part II, 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 OF 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE 
 PARLIAMENT. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 (1) Documents Nos. 1-159 have been published as a White 
 Paper, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) [Cd. 7467]. 
 
 (2) Document No. 160 has been published as a White Paper^ 
 Miscellaneous No, 8 (1914) [Cd. 7445]. 
 
 (3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper, 
 Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) [Cd. 7596]. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 To Sir H. Eumbold 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 Sir H. Rumbold . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir M. de Eunsen 
 
 Communicated by 
 Austro-Hungarian 
 Ambassador. 
 
 To Sir M. de Bunsen 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan . . 
 (Telegr*phjo) 
 
 1914 
 July 20 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen , , 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Mr. Craokanthorpe 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 German Ambassador 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie 
 
 To Sir H. Rumbold 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 22 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 
 Conversation with German Ambassador respecting 
 disquieting situation between Austria-Hungary 
 and Servia. Sir E. Grey assumes that Austria- 
 Hungary will publish her case against Servia 
 before taking any action, and thus facilitate 
 Russia counselling moderation at Belgrade 
 
 Attitude of German Government. Secretary of 
 State prefers not to interfere, and considers 
 that fiustria-HuBgary has shown great forbear- 
 ance towards Servia in the past 
 
 Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
 respecting note to be sent to Servian Govern- 
 ment. Objections urged to insertion of time- 
 limit. Dangers of European conflagratioi) 
 
 Text of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia . . 
 
 Austro-Hungarian note to Servia. Conversation 
 with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. Sir E. Grey 
 deprecates Austrian demands as inconsistent 
 with maintenance of Servian independent 
 sovereignty. . 
 
 Conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs respecting results of M. Poinpar^'s visit 
 to St. Petersburgh. Minister for Porejgn Afiairs 
 and French Ambassador urged that His Majestjr's 
 Government should proclaim solidarity with 
 them. Former hoped in any case His Majesty's 
 Government would express strong reprobation of 
 Austro-Hungarian action . . 
 
 Views of Russian Charg^ d'Affairgs on situation as 
 expressed to Austro-Hungarian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs 
 
 Servian Prime Minister hopes that His Majesty's 
 Government will use influence in moderating 
 Austro-Hungarian demands 
 
 Views of German Government on situation. Ger- 
 man Government defend attitude of Austria- 
 Hungary towards Servia, and consider matter 
 concerns those States alone 
 
 Conversation with French Ambassador respecting 
 Austro-Hungarian note and possibility of media- 
 tion by the four Powers 
 
 Conversation with German Ambassador, who 
 justified Austro-Hungarian action and demands, 
 and urged localisation of conflict. Question of 
 using influence at St. Petersburgh and Vienna 
 in favour of moderation. Ambassador i 
 Servian reply must not be a mere negative 
 
T-ABLE or CONTENTS. 
 
 n 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 20 
 
 21 
 22 
 
 23 
 
 To Mr. Craokan- 
 thorpe 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Communicated by 
 Russian Ambassa- 
 dor. 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie . . 
 „ Sir G. Buchanan 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir F. Bertie 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914 
 July 24 
 
 25 
 
 Sir H. Rumbold .. 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir R. Rodd 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen . . 
 ^ (Telegraphic) 
 
 Mr., Crackanthorpe 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 26 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 Suggests lines of Servian reply to Aiistriar Hungary. 
 To consult with Russian and French Qolleagues 
 as to giving advice to Servian Government. 
 Favourable reply should be given on as many 
 points as possible . . 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to 
 request extension of time-hmit allowed to Servia, 
 and to urge that Austria- Hungary should inform 
 Powers of baisis of accusations against Servia. 
 Recommends similar instructions to HisMajesty's 
 Ambassador 
 
 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has stated that 
 step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatun). 
 Austro-Hungarian Government did not threaten 
 actual military operations. To inform Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs 
 
 French Government have given Servia advice 
 similar to that advocated by His Majesty's 
 Government (see No. 12 ) 
 
 Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests 
 thai moderating advice be given at Vienna as 
 well as at Belgrade 
 
 Russian Government consider that, in view of 
 early expiry of time-limit, it is too late to counsel 
 moderation at Belgrade. Russia prepared to 
 stand aside if mediation of four Powers is 
 accepted. Minister for Foreign Affairs urges 
 that Great Britain should act with France and 
 Rus.sia. Situation will be desperate unless Ger- 
 many can restrain Austria-Hungary 
 
 German Secretary of State admits intention of 
 Austria-Hungary to take military action against 
 Servia. His JlxceUency considers crisis might 
 be localised. He disclaims all previous know- 
 ledge of terms of Austro-Hungarian note 
 
 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs says Austria- 
 Hungary will only be satisfied with uncondi- 
 tional acceptance of her note . . 
 
 Austro-Hungarian press comments show that 
 Servian surrender is neither expected nor 
 desired. Austro-Hungarian Minister will leave 
 Belgrade failing unconditional acceptance of 
 note by 6 p.M. to-day . . 
 
 Brief summary of projected Servian reply 
 
 Russian and French representatives still without 
 instructions. In view of this and of proposed 
 conciliatory Servian reply he has ab^taiAed from 
 advising Servian Government. Probable that 
 Russia has already urged utmost moderation on 
 Servian Government 
 
 Peparture of Austro-Hungarian Minister. Govern- 
 ment has left for Nish with diplomatic represen- 
 tatives . , . . . . . . . . . . 
 
ZIl 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 24 
 
 25 
 
 To Sir G. Buchanan 
 ■ (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir H. Rumbold 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 26 ToSir M. de Bunsen 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 27 
 
 28 
 29 
 
 31 
 32 
 33 
 
 34 
 
 35 
 36 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie . . 
 „ Sir H. Rumbold 
 „ Sir G. Buchanan 
 
 [Nil] 
 
 To Sir R. Rodd . . 
 
 To Mr. Crackan- 
 thorpe. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir H. Rumbold . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir R. Rodd 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie . . 
 „ Sir H. Rumbold 
 ,, Sir R. Rodd. 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 37 To Sir F. Bertie . . 
 
 1914. 
 July 25 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 26 
 
 26 
 
 26 
 
 26 
 
 20 
 
 26 
 
 Refers to No. 6. Approves statement as to atti- 
 tude of His Majesty's Government. Latter 
 cannot do more, but are anxious to prevent 
 war. Suggests that four other Powers should 
 mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburgh if Austria- 
 Hungary and Russia mobilise. German co- 
 operation essential . . . . 
 
 Conversation with German Ambassador respecting 
 question of mediation between Austria-Hungary 
 and Russia. Ambassador thinks Austria might 
 accept it . . 
 
 Russian communication to Austria-Hungary, 
 asking for an extension of time-limit of ultima- 
 tum to Servia, and enquiring data on which 
 Austria bases her demands. He should support 
 his Russian colleague 
 
 Has informed German Ambassador of projected 
 Servian reply (see No. 21), and expressed hope 
 that Germany wiU influence Austria-Hungary to 
 receive it favourably 
 
 Has informed Itahan Ambassador of statements 
 made to German Ambassador (see No. 25). 
 His Excellency states that Italy is anxious to 
 see war avoided . . 
 
 25 Conversation with Servian Minister. Although 
 ready to meet any reasonable demands of 
 Austria- Hungary, Servian Government could not 
 agree to abandon certain political ideals 
 
 25 Servian reply considered unsatisfactory. War 
 regarded as imminent 
 
 Reports conversation with German Ambassador. 
 Latter considers that Russia wiU remain inactive 
 
 Reports sudden return of Emperor to Berlin. 
 German Under-Secretary of State of opinion 
 that Russia will not move unless Servian terri- 
 tory is annexed . . 
 
 German Ambassador at Vienna instructed to pass 
 on to Austro-Hungarian Government hope of 
 His Majesty's Government that they will take 
 favourable view of Servian reply. German 
 Government cannot go beyond this 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes proposal 
 for conference, and Italian Ambassador at 
 Vienna will be instructed accordingly.. 
 
 To ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 will a^ee to a conference in London, and to ask 
 that French, German, and Italian representa- 
 tives at Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade 
 should urge on respective Governments that 
 pending decision, all active military operations 
 should be suspended . . . . . . 
 
 It is important to know if France will agree to 
 suggestion that the four Powers should urge 
 moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh 
 
 18 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 19 
 
 19 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS. 
 
 XIH 
 
 38 
 
 39 
 40 
 
 41 
 
 42 
 
 43 
 
 44 
 
 45 
 46 
 
 47 
 48 
 
 Sir R. Kodd 
 
 Communicated by 
 Servian Minister 
 
 Sir M. de Bunaen . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir F. Bertie 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir E. Gpschen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir E. Goschen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir G. Buchanan 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir M. de Bunscn 
 
 1914 
 July 23 
 
 27 
 
 49 
 
 50 
 
 To Sir R. Rodd 
 
 Sir M. de Bunscn. . 
 
 26 
 
 27 
 
 27 
 
 27 
 
 27 
 
 27 
 
 27 
 
 27 
 
 27 
 
 27 
 
 28 
 
 Conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, who considers gravity of situation lies 
 in conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment that their prestige is involved . . 
 
 Text of Servian reply to Austro-Hungarian note . . 
 
 Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russian 
 Government will not press for more time. Russia 
 cannot possibly remain indifferent if Servia is 
 attacked 
 
 Considers that Austria-Hungary is fully deter- 
 mined on war with Servia . . " . . 
 
 French Government accept proposals respecting 
 conference. Necessary instructions sent to 
 French representatives at Berlin, Belgrade, 
 Vienna, and St. Petersburgh . . 
 
 German Secretary of State is opposed to British 
 proposal for a conference. In favour of direct 
 exchange of views between 'Vienna and St. 
 Petersburgh. Germany's position in the event 
 of Russian mobilisation. Secretary of State 
 more hopeful . , 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversation 
 with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting 
 note to Servia. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 thinks that Entente Powers should present solid 
 front to Germany . . 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided 
 to propose direct conversation between Vienna 
 and St. Petersburgh 
 
 German Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grey 
 desires to keep in touch with Germany so long 
 as the latter works for peace. Germany should 
 urge moderation at Vienna. Servian reply 
 might form basis for discussion 
 
 Russian Ambassador informed of British attitude. 
 Question whether Russia would take action if 
 Austria-Hungary agreed not to annex Servian 
 territory 
 
 Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, 
 who reviewed Servian question at length. Sir 
 E. Grey expressed surprise at Austrian attitude 
 towards Servian reply, which seems already to 
 involve deep humiliation of Servia. British 
 fleet will be kept assembled, but this is no more 
 than proof of anxiety felt in country . . 
 
 Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who agrees 
 in proposal for conference. His Excellency 
 will recommend to German Government that 
 Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Servia should 
 suspend military operations pending conference 
 
 Text of declaration of war by Austria-Hungary 
 against Servia 
 
XIV 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 No. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Date. 
 
 Subject. 
 
 
 
 
 1914 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 Sir F. Bertie 
 
 July 37 
 
 French Gpvenunent agree to proposals of His 
 Majesty's Government for conference between 
 the four Powers in London 
 
 32 
 
 52 
 
 French Ambassador 
 
 27 
 
 French Government in favour of British proposal 
 for conference, and are ready to send instructions 
 accordingly . . 
 
 33 
 
 53 
 
 Communicated by 
 Russian Ambas- 
 sador. 
 
 28 
 
 Communicates telegram from Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs to the eflfeot that Russian 
 Government are in favour of British proposal for 
 conference, failing commencement of direct 
 Austro-Russian conversations . . , 
 
 33 
 
 54 
 
 )! »> 
 
 28 
 
 Communicates telegram received from Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs to effect that German 
 Government appear to have taken no measures 
 to induce Austria-Hungary to modify attitude 
 towards Servia, and suggesting His Majesty's 
 Government approaching the German Govern- 
 ment. Key of the situation really at Berlin . . 
 
 34 
 
 55 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 27 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all 
 his influence at Belgrade to induce Servia to give 
 satisfa,ction to Austria, but Servian territorial 
 integrity must be guaranteed and sovereign 
 rights be respected. He has proposed direct 
 conversations with Austria, but would be per- 
 fectly ready to stand aside if idea of conference 
 accepted 
 
 34 
 
 56 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsan . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 27 
 
 Reports conversation between Russian Ambassa- 
 dor and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs. Russia will be unable 
 to localise war. Russia will restrain Servia as 
 , long as possible, in order to give time for a settle- 
 mefit. Russian Ambassador urged that conver- 
 sations should be continued at St. Petersburgh. 
 
 35 
 
 57 
 
 Sir R. Rocld 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 27 
 
 Italian Miuietpr for Foreign Affairs' views as to 
 conference and suspension of hostilities. Possi- 
 bility of Servia accepting Austrian note in its 
 entirety on recommendation of four Powers 
 
 35 
 
 58 
 
 Sir F. Bertie 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 28 
 
 Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E. 
 Gre.y's observations to German Ambassador will 
 tend towards peace 
 
 36 
 
 59 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 28 
 
 Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His 
 Majesty's Government. German Ambassador 
 has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that 
 Austria-Hungary would respect integrity of 
 Servia, but gave no assurance respecting her 
 independence 
 
 36 
 
 60 
 
 Sir B. Gosphen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 28 
 
 Refers to No. 43. German Secretary of St*te has 
 used similar language to French and Italian 
 Ambassadors. Agrees with his two colleagues in 
 thinking that German Government object only 
 to form of proposal respecting conference 
 Sugg-'sts Herr von Jagow might himself be in- 
 du'. ed 1 1 suggest lines of co-operation . . 
 
 36 
 
TA^Jjie OF CONTENTS. 
 
 ?.V 
 
 61 
 
 62 
 
 63 
 
 64 
 
 65 
 
 66 
 67 
 
 68 
 69 
 70 
 
 71 
 
 gir M. de Bijnsgn . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir B. Bofid 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Mr. Oaekanthorpe 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir E. Goschen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir G. Buchanan 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Communicated by 
 Count Bencken- 
 dorff. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan . . 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 19U. 
 July 28 
 
 28 
 
 28 
 
 28 
 
 28 
 
 28 
 
 28 
 
 28 
 
 29 
 
 28 
 
 28 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs states th»t Austria 
 cannot delay proceedings against Seryia, and 
 would decline any negotiations on basis of 
 Servian reply. Npthing could now prevent 
 conflict 
 
 Gpnversation with Austro-JEfungarian Mipister for 
 Foreign Affairs, who says that war will be de- 
 clared to-day, »nd that no me4iatiou could be 
 jilas appealed to him to place peace 
 
 of Europe first »nd quarrel with Servia second. . 
 
 Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 of substaijoe of No. 27. He is tetegraphing 
 similar instyuotjons to Berlin and Vienna 
 
 Informs of conversation between Servia Chargi 
 d'Affaires 3,nd Italian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. Servift might still accept whole Aus- 
 trian note if certain explanations were given her. 
 Such explanations should be given to the Powers, 
 who should then advise Servia to accept without 
 conditions . . 
 
 Has urged greatest moderation on Servian Govern- 
 ment pending result of efforts for peaceful 
 solution 
 
 Declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against 
 Servia . . . . . . . . 
 
 Befers to No. 43. Proposeql. conference would not 
 be arbitration, but private and informal discus- 
 sion to find a settlement. Agrees that direct 
 conversations between St. Petersburgh and 
 Vienna would be preferable 
 
 Ready to propose that German Secretary of State 
 should suggest method of mediation by four 
 Powers. Will Ifcep the idea in reserve till result 
 of Austro-Bussjan conversations is seen 
 
 Befers to No. 55. Expresses satisfaction at pros- 
 pect of direct Austro-Bussian conversations. 
 Enquires further as to proposed action at 
 Belgrade 
 
 Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that 
 Bussian Government will announce partial 
 mobjiisatiop on the 29th July ; that Russian 
 Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled ; 
 and that jpediatipp by His Majesty's Goyern- 
 mgnt is most ijrgent 
 
 Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who ex- 
 |>ressed anxiety to work in concert with England. 
 Be&sons for German refusal to support propps^d 
 eopference. As Russia had mobiltsed., he could 
 no longer urge moderation at Vienna. General 
 opinion at Berljn that Bussia is unprepared for 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for 
 -oi Sir E. Grey's language to Germaij Ambassador 
 (see No. 46). If Austria crossed Servian frontier 
 Russia would mobilise. Has informed German 
 Amhasisdm that Germiany should use her 
 influence at Vienna , . 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 73 
 
 74 
 
 75 
 
 76 
 
 77 
 
 78 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir E. Gosohen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir E. Gosohen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914 
 July 28 
 
 28 
 
 79 
 
 80 
 
 81 
 
 82 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir R. Rodd 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir R. Rodd . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Mr. Beaumont 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 Informs of Austrian declaration of war against 
 Servia 
 
 Russian Ambassador states that Austro-Hungarian 
 Government have declined Russian Govern- 
 ment's suggestion of direct discussion between 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Afiairs and Austrian 
 Ambassador at St. Petqrsburgh. Russian 
 Ambassador considers conference in London of 
 less interested Powers the only solution. . . . 
 
 Chancellor states it is too late to act on British 
 suggestion that Servian reply might form basis 
 of discussion. German Government had in- 
 formed Austrian Government that they quite 
 understood that latter could not rest satisfied 
 unless guaranteed that demands on Servia should 
 be carried out in their entirety. Austrian 
 Government had been advised to say openly that 
 hostilities had that exclusive object 
 
 German Secretary of State states that any appear- 
 
 anpe of pressing moderation on Austria would 
 
 probably precipitate matters. His Excellency 
 
 . is troubled by reports of military measures in 
 
 Russia and France 
 
 Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates language of 
 Chancellor, and will be very grateful if he can 
 save the peace of Europe. This country will 
 continue to make every effort in that direction 
 
 Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. Has com- 
 municated substance of No. 68 to Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. Mobilisation only directed 
 against Austria. As Austria has definitely 
 declined direct conversations. Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs will suggest to German Ambassa- 
 dor return to idea of conference. Views of 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs on Italian proposals 
 (see Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador says 
 his Government are continuing to exert friendly 
 influence at Vienna 
 
 French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no 
 steps can now be taken to stop war with Servia. 
 Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might 
 remain quiet if Austro-Hungarian Government 
 gave binding engagement to Europe not to 
 acquire Servian territory or destroy indepen- 
 dence of Servia 
 
 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that 
 German Secretary of State might propose for- 
 mula, and that this might be concomitant with 
 direct Austro-Russian conversations .. 
 
 Understands that Austria will not accept any form 
 of mediation betWfeen Austria and Servia. Italian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at 
 Berlin-and Vienna 
 
 Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably 
 beyond the satijak 9rnd the pimitive occupation 
 of Servian territory. Expected assistance for 
 Austrian army from Mussulman population in 
 Servia . . 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 83 Mr. Crackanthorpe 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 84 
 
 85 
 
 To Sir E. GoSchen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir £. Goschen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914 
 July 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 87 
 
 88 
 
 90 
 
 91 
 
 Sir R. Bodd 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir JF. Bertie 
 
 To Sir E. Goschen 
 
 To Sir M. de Bunsen 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 29 
 
 Has been asked by Servian Prime Minister to 
 convey his thanks for statement in the House of 
 Commons on the 27th July 
 
 German Ambassador states that Chancellor is 
 endeavouring to mediate between Austria and 
 Russia. His Majesty's Government urge that 
 Germany should suggest some method by which 
 the four Powers could preserve the peace between 
 Austria and Russia 
 
 German Secretary of State offers that in return for 
 British neutrality German Government would 
 give every assurance that they would make no 
 territorial acquisitions at the expense of France. 
 He was unable to give similar assurance as 
 regards French colonies. If neutrality of Hol- 
 land were respected by Germany's adversaries, 
 Germany would give assurances to do likewise. 
 Operations of Germany in Belgium depend on 
 action of France, but at end of war Belgian 
 integrity would be respected if she had not sided 
 against Germany . . 
 
 In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is 
 passed for fiirthler discussions on basis of Servian 
 note. His utmost hope is that Germany will 
 influence Vienna to prevent or moderate any 
 further Austrian demands on Servia . . 
 
 Conversation with French Ambassador respecting 
 policy of His Majesty's Grovernment. Has told 
 M. Cambon of intention to warn German, Am- 
 bassador that His Majesty's Government will 
 not necessarily stand aside if efforts for peace 
 fail. On the other hand, the present case is 
 different from that of Morocco a few years back, 
 and if France becomes involved His Majesty's 
 Government, who are free from engagements, 
 will have to decide on their attitude in the light 
 of British interests 
 
 Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro- 
 Hungarian declaration of war having rendered 
 direct conversation between Vienna and St. 
 Petersburgh impossible, it is most important, in 
 the event of German Cliancellor failing in his 
 efforts at mediation, that Germany should pro- 
 pose some method of co-operation between the 
 four Powers 
 
 Has warned German Ambassador of possibility of 
 British intervention in certain eventualities 
 
 Has communicated to German Ambassador text of 
 Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto 
 (see No3. 64 and 81). Discussion of question of 
 mediation . . 
 
 Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, 
 who attempted to justify attitude of his Govern- 
 ment in spite of readiness of Powers to assiit in 
 obtaining satisfaction from Servia 
 
XVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 92 
 
 93 
 
 To Sir R. Rodd . . 
 
 Communicated by 
 Count Benoken- 
 dorff 
 
 94 
 
 Sir il. de Bunsen 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 95 
 
 Sir 11. de Bunsea 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 96 
 
 97 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir E. Goschen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914 
 July 29 
 
 30 
 
 29 
 
 30 
 
 30 
 
 30 
 
 30 
 
 Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian 
 Government suggest that German objections to 
 mediation might be met by some change in pro- 
 cedure 
 
 Communicates telegraphic correspondence between 
 himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 and Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (1 ) Austro- 
 Hungaria.n Government have been urged by 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to be moderate 
 towards Servia ; (2) negotiations with German 
 Government through Russian Ambassador at 
 Berlin ; (3) Austro-Hungarian Government 
 decline direct conversations with Russian 
 Government 
 
 In present temper of Austria- Hungary, irrevocable 
 steps may be taken unless Germany with the 
 other three Powers can mediate at once. Russian 
 Ambassador fears effect on Russian opinion if 
 serious engagement takes place before agree- 
 ment is reached. Reports interviews between 
 the Russian and French Ambassadors and the 
 German Ambassador 
 
 Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia 
 could not see Servia crushed, but would ^quiesce 
 in measures that would safeguard Austria- 
 Hungai'y's Slav provinces from further hostile 
 propaganda. Extreme anti-Servian and anti- 
 Russian sentiments of German Ambassador, 
 to whom text of Austro-Hungarian note was 
 probably known beforehand 
 
 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has 
 informed Russian Ambassador that, as Russia 
 had mobilised, Austria must do likewise. No 
 threat meant. No objection to direct Austro- 
 Hungarian conversations being continued at 
 St. Petersburgh. Russian Ambassador more 
 hopeful 
 
 German Ambassador has informed Russian Minis- 
 ter for Foreign Affairs that his Government 
 would guarantee that Austria should r^pget 
 Servian integrity. Russia could not, however, 
 agree to vassalage of Servia to Austria. For- 
 mula of conditions subject to which Russia 
 would stop military preparations 
 
 German Government have asked Austrian Govern- 
 ment whether they would accept mediation on 
 basis of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian 
 troops and issue of conditions from there. Could 
 His Majesty's Government induce Russia to 
 agree to above basis for an arrangement ? Ger- 
 man Seeretary of State says that Russian mo- 
 bilisation J».as increased difficulties of situation. 
 German Government have made no special 
 miiitary preparations 
 
TABLE OF GONTKNTS. 
 
 99 
 
 Sir F. Bertie 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914 
 July 30 
 
 100 
 
 101 
 
 Sir R. Rodd 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir E. Gosohen 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 30 
 
 30 
 
 102 
 
 103 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir G. Buchanan 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 30 
 
 30 
 
 104 
 
 105 
 
 106 
 
 107 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir R. Rodd 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir E. Gosohen , . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 30 
 
 30 
 
 30 
 
 30 
 
 Conversation with President oi the Republic re- 
 garding German communication to St. Peters- 
 burgh as to Russian mobilisation. Russia con- 
 sents to demobilise subject to assurance from 
 Austria to respect sovereignty of Servia and sub- 
 mit certain points in the Austrian note to inter- 
 national discussion. Peace depended on attitude 
 of His Majesty's Government. Pacific attitude 
 of France. A British declaration to support 
 Prance would prevent Germany going to war. 
 Explained difficulty of such a declaration 
 
 German Ambassador at Rome thinks Germany 
 could prevent Austria from making exorbitant 
 demands if Servia would submit on occupation 
 of Belgrade 
 
 Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's Government 
 cannot entertain German proposals to secure 
 British neutrality. For many reasons such 
 a bargain with Germany at the expense of 
 France would be a disgrace to Great Britain. 
 His Majesty's Government cannot bargain away 
 her obligations regarding Belgian neutraUty. 
 His Majesty's Government must preserve full 
 freedom of action. Best way of maintaining 
 good relations with Great Britain is for Germany 
 to work with her for the preservation of peace . . 
 
 Has warned German Ambassador that Germany 
 must not count on Great Britain standing aside 
 in all circumstances 
 
 German Ambassador states tliat German Govern- 
 ment would advise Austria not to advance 
 beyond Belgrade and adjoining territories, whilst 
 Powers urged Servia to give satisfaction sufficient 
 to placate Austria. Earnest hope that this may 
 be agreed to. Suggests change in the formula 
 proposed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 (see No. 97) in order to meet existing situation. . 
 
 To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of telegram 
 to Sir G. Buchanan (see No. 103). Trusts that 
 French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh will be 
 able to induce Russian Government not to 
 precipitate a crisis . . . . 
 
 Conversation with French Ambassador respecting 
 attitude of Great Britain in event of conflict 
 between France and Germany ; encloses copies 
 of notes exchanged with French Ambassador 
 in 1912, and discusses their scope. Cabinet to 
 meet to-morrow 
 
 Austria has declined to continue direct conversa- 
 tions with Russia. Germany beheved to be 
 more disposed to give oonoUiatory advice at 
 Vienna owing to likelihood of British support 
 for Russia and France. Itahan Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs is in favour of working with 
 His Majesty's Government even if idea of dis- 
 cussions between four Powers is impossible . . 
 
 Has asked German Secretary of State if he can 
 suggest any course of action- Latter replied 
 that he was in communication with Vienna to 
 save time. Chancellor was " pressing the 
 button " at Vienna to utmost of his power, and 
 feared he had perhaps gone too far 
 
 54 
 
 54 
 
 54 
 
 55 
 
 55 
 
 56 
 
 56 
 
 58 
 
 59 
 
TABLE 01' CONTENTS. 
 
 108 
 
 109 
 
 110 
 
 111 
 
 Sir E. Goschen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir G. Buchanan 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir E. Goschen 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 112 
 
 113 
 
 114 
 
 115 
 
 110 
 
 117 
 
 118 
 
 Sir E. Goschen . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie . . 
 ,, Sir E. Goschen 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir F. VilUers.. 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir F. Bertie 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir ?\r. cle Bunscn 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914 
 July 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 German Chancellor states that owing to Russian 
 mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. 
 These proceedings had come just when the Czar 
 had appealed to the Emperor and when the 
 latter was about to mediate at Vienna . . 
 
 Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His 
 Majesty's Government to his appeal for British 
 neutrality (see No. 101 ). Chancellor desires time 
 to reflect on it . . 
 
 German Ambassador states that Austro-Russian 
 conversations have been resumed at Vienna and 
 St. Petersburgh. German Ambassador has 
 asked that Russia should suspend military pr.v 
 parations in meanwhile. Has informed his 
 Excellency that his Majesty's Government 
 cannot ask Russia to do this unless Austria 
 consents to limit advance of her troops into 
 Servia. Expresses satisfaction at resumption 
 of conversations . . 
 
 If settlement cannot be reached by direct Austro- 
 Russian conversations, suggests that four Powers 
 should undertake to obtain full satisfaction of 
 Austrian demands from Servia, provided latter's 
 sovereignty and integrity remain intact. Has 
 informed German Ambassador that if Austria 
 and Germany could bring forward any fair 
 proposal, His Majesty's Government would 
 support it strongly at Paris and St. Petersburgh 
 
 German Government are about to proclaim 
 " Kriegsgefahr," to be followed by immediate 
 mobiUsation. Germany preparing for all emer- 
 gencies 
 
 Russian general mobilisation ordered, owing to 
 Austro-Hungarian movements of troops against 
 her. Germany also making military prepara- 
 tions. Russia cannot allow Germany to get a 
 start 
 
 Enquires whether France and Germany wiU 
 engage to respect neutrality of Belgium . . 
 
 To inform Belgium Government of No. 114. Sir 
 E. Grey assumes that Belgium will do her utmost 
 to maintain her neutrality 
 
 French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's 
 Government cannot undertake definite pledge 
 to intervene in war, but that situation will be 
 reconsidered in presence of any now develop- 
 ment 
 
 Informs of German ultimatum to Russia. German 
 Ambassador demands answer from French 
 Government by 1 p.m. to-morrow as to French 
 attitude 
 
 Under-Secretary of State says that mobilisation 
 was not necessarily a hostile act. Austria- 
 Hungary resents Russian intervention on behalf 
 of Servia. Kiissiaii .'Embassador states that his 
 Government have advised Servian compliance 
 with .Austrian demands so far as compatible witli 
 independence 
 
 02 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 119 
 
 120 
 
 121 
 
 122 
 
 123 
 
 124 
 125 
 
 126 
 
 127 
 128 
 
 129 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie ... 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan . , 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir E. Goschen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir E. Goschen 
 
 Sir F. Bertie 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir F. Villiers 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Luxemburg Minister 
 of State. 
 
 1914 
 July 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 31 
 
 Aug. 1 
 
 July 31 
 31 
 
 Aug. 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 Has denied to French Ambassador that His 
 Majesty's Government had given German 
 Government the impression that they would 
 remain neutral. His Majesty's Government 
 could not, however, at the present moment give 
 France any pledge, though further developments 
 might justify intervention 
 
 New formula proposed by Russian Government. 
 Russian Government will maintain waiting 
 attitude if Austria agrees to stop advance of her 
 troops and to allow consideration by Great 
 Powers of satisfaction to be given by Servia to 
 Austria-Hungary without prejudice to her 
 independence. Czar has undertaken that no 
 Russian soldier will cross frontier so long as 
 conversation with Austria continues 
 
 German Government appreciate Sir E. Grey's 
 efforts to maintain peace, but cannot consider 
 any proposal pending Russian reply to ultimatum 
 presented by Germany relating to Russian 
 moliilisation . . 
 
 Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 114. Secretary 
 of State cannot reply to British request until he 
 has consulted Emperor and Chancellor. He 
 doubts, however, whether German Government 
 can give any answer. German Government 
 alleges commission of hostile acts by Belgium . . 
 
 Conversation with German Ambassador respecting 
 the possible effect on British public opinion of 
 any violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Any 
 promise that His Majesty's Government should 
 stand aside definitely refused 
 
 German ultimatum to Russia. French Govern- 
 ment-anxious to know at once attitude of His 
 Majesty's Government 
 
 Neutrality of Belgium (see No. 114). French 
 Government are resolved to respect neutrality of 
 Belgium unless compelled to act otherwise by 
 reason of violation at the hands of another 
 Power 
 
 German Ambassador has been informed that 
 French Government fail to understand reason 
 for German communication respecting attitude 
 of France in the event of a Russo-German war 
 (see No. 117). German Ambassador will see 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening . . 
 
 Mobilisation of Austrian army and fleet . . 
 
 Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium 
 expects Powers to observe and uphold her 
 neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the 
 utmost of her power 
 
 German Government have informed Luxemburg 
 that the German military measures in tbat 
 country do not constitute a hostile act, but are 
 only to insure against attack from France 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 130 
 
 131 
 
 132 
 133 
 
 131 
 
 To Sir E. Gosch'en 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir F. Bertie 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 lau 
 
 Aug. 1 
 
 135 
 
 136 
 
 137 
 
 138 
 
 To Sir G. Buchanan 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir P. Bertie 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir M. de Bunsen 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir E. Goschen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 British merchant-ships have been detained at 
 Hamburg, To request immediate release. 
 Points put deplorable effect on British public 
 opinion if detention continued . . 
 
 Russian Government report readiness of Austria to 
 discuss with Russia and to accept basis of media- 
 tion not open to objections raised in regard to 
 original Russian formula (see No. 97). Hopes 
 that German Government may be able to make 
 use of Russian communication in order to avoid 
 tension 
 
 Russia consents to British formula for basis of 
 mediation (see No. 103) 
 
 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed 
 Russian Government that Austro-Hungarian 
 Government are ready to discuss substance of 
 Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Russian Govern- 
 ment hope that these discussions will take place 
 in Londop with participation of Great Powers, 
 and that His Majesty's Government will assume 
 direction of them . . 
 
 Conversation with President of Republic. German 
 Governmeiit are trying to saddle Russia with the 
 responsibility for present situation. President 
 justifies Russian action. Germany is practically 
 mobilising, so France must also. French troops 
 are kept 10 kilom. from frontier, whereas 
 Germans have made incursions into French 
 territory. French Government do not yet 
 despair of possibility of avoiding war 
 
 Has received, reliable information that Austria- 
 Hungary has informed German Government 
 that she would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for 
 mediation between Austria- Hungary and Servia. 
 Military action would continue against Servia for 
 present, but Russian mobilisation and Austro- 
 Hungarian counter measures would cease. He 
 should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 
 General mobilisation in France ordered owing to 
 German military measures. French troops have 
 left a zone of 10 kilom. between them and 
 the frontier 
 
 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assur- 
 ance that Austrians will respect territorial in- 
 tegrity of Servia, and will not occupy sanjak. 
 Austria has not " banged the door " on further 
 conversations with Russia 
 
 Conversation with German Secretary of State. 
 German Government have ordered mobilisation. 
 Absence of reply to German ultimatum must be 
 regarded as creating a state of war. Russian 
 Governmc^jt will bo so informed 
 
TABiS OF CONTENTS. 
 
 y^w.i 
 
 Sir Q, BBcbanaii . . 
 (TeJa^rapHq) 
 
 140 
 
 Sir F, Bortie 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 141 I Sir M. de Bunsen . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 142 
 143 
 
 144 
 
 145 
 
 Sir E. Goschea 
 
 (TeiegTftphic) 
 
 II II • • 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 II II • • 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 146 i Sir P. Villiers 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 147 
 
 148 
 
 liiwewburg Miiiister 
 (rf State. 
 
 (Telefraphio) 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie . . 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Un8fl.tJs£8ctQry r^sijlt of discussions between Ger- 
 man an4 Aii9tro-Hungari»n Apbaess^ors with 
 the Czar and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 respectiTeiy- Russian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs sstyg that Austrian domination of Servift 
 WQuld vitftUy affect Russia, and that he is weary 
 of his ceaseless efforts to avoid war. Action of 
 Aijstro-Pjjngarian Governjnent and German 
 preparations have forced Biussiaa Government 
 to order mobilisation, and mobiliss^tion of Ger- 
 many ha? created desperate situation. M. 
 Sft»onof would adhere to fonsulft coptained in 
 No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before 
 the Germans cross frontier. In no case will 
 Russia CQiJJmepoe hostilities. Fear of general 
 conflagration in the Balkans 
 
 Freneji Minister for War has impressed on British 
 military ftttache that only way of securing peace 
 was for Great Britain to take military action. 
 Minister of War maintains that France has, 
 by withdrawing from frontier, given proof of 
 her desire to abstain from any provocative act . 
 
 Conveiaation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna 
 respecting Genjian ultimatum to Russia. His 
 Ejccellency thinks that German Government 
 desired war from the first- Explains nature of 
 Bussian mobilisation, and says that Russia had 
 iio intention of attacking Austria. French 
 Awbassador to speak 6amestly to Atistrian 
 Minister for Foreign Afiairs. Anjjety as to 
 attitude of Great Britain . . 
 
 General mobilisation of German army and navy. . 
 
 Detention of British steamers. German Secretary 
 Of State hsiB promised to send orders to release 
 steamers without delay . . 
 
 German Secretary of State says that, owing to 
 certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, 
 Germany and Russia are in a state of war 
 
 Or^lers sent la»t night to allow British ships de- 
 tained in Hamburg to proceed. This as a 
 special favour to His Majesty's Government. 
 Reason of detention was that mines were being 
 laid and other precautions taken 
 
 Belgian Government confirms report that German 
 force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg . . 
 
 Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory are 
 manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the 
 Grand t>ucjiy guaranteed by Treaty of London 
 of 1867. Protest has been made to the German 
 representatives at Luxemburg and also to 
 Gernjan Secretary of State 
 
 Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting 
 protection by British fleet of French coasts or 
 shipping subject to consent of Parliament. 
 Question of despatch of British force to assist 
 France. Effect of violation of Luxemburg and 
 Belgium neutrality 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 No. 
 
 149 
 
 150 
 151 
 
 152 
 153 
 
 154 
 
 155 
 
 ICG 
 
 157 
 
 15S 
 159" 
 
 To Sir E. Goscjien 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir E. Gosohen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir P. VilUers 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir F. Bertie 
 
 To Sir E. Gosohen 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914 
 Aug. 2 
 
 Sir F. Villiers 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir F. ViUi^rs.. 
 
 IGO 
 
 J 01 
 
 To Sir E. Goschpn 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Communicated by 
 German Ambassa- 
 dor. 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir F. Villiers 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 To Sir E. Goschen 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Sir E. Goschen 
 
 Sir M. do Eunsen . . 
 
 Subject. 
 
 
 Sept. 1 
 
 I 
 
 Detention of British steamers. Sugar unloaded by 
 force from British vessels at Hamburg and 
 detained. Should inform Secretary of State 
 that His Majesty's Government trust that order 
 already sent for release of British vessels covers 
 also release of cargoes (see No. 143) 
 
 Detention of British steamers. Eefers to No. 149. 
 No information available 
 
 French Government have Offered five army corps 
 to Belgian Government. Belgian Government 
 reply that whilst sincerely grateful they do not 
 propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers, 
 and will decide later on their action . . 
 
 Communication of. French Ambassador to, effect 
 that Italy does not consider cams faderis has 
 arisen 
 
 Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government 
 have been informed that German Government 
 have proposed to Belgium friendly neutrality 
 entailing free passage through Belgian territory, 
 and of German threat in case of refusal. Belgian 
 Government have declined offer. Should ask 
 for immediate assurance from German Govern-, 
 ment that they will not proceed with threat or 
 violate Belgian territory. . 
 
 Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In view of 
 Belgian reply, German Government have 
 threatened to carry out their proposals by force 
 
 To inform Belgian Government that His Majesty's 
 Government expect that they will resist attempt 
 to infringe their neutrality. His Majesty's 
 Gpvernment prepared to join with Russia and 
 France in assisting Belgian Government to 
 resist German aggression and to guarantee 
 independence and integrity in future years . . 
 
 To demand "immediate release of British 
 detained in German ports 
 
 Assurance that Germany will in no case arfnex 
 Belgian territory. Germany forced to disregard 
 Belgian neutrality owing to knowledge of 
 French plans 
 
 German troops have entered Belgian territory. 
 Liege summoned to surrender . . 
 
 Belgian neutrality threatened by Germany. Un- 
 less Gorman Government prepared to give 
 assurance by 12 midnight to respect neutrality 
 of Belgium, His Majesty's Ambassador is to ask 
 for passports and to say that His Majesty's 
 Government feel bound to take all steps in their 
 power to uphold their treaty obligations . . 
 
 Reports final negotiations at Berlin. Records 
 departure from Berlin and journey to England . . 
 
 Reviews negotiations with Austro-Hungarian 
 Government at Vienna, and incidents upon 
 rupture of diplomatic negotiations. Reports 
 
 departure fro m Vienn a upon declaration of war ! 81 
 
XXV. 
 
 LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE COR- 
 RESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS. 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Edward Grey. 
 Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
 
 " ' " ' Sir A. Nioolson. 
 
 Monsieur Paul Cambon. 
 
 Count BenckendorfE. 
 
 Monsieur de Etter {Counsellor of Embassy). 
 
 Prince Liohnowsky. 
 
 Count Mensdorff. 
 
 Count Lalaing. 
 
 Monsieur Bosohkovitch. 
 
 Monsieur Poitlcare. 
 Monsieur Viviani. 
 
 for Foreign Affairs 
 French Ambassador 
 Russian Ambassador 
 
 Okrnuin Ambassador 
 Ailstro-Hungarian Ambassador 
 Bdgian Minister 
 Servian Minister 
 FRANCE. 
 
 President of the Republic 
 
 President of the Council and Minister 
 
 for Foreign Affairs 
 Minister of Justice and Acting 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 British Ambassador 
 Russian Ambassador 
 German Ambassador 
 Austrian Ambassador 
 
 RUSSIA. 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 British Ambassador 
 French Ambassador 
 German Ambassador 
 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
 
 GERMANY. 
 
 Imperial Chancellor 
 Secretary of State 
 Under Secretary of State 
 British Ambassador 
 
 Russian Ambassador 
 French Ambassador 
 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 
 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Count Berohtold. 
 Under Secretaries of State for Foreign j Baron Macohio. 
 
 Affairs I Count Forgaoh. 
 
 British Ambassador Sir Maurice de Bunsen. 
 
 French Ambassador Monsieur Dumainc. 
 
 Russian Ambassador Monsieur Schebeko. 
 
 German Ambassador Herr von Tschirsoky. 
 
 ITALY. 
 
 Monsieur Bienvenu-Martin. 
 Sir Francis Bertie. 
 Monsieur Isvolsky. 
 Baron von Sohoen. 
 Count Sc6zsen. 
 
 Monsieur Sazonof. 
 Sir George Buchanan. 
 Monsieur Paleologue. 
 Count Pourtal^s. 
 Count Szap^ry. 
 
 Dr. von Bethmann-HoUwog. 
 
 Herr von Jagow. 
 
 Herr von ZimBaermann. 
 
 Sir Edward Goschen. 
 
 Sir Horace Rumbold {Counsellor of Embassy). 
 
 Monsieur Swerbeiev. 
 
 Monsieur Jules Cambon. 
 
 Count Szogyeny. 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 British Ambassador 
 
 BELGIUM. 
 
 British Minister 
 
 SERVIA. 
 
 Prime Minister 
 British Minister 
 
 Austro-Hungarian Blinister 
 
 Marquis di San Giuliano. 
 Sir Rennell Rodd. 
 
 Sir Francis Villiers. 
 
 Monsieur Pashitch. 
 
 Mr. des Graz. 
 
 Mr. Crackanthorpe {First Secretary). 
 
 Baron Giesl. 
 
PART I. 
 
 COHRESPONDENCte LAID BEFORE 
 PARLIAMENT. 
 
 No. 1. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir Hi liumbold, British Charge, d' Affaires at Berlin. 
 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. 
 
 I ASKED tlje German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going 
 on in Vienna with regard to Servia. 
 
 He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and 
 he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. 
 
 I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold,* 
 in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion 
 that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared Up. 
 
 The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia 
 could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. 
 
 I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything 
 until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded 
 presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial. 
 
 The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some 
 case that would be known. 
 
 I said that this would make i-i easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel 
 moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within 
 reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making 
 any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated 
 the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of thom should 
 be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable. 
 
 The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. 
 
 1 am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 • Anatro-Hungarian Minister for iPoreign Affairs. 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 Sir E. Eumhold, British Ohargi d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Beeeived July 22.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, Jvly 22, 1914. 
 
 Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming 
 Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation 
 that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's 
 part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue waS one 
 for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no 
 interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had 
 therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungariau Government should 
 be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on 
 several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasized the 
 extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper 
 footing. 
 
 Finally, his Excellency obserlred to me that for a long time past the attitude 
 adopted towards Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbear- 
 
No. 3. 
 Sir Edward Grei/ to f^ir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna- 
 Sir, ' Foreign Office, July 23, 1914. 
 
 Count MENSDORrp' told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to 
 let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to 
 Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the 
 demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper 
 that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I 
 gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials 
 in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands 
 consequently made by Austria on Servia. , 
 
 As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make 
 any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me 
 probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight. 
 
 But, when Count MensdtJrff told me that he supposed there would be something 
 in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said 
 that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in 
 Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even 
 if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there woulcJ be a prospect 
 of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a. satisfactory reply from Servia. I 
 admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly pro- 
 tracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards ; that, 
 if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public 
 opinion might be less excited, after a v/eek it might have cooled down, and if the 
 Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Governinent 
 would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from 
 Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after 
 other means had been tried and failed. 
 
 Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the 
 murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own terri- 
 tory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she 
 intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never 
 kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disin- 
 tegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself. 
 
 I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had 
 told me this afternoon, but I could not help divelling upon the awful consequences 
 involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not 
 specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what 
 might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable 
 that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it on behalf of patience 
 and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used 
 in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and 
 how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her 
 demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as 
 many as four Great Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and 
 Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expendi- 
 ture of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war 
 would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and 
 industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of 
 things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, 
 many things might be completely swept away. 
 
 Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences 
 of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia. 
 
 I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties siich as this, it was just as true 
 to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it 
 took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, 
 Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly 
 with each other. 
 
 Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the 
 impression that the attitude in St. Petersburgh had not been very favourable 
 recently. I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 
 * Atistro-Hungarian .\mbassadov in London. 
 
No. 4. 
 
 Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for 
 Austrian Ambasiador in London- 
 July 24, 1914.) 
 
 Lk Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
 s'eat vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 do 
 ce mois, par I'entremise du Ministre 
 Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note 
 suivarite au Gouvernement Royal de 
 Serbie : 
 
 "Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de 
 Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son 
 Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Im- 
 perial et Royal la declaration sui- 
 vante : — 
 
 " ' La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas 
 ete atteinte dans ses droits par le fait 
 accompli cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine et 
 qu'elle se conformera par consequent a 
 telle decision que les Puissances pren- 
 dront par rapport a I'artiole 25 du Traite 
 de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des 
 Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage 
 des a present a abandonner 1' attitude 
 de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a 
 observee a I'egard de I'annexion depuis 
 I'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en 
 outre, a changer le cours de sa politique 
 actuelle envers I'Autriche-Hongrie pour 
 vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur 
 le pied d'un bon voisinage.' 
 
 " Or, I'histoire des dernieres annees, 
 et notamment les evenements douloureux 
 du 28 juin, ont demontre I'existence en 
 Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont 
 le but est de detacher de la Monarohie 
 austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses 
 territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris 
 jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement 
 serbe, est arrive a se manifester au 
 dela du territoire du royaume par des 
 actes de terrorisme, par une serie d' atten- 
 tate et par des meurtres. 
 
 "Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin 
 de satisfaire aux engagements formels 
 contenus dans la declaration du 31 mars, 
 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce 
 mouvement : il a tolere I'aotivite crimi- 
 nelle des differentes societes et aflSlia- 
 tions dirigees centre la Monarchic, le 
 langage effrene de la presse, la glori- 
 fication des auteurs d'attentats, la par- 
 ticipation d'officiers et de fonotionnaires 
 dans les agisscments subversifs, une 
 propagando malsaine dans I'instruction 
 publique, tolere enfin toutes les mani- 
 festations qui pouvaient induire la 
 population serbe a la haine de la 
 Monarohie et au mepris de ses institu- 
 tions. 
 
 " Cette tolerance coupable du Gou- 
 vernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas 
 cesse au moment oii les evenements du 
 
 Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, 
 -(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 The Austro-Hungarian Government 
 felt compelled to address the following 
 note to the Servian Grovernment on the 
 23rd July, through the medium of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade : 
 
 " On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian 
 Minister in Vienna, on the instructions 
 of the Servian Government, made the 
 following declaration to the Imperial 
 and Royal Government ; — 
 
 " ' Servia recognises that the fait 
 accompli regarding Bosnia has not 
 affected her rights, and consequently 
 she will conform to the decisions that 
 the Powers may take in conformity with 
 article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In 
 deference to the advice of the Great 
 Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce 
 from now onwards the attitude of pro- 
 test and opposition which she has 
 adopted with regard to the annexation 
 since last autumn. She undertakes, 
 moreover, to modify the direction of her 
 policy' with regard to Austria-Hungary 
 and to live in future on good neighbourly 
 terms with the latter.' 
 
 " The history of recent years, and in 
 particular the painful evenis of the 28th 
 June last, have shown the existence of 
 a subversive movement with the object 
 of detaching a part of the territories of 
 Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. 
 The movement, which had its birth 
 under the eye of the Sei'vian Govern- 
 ment, has gone so far as to make itself 
 manifest on both sides of the Servian 
 frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism 
 and a series of outrages and murders. 
 
 " Far from carrying out the formal 
 undertakings contained in the declara- 
 tion of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal 
 Servian Government has done nothing 
 to repress these movements. It has per- 
 mitted the criminal machinations of 
 various societies and associations 
 directed against the Monarchy, and has 
 tolerated unrestrained language on the 
 part of the press, the glorification of 
 the perpetrators of outrages, and the 
 participation of oificers and functionaries 
 in subversive agitation. It has per- 
 mitted an unwholesome propaganda in 
 public instruction, in short, it has 
 permitted all manifestations of a nature 
 to incite the Servian population to 
 hatred of the Monarchy and contempt 
 of its institutions. 
 
 " This culpable tolerance of the Royal 
 Servian Government had not ceased 
 at the moment when the events of the 
 
28 juin dernier en ont demontre au 
 monde entier les consequences funestes. 
 
 " II resnlte des depositions et aveux 
 des auteiirs tiriminels de I'attefltat du 
 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a 
 ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et 
 eXpltwifs dont les ttieurtriers se trou- 
 v&ient etre mtinis leur ont et6 donnes 
 par des officiers et fonctionnaires sefbes 
 faisaht partie de la " Narodna Odbrana," 
 et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des 
 criminels et de leurs armes a ete organise 
 et effectue par des chefs du service- 
 frontiere serbe. 
 
 " Les resultats mentionnfe de I'iiistruc- 
 tion ne permettent pas &n Gout'erne- 
 meht linpefial et Royal de poursUivre 
 plus longtemps I'attitude de longanimite 
 expectatiVe qu'il avait obsertee pendant 
 des anrtees vis-a-vis des agissemehts 
 concentres a Belgrade et propages de la 
 sur les territoires de la Monarchie ; ces 
 resultats lui imposent au contraire le 
 devoir de mettre fin a des menees qui 
 forment une menace perpetuelle pour la 
 tranquillite de la Monarchie. 
 
 " C'est pour atteindre ce but que le 
 Gouvernement Imperial et Royal se voit 
 oblige de demander aU Gouvernement 
 serbe I'^nonciation oflicielle qu'il con- 
 darane la propagande dirigde centre la 
 Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-a-dire 
 I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en 
 dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie 
 des territoires qui en font partie, et 
 qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les 
 moyenfi, cette propagande criminelle et 
 terroriste. 
 
 " Afin de donner un caractere solennel 
 a cet engagement, le Gouvernement 
 Royal de Serbie fera publier a la pre- 
 miere page du ' Journal officiel ' en date 
 du 13/26 juillet I'enonciation suivante : — 
 
 " ' Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie 
 condamne la propagande dirigee centre 
 I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire I'ensemble 
 des tendances qui aspirent en dernier 
 lieu a detacher de la Monarchie austro- 
 hongroise des territoires qui en font 
 partie, et il deplore sincerement les 
 consequences funestes de ces agissements 
 criminels. 
 
 " ' Le Gouvernement Royal regrette 
 que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes 
 aient participe a la propagande eus- 
 raentionnee et compromis par la les 
 relations de bon voisinage auquel le 
 Gouvernement Royal s'etait solennelle- 
 raent engage par sa declaration du 31 
 mars, 1909. 
 
 " ' Le Gouvernement Royal, qui des- 
 approuv© et repudi© tout© idee on ten- 
 tative d'immixtion dans les destinees des 
 habitants d© quelque partie d©rAutriche' 
 
 28th June last proved its fatal con- 
 sequences to the whole world. 
 
 " It results from the depositions and 
 confessions of the criminal perpetrators 
 of the outrage of the S8th June that 
 the Serajevo assassinations were planned 
 in Belgrade; that the arms and ex- 
 plosives with which the murderers Were 
 provided had been given to them by 
 Servian officers and functionaries belong- 
 ing to the Narodna Odbrana; and 
 finally, that the passage into Bosnia of 
 the criminals and their arffls was orga- 
 nised and effected by the Chiefs of the 
 Servian frontier service. 
 
 " The above-mentioned results of the 
 magisterial investigation do not permit 
 the Austro-Hungarian Government to 
 pursue any longer the attitude of ex- 
 pectant forbearance w'hich they have 
 maintained for years in face of the 
 machinations hatched in Belgrade, and 
 thence propagated in the territories of 
 the Monarchy. The results, on the con- 
 trary, impose on them the duty of 
 putting an end to the intrigues which 
 form a perpetual menace to the tran- 
 quillity of the Monarchy. 
 
 " To achieve this end the Imperial and 
 Royal Government see themselves com- 
 pelled to demand from the Royal 
 Servian Government a formal assurance 
 that they condemn this dangerous pro- 
 paganda against the Monarchy ; in 
 other words, the whole series of ten- 
 dencies, the ultimate aim of which is to 
 detach from the Monarchy territories 
 belonging to it, and that they undertake 
 to suppress by every means this criminal 
 and terrorist propaganda. 
 
 " In order to give a formal character 
 to this undertaking the Royal Servian 
 Government shall publish on the front 
 page of their ' Official Journal ' of the 
 13/26 July the following declaration: — 
 
 " ' The Royal Government of Servia 
 condemn the propaganda directed 
 against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the gene- 
 ral tendency of which the final aim is to 
 detach from the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchy territories belonging to it, 
 and they sincerely deplore the fatal 
 consequences of these criminal pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 " ' The Royal Government regret that 
 Servian officers and functionaries par- 
 ticipated in the above-mentioned pro- 
 paganda and thus compromised the good 
 neighbourly relations to which the 
 Royal Government were solemnly 
 pledged by their declaration of the Slat 
 March, 1909. 
 
 " ' The Royal Government, who dis- 
 approve and repudiate all idea of inter- 
 fering or attempting to interfere with 
 the destinies of the inhabitants of any 
 
Hoiigrie que ce soit, considere de son 
 devoir d'avertir formellement les ofB- 
 ciei'S, Ifes fonctionnaires et toute la 
 population dU royauilie que doienavant 
 il proeedera avec la derflifere rigueur 
 contre les :^6rsoniies qui SB rgndraient 
 coupables de pareils agissements qn'il 
 mettra tous ses efforts a prerenir et h, 
 leprimer.' 
 
 " Cette enollciatibn sera port^e simul- 
 tanement a la connaissance de I'Armee 
 Royale par uu ordre du jour de Sa 
 Majeste le Roi et sera publiee dalis Ife 
 ' Bulletin official ' de I'armee. 
 
 " Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'en- 
 gage en outre : 
 
 " 1" k SUpprimer tbute publication qui 
 excite a la haiue et au mepris de la 
 Mbnarchie et dont la teridaiice geiierale 
 est dirigee coutre soil integrity terri- 
 toriale ; 
 
 "2" a dissoudre imraediatement la 
 societe dite ' Narodna Odbrana,' a cbn- 
 flsqlier tons ses moyens de propagande, 
 et a prooeder de la ingme maniere contre 
 les autres societes et affiliations en 
 Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propagande 
 coiitre la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; 
 le Gouvernement Royal prendra les 
 mesures riectessaires pour que les societes 
 dissoutes ne puissent pas coiitinuer leur 
 aetivite sous uii aiitre noni et sous une 
 autre forine ; 
 
 " 3° a elimiuer sans d^lai de I'instruc- 
 tion publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui 
 concerne le corps etiseignant que les 
 moyens d' instruction, tout oe qui sert 
 ou pourrait servir a fomenter la pro- 
 paganda contre I'Autriche-Songrie ; 
 
 " 4" a eloigner du service militaire et 
 de I'administration en general tous l^s 
 officiers et fonotionnaires coupables de 
 la propagaiide cofttre la Monarchie 
 austro-hongroise et dont le Gouverne- 
 iMent liilperial et Royal se reserve de 
 cdminuiiiquer les noriis et les faits au 
 GoUveriieinerit Royal ; 
 
 " S° a. accepter la collaboration eri 
 Sferbie des orgaiies du Gouvernemeiit 
 Imperial et Royal dans la suppression 
 du faSiivenient subversif dirige centre 
 I'integrite territoriale de la Monarchie ; 
 
 "6" a ouVi-ir Une enquSte judiciairg 
 c6ntr6 les partisans du bbifiplot du 28 
 julu se tfouvant Siir territoii'fe serbe ; 
 
 "dgs erganfes, dllegufe par Is Gou- 
 vernefflent Imperial et Roydl, prendroHt 
 part aiix recherches y relatives ', 
 
 " 7°. a proceder d'lirgence a TarrSsta- 
 tion dii Commandant Voija Tankosic et 
 du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de 
 rfitat sei'be, compromis par les re- 
 sultats de ritistfuctioli db Sarajevo ; 
 
 part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, 
 consider it .their duty formally tc warn 
 officers arid functionaries, and the whole 
 population of the kingdom, that hence- 
 forward they will iJroceed with the 
 utmost rigour against p^rsbiis who may 
 be guilty of such nlachinations, which 
 they will uSe all their efforts to antici- 
 pate and suppress.' 
 
 '■ This deblaration shall simultaneously 
 be comimlnicated to the Royal arniy as 
 an order of the day by His Majesty the 
 King and shall b© published in the 
 'Official Bulletin' of the Army. 
 
 " The Royal Servian Government 
 further undertake : 
 
 " 1. To suppress any publication which 
 incites to hatred and contempt of the 
 Austro-Huugarian Monarchy and the 
 general teiidency of which is directed 
 against its territorial integrity ; 
 
 " 2. To dissolve immediately the 
 society styled ' Narodna .Odbrana,'- to 
 confiscate all its means of propaganda, 
 and to proceed in the same manner 
 against other societies and their 
 branches in Servia which engage in pro- 
 paganda agBjinst the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchyj 'The Royal Grovemtoent shall 
 tfike the necessary, measures to prevent 
 the societies dissolved from continuing 
 their activity under another name and 
 form ; 
 
 " 3. To eliminate Without delay iibm 
 public, instruction in Sfe/Via, both a^ 
 regards the teaching body and also as 
 regards the methods of instruction, 
 everything that serves, or Height serve, 
 to foment the propaganda against 
 Austria-Hutigary ; 
 
 " 4. To. remove from the military ser^ 
 vice, and from, the administration in 
 general, all officers and functionaries 
 
 fiilty of propaganda against the Austro- 
 lingariaii Monarchy whose names and 
 deeds the AUstrd-Hurigarian Governmeiit 
 reserve to themselves the. right of com- 
 ihiinicatirig to the Royal Goveriimerit ; 
 
 "5. To accept the cbllaboration in 
 Servia of representatives of the Austro-" 
 Hungai'iah Government for the suppres- 
 sion of the subversive iiioveinent directed 
 against the territorial integrity of the 
 ifdiiarchy ; 
 
 "6. T8 take judicial proceedings 
 against accessories to the plot of tfe 
 28th June who are Oil Servian territdl-y ; 
 delegates of the AuStrb-ttufagariail 
 GbVeriifiifeilt will take part ifl the investi- 
 gatloii relating thereto; 
 
 " 7. To proceed Without delay to the 
 arrest of Majoi- Voiia Tankositch arid of 
 the individual named Milan Cigaiiovitch, 
 a Sel'viafl State ettl^ldyS, who have been 
 cbriiproilHised by th4 results of the 
 rnagisterial enquiry at Selajevo; 
 
"8° a empecher, par des mesures effi- 
 caces, le concours des autorites serbes 
 dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'ex- 
 plosifs a travers la frontiere ; 
 
 " a licencier et punir severement les 
 fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de 
 Sohabatz et de Loznioa coupables d'avoir 
 aide les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en 
 leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere ; 
 
 "9° a donner au Gouvernement Im- 
 perial et Royal des explications sur les 
 propos injustifiables de hauts fonction- 
 naires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a 
 I'etranger, qui, malgre leur position 
 officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres I'attentat 
 du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des inter- 
 views d'une maniere ■ hostile envers la 
 Monarchie austro-hongroise ; enfin 
 
 " 10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gou- 
 vernement Imperial et Royal de I'execu- 
 tion des mesures comprises dans les 
 points precedents. 
 
 " Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
 attend la reponse du Gouvernement 
 Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 
 de ce mois a 6 heures du soir. 
 
 " Un memoire concernant les resultats 
 de I'instruction de Sarajevo a I'egard 
 des fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 
 7 et 8 est annexe a cette note." 
 
 J'ai I'honneur d'inviter votre Excel- 
 lence de vouloir porter le contenu de 
 cette note a la connaissance du 
 Gouvernement' aupres duquel vous etes 
 accredite, en accompagnant cette com- 
 munication du commentaire que voici : 
 
 Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement 
 Royal serbe a adresse a I'Autriche- 
 Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est 
 reproduit ci-dessus. 
 
 Le lendemain meme de cette declara- 
 tion la Serbie s'est engagee dans une 
 politique tendant a inspirer des idees 
 subversives aux ressortissants serbes de 
 la Monarchie austro-hongroise et a pre- 
 parer ainsi la separation des territoires 
 austro-hongrois, limitrophes a la Serbie. 
 
 La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agita- 
 tion criminelle. 
 
 Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent 
 pas a se former qui, soit ouvertement, 
 soit clandestinement, etaient destinees a 
 creer des desordres sur le territoire 
 austro-hongrois. Ces societes et affilia- 
 tions comptent parmi leurs membres des 
 generaux et des diplomates, des fonction- 
 naires d'Etat et des juges, bref les som- 
 mites du monde officiel et inofficiel du 
 loyaunie. 
 
 Lo journalisme serbe est presque en- 
 tierenient au service de cette pro-' 
 pagande, dirigee contre I'Autriche- 
 Hoiigrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans 
 que les organes de la presse serbe n'ex- 
 
 "8. To prevent by effective measures 
 the co-operation of the Servian autho- 
 rities in the illicit traffic in arms and 
 explosives across the frontier, to dismiss 
 and punish severely the officials of^ the 
 frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica 
 guilty of having assisted the perpetra.tors 
 of the Serajevo crime by facilitating 
 their passage across the frontier ; 
 
 "9. To furnish the Imperial and 
 Royal Government with explanations 
 regarding the unjustifiable utterances of 
 high Sei-vian officials, both in Servia and 
 abroad, who, notwithstanding their 
 official position, have riot hesitated since 
 the crime of the 28th June to express 
 themselves in interviews in terms of 
 hostility to the Austro-Hungariaii 
 Government ; and, finally, 
 
 " 10. To notify the Imperial and 
 Royal Government without delay of the 
 execution of the measures comprised 
 under the iireceding heads. 
 
 " The Austro-Hungarian Government 
 expect the reply of the Royal Govern- 
 ment at the latest by 6 o'clock on 
 Saturday evening, the 25th July. 
 
 " A memorandum dealing with the 
 results of the magisterial enquiry at 
 Serajevo with regard to the officials 
 mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is 
 attached to this note." 
 
 I have the honour to request your 
 Excellency to bring the contents of this 
 note to the knowledge of the Government 
 to which you are accredited, accom- 
 panying your communication with the 
 following observations : — 
 
 On thd 31st March, 1909, the Royal 
 Servian Government addressed to 
 Austria-Hungary the declaration of 
 which the text is reproduced above. 
 
 On the very day after this declaration 
 Servia embarked on a policy of instilling 
 revolutionary ideas into the Serb sub- 
 jects of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
 archy, and so preparing for the separa- 
 tion of the Austro-Hungarian territory 
 on the Servian frontier. 
 
 Servia became the centre of a criminal 
 agitation. 
 
 No time was lost in the formation of 
 societies and groups, whose object, either 
 avowed or secret, was the creation of 
 disorders on Austro-Hungarian terri- 
 tory. These societies and groups count 
 among their members generals and 
 diplomatists. Government officials and 
 judges — in short, men at the top of 
 official and unofficial society in the 
 kingdom. 
 
 Servian journalism is almost entirely 
 at tlie service of this propaganda, which 
 is directed against Austria-Hungary, and 
 not a day passes without the organs of 
 the Servian press stirring un tlioii' 
 
citent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au 
 mepris de la Monarohie voisine ou a des 
 attentats diriges plus ou moins ouverte- 
 ment coutre sa surety et son integrite. 
 
 Un grand nombre d'agents est appele 
 a soutenir par tons les moyens I'agita- 
 tion centre I'Autriohe-Hongrie et a oor- 
 rompre dans les provinces limitrophes la 
 jeunesse de ces pays. 
 
 L' esprit conspirateur des politiciens 
 serbes, esprit dont les annales du 
 royaume portent les sanglantes em- 
 preintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis 
 la derniere crise balkanique ; des in- 
 dividus ayant fait partie des bandes 
 jusque-la ocoupees en Macedoine sont 
 venus so mettre a la disposition de la 
 propagande terroriste contre I'Autriche- 
 Hongrie. 
 
 En presence de ces agissements, 
 auxquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est exposee 
 depuis des annees, le Gouvernement de 
 la Serbie n'a pas crue devoir prendre 
 la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le 
 Gouvernement serbe a manque au devoir 
 que lui imposait la declaration solennelle 
 du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est 
 mis en contradiction avec la volonte de 
 I'Europe et avec I'engagement qu'il 
 avait pris vis-a-vis de I'Autriche-Hongrie. 
 
 La longanimite du Gouvernement Im- 
 perial et Royal a I'egard de I'attitude 
 provocatrice de la Serbie etait inspiree 
 du desinteressement territorial de la 
 Mouarchie austro-hongroise et de I'espoir 
 que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout 
 de menje par apprecier a sa juste 
 valeur I'amitie de I'Autriche-Hongrie. 
 En observant une attitude bienveillante 
 pour les interets politiques de la Serbie, 
 le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
 esperait que le royaume se depiderait 
 finalement a suivre de son cote un© 
 ligne de oonduite analogue. L'Autriohe- 
 Hongrie s'attendait surtout a une 
 pareille evolution dans les idees poli- 
 tiques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les 
 evenements de I'anne© 1912, le Gouverne- 
 ment Imperial et Royal rendit possible, 
 par une attitude desinteressee et sans 
 rancune, I'agrandissement si considerable 
 de la Serbie. 
 
 Oette bienveillance manifestee par 
 I'Autriche-Hongrie a I'egard de I'Etat 
 voisin n'a cependant aucuuement modifie 
 les precedes du royaume, qui a continue 
 a tolerer sur son territoire une pro 
 pagande, dont les funestes consequences 
 se sont manifestees au monde entier le 
 28 juin dernier, jour oil I'heritier pre- 
 somptif de la Monarchie et son illustre 
 epouse devinrent les victimes d'un corn- 
 plot tram4 a Belgrade. 
 
 En presence de cet etat de choses le 
 Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a du 
 se decider a entreprendre de nouvelles 
 
 readers to hatred or contempt for the 
 neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages 
 directed more or less openly against its 
 security and integrity. 
 
 A large number of agents are em- 
 ployed in carrying on by every means the 
 agitation against Austria-Hungary and 
 corrupting the youth in the frontier 
 provinces. 
 
 Since the recent Balkan crisis there 
 has been a recrudescence of the spirit of 
 conspiracy inherent in Servian poli- 
 ticians, which has left such sanguinary 
 imprints on the history of the kingdom ; 
 individuals belonging formerly to bands 
 employed in Macedonia have come to. 
 place themselves at the disposal of the 
 terrorist propaganda against Austria- 
 Hungary. 
 
 In the presence of these doings, to 
 which Austria-Hungary has been exposed 
 for years, the Servian Government have 
 not thought it incumbent on them to 
 take the slightest step. The Servian 
 Government have thus failed in the duty 
 imposed on them by the solemn declara- 
 tion of the 31st March, 1909, and acted 
 in opposition to the will of .Europe and 
 the undertaking given to Austria- 
 Hungary. 
 
 The patience of the Imperial and 
 Royal Government in the face of the 
 provocative attitude of Servia was 
 inspired by the territorial disinterested- 
 ness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 and the hope that the Servian Govern- 
 ment would end in spite of every- 
 thing by appreciating Austria-Hungary's 
 friendship at its true value. By observ- 
 ing a benevolent attitude towards the 
 political interests of Servia, the Imperial 
 and Royal Government hoped that the 
 kingdom would finally decide to follow 
 an analogous line of conduct on its own 
 side. In particular, Austria-Hungary 
 expected a development of this kind in 
 the political ideas of Servia, when, after 
 the events of 1912, the Imperial and 
 Royal Government, by its disinterested 
 and ungrudging attitude, made such a 
 considerable aggrandisement of Servia 
 possible. 
 
 The benevolence which Austria- 
 Hungary showed towards the neighbour- 
 ing State had no restraining effect on 
 the proceedings of the kingdom, which 
 continued to tolerate on its territory a 
 propaganda of which the fatal conse- 
 quences were demonstrated to the whole 
 world on the 28th June last, when the 
 Heir Presumotive to the Jlonarchy and 
 his illustrious consort fell victims to a 
 plot hatched at Belgrade. 
 
 In the presence of this state of things 
 the Imperial and Royal Government 
 have felt compelled to take new and 
 
8 
 
 et pressautes demarches a Belgrade afin 
 d'amener le Gouvernement serbe a 
 arreter le mouvement incendiaire mena- 
 gant la sflj-ete et I'integrite d© la 
 Monarchie austro-hongroise. 
 
 Le Oouvernement Imperial et Royal 
 est persuade qu'en entreprenant cette 
 demarche il se trouve en plein accord 
 avec les sentiments de toutes les nations 
 civilisees, qui ne sauraient admettre 
 que le regicide devint une arme dont 
 on puisse se servir impunement dans la 
 lutte politique, et que la paix europeenne 
 fut continuellement troubl^e par les 
 agissements partant de Belgrade. 
 
 C'est a I'appui de ce qui precede que 
 le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
 tient a la disposition du Gouvernement 
 Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier 
 elucidant les menses serbes et les rap- 
 ports existant entre ces menees et le 
 meurtre du 28 juin. 
 
 Une communication identique est 
 adressee aux representants Imperiaux et 
 Royaux aupres des autres Puissances 
 signataires. 
 
 Vous 6tes autorise de laisser une copie 
 de cette depeche entre les mains de 
 M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 
 
 Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914. 
 
 urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to 
 inducing the Servian Government ix) 
 stop the inoendiai'y movement that is 
 threatening the security and integi'ity of, 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
 
 The Imperial and Royal Government 
 are convinced that in taking this step 
 they will find themselves in full agree- 
 ment with the sentiments of all civilised 
 nations, who cannot permit regicide to 
 become a weapon that can be employed 
 with impunity in political strife, and the 
 peace of Europe to be continually dis- 
 turbed by movements emanating from 
 Belgrade. 
 
 In support of the above the Imperial 
 and Royal Government hold at the dis- 
 posal of the British Government a dossier 
 elucidating the Servian intrigues and the 
 connection between these intrigues and 
 the murder of the 28th June. 
 
 An identical communication has been 
 addressed to the Imperial and Royal 
 representatives accredited to the other 
 signatory Powers. 
 
 You are authorised to leave a copy of 
 this despatch in the hands of the 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Vienna, July 24, 1914. 
 
 Annexe. 
 
 L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le 
 Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo 
 Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat 
 et de complicite y relative— crime com- 
 mis par eux le 28 juin dernier — a 
 jusqu'ici abouti aux constatious sui- 
 vantes : 
 
 1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assas- 
 siner, lors de son sejour a Sarajevo, de 
 I'Archiduc Pran9ois-Ferdinand fut forme 
 a Belgrade par Gavrilo Princep, 
 Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nomme Milan 
 Ciganovio et Trifko Grabez, avec le con- 
 ooui-s du commandant Voija Tankosid. 
 
 2°. Les six bombes et les quatre 
 pistolets Browning avec munition, 
 moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont 
 oommis 1' attentat, ^furent livres a Bel- 
 grade a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez 
 par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le 
 commandant Voija Tankosid. 
 
 3°- Les bombes sont des grenades a 
 la main provenant du depot d'armes de 
 I'armee serbe a Kragujevad. 
 
 4°. Pour assurer la reussite de I'atten- 
 tat, Ciganovio enseigna a Princip, 
 Cabrinovic et Grabez la maniere de se 
 servir des grenades et donna, dans uu 
 foret pres da champ de tir a Topschider, 
 des lefons do tir avec pistolets Browning 
 a Princip et Grabez. 
 
 Annex. 
 The criminal enquiry opened by the 
 Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Prin- 
 cip and his accessories in and before the 
 act of assassination committed by them 
 on the 28th June last has up to the 
 present led to the following con- 
 clusions : — 
 
 1. The plot, having as its object the 
 assassination of the Archduke Francis 
 Ferdinand at the time of his visit to 
 Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by 
 Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, 
 one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, 
 with the assistance of Commander Voija 
 Tankosid. 
 
 2. The six bombs and the four Brown- 
 ing pistols and ammunition with which 
 the guilty parties committed the act 
 were delivered to Princip, Cfbrinovid, 
 and Grabez by the man Milan Ciganovid 
 and Commander Voija Tankosid at 
 Belgrade. 
 
 3. The bombs are hand - grenades 
 coming from the arms depot of the 
 Servian army at Kragujevad. 
 
 4. In order to ensure the success of 
 the act, Ciganovid taught Princip, 
 Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the 
 bombs, and gave lessons in firing Brown- 
 ing pistols to Princip and Grabez in a 
 forest near the shooting ground at 
 Topschider. 
 
, 5°. Pour rendre possible a Princip, 5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and 
 
 Ciabrinovic et Grabez de passar la Grabez' to cross the frontier of Bosnia- 
 
 frontiere de Bosnie-Herzegovine et d'y Herzegovina and smuggle in their con- 
 
 introduire olandeetinement leur contre- traband of arms secretly, a secret system 
 
 bande d'armes, un systfeme de transport of transport was organised by Ciganovic. 
 
 secret fut organise par Ciganovio. By this arrangement the introduction 
 
 D'apres cette orj^anisation I'introduc- into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals 
 
 tion en Bosnie-Herzegovine des mal- and their arms was effected by the 
 
 faiteurs et de leurs armes fut operee officials controlling the frontiers at 
 
 par les capitaines-fronti&ves de Chabac Chabae (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as 
 
 (Rade Popovic) et de Loznica ainsi que well as by the customs officer Rudivoj 
 
 Ijar le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loz- Grbic, of Loznica, with the assistance 
 
 nica avec le concours de divers par- of various individuals, 
 ticuliers. 
 
 No. 5. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir HI. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 
 
 Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading 
 up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.* 
 
 In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to 
 me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short'one at that, had 
 been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Arohduie 
 and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused 
 sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never 
 before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so 
 formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the mainte- 
 nance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it 
 might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials 
 who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia. 
 
 I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with 
 the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The 
 merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His 
 Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in 
 order to discuss those merits. 
 
 I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with 
 other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to miti- 
 gate the difficulties of the situation. 
 
 Count Mensdorff* replied that the present situation might never have arisen if 
 Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Servia had, how- 
 ever, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed 
 since the murder ; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the 
 procrastination on Servia's part. 
 
 I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have 
 been introduced later ; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had 
 been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand 
 for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation. 
 
 • Austro-Hun^arian Ambassador in London. 
 
 No. 6. 
 
 Sir 0. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ 
 
 (.Received July 24.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. 
 
 I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof* to the effect that 
 the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him. 
 
 'Bassian Minister for Foreign Aflklra. 
 
10 
 
 His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and 
 he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian 
 step clearly meant that war was imminent. 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative 
 and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had hrst 
 been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance |ie 
 hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity 
 with Russia and France. 
 
 The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the 
 obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides support- 
 ing Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. 
 
 I said that I would telegraph a, full report to you of what their Excellencies had 
 just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from 
 His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their 
 part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct Biitish interests in 
 Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by 
 British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that 
 the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part 
 of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the 
 problems now at issue. 
 
 In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that 
 his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communi- 
 cation to Austr*a to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs 
 of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to 
 embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it 
 the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria ? 
 
 M. Sazonof* said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at 
 any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this 
 afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably 
 to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to. 
 
 I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to 
 extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to 
 bear on Austria with that end in view ; French Ambassador, however, thought that 
 either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Which- 
 ever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and 
 united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. 
 Thereupon 1 said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far 
 Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. 
 M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that 
 doubtless soine of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia. 
 
 French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to pre,ss me for a declara- 
 tion of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian 
 Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might per- 
 haps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Govern- 
 ments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Servia woiild endanger 
 the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them 
 that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, 
 which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great 
 Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that 
 we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did oreak out; we should have 
 rendered war more likely if -we did not from the outset make common cause with 
 his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government 
 would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria. 
 
 President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, 
 on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria 
 purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum. 
 
 It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if 
 we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand. 
 
11 
 
 No. 7. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edioard G-rey. — 
 
 {Received July 24.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914. 
 
 Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador 
 that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia 
 indifferent. 
 
 Russian Charg^ d' Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal vieTv, that Austrian note was drawn 
 up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was 
 both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied 
 that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian 
 demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. to-morrow. His Fxcellency added that 
 Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken 
 had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objec- 
 tions to what had been done could be raised by any Power. 
 
 No. 8. 
 
 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Received July 24.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914. 
 
 Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Govern- 
 ment, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to 
 induce Austrian Government to moderate them. 
 
 This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early 
 this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious 
 as to developments that may arise. 
 
 No. 9. 
 
 Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914. 
 
 The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circum- 
 stances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his 
 consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian 
 propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts 
 now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity 
 of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern 
 Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into 
 the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at 
 least the connivance of members of Government and army. 
 
 The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially 
 marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian 
 crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great 
 Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed 
 did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was 
 given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, 
 at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great, Servian propaganda 
 has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set 
 the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly 
 evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self- 
 preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in 
 face of this movement on the other side of the frontiei-, by which the security and 
 the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, 
 the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can 
 only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which 
 public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not 
 exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply 
 
12 
 
 with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provoca- 
 tive attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it 
 does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then 
 have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian 
 Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the 
 choice of the means having to be left to them. 
 
 The Imperial Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the present 
 case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria- 
 Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to 
 reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire 
 urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power 
 would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable conse- 
 quences. 
 
 No. 10. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 
 
 After telling M. Cambon* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which 
 I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorfft 
 upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German 
 Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exerciie moderating 
 influence in St. Petersburgh. I would say to the Ambassador that, of' course, if 
 the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria 
 and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it ; but, if Russia took the view 
 of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in 
 Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, 
 to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance 
 of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, 
 Prance, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act 
 together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 
 
 M. Cambon said that, if there was u, chance of mediation by the four Powers, 
 he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed 
 out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russi'i had expressed 
 some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would 
 march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. 
 Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria 
 attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would 
 bo too late for any mediation. 
 
 I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh 
 until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. 
 I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it 
 would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and 
 Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any 
 chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it. 
 
 M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against 
 Servia. The important tiling was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best 
 chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the 
 other Powers. 
 
 I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia. 
 He replied that it was so. 
 
 I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the 
 subject. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 * French Ambassador in London. 
 t Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 
 
13 
 
 No. H.: 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bumhold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 
 
 German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Govern- 
 ment about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the German Government 
 is making the same communication to the Powers. 
 
 I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between 
 Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. 
 Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the 
 situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had 
 expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise 
 moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in view of the extra- 
 ordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and 
 the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was 
 concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone. 
 
 The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, 
 was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work 
 together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation in 
 the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming tlireatening. 
 
 The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia 
 and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Servia ; it would 
 be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to 
 gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless 
 Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should 
 inform Secretary of State. 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky* said that Austria might be expected to move when the 
 time limit expired unless Servia could give uncondition.il acceptance of Austrian 
 demands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative 
 reply must in no case be returned by Servia ; a repl3' favourable on some points 
 must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded 
 to Austria. 
 
 • German Ambassador in London. 
 
 No. 12. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 
 
 Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however 
 subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Sera- 
 jevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express 
 concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian 
 demands as they consider best in Servian interests. 
 
 It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires 
 can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only 
 chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as 
 many points as the time limit allows. 
 
 Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's (Jovernment will express 
 their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said 
 above, and I do not Kke to say even that without knowing what is being said at 
 Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your 
 French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed 
 above, to Servian Government. 
 
 I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate 
 military action. 
 
14 
 
 No. 13. 
 'Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25. 
 
 M. SazoNof telegraphie au Charge 
 d' Affaires d© Russie a Vienne en date du 
 ll (24) juillet, 1914 : 
 
 " La communication du Gouvernement 
 austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lende- 
 main de la presentation de I'ultimatum a 
 Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un 
 delai tout a fait insuffisant pour entre- 
 prendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour 
 I'aplanissement des complications surgies. 
 
 " Pour prevenir les consequences incal- 
 culables et egalement nefastes pour 
 toutes les Puissances qui i>euvent suivre 
 le mode d' action du Gouvernement 
 austro-hongrois, il nous parait indispens- 
 able qu'avant tout le delai donne a la 
 Serbia pour repondre soit prolonge. 
 L'Autriche-Hongrie, se declarant dis- 
 posee a informer les Puissances des don- 
 nees de I'enquete sur lesquelles le 
 Gouvernement Imperial et Royal base ses 
 accusations, devrait leur donner egale- 
 ment le temps de s'en rendre compte. 
 
 " En ce cas, si les Puissances se oon- 
 vainquaient du bien-fonde de certaines 
 des exigences autrichiennes, elles se 
 trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir 
 au Gouvernement serbe des conscils en 
 consequence. 
 
 " Un refus de prolonger le terme de 
 I'ultimatum priverait de toute portee la 
 demarche du Gouvernemeut austro- 
 hongrois aupres des Puissances et se 
 trouverait en contradiction avec les bases 
 meme des relations internationales. 
 
 " Le Prince Koudachef est charge de 
 communiquer ce qui precede au Cabinet 
 de Vienne." 
 
 M. Sazonof espere que le Gouverne- 
 ment de Sa Majeste britannique adherera 
 au point de vue expose, et il exprime 
 I'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien 
 munir 1' Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a 
 Vienne d' instructions conformes. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 M. Sazonop telegraphs to the Russian 
 Charge d' Affaires at Vienna on the 11th 
 (24th) July, 1914 : 
 
 " The communication made by Austria- 
 Hungary to the Powers the day after the 
 presentation of the ultimatum at Bel- 
 grade leaves a period to the Powers 
 which is quite insufficient to enable them 
 to take any steps which might help to 
 smooth away the difficulties that have 
 arisen. 
 
 " In order to prevent the conse- 
 quences, equally incalculable and fatal 
 to all the Powers, which may result from 
 the course of action followed by the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems 
 to us to be above all essential that the 
 period allowed for the Servian reply 
 should be extended. Austria-Hungary, 
 having declared her readiness to inform 
 the Powers of the results of the enquiry 
 upon which the Imperial and Royal 
 Government base their accusations, 
 should equally allow them sufficient time 
 to study them. 
 
 " In this case, if the Powers were con- 
 vinced that certain of the Austrian 
 demands were well founded, they would 
 be in a position to offer advice to the 
 Servian Government. 
 
 " A refusal to prolong the term of the 
 ultimatum would render nugatory the 
 proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government to the Powers, and would be 
 in contradiction to the very bases of 
 international relations. 
 
 " Prince Kudachef is instructed to 
 communicate the above to the Cabinet at 
 Vienna." 
 
 M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic 
 Majesty's Government will adhei'e to the 
 point of view set forth above, and he 
 trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way 
 to furnish similar instructions to the 
 British Ambassador at Vienna. 
 
 No. 14. 
 
 Sir Edward Orey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 
 
 Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken 
 at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche with a time limit, and that if the 
 Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military prepara- 
 tions, not operations. 
 
 In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at 
 Paris (St. Petersburgh), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as 
 possible ; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute. 
 
15 
 
 No. 15. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Beceived 
 
 July 25.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. 
 
 I LBAEN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have 
 not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your 
 telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given 
 similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yester- 
 day, t 
 
 • See No. 14. t See No. 12. 
 
 No. 16. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received 
 
 July 25.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. 
 
 Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to makeexcept that modes- 
 rating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. He hopes that the 
 Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be suflSciently favour- 
 able to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He 
 says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the 
 Austrian demands in their entirety. 
 
 No. 17. 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan, Bntish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 {Received July 25.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914. 
 
 I s.\w the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his 
 Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this afternoon 
 I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested 
 should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yester- 
 day to Belgrade, t 
 
 The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explana- 
 tions of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information 
 which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his 
 Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a 
 communication, as the time limit expires this evening. 
 
 The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had 
 suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State 
 could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the 
 Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Aiistrians attacking Servia, 
 the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into 
 the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. 
 His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the 
 question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 
 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to 
 Austria, but to the Powers. 
 
 If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand 
 aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. 
 It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to 
 arbitration. 
 
 On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by 
 mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his 
 Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would 
 take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed 
 against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, 
 •See No. 14. t See No. 12. 
 
16 
 
 and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really 
 wanted w^rj but her attitude was decided by ours, If we took our stand firmly with 
 Prance and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood 
 would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. 
 
 I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to 
 better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might 
 one day be converted into an ally, tharn if she were to declare herself Russia's aljy 
 at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she 
 could count upon our neutrality. 
 
 I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 
 warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere 
 mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war 
 at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia 
 and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the 
 support of Prance, she will face aU the risks of war. He assured me once more that 
 he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain 
 Austria I could regard the situation as desperate. 
 
 No. 18. 
 iS'ir H. Itumhold, British Charge, d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Mdward Grey. — 
 
 {Iteceived July 25.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914. 
 
 YoTjE telegram of the 24th July* acted on. 
 
 Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from 
 German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at 
 Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Poreign Affairs your suggestion for an 
 extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it 
 appeared from press that Count Berchtoldt is at Ischl, and Secretary of State 
 thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and diflSculty in getting 
 time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria- 
 Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Au^tro-Hungarian 
 Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to takfe 
 military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow cer- 
 tain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. 
 
 Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count 
 Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna, and had told him that 
 Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, 
 in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether 
 it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would 
 dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not, He remained 
 of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this 
 morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic 
 view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to 
 understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do 
 all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and 
 Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to 
 the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 
 
 Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left mucb to be 
 desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had 
 been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no 
 such knowledge. 
 
 " See No. 11. t Austro-Hungarian Minieter (or Foreisu Affairs. 
 
 No. 19. 
 
 Sir B. liodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Edward Grey.^^Beceivcd 
 
 July 25.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 25, 1914. 
 
 I SAW the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the sug- 
 gestion that Francei, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. 
 
17 
 
 Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia 
 become menacing. 
 
 In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance 
 by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria 
 intends to seize the Salonica Railway. 
 
 No. 20. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Orey. — 
 
 {Beceived July 25.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 
 
 Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of 
 Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the 
 Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing un- 
 conditional acceptance of note at 6 p.m. to-day. 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to 
 the Emperor Servian reply when it comes. 
 
 No. 21. 
 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Beceived July 25.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 
 
 The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I 
 am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be 
 most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is 
 possible. 
 
 The following is a brief summary of the projected reply : — 
 
 The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the 
 "Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Govern- 
 ment declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as 
 the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with inter- 
 national usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who cau De 
 clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to 
 in the Austrian note. They aj-e prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana. 
 
 The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want 
 war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the 
 Servian reply. 
 
 No. 22. 
 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Beceived July 25.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, 
 and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views. 
 
 They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of 
 this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now 
 abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government. 
 
 I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged 
 the utmost moderation on the Servian Government. 
 
 No. 23. 
 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
 
 (Beceived July 25.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 
 
 The Austrian Minister left at 6.30. 
 
 The Government have left for Nish, where the Skuptchina* will meet on Monday. 
 I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge 
 
 of the archives. 
 
 • The Servian Parliament. 
 
18 
 
 No. 24. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Amiassador at St. Petersburgh. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 
 
 You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His 
 Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported an your 
 telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government. 
 
 I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going 
 to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development 
 of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it. 
 
 The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche makes 
 it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have 
 mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, 
 is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Govern- 
 ments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna 
 and St. Petersburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, 
 I feel strongly that France and ourselves .should act upon it. Italy would no doubt 
 gladly co-operate. 
 
 No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia 
 or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. 
 The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential. 
 
 •See No. 6. 
 
 No, 25. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bumhold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 
 
 The Austi'ian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian 
 method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break oif diplomatic 
 relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In 
 inf oi-ming ■ the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of 
 mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday 
 should be delayed. 
 
 Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria 
 and Russia. The only chance of peac-e, if this did happen, would be for Germany, 
 France, Russia, and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and 
 Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters 
 between them. 
 
 The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office 
 saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than 
 other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once 
 she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky* said, 
 however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, 
 Austria might be able with dignity to accept it He expressed himself as personally 
 favourable to this suggestion. 
 
 I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene 
 between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between 
 Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a 
 hand. 
 
 I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian 
 mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic 
 action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travel- 
 ling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore 
 be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed^ with 
 my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing 
 to act upon it. 
 
 * German Ambaasador ia Loudon. 
 
19 
 
 No. 26. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 
 
 The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which 
 his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions 
 to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs : — 
 
 " The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are pre- 
 vented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. 
 The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the 
 time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers 
 of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Govern- 
 ment hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may 
 examine the matter. If thtey found that some of the Austrian requests were weU 
 founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. 
 If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only 
 would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their 
 communication to the Powers of any practical meaning." 
 
 You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague. 
 
 Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been 
 a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were 
 to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military prepara^ 
 tions, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time 
 in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable 
 steps. 
 
 No. 27. . 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Bumbold, 
 British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador 
 at St. Petersburgh. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply 
 contained in Mr. Orackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.* I have said that, if Servian 
 reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German 
 Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable 
 view of it. 
 
 •See No. 21. 
 
 No. 28. 
 [Nil.] 
 
 No. 29. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at Bome. 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 
 
 The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms 
 what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning. 
 
 The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the 
 fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 E. GREY. 
 
 No. 30. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crachanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade. 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 
 
 The Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant .and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson* 
 on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary. 
 • British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
 
20 
 
 He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were 
 perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as 
 such demands were kept on the " terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry 
 at Serajevo — an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy — disclosed 
 the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian 
 territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps 
 to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political 
 ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a 
 radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent 
 State would, or could, submit to such dictation. 
 
 * He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects — 
 Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, 
 considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying 
 to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was 
 an innocent and harmless individual. 
 
 Sir A. Nioolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch* his opinion on the whole 
 question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, thoi gh it was to 
 ,be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian 
 demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GBEY. 
 * Servian Minister in London. 
 
 No. 31. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Beceived July 26.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 
 
 Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, 
 ai'd the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be 
 i'.iiminent. 
 
 No. 32. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 {Received July 26.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 
 
 AccoRDiNO to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet 
 during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Himgary is resolved to inflict, ha,ving 
 received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. 
 In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by 
 public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything 
 depended on the personality of the Rus.=ian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could 
 resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of u. few newspapers. He pointed out that 
 the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly 
 quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, 
 be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier 
 questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, 
 Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, 
 was not at all in a condition for facing a war. 
 
 I repKed that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers 
 by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally 
 sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner 
 of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, 
 according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to 
 Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, 
 however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted 
 Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she 
 made any such claim. As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about 
 in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. 
 
21 
 
 The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the 
 German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian 
 concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been 
 informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the 
 Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia 
 had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were 
 all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insuSBoient to satisfy 
 the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her 
 offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade. 
 
 No. 33. 
 
 Sir H. Bumhold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Eduard Grey. — 
 
 (Beceired July 26.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. 
 
 Empkkor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that 
 Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. 
 They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excite- 
 ment. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. 
 Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia 
 would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia 
 would not act if Austria did not annex territory. 
 
 No. 34. 
 
 Sir H. Bumhold, British Chargi d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 {Beceired July 26.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. 
 
 Undek-Skoret.iry of state has just telephoned to me to say that German 
 Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corre- 
 sponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.* 
 
 Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communica- 
 tion to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a 
 certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going 
 beyond this. 
 
 •See No. 21. 
 
 No. 35. 
 
 Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Eduard Grey. — (Beceired July 26.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 26, 1914. 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will 
 instruct Italian Ambassador^ to-night accordingly. 
 
 Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that 
 Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration 
 of war. 
 
 No. 36. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Bumhold, 
 British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at 
 Borne. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. 
 
 WoTTLD Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here 
 to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet 
 here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would 
 prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he 
 would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the 
 Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, 
 and St. Petersburgh should be authorised to request that all active military opera- 
 tions should be suspended pending results of conference. 
 
22 
 
 No. 37. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Amhassador at Paris. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. 
 
 Beklin telegram of 25lh July.* 
 
 It is important to know if Prance will agree to suggested action by the four 
 Powers if necessary. 
 
 •See No. 18. 
 
 No. 38. 
 
 Sir li. Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Beceived July 27.) 
 . Sir, Borne, July 23, 1914. 
 
 I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms 
 of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom 
 I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Oflfice, took the view that the gravity of 
 the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it 
 was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the 
 turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success. 
 
 I have, &c. 
 
 RENNELL RODD. 
 
 No. 39. 
 Beply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. — (Communicated bj/ the 
 
 Servian Minister, July 27.) 
 
 (Translation.) 
 The Royal Servian Governmenu nave 
 received the communication of the Impe- 
 rial and Royal Government of the 10th 
 instant,* and are convinced that their 
 reply will remove any misunderstanding 
 which may threaten to impair the good 
 neighbourly relations between the Aus- 
 tro-Hungarian Monaichy and the King- 
 dom of Servia. 
 
 Conscious of the fact that the protests 
 which were made both from the tribune 
 of the national Skuptchinat and in the 
 declarations and actions of the respon- 
 sible representatives of the State — pro- 
 tests which were cut short by the declara- 
 tions made by the Servian Government 
 on the 18th* March, 1909 — have not been 
 renewed on any occasion as regards the 
 
 Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a regu 
 la communication du Gouvernement 
 Imperial et Royal du *10 de ce mois et 
 il est persuade que sa reponse eloignera 
 tout malentendu qui menace de gater 
 les bons rapports de voisinage entre la 
 Monarchie austro-hongroise et le 
 Royaume de Serbie. 
 
 Le Gouvernement Royal oonsoient que 
 les protestations qui ont apparu tant de 
 la tribune de la Skoupohtina nationale 
 que dans les declarations et les actes 
 des representants responsables de rj;tat, 
 protestations qui furent coupees court 
 par les declarations du Gouvernement 
 serbe, faites le *18 mars, 1909, ne se sont 
 plus renouvelees vis-a-vis de la graude 
 Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion 
 et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la 
 part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se 
 sont sucoede que de la part de leurs 
 organes, aucune tentative n'a ete faite 
 dans le but de changer I'etat de choses 
 politique et juridique cree en Bosnie et 
 Herzegovine, le Gouvernement Royal 
 constate que sous ce rapport le Gou- 
 vernement Imperial et Royal n'a fait 
 aucune representation, sauf en ce qui 
 eoncerne un livre scolaire, et an sujet 
 de laquelle le Gouvernement Imperial 
 et Royal a re^u une explication entiere- 
 ment satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nom- 
 breuses fois donne des preuves de sa 
 politique pacifique et moderee pendant 
 la duree de la cvise ^alkanique, et c'est 
 grace a la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle 
 • Old style. t 
 
 great neighbouring Monarchy, and that 
 no attempt has been made since that 
 time, either by the successive. Royal 
 Governments or by their organs, to 
 change the political and legal state of 
 aifairs created in Bosnia and Herzego- 
 vina, the Royal Government draiy atten- 
 tion to the fact that in this connection 
 the Imperial and Royal Government have 
 made no representation except one con- 
 cerning a school book, and that on that 
 occasion the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
 ment received an entirely satisfactory 
 explanation. Servia has several times 
 given proofs of her pacific and moderate 
 policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is 
 tha-nks to Servia and to the sacrifice 
 that she has made in the exclusive in- 
 terest of Euroi^ean peace that that peace 
 The Servian Parliament. 
 
23 
 
 a fait dans I'interet excUisif de la paix 
 europeenne que cette paix a ete pre- 
 serves . Le Gouvernement Royal ne 
 peut pas etre rendu responsable pour 
 les manifestations d'un caractere prive, 
 telles que les articles des journaux et 
 le travail paisiKle des societes, mani- 
 festations qui se produisent dans presque 
 tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire 
 et qui echappent, en regie generale, au 
 controls officiel, d'autant moins que le 
 Grouvernement Royal, lors de la solution 
 de toute une serie de questions qui se 
 sont presentees entre la Serbia et 
 I'Autriche-Hongrie, a montre une grande 
 prevenance et a reussi, de cette fa9on, 
 a en regler le plus grand nombre au 
 profit du progres des deux pays voisins. 
 
 C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal 
 a ete peniblement surpris par les afiBrma- 
 tions, d'apres lesquelles des personnes 
 du Royaume de Serbie auraient par- 
 tioipe a la preparation de I'attentat 
 comrais a Sarajevo; il s'atteudait a ce 
 qu'il soit invite a collaborer a la re- 
 cherche de tout ce qui se rapporte a 
 ce crime, et il etait pret, pour prouver 
 son entiere correction, a agir centre 
 toutes les personnes a I'egard desquelles 
 des communications lui seraient faites, 
 se rendant done au desir du Gouverne- 
 ment Imperial et Royal, est dispose a re- 
 mettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans 
 egard a sa situation et a son rang, pour 
 la complicite duquel, dans le crime de 
 Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient four- 
 nies, et specialement, il s' engage a faire 
 publier a la premiere page du "Journal 
 officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, I'enon- 
 oiation suivante : 
 
 " Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie 
 condamne toute propaganda qui serait 
 dirigee centre I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est- 
 a-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui as- 
 pirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la 
 Monarchie austro-hongroise des terri- 
 tories qui en font partie, et il deplore sin- 
 cerement les consequences funestes de ces 
 agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement 
 Royal regrette que certains officiers en 
 fonctionnaires serbes aient participe, 
 d'apres la communication du Gouverne- 
 ment Royal et Imperial, a la propagande 
 susmentionnee, et compromis par la les 
 relations de bon voisinage anxquelles le 
 Gouvernement Royal serbe etait solen- 
 nellement engage par sa declaration du 
 31 mars, 1909,* qui desapprouve et re- 
 pudie toute idee ou tentative d'une im- 
 mixtion dans les destinees des habitants 
 de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hon- 
 grie que se soit, considere de son devoir 
 d'avertir formellement les officiers et 
 fonctionnaires et toute la population du 
 
 has been preserved. The Royal Govern- 
 ment cannot be held responsible for 
 manifestations of a private character, 
 such as articles in the press and the 
 peaceable work of societies — manifesta- 
 tions which take place in nearly all coun- 
 tries in the ordinary course of events, 
 and which, as a general rule, escape 
 official control. The Royal Government 
 are all the less responsible, in view of the 
 fact that at the time of the solution of a 
 series of questions which arose between 
 Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave 
 proof of a great readiness to oblige, and 
 thus succeeded in settling the majority 
 of these questions to the advantage of 
 the two neighbouring countries. 
 
 For these reasons the Royal Govern- 
 ment have been pained and surprised at 
 the statements, according to which mem- 
 bers of the Kingdom of Servia are sup- 
 posed to have participated in the pre- 
 parations for the crime committed at 
 Serajevo; the Royal Government ex- 
 pected to be invited to collaborate in an 
 investigation of all that concerns this 
 crime, and they were ready, in order to 
 prove the entire correctness of their atti- 
 tude, to take measures against any pei'- 
 sons concerning whom representations 
 were made to them. Falling in, there- 
 fore, with the desire of the Imperial and 
 Royal Government, they are prepared to 
 hand over for trial any Servian subjecit, 
 without regard to his situation or rank, 
 of whose complicity in the crime of Sera- 
 jevo proofs are forthcoming, and more 
 especially they undertake to cause to be 
 published on the first page of the " Jour- 
 nal officiel," on the date of the 13th 
 (26th) July, the following declaration: — 
 
 " The Royal Government of Servia con- 
 demn all propaganda which may be 
 directed against Austria-Hungary, that 
 is to say, all such tendencies as aim at 
 ultimately detaching from the Austro- 
 Hungarian Monarchy territories which 
 form part thereof, and they sincerely de- 
 plore the baneful consequences of these 
 criminal movements. The Royal Govern- 
 ment regret that, according to the com- 
 munication from the Imperial and Royal 
 Government, certain Servian officers and 
 officials should have taken part in the 
 above-mentioned propaganda, and thus 
 compromised the good neighbourly rela- 
 tions to which the Royal Servian Govern- 
 ment was solemnly engaged by the decla- 
 ration of the 31st March, 1909,* which 
 declaration disapproves and repudiates 
 all idea or attempt at interference with 
 the destiny of the inhabitants of any 
 part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and 
 they consider it their duty formally to 
 warn the officers, officials, and entire 
 
 ' New style. 
 
24 
 
 loyaume que, dorenavant il procedera 
 avec la derniere rigueur contre les per- 
 sonnes qui se rendraient coupables de 
 pareils agissemente, qu'il mettra tous ses 
 efforts a prevenir et a reprimer." 
 
 Cette enonoiation sera portee a la oon- 
 naissance de I'armee Royale par un ordre 
 du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste 1© Roi, 
 par Son Altesse Royale le Prince heritier 
 Alexandre, et sera publie dans le pro- 
 chain bulletin officiel de I'armee. 
 
 Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en 
 outre : 
 
 1. D'introduire dans la premiere con- 
 vocation reguliere de la Skoupchti.iat une 
 disposition dans la loi de la presse, par 
 laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus 
 sevfere la provocation a la haine et au 
 mepris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, 
 ainsi que oontre toute publication dont 
 la tendance generale serait dirigee con- 
 tre I'integrite territoriale de I'Autriche- 
 Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revi- 
 sion de la Constitution, qui est pro- 
 ciiaine, a faire introduire dans I'article 
 22 de la Constitution un amendement de 
 telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus 
 puissent etre confisquees, ce qui actuelle- 
 meut aux termes categoriques de I'article 
 22 de la Constitution est impossible. 
 
 2. Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune 
 preuve et la note du Gouvernement 
 Imperial et Royal ne lui en fournit non 
 plus aucune que la societe " Narodna 
 Odbrana " et autres societes similaires 
 aient commis, jusqu'k ce jour quelques 
 actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait 
 d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins, le 
 Gouvernement Royal acceptera la de- 
 mande du Gouvernement Imperial et 
 Royal et dissoudra la societe " Narodna 
 Odbrana" et toute autre societe qui 
 agirait contre I'Autriche-Hongrie. 
 
 3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe 
 s'engage a eliminer sans delais de 
 1' instruction publique en Serbie tout ce 
 qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter la 
 propagande contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, 
 quand le Gouvernement Imperial et 
 Royal lui foarnira des faits et des preuves 
 de cette propagande. 
 
 4. Le Gouvernement Royal aocepte de 
 meme a eloigner du service militaire ceux 
 pour qui I'enqaete judiciaire aura prouve 
 qu'ils sont coupables d' actes diriges 
 contre I'integrite du territoire de la 
 Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend 
 que le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
 lui communique ulterieurement les noms 
 et les faits de ces officiers et fonction- 
 naires aux fins de la procedure qui doit 
 s'ensuivre. 
 
 population of the kingdom that hence- 
 forth they will take the most rigorous 
 steps against all such persons as are 
 guilty of such acts, to prevent and to re- 
 press which they will use their utmost 
 endeavour." 
 
 This declaration will be brought to the 
 knowledge of the Royal Army in an order 
 of the day, in the name of His Majesty 
 the King, by his Royal Highness the 
 Crown Prince Alexander, and will be pub- 
 lished in the next official army bulletin. 
 
 The Royal Government further under- 
 take : — 
 
 1. To introduce at the first regular 
 convocation of the Skuptchinat a pro- 
 vision into the press law providing for 
 the most severe punishment of incite- 
 ment to hatred or contempt of the Aus- 
 tro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking 
 action against any publication the gene- 
 ral tendency of which ia directed against 
 the territorial integrity of Austria-Hun- 
 gary. The Government engage at the 
 approaching revision of the Constitution 
 to cause an amendment to be introduced 
 into article 22 of the Constitution of such 
 a nature that such publication may be 
 confiscated, a proceeding at present im- 
 possible under the categorical terms of 
 article 22 of the Constitution. 
 
 2. The Government possess no proof, 
 nor does the note of the Imperial and 
 Rojal Government furnish them with 
 any, that the " Narodna Odbrana '' and 
 other similar societies have committed up 
 to the present any criminal act of this 
 nature through the proceedings of any 
 of their members. Nevertheless, the 
 Royal Government will accept the de- 
 maud of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
 ment, and will dissolve the "Narodna 
 Odbrana " Society and every other 
 society which may be directing its efforts 
 against Austria-Hungary. 
 
 3. The Royal Servian Government 
 undertake to remove without delay from 
 their public educational establishments 
 in Servia all that serves or could serve 
 to foment propaganda against Austria- 
 Hungary, whenever the Imperial and 
 Royal Government furnish them with 
 facts and proofs of this propaganda. 
 
 4. The Royal Government also agree 
 to remove from military service all such 
 persons as the judicial enquiry may have 
 proved to be guilty of acts directed 
 against the integrity of the territory of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and 
 they expect the Imperial and Royal 
 Government to communicate to them at 
 a later date the names and the acts of 
 these officers and officials for the pur- 
 poses of the proceedings which are to be 
 taken against them. 
 
 t The Servian Parliament. 
 
25 
 
 5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit 
 avouer qu'il ne se rend pas olairement 
 compte du sens et de la portee de la 
 demande du Gouvernement Imperial et 
 Royal que la Serbie s'engage a accepter 
 sur son territoire la collaboration d©s 
 organes du Gouvernement Imperial et 
 Royal, mais il declare qu'il admettra la 
 collaboration qui repondrait aux prin- 
 cipes du droit international et a la pro- 
 cedure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons 
 rapports de voisinage. 
 
 6. Le Gouvernement Royal^ cela va de 
 soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une 
 enquete centre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, 
 eventuellement, auraient ete meles au 
 complot du 15* juin, et qui se trouve- 
 raient sur le territoire du roj'aume. 
 Quant a la participation a oette enquete 
 des agents ou autorites austro-hongrois 
 qui seraient delegues a cet effet par le 
 Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, le 
 Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas F accep- 
 ter, car 06 serait une violation de la Con- 
 stitution et de la loi sur la procedure 
 criminelle; cependant dans des cas con- 
 crets des communications sur les resultats 
 de I'instruction en question pourraient 
 etre donnees aux agents austro-hongrois. 
 
 7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait pro- 
 ceder, des le soir meme de la remise de la 
 note, a I'arrestation du Commandant 
 Voislav Tankossitoh. Quant a Milan 
 Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Mon- 
 archie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 
 15* juin etait employe (comme aspirant) 
 a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a 
 pas pu encore etre arrete. 
 
 Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est 
 priee de vouloir bien, dans la forme 
 accoutumee, faire connaitre le plus tot 
 possible, les presomptions de culpabilite 
 ainsi que les preuves eventuelles de leur 
 culpabilite qui ont ete recueillies jusqu'a 
 ce jour par I'enquete a Sarajevo aux fins 
 d'enquete ulterieure. 
 
 8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera 
 et ietendra les mesures prises pour 
 empSoher le trafic illicite d'armes et 
 d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II va 
 de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une 
 enquete et punira severement les fonc- 
 tionnaires des frontieres sur la ligne 
 Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manque a 
 leurs devoirs et laisse passer les auteurs 
 due crime de Sarajevo. 
 
 9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera 
 volontiers des explications sur les propos 
 que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie 
 qu'a I'etranger, ont ea apres I'attentat 
 dans des entrevues et qui, d'apres 
 I'affirmation du Gouvernemeiit Imperial 
 
 •Old 
 
 5. The Royal Government must oonfocs 
 that they do not clearly grasp the menii- 
 ing or the scop© of the demand made by 
 the Imperial and Royal Government that 
 Servia shall undertake to accept the 
 collaboration of the organs of the 
 Imperial and Royal Government upon 
 their territory, but they declare that 
 they wnll admit such collaboration as 
 agrees with the principle of international 
 law, with criminal procedure, and with 
 good neighbourly relations. 
 
 6. It goes without saying that the 
 Royal Government consider it their dutj- 
 to open an enquiry against all such 
 persons as are, or eventually may be, 
 implicated in the plot of the 15th* June, 
 and who happen to be within the terri- 
 tory of the kingdom. As regards the 
 participation in this enquiry of Austro- 
 Hungarian agents or authorities ap- 
 pointed for this purpose by the Imperial 
 and Royal Government, the Royal 
 Government cannot accept such an 
 arrangement, as it would be a violation 
 of the Constitution and of the law of 
 criminal procedure ; nevertheless, in con- 
 crete cases communications as to the 
 results of the investigation in question 
 might be given to the Austro-Hungarian 
 agents. 
 
 7. The Roj-al Government proceeded, 
 on the very evening of the delivery of the 
 note, to arrest Commandant Voislav 
 Tankossitoh. As regards Milan Zigano- 
 vitch, who is a subject of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 
 15th* June was employed (on probation) 
 by the directorate of railways, it has not 
 yet been possible to arrest him. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Government are 
 requested to be so good as to supply as 
 soon as possible, in the customary form, 
 the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well 
 as the eventual proofs of guilt which 
 have been collected up to the present, at 
 the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes 
 of the later enquiry. 
 
 8. The Sei-vian Government will rein- 
 force and extend the measures which 
 have been taken for preventing the illicit 
 traffic of arms and explosives across the 
 frontier. It goes without saying that 
 they will immediately order an enquiry 
 and will severely punish the frontier 
 officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line 
 who have failed in their duty and allowed 
 the authors of the crime of Serajevo to 
 pass. 
 
 9. The Royal Government will gladly 
 give explanations of the remarks made 
 by their officials whether in Servia or 
 abroad, in interviews after the crime 
 which according to the statement of the 
 Imperial and Royal Government were 
 
 style. 
 
26 
 
 et Royal, ont ete hostiles envers la Mon- 
 arohie, des que le Giouvernement Imperial 
 et Royal lui aura oommuniqu© les pas- 
 sages en question de oes propos, et des 
 qu'il aura demontre que les propos 
 employes ont, en effet, ©t© tenus par 
 lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le 
 Gouyernement Royal luimeme aura soin 
 de recueiUir dee preuves et convictions. , 
 
 10. Le GouTernement Royal informera 
 le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de 
 I'execution des mesures comprises dans 
 les points precedents en tant que cela 
 n'a pas ete deja fait par la presente note, 
 aussitot que chaque mesure aura ete 
 ordonnee et executee. 
 
 Dans le caa ou le Gouvernement 
 Imperial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait 
 de cette reponse, le Gouvernement serbe, 
 considerant qu'il est de I'interet oommun 
 de ne pas precipiter la solution de oette 
 question, est pret comme toujours 
 d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en 
 remettant cette question a la decision du 
 Tribunal international de La Haye, soit 
 aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part 
 a I'elaboration de la declaration que le 
 Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) 
 mars, 1909. 
 
 Belgrade, le 12 (25) jviUef, 1914. 
 
 hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as 
 the Imperial and Royal Government haye 
 communicated to them the passages m 
 question in these remarks, and as soon as 
 they have shown that the remarks were 
 actually made by the said officials, 
 although the Royal Government wUl 
 itself take steps to collect evidence and 
 proofs. 
 
 10. The Royal Government will inform 
 the Imperial and Royal Government of 
 the execution of the measures comprised 
 under the above heads, in so far as this 
 has not already been done by the present 
 note, as soon as each measure has been 
 ordered and carried out. 
 
 If the Imperial and Royal Government 
 are not satisfied with this reply, the 
 Servian Government, considering that it 
 is not to the common interest to pre- 
 cipitate the solution of this question, are 
 ready, as always, to accept a pacific 
 understanding, either by referring this 
 question to the decision of the Inter- 
 national Tribunal of The Hague, or to 
 the Great Powers which took part in the 
 drawing up of the declaration made by 
 the Servian Government on the 18th 
 (31st) March, 1909. 
 
 Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 No. 40. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsei\, British Ambassador at Vienn-a, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 {Received July 27.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 
 
 RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian 
 Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain 
 indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your tele- 
 gram of the 2Sth instant* (last paragraph). 
 
 AVheu the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Parist arrived, I 
 had the Fionch and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great 
 satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, how- 
 ever, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a 
 say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by 
 either the A"stro-Hungarian or the German Government. 
 
 Instructions were also given tp the Italian Ambassador to support the request of 
 the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, 
 however, too late for any useful action to be taken. 
 
 • See No. 26. t See No. 36. 
 
 No. 41. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Amhcstador at Vienna, to Sir Edirard Grey. — 
 
 (Beceived July 27.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. 
 The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn 
 up as to make war inevitable ; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully 
 resolved to have war with Servia ; that they consider their position as a Great Power 
 
27 
 
 to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is 
 unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone 
 wild with (joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or preven- 
 tion would undoubtedly be a great disappointment. 
 
 I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to 
 the Austrian Minister for Foreign Afiairs the hope of His Majesty's Government 
 that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he 
 cannot suggest a way out even now. 
 
 No. 42. 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Beceived 
 
 Julii 27.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914. 
 
 YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by 
 the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this 
 evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French 
 Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of 
 their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have 
 also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Peters- 
 burgh, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some 
 success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for 
 the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so. 
 
 * Nos. 36 and 37. 
 
 No. 43. 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey — (Eeceived 
 
 July 27.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. 
 
 YOUR telegram of 26th July.* 
 
 Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to 
 a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at 
 the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your sugges- 
 tion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I 
 was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that repre- 
 sentatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest 
 means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a 
 conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just 
 received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part 
 of M. de Sazonoft to exchange views with Count Berchtold.t He thought that this 
 method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, 
 before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the 
 Austrian and Russian Governments. 
 
 In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria 
 was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter 
 would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by " mobilising against Ger- 
 many." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobi- 
 lise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian 
 system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difiBcult exactly to locate 
 her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken 
 by surprise. 
 
 Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had caused him 
 
 to take more hopeful view of the general situation. 
 
 •See No. 36. 
 tEussian Minister for Foreign AiTaira. 
 i AuBtro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 No. 44. 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 {Received July 27.) 
 (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, Jvly 27, 1914. 
 
 AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday 
 with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of 
 
28 
 
 the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although, he perfectly understood Austria s 
 motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as 
 a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable 
 enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate 
 execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, 
 moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would 
 be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that 
 she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end 
 to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to col- 
 laborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to comr..iunicate his 
 Excellency's remarks to his Government. i, j. t i, i 
 
 On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that i had 
 correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with 
 him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that you could 
 not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he 
 believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German 
 Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France 
 if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stif- 
 fened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at 
 Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious 
 to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do 
 anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian 
 Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops 
 would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued. 
 
 In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the 
 Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her mili- 
 tary preparations if it was deferred too long. 
 
 * See No. 6. 
 
 No. 45. 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 •.Received July 27.) 
 (Telegraphic.) St. Petershurgh, July 27, 1914. 
 
 SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my 
 telegram of to-day,* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modi- 
 fications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct 
 conversation between Vienna and St. Petershurgh. 
 
 ♦ See No. 44. 
 
 No. 46. 
 
 Sir Edward Orey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 
 
 GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in 
 principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of 
 course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been 
 instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petershurgh to localise the war and 
 to keep up the peace of Europe. 
 
 I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected 
 to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that 
 there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected 
 to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless 
 Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna 
 that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside 
 as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined 
 to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be 
 involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and 
 pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna. 
 
29 
 
 I recalled what German Govermnent had said as to the gravity of the gituatioa 
 if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Ggrmany assisted Austria 
 against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dis- 
 pute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might 
 be rijised that would supprsede the dispute between Austria and Servja, and would 
 bring other Power? in, and the war would be the biggest ever known ; but as Icng 
 as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated 
 that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that sonie moderation must be urged, 
 
 No. 47. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershvrrilt . 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 19X4. 
 
 SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Gosehen.* 
 
 I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles 
 impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Bxeelleney 
 deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. 
 
 This impression ought, as 1 have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we 
 have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not 
 to disperse for manceuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that 
 my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic 
 action was promised. 
 
 We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no 
 action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, 
 and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than 
 the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments. 
 
 •Bee No. 37. 
 
 No. 48. 
 
 Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 
 
 COUNT MENSDORPF* told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Govern- 
 ment had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to 
 address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. 
 Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending 
 towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final 
 disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their 
 wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to 
 enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity p^irsued up to now by 
 Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many 
 years endeavoured to find a way to get on with theit turbulent neighbour, though 
 this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. 
 The Sarajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the 
 Se rvian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria 
 if involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider 
 that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guaran- 
 tees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of 
 peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to 
 this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. 
 They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no 
 sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of 
 self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they 
 prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she 
 had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and 
 of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended 
 by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose 
 hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely 
 injured Austrian national jirosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding 
 in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in 
 u, fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if 
 necessary. 
 
 • Austro-Hungarlan Ambassador in London. 
 
30 
 
 Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia was con- 
 fronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adhe- 
 rence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia 
 had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the 
 repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preser- 
 vation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking 
 Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory. 
 
 I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Govern- 
 ment upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the con- 
 versation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that 
 reply. 
 
 Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be 
 satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing— the co-operation of 
 Austrian oflScials and police — which would be a real guarantee that in practice the 
 Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria. 
 
 I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even 
 after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of 
 bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the 
 same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be 
 incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of 
 the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. 
 Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when 
 Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increas- 
 ingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that 
 our ileet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. 
 We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no 
 menace in what we had done about our fleet ; but, owing to the possibility of a 
 European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this 
 moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed 
 to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia 
 that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was verj- disappointing to me that 
 the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as 
 a blank negative. 
 
 I am, &c. 
 
 E. GREY. 
 
 No. 49. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne. 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 
 
 THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson* to-day that the Italian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of 
 four to be held in London. 
 
 As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to 
 suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di 
 San Giulianot would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Govern- 
 ment, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at 
 Vienna. 
 
 I am, Ac, 
 
 E. GREY. 
 
 •British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
 t Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
Sir, 
 
 31 
 
 No. 50. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 {Iteceived July 31.) 
 
 Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE tlie honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro- 
 Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Serria. 
 
 I have, &c. 
 
 MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 
 
 Enclosure in No. 50. 
 
 Copy of Note verhale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
 
 POUR mettre fin aux menees subver- 
 sives partant de Belgrade et dirigees 
 centre I'integrite territoriale de la Mon- 
 archic austro-hongroise, le Gouverne- 
 ment Imperial et Royal a fait parvenir a 
 la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Gouverne- 
 ment Royal de Serbie une note dans 
 laquelle se trouvait formulee une serie de 
 demandes pour 1' acceptation desquelles 
 un delai de quarante-huit heures a ete 
 acoorde au Gouvernement Royal. Le 
 Gouvernement Ros'al de Serbie n'ayant 
 pas repondu a cette note d'une maniere 
 satisfaisante, le Gouvernement Imperial 
 et Royal se trouve dans la necessite de 
 pourvoir lui-meme a la sauvegarde de ses 
 droits et interets et de recourir a cet 
 effet a la force des armes. 
 
 L'Autriohe-Hongrie, qui vient d'adres- 
 ser Si la Serbie une declaration formelle 
 conformement a I'article ler de la con- 
 vention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative a 
 I'ouverture des hostilites, se considere 
 des lors en etat de guerre avec la Serbie. 
 
 En p )rtant ce qui precede a la connais- 
 sance de I'Ambassade Royale de Grande- 
 Bretagne le Ministere des Affaires 
 fitrangeres a I'honneur de declarer que 
 I'Autriche-Hongrie se conformera au 
 oours des hostilites, sous la reserve d'un 
 procede analogue de la part de la Serbie, 
 aux stipulations des conventions de La 
 Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'a 
 celles de la Declaration de Londres du 26 
 fevrier, 1909. 
 
 L'Ambassade est priee de vouloir bien 
 communiquer, d'urgenoe la presente no- 
 tification a son Gouvernement. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 IN order to bring to an end the sub- 
 versive intrigues originating from Bel- 
 grade and aimed at the territorial 
 integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
 archy, the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
 ment has delivered to the Royal Servian 
 Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, 
 in which a series of demands were formu- 
 lated, for the acceptance of which a delay 
 of forty-eight hours has been granted to 
 the Royal Government. The Royal 
 Servian Government not having answered 
 this note in a satisfactory manner, the 
 Imperial and Royal Government are 
 themselves compelled to see to the safe- 
 guarding of their rights and interests, 
 and, with this object, to have recourse 
 to force of arms. 
 
 Austria-Hungary, who has just ad- 
 dressed to Servia a formal declaration, in 
 conformity with article 1 of the conven- 
 tion of the 18th October, 1907, relative 
 to the opening of hostilities, considers 
 herself henceforward in a state of war 
 with Servia. 
 
 In bringing the above to notice of His 
 Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the 
 Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the 
 honour to declare that Austria-Hungary 
 will act during the hostilities in con- 
 formity with the terms of the Conven- 
 tions of The Hague of the 18th October, 
 1907, as also with those of the Declara- 
 tion of London of the 28th February, 
 1909, provided an analogous procedure is 
 adopted by Servia. 
 
 The embassy is requested to be so good 
 as to communicate the present notifica- 
 tion as soon as possible to the British 
 Government. 
 
32 
 No. 51. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 {Beceived July 28.) 
 Sir, Paris, July 27, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from 
 the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an 
 outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia. 
 
 I have, &c. 
 
 FRANCIS BERTIE. 
 
 Enclosure in No. 51. 
 Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin. 
 
 PAR une note en date du 25 de ce 
 niois, son Excellence I'Ambassadeur d' 
 Angleterre a fait connaitre au Grouverne- 
 m.ent de la Republique que, d'apres Sir 
 Edward Grey, la seule maniere d'assurer, 
 si c'etait possible, le maintien de la paix 
 dans le cas oil les rapports entre la 
 Russie et I'Autriche deviendraient plus 
 tendus serait une demarche commune a 
 Vienne et a Saint-Petersbourg des repr6- 
 sentanta de 1' Angleterre, de la France, 
 do I'AIlemagne et de I'ltalie en Autriche 
 et en Russie; et il a exprime le desir de 
 savoir si le Gouvernement de la Repub- 
 lique etait dispose a accueillir favorable- 
 ment cette suggestion. 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres 
 par interim a I'honneur de faire con- 
 naitre a son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie 
 qu'il a invite M. Jules Cambon* a se 
 oonoerter aveo I'Ambassadeur d' Angle- 
 terre en Allemagne et a appuyer la de- 
 marche qu'ils jugeront opportune de faire 
 aupres du Cabinet de Berlin. 
 
 Le Gouvernement de la Republique a, 
 d'autre part, conformement au desir ex- 
 prime par le Gouvernement britannique 
 et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie 
 lui a transmis par une note en date du 
 26 de 06 mois, autorise M. Paul Cambont 
 h prendre part a la reunion proposee par 
 Sir Edward Grey pour reohercher avec 
 lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et 
 d'ltalie S, Londres, les moyens de re- 
 soudre les difflcultes actuelles. 
 
 Le Gouvernement de la Republique est 
 pret egalement a donner aux agents 
 frangais h Petersbourg, k Vienne et a Bel- 
 grade des instructions pour qu'ils obtien- 
 nent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien 
 et serbe de s'abstenir de toute operation 
 militaire active en attendant les r4sul- 
 tats de cette conference. II estime toute- 
 fois que les chances de succ&s de la pro- 
 position de Sir Edward Grey reposent 
 essentiellement sur Paction que Berlin 
 serait disposee a Vienne [.sic]. Une d6- 
 
 (Translation.) 
 IN a note of the 25th of this month, 
 his Excellency the British Ambassador 
 informed the Government of the Republic 
 that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only 
 possible way of assuring the maintenance 
 of peace in case of the relations between 
 Russia and Austria becoming more 
 strained would be if the representatives 
 of Great Britain, France, Germany, and 
 Italy in Austria and Russia were to take 
 joint action at Vienna and at St. Peters- 
 burgh ; and he expressed the wish to know 
 if the Government of tha Republic were 
 disposed to welcome such a suggestion. 
 
 The Minister for Foreign Affairs ad 
 interim has the honour to inform his Ex- 
 cellency Sir F. Bertie that he has re- 
 quested M. Jules Cambon* to concert 
 wiiJi the British Ambassador in Germany 
 and to support any representation which 
 they may consider it advisable to make to 
 the Berlin Cabinet. 
 
 In accordance with the desire ex- 
 pressed by the British Government and 
 conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his 
 note of the 26th of this month, the Gov- 
 ernment of the Republic have also autho- 
 rised M. Paul Cambont to take part in 
 the conference which Sir E. Grey has 
 proposed with a view to discovering in 
 consultation with himself and the Ger- 
 man and Italian Ambassadors in London 
 a means of settling the present difficul- 
 ties 
 
 The Government of the Republic is 
 likewise ready to instruct the French re- 
 presentatives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, 
 and Belgrade to induce the Russian, 
 Austrian, and Servian Governments to 
 abstain from all active militai-y opera- 
 tions pending the results of this confe- 
 rence. He considers, however, that the 
 chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being 
 successful depends essentially on the ac- 
 tion which the Berlin Government would 
 be willing to take at Vienna. Repre- 
 
 * French Ambassador in Berlin, 
 trrench Ambassador in London. 
 
33 
 
 marchc aupres du Gouvernement austro- 
 lioiigrois pour amener la suspension des 
 operations railitaires parait vou^e a 
 I'echec si I'influence de I'AUemagne ne 
 s'-est pas exercee an prealable sur le 
 Cabinet de Vienna. 
 
 Le Garde des Sceaux, President du 
 Conseil et Miuistre des Affaires fitran- 
 geres par interim, saisit oette occasion de 
 renouveler, &c. 
 
 Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914. 
 
 sentations made to the Austrian-Hun- 
 garian Government for the purpose of 
 bringing about a suspension of military 
 operations would seem bound to fail un- 
 less the German Government do not be- 
 forehand exercise their influence on the 
 Vienna Cabinet. 
 
 The President pf the Council ad in- 
 terim takes the opportunity, &c. 
 
 Paris, July 27, 19l 
 
 No. 52. 
 Note cormwunicated by French Embassy, .Jvly 28, 1914. 
 
 LE Gouvernement de la Republique 
 accepte la proposition de Sir Edward 
 Grey relative a une intervention de la 
 Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de 
 I'AUemagne et de I'ltalie en vue d'eviter 
 les operations militaires actives sur les 
 frontieres autrichiennes, russes et serbes ; 
 il a autorise M. P. Cambon* a prendre 
 part aux dfliberations de la reunion a 
 quatre, qui doit se tenir a Londres. 
 
 L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin a, 
 re9U pour instructions, apres s'etre con- 
 certo avec 1' Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a 
 Ber^n, d'appuyer la demarche de ce 
 dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui 
 seraient jugees opportunes. 
 
 M. Vivianif est pret a envoyer aux 
 representants fran9ais a Vienne, Saint- 
 Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions 
 dans le sens suggere par le Gouverne- 
 ment britannique. 
 
 Ambassade de France, Londres, 
 le 27 juillet, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 THE Government of the Republic 
 accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in 
 regard to intervention by Great Britain, 
 France, Germany, and Italy with a v?ew 
 to avoiding active military operations on 
 the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and 
 Servia; and they have authorised M. P. 
 Cambon* to take part in the delibera- 
 tions of the four representatives at the 
 meeting which is to be held in London. 
 
 The French Ambassador in Berlin has 
 received instructions to consult first the 
 British Ambassador in Berlin, and then 
 to support the action taken by the latter 
 in such manner and degree as may be 
 considered appropriate. 
 
 M. Vivianif is ready to send to the 
 representatives of France in Vienna, St. 
 Petersburgh, and Belgrade instructions 
 in the sense suggested by the British 
 Government. 
 
 French Embassy, July 27, 1912. 
 
 • French Ambassador in London. 
 t French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 No. 53. 
 
 3/. Sazonof, Eussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benchendorff, Russian 
 Ambassador in London. — (Communicated by Count Benchendorff, July 28.) 
 
 Saint-Petersbourg , 
 (Telegraphique.) 
 
 le 14 (271 juillet, J914. 
 L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est 
 venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que 
 I'Angleterre prenne I'initiative de con- 
 voquer a Londres une conference des 
 representants de I'Angleterre, la France, 
 I'AUemagne et I'ltalie, pour etudier une 
 issue a la situation aotuelle. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 St. Petersburgh, 
 (Telegraphic.) 
 
 July '27, 1914. 
 THE British Ambassador came to 
 ascertain whether we think it desirable 
 that Great Britain should take the 
 initiative in convoking a conference in 
 London of the representatives of Eng- 
 land, France, Gej-many, and Italy to 
 examine the possibility of a way out of 
 the present situation. 
 
34 
 
 J'ai repondu a I'Ambassadeur que j'ai 
 entame des pourparlers avec I'Ambas- 
 sadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions 
 que j'espere favorables. Pourtant je 
 n'ai pas encore re^u de reponse a la 
 proposition que j'ai faite d'une revision 
 de la note entre les deux Cabinets. 
 
 Si des explications directes avec le 
 Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irrealis- 
 ables, je suis pret a accepter la proposi- 
 tion anglaise, ou toute autre de nature a 
 resoudre favorablement le conflit. 
 
 Je voudrais pourtant ecarter des 
 aujcfurd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait 
 surgir de la reponse donnee par le 
 Ministre de la Justice fran9ais a I'Am- 
 bassadeur d'AIlemagne, concernant des 
 conseils de moderation a dormer au 
 Cabinet Imperial. 
 
 I replied to the Ambassador that I 
 have begun conversations with the 
 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under 
 conditions which, I hope, may be favour- 
 able. I have not, however, received as 
 yet any reply to the proposal made by 
 me for revising the note between the two 
 Cabinets. 
 
 If direct explanations with the Vienna 
 Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am 
 ready to accept the British proposal, or 
 any other proposal of a kind that would 
 bring about a favourable solution of the 
 conflict. 
 
 I wish", however, to put an end from 
 this day forth to a misunderstanding 
 which might arise from the answer given 
 by the French Minister of Justice to the 
 German Ambassador, regarding counsels 
 of moderation to be given to the Imperial 
 Cabinet. 
 
 • No. 54. 
 
 M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benclcendorff, Bussian 
 Ambassador in London. — (Communicated by Count Bcnckendorff, July 28, 1914.) 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 St. I'etersburgh, 
 (Telegraphic.) July 15 (28), 1914. 
 
 MY interviews with the German Am 
 bassador confirm my impression that 
 Germanj' is, if anything, in favour of the 
 uncompromising attitude adopted by 
 Austria. 
 
 The Berlin Cabinet, who could have 
 prevented the whole of this crisis develop- 
 ing, appear to be exerting no influence 
 on their ally. 
 
 The Ambassador considers that the 
 Servian reply is insufficient. 
 
 This attitude of the German Govern- 
 ment is most alarming. 
 
 It seems to me that England is in a 
 better position than any other Power to 
 make another attempt at Berlin to 
 induce the German Government to take 
 the necessary action. There is no doubt 
 that the key of the situation is to be 
 found at Berlin 
 
 Saint-Petersbourg, 
 le 15 (28) juillet, 1914. 
 (Telegraphique. ) 
 
 MES entretiens avec I'Ambassadeur 
 d'AUemagne conflrment mon impression 
 que I'Allemagne est plutot favorable a 
 I'intransigeance de I'Autriche. 
 
 Ije Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu 
 arreter tout le developpement de la crise, 
 parait n'exercer aucune action sur son 
 alliee. 
 
 L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la 
 reponse de la Serbie. 
 
 Cette attitude allemande est tout par- 
 ticulierement alarmante. 
 
 II me semble que mieux que toute 
 autre Puissance I'Angleterre serait en 
 mesure de tenter encore d'agir a Berlin 
 pour engager le Gouvernement allemand 
 a I'action necessaire. C'est a Berlin 
 qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de 
 la situation. 
 
 No. 55. 
 
 Sir 0. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peterslnirgh, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
 
 (.Received July 28.) 
 (Telegraphic.) st^ Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. 
 
 WITH reference to my telegi-am of yesterday,* I saw the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic. 
 
 He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Govern- 
 ment to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial 
 
 • See No. 44. 
 
35 
 
 integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that 
 she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would 
 accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished 
 to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that 
 would ensue. 
 
 He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, 
 alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers. 
 
 I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conferenco of the four 
 Powers, and on his replying in the af&rmative, I told him confidentially of your 
 instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would 
 prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, 
 to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal oijinion that a direct exchange 
 of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary. 
 
 His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted 
 the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the 
 Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place. 
 
 No. 56. 
 
 Svr M. de Bunsein, British Ambassador ai Vienna, to Sir Edward Orey. — 
 
 (Beceived July 28.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 
 
 THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with 
 Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him 
 that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well acquainted with 
 the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He 
 could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to 
 localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on 
 previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly 
 hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Barou 
 Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken 
 place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian 
 Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians qui«t pending 
 any discussions that might yet take place, and he tcld me that he would Sdvise his 
 Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as pos- 
 sible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to 
 enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation 
 which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Avistrian 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had agreed that much of the Austro- 
 Huugarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had prac- 
 tioaUy reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably 
 be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian 
 Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be 
 furnished with full powers to continue discussion witli the Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield aJl that could be 
 fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit 
 this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 No. 57. 
 
 Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Edward Orey. — 
 {Beceii:cd July 28.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 27, 1914. 
 
 MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing 
 to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had 
 hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference 
 meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding 
 from any point laid down in her note to Servia, but he believes that if Servia 
 
36 
 
 will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that 
 such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Serria may be 
 induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to 
 the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe 
 and not to Austria-Hungary alone. 
 
 Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably 
 impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion 
 to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communi- 
 cation of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him 
 aosurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Servia. 
 
 No. 58. 
 
 Sii' F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Becah-ed July 28.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. 
 
 I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon 
 the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your 
 telegram* to Berlin of the 27th July. 
 
 His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms 
 what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations 
 to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace. 
 
 •See No. 46. 
 
 No. 59. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 {Received Jxdy'2%.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. 
 
 I INFOllMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversa- 
 tion with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday* 
 to St. Petersburgh. 
 
 He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility 
 for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves " sohdaires " with Russia on 
 a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condition is not one 
 affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and 
 Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the 
 Russian Government. 
 
 German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of 
 Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave 
 no assurance. 
 
 •See No. 47. 
 
 No. 60. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Beceived July 28.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 
 
 SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my 
 telegram of yesterday* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your pro- 
 posal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found 
 that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to aU of us that never- 
 theless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We 
 therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the 
 form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on 
 which he would find it possible to work with us. 
 
 •See No. 43. 
 
37 
 
 No. 61. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 {Received Jviy 28.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
 
 I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. 
 
 His Excellency declared- that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike prooeedingR 
 against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis 
 of Servian reply. 
 
 Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engag-ed, and nothing could now prevent corfiict. 
 
 No. 62. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Received July 28.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
 
 I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram 
 of 27th July* to Berlin. I avoided the word " mediation," but said that, as men- 
 tioned in your speech,t which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conver- 
 sations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an 
 arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and 
 as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian 
 reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary ; that you thought 
 it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might 
 remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this 
 sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion 
 could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and 
 that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, 
 might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This 
 was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately 
 concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now 
 be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the 
 peace of Europe. 
 
 In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course 
 of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would 
 arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria- 
 Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas AustriarHungary put 
 first h€r quarrel with Servia, you were anjiious in the first instance for peace of 
 Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force 
 to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought 
 not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial 
 aggrandisement, and which could no longer be postponed. 
 
 •See No. 46. 
 
 t " Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931. ■ 932, 933. 
 
 No. 63. 
 
 .Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at Home, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
 {Received July 28.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 28, 1914. 
 
 YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.* 
 
 1 have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately 
 telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna. 
 
 •See No. 27. 
 
38 
 
 No. 64. 
 
 Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (iceceived July 28.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Bcme, July 28, 1914.. 
 
 AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Aifairs I submit ths following to 
 you: — 
 
 In a long conversation this morning Servian Charge d'Affaires had said he 
 thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian 
 agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might still 
 accept the whole Austrian note. 
 
 As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to 
 Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then 
 advise Servia to accept without conditions. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official 
 explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation — such as slight verbal 
 difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda — qaite childish, but 
 there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such -.i, course as was 
 considered practicable by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. It was stated tliat co-opera- 
 tion of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial 
 or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted' this. 
 He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here. 
 
 I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian 
 declaration. 
 
 Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning 
 of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion 
 on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given 
 to Italian Ambassador. 
 
 No. 65. 
 
 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 {Received July 28.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) IVts7i, July 28, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending 
 efforts being made towards a peaceful solution. 
 
 Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels 
 have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova. 
 
 No. 66. 
 
 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Gray.- 
 
 (Beceived July 28.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Msh, July 28, 1914. 
 
 TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria. 
 
 No. 67. 
 Sir Edward Grey to ,S'(r E. Goschen, British .imhassador at Berlin 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign. Office, July 28, 1914. 
 
 EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was mv 
 idea m proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration but 
 a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for 
 a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been 
 ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating 
 Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies. 
 
 But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria 
 and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it ' ■ 
 the most preferable method of all. ' '^ 
 
 'See No. 43, 
 
39 
 
 I understand that the Russian Minister for -Foreign Affairs has proposed a 
 friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, 
 it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical. 
 
 It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the 
 German .Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation 
 recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.* 
 
 ♦See No. 46. 
 
 No. 68. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. 
 
 GERMAN Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria 
 and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German 
 Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. 
 I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between 
 Austria and Russia progress. 
 
 No. 69. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchaman, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. 
 
 IT is most satisfactory that there is a, prospect of direct exchange of views 
 between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram 
 of the 27th July.* 
 
 I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but 
 I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes 
 the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of 
 views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might 
 then take more concrete shape. 
 
 •See No. 56. 
 
 No. 70. 
 
 Telegrams communicated by Count Beckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London. 
 
 July 29, 1914. 
 (1.) Telegram from, M. Sazonof to Bussian Ambassador at Berlin, dated 
 
 July 28, 1914. 
 IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Sei'via, the Imperial 
 Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circon- 
 scriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Govern- 
 ment, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany. 
 The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post. 
 
 (2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff.* 
 The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct com- 
 munications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to 
 set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria 
 against Servia is now most urgent. 
 
 Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to 
 drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia. 
 
 * Bussian Ambassador in London. 
 
 No. 71. 
 
 Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 {Received July 29.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 
 
 AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, 1 called upon his Excellency this evening. 
 He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany 
 should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they bad 
 done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept 
 
 C 
 
40 
 
 your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he 
 did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in 
 his opinion have had appearance of an " Areopagus " consisting of two Powers of 
 each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers; but his 
 inability to accept the proposed conference must not be regarded as militating 
 against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he 
 was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to get the two Govern- 
 ments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He 
 had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory 
 result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia 
 had mobiUsed fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very 
 serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances 
 it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He 
 added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take 
 similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. L 
 ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, 
 to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any 
 case offered a basis ifor discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would 
 rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, 
 but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with 
 Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He 
 reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost 
 to maintain general peace. " A war between the Great Powers must be avoided," 
 were his last words. 
 
 Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as 
 Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that 
 opinion is shared by many people here. 
 
 No. 72. 
 
 Sir G. Bvrhanan, British Amhassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (jReceived July 29.) 
 (Tolesraphic.) St. Petersburgh, .July 29, 1914. 
 
 MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you 
 had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram* to Berlin, 
 substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view 
 of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had 
 reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know 
 the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would 
 be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, 
 been instructed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I added 
 that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed 
 by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were 
 attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might 
 take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would 
 be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier. 
 
 I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels 
 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do 
 so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his 
 restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being 
 thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked 
 by Austria. 
 
 As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instruc- 
 tions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still 
 waiting for their final instructions. 
 
 *See No. 46. 
 
41 
 
 No. 73. 
 Sir M. (ie Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Received July 29.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
 
 I HAVK received note verhale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, 
 the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July* in a satisfactory 
 manner. Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection 
 of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary 
 has addressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 
 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from 
 to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia 
 does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declara- 
 tion of London of 26th February, 1909. 
 
 * See No. 4. 
 
 No. 74. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 {Received July 29.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
 
 I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's sug- 
 gestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion 
 was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be 
 discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, who should be authorised accordingly. 
 
 The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less inte- 
 rested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving 
 peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly 
 in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all 
 hope need not be abandoned. 
 
 No. 75. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received 
 
 July 29.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 
 
 I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he 
 regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once 
 communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and 
 that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply 
 might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving^their reply, 
 despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain 
 desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of 
 Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia 
 would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had 
 then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against 
 Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that 
 the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had 
 
 no territorial designs. , , n . , • • ^ . ^ 
 
 He advised the Austro-Hnngarian Government, should this view be correct, to 
 speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate 
 all possible misunderstandings. 
 
 As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna. 
 
 From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, 
 his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his 
 power to prevent danger of European complications. 
 
 The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confi- 
 dence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he 
 was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which 
 he sincerely appreciated. 
 
 J — 
 
42 
 No. 76. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Beceived July 29.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, Jvly 29, 1914. 
 
 I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he 
 had told me the other day that he had to he very careful in giving advice to 
 Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to 
 precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened, 
 and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply 
 offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much 
 troubled by reports of mobilisation in Eussia, and of certain military measures, 
 which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these 
 measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had 
 done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers 
 on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a 
 matter of fact it is true. My French ooUeague said to Under-Secretary of State, 
 in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered 
 Servia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable 
 for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions 
 for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think 
 idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from 
 conference proposed by you. 
 
 Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government 
 that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments. 
 
 No. 77. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
 
 I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram 
 of to-day.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as 
 heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all 
 fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as 
 to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency 
 for having saved the peace of Europe. 
 
 •See No. 75. 
 
 No. 78. 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Fctcrsburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 {Beceived July 29.) 
 (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. 
 
 PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day. 
 
 I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* to Berlin 
 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and 
 informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secre- 
 tary of State had made 'to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already 
 reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained would 
 only be directed against Austria. ' 
 
 Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between 
 Vienna and St. Petersburgh. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had pro- 
 posed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed 
 when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a 
 return should be made to your proposal for « conference of four Ambassadors or 
 at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less dir^tlv 
 interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if von thought it advisable 
 Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him and 
 r.e did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost,' and 
 
 *See No. 67. 
 
43 
 
 the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving by 
 means of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individu- 
 ally, at some formula which Austria oould be induced to accept. Through- 
 out Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done 
 all in their power to maintain peace. If their efEorts to maintain peace failed, he 
 trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of 
 the Russian Government. 
 
 I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome 
 telegram of the 27th July,* which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply 
 his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers 
 provided it was acceptable to Servia ; he oould not, he said, be more Servian than 
 Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be 
 made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum. 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram 
 of the 28th instantt was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances 
 of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had 
 informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing 
 at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not 
 help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as 
 he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace 
 of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been 
 recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his atten- 
 tion to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to 
 military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, 
 and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan 
 crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation 
 for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in 
 earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have 
 believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given 
 me to underst.ind that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier imme- 
 diately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was 
 completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary 
 that we should in the meanwhile all work together. 
 
 • See No. 57. t See No. 69. 
 
 No. 79. 
 
 Sir M. de Bujisen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Ch-ey. — (Beceived 
 
 July 29.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 
 
 THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with 
 Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the 
 Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, and by the 
 declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. 
 If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to 
 Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburgh to the effect that 
 she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian 
 territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain 
 quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Govern- 
 ment would refuse to do. 
 
 No. 80. 
 
 Sir B Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Edward Grey.—(B.eceived 
 
 July 29.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 29, 1914. 
 
 In your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador was 
 reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contra- 
 diction with the telegram of the 27th instantt from Berlin. 
 
 Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German 
 view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,t but 
 • See No. 46. t See No. 43. 
 
44 
 
 what creates difficulty is rather the " conference," so the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which 
 he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in 
 London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula 
 acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this 
 exchange of views woxild keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna 
 and St. Petersburgh fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views 
 might be concomitant with such direct communication. 
 
 The German Govei-nment are also being informed that the Italian Government 
 would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible 
 step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend 
 their co-operation in this. 
 
 He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that 
 Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations 
 with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France 
 he thought it would have a great effect. 
 
 Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still 
 advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue 
 to exchange views. 
 
 No. 81. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
 
 WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.* 
 
 It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I under- 
 stand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any 
 discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from 
 Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the 
 Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian ilinister for Foreign Affairs must 
 therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is 
 given to any suggestions he can make there. 
 
 • See No. 64. 
 
 No. 82. 
 
 Mr. Beaumont, British Charge d' Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
 
 (Beceii-ed July 29.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Constantinople, July 29, 1914. 
 
 I TJNDERSTANB that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond 
 the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from 
 a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable 
 economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on 
 which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented 
 with Servian rule. 
 
 No. 83. 
 
 Mr. Crachanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
 
 (Beceivcd July 29.) 
 (Telegraphic.) ^Yis7i, Jvly 29, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of 
 his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the 
 House of Commons. 
 
45 
 
 No. 84. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Britisji Arabassador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) For-eipn Office, July 29, 1014. 
 
 THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to 
 iiif.orm me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, 
 and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, 
 and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Peters- 
 burgh the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the 
 German Amhasaadfir that an agreement arrived at ,dicf.ot betw.een Austria -and 
 Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as 
 there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian 
 Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the 
 Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be authorised to discuss directlj' 
 with tihe Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro- 
 Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburgh had been told that 
 Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they 
 were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. 
 They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discus- 
 sion, or even conversations d quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that 
 tJhe German Government should suggest any method by wMcla ihe iaiuence of the 
 four Powers could be used togethpr to prevent war between Austria and Russia. 
 France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence 
 was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest 
 if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation 
 by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would " press the 
 button " in the interests of peace. 
 
 No. 8S. 
 
 Sir E. Ouschen^ Bnti.s7i Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Beceived July 29.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 
 
 I AVAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just 
 returned from Potsdam. 
 
 He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration 
 might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's 
 ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to 
 make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, sp 
 far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that 
 Great Britain would never stand by and allow JTrance to be crushed in any conflict 
 there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Pro- 
 vided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given 
 to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial 
 acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any w^i" that 
 roigbt ensue. 
 
 I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and be said that he was 
 unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, 
 his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity 
 and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's 
 Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action 
 of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but 
 when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided 
 against Germany. 
 
 His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the 
 object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding 
 with England ; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that under- 
 standing which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agree- 
 ment between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present 
 moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the 
 
46 
 
 conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward 
 to realisation of his desire. 
 
 In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal 
 to you, I said that 1 did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would 
 care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you 
 would desire to retain full liberty. 
 
 Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the 
 contents of your telegram of to-day* to his Excellency, who expressed his best 
 thanks to you. 
 
 •See No. 77. 
 
 No. 86. 
 Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Borne, Juhj 29, 1914. 
 
 MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further 
 discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by 
 Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes for is 
 that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further 
 demands on Servia. 
 
 No. 87. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
 
 Foreign Ujfice, July 29, 1914. 
 Sir, 
 
 AFTER telling M. Cambon* to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I 
 told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be 
 misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security 
 that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now 
 making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon* that 
 I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the 
 present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the 
 diflBculty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the di.spute was one 
 in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, 
 in an attempt to crush Prance, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question 
 that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present 
 case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called 
 to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we 
 should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the 
 supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our 
 idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If 
 Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our 
 minds what we should do; it was a, case that we should have to consider. France 
 would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing 
 to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from 
 engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to 
 do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all 
 precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowskyt 
 not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair tliat I should let 
 M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to 
 do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise. 
 
 M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He under- 
 stood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between 
 Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be 
 raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one 
 of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to 
 do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon 
 H. 
 
 * French Ambassador in London, 
 t German Ambassador in London. 
 
47 
 
 He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from 
 Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This 
 assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia 
 was attacked. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 
 No. 88. 
 
 Sir Edicard Gicy to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
 Sir, 
 
 I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I bad 
 received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also 
 told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff,* that the Austrian 
 declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between 
 Russia and Austi-ia. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by 
 the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German 
 Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 
 If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that 
 Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this 
 morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work 
 together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian 
 Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military 
 operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only 
 drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was, of course, too late 
 for all military operations against Sorvia to be suspended. In a short time, I 
 supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some 
 Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into 
 existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until 
 she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance 
 further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia. 
 
 The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what 1 
 had said to him this morning. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 'Russian Ambassador in London. 
 
 No. 89. 
 Sir Edu-ard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 Foreign Office, Jvhj 29, 1914. 
 Sir, 
 
 AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European 
 situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, 
 something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was 
 restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfer- 
 ing in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might 
 be so great that rt would involve all European interests ; and I did not wish him to 
 be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped would continue — 
 into thinking that we should stand aside. 
 
 He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we 
 should, under certain circumstances, intervene? 
 
 I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a 
 threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, wo 
 should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany 
 was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew 
 very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British 
 interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the 
 decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had 
 to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at 
 present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German 
 
48 
 
 Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, 
 and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I 
 did not wish to be open to any reproach from Mm that the friendly tone of all out 
 conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should 
 not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course 
 of things might have been different. 
 
 The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said ; indeed, he told 
 me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the 
 situation . 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 
 No. 90. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 Foreign. Office, July 29, 1914. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as 
 recorded in my telegram of the 29th July* to your Excellency, I gave the Ambas- 
 sador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd'st telegram of the 28th Julyt and of my reply to 
 it.§ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Aus- 
 trian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what 
 the Marquis di San GiulianoTF had said, to be a metliod by which, if the Powers were 
 allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfac- 
 tion for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, how- 
 ever, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and 
 could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the 
 German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria 
 would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to 
 mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply 
 of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any 
 length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pres- 
 sure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the 
 view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, 
 and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, 
 but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far 
 Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some 
 humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the 
 humiliation of Russia. 
 
 The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as 
 to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian inde- 
 pendence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would 
 affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans. 
 
 I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to 
 say who woxild not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking 
 precautions. 
 
 The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of 
 preserving the peace of Europe. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 
 ' See No. 84. t British Ambassador in Bome. JSee Xo. 64. 
 
 § See No. 81. t Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
49 
 
 No. 91. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, Amhaxsador at Vienna. 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
 
 THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum, 
 which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of 
 Servia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action 
 was. 
 
 I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria 
 and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The 
 Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they 
 might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake. 
 
 Count Mensdorff* said that the war with Servia mvist proceed. Austria could 
 not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she 
 had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandise- 
 ment, and all she w-ished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded. 
 
 I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the 
 independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort 
 of vassal State. 
 
 Count Mensdorff* deprecated this. 
 
 In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian 
 action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before 
 the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere 
 of influence. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 B. GREY. 
 * Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 
 
 No. 92. 
 
 Sir Edirard Grey to Sir H. Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne. 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
 
 THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis 
 di San Giuliano* suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the 
 four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by 
 some change in the form of procedure. 
 
 I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government 
 to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria 
 p.nd Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be 
 applied. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 * Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 No. 93. 
 
 Telegrams communicated by Count Bcnchendorff, Bussian Ambassador in London, 
 
 July 30, 1914. 
 
 (1.) 
 Bussian Ambassador at Tiinna to M. Sazonof.* 
 
 Virnne, (Translation.) 
 
 Ic 15 (28) juillet, 1914. Vienna, July 16 (28), 1914. 
 
 (Telegraphique.) (Telegraphic.) 
 
 J'AI entretenu aujourd'hni le Comte I SPOKE to Count Berchtoldt to-day 
 
 Berchtoldt dans le sens des instructions in the sense of your Excellency's instruc- 
 
 de votre Excellence. Je lui fis observer, tions. I brought to his notice, in the 
 
 en termes les plus amicaux, combien il most friendly manner, how desirable it 
 
 etait desirable de trouver une solution was to find a solution which, while conso- 
 
 qui, en consolidant les bons rapports lidating good relations between Austria- 
 
 entre I'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, Hungary and Russia, would give to the 
 
 donnerait a la Monarchie austro-hon- Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine 
 
 * Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 t Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
50 
 
 groise des garanties serieuses pour ses 
 rapports futurs arec la Serbie. 
 
 J'attirais I'attention du Comte Berch- 
 toldt sur tous les dangers pour la paix 
 de I'Europe, qu'entrainerait un conflit 
 arme entre I'Autriche-Hongrie et la 
 Serbie. 
 
 Le Comte Berchtoldt me repondit qu'il 
 se rendait parfaitement compte du se- 
 rieux de la situation et des avantages 
 d'une franche explication avec le Cabi- 
 net de Saint-Petersbourg. II me dit que 
 d'un autre cote le GouTernement austro- 
 hongrois, qui ne s'etait decide que tres 
 mal volontiers aux mesures energiques 
 qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne 
 pouvait plus ui reouler, ni entrer en dis- 
 cussion auoune des termes de la note 
 austro-hongroise. 
 
 Le Comte Berchtoldt ajouta que la 
 crise etait devenue si aigue, et que I'ex- 
 citation de I'opinion publique avait 
 atteint tel degre, que le Gouvemement, 
 le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, 
 d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la reponse 
 memo de la Serbie donne la preuve du 
 manque de sincerite de ses promesses 
 pour I'avenir. 
 
 guarantees for its future relations with 
 Servia. 
 
 I drew Count Berchtold'st attention to 
 all the dangers to the peace of Europe 
 which would be involved by an armed 
 conflict between Austria-Hungary and 
 Servia. 
 
 Count Berchtoldt replied that he was 
 well aware of the gravity of the situa- 
 tion and of the advantages of a frank 
 explanation with the St. Petersburgh 
 Cabinet. He told me that, on the other 
 hand, the Austro-Huugarian Govern- 
 ment, who had only decided much 
 against their will on the energetic mea- 
 sures which they had taken against 
 Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter 
 into any discussion about the terms of 
 the Austro-Hungarian note. 
 
 Count Berchtoldt added that the crisis 
 had become so acute, and that public 
 opinion had risen to such a pitch of ex- 
 citement, that the Government, even if 
 they wished it, could no longer consent 
 to such a course. This was all the more 
 impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Ser- 
 vian reply itself furnished proof of the 
 insincerity of Servia's promises for the 
 future. 
 
 t Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 (2.) 
 
 M. Sazonof, Russian ^[inister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benchendorff, Bussian 
 
 Ambassador in London. 
 
 Sai n t-P efershourg, 
 Ic 16 (29) juillet, 1914. 
 (Telegraphique.) 
 
 L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, 
 an nom du Chancelier, que I'Allemagne 
 n'a pas cesse d'exercer a Vienne uno 
 influence moderatrioe et qu'elle con- 
 tinuera cette action meme acres la de- 
 claration de guerre. Jusqu'a ce matin il 
 n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armies 
 autrichiennes aient franchi la frontiere 
 serbe. J'ai prie TAmbassadeur de trans- 
 mettre au Chancelier mes remerciements 
 pour la teneur amicale de cette com- 
 munication. Je I'ai informe des mesures 
 miiltaires prises par la Russie, dont 
 aucune, lui dis-je, n'etait dirigee contre 
 TAUemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne pre- 
 jugeaient pas non plus des mesures agres- 
 sives contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, ces 
 mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation 
 de la plus grande partie de I'armee 
 austro-hongroise . 
 
 L'Ambassadeur se prononi^ant en 
 faveur d' explications directes avec le 
 Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je repondis 
 que j'.v etais tout dispose, pour peu que 
 les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il 
 parlait trouvent echo a Vienne, 
 
 St. Petershvrgh, 
 July 16 (29), 1914. 
 (Telegraphic.) 
 
 THE German Ambassador informs me, 
 in the name of the Chancellor, that Ger- 
 many has not ceased to exercise a 
 moderating influence at Vienna, and 
 that she will continue to do so even after 
 the declaration of war. Up to this 
 morning there had been no news that 
 the Austrian army has crossed the 
 Servian frontier. I have begged the 
 Ambassador to express my thanks to the 
 Chancellor for the friendly tenour of this 
 communication. I have informed him of 
 the military measures taken by Russia, 
 none of which, I told him, were directed 
 against Germany ; I added that neither 
 should they be taken as aggressive 
 measures against Austria-Hungary, their 
 explanation being the mobilisation of the 
 greater part of the Austro-Hungarian 
 army. 
 
 The Ambassador said that he was in 
 favour of direct explanations between 
 the Austrian Government and ourselves 
 and I replied that I, too, was quite 
 wiUing, provided that the advice of the 
 Gterman Government, to which he had 
 referred, found an echo at Vienna, 
 
51 
 
 En m6me temps je signalais que nous 
 etions tout disposes h, accepter le projet 
 d'une conference des quatre Puissances, 
 un projet auquel, paraissait-il, I'Alle- 
 magne ne sympathisait pas entierement. 
 
 Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meil- 
 leur moyen pour mettre k profit tous les 
 moyens propres a produire une solution 
 paciflque, consigterait en une action 
 parallele des pourparlers d'line con- 
 ference a quatre de TAUemagne, de la 
 France, de I'Angleterre et de I'ltalie et 
 d'un contact direct entre I'Autriche- 
 Hongrie et la Russie, a I'instar a peu 
 prfes de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments 
 les plus critiques de la criae de I'an 
 dernier. 
 
 Je dis a I'Ambassadeur qu'apres les 
 conoeesiona faites par la Serbie, un ter- 
 rain de compromis pour les questions 
 restees ouvertes ne serait pas tres difficile 
 a trouver, a condition toutefois de 
 quelque bonne volonte de la part de 
 I'Autriche et a condition que toutes les 
 Puissances usent de toute leuT influence 
 dans un sens de conciliation. 
 
 I said at the same time that we were 
 quite ready to accept the proposal for a 
 conference of the four Powers, a proposal 
 with which, apparently, Germany was 
 not in entire sympathy. 
 
 I told him that, in my opinion, the 
 best manner of turning to account the 
 most suitable methods of finding a peace- 
 ful solution would be by arranging for 
 parallel discussions to be carried on by a 
 conference of the four Powers — Germany, 
 France, England, and Italy — and by a 
 direct exchange of views between 
 Austria-Hungary and Russia on much 
 the same lines as occurred during the 
 most critical moments of last year's 
 crisis. 
 
 I told the Ambassador that, after the 
 concessions which had been made by 
 Servia, it should not be very difficult to 
 find a compromise to settle the other 
 questions whioh remained outstanding, 
 provided that Austria showed some good- 
 will and that all the Powers used their 
 entire influence in the direction of con- 
 ciliation. 
 
 (3.) 
 M. Saaonof, Bussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Bussian 
 
 Ambassador in London. 
 
 Saini-Petershourg , 
 le 16 (29) juillet, 1914. 
 (Telegraphique.) 
 
 Lors de mon entretien avec I'Ambas- 
 sadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon 
 telegramme precedent, je n'avais pas 
 encore recu le telegramme du 15, (28) 
 juillet de M. Schebeko.* 
 
 Le oontenu de ce telegramme constitue 
 un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de pro- 
 ceder a un echange d'idees direct avec le 
 Gouvernement Imperial. 
 
 Des lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'a 
 nous en remettre entierement au 
 Gouvernement britannique pour I'initia- 
 tive des demarches qu'il jugera utile de 
 provoquer. 
 
 St. Petersburgh, 
 July 16 (29), 1914. 
 (Telegraphic.) 
 
 AT the time of my interview, with the 
 German Ambassador, dealt with in my 
 preceding telegram, I had not yet 
 received M. Schebeko' s* telegram of the 
 15th (28th) July. 
 
 The contents of this telegram consti- 
 tute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to 
 agree to a direct exchange of views with 
 the Imperial Government. 
 
 From now on, nothing remains for us 
 to do but to rely entirely on the British 
 Government to take the initiative in any 
 steps which they may consider advisable. 
 
 * KuBsian Ambassador at Vienna. 
 
 No. 94. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Beceived July 30.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 
 
 I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations 
 on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. 
 Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, 
 that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news 
 of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not 
 generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German Govern- 
 ment declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not 
 immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, 
 
52 
 
 irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Amba-s- 
 sador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both 
 my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambas- 
 sador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and 
 explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest 
 in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at 
 Belgrade to induce Servian Government to sieet principal Austrian demands in 
 a favourable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would pro- 
 bably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been 
 completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. 
 German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any 
 prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany 
 might consent to act as mediator in Qoncert with the three other Powers. 
 
 I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of 
 the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. 1 
 gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on 
 Servia. 
 
 No. 96. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Eeceived July 30.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 
 
 RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by 
 Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regard- 
 ing the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are 
 taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be 
 crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact 
 from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of 
 hostile propaganda from Servian territory. 
 
 The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at 
 Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against 
 acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war. 
 
 Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme 
 anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to 
 plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity. 
 
 Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German 
 Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was 
 despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German 
 Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it. 
 
 No. 96. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Amhassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Beceived July 30.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 
 
 THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this after- 
 noon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview 
 with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria 
 must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, 
 but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been 
 taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassadm- at St. Petersburgh continuing 
 their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the 
 basis of the Servian reply. 
 
 On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to 
 make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that Austria 
 vvould declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet 
 be done to prevent war with Austria. 
 
S3 
 
 No. 97. 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersbwrgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (.lieceived July 30.) 
 (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914. 
 
 FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. 
 His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that 
 German Government were willing to guarantee that Sei'vian integrity would be 
 respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless 
 Se*yia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara 
 had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were 
 to tolerate such a state of affairs. 
 
 M. Sazonof* told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Govern- 
 ment that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia- 
 more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. 
 
 German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. 
 He appealed to M. Sazonof* to make some suggestion which ha could telegraph 
 to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof* accordingly drew up and handed 
 to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation : — 
 
 " If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of 
 question of European interest, declares hersslf ready to eliminate from her ulti- 
 matum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to 
 stop all military preparations." 
 
 Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal 
 is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement 
 here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a conoe-ssion, Russia 
 cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly 
 postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation. 
 
 * BuBsian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 No. 98. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 {Received July 30.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 
 
 SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince 
 Lichnowsky's* telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro- 
 Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis 
 of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their 
 conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian 
 mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, 
 who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also 
 against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to 
 agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime 
 to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria 
 he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved. 
 
 He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of 
 Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in 
 France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a measure which had been officially 
 taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday — Imperial Govern- 
 ment had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Somethi-ng, how- 
 ever, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised 
 they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France 
 did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity. 
 
 His Excellency added that telegramt received from Prince Lichnowsky* last 
 night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with sur- 
 prise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which 
 you had spoken. 
 
 • German Ambassador in London. t See No. 102. 
 
54 
 
 He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very latp last night ; 
 had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in 
 the way he had done. 
 
 No. 99. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, BrUish Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Gieij. — 
 {Beceived July 30.) 
 (Telegraphic.) I'aris, Jxdy 30, 1914. 
 
 PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been 
 informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation 
 Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburgh, 
 states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a, request 
 to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The 
 answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives 
 an assurance that she wiU respect the sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of 
 the demands of the Austrian note, which Servia has not accepted, to an international 
 discussion. 
 
 President thinks that these conditions will not be aoofepted by Austria. He 
 is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If 
 His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of Fi-ance 
 in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a, result of the present 
 differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would 
 at once modify her attitude. 
 
 I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to 
 make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be 
 in the interests of peace. Prance, he said, is pacific. Slie does not desire war, and 
 all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not 
 to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable 
 information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz 
 ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably 
 draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now 
 of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be main- 
 tained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war. 
 
 No. 100. 
 Sir B. Bodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Beccived July 30.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 30, 1914. 
 
 GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would be 
 able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be 
 induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of 
 Belgrade had been accomplished. 
 
 I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be 
 devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views. 
 
 I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion. 
 
 No. 101. 
 S'lr Edward Orey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 
 
 YOUR telegram of 29th July.* 
 
 His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's 
 proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. 
 
 What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are 
 taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as 
 distinct from the colonies. 
 
 From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, 
 without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as 
 to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. 
 
 • See No. 85. 
 
55 
 
 Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain 
 with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of 
 this country would never recover. 
 
 The Chancellor also in effect asks us .to bargain away whatever obligation or 
 interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that 
 bargain either. 
 
 Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a 
 future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered posi- 
 tive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must 
 preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any 
 such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chan- 
 cellor contemplates. 
 
 You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly 
 that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany 
 is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if 
 we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I 
 believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's 
 Government will work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill. 
 
 And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present 
 crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to 
 which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive 
 or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by Prance, Russia, and 
 ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I 
 could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, 
 our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form 
 the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than 
 any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful 
 that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite 
 rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto. 
 
 No. 102. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Ooschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky* that Germany must not count upon our 
 standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the tele- 
 gram from Prince Lichnowsky* to German Chancellor, to which reference is made 
 in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.t 
 
 * German Ambassador in London. 
 ' tSee No. 98. 
 
 No. 103. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 
 
 GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour 
 to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of 
 frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange 
 that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied 
 would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yester- 
 day as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly 
 hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides. 
 
 Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,* as 
 quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,t and fears it cannot be modified; but if 
 Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers 
 would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian 
 sovereign rights or independence. 
 
 If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, 
 declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and 
 
 •Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. tSe No. S7. 
 
56 
 
 to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would 
 also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided 
 that other Powers did the same. 
 
 It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You 
 should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 ■ No. 104. 
 Sir Edicard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 
 
 YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. 
 Buchanan* of to-day, t and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to 
 precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. 
 Petersburgh. 
 
 * British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. t See No. 103. 
 
 No. 105. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 
 
 M. CAMBON* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years 
 ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we 
 would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference 
 copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace 
 of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask 
 me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we 
 .should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind 
 was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy 
 is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced 
 and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. 
 He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that 
 France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain 
 neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things 
 could France admit. 
 
 I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him 
 r.gLiin to-morrow afternoon. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 * French Ambassador in London. 
 
 Enclosure 1 in No. 105. 
 
 Sir Fdward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London. 
 My Dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, Sovember 22, 1912. 
 
 FRO^il time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military 
 experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consulta- 
 tion does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time 
 whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultar 
 tion between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that 
 commits either Government to .action in a contingency that has not arisen and may 
 never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respec- 
 tively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 
 
 You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason 'to 
 expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know 
 whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 
 
 I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked 
 attack by a third Power, or something that threaten-ed the general peace, it should 
 immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together 
 to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would 
 be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of 
 the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments 
 would then decide what effect should be given to them. 
 
 Yours, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 
S7] 
 
 Enclosure 2 in No. 105. 
 M. Camhon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 L' Amhassade de France, 
 
 Londres, 
 ce 23 novemhre, 1912. 
 Cher Sir Edward, 
 
 PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 
 novembre, vous m'avez rappele que, 
 dans ces dernieres annees, les autorites 
 militaires et navales de la France et de 
 la Grande-Bretagne s'etaient consultees 
 de temps en temps; qu'il avait tou jours 
 ete entendu que ces consultations ne re- 
 streignaient pas la liberte, pour ohaque 
 Gouvernement, de decider dans I'avenir 
 s'ils se preteraient I'un I'autre le con- 
 cours de leurs forces armees ; que, de 
 part et d' autre, ces consultations entre 
 specialistes n'etaient et ne devaient pas 
 etre cousiderees comme des engage- 
 ments obligeant nos Gouvernements 
 a agir dans certains cas ; que cependant 
 je vous avais fait observer que, si I'un ou 
 I'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de 
 graves raisons d'apprehender une atta- 
 que non provoquee de la part d'une 
 tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel 
 de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur I'assis- 
 tanoe armee de I'autre. 
 
 Votre lettre repond a cette observa- 
 tion, et je suis autorise a vous declarer 
 que, dans le cas ou I'un de nos deux 
 Gouvernements aurait un motif grave 
 d'apprehender soit I'aggression d'une 
 tierce puissance, soit quelque evenement 
 mena9ant pour la paix generale, ce Gou- 
 vernement examinerait immediatement 
 avec I'autre si les deuxGouvernements doi- 
 vent agir de concert en vue de prevenir 
 I'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. 
 Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements de- 
 libereraient sur les mesures qu'ils serai- 
 ent disposes a prendre en commun ; si 
 ces mesures comportaient une action, les 
 deux Gouvernements prendraient aussi- 
 tot en consideration les plans de leurs 
 etats majors et decideraient alors de la 
 suite qui devrait etre donnee a ces plans. 
 Votre sincerement devoue, 
 
 PAUL C AMBON. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 French Embassy, London. 
 November 23, 1912. 
 Dear Sir Edward, 
 
 YOU reminded me in your letter of 
 yesterday, 22nd November, that during 
 the last few years the military and naval 
 authorities of Prance and Great Britain 
 had consulted with each other from time 
 to time; that it had always been under- 
 stood that these consultations should not 
 restrict the liberty of either Government 
 to decide in the future whether they 
 should lend each other the support of 
 their armed forces ; that, on either side, 
 these consultations between experts were 
 not and should not be considered as 
 engagements binding our Governmenis 
 to take action in certain eventualities ; 
 that, however, I had remarked to you 
 that, if one or other of the two Govern- 
 ments had grave reasons to fear an un- 
 provoked attack on the part of a third 
 Power, it would become essential to 
 know whether it could count on the 
 armed support of the other. 
 
 Your letter answers that point, and I 
 am authorised to state that, in the event 
 of one of our two Governments having 
 grave reasons to fear either an act of 
 aggression from a third Power, or some 
 event threatening the general peace, 
 that Government would immediately 
 examine with the other the question 
 whether both Governments should act 
 together in order to prevent the act of 
 aggression or preserve peace. If so, the 
 two Governments would deliberate as to 
 the measures which they would be pre- 
 pared to take in common ; if those mea- 
 sures involved action, the two Govern- 
 ments would take into immediate con- 
 sideration the plans of their general 
 staffs and would then decide as to the 
 effect to be given to those plans. 
 Yours, &c., 
 
 PAUL CAMBON. 
 
 Enclosure 3 in No. 105. 
 
 French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M . Camhon, French Ambassador in London. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 L' ARMEE allemande a ses avant- THE German Army had its advance- 
 
 postes sur nos bomes-frontieres, hier ; posts on our frontiers yesterday; Ger- 
 par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes man patrols twice penetrated on to our 
 ont penetre sur notre territoire. Nos territory. Our advance-posts are with- 
 avant-postes sont en retraite a 10 kilom. drawn to a distance of 10 kilora. from the 
 en arriere de la frontiere. Les popula- frontier. The local population is pro- 
 
58 
 
 tions aiiisi abandonnees a I'attaque de 
 I'armee adverse protestent; mais le 6ou- 
 vernement tient a montrer a 1' opinion 
 publique et au Gouvernement britan- 
 nique que I'agresseur ne sera en aucun 
 cas la France. Tout le 16= Corps de Metz 
 renforce par une partie du 8' venu de 
 Treves et de Cologne occupe la frontiere 
 de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15= Corps 
 d'Armee de Strasbourg a serre sur la 
 frontiere. Sous menace d'etre fusilles les 
 Alsaeiens-Lorrains des pays annexes ne 
 peuvent pas passer la frontiere ; des re- 
 servistes par dizaines de milliers sont rap- 
 peles en Allemagne; c'est le dernier 
 stade avant la mobilisation : or, nous 
 n'avons rappele aucun reserviste. 
 
 Comme vous le royez, 1' Allemagne I'a 
 fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informa- 
 tions concordent pour montrer que les 
 preparatifs allemands ont commence 
 samedi,* le jour meme de la remise de la 
 note autrichienne. 
 
 Ces elements, ajoutes a ceux contenus 
 dans mon telegramme d'hier, vous per- 
 mettent de faire la preuve au Gouverne- 
 ment britannique de la volonte pacifique 
 de I'un et des intentions agressives de 
 I'autre. 
 
 testing against being thus abandoned to 
 the attack of the enemy's army, but the 
 Government wishes to make it clear to 
 public opinion and to the British Gov- 
 ernment that in no case will France be 
 the aggressor. The whole 16th corps 
 from Metz reinforced by a part of the 
 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupy- 
 ing the frontier at Metz on the Luxem- 
 burg side. The 15th army corps from 
 Strassburg has closed np on the fron- 
 tier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine 
 are prevented by the threat of being 
 shot from crossing the frontier. Reser- 
 vists have been called back to Germany 
 by tens of thousands. This is the last 
 stage before mobilisation, whereas we 
 have not called back a single reservist. 
 
 As you see, Germany has done so. I 
 would add that all my information goes 
 to show that the German preparations 
 began on Saturday,* the very day on 
 which the Austrian note was handed in. 
 
 These facts, added to those contained 
 in my telegram of yesterday, will enable 
 you to prove to the British Government 
 the pacific intentions of the one party 
 and the aggressive intentions of the 
 other. 
 
 * Sic : in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatnra was, 
 in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 26, and it is 
 clearly to the latter document that reference is intended. 
 
 No. 106. 
 
 Sir B. Eodd, British Ambassador at Borne, to Sir Edward Crrey. — 
 (Beceiued July 31.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 30, 1914. 
 
 I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, 
 that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views 
 with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was 
 now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced 
 that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue 
 with us. 
 
 He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the 
 German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the 
 four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider accept- 
 able. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the 
 terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would 
 neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to 
 ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany 
 would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, 
 on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew 
 the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. 
 There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was 
 in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the 
 idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible. 
 
59 
 
 No. 107. 
 
 Sir E. Ooschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Beceived July 31.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 
 
 I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government 
 to the communication* which you made to them through the German Ambassador 
 in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers 
 could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed 
 last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to 
 an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government 
 had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt 
 that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had 
 asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer 
 had, however, yet been returned. 
 
 The Chancellor told me last night that he was " pressing the button " as hard 
 as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging 
 moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise. 
 
 •See No. 84. 
 
 No. 108. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Beceived July 31.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 
 
 CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at 
 Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. 
 He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather 
 more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave 
 his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as 
 he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against 
 Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell 
 me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German 
 Government would take some very serious step ; he was, in fact, just on the point 
 of going to have an audience with the Emperor. 
 
 His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo- 
 German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor 
 in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor 
 was actually conforming to that request. 
 
 No. 109. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Received July 31.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 
 
 I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British 
 neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.* His 
 Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the 
 frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your 
 communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that 
 I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before 
 giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be 
 certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your 
 message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of 
 conversation, and not as an official document. 
 His Excellency agreed. 
 
 *See No. 101. 
 
60 
 No. 110. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershurgh. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 
 
 I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the 
 German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian 
 Minister for Foreign AflEairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has also been instructed that he may converse with 
 the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations 
 about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions 
 directly afiecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to 
 the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not 
 too great a number against 400,000 Servians. 
 
 The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show 
 goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations. 
 
 It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed 
 between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them. 
 
 I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I 
 did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put 
 by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. 
 
 No. 111. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Amhafsador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 
 
 I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and 
 Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been 
 Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian inten- 
 tions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has ijccurred to 
 me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna 
 and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to 
 sound St. Petersburgh whether it would be possible for the four disinterested 
 Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she 
 obtained fidl satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they 
 did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As 
 your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect 
 them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to 
 prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and 
 integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or 
 preparations. 
 
 You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal. 
 
 I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any 
 reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria 
 were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be 
 unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and Paris, 
 and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His 
 Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but 
 otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be 
 drawn in. 
 
 You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal 
 above. 
 
 No. 112. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edicard Grey. — 
 {Iteceiied July 31.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin , July 31, 1914. 
 
 ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from their 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. 
 
61 
 
 Chancellor tells me that " Kriegsgefahr "* will be proclaimed at once by German 
 Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation 
 is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost iBnaediately. His Excellency added 
 in explanation that " Kriegsgefahr "* signified the taking of certain precautionary 
 measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country. 
 
 This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Bxcellency^ seemed to him to put an 
 end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare 
 for all emergencies. 
 
 I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at 
 Vienna to do something iii general interests to reassure Russia and to show them- 
 selves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last 
 night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received 
 a, reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Fbreign Affairs would take wishes 
 of the Emperor this morning in the matter. 
 
 * " Imminenoe of War." 
 
 No. 113. 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Orcy. — 
 
 (Beceived July 31.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) St. Peiershurcik, July 31, 1914. 
 
 IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation. 
 
 This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambas- 
 sador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention 
 of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia. 
 
 Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military pre- 
 parations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. 
 
 No. 114. 
 
 )Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and Sir E. Gasehen, 
 British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 (lelegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1&14. 
 
 I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of 
 mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view 
 of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to 
 engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. 
 
 A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is 
 important to have an early answer. 
 
 No. 115. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) . Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 
 
 IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, 
 in consideration of the possibilty of a European war, I have asked French and 
 German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium 
 provided it is violated by no other Power. 
 
 Yon should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the 
 utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to 
 uphold and observe. 
 
 You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired. 
 
62 
 
 No. 116. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.* 
 
 Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties 
 or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the 
 Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, \^hereas 
 in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. 
 
 1 believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in 
 situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. 
 
 We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told 
 the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider 
 this decision. 
 
 I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the pre- 
 sent moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there 
 is a new development. 
 
 • See No. 99. 
 
 No. 117. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received 
 
 July 31.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 
 
 AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When 
 I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency. 
 
 German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that 
 orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German 
 Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian 
 Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised. 
 
 The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisa- 
 tion of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve 
 hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German 
 demand. 
 
 The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and 
 enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. 
 
 German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is 
 going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. 
 in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will 
 adopt in the circum.stances. 
 
 He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. 
 
 I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general 
 mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place. 
 
 No. 118. 
 
 Sir M. de Biinsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Heceived July 31.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) • Vienna, July 31, 1914. 
 
 I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although 
 Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the 
 Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobili- 
 sation was not to he regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams 
 were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, 
 and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh 
 and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, 
 be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would 
 mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her 
 
63 
 
 position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary 
 found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that 
 during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of 
 Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a com- 
 promise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted 
 frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the 
 situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar com- 
 promise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see tho 
 Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation. 
 
 The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere 
 unduly with Servia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present 
 Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views ; and that, as regards Au.strian 
 demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could 
 without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly 
 in the interests of peace. 
 
 No. 119. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
 
 Sir, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 
 
 M. CAMBON* referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur 
 Nicolsont this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was 
 the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encourag- 
 ing element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of 
 Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace. 
 
 I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the 
 impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that 
 we should remain neutral. I had not only d-efinitely declined to say that we woiiJd, 
 remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the Germaui 
 Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be 
 drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement 
 to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany 
 under the impression that we would stand aside. 
 
 M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday. 
 
 I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could 
 not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy 
 before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present 
 moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or 
 obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this 
 situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that inter- 
 vention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I 
 would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. 
 Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war. 
 Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of 
 Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether 
 each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to 
 violate the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany 
 made an attack on her. 
 
 I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone 
 at present, we could not take any engagement. 
 
 M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning; rejected proposals that 
 might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that Prance 
 should be crushed by Germany. AVe should then be in a very diminished position 
 with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made n great mistake in allowing an 
 enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. 
 He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again. 
 
 * French Ambassador in London. 
 
 t British Under Spcrptarr of State for Foreign Affairs. 
 
64 
 
 I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as ihere was 
 some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give 
 was that we could not nndertake any definite engagement. 
 
 I aro^, &c. 
 
 E. GEEY. 
 
 No. 120. 
 
 Sir 6. BuckaTtany British Amlassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.— 
 
 (Beceived August 1.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914. 
 
 MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked 
 us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated 
 to amalgamate proposal made %y you in your telegram of SOth July* witli formula 
 recorded in my telegram of SOth July.t He trusted it would meet with your 
 approval : — 
 
 " Si I'Autriche consentira a arreter marche des ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, 
 si, reoonnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume le oaractexe d'une question 
 d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction 
 que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser 
 porter atteinte a ses droits d'etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie 
 s' engage a oonserver son attitude expectante."+ 
 
 His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by 
 Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas 
 had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of 
 peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure 
 Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was con- 
 cealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria 
 continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved 
 across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, 
 to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress. 
 
 M. Sazonof§ said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful 
 solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the 
 atmosphei-e was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see 
 your way to agreeing to this. 
 
 His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment, who had done so much to save the situation. It would he largely due to 
 them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Governn,eirt, "and the 
 Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain. 
 *See No. 103. .f gg^ jjo. 97. 
 
 tTEANSLATION.— " It Austria will agree to cheoh the advance of her trooDB on Servian 
 territory; li recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia ha/ Assumed a 
 character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into Thlmitter 
 and determine whether Scrvia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian GoverSment ^thXf,f 
 Sk^SfaS^^er J^^nratt^trdr'^^'^" ^'^'^ °^ ^^ independenc^e, EussJr^.Tl?Tn°dU"^^^e°?o* 
 § Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 No. 121. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen. British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey-^ 
 {lieccived August 1.) 
 
 ^^'yOTffiegram of 31st July.* ^''^'''' -^"'^ ^^' l^^^' 
 
 I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accent 
 your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European 
 
 war. 
 
 • See No. Ill, 
 
65 
 
 He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appre- 
 ciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the 
 Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer 
 from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, uhich he 
 admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the 
 Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand 
 her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her 
 side to mobilise at once. 
 
 I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for 
 Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it 
 was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed 
 against Austria. 
 
 His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought 
 personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case 
 he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no 
 use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the 
 German demand. 
 
 He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the 
 Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last liight been 
 urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and telegraphic and 
 telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature — but 
 Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything. 
 
 No. 122. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Hdvjard Grey. — 
 (lieceived August 1.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, Jidy 31, 1914. 
 
 NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. 
 Sortie.* 
 
 I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the 
 Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what 
 he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain 
 amount of their plan of campaigil in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore 
 very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, never- 
 theless, took note of your request. 
 
 It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain 
 hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he 
 alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo 
 already. 
 
 I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but 
 the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote. 
 
 In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in 
 any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government. 
 
 • See No. 114. 
 
 No. 123. 
 
 Hir Edu-ard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 Sir, Foreir/n Office, August 1, 1914. 
 
 I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply* of the German Govern- 
 ment with regard to the neutralitj of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, 
 because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany 
 could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by 
 Prance it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the 
 other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant 
 while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling 
 in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet 
 meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. 
 
 •See No. 122. 
 
66 
 
 He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium 
 neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. 
 
 I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were con- 
 sidering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would 
 be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium 
 would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could 
 give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. 
 
 The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on 
 which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France 
 and her colonies might be guaranteed. 
 
 I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on 
 similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 
 No. 124. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Beceived 
 
 August 1.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 
 
 ON the receipt at 8-30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent a 
 message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 
 10-30 to-night at the Elysee, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a 
 note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium 
 which you instructed me to make. 
 
 He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambas- 
 sador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her 
 army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the 
 attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made 
 by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible. 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing 
 up. 
 
 •See No. 114. 
 
 No. 125. 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Beceived 
 
 August 1.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 
 
 MY immediately preceding telegram.* 
 
 Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows :■ — 
 
 French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it 
 would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that 
 France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her 
 own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. Presi- 
 dent of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French 
 Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian 
 ilinister for Foreign Affairs to-day. 
 
 •See No. 124. 
 
 No. 126. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.- — {Beceived 
 
 August 1.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, August I, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the 
 German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the ^Jlinistry for Foreign Affairs 
 this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which 
 
67 
 
 prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his 
 Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after 
 Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were 
 ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French 
 Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready 
 to converse, th* German Government should have at that moment presented an 
 ultimatum at St. Petersburgh requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There 
 were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German 
 Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and 
 had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break 
 off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador 
 was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary 
 proceeding. 
 
 The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again 
 this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he 
 had packed up. 
 
 No. 127. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, Briti::^ Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 (Beceived August 1.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. 
 GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet. 
 
 No. 128. 
 
 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Beceived August 1.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 1, 1914. 
 
 BELGIAN neutrality. 
 
 The instructions convoyed in your telegram of yesterday" have been acted upon. 
 Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her 
 neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so inform- 
 ing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the 
 neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend 
 themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours 
 were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but be thought 
 it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies. 
 
 •See No. 115. 
 
 No. 129. 
 Minister of State, Luxemburg , to Sir Edward Grey. — (Beceived August 2.) 
 
 Luxembourg, 2 aouf, 1914. 
 (Telegraphique.) 
 
 MINISTRE d'fitat du Luxembourg 
 Eysohen vient de recevoir par I'inter- 
 mediaire du Ministre d'Allemagne a 
 Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un tele- 
 gramme du Ohancelier de I'Empire alle- 
 mand Bethmann-Holhveg disant que les 
 mesures militaires a Luxembourg ne 
 constituent pas un acte hostile centre le 
 Luxembourg, mais sent uniquement des 
 mesures destinees a assurer contre 
 attaque eventuelle d'une armee franpaise. 
 L'exploitation des voies ferrees affermees 
 a I'Empire Luxembourg reoevra com- 
 plete indemnite pour dommages even- 
 tuels. 
 
 / (Translation.) 
 
 Luxemburg , August 2, 1914. 
 (Telegraphic.) 
 
 THE Luxemburg Minister of State, 
 Eyshen, has just received through the 
 German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de 
 Buoh, a telegram from the Chancellor of 
 the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, 
 to the effect that the military measures 
 taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a 
 hostile act against Luxemburg, but are 
 only intended to insure against a possible 
 attack of a French army. Full compen- 
 sation will be paid to Luxemburg for any 
 damage caused by using the railways 
 which are leased to the Emoire. 
 
68 
 
 No. 130. 
 iStr Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, Avgvst 1, 1914. 
 
 WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers 
 belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchanlrships. 
 
 I cannot ascertain on what ground the detention of British ships has been 
 ordered. 
 
 You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they 
 should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinioc here will 
 be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are 
 most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Govern- 
 ment will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the 
 situation between us impossible. 
 
 No. 131. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 
 
 I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite 
 in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war. 
 
 The Russian Grovernment has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to 
 discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation 
 which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia 
 originally suggested. 
 
 Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia arc ready to 
 converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the 
 Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His JMajesty's 
 Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters. 
 
 No. 132. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Amhassador at Berlin. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 
 
 FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof* to Count Benckendorfft of the 31st 
 July communicated to me to-day : — 
 "(Urgent.) 
 
 ' ' Formule amendee conf ormement a la proposition anglaise : 'Si Autriche 
 consent a arreter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant 
 que le conflit austro serbe a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, 
 elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pour- 
 rait accorder an Gourernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte a ses 
 droits d' jitat souvcrain et a son independance, la Russie s' engage a conserver son 
 attitude expectante.' "+ 
 
 (Above communicated to all the Powers.) 
 
 * Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 
 t Russian Ambassador In London. 
 
 i Teanslation. — "Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: 'If 
 Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising 
 that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European 
 interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can 
 accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a 
 State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.' " 
 
 No. 133. 
 
 Sir Echrard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Am,bassador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 
 
 M. DE ETTER* came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from 
 M. Sazonof, t dated the 31st July, which are as follows: — 
 
 * Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London. 
 t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
69 
 
 "The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government 
 to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied 
 by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should 
 take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers. 
 
 " M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of 
 these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be 
 very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her mili- 
 tary action on Servian territory." 
 
 (The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) 
 
 No. 134. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received 
 
 August 1.) 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. 
 
 PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government were 
 trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of 
 general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered 
 a general mobilisation ; that, although the measures which the German Government 
 have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated ; 
 that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that 
 Prance is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military 
 preparations ; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German 
 frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of 
 provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually 
 on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding 
 mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his 
 conversations with the German Ambassador with a, view to preserving the peace ; 
 that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, Sincerely desire the 
 preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible tc 
 avoid war. 
 
 No. 135. 
 
 Sir Eihrard Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petcrsburgh. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 
 
 INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Govern- 
 ment have informed German Government that though the situation has been 
 changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts 
 of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my 
 proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance 
 would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue 
 for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Govern- 
 ment to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case 
 Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, 
 which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation. 
 
 You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the oon- 
 sideratdon of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop 
 mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the 
 matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government. 
 
 No.l36. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.- 
 {Beceived August 1.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. 
 
 MINISTER of War informed military attache this afternoon that orders had been 
 given at 3-40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became neces- 
 sary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of " Kriegszustand,"* 
 
 * " State of war." 
 
70 
 
 the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their 
 covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, 
 he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name. 
 
 The French forces on the frontier hare opposed to tiiem eight army corps on a 
 war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the 
 utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between 
 the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and 
 the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisa- 
 tion is one for purely defensive purposes. 
 
 No. 137. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunscn, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 
 
 I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with 
 the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his 
 Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to 
 impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The 
 Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report Mhich had been published 
 in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak. 
 
 Count Mensdorff* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of 
 a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh 
 by Count Berchtold,t and gave me the substance. 
 
 It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent 
 for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. 
 Petersburgh that the " door had been banged " by Austria-Hungary on all further 
 conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold 
 repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had 
 already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an infraction of 
 Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being con- 
 templated by Austria-Hungary. 
 
 Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff* to the fact that this telegram 
 contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh had not 
 been broken off by Austria-Hungary. 
 
 * Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 
 
 t Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 No. 138. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 {Received August 2.) 
 
 YOUR telegram of to-day.* 
 
 I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of 
 State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between 
 Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally If 
 therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and 
 Germany did not desne war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that 
 Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement 
 Secretary of btate said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German 
 influence at Vienna and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have 
 been well But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that 
 she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobiUse also. Russia had said that 
 
 * See No. 131. 
 
71 
 
 her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well 
 remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with 
 Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the 
 German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses 
 of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, 
 though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the spooifted 
 time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore M-dered mobilisation, and 
 the Gei'man representative at St. Petersburgh had been instructed within a certain 
 time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard 
 their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war. 
 
 No. 139. 
 
 Sir 6. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 
 {Ueceived August 2.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 1914. 
 
 MY telegram of 31st July.* 
 
 The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German 
 Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress what- 
 ever was made. 
 
 In the evening M. Sazonoft had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador 
 who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the 
 conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary 
 and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, 
 and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real ques- 
 tion which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush 
 Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave 
 Servia u, free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian 
 question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria- 
 Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discus- 
 sion of this question cpuld be expected was London, and any such discussion was 
 being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a 
 virtually unfortified town, to bombardment. 
 
 M. Sazonoft informed the French Ambassador and mystelf this morning of his 
 conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the 
 Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with 
 Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that 
 Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of 
 the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia 
 a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both 
 tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, 
 secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been 
 an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German 
 Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian iTltimatum ; what 
 mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been post- 
 poned until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Ger- 
 many was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh : the 
 former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported 
 to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonoft was completely 
 weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held 
 out to him had been refvised. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of 
 four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between 
 Austria and Russia ; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these 
 attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. 
 The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had 
 forced the Russian Government to orde_r mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Ger- 
 many had created u desperate situation 
 
 •See No. 120. 
 
 t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
72 
 
 M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my tele- 
 gram of 31st July,* had been forwarded by the Bussian Government to Vienna, and 
 he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was 
 crossed by German troops. In no case would Kussia begin hostilities first. 
 
 I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of 
 France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own 
 sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last 
 attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. 
 
 ♦See No. 120. 
 
 No. 140. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Eduard Gh-ey. — (Received 
 
 August 1.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. 
 
 THE Minister of War again sent for the military attache this evening, as he said 
 he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact 
 that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and 
 the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the 
 French endeavours to commit no provocative act. 
 
 No. 141. 
 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Amhassador at Vienna, to Sir Edu-ard G-rey. — 
 
 (Received August 2.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. 
 
 I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon 
 he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by 
 the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demo- 
 bilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant 
 war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise 
 if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Tienna thinks that war is almost inevi- 
 table, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany wiU 
 attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted 
 to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to 
 those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany 
 and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to 
 the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian 
 integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack 
 Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight con- 
 cession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his 
 Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and 
 that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian 
 Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the 
 first. 
 
 It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask 
 whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being 
 considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that 
 nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed 
 on their present course, if they have made up their mind with tho approval of 
 Germany. 
 
73 
 
 No. 142. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Amhassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Orey. — 
 
 {Received August 2.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. 
 
 ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and 
 army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August. 
 
 No. 143. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Received August 2.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) B-erlin, August 1, 1914. 
 
 DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg. 
 
 Your telegram of 1st August* acted on. 
 
 Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has 
 promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay. 
 
 *See No. 130. 
 
 No. 144. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Amhassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (lieceived August 2.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, A^tgust 2, 1914. 
 
 SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian 
 troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war. 
 
 No. 145. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Amhassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Received August 2.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. 
 
 MY telegram of 1st August.* 
 
 Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British 
 ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as 
 a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been 
 allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other 
 precautions being taken. 
 
 •See No. 143. 
 
 No. 146. 
 
 Sir F. X'illiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Received Avgust 2.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Brussels, .iugust 2, 1914. 
 
 THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has 
 been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government. 
 
 D-2 
 
74 
 
 No. 147. 
 Minister of-State, Ijuxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) 
 
 * Luxembourg, le 2 aoiit, 1914. 
 (Telegraphique.) 
 
 J'AI I'honneur de porter a la connais- 
 aanoe de votre Excellence les faits 
 suivaots : 
 
 Dimanche, 2 aout, de grand matin, les 
 troupes allemandes, d'apres les informa- 
 tions qui sout parvenues au Gouverne- 
 ment Grand ducal a I'heure actuelle, ont 
 penetre sur le territoire luxembourgeois 
 par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de 
 Remioh, se dirigeant specialement vers le 
 sud du pays et vers la rille de Luxem- 
 bourg, capitale du Grand Duche. Un 
 certain nombre de trains bljin^es ayec 
 des trouT)es et des munitions ont ete 
 aohemines par la voie de chemin de fer 
 de Wasserbillig a Luxembourg, ovi I'on 
 s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un 
 instant a 1' autre, ces faits impliquent des 
 aotes manifestement contraire a la 
 neutralite du Grand Duche garantie par 
 le Traite de Londres de 1867. Le 
 Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas 
 manqu^ de protester energiquement 
 centre cette agression aupres des repre- 
 sentants de Sa Majeste I'Empereur 
 d'Allemagne a Luxembourg. Une pro- 
 testation identique va etre transmise 
 telegraphiquement au Secretaire d';fitat 
 pour les Affaires Etrangeres a Berlin. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Luxejuburg , 
 (Telegraphic.) August 2, 1914. 
 
 I HAVE the honour to bring to your 
 Excellency's notice the following facts : — 
 
 On Sunday, the 2nd August, very 
 early, the German troops, according to 
 the information which has up to now 
 reached the Grand Ducal Government, 
 penetrated into Luxemburg territory by 
 the bridges of Wasserbillig and R-emioh, 
 and proceeded particularly tovfards the 
 south and in the direction of Luxemburg, 
 the capital of the Grand Duchy. A cer- 
 tain number of armoured trains with 
 troops and ammunition have been sent 
 along the railway line from Wasserbillig 
 to Luxemburg;, where their arrival is 
 expected. These occurrences constitute 
 acts which are manifestly contrary to the 
 neutrality of the Grand Duchy as 
 guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 
 1867. The Luxemburg Government have 
 not failed to address an energetic pro- 
 test against this aggression to the repre- 
 sentatives of His Majesty the German 
 Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical 
 protest will be sent by telegraph to the 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at 
 Berlin. 
 
 No. 148. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Beitie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914. 
 
 AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon* the following memoran- 
 dum : — 
 
 " I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the 
 Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French 
 coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. 
 
 " This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government 
 receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His 
 Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by 
 the German fleet takes place." 
 
 I pointed out that we had very large questions and most diificult issues to con- 
 sider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war 
 upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, 
 but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been con- 
 centrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their 
 north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them 
 this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German 
 fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that T\ould 
 enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet. 
 
 M. Cambon* asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doc- 
 trine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He 
 * French Ambassador in London. 
 
75 
 
 asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I 
 said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement 
 we should make in Parliament to-morrow — in effect, whether we should declare 
 violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him what had been said to 
 the German Ambassador on this point. 
 
 No. 149. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914. 
 
 YOUR telegram of 1st August.* 
 
 I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the 
 British steamship " Sappho " at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears 
 to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar. 
 
 You should inform Secretary* of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram 
 of 1st August, t I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to 
 allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the 
 detention of which cannot be justified. 
 
 • See No. 14S. t See No. 130. . , , 
 
 No. 150. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Received August 3.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, Augvst 3, 1914. 
 
 YOUR telegram of 2ud August* : Detention of British ships at Hamburg. 
 No information available. 
 
 •See No. 149. 
 
 No. 151. 
 
 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
 (Received August 3.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. 
 
 FRENCH Government have offered through their military attache the support 
 of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following leply has been 
 sent to-day : — 
 
 "We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual 
 support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the 
 guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action 
 which they may think it necessary to take." 
 
 No. 152. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
 
 Sir, Foreign Office, August 3, 1914. 
 
 ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communica- 
 tion : — 
 
 " In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums 
 had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the 
 intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Ginliano* replied : — 
 
 " ' The war undertaken by Auistria, and the consequences which might result, 
 had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both 
 •Italian Minister (or Foreign Affairs, 
 
76 
 
 were therefore m conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, 
 and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.' " 
 
 In making this communication, M. Cambont was instructed to lay stress upon the 
 Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive 
 war, and that, for this reason, the casus foederis under the terms of the Triple 
 Alliance did not arise. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 E. GREY. 
 
 t French Ambassador in London. 
 
 No. 153. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschev, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 (Telegraphic.) Forcicjn Office, Augvst 4, 1914. 
 
 THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for 
 diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms : — 
 
 " Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of 
 your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof oi 
 friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic 
 intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 
 
 His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have 
 delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing 
 free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence 
 and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threaten- 
 ing in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested 
 within twelve hours. 
 
 We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant 
 violation of the law of nations. 
 
 His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty 
 to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an 
 assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that 
 her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You sliould ask for an immediate 
 reply. 
 
 No. 154. 
 
 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edirard Grey. — 
 {Beceived August 4.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Brussels, Anfiust 4, 1914., 
 
 GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned 
 proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply 
 to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures 
 considered indispensable in view of the French menaces. 
 
 No. 155. 
 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 
 
 YOU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by 
 Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality. His Majesty's Government 
 expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's 
 Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's 
 Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in 
 offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of 
 resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their 
 independence and integrity in future years. 
 
77 
 
 No. 156. 
 
 Sir Edward Orey to Sir E. Oosehen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreif/n Offlee, August 4, 1914. 
 
 I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the 
 detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This 
 aotioil on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct 
 contraTeiltion of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency 
 by the Imperial Ohanoellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British 
 ships if such release has not yet been given. 
 
 No. 157. 
 
 German Eoreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London. — ■ 
 (Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Berliv, August 4, 1914. 
 
 PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British 
 Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assu- 
 rance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under 
 no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this ' declaration is 
 bbrne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect 
 her iieutrnlity. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory 
 without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland, 
 Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French 
 attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable 
 information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being 
 for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance. 
 
 No. 158. 
 
 Sir F. Villiers, British MinUfer at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received 
 
 Aw/ust 4.) 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
 
 MILITARY attache has been informed at War Office that German troops have 
 entered Belgian territory, and that Liege has been summoned to surrender by small 
 party of Germans who, however, were repulsed. 
 
 No. 159. 
 
 Sir Edioard Grey to Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 
 
 WE hear that Gei'many has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if neces- 
 sary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. 
 
 We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich, 
 In these circumstances, and in View of the fact that Germany declined to give 
 the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our 
 request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and 
 ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning* be received 
 here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instnacted to ask for your passports, 
 and to Say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their 
 power to Uphold the neulrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which 
 Germany is as much a pftrty as oilrselves. 
 
 *See No. 153. 
 
78 
 
 No. 160. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 Sir, London, August 8, 1914. 
 
 IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4tii 
 instant* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the 
 name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain 
 from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagowt at once replied that he was 
 sorry to say that his answer must be "No,'' as, in consequence of the German 
 troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been 
 already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial 
 Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance 
 into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with 
 their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It 
 was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern 
 route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength 
 of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition, entailing great 
 loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for 
 bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great 
 Grerman asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I 
 pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian 
 frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, 
 and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible 
 consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons 
 he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back. 
 
 During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,t and, 
 in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the 
 Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial 
 Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would 
 proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their 
 advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial 
 Government that His ilajesty's Government would have to take all steps in their 
 I'ower to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which 
 Germany was as much a party as themselves. 
 
 Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer 
 thaji that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the 
 Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance 
 through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram, and, 
 pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's 
 Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible 
 consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last 
 moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time 
 given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said 
 that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place 
 at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagowt expressed 
 his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, 
 which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great 
 Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin 
 was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must 
 understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements. His 
 Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done. 
 I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, 
 perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me 
 to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a 
 harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by 
 His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word — " neutrality," 
 a word which in war time had so often been disregarded— just for a scrap of paper 
 Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing 
 better than tn ho friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been 
 
 • See No. 153. 
 
 t German Secretary of State 
 
 t See No. 159. 
 
79 
 
 rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew-, he 
 had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of 
 cards. What we had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind 
 while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britaiji 
 responsible for all , the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly 
 against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow* 
 wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and 
 death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, 
 so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of " life and 
 death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engage- 
 ment to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn 
 compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engage- 
 ments given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what 
 price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought 
 of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences 
 could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his 
 Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so 
 little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by 
 further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining 
 Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and 
 his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain 
 peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which 
 saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them 
 had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, 
 notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the 
 war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to 
 our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed 
 our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no 
 one regretted this more than I. 
 
 After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a 
 telegraphic report of \vhat had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central 
 Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but appar- 
 ently never despatched.* 
 
 At about 9-30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came 
 to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and 
 personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a 
 demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an 
 authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better 
 than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where 
 diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; 
 but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given 
 Herr von Jagowt a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an 
 answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satis- 
 factory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements 
 required. Herr Zimmermannt said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as 
 the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that 
 night or any other night. 
 
 In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermannt left me, a flying sheet, issued by 
 the " Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating t,hat Great Britain had declared 
 war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of 
 an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small 
 force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, 
 and the attitude of the mob became threatening. We took no notice of this demon- 
 stration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the 
 landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned 
 us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an 
 account of what was happening. Herr von Jagowt at once infoimed the Chief 
 
 • Tbls telegram never reached the Foreign Office. 
 
 t German Secretary of State. 
 
 t German "Under-Secretary of State. 
 
80 
 
 of Polic0, and an adequate foroe of mounted police, sent with great promptness, 
 very soon cleared the street. From that moment on w© were well guarded, and no 
 more direct unpleasantness occurred. 
 
 After order had been restored Herr von Jagow* came to see me and e.?pressed 
 his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of 
 his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. 
 It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet 
 circulated jp the streets had not been authorised by the Grovernment; in fact, the 
 Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement 
 should be issued, and ho had replied, " Certainly not, until the morning." It 
 was in consequence of his decision to that effect thax only a small force of police 
 had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the 
 presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to 
 disturbances. It was the " pestilential ' Tageblatt,' " which had somehow got hold 
 of the news, that had upset his calcnlations. He had heard rumours that the mob 
 had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the 
 embassy, but he felt sure that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the 
 report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the 
 disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with 
 me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no 
 apology could hare been more full and complete. 
 
 On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's 
 aides-de-camp to me with the following message : — 
 
 " The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the 
 occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather 
 from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action 
 of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. 
 His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the 
 titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of 
 what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles." 
 
 I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner 
 of its dehvery. 
 
 On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying 
 time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow* and the officials of the 
 Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel 
 banded me my passports — which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing— 
 and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I 
 should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I 
 preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen ; they had 
 therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to 
 wait till the following morning, I agreed to this, and he said that I might be guite 
 assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding 
 night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in 
 their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a 
 difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow 
 couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles 
 as time allowed. 
 
 The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force 
 of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the 
 embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there 
 suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the 
 crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station 
 to say Good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements 
 ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the 
 Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in 
 his efforts to prevent the gi-eat crowds which thronged the platforms at every 
 station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic 
 songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain 
 of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier. 
 
 * German Secretary of State. 
 
81 
 
 Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place 
 on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under 
 the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day, 
 with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which 
 counsellor, naval and military attaches, secretaries, and the two young attaches 
 buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and 
 inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was 
 proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the 
 invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal 
 risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me. 
 
 I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my 
 American colleague, Mr. Gerard,* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and 
 hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the 
 embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us 
 and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extri- 
 cated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to 
 himself, and his calmness and savoir faire and his firmness in dealing with the 
 Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and 
 interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands. 
 
 I have, &c. 
 
 W. E. GOSCHEN. 
 
 • American Ambassador in Berlin. 
 
 No. 161. 
 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 Sir, London, September 1, 1914. 
 
 THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the 
 outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record 
 their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments. 
 
 The dehvery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of tlie Austrian note to Servia was 
 preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von 
 Tschirscky,* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words 
 of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 
 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with 
 Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom 
 he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed 
 to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and tliat 
 the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a 
 self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he 
 was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at 
 Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count 
 Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to con- 
 fide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presen- 
 tation about the time we were speaking. 
 
 So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing 
 that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. 
 He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might 
 have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, 
 which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, 
 would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtoldt during this 
 critical time. In poiiat of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As 
 for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berohtold of the impending storm, 
 and it was from a private source that I received on the loth July the forecast of 
 what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true 
 that during all this time the " Neue Freie Presse " and other leading Viennese 
 newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. 
 The official " Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was 
 
 •Gei'iran Ambassador at Vienna, 
 t Austro-Hungarian Minister tor Foreign Affairs. 
 
82 
 
 published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would 
 shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications. 
 
 On the 24th July the note was pviblished in the newspapers. By common con- 
 sent it was at once styleS an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither 
 expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured 
 in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen 
 disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known 
 later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron 
 Giesl* had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, 
 vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs tiU the small hours 
 of the morning. 
 
 The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of 
 organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of 
 War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian 
 Embassy were fi-ustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches 
 to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at 
 Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the ^Monarchy, 
 showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no 
 doubt that the small body of Aus-trian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this 
 momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the 
 determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inha- 
 bited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters 
 at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again 
 in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold'st peace policy had 
 met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Xow the flood-gates were opened, and 
 the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign 
 punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had 
 before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later 
 to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. 
 Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans 
 must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of 
 Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country 
 should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should 
 be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact sum- 
 mary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to 
 me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. 
 This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of 
 events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means 
 of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in 
 some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears ot 
 Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead 
 of adopting this course the Austro-Hnngarian Government resolved upon war. The 
 inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation 
 and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against 
 Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and 
 Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the 
 proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace 
 is recorded in the "White Paper on the European crisis.! On the 28th July I saw 
 Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation 
 mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons§ on the previous day should be 
 accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. 
 His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that 
 matters had gone too far ; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she 
 could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place 
 between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a 
 matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately con- 
 cerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities 
 could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. T 
 disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate 
 grievances against Servia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be 
 makin.g these the starting point of her policy. His Majesty's Government were 
 
 • Austro-Hungarian JEinister at Belgrade. 
 
 t .Vustro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 t " Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)." 
 
 § See Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 107, eolu™n3 931-933. 
 
83 
 
 bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance 
 of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart. 
 
 His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question 
 in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene 
 after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. 
 His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he 
 had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had 
 resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, 
 he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was 
 necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought 
 to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained 
 a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind 
 as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the 
 invasion of Servia. 
 
 The German Government claim to have persevered to the ena in the endeavour 
 to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von 
 Tschirscky* abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and 
 Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no 
 means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian 
 Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko 
 endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to 
 furnish Count Szaparyt with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful 
 conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof.J 
 Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in 
 the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. 
 Schebekoll again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the con- 
 tinuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. Prom now onwards the tension 
 between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. 
 As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st 
 August I was informed by M. Schebekoll that Count Szaparyt had at last conceded 
 the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonoft that Austria would consent to 
 submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible 
 with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof,+ M. Schebeko || added, 
 had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual 
 invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at 
 this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you 
 on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,11 to the effect that Austria had neither 
 " banged the door " on compromise nor cut off the conversations. tt M. Schebekoll 
 to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory 
 language to Count Berohtold§, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count 
 Forgach,+t had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia 
 to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably 
 have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebekoll repeatedly told me he was 
 prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. 
 
 Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut 
 short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct 
 conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by 
 means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums 
 were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on 
 Russia on the 1st August, and on Prance on the 3rd August. A few days' delay 
 might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in 
 history. 
 
 Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebekoll had been in- 
 structed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by 
 
 • German Ambassador in Vienna. 
 
 t Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 
 
 i Enssian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 § Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 II Eussian Ambassador in Vienna. 
 
 i[ Austro-Hnngarian Ambassador in London. 
 
 ttSee No. 137. 
 
 tX Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreien Affairs. 
 
84 
 
 the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when 
 Count Berchtold* informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro- 
 Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian 
 Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian 
 conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, 
 Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia." 
 
 M. Schebekot left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the 
 Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but 
 was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne. 
 
 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the pre- 
 vious day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that 
 Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared 
 up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count 
 Berchtold* the categorical declaration that no Avistrian troops were being moved to 
 Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, 
 giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been 
 moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a 
 westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German 
 troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold 
 in I'eply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his 
 Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile 
 demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a 
 harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before 
 the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the 
 throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated. 
 
 The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special 
 editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your 
 speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech 
 in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of 
 the German vdtimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of 
 these days transpired. The " Neue Freie Presse " was violently insulting towards 
 England. The " Fremdenblatt " was not offensive, but little or nothing was said 
 in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgium 
 neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in 
 the war. 
 
 The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely 
 mentioned in the newspapers. 
 
 On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous 
 day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding 
 that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and 
 France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular 
 communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same 
 time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit 
 any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage. 
 
 On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram 
 of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff,+ at 
 the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred 
 between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia 
 who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops 
 to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France 
 The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for 
 my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count 
 Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight 
 of the 12th August. 
 
 After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted imme- 
 diately m the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge 
 provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interrup- 
 tion of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's 
 J<.n5bassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold* received me at midday. I delivered 
 my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he 
 told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorfft had just come in but had not 
 
 ♦Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 T ±i.usgian Ambassador in Vienna. 
 
 * Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 
 
85 
 
 yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the 
 courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which 
 were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, 
 he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplo- 
 matic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words 
 how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided 
 useless argumeni;. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration 
 the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other 
 places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him 
 on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of n'hat I said, and promised to see 
 what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be 
 over. Count Berohtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British Consul at 
 Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy 
 in the capacity of Charge des Archives. He presumed a similar privilege would not 
 be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Grovernment. I 
 took leave of Count Berohtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of 
 my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and 
 consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my 
 profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my 
 hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health 
 and strength. Count Berohtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message. 
 
 Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the 
 following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrange- 
 ments made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the 
 day Countess Berohtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of 
 Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for 
 the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walters- 
 kirchen was present at the station on behalf of Coiint Berohtold. The journey was 
 necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. AVe reached Buchs, on 
 the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting 
 place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entrain- 
 ing troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other 
 large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to pre- 
 serve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no 
 doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Grovernment had desired that the journey should 
 be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should 
 receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's repre- 
 sentative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, 
 for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my 
 sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfort- 
 able accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after 
 three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision 
 had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for 
 our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 
 22nd August. 
 
 I have, &o., 
 
 MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 
 
PART II. 
 
 SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 
 
 (1) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) 
 
 (2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) 
 
 (3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914)... 
 
 (4) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914)... 
 
 (5) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914)... 
 
 Page 
 89 
 
 96 
 97 
 97 
 98 
 
PART 11. 
 
 SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 
 
 (1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 AUGUST 3, 1914. 
 
 Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to 
 preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly 
 difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that 
 the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared 
 war upon each other. 
 
 Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to 
 clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with 
 regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obhgations the 
 Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. 
 First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, 
 with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on 
 that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's 
 Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. 
 Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co- 
 operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan 
 crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of 
 view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, 
 but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were wiUing to give 
 time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly. 
 
 In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe ; because 
 there has been Uttle time, and there has been a disposition — at any rate in some quarters 
 on which I will not dwell — ^to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great 
 risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as 
 the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, 
 and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were 
 most in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I 
 would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view 
 of British interests, British honour, and British obhgations, free from all passion as to 
 why peace has not been preserved. 
 
 We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when 
 we were working for peace ; and when those papers are published I have no doubt that 
 to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole- 
 hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own 
 judgment as to what forces were at work which operated ag'ainst per.ce. 
 
 I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House — 
 and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once — that if any crisis such as 
 this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House 
 that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that wo would have no 
 secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because 
 we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. 
 I will deal with that point to clear the ground first. 
 
 There has been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to 
 be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an alliance 
 — it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis 
 — also a Balkan crisis — originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
 Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because 
 his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a 
 Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would 
 justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never 
 asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised. 
 
90 
 
 In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything 
 more than diplomatic support — up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic 
 support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go 
 back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeoiras Conference, 
 and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a general 
 election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I — spending 
 three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office — ^was asked the 
 question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would 
 give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless 
 it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the 
 occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question 
 of Morocco — a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country 
 and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides — that if out of that agreement 
 war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would 
 have rallied to the material support of France. 
 
 I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember 
 almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the 
 time. I made no promise and I used no threats ; but I expressed that opinion. That 
 position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I 
 think very reasonably, " If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain 
 might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support 
 which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if 
 you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place 
 between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and 
 authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that 
 nothing which passed between mihtary or naval experts should bind either Government 
 or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would 
 give that support when the time arose. 
 
 As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect ; I 
 had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be sum- 
 moned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the 
 Prime Minister ; I consulted, I remember. Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of 
 State for War ; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
 That was the most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding 
 that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that 
 conversations between mihtary and naval experts took place was later on — I think much 
 later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance — but later 
 on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet. 
 
 The Agadir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — and throughout that I took precisely 
 the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and 
 consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding 
 in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations 
 which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government ; and on the 
 22nd November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read 
 to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which 
 I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record 
 that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding 
 engagements upon the Governments : — 
 
 " My dear Ambassador, 
 
 " From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts 
 have consulted together. It has always been imderstood that such consultation 
 does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time 
 whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation 
 between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits 
 either Government to action in a oontiagency that has not yet arisen and may never 
 arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively 
 at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 
 
 " You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to 
 expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know 
 whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 
 
 " I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack 
 by a third Power, or something that threatened the gen3ral peace, it should imme 
 
91 
 
 diately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to 
 prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be 
 prepared to take in common." 
 Lord Charles Beresford. — ^What is the date of that ? 
 
 Sir E. Grey.— The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Govern- 
 ment with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime 
 Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards 
 our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or 
 whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and, a fortiori, the 
 House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point 
 of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons 
 that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious 
 from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously 
 taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the 
 freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the 
 freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be. 
 
 Well, Sir, I will go further, and I wiH say this : The situation in the present crisis is 
 not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was 
 primarily a dispute which concerned France — a dispute which concerned France and 
 France primarily — a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement 
 subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged 
 to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but 
 diplomatic support ; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand 
 with France diplomatically in that question. 
 
 The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to 
 Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement 
 with France ; it has not originated with anytliing which primarily concerned France. It 
 has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most 
 absolute confidence — no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in 
 war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of 
 France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite 
 alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of 
 honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian 
 Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faith- 
 fully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation. 
 
 I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have 
 had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House — 
 aad my own feeling — for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made 
 their agreement with France — the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that 
 these two nations, who had liad perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these dif- 
 ferences away ; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign 
 influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. 
 But how far that friendship entails obhgation — ^it has been a friendship between the 
 nations and ratified by the nations — how far that entails an obligation, let every man 
 look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for 
 himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more 
 than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, 
 individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have 
 given the House my own feeling in the matter. 
 
 The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts 
 of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the 
 Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friend- 
 ship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security 
 that there was nothing to be feared from us. 
 
 The French coasts are absolutely imdefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, 
 and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and 
 friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feehng is that if a foreign 
 fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the 
 aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended 
 coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practioaEy within sight of 
 our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that 
 would be the feehng of this country. There are limes when one fi'els tho,t if these circum- 
 
92 
 
 stances actually did ai-ise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force 
 throughout the land. 
 
 But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of 
 British interests, ajid it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently 
 going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with 
 her fleet in the Mediterranean ? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to 
 what we wiU do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at 
 the mercy of a German fleet coming down the channel to do as it pleases in a war which 
 is a war of Hfe and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French 
 fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European con- 
 flagration ; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it ? Let us 
 assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, " No, we cannot 
 undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French 
 fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean ; and let us assume that the consequences — 
 which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which 
 are at peace — ^in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war — let us assume 
 that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden 
 moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we shall go to war ; and let us assume 
 ■ — ^which is quite possible — that Italy, who is now neutral — because, as I understand, slie 
 considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive 
 alliance her obHgation did not arise — let us assume that consequences which are not yet 
 foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart 
 from her attitude of neutrahty at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British 
 interests ourselves to fight — what then wiU be the position in the Mediterranean ? It 
 might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because 
 our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country. 
 
 Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade 
 route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our 
 position then ? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing 
 alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very 
 moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have 
 exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most 
 appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly 
 that France was entitled to know — and to know at once — whether or not in the event of 
 attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British 
 support. In that emergency, and in these compt'lling circumstances, yesterday afternoon 
 I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement : — 
 
 " I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel 
 or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or 
 shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. Tliis assurance 
 is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support 
 of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to 
 take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes 
 place." 
 
 I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing 
 immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action 
 should that contingency arise. Tilings move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh 
 news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way ; but I understand that the 
 German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge om'selves to neutrality, to 
 agree that its fleet would not attack the nortliern coast of France. I have only heard that 
 shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, 
 iSir, there is the more serious consideration — becoming more serious every hour — ^there is 
 the question of the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to 
 Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history— 
 r. historj' accumulated since. In 1870, ^rhen there was war between Pi-anoe and Germany, 
 the question of tlie neutrality of Belgium arose, and various tilings were said. Amongst 
 other things. Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that — confirmmg his verbal 
 assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to 
 the treaty in existence — that the German Confederation and its alhes would respect the 
 neutrality of Belgium, it being alwaj-s understood that tliat neutrality would be respected 
 
93 
 
 by the other beUigerent Powers. That is valuftble as a reeogsitioj; i» 1S70 o» the part of 
 Germany of the saoredness of these treaty rights. 
 
 What was our own attitude ? The people who laid down the attitude of the British 
 Government were Lord Granville in the House of Jjords and Mr. Gladstone in the House 
 of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8tb 4«f B3t, 1870, used these words. He said : — 
 
 " We might have explaiofid to the country and to foreign nations, that we could not 
 think this country was bound either morally or internationally,, or that its interests 
 were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium ; though this 
 course might have had some oonvenienjces, though it might have been easy to 
 adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a 
 course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the 
 name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country's 
 interests." 
 
 Mr. Gladstone ^oke as follows two days later : — 
 
 " There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time 
 permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of &e obligations of 
 that treaty ; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have 
 held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of 
 the ejdstence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether 
 of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion 
 for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon f orei^ policy to whom 
 I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, 
 never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that imprac- 
 ticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance, that there is already an existing 
 guarantee in force, is, of necessity, an important fact, and a wei^ty element in the 
 case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also 
 this further consideration, the force of which we must aE feel most deeply, and tliat 
 is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Powei' 
 whatever." 
 The treaty is an old treaty — 1839 — and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is 
 one of those treaties which are foimded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which 
 benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of 
 Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we 
 cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of tlie impor- 
 tance of those obligations, than was taken hy Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870. 
 
 I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation 
 was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our poEcy — 
 a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in 
 similar terms to both Paris and BerMn to say that it was essential for us to know whether 
 the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engage- 
 ment to respect the neutrahty of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French 
 Government tiiis reply : — 
 
 " The Fr^jcb Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it 
 would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that 
 France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her 
 security, to S/Ct otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The 
 President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French 
 Minister at Bn"ss^-S has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day." 
 
 From the German Government the reply was : — 
 
 " The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before 
 consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor." 
 Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he 
 hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether 
 they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, 
 to have the undesirable effeet of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of eam- 
 piajgn. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got 
 the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers : — 
 
 " Belgium expects and desires that other Powers wiU observe and uphold her neutrahty, 
 which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me. 
 
94 
 
 Blinister for Foreign Affairs said, tliat, in the event of the violation of the neutrality 
 of their territory they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves 
 against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were 
 excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but he thought it 
 well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies." 
 It now appears from the news I have received to-day — wliich has come quite recently, 
 r.nd I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form — that an ulti- 
 matum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to oSer Belgium 
 friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of 
 German troops throiigh Belgium. WeU, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, 
 up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position 
 to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were 
 sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after 
 the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that 
 we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality. 
 Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had 
 been received from the King of the Belgians by our King — King George : — 
 
 " Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your 
 predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friend- 
 ship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic inter- 
 vention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 
 
 Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic 
 intervention do now ? We have great and vital interests in the independence — and 
 integrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her 
 neutraUty to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she 
 admitted the violation of her neutraUty, it is clear she could only do so under duress. 
 The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one tiling. Their one desire is that they 
 should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much 
 that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war 
 which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of 
 one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end 
 of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone. 
 
 I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the 
 independence of Belgium. It will be found in " Hansard," volume 203, p. 1787. I have 
 not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me 
 so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone 
 said : — 
 
 " We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which 
 we may have in the Uteral operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to 
 the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed 
 as it^is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration 
 of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become partici- 
 pators in the sin." 
 
 No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to 
 Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been 
 offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, 
 the independence of HoUand will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British 
 interests, to consider what may be at stake. If Prance is beaten in a struggle of life and 
 death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the 
 will and power of one greater than herself — consequences which I do not anticipate, because 
 I am sure that Prance has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and 
 patriotism which she has shown so often — still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell 
 under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would 
 not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common 
 interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power ? 
 
 It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, 
 whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put 
 tilings right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis Mke this, we run 
 away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt 
 whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much 
 
95 
 
 value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great 
 Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert 
 its superior strength. For us^ with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our 
 commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we 
 shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. 
 
 We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether 
 we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, 
 but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war — all 
 their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle — 
 they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether 
 we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment, that at 
 the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a 
 material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of 
 the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us — if that had been the 
 result of the war — falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure 
 that our moral position would be such .as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I 
 have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure oi 
 all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite 
 clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the oonsC' 
 quences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed. 
 
 I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with 
 regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken nc 
 engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. 
 Mobilisation of the fleet has taken place ; mobilisation of the army is taking place ; but 
 we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that — in the case of a European con- 
 flagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and 
 other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown 
 factors — we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending 
 an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing J 
 would say. 
 
 The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general 
 feeling throughout Ireland — and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad — does 
 not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. 
 I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions 
 which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how 
 vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 What other poUcy is there before the House ? There is but one way in which the 
 Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and 
 that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. 
 We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the 
 House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which 
 prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions abso- 
 lutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of 
 aU the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, " We wUl have nothing 
 whatever to do with this matter " under no conditions — the Belgian treaty obhgations, 
 the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what 
 may happen to France from our failure to support France — if we were to say that all those 
 things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, T 
 believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should 
 not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences. 
 
 My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the 
 House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, 
 and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to 
 Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having 
 to use all the strength we have at any moment — we know not how soon — to defend our- 
 selves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I 
 have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to 
 force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be 
 forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe 
 the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no 
 doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher 
 mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified 
 
96 
 
 in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thotight 
 is wfth us always of the stttferiig and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe 
 will feScape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amotint of 
 harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the 
 amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the 
 Continent. 
 
 The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Govemment in deciding what to 
 advise the flonSe of Commons to do. We have disclosed our minds to the House of 
 Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear 
 to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, 
 as probably it may develop, we WiU face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, 
 and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we stto^e 
 for peace laSt Week the House will see from the papers tha,t will be before it. 
 
 But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face 
 with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe 
 we shall have the support of the House at large in pr6ceeding to whatever the consequences 
 may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or 
 action taken by others. I believe the countrj', so quickly has the situation been forced 
 upon it, has not had time to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinMng of the quarrel 
 between Austria and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown 
 out of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. 
 We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at 
 war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the BVenoh frontier. 
 We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris. 
 
 The liituation has developed so rapidly that technieaUy, as regards the condition of 
 the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring 
 out the underlying is.sues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to 
 put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not 
 improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then 1 
 believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude 
 of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe 
 to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, 
 but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endxu-ance of the whole 
 country. 
 
 (2) rUBTHER 8TATEME>^T MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IK THE HOUSE OE 
 COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 19U. 
 
 Gehhant AyrD Belgium. 
 
 I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not 
 in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information 1 have 
 received from the Belgian Legation in Loudon, and is to the following effect : — 
 " Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly 
 neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian territory, and promising maintenance 
 of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and 
 threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of 
 twelve hours was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have an.swered that an attack 
 on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that 
 to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of a nation. Con- 
 scious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible 
 means." 
 Of course, I can only say that th" Government are prepared to take into grave con- 
 sideration the information which it has received. I make no further comment upon it. 
 
97 
 
 (3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 AUGUST 4, 1914. 
 
 Mr. Bonar Law.—l wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement 
 that he can now make to the House ? 
 
 The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith). — In conformity with the statement of pohcy made 
 here by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this 
 morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect : — 
 
 " The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic 
 intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed 
 that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note 
 proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territorj', and 
 promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its 
 possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium 
 as an enemy. An answer was requested witliin twelve liours. We also understand 
 that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of 
 nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a 
 treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request 
 an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, 
 and that her neutrality wiU be respected by Germany. You should ask for an 
 immediate reply." 
 We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram : — 
 " German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intended pro- 
 posals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to 
 theii' regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures 
 considered indispensable in view of the French menaces." 
 Simultaneously — almost immediately afterwards — ^we received from the Belgian 
 Legation here in London the following telegram : — 
 
 " General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich (near Aix- 
 la-ChapeUe)." 
 Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has penetrated still further 
 into Belgian territory. We also received this morning from the German Ambassador 
 here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the 
 Ambassador to us. It is in these terms : — 
 
 " Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government 
 
 with regard to our intentions by repeating most positively formal assurance that, 
 
 even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany wiU, under no pretence 
 
 whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by 
 
 fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. 
 
 It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgic territory without making 
 
 at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress 
 
 upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across 
 
 Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. 
 
 Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a 
 
 question of life or death to prevent French advance." 
 
 I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Goverimient : We cannot regard this as in 
 
 any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply to it, repeated the request 
 
 we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance 
 
 in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. 
 
 We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of 
 
 this morning — which I have read to the House — should be given before midnight. 
 
 (4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MliMSTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 AUGUST 5, 1914. 
 
 Mr. Boruir Law. — May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can 
 give us to-day ? 
 
 The Prime Minister. — Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock 
 last evening, and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany 
 and ourselves. 
 
98 
 
 We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram : — ■ 
 
 " I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs " 
 — that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs— 
 
 " a note of which the following is a literal translation : — 
 
 " ' Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Government that this 
 morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation 
 of engagements assumed by treaty. 
 
 " ' Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all means in their power. 
 
 " ' Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, 
 in defence of her territory. 
 
 " ' There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible 
 measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time of guarding 
 the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium. 
 
 " ' Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defence of her fortified 
 places.' " 
 
 We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador here the following telegram 
 received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels :— 
 
 ■' The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French mihtary 
 attache to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with 
 the Belgian army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers 
 now being made. Orders have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors 
 not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier." 
 
 This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take 
 the opportunitv of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move a 
 vote of credit of 100,000,000^. 
 
 (5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 AUGUST 6, 1914. 
 
 Motion made, and Question proposed, " That a sum, not exceeding £100,000,000, be 
 granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defraying 
 expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures 
 which may be taken for the security of the country, for the conduct of Naval and Military 
 operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, 
 and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, 
 or otherwise for the rehef of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the exist- 
 ence of a state of war." 
 
 The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith). — ^In asking the House to agree to the resolution 
 which Mr. Spea.ker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it 
 is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was covered by my right hon. 
 fiiend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago. He stated — and I do not think 
 any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been 
 answered — the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret. 
 His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with 
 what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. But, Sir, 
 the papers which have since been presented to ParUament, and which are now in the hands 
 of hon. Members wiU, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even 
 when the last gUmmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efiorts of my right 
 hon. friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in 
 the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, 
 by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend that 
 the area of the conflict was hmited, and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned 
 peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less success- 
 ful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will 
 accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman : that, 
 never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own 
 country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest 
 interest of all countries — universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of 
 
99 
 
 hon. Members show something more than that. They show what were the terms which 
 were ofiered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this 
 House, but all our fellow- subjects everywhere wiU read the communications, will read, 
 learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin 
 and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are 
 contained in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen 
 on the 29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper.* I think I must refer to them for a 
 moment. After referring to the state of tilings as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward 
 Goschen goes on : — 
 
 " He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said 
 that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed 
 British policy, that Great Britaia would never stand by and allow Prance to be 
 crushed in any confliot there might be. That, however, was not the object at 
 which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britaio were certain, 
 every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial 
 
 Government " 
 
 Let the House observe these words — 
 
 " aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of Prance should they prove 
 victorious in any war that might ensue." 
 Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question : — 
 
 " I questioned His Excellenoy about the French colonies " 
 
 What are the Prenoh colonies ? They mean every part of the dominions and possessio.ig 
 of Prance outside the geographical area of Europe — 
 
 " and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect." 
 Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial, and almost 
 the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small states : — 
 
 " As regards Holland, however. His Excellency said that so long as Germany's advers- 
 aries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready 
 to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise." 
 Then we come to Belgium : — , 
 
 " It depended upon the action of BVance what operations Germany might be forced 
 to enter upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be 
 respected if she had not sided against Germany." 
 Let the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland 
 it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality ; but in regard to Belgium 
 there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came 
 to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added : — 
 " Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about 
 an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances "— — 
 the assurances I have read out to the House — 
 
 " might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired." 
 What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object 
 of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feehng against Germany, 
 but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this 
 matter. What did that proposal amount to ? In the fh-st place, it meant this : That 
 behind the back of Prance — they were not made a party to these communications — we 
 should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the 
 event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of 
 Prance. What did it mean as regards Belgium ? When she addressed, as she has 
 addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee 
 of her neutrality, what reply should we have given ? What reply should we have given 
 to that Belgian appeal ? We should have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, 
 we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our pUghted 
 word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the 
 most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who 
 can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. 
 What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, 
 if we had assented to this infamous proposal ? Yea, and what are we to get in return for 
 the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations '! What are we to get 
 in return ? A promise — nothing more ; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain 
 
 * See Part II., No. 85, page 64. 
 
100 
 
 eventualities ; a promise, be it observed — I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be 
 put upon record — given by a Power which was at that very moment announcmg its m- 
 tention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we 
 had dallied or temporised, we, as a Governmei(it,'^ould have covered ourselves with dis- 
 honour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. 
 I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. 
 friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages. This 
 document. No. 101 of my Paper,* puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British 
 Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend says : — 
 
 " His Majesty's Government caimot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal 
 that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us 
 in effect is-to engage to stand by while Pre;nch Colonies are taken if Prance is beaten, 
 so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. 
 
 Prom the material point of view " 
 
 My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language : — 
 
 " such a proposal is unacceptable, for Prance, without further territory in Europe 
 being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, 
 and become subordinate to German policy." 
 That is the material aspect. But he proceeded : — 
 
 " Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with 
 Germany at the expense of Prance, a disgrace from which the good name of this 
 country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain 
 away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. 
 We could not entertain that bargain either." 
 He then says : — 
 
 " We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to 
 require." 
 And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate : — 
 
 " You should . . . add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good 
 relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work 
 together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . Por that object this Govern- 
 ment wiU work in that way with all sincerity and good will. 
 If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own 
 endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a 
 party-, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be 
 pursued against her or her allies by Prance, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separ- 
 ately. I have desired this and worked for it " 
 
 The statement was never more true — 
 
 " as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany having a corre- 
 sponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too 
 Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much 
 more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, 
 I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which wiU follow may make possible some 
 more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto." 
 That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language 
 the attitude of this Government. Can any one who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of 
 obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it ; can any one honestly doubt that 
 the Government of this country in spite of great provocation — and I regard the proposals 
 made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and 
 almost without answer — can any one doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. 
 Gentleman, who had already earned the title — ^and no one ever more deserved it — of Peace 
 Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but 
 unhappily frustrated purpose ? I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country — 
 I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole — that we made every efiort any 
 Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What 
 is it we are fighting for ? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, 
 the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, 
 and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no 
 man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days — more trying perhaps than 
 any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man 
 amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the 
 
 • See Part II., No. 101, page 77. 
 
101 
 
 almost unequalled suSenng which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only 
 to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries 
 of the world, but to posterity and t^»e whole prospects of European civilisation. Every 
 step we took we took with that j^^p before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibihty 
 wMoh it is impossible to descBJl^^RJnhappily, if — ^in spite of all our efforts to keep the 
 peace, and with that full sii^v^Jffpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be 
 decided in favour of wair — ^wc^il^'e, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the 
 interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we be- 
 lieve, and I am certam the coimtry will beUeve, we a^ u nsheathing om- sword in a just 
 cause. 
 
 If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two s^HHBlftn the first place to 
 fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered in 
 between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an 
 obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly 
 have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in 
 these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and 
 factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small 
 nationalities are not to be crushed, ia defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary 
 will of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not beheve any nation ever entered into 
 a great controversy — and this is one of the greatest history wiU ever know — with a clearer 
 conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the main- 
 tenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the 
 maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, 
 not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge 
 this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that aU the 
 resources, not only of this United Kigndom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the 
 centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured, 
 that I am now about to ask this Committee — to make the veiy unusual demand upon it — 
 to give the Goveminent a Vote of Credit of 100,000,000?. I am not going, and I am sure 
 the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit 
 and Supplementary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise ia that 
 connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were necessary, I 
 could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am 
 not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of 
 the Coramittee. There is one tiling to wliich I do call attention, that is, the Title and 
 Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past. Votes of this kind have been taken simply for 
 naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give 
 us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this 
 money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be apphed not only for strictiy 
 naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of 
 trade, industry, business, and communications — ^whether by means of insurance or indem- 
 nity against risk or otherwise — for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses aiising 
 out of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it 
 was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. 
 It gives the Government a freehand. Of course, the Trea:sury will account for it, and any 
 expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it 
 would be a great pity — ^in fact, a great disaster — if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were 
 not enabled to make provision — ^provision far more needed now than it was under the 
 simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days — for all the various ramifications and 
 developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great 
 Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them. 
 
 I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War — a position which I held 
 until this morning — for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the 
 Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon 
 myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go 
 back but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that 
 the condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought 
 to an end and complete confidence re-established. I beUeve that is the case ; in fact, I 
 know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spiiit and 
 habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. 
 Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done 
 so imder normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the 
 
102 
 
 country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and 
 another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all 
 departments and who is ultimately responsible foy the whole polipy of the Cabinet, should 
 give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to'P*^, affairs of our Army in a great war. 
 I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldiS^ °'^^dministrator, in the person of 
 Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and P^'A^iljfeptija.t everyone would expect 
 from him, at my request stepped into the bfeach. LordS^K/iJlaer, as everyone knows, is 
 not a politician. His association with the Government ab\^^ember of the Cabinet for this 
 purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. 
 He has', at a great public emerg«;«i^*, responded to a groat public call, and I am certain 
 he will have with him, in tVip it^iostge of one (jf the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen 
 upon a Minister, th&4^ge to staftnfliaence of 'ari"'p3i:tiEs and all opinions. 
 
 I am asking on his behalf for the Army, powt , to increase the number of men of all 
 ranks, in addition to the number aheady voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the 
 Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our 
 own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is 
 prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing 
 Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost liihits of their 
 possibihties, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a 
 moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds . 
 with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her 
 
 family. 
 
 Sir, I wiU say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all 
 that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in my 
 general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds 
 of truth. It is not my purpose — it is not the purpose of any patriotic man — to inflame 
 feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too 
 grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and 
 confidently we believe that Parliament and the country wiU enable us to do it. 
 
 Taylor, Garnett, Evans, & Co., Ltd., London, Manchester, and Beddish, 
 
..■:;,■.:■.;■ /NAVY.'- 
 
 ExphmATiolSi of DifieEisnoes betwieetx. the Bstjinas^tes of tEe T^ars 1913-^14 and 
 Ijlt^t^S.. ■ : .^ ,. ■ ■■. ,,^ ^ \ ■ ^ '■ ' ' - i ^": •':'■:■ : 
 
 ^ SxATBJjsNia B^o^iriB^ the nuBabeiJS. box'nle.aiid the ^ctua^lrExpenclitut^ on Naval 
 S^vifles-loVthe Tfeara 1905-06 t6'1912^13(ilioMvej', andli&Es^iiiates for I9l34i 
 and 1^14^12] ; thp Cctatributions from IiMia and the GolonisB' towArds Naval Bacpendi- 
 -tulej&o./ '■■-'._-■' ■■ . ' -, ■ /.;, ', -;■ ,, 
 
 - .;i*RpaBAMMB of Ship-building, Repairs, Maintenauoei ifcc. Appendiqes.: ;>Ia3e» 
 HvCri34 of Session 1914. PiioeJtj; 8rf.,'postfree4«, Id. 
 
 'STATEMBNf of the Firsfc Lord of the Adidi'arty explanatory bi tlie.Navy, Bstijiiatesi 
 T;914-15v With'pSeoord of the Work done by the lOepar^inent. in 191^-14: >Shi&" 
 ; euUdlng, Adniiaistra,tion. Navy Pol\ey in the Overseas Dominions. Organisa- 
 tion of the Fleet, Air Service. Ordnanbe. Pexffloiinel. Greenwich Hospital. 
 tCd.; 7302] of Session 19li. Price 2|rf. , post free SeJ. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTAJlY ESTIMATE, 1914-15., ^ 
 
 EspM^TK of the Additional Number bf Ofpoers and Men required to be voted- for 
 the Nfcvy for the year ending Slat March, 1915. 
 
 H«C. 417 of Session 1914.' Price J<i.,. post free Id. 
 
 SEPARATION AM.OWANCES. 
 
 Separation Allowances to the Wives and Children of Seamen, Marines, and 
 iteiaa-vists borne on 1*e Boolcs of H.M. Ships. ,.; 
 
 ^ ^ [Cd. 7619] of Session 1914. Priccjii,, post free Id. vll§ > : 
 
 NAVY APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT, I912-li "' 
 
 !^ Appropwation A<X!OtJNT of the Sum^ granted by Pkjlitmeat foe. Navy Services 
 for the Yew ended Slat March, 191^; also Statement of the Surpluses and Defieita 
 -Upon the Grants for Navy Services fpr thatvYear. With the Report of .the Co»ip- 
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 H.C. 92 of Session 1914. Price i». Itt., post free' Is. id. 
 
 FLEETS (GkEAT BRITAIN AND FOREIGN 
 COUNTRIES). 
 
 RETURBr Bhftwing the Fleets of Great Britain, France, Russia,. Germany, Italy, 
 Austria-Hvngary, United States of Ainerica, and Japan, on the 1st January, 1914, 
 <imitting BattlesUps, Battle Cruisiera, and Cruisers over 20 ye«krs'oldy&om date of 
 Jaunch, and distingnishiBgi both, built and buildfng> BittJtesSips,. Battle Cruisers, 
 Littht Ohiis^ra, Torpedo Vessels; Torpedo Boat Destroyeci, Torpedo Boats, and' 
 ^ibmariBfiS. Also, Return to shctw Cute ^Launch, ]>ate of Cbmpletion, {)ispkifCe«: 
 ment, Horae-poWer, and Armaments i<i$uoed to one common scale. > ~ 
 
 H.C. 113 of Session 1914. Price 7id., post free. 9i|<?. 
 
 NAVAL EXPENDITURE (PRINCIPAL NAVAL POWERS). 
 
 Return of the Total Naval EjKpenditure otthe United ^ngdpm in each of ^e 
 Jastro years showing the Interest on Naval Loans included in the Estimates, -the 
 : Amount of Expen^tiffe out of N^EvVtd Loans, if any, and the A|ip:^p:pia1stons iu Aid ; 
 -tie Expenditure on New CoHstrucidon and Armament, and die amount of New Con- 
 fitruotion ejj^essed in tonnage in each of th« years^ named, and the numbers in 
 Pa-sonntel ; also similar inilormation for each of me Principal Foreign Naval Powers. 
 
 ■ HX!, 410 <rf Session 1914. Priee 1^.^ post free id. 
 
ARMY. 
 
 AKMY ESTIMATES FOR THE YEAR 1914-15. 
 Together with Explanations of the Variations of the Numbers of His Majesty's 
 British Forces and of the amounts provided in the Estimates, and Statements 
 showing the net Army Expenditure for Ten Years,~ the amounts provided for each 
 Arm of the Seirvice and for various Miscellaneous Establishments, and the amounts 
 included for the Colonies and Egypt. 
 
 H.C. 131 of Session 1914. Price Is. lOd., post free 2s. 2d. 
 Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War relating to the Army Estimates 
 for 1914-15. 
 
 [Cd. 7253] of Session 1914. Price Id., post free l^d. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES. 
 
 Additional 500,000 Men Required in the Year ending Slst March, 1915, ia 
 consequence of the War in Europe. 
 
 H.C. 415 of Session 1914. Price ^d., post free Id. 
 Further Additional 500,000 Men Required. 
 
 H.C. 4G4 of Session 1914. Price id., post free Id. 
 
 SEPARATION ALLOWANCE. 
 
 Increased Rates of Separation Allowance for the Wives and Children of Soldiers. 
 [Cd. 7623] of Session 1914. Price ^., post free W. 
 
 STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY, &c. 
 
 Statistics relating to the Strength of the Regular Army, Special Reserve,- 
 Territorial Force, and Territorial Training and Musketry. 
 
 [Cd. 7255] of Session 1914. Price id., post free Id. 
 
 TERRITORIAL FORCE. 
 
 Annual Return for 1913. Prefaced by some Introductory Notes, containing 
 General Remarks on the Force, Establishments in Districts and Counties, Camp 
 Figures, Reserve, Alterations in Establishments, and Modifications in the Return. 
 Tables, showing Establishment, Strength, and Number attending Camp for each 
 Unit ; &c. 
 
 [Cd. 7254] of Session 1914. Price Id., post free 9i. 
 
 ARMY APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT, 1912-13. 
 
 Appropriation Account of the sums granted by Parliament for Army Services 
 for the Year ended Slst March, 1913 ; also Statement of the Surpluses and Deficits 
 upon the Grants for Army Services for that year. With the Report of the Comptroller 
 and Auditor General thereon, also upon the Store Accounts of the Army. 
 H.C. 3 of Session 1914. Price Is. Id., post free Is. id. 
 
 TREASURY ASSISTANCE TO BANKS AND DISCOUNT 
 
 HOUSES, &c. 
 
 Return of Papers relating to the Assistance rendered by the Treasury to Banks 
 and Discount Houses since the Outbreak of War on the 4th August, 1914, and to 
 the Questions of the Advisability of Continuing or Ending the Moratorium and of 
 the Nature of the Banking Facilities now available. (Dated 27 August, 1914.) 
 H.C. 457 of Session 1914. Price Id., post free l^d. 
 
 INSURANCE OF BRITISH SHIPPING IN TIME 
 
 OF WAR. 
 
 Report, dated April 30th, 1914, of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
 Defence on the Insurance of British Shipping in Time of War, to devise a scheme 
 to ensure that, in case of war, British Steamships should not be generally laid up,; 
 and that Oversea Commerce should not be interrupted by reason of inability tc 
 cover War risks of Ships and Cargoes by Insurance, and which would also secure 
 that the insurance rates should not be so high as to cause an excessive rise in prices. 
 [Cd. 7560] of Session 1914. Price 2id., post free 3d. 
 
MISCELLANEOUS. No. 11 (1914). 
 
 DOCUMENTS 
 
 RESPECTING THE 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE WAR 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 THE RUSSIAN GOYERNMENT. 
 
 Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Sis Majesty. 
 
 October 1914. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED 0NDBU THIS ATJTHOIIITY OP HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONIiRY OrPICB 
 
 By HABEISON and SONS, 45-47, St. Martin's Lane, W-C, 
 
 PkINTIES in OUBINAIIY TO HiS MAJESTY. 
 
 To be purchased eitJier directly or through any Bookseller, from 
 
 WYMAN AND SONS, Ltd., 29, Bhbams Buildings, Fettjer Lane, B.C., and 
 
 28, Aeinqdon Stkebt, S.W., and 54, St. Mahy Street, Caiidht; or 
 
 H M. STATIONERY OPFICB (Scottish Branch), 23, Foiith Stkeet, Edinbukgu ; or 
 
 B. PONSONBY, Ltd., 116, Giiafton Stkeet, Ddbiin ; 
 
 or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, 
 
 the United States of America, the Oontinent of Europe and Abroad of 
 
 T. FISHER UNWIN, London, W.O. 
 
 1914. 
 
 [Cd. 7626.] Price 3d. e.v. 
 
DOCUMENTS RESPECTING THE NEGOTIATIONS 
 PRECEDING THE WAR, PUBLISHED BY 
 THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 Mussian ChargS d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914. 
 
 (Tdlegramme.) 
 
 Le Minislre d'Autriche vient 
 de transmettre, a 6 heures da 
 .soir, au Ministve des Finances 
 Patchou, qui remplace Paohitch, 
 une note ultimative de son 
 Gouvernement fixant un d^lai 
 de quarante-huit heures pour 
 racceptation des demandes y 
 contenues. Giesl a ajout6 ver- 
 baleinent qtie pour le cas oil la 
 note ne serait pas acceptee 
 integralement dans uu delai de 
 quarante-huit heures, il ayait 
 I'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec 
 le personnel de la legation. 
 Pachitch et les autres Ministres 
 qui se trouvent en tourn^e 61ec- 
 torale ont ete rappel^s et sont 
 attendus k Belgrade demain 
 vendredi k 10 heures du matin. 
 Patchou, qui m'a communique le 
 contenu de la note, sollicite 
 I'aide de la Russie et declare 
 qu'aucun Gouvernement serbe 
 ne pourra accepter les demandes 
 de I'Autriche, 
 
 (Sign6) 'STRANDTMAN. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Austrian Minister, at 
 6 o'clock this evening, presented 
 an ultimatum from his Govern- 
 ment to the Minister of Finance, 
 Patchou, in the absence ofPash- 
 itch, requiring the acceptance 
 of the demands containedtherein 
 within forty- eight hours. Giesl 
 added verbally that, in the 
 event of failure to accept the 
 note integrally within forty- 
 eight hours, he was under 
 instructions to leave Belgrade 
 with the staff of the legation. 
 Pashitch and the other Ministers, 
 who are away electioneering, 
 have been recalled and are ex- 
 pected at Belgrade to-morrow, 
 Friday, at 10 A.M. Patchou, 
 who communicated to me the 
 contents of the note, solicits the 
 help of Russia and declares 
 that no Servian Government 
 could accept the demands of 
 Austria. 
 
 [995] 
 
 B 2 
 
No. 2. 
 
 Russian Chargi d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, 
 
 Belgradfi, July 10 (23), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Text of the note presented 
 to the Servian Government by 
 the Austro-Hungarian Minister 
 to-day. 
 
 [Here follows the text of the note, for which see " Miscellaneous 
 Np. 6 (1914) " [Cd. 7467], No. 4, p. 3-6.] 
 
 (Sign6) STRANDTMAN. 
 
 (TeMgramme.) 
 
 Texte de la note qui a ete 
 transmise aujourd'hui par le 
 Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie au 
 Gouvernement serbe : 
 
 No. 3. 
 
 Note verbale personally presented hy the Austro-Hungarian Ambas- 
 sador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 at 10 A.M. on July 11 (24), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Le Gouvernement Imperial et 
 Royal s'est trouv6 dans la 
 n^cessite de remettre le jeudi 
 10 (23) du mois courant, par 
 I'entremise du Ministre Imperial 
 et Royal k Belgrade, la note 
 suivante au Gouvernement 
 Royal de Serbie. 
 
 [Suit le texte de la note.] 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
 ernment have found themselves 
 obliged to present the following 
 note to the Servian Government 
 through the Austro-Hungarian 
 Minister at Belgrade on Thurs- 
 day, the 10th (23rd) instant. 
 
 [Here follows the text of the 
 note.] 
 
 No. 4. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargi d' Affaires 
 
 at Vienna. 
 
 St. Petersburgh, July 11 (24), 1914. 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 Vbuillez transmettre au 
 Ministre des Affaires fitrang^res 
 n'Autrichc-Hongrie ce qui suit: 
 
 " La communication du Gou- 
 vernement austro-hongrois aux 
 Puissances le lendemain de la 
 
 (Translation). 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Please convey the following 
 message to the Austro-Hungarian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs : — 
 
 "The communication made by 
 the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment to the Powers the day after 
 
presentation de I'ultimntum a 
 Belgrade nelaisseauxPuissanoes 
 qu'un d^lai tout k fait iiisuffisant 
 pour entreprendi-e quoi qu'il 
 soit d'utile pour I'aplanissement 
 des complications surgies. 
 
 "Pour prevenir les conse- 
 quences incalculables et ^gale- 
 ment nefastes pour toutes les 
 Puissances qui peuvent suivre 
 le mode d'action du Gouverne- 
 ment austro-hongrois, il nous 
 parait indispensable qu'avant 
 tout le deiai donn^ k la Serbie 
 pour r6pondre soit prolonge. 
 L'Autriche-Hongrie, se declarant 
 disposee k informer les Puis- 
 sances des denudes de I'enquete 
 sur lesquelles le Gouvernement 
 Imperial et Royal base ses accu- 
 sations, devrait leur donner 
 egalement le temps de s'en 
 rendre compte. 
 
 " En ce cas, si les Puissances 
 se convainquaient du bien-fonde 
 de certaines des exigences 
 autrichiennes, elles se trou- 
 veraient en mesure de faire 
 parvenir an Gouvernement serbe 
 des conseils en consequence. 
 
 " Un refus de prolooger le 
 terme de I'ultimatum priverait 
 de toute port^e la d-marche du 
 Gouvernement austro-hongrois 
 aupres des Puissances et se 
 trouverait en contradiction avec 
 les bases mSmes des relations 
 internationales." 
 
 Communique a Londres, 
 Rome, Paris, Belgrade. 
 
 (Signe) SAZONOW. 
 
 the presentation of th e ultimatum 
 at Belgrade affords to the Powers 
 a period which is quite insuffi- 
 cient to enable them to take 
 any steps which might help to 
 smooth away the difficulties 
 that have arisen. 
 
 " In order to prevent the con- 
 sequences, incalculable and 
 equally fatal to all the Powers, 
 which may result from the 
 course of action followed by 
 the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment, it seems to us to be above 
 all essential that the period 
 allowed for the Servian reply 
 should be extended, Austria- 
 Hungary, having declared her- 
 self to be disposed to inform the 
 Powers of the facts elicited by 
 the enquiry upon which the 
 Imperial and Royal Government 
 base their accusations, should 
 equally allow them sufficient 
 time to study those facts. 
 
 "In this case, if the Powers 
 were convinced that certain of 
 the Austrian demands were well- 
 founded, they would be in a 
 position to offer corresponding 
 advice to the Servian Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 " A refusal to prolong the 
 term- of the ultimatum would 
 render nugatory the representa- 
 tions made by the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government to the 
 Powers, and would be in con- 
 tradiction to the very bases of 
 international comity." 
 
 Communicated to London, 
 Rome, Paris, and Belgrade. 
 
 (Signed),. SAZONOF. 
 
No. 5. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Rutssian Representatives at 
 London, Berlin, Rome, and Paris, 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) i 
 
 With reference to my tele- 
 gram of to-day to Kudachef* we 
 trust that the Government to 
 which you are accredited will 
 share the Russian point of view 
 and will at once instruct their 
 Representative at Vienna to hold 
 similar language. 
 
 Communicated to Belgrade. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 Me r^fere a mon t^l6gramme 
 a Koudachew d'aujourd'hui ; 
 nous esp^rons que le (xouverne- 
 ment auprte duquel vous etes 
 accredit^ partagera notre point 
 de vue et prescrira d'urgence k 
 son Repr^sentant k Vienne de 
 se prononcer dans le mSme sens. 
 
 Communique k Belgrade. 
 
 (Sign6) SAZONOW. 
 
 No, 6. 
 
 Telegram from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Servia to 
 His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 
 
 Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914. 
 
 Le Gouvernement austro- 
 hongrois a remis hier soir au 
 Gouvernement serbe une note 
 coneernant ^'attentat de Sara- 
 jevo. Consciente de ses deV-orrs 
 internationaux, la Serbie d^s les 
 premiers jours de I'horrible crime 
 a declare qu'elle le condamnait 
 et qu'elle 6tait prete a ouvrir 
 une enquSte sur son territoire 
 si la coraplicite de certains de 
 ses sujets etait prouvee au 
 cours du proces instruit par 
 les autorit^s austro-hongroises. 
 Cependant, les demandes con- 
 teniies dans la note austro- 
 hongroise sont inutilement 
 humiliantes pour la Serbie et 
 incompatibles avec sa dignity 
 comme l^tat ind^pendant. Ainsi 
 on nous demande sur un ton 
 p(5remptoire une declaration du 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Go- 
 vernment yesterday evening 
 presented to the Servian Gov- 
 ernment a note respecting 
 the outrage at Serajevo. 
 Servia, aware of her interna- 
 tional obligations, has declared, 
 ever since the horrible crime 
 was committed, that she con- 
 demned it, and that she was 
 ready to open an enquiry in 
 Servia if the complicity of 
 certain of her subjects were 
 proved at the trial instituted 
 by the Austro-Hungarian autho- 
 rities. The demands contained 
 in the Austro-Hungarian note 
 are, however, unnecessarily 
 humiliating for Servia, and in- 
 compatible with her dignity asan 
 independent State. For instance, 
 we are peremptorily called upon 
 
 * Russian Charge d'Affaii'Gs in Vienna. 
 
Gouvernement dansl' "Officiel," 
 et uii ordre du Soviverain h I'ar- 
 m6e, ouiious r6primerions I'esprit 
 hostile centre 1' Autriche en nous 
 faisant k noiis-in^mes des re- 
 proches d'une faiblesse crimi- 
 nelle envers nos menses perfides. 
 On nons impose ensuite I'ad- 
 mission des fonctionnaives 
 austro-hongrois en Serbie pour 
 participer avec les nStres k 
 Finstruction et pour surveiller 
 I'exdcution des autres conditions 
 indiqu^es dans la note. Nous 
 avons veqxi nn d^lai de quarante- 
 huit heures pour accepter le 
 tout, faute de quoi la Legation 
 d' Autriche - Hongrie quittera 
 Belgrade. Nous sommes pr^ts 
 a accepter les conditions austro- 
 hongroises qui sont compatibles 
 avec la situation d'un l^tat 
 ind^pendant, ainsi que celles 
 dont I'acceptation nous sera 
 conseillee par votre Majesty ; 
 toutes les personnes dont la 
 participation a I'attentat sera 
 d^monti'ee seront sev^rement 
 punis par nous. (Jertaines 
 parrai ces demandes ne pour- 
 raient etre execut^es sans des 
 changements de notre legisla- 
 tion, ce qui exige du temps. 
 On nous a donne un delai trop 
 court. Nous pouvons etre 
 attaques apr^s Fexpiration du 
 delai par I'arm^e austro-hon- 
 groise qui se concentre sur 
 notre frontiere. II nous est 
 impossible de nous defendre et 
 nous supplions votre Majeste 
 do nous donner son aide le plus 
 tot possible. La bienveillance 
 pr^oieuse de votre Majesty qui 
 s'est manifestee tant de fois k 
 notre egard nous fait esp^rer 
 fermetnement que cette fois 
 encore notre appel sera entendu 
 par son gen^reux coeur slave. 
 
 En ces moments difficiles 
 j'interprete les sentiments du 
 peuple serbe, qui supplie votre 
 Majesty de vouloir bien s'in- 
 
 to insert a declaration by the 
 Govei'nment in the " Officig-l 
 Journal," and for an order from 
 the Sovereign to the army, in 
 which we are to check the spirit 
 of hostility towards Austria and 
 to blame ourselves for criminal 
 weakness as regards our trea- 
 cherous intrigues. We are fur- 
 ther required to admit Austro- 
 Hungariau officials into Servia 
 to take part with our officials at 
 the trial and to superintend the 
 carrying out of the other condi- 
 tions laid down in the note. 
 We are required to accept 
 these demands in their en- 
 tirety within forty-eight hours, 
 failing which the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Legation will leave 
 Belgrade. We are prepared to 
 accept those of the Austro- 
 Hungarian conditions which 
 are compatible with the position 
 of an independent State, as 
 well as those to which your 
 Majesty may advise us to agree, 
 and all tliose persons whose 
 complicity in the crime may be 
 proved will be severely punished 
 by us. Certain of the demands 
 could not be carried out with- 
 out changes in our legislation, 
 which would need time. We 
 have been allowed too short a 
 time limit. We may be attacked 
 at the expiration of the time 
 limit by the Austro-Hungarian 
 army which is coucentrating 
 upon our frontier. We are 
 unable to defend ourselves and 
 we beg your Majesty to come to 
 om- aid as soon as possible. The 
 much appreciatedgood will which 
 your Majesty has so often shown 
 towards us inspires iis with 
 the firm belief that once again 
 our appeal to your noble Slav 
 heart will not pass unheeded. 
 ■ At this critical moment I 
 echo the feelings of the 
 Servian people in praying your 
 Majesty to be pleased to interest 
 
teresser au sort du Koyaume de yourself in the fate of the King- 
 Serbie. "dom of Servia. 
 
 (Sign^) ALEXANDRE. 
 
 No. 7. 
 
 Russian Chargi d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 11 (24), 1914. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 TOUS les journaux du matin, 
 meme ceux, rares, qui recon- 
 naissent I'impossibilit^ pour la 
 Serbie d'accepter les conditions 
 posees, accueillent avec une 
 grande sympathie le ton 6ner- 
 gique adopts par I'Autriche. 
 L'officieux " Local-Anzeiger " 
 est particulierement agressif; 
 il qualifie de superflus les re- 
 cours ^ventuels de la Serbie a 
 Saint-Petersbourg, a Paris, k 
 Athfenes et k Bucarest, et ter- 
 mine en disant que le peuple 
 allemand respirera librement 
 quand il aura appris que la 
 situation dans la peninsule 
 balkanique va enfin s'^claircir. 
 (Signe) BRONEWSKY. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 All the morning papers, even 
 those few which recognise the 
 impossibility of Servia's accept- 
 ing the prescribed conditions, 
 warmly welcome the strong line 
 adopted by Austria. The semi- 
 ofScial " Lokal-Anzeiger " is 
 particularly violent ; it describes 
 as fruitless any possible appeals 
 that Servia may make to 
 St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, 
 or Bucharest, and concludes by 
 saying that the German people 
 will breathe freely when they 
 learn that the situation ia the 
 Balkan peninsula is to be 
 cleared up at last. 
 
 No. 8. 
 
 Russian Chargi d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affair's. 
 
 Paris, July 11 (24), 1914. 
 
 (T^l^gi-amme.) 
 
 La copie de la note officielle- 
 ment remise a Belgrade a cte 
 communiquee par I'Ambassa- 
 deur d'Autriche au Gouverne- 
 ment frangais. Plus tard I'Am- 
 bassadeur d'Allemagne a visits 
 le Ministre et lui a lu une 
 communication reproduisant les 
 arguments autrichiens et indi- 
 quant qu'en cas de refus de la 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 A oopy of the note officially 
 presented at Belgrade has been 
 communicated to the French 
 Government by the Austrian 
 Ambassador. The German 
 Ambassador later visited the 
 Minister and read to him a 
 communication containing the 
 Austrian arguments, and indi- 
 cating that in the event of a 
 
part de la Serbie, I'Autriche 
 serait obligee de recourii- a tine 
 pressiou et, en cas de besoin, k 
 des mesures militaires ; la com- 
 munication se terminait par la 
 remarque qu'a I'avis de I'Alle- 
 magne cette question devrait 
 §ti-e resolue directement entre 
 TAutriche et la Serbie el qu'il 
 etait de 1 'int^rSt des Puissances 
 de circonscrire I'affaire en 
 Fabandoniiant aux parties inte- 
 ressees. Le g6raut du Departe- 
 ment politique, qui assistait a 
 I'entretien, demanda a lAmbas- 
 sadeur s'il fallait consid^rer 
 Taction autrichienne comme rm 
 ultimatum — en d'autres termes, 
 si, dans le cas oil la Serbie ne 
 se soumettrait pas entiferement 
 aux demandes autrichienuee, 
 les hostilit6s 6taient inevitables. 
 L'Ambassadeur 6vita una r^- 
 ponse directe en alMguant I'ab- 
 sence d'instructions. 
 
 (Signe) SEVASTOPOULO. 
 
 refusal on the part of Servia, 
 Austria would be obliged to 
 resort to pressure, and, in case 
 of need, to military measures. 
 The communication ended with 
 the observation that, in the 
 opinion of G ermany, this question 
 ought to be settled between 
 Austria and Servia direct, and 
 that it was to the interest of the 
 Powers to localise the affair by 
 leaving it to the interested 
 parties. The Acting Head of 
 the Political Department, who 
 was present at the interview, 
 asked the Ambassador whether 
 the Austrian action should be 
 considered as an ultimatum — in 
 other words, whether, in the 
 event of Servia not submitting 
 entirely to the Austrian de- 
 mands, hostilities were inevit- 
 able. The Ambassador avoided 
 a direct reply, alleging that he 
 had no instructions. 
 
 No. 9. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affaires. 
 
 Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914. 
 
 (Tel6gi-amme.) 
 
 Paohitch est rentr^ a Bel- 
 grade. II a Tintentiou de 
 donner dans le delai fixe, c'est- 
 a-dire demain samedi k 6 
 heures du soir, une r^ponse a 
 I'Autriche indiquant les points 
 acceptables et inacceptables. 
 On adressera aujoiu-d'hui meme 
 aux Puissances la priere de 
 d^feudre I'indepeudance de la 
 Serbie. Ensuite,ajoutaPachitch, 
 si la guerre est inevitable — nous 
 ferons la guerre. 
 
 (Sign6) STRANDTMAN. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Paphitoh has returned to 
 Belgrade. He intends to give 
 an answer to Austria within the 
 prescribed time limit — that is to 
 say, to-morrow, Saturday, at 
 6 P.M. — showingthe points which 
 are acceptable or unacceptable. 
 To-day an appeal will be 
 addressed to the Powers to 
 defend the independence of 
 Servia. Then, added Pashitch, 
 if war is inevitable, we will make 
 war. 
 
No. 10. 
 
 Annoicncemenl bi/ the Russian Government. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 Les derniers ev&iements et 
 I'envoi par I'Autriche-Hongrie 
 d'un ultimatum a la Serbie pr6- 
 occupent le Gouvernement 
 Imp&-ial au plus haut degre. 
 Le Gouvernement suit attentive- 
 nient revolution duconflit serbo- 
 autvichien qui ne peut pas laisser 
 la Russie indiff^rente. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Recent events and the 
 despatch of an ultimatum to 
 Servia by Austria- Hungary are 
 causingthe Russian Government 
 the greatest anxiety. The 
 Government are closely follow- 
 ing the course of the dispute 
 between the two countries 
 to which Russia cannot remain 
 indifferent. 
 
 No. 11. 
 
 Russian ChargS d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (T^l^gramme.j 
 
 Le Comte Berchtold se trouve 
 a Ischl. Vu I'impossibiHte d'y 
 arriver a temps, je lui ai tele- 
 graphic uotre proposition de 
 prolonger le delai de I'ultimatum 
 et I'ai r^pet^e verbal ement au 
 Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a 
 promis de la communiquer h, 
 temps au Ministre des Affaires 
 Etrang^res, mais a ajoute qu'il 
 pouvait pr^dire avec assurance 
 un refus categorique. 
 
 (Bign^) KOUDACHEW. 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Count Berchtold is at Ischl. 
 In view of the impossibility of 
 arriving there in time, I have 
 telegraphed to him our proposal 
 to extend the time limit of the 
 ultimatum, and I have repeated 
 this proposal verbally to Baron 
 Macchio. The latter promised 
 to communicate it in time to 
 the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 but added that he had no hesita- 
 tion in predicting a categorical 
 refusal. 
 
 No. 12. 
 
 Russian Cliarg4 d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Vienna, July 12 (25), 191-1. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 In' continuation of my tele- 
 gram of to-day I have just 
 
 (Teiegramme.) 
 
 Suite k mon t^legramme 
 d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir 
 de Macchio la r6ponse negative 
 
 heard from Macchio that the 
 
du Gouvernement austro- 
 hongrois a notre proposition de 
 prolonger le d^lai de la note. 
 
 (Sign6) KOUDACHEW. 
 
 Austi-o-Hungarian Grovernment 
 refuse our proposal to extend 
 the time limit of the note. 
 
 No. 13. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (Delayed in transmission, received July 14 (27), 1914.) 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (T^Mgramme.) 
 
 Je transmetslareponse que le 
 President du Conseil des Minis- 
 tres serbe a remis au Ministre 
 austro-hongrois a Belgrade 
 aujourd'hui avaut I'expiration 
 du d^lai de I'ultimatum. 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Following is the reply which 
 the President of the Servian 
 Cabinet to-day handed to the 
 Austro-Hungarian Minister at 
 Belgrade before the expiration 
 of the time limit of the ultima- 
 tum. 
 
 [Here follows the text of the Servian reply, for which see 
 '■Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) " [Cd. 7467], No. 39.] 
 
 (Sign^) STRANDTMAN. 
 
 No. 14. 
 
 Russian Charg^ d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) 
 
 Al regu voire t^l^gramme du 
 11 (24) juillet. Ai communique 
 flon contenu au Ministre des 
 Affaires liltrangferes, II me dit 
 que le Gouvernement anglais 
 I'a 6galement pri6 de conseiller 
 k Vienne la prolongation du 
 d^lai de I'ultimatum ; il a com- 
 munique cette d-marche t616- 
 graphiqueraent k Vienne, il va 
 ■en faire autant pour notre d6- 
 marohe, mais il craint q\\k la 
 suite de I'absence de Berchtold, 
 parti pour IschI, et vu le manque 
 de temps, ses t616grammes ne 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 1 HAVE received your tele- 
 gram of the 11th (24th) July 
 and have communicated its con- 
 tents to the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. He tells me that the 
 British Government have like- 
 wise urged him to advise 
 Vienna to extend the time limit 
 of the ultimatum. He has 
 informed Vienna telegraphi- 
 cally of this step, and he will do 
 the same as regards Russia's 
 action, but he fears that in the 
 absence of Berchtold, who has 
 left for Ischl, and in view of the 
 
10 
 
 restent sane r(^8iTltats ; il a, en 
 outre, des doutes sur 1' opportu- 
 nity pour TAutriclie de cMer aii 
 dernier moment, et il se de- 
 mands si cela ne pouvait pas 
 augmenter I'assurance de la 
 Serbie. J'ai repondu qu'iine 
 grande Puissance comme I'Au- 
 triche pourrait oeder sans porter 
 atteinte k sou prestige et ai fait 
 valoir tons les arguments con- 
 formes, cependant je n'ai pu 
 obtenir des promeeses plus pre- 
 cises. Meme lorsque je laissais 
 entendre qu'il fallait agir a 
 Vienne pour t^viter la possibilite 
 de consequences redoutables, 
 le Ministre des Affaires ifitran- 
 gk-es r^pondait cbaque fois 
 u6gativement. 
 
 (Sign6) BRONEWSKY. 
 
 lack of time, his telegrams may 
 have no result. Moreover, he 
 has doubts as to the wisdom of 
 Austria yielding at the last 
 moment, and be is inclined to 
 think that such a step on her 
 part might increase the assu- 
 rance of Servia. 1 rephed that 
 a great Power such as Austria 
 could give way without im- 
 pairing her prestige, and I 
 adduced every other similar 
 argument, but failed, neverthe- 
 less, to obtain any more definite 
 promise. Even when I gave 
 him to understand that action 
 must be taken at Vienna if the 
 possibility of terrible conse- 
 quences was to be avoided, the 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 answered each time in the 
 negative. 
 
 No. 15. 
 
 Bussian Cliargi d'A f aires at Paris to Bussian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 Al re9u le telegramme du 
 11 (24) juillet conceruant la pro- 
 longation du delai de I'ulti- 
 matum autrichien et ai fait la 
 communication prescrite. Le 
 Repr^sentant de France a 
 Vienne a 6te muni d'instruc- 
 tions conformes. 
 
 (Sign6) SEVASTOPOULO. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAVE received your tele- 
 gram of the 11th (24th) July re- 
 specting the extension of thetitae 
 limit of the Austrian ultimatum, 
 and I have made the communi- 
 cation in accordance with your 
 instructions. The French Re- 
 presentative at Vienna has been 
 furnished with similar iastruc- 
 tions. 
 
n 
 
 No. 16. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (T61egramme.) 
 
 REgu t616 gramme du 11 
 juillet. Grey a present a I'Am- 
 baesadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne 
 d'appuyer notre d-marche con- 
 cernant la prolongation dn d^lai 
 de I'ultimatmn. II m'a dit en 
 meme temps que I'Ambassadeur 
 d'Autriche etait venu le 'voir et 
 avait explique qu'on ne devrait 
 pas attribuer a la note au- 
 trichienne le caractfere d'un 
 ultimatum; il faudrait la con- 
 siderer comme une d-marche 
 qui, en cas d'absence de r^ponse, 
 ou en cas de r^ponse insuffisante 
 au terme fix6, aurait comme 
 suite la rupture des relations 
 diplomatiques et le depart im- 
 midiat de Belgrade du Ministre 
 d'Autriche- Hongrie, sans en- 
 trainer cependant le commence- 
 ment imm^diat des hostilit^s. 
 Grey a ajout6 qu'a la suite de 
 cette explication il a indiqu6 a 
 I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a 
 Vienne que dans le cas oil il 
 serait trop tard pour soulever la 
 question de la prolongation du 
 delai de I'ultimatum, celle de 
 I'arret des hostilitdspourrait peut- 
 etre servir de base k la discus- 
 
 sion. 
 
 (Sign^) 
 
 BENCKENDORFF. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegi-am.) 
 
 I HAVE received your tele- 
 gram of the llth July. Grey 
 has instructed the British Ani- 
 baysador at Vienna to support 
 our action for the extension of 
 the time limit of the ultimatum. 
 At the same time he ex- 
 plained to me that the Austrian 
 Ambassador had come to see 
 Lim, and had explained that 
 the Austrian note should not be 
 regarded as an ultimatum. It 
 should be regarded as a step, 
 which, in the event of no reply, 
 or in the event of an unsatisfac- 
 tory reply within the time fixed, 
 would be followed by a rupture 
 of diplomatic relations and the 
 immediate departure of the 
 Austro - Hungarian Minister 
 from Belgrade ; without, how- 
 ever, entailing the immediate 
 opening of hostilities. Grey 
 added that as a result of this 
 explanation he had told the 
 British Ambassador at Vienna 
 that, should it be too late to 
 raise the question of extending 
 the time limit of the ultimatum, 
 the question of preventing hosti- 
 lities might perhaps serve as a 
 basis for discussion. 
 
 No. 17. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
 
 London. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) (Telegram.) 
 
 Dans le cas d'une nouvelle In the event of any change 
 aggravation de la situaiion, for the worse in the situation 
 
12 
 
 pouvant provoquer de la part 
 dee Grandes Puissances des 
 actions conform es, nous comp- 
 tons que I'Angleterre ne tardera 
 pas de se ranger nettement du 
 cote de la Russie et de la 
 France, en vue de maintenir 
 I'equilibre europeen, en faveur 
 duquel elle est intervenue con- 
 stamment dans le passe, et qui 
 serait sans aucun donte com- 
 promis dans le cas du triomphe 
 de I'Autriche. 
 
 (Sign6) SAZONOW. 
 
 which raiwht lead to joint action 
 by the Great Powers, we count 
 upon it that England will at 
 once side definitely with Russia 
 and France, in order to main- 
 tain the European balance of 
 power, for which she has con- 
 stantly intervened in the past, 
 and which would certainly be 
 compromised in the event of the 
 triumph of Austria. 
 
 No. 18. 
 
 A^ote verhale handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the 
 German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 1l nous revieut de source 
 autoritatiye que la nouvelle 
 repandue par quelques jouinaux 
 d'apres laquelle la demarche 
 du Gouvernement d'Autriche- 
 Hongrie a Belgrade aurait ^te 
 faite a I'iustigation de I'AUe- 
 magne est absolument fausse. 
 Le Gouvernement allemand n'a 
 pas eu connaissance du texte de 
 la note aiitrichienne avant 
 qu'elle ait ete remise, ot n'a 
 exerce aucune influeuce sur son 
 contenu. C'est a tort qu'on 
 attribue a I'Allenjagne une atti- 
 tude comminatoire. 
 
 L'Allemagne appuie natu- 
 rellement comma allie de 
 I'Autriche les revendications a 
 sou avis legitimes du Cabinet de 
 Vienna centre la Serbie. 
 
 Avant tout alia desire, comma 
 elle I'a d6ja declare dte le com- 
 mencement du difierend austro- 
 serbe, que ce conflit reste 
 localise. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 W'e learn from an authorita- 
 tive source that the news spread 
 by certain newspapers, to the 
 effect that the action of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government 
 at Belgrade was instigated by 
 Germany, is absolutely false. 
 The German GoA'cmment had 
 no knowledge of tha text of the 
 Austrian note before it was 
 presented, and exercised no 
 influence upon its contents. A 
 threatening attitude is wrongly 
 attribiited to Germany. 
 
 Germany, as the ally of 
 Austria, naturally supports the 
 claims made by the Vienna 
 Cabinet against Servia, which 
 fiiie considers justified. 
 
 Above all Germany wishes, 
 as she has already declared 
 from the very beginning of tha 
 Austro-Servian dispiite, that 
 this conflict should be localised. 
 
13 
 
 No. 19. 
 
 Russian Chargi d' Affaires at Paris to Russian. Minister for 
 Foreign A fairs. 
 
 Paris, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (Tilegramme.) 
 
 Me refers a mon l^Mgramme 
 du 11 (24) juillet. 
 
 Aujourd'hui un journal du 
 matin a public, gous une forme 
 pas entierement exacte, les 
 declarations d'hier de I'Ambas- 
 sadeur d'Allemagne, en les 
 faisarit suivre de commentaires 
 c|ui attribueut a cette d-marche 
 le caractfere d'une menace. 
 L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, 
 trfes impressionne par ces divul- 
 gations, a visite aujourd'liui le 
 Gerant du D^partement poli- 
 tique pour lui dire que ses 
 paroles n'avaient nullenient eu 
 le caract^re de menace qu'on 
 leur attribue. II a declare que 
 I'Autricheavait presente sa note 
 a la Serbie sans entente precise 
 avec Berlin, mais que cepen- 
 dant I'Allemagne approuvait le 
 point de vue de I'Autriche, et 
 que certainement " la fleche une 
 fois partie " (ce sont la ses 
 propres paroles), I'Allemagne ne 
 pouvait se laisser guider que 
 par ses devoirs d'alliee. 
 
 (Sign^) SKVASTOPOULO. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram,) 
 
 Please refer to my telegram 
 of the llth(24tli) July. 
 
 A morning paper has to-day 
 published, in a not altogether 
 correct form, the declarations 
 made yesterday by the German 
 Ambassador, and has added 
 comments in which it charac- 
 terises these utterances as being 
 in the nature of threats. The 
 German Ambassador, Avho is 
 much upset by these disclosures, 
 to-day visited the Acting Head 
 of the Political Department, and 
 explained to him that his words 
 in no ivise bore the threatening 
 character attributed to them. 
 He stated that Austria had 
 presented her note to Servia 
 without any definite under- 
 standing with Berlin, but that 
 Germany nevertheless ap- 
 proved of the Austrian point of 
 view, and that undoubtedly 
 "the bolt once fired" (these 
 were his own words), Germany 
 could only be guided by her 
 duties as an ally. 
 
 No. 20. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 (T616gramme.^ 
 
 Grey m'a dit que I'Ambas- 
 sadeur d'Allemagne lui a d^clar^ 
 que le Gouvernement allemand 
 n'avait pas ete informe du texte 
 de la note autrichienne, mais 
 
 London, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Grey has told me that the 
 German Ambassador has de- 
 clared to him that the German 
 Government were not informed 
 of the text of the Austrian note, 
 
14 
 
 qu'il sotitenait entievement la 
 demarche aiitrichienne. L'Ani- 
 bassadem- a detnande en mSme 
 temps si I'Angleterre ponvait 
 consentir k agir a Saint-Peters- 
 bourg dans un esprit de con- 
 ciliation. Grey a repondn que 
 cela 6tait completement impos- 
 sible. Le Alinistre a ajoiite qne 
 tant que les complications n'ex- 
 istaient qu'entre rAutriche et 
 la Serbie, les interets anglais 
 n'etaient engages qu'indirecte- 
 nient, mais qw'il devait prevoir 
 que la mobilisation autriehienne 
 aurait comme suite la mobilisa- 
 tion de la Russia et que d^s ce 
 moment on se trouverait en 
 presence d'une situation a la- 
 quelle seraient interess^es toutes 
 les Puissances. L'Angleterrese 
 resevvait pour ce cas une com- 
 plete liberte d'action. 
 
 (Sign^) BENCKENDORFF. 
 
 but that they entirely supported 
 Austria's action. The Ambas- 
 sador at the same time asked if 
 Great Britain could see her way 
 to bring conciliatory pressure to 
 bear at St. Petersburg. Grey 
 replied that this was quite 
 impossible. He added that, 
 as long as complications ex- 
 isted between Austria and 
 Servia alone, British interests 
 were only indirectly afifected ; 
 but he had to look ahead to the 
 fact that Austrian mobilisation 
 would lead to Russian mobilisa- 
 tion, and that from that moment 
 a situation would exist in which 
 the interests of all the Powers 
 would be involved. In that 
 event Great Britain reserved to 
 herself full liberty of action. 
 
 No. 21. 
 
 Russian ChargS iT Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (T^l^gramrae.) 
 
 MalQR:^ le caract^re extrS- 
 mement conciliant de la reponse 
 serbe a I'ultimatum, le Ministre 
 d'Autriche vient d'informer, a 
 6 heures et demie du soir, le 
 Gouvernement serbe par note, 
 que n'ayant pas re9U au delai 
 fix^ une reponse satisfaisante il 
 quitte Belgrade aveo tout le 
 personnel de la legation. La 
 Skoupchtina est convoquee a 
 Nich pour le 14 (27) juillet. Le 
 Gouvernement serbe et le Corps 
 diplomatique partent ce soir 
 pour la meme ville. 
 
 (Sign4) STRANDTMAN. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Ix spite of the extremely con- 
 ciliatory nature of the Servian 
 reply to the ultimatum, the 
 Austrian Minister has just in- 
 formed the Serviau Govern- 
 ment, in a note handed in at 
 6-30 P.M. this evening, that, not 
 having received a satisfactory 
 answer within the time limit 
 fixed, he was leaving Belgrade 
 with the entire staff of the 
 legation. The Skupchtina is 
 convoked for the 14th (27th) 
 July at Nish. The Servian 
 Government and the Diplomatic 
 Body are leaving this evening 
 for that town. 
 
15 
 
 No. 22. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at London to the Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 (Telegram me.) 
 
 Grey a dit a TAmbassadeur 
 d'Allemagne qu'a son avis la 
 mobilisation autrichienne devait 
 entrainer la mobilisation de la 
 Russie, qu'alors surgirait le 
 danger aigu d'uue guerre gen6- 
 rale et qu'il ne voyait qu'un 
 seul nioyen pour une solution 
 pacifique: qu'en presence desmo- 
 bilisations autrichienne et russe, 
 rAllemagne, la France, I'ltalie 
 et I'Aiigleterre s'abstiennent 
 d'une mobilisation immediate et 
 proposent tout d'abord leurs 
 bons offices. Grey m'a dit que 
 ce plan necessitait avant tout 
 I'agrement de I'Allemagne et 
 I'engagement de cette Puissance 
 de ne pas mobiliser. En conse- 
 quence il a adressd tout d'abord 
 a Berlin une question k ce 
 sujet. 
 
 (Signe) BENCKENDORFF. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Grky has told the German 
 Ambassador that in bis opinion 
 Austrian mobilisation must lead 
 to Russian mobilisation, that 
 grave danger of a general war 
 will thereupon arise, and that 
 he sees only one means of 
 reaching a peaceful settlement^, 
 namely, that, in view of the 
 Austrian a]id Russian mobilisa- 
 tions, Germany, France, Italy,, 
 and Great Britain should abstaia 
 from immediate mobilisation, 
 and should at once offer their 
 good offices. Grey told me 
 that the first essential of this 
 plan was the consent of Ger- 
 many and her promise not to 
 mobilise. He has therefore, as 
 a first step, made an enquiry on 
 this point at Berlin. 
 
 No. 23. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
 
 Rome. 
 
 St. Petersburg, .July 13 (26), 1914. 
 
 (Tel^grarame.) 
 
 L'Italie pourrait jouer un 
 r61e xie tout premier ordre en 
 faveur du maintien de la paix, 
 en exer9ant I'influence neces- 
 saire sur I'Autriche et en adop- 
 tant une' attitude nettement 
 defavorable au conflit, car ce 
 dernier ne saurait Stre localise. 
 II est desirable que vous expri- 
 miez la conviction qu'il est 
 [99 5J 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Italy might play a part of 
 the first importance in favour of 
 preserving peace, by bringing 
 the necessary influence to bear 
 upon Austria, and by adopting 
 a definitely unfavourable atti- 
 tude towards the dispute on the 
 gi-ound that it could not be 
 localised. You should express 
 your conviction that Russia 
 
16 
 
 impossible pour la Russie de ne cannot possibly avoid coming to 
 pas venir en aide k la Serbie. to tlie help of Servia. 
 
 (Sign^) SAZONOW. 
 
 No. 24. 
 
 Acting Russian Consul at Prague to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Prague, July 13 (26),. 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegi-arame.) (Telegram.) 
 
 La. mobilisation a ^te decret^e. MOBILISATION 
 
 ordered. 
 (Signd) KAZANSKY. 
 
 has been 
 
 No. 2/). 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian A mbassaJor at 
 
 Vienna. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914. 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) 
 
 J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long 
 entretien sur un ton amical avec 
 I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hon- 
 grie. Aprfes avoir examine avec 
 lui les dix deraandes adress^es 
 h la Serbie, j'ai fait observer 
 qu'a part la forme peu habile 
 sous laquelle elles sont pr6- 
 sentdes, quelques-unes parmi 
 elles sont absolument inex6- 
 cutables, mSme dans le cas oil 
 le Gouvernement scrbe decla- 
 rerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, 
 par exemple, les points 1 et 
 2 ne pourraient etre executes 
 sans un remaniement des lois 
 Serbes sur la presse et sur les 
 associations, pour lequel le con- 
 sentement de la Skoupchtina 
 pourrait Stre difficilement ob- 
 tenu; quant a I'execution 
 des points 4 et 5, elle 
 pourrait produire des conse- 
 quences tort dangereuses et 
 meme faire naitre le danger 
 d'actes de tevrorisme diriges 
 contre les membres de la Maison 
 Royale et contre Pachitch, ce 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAD a long and friendly 
 convei-sation to-day with the 
 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. 
 After discussing the ten demands 
 addressed to Servia, I drew his 
 attention to the fact that, quite 
 apart from the clumsy form in 
 which they were presented, 
 some of them were quite im- 
 practicable, even if the Servian 
 Government agreed to accept 
 them. Thus, for example, 
 points 1 and 2 could not 
 be carried out without recasting 
 the Servianpresslawand associa- 
 tions law, and to that it might 
 be difficult to obtain the consent 
 of the Skupchtina. As for en- 
 forcing points 4 and 5, this 
 might lead to most dangerous 
 consequences, and even to the 
 risk of acts of terrorism directed 
 against the Royal Family and 
 against Pashitch, which clearly 
 could not be the intention 
 of Austria. With regard to 
 the other points it seemed to 
 me that, with certain changes 
 
17 
 
 qui ne saurait entrer dans lea 
 vues de I'Autriohe. Eii ce qui 
 regai'de les autres points, il me 
 semble qu'avec certains change- 
 ments dans les details, il ne 
 serait pas difficile de trouver un 
 terrain d' entente si les accusa- 
 tions y contenues ^taient con- 
 firmees par des preuves suffi- 
 (santes. 
 
 Dans I'iuteret de lu conser- 
 vation de la paix, qui, aux dii'es 
 de Szapary, est precieuse k 
 I'Autriclie au mSme degr6 qu'^ 
 toutes les Puissances, il serait 
 ndoessaire de mettre au plus tot 
 possible une fin a la situation 
 tendue du moment. Dans ce 
 but il me semblerait trfes desi- 
 rable que I'Ambassadeur d'Au- 
 triche-Hongrie frit autoris^ 
 d'entrer avec moi dans un 
 echauge de vues priv6 aux fins 
 d'un remaniement en commun 
 de quelques articles de la note 
 autrichieune du 10 (23) juillet. 
 Ce procdde permettrait peut- 
 etre de trouver une formule qui 
 flit acceptable pour la Serbie, 
 tout en donnant satisfaction 
 k rAntriche quant au fond de 
 ses demandes. Veaillez avoir 
 une explication prudente et 
 araicale dans le sens de ce t6le- 
 gramme avec le Ministre des 
 Affaires fitrangeres. 
 
 Communique aux Ambassa- 
 deurs en AUemagne, en France, 
 en Angleterre et en Italie. 
 
 (Signe) SAZONOW. 
 
 of detail, it would not be diffir 
 cult to find a basis of mutual 
 agreement, if the accusations 
 contained in them were con- 
 firmed by sufficient proof 
 
 In the interest of the main- 
 tenance of peace, which, ac- 
 cording to the statements of 
 Szapary, is as much desired by 
 Austria as by all the Powers, it 
 was necessary to end the ten- 
 sion of the present moment as 
 soon as possible. With this 
 object in view it seemed to me 
 most desirable that the Austro- 
 Hungarian Ambassador should 
 bo authorised to enter into a 
 private exchange of views 
 in order to redraft certain 
 articles of the Austrian note of 
 the 10th (23rd) July in consul- 
 tation with me. This method 
 of procedure would perhaps 
 enable us to find a formula 
 which would prove acceptable 
 to Servia, while giving satis- 
 faction to Austria in respect of 
 the chief of her demands. Please 
 convey the substance of this 
 telegram to the Minister for 
 Foreign Afiaii's in a judicious 
 and friendly manner. 
 
 Communicated to Russian 
 Ambassadors in Germany, 
 France, Great Britain, and Italy, 
 
 No. 26. 
 
 Mussian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
 
 Berlin. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Teiegramme.) (Telegram.) 
 
 Veuillez communiquer le Plea.se communicate the 
 
 contenu de mon teiegramme h contents of my telegram to 
 
 [995] 2 
 
18 
 
 Vienne d'aujourd'hui au Miiiietre 
 des Aftaires ^trang^res alle- 
 mand et lui exprimer I'espoir 
 que de son cote il trouvera 
 possible de conseiller k Vienne 
 d'aller au-devant de notre 
 proposition. 
 
 (Sigue) SAZONOW. 
 
 Vienna of to-day to the German 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 
 express to him the hope that 
 he, on his part, will be able to 
 advise Vienna to meet Russia's 
 proposal in a friendly spirit. 
 
 No. 27. 
 
 Russian ChargS d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, 
 
 Paris, July 13 (26), 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 Llj; Directeur du Departe- 
 ment politique m'infbrme que, 
 lors de la communication qu'il 
 a faite a I'Ambassadeur d'Au- 
 triche du contenu de la reponse 
 serbe h, I'ultimatum, I'Ambas- 
 sadeur n'a pas cache son etonne- 
 ment de ce qu'elle n'ait pas 
 donne satisfaction a Giesl. 
 L'attitude concihante de la 
 Serbie doit, selon I'avis du 
 Directeur du D^partemeut poli- 
 tique, produire la meilleure 
 impression en Europe. 
 
 (Signe) SEVASTOPOULO. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Director of the Political 
 Department informs me that, 
 upon his informing the Austro- 
 Hungariaii Ambassador of the 
 contents of the Servian reply 
 to the ultimatum, the Ambas- 
 sador did not conceal his sur- 
 prise that it had failed to satisfy 
 Gtesl. In the opinion of the 
 Director of the Political Depart- 
 ment, Servia's conciliatory atti- 
 tude should produce the best 
 impression in Europe. 
 
 No. 28. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July 13 (26), 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 Aujourd'hui I'Ambassadeur 
 d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu 
 visite au G^rant du Ministfere des 
 Affaires Etrang^res et lui a fait 
 les declarations suivantes : 
 
 " L'Autriche a declare k la 
 Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas 
 des acquisitions territoriales et 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The German Ambassador 
 again visited the Acting Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs to-day, and 
 made to him the follov^ing 
 declarations : — 
 
 " Austria has declared to 
 Russia that she does not desire 
 territorial acquisitions, and that 
 
19 
 
 qu'elle ne menace pas Tint^grit^ 
 de la Serbia. Son but unique 
 est d'assurer sa propre tran- 
 quillity. Par cons6quent il de- 
 pend de la Russie d'eviter la 
 guerre. L'Allemagne ee sent 
 solidaire avec la France dans le 
 d^sir ardent de conserver la 
 paiK et espfere fermement que 
 la France usera de son influence^ 
 a Petersbourg dans un sens 
 moderateur." 
 
 Lfe Ministre fit observer que 
 TAUemagne pourrait de sou 
 cote entreprendre des d-marches 
 analogues a Vienna, surtout en 
 presence de I'esprit de concilia- 
 tion dont a fait preuve la Serbie. 
 L'Ambassadeur repondit que 
 cela n'etait pas possible, vu la 
 resolution prise de ne pas s'im- 
 miscer dans le conflit austro- 
 serbe. Alors de Ministre de- 
 manda, si les quatre Puissances 
 — I'Anglaterre, I'Allemagne, 
 ritalie et la France — ne pou- 
 vaient pas entreprendre des 
 d6marcbes k Saint-P6tersbourg 
 et k Vienna, puisqua I'affaire se 
 r^duisait en somme a un conflit 
 entre la Russie et I'Autriche. 
 L'Ambassadeur allegua I'ab- 
 seuco d'instructions. Finale- 
 ment le Ministre refusa d'adh^rer 
 il la proposition allemande. 
 
 (Signe) SEVASTOPOULO. 
 
 she harbours no designs against 
 the integrity of Servia. Her sole 
 object is to secure her own peace 
 and quiet, and consequently 
 it rests with Russia to prevent 
 war. Germany is at one with 
 France in her ardent desire to 
 
 E reserve peace, and she sincerely 
 opes that France will exercise 
 a moderating influence at St, 
 Petersburg." 
 
 The Minister pointed out that 
 Germany on her part might 
 well act on similar lines at 
 Vienna, especially in view of 
 the conciliatory spirit displayed 
 by Servia. The Ambassador 
 replied that such a course was 
 not possible, owing to the de- 
 cision not to intervene in the 
 Austro-Servian dispute. The 
 Minister then asked whether 
 the four Powers — Great Britain, 
 Germany, Italy, and France — 
 could not make representations 
 at St. Petersburg and Vienna, 
 for that the matter amounted, 
 in elfect, to a dispute between 
 Austria and Russia. The Am- 
 bassador alleged that he had 
 no instructions. Finally, the 
 Minister refused to agi'ee to 
 the German proposal. 
 
 No. 29. 
 
 Bussian Charg^ d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 Le Directeur du D^partement 
 politique a deolar^ qu'k son avis 
 personnel, las demarches suc- 
 cessives allemandas a Paris out 
 pour but d'intimider la France 
 
 Paris, July 13 (2G), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Director of the Political 
 Department lias expressed the 
 personal opinion tiiat the series 
 of representations made by 
 Germany at Paris aim at in- 
 
20 
 
 et d'amener eon iutervention a 
 Saint-Petersbourg. 
 
 (Sign^) SEVASTOPOULO. 
 
 timidating France and at se- 
 curing her intervention at St. 
 Petersburg. 
 
 No. 30. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Hussion Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 13 (26), 1914. 
 
 (Telegrarame.) 
 
 APRfes la reception k Berlin 
 de la nouvelle de la mobilisation 
 de I'armee autrichienne contra 
 la Serbie une grande foule, 
 composee, aux dires des jour- 
 naux, en partie d'elements au- 
 trichiens, se livra a une serie 
 de bruyanies manifestations en 
 faveur de I'Autriche. A une 
 heui-e avancee de la soiree les 
 manifestants se mass^rent k 
 plusieurs reprises devant le 
 palais de I'Ambassade Imperiale 
 en poussant des cris hostiles a 
 la Russie ; la police etait presque 
 abseute et ne prenait aucune 
 mesure. 
 
 (Sign^) BRONEWSKY. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 On the news reaching Berlin 
 that the Austrian army had 
 mobilised against Servia, a large 
 crowd, in which the papers 
 report the presence of an 
 Austrian element, gave vent 
 to a series of noisy demon- 
 strations in favour of Austria. 
 Late in the evening the crowd 
 several times collected before 
 the Imperial Russian Embassy 
 and some anti-Russian shouting 
 occuiTed. Hardly any police 
 were present and no precau- 
 tions were taken. 
 
 No. 31. 
 
 JRussiaii Ambassador at London to Hussian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, Jxily 14 (27), 1914. 
 
 (T^Mgramme.) 
 
 Ai re<;u votre telegi-amme du 
 13 (26) juillet. Prie me tele- 
 graphier si, a votre avis, vos 
 pourparlers directs avecle Cabi- 
 net de Vienne s'accordent avec 
 le projet de Grey concernant la 
 mediation des quatre Gouverne- 
 ments. Ay ant appris de I'Am- 
 bassadeur d'Angleterre a Saint- 
 
 (Translatiou.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAVE received your tele- 
 gram of the 13th (26th) July. 
 Please inform me by telegraph 
 whether you consider that your 
 direct discussions with the 
 Vienna Cabinet harmonise with 
 Grey's scheme for mediation by 
 the four Governments. Having 
 heard from the British Ambassa- 
 
21 
 
 P6tersbourg que vous 6tiez dis- 
 pose k acceptei- cette combi- 
 naison, Grey a decide de la 
 transformer en une proposition 
 officielle qu'il a faite hier soir k 
 Berlin, h, Paris et k Rome. 
 
 (Sign6) BENCKENDORFF. 
 
 dor at St. Petersburg that yon 
 would be prepared to accept 
 such a combination, Grey de- 
 cided to turn it into an ofiBcial 
 proposal, which he commani- 
 cated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, 
 and Rome. 
 
 No. 32. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at 
 Paris and Ziondon. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 14 C27), 1914. 
 
 (T^Mgramme.) 
 
 L'Ambassadeue d'Angleterre 
 est venu s'informer ei nous 
 jugeoDS utile que I'Angleterre 
 prenne I'initiative de convoquer 
 a Londres une conf6reuce des 
 repr^sentants de I'Angleterre, la 
 France, I'Allemagne et I'ltalie, 
 pour etudier une issue a la situa- 
 tion actuelle. 
 
 J'ai r^pondu a I'Ambassadeur 
 que j'ai entam6 des pourparlers 
 avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche- 
 Hongrie, en conditions que 
 j'espere favorables. Pourtant 
 je n'ai pas encore re9u de 
 r^ponse a la proposition que j'ai 
 faite d'une revisioa de la note 
 entre les deux Cabinets. 
 
 Si des explications directes 
 avec le Cabinet de Vienne se 
 trouvaient irr^alisables, je suis 
 pret k accepter la proposition 
 anglaise ou toute autre de 
 nature a resoudre favorable- 
 ?nent le conflit. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The British Ambassador has 
 enquired whether we think 
 it desirable that Great Britain 
 should take the initiative in 
 summoning a conference in 
 London of the representatives of 
 Great Britain, France, Germany, 
 and Italy to examine the possi- 
 bility of finding a way out of 
 the present situation. 
 
 I replied to the Ambassador 
 that 1 had begun conversations 
 with the Austro - Hungarian 
 Ambassador under conditions 
 which, I hoped, might be favour- 
 able. I had not, however, 
 received as yet any reply to 
 my proposal for the revision of 
 the note by the two Cabinets. 
 
 If direct explanations with 
 the Vienna Cabinet proved 
 impossible, I was ready to fall 
 in with the British proposal, or 
 any other proposal of a kind 
 likely to lead to a fuvoura,ble 
 settlement of the' dispute. 
 
 (Sign^) SAZONOW. 
 
22 
 
 No. 33. 
 
 Hussian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at 
 Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 14 (27), 1914. 
 
 (Tdlegramme.) 
 
 Ai pris connaissance de la 
 reponse transmise par le Gou- 
 vernement serbe au BaronGiesl. 
 Elle d^passe toutes nos pre- 
 visions par sa moderation et son 
 desir de donner la plus complete 
 satisfaction k I'Autriche. Nous 
 ne yoyons pas quelles pourraient 
 etre encore les demandes de 
 I'Autriche, k moins que le Cabi- 
 net de Vienne ne cherche un 
 f)retexte pour une guerre avec 
 a Serbie. 
 
 (Sign6) SAZONOW. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAVE taken note of the 
 reply returned by the Servian 
 Government to Baron Giesl. 
 It exceeds all our expecta- 
 tions in its moderation, and 
 in its d&sire to afford the 
 fullest satisfaction to Austria. 
 We do not see what further 
 demands could be made by 
 Austria, unless the Vienna 
 Cabinet is seeking for a pretext 
 for war with Servia. 
 
 No. 34. 
 
 Russian ChargS d' Affaires at 'Paris to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July 14 (27), 1914. 
 
 (T^legvamme.) 
 
 L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne 
 a conf6r6 aujourd'hui de nou- 
 veau longuement sur la situation 
 avec le Directeur du D^parte- 
 ment politique. L'Ambassa- 
 deur a beaucoup insiste sur 
 I'exclusion de toute possibilite 
 d'une mediation ou d'une con- 
 lerence 
 
 (Sigiie) SEVASTOPOULO. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The German Ambassador 
 discussed the situation again 
 to-day at great length with the 
 Director of the Political Depart- 
 ment. The Ambassador laid 
 great stress on the utter im- 
 possibility of any mediation or 
 conference. 
 
 No. 35. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign ° 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July 14 (27), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (T^legramme.) (Telegram.) . 
 
 Ai confere avec le G^rant du I discctssed the situation with 
 Minist^re des Affaires ^^tran- the Acting Minister for Foreign 
 
23 
 
 gferes, en presence de Berthelot, 
 imra^diatement apr^s mon re- ' 
 tour h Paris. Tous les deux 
 m'ont confirme les details con- 
 cernant les d(5marches de 
 I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne que 
 Sevastopoulo vous a communi- 
 ques dans see t^l^grammes. 
 Ce matin le Baron de Schoen 
 a confirme par ecrit sa declara- 
 tion d'hier, savoir: 
 
 1. L'Autriche a declare a la 
 Russia quelle ne recherche pas 
 d' acquisitions et n'attente pas k 
 I'integrite de la Serbie. Son 
 unique but est d'assurer sa 
 propre tranquiHite. 
 
 2. Par consequent il depend 
 de la Russie d'^viter la guerre. 
 
 3. L'Allemagne 'et la France, 
 complfetement solidaires dans 
 I'ardent d6sir de ne pas rompre 
 
 la 
 
 paix, 
 
 Russie 
 rateur. 
 
 doivent 
 dans un 
 
 agir 
 sens 
 
 sur la 
 mode- 
 
 Affairs, in the presence of Ber- 
 thelot, directly after my return 
 to. Paris. They both con- 
 firmed the information respect- 
 ing the action taken by the 
 German Ambassador, which 
 Sevastopoulo has already tele- 
 graphed to you. This morning 
 Baron von Schoen confirmed 
 his declaration of yesterday in 
 writing, i.e. : 
 
 1. That Austria lias declared 
 to Russia that she seeks no 
 territorial acquisitions and that 
 she harbours no designs against 
 the integrity of Servia. Her 
 sole object is to secure her own 
 peace and quiet. 
 
 2. That consequently it rests 
 with Russia to avoid war. 
 
 3. That Germany and France, 
 entii-ely at one in their ardent 
 desire to preserve peace, should 
 exercise their moderating in- 
 fluence upon Russia. 
 
 Le Baron de Schoen a sp^- 
 cialement souligne I'expression 
 de la solidarite entre I'Alle- 
 magne et la France. D'apres 
 la conviction du Ministre de la 
 Justice, les d-marches susdites 
 de I'AUemagne out pour but 
 evident de desunir la Russie et 
 la France, d'entrainer le Gou- 
 vernement franqais dans la voie 
 des representations a Saint- 
 Petersbourg et de compro- 
 mettre ainsi not re allie a nos 
 yeux ; enfin, en cas de guerre, 
 d'en rejeter la responsabilite 
 non sur I'AUemagne, qui em- 
 ploie soi-disant tous ses efforts 
 pour le maintien de la paix, 
 mais sur la Russie et la France. 
 (Signe) ISVOLSKY. 
 
 Baron von Schoen laid special 
 emphasis on the expression of 
 solidarity of Germany and 
 France. The Minister of 
 Justice is convinced that these 
 steps on the part of Germany 
 are taken with the evident ob- 
 ject of alienating Russia and 
 France, of inducing the French 
 Government to make repre- 
 sentations at St. Petersburg, 
 and of thus compromising our 
 ally in our ej'es ; and finally, in 
 the event of war, of throwing 
 the responsibility not on Ger- 
 many, who is ostensibly making 
 every effort to maintain peace, 
 but on Russia and France. 
 
24 
 
 No. 36. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July U (27), 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 Il ressort devos telegrammes 
 du 13 (26) juillet que vous ne 
 connaissiez pas encore la re- 
 ponse du Gouvernement serbe. 
 Le telegramme par lequel cette 
 nouvelle m'a ete communique 
 de Belgrade a ete egalement en 
 route pendant vingt heures. Le 
 telegramme du Ministre des 
 Affaires ]5trangeres fran9ais ex- 
 pedie avant-hier, au triple tarif, 
 ^11 heures du matin, et con- 
 tenant I'ordre d'appuyer notre 
 d-marche, n'est parvenu a sa 
 destination qua 6 heures. II 
 n'y a aucun doute que ce tele- 
 gramme n'ait ete retenu inten- 
 tionnellement par le tel(5graphe 
 autrichien. 
 
 (Sigiie) ISVOLSKY. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegi-am.) 
 
 It is clear from your tele- 
 grams of the 13th (26) July that 
 you were not then aware of 
 the reply of the Servian Go- 
 vernment. The telegram from 
 Belgrade informing me of it 
 also took twenty hours to reach 
 us. The telegram from the- 
 French Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, sent the day before 
 yesterday at 11 o'clock in the 
 morning, at the special urgent 
 rate,whichcontainediristruction8 
 to support (far representations, 
 only reached its destination at 
 6 o'clock. There is ne doubt 
 that this telegram was inten- 
 tionally delayed by the Austrian 
 telegraph office. 
 
 No. 37. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Pai-is, July 14 (27), 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 D'OfiDRE de son Gouverne- 
 ment, FAmbassadeiu" d'Autriche 
 a communique au Gerant du 
 Ministere des Affaires ifitrangeres 
 que la reponse de la Serbie a ete 
 jugee insuffisante a Vienne et 
 que demain, mardi, I'Autriche 
 procederait a des " actions ener- 
 giques" dont le but serait de 
 forcer la Serbie de lui donner 
 les garanties necessaires. Le 
 Ministre ayant demand^ en quoi 
 oonsisterait ces actions, I'Am- 
 bassadeur repondit qu'il n'avait 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 On the instructions of his 
 Government, the Austrian Am- 
 bassador has informed the 
 Acting jMinister for Foreign 
 Affairs ,that Servia's answer has 
 not been considered satisfactory 
 in Vienna, and that to-moiTOW, 
 Tuesday, Austria will proceed 
 to take '• energetic action "with 
 the object of forcing Servia to 
 give the necessary guarantees. 
 The Minister having asked what 
 form such action would take, the 
 Ambassador replied that he had 
 
25 
 
 pas de renseignements exacts a 
 ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait s'agir 
 d'un passage de la f'rontifere 
 serbe, d'un ultimatum et mcme 
 d'une declaration de giierre. 
 
 (Sign^) ISVOLSKY. 
 
 no exact information on the 
 subject, but it might mean 
 either the crossing of the Ser- 
 vian frontier, or an ultimatum, 
 or even a declaration of war. 
 
 No. 38. 
 
 Russian Ghargi d^ Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 14 (27), 19U. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 J'ai prie le Ministre des 
 Affaires ifitrang^res d'appuyer a 
 Vienne votre proposition ten- 
 dant a autoriser Szapary d'ela- 
 borer, par la voie d'un echange 
 de vues prive avec vous, une 
 redaction des demandes austro- 
 hongroises acceptable pour les 
 deux parties. Jagow a repondu 
 qu'il Itait au conrant de cette 
 proposition et qu'il partageait 
 I'avis de Pourtales que, puisque 
 Szapary avait commence cette 
 conversation, il pourrait aussi 
 bien la continuer. II tel^- 
 graphiera dans ce sens a I'Am- 
 bassadeur d'Allemagne aVienne. 
 Je I'ai prie de conseiller d'une 
 faqon plus pressante a Vienne 
 de s'engager dans cette vbie de 
 conciliation ; Jagow a repondu 
 qu'il ne pouvait pas conseiller 
 a I'Autriche de c^der. 
 
 (Signe) B RONE W SKY. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I BEGGED the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs to support your 
 proposal in Vienna that Szapary 
 should be authorised to draw 
 up, by means of a private ex- 
 change of views with you, a 
 wording of the Austro-Hun- 
 garian demands which would 
 be acceptable to both parties. 
 Jagow answered that he was 
 aware of this proposal and that 
 he agreed with Pourtales that, as 
 Szapary had begun this conver- 
 sation, he might as well go on 
 with it. He will telegraph in 
 this sense to the German Am- 
 bassador at- Vienna. I begged 
 him to press Vienna with greater 
 insistencie to adopt this con- 
 ciliatory line ; Jagow answered 
 that he could not advise Austria 
 to give way. 
 
 No. 39. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegramme.) (Telegram.) 
 
 Aujourd'HUI, avant ma visite Before ray visit to the 
 au Ministre des Affaires ifitran- Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 
26 
 
 geres, ce dernier avait reQU 
 celle de rAmbassadeur de 
 France, qui avait tent^ de lui 
 faire accepter la proposition 
 anglaise relative a une action 
 en faveur de la paix, action qui 
 serait exerc^e eimultan^ment a 
 Saint-Petersbourg et k Vienne 
 par I'Angleterre, I'Allemagne, 
 ritalie et la France. Cainbon 
 a proposd que ces Puissances 
 dorinent a Vienne un conseil 
 dans les termes suivants : 
 " S'abstenir de tout acte qui 
 pourrait aggraver la situation 
 de I'heure actuelle." En adop- 
 tant cette formula voil^e on 
 eviterait de mentionner la n6ces- 
 bM de s'abstenir d'une invasion 
 de la Serbie. Jagow a oppos^ 
 a cette proposition un refus 
 categorique, et cela malgr^ les 
 instances de I'Ambassadeur, qui 
 a fait valoir, comme un bon cote 
 de la proposition, le groupement 
 mixte des Piiissances grace 
 auquel on evitait I'opposition de 
 I'AlliancQ a I'Entente, ce dont 
 s'etait si souvent plaint Jagow 
 lui-meme. 
 
 CSign6) BRONEWSKY. 
 
 to-day his Excellency had re- 
 ceived the French Ambassador, 
 wlio endeavoured to induce him 
 to accept the British proposal 
 for action in favour of peace, 
 such action to be taken simul- 
 taneously at St. Petersburg 
 and at Vienna by Great Britain, 
 Germany, Italy, and l?'rance. 
 Cambon suggested that these 
 Powers should give their advice 
 to Vienna in the following 
 terms : "To abstain from all 
 action whichmightaggravate the 
 existing situation." By adopting 
 this vague formula, all mention 
 of the necessity of refraining 
 from invading Servia might be 
 avoided. Jagow refused point- 
 blank to accept this sugges- 
 tion in spite of the entreaties of 
 the Ambassador, who emplia- 
 sised, as a good feature of the 
 suggestion, the mixed grouping 
 of the Powers, thanks to which 
 the opposition between the 
 Alliance and the Entente — a 
 matter of which Jagow himself 
 had often complained — was 
 avoided. 
 
 No. 40. 
 
 Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to 
 His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia, July 14 (27), 
 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 VoTRE Altesse Royale en 
 s'adressant a moi dans un 
 momentparticulierement difficile 
 ne s'est pas trompee sur les 
 sentiments qui m'animent a sou 
 6gard et sur ma pympathie 
 cordiale pour le peuple serbe. 
 
 Ma plus Sf^rieuse attention 
 est attir^e par la situation 
 actuelle et raon Gouvernement 
 s'applique de toutes ses forces a 
 aplanir les pr4sentes difficult^s. 
 Je ne doute point que votre 
 
 When your Royal Highness 
 applied to me at a time of 
 especial stress, you were not 
 mistaken in the sentiments 
 which I entertain for you, or in 
 my cordial sympathy with the 
 Servian people. 
 
 The existing situation is en- 
 gaging my most serious atten- 
 tion, and my Government are 
 using their utmost endeavour 
 to smooth away the present 
 difficulties. I have no doubt 
 
27 
 
 Altesse et le Gouvernement 
 Royal ne veuilleut faciliter cette 
 tiche en ne negligeaut lien 
 pour arriver k une solution qui 
 permette deprevenir les liorreurs 
 d'une nouvelJe guerre tout en 
 sauvegardant la dignity de la 
 Serbie. 
 
 Tant qvi'il y a le moindre 
 espoir d'6viter une effusion de 
 sang, tons nos efforts doi»vent 
 tendre vers ce but. Si, malgre 
 notre plus sincere deeir, nous 
 ne reussissons pas, votre Altesse 
 peut ^tre assuree qu'en aucun 
 cas la Russie ne se desinteressera 
 du sort de la Serbie. 
 
 (Signe) NICOLAS. 
 
 that your Highness and the 
 Royal Servian Government wish 
 to render that task easy by 
 neglecting no step which might 
 lead to a settlement, and thus 
 both prevent the horrors of a new- 
 war and safeguard the dignity 
 of Servia. 
 
 So long as the slightest hope 
 exists of avoiding bloodshed, 
 all our efforts must be directed 
 to that end ; but if in spite of 
 our earnest wish we are not suc- 
 cessful, your Highness may rest 
 assured that Russia will in no 
 case disinterest herself in the 
 fate of Servia. 
 
 No. 41. 
 
 Hussian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Vienna, July 14 (27), 1914. 
 
 (Teldgramme.) 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires 
 ^trang^res est absent. Pendant 
 un entretien prolong^, que j'ai 
 eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, 
 j'ai, en termes tout k fait 
 amicaux, attir6 son attention 
 sur I'impression d^favorable qua 
 produite en Rxissie la pr&enta- 
 tion par TAutriche k la Serbie 
 de demandes absolument inac- 
 oeptables pour chaque fitatinde- 
 pendant, bien que petit. J'ai 
 ajout^ que ce proc^dl, qui pour- 
 rait amener des complications les 
 moins desirables, a provoqu^ en 
 Russie une profonde surprise et 
 une reprobation general e. II 
 faut supposer que I'Autriche, 
 sous I'influence des assurances 
 du Repr^sentant allemand k 
 Vienne, lequel pendant toute 
 cette crise a joue un role 
 d'instigateur, a compt^ sur la 
 probability de la localisation de 
 
 ■(Translp-tion.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs is away. During a long 
 conversation which I had with 
 Macchio to day I drew his 
 attention, in a perfectly friendly 
 way, to the unfavourable im- 
 pression produced in Russia by 
 the presentation of demands 
 by Austria to Servia, which it 
 was quite impossible for any 
 independent State, however 
 small, to accept. I added that 
 this method of procedure might 
 lead to the most undesirable 
 complications, and that it had 
 aroused profound surprise and 
 general condemnation in Russia. 
 We can only suppose that 
 Austria, influenced by the 
 assurances given by the German 
 Representative at Vienna, who 
 has egged her on throughout 
 this crisis, has counted on the 
 probable localisation of the 
 
28 
 
 son coi)flit avec la Serbie et sur 
 la possibility de porter k cette 
 derniere impunement un coup 
 grave. La declaration du 
 Gouveriiement Imperial con- 
 cernant riinpossibilit6 pour la 
 Russie de rester indifferente en 
 presence d'un tel precede a 
 provoqiie ici nne grande impres- 
 sion. 
 
 (Signe) 8CH]&B]fiK0. 
 
 dispute with Servia, and on 
 the possibility of inflicting with 
 impunity a serious blow upon 
 Ihat country. The declaration 
 by the Russian Government 
 that Russia cordd not possibly 
 remain indifferent in the face ot 
 such conduct has caused a great 
 sensation here. 
 
 No. 42. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 London, July 14 (27), 1914. 
 
 Telegramme.) 
 
 Grey vient de repoudre a 
 I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui 
 etait venu le questionner sur la 
 possibilite d'une action a Saint- 
 Petersbourg, que cette action 
 devrait se produire a Vienne 
 et que le Cabinet de Berlin 
 serait le mieux quahfi^ pour 
 I'exercer. Grey a fait observer 
 en meme temps que la reponse 
 serbe a la note autrichienne 
 depassait par sa moderation et 
 son esprit de conciliation tout 
 ce a quoi on pouvait s'attendre. 
 Grey a ajoute qu'il en concluait 
 que la Russie avait conseill6 a 
 Belgrade de dqnner une reponse 
 mod&'^e et qu'il pensait que la 
 reponse serbe pouvait servir de 
 base a une solution pacifique et 
 acceptable de la question. 
 
 Dans ces conditions, a con- 
 tinue Grey, si I'Autriche malgre 
 cette reponse commen^ait ies 
 hostilites, elle prouverait son 
 intention d'andantir la Serbie. 
 La question placee sur ce ter- 
 rain produirait une situation 
 qui pourrait ameuer une guerre 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Grey has just informed the 
 German Ambassador, who came 
 to question him as to the possi- 
 bility of taking action at St. 
 Petersburg, that such action 
 ought rather to bo taken at 
 Vienna, and that the Berlin 
 Cabinet were the best qualified 
 to do so. Grey also pointed 
 out that the Servian reply to 
 the Austrian note had ex- 
 ceeded anything that could 
 have been expected in modera- 
 tion and in its spirit of con- 
 ciliation. Grey added that he 
 had therefore come to the con- 
 clusion that Russia must have 
 advised Belgrade to return a 
 moderate reply, and that he 
 thought the Servian reply could 
 form the basis of a peaceful 
 and acceptable solution of the 
 question. 
 
 In these circumstances, con- 
 tinued Grey, if Austria were to 
 begin hostilities in spite of that 
 reply, she would prove her 
 intention of crushing Servia. 
 Looked at in this light, the 
 question might give rise to a 
 situation which might lead to 
 
29 
 
 dans laquelle seraient impliqiiees 
 toutes les Puissances. 
 
 Grey a enfin declar^ que le 
 Gouvernement anglais etait 
 bien sincferement disposed a col- 
 laborer avec le Gouvernement 
 allemand taut qu'il s'agirait de 
 la conservation de la paix; 
 mais que pour le oas contraire 
 I'Angleterre se r^servait une 
 pleine liberte d'action. 
 
 (Signd) BENCKENDOKFF. 
 
 a war in which all the Powers 
 would be involved. 
 
 Grey finally declared that the 
 British Government were sin- 
 cerely anxious to act with the 
 German Government as long 
 as the preservation of peace 
 was in question ; but, in the 
 contrary event, Great Britain 
 reserved to herself full liberty 
 of action. 
 
 No. 43. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
 
 London. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 15 (28;, 1914. 
 
 (T^l^gi-amme.) 
 
 Mes entretienn avec I'Ambas- 
 aadeur d'Allemagne confirment 
 mon inipression que I'Allemagne 
 est plutot favorable a I'intraii- 
 sigeance de I'Autriche. 
 
 Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui 
 aurait pu arreter tout le de- 
 veloppement de la crise, parait 
 n'exercer aucune action sar son 
 alli^e. 
 
 L'Ambassadeur trouve in- 
 suffisante la r^ponse de la 
 Serbie. 
 
 Cette attitude allemande est 
 tout particuli^rement alar- 
 mante. 
 
 II me semble que mieux que 
 toute autre Puissance I'Angle- 
 terre serait en mesure de tenter 
 encore d'agir a Berlin pour 
 engager le Gouvernement alle- 
 mand a Taction n^cessaire. 
 Cest k Berlin qu'indubitable- 
 ment se trouve la clef de la 
 situation. 
 
 (Sign^) SAZONOW. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 My interviews with the Ger- 
 man Ambassador confirm my 
 impression that Germany is, if 
 anything, in favour of the un- 
 compromising attitude adopted 
 by Austria. 
 
 The Berlin Cabinet, who 
 could have prevented the whole 
 of this crisis developing, appear 
 to be exerting no influence on 
 their ally. 
 
 The Ambassador considers 
 that the Servian reply is insufii- 
 cient. 
 
 This attitude on the part of 
 the German Government is most 
 alarming. 
 
 It seems to me that Great 
 Britain is in a better position than 
 any other Power to make another 
 attempt at Berlin to induce the 
 German Government to take 
 the necessary action. There is 
 no doubt that the key of the 
 situation is to be found at 
 Berlin. 
 
30 
 
 No. 44 
 
 Bussian Consul General at Fiume to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Fiume, July 15 (28), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 L'etat de siege a ete pvo- 
 clame f n Slavonic, en Croatie et 
 ^ Fiume et en meme temps les 
 reservistes de toutes les cate- 
 gories ont ete mobilises. 
 
 (Signe) SALVIATI. 
 
 (Telegi-am.) 
 
 State of siege has been pro- 
 claimed in Slavouia, in Croatia, 
 and at Fiume, and the reservists 
 of all classes Lave also been 
 called up. 
 
 Xo. 45. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.^ 
 
 J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le 
 Comte Berchtold dans le sens 
 des instructions de votre Excel- 
 lence. Je lui fis observer, en 
 termes les plus amicaux, com- 
 bien il etait desirable de trouver 
 une solution qui, en consolidant 
 lesbonsrapportsentrerAutriche- 
 Hongiie et la Russie, dounerait 
 a la Mouarchie austro-hongroise 
 des garanties serieuses pour ses 
 rapports futurs avec la Serbie. 
 
 J'attirais I'attention du Comte 
 Berchtold sur tons les dangers 
 pour la paix de I'Europe qu'en- 
 trainerait nn conflit arme eutre 
 I'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie. 
 
 Le Comte Berchtold me re- 
 pondit qu'il se rendait parfaite- 
 ment compte du s^rieux de la 
 situation et des avantages d'une 
 franche explication avec le 
 Cabinet de Saiut-P(5tersbourg. 
 II me dit que d'un autre cote le 
 Gouvernement austro-hongrois, 
 qui ne s'etait decide que tres mal 
 volontiers aux mesures ener- 
 giques qn'il avait prises centre 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I SfOKE to Count Berchtold 
 to-day in the sense of your 
 ExceUency's instructions. I 
 pointed out to him in the 
 most friendly manner, how 
 desirable it was to find a solution 
 which, while consolidating good 
 relations between Austria-Hun- 
 gary and Russia, would give to 
 the Austro-Huugarian Monarchy 
 genuine guarantees for its future 
 relations with Servia. 
 
 I drew Count Berchtold's 
 attention to all the dangere to 
 the peace of ICurope which 
 an armed conflict between 
 Austria-Hungary and Servia 
 would involve. 
 
 Count Berchtold replied that 
 he was well aware of the gravity 
 of the situation and of the 
 advantages of a frank explana- 
 tion with the St. Petersburg 
 Cabinet. He told me that, on 
 the other hand, the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government, who 
 had only decided, much against 
 their will, on the energetic 
 
31 
 
 la Serbie, Be pouvait plus ni 
 reculer, ni entrer en discussion 
 aucune des termes de la note 
 austr o-hon groise. 
 
 Le Comte Berohtold ajouta 
 que la crise etait devenue si 
 aigue, et que Texcitation de 
 I'opinion publique avait atteint 
 tel degr6, que le Gouvernement, 
 le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y 
 consentir, d'autant moins, me 
 dit-il, que la r^ponse meme de 
 la Sevbie donne la preiive du 
 manque de sincerite de ses 
 promesses poiir I'avenir. 
 
 (Sign^) SCH^B:^K0. 
 
 measures Avhich they had taken 
 against Servia, could no longer 
 recede, nor enter into any dis- 
 cussion of the terms of the 
 Austro-Hungarian note. 
 
 Count Berchtold added that 
 the crisis had become so acute, 
 and that public opinion had 
 been incited to such a pitch, 
 that the Government, even if 
 they wished it, could no longer 
 consent to such a course. 
 This vcas all the more impos- 
 sible, he said, inasmuch as the 
 Servian reply itself furnished 
 proof of theinsincerity of S ervia'a 
 promises for the future. 
 
 No. 46. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 15 (28), 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas 
 public le texte de la note 
 responsive serbe qui lui avait 
 ete communique. Jusqu'k ce 
 moment cette note n'a paru in 
 extenso dans aucun des journaux 
 locaux, qui selon toute evidence 
 ne veulent pas lui donner place 
 dans leurs colonnes, se rendant 
 compte de I'effet. calmant que 
 cette publication produirait sur 
 les lecteurs allemands. 
 
 (Signe) BRONEWSKY. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Wolff Bureau has not 
 published the text of the Servian 
 reply, although it was com- 
 municated to them. Up to 
 the present this note has not 
 appeared in extenso in any of the 
 local papers, which, to all appear- 
 ances, do not wish to publish it 
 in their columns, being well 
 aware of the calming effect 
 which it would have on German 
 readers. 
 
 [995] 
 
32 
 
 No. 47. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegramme.) (Telegi-am.) 
 
 Le decret sur la mobilisation THEorderforgeneralmobilisa- 
 
 g^nerale a 6t6 signe. tion has been signed. 
 (Sign6) SCHfiB:6K0. 
 
 No. 48. 
 
 JRussian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
 
 London. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914. 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) 
 
 ENpresence deshostilites entre 
 I'Autriche-Hoiigrie et la Serbie 
 il est necessaire que I'Angleterre 
 entreprenne d'urgenceune action 
 mediatrice et que Taction mili- 
 taire de I'Autriche contra la 
 Serbie soit immediatement sus- 
 pendue. Autrement la mediation 
 ne servira que pretexte pour 
 tirer en longueur la solution de 
 la question et donnera entre 
 temps k I'Autriche la possibilite 
 ■d'^craser completement la Serbie 
 ■et d'occuper une situation 
 dominante dans les Balkans. 
 
 Communique a Paris, Berlin, 
 Vienne et Rome. 
 
 (Sign6) SAZONOW. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 In face of the hostilities 
 between Austria-Hungary and 
 Servia, it is necessary that Great 
 Britain should take instant 
 mediatory action, and that the 
 military measures undertaken 
 by Austria against Servia should 
 be immediately suspended. 
 Otherwise mediation will only 
 serve as an excuse to make the 
 question drag on, and will mean- 
 while make it possible for 
 Austria to crush Servia com- 
 pletely andto acquire a dominant 
 position in the Balkans. 
 
 Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, 
 and Rome. 
 
 No. 49. 
 
 Mussian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargd d' Affaires 
 
 at Berlin. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 ^T^legramme.) (Telegram.) 
 
 L'Ambassadeur d'AUemague The German Ambassador 
 jn'informe, au nom du Chance- informs me, in the name of the 
 lier, que I'Allemagne n'a pas Chancellor, that Germany has 
 
33 
 
 cess6 d'exercer a Vienne une 
 influence mod6ratrice et qu'elle 
 continuera cette action mSme 
 apr^s la declaration de guerre. 
 Jusqu'k ce matin il n'y avait 
 aucune nouvelle que les armies 
 autrichiennes aient franchi la 
 frontifere serbe. J'ai pri6 I'Am- 
 bassadeur de transmettre au 
 Chancelier mes remerciments 
 pour la teneur amicale de cette 
 communication. Je I'ai inform^ 
 des mesures militaires prises par 
 la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis- 
 je, n'^tait dirigee centre FAUe- 
 magne ; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne 
 prejugaient pas non plus des 
 mesures agressives contra 
 I'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures 
 s'expliquant par la mobilisation 
 de la plus grande partie de 
 I'armee austro-hongroise. 
 
 L'Ambassadeur se prononQant 
 en faveur d'expKcations directes 
 entre le Cabinet de Vienne et 
 nous, je repondis que j'y etais 
 tout dispose, pour peu que les 
 conseils du Cabinet de Berlin 
 dont il par] ait trouvent echo a 
 Vienne. 
 
 En mSme temps je signalais 
 que nous ^tions tout disposes k 
 accepter le projet d'une con- 
 ference des quatre Puissances, 
 un projet auquel, paraissait-il, 
 I'Allemagne ne syrapathisait pas 
 entiferement. 
 
 Je dis que, dans mon opinion, 
 le meilleur moyen pour mettre 
 a profit tous les moyens propres 
 a produire une solution pacifi que 
 consisterait en une action 
 parallfele des pourparlers d'une 
 conference a quatre de I'Alle- 
 magne, de la France, de I'Angle- 
 terre et de I'ltalie et d'un contact 
 direct entre I'Autriclie-Hongrie 
 et la Russie, k I'instar ^ peu prfes 
 de ce qui avait eu lieu aux 
 moments les plus critiques de la 
 crise de I'an dernier. 
 
 [995] 
 
 not ceased to exercise a mode- 
 rating influence at Vienna, and 
 that she will continue to do so 
 even after the declaration of 
 war. Up to this morning there 
 had been no news that the 
 Austrian army had crossed the 
 Servian frontier. I begged the 
 Ambassador to express my 
 thanks to the Chancellor for the 
 friendly tenor of this communi- 
 cation. I informed him of the 
 military measures taken by 
 Russia, none of which, I told 
 him, were directed against 
 Germany ; I added that neither 
 should they be taken as 
 aggressive measures against 
 Austria-Hungary, their explana- 
 tion being the mobilisation of 
 the greater part of the Austro- 
 Hungarian army. 
 
 The Ambassador said that he 
 was in favour of direct explana- 
 tions between the Austrian 
 Government and Russia, and 
 I replied that I, too, was quite 
 willing, provided that th"e advice 
 of the German Government, to 
 which he had referred, found an 
 echo at Vienna. 
 
 I pointed out at the same 
 time that we were quite ready 
 to accept the proposal for a 
 conference of the four Powers, 
 a proposal with which, appa- 
 rently, Germany was not in 
 entire sympathy. 
 
 J. told him that, in my opinion, 
 the best manner of turning 
 to account all methods suit- 
 able for finding a peaceful 
 solution would be to arrange 
 for parallel discussions to be 
 carried on as to a conference 
 of the four Powers — Germany, 
 France, Great Britain, and Italy 
 — and by a direct exchange ot 
 views between Austria-Hungary 
 and Russia on much the same 
 lines as occurred during the 
 most critical moments of last 
 year's crisis. 
 
 D 2 
 
34 
 
 Je dis a I'Anibassadeur 
 qu'aprfes les concessions faites 
 par la Serbie, un terrain de 
 compromis pour les questions 
 restees ouvertes ne serait pas 
 trfes difficile a trouver, a con- 
 dition toutefois de quelque 
 bonne volonte de la part de 
 I'Autriche et a condition que 
 toutes les Puissances usent de 
 toute leur influence dans un 
 sens de conciliation. 
 
 Communique aux Ambassa- 
 deurs en Angleterre, en France, 
 en Autriclie-Hongrie et en 
 Italic. 
 
 (Sign6) SAZONOW. 
 
 I told the Ambassador that, 
 after the concessions which had 
 been made by Servia, it should 
 not be very difficult to find a 
 compromise to settle the other 
 questions which remained out- 
 standing, provided that Austria 
 showed some goodwill and that 
 all the Powers used their entire 
 influence in the direction of 
 conciliation. 
 
 Communicated to Russian 
 Ambassadors in England, 
 France, Austria-Hungary, and 
 Italy. 
 
 No. 50. 
 
 Mussian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at 
 London and Paris. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 LORB de mon entretien avec 
 I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont 
 traite mon telegramme pre- 
 cedent, je n'avais pas encore 
 re9U ie lel^gramme du 15 (28) 
 juillet de M. Schebeko. 
 
 Le contenu de ce telegramme 
 constitue un refus du Cabinet de 
 Vienne de proc^der a un echange 
 d'idees direct avec le Gouverne- 
 ment Imperial. 
 
 D^s lors, il ne nous reste plus 
 qu'a nous en remettre entifere- 
 ment au Gouvernement britan- 
 uique pour I'initiative des 
 demarches qu'il jugera utile de 
 provoquer. 
 
 Communique a Vienne, Rome 
 et Berhn. 
 
 (Sign^) SAZONOW. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 At the time of my interview 
 with the German Ambassador, 
 recorded in my preceding tele- 
 gram, I had not yet received 
 M. Schebeko's* telegram of the 
 15th (28th) July. 
 
 The contents of this telegram 
 amount to a refusal on the part of 
 the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a 
 direct exchange of views with 
 the Russian Government. 
 
 Hence nothing remains for 
 us to do but to rely entirely 
 on the British Government to 
 take the initiative in any steps 
 which they may consider advis- 
 able. 
 
 Communicated to Vienna, 
 Rome, and Berlin. 
 
 * Russian Ambassador at Vienna. 
 
35 
 
 No. 51. 
 
 Russian Ghargi d' Affaires at Berlin to Rustian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 BerliB, July 16 (29), 1914. 
 
 (Tdl^gramme.) 
 
 SuR ma question s'il avait une 
 reponse de Vienne relativement 
 a votre proposition de pour- 
 parlers priv^s a Saint-P6ters- 
 bourg, le Secretaire d'^fitat a 
 r^pondu n^gativement. 
 
 II declare qu'il lui est fort 
 difficile d'agir sur Vienne, sur- 
 tout ouvertement. Parlant k 
 Cambon, il a mSme ajoute qu'en 
 cas d'une pression trop evidente 
 I'Autriche se h^terait de mettre 
 rAllemagne en presence d'un 
 fait accompli. 
 
 Le Secretaire d'Etat dit qu'il 
 a refu aujourd'hui un t^le- 
 gramme de Pourtales d'oii il 
 constate que plus que les pre- 
 miers jours vous etes dispose a 
 trouver un compromis accep- 
 table pour tons. J'ai replique 
 que probablement vous avez 
 ete d6s le commencement en 
 faveur d'un compromis, bien 
 entendu a la condition qu'il soit 
 acceptable non seulement pour 
 I'Autriche, mais dgalement pour 
 nous. II m'a dit ensuite qu'il 
 paraissait que nous avions 
 commence a mobiliser sur la 
 fronti^re autrichienne et qu'il 
 craignait que ceci rendrait plus 
 difficile pour I'Autriclie la possi- 
 bilite de s'entendre avec nous, 
 d'autant plus que I'Autriche ne 
 mobilisait que contre ia Serbie 
 et ne faisait pas de preparatifs 
 sur notre frontiere. J'ai r6- 
 pondu que, d'aprfes les ren- 
 seignements dont je disposais, 
 I'Autriche mobilisait egalement 
 sur notre frontifere et que par 
 cons^quentnous devions prendre 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 On my enquiry whether he 
 had received from Vienna a 
 reply respecting your proposal 
 for private discussions -at St. 
 Petersburg, the Secretary of 
 State answered in the negative. 
 
 He declares that it is very 
 difficult for him to produce any 
 effect at Vienna, especially 
 openly. He even added, in 
 speaking to Cambon, that were 
 pressure brought to bear too 
 obviously, Austria would hasten 
 to face Germany with a fait 
 accompli. 
 
 The Secretary of State tells 
 me that he received a telegram 
 to-day from Pourtales, stating 
 that you seemed more inclined 
 than you previously were to 
 find a compromise acceptable to 
 all parties. I replied that pre- 
 sumably you had been in favour 
 of a compromise from the outset, 
 provided always that it were 
 acceptable, not only to Austria, 
 but equally to Russia. He then 
 said that it appeared that Russia 
 had begun to mobilise on the 
 Austrian frontier, and that he 
 feared that this would make it 
 more difficult for Austria to come 
 to an understanding with us, all 
 the more so as Austria was mobi- 
 lising against Servia alone, and 
 was making no preparations 
 upon our frontier. I replied 
 that, according to the informa- 
 tion in my possession, Austria 
 was mobilising upon the Russian 
 frontier also, and that conse- 
 quently we had to take similar 
 steps. I added that whatever 
 measures we might, perhaps, 
 
36 
 
 des niesures analogues. J'ai 
 ajout6 que les mesiu-es que nous 
 avons peut-etre prises de notre 
 c6t6 n'ltaient nuUement dirig^es 
 contre rAllemagne. 
 
 (Sign6) BRONEWSKY. 
 
 have taken on our side were in 
 no wise directed against Ger- 
 many. 
 
 No. 52. 
 
 Russian CliargS d' Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Nish, July 16 (29), 1914. 
 
 (■Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Bulgarian Minister to- 
 day declared to Pashitch, in the 
 name of his Government, that 
 Bulgaria would remain neutral. 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) 
 
 Aujourd'hui le Ministre de 
 Bulgarie, au nom de son Gou- 
 vernement, a d<^,clar6 k Pachitch 
 que la Bulgarie observerait la 
 neutrality. 
 
 (Sign6) STRANDTMAN. 
 
 No. 53. 
 
 Russian A mbassador at Paris to Russian Miidster for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July 16 (29), 1914. 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) 
 
 A l'occasion de Tarrivee du 
 President de la Republique fran- 
 9aise, le Ministre des Affaires 
 Etrangferes avait pr^par^ un 
 court expos^ de la situation 
 politique actuelle, k pen prte 
 dans les termes suivants : 
 L'Autriche, craignant la decom- 
 position interieure, s'est empar^e 
 du pr^texte de I'assassinat de 
 I'Archiduc pour eesayer d'obtenir 
 des garanties qui pourront 
 revStu- la foiTae de I'occupation 
 des communications militaires 
 serbes ou mime du temtoire 
 serbe. L'Allemagne soutient 
 I'Autriche. Le maintien de la 
 paix depend de la seule Russie, 
 parce qu'il s'agit _d'une affaire 
 qui doit etre "localis6e" entfe 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 For the' information of the 
 President of the French Re- 
 public on his return, the French 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs had 
 prepared a short summary of 
 the present political situation, 
 approximately in the following 
 terms : Austria, fearing iaternal 
 disintegration, seized upon the 
 assassination of the Archduke 
 as an excuse for an attempt to 
 obtain guarantees, which may 
 assume the form of an occupation 
 of Servian military lines or even 
 Servian territory. Germany is 
 supporting Austria. The pre- 
 servation of peace depends upon 
 Russia alone, for the question 
 at issue must be "localised" 
 between Austria and Servia; 
 
37 
 
 I'Autriclie et la Serbie, c'est-a- 
 dire de la punition de la poli- 
 tique prec^dente de la Serbie et 
 des garanties pour I'avenir. De 
 ceci rAllemagne conclut qu'il 
 faut exeroer une action mod^- 
 ratrice a P^tersbourg. Ce 
 sophisme a 6te refute k Paris 
 comrae a Londres. A Paris, le 
 Baron de Schoen a en vain 
 t^che d'entrainer la France a 
 une action solidaire avec I'Alle- 
 magne sur la Russie en faveur 
 du maintien de la paix. Les 
 memes tentatives ont 6te faites 
 a Londres. Dans les deux 
 capitales il a ete repondu que 
 Taction devrait etre exercee a 
 Vienne, car les demaudes ex- 
 cessives de rAutiiche, son refus 
 de discuter les rares reserves de 
 la Serbie, et la declaration de 
 guerre menacent de provoquer 
 la guerre gen^rale. La France 
 et I'Angieterre ne peuvent 
 exercer une action modei'atrice 
 .sur la Russie, laquelle jusqu'ici 
 a fait preuve de la plus grande 
 moderation, surtout en conseil- 
 laut a la Serbie d'accepter ce 
 qui etait possible de la note 
 autrichienne. Aujourd'hui rAlle- 
 magne parait renoncer a I'idee 
 d'une action sur la Russie seule 
 et incline vers une action media- 
 trice a Petersbourg et a Vienne, 
 mais en meme temps I'Allemagne 
 comme I'Autriche taclient de 
 faire trainer I'affaire. L'Alle- 
 magne s'oppose a la conference 
 sans indiquer aucune autre 
 maniere d'agir pratique. L'Au- 
 triche mene des poui-parlers 
 manifestement dilatoires a 
 Petersbourg. En meme temps 
 elle prend des mesures actives, 
 et si ces mesures sont tol^r^es, 
 ses pretentions augmenteront 
 proportionnellement. II est tr^s 
 desirable que la Russie prete 
 tout son appui au projet de 
 mediation que pr^sentera Sir E. 
 Grej. Dans le cas contraire, 
 
 that question is the punishment 
 of Servia for her previous poKcy 
 and the obtaining of guarantees- 
 for the future. Germany con- 
 cludes from this that a mode- 
 rating influence should be 
 exerted at St. Petersburg. 
 This sophism has been refuted 
 both in Paris and in London. In 
 Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly 
 endeavoui-ed to induce France to- 
 adopt joint action with Germany 
 towards Russia for the pre- 
 servation oi peace. The same 
 attempts were made in London. 
 In both capitals the answer was 
 given that any action taken 
 should be at Vienna, as it wa& 
 Austria's inordinate demands, 
 her refusal to discuss Servia's 
 few reservations, and her de- 
 claration of war, that threatened 
 to provoke a general war. 
 France and England are unable 
 to bring any moderatingpressure 
 to bear upon Russia, as, so far, 
 that Power has shown the 
 greatest moderation, more par- 
 ticularly in her advice to Servia 
 to accept as much as was 
 possible of the Austrian not&. 
 Apparently Germany has now 
 given up the idea of pressure 
 upon Russia only, and inclines 
 towards mediatory action both 
 at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, 
 but at the same time both Ger- 
 many and Austria are endea- 
 vouring to cause the questioni 
 to drag on. Germany is op- 
 posing the conference without 
 suggesting any other practical 
 course of action. Austria is 
 continuing discussions at St. 
 Petersburg, which are mani- 
 festly of a procrastinatingnature. 
 At the same time she is taking 
 active steps, and if these steps- 
 are tolerated, her claims will' 
 increase proportionately. It is 
 highly desirable that Russia 
 should lend all her support to 
 the proposal for mediation which 
 
38 
 
 rAutriche, sous pr^texte de 
 " garantie," pourra, en fait, 
 changer le statut territorial de 
 I'Europe orientale. 
 
 (Sign^) ISWOLSKY. 
 
 will be made by Sir E. Grey, 
 in the contrary event, Austria, 
 on the plea of " guarantees," 
 will be able, in effect, to alter 
 the tenitorial status of eastern 
 Europe. 
 
 No. 54. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 London, July 16 (29), 1914. 
 
 (Teldgramme.) 
 
 Al communique le contenu 
 de vos telegrammes du 15 (28) 
 juillet k Grey. II a declare 
 aujourd'hui k I'Ambassadeur 
 d'Allemagne que les pourparlers 
 directs entre la Russie et I'Aa- 
 triche avaient ^chou6, et que 
 les correspondants des journaux 
 mandaient de Saint-P6tersbourg 
 que la Kussie mobilisait aontre 
 I'Autriche a la suite de la mobi- 
 lisation de cette dernifere. Grey 
 dit qu'en principe le Gouverne- 
 ment allemand s'est declare en 
 faveur de la mediation, mais 
 qu'il rencontre des difficult^s 
 quant a la forme. Grey a insists 
 pour que le Gouvernement alle- 
 mand indiqu^t la forme laquelle 
 a I'avis de I'Allemagne pourrait 
 permettre aux quatre Puissances 
 d'exercer leur mediation pour 
 eviter la guerre ; vu le consente- 
 ment de la France, de I'ltalie 
 et de I'Angleterre la mediation 
 pourrait avoir lieu seulement 
 dans le cas oil I'Allemagne con- 
 sentirait a se ranger du cote de 
 la paix. 
 
 (Sign6) BENCKENDORFF. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAVE communicated the 
 contents of your telegrams of 
 the 15th (28th) July to Grey. 
 He informed the German Am- 
 bassador to-day that the direct 
 discussions between Russia and 
 Austria had been fruitless, 
 and that press correspondents' 
 were reporting from St. Peters- 
 burg that Russia was mobilis- 
 ing against Austria in conse- 
 quence of the latter's mobilisa- 
 tion. Grey said that, in prin- 
 ciple, the German Government 
 had declared themselves in 
 favour of mediation, but that 
 he was experiencing difficulties 
 with regard to the form it 
 should take. Grey has urged 
 that the German Government 
 should indicate the form which, 
 in their opinion, would enable 
 the four Powers to have re- 
 course to mediation to prevent 
 war ; France, Italy, and Great 
 Britain having consented, me- 
 diation coiild only come into 
 play if Germany consented to 
 range herself on the side of 
 peace. 
 
39 
 
 No. 55. 
 
 Mussian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July 16 (29), 1914. 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 ViviANi vient de me con- 
 firmer I'enti^re resolution du 
 Gouvernement fran9ais d'agir 
 d'accord avec nous. Cette reso- 
 lution est soutenue par les 
 cercles les plus ^tendus et par 
 les partis y compris les radicaux- 
 socialistes, qni vienuent de lui 
 presenter une declaration ex- 
 primant la oonfiance absolue et 
 les dispositions patriotiques du 
 groupe. Dhs son arrivee a Paris, 
 Viviani a telegraplii^ d'urgence 
 a Londres que, vu la cessation 
 des pourparlers directs entre 
 Petersbourg et Vienne, il ^tait 
 necessaire que le Cabinet de 
 Londres renouvelS,t le plus tot 
 possible, sous telle ou autre 
 forme, sa proposition concernant 
 la mediation des Puissances. 
 Avant moi Viviani a re^u au- 
 jo\u-d'hui I'Ambassadeur d'Alle- 
 magne, qui lui a renouvel6 
 I'assurance des tendances paci- 
 fiques de I'Allemagne. Viviani 
 ayant fait observer que si 
 TAUemagne desirait la paix 
 elle devrait se hater d'adherer 
 a la proposition de mediation 
 anglaise, le Baron Schoen a 
 repondu que les mots " confe- 
 rence " ou "arbitrage" efi&'ay- 
 aient I'Autriche. Viviani a r^- 
 plique qu'il ne s'agissait pas de 
 mots, et qu'il serait facile de 
 trouver une autre forme de 
 mediation. D'apres I'avis du 
 Baron de Schoen, pour le succfes 
 des negociations entre les Puis- 
 sances il serait necessaire de 
 savoir ce que I'Autriche comp- 
 terait demander k la Serbie. 
 Viviani a repondu que le Cabinet 
 de Berlin pourrait bien facile- 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Viviani has just confirmed to 
 me the French Government's 
 firm determination to act in 
 conceit with Russia. This 
 determination is upheld by all 
 classes of society and by the 
 political parties, including the 
 Radical Socialists who have 
 just addressed a resolution to 
 the Government expressing the 
 absolute confidence and the 
 patriotic sentiments of their 
 party. Since his return to 
 Paris, Viviani has telegraphed 
 an urgent message to London 
 that, direct discussions between 
 St. Petersburg and Vienna 
 having ended, the London 
 Cabinet should again put for- 
 ward their proposal for mediation 
 by the Powers as soon as pos- 
 sible under one form or another; 
 Before seeing me to-day Viviani 
 saw the German Ambassador, 
 and the latter again assured him 
 of the peaceful intentions of Ger- 
 many. Viviani having pointed 
 out that if Germany wished, for 
 peace she should hasten to give 
 her support to the British pro- 
 posal for mediation, Baron von 
 Schoen replied that the words 
 " conference " or " arbitration " 
 alarmed Austria. Viviani re 
 torted that it was not a question 
 of words, and that it would be 
 easy to find some other form 
 for mediation. In the opinion 
 of Baron von Schoen, it was 
 necessary for the success of 
 the negotiations between the 
 Powers to know what Austria 
 intended to demand from Ser- 
 via. Viviani answered that 
 the BerUn Cabinet could quite 
 
40 
 
 ment s'en enqu^rir auprfes de 
 I'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant 
 la note responsive serbe pour- 
 rait servir de base k la discus- 
 sion ; il a ajout^ que la France 
 desirait sincferement la pais, 
 mais qu'elle etait en meme 
 temps r^solue d'agir en pleine 
 harmonic avec ses allies et amis, 
 et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, 
 avait pu se convaincre que cette 
 resolution rencontrait la plus 
 vive approbation du pays. 
 
 (Sign^) ISWOLSKY. 
 
 easily make this enquiry of 
 Austria, but that, meanwhile, 
 the Servian reply' might well 
 form the basis of discussion ; 
 he added that France sincerely 
 desired peace, but that she was 
 determined at the same time to 
 act in complete harmony with 
 her allies and friends, and that 
 he. Baron von Schoen, might 
 have convinced himself that 
 this determination met with 
 the warmest approval of the 
 country. 
 
 No. 56. 
 
 Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia to 
 His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 
 
 Peofond^ment touch^ par le 
 t^l^gramme que votre Majeste 
 a bien votilu m'adresser hier, je 
 m'empresse de la remercier de 
 tout mon coeur. Je prie votre 
 Majesty d'etre persuadee que la 
 cordiale sympathie dont votre 
 Majeste est animee envers mon 
 pays nous est particuliferement 
 precieuse, et remplit notre ame 
 de I'espoir que I'avenir de la 
 Serfeie est assure, etant devenu 
 I'objet de la haute sollicitude 
 de votre Majeste. Ces moments 
 p^nibles ne peuvent que raffer- 
 mir les liens de I'attachement 
 profond qui unissent la Serbia a 
 la sainte Russie slave, et les 
 sentiments de reconnaissance 
 eternelle pour I'aide et la pro- 
 tection de votre Majesty seront 
 conserves pieusement dans I'ame 
 de tous les Serbes. 
 
 (Sign^) ALEXANDRE. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Deeply touched by the tele- 
 gram which your Majesty was 
 pleased to address to me yester- 
 day, I hasten to thank you with 
 all my heart. Your Majesty 
 may rest assured that the cordial 
 sympathy which your Majesty 
 feels towards my country is 
 especially valued by us, and 
 fills our hearts with the belief 
 that the future of Servia is 
 secure now that it is the object 
 of your Majesty's gracious solici- 
 tude. These painful moments 
 cannot but strengthen the bonds 
 of deep attachment which bind 
 Servia to Holy Slav Russia, and 
 the sentiments of everlasting 
 gratitude which we feel for the 
 help and protection afibrded to 
 us by your Majesty will ever be 
 cherished in the hearts of all 
 the Serbs. 
 
41 
 
 No. 57. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Nish, July 16 (29), 1914. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 J'ai communique a Pachitch 
 letexte dut^Mgrammeresponsif 
 de 8a Majest? I'Empereur au 
 Prince Alexandre. Pachitch, 
 apres 1' avoir lu, se signa et dit : 
 " Seigneur ! Le Tsar est grand 
 et clement ! " Ensuite il m'em- 
 brassa, ne pouvant contenir 
 r^motion qui I'avait gagne. 
 L'h^ritier est attendu k Nioh 
 dans la nuit. 
 
 (Sign6) STRANDTMAN. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAVE communicated to 
 Pashitch tlie text of the tele- 
 graphic reply returned by His 
 Majesty the Emperor to Prince 
 Alexander. On reading it, 
 Pashitch crossed himself and 
 exclaimed : " The Czar is great 
 and merciful ! " He then 
 embraced me and was over- 
 come with emotion. The heir- 
 apparent is e:^pected at Nish 
 late to-night. 
 
 No. 58. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
 
 Paris. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 Aujourd'hui I'Ambassadeur 
 d'AlIemagne m'a communique 
 la resolution prise par son 
 Gouvernement de mobiliser, si^ 
 la Russie ne cessait pas ses 
 preparatifs miHtaires. Or, nous 
 n'avons commence ces derniers 
 qu'a la suite de la mobilisation 
 a laquelle avait deja proc^de 
 I'Autriche et vu I'absence 
 ^vidente ohez cette dernifere du 
 desir d accepter un mode quel- 
 conque d'une solution pacifique 
 de son conflit avec la Serbie. 
 
 Puisque nous ne pouvons pas 
 acc^der au ddsir de I'Allemagne, 
 il ne nous reste que d'acceierer 
 nos propres armements et de 
 compter avec I'inevitabilite pro- 
 bable de la gnerre. Veuillez 
 en avertir le Gouvernement 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The German Ambassador to- 
 day informed me of the decision 
 of his Government to mobilise, if 
 Russia did not stop her military 
 preparations. Now, in point of 
 fact, we only began these pre- 
 parations in consequence of the 
 mobilisation already undertaken 
 by Austria, and owing to her 
 evident unwillingness to accept 
 any means of arriving at a 
 peaceful settlement of her dis- 
 pute with Servia. 
 
 As we cannot comply with the 
 wishes of Germany, we have no 
 alternative but to hasten on our 
 own military preparations and 
 to assume that war is probably 
 inevitable. Please inform the 
 French Government of this, and 
 
42 
 
 fran9ais et lui exprimer en 
 meme temps notre sincere re- 
 connaissance pour la ddclaration 
 que I'Ambassadeur de France 
 m'a faite en son nom en disant 
 que nous pouvons compter 
 entierement sur Fappui de notre 
 alliee la France. Dans les cir- 
 constances actuelles cette decla- 
 ration nous est particulierement 
 prdcieuse. 
 
 Communiqae aux Ambassa- 
 deurs en Angleterre, Autriche- 
 Hongrie, Italie, AUemagne. 
 
 (Sign^) SAZONOW. 
 
 add that we are sincerely grate- 
 ful to them for the declaration 
 which the French Ambassador 
 made to me on their l)ehalf, to 
 the effect that we could count 
 fully iipon the assistance of our 
 ally, France. In the existing 
 circumstances, that declaration 
 is especially valuable to us. 
 
 Communicated to the Russian 
 Ambassadors in Great Britain, 
 Austria-Hungary, Italy, and 
 Germany. 
 
 No. 59. 
 
 Russian Cliargi d' Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Nish, July 17 (30), 1914. 
 
 (Tel6gramme.) 
 
 Le Prince-R6gent a public 
 hier un manifeste sign6 par tous 
 les Ministres k I'occasion de la 
 declaration de la guerre par 
 I'Autriche a la Serbie. Le 
 manifeste se termine par les 
 paroles suivantes: "Defendez 
 de toutes vos forces vos foyers 
 et la Serbie." Lors de I'cuver- 
 ture solennelle de la Skoup- 
 chtina, le Regent lut en son nom 
 le discours du trone, au debut 
 duquel il indiqua que le lieu 
 de la convocation d^montrait 
 I'importance des ev6nements 
 actuels. Suit I'expos^ des faits 
 des derniers jours — I'ultimatum 
 autrichien, la reponse serbe, les 
 efforts du Gouvernement Royal 
 de faire tout ce qui etait com- 
 patible avec la dignit6 de I'lfitat 
 pour ^viter la guerre et enfin 
 I'agression armee du voisin plus 
 puissant centre la Serbie, aux 
 cotds de laquelle se tient le 
 Montenegi-o. En paasant a 
 I'examen de I'attitude des Puis- 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Prince Regent yesterday 
 published a manifesto, signed by 
 all the Servian Ministers, on the 
 declaration of war by Austria 
 against Servia. The manifesto 
 ends with the following words : 
 " Defend your homes and 
 Servia with all your might.'' At 
 the solemn opening of the 
 Skupchtina the Regent read the 
 speech from the Throne, in his 
 own name. At the beginning 
 of his speech he pointed out that 
 the place of their convocation 
 showed the importance of 
 present events. He followed 
 this with a summary of recent 
 events — the Austrian ultimatum, 
 the Servian reply, the efforts ot 
 the Servian Government to do 
 their utmost to avoid war that 
 was compatible with the dignity 
 of the State, and, finally, the 
 armed aggression of their most 
 powerful neighbour against 
 Servia, at whose side stood 
 Montenegro. Passing in review 
 
43 
 
 sances en presence dn conflit, 
 
 le Prince insista tout d'abord 
 
 sur les sentiments dont est 
 
 anim^e la Euseie et sur la toute 
 
 gracieuse communication de Sa 
 
 Majeste I'Empereur disant que 
 
 la Hussie en aucuu cas n'aban- 
 
 donnera la Serbie. A chaque 
 
 mention du nom de Sa Majeste 
 
 Imperiale et de la Russie un 
 
 "jivio" formidable et febrile 
 
 secouait la salle des stances. 
 
 Les marques de sympathie de 
 
 la part de la France et de 
 
 I'Angleterre furent aussi re- 
 
 levees separement et provo- 
 
 quferent des "jivio" d'approba- 
 
 tion de la part des deputes. Le 
 
 discours du trone se termine par 
 
 la declaration d'ouverture de la 
 
 Skoupchtina et par I'expression 
 
 du voeu que toutes les mesures 
 
 soient prises pour faciliter la 
 
 tache du Grouvemement. 
 
 (Sign6) STRANDTMAN. 
 
 the attitude of the Powers 
 towards the dispute, the Prince 
 emphasised in the first place the 
 sentiments which animated 
 Russia, and the gracious com- 
 munication from His Majesty 
 the Emperor that Russia -would 
 in no case abandon Servia. At 
 each mention of His Majesty 
 the Czar and of Russia the hall 
 resounded with loud bursts of 
 wild cheering. The sympathy 
 shown by France and England 
 was also touched upon in turn, 
 and called forth approving 
 plaudits from the members. The 
 speech from the throne ended 
 by declaring the Skupchtina 
 open, and by expressing the 
 hope that everything possible 
 would be done to lighten the 
 task before the Government. 
 
 No. 60, 
 
 Russian Minister for Fcreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at 
 Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 17 (30), 1914. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, 
 qui vient de me quitter, m'a d^- 
 mand6 si nous ne pouvions pas 
 nous contenter de la promesse 
 que I'Autriche pourrait donuer 
 — de ne pas porter atteinte a 
 I'iatdgriti du Royaume de Serbie 
 — et indiquer a quelles condi- 
 tions n'ous pourrions encore 
 consentir k suspendre nos arme- 
 ments ; je lui ai dicte, pour Stre 
 transmise d'urgence £ Berlin, 
 la declaration suivante : " Si 
 I'Autriche, reconnaissant que la 
 question austro-serbe a assume 
 le caract^re d'une question 
 europ^enne, se declare prSte k 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The German Ambassador, 
 who has just left me, has asked 
 whether Russia would not be 
 satisfied with the promise which 
 Austria might give — that she 
 would pot violate the integrity 
 of the' Kingdom of Servia — and 
 whether we could not indicate 
 upon what conditions we would 
 agree to suspend our military 
 preparations. I dictated to him 
 the following declaration to be 
 forwarded to Berlin for imme- 
 diate action : " If Austria, re- 
 cognising that the Austro- 
 Servian question has become a 
 question of European interest, 
 
44 
 
 Glimmer de son ultimatum les 
 points qui portent atteinte aux 
 droits soiiverains de la Serbia, 
 la Russie s'engage k cesser ses 
 pr^paratifs militaires." 
 
 Veuillez tel^graphier d'ur- 
 gence quelle sera I'attitude du 
 Gouvernement allemand en pre- 
 sence de cette nouvelle preuve 
 de notre desir de faire le pos- 
 sible pour la solution pacifique 
 de la question, car nous ne 
 pouvons pas admettre que de 
 semblables pourparlers ne ser- 
 vent qu'a faire gagner du temps 
 a I'Allemagne et k I'Autriche 
 pour leurs preparatifs militaires. 
 (Sign6) SAZONOW. 
 
 declares herself ready to elimi- 
 nate from her ultimatum such 
 poinbs as violate the sovereign 
 rights of Servia, Russia under- 
 takes to stop her military pre- 
 parations." 
 
 Please inform me at once by 
 telegraph what attitude the 
 German Government will adopt 
 in face of this fresh proof of 
 our desire to do the utmost 
 possible for a peaceful settlement 
 of the question, for we cannot 
 allow such discussions to con- 
 tinue solely in order that Ger- 
 many and Austria may gain 
 time for their military prepara- 
 tions. 
 
 No. 61. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 A fairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (T61egramme.) 
 
 J'apprends (jue le d6cret de 
 mobilisation de I'armee et de la 
 flotte allemandes vient d'etre 
 promulgue. 
 
 (Sign^) SWERBl^EW. 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I LEARN that the order for 
 the mobilisation of the German 
 army and navy has just l)een 
 issued. 
 
 No. 62. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 
 
 (Telegvamme.) 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires 
 ;6trang^res vient de me t^l^- 
 plioner pour communiquer que 
 la nouvelle lancee tout k I'heure 
 de la mobilisation de I'armee et 
 de la flotte allemandes est 
 fausse ; que les feuillets des jouv- 
 
 17 (30), 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs has just telephoned that 
 the news of the mobilisation of 
 the German army and fleet, 
 which has just been announced, 
 is false; that the news sheets 
 had been printed in advance so 
 
45 
 
 naux etaient imprimis d'avance 
 en provision de toutes eventua- 
 lites, et mis en vente k I'heure 
 de raprfes-midi, mais que main- 
 tenant ils sont confisqu6s. 
 
 (Sign6) SWERB^EW. 
 
 as to be ready for all eventua- 
 lities, and that they were put 
 on sale in the afternoon, but 
 that they have now been confis- 
 cated. 
 
 No. 63. 
 
 Riissian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 Al repu votre telegramme du 
 16 (29) juillet et ai transmis le 
 texte de voire proposition au 
 Ministre des Affaires ifitrangeres, 
 que je viens de voir ; il m'a dit 
 qu'il avait re9u un telegramme 
 identique de rAmbassadeur 
 d'AUemagne a Saint - Peters- 
 bourg et m'a declare ensuite 
 qu'il trouvait notre proposition 
 inaeceptable pour I'Autriche. 
 
 (Signe) SWERB^EW. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAVE received your tele- 
 gram of 16th (29th) July, and 
 have communicated the text of 
 your proposal to the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, whom I have 
 just seen. He told me that he 
 had received an identic tele- 
 gram from the German Ambas- 
 sador at St. Petersburg, and 
 he then declared that he con- 
 sidered it impossible for Austria 
 to accept our proposal. 
 
 No. 64. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister Jor Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 London, July 17 (30), 1914. 
 
 (TeMgramme.) 
 
 Al communique le contenu de 
 vos t616grammes des 16 (29) et 
 17 (30) juillet k Grey,lequel con- 
 sid^re la situation comme tr^s 
 serieuse, mais desire continuer 
 les pourparlers. J'ai fait ob- 
 server k Grey que depuis que 
 vous lui aviez fait la proposition 
 d'accepter tout ce qu'il pro- 
 poserait en faveur du maintien 
 de la paix, pourvu que rAutriche 
 ne pfit profiter de ces atermoie- 
 ments pour ecraser la Serbie, la 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAVE communicated the 
 substance of your telegrams of 
 the 16th (2'9th) and 17th (30th) 
 July to Grey, who looks upon 
 the situation as most serious, 
 but wishes to continue the 
 discussions. I pointed out to 
 Grey that — since you agi'eed 
 with him to accept whatever 
 proposal he might make in order 
 to preserve peace, provided that 
 Austria did not profit by any 
 ensuing delays to crush Servia 
 
46 
 
 situation dans laquelle vous vous 
 trouviez s'^tait apparemment 
 modifi^e. A cette ipoque nos 
 rapports avec TAUemagne n'6- 
 taient pas compromis. Aprte 
 la declaration de I'Ambassadeur 
 d'Allemagne k Saint- P6ters- 
 bourg concevnaut la mobilisation 
 allemande, ces rapports avaient 
 change et sa demands avait 
 re9U de votre part la seule 
 r^ponse que pouvait donner 
 une Grande Puissance. Lorsque 
 I'Am bassadeur d' Allemagne etait 
 revenu aupres de vous et s'6tait 
 enquis de vos conditions, vous 
 les aviez formulees dans des 
 circonstances tout k fait sp6- 
 ciales. J'ai en meme temps de 
 nouveau insists aupres de Grey 
 sur la n^cessite de prendre en 
 considei-ation la situation nou- 
 velle cr^ee par la faute de 
 I'Allemagne k la suite de Paction 
 de I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. 
 Grey a r^pondu qu'il le com- 
 prenait et qu'il tiendrait compte 
 de ces arguments. 
 (Signe) BENGKENDORFF. 
 
 — the situation in which you 
 were placed had apparently 
 been modified, At that time 
 our relations with Germany had 
 not been compromised. After 
 the declaration made by the 
 German Ambassador at St. 
 Petersburg regarding German 
 mobilisation, those relations had 
 changed, and you had returned 
 the only reply to his request 
 that was possible from a Great 
 Power. When the German 
 Ambassador again visited you, 
 and enquired what your con- 
 ditions were, you had formu- 
 lated them in altogether special 
 circumstances. I also again 
 emphasised to Grey the neces- 
 sity of taking into consideration 
 the new situation brought about 
 by the fault of Germany in 
 consequence of the German 
 Ambassador's action. Grey re- 
 plied that he fully understood 
 this, and that he would remem- 
 ber these arguments. 
 
 No. 6.5. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 London, July 17 (30), 1914. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 L'Ambassadbur d'Allemagne 
 a demande k Grey pour quelle 
 raison I'Angleterre prenait des 
 mesures militaires sur terre et 
 sur mer. Grey a r^pondu que 
 ces mesures n'avaient pas un 
 caract^re agressif, mais que la 
 situation etait telle que chaque 
 Puissance devait se preparer. 
 
 (Sign6) BENGKENDORFF, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The German Ambassador has 
 asked Grey why Great Britain 
 was taking military measures 
 both on land and sea. Grey 
 replied that these measures had 
 no aggressive character, but 
 that the situation was such^that 
 each Power must be ready. 
 
47 
 
 No. 66. 
 
 Rutsian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Vienna, July 18 (31), 1914. 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 Malqre la mobilisation g6n6- 
 rale, je continue k ^changer des 
 vues a-\-ec le Comte Berchtold 
 et ses collaborateurs. Tous 
 insistent sur I'absence chez 
 TAutriche d'intentions agres- 
 sives quelconques contre la 
 Russia et de vie^es de conquete 
 k regard de la Serbie, mais tous 
 insistent egalement sur la n6- 
 cessite pour I'Autriche de pour- 
 suivre jusqu'au bout Taction 
 commencee et de donner k la 
 Serbie une le9on serieuse qui 
 pourrait constituer une certaine 
 garantie pour I'avenir. 
 
 (Signe) SCHjeB^KO. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 In spite of tbe general mobi- 
 lisation, my exchange of views 
 with Count Berchtold and his 
 colleagues continues. They all 
 dwell upon the absence on 
 Austria's part of any hostile 
 intentions whatsoever against 
 Russia, and of any designs of 
 conquest at the expense of" 
 Servia, but they are all equally 
 insistent that Austria is bound 
 to carry through the actiont 
 which she has begun and to 
 give Servia a serious lesson, 
 which would constitute a sure- 
 guarantee for the future. 
 
 No. 67. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at 
 Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914. 
 
 (T61(5gramme.) 
 
 Me r^f^re a mon t^l^gramme 
 da 17 (30) juillet. D'ordre de 
 son Gouvernement, I'Ambas- 
 sadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis 
 le dt^sir du Cabinet de Londres 
 d'inti-oduire quelques modifica- 
 tions dans la formule qui j'ai 
 propos6e hier k I'Ambassadeur 
 d'Allemagne. J'ai repondu que 
 j'acceptais la proposition an- 
 glaise. Ci-dessous je vous trans- 
 mets la formule modifiee en 
 consequence : 
 
 " Si I'Autriche consent k 
 
 arreter la marche de ses armies 
 
 sur le territoire serbe et si, 
 
 reconnaissant que le conflit 
 
 [995] 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Please refer to my telegran* 
 of 17 (30) July. The British 
 Ambassader, on the instructions 
 of his Government, has informed 
 me of the wish of the London 
 Cabinet to make certain modi- 
 fications in the formula which I 
 suggested yesterday to the 
 German Ambassador. I replied 
 that I accepted the British 
 suggestion. I accordingly send 
 you the text of the modified 
 formula which is as follows: — 
 
 " If Austria will agree to check 
 the advance of her troops on 
 Servian territory; if,recognising 
 that the dispute between 
 
 E 
 
48 
 
 austro-serbeaassume lecaract^re 
 d'unequestiond'intdr^teuropeen, 
 elle admet que les Graudes Puis- 
 sances examinent la satisfaction 
 que la Serbie pouiTait accovder 
 au Gouvernement d'Autriche- 
 Hongrie sans laisser porter 
 atteinte a ses droits d'lStat 
 souverain et a son independance, 
 — la Russie s' en gage a conserver 
 son attitude expectante." 
 
 (Signe) SAZONOW. 
 
 Austria and Serbia has become 
 a question of European interest, 
 sbe will allow the Great Powers 
 tolookintothe matter and decide 
 what satisfaction Servia could 
 afford to the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government without impairing 
 her rights as a sovereign State 
 or her independence, Russia will 
 undertake to maintain her wait- 
 ing attitude." 
 
 ^^. 68. 
 
 Hussian Ambassador al Berlin to Hussion Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 18 {31), 1914. 
 
 (Tel^gi-amme.) 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires 
 ^^trang^res vient de me dire que 
 nos pourparlers, qui etaientdeja 
 difficiies a la siiite de la mobihsa- 
 tion centre I'Autriche, le devien- 
 nent encore davantage en 
 presence des graves mesures 
 militaires que nous prenons 
 centre I'AUemagne ; des nou- 
 velles J relatives sont, d'apres 
 lui, re9ues ici de tous les cotes 
 et devrout provoquer inevitable- 
 ment des mesures analogues de 
 la part de I'Allemagne. A cela 
 j'ai repondu que, d'aprte des 
 renseignements sure dont je 
 disposais et qui etaient confirmes 
 par tous uos compatriotes 
 anivant a Berlin, la prise centre 
 nous des mesures susdites se 
 poursuivait egalement en AUe- 
 magne avec gi'aude activite. 
 Malgre cela, le Ministre des 
 Affaires Etrangk'es aflBrme qu'ici 
 on u'a fait que rappeler les 
 officiers de leurs conges et les 
 troupes des champs de manceu- 
 vree. 
 
 (Signe) SWERBEEW. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs has just told me that our 
 discussions, "which were alreadr 
 difficult enough on account of 
 the mobilisation against Austria, 
 were becoming even more so in 
 view of the serious military 
 mesures that we were ta,king 
 against Germany. He said that 
 infomiation on this subject was 
 reaching Berlin from all sides, 
 and this must ine\'itably provoke 
 similar mesures on the part of 
 Germany. To this 1 repHed 
 that, according to sure informa- 
 tion in my possession, which 
 was confinned by all our com- 
 patriots arriving from Berhn, 
 Germany also was very actively 
 engaged in taking military 
 measures against Russia. In 
 spite of this, the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs asserts that the 
 only step taken in Germany has 
 been the recall of oiBcers from 
 leave and of the troops from 
 manoeuvres. 
 
49 
 
 No. 69. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at 
 
 London. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914. 
 
 (T616gramme.) 
 
 J'ai pri^ I'Ambassadeur d'An- 
 gleterre de transmettre k Grey 
 I'expressiou de ma plus sinck-e 
 reconnaissance pour le ton 
 amical et ferme dont il a us6 
 pendant les pourparlers avec 
 I'AUemagne et I'Autriche, gi-ace 
 a quoi I'espoir de trouver une 
 issue pacifique de la situation 
 actuelle n'est pas encore perdu. 
 
 .Je I'ai aussi prie de dire au 
 Ministre anglais que je pensais 
 que ce n'etait qu'a Londres que 
 les pourparlers auraient encore 
 quelques chances d'un succte 
 quelconque, en f'acilitant h, 
 I'Autriche la n^cessite d'un com- 
 promis. 
 
 Communique a I'Ambassadeur 
 en France. 
 
 (Signe) SAZONOW. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAVE requested the British 
 Ambassador to express to Grey 
 my deep gratitude for the firm 
 and friendly tone which he has 
 adopted in the discussions with 
 Germany and Austria, thanks to 
 which the hope of finding a 
 peacefulissuetothepresentsitua- 
 tion need not yet be abandoned. 
 
 I also requested him to inform 
 the British Minister that in my 
 opinion it was only in London 
 that the discussions might still 
 have some faint chance of success 
 and of rendering the necessary 
 compromise easier for Austria. 
 
 Communicated to Eussian 
 Ambassador in France. 
 
 No. 70. 
 
 Secret Telegram to Russian Representatives abroad. 
 
 July 19 (August 1), 1914. 
 
 (T^Mgramme.) 
 
 A MINUIT I'Ambassadeur 
 d'Allemagne m'a declare, d'ordre 
 de son Gouvernement, que si 
 dans les douze heures, c'est-k- 
 dire a midi, samedi, nous ne 
 commencions pas la demobilisa- 
 tion, non seulement k I'^gard de 
 I'Allemagne, mais aussi a I'egard 
 de I'Autriche, le Gouvernement 
 allemand serait force de donner 
 I'ordre de mobilisation. ■ A ma 
 question si c'etait la guerre, 
 I'Ambassadeur a rcpondu par la 
 ■ [995] 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 At midnight the German 
 Ambassador announced to me, 
 on the instruction of his Govern- 
 ment, that if within 12 hours, 
 that is by midnight ou Saturday, 
 we had not begun to demobilise, 
 not only against Germany, but 
 also against Austria, the German 
 Government would be compelled 
 to give the order for mobilisation. 
 To my enquiry whether this 
 meant war, the Ambassador 
 replied in the negative, but 
 E 2 
 
50 
 
 negative, mais en ajoutant que 
 nous 6tions fort prte d'elle. 
 
 (Sign6) SAZONOW. 
 
 added that we were very near 
 it. 
 
 No. 71. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 ■ Affairs. 
 
 London, July 19 (August 1), 1914 
 
 (T616gramme.) 
 
 Geey m'a dit 'qu'il a tele- 
 graphic k Berlin qu'a son avis 
 la derni^re formule acceptCe par 
 le Gouvernement russe constitue 
 la base de negocialions qui 
 prCsente le plus de chances 
 pour une solution pacifique du 
 conflit. II a exprime en m^me 
 temps I'espoir qu'aucune Grande 
 Puissance ne commencerait les 
 hostilit6s avant I'examen de 
 cette formule 
 (SignC) BENCKENDORFF. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Grey tells me that he has 
 telegraphed to Berlin that in 
 his opinion the last formula 
 accepted by the Russian Govern- 
 ment offers the best prospect as 
 a basis of negotiations for a 
 peaceful settlement of the dis- 
 pute.- At the same time he 
 expressed the hope that no 
 Great Power would open hos- 
 tilities before this formula had 
 been considered. 
 
 Russian Ambassado 
 
 No. 72. 
 
 at London to Russian Minifter for Foreign 
 Affairs. 
 
 Loudon, July 19 (August 1), 1914. 
 
 (TClCgramme.) 
 
 Le Gouvernement de la 
 Grande-Bratagne a pos6 aux 
 Gouvernements fran9ais et alle- 
 mand la question s'ils respec- 
 teraient la neutrality de la 
 Belgique. 
 
 La France a rCpondu dans 
 I'affirmative, tandis que le Gou- 
 vernement allemand a declarC 
 ne pouvoir rCpondre k cette 
 question catCgoriquement. 
 
 (SignC) BENCKENDORFF. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The British Government has 
 enqiiired of the French and 
 German Governments whether 
 they will respect the neutrality 
 of Belgium. 
 
 France answered in the 
 affirmative, but the German 
 Government stated that they 
 could not give any definite 
 answer to the question. 
 
51 
 
 No. 7a, 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914. 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 L'Ambassadbur d'Autriche a 
 visit6 hier Viviani ct lui a 
 declare que I'Autriche non seule- 
 ment n'avait pas le dessein de 
 porter atteinte a I'integrit^ terri- 
 toriale de la Serbie, mais 6tait 
 prete a discuter avec les autres 
 FuiBsauces le fond de son con- 
 flit avec la Serbie. Le Gou- 
 vernement fraucjais est trfes 
 preoccupe par les preparatifs 
 militaires extraordinaires de 
 rAllemagiie sur la fronti^re 
 franijaise, car il est convaincu 
 que sous le voile du " Kreigs- 
 zustand " se produit une Vf5ri- 
 table mobilisation. 
 
 (Sign6) ISWOLSKY. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Austrian Ambassador yes- 
 terday visited Viviani and de- 
 clared to him that Austri a, far from 
 harbouring any designs against 
 the integrity of Servia, was in 
 fact ready to discuss the grounds 
 of her grievances against Servia 
 with the other Powers. The 
 French Govei-nment are much 
 exercised at Germany's extra- 
 ordinary military activity on 
 the French frontier, for they are 
 convinced that, under the guise 
 of " Kreigszustand," mobilisa- 
 tion is in reality being carried 
 out. 
 
 No. 74. 
 
 liussiaii Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914. 
 
 (T^legrarame.) 
 
 A LA. reception ici du t616- 
 gramme de I'Ambas.sadeur de 
 France k Saint-Petersbourg 
 coiitenant la communication que 
 V0U8 a faite I'Ambassadeur 
 allemand concernant la resolu- 
 tion de I'Allemagne de decreter 
 aujourd'hui la mobilisation 
 g^uerale, le President de la 
 R^publique a signe le d6cret do 
 mobihsation. Dans les rues on 
 procMe k I'affichage des listes 
 d'appel des r^servistes. L'Am- 
 bassadeur d'Allemagne vient de 
 rendre visite k Viviani, mais ne 
 lui a fait aucune nouvelle com- 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 On the receipt in Paris of the 
 telegram from the French 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
 reporting the communication 
 made to you by the German 
 Ambassador respecting Ger- 
 many's decision to order general 
 mobilisation to-day, the Presi- 
 dent of the French Republic 
 signed the orderf or mobilisation. 
 Lists of the reservists recalled 
 to the colours are being posted 
 up in the streets. The German 
 Ambassador has just visited 
 Viviani, but told him nothing 
 fresh, alleging the impossibility 
 
52 
 
 munication, en alleguant I'im- 
 possibilit6 de d^chiffrer les 
 t^legrammes qu'il a re9us. 
 Yiviani I'a iuforme de la signa- 
 ture du decret de mobilisation 
 en reponse a la mobilisation 
 allemande et lui a fait part de 
 son etonnement de ce que 
 I'Allemagne eut pris une telle 
 mesure a un moment oise pour- 
 suivait encore un echange de 
 vues amical entre la Russie, 
 rAutriche et les Puissances ; il a 
 ajoute que la mobilisation ne 
 prejugeait pas necessairement 
 la guerre et que I'Ambassadeur 
 d'Allemagne pourrait rester a 
 Paris comme I'Ambassadeur de 
 Russie est reste a Vienne et 
 celui d'Autriche a Saint-Pdters- 
 bourg. 
 
 (Sign6) ISWOLSKY. 
 
 ofdecypberingthe telegrams he 
 has received. Viviani informed 
 him of the signature of the order 
 for mobilisation issued in reply- 
 to that of Germany, and ex- 
 pressed to him his amazement 
 that Germany should have taken 
 such a step at a moment when a 
 friendly exchange of views was 
 still in progi-ess between Russia, 
 Austria, and the Powers. He 
 added that mobilisation did not 
 necessarily entail war, and that 
 the German Ambassador might 
 stay in Paris as the Russian 
 Ambassador had remained in 
 Vienna and the Austrian Am- 
 bassador in St. Petersburg. 
 
 No. 75. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Pavis to Russian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914. 
 
 (Tel6gramme.) 
 
 Je tiens du President que 
 pendant les dernik-es journees 
 I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a 
 assure avec force le President 
 du Conseil des Ministres et lui- 
 m^me, que I'Autriche nous 
 aurait deolar6 ^tre prete a 
 respecter non seulement I'int^- 
 grit^ territoriale de la Serbie, 
 mais aussi ses droits souverains, 
 mais que nous aurions inten- 
 tionnellement fait le silence sur 
 cette declaration. J'ai oppos^ 
 un dementi categorique k cela. 
 (Sign6) ISWOLSKY. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HEAR from the President 
 that during the last few days 
 the Austrian Ambassador em- 
 phatically assured both the 
 President of the Council of 
 Ministers and him that Austria 
 had declared to Russia that she 
 was ready to respect both the 
 territorial integrity of Servia 
 and also her sovereign rights, 
 but that Russia had intention- 
 ally received this declaration in 
 silence. I contradicted this 
 flatly. 
 
53 
 
 No. 76. 
 
 Note presented hy the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg on 
 July 19 (August 1), at 7-10 P.M. 
 
 Le GoTivernement Imperial 
 s'est effbrc6 dfes les debuts de 
 la crise de la mener a une solu- 
 tion pacifique. Se rendaut k un 
 d^sir qui lui en avait 6te 
 exprime par Sa Majeste I'Eni- 
 pereui- de Russie, Sa Majeste 
 rEmpereur d'Allemagne d'ac- 
 cord avec I'Angleterre s'etait 
 applique a accomplir un role 
 m^diateur aupr^s des Cabinets 
 de Vienne et de Saint-P6ters- 
 bourg, lorsque la Eussie, san-s 
 en attendre le r^sultat, proceda 
 k la mobilisation de la totalite 
 de ses forces de terra et de mer. 
 A la suite de cette mesure 
 mena9ante ne motivee par aucun 
 presage militaire de la part de 
 I'Allemagne, I'Empire allemand 
 s'est trouve vis-a-vis d'un 
 danger grave et imminent. Si 
 le Goiivernement Imperial eut 
 manque de parer a oe p6ril, il 
 aurait compromis la s^curit^ et 
 I'existence mSme de TAlle- 
 magne. Par consequent le 
 Gouvernement allemand se vit 
 force de s'adresser au Gouverne- 
 ment de Sa Majeste I'Empereur 
 de Toutes les Russies en in- 
 sistant sur la cessation desdits 
 actes militaires. La Russie 
 ayant- refusd de faire droit a 
 (n'ayant pas cru devoir r^pondre 
 a*) cette demande et ayant 
 manifest^ par ce refus (cette 
 attittide*) que son action ^tait 
 dirigee centre I'Allemagne, j'ai 
 I'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gou- 
 vernement, de faire savoir a 
 votre Excellence ce qui suit : 
 
 * Les mots places entre paren- 
 theses se trouvent dans I'original. 
 II faut supposer que deux variantes 
 avaient ete pr^par^es d'avance et 
 que par erreur elles ont 6t4 ins^r^es 
 toutes les deux dans la note. 
 
 (Translatiou.) 
 
 The Imperial German Govern- 
 ment have used every effort 
 since the beginning of the crisis 
 to bring about a peaceful 
 settlement. In compliance with 
 a wish expressed to him by His 
 Majesty the Emperor of Russia, 
 the German Emperor had 
 undertaken, inconcert with Great 
 Britain, the part of mediator 
 between the Cabinets of Vienna 
 and St. Petersburg; but Russia, 
 without waiting for any result, 
 proceeded to a general mobilisa- 
 tion of her forces both on land 
 and sea. In consequence of 
 this threatening step, which was 
 not justified by any military 
 proceedings on the part of Ger- 
 many, the German Empire was 
 faced by a grave and imminent 
 danger. If the German Govern- 
 ment had failed to guard 
 against this peril, they would 
 have compromised the safety 
 and the very existence of Ger- 
 many. The German Govern- 
 ment were, therefore, obliged 
 to make representations to the 
 Government of His Majesty the 
 Emperor of All the Russias and 
 to insist upon a cessation of the 
 aforesaid military acts. Russia 
 having refused to comply with 
 (not having considered it neces- 
 sary to answer*) this demand, and 
 having shown by this refusal (this 
 attitude*) that her action was 
 directed against Germany, I have 
 the honour, on the instructions 
 of my Government, to inform 
 your Excellency as follows: — 
 
 * The words in brackets occur in 
 the original. It must toe supposed 
 that two variations had been pre- 
 pared in advance, and that, toy mis- 
 take, they were both inserted in the 
 note. 
 
54 
 
 Sa Majesty I'Empereur, mon 
 aiiguste Souverain, au nom de 
 rEmpire, relevant le defi, se 
 considere en 6tat de guerre avec 
 la Russie. 
 
 ,(Sign6) F. POUUTALES. 
 
 His Majesty the Emperor, my 
 august Sovereign, in the name 
 of the German Empire, accepts 
 the challenge, and considers 
 himself at war with Russia. 
 
 No. 77. 
 
 Announcement by the Russian Minisfer for Foreign Affairs respecting 
 
 Recent Events. 
 
 July 20 (August 2), 1914. 
 
 Un expose defigurant les 
 ev6nements dee derniers jours 
 ayant paru dans la presse 
 €trangere, le Ministere des 
 Affaires fitrangferes croit de son 
 devoir de publier I'aper^u sui- 
 vant des pourparlers diplo- 
 matiquee pendant le temps 
 fiusvise : 
 
 Le 10 (23) juillet, annee cou- 
 rante, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hon- 
 grie aBel grade presenta au Mini- 
 etre President serbe une note oil 1 e 
 Gouvernement serbe etait accuse 
 d'avoir favorise le mouvement 
 pau-serbo qui avait abouti a 
 i'assassinat de I'h^ritier du trone 
 ^ustro-hongrois. En conse- 
 q^uence I'Autriuhe-Hongrie de- 
 mandait am Gouvernement serbe 
 non seulement de condamner 
 «ous une forme solennelle la 
 susdite propagande, mais aiissi 
 de prendi'e, sous le control e de 
 I'Autriche-Hongrie, une serie 
 de mesures tendant k la d6- 
 couverte du complot, a la punl- 
 tion des sujets sevbes y ayant 
 participe et a la prevention 
 dans I'avenir de tout attentat 
 sur le sol du Royaume. Un 
 delai de quarante-huit heures 
 fut lixe au Gouvernement serbe 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 A GARBLED Version of the 
 events of the last few days 
 having appeared in the foreign 
 press, the Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs considers it his 
 duty to publish the following 
 brief accomit of the diplomatic 
 discussions during the period 
 under review : — 
 
 On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, 
 the Austro-Hungarian Minister 
 at Belgrade presented a note to 
 the Prime Minister of Servia, in 
 which the Servian Government 
 were accused of having fostered 
 the pan-Serb movement, which 
 had led to the assassination of the 
 heir to the Austro-Hungarian 
 throne. Austria-Hungary, there- 
 fore, demanded of the (Servian 
 Government, not only the con- 
 demnation in the most formal 
 manner of the above-mentioned 
 propaganda, but also the 
 adoption, under Austrian super- 
 vision, of a series of measures 
 for the discovery of the plot, for 
 the punishment of any Servian 
 subjects who had taken part in 
 it, and for the prevention of any 
 future attempts at assassination 
 upon Austrian soil. A time 
 limit of forty-eight hours was 
 
55 
 
 pour la r^ponse k la susdite 
 note. 
 
 Le Gouvernement Imperial, 
 auquel rAmbassadeur d'Au- 
 triche-Hongrie a Saint- P^ters- 
 bourg avait communique letexte 
 de la note dix-sept heures apres 
 sa remise a Belgrade, ayaat pris 
 connaissance des demandes j 
 contenues, dut s'apercevoir que 
 quelques-unee parmi elles 
 ^taient inex^cutables quant au 
 fond, tandis que d'autres etaient 
 presentees sous une forme in- 
 compatible avec la dignite d'un 
 Etat iudependaut. Trouvant 
 inadmiesibles la diminution de 
 la dignite de la Serbie contenue 
 dans ces demandes, ainsi que la 
 tendance de rAutriche-Hongrie 
 d'assurer sa preponderance dans 
 les Balkans demoutree par ces 
 memes exigences, le Gouverne- 
 ment russe fit observer dans la 
 forme la plus amicale k 
 rAutriche-Hongrie qu'il serait 
 desirable de soumettre a un 
 nouvel examen les points con- 
 tenus dans la note austro- 
 hongroise. Le Gouvernment 
 austro-hongrois ne crut possible 
 de consentir a une discussion de 
 la note. L'action moderatrice 
 des autres Puissances a Vienne 
 ne tut non plus couronnee de 
 succes. 
 
 Malgre que la Serbie eut 
 reprouve le crime et se fut mon- 
 tree prete k donner satisfaction 
 a I'Autriche dans une mesure 
 qui depassa les previsions non 
 seulement de la Russie, mais 
 aussi des autres Puissances, le 
 Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a 
 Belgrade jugea la reponse serbe 
 insuiEsante et quitta cette ville. 
 
 Reconnaissant le caract^re 
 «xagere des demandes pre- 
 sentees par I'Autriche, la Russie 
 avait declare encore auparavant 
 
 given to the Servian Govern- 
 ment within which to reply to 
 this note. 
 
 The Russian Government, to 
 whom the Austro-Hungarian 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
 had communicated the text of 
 the note seventeen hours after 
 its presentation at Belgrade, 
 having taken note of the 
 demands contained therein, 
 could not but perceive that 
 some of these demands were im- 
 possible of execution as regards 
 their substance, whilst others 
 were presented in a form which 
 was incompatible with the 
 dignity of au independent State. 
 Russia considered that the humi- 
 liation of Servia, involved in 
 these demands, and equally the 
 evident intention of Austria- 
 Hungary to secure her own 
 hegemony in the Balkans, which 
 iinderlay her conditions, were 
 inadmissible. The Russian 
 Government, therefore, pointed 
 out to Austria-Hungary in the 
 most friendly manner that it 
 wouldbedesii'able to re-examine 
 the points contained in the 
 Austro-Hungarian note. The 
 Austro-Hungarian Government 
 did not see their way to agree 
 to a discussion of the note. The 
 moderating influence of the 
 four Powers at Vienna was 
 equally unsuccessful. 
 
 Despite the fact that Servia 
 had reprobated the crime, and 
 had shown herself ready to 
 give Austria satisfaction to an 
 extent beyond the expectations, 
 not only of Russia, but also of 
 the other Powers — despite these 
 facts, the Austro - Hungarian 
 Minister at Belgrade considered 
 the Servian reply insuiBcient 
 and left the town. 
 
 Recognising the exaggerated 
 nature of the demands made 
 by Austria, Russia had pre- 
 viously declared that she could 
 
56 
 
 qu'il lui serait impossible de 
 rester indiff^rente, sans se re- 
 fuser toutefois a employer tons 
 ses eiForts pour trouver uue issiie 
 pacifique qui fut acceptable 
 pour I'Autriche et menageat son 
 amour-propre de Grande Puis- 
 sance. En meme temps la 
 Russie ^tablit fermement qu'elle 
 admettait une solution pacifique 
 de la question seulement dans 
 une mesure qui n'impliquerait 
 pas la diminution de la dignite 
 de la Serbie comme llltat ind6- 
 pendant. Malheureusement 
 
 tous les eiforts d^ployes par le 
 Gouvernement Imperial dans 
 cette direction rest^rent sans 
 effet. Le "Gouvernement austro- 
 hongrois, apr^s s'etre d6rob6 k 
 toute intervention conciliatrice 
 des Puissances dans son conflit 
 avec la Serbie, pioceda a la 
 mobilisation, d^clara ofScielle- 
 ment la guerre a la Serbie, et le 
 jour suivant Belgrade fut bom- 
 bardde. Le manifeste qui a 
 accompagne la declaration de 
 guerre accuse ouvertement la 
 Serbie d'avoir prepare et ej:e- 
 cute le crime de Seraiewo. 
 Une pareille accusation d'un 
 crime de droit commun lanc6e 
 contre tout un peuple et tout 
 un !fitat attira a la Serbie par 
 son inanite 6vidente les larges 
 sympathies des cercles de la 
 society eiu'op^enne. 
 
 A la suite de cette manifere 
 d'agir du- Gouvernement austro- 
 bongrois, malgre la declaration 
 de la Russie qu'elle ne poui-rait 
 rester indifierente au sort de 
 la Serbie, le Gouvernement 
 Imperial jugea n^cessaire d'or- 
 donner la mobilisation des cir- 
 conscriptions militaires de Kiew, 
 d'Odessa, de Moscouetde Kazan. 
 Une telle decision s'imposait 
 parce que depuis la date de la 
 remise de la note austro-hon- 
 groise au Gouvernement serbe 
 et les premieres d-marches de 
 
 not remain indifi"erent, while not 
 desisting from doing her utmost 
 to find a peaceful issue which 
 might prove acceptable to Aus- 
 tria, and spare the letter's self- 
 respect as a Great Power. 
 At the same time Russia let 
 it be clearly understood that 
 she could accept a peaceful 
 settlement of the question only 
 so faii as it involved no humilia- 
 tion of Servia as an independent 
 State. Unhappily all the efforts 
 of the Russian Goveroment to 
 this end were fruitless. The 
 Austro-Hun garian Governm eut, 
 which had shunned any attempt 
 at conciliatory intervention by 
 the Powers in the Austrian 
 dispute with Servia, proceeded 
 to mobilise and declared war 
 officially against Servia, and 
 the following day Belgrade was 
 bombarded. The manifesto 
 which accompanied the de- 
 claration of war openly accuses 
 Servia of having prepared and 
 carried out the crime of Sera- 
 jevo. Such an accusation of a 
 crime at common law, launched 
 against a whole people and a 
 whole State, aroused, by its 
 evident inanity, widespread 
 sympathy for Servia throughout 
 all classes of European society. 
 
 Li consequence of this beha- 
 viour of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government, in spite of Russia's 
 declaration that she could not 
 remain indifferent to the fate of 
 Servia, the Russian Government 
 considered it necessary to order 
 mobilisation in the military dis- 
 tricts of Kiefif, Odessa, Moscow, 
 and Kazan. This decision was 
 rendered necessary by the fact 
 that since the date when the 
 Austro - Hungarian note was 
 communicated to the Servian 
 Government, and since the first 
 
57 
 
 la Russie cinq jours s'^taient 
 ecoul^s, et cependant le Cabinet 
 de Vienne n'avait fait aiicuu 
 pas pour aller au-devant de nos 
 efforts pacifiques ; au contraire, 
 la mobilisatiou de la moitie de 
 I'arm^e austro-hongroise avait 
 6t6 d^cr^tee. 
 
 Le Gouvernement allemand 
 fut mis au courant des mesures 
 prises par la Russie; il lui fut 
 en meme temps explique 
 qu'elles n'etaient que la conse- 
 quence des armeraeuts au- 
 tricliiens et nullemeut divig6es 
 centre I'Allemagne. En m^me 
 temps, le Gouvernement Impe- 
 riel d^clara que la Russia 6tait 
 pr^te k continuer les pourparlers 
 en vue d'une solution pacifique 
 du conflit, eoit par la voie de 
 negociations directes avec le 
 Cabinet de Vienne, soit, en 
 suivant la proposition de la 
 Grande-Bretagne, par la voie 
 d'une conference des quatre 
 Grandes Puissances non inte- 
 ress^es directement, voire, 
 I'Angleterre, la France, I'Alle- 
 magne et I'ltalie. 
 
 Cependant cette tentative de 
 la Russie echoua egalement. 
 L'Autriche-Hongrie ddclina un 
 echange de vues ult^rieur avec 
 nous, et le Cabinet de Vienne se 
 d^roba k la pai-ticipation k la 
 conference des Puissances pro- 
 jet^e. 
 
 N^anmoins, la Russie ne dis- 
 contiuua pas ses efforts en 
 faveur de la paix. R6pondant 
 a la question de I'Ambassadeur 
 d'Allemagne, k quelles con- 
 ditions nous consentirions encore 
 k suspendre nos armements, le 
 Ministre des Affaires jfitrangeres 
 d^clara que ces conditions se- 
 raient la reconnaissance par 
 I'Autriche-Hongrie que la ques- 
 tion austro-serbe avait revStu le 
 caract^re d'une question euro- 
 p6enne, et la declaration de 
 
 steps taken by Russia, fiv& 
 days had elapsed, and yet the 
 Vienna Cabinet had not taken 
 one step to meet Russia half- 
 way in her efforts towards peace. 
 Indeed, quite the contrary ; for 
 the mobilisation of half of the 
 Austro - Hungarian army had 
 been ordered. 
 
 The German Government 
 were kept informed of the steps 
 taken by Russia. At the same 
 time it was explained to them 
 that these steps were only the- 
 result of the Austrian prepara- 
 tions, and that they were not 
 in any way aimed at Germany. 
 Simultaneously, the Russian 
 Government declared that Russia 
 was ready to continue discus- 
 sions with a view to a peaceful 
 settlement of the dispute, either 
 in the form of direct negotiations 
 with Vienna or, as suggested 
 by Great Britain, in the form of 
 a conference of the four Great 
 Powers not directly interested, 
 that is to say, Great Britain,. 
 France, Germany, and Italy. 
 
 This attempt on the part of 
 Russia was, however, equally 
 unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary 
 declined a further exchange- 
 of views with Russia, and the 
 Vienna Cabinet was unwilling- 
 to join the proposed conference 
 of the Powers. 
 
 Nevertheless Russia did not 
 abandon her efforts for peace. 
 When questioned by the Ger- 
 man Ambassador as to the con- 
 ditions on which we woirld still 
 agree to suspend our prepara- 
 tions, the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs declared that these con- 
 ditions were Austria's recogni- 
 tion that the Austro-Serbian 
 question had assimied a Euro- 
 pean character, and a declaration 
 by her that she agreed not to 
 insist upon such of her demands- 
 
cette meme Puissance qu'elle 
 consentait a ne pas insister sur 
 des demandes incorapatibles 
 avec les droits souverains de la 
 Serbie. 
 
 La proposition de la Russie 
 fut jugee par TAUemagne inac- 
 •ceptable pour rAutriche-Hon- 
 grie. Simultanement on re9ut 
 a Saint-Petersbourg la nouvelle 
 de la proclamation de la mobili- 
 sation gen^rale par TAutriche- 
 Hongrie. 
 
 En meme temps les hostilites 
 ■continuaieut sur le territoire 
 serbe et Belgrade fut bombardee 
 •derechef. 
 
 L'insucc^s de nos propositions 
 pacifiques nous obligea d'^largir 
 les mesures de precaution mili- 
 taires. 
 
 Le Cabinet de Berlin noug 
 ayant adresse une question k 
 06 sujet, il lui fut repondu que 
 la Russie ^tait forc^e de cora- 
 Tnencer ses amiements pour se 
 premunir contre toutes eventu- 
 -alites. 
 
 Tout en prenant cette mesure 
 de precaution, la Russie n'en dis- 
 •continxiait pas moins de recher- 
 cher de toutes ses forces une 
 issue de cette situation et de- 
 clava etre prete a accepter tout 
 nioyeii de solution du conflit qui 
 comporterait I'observation des 
 conditions posees par nous. 
 
 Malgre cette communication 
 conciliante, le Gouvernement 
 allemand, le 18 (31) juillet, 
 adressa au Gouvernement russe 
 la demande d'avoir a suspendre 
 ses mesures militaires a midi du 
 19 juillet (l"aout), en mena9ant, 
 dans le cas contraire, de pro- 
 ceder a une mobilisation gene- 
 rale. 
 
 , Le lendemain, 19 juillet (!"' 
 aout), I'Ambassadeur d'AUe- 
 magne transmit au Ministre des 
 Affaires Etrang^res, au nom de 
 
 as were incompatible ■with the 
 sovereign rights of Servia. 
 
 Germany considered this Rus- 
 sian proposal unacceptable to 
 Austria-Hungary. At that very 
 moment news of the proclama- 
 tion of general mobilisation by 
 Austria - Hungarj' reached St. 
 Petfi'sburg. 
 
 All this time hostilities were 
 continuing on_Serviau territory, 
 and Belgrade was bombarded 
 afresh. 
 
 The failure of our proposals 
 for peace compelled iis to 
 extend the scope of our pre- 
 cautionary military measures. 
 
 The Berlin Cabinet questioned 
 us on this, and we rephed that 
 Russia was compelled to begin 
 preparations so as to be ready 
 for every emergency. 
 
 But while taking tliis pre- 
 cautionary step, Russia did not 
 on that account abandon her 
 strenuous efforts to find some 
 solution of the situation, and 
 she announced that she was 
 ready to accept any proposed 
 settlement of the problem that 
 might be put forward, provided 
 it complied with the conditions 
 laid down by her. 
 
 In spite of this conciliatory 
 communication, the Gerruan 
 Government on the J 8th (31st) 
 July demanded of the Russian 
 Government that they should 
 suspend their military measures 
 by midday on the 19th July 
 (1st August), and threatened, 
 should they fail to comply, to 
 proceed to general mobilisation. 
 
 On the following day, the 19th 
 July (1st August), the German 
 Ambassador, on behalf of his 
 Government, forwarded a decla- 
 
59 
 
 son Gouvernement, 
 tion de guerre. 
 
 la d^clara- ration of war to the Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 No. 78. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives 
 
 Abroad. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 20 (August 2), 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 Il est absolument olair que 
 TAlIemagne s*efforce dfe k pre- 
 sent de rejeter sur nous la 
 responsabilite de la rupture. 
 Notre mobilisation a 4tt^ provo- 
 qu.6e par I'^norme responsabilite 
 ■que nous aurions assum^e, si 
 nous n'avions pas pris toutes les 
 mesures de precaution a un mo- 
 ment ou TAutricbe, se bornant a 
 des pourparlers d'un caractfere 
 dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade 
 et procedait a une mobilisation 
 g^nerale. 
 
 Sa Majesty I'Empereur s'etait 
 engagd vis-k-vis de I'Empereur 
 d'AUemagne par sa parole k 
 n'entreprendre aucun acte 
 agressif tant que dureraient les 
 pourparlers avec! I'Autriche. 
 Aprfes une telle garantie et aprfes 
 toutes les preuves de I'amour de 
 la Eussie pour la paix, I'Alle- 
 magne ne pouvait ni avait le 
 droit de douter de notre decla- 
 ration que nous accepterions 
 avec joie toute issue pacifique 
 compatible avec la dignite et 
 I'independance de la Serbie. 
 Une autre issue, tout en 6tant 
 complfetement incompatible avec 
 notre propre dignite, aurait 
 certainement ebranle F^quilibre 
 europeen, en assurant I'heg^- 
 monie de I'Allemagne. Ce ca- 
 ractei'e europeen, voire mondial, 
 du conflit est infiniment plus 
 important que le pr6texte qui 
 I'a cre6. Par sa decision de 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 It is quite evident that Ger- 
 many is now doing her utmost 
 to foist upon us the responsi- 
 bility for the rupture. We 
 were forced to mobilise by the 
 immense responsibility which 
 would have fallen upon our 
 shoulders if we had not taken 
 all possible precautionary mea- 
 sures at a time when Austria, 
 while confining herself to dis- 
 cussions of a dilatory nature, 
 was bombarding Belgrade and 
 was undertaking general mobi- 
 lisation. 
 
 The Emperor of Russia had 
 promised the German Emperor 
 that he would take no aggres- 
 sive action as long as the 
 discussions with Austria con- 
 tinued. With such a giiarantee, 
 and after so many proofs of 
 Russia's desire for peace, Ger- 
 many neither could, nor had 
 the right to, doubt our declara- 
 tion that we would joyfully 
 accept any peaceful settlement 
 compatible with the dignity 
 and independence of Servia. 
 Any other solution, besides 
 being entirely incompatible 
 with our own dignity, would 
 assuredly have upset the Euro- 
 pean balance of power by 
 securing the hegemony of Ger- 
 many. The European — nay, 
 the world-wide — character of 
 this dispute is infinitely more 
 important than the pretext 
 from which it springs. By 
 
60 
 
 nous declarer la guerre k un 
 moment oh. se poursuivaient les 
 n^gociatious eutre les Puis- 
 sances, I'Allemagne a assum6 
 uue lourde responsabilit^. 
 
 (Sign6) SAZONOW. 
 
 her decision to declare war 
 \ipou us, at a moment when 
 negotiations were in progress 
 between the Powers, German^' 
 has assumed a heavy respon- 
 sibility. 
 
 No. 79. 
 
 2\'ote presented by the Auntro-Uungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
 to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July ^A: {August 6) 
 19U, at 6 P.M. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 On the instructions of his 
 Government, the undersigned, 
 the Austro-Hungarian Ambas- 
 sador, has the honour to inform 
 his Excellency the Russian 
 
 D'ORDRE de son Gouverne- 
 ment, le soussign^ Ambassadeur 
 d'Autriche-Hongrie a I'honneur 
 •de notifier a son Excellence M. 
 le Ministre des Affaires !fitran- 
 g;6res de Russie ce qui suit : 
 
 " Vu I'attitude mena9aute 
 ^rise par la Russie dans le con- 
 flit eutre la Monarchic austro- 
 hongroise et la Serbie et en 
 presence du fait qu'en suite de 
 ce conflit la Russie d'apres une 
 communication du Cabinet de 
 Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les 
 hostilites centre I'Allemagne et 
 que celle-ci se trouve par conse- 
 quent en etat de guerre avec la- 
 dite Puissance, I'Autriche-Hon- 
 grie se considfere egalement en 
 etat de guerre avec la Russie k 
 partir du present moment." 
 
 (Sign^) SZAPARY. 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs as 
 follows : — 
 
 " In view of the threatening 
 attitude adopted by Russia in 
 the conflict between the Austro- 
 Hungarian Monarchy and 
 Servia ; and of the fact that, 
 according to a commiuiication 
 from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia 
 has seen fit, as a result of that 
 conflict, to open hostilities 
 against Germany ; and whereas 
 Germany is consequently at war 
 with Russia; Austria-Hungary 
 therefore considers herself also 
 at war with Russia from the 
 present moment." 
 
MISCELLANEOUS. No. 12 (1914). 
 
 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 
 
 RESPECTING 
 
 THE WAE 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE 
 
 BELGIAN GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Presented to both Houses of Parliament hy Command of His Majesty. 
 
 October 1914. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
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 By IIAKEISON and SONS, 43-47, St. Mautin's Lank, W.C, 
 
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 1914. 
 
 [Cd. 7627.] Price ^d. ^Y 
 
LIST OF CONTENTS. 
 
 No. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Date. 
 
 Subject. 
 
 
 Count E. de Dudzeele 
 to M. Davignon 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgiau 
 Ministers at Paris, 
 Berlin, London, Vienna, 
 and St. Petersburg 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 Ministers at Tlie 
 Hague, Rome, and 
 Luxemburg 
 
 M. M. de Welle to 
 M. Davignon 
 
 Count Clary to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 Bai'on Bey ens to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Count E. de Dudzeele 
 to M. Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgiau 
 Ministers at Berlin, 
 Paris, London, Vienna, 
 St. Petersburg, Rome, 
 The Hague, and 
 Luxemburg 
 
 jM. Davignon to Belgian 
 Ministers at Berlin, 
 Paris, and London 
 
 M. Davignon to all Bel- 
 gian Heads of Missions 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 I Ministers at Berlin, 
 i Paris, and London 
 
 I 
 
 1914. 
 July 24 
 
 24 
 
 21) 
 
 29 
 
 31 
 
 .31 
 
 .Forwards text of Austro-Hungarian ulti- 
 matiun to Servia 
 
 Instructions for eventual presentation of 
 a note to the respective Governments 
 informing them of Belgian determination 
 to remain neutral in the event of a 
 European war 
 
 Instructions eventually to present a note 
 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
 same terms as that to be addressed to 
 the five Powers guaranteeing Belgian 
 neutrality 
 
 Forwards text of reply of Servian Govern- 
 ment to the Austro-Hungarian note 
 
 Austro-Hungarian Government consider 
 the Servian reply unsatisfactory and ; 
 have broken off diplomatic relations with 
 Servia 
 
 British Government suggest intervention 
 at Vienna and St. Petersburg by Great 
 Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to 
 find a basis of compromise. Germany 
 alone has not yet replied 
 
 28 I Declaration of war by Austria-Hungary 
 against Servia 
 
 [1037] 
 
 Belgian Government have placed army 
 on strengthened peace footing. This 
 step should not be mistaken for mobili- 
 sation 
 
 French assurance to Belgium that no 
 French troops will invade Belgium even 
 if considerable forces are massed upon 
 the Belgian frontiers... 
 
 Belgian mobilisation ordered as from 
 Saturday, 1st August 
 
 British Government have asked French 
 and German Governments separately if 
 each of them is prepared to respect 
 Belgian neutrality, provided it is not 
 violated by any other Power ... 
 
LIST OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Ill 
 
 No. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Date. 
 
 Subject. 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 Legations at Berlin, 
 Paris, and London 
 
 Count de Lalaing to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Baron Bey ens to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 (Telegrapliic) 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 Ministers at Berlin, 
 Paris, and London 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 Ministers accredited to 
 Guarantor Powers 
 
 (Telegrapliic) 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 Legations at Borne, 
 The Hague, and Luxem- 
 burg 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 M. Eyschen to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 19 : M. Davignon to the 
 Belgian Ministers ac- 
 credited to Guarantor 
 Powers 
 
 ! 
 
 20 Herr von Below to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 Interview between Herr 
 von Below and Baron 
 van der Elst 
 
 M. Davignon to Herr 
 von Below 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 Ministers at Paris, 
 Loudon, Vienna, Ber- 
 lin, St. Petersburg, 
 and The Hague 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914. 
 ,luly31 
 
 Aug. 1 
 
 Baron van der Elst has reminded German 
 Minister of the assurances given by 
 Germany to Belgium regarding respect 
 of her neutrality 
 
 France accepts Britishsuggestiouthatshe 
 should not violate Belgian neutrality, 
 provided it is respected by Germany 
 (see No. 11) ... 
 
 Germany refuses to answer British pro- 
 posal to respect Belgian neutrality 
 
 Prance explains the conditions on which 
 she will respect Belgian neutrality 
 
 To carry out the instructions contained 
 in the despatch of 24th July (see No. 2) 
 
 To carry out the instructions contained 
 in the despatch of 24th July (see No. 3) 
 
 The President of the Luxemburg Govern- 
 ment protests against the violation of 
 the neutrality of the Grand Duchy 
 guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 
 1867 
 
 French Minister has published his 
 declaration of 1st August. Belgium 
 would greatly value a similar assurance 
 from Germany 
 
 Presentation of German ultimatum. 
 Germany calls upon Belgium to allow 
 the passage of German troops 
 
 Germany complains to Belgium of the 
 violation of her frontiers by dirigibles, 
 and a French patrol ... 
 
 Belgian reply to German ultimatum. 
 Belgium cannot fail in the duties im- 
 posed upon her by the treaties of 1839. . . 
 
 Informs of German action and of Belgian 
 attitude 
 
IV 
 
 LCST OF CONTENTS. 
 
 No. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Date. Subject. ^ 
 
 • Ph 
 
 24 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 Ministers at Berlin, 
 Paris, London, Vienna, 
 and St. Petersburg 
 
 The King of Belgium to 
 the King of England 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914. 
 Aug. 3 
 
 3 
 
 Belgium has informed France that for 
 the moment she does not appeal to the 
 guarantee of the Powers. She will 
 eventually decide what must be done ... 
 
 Belgium maizes a supreme appeal to the 
 British Government to safeguard her 
 neutrality ... ... ... ...! 
 
 1 
 
 23 
 24 
 
 26 I Count de Lalaing to 
 ' M. Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 27 
 
 28 
 
 Herr von Below to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 Sir P. Villiers to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 29 Baron Fallon to M. 
 j Davignon 
 
 30 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 
 \ Ministers at London ' 
 I and Paris 
 
 (Telegraphic) ' 
 
 31 M. Davignon to Herr 
 
 von Below 
 
 32 Herr von Below to M. 
 
 Davignon 
 
 33 i M. Davignon to Baron 
 Grenier 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 34 M. Davignon to Baron 
 Bey ens 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 35 Baron Beyens to M. 
 
 Davignon 
 
 36 ! Count de Lalaing to 
 ! M. Davignon 
 
 Great Britain declares she will go to war 
 if the neutrality of Belgium is violated 
 (seeNo. 23) ... 
 
 Germany will tate, if necessary by force 
 of arms, such steps as she may consider 
 necessary for her safety in face of French 
 I menaces 
 
 Great Britain expects Belgium to resist 
 to her utmost the pressure exerted by 
 Germany to make her abandon her 
 neutrality and that she will appeal to 
 the guaranteeing Powers 
 
 4 [ Holland informs Belgian Government 
 that she may perhaps be forced to 
 establish war buoying of the Scheldt , ... 
 
 Violation of Belgian territory at Gem- 
 menich 
 
 24 
 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 Forwards passports to German Minister 28 
 
 Germany leaves German interests in 
 Belgium in hands of the United States 
 of America ... ... ... ... 29 
 
 Belgian Government request Spanish | 
 Government to take charge of Belgian I 
 interests in Germany... ... ..! 29 
 
 Instructions to ask for his passports ... 29 
 
 Speech of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg in 
 the Reichstag, in which the Chancellor , 
 admitted that Germany committed an ' 
 injustice in disregarding the protests of | y 
 the Luxemburg and Belgian Govern- '\ 
 ments ... ... ... ... 30 
 
 British attitude in the European dispute ' 31 
 
LIST OF CONTENTS. 
 
 No. 
 
 Name. 1 Date. 
 
 Subject. 
 
 i. 
 
 37 
 
 1914. 
 Count do Lalaing to M. [ Aug. 4 
 Davignoii 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Great Britain expects that Norway, 
 Holland, and Belgium will resist 
 German pressure and will preserve 
 their neutrality. In that event they 
 will be supported by her 
 
 33 
 
 38 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 4 
 Ministers at Paris, 
 London, and St. Peters- 
 burg 
 
 Summary of the diplomatic situation. No 
 act of war having been committed before 
 the expiration of the ultimatum,- the 
 Cabinet decided on 3rd August, at 10 
 o'clock, not yet to appeal to the guaran- 
 teeing Powers 
 
 33 
 
 39 
 
 Count de Lalaing to M. ' 4 
 Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Great Britain has called upon Germany to 
 respect Belgian neutrality. The ulti- 
 matum expires at midnight 
 
 37 
 
 40 
 
 jSl. Davignon to British, 4 
 French, and Russian ' 
 Ministers at Brussels 
 
 1 
 
 German troops having entered Belgium, 
 the Belgian Government appeal to Great 
 Britain, France, and Russia to co-ope- 
 rate, as guaranteeing Powers, in the 
 defence of Belgian territory ... 
 
 38 
 
 41 
 
 Count de Lalaing to M. 5 
 Davignon i 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Great Britain has declared war against 
 Germany 
 
 38 
 
 42 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 5 
 Ministers at Paris, 
 London, and St. I'eters- 
 burg 
 
 Belgium appeals to the Powers guaran- 
 teeing her neutrality... 
 
 39 
 
 43 
 
 44 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 M. Davignon to all 
 Heads of Belgian Mis- 
 sions 
 
 45 Baron Beyens to M. 
 Davignon 
 j (Telegraphic) 
 
 46 : Baron Grenier to M. 
 I Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 47 j Baron Guillaume to M. 
 I Davignon 
 
 48 I Sir F. Villiers to M. 
 
 Davignon 
 
 49 j Count de Lalaing to 
 Mt Davignon 
 j , (Telegraphic) 
 
 Summary of the diplomatic situation 
 
 In virtue of article 10 of the Fifth Hague 
 Convention of 1907, Belgium, in forcibly 
 repelling the infringement of her neu- 
 trality, commits no hostile act 
 
 Staff of Belgian Legation in Germany will 
 leave Berlin on 6th August 
 
 Spanish Government uudertalfe the pro- 
 tection of Belgian interests in Germany 
 
 Germany declared war on France on 3rd 
 August at 6 P.M. 
 
 Great Britain agrees to co-operate, as a 
 guaranteeing Power, in the defence of 
 Belgian territory 
 
 British fleet will ensure free passage of 
 the Scheldt for the provisioning of 
 Antwerp 
 
LIST OF CONTENTS. 
 
 No. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Date. 
 
 Subject. 
 
 50 
 
 51 
 
 52 
 
 53 
 
 54 
 
 Baron Fallon to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 M. Davignon to Baron 
 Grenier 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 Ministers at Paris, 
 London, and St. Peters- 
 burg 
 
 ]M. do Weede to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 M. Davignon to Baron 
 Fallon ' 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914. 
 .*ug. 5 
 
 War buoying is about to be established 
 (see No. 29) ... 
 
 Baron Guillaume 
 JM. Davignon 
 
 to 
 
 55 Baron Fallon to M. ] 
 
 Davignon 
 I (Telegra))hic) 
 
 56 'SI. Davignon to Baron 
 
 Fallon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 58 
 59 
 
 60 
 
 61 
 
 62 
 
 63 
 64 
 
 JSI. Davignon to Belgian 
 Ministers at Paris and 
 London 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Baron Fallon to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Baron Guillaume to 
 M. Davignon ' 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 Baron Fallon to M. ' 
 Davignon i 
 
 M. Davignon to Baron 
 Fallon I 
 
 (Telegraphic) j 
 
 5 I Belgian Government thank Spanish Go- 
 vernment for taking charge of Belgian 
 interests in Germany 
 
 5 I France and Russia agree to co-operate 
 with Great Britain In the defence of 
 Belgian territory 
 
 6 Communicates declaration of Netherlands 
 neutrality in war between Belgium and 
 Germany 
 
 6 Regulation of commercial navigation of 
 the Scheldt (see No. 50) 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 Same subject as above . 
 
 Same subject as above . 
 
 Belgian Government anxious that war 
 should not extend to Central Africa. 
 Do French and British Governments 
 agree to Belgian proposal to neutralise 
 the Congo conventional basin ? 
 
 Despatch explaining preceding telegram 
 
 France reserves her reply respecting 
 Belgian proposal to neutralise Congo 
 conventional basin 
 
 Communication of a fresh German pro- 
 posal repeating the ultimatum of 
 2nd August ... 
 
 French Government are inclined to pro- 
 claim the neutrality of the Congo con- 
 ventional basin (see No. 59) ... 
 
 Communicates German text (containing 
 an error) of the second German iiroposal 
 and a translation of that document 
 (containing another error) 
 
 Belgian Government have received the 
 fresh German proposals and will reply 
 shortly 
 
 To ask German Government the meaning 
 they attach to the word " Auseinander- 
 setzung " 
 
 60 
 
LIST OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Vll 
 
 No. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Date. 
 
 65 
 
 66 
 
 67 
 68 
 
 69 
 70 
 
 71 
 
 72 
 
 73 
 74 
 
 M. Davignon to British, 
 Russian, and French 
 Ministers 
 
 M. Davignon to Belgian 
 Ministers at London, 
 Paris, and St. Peters- 
 burg 
 
 Mr. Whitlock to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 Sir P. Villiers to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 M. Klobukowski to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 Baron Fallon to M. 
 Davignon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 M. Davignon to Baron 
 Fallon 
 
 (Telegraphic) 
 
 1914. 
 Aug. 10 
 
 10 
 
 M. Sazonot to M. Davig- 
 non 
 
 (Telegraphic) ! 
 
 Baron Fallon to M. I 
 Davignon 
 
 Baron Gaillaume to M. , 
 Davignon ' 
 
 75 ] Count de Lalaing to M. 
 j Davignon 
 
 76 ■ M. Tomhenr to M. 
 I Kankin (Telegraphic) 
 
 77 ! Count Clary to M. 
 j Davignon 
 
 i (Telegraphic) 
 
 78 M. Davignon to Baron 
 
 Fallon (Telegraphic) 
 
 79 ; M. Davignon to all ! 
 Heads of Belgian Mis- 
 sions j 
 
 Subject. 
 
 11 
 11 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 13 
 16 
 
 17 
 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 29 
 29 
 
 Belgian Government communicate to 
 Kepreseutatives of the guaranteeing 
 Powers the text of the second German 
 note and of the reply which they pro- 
 pose to return 
 
 Luxemburg authorities have asked 
 Belgian Minister to leave Luxemburg. 
 In the circumstances, Belgian Govern- 
 ment have not taken a similar step with 
 regard to Luxemburg Kepresentative 
 at Brussels ... 
 
 United States of America agree to take 
 charge of German interests in Belgium 
 
 Great Britain concurs in proposed Belgian 
 reply to second German ultimatum (see 
 No. 65) 
 
 French Government likewise entirely 
 agree in proposed reply (see No. 65) ... 
 
 The German text contained an error. 
 The meaning is "her conflict with 
 France" 
 
 
 61 
 
 62 
 
 64 
 
 64 
 
 65 
 
 65 
 
 The new German proposal repeats the J 
 proposal contained in the ultimatum of i 
 2nd August. Belgium can only repeat 
 the reply she gave to that ultimatum ... 66 
 
 Russian Government congratulateBelgian 
 Government on their firm and dignified 
 attitude (see No. 65) ... ... ... 66 
 
 Belgian reply to second German proposal 
 presented on 13th August ... ... 67 
 
 France no longer wishes to neutralise the 
 Congo conventional basin (see Nos. 57 
 and 58) ... ... 67 
 
 British Government cannot agree to Bel- 
 gian proposal to neutralise the Congo 
 conventional basin ... ... ... C8 
 
 Germans attacked Belgian Congo on 22nd 
 August ... ... ... ... 69 
 
 Austria-Hungary declares war against 
 Belgium ... ... ... ... 69 
 
 Belgian reply to Austro-Hungarian decla- 
 ration of war ... ... ... 70 
 
 Information respecting German allega- 
 tions against Belgium contained in 
 British Parliamentary White Paper 
 
Vlll 
 
 LIST OP PERSONS WHOSE SIGNATURES APPEAR 
 IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR 
 OFFICIAL POSITIONS. 
 
 BEIiGITJM. 
 
 Minister jor Foreign Affairs ... 
 Secretary-General of the ilinistry foi- 
 
 Foreign Affairs 
 Tice-Governor of the Katanga 
 British Minister 
 French, Minister 
 Netherlands Minister 
 United States Minii'ter 
 German Minister 
 
 Monsieur DavignoD. 
 Baron van der Blst. 
 
 Monsieur Tombeur. 
 Sir Francis Villiers. 
 Monsieur Klobukowski. 
 Jonkheer de Weede. 
 Mr. Wliitlock. 
 Herr von Below Saleske. 
 
 GEE AT BRITAIN. 
 
 Belgian Minister 
 
 Count de Lalains;. 
 
 FRANCE. 
 
 Belgian Minister 
 
 Baron Guillaiime. 
 
 SPAIN. 
 
 Belgian Minister 
 
 Baron Grenier. 
 
 THE NETHERLANDS. 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs... 
 Belgian Minister 
 Austro-Htingarian Minister ... 
 
 Jonkheer Loudon. 
 
 Baron Fallon. 
 
 Count Clary und Aldringen. 
 
 I.UXEMBXTBG. 
 
 President of the Government. 
 Belgian Minister 
 German Min ister 
 
 Monsieur Eysclien. 
 
 Count van den Steen de Jehay. 
 
 Herr von Buch. 
 
 SERVIA. 
 
 Belgian Minister 
 
 Monsieur Michotte de Welle. 
 
 GERMAmr. 
 
 Belgian Minister 
 
 Baron Bey ens. 
 
 ATTSTRIA-HTJNGARY. 
 
 Belgian Ministe r 
 
 Count Errembault de Dudzeele. 
 
DIPLOMATIC COERESPONDENCE EESfECTING 
 
 THE WAR. 
 
 (July 24-August 29.) 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 Count Errembmdt de JDudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Vienna, July 24, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai riionneur de vous faire 
 parvenir, sous ce pli, le texte 
 de rultimatum de rAutriche- 
 Hongrie a la Serbia. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 (Signe) CoMTE ERREMBAULT 
 DE DUDZEEl.E. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE the honour to enclose 
 herewith the text of the Austro- 
 Hungarian ultimatum to Servia. 
 
 Enclosure in No. 1. 
 
 (Text of Austro-Hungarian note, for which see " Miscellaneous- 
 No. 6 (1914) " [Cd. 7476] No. 4, pp. 3-6.] 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and 
 St. Petersburg. 
 
 Brussels, July 24, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Lb Gouvernement du Eoi s'est 
 demand^ si, dans les circonstances 
 actuelles, il n'y aurait pas lieu 
 d'adresser aux Puissances qui ont 
 garanti son inddpendance et sa 
 neutrality, uue communication 
 destin^e i leur confirnier sa 
 r&olution de remplir les devoirs 
 internationaux que lui imposent 
 les trait^s au cas ou une gueiTO 
 viendrait h, ^clater aux fronti^res 
 de la Belgique. 
 [1037] 
 
 Sir, 
 
 The Belgian Government have ■ 
 had under their consideration 
 whether, in present circumstances, . 
 it would not he advisable to 
 address to the Powers who gua- 
 rantee Belgian independence and 
 neutrality a communication 
 assuring them of Belgium's de- 
 termination to fulfil the inter- 
 national obligations imposed upoa 
 her by treaty in the event of a. 
 war breaking out on her frontiers. 
 
II a 6td anient h la conclusion 
 qu'une telle communication serait 
 pr^matur^e k I'heure pr^sente 
 •mais qtie iles-"^^nements ponr- 
 raient se pr^cipiter et ne,,poittt 
 lui laisser le temps de faire 
 parvenir, au moment voulu, les 
 instructions opportunes a ses 
 repr^sentants k I'^tranger. 
 
 Dans cette situation, j'ai pro- 
 pose au Eoi et k mes collogues du 
 Cabinet, qui se sont rallies k ma 
 manitre de voir, de vous donner, 
 d6s k present, ties indications 
 precises sur la demarche que vous 
 aturiez k faire si I'^ventualit^ 
 d'une guerre franco-allemande 
 deveuait^plus menagante. 
 
 A'ous trouverez, sous ce pli, 
 une lettre sign^e, mais uon datde 
 dont vous aurez k donner lecture 
 et ^laisser copie au Mioistre des 
 Affaires fitrangferes si les circon- 
 stauces exigent cette communica- 
 tion. 
 
 Je vous indiquerai par t^l^- 
 gramme le moment d'agir. 
 
 Le teMgramme vous sera 
 adresse 'k rhetire on la mobilisa- 
 tion de I'arm^e beige sera 
 d^cr^tde, si, contrairement k notre 
 sincere espoir, et aux apparences 
 de solution pacifique, nos ren- 
 sei<»nements nous amenaient S 
 prendre cette mesure extreme de 
 precaution. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 (Sign6) DAVIGXOX. 
 
 The Government have come to 
 the conclusion that such a com- 
 munication would be premature 
 at present; but that' events might 
 joiove rapidly and not leave suffi- 
 cient time to forward suitable 
 instructions at the desired mo- 
 ment to the Belgian representa- 
 tives abroad. 
 
 In these circumstances I have 
 proposed to the King and to my 
 colleagues in the Cabinet, who 
 have concurred, to give you now 
 exact instructions as to the steps 
 to be taken by you if the prospect 
 of a Franco-German war became 
 more threatening. 
 
 I enclose herewith a note, 
 signed but not dated, which you 
 should read to the Minister for 
 Foreign Afifairs and of which j-ou 
 should give him a copy, if cir- 
 cumstances render such a com- 
 munication necessary. 
 
 I wiU inform you by telegram 
 when you are to act on these 
 instructions. 
 
 This telegram will be despatched 
 when the order is given for 
 the mobilisation of the Belgian 
 army if, contrary to our earnest 
 hope and to the apparent pros- 
 pect of a peaceful settlement, our 
 information leads us to take this 
 extreme measure of precaution. 
 
 Enclosure in Xo. 2. 
 
 Mon.sieur.le. Ministre, 
 
 La situation internationale est 
 grave; .re ventualitd d'un conflit 
 entre plusieurs Puissances ne 
 pent Stre 6ca,Tt^ des preoccupa- 
 tions du Gouvemement du Eoi. 
 
 La Belgique a observe avec la 
 plus scrupuleuse exactitude les 
 devoiis 'd'Etat neutre que lui 
 imposent les traitfe du 19 avril 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The international situation is 
 serious, and the possibLlity of a 
 war between several Powers 
 naturally preoccupies the Belgian 
 Grovemment. 
 
 Belgium has most scrupulously 
 observed -the duties of a neutral 
 State imposed upon her by the 
 treaties of April 19, 1839; and 
 
1839. Ces devoirs, elle s'attachera 
 in^branlablement k les remplir, 
 quelles que soient les eircoa- 
 stances. 
 
 Les dispositions amicales des 
 Puissances k son ^gard ont et^ 
 affirm^es si souvent que la 
 Belgique a la confiance de voir 
 son territoire demeurer hors de 
 toute atteinte si des hostilites 
 venaient k se produire k ses 
 frontieres. 
 
 Toutes les mesures n^cessaires 
 pour assurer I'observation de sa 
 neutralite n'en ont pas moins ^t^ 
 prises par le Gouvernement du 
 Eoi. L'armfe beige est mobiliste 
 et se porte sur les positions 
 strategiques choisies pour assurer 
 la defense du pays et le respect 
 de sa neutralite. Les forts 
 d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont en 
 ^tat de d(5fense. 
 
 11 est k peine ndcessaire, 
 Monsieur le Ministre, d'insister 
 sur le caractere de ces mesures. 
 Elles n'ont d'autre but que de 
 mettre la Belgique en situation 
 de remplir ses obligations Inter- 
 nationales ; elles ne sont et n'ont 
 pu etre inspir^es, eela va de soi, 
 ni>par le dessin de prendre part 
 k une lutte arm^e des Puissances, 
 ni par un sentiment de defiance 
 envers aucun d'elles. 
 
 Me conformant aux ordres 
 re§us, j'ai I'honneur de remettre 
 k votre Excellence une copie de 
 la declaration du Gouvernement 
 du Eoi et de la prier de bien 
 v.ouloir.en prendre acte. 
 
 Une communication ideutique 
 .a-^^t^ifaite aux autres Puissances 
 garantes de la .neutrality beige.. 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 
 thos^ duties she. will strive 
 unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever 
 the circumstances may be. 
 
 The friendly feelings of the 
 Powers towards her have been so; 
 often reaffirmed that Belgium 
 confidently expects that her ter- 
 ritory will remain free from any 
 attack, should hostilities break 
 out upon her frontiers. 
 
 All necessary steps to ensure 
 respect of Belgian neutrality have 
 nevertheless been taken by the 
 Govermnent. The Belgian army 
 has been mobilised and is taking 
 up such strategic positions as 
 have been chosen to secure the 
 defence of the country and the 
 respect of its neutrality. The 
 forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse 
 have been put in a state of 
 defence. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to 
 dwell upon the nature of these 
 measures. They are intended 
 solely to enable Belgium to fulfil 
 her international obligatioi^s ; 
 and- it is obvious that they neither 
 have been nor can have been 
 undertaken with any intention 
 .of taking part in an armed 
 struggle between the Powets or 
 from any feeling of distrust of 
 any of those Powers. 
 
 In accordance with my instruc- 
 tions, I have tlie honour to com- 
 municate to your Excellency a 
 copy of the declaration by the 
 Belgian Government, and to 
 request that you will be good 
 enough to. take note of it. 
 
 A similar communication ,has 
 been made to the otlaer Powers 
 guaranteeing. Belgian neutrality. 
 
 [1037] 
 
 B 2 
 
No. 3. 
 
 Monsie^ir Bavignon, Belgian Ministtr for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. 
 
 Brussels, July 25, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai adress^ k vos collegues 
 accr^ditds auprfes des Puissances 
 garantes de I'ind^pendance et de 
 la neutrality de la Belgique une 
 circulaire, sans date, dont vous 
 trouverez le texte sous ce pli. 
 
 Si la menace d'une guerre 
 franco-allemande devenait im- 
 minente, cette circulaire serait 
 communiqu^e aux Gouverne- 
 ments des Puissances garantes, 
 pour leur faire connaitre notre 
 resolution bien arret^e de remplir 
 les devoirs internationaux que 
 nous imposent les trait^s de 1839. 
 
 La communication dont il 
 s'agit ne serait effeetufe que sur 
 un ordre t41(5graphique de ma 
 part. 
 
 Si les circonstances m'am^nent 
 k donner cet ordre, je vous prierai, 
 ^galement par la voie teMgra- 
 phique, de donner conna,issance 
 de notre demarche au Gouveine- 
 ment aupr^s duquel vous etes 
 accr^dite, en lui communiquant 
 une copie de la circulaire ci- 
 jointe, £ titre de renseignement, 
 et sans demauder qu'il vous soit 
 donn^ acte de cette communica- 
 tion. 
 
 Mon t^l^gramme vous indi- 
 querait, ^ventuellement, la date 
 qui devrait etre attribute a la 
 circulaire, date que vous auriez 
 soin d'inscrire sur la copie que 
 vous remettriez au Ministre des 
 Affaires fitrang^res. 
 
 II va de soi que la pr^sente 
 d^peche et son annexe doivent 
 conserver un caract^re stricte- 
 mente confidentiel, jusqu'au requ 
 de nouvelles instructions de ma 
 part. 
 
 (Sign^) DAVIGNON". 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 I HAVE addressed an undated 
 circular note, a copy of which i& 
 enclosed, to the Belgian repre- 
 sentativesaccredited tothePower? 
 guaranteeing the independence 
 and neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 Should the danger of a war 
 between France and Germany 
 become imminent, this circular 
 note will be communicated to the 
 Governments of the guaranteeing- 
 Powers, in order to inform them 
 of our fixed determination to 
 fulfil those international obliga- 
 tions that are imposed upon us 
 by the treaties of 1839. 
 
 The communications in ques- 
 tion would only be made upon 
 telegraphic instructions from me. 
 
 If circumstances lead me to 
 issue such instructions, I shall 
 request you also, by telegram, to 
 notify the Government to which 
 you are accredited of the step we 
 have taken, and to communicate 
 to them a copy of the enclosed 
 circular note for their information, 
 and without any request that 
 they should take note thereof. 
 
 My telegram will inform you 
 of the date to be given to the 
 circular note, which you should 
 be careful to fill in on the copy 
 which you hand to the Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 It is unnecessary to point out 
 that this despatch and its enclo- 
 sure should be treated as strictly 
 confidential until the receipt of 
 fresh instructions from me. 
 
Enclosure in No. 3. 
 (See Enclosure in No. 2.) 
 
 No. 4. 
 
 Monsieur Michotte de Wclle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de vous faire 
 parvenir, _sous ce pli, le texte de 
 la K^ponse faite par le Gouverne- 
 ment serbe k la communication 
 austro - hongroise du 10 (23) 
 juillet. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 (Signd) MICHOTTE 
 
 DE WELLE. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE the honour to trans- 
 mit to you herewith the text of 
 the reply returned by the Servian 
 Government to the Austro-Hun- 
 garian note of the 10 (23) July. 
 
 Enclosure in No. 4. 
 
 JText of the Servian reply, for which see " Miscellaneous No. 6, 
 (1914)," [Cd. 7467], No. 39.] 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 Communication made on July 26, 1914, hy the Austro-Hungarian 
 Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreig7i Affairs. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Monsieur Pashitch gave the 
 reply of the Servian Government 
 to the Austro-Hungarian note 
 before 6 o'clock yesterday. This 
 reply not having been considered 
 satisfactory, diplomatic relations 
 have been broken off and the 
 Minister and staff of the Austrian 
 Legation have left Belgrade. Ser- 
 vian mobilisation had already 
 been ordered before 3 o'clock. 
 
 Monsieur Pachitch a donnu 
 hier avant 6 heures la response 
 du Gouvernement serbe k la note 
 aust]'o-hongroise. Cette r^ponse 
 n'ayant pas 6t6 jugde satisfaisante, 
 les relations diplomatiques ont 
 et^ rompues et le Ministre et le 
 personnel de la Legation d'Au- 
 'triehe ont quittd Belgrade. La 
 mobilisation serbe avait iti dd- 
 cr^t^e ddja avant 3 heures. 
 
No. 6. 
 
 Baron Bet/ens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Bavignon, 
 Belgian MinAst&F for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, July 27, 1914. 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) 
 
 D'APRis un t^legramme du 
 Chargd d'Affaires britannique a 
 Belgrade, le Gouvernement serbe 
 a ced6 sur tous les points de la 
 note autrichienne. II admet 
 mSme rimmixtion de fonction- 
 naires autricliieDS si celle-ci pent 
 s'accorder avec les usages du 
 droit des gens. Le Charge 
 d'Affaires britannique estirae que 
 cette rdponse devrait satisfaire 
 I'Autriche dans le cas ou celle-ci 
 ne voudrait pas la guerre. Nean- 
 moins rimpression est plus favo- 
 rable ici aujourd'hui,surtout parce 
 que les bostilitds contre la^ Serbie 
 n'ont pas commence. Le Gou- 
 vernement britannique propose 
 I'intervention de I'Angleterre, de 
 I'Allemagne, de la France et de 
 ritalie k Saint-Petersbourg et a 
 A'^ienne pour trouver un terrain 
 de conciliation. L'AUemagne 
 seule n'a pas encore r^pondu. 
 L'Empereur d^cidera. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 AccOEbiNG to a telegram from 
 the British Charg^ d'Affaires afc 
 Belgrade, the Servian Govern- 
 ment have given way on all the 
 points of the Austrian note. 
 They even allow the intervention 
 of Austrian ofiBcials if such a pro- 
 ceeding is in conformity with 
 the usages of international law. 
 The British Charg^ d'Affaires 
 considers that this reply should 
 satisfy Austria if she is not 
 desirous of war. Nevertheless, a 
 more hopeful atmosphere pre- 
 vails here to-day, more particu- 
 larly because hostilities against 
 Seryia _have not begun. The 
 British Government suggest 
 mediation by Great Britain, 
 Germany, France, and Italy at 
 St. Petersburg and Vienna in 
 order to find some basis for com- 
 promise. Germany alone has 
 not yet replied. The decision, 
 rests with the Emperor. 
 
 Xo. 7. 
 
 Count Brrembault de Dmhcde, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to 
 M. Bavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires 
 Etrangferes me notifie la declara- 
 tion de guerre de I'Autriche- 
 Hongrie Ji la Serbie. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs has notified me of the 
 declaration of war by Austria- 
 Hungary against Servia. 
 
No. 8. 
 
 Monsieur Dwvigiion, Belgian Minister fm-' Foreign- Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vierma,'8t, Petersburg, 
 Borne, The Hagiie, and Luxemburg. 
 
 Brussels, July 29, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Le Gouvernement du Roi a 
 dteid^ de mettre Tarm^e sur le 
 pied de paix renforc^. 
 
 Cette mesure ne doit etre en 
 aucune faQon confondue avec la 
 mobilisation. 
 
 A cause du peu d'^tendue de 
 son territoire, la Belgique tout 
 enti^re constitue en quelque sorte 
 une zone frontiere. Son aruK^e, 
 sur le pied de paix ordinaire, ne 
 comporte qu'une classe de milice 
 sous les armes. Sur le pied de 
 paix renf orc^ ses divisions d'armde 
 et sa division de cavalerie, gr§,ce 
 au rappel de trois classes, ont des 
 effectifs analogues k ceux des 
 corps entretenus en permanence 
 dans les zones frontieres des 
 Puissances voisines. 
 
 Ces renseignements vous per- 
 mettraient de rdpondre aux 
 questions qui pourraient vous 
 etre poshes. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 (Sign^) DAVIGNON. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The Belgian Government have 
 decided to place the army upon 
 a strengthened peace footing. 
 
 This step should in no way be 
 confused with mobilisation. 
 
 Owing to the small extent of her 
 territory, all Belgium consists, in 
 some degree, of a frontier zone. 
 Her army on the ordinary peace 
 footing consists of only one class 
 of armed militia : on the strength- 
 ened peace footing, owing to the 
 recall of three classes, her army 
 divisions and her cavalry division 
 comprise effective units of the 
 same strength as those of the 
 corps permanently maintained in 
 the frontier zones of the neigh- 
 bouring Powers. 
 
 This information will eiiable 
 you to reply to any questions 
 which may be addressed to you. 
 
 No. 9. 
 
 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
 Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. 
 
 Brussels, July 31, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre de 
 France ^tant venu me montrer 
 un t^Mgramme de I'Agence Havas, 
 decr^tant I'^tat de guerre en 
 AUemagne, m'a dit : 
 
 " Je profite de cette occasion 
 pour vous declarer qu^aucune in- 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The French Minister came to 
 show me a telegram from the 
 Agence Havas reporting a state 
 of war in Germany, and said : — 
 
 " I seize this opportunity to 
 declare that no incursion of 
 
cursion des troupes franqnises 
 n'aura lieu en Belfi'ique, meme si 
 des forces importantes c'tri'cnt 
 iiiass^es sur les frontieres do votre 
 pays. LaFrance ne veut pas avoir 
 la responsabilit^ d'accomplir vis-a- 
 A'is de la Belgique, le premier 
 acte d'hoslilit(5. Des instructions 
 dans ce sens seront donnees aux 
 autorit^s fraugaises." 
 
 J'ai remerci^ Monsieur Klobu- 
 kowski de sa commanication et 
 j'ai cru devoir lui faire remarquer 
 que nous avions toujours eu la 
 plus grande confiauoe dans la 
 lojaut^ que nos deuxfitats voisins 
 mettraient k tenir leurs engage- 
 ments k iiotre egard. Nous avons 
 aussi tout lieu de croire que 
 I'attitude du Gouvernement alle- 
 mand sera identique a celle du 
 Crouvernement de la Eepublique 
 frangaise. 
 
 Veuillez agrfer, &c. 
 
 (Signe) DAVIGN"OX. 
 
 French troops into Belgium will 
 take plac^ even if considerable 
 forces are massed upon the fron- 
 tiers of yonr country. France does 
 not wish to incur the responsi- 
 bility, so far as Belgium is con- 
 cerned, of taking the first hostile 
 act. Instructions in this sense 
 will be given to the French autho- 
 rities." 
 
 I thanked Monsieur Xlobu- 
 kowski for his communication, 
 and I felt bound to observe that 
 we had alwaj^s had the greatest 
 confidence in' the loyal observance 
 by both our neighbouring States 
 of their engagements towards us. 
 We have also every reason to 
 believe that the attitude of the 
 German Government will be the 
 the same as that of the Govern- 
 ment of the French Eepublic. 
 
 No. 10. 
 
 Monsieur DaviQiwn, Belgian Minister for foreign Affairs to all Heads 
 of Belgian Missions abroad. 
 
 Brussels, July 31, 1914 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 Le Ministre de la Guerre me 
 fait savoir que la mobilisation est 
 decr^tde et que le samedi 1" 
 aout est le premier jour de la 
 mobilisation. 
 
 (Siguc) BAA'IGXON. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Minister of War informs 
 that mobilisation has been 
 
 me 
 
 ordered, and that Saturday, the 
 1st August,, will be the first 
 day. 
 
 No. 11. 
 
 Monsieur Davif/non, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. 
 
 Brussels, July 31, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 ■ Le ^Ministre d'Angleterre a 
 demand^ k me voir d'urgence et 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The British Minister asked to 
 see me on urgent business, and 
 
m'a fait la communication sui- 
 vante, qu'il souhaitait Stre h 
 meme de in'exposer depuis plu- 
 sieurs jours : En raison de la 
 possibility d'une guerre euro- 
 p^enne, Sir Edward Grey a 
 demand^ aux Gouvernements 
 ifranQais et allemand, s^parement, 
 si chacun d'eux dtait pret k res- 
 pecter la neutrality de la Belgique 
 pourvu qu'aucune Puissance ne la 
 viole : 
 
 " Vu les trait^s qui existent, je 
 suis charg^ d'infornier le Ministre 
 des Affaires liltTang^res de Bel- 
 gique de ce qui pr^cfede et de dire 
 que Sir Edward Grey presume 
 que la Belgique fera tout son 
 possible pour maintenir sa neu- 
 trality et qu'elle desire et s'attend 
 a ce que les autres Puissances 
 I'observent et la maintiennent." 
 
 Je me suis empress^ de remer-' 
 cier Sir Francis Villiers de cette 
 communication que le Gouverne- 
 ment beige appr^cie particuli^re- 
 ment et j'ai ajoute que la Grande- 
 Bretagne et les autres nations 
 garantes de notre inddpendance 
 pouvaient etre assur^es que nous 
 ne n^gligerions aucun effort pour 
 maintenir notre neutrality, et 
 que nous ^tions convaincus que 
 les autres Puissances, vu les ex- 
 <jellents rapports d'amitie et de 
 confiance, que nous avions tou- 
 jours entretenus avec elles, obser- 
 veraient et maintiendraient cette 
 neutrality. 
 
 Je n'ai pas manqu^ d'affirmer 
 que nos forces militaires, consi- 
 d^rablement developpdes k la 
 suite de notre reorganisation rd- 
 cente, ^talent k mgme de nous 
 permettre de nous d^fendre 6nev- 
 giquement en cas de violation de 
 notre territoire. 
 
 Au cours de la conversation 
 qui a suivi, Sir Francis m'a paru 
 un peu surpris de la rapidity avec 
 laquelle nous avions ddcidd la 
 mobilisation de notre armde. J'ai 
 
 made the following communica- 
 tion, which he liad hoped for some 
 days to be able to present to me : 
 Owing to the possibility of a 
 European war, Sir Edward Grey 
 has asked the French and German 
 Governments separately if they 
 were each of them ready to 
 respect Belgian neutrality pro- 
 vided that no other Power vio- 
 lated it :— 
 
 " In view of existing treaties, I 
 am instructed to inform the Bel- 
 gian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 of the above, and to say that 
 Sir Edward Grey presumes that 
 Belgium will do her utmost to 
 maintain her neutrality, and that 
 she desires and expects that the 
 other Powers will respect and 
 maintain it." 
 
 I hastened to thank Sir Francis 
 Villiers for this communication, 
 which the Belgian Government 
 particularly appreciate, and I 
 added that Great Britain and the 
 other nations guaranteeing our 
 independence could rest assured 
 that we would neglect no effort 
 to maintain our neutrality, and 
 that we were convinced that the 
 other Powers, in view of the ex- 
 cellent relations of friendship and 
 confidence which had always 
 existed between us, would respect 
 and maintain that neutrality. 
 
 I did not fail to slate that our 
 military forces, which had been 
 considerably developed in conse- 
 quence of our recent re-organisa- 
 tion, were sufficient to enable us 
 to defend ourselves energetically 
 in the event of the violation of 
 our territoiy. 
 
 In the course of the ensuing 
 conversation. Sir Francis seemed 
 to me somewhat surprised at the 
 speed with which we had decided 
 to mobilise our army. I pointed 
 
10 
 
 fait remarquer que les Pays-Bas 
 avaient pris une resolution iden- 
 tique avant nous 'et (^ne d'autre 
 part la - date" r^cente de notre 
 nouveau regime militaire et les 
 mesures transitoires que nous 
 avions-du decider k cette occasion, 
 nous imposaient des mesures 
 urgentes et complMes. Nos 
 voisins et garants devaient voir 
 dans cette resolution le d^sir de 
 manif ester notre profonde volont^ 
 de maintenir nous-m&mes notre 
 neutrality. 
 
 Sir Francis m'a paru satisfait 
 de ma reponse et m'a aunonc^ que 
 son Gouvernement attendait cette 
 reponse pour continuer les nego- 
 ciations avec la France et I'Alle- 
 magne, negociations dont la 
 conclusion me serait commu- 
 niqu^e. 
 
 Veuillez agreer, &c. 
 
 (Signe) DAVIGNON. 
 
 out to him that the Netherlands 
 had come to a similar decision 
 before we had done so; and that, ' 
 moreover; the recent dat e of ■ our 
 new military system, and the tem- 
 porary nature of the measures 
 upon which we then had to 
 decide, made it necessary for us 
 to take immediate and thorough 
 precautions. Our neighbours and 
 guarantors should see in this 
 decision our strong desire to 
 uphold our neutrality ourselves. 
 
 Sir Francis seemed to be satis- 
 fied with my reply, and stated 
 that his Government were await- 
 ing this reply before continuing 
 negotiations with F'rance and 
 Germany, the result of wliich 
 would be communicated to me. 
 
 . No. 12. 
 
 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
 Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. 
 
 Brussels, July 31, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Ce matin, au cours d'une con- 
 versation que le Secretaire General 
 de mon Departement a eue avec 
 Monsieur de Below, il a expliqu^ 
 au Ministre d'Allemagne la portee 
 des mesures militaires que nous 
 avons prises et lui a dit qu'elles 
 etaient une consequence de notre 
 volonte d'accomplir nos obliga- 
 tions Internationales, qu'elles 
 n'impliquaient en aucune faqon 
 une attitude de defiance envers 
 nos voisins. 
 
 Le Secretaire General a de- 
 mande ensuite au Ministre d'Alle- 
 magne s'il avait connaissance de 
 la conversation qu'il avait eue 
 ave& son predecesseur. Monsieur 
 de Flotow, et de la reponse que 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 In the course of the conversa- 
 tion which the Secretary-General 
 of my Department had with 
 Herr von Below this morning, 
 he explained to the German 
 Minister the scope of the military 
 measures which we had taken, 
 and said to him that they were 
 a consequence of our desire to 
 fulfil our international obliga- 
 tions, and that they in no wise 
 implied an attitude of distrust 
 towards our neighbours. 
 
 The Secretary-General then 
 asked the German Minister if he 
 knew of. the conversation which 
 he had had with his predecessor, 
 Herr von Flotow, and of the 
 reply M'hich the Imperial Chan- 
 
11 
 
 le Chancelier de I'Empire avait 
 charg^ celui-ci de lui faire. 
 
 AwGGnrsdeda poldmique sou-, 
 lev^e en 1911 par le d^pSt An 
 projet hoUandais concernant les 
 fortifications de Flessingue, cer- 
 tains journaux avaient affirm^ 
 qu'en cas de guerre franco-alie- 
 mande , notre neutrality serait 
 violee par TAllemagne. 
 
 Le D^partement des Affaires 
 ^trangeres avait sugg^re I'id^e 
 qu'une declaration faite aaParle- 
 ment allemand k I'occasion d,'un 
 d^bat sur , la politique ^trang^re 
 serait de nature k apaiser Topinion 
 publique eta.calmer ses defiances, 
 si regrettables au point de , vue 
 des relations des deux pays. 
 
 Monsieur de Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg fit r^pondre qu'ii avait 6t& 
 tr^s sensible aux sentiments qui 
 avaient inspire notre d-marche. 
 II ddclarait que TAllemagne 
 n'avait pas I'intention de violer 
 notre neutrality, mais il estimait 
 qu'en faisant publiquement une 
 declaration rAUemagne affai- 
 blirait sa situation militaire vis-, 
 ^-vis de Ja France, qui, rassurde 
 du cotd du nord, porterait toutes 
 ses forces du cote de Test. 
 
 Le Baron van der Elst, pour- 
 suivant, dit qu'il comprenait par- 
 faitement les objections qu'a- 
 vaient faites Monsieur de Beth- 
 mann-HoUweg k la declaration 
 publique sugg^ree, et il rappela 
 que depuis lors, en 1913, Monsieur 
 de Jagov? avait fait k la Commis- 
 sion du-Budget du Reichstag des 
 declarations rassurantes quant 
 au respect de la neutrality de la 
 Belgique. 
 
 Monsieur de Below r^pondit 
 qu'il etait au courant de la conver- 
 sation avee Monsieur de Flotow, 
 et qu'il etait certain que les senti- 
 ments exprim^s k cette dpoque 
 n'avaient pas changd. 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 (Signe) DAVIGNON. 
 
 cellor - had instructed the latter 
 to give. 
 
 - In- tbe ..-oeurse^ of ;the-- contro- 
 versy - which arose in 1911 as 'a 
 consequence of the Dutch scheme 
 for the fortification of Flushing, 
 certain newspapers had main- 
 tained that in the case of a Franco- 
 German war Belgian neutrality 
 would be violated by Germany.- ■ 
 
 The Departijient of Foreign 
 Affairs had suggested .that, a 
 declaration in the German Par-i 
 liament during a , debate, on 
 foreign affairs would serve to 
 calm public opinion, and to dispel 
 the mistrust which was i so 
 regrettable from the point, of 
 view of the relations between the 
 two countries. ■ . ; . . 
 
 Herr. von BethmanrtrHollweg 
 replied that he hadfully appre-' 
 ciated the feelings which :had 
 inspired our representations. He 
 declared that Germany . had no 
 intention of violating Belgian 
 neutrality, but he considered that 
 in making a public declaration 
 Germany would weaken her 
 military position in regard to 
 France, who, secured on the 
 northern side, would concentrate 
 all her energies on the east. 
 
 Baron van der Elst, continuing, 
 said that he perfectly understood 
 the objections raised by Herr von 
 Bethmann-Hollwegtotheproposed 
 public declaration, and he recalled 
 the fact that since then, in 1913, 
 Herr von Jagow had made, re- 
 nssuring declarations to the 
 Budget Commission of the Eeichs- 
 tag respecting the maintenance 
 of Belgian neutrality. 
 
 Herr von" Below replied that he 
 knew of the conversation with 
 Herr von Flotow, and that he 
 was certain that the sentiments 
 expressed at that time had not 
 changed. 
 
12 
 
 Enclosure in No. 12. 
 
 Tlie Belgian Minister at Berlin to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, May 2, 1913. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai I'honueur de vous faire 
 connaitre, d'apres rofificieuse 
 "" Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeit- 
 ung," les declarations faites, au 
 corns de la seance du 29 avril de 
 la Commission du Budget du 
 Ueichstag, par le Secretaire d'l^tat 
 aux Affaires Iiltrangferes et le 
 Ministre de la Guerre relative- 
 ment a la neutrality de la Bel- 
 gique : 
 
 " Un n\embre du parti social- 
 d^mocrate dit : ' En Belgique on 
 voit avec apprehension s'ap- 
 procher une guerre fraiico-alle- 
 mande, car on craint que I'Alle- 
 magne ne respectera pas la neu- 
 trality de la Belgique.' 
 
 " Monsieur de Jagow, Secre- 
 taire d'£tat aux Affaires !fitran- 
 gferes, repondit : ' La neutralite 
 de la Belgique est determinte 
 par des conventions internatio- 
 nales, et I'Allemagne est decid^e h 
 respecter ces conventions.' 
 
 " Cette declaration ne satisfit 
 pas un autre membre du parti 
 social-democrate. Monsieur de 
 Jagow observa qu'il n'avait rien 
 k ajouter aux paroles claires qu'il 
 avait prononcees relativement aux 
 relations 
 Belgique. 
 
 " A de nouvelles interrogations 
 d'un membre du parti social- 
 democrate, Monsieur de Heerin- 
 gen, Ministre de la Guerre, re- 
 pondit : ' La Belgique ne joue 
 aucun role dans la justification 
 du projet de reorganisation mili- 
 taire allemand ; celui-ci se trouve 
 justifie par la situation en Orient. 
 L'AUemagne ne perdra pas de 
 vue que la neutralite beige est 
 
 de I'Allemagne avec la 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HATE the honour to bring to 
 your notice the declarations 
 respecting Belgian neutrality, as 
 published iu the semi-official 
 "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeit- 
 ung," made by the Secretary of 
 State and the Minister of War, 
 at the meeting of the Budget 
 Committee of the Eeichstag on 
 April 29th :— 
 
 " A member of the Social 
 Democrat Party said : ' The 
 approach of a war between Ger- 
 many and France is viewed with 
 apprehension in Belgium, for it is 
 feared that Germany wiU not 
 respect the neutrality of Belgium.' 
 
 " Herr von Jagow, Secretary of 
 State, replied : ' Belgian neu- 
 trality is provided for by Inter- 
 national Conventions and Ger- 
 many is determined to respect 
 those Conventions.' 
 
 " This declaration did not 
 satisfy another member of the 
 Social Democrat Party. Herr 
 von Jagow said that he had 
 nothing to add to the clear state- 
 ment he had made respecting 
 the relations between Germany 
 and Belgium. 
 
 " In answer to fresh enquiries 
 by a member of the Social Demo- 
 crat Party, Herr von Heeringen, 
 the Minister of War, replied : 
 ' Belgium plays no part in the 
 causes which justify the proposed 
 reorganisation of the German 
 military system. That proposal 
 is based on the situation in the 
 East. Germany will not lose sight 
 of the fact that the neuti-ality of 
 
13 
 
 garantie par les trait^s inter- 
 nationaux.' 
 
 "Un membre du parti pro- 
 gressiste ayant encore parl6 de 
 la Belgique, Monsieur de Jagow 
 fit remarquer k nouveau que sa 
 declaration concernant la Bel- 
 gique ^tait suEBsamment claire." 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 (Signe) Baron BEYENS. 
 
 Belgium is guaranteed by inter- 
 national treaty.' 
 
 " A member of the Progressive 
 Party having once again spoken 
 of Belgium, Herr von Jagow 
 repeated that this declaration in 
 regard to Belgium was suificiently 
 clear." 
 
 No. 13. 
 
 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, August 1, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Great- Britain has asked 
 France and Germany separately if 
 they intend to respect Belgian terri- 
 tory in the event of its not being 
 violated by their adversary. 
 Germany's reply is awaited- 
 France has replied in the affirma- 
 tive. 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) 
 
 L'Angleteere a demande se- 
 par^ment k la France et k I'Alle- 
 magne si elles respecteraient le 
 territoire de la Belgique dans le 
 cas ou leur adversaire ne la 
 violerait pas. On attend la rd- 
 ponse allemande. La France a 
 accept^. 
 
 No. 14. 
 
 Baron Bey ens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon^ 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, Aug 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre 
 a ^t^ charg6 de demander au 
 Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res 
 si, en cas de guerre, I'AUemagne 
 respecterait la neutrality de la 
 Belgique, et le Ministre aurait 
 dit qu'il ne peut pas r^pondre k 
 cette question. 
 
 ust 1, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The British Ambassador, has 
 been instructed to inquire of the 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs- 
 whether, in the event of war,. 
 Germany would respect Belgian 
 neutrality, and I understand that 
 the Minister replied that he was. 
 unable to answer the question. 
 
14 
 
 No. 15. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belyian Minister for Foreign Affairs,' to the 
 Belgian Ministers at Berlin,. Boris, and London. 
 
 > Brussels, August 1, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Miuisfcre, 
 
 J'ai rhonneur de vous faire 
 savoir que le Ministre de France 
 m'a fait verbalement la communi- 
 cation suivante : 
 
 "Je suis autoris^ h. d&larer 
 qu'en cas de conflit international, 
 le Grouvernement de la Edpu- 
 blique, ainsi qu'il I'a to uj ours 
 d^clar^ respectera la neutrality 
 de la Belgique. Dans I'hypothfese 
 ou cette neutralite ne serait pas 
 respect^e par une autre Puissance, 
 le Gouvemement franqais, pour 
 assurer sa propre defense, pour- 
 rait Stre amen6 h, modifier son 
 attitude." 
 
 J'ai remerci^ son Excellence, et 
 ai ajoute que de notre c6te nous 
 avions pris sans aucun retard 
 toutes les mesures voulues pour 
 faire respecter notie inddpen- 
 dance et nos fronti^res. 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 (Sign^) DAVI&NOX. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 I HAVE the lionour to inform 
 you that the French Minister 
 has made the following verbal 
 communication to me : — 
 
 " I am authorised to declare 
 that, in the event of an inter- 
 national war, the French Govern- 
 ment, in accordance with the de- 
 clarations they have always made, 
 "will respect the neutrality of 
 Belgium. In the event of this 
 neutrality not being respected by 
 another Power, the French 
 Government, to secure their own 
 defence, might find it necessary to 
 modify their attitude." 
 
 I thanked his Excellency and 
 added that we on our side had 
 taken without delay all the 
 measures necessary to ensure 
 that our independence and our 
 frontiers should be respected. 
 
 No. 16. 
 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at Paris, 
 Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersbxirg. 
 
 Brussels, August 1, 1914. 
 
 (Tra,nslation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 -Carry out instructions- .con- 
 -tained in my .despatch of the 24th 
 July. 
 
 (T^l^gr^mme.) 
 
 -Ek^cUTez instructions donn les 
 ■par lettre du 24 juillet. 
 
 (Signl) DAVIGNON. 
 
 (See No. 2.) 
 
15 
 
 No. 17. 
 
 Belgian Minister fol' Foreign Affairs to 'Belgian 'Ministers at Borne, 
 The Hague, Lvxemhurg. 
 
 Brussels, August 1, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (T^Mgramme.) (Telegram.) ■ 
 
 Ex]ficuTEZ instructions donnees Carry out instructions con- 
 par lettre du 25 juillet. tained in my despatch of the 25th 
 
 July. 
 (Sign^) DAVIGNOK 
 
 (See No. 3.) 
 
 No. 18. 
 
 Monsieitr Eyschen, President of the Luxeniburg Government to 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. 
 
 (Tfl^gramme.^ 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de porter k la 
 connaissance de votre Excellence 
 les faits suivants : Dimanche 2 
 aout, de grand matin, les troupes 
 allemandes, d'apres les informa- 
 tions qui sont parvenues au 
 Gouvernement grand-ducal a 
 I'heure actuelle, ont p^n^tre sur 
 le territoire luxembourgeois par 
 les ponts de Wasserbillig et de 
 Eemich, se dirigeant sp^cialement 
 vers le sud du pays et vers la 
 ville de Luxembourg, capitale du 
 Grand-Diich^. Un certain nombre 
 de trains blind^s avec des troupes 
 et des munitions orit ^t^ ache- 
 minds par la voie de chemin de 
 fer de Wasserbillig ^Luxembourg, 
 oil Ton s'attend a les voir arriver 
 d'un instant" k Tautre. Ces' faits 
 impliquent des aetes inaiiifeste- 
 ment contraires k la neutralite 
 du Grand-Duch4 garantie par le 
 Traite de Londres de 1867. Le 
 Gouvernement -4-uxembourgeois 
 n'a pas manqu^ de protester 
 <5nergiquement centre cette 
 agression auprfes du Eeprdsentant 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I HAVE the honour to acquaint 
 your Excellency with the follow- 
 ing facts : According to informa- 
 tion which has just reached the 
 Grand Ducal Government, early 
 on the morning of Sunday, 
 August 2, German troops 
 entered Luxemburg territory by 
 the "Wasserbillig and Eemich 
 bridges, proceeding more par- 
 ticularly towards the south and 
 towards the town of Luxemburg, 
 capital of the Grand Duchy. A 
 , certain number of armoured 
 trains with troops and ammu- 
 nition have passed" aloiig the 
 railway from Wasserbillig to 
 Luxemburg, where they are ex- 
 pected at any moment. These 
 incidents constitute acts plainly 
 contrary to the neutrality of the 
 Grand Duchy, guaranteed by the 
 Treaty of London of 1867. The 
 Luxembiirg Government have 
 not-failed -to protest vigorously 
 to the German Eepresentative at 
 Luxemburg against this act of 
 aggression. An identic protest 
 
16 
 
 de Sa Majesty TEmpereur d'AUe- 
 inagne h Luxembourg. Une pro- 
 testation identique va etre 
 tiansmise t^l^graphiquement au 
 Secretaire d'llltat pour les Affaires 
 liltrangferes a Berlin. 
 
 Le Ministre d']5tat. 
 President du Grouvernement : 
 
 (Sign6) EYSOHEX. 
 
 will be telegraphed to the Germnn 
 Secretary of State at Berlin. 
 
 Xo. 19. 
 
 ^foiisuiir Bavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian 
 Ministers at Paris, Berlin, Loiuion, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. 
 
 Brussels, August 2, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I WAS careful to warn the 
 German Minister through Mon- 
 sieur de Bassompierre that an 
 announcement in the Brussels 
 press by Monsieur Klobukowski^ 
 French Minister, would make 
 pubHc the formal declaration 
 which the latter had made to 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'avais eu soin de faire avertir 
 par Monsieur de Bassompierre le 
 Ministre d'Allemagne qu'un com- 
 munique de Monsieur Klobukow- 
 ski, Ministre de France, a la 
 presse bruxelloise, annoncerait 
 la declaration formelle que ce 
 dernier m'avait faite le 1" aout. 
 Kencontrant Monsieur de Below, 
 ce dernier m'a remercie de cette 
 attention et a ajoute que jusqu'i 
 present il n'avait pas ^te charge 
 de nous faire une communication 
 officielle, mais que nous connais- 
 sions son opinion personnelle sur 
 la security avec laquelle nous 
 avions le droit de considerer nos 
 voisins de Test. J'ai imm^diate- 
 ment r^pondu que tout ce que 
 nous connaissions des intentions 
 de ceux-ci, intentions indiquees 
 dans les multiples entretiens 
 anterieurs, ne nous permettait 
 pas de douter de leur parfaite 
 correction vis-&.-vis de la Bel- 
 gique; je tenais cependant h. 
 ajouter que nous attacherions le 
 plus grand prix a etre en posses- 
 sion d'une declaration formelle 
 dont la nation prendrait con- 
 naissance avec joie et reconnais- 
 sance. 
 
 Veuillez agreer, &c. 
 
 (Signe) DAVIGXOX. 
 
 me on the 1st August. When 
 I next met Herr von Below he 
 thanked me for this attention,, 
 and added that up to the present 
 he had not been instructed to 
 make us an ofi&cial communica- 
 tion, but thatwe knew his personal 
 opinion as to the feelings of 
 security, which we had the right 
 to entertain towards our eastern 
 neighbours. I at once replied 
 that all that we knew of their 
 intentions, as indicated in 
 numerous previous conversations, 
 did not allow us to doubt 
 their perfect correctness toward* 
 Belgium. I added, however, that 
 we should attach the greatest 
 importance to the possession of a 
 formal declaration, which the 
 Belgian nation would hear o£ 
 witli joy and gratitude. 
 
17 
 
 No. 20. 
 
 Nute presented hy Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, 
 to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign, Affairs. 
 
 Kaiserlich Deutf=cle Gesandtschaft in Belgien. — 
 Briisse], den 2. August 1914. 
 
 (Tres Confidentiel.) 
 
 . Deh Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlassige Nachrichten vor 
 fiber den beabsichtigten Aufmarscli franzosischer Streitkrafte an der 
 Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sis lassen keinen Zweifel iibar die 
 Absicht Frankreichs, durch belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland 
 vorzugehen. 
 
 Die Kaiserliche Eegierung kann sich der Besorgniss nicht 
 erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, niclit im Stande sein 
 wird, ohne Hiilfe einen franzosisclien Vormarsch mit so grosser 
 Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuwehren, dass darin eine ausreichende Sicher- 
 heit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands gefunden werden kann. Es 
 ist e'in Gnbot der Selbsterhaltung fiir iJeutschland, dem feindlichen 
 Angriff zuvorzukommen. Mit dem grossten Bedauern wiirde es 
 daher die deutsclie Eegierung eriullen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der 
 Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken wiirde, dass die Massnahmen 
 seiner Gegiier Deutscliland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch seinerseits 
 belgisches Gebiet zu betreten. 
 
 Um jede Missdeutung auszusohliessen, erklart die Kaiserliche 
 Regierung das Folgende : 
 
 1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeiten gegen 
 Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstelienden Kriege, 
 Deutschland gegeniiber eine wohlwollende Neutralitat einzunehmen, 
 60 verpflichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, beim Friedensschluss 
 Besitzstand und Unabhangigkeit des Konigreichs in voUeni. Umfang 
 zu garantieren. 
 
 2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Voraussetzung, das 
 Gebiet des Konigreichs wieder zu raumen, sobald der Friede ge- 
 ecblossen ist. 
 
 3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher Haltung Belgiens ist Deutschland 
 bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Koniglich Belgischen Behordenalle 
 Bediirfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen und jeden 
 Schaden zu ersetzen, der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht 
 werden konnte. 
 
 4. SoUte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feitidlich entgegen 
 treten, iusbesondere ihrem vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas- 
 Befestigungen oder durch Zerstorungen von Eisenbalmen, Strassen, 
 Tunnein oder sonstigen Kunstbauteu Schwierigkeiten bereiten, so wild 
 Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Konigreich als 
 Feind zu betraehten. In diesem Falle wiirde Deutschland dem 
 Konigreich gegeniiber keine Verpflichtiingen iibernehmen konnen, 
 sondern miisste die spatere Eegelung des Verhaltnisses beider Staaten 
 zu einander der Eiitscheidung der Waffen iiberlassen. 
 
 Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten Hoffnung hin, 
 dass diese Eventualitnt niuht eintretcn, und dass die Konigliche 
 Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Massnahmen zu tieffen wissen 
 [1037] C 
 
18 
 
 wird, Tim zu verhinderen, dass \^orkommui>se, wie die vorstehend 
 erwahnten, sich ereigrieu. In diesem Falle wiirden die freund- 
 sohaftliclien Bande, die beide Nachbarstaiten verbinden, eine weitere 
 und dauemde Festigung erfahren. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Imperial German Legation in Belgium. — Brussels, August 2, 1914. 
 
 (Very Confidential.) 
 
 Eeliable information has been 
 received by the German Govern- 
 ment to the effect that French 
 forces intend to march on the 
 line of the Meuse by Givet and 
 Namur. This information leaves 
 no doubt as to the intention of 
 France to marcli through Belgian ■ 
 territory against Germany. 
 
 The German Government can- 
 not but fear that Belgium, in 
 spite of the utmost goodwill, will 
 be unable, without assistance, to 
 repel so considerable a French 
 invasion with sufficient prospect 
 of success to afford an adequate 
 guarantee against danger to 
 Germany. It is essential for 
 the self-defence of Germany that 
 she should anticipate any 
 such hostile attack. The German 
 Government would, however, feel 
 the deepest regret if Belgium 
 regarded as an act of hostility 
 against herself the fact that the 
 measures of Germany's opponents 
 force Germany, for her own pro- 
 tection, to enter Belgian terri- 
 tory. 
 
 In order to exclude any possi- 
 bility of misunderstanding, the 
 German Government make the 
 following declaration : — 
 
 1. Germany has in view no 
 act of hostility against Belgium. 
 In the event of Belgium being 
 prepared in the coming war to 
 maintain an attitude of friendly 
 neutvalit}' towards Germany, the 
 German Government bind them- 
 selves, at the conclusion of peace, 
 to guarantee the possessions and 
 
 (Tr^s Confidentielle.) 
 
 Le Gouvernement allemand a 
 re9u des nouvelles sures d'apres 
 lesquelles les forces franQaises 
 auraient I'intention de marcher 
 sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur. 
 Ces nouvelles ne laissent aucun 
 doute sur I'intention de la France 
 de marcher sur I'Allemagne par 
 le territoire beige. 
 
 Le Gouvernement Imperial 
 allemand ne pent s'empecher 
 de craindre que la Belgique, 
 malgr^ sa meilleure volenti, 
 ne sera pas en mesure de 
 repousser sans secours une marche 
 fran^aise d'un si grand d^veloppe- 
 ment. Dans ce fait on trouve 
 une certitude suffisante d'une 
 menacedirig^e centre I'Allemagne. 
 C'est un devoir imperieux de 
 conservation pour TAUemagne de 
 prevenir cette attaque del'ennemi. 
 Le Gouvernement allemand re- 
 gretterait tres vivement que la 
 Belgique regardat comme un acte 
 d'hostiiit^ contre elle le fait que 
 les mesures des ennemis de 
 I'Allemagne I'obligent de violer 
 de son c6t4 le territoire beige. 
 
 Afindedissipertout malentendu 
 le Gouvernement allemand de- 
 clare ce qui suit : 
 
 1. L'AUemagne n'a en vue 
 aucun acte d'hostilit(5 contre la 
 Belgique. Si la Belgique consent 
 dans la guerre qui va commencer 
 h prendre ime attitude de neu- 
 trality amicale vis-k-vis de 
 I'Allemagne, le Gouvernement 
 allemand de son cote s'engage, au 
 moment de la paix, k garantir le 
 
19 
 
 Eoyaume et ses possessions dans 
 toute leur ^tendue. 
 . 2. L'AUemagne s'engage sous 
 la condition ^nonc^e k Ivacuer le 
 territoire beige aussitSt la paix 
 conclue. 
 
 3. Si la Belgique observe une 
 attitude amieale,- I'Allernagne est 
 prSte, d'accord avec les autorit^s 
 du Gouvernement beige, k acheter 
 centre argent comptant tout ce 
 qui est n^cessaire k ses troupes et 
 ^ indemniser pour les donimages 
 causes en Belgique. 
 
 4. Si la Belgique se comporte 
 d'une fa9on hostile centre les 
 troupes allemandes et particuliere- 
 ment fait des difficult^s k leur 
 marche en avantparuneopposition 
 des fortifications de la Meuse ou 
 par des destructions de routes, 
 chemins de fer, tunnels ou autres 
 ouvrages d'art, rAllemagne sera 
 obligee de consid^rer la Belgique 
 en enneinie. 
 
 Dans ce cas rAUemagne ne 
 prendra aucun engagement vis-&,- 
 vis du Royaume, mais elle laissera 
 le reglement ult^rieur des rapports 
 des deux ,!fitats I'un vis-a-vis de 
 I'autre k la d&ision des armes. 
 .Le Gouvernement allemand a 
 I'espoir justifid que cette Eventu- 
 ality ne se produira pas et que le 
 Gouvernement belgesauraprendre 
 les "mesures appropri^es pour 
 I'empgcher de se produire. Dans 
 ce cas les relations d'amitiE qui 
 unissent les deux ^fitats voisins 
 deviendront plus Etroites et du- 
 rables. 
 
 independence of the Belgian 
 Kingdom in full. • 
 
 2. Germany undertakes, under 
 the above-mentioned condition, 
 to evacuate Belgian territory on 
 the conclusion of peace. 
 
 , 3. It Belgium adopts a friendly 
 attitude, Germany is prepared',' 
 in co-operation with the Belgian 
 authorities, to purchase all neces- 
 saries for her troops against a 
 cash payment, and to pay an 
 indemnity for any damage that 
 may have been caused by German 
 troops. 
 
 • 4. Should Belgium oppose the 
 German troops, and in particular 
 should she throw difficulties in 
 the way of their march by a 
 resistance of tlie fortresses on the 
 Meuse, or by destroying railways, 
 roadsi tunnels, or other similar 
 works, Germany will, to her. 
 regret,' be compelled to consider,- 
 Belgium as an enemy. 
 
 V In this event, Germany can-- 
 undertake no obligations towards - 
 Belgium, but the eventual adjust- 
 ment of the i-elations between 
 the two States must be left to - 
 the decision of arms. 
 
 The German Government, how- - 
 ever, entertain the distinct hope- 
 that this eventuality will not- 
 occur, and that the Belgian 
 Government will know how to 
 take the necessary measures to 
 prevent the occurrence of inci- 
 dents such as those mentioned. 
 In this case the friendly ties 
 w'hich bind the two neighbouring 
 States will grow stronger aud- 
 more enduring. 
 
 [1037] 
 
 C 2 
 
20 
 
 No. 21. 
 
 Memorandum of an Interview ashed for at 1-30 A.ir.. on Avgust 3, hy 
 Herr von Belovj Saleske, German Ifinister, tvith Baron van der 
 List, Searctai-y-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 A 1 heure et demie de la nuit, 
 le Jlinistre d'Allemagne a dfi- 
 mande k voir le Baron van der 
 Elst. II lui a dit qu'il etait charg^ 
 par son- Gouvernement de nous 
 informer que des dirigeables 
 fran9ais avaient jet6 des bombes 
 efe qu'une patrouille de cavalerie 
 f ran9aise, violant le droit des gens, 
 attendu que la guerre nMtait pas 
 d^claree, avait travers^ la fron- 
 tiere. 
 
 Le Secretaire G ^ueral a deniande 
 k Monsieur de Below ou ces faits 
 s'^taient passes; en Allemagne, 
 lui fut-il r^pondu. Le Baron van 
 der Elst fit remarquer que dans 
 ce cas il ne pouvait s'expliquer 
 le but de sa communication. 
 Monsieur de Below dit que ces 
 actes, contraires au droit des gens, 
 etaient de nature k faire supposer 
 d'autres actes coutre le droit des 
 gens que poserait la France. 
 
 At 1-30 A.M. the German 
 Minister asked to see Baron van 
 der Elst. He told him that he 
 had been instructed by his 
 Government to inform the Bel- 
 gian Government that French 
 dirigibles had thrown bombs, and 
 that a French cavalry patrol had 
 crossed the frontier in violation 
 of international law, seeing that 
 war had not been declared. 
 
 The Secretary-General asked 
 Herr von Below where these 
 incidents had happened, and was 
 told that it was in Germany. 
 Baron van der Elst then observed 
 that in that case he could not 
 understand tlie object of this 
 communication. Herr von Below 
 stated that these acts, which were 
 contrary to international law, 
 were calculated to lead to the 
 supposition that other acts, con- 
 trary to international law, would 
 be committed by France. 
 
 Xo. 22. 
 
 J^ote communicated hy Monsieur Bavignon, Belgian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Belovj Saleske, German Minister. 
 
 Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 A.M.). 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The German Government stated 
 in their note of the 2nd August, 
 1914, that according to reliable 
 information French forces in- 
 tended to march on the Meuse 
 via Givet and Namur, and that 
 Belgium, in spite of the best 
 intentions, would not be in a 
 positition to repulse, without 
 assistance, an advance of French 
 troops. 
 
 Par sa note du 2 aout 1914, le 
 •Gouvernement allemand a fait 
 conn aitre que d'apr^s des nouvelles 
 sures les forces fran(5aises auraient 
 I'intention de marcher sur la 
 Meuse par Givet et Namur, et que 
 la. Belgique, malgr^ sa meiUeure 
 ^olont^ ne serait pas en etat de 
 repousser sans secours une marche 
 en avant des troupes fran9aises. 
 
21 
 
 Le Gouvernement allemand 
 s'estimerait dans I'obligaUoii de 
 pri^veiiir cette attaque et de violer 
 le territoire beige. Dans ces 
 conditions, I'Alleniagne propose 
 au Gouvernement du Koi de 
 prendre vis-a-vis d'elle une atti- 
 tude amicale et s'engage au 
 moment de la paix k garantir 
 I'int^gritd du Eoyaume et de ses 
 possessions dans toute leur etendue. 
 La note ajoute que si la Belgique 
 fait des difScult^s k la marohe en 
 avant des troupes allemandes, 
 rAUemawne sera obligee de la 
 consid^rer comme ennemie et do 
 laisser le rfeglement ult^rieur des 
 deux !fitats I'un vis-a-vis de 
 Tautre k la decision des armes. 
 
 Cette note a provoqud chez le 
 Gouverueinent du Eoi un profond 
 et douloureux ^tonnement. 
 
 Les intentions qu'elle attribue 
 h la France sent en contradiction 
 avec les declarations fornielles 
 qui nous ont iti faites le 1"' 
 aout, au nom du Gouvernement 
 de la E6publique. 
 
 D'ailleurs, si contrairement k 
 notre attente une violation de la 
 neutrality beige venait a etre 
 conunise par la France la Bel- 
 gique remplirait tous ses devoirs 
 internationaux et son armfe 
 opposcrait k I'envahisseur la plus 
 vigoureuse resistance. 
 
 Les traitds de 1839 confirm^s 
 par les trait^s de 1870 consacrent 
 rinddpendance et la neutralitd de 
 la Belgique sous la garaiitie des 
 Puissances et notamment du 
 Gouvernement de Sa Majesty le 
 Eoi de Prusse. 
 
 La Belgiqiie a toujours 6ti 
 fiddle k ses obligations Inter- 
 nationales; elle a accompli ses 
 devoirs dans un esprit de loyale 
 impartiality; elle n'a n^glig^ 
 aucan effort pour maintenir ou 
 faire respecter sa neutrality. 
 
 L'atteinte k son indopen dance 
 dont la menace le Gouvernement 
 
 The German Government, there- 
 fore, considered themselves com- 
 pelled to anticipate this attack 
 and to violate Belgian territory. 
 In these circumstances, Germany 
 proposed to the Belgian Govern- 
 ment to adopt a friendly attitude 
 towards her, and undertook, on 
 the conclusion of peace, to 
 guarantee the integrity of the 
 Kingdom and its possessions to 
 their full extent. The note added 
 that if Belgium put difficulties 
 in the way of the advance of 
 German troops. Germ any -would 
 be compelled to consider her as- 
 an enemy, and to leave the-, 
 ultimate adjustuient of the rela- 
 tions between the two States to- 
 the decision of arms. 
 
 This note has made a deep- 
 and painful impression upon the- 
 Belgian Government. 
 
 The intentions attributed tc 
 France by Germany are in con- 
 tradiction to the formal declara- 
 tions made to us on August 1, 
 in the name of the French 
 Government. 
 
 Moreover, if, contrary to our 
 expectation, Belgian neutrality^ 
 should be violated by France 
 Belgium intends to fulKl her 
 international obligations and tha 
 Belgian army would offer the- 
 most vigorous resistance to the. 
 invader. 
 
 The treaties of 1839, confirmed 
 by the treaties of 1870 vouch for 
 the independence and neutrality 
 of Belgium under the guarantee 
 of the Powers, and notably of the 
 Government of His Majesty the 
 King of Prussia. 
 
 Belgium has always been faith- 
 ful toher international obligations, 
 she has carried out her duties in 
 a spirit of loyal impartiality, and 
 she has left nothing undone to 
 maintain and enforce respect for 
 her neutrality. 
 
 The attack upon her indepen- 
 dence with which the German 
 
22 
 
 allemand constituerait une fla- 
 grante violation du droit des gens. 
 Aueun int^r^t strat^gique ne 
 justifie la violation du droit. 
 
 Le Gouvernement beige en 
 acceptant les propositions qui lui 
 .■sent notifi^es sacrifierait I'honneur 
 de la nation en meme temps qu'il 
 trahirait ses devoirs vis-^-vis de 
 I'Europe. 
 
 Couscieut du role que la 
 "Belgique joue depuis plus de 
 •80 ans dans la civilisation du 
 Tiionde, 11 se refuse k croire que 
 I'ind^pendance de la Belgique ue 
 p.uisse etre conservee qu'au prix 
 dela violation de sa neutralitd 
 
 Si cet espoir ^tait deqxL le 
 Gouvernement beige est ferme- 
 ment d&id^ k repousser par tous 
 les moyens en son pouvoir toute 
 atteinte k S'">n droit. 
 
 Government threaten her con- 
 stitutes a flagrant violation of 
 international law. No strategic 
 interest justifies such a viola.tion 
 of law. 
 
 The Belgian Government, if 
 they were to accept the pro- 
 posals submitted to them, would 
 sacrifice the honour of the nation 
 and betray their dutj towards 
 Europe. 
 
 Conscious of the part which 
 Belgium has played for more than 
 eighty years in the civilisation of 
 the world, they refuse to believe 
 that the independence of Belgium 
 caa only be preserved at the 
 price of the violation of her neu- 
 trality. 
 
 if this hope is disappointed 
 the Belgian Government are 
 firmly resolved to repel, by all 
 the means in their power, every 
 attack upon their rights. 
 
 No. 23. 
 
 Monsieur Darignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, 
 The Hague. 
 
 Brussels, August 3, 1914 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 At 7 P.M. last night Germany 
 presented a note proposing 
 friendly neutrality. This entailed 
 free passage through Belgian 
 territory, while guaranteeing the 
 maintenance of the independence 
 of Belgium and of her possessions 
 on the conclusion of peace, and 
 threatened, in the event of refusal, 
 to treat Belgium as an enemy. 
 A time limit of twelve hours was 
 allowed withiu which to reply. 
 
 Our answer has been that this 
 infringement of our neutrality 
 would be a flagrant violation of 
 international law. To accept the 
 German proposal would be to 
 sacrifice the honour of the nation. 
 
 (TeMgramme.) 
 
 L'AUiEMAGNE a remis hier soir 
 7 heures une note proposant la 
 neutraliti^ amicale comportant le 
 passage libre par notre territoire, 
 promettant le maintien de I'indd- 
 pendance du Eojaume et de ses 
 possessions k conclusion de la 
 paix, mena9ant en cas de refus de 
 traiter la Belgique comme 
 ennemie, d^lai de la r^ponse 
 flx^ k douze heures. Xous avons 
 repondu que I'atteinte k notre 
 neutrality serait une violation 
 flagrante du droit des gens. 
 L'acceptation de la proposition 
 allemande sacrifierait I'honneur 
 de la nation. Consciente de son 
 devoir, la Belgique est fermement 
 
23 
 
 d^cidde k repousser une agression 
 par tous moyens; 
 
 (Sign6) DAVIGNOK 
 
 Conscious of her duty, Belgium is 
 firhily resolved- to repel any 
 attack by all the means in her 
 power. 
 
 No. 24. 
 
 Foreign 
 London, 
 
 Moiisieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for 
 Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, 
 St. Petersburg. 
 
 Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon_), 
 
 Affairs, to the 
 Vienna, and 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 CoMME vous le savez, I'Alle- 
 magne a remis a la Belgique un 
 ultimatum expirant ce matin 
 3 aoAt, k 7 heiires. Aucun fait 
 de guerre ne s'^tant encore 
 produit a I'heure actuelle, le 
 Oonseil des Ministres . a d^cid^ 
 qu'il n'y avait pas lieu, pour le 
 inoment, de faire appel aux 
 Puissances garantes. 
 
 Le Ministre de France m'a dit 
 k ce sujet : 
 
 " Sans^tre charg^d'une declara- 
 tion de mon Gouvernement, je 
 crois cependant, ni'inspirant de 
 ses intentions connues, pouvoir 
 dire que si le Gouvernement 
 Eoyal faisait appel au Gouverne- 
 ment fran9ais, commep Puissance 
 garante de sa neutrality nous 
 r^pondrions imm^diatement k 
 son appel; si cet appel n'etait 
 pas formule, il est probable, k 
 moins bien entendu que le souci 
 •de sa propre defense ne determine 
 des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il 
 attendra pour, intervenir que la 
 Belgique ait fait un acte de 
 resistance effective." 
 
 J'ai remercie Monsieur Klobu- 
 Ifowski del'appui quele Gouverne- 
 ment fran9ais voulait bien nous 
 offrir ^ventuellement et lui ai dit 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Sir, 
 
 As you are aware, Germany has 
 delivered to Belgium an ulti- 
 matum which expires this 
 morning, 3rd August, at 7 a.m. 
 As no act of war has occurred up 
 to the present, the Cabinet has 
 decided that there is, for the 
 moment, no need to appeal to the 
 guaranteeing Powers. 
 
 The French Minister has made 
 the following statement to me 
 upon the subject : — 
 
 " Although I have received no 
 instructions to make a declaration 
 from my Government, I feel 
 justified, in view of their well- 
 known intentions, in saying that 
 if the Belgian Government were 
 to appeal to the French Govern- 
 ment as one of the Powers 
 guaranteeing their neutrality, the 
 French Government would 
 at once respond to Belgium's 
 appeal ; if such an appeal were 
 not made it is probable, that 
 — unless of course exceptional 
 measures were rendered necessary 
 in self-defence — the French 
 Government would not intervene 
 until Belgium had taken some 
 effective measure of resistance." 
 
 I thanked Monsieur Klobu- 
 kowski for the support which the 
 French Government had been 
 good enough to offer us in case of 
 
24 
 
 que le Gouvernement da Eoi ne 
 faisait pas appel, pour Tinstant, 
 k la garantie des Puissances et se 
 rc'servait d'apprfoier ultdiieure- 
 ment ce qu'il y auia lieu de 
 
 (Signe) DAVIGNON. 
 
 need, and I informed him that 
 the Belgian Government were 
 making no appeal at present to 
 the guarantee of the Powers, and 
 that they would decide later what 
 ought to be done. 
 
 No. 25. 
 
 Ilis Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty Kiny George. 
 
 Brussels, August 3, 1914. 
 
 (Toldgramme.) 
 
 Me souvenant des nombreuses 
 marques d'amiti^ de -votre Ma jesti^ 
 et de ses pr^d^cesseurs, de I'atti- 
 tude amieale de I'Angleterre en 
 1870, et do lapreuve de sympathie 
 qu'elle vient encore de nous 
 donner, je fais uu supreme appel 
 k I'intervention diplomatique du 
 Gouvernement de Sa Majestd 
 pour la sauvegarde de la neutrality 
 de la Belgique. 
 
 (Signd) ALBERT. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Mindful of the numerous 
 marks of friendship of your 
 Majesty and of your Majesty's 
 predecessors, as well as the 
 friendly attitude of Great Britain 
 in 1870 and of the proofs of sym- 
 pathy which she has once again 
 shown us, I make the supreme 
 appeal to the diplomatic inter- 
 vention of your Majesty's 
 Government to safeguard the 
 neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 No. 26. 
 
 Belgian Minister at London to Monsieur Davignon. Belgian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, August 3, 1914. 
 
 (Tdlegramme.) 
 
 J'ai montrd votre tdlt^gramme 
 au Ministre des Affaires fitran- 
 g^res, qui I'a communique au 
 Conseil des Ministres. Le 
 Ministre des Affaires ]6trang6res 
 m'a dit que si notre neutrality 
 dtait violde, c'dtait la guerre avec 
 I'AUemagne. 
 (Signe) CoMTE DE LALAING. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 I SHOWED your telegram to 
 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 who has laid it before the 
 Cabinet. The Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs has informed me 
 that if our neutrality is violated 
 it means war with Germany. 
 
 (See No. 23.) 
 
25 
 
 No. 27. 
 
 Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Mininter for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 (The original is in French.) 
 
 Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.). 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai ^t^ charge et j'ai I'honneitr 
 d'informer votre Excellence que 
 par suite du refus oppose par le 
 Gouvernement de Sa Majesty le 
 lloi aux propositions bien inten- 
 tionndes que lui avait soumises 
 le Gouvernement Imperial, celui- 
 ci se verra, k son plus vif regret, 
 forc6 d'ex^cuter — au besoin par 
 la force des armes — les mesures 
 de security exposdes comme indis- 
 pensablos vis-^-vis des menaces 
 francjaises. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 (Sign(5) VON BELOW. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 In accordance with my instruc- 
 tions, I have the honour to inform 
 your Excellency that in con- 
 sequence of the refusal of the 
 Belgian Government to entertain 
 the well-intentioned proposals 
 made to them by the German 
 Government, the latter, to their 
 deep regret, find themselves 
 compelled to take — if necessary 
 by force of arms— those measures 
 of defence already foreshadowed 
 as indispensable, in view of the 
 menace of France. 
 
 No. 28. 
 
 Note communicated hj Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister at 
 Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. 
 
 Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
 
 Je suis charg^ d'informer le 
 Gouvernement beige que si 
 I'Allemagne exerce une pression 
 dans le but d'obliger la Belgique 
 k abandonner son role de pays 
 neutre, le Gouvernement de Sa 
 Majeste britannique s'attend a ce 
 que la Belgique r^siste par tons 
 les moyens possibles. 
 
 Le Gouvernement de Sa Ma- 
 jest^ britannique, dans ce cas, est 
 prSt k so joindre k la Kussie et a 
 la France, si la Belgique le ddsire, 
 pour offrir au Gouvernement 
 beige sans df^Iai une action com- 
 mune, qui aurait comme but de 
 rdsister aux mesures de force 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 I AM instructed to inform^the 
 Belgian Government that if 
 Germany brings pressure to bear 
 upon Belgium with the object 
 of forcing her to abandon her 
 attitude of neutralitj'^. His 
 Britannic Majesty's Government 
 expect Belgium to resist with all 
 the means at her disposal. 
 
 In that event, His Britannic 
 Majesty's Government are pre- 
 pared to join Eussia and France, 
 should Belgium so desire, in ten- 
 dering at once joint assistance to 
 the Belgian Government with a 
 view to resisting any forcible 
 measures adopted by Germany 
 
26 
 
 employees par TAllemagne contre_ 
 la Belgique et en mSme temps 
 d'offrir une-garantie pour main- 
 tenir Tind^pendance et rintegrit^ 
 de la Belgique dans ravenir. 
 
 against Belgium, and also offering 
 a guarantee for the maintenance 
 of the future independence and 
 iiitegrity of Belgium. 
 
 No. 29. 
 
 Belgian Minister at The Hague to Monsieur Bavigmm, Belgian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The Hague, August 4, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires'^fitran- 
 gferes m'a dit hier soit que le 
 Gouvernement de la Keine serait 
 peut-etre oblig^, dans les circon- 
 stances graves actuelles.d'instituer 
 sur I'Escaut le balisage de guerre. 
 
 Le Jhr. Loudon m'a lu un 
 projet de note qui allait m'an- 
 noncer cette decision. 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de vous Irans- 
 mettre, sous ce pli, une copie de 
 la note en question qui m'a ^t^ 
 remise dans la soiree d'hier. 
 
 Comme vous le verrez, I'Escaut 
 ne sera feim^ que pendant la nuit. 
 Pendant le jour, la navigation 
 sera possible mais seulement avec 
 des pdotes neerlandais qui ont 
 ^\A munis des indications nau- 
 tiques necessaires i ce sujet. De 
 cette fa9on les interets de la 
 defense du territoire nderlandais 
 et eeux de la navigation beige 
 d'Anvers sont sauvegardfe. 
 
 Vous remarquerez qu'ensuite 
 le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas 
 nous demande qu'en cas ou le 
 balisage de guerre serait institue, 
 nous fassions retirer les bateaux- 
 phare " WieHngen " et " Wande- 
 laar " en vue de faciliter le main- 
 tien de la neutrality du territoire 
 des Pays-Bas. 
 
 Je vous ferai remarquer que le 
 terme employ^ dans cette note 
 
 me 
 
 yesterday 
 
 observe, the 
 be closed at 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Sir, 
 
 The Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs told me yesterday evening 
 that the NetherJandsGovemment 
 would perhaps be -obliged, owing 
 to the gravity of the present 
 situation, to institute war buoying 
 on the Scheldt. 
 
 M. Loudon read me the draft 
 of the note which would announce 
 this decision to me. 
 
 I have the honour to transmit 
 to you herewith a copy of the 
 note in question which was 
 communicated to 
 evening. 
 
 As you will 
 Scheldt will only 
 night. By day navigation will 
 be possible, but only with Dutch 
 pilots who have been furnished 
 with the necessary nautical 
 instructions. In this way both 
 Dutch interests in the defence 
 of their territory, and Belgian 
 interests in the navigation of 
 Antwerp will be safeguarded. 
 
 Tou will note that the Nether- 
 lands Government further ask 
 that in the event of the war 
 buoying being carried out, we 
 should cause the lightships 
 " Wielingen " and " Wandelaar " 
 to be withdrawn in order to 
 facilitate the maintenance of the 
 neutrality of Dutch territory. 
 
 I would point out that the 
 phrase used in this note, "sailing 
 
27 
 
 "remonter I'Esoaut" n'est pas 
 assez explicite ; desoendre le 
 fleiive sera permis dans les mSmes 
 copditions. Le Ministre vient de 
 - m'en donner I'assurance. 
 
 'Aussit6t que le Gouvernement 
 n^erlandais aura d^oid^ cette 
 mesure d'exception j'en serai 
 inforrae. 
 
 II f aut environ six heures pour 
 effectuer ce balisage de guerre. 
 Je vous t^l^graphierai aussitot. 
 Veuillez agrder, &c. 
 
 (Sign^) Baeon FALLON. 
 
 up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently 
 explicit ; sailing down would be 
 permitted under the same condi- 
 tions. The Minister has, how- 
 ever, given me this assurance. < 
 
 As soon as the Netherlands 
 Government have decided upon 
 this exceptional measure I shall 
 be informed of it. 
 
 About six hours are necessary 
 to carry out war buoying. 
 
 I will at once telegraph to you. 
 
 Note enclosed in No. 29. 
 
 Le Gouvernement de la Eeine 
 pourrait se voir oblig^ dans I'in- 
 t&^t du maintien de la neutrality 
 du territoire des Pays-Bas d'insti- 
 tuer sur I'Escaut Je balisage de 
 guerre, c'est-k-dire d'enlever ou 
 de modifier une partie du balisage 
 actuel et des phares. 
 
 Toutefois, ce balisage de guerre 
 a 6t^ conqu de maniere \ ee 
 qu'apres son institution il sera 
 encore possible de remouter 
 I'Escaut pour gagner Anvers 
 pendant le jour, mais seulement 
 avec des pilotes n^erlandais, qui 
 ont et4 munis des indications 
 nautiques n^cessaires k ce sujet. 
 En agissant de la sorts, le Gou- 
 vernement de la Eeine est con- 
 yaincu de pouvoir tenir compte 
 ^galement des int(^rets de la 
 defense du territoire n^erlandais 
 et de ceux de la navigation beige 
 d'Anvers. 
 
 Aprfes I'institution du balisage 
 de guerre sur I'Escaut, il n'y 
 aurait plus de raison d'entrer 
 dans la passe de mer de Flessingue 
 pendant la nuit et comme la 
 presence des bateaux - phare 
 " Wielingen " et " Wandelaar " 
 n'est pas indispensable pour la 
 navigation pendant le jour, le 
 Gouvernement nderlandais met- 
 trait un haut prix a ce que le 
 
 The Netherlands Government 
 may be compelled, in order to 
 maintain the neutrality of Dutch 
 territory, to institute war buoying 
 upon the Scheldt, that , is to say, 
 to move or modify a portion of 
 the actual arrangement of biioys 
 and lights. 
 
 At the same time this special 
 arrangement of buoys has been so 
 drawn up that when it is brought 
 into force it will still be possible, 
 to sail up the Scheldt as far as 
 Antwerp by day, but only with 
 Dutch pilots who have been 
 furnished with the necessary 
 nautical instructions. In thus 
 acting the Netherlands Govern- 
 ment are convinced that they 
 will be able to serve equally 
 both the Dutch interests in the 
 defence of Netherlands territory 
 and Belgian interests in the 
 navigation of Antwerp. 
 
 After the establishment of 
 war buoying on the Scheldt, 
 there would be no further reason 
 to enter the tidal water of 
 Flushing at night, and as the 
 presence of the lightships " Wie- 
 lingen " and " Wandelaar " is not 
 indispensable to navigation by 
 day, the Netherlands Government 
 would be much obliged if the 
 Belgian Government would be 
 
28 
 
 Gouvernement Eoyal beige 
 voulut bien, au cas ou le balisage 
 de guerre serait institu6 par lui, 
 faire retirer les'lits liateaux en 
 vue de I'aciliter le maintieu de la 
 iieutralite du teriitoire des Pays- 
 
 good enough, in the event of the 
 establishment of war buoying, to 
 withdraw these boats in order 
 to facilitate the maintenance of 
 the neutrality of Dutch territory. 
 
 No. 30. 
 
 Monsieur Davirjnon, Bdrjian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian 
 Ministers at London aTid Paris. 
 
 Brussels, August J, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (T^i^gramme.) (Telegram.) 
 
 L'fitat-Major fait savoir que le The General Staff announces 
 territoire national a 6t6 viole k that Belgian territory has been 
 Gemmenich. violated at Gemmenich. 
 
 (Signd) DAVIGNOK 
 
 No. 31. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Ilerr von Below Saleshe, German Minister. 
 
 Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de faire savoir 
 h. votre Excellence que des au- 
 jourd'hui le Gouvernement du 
 Jloi ne saurait plus lui recon- 
 naitre de caract^re diplomatique 
 et cesse d'avoir des relations 
 ofScielles avee elle. Votre Ex- 
 cellence trouvera sous ce pli les 
 passeports qui sont necessaires k 
 son depart et i\ celui du personnel 
 de la Idgation. 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 
 (Sign(5) DAVIGNON. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 I HAVE the honour to inform 
 your Excellency that from to-day 
 the Belgian Government are 
 unable to recognise your diplo- 
 matic status and cease to have 
 official relations with you. Youi- 
 Excellency will find enclosed 
 the passports necessary for your 
 departure with the staff of the 
 legation. 
 
29 
 
 No. 32. 
 
 Herr von Below Saleshe, Gerinan Minister, to Monsieur Dcivignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur d'accuser recep- 
 tion k votre Excellence de sa 
 lettre du 4 aoiit et de lui faire 
 savoir que j'ai remis la garde de 
 la Legation Imp^riale a Bruxelles 
 aux soins de mon collogue des 
 ^fitats-Unis. 
 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 (Signd) 
 
 DE BELOW. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE the honour to acknow- 
 ledge the receipt of your Excel- 
 lency's note of the 4th August, 
 and to inform you that I have 
 entrusted the . custody of the 
 German Legation of Brussels to 
 the care of my United States 
 colleague. 
 
 No. 33. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid. 
 
 Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
 
 to 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) 
 
 Veuillez demander au Gou- 
 vemement espagnol s'il veut bien 
 se charger de la protection des 
 int^r^ts beiges en Allemagne et, 
 dans ce cas, donner les instruc- 
 tions n&essaires k son Ambassa- 
 deur k Berlin. 
 
 (Signe) DAVIGNOK 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Please ask the Spanish 
 Government if they will be good 
 enough to take charge of Belgian 
 interests in Germany, and 
 whether in that event they will 
 issue the necessary instructions 
 to their Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 No. 34. 
 
 Monsieur JDavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Baron Beyenn, Belgian Minister at Berlin. 
 
 Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
 
 ■(Tel^gramme.) 
 
 Le Ministre d' Allemagne quitte 
 le pays ce soir; demandez vos 
 passeports. Nous prions le 
 <3ouvernement de Madrid d'auto- 
 ariser I'Ambassadeur d'Espagne de 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The German Minister is leav- 
 ing to-night ; you should ask for 
 your passports. We are request- 
 ing the Spanish Government to 
 authorise the Spanish Ambassa- 
 
30 
 
 Youloir Men se charger de la pro 
 tection des mt^rSts beiges ei 
 Allemagne. 
 
 (Signe) DAVIGNON, 
 
 dor to be good enough to take 
 
 charge of 
 Grermany. 
 
 Belgian interest& in 
 
 Xo. 35. 
 
 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, August 4, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE the honour to trans- 
 mit to you herewith a translation 
 of part of the speech made to-day 
 in the Eeichstag by the Imperial 
 Chancellor on the subject of 
 the infamous violation of Belgian 
 neutrality : — 
 
 " We are in a stat-e of legiti- 
 mate defence and necessity knows 
 no law. 
 
 ■' Our troops have occupied 
 Luxemburg and have perhaps 
 already entered Belgium. This is 
 contrary to the dictates of interna- 
 tional law. France has, it is true, 
 declared at Brussels that she was 
 prepared to respect the neutrahty 
 of Belgium so long as it was 
 respected by her adversary. But 
 we knew that France was ready 
 to invade Belgium. France could 
 wait ; we could not. A French 
 attack upon our flank in the 
 region of the Lower Ehine might 
 have been fatal. "We were, there- 
 fore, compelled to ride roughshod 
 over the legitimate protests of the 
 Governments of Luxemburg and 
 Belgium. For the wrong which 
 we are thus doing, we will make 
 reparation as soon as ovir mihtary 
 object is attained. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai I'honueur de vous faire 
 parvenir, ci-aprfes en traduction, 
 la partie du diseours prononc^. 
 aujourd'hui a la tribune du 
 Eeichstag par le Ghancelier de 
 I'Empire et relative 4 I'odieuse 
 violation de notre neutrality : 
 
 "Nous nous trouvons en ctat 
 de legitime defense et la n^cessit^ 
 ne connait pas de lois. 
 
 '• Nos troupes ont occup6 
 Luxembourg et ont, peut-etre, 
 d^ja penetre en Belgique. Gela 
 est en contradiction avec les pre- 
 scriptions du droit des gens. La 
 France a, il est vrai, declare h, 
 Bruxelles qu'elle etait resolu h. 
 respecter la neutrality de la 
 Belgique, aussi longtemps que 
 I'adversaire la respecterait. Mais 
 nous savions que la France se 
 tenait prete pour envahir la 
 Belgique. La France pouvait 
 attendre. Xous pas. Une attaque 
 fran§aise sur notre flanc dans la 
 region du Ehin inf&ieur aurait 
 pu devenir fatale. C'est ainsi 
 que nous avons (5t^ forces de 
 passer outre aux protestations 
 jusdfi&s des Gouvernements 
 luxembourgeois et beige. L'in- 
 justice que nous commettons de 
 cette faQon, nous la r^parerons 
 des que notre but militaire sera 
 at-teint. 
 
 'A celui qui est menae^ au 
 point oil nous le sommes et qui 
 lutte pour son bien supreme, il 
 
 " Anyone in such grave danger 
 as ourselves, and who is strug- 
 gling for his supreme welfare can 
 
31 
 
 n'est permis que de songer au 
 moyen de se d^ager ; nous nous 
 trouvons cote a cote avee I'Au- 
 triche." 
 
 n est k remarquer que Mon- 
 sieur de Bethmann-Hollw^ re- 
 connMt, sans le moindre detour, 
 que rAllemagne viole le droit 
 international en envahissant le 
 temtoire beige et qu'elle commet 
 une injustice a notre egard. 
 Veuillez agreer, &c 
 (Signe) Baros BETEXS. 
 
 only be concerned with the means 
 of extricating himself ; we stand 
 side by side with Austria." 
 
 It is noteworthy that Herr von 
 Bethmann - HoUweg recogoises, 
 without the slightest disguise, that 
 (Jermany is violating international 
 law by her invasion of Belgian 
 territory and that she is com- 
 mitting a wrong against us. 
 
 Xo. 36. 
 
 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Dariffnon, 
 Bdgian MiniMer for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, August 4, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Muiistre, 
 
 J'ai rhonneur de vous faire 
 savoir que le Premier Ministre a 
 fait cet apres-midi k la Chambre 
 des Commnues une nouvelle de- 
 claration relativement a la crise 
 europ^enne. 
 
 Apres avoir rappele les prin- 
 C'paiix points exposes hier par 
 Sir E. Grey, le Premier ilinistre 
 a donne lecture : 
 
 1° d'un tel^ramme de Sir F. 
 Tilliers, re§u ce matin, qui fait 
 connaitre la teneur du second 
 ultimatum adresse par le Gou- 
 vemement allemand au Gou- 
 vernement beige et qui vous a 
 ete remis ce matin (voir Xo. 27) ; 
 
 2° du tel^gramme par lequel 
 vous m'annoncez la violation de 
 la frontiere a Gemmenich, dont 
 j'ai remis copie a Sir A Xicolson ; 
 
 3" d'un telegramme adresse ce 
 matin par le Gouvernement alle- 
 mand a son Ambassadeur a 
 Londres dans le but evident 
 d'egarer I'opinion pnblique sur 
 son attitude. En voici la tra- 
 duction d'apres un journal de ce 
 soir: 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HATE the honour to inform 
 you that in the House of Com- 
 mons this afternoon the Prime 
 Minister made a fresh statement 
 with regard to the European 
 crisis. 
 
 After recalling the principal 
 points set forth yesterday by 
 Sir E. Grey, the Prime Minister 
 read: — 
 
 1. A telegram received from 
 Sir P. Yniiers this morning which 
 gave the substance of the second 
 ultimatum presented to the 
 
 ■ Belgian Government by the 
 Gterman Government, which had 
 been seut to you this morning 
 (see Xo. 27). 
 
 2. Your tel^ram informing me 
 of the violation of the frontier at 
 Gemmenich, a copy of which I 
 have given to Sir A. Xicolson. 
 
 3. A telegram which the Ger- 
 man Government addressed to its 
 Ambassador in London tliis morn- 
 ing with the evident intention of 
 misleading popular opinion as to 
 its attitude. Here is the transla- 
 tion as published in one of this 
 evening's newspapers : — 
 
32 
 
 " Veuillez dissiper toute me- 
 fianee que le Gouvernement bri- 
 trannique pourrait avoir au sujet 
 de nos intentions, en r^petant, de 
 la maniere la plus positive, I'as- 
 surance formelle que meme en 
 cas de conflit arm^ avec la Bel- 
 gique, TAllemagne n'annexera 
 sous aucun pr^texte le territoire 
 beige. 
 
 " La sinc^rite de cette declara- 
 tion est eorroboree par le fait 
 que rAllemagne a solennellement 
 donne sa parole k la Hollande de 
 son intention de respecter sa 
 neiitralit^. 
 
 " II est Evident que nous ne 
 pourrions nous annexer le terri- 
 toire beige d'une maniere avan- 
 tageuse sans faire, en mSnie 
 temps, une acquisition territoriale 
 au detriment de la Hollande. 
 
 "Priere de faire bien com- 
 prendre k Sir E. Grey qu'il ^tait 
 impossible d'exposer I'armee alle- 
 mande k une attaque fran9aise 
 portee en traversant la Belgique, 
 attaque qui, d'aprfes des informa- 
 tions absolument ineontestables, 
 ^tait projet^e. 
 
 " En consequence I'Allemagne 
 n'a pas tenu compte de la neu- 
 trality beige afin d'eviter ce qui 
 est pour elle une question de vie 
 on de mort, une attaque fran^aise 
 par la Belgique." 
 
 Mr. Asquith a ensuite expose 
 k la Chambre qu'en reponse k 
 cette note du Gouvernement alle- 
 mand le Gouvernement britan- 
 nique lui avait renouveM sa 
 proposition de la semaine der- 
 ni^re, k savoir de donner au sujet 
 de la neutrality beige les niemes 
 assurances que la France en avait 
 donnees la semaine derniere, tant 
 k I'Angleterre qa'k la Belgique. 
 Le Cabinet anglais accordait k 
 celui de Berlin jusqu'i miuuit 
 pour lui faire connaitre sa reponse. 
 
 Veuillez agrder, &c. 
 - (Sign(5) COMTE DE LALAIXG. 
 
 "Please dispel any mistrust 
 which may subsist on the part of 
 the British Government with re- 
 gard to our intentions, by repeat- 
 ing most positively the formal 
 assurance that, even in the case 
 of armed conflict with Belgium, 
 Germany will, under no pretence 
 whatever annex Belgian territoiy. 
 
 " Sincerity of this declaration 
 is borne out by fact that we 
 solemnly pledged our word to 
 Holland strictly to respect her 
 neutrality. 
 
 "It is obvious that we could 
 not profitably annex Belgian 
 territory without making at the 
 time territorial acquisitions at tlie 
 expense of Holland. 
 
 "Please impress upon Sir E. 
 Grey that German army could not 
 be exposed to French attack 
 across Belgium, which was 
 planned according to absolutely 
 unimpeachable information. 
 
 " Germany had consequently 
 to disregard Belgian neutrality, 
 it being for her a question of life 
 or death to prevent French 
 advance." 
 
 Mr. Asquith then informed the 
 House that in answer to this note 
 of the German Government the 
 British Government had repeated 
 their proposal of last week, 
 namely, that the German Govern- 
 ment should give the same assur- 
 ances as to Belgian neutrality as 
 France had given last week both 
 to England and to Belgium. 
 The British Cabinet allowed the 
 Berlia Cabinet till midnight to 
 reply. 
 
33 
 
 No. 37. 
 
 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Lavicjnon^ 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, August 4, 191-4. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs has informed the Britisli- 
 Ministers in Norway, Holland, 
 and Belgium, that Great Britainr 
 expects that these three king- 
 doms will resist German pressure- 
 and observe neutrality. Should 
 they resist they will have the 
 support of Great Britain, who is. 
 ready in that event, should the: 
 three above-mentioned Govern- 
 ments desire it, to join Franee- 
 and Eussia,in offering an alliance , 
 to the said Governments for the - 
 purpose of resisting the use of" 
 force by Germany against them, 
 and a guarantee to maintain this-; 
 future independence and integrity 
 of the three kingdoms. I observed 
 to him that Belgium was neutral 
 in perpetuity. The Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs answered : This 
 is in case her neutrality is 
 violated. 
 
 (T^ldgramme.) 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires ifitran- 
 geres a fait savoir aux Ministres 
 anglais en Norvege, HoUande, 
 Belgique.que I'Angleterre s'attend 
 h, ce que ces trois Eoyaumes r^- 
 sistent k la pression de I'AUe- 
 magne et gardent la neutrality. 
 Dans leur resistance ils seront 
 soutSnus par I'Angleterre, qui, 
 dans ce eas, est prete &, coopdrer 
 avec la France et la Eussie si tel 
 est le d6sir de ces trois Gouverne- 
 ments en offrant alliance auxdits 
 Gouvernements, pour repousser 
 I'emploi centre eux de la force 
 par TAUemagne, et garantie, 
 pour le maintien futar de I'indd- 
 pendance et de rintdgrit^ des 
 trois Royaumes. J'ai fait re- 
 marquer que la Belgique est 
 neutre k perpdtuitd. Le Ministre 
 des Affaires fitrangeres a rd- 
 
 pondu : C'est pour le cas de 
 neutrality violde. 
 
 (Signe) CoMTE de LALAING. 
 
 No. 38. 
 
 Monsieur Bavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian. 
 Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 
 
 Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de porter k votre 
 connaissance I'ordre de faits suc- 
 cessifs qui ont marqud pendant 
 les derniers jours les relations de 
 la Belgique avec certaines des 
 Puissances garantes de sa neu- 
 trality et de son inddpendance. 
 
 Le 31 juillet le Ministre d'An- 
 gleterre me fit une communica- 
 [1037] 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE the honour to inform 
 you of the course of recent 
 events as regards the relations of 
 Belgium with certain of tlie 
 Powers which guarantee her 
 neutrality and independence. 
 
 On the 31st July the British 
 Minister made me a verbal com- 
 
 D 
 
3 '4 
 
 tion verbale aux termes de la- 
 quelle, en pr6yision d'une guerre 
 europerinif, Sir E. Grey avait 
 demand^ aux Gouvernements 
 allemand et fran9ais, s^par^ment 
 si chacun deux ^tait resolu k 
 1 especter la neutrality de la Bel- 
 gique dans I'eventualit^ ou cette 
 neutraltte ne serait pas vioMe par 
 aucune autre P^iissance. 
 
 En raison des traitfe existants, 
 Kr Francis VilKers 6tait charg^ 
 de porter cette d^marehe k la, 
 connaissance du Gouvernement 
 du Roi en ajoutant que Sir E. 
 Grey pr^sumait que la Belgique 
 <itait resolue k maintenir sa neu- 
 trality et qu'eUe .s'attendait k ce 
 que les autres Puissances la re- 
 spectent. 
 
 J'ai dit a Monsieur le Ministre 
 d'Angleterre que nous appreciions 
 liautement cette communication, 
 qui r^pondait 4 notre attente, et 
 j'ai ajciut^ que la Grande-Bretagne 
 ainsi que les autres Puissances 
 garantes de notre inddpendance 
 pourraienfc efcre pleinement as- 
 surees de notre ferme volenti de 
 maintenir notre neutrality ; celle- 
 <i\ ne nous paraissant d'ailleurs 
 pas pouvoir etre menac^e par 
 aucun de ces £tats avec lesquels 
 nous entretenons les rapports les 
 plus cordiaux et les plus con- 
 tiants. Le Gouvernement, ai-je fait 
 j'emarquer, avait donne une preuve 
 de cette resolution en preiiant 
 d6s k present toutes les mesures 
 militaires que la situation lui 
 paraissait comporter. 
 
 A son tour, Monsieur le Ministre 
 '-de France se declara, le l''"' aout, 
 •dans une conversation verbale, 
 BUtoris^ k faire connaitre au 
 Oouvernement beige, qu'en cas 
 de conflit international, le Gou- 
 vernement de la E^pubHque, 
 conform6ment k ses declarations 
 constantes, respeoterait le terri- 
 toire de la Belgique et qu'il ne 
 serait ameue a modifier son atti- 
 tude que dans le cas de violation 
 
 munication according to wbich 
 Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a 
 Ea*opeaai-- war^ . Jiad asked the 
 German and Frencb Governments 
 separately if each of tbem were 
 resolved to respect the neutrality 
 of Belgium should that neutrality 
 not be violated by any other 
 Powei!i 
 
 In view of existing treaties. 
 Sir F. Villiers was instructed to 
 bring this step to the knowledge 
 pf the Bielgian Government, 
 adding that Sir E. Grey pre- 
 sumed that Belgium was resolved 
 to . maintain her neutrality, .and 
 that she expected other Powers 
 to respect it. 
 
 I told theBritish'Minister that 
 we highly appreciated this com- 
 munication, which was in accor- 
 dance with our ex,pectation, and 
 I added "that Great Uritain, as 
 well as the other Powers who ha± 
 guaranteed our independence, 
 mightxest fully assumed of ourfirm, 
 determination to maintain our 
 neutrality ; nor did it seem 
 possible that our neutrality 
 could be tbreatened by any 
 of those States, with whom 
 we enjoyed the most cordial and 
 frank relations. The Belgian- 
 Government, I added, had given 
 .proof of this resolution by taking 
 from now on all such military 
 measures as seemed to them to be 
 necessitated by the situation. 
 
 In bis turn the French Minis- 
 ter made a verbal communication 
 on August 1st to the effect 
 that he was authorised to inform 
 the Belgian Government that in 
 case of an international war the 
 French Goverimaent.in conformity 
 with their repeated declarations, 
 would respect Belgian territory, 
 andthattheywouldnot be induced' 
 to modify their attitude except 
 in the event of the violation of 
 
35 
 
 de la aeutralitd beige par une 
 autre Puissance. 
 
 Je remerciai son Excellence et 
 ajoutai que nousavionsd^ja pris 
 toutes les dispositions requises 
 pour assurer le respeetde notre 
 independence et de nos frontieres. 
 
 Le 2 aout, dans la matinee, 
 j'eus av.ec Sir Francis Villiers un 
 nouvel entretien au cours duquel 
 il me fit part de ce qu'il avait 
 transmis t^l^graphiquementsame- 
 <ii, d^s la premiere heure, a son 
 Oouverneruent notre conversation 
 •du 31 juillet en ay ant soin de 
 reproduire tidyement la dilata- 
 tion solennelle qu'il avait recu- 
 •eillie de la volont^ de la Belgique 
 de d^fendre ses frontieres, de 
 quelque c6t6 qu'elles soient en- 
 vahies. II ajouta : " Nous savons 
 <jue la France vous a donn^ des 
 assurances formelles ; mais I'An- 
 gleterre n'a r^qu k ce sujet aucune 
 r^ponse de Berlin." 
 
 Ce dernier fait ne provoqua en 
 Tuoi aucune Amotion particulifere, 
 parce que la d&laration du Gou- 
 vernement allemand pouvait pa- 
 Taitre surabondante en presence 
 des trait^s existants. D'ailleurs 
 le Secretaire d'lfitat aux Affaires 
 £trangferes avait affirm^ k la 
 stance de la Commission du 
 Eeichstag du 29 avril 1913 
 "' que la neutrality de la Belgique 
 est ^tablie conventionnellement 
 et que I'Allemagne a I'intention 
 de respecter ce traits." 
 
 Le mgme jour. Monsieur de 
 Below Saleske, Ministre d'Alle- 
 magne, se pr^senta au Minis tere 
 des Affaires £trang^res^l9 heures 
 et me remit la note ci-jointe 
 (voir pi^ce No. 20). Le Gou- 
 vernement allemaud accordait au 
 Gouvernemeat beige un d^lai de 
 douze heures pour lui faire con- 
 naitre sa decision. 
 
 Aucune hesitation ne pouvait 
 
 se manifester au sujet de la rd- 
 
 ponse qu'appelaifi la proposition 
 
 surprenante du Gouvernemeut 
 
 [1037] 
 
 of Belgian neutrality by another 
 I'owei'. 
 
 I thanked his Excelleopyj and 
 added that we had already taken 
 all the necessary precautions to 
 ensure respect of our indepen- 
 dence and our frontiers. 
 
 On the morning of the August 
 2nd I had a fresh conversation 
 withiSir F. Villiers, in the course 
 of which he told me that he had 
 lost no time iu . telegraphing 
 our conversation of July 31st 
 to his Government, and that 
 he had been careful to quote 
 accurately the solemn declara- 
 tion which he had received of 
 Belgium's intention to defend her 
 frontiers from whichever side 
 they might be invaded. He added: 
 " We know that France has given 
 you formal assurances, but Great 
 Britain has received no reply 
 from Berlin on this subject." 
 
 The latter fact did not par- 
 ticularly affect me, - since a 
 declaration from the German 
 Govei-nment might appear super- 
 fliiuus in view of existing treaties. 
 Moreover, the Secretary of State 
 had reaffirmed,, at the meeting of 
 the committee of the Eeichstag 
 of April 29th, 1913, " that the 
 neutrality of Belgium is estab- 
 lished by treaty which Germany 
 intends to respect." 
 
 The same day Herr von Below 
 Saleske, the German Minister, 
 called at the Ministry for Foreign 
 Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed 
 to me the enclosed note (see 
 No. 20). The German Govern- 
 ment gave the Belgian Govern- 
 ment a time limit of twelve hours 
 within which to communicate 
 their decision. 
 
 No hesitation was possible 
 
 as to the reply called for by 
 
 the amazing proposal of the 
 
 German Government. You will 
 
 D 2 
 
36 
 
 aJlemand. Yous en trouverez une 
 copie sous ce pli. (Voir piece 
 No. 22.) 
 
 L'ultimatum expirait le 3 aout, 
 k 7 heures du matin; comme k 
 10 heures aucun fait de guerre 
 ne s'etait produit, le Conseil des 
 Ministres d&ida qu'il n'y avait 
 pas lien, pour le moment, de faire 
 appel aux Puissances garantes. 
 
 Vers midi, le Ministre de 
 Trance m'interrogea sur ce point 
 et me dit : 
 
 " Bien qu'en raison de la sou- 
 dainet^ des ev^nements je ne sois 
 encore cliarge d'aucune declara- 
 tion, je crois cependant, m'in- 
 spirant des intentions biens 
 connues de mon Gouvernement, 
 pouvoir dire que si le Gouverne- 
 ment Royal faisait appel au Gou- 
 vernement fran^ais comme Puis- 
 sance garante de sa neutralite, 
 il repondraijt immediatement k 
 son appel. Si cet appel n'etait 
 pas formuld il est probable, k 
 moins bien entendu qiie le souci 
 de sa propre defense ne determine 
 des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il 
 attendrait, pour intervenir, que 
 la Belgique ait fait un acta de 
 rdsistance eflfective." 
 
 find a copy enclosed. (See 
 No. 22.) 
 
 The ultimatum expired afc 
 7 A.M. on August 3rd. As at. 
 10 o'clock no act of war hadt 
 been committed, the Belgian. 
 Cabinet decided that there was- 
 no reason for the moment to- 
 appeal to the guaranteeing; 
 powers. 
 
 Towards mid-day the French 
 Minister questioned me upon this 
 point, and said : — 
 
 " Although in view of the rapid 
 march of events I have as yetr 
 received no instructions to make 
 a declaration fiom my Govern- 
 ment, I feel justified, ia view of 
 their well-known intentions, in 
 saying that if the Belgian Govern- 
 ment were to appeal to the 
 French Government as one o£ 
 the Powers guaranteeing their 
 neutrality, the French Govern- 
 ment would at once respond ta 
 Belgium's appeal ; if such an 
 appeal were not made it is pro- 
 bable that — unless, of course, 
 exceptional measures were 
 rendered necessary in self- 
 defence — the French Government 
 would not intervene until Bel- 
 gium had taken some effective 
 measure of resistance." 
 
 J'ai remercie Monsieur Klobu- 
 kowski de I'appui que le Gou- 
 vernement frauQais voulait bien 
 nous ofiiir ^ventuellement et lui 
 ai dit que le Gouvernement du 
 Eoi ne faisait pas appel, pour 
 I'instant, k la garantie des Puis- 
 sances et se r(5servait d'apprecier 
 ult^rieurement ce qu'il y aura 
 lieu de faire. 
 
 Enfin, le 4 aout, a 6 heures du 
 matin, le Ministre d'Allemagne 
 me fit la communication suivante. 
 (Voir pifeee No. 27.) 
 
 Le Conseil des Ministres de- 
 libere en ce moment au sujet de 
 
 I thanked Monsieur Klobu- 
 kowski for the support which the 
 French Government had been 
 good enough to offer us in case of 
 need, and I informed him that the 
 Belgian Governmeut were making 
 no appeal at present to the 
 guarantee of the Powers, and 
 that they would decide later what 
 ought to be done. 
 
 Finally, at 6 A.M. on August 4th, 
 the German Minister made the 
 following communication to me. 
 (See No. 27.) 
 
 The Cabinet is at the present 
 moment deliberating on the 
 
37 
 
 garantes 
 
 I'appel aux Puissances 
 de notre neutrality. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 (Sign^) DAVIGNON, 
 
 question of anappeal to the Powers 
 guaranteeing our neutrality. 
 
 No. 39. 
 
 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, August 4, 1914. 
 
 ^T^Mgramme.) 
 
 L'Angleteeee a somm^ ce 
 matin FAllemagne de respecter 
 la neutrality beige. L'ultimatum 
 •dit que vu la note adress^e par 
 I'Allemagne k la Belgique mena- 
 ^aut cette derni^re de la force 
 des armes si elle s'oppose au 
 passage de ses troupes, vu la 
 violation du territoire beige k 
 Gemmenich, vu le fait que I'Al- 
 lemagne a refuse de donner k 
 I'Angleterre la meme assurance 
 que celle donnfe la semaine der- 
 nifere par la France, I'Angleterre 
 doit demander h, nouveau une 
 reponse satisfaisante au sujet du 
 respect de la neutrality beige et 
 d'un trait^ dont I'Allemagne est 
 signataire aussi bieu qu'elle- 
 mSme. L'ultimatum expire k 
 minuit. 
 
 En consequence de I'ultimatam 
 de I'Angleterre k I'Allemagne, la 
 proposition anglaise que je vous 
 ai transmise par tdlegramme est 
 annulfe pour le moment. 
 (Sign^) CoMTE DE LALAING. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Great Britain this morning 
 called upon Germany to respect 
 Belgian neutrality. The ulti- 
 matum says that whereas the note 
 addressed by Geimany to Bel- 
 gium threatens the latter with 
 an appeal to the force of arms if 
 she opposes the passage of 
 German troops; and whereas 
 Belgian territory has been 
 violated at Gemmenich; and 
 whereas Germany has refused 
 to give Great Britain a similar 
 assurance to that given last week 
 by France ; therefore Great 
 Britain must once again demand 
 a satisfactory reply on the subject 
 of the respect of Belgian neu- 
 trality and of the treaty to which 
 Germany, no less than Great 
 Britain, is a signatory. The ulti- 
 matum expires at midnight. 
 
 In consequence of the British 
 ultimatum to Germany, the 
 British proposal which I tele- 
 graphed to you is cancelled for 
 the time being. 
 
 (See No. 37.) 
 
38 
 
 No. 40. 
 
 3fonsieitr Bavignon, Selgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to BrjiisJi^ 
 French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels. 
 
 Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 The Belgian Government 
 regret to have to announce to 
 j^'our Excellency that this morning' 
 the armed forces of Germany 
 entered Belgian territory in 
 violation of treaty engagements. 
 
 The Belgian Government are 
 firmly determined to resist by all 
 the means in their power. 
 
 Belgium appeals to Great 
 Britain, France, and Eussia to< 
 co-operate as guaranteeingPowers 
 in the defence of her territory. 
 
 There should be concerted and 
 joint action, to oppose the forcible 
 measures taken by Germany 
 against Belgium, and, at the same 
 time, to guarantee the future 
 maintenance of the independence 
 and integrity of Belgium. 
 
 Belgium is happy to he able to 
 declare that she will undertake 
 the defence of her fortified places. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Le Gouvernement beige a le 
 regret de devoir annoncer a votre 
 Excellence que ce matin les forces 
 armces de TAUemagne ont p6- 
 n^tr^ sur le territoii'f! beige en 
 violation des engagements qui 
 ont et^ pris par traits. 
 
 Le Gouvernement du Eoi est 
 fermement decide k r^sister par 
 tons les moyens en son pouvoir. 
 
 La Belgique fait appel k TAn- 
 gleterre, k la France et k la Eussie 
 pour coopt^rer, comme garantes, 
 a la defense de son territoire. 
 
 II y aurait une action con- 
 ceit-^e et commune ayant pour 
 but de resister aux mesures de 
 forces employes par lAllemagne 
 centre la Belgique et en meme 
 temps de garantir le maintien 
 de rindependance ot de I'integrit^ 
 de la Belgique dans I'avenir. 
 
 La Belgique est heureuse de 
 pouvoir declarer qu'elle assumera 
 la defense des places fortes. 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 
 (Sign^) DAVIGXOX. 
 
 Yo. 41. 
 
 Ccrnt dc Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Bavignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign A fairs. 
 
 London, August 5, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Germany, having rejected the 
 British proposals. Great Britain 
 has informed her that a state of 
 war existed between the two 
 countries as from 11 o'clock. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 L'Allemagxe ayant rejet^ les 
 propositions angiaises, lAngle- 
 terro lui a d^clar^ que I'^lat de 
 guerre existait entre les deux 
 pays, k partir de onze heui-es. 
 (Signed) CoMTE DE LALATXG. 
 
39 
 
 No. 42. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign- Affairs, to the' 
 Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Peterslurg. 
 
 Brussels, August, 5, 1914. 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) 
 
 Ape^s la violation du, terri- 
 , toire h, Gemmenich, la Belgique a 
 fait appel, par I'interm^diaire de 
 leurs representants accr^dit^s k 
 Bruxelles, k I'Angleterre, k la 
 france et k la Eussie pour co- 
 op^rer, comme garantes, k la 
 defense de son territoire. 
 
 La Belgique assume la defense 
 des places fortes. 
 
 (Sign^) DAVIGNOK 
 
 (Translation.)' 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 After the violation of Belgian 
 territory at Gemmenich, Belgiupi 
 appealed to Great Britain, France, 
 and Eussia through their repre- 
 sentatives at Brussels, to co- 
 operate as guaranteeing Powers 
 in the defence of her territory. ' 
 
 Belgium undertakes the defence 
 of her fortified, places. 
 
 No. 43. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 
 
 Brussels, August 5, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Pae ma d^pgche du 4 aout 
 (voir piece Xo. 38), j'ai eu I'hon- 
 neur de vous exposer la suite des 
 (^v^nements qui ont marqu6 les 
 relations internationales de la 
 Belgique du 31 juillet au 4 aout. 
 J'ajoutais que le Conseil des 
 Ministres examinait la question 
 de savoir si la Belgique, dont le 
 territoire avait etd envahi depuis 
 le matin, ferait appel a la 
 garantie. 
 
 Le Conseil venait de se d&ider 
 en faveur de I'affirmative, lorsque 
 le Ministre d'Angleterre me fit 
 savoir que la proposition dont il 
 m' avait saisi et d'aprfes laquelle 
 le Gouvernement britannique 
 ^tait dispose k r^pondre k notre 
 appel en garantie, ^tait annul^e 
 pour le moment. (Voir pi^ce 
 No. 37.) 
 
 Un t^l^gramme de Londres 
 m'appritque ce changementd'atti- 
 
 Sir, 
 
 , (Translation.) 
 
 In' my despatch of August 4 
 (see No. 38) I had the honour 
 to inform you of the sequence of 
 events which had attended the 
 international relations of Belgium 
 from July 31st to August 4th. I 
 added that the Cabinet was con- 
 sidering the question whether 
 Belgium,whose territory had been 
 invaded since the morning, should 
 appeal to the guarantee of the 
 Powers. 
 
 The Cabinet had decided in the 
 affirmative when the British 
 Minister informed me that the 
 proposal which lie had com- 
 municated to me, and according 
 to which the British Government 
 were disposed to respond favour- 
 ably to our appeal to her as a 
 guaranteeing Power, was cancelled 
 for the time being. (See No. 37.) 
 
 A telegram from London made 
 it clear that this change of 
 
40 
 
 tilde dtait motiv^ par uii ulti- 
 matuir, de TAngleterre laissant k 
 I'Allemagne un d^lai de dix 
 heures pour ^vacuer le sol beige 
 et respecter la neutrality de la 
 Belgique. (Voir pifece No. 39.) 
 Dans la soiree, le Gouvemement 
 du Eoi a adress^ par rinterm^- 
 diaire de leurs repr^sentants 
 respectif s k Bruxelles, k la France, 
 k la Grande-Bretagne et k la 
 Kussie, la note dont vous trou- 
 verez la copie ci-jointe. (Voir 
 piece No. 40.) 
 
 Comme vous le remarquerez, la 
 Belgique fait appel k I'Angleterre, 
 a la France et k la Eussie pour 
 coop^rer comme garantes k la 
 defense de son territoire et au 
 maintien dans I'avenir de I'ind^- 
 pendance et de I'iutdgrit^ du terri- 
 toire. Elle assurera la defense 
 des places fortes. 
 
 Jusqu'ici nous ne connaissons 
 pas I'accueil qui a it6 r^servd k 
 notre appel. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 (Signd) DAVIGNON. 
 
 attitude was caused by an ulti- 
 matum f roin Great Britain giving 
 Germany a time limit of ten hours 
 within which to evacuate Belgian 
 territory and to respect Belgian 
 neutrality. (See No. 39.) During 
 the evening, the Belpian Govern- 
 ment addressed to France, Great 
 Britain, and Eussia, through their 
 respective representatives at Brus- 
 sels, a note, of which a copy is 
 enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.) 
 
 As you will observe, Belgium 
 appeals to Great Britain, France, 
 and Eussia to co-operate as 
 guaranteeing Powers in the 
 defence of her territory and in 
 the maintenance for the future of 
 the independence and integrity of 
 her territory. She will herself 
 undertake the defence of her 
 fortified places. 
 
 As yet we are not aware how 
 our appeal has been received. 
 
 No. 44. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic 
 Relations with Belgium. 
 
 Brussels, August 5, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Pae le traits du 18 avril 1839, 
 la Prusse, la France, I'Angleterre, 
 I'Autriche et la Eussie se sout 
 ddclar^es garantes du traits conclu 
 le meme jour entre Sa Majesty le 
 Eoi des Beiges et Sa Majesty le 
 Eoi des Pays-Bas. Ce traits 
 porte : " La Belgique formera un 
 ]5tat ind^pendant et perp^tuelle- 
 nient neutre." La Belgique a 
 rempli toutes ses obligations 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 By the treaty of April 18th, 
 1839, Prussia, France, Great 
 Britain, Austria, and Eussia 
 declared themselves guarantors of 
 the treaty concluded on the same 
 day between His Majesty the 
 King of the Belgians and His 
 Majesty the King of the Nether- 
 lands. The treaty runs : " Bel- 
 gium shall form a State indepen- 
 dent and perpetually neutral." 
 
41 
 
 Internationales, elle a accompli 
 ses devoirs dans uu esprit de 
 loyale impartialite, eUe n'a n^Uge 
 aucun effort pour maintenir et 
 faire respecter sa neutralite. 
 
 Aussi est-ce avec une p^nible 
 Amotion que le Gouvemement du 
 Roi a appris que les forces armies 
 de I'Allemagne, Puissauce garante 
 de notre neutralite, ont pendtr^ 
 s\ir le territoire de la Belgique en 
 violation des engagements qui ont 
 et^ pris par ti-aite. 
 
 II est de notre devoir de pro- 
 tester avec indignation centre im 
 attentat an droit des geus 
 qu'aucun aet« de notre part n'a 
 pu provoquer. 
 
 Le Gouvemement du Eoi est 
 fermement d6cide k repousser par 
 tons les moyens en son pouvoir 
 I'atteinte portee a sa neutrality 
 et il rappelle qu'en vertu de 
 Tarticle 10 de la Convention de 
 La Haye de 1907, concernant les 
 droits et les devoirs des Puis- 
 sances et des peisonnes neutres 
 en cas de guerre sur terre, ne pent 
 ^tre considere comme un acte 
 hostile le fait, par une Puissance 
 neutre, de repousser, meme par 
 la force, les atteintes k sa neu- 
 tralite. 
 
 Vous voudrez bien demander 
 d'urgence une audience an 
 Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres 
 et donner lecture k son Excellence 
 de la pr&ente lettre dont vous lui 
 laisserez copie. Si I'audience ne 
 pouvait vous etre imm^diatement 
 accordee, a'ous ferez par ferit la 
 communication dont il s'agit. 
 Yeuillez agreer, &c. 
 
 (Signe) DA^IGXOX. 
 
 Belgium has fulfilled all her 
 international obligations, she has 
 accomplished her duty in a spirit 
 of loyal impartiality, she has 
 neglected no effort to maintain 
 her neutrality and to cause that 
 neutrahty to be respected. 
 
 In these circumstances the 
 Belgium Grovernment have learnt 
 with deep pain that the armed 
 forces of Germany, a Power 
 guaranteeing Belgian neutrahty, 
 have entered Belgian ten-itory in 
 violation of the obligations imder- 
 taken by treaty. 
 
 It is our duty to protest with 
 indignation against an outrage 
 against international law pro- 
 voked by no act of ours. 
 
 The Belgian Government are 
 firmly determined to repel by all 
 the means in their power the 
 attack thus made upon their 
 neutrality, and they recall the 
 fact that, iu virtue of article 10 
 of The Hague Convention of 1907 
 respecting the rights and duties 
 of neutral Powers and persons in 
 the ease of war by land, if a 
 neutral Power repels, even by 
 force, attacks on her neutrahty 
 such action cannot be considered 
 as a hostile act. 
 
 I have to request that you wiU 
 ask at once for an audience with 
 the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 and read this despatch to his 
 Excellency, handing bim a copy. 
 If the interview cannot be granted 
 at once you should make the 
 communication in question in 
 writing 
 
42 
 
 No. 45. 
 
 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Berlin, August 5, 1914. 
 
 (TeMgramme.) 
 
 J'ai reQu mes passeports. Je 
 quitterai Berlin demain matin 
 avec personnel pour la Hollande. 
 
 rSigne) Baeon BEYENS. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 L HAVE received my passports 
 and shall leave Berlin to-morrow- 
 morning for Holl^Jid with the 
 staff of the legation. 
 
 No. 46. 
 
 Baron Cfrenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Spanish Government un- 
 dertake the custody of Belgian 
 interests in Germany, and are 
 to-day sending telegraphic in- 
 structions to their Ambassador 
 at Berlin. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 Le Gouvernement espagnol se 
 charge des int^rSts beiges en 
 Allemagne. II donne aujourd'hui 
 t^legraphiquement des instruc- 
 tions a son Ambassadeur h. 
 Berlin. 
 
 (Sign^) Baron GEEXIEE. 
 
 (See No. 33.) 
 
 No. 47. 
 
 Baron Ghiillanme, Belgian Minister at Paiis, to Monsie-ur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Paris, August 5, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le IMinistre, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de vous faire 
 parvenir, sous ce pli, une copie de 
 la notification de I'^tat de guerre 
 existant entre la France et lAlle- 
 magne, qui m'a ^te remise aujour- 
 d'hui. 
 
 Veuillez agr&r, &c. 
 (Signe) Baeok GUILLAUME. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 I hate the honour to enclose 
 herewith a copy of the notifica- 
 tion of a state of war between 
 France and Germany, which has 
 been communicated to me to-day. 
 
43 
 
 Enclosure in No. 47. 
 
 Le • Gonvernement Imperial 
 allemand, apr^s avoir laiss4 ses 
 forces armtes franchir la fron- 
 tifere et se livrer sur le territoire 
 franqais k divers actes de meurtre 
 et de violence ; apr^s avoir viol^ 
 la neutrality du Grand-Duch^ de 
 Luxembourg au m^pris des stipu- 
 lations de la Convention de 
 Londres du 11 mai 1867 et de la 
 Convention de La Haye du 
 
 18 octobre 1907, sur les droits et 
 devoirs des Puissances et des 
 personnes neutres en cas de 
 guerre sur terre (articles 1^'' ^ 11), 
 conventions sign^es de lui ; apres 
 avoir adresse un ultimatum au 
 Gonvernement Eoyal de Belgi(Jue, 
 tendant a exiger le passage des 
 forces allemandes par le territoire 
 bfelge, en violation des trait^s du 
 
 19 avril 1839 ^galement signds 
 par lui et de la susdite convention 
 de La Haye ; 
 
 A d^clard la guerre k la France 
 le 3 aout 1914, a 18 heures 45 ; 
 
 Le Gouverijement de la Edpu- 
 blique se voit dans ces conditions 
 oblig^ de son cot^ de recourir k la 
 force des armes. 
 
 II a en consequence I'honneur 
 de faire savoir par la pr^sente au 
 Gouvernement Koyal que I'^tat 
 de guerre existe entre la France 
 et I'Allemagne k dater du 3 aout, 
 18 heures 45. 
 
 Le Gouvernement de la E^pu- 
 blique proteste aupres de toutes 
 les nations civilis^es et sp^ciale- 
 ment auprfes des Gouvernements 
 signataires des conventions et 
 trait^s susrappel4s, centre la vio- 
 lation-par I'Empire allemand de 
 ses engagements internationaux ; 
 il fait toutes reserves quant aux 
 reprdsailles qu'il pourrait se voir 
 amen^ k exercer eontre un ennemi 
 
 Whekeas the Imperial German 
 Government have allowed their 
 armed forces to cross the frontier 
 and to indulge in divers acts of 
 murder and violence on French 
 territory ; and whereas they hav& 
 violated the neutrality of the 
 Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, in 
 contravention of the provisions 
 of the Convention of London of 
 May lltli, 1867, and of the Con- 
 vention of The Hague of October 
 18th, 1907, respecting the rights 
 and duties of neutral Powers and 
 persons in the case of war oa 
 land (articles 1-11), fo which, 
 conventions the German Govern- 
 ment were signatories; and 
 whereas they have addressed aik 
 ultimatum to the Belgian Govern- 
 ment in order to secure the 
 passage of the German forces 
 through Belgian territory, there- 
 by violating the treaties of April 
 19th, 1839, also signed by them, 
 and of the above - mentioned 
 Hague Convention ; 
 
 They have declared war against 
 France on Axigust 3rd, 1914, at 
 6-45 P.M. : 
 
 Therefore the French Govern- 
 ment are themselves obliged in 
 these circumstances to resort to 
 arms. 
 
 The French Government there- 
 fore have the honour hereby to 
 inform the Belgian Government 
 that a state of war exists between 
 France and Germany as from 
 August 3rd, at 6'45 p.m. 
 
 The French Government pro- 
 test to all civilised nations, and 
 more particularly to the signatory 
 Governments of the conventions 
 and treaties alluded to above, 
 against Germany's violation of 
 her international undertakings; 
 the French Government reserve 
 to themselves any action respect- 
 ing reprisals which they may feel 
 impelled to take against an enemy 
 
44 
 
 aussi pen soucieiix de la parole 
 donn^e. 
 
 Le Gouvernement de la E^pu- 
 tlique, qui entend observer les 
 principes du droit des gens, se 
 conformera durant les hostilit^s 
 et sous reserve de reciprocity aux 
 dispositions des conventions Inter- 
 nationales sign^es par la France 
 concernant le droit de la guerre 
 sur lerre et sur mer. 
 
 La pr^sente notification faite 
 en conformity de I'article 2 de 
 ladite II' Convention de La Haye 
 du 18 octobre 1907 relative k 
 I'ouverture des bostilit(^-s est 
 remise a M. le Ministre de 
 Belgique i Paris, le 5 aout 1914, 
 ^14 heures. 
 
 who pays so little regard to his 
 plighted word. 
 
 The French Government, desi- 
 rous of observing the principles of 
 in ternational law, will, on condition 
 of reciprocity, act, during hostili- 
 ties, in conformity with the pro- 
 visions of the international con- 
 ventions signed by France on the 
 subject of the rights of war on 
 land and on sea. 
 
 This notification, which is made 
 in accordance with article 2 of 
 the said Second Hague Conven- 
 tion of October 18th, 1907, 
 respecting the opening of hostili- 
 ties, is communicated to the 
 Belgian Minister at Paris on 
 August 5th, 1914, at 2 p.ii. 
 
 No. 48. 
 
 Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British 
 Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Bavignon. Belgian Minister for 
 Fweign Affairs. 
 
 Je suis charge d'iu former le 
 Gouvernement beige que le Gou- 
 vernement de Sa Majeste britan- 
 nique considfere Taction commune 
 dans le but de r^sister k I'Alle- 
 magne comme etant en vigueur 
 et justifi^e par le traits de 1839. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 I AM instructed to inform the 
 Belgian Grovernment that His 
 Britannic Majesty's Government 
 consider joint action with a view 
 to resisting Germany to be in 
 force and to be justified by the 
 Treaty of 1839. 
 
 No. 49. 
 
 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minuter at London, to Monsieur Bavignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, August 5, 1914. 
 
 (Tdl^gramme.) 
 
 L'Angleteere accepte de co- 
 op^rer comme garante k la defense 
 de notre territoire. La flotte 
 anglaise assurera le Kbre passage 
 de I'Escaut pour le ravitaille- 
 ment d'Anvers. 
 
 (Signe) CoMTE DK LALAING. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Great Britain agrees to take 
 joint action in her capacity of 
 guaranteeing Power for the de- 
 fence of Belgian territory. The 
 British fleet will ensure the free 
 passage of the Scheldt for the 
 provisioning of Antwerp. 
 
45 
 
 No. 50. 
 
 Belgian Minister at The Saugue to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian- 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The Hague, August 5, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (T^l^gramme.) (Telegram.) 
 
 Le balisage de guerre va etre The war buoying is about to^ba 
 ^tabli. established. 
 
 (Sign^) Baeon FALLOK 
 
 (See No. 29.) 
 
 No. 51. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Baron Cfrenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid. 
 
 Brussels, August 5, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 ExPRiMEZ au Gouvernement 
 espagnol les remerciements trfes 
 siuc^res du Gouvernement du 
 Eoi. 
 
 (Signe) DAVIGNON. 
 
 Please express to the Spanish 
 Government the sincere thanks 
 of the Belgian Government. 
 
 (See No. 46.) 
 
 No. 52. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 
 
 Brussels, August 5, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de vous faire 
 savoir que les Ministres de France 
 et de Eussie ont fait ce matin 
 une demarche apres de moi, pour 
 me faire connaitre la volenti de 
 leurs Gouvernements de r^pondre 
 a notre appel et de coop&er 
 avec I'Angleterre k la defense de 
 notre territoire. 
 
 Veuillez agrfer, &c. 
 
 (Sign6) DAVIGNON. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE the honour to inform 
 you that the French and Russian 
 Ministers made a communication 
 to me this morning informing me 
 of the willingness of their Govern- 
 ments to respond to our appeal, 
 and to co-operate with Great 
 Britain in the defence of Belgian 
 territory. 
 
46 
 
 No. 53. 
 
 Jonkheer de Weede, Nethexlwnds Mmister at Brussels,. to Monsieur 
 Davignon, Belgian Minister for. Foreign Affairs. 
 
 .Brvisspls, August 6, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai Thonneur de faire parvenir 
 ci-joint k votre Excellence ua 
 exemplaire du num^ro extra- 
 ordinaire du " Staatscourant," 
 contenant la d(5claratiou de 
 neutralite des Pays-Bas dans la 
 guerre entre la Belgique et I'AUe- 
 magne, et I'Angleterre et I'Alle- 
 ruagne. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 <Sign'd) Jonkheer de WEEDE. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir. 
 
 I HAVE the honour to transmit to 
 your Excellency herewith a copy 
 of the special edition of the " Staats- 
 courant," containing the declara- 
 tion of the neutrality of the 
 Netherlands in the war between 
 Belgium and Germany, and 
 between Great Britain and Ger- 
 many. 
 
 Enclosure to No. 53. 
 Laws, Deckees, Nominations, &c. 
 
 Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The Ministers of Foreign 
 Affairs, Justice, Marine, Wa,r, 
 and the Colonies, authorised to 
 that effect by Her Majesty the 
 Queen, make known to all whom 
 it may concern that the Nether- 
 lands Government will observe 
 strict neutrality in the war 
 which has broken out between 
 Great Britain and Germany, and 
 Belgium and Germany, Powers 
 friendly to the Netherlands, and 
 that, with aview to the observance 
 of this neutrality, the following 
 dispositions have been taken : — 
 
 Les Ministres des Affaires 
 Diltrangeres, de la Justice, de la 
 Marine, de la Gaerre et des 
 Colonies, autoris^s k cette fin par 
 Sa Majesty la Eeine, portent k la 
 «onnaissance de tons ceux que la 
 chose concerne, que le Gouverne- 
 ment n^erlandais observera dans 
 la guerre qui a delate entre les 
 Puissances amies des Pays-Bas, 
 Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne, 
 et Belgique et Allemagne, une 
 stricte neutrality, et qu'en vue de 
 I'observation de cette neutrality 
 les dispositions suivantes ont ^td 
 arret^es : 
 
 Article 1". 
 
 Dans les limites du territoire 
 <le rilltat, coniprenant le territoire 
 ■du Eoyaume en Europe, outre 
 les colonies et possessions dans 
 •d'autres parties du monde, aucun 
 genre d'hostilites n'est permis et 
 ce territoire ne peut servir de base 
 pour des operations hostiles. 
 
 Article 1. 
 Within the limits of the terri- 
 tory of the State, including the 
 territory of the Kingdom in 
 Europe and the colonies and 
 possessions in other parts of the 
 world, no hostilities of any kind 
 are permitted, neither may this 
 territory serve as a base for 
 hostile operations. 
 
47 
 
 Akticle 2. 
 
 M roccupation d'une partie 
 quelGoaque du ferritoire de I'^tat 
 par tm bellig^rant, ni le passage 
 4.tra¥er-s fie territoire par voie de 
 terre. par des troupes ou des con- 
 sols de munitions appartenant 5, 
 \ln des belUg^rants ne spntpermis, 
 lIo^i<gJ^si^/L^^e le passage k travers 
 le -territoire situ^ k I'int^rieur des 
 oaux territoriales n^erlandaises 
 par des navires de guerre ou des 
 bS,timeiits des bellig^rants as- 
 similfe k ceux-ci. 
 
 ARTICLE 3. 
 
 Les' tlxiUpes 6u-les militaires, 
 appartenant aux bellig^rants ou 
 ■destines k ceux-ci et arrivant sur 
 le territoire de I'^tat par voie 
 de terre seront imm^diatement 
 d^sarm^s et-intern^s jusqu'^ la fin 
 de la guerre. 
 
 Les navires de guerre ou Mtir 
 ments assimiMs A ces derniers,. 
 ■appartenant k un belligerant, qui 
 contreviendront aux prescriptions . 
 des articles 2,: 4 ou 7, ne pourront. 
 <}uitter ice ite^ritoire avant la fin. 
 de la guerre. 
 
 Aeticle 4. 
 
 Les navires de guerre ou blti- 
 meM&i assimilds 4 ces. derniers, 
 qui appaifciennent k un belU- 
 g^rant, .n'auEont pas uGces au 
 territoire de I'i^tat. 
 
 Akticle 5. 
 
 La disposition de I'article 4 
 n'est pas applicable : 
 
 1° aux navires de guerre ou 
 b^timents d'un belligerant assi- 
 ifliles k ces derniers, et qui par 
 suite d'avarie ou de I'dtat de la 
 mer sont tenus d'entrer dans un 
 des ports ou - rades de I'^tat. Les 
 navires pourront quitter lesdits 
 ports ou rades des que les circon- 
 stances qui les out contraints de 
 s'y r^fugier auront cess^ d'exister; 
 
 Article 2.' ■ 
 
 Neither the occupation of any 
 part of the territory of the State 
 by a belligerent nor the passage 
 across ■ this territory by land is 
 permitted to the troops or 
 convoys of munitions belonging, 
 to the belligerents, nor is thg; 
 passage across the territory 
 situated within the territorial, 
 viraters of the Netherlands ■ by^ 
 the warships or ships assi- 
 milated thereto of the belligerents, 
 permitted.' 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 Troops or soldiers belonging to 
 the belligerents or destined for 
 them arriving in the territory of 
 the State by land will be imme- 
 diately disarmed and interned 
 until the termination of the war. 
 
 Warships, or ships assimilated; 
 thereto belonging to a belligerent, 
 who contravenes the provisions of 
 articles 2, 4, ,or 7 will not be per- 
 mitted to leave the said territory 
 ujatil the end of the war. 
 
 Article 4. 
 
 No warships or ships assimilated 
 thereto ■■ belonging to any of 
 the belligerents shall have access 
 to the said territory. 
 
 Article 5. 
 
 The provisions of article 4 do 
 not apply to : — 
 
 1. Warships or ships assimilated 
 thereto which are forced to 
 enter the ports or roadstead of 
 the State on account of damages 
 or the state of the sea. Such 
 ships may leave the said ports or 
 roadsteads as soon as the circum- 
 stances which have driven them 
 to take shelter there shall have 
 ceased to exist. 
 
43 
 
 2° aux navires de guerre ou 
 Mtiments assimil^,s, appartenant 
 k un bellig^rant, et qui font escale 
 dans un port ou una rade situ^s 
 dans le territoire des colonies et 
 possessions d'outre-mer.exclusive- 
 ment dans le but de completer 
 leur provision de denizes alinaen- 
 taires ou de combustibles. Ces 
 navires devront repartir d^s que 
 les circonstances qui les ont forces 
 k faire escale ont cess^ d'exister, 
 avec cette condition que le sejour 
 en rade ou dans ie port ne pourra 
 durer plus de ^dngt-quatre heures ; 
 
 3° aux navires de guerre ou 
 b§,tiinents assimil^s, appartenant 
 k un bellig^rant, et qui sont 
 utilises exclusivement pour une 
 mission religieuse, scientifique, ou 
 humanitaire. 
 
 Article 6. 
 
 Les navires de guerre ou bS,ti- 
 ments assimil^s appartenant h 
 un bellig^rant, ne peuvent r^parer 
 leurs avaries dans les ports ou 
 rades de I'liltat qu'en tant que 
 cette reparation est indispensable 
 k la s^curit^ de la navigation, et 
 ils ne pourront en aucune faqon 
 accroitre leurs capacit^s de 
 combat. 
 
 Article 7. 
 
 Les navires de guerre ou b^ti- 
 ments assimil^s, appartenant k 
 im belligerant, et qui, au com- 
 mencement de la guerre, se trou- 
 veraient sur le territoire de I'Etat, 
 eont tenus de le quitter dans les 
 vingt-quatre heures de la publi- 
 cation de la pr^sente. 
 
 Article 8. 
 
 Si des navires de guerre ou 
 b&timents assimil^s appartenant 
 k divers bellig^rants se trouvent, 
 en mSme temps, dans les con- 
 ditions vis^es k I'article 5, dans 
 une meme partie du monde, et 
 sur le territoire de I'^tat, un delai 
 d'au moins vingt-quatre heures 
 
 2. Warships or ships assimilated 
 thereto belonging to a belligerenti 
 which anchor in a port or roadstead 
 in the colonies or oversea posses- 
 sions exclusively with the object 
 of completing their provision of 
 foodstuffs or fuel These ships 
 must leave as soon as the cir- 
 cumstances which have forced 
 them to anchor shall have ceased 
 to exist, subject to the condition 
 that their stay, in the roadstead 
 or port shall not exceed twenty- 
 four hours. 
 
 3. Warships or ships assimilated 
 thereto belonging to a beUigerenfc 
 employed exclusively on a re- 
 ligious, scientific, or humanitarian 
 mission. 
 
 Article 6. 
 
 Warships or ships assimilated 
 thereto belonging to a belligerent 
 may only execute such repairs in 
 the ports and roadsteads of the 
 State as are indispensable to their 
 seaworthiness, and they may in no 
 way increase their fighting capa- 
 cities. 
 
 Article 7. 
 
 Warships or ships assimilated 
 thereto belonging to a belligerent 
 who may at the commencement of 
 war be within the territory of th& 
 State must leave within twenty- 
 four hours from the moment of the 
 publication of this declaxatiou. 
 
 Article 8. 
 
 If warships or ships assimilated 
 thereto belonging to dififerent belli- 
 gerents find themselves at the same, 
 time, in the conditions set forth in 
 article 5, in the same part of the. 
 world and within the territory of 
 the State, a delay of at least 
 twenty-four hours must elapse 
 
49 
 
 doit s'&ouler entre le depart des 
 navires de chacun des belli- 
 g^rants. A moins de circon- 
 stances speciales, I'ordre de depart 
 est d^termin^ par I'ordre d'arrivde. 
 Un navire de guerre ou un blti- 
 meiit assirail^, appartenant a un 
 bellig^rant, ne peut quitter le 
 territoire de I'fitat que vingt- 
 quatre heures apres le depart 
 d'un navire de commerce portant 
 le pavilion de I'autre belligerant. 
 
 Article 9. 
 
 Les navires de guerre ou b§,ti- 
 ments assimil^s, appartenant k un 
 belligerant, vis& k I'article 5 et 
 a I'article 7, ne peuvent Stre ravi- 
 taillds en denr^es alimentaires 
 dans les ports et les rades du pays 
 que dans lamesure n^cessaire pour 
 parfaire leurs provisions jusqu'^ la 
 limite normale du temps de paix. 
 
 De m§me, ils ne peuvent 
 charger de combustible que dans 
 la mesure n^cessaire pour pouvoir 
 atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils 
 ont encore k bord, le port le plus 
 rapproch4 de leur propre pays. 
 
 Un meme b^timent ne peut 
 «tre ravitailie k nouveau en com- 
 bustible qa'k I'expiration d'une 
 p^riode de trois mois au moins 
 aprfes son precedent ravitaille- 
 ment dans le territoire de I'^tat. 
 
 between the departure of eac'i 
 respective belligerent ship. Ex- 
 cept in special circumstances, the 
 order of departure shall be deter- 
 mined by the order of arrival. 
 A warship or ship assimilated 
 thereto belonging to a belligerent 
 may only leave the territory of 
 the State twenty-four hours after 
 the departure of a merchant ship 
 which flies the flag of another 
 belligerent. 
 
 Article 9. 
 
 Warships or ships assimilated 
 thereto belonging to a belligerent 
 to which articles 5 and 7 are appli- 
 cable may only be provisioned 
 with foodstuffs in the ports and 
 roadsteads of the country to the 
 extent necessary to bring their 
 provisions up to the normal limit 
 in time of peace. 
 
 Similarly they can only be 
 supplied with fuel to the extent 
 necessary to enable them, with 
 the stock they already have on 
 board, to reach the nearest port 
 of their own country. 
 
 The same vessel cannot again 
 be provided with fuel until a 
 period of at least three months 
 shall have elapsed since it was 
 last provisioned in the territory 
 of the State. 
 
 Article 10. 
 
 Une prise ne peut Stre amende 
 dans le territoire que lorsqu'elle 
 €st incapable de naviguer, qu'elle 
 tient mal la mer, qu'elle manque 
 de combustible ou de denrfes 
 alimentaires. 
 
 EUe doit s'^loigner dfes que la 
 cause de son entree dans le terri- 
 toire cosse d'exister. 
 
 Si elle ne le fait pas, I'ordre 
 lui sera donne de partir imm4- 
 diatement; en cas de refus, il 
 sera fait usage des moyens dis- 
 ponibles pour lib^rer la prise avec 
 [1037] 
 
 Article 10. 
 
 A prize may only be brought 
 into Dutch territory if such prize 
 is unnavigable, or unseaworthy, 
 or short of fuel or foodstuffs. 
 
 Such prize must leave as soon 
 as the reasons which caused her 
 to enter Dutch territory cease to 
 exist. 
 
 Should such prize fail to do so, 
 immediate orders shall be given 
 her to leave. In the event of a 
 refusal, all possible means shall 
 be employed to liberate the prize. 
 
50 
 
 ses oificiers et son Equipage, et 
 pour interner 1' Equipage placid k 
 bord par le belllig^rant qiii a fait 
 la prise. 
 
 Article 11. 
 
 II est interdit, sur le terricoire 
 de ritat, de former des corps 
 combattants ou d'ouvrir des 
 bureaux de reerutement au profit 
 des bellig^rants. 
 
 Article 12. 
 
 II est interdit, sur le territoire 
 de I'Etat, de prendre du service 
 k bord de navires de guerre ou de 
 batiments assimil^s. 
 
 Article 13. 
 
 II est interdit, sur le territoire 
 de rfitat, d'am^nager, d'armer ou 
 d'^quiper des navires destines k 
 des fins militaires au profit d'un 
 belligerant, ou de foixrnir ou con- 
 duire k un belligerant de tels 
 navires. 
 
 • Article 14. 
 
 II est interdit, suv le territoire 
 de riiltat, de fournirdes amies ou 
 des munitions k des navires de 
 guerre ou batiments assimiles 
 appartenant a un belligerant, ou 
 de leur venir en aide d'une 
 maniere quelconque en vue de 
 I'augmentation de leur Equipage 
 ou de leur am^nagement. 
 
 Article 15. 
 
 II est interdit, sur le territoire 
 de r£tat, sauf autorisation pr^- 
 alable des autorit^s locales com- 
 p^tentes, de faire des reparations 
 aux navires de guerre ou b§,ti- 
 ments assimiles appartenant k 
 un belligerant, ou de leur fournir 
 des provisions de bouche ou de 
 combustible. 
 
 Article 16. 
 
 II est interdit, sur le territoire 
 de r£tat, de cooperer au degr^e- 
 
 with her officers and crew, and to 
 intern the crew placed on board 
 by the belligerent who has taken 
 it as prize. 
 
 Article 11. 
 
 It is forbidden, in State terri- 
 tory, to form a corps of com- 
 batants or to open recruiting 
 offices on behalf of the belli- 
 gerents. 
 
 Article 12. 
 It is forbidden, in State terri- 
 tory, to take service on board 
 warships or ships assimilated 
 thereto. 
 
 Article 13. 
 
 It is forbidden, in State terri- 
 tory, to equip, arm, or man vessels 
 intended for military purposes on 
 behalf of a belligerent, or to 
 furnish or deliver such vessels to 
 a belligerent. 
 
 Article 14. 
 
 It is f 01 bidden in State terri- 
 tory to supply arms or ammu- 
 nition to warships or ships 
 assimilated thereto belonging to 
 a belligerent, or to come to their 
 assistance in any manner whatso- 
 ever with a view to augment 
 their crew or their equipment. 
 
 Article 15. 
 It is forbidden in State territory 
 failing previous authorisation by 
 the competent local authorities, 
 to repair warships or ships 
 assimilated thereto belonging to 
 a belligerent, or to supply them 
 with victuals or fuel. 
 
 Article 16. 
 
 It is forbidden- in State terri- 
 tory to take part in the dis- 
 
51 
 
 ment ou k la reparation de prises, 
 sauf en ce qui est n^cessaire pour 
 les rendre propres k tenir la mar ; 
 ainsi que d'acheter des prises ou 
 des marchandises confisqutes, et 
 de les reoevoir en ^change, en 
 don ou en d^pot. 
 
 Article 17. 
 
 Leterritoire de I'fitat comprend 
 la mer coti^re sur une largeur de 
 3 milles marins a raison de 60 par 
 degr^ de latitude, k partir de la 
 laisse de la basse mer. 
 
 En ce qui concerne les baies, 
 cette distance de 3 milles marins 
 est mesuree k partir d'une ligue 
 droite tirde a travers la bale aussi 
 pr6s que possible de I'entr^e, au 
 point ou I'Duverture de la bale ne 
 d^passa pas 10 milles marins, k 
 raison de 60 par degr^ de latitude. 
 
 Aeticle 18. 
 
 En outre, I'iutention est attir^e 
 sur les articles 100, 1°, et 205 du 
 Code penal; "Indisch Staatsblad," 
 1905, No. 62; Art. 7, 4°, de la 
 loi sur la quality de N^erlandais 
 et sur le domicile (" Nederlandsch 
 Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268; 1910, 
 No. 216) ; art. 2, No. 3, de la loi 
 sur la quality de sujet neerlandais 
 (" NederlandschStaatsblad," 1910, 
 No. 55; "Indisch Staatsblad," 
 1910, No. 296 ; art. 54 et 55 du 
 Code pdnal de Suriname ; art. 54 
 et 55 du Code penal de Curagao). 
 
 De meme, I'attention des com- 
 mandants de navires, armateurs 
 et affrdteurs, est attir^e sur le 
 danger et les inconvenients, aux- 
 quels lis s exposeraient en ne 
 respectant pas le blocus effect if 
 des belligdrants, en transportant 
 de la contrebande de guerre ou 
 des d^peches militaires pour les 
 bell^erants {k moins qu'il ne 
 [1037J 
 
 mantling or repairing of prizes; 
 except in so far as is necessary to 
 make them seaworthy; also to 
 purchase prizes or confiscated 
 goods, and to receive them in 
 exchange, in gift, or on deposit. 
 
 Article' 17. 
 
 The State territory comprises 
 the coastal waters to a distance 
 of ■ 3 nautical miles, reckoning 
 60 to the degree of latitude, from 
 low-water mark. 
 
 As regards inlets, this distance 
 of 3 nautical miles is measured 
 from a straight line drawn across 
 the inlet at the point nearest the 
 entrance where the mouth of the 
 inlet is not wider than 10 nautical 
 miles, reckoning 60 to the degree 
 of latitude. 
 
 Article 18. 
 
 Further, attention is called to 
 Articles 100, Section 1, and 205 
 of the Penal Code ; " Indisck 
 Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62; Ar- 
 ticle 7, Section 4, of the Law 
 respecting the status of Nether- 
 lands nationality, and respecting 
 domicile (" Nederlandsch Staats- 
 blad," 1892, No. 268; 1910,. 
 No. 216); Article 2, No. 3, of ^the 
 Law respecting the status of 
 Netherlands nationality (" Neder- 
 landsch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 55 ;. 
 " Indisch Staatsblad," ' 1910, 
 No. 296 ; Articles 51 and 55 of 
 the Penal Code of Surinam; 
 Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal 
 Code of Cura^oa). 
 
 Similarly, the attention of cam- 
 manding oflticers, owners, and 
 charterers of ships is called to 
 the dangers and inconveniences 
 to whicii they would expose 
 themselves by disregarding the 
 effective blockade of belligerents, 
 by carrying contraband of war, 
 or militaiy despatches for belli- 
 gerents (except in the course 
 E 2 
 
52 
 
 s'agisse du service postal rc'gulier) 
 oil en ex&utant pour eux d'autres 
 services de transport. 
 
 Quiconqiie se rendraitcoupable 
 d'actes pr^vus ci-dessus, s'ex- 
 poserait a toutes Ics consequences 
 de ces actes, et ne pourrait obtenir 
 k cet (igard aucune protection ni 
 intervention du Gouvernement 
 nuerlandais. 
 
 of the regular postal service), or 
 by rendering them other trans- 
 port services. 
 
 Any person guilty of the acts 
 aforesaid would expose himself to 
 all the consequences of those acts, 
 and would not be able, as regards 
 them, to obtain any protection cr 
 intervention on the part of the 
 Netherlands Government. 
 
 No. 54. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Baro% Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hagtie. 
 
 Brussels, August 6, 1914. 
 
 \T(51egramme.) 
 
 Veuillez communiquer an 
 Gouvernement n^erlandais la note 
 «uivante: 
 
 Le Gouvernement beige a pris 
 note de I'^tablissement du balisage 
 ■de guerre sur I'Escaut et de ce 
 ■que le Gouvernement hollandais 
 ■assurera le maintien do la naviga- 
 tion. 
 
 II coriviendrait que la naviga- 
 tion put se faire k pavtir de 
 80 minutes avant le lever du 
 soleil jiisqu'4 30 minutes apros 
 son coucher et que I'^change des 
 pilotes se fit a Bath. 
 
 Si d^sireux qu'il soit de con- 
 sentir aux demaudes duGouverne- 
 ment hollandais, le Gouverne- 
 rment beige estime qu'il a lieu, a 
 raison des ports du littoral, de 
 niaintenir les bateaux-phares de 
 "Wielingen et de Wandelaar, ainsi 
 que les bouses du cbenal de 
 Wielingen. 
 
 (Sign^) DAYIGNOK 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Please communicate the fol- 
 lowing note to the Netherlands 
 Government : — 
 
 The Belgian Government have 
 taken note of the establishment 
 of war buoying on the Scheldt 
 and of the fact that the Nether- 
 lands Government will ensure 
 the maintenance of navigation. 
 
 It would be convenient that 
 navigation should be possible 
 from 30 minutes before sun- 
 rise to 30 minutes after sun- 
 set, and that the exchange of 
 pilots should take place at Bath. 
 
 With every desire to fall in 
 with the requests of the Nether- 
 lands Government, the Belgian 
 Government think that it is 
 desirable in the interests of the 
 littoral ports to retain the light- 
 ships of Wielingen and of Wan- 
 delaar, and also the buoys of the 
 Wielingen Channel. 
 
 (See No. 50.) 
 
53 
 
 No. 55. 
 
 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hajm, to Monsieur Davirjnon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The Hague, August 6, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 N.A.VIGATION on the Scheldt is 
 allowed from daybreak and so 
 long as it is light. The Wie- 
 lingen buoys will be replaced. 
 The exchange of pilots at Hans- 
 weert is easier and better or- 
 ganised. Are you particularly 
 anxious to have Bath ? 
 
 (Tdl^gramme.) 
 
 La navigation sur I'Escaut pent 
 se faire dis I'aube et tant qu'il 
 fait clair. Les bouses de Wielingen 
 seront retablies. L'eehange des 
 pilotes k Hanaweert est plus 
 facile et mieux organise. Insistez- 
 vous pour Bath. 
 
 (Sign^) Bakon PALLON. 
 
 No. 56. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affair, to 
 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 
 
 Brussels, August 7, 1914. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 Veoillez exprimer au Gou- 
 vernement n^erlandais les re- 
 merciements sinc^res du Gou- 
 vernement beige pour les mesures 
 prises pour assivrer la navigation 
 sur I'Escaut. Le Gouvernement 
 est d'accord avec le Gouverne- 
 ment hoUandais au sujet de la 
 dur^e de la navigation. II avait 
 propose Bath, mais accepte Hans- 
 weert, puisque ce port est mieux 
 outille pour l'eehange des 
 pilotes. 
 
 (Sign(5) DAVIGNON. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Please express to the Nether- 
 lands Government the sincere 
 thanks of the Belgian Government 
 for the measures taken to secure 
 navigation on the Scheldt. The 
 Belgian Government are in agree- 
 ment with the Netherlands 
 Government on the subject of the 
 extent of navigation. .They had 
 proposed Bath, but accept Hans- 
 weert, since this port has better 
 facihties for the exchange of 
 pilots. 
 
 No. 57. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the 
 Belgian Ministers at Paris and London. 
 
 Brussels, August 7, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (T^l^gramme.) (Telegram.) 
 
 La Belgique souhaite que la Belgium trusts that the war 
 guerre ne soit pas eteudue en will not be extended to Central 
 
54 
 
 Afi'ique ceiitrale. Le Gouver- 
 neardu Congo telge a reij.u pour 
 iujlTiictions d'obsei'ver une atti- 
 tude strictement defensive. Priez 
 le Gouvernement frangais [an- 
 glais] de faire savoir si son 
 intention est de proclamer la 
 neutralite an Congo franqais 
 [colonies britanniques du bassin 
 conyentionnel du Congo], con- 
 fovm^ment a I'article 11 de 
 I'Acte general de Berlin. Un 
 t^legrampie de Boma annonce 
 que les hostilites sont probables 
 enlre Friinq.ais et Allemands dans 
 rOnbanghi. 
 
 (Signe) DAYIGXOX. 
 
 Africa. The Governor of the 
 Belgian Congo has received in- 
 structions to maintain a Strictly 
 defensive attitude. Please ask 
 the French Government [British 
 Government] whether they intend 
 to proclaim the neutrality of the 
 French Congo [British colonies 
 in the conventional basin of the 
 Congo], in accordance with article 
 11 of the Greneral Act of Berlin. 
 A telegram from Boma reports 
 that hostilities are probable be- 
 tween the French and Germans 
 in the Ubangi. 
 
 Xo. 58. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Ministers at Paris and London. 
 
 Brussels, August 7, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 CoMMj: suite a mon telegramme 
 <le ce matin, j'ai I'honueur de 
 vons prier de porter k la con- 
 naissance du Gouvernement fran- 
 <;,ais [anglais] I'information sui- 
 vante : 
 
 Tout en piescrivant au Gouver- 
 neur General du Congo de j)reudre 
 des mesures de defense sur les 
 frouti^res communes de la colonic 
 beige et des colonies allemandes 
 de I'Est africain et du Kameroun, 
 le Gouvernement du Eoi a invite 
 ce liaut fonctionnaire a s'abstenir 
 de toute action offensive centre 
 ces colonies. 
 
 Yw la mission ci\ilisa trice com- 
 mune aux nations colonisatrices, 
 le Gouvernement beige desire, en 
 effet, par un souci d'humanit^, ne 
 pas dtendre le champ des hos- 
 tilites h. I'Afrique centrale. II 
 lie prendra done point I'initiative 
 d'infliger une pareille epreuve 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 With reference to my telegram 
 of this morning, I have the honour 
 to request you to bring to the 
 notice of the French [British] 
 Government the following infor- 
 mation : — 
 
 While instructions have been 
 sent to the Governor-General of 
 the Congo to take defensive 
 measures on the common frontiers 
 of the Belgian colony and of the 
 German colonies of East Africa 
 and the Cameroons, the Belgian 
 Government have suggested to 
 that of&cer that he should abstain 
 from all offensive action against 
 those colonies. 
 
 In view of the civilising mis- 
 sion common to colonising nations, 
 the Belgian Government desire, 
 in effect, for humanitarian rea- 
 sons, not to extend the field of 
 hostilities to Central Africa. 
 They will, therefore, not take tlie 
 initiative of putting such a strain 
 
55 
 
 h la civilisation dans cette region 
 et les . forces militaires qu'il y 
 possede n'entreront en action que 
 dans . le cas oi\ elles devraient 
 repousser uiie attaque directe 
 centre ses possessions africaiues. 
 
 J'attacherais du prix k savoir 
 si le Gonvernement de la E^pu- 
 blique [deSa Majesty britannique] 
 partage cette maniere de voir et, 
 le cas ^chdant, s'il entre dans ses 
 intentions, ci I'o^casion du conflit 
 actuel, de se pr^valoir de la 
 disposition de I'article 11 de 
 I'Acte g^ndral de Berlin pour 
 placer sous le rt^gime de la 
 neutraUte celles de ses colonies 
 qui sont comprises dans le bassin 
 conventionnel du Congo. 
 
 J'adresse une communication 
 identique k votre coUegue k 
 londres [Paris.]. 
 
 Veuillez agrfer, &c. 
 
 (Signe) DAVIGNON. 
 
 on civilisation in that region, and 
 the military forces which they 
 possess there, will only go into 
 action in, the event of their 
 having to repel a direct attack on- 
 their African possessions. 
 
 I should be glad to. . learn 
 whether the French. [British] 
 Government share this view and 
 in that case whether it is their 
 intention, during the present, 
 conflict, to avail themselves of 
 article 11 of the General Act of 
 Berlin to neutralise such of their 
 colonies as are contained in the 
 conventional basin of the Congo. 
 
 I am addressing an identic 
 communication to your colleague 
 at London [Paris]. 
 
 No. 59. 
 
 Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Paris, August- 8, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai eu I'honneur de parler au 
 President de la Eepublique de 
 votre ' t^l^gramme d'hier. Je 
 I'avais re^u dans la soirde et I'avais 
 imm^diatement communique au 
 Minist^re des Affaires Etrang^res. 
 On avait demand^ k rdfidchir 
 avant de me repondre. 
 
 Monsieur Poincare m'a promis 
 de parler de cette question 
 aujourd'hui au Ministre des Colo- 
 nies. A premiere vue, il ne 
 verrait guSre d'inconv^nient k 
 proclamer la neutrality du Congo 
 franqais, mais il reserve cependant 
 sa r^ponse. II croit que des fails 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE had the honour of 
 speaking to the President of the 
 Eepublic with respect to your 
 telegram of yesterday. I had 
 received it during the ev&ning 
 and had immediately communi- 
 cated it to the Ministry for 
 Foreign Affairs. They asked for 
 time to consider it before answer- 
 ing. 
 
 Monsieur Poincar^haspromised 
 me to speak on this subject to- 
 day to the Minister of the 
 Colonies. At first sight he could 
 see little difficulty in proclaiming 
 the neutrality of the French 
 Congo, but he nevertheless re- 
 serves his reply. He believes 
 
56 
 
 de guerre ont deja eclatd dans 
 rOubanghi. II a profit^ de la 
 circonstance pour me rappeler que 
 la protection que nous accorde la 
 France s'etend aussi a nos colonies 
 et que nous n'avons rien i\ 
 craindre. 
 
 VeuiLlez agr^er, &c. 
 (Sign^) Bauon GUILLAUME. 
 
 that acts of war have already 
 taken place in the Ubangi. He 
 has taken the opportunity to re- 
 mind me that the protection 
 accorded us by France extends 
 also to our colonies and that we 
 have nothing to fear. 
 
 Xo. 60. 
 
 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Buvignon, 
 Belgian Minister fm' Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The Hague, August 9, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Netherlands Jlinister for 
 Foreign Affairs has begged me to 
 convey to you the following 
 information, the United States 
 Minister at Brussels having de- 
 clined to do so : — 
 
 The fortress of Li^ge has been 
 taken by assault after a brave 
 defence. The Grerman Govern- 
 ment most deeply regret that 
 bloody encounters should have 
 resulted from the attitude of the 
 Belgian Government towards 
 Germany. Germany is not com- 
 ing as an enemy into Belgium, it 
 is only through the force of 
 circiimstances that she has had, 
 owing to the military measures of 
 France, to take the grave decision 
 of entering Belgium and occupy- 
 ing Li^ge as a base for her further 
 military operations. Now that 
 the Belgian army has upheld the 
 honour of its arms by its heroic 
 resistance to a very superior 
 force, the German Government 
 beg the King of the Belgians 
 and the Belgian Government to 
 spare Belgium the further horrors 
 of war. The Grerman Govern- 
 ment are ready for any compact 
 with Belgium which can be re- 
 conciled with their arrangements 
 
 (Tel6gramme.) 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires 
 ifitrangferes m'a pri^ de vous 
 transmettre les informations sui- 
 vantes, parce que le Ministre 
 d'Am^riqiie h, Bruxelles s'y re- 
 fuse : 
 
 La forteresse de Liege a ^te prise 
 d'assaut apres une defense 
 courageuse. Le Gouvernement 
 allemand regrette tres profond^- 
 ment que par siiite de I'attitude du 
 Gouvernement beige contre Alle- 
 magne, on en est arriv6 k des ren- 
 contres sanglantes. L'Allemagne 
 ne vient pas en ennemie en 
 Belgique, c'est seulement par la 
 force des ^v^nements qu'elle a du, 
 a cause des mesures militaires de 
 la France, prendre la grave 
 determination d'entrer en Bel- 
 gique et d'occuper Li^ge comme 
 point d'appui pour sea operations 
 militaires ulterieures. Apr^s que 
 Tarm^e beige a par sa resistance 
 h^roique contre une grande sup^- 
 rioritl, maintenu I'honneur de ses 
 armes, le Gouvernement allemand 
 prie le Eoi des Beiges et le 
 Gouvernement beige d'eviter k la 
 Belgique les horreurs ulterieures 
 de la guerre. Le Gouvernement 
 est prSt k tons accords avec la 
 Belgique qui peuvent se concilier 
 
57 
 
 avec ses arrangements (voir pi^ce 
 No. 70) avec la France. L'AUe- 
 magne assure encore solennelle- 
 ment qu'elle n'a pas rintention de 
 s'approprier le territoire beige et 
 que cette intention est loin d'elle, 
 L'AUemagne est toujours prSte k 
 ^vacuer la Belgique aussitdt que 
 I'etat de guerre le lui permettra. 
 
 L'Ambassadeur des fitats-Unis 
 avait pri^ son coUfegue de se 
 charger de cette tentative de 
 mediation. Le Ministre des 
 Affaires Etrangeres a accepte sans 
 enthousiasme cette mission. Je 
 m'en suis chai^^ pour lui faire 
 plaisir. 
 
 (Sign^) Bakon FALLON. 
 
 with France. (See No. 70.) 
 Germany once more gives her 
 solemn assurance that it is not her 
 intention to appropriate Belgian 
 territory to herself and that such 
 an intention is far from her 
 thoughts. Germany is still 
 ready to evacuate Belgium as 
 soon as the state of war will allow 
 her to do so. 
 
 The United States Ambassador 
 had asked his colleague to under- 
 take this attempt at mediation. 
 The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 has accepted this mission without 
 enthusiasm. I have undertaken 
 it to oblige him. 
 
 No. 61. 
 
 Baron Cfuillaume, Belgian Minister ai Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Paris, August 9, 1914. 
 
 (T^Mgramme.) 
 
 Le .Gouvernement fran9ais est 
 trfes dispos6 h, proclamer la neu- 
 trality des possessions da bassin 
 conventionnel du Congo et prie 
 I'Espagne de le proposer a Berlin. 
 
 (Sign^) Bason GUILLAUME. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The French Government are 
 strongly inclined to proclaim the 
 neutrality of the possessions in 
 the conventional basin of the 
 Congo and are begging Spain to 
 make the suggestion at Berlin. 
 
 ISee No. 59.) 
 
 No. 62. 
 
 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The Hague, August 10, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 E]^PONDANT k un appel tel^- 
 phonique, hier k 9 heures du soir, 
 je me suis rendu au D^partement 
 , des Affaires ^trang^res. 
 
 Le Jhr. Loudon m'a dit que 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 In response to a call on the 
 telephone, yesterday evening at 
 9 o'clock, I went to the Depart- 
 ment for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Jonkheer lioudon told me that 
 
58 
 
 mon collogue d'Allemagne sortait 
 deson cabinet et lui avait remis 
 un document que le representant 
 des fitats-Unis k Bruxelles avait 
 refus^ de vous transraettre. 
 
 I^ diplomats am^ricain, cliarg4 
 de la Legation d'Allemagne a 
 Bruxelles, a pretendu qu'il n'a pas 
 recu d'ordres speeiaux de Wash- 
 ington pour intervenir officielle-, 
 ment aupres du Gouvernement 
 beige dans I'int^ret de I'AUe- 
 magne. 
 
 Le Miuistre. d'Amerique a, en 
 conSequeuce, telegraphie k son 
 coUegue a La Haye, lequel a 
 inform^ le reprdsentant allemand 
 du refus de Mr. "Whitlock. 
 
 La premiere demarche a done 
 ete faite par le Gouvernement 
 allemand aupres de I'Ambassa- 
 deur des Etats-Unis a Berlin. 
 
 Dans ces conditions et vii 
 I'urgence que pr^sentent ces 
 affaires, ilonsieur von Miiller a 
 a pri^ le Jhr. Loudon do servir 
 d'intermediaire du Gouvernement 
 allemand apres de vous. 
 
 Son Excellence m'a lu le texte 
 allemand du document. Je n'ai 
 pas cache mon ^tonnement de 
 cette tentative de mediation et sa 
 faible chance de suec^s dans cette 
 forme ; mais uniquement pour 
 etre agreable au ]\Iinistre des 
 Affaires Etrangferes des Pays-Bas 
 j'ai promis de vous tel^graphier 
 imm^diatement ; ce que j'ai fait 
 hier. 
 
 Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, le 
 document allemand dans sou 
 texte original et en traduction. 
 (Sign(§) Baron FALLO^S^ 
 
 my German colleague bad just left 
 his room, and had handed him 
 a document which the United 
 States representative at Brussels 
 had declined to forward to you. 
 
 The United States ofiBcial in 
 charge of the German Legation 
 at Brussels stated that he had 
 received no special instructions 
 from Washington to intervene 
 ofBcially with the Belgian Go- 
 vernment in the interest of 
 Germany. 
 
 The United States Minister 
 consequently telegraphed to his 
 colleague at The Hague, who in- 
 formed the German representative 
 of Mr. Whitlock's refusal. 
 
 The German Government, 
 therefore, took the initial step by 
 approaching the United States 
 Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 In these circumstances, and in 
 view of the urgency of these 
 matters, Herr von jMUller begged 
 Jonkheer Loudon to act as the 
 intermediary of the German 
 Government in this negotiation 
 with you. 
 
 His Excellency read me the 
 German text of the document. I 
 did not hide my astonishment at 
 this attempt at mediation, and its 
 poor chance of success in this 
 form; but, solely in order to 
 oblige the Xetherlands Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, I promised to 
 telegraph to you immediately ; 
 and this I did yesterday. 
 
 You will find the German 
 docimient enclosed in original 
 and translation. 
 
 Enclosure 1 in Xo. 62. 
 
 Die Festung Llittich ist nach tapfrer Gegenwehr im Sturm 
 genommen worden. Die Deutsche Eegierung bedaueit es auf das 
 tiefste, dass es infolge der Stellungnahme der Belgischen Eegierung 
 gegen Deutschland zii bliitigen Zusammenstossen gekommen ist. 
 Deutsehland kommt nicht als Feind nach Belgien.. Nur unter dem 
 
59 
 
 Zwang des Verhaltnisse hat es angesichts der militarischen Massnah" 
 men Frankreiehs den scliweren Entschluss fassen mussen, in Belgien 
 einzuiiicken und Liittioh als Stiitzpunkt fiii" seine weiteren 
 militarischen Operationen besetzen zu niussen. ' Nachdem die 
 Belgisohe Arniee in heldenmutigem Widerstand gegen die grosse 
 tlberlengenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das gianzendste gewahrt hat,' 
 bittet die Deutsche Eegierung seine Majestat den Konig und die 
 Belgische Eegierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken des Krieges zu 
 ersparen. Die Deutsche Eegierung ist zu jedeih Abkommen mit 
 Belgien bereit das sich irgendwie mit Eiicksicht auf seine {voir pi^ce 
 No. 70) Auseinaudersetzung mit Frankreich voreinigen lasst. Deutsch- 
 land versicliert nochmals feierlichst, dass es nieht von der Absicht 
 geleitet gewesen ist sich Be]gisches Gebiet anzueignenv und dass ihm 
 diese Absicht durchaus fem liegt. Deutschland is noch immer bereit 
 das Belgische Konigreich unverziiglich zu raumen, sobald die Kriegs- 
 lage es ihm gestattet. " Der hiesige Amerikanische Botschaf ter ist 
 mit diesem VermittluDgsversuch seines Briisseler Kollegen ein- 
 verstanden." 
 
 Enclosure 2 in No. 62. 
 (Translation.) 
 
 La forteresse de Li^.ge a ^t^ 
 prise d'assaut apres une defense 
 courageuse. Le Gouvernement 
 allemand regrette le plus, pro- 
 fond^ment que par suite de 
 I'attitude du Gouvernement beige 
 centre I'Allemagne on en soit 
 arriv^ k des rencontres sanglantes. 
 LAUemagne ne vieiit pas en 
 ennemie en Belgique. C'est 
 seulement par la force des 
 ^v^nements qu'elle a du, ci cause 
 des mesures militaires de la 
 France, prendre la grave determi- 
 nation d'entrer en Belgique et 
 d'oocuper Liege comme point 
 d'appui pour ses operations mili- 
 taires ultdrieures. Apr^s que 
 I'arm^e beige a, dans une re- 
 sistance hiroique contre line 
 grande superiority, maintenu 
 I'honneur de scs armes de la 
 faqon la plus brillante, le Gou- 
 vernement allemand prie Sa 
 Majeste le Eoi et le Gouverne- 
 ment beige d'^viter k la Belgique 
 les horreurs ult^rieures de la 
 guerre. Le Gouvernement alle- 
 mand est pr^t k tout accord avec 
 la Belgique, qui peut se concilier 
 
 The fortress of Li^ge has been 
 taken by assault after a brave 
 defence. The German Govern- 
 ment most deeply regrets that 
 bloody encounters should have 
 resulted from the Belgian Go- 
 vernment's attitude towards Ger- 
 many. Germany isi not coming 
 as an enemy into Belgium. It is 
 only through the force of circum- 
 stances that she has had, owing 
 to the military measures of France, 
 to take the grave decision of 
 entering Belgium and occupyiug 
 Lidge as a base for her further 
 military operations. Now that 
 the Belgian army has upheld the 
 honour of its arms in the most 
 brilliant manner by its heroic 
 resistance to a very superior 
 force, the German Government 
 beg the King of the Belgians and 
 the Belgian Government to spare 
 Belgium the horrors of war. 
 The German Government are 
 ready for any compact with Bel- 
 gium which can in any way be 
 reconciled with their arrange- 
 ments with France. Germany 
 gives once more her solemn assur- 
 
60 
 
 de n'importe quelle maniere avec 
 ses arrangements avec la France. 
 L'AIlemagne assure encore une 
 fois solennellement quelle n'a 
 pas ^t^ dirig^e par I'intention de 
 s'approprier le territoire beige et 
 que cette intention est loin d'elle. 
 L'AIlemagne est encore toujours 
 prete k ^vacuer la Belgiqiie aussi- 
 t8t que r^tat de la guerre le lui 
 permettra. 
 
 L'Ambassadeur des fitats- 
 Unis ici est d'accord avec cette 
 tentative de mediation de son 
 collogue de Bruxelles. 
 
 anee that she has not been ani- 
 mated by the intention of appro- 
 priating Bel^an territory for 
 herself, and that such an inten- 
 tion is far from her thoughts. 
 Germany is still ready to evacuate 
 Belgium as soon as the state of 
 war will allow her to do so. 
 
 The United States Ambassador 
 here concurs in this attempt at 
 mediation by his colleague in 
 Brussels. 
 
 No. 63. 
 
 Monsieur Daviffiion, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Barun Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 
 
 Brussels, August 10, 1914. 
 
 (T^Mgramme.) 
 
 Le Gouvernement du Eoi a 
 regu les propositions que le Gou- 
 vernement allemand lui a fait 
 parvenir par I'entremise du Gou- 
 vernement neerlandais. II vous 
 transmettra prochainement sa 
 reponse. 
 
 (Sign^) DAVIGNON. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Belgian Government have 
 received the proposals made to 
 them by the German Government 
 through the intermediary of the 
 Netherlands Government. They 
 will forward a reply shortly. 
 
 (See No. 62 and Enclosures.) 
 
 No. 64. 
 
 Monsieur Bavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 
 
 Brussels, August 10, 1914. 
 
 (Telegramme.) 
 
 Uk doute subsiste quant h, la 
 signification du mot "Ausein- 
 andersetzung," que vous tra- 
 duisez par " arrangement." VeuU- 
 lez vous informer si, dans la 
 pens^e du Gouvernement alle- 
 mand, il s'agit des arrangements 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Doubt exists as to the meaning 
 of the word " Auseinanderset- 
 zung," which you translate by 
 " arrangement." Please ascertain 
 whether the German Government 
 have in mind any arrangements 
 which we may have come to with 
 
61 
 
 que nous aurions pris avec la 
 France ou du r^fjlement du diff^- 
 rend entre la France et I'AUe- 
 inagne. 
 
 (Sign^) DAVIGNOK 
 
 France, or a settlement of the 
 dispute between France and Ger- 
 many. 
 
 No. 65. 
 
 Moiisieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 British, Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels. 
 
 Brussels, August 10, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Minis tre, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de faire savoir k 
 votre Excellence que le Miuistre 
 du Eoi a La Haye, k la demande 
 du Ministre des Affaires £tran- 
 g^res des Pays-Bas, nous a trans- 
 mis la proposition suivante du 
 Gouvernement allemand. (Voir 
 piece No. 62, annexe 2.) 
 
 Voici le texte de la r^ponse 
 que le Gouvernement du Eoi se 
 propose de faire h, cette communi- 
 cation : 
 
 " La proposition que nous fait 
 le Gouvernement allemand re- 
 produit la proposition qui avait 
 et^ formulae dans I'ultimatum du 
 2 aout. Fiddle h, ses devoirs inter- 
 nationaux, la Belgique ne pent 
 que rditerer sa r^ponse k cet 
 ultimatum, d'autant plus que 
 depuis le 3 aout sa neutrality a 
 ^te viol^e, qu'une guerre dou- 
 loureuse a et^ portde sur son 
 territoire, et que les garants de 
 sa neutrality ont loyalement et 
 imm^diatement r^pondu k son 
 ;appel." 
 
 Le Gouvernement du Eoi tient 
 ki, ce que les Puissances garantes 
 de la neutrality de Belgique 
 aient connaissance de ccs docu- 
 ments. 
 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 (Signd) DAVIGNON. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE the honour to inform 
 your Excellency that the Belgian 
 Minister at The Hague, at "the 
 request of the Netherlands 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, has 
 forwarded to us the following 
 proposal from the German Go- 
 vernment. (See No. 62, en- 
 closure 2.) 
 
 The Belgian Government pro- 
 pose to return the following reply 
 to this communication : — 
 
 "The proposal made to us by 
 the German Government repeats 
 the proposal formulated in 
 their ultimatum of August 2. 
 Faithful to her international 
 obligations, Belgium can only 
 reiterate her reply to that ulti- 
 matum, the more so as since 
 August 3 her neutrality has 
 been violated, a distressing war 
 has been waged on her territory, 
 and tlie guarantors of her neu- 
 trality have responded loyally 
 and without delay to her appeal." 
 
 The Belgian Government con^ 
 sider that the Powers guarantee- 
 ing the neutrality of Belgium 
 should have cognizance of these 
 documents. 
 
G2 
 
 No. 66. 
 
 Monsieur Bavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
 Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg. 
 
 Brussels, August 10, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de vous faire 
 connaitre les circonstances qui 
 ont amen^ le depart de Luxem- 
 bourg du representant du Eoi. 
 
 Le General commandant des 
 troupes alleinandes dans le 
 Grand-Duch^ de Luxembourg 
 fit part, le 8 aout, au Ministre 
 d'Allemagne en cette ville, de la 
 volont^ des autoritds militaires 
 de provoquer le ddpart du repre- 
 sentant du Eoi prfes la Cour 
 grand-ducale. 
 
 M. von Eucli adressa k 
 M. Eyschen, President du Gou- 
 vernement, une lettre dont la 
 traduction suit : 
 
 " Luxembourg, 
 
 "le 8 aout 1914. 
 " Excellence, ' 
 
 " En consequence de I'attitude 
 complfetement hostile que la 
 Belgique a prise vis-&,-vis de 
 I'AUemagne, les autorit^s mili- 
 taires se voient contraintes d'in- 
 sister pour le depart d'ici du 
 Ministre de Belgique. 
 
 Son Excellence le G^n^ral 
 commandant fait prier le Comte 
 van den Steen de Jehay, d'or- 
 ganiser son voyage de depart de 
 telle fa9on qu'il puisse, end(5ans 
 les vingt-quatre heures, entrer 
 en relation personnellement k 
 Coblence avec le G^n^ral de 
 Ploetz, au sujet de son voyage 
 ult^rieur. Le depart n'est possible 
 que par la voie Tr^ves-Coblence." 
 (Sign^) "DE BacH." 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 I HAVE the honour to inform 
 you of the circumstances whicli 
 led to the departure of the Bel- 
 gian representative from Luxem- 
 burg. 
 
 The General Officer command- 
 ing the German troops in the 
 Grand Duchy of Luxemburg 
 informed the German Minister in 
 that town, on August 8, of the 
 desire of the military authorities 
 for the departure of the Belgian 
 representative at the Grand Ducal 
 Court. 
 
 Herr von Buch addressed to 
 Monsieur Eyschen, President of 
 the Government, a note, of which 
 the following is a translation : — 
 
 '■ Luxemburg, 
 
 "August 8, 1914. 
 " Your Excellency, 
 
 " In consequence of the com- 
 pletely hostile attitude adopted 
 by Belgium towards Germany, 
 the military authorities find 
 themselves obliged to insist upon 
 the departure of the Belgian 
 Minister from Luxemburg. 
 
 " His Excellency the General 
 Officer commanding begs Count 
 A'an den Steen de Jehay to arrange 
 his journey home in such a way 
 that he may be able, within 
 twenty-fours hours, to see General 
 von Ploetz at Cohlentz, with a 
 view to settling the details of 
 the further stages of his journey. 
 It is impossible for him to travel 
 except viS, Tr^ves-Coblentz. 
 
 (Signed) " voN BuOH." 
 
 M. Eyschen transmit cette Monsieur Eyschen forwarded 
 lettre le meme jour au Comte this note the same day to Count 
 
63 
 
 van de Steen de Jehay, dans les 
 termes suivants : 
 
 " Luxembourg, 
 
 " le 8 do'At 1914. 
 " Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 " J'ai le trfes vif regret de vous 
 communiquer ci-joint copie d'une 
 lettre du Ministre d'Allemagne 
 m'informant que I'autorit^ mili- 
 taire allemande demande votre 
 depart. 
 
 "Vous y trouverez les condi- 
 tions y attach^es. 
 
 " M. von Buch me dit que les 
 autorites militaires conseilleraient 
 plut6t le voyage par chemin de 
 fer, parce que le voyage par 
 automobile vous exposerait a Stre 
 arrSte trop souvent pour des 
 motif sdecontrole. Mais le choix 
 vous est abandonn^. 
 
 " Le Ministre d'Allemagne 
 viendra chez moi prendre votre 
 r^ponse. 
 
 " Je ne saurais vous dire com- 
 bien la t^che que je remplis en 
 ce moment m'est p^nible. Je 
 n'oublierai jamais les relations si 
 agr^ables que nous avons eues et 
 je fais des voeux pour que votre 
 voyage se fasse dans les meilleures 
 conditions. 
 
 (Sign6) " Eyschen." 
 
 van den Steen de Jehay, accom- 
 panied by a letter in the following 
 terms : — 
 
 " Luxemburg, 
 
 " August 8, 1914. 
 " Sir, 
 
 " I greatly regret to have to 
 communicate to you the enclosed 
 copy of a note from the German 
 Minister, informing me that the 
 German military authorities de- 
 mand your departure. 
 
 "You will find in it the con- 
 ditions which they attach thereto. 
 
 " Herr von Buch told me that 
 the military authorities advise 
 you to travel by railway, as an 
 attempt to carry out your journey 
 by motor would expose jow to 
 being too frequently stopped for 
 reasons connected with the con- 
 trol of the roads. But the choice 
 is left to you. 
 
 "The German Minister will 
 come to me for your answer. 
 
 " I cannot tell you how painful 
 it is to me to fulfil my present 
 task. I shall never forget the 
 pleasant relations which have 
 existed between us, and I hope 
 that your journey may be carried 
 out under the best possible con- 
 ditions. 
 
 (Signed) " Eyschisn." ' 
 
 Le Gouvernement beige esti- 
 mant que leGouvernement grand- 
 ducal n'avait pas ou le choix de 
 son attitude et que celle qu'il 
 avait 6t6 obligd d'adopter n'im- 
 pliquait en aucune maniere une 
 intention discourtoise k regard 
 du Eoi et de la Belgique, d^cida 
 qu'il n'y avait pas lieu, dans ces 
 conditions, de prior le Charg^ 
 d'Affaires du Grand-Duch^ de 
 quitter la Belgique. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 (Signd) DAVIGNON. 
 
 The Belgian Government, con- 
 sidering that the Grand Ducal 
 Government had no choice in their 
 attitude, and that the course 
 they had been obliged to adopt 
 in no way implied any discour- 
 teous intention towards the King 
 of the Belgians or towards Bel- 
 gium, decided that there was no 
 reason, in these circumstances, 
 for requesting the Luxemburg 
 Charg^ d'Affaires to leave Bel- 
 gium. 
 
64 
 
 No. 67. 
 
 Mr. WMtlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Brussels, August 11, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, • 
 
 The United States Legation 
 received a telegram to-day from 
 Washington, conveying the in- 
 formation that the United States 
 Government had, at the request 
 of the German Government, con- 
 sented, as a matter of interna- 
 tional courtesy, to undertake the 
 protection of German subjects in 
 Belgium. 
 
 In accordance with the in- 
 structions contained in this tele- 
 gram, we will, therefore, if you 
 see no objection, undertake to 
 use our good and friendly offices 
 with the Belgian Government 
 for the protection of German 
 subjects. The pleasant relations 
 which we have had with you in 
 this matter up to the present 
 convince me that we may con- 
 tinue them with the same object 
 on the same pleasant footing. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 La Legation a re^u aujourd'hui 
 de Washington une depeche I'in- 
 formant que le Gouvernement 
 des ;6tats-Unis avait, &, la de- 
 mande du Gouvernement alle- 
 mand, consent! ^titre de courtoisie 
 Internationale, k accepter la pro- 
 tection des int^rSts des sujets 
 allemands en Belgique. 
 
 En vertu des instructions qui 
 accompagnaient cette depSche, 
 nous nous occuperons done, si 
 vous n'y voyez pas d'inconv^nient, 
 d'exercer nos bons et amicaux 
 offices aupres du Gouvernement 
 du Eoi, pour la protection des 
 sujets allemands. Les agr^ables 
 rapports que nous avons eus k 
 ce sujet jusqu'i present me 
 donnent la conviction que c'est 
 avec le meme et mutuel sentiment 
 que nous pourrons les poursuivre 
 dans le mime but. 
 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 (Sign6) BEAND WHITLOCK. 
 
 No. 68. 
 
 Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Brussels, August 11, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai telegraphic h. Sir Edward 
 Grey la communication allemande 
 et la r^ponse projet^e. 
 
 J'ai re9u I'ordre d'exprimer h. 
 votre Excellence I'enti^re appro- 
 bation du Gouvernement de Sa 
 Majesty britannique. Ce dernier 
 nepeut que se declarer d'accord 
 sur les termes de la r^ponse que 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 1 HAVE telegraphed to Sir E. 
 Grey the German communication 
 and the proposed reply. 
 
 I have received instructions to 
 express to your Excellency the 
 entire concurrence of His Bri- 
 tannic Majesty's Government. 
 The latter can only declare their 
 approval of the terms of the reply 
 
65 
 
 le Gouvernement beige se propose 
 de faire k une tentative de semer 
 la disunion parmi les pays 
 maintenant unis, pour la defense 
 des traites violas par I'Alle- 
 magne. 
 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 (Sign^) F. H. VILLIEES. 
 
 which the Btlgian Government 
 propose to give to this attempt 
 to sow discord between the Powers 
 at present united for the defence 
 of the treaties violated by Ger- 
 many. 
 
 (See No. 65.) 
 
 No. 69. 
 
 Monsieur Klohukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur 
 Bamgtuin, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Brussels, August 11, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de faire savoir 
 k votre Excellence que le Gou- 
 vernement franqais donne son 
 entiere adhesion k la reponse que 
 le Gouvernement beige se propose 
 de faire au nouvel ultimatum de 
 I'Allemagne. 
 
 Cette reponse est bien celle 
 qu'on pouvait attendre d'un Gou- 
 vernement et d'un peuple qui ont 
 r^sist^ aussi h^roiquement k la 
 violation odieuse de leiir terri- 
 toire. 
 
 La France continuera k remplir 
 
 ses devoirs de garante de la 
 
 neutrality beige et de fiddle amie 
 
 de la Belgique. 
 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 
 (Sign^) KLOBUKOWSKI. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 I HAVE the honour to inform 
 your Excellency that the French 
 Government give their entire 
 concurrence to the reply which 
 the Belgian Government propose 
 to return to the new German 
 ultimatum. 
 
 That reply is one which was 
 to be expected from a Govern- 
 ment and a people who have so 
 heroically resisted the hateful 
 violation of their territory. 
 
 France will continue to fulfil 
 her duties as a guaranteeing 
 Power of Belgian neutrality and 
 as a faithful fiiend of Belgium. 
 
 (See No. 65.) 
 
 No. 70. 
 
 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hagve, to Monsieur Davignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 Le texte allemand contenait 
 une faute : au lieu de " seine 
 [1037] 
 
 The Hague, August 12, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The German text contained 
 a mistake : instead of " seine 
 
66 
 
 Auseinandersetzung '' il faut lire 
 " ihre " et done traduire " son 
 conflit avec la France." 
 
 (Signe) Baeon FALLOK 
 
 (See No. 64.) 
 
 Auseinandersetzung," it should 
 read "ihre," and thus be translated 
 " their conflict with France." 
 
 No. 71. 
 
 Monsieur Bavigjwn, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 
 
 Brussels, August 12, 1914. 
 
 (T^legramme.) 
 
 Peieee de remettre le t^l6- 
 gramme suiv^ant au Ministre des 
 Affaires llltrangeres : 
 
 " La proposition que nous fait 
 le Gouvernement allemand repro- 
 duit la proposition qui avait ^te 
 formulee dans Tultimatuni du 
 2 aout. Fidele a ses devoirs 
 internationaux, la Belgique ne 
 peut que reiterer sa reponse k 
 cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que 
 depuis le 3 aout sa neutralite a 
 ^t^ vioMe, qu'une guerre doulou- 
 reuse a 6te port^e sur son terri- 
 toire, et que les garants de sa 
 neutrality ont loyalement et im- 
 mddiatement r^pondu a son 
 appel." 
 
 (Sign4) DAVIGNON. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Please communicate the fol- 
 lowing telegram to the Nether- 
 lands Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs : — 
 
 "The proposal made to us by 
 the German Government repeats 
 the proposal which was formu- 
 lated in the ultimatum of 
 August 2nd. Faithful to her 
 international obligations, Belgium 
 can only reiterate her reply to 
 that ultimatum, the more so as 
 since August 3rd, her neutrality 
 has been violated, a distressing 
 war has been waged on her terri- 
 tority, and the guarantors of her 
 neutrality have responded loyally 
 and without delay to her appeal. 
 
 No. 72. 
 
 Monsieur Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Akiisimr Darignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 St. Petersburg, August 13, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 Veuillez remercier le Gou- 
 vernement Eoyal pour sa com- 
 munication et lui exprimer le 
 plaisir que le Gouvernement 
 Imperial eprouve a voir son 
 
 Belgian 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Please thank the 
 Government for their communi- 
 cation, and express to them the 
 pleasure which the Eussian 
 Government feel at the firui and 
 
67 
 
 attitude ferme et digne dont il 
 le f^licLte tr^s vivement. 
 
 (Signd) SAZONOF. 
 
 dignified attitude, upon which 
 they are heartily to be congratu- 
 lated. 
 
 (See No. 65.) 
 
 No. 73. 
 
 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Bavignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The Hague, August 13, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 J'ai eu I'honneur de recevoir 
 votre t^l^gramnie d'hier, et j'ai» 
 remis aussitot k Monsieur le 
 Ministre des Affaires ^fitrang^res 
 la reponse de la Belgique k la 
 seeonde proposition allemande. 
 
 Son Excellence m'a promis de 
 faire parvenir imm^diatement au 
 Ministre d'AUemagne la commu- 
 nication du Gouvernement du 
 Eoi. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 (Signd) Baron FALLON. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 T HAD the honour to receive 
 your telegram of yesterday, and I 
 at once communicated to the 
 Netherlands Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, the Belgian reply to the 
 second German proposal. 
 
 His Excellency undertook to 
 forward the Belgian communica- 
 tion to the German Minister 
 forthwith. 
 
 (See No. 71.) 
 
 No. 74. 
 
 Baron Gvillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Bavignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Paris, August 16, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Au cours de I'entretien que 
 j-ai eu ce mntin avec Monsieur 
 de Margerie j'ai amend la conver- 
 sation |Sur les affaires coloniales 
 et sur la d-marche que vous 
 m'avez chargd de faire par votre 
 tdldgramme et votre di'peche du 
 7 de ce mois. 
 
 Mon interlocuteur m'a rappele 
 que le Gouvernement de la Edpu- 
 blique s'dtait adressd k I'Espagne, 
 qui n'avait pas donn6 reponse 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 In the course of a conversation 
 v^'hich I had this morning with 
 Monsieur de Margerie, I turned 
 the conversation to colonial affairs 
 and to the action which you had 
 instructed me to take in j'our tele- 
 gram and your despatch of the 7tli 
 iiistant. 
 
 Monsieur de Margerie remind- 
 ed me that the French Govern- 
 ment had approached Spain, but 
 the latter had not answered 
 
68 
 
 avant d'avoir I'avis de J'Ans;le- 
 terre. II paratt que celle-ci 
 continue k ne pas donner de 
 r^ponse. 
 
 M. de Margarie estime qu'en 
 presence de la situation actuelle, 
 il importe de frapper TAllemagne 
 partout ou on peut I'atteindre ; il 
 croit que telle est aussi Topinion 
 de I'Angleterre, qui aura certes 
 des pretentions k faire valoir; la 
 France desire reprendre la partie 
 du Congo, quelle a dii e^der k 
 la suite des incidents d'Agadir. 
 Un succ^s, me dit mon interlo- 
 euteur, ne serait pas difficile k 
 obtenir. 
 
 Veuillez agrt'er, &c. 
 (Sign(5) Baron GUILLAUME. 
 
 before knowing the views of 
 Great Britain. It seems that the 
 latter has still given no answer. 
 
 Monsieur de Margerie con- 
 sidered that in view of the pre- 
 sent situation Germany should 
 he attacked wherever possible; 
 he believes that such is also the 
 opinion of Great Britain, who 
 certainly has claims to satisfy; 
 France wishes to get back that 
 part of the Congo which she had 
 been compelled to give up in con- 
 sequence of the Agadir incident. 
 
 Monsieur de Margerie added 
 that a success would not be 
 "difficult to obtain. 
 
 (See Nos. 57 and 58.) 
 
 No. 75. 
 
 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Bavignon, 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 London, August 17, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 En r^ponse k votre d^peche du 
 7 aoiit, j'ai I'honneur de vous, 
 faire savoir que le Gouvernement 
 britannique ne peut se rallier k la 
 proposition beige tendant a re- 
 specter la neutrality des posses- 
 sions des Puissances bellig^rantes 
 dans le bassin conventionnel du 
 Congo. 
 
 Les troupes allemandes de I'Est 
 Africain allernand ont ddja pris 
 I'offensive contre le protectorat 
 anglais de TAfrique centrale. 
 D'autre part, des troupes britan- 
 niques out deja attaqui^ le port 
 allemand de IJar-es-Salaam, ou 
 elles ont d^truit la station de 
 t^l^graphie sans til. 
 
 Dans ces circonstances, me me 
 si le Gouvernement anglais ^tait 
 persuade de I'utilite politique et 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 In reply to your despatch of 
 August 7th, I have the honour to 
 inform you that the British 
 Government cannot agree to the 
 Belgian proposal to respect the 
 neutrality of the belligerent 
 powers in the conventional basin 
 of the Congo. 
 
 German troops from German 
 East Afiica have already taken 
 the offensive against the British 
 Central African Protectorate. 
 Futhermore, British troops have 
 already attacked the German 
 port of Dar-es-Salaam, where 
 they have destroyed the wireless 
 telegraphy station. 
 
 In these circumstances, the 
 British Government, even if they 
 were convinced from the politi- 
 
strategique de la proposition beige, 
 il ne pourrait I'adopter. 
 
 Le G Oliver nement de Londres 
 croit que les forces qu'il envoie 
 en Afrique seront suffisantes pour 
 vainere toute opposition. II fera 
 tous ses efforts pour empecher des 
 soulevements dans la population 
 indig^.ne. 
 
 La France est du meme avis 
 
 que I'Angleterre, vu I'activitci 
 
 allemande que Ton remarque pr^s 
 
 de Bonar et Ekododo. 
 
 Veuillez agr^er, &c. 
 
 'Signd) Count de LALAING. 
 
 cal and strategical point of view 
 of the utility of the Belgian 
 proposal, would be unable to 
 adopt it. 
 
 The British Government be- 
 lieve that the forces they are 
 sending to Africa will be sufiBcient 
 to overcome all opposition. They 
 will take every step in their 
 power to pi'event any risings of 
 the native population. 
 
 France is of the same opinion 
 as Great Britain on account of 
 German activity which has been 
 noticed near Bonar and Ekododo. 
 
 (See ISTos. 57 and 58.) 
 
 Xo. 7G. 
 
 Moiiikur Tombeiir, Belgian Vice-Govcrnor of the Katanga, to 
 Monsieur Benkin, Belgian Minister for the Colonies. 
 
 (Tdldgramme.) 
 
 Allemands continuant leurs 
 escarmouches au Tanganika ont 
 attaqu^, le 22 aout, le port de 
 Lukuga. lis ont eu deux noirs 
 tu^s et deux blesses. De nou- 
 velles attaques sont attendiies. 
 (Sign6) TOMBEUE. 
 
 Elizabethville, August 26, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 The Germans are continuing 
 their skirmishes on Tanganyika 
 and attacked the port of Lukuga, on 
 August 22nd. Twoof their natives 
 were killed and two wounded. 
 Fresh attacks are expected. 
 
 No. 77. 
 
 Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Bimgarian Minister cd The 
 Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. 
 
 (Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.) 
 
 The Hague, August 28, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 <_T61(igramme.) (Telegram.) 
 
 D'oKDEEdemonGouvernement, On the instructions of my 
 
 j'ai I'honneur de notifier a votre Government, I have the honour 
 Excellence ce qui suit : to inform your Excellency as 
 
 follows ; — 
 
 [1037] 
 
70 
 
 '■' Yu que la Belgique, apres 
 avoir refus^ d'accepter les pro- 
 positions qui lui avaient 6t6 
 advessees k plusieurs reprises par 
 rAllemagne, prete sa cooperation 
 niilitaire k la France et a la 
 Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes deux 
 ont declare la guerre k FAutriche- 
 Hongrie, et eu presence du fait 
 que, comme il vient d'etre con- 
 state, les ressortissants autrichiens 
 •«t hongrois se trouvant en Bel- 
 gique ont, sous les yeux des 
 'autorites Eoyales, du subir un 
 traitement contraire aux exi- 
 gences les plus primitives de 
 I'humanite et inadmissibles meme 
 vis-^-vis des sujets d'un liltat 
 ennemi, I'Autriche-Hongrie se 
 voit dans la ndcessite de rompre 
 les relations diplomatiques et se 
 considerc des ce moment en ^tat 
 do guerre avec la Belgique. Je 
 quitte le pays avec le personnel 
 de la legation et confie la protec- 
 tion de mes adrainistr^s au 
 Ministre des fitats-Unis d'Ara(5- 
 lique en Belgique. De la part 
 du Gouvernement Imperial et 
 ]-Joyal les passeports sont remis 
 au Comte Errembault de Dud- 
 
 (Sign^) CLARY. 
 
 " Whereas Belgium, having 
 refused to accept the proposals 
 made to her on several occasions 
 by German}', is affording her 
 military assistance to'France and 
 Great Britain, both of which 
 Powers have declared war upon 
 Austria-Hungary, and whereas 
 as has just been proved, Austrian 
 and Hungarian nationals in 
 Belgium have had to submit, 
 under the veiy eyes of the Belgian 
 authorities, to treatment contrary 
 to the most primitive demands of 
 humanity and inadmissible even 
 towards subjects of an enemy 
 State, therefore Austria finds her- 
 self obliged to break off diplomatic 
 relations and considers herself 
 from this moment in a state of 
 war with Belgium. I am leaving 
 the country with the staff of the 
 legation and I am entrusting the 
 protection of Austrian interests 
 to the United States Minister iu 
 Belgium. The Austro-Hungarian 
 Government are forwarding his 
 passports to Count Errembault 
 de Dudzeele.'' 
 
 No. 78. 
 
 Monsieur Bavigivm, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 
 
 Antwerp, August 29, 1914. 
 
 (Tel^gramme.) 
 
 Pjii^ee accuser reception a 
 Legation Autriche par interm6- 
 diaire Ministre Affaires fitran- 
 gferes declaration de guerre Au- 
 triche-Hongrie k Belgique et 
 aj outer ce qiu suit : 
 
 " La Belgique a toujours entre- 
 tenu des relations d'amitie avec 
 tons ses voisins sans distinction. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 (Telegram.) 
 
 Please inform the Austrian 
 Legation through the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs that I have 
 received Austria-Hungary's de- 
 claration of war against Belgium, 
 and add the following : — 
 
 "Belgium has always enter- 
 tained friendly relations with all 
 her neighbours without distinction . 
 
71 
 
 EUe a scrupuleusemeut rempli 
 les devoirs que la neutralitc lui 
 impose. Si elle n'a pas cru 
 pouvoir accepter les propositions 
 de rAUemagiie, c'est que celles-ci 
 avaient pour objet la violation 
 des engagements qu'elle a pris k 
 la face de I'Europe, engagements 
 qui ont ^tt^ les conditions de la 
 creation du Royaume de Belgique. 
 Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, 
 quelque faible qu'il soit, puisse 
 m^connaitre ses devoirset sncrifier 
 son honneur en s'inclinant devant 
 la force. Le Gouvernement a 
 attendu, non seulement les ddlais 
 de I'ultimatum, mais la violation 
 de son territoire par les troupes 
 allemandes avant de faire appel a 
 la France et h I'Angleten-e, ga- 
 rantes de sa neutralite au mSme 
 titre que I'Allemagne et I'Au- 
 triche-Hongrie, pour cooperer au 
 nom et en vertu des traites a la 
 defense du territoire beige. 
 
 En repoussant par les amies 
 les envahisseur», elle n'a m^me 
 pas accompli un acte d'hostilite 
 aux termes de I'artiele 10 de la 
 Convention de La Haye siir les 
 droits et devoii's des Puissances 
 neutres. 
 
 L'Allemagne a reconnu elle- 
 meme que son agression constitue 
 une violation du droit des gens 
 et ne pouvant la justifier elle a 
 invoqu^ son int^ret stratdgique. 
 
 La Eelgique oppose un dementi 
 formel k I'afifirmation que les 
 ressortissants autrichiens et hon- 
 grois auraient subi en Belgique 
 un traitement contraire aux 
 exigences les plus primitives de 
 I'humanitd. 
 
 Le Gouvernement Eoyal a 
 donne, des le d(^but des hostilit^s, 
 les ordres les plus stricts quant k 
 la sauvegarde des personnes et 
 des propri^tes austro-hongroises. 
 (Signe) DAVIGlSrOK 
 
 She had scrupulously fulfilled the 
 duties imposed upon her by her 
 neutrality. If she has not been 
 able to accept Germany 's proposal s, 
 it is because those proposals con- 
 templated tJie violation of her 
 engagements toward Europe, en- 
 gagements which form the con- 
 ditions of the creation of the 
 Belgian Kingdom. She has been 
 imable to admit tliat a people, 
 however weak they may be, can 
 fail in their duty and sacrifice 
 their honour by yielding to force. 
 The Government have waited, not 
 only until the ultimatum had 
 expired, but also until Belgian 
 territory had been N'iolated by 
 German troops, before appealing 
 to France and Great Britain, 
 guarantors of her neutrality, under 
 the same terms as are Germany 
 and Austria-Hungary, to co- 
 operate in the name and in virtue 
 of the treaties in defence of 
 Belgian territory. By repelling 
 the invaders by force of arms, 
 she has not even committed an 
 hostile act as laid down by the 
 provisions of article 10 of The 
 Hague Convention respecting 
 the rights and duties of neutral 
 Powers. 
 
 "Germany herself has recog- 
 nised that her attack constitutes 
 a violation of international law, 
 and, being unable to justify it, she 
 has pleaded her strategical in- 
 terests. 
 
 " Belgium formally denies the 
 allegation that Austrian and 
 Hungarian nationals have suffered 
 treatment in Belgium contrary to 
 tlie most primitive demands of 
 humanity. 
 
 " The Belgian Go vernment, from 
 the very commencement of hos- 
 tilities, have issued the strictest 
 ordersfor the protection of Austro- 
 Hungarian persons and property." 
 
7^2- 
 
 Xo. 79. 
 
 Monsieitr Baxignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Belgian Ministers abroad. 
 
 Antwerp, August 29, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Sous la date du 17 aout, j'ai 
 adresse au Ministre du Eoi k 
 Londres une lettre dans laquelle 
 j'ai cru devoir relever certaines 
 allegations produites par le 
 Gouvernement allemand, et dont 
 faisait mention le " Blue Book "' 
 public recemment par le Gou- 
 vernment anglais. 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de placer sous 
 vos yeux une copie de cette 
 lettre et de ses annexes. 
 
 Veuillez, je vous prie, en 
 donner connaissance au Gouverne- 
 ment aupres duquel vous etes 
 accredit^. 
 
 Veuillez agrder, &c. 
 
 (Signd) DAVIGXON. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 Under date of the I7th August, 
 I addressed a despatch to the 
 Belgian Minister at London, in 
 which Ifelt bound to call attention 
 to certain allegations made by the 
 German Government which are 
 mentioned in the Blue Book 
 recently published by the British 
 Government. 
 
 I have the honour to enclose 
 for your information a copy of the 
 despatch in question and of its 
 enclosures. 
 
 I request that you will bring 
 its contents to the notice of the 
 Government to which you are 
 accredited. 
 
 Enclosure 1 in No. 79. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Count dc Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London. 
 
 Brussels, August 17, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 Le "Blue Book" public re- 
 cemment par le Gouvernement 
 britanuique reproduit, sous le 
 No. 122 (page 65), le texte d'un 
 tdldgramme adressd de Berlin, le 
 31 juillet, par Sir E. Goschen a 
 Sir E. Grey, t(51(5gramme dont 
 j'extrais le passage suivant: 
 
 " It appears from what he [his 
 Excellency the Secretary of State] 
 said, that the German Government 
 consider that certain hostile acts 
 have already been committed by 
 Belgium. As an instance of this, 
 he alleged that a consignment of 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 The Blue Book recently pub- 
 lished by the British Government 
 contains (see No. 122, p. 65) the 
 text of a telegram despatched 
 from Berlin on the 31st July by 
 Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in 
 which the following passage 
 occurs : — 
 
 " It appears from what he [his 
 Excellency the Secretary of State] 
 said, that the German Govern- 
 ment consider that certain hostile 
 acts have already been committed 
 by Belgium. As an instance of 
 this, he alleged that a consign- 
 
73 
 
 com for Germany had been placed 
 under an embargo already." 
 
 Le fait auquel le Secretaire 
 d'Etat allemand des Affaires 
 Etrangeres a fait allusion dans 
 son entretien avec Sir E. Go- 
 scheu, et qu'il considerait comme 
 un acte hostile de la part de la 
 Belgique, se rapper te sans doute 
 a rapplication des arret^s Hoyaux 
 du :^0 juillet, qui ont prohibd 
 provisoirement Texportation de 
 J5elgique de certains produits. 
 Comme vous le constaterez par 
 I'exposd que je tiens k vous faire 
 ci-apres, le fait qui nous est 
 reprochd n'a nullemerit le carac- 
 tere qu'on a voulu lui donner en 
 AUemagne. 
 
 Des arretds Eoyaux datds du 
 30 juillet et publi(5s au " Moniteur 
 beige " du lendemain ont prohibd 
 a titre provisoire, par toutes les 
 frontieres de terre et de mer, 
 I'exportation d'une s^rie de pro- 
 duits, des cer^ales notamment. 
 Sous la date du 31 juillet, M. le 
 Ministre d'Allemagne k Bruxelles 
 ine signala que la douane d' An vers 
 retenait des chargements de 
 grains a destination de I'Alle- 
 raagne qui, simplement trans- 
 bordea dans notre port,ne faisaient 
 en r^alitd qu'y transiter. M. de 
 Below Saleske demandait la libre 
 sortie des bateaux portaut ces 
 chargements. Le jour meme ou 
 il re^ut la reclamation du 
 Ministre d'Allemagne, mon De- 
 partement en saisait le Minist^re 
 des Finances, et d^s le surlende- 
 main 2 aout, celui-ci nous 
 annonoa qu'il avait ^te transmis 
 k la douane beige des instructions 
 donnant pleine et entiere satis- 
 faction k I'AUemagne. 
 
 Je crois jie pouvoir mieux faire, 
 Monsieur le Comte, que de placer 
 sous vas yeux une copie de la 
 
 ment of corn for Germany had 
 been placed under an embargo 
 already." 
 
 The incident to which the Ger- 
 man Secretary of State alluded 
 in his conversation witli Sir E. 
 Goschen, and which he considered 
 as an hostile act on the part of 
 Belgium, doubtless refers to the 
 application of the Royal decree 
 of the 30th July, which provision- 
 ally prohibited the export from 
 Belgium of certain products. As 
 you will see from the explanation 
 in the following paragraph, the 
 incident with which we are re- 
 proached has in no wise the cha- 
 racter which Germany has wished 
 to attribute to it. 
 
 The R<jyal decrees dated the 
 30th July and published in the 
 " Moniteur beige " the following 
 day forbade, provisionally, the 
 export, both by land and by sea 
 of a series of products, more 
 especially of cereals. On the 
 31st July the German Minister 
 at Brussels called my attention 
 to the fact that the Antwerp cus- 
 toms were detaining cargoes of 
 grain addressed to Germany, 
 which, as they were merely trans- 
 shipped in our port, were in reality 
 only in transit. Herr von Below 
 Saleske requested that the vessels 
 carrying these cargoes should be 
 allowed to depart freely. The 
 very day on which the German 
 Minister's request was received, 
 the Foreign Office brought thi' 
 matter to the notice of the 
 Ministry of Finance, and the 
 following day, the 2nd August, 
 that Department informed us 
 that instructions had been for- 
 warded to the Belgian Customs 
 giving full and entire satis- 
 faction to Germany. 
 
 I cannot do better than enclose, 
 for your information, copies of 
 the correspondence exchanged ou 
 
74 
 
 correspondance echangee a oe 
 sujet avect M. de Below Saleske. 
 Vous y verrez que rien dans notre 
 attitude ne pouvait etre coiisid^rd 
 comme t^moignant de dispositions 
 hostiles'k regard de I'Allemagne; 
 les mesures prises par le Gou- 
 vernement beige k ce moment ne 
 constituaient que les simples 
 prfeautions que tout liltat a le 
 droit et le devoir de prendre dans 
 des circonstanees aussi excep- 
 tionnelles. 
 
 II serai t bon que vous adres- 
 siez an Gouvernement de Sa 
 Majeste britanniquo une commu- 
 nication afin de dVclairer sur la 
 realite des faits. 
 
 Veuillez agreer, &c., 
 (Sign^) DAVIGNOK 
 
 this subject with Herr Below 
 Saleske. You will observe that 
 nothing in our attitude can be 
 taken as showing any hostile 
 dispositions towards Germany ; 
 the steps taken by the Belgian 
 Government at that time were 
 nothing more than those simple 
 precautions which it is tlie right 
 and duty of every .State to adopt 
 in such exceptional circum- 
 stances. 
 
 It would be as well that you 
 should address a communication 
 to the British Government in 
 order to explain the real facts of 
 the case. 
 
 Enclosure 2 in No. 79. 
 
 Ilerr ron Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur 
 Bavirjnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Brussels, July 81, 1914. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 On m'a inform^ d'Anvers que 
 la douane a d^fendu le depart des 
 bateaux charges de grains pour 
 I'Allemagne. 
 
 Vu qu'il ne s'agit pas dans ces 
 cas d'une exportation de grains, 
 mais d'un transit, parce que la 
 marchandise a &ti seulement 
 transbordee h, Anvers, j'ai I'hon- 
 neur de recourir a votre bienveil- 
 lante entremise afin qu'on laisse 
 partir pour I'Allemagne les ba- 
 teaux en question. 
 
 En mSme temps, je prie votre 
 Excellence de me faire savoir si 
 ie port d'Anvers est fermde pour 
 le transit des marchandises enu- 
 m^rees au "Moniteur" d'aujour- 
 d'hui. 
 
 En attendant la r^ponse de 
 votre Excellence dans le plus bref 
 delai possible, je profite de cette 
 occasion, &c. 
 (Sign^,) DE BELOW SALESKE- 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 Jl I AM informed from Antwerp 
 that the Customs have forbidden 
 tlie despatch of vessels containing 
 cargoes of grain for Germany. 
 
 In view of the fact that it is not 
 in this case a question of the 
 cxpoi^t of grain, but of grain in 
 transit, the goods in question 
 having been merely transhipped 
 at Antwerp, I have the honour to 
 ask your good offices in order 
 that the vessels in question may 
 be allowed to lea^e for Germany. 
 
 At the same time I beg your 
 Excellency to inform me if the 
 port of Antwerp is closed for the 
 transit of those goods specified in 
 the " Moniteur " of to-c!ay. 
 
 Awaiting your Excellency's 
 reply at your earliest possible 
 convenience, I have, &c. 
 
75 
 
 Enclosure 3 in No. 79. 
 
 Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von 
 Beloiv Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. 
 
 Brussels, August 1, 1914. 
 
 llonsieur le Miiiistre, 
 
 En r^ponse a la lettre de votre 
 Excellence du 31 juillet, j'ai 
 I'honneur de lui faire savoir que 
 I'arrgt^ beige du 30 juillet ne vise 
 que Texportation et non le transit 
 •des prdduits cit^s. 
 
 J'ai eu soiu de faire part de 
 votre coinmunication h, mon eol- 
 legue des Finances, en le priant 
 •de vouloir bien donner aux 
 bureaux de la douane des instruc- 
 tions precises de nature k prdvenir 
 toute erreur dans I'application de 
 I'arret^ pr^cite. 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 
 (Sign^) DAVIGNON. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 (Translation.) 
 
 In reply to your Excellency's 
 note of tbe 31st July, I have the 
 honour to inform you that the 
 Belgian decree of the 30th July 
 concerns only the export and not 
 the transit of the products men- 
 tioned. 
 
 I at once communicated your 
 note to the Minister of Finance 
 and begged him to issue precise 
 instructions to the Customs 
 officials in order that any erj'or 
 in the application of the above- 
 mentioned decree might be 
 avoided. 
 
 Enclosure 4 in No. 79. 
 
 .Monsiei'.r Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von 
 Beloiv Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. 
 
 Brussels, August 3, 1914. 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Sir, 
 
 With reference to the note 
 which your Excellency was good 
 enough to address to me on the 
 31st July, I have the honour to 
 inform you that the Minister of 
 Finance has instructed the Cus- 
 toms that the prohibitions estab- 
 lished by the Eoyal decrees of 
 the 30th July last, only apply to 
 actual exports, and do not, there- 
 fore, extend to goods regularly 
 declared in transit at the time of 
 import. Moreover, when duty- 
 free goods are declared to be for 
 actual consumption, although they 
 are really intended for export, 
 they are commonly the object of 
 
 !^Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 CoMME suite k la lettre que 
 -votre Excellence a bien voulu 
 m'adresser le 31 juillet, j'ai 
 I'honneur de lui faire savoir que 
 mon collegue des Finances a 
 porte k la connaissance du service 
 des douanes que les prohibitions 
 etablies par les arretes Eoyaux du 
 30 juillet ecoul(5 ne visent que 
 I'exportation proprement dite et 
 ne s'etendent done pas aux mar- 
 •chandises regulierement d^clar^es 
 ■ en transit lors de I'importation. 
 Au surplus, lorsque des marchan- 
 dises lib res de droits sont de- 
 clare'es en consommation, bien 
 •qu'elles soient en r^alit^ destinies 
 
76 
 
 :i I'exportation, elles font com- 
 inunement I'objet de d&larations 
 de libre entree sp^ciales, qui sont 
 consid^r^es comme des documents 
 de transit. Enfin, s'il arrivait 
 que de telles marchandisesavaient 
 ^te declar^es en consommation 
 sans restrictions, comme si elles 
 devaient rester effectivement dans 
 le pays, la douane en permettrait 
 encore la sortie du moment ou il 
 serait dument etabli, par les 
 documents d'expedition - mani- 
 festes,connaissements,&c.,qu'elles 
 devaient etre exportees immd- 
 diatemeut en transit. 
 
 Je puis ajouter que I'exporta- 
 tion des grains auxquels se 
 rapportait la lettre pr^cit^e de la 
 L(^gatiou Imperiale a ^te autorisd 
 le !"■ aout. 
 
 Je saisis, &c. 
 
 (Sign4) DAVIGNOK 
 
 special declarations of free entry, 
 which are considered as transit 
 documents. Tn short, if it should 
 happen that such goods had been 
 declared as for consumption with- 
 out restriction, as though they 
 were to remain in the country, the 
 Customs would still allow them 
 to leave the country as soon as it 
 had been duly established by 
 despatch receipts, bills of lading, 
 &c., that they were to be exported 
 forthwith in transit. 
 
 I would add that the export of 
 grain with which your note deals 
 was authorised on the 1st August.